

ops of the anti-Nicene party. As such he was condemned by name by the orthodox assembly of SARDICA in 343. Later he was involved in a bitter feud with St. CYRIL OF JERUSALEM on jurisdictional and doctrinal grounds. His career reached a climax when the Homoean confession (the Son is “like to” the Father) became the official creed of the empire at the Synod of Constantinople in 360. When orthodoxy prevailed under the Emperor Jovian, Acacius had no scruples in signing the Nicene creed; but he returned to Homoean doctrine when VALENS became Emperor of the East in 364. However, he was condemned by the Homoiousian synod of Lampsacus in the summer of 365 but retained his see until his death (c. 366). He was noted for his eloquence and Biblical scholarship. He renovated the famous library of Caesarea, and he composed several works that are lost, except for a few exegetical fragments on Romans and the Octateuch.

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[V. C. DE CLERCQ]

## ACADEMIC FREEDOM

The nature and purposes of academic freedom have assumed different forms at different points in history and in the contexts of secular and Catholic education, and when applied to professors or to students. This article will examine this complex idea in five steps: (1) some historical precedents to the modern concept of academic freedom before the 20th century; (2) the development of the idea in the United States; (3) the idea in Catholic colleges and universities in the United States; (4) *Ex corde ecclesiae* (1990) and its application in the U.S.; and (5) the continuing tensions regarding academic freedom today, especially with regard to Catholic universities.

**Historical Precedents.** With the development in the West of cathedral schools in 11th and 12th-century Europe, and then the great medieval universities beginning in the 12th century, questions arose about the relationship between these educational institutions and the surrounding society, including civil rulers and bishops. Theological faculties within universities gained a certain magisterial authority recognized by bishops and the pope. In some instances, for example, at the University of Paris in 1215 and then again in 1231, the popes protected theological faculties from the precipitous intervention of local bishops into their disputes. On the one hand, the theologians generally accepted authoritative Church teaching; on the other hand, they enjoyed considerable freedom in debating “disputed questions.” Their influence in the

Church was considerable. In one admittedly unusual situation, John XXII (1316–1334), asked the theologians of Paris not to come too quickly to a judgement about the orthodoxy of several sermons he had preached on the Beatific Vision, explaining that he was only testing his ideas in public, ideas which he thought merited further debate. Often, however, bishops did make determinations about proposed theological propositions, as was the case with Bishop Steven TEMPIER’s condemnation (1277) of 100 propositions, including several extracted from the writings of St. THOMAS ACQUINAS. The role of theologians in explaining the faith and putting forth new ways of thinking of it on the one hand, and on the other hand the role of bishops in making judgments as to which explanations and interpretations are orthodox, has continued to be a locus for a distinctively Catholic understanding of academic freedom.

At the time of the REFORMATION, the corporate character of medieval universities largely disappeared. The type of theology taught in a particular university in a confessional state was determined in large part by the ruler of that state. Universities in Europe had become, for all practical purposes, confessional institutions. In the early 18th and 19th centuries, a number of German universities “secularized” themselves, and in that process their faculties developed the concepts of *Lehrfreiheit* (the freedom of professors to do unfettered research and teach their findings) and *Lernfreiheit* (the freedom of students, mostly what we would consider graduate students, to learn from whomever they wished and to live their lives in private quarters without supervision). In the view of these faculty, such freedoms constituted a university in the true sense.

On the eve of the 20th century, academic freedom (though the name was not used until the early 20th century) indicated a thinker’s personal commitment to speak what he or she believes to be true, regardless of consequence; the appropriateness of the use of reason for believers trying to think through their faith; the freedom of theologians to debate disputed questions; and the protection of academics from persons of power from outside the university.

**Academic Freedom in the United States.** An institutional confessional stance marked most of the early American colleges: Harvard and Yale, for example, being Congregationalist, William and Mary Anglican, and Princeton Presbyterian. The medieval universities had been self-governed by guild systems and thus largely protected themselves from various external threats. In the New World, boards composed of clergy and laity rather than faculty retained the power to hire and fire and to set policy. With greater reliance on the empirical research



*Students at Columbia University, New York, protest the university's failure to reappoint Donald Henderson, economics instructor, striking in defense of "academic freedom." Violence erupted between strikers and nonstrikers, and police were called to break up the rioting, May 15, 1933. (©Bettmann/CORBIS)*

model after the Civil War, the dominance of the clergy as presidents and board members of these colleges declined dramatically. By the end of the 19th century, the development of many of the social sciences as distinct disciplines further strengthened the autonomy of faculty, who now based their research on empirical methods of investigation over which the churches had decreasing authority.

Between 1890 and 1915, presidents of these colleges dismissed a number of faculty, many of whom had done doctoral work in German universities. These cases became widely known, and in 1915 thirteen professors signed a statement on academic freedom, titled "Declaration of Principles." Johns Hopkins philosopher Arthur Lovejoy and Columbia economist Edwin R. Seligman drafted the statement; eight of the 13 signers had studied in Germany and seven were social scientists. They

founded the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), with John Dewey as its first president. Initially, membership was open to "any university or college teacher of recognized scholarship or scientific productivity who holds, and for ten years has held, a position of teaching or research." Administrators were then typically excluded. Academic freedom in the United States became at this time a protection for individual university professors against the arbitrary actions of administrators and those outside the academy who would seek to influence them. Stated more positively, academic freedom defended professors' ability to do research and go wherever their investigations led them, to teach their students what they know and believe, and to address issues in the public forum ("extramural freedom"), but to do so not as spokespersons for the university.

The AAUP insisted on the responsibilities as well as on the rights of individual professors. For example, when dealing with controversial matters, professors were expected to set forth divergent opinions without suppression or innuendo and were to help students learn for themselves rather than indoctrinate them. According to the 1915 Declaration, “the liberty of a scholar to set forth his conclusions, be they what they may, is conditioned by their being conclusions gained in a scholar’s method and held in a scholar’s spirit; that is to say, they must be fruits of competent and patient and sincere inquiry; and they must be set forth with dignity, courtesy, and temperateness.” Moreover, the AAUP stressed that research required evaluation, which could be done competently only by peers who were to follow certain procedures designed to ensure fairness in matters of promotion and tenure. Again, in the 1915 Declaration, the AAUP stated that in all disciplines, “the first condition of progress is complete and unlimited freedom to pursue inquiry and publish its results,” and added that “such freedom is the breath in the nostrils of all scientific activity.” In the AAUP’s vision of the academy, administrators gave permission to hire; professors, who constituted “the community of the competent,” decided whom they would hire.

The signers of the 1915 “Report” acknowledged the right of a board of trustees of a denominational college to govern according to its religious tradition, but made it clear that the AAUP had serious reservations about the academic integrity of at least a number of such institutions. They stated that such institutions “do not, at least as regards one particular subject, accept the principles of freedom of inquiry, of opinions and of teaching; and their purpose is not to advance knowledge by the unrestricted research and unfettered discussion of impartial investigations, but rather to subsidize the promotion of the opinions held by persons usually not of a scholar’s calling, who provide funds for their maintenance. Concerning the desirability of the existence of such institutions, the committee does not desire to express any opinion. But it is manifestly important that they should not be permitted to sail under false colors. Genuine boldness and thoroughness of inquiry and freedom of speech are scarcely reconcilable with the prescribed inculcating of a particular opinion upon a controverted question.” As a result, the AAUP judged that nearly all church-related colleges could not fully embrace academic freedom. In 1940, it stated what came to be known as the “limitations clause,” which read: “limitations in academic freedom because of religious and other aims of the institutions should be clearly stated in writing at the time of appointment.”

At the time, few church-related institutions had any discussions about academic freedom. A report given at the 1942 meeting of the National Catholic Education Association convention stated that 65% of those Catholic colleges that responded to the questionnaire made no provision for tenure. Since a great majority of Catholic colleges were run and staffed by religious, they never saw the need for tenure. People under the vow of obedience were simply assigned and reassigned, sometimes quite arbitrarily.

The 1960s saw a number of changes in Catholic higher education: the establishment of largely lay boards of trustees, more widespread adoption of the dominant scientific research model, and a decline in Catholic professional associations. By 1970, the AAUP stated that “most such colleges no longer need to state such a limitations clause.” It remained, nonetheless, opposed to any forms of indoctrination. In 1983, for example, it stated that a “college or university is a marketplace of ideas, and it cannot fulfill its purpose of transmitting, evaluating and extending knowledge if it requires conformity with any orthodoxy of content or method.” In 1988, shortly after moral theologian Fr. Charles Curran had been told by the Catholic University of America trustees, that he could no longer teach Catholic moral theology, a subcommittee of the AAUP clarified further the 1940 statement by affirming clearly two of its main points: “(1) the prerogative of institutions to require doctrinal fidelity; and (2) the necessary consequences of denying to institutions invoking this prerogative the moral right to proclaim themselves as seats of higher learning.” Though never formally approved by the AAUP, the subcommittee’s conclusions are consistent with the organization’s long-standing doubt that some church-related institutions provide their faculty with academic freedom, and, in fact, are universities in the “full sense of the term.”

**Academic Freedom and Catholic Colleges and Universities in the U.S.** Most Catholic educational institutions, beginning with those established by the Ursuline sisters in New Orleans in the 1720s, and John Carroll in Washington in 1789, were little more than primary schools whose mission was to prepare their students for service in the world and equip them with the capacity to defend their Catholic faith. Nearly all of the institutions that eventually grew into colleges were founded by religious communities of men and women. At the turn of the 19th century, nearly all Catholic colleges were small, and even by 1940 typically had no endowments, the religious who ran the majority of them constituting their institutions’ “living endowments.” Few offered tenure and none endorsed the AAUP’s understanding of academic freedom. In 1889, the U.S. bishops founded in Washington, D.C., the Catholic University of America, intended

initially to be only a graduate school. Bishops on the board retain full legal control at a pontifically chartered institution. Over the years, the board of the Catholic University dismissed several faculty for opinions judged to be unorthodox (most recently, the 1986 Curran case).

Catholic colleges and universities grew steadily in number and size in the 20th century. In 1916, 32,000 students had enrolled in 84 colleges for men (though more than half these men were actually high school students), and by 1940, 160,000 men and women were enrolled. Shortly after the end of World War II, enrollments at Catholic colleges and universities grew considerably (thanks to the GI Bill and the baby boom). By 1966, nearly 400,000 students had enrolled. In the 1960s, leaders of these institutions began to shift full authority over their institutions to predominantly lay boards of trustees and to adopt the ecumenical emphasis of Vatican II. They promoted the professionalization of their faculties, and, in the process, frequently looked to the AAUP for their understanding of academic freedom and tenure. The year 1966 also marked the beginning of an unexpected and rapid decline in the number of religious men and women who had founded these very institutions.

In July 1967, twenty-six Catholic university and college presidents, faculty, and bishops gathered in Land O'Lakes, Wisconsin, to prepare a statement on the nature and role of a Catholic university. "The Catholic university today must be a university in the full modern sense of the word, with a strong commitment to and concern for academic excellence. To perform its teaching and research functions effectively the Catholic university must have a true autonomy and academic freedom in the face of authority of whatever kind, lay or clerical, external to the academic community itself. To say this is simply to assert that institutional autonomy and academic freedom are essential conditions of life and growth and indeed of survival for Catholic universities as for all universities." This excerpt from the statement has been frequently cited by many leaders of Catholic higher education. Just as frequently overlooked, however, is another affirmation found in the same paragraph: "Distinctively, then, the Catholic university must be an institution, a community of learners or a community of scholars, in which Catholicism is perceptibly present and effectively operative." How to be distinctively Catholic and, at the same time, an autonomous institution which affirms an "academic freedom in the face of authority of whatever kind," has remained a key question ever since.

A series of state and Supreme Court judgments in the 1960s and 1970s made it difficult for Catholic colleges and universities to be explicit about their religious mission and remain eligible for state and federal funding. In

the early 1980s, a series of court decisions seemed, at least in the view of some academic leaders, to force Catholic colleges and universities to choose between being sectarian or secular. Some of these leaders thought that if they were to remain eligible for federal funding, they needed to avoid any mention of the religious mission of their institution when hiring new faculty or admitting students, to teach theology only as an academic discipline, and to avoid all proselytizing. Most institutions had already made all religious practices optional and had begun to affirm academic freedom along the lines outlined by the AAUP, if not simply adopting it as their own. Given such understandings, along with the rapid expansion and professionalization of lay faculties, the decrease in the number of priests and religious, the power of accrediting agencies, the restrictions that accompanied an ever-increasing amount of government money for sponsored research, and the market pressures to compete with state subsidized public institutions, many Catholic colleges and universities, by the mid 1980s, struggled to find legal ways to make their identity and mission "perceptibly present and effectively operative."

**Ex corde ecclesiae (1990).** In 1979, the Vatican Congregation for Education published the apostolic constitution *Sapientia Christiana*, written for all pontifically chartered universities (such as the Catholic University of America). Shortly thereafter, the Congregation initiated a world-wide consultation for a second document that would deal with all non-pontifically chartered institutions—the vast majority of institutions in the U.S. In 1990, Pope John Paul II published the apostolic constitution *Ex corde ecclesiae*, indicating by its title that universities find their origin from the heart of the Church. The document's vision of higher education calls for Catholic institutions to show how various types of knowledge relate to one another, and to develop a coherent undergraduate curriculum in which philosophy and theology provide a framework for integration. It calls for faculty members to learn about each other's work, to search for the ethical and moral implications of both the methods and discoveries of their research, and to promote social justice.

Two essential components of the Land O'Lakes statement appear in the 1990 document: "Every Catholic university possesses that institutional autonomy necessary to perform its functions effectively and guarantees its members academic freedom, so long as the rights of the individual person and of the community are preserved within the confines of the truth and the common good." By institutional autonomy, the document explains in a footnote that "the governance of an academic institution is and remains internal to the institution." Concerning academic freedom, it explains further that it "is the guaran-

tee given to those involved in teaching and research that, within their specific specialized branch of knowledge and according to the methods proper to that specific area, they may search and publish the results of this search, keeping in mind the cited criteria, that is, safeguarding the rights of the individual and of society within the confines of the truth and the common good.”

The Vatican directed national episcopal conferences to take the general norms outlined in the second part of *Ex corde* (the first part dealt with the mission and identity of Catholic higher education), and make whatever adaptations were needed for their local application. A “pastoral” application was produced by the U.S. bishops in 1996, but was rejected by the Vatican, which directed that essential juridical elements, outlined in the revised 1983 Code of Canon Law, be included in a new application. Among those juridical elements were the requirement of the *mandatum* for Catholic theologians, the taking of the Oath of fidelity by presidents of Catholic universities, the desirability of at least 50 percent of the faculty and the board of trustees be Catholics, and the clear inclusion of *Ex corde*’s description of the mission and nature of a Catholic university in the by-laws of the local institution. The bishops produced such an application in 1999, which was subsequently approved by the Vatican.

**Continuing Tensions Regarding Academic Freedom.** Five persistent tensions accompany the idea of academic freedom at Catholic colleges and universities: (1) the differences between the corporate and individual aspects of academic freedom, (2) the AAUP’s understanding of academic freedom, (3) institutional autonomy and episcopal authority, (4) the academic freedom of the Catholic theologian, and (5) the practice of hiring for mission.

First, Catholic universities have stressed in practice, though rarely explicitly, a corporate idea of academic freedom. The AAUP understanding of academic freedom emphasizes the rights and responsibilities of the individual professor and the corresponding power of professional peers to determine what counts as knowledge. That understanding arose largely out of a liberal democratic focus on individual rights. Catholic tradition draws on a different understanding of the individual and society. It starts with the understanding that a person is radically social and always a member of a community. It describes society more in organic than contractual terms, though rights continue to belong both to the community and the individual. Given these differences between the AAUP and the Catholic approaches to the individual’s relationship to community, it is understandable why the Church has had such difficulty with many of the affirmations of the Enlightenment, particularly the way it formulated the

ideas of freedom of conscience and religious liberty. It seemed to Church authorities that both freedoms led inevitably to a kind of philosophical relativism and a rejection of Church tradition and authority. It was only midway through the 20th century that the work of thinkers like John Courtney Murray helped the Church embrace religious freedom, albeit with careful qualifications. Medieval universities retained a strong corporate freedom; they set their own standards and debated controversial issues. Were the university not to have the right to set appropriate standards that strengthen the Catholic character of the institutions, then the emphasis only on the individual professor’s rights would weaken the corporate identity of the institution.

Second, the AAUP’s concept of academic freedom emphasizes, as has been mentioned, a type of knowledge that relies primarily on scientific methodology. Therefore, it emphasizes new knowledge, acquired by inquiry and experimentation rather than the faithful retrieval and handing on of religious and humanistic traditions. In other words, the authority of a certain type of tradition, a religious tradition, was displaced by another tradition, a certain academic tradition that recognized as valid only that knowledge which is arrived at through scientific methodology. While it is true that very few thinkers now would describe themselves only as empiricists, for a number of secular academics the acceptance of Christian revelation as true still appears to be an indefensible sacrifice of intellectual freedom.

Having underscored these two limitations, it should be added that Catholic institutions can benefit from other characteristics of the AAUP understanding of academic freedom. In particular, its emphases on due process and institutional autonomy are of critical importance for Catholic institutions, which only in recent decades are putting in place procedures to insure both.

Third, *Ex corde* strikes a delicate balance between institutional autonomy on the one hand and episcopal authority on the other when, citing Pope John Paul II’s 1987 New Orleans address to the leaders of Catholic higher education, it says that bishops “should be seen not as external agents but as participants in the life of the Catholic university.” Except for pontifically chartered universities, nearly all Catholic colleges and universities in the United States (diocesan colleges have a slightly different relationship to their bishop) have predominantly lay boards of trustees. In essence, the local bishop has, as a consequence, no direct authority within the university to hire or fire faculty or employees. The bishop’s influence takes the form of persuasion and encouragement, and will be as effective as is his relationship with the leadership and members of a particular Catholic college. On the

other hand, if a board of trustees changed its by-laws to permit the bishop some direct authority, the bishop's "influence" would become administrative authority, no longer external but internal. Unfortunately, the mutually exclusive meaning conveyed by the words "external" and "internal" obscure the many ways in which the life of the Church, including the leadership of bishops, and the mission of a Catholic university do and should mutually influence each other. While the Church and the university have distinctive missions, in some ways, not juridical, these missions overlap.

Fourth, some secular academics question seriously whether Catholic theologians have genuine academic freedom. Theologians do not employ the same methods of verification as do scientists; their work, like that done by many in the humanities, is seen as mainly interpretation and opinion, not the result of rigorous and objective methodologies. Their teaching is perceived as "advocacy" or even "proselytization," rather than the dispassionate presentation of knowledge. Their competency is determined not by their peers, but by bishops who are perceived as "external non-academic" agents. The requirement that Catholic theologians teaching Catholic theology have from the local bishop a *mandatum* seems to verify all these perceptions. In response to these concerns, some have criticized the narrow epistemology that privileges the scientific method. Others maintain that many academics have shown that it is possible to teach a discipline enthusiastically and yet critically. It is also pointed out that "realities" outside the academy daily determine what ought to be the subject matter of a discipline—Supreme Court decisions for legal education, business trends for finance curricula, the state of the environment for ecologists, and developments in information technology for those designing communications curricula. More precisely, the lives and experiences of Christian believers in different cultures during different periods of history constitute as important a source for theological work as do the formal doctrinal decisions of Church councils and bishops. Finally, defenders of the *mandatum* point out that it only requires a Catholic theologian to present as Catholic theology what is officially the teaching of the Church—a legitimate professional expectation. Theologians, they continue, may also present other points of view, provide comparisons with other traditions, and raise critical questions, even about official teachings of the Church. If however a Catholic theologian opposes dogmatic teachings of the Church, then he or she ceases to be a Catholic theologian in good standing. Continuing tensions remain and, if Church history is any indication, will continue to remain as to how to insure due process should a difference on doctrine arise between a theologian and a bishop, and as to whether that difference is le-

gitimate or heterodox. Or, tensions will remain over differing interpretations of just what constitutes, in the words of *Ex corde*, the "confines of truth" and "the common good," the two qualities it attaches to academic freedom.

Fifth and finally, in recent years Catholic colleges and universities have increasingly attempted to "hire for mission," that is, to seek out academically qualified candidates for faculty positions who are Catholic or, if not, who nonetheless understand and support the institution's Catholic mission. Such efforts are fraught with difficulties, not the least of which are hiring candidates with religious but not academic qualifications and making all who are not Catholics feel only tolerated. Defenders of the practice of hiring for mission claim that if Catholicism is to be "perceptively present and effectively operative," especially as an intellectual force, then at least some Catholic intellectuals must be hired. As important as Catholic theology is for a Catholic university, other disciplines also must find ways to explore, critique, and embody key insights of Catholic intellectual traditions. Finally, they argue that unless there is a strong and vital non-juridical relationship to the faith and intellectual life of the Church that founded the college or university, it is only a matter of time before that institution begins to move away from its theological tradition to a moral one, and from there to a humanistic tradition, and before long, given the strong secular currents in the academy in the West, to a tradition that has no discernible relationship—intellectual or cultural—to the founding Church at all.

How to understand academic freedom for Catholic colleges and universities, how to benefit from the AAUP understanding of academic freedom aware of its limitations, how to balance institutional autonomy with a vital relationship to the larger Church, how to hire for mission without narrowing the base of faculty talent and the range of views any university should examine, and how to sustain a context in which theologians as well as faculty in other disciplines can creatively work—these challenges, if handled thoughtfully, will continue to ensure that Catholic higher education will provide a truly distinctive alternative to the over 3,000 other institutions of higher learning in the United States.

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[J. L. HEFT]

## ACCA OF HEXHAM, ST.

Bishop of Hexham; d. Hexham, England, Oct. 20, 740. A Northumbrian, he was fostered by Bosa (d. 705), who was afterward appointed bishop of York (678), and he became the devoted disciple and companion of WILFRID. When the latter was reinstated at Hexham in 705, he made Acca abbot of St. Andrew’s monastery there. Acca succeeded Wilfrid as bishop of Hexham in 709. In addition to ruling the diocese with zeal, he concerned himself with the promotion of the liturgy in all its splendor by procuring the service of the cantor Maban (fl. 720), who had inherited the Roman tradition of psalmody of GREGORY THE GREAT, brought to England by the monks of Augustine of Canterbury. He completed, decorated, and richly furnished the churches begun by Wilfrid. He promoted learning, built and equipped a famous library, and, above all, encouraged BEDE, who wrote about him and dedicated several books to him. He was expelled from Hexham in 732 for some unknown reason; he sought refuge in Galloway but returned to die and be buried in his diocese.

Feast: Oct. 20.

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[C. MCGRATH]

## ACCEPTANTS

Members of the clergy, especially in France and in the Netherlands, who accepted the bull *Unigenitus*, dated Sept. 8, 1713, and known in France as early as September 25. At this time, in France, a pontifical declaration had no effect until after it had been accepted by parliament and the Assembly of the Clergy. Parliament discussed the bull *UNIGENITUS* on September 27 and 28. The opposition was led by Attorney General H. F. Daguesseau, who maintained that he saw in it proof of the fallibility of the popes, and parliament refused to endorse the bull, at least for the time being. The King then brought together the bishops present in Paris in an Assembly of the Clergy.

The debates began on October 16. The Acceptants were immediately in the majority; supported by those in power and influenced especially by Cardinals A. G. de Rohan and H. de Bissy, they were nevertheless unable to attain unanimity and subdue their opponents, grouped around Cardinal L. A. de Noailles, Archbishop of Paris. Louis XIV, annoyed, sent the opponents to their dioceses and on Feb. 15, 1714, by a *lettre de cachet*, imposed on parliament the acceptance of the bull. In Aug. 1714, 112 bishops had accepted it, while only 16 refused it. Some Acceptants retracted their submission in 1716, during the brief period in which the Regent was favorably disposed toward Jansenism; but shortly afterward the Acceptants again had the support of those in power, and the Archbishop of Sens, Languet de Gergy, assumed a leading position in the group. The victory was practically assured them after the royal declaration of March 24, 1730, which made *Unigenitus* a law of the land.

[L. J. COGNET]

## ACCESSUS

In order to expedite the papal election, each cardinal, immediately after an inconclusive ballot, was allowed an additional vote in favor of a candidate other than the one for whom he had voted in the ballot; such additional votes were added to those cast in the ballot in the hope of effecting a two-thirds majority. This procedure was known as *accessus*, i.e., acceding to the latter candidate. A cardinal could use this right of *accessus* only once after each ballot; after 1621 he could not use it in his own favor. The complications involved in ensuring that a cardinal did not use it in his own favor or in favor of the candidate for whom he had already voted in the ballot prompted St. Pius X in 1904 to abolish it, replacing it with a second ballot that should take place immediately after each morning and evening ballot.

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[B. FORSHAW]

## ACCIAIOLI

A celebrated Florentine family whose name (spelled also Acciaiuoli or Acciajuoli) derives from *acciaio* (steel), in which the family dealt in the Brescia-Bergamo area until Frederick Barbarossa’s depredations against the Guelfs of Lombardy forced them to move into Tuscany. From the year 1161, when Guigliarallo Acciaiuoli settled