The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. Electronic edition. :: Volume 7: Science and Philosophy

Endnotes

^†1 He was employed by the Coast Survey from September 21, 1859, to June 1, 1860, and from July 1, 1861, to December 31, 1891.

^†2 See the Bibliography in Vol. VIII, especially the years 1872 through 1886; Peirce produced little in the way of results for the Coast Survey after he moved to Milford, Pa., in the spring of 1887.

xii

^†3 Cf. 6.44, 6.46. Peirce's most original contribution to geodetics was the discovery of a new source of error in gravity measurement; this is described at 7.1-12. Peirce also did research for the Coast Survey on standards of measurement.

^†1 (Ed.) From pp. 359-361 of Appendix 14, "On the Flexure of Pendulum Supports," [CS 1881] 1883, pp. 359-441.

This gives a succinct account, in Peirce's own words, of his most original work in the field of pendulum measurements.

^†2 Thus, Bessel's idea of directly measuring the position of the center of mass was supposed by the Swiss savans to belong to M. Cellerier.

^†3 (Ed.) [Bibliography] G-1875-5. The quotations from the circular by Baeyer, given in 7.6, and from the reports, given in this paragraph, are in [International Geodetic Comm., Paris, 1875] 1875, pp. 90-91, 93, and 96.

^†4 (Ed.) See [Bibliography] G-1875-5. The quotation in this paragraph from Hirsch is in [International Geodetic Comm., Brussels, 1876] 1877, p. 18.

^†5 (Ed.) [Bibliography] G-1877-3.

^†6 (Ed.) See [Bibliography] G-1877-3.

^†7 (Ed.) "Six Reasons for the Prosecution of Pendulum Experiments," pp. 506-508 of Appendix 22, "Report of a Conference on Gravity Determinations, Held in Washington, in May, 1882," [CS 1882] 1883, as corrected from a reprint marked "Copy read by C. S. Peirce," Widener IC2c.

This is reprinted here because it is a good statement by Peirce of what he thought the value of his pendulum work to be.

^†8 (Ed.) J. E. Hilgard was Superintendent of the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey at this time.

^†9 (Ed.) Cf. [Bibliography] G-1879-1, G-1881-5, G-1882-12.

^†1 (Ed.) "On Small Differences of Sensation," Memoirs of the National Academy of Sciences 3, Part I (1884) 73-83, with corrections from a reprint marked, "Prof. John W. Langley, With the regards of C. S. Peirce," Widener IC1a.

The article was written with Joseph Jastrow, a student of Peirce at Johns Hopkins University. In The Nation 98 (14 May 1914) 571 Jastrow says of it: "It was Mr. Peirce who introduced me to the possibility of an experimental study of a psychological problem. He provided the problem, the instruments which I set up in my room, the method, and the mode of reaching the results; these were printed over our joint names." See also Joseph Jastrow, "Charles S. Peirce as a Teacher," The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Method 13 (21 Dec. 1916) 724.

Edwin G. Boring, in his A History of Experimental Psychology, p. 529, refers to "On Small Differences of Sensation" as "an important paper on the method of determining the differential limen . . ."

^†2 Elemente der Psychophysik, I, p. 242.

^†3 The rule for finding this ratio is as follows: Divide the logarithm of the ratio of excitations by the probable error and multiply the quotient by 0.477. Call this product t. Enter it in the table of the integral {th}t, given in most works on probabilities; {th}t is the proportion of cases in which the error will be less than the difference between the given excitations. In all these cases, of course, we shall answer correctly, and also by chance in one-half of the remaining cases. The proportion of erroneous answers is therefore (1-{th}t)/2. In the following table the first column gives the quotient of the logarithm of the ratio of excitation, divided by the probable error, and the second column shows the proportion of erroneous judgments:

0.0	0.50
0.05	0.49
0.1	0.47
0.25	0.43
0.5	0.37
1.0	0.25

To guess the correct card out of a pack of fifty-two once in eleven times it would be necessary to have a sensation amounting to 0.37 of the probable error. This would be a sensation of which we should probably never become aware, as will appear below.

^†4 The number of errors, when an increase of weight was followed by a decrease, was slightly less than when the first change was a decrease of pressure.

^†5 The result of our observations on the confidence connected with the judgments is as follows: —————————————————————————————- [Subject, Mr Peirce.] —————————————————————————————- Average Number of Variations. confidence. sets of 50. —————————————————————————————- Grams. 60 ........................... .67 7 30 ........................... .28 6 15 ........................... .15 5 —————————————————————————————- ——————————————————————————————— [Subject, Mr. Jastrow.] ——————————————————————————————— 60............................ .90 13 30............................ .51 12 15............................ .30 12 20............................ .11 12 10............................ .06 12 5............................ .00 10 ———————————————————————————————

In 1,125 experiments (subject, Mr. Peirce) — variations 15, 30, and 60 grams — there occurred confidence of 3, 35 times (3 per cent.); of 2, 102 times (9 per cent.); of 1, 282 times (25 per cent.); of 0, 706 times (63 per cent.). In these experiments there were 332 (29 per cent.) errors committed, of which 1 (0.3 per cent.) was made in connection with a confidence 3; 10 (3 per cent.) with a confidence 2; 51 (15 per cent.) with a confidence 1; 270 (81 per cent.) with a confidence 0. From which we find that in connection with a confidence of 3 there occurred 1 error in 35 cases (3 per cent.); with a confidence of 2, 10 errors in 102 cases (10 per cent.); with a confidence of 1, 51 errors in 282 cases (18 per cent.); with a confidence of 0, 270 errors in 706 cases (38 per cent.).

In 1,975 experiments (subject, Mr. Jastrow) — variations 15, 30, and 60 grams — there occurred confidence of 3, 62 times (3 per cent.); of 2, 196 times (10 per cent.); of 1, 594 times (30 per cent.); of 0, 1,123 times (57 per cent.). In these experiments there were 451 (23 per cent.) errors committed, of which 2 (0.4 per cent.) were made in connection with a confidence of 3; 12 (3 per cent.) with a confidence of 2; 97 (22 per cent.) with a confidence of 1; 340 (75 per cent.) with a confidence of 0. Again, in connection with a confidence of 3, errors occurred twice in 62 cases (3 per cent.); with a confidence of 2, 12 times in 196 cases (6 per cent.); with a confidence of 1, 97 times in 504 cases (16 per cent.); with a confidence of 0, 340 times in 1,123 cases (30 per cent.).

In 1,675 experiments (subject, Mr. Jastrow) — variations 5, 10, and 20 grams — there occurred confidences of 3, none; of 2, none; of 1, 115 times (7 per cent.); of 0, 1,560 times (93 per cent.). In these experiments there were 538 (32 per cent.) errors committed, of which 16 (3 per cent.) occurred in connection with a confidence of 1; 522 (97 per cent.) with a confidence of 0. Again, in connection with a confidence of 1, errors occurred 16 times in 115 cases (14 per cent.); with a confidence of 0, 522 times in 1,560 cases (34 per cent.). Second group. ———————————————————————————- Ratio of weights. Mark 0. Mark 1. Mark 2. Mark 3. ———————————————————————————- 1.015.......{110 right 51 right 3 right 1 right { 66 wrong 17 wrong 2 wrong 0 wrong 1.030.......{106 right 72 right 23 right 2 right { 35 wrong 11 wrong 1 wrong 0 wrong 1.060.......{ 86 right 75 right 54 right 24 right { 8 wrong 1 wrong 2 wrong 0 wrong ———————————————————————————- Third and fourth groups. [Marks 2 and 3 do not occur.] ——————————————————————- Ratio of weights. Mark 0. Mark 1. ——————————————————————- 1.005...............{294 right 2 right {203 wrong 1 wrong 1.010...............{366 right 32 right {192 wrong 30 wrong 1.020...............{395 right 68 right {131 wrong 6 wrong ——————————————————————-

^†6 At first a short pause was made in the set of 25, at the option of the subject; later this was dispensed with.

^†7 In the experiments of December, 1883, and January, 1884, the method as above described was not fully perfected, the most important fault being that the total weight instead of being removed and replaced by a mechanical device, was taken off by the operator pressing with his finger upon the beam of the balance.

^†8 In the tables of the third and fourth groups, there is a marked divergence between the a priori and a posteriori probable error, for the average number of errors in 50, making the observed probable error too small. This can only be partly accounted for by the fact that the subject formed the unconscious habit of retaining the number of each kind of experiment in a set and answering according to that knowledge. In point of fact the plus errors and minus errors separately do not exhibit the singular uniformity of their sums, for which we are quite unable to account. Thus in the fourth group we have: Number of + and - errors. Date. 1.020 1.010 1.005 ———————————————————————————— March 30........ -4,+ 7 -6,+10 -13,+ 8 March 31........ -7,+ 3 -5,+10 - 6,+15 April 2......... -1,+10 -8,+ 9 - 8,+13 April 3......... -4,+ 5 -4,+14 -10,+10 April 6......... -6,+ 6 -8,+ 7 -10,+11 April 7......... -5,+ 9 -8,+ 7 - 8,+ 9 ————————————————————————————

^†9 The conclusions of this paper are strengthened by the results of a series of experiments on the color sense, made with the use of a photometer by Mr. Jastrow. The object was to determine the number of errors of a given magnitude, and compare the numbers thus ascertained with the theoretical numbers given by the probability curve. A thousand experiments were made. Dividing the magnitude of the errors from 0 to the largest error, made into 5 parts, the number of errors, as observed and calculated, that occur in each part are as follows: Observed ....... 199 181 217 213 190 Calculated ..... 213 197 209 181 200

These numbers would be in closer accordance if the probable error were the same throughout, as it is not owing to the effects of practice, etc. Moreover, the experiments were made on different colors — 300 on white and 100 each on yellow, blue, dove, pink, green, orange, and brown. These experiments were not continuous.

^†10 (Ed.) See the following section of the present chapter.

^†11 (Ed.) Cf. [Bibliography]G-1887-3, p. 194.

^†12 (Ed.) From a manuscript, "Guessing," with a quotation in 36n13 from a fragmentary alternative draft. These manuscripts are in Widener IB2-12, and are dated c.1907 on the basis of internal references and statements in the letter referred to in 44n17.

The manuscript, "Guessing," was published in The Hound and Horn 2 (April-June 1929) 267-282.

In the passages reprinted here Peirce gives a non-technical summary of the previous paper and discusses some philosophical implications of it.

^†13 (Ed.) The fragmentary manuscript (see 36n12) begins: "All our knowledge starts from perception, and consequently perception ought never to be doubted, and indeed never can be doubted. That is to say, that we cannot doubt that that really seems which seems to seem" and then the manuscript proceeds very much like the version printed above. Cf. 5.157.

^†14 (Ed.) Cf. 2.638, 2.753, 2.755.

^†15 (Ed.) Peirce here recounts a personal anecdote, concerning the theft of his coat and a valuable watch from his stateroom on a Boston to New York boat. He says that he made all the waiters stand in a row and after talking briefly with each, but without consciously getting any clue, he made a guess as to which one was guilty. The upshot of the story is that after many difficulties, and by making more successful guesses, he proved that his original guess had been correct.

^†16 (Ed.) See the first section of this chapter.

^†17 (Ed.) Reprinted as the first section of this chapter. Peirce says in a letter to William James of 16 July 1907 (Houghton Library) that there were 3389 guesses given with a confidence of "Naught" and about two thirds of these were correct (see 26n5).

^†1 (Ed.) Paragraphs 49-52 are from manuscript L, undated (but cf. 59n4), Widener IB2-9. Paragraphs 53-58 are from "Of the Classification of the Sciences. Second Paper. Of the Practical Sciences," Widener II. Paragraphs 53-57, 381n19 and 58 come from the manuscript in that order. This manuscript is dated c.1902 on the basis of references in it.

^†2 (Ed.) This statement appears on page 3 in the edition edited by Alois Höfler, published by C. E. M. Pfeffer, Leipzig, 1900.

^†3 (Ed.) Cf. 5.340.

^†4 (Ed.) Paragraphs 59-76 are "Introductory Lecture on the Study of Logic," [JHUC] 2(Nov 1882)11-12, with two preliminary paragraphs omitted. Paragraphs 77-78 are from manuscript N, Widener IB2-9, undated, but the manuscript contains results from the census of 1900. This manuscript and manuscript L (cf. 49n1) are probably parts of the same work.

^†5 (Ed.) Orbellis (Nicholaus de), Expositio super textu Petri Hispani, Super libro Peryhermenias, Venice, 1500, fol. a3v.

^†6 (Ed.) See Book I of the present volume.

^†7 (Ed.) Peirce's main task in the United States Coast Survey was to measure the force of gravity by swinging a pendulum.

^†8 (Ed.) See the review of Wundt's book in [CP] VIII, Book I, Review 14.

^†9 (Ed.) See [CP] V.

^†10 (Ed.) See the rest of the present book and [CP] II for discussions of most of the topics mentioned in this and the following paragraphs.

^†11 (Ed.) Cf. 5.383ff.

^†12 (Ed.) Paragraphs 79-88 are "Scientific Method," Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology (edited by James Mark Baldwin), Vol. II, 1902, pp. 500-503. Paragraphs 89-91 are "Verification," ibid., pp. 761-762.

^†13 (Ed.) Peirce did not define this term for Baldwin's Dictionary, but see Section 1 of the present chapter (49ff.).

^†14 (Ed.) See Chapter 2, "Economy of Research," in the present book.

^†15 (Ed.) See Chapter 3, "The Logic of Drawing History from Ancient Documents," in the present book.

^†16 (Ed.) Cf. Chapter 5, "Telepathy and Perception," in Book III of the present volume.

^†17 (Ed.) 2.773-778.

^†18 (Ed.) 2.783-787.

^†19 (Ed.) Paragraphs 92-93 are "Parsimony (law of)," Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology (edited by James Mark Baldwin), Vol. II, 1902, p. 264. Paragraphs 94-96 are from "Theory," ibid., pp. 693-694.

^†20 (Ed.) "Notes for my Logical Criticism of Articles of the Christian Creed," Widener IB3. Judging by the reference to 1860 in the second paragraph, this is to be dated c.1910.

^†21 (Ed.) Peirce also uses "Abduction" and "Hypothesis" for what he here calls "Retroduction."

^†22 (Ed.) That is, in the case of a unit mass, the force is equal to the acceleration, and it is also equal to the derivative of the energy with respect to distance.

^†23 (Ed.) See [CP] IV, Book II.

^†24 (Ed.) Peirce's fallibilism, the doctrine that there is no absolute certainty in knowledge, is discussed at 1.8ff., and elsewhere in [CP] I.

^†25 (Ed.) Cf. the discussion of unreal doubt as contrasted to genuine doubt at 5.265 and elsewhere in [CP] V.

^†26 (Ed.) From Vol. I of Lecture 7 of the Lowell Lectures of 1903, Widener IB2-4. Cf. 2.755-760 and 7.208-217 for related treatments of the same topic.

^†27 (Ed.) "The Deductions which we base upon the hypothesis which has resulted from Abduction produce conditional predictions concerning our future experience. That is to say, we infer by Deduction that if the hypothesis be true, any future phenomena of certain descriptions must present such and such characters. We now institute a course of quasi-experimentation in order to bring these predictions to the test, and thus to form our final estimate of the value of the hypothesis, and this whole proceeding I term Induction. I speak of quasi-experimentation because the term experiment is, according to the usage of scientific men, restricted to the operation of bringing about certain conditions. The noting of the results of experiments or of anything else to which our attention is directed in advance of our noting it, is called Observation. But by quasi-experimentation I mean the entire operation either of producing or of searching out a state of things to which the conditional predictions deduced from hypothesis shall be applicable and of noting how far the prediction is fulfilled." From an earlier passage of the same lecture (110n26).

^†28 (Ed.) From Lecture IV (c.1866) of the same series from which 7.579-596 are taken, Widener IB2-10; cf. 7.579n34.

^†1 (Ed.) "Note on the Theory of the Economy of Research," [CS 1876] 1879, pp. 197-201, with some corrections from a manuscript version in Widener IC2a. Cf. 5.600ff.; the paper referred to at 5.601n§ is probably this one.

^†2 (Ed.) In this paragraph the editor has corrected the second formula according to the manuscript, and rewritten the notation somewhat to make it uniform.

^†3 (Ed.) In the manuscript version (see 139n1) Peirce says that this problem suggested his speculations on the economy of research.

^†4 (Ed.) See [Bibliography] G-1879-5d, p. 260.

^†5 (Ed.) "[Memoir] No. 28, On the Economics of Research," from an application by Peirce for a grant from the Carnegie Institution (stamped by the Carnegie Institution 30 July 1902) with an added quotation in the present footnote from an alternative draft, both in Widener VB5. Peirce proposed to write thirty-six memoirs on logic, most of them of approximately 20,000 words, a few much shorter, and some of 50,000 words.

The following are quoted from other parts of the application: "Therefore, what I hereby solicit the aid of the Carnegie Institution to enable me to do is to draw up some three dozen memoirs, each complete in itself, yet the whole forming a unitary system of logic in all its parts, which memoirs shall present in a form quite convincing to a candid mind the results to which I have found that the scientific method unequivocally leads, adding, in each case, rational explanations of how opposing opinions have come about; the whole putting logic, as far as my studies of it have gone, upon the undeniable footing of a science," pp. 4-5.

"It is my belief that science is approaching a critical point in which the influence of a truly scientific logic will be exceptionally desirable. Science, as the outlook seems to me, is coming to something not unlike the age of puberty. Its old and purely materialistic conceptions will no longer suffice; while yet the great danger involved in the admission of any others, ineluctable as such admission is, is manifest enough. The influence of the conceptions of methodeutic will at that moment be decisive," p. 57.

In an alternative draft of this application he says: "What are the researches of which I speak? "They are the work of my life, that which I seem to have been put into the world to do." The application was rejected.

^†6 (Ed.) Section 1 of the present chapter.

^†7 (Ed.) See the same quotation in 7.59.

^†1 (Ed.) From a draft of a report on the meeting of the National Academy of Sciences in November, 1901, Widener IV; see [Bibliography] N-1901-16. Cf. [Bibliography] G-1901-2b and 2c, both of which touch on the topic of the present chapter and which were written about the same time.

^†2 (Ed.) The remainder of this chapter is from a typed manuscript, "On the Logic of drawing History from Ancient Documents especially from Testimonies," with two quotations added at 182n7 and 220n18. The material from the manuscript includes additions in Peirce's hand and a few minor editorial corrections taken from a corresponding handwritten manuscript; the quotation in 220n18 is from some alternate pages of the handwritten manuscript. These manuscripts are at Widener IB2-12 and are dated c.1901 on the basis of Peirce's National Academy of Sciences paper, [Bibliography] G-1901-4.

^†3 (Ed.) Cf. 2.19ff.

101

^†4 (Ed.) Peirce's theory of probability is presented in [CP] II, Part B of Book III.

105

^†5 (Ed.) See 1.188, 1.260, 1.502.

105

^†6 (Ed.) See 1.189.

^†7 (Ed.) "On five occasions in my life, and on five occasions only, I have had an opportunity of testing my Abductions about historical facts, by the fulfillment of my predictions in subsequent archeological or other discoveries; and on each one of those five occasions my conclusions, which in every case ran counter to that of the highest authorities, turned out to be correct. The last two cases were these. Prof. Petrie published a history of Egypt in which he treated the first three dynasties as mythical. I was just about writing a history of science and in the first chapter I showed why those Dynasties including the name of Menes and other facts ought to be considered historical. Before my book was near completion Petrie himself found the tomb of Menes. Again a few years ago I wrote in the Nation, where there was no room for details, that the Babylonians had high scientific genius and that there was reason to conjecture that Alexander sent home a Babylonian celestial globe dating from 2300 years B.C. Now the newest finds show that at that very date they were accomplished astronomers." From the Lowell Lectures of 1903, Lecture VIII, following shortly after 5.604; Widener IB2-4. See [Bibliography] G-1903-2a.

107

^†8 (Ed.) [Bibliography] G-c.1902-2.

107

^†9 (Ed.) Cf. [Bibliography] G-1901-2.

112

^†10 (Ed.) Cf. [Bibliography] G-1891-1.

116

^†11 (Ed.) The Principles of Empirical or Inductive Logic, London, 1889. The quotations given by Peirce in paragraphs 199 and 200 are taken from pages 495 and 498.

119

^†12 (Ed.) See R. C. Archibald, Benjamin Peirce, p. 14, for an account of this.

121

^†13 (Ed.) These subjects are also treated in [CP] II.

125

^†14 (Ed.) See Chapter 2, "Economy of Research," in the present book.

126

^†15 (Ed.) Cf. 7.110-130.

126

^†16 (Ed.) There follows a long discussion of collections (sets), of which we have printed here only that part necessary to understand the discussion below.

127

^†17 (Ed.) [Bibliography] G-1881-7 ([AJM]). See also [Bibliography] G-1885-3 ([AJM]).

138

^†18 (Ed.) "[Abduction] alone can propose every proposition. . . . induction is the sole court of last resort in every case.

138

"This being the case, what does it matter how the work of abduction is performed? It matters much, for the reason that it originates every proposition. It is true that, however carelessly the abduction is performed, the true hypothesis will get suggested at last. But the aid which a correct logic can afford to science consists in enabling that to be done at small expenditure of every kind which, at any rate, is bound to get done somehow. The whole service of logic to science, whatever the nature of its services to individuals may be, is of the nature of an economy. So much truth, — and more than this, — I concede to the doctrine of Ernst Mach, although I cannot approve of the extreme length to which he carries the theory of economy. . . .

138

"The principles upon which abduction ought to be conducted ought to be determined exclusively by considerations of what purpose it subserves and how it may best subserve that purpose. Since, therefore, in scientific investigation abduction can subserve no other purpose than economy, it follows that the rules of scientific abduction ought to be based exclusively upon the economy of research." From a fragmentary alternative draft (see 164n2).

138

Cf. Chapter 2, "Economy of Research," in the present book (7.139ff.).

151

^†19 (Ed.) The essentials of this story are credited in John Edwin Sandys, A History of Classical Scholarship, Vol. 1, 3rd edition, University Press, Cambridge, 1921, pp. 85-86.

153

^†20 (Ed.) Peirce's brackets.

161

^†21 (Ed.) Peirce's brackets.

162

^†22 (Ed.) Peirce advanced the same theory at 2.776, but at 8.209 (c.1905) he confesses that it is doubtful.

164

^†23 (Ed.) Peirce then proceeds to give two more illustrative examples. The first is a problem of the chronology of Plato's dialogues, and the second concerns the life of Pythagoras. This part of the manuscript is more than half as long as the part reprinted here.

165

^†1 (Ed.) Paragraphs 256-261 are from one draft of a manuscript on the productiveness of the nineteenth century in great men; paragraphs 262-266 are from an alternative draft. Both drafts are in Widener IC1b, and are dated c.1900 on the basis of their resemblance to [Bibliography] G-1901-5a and internal references to dates.

165

For additional information on Peirce's study of great men see [Fisch-Cope] 290-291 and Joseph Jastrow, "Charles S. Peirce as a Teacher," The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Method 13 (21 Dec 1916) 724-725.

167

^†2 The fact that some of the finest observations of the naturalist were made by a blind man sufficiently shows that that science does not call for any extraordinary amount of the power I have in view.

167

(Ed.) Peirce is probably referring here to François Huber, 1750-1831, a Swiss naturalist who became blind at age fifteen. He was noted for his investigations of bees.

169

^†3 (Ed.) [Bibliography] G-1878-6.

170

^†4 This vote was probably influenced by religious bias.

172

^†5 (Ed.) Cf. Peirce's "Introductory Lecture on the Study of Logic," 7.59-76.

174

^†6 (Ed.) Peirce then proceeds to discuss the great men of the nineteenth century. He discusses the century's great men in science in [Bibliography] G-1901-5a.

175

^†7 (Ed.) Paragraphs 267-275 are the concluding remarks to a series of lectures on the history of science, Widener IC1b, with quotations added at 267n8. The first paragraph of 267n8 is from Lecture V of this series, Widener IC1b. These are most probably the lectures delivered on "The History of Science" to the Lowell Institute, 1892-1893. On the basis of this probability and internal references, Lecture V is dated c.1892, and the concluding remarks 1893.

175

Paragraphs 276-278 are Section 13, "Varieties of Medisense," of an incomplete manuscript, undated, Widener IB2-10. This manuscript has some resemblance to 7.539-552, [Bibliography] G-undated-9, and may have been written about the same time.

175

Paragraph 279 is from Section 1, "Classification of the Sciences," of Minute Logic, Chapter 2, "Prelogical Notions," Widener IB2-2. The marginal sidehead is "Three Stages of Physical Research." One of the manuscript pages is stamped "Mar 12 1902." This selection lies between 7.374n10 and 7.362; cf. 7.362n1.

^†8 (Ed.) In Lecture V of the series (see 267n7), Peirce says: "For my part, I am quite sure that, however it may be with the rank and file of the great army of general readers, those who come here will be interested in the history of science not as a mere Wonder Book, but as an instance, a specimen, of how the laws of growth apply to the human mind. As this Century is drawing to a close, it is interesting to pause and look about us and to ask ourselves in what great questions science is now most interested. The answer must be that the question that everybody is now asking, in metaphysics, in the theory of reasoning, in psychology, in general history, in philology, in sociology, in astronomy, perhaps even in molecular physics, is the question How things grow; and by far the most interesting aspect of the history of science, is that it shows how an important department of human thought has been developed from generation to generation, with a view of comparing this growth with the historical development of art, of religion, of politics, and of institutions generally, and not only with historical development but also with the growth of the individual mind, and not only of mind, but of organisms both in their geological succession and in their individual development, and with the formation of worlds, and even with the gradual coming into being and crystallization of the fundamental laws of matter and of mind, — from all of which facts taken together we are to expect in the future a grand cosmogony or philosophy of creation."

In the "Introduction" to a planned history of science, Widener IC1b (undated), Peirce says: "For that which the author had at heart throughout his studies of the history of science was to gain an understanding of the whole logic of every pathway to the truth."

178

^†9 (Ed.) [Bibliography] G-1891-1e (1893).

179

^†10 (Ed.) Cf. 7.539-552.

179

^†11 (Ed.) Cf. [Bibliography] G-c.1893-4.

180

^†12 (Ed.) Cf. [Bibliography] N-1894-4.

181

^†13 (Ed.) From "Of the Nature of Measurement," an undated, incomplete manuscript in Widener IA-4. Cf. 4.142-152 which are on the same topic.

184

^†14 (Ed.) Cf. 5.389.

186

^†15 (Ed.) Cf. 3.567ff., 4.639ff., 6.174ff.

187

^†16 (Ed.) Brackets in the original.

190

^†17 (Ed.) The proof, which is quite long, and a scholium are omitted. The title, "Of Space Measurement," precedes the following paragraphs.

193

^†18 (Ed.) The manuscript continues for several pages and then breaks off in the middle of a sentence.

^†1 (Ed.) This chapter is from a set of associated manuscripts in Widener IB2-8, with the addition of a quotation in the present footnote. These manuscripts seem to be a number of partial drafts of a book to be titled "Logic." One set of chapters includes several bearing dates in March, 1873, and one chapter of another set is dated "1873 July 1." Others may have been written in 1872; in a letter to his brother Henry dated November 24, 1872, William James says, "Charles Peirce . . . read us an admirable introductory chapter to his book on logic the other day" ([Perry] I, 332). Some of the manuscripts have no heading, but probably belong to this undertaking. The portions bearing no date are dated here c.1873.

The contents of the present chapter should be compared with "The Fixation of Belief" (1877), 5.358-387, and "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" (1878), 5.388-410. Several pages in the set of manuscripts from which the present chapter is taken contain passages to be found in the first of these two articles. In 1909 and 1910 Peirce worked on a revision of these two articles, to be published under a single title. A draft for this work is titled, "Essays Toward the Interpretation of Our Thoughts (Provisional Title of volume); My Pragmatism (Provisional Title of the Essay), set forth in Two Chapters," Widener IB2-11. On page 1 of the draft, in a preface for the work, Peirce says: "The main part of this Essay, — the characterizations of Belief and of Doubt, the argument as to the effective aim of inquiry, the description of four methods directed toward that aim, with the criticisms of them, the discussion of the proper function of thinking, and the consequent maxim for attaining clear concepts, — reproduces almost verbatim a paper I read, — it must have been in 1872, — to a group of young men who used, at that time, to meet once a fortnight in Cambridge, Mass., under the name of 'The Metaphysical Club,'-a name chosen to alienate such as it would alienate." This page is headed "1909 Apr 6 2AM, MEANING, Pragmatism." Cf. 5.13 and [Bibliography] G-1909-1.

194

^†2 (Ed.) Paragraphs 313-314 are "Chapter 1 (Enlarged abstract)," with added quotations at 313n3 and 314n4. Paragraphs 315-316 are from an abstract of the first few chapters. Paragraphs 317-325 are the contents of an untitled manuscript. See 313n1.

195

^†3 (Ed.) ". . . the characters of belief are three. First, there is a certain feeling with regard to a proposition. Second, there is a disposition to be satisfied with the proposition. And third, there is a clear impulse to act in certain ways, in consequence." From "Of Reality" (see 313n1).

195

^†4 (Ed.) "Doubt has degrees and may approximate indefinitely to belief, but when I doubt, the effect of the mental judgment will not be seen in my conduct as invariably or to the full extent that it will when I believe. Thus, if I am perfectly confident that an insurance company will fulfill their engagements I will pay them a certain sum for a policy, but if I think there is a risk of their breaking, I shall not pay them so much." From a fragment (see 313n1).

195

^†5 (Ed.) In the omitted portion of the manuscript Peirce briefly outlines three of his four "methods of effecting a settlement of opinion." The first is "obstinate adhering to whatever happens to be one's existing opinions." The second is by persecution. The third is "by the natural development of opinion," which fails when "one community comes in contact with another. Then it is seen that the result is quite accidental and dependent on surrounding circumstances and initial conditions and belief gets all unsettled.

195

"In this way once more the conviction is forced on man that another's opinion, if derived by the same process as his own, is as good as his own, and that other's opinion is taken by him for his own. Then he says we in the sense of the learned world."

195

Peirce's fourth method is discussed in our following paragraph.

200

^†6 (Ed.) From "LOGIC, Chap. 4 (—- draft)" (see 313n1).

201

^†7 (Ed.) From "LOGIC, Chap. 4. — Of Reality (1st draft)," with an added quotation in 331n9. See 313n1.

201

^†8 (Ed.) See Book III, Chapter 2, "Association," in the present volume.

203

^†9 (Ed.) Investigation involves, besides sensation, "the production of new beliefs out of old ones according to logical laws. This process is the logical process, but by an extension of the meaning of a familiar word I call it also inference." From "Of Reality," the same manuscript quoted at 313n3.

207

^†10 (Ed.) An untitled manuscript originally in one paragraph, with an added quotation in 336n11. See 313n1.

^†11 (Ed.) "The final settled opinion is not any particular cognition, in such and such a mind, at such and such a time, although an individual opinion may chance to coincide with it. If an opinion coincides with the final settled opinion, it is because the general current of investigation will not affect it. The object of that individual opinion is whatever is thought at that time. But if anything else than that one thing is thought, the object of that opinion changes and it thereby ceases to coincide with the object of the final opinion which does not change. The perversity or ignorance of mankind may make this thing or that to be held for true, for any number of generations, but it can not affect what would be the result of sufficient experience and reasoning. And this it is which is meant by the final settled opinion. This therefore is no particular opinion but is entirely independent of what you, I, or any number of men may think about it; and therefore it directly satisfies the definition of reality." From "Logic, Chap. 6th," March 10, 1873 (see 313n1).

209

^†12 (Ed.) Cf. 5.403.

211

^†13 (Ed.) Cf. 5.255.

212

^†14 (Ed.) An untitled manuscript originally in one paragraph. The date is hardly legible, but is probably March 6, 1873. A manuscript dated March 8, 1873, seems to be an alternative draft, but in the opinion of the editor the manuscript printed here is superior to the later draft. See 313n1.

215

^†15 (Ed.) "Logic, Chap. 5th," March 10, 1873, originally in one paragraph. See 313n1.

217

^†16 Cf. 5.253.

218

^†17 (Ed.) Chapter V, "That the significance of thought lies in its reference to the future." A draft of Chapter IV, "The Conception of Time essential in Logic," dated "1873 July 1," seems to belong with this Chapter V as parts of one series. See 313n1.

218

^†18 (Ed.) Cf. 5.287ff.

219

^†19 (Ed.) Cf. 8.33 (1871) and 5.400 (1878).

219

^†20 (Ed.) The manuscript ends without a period.

223

^†1 (Ed.) Peirce uses the terms "psychognosy" and "physiognosy" for the psychical and physical sciences, respectively (cf. 1.242).

223

This chapter is from Section 1, "Classification of the Sciences," of Minute Logic, Chapter 2, "Prelogical Notions," including some alternative pages, Widener IB2-2, with a quotation added in 381n19. The manuscript has dates of early 1902 stamped in the margin of several sheets. All but one of Peirce's marginal sideheads are omitted, and some of his marginal notes have been treated as footnotes rather than as insertions in the text.

223

1.203-283 are from the first part of this manuscript. Paragraph 374n10 follows shortly after 1.283. The rest of the present chapter follows considerably after 374n10; in the manuscript between 374n10 and 362, Peirce deals with the subdivisions of Physiognosy. Cf. 7.267n7.

223

^†2 (Ed.) Cf. 1.269-272.

224

^†3 (Ed.) 1.269-270.

224

^†4 (Ed.) No such chapter is among the manuscripts. A list of all the chapters for which there are manuscripts is given at [Bibliography] G-c.1902-2.

225

^†5 (Ed.) The text continues at paragraph 366. Paragraph 364 is from some alternative sheets, and 365 is from some other alternative sheets (see 362n1).

226

^†6 Not being a German university professor, his arguments were not fairly considered by German university professors, and were treated with contempt by those who pin their faith upon the philosophical fashions that happen for the moment to prevail in those universities. [Peirce's marginal insert.]

227

^†7 Professor Baldwin in the preface of his Dictionary distinctly places himself upon the platform that philosophical and scientific questions ought to be settled by majorities. 'We are many: you are one,' he says. But in the history of science majorities short of unanimity have more often been wrong than right. Majorities do not form their opinions rationally. [Peirce's marginal insert.]

231

^†8 (Ed.) Cf. 1276, 8.122n19, and 8.274.

232

^†9 (Ed.) No such chapter is among the manuscripts. Cf. 363n4.

233

^†10 (Ed.) "As the different Orders are distinguished by the different conceptions which govern them, so it has seemed to me that the different Families are distinguished by the differences of their methods of investigation, when these different methods are applied to different problems. For if there are two different methods, both of them sound and scientific, which are applicable to the same problem, they ought to be employed jointly; or if not, they at any rate are too closely associated to make different families of science. Nothing, for example, can be in stronger contrast than the method of investigating ancient history from monuments and from documents. But the only proper course is to use both methods conjointly. It is true that one man may not be strong enough to work in both ways to advantage; but still he will thoroughly know that his own work is only a result of the division of labour and that it has to be joined to another man's work by a third workman, before anything can be settled. On the other hand, a mere difference of problems, where the methods of investigation are identical does not constitute a division that can rank as a division between Families of science.

233

"Different Genera of the same Family of science are studies which have precisely the same general character, but of which each is strongly distinguished by some marked feature. This is a sufficiently vague statement, not to have the effect of imposing an artificial classification, while it is clear enough to be of material service in enabling us to determine whether a given subdivision is a division into Families or into Genera.

233

"Finally, the different Species of one Genus of science, are studies which, though morphologically identical in all their features, even similar in their proportions, and undistinguished by any leading peculiarities, lie nevertheless not so exactly in one path that the man who is everywhere prepared for the pursuit of the one will be quite ipso facto expert in the other, without having anything to learn of new kinds of precaution; in sharpening his attention to unfamiliar observations, in manipulating an instrument that has been strange to him, or in putting a familiar one to unfamiliar uses." From the manuscript, following shortly after 1.283 (see 362n1).

236

^†11 Take, as an example, Cattell's observations of the motions of a reader's eyeball. [Peirce's marginal insert.]

240

^†12 (Ed.) See the following chapter, "Association."

240

^†13 (Ed.) See Chapter 5, "Telepathy and Perception," in the present book.

240

^†14 (Ed.) Cf. 1.271.

241

^†15 (Ed.) Cf. Chapter 3, "The Logic of Drawing History from Ancient Documents," Book II, present volume.

242

^†16 Of course, if they are not so, they are not what the Darwinian means by "adaptive." For example, Weismann says that death is an adaptive character.

243

^†17 I can tell by the expression of face the state of mind of my horse just as unmistakably as I can that of my dog or my wife.

244

^†18 This is the marvel and admirable in it; and this essentially supposes a generous portion of capacity for blundering. [Peirce's marginal insert.]

^†19 (Ed.) "Descriptive Definition of a Human Instinct, as the term will here be used. An animal instinct is a natural disposition, or inborn determination of the individual's Nature (his 'nature' being that within him which causes his behaviour to be such as it is), manifested by a certain unity of quasi-purpose in his behaviour. In man, at least, this behaviour is always conscious, and not purely spasmodic. More than that, unless he is under some extraordinary stress, the behaviour is always partially controlled by the deliberate exercise of imagination and reflexion; so much so that to the man himself his action appears to be entirely rational, so far is it from being merely sensori-motor. General analogy and many special phenomena warrant the presumption that the same thing is true of the lower animals, though they are undoubtedly far less reflective than men. Yet the adaptation of the behaviour to its quasi-purpose in some definite part overleaps all control . . . . So then the three essential characters of instinctive conduct are that it is conscious, is determined to a quasi-purpose, and that in definite respects it escapes all control." From "Of the Classification of the Sciences. Second Paper. Of the Practical Sciences," Widener II, c.1902 (see 7.49n1).

245

^†20 (Ed.) The marginal sidehead "Science is but a Development of Instinct" appears opposite this paragraph.

247

^†21 As I write, the Monist XII.321 brings me the account of such a thing dating from the XVIth century before Christ, or earlier. Several sciences are known to have been earlier than that; but they were probably looked upon as Useful Arts. This seems purely speculative.

247

(Ed.) The reference is to James H. Breasted, "The First Philosopher," The Monist 12(April, 1902)321-336.

247

^†22 (Ed.) We omit a long section on linguistics and anthropology. The following is from an alternate page of this part of the manuscript (see 362n1): "The Indo-European languages are singular in having the common noun distinctly and fully developed as a separate part of speech, and by more or less development even of abstract nouns. I do not mean to say that the common noun is not fully developed in any other language; but only that such a phenomenon is exceptional in every other great family of speech. This requires and evidences considerable power of thought on the part of those who use these languages. With the exercise of a little ingenuity it is possible to express anything in these languages, provided no higher relations than dyadic ones enter. Only very simple propositions can be expressed involving higher relations; and those whose mental education is limited by the powers of these languages are unable to grasp the meaning of a complex triple relation; . . ."

248

^†23 (Ed.) Cf. 7.256-266.

248

^†24 (Ed.) The manuscript continues, "In Descriptive Psychognosy we have recognized two Suborders, the one relating to Situations, the other to Events." Cf. 1.272. Peirce then discusses bibliography, books of travels, numismatics, metrology, history, etc.

249

^†1 (Ed.) Sections 1-7 are "Introduction, Association of Ideas," c.1893, from Grand Logic, Widener IB2-1, with the omission of Art. 3, a long section devoted to the history of the doctrine of association, of which only a few sentences are printed (417n21), and with an added quotation in 392n7. Sections 1 and 2 are Peirce's Art. 1 and 2, respectively, and sections 3 through 7 are Peirce's Art. 4 through Art. 8, respectively. The titles of all these sections, except that of Section 5, are taken from a partial table of contents in Widener IB2-1, with some changes in capitalization.

250

^†2 It is now more often called reproduction, which is the German term. I prefer to write English; and certainly no reader will suppose that I am speaking of suggestion in its hypnotic connection.

250

^†3 (Ed.) Cf. 6.60.

250

^†4 (Ed.) A Treatise of Human Nature. In the Everyman's Library edition, No. 548, 1939, edited by Ernest Rhys, this passage appears in Vol. I, page 19.

251

^†5 (Ed.) Cf. 1.383.

252

^†6 (Ed.) Cf. 4.157.

^†7 (Ed.) "An 'occult property' is a property which is only brought to light by experiment. 'Occult Science' means, therefore, precisely experimental science. The reason these properties were called occult was that they could not be deduced after the manner of Aristotle from the prime qualities hot and cold, moist and dry." A footnote, p. 16, from Peirce's Prospectus of The Treatise of Petrus Peregrinus on the Lodestone, [Bibliography] G-c.1893-4.

252

^†8 See Mr. A.B. Kempe's Memoir upon Mathematical Form.

253

^†9 (Ed.) Art. 3, on the history of the doctrine of association, is deleted here (see 388n1).

253

^†10 Hartmann's account of association is well worth reading.

253

^†11 Unconscious Memory.

254

^†12 They are written out, but as for seeing the light, even if they were printed, that does in no wise depend on their merit. Men do not want to know the truth and they ought to have their way. (Ed.) But cf. 7.546, 7.215.

254

^†13 The distinction is virtually made by James Mill. J.S. Mill, and I think Bain too, mistakenly calls subjective intensity emotional intensity.

255

^†14 (Ed.) See Chapter 2, "Small Differences of Sensation," of Book I of the present volume.

257

^†15 (Ed.) In the following paragraphs, Peirce shows the inter-relationship between the points he is making by numbering them in a special way. We have placed these numbers in parentheses to separate them from the paragraph numbers. Note that (22) is the second point under (2), (32) is the second point subordinate to (3), (321) the first sub-item under (32), etc.

258

^†16 (Ed.) In the manuscript paragraph 404 was inserted between the lines after paragraph 405. We have adopted the present order so that there will be references to ten numbered points, (11), (12), (21), (22), (23), (31), (32), (33), (34), and (41), preceding paragraph 405.

259

^†17 (Ed.) In the deleted Art. 3; see 392n9.

260

^†18 Professor James seems to think it to the purpose to remark that "the similarity of two things does not exist till both are there." That may be; it is so, in a sense. But how he infers that "it is meaningless to talk of it as an agent of production" I cannot see. Nobody means that the appearance of resemblance is an agent but that what there is in the depths of the soul that makes the appearance also makes the association.

260

(Ed.) The quotation from James in the text is from The Principles of Psychology, Vol. 1, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1890, p. 579; the quotation in this footnote is from the same volume, p. 591.

261

^†19 James wants us to say things. I reply that ideas were always meant as objects, direct objects, not matters of psychology, by those who talked of them. When he says things he cannot mean the real external things; for they are beyond the power of thought. He can only mean the perceived objects, which are precisely what is meant by "ideas." What is perceived is an idea, in contradistinction to a raw sensation.

261

^†20 (Ed.) Chapters XVIII (2.645-660) and XIX of the Grand Logic were to be on probability and induction, respectively; no manuscript of Chapter XIX has been found.

264

^†21 (Ed.) In the discussion of Hartley in the omitted Art. 3, Peirce says: "Proposition 3: sensations remain in the soul for a brief interval of time after the object is removed. This seems like a genuine psychological observation; and the acuteness of the physician is certainly shown in giving it this foremost place. But the proof offered is perfectly futile."

264

^†22 (Ed.) In Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, Education and University Reform, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1861, p. 53, Sir William Hamilton says: "We know; and We know that we know: — these propositions, logically distinct, are really identical; each implies the other . . . . The attempt to analyze the cognition I know, and the cognition I know that I know, into the separate energies of distinct faculties, is therefore vain."

265

^†23 (Ed.) Cf. 5.213ff.

268

^†24 (Ed.) The editor suggests that the two triangles in perspective constitute a figure distinct from the figure of the ten dots; and that the association is between ten dots in the original figure, and ten rays in the second figure.

275

^†25 (Ed.) From Qualitative Logic, a partially completed book intended for young people, Widener IB2-9, undated. Paragraphs 451-457 are a draft of Chapter I, "The Association of Ideas." Paragraphs 458-462 are a draft of Chapter II, "The Simple Consequence."

275

The reader's attention is called to the similarity between 7.454-457 of this section and 7.445-450 which come from Grand Logic. Paragraphs 7.457 and 7.448-450 are nearly identical. This similarity provides some information as to when Qualitative Logic was written.

276

^†26 (Ed.) Cf. 1.626ff.

279

^†27 Absolute doubt is also impossible.

279

^†28 (Ed.) The manuscript then continues with Chapter III, "The Modus Ponens"; Chapter IV, "The Traditional Syllogistic"; etc.

280

^†29 (Ed.) From Chapter VI of Grand Logic, Widener IB2-1, coming after 4.52. This is dated 1893 on the basis of 4.21n*.

282

^†30 (Ed.) Cf. 4.121ff.

284

^†1 (Ed.) Sections 1-8 are "Habit," Widener IB3, c.1898, with a quotation added in 494n9. The manuscript, "Habit," is probably a version of Lecture 7 of the Cambridge series, [Bibliography] G-1898-1. The manuscript from which 494n9 is taken is probably a version of Lecture 2 of this series. Section 9 is from Lecture 4 of the Cambridge series; cf. 518n16.

286

^†2 (Ed.) Cf. 6.240.

287

^†3 (Ed.) See also 6.23, 6.72, and [Bibliography] N-1890-3.

289

^†4 (Ed.) Benjamin Peirce.

290

^†5 (Ed.) Cf. 1.135.

294

^†6 (Ed.) Cf. 6.82ff. Peirce's categories of First, Second, and Third are discussed especially in [CP] I.

294

^†7 (Ed.) See the discussion of indices in [CP] II and elsewhere.

294

^†8 (Ed.) Cf. 6.6, 6.211-212.

296

^†9 (Ed.) This is probably a reference to the following rules (cf. 2.226): "Rule I. Assign to every scientific conception a scientific name of its own, preferably a new word rather than one already appropriated to an unscientific and dubious conception.

296

"That was the practice adopted by the scholastic doctors, how advantageously every student will testify. The renaissance, on the other hand, condemned the scholastic terms as not being Ciceronian, with the result of making renaissance philosophy as soft and savorless as a sage pudding. There is a rule of good writing higher than Ciceronian purity, that of expressing your thought, both accurately and concisely. More than a rule of good writing, this is a fundamental condition of scientific thinking; for man cannot think at all without formulas, nor think powerfully without concise formulas . . . .

296

"Rule II. The author of a scientific conception has the first right to name it; and his name ought to be accepted, unless there are grave substantial objections to it. But if he fails to give it a scientific name, somebody else must do so; and in that case the earliest good scientific name shall be employed . . . .

296

"Rule III. After a scientific conception has once received a suitable name, let it not be called by any other scientific name, old or new . . . .

296

"Rule IV. As far as practicable, let the terms of philosophy be modelled after those of scholasticism . . . ." From "Detached Ideas; Induction, Deduction, and Hypothesis," Widener IB2-10, c.1898, probably a draft of one of the lectures (possibly the second) on "Detached Ideas on Vitally Important Topics" of the Cambridge series (see 468n1).

300

^†10 (Ed.) See Chapter 2, "On Small Differences of Sensation," in Book I of the present volume.

300

^†11 (Ed.) See also the preceding chapter, "Association."

307

^†12 (Ed.) The dots indicate a blank in the manuscript, where presumably Peirce meant to write in the value of the gravitational constant. This value is approximately 6.7 x 10-8 in the centimeter-gram-second system of units.

308

^†13 (Ed.) Cf. [Bibliography] G-1891-1.

309

^†14 (Ed.) Presumably Lecture 8, "The Logic of Continuity." There is a manuscript, "The Logic of Continuity," in Widener IB3 which is very probably the lecture referred to; 6.185-213 are from this manuscript.

310

^†15 (Ed.) See the preceding footnote.

310

^†16 (Ed.) This final section is the four missing manuscript pages referred to at 6.81n* (p. 60); these pages are now with the rest of the manuscript at Widener IB2-10. They are published here to fill the gap in "Causation and Force," 6.66-87, Lecture 4 of the Cambridge series, [Bibliography] G-1898-1. This lecture deals with some of the topics discussed in "Habit," Sections 1-8 above.

313

^†1 (Ed.) From Section 2, "Some Logical Prolegomena," the final section of a manuscript, "On Topical Geometry, in General," Widener IA-2, undated, with added quotations in 534n4 and 535n6. A partial draft and a complete draft of Section 2 have a common first page. Paragraphs 524-529 are from the partial draft; paragraphs 530-538 are the last part of the complete draft.

315

^†2 (Ed.) These are the psychological versions of Peirce's categories, First, Second, and Third, which are treated in general in [CP] I, Book III.

317

^†3 But I do not mean to say that bare striving usually does any more good in these cases than in the case of such a physical difficulty as turning a key that does not fit very well in its lock. If a moderate effort does not suffice, some contrivance has to be employed.

^†4 (Ed.) "When the idea of space forms itself in our minds, or being inborn, connects itself with sensations, those things come to be regarded as near together which act strongly on one another, and are intimately related in regard to forces; while those things come to be regarded as remote which, as far as those forces of which we have any primitive experience are concerned, have little to do with one another. Hence, when gravitation was found to act at a distance, and even at vast distances, men were astounded; they thought it could not be. It seemed somehow to involve absurdity. The absurdity which was obscurely felt was that the idea [of] nearness was the idea of close connection; and therefore men felt that immediate connection supposed confinity. But that instinctive idea has been corrected. Any particle may be regarded as extending throughout space. It is where it acts. But it acts extremely little except in a very little space; and its place is peculiarly where it acts the most." From a fragment in Widener IA-8, undated.

319

^†5 (Ed.) Cf. 3.567, 4.639-640.

^†6 (Ed.) "I begin by defining a part of any whole, in a sense of the [term] much wider [than] any in current use, though it is not obsolete in the vocabulary of philosophy. In this broadest sense, [it] is anything that is (1) other than its whole, and (2) . . . such that if the whole were really to be, no matter what else might be true, then the part must under all conceivable circumstances itself really be, in the same 'universe of discourse,' though by no means necessarily in the same one of those three Universes with which experience makes us all more or less acquainted. Thus, light is a part of vision . . . .

"A perfect continuum belongs to the genus, of a whole all whose parts without any exception whatsoever conform to one general law to which same law conform likewise all the parts of each single part. Continuity is thus a special kind of generality, or conformity to one Idea. More specifically, it is a homogeneity, or generality among all of a certain kind of parts of one whole. Still more specifically, the characters which are the same in all the parts are a certain kind of relationship of each part to all the coördinate parts; that is, it is a regularity. The step of specification which seems called for next, as appropriate to our purpose of defining, or logically analyzing the Idea of continuity, is that of asking ourselves what kind [of] relationship between parts it is that constitutes the regularity a continuity; and the first, and therefore doubtless the best answer for our purpose, not as the ultimate answer, but as the proximate one, is that it is the relation or relations of contiguity; for continuity is unbrokenness (whatever that may be,) and this seems to imply a passage from one part to a contiguous part. What is this 'passage'? This passage seems to be an act of turning the attention from one part to another part; in short an actual event in the mind. This seems decidedly unfortunate, since an event can only take place in Time, and Time is a continuum; so that the prospect is that we shall rise from our analysis with a definition of continuity in general in terms of a special continuity. However, it is possible that this objection will disappear as we proceed." From "Supplement. 1908 May 24," Widener IA-3, an addendum alternative to 4.642 ([Bibliography] G-1908-1b).

325

^†7 (Ed.) An untitled manuscript, Widener IB1-2, undated. The quotations in 540n8 and 541n9 are from what appears to be an alternative partial draft, Widener IC1-a,b, undated. In this alternative draft it is stated that the paper was originally written to be read to a group that met Sunday afternoons. It is likely that these manuscripts were written about 1900; see paragraphs 539, 540 and 545 and [Bibliography] G-1901-5, but note that Kant died in 1804 and not "in the last year of the last century," as Peirce says in paragraph 540.

325

^†8 (Ed.) "Direct in philosophical language without anything intervening. Thus this house directly abuts upon the street. I am talking to you directly. Immediate involves the same idea carried further. It denies every kind of separation by a boundary, by a difference of place or time. What is immediately in consciousness is what consciousness is made of." A footnote from the alternative draft (see 539n7).

328

^†9 (Ed.) "No sharp line of demarcation can be drawn between different integral states of mind; certainly not between such states as feeling, knowing, and willing. It is plain that we are actively knowing in all our waking minutes, and actually feeling, too. If we are not always willing, we are, at least, at all times consciously reacting against the outer world. Strumpell's celebrated experiment, fully confirmed by others, shows that as soon as outward stimuli are entirely removed, the person falls asleep." From the alternative draft (see 539n7).

332

^†10 (Ed.) Peirce first had "One is an objective intensity" and then substituted "One is the intensity of the feeling itself." Cf. 555.

332

^†11 (Ed.) Cf. 7.215.

334

^†12 (Ed.) See Chapter 2, "Small Differences of Sensation," Book I, present volume.

335

^†13 (Ed.) Cf. 553-554.

335

^†14 (Ed.) In 544.

336

^†15 (Ed.) See Chapter 2, "Association," in the present book.

337

^†16 (Ed.) See further 7.276-278.

337

^†17 (Ed.) Paragraph 553 is an undated fragment; paragraph 554 is from an alternative draft. Both are in Widener IC1-a,b.

337

Paragraphs 555-558 are from Chapter I, "Of Reasoning in General," of the "Short Logic," Widener IB2-10. This manuscript is dated c.1893 in [CP] II. Paragraph 555 follows immediately after the last sentence of 2.443. The part of the manuscript from which 555-558 and 2.444 are taken is not continuous; paragraph 2.444 is from manuscript pages beyond 555-558, but the last paragraph of 2.444 is similar to 558.

338

^†18 (Ed.) Cf. 547.

338

^†19 (Ed.) "An idea is nothing but a portion of consciousness having in itself no definite boundaries, except so far as it may be of a different quality from contiguous ideas." Peirce's marginal comment.

340

^†20 (Ed.) Cf. 546.

340

^†21 (Ed.) No such explanation is given in the extant manuscript.

341

^†22 It may be remarked that this is a very temporary condition, and shortly after the interesting idea will be found to have a lower subjective intensity than it would have had if it had not been interesting.

341

^†23 (Ed.) "What is the Use of Consciousness?" Chapter IV, c.1893, of Grand Logic, Widener IB2-1.

341

^†24 (Ed.) "The Materialistic Aspect of Reasoning," 6.278-286.

342

^†25 Take, for instance, that superlatively cunning defense of common sense, the doctrine of immediate perception, — a doctrine so subtle that it has eluded the grasp of many a fine logician, — and what is it, after all, but a confession that to see and to be seen are one and the same fact.

343

^†26 (Ed.) "Immortality in the Light of Synechism," Widener IB3. "For the Open Court" is written on the manuscript. It is dated c.1892 on the basis of the bibliographic references in the article.

343

^†27 (Ed.) Synechism is treated in detail in [CP] VI, Part B of Book I.

343

^†28 The Greek word means continuity of parts brought about by surgery.

343

^†29 (Ed.) [Bibliography] G-1891-1c (1892). This paper gives a definition of "synechism," 6.103.

344

^†30 (Ed.) Cf. Chapter 5, "On Non-Euclidean Geometry," [CP] VIII, Book I.

344

^†31 (Ed.) Cf. 1.171.

346

^†32 (Ed.) Edward Stanton Huntington, Dreams of the Dead, by Edward Stanton (pseud.), Boston, 1892. Cf. [Bibliography] N-1892-14.

346

^†33 (Ed.) Gustav Freytag, Die Verlorene Handschrift, Leipzig, 1869.

347

^†34 (Ed.) From Lecture XI of an incomplete series of lectures in Widener IB2-10. The editor has been unable to make a positive identification of these lectures, but the internal references and the general tone of the writing indicate that they are probably the manuscripts for the Lowell Institute lectures of 1866-67 ([Bibliography] G-1866-2a). On this basis Lecture XI is dated c.1867. In Widener IB2-10 these lectures are mixed with the manuscripts of a different series, which are probably those of the Harvard series of 1865-66, [Bibliography] G-1864-3.

348

^†35 (Ed.) Lecture X. Only fragments of it have been found.

348

^†36 (Ed.) Cf. 2.407ff.

348

^†37 (Ed.) The following was pencilled in the margin with a line to indicate that it was to be inserted here: "Most ignorant of what he's most assured His glassy essence."

349

^†38 (Ed.) Peirce here inserted "Upon the diversities of theories of the soul there are some pretty lines by Sir John Davies in his poem on Psychology" and referred to Sir William Hamilton's edition of Thomas Reid's Works, p. 203.

349

^†39 (Ed.) Induction and hypothesis are discussed in Book II of the present volume and at 2.508ff. (1867).

350

^†40 (Ed.) Cf. 7.131-138, which are from Lecture IV of the same series (see 579n34).

351

^†41 (Ed.) Cf. 5.339.

351

^†42 (Ed.) Compare the following paragraphs with 5.313ff. (1868).

356

^†43 (Ed.) Cf. [Bibliography] G-1868-2a (5.213-263).

^†1 (Ed.) "Telepathy," including some alternative pages, Widener IC1-a,b, with deletions, and with an added quotation in 597n3. This manuscript is dated 1903 on the basis of the dates given in the next footnote, references to a manuscript on telepathy in the Peirce-James correspondence (James collection, Houghton Library), what appear to be James's handwritten comments in the margin of the first part of the manuscript, and a crossed-out date in the last section of the manuscript. This was a first draft from which Peirce intended to extract a magazine article.

Peirce divided the manuscript into six sections (with no titles); the sections of the present chapter are the same as Peirce's, but the titles have been supplied by the editor.

Cf. 6.548-587 and [Bibliography] G-1887-3 for other writings by Peirce on the subject of psychical research.

359

^†2 (Ed.) John Trowbridge, "Telepathy," The Nation 76 (16 April 1903)308309; and William James, "Telepathy Once More," ibid., (23 April 1903) 330.

360

^†3 (Ed.) [Bibliography] G-1887-3, "Criticism on 'Phantasms of the Living'. . ." In a fragment in Houghton Library, Peirce says: "Phenomena for which psychical researchers invoke telepathy can be explained by unconscious mental action, after severe scrutiny of testimony, and with aid from the doctrine of chances." Cf. [Bibliography] G-1887-3, p. 194. The fragment concludes, "Eight years ago on the appearance of the laborious work, Phantasms of the Living, I examined the question with care, pronounced it very doubtful, but provisionally rejected the whole theory. Reviewing the state of the question, this year, I find no decided change in either direction." This internal reference dates the fragment as c.1895.

362

^†4 (Ed.) Cf. 5.354ff., 2.654ff.

363

^†5 It would be different if the theory of Hobbes, LaRochefoucauld, and other thinkers in the boyhood of modern philosophy, were true, and man could not act otherwise than selfishly. But this theory which rests on a logical fallacy is supported by no fact and refuted by many.

363

^†6 The word "veridical" was first made a term of art by Mr. Myers in the sense of coinciding with the truth, whether fortuitously or causedly. It is contrary to the ethics of terminology to change the meaning of a term of art without necessity. Its author has no more right to do so than anybody else. Yet in Baldwin's Dictionary, where accuracy of definition ought to have been the first consideration, Mrs. Sidgwick limits the term to that which is determined by a general cause to be true, with no hint that it had ever been used in any other sense. Looseness of speech and looseness of thought are wife and husband. I shall speak of the 'simply veridical' and the 'determinedly veridical,' in the wider and narrower senses.

369

^†7 (Ed.) See [CP] V, Pragmatism and Pragmaticism.

371

^†8 (Ed.) The psychological versions of Peirce's categories of First, Second, and Third are discussed in 7.524-538, and the categories in general are treated in [CP] I.

374

^†9 Formed from percipio on the analogy of praecipuum from praecipio. I am quite sure that it would be well if philosophers were bolder in forming new words instead of giving old ones so many meanings. What if we were to use words ending in -cept for different kinds of acquisition of cognition? There would be of good Latin words accept, antecept, decept, except, incept, intercept, occept, precept, suscept, besides many others quite supportable.

374

^†10 (Ed.) Cf. 7.537.

375

^†11 There is no objection to saying that 'The chair appears yellow' means 'The chair appears to me yellow'; but the reference to the future self is more pertinent.

376

^†12 (Ed.) "It may be objected that a perceptual judgment is not so utterly beyond all control or check as I say; since it may be revised. I may negligently think 'this chair appears scarlet,' when if I had looked more carefully, I should have said 'it appears vermillion.' I reply that no doubt mistakes can arise from inadvertency; and possibly, in order to take due account of that phenomenon, some complication of my statement would be required. But it cannot be that, on this account, it is fundamentally wrong. A perceptual judgment can only refer to a single percept which can never re-exist; and if I judge that it appears red when it did not appear red, it must, at least, be acknowledged that it appeared to appear red. I do not think it worth while to follow out the objection further." From alternate pages of the manuscript (see 597n1).

377

^†13 (Ed.) Cf. Peirce's doctrine of synechism, 7.565ff.

381

^†14 It was discovered by H.G.F. Schroeder in 1858. Poggendorff Annalen CV, 298.

382

^†15 I myself was severely taken to task, sat upon, squelched, marked down to my real insignificance, by an eminent French logician, for presuming to speak disparagingly of so sublime a work of genius as the algebra of dual relatives, this algebra happening to be a thing of my own invention.

383

^†16 (Ed.) Cf. 5.205, 6.109-110.

383

^†17 In the Monist for July, 1892, I followed him in this misunderstanding, my notion of continuity at that date being far from clear. (Ed.) Cf. 6.120ff.

383

^†18 (Ed.) The editor has deleted a long passage on continuity, which presents material already covered in 6.120ff. and 6.174ff.

384

^†19 (Ed.) Cf. 3.567, 4.639ff.

384

^†20 (Ed.) That is, real numbers.

386

^†21 (Ed.) Cf. 8.12ff.

389

^†22 (Ed.) Peirce's observational theory of mathematics is discussed also in various places in [CP] IV.

391

^†23 (Ed.) See Book II, "Scientific Method," in the present volume.

397

^†24 (Ed.) The manuscript breaks off shortly after this point.

Volume 7: Science and Philosophy.

Book 1: Experimental Science

Chapter 1: Measurement of the Force of Gravity

§1. A Source of Error in pendulum Measurements (Ed.) From pp. 359-361 of Appendix 14, "On the Flexure of Pendulum Supports," [CS 1881] 1883, pp. 359-441. This gives a succinct account, in Peirce's own words, of his most original work in the field of pendulum measurements. †1

Chapter 2: Small Differences of Sensation

Book 2: Scientific Method

Chapter 1: Scientific Method

§3. Scientific Method (Ed.) Paragraphs 79-88 are "Scientific Method," Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology (edited by James Mark Baldwin), Vol. II, 1902, pp. 500-503. Paragraphs 89-91 are "Verification," ibid., pp. 761-762. †12

§4. Simplicity (Ed.) Paragraphs 92-93 are "Parsimony (law of)," Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology (edited by James Mark Baldwin), Vol. II, 1902, p. 264. Paragraphs 94-96 are from "Theory," ibid., pp. 693-694. †19

§5. Kinds of Reasoning (Ed.) "Notes for my Logical Criticism of Articles of the Christian Creed," Widener IB3. Judging by the reference to 1860 in the second paragraph, this is to be dated c.1910. †20

§6. Kinds of Induction (Ed.) From Vol. I of Lecture 7 of the Lowell Lectures of 1903, Widener IB2-4. Cf. 2.755-760 and 7.208-217 for related treatments of the same topic. †26

§7. Uniformity of Nature (Ed.) From Lecture IV (c.1866) of the same series from which 7.579-596 are taken, Widener IB2-10; cf. 7.579n34. †28

Chapter 2: Economy of Research

§1. Original Paper (Ed.) "Note on the Theory of the Economy of Research," [CS 1876] 1879, pp. 197-201, with some corrections from a manuscript version in Widener IC2a. Cf. 5.600ff.; the paper referred to at 5.601n§ is probably this one. †1

Chapter 3: The Logic of Drawing History from Ancient Documents

§1. Abstract (Ed.) From a draft of a report on the meeting of the National Academy of Sciences in November, 1901, Widener IV; see [Bibliography] N-1901-16. Cf. [Bibliography] G-1901-2b and 2c, both of which touch on the topic of the present chapter and which were written about the same time. †1

§3. Criticism of the Theory of Balancing Likelihoods

§4. The Logic of Science

§5. Regularity and Explanation

§6. Abduction, Induction, and Deduction (Ed.) These subjects are also treated in [CP] II. †13

§7. Three Kinds of Induction (Ed.) Cf. 7.110-130. †15

§8. Abduction

§9. The Logic of History

§10. Application of the Method

Chapter 4: Notes on Science

§3. Measurement (Ed.) From "Of the Nature of Measurement," an undated, incomplete manuscript in Widener IA-4. Cf. 4.142-152 which are on the same topic. †13

§1. Investigation (Ed.) Paragraphs 313-314 are "Chapter 1 (Enlarged abstract)," with added quotations at 313n3 and 314n4. Paragraphs 315-316 are from an abstract of the first few chapters. Paragraphs 317-325 are the contents of an untitled manuscript. See 313n1. †2

§2. Logic (Ed.) From "LOGIC, Chap. 4 (—- draft)" (see 313n1). †6

§3. Observation and Reasoning (Ed.) From "LOGIC, Chap. 4. — Of Reality (1st draft)," with an added quotation in 331n9. See 313n1. †7

§4. Reality (Ed.) An untitled manuscript originally in one paragraph, with an added quotation in 336n11. See 313n1. †10

§6. Belief (Ed.) "Logic, Chap. 5th," March 10, 1873, originally in one paragraph. See 313n1. †16

§7. Pragmatism (Ed.) Chapter V, "That the significance of thought lies in its reference to the future." A draft of Chapter IV, "The Conception of Time essential in Logic," dated "1873 July 1," seems to belong with this Chapter V as parts of one series. See 313n1. †17

Book 3: Philosophy of Mind

§1. Introduction

§2. Consciousness and Purpose

§3. Mind and Body

§4. Nomological Psychognosy

§5. Psychology

§6. Classificatory Psychognosy (Ed.) Cf. 1.271. †14

§1. General Characteristics of Mental Action

§2. Contiguity and Resemblance

§3. Defence of Author's Opinions Stated in Art. 2 [Sec. 2]

§4. Psychological Truths Needed in Logic

§5. Theoretical Interest

§6. Experience and Inference

§7. Uncontrolled Inference

§9. Association and the Law of Mind (Ed.) From Chapter VI of Grand Logic, Widener IB2-1, coming after 4.52. This is dated 1893 on the basis of 4.21n*. †29

§1. Laws of Physics

§2. Non-Conservative Actions

§3. Relative and Absolute Motion

§4. Psychical Action

§5. Association

§6. Law of Action of Ideas

§7. Physics and Psychics

§8. Evolution of the Laws of Nature

Chapter 4: Consciousness

§4. What is the Use of Consciousness? (Ed.) "What is the Use of Consciousness?" Chapter IV, c.1893, of Grand Logic, Widener IB2-1. †23

§5. Synechism and Immortality (Ed.) "Immortality in the Light of Synechism," Widener IB3. "For the Open Court" is written on the manuscript. It is dated c.1892 on the basis of the bibliographic references in the article. †26

§1. Telepathy

§2. The Scientific Attitude

§3. Perception

§4. A Programme

§5. The Percipuum

§6. Conclusion

Endnotes

§1. A Source of Error in pendulum Measurements ^†1

§3. Scientific Method ^†12

§4. Simplicity ^†19

§5. Kinds of Reasoning ^†20

§6. Kinds of Induction ^†26

§7. Uniformity of Nature ^†28

§1. Original Paper ^†1

§1. Abstract ^†1

§6. Abduction, Induction, and Deduction ^†13

§7. Three Kinds of Induction (Ed.) Cf. 7.110-130. ^†15

§3. Measurement ^†13

§1. Investigation ^†2

§2. Logic ^†6

§3. Observation and Reasoning ^†7

§4. Reality ^†10

§6. Belief ^†16

§7. Pragmatism ^†17

§6. Classificatory Psychognosy (Ed.) Cf. 1.271. ^†14

§9. Association and the Law of Mind ^†29

§4. What is the Use of Consciousness? ^†23

§5. Synechism and Immortality ^†26