Division of the Concept

So we've examined very generally what simple apprehension is and what a concept is; and we've discussed two attributes or properties that every concept has: comprehension and extension. Now, we are going to look at the various kinds of concepts there are; i.e., we are going to divide the concept into its specific types—first, according to the various kinds of concepts that there are when the concept is considered singly and in itself, then, according to the various kinds of relations one concept can have to another. Why do we have to do this in order to perfect our reasoning (the goal of Logic)? Because oftentimes, confusing various types of concepts will render our syllogism invalid, as we will see later. To give a very obvious example of this: Every triangle has three interior angles equal to 180 degrees; but John's love situation is a triangle; therefore, his love situation has three interior angles equal to 180 degrees. Obviously, 'triangle' here refers to two different concepts. Though this is a fairly obvious error, many mistakes involving a confusion of concepts are more subtle and require training to spot.

Now, a concept can be looked at in two ways, materially and formally. Considering the concept *materially* is to consider the concept according to the object in reality that the concept makes known; for example, the concept of a dog, or of a car, or of a man, etc. etc. If we were to divide the concept according to the things it makes known —that is, if we were to divide the concept materially—there would be as many concepts as there are things in reality that can be known. In Material Logic, we will arrange all things in reality that can be known into ten ultimate categories called the 'predicaments' and hence we will have divided the concept materially. But this doesn't concern us right now. In Formal Logic, we're interested in what pertains to all concepts in themselves regardless of any particular thing that they make known to us. We are interested here only in how the concept can be divided *formally;* that is, according to the nature of a concept itself, not according to the nature of the things in reality. Now, a concept is essentially a representation—to stand as a substitute in our mind for the realities that we know and to represent those things is of the very nature of a concept. Hence, to divide the concept formally is to divide it according to *how* it represents the things in reality to our mind. In this way, the concept is divided according to the different ways that one and the same thing can be known or represented. And this happens in three ways: 1) from the point of view of the *logical (or formal) object*, according to whether the thing's comprehension or extension is represented; 2) from the point of view of *perfection*, according to whether the concept well or poorly gives us knowledge of the thing; 3) and from the point of view of *origin*, according to how we get the concept.

Division of the Concept by Reason of the Way it Represents Objects

The formal or logical object can be considered in two ways, as we've seen: either comprehensively or extensively. Comprehensively, the object is certain totality or indivisible constituted by a number of intelligibly distinct notes. Extensively, the object is taken for all those subjects and individuals to which the whole set of comprehensive notes can apply. The concept can make known or represent both the comprehension and the extension, and it does so in different ways. And since comprehension is the foundation for extension (as I pointed out in the last section), we'll start with the different ways that a concept signifies the comprehension of the object; then, the different ways that the concept can signify the extension of the object.

Division of the Concept by the Ways it Signifies or Represents Comprehension

Incomplex and Complex Concepts

By reason of comprehension, the concept is first divided into *incomplex concepts* and *complex concepts*. An **incomplex concept** is one which *represents strictly one, single quiddity or essence* (e.g., the idea of 'man', the idea of 'learnedness', the idea of 'whiteness') and so one collection of comprehensive notes; whereas the **complex concept** *represents strictly several essences or quiddities conceived as a single quiddity* (e.g., learned white man), and so represents two or more collections of comprehensive notes as though they were one. Remember, both of these kinds of concepts are known by simple apprehension; in other words, 'learned white man' is still a single *concept* though it is composed of several elements which are separable in reality. It is not a judgment—I'm not saying 'the man is learned and white.' The complex concept not only has all the intelligible comprehensive notes of 'man' but it has other notes besides (i.e., learnedness and whiteness) which are over and above the notes required to conceive 'man'. And all of these notes (learnedness, whiteness, and man), though in reality different and separable, are conceived as a single indivisible quiddity. So, how do we know if what we are conceiving has one or several quiddities? For example, if we were to conceive of man as 'rational animal' would this be a complex concept since it has two elements, 'rationality' and 'animality'? No. We have multiple quiddities only if one is not contained within the essential comprehensive notes of the subject we're considering. Rationality and animality pertain essentially to the nature of man, and so conceiving of man as 'rational animal' doesn't join two quiddities but simply makes explicit two aspects of one and the same quiddity. 'Learned', on the other hand, does

not pertain essentially to man—some men are idiots (I'll give you a list of examples, if you'd like). So by joining 'learnedness' to 'man', you aren't simply pointing out a note which is implicitly contained in the concept 'man' but you're adding to that concept of 'man'; you're pointing out one real thing, man, which is qualified by another real thing, learning. Later, we'll learn that each distinct essence is distinct precisely because it can be placed into a different category or *predicament*: man will be placed in the predicament of substance, while learnedness will be placed in the predicament of quality. So we need to make a distinction between *incomplex concepts* which are *incomplexly stated*, and *incomplex concepts* which are *complexly stated*. So, the concept of 'man' is an incomplex concept because it refers to a single nature; i.e., that of man. But when I express this concept as 'rational animal', I'm *stating* the concept complexly. Again, we have to distinguish between *complex concepts* which are *complexly stated*, and *complex concepts* which are *incomplexly stated*. So 'learned man' is a complex concept because it signifies two essences which are distinct in reality; i.e., learnedness and man. And it is also complexly stated because each of those elements is given very clearly. However, if we were to state the concept of 'learned man' as simply 'scholar', then the complex concept is being stated incomplexly; i.e., without distinct parts. And keep in mind that each complex concept (i.e., a concept which refers to several really distinct essences) can be broken apart so that each of the distinct essences can be considered as incomplex things: in other words, the complex concept of 'learned man' can be broken up into the incomplex concepts of 'learnedness' and 'man'.

Now, concepts always represent various comprehensive notes, as we've seen. And these comprehensive notes exist together within the thing under consideration: 'living', 'sentient', 'rational', etc. all together make up the nature of man. But these notes can be represented by the concept in two ways: precisely as notes and as parts making up the whole quiddity of man; or else as separated from the quiddity of man and considered as things in themselves. That is, an intelligible attribute can be understood or conceived as a *part* of the object in which it was discovered—as a comprehensive note of the thing—or as *completely separated* from that object—not as a comprehensive note, but as a new thing. From this point of view, concepts are either **concrete** or **abstract**. So, in the comprehensive notes of 'man' we find the note 'sentient' or 'having senses'. We can, however, consider 'sentient' not as it is a comprehensive note, but as it is a thing in itself and totally abstracted from the other notes. In that event, 'sentient' becomes 'sentience'; or 'rational' becomes 'rationality'. Furthermore, some incomplex concepts include within their comprehension *a relation* to another subject besides the object that they immediately represent, while others do not include within their comprehension a reference to another subject beyond themselves. From this point of view, concepts are either **connotative** or **absolute**.

Concrete and Abstract Concepts

So, *incomplex* concepts are of two kinds: *concrete* and *abstract.* The difference is between the ways the concept represents the thing we encounter in reality. When a concept represents a substance in reality, then it is called concrete, because it can be said of concrete, individual things. So, man is concrete concept because we can say 'Peter is a man'. Likewise, when the concept represents what really is a part of a substance *precisely as* a part, the concept is also concrete. When I think 'rational' I'm conceiving a part of man precisely as a part. Hence, it can be said of concrete things: Peter is rational. On the other hand, when the concept represents what is really part of a substance not *as* a part but *as though it were a substance itself*, we have an abstract concept. When I think 'rationality' I'm no longer considering what is but a part of man's comprehension (i.e., rational) precisely as it is a part; rather, I'm thinking of it as though it were a single thing itself. So, a concrete concept, most generally speaking, is one which represents or signifies a substantial thing or a comprehensive note of a substantial thing considered precisely as a comprehensive note; whereas the abstract concept signifies or represents a note considered *apart* from that substance and as a thing in itself. This is the difference between 'rational' and 'rationality'; between 'man' and 'humanity'; between 'living' and 'life'; between 'white' and 'whiteness'; between 'strong' and 'strength'.

Recall, once again, that the intellect doesn't know everything there is to know about an object at a single glance. Instead, it distinguishes various intelligible or formal objects from the material objects that we encounter in reality; thus, man can be considered as living, as animal, as rational, etc. And all these notes *taken together* constitute the comprehension of our concept man. When I consider 'rational' in the concept 'man' I'm considering it precisely as one of the notes, as an element making up the concept 'man'—'rational' is known as a part of the nature or quiddity of man, as a part of that external thing encountered in reality. This is what we call a concrete concept, and it is had by a very simple process of abstraction from the individual thing (so, every adjective is a concrete concept because it refers to a trait or characteristic precisely as it exists within the thing—strong, black, smelly, etc.). But we can also perform *another* abstraction by which 'rational' is separated entirely from the thing we've encountered in reality and is, instead, considered as a thing in itself. By this second abstraction, the mind knows an intelligible object (i.e., some attribute which was first found in the external thing) apart from the quiddity of the thing. 'Rationality' is considered precisely as a thing and not as a part of the comprehension of 'man'. This is

what we call an abstract concept. 'Man' is a concrete concept because it represents what the thing is in reality, and it is an aspect of the thing *considered as an aspect*. 'Humanity' is an abstract concept because it refers to human nature *considered as a thing* in itself and apart from the other notes of 'living', 'sentient', etc. Likewise, 'living' is a concrete concept because it is considered as part of the substance man, but 'life' is an abstract concept which is separated from every other note in the comprehension of man.

Now, any given concrete concept can be made abstract by further separating it from that thing of which it is a part; that is, by separating it from the other comprehensive notes. Organism has the notes 'substance, material, and living'. 'Living', then is considered as a part of the comprehension of organism and as such it is concrete. But 'living' becomes 'life' when it is abstracted from the other notes of 'organism'. But the abstraction need not stop there. 'Life' has its own comprehensive notes; for example, 'self-moving' would be a comprehensive note of 'life', because something is said to live when it moves by an intrinsic principle. So self-moving is a concrete concept which goes into making up the concept of life. But we can abstract 'self-moving' from the other notes of life and consider it, not as a part, but as another whole: namely, 'self-motion'. So, concrete concepts can be made abstract by separating them from whatever whole they are in. And for any given intelligible attribute discovered in a thing, there can be an abstract concept, though these are very rarely named: e.g., there is no name for the abstract concept corresponding to dog, so we call it 'dogness'.

So, again, when I think 'rational' I'm thinking of the trait of 'rationality' applying to some subject, as being a modification or a part of some subject. In this way, we can say 'rational' of Peter—'Peter is rational'—because rational is conceived as a part of Peter's nature. On the other hand, 'rationality' is conceived, not as a part of Peter, but as a thing in itself and independent of a subject. Hence, we cannot say, 'Peter is rationality' anymore than we can 'Peter is a stone.' To put this in other terms, the **concrete concept** *signifies THAT WHICH IS*; whereas the **abstract concept** signifies *THAT BY WHICH a thing is*. So, Peter is 'rational' *because of* 'rationality'. Yet, since 'rationality' is conceived as a thing in itself and as excluding a subject in which it inheres, it cannot be 'said of' or 'predicated of' Peter: we cannot say 'Peter is rationality.' Again, we cannot say 'Peter is humanity.' Rather, we say 'Peter is man', and it is BY his humanity that he is a man. In the first case, 'man' is conceived as a formality found in the subject Peter—man is what Peter is; while in the second case, 'humanity' is conceived as a thing in itself and not a determination or formality of some subject—humanity is that *by which* Peter is man. '100' is an abstract concept, whereas '100 men' is a concrete concept. So again, a concrete concept is one which signifies that which a thing is (a subject with a form); an abstract concept is one which signifies that by which a thing is (the form alone). Or, in other terms, the difference between concrete and abstract concepts is the difference between conceiving some substance or comprehensive note precisely *as* a substance or comprehensive note versus conceiving some comprehensive note as a new thing with its *own* comprehension.

Absolute and Connotative Concepts

Incomplex concepts can again be divided into two kinds: *absolute* or *connotative*. Most concepts represent an object which exists by itself and independently of another thing outside of itself. 'Man', for example, is the concept of a substance which exists in itself and is not a determination or alteration of another substance—we call it an *absolute* concept because it doesn't necessarily imply another subject besides itself. That is, there is nothing in the comprehensive notes that isn't found in the singular existing thing encountered in reality—its comprehensive notes contain a relation to nothing outside of this substantial thing. But sometimes concepts imply, above and beyond themselves, a relation to another subject, so that its very signification includes a reference to something else. This we call a connotative or relative concept.

Many connotative concepts are easy to recognize. The concept of father necessarily includes within its comprehensive notes a relation to some child; without this reference, 'father' could not properly be conceived; 'husband' cannot be understood without including a relation to 'wife' in its comprehensive notes; 'higher' cannot be conceived without including in its notes a relation to something which it surpasses in height; 'friend' cannot be conceived without implying the subject of friendship. But some concepts don't immediately strike us as being connotative. 'White', for example, is the concept of something which determines and qualifies some subject—there must necessarily be, then, a subject which is determined and modified by it; i.e., there must be a white *thing*. So this *connotative* concept always implies, or connotes, some subject which is made white.

Because of this, we can divide connotative concepts into two kinds: strictly or *essentially connotative* concepts; and not-strictly or *non-essentially* connotative concepts. The concept 'white' is *not essentially* connotative, because it can be abstracted from any given subject to give us the concept 'whiteness'. 'Whiteness' does not necessarily imply a relation to anything, whereas 'white' does. 'Father', on the other hand, is *essentially* connotative. Even when it is separated from the comprehensive notes of a thing which is called 'father' and we get the abstract concept 'fatherhood', it still necessarily implies or connotes a relationship to 'offspring'. 'Near' is

a concrete concept that yields the abstract concept of 'nearness', but 'near' and 'nearness' both essentially connote a relation of distance between two objects. So the difference between essentially connotative concepts and non-essentially connotative concepts boils down to one thing: relation.

In Material Logic, we will look at the ten ultimate categories into which all real beings (except God) can be placed—these, again, are called the predicaments. And when we deal with the predicaments we will learn about the various kinds of accidents or attributes that a thing can have. 'Color', for example, will be placed in the predicament of quality, while 'circular' will be placed in the predicament of quantity, and 'clothed' will be in the predicament of possession, and 'sitting' will be in the predicament of 'position', etc. Now, there is one very peculiar predicament called 'relation'. And relation always and everywhere will include at least two terms. For example, 'faster' is a relation which will always imply something which is slower; 'up' is a relation which always imply 'down', etc. So whenever we have an attribute or accident which is a relation it *always* refers to at least two things in its comprehension. 'Father' is always related to 'offspring'; 'offspring' is called the *term* of the relation. Now, when father is conceived by the mind but son is not, there is still a necessary implication—'offspring' is still connoted or implied; that is, the *term* of the relation is still implied. So when a concept represents a relation—be it concrete or abstract—and the term of the relation (for example, 'offspring') is not explicitly and clearly included in the concept, that concept will *always* be connotative. So, *essentially* connotative concepts are *always* concepts of relations, but *not every* concept of a relation will be connotative. If I conceive 'the father of John', this concept is not connotative because the term of the relation (i.e., John) is clearly stated and not merely implied. In other words, the term of a relation can be either implicit or explicit. For example, 'faster' is a relationship of speed. If I think simply 'a thing which is faster', then the term of this relationship (namely, that which is *slower*) is not explicitly stated; but if I think 'a thing which is faster than light', then the term of the relation *is* explicitly stated. Now, explicit is imposed to implicit. So, if a connotative term is one which contains an *implicit* relation to another, then concepts of explicit relations are not connotative.

Now, an absolute concept is conceived as though it were a self-contained substance without a reference to anything else; but it need not necessarily *be* a substance. 'Man', for example, is conceived as a substance and really is a substance. 'Whiteness', however, is not really a substance yet it is conceived as though it were a stand-alone substance without a reference to a white subject. 'White', on the other hand, is not thought to be some particular thing, but rather it is conceived as a modification of something else; we have 'a white man', 'a white house', 'a white dog', etc. etc. But we don't have simply 'white'. 'White', then, is said to *imply* or connote the subject in which it is found; and it's impossible to conceive of 'white' without this implication. So, an absolute concept must not include in its comprehension a relation to another subject outside what it explicitly contained in that concept; but all accidents and attributes imply a subject of which they are accidents and attributes. Therefore, an absolute concept must be one which signifies something *after the manner of a substance enclosed in itself* (even if it isn't really a substance) and *not* after the manner of an accident, or attribute, or modification determining another. On the other hand, a connotative concept *does* signify something after the manner of a formality determining, modifying, and implying a subject besides itself, even if it really is a substance. 'Father' is conceived as a substantial thing in reality, nevertheless it isn't an absolute concept since it implies a relation to offspring. So every absolute concept must be conceived as a substance, but not everything conceived as a substance will be absolute. A 'teacher' is conceived as a substantial thing; we encounter teachers in reality. But it is an essentially connotative concept because it always implies a relationship to a student.

So, understand that a connotative concept always implies (or connotes) and has reference to something else—to something extrinsic or beyond what is immediately contained in the concept itself. In the case of non-essentially connotative concepts, there is always a relation to at least two things: 1) an abstract concept, and 2) a subject: 'white' implies 'whiteness' (which is an *abstract* concept) determining or modifying this or that subject. 'Blind' is a concept which implies 'blindness' affecting this or that seeing subject. So the connotative concept (e.g., blind), first and directly signifies its abstract concept (e.g., blindness) while secondly and indirectly signifying the subject to which it belongs (e.g., an animal which has lost its sight). 'White' signifies 'whiteness' as joined to something, not as standing by itself. So, the non-essentially connotative concept actually signifies two natures, though one is signified directly and clearly, while the other is signified indirectly and obscurely. The *essentially* connotative concept, on the other hand, does not always imply a relation to the abstract concept for the simple reason that an essentially connotative concept *can in fact BE* an abstract concept. 'Father', as a concrete concept, signifies directly 'fatherhood' (an abstract concept) and indirectly the man who is affected by a relation of paternity to some child. But 'fatherhood' itself is abstract, and it still implies a relation to offspring. So, the *essentially* connotative concept which is *also* a *concrete* concept will imply a reference to an abstract concept and to a subject, just as the non-essentially connotative concept—'father' implies 'fatherhood' as modifying or affecting this subject. But when it is conceived *precisely as an abstract* concept (e.g., fatherhood), the implication or connotation doesn't have reference to another abstract concept or to a subject determined by it; instead, it implies

and has a relation to its correlative concept: e.g., 'fatherhood' implies 'childness', to give it a name. 'Nearness' implies 'farness'. 'Kingship' implies 'subjectship.' 'Highness' implies 'lowness', etc. 'Soccer-teamness' implies 'team-memberness'. If you didn't *implicitly* conceive of team members you couldn't conceive of a team because a team is a relation among members. 'Creation' necessarily implies a 'creator'—a relation to a creator must always be included in the comprehensive notes of 'creation'. 'Sculpture' necessarily implies a 'sculptor'.

Nothing in reality, it's true, is ever completely by itself. The mere fact of existence puts things in relation to each other, and so everything in that sense is relative. Even just 'being distinct' is a relation that one thing has to all other things. But that isn't to say that these relations are included in the *comprehension* of the thing as it is conceived or known by the intellect. Man might be, as a matter of fact (i.e., *de facto,* to give the technical term), the master of all animals, but the comprehension of man doesn't necessarily include this relation among its notes. Even if no other animals existed, even if we had no understanding of brutes at all, we could still conceive properly of man's nature. But this couldn't be if it had to include a relation to animals. So the fact that things happen to be in relation to other things is not enough to make concepts of them connotative. It might *suggest* a relation. We might arrive at a relation by the *association* of several concepts; but connotative means that there is a conceptual necessity of including this relation among the thing's comprehensive notes, so that the thing cannot properly be understood without this relation.

Finally, keep in mind what I said earlier: the process of defining will be a spelling out or enumeration of the various essential comprehensive notes of a thing. If, then, a thing cannot be defined without mentioning something else besides itself then it must contain a relation to another in its comprehensive notes; therefore, it will be connotative (e.g., higher cannot be defined except by referring in the definition to something else which it surpasses in height).

The Division of Complex Concepts

Just a few words about this. Complex concepts (e.g., learned white man) follow the same division as incomplex concepts. So, the complex concept can also be divided into concrete and abstract. But the abstract of learned white man wouldn't be 'learnedness whiteness humanity', because that would turn the complex concept into three incomplex concepts. Rather the abstract concept of learned white man would be more like 'learned-white-man-ness'; or to state the complex concept incomplexly, it would be 'scholarness'. Even though I've used the concept 'father' in a lot of the examples above, it is properly a complex concept: it is 'man' qualified by a relation of paternity. That is, it represents more than one nature in reality. It's abstract would be 'fatherhood'.

Complex concepts are likewise divided into absolute and connotative depending on whether any of the elements in the concept imply a subject not explicitly included among their comprehensive notes. So 'white man' is absolute because neither term implies another subject. You might ask, 'isn't white a connotative concept?' When white is taken as an incomplex concept, yes, it is connotative because it implies some subject which is white. However, here a subject which is white is not *implied* in the concept 'white man' but it is an essential note of the concept: the subject is man. Nothing else is connoted or implied. 'Annoyingly cheerful', on the other hand, is non-essentially connotative, because it implies some subject which *is* annoyingly cheerful. 'Annoying cheerfulness', then, would be the abstract and it would be an absolute concept. 'Father' would be an essentially connotative complex concept.

And what about something like 'golf ball'? This is a ball with a relation added to it; namely, the relation to the game of golf. Wouldn't it then be connotative, always implying the game of golf? No. Remember that the concept of a relation can include the *term* of the relation either implicitly or explicitly. If implicitly, then it is connotative since a connotative concept is one which implies something besides itself. But if the concept explicitly includes the *term* of the relation, then it doesn't connote or imply that term. 'Golf ball' includes the term of the relation: namely, the game of golf. For the same reason, 'sculptor of this statue' is not connotative, because it doesn't *imply* this statue, but rather it very clearly points out this statue. 'Sculptor', on the other hand, does not clearly give the term within the comprehension of the concept, but only implies it. 'Creator' is the same way—creator of what? There must be something which was created if we are to conceive of something as creator, but it isn't clearly and explicitly contained within the concept.

Three Cautions

Be careful not to confuse absolute and abstract concepts. Not every abstract concept is an absolute concept (because essentially connotative concepts can be abstract), and not every absolute concept is an abstract concept. 'Man', for example is an absolute concept. It signifies a substance, not a modification of a substance. Yet, 'man' is not an abstract concept; it's a concrete concept. It signifies what a thing is (e.g., Peter is a man) and not that by

which it is (e.g., humanity).   But, 'whiteness', 'blindness', 'learnedness', etc., these are all abstract concepts (i.e., that by which something is white, blind, and learned) and they are also absolute concepts conceived as though they were substances.

Furthermore, don't confuse concrete and connotative concepts. Not every connotative concept is a concrete concept (because 'fatherhood' is connotative and abstract), and not every concrete concept is a connotative concept. 'Man' for example, is a concrete concept since it refers to 'what a thing is' and not 'by what' a thing is; but it doesn't imply a subject which it modifies (i.e., it isn't connotative) since it doesn't modify anything but, rather, it is a substance itself. 'White', on the other hand, or 'blind' are concrete concepts since they refer to what a thing is and not 'that by which' a thing is, but they are connotative since they imply a subject which they determine and modify.

And do not confuse the connotative concept with adjectives.   Every adjective is connotative (e.g., black, bright, fast, large, happy, etc. each imply a subject which is black, bright, fast, large, or happy),but not everything which is connotative is an adjective. 'Father', for example, is grammatically a noun, but as a concept it is connotative; it implies an absolute concept (i.e., fatherhood) applied to some subject (i.e., to some man who has a child).

Finally, do not mistake a complex concept for an incomplex connotative concept. 'Scholar' does not imply or connote learning as something extrinsic to itself. Rather, learning is one of the very elements of 'Scholar': scholar is an incomplex term for the complex object 'learned man' or 'man with learning'.

To sum up: a **concrete concept** is one which represents some substance or an attribute known in a substance and considered precisely as a part of that substance's comprehension. An **abstract concept** is one which represents some attribute known in a thing yet considered *not as a part* of that thing's comprehension, but rather as a new thing with its own comprehension.

An **absolute concept** is one whose comprehensive notes do not include a relation to another subject. And because accidents (i.e., attributes or traits) always imply a relation to that of which they are accidents (i.e., a substance which they modify), absolute concepts must be conceived as substances (even if they aren't really substances). A **connotative concept** is one whose comprehensive notes include a relation to another implicit subject extrinsic to itself. Connotative concepts are of two kinds: non-essentially connotative concepts and essentially connotative concepts. **Non-essentially connotative concepts** include among their comprehensive notes a relation to another subject *only* when they are conceived concretely—not when they are conceived abstractly. **Essentially connotative concepts** are concepts of relations whose terms are not explicitly stated. They always include two or more subjects in their comprehension whether they are conceived concretely or abstractly.

EXERCISES: We don't normally pay much attention to these various kinds of concepts, but they are exceptionally important for reasoning. So, practice will be required to adequately identify and catalogue our ideas. Here are some examples:

House – incomplex, concrete and absolute

House is the concept of a single artificial nature and therefore incomplex; it is a substance (though artificial) and not an attribute conceived as a substance, therefore it is concrete; I can conceive house without necessarily implying something extrinsic to the house, therefore it is absolute.

Short – incomplex, concrete and connotative

Short is the concept of a single quality, therefore it is incomplex; it is considered as an attribute or note of some substance, not as a substance itself, therefore it is concrete; it implies a relation to 1) the abstract concept 'shortness' 2) a subject which is called short, and 3) something else which is tall, therefore it is connotative.

Shortness – incomplex, abstract and connotative

Shortness represents a single quality, therefore it is incomplex; it is conceived as a thing in itself, though in reality it is not a thing in itself, therefore it is abstract; it no longer implies a relationship to something which is short, but it is still a concept of a relation and therefore implies a subject by which shortness is measured.

Substance – incomplex, concrete and absolute

Substance only represents a single quiddity, therefore it is incomplex; it represents what in reality is really a thing and not simply conceived as a thing, therefore it is concrete; it represents in its comprehensive notes nothing else

besides itself, therefore it is absolute.

Substantiality – incomplex, abstract and absolute

Substantiality only represents a single quiddity, therefore it is incomplex; it represents the note 'substantial' as though it were a single thing, when in fact it is but a note of a thing (e.g., man is substantial), therefore it is abstract; it represents nothing in its comprehensive notes besides itself, therefore it is absolute.

Classical – incomplex, concrete and connotative

Classical represents a single quality, therefore it is incomplex; it represents an attribute or note of something precisely as a note, and not as a separate thing, therefore it is concrete; it implies a subject which *is* classical, therefore it is connotative.

Socialist – complex, concrete and connotative

Socialist represents the nature of man qualified by an adherence to socialism, therefore it is complex; a socialist is a substance with an attribute conceived as its part, not simply an attribute conceived as a substance, therefore it is concrete; it can be conceived without a relation to anything else, therefore it is absolute (it doesn't imply the doctrine of socialism as something extrinsic to itself, but it includes 'socialist doctrine' in its very self as the term of a relation, for a socialist is a man who adheres to socialism; on the other hand, if we were to conceive of 'man who adheres' without mentioning to what he adheres, the concept is connotative).

Ball – incomplex, concrete and absolute

Ball represents something which is one nature in reality, therefore it is incomplex; it is a substantial thing, not just an attribute conceived as a substantial thing, therefore it is concrete; and it can be understood without implying a relation to anything outside itself, therefore it is absolute.

Tennis Ball – complex, concrete and connotative

Tennis ball represents several natures, a ball and a relation to the game of tennis, therefore it is a complex concept; it represents a real thing with a real quality, not something merely conceived as a real thing, therefore it is concrete; it does not refer to anything outside of itself (the game of tennis is not implied but included in the attribute of 'tennis', for a tennis ball is a ball used in the game of tennis).

Near – incomplex, concrete and connotative

Near represents the nature of a single relation, therefore it is incomplex; it is represents an attribute of some object, and is not conceived as a thing in itself; it is connotative because it represents a relation and cannot be conceived without that which is near.

Nearness – incomplex, abstract, connotative

Nearness represents a single relation, therefore it is incomplex; it conceives of it as some subject, when in reality it is only an attribute of some subject, therefore it is abstract; it is a concept of a relation, therefore it always connotes a relation to farness.

Triangle (as object of mathematical inquiry) – incomplex, abstract, and absolute

Represents a single quantity, therefore it is incomplex; it represents as a substance what is really only the attribute of a substance, therefore it is abstract; its comprehensive notes include on relation to anything distinct from itself, therefore it is absolute.

Triangular – incomplex, concrete and connotative

Represents a single quantity, therefore it is incomplex; it represents the attribute of something precisely as an attribute, therefore, it is concrete; it connotes or implies something which is triangular, therefore it is connotative.

Triangularity – incomplex, abstract and absolute

Represents a single quantity, therefore it is incomplex; it represents the attribute of something as though it were a thing in itself, therefore it is abstract; its comprehensive notes include on relation to anything distinct from itself,

therefore it is absolute.

Very tricky stuff! Keep in mind the definitions of these kinds of concepts and see if you can identify the following as complex or incomplex and concrete or abstract and absolute or connotative.

Blue

Friend

Friendly

Friendship

Spiritual

Spirit

Red-head

Red-headedness

John

Good

Goodness

Creator

Living material substance

Organism

Happy

Policeman

A lump of gold

Intellect

Intellectual

An Italian man

Italian