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�'$'(%. '( (/% ("+ .$17$'*(+ (% ')# 1$0, (*' 9 64.'$+3#%. '( $ 3%$5$ *+ ")*0) "# )$7# +( %(1#! + ./&%#5# 5#%04 $+3 8/.'*0# )# #+$61#. /. '( 6# +(')*+2 1#.. ')$+ $2#+'. ((/% ("+ .$17$'*(+9 .)$%#%. *+ ')# .$'*.-$0'*(+ $1%#$34 $+3 $6/+3$+'14 $00(5&1*.)#3 64 )%*.'! ?? 55( #' */.'/5 #' +#0#..$%*/5 *+'#11*2(9 /' 0/* 7(1/#%*' 3$%# -*1*/.9 $ &$'%# %#33$'/% ( 9 0! J E 0)5*''9 #3!9 ? ! B ! The Thomist 81 (2017): 183-212 THE PROTREPTIC OF SUMMA THEOLOGIAE I-II, QQ.1-5 ADAM EITEL Yale Divinity School Yale University W HAT IS HAPPINESS? What is the best and happiest life that a human being can live? On what sort of good would a life like that be founded? What other goods would it require? Or is happiness even something that creatures like us in a world like ours should hope to achieve? Modern readers have been ineluctably struck by how nearly Thomas Aquinas’s answers to these questions resemble those of Aristotle. It is not difficult to see why. The sheer frequency of citations to the Nicomachean Ethics in Summa theologiae I-II, questions 1-5—Thomas’s so-called “treatise on happiness”— indicates that Thomas himself saw some semblance of Aristotle’s account of the human good in his own considered view on the subject. It would be foolish to deny those Aristotelian semblances. Nor do I need to rehearse here all the ways those semblances can deceive.1 A single example will suffice. Contemporary exegetes remain intractably divided over what Aristotelian happiness (eudaemonia) entails. One camp argues that Aristotle identifies human happiness exclusively with the exercise of the virtue of wisdom (sophia)—specifically, in divine 1 See Mark D. Jordan, The Alleged Aristotelianism of Thomas Aquinas, Etienne Gilson Series 15 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1992), rev. and repr. in Mark D. Jordan, Rewritten Theology: Aquinas after His Readers (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 60-88. A brief account of some of the philosophical concerns behind modern preoccupations with Thomas’s “Aristotelianism” can be found in Wayne J. Hankey, “Pope Leo’s Purposes and St Thomas’s Platonism,” in S. Tommaso nella storia del pensiero: Atti dell VIII Congresso Tomistico Internationale, vol. 8 and Studi Tomistici 17 (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1982), 39-43. 183 184 ADAM EITEL contemplation (theôria).2 A second contends that happiness consists in an “inclusive end” composed of theôria, the moral virtues, and various “exterior goods,” such as honor, wealth, and leisure.3 Significantly, many of Thomas’s contemporary readers purport to find something like the second, inclusivist account of happiness (beatitudo) in the treatise on happiness.4 2 See, for example, René A. Gauthier and Jean Y. Jolif, L’Éthique à Nicomaque: Introduction, traduction et commentaire, Aristote: Traductions et Études (Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1958); Thomas Nagel, “Aristotle on Eudaimonia,” Phronesis 17 (1972): 252-59; Anthony Kenny, The Aristotelian Ethics: A Study of the Relationship between the Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978); Robert Heinaman, “Eudaimonia and Self-Sufficiency in the Nicomachean Ethics,” Phronesis 33 (1987): 31-53; Richard Kraut, Aristotle on the Human Good (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); Kenny, Aristotle on the Perfect Life (Oxford University Press, 1992); John Cooper, “Plato and Aristotle on ‘Finality’ and ‘(Self-) Sufficiency,” in Knowledge, Nature, and the Good (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); Gabriel Richardson Lear, Happiness and the Highest Good (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). Cf. David Charles, “Aristotle on WellBeing and Intellectual Contemplation,” Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1999): 205-23; Dominic Scott, “Aristotle on Well-Being and Intellectual Contemplation,” Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1999): 225-42; Stephen S. Bush, “Divine and Human Happiness in Nicomachean Ethics,” Philosophical Review 117 (2008): 49-75. 3 See, for example, W. F. R. Hardie, “The Final Good in Aristotle’s Ethics,” Philosophy 40 (1965): 277-95; John Cooper, Reason and Human Good in Aristotle (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975), 99; Daniel Devereux, ‘‘Aristotle on Active and Contemplative Lives,” Philosophy Research Archives 3 (1977): 834-44; David Keyt, “Intellectualism in Aristotle,” Paideia (1978): 138-57; J. L. Ackrill, “Aristotle on Eudaimonia,” in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, ed. A. Rorty (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1980), 15-33; A. W. Price, “Aristotle's Ethical Holism,” Mind 89 (1980): 338-52; Martha Nussbaum, “Aristotle,” in Ancient Writers 1, ed. T. James Luce (New York: Scribner, 1982), 377-416; T. H. Irwin, “Permanent Happiness: Aristotle and Solon,” in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 3, ed. Julia Annas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 89-124; J. Whiting, “Human Nature and Intellectualism in Aristotle,” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 68 (1986): 70-95; Sarah Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). 4 This reading especially predominates in contemporary Anglophone scholarship. See for example Ralph McInerny, Aquinas on Human Action: A Theory of Practice (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1992), 32; McInerny, Ethica Thomistica: The Moral Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1997), 42; David M. Gallagher, “Desire for Beatitude and Love of Friendship in Thomas Aquinas,” Mediaeval Studies 58 (1996): 1-47; John Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory, Founders of Modern THE PROTREPTIC OF STH I-II, QQ. 1-5 185 But such readings face a crucial problem. According to Thomas, Aristotle’s view more nearly resembles the exclusivist account: commenting on book X of the Nicomachean Ethics, Thomas thus notes that “contemplative activity clearly belongs to the intellect according to its proper virtue—namely, wisdom. . . . And that happiness consists in such an activity seems to agree both with the things said in Ethics I and indeed with the truth itself.”5 The ironies that follow are delicious. When contemporary readers insist upon the “Aristotelian” character of Thomas’s notion of happiness, they ascribe to him a view that Thomas himself took Aristotle to deny. Consequently, the extent of Thomas’s debt to the Ethics is made to depend on the extent to which he alledgedly misread it.6 Political and Social Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 85-86; Colleen McCluskey, “Happiness and Freedom in Aquinas’s Theory of Action,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 9 (2000): 72; Jean Porter, Nature as Reason: A Thomistic Theory of the Natural Law (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2004), 81; Don Adams, “Aquinas on Aristotle on Happiness,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 1 (1991): 98-118, at 99. One notable exception to the standard reading is Anthony Kenny, “Aquinas on Aristotelian Happiness,” in Aquinas’s Moral Theory: Essays in Honor of Norman Kretzmann, ed. Scott MacDonald and Eleonore Stump (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999), 15-27. Cf. Wolfgang Kluxen, Philosophische Ethik bei Thomas von Aquin (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998), 124-44; Eberhard Schockenhoff, Bonum Hominis: Die anthropologischen und theologischen Grundlagen der Tugendethik des Thomas von Aquin, Tübinger Theologische Studien 28 (Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag, 1987), 83-85; Hermann Kleber, Glück als Lebensziel: Untersuchungen zur Philosophie des Glücks bei Thomas von Aquin (Münster: Aschendorff, 1988), 196-200; Christian Trottmann, La vision béatifique: Des disputes scholastiques à sa définition par Benoît XII (Rome: Ecole française de Rome, 1995), 257. 5 X Nic. Ethic. lect. 10 (Opera omnia iussu impensaque Leonis XIII. P.M. [Rome: 1882-], vol. 47/2, p. 583): “manifestum est, quod speculativa operatio est intellectus secundum propriam virtutem eius, scilicet . . . sapientiam. . . . Et quod in tali operatione consistat, felicitas, videtur esse consonum eis, quae in primo dicta sunt de felicitate, et etiam ipsi veritati.” See also I Nic. Ethic., lect. 4 (Leonine ed., 47/1:14-16); Tabula libri Ethicorum, C 244 (Leonine ed., 48:B 84). Here and except as noted, parenthetical citations following medieval textual divisions of Thomas’s works designate volume and page number of the Leonine edition. 6 I assume here the standard chronology of Thomas’s works indicated in Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., Saint Thomas Aquinas, vol. 1, trans. Robert Royal (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996), 327-61; 424-438; esp., 227, nn. 7-10. I thus reject James Doig’s attempt to date books II to VII of the commentary on 186 ADAM EITEL Irony has its uses. It can give us new eyes to see. Yet my purpose in what follows is not to show how little questions 1-5 of the Prima secundae recall the Nicomachean Ethics. I rather want to show how nearly these questions recall one of Thomas’s own experiments in sapiental persuasion. I will argue that the immediate textual antecedent to these questions is book III of the Summa contra Gentiles. Proceeding on this basis—and by surfacing a dense proliferation of rhetorical figures that modern readers have yet to notice—I will argue that questions 1-5 of the Prima secundae comprise a protreptic to the contemplation of God. The aim of protreptic discourse is to turn or convert another toward a specific end. Since, for Thomas, the best and happiest life is principally founded on contemplation, it is especially this activity that he urges upon the reader of the Prima secundae. The novelty of this argument invites a number of questions. If these questions comprise a protreptic, how is it meant to succeed? Does Thomas aim to persuade the reader by proposing an end unknown, or by hastening the pursuit of an end already known and already desired? Does the suasion turn on reasoned Aristotle’s Ethics posterior to the Secunda secundae of the Summa theologiae (James C. Doig, Aquinas’s Philosophical Commentary on the Ethics: A Historical Perspective [Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001], 109-230) as evidence that in the Ethics commentary Thomas aims to articulate his own “moral philosophy” (ibid., xvi; cf. xixvii, 109-230). The longstanding consensus regarding the literal or expository purpose of the Ethics commentary is well attested. See especially Charles Jourdain, La philosophie de saint Thomas d’Aquin (Paris: Hachette, 1858), 81-96; Pierre Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant et “l’averroïsme” au xiime siecle (Louvain: Institut superieur de philosophe de l’Universite, 1911), 42; Martin Grabmann, “Les commentaires de saint Thomas d’Aquin sur les ouvrages d’Aristote,” Annales de l’institut supérieur de philosophie 3 (1914): 231-81; Etienne Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (London: Sheed & Ward, 1955), 367; Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R., “Aquinas as Aristotelian Commentator,” in St. Thomas Aquinas 1274-1974: Commemorative Studies (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1974), 213-38; Leo Elders, “St. Thomas Aquinas’s Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics,” in Autour de saint Thomas d’Aquin; Recueil d’etudes sur sa pensée philosophique et théologique, vol. 1 (Paris: FAC-éditiones, 1987), 77-122 at 115; Mark D. Jordan, “Thomas Aquinas’s Disclaimers in the Aristotelian Commentaries,” in Philosophy and the God of Abraham: Essays in Memory of James A. Weisheipl, O.P., ed. R. James Long (Toronto: Pontifical Institute for Medieval Studies, 1991), 99-112; Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas, 1:227-39. THE PROTREPTIC OF STH I-II, QQ. 1-5 187 argument alone, or is there also some appeal to the passions? Grappling with these issues will require coming to grips with Thomas’s rhetorical inheritance. But I must begin with a more basic question: why does the Prima secundae begin with five questions on happiness? I. THE SETTING OF QUESTIONS 1-5 OF THE PRIMA SECUNDAE The significance of the question must be clarified. The first step toward clarity is to be reminded that these questions are not, in fact, a “Treatise on Happiness.” They cannot be, since, contrary to modern editorial impositions, the Summa is not divided into tractationes or inquisitiones. Its quaestiones rather coalesce in increasingly expansive dialectical wholes. It follows that questions about the purpose of any of the Summa’s wholes cannot be asked well without first knowing what Thomas wants to teach in the whole Summa. Some old lessons in this regard bear repeating. Scholars allow that the Summa was written to reform the pastoral and practical curricula of Dominican houses and schools.7 It is in this connection that the Summa’s prologue addresses beginners (incipientes) in sacra doctrina.8 If Thomas writes not just for any and every beginner, he seems to be especially concerned with the fratres communes of the Dominican order—especially with those friars who, unlike Thomas, had not received a university education.9 If it is for their sake that Thomas forswears “useless questions, articles, and arguments” and “frequent repetition,”10 it is for their sake, too, that he endeavors to reform the Dominican tendency to 7 Leonard E. Boyle, O.P., The Setting of the Summa Theologiae of Saint Thomas (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1982), rev. and repr. in Boyle, “The Setting of the Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas-Revisited,” in The Ethics of Aquinas, Moral Traditions Series (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 1-16; M. Michèle Mulchahey, “First the Bow Is Bent in Study”: Dominican Education before 1350 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1998), 278-306 and 314-21; Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas, 1:142-45. Cf. John I. Jenkins, Knowledge and Faith in Thomas Aquinas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 85-90. 8 STh I, prologus (Leonine ed., 4:5). 9 Boyle, “The Setting of the Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas-Revisited,” 8. 10 STh I, prologus (Leonine ed., 4:5). 188 ADAM EITEL separate morals from Christian doctrine. The very structure of the Summa enacts this reform by expanding, reordering, and relocating a traditional collection of moral topics within the frame of Christian theology. A comparison of the Summa to some of its immediate textual predecessors—such as William of Auxerre’s Summa aurea and the Summa theologica of Alexander of Hales—can illustrate the point. Following the general structure of Peter Lombard’s Sentences, both of these works append discrete clusters of moral topics to the doctrines of sin and Christ.11 By contrast, the Summa combines and repositions moral topics squarely within the procession and return of creatures to God. The prelude to question 2 of the Prima pars alludes to this innovative structure: “in effort to expound this teaching we will first treat God [STh I], second, the rational creature’s movement toward God [STh II], and third, Christ, who, insofar as he is a human being, is our way of tending to God [STh III].”12 Whereas Thomas’s predecessors dispersed moral matters across a wide range of doctrines, Thomas gathers them into a single sequence of questions spanning the long Secunda pars. Thomas’s relocation of morals within the structure of the Summa was novel.13 His reordering of those topics was altogether odd. This, too, can be quickly seen against the 11 See for example Peter Lombard, Sententiae in IV libris distinctae II, dd. 24-34 and III, dd. 34-40 (3d rev. ed. [Rome: Editiones collegii s. Bonaventurae ad claras aquas, 1971]: 1/2:450-539 and 2:190-229); William of Auxerre, Summa aurea II, tr. 12-25 and III, tr. 10-55 (ed. Jean Ribaillier, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, vols. 16-20 [Paris: Editions du centre national de la recherche scientifique; Rome: Editiones collegii s. Bonaventurae ad claras aquas, 1980-87], 2:357-713 and 3:112-1068); Alexander of Hales, Summa theologica II, qq. 26-60 and III, qq. 61-68 (ed. the Fathers of the Collegium S. Bonaventurae [Ad claras aquas (Quaracchi): Ex typographia collegi s. Bonaventurae, 1924], 4/2:314-939 and 949-1111. 12 STh I, q. 2, pro. (Leonine ed., 4:27). 13 The novelty of the Summa’s structure has been discussed elsewhere. See for example Roger Guindon, O.M.I., Béatitude et théologie morale chez saint Thomas d’Aquin, Les publications seriées de l’université d’Ottawa, vol. 50 (Montreal: Éditions de l’université d’Ottawa, 1956), 17-114; Ignatius Theodore Eschmann, O.P., The Ethics of Saint Thomas Aquinas: Two Courses, ed. Edward A. Synan, Etienne Gilson Series 20; Studies in Medieval and Moral Teaching 1 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1997), 24-30; Jordan, Rewritten Theology, 126-35. THE PROTREPTIC OF STH I-II, QQ. 1-5 189 backdrop of one of the Summa’s textual antecedents, his own Scriptum on the Sentences. In accordance with Scholastic convention, Thomas attaches to the penultimate distinction of the Lombard’s final book five long questions on “happiness,” the “vision of God,” its “delight,” “dowries” (dotis), and “treasures” (aureoli).14 At the beginning of the Prima secundae he eschews this conventional division; instead, he composes five comparatively brief questions on “the final end in general (q. 1) and “happiness” (qq. 2-5)—specifically, “in what it consists” (q. 2) “what it is” (qq. 3-4), and “how we can pursue it” (q. 5).15 The division of these questions is unprecedented in medieval theology. Their order with respect to other moral topics is moreover peculiar.16 Admittedly, it was not unusual for medieval works of moral philosophy to begin with an account of the good in general. Nor was it unusual to find treatments of human happiness in theological discussions of the “last things.”17 But crucially, Thomas breaks with both of these conventions: the Secunda pars begins (rather than ends) with an urgent search for the human good (rather than the good in general). This, too, was new—so much so that the substance of 14 See IV Sent., d. 49, qq. 1-5 (Sancti Thomae Aquinatis angelici ordinis predicatorum Opera omnia ad fidem optimarum editionem accurate recognita [Parma: Typis Petri Fiaccadori, 1857], 7: 1167-244). 15 See STh I-II, q. 1, pro.; and q. 2, pro. (Leonine ed., 6:6, 17). 16 At least many of the quaestiones, articuli, and quaestiunculae in IV Sent., d. 49, q. 1, aa. 1-4 and q. 5, aa. 1-3 borrow topical headings from prior commentaries or theological works well known to thirteenth-century Parisian schools. Compare especially IV Sent., d. 49, q. 1, aa. 1-4 and q. 5, aa. 1-3 to Bonaventure, Commentaria in quatuor libros sententiarum IV, d. 49, p. 1, a. 1, qq. 1-6 and p. 2., a. 2, qq. 1-4 (Doctoris seraphici S. Bonaventura opera omnia, ed. the Fathers of the Collegium S. Bonaventurae [Ad claras aquas (Quaracchi): Ex typographia collegi s. Bonaventurae, 1881-1902]: 4:999-1035). Cf. Albert the Great, Super IV Sententiarum, d. 49, B., aa. 6-7 (Opera Omnia, ed. August Borgnet [Paris: Vivès, 1894], 30:672-79). 17 See for example Albert the Great, Summa de bono tr. 1, q.1, aa. 1–10 (Opera omnia ad fidem codicum manuscriptorum edenda, ed. Institutum Albertus Magnus Coloniense [Munster: Aschendorff, 1951-], 28:1–21). Cf. Philip the Chancellor, Summa de bono, q. 4 (ed. Nicolaus Wicki, Corpus philosophorum mediiaevi 2 [Bern: Francke, 1985], 1:20-22). See also Peter Lombard, Sententiae IV, d. 49 (Quaracchi ed., 4:54753); Bonaventure, Brevoloquium p. 7, c. 7 (Quaracchi ed., 5:281-91); William of Auxerre, Summa aurea IV, tr. 18, c. 3, qq. 1-3 (Ribaillier, ed., 4:490-526). 190 ADAM EITEL these five questions cannot be understood well without first puzzling over location. That is the sense of the question I mean to pose: why does the Prima secundae begin with five questions on happiness? Most studies of the “treatise on happiness” never ask this question; scholars tend to assume that Thomas writes the treatise for the sole purpose of making known what human happiness is. But that cannot be right. Readers of the Prima secundae are expected to have already worked through arguments on the nature of happiness in the Prima pars—and not just once but twice: first, in the discourse on divine perfection, which culminates in a single question on the happiness of God (STh I, q. 26);18 and again some thirty questions later in the discussion of angels in glory (q. 62). Both of these inquiries touch not only upon the nature of divine and angelic happiness, but also upon the nature of happiness more generally. Thus, readers of the Prima secundae are expected already to know that “the word ‘happiness’ [beatitudo] designates the final perfection of a rational or intellectual nature”—that is, the “intellectual activity” by which a human being or an angel can be united to God, the “thing itself” (ipsa res) to which all of creation is ordered.19 Then, too, readers are expected already to know that human happiness is twofold. The first sort of happiness—which “we look forward to in the future, whereby ‘we shall see God as he is’”—is “beyond the nature of every created intellect” and requires “the infusion of a gracious light.”20 The second sort, by contrast, can be gained in this life through “the most perfect human contemplation . . . of the best intelligible object, God” insofar as “many and more excellent of his effects are demonstrated to us, and insofar as we attribute to him some things known by divine revelation—say, that God is 18 See Wayne J. Hankey, God in Himself: Aquinas’ Doctrine of God as Expounded in the Summa Theologiae (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 111-14. 19 STh I, q. 26, a. 3, ad. 2 (Leonine ed., 4:304); q. 26, a. 2 (Leonine ed., 4:302); q. 62, a. 1 (Leonine ed., 5:110). 20 STh I, q. 62, a. 1 (Leonine ed., 5:110); q. 12, a. 13, corp. and ad 1 (Leonine ed., 4:137-38). See STh I, q. 12, a. 4 (Leonine ed., 4:120-21). THE PROTREPTIC OF STH I-II, QQ. 1-5 191 Three and One.”21 If readers of the Prima secundae can be expected already to know all of this, then they can also be expected to know that such happiness secondarily includes the exercise of practical reason. For how else could the human good be said to approximate God’s “governance of the universe”?22 The preceding paragraph demonstrates just how much of the character of the human good Thomas expects readers of the Prima secundae already to grasp. It is true that the first five questions recollect and refine the schematic remarks on human happiness scattered throughout the Prima pars. But these addenda can hardly be said to warrant forty elaborate articles (which Thomas has rather curiously divided symmetrically into five groups of eight—a point discussed below). So the search continues. What is the purpose of these first five questions? Why does Thomas begin the Prima secundae as he does? I. T. Eschmann made a good suggestion over sixty years ago in a lecture course at the Pontifical Institute for Medieval Studies. Eschmann emphasized that the Summa’s several prologues and preambles hold the keys to the principles governing its structure. With respect to the first five questions of the Prima secundae, Eschmann put great weight on the preamble to question 1. To quote Eschmann’s translation of the passage, Thomas notes that in this matter we shall consider first the final end of human life [I-II, qq. 1-5]; and secondly, those things by means of which a human being may advance towards this end, or stray from the path [I-II, qq. 6-114; II-II, qq. 1-189]: for from the end we should grasp the characters [rationes] of those things which are ordered to the end. And since the final end of human life is said to be happiness, we must consider the final end in general and happiness.23 The bracketed citations in Eschmann’s translation are mine, not his. I have inserted them to help illustrate the significance of the preamble as Eschmann understood it. “[T]he first five Questions of the Prima secundae,” writes Eschmann, 21 STh I, q. 62, a. 1 (Leonine ed., 5:110); q. 12, a. 13, ad 1 (Leonine ed., 4:137-38). STh I, q. 26, a. 4 (Leonine ed., 4:304). 23 STh I-II, q. 1, pro. (Leonine ed., 6:6). 22 192 ADAM EITEL are thus a sort of foundation, of “first philosophy,” or proto-philosophia, with respect to the whole of [Summa] II. This whole treatise of the II Part is about human acts. The preamble of such a treatise is the doctrine of beatitude, that is, about the end of those acts.24 According to Eschmann, the beginning of the Prima secundae is a first demonstration of the end toward which all of the acts analyzed in the Secunda pars must aim. These five questions are in other words a kind of proto-philosophia (to borrow Eschmann’s term) after the manner of Aristotle’s Metaphysics XII: they invoke the highest being who is said to move all other beings by being sought as the highest good. Eschmann’s suggestion plausibly amplifies without embellishing what the preamble to question 1 plainly says: because “the final end of human life is said to be happiness,” the Secunda pars is first and foremost concerned with “the things by means of which a human being may advance towards this end”: actions (qq. 6-21), passions (qq. 22-48), and their principles— namely, virtues (qq. 49-67), law (qq. 90-108), and grace (qq. 109-114). Yet, because “the characters” (rationes) of things ordered to an end can only be grasped in light of the character of the end itself,25 the Prima secundae must first treat happiness. “For ‘happiness’ [beatitude] names the final end.”26 At last, we have a partial answer to the question of why the Prima secundae begins with a discourse on happiness. Yet, several puzzles remain. It is one thing to explain the location of these questions; it is quite another to explain their content, namely, the pedagogical decisions they enact. Why, in a work that promises to avoid faulty repetition, does Thomas belabor a topic already sketched throughout the course of the Prima pars? A survey of recent efforts to expound the first five questions of the Prima secundae suggests that there are more pressing and perplexing questions still. Some readers worry that Thomas traverses long and pointless digressions—dialectical excurses 24 Eschmann, Ethics of Saint Thomas Aquinas, 38. STh I-II, q. 1, pro. (Leonine ed., 6:6). See also STh I-II, q. 49, a. 1, pro. (Leonine ed., 6:390) and q. 90, a. 1, pro. (Leonine ed., 7:149). 26 STh I-II, q. 2, a. 1, pro. (Leonine ed., 6:17). 25 THE PROTREPTIC OF STH I-II, QQ. 1-5 193 which, from a logical standpoint, seem to be specious or misplaced.27 Others conclude that Thomas seems needlessly to multiply arguments, giving three where one might be sufficient. Accusing him of excessive “abstractness” and of omitting crucial premises, others contend that Thomas does not say enough.28 The lengths to which some readers have gone to dispatch these difficulties shows how serious they take them to be. Some have taken it upon themselves to revise Thomas’s arguments.29 But most have elected simply to hover over the text from a height where its difficulties cannot be seen.30 27 See for example the discussion of STh I-II, q. 1 in J. Ramirez, De hominis beatitudine: Tractatus theologicus ad 1-2 Summa theologiae (qq. 1-5) (Madrid: Consejo superior de investigaciones cientifices, 1942-47). Cf. Eschmann, Ethics of Saint Thomas Aquinas, 41: “if Ramirez's hypothesis is true, [q. 1, aa. 2-3] must be considered an excursion, even an undue interruption of the reasoning.” See also Eschmann’s assessment of q. 1, a. 4, ad 4 (“[t]his Argument, in the midst of a fundamental discussion in ethics, is very specious” [ibid., 102]); q. 1, a. 7 (“[n]othing is particularly noteworthy about the Responses [in q. 1, a. 7]” [ibid., 147]); q. 1, a. 8 (“Saint Thomas is unable to prove his thesis here [in STh I-II, q. 1, a. 8] save by anticipating a thesis” [ibid., 148]); see also Eschmann’s critique of Ramirez apropos q. 1, a. 5 (ibid., 112-13). 28 For charges of abstractness, see for example McInerny, Aquinas on Human Action, 28. For criticisms of the “argument” of Summa I-II, q. 1, a. 4, see for example G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1957), section 21. See also McInerny, Aquinas on Human Action, 28, 31; Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung, Colleen McCluskey, and Christina Van Dyke, Aquinas’s Ethics: Metaphysical Foundations, Moral Theory, and Theological Context (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009), 74. 29 Scott MacDonald, “Ultimate Ends in Practical Reasoning: Aquinas’s Aristotelian Moral Psychology and Anscombe’s Fallacy,” The Philosophical Review 100 (1991): 31-66 severs STh I-II, q. 1 from qq. 2-5, ignores q. 1, aa. 2, 3, 8, and introduces foreign distinctions (e.g., “weak” and “strong” final ends) in order to defend the cogency of what MacDonald takes to be the “argument” of q. 1. Cf. Georg Wieland, “Happiness (Ia-IIae, qq. 1-5),” trans. Grant Kaplan, in The Ethics of Aquinas, ed. Stephen J. Pope, Moral Traditions Series (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 57-68, at 58-59, where STh I-II, q. 1 is said to proceed by “a formal line of argument” in which series of “analytical connections between actions and ends” lead to further “theses,” in preparation for q. 2, in which this purely formal argument is then “complemented with a substantive, material explanation” (58-59). Cf. Kleber, Glück als Lebensziel, 196-200. 30 See for example Denis J. M. Bradley, Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good: Reason and Human Happiness in Aquinas’s Moral Science (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1997), which reconstructs Thomas’s account of 194 ADAM EITEL It would be possible to show that the anxieties which motivate both of these strategies stem from false assumptions about the purpose of these questions. I want to pursue a different tack. More concretely, I want to propose a reading of these questions that seeks less to explain than to dissolve their alleged defects. In what follows, I will argue that Thomas’s rhetorical purpose in these questions is not merely demonstrative but also and more basically hortatory and persuasive. It follows that the digressions, flourishes, and infelicities that have so troubled modern readers are neither failures of reason nor disputative construction; they are rhetorical devices for hastening the reader’s pursuit of the activity upon which the best and happiest life is chiefly founded. To say this is to say that the first five questions of the Prima secundae comprise a protreptic to happiness—an exhortation to the contemplation of God. To begin showing this I need first to establish that Thomas grasps the necessity of moral persuasion in sacra doctrina. II. RHETORICAL INHERITANCE The protreptikos, exhortatio, or, as it was sometimes called, the parainetikos, was conceived in antiquity as a persuasion to the study and practice of a particular art, science, or skill. From the fourth century B.C., philosophic protreptics had the specific aim of converting students to the love of wisdom. Because wisdom is a contested concept, students had to be won for a particular notion of wisdom as conceived by a particular school happiness almost exclusively from the Scriptum super libros Sententiarum and the Summa contra Gentiles, with supplementary material drawn from the Sententia libri Ethicorum, Super Boetium De Trinitate, and Quaestiones disputatae de virtutibus in communi. Of the fifty-one pages listed in the index to this volume which purport to treat Thomas’s notion of beatitudo or felicitas, only twelve reference STh I-II, qq. 1-5 as texts for comparison—leaving long stretches of articles (q. 1, aa. 2-3, 7-8; q. 2, aa. 1-4; q. 4, aa. 1-8) to the side. The attention paid to STh I-II, qq. 1-5 in one representative rejoinder to Bradley’s volume is thinner still. See Lawrence Feingold, The Natural Desire to See God according to St. Thomas Aquinas and His Interpreters (Naples, Fla.: Sapientia Press of Ave Maria University, 2010), which omits discussion of partial or entire questions (q. 1, aa. 1-7; q. 2, aa. 1-8; q. 3, aa. 1, 3-4; q. 4, aa. 1-8; q. 5, aa. 1-2). THE PROTREPTIC OF STH I-II, QQ. 1-5 195 and its corresponding form of life.31 Unsurprisingly, then, we know of protreptics written by Platonists, Peripatetics, Stoics, Epicureans, and others besides.32 Protreptic discourse could assume any number of literary forms, but dialogue (e.g., pseudo-Plato’s Clitophon, Plato’s Alcibiades I, Phaedo, Euthydemus), epistle (e.g., Epicurus’s third letter to Menoeceus, the ninetieth of Seneca’s Moral Letters, Porphyry’s Letter to Marcella) and anthology (e.g., Iamblichus’s Protreptic) are especially well attested.33 One does not have to circumscribe these texts within a stable “genre” to notice their family resemblances:34 each presupposes that moral inquiry must begin with persuasion, that moral persuasion is always already entangled with competing accounts of the human good, and that the character of such persuasion must foreshadow the character of the inquiry it enjoins. Furthermore, each of these texts deploys various rhetorical devices for hastening the reader’s pursuit of wisdom as understood in accordance with a specific conception of the human good.35 31 See James Henderson Collins III, Exhortations to Philosophy: The Protreptics of Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 17-18; see also Mark D. Jordan, “Ancient Philosophic Protreptic and the Problem of Persuasive Genres,” Rhetorica: A Journal of the History of Rhetoric 4 (1986): 309-33 at 309. 32 See Dirk M. Schenkeveld, “Philosophical Prose,” in Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period (330 B.C. - A.D. 400), ed. Stanley E. Porter (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1997), 195-264 at 204. 33 The list is exemplary, not exhaustive. For further examples see Jordan, “Ancient Philosophic Protreptic and the Problem of Persuasive Genres,” 310-14; Schenkeveld, “Philosophical Prose,” 204-13. A still very useful survey of ancient philosophic protreptic can be found in Paul Hartlich, “De exhortationem a Graecis Romanisque scriptarum historia et indole,” (Leipzig: I.B. Hirschfeld, 1889), 209-300. See also T. C. Burgess, Epideictic Literature, Studies in Classical Philosophy 3 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1902), 229-31 for a general survey. 34 The difficulties encountered in the definition of persuasive genres are described in Henderson Collins III, Exhortations to Philosophy, 17ff.; Jordan, “Ancient Philosophic Protreptic and the Problem of Persuasive Genres,” 327-33; S. R. Slings, “Protreptic in Ancient Theories of Philosophical Literature,” in J. R. Abbenes, S. R. Slings and I. Smiter, eds., Greek Rhetoric after Aristotle: A Collection of Papers in Honour of D.M. Schenkeveld (Amsterdam: Free University Press, 1995), 173-92. 35 See for example the rhetorical analysis of Epicurus’s third letter in Schenkeveld, “Philosophical Prose,” 206-9. 196 ADAM EITEL Of course, Thomas knew very few of the ancient works that might be called protreptics. He might have read Aristippus of Cantania’s twelfth-century translation of the Phaedo,36 but this can be doubted.37 Nor, obviously, was the lost Hortensius among the Ciceronian works that Thomas inherited.38 However, he was intimately familiar with Christian transformations of ancient philosophic protreptic—not, it seems, Clement of Alexandria’s Protreptic, Tatian’s To the Greeks, or Gregory of Nyssa’s On Virginity, but perhaps Hilary of Poitiers’s On the Trinity,39 probably Augustine’s Against the Academicians and Confessions,40 and most certainly Boethius’s Consolation of 36 The availability of Plato’s works in the medieval Latin West is discussed in Stephen Gersh, “The Medieval Legacy from Ancient Platonism,” in The Platonic Tradition in the Middle Ages: A Doxographic Approach, ed. Stephen Gersh and M. J. F. M. Hoenen (New York: W. de Gruyter, 2002), 3-30, at 12. Cf. Raymond Kilbansky, The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition during the Middle Ages, Outlines of a Corpus Platonicum Medii Aevi (London: The Warburg Institute, 1939), 27-28. 37 See R. J. Henle, Saint Thomas and Platonism: A Study of the “Plato” and “Platonici” Texts in the Writings of Saint Thomas (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1956), xxi; and Wayne J. Hankey, “Aquinas and the Platonists,” in Gersh and Hoenen, eds., Platonic Tradition in the Middle Ages, 279-324, at 281. 38 See Clemens Vansteenkiste, “Cicerone nell’opera di S. Tommaso,” Angelicum 36 (1964): 343-82, at 378-79, which concludes that Thomas had direct knowledge of Somnium Scipionis, De naturam deorum, Paradoxa, Disputationes Tuscalanae, De officiis, De inventione, and the pseudo-Ciceronian Rhetorica ad Herennium. See also John O. Ward, “The Medieval and Early Renaissance Study of Cicero’s De inventione and the Rhetorica ad Herennium: Commentaries and Contexts” in The Rhetoric of Cicero in Its Medieval and Early Renaissance Commentary Tradition, ed. Virginia Cox and John O. Ward, Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition 2 (Boston: Brill, 2006), 43. 39 See Joseph Wawrykow, “The Summa Contra Gentiles Reconsidered: On the Contribution of the de Trinitate of Hilary of Poitiers,” The Thomist 58 (1994): 617-34, esp. at 626. Cf. Jordan, Rewritten Theology, 107. The Consolation’s availability in the thirteenth-century Latin West is attested in Noel Harold Kaylor and Philip Edward Phillips, eds., A Companion to Boethius in the Middle Ages (Boston: Brill, 2012). 40 The persuasive character of Augustine’s Confessions is discussed in Erich Feldman, “Confessiones” in Augustinus-Lexikon, ed. Cornelius P. Mayer et al. (Basel: Schwabe, 1994), 1:1134-93, at 1116-67; Cornelius P. Mayer, “Die Confessiones des Aurelius Augustinus: Eine philosophisch-theologische Werbeschrift (Protreptikos) für Christliche Spiritualität,” Theologie und Glaube 88 (1998): 285-303, at 288-89; Annemaré Kotzé, Augustine’s Confessions: Communicative Purpose and Audience, Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae 71 (Leiden: Brill, 2004). THE PROTREPTIC OF STH I-II, QQ. 1-5 197 Philosophy. Thomas also had more recent examples of exhortations to Christian wisdom, such as Hugh of St. Victor’s Didascalicon, Richard of St. Victor’s Mystical Ark, and William of Auvergne’s On the Universe (to name only a few examples).41 Yet even if Thomas’s knowledge of each of these texts were beyond dispute (it is not), it would still be necessary to show that he explicitly recognizes their hortatory purpose (he does not). How, then, can it be shown that Thomas grasps the necessity of persuasion in sacra doctrina? A surplus of evidence from Thomas’s works can be adduced in order to convince. Thomas’s rhetorical competence is apparent throughout his corpus. He knows that “rhetoric is a science by which a man is able to persuade,”42 and his knowledge of its technical requirements suggests a sustained interest in the rhetorical manuals used in thirteenth-century schools.43 In an early example from the Scriptum, Thomas notes that an introduction (exordium) should render one’s audience “attentive, receptive, and welldisposed.” Citing Cicero, Thomas goes on to show how the last of these rhetorical effects is sometimes accomplished through 41 Thomas’s intimate familiarity with Richard of St. Victor’s Mystical Ark is evident in STh II-II, q. 180 (Leonine ed., 10:424-34). 42 STh I-II, q. 27, a. 2 ad 2 (Leonine ed., 6:193). Cf. III Sent., d. 33, q. 3, a. 1, qcla. 4 (Scriptum super Sententiis magistri Petri Lombardi, ed. M. F. Moos, O.P. [Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1933], 3:1078); Contra impugnantes, c. 12, §2 (Leonine ed., 41:A135); I Nic. Ethic., lect. 3 (Leonine ed., 47/1:12); see also Super I Cor., c. 1, lect. 3 (ed. Raphael Cai, O.P. [Turin-Rome: Marietti, 1953], 1:240-41). 43 For the “causes” (genera causarum) of rhetoric, see for example IV Sent., d. 16, q. 3, a. 1, qcla. 1 ad 1 (Parma ed., 7: 760); cf. I Nic. Ethic., lect. 18 (Leonine ed., 47/1:66). For its “offices,” STh II-II, q. 177, a. 1, obj. 1 (Leonine ed., 10:414); and Contra impug., c. 12, §2 (Leonine ed., 41:A135-36). For its “canons” (e.g., elocutio), In De div. nom., pro. (In librum Beati Dionysii De diviniis nominibus expositio, ed. C. Pera, P. Caramello, and C. Mazzantini [Turin-Rome: Marietti, 1950], 1); and Super Psalmo, c. 18 (S. Thomae Aquinatis Opera omnia, ed. Roberto Busa [Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt: Fromman-Holzboog, 1980], 6:72). For its figures (e.g., enthymema, exemplum, coniectura, contentio) I Post. Anal., lect. 1 (Leonine ed., 1*/2:9); STh II-II, q. 38, a. 1 (Leonine ed., 8:303); q. 48, a. 1 (Leonine ed., 8:366); q. 49, a. 4, ad 3 (Leonine ed., 8:370). See also James J. Murphy, Rhetoric in the Middle Ages: A History of Rhetorical Theory from Saint Augustine to the Renaissance (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1974), esp. 89-134 and 269-356; Mulchahey, “First the Bow Is Bent in Study,” 400-479. 198 ADAM EITEL prayer.44 Another example is the Ciceronian analysis of style in the much later Commentary on the Psalms. Thomas remarks that “there are three manners of speaking,” namely, “the low,” “the colorful,” and “the merely ornate. The first,” he continues, “is for teaching; the second, for persuading; the third for delighting. And the Apostles spoke in each of these ways.”45 These remarks make plain Thomas’s judgment that the use of rhetoric in sacra doctrina is consonant with the apostle’s manner of teaching.46 In point of fact, in the Commentary on 1 Corinthians he insists that although no Christian teacher should “take eloquent wisdom as the main source of his teaching,” a Christian teacher may “use eloquent wisdom” so long as he proceeds from “the true foundation of faith.”47 Putting the point more strongly in his Apology for the Religious Orders, Thomas insists that a Christian teacher simply must make use of rhetoric if he wishes to move others to act: “when urging someone to act, an eloquent teacher must not only teach in order to instruct and delight in order to captivate, but also persuade in order to convince.”48 This last citation hails from one of Thomas’s most personal works. In it, he advances a passionate defense of his way of life and manner of preaching. A vowed member of the Order of Preachers, Thomas does wish to move others to action. And at times this wish is clearly manifested on the surface of the works he writes. Perhaps the most striking instance is found in the prelude attached to the Exposition of Boethius’s De hebdomadi- 44 IV Sent., d. 15, q. 4, a. 3, qcla. 2. (Moos, ed., 7:742). Cf. Cicero, De Inventione I, 15.22 (ed. H. M Hubbell [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1949], 44-66). See also Super Matt., c. 6, lect. 3 (ed. Raphael Cai, O.P [Turin-Rome: Marietti, 1951], 90). 45 Super Psalmo 18 (Busa, ed., 6:72). Cf. Rhetorica ad Herennium IV, 8.11-12.15 (trans. Harry Caplan [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954], 252-62). 46 For the dangers of rhetoric (e.g., public display of vanity, deception), see Super I Cor. 1:3 (Cai, ed., 240-44); Contra impug., c. 12, §§1-3 (Leonine ed., 41:A134-37). See also STh I-II, q. 7, a. 4, ad 3 (Leonine ed., 6:67). 47 Super I Cor. 1.3 (Cai, ed., 240). 48 Contra impug., c. 12, §2 (Leonine ed., 41:A135-36), paraphrasing Augustine, De doctrina christiana 4. THE PROTREPTIC OF STH I-II, QQ. 1-5 199 bus. Significantly, Thomas explicitly refers to the prelude as an “exhortation” (exhortatio). “First run into your house, and there call them in, and there play and work out your conceptions,” Ecclesiasticus 33[:15-16]. . . . in the words proposed, the sage calls one back to oneself saying, “First run into your own house”—that is, away from exterior things you should carefully retire to your own mind. . . . And therefore he adds, “and there call them in”—that is . . . gather together your whole attention . . . “and there play.” Here one must consider that the contemplation of wisdom is suitably compared to play on two counts. . . . First, because play is delightful and the contemplation of wisdom possesses maximum delight. . . . Second, because things done in play are not ordered to anything else, but are sought for their own sake. . . . And therefore Divine Wisdom compares her delight to play in Proverbs 8[:30]: “I was delighted everyday playing before Him.” Hence here is also added, “and there work out your conceptions,” through which, namely, a human being grasps the knowledge of truth. Boethius, therefore, following this exhortation [huius exhortationis spectator], has made for us a book about his own conceptions.49 Thomas’s prelude to the Exposition may be called a protreptic or exhortation to Christian wisdom. What does this exhortation urge? An activity. Precisely which activity does it recommend? Contemplation. But how should one contemplate? Thomas gives specific instructions. Recollect yourself, gather your attention, and then—casting aside concern for exterior things—begin to “work out your own conceptions.” Do this for its own sake, says Thomas, since contemplation is the maximally delightful human activity. But what should one contemplate? Readers of On the Hebdomads can begin with Boethius’s conceptions—a series of “principles” (principia), “terms” (terminos), and “rules” (regulas) from which he has traced a route to the highest good.50 The prelude to the Exposition is perhaps Thomas’s most transparent protreptic invention. It is also his shortest and least ambitious. There is a body of scholarship that convincingly shows that the Summa contra Gentiles is best understood as a protreptic to Christian wisdom.51 Of course, the Summa 49 Expositio libri Boetii De ebdomadibus, I (Leonine ed., 50:267-68). Ibid. (Leonine ed., 50:269). See also ibid., III-V (Leonine ed., 50:275-82). 51 See Mark D. Jordan, “The Protreptic Structure of the Summa Contra Gentiles,” The Thomist 50 (1986): 173-209, rev. and repr. in “The Protreptic of Against the Gentiles,” in Rewritten Theology, 89-115. Joseph Wawrykow, “The Summa Contra 50 200 ADAM EITEL theologiae differs from the Summa contra Gentiles in audience, scope, and intention. Nevertheless, a comparison of several parallel passages will show that the beginning of the Prima secundae retains the Summa contra Gentiles’ protreptic motivation. The best way to see this connection is to begin with the prologue to the Prima secundae. I will consider its dense concatenation of rhetorical figures before comparing the persuasive structures of the Summa contra Gentiles, book III, chapters 1-163 to that of questions 1-5 of the Prima secundae. III. THE PROTREPTIC OF SUMMA I-II, QQ. 1-5 The first indication of the persuasive purpose of these five questions is found in the prologue to the Prima secundae. [A] Quia, sicut Damascenus dicit, homo factus ad imaginem Dei dicitur, secundum quod per imaginem significatur intellectuale et arbitrio liberum et per se potestativum; postquam praedictum est de exemplari, [B] scilicet de Deo, et de his quae processerunt ex divina potestate secundum eius voluntatem; [A´] restat ut consideremus de eius imagine, idest de homine, secundum quod et ipse est suorum operum principium, quasi liberum arbitrium habens et suorum operum potestatem.52 The prologue displays several curious features. In both its content and in its brevity, it differs from the prologues to the Prima pars, Secunda secundae, and Tertia pars. It contains no divisio or ordo procedendi—something that Thomas only proGentiles Reconsidered: On the Contribution of the de Trinitate of Hilary of Poitiers,” The Thomist 58 (1994): 617-34; Thomas S. Hibbs, Dialectic and Narrative in Aquinas: An Interpretation of the Summa Contra Gentiles (South Bend, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995). An alternative account of Against the Gentiles’s persuasive character can be found in Guy H. Allard, “Le ‘Contra Gentiles’ et le modèle rhétorique,” Laval théologique et philosophique 30 (1974): 237-50. Cf. Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas, 1:104-7. 52 STh I-II, prol. (Leonine ed., 6:5): “Since, as Damascene says, human beings are said to be made in the image of God, insofar as image implies intelligence and free-will and self-power; after we have treated the exemplar, God, and those things that proceed from divine power according to his will; it remains for us to consider his image, the human being, insofar as he too is the principle of his actions, as having free-will and self-power.” I have retained the Latin in the body of the text to facilitate its rhetorical analysis. THE PROTREPTIC OF STH I-II, QQ. 1-5 201 vides after questions 1-5, in the prooemium to question 6—and it is not so much a statement of the Prima secundae’s subject matter as a brief meditation on a lofty theme. This is the first curious feature of the prologue. The second is its style. Whereas the prologues to the Prima pars, Secunda secundae, and Tertia pars are written in unremarkable if not plain Scholastic prose, here we find a single sentence composed in a colorful, highflown style.53 There is an ornate yet smooth arrangement of rhetorical figures: polyptoton is high, antimetabole and epistrophe are frequent, and its clauses are chiastically disposed.54 Thus, the middle clause [B] speaks of God—the unrepeatable and so unrepeated Exemplum—whereas the first clause is echoed in the last: [A] “human beings are said to be made in the image of God [homo factus ad imaginem Dei dicitur]” and so have “intelligence, free-will, and self-power [intellectuale et arbitrio liberum et per se potestativum].” And again in the final clause we read that [A´] “. . . God’s image, which is the human being, as being the principle of his actions and having free-will and power over his actions [eius imagine, idest de homine, secundum quod et ipse est suorum operum principium, quasi liberum arbitrium habens et suorum operum potestatem].” Polyptoton, antimetabole, epistrophe, and chiasm—together, these figures of symmetry lend the prologue a special beauty that is very uncharacteristic of the Summa’s otherwise spartan prose. Nor we may dismiss the concurrence of these figures as 53 In the prologue to the Prima pars, Thomas pledges to write “as plainly [dilucide] as the subject matter will allow” (STh I, prol. [Leonine ed., 4:5]). 54 Each of these rhetorical figures are treated in works with which Thomas was certainly familiar. For polyptoton, the repetition of a word by different grammatical case or by cognate, see “homo”/”homine”; “imaginem”/”imagine”; “arbitrio liberum”/”voluntatem”/”liberum arbitrium”; “potestativum”/”potestate/potestatem” (cf. Isidore of Seville, Etymologiae 1.36.17 [ed. W. M. Lindsay, Scriptorum classicorum bibliotheca Oxoniensis 20 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1911), 66-67]). For antimetabole or commutatio—the repetition of words in successive clauses but in reverse grammatical order—and epistrophe or conversio—ending a series of lines, clauses, etc. with the same word or words—see “[A] . . . arbitrio liberum et per se potestativum; [B] . . . potestate secundum eius voluntatem; [A´] . . . liberum arbitrium habens et suorum operum potestatem” (cf. Rhetorica ad Herennium 4.28.39 and 4.13.19 [Caplan, trans., 325-27 and 277-82]). 202 ADAM EITEL the mere product of chance or unconscious deliberation. How is a reader supposed to make sense of this idiosyncrasy? The answer points once more to Thomas’s specifically Dominican form of life. The prologue to the Prima secundae more nearly resembles a prothema to a thirteenth-century sermo moderna than an accessus to a moral treatise. To say this is to say that the prologue functions in this context as an exordium to a decidedly persuasive discourse. Its purpose is to make the reader attentive, receptive, and well-disposed to the suasion that follows.55 It does this by appealing not only to the rational but also to the affective capacities of the reader. Quite apart from its ornate style, the prologue reminds one that the reader—the imago dei—is in possession of the powers and capacities to pursue God, the one in whose image the reader has been made.56 The beauty of the prologue enhances this mnemonic effect by capturing the reader’s attention: for beauty elicits love (amor), love elicits delight (delectatio), and together these passions—as Thomas will later argue—make us ready to listen57 and “to investigate from within each thing that belongs to the good loved.”58 55 Cf. Thomas of Chobham, Summa de arte praedicandi VII.1: “Some preachers call their prologue a prothema, because . . . before they proceed with the main theme, they lay out a brief theme before the main one, and thus earn the goodwill of their audience, preparing them to pay attention and to be ready to learn” (ed. Franco Morenzoni [Turnhout: Brepols, 1988], 265). A brief discussion of the structure of Thomas’s university sermons can be found in Mark-Robin Hoogland, C.P., “Introduction” in Thomas Aquinas, The Academic Sermons, The Fathers of the Church, Mediaeval Continuation 11 (Washington, D.C: The Catholic University of America Press, 2010), 8-10. 56 Thomas also knows that a reader may be captivated by appeals to his or her own dignity. See Rhetorica ad Herennium 1.4.6-7.11 (Caplan, trans., 10-22); Cicero, De inventione 1.15.20-18.26 (ed. H. M Hubbell [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1949]); Cicero, De oratore, 2.78.315-80.325 (ed. E. W. Sutton [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1942], 336-442). 57 STh I-II, q. 33, a. 3 (Leonine ed., 6:233); cf. q. 33, a. 1, ad 2 (Leonine ed., 6:231). On the relation between beauty and love, see STh q. 27, a. 1, ad 1 (Leonine ed., 6:192). On the relation between love and delight, see STh I-II, q. 25 (Leonine ed., 6:183-87); q. 27, a. 4 (Leonine ed., 6:195-96); q. 28, a. 6 (Leonine ed., 6:202). 58 STh I-II, q. 28, a. 2 (Leonine ed., 6:198-99); cf. q. 28, a. 3 (Leonine ed., 6:199200). THE PROTREPTIC OF STH I-II, QQ. 1-5 203 If this argument, that the prologue to the Prima secundae is an exordium to a persuasive discourse, is correct, then we should not be surprised to find rhetorical figures saturating every aspect of the five questions that follow. And indeed we do. The significance of these protreptic details comes into focus against the backdrop of the structure of these five questions which, I can now show, replicates the hortatory structure of book III of the Summa contra Gentiles. In his groundbreaking work on the Summa contra Gentiles, Mark Jordan has shown that [t]he argument [of Contra Gentiles 3] rises from a general assertion of teleological order (1–16), through the thesis that God is the end of all creatures and of intellectual substances particularly (17–26), to a comparison of contemplation with all other possible claimants to human happiness (27– 47). Thomas ends the sequence by representing the contemplation of God in beatitude, which is both heaven and the fulfillment of philosophic longing for unfettered contemplation (48–63; compare 41–44).59 The below diagram shows that a nearly duplicate structure may be seen in the first five questions of the Prima secundae. The parallels are striking. General explication of the teleological order Thesis that God is the end of all creatures Comparison of contemplation of God with rival claimants to happiness Representation of contemplation of God in perfect happiness Assurance that the end can be grasped ScG III, cc. 1-16 STh I-II, q. 1, aa. 1-7 ScG III, cc. 17-26 STh I-II, q. 1, a. 8 ScG III, cc. 27-47 STh I-II, qq. 2-3 ScG III, cc. 48-63 STh I-II, q. 4 ScG III, cc. 63-163 STh I-II, q. 5 As in chapters 1-16 of book III of the Summa contra Gentiles, the argument of questions 1-5 of the Prima secundae rises from a general explication of the teleological order (q. 1, aa. 1-7), 59 Jordan, Rewritten Theology, 109. 204 ADAM EITEL through the claim that God is the end of all creatures (q. 1, a. 8). Only now, the claim of chapters 1-27 of in the Summa contra Gentiles—namely, that God is the final end of all “intellectual substances”—is more sharply focused on just the imago dei.60 From here the ascent continues much as it does in chapter 27 and the following in the Summa contra Gentiles: a stepwise analysis of rival claimants to human happiness terminates in an account of perfect happiness, the contemplation of God in heaven (qq. 2-3). Here, Thomas also includes a string of arguments to clarify the nature of the activity by which the reader can begin participating in the happiness of heaven even now. It “consists first and principally in contemplation, but secondarily in the activity of the practical intellect, ordering human actions and passions.”61 Like its antecedent, the sequence in the Prima secundae concludes with an evocative description of heavenly contemplation and the delight, virtue, and friendships it will entail (q. 4). The ascent of questions 1-4 ends here; the protreptic does not. Much as in chapters 63-163 of the Summa contra Gentiles, Thomas undertakes to assure the reader that the distant end proposed can actually be achieved. In the Summa contra Gentiles, such assurance proceeds by reminding the reader of divine providence.62 By contrast, readers of the Prima secundae are expected to have just received this assurance in the teaching on divine government that concludes the Prima pars (STh I, qq. 103-19). Thomas reminds the reader that God sustains human beings—each one—all children of Adam but also siblings of the Virgin Mother in whom Christ was conceived by the Holy Spirit.63 Capitulating this Christological peroration, question 5 of the Prima secundae reminds that—despite the hard knocks of misfortune, ignorance, suffering, and sin (q. 5, aa. 1-4)—human beings can be “turned to God” (converti ad Deum 60 STh I-II, q. 1, a. 8 (Leonine ed., 6:16). STh I-II, q 3, a. 5 (Leonine ed., 6:31). 62 See Jordan, Rewritten Theology, 109. 63 STh I, q. 119, a. 2, ad 4 (Leonine ed., 5:576). 61 THE PROTREPTIC OF STH I-II, QQ. 1-5 205 [q. 5, aa. 5-7])64 through “justifying grace” (gratiam iustificantem)—“the principle of movement that tends towards happiness” which comes to sinners through “Christ, who is both God and man.”65 The hortatory structure of these first five questions is itself a device of persuasion. It also contains several additional features of both classical and Christian protreptic. Perhaps the most telling example is the synkrisis of questions 2 and 3. A synkrisis is a traditional rhetorical device used in agonistic comparisons for the purpose of assigning praise or blame.66 Thomas’s use of the device here harkens back to the Summa contra Gentiles. In the first book (c. 5), he makes explicit what ancient philosophic protreptics tend to assume: philosophers must lure students away from sensual pleasures toward the “much sweeter” delights of active and contemplative virtue. Somewhat later, in book III, chapters 27-44, he acknowledges that a teacher of Christian wisdom must also compete for students’ attention. For this reason, he gives arguments to rule out the possibility that happiness might consist not only in sensual pleasures, but also in honors, political power, the liberal arts, and even in the exercise of the moral virtues.67 The synkrisis of question 2 of the Prima secundae is at once more compressed and comprehensive than that of book III of the Summa contra Gentiles.68 The arguments of question 2 purport to show that happiness consists neither in bona exteriora (e.g., wealth, honor, fame, power), nor in bona corporalia (e.g., health, sensual pleasure), nor even in bona 64 STh I-II, q. 5, a. 5, ad 1 and 2 (Leonine ed., 6:51-52). STh I-II, q. 5, a. 7, corp. and ad 2-3 (Leonine ed., 6:53). Cf. STh I-II, q. 5, a. 3 (Leonine ed., 6:49). The theme of divine providence recurs throughout the protreptic. See for example STh I-II, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3 (Leonine ed., 6:9); q. 1, a. 4, ad 1 (Leonine ed., 6:12); q. 1, a. 8, obj. 3 (Leonine ed., 6:16); q. 2, a. 8, ad 2 (Leonine ed., 6:24-25); q. 5, a. 6, obj. 1 (Leonine ed., 6:52). 66 For the tradition of synkrises in antiquity, see Friedrich Focke, “Synkrisis,” Hermes 58 (1923): 327-68. 67 ScG III, cc. 7-36 (Liber de veritate catholicae Fidei contra errores infidelium seu Summa contra Gentiles, ed. P. Marc, C. Pera, P. Caramello [Turin-Rome: Marietti, 1961], 3:9-109). See also Jordan, Rewritten Theology, 109-10. 68 STh I-II, q. 2, a. 7, obj. 3 and ad 3 (Leonine ed., 6:23-24). 65 206 ADAM EITEL animae (e.g., virtues and virtuous acts). For “nothing,” as Thomas notes, “can lull the human will, except the universal good, which cannot be found in any created thing, but only in God.”69 On this basis, question 3 extends the synkrisis by targeting seemingly more plausible accounts of happiness. That happiness might, say, consist more in habit than in act (a. 2), more in an act of will than of intellect (a. 4), more in metaphysics than in contemplation (a. 6), more in the contemplation of angels than of God (a. 7) may ring hollow to modern readers. However, it is well to remember that these were actual views competing for the allegiance of actual students in thirteenth-century schools.70 For Thomas, the possibility that a student might be more swayed by one or more rival accounts of happiness was very real. His criticism of those rival accounts is also a form of synkrisis, and it recalls the critique of rival schools in ancient philosophy.71 Of course, Thomas knows that a teacher can only protect students from error by proposing “certain aids or tools” by which they can proceed from things known in general to more particular knowledge still.72 The philosophical vocabulary deployed throughout the synkrisis helps to accelerate this movement by furnishing conceptual tools for distinguishing the “object and cause of happiness” (beatitudinis obiectum et causa) from its 69 STh I-II, q. 2, a. 8 (Leonine ed., 6:24). Cf. Bonaventure, IV Sent., d. 49, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1, ad 5 (Quaracchi ed., 4 1001): “created happiness . . . is principally said to be a habit” (“beatitudo creata . . . principalius dicit habitum); John of Peckham, Quodlibet I, q. 5 (Ioannis Pecham Quodlibeta quatuor, ed. F. Delorme and G. Etzkorn [Grottaferatta: Collegio s. Bonaventura, padri editori di Quaracchi, 1989], 16): “I say that happiness principally consists in an act of the will” (“Dico quod beatitudo consistit principalius in actu voluntatis”). See also more generally Edouard-Henri Wéber, Dialogue et dissensions entre saint Bonaventure et saint Thomas d’Aquin à Paris, 1252-1273, Bibliothèque Thomiste 41 (Paris: J. Vrin, 1974). A discussion of philosophical conceptions of happiness held by various aristae in the Parisian arts faculty of the 1260s can be found in Carlos Steel, “Medieval Philosophy: An Impossible Project? Thomas Aquinas and the Averroistic ideal of Happiness,” Miscellanea Mediaevalia 26 (1998): 152-74. See also more generally Vie active et vie vontemplative au Moyen Âge et au seuil de la Renaissance, ed. Christiane Trottmann (Rome: École francaise de Rome, 2009). 71 Jordan, Rewritten Theology, 110. 72 STh I, q. 117, a. 1, obj. 3 and ad 3 (Leonine ed., 5:557-58). 70 THE PROTREPTIC OF STH I-II, QQ. 1-5 207 “essence” (essentia beatitudinis) and “essential accident” (per se accidens). Many other persuasive devices follow the synkrises of questions 2 and 3—not least the vivid description of perfect happiness in question 4. The purpose of vivid description (descriptio) is to enhance a reader’s visualization of a particular scene.73 By concatenating Augustinian images of resurrected bodies, Thomas uses this traditional rhetorical device to stir the reader’s desire for the rest of eternal contemplation: Augustine says in the Literal Commentary on Genesis 12 that . . . “when this body will no longer be natural, but spiritual, then will it be equaled to the angels, and that will be its glory, which erstwhile was its burden.” Consequently, because from the happiness of the soul there will be an overflow into the body, so that this too will obtain its perfection. Hence Augustine says in the Letter to Dioscorus that “God gave the soul such a powerful nature that from its exceeding fullness of happiness the vigor of incorruption overflows into the lower nature.”74 according to Augustine in On the Sermon on the Mount . . . a heaven raised on the height of spiritual goods . . . will be appointed to the blessed—not as a need of happiness, but by reason of a certain fitness and adornment.75 spiritual creatures receive no other interior aid to happiness than the eternity, truth, and charity of the Creator. If, however, they can be said to be helped from without, perhaps it is only by this: they see one another and rejoice in their fellowship in God.76 The first passage evokes the embodied pleasure of resurrected bodies engaged in contemplation. The second vivifies this scene with a depiction of those same bodies luxuriating in the beauty of the new creation. Finally, with a surprising evocation of 73 See for example Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 8.3.61-72 (ed. Donald A. Russell [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001], 374-80). Cf. Rhetorica ad Herennium 4.39.51 (Caplan, trans., 360-62). 74 STh I-II, q. 4, a. 6 (Leonine ed., 6:44). Following Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 12.35 and Epistula 118. 75 STh I-II, q. 4, a. 7, ad 3 (Leonine ed., 6:45); following Augustine, De sermo Domino in monte 1.5. 76 STh, I-II, q. 4, a. 8 (Leonine ed., 6:46). Following Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 8.25. 208 ADAM EITEL resurrected friendship, the third passage serves to quicken the reader’s desire for heavenly leisure. A detailed consideration of question 4 would show that these images serve neither to supply premises nor to stipulate doctrines. We cannot, for that reason, dismiss them as “mere ornaments” or illogical digressions.77 Thomas rather includes them in order to fortify the reader’s desire for the end they so vividly describe. Crucially, such fortification is grounded throughout the protreptic of these questions by rousing clusters of synonymia—yet another persuasive device.78 God, says Thomas, is “the First Good,” “the Universal Good,” “the Universal Font of Goodness,” “the Infinite and Perfect Good,” “the Uncreated Good,” “the Highest Good,” “the Good of all Good,” the “Unchangeable Good,” the “Infinite Good Itself” and “the Good of All Good” and “the Highest Font of Goodness.”79 Could anything be more desirable? The protreptic character of these first five questions of the Prima secundae can be further seen in a number of less obvious rhetorical figures. Thomas’s subtle use of consummatio—the constellation of multiple arguments for a single point—helps to show how just one of the alleged defects of these questions dissolves once seen through the lens of protreptic motivation.80 Consider once more the synkrisis of question 2, article 4 of the Prima secundae, where Thomas gives two arguments to 77 Cf. Georg von Hertling, “Augustinus Zitate bei Thomas von Aquin,” in Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften 4 (1914): 535-602. 78 Cf. Rhetorica ad Herennium 4.28.38 (Caplan, trans., 325). 79 For “primum bonum,” see STh I-II, q. 1, a. 4, ad 1 (Leonine ed., 6:12); for “bonum universum,” q. 2, a. 8 (Leonine ed., 6:24); for “bonum increatum,” q. 3, a. 1 (Leonine ed., 6:26); q. 3, a. 2, ad 4 (Leonine ed., 6:27); q. 3, a. 3 (Leonine ed., 6:28); for “ipsum universalem fontem boni” and “infinitum et perfectum bonum,” q. 2, a. 8, ad 1 (Leonine ed., 6:24); for “summum bonum,” q. 3, a. 1, obj. 2 (Leonine ed., 6: 26); q. 4, a. 1 (Leonine ed., 6:37); q. 5, a. 2 (Leonine ed., 6:48); for “ipsum bonum infinitum” and “bonum omnis boni,” q. 5, a. 2, ad 3 (Leonine ed., 6:48); for “summo fonte bonorum,” q. 4, a. 8, ad 2 (Leonine ed., 6:46). For “incommutabile bonum,” q. 1, a. 7. obj. 1 (Leonine ed., 6:15). 80 For additional instances of consummatio (cf. Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 9.2.103 [Russell, ed., 92) in the context of Summa I-II, qq. 1-5, see STh I-II, q. 1, a. 5 (Leonine ed., 6:13); q. 1, a. 6 (Leonine ed., 6:14); q. 2, a. 5 (Leonine ed., 6:21); q. 3, a. 5 (Leonine ed., 6:31); q. 4, a. 5 (Leonine ed., 6:42); q. 5, a. 1 (Leonine ed., 6:47). THE PROTREPTIC OF STH I-II, QQ. 1-5 209 show that happiness cannot consist in power. To these arguments, he then adds four more “general arguments” (generales rationes) to show that happiness cannot consist in any exterior good whatsoever. All told, he thus gives no fewer than six arguments against the view that happiness consists in power. Yet it seems that the last of his generales rationes might have sufficed: happiness, Thomas argues, is a perfect and, therefore, permanent good to which human beings are naturally ordered by their own “interior principles,” namely, intellect and will; by contrast, riches, honor, glory, fame, and power all depend on “exterior causes,” and more often than not they follow from fortune. “Hence,” Thomas concludes, “it is clear that happiness in nowise consists in the foregoing goods.”81 The argument is decisive. Why, then, does Thomas advance no fewer than six arguments when just this one might do? The reason is that he wants to lure his readers away from the goods that might distract from the pursuit of the Final End—and because those unconvinced by one argument might be better won over by another.82 This point raises a larger question about how Thomas takes the protreptic to succeed. To conclude, I will briefly address this question by uncovering a final piece of protreptic evidence. CONCLUSION I noted above that Thomas writes for beginners in sacra doctrina—especially for Dominican beginners whom he likens to “little ones in Christ.”83 I then argued that the Prima secundae addresses itself to beginners whom Thomas expects to be already schooled in the Prima pars, readers whom he expects to know at least partly—and thus at least partly to desire—the end that the first five questions of the Prima secundae enjoin. The strategy of the protreptic is carefully adapted to its intended audience. It thus aims not so much to elicit a new desire as to strengthen a desire already admitted (and, long 81 STh I-II, q. 2, a. 4 (Leonine ed., 6:20). Cf. Jordan, Rewritten Theology, 113. 83 STh I, prol. (Leonine ed., 4:5). 82 210 ADAM EITEL before that, already implanted and nourished by God).84 The means for achieving this fortification of desire may be summarized as follows. First, the protreptic seeks to assure the reader that happiness can be reached. Second, it seeks to fortify the reader’s desire for this end by advancing an evocative clarification of the ratio beatitudinis. Third, because this desire must be converted into lived action, the protreptic extols the activity by which the happiness of heaven can be pursued here and now: contemplation. This points to the fourth and most decisive feature of the protreptic, namely, the allusions to divine grace. The allusions are necessary because Christians confess that the power through which God can be known and loved is always already a divine gift. Of course, the final success of this protreptic depends upon the reader’s ability to recollect what it proposes. This points to a final rhetorical figure which—as far as I am aware—has so far escaped the commentators on the Summa. Questions 1-5 of the Prima secundae exhibit a chiastic structure, one that ascends and descends through a tripartition of created goods from the imago dei to its Exemplum to the imago dei: A STh q. 1, aa. 1-8 B STh q. 2, aa. 1-4 C STh q. 2, aa. 5-6 D STh q. 2, aa. 7-8 E STh q. 3, aa. 1-8 D´ STh q. 4, aa. 1-4 C´ STh q. 4, aa. 5-6 B´ STh q. 4, aa. 7-8 A´ STh q. 5, aa. 1-8 84 Imago Dei Bona Exteriora Bona Corporalia Bona Animae Bonum Increatum Bona Animae Bona Corporalia Bona Exteriora Imago Dei [8] [4] [2] [2] [8] [4] [2] [2] [8]85 Cf. STh I-II, q. 1, a. 1 (Leonine ed., 6:6); q. 1, a. 2, ad 2-3 (Leonine ed., 6:9); q. 1, aa. 3-8 (Leonine ed., 10-16); q. 2, a. 7 (Leonine ed., 6:23); q. 3, a. 1, obj. 3 (Leonine ed., 6:26); q. 3, a. 6, ad 2 (Leonine ed., 6:32); q. 3, a. 8 (Leonine ed., 6:35-36); q. 5, a. 8 (Leonine ed.,: 6:54). 85 The letters on the left-hand side of the diagram (A-B-C-D-E-D´-C´-B´-A´) represent chiastic rings of thematically grouped articles, which are designated by the numbers on the right-hand side of the diagram (8-4-2-2-8-4-2-2-8). B, for example comprises 4 articles (STh I-II, q. 2, aa. 1-4) thematically centered on bona exteriora, whereas as B´ comprises 2 articles (STh I-II, q. 4, aa. 7-8) centered on bona exteriora. The chiastic structure (A-B-C-D-E-D´-C´-B´-A´) thus coordinates with the recurring THE PROTREPTIC OF STH I-II, QQ. 1-5 211 Thomas subtly hints at this chiastic structure in the response to the third objection in question 2, article 7. In the briefest of passing comments, he retrospectively discloses that the whole of question 2 is thematically arranged according to a tripartite division of created goods: bona exteriora (B: q. 2, aa. 1-4), bona corporalia (C: q. 2, aa. 2-6), and bona animae (D: q. 2, aa. 78).86 On this basis, a reader can later discover that the same tripartite division structures (in descending order) the articles of question 4: Thomas elaborates the bona animae (D´: q. 4, aa. 14), bona corporalia (C´: q. 4, aa. 5-6), and bona exteriora (B´: q. 4, aa. 7-8) that happiness requires. At the center of this ascending and descending pattern is question 3, a single sequence of articles terminating in the vision of the Increatum Bonum. In turn, questions 2-4 are flanked by questions 1 and 5, both of which center on the imago dei who—by intellect and will—can achieve union with God. Lest we doubt the existence of this chiastic structure, it should be noted that the number of thematically clustered articles grouped under the chiasm’s rings (A-B-C-D-E-D´-C´-B´-A´) exhibits the numerological pattern 8-4-2-2-8-4-2-2-8. The coincidence of these patterns is too elegant to be contrived. But for what is the chiasm intended? How is it meant to serve the protreptic purpose of the beginning of the Prima secundae? Such questions invite investigation beyond the scope of this essay, but I may close with an initial hypothesis. It seems most plausible that Thomas intended the chiastic structure of these questions to facilitate contemplation on their subject numerological pattern (8-4-2-2-8-4-2-2-8). I leave aside here the significance of the question of numerological significance (a common feature of ancient and medieval Latin literature), but see Ernst Robert Curtius, European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, new ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2013), 501-10. 86 See STh I-II, q. 2, a. 7, obj. 3 and ad 3 (Leonine ed., 6:23). Thomas notes the tripartition of goods in I Nic. Ethic., lect. 12 (Leonine ed., 47/1:124), though he might have encountered it in any number of sources, such as Augsutine, De civitate Dei 10.4. See Joseph A. Clair, “Discerning the Good in the Letters and Sermons of Augustine,” (PhD diss., Princeton University, 2013), which suggests that the tripartition is specifically though not exclusively Platonic (see, for example, Laws 743e; Republic. 357b-358a; Philebus 48a, 66a-67b; Phaedo 63e-69e [cited in ibid., 18 n. 38]). 212 ADAM EITEL matter.87 Elsewhere he notes that recollection requires “a starting point,” since “human beings, by a certain roving of the mind, pass from one thing to another by reason of likeness, or contrariety, or closeness.” For example, from “air,” Thomas notes, one might recall “moisture, because air is moist, and from moisture one reaches a recollection of autumn, which is obtained by reason of contrariety (because this season is cold and dry).”88 By the same token, a chiastically arranged sequence of questions can furnish any number of principia for recollecting arguments, distinctions, and images for contemplation. That Thomas would dispose the arguments of these questions in this manner also shows protreptic motivation. A teacher who has traced a route to the Highest Good wants that route to be remembered.89 87 The cultivation of memoria in medieval academic culture is discussed in Mary Carruthers, The Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture, Cambridge Studies in Medieval Literature (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 88 In De memoria et reminiscencia, lect. 6 (Leonine ed., 45/2:125). 89 My thanks go to the Saint Thomas Aquinas Institute for Theology and Culture, University of Fribourg, and to the Fulbright Foundation for the support which enabled me to prepare this article. I would also like to express gratitude to colleagues at Blackfriars Hall, University of Oxford and at the Yale Center for Faith and Culture for opportunities to present some of the arguments presented here. The Thomist 81 (2017): 213-45 REREADING ROBERT GROSSETESTE ON THE RATIO INCARNATIONIS: DEDUCTIVE STRATEGIES IN DE CESSATIONE LEGALIUM III JUSTUS H. HUNTER United Theological Seminary Dayton, Ohio I N OXFORD, sometime between 1230 and 1235, Robert Grosseteste produced De cessatione legalium.1 The argument of the text is notoriously complex. Richard Dales and Edward King, editors of the critical edition, observe that it “is difficult to summarize because the arguments, complex in themselves, are further obfuscated by the circular and tangential conventions of the author’s style.”2 Indeed, Grosseteste’s arguments often seem disorganized. (Grosseteste) was not by nature a systematic thinker any more than he was by nature a tidy organizer of material from the past. His strength lay in discovering areas of knowledge to which he could make a new contribution. Having done this, he was content to leave it to others to go further if they could, while he passed on to the next problem.3 1 Robert Grosseteste, On the Cessation of the Laws, trans. Stephen M. Hildebrand, The Fathers of the Church Mediaeval Continuation 13 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2012), 15-16. Unless otherwise noted, English translations are taken from this text; the Latin text comes from Robert Grosseteste, De cessatione legalium, ed. Richard C. Dales and Edward B. King, Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi 7 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). 2 Grosseteste, De cess. legal. (Dales and King, eds., xv). 3 R. W. Southern, Robert Grosseteste: The Growth of an English Mind in Medieval Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 46. 213 214 JUSTUS H. HUNTER But instances should not be predetermined by impressions. As Stephen Hildebrand has shown, if the argument of De cessatione legalium lacks the organizational transparency of Grosseteste’s Parisian counterparts, it is not so bewildering as Dales and King suggest: Grosseteste’s argument . . . is both coherent and comprehensive; it is not haphazard but deliberate and purposeful, even if sometimes circuitous. His great achievement is to clarify the larger theological contexts in which one must view the difficult question of the relation between the Old and New Testaments.4 The most commented-on arguments of De cessatione legalium are the opening paragraphs of book III. There Grosseteste argues that God would have become human, even if humanity had not fallen. Typically, these paragraphs are read as a series of loosely related arguments united by their conclusion that the Incarnation would have occurred, even if the Fall had not. The analytical reading I undertake here shows a greater unity in these passages than previously observed, as it will be seen that Grosseteste employs two basic strategies of argumentation here. Moreover, I will suggest that such an analytical reading is helpful for bringing the arguments of De cessatione legalium into conversation with later debates over the ratio incarnationis at Paris. This latter point will be illustrated by a brief look at St. Thomas Aquinas’s arguments on the ratio incarnationis in the Scriptum and the Summa theologiae.5 I. DE CESSATIONE LEGALIUM In the first chapter of De cessatione legalium, Grosseteste specifies the argument he will overturn: “There were many in the primitive Church who asserted that the sacraments of the Old Law together with the sacraments of the New Law must be observed and that there could be no salvation without observing 4 Grosseteste, On the Cessation of the Laws, 16-17. Ratio incarnationis is ordinarily translated “motive” or “reason for the Incarnation.” I have retained the Latin, to preserve the ambiguity of the term ratio. 5 GROSSETESTE ON THE RATIO INCARNATIONIS 215 them.”6 In part I, he recites and rebuts several arguments in support of these “many in the primitive Church.” He then turns to Christology for a “slightly greater way of beginning.”7 Though the assertion is somewhat cryptic, his procedure is not. Grosseteste returns to the Garden of Eden in order to narrate salvation history, and to locate the law and Christ in that grand narrative. Grosseteste first establishes the need for both natural and positive law in every state of the rational creature.8 He then recounts the Fall of both angels and humans, drawing attention to the character of their temptation and failure.9 This brings him to an important conclusion: It is clear, therefore, from the fact that man sinned, that there ought to be both the faith which was believed and the law which was upheld. But when man had broken the natural and positive law by sinning, and the same positive law before him, that is, of not eating the fruit, now was not law to him, because he was not in its power, another positive law would be uselessly given to him, unless first he was proven again in the observation of the natural law.10 Thus God left humanity to the natural law for some time, until the gift of the positive law might “be added for the fullness of obedience.”11 That positive law was given, initially, to Noah and Abraham. However, due to sin, ignorance, and the growing 6 De cess. legal., I.1.1 (Dales and King, eds., 7, ll. 1-3): “Fuerunt plurimi in primitiva ecclesia qui astruerent sacramenta veteris legis simul cum sacramentis nove legis observanda esse nec sine illorum observacione salutem esse.” 7 De cess. legal., I.4.1 (Dales and King, eds., 17, ll. 4-5): “paulo altius exordiendum.” 8 De cess. legal., I.4-5. As Grossesteste observes in 5.7, this would include a fitting reception of the positive law for angels as well as humans. 9 De cess. legal., I.6. 10 De cess. legal., I.6.19 (Dales and King, eds., 34, ll. 2-7): “Liquet igitur quod ex quo homo peccavit oportuit esse et fidem que crederetur et legem que servaretur. Sed cum homo prevaricatus fuit peccando tam legem naturalem quam positivam, ipsaque lex prius illi positiva, scilicet de non edendo pomo, iam non fuit illi lex, quia non erat in eius potestate, frustra daretur ei lex aliqua alia positiva, donec prius iterum probaretur in observatione legis naturalis.” 11 De cess. legal., I.7.1 (Dales and King, eds., 34, l. 10): “ad plenitudinem obediencie adderetur.” 216 JUSTUS H. HUNTER weakness of memory, by the time of Moses it was necessary for God to convert the positive law into a written law.12 Grosseteste recasts his narrative with a four-person headship typology at De cessatione legalium I.8.13 He considers “the human race, as it were, in four persons”: (1) natural Adam, (2) fallen Adam, (3) Satan, and (4) Christ. All of humanity shares in the first two, insofar as all men are (1) naturally begotten from Adam and (2) originally vitiated in him. The final two, however, distinguish two bodies according to their heads.14 In the third are “all the guilty and those finally great sinners,” for whom Satan is and will be the head.15 In union with him they will all be cast into hell. Conversely, Christ and his body, the Church, form the other race of humanity. All these together will be granted final glory. These four persons bear four distinct relations to various kinds of law. The typology allows Grosseteste to specify the nature and possibility of the cessation of (some) law in the coming of Christ. To the first person (natural Adam) was given the natural law and the positive law (“Do not eat”), but not the written law. For the second person (fallen Adam), the natural law remains and the positive law stands until that obligation is removed, but now the written law is conferred in order to overcome ignorance. The third person remains under the natural, positive, and written laws, although they are given in vain as Satan and those united to him as their head do not fulfill the obligations of the law. Finally, those who are united to Christ as their head receive Christ’s liberation and redemption, whereby they are freed from the obligation to the positive law as well as the (former) written law. Instead, they are given a new written law. For Grosseteste, it is worth noting that 12 De cess. legal., I.7. Grosseteste’s four persons appear later, in the fourteenth century, in John Wyclif’s De veritate sacrae scripturae III, 28. Wyclif lauds and recalls the dominus Lincolniensis on the question of the cessation of the law, and follows Grosseteste in treating standard Christological quaestiones in this context, albeit in a way distinctive to Wyclif. 14 Grosseteste apparently has Augustine’s De civitate Dei in mind. 15 De cess. legal., I.8.1 (Dales and King, eds., 38, ll. 19-20): “Tercia vero persona est omnes criminosi et maxime finaliter peccatores cum capite suo diabolo.” 13 GROSSETESTE ON THE RATIO INCARNATIONIS 217 liberation and redemption are effected, specifically, through Christ’s Passion: Redemption and liberation through the Passion of Christ was rightly given to the person whom we call Adam the transgressor, that is, fallen Adam together with the human race sinning in him in the beginning. This redemption and liberation were so given that, freed from the pit of sin, Adam may pass over into the person whose head is Christ.16 The four-person typology demonstrates the prominence the unitive effects of the Incarnation have in Grosseteste’s theology. As we will see, these unitive effects are central to his reflection on the ratio incarnationis in book III. The remainder of book I of De cessatione legalium supplies scriptural evidence for the cessation of the ritual law—the positive, written law of the Old Testament (I.11). Satisfied with his case on this point, Grosseteste shows that Jesus is the Christ promised by that law in book II. The text moves through a standard series of topics in Christology, insofar as those topics are anticipated in the Old Testament. The particular time of the Incarnation is treated as an extended reflection on Daniel 9. The Passion is considered in connection with Isaiah 52-53. Taken together, book II produces a familiar description of the coming Messiah: the Messiah brings blessing by freedom from sin and guilt (II.2.1; 3.1-2); is both divine and human (II.2.2-6; 3.3); free from the stain of sin (II.3.4-6); from Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Judah, Jesse, and David (II.3.7-13); born of a virgin in Bethlehem (II.3.13-14), would suffer insult, injury, and violent death to free people from sin and punishment (II.4-6); and born in the time of Herod (II.7). Grosseteste sums this all up in one paragraph: (Christ) is the greatest and best man, without any sin or lie, decendant from Abraham through Isaac, Jacob, Judah, Jesse, and David, who unifies all the nations in a harmonious way of life by a most equitable justice, who rules over 16 De cess. legal., I.8.4 (Dales and King, eds., 40, ll. 8-12): “Redemptio vero et liberacio per Christi passionem proprie data est illi persone quam nominavimus Adam prevaricatorem, id est Ade lapso, cum humano genere in eo originaliter peccante, ut per redemptionem liberata a peccati fovea, transeat in personam cuius capud est Christus.” 218 JUSTUS H. HUNTER all and has dominion without end, who was conceived and born of a virgin, who is perfect from his conception in wisdom and virtue, who was born in Bethlehem when the leadership and principate of the Jews failed, dispirited by insults and despised, who suffered and was killed in the way that Isaiah and the Psalmist describe at the time Gabriel announced to the prophet Daniel, a time which history has shown to be during the reign of Tiberius Caesar. But it is impossible that all these things come together in any man but the Lord Jesus, son of Mary.17 This is the context for Grosseteste’s famous reflection on the ratio incarnationis. Book III takes up a parallel set of Christological issues, but with the addition of rational demonstrations. For instance, he supplies five arguments to prove that the appropriate place of Christ’s ministry was Jerusalem (III.3.1-4). De cessatione legalium III.4 gives a litany of arguments for the timing of Christ’s advent, all from reason. The parallelism between books II and III of De cessatione legalium, distinguished by the kinds of demonstration supplied (the former from the text of the Old Testament, the latter from reason), support Hildebrand’s suggestion that De cessatione legalium “is not haphazard but deliberate and purposeful.”18 Grosseteste’s extended reflection on the ratio incarnationis, therefore, serves the larger argument of De cessatione legalium as a rational demonstration of the appropriateness of Christ’s Incarnation to fulfill the divine will from eternity. Accordingly, book III’s reflection on the ratio incarnationis extends Grosseteste’s argument, begun in book II, that Jesus is the Christ promised in the Old Testament. Moreover, it exhibits the many unions effected by the Incarnation, in keeping with the 17 De cess. legal., II.9.3 (Dales and King, eds., 116, ll. 13-24): “illum Deum, saltim concedet quod sit maximus et optimus hominum, sine omni peccato et mendacio, descendens de Abraham per Ysaac et Iacob et Iudam et Iesse et David, adunans omnes naciones in unam morum concordiam equissima iusticia, super omnes regnans et dominans sine termino, conceptus et natus de virgine, perfectus a conceptu sapientia et virtute, natus in Bethlehem deficiente ducatu et principatu Iudeorum contumeliis affectus et despectus, passus et occisus per modum quem describunt Ysayas et psalmista, et illo tempore quo Gabriel angelus nunciavit Danieli prophete quod tempus secundum hystorias convincitur esse, regnante Tiberio Cesare. Sed hec omnia impossibile est convenire in alio homine quam in Domino Ihesu, filio Marie.” 18 Grosseteste, On the Cessation of the Laws, 16-17. GROSSETESTE ON THE RATIO INCARNATIONIS 219 four-person, headship typology of book I. The ratio incarnationis arises at this juncture as a means for Grosseteste to expand his argument for Christ as the one who brings to cessation the positive law and the former written law. II. “THAT GOD WOULD HAVE BECOME HUMAN, EVEN IF HUMANITY HAD NOT FALLEN” The opening paragraphs of book III, on “whether God would have become human, even if humanity had not fallen,” are notably obscure. Grosseteste presents a series of arguments which are “numerous (he gives nineteen in all), extensive, and often interconnected.”19 At points he briefly sketches an argument and then proceeds to another, more detailed argument, only to return to the initial argument. The peculiarity of the organization has led his modern interpreters to group and synthesize the various arguments. Several proposals emerge. Where James McEvoy finds five “considerations,” Dominic Unger sees ten arguments.20 James Ginther, similar to McEvoy, rehearses five arguments, although there are important differences in the details.21 As the readers observe, Grosseteste’s arguments “that God would have become human, even if humanity had not fallen” are diverse, perhaps even randomly arranged. De cessatione legalium III.1 gives the impression Grosseteste was collating a litany of arguments as they occurred to him, or he recalled them, with little concern for their interrelationship. This characteristic of the text leads many to conclude that De cessatione legalium III.1 is a loosely related series of arguments: 19 James McEvoy, “The Absolute Predestination of Christ in the Theology of Robert Grosseteste,” in Robert Grosseteste: Exegete and Philosopher (Aldershot, Hampshire: Variorum, 1994), 213. 20 Ibid., 213-17; Dominic Unger, “Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln (12351253) on the Reasons for the Incarnation,” Franciscan Studies 16 (1956): 26-34. Technically, Unger finds nine arguments in De cessatione legalium, and a tenth in the sermon Exiit edictum. 21 James R. Ginther, Master of the Sacred Page: A Study of the Theology of Robert Grosseteste, ca. 1229/30-1235 (Burlington: Ashgate, 2004), 130-37. 220 JUSTUS H. HUNTER “[Grosseteste] presents [his arguments] in no particular order.”22 Lest this be considered a weakness, “[the arguments] can, however, be synthesized . . . indeed they gain thereby in intelligibility and cumulative force.”23 Thus, several readings of De cessatione legalium III.1 have emerged which reorganize and group the various elements into more consistent, developed, and distinct arguments. McEvoy’s reading has been the most influential. He groups the nineteen or so arguments into five thematic “considerations.” For example, the first consideration runs as follows: since God is the highest good and the highest good would actualize the best possible created effect, and since the Incarnation is the best possible created effect, then God, in virtue of being the highest good, would actualize the Incarnation in a world without sin. This may be called the “highest good” consideration. McEvoy derives this consideration by synthesizing the arguments at paragraphs 3 and 4 with paragraphs 8 and 9. Paragraphs 5 through 7, on the other hand, express another consideration for McEvoy. Here Grossetesteste argues that humanity’s capacity for union with God cannot be contingent upon the existence of sin. This may be called the “independent of sin” consideration. Thus, we have two considerations distinguished according to their primary themes— the highest good and independence from sin, respectively. Unger and Ginther diverge from McEvoy’s reading on the organization of paragraphs 3 through 9. Both Unger and Ginther recognize that Grosseteste does not consider an independent thematic consideration in paragraphs 5 through 7. Rather, these paragraphs develop an objection which contributes to the argument begun in paragraphs 3 and 4. And yet, both Unger and Ginther find other thematic groupings in paragraphs 8 and 9. For Unger, paragraphs 3 through 8 form a single argument, but paragraph 9 presents a second argument, grounded in divine generosity rather than divine goodness. Ginther, on the other hand, distinguishes paragraphs 3 through 22 23 McEvoy, “Absolute Predestination of Christ,” 213. Ibid. GROSSETESTE ON THE RATIO INCARNATIONIS 221 7 from 8 and 9: the former focus upon the divine goodness, the latter upon the glory granted creation by the Incarnation. The reading which follows is more analytic than those currently offered. Thus, it makes several important contributions: (1) a precise exposition of Grosseteste’s mode of argumentation, (2) a clear presentation of deductive forms of Grosseteste’s arguments, and (3) insight into the place of De cessatione legalium III.1 in emerging thirteenth-century debates over the ratio incarnationis. III. THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES STRATEGY Grosseteste thinks we can supply reasons for the Incarnation that are prior to the redemption from sin. That is, those reasons would still obtain in possible worlds without the Fall.24 For the sake of precision, the analysis that follows will refer to several sets of possible worlds. The analysis is intentionally rudimentary, so that the concepts employed are both (1) serviceable for refining our analysis and (2) understandable to the lay reader. Let us distinguish between four sets of possible worlds: W, F, I, X. The set of worlds in W (hereafter W-worlds) are all possible worlds (including our own) with both the Fall and the Incarnation. The set of F-worlds are all possible worlds with the Fall and without the Incarnation. The set of I-worlds are all possible worlds without the Fall and with the Incarnation. The set of X-worlds are all possible worlds without the Fall or the Incarnation. 24 “Prior” here means priority of the divine volition for Incarnation over the divine volition for redemption, such that the former volition would be elicited independent of whether or not the latter volition were. I am not the first person to introduce possible worlds semantics into analysis of the ratio incarnationis; see R. Trent Pomplun, “The Immaculate World: Predestination and Passibility in Contemporary Scotism,” Modern Theology 30 (2014): 544f. See also William Marshner, “A Critique of Marian Counterfactual Formulae: A Report of Results,” Marian Studies 30 (1979): 108-39. For a very basic orientation to set theory, which will suffice for our purposes, see part I of David Papineau, Philosophical Devices: Proofs, Probabilities, Possibilities, and Sets (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 222 JUSTUS H. HUNTER Readers with some philosophical training will inquire what sort of possibility is intended—logical, causal, or another. At this point, it is best simply to stipulate the relevant sense of possibility intended: we are concerned with the set of possible worlds that could be created by a God who possesses the character Grosseteste assumes or ascribes to him. We will call this Grossetestean possibility, a species of something like theological possibility. Having stated his question as well as the conclusion for which he will be arguing in paragraphs 1-2, the litany of Grosseteste’s arguments proceeds with De cessatione legalium III.1.3. The first argument begins from several Anselmian assertions: “God is supreme power, wisdom, and goodness, and he is better than can be thought.”25 Grosseteste infers that God’s supremacy requires that any created potency for good must be actualized, lest God be less than supremely good and generous: “For if the universe were capable of some degree of goodness which he did not pour into it, he would not be supremely generous and so not supremely good.”26 Grosseteste draws a further, comparative implication; goodness exerts itself not only for benefit, but for the greater benefit. Hence, he reiterates, “supreme goodness pours in as great a good as it is capable of.”27 It is a Platonic rendition of the earlier principle, which we can restate as follows: if x is some good, and our W-world is capable of x, then x will be actualized. While Grosseteste is consistent in applying this principle, he astutely observes a relevant distinction between two classes of capacity: capacity simpliciter and conditional capacity. If our W-world’s capacity for the Incarnation has the Fall as a necessary condition (a conditional capacity for the Incarnation), then possible worlds in which there is no Fall will lack the Incarnation. I-worlds will be Grossetesteanly impos25 De cess. legal., III.1.3 (Dales and King, eds., 120, ll. 2-3): “Deus est summa potentia et sapientia et bonitas et magis bonus quam etiam possit excogitari.” 26 Ibid. (Dales and King, eds., 120, ll. 5-7): “Si enim ipsa esset capabilis aliquante bonitatis quam ipse illi non influeret, non esset summe largus et ita nec summe bonus.” 27 De cess. legal., III.1.4 (Dales and King, eds., 120, ll. 11-12): “Summa igitur bonitas tantum bonum influit universitati quanti boni ipsa est capax.” GROSSETESTE ON THE RATIO INCARNATIONIS 223 sible. If, on the other hand, our W-world has a capacity simpliciter for the Incarnation, then the Incarnation might still occur in worlds without the Fall. I-worlds will be Grossetesteanly possible. In fact, given Grosseteste’s application of the aforementioned supreme goodness premise, it seems necessary that worlds without the Fall will be I-worlds. In the four paragraphs which follow (5-8), Grosseteste gives a series of arguments in favor of our W-world’s capacity for the Incarnation simpliciter. He begins by clarifying the capacity at stake: it is a capacity of human nature for personal (i.e., hypostatic) union with the divine nature.28 Next, he distinguishes human nature prior to the Fall from human nature subsequent to the Fall in terms of corruption: prior to the Fall was an incorrupt human nature, subsequent to the Fall a corrupt human nature. He then takes from the Lombard an account of the hypostatic union as union “to the flesh through the mediation of the intellect.”29 Having clarified the relevant capacity, he then specifies what it would mean for that capacity to be conditional upon the Fall: either (a) the soul is more assumable given the corruption of sin or (b) the intellect is more united to the flesh given the corruption of sin. He argues that (b) is impossible insofar as the union of intellect with flesh is greater preceding the corruption of sin, since the intellect shares its eternity (i.e., possibility for not dying) with the flesh.30 Paragraphs 5 and 6 refute option (a). Beginning from the metaphysical premise that “everything that is understood is either essence or the defection or negation of essence,” Grosseteste further clarifies the corruption of sin: it is a defection, or privation, of essence.31 Moreover, given the same 28 De cess. legal., III.1.5. Ibid. ((Dales and King, eds., 120, ll. 27-28): “Unitum est carni per medium intellectum Verbum Dei.” Peter Lombard, Sentences 3.2. N.b. Grosseteste uses intellectum and anima interchangeably here, which I will imitate by using “intellect” and “soul” interchangeably in my discussion of this argument. 30 De cess. legal., III.1.5 (Dales and King, eds., 121, ll. 3-4): “sed tanto fortiorem habuit unicionem quanto possibilitas non moriendi distat a necessitate moriendi.” 31 De cess. legal., III.1.6 (Dales and King, eds., 121, ll. 7-8): “Preterea, utraque corrupcio tam culpe quam pene non est essentia, sed essentie defectio.” 29 224 JUSTUS H. HUNTER premise, it must be that the capacity for personal union with the divine nature is an essence (rather than a defection of essence). Thus by substitution we can say: The corruption of sin is the cause of personal union with the divine nature. Everything understood is a defection of essence or an essence. A defection of essence is the cause of an essence. This conclusion, Grosseteste contends, is absurd, and so it must be that our W-world’s capacity for the Incarnation is a capacity simpliciter. Since our W-world’s capacity for the Incarnation simpliciter is (by definition) independent of the Fall, and the capacity for the Incarnation simpliciter is a good, the Incarnation must be actualized in all possible worlds, lest God be less than supremely good (see De cess. legal. III.1.3). Thus, the set of Grossetesteanly possible worlds without the Fall will include the Incarnation, and so X-worlds (without the Fall or the Incarnation) are impossible. Grosseteste produces a second, related argument in support of our W-world’s capacity for the Incarnation simpliciter, this time in the form of a reductio. Suppose that our W-world’s capacity for the Incarnation is conditional on the Fall. It follows that if humanity had not fallen, God would not have become incarnate.32 Possible X-worlds will obtain. But our W-world is a more glorious, and therefore better, world than any X-world because our W-world contains a creature worthy of adoration while all X-worlds possess no such creature. Since (1) “the glory of being worshipped incomparably exceeds every created glory” and (2) “the whole of creation was glorified in the flesh assumed by the Word; it was . . . on fire with the divinity of the Word that assumed it,” our W-world is inestimably better than any X-world.33 However, given the premise at De cessatione 32 De cess. legal., III.1.8 (Dales and King, eds., 121, ll. 19-20): “Ad hec ponamus quod homo lapsus non esset neque Deus homo esset.” 33 De cess. legal., III.1.8 (Dales and King, eds., 121, l. 33–122, l. 1): “gloriositas adorabilitatis incomparabiliter excedit omnem aliam gloriositatem creature”; ibid. (Dales and King, eds., 122, ll. 8-10): “sic est universitas creature magis glorificata in carne assumpta a Verbo, ut ita dicam, ignita divinitate Verbi assumentis.” GROSSETESTE ON THE RATIO INCARNATIONIS 225 legalium III.1.4 that “supreme goodness pours in as great a good as it is capable of,” if we continue to hold that X-worlds are possible, we reach the absurd conclusion that X-worlds are possible worlds which are impossibly actual because they are inestimably worse than our W-world, which is to say a possible world is impossible.34 Reductio ad absurdum. In paragraph 9, Grosseteste gives a parallel argument to that formulated in paragraphs 3 and 4 and defended in paragraphs 5-8. God is supremely generous and therefore supremely lacking in envy.35 Thus, God “creates every kind of creature that can exist.”36 In support of this latter principle, we are given the aforementioned deductive argument from the divine generosity as well as an a posteriori argument from the evidence of creation: we see that God has actualized even the most insignificant of possible things, such as insects or reptiles.37 In light of this empirical observation, Grosseteste then poses the question: “[If] God does not omit the nature of the insect lest the whole of creation be imperfect and less honorable, would He omit Christ, the greatest honor for all creation?”38 The answer is, of course, no. These arguments all deploy a common strategy: they move from the attribution of some divine perfection to the conclusion 34 This is a slight expansion of Grosseteste’s argument, which simply concludes that one must think (1) that God would have become human even if humanity had not fallen or (2) this world is inestimably better as a result of the Fall. However, the latter possibility, by implication, is an impossibility for the reasons adumbrated above. 35 Grosseteste’s argument recalls Plato’s Timaeus 29E: “Now why did he who framed this whole universe of becoming frame it? Let us state the reason why: He was good, and one who is good can never become jealous of anything. And so, being free of jealousy, he wanted everything to become as much like himself as was possible.” Plato, “Timaeus,” in Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper, trans. Donald J. Zeyl (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Company, 1997), 1236. 36 De cess. legal., III.1.9 (Dales and King, eds., 122, l. 19): “[Deus] creat omnes species creaturarum quas possibile est esse.” 37 De cess. legal., III.1.9 (Dales and King, eds., 122, ll. 21-22): “nec etiam naturam vermiculi aut alicuiusmodi muscarum vel reptilium relinquit non creatam.” 38 Ibid. (Dales and King, eds., 122, ll. 25-27): “Non omittit naturam vermiculi ne sit universitas imperfecta et minus decora, et omitteret Christum, universitatis decus maximum?” 226 JUSTUS H. HUNTER that a particular effect would be necessary in possible worlds without the Fall. We can express the basic strategy in four propositions: (1) The Incarnation is possible. (2) The Incarnation does not have sin as a necessary condition (a capacity simpliciter). (3) There is some divine attribute y which supplies a reason for the Incarnation. (4) Even in possible worlds without sin, y supplies a reason for the Incarnation.39 Grosseteste’s arguments across De cessatione legalium III.1, 3-9 utilize this basic strategy. Different values are substituted for y—goodness, glory, generosity—but all variants are deductive arguments for the same conclusion: even in a possible world without sin, God has a reason for the Incarnation, and so there is Incarnation. Or, in terms of our possible worlds: X-worlds are Grossetesteanly impossible. This, in Grosseteste’s idiom, is sufficient to guarantee the conclusion that “if Adam had not sinned, God would become incarnate.”40 This argumentative strategy may be called the divine attributes strategy. IV. THE CREATED EFFECTS STRATEGY Paragraphs 10-30 present a greater challenge to our analysis of Grosseteste’s argumentative strategies in De cessatione legalium III.1. These sections are the primary locus of disagreement in the secondary literature with regard to Grosseteste’s organization of his various themes.41 39 It should be noted that there is an unstated assumption along the following lines: “If God has a reason for actualizing x, then x.” Grosseteste seems to assume this to be the case, but this assumption is questioned by theologians at Paris in the thirteenth century. 40 I have intentionally left this inference open in my analysis of the argument, as Grosseteste’s presumption will be the very point at which St. Thomas and others will object. 41 Ginther, Master of the Sacred Page, 132-41; McEvoy, “The Absolute Predestination of Christ,” 214-17; Unger, “Robert Grosseteste on the Reasons for the Incarnation,” 25-32. GROSSETESTE ON THE RATIO INCARNATIONIS 227 McEvoy’s treatment, the most influential, passes over paragraph 10 and moves straight into paragraphs 11-15. Unger connects paragraph 10 with paragraphs 18 and 19 on the unity of the Church in Christ’s headship. McEvoy observes that paragraphs 11-15 are linked to paragraphs 16-17 and 22-24 as arguments for justification and redemption as “independent needs of man.”42 Ginther, who gives the most unified treatment of De cessatione legalium III.1, links 10-15 with 16-19 (and presumably 20-21, although this is not explicit), all of which are unified under the themes of justification and sanctification (or adoption). And yet, while all agree that paragraphs 22-24 form a unit, as do 25-29, these are treated as two unrelated arguments, both of which are unrelated to the preceding arguments of paragraphs 10-21. Only Ginther suggests an overarching unity in Grosseteste’s treatise, although the nature of that unity is not apparent.43 In sum, paragraphs 10-30 have largely been read as a reflection of the unsystematic character of Grosseteste’s mind. And yet, several textual clues suggest such a strategic unity across these paragraphs. First, in paragraph 10 Grosseteste states: “If there were no [Incarnation] . . . the Church would be headless and so would humanity.” This twofold division of Christ’s headship (of the Church and of humanity) is underscored by the iteration of Christ’s dual headship in paragraphs 16, 17, 22, and 25. If we follow this recurring suggestion, we discover that the ensuing arguments can be divided into two groups: those having to do with Christ’s headship of the Church, or what we will call “goods of supernatural headship,” and those having to do with Christ’s headship of humanity (and by extension all of creation), which we will call “goods of natural headship.” So we have two subdivisions of the text: paragraphs 11-24 on the goods of supernatural headship achieved by the Incarnation, and paragraphs 25-29 on the goods of natural headship achieved by the Incarnation. 42 43 McEvoy, “The Absolute Predestination of Christ,” 214. Ginther, Master of the Sacred Page, esp. 135-36. 228 JUSTUS H. HUNTER Second, there are movements internal to the subdivisions into goods of supernatural and natural headship. Among the supernatural goods, Grosseteste moves with the order of salvation from justification (paras. 11-15), to adoption (paras. 16-17), to union with the Church (paras. 18-21), and finally to beatitude (paras. 22-24). Among the natural goods, he moves through elevating degrees of union, from an argument for humanity as the microcosmic principle of the unity of creation (paras. 25-27), to the God-man as the union between creature and Creator (para. 28). Third, in paragraphs 11-15 Grosseteste analyzes the sentence “The suffering God-man justifies fallen humanity.” These paragraphs are the longest argument he gives for a particular created effect as a reason for the Incarnation. The logic of that argument is transferable to all the goods specified in ensuing arguments, both for goods of supernatural headship and for goods of natural headship. In keeping with these textual clues, the subsequent analysis moves from the semantic analysis of paragraphs 11-15 to the treatment of goods of supernatural and natural headship of paragraphs 16-30.44 A) Paragraphs 11-15: Semantic Analysis As noted above, Grosseteste gives a semantic analysis, in paragraphs 11-15, of the proposition: 3.1 The suffering God-man justifies fallen humanity.45 He supplies two axioms: “the cause is precisely proportionate to the effect,”46 and “there is always a single cause.”47 The implica44 Paragraph 30 is a bit oddly located, insofar as it returns to the order of grace and the union effected in the sacrament of the Eucharist. However, this could be attributed to the fact that the paragraph is chiefly comprised of an extended citation from Radbertus, which reiterates several key arguments from paragraphs 16-21. The passage is unique in form as an extended citation, and therefore is something of an addendum. 45 De cess. legal., III.1.11 (Dales and King, eds., 123, ll. 13-14): “Deus-homo passus per se iustificat hominem lapsum.” GROSSETESTE ON THE RATIO INCARNATIONIS 229 tion for 3.1 is twofold. First, there exists some perfect correspondence between each term in the subject and object of 3.1. Second, the cause of a particular good (i.e., justification) in our world will be the cause of that good in other possible worlds. Given this rule, Grosseteste poses the following question: if we are seeking to reformulate 3.1 for those possible worlds in which the Fall does not obtain, what is precisely proportionate (or corresponds, correspondeat) to “fallen”? He considers two options: either (A) “suffering” is precisely proportionate to “fallen,” or else (B) “suffering man” is precisely proportionate to “fallen.” If option A is correct, then we will revise 3.1 for worlds without the Fall as follows: 3.2 The God-man justifies humanity. Alternatively, on option B, 3.1 is revised as follows: 3.3 God justifies humanity. Now that he has clarified the possible analyses of 3.1 without “fallen” to 3.2 (option A) or 3.3 (option B), Grosseteste proceeds to supply an argument in support of 3.2 and against 3.3 in paragraphs 13-15. In support of 3.2 over against 3.3, he begins with appeals to authority. First he cites 1 Corinthians 1:30: “[Jesus Christ] became [factus est] for us wisdom from God, justice to you and holiness and redemption.” As Grosseteste notes, Christ confers justice “by his becoming,” factus est, which is to say by his humanity. Second, Romans 5:19 asserts, “by one (man’s) obedience, the many will be made righteous.” As obedience can only be said of Christ’s human will, it must be that Christ’s humanity is involved in the justification of humanity. Having made his case that 3.2 is warranted by Scripture, Grosseteste expands the object of the assertion: 46 Ibid. (Dales and King, eds., 123, l. 14): “est hec precise conproportionata causa huic effectui.” 47 De cess. legal., III.1.12 (Dales and King, eds., 123, l. 27): “semper unica est causa.” 230 JUSTUS H. HUNTER 3.4 The God-man justifies rational creatures. Once again, he turns first to authority, in this case to Dionysius the Areopagite’s Celestial Hierarchy 7. Dionysius’s text itself is rather convoluted: [The superior intelligences] are contemplative also because they have been allowed to enter into communion with Jesus not by means of the holy images, reflecting the likeness of God’s working in forms, but by truly coming close to him in a primary participation in the knowledge of the divine lights working out of him. To be like God is their special gift and, to the extent that it is allowed them, they share, with a primordial power, in his divine activities and his loving virtue.48 Grosseteste, following the versio Eriugena, renders the final passage “because the divine likeness has been given to them substantially, these kind share, as much as is possible in their preoperative power, in the same deiformity and human virtues.” While the Celestial Hierarchy is obscure, Grosseteste’s conclusion could not be clearer. Even the superior intelligences, the highest rational49 creatures—cherubim and seraphim— which surround the throne of God in endless praise and contemplation, are justified by the God-man. Their Godlikeness is given in virtue of their sharing in the “deiformity and human virtues” of Christ, the God-man. Thus, on authority, we conclude 3.4, and, a fortiori, affirm 3.2 and deny 3.3. Immediately, however, there is a problem with our assertion 3.4, “The God-man justifies rational creatures.” While Grosseteste takes it that he has established that Christ’s humanity is in some manner the cause of justification in every justified rational creature, the question remains as to the sense in which that humanity causes justification, as well as its relation to God’s 48 Celestial Hierarchy 7.208C.32-40; text taken from Colm Luibhéid and Paul Rorem, trans., Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works, The Classics of Western Spirituality (New York: Paulist Press, 1987), 163-64. 49 Grosseteste refers to both humans and angels as rational creatures in De cess. legal. III.1.13-14. Whereas Thomas Aquinas distinguishes between humans and angels, the latter being strictly speaking intellectual rather than rational, Grosseteste makes no such distinction here. GROSSETESTE ON THE RATIO INCARNATIONIS 231 causality in justification. If “the formation of justice always happens in one way, because the cause of one thing is always one,”50 it remains to be shown how the two (divinity and humanity) are involved in producing the single effect. This, Grosseteste holds, is given in the formula “justice always and simply descends from God through Christ, the God-man, into every rational creature who is made just.” Thus, in two ways over the course of paragraphs 13 and 14 Grosseteste refines 3.2 (option A): (1) the God-man justifies not only humanity, but all rational creatures, and (2) the God-man is involved in this justification, “always and simply,” as the one through whom justice descends to rational creatures, while God is the one from whom justice descends. So, we can finally render Grosseteste’s overarching assertion as follows (with a revision from active to passive voice): 3.5 Always and simply, rational creatures are justified through the God-man. Grosseteste returns to his original semantic analysis of 3.1: “The suffering God-man justifies fallen humanity.” He has offered support of his position that “suffering” corresponds to “fallen” such that, in those possible worlds in which there is no Fall, proposition 3.2, “The God-man justifies humanity,” remains true. If so, for these worlds which resemble our own insofar as God wills the justification of humanity, there must be a Godman. Therefore, they will be I-worlds—with the Incarnation and without the Fall. But the entire argument will dissolve if Grosseteste cannot supply an account of his position that “suffering” corresponds to “fallen,” which we have called option A, and, conversely, that “suffering man” cannot correspond to “fallen,” or option B. Paragraph 15 works out this final issue of the semantic analysis of 3.1. Grosseteste’s argument is extremely terse, but analysis shows that the basic strategy is a kind of reductio. Assuming option B and 3.3 are true, without any mediation 50 De cess. legal., III.1.14 (Dales and King, eds., 124, ll. 26-27): “Quapropter si iusticie informacio uno modo semper fit, quia unius semper una est causa.” 232 JUSTUS H. HUNTER (absque mediacione) through the God-man, then we must tell a story about the Incarnation in the de facto order that does not violate 3.3, “God justifies humanity.” We will have to answer the following question: If not for justification, why did God become incarnate? Grosseteste considers one alternative: to satisfy by passion. “The Passion of Jesus Christ is satisfaction for our offenses.”51 For the sake of simplicity, we can state: 3.11 Jesus Christ satisfies by his Passion (i.e., suffering).52 By “Jesus Christ,” Grosseteste designates the humanity assumed by the Son in the Incarnation, distinct from the divinity which is the sole cause of justification (there is no through-ness involved). This analysis provides an account of what it means for “suffering man” to correspond to “fallen” in 3.1. Grosseteste’s reductio runs as follows. If the Passion of Jesus Christ is the proper and proportionate cause of satisfaction, and God the proper and proportionate cause of justification, then it seems to follow that “the humanity of Jesus Christ [is] only materially necessary for the Passion, that is, it would exist only so that God the Son could suffer in it and by his Passion make satisfaction for the offense of the human race. But this does not seem fitting.”53 Once again, Grosseteste is terse, but the argument is not difficult to tease out. If the only purpose we can assign to the Son’s assumption of a human nature is to suffer and die, then, it seems, God creates some creature (Christ’s human nature) for the sole purpose of its suffering. This result, 51 De cess. legal., III.1.15 (Dales and King, eds., 125, l. 9): “Item, passio Ihesu Christi est satisfactio pro nostro delicto.” 52 Presumably, underlying the assertion is Grosseteste’s acceptance of the argument of Anselm’s Cur Deus homo 2.1-11 that only the God-man can offer satisfaction. In this case, the Son would take on humanity only in order to die to give satisfaction for our offenses. 53 Ibid. (Dales and King, eds., 125, ll. 12-17): “Si igitur ponamus Deum precisam causam et comproporcionatam absque mediacione aliqua iustificationi, et passionem satisfactioni, humanitas Ihesu Christi solumodo erit materialis necessitas ad passionem, ideo videlicet solum existens ut Deus Filius in ea posset pati, et passione sua pro delicto humani generis satisfacere. Quod non videtur conveniens.” GROSSETESTE ON THE RATIO INCARNATIONIS 233 “God creates some creature only so that it can suffer,” Grosseteste deems inconveniens. Paragraphs 11-15 develop a semantic analysis that sketches a form of argument Grosseteste will reuse in subsequent paragraphs. Some good x (e.g., the infusion of justice) has for its cause the God-man as the means of mediation: “x is from God through the God-man.” That is, the Incarnation is a necessary condition of x. Moreover, since x is not conditional upon the Fall (lest inconvenientia ensue), then the assertion holds in possible worlds without the Fall, and so I-worlds are Grossetesteanly possible, and X-worlds are not. B) Paragraphs 16-30: Created Effects What follows in paragraphs 16-30 is a series of arguments which work from the premises and strategies outlined in both paragraphs 3-9 and 11-15. The arguments all gather around a concern over various “unitive” aims of the Incarnation intimated by paragraph 10’s language of “headship” and hearkening back to the four-person headship typology of book I. Moreover, they follow the arc of topics summarized in paragraph 10: they move from the order of grace (between Christ and the Church, in the sacrament of marriage, and in beatitude) to the order of nature (among all creatures and between Creator and creation). The way in which the two strategies which precede (in 3-9 and 11-15) are together applied to the subsequent “unitive aims” arguments is rather complicated. Thus, I will withhold analysis of these two strategies and their interrelation in the later arguments until I have given an analytic description of those arguments in this section. Grosseteste argues, in paragraph 16, that the Incarnation obtains in possible worlds without the Fall because, even without sin, “humanity would have been adopted children of God through grace.”54 Unity of will, the greatest possible union without the Incarnation, is insufficient for adoption. “Rather, 54 De cess. legal., III.1.16 (Dales and King, eds., 125, ll. 18-19): “homines, ut videtur, fuissent filii Dei adoptivi et per gratiam.” 234 JUSTUS H. HUNTER along with [the conformity of will] there is the unity of nature which we share with Christ.”55 This unity of nature requires the Son’s taking on of a human nature; that is, it is effected by the Incarnation. “Unless the Son of God were a sharer in our nature, we would not share in his divinity by adoption, nor would we be his brothers or the adopted sons of God the Father.”56 Grosseteste returns to this point later when, considering the Eucharist, he cites Radbertus:57 And Christ is in us today not only by an agreement of wills; rather, he is in us also by nature, just as we are rightly said to remain in him. For if the Word was made flesh, and we truly receive the Word as flesh in the food of the Lord, how is Christ not rightly thought to remain naturally in us, who as Godborn-man took the nature of our flesh and made it inseparable from himself, and who added the nature of his own flesh to the nature of eternity under this sacrament of the flesh that we must partake of?58 It must be, then, that even in those possible worlds without the Fall, the Incarnation obtains. Once again, a reductio is offered in support of the conclusion. If there were no Incarnation in possible worlds without the Fall, then the unity between God and humanity would simply be the conformity of wills, which only brings friendship 55 Ibid. (Dales and King, eds., 125, ll. 22-25): “Sed hanc unitatem qua sumus unum vel unus in Christo non facit solum conformitas voluntatis nostre cum voluntate Christi, sed cum hoc etiam unitas nature in qua communicamus cum Christo.” 56 De cess. legal., III.1.17 (Dales and King, eds., 126, ll. 5-7): “Igitur nisi Filius Dei esset particeps nature nostre, nos non essemus per adopcionem participes divinitatis sue, neque fratres eius, neque filii adopcionis Dei Patris.” 57 Grosseteste mistakenly attributes the position, from On the Body and Blood of the Lord 9.4, to Rabanus. 58 De cess. legal., III.1.30 (Dales and King, eds., 132, l. 26-133, l. 3): “Necnon et Christus hodie in nobis non solum per concordiam voluntatis sed etiam per naturam in nobis, sicut et nos in illo recte manere dicitur. Nam si Verbum caro factum est, et nos vere Verbum carnem in cibo dominico sumimus, quomodo Christus in nobis manere naturaliter iure non estimatur, qui et naturam carnis nostre inseparabilem sibi homo natus Deus assumpsit, et naturam carnis sue ad naturam eternitatis sub sacramento hoc nobis communicande carnis admiscuit?” GROSSETESTE ON THE RATIO INCARNATIONIS 235 or servitude.59 Since this unity is inferior to the unity of adoption, the state of humanity in a sinless world would be worse than in a world with sin. Thus, some possible world with sin is better than a sinless possible world, which is absurd. Moreover, we would have to attribute sin as the cause of adoption, which is to derive an essence from a privation, to use the earlier logic from paragraph 6. In those possible worlds without the Fall, if there were no Incarnation the Church, as the communion of adopted children, would lack its unity with Christ. “The Church together with the Son of God would not have been one Christ, and so the Church would lack the greatest good.”60 In this case, these worlds would be worse than possible worlds with sin. So, the argument of paragraphs 16-17 is applied in this parallel instance: some possible world with sin is better than a sinless possible world, which is absurd. God’s unitive aims for Christ and the Church are further buttressed by an appeal to Paul’s interpretation of Genesis 2:24 in Ephesians 5:32: Before his Fall Adam prophesied the marriage of Christ and the Church, saying, “Therefore a man shall leave his father and mother and shall cleave to his wife, and the two shall become one flesh.” About this the Apostle says, “This great mystery [sacramentum] is of Christ and the Church.”61 What appears to be a straightforward application of scriptural warrant turns out to express a sacramental argument that inverts a temporal objection Grosseteste raised in paragraph 14. In paragraph 20, he begins with an argument for Adam’s prophetic knowledge of the union of Christ and the Church, 59 De cess. legal., III.1.17 (Dales and King, eds., 126, ll. 10-12): “Sola namque conformitas voluntatum non facit aliquam filiacionem, sed inter pares facit amicitiam et societatem; inter impares vero servitutem obedientem.” 60 De cess. legal., III.1.18 (Dales and King, eds., 126, ll. 24-26): “Maximo itaque bono careret ecclesia nisi peccasset homo, non enim esset unus Christus cum Dei Filio.” 61 De cess. legal., III.1.20 (Dales and King, eds., 127, ll. 3-6): “Item, Adam ante lapsum suum prophetavit matrimonium Christi et ecclesie, dicens: Quamobrem relinquet homo patrem et matrem et adherebit uxori sue; et erunt duo in carne una. De quo dicit apostolus: Sacramentum est hoc magnum in Christo et ecclesia.” 236 JUSTUS H. HUNTER which antedated the Fall. According to Genesis 2, Adam held the belief that Christ would be married to the Church, and therefore believed that Christ would be. Thus, “while he knew and believed nothing about the sin of the human race, which was about to happen, he believed in the marriage of Christ and the Church.”62 This leads into a second argument from the sacrament of marriage. Grosseteste distinguishes between three “indissoluble unions” (indivisibilis uniones): (1) the hypostatic union of humanity and divinity in Christ; (2) the sacramental union of Christ and the Church, which is a marital union; and (3) the marital union between a husband and wife.63 Grosseteste reasons that the first is a condition of the latter two. Unless there is a hypostatic union between humanity and divinity in Christ—unless there is an Incarnation—neither the union of Christ and the Church nor that of marriage will exist. Since the union between a husband and wife would have existed indissolubly even if there were no Fall (lest the sacrament of marriage would have less dignity in a sinless world than it would have in a fallen world), so it must be that even in possible worlds without the Fall the Incarnation would occur both for the union of Christ and the Church, the Church’s greatest good, and for the indissolubility of marriage. As mentioned earlier, something of a transition arises in paragraphs 22–24. Formally, the passage shares with the three arguments immediately preceding (paras. 16-17, 18-19, 20-21) an opening by appeal to authority, in this case to (Pseudo-) Augustine. Pseudo-Augustine, in On the Spirit and the Soul, argues that the interior and exterior senses of humanity each have their own distinct objects which bring their perfection in beatitude. The Incarnation perfects both senses in a single object: the God-man. 62 Ibid. (Dales and King, eds., 127, ll. 13-14): “Nichil igitur de peccato humani generis quod esset futurum sciens vel credens, credidit matrimonium Christi et ecclesie.” 63 The three “indissoluble unions” of paragraph 21 indicate further conceptual scaffolding underlying De cess. legal., III.1.15-21. GROSSETESTE ON THE RATIO INCARNATIONIS 237 For God was made man in order to beatify in himself the whole man, to convert man wholly to him, and to be man’s whole delight, because he was seen by the sense of the flesh through flesh, and by the sense of the mind through the contemplation of God.64 The existence of the God-man, then, is a necessary condition of the final perfection of humanity in the beatific vision. Unity remains central to the argument. Grosseteste considers the possibility that a human could be beatified by the mind’s contemplation of God (interior sense) while sensing something else with the flesh.65 Perfect beatitude cannot be had in this way, he argues, insofar as perfect beatitude “demands the conversion of the whole attention of the soul to the highest good.”66 Since perfected humans in a world without the Incarnation would direct the attention of their rational soul to God, the highest good, and their sensitive soul to another, lesser good, it will be a less perfect world than one in which final beatitude has a single object. Grosseteste extends his argument by appeal to a scriptural vision of the eschaton, at which time the flesh of the Lord Jesus Christ will be manifested . . . as more splendid and beautiful than the sun and every bodily creature, because in comparison with the splendor of the flesh of Christ, the sun will seem not to shine. When it will be glorified, the eye of our flesh will be able to see the splendor and beauty of the flesh of Christ.67 64 De cess. legal., III.1.22 (Dales and King, eds., 128, ll. 10-13): “Propterea enim Deus homo factus est ut totum hominem in se beatificaret et tota conversio hominis esset ad ipsum, et tota dileccio esset in ipso, cum a sensu carnis videretur per carnem, et a sensu mentis per divinitatis contemplacionem.” 65 De cess. legal., III.1.23. 66 Ibid. (Dales and King, eds., 128, l. 30-129, l. 1): “Nec posset esse sic beatitudo perfecta que exigit tocius intencionis anime in summum bonum conversionem.” 67 De cess. legal., III.1.24 (Dales and King, eds., 129, ll. 4-7): “Ad hec caro Domini Ihesu Christi manifestabitur post resurrectionem splendidior et pulcrior sole et omni corporali creatura, quia camparacione splendoris carnis Christi, nec sol splendere videbitur. Possibilis est autem oculus noster carnalis cum glorificabitur ad visionem splendoris et pulcritudinis carnis Christi.” 238 JUSTUS H. HUNTER Two consequences follow for possible worlds without the Incarnation. First, for the human creature, beatitude itself would be a state of unceasing misery. The creature must obtain every natural good in its final state, otherwise its final state will retain an unceasing desire for something lacking and will not be at rest. In this case, the exterior sense of the human being must perceive God, otherwise it will desire something greater than that which it obtains. Perception of God by exterior sense is only possible if God is united to a creature possessing a sensible body, a condition satisfied by the God-man. Second, creation itself obtains an aesthetic perfection by the presence of the God-man. Drawing upon his earlier recitation of John Damascene in De cessatione legalium III.1.8, Grosseteste argues that all of creation is perfected in beauty by the presence of the God-man, just as wood enflamed by its union with fire becomes more beautiful in the form of charcoal than it was otherwise. And, if a possible world is more beautiful, just as if it is more good, then it will be actualized by a perfectly good and beautiful God (per paras. 3-9). This transition to the aesthetic good of creation precedes a final transition in Grosseteste’s argument. Whereas the other unitive aims of the Incarnation are goods of supernatural headship—justification, adoption, sacramental union, beatitude—the unitive aims treated in paragraphs 25-29 are goods of natural headship. The foundational premise is given at paragraph 26. Grosseteste argues, in Platonic fashion, that “because perfection and beauty consist in unity, in greater unity there is greater perfection and beauty.”68 And since, according to Grosseteste, God would actualize the greatest possible perfection, it must be that the greatest possible unity obtains in this world and any other possible worlds that God would choose to actualize (all Grossetesteanly possible worlds). The question is, what is the greatest possible unity that God could actualize in creation? Grosseteste distinguishes three kinds 68 De cess. legal., III.1.26 (Dales and King, eds., 130, ll. 7-8): “cum perfeccio et pulchritudo in unitate consistat, et in maiori unitate perfeccio et pulchritudo maior.” GROSSETESTE ON THE RATIO INCARNATIONIS 239 of unity: numerical, natural (having the same nature), and generic (occupying the same genus). All created things, which together comprise the universe, occupy the single genus of creatures. However, some unities are “stronger” than others, and generic unity is the weakest. It “has the least true unity.”69 So while generic unity would (and does) satisfy the unityrequirement which is a condition of a “universe,” if it is not the greatest possible unity the universe could possess, then the universe would be deprived by its Creator of some possible good, which is unbefitting a perfect Creator. But the unity of the created universe itself is only part of the unity which Grosseteste is seeking. There is another unity: that of Creator with creation. And in this case, generic unity does not obtain, since God does not occupy a common genus with creation.70 If, however, there possibly exists some single principle in which both the aforementioned “strongest possible unity of creation” condition is met, and the unity of Creator with creation is effected, then it must be that a perfect God would actualize that possible principle of unity. The God-man, Grosseteste argues, is such a principle of unity. As to the first issue (the unity of the universe itself), Grosseteste advances a microcosmic argument for a natural unity between humans and every other creature. Unlike the angels, humans possess a natural unity with all corporeal natures in virtue of the human body’s composition of the elements (i.e., light, heat, humidity, and coldness): “The human body is united, consequently, with all the elemental natures united with the elements themselves.” Thus, humanity possesses a natural unity with all corporeal creatures, both those composed of multiple elements and those which are simply one element, such as light. Alternatively, because humanity possesses a rational soul, together with the 69 Ibid. (Dales and King, eds., 130, l. 2): “genus est unitas est debilissima et minimum habens vere unitatis.” 70 De cess. legal., III.1.27. To this point, we might add, God is not in any genus, as there is no genus-species composition in God if God is perfectly simple. See Thomas Aquinas, STh I, q. 3, a. 5. 240 JUSTUS H. HUNTER lower powers (sensitive and vegetative), humans are naturally united to all animate creatures: “The rational soul is also united with the sensible soul of brute animals in the sensitive power, and with the vegetative soul of plants in the vegetative power.”71 To this we can add the human creature’s natural union with all intelligent creatures, in virtue of the rational soul. Thus, given humanity’s unity with all corporeality and animate beings, a human nature is apt for service as the unifying principle of the universe. If a human nature can unite creation, it cannot serve as the unifying principle of the Creator and creature. As there is no generic unity between the Creator and creature, neither is there any natural unity. Either, then, we must conclude only that the creation of some human creature is necessary for Grosseteste’s God, or else identify some principle in which both Creator and creation are united. If the latter is possible, it must be actualized by Grosseteste’s God. And if the creature in which Creator is united to creation is a human being, in whom all of creation is naturally united, then the greatest possible unity will obtain.72 This is possible, not by natural union, but by personal (hypostatic) union. As Grosseteste puts it: If, then, God should assume man in a personal unity, all creation has been led back to the fullness of unity; but if he should not assume man, all creation has not been drawn to the fullness of unity possible for it. If, therefore, we leave aside the Fall of man, it is nonetheless fitting that God assume man into a personal unity, because he could do it and it would not be inappropriate [nec 71 De cess. legal., III.1.27 (Dales and King, eds., 131, ll. 2-4): “Communicat quoque anima rationalis cum anima sensibili brutorum in potentia sensitiva, et cum anima vegetabili plantarum in potentia vegetativa.” 72 Technically, it could be that two distinct principles effect each of these unities— one between Creator and creature, and the other between all of creation. If both of these are possibly actualized by Grosseteste’s God, then they would be independent of one another given one condition: they could not possibly be actualized in a single principle. If they could be actualized in a single principle, then the same logic that demanded the actualization of two distinct principles will necessarily lead to the necessity of the actualization of the single principle instead. GROSSETESTE ON THE RATIO INCARNATIONIS 241 deceat] for him to do it; but even more, it would be appropriate [deceat], because without this the created universe would lack unity.73 Thus, in possible worlds without the Fall, God could assume man (because he has in our W-world), and it would be appropriate (deceat) for all the reasons we have shown. And so we can conclude that he would. Potuit, decuit, ergo facit. Grosseteste gives another rendition of these unitive-aims arguments, in this case for the “circular fulfillment” of creation: “if [the Incarnation] were done, all creation would have the fullest and most fitting unity, and through this all natures would be led back into a circular fulfillment.”74 Not only does Christ unite all creation in a natural unity in virtue of being truly human, and the Creator to the creature by a unity of assumption, but Christ further unites the series of human generation in a circular unity. “Seth is from Adam, and Enosh is from Seth . . . and so on in a line descending down to Jesus. And I can turn back and say, Adam is from Jesus, for this man, when Jesus was manifested, created Adam.”75 Thus, Christ unites all of humanity in a circle of human generation. By now the argument for the actualization of this possibility in those worlds will be familiar: Because, then, it is better that both the created universe and the series of human generation be united in such a circular period than that they be deprived of this union it would be possible for God to perfect them in this 73 De cess. legal., III.1.28 (Dales and King, eds., 131, ll. 9-15): “Si igitur assumat Deus hominem in unitatem persone, reducta est universitas ad unitatis complementum. Si vero non assumat, nec universitas ad unitatis complementum sibi possibile deducta est. Circumscripto igitur hominis lapsu, nichilominus convenit Deum assumere hominem in unitatem persone, cum et hoc possit facere nec dedeceat ipsum hoc facere; sed multo magis deceat, cum sine hoc careat universitas unitate.” 74 De cess. legal., III.1.28 (Dales and King, eds., 131, ll. 16-18): “Hoc vero facto, habeat universitas plenissimam et decentissimam unitatem, redacteque sint per hoc omnes nature in complementum circulare.” 75 De cess. legal., III.1.29 (Dales and King, eds., 131, ll. 27-30): “Possum enim sic dicere: ex Adam est Seth et ex Seth Enos et ex Enos Cainan, et ita linealiter descendendo usque ad Ihesum. Possumque reflectere et dicere: ex Ihesu Adam; iste enim homo, demonstrato Ihesu, creavit Adam.” 242 JUSTUS H. HUNTER way. And that these things are thus perfected seems to be manifest, because it is necessary that the perfection of this sort of circular period exist.76 This time, however, he introduces a new theological premise into his argument by appeal to book II, chapter 29 of John Damascene’s De fide orthodoxa, which Grosseteste renders as follows: Providence is the will of God, on account of which everything that exists receives fitting direction. But if the will of God is providence, it is altogether necessary according to right reason for everything that happens by providence to be also what is best and what most befits God, so that it could not turn out better.77 Here we reach a critical juncture: the intersection of will and nature, in this case implied by reference to the attribute of perfection. This issue will emerge as the critical one for subsequent theologians. Recalling the sweep of the argument extending across paragraphs 11-30, we can now express a second strategy: (1) God actualizes some created effect x in our W-world. (2) x does not have the Fall as a necessary condition. (3) If there were no Fall, God would actualize x. (4) x has a human nature hypostatically united to a divine person as a necessary condition. (5) If there were no Fall, there would be a human nature hypostatically united to a divine person (for the sake of x). We may call this argumentative strategy the created effects strategy. 76 Ibid. (Dales and King, eds., 131, l. 30-132, l. 2): “Cum igitur melius sit tam rerum universitatem quam humane generacionis seriem tali circulacionis periodo uniri quam ista unicione privari, possibile quoque sit et Deum sic perficere. Et ista sic perfici manifestum videtur esse quod huiusmodi circularis periodi perfeccionem necesse sit esse.” 77 De cess. legal., III.1.29 (Dales and King, eds., 132, ll. 2-7): “Ait namque Iohannes Damascenus: ‘Providentia est voluntas Dei, propter quam omnia que sunt convenientem deduccionem suscipiunt. Si autem Dei voluntas est providentia, omnino necesse est omnia que providentia fiunt, secundum rectam rationem et optima et Deo decentissima fieri, et ut non est melius fieri.’” GROSSETESTE ON THE RATIO INCARNATIONIS 243 V. THE DEDUCTIVE STRATEGIES AT PARIS The preceding analysis of Grosseteste’s two deductive strategies in De cessatione legalium III.1 allows us to isolate with some precision two theological problems which exercised subsequent theologians at Paris, like St. Thomas. We can express these problems in a pair of questions: (1) If the arguments of the divine attributes strategy hold, what sense can be given to “divine freedom”? (2) In light of the created effects strategy, what relation does God’s actualizing of x in our Wworld have to any other theologically possible world? These two questions are interrelated; the application of divine actions in our W-world across all or some possible worlds is one way to render an account of divine freedom. Duns Scotus’s famous contribution to the ratio incarnationis makes this most explicit, as do the subsequent debates between Dominican, Franciscan, and other theologians over the signa rationis. These two interrelated problems arise in Paris as Grossetestean arguments are developed early in the thirteenth century.78 Similar approaches to Grosseteste’s can be observed in both Alexander of Hales and Odo Rigaldi.79 Later in the thirteenth century, when Thomas takes up the question of the ratio incarnationis, he is concerned both (a) to avoid the problems for divine freedom posed by Grossetestean deductive strategies, and (b) to retain certain insights contained within the Grossetestean arguments. Thus, his reflections reflect subtle 78 It is difficult to discern whether and how the arguments of Grosseteste’s De cessatione legalium were received at Paris. By “Grossetestean” arguments I mean to denote arguments of the Parisian theologians which employ variations of the divine attributes and created effects strategies, thereby producing similar theological problems for subsequent theologians, such as St. Thomas. 79 Alexander, Quaestiones disputatae ‘antequam esset frater,’ q. 15, disp. 2, mem. 4; Johannes Bissen, “De Motivo Incarnationis,” Antonianum 7 (1932): 334-36. Other important arguments on the ratio incarnationis in the thirteenth century which reject and/or revise the Grossetestean arguments are developed by Guerric of St.-Quentin, Albert the Great, and, most influentially, St. Bonaventure. A full treatment of St. Thomas’s contributions to the ratio incarnationis, which is beyond the scope of this article, would need to take into account this broader set of texts and the debates they reflect at Paris in the thirteenth century. 244 JUSTUS H. HUNTER deliberation concerning the Grossetestean deductions; he seeks to block the deductions to preserve freedom, while allowing certain features of the Grossetestean arguments to be reappropriated without the negative implications for freedom. This subtlety can be observed in both the early reflections of the Scriptum and the mature treatment of the Summa theologiae. The concern to preserve divine freedom is at the fore of Thomas’s reflections in distinction 1, question 1 of book III of the Scriptum. There, Thomas insists that a response to the question can be supplied only by appeal to divine revelation, since “the only one able to answer this question truly is the one who was born and poured out, because he willed it.”80 Rational arguments, like those of Grosseteste, can augment divine revelation by demonstrating the possibility (a. 1) and congruity (a. 2) of the Incarnation. In article 2, Thomas only supplies arguments for the congruity of the Incarnation for the sake of redemption from sin. Furthermore, he strikingly derives these arguments from the attributes of goodness, justice, and wisdom. The same divine attributes used by Grosseteste in De cessatione legalium III are deployed by Thomas for the opposite conclusion. A more refined, yet congrous strategy is employed in question 1, articles 1-3, of the Tertia pars. Here, Thomas recasts the Grossetestean arguments in the category of convenientia. Both the self-communication of the good and the unique unitive work of personal union to a human nature, composed of both soul and flesh, show the fittingness (convenientia) of the Incarnation in our world.81 Likewise, that God became incarnate for the sake of redemption is fitting, which is to say not strictly necessary.82 Both conclusions, then, are fitting. And so, when Thomas considers Grosseteste’s counterfactual—“If humanity had not sinned, would God have become incarnate?”— he dutifully blocks any deduction, Grossetestean or otherwise, 80 III Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 3: “hujus quaestionis veritatem solus ille scire potest qui natus et oblatus est, quia voluit.” 81 STh III, q. 1, a. 1. 82 STh III, q. 1, a. 2. GROSSETESTE ON THE RATIO INCARNATIONIS 245 for either response. But he retains the possibility of the Incarnation in worlds without the Fall: “even had sin not existed, God could have become incarnate.”83 Thomas is not simply expressing a hesitation. His assertion is not simply a concession to his teacher Albert, who favors the opposite response. It is intrinsic to the logic of his conclusion that the question must finally rest in the freedom of the divine will, revealed in Scripture. Thomas’s treatment, both in the Scriptum and in the Summa theologiae, evinces subtle deliberation upon the two problems with the Grossetestean deductions isolated above. The deductions from divine attributes must be blocked to preserve divine freedom, and God must remain free over x goods in every possible world.84 Our re-reading of De cessatione legalium III.1 has allowed us to isolate, with some precision, the Grossetestean problems reflected in Thomas’s early and late treatments of the ratio incarnationis. Moreover, that larger context suggests a deeper unity between Thomas’s treatments of the ratio incarnationis in the Scriptum and Summa theologiae than is sometimes observed.85 83 STh III, q. 1, a. 3: “Quamvis potentia Dei ad hoc non limitetur, potuisset enim, etiam peccato non existente, Deus incarnari.” 84 As much is implied by his assertion of the theological possibility of I-worlds (without the Fall and the Incarnation) in both texts. 85 See, for instance, John Capreolus, Defensiones III, d. 1, q. 1, a. 3, ad 1. The Thomist 81 (2017): 247-72 A PRESUMPTUOUS AGE? THE SIN OF PRESUMPTION IN THE SUMMA THEOLOGIAE AS A KEY TO UNDERSTANDING THE “AGE OF ENTITLEMENT” ANTHONY R. LUSVARDI, S.J. Boston College School of Theology and Ministry Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts Of forgiveness be not overconfident, adding sin upon sin. Say not: “Great is his mercy; my many sins he will forgive.” For mercy and anger alike are with him; upon the wicked alights his wrath. Delay not your conversion to the Lord, put it not off from day to day; For suddenly his wrath flames forth; at the time of vengeance, you will be destroyed. Rely not upon deceitful wealth, for it will be no help on the day of wrath. (Sir 5:5-10) I N CONVERSATIONS with those engaged in college pastoral ministry, a word I frequently hear spoken with frustration is “entitlement.” A recent study claims that we are, in fact, “living in the age of entitlement.”1 While the word is not found in any classical catalogue of vices, I suspect that what we call “entitlement” is the contemporary manifestation of an ancient vice—the sin of presumption. Saint Thomas Aquinas reckoned presumption a particularly serious sin—a sin against 1 Jean M. Twenge and W. Keith Campbell, The Narcissism Epidemic: Living in the Age of Entitlement (New York: Atria Paperbacks, 2013). Prior to Twenge and Campbell’s work, the most significant critique of American cultural narcissism comes from Christopher Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1978). Lasch covers some of the same ground as Twenge and Campbell, though his critique is more far-ranging and less focused on the theme of entitlement per se. 247 248 ANTHONY R. LUSVARDI, S.J. the Holy Spirit—and dedicated two questions of the Summa theologiae to its manifestations, but the vice is little discussed in contemporary preaching or scholarship.2 If, as I am suggesting, entitlement is a contemporary manifestation of presumption, this ancient vice deserves a fresh look. In the Summa, Aquinas approaches presumption from two such different perspectives—as a sin against magnanimity (STh II-II, q. 130) and against hope (STh II-II, q. 21)—that at times it is not clear whether he is speaking of the same phenomenon. For ease of reference I will call these two different manifestations of presumption “secular” and “theological” presumption respectively, but how precisely they relate to each other is not on the surface clear. How, for example, does an overestimation of oneself lead to an underestimation of God? We will see that Aquinas treats these two types of presumption as distinct, though related, sins. Understanding how secular presumption can—but does not always—lead to theological presumption will require appreciating the distorting effects of these sins on our relationships. In coming to understand what presumption means to Aquinas, I hope we will also begin to see why this vice is particularly prevalent in our own age. I. SECULAR PRESUMPTION While presumption first appears in the Summa as a sin against hope, Aquinas treats the sin again, somewhat more briefly, in his treatise on fortitude, of which the virtue of magnanimity is a part. Presumption is the first of four sins he lists that are opposed to magnanimity (along with ambition, 2 A recent essay by David Elliot calls for more attention to worldliness as a threat to hope and identifies presumption and despair as springing from such worldliness. See David Elliot, “The Christian as Homo Viator: A Resource in Aquinas for Overcoming ‘Worldly Sin and Sorrow’,” Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics 34, no. 2 (2014): 101-21. Presumption is also briefly treated, again as a threat to hope, in Josef Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2012); and Romanus Cessario, “The Theological Virtue of Hope,” in The Ethics of Aquinas, ed. Steven Pope (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 232-43. Presumption in its own right has garnered little scholarly attention. PRESUMPTION AND THE “AGE OF ENTITLEMENT” 249 vainglory, and pusillanimity). This “secular presumption” is a more general fault than “theological presumption,” so it makes sense to start our exploration with question 130 even if this involves moving backwards in the Summa. To understand presumption, we must first understand what Aquinas means by magnanimity. On the surface, magnanimity might seem a rather dangerous Christian virtue, for Aquinas describes it as the virtue of seeking great honors.3 To be sure, such honors for Aquinas are always tied to virtue—that which is most worthy of honor—so we could describe magnanimity as striving to be worthy of great honor through great virtue. 4 Aquinas is aware that such emphasis on honor seems to conflict with humility; he even allows that, in a sense, humility and magnanimity pull the subject in opposite directions.5 We must realize, however, that Aquinas is borrowing the virtue of magnanimity from Aristotle, and, as R. E. Houser has argued, for Aristotle magnanimity is opposed to humility.6 Mary M. Keys points out the significant ways in which Aquinas’s treatment of magnanimity represents a critique and modification of Aristotle’s account of the same virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics.7 Aristotle’s “magnanimous man,” she argues, is averse to being in any sense a debtor to others, seeing this as detracting from his self-sufficiency in virtue.8 Aristotle’s sense of honor bristles at dependency on others. Aquinas, by contrast, undercuts Aristotle’s individualistic focus by emphasizing the pursuit of common goods as essential to virtue; common goods by their very nature require the assistance of others. Moreover, Aquinas’s understanding of magnanimity is shaped by a strong sense of 3 STh II-II, q. 129, a. 1. STh II-II, q. 129, a. 4. 5 STh II-II, q. 129, a. 1, ad 4. 6 R. E. Houser, “The Virtue of Courage (IIa IIae, qq. 123-140),” in Pope, ed., The Ethics of Aquinas, 310. 7 Mary M. Keys, “Aquinas and the Challenge of Aristotelian Magnanimity,” History of Political Thought 24 (2003): 37-65. 8 Ibid., 43. Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.3.1123b-1125a (trans. Martin Ostwald ([Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1999]). 4 250 ANTHONY R. LUSVARDI, S.J. human beings’ mutual dependence on each other and on God.9 Aquinas’ treatment of such virtues as religion, piety, and gratitude makes clear that he regards acknowledging our dependence on others—especially those such as our parents and God to whom our debt can never be repaid—as essential to virtue.10 For Aquinas, the acknowledgment of such debts is a question of acknowledging reality; this truthful assessment of reality is the common feature holding magnanimity and humility together as complementary. 11 Both depend upon the accurate assessment of our own abilities, though magnanimity helps us to recognize our fullest potential while humility helps us to recognize our limitations and shifts our focus beyond ourselves to God, the source of our gifts.12 Houser refers to the recognition of our great abilities as divine gifts as the move by which Aquinas “baptizes” Aristotelian magnanimity.13 Furthermore, as already alluded to, although honor provides the matter for magnanimity, great deeds are the virtue’s ends.14 When honor itself becomes the end—one’s reason for striving—we fall into ambition, a sin, like presumption, opposed to magnanimity by way of excess.15 Aquinas’s notion of ambition is more expansive than excess desire for honor, however, for he argues that ambition includes striving to accomplish great deeds that are either not aimed at the good of others or are done without reference to God. Thus, as his account of magnanimity develops, the importance he ascribes to honor is relativized, subordinated to the magnanimous individual’s relationships with God and others. Before turning directly to presumption, it will be helpful also to have in mind some understanding of pusillanimity, another sin opposed to magnanimity, though opposed by way of defect rather than excess. Appreciating what is sinful in pusillanimity 9 Keys, “Aquinas and the Challenge of Aristotelian Magnanimity,” 49. STh II-II, qq. 80, 101, and 106. 11 Keys, “Aquinas and the Challenge of Aristotelian Magnanimity,” 53. 12 STh II-II, q. 129, a. 3, ad 4. 13 Houser, “The Virtue of Courage,” 311. See STh II-II, q. 131, a. 1. 14 STh II-II, q. 129, a. 8. 15 STh II-II, q. 131, a. 1. 10 PRESUMPTION AND THE “AGE OF ENTITLEMENT” 251 helps to balance our understanding of magnanimity, allowing us to see why Aquinas went to the trouble of “salvaging” the somewhat problematic Aristotelian virtue rather than simply dropping it from the Summa. Pusillanimity amounts to squandering one’s gifts and potential. Aquinas illustrates the vice with the biblical parable of the servant who buries the money entrusted to him by his master rather than invest it, earning the master’s condemnation (Matt 25:14-30; Luke 19:11-27). He goes so far as to declare that pusillanimity is a more serious sin than presumption, for it represents selfsatisfaction of a different sort, a point to which we will return when comparing theological and secular presumption.16 To understand why he thinks pusillanimity is such a grave sin, we should recall the emphasis he places on happiness as the actualization of our potential.17 Perfection, for Aquinas, consists in actualizing a thing’s full potential, so pusillanimity represents the choice of imperfection over perfection. It amounts to the refusal to live fully. That people should desire to attain great virtue is fully consistent with Aquinas’s thought. The fact that he cites a gospel parable to explain a sin opposed to magnanimity already implies a connection between magnanimity and the theological virtue of hope, which, as we shall see, deals explicitly with eternal life. Both magnanimous and hopeful people strain upward, a movement undercut by pusillanimity. The pusillanimous reach for less than life’s highest good, stopping short of perfection, ultimately settling for less than God. Eventually I will argue that theological presumption also involves a kind of pusillanimity, but here it should be noted that when Aquinas treats secular presumption he speaks in terms of excess. Unlike ambition and vainglory—which cause us to seek honor and glory as ends in themselves—secular presumption is oriented toward real accomplishments. The ambitious and vainglorious would be happy even with undeserved honor and glory, but the presumptuous person attempts genuine acts of 16 17 STh II-II, q. 133, a. 2, ad 4. STh I-II, q. 3, a. 2. 252 ANTHONY R. LUSVARDI, S.J. virtue. The problem is that presumptuous individuals strive for accomplishments that exceed their actual powers. Even this might not be a problem for Aquinas if such individuals turned to God for assistance; union with God, after all, exceeds our natural capabilities, yet striving for such a spiritual goal is life’s highest good. The presumptuous, however, neglect God’s assistance when striving for virtue, as if they themselves possessed God’s power.18 Secular presumption’s fault lies in the erroneous overestimation of one’s own abilities. Though the question of eternal life is always in the background of Aquinas’s ethical thought, when treating secular presumption in question 130 of the Secunda secundae he has in mind the overestimation of our abilities in all spheres of life. Presumption can lead to the vices of fearlessness and excess daring, whereby we do not fear those things it is reasonable to fear or we take aggressive risks when it is unreasonable to do so. 19 The presumptuous individual can go wrong in many ways.20 He could, for example, think he has some quality that in reality he lacks—imagining himself fluent in French only to find himself mute upon stepping off the plane in Paris. Or she could assume that she possesses moral goodness because of some unrelated quality; so the celebrity thinks herself wise just because she is famous. Aquinas suggests that an overreliance on other people’s opinions fuels this latter manifestation of presumption. The celebrity whose fame might rest on some genuine talent—acting, say—is asked by the entertainment media for her opinion on the great moral quandaries of the day; even if she has never given such matters much previous thought, she comes to regard her opinion as of great importance simply because she is being asked. Human opinion, Aquinas is acutely aware, is often based on irrational, and sometimes rather superficial, factors. At times, such factors can make the virtues of the presumptuous appear to surpass those of the magnanimous. Aquinas rather wryly observes, however, that while 18 STh II-II, q. 130, a. 1, ad 2 and 3. STh II-II, q. 126, a. 1; and q. 127, a. 2, ad 1. 20 STh II-II, q. 130, a. 2, ad 3. 19 PRESUMPTION AND THE “AGE OF ENTITLEMENT” 253 presumptuous individuals always exceed their own abilities, they suffer no excess of actual accomplishments.21 The dynamics of presumption described above seem to me to embody the trend of entitlement so prevalent and troubling today. Psychologists Jean M. Twenge and W. Keith Campbell speak of this trend as an expression of narcissism. They describe narcissism as the “disease of excessive self-admiration” and, in an observation reminiscent of Aquinas, note that while narcissists tend to possess average abilities, they see themselves as fundamentally superior to others.22 Twenge and Campbell cite studies to show that, contrary to conventional cultural wisdom, high self-esteem does not correspond to increased success academically or professionally, and sometimes actually decreases performance. 23 Their data suggest that in our contemporary celebration of self-esteem we often leave out the element Aquinas sees as the crucial common denominator preventing magnanimity from shriveling into pusillanimity or spilling over into presumption: the truthful assessment of our own abilities. They also suggest the reason why, as Aquinas notes, presumptuous individuals at times seem to surpass magnanimous people: those concerned with appearances naturally tend to surpass others in visibility, creating the illusion of success. 24 However, Twenge and Campbell strongly defend the notion that over the long term narcissism hinders rather than boosts actual accomplishment.25 21 STh II-II, q. 130, a. 2. Twenge and Campbell, Narcissism Epidemic, 18-19. They distinguish Narcissistic Personality Disorder (NPD), an extreme and clinically diagnosable version of narcissism, from more widespread narcissistic traits present in our culture at large. While NPD is on the rise—almost one in ten Americans in their twenties has experienced its symptoms— they argue that narcissism as both an individual and a cultural trait has even more dramatically risen (ibid., 2-3, 22-23). 23 Ibid., 48-51. Twenge and Campbell, to be sure, are not advocating feeling lousy about oneself in their critique of contemporary attitudes surrounding self-esteem. Instead, quite consistently with Thomistic thought, they seem to be critical of seeing feeling good about oneself as an end in itself. They would likely be quite comfortable with the balance Aquinas strikes between magnanimity and humility. 24 Ibid., 53-54. Cf. STh II-II, q. 130, a. 2, ad 3. 25 Twenge and Campbell, Narcissism Epidemic, 42-47. 22 254 ANTHONY R. LUSVARDI, S.J. Twenge and Campbell identify several root causes of the growth in cultural narcissism they claim to trace over the past four decades: parenting techniques, the growth in the celebrity media culture, technological changes that encourage us to put all our life on display, and economic factors—such as easy credit—that encourage overindulgence.26 Their chapters dealing with each of these areas provide compelling arguments (and amusing examples), but Aquinas’s analysis of presumption pushes us to look more deeply still into the spiritual dynamics behind the growth in presumption.27 Before addressing theological presumption, however, it is worth returning to Aquinas’s observation that the possession of certain types of goods—wealth or status—can lead us to assume that our virtues are greater than they are. While Twenge and Campbell provide a number of cringe-inducing anecdotes involving celebrities from Paris Hilton to Barry Bonds, I would contend that this type of presumption is a temptation for anyone growing up in relatively privileged groups—thus the sense of entitlement observed by campus ministers among their mostly middleclass and upper-middle class students. 28 Aquinas would point to the temptation to imagine that we deserve the privileges into which we are born. This sense of entitlement tends to obscure the ways in which one’s privileges depend upon the work and sacrifices of other people—one’s parents, grandparents, other members of society—and God’ grace. While Aquinas’s discussion is framed in terms of the individual “presumptuous man,” his overall emphasis on the common good and his analysis of the effect of popular opinion on the 26 Ibid., 73-140. David Elliot (“The Christian as Homo Viator,” 108) suggests that the figure of the “self-made man” prominent in some versions of the American mythology may predispose us—perhaps Americans in particular—to secular presumption. I will give Elliot’s analysis of worldliness as feeding presumption greater attention when turning to presumption as a sin against hope. In Lasch’s critique, the figure of the “self-made man,” which once embodied the austere ideals of the Protestant work ethic, has degenerated into therapeutic self-absorption (Culture of Narcissism, 52-53, 59-60). 28 Twenge and Campbell, Narcissism Epidemic, see esp. 90-93. 27 PRESUMPTION AND THE “AGE OF ENTITLEMENT” 255 dynamics of presumption hint at a social dimension of the sin.29 In other words, it seems consistent with Aquinas’s thought to argue that whole cultures can become prone to presumption. For example, those from economically more advanced nations might be tempted to imagine that their countries are also more “civilized”—morally advanced—than those of the Third World, conflating wealth with virtue. We can also be tempted into a “myth of progress” that equates technological advancement with moral improvement; we see evidence of such modern presumptuousness in the way in which the adjective “medieval” is frequently used as synonymous with barbarism, though the twentieth century produced Verdun and Auschwitz. While it is impossible in this article to explore all of the ways in which presumption distorts our relationships as individuals and societies, Aquinas’s analysis should at least make us aware of the ways in which many of the benefits that characterize modern Western cultures—material prosperity and technological advancement in particular—also make us vulnerable to presumptuous attitudes. II. THEOLOGICAL PRESUMPTION Perhaps the most distinctive contribution offered by Aquinas’s analysis of the phenomenon we are discussing— whether we call it entitlement or presumption—is the emphasis he places on its relationship with our attitudes toward eternal life. A Christian ethics aiming at anything less than eternal life, after all, would make little sense to him. Thus, even when he is treating secular presumption, he is concerned with the sin’s spiritual repercussions, as is evident from the fact that he calls even secular presumption a sin.30 In fact, one could easily make 29 Aquinas is clear that the happiness of the individual cannot be understood apart from his relationship to “universal happiness” because the individual always exists as part of a larger whole (STh II-II, q. 90, a. 2; see also I-II, q. 3, a. 2, ad 2). 30 The location of secular presumption within the Summa also hints at its relevance to the journey toward heaven, for Aquinas places magnanimity and its corresponding vices within his treatise on fortitude. Fortitude, like magnanimity, undergoes significant modification when Aquinas adopts the virtue from Aristotle. Aristotle considers the 256 ANTHONY R. LUSVARDI, S.J. the argument that Aquinas is primarily interested in presumption as it pertains to eternal life, for the sin first arises in the Summa in the context of hope in eternal life, and there it receives its lengthiest treatment. Theological presumption is a sin against hope, one of the theological virtues. Aquinas distinguishes the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity, which are infused in the soul directly from God, from the natural virtues acquired by habit. 31 Such natural virtues can be acquired by anyone, Christian or nonChristian, while the theological virtues are a gift of God inseparable from Christian revelation.32 In fact, faith—belief in God and his self-revelation in Christ—is the necessary first step on one’s journey to eternal life.33 Hope, as we shall see, likewise has as its object eternal life. 34 While Aquinas allows that we often hope and pray for goods other than eternal life per se, including temporal goods, he says that such secondary goods ought to be hoped for insofar as they pertain to eternal happiness.35 Finally, charity is the supernatural union with God as our last end. 36 Charity perfects all the other virtues, and without charity even faith and hope would be lifeless.37 Mortal sin means the loss of charity and, therefore, eternal life, though it does not necessarily entail the loss of the other virtues.38 paradigmatic act of fortitude to be death in battle (Nic Ethic. 3.6.1115a.25-30). Aquinas, however, expands the notion of “battle” to include all forms of spiritual combat (STh II-II, q. 123, a. 5; q. 124, a. 2). In fact, he replaces death in battle with martyrdom as the paradigmatic act of fortitude (II-II, q. 123; cf. q. 124, a. 2). He even claims the need for supernatural fortitude for perseverance to eternal life, an end that exceeds our natural human capacities (II-II, q. 139, a. 1). I note all of this merely to show that Aquinas’s concern with eternal life shines through his treatment of the cardinal virtues. 31 STh I-II, q. 63, a. 2. 32 STh I-II, q. 65, a. 2. 33 STh II-II, q. 2, a. 7; q. 4, a. 1. 34 STh II-II, q. 17, a. 2. 35 Ibid., ad 2. 36 STh II-II, q. 23, aa. 1 and 7. 37 STh II-II, q. 4, a. 3; II-II, q. 17, a. 8. 38 STh I-II, q. 71, a. 4. PRESUMPTION AND THE “AGE OF ENTITLEMENT” 257 What is most important to understand here is the way that Aquinas sees human life as having basically two possible orientations: the first toward earthly happiness and the second toward eternal, perfect happiness. 39 Pagans, for example, can perform virtuous acts and possess habits of prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance; in themselves, however, these virtues are insufficient for the higher good of eternal union with God.40 They might help to remove potential obstacles to eternal life, but without the addition of the supernatural gift of charity they remain essentially empty containers for true virtue. The infusion of the theological virtues changes the very trajectory of one’s life; all of one’s actions come to aim at an end beyond this life.41 All mortal sin, presumption included, can be thought of as lowering the trajectory of our actions away from the end of eternal life with God. Theological presumption, Aquinas believes, does so by undermining hope. The scholarly attention presumption has thus far received has come mostly in the context of the exploration of the virtue of hope. Josef Pieper and Romanus Cessario, O.P., both emphasize that hope requires an affective movement toward a future good; to be an object of hope such a good must be (1) not yet in our possession and (2) difficult to attain but (3) nonetheless attainable. 42 Aquinas repeatedly uses the word “arduous” to describe the object of hope, implying a sense of sustained struggle to attain hope’s end. As we have already seen, for Aquinas, the good at which hope aims is ultimately eternal life. Consequently, as Pieper points out, hope for Aquinas is a resolutely supernatural virtue that makes no sense apart from its reference to Christ. 43 As Cessario elaborates, because of the good at which it aims, hope 39 STh I-II, q. 5, a. 5. STh II-II, q. 23, a. 7. 41 The supernatural significance one’s actions come to attain in virtue of the infusion of charity is described by Aquinas as “merit” (STh I-II, q. 114). Pieper succinctly points out that Aquinas’s understanding of merit does not entail Pelagianism but presupposes the existence of something that cannot be merited (Faith, Hope, Love, 93-94). 42 Cessario, “Theological Virtue of Hope,” 232-33; Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love, 125. 43 Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love, 105-6. 40 258 ANTHONY R. LUSVARDI, S.J. makes us realize that we must rely on God; hope’s virtuousness consists precisely in its reliance on divine help.44 Aquinas distinguishes hope from faith in that while faith allows us to know the truth God has revealed to us—which includes the good of eternal life—hope moves us to attain that good.45 As Cessario and Pieper point out, both faith and hope pertain to the realization of a future good; therefore, faith and hope do not exist in heaven—though charity does—because the blessed already enjoy the happiness to which faith and hope look forward. 46 This life, however, is characterized by our journey toward the perfected charity of heaven.47 Cessario and Pieper rightly make much of the movement that is characteristic of such a journey. Aquinas repeatedly uses the word “wayfarer” to describe our state in this world. Such movement is not, obviously, geographical, but consists in our constant transformation as we grow in union with God. Such growth is inseparable from charity, for Aquinas says that acts of charity increase our very capacity for charity.48 It is worth pausing to appreciate the implications of his vision, the grandeur of his conception of heaven, for he is arguing that salvation means we will not just reach our fullest potential, but that we will exceed it. Whereas the distinguishing characteristic of sins against faith is the denial of the truth toward which we aim, the distinguishing characteristic of sins against hope is in some way to give up on the journey itself, to call a halt to our transformation. This giving up is most apparent in the first sin against hope Aquinas addresses in the Summa: despair. Despair also involves false beliefs, but what is most characteristic of despair is the deficient movement of the appetitive power corresponding to those false beliefs.49 The false intellect that is a part of despair does not necessarily constitute heresy or 44 Cessario, “Theological Virtue of Hope,” 234-35. STh II-II, q. 17, a. 6. 46 STh II-II, q. 18, a. 2; q. 24, a. 8. 47 STh II-II, q. 24, a. 4. 48 STh II-II, q. 24, a. 6. 49 STh II-II, q. 20, a. 1. 45 PRESUMPTION AND THE “AGE OF ENTITLEMENT” 259 unbelief; the despairing person, it is true, believes that God refuses to pardon his sins but he need not believe that God refuses to pardon sins in general. 50 Aquinas sees the root of despair not in a false doctrine, but in the preference of one’s own guilt to God’s mercy. 51 Such a perverse choice can arise from many things, from an overindulgence in sensual pleasures leading to sloth to an aberrant sense of pride.52 The false choice the despairing make can be exacerbated if they choose to fill the void created by the absence of hope with worldly goods. 53 Whatever its origin, despair is a particularly dangerous sin because it precludes the possibility of sin’s remedy; the absence of hope negates the will’s ability to move one away from evil and toward good. That despair involves a dearth of hope should be apparent enough, but when it comes to the relationship between presumption and hope, Aquinas’s picture becomes more complicated. Following Aristotle, Aquinas typically treats vices as being opposed to their corresponding virtue either by excess or deficiency. As we have already seen, ambition, presumption, and vainglory are opposed to magnanimity by excess, and pusillanimity is opposed by deficiency. Despair is opposed to hope by deficiency, and Aquinas treats presumption as its corresponding opposite. But the correspondence is asymmetrical because he has already argued that it is impossible for hope—or any of the theological virtues—to be excessive. 54 50 STh II-II, q. 20, a. 2. Ibid., ad 2. 52 STh II-II, q. 20, a. 4; q. 20, a. 2, ad 2. James Thomson’s poem “Once in a Saintly Passion” captures the pride that leads to despair: Once in a saintly passion I cried with desperate grief, “O Lord, my heart is black with guile, Of sinners I am chief.” Then stooped my guardian angel And whispered from behind, “Vanity, my little man, You’re nothing of the kind.” 53 STh II-II, q. 20, a. 1, ad 1. 54 STh II-II, q. 17, a. 5, ad 2. 51 260 ANTHONY R. LUSVARDI, S.J. Aquinas himself raises this issue in an objection.55 Significantly, he has preemptively closed off one possible reply to this objection in question 21, article 1 of the Secunda secundae by insisting that the presumptuous do indeed trust in God. Each of the three initial objections in this article raises the argument that presumption must go wrong by trusting in something other than God, namely, human power. In fact, having already read question 130, we know that Aquinas speaks of secular presumption in precisely these terms, as an inordinate overconfidence in our own power to the detriment of reliance on God. In the body of his reply to these objections, Aquinas insists he is dealing with two varieties of presumption. Presumption against magnanimity leads us to trust in human power when we should trust in God, but presumption against hope leads us to trust in God—though in the wrong way. This presumption is a more serious offence since it constitutes a sin against the Holy Spirit.56 Here we might note that the distinction between secular and theological presumption is not reducible to a difference in their objects—that is, that secular presumption aims at secular goods but theological presumption aims at religious goods. It is possible to overestimate one’s ability to achieve some religious good, for example by overestimating one’s stamina before undertaking a strenuous pilgrimage. Aquinas offers Peter’s premature boast that he is willing to suffer with Christ as an example of secular, not theological, presumption; Peter’s object is religious, but his error comes from misunderstanding himself, not God.57 Sorting out the relationship between the two varieties of presumption is a task to which we will shortly turn, but first we need to be clear about how we can misuse trust in God. We have seen that it is impossible to hope in God too much or too strongly. Instead, Aquinas speaks of inordinate or unbecoming hope. 58 Presumptuous hope is inordinate on our part, but its 55 STh II-II, q. 21, a. 2, obj. 2. STh II-II, q. 21, a. 1, ad 1. 57 STh II-II, q. 130, a. 2, ad 3. 58 STh II-II, q. 21, a. 2, ad 1. 56 PRESUMPTION AND THE “AGE OF ENTITLEMENT” 261 unbecomingness refers to the picture of God it presupposes. What Aquinas is driving at is that theological presumption leads to trust in a false understanding of God. In the sed contra of the first article on theological presumption, instead of relying on the lapidary phrase of a recognized authority as he normally does, Aquinas advances an argument of his own: the presumptuous ignore God’s justice. Theological presumption comes close to heresy in that it seems to involve the denial—or at least diminishment—of a truth about God, namely, that he is just.59 The reason Aquinas reckons presumption a sin against hope rather than against faith, however, is that this false belief shapes the movement of the appetites. 60 As with despair, which also involves false beliefs, what distinguishes presumption from merely intellectual error is its effect on one’s movement toward eternal life. The asymmetries in Aquinas’s treatment of despair and presumption are noteworthy. The despairing, he says, may still acknowledge that God is merciful in the abstract, though they doubt that his mercy applies in their own particular case. When dealing with presumption, Aquinas focuses immediately on the error the presumptuous make in their understanding of God. This focus seems motivated by the desire to highlight the distinction between secular and theological presumption, underscoring the greater sinfulness of the latter.61 Secular presumption, Aquinas implies, is not always mortally sinful.62 We might recall the example of our ersatz francophone, whose presumption makes him look ridiculous when ordering in a French restaurant but does not turn him away from God. Exaggerating our own powers, Aquinas argues, is not as grave an offense as detracting from God’s majesty, which one effectively does by “despising” his justice. Aquinas does contend that the failure to acknowledge God’s mercy represents an even greater detraction 59 STh II-II, q. 11. STh II-II, q. 21, a. 2; cf. q. 14, a. 2, ad 1. 61 STh II-II, q. 21, a. 1, ad 1. 62 STh II-II, q. 130, a. 2, ad 1. 60 262 ANTHONY R. LUSVARDI, S.J. from God—making despair a graver sin than presumption—but in either case we end up with a diminished image of the Deity.63 To summarize thus far, because Aquinas treats theological presumption as a sin directly against God, he does not speak of the possibility of its compatibility with an abstract belief in God’s justice as, when treating despair, he allows that the sin is compatible with belief in a generally merciful God. On the other hand, because secular presumption is focused on an exaggerated sense of one’s own powers, it does seem compatible with abstract orthodoxy. However, it is easy to see how secular presumption lends itself to theological presumption on a practical level. This is equally the case when we speak of the phenomenon as a social sin. If, as I have suggested, presumption can come to characterize whole cultures and groups, one can see how the collective sense that we are above God’s judgment can bleed into at least a practical denial of that judgment altogether. If we are all entitled to God’s mercy, divine justice fades away even conceptually. Furthermore, by categorizing presumption as a sin against hope rather than faith, Aquinas emphasizes the practical effects of our beliefs on the appetites and their movements. The precise beliefs of the presumptuous could be formulated in various ways, focusing more on either individuals or the collective, but the essential characteristic of such beliefs is that they cause us to give up striving for conversion. Aquinas himself describes the misshapen appetites of the presumptuous in slightly different ways, as seeking heavenly glory without merit or pardon without repentance.64 Whichever emphasis we use, perseverance in sin without the intention of repenting and receiving pardon is for Aquinas the paradigmatic act of presumption. In making this point, he strikes a fairly sympathetic note toward sinners: even those who sin with the intention of eventually giving up their sin and repenting at some future time do not commit presumption. 65 The presumptuous 63 STh II-II, q. 21, a. 2. STh I-II, q. 64, a. 4, ad 3; II-II, q. 14, a. 2. 65 STh II-II, q. 21, a. 2, ad 3. 64 PRESUMPTION AND THE “AGE OF ENTITLEMENT” 263 are only those who intend never to give up sinning and still expect to be saved. Leaving the door open even a crack to the possibility of conversion is enough to save one from presumption. This clement note should not surprise us, for we have already seen that Aquinas is aware of the difficulty of living a life without sin, as is evident from his repeated description of the moral life as arduous. We have seen how commentators on Aquinas’s view of hope emphasize his description of our existence in this world as that of a wayfarer, indicating the importance he places on our life as a process of movement and growth in rightness toward God. The process of sanctification itself is important because sanctification implies growth; presumption is deadly because it short-circuits this process. One cannot be converted from one’s sins if one denies that they present obstacles to one’s salvation. To illustrate the point, we might think of the parable of the Pharisee and the tax collector (Luke 18:9-14). In Aquinas’s terms, only the tax collector seems interested in actualizing his potential—moving from his imperfect state to something better—because the Pharisee is satisfied with himself precisely as he is. In such self-satisfaction we can see the resemblance of theological presumption to pusillanimity, the moral stinginess that we saw earlier opposes magnanimity by deficiency.66 The pusillanimous refuse to seek great things; they settle for less than their potential. In a sense, theological presumption also involves settling: for a deficient understanding of eternal life, for virtue’s reward without virtue, for forgiveness without a new beginning, for mercy without one’s broken relationships being righted, for a heaven in which we are not perfected. Presumption distorts charity because the union with God the presumptuous seek can only be one in which God turns out to be just like us, because we have refused to budge in order to become more like him. The God of the presumptuous, it turns out, is really not all that great. 66 STh II-II, q. 133. 264 ANTHONY R. LUSVARDI, S.J. III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SECULAR AND THEOLOGICAL PRESUMPTION By now it should be clear how presumption blocks our path to eternal life, but a few questions remain to be cleared up, chief among them the exact relationship between theological and secular presumption. I have spoken of the sense in which theological presumption resembles pusillanimity in that both involve hoping for too little, but Aquinas argues that secular presumption involves attempting too much. Are we dealing with two distinct phenomena that share the same name? It does seem possible—remembering the overconfident francophone—to be guilty of secular presumption without that fault entailing theological presumption. The last article of Aquinas’s question on theological presumption asks whether vainglory leads to presumption. As we would expect, Aquinas distinguishes the two types of presumption along the lines we have been sketching.67 Vainglory— the inordinate desire for glory in the eyes of others—leads to a presumption that attempts novelties beyond our power; this phenomenon we have been calling secular presumption. Aquinas says that the second type of presumption, which we recognize as theological, relies inordinately on God’s mercy and arises not from vainglory but directly from pride. He adds by way of explanation that by pride he means thinking oneself above the possibility of divine punishment. The difference seems to be one of motive; the vainglorious desire an earthly good—human glory—excessively, but pride is a spiritual sin.68 Aquinas speaks of pride as coveting our own excellence inordinately. In itself, desiring excellence might not seem to be a problem; we should, after all, desire the highest human good of union with God. When Aquinas deals with pride as the first man’s sin, however, we see that the proud desire something more than human excellence; Aquinas speaks of them as desiring a false equality with God and, in phrasing that calls to 67 68 STh II-II, q. 21, a. 4. STh II-II, q. 163, a. 1; q. 162, a. 8, ad 2. PRESUMPTION AND THE “AGE OF ENTITLEMENT” 265 mind secular presumption, as desiring to obtain happiness by their own natural power.69 The proud desire excellence in a way that refuses to be subject to God. 70 Attention to the effects our desires have on our relationships helps us to see Aquinas’s underlying concerns. Pride is inordinate because it causes us to desire excellence in a way that distorts our relationships, most especially our relationship with God. Aquinas’s entire ethical framework, we must remember, is relational.71 How we think of ourselves necessarily has a bearing on how we relate to others; thus, even secular presumption, which begins with an overestimation of ourselves, quickly distorts our relationships. As we saw earlier, Aquinas’s sense of human interdependence causes him to modify Aristotle’s understanding of magnanimity. His belief in creation means that from the first moment of our existence we are in a relationship of dependence on God. Simple justice would require that this relationship be characterized by our gratitude for the unearned blessing of existence.72 Pride involves a distortion in our way of relating to God at this most fundamental level. This distortion seems to be what distinguishes pride from vainglory and secular presumption. It explains why pride is at the root of all mortally sinful presumption. Let us then briefly attempt to summarize the relevant distinctions in the relationship between theological and secular presumption. As we have seen, secular presumption can come from a source other than pride, namely, vainglory. Vainglory is not in itself necessarily a mortal sin, though pride is.73 Because theological presumption is rooted in mortally sinful pride, we 69 STh II-II, q. 162, a. 2. STh II-II, q. 161, a. 5. Reflecting on Aquinas’s notion of obedience also helps to reveal the way in which pride and, therefore, presumption undermine charity; for obedience has to do with moving our will in order for it to achieve union with the will of the one we love. Obedience for Aquinas proceeds from charity, and without obedience true charity is not possible (II-II, q. 104, aa. 3 and 4). 71 The moral virtues, he claims, could also be thought of as the social virtues because they involve our relationships with others (STh I-II, q. 61, a. 5). And the theological virtues, of course, bear directly on our relationship with God. 72 STh II-II, q. 122, a. 4. 73 STh II-II, q. 132, a. 3; q. 162, a. 5. 70 266 ANTHONY R. LUSVARDI, S.J. can understand the relationship of secular presumption to theological presumption as akin to that between venial and mortal sin. Secular presumption can remain superficial and passing. Because Aquinas speaks of pride as opposing magnanimity, though not as directly as it opposes humility, he leaves open the possibility that secular presumption can take on a mortally sinful form.74 In other words, it is possible that one’s inflated sense of oneself will cause one to harm others gravely, though this is not necessarily the case. It is also possible that one’s inflated understanding of oneself will lead one to take heaven for granted, imagining oneself so loveable that one starts to believe that God is simply unable to go on without one’s presence. At this point one has created a codependent deity and fallen into theological presumption. But one could fall into such an error directly from pride, without passing through secular presumption or caring about earthly glory, just as mortal sin is not necessarily, but possibly, preceded by venial sin. Because the attitudes and dispositions involved in secular and theological presumption are similar, we would expect there to be quite a bit of overlap between the two sins in practice. Still, Aquinas makes so many distinctions between them that we must hold that they are not identical; nor can we say, as one might expect upon initially being presented with the problem, that they are precisely the same phenomenon simply viewed from different angles. IV. PRESUMPTION AND ENTITLEMENT Twenge and Campbell speak of entitlement as the belief that we deserve special treatment, that we are owed privileges and success because of who we are. 75 If we apply this concept to God and the afterlife, we arrive at Aquinas’s theological presumption. Does such theological presumption characterize our own “age of entitlement”? Twenge and Campbell do not directly address this question, but Pieper suggests that the 74 75 STh II-II, q. 162, a. 1, ad 3. Twenge and Campbell, Narcissism Epidemic, 230-31. PRESUMPTION AND THE “AGE OF ENTITLEMENT” 267 answer is yes. He laments that the last things—death, judgment, heaven, and hell—are not taken seriously today.76 The lack of attention paid to life after death in his view suggests the attitude that such matters can be taken for granted. Pieper identifies two types of classic presumption at work today. The first he calls bourgeois moralism, which conflates salvation with being a socially acceptable citizen, discounting the need for doctrine or sacraments. The second he identifies with the certainty some Reformation traditions claim to possess as a consequence of having accepted Christ as their personal savior.77 David Elliot agrees with Pieper that the afterlife receives inadequate attention today, and he identifies Christian reluctance to talk about the afterlife with the defensiveness many Christians feel in the wake of criticism from Marx, Nietzsche, and others that belief in the life to come is a distraction from the concerns of this world. 78 He rightly rejects this criticism, pointing out that hope in eternal life, properly understood, should free us to act with even greater virtue in this life. He claims that the lack of attention given to the afterlife—and therefore a deficit of hope—leads to worldly despair.79 In other words, if we have given up hope in the life to come, our focus can only be on worldly goods. Such a shift replaces hope with optimism.80 Elliot argues that this worldly shift leads to negative consequences in this life as we become more concerned with 76 Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love, 134. Though Pieper’s essay was written nearly four decades ago, popular attitudes toward the last things do not seem to have grown noticeably more judicious in the intervening years. Lasch also identifies “the inability ‘to take an interest in anything after one’s own death’” with the spread of cultural narcissism (Lasch, Culture of Narcissism, 188). 77 Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love, 126-27. 78 Elliot, “The Christian as Homo Viator,” 101-2. 79 Ibid., 109-10. 80 The merely psychological nature of optimism is contrasted with the divine gift of hope by Pope Francis in one of the earliest and most influential interviews of his papacy: Antonio Spadaro, “A Big Heart Open to God,” America 209 no. 8 (2013): 32. Richard Lennan extensively contrasts a worldly optimism, the borders of which are “coterminous with our capacity to think positively,” with the supernatural gift of hope capable of leading to conversion (Richard Lennan, “The Church as a Sacrament of Hope,” Theological Studies 72 [2011]: 251). 268 ANTHONY R. LUSVARDI, S.J. those goods Aquinas identifies with ambition, vainglory, and avarice. 81 We see evidence of such a shift in The Narcissism Epidemic. In its effects, Elliot’s “optimistic despair” is similar to theological presumption, for in both cases we can safely ignore the judgment promised in Matthew 25. The difference is that theological presumption allows us still to maintain a belief in heaven, though our understanding of heaven may be rather superficial.82 If we know what to look for, we will find ample evidence of contemporary theological presumption. In their widely discussed study of the religious lives of American adolescents, sociologists Christian Smith and Melinda Lundquist Denton critique the belief system they call “Moralistic Therapeutic Deism.”83 While not an official creed, Moralistic Therapeutic Deism describes the de facto beliefs of the majority of American young people regardless of formal religious affiliation.84 The belief system Smith and Denton describe 81 Elliot, “The Christian as Homo Viator,” 110-12. That Elliot has focused on optimistic despair and I have focused on theological presumption may have something to do with our respective locations, the United Kingdom and United States. My perception is that in Europe explicit atheism and agnosticism are more common—thus the denial of the afterlife altogether—while in the United States religious belief is more explicit, though often superficial. This longstanding critique of American religion finds classic expression in Will Herberg, Protestant—Catholic—Jew (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983). 83 Christian Smith with Melinda Lundquist Denton, Soul Searching: The Religious and Spiritual Lives of American Teenagers (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 162-63. Smith and Denton’s characterization of this de facto contemporary creed is, in my view, particularly trenchant, but their observations are hardly unique. Lasch repeatedly critiques the effects of a prevailing therapeutic outlook on American ethical and religious attitudes. Moralistic Therapeutic Deism also bears a resemblance to “Sheilaism,” described in Robert N. Bellah, Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2008), 221. “Sheilaism” is the term invented by nurse Sheila Larson to describe her own highly individual belief system; as she puts it, “It’s Sheilaism. Just my own little voice. . . . It’s just try to love yourself and be gentle with yourself.” Bellah notes a general shift toward “therapeutic privatization” at work in American religious attitudes, of which Sheilaism is a rather striking example (ibid., 224). In such radically individualized religion, “God is simply the self magnified” (ibid., 235). 84 Though their study focuses on teenagers, Smith and Denton argue that Moralistic Therapeutic Deism reflects the beliefs of large numbers of American adults as well (Soul Searching, 166). 82 PRESUMPTION AND THE “AGE OF ENTITLEMENT” 269 is a far cry from anything resembling orthodox Christianity.85 While Aquinas speaks of the goal of human existence in terms of union with God, Moralistic Therapeutic Deists tend to view the goal of life as feeling good about oneself and prefer a distant God who becomes involved in one’s life only when needed to resolve problems. 86 Smith and Denton describe the popular vision of God that emerges from their study as a cross between Divine Butler and Cosmic Therapist.87 In terms of the soteriological question directly at issue in our discussion, heaven seems to be a not terribly arduous goal attained by “good people” when they die.88 Religious beliefs and practices have little to do with one’s destination in the afterlife, and God’s moral demands are fairly low. 89 Smith and Denton’s conclusions suggest that Pieper’s bourgeois moralistic presumption is common today, perhaps even the norm. This conclusion should not surprise us. If Twenge and Campbell’s argument is correct and secular presumption characterizes our age, and if the attitudes underlying secular and theological presumption are similar, we would expect to see entitled attitudes spill over into religious beliefs. In light of all of the above analysis, how do we combat presumption? Twenge and Campbell provide suggestions to fight each of the root causes they identify as feeding narcissism, from adjusting the messages parents send their children—emphasizing relationships instead of uniqueness by, for example, saying, “I love you” instead of “You are special”—to tightening rules for mortgage lending.90 Pieper recommends recovering a sense of “fear of the Lord,” a virtue he argues must not be reduced to mere respect—“wonder and awe,” as it is often phrased today—but instead must put our genuine fears and hopes in the right order.91 Otherwise, he says, we will end up 85 Ibid., 170-171. Ibid., 163. For Aquinas’s radically different vision, see STh II-II, q. 23, a. 1. 87 Smith and Denton, Soul Searching, 165. 88 Ibid. 89 In Lasch’s analysis, therapeutic religion diminishes the importance of the afterlife because one’s goal becomes present psychic security (Culture of Narcissism, 7). 90 Twenge and Campbell, Narcissism Epidemic, 193-94, 137-38. 91 Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love, 138, 132. 86 270 ANTHONY R. LUSVARDI, S.J. fearing social disapprobation more than the effects of sin. 92 Elliot lists a number of traditional spiritual “remedies” to worldliness that have value as counterweights to presumption: poverty of spirit, the practice of memento mori, meditation on the poverty of Christ, simplicity, and rejoicing in hope.93 I would further suggest that some of our pastoral and theological instincts need to be rethought. Contemporary funeral liturgies, for example, might sometimes be confused with canonization Masses, for all the confident declarations that the deceased is now in heaven. Among the more disturbing I have attended was the funeral of a man who had committed suicide in order to avoid what was projected to be a lengthy prison term for assaulting his girlfriend; at the funeral, the priest declared, “Whatever pain he was feeling is now gone, and he is with God.” While the priest was motivated by a laudable desire to comfort the man’s family, the ethical implications of his statement are troubling, especially since the funeral was on an Indian reservation with one of the highest suicide rates in the world. A related tendency at funeral liturgies and elsewhere is to speak of heaven as “a better place,” sometimes without any mention of Christ, or even God, at all. In this vague, nondenominational phrasing, we have evidence of the pusillanimous nature of presumption; we are certain we can achieve heaven because it has become such a bland goal. Perhaps we need to recover something of Aquinas’s vision of life as an arduous journey toward a union with God so intense it changes our very capacity to love. A final question this exploration of presumption raises, perhaps the most provocative of all, has to do with soteriology. In his history of Catholic doctrine on salvation, Francis A. Sullivan, S.J., describes the “presumption of guilt” characteristic of “medieval judgment” giving way to a “presumption of innocence” in more recent Catholic theology.94 Sullivan regards 92 Ibid., 133. Elliot, “The Christian as Homo Viator,” 113-16. 94 Francis A. Sullivan, Salvation outside the Church? Tracing the History of the Catholic Response (Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1992), 202. 93 PRESUMPTION AND THE “AGE OF ENTITLEMENT” 271 this shift as a clear good, but his conclusions have not gone unchallenged. 95 Adding the concerns I have raised about presumption to this discussion will not answer the question of whether our understanding of salvation should be expansive or restrictive—of how narrow the narrow gate actually is (Matt 7:13-14). But it should, I think, introduce a note of caution about salvation optimism. We should ask, for example, how theologies that are optimistic about the possibility of salvation outside the visible Church change the attitudes of those within the Church regarding their own salvation. Do such theologies— and their popular expressions—take adequate account of the danger of presumption? Do they result in a notion of heaven that is vague and insipid? Do they obscure the necessity of conversion and moral growth so central to Aquinas’s vision of human life’s last end? In the conclusion to his book Sullivan points out that various cultural and historical factors shaped— and limited—theologies of salvation expressed in the medieval period and earlier.96 Awareness of the dangers of presumption reminds us of the necessity for humility regarding our own cultural limitations and preconceptions. Our wealth and technological advancement may not, in fact, help us to think clearly about our actual merits. Can it be that the comforts of modernity are false guideposts on the wayfarer’s journey? In a presumptuous age, has heaven become the final entitlement? Such questions cannot be answered here, and perhaps they are best left as provocations, intended to trouble. Pondering the possibility of presumption reminds us that sometimes it is salutary to allow oneself to be troubled, that sometimes our salvation can only be worked out with “fear and trembling” 95 For a recent example of an opposing viewpoint, see Ralph Martin, Will Many Be Saved? What Vatican II Actually Teaches and Its Implications for the New Evangelization (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2012). Martin takes particular aim at the “optimistic” soteriology of Karl Rahner and Hans Urs von Balthasar. The question in dispute in his critique has to do specifically with the question of salvation outside the visible Church. While the questions raised by the sin of presumption are somewhat different, they are nonetheless related, at least at the level of our attitudes. 96 Sullivan, Salvation outside the Church? 201-3. 272 ANTHONY R. LUSVARDI, S.J. (Phil 2:12). From the parable of the wise and foolish virgins (Matt 25:1-13) to Jesus’ counsel that the Son of Man will return at an unexpected hour (Matt 24:44), the Gospels contain numerous warnings against spiritual complacency. In an age of entitlement, an age abounding in what the Book of Sirach calls “deceitful wealth,” perhaps a dose of discomfort is needed to move us from presumption to hope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