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Let your speech be “yes, yes: no, no”; whatever is beyond these comes from the evil one. (Mt. 5:37)

l

October 2008

Reprint #83

SPE SALVI:
AN ENCYCLICAL
THAT LEAVES MANY
PERPLEXED

A reader writes us:

Most esteemed editorial staff,
As a faithful reader of SÌSÌNONO, I would like to ask you to let me convey my perplexities
about the recent encyclical of the Pontiff at present reigning, Spe Salvi, dated November 30, 2007.
This encyclical discusses the fundamental theme of “Christian hope,” which is hope in
eternal life, promised by Christ to them that love Him and follow His teachings. The encyclical
derives its title from a well-known passage of St. Paul: “Spe salvi facti sumus—In hope we were
saved” (Rom. 8:24). Many have been struck by the fact, undoubtedly positive, that in this
document the Pope did not once cite the Second Vatican Council, and also by the fact that

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he criticized diverse aspects of modern and
contemporary thought. To this, I add the fact that
he has utilized extensively the letters of St. Paul
and the Fathers of the Church in his discourse.
St. Paul, in particular, had been shunted aside
or misrepresented after Vatican II because he
was clearly incompatible with the “ecumenical
dialogue.”
From the point of view of the use of sources, it
seems to me, therefore, that the encyclical marks
a return to Tradition. All of these aspects are not,
however, sufficient, in my opinion, to give an
altogether positive judgment about it. As far as the
absence of references to Vatican II is concerned,
from which some appear to draw optimistic
auspices for the beginning of a “recovery” from that
disastrous Council, I point out that the texts of those
acts do not truthfully give particular space to the
theme of “Christian hope,” all caught as they are by
the desire to “dialogue” with the values of the world.

Four Critical Observations
With this I come to my first critical observation
about the encyclical: it seems to me that even
within it the supernatural dimension of authentic
Christian hope is lacking. Second observation: the
papal document appears to accept the absurd idea
(of de Lubac and his partners), according to which
the Catholic view of salvation in the writings of
St. Paul and the Fathers of the Church would have
been “communitarian,” only to be progressively
distorted subsequently into an “individualistic”
view that would have selfishly reduced it to a
mere “individual” salvation (Spe Salvi, §§13-15,
citing from the Vatican online edition). In §14, the
Encyclical openly praises the interpretation of de
Lubac, striving to continue correcting this supposed
“individualism” in the appropriate manner, that is,
trying to find (it seems to me) the proper balance
between the communitarian and individual
conception of salvation! In other words: between the
New Theology and the dogma of faith!
In third place, it seems to me that the hope
of salvation is seen by the Pope above all from
the angle of the “inner experience” of the subject
(insofar as this corresponds to an “existential
need” of the subject itself) more so than from the
perspective of revealed Truth, which teaches us that
the salvation of our individual soul is an objective
reality, established by God, which will be realized in
the Beatific Vision, but only for him who will have
believed in Our Lord and will have died in the grace
of God.
The discourse on “Christian hope” involves the
exposition of the doctrine of the four last things, and

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this exposition–this is my fourth observation–in the
encyclical seems to me rather ambiguous. Neither
heaven nor hell ever appears as it appears in
Scripture, Tradition, and, finally, in the doctrine of
the Church, which has always represented heaven
and hell as supernatural places completely concrete
and already established by the Father, where the
soul is sent after [the particular] judgment by Our
Lord immediately after death, in anticipation of
being rejoined with the body after the Universal
Judgment, which will confirm the judgment
imparted individually to everyone.
For Benedict XVI, the hope of our faith is
above all that of being “awaited by the Love of
God” (§3). This is certainly an orthodox concept.
But it is necessary to see how it is utilized. This
“encounter” with the Love of God, which awaits us,
should be such that it “change[s] our lives, so that
we know we are redeemed through the hope that it
[the encounter] expresses” (§4). One immediately
notices that the “redemption” is presented in terms
of an individual’s inner need of redemption, rather
than as an objective reality, of supernatural origin,
because it derives from the Cross and Resurrection
of Our Lord. In reality, it matters little that we feel
“redeemed” or less. After all, what Catholic can
effectively feel “redeemed”? What matters is not
our personal disposition with regard to the idea of
redemption, but rather the fact of being effectively
redeemed, that is to say, to achieve salvation, at the
end of our earthly life. But to fulfill this objective,
Revelation, and therefore the doctrine of the
Church, tells us that it is not possible if we do not
have faith in Our Lord and do not live according to
His commandments. In short, Redemption as the
effective salvation of our soul is not possible outside
the Church, depositary of the divine Revelation
and of the means of salvation. It does not seem to
me, however, that redemption is presented in this
manner in the Encyclical.

An Existential Notion
of “Eternal Life”
What notion does the encyclical give of eternal
life”? In §§10-12, the Pope poses the question: “What
is eternal life?” One would expect in vain a clear
and precise answer consistent with the Church’s
constant doctrine: it is the life in which the elect
are as ngels of the Lord, forever immersed in the
beatitude of the Beatific Vision. He begins his
discourse starting with what the individual believes
about eternal life, if he truly desires it, if he does
not desire it... We know that daily life is insufficient,
and we feel that there must in some way exist
another life, but we do not know what (§§10-11).
These reflections are based on texts by St. Ambrose
and St. Augustine, in which both Fathers of the
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Church describe the uncertainty with which the
children of the world imagine a hereafter, of which
they confusedly feel the need, although without
believing. But to this uncertainty the Fathers would
reply with the certainty of eternal life, promised
and guaranteed by the Risen Christ and attainable
(only) by means of faith and works in Him. But this
final aspect does not appear in the reconstruction
of the Pope. How does he comment, in fact, on the
following sentence from St. Ambrose in the funeral
discourse for his deceased brother Satyrus: “Death
is, then, no cause for mourning, for it is the cause
of mankind’s salvation” (§10)? In this singular way:
“Whatever precisely St. Ambrose may have meant by
these words–it is true that to eliminate death or to
postpone it more or less indefinitely would place the
earth and humanity in an impossible situation, and
even for the individual would bring no benefit” (§11;
my italics).

The true meaning of
St. Ambrose’s phrase
“Whatever” precisely St. Ambrose meant to
say? But what he meant to say is extremely clear:
death “is a cause of salvation” for us believers since
by means of death we are finally removed from the
tribulations of this world, and we enter into eternal
life in which we will forever contemplate God “face
to face,” as St. Paul says. For this reason Christians
rightly called death “dies natalis,” day of our (true)
birth, because it is birth into eternal life, the only
true life for man. Our “salvation,” in a concrete,
material sense, begins therefore with our death,
which forever takes us out of the reach of the Prince
of this world. For the unrepentant sinner, death is
instead a cause of perdition, as he goes into eternal
damnation.
This objectively salvific meaning of our death, which
helps us to conquer the fear of death (result of
human fragility, produced in turn by original sin), is
already found in St. Paul. It suffices to think of the
famous passage of the second letter to Timothy, in
which he foretells his own martyrdom and considers
death the desired “liberation” from the chains of
this world, to be able finally to access the sempiternal
prize:
For I am now ready to be sacrificed: and the time of
my dissolution is at [tempus resolutionis meae instat]. I
have fought a good fight, I have finished my course, I
have kept the faith. As to the rest, there is laid up for
me a crown of justice, which the Lord the just judge will
render to me in that day; and not only to me, but to them
also that love his coming. (II Tim. 4:6-8)

Not only for St. Paul, obviously: for all believers
who have persevered until the end in the “good
fight” against themselves and the world, death is the
“cause of salvation, liberation” that introduces them
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THE ANGELUS • October 2008

to eternal life. Not only for St. Paul but for all true
believers, “to live is Christ, and to die is gain” (Phil.
1:21) because it allows us to join Christ forever. St.
Ambrose meant to refer to this immortal “gain” in
the passage cited by the Pope.

A Philosophical
Notion of Eternal Life
These concepts are quite clear. Yet how does
“eternal life” appear in the encyclical, always
understood according to the existential meditations
of the individual?
The term “eternal life” is intended to give a name to
this known [known in the sense that it is known to exist]
“unknown.” Inevitably it is an inadequate term that creates confusion. “Eternal,” in fact, suggests to us the idea
of something interminable, and this frightens us; “life”
makes us think of the life that we know and love and do
not want to lose, even though very often it brings more
toil than satisfaction, so that while, on the one hand, we
desire it, on the other hand, we do not want it. (§12)

Thus, how do we arrive at a concept which is
not contradictory? By understanding eternal life as
plunging into the ocean of infinite love, a moment in
which time–the before and after–no longer exists. We
can only attempt to grasp the idea that such a moment is
life in the full sense, a plunging ever anew into the vastness of being, in which we are simply overwhelmed with
joy. This is how Jesus expresses it in St. John’s Gospel:
“I will see you again and your hearts will rejoice, and no
one will take your joy from you” (16:22). We must think
along these lines.... (§12)

This seems to me a philosophical notion of
eternal life, in which the idea of “joy” prevails,
which will be proved in the “plunging ever anew
into the vastness of being”: of being, in general, and
not of God. The citation from St. John is used in
support of this concept, which seems to me more
Plotinian than Christian. And will this “plunging
ever anew into the vastness of being” be granted to
all, even to unrepentant sinners?

“Kantism” in the Encyclical?
Is the encyclical imbued with Kantian
philosophy? With this last question I mean: How
do we harmonize the Pope’s invitation to think
“along these lines” with the truly Catholic concept
of “eternal life”? Are they truly reconcilable? The
“great hope” of man, writes Benedict XVI, “can
only be God, who encompasses the whole of reality
and who can bestow upon us what we, by ourselves,
cannot attain”; God, and therefore “the foundation
of hope: not any god, but the God who has a human

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face and who has loved us to the end, each one of us
and humanity in its entirety” (§31).
Have we here a clear assertion of the
supernatural nature of the Kingdom of God and
therefore of salvation? But the Pope continues:
His Kingdom is not an imaginary hereafter, situated in
a future that will never arrive; His Kingdom is present
wherever He is loved and wherever His love reaches
us. (§31)

The Kingdom of God is therefore “present.” Where?
“Wherever He is loved and wherever His love
reaches us.” In our conscience, then? The Pope
seems to wish to render the concept expressed by
the famous Gospel phrase: “The Kingdom of God
is within you” (Lk. 17:21). Indeed, he continues:
“His love alone gives us the possibility of soberly
persevering day by day, without ceasing to be
spurred on by hope, in a world which by its very
nature is imperfect” (§31). But immediately after he
adds: “His love is at the same time our guarantee of
the existence of what we only vaguely sense [eternal
life] and which nevertheless, in our deepest self, we
await: a life that is ‘truly’ life” (§31).
The “guarantee” of the existence of eternal life,
beyond the vague intuition that our mind can have,
is given, therefore, by the love of God for us. By
Revelation, then? But the Pope does not say clearly
that this “love of God” is certain for us exclusively on
the basis of Revelation. In my opinion, he does not
say it. The hope of salvation, thus outlined, remains
then an act of the inner experience of the individual,
who postulates the existence of the love of God as
necessary to belief in the reality of the object of this
hope.
Perhaps my conclusion is too “Kantian”? Does it
strain the Pope’s thought? Why do I say: “Kantian?”
Because, in the Pope’s discourse, the love of God
appears to be understood as a necessary idea in
order to believe in the existence of eternal life,
which therefore would not result in an autonomous
way from Revelation. Similarly, for Kant, the
existence of God is an idea that reason requires to
be able to legitimize the existence of morality. The
god of Kant is not the living God; it is an idea of
reason. However, can we say that the idea of God
present in the encyclical is not that of the living
God? In §26 does not the Pope say that through
Christ “we have become certain of God, a God who
is not a remote ‘first cause’ of the world, because
his only-begotten Son has become man and of
him everyone can say: ‘I live by faith in the Son
of God, Who loved me and gave Himself for me’
(Gal. 2:20)”? And yet, next to the representation of
God, who appears as a living God, in the encyclical
one finds, in my opinion, the idea of the god of the

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philosophers–I do not see how else to call it; that is to
say, the idea of God that man’s interior experience
postulates as necessary in order to satisfy his own
spiritual exigencies of love, happiness, and justice.

Uncertain Nature
of the Last Things
This impression also results, always in my
opinion, from the last part of the document, in
which the Pontiff explains to us the meaning of some
“settings” for “learning and practising hope.” I will
pass over “prayer” and “action and suffering” as a
school of hope and dwell, instead, on “Judgment as
a setting for learning and practising hope,” which is
the part in which the four last things are necessarily
discussed.
Christian hope is also “hope in God’s justice”
(§41). In the Judgment there is therefore the
“splendor of hope.” The Last Judgment is a “symbol
of our responsibility for our lives” (ibid.)–an obscure
sentence, in my opinion, because, among other
reasons, the Judgment is not simply a “symbol of our
responsibility,” but the infallible decision of the Just
Judge that forever establishes our responsibilities,
that is, our faults and our merits. However, the
Pope continues, iconography has given, in time,
“more and more prominence...to its ominous and
frightening aspects,” hiding that of “hope” (ibid).
The authentic meaning of the Judgment would then
seem to be one of hope, and not the “ominous and
frightening” one. Why “ominous and frightening”?
The Pontiff does not say, but it is understood that he
is referring to the judgment of the damned.
In the Last Judgment, divine justice is, however,
executed.
Yes, there is a resurrection of the flesh. There is justice.
There is an “undoing” of past suffering, a reparation that
sets things aright. For this reason, faith in the Last Judgment is first and foremost hope....I am convinced that
the question of justice constitutes the essential argument,
or in any case the strongest argument, in favor of faith
in eternal life. The purely individual need for a fulfillment that is denied to us in this life, for an everlasting
love that we await, is certainly an important motive for
believing that man was made for eternity; but only in
connection with the impossibility that the injustice of
history should be the final word does the necessity for
Christ’s return and for new life become fully convincing
(emphasis added). (§43)

Are not the Parousia of Our Lord and the
universal Judgment then to be considered “fully
convincing” on the basis of Scripture and the
doctrine of the Church? And it is in an Encyclical
that we must find such an affirmation? And what
is the “fully convincing” argument for the children
of the world?—Always the one able to satisfy the
inner need of the individual, which, according to

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the Pope, would suffer in seeing injustice triumph
in history. To prevent this triumph, it is necessary
to believe in the justice that will “undo” past
suffering and set things aright at the resurrection of
the dead. Certainly, this is an argument in favor of
the existence of God: given the injustice that there
always is in the world, there must also be a God
who one day will put everything back in place. But
that this should be the argument upon which to
establish “Christian hope” in a “fully convincing”
manner is, in my opinion, at the very least dubious,
since “Christian hope” in salvation is based on facts
testified by Holy Scripture and Tradition, and on the
teachings of the Church. Our hope has an objective
foundation based on revealed Truth and kept in
the “deposit of faith”–a supernatural foundation,
therefore. It is not based on the so-called spiritual
needs of the individual, on his subjective inner
experience, always in search of something he does
not find.
However, if in the Judgment, the “hope of
justice” is fulfilled, will it be just or not that the
wicked (the unrepentant sinners) go to eternal
damnation? Should not the Encyclical have, at
this point, reaffirmed traditional doctrine on hell,
precisely in order to conclude the explanation of
the idea of the “hope of justice” coherently? And
instead, nothing. The text of the Pope seems to
propose the image of the Judgment as that of a
“hope” possibly stripped of the “ominous and
frightening” aspect, that is, of sentences to eternal
damnation! In fact, the encyclical interprets
the parable of Lazarus and the rich man as if it
showed us the existence of purgatory, not of hell
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(§44). If some sinners exist, the document does
not say so. The notion of sin as a specific notion
does not even appear. Nor does hell appear–hell,
which in fact is not the place of eternal damnation
(“Abandon all hope, all ye who enter here,” Dante,
Inf., III, 8), but the way of being of
people for whom everything has become a lie, people
who have lived for hatred and have suppressed all
love within themselves. This is a terrifying thought,
but alarming profiles of this type can be seen in certain
figures of our own history. In such people all would be
beyond remedy and the destruction of good would be
irrevocable: this is what we mean by the word Hell.
(§45)

Are all saved, then? Indeed, we read that
our defilement does not stain us forever if we have at
least continued to reach out towards Christ, towards
truth and towards love [Reach out, how? In the intention?]. Indeed, it has already been burned away through
Christ’s Passion. At the moment of Judgment we experience and we absorb the overwhelming power of His love
over all the evil in the world and in ourselves. (§47)

Signed Letter
Translated from SISINONO, March 15, 2008.

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Some
Bishops
rebel
against
the
Pope:

Yet Another Fruit
of the Council’s
Reformed Collegiality?
What are we to make of bishops who rebel against the Pope? One of our readers
asked this question in relation to the open rebellion of a part of the episcopate against
the Motu Proprio of the reigning Pontiff (Summorum Pontificum of July 6, 2007), which
“liberalizes,” as they say, the celebration of the holy Mass according to the ancient
Roman rite, the so-called Tridentine Mass, as well as the sacraments also of the ancient
rite.
This is what we think: the modernizers will not let go. They are, moreover, always
the same ones. Among the rebellious bishops, one finds the names of Cardinals Martini
and Tettamanzi. The first has for years been considered the principal representative of
the progressivist (that is to say, neo-modernist) faction in the bosom of the hierarchy.
The second, of the same tendency, recently made the papers when, in the Cathedral
of Milan, he celebrated the Epiphany with “multiethnic” rites that included the
participation of Asian dancers (from Sri Lanka) in clinging costumes that bared the
midriff. But for years the ecumenical rites of the Novus Ordo have been celebrating a
so-called “festival of peoples” in conjunction with the Epiphany. The faithful are used

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to it. What caused a scandal at Milan, more than
the ceremony itself, was the kind of participation
the Cardinal felt obliged to allow. But it is clear
that, abstracting from the more or less scandalous
costumes worn by the participants, the real scandal is
constituted by the ecumenical rite itself, which makes
possible the sacrilegious medley of sacred and profane
thanks to the “liturgical creativity” ratified by the
Second Vatican Ecumenical Council.

The Negative Effect
of the New Collegiality
With this last reference, we broaden the response
to the question raised by our reader. For we think
that if Vatican II had not confounded the traditional
meaning of collegiality by obscuring the institutional
relationship between the bishops and the pope,
the bishops who are against papal directives would
never have dared to openly defy the authority of
the Sovereign Pontiff. The fact is, whether we like it
or not, that after this reform, the bishops taken as a
coetus united in a college with the pope can consider
themselves equal to the pope as titulary of the summa
potestas over the Church.
What is the essential notion of the reform?
Romano Amerio expressed it clearly and concisely in
Iota Unum:
The Nota praevia rejects the familiar notion of collegiality, according to which the Pope alone is the subject of
supreme authority in the Church, sharing his authority as
he wills with the whole body of bishops summoned by him
to a council. In this view, supreme authority is collegial
only through being communicated at the discretion of the
Pope. But the Nota praevia also rejects the novel theory that
supreme authority in the Church is lodged in the college
together with the Pope, and never without the Pope, who
is its head, but in such a way that when the Pope exercises
supreme power, even alone, he exercises it precisely as
head of the college, and therefore as a representative of the
college, which he is obliged to consult in order to express
its opinion. This view is influenced by the theory that
authority derives from the multitude, and is hard to reconcile with the divine constitution of the Church. Rejecting
both of these theories, the Nota praevia holds firmly to the
view that supreme authority does indeed reside in the college of bishops united to their head, but that the head can
exercise it independently of the college, while the college
cannot exercise it independently of the head.1

A Novelty Dangerous
to Papal Primacy
Such is the novelty that was introduced in the
teaching of the hierarchy, a novelty that seems to fall
midway between the traditional doctrine and more
revolutionary theories. In effect, a supreme power of
the college of bishops “together with its head” did not
exist in the constitution of the Church before Article

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THE ANGELUS • October 2008

22 of Lumen Gentium. In the 1917 Code of Canon Law,
which was then still in vigor, there is no trace of it
(see Canons 218 and 219, which define the figure of
the Roman Pontiff, and 329, consecrated to that of
the bishop). It is question of an undeniably important
novelty. Before, the supreme power of governing and
teaching in the Church had always been recognized
iure divino to the Sovereign Pontiff alone, and not to the
college of bishops, even with the pope at its head.
But given the fact that, in the exercise of this power,
the pope is superior to the college since the college
cannot exercise its authority independently of its head,
requiring as it does his authorization, while the head
exercises it independently of the college, does this not
preserve the primacy of the pope, thereby avoiding a
dogmatic rupture with tradition? This is precisely what
must be established. The Council clearly affirmed its
desire to conserve the primacy. This intention comes
through explicitly in the declarations contained in
Article 18 of Lumen Gentium. But this is not enough,
obviously. In this delicate matter, declarations of
intention, however sincere, do not suffice. It is
necessary to see how the primacy was effectively
conserved, whether it is intact or not, and whether it
was conserved in a conceptually clear manner that
does not contradict (even in part) the previously
taught doctrine.
Does the supremacy of the pope in relation to
the college of bishops concern just the exercise of the
summa potestas, or also (which would be logical), the
titularity of that power. In effect, if he lacks supremacy
in the titularity of the summa potestas, by virtue of
what can the Pontiff exercise it over the bishops? But
how can this supremacy also include (as it should)
the titularity of this power if the latter is now also
attributed to the order of bishops in union with
the Pope? Lumen Gentium 22 states: “The order of
bishops...is also the subject of supreme and full power
over the universal Church, provided we understand
this body together with its head the Roman Pontiff
and never without this head. This power can be
exercised only with the consent of the Roman Pontiff.”
The word also appears here because it has just recalled
the traditional understanding of primacy: “In virtue of
his office, that is as Vicar of Christ and pastor of the
whole Church, the Roman Pontiff has full, supreme
and universal power over the Church. And he is
always free to exercise this power.”
Does not the extension to the college of bishops
(together with its head) of the titularity of the
summa potestas imply the diminution of the pope’s
superiority vis-à-vis the bishops, introducing a crack
in the primacy? And it is even more than a crack,
it seems to us. This extension seems to attribute the

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summa potestas to two distinct subjects as organs of
the Church’s constitution: to the Pope an uti singulus
and to the college of bishops together with the pope,
as a coetus with the pontiff as head. But can a summa
potestas, which is in itself of divine origin, be attributed
to two subjects constitutionally distinct and, what’s
more, hierarchically subordinated, given that it is
the pope who appoints and directs the bishops, and
not the reverse? Obviously not. That would create
an unacceptable diarchy, a source of confusion, both
conceptual and practical, in the Church.
These ambiguous yet essential aspects of the
“reforms” introduced by Vatican II should be clarified
once and for all, for the good of souls. The need
to open the debate on Vatican II in the Church is
becoming increasingly urgent. It seems unwise to
us to continue to impede it by retreating behind a
façade that everything is going well since the pope
was not subordinated to the Episcopal college, as the
revolutionaries, the new theologians, desired; and it
preserved the primacy, which allows him to exercise
the summa potestas alone, unlike the Episcopal college.
In reality, the superiority of the pope is no longer the
same as it was in the past; it has even become less
clear in its foundation if the titularity of the summa
potestas is henceforth also attributed to the college with
the pope.
By reason of the new constitutionally guaranteed
position of the Episcopal body, in the general
mentality the image has faded of the Sovereign
Pontiff as the Vicar of Christ unilaterally exercising
the primacy without having to render an account to
anyone as his sovereign prerogatives of divine right
monarch allow him to do, limited only by the divine
and natural law. That is why a motu proprio like

Summorum Pontificum, in which the Pontiff exercised
the primacy by substantially ordering the bishops not
to oppose those who request the celebration of the
holy Mass following the ancient Roman rite, was
greeted with such coldness and an attitude of passive
resistance visible to all, and even causing a veritable
rebellion amongst the most audacious.
Canonicus
Translated by Angelus Press from Courrier de Rome, April 2008, pp.1-2.
1

Romano Amerio, Iota Unum: A Study of Changes in the Catholic Church
in the XXth Century (Kansas City: Sarto House, 1996), p.90. The new collegiality was introduced by the conciliar Constitution Lumen Gentium in its
Article 22. But since it seemed ambiguous to many, a nota praevia (in reality
posterior) was added to the Constitution that gave the authentic interpretation
of this article so as to remove all doubts.

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$11.95
$13.95
$15.95
$17.95
18% of order

Airmail surcharge (in addition to above)
Foreign 21% of subtotal.

Available from:

ANGELUS PRESS
2915 Forest Avenue
Kansas City, MO 64109 USA

Phone: 1-800-966-7337
www.angeluspress.org