79 (2015): 173 212

THE TRANSFORMATIVE POWER OF GRACE AND
CONDIGN MERIT AT THE COUNCIL OF TRENT
CHRISTIAN D. WASHBURN

A

CLEAR UNDERSTANDING of merit, as defined by the
Council of Trent in canon 32 of the
, will determine the nature and extent to
which an ecumenical
can be made on the issue
of justification. In the debate over justification at the Council of
Trent, the council fathers addressed two questions concerning
merit. First, “Is the unjustified able to merit condignly initial
justification?”1 I will not discuss this question, since there was
no serious theologian at any point during the Tridentine
proceedings who maintained that it was possible to merit
condignly initial justification. A second question, however, did
agitate the minds of the fathers, which may be stated as, “Once
one is transformed by inhering righteousness in the process of
justification, is this justified Christian able to merit condignly?”
Prior to the Second Vatican Council, most theologians seem
to have held that Trent had actually defined the claim that the
justified Christian is able to merit condignly, while in
1

This article prescinds from any discussion of the more complicated question
concerning the role of congruous merit prior to initial justification. This topic has been
treated by Heiko Augustinus Oberman, “The Tridentine Decree on Justification in the
Light of Late Medieval Theology,”
3 (1967): 28
54; “Duns Scotus, Nominalism, and the Council of Trent,” in H. A. Oberman,
!
"
!
(Grand Rapids, Mich.: W.B. Eerdmans, 1992), 204 33; Hanns Rückert, “Promereri.
Eine Studie zum tridentinischen Recht fertigungsdekret als Antwort an H. A.
Oberman,” #
$
68 (1971): 162 94.
173

174

CHRISTIAN D. WASHBURN

contemporary ecumenical discussions there has been a tendency
to read the Tridentine doctrine on merit purely in terms of a
gratuitous gift.2 In this article I will attempt to determine
whether the fathers of the Council of Trent intended in canon
32 of the
to define a doctrine of
merit that is notionally equivalent to condign merit. To this
end, in the first part of this article I will trace the conciliar
debates and various schemata that led to the formulation of
canon 32. In the second part I will offer a reflection on the final
form of the decree in light of the debates.
2
F. X. de Abarzuza, O.F.M.Cap.,
, 2d ed. (Madrid:
Ediciones Studium, 1956), 3:521; Severino Gonzalez, S.J., “
,” in Iosepho A. De
Aldama, S.J., Richardo Franco, S.J., Severino Gonzalez, S.J., Francisco A. P. Sola, S.J.,
and Iosepho F. Sagues, S.J.,
, 4th ed. (Madrid: Biblioteca De
Autores Cristianos, 1967), 4:694 95; Jean Herrmann, %
, 7th ed. (Lyons: E. Vitte, 1937), 326; J. M. Hervé,
, 16th ed. (Westminster, Md.: The Newman Bookshop, 1943), 3:243; H.
Hurter, S.J.,
, 12th ed. (Innsbruck: Libraria
Academica Wagneriana, 1908), 3:204; Ludovico Lercher, S.J., %
, 3d ed. (Innsbruck: Feliciani Rauch, 1948), 4.1:109; J. Riviere, “Mérite,”
&
'
( ) &
&
'
, ed. E. Amann, E. Mangenot, and A. Vacant
(Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1928), 10.1: 757; Ludwig Ott, *
+
+ (Freiburg: Herder, 1959), 320; Christian Pesch,
, 4th
ed. (Freiburg im Breisgau: B. Herder, 1916), 5:247; Joseph Pohle and Arthur Preuss,
*
,
- .
,
, 6th ed. (St. Louis: B. Herder Book
Co, 1929), 407; Adolphe Tanquerey,
, 27th ed. (Paris:
Desclée et Socii, 1953), 3:195 96.
In postconciliar ecumenical work, theologians have tended either to read Trent by
avoiding the use of the terms
and
as well as the concepts thereof, or
to read the council as having affirmed merit as a reward to a promise. Carl J. Peter,
“The Decree on Justification in the Council of Trent,” in H. George Anderson, T.
Austin Murphy, and Joseph A. Burgess,
. /
(Minneapolis: Augsburg
Publishing House, 1985); Karl Lehmann and Wolfhart Pannenberg,
!
0 (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990), 66
68. Pesch argues that the Catholic Church should “take leave of the
and
of ‘merit’” (Otto Hermann Pesch, “The Canons of the Tridentine Decree on
Justification: To Whom Did They Apply? To Whom Do They Apply Today?” in
. /
)
1
,
0 ed. Karl
Lehmann, trans. Michael Root and William G. Rusch [New York, N.Y.: Continuum,
1997], 191).

GRACE AND MERIT AT THE COUNCIL OF TRENT

175

I. BACKGROUND TO CANON 32
,2

3 +

The occasion for canon 32 of the
was the denial on the part of Protestant theologians of the
doctrine of merit as it had been expressed in the medieval
period. In the late Middle Ages, the question of condign merit
was frequently discussed, perhaps most notably by St. Thomas
1
Aquinas (1225 74).3 Aquinas treated merit in the
within his questions on grace, categorizing it “as an effect
of cooperating grace.”4 He also distinguished between merit and
reward, for “a reward means something bestowed by reason of
merit.”5 Therefore, merit is a function of justice, and justice
depends on the equality between agents. Now man is not God’s
equal, so he cannot by his own nature make a claim on God.6
For Aquinas the possibility of meriting is a result of divine
ordination: in his wisdom God “will bring things to their end in
a way appropriate to their natures.”7 God is not “our debtor
simply but His own, inasmuch as it is right that His will should
be carried out.”8 In order to accomplish this end, God has made
this relationship possible by giving man the grace necessary to
accomplish what by the power of his nature alone he could not.
There are two types of merit: condign merit and congruous
merit. Condign merit is the right in strict justice to a reward,
3

For Aquinas’s view of merit, see Joseph Wawrykow, * ( *
,
(
(
,'
(Notre Dame, Ind.: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1995); Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *
/
4
*
,'
ed. J. Patout Burns (London: Darton, Longman
& Todd, 1971).
4
I II, q 114, prooem. References to the
are taken from
Thomas Aquinas,
(Lander, Wy.: Aquinas Institute for the Study of
Sacred Doctrine, 2012).
5
I II, q 114, a. 1.
6
Ibid.
7
Michael Root, “Aquinas, Merit, and Reformation Theology after the
,”
20 (2004): 12.
8
I II, q 114, a. 1, ad 3.

176

CHRISTIAN D. WASHBURN

whereas congruous merit is based on what is fitting in a given
situation. Aquinas noted that, insofar as a man’s meritorious
work proceeds from his free will, he can merit only con
gruously. By grace, however, God makes us participators in the
divine nature and adopted “sons of God.”9 Therefore, insofar as
a meritorious work proceeds from the Holy Spirit working in
man, man can merit condignly. Aquinas saw this doctrine of
merit as grounded in scriptural affirmations such as, “There is
laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord, the just judge,
will render to me in that day” (2 Tim 4:8).
Concerning the object of merit, Aquinas strictly delineated
that which can and that which cannot be merited. Man cannot
merit initial justification,10 nor can one who has committed
mortal sin merit his own restoration to grace, either condignly
or congruously,11 nor can one merit the gift of final per
severance.12 Once one is an adopted son, he can condignly merit
an increase in grace.13 One may merit congruously, but never
condignly, the first grace for another, and one can also
condignly merit eternal life.14
The main elements of Aquinas’s teaching—such as the
inability to merit condignly initial justification, the necessity of
being in the state of grace, the necessity of grace for meritorious
acts, and the necessity of being in Christ—are shared by all
orthodox theologians. Nevertheless, among late medieval and
early modern theologians there were also a number of
important distinctions and emphases concerning condign merit.
Some theologians such as Thomas Netter (ca. 1375 1430)
thought that the terms
and
should be
avoided altogether and that one should simply speak of merit )

9
10
11
12
13
14

I II, q 114, a. 3.
I II, q 114, a. 5.
I II, q 114, a. 7.
I II, q 114, a. 9.
I II, q 114, a. 8.
I II, q 114, a. 2.

GRACE AND MERIT AT THE COUNCIL OF TRENT

177

.15 John Duns Scotus (1266 1308) held that works of the
justified are condignly meritorious by virtue of the divine
promise,16 while Tommaso de Vio, O.P. (1468 1534) and
Domingo de Soto, O.P. (1494 1560) taught that works are
condignly meritorious by virtue of the works themselves.17
What marks almost all views of condign merit is that merit is
not merely a function of mercy but also a function of justice.
Martin Luther found this language of merit deeply troubling,
but he and later Lutheran theologians were perfectly willing to
grant the use of the term as long as it was essentially reduced to
a form of mercy, removing any notion of justice from its
meaning.18 As early as 1518, Luther appears to have denied

15

Thomas Netter,
5
,
'
!
(Venice: Apud Iordanum Zilettum,
1571), 3: fol. 25.
16
Scotus is sometimes understood as affirming that merit is based solely on the
divine acceptation. Andreas Vega,
. 67 .
8
)
4
)9
8
:
9
(Cologne: Apud Geruinum Calenium & Haeredes Quentelios, 1572 [repr. Ridgewood,
N.J., The Gregg Press, 1964]), 789. Richard Cross argues that Scotus acknowledged
both condign and congruous merit. For Scotus, merit is not based on mere acceptation
since this would be a gross form of voluntarism. Scotus’s doctrine of merit includes
other aspects. “For example Scotus argues that God loves acts ‘according to their
goodness’ and that God ‘accepts them with reference to some good which ought to be
justly awarded to it’” (Richard Cross,
[New York: Oxford University Press,
1999], 103). On Bonaventure see Constantino Ferraro,
3
(Rome: Pontificium Athenaeum Antonianum, 1956).
17
Tommaso de Vio,
,'
(Antwerp: Apud Viduam & Haeredes Joannis Stelsii, 1576)
on q. 114, a. 3. Cajetan’s later
.
"
puts a much
stronger emphasis on the pact made between God and man. Tommaso de Vio, 4
7
'
.
.
.
;
'
< .
.
'
; ' =
='
'
'
)
. %
'
"
8
'
(Lyon: Apud
haeredes Iacobi Iuntae, 1562), 290.
18
See, e.g., Chemnitz, !)
% '
)
)
8
'
:

178

CHRISTIAN D. WASHBURN

formally the doctrine of merit. 19 Later, in
3
5 , he argued that the Scholastics were actually worse than the
Pelagians, since the Pelagians at least “confess and assert con
dign merit, simply, candidly, and ingenuously, calling a spade a
spade and a fig a fig, and teaching what they really believe.”20
By the time of his
*
(1535), Luther’s
venom against the doctrine of merit was rather more pro
nounced, for he called it the “theology of the antichristian
kingdom”21 and the “tricks of Satan.”22 When Luther stated,
“Trying to merit grace is trying to placate God with sins,”23 he
clearly included works both before and after grace.24
There are several reasons why Luther had a fundamental
problem with either the justified or the unjustified meriting
anything
. First, there is a basic anthropological
problem in Luther’s doctrine of concupiscence. “A good work,
well done, is a venial sin according to the mercy of God, but a
mortal sin according to the judgment of God”25 and therefore
'
8 '
> > (Frankfurt am
Main: Feierabend & Hüter, 1566), 933.
19
Reinhard Schinzer,
7
?
"
!
+
, Theologische Existenz heute [n.F.], n. 168 (München:
Kaiser, 1971), 53 54.
20
Martin Luther,
3
5 , vol. 33 of "
@ 5 + , ed. Philip S.
Watson and Helmut Lehmann (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972), 268 (hereafter "5).
21
Martin Luther,
*
(1535) ("5 27:124).
22
Ibid. ("5 27:125).
23
Ibid. ("5 27:126). See also E. Disley, “Degrees of Glory: Protestant Doctrine and
the Concept of Rewards Hereafter,”
42 (1991): 85 95,
105, which shows how the early Protestants opposed the idea of condign merit
especially. On Calvin’s doctrine of merit, see Charles Raith II, “Calvin's Critique of
Merit, and Why Aquinas (Mostly) Agrees,”
!
20 (2011): 135 66; Charles
Raith II, “Aquinas and Calvin on Merit, Part II: Condignity and Participation,”
!
21 (2012): 195 210. Calvin’s views on merit, however, were not important at
the Council in the debates on justification, where he was mentioned only three times:
(Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1911), 5:269.42; 435.27; 487.32 (hereafter
).
24
Luther,
*
(1535) ("5 27:127).
25
,
"
.
"
6[
,
,
,
"
.
3
" 6] (1520) (5
,
. [Weimar:
Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger, 1897 (hereafter 5,)] 7:138.25 28, 138.37 139.1);

GRACE AND MERIT AT THE COUNCIL OF TRENT

179

could never be pleasing to God. Second, Luther argued that
merit, understood as a right to a reward, presupposes that man
can make a claim on God in justice, but God is not a debtor to
any person. Third, Luther introduced into Protestant thought a
radical separation of law and gospel which was subsequently
advanced as doctrine in the Lutheran confessional documents.26
For Luther law and gospel are not just distinct but also
antithetical.27 The gospel does not demand one’s works in
justice or command one to do anything but invites one simply
to receive the offered grace of the forgiveness of sins and
eternal salvation.28
Luther was correct that the major schools of late medieval
thought, whether Dominican or Franciscan, made merit at least
in part a function of justice. In these schools “condign merit” is
partly measured by justice, and thus it gives a real claim to a
reward. As we will see, to most of the council fathers of Trent
Luther’s position on merit was inconsistent with the deposit of
faith.
32

)

3 +

After much delay, the Council of Trent finally opened on
December 13, 1545, with four cardinals, four archbishops,
twenty one bishops, and five superior generals of mendicant

“Omne opus iusti damnabile est et peccatum mortale, si iudicio Dei iudicetur” (5,
7:138.29 30).
26
!
5 A1B, in
3 +
1
$
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1998), 790 91.
27
Luther writes, “lex est negatio Christi” (5, 40 2:18.4 5). “Hic iterum videmus
Legem et Evangelium quae inter se longissime distincta et plus quam contradictoria
separata sunt, affectu coniunctissima esse” (%
*
[5, 40 1:520.25 26]). On the issue of law and gospel, see G. Söhngen,
“Gesetz und Evangelium,”
14 (1960): 81 105; F. Böckle, *
C
*
*
! +
D+
(Lucerne: Räber
Verlag, 1965); O. Pesch, “Law and Gospel: Luther’s Teaching in the Light of the
Disintegration of Normative Morality,”
34 (1970): 84 113.
28
5, 36:30 31.

180

CHRISTIAN D. WASHBURN

orders present.29 The council was to be presided over by three
papal legates, Cardinals Giovanni Maria Ciocchi del Monte,
Marcello Cervini, and Reginald Pole, two of whom were later
elected pope. Early on it was decided that the council would
deal simultaneously with questions of dogma and reform, such
that at each session there would be a dogmatic decree affirming
the faith of the Church and a reform decree.30 The council also
intentionally avoided attempting to resolve those matters that
had been debated by the various Catholic schools of thought
which were not contrary to the Catholic faith. It also decided
not to condemn heretics by name, choosing instead to condemn
those errors that were thought to trespass on the teaching of
Christ and his Church.31
As was customary in councils, one of the first acts was to
profess solemnly the Nicene Constantinopolitan Creed (in the
third session). The council wished to take up first the questions
of original sin and justification, to which the issue of merit was
tied, but on February 7 the legates decided instead to take up
the issue of Scripture and Tradition.32 The council debated these
issues, eventually approving its decree in the fourth session, on
April 8, 1546.33 It then took up the question of original sin on
May 24, 1546 and approved the decree in the fifth session, on
June 17, 1546.34

29
John W. O’Malley,
5
(Cambridge, Mass.:
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2013), 75.
30
Hubert Jedin, , , vol. 2, trans. Dom Ernest Graf,
O.S.B. (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd., 1957 61), 52 53. Ludwig von Pastor,
,
3d ed. (St. Louis: B. Herder
Book Co., 1950), 12:253.
31
Hubert Jedin, “Council of Trent and Reunion: Historical Notes,” 3 (1962): 8 9.
32
Jedin, , 2:53.
33
Ibid., 2:90.
34
Ibid., 2:132, 160.

GRACE AND MERIT AT THE COUNCIL OF TRENT

2

181

3

The discussion on the doctrine of justification opened on
June 21.35 On June 22, 1546, the legates proposed six questions
on justification to the minor theologians (theologians who were
not bishops).36 Unfortunately, we do not know by whom or
how the questions were formed.37 The questions were as
follows:
1. What is meant by justification both as regards the name and the thing?
2. What are the causes of justification? What is God’s part in the process and
what is man’s?
3. How are the faithful to understand the assertion that man is saved by faith?
4. Do works play a role in the process of justification—both before and
after—and in what way? What is the role of the sacraments in that process?
5. What is the process of justification—what precedes, accompanies, and
follows it?
6. By what proofs from scripture, the Fathers, councils, and the apostolic
traditions is the Catholic doctrine supported?38

It is immediately evident that five of the six questions come
down to the issue of agency: who is the agent, or who are the
agents, in the act of justification? Is it man alone, or is it God
alone, or is it a dual agency? This is significant, for any doctrine
of merit in the proper sense is dependent on a type of dual
agency.
From June 22 until June 28, the discussion of these questions
occurred in six congregations of theologians.39 While most of
the speeches of the minor theologians have been lost, Marcus
Laureus, O.P., wrote a brief summary of their discussions,
concluding that the theologians were in agreement that “works
done after justification conserve and increase justification and
35

5:257.
5:261.26 35. On the role of minor theologians at Trent, see Nelson H.
Minnich, “The Voice of Theologians in General Councils from Pisa to Trent,”
59 (1998): 420 41.
37
Jedin, , 2:176.
38
Ibid.
39
5:262 81. Jedin, , 2:177 80.
36

182

CHRISTIAN D. WASHBURN

are meritorious of eternal life when they are informed by the
grace and merits of Christ.” He also noted that “most of the
theologians affirmed that . . . works done after justification are
meritorious of eternal life.”40
We also have preserved the lengthy speech of the papal
theologian Alphonsus Salmeron, S.J. (1515 85), delivered on
June 23. This speech was primarily concerned with the issue of
first justification, but toward the end Salmeron affirmed that
good works performed after justification are meritorious.41 He
also identified ten errors that he wanted condemned by the
council, the last four of which directly concern the ability of the
justified to merit: (1) the justified are incapable of fulfilling the
law, and they sin in all their works; (2) the justified cannot
increase in justification; (3) the justified are not able to merit
eternal life; and (4) the justified are not able to perform works
of satisfaction.42
On June 30, 1546, the legates presented to the general
congregation a brief document entitled
which was read to the fathers by Cardinal Del
Monte.43 This document had emerged from the discussions of
the minor theologians and contained two important elements
crucial to subsequent discussions. First and most importantly,
the document distinguished three states (
) in the
process of justification. The first state (
) is that
initial justification whereby a person is made a believer out of
an unbeliever.44 The second state (
) finds the
justified individual in a state of grace, living a life faithful to

40
“Opera vero post iustificationem conservant et augent iustitiam et sunt meritoria
vitae aeternae, cum sint informata gratia et meritis Christi. In haec sententia omnes
convenerunt, quamvis supradiciti quatuor visi sunt extenuasse meritum operum. Et
maior pars theologorum dixit, quod opera disponentia ad iustificationem sunt meritoria
iustificationis de congruo, opera vero post iustificationem sunt meritoria vitae aeternae
de condigno” (
5:280.38 44).
41
5:272.14 15.
42
5:272.24 28.
43
Jedin, , 2:181.
44
5:281 82.

GRACE AND MERIT AT THE COUNCIL OF TRENT

183

Christ and attempting to obtain the end, heaven, which Christ
desires for him. The third state (
) is the restoration
to justification after the justified has fallen. This tripartite
division allowed for conceptual clarity in dealing with the place
of works and merit in the Christian life.
Second, the document offered a list of errors, and these
twenty two errors were arranged under the tripartite division. It
is useful for identifying what was thought to be at issue at this
stage in the debate, particularly as it pertains to the second state
of justification (
). There are two
errors that draw our attention:
7. Good works following justice signify only themselves, and they do not
justify, that is merit an increase of justice.
8. The works of the just do not merit eternal life.45

These errors do not qualify the term
in any way and
therefore leave open the possibility that it could be understood
as either congruous or condign merit. Nevertheless, we are able
to come to a conclusion about the meaning of the term in these
errors by looking at another error. Error five condemns the
proposition that “the good works of the just are sins and merit
hell,”46 and this can only refer to a merit based on justice. Hell,
as Catholic theologians of the time agreed, can only be said to
be merited in justice. At this stage it would appear that the term
in errors seven and eight was used univocally for condign
merit. While these errors would “play no role” in subsequent
debate,47 they are useful for telling us what was in the mind of
the council fathers at this point.
From July 15 to July 23, the council fathers discussed the
issues dealing with the second and third stages of justification in
45
“7. Quod opera bona sequentia iustitiam eam tantum significant, nec iustificant, id
est iustitiae augmentum merentur. 8. Quod opera iusti non merentur vitam aeternam”
(
5:282.20 23).
46
“5. Quod omnia opera iustificati sint peccata et infernum mereantur” (
5:282.19).
47
Jedin, , 2:182.

184

CHRISTIAN D. WASHBURN

eight general congregations.48 As they did, the theological battle
over justification and merit became increasingly antagonistic, as
illustrated in the infamous behavior of two bishops. Already in
late June, Dionisio de Zanettini, known by his nickname
Grechetto, the Franciscan bishop of Chironissa, had accused the
entire Augustinian Order of being infected by the teachings of
Luther.49 Then, during a speech to the general congregation of
July 17, 1546, Tommaso Sanfelice, the bishop of La Cava,
reasserted the theory of double justification and explicitly
denied the value of good works.50 This only confirmed some of
Zanettini’s suspicions about the extent of the infection. As the
council fathers were preparing to leave, Zanettini insulted
Sanfelice to another bishop, muttering under his breath that “he
is either a knave or a fool.” This sentiment was encouraged by
the bishop of Bertinoro, who added that he had often told
Sanfelice that he “does not understand these things at all.”
Sanfelice overheard these remarks and reproached his insulter
by asking, “What are you saying?” Zanettini repeated his
words: “Yes, you are either a knave or a fool.” Sanfelice
grabbed Zanettini’s beard, shaking him so violently that he was
left with a handful of hair. Zanettini, unruffled by the violence
done to his person, shouted, “I have said that the Bishop of La
Cava is either a knave or a fool, and I shall prove it!”51 Sanfelice
had struck a bishop, a crime punishable by excommunication,
and he was immediately imprisoned in a local monastery.
Aside from this excitement, very little was said about merit
during the debates on the second and third states of
justification. On July 16, a number of fathers raised the
question of the value of good works and merit. The view of the
archbishop of Armaugh, Robert Wauchope, is important, for he
became one of the drafters of the so called July draft, which was
the first form of the decree. The archbishop affirmed that,
48

5:340 84.
10:539.19. Jedin, 50
5:352 54.
51
This story is recounted in Jedin, von Pastor, , 12:341.
49

, 2:181.
, 2:191. See also

GRACE AND MERIT AT THE COUNCIL OF TRENT

185

without the grace of God, man can do nothing on his own.
After justification, however, “works increase justice and are the
fruits but not the signs of justification.” He continued, “Works
after justification merit and a reward is owed to them
, insofar as they proceed from the grace of God.”
These good works which come from the Holy Spirit also
proceed from our free will by the grace of God.52
The issue came up again on July 20, when Juan Fonseca,
bishop of Castellamare, outlined the different types of works
and their relationship to merit. He divided man’s works into
four categories. First, works that proceed merely from man’s
will and are not meritorious. Second, works that are aided by
prevenient grace and are meritorious
. Third, works
that proceed from justifying grace and are meritorious
. Fourth, works that proceed from the Holy Spirit and
are meritorious
. Fonseca also specified the two
objects of merit as an increase in grace and eternal life. He
finally noted that just as evil merits evil, so good merits good. If
one’s observance of the commandments is not meritorious, then
any transgressions of the commandments could hardly be
demeritorious.53
In the general congregation on July 23, the debate over merit
continued. Girolamo Seripando (1493 1563), the General of
the Hermits of St. Augustine, the order to which Luther had
belonged, did not directly take up the issue of double justice but
it pervaded his thought. This is most evident when he came to
the question of merit. Seripando asked “Whether the works by
which we are led to eternal life can be called merits?” He
52

“Opera post iusticationem augent iustitiam et sunt fructus, non signa iusticationis.
Item sacramenta etiam augent gratiam post iusticationem, quae opera post iusticationem
merentur et debetur eis merces, etiam de condigno, quatenus sc. procedunt a gratia Dei”
(
5:346.8 13). Angelo Massarelli also summarized the opinion of an unnamed
council father who held that justice received was increased and that “Opera non sunt
signa, sed fructus iustificationis, et tunc meretur et debetur eis merces de condigno”
(
5:379.11 12). I suspect that this is actually a summary of Robert Wauchope’s view,
but it is not certain.
53
5:363.

186

CHRISTIAN D. WASHBURN

answered that eternal life is called a reward and a grace;
however, while works E F be called merits, they E
F be
called gifts.54 He warned of the pride that is associated with
those who speak of their merits; while heaven can be spoken of
in terms of wage, this should be understood as a grace.55 He
therefore logically concluded that if man is crowned, he is
crowned on account of mercy and not on account of his
merits.56
Seripando was followed by the General of the Carmelites,
Nicolas Audet, who set forth with perspicuity the Catholic
doctrine on the power of grace in the regenerate. Audet’s keen
piece began with a consideration of the transformation that
takes place in the Christian as a son of God. Through good
works the justified is able not only to conserve but also to
increase his justification. Audet clearly rejected any suggestion
that the works of the righteous are in themselves mortal sin
which is not imputed to us on account of the divine mercy.
Rather, the good works are not only from God but also from
man when moved by the grace of God. This is clear from
Christ’s words that a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit
(Matt 7:18). Finally, Audet insisted that merit does not detract
from the grace of God or the merits of Christ. It rather exalts
the power of God’s grace since it shows how man’s fallen
nature has been elevated so that man is an adopted son of God
and therefore is able to merit.57
The General of the Servites, Agostino Bonucci, spoke last.
According to the summary of his speech, it was clearly a
response to Audet. He first stated that the justified are
conserved in justice principally by the grace of God, a position
that his opponents would not deny; but he went on to argue
that while good works increase justice, they do not do so
“effectively” but from the goodness of God and by the merits of

54
55
56
57

5:373.38 41.
5:373.42 46.
5:374.1.
5:377.10 19.

GRACE AND MERIT AT THE COUNCIL OF TRENT

187

Christ. The good works are meritorious of eternal life in so far
as God accepts them and not in so far as they are our own.58
2
After these debates, four prelates, Cornelio Musso, Giacomo
Giacomelli, Benedetto de’Nobili, and Robert Wauchope, were
chosen by secret ballot in order to draw up the first draft of a
decree, which became known as the July draft.59 The draft was
presented to the general congregation on July 24, 1546 and
contained an introduction, three chapters, and twenty one
canons.60 This draft clearly rejected a number of points that
were essential to the views of the Reformers and to the
adherents of double justice. First, it rejected any understanding
of the justified person as remaining in sin (canon 4).61 It also
anathematized the restriction of justification to remission of sins
alone (canon 5) and the denial of justification as also a gift of
righteousness (
). Thus the justified has not
only put off the old man, but put on the new, that is, not only
has he died to sin, but he also lives in justice.62 Canon 6 made it
clear that this gift of righteousness that makes us just is not the
righteousness of Christ but is the habit ( .
) of grace.63
This transformative understanding of justification logically
entailed a certain doctrine of merit and excluded another. There
were two canons that dealt with the merit of the justified
Christian: canons 14 and 15. Each of these short canons was
followed by a longer explanation of the canon. Canon 14

58

5:370.47 54.
Jedin, , 2:193. There is debate over the authorship
of this first draft. The draft was originally thought to be the work of Andres de Vega.
See Jedin, , 2:193; Alister E. McGrath, %
,
, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998), 258.
60
5:384 91.
61
5:386.12 17.
62
5:386.18 24.
63
5:386.25 33.
59

188

CHRISTIAN D. WASHBURN

anathematized those who deny that good works increase grace
then asserted that good works of the justified are
not only the fruits but also the “cause of justification.”64 Canon
15 introduced several themes that would persist throughout
subsequent drafts of the decree. First, the canon anathematized
anyone who says that “merit is pride” when speaking of the
works of the justified.65 In the explanatory portion the draft
noted that Christians are instructed by the Scriptures “to do
good,” “to be rich in good deeds,” and “to lay up treasure for
themselves” (1 Tim 6:18 19). It went on to affirm that those
who, like Moses, seek a reward do not sin. Second, while the
canon did not use the phrase “true merit” (
), it
was the first to modify
with
: “The merit of
those works is true.”66 To make it clear that this is a true merit
and not merely a merit
' , the canon specified that
this “crown of justice” is given “by the just judge.”67 The canon
also specified only two objects of this merit: an “increase of
grace” and “the glory of eternal life.” The canon was also clear
that it is only the justified who are able to merit and that this is
on account of being engrafted into Christ.
In the subsequent discussions on the July draft, the
comments of the theologians were on the whole positive. All
but five of the theologians wanted to see the term
.
retained, and nothing significant was said on the canon on
merit.68 The council fathers began to discuss the July draft on
August 13 in a general congregation, and on the whole they
seemed content with the doctrine of the decree but did not like
its style or structure.69 In the general congregation of August 17,
many of the fathers admitted to being unprepared to discuss the
July draft. Canon 15, however, did not come under scrutiny;
64

5:389.15.
“Si quis dixerit, de bonis operibus iustificati hominis loquens:
: anathema sit” (
5:389.16 17).
66
“Verum enim est meritum operum illorum” (
5:389.16 21).
67
5:389.16 33.
68
5:392 93.
69
5:402 5.
65

.

)

GRACE AND MERIT AT THE COUNCIL OF TRENT

189

the reference to merit being true appears to have been
sufficient. 70
!2

.

The legates, however, appear to have decided that the July
draft was inadequate on the very day it was set before the
council, for on that day Cervini called for Seripando and
requested him to draw up a new draft.71 Seripando drew up a
draft known as preliminary draft A (hereafter Draft A) which
was submitted to the legates on August 11. He was asked two
weeks later to rewrite the document, which was done by August
29 and was known as preliminary draft B (hereafter Draft B).72
Although neither was presented to the council, these two drafts
are important, for Seripando effectively introduced into
subsequent decrees long doctrinal chapters preceding the
canons, whereas previous decrees were essentially a list of
canons with theological explanations appended to the canons.
Draft A used the term
.73 Draft B is noteworthy for two
key reasons. First, it introduced the notion of double justice: the
eighth chapter was entitled
.74 Here Seripando
avoided an explicit discussion of imputed or infused
righteousness, instead preferring biblical terms. Second, the
draft contained a number of points that retreated from some
positions of the July draft. Both chapter 15 and canon 8
employed the term
in reference to the justified;75 and
while Seripando preferred to speak principally in terms of
promise and a reward, he also spoke in terms of justice. He
explicitly mentioned “the just judge” who will render to every
man according to his works. Both Draft A and Draft B are
notable in that Seripando appears to have taken the effort to
70

5:408 9.
Jedin, 72
Ibid., 2:240.
73
5:821 28.
74
5:829.
75
5:831 32.
71

, 2:239.

190

CHRISTIAN D. WASHBURN

incorporate the majority views on merit that were clearly
inconsistent with his own personal theological views, even
introducing the term
.
Cervini found Seripando’s Draft B inadequate and had it re
vised.76 After consultation with a large number of theologians
and bishops, he presented this draft, now known as the
September draft, to the general congregation on September 23,
1546.77 The draft was considerably longer than the July draft,
with eleven chapters and twenty one canons.78 In Seripando’s
opinion, Draft B was so “deformed” that he could no longer
either recognize or approve it.79
For our purposes, there are a couple of key points that must
be noted about the September draft. First, the draft was clear
that one may not merit initial justification and that all works
that precede justification are excluded from initial justification
as “merits properly [
] called.”80 The use of the term
as a qualifier of merit is helpful, for it makes clear two
things. First, the fathers understood that there is a distinction
between merit properly called and a quasi merit, and they
intended to make this distinction in non Scholastic terms.
Second, the draft clearly attempted to delineate a transformative
understanding of justification whereby it is not only the
forgiveness of sin but also the transformation into God’s friend.
The draft was equally clear that they “are not two justices which
are given to us. . . . There is one justice of God through Jesus
Christ by which we are not merely considered to be just but we
are named and are truly just.”81 This clearly excludes Luther’s
view as well as Seripando’s. Finally the decree explicitly linked
76

Jedin, , 2:241; Jean Rivière, “La doctrine du mérite
au concile de Trente,”
7 (1927): 274.
77
5:420 27.
78
5:426 27.
79
2:430.3 5.
80
5:423.16 19.
81
“Ita non sunt duae iustitiae, quae nobis dantur, Dei et Christi, sed una iustitia Dei
per Iesum Christum, (hoc est caritas ipsa vel gratia), qua iustificati non modo
reputamur, sed vere iusti nominamur et sumus” (
5:423.34 36).

GRACE AND MERIT AT THE COUNCIL OF TRENT

191

its transformationalist understanding with its teaching on works
and merits so that those who are justified are called to eternal
life, which is both a promise and a reward to good works. God’s
grace is a fountain leading man to perform works.
The canons presented a clearer understanding of merit.
Canon 21 reads:
If anyone says that the justified man, who has become a living member of
Jesus Christ, does not merit eternal life by his good works, or that the good
works of the just are the gift of God in such a way that through His grace they
are not good merits: anathema sit.82

One may note several things about this canon. First, the subject
of the canon is the justified. Second, the good works performed
are not the result of grace in such a way that they are not also
merits. Finally, the use of the word “true” as a modifier of merit
is now absent from the text. This is probably due to the in
fluence of Seripando’s preliminary drafts, which spoke of merit
but dropped the “true” of the July draft.
The September draft was immediately taken up by the minor
theologians in three congregations of theologians held
September 27 29.83 Unfortunately, their interventions are only
summarized, and so it is difficult to understand precisely what
they were getting at. There was only a single objection to canon
21 recorded: Jean de Conseil, O.F.M., wanted the term .
deleted, but no explanation is given.84 There is one point
in these discussions, however, concerning merit prior to initial
justification that helps to clarify how the council understood the
term
. The theologians repeatedly discussed the issue of
“merit properly [
] called” with respect to good works
prior to initial justification. A number of the theologians argued
that all merit is excluded prior to justification, not just merit in
82

“Si quis hominem iustificatum et vivum Christi Iesu membrum effectum dixerit
non mereri bonis operibus vitam aeternam; aut bona opera iustorum ita esse dona Dei,
ut per eius gratiam non sint etiam bona merita: anathema sit” (
5:427.47 49).
83
5:432 33 (27th edition); 5:433 34; 436 440 (28th edition).
84
5:432.31 32. 439.14 15.

192

CHRISTIAN D. WASHBURN

the proper sense.85 Thus the qualification of merit by the term
signifies a merit partially grounded in justice.
From October 1 to October 12, fifty eight fathers of the
council discussed the September draft in nine general
congregations.86 The bishops, like the theologians before them,
repeatedly took up the question of
with respect to good
works prior to initial justification. On the whole they expressed
disapproval of the phrase and wished to deny all merit prior to
justification. For our purposes, what is interesting is that
although the expression “merit
” was non Scholastic, it
was understood as the conceptual equivalent of the Scholastic
“condign merit.” The General of the Conventuals, Bonaventura
Costacciaro, O.F.M.Conv., for example, was clear that
congruous merit, or “improper merit” (
' 2 is
distinct from condign merit, which is “proper” or “true”
merit.87
During the nine days on which the draft was discussed, only
one of the council fathers took up the issue of merit in canon
21. Costacciaro explicitly affirmed Aquinas’s discussion of
condign merit, concluding that a just man may both “justly”
seek a reward and “can :
expect a reward before the
tribunal of God” for his works.88 He not only used the adverb
“justly” but immediately noted that the context of the reward is
the just tribunal of God. For Costacciaro, man is able to fulfill
the law through grace according to the substance of the works
and according to the intention of the one who commands, that
is, God. Most interesting is that Costacciaro does not appear to
have noticed the subtle change that took place between the July
and September drafts, and he appears still to have been reading
“merit” in the sense of condign merit.89
85

5:439. 43 44; 441.29 34.
Jedin, , 2:244. There were no general
congregations on October 3, 4, and 10 (
5:442 97).
87
5:480.8 13. See also
5:452.34 36.
88
5:483.27 37.
89
Hubert Jedin,
"
(St. Louis:
B. Herder Book Co., 1947), 357.
86

GRACE AND MERIT AT THE COUNCIL OF TRENT

193

The debates over the September draft reveal that the council
fathers were preoccupied with the issues of double justification
and the certainty of salvation.90 On October 15, therefore, the
legates decided to pose two questions to the minor theologians
on these two issues.91 Seripando had originally composed the
question on double justification, and in his form the question
contained no discussion of merit. The question, to Seripando’s
chagrin, was revised by Cardinal Del Monte. Del Monte
introduced a crucial phrase that would help to bring the issue of
merit in the justified to the fore. The new question asked,
Has the justified, who has performed good works in a state of grace and with
the help of actual grace—both which stem from the merits of Christ—and
who has thus preserved inherent justice, so completely met the claims of
divine justice
.
:
.
?92

The question now directly related the issue of double justi
fication to the issue of merit.
The theologians discussed these two questions from October
15 to October 26,93 and there were only five supporters of
double justice: Aurelius of Rocca Contracta, Marianus of Feltre,
Stephen Sestino, Lorenzo Mazochi, and Antonio Solis.94 What
90

On double justification, see Stephan Ehses, “Johannes Groppers
Rechtfertigungslehre auf dem Konzil von Trient,” D
<
G
,
+
G $
20 (1906): 17588; Jedin,
"
, 348 92; J. F. McCue, “Double Justification at the
Council of Trent: Piety and Theology in Sixteenth Century Roman Catholicism,” in
Carter Lindberg and George W. Forell, eds.,
!
*
5
/
(Kirksville, Mo.: Sixteenth Century Journal
Publ., Northeast Missouri State Univ, 1984), 39 56; Paul Pas, “La doctrine de la double
justice au Concile de Trente,” !
"
30 (1954): 553;
E. Yarnold, “Duplex iustitia: The Sixteenth Century and the Twentieth,” in Henry
Chadwick and G. R. Evans, eds.,
,
!
+ (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 213 22.
91
Jedin, , 2:249.
92
Ibid.
93
5:523 633.
94
See Jedin on the three Augustinians. Jedin, , 2:254.
McGrath, %
, 262.

194

CHRISTIAN D. WASHBURN

united all five was their belief that the reception of inhering
righteousness leaves man radically incomplete so that his works
are equally incomplete without a second justice applied.95 Merit
in the proper sense is simply not possible. Marianus of Feltre,
for example, used the theory of the application of the justice of
Christ to argue that the good works of the just are not
meritorious
but are meritorious only “
' .”96
These five theologians were a distinct minority: by the end of
the debate of the theologians on October 26, over twenty eight
theologians had rejected double justification.97 Many of these
supported a doctrine of merit based in some respect on justice.
Ludovidcus Vitriarius, O.F.M., for example, stated quite bluntly
that eternal life is a matter of justice, since God is bound by his
own law to give “according to one’s works.”98 Other theo
logians expressed similar attitudes.
It was the Jesuit theologian Diego Laínez who, on the last
day of the discussion of the theologians, gave “the most com
prehensive refutation of the doctrine of two fold justice.”99
Laínez was one of the early companions of Ignatius of Loyola
and a founding member of the Jesuits. Pope Paul III, impressed
with the new order, had asked Ignatius to send some men to
serve as the personal theologians of the pope at the council;
Ignatius personally chose Laínez, who was already well known
to both the pope and the cardinals for his theological
expertise.100
(Antonio Solis)
5:576.31 35; (Lorenzo Mazochi)
5:581 90; (Stephen
Sestino)
5:607 11; (Aurelius of Rocca Contracta)
5:561 64.
96
5:599.4 10.
97
Pas, “La doctrine de la double justice au Concile de Trente,” 51 52.
98
Jedin, , 2:256.
99
Ibid., 2:257; Jedin,
, 373. Laínez’s speech is contained in
5:612 29,
and in Hartmann Grisar,
. " ́ C
H
) *
(Innsbruck:
F. Rauch; Neo Eboraci: Fr. Pustet, 1886).
100
Juan de Polanco, who became Secretary of the Society of Jesus and an early
historian of the order, writes, “Since the learning and piety of Fathers James Laynez and
Alphonsus Salmeron were well known to the pontiff and to the principal cardinals of

GRACE AND MERIT AT THE COUNCIL OF TRENT

195

Laínez began his speech with a simple analogy of a powerful
and wealthy king who wants to share his wealth with his
subjects. The king has a beloved son who deserved (
)
to inherit all the treasures of the kingdom. The king’s son has
three servants to whom he offers the reward of a precious jewel,
but all three are sick and powerless to fight. To the first servant
the son says, “Only believe in me, and I, who merited
[
] the riches of the king’s riches, will gratuitously
obtain the jewel for you.” The second servant is given a large
sum of money so that he can redeem himself and be partially
healed, buy a horse and weapons, and fight to obtain the jewel.
To the third, the son gives freedom, health, and weapons as a
gift so that he can fight bravely and merit (
) the jewel.101
The state of the first servant is that of the Protestant with
merely imputed righteousness. The state of the second reflects
the theory of double justice, according to which the servant is
not completely healed. This stresses the inadequacy of the
servant despite the gifts. The state of the last servant is one in
which the servant has been completely healed by the gifts so
that the corresponding merits are adequate for obtaining the
jewel. Immediately, one should notice a rather striking fact:
Laínez’s assault was not based simply on the nature of inhering
righteousness but rather on the relation of inhering righteous
ness to merit. Laínez then engaged in a lengthy refutation of
imputed righteousness, repeatedly returning to the various
Catholic doctrines and practices related to merit.
There are, according to Laínez, twelve arguments against the
doctrine of double justification, and many of these relate
directly to merit. First, it must be recalled that the rejection of
merit is based on the imperfection of inhering justice. Laínez
took up this issue first, arguing that inhering justice is not
absolutely imperfect: the very possibility of merit suggests that it
the Roman Curia, in this current year both were sent as theologians of the Pope”
(Joseph Ficther,
"
C
[St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1944], 57). See
C. E. Maxcey, “Double Justice, Diego Laynez, and the Council of Trent,”
48 (1979): 269 78.
101
5:612.11 14.

196

CHRISTIAN D. WASHBURN

is not.102 He further noted that both Scripture and the doctors
of the Church teach that that one can merit eternal life.103
Laínez also argued that double justification leads to a denial of
the Catholic doctrines of purgatory and satisfaction. In purga
tory, the imperfections of those who die in the state of grace are
atoned. Yet if one admits of a second imputed justice that
supplies for these imperfections, purgatory is rendered super
fluous.104 Moreover, Laínez suggested that double justice
undermines the Catholic doctrine of satisfaction. This is of
some import, for between merit and satisfaction there is not a
formal but only a material distinction based on their respective
effects. Satisfaction is the full payment of a debt, that is, it is
nothing more than compensation for an injury done to
another.105 It is therefore part of justice and not merely a part of
mercy. Lastly, the credal affirmation that Christ will come to
judge the living and the dead, for example, would be emptied of
any significance if Christ does not render to the just a reward
for their works.106 Laínez rather forcefully asserted that imputed
justice “sins against the throne of justice, and makes it into a
throne of mercy.”107
While Laínez’s speech was devastating to the adherents of
double justice and their peculiar doctrine of merit, the council
fathers had already shown themselves to be utterly unsym
pathetic to the theory. The Florentine conventual Clemente
Tomasini observed, “I know no doctor who taught it, nor did I
find it in Scripture,” and Gentian Hervet dismissed the theory
of double justice as “newly excogitated.”108 Subsequently, the

102

5:614.25 26.
5:615.15 20.
104
5:615.45 616.8.
105
Satisfaction takes on the character of punishment. See
)
'
)
,
ed. Petrus Rodríguez et al. (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana/Ediciones Univ. de
Navarra, 1989), 876.
106
5:616.16 25.
107
5:617.32.
108
Jedin, , 2:257.
103

GRACE AND MERIT AT THE COUNCIL OF TRENT

197

drafts of the decrees were increasingly altered so that merit was
not only affirmed but also specifically based on justice and not
simply on mercy.
/2

I

.

What was now clear to the council fathers was that the
notion of double justice could in no way be affirmed, for it
entailed in part a rejection of true merit in the justified.
Although Seripando’s view of double justice was now defeated,
he was again entrusted with revising the draft;109 this was the
draft of October 31.110 After ten days of drafting, it was given to
Del Monte to modify. The “November draft” was presented to
the general congregation on November 5, 1546.111 There were a
number of important structural and doctrinal modifications
introduced into the discussion. This draft now addressed the
question of the “causes” of justification first raised on June 22
and delineated these in Aristotelian terms. Trent is sometimes
faulted for the insertion of Aristotelian causation into an
otherwise biblical presentation; however, the genius of this
insertion is that it helps to make clear two central claims: the
theocentric/Christocentric orientation of justification and the
relationship between God’s work and man’s. Perhaps most
importantly, the draft identified “the formal cause of justi
fication” as “the
righteousness of God” (
), a phrase that had been in Seripando’s October
31 draft. The introduction of this schema of causation
eventually led, as we will see, to the exclusion of the theory of
double justification.112
There were, however, also a number of important dif
ferences between Seripando’s October 31 draft and Del Monte’s
November 5 draft in the formulation of chapter 16 and canon

109

Jedin,
, 377.
5:510 17.
111
5:634 41.
112
5:636.36 37; 512.12 20.
110

198

CHRISTIAN D. WASHBURN

31 on the fruit of justification and merit. Although chapter 14
of Seripando’s draft used the term
, it seems to be
understood in terms of reward.113 Del Monte’s text was quite a
bit stronger:
nothing further should be said to be lacking in the justified to prevent them
(provided they have acted with that affection of love which is required in this
mortal life) from being regarded as having fully satisfied the divine law and as
being bedewed by divine grace, having merited [
] eternal life.114

There are two things to note about this passage. First, the
descriptor “truly” (
) before merit is absent. Second, Del
Monte’s text asserts that it is possible to satisfy the law “fully.”
Seripando wrote in marginalia that “the whole passage seems to
be the work of a man who does not know whereof he speaks, or
who is fearful of falling into Lutheran errors.”115
Canon 30 of the November draft reads:
If anyone says that man having been justified and made a living member of
Jesus Christ, by good works, which he performs through the grace of God and
the merit of Christ, does not truly merit eternal life, or that those good works
are the gifts of God in such a way that they are not also the good merits of a
man: let him anathema.116

There are a number of points to make about this canon. First,
and most importantly, it significantly intensified the council’s
position on merit. Canon 31 of Seripando’s draft anathematized
those who deny that one can “merit [
] with good works

113

5:515.12ff.
“nihil ipsis iustificatis amplius deesse dicendum est, quominus plene (dummodo
eo caritatis affectu, qui in huius vitae mortalis cursu requiritur, operati fuerint) divinae
legi satisfecisse ac velut undique divina gratia irrorati, aeternam vitam promeruisse
censeantur” (
5:639.33 36).
115
Jedin,
, 378.
116
“Si quis hominem iustificatum et vivum Christi Iesu membrum effectum, dixerit
bonis operibus, quae ab eo per Dei gratiam et Christi meritum proficiscuntur, non vere
mereri vitam aeternam, aut ipsa bona opera ita esse dona Dei, ut non sint etiam bona
hominis merita: anathema sit” (
5:641.40 43).
114

GRACE AND MERIT AT THE COUNCIL OF TRENT

199

an increase in grace.”117 Del Monte’s draft, now canon 30,
significantly intensified Seripando’s text by the addition of
“truly to merit” (
). Second, the subject who performs
merit is the justified who merits through the grace of God.
Third, man’s merit is not reducible to the merit of Christ. Merit
is at least in part also the merit of the agent performing the
good works. This is, of course, necessary since man may
cooperate with God through grace so that the works he
performs are his works.
The majority of bishops were in support of the proposed
changes. The November decree underwent extensive debate in
fourteen general congregations from November 9 through
December 1.118 Decisively, on November 23, the Jesuit Claude
Le Jay, who suggested that the “one” in the phrase “the formal
cause of justification is the
righteousness of God” (
) should be moved so that it now read
“the
formal cause” of justification “is the righteousness of
God” (
).”119 This was a substan
tial step toward formally excluding the theory of double justice.
These discussions surrounding the draft primarily concerned the
issue of double justice, but the issue of merit surfaced
repeatedly, and in each case it was based in part on some
conception of justice. Thus Balthazar Heredia, O.P., Juan Bernal
de Luco, Sebastiano Pighino, Bonaventura Costacciaro, and
Tommaso Stella, O.P., all took up the topic in a similar
respect.120
On November 26 and 27, Seripando delivered a speech that
was intended as one last push of a position that was dying a
117

“dixerit non mereri bonis operibus gratiae augmentum” (
5:517.18 20).
The fourteen General Congregations were held on November 9 (
5:643), 10
(
5:644), 12 (
5:646), 13 (
5:648), 18 (
5:643), 19 (
5:650), 20
(
5:652), 22 (
5:656), 23 (
5:658), 24 (
5:659), 26 (
5:662), 27
(
5:664), 29 (
5:676), and December 1 (
5:678).
119
5:658.24 26.
120
Balthazar Heredia, O.P.)
5:646.21 5; (Juan Bernal de Luco)
5:653.22 24;
(Sebastiano Pighino)
5:651.37 41; (Bonaventura Costacciaro)
5:662.42 44;
(Tommaso Stella, O.P.)
5:678.10 17.
118

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CHRISTIAN D. WASHBURN

slow death. He had already in his short treatise on good works
repeatedly referred to the works of the justified as menstrual
cloths (Isa 64:6).121 In this speech he went on to argue that the
only true justice is the justice of Christ, thereby implying the
radical insufficiency of any other justice. He then argued that
eternal life is a grace which God awards us not in justice but in
mercy.122 Such a position was hardly compatible with a doctrine
of merit. Seripando raised again the question of works and
suggested that the justice of our works cannot be considered
perfect, giving a series of reasons why this is so.123 He
concluded by appealing to the fathers: if the justice of our
works is so flawed, what recourse does anyone have other than
appealing to mercy?124
On the basis of these discussions the legates decided to revise
the November draft. The council fathers met in eight general
congregations from December 7 through December 17.125 It was
during this period that the council finally decided to exclude
once and for all the doctrine of double justification. On De
cember 11, during the discussion of chapter 8, the “one formal
cause” was replaced by “sole formal cause” (
) of justification. The draft now affirmed that “the sole
formal cause” of justification “is the justice of God, not that by
which He Himself is just, but that by which He makes us just in
His sight.”126 This is important, for not only was double justice
excluded, but the phrase also made it impossible to argue that
one’s transformation is so radically incomplete that one needs a
second application of Christ’s justice. This deprived the
adherents of double justice of one of their main arguments
121

12:632.11 15; 635.36 42.
12:632.11 15.
123
5:669.23 24.
124
5:670.14 16.
125
Jedin, , 2:293.
126
“Demum unica formalis causa est iustitia Dei, non qua ipse iustus est, sed qua nos
coram iustos facit” (
5:700.25). On the development and importance of the phrase
“unica formalis causa,” see Christopher J. Malloy, !
,
'
(New York: Peter Lang, 2005), 69 78.
122

GRACE AND MERIT AT THE COUNCIL OF TRENT

201

against a doctrine of “true merit.” Chapter 16 was discussed on
December 14 and canon 32 (formerly canon 30) on December
15 and 16. The fathers’ suggestions for the revision of chapter
16 were relatively minor,127 and the fathers had no real
objection to canon 32. The few objections mostly suggested that
either the identification of an increase in eternal life or the
attainment of glory were superfluous as objects of merit in the
canon.128 In the case of both chapter 16 and canon 32, no one
objected to the notion of true merit.
The legates then decided to select only those bishops who
were theologians to review the draft again. This was done in
eighteen conferences, held from December 17 to December 31,
but these conferences only touched on our topic lightly.129
Chapter 16 was discussed again in a general congregation on
January 2 and 5,130 but nothing further of relevance developed;
the same is true for canon 32, which was discussed again on
January 6,131 and the final form was presented on January 10.132
II. THE FINAL DECREE
The final decree, the
was unani
mously accepted on January 13, 1547 in the sixth session by the
fifty nine bishops present.133 It is a masterpiece of theology.
There are a number of points in the
n not
touched upon in the above historical analysis that help to
contextualize and lay the foundation for a proper understanding
of chapter 16 and canon 32. Among other things, the decree
formally repudiates the merely imputed righteousness of
Protestant theology and the theory of double justification in
favor of inhering righteousness. This entails a corresponding
127

5:710 12.
5:717.19 20; 717.32 33; 719.45; 720.30 31; 723.38 40.
129
Jedin, , 2:293.
130
5:753; 758 59.
131
5:760 62.
132
5:778.7 11.
133
Jedin, , 2:304, 307.
128

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CHRISTIAN D. WASHBURN

affirmation of merit and the exclusion of all views that make
merit into something other than merit in the justified. This can
be most clearly seen in the language of chapter 16 and canon
32.
In chapter 7, the council explains that initial justification has
two aspects: the forgiveness of sins and the sanctification and
renewal of the interior man.134 In canon 11, the council anathe
matizes those who claim that initial justification consists in “the
remission of sin alone.”135 God not only mercifully forgives sins
but also transforms the sinner internally, constantly sustaining
him so that the justified man is a new creation who is both
gifted and who, by living the life that Christ wills for all men, is
able to obtain the reward of eternal life. Trent is clear that this
transformation in man occurs through the infusion of inhering
righteousness or sanctifying grace, which it holds is the “sole
formal cause of justification.”136
The transformation that takes place in justification has
profound implications for the nature of Christian life after
initial justification. Trent affirms that after initial justification,
one’s justification is not static but is capable of growth: there is
an ongoing transformation that takes place in the justified
Christian. Thus Trent defines that “through observance of the
commandments of God and of the Church, they increase in that
very justice received through the grace of Christ, by faith
cooperating in good works, and they are even more justified.”137
It cannot be stressed enough that this is a growth in justification
itself.138 This growth, of course, is impossible according to many
134
Peter Hünermann, Helmut Hoping, Robert L. Fastiggi, Anne Englund Nash, and
Heinrich Denzinger, eds.,
/
, 43rd edition (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2012)
(hereafter -), 1528.
135
- 1561.
136
- 1529. Christopher J. Malloy, “The Nature of Justifying Grace: A Lacuna in
the Joint Declaration,”
62 (2001): 93 120.
137
- 1535.
138
Post Tridentine Lutheran confessional documents make it clear that one may not
increase one’s justification through works. The Lutheran view is stated in the
, It is clear from God’s Word that faith is the only real means through

GRACE AND MERIT AT THE COUNCIL OF TRENT

203

Protestant theologians, given their understanding of justification
as the mere imputation of the righteousness of Christ, which is
the same in all Christians.139
There are two fundamental elements that make it possible
for the justified Christian to fulfill the law. First, the council
defines that Christ is a “lawgiver” and anathematizes those who
teach that the gospel is “a mere absolute promise of eternal life,
without the condition of observing the commandments.”140
Furthermore, law and gospel are not antithetical, for the gospel
contains within itself the law of Christ, which reveals the divine
will for man. This law is not impossible for the justified to
observe, since he has been engrafted into Christ. Second, the
justified man is a new creation, and this new objective
condition, accomplished by the infusion of sanctifying grace,
leads not only to the possibility but even to the necessity of
observing the commandments for salvation. Indeed, in canon 18
Trent anathematizes those who teach that “the commandments

which righteousness and salvation not only are received but also are preserved by God.
Therefore, it is proper to reject the decree of the Council of Trent and whatever else is
used to support the opinion that our good works preserve salvation or that our works
either completely or only in part preserve and maintain the righteousness received by
faith or even faith itself” (
, 4:35; in Robert Kolb, Timothy J. Wengert,
and Charles P. Arand,
3 +
!
"
[Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2000], 580).
139
,
,
, 4:195 96, in
3 +
1
$
, 198.
140
- 1570 and 1571. The issue of law and gospel has been largely ignored in
ecumenical discussions. See Dietz Lange, J.
7
0
*
?C
"
,.
, C
$ C
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1991), 38.
Saint John Paul II was quite emphatic about Christ’s role: “From the very lips of Jesus,
the new Moses, man is once again given the commandments of the Decalogue. Jesus
himself definitively confirms them and proposes them to us as the way and condition of
salvation. The commandments are linked to a promise” (7
12). In John
Paul II’s general audience of October 14, 1987, he stated that Christ “conducted himself
as a lawgiver” but not merely with “the authority of a divine envoy or legate as in the
case of Moses” (John Paul II,
,
[Boston:
Pauline Books & Media, 1996], 231 32).

204

CHRISTIAN D. WASHBURN

of God are impossible to observe even for the man who is
justified.”141
With this in mind, the first thing to notice about chapter 16
is that it is only concerned with the justified. To the justified,
life eternal is proposed, both as “a grace mercifully promised to
the sons of God” and “as a recompense” which, according to
the promise of God, is to be given for their good works and
merits. Christ Jesus continually infuses his virtue into the jus
tified, a virtue that always precedes, accompanies, and follows
their good works. These works make men “pleasing and
meritorious before God,” and the justified are considered to
have satisfied the divine law by these works. Because these
works are done in God, they have “truly merited” (
) eternal life. 142
Trent rejects any view that simply reduces our justice to the
justice of Christ; however, the council is clear that “our justice”
is not “considered as coming from us.” Chapter 16 asserts that
even the justice one receives in justification not only is “called
ours” but is indeed “our own personal justice” since it inheres in
us.143 This affirmation does not necessarily lead to pride, since
we are to glory “in the Lord.” Nevertheless God bestows on the
justified his gifts in such a way that these gifts become their own
merits.
This background helps to contextualize canon 32. In order
to evaluate canon 32 theologically, it will be helpful to break it
down into its constituent pieces, which will give us a better
sense of what the council intended.144 The approved canon
reads:
141

“Dei praecepta homini iustificato ad observandum esse impossibilia” ( - 1536).
See also - 1568.
142
- 1546.
143
“propria nostra iustitia” and “iustitia nostra dicitur” ( - 1547).
144
The canons carry significant doctrinal weight. On the relative doctrinal value of
canons and chapters, there is a great deal of debate over which is more significant.
George Tavard argues that the chapters are more authoritative doctrinally (George
Tavard,
, !
[New York: Paulist Press, 1983], 128 n. 14).
Most theologians are arrayed against him, holding that the canons are more significant

GRACE AND MERIT AT THE COUNCIL OF TRENT

205

If anyone says that the good works of the justified man are gifts of God in
such a way that they are not also the good merits of the justified man himself;
or that by the good works he performs through the grace of God and the
merits of Jesus Christ (of whom he is a living member), the justified man does
not truly merit an increase of grace, eternal life, and (provided he dies in the
state of grace) the attainment of this eternal life, as well as an increase of
glory, let him be anathema.145

The subject of the canon is the “justified man” who, by his
justification, has become a member of Christ. It is precisely the
infusion of sanctifying grace and the engrafting into Christ that
makes one able to merit, for as chapter 16 makes clear, Christ’s
influence always “precedes, accompanies, and follows” the good
actions of a justified man.146
In addition, the council fathers anathematize those who say
that merits are understood merely as the gift of God. The
doctrinally. Edward Schillebeeckx argues, for example, that “these
were,
however, not discussed in detail by the Council itself and, unlike the canons, they have
no precise dogmatic value. They form, as it were, an explanatory
, although
of a more official kind” (E. Schillebeeckx,
!
, trans. N. D. Smith (New York:
Sheed and Ward, 1968), 40 n. 35). See also E. Iserloh, “Luther and the Council of
Trent,” in K. Lehman, ed.,
. /
)
1
,
0 (New York: Continuum, 1997), 170; Jedin, , 2:309; Jedin, “Council of Trent and Reunion,” 10 12; and Francis A.
Sullivan,
/
5
%
(New York: Paulist Press, 1996), 49. There are two reasons that neither side is quite
correct. First, it is not universally true that the canons received more attention than the
chapters, as is evident from the formulation of certain sections of chapter 16 of the sixth
session, for example. Second, the council itself does not seem to privilege the canons
over the chapters. Trent is quite clear that adherence to both the canons and the
chapters is necessary in order to be justified. Thus Trent states, “No one can be justified
unless he faithfully and firmly accepts the Catholic doctrine of justification, to which the
holy council has decided to add the following canons, so that all may know, not only
what they should hold and follow, but also what they should shun and avoid”
( - 1550).
145
“Si quis dixerit hominis iustifati bona opera ita esse dona Dei, ut non sint etiam
bona ipsius iustificati merita, aut ipsum iustificatum bonis operibus, quae ab eo per Dei
gratiam et Iesu Christi meritum (cuius vivum membrum est) fiunt, non vere mereri
augmentum gratiae, vitam aeternam et ipsius vitae aeternae (si tamen in gratia
decesserit) consecutionem, atque etiam gloriae augmentum: anathema sit” ( - 1582).
146
- 1546.

206

CHRISTIAN D. WASHBURN

fathers deliberately phrased this canon in Augustinian terms.147
Both Luther and Seripando had suggested that merits are not
properly the merits of the one justified but rather are imputed
to him from Christ. Canon 32 is quite clear that each merit is
truly and properly “the good merits of him [
] who is
justified” and thus in part the result of the activity of the agent.
This was necessary, since chapter 16 asserts that even the justice
one receives in justification is not only “called ours” but is even
“our own personal justice” since it inheres in us.
One should also note the use of the phrase “truly merit,”
As shown above, the fathers of Trent almost
without exception were convinced that the merit inherent in
good works is a true
based upon divine justice. They
purposely employed the term
to exclude the '
merit
which, in the technical terminology of the Schools, is called
. They simply refrained from using the term
, because
is “a plain and
adequate term,” and they thereby avoided certain theological
controversies regarding the nature of
and

147
See
, s.v. “Mérite.” Augustine on this point is frequently abused on account
of a number of statements which are usually taken out of context, particularly from his
"
194. Augustine writes: “When God crowns our merits, He crowns His own gifts”
(“cum Deus coronat merita nostra, nihil aliud coronet quam munera sua?” ["
194,
5.19 ( !" 57.190). Some argue that Augustine is quite clear that merit is reducible to
grace, citing the following passage: “For, if eternal life is given in return for good works
. . . how is eternal life a grace since grace is not repayment for works. . . . It seems to
me, then, that this question can only be resolved if we understand that our good works
themselves for which eternal life is our recompense also pertain to the grace of God”
(St. Augustine, ,
%7
+
,
trans. Roland J. Teske, S.J., ed. John E. Rotelle, O.S.A., The Works of Saint Augustine:
A Translation for the 21st Century, I/26 [Hyde Park, N.Y.: New City Press, 1999], 83
[hereafter 5 ,]). Augustine also writes, “If they understood our merits so that they
recognized that they were also gifts of God, this view would not have to be rejected”
(4 *
/
[
.
.
], 6.15 [5 , I/26:81). Here
Augustine is really describing the dual agency that takes place in merit. By affirming that
“our merits” are “also” the gifts of God, he does not say that they are exclusively the
“gifts of God.”

GRACE AND MERIT AT THE COUNCIL OF TRENT

207

its requisites.148 This phrase is even more significant when one
recalls that it was used prior to the Reformation against the
Scotists, whose “
was not
.”149
Some contemporary scholars, such as Otto Hermann Pesch,
have argued that the Tridentine doctrine of merit can be done
away with and replaced by the original biblical concept of
reward. Merit for Pesch is simply a concept that was introduced
into theology in the postbiblical period.150 The Tridentine
concept of merit, however, cannot simply be collapsed into the
concept of reward without making the council say something
that it certainly did not intend to say. The concepts are not
identical but correlative, for, as Bellarmine explained, a reward
is that which is rendered to merit.151 Reward and merit cannot
148
Pohle and Preuss, *
,
- .
,
, 407. The
various pre Tridentine theories of condign merit were often quite elaborate and had
elements that were distinctive to particular schools of thought. Some emphasized the
divine pact and others the good works themselves. Trent sought to avoid resolving
questions that were freely debated by the schools. On the various schools prior to Trent
see Bellarmine,
15.2.5.16 22 (
.
3
, 4
vols. [Paris: Triadelphorum, 1613], 4:1009 22).
149
C. Feckes,
* .
3
.
(Münster i.W.: Verlag der Aschendorffschen Verlagsbuchh,
1925), 84 n. 251, cited in Jedin,
, 364.
150
Otto Hermann Pesch, “The Canons of the Tridentine Decree on Justification: To
Whom Did They Apply? To Whom Do They Apply Today?" in Lehman, ed.,
. /
, 190f.; Otto Hermann Pesch, “Die Lehre vom 'Verdienst' als
Problem für Theologie und Verkündigung,” in 5
7 +G
C
KL * .
(München: Schöningh, 1967), 2:1865 1907.
151
Bellarmine,
, 15.2.5.2 (Paris ed., 4:970). The
(1999) must be praised for its preservation of the
distinction between merit and reward when it states: “When Catholics affirm the
‘meritorious’ character of good works, they wish to say that, according to the biblical
witness, a reward in heaven is promised to these works.” The consensus on the
preservation of this distinction is a true ecumenical advancement toward more perfect
communion. Dulles notes, however, in his discussion of the
that it
“softens the opposition by teaching that when Catholics speak of merit they mean that
‘a reward in heaven is promised.’ This is true enough, but it is incomplete because it fails
to say that the reward is a just one. Without reference to justice, the true notion of merit
would be absent” (Cardinal Avery Dulles, “Justification: the Joint Declaration F

208

CHRISTIAN D. WASHBURN

be read as synonyms in the conciliar text. The council used the
term
in four crucial places: twice as a noun and twice as a
verb. If we were to conflate the two concepts, then chapter 16
would absurdly read: the justified “can also be regarded as
having truly rewarded eternal life.” And canon 32 would read
“The justified truly rewards an increase of grace, eternal life,”
etc. One can immediately see the absurd and Pelagian reading of
Trent into which one would be forced, whereby man now is the
agent rewarding some unknown subject.
In order to clarify what Trent was attempting to do, it is
useful to compare it to the Council of Nicaea. The use of the
term
is analogous to the Council of Nicaea’s use of the
nonbiblical term
.
(
) for Christ’s
equality to the Father in order to explain precisely the correct
meaning of revelation.152 Similarly, what was at dispute in the
controversy over merit was in part the meaning of the term
as used in the Scriptures. All parties in the dispute,
whether Protestants, adherents of double justice, or opponents
of double justice, used the term
but without any
agreement as to the meaning of the substance of the doctrine.
So Trent used the extrabiblical term
, not simply because it
had come to be used in the schools, but in order to define more
precisely what was meant by the biblical concept of reward.
Moreover, the Council of Nicaea felt compelled to add the
term
in the phrase “true God from true God.” This was
deemed necessary in order to ensure that the Arian inter
pretation of the phrase “God from God” would be rejected. By
adding “true” to God, the council ensured that the term “God”
was being used not only univocally but in the proper sense. As
9 (2002): 115). As the
acknowledges,
it does not “cover all that each church teaches about justification,” and my analysis of
the Tridentine decree shows that there is more ecumenical work to be done on the
doctrine of merit.
152
Alois Grillmeier,
trans. John Bowden (London:
Mowbrays, 1975), 1:269; Khaled Anatolios,
I
(Grand Rapids, Mich: Baker Academic, 2011), 127,
283.

GRACE AND MERIT AT THE COUNCIL OF TRENT

209

in the Arian controversy where all parties could happily call
Jesus “God” as long as the sense of the term “God” was left
ambiguous, so both Protestants and the adherents of double
justice could use the term
as long as it was not a merit
grounded at least in part in justice.153 Like Nicaea, Trent added
the term
as a modifier of merit in an attempt to ensure that
the term
would be understood in the proper sense. This
usage of the term is clear from the debates above and is
confirmed by the council’s other and frequent usages of
.
For example, the council in its decree denies that concupiscence
is truly and properly (
) sin.154 Man is described as
“truly [
] justified” in contradiction to being justified in a
merely imputed sense.155 The seven sacraments are “truly and
properly [
]” sacraments, to distinguish Catholic
doctrine from that of many Protestants, who were willing to
employ the term “sacraments” in a broad sense.156 “True” water
must be used in baptism against those who thought that John 3
was to be understood metaphorically.157 In the Eucharist are
contained “truly [
], really and substantially” the body and
blood together with the soul and divinity of Jesus.158 In every
case, the term “true” is used to delineate the use of a term
according to its proper (nonmetaphorical) and strict (nonbroad,
153

See note 18.
“If anyone denies that the guilt of original sin is remitted by the grace of our Lord
Jesus Christ given in baptism, or asserts that all that is sin in the true and proper sense is
not taken away but only brushed over or not imputed, let him be anathema”
( - 1515).
155
- 1534.
156
“If anyone says that the sacraments of the New Law were not all instituted by
Jesus Christ our Lord; or that there are more or fewer than seven, that is: baptism,
confirmation, the Eucharist, penance, extreme unction, orders, and matrimony; or that
any of these seven is not truly and properly a sacrament, let him be anathema”
( - 1601).
157
“Si quis dixerit, aquam veram et naturalem non esse de necessitate baptismi, atque
ideo verba illa Domini nostri lesu Christi . . .: anathema sit” ( - 1615).
158
“If anyone denies that in the sacrament of the most Holy Eucharist the body and
blood, together with the soul and divinity, of our Lord Jesus Christ, and therefore the
whole Christ, is truly, really, and substantially contained, but says that he is in it only as
in a sign or figure or by his power: let him be anathema” ( - 1651).
154

210

CHRISTIAN D. WASHBURN

fully determinate) sense—that is, as formally comprehending
the intelligible content defining the primary instance of the
term which, in the case of “merit,” implies an intrinsic worthi
ness based on a good work, as opposed to mere fittingness
based on suitable agreement.
Certain contemporary scholars have suggested that Trent’s
doctrine of merit is an “eschatological statement about grace”
rather than a “practical ethical thought.”159 This is clearly a false
dichotomy. It is true that the reward for merit is beatitude, but
this eschatological reality is the end of merit rather than merit
as such. This is clear from the fact that merit is not merely an
“eschatological statement about grace” since one merits in this
life and one of the objects of merit is an increase of grace in this
life. Second, merit occurs through the conformity of the
justified’s life to the law of Christ, in whom the justified have
been engrafted. Merit therefore has a decidedly practical ethical
dimension, since according to the council, heaven is rewarded
in part on account of one’s obedience to the commandments. It
may also be noted that heaven is lost on account of one’s
disobedience. Trent is incredulous in the face of Protestant
theology’s insistence that man is ever unable to do that which is
desired of him. Instead Trent affirms the possibility of observing
the commandments and notes that the basic stance of the
Christian is that “those who are sons of God love Christ, and
those who love him keep his words.”160
Of course, this ethical component is grounded in the
Tridentine affirmation of the conversion that takes place
through the infusion of inhering righteousness and engrafting
into Christ. This engrafting leads, as we have seen, to the
possibility of man fulfilling the law which Christ as the lawgiver
has given. This is why the sixteenth chapter is clear that the
justified “can be regarded as having entirely fulfilled the divine
law by the works they have done in the sight of God.”161 Such a
159

Pesch, “Canons of the Tridentine Decree on Justification,” 190.
- 1536.
161
- 1546.
160

GRACE AND MERIT AT THE COUNCIL OF TRENT

211

position is impossible to affirm for most Protestant theologians
and adherents of double justice.
One may also note that Trent specified the true and proper
objects of merit: first, one may merit an increase in grace;
second, one may merit eternal life; and finally, one may merit
an increase in glory.162 Here we see the actual eschatological
significance of merit, which has as its end not merely a good
work but a good work that is ordered to attaining eternal
beatitude.
Finally, a clear understanding of merit, as defined by the
council in canon 32 of the
, will
determine the nature and extent to which an ecumenical
can be made on the issue of justification. One
must therefore discern the dogmatic value of the Tridentine
teaching. Pesch, for example, has argued that Trent’s teaching
on merit is a “dispensable theologoumenon.”163 He attempts to
preserve the Tridentine teaching by distinguishing between the
substance of Trent’s teaching, which is binding, and the concept
and word, which are not.164 Certainly Pesch is correct to
distinguish between the term
, which one could do away
with, and the substance of the doctrine that must remain. For
Pesch, however, the substance of the doctrine of merit is
reducible to the biblical concepts of fruitfulness or grace.165
There is absolutely no basis either in Scripture or the council for
such an assertion other than theological wishfulness; one must
remember that Trent’s teaching on this matter is irreformable as
such and therefore perpetually binding. While one could do
away with the word
, nevertheless, the concept of merit is
part of the substance of that teaching. Vatican I defined that the
“understanding of its [the Church’s] sacred dogmas must be
perpetually retained, which Holy Mother Church has once

162

Pesch, “Canons of the Tridentine Decree on Justification,” 190f.
Pesch, “Die Lehre vom ‘Verdienst’,” 1905.
164
Ibid., 1902.
165
Ibid., 1907.
163

212

CHRISTIAN D. WASHBURN

declared”; thus there can be no retreat from this meaning.166
Trent affirmed the content of the faith, and the substance of its
teaching is that the justified man is able to merit truly an
increase in grace and eternal life.
CONCLUSION
Both Protestant theologians and most adherents to
)
were led by their peculiar theories to reduce merit to an
absolutely gratuitous reward. The council repudiated both
positions and taught that in justification not only are the sins of
the faithful forgiven but also the faithful are made innocent,
immaculate, pure, guiltless and thereby become friends and
adopted sons of God, so that there is nothing whatever to
impede their entrance into heaven. It is clear that the council
did not employ the Scholastic terms of
or
merit, instead preferring terms such as
,
and
to convey the essential elements of the same
teaching. What one sees in the development of the drafts with
the addition of the term
before merit is that the council
wanted to make clear it was not indicating either a merit
'
or a quasi merit. Moreover, there is significant
intertextual evidence that use of the term
by the council
was intended to signify merit in its proper sense. The council
fathers used terms that have the same logical comprehension as
“condign merit,” insofar as it is in part a function of justice. Yet,
those theologians who believe the council’s use of “merit”
means condign merit as understood by the schools go, I believe,
too far. Moreover, some contemporary readings of the
Tridentine doctrine of merit seem in fact to be a denial of the
teaching which the council took such pains to define.

166
“Hinc sacrorum quoque dogmatum is sensus perpetuo est retinendus, quem semel
declaravit sancta mater Ecclesia, nec umquam ab eo sensu altioris intelligentiae specie et
nomine recedendum” ( - 3020).

The Thomist 79 (2015): 213-63

AN INDUCTIVE STUDY OF THE NOTION OF EQUIVOCAL
CAUSALITY IN ST. THOMAS
CHRISTOPHER A. DECAEN
Thomas Aquinas College
Santa Paula, California

A

LTHOUGH THE FUNDAMENTAL kinds of causality—
material, formal, agent, and final—are well known
among students of St. Thomas and Aristotle, a particular
mode of agent causality is unusual both for being of profound
importance and for rarely receiving the attention it deserves. I
refer to what St. Thomas calls “equivocal” or “non-univocal”
agent causality, as distinct from the more straightforward
univocal agent causality of one man generating another, hot
things making other things hot, and moving bodies causing
other bodies to move.
Saint Thomas employs the idea of equivocal agency throughout his corpus as a way to understand many instances of agentpatient relationship in nature, art, and the supernatural.
Surprisingly, however, neither St. Thomas nor Aristotle, from
whom he appears to draw the notion, explicitly mentions
equivocal causality where one might expect it: in their most
formal and complete discussions of causality as such.1 Likewise,
one is hard pressed to find extended discussions of it in the
scholarly literature centered on agent causality.2 This may have

1
I have in mind Phys. 2.3; Metaphys. 1.3-6; 5.2; and St. Thomas’s commentaries on
each, as well as De Princip. Nat., c. 3.
2
Rather than performing the impossible task of listing the works on agent causality
that say little or nothing about equivocal causality, I will point out the few I have found
that have something to say on it. See John F. Wippel, Metaphysical Themes in Thomas
Aquinas II (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 50-68;
although Fr. Wippel frequently references equivocal causality, his is an exclusively

213

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CHRISTOPHER A. DECAEN

something to do with the fact that St. Thomas’s paradigm
example seems to rely on an outmoded component of ancient
and medieval cosmology. His paradigm example is the sun, and
the incorruptible heavenly substance in general, causing various
phenomena here below.3 One wonders whether this example is
itself the primary reason for such silence among Thomists afraid
that it acquires guilt by association with the geocentric vision of
the universe.
These lacunae and this example, then, when combined with
the frequency with which St. Thomas employs the concept of
equivocal causality—especially in the context of understanding
divine action—make all the more useful an extended
consideration of the idea. The following is intended to be a first
attempt at such a discussion, an essay in the original sense of the
word. It will be inductive in the sense that it will gather, not
only all the relevant passages in the Thomistic corpus, but also
the various and lesser-known examples of this sort of causality.
If this essay only impels other students of St. Thomas to think in
a more sustained way about this kind of agency, and possible
examples of it, then it will have accomplished its purpose.
The essay is divided into six parts, each of which is
interspersed with examples of equivocal causality other than the
sun. First, I will explain at length what St. Thomas means by
equivocal agent causality by presenting two apparently distinct
ways in which he describes it, namely, as an agent that bears the
form it gives in a different way than it is received or as one that
bears it in a more eminent way. Second, I will argue that this
historical study of St. Thomas’s references to the more general axiom about like causing
like. See also Michael Dodds, O.P., Unlocking Divine Action: Contemporary Science and
Thomas Aquinas (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2012);
Fr. Dodds refers frequently to the distinction between univocal and nonunivocal agency,
though he seems not to intend precisely the same thing as St. Thomas does; in Dodd’s
usage it seems to be identical to the difference between causes of radically different
orders, such that it appears that God is the only nonunivocal cause. The only academic
article I have found that has much to say about equivocal causality is John M. Quinn,
“The Third Way: A New Approach,” The Thomist 42 (1978): 50-68.
3
In the texts that follow I will cite several instances where St. Thomas uses the sun
as his chief example, but any reader who has come across St. Thomas’s references to
equivocal causality knows what I am talking about.

EQUIVOCAL CAUSALITY IN ST. THOMAS

215

apparent distinction is significant, implying that one is broader
and more rudimentary, whereas the other is narrower and more
proper. In the third and fourth parts, I will further elucidate
equivocal causality and the aforesaid distinction by comparing it
to two other sorts of agency, namely, instrumental and universal
causality. Using these comparisons I will, in the fifth section,
show how the greater eminence of possession in the equivocal
cause itself exists in different ways. Having gathered from St.
Thomas’s work many examples of equivocal causality that on
the whole are less in conflict with science as we know it now, in
a final section I will suggest several other instances of causality
in contemporary science that might be profitably interpreted
through equivocal agency.
I. TWO DESCRIPTIONS OF EQUIVOCAL CAUSALITY
A) Names Univocal, Equivocal, and Analogical
It is likely that one will not understand equivocal causality
unless one first understands what an equivocal name is, so we
will begin with a brief review of the fundamental difference
between equivocal and univocal naming. Aristotle begins the
Organon by distinguishing such names:
Things are spoken of equivocally when the name alone is common to them,
but the account of the substance belonging to the name is different (such as
when both a man and a drawn figure are called “animals”). . . . For if one
were to give what each of these is as being an animal, one would give an
account peculiar to each one. However, things are spoken of univocally when
the name is common and the account of the substance belonging to the name
is the same (such as when both a man and an ox are called “animals”).4

Things named univocally have one name and one definition,
whereas things named equivocally have one name but different
definitions.

4

Categories 1.1a1-8. All translations of Aristotle and St. Thomas in this essay will be
my own, though I will give the original Greek or Latin where it seems helpful.

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CHRISTOPHER A. DECAEN

A further distinction can be made among equivocal names,
however, bearing on the idea of equivocal causality. These
definitions can be either wholly different—such as when I call
both the flying rodent and the baseball club “bats”—or only
partly so—such as when I call both the animal and the weather
“healthy.” In the former case, there is nothing intelligible about
the fact that both receive the same name, simply because there is
no intelligible connection between baseball and flying rodents.
In the latter case, however, the connection between the
condition of the animal and the weather conducive to it is
intelligible; it makes sense that both would be called “healthy.”
Whence, because the former sort of equivocation is a pure case,
it is antonomastically called “equivocation,” whereas the latter
receives a new name, “analogy,” to indicate the proportionality
of the two rationes receiving the same name.5 However, at least
as far back as Boethius the same distinction is sometimes made
by calling the former “fortuitous equivocals” (aequivoca a casu)
and the latter “deliberate equivocals” (aequivoca a consilio) to
preserve the connection of both with the general notion of
equivocation.6
This foundation having been laid, one might wonder which
kind of equivocal St. Thomas has in mind when he speaks of
equivocal causes: pure equivocation or intelligible and advised
equivocation? An answer will become clear as we consider the
two basic ways in which he describes equivocal causes.

5

Saint Thomas says that this implies that even Aristotle’s example of an equivocal
use of a word, namely, “animal” said of the figure in a picture, is really an instance of
analogy; see STh I, q. 13, a. 10, ad 4. On analogy and equivocation, see IV Metaphys.,
lect. 1 (passim); XI Metaphys., lect. 3 (2197); and STh I, q. 13, a. 5. All citations of St.
Thomas’s commentaries on Aristotle and Pseudo-Dionysius are from the Marietti
edition; parenthetical numbers refer to paragraph numbers in this edition.
6
See Boethius, In Categ. Arist. Libri Quatuor, 166B-C. Saint Thomas follows
Aristotle himself in occasionally referring to pure equivocations as aequivoca a casu
(I Metaphys., lect. 14 [223]). It is, of course, ironic (and confusing) that “equivocal”
turns out to be itself an equivocal word.

EQUIVOCAL CAUSALITY IN ST. THOMAS

217

B) Equivocal Causality as Articulated in “Summa contra
gentiles” I, c. 29: The “Different Mode and Account”
Saint Thomas presents perhaps his most straightforward
account of what an equivocal agent is, and how it is related to
equivocal naming, in a discussion in the Summa contra gentiles
of how creatures are like God. In this context it is understood
that a univocal cause is one that is specifically the same as its
effect: just as a father generates a son, and both are univocally
called “men,” a univocal agent has the form it gives in the same
way that the patient receives it. Thus, St. Thomas describes the
opposite of a univocal cause as follows:
Effects falling short of their causes do not agree with them in name and
account [ratione], yet it is necessary that there be found a certain likeness
[aliquam similitudinem] between them. For it is of the nature of action that
the agent would effect a like to itself [agens sibi simile agat], since each thing
acts according as it is in act. Whence the form of the effect is found in a
certain way [aliqualiter] in an exceeding cause, but according to a different
mode and a different account [alium modum et aliam rationem]—by reason of
which it is called an equivocal cause. For the sun causes heat in the lower
bodies by acting according as it is in act; whence it is necessary that the heat
generated by the sun holds a certain likeness to the active power of the sun,
through which the heat in these lower things is caused—by reason of which
the sun is called “hot,” although not with a single account. And so the sun is
said to be like all those things in which it effectively induces its effects, and yet
it is still unlike all of them inasmuch as effects of this sort do not possess heat
(and things of this sort) in the same mode as it is found in the sun. So too God
also brings forth all perfections, and through this has a likeness with all
things—and an unlikeness at the same time.7

Here we have, not only the classic example of the sun (in this
instance, as a cause of heat),8 but we also have a clear statement
of the principle: When an agent possesses the form the patient

7

ScG I, c. 29.
The following is just a sampling of other places where the sun is described as an
equivocal cause of heat: STh I, q. 57, a. 2, ad 2; I Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 2; II Sent., d. 1,
q. 2, a. 2; IV Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, ad 4; ScG I, c. 31.
8

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CHRISTOPHER A. DECAEN

receives in a different way9 than the patient receives it, the agent
is called an “equivocal cause.” There is an ambiguity in St.
Thomas’s distinction here, however, especially as it pertains to
the way in which this connects with equivocal and univocal
naming. He says that the equivocal agent does not receive the
same name as the patient, so it would seem that an equivocal
agent is not called “equivocal” for the same reason as some
names are. And yet in St. Thomas’s very example he also says
that the sun is called “hot.”10
The most plausible way of understanding this apparent
contradiction is to read the first claim in light of the second:
The name “equivocal cause” is an abbreviated way of saying
that the name of the effect is not commonly said of the agent—
the sun is not usually thought of as hot (in the ancient cosmology)—or if in some contexts, or in some languages, the
same name is given to both, then that name is being used
equivocally, that is, under a significantly different meaning.
Such an equivocation would obviously not be by chance, but in
virtue of the recognition of a sort of proportion between the
sun’s active nature and its effects. That this is the drift of St.
Thomas’s thought is clear from the context, for he seems to be
recapitulating the argument for thinking of the sun as hot when
he recalls the axiom that because an agent can act upon another
only in virtue of its own actuality, what it brings forth in the
patient must make it like itself. Thus, if the noonday sun heats
my brow, the sun too must be hot. In the case of the equivocal
agent, however, we must make the proviso that the effect is like
the patient in only a qualified way. Heat is equivocally, but
advisedly, attributed to both the sun and the brow, the latter
according to the ordinary meaning of the word but the former
because its capacity to bring about heat (in the ordinary

9
For now we will treat the difference in modus and ratio as unimportant, largely
because St. Thomas does not elsewhere mention both, but one or the other. However,
we will consider possible differences in St. Thomas’s intent later. See note 78.
10
We might compound the contradiction by noting that in some passages
St. Thomas will also say that the sun is not hot; see I Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 2.

EQUIVOCAL CAUSALITY IN ST. THOMAS

219

meaning of the word) must contain something of the nature of
this heat—otherwise it would not be able to bring it about.11
It appears that, in spite of St. Thomas dubbing them
equivocal causes, such causes do not have the form of the effect
in a purely equivocal way: If the name of the effect is given to
the equivocal agent, it is said according to an analogy.12 He says
this explicitly elsewhere, again invoking the axiom about an
agent being able only to make a thing become like itself:
Every agent effects a thing like to itself, so the effect of the agent must be in
some mode in the agent. For in some it is the same according to species, and
such are called univocal agents (e.g., heat in a fire heating something), but in
some it is the same according to a proportion or analogy [proportionem sive
analogiam] (e.g., when the sun heats something). For there is something in the
sun that thus makes it a heating thing just as heat makes a fire hot, and
following this, heat is said to be in the sun equivocally.13

On ancient cosmology, if one is calling the sun “hot” (and is not
speaking merely metaphorically), then he is either onto
something, or he is using the word univocally and is therefore
making a mistake.
One might also want to distinguish among equivocal causes
insofar as some more than others readily and customarily
deserve the name of their effect. For example, some men are
wise, as are some books, and so is God. But whereas we might,
in a rather extended sense, call a book “intelligent” or “wise”
(because of the intelligence it can communicate or because of its
author), a man is called “wise” more properly, for he, unlike the
11
In ancient cosmology the sun and all celestial matter were thought to be
incorruptible (as consistent observation suggested). Because alteration is the qualitative
change a body undergoes on the way toward its corruption, alteration and the qualities
that alter would also be impossible for a heavenly body. However, since being heated up
and heating up other things are instances of alteration, heavenly bodies are neither
heatable nor hot; see Aristotle, De Caelo 1.3.
12
This is not, however, to say that every analogous use of a name is an equivocal
cause; sometimes not the cause but the effect receives the name analogously, as when we
say one’s complexion is healthy or one’s actions are wise. Every equivocal agent is
named by the effect analogically, but not everything named analogically is an equivocal
agent.
13
IV Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 4. See also STh I, q. 45, a. 8, ad 3.

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CHRISTOPHER A. DECAEN

book, possesses the knowledge as knowledge, that is, as a
perfection of his intellect—and God is said to possess wisdom in
the same way, only far more so, inasmuch as he not only possesses a greater wisdom than might be found in any book or any
created intellect but also because he is wisdom itself. Hence,
there are degrees of equivocity among equivocal causes: some
receive the name of the effect in a less equivocal way than do
others, and the others possess it in a way that is closer to pure
equivocation. This may be why St. Thomas sometimes says that
it is something of an understatement to call God an equivocal
cause of wisdom; it might be more illuminating to say he is an
agent cause of wisdom according to analogy:
Each of these things [i.e., wisdom, goodness, etc.] is in God according to the
truest account of it [secundum sui verissimam rationem]. . . . And thence it is
that he himself is not a wholly equivocal cause of the things [causa rerum
omnino aequivoca], since according to his own form he produces effects like
himself not univocally but analogically [analogice].14

God is not called “wise” in a wholly equivocal way but rather in
a robust way that is better expressed by calling it an analogy.
Yet, can we articulate more clearly in what this analogy
consists? Can we do no more than take refuge in the, admittedly
fundamental, axiom that an agent always brings about its like,
and insist that therefore there must be some sense in which the
form of the effect is in the equivocal cause, whatever that sense
might be? In the Summa contra gentiles passage cited above St.
Thomas is fairly minimal in his description of equivocal causes
when he says they possess the form they give simply in a “different” way. This minimalism is not unique to this passage: St.
Thomas uses similar language elsewhere, for instance in the
Prima secundae saying that in nonunivocal causality the patient
“receives the form from the agent not according to the same
account as it is in the agent.”15 Could the form, then, be present
in the agent in a higher way than the patient receives it? Could
14

I Sent., d. 2, q. 1, a. 2. See also ScG I, c. 31.
STh I-II, q. 60, a. 1. See also IV Sent., d. 44, q. 3, a. 1, qcla. 3, ad 2 (quoted
below).
15

EQUIVOCAL CAUSALITY IN ST. THOMAS

221

it be present in a lower way? Indeed, what do “higher” and
“lower” mean in this context? Here St. Thomas is not intent on
settling this question. Yet he does hint at a more determinate
account when he notes that equivocal causality happens when
the effects are “falling short” (deficientes) of an “exceeding”
(excedens) cause. In fact, he defines equivocal causality more
narrowly elsewhere.
C) Equivocal Causality as Articulated in “Summa Theologiae” I,
q. 4, a. 2: The “More Eminent Mode”
In discussing the divine perfection, St. Thomas distinguishes
equivocal and univocal causality as follows:
Whatever there is of a perfection within an effect must be found within the
efficient cause, either according to the same account, if it is a univocal agent
(for example, a man generates a man), or in a more eminent mode, if it is an
equivocal agent (for example, in the sun there is a likeness of those things that
are generated through the power of the sun).16

Again we find the example of the sun, this time causing not so
much heat as generation, presumably the seasonal burst of life
called spring.17 When the sun quickens plants so that seedlings
sprout and flowers bloom, one cannot call the sun a sprout, or a
bloomer, or even alive (even in ancient cosmology) without
equivocating in some measure, that is, without extending the
meaning of “alive.”
Here St. Thomas uses the distinction to argue that God is an
equivocal agent of all perfections in creation and therefore
possesses them in advance—albeit “in a more eminent mode”
(eminentiori modo). Thus, the word “different” has been
replaced by “more eminent.” Nor is this way of speaking the
exception. Saint Thomas more often than not describes the way
the equivocal agent possesses the form it gives as “more
eminent” or some synonym such as “nobler,” “more excellent,”

16
17

STh I, q. 4, a. 2. See also De Malo, q. 1, a. 3.
On its other effects, see note 81.

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CHRISTOPHER A. DECAEN

“higher,” or “more sublime.”18 What exactly this more eminent
mode consists in, however, is often difficult to pin down.
Yet in certain instances, the presence of a genuine hierarchy
stands out. For example, St. Thomas seems to suggest that an
animal’s growing hair is an instance of equivocal causality, for
while this generation might be “properly called ‘ennaturing’”
(nativitas), still hair is not one in species with the animal: “This
is why fur, or hair, does not have the account of one begotten,
and offspring” (rationem geniti et filii), but only when what
comes forth is like the agent “in a nature of the same species, as
a man comes forth from a man, and a horse from a horse.”19 It
is obvious that the animal is a higher sort of being than is its
hair, so proposing that the animal bears the form it generates in
a higher way is intelligible.20 Likewise, St. Thomas says that “a
mule comes to be not from a mule but from a horse and an ass”;
thus, although “there is a certain likeness” between the horse
and the mule, this generation is “not wholly univocal.”21 Just as
the mule bears the nature of a horse in a deficient way, this
nature is in the parent horse in a more perfect way. The same is
true when Aristotle gives the example of a man fathering a
daughter; based on his (admittedly erroneous) view of the
father as the sole agent in conception, he naturally concludes
that the parent is an equivocal cause and that the father, qua
male, more completely possesses the nature the daughter
receives.22
18

For other uses of eminentius, see II Sent., d. 15, q. 1, a. 2, ad 4; ScG II, c. 98; for
nobilius, see I Sent., d. 2, q. 1, a. 3; II Sent., d. 15, q. 1, a. 2, ad 4; for excellentius, see
STh I, q. 6, a. 2; De Malo, q. 4, a. 3; I Sent., d. 2, q. 1, a. 3; for altior, see VIII Phys.,
lect. 10 (1053); IV Sent., d. 41, q. 1, a. 1, qcla. 5, sol. 1, ad 1; for sublimior, see De
Pot., q. 7, a. 1, ad 8.
19
STh I, q. 27, a. 2.
20
We might add alongside hair any number of bodily secretions, from sweat and
tears to skin oils and mucus. These all seem to be equivocally generated by the body. See
STh I, q. 119, a. 1, ad 3, on the nature of blood, fundamental humors (humidum
radicale), and alia huiusmodi in the body that have the virtus specei but “do not reach all
the way toward perfectly attaining the nature of the species.”
21
VII Metaphys., lect. 8 (1452).
22
Ibid. Granted that Aristotle and St. Thomas conceive of the female as a defective
male, the point does not necessarily hinge upon this claim. Even if we were to update

EQUIVOCAL CAUSALITY IN ST. THOMAS

223

Because St. Thomas as a rule describes equivocal agents as
possessing the forms they give in a higher way, one wonders
whether he intends this higher possession of the form whenever
he speaks of equivocal agents; after all, as was noted, even in
the passage from the Summa contra gentiles he speaks of the
equivocal agent as “exceeding” the patient in some way. Indeed,
if this is not the case, it would seem that St. Thomas employs
two ways of conceiving equivocal causality, one more
rudimentary and generic, and another more specific and
perhaps the principal notion. And such a multiplication of
notions is undesirable, at least prima facie.
II. A DIFFERENT VS. A MORE EMINENT MODE
A reason for thinking St. Thomas is not simply misspeaking
in the Summa contra gentiles when he says that equivocal agents
possess the form they give in a “different” way is the fact that
he occasionally identifies as equivocal causes agents that appear
to bear the form they give in a lower way than do the patients
that receive them. For instance, in the Sentences commentary, in
the context of speculations about how the souls of the damned
will be united to their bodies at the general resurrection, he
says:
The likeness of the agent is in the patient in two ways: in one way, through
the same mode in which it is in the agent, as it is in all univocal agents (e.g.,
the hot makes a thing hot, and a fire generates a fire); in another way, through
a mode diverse from the mode in which it is in the agent, as it is in all
equivocal agents. In these, however, sometimes it happens that the form
received in the patient materially is in the agent spiritually (e.g., the form that
is in a house made through art is in itself materially and is in the mind of the
artisan spiritually); but sometimes, conversely, it is materially in the agent, and
it is received spiritually in the patient (e.g., whiteness is materially in the wall,

the physiology and embryology and consider a woman conceiving and giving birth to a
son, there still seems to be a degree of equivocal causality here, and the boy would bear
the (admittedly only accidentally different) feminine form in an inferior way than would
his mother. Perhaps it is worth adding that St. Thomas thinks the woman has a seed
(semen), but it is passive; see STh I, q. 115, a. 2, ad 3; q. 118, a. 1, ad 4. See also note
90 below.

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CHRISTOPHER A. DECAEN

from which it is received spiritually in the pupil, and even in the medium
carrying the whiteness to the pupil). And so it is in the proposed matter.23

This text is particularly interesting both because it proposes a
distinction among sorts of equivocal causality and because here
St. Thomas does not have recourse to the sun but to two less
time-bound examples: The artisan causing the artifact and the
color in the object causing its impression in the transparent
medium between itself and the eye, and then even in the eye
itself. One does not call the architect a house nor the sensible
species of white received into the eye (or the transparent air)
white, at least not without equivocating.
But there the likeness stops and the distinction becomes
paradoxical. The first case is straightforward: The agent
possesses the form in a higher way—that is, cognitively, in the
practical intellect: the plan of the house in the builder’s mind is
the form in virtue of which he turns the lumber into a house.
We will return to this example later; at the moment the other
case is more urgent, for here something strange seems to
happen: If it is clear that a spiritual (i.e., an immaterial or
intentional) mode of being is higher than a material mode, then
here the lower seems to cause the higher, for the equivocal
agent (the white wall) possesses the form of the effect in an
inferior way than it is received in either patient (the eye or the
air), since both receive it spiritually. Indeed, the difficulty is
most apparent with the eye, for it possesses the sensible species
not only intentionally (as does the transparent medium) but
cognitively, such that it knows the white in virtue of it. It is not
readily apparent how we can think of the white wall as having
the form in a “more eminent way.”
This puzzle is compounded by the fact that the Sentences
passage is not unique, for St. Thomas offers a similar example in
the Prima pars, in the course of showing that truth is principally
a thing of the intellect. There he entertains the objection that
whatever is the cause of something must be what it causes all
the more so, and since real things outside the mind cause the
23

IV Sent., d. 44, q. 3, a. 1, qcla. 3, ad 2.

EQUIVOCAL CAUSALITY IN ST. THOMAS

225

truth of our thoughts, these things must be true as well. Saint
Thomas responds in terms of equivocal causality:
Although the truth of our intellect is caused by the thing [a re], yet it is not
necessary that the account of truth is found there foremost [per prius], just as
neither is the account of health found foremost in the medicine rather than in
the animal. For the medicine’s power, and not its health, causes the health [of
the animal], since it is not a univocal agent. And in a similar way the thing’s
existence [esse rei], not its truth, causes the truth of the intellect.24

Again we find what amount to two more examples of equivocal
causality. If medicine were the sort of thing that causes health
by being healthy, it would be a univocal agent. In fact, however,
medicine causes health without being healthy—taking the word
univocally, to describe a condition exclusive to organisms.
Rather, medicine possesses health, not as a constitutive order
and equilibrium among organs and humors, but as a power to
bring about this order. Medicine is rightly called “healthy,” of
course, but this is an equivocal (or better, analogical) use of the
word, and (more importantly for our concerns) medicine clearly
does not possess health in a higher or more eminent way than
does the animal. Likewise, St. Thomas indicates that the real
existence of something is an equivocal cause of the mind’s
conforming to it. This amounts to another version of the
example of the white forming the eye, for St. Thomas here says
that what is truth in color vision preexists within the color in
the visible object and its ability to effect that truth in the eye.
Still other examples of equivocal agents that seem to bear the
form they give in a lower way are found in St. Thomas’s
commentary on Aristotle’s discussion of the likeness between an
agent and its effect in book 7 of the Metaphysics. He enumerates several examples of agents and generations that are “in no
way univocal,” where the “generated thing’s entire form does
not itself precede in the generator, but only a certain part of it,
or a certain part of a part.”25 After again giving another version
of the medicine example—here hot medicine is the equivocal
24
25

STh I, q. 16, a. 1, ad 3.
VII Metaphys., lect. 8 (1446). See also Aristotle, Metaphys. 7.9.1034a22-33.

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cause of the heat that is “a part of health, or is something
leading to a part of health”26—St. Thomas elaborates on how
Aristotle modifies the example by introducing local motion into
the causal sequence:
When heat is generated through a motion, the heat is in a certain mode in the
motion itself as in an active power. For the very power of causing heat, which
is in the motion, is something of the genus of heat. And this heat existing by
power within the motion effects the heat in the body, yet not by a univocal
generation but by an equivocal one, since the heat in the motion and in the
hot body is not of a single account [unius rationis].27

Aristotle and St. Thomas are here somewhat ambivalent on the
exact relation between heat and health. Health either contains
in its notion a certain mean body temperature, or this body
temperature itself causes something integral to health. Perhaps it
is to clarify the relationships of equivocal causality he is
considering, then, that Aristotle replaces the example of hot
medicine causing the salubrious heat in the sick man with a heat
source of a different sort: motion—more specifically, Aristotle
says earlier, “the doctor produces heat by friction [tēi tripsei]”
(1032b26). Just as the man’s heating is an equivocal cause of his
healing, so is the therapeutic massaging of his body an equivocal
cause of the doctor’s heating of the man and therefore even of
his healing.28 Now, it is true that local motion’s natural priority
over alteration renders more intelligible the notion that rubbing
might be said to bear in a more eminent way the heat it brings
about. Nevertheless, like the medicine, this rubbing motion does
not obviously contain health itself in a more eminent way than
does the animal. Thus, it is not clear that every agent St.
26

VII Metaphys., lect. 8 (1446).
Ibid. (1448). Although Aristotle gives the illustration of the motion causing heat in
turn causing health in 9.1034b27-30, he had already brought it up in 7.1032b1-b32. In
several other places, Aristotle notes that it is in the nature of motion to heat and ignite
bodies; see De Caelo 2.7.289a11-35; Meteor. 1.3.341a17-28; for St. Thomas’s
reflections, see also I Meteor., lect. 5 (33-35); II De Caelo, lect. 10 (387-88, 391).
28
Here the modern kinetic theory of heat may render plausible the idea of vibratory
motions as possessing heat in a higher, more eminent way; see note 69. Indeed, the
Maxwellian notion of energy as a whole suggests that one form of energy may be an
equivocal cause of another.
27

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Thomas calls an equivocal cause must possess the form in a
more eminent way.
As the Metaphysics passage continues, Aristotle offers several
more examples of equivocal agents, and again they appear to be
inferior to their effects. Comparing the generative power of an
animal’s seed to the aforementioned causality of the architect,
St. Thomas glosses Aristotle by saying that
A seed works toward a generation just as do those things that come to be
through an art. For just as the architect is not actually a house, nor does he
have the form that is the house in act but in his capacity, so too the seed is not
the animal in act, nor does it have the soul that is the animal’s form in act but
in its capacity alone. For in this way there is within the seed a formative
power that is related to the matter of conception just as the form of the house
in the mind of the architect is related to the stones and lumber—except that
the form of the art is wholly external to the stones and lumber, whereas the
power of the seed is intrinsic [to the matter of conception].29

Just as the architect is an equivocal cause of the house, so is the
seed an equivocal cause of an animal. Saint Thomas sheds some
light on this possession “by capacity” (potestate) in words
similar to the aforementioned passage in the Sentences commentary: The architect has the form of the house “not indeed
according to the same mode of being [modum essendi]” as does
the house itself, that is, “not according to a material existence
[esse materiale], but according to the immaterial existence [esse
immateriale] that it has in the mind of the artisan.” Thus, in a
way “this generation is partly due to something univocal, with
respect to the form, but partly due to something equivocal, with
respect to the existence of the form in the subject.”30 So the
builder is related to his materials in the same way that the
parent’s seed is related to the matter disposed to become a new
life. Yet, just as the mode of existence of the house-form in the
builder’s mind is distinct from that in the building materials
underlying the finished house, so too the animal’s seed possesses
the form it will educe in a different mode than does the newly
conceived animal.
29
30

VII Metaphys., lect. 8 (1451); see Metaphys. 7.9.1034a34-b3.
VII Metaphys., lect. 8 (1445); see Metaphys. 7.9.1034a22-24.

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Nevertheless, St. Thomas points out a significant distinction
between artificial and natural generations as regards univocal
and equivocal causality:
However, although animal generation from seed is not from the seed as from
a univocal [agent] (since the seed is not an animal), nevertheless that from
which the seed is [generated] is in a certain way univocal with that which
comes to be from the seed. For the seed comes to be from an animal. And in
this there is a dissimilarity between natural generation and artificial
generation, since it is not necessary that the form of the house in the mind of
the artisan be due to a [different] house—although sometimes this happens, as
when someone makes a new house according to the model of another. But it is
always necessary that a seed be from an animal.31

An animal seed is always an instrument that an animal is using
to generate another of its kind, and as such, not only is an
animal from it, but it itself is from an animal: man generates
seed, which generates man. Thus, a seed’s agency is essentially
intermediate. The house-builder, however, can invent the form
of a house without any experience of another house—this is in
fact what it is to have the art—so he is more of a first cause than
is the seed. This reliance upon, and reduction to, a univocal
agent would suggest that seed is an inferior sort of equivocal
cause when compared to the artist, for the seed bears the form
it educes in a more instrumental and less complete way than
does the artist the form in his mind.32
Now, because the seed and the medicine examples are
instances of what are typically referred to as instrumental
causes,33 it is tempting at this point to jump to two conclusions.
First, one might think that instrumental causality is a species of
31

VII Metaphys., lect. 8 (1452).
It also suggests that the parent animal itself is an equivocal cause of the seed itself,
although St. Thomas does not explicitly consider this. The relation of the animal to its
seed seems quite similar to its relation to its hair, fur, and secretions in general,
mentioned earlier. For just as the hair, sweat, tears, saliva, and various bodily fluids are
naturally brought forth by the animal to protect, cool, cleanse, and feed itself, so too its
seed is emitted during copulation to reproduce. The two ways the nutritive soul
participates in immortality are at work here: self-nourishment/self-preservation and
reproduction. See De Anima 2.4.415a20-b3.
33
See, for instance, STh I, q. 118, a. 1.
32

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equivocal causality, for some but not all of the latter are
instances of the former. Second, one might therefore think that
this distinction explains why St. Thomas sometimes says the
equivocal agent has the form it gives in a different way and
other times that it has it in a more eminent way, such that
noninstrumental equivocal causes possess the form they give in
a higher way, but instrumental equivocal causes possess it in a
lower way. In order to show that this interpretation of St.
Thomas, although taxonomically neat, is nevertheless not the
whole story, we will need to consider more carefully what is
meant by instrumental causality. By pointing out the ways in
which equivocal agents are like and unlike instrumental agents,
we will have greater precision in our understanding of the
nature of equivocal causality and give greater clarity to St.
Thomas’s claim about the eminence of the preexisting form.
III. INSTRUMENTAL AND EQUIVOCAL CAUSALITY
A) What Is Instrumental Causality?
Saint Thomas employs the notion of instrumental causality in
many contexts, usually with the basic description that “an
instrument is what does not perform the action of the principal
agent by its own proper power, but by the power of the
principal agent.”34 The most common examples he gives are a
carpenter’s tool, words, and the sacraments.35 In each case, the
instrumental cause is distinguished from both the principal
cause and the ultimate effect; again, an instrument is essentially
34

STh I-II, q. 112, a. 1, ad 1; see also STh I, q. 18, a. 3. As with equivocal causality,
secondary literature devoted to instrumental causality is scarce, and I would suggest that
Fr. Romanus Cessario’s recent charge that theologians need to think more carefully
about the metaphysics of sacramental causality (“Sacramental Causality: Da Capo!,”
Nova et Vetera 11 [2013]: 307-16) is doomed if it does not begin with careful thought
about instrumental causality. A few exceptional studies of instrumental causality are
Sebastian Walshe, O. Praem., “The Notion of Instrumental Causality” (S.T.D. diss.;
Rome: Pontifical Institute of St. Thomas, 2006); and J. Albertson, “Instrumental
Causality in St. Thomas,” The New Scholasticism 28 (1954): 409-35.
35
For the carpentry examples, see below. For grace and speech, see STh III, q, 62,
a. 1; and STh III, q, 62, a. 4, ad 1.

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a medium, a “that through which.” This intermediacy is what
makes it unclear how or whether the instrument bears the form
the effect receives. Sometimes St. Thomas seems to go so far as
to simply deny that it bears the form it conducts, such as when
he says that
An instrumental cause acts . . . only through the motion with which it is
moved by the principal agent. Whence the effect does not become like the
instrument, but like the principal agent (such as the bench does not become
like the saw, but like the art that is in the mind of the artisan).36

On other occasions he speaks with greater nuance by saying that
“an instrumental agent need not possess the form that it induces
as disposing that very thing [ut disponentem ipsum], except only
through the mode of intention, as is clear of the form of the
bench in the saw.”37 Thus, the instrument is a strange sort of
agent cause, for the effect is not strictly speaking being
assimilated to it but rather to the principal agent. Insofar as
agent causes as such make things become like themselves, it
seems that an instrumental agent is not perfectly an agent.38
Yet in order for an instrument to be an agent in any sense—
and indeed, in order for the instrument to be, not only spatially,
but causally between the principal agent and the ultimate
effect—there must be some way in which the instrument bears
the form the patient receives. One cannot give what one does
not have, and thus what one in no way has one can in no way
give.
An initial way of seeing this comes from the universal
experience of amateur fix-it men: there is a right tool for each
job because of the congruence of the tool’s form or shape to
what one wants to do, as anyone using a pipe wrench when a
crescent wrench is called for learns, to his grief. Saint Thomas
notes this by saying that
36

STh III, q, 62, a. 1.
IV Sent., d. 5, q. 2, a. 2, qcla. 5.
38
Cajetan even goes so far as to cite Alexander of Aphrodisias to the effect that
instruments “are not efficient causes,” “not properly” (In I STh, q. 4, a. 2). Aristotle
himself appears to associate instrumental causes more directly with final causality than
with agent causality (Phys. 2.3.194b35-195a2; Metaphys. 5.2.1013a35-b3).
37

EQUIVOCAL CAUSALITY IN ST. THOMAS

231

an instrument has two actions. The one is instrumental, according to which it
operates not in its proper power, but in the power of the principal agent. But
it has another proper action that belongs to it according to its own proper
form. For example, it belongs to the saw to cut by reason of its own
sharpness, but to make a bed insofar as it is the instrument of the art.
Moreover, it does not complete the instrumental action except by exercising
its proper action, for it makes the bench by cutting it.39

An instrument, in virtue of its own proper character, both
amplifies and makes determinate the agency of the principal
agent; one might even say that the reason we must use
instruments is because of the disproportion between the aims of
our intellect and the fact that we have only hands for
accomplishing those aims. Thus, an instrumental agent is not
simply a second domino in a series, as though to be an instrument is the same thing as to be a moved mover that could
simply be swapped for the first or the third domino. An
instrument, properly speaking, is something of the principal
agent, almost a part of it.40 For instance, the carpenter himself
cuts the wood by means of the saw—which saw, left to itself,
and even if placed right next to the wood, could do nothing at
all. Thus, the principal agent draws the instrument up into its
own agency such that it can actually be an agent, but through
the instrument’s own character the principal agent is an agent of
this specific effect. Otherwise the principal agent would have no
reason to use this tool, or any tool, at all;41 the tool must have
something of the effect within itself.

39

STh III, q. 62, a. 1, ad 2.
This is perhaps why one of the few divisions St. Thomas makes of instrumental
causes is into genuine parts (i.e., those continuous with the principal agent, like the
hand) and quasi-parts (i.e., those touching but not continuous with the principal agent,
like saws). See STh III, q. 62, a. 5; and ScG IV, c. 41.
41
See STh I-II, q. 83, a. 1, ad 2. This is not to say that a principal agent must always
employ an instrumental cause. To call one agent “principal” and the other
“instrumental” is to say that the effect is more properly attributed to the former; as a
result, a principal agent often can bring about the effect without the use of the
instrument, either by means of a different one or even by itself (as when we admiringly
say someone did something “with his bare hands” when one usually uses a wrench, or a
bottle opener).
40

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But there is a deeper way of seeing that the instrument bears
the form of the effect, albeit in an appropriately intermediate
manner. Saint Thomas will say that, whereas
the power of the principal agent possesses an existence enduring and complete
in nature [permanens et completum esse in natura], the power of the
instrumental agent possesses an existence going across from the one into the
other, and an incomplete existence [esse transiens ex uno in aliud, et
incompletum], just as motion too is the imperfect act [going] from the agent
into the patient.42

Thus, just as while something is being moved into a new place,
it does not have the actuality the agent is in the process of
giving it, so too an instrument while being employed does not
possess the form it communicates. Nevertheless, it is not true
that the body being moved in no sense has the place it is
entering, and nor is it meaningless to ask where the moving
body is; likewise, one cannot say the instrument in no sense has
the form, for the latter passes through the former—otherwise
this would really be action at a distance.43 And while the
instrument as such participates in this higher agent causality in a
transitory way (for it lasts only as long as the principal agent is
using it) the instrument is transferring, and therefore bearing
“through the mode of a flowing intention [intentionis
fluentis],”44 the form which is more static in the mind of the
agent and which he intends to put into the patient. Nor is this
principle limited to the instruments of intelligent artists. In the
case of the aforementioned colored object, the visual medium
instrumentally (and yet while remaining transparent) bears the
color to the eye.

42

STh III, q. 62, a. 4.
On St. Thomas’s rejection of action at a distance and its connection to
instrumental causality, see my “The Impossibility of Action at a Distance,” in Wisdom’s
Apprentice: Thomistic Essays in Honor of Lawrence Dewan, O.P., ed. Peter Kwasniewski
(Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 173-200.
44
IV Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, sol. 4.
43

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233

B) Instrumental Causality in Comparison to Equivocal Causality
Having now reviewed what instrumental causality is, we turn
to whether it makes sense to think of it as a species of equivocal
causality. Besides the fact that some of the aforementioned
equivocal causes are also instrumental causes (medicine of
health, seed of animal), equivocal and instrumental causes do,
after all, hold in common the mark of bringing about an effect
without possessing the form in the way that the effect does.
Nevertheless, not only does St. Thomas never assert that
instrumental causality is a species of equivocal causality, but he
explicitly separates them. Thus, in the Sentences commentary he
says:
The agent is twofold: one principal and another instrumental. A principal
agent, however, when it makes a thing like itself, must possess the form that it
induces through its action (in univocal agents), or some more noble one (in
non-univocal agents). But an instrumental agent need not possess the form
that it induces as disposing that very thing, except only through the mode of
intention, as is clear of the form of the bench in the saw.45

Thus, an equivocal agent has more in common with a univocal
one than with an instrumental one, for the former two are
principal agents, and the instrumental cause is in a class all its
own.
Further, we may consider the aforementioned example of
the white wall affecting the medium and the eye. As we saw, St.
Thomas considers the white to be an equivocal cause of the
white species in the air, which in turn impresses itself upon the
eye. Yet the species in the air does not itself seem to be an
equivocal cause of the species in the eye, for in both cases the
white-wall-oriented form seems to be present in the same way,
namely, such that it “intends” the white wall. It is true that only
in the eye is the form possessed in a knowing organ, forming
the foundation for an act of vision; nevertheless, at the level of

45

IV Sent., d. 5, q. 2, a. 2, qcla. 5. See also IV Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 4; De Malo, q. 4,
a. 3; and STh III, q. 62, a. 3, for similar divisions between instrumental causes, on the
one hand, and both univocal and equivocal ones, on the other.

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the impression of this form—that is, immaterial existence in a
transparent body—the eye and the air receive the form in
fundamentally the same way.46 In short, it seems that the
transparent medium conducting the white to the eye is a
univocal cause. And yet, clearly the transparent medium is an
instrumental cause: it is causally between the white wall and the
eye, communicating the white to the eye in a “flowing” manner,
such that it accomplishes something that exceeds its proper
powers. At least one instrumental cause is not an equivocal
cause.47
Although instrumental causality is not a species of equivocal
causality, the likeness between them is enough to draw the more
modest conclusion that the same agent cause might be called
instrumental from one perspective and equivocal from another.
They might be one in subject but different in account. If one
attends only to the sheer otherness between an agent’s mode of
possessing the form it gives and the effect itself, one would call
the seed, for example, an equivocal cause of animal life; yet if
one attends also to that agent’s intermediacy in causality, and
especially the incomplete character of its possession of the form
it transmits, one would call the seed an instrumental cause of
animal life. Right away, then, one might conclude that this is
why St. Thomas speaks of equivocal agents in the two
aforementioned ways, that is, as possessing the form in a
different way and in a more eminent way. The former is looser
so as to include the equivocal agents that happen also to be
instrumental agents, whereas the latter gets more to the essence
of equivocal agency. But even here caution is needed.

46

This is why, Aristotle and St. Thomas say, both the air and the lens and eye jelly
must be transparent. Before the act of vision is completed or expressed in virtue of the
sensitive soul, the white species is present in the eye in the same way as in the air. See II
De Anima, lect. 14 (418); and De Sensu, lect. 4 (48-54), based on De Sensu et Sensato
2.438a10-16.
47
A simpler instance would be where the species-bearing air acts upon another
transparent medium (say, water) and communicates the species to it (though it would be
refracted); clearly this is univocal instrumental causality. Others are imaginable,
especially in the realm of human art, such as machines that make other machines, or
vehicles designed to transport other vehicles.

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235

On this interpretation of the two ways of speaking, if it be
taken absolutely, any equivocal cause that does not bear the
form in an unambiguously more eminent way would have to be
an instrumental cause. But again the aforementioned examples
check this generalization. We may consider yet again the
example of the white object equivocally causing the white in the
medium and the eye. Here, as St. Thomas notes, the form
materially determining the body engenders a like form
spiritually determining the transparent air and eye, an equivocal
cause that bears the form in a mode inferior to the mode in
which it is received—and yet the white wall is not an
instrumental cause of the formation of the transparent medium,
but its principal cause. Likewise, the real existence of an enmattered form, we saw, is an equivocal cause of the truth of
one’s knowledge of it, and for the same reason the form exists
in a higher mode (that is, intellectually) in the mind, and yet the
real being is not naturally conceived as an instrumental cause of
the knowing but as a principal cause.
Again, a more restrained conclusion seems in order. Some
instrumental causes are equivocal and some equivocal causes are
instrumental, and it is more appropriate to say that the
instrumental equivocal cause bears the form it gives in a
different (because inferior) way than to say that it bears it in a
more eminent way—but this is not to affirm that only
instrumental equivocal agents bear the forms they give in this
lower way. It would be safer to say that the difference between
the two ways St. Thomas speaks should not be divided so
sharply. Perhaps all equivocal agents possess the forms they
induce in a more eminent way in some measure—though what
is meant by such “greater eminence” may differ widely, to the
point that it would often be less confusing simply to describe
this mode of possession as just “different.” I will support this
view shortly, but in order to do so we must discuss another sort
of agent causality that is closely related to equivocal causality,
namely, universal causality.

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IV. UNIVERSAL AND EQUIVOCAL CAUSALITY
A) What Is Universal Causality?
Like equivocal causality, with which it is easily confused,
universal causality is sorely neglected in Thomistic discussions
of causality.48 This may be partly for the same reasons, as again
the sun is St. Thomas’s typical non-divine example; likewise,
when Aristotle famously but cryptically says that “the sun and a
man generate a man,”49 he seems to have in mind the sun
functioning as a universal cause. Saint Thomas introduces this
sort of causality even more frequently than he does equivocal
causality, and its fecundity in sacred theology is vast and underappreciated.50 Indeed, a deeper understanding of it appears to
hold the key for resolving several unnecessarily perennial
disputes in theology and philosophy.51 The following is only an
initial foray into this subtle and difficult matter.

48

Some of the few exceptions I have encountered are Ronald P. McArthur,
“Universal in praedicando, Universal in causando,” Laval théologique et philosophique
18 (1962): 59-95; and Oliva Blanchette, Philosophy of Being: A Reconstructive Essay in
Metaphysics (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2003),
479-84, although this latter deals with it exclusively in terms of divine universal
causality. Rarely is universal causality considered precisely as such. For instance,
Dodds’s excellent treatment of God’s transcendent action (Unlocking Divine Action) is
implicitly about universal causality, but the expression is not used.
49
Phys. 2.2.194b14.
50
Universal causality turns up in every part of the Summa, often at crucial junctions.
In the Prima pars St. Thomas argues that God, and even God’s will, is the universal
cause of all that is (STh I, q. 19, aa. 6, 7, and 11; q. 45, a. 5; q. 49, a. 3). In the Tertia
pars he argues that the incarnate Son of God, and specifically his passion, is the
universal cause of salvation (STh III, q. 4, a. 4, ad 1; q. 7, a. 11; q. 52, a. 1, ad 2).
Likewise, in the Secunda secundae he explains that just as the general virtue of legal
justice is a universal cause of the acts of the other moral virtues, so too the theological
virtue of charity is the universal cause of all virtuous acts (STh II-II, q. 58, a. 6). In the
Prima secundae he even speaks of the vice of arrogance as a quasi-universal cause of the
other vices (STh I-II, q. 162, a. 2).
51
I have in mind the reconciliation of predestination and free-will, the relation
between chance and per se causality, and the proper understanding of the common
good, among others.

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237

Because most of the places where St. Thomas speaks of
universal causality center on God, who is really only the
paradigm and most perfect instance of universal causality,
relying upon them exclusively can lead to overstating the basic
nature of this causality. Hence, the generality in the second
book of Aristotle’s Physics, in the enumeration of the kinds and
modes of causes, is a helpful starting point. Noting an ambiguity
in what Aristotle says about prior and posterior modes of
causality (Phys. 2.3.195a30), St. Thomas presents two ways of
understanding Aristotle:
One should notice, however, that “the universal and the proper” or “the prior
and the posterior” cause can be taken either according to a commonness of
predication (following the examples posited here of the physician and the
artisan), or according to a commonness [communitatem] of causality (as when
we say the sun is a universal cause of heating, but fire a proper cause).52

The first usage of the expressions “proper” or “particular cause”
and “universal cause” designates the universality of the
predicate describing the cause; apparently this is the sense that
Aristotle chiefly has in mind, since his examples are the agent
named as “physician” and as “artist,” respectively. Nevertheless,
St. Thomas takes the opportunity to mention another mode of
causality that equally deserves these names, where the differences are not just according to our manner of contemplating
the causes but in their manner of being a cause.53 As he
continues, St. Thomas explains the difference between causing
universally and causing particularly:
For it is manifest that every power extends to certain things according as they
have in common one account of the object [communicant in una ratione
obiecti]. Also, inasmuch as a power extends to more things, so far is it
necessary that that account be more common [communiorem], and if a power
is proportioned to the object according to the latter’s account, it follows that a
higher cause acts according to a form more universal and less contracted
52

II Phys., lect. 6 (189); he makes this distinction also in STh I-II, q. 45, a. 5.
Hence the two uses of “universal cause” are sometimes distinguished under the
names universale in praedicando and universale in causando. For the sake of simplicity,
however, in the rest of this article I will refer to the universal in causando simply as a
universal cause.
53

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CHRISTOPHER A. DECAEN

[magis universalem et minus contractam]. And one must consider the order of
things in this way, because inasmuch as some things are higher among beings,
so far do they have less contracted forms, and forms more dominant over
matter, which restricts [coarctat] the power of a form.54

In short, since a cause must be proportioned to its effect, the
very same effect can simultaneously have more than one cause
just as the effect can be considered in a more or less universal
manner. This entails, of course, that a more universal cause
brings about a greater number, and even a multitude of kinds,
of effects than does a particular cause. Whence, St. Thomas
continues the connection with universal predications by adding
that since alteration is the genus of heating, and the sun and the
heavenly bodies are universal causes of heating, then “if fire is
the primary thing that heats things [primum calefaciens], then
the heavens are not merely the primary thing that heats things,
but the primary thing that alters them [primum alterans].”55
This should not be understood to mean that the universal
cause causes only part, or one aspect, of the effect, while the
particular cause causes the remainder. This would be to
misunderstand how universal predicates themselves name real
things, for “man” and “animal” name the same reality (namely,
Socrates) but in different ways, according to how determinate
our thoughts are about Socrates. Further, this view would
destroy the unity of the effect, implying that the effect is an
accidental whole, since as a whole it would have no per se

54
II Phys., lect. 6 (189). Because of this communitas, St. Thomas occasionally uses
the name causa communis or communior (STh I, q. 44, a. 2), or even causa generalis
(STh I-II, q. 46, a. 1), to name universal causes. It is noteworthy that, should someone
assert that universal causality is unintelligible as a distinct mode of causality, we do still
speak this way when we call the leader of an army a “general.” Obviously this is a
generality not of predication but of power. The same goes for the longstanding
convention of calling the political heads of medicine, law, and a religious order the
“surgeon general,” “attorney general,” and “superior general,” respectively. There is
nothing military intended in calling these figures “generals” but rather something
pertaining to scope and leadership over other surgeons, attorneys, and superiors.
Likewise, general anesthetic is not anesthetic considered as a genus, but something that
anesthetizes generally, i.e., the whole body.
55
Ibid.

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cause.56 Rather, both causes bring about the entire effect, the
particular cause in a more limited way and the universal cause
in a more encompassing way, for the particular cause brings
about only this instance of the effect (this man Socrates) and
therefore not the effect in virtue of what it is (Socrates as man),
which is due to the universal cause.57 As St. Thomas says,
In the degree that a cause is higher, to that degree it is more common and
more thoroughly an agent [communior et efficacior], and in the degree that it
is more thoroughly an agent, to that degree it more profoundly enters into the
effect [profundius ingreditur in effectum], and from a more remote potency
this very cause leads the effect into act. . . . Thus, if we consider the individual
agents, every particular agent is immediate to its own effect; if, however, we
consider the power by which the action comes to be, thus the power of the
higher cause will be more immediate to the effect than the power of the lower.
For the lower power is not conjoined to the effect except through the power
of the higher; whence it is said in the book de Causis (prop. 1) that the power
of the first cause acts on the thing caused in a prior way [prius], and more
vigorously [vehementius] enters into it.58

As in the case of the principal and instrumental cause, a
universal cause acts through a particular cause, rather than
alongside of and competing with it. Thus, according to ancient
cosmology, the sun does not merely heat bodies when there is
no fire at hand to do so, as though acting as a backup fire; nor
does it simply supply one degree of heat while the fire provides
another, until the wood reaches ignition temperature. Rather, as
a universal cause, the sun gives the fire itself, and all other
agents of alteration, their efficacy as causes, and so it is at work
even in the fire. For the fire bears within itself the power of the
sun, and so the act of heating is even more fundamentally that

56

See ScG III, c. 70, on the whole being caused by both the particular and the
universal cause, not part by each. On all of the aforementioned difficulties, see
McArthur, “Universal in praedicando, Universal in causando.”
57
Saint Thomas sometimes states this principle, perhaps too succinctly, by saying
that the particular cause brings about fieri, whereas the universal brings about esse; for
example, STh I, q. 104, a. 1.
58
De Pot., q. 3, a. 7. See also STh I, q. 79, a. 4.

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of the sun than it is of the fire. Nothing about the effect simply
escapes the reach of the universal cause.59
B) Universal Causality in Comparison to Equivocal Causality
Is universal causality the same thing as equivocal causality? It
is tempting to say yes. Besides the fact that St. Thomas calls the
sun both kinds of cause, at times he uses the language of
universal causality to describe an equivocal cause, for instance,
when he says that “equivocal generations are prior to univocal
generations in this, that equivocal causes hold their influence
over the whole species [habent influentiam supra totam
speciem], but univocal causes do not, but only over one individual.”60 On one occasion he almost appears to equate them:
Although in predications it is necessary that equivocals be reduced to
univocals, nevertheless in actions the non-univocal agent of necessity precedes
the univocal agent. For a non-univocal agent is a universal cause of the whole
species, just as the sun is the cause of the generation of all men. But a univocal
agent is not a universal agent cause of the whole species (otherwise it would
be the cause of its very self, since it is contained under the species); rather, it is
a particular cause, relative to this individual, which it establishes in a
participation of the species. Therefore a universal cause of the whole species is
not a univocal agent. However, the universal cause is prior to the particular
cause.61

Saint Thomas appears to be saying that every nonunivocal (i.e.,
equivocal) cause is universal, and every universal cause must be
equivocal (for no univocal cause can be a universal cause). Thus,
the evidence that, in St. Thomas’s mind, equivocal and universal
causes (and therefore also univocal and particular causes) are

59

See STh I, q. 46, a. 1, ad 6; q. 103, a. 7.
In Boet. de Trin., q. 1, a. 4, ad 4; see also De Verit., q. 1, a. 4, ad 4; and VIII Phys.,
lect. 10 (1053).
61
STh I, q. 13, a. 5, ad 1. Elsewhere St. Thomas makes a similar argument, especially
as regards the divine causality of the very existence of a form; see STh I, q. 104, a. 1.
There is, however, no mention of equivocal causality in this passage.
60

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the same thing is not thin.62 In the following, however, I will try
to show otherwise, both as to the truth of the matter and as to
the mind of St. Thomas.
First, we may consider the obvious fact that the names do
not seem to mean the same thing. Not only do the basic
adjectives in the names in no way connote the same notions—
“equivocal” does not mean the same thing as “universal” any
more than “univocal” means the same thing as “particular”—
but even in St. Thomas’s abovementioned explanation the
meanings do not neatly align. An equivocal cause is one that has
the form of the effect in a different and/or more eminent mode
than the effect, whereas a universal cause is one that intimately
causes all the individuals of a certain genus or species. It is clear,
then, that even if every equivocal cause were universal, and
every universal cause equivocal, the names at least indicate
really distinct rationes, distinct ways of considering a given
cause.
One can make the distinction sharper still, for although all
equivocal causes must be agent causes, not all universal causes
are agent causes. Saint Thomas explicitly speaks of universal
final causes as well. For instance, he points out that a common
good must not be universal in the way a predicate or a concept
is, but precisely as a cause:
Works are indeed in particulars, but those particulars can be referred to the
common good—not, in fact, a good common with the commonness of a genus
or a species, but with the commonness of a final cause [non quidem
communitate generis vel speciei, sed communitate causae finalis], according to
which the common good is called the common end.63

In fact, a moment’s reflection makes it clear that any sound
understanding of the common good entails universality precisely as a cause, a final cause, for otherwise a common good is
nothing other than the very concept of a particular good, a
62
Likewise, in the few discussions of equivocal or universal causality I have
encountered in the secondary literature, authors consistently seem to use the
designations interchangeably.
63
STh I-II, q. 90, a. 2, ad 2; on universal agent vs. universal final causes, see also STh
I-II, q. 2, a. 5, obj. 3 and ad 3.

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universal consideration of many particular goods.64 The
common good, however, is not simply what particular goods all
have in common, but a distinct and higher good, which is
therefore that for the sake of which these particular and private
goods themselves are sought. Whether the common good one
has in mind is that of a family, a city, or the kingdom of God, it
is also the good of the members and is more fundamental to
their desire than the corresponding private goods. Likewise, it is
not a stretch to say that prime matter, the ultimate underlying
of all coming to be, is a (indeed, the) universal material cause.
For every other matter—whether elements of a compound
substance, or organs of an animal, or any material part of a
whole—has its potency to be in some qualified way (esse tale)
through its underlying matter’s potency to be without quailfication (esse simpliciter), and this potency is present in all
coming to be.65 Similarly, there seem to be several instances of
universal formal causality. An exemplar is an external form that
causes all other forms imitating it, its images;66 again, the form
of the universe, which is its order, is a universal cause of all of
the forms of its parts, which seems to be what St. Thomas
means when he speaks of a particular failing in the universe
being unnatural relative to particular natures but natural relative
to “universal nature”;67 in addition, even substantial form seems
to be a universal formal cause of proper accidents.68 Universal
causality seems broader than equivocal causality.

64
See Charles De Koninck, “The Primacy of the Common Good,” in The Writings of
Charles De Koninck,, vol. 2, ed. and trans. Ralph McInerny (Notre Dame, Ind.:
University of Notre Dame Press, 2009), 96-97.
65
One might even say that letters are universal material causes of all speech, even
while granting that syllables and words are particular material causes of the same.
66
This would be especially true of the divine ideas; see STh I, q. 6, a. 4; and q. 15,
a. 3.
67
See STh I, q. 22, a. 2, ad 2; q. 92, a. 1, ad 1; q. 99, a. 2, ad 1.
68
A substantial form’s emanation of its properties is often described by way of an
analogy with agent causality. Nevertheless, since the substance and accident are one in
subject, this is only like agent causality. There is at least as much likeness between
formal causality and the way that the form by which a thing is without qualification
originates the form by which a thing is qualifiedly.

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Perhaps one might grant this and still propose that among
agent causes a universal and an equivocal cause are the same
reality, though each designation expresses a different aspect of
that causality. This still seems to make too strong an association,
though, and the difference between their accounts points
toward another proposal: the idea of an equivocal cause seems
to say less than the idea of a universal cause, and this suggests
that universal (agent) causality is a mode, determination, and
perhaps even a species of equivocal causality. That is, every
universal agent is an equivocal agent, but the converse is not so.
Again, what makes this suggestion most convincing are the
examples enumerated above in part II.
Certainly some of these examples can intelligibly be
described as universal agent causes as well. For instance, like the
sun and God, the architect (or any artist, for that matter),
because he acts in virtue of the art, is a cause of an entire genus
of houses, unlike an underling who is a particular cause because
he works only at the artist’s direction, and perhaps only on one
house, or even part of one house. The same might be said for an
object of knowledge: the object, insofar as it is a real being,
seems to be a universal cause of the truth or awareness of it in
all who can know it. Analogously, the white of this wall is a
universal cause of our knowledge of it through its multiplying
its species in the air and eyes by emanating in all directions.
Again, an animal seems to be a universal cause of all its seed, for
it alone can generate offspring like itself, and it always does so
through its seed.
Nevertheless, many of the other examples are clearly
particular causes. This hot medicine is a cause only of this man
becoming healthy; it is not a panacea, even for this one man, as
he could be healed by other means or from other diseases.
Likewise, friction does not seem to be the universal cause of all
heat, much less of all health.69 And it is clearest of all that an
69
This is true even in the contemporary account of heat where not all heat is caused
by, or consists of, chaotic motion, as there is also radiant heat attributable to light, as
victims of sunburn will attest; St. Thomas himself notes this as well in In II De Caelo,
lect. 10, n. 393. At any rate, the kinetic theory has a tendency to reduce this example to
univocal causality since the common interpretation of it is that heat is nothing more

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animal’s seed is not a universal cause, as it causes only one
offspring.70 Thus, these examples fall short of the encompassing
causality that a universal agent possesses. Indeed, part of the
reason that they cannot be universal causes is that they are also
instances of instrumental causality. For the transcendence of a
universal cause clearly implies principal causality.
If this account is correct, then, when St. Thomas says (in
STh I, q. 13, a. 5) that “a nonunivocal agent is a universal cause
of the whole species,” he should not be interpreted as asserting
that all nonunivocal agents are universal causes, but only that
some (and perhaps the highest ones) are. The procedure of the
argument suggests this, for it is replying to the objection that, as
with equivocation in speech, all equivocal causes presuppose
univocal causes. To undermine this assumption, St. Thomas
needs only to show that this is not necessary, but in fact he goes
further and shows that all univocal causes in fact presuppose
equivocal causes, namely, universal equivocal causes. His point
is that equivocal causes are prior to univocal causes precisely
because there must be a universal cause of the effect’s species
prior to the effect as an individual, and such a cause would have
to be equivocal (otherwise it would itself have the form of the
effect univocally and therefore be the cause of itself). Thus, it is
neither necessary nor relevant to St. Thomas’s argument that his
superficially unqualified claim be taken universally. This reading
also fits the fact that it is precisely instrumental equivocal causes
that seem least of all like universal causes, for instrumental
causes least clearly bear the form of the effect in a more
eminent mode, which a universal cause must do because of its
scope over, and intimacy with, the effect.
Moreover, although not every equivocal cause is univocal, it
is indisputable that every universal cause is equivocal, for the
than chaotic molecular motion, rather than its effect; thus, on the modern theory the
rubbing of my hands is nothing more than directed molecular collisions resulting in
more molecular collisions, which only appear to be the distinct reality called “heat.”
70
Indeed, the parent appears to be a better candidate for this universal causality of
the (potentially many) offspring. Though of course the parent is a univocal cause of its
children, so to call even the parent the universal agent would require some
qualifications. But see note 71 below.

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argument St. Thomas makes—to cause an entire genus requires
not being a member of that genus—is decisive.71 This means, in
turn, that another field of examples of equivocal causality opens
up. For example, besides the theological examples mentioned
above,72 St. Thomas speaks of the ruler of a city, the general of
an army, and even the intellect of the inner senses as being
universal causes.73 Likewise, the common sense power, by which
we sense our act of sensing and discern one sense power from
another, he says is “common” in the mode of a universal cause,
for it is a cause of sensation as such.74 Likewise, prudence is a
universal cause of each of the moral virtues.75 At any rate,
armed with the notion of universal causality as a kind of
equivocal cause, we can now revisit the matter of the “more
eminent” way in which the equivocal agent bears the form it
gives.
V. GRADATIONS OF EMINENCE
A) Preliminaries to a Survey
To illuminate the idea of the more eminent mode with which
the effect pre-exists in the equivocal agent, we will proceed
through a sort of manuductio, or “leading by the hand,”76

71
The only exception I can see to this might be Adam in relation to the human race.
If man generating man is the paradigm example of univocal causality, surely Adam is a
univocal but universal cause; St. Thomas discusses this most clearly in considering
Adam’s sin and its transmission to the race (STh I-II, q. 81, a. 1). Yet perhaps there is
something of equivocal causality even here, as Adam is not merely a man, but (as his
name in Hebrew indicates) Man, and he is not merely a father who happens to be first
in the order of generation, but a father who bears all his offspring in his person in a way
that no other father after has or can.
72
See note 50 above.
73
See STh I-II, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3; q. 6, a. 8; and q. 18, a. 7, respectively.
74
See STh I, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2; and q. 57, a. 2; q. 78, a. 4, ad 2.
75
See STh I, q. 55, a. 3, ad 3; see also I-II, q. 60, a. 1. Saint Thomas draws several
other examples of universal causality from Pseudo Dionysius in his commentary on the
Divine Names (c. 4, lect. 4; and c. 5, lect. 1 and 2).
76
On manuductio, see Marie I. George, “Mind Forming and Manuductio in
Aquinas,” The Thomist 57 (1993): 201-13.

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reviewing some of the examples encountered above, in
combination with a series of oppositions and negations, in order
to manifest the range of degrees of eminence. We will begin by
excluding a possible misunderstanding about what this greater
eminence might consist in, namely, a mere greater intensity.
Saint Thomas’s paradigm case of the opposite of an equivocal cause is fire heating a piece of wood. They are univocally
called “hot”: one does not mean different things when one calls
a fire and a heated piece of wood “hot.” The fire is of course
much hotter than the wood, but this very use of the comparative
indicates that the word is being used univocally: whatever is
hotter than another is as hot as that other, only more so. As
straightforward as this difference in degree is, it is not what St.
Thomas intends when he says that the equivocal agent has the
form of the effect in a different or more eminent mode. When
he distinguishes three kinds of likeness between agent and
patient, he adds that some things
are called like that share in a form according to the same account, and not
according to the same mode, but rather according to more and less (for
example, the less white is said to be like the more white). And this is an
imperfect likeness. . . . [H]owever, some things are called like that share in the
same form, but not according to the same account, as is evident in nonunivocal agents.77

Like the duller and the brighter white, the heat of the wood and
that of the fire differ only in degree (modus), not in account
(ratio). However, with an equivocal agent, though both agent
and patient might be called “hot,” there is not even a likeness of
account; the sun is not merely much hotter than the wood or
the fire (as we might say now), but it is called “hot” in a
different way altogether. One might say that the sun is so much
hotter than the wood that one no longer means the same thing
by the word when one calls it “hot.”78
77

STh I, q. 4, a. 3.
Hence we see better why St. Thomas describes an equivocal cause as possessing the
form in a different account and mode (see note 9). He goes on in this same passage to
say that, although the equivocal agent is never one in species with its effects, often they
are one in genus (for both the sun and wood are bodies). Even this, however, is not
78

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247

With that simple solution ruled out, we can turn now to the
more difficult task of articulating how a form can exist more
eminently. We first note that the form as possessed by the agent
differs from the form as possessed by the patient in a
nonrandom way: the difference derives from the natures of the
possessors. Saint Thomas often distinguishes agent causes in
virtue of this difference:
The agent cause is twofold: One agent is proportioned to the thing susceptible
to its effect—whence it induces in the effect a form of the same species and
account, as in all univocal agents. . . . But another agent is not proportioned to
the one receiving its effect—whence the effect does not attain the species of
the agent, but only a certain likeness of it, as much as it can, as in all equivocal
agents.79

Thus, the axiom that whatever is received is received according
to the mode of the receiver is the reason why not all agents are
univocal. In a way, it is the patient’s “fault” that the agent is
equivocal rather than univocal, since the patient receives “as
much as it can” (quantum potest), but it cannot receive all that
is there in the agent.80 So too, if there is a gradation among the
fundamental capacities of patients, there will also be a gradation
in the greater eminence in modes in equivocal agents. With this
principle in hand we can look again at our examples.
B) Universal Equivocal Causes as Clear Cases of Greater
Eminence
Among equivocal causes, universal causes seem to be the
ones that would most manifestly possess the form they induce in
a more eminent way. Because they generate a thing not merely
necessary for a cause to be an equivocal cause, for God does not share a genus with
anything; he is still, however, one with his creatures “according to a sort of analogy, just
as existence itself is common to all things” (STh I, q. 4, a. 3). For similar language, see
STh I, q. 6, a. 2; and ScG III, c. 24.
79
II Sent., d. 1, q. 2, a. 2. See also II Phys., lect. 11 (242).
80
Hence, elsewhere St. Thomas defines equivocal causality as happening wherever
the patient is “not perfectly assimilated to the agent” because it is not equal in power to
it (De Pot., q. 7, a. 1, ad 8).

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as an individual but as an individual of this species or genus,
they must bear a multitude of different particular forms in a
way that somehow overcomes their opposition and mutual
exclusion. We may consider the sun example again. Heat is not
the only effect that once was attributed to the sun: Fire itself,
the desiccation of bodies, the allegedly spontaneous generation
of vermin in putrefying matter, and even of man himself in
human generation are all effects of the sun, according to the
medievals. In fact, St. Thomas says that the sun is the cause of
all motions, changes, qualities, and substantial forms of generable substances.81 To possess such a panoply of diverse forms
more eminently is somehow to possess them without their
mutual diversity; it is to possess them in a more unified way.
Saint Thomas puts this very problem to himself in the
aforementioned fourth question of the Summa, in the first two
objections to the claim that God possesses within himself all the
perfections of creatures. The objections read:
It seems that the perfections of all things are not in God, for God is simple, as
was shown [q. 3, a. 7], but the perfections of things are many and diverse.
Therefore all the perfections of things are not in God. Further, opposites
cannot be in the same thing. But the perfections of things are opposites; for
each species is perfected through its own specific difference, but the
differences by which a genus is divided and the species are constituted are
opposed. Therefore because opposites cannot be simultaneously in the same
thing, it seems that not all the perfections of things are in God.82

How can manifold distinct, and therefore contradictory and
perhaps even contrary, perfections preexist in God, or indeed in
any universal equivocal agent? Saint Thomas’s reply draws on
Pseudo-Dionysius:

81

For the sun as an equivocal agent cause of fire, see De Pot., q. 7, a. 1, ad 8; of
dryness, see ScG I, c. 31; of “certain animals” in putrefying matter, see Comp. Theol. I,
c. 43 and ScG IV, c. 10; of man, see Comp. Theol. I, c. 198; De Malo, q. 4, a. 3.; and
VIII Phys., lect. 10 (1053); and of all motion, generation, life, and substances, including
their manifold qualities, see II Phys., lect. 4 (175); STh I, q. 4, a. 2, ad 1; ScG III, c. 24
(passim); and In Div. Nom., c. 4, lect. 3 (312).
82
STh I, q. 4, a. 2, obj. 1 and 2.

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“God exists not in a certain mode, but simply and without being enclosed
thereby [simpliciter et incircumscripte] he holds in advance within himself the
whole of existence uniformly [uniformiter]”. . . . To the first, therefore, it
should be said that “Just as the sun,” as Dionysius says in Div. Nom. v, “while
remaining one and shining uniformly, possesses in advance within its very self
uniformly [in seipso uniformiter praeaccipit] the substances of sensible things,
and their many and diverse qualities, so much more so is it necessary that
within the cause of all things there preexist, according to a natural union, all
things.” And thus things that are diverse and in themselves opposed to each
other preexist in God as one, without injury to his simplicity.83

Saint Thomas uses similar language a little later in the Summa:
In a universal cause, the effect is “unequal to the power of the
agent cause,” so it “receives the likeness of the agent not
according to the same account, but deficiently, such that what is
in the effects dividedly and in a manifold way [divisim et
multipliciter] is in the cause simply and in the same mode
[simpliciter et eodem modo].”84 A universal agent in some way—
and God, the most universal of universal agents most
unqualifiedly—unites and thereby possesses all the forms that it
generates, although these forms, in their natural existence
within their proper matter, are mutually opposed. In the single
form of the universal agent they take on a mode of existence
that suppresses their mutual exclusivity, because it supplies for
their deficiency, and allows them to coexist in a noncompeting,
and therefore simpler, way.
Of course this is all well and good in ancient cosmology. If it
no longer appears that the sun is quite as elevated a cause as the
ancients and medievals thought, then are there any clear
instances of universal causes that bear in a unified way the
manifold forms they bring about, other than God himself? Is
there any evidence of this unification of opposites in the
nonobsolete examples treated above? The answer is difficult,
just as it is no longer easy to identify nondivine universal causes.

83

STh I, q. 4, a. 2, corp. and ad 1.
STh I, q. 13, a. 5; see also q. 57, a. 1. In the commentary on the Divine Names St.
Thomas describes these as “united not through the mode of intermingling [modum
confusionis], as stones are united within a wall, but through the mode of a certain
unification [modum unitionis cuiusdam]” (In Div. Nom., c. 5, lect. 1 [646]).
84

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Nevertheless, I propose that we come close to such a clear case
in the case of the architect.
The architect generates a house in virtue of the house-form
within him. How is this so? The house-form in virtue of which
he designs and builds is not merely the image or blueprint in his
imagination. Anyone can have an image, even a detailed image,
of something he wants to have, but only an artist has something
in virtue of which such a house could be actually brought into
being. The relevant house-form is not in the architect’s
imagination but in his practical intellect. Indeed, Aristotle in
one place even says that “the form of the house in the intellect
is the art.”85 But the intellect is formed not by particulars but by
universals, and the practical intellect by universals as realizable
in action or artifice. Thus, the architect creates the house in
virtue of the universal house as present in his art. By the very
universality of this understanding he can see what is the best
form for the given matter and given plot of land, the skills of his
underlings, and even the spending limit of the homeowner.
This, then, is also why the art allows him to make not just this
house, or even only identical houses, but perhaps a myriad of
houses and buildings of different shapes and sizes, all depending
on the possibilities contained within the scope of his art and the
conditions under which it is to be employed.
The architect’s equivocal causality is a sort of universal
causality, where we can see that the art itself is, or contains in a
unified and simple way, the multitude of different possible
houses he might build. A given architect, then, although he is
not a universal cause of “house” as such, is a universal cause of
the houses he might build. Thus, while it is true that we do not
usually name this cause by the effect (except denominatively, by
calling him a house-builder), we do often name the effect by its
cause: We often name the edifice after its architect, calling it a
“Frank Lloyd Wright,” or a photograph an “Ansel Adams,” or a
painting a “Caravaggio.”86 The artist’s name itself comes to
85

Metaphys. 7.9.1034a25.
We could add that Stradivarius names a violin and a Rodin names a sculpture.
Notice this way of speaking seems particularly true when the art in question is fine art,
86

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name a quasi-species. Likewise, then, the artist continues to
create a multitude of different houses because each by itself
manifests his virtue in only a circumscribed and incomplete
way, whereas he possesses the perfections of these otherwise
mutually exclusive creations in a unified, and therefore more
eminent, way.87
A somewhat different, but perhaps even more straightforward, way of detecting a more eminent way of possession
can be gathered from the instance of the white wall, which is, in
a different way, also a quasi-universal cause. It is undeniable
that the medium and the eye bear the sensible species in an
immaterial mode, and therefore in a mode higher than the
mode in which the wall bears it. Nevertheless, it is also obvious
that the wall is white in a more complete way than is the
medium or the eye. Saint Thomas states this simply by saying
that “the form existing perfectly in the matter makes it be such
in act (namely, fire or colored), but if it does not make
something be such, then it is imperfectly in it (such as the form
of the color in the air as in a thing carrying it).”88 One might say
that the wall is white according to its proper account, while the
medium and the eye are white only according to a derivative
account of what white is, even though the mode of existence of
the white in the medium is generically higher than that in the
wall. The impressed species of white is essentially a participation in the white of the wall, just as the individual white of
or has some share in fine art. Thus, for instance, we do not speak of the nourishing
actions of a physician, a therapist, or a spiritual director as pertaining to arts where the
agent is conforming the patient to himself in this way, such that each patient is a
particular product or manifestation of the possibilities of the artist’s art. We certainly do
not name the healed patient by the physician. This is probably both because the patients
in question are human beings, not artifacts, and because the action of these artists is not
a making so much as a helping the patient to help himself.
87
It is perhaps helpful to recall that, as a knower, the artist possesses immaterially
the forms he generates; this allows the same intellect to possess several otherwise
opposed forms, and in a unified way. As Aristotle frequently says, the knowledge of
opposites is one (Topics 1.10.104a15; De Anima 3.6.430b20-25). Thus, the very nature
of knowing must involve an overcoming of opposition, especially insofar as the
opposites are deprived in some way.
88
ScG II, c. 50.

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the wall is a sort of universal cause of its own emanation in all
directions, such that it can be received by many sets of eyes, and
perhaps even in different ways. Thus it is not unintelligible to
say the white of the wall is white in a higher way.
C) Instrumental Agents as Bearing an Element of Greater
Eminence
In spite of the inferiority of instrumental equivocal agents,
even they might contain a trace of greater eminence. In the case
of medicine, its role in conducting, rather than holding on to,
the health it brings about suggests both imperfection and
perfection when compared to the form as it exists in the
successfully healed patient: imperfection insofar as the health is
not in the medicine in any lasting or proportionate way, but
perfection insofar as the health in some way in the medicine is
apt to be communicated to the patient, whereas the health as
received by the patient is not. That is, medicine as such has the
power to mediate health, whereas a healthy animal does not.89
Something similar is true, at least on Aristotle’s account, of the
animal’s seed. It has no animal soul of its own, yet precisely
because it can bring such a soul into act in the appropriate
matter, it must possess in a vestigial and transient way the
power of an adult animal soul. The seed is fecund whereas the
embryo, at least while it is an embryo, is sterile.90 This point
seems in fact to be valid for all instrumental agents. We may
consider again the carpenter’s use of a saw, or the teacher’s use
89
A sign of which is that we do not cure the sick by simply surrounding them with
the healthy, since health, unfortunately, is not contagious. Interestingly, illness seems
not to require a medicine-like instrument (except perhaps the air). It is more like a
univocal cause in this way: illness begets illness.
90
Of course, one must speak with some reservation about Aristotle’s seed example,
since it now looks like the sperm is not the only agent cause of conception. Embryology
has shown that the sperm swims to the ovum, but the ovum seems to grab the sperm
that comes in contact with it, in virtue of an adhesive coating on its surface. The sperm
does not so much penetrate the ovum as it moves from side to side so that the ovum’s
“stickiness” can better attach it to the ovum, so as to allow for conception. Now,
however, we seem to have two equivocal instrumental agents to consider, each of which
acts upon the other. See note 22 above.

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of the spoken word. Freshly cut wood is itself useless for cutting
more wood, and even students who have learned well are not
necessarily ready to teach and certainly not without themselves
using more words as their own instruments.
This in no way modifies our earlier claim that only equivocal
causes that are, or in some way participate in the character of,
universal causes most manifestly possess the forms they educe in
a higher way. It is only to suggest that the gradations and modes
of “greater eminence” might be manifold, since the very fact
that an instrument is lifted up into the principal agent’s causality
is a reason to say that, in some modest sense, even here the
instrumental agent possesses the form it mediates in a higher
way.
VI. EQUIVOCAL CAUSALITY IN MODERN SCIENCE
In this final section, I will tentatively speculate on how this
distinction between univocal and equivocal causes might be
helpful in interpreting both the data and the theories offered by
the natural science of our day. Unfortunately, because these
examples will be wide ranging, my explanation of each will be
brief. My purpose is to provoke, not to prove. Many disciples
of St. Thomas have prematurely abandoned ship in relinquishing natural philosophy to mathematical physics, apparently
thinking the philosophy was going down with the cosmology.
The recognition that some causes operate equivocally can be an
important step both toward a Thomist’s return to the natural
sciences and toward his making sense of, and perhaps even
offering an alternative account of, what the science is itself
looking at. I will begin with some fairly particular examples and
then build to some of the more central theories of contemporary science.
A) Latent Heat
In a modification of Aristotle’s example of heat causing
health, one might point out that heat also causes a body to
change its state. Since the eighteenth century, it has been

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CHRISTOPHER A. DECAEN

noticed that as one heats up a body, the body continually
increases in temperature, and at a determinate rate peculiar to a
given substance, called the substance’s “specific heat capacity.”
This constant rate of temperature increase per heat input,
however, breaks down at two particular temperatures;
suddenly, although heat is still “going into” the substance, the
temperature stops rising. After a few minutes, however, the
substance visibly starts to change its state: either the solid melts
or the liquid boils. The undetected but significant quantity of
heat that brings about this state change without a temperature
change is called that substance’s “latent heat.” Thus, while heat
first and ordinarily causes a substance to get hotter, in certain
circumstances, depending on the particular nature of the
substance, heat causes it to take on a different form.91 As long as
one grants that temperature change and state change are really
different realities, regardless of whatever underlying realities
they might share, one must grant that the heat source is an
equivocal cause of state-change.
B) White Light
Since Isaac Newton’s work in optics it has been clear that the
color white, whether considered as the surface property of an
opaque body or as a property of light, is composed of all the
other colors. If an opaque body is white and illuminated, and an
orange ball is held near it (but is not itself directly illuminated),
the ball appears the color it is, orange. If, on the other hand,
only the ball is directly illuminated, and the white body held
near it (but not itself illuminated), the white body will appear
not white, but orange. Something similar happens whatever the
ball’s color. Thus, a white body appears to have the power to
reveal or activate all the other colors in bodies that we
ordinarily see they have when they themselves are directly
91
Whether this is a substantial or an accidental change is irrelevant to my point.
Aristotle’s view is not as simple as one sometimes hears. He seems to have considered
the vaporization of water as a substantial change (the water becoming air), though he
thinks of freezing as an accidental change. See Meteor. 1.3.340a34; 1.11.347b15;
4.3.380b30-32.

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illuminated.92 The white body, then, is like the sun itself: it
makes orange things appear orange, blue things blue, white
things white, etc. The other colors, however, can reveal only
their own color in other bodies, and then only to the extent that
that color is there to be revealed in the first place; the
illuminated orange body does relatively little to illuminate a
blue body.
One way of expressing the contemporary account of this
phenomenon is to say that white light (or the white of the body)
is really nothing more than all possible colors superimposed on
each other, so this is in fact an instance of univocal agency: it is
the orange actually present in the white object that makes the
orange ball appear orange. This way of interpreting the phenomenon, however, is encumbered with having to assert,
finally, that white does not really exist; it looks like it exists, but
it does not (except perhaps in our sensorium). Only the other
colors are there in reality.93 If it is clear that this would be to
deny the obvious—that white is a real color, perhaps even the
purest of colors—then we cannot take this reductionist
approach, and we have a case of equivocal causality: white has
it in its nature to illuminate the orange as orange, that is, to
make the ball actually able to shine forth the color orange.
This example is particularly striking because one can detect
in it something of the effect’s more eminent existence in the
cause. A multitude of distinct and even opposed colors can be
illuminated by the white, even at the same time in different
objects. Thus, the white surface must bear these otherwise
opposed colors, but in a higher mode—which mode is, or is a
property of, what it is to be white. Whiteness, then, is the
synthesis and harmonizing of all colors, the perfection of color
92
Whether the color is actually in the orange body when it is not being illuminated
(by direct light or by reflection) is irrelevant to my basic point, although one would have
to make further distinctions on each view. For a fuller discussion, see Christopher A.
Decaen, “The Viability of Aristotelian-Thomistic Color Realism,” The Thomist 65
(2001): 179-222.
93
Ironically, one finds in many articulations of the nature of color and light, from
Newton to the present, that conceding this inch, that white is not real, leads inexorably
to granting the mile that no color or sensible quality is real.

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as such; conversely, each color is a finite participation in what it
is to be white, received according to the mode of the receiving
surface.94
This modality is reflected in the color of light when in transit
as well. In the medium a color is present as a light wave which
has its own proper wavelength.95 When several waves are
passing through the same part of the medium they overlap in
noneliminative, but algebraically additive ways; they together
compose a single, albeit complicated, wave form. This composite wave is what is actually in the medium, not two partial
and mutually exclusive wavelengths. In the case of white light,
this is true most of all. Although it does not have its own
wavelength or even a unique wave shape, the white light exists
in the medium as a harmony or blend of waves that reach the
orange body, at which it is absorbed and then its residue
(namely, orange light) is reflected away to illuminate another
body.
C) Electricity and Magnetism
As the study of electricity began to take off in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, it was discovered that
if a compass were placed underneath a wire pointing northsouth carrying an electric current, the needle would turn out of
its own north-south alignment to a determined angle deviation
inversely related to the distance between the wire and the
compass. Were the compass held over the wire, the deviation
would be in the opposite direction, and if placed alongside it,
no deviation at all would occur. Although up to that time only
other magnets (or induced magnets, like iron) had ever been
found to affect magnets, the current appeared to be radiating
94

Aristotle and, even more clearly, St. Thomas seem to have had this insight when
they recognized that the color white is the “measure of all colors, since each color is so
much the nobler to the degree that it approaches more toward whiteness” (In Div.
Nom., c. 4, lect. 3 [310]). Saint Thomas even speaks of light as a universal cause of all
colors; see STh I, q. 14, a. 6; q. 115, a. 1.
95
Here we in fact see modern science’s version of the “flowing intention” St.
Thomas describes in terms of instrumental causality. See above, note 44.

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magnetic action in a rotating circle perpendicular to the wire.
The very air around the current seemed magnetic. In addition, it
was soon discovered that if a piece of iron was placed near a
current (or, to magnify the effect, if the current-carrying wire
was wrapped around the iron) it became magnetic. In short, it
seems that an electric current is an equivocal cause of
magnetism in the region around it.
About the same time, scientists discovered that when a
conducting wire is brought near to a magnet, a small current is
produced in that wire; likewise, when they are separated,
another current is produced, but in the opposite direction.
Thus, moving magnets act like equivocal causes of current.
Further, one can combine these phenomena in electrical
induction. If the current-carrying wire is wrapped around the
iron block and is brought near a second conductive wire, a
stronger current is produced than if the iron were not there.
The first current seems to cause magnetism, which in turn
causes a transitory current in the second wire—a series of
alternating equivocal causes.
These phenomena and the theory that interprets them are
collectively known as “electromagnetism.” The presently
accepted theory that offers a mathematically complete account
of them was offered in the late nineteenth century by James
Clerk Maxwell. It proposes that a single irreducible field of
energy is, in one way, the cause of the current, in another way,
the cause of the magnetism, and in another way mediates both
of them. Although superficially this suggests that the causality is
univocal—the phenomena are all manifestations of one
electromagnetic field—a more coherent account would be to say
that the field itself is an equivocal cause of both phenomena,
and that the magnet, for example, is an equivocal cause of the
state of the field. Albert Einstein’s interpretation of the
phenomenon lends itself to this approach:
[W]e cannot be content . . . [to say] that the magnet acts directly on the iron
through the intermediate space, but we are constrained to say . . . that the
magnet calls into being something physically real in the space around it, that
something being what we call a “magnetic field.” In its turn this magnetic field
operates on the piece of iron, so that the latter strives to move toward the

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magnet. . . . [W]ith [this account’s] aid electromagnetic phenomena can be
theoretically represented much more satisfactorily than without it.96

As long as we grant the sensibly apparent fact that electric
current is not simply the same thing as magnetism, and that
neither simply is the electromagnetic field, we still have a single
field causing two things that are not the field but conditions in
it (and distinct ones at that). As in the account of white light
above, so long as one does not explain the current and the
magnetism to the point of explaining them away, the electromagnetic field’s causality of electricity and magnetism is not
univocal.97
D) The Gravitational Field of General Relativity
In the general theory of relativity, we have another instance
of mutual equivocal causality. Here massive bodies by their very
nature are said to “curve” the space (and time) around them,
thereby influencing the otherwise inertial motions of nearby
bodies in what we identify as gravity, or gravitational orbits.
Thus, a body falls toward the earth because the space-time field
around the earth is more “warped” than that on the opposite
side of the body, in such a way that the distance between the
body and the earth shrinks and bends; this is called “falling.” A
massive body seems to act upon the massless space-time around
it, curving it, and the curved space-time then acts upon another
massive body, bringing them together. Again, this looks like
another case of dual equivocal causality, where one agent is the
instrument of the other.98 Thus Einstein says,
96

Albert Einstein, Relativity: The Special and General Theory, 15th edition (New
York: Bonanza, 1961), 63 (emphasis added).
97
Because it is now clear that light is itself an electromagnetic phenomenon—the
only one sensible to the eye—it seems that the equivocal causality suggested above in an
interesting way presupposes this one; it is not clear to me, however, that it reduces
entirely to this one.
98
According to Newton’s third law about equal and opposite reactions, each massive
body acts on the other, causing mutual gravitation. This does not alter our description,
though it does duplicate it. Interestingly, it does not appear that the third law applies to
a mass’s agency on the gravitational field when it curves it.

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The action of the earth on the stone takes place indirectly. The earth produces
in its surroundings a gravitational field, which acts on the stone and produces
its motion of fall. . . . The body (e.g., the earth) produces a field in its
immediate neighborhood directly.99

Like the animal generating a seed through which he generates
another like himself, the instrumental equivocal agent appears
to mediate a univocal cause and its effect (namely, two bodies
being “weighty” toward each other).
But unlike in the seed example, it is difficult to determine
which is more the instrument of which. In the case of the seed,
although it is true that the parent animal is itself the effect of a
prior seed, it is clear that the parent is the principal agent and
the seed is instrumental, even if the alternation of animal-seedanimal-seed continues into infinity.100 However, it seems on the
face of it reasonable to say that the massive bodies are prior to
the field between them—the “space” between them seems to be
a medium of their mutual action. Yet the nature of general
relativity seems to give primacy to the field. In fact, in some
presentations of the theory, massive bodies are treated as merely
concentrated parts of the field. But even if this is hyperbole—
again, it is contrary to the whole endeavor of natural science to
explain away matter—it is clear that the theory assigns a kind of
priority to the gravitational field.
It is no small irony, then, that this example brings us back to
the heavenly bodies, or at least what they were said to be made
from: the celestial substance, sometimes called “aether.” On
both electromagnetic and general relativistic theories, space is
not empty. Space is, or is filled with, a field (or fields) of
agency. And this quasi-substance seems to be in more than one
way an equivocal cause of much of what is going on in
“ordinary” matter.101
99

Einstein, Relativity, 64.
To say otherwise would be to propose a sort of Dawkins-esque “selfish seed” that
uses the animal to perpetuate itself, which is implausible to anyone attending to the
natures of things.
101
On relativity and electromagnetism in connection with the notion of the aether,
see Christopher A. Decaen, “Aristotle’s Aether and Contemporary Science,” The
Thomist 68 (2004), 398-420.
100

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E) Evolutionary Mutations and Spontaneous Generations
Those who take the time to think about what is implied in
the theory of evolution—and especially Aristotelians and
Thomists—often run up against the fact that it postulates new
species being generated from old.102 No matter how gradualistic
the particular version of Darwinism one considers, as long as
one grants that the parent and the offspring really are of
different species—and, admittedly, some interpretations of
evolution deny this—one must say that at one point a dinosaur,
for example, gave birth to what was essentially a bird. Thus,
unless we consider the bird as just a monster, a deformed
dinosaur and not really a new species, we are asserting the
existence of equivocal generation.
We must then also look for an equivocal agent. It is difficult
to offer this title to the parent dinosaur in any adequate way, if
for no other reason than that this sort of generation seems to
happen by chance, and the parent archaeopteryx by its nature
desires to produce another archaeopteryx, so from its
perspective the bird would be a monster. Therefore we must
trace it back to a higher cause. The contemporary understanding for this agency is that it is immediately, or at least
fundamentally, a result of genetic mutation, which mutation
(again, ironically) often traces back to the sun. That is, high
energy solar rays continuously bombarding organisms lead to
genetic mutations which, when circumstances are right, manifest
themselves at the conception and birth of a new species.
Whether this account is sufficient is debatable, for both
physicists and philosophers, but resolving immediately to the
divine creative agency is even more so; it seems possible that
within the order of creation there could be one or more
102

See, for example, Mortimer J. Adler, The Problem of Species (New York: Sheed
and Ward, 1940); and idem, “Solution to the Problem of Species,” The Thomist 3
(1941): 279-379; see also Etienne Gilson, From Aristotle to Darwin and Back Again: A
Journey in Final Causality, Species, and Evolution (San Francisco: Ignatius, 2009;
originally published in 1971); and W. Norris Clarke, S.J., The One and the Many: A
Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame
Press, 2001), 194-96, 245-60.

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equivocal agents whose per se operation brings about new
species from the potency of matter.103 Yet whether one speaks
of a material agent or an immaterial one, as long as the agent
cause of the first bird cannot itself be a bird, we are talking
about an equivocal cause.
A similar case derives from the borderlands of evolution, at
the origin of life itself. Again we have a sort of irony in that,
after the biologists chided Aristotle for positing an occasional
spontaneous generation in decaying matter (which in the
nineteenth century was shown to be due to a passing fly
depositing its eggs), the beginning of evolution appears to
require just this sort of thing. Somehow somewhere life
“emerged” from the nonliving. Precisely how the proverbial
primordial soup gave birth to the first single-celled organism is
one of the grails of modern biology, but give birth it did,
according to the theory. And again, as long as one does not
make the preposterous claim that not only is there no essential
difference between a blue whale and a beetle, but further that
there is no essential difference between the living and the
nonliving, there is no way around positing one or more
equivocal agents to explain what is going on here.
F) Sensation Itself?
No doubt I am neglecting many other possible candidates
within contemporary science, from the different forms of
energy conversion in thermodynamics, to the various versions
of emergentism in biology, to the observation-triggered collapse

103

For an extended presentation of this Thomistic interpretation of evolution, see
Charles De Koninck’s “The Cosmos,” “The Problem of Indeterminism,” and
“Reflections on the Problem of Indeterminism,” in The Writings of Charles De Koninck,
vol. 1, ed. and trans. Ralph McInerny (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame
Press, 2008), 235-442, but especially 274, 285-87. See also Lawrence Dewan, O.P.,
Form and Being: Studies in Thomistic Metaphysics (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic
University of America Press, 2006), 120-27, 129-30. While he appears to have
reservations about parts of De Koninck’s approach (as do I), Fr. Dewan ends his essay
by saying that he has never encountered “any public discussion of this doctrine of De
Koninck’s,” and he is certainly correct when he says “it merits discussion” (127).

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of a probability wave in quantum theory. However, I will
briefly conclude dialectically with only one more, one that I
think would be incontrovertible to the modern scientist. The
common interpretation of sensation of what Aristotle and St.
Thomas call “proper sensibles” (colors, smells, temperature,
sounds, and flavors) is that they exist only in our perception, in
our mind; what exists “out there” in bodies are purely
quantitative attributes of bodies, whether shapes, frequencies,
densities, or velocities, which somehow act upon similar
attributes of our eyes, ears, hands, etc., and somehow yield the
experiences of color, sound, warmth, etc. It is that “somehow”
to which I want to call attention. If what is not colored acts
upon my eye and/or brain and causes me to experience color,
how is this not equivocal causality?104
CONCLUSION
Readers who are unfamiliar with, and those who are overly
familiar with, the science of the examples I have proposed may
have doubts about whether it is correct to call them equivocal
causes, and I do not wish to overstate the (admittedly cursory)
case I have offered. Perhaps some of them will not bear closer
scrutiny. Nevertheless, I suggest that those who look into these
matters with fresh eyes will become more convinced at least of
the plausibility of the proposals. Some of those more immersed
in contemporary science may be skeptical about this novel
approach to the modern theories in part because of their
habituation to the reductionist approach in the sciences, where
what I am calling equivocal causality is often treated as just
hidden univocal causality. If an x seems to cause a y, the
explanation is often that this is only because x is secretly just
another y, or both are really just z’s. The problem with this
approach is that absolute reductionism, although it begins in
wonder, often ends in surrealism: the phenomenon to be
explained ends up being an illusion, leaving one with only the
104

On this point, see Erwin Schrödinger, What is Life? (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1967), 167-68.

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explanation and nothing to explain.105 However, no sober
approach to natural science will sacrifice the sensible object one
wishes to understand on the altar of an enticingly elegant
theory, both because such a sacrifice is logically incoherent and
because we are more sure that the sensible object exists than
that the theoretical entities that replace it do, and science must
always rely upon what is more known to us. Thus, I contend
that any theory in natural science which takes the reality of the
effect as given will, in positing a cause, often find itself dealing
with equivocal causes.
The number and variety of these examples of equivocal
causality—both those St. Thomas explicitly mentions and those
I suggest based on science unavailable to the Angelic Doctor—
show that the notion of equivocal causality in general is not
narrow in its applicability. Indeed, the more one tries to find
examples, the more they seem to be ubiquitous; one almost
concludes that finding univocal causes is more of a challenge.
Although it seems to come in a wide range of forms, and the
equivocity in question seems to admit of manifold degrees,
some of them quite obscure, St. Thomas’s teaching on equivocal
causality is intelligible in itself, and examples of it appear to be
at work at all levels of reality—even without Aristotle’s sun.106

105

This problem seems to be one of the driving forces behind recent ideas of
“emergence” in contemporary science and philosophy of science. For an early
presentation of the idea of emergence and tempered reductionism in the context of
interpreting quantum theory, see David Bohm, Causality and Chance in Modern Physics
(New York: Harper and Row, 1957), especially 50-67.
106
This essay is an expanded version of a lecture I gave at the West Coast meeting of
the Society for Aristotelian-Thomistic Studies, June 19-20, 2014 at Thomas Aquinas
College. I would like to thank those who attended the talk for their probing questions,
and the insights they offered. I would particularly like to thank Fr. Sebastian Walshe
and Marie I. George for their invaluable comments on the initial talk and the draft of
this essay, respectively.

The Thomist79 (2015): 265-314

“NATURAL,” “FAMILY,” “PLANNING,” AND THOMAS
AQUINAS’S TELEOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDING OF
MARRIAGE
ERIC JOHNSTON
Seton Hall University
South Orange, New Jersey

A

T FIRST GLANCE, the modern Magisterium’s teaching
in favor of “responsible parenthood” and the use of
periodic abstinence seems a challenge to traditional ways
of talking about marriage.
The 1917 Code of Canon Law opened its discussion of
marriage by stating, “The primary end of matrimony is the
procreation and upbringing of the child; the secondary [end] is
mutual help and the healing of concupiscence.”1 Gratian,
summarizing canon law up till the twelfth century, and the
central authority on the topic thereafter, said, “God joined male
and female by nuptial chastity for the purpose of propagating
the race,” and distinguished “the use of the marital act for the
procreation of children” from “the use of promiscuous women,
in the way of dogs.”2 And Vatican II’s Gaudium et Spes states,

1
Codex Iuris Canonici (Rome: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1917), canon 1013.
Translation my own.
2
Gratian, Concordantia Discordantium Canonum, part 2, causa 31, q. 1, can. 12;
causa 27, q. 1, can. 41. Invoking the same principle, he says, “though they come
together to procreate, they may not separate in order to procreate. The bond of
marriage remains even if children, on account of whom it is entered into, do not follow
because of manifest infertility” (ibid., causa 32, q. 7, can. 27), and “The Apostle
concedes their coming together for reasons apart from procreation: even though it is
their depraved habits that impel them to share the bed, nevertheless, they protect their
nuptials from adultery or fornication. But this is not acknowledged on account of their
marriage, but rather ignored for its sake” (ibid., causa 32, q. 2, can. 3). See Edward

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“By their very nature, the institution of matrimony itself and
conjugal love are ordained for the procreation and upbringing
of children.”3
But just three years later, Paul VI’s encyclical Humanae Vitae
failed to mention any such primacy for procreation, or indeed
the very word “end,” instead speaking of “the two meanings”
(significationes) not only of marriage but “of the conjugal act:
the unitive meaning and the procreative meaning.”4 It
proclaimed, “Conjugal love requires in husband and wife an
awareness of their mission of ‘responsible parenthood’,”5
according to which sometimes “the married couple are
concordant in the positive will of avoiding children for plausible
reasons, seeking the certainty that offspring will not arrive. . . .
They are able to renounce the use of marriage in the fecund
periods when, for just motives, procreation is not desirable,
while making use of it during infecund periods to manifest their
affection and to safeguard their mutual fidelity.”6 The 1983
Code of Canon Law completely eliminated the 1917 Code’s
reference to primary and secondary ends—indeed, it eliminated
any reference at all to the “ends” of marriage. And Pope John
Paul II was well known for his abundant embrace of the concept
“responsible parenthood.”7
Peters, “How to Use Pio-Benedictine Footnotes and Gasparri’s Fontes Codicis Iuris
Canonici” (www.canonlaw.info/canonlaw_17fontes.htm).
3
Second Vatican Council, “Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern
World,” Gaudium et Spes 48. Translation from the Vatican website (www.vatican.va).
4
Humanae Vitae 12. Translation from the Vatican website (www.vatican.va).
5
Ibid. 10.
6
Ibid. 16.
7
E.g., Familiaris Consortio 35, 66, 74; Evangelium Vitae 13, 88, cf. 90. The key
magisterial teachings on the use of infertile periods are the sections on “Birth Control”
and “The Heroism of Continence” in Pius XII, “Allocution to Midwives” (Oct. 29,
1951); Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et Spes 50-51; Paul VI, Humanae Vitae 16;
John Paul II, “Theology of the Body,” audiences 120-32 (in the numbering adopted in
Michael Waldstein, ed., Man and Woman He Created Them: A Theology of the Body
[Boston: Pauline, 2006]); Familiaris Consortio 32; Evangelium Vitae 13, 88; Veritatis
Splendor 47-49. See also, Pontifical Council for the Family, The Truth and Meaning of
Human Sexuality: Guidelines for Education within the Family (Dec. 8, 1995). The issue
does not seem to be treated at all in the primary statements on sexuality from the Sacred
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith: “Declaration on Certain Questions

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The ultimate authority cited by the 1917 Code is St. Thomas
Aquinas. “The good of the child is the principal end of
marriage,” Thomas writes in the Scriptum on the Sentences.8
regarding Sexual Ethics Persona Humana” (Dec. 29, 1975); “Instruction on Respect for
Human Life in its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation Donum Vitae” (Feb. 22,
1988). Scholarly treatments of natural family planning include G. E. M. Anscombe,
“Contraception and Chastity,” reprinted in Why Humanae Vitae was Right: A Reader,
ed. Janet E. Smith (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993), 119-46; Alexander R. Pruss,
“Christian Sexual Ethics and Teleological Organicity,” The Thomist 64 (2000): 71-100;
Ernest Fortin, “Humanae Vitae’s Silver Jubilee: Twenty-Five Years Later,” in Ernest L.
Fortin, Collected Essays, vol. 4, Ever Ancient, Ever New: Ruminations on the City, the
Soul, and the Church, ed. Michael P. Foley (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007);
Mary Shivanandan, “Feminism, Nature and Humanae Vitae: What’s Love Got to Do
with It?” Nova et Vetera (English ed.) 6 (2008): 901-26; Joseph W. Koterski, S.J.,
“Theological Reflections on Natural Family Planning,” Nova et Vetera (English ed.) 6
(2008): 765-78; and in general, Janet Smith, ed., Why Humanae Vitae Was Right: A
Reader and Humanae Vitae a Generation Later (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic
University of America Press, 1991); and all of Nova et Vetera (English ed.) 6, no. 4
(2008).
8
As is standard, the 1917 Code first cites Gratian, then pontifical statements—none
of which contain the language of “primary” and “secondary”—followed by citations
from Roman Congregations. The first of these is from an instruction of the Holy Office
(“S.C.S. Off., instr. [ad Ep. S. Alberti], 9 dec. 1874”). That decree gives the wording
cited here from St. Thomas, though it mistakenly cites it as IV Sent., d. 23, q. 1, a. 1,
ad 7, a particular place that does not exist, in a discussion about the anointing of the
sick. Thomas does repeatedly say, however, including in IV Sent., d. 33, that children
are the “finis principalis” of marriage: see IV Sent., d. 30, q. 1, pro.; d. 31, q. 1, a. 2, ad
1; d. 31, q. 1, a. 3 (although the sacrament is the “principal good,” the child is the
“principal end”); d. 32, q. 1, a. 2, qcla. 2; d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, arg. 3, corp. and ad 6-8;
d. 33, q. 1, a. 2; d. 33, q. 1, a. 3, qcla. 1; d. 33, q. 1, a. 3, qcla. 3; d. 33, q. 2, a. 1, arg. 1
and 4 and ad 4; d. 33, q. 2, a. 2, qcla. 1. See also d. 30, q. 1, a. 3, ad 1 (where Thomas
says there can only be one principal end, but many secondary ones), and d. 27, q. 1,
a. 1, qcla. 2, ad 1 (where he says “woman was principally made to be a help for man in
children,” in adjutorium prolis).
In the first of these passages, Thomas attributes the distinction to the Sentences itself.
In d. 30, c. 3, “De finali causa coniugali,” Peter Lombard states, “the principal final
cause of contracting matrimony is the procreation of children. For this reason God
established wedlock between the first parents, to whom he said, ‘Be fruitful and
multiply, etc.’ The second is, after the sin of Adam, the avoidance of fornication; hence
the Apostle says, ‘on account of fornication each one has a wife, and each woman has
her husband.’ There are also other honest causes, such as the reconciliation of enemies
and the reestablishment of peace. And there are also less honest causes” (Sententiae in IV

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Calling upon the etymology that says matrimonium comes from
matris munium, “the duties, or office, of motherhood,”9 he
writes, “since things are for the most part named from their
end, as being their best part, the coming together which is
matrimony gets its name from the good of the child, which is
what is principally sought through matrimony, while the name
‘concubine’ expresses that conjunction in which only the shared
bed [con-cubile] is sought for its own sake.”10
Has the modern Magisterium abandoned the doctrine that
children are the principal end of marriage? Does “natural family
planning” turn marriage into concubinage? The solution can be
found through a more robust examination of ends. Thomas
himself gives a richly teleological account of marriage11 that
allows us to see why the avoidance of childbirth, by appropriate
means, can at times be advisable precisely in view of children as
the “primary end” of marriage.12
In the first part of this article, I will establish Thomas’s
teleological understanding of marriage, first in the straightLibris Distinctae, v. 2 [Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras
Aquas, 1981], 441).
9
See IV Sent., d. 27, q. 1, a. 1, qcla. 2.
10
IV Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 3, qcla. 1.
11
Indeed, he introduces marriage in ScG III, c. 122, precisely as his primary concrete
example of how the teleology of God’s providence and man’s participation in it relates
to actual life in the world.
12
This will also help us to understand why the Magisterium has long been
remarkably weak in its adherence to Lombard’s distinction of “primary” and
“secondary” ends. The papal authorities cited by the 1917 Code in fact do not use the
language they are cited to support. Eugenius IV (in the constitution Exultate Deo [Nov.
22, 1439]) refers to the “triplex bonum Matrimonii”; Benedict XIV (in the constitution
Dei Miseratione [Nov. 3, 1741]) says he is concerned “for the care of the education of
the child, and to preserve the other goods of matrimony”; and Leo XIII, in his 1880
encyclical on marriage, Arcanum, which the Code cites in its entirety, uses the word
“end” only one time, when he says, “If, then, we consider the end of the divine
institution of marriage, we shall see very clearly that God intended it to be a most
fruitful source of individual benefit and of public welfare. Not only, in strict truth, was
marriage instituted for the propagation of the human race, but also that the lives of
husbands and wives might be made better and happier” (Arcanum 26). Even the
paragraph cited from the decree of the Holy Office begins, “No one is unaware that the
child is another end of matrimony.” The legal language of “primary” and “secondary”
does not require any diminishment of the “secondary ends.”

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forward presentation of the Summa contra gentiles, then in the
richer, more complicated presentation of the Summa theologiae.13 In the second part, I will show how Thomas’s use of
this teleological understanding can inform our understanding of
nonprocreative sex. In the third part, I will briefly consider
“lactational amenorrhea” as an illustration of the natural
ordering of human biology to the greater goods sought through
natural family planning. In the end, we shall see how the phrase
“natural family planning” illumines, almost as does a definition,
a full Thomistic understanding of marriage. We shall see, too,
how this view of nature and teleology reveals a profound
hylemorphic unity between biology and morality in Thomas’s
understanding of marriage.
I
A) The Unnaturalness of Fornication
We find Thomas’s most straightforward account of marital
and sexual ethics in the Summa contra gentiles, book 3, chapters
122-26.14 He begins with a surprisingly modern statement of
13
On Thomas’s theology of marriage, see Paul Gondreau, “The ‘Inseparable
Connection’ between Procreation and Unitive Love (Humanae Vitae, §12) and
Thomistic Hylemorphic Anthropology,” Nova et Vetera (English ed.) 6 (2008): 731-64;
idem, “The Natural Law Ordering of Human Sexuality to (Heterosexual) Marriage:
Towards a Thomistic Philosophy of the Body,” Nova et Vetera (English ed.) 8 (2010):
553-92; idem, “The Redemption and Divinization of Human Sexuality through the
Sacrament of Marriage: A Thomistic Approach,” Nova et Vetera (English ed.) 10
(2012): 383-413; idem. “The Natural Ordering to Marriage as Foundation and Norm
for Sacramental Marriage,” The Thomist 77 (2013): 41-69; Steven A. Long, “An
Argument for the Embryonic Intactness of Marriage,” The Thomist 70 (2006): 267-88;
and Angela McKay, “Aquinas on the End of Marriage,” in Human Fertility: Where Faith
and Science Meet, ed. Richard J. Fehring and Theresa Notare (Milwaukee, Wis.:
Marquette University Press, 2008), 53-70.
14
Thomas stopped writing on Dec. 6, 1273, before reaching the section on marriage
in the Tertia pars. The questions in the Supplement to the Summa theologiae were
compiled after his death by Reginald of Rome, from Thomas’s extensive treatment of
marriage in the Scriptum super Sententias. This material comes from the very beginning
of his career, however, and there is clear evidence of development in his thinking on the

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ERIC M. JOHNSTON

the question: if an unmarried man and woman (sub nullius
potestate) freely choose (ea volente) to engage in sexual
intercourse, whom are they hurting (ScG III, c. 122, n. 1)?15 He
quickly dismisses the idea that they are hurting God or
scandalizing their neighbors unless there is some human good
under assault (ibid., nn. 2-3).
To solve the problem, he introduces teleology, recalling that
it is the central theme of book 3, on God’s Providence.16
God cares for each thing according to what is its good. Now, it is the good of
each thing that it reach its end; its evil is that it be diverted from its due end.
This is true of parts as it is of wholes: so that each part of a man, and each act
of those parts, might obtain the end that belongs to it [finem debitum]. (Ibid.,
n. 4)

Unlike urine, sweat, and other excretions, the good of semen
is not only to be secreted: for the individual it is a superfluity,
but it plays a necessary role in the propagation of the species. It
has an end beyond just being secreted. It should, therefore, be
used in the context of that end, and not that of sexual
perversity.17 So far so good.
matter; moreover, as Thomas describes in the prologue to the Summa theologiae, the
presentation of the Sentences leaves much to be desired. In 1268-72, Thomas
commented on the Gospel of Matthew, where Jesus discusses marriage in 5:27-32 and
19:3-12; a sixteenth-century editor, however, replaced Thomas’s commentary on
5:23-6:8 with that of Peter of Scala (see the entry by Gilles Emery, O.P., in Jean-Pierre
Torrell, O.P., Saint Thomas Aquinas, v. 1, The Person and His Work, trans. Robert
Royal [Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996], 339-40).
The commentary on the latter section holds very closely to the particular challenges of
the text. If a fuller account of marriage was given, it must have been in the lost
commentary on 5:27-32. There is also an important discussion in Thomas’s
commentary on First Corinthians 7 (likely written in 1272-73), which we will examine
below. The commentary on Ephesians 5:22-33 focuses more on the marriage of Christ
and his Church (the larger theme of Ephesians) than on human marriage.
15
References to the Summa contra gentiles include paragraph numbers taken from
the online edition at www.corpusthomisticum.org.
16
See ScG III, c. 1.
17
Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1986) defines “perversion” as “an
aberrant sexual practice esp. when habitual and preferred to normal coitus.” I shall use
this word where the tradition Thomas receives uses contra naturam, because the latter
phrase is ambiguous, as will be explained below. If one prefers a more vivid translation,

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Thomas uses his opening consideration on the proper end of
semen to point us to a more fundamental sexual teleology.
Semen, he adds,
is emitted for the use of generation, to which coitus is ordered. But human
generation would be futile unless it was followed by the nutrition that is due
to it, for what was generated would not survive, if the appropriate nutrition
were withdrawn. Thus the emission of semen ought to be ordered so that both
a fitting [conveniens] procreation can follow, and also the rearing of what is
procreated. (Ibid.)

These brief sentences set out in teleological terms an entire
trajectory of sexual ethics.
Thomas argues that the female plays a twofold role in
childbearing: both contributing to the conception of the child
and giving nutrition to what is conceived.18 Thus by introducing
nutrition in this context, he makes clear that depositing seed in
the womb is not the “end” of sexual activity. The end of the
seed is not just conception but a healthy pregnancy—and after
that a healthy upbringing. Thomas quickly sketches out, in fact,
that the ultimate end of sexual intercourse is not conception but
a healthy adult—and thus we see that he makes an important
move when, in discussing the “principal end” for the first time
in the Sentences, he says, “by ‘the child’ is understood not only
the procreation of the child, but also his upbringing, to which as
to an end is ordered the entire sharing of works between man
and wife.”19

Romanus Cessario, O.P., quotes Mary Ann Glendon’s translation of contra naturam as
“the filthy five”: “masturbation, bestiality, sodomy, contraception, and fetishes”
(Romanus Cessario, “Humanae Vitae 17: Vaticinium ex eventu?” Nova et Vetera
[English ed.] 6 [2008]: 728).
18
For Thomas’s fullest account of the process of conception, including the woman’s
active role, see De Pot., q. 3, a. 9, ad 9. See also STh III, q. 32, a. 4, on Mary’s “activity”
in the conception of Christ. See also Eric M. Johnston, “The Biology of Woman in
Thomas Aquinas,” The Thomist 77 (2013): 577-616.
19
IV Sent., d. 31, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1. The text of Lombard (cited above) says only “the
procreation of children,” but the 1917 Code and Gaudium et Spes follow Thomas’s
exact language: “procreatio et educatio.”

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Thus the sense in which sexual perversity is unnatural
(because it does not allow the semen to bring about a
conception) and abortion is unnatural (because it does not allow
a pregnancy to end in a healthy birth)20 also shows how
fornication is unnatural (because it does not give the child that
is born the familial context in which he may grow to be a
healthy adult). In this movement, Thomas clearly melds the
“natural” ordering of biology with the “natural” ordering of
human actions.
He applies the principles, in a human-animal syllogism
central to every treatment of marriage he offers:
Now, for whatever animals there be in which the female does not suffice for
the raising of the offspring, male and female remain together after coitus as
long as is necessary for the raising and instruction of the offspring. . . . But it is
manifest that in the human species the female alone is least of all sufficient for
the rearing of the offspring. (ScG III, c. 122, n. 6)

B) “End,” “Due,” “Nature”
It is worth paying attention to the richness of Thomas’s use
of the words “end,” “due,” and “nature.” Although we often
think of “ends” in terms of subjective intentions or “purposes,”
Thomas here seems to draw more on the physical idea that
natural processes have a typical “endpoint.”21
Thomas explains this teleological understanding of nature at
length in his commentary on book 2 of Aristotle’s Physics.
There Aristotle defines nature as “a principle of motion and
rest” (adding the precisions “in the thing the nature is in, first

20

Note that in this context, the tradition calls abortion “murderous” even when,
according to a traditional embryology, it is not technically murder: whether or not the
fetus is a human person, the intention of the act is to destroy a life in the process of
becoming. See Lombard, IV Sent., d. 31, and the comments in note 39 below.
21
For a classic treatment of Aristotle’s analogical use of the word end, see Robert
Sokolowski, “What is Natural Law? Human Purposes and Natural Ends,” The
Thomist 68 (2004): 507-29.

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and per se and not secundum accidens”).22 The end is the place
where the motion comes to rest: “He says ‘of motion and rest’
because those things that are naturally moved to a place
similarly, or rather naturally, rest in that place.”23 Although
motion is defined by the four causes, it is appropriate to insist
particularly on the end, both because it is less obvious (since it
only arrives at the temporal end of the process)24 and because
the end is “aliarum causarum causa,” the cause that makes the
agent, the material, and the form to be what they are.25
Aristotle’s five demonstrations that nature is “among those
things that act for an end” illustrate how the idea of an ordered
motion toward an end is at the center of his understanding of
“nature.” First, natural things act predictibly, because all their
actions are aimed at an end. Second, they are orderly, as a plant
puts down roots, then grows a stalk, and then puts out leaves:
“the beginning and what follows are done in order to reach the
end,” “unless something impedes them from reaching it.” Third
(a further explanation of the second point), just as the art of
medicine chooses its acts in order to reach the natural good of
health, so too nature itself acts as if prudently to achieve its
ends. Fourth, nature is most clear in animals, who act in such
purposeful ways that one is tempted to think they are
intelligent. Fifth, the form of a thing is itself the conclusion of
the process by which it comes to be.26 All of these explanations
manifest an understanding of nature as an orderly sequence of
actions toward an end.

22

I will present Aristotle’s doctrine through Thomas’s commentary. The words
“principium motus” are first proposed at II Phys., lect. 1, n. 3; the full definition is
presented in ibid., n. 5.
23
II Phys., lect. 1.
24
Ibid., lect. 5.
25
“This species of cause is most powerful among the other causes, for the final cause
is cause of the other causes. For it is clear that the agent acts on account of the end; and
similarly it was shown above with artifacts, that forms are ordered to their use as to an
end, and materials are to their forms as to an end. For this great reason, the end is called
cause of causes” (ibid.).
26
II Phys., lect. 13.

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Thus Aristotle says that “end” can also be said of
intermediaries, steps on the way to the ultimate end: “lest
someone believe that only that which comes last is a cause ‘on
account of which’.”27 Health is the end for which we prefer
leanness; leanness the reason we undertake a cleansing;
cleansing the purpose of a medication; and the medication the
reason for acquiring certain materials. To refer to this
understanding that nature is defined by motion toward an end, I
shall use the word process.
Thomas’s opening presentation of marriage in book 3,
chapter 122 of the Summa contra gentiles ties human intention
to this conception of natural “process.” Here “end” is primarily
coordinated with the verb sequor (to follow): that word in fact
appears more frequently in the chapter (nine times) than does
finis (four times), though it always denotes the same idea.28
What normally “follows” upon ejaculation is the entrance of
sperm into the womb; “then” conception, then pregnancy, then
birth, then growth to maturity, supported by both proper
feeding (which Thomas introduces through a surprisingly long
tangent on mammalian milk and the way birds replace it [ScG
III, c. 122, n. 6]) and human instruction. “End” primarily
denotes, not a human purpose, but a chain of events.
“Due,” debitum, unites a moral assertion with a purely
natural process. “Evil,” malum, is for a thing to be “diverted”
from its due end; parts as well as wholes should reach this due
end (ibid., n. 4). Thus far the use of the word seems to apply to
the moral realm. But then Thomas says it would be futile,
frustra, if the “due” nutrition did not “follow” on generation,
27

Ibid., lect. 5.
“The good of each thing is that it follow through [consequatur] to its end”; “the
generation of a man would be futile if the due nutrition did not follow”; “the emission
of seed should be ordered such that an appropriate [conveniens] generation, and the
education of what is generated, can follow”; “the emission of seed in such a mode that
generation cannot follow”; “a mode by which generation cannot follow secundum se”;
“but if per accidens generation cannot follow the emission of seed”; “if semen is emitted
such that generation can follow, but appropriate [conveniens] rearing is impeded”;
“natural rectitude in human actions is not according to things which happens per
accidens in one individual, but according to those things which follow [consequuntur]
for the whole species”; “the emission of seed such that offspring cannot follow.”
28

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because what is generated would not endure if that due
nutrition is taken away. Thus the emission of semen “ought”
(debet) to be “orderly,” such that the fitting generation and
education can “follow.” Even the word for fitting, conveniens,
also principally denotes a process: what “comes along.” Here
what makes something “due” is precisely the possibility of it
following its natural course to its natural end (an ought from an
is).
Thus it is no small sin, he says, if one emits semen apart from
the “due end” of generation and education. He contrasts this
with walking on one’s hands, which is not what hands are
“ordered” to do according to nature (ibid., n. 9). He uses the
distinction to bring out the idea of natural process. The problem
is not an isolated atypical use of hands or semen. The problem,
rather, is that by un-orderly emission of semen, the good of
man is impeded, inasmuch as the natural process of preserving
and passing on the species is thwarted. The difference is a
matter of process: walking on hands does not impede a natural
process and thus thwart the reaching of an end, the way that
sexual impropriety does. The justice implied in debitum has to
do, not just with an isolated purpose, but with a longer process.
Finally, the six central paragraphs of this chapter use the
word “natura” fourteen times. On the most basic level, nature
describes automatic, biological realities: mammalian mothers
have milk “prepared by nature”; nature makes up for the lack of
milk in birds by giving most species of bird fathers a natural
instinct to stay with the mother and feed her offspring.29 In
29

“For since the bird does not nourish its offspring with milk, which is at hand, as it
were prepared by nature, as happens with quadrupeds, but must seek for food for its
offspring elsewhere; and since it must, further, keep them warm by sitting on them; the
female alone does not suffice to do this. Thus by divine providence it is naturally innate
to the male in such animals, that he remain with the female to raise the little ones” (ScG
III, c. 122, n. 6).
Aristotle notes that marsh birds and many other heavy species, which live closer to
their sources of food, do not need the presence of the father and thus mate
indiscriminately. These observations, however, appear to be inductive, not deductive; he
notes that the mating behaviors of crows are slightly different from other tree-dwelling
birds, and does not try to explain away the difference. On normal birds, see Historia

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general, animals “have by nature their own kind of prudence,”
by which they provide for themselves; Thomas contrasts this
with man, who uses reason instead.30 In the passage about
walking on one’s hands, he speaks of what is “ordered
according to nature,” easily sliding between “according to
nature,” “good,” and “the good of nature.” In the same passage,
he also speaks of nature as that which is procreated (ibid., n. 9).
In all of these passages, nature seems to refer to a “naturally
occurring” process, by which a thing grows into what it is and
acts like what it is.
Man’s relation to nature is similar. Just as it is natural for
many birds to stay with their mates and offspring, so too with
man (ibid., n. 6). Thus marriage is “natural” to man, both as
what his natural inclinations incline him toward and as the way
in which nature provides for human children; to act contrary to
marriage, as by fornication, is “against the good of man” (ibid.,
n. 8)—“good” again being identified with the “end” of the
“natural” process. Among sexual acts, the kind that per se tends
to create babies is a “natural conjunction of male and female,”
whereas those which do not are called sins “against nature”
(ibid., n. 5).31
Finally, Thomas speaks of “natural rectitude” in human
actions. This rectitude is defined, not by the outcome of the
specific act, but by the way it relates to the longer natural
process. Thus Thomas dismisses the case of a self-sufficient
woman, who would not need the material help of her children’s
father, by saying “natural rectitude in human action is not
according to what occurs per accidens in one individual, but
according to what follows [consequuntur] for the species as a
animalium 6.8.564a7-10 and 9.7.612b18-34. For exceptions see HA 6.8.564a12-18 (on
marsh birds), HA 9.8.613b6-8, 25-30 (on heavy birds), and HA 6.9.564b2-6 (on
peacocks). In HA 6.18.572a5-8 he notes that many domesticated animals (such as
Thomas’s favorite examples, dogs and chickens) lose their instinct to care for their own
offspring.
30
“Other animals naturally have their prudences [suas prudentias], by which they can
provide for themselves [sibi providere], but man lives by reason, which must arrive at
prudence [ad prudentiam] by the experiences of a long time” (ibid., n. 8).
31
The description of such acts as contra naturam, and perhaps a stimulus to think of
sexual activity in terms of nature, comes from St. Paul’s Letter to the Romans 1:26-27.

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whole” (ibid., n. 7). In isolation, the act may have acceptable
consequences, but it is judged in relation to the normal
“natural” process. (We shall consider this text further below.)
In discussing sexual acts, Thomas is quick to draw a radical
distinction between perverse acts, which are of their nature
unable to conceive a child, and those that are only unable per
accidens (ibid., n. 5). His example, a woman who is “sterile,” is
interesting: sterility is a permanent condition, which Thomas
explicitly distinguishes from temporary infertility;32 sterility
seems to be the most extreme case. An action is “natural” or not
according to the whole normal process that follows on the
nature of the species, not just the immediate consequences.
Nature denotes a process towards an end.
In the question on lust in De malo (written in preparation
for the Secunda pars), Thomas sums up the argument:
The act of lust can be called contra naturam in two ways. First, absolutely, as
it is contrary to the nature of every animal; and thus every act of lust apart
from the intercourse of male and female is called contra naturam, inasmuch as
it is not proportionate to generation, which in all kinds of animals comes from
the intercourse of the two sexes; this is how the Gloss speaks [on Romans 1].
In another way, an act is called contra naturam because it is against the proper
nature of man, to which it belongs to order the act of generation to its proper
[debitam] upbringing; in this way, all fornication is contra naturam.33

Thomas’s easy movement between biological and moral
“nature” is perhaps surprising. But his classic presentation of
natural law, in question 91, article 2 of the Prima secundae,
similarly defines nature in terms of an interior principle of
motion toward an end. God’s eternal law is present in creation
as the ruling and measuring is present in the ruled and
measured: “from his impression they have their inclination to
their proper acts and ends,” their nature. Man too has this
32
See IV Sent., d. 32, q. 1, a. 2, qcla. 2, arg. 3 and ad 3; d. 34, q. 1, a. 5. In the
Summa theologiae, Thomas uses the word to describe mules (STh I-II, q. 77, a. 2, obj.
4), Abraham’s wife Sarah (STh I-II, q. 102, a. 5, ad 1), and St. Elizabeth (STh III, q. 30,
a. 4, ad 3).
33
De malo, q. 15, a. 1, ad 7.

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“natural inclination to his due act and end.” When the Psalm
says “the light of your face is signed upon us, O Lord,” it means
“all our reasoning is derived from naturally known principles,
and all our appetites for things that are ad finem are derived
from our natural appetite for the ultimate end” (STh I-II, q. 91,
a. 2, ad 2), as the measurer is in the measured. Like all of
creation, man has his nature from the Creator; his nature
constitutes a principle of motion toward his proper end; and
insofar as man is diverted from that end, his nature is thwarted.
And as with all natures, this inclination toward the end includes
inclinations toward subordinate, “secondary” ends.34
C) Personalism and Teleology in the “Secunda secundae”
The treatment of lust in the Summa theologiae seems to
follow a different order, considered in relation to personal
injury rather than to nature. This difference is partly a matter of
context: the Summa contra gentiles introduces marriage as a
paradigmatic concrete example of how the divine law fits within
divine providence,35 whereas the Secunda secundae is examining
the virtues, ordered by charity and justice; the Summa contra
gentiles is considering marriage, the Secunda secundae lust; the
Summa contra gentiles focuses on divine order, the Secunda
secundae on the human good. But nature and teleology
undergird even Thomas’s more “personalist” treatments of
sexuality.
The Summa contra gentiles surprises us by dismissing the
argument that fornication does personal injury. The chapter on
fornication concludes, “after the sin of homicide, by which an
already existing human nature is destroyed, this kind of sin, by
which the procreation of human nature is impeded, seems to
34

See STh I-II q. 94, a. 2, where Thomas gives his classic and much controverted
presentation of man’s inclination toward “the conservation of his being, according to his
nature . . .; man’s inclination . . . according to the nature he shares with the other
animals, toward the conjoining of male and female, and the rearing of children, and the
like . . .; man’s inclination toward the good according to the nature of reason . . .; the
natural inclination to know the truth about God, and to live in society.”
35
See ScG III, c. 121.

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hold second place.” In light of his arguments, it is strange that
Thomas does not point out that fornication36 does do harm to
the child who might be born. Instead, both in his Latin and in
the logic of his argument, the final word is nature.37
By contrast, when he treats fornication in question 154 of
the Secunda secundae, on the kinds of lust, his principle is that
“every sin committed directly against the life of man is a mortal
sin.”38 The arguments are the same: some animals need the
presence of the father for the rearing of the offspring, therefore
males of these species “naturally” care for their young, and
exceptions to the rule (as a father who provides at a distance)
are accidental, and thus incidental to moral judgments.
But here the charge is not so much that fornication is
unnatural or irrational as that it hurts the children who may
result. It is ranked in wickedness according to its offense against
human life: fornication is worse than stealing “and the like,”
which attack only exterior goods, but not as bad as murder,
because murder is against one “already born,” whereas
fornication is against the one who is to be born in the future.39
36

Always recognizing that by “fornication” he means properly procreative acts, only
analogically similar to properly nonprocreative, perverse sexual acts.
37
“Unde post peccatum homicidii, quo natura humana iam in actu existens
destruitur, huiusmodi genus peccati videtur secundum locum tenere, quo impeditur
generatio humanae naturae” (ScG III, c. 122, emphasis added).
38
STh II-II, q. 154, a. 2.
39
STh II-II, q. 154, a. 3. Those concerned with the modern abortion debate will note
that Thomas appears to be imprecise in locating the key point as birth: rather than iam
natus and nasciturus, perhaps it should be iam existens and futurus. In fact, the point
was already clear in Lombard’s Sentences, drawing on Augustine’s De bono coniugali,
De nuptiis et concupiscentia, Super Exodum, and De quaestionibus novi et veteri
testamenti, and Jerome’s Ad Algasiam. In distinction 31, Thomas explains, Lombard
considers Augustine’s three goods of marriage; then he considers those who oppose
marriage’s orientation to children. First he treats those who simply do not intend
children; then those who actively impede children through . . . birth-control drugs
(venena sterilitatis). Seeing the connection between lust and an attack on human life,
Augustine calls this “libidinosa crudelitas vel libido crudelis”: they “wish to kill the child
before it lives—or, if it is alive in utero, to kill it before it is born.” If they agree to this,
they are not properly married at all. If one does it against the other’s will, he is an
adulterer with respect to his wife, or she a prostitute with respect to her husband. This

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In contrast to the order in the Summa contra gentiles,
perversity (contra naturam) is treated last, not first.40 This sets
up a ranking of the different kinds of lustful sins.41 As in the
Summa contra gentiles, perversity is worst, being contrary to
what is determined by nature. But rather than setting the tone
for other sins, contra naturam is then dismissed, and replaced
by relationships. Coitus with close relations42 offends against the
people we most ought to respect; stealing a girl from her
husband is worse than stealing her from her father, because the
husband has a greater claim; stealing her away does more injury
to her father or husband than merely having coitus with her;
taking her virginity does more injury to her than if she had
already lost it; and all of these are worse than simple
fornication, insofar as they all hurt the child to be born, but the
other kinds hurt other people as well. The emphasis seems to be
not on nature but on personal injury.
When we look closer, though, we find that even these
arguments are rooted in teleology. To take a girl’s virginity
hurts her precisely because it prevents her from entering into a
normal marriage. If she is still under her father’s power, it hurts
him because it interferes with the paternal care to which
leads, Thomas says, to a secondary question, “When is abortion murder?” This is a locus
classicus for the tradition’s denial of immediate infusion of the rational soul. For our
purposes, it is worth noting Thomas’s and Lombard’s insistence on a sort of continuum
of murderous intent, from the killing of a fully formed child to the prevention of
conception by the use of sexual poisons. In this perspective, the personhood of the
unborn child is not the most important point: even contraception intends the death of
one’s own child.
40
ScG II-II, q. 154, a. 11.
41
ScG II-II, q. 154, a. 12.
42
The Latin is incestus, but the article on the topic (a. 9) specifically includes affines
as well as consanguinei. The Sentences defines affinity as in-laws: “quae ad virum ex
parte uxoris, seu quae ex parte viri ad uxorem pertinet” (IV Sent., d. 31). It is
interesting, however, that Thomas’s four arguments here, and all his arguments in ScG
(considered below) apply equally to the girl next door: we owe a certain honor to those
who are close to us and pertain to our parents’ house; we live so closely among them
that sexual congress is too easy to come by; it constrains the “multiplication of friends”
by which we leave our father’s house and become part of a broader circle; there is too
much natural love already built in to those we grew up with. In the last case, most
people probably love the girl next door more than they love their wife’s cousin.

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fatherhood is ordered.43 If she is in her majority, it still hurts her
fatherland (the idea of injury stretched to its limits) because the
“virginitatis signum” exists precisely as an impediment to
fornication.44
A woman can be taken away from her home against her
father’s will, her betrothed’s will, or her own will; she can then
be engaged in sexual activity either with or against her will.45
This abduction, properly an act of violence, is subsumed under
lust because it is ordered to lust.46 It is an injury to her fiancé
because it interrupts a process that is meant to end in marriage.
It is an injury to her parents because their authority is ordered
to helping their daughter prepare for marriage. And sexual
violence is an injury to the woman, not only because her body
in general belongs to her, but because, as we have seen above
and will see more richly below, her sexuality in particular is
ordered toward the raising of children, which requires the
loving cooperation of the parents.47 Sexual violence is
unnatural, because potential parents ought to be friends.
Adultery injures the children it might conceive, just as
fornication does. But it also injures the children the adulterous
woman conceives with her husband, insofar as it undermines his
sense that they are his; he can no longer be sure of the order
from his own marital acts to the raising of his children.48 It
undermines the trust (fides) that is required between the
spouses, precisely contrary to the good order of the children
they have come together to parent.49 Thus even a disordered
43

STh II-II, q. 154, a. 6.
Ibid., ad 1.
45
In a modern context, one cannot but regret Thomas’s failure more fully to discuss
the specific violence of rape; the tradition he receives gives the common name raptus to
all these kinds of violence. The only thing that can be said in Thomas’s defense is that
he has a much richer sense of relationality, especially within the family, than we do—
and it is no diminution of the woman’s dignity to say that an outrage against her is also
an outrage against her family.
46
STh II-II, q. 154, a. 7, obj. 2 and ad 2.
47
STh II-II, q. 154, a. 7.
48
STh II-II, q. 154, a. 8.
49
Ibid., ad 2 and 3.
44

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lust toward one’s wife can be called adultery, insofar as it
undermines a man’s ability to participate in the broader
relationship of marriage.50
Coitus with close relations causes three problems.51 First, we
owe our parents honor as proceeding forth from them. The lust
that attends fallen sexuality, however, is something honor
makes us want to cover up. Thus a twofold teleology sees first,
in our relatives, a kind of continuation of our parents or
grandparents, and second, in lust, a kind of disorder in our
persons; we avoid incest because we see the connections. A
second problem is that living close together tends to promote
affection; the girl next door provides so many opportunities
that we might lose sight of other parts of life. And third, the life
of social man is ordered to an ever broader web of
relationships: Augustine says, in City of God 15, “there is an
ideal reason for charity when men, among whom there is a
useful and noble harmony, are bound together by the bonds of
numerous vagaries, not joined one-to-one in every regard, but
each individual sprinkled out among many.”52 One of the ends
of marriage is not just that we cling to our wives, but that we
leave our parents’ home and go out into the world.
Thus the question on lust ends with the principle: “the order
of nature is from God himself. So in sins in which the very
order of nature is violated, there is injury to God himself, the
orderer of nature.”53 Indeed, the order of charity, by requiring

50
STh II-II, q. 154, a. 8, obj. 2 and ad 2. See Matthew 5:28 and John Paul II,
“Theology of the Body,” audience 43 (in Waldstein, ed., Man and Woman He Created
Them, 297-99), where the pope, following Thomas and his sources (Jerome quoting
Sixtus the Pythagorean), makes one of his most controversial statements in this regard.
51
STh II-II, q. 154, a. 9.
52
Quoted in ibid.
53
STh II-II, q. 154, a. 12. Cf. the objection in ScG III, c. 122, n. 2: “But it does not
seem to be a sufficient response if someone says that it does injury to God. For God is
not offended by us except inasmuch as we act against our good, as has been said. But it
is not apparent that this is against the good of man. Thus it does not seem that injury is
done to God in this way.” The argument of the chapter reverses the minor premise, and
thus comes to the same conclusion as the Summa Theologiae, but it does seem to focus
more on nature itself.

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that we especially love those to whom we are intimately joined,
demands above all that we love human nature itself.54
D) The “Summa theologiae” on the Teleology of Sexual Pleasure
Other questions in the Summa theologiae provide even more
riches of sexual teleology. Within the question on the kinds of
lust, Thomas considers “touching and kissing” (tactibus et
osculis) or “kissing and embracing” (osculis et amplexibus).55 He
distinguishes, obviously, between a kiss of greeting and a kiss of
foreplay. But then he argues that sexual kissing where coitus
would be illicit is itself a mortal sin: even if one does not
consent to the actual act of fornication, the pleasure of “kissing
and touching” comes precisely from its order to coitus. The
teleology we saw in the Summa contra gentiles is again the
central point: the “end” of kissing—not the subjective intention
of the person, but the place where this process naturally ends
up—is coitus.56 So connected are they that Thomas, and the
tradition before him (which he emphasizes with a double sed
contra), thinks the kissing takes part in the sin to which it would
naturally lead, even if the persons do not let it go that far.
In the previous question, Thomas considers the morality of
marital coitus itself. He says, “The order of reason is that each
thing be fittingly ordered to its end. Thus there is no sin if
someone uses things for the end to which they are directed [ad
finem ad quem sunt], in a fitting way and order, as long as that
end is truly good.” He cites Augustine (supposedly the master of
anti-sexuality) saying that “as food is for the health of man, so

54

STh II-II, q. 154, a. 12, obj. 3 and ad 3.
STh II-II, q. 154, a. 4.
56
Cajetan perceptively notes that kissing is pleasant for precisely the same reason sex
is pleasant, namely, to lead individuals to procreate: “Natura directe hos actus ordinavit
ad concubitum, et ideo posuit in eis delectationem” (in Thomas Aquinas, Opera Omnia,
v. 10 [Rome: Commissio Leonina, 1899], 226, III).
55

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sexual activity is for the health of the species.” Sexual activity
that tends toward its proper end is without sin.57
The pleasure that attends sexual activity, which Thomas
believes attains a “superfluity” that “so absorbs reason as to
make it impossible to understand anything,”58 is no hindrance
to the goodness of the activity. What matters is where the acts
are ordered and whether the soul is attached to the right ends of
the acts or merely to the pleasure itself, which can also be found
in disordered acts. Though in one sense reason may be
swallowed up by the vehemence of the pleasure, what matters is
that the act itself is according to reason: that is, ordered to its
proper end.59
Thomas adds two quotations from Augustine’s City of God
13 to say that the disorderliness of sexual pleasure is a result of
original sin, but that this detracts nothing from the goodness of
the act.60 Earlier in the Summa, when he treats of Adam and
Eve, he rejects the opinion of Gregory of Nyssa, who thought
coitus was too evil to be found before the Fall, siding instead
with Augustine: animality is part of what we are, and like all the
animals, we procreate sexually.61
Although Augustine says the soul and body would remain
“tranquil” during prelapsarian coitus, Thomas rejects the idea
that in the state of innocence the sensual pleasure (delectatio
secundum sensum) would have been any less, because where
“nature is more pure, the body is more sensitive.”62 The
57

STh II-II, q. 153, a. 2. We will further consider accidentally nonprocreative sex
below.
58
Ibid., obj. 2. Thomas takes Aristotle’s word for it. See Nic. Ethic. 7.11: “The
reasons given for the view that pleasure is not a good at all [include the idea that] . . .
the pleasures are a hindrance to thought, and the more so the more one delights in
them, e.g. in sexual pleasure; for no one could think of anything while absorbed in
this.” Both Aristotle and Thomas deny the conclusion, but not the premise.
59
STh II-II, q. 153, a. 2, ad 2.
60
Ibid., and ad 3. Here and throughout this paper, Augustine is treated only as
quoted within the referenced texts of Thomas.
61
STh I, q. 98, a. 2.
62
Note that “nature,” in this case, refers to the ordering of affections towards their
proper ends. On the naturalness of the passions in the moral life, see Servais Pinckaers,
O.P., “Les passions et la morale,” Revue de sciences philosophiques et théologiques 74

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pleasure would have been “moderate” only in the sense that it
would be precisely as it should be.
But, Thomas argues, since procreation is an essentially biological, animal act, it is natural that those engaged in it should
briefly be like the animals: unable to reason.63 This is not
unreasonable, he says, but natural: part of the process, as it
should be. In fact, to underline his point, he concludes that in
the state of innocence there would have been no praise in
refraining from coitus (he uses the word continentia, which
applies to married continence as well as virginity), because such
animality is perfectly reasonable.64 To be reasonable is not to be
pondering things at the moment but to live an orderly life: in
itself the animal pleasure of sexuality detracts nothing from that
life but is part of its overall reasonability.
There is an important difference between the various forms
of human perversion, on the one hand, and the naturalness of
animals. Precisely because animals do not deviate from their
natures, animal coitus is more reasonable than is human
coitus65—even the counterexamples of lecherous species of
(1990): 381-86; idem, The Sources of Christian Ethics, trans. Mary Thomas Noble, O.P.
(Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1995), especially chap.
17, “Natural Inclinations at the Source of Freedom and Morality,” 400-456; Paul
Gondreau, The Passions of Christ’s Soul in the Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas
(Münster: Aschendorff, 2002); idem., “The Passions and the Moral Life: Appreciating
the Originality of Aquinas,” The Thomist 71 (2007): 419-50; and Josef Pieper, The Four
Cardinal Virtues (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996), passim.
63
STh II-II, q. 153, a. 2, ad 2: “Nor does the fact that reason cannot have a free act
of reason for considering spiritual things simultaneously with this pleasure show that
this act is contrary to virtue. For it is not contrary to virtue if the act of reason is
sometimes paused by something that is done according to reason. Otherwise, when
someone went to sleep, it would be contrary to virtue. Nevertheless, the fact that
concupiscence and venereal pleasure do not submit to the command and moderation of
reason, comes from the punishment of the first parent . . . as is clear from Augustine, in
De Civ. Dei XIII.”
64
STh I, q. 98, a. 2, ad 3.
65
Consider Aristotle’s observations in Historia Animalium: “In a general way in the
lives of animals many resemblances to human life may be observed. Acute intelligence
will be seen more in small creatures than in large ones, as is exemplified in the case of
birds by the nest-building of the swallow. In the same way as men do, the bird mixes

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animals behave in ways that are appropriate to the needs of
their offspring in ways that humans engaged in sexual sin do
not. Thomas’s and Cajetan’s remarks, noted above, about the
natural pleasantness of kissing are remarkable for allowing
nature itself to keep human sexual activity face-to-face and
human.
Lust is a sin, Thomas concludes, not because sexual activity is
bad, but because it is ordered to what is most important: “the
more something is necessary, the more the order of reason must
be maintained around it.” Sexual activity is most necessary
(valde necessarius) for the common good, because it produces
human citizens.66 Thomas’s focus is not on the act in isolation,
not for example on how reason is swallowed up or how man is
distracted, but on the part acts play in the broader conception
of a human life. Acts are irrational and unnatural, or rational
and natural, insofar as they are ordered or not to the larger
processes of which they are parts. The pastor of Our Lady of
Perpetual Responsibility in Garrison Keillor’s tales of Lake
Wobegon preaches once a year on contraception: “If you don’t
want to go to Minneapolis, what are you doing on the train?”

mud and chaff together; if it runs short of mud, it souses its body in water and rolls
about in the dust with wet feathers; furthermore, just as man does, it makes a bed of
straw, putting hard material below for a foundation, and adapting all to suit its own
size. Both parents co-operate in the rearing of the young; each of the parents will detect,
with practiced eye, the young one that has had a helping, and will take care it is not
helped twice over; at first the parents will rid the nest of excrement, but, when the
young are grown, they will teach their young to shift their position and let their
excrement fall over the side of the nest. Pigeons exhibit other phenomena of a similar
kind. In pairing the same male and the same female keep together; and the union is only
broken by the death of one of the two parties. . . . As a general rule these birds show
this conjugal fidelity, but occasionally a female will cohabit with other than her mate”
(HA 9.7.612b18-34, 13a6-8 [trans. D’Arcy Wentworth Thompson, The Internet
Classics Archive, http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/history_anim.9.ix.html (accessed June
24, 2015)]).
66
STh II-II, q. 153, a. 3.

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E) Following Nature
Thomists argue over the precise role teleology plays in
judging the rightness of human acts. To cite only the most
intramural debates, philosophers Steven Long and Steven Jensen
dispute how the intention of the actor can modify the object of
an action—but their argument hovers precisely over the natural
teleology of actions and their relation to human purposes.67
Meanwhile, theologian Servais Pinckaers emphasized the overarching orientation of human life toward God, man’s natural
and supernatural end.68
It is beyond the scope of this article to distinguish or judge
between these accounts. Here we only illustrate Thomas’s
application of his thinking in the questions surrounding
marriage and sexuality. We can say at this point, however, that
our examination heartily confirms the following words from Fr.
Pinckaers:
The Fathers of the Church . . . saw in nature the direct work of God, the
creator of Genesis, and the work of the Word of John’s Gospel. To their
minds, the following of nature harmonized with the scriptural following of
God and of Christ; in this new light it became more personal. Thus we can
understand St. Thomas’s method, so foreign to us, his marked preference for
examples taken from the physical order, even when explaining realities of the
spiritual order. For him, God’s action was manifested in a particularly
luminous way in the movements of beings completely subject to nature, that
is, to the divine rule, untroubled as they were by the intervention of an often67
Steven A. Long, “A Brief Disquisition regarding the Nature of the Object of the
Moral Act according to St. Thomas Aquinas,” The Thomist 67 (2003): 45-71; Steven
Jensen, “A Long Discussion regarding Steven A. Long’s Interpretation of the Moral
Species,” The Thomist 67 (2003): 623-43; Steven A Long, “Response to Jensen on the
Moral Object,” Nova et Vetera (English ed.) 3 (2005): 101-8; Steven J. Jensen, “When
Evil Actions Become Good,” Nova et Vetera (English ed.) 5 (2007): 747-64; Steven A.
Long, The Teleological Grammar of the Moral Act, Introductions to Catholic Doctrine
(Naples, Fla.: Sapientia Press, 2007); Steven Jensen, Good and Evil Actions: A Journey
through Saint Thomas Aquinas (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America
Press, 2011).
68
See especially his “Notes Explicatives” in S. Thomas d’Aquin: Les actes humains
(Somme théologique, Ia-IIae, qq. 6-17), v. 1, Editions de La Revue des jeunes (Paris:
Cerf, 1961), 289-404.

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deficient freedom. We can therefore find in them our models for human
action, providing always that we realize the role played by analogy.69

In what we have seen above, Thomas’s thinking on sexual
morality exemplifies this “following of nature.” To be rational,
and in line with the wisdom of God, we must line up with the
natural processes of which sex is a part.
Why, then, does Thomas begin his more radically natureoriented text in the Summa contra gentiles by insisting on the
difference between sexual activity that is truly contra naturam
and merely sterile acts? “But if procreation cannot follow from
the emission of the seed per accidens, this is neither contra
naturam, nor sin, as happens in the case of a sterile woman.”70
The distinction does not seem to turn on knowledge: both the
Bible and experience provide plenty of examples of couples
who can be morally certain that their sexual acts will not
conceive a child. As Humanae Vitae 11 says, “The fact is, as
experience shows, that new life is not the result of each and
every act of sexual intercourse.” Instead, the point seems to be,
as Humanae Vitae 11 insists, that the acts themselves are ad
vitam humanam procreandam per se destinatus: regardless of
the known outcome, the acts themselves are part of the natural
process.
Humanae Vitae 16 goes on to say, “the Church . . . considers
it lawful for married people to take advantage of the infertile
period but condemns as always unlawful the use of means
which directly prevent conception. . . . When the infertile
period [tempora conceptibus non apta] recurs, they use their
married intimacy to express their mutual love and to safeguard
their fidelity toward one another.”
Thomas’s teleological approach to marriage provides two
possible arguments for the “naturalness” of the use of infertile
periods, roughly corresponding to Humanae Vitae’s “to express
their mutual love” and “to safeguard their fidelity.” To
understand these arguments, we will next examine Thomas’s

69
70

Pinckaers, Sources of Christian Ethics, 334.
ScG III, c. 122.

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account of marital love, then his account of marital coitus as a
remedy for lust.
II
The progress of Thomas’s argument in the Summa contra
gentiles is instructive for our understanding of “married love.”
Thomas shows that it is precisely the biological ordering of
marriage to children that entails a much wider understanding of
what marriage is. This account takes us deeper into the
continuity of biology and morality, the intelligibility of avoiding
children precisely in light of children as the end of marriage,
and the richness of the phrase “natural family planning.” We
will consider Thomas’s presentation of this wider understanding
under two heads: first, the way his understanding is rooted in
biology; second, the teleological ordering of this biological
relationship beyond biological concerns.
A) Married Love, Beyond Procreation, Part One: The Biological
Substrate
Chapter 122, on fornication, is emphatically biological. As
we have described, its emphasis is on the parallel between
fornication and sexual perversity: just as perversity prevents
semen from reaching its proximate end, conception, so too does
fornication prevent the conception from reaching its final end, a
healthy adult. The normally terse Thomas spends a surprising
number of words discussing bodily fluids, as if to get our minds
firmly rooted in pure biology.
When he turns from perversity to fornication, he again
insists on the biological. Fornication, he says, thwarts the
rearing, or educatio, of the young. But his first, fairly long paragraph on educatio describes it entirely in terms of nutrition.
Again, his examples almost forcefully focus our attention on
biology: mammals feed their young with milk, but birds must
seek out other food. His concluding minor premise fits man in
as a kind of animal: “In the human species the female is least

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sufficient to rear the offspring alone, since the necessity of
human life requires many things which cannot be provided by
one alone.”71 He will go on to discuss specifically rational
aspects of this, but first he phrases it as if what is specific to man
is his animal helplessness.
The opening of the next chapter seems to stress the unity of
argument: “If one considers rightly, the preceding argument
[singular] seems to lead one to the conclusion that the society of
male and female in human nature, which we call marriage, is
not only long-term, but life-long.” All that follows is rooted in
the biology of chapter 122.
These next three chapters (123-25) ascend into considerations of justice, friendship, good morals, and the broader
community—but the final chapter (126) returns to biology. The
first paragraph of this last chapter summarizes what has gone
before: sexual activity that does not go along (non convenit)
with the procreation and rearing of children is irrational; sexual
activity that does (secundum quod congruit) is rational. Since the
divine law is only against irrationality, some sexual acts are
allowable. Three subsequent arguments follow the same
rigorously biological logic.
The three middle chapters begin with almost coarsely biological arguments, as if to emphasize the animality of marriage.
As they move upward into less specifically biological arguments,
they remain nonetheless rooted in animality.
In chapter 123, for example, the first reason Thomas gives
that marriage should be life-long is the need to preserve
possessions: so that the son may carry on in the things that
belong to the father. He says that even birds do this. The next
two arguments oppose biological differences to a rational
concern for equity: if the man is more inclined to leave, because
of the woman’s passing beauty and fertility (123, n. 3), or if the
woman is more inclined to stay, because of her physical and

71

“One”’ (unum) is in the masculine; it seems that not only a single woman, but also
a single man would be insufficient. The problem is not gender but number. See ScG III,
c. 122, n. 6.

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perhaps mental or emotional frailty (ibid., n. 4), it is only fair to
demand the same standard of indissolubility for both.
Next, two arguments treat the even higher concerns of
human relationship. The first is about a father’s relationship
with his children. The child needs his father’s governance—
even, the argument for life-long marriage suggests, into
adulthood (ibid., n. 5). This is a richly human argument about
marriage and family. But Thomas spends most of the paragraph
discussing the “natural instinct” to be “certain about offspring”:
the governance of children demands life-long marriage because
otherwise the father risks governing children who are not
biologically his own, “when a woman known by one man, is
then known by another.”
The focus on certainty about offspring is doubly strange.
First, it is not obvious why paternal governance must be rooted
in biology; can a man not also guide his step-children? How is
the relationship hurt if they are not his own? But second, if he
must know which children are biologically his, canon law has
always recognized that “certainty about offspring” can be
guaranteed by a mere waiting period. Four months between
marriages is sufficient to know which children he is biologically
obliged to govern; certainty does not require an entire lifetime.
The argument about guiding children would seem stronger
without the reference to biological certitude—yet Thomas’s
insistent focus on that certitude underlines his concern to root
the human relationships of family in biology.
The next argument for life-long marriage is today his most
popular: “Friendship is greater insofar as it is firmer and more
lasting; but between man and wife there seems to be the greatest
friendship.” This is nice and romantic; Thomas glosses it with
the line from Genesis about leaving one’s father and mother
(123, n. 6), but he roots it in biology. First, “the act of carnal
copulation makes a sweet society even among the beasts”: this
friendship is rooted, in part, in hormones.72 Second, human
72
For a review of the literature on oxytocin, see Heon-Ji Lee, et al., “Oxytocin: The
Great Facilitator of Life,” in Progress in Neurobiology 88 (2009): 127-51.

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marriage unites the couple in totius domesticae conversationis
consortium, “a partnership of overall household fellowship.”73
In other words, the friendship of man and wife is rooted not so
much in being soulmates as in being housemates—even, as
Aristotle says, “messmates” (connutritione).74 They build the
friendship by living life together.
The final arguments go beyond the family, into society.
Marriage is a social matter, a matter of law, Thomas says,
because it is ordered to the greatest biological necessity of
society: more people (ibid., n. 7). His gloss on this is as coarsely
biological as can be: “eating, and the emission of other
superfluities, pertains to the individual, but procreation to the
conservation of the species.” Marriage engages our social nature
precisely because of its biological order. Laws against divorce
73
Gondreau, citing conversations with Russell Hittinger, argues that consortium is a
legal term. See “Inseparable Connection,” 657-58. In light of the biological emphasis I
establish here, I prefer the more mundane reading that “consortium” refers, literally, to
sharing a common lot, or drawing the same straw (sors).
74
Aristotle cites connutritum as one of the causes of love among brothers: “Two
things that contribute greatly to friendship are a common upbringing [connutritum; Gr.
syntrophon] and similarity of age; for ‘two of an age take to each other’, and people
brought up together [unius mori; Gr. synétheis] tend to be comrades; whence the
friendshp of brothers is akin to that of comrades [etayricae; Gr. hetairoi]. . . . The
friendship of brothers has the characteristics found in that of comrades (and especially
when these are good), and in general between people who are like each other, inasmuch
as they belong more to each other [proximiores; Gr. oikeioteroi] and start with a love for
each other from their very birth, and inasmuch as those born of the same parents and
brought up together [connutriti et disciplinati similiter; Gr. syntrophoi kai paideuthentes
homoiós]” (Nic. Eth. 8.12.1161b33-1162a1, 1162a9-14; Latin from Thomas Aquinas,
Opera Omnia, v. 47.2 (Rome: Leonine Edition, 1969), 484-85). Thomas here
distinguishes the love of connutritum from the love that arises from sexual activity—“in
these, the love which comes from communion of origin and the common table is joined
to the love of concupiscence” (ScG III, c. 125. n. 5)—but it nonetheless is a nice
description of the substratum of the marital relationship. Thomas also utilizes table
fellowship in his Eucharistic hymns in the office “Sacerdos” for the Feast of Corpus
Christ: the concluding strophe of the hymn for Lauds, “Verbum supernum prodiens,”
says, “Being born, he gave himself as a companion [socium]/ eating with them
[convescens], [he gave himself] as a friend”; and the concluding strophe of the sequence
for the Mass, “Lauda Sion Salvatorem,” says, “You who know and can do all things,/
who pasture us mortals here,/ you who there sat at table with us [nos ibi commensales],/
make us co-heirs and comrades [sodales],/ of the heavenly citizens.” Connutriti,
convescentes, commensales: nice images for totius domesticae conversationis consortium.

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strengthen marriage by demanding that we love one another
faithfully, be committed to the long-term care of our households, and not break up the wider friendships that marriage
promotes, as divorce sets ex-in-laws at odds (ibid., n. 8).
Finally, society needs not only people but good people. So
law promotes marriage because the problem-solving marriage
requires makes us better people (ibid.). Polygamy is outlawed
because it causes strife (124, n. 6). And ideally the law protects
us from some occasions for lust (125, n. 5). The goodness of
society itself is built on the biological substratum of family and
procreation.
B) Married Love, Beyond Procreation, Part Two: Specifically
Human Ends
Looking at the same arguments from the opposite
perspective, we can see that upon this biological substratum are
built truly human institutions. At this point it gets confusing to
say which ends are “primary” and which “secondary.” Marriage
is for children, but children are for society, and precisely
because marriage is ordered toward the rearing of children, it
builds up the friendships between spouses, in-laws, and
generations that are the ultimate purpose of children and the
foundation of society. God made Eve so that Adam would not
be alone; Thomas might point out that she is both a “help” to
create more friends, and the first among many.
Thomas begins his inquiry into the specifically human nature
of marriage in chapter 122, on fornication. Having established
that humans, like many other species of animals, need a
partnership of father and mother to care for their helpless
children, he raises the question of a wealthy woman (ScG III,
c. 122, n. 7). One can easily imagine a situation in which the
woman, unlike a bird, does not need the father’s help to feed
her children.
His response in the following paragraph takes us deep into
his definition of marriage (ibid., n. 8). “In the human species,
the offspring needs not only nutrition for the body, as in other

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animals, but also instruction for the soul”—in the later
commentary on 1 Corinthians 7, he will refine this statement:
“which involves not only feeding the body, but also feeding the
soul.”75 This is, on the one hand, instruction in prudence, which
requires long experience, and on the other hand, moral
correction (repressione), to overcome the impulses of the
passions, which corrupt prudence.
It is necessary therefore in the human species to work on the improvement of
the offspring not for a short time, as among birds, but through the great space
of a life. Whence, since it is necessary among all animals that the male stay
with the female as long as the work of the male is necessary for the offspring,
it is natural for man that the male enter into no passing society with a given
female, but one that lasts for a long time. And this is the society we call
marriage. Thus marriage is natural to man, and fornication, which is outside
marriage, is against the good of man. (Ibid.)

This is his initial definition of marriage.
But there is some ambiguity to be worked out. In this first,
defining paragraph, the mother and the marital relationship
sound almost superfluous. “This requires the work of the male,
in whom, for instruction, the reason is more established, and for
chastisement, the strength is greater.” Marriage, in the text we
have quoted, is determined by how long “the work of the male
is necessary.” Earlier in the same chapter, however, he has said,
“the necessity of human life requires many things which cannot
be provided by one [masculine] alone.” The rest of the chapters
argue that children need not just the presence of their father,
but that of their mother—or, to be more precise, they need a
family.
It is instructive to begin with the end. At the end of chapter
123, Thomas says, “the conjunction of man and woman is
ordered in the laws not only insofar as it pertains to the
generation of children, as among the other animals, but also
insofar as it aids good morals, which right reason disposes both
in regard to man himself, and insofar as he is part of a domestic
family and of civil society.” Indissoluble marriage serves all

75

Super I Cor., c. 7, lect. 1.

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three ends: it builds up “civil society” by creating a firm love
among in-laws, drawing a man beyond his own household; it
makes him care for his “domestic family,” since he is stuck with
it; and “in regard to man himself,” it makes him live a more
faithful love, avoiding adultery (123, n. 8). Each of these
arguments roots morality in biological relationships.
None of these goods speak directly of child-rearing, but all
are essential to it. How can a child learn to have “good morals
. . . in regard to himself, and insofar as he is part of a domestic
family and of civil society” except from parents who themselves
live them? Again, the question of “primary” and “secondary”
ends is confusing. Are the good morals of the parents “ordered
to” the good of the child? Yes and no. In fact, the parents’
ordering to the children is part of their good ordering in
themselves and their right relationship to society.
Parallel arguments could be made throughout the Summa
contra gentiles’ rich chapters on marriage. These chapters on
marriage conclude with the common good: “‘the good of the
many,’ he says, ‘is always more divine than the good of the
one’” (125, n. 10). On the one hand, the parent learns to prefer
the common good to his private good precisely through giving
himself over to the good of his family. On the other hand, the
child learns through watching the parent. Finally, both learn by
going out into society.
Similarly, within the home, a child learns equity and
friendship, both put forth as central goods, precisely through
the way his parents live those goods. But is the parent just “for”
the child? Yes and no. And is the parental friendship “for” the
children? Yes and no. Children need the friendship of husband
and wife. But it is a true friendship, truly ordered to the
common good: indeed, it cannot serve its purpose if it is not.
Perhaps, then, the most important argument comes in the
Tertia pars, when Thomas asks whether the virginal marriage
between Joseph and Mary was a true marriage. He recalls that
the “first perfection” of a thing is its form, the “second

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perfection” is the operation by which it attains its end.76 The
form of marriage he calls a “union of souls.” The end is to
procreate and educate children. Now Mary and Joseph did not
perform the operation by which one procreates—but they did
perform the operations of education, “other works, by which
they yield [obsequuntur] to one another to nourish the
children.”77
This statement marks an advance over the early Thomas,
who said in his commentary on the Sentences: “Marriage has a
double perfection. One in its being, which is made by the
consent of words, and this perfection their marriage had. The
other perfection is in the operation, and thus they were not
perfect, because the proper act of marriage is the carnal
embrace.”78 In the Summa theologiae, he sees that the other
proper “marital act” (actum matrimonii)—indeed, the more
perfecting act—is the many “other works” by which marriage
serves the children. This brings his attention to the fact that
though marriage “is made” by the words of consent, the true
form brought into being by those words is a “union of souls.” In
the later text, he says this is “the marriage bond” (copulam

76

See Marie Leblanc, “Amour et procréation dans la théologie de saint Thomas,”
Revue Thomiste 92 (1992): 433-59. Gondreau takes issue with Leblanc’s insistence on
procreation as the only end of marriage, but I think what we say here responds to his
concerns. See Gondreau, “Inseparable Connection,” 745.
77
STh III, q. 29, a. 2. Thomas suggests that the multitudinous acts of making a home
and raising a family are analogous to the “marital act” in its reduced meaning as only
coitus: “But the second perfection consists in the operation of a thing, through which the
thing somehow attains its end. . . . Now the end of matrimony is generating and rearing
children, the first of which is attained by the conjugal bed [concubitum coniugalem], the
second by other works of the man and wife, by which they yield to one another in order
to nourish the children. . . . With regard to the second perfection, through the ‘marital
act,’ if this is taken as the carnal bed [carnalem concubitum], through which children are
generated, this [marriage of Mary and Joseph] would not be a consummated
marriage. . . . Nevertheless that marriage also has the second perfection with regard to
the rearing of the child” (ibid., emphasis added). Coitus is not the only act specific to
married people. Indeed, non-married people have coitus; only married people properly
raise children.
78
IV Sent., d. 30, q. 2, a. 2.

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coniugalem) and explicitly distinguishes it from “the carnal
bond” (copulam carnale) that typically accompanies it.79
Thomas’s deeper appreciation of what marriage is—brought
about by a deeper appreciation of how education completes
procreation—contributes not only to his understanding of Mary
and Joseph’s virginal marriage but also to our understanding of
marriage more generally.
Just as man is animal and rational, so marriage is rooted in
biology (in procreation) yet reaches far beyond (in education).
Marriage is a complete relationship, a relationship of equity,
friendship, love, and the common good, a relationship that
reaches beyond merely material provision into the most social
concerns of human life.
A first way of thinking about the use of infertile periods,
corresponding to Humanae Vitae’s “to express their mutual
love,” could take precisely this approach. To be what it is, and
to serve its fullest biological purpose (the education of
children), marriage needs to be an abundant relationship. That
relationship is built on a biological substrate. Parents cannot
parent without the totius domesticae conversationis consortium.
But so too, perhaps, they cannot parent without the “sweet
society,” the hormonal affection that arises from their biological
relationship.
The use of infertile periods can thus in a sense be ordered to
procreation, in that it can be ordered to the good of the
children, by building up the marital relationship. To do so, of
course, requires both the intention of the parents (who must
keep their focus beyond immediate pleasure and on the good of
their marital relationship and their family) and the rightness of
the act. Contra naturam sexuality cannot build up the biological
relationship of the parents precisely because it is a contradiction: an effort simultaneously to order to the good of the
children an act precisely defined by its opposition to children.
Infertile coitus, on the other hand, by a husband and wife who
recognize the inherent ordering of coitus towards children, but
79

STh III, q. 29, a. 2.

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use it for the intermediate good of marital union, is not contra
naturam, but part of the bigger process.
C) “Remedium concupiscentiae”? “To Safeguard Their Fidelity”
But is infertile coitus necessary to maintain the “sweet
society” of marriage? From the Aristotelian perspective, it is
worth noting that, though coitus contributes to the “sweet
society” by which many animals pair for life, animals that pair
for life do not engage in sexual activity during infertile periods:
the only time for embracing is spring. Exceptions to the rule,
such as dogs and primates, do not practice monogamy. Thus
even among the animals, it seems that domestic partnership
contributes more to long-term fidelity than does infertile coitus.
Better to make love in the kitchen, or by feathering the nest,
than in the bedroom.
In 1 Corinthians 7:1-2, St. Paul says, “Regarding those things
about which you wrote to me, it is good for a man not to touch
a woman. But on account of fornication each one has his wife,
and each woman has her husband.” This passage is the locus
classicus for the view that marital nonprocreative coitus can
only be prompted by sinful lust: “fornication.”80 Thomas’s
treatment of the text gives us a richer way of understanding
both Paul’s words and the relationship between morality and
biology. In this penultimate section of this article, we shall
follow Thomas through this text, with commentary from the
Summa, to find his thinking on nonprocreative coitus as a
remedium. We shall find it a helpful commentary on Pope
Paul’s second reason for using infertile periods, “to safeguard
their fidelity.”

80

The interpretation of this passage is much controverted. It is not clear, for
example, whether “it is better” refers to Paul’s opinion, or to the opinion that the
Corinthians wrote to him. For an excellent reading of the second option, see Ronald A.
Knox, “The Corinthians’ Letter to St. Paul,” in Enthusiasm: A Chapter in the History of
Religion, with Special Reference to the XVII and XVIII Centuries (Notre Dame, Ind.:
Notre Dame Press, 1994), 9-24. Here, however, our goal is to understand Thomas’s
reading; he clearly thinks the opinion belongs to Paul.

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Thomas begins by reading the biological underpinnings of
the text. In itself, coitus does not serve the good of the
individual, as eating does, but only the good of the species.
Coitus is good because it makes babies—Thomas notes, just in
passing, that there would be no reason for women (either
absolutely, or in marriage) except for procreation.81 For the
individual, he says, coitus is “not good” in three ways. Its
pleasure drags down the soul; the necessities of marriage, which
for reasons explained above, must surround coitus, make the
man like a slave to his wife; and feeding a family is expensive.
Next, following St. Paul’s language, Thomas discusses the
“necessity of touching a woman.” The first necessity is for
procreation, as it says in Genesis: “male and female he created
them, and God blessed them, and said, increase and multiply,
and fill the earth.”82 If the Apostle says, “It is good for a man
not to touch a woman,” he must think there is no more absolute
need for Christians to procreate.83
But when Paul goes on to say, “on account of fornication,”
Thomas proposes a “second necessity [of touching a woman],
insofar as [marriage] is instituted in remedium culpae.”84 For
81

Super I Cor., c 7, lect. 1: “Bonum est homini mulierem non tangere. Circa quod
notandum quod mulier data est viro ad adiutorium generationis.” Perhaps we can better
understand his statement by rephrasing it: the biological reason for the biological
diversity of gender is procreation. Unless otherwise noted, all references in this section
are to this lectio.
82
Thomas does not treat sexuality under the heading of the second creation account,
“It is not good for man to be alone” (Gen 2:18). Or rather, he sees woman’s role in this
account under the heading, “there was not found a help [adiutor] like to him,” and sees
the man’s relationship with the woman as part of building a family and a polis, not as
the conclusion of man’s search for friendship.
83
Thus Super I Cor., c. 7, lect. 1: “the human race already multiplied, and the people
of God now augmented, not by the propagation of the flesh, but by the generation
which is from water and the Holy Spirit.”
84
The more common phrase, which Thomas will use later in this lectio, is remedium
concupiscentiae; since we do not have a critical edition of this commentary, it is possible
this is a scribal error. However, he does speak of remedium contra culpam in his
commentary on the previous chapter of this letter: Super I Cor, c. 6, lect. 1, on verses
4-5. We will use remedium concupscentiae because of its significant place in the
tradition (see Cormac Burke, “A Postscript to the ‘Remedium Concupiscentiae’,” The

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fallen man, even after baptism, “carnal concupiscence still
remains. Although it does not dominate, still it incites,
especially to venereal acts, because of the vehemence of the
pleasure.”
Thomas takes a moderate position on this “carnal
concupiscence.” Augustine says, “the infection of original guilt
most appears in the motion of the genitals.”85 Thomas redirects
the focus to the word “infection”: original sin is an “infection”
insofar as it passes from one person to the other; the
procreative process is particularly “infected” only in that it is
the means by which original sin is passed on. But for Thomas,
this is no specific indictment of sexuality. He says sexual
pleasure is more unruly than other kinds, not because of a
particular disorder, but only because it is rooted in the
foundational sense of touch and is of central importance for the
preservation of the species.86 Whereas we can feel the pain of
hunger, because it pertains to our individual bodily needs, we
cannot feel the pain of the species; therefore, nature endows
sexuality with an especially strong drive.
The deeper problem of original sin is not specific to sex, says
Thomas, but is in general the loss of original justice as a “fetter”
(vinculo) on our sensitive powers. Formally, original sin is the
loss of the order of original justice, above all the will failing to
be subject to God. The consequence of this, however, and thus
the material of original sin, is the disordered affection of the

Thomist 70 [2006]: 481-536; and the CIC 1917, c. 1013), because it more directly
explains what is being remedied, and because it will more directly allow us to respond
to Cormac Burke’s article.
85
De civ. Dei, 14, quoted in STh I-II, q. 84, a. 4, sc.
86
STh I-II, q. 83, a. 4, ad 3. For Augustine’s position on this question, see De civitate
Dei, 14.15-20. Similarly, Augustine says, “sexual libido transmits original sin to the
offspring” (STh I-II, q. 83, a. 4, obj. 3) but Thomas explains this as not “actual” libido,
but “habitual” libido (ibid., ad 3). “Even if it was granted by the divine power that
someone experienced no disorderded libido in the procreative act, he would still
transmit original sin to the offspring.” The lust of the parents is not the cause of original
sin in the children, just a sign of the fallenness of human nature.

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appetites for mutable goods.87 Unruly appetite is part of the
fallen condition.
All of this is the context in which Thomas says Paul’s words
“on account of fornication” refer to “the necessity of touching a
woman” in remedium culpae. Fallen man’s sexual powers do
not stay within the limits of the larger good, but tend to their
own motion. Quoting Jesus’s teaching on celibacy in Matthew
19, “not all can hold this teaching,” Thomas says, “to conquer
this concupiscene [of lust] belongs to a greater power than can
belong [convenire] to men.” Instead, “it is necessary that one
give in to this concupiscence in one sense [in parte], and
conquer it in another.”
Thomas’s teaching on what this giving in and conquering
means is his great contribution to the question of the remedium
concupiscentiae. The goal, he says, is to order the procreative
act by reason; thus man is not overcome by concupiscence, but
rather subjects concupiscence to reason. He follows this statement with his standard argument: “in some species of animals,
the female alone does not suffice for the rearing of the
offspring,” etc. Concupiscence is subjected to reason when it is
subjected to the procreative logic of marriage: the procreative
act must be in the context of a relationship that can bring it to
its happy end, a healthy adult human being. This, says Thomas,
is what Paul means when he opens by saying, “It is good for a
man not to touch a woman. Nevertheless, on account of
fornication . . .”. He means, “namely, to avoid fornication,” by
subordinating the unruly sex drive to marriage.

87
See STh I-II, q. 82, a. 3 and a. 4, ad 1. See also Council of Trent, session five,
“Decree concerning Original Sin,” n. 5: “The holy council confesses and perceives that
in the baptised, concupiscence or a tendency to sin remains; since this is left as a form of
testing, it cannot harm those who do not given consent but, by the grace of Christ, offer
strong resistance; indeed, that person will be crowned who competes according to the
rules. This concupiscence the Apostle sometimes calls sin, but the holy council declares
that the catholic church has never understood it to be called sin in the sense of being
truly and properly such in those who have been regenerated, but in the sense that it is a
result of sin and inclines to sin” (Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, ed. Norman P.
Tanner [London: Sheed and Ward, 1990], 667*).

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Paul goes on, and Thomas’s commentary takes us deeper
into the meaning of remedium concupiscentiae. Three times in
the nine verses Thomas comments on in this lectio, Paul uses
words that seem too harsh. In verse 2, he says, “each one has his
wife on account of fornication.” In verse 6, after saying the
couple should come back together after times of fasting and
prayer, he says, “But I say this by way of indulgence.” And in
verse 9, he says “it is better to marry than to burn.” Thomas
says, “the Apostle seems to speak inappropriately
[inconvenienter], for indulgence is only for sin. . . . He seems to
be saying that marriage is sin.” Later he says, “it should be
carefully noted [hic attendendum] that the Apostle uses an
improper comparison, for marrying is good (though less good),
but burning is evil.”
To explain Paul’s “indulgence,” Thomas names four motives
for engaging in marital intercourse. First, marital coitus can be
ordered to the good of procreating a child and bringing it up to worship God;
the conjugal act is then an act of the virtue of religion. Or it can be done for
the purpose of ‘rendering the debt’ [more on this in a moment], then it is an
act of justice. Every such act of virtue is meritorious, if done with charity.

These two kinds of act are “without any sin, mortal or venial.”
A third motive for marital coitus is “with venial sin: namely
when someone is urged on to the marital act by concupiscence,
but a concupiscence which remains within the limits of
marriage, so that the man is content with only his wife.” This is
distinguished from a fourth kind: “but sometimes the guilt is
mortal, namely when one is carried by concupiscence outside
the limits of marriage: namely, when he engages with his wife,
but would equally or even more freely engage with someone
else.” The meritorious acts need no indulgence; the mortal sin
cannot be indulged. Paul then, says Thomas, is only “indulging”
the kind with venial sin.
This categorization reveals much about Thomas’s thinking
on nonprocreative marital coitus. His distinction between
mortal and venial sin inhabits precisely the realm of fallen man,
where, as we saw above, “carnal concupiscence still remains.
Although it does not dominate, still it incites, especially to

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venereal acts.” The spouse moved by lust who would not let lust
take him outside of marriage subordinates unruly passion to the
reasonable project of marriage. In Thomas’s mind, this is fundamentally different from a marital act moved by lust without
such subordination to reason, even though both are physically
engaged in with the same spouse, and both are moved by the
same motive of lust: the desire for pleasure rather than for the
real goods of marriage.
The second category, “done for the purpose of ‘rendering
the debt’ . . . an act of justice,” without sin and meritorious,
seems to correlate with the category of venial sin. The language
of debt is Paul’s: “let the husband render the debt to his wife,
and similarly the wife to her husband” (v. 3). Thomas interprets
it in light of the next verse, “The woman has not power over
her own body, but the man; similarly the man too has not
power over his own body but the woman,” along with Paul’s
repeated concern about impurity, as in the following verse: “do
not defraud each other . . . lest Satan tempt you on account of
your incontinence.”
The key to the argument comes from Augustine: though it is
better “not to touch a woman,” “God does not want a prize of
that value to be balanced by such a loss, that when one of the
spouses abstains, the other one unwilling, the latter might fall
into damnable seductions.”88 When a husband, for example, is
in the category of venial sin, being motivated by lust but
wanting to stay within marriage, the wife owes it to him to let
him find marital expression for this passion.89 The spouse who
gives performs a meritorious act of justice; the spouse who asks
88

Thomas does not cite a source, only “sicut dicit Augustinus.”
The early Thomas expresses a view, apparently common, that one can also ask
“tacitly”: “there are two ways of ‘requesting the debt.’ In one way, expressly, as when
they use words with one another. In another way, the request is interpreted, namely
when the man perceives by some signs that the wife would like the debt to be rendered
to her, but is silent because of modesty. And so, even if she does not expressly request
the debt with words, nevertheless the man is bound to render it, when his wife’s will of
having the debt rendered appears expressly through signs” (IV Sent., d. 32, q. 1, a. 2,
qcla. 1).
89

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ERIC M. JOHNSTON

engages in an act that “has sin attached, but nonetheless venial
on account of the goods of marriage, without which it would be
mortal sin.”
A full appraisal of this claim would require an examination
of the meaning of venial sin, which is beyond the scope of this
article.90 But Thomas gives us some sense of the lightness of the
sin here in his commentary. Paul says, “do not defraud one
another, except perhaps with consent, for a time, that you may
have time to pray; and then return to one another.” Thomas
says, “he teaches that three things are to be observed in such an
interruption” of marital relations. It must be “by common
consent,” and he quotes Ecclesiastes, “three things are well
pleasing to my soul, which are approved before God and men:
the concord of brothers, the love of neighbors, and a man and
woman consenting well with one another.” It must be “only for
a time”—Thomas appears to consider a will for permanent
abstinence contrary to Scripture. And it must be “for the proper
end, namely for spiritual acts, for which continence renders
them better prepared.”
To this Thomas adds two citations from Scripture. The
prophet Joel speaks of “sacrifice and drink offering to our God”
and adds “let the bridegroom go forth from his chamber, and
the bride from her marriage bed” (2:14, 16). In 1 Kings, “it says
that when the solemnities of dedication had been celebrated,
they went back to their tents rejoicing”—a sexual reading of a
not obviously sexual text (8:66).
Thomas’s gloss seems to overwhelm the apparent negativity
of Paul. Though Paul emphasizes the presence of sin, Thomas
underlines joy, and even God’s pleasure at consent between
man and wife. Thus he concludes the lectio by glossing Paul’s
phrase, “it is better to marry than to burn,” by saying that
marriage prevents “burning with lust,” and that Paul’s phrases,
though they are meant to encourage to a higher vocation, are
nonetheless “inappropriate” insofar as they appear to denigrate
the good of marriage.

90

See STh I-II, q. 72, a. 5; and qq. 88-89.

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305

Cormac Burke has written that “the practical effect” of the
language “remedy of concupiscence” “has been to create a
certain idea that marriage ‘legitimizes’ concupiscence, an idea
which, if further analyzed amounts to saying that ‘marriage
legitimizes disordered sexuality.”91 To the contrary, Thomas’s
account of the remedium concupiscentiae argues first that
marital lust must be brought within the confines of marriage,
not only externally, but internally, so that the person who does
not have entire control of his or her sexual impulses
nevertheless would not express them in any but marital ways.
Thomas argues, second, that the act by which a spouse helps his
or her partner find the appropriate expression for sexual
impulses is without sin and meritorious.
Burke asserts,
It was not that to marry stopped the “burning” of lust or concupiscence, but
that once married one could yield unconcernedly to this “burning,” whose
satisfaction is legitimized by marrying. In this view, conjugal relations, justified
by being oriented to procreation, were exempt from any further moral or
ascetical issue of control or purification.92

Although this may well be true of some people’s understanding
of remedium concupiscentiae, and although Burke tries to save
Thomas by asserting that he himself did not hold to any form of
remedium concupiscentiae,93 Thomas in fact provides a much
91

Burke, “Postscript to the ‘Remedium concupiscentiae’,”535.
Ibid., 501.
93
E.g., “Despite the long presence it has enjoyed in much of ecclesial writing and its
acceptance over fifty years in the 1917 Code, the concept of the remedium
concupiscentiae (a) lacks theological and anthropological substance (and, contrary to
generalized opinion, has little if any backing in the thought of St. Augustine or St.
Thomas)” (ibid., 487); “The attribution to Augustine and Thomas Aquinas of the
teaching that marriage is directed to the ‘remedy of concupiscence’ therefore lacks solid
grounds” (ibid., 497). Where we have argued that Thomas views venial sin as being on
the path to healing, Burke interprets it as pure condemnation: “Is a spouse not meant to
be the object of a different and nobler sort of desire than simple self-satisfaction? Should
we be surprised then at St. Thomas's opinion that ‘consentiens concupiscentiae in
uxorem’ is guilty not of a mortal sin, but indeed of one that is venial?” (ibid., 519).
Burke relocates the remedium from the use of nonprocreative intercourse considered
92

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ERIC M. JOHNSTON

richer account of that teaching, firmly rooted in the words of St.
Paul.
For Thomas, it is not that externally appropriate acts
legitimate internal disorder. Rather, the person learns to embrace that external order. This happens above all when the
person embraces the good of children, personally intending not
only procreation but the healthy rearing of children for the
glory of God. But it happens, too, in what Thomas calls the
good of faithfulness, when the couple learns to bring their still
fallen sexual desires firmly within the bounds of marriage,
above all by “being content with their own wife” or husband,
and thus binding lust “within the limits of matrimony,” as well
as by working with one’s spouse in their efforts to thus civilize
their unruly passions. This is a work of healing, though
admittedly the work of a lifetime.
In his discussions both of celibacy and of chastity, Thomas
recalls these words from Augustine: “I think nothing brings the
male soul down from the heights more than the charms of
woman and that contact of bodies without which one cannot
have a wife.”94 If this gives a motive for celibacy, it also explains
the enduring importance, and indeed dignity, of the remedium
concupiscentiae. The deeper dignity of the totius domesticae
conversationis consortium both awakens one’s fallen sexual
desires and becomes the context for the healing of those
desires.95
here to the grace of the sacrament: “Taking up again the objection that marriage,
precisely because it tends to increase concupiscence, cannot be a vehicle of grace,
[Thomas] turns the objection around and says that grace is in fact conferred in marriage
precisely to be a remedy against concupiscence, so as to curb it at its root” (ibid., 497).
Burke also tries to do away with the primacy of child rearing: “The hitherto prevalent
evaluation of conjugal intercourse—centered almost exclusively on its procreative
function and finality—is both dated and deficient” (ibid., 513). See also Cormac Burke,
“Marriage: A Personalist or an Institutional Understanding?” Communio, 19 (1992):
278-304.
94
STh II-II, q. 186, a. 4; and q. 151, a. 3, ad 2.
95
Cf. John Cassian, Conferences 19.16: “Even when we are living in solitude,
though the incentive to irritation and matter for it cannot arise from men, yet we ought
of set purpose to meditate on incitements to it, that as we are fighting against it with a
continual struggle in our thoughts, a speedier cure for it may be found for us. But

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Insofar as “the institution of matrimony itself and conjugal
love are ordained for the procreation and education of children,
and find in them their ultimate crown,” Thomas’s account of
the remedium concupiscentiae nicely illuminates a theory of
marriage ordered to procreation and further illumines
marriage’s hylemorphic unity of biology and morality.
III. LACTATIONAL AMENORRHEA: CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON
“NATURAL,” “FAMILY,” AND “PLANNING”
To conclude this article on the biological ordering of
marriage, let us examine how human biology is itself ordered to
the good of the human person. In recent decades it has been
scientifically established that the human body naturally suppresses ovulation for an average of perhaps fifteen months96
following childbirth—and thus naturally spaces children at least
two years apart—if the mother practices what has been called

against the spirit of fornication the system is different, and the method an altered one.
For as we must deprive the body of opportunities of lust, and contact with flesh, so we
must deprive the mind of the recollection of it. For it is sufficiently dangerous for
bosoms that are still weak and infirm even to tolerate the slightest recollection of this
passion, in such a way that sometimes at the remembrance of holy women, or in reading
a story in Holy Scripture, a stimulus of dangerous excitement is aroused. For which
reason our Elders used deliberately to omit passages of this kind when any of the juniors
were present. However for those who are perfect and established in the feelings of
chastity there can be no lack of proofs by which they may examine themselves, and
establish their perfect uprightness of heart by the uncorrupted judgment of their own
conscience. There will then be for the man who is thoroughly established a similar test
even in regard to this passion, so that one who is sure that he has altogether
exterminated the roots of this evil may for the sake of ascertaining his chastity, call up
some picture as with a lascivious mind. But it is by no means proper for such a test to be
attempted by those who are still weak, for to them it will be dangerous rather than
useful.” See also ibid., 19.12.
96
La Leche League International, The Womanly Art of Breastfeeding, 7th rev. ed.
(New York: Penguin, 2004), 380. Cf. P. Lewis et al., “The Resumption of Ovulation
and Menstruation in a Well-Nourished Population of Women Breastfeeding for an
Extended Period of Time,” Fertility and Sterility 55, no. 3 (1991): 529-36; and M.
Labbok, “The Lactational Amenorrhea Method (LAM) among Working Women,”
Contraception 62 (2000): 217-19.

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“ecological breastfeeding.”97 This effect is called “lactational
amenorrhea.”
“Ecological breastfeeding” is distinguished, by greater
mother-child closeness, from some cultural practices that may
be called “exclusive breastfeeding.” “Nursing provides all your
baby’s nourishment, liquids, and pacification for the first six to
eight months. . . . Once your baby starts solids, you continue to
nurse your baby frequently—day and night, and you continue to
take him with you wherever you go.”98 The woman’s biology
naturally suppresses ovulation under these circumstances, but
not under others.
In determining the “naturalness” of this practice, the medical
indications are impressive.99 Medical studies show that children
who are abundantly breastfed grow up to have fewer infec97

Paul VI’s “Birth Control Commission” was ignorant of this fact. In their final
report, in the section on “biological and medical facts,” they wrote, “after a birth,
fertility returns more rapidly than it used to. This is so, whether the woman nurses or
not” (“Rapport finale des travaux de la Commission Pontificale pour l’étude des
problèmes de la famille, de la population et de la natalité,” 27 June 1966, signed by
Henri de Riedmatten, O.P., Secrétaire Général, p. 25). This report, previously secret,
was recently published on Germaine Grisez’s web site: http://www.twotlj.org/FinalReport.pdf, accessed on June 28, 2013.) In a prophetic key, Pius XII said, “As for the
future . . . who can be sure that the natural rhythm of procreation will be the same in
the future as it is now? Is it not possible that some law that will moderate the rhythm of
expansion from within may come into play? Providence has reserved the future destiny
of the world to itself” (“The Large Family: An Address of Pope Pius XII to the Directors
of the Associations for Large Families of Rome and of Italy,” January 20, 1958 [in The
Pope Speaks 4, no. 4 (Spring 1958): 367]).
98
John F. Kippley and Sheila K. Kippley, The Art of Natural Family Planning, 4th
ed. (Cincinnati: The Couple to Couple League International, 1996), 333. Continued
study has led Sheila Kippley to publish “seven standards of ecological breastfeeding.”
See Sheila Matgen Kippley, Breastfeeding and Natural Child Spacing: How Ecological
Breastfeeding Spaces Babies, 4th ed. (Cincinnati: The Couple to Couple League
International, 1999), 1-5.
99
For overall benefits, see: American Academy of Pediatrics Work Group on
Breastfeeding. “Breastfeeding and the Use of Human Milk,” Pediatrics 100, no. 6
(1997): 1035-37; M. J. Heinig and K.G. Dewey, “Health Advantages of Breastfeeding
for Infants: A Critical Review,” Nutritional Research Review 9 (1996): 89-110; A. S.
Cunningham, D. B. Jelliffe, and E. F. P. Jelliffe, “Breastfeeding and Health in the 1980s:
A Global Epidemiological Review,” Journal of Pediatrics 118, no. 5 (1991): 659-66. All
references in the next series of notes are taken from La Leche League, Womanly Art.

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tions,100 better teeth,101 fewer allergies,102 less obesity,103 and
higher intelligence.104 Mothers who practice such abundant
breastfeeding experience better control of weight105 and stress106
in the short term, and significantly lesser chances of

100

A. Goldman, “Immunologic Components in Human Milk during the Second Year
of Lactation,” Acta Paediatrica Scandinavica 72 (1983): 461-62; E. Gulick, “The Effects
of Breastfeeding on Toddler Health,” Pediatric Nursing 12 (1986): 51-54; C. Van den
Bogaard, et al., “The Relationship between Breastfeeding and Early Childhood
Morbidity in a General Population,” Family Medicine 23 (1991): 510-15; K. G. Dewey
et al., “Differences in Morbidity between Breastfed and Formula-Fed Infants,” Journal
of Pediatrics 126, no. 5 (1995): 696-702; A. S. Goldman, “Modulation of the
Gastrointestinal Tract of Infants by Human Milk; Interfaces and Interactions: An
Evolutionary Perspective,” Journal of Nutrition 130 (2000): 426s-31s.
101
H. M. Labbok and G. E. Hendershot, “Does Breastfeeding Protect against
Maloclusion?” American Journal of Preventative Medicine 3 (1987): 227-32; J. Sinton et
al., “A Systematic Overview of the Relationship between Infant Feeding Caries and
Breast-feeding,” Ontario Dentist Journal 75, no. 9 (1998): 23-27.
102
A. L. Wright et al., “Relationship of Infant Feeding to Recurrent Wheezing at Age
6 years,” Archives of Pediatric and Adolescent Medicine 149 (1995): 758-63; U. M.
Saarinen et al., “Breastfeeding as Prophylaxis against Atopic Disease: Prospective
Follow-up Study until 17 Years Old,” Lancet 346, no. 8982 (1995): 1065-69; W. H.
Oddy et al., “Maternal Asthma, Infant Feeding, and the Risk of Asthma in Childhood,”
Journal of Allergy and Clinical Immunology 110 (2002): 65-67.
103
M. Kramer, “Do Breastfeeding and Delayed Introduction of Solid Foods Protect
against Subsequent Obesity?” Journal of Pediatrics 98 (1981): 883-87; M. W. Gillman et
al., “Risk of Overweight among Adolescents Who Were Breastfed as Infants,” Journal of
the American Medical Academy 285 (2001): 2461-67.
104
A. Lucas et al., “Breast Milk and Subsequent Intelligence Quotient in Children
Born Preterm,” Lancet 33 (1992): 261-62; J. W. Anderson et al., “Breastfeeding and
Cognitive Development: A Meta-Analysis,” American Journal of Clinical Nutrition 70
(1999): 525-35; M. Xiang et al., “Long-Chain Polyunsaturated Fatty Acids in Human
Milk and Brain Growth during Early Infancy,” Acta Pediatrica 89, no. 2 (2000):
142-47; E. L. Mortensen et al., “The Association between Duration of Breastfeeding
and Adult Intelligence,” Journal of the American Medical Academy 28, no. 15 (2002):
2365-71.
105
K. Dewey et al., “Maternal Weight-Loss Patterns during Prolonged Lactation,”
American Journal of Clinical Nutrition 58 (1993): 162-68.
106
M. Altremus et al., “Suppression of Hypothalmic-Pituitary-Adrenal Axis
Responses to Stress in Lactating Women,” Journal of Clinical Endoctrinol Metabolism
80, no. 9 (1995): 2954-59.

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osteoperosis107 and breast cancer108 in the long term. Female
children who are breastfed are 26-31% less likely to get breast
cancer as adults.109 Ovulation is suppressed not because the
mother’s body is exhausted, but as part of a healthy, natural
process ordered to the biological good of mother and child.
These medical indications are not only prudential motives in
themselves, but point deeper to the harmony of ecological
breastfeeding with nature.
Some Catholic authorities assert that there are also social
benefits. Maria Montessori, herself a medical doctor, noted the
unnaturalness of “all our Western ultramodern ideals. Nowhere
else, in fact, do we find children treated in a fashion so opposed
to their natural needs. In almost all countries, the baby
accompanies his mother wherever she goes. Mother and child
are inseparable. . . . Mother and child are one. Except where
civilization has broken down this custom, no mother ever
entrusts her child to someone else.”110
Pope Pius XII told a group of Italian women, “Except where
it is quite impossible, it is more desirable that the mother should
feed her child at her own breast. Who shall say what mysterious
107
H. J. Kalkwarf et al., “Intestinal Calcium Absorption of Women during Lactation
and after Weaning,” American Journal of Clinical Nutrition 63, no. 4 (1996): 526-31;
L. Sinigaglia et al., “Effect of Lactation on Postmenopausal Bone Mineral Density of
Lumbar Spine,” Journal of Reproductive Medicine 41, no. 6 (1996): 439-43; F. Polatti et
al., “Bone Mineral Changes during and after Lactation,” Obstetrics and Gynecology 94,
no. 1 (1999): 52-56; P. Henderson et al., “Bone Mineral Density in Grand Multiparous
Women with Extended Lactation,” American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology 182,
no. 6 (2000): 1371-77.
108
M. L. Gwinn et al., “Pregnancy, Breastfeeding, and Oral Contraceptives and the
Risk of Epithelial Ovarian Cancer,” Journal of Clinical Epidemiology 43, no. 6 (1990):
559-68; S. M. Enger et al., “Breastfeeding Experience and Breast Cancer Risk among
Post-Menopausal Women,” Cancer Epidemiology Biomarkers Preview 7 (1998): 365-69;
Collaborative Group on Hormonal Factors in Breast Cancer, “Breast Cancer and
Breastfeeding: Collaborative Reanalysis of Individual Data from 47 Epidemiological
Studies in 30 Countries, including 50,302 Women with Breast Cancer and 96,973
Women without the Disease,” Lancet 360 (2002): 187-95.
109
J. Freudenheim et al., “Exposure to Breast Milk in Infancy and the Risk of Breast
Cancer,” Epidemiology 5, no. 3 (1994): 324-31.
110
Kippley and Kippley, Art of Natural Family Planning, 340, quoting Maria
Montessori, The Absorbent Mind (New York: Dell, 1967) 99, 104-5.

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influences are exerted upon the growth of that little creature by
the mother upon whom it depends entirely for its
development.”111
In fact, as Montessori said, this is the practice in much of the
world. Modern researchers note, “Demographic data indicate
that in many developing countries, the protection from
pregnancy provided by breastfeeding alone is greater than that
given by all other reversible means of family planning combined, and that breastfeeding makes a considerable contribution
to securing a two-year birth interval.”112
111

Kippley and Kippley, Art of Natural Family Planning, 341, quoting Pius XII,
“Guiding Christ’s Little Ones: Address to the Women of Italian Catholic Action, Feast
of Christ the King,” October 26, 1941 (in The Major Addresses of Pope Pius XII, vol. 1,
Selected Addresses, ed. Vincent A. Yzermans [St. Paul: North Central Publishing, 1961],
44). Modern medical research confirms this insight: M. Lavelli and M. Poli, “Early
Mother-Infant Interaction during Breast and Bottle Feeding,” Infant Behavior
Development 21, no. 4 (1998): 667-84. For a book-length argument, see Sheila Matgen
Kippley, Breastfeeding and Catholic Motherhood: God’s Plan for You and Your Baby
(Manchester, N.H.: Sophia, 2005). Gorden Neufeld and Gabor Mate, M.D., Hold On
to Your Kids: Why Parents Need to Matter More than Peers (New York: Ballantine,
2006), a book popular among Catholic parents, argues for the social importance of
parent-child “attachment” without reference to breastfeeding.
112
Kippley and Kippley, Art of Natural Family Planning, 339, quoting “The Bellagio
Consensus: Conference on Lactational Infertility, Bellagio, Italy, August 1988,” in
Contraception 39 (1989): 447-96. It also seems to have been the practice in medieval
Europe. Nicholas Orme, an expert on children in the middle ages, says, “Medieval
children were fed at the breast for longer than usually happens today. . . . Weaning from
breast-feeding seems to have been done at any time from one to three” (Nicholas Orme,
Medieval Children [New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001], 66 n. 81). Medieval
devotion to Mary “tells of her being weaned by St. Anne at three” (ibid., 66) and Mary
was herself often depicted as “the ideal of a mother breast-feeding her child” (ibid., 59,
caption). Weaning was treated as “the first milestone after birth, marking a stage
towards independence”—more significant than first steps or words (ibid., 66). Mothers
did not nurse only if they were sick, dead, or too itinerant, as in the case of queens; in
those cases, they used wet nurses (ibid., 58). And “parents and nurses frequently slept
with young children,” despite nervousness among clerical leaders (ibid., 78). Orme cites
contemporary authorities on education: Giles of Rome emphasized that a mother’s milk
is specifically designed for her own child (ibid., 58, citing Giles of Rome, De regimine
principum, part 2, book 2, c. 15), and contradicting Aristotle but siding with today’s
breastfeeding-advocacy group La Leche League, Giles “states that crying should be
discouraged” (ibid., 63). Bartholomew Anglicus, a popular thirteenth-century Franciscan

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It seems medically warranted to judge that lactational
amenorrhea points to something more deeply “natural”: a
rational use of human biology produces abundant biological,
intellectual, and arguably social benefits, for mother and child,
and triggers a natural biological response to provide space
between children. La Leche League speaks in the language of
nature:
Lactational amenorrhea is a normal, healthy part of the female reproductive
cycle. Women who bear only two or three children during their reproductive
years come to think of their monthly menstrual cycle as normal and the period
of lactational amenorrhea a departure from the norm. However, going for
years without having a period is probably what women’s bodies were meant to
do. Mothers in traditional hunter-gathering cultures nursed each baby for two
or three years and enjoyed long periods of lactational amenorrhea. When their
periods returned, they would become pregnant again, and it might be another
three years before they again had a menstrual period. As a result, these women
experienced far fewer menstrual periods in their lifetime. Today, scientists
believe that extended periods of lactational amenorrhea may help to explain
the lower rates of ovarian, endometrial, and breast cancer found in women
who breastfeed. The absence of the repeated hormonal ups and downs of
regular menstrual cycles may leave the breasts and reproductive organs less
vulnerable to cancer.113

Lactational amenorrhea is a naturally occurring infertility
attending what appears to be an abundantly healthy process.
Monthly infertility could be understood as a defect—the
inability of the body always to be ready to carry a child—but
lactational amenorrhea seems to indicate that nature itself seeks
infertile periods for the good of the child. Even biology is
ordered not just to procreation but to rearing healthy adults.
“Natural family planning” is often thought of as a peculiar
interruption into the normal pattern of fecundity. But defining
natural family planning as “the use of marriage in the infecund
author, “adds a little more about the care of babies in his encyclopedia. . . . When babies
cry, they should be offered the breast,” held, and sung to (ibid., citing Bartholomew de
Glanville [or Anglicus], De proprietatibus rerum). His studies of family size suggest that
not only infant mortality but suppressed fertility limited average family sizes to two or
three per family, or five among the very wealthy, though of course there were
exceptions (ibid., 53-55).
113
La Leche League, Womanly Art, 379.

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periods only”114 might give a mistaken impression—an unfortunately narrow way of thinking about “natural,” “family,” and
“planning.”
In Thomas Aquinas’s presentation of marriage, human
reason, or “planning,” is exercised, on the one hand, precisely
by following nature: discovering natural processes that serve the
natural needs of human children, both biological and rational,
and living according to them. In fact, the natural process of
marriage and sexuality is precisely ordered to “family.” To plan
wisely (and morally) is to plan naturally and for family.
On the other hand, nature and family demand planning.
Procreation may well (and often does) happen without any
foresight. But marriage precisely is planning naturally for
family. It is the rational project of creating a family, wherein
procreation can reach its proper natural end, healthy adults.
Marriage demands constant planning: what defines its good is
precisely its planning to provide both for the physical needs of
the children (itself a rational project) and for their needs as
rational beings: instruction and moral correction. Both the
substrata and the ends of this properly human education are
almost defined by the confluence of nature, planning, and
family: totius domesticae conversationis consortium, the bonos
mores of the family members, and society itself.
The term “natural family planning,” of course, is more
typically used to describe the limitation of offspring. Here again
we must note three things. First, marriage is for family: since
the offspring are the end of marriage, and ends are unlimited, a
marriage can never have too much child-rearing. Second,
marriage requires planning: offspring require rearing—that is
the very purpose of marriage—and thus it can never be right to
procreate without planning family according to the natural
requirement of human offspring. That is the principal argument

114

Paul VI, Humanae Vitae 16.

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against fornication, but it also demands the fuller project of
“responsible parenthood.”115
Third, marriage follows nature (sequi naturam): as we have
briefly demonstrated in our presentation of lactational
amenorrhea, human biological nature itself contains rhythms
ordered precisely toward the natural needs of rearing children.
When reason uncovers these rhythms and follows this nature, it
naturally limits the growth of family precisely by providing for
the physical, emotional, and relational needs of small children,
upon which their later growth is based. Thus lactational
amenorrhea could be considered the most proper paradigm for
the meaning of “natural family planning”: a means, discovered
by reason, but rooted precisely in human nature, animal and
rational.

115

“Responsible Parenthood” is a key theme in Humanae Vitae: see §§1 and 10. See
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