

Middle knowledge gets its name because it partakes partly of the nature of two extreme kinds of divine knowledge, while partly differing from them.

There is God's natural or necessary knowledge (called *mere naturalis* by Molina), prior to every decree, and inconceivable as absent from God (His knowledge of Himself); there is also His free, contingent knowledge (which Molina called *mere libera*), presupposing an absolute decree, and conceivable as absent from God (His knowledge of human history). Because it is prior to every absolute decree, between these two is middle knowledge. It is like God's natural knowledge, being prior to any absolute decree, but unlike it, in being conceivably absent from God; it concerns contingent being. It is also like God's free knowledge, since both can be absent from God; but unlike it, because God's free knowledge presupposes an absolute decree that something be. Molina speaks of middle knowledge only in this sense.

There is also God's knowledge of simple intelligence, which represents things, but not as existing (possibles), and His knowledge of vision, which represents things as absolutely existing. Because its object is the free futurible, between these two is middle knowledge. It is like the former, since neither represents an object as absolutely existing, but unlike it, because knowledge of a futurible represents a conditionally existing thing. Also it is like knowledge of vision, since neither represents its object as merely possible; but unlike it, for vision represents its object as absolutely, not conditionally, existing.

This article has dealt with God's direct middle knowledge, by which He knows, prior to any absolute decree, what a free creature would do in any contingency. There is also God's reflex middle knowledge, by which He knows what He Himself would do in any circumstances. Such circumstances may depend upon God alone: "if I would create another universe, I would create so many angels"—God as it were reflects upon His own conditional action, "if I would create"; or circumstances may depend upon God and a creature: "if I would see Adam obeying, I would still send Christ"—here God reflects upon an object of His own direct middle knowledge, namely Adam obeying.

Direct middle knowledge is held by all Molinists, but not all admit reflex middle knowledge. Molinists also hold God's middle knowledge, together with that of simple intelligence, to be the cause of things only as directive of divine action.

See Also: GRACE, CONTROVERSIES ON; MOLINISM; FREE WILL AND GRACE; OMNISCIENCE; BÁÑEZ AND BÁÑEZIANISM.

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SCIENTISM

Scientism is a system of thought or attitude of mind holding that science constitutes the only valid knowledge and is alone capable of solving all human problems. Science is here understood in the sense of a systematized body of knowledge obtained from empirical procedures, entailing objectivity in the measurement of phenomena and the reduction of particular laws to a small number of principles. Observation of phenomena, description, classification, explanation, and verification are the techniques it employs. Scientism asserts that truth can be arrived at solely through such techniques, and hence regards philosophy and religion as purely subjective in character.

Contemporary scientism is the outgrowth of the rapidity of developments in the physical sciences, mathematics, and technology. Philosophically, its roots lie in the mathematicism of R. DESCARTES; in the empiricism of J. LOCKE, D. HUME, and J. S. MILL; in the physicalism of I. KANT; and in 19th-century POSITIVISM and pragmatism. Throughout the history of thought it has frequently manifested itself as MATERIALISM. Its chief proponents in the 1960s are the schools of LOGICAL POSITIVISM and scientific EMPIRICISM—the latter seeking to unify all sciences into a science of sciences through the analysis of language.

Scientism, like much of science itself, is wedded to formalism and axiomatic method, conceptualization through signs, univocity of concepts, and the transcendence of mind over reality. Such an approach to reality results in knowledge of a purely univocal nature. Yet man's knowledge is not restricted to univocal knowledge alone. Analogical concepts acquired through the natural light of reason are valid, as is the knowledge of God, man, and the world acquired through the supernatural light of faith. Moreover, love, affectivity, beauty, personality, and a host of other realities are by their very nature inaccessible to empirical methods.

Science, philosophy, and theology can lay equal claim to validity when dealing with their own subject

matter and according to their proper methods and principles. Scientism, by restricting valid knowledge to the level of science, overgeneralizes the scientific method and overrestricts reality to the confines of matter alone.

See Also: LOGICISM; METAPHYSICS, VALIDITY OF.

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SCIENTOLOGY

A quasi-scientific and religious movement founded by L. Ron Hubbard, an American science fiction author. Hubbard’s book, *Dianetics: The Modern Science of Mental Health* (New York 1950), became an international best seller and led, in 1952, to the incorporation of an international organization which later evolved into Scientology. Dianetics initially claimed to be “a science of mental health,” but with the creation of the Founding Church of Scientology (offices in Wash., D.C., and in New York, N.Y.) in 1955, the organization took a religious turn. The church has followers in English speaking countries throughout the world, as well as in Denmark, France, and Sweden, and has claimed up to several million adherents.

Although formal religious services play no part in the activities of the organization, Scientology does possess a highly structured system of beliefs and identifies itself as a church. It accepts a doctrine of reincarnation that claims the human being is a *thetan*, a preexistent spiritual being. In this life human beings possess a body and mind that enable them to travel through the physical universe, called MEST (matter, energy, space, time). Mental functioning is guided by the quest for survival, the fundamental drive of human existence, which divides the mind into “analytic,” or conscious, and “reactive,” or subconscious functions. Every experience in one’s life is said to be recorded as a mental image. Painful experiences, called “engrams,” are not immediately available to the analytic mind, but are recorded in the reactive. They may be exceedingly difficult to detect, some tracing their origins back to prenatal injuries in the womb. When stimulated later, Scientology claims, they may lead to irrational behavior.

Therapy proceeds with the help of an “E-meter,” similar to a skin galvanometer or lie detector, which identifies emotionally charged words. An “auditor” reviews

one’s past to help reduce the power of engrams or to convert them into conscious memories. Through long discipline in this procedure, a novice or “preclear” becomes a “clear” and is able to become an auditor to others or a minister of the church.

The church has been criticized for its scientific and religious claims, and for the financial demands it makes on its members. Psychotherapists deny that the unconscious mind can be neutralized by the procedures Hubbard proposed. Although the literature of Scientology and E-meters now carry medical disclaimers, the church has been plagued from its inception by lawsuits filed both by various governments and by disaffected members.

For its part, the church has filed scores of lawsuits against governmental agencies, asserting that it has been a victim of religious persecution. When L. Ron Hubbard died Jan. 28, 1986, at the age of 74, the church was still under investigation by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service. The church suffered its most serious blow in 1984 when the IRS successfully argued that the church’s tax-exempt status should be revoked.

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SCIOPIIUS, KASPAR

Philologist, polemicist, and diplomat; b. Neumarkt (Upper Palatinate), May 27, 1576; d. Padua, Italy, Nov. 19, 1649. After studies in philology in Heidelberg, Altdorf, and Ingolstadt, Scioppius (Schoppe) published the first of his many scientific works, *Verisimilium libri quatuor* (1595), suggesting improvements in the writings of Plautus, Symmachus, and Cornelius Nepos. He became a convert to Catholicism in 1598, writing about it in *De migratione sua ad Catholicos* (1599). He moved to Rome, where he displayed his antagonism to Protestantism by a prodigious writing campaign that included *Pro auctoritate ecclesiae* (1598) and *De variis fidei controversiis* (1600). His uncompromising Catholicism won favor and admiration from the popes, Prince Ferdinand, and the Dukes Wilhelm and Maximilian of Bavaria. His successful polemics made him the protagonist for the Catholic cause during the THIRTY YEARS’ WAR (1618–48). In the *Classicum belli sacri* (1619) he challenged the use of arms against heretics. Though he had always showed reserve toward the Jesuits with the *Actio perduellionis in Jesuitas* (1632) he opened a sharp attack that startled his patrons and friends. His antagonism in-