CASSICIACUM NOTEBOOKS

Religious Studies 1

"*Cassiciaco, ubi ab œstu sœculi requievimus in te, amœnitatem sempiterne virentis paradisi tui.*". S. Augustine, *Confessions* IX, 3.

(...in Cassiciacum, where we have tasted in You a holy rest after the agitations of the century, the delights and the eternal springtime of your paradise).

IS THE APOSTOLIC SEE VACANT?

(*LEX GRANDI, LEX CREDENDI*)

by the Rev. M.L. Guérard des Lauriers, o.p.

Association Saint-Hermenegilde Nice May 1979 SAINT HERMENEGILDE, *Martyr*, April 13.

He is the saint canonized for refusing - and refusing to be martyred - to make Easter.

The son of the Visigoth king of Spain, Leovigild, St. Herrmegilde was born into Arianism like all his people. He was married in 579 to a young Frenchwoman, a descendant of Saint Clotilde: Ingonde, daughter of Sigebert, king of the Franks of Austrasia, and of Brunehaut. Under the influence of Ingunda, Herrmegilde abjured Arianism: he was converted and baptized by his teacher and friend St. Leander, bishop of Seville. Soon all Catholic hopes were pinned on the young crown prince. His father Leovigild had him thrown into prison and *on Easter night* he had *an* Arian *bishop bring him communion*.

Hermenegilde *indignantly rejected* this heretical bishop: *for this* he was put to *death* (beheaded) on 13 April 586.

Three years later, all of Spain adhered to the Roman faith. The martyrdom of St. Hennenegilde, who for this reason is called "the Clovis of Spain", was born. His body rests in Seville, of which he is the patron. Thus, contrary to the shamefully opportunistic doctrines of the present recycled, there is no reason to accept with closed eyes any mass, any communion, any bishop, under the pretext of obedience and precept.

(With the kind permission of Mr. Jean Madiran, Director of *Itinéraires*).

# UNEXPECTED PUBLICATION... THE "CAHIERS DE CASSICIACUM" STUDIES OF RELIGIOUS SCIENCES ...BUT NOT USELESS

The Church does not require any of her faithful to be a theologian. However, "taken as a body, she is on her own behalf a theologian [...]. She does not allow herself to think that she could, and perhaps advantageously, do without Theology, that Theology is not knowledge, a Wisdom even, that this Wisdom is false or vain wisdom, or superfluous wisdom. (Abbot V.-A. Berto, *for the Holy Roman Church*, p. 38).

The great current of renewal of religious studies in the light of St. Thomas Aquinas, inaugurated by Leo XIII, has been exhausted in the muddy swamp of the triumphant modernism immanent in the conciliar Church.

Many Catholics - too few in number - have reacted in defense of the Faith. Reviews and periodicals of all kinds, with or without their specific character, have entered the fray. All of them have their merits, and several stand out for the seriousness of their documentation or the quality of their articles. However, in this concert where all is not harmony, the strictly theological register has hardly tempted composers or performers. We are not suggesting that no theological studies have been undertaken among the Catholic faithful since the crisis. But the reviews most oriented in this direction are limited, most often, to works of good popularization or to the recall of points of doctrine defined by the Magisterium.

The life of theology demands a scientific deepening of the questions that are its object. And it is necessary that theological work can find its place. The phenomenon noted by the President of the Association of the Friends of Louis Jugnet must cease: "on the whole, *we must have the courage to say it, good thought no longer thinks very much*"; a reaction that is all the more urgent since this same author notes "*the disturbing anti-intellectualism that has taken hold of some of our friends a few years ago*".

And yet, "*Theology consists, at least sometimes, in reflection, and not only in repetition*" (R.P. Guérard des Lauriers).

In front of this state of affairs, the Saint-Herménégilde association, which proposes in particular the diffusion of philosophical and religious works, agreed to take in charge the edition of the "Cahiers de Cassiciacum". Mr. Abbot Bernard Lucien ensures the direction of the publication. These "notebooks" will publish studies touching the various fields of the religious sciences. They will be particularly concerned to deal with the points of doctrine which are the most abused today, and the most delicate problems of the present time. There is, moreover, at this level, a real work of reorganization to be accomplished. In fact, the desire to justify difficult positions leads many Catholics to invent apparent arguments, far from the light of true theological principles; this phenomenon, which is the result of a hybrid of militant voluntarism and intellectual pusillanimity, contributes in part to the confusion which pervades the traditionalist phalanx. The concern for theology can even bear fruit in the pastoral order.

The patronage of Saint Augustine will remind us, moreover, that the work of understanding the faith has always been an organic part of the life of the Church. The few priests who have taken the initiative in this work are especially indebted to Father Guérard des Lauriers O.P.: it is he who has nourished and developed in them, by his example and his lessons, a deep taste for theological wisdom. Guérard des Lauriers himself devoted his life to the service of the Truth, in the deepening of the intelligibility of the Faith, according to the purest tradition of the Order of Friars Preachers. A former student of the École Normale Supérieure (rue d'Ulm; *Mathematics*), he also received a doctorate in mathematics when he was already a religious. He was for a long time a professor at the Saulchoir, the scholasticate of the Dominicans in France, and then at the Pontifical Lateran University in Rome.

The "Cassiciacum Notebooks" will also be, first of all, a work of piety towards the reverend Father. And mainly by publishing as abundantly as possible his works, ancient or recent, which will be for all those who approach them a source of light: if at least the reader is willing to follow the sometimes steep paths to which the author invites them: it is necessary to rise in order to discover universal points of view as wide as the truth.

The first of the "Cahiers de Cassiciacum" is exceptional: it is devoted to the study of the R.P. Guérard des Lauriers on the question of the Pope, "LE SIÈGE APOSTOLIQUE EST-IL VACANT? (*LEX ORANDI, LEX CREDENDI*). The Guérard des Lauriers text which appears in the "Guérard des Lauriers" is notably increased compared to the one which appeared in a mimeographed booklet with a very limited edition. Its importance will not escape any Catholic. And all will understand the particular effort to be made to ensure the widest possible diffusion.

Although it seemed desirable to plan for four issues per year, it is not possible to ensure strict regularity for such an undertaking. The modest means available are the first reason for this: but readers and friends will be able to come to the aid of this publication generously, if they understand the need for it, as those who made it possible to launch it have understood. A second reason is that the development of delicate studies cannot be "planned" like the organization of a five-year plan; it is better to postpone a publication than to present readers with journalistic approximations which are not appropriate in this field. Whatever the elasticity of the periodicity, the subscription will always be for four issues.

Abbot Jacques-Marie Seuillot.

# IS THE APOSTOLIC SEE VACANT? (*LEX ORANDI, LEX CREDENDI*)

## M.L. Guérard des Lauriers, o.p.

What is Truth?

Pilate does not wait for the answer,  
because by delivering up  
the One who is the Truth   
  
he has already   
betrayed  
the Truth.

These pages are for everyone, they are dedicated: to the soft minds that will not read them,

to sub-Pilates who find the principle of non-contradiction too *simple* to be true,

to the peacemakers who sow discord

to all those whose vocation is only to be right.

The Truth will set you free.

## WARNING

The present study was to have appeared in June 1978. Purely accidental circumstances, unrelated to the death of Cardinals Montini and Luciani, have delayed its publication. In spite of these events, we believe that we must present these observations for the reflection of the faithful without making any changes.

Here are three reasons. They follow each other like phases of a causal unfolding that is measured by the past, the present and the future.

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The first reason is the very one that justifies history, which consists *first of all in* describing past events in the present.

What was "really" true of the past, when it was present, must remain true when this present, now past, is entirely objectified. If it is true that history is the "objective past" refracted into the "present" of the historian, it is in this sense that the witness in act obviously testifies in the present, and for all that states his own "present". But the witness must ignore himself absolutely, precisely in this act in which he aims to testify to the truth. Otherwise, the canonical books themselves would not contain any *objective testimony* to the past facts which concern the Life of the Incarnate Word. S. John affirms the contrary: *quod manus nostræ contrectaverunt de verbo vitæ* [[1]](#footnote-2).

What we believed to be true of the living Cardinal J.B. Montini under the pontificate of "Paul VI", we believe to be true of the deceased Cardinal Montini under the pontificate of John Paul II as well as John Paul Ier This is the first reason why we publish it unchanged.

The second reason follows from the first. John Paul, after John and Paul. *Post hoc, ergo propter hoc...*? *Deus scit.*

Whatever may be the case with a purpose that is a matter of "intention", a causal link is made manifest in the consequences that are observable. This causal link, which connects John Paul, if not to John, at least to Paul, is this. Even if we admit, as is possible and as seems probable to us, *salvo meliore judicio*, that the Conclaves of August 24 and October 14, 1978, could have been valid in spite of the arbitrary eviction of the octogenarian Cardinals, a serious difficulty remains. Indeed, the Cardinals who elected Cardinal Luciani and Cardinal Wojtyła were overwhelmingly appointed by Cardinal Montini. Now, as we explain in the present study, if Cardinal Montini was pope really in the sense that, during his lifetime, the Apostolic See could have no other occupant, he was pope only "materially". For, since he did not have the real and effective purpose of promoting the divine Good which Christ committed to the Church, Cardinal Montini did not receive the Communication of "being with" promised by Christ[[2]](#footnote-3), and was not "*formally*" Pope.

Under these conditions, the acts performed by "Paul VI" are, of themselves, invalid. Consequently, the two Conclaves are, of themselves, invalid. "Of themselves", that is to say, except for the substitution dispensed by God in view of the divine Good which He has committed to the Church.

Is there such a thing as a stand-in?

We will indicate the essential, considering successively each of the three powers which the Church possesses in the "virtue" of her Head.

## a) The question of substitution for the power of sanctification.

As regards the power of sanctification, God Himself makes up for the deficient official Church in favor of the faithful. The sacraments, which were divinely instituted and whose rite, committed to the care of the Church, has been preserved until the recent reformation, remain valid and efficacious *in themselves*, whatever may be the disavowal of a Church which disavows itself as the 57infallible Guardian and Mistress of the Deposit. Validity and efficacy are to be found in the traditional rite, which contains the intention of the traditional Church, and consequently the intention of Christ. Christ operates in the sacraments "from always", as He has always done. He supplements, in *favour of the faithful*, in the sense that He operates immutably, independently of the mediation which a "disoriented" Church can no longer exercise. It is true that marriage raises a particular difficulty to which we will return later and which the principles immediately recalled make it possible to clarify.

We therefore make it clear that, as far as sacred power is concerned, *there is divine substitution in favour of the faithful who remain faithful* to the traditional rites.

While there *can obviously be no divine substitution*, which would make valid the acts, in *themselves invalid*, by which the authority scuttles the traditional rites.

Paul VI has, at least apparently, promulgated by the *Constitutio Apostolica Missale Romanum* (April 3, 1969), a document which is allegedly a "new *ordo missæ"*; whereas this document cannot be "of the Church" since it upholds the opposition of contrariety with each of the Church's notes.

Thus, with regard to the power of sanctification, there is substitution in favor of the faithful; the hypothesis of substitution in favor of "authority" is meaningless.

On the contrary, in the case of magisterial power and canonical power, the mediation exercised by the Church in law with regard to the faithful remains absolutely necessary. For these two powers, it is impossible for there to be a "substitution" *in favour of the faithful* if there is not, first and foremost, the same substitution in favour of "authority".

And since it is obvious that there can be no *divine* substitution which would make valid an act presumed to be invalid by the "authority", in cases where this authority would remain the norm which *God Himself* has established as being *absolute*, it is necessary to distinguish, for the question of substitution, two other cases

## b) The question of the [impossible] substitution for infallible magisterial power.

The infallible Magisterium has two different modes of exercise: one is "extraordinary", the culmination of which was defined by Pius IX, and the other is "ordinary", the principal basis of which is the continuity of Tradition. This distinction is too well known for us to insist on it. Let us observe, however, that the "post-conciliarism" of the Vatican[[3]](#footnote-4) has involved "inflating" the "extraordinary", to such an extent that even today, for many "traditional" Catholics, in fact if not by consent, everything happens as if the infallible Magisterium, or even the Magisterium as such, had no reality except on the condition that it be exercised according to the "extraordinary mode". This error, which is latently widespread, has contributed greatly to the fallacious simplicity of the all too famous "duty to disobey".

The infallible Magisterium also presents, from another point of view, that of quality, two modalities.

The revealed fact is, in fact, on the one hand, the object of the "articles of faith", that is to say, of the propositions which are, by God, its expression; and on the other hand, it is the norm of human action, insofar as the latter is immediately ordered to sanctification. It is appropriate, therefore, to distinguish two modalities for the infallible Magisterium, one "theoretical" and the other "practical". The "theoretical" modality is specified by the intelligible expression of the *Sacred Doctrine*; the "practical" modality by the implementation of the same *Doctrine* in the life of the Church *in via*.

The extraordinary infallible Magisterium, as defined by Pius IX3, is theoretical. The typical case, and moreover unique since the definition of 1870, is that of the Assumption defined by Pius XII on November 1950. For example, the Pope could "decide" *ex cathedra*, according to the form foreseen by Vatican I, the question of whether the so-called "new Mass" is or is not valid; it would then no longer be a question of promulgating an *ordo* (the "practical" order), but of passing judgment (the "theoretical" order) on the doctrine implied by this *ordo*.

The ordinary infallible Magisterium is in fact both theoretical and practical. The two distinctions: "ordinary-extraordinary", "theoretical-practical", thus differentiate the modalities of the infallible Magisterium, although infallibility is always equally committed. In all these cases, no substitution is possible. It is impossible for God to have to "substitute" for what He Himself confers absoluteness upon. Either the Authority is, and it is infallible; or the "authority," however it may appear, is not the Authority.

- What we have just observed is obvious *a priori*, is no less obvious *a posteriori*.

Paul VI, who was Pope in reality, albeit "materially", would have acted upon the charism of infallibility if he had made an act of the Extraordinary Magisterium; but he chose not to do so.

In other words, the charism of infallibility belongs to the physical person of the pope; and its exercise is assured, if the conditions specified by *Pastor æternus* are fulfilled. The pope who is only *materialiter* is, in this respect, really pope. He enjoys the charism, if he exercises it in the required conditions, whatever may be the case of intentions or lack of intention which do not concern this exercise.

This is the first part of the alternative: if the Authority is, it is *positis ponendis*, infallible. Paul VI did not confirm this, but he did not deny it.

On the other hand, Paul VI, in promulgating, at least apparently, on December 7, 1965, the Declaration: *Dignitatis humanae personae*, took an act which disqualified "authority".

On the one hand, in fact, this Declaration contains a proposition which supports the opposition of contradiction with the traditional doctrine recapitulated and solemnly promulgated by Pius IX. This proposition is therefore a heresy; and, far from being imputed to an (unthinkable) *lapsus mentis*, it has in fact inspired the behaviors by which the "pseudo-authority" has succeeded in secularizing the still Catholic States.

On the other hand, this Declaration should have been infallible, given the manner of its promulgation. And this for all three reasons.

1. 1. The Declaration: *Dignitatis humanae personae* is, by Paul VI's own admission, a solemn ordinary Magisterium; indeed, it emanates from the highest doctrinal authority in the Church, namely the Pope and the Council *together*.

*Together*, even physically, that is, as much as it is possible to be. Paul VI did not simply ask for a consultation of all the bishops of Christendom, as Pius IX and Pius XII had done, in order to define the Immaculate Conception and the Assumption. Paul VI had *with* him all the bishops of Christendom, who had been summoned by him. *Together, therefore,* they recapitulated the Roman Catholic Church "which is the Mystical Body of Christ"[[4]](#footnote-5). They were fulfilling the very conditions which Jesus wished to fulfil when, before summoning "the eleven" [Peter and the other Apostles, except Judas], He made them the infallible promise: "Behold, I am with you always". If such conditions did not imply *ipso facto, ex se*, that Christ was, as He promised, "with" His beloved Bride, it would have to be concluded that He who is the Truth Himself [[5]](#footnote-6)had deceived.

1. The Declaration *Dignitatis...* deals with a doctrine received and defined by Tradition, and solemnly recapitulated by Pius IX in the Syllabus and in the Encyclical *Quanta cura*.
2. This Declaration is expressly presented as being integrated with the revealed data.

This is because its content is not simply a doctrine concerning the natural order, assumed in the supernatural order. On the contrary, from the outset this doctrine is affirmed in virtue of the relationship it immediately bears to Revelation: "the very dignity of the human person, as made known by the word of God and human reason".

The inevitable result is this. The content of the Declaration is presented in that same Light of which the Magisterium and it alone is in law the depository. The qualification of the content in relation to the revealing Light is therefore the same as that of the act by which the Magisterium presents this content as revealed.

In other words, to specify what is the meaning of the "word of God" can only be an act of the Magisterium. If the [juridical] clauses of this act are such that they should guarantee its divine inspiration and hence its infallibility, the doctrine which this act affirms and which is declared to be in conformity with this divine inspiration, this doctrine should *ipso facto* be promulgated under the note of infallibility.

In other words, if the authority of Scripture were not allegedly but actually invoked, it could be argued that the Declaration deals with a doctrine of the natural order whose estimation does not formally belong to the Magisterium of the Church. The qualification of the Declaration as emanating from the Magisterium might not apply to the content of the Declaration, which would not formally fall within the competence of the Magisterium.

But this is not the case. It is in relation to Scripture that the Declaration intends to specify what the dignity of the human person consists in. The affirmation is therefore formally the responsibility of the Church's Magisterium. Consequently, the qualification that belongs to the act of affirmation insofar as it proceeds from the Magisterium belongs *ipso facto* to the content of the same act, which is placed under the influence of the Magisterium. The Vatican has supped with Satan, referring to the word of God in order to deceive more effectively. But "God is not mocked"[[6]](#footnote-7). It is the word of God, present although misplaced in these places, which makes the condemnation of Vatican II decisive.

Let's summarize the three reasons above.

By virtue of the third, the Declaration has the same qualification as the act from which it emanates. That is, the content is a truth declared under the note of infallibility, if the act is an infallible act of the Magisterium. Now, in view of the first two reasons, this act commits infallibility, or at least it should. For if, in virtue of the very conditions under which it is made, this act did not engage infallibility, no affirmation emanating from the *universal*[[7]](#footnote-8) *ordinary Magisterium* could be declared infallible, by reason of the very act of promulgation; which is manifestly false[[8]](#footnote-9).

This is the second part, the "lived" part, of the alternative. The "authority", i.e. the Pope and the Second Vatican Council, together constituting the "universal ordinary Magisterium"7, promulgated a Declaration, a proposition of which is a heresy, whereas it should have been an infallibly revealed truth8. This "authority" was therefore not "with" Him "who is the Truth" 5. And *He not being with it*, this "authority" was not the Authority. This is in addition to the even more obscure question of whether Cardinal Montini was *personally a* heretic.

- Here, then, is the inescapable conclusion, first of all with regard to Paul VI. The Second Vatican Council was regularly convened. Its decisions were regularly approved and promulgated. There is therefore nothing in the Council itself that would invalidate what it has, in its own right, as a Council of "authority". But, according to the *Nota previa* derisorily published after [!] the *Constitutio lumen gentium*, and fallaciously not integrated into the said *Constitutio*, there is not: on the one hand, the pope, and on the other hand, the council; there is: on the one hand, the pope alone, and on the other hand, the pope with the council[[9]](#footnote-10). That is to say, the authority of the Council is ultimately based on the authority of the Pope who approves the Council. If therefore, at least from December 7, 1965, Paul VI and Vatican II together were, in the Church or outside the Church God knows, an "authority" that could no longer be Authority, we must conclude that at least by the act of December 7, 1965, Cardinal J.B. Montini became a subject not capable of exercising, in the Church, Authority.

As for the Council itself, it is also inescapable to observe the following.

The Second Vatican Council recalled and clarified many truths. It usually used a "mode of meaning" that is ambiguous. So much so that a *Nota previa* was necessary to clarify *a posteriori on an essential point*9, what the meaning of the major document is, namely the *Constitutio Lumen gentium*, a *Constitutio* whose scope is self-evident, and has in fact manifested itself, as being dogmatic, whatever the affirmation emanating from the Council itself under the "authority" of Paul VI8. From this ambiguity have resulted the many errors which post-conciliarism has placed, not without reason, under the aegis of the Council itself. These defects, however serious they may be, would not in themselves have been sufficient to cast doubt on the fact that the Second Vatican Council was an *authentic* ecclesial fact, that is to say, a sure link in the homogeneous development of Catholic doctrine. However, the following two recitals inexorably call this into question.

The first has been mentioned above. *Of itself*, an Ecumenical Council, which is duly approved by the Pope, and which in virtue of this very approval, "has attributed to its teachings the authority of the ordinary supreme magisterium, which is so manifestly authentic that it must be accepted by all the faithful...", of itself such a Council enjoys the "being with" infallibly promised by Christ. 8, such a Council of *course* enjoys the "being with" infallibly promised by Christ.

*Such a Council must* inherently *enjoy this "being with", must therefore be immune to any error*. Now, the Second Vatican Council explicitly affirmed at least one error. Therefore, this Council cannot authentically be, and only appeared to be fraudulently, an ecclesial fact, a manifestation of Life in the Church of "Him who is Life"5.

The second recital confirms this conclusion. And it specifies it: Vatican II, as a Council, is not "of the Church", because it has introduced into the "people of God", if not into the Church, the most pernicious of the vitiosities which are inherent in schism.

Let us refer to the statement of Paul VI: "This Council has avoided proclaiming in the extraordinary mode dogmas affected by the note of infallibility"8. The favor with which most "traditionalists" have welcomed this valuation reveals a serious alteration in the way infallibility is conceived.

"We are relieved. Nothing is lost, indeed everything is saved; the infallible Magisterium is not involved". Such was the dominant reaction. It presupposed that the exercise of the "extraordinary" Magisterium and the Roman privilege of infallibility were considered, at least "subconsciously", to be convertible. In this view, a wandering appears to be of little importance, if it is attributable to the "ordinary" Magisterium.

This latent *consensus* served the "authority" very effectively, for it defused the "unfortunate bad temper" of most of the fundamentalists, who were all the more vindictive for being less informed. Reassured by the "non-irreformability", a kind of mortgage on the future, they were better disposed to absorb the revolution hidden in the *aggiornamento*.

And so the "faithful", "integralists" included, Cardinal Luciani included, Cardinal Wojtyła (?), have become familiar with the idea that the "extraordinary infallible" being obviously respected and even adored, everything else, at the level of the "ordinary", can change. These "faithful", little by little, begin to examine as possible the hypothesis that, with regard to the Magisterium, which is of course *only* "ordinary", the Church's doctrine concerning religious freedom can change. And to help them believe they are enlightened, some "*leader"* presents to them as being as plausible as it is favorable another hypothesis of the same strain, that of a duality of Masses within the Roman Catholic Church... 43Pius XII would have added a paragraph to the Encyclical *Mystici Corporis Christi*!

The Declaration of Paul VI concerning the non-infallibility of Vatican II B had, however, an even more serious consequence, which remains.

The "faithful" have indeed understood, not what Paul VI wrote, but what he wanted to be understood. Paul VI, as we have observed, was careful not to affirm that Vatican II did not contain *any* infallible declaration. But he "launched", he succeeded in "launching", this formidable idea: an ecumenical Council approved by the Pope does not have to be infallible. *In reality,* under the false pretence of respect, this is a mortal blow to infallibility in the opinion of the "faithful". If, in fact, the "authority" which, in the Church, should be the sovereign Authority, does not want to, or even simply does not dare to, assert itself as infallible, if this is so, infallibility no longer exists. However, what has always been true in the Church has been true in another respect since Vatican I. And to shake it, it required as much cunning as subtlety.

"Paul VI - Vatican II", by not reaffirming the primacy of jurisdiction which belongs to the Pope in every part of Christendom, and by avoiding exercising the privilege of infallibility, opposes *in deed*, though without declaring it, the two essential points dogmatically affirmed in the *Constitutio Pastor æternus* of Vatican I. "Paul VI - Vatican II" is a schism because it breaks with Tradition[[10]](#footnote-11), and because it continues to maintain, in the body of the "faithful", the destructive shaking which is the proper effect of schism.

For the unity of the Faith can no longer be safeguarded if the Supreme Pontiff, that is to say, the Pontiff who is sovereign by right, renounces the exercise of the primacy of jurisdiction; this, unfortunately, we are able to observe. More radically still, it is the very possibility of the Faith, and not only unity, which is annihilated by schism, that is, by not being "one" with the Authority of the Church. For the certainty which is proper to the act of theological Faith can only be absolute, if the "articles" are presented as divinely revealed by an Authority *which affirms itself as infallible*. The "authority" which, in fact, no longer affirms itself as infallible, also in fact makes the Faith impossible in the whole Church; it makes schism with the Authority and with the whole Church, because the proper sign of the Authority in the Church is precisely to claim for itself [[11]](#footnote-12)the privilege of infallibility with which Christ does not cease to invest His beloved Bride2.

It is therefore inescapable to conclude that neither Paul VI as occupant of the Apostolic See, nor Vatican II as an Ecumenical Council, can be "of the Church", Respectively as such, and whatever the intentions of which God alone is the judge, they are objectively and will have to be officially declared schismatic, and outside the Church whose unity can only be holy, catholic and apostolic: holy which excludes all duplicity, in word as well as in deed; catholic [kat'holon15: *organically* one], which excludes all duality, both in Doctrine and in Sacrifice; apostolic, which excludes all rupture with Tradition, and hence all "*innovation*" 10. We ask the reader who refuses this conclusion to refute the argument which establishes it. The "prudential" shield does not allow one to dodge the two-edged sword of truth.

To observe a fact requires, if one wants to have a perfect assurance of it, to examine what it consists of. And this, the more unusual the fact is.

The question is therefore the following. *How* can it be that Cardinal J.B. Montini ceased to be Pope, when to all appearances he remained so? To this question we propose two answers.

### The first is theological.

Since in this case "being Pope" is a question, we must distinguish two meanings:

1. "to be pope" only "materially" [*materialiter*], i.e. to occupy the Apostolic See;
2. to be Pope also formally [*formaliter*], that is, to exercise authority in the Name of Christ in the Catholic Church.

Paul VI did not cease to be Pope *materialiter*; such was the "appearance". Paul VI ceased to be Pope *formaliter*, at least from December 7, 1965; such was and remains the reality. In short, we introduce three distinctions. The first concerns the person: "Pope, and pope". The second concerns the exercise of the function: "*formaliter*, *materialiter*". The third results from the coordination of the first two: "Authority and authority", The Pope occupies the Apostolic See, and he exercises the Authority; he is Pope, both *materialiter* and *formaliter*. The Pope occupies the Apostolic See, but he is metaphysically not capable of exercising Authority; he is Pope only *materialiter*, he is "authority".

The present study aims at proving, *from the observation of facts*, that at least from December 7, 1965, Paul VI was no longer pope but *materialiter*. The authors who believe that Paul VI was, at that moment, a heretic, will logically consider that we are going astray in a vain dialectic. However, we think that it is not possible to prove with certainty that Paul VI was personally a heretic, nor, therefore, is it appropriate to affirm it. In these circumstances, the fact of having promulgated the Declaration *Dignitatis...*, does not in itself constitute a sufficient reason to affirm that Paul VI was no longer pope than *materialiter*. In order to conclude this, that is, to infer from an act that is admittedly "crucial" the qualification of a permanent state, it is necessary to bring in other considerations. Together they constitute the first theological answer to the question: how can it be that Cardinal J.B. Montini ceased to be Pope, when to all appearances he remained so?

### The second answer is historical.

We owe to the kindness, and courage, of Mr. Winckler, the important document which we are happy to publish in Appendix I. The reading of this document leads one to think that Cardinal J.B. Montini was never pope, not even *materialiter*.

Thus, both *a posteriori* and *a priori*, the hypothesis of a substitution, for a presumed invalid act of the infallible Magisterium, is nonsense. What remains to be examined, then, concerning the powers of the Church, are the two cases to which our present question refers, namely the question: "John Paul II?

## c) The question of substitution for non-infallible magisterial power and for canonical power.

These two powers are, in their concrete exercise, particularly linked. For if canonical power intervenes in every act of the Authority, in the way that Christ manifests himself as King in exercising his functions as Priest and Prophet, canonical power has more importance and can be preponderant when the power whose application it assures is not intrinsically determined, *a fortiori* when the Authority uses canonical power in isolation.

It is not always clear, therefore, whether such a decision is doctrinal or merely disciplinary. Let us evoke, in passing, the condemnation, by Pius XI, of *Action Française*, and the revocation, by Pius XII, of this condemnation; acts whose apparent opposition is explained only because they come under the ordinary magisterial power, which is not infallible, and which is both practical and theoretical.

The validity of a conclave is obviously a matter of canonical power.

In all these cases, it is not impossible that such a doubtful or even presumed invalid act of "authority" should in fact have the scope which it must have by nature, in virtue of a divinely granted substitution.

What about the two conclaves of August 24 and October 14, 1978?

The fact that, as we have observed above, this question is inescapably raised, suffices to show that what concerns "Paul VI" and consequently each of the acts of his Pontificate, is not without repercussions for the present. This is the second reason why we are publishing unchanged the present reflections on the past.

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The third reason is taken from the future, insofar as it is the place of "conversion" whose stake is Eternity[[12]](#footnote-13).

- The question "Paul VI?", linked to that of "the so-called new Mass?", has been asked many times by the faithful attached to Tradition, especially in the last decade. This question is being asked again and again. The form, it is true, is modified. We understand this by analogy with the theological order.

But can a catechumen receive the "formless faith", that is to say, receive the *habitus* of theological faith, without that of sanctifying grace? From a psychological point of view, this is highly improbable. But it is not metaphysically impossible. If, for example, an adult prepares for Baptism by fulfilling all the required conditions; and if, knowingly at the moment of receiving Baptism, he commits a mortal sin, then he receives the *habitus* of unformed faith, and not grace.

That being said, the question "John Paul II?" is posed in the following way.

If John Paul II adheres to Vatican II *as a Council*, instead of declaring it "heretical", it is not impossible that, like the catechumen who commits a sin at the moment of being baptized, he is pope only *materialiter*. This supposes that, in order to preserve in the Church the uninterrupted succession which is held to be "apostolicity", God has "provided" in favour of two inherently invalid Conclaves.

But it is also possible that John Paul II would be a *formaliter* pope. The sign of this would be that he would disqualify Vatican II as a *Council*, and that he would clearly abrogate the apparent promulgation of the so-called New Mass8. In this respect, the "Paul VI?" question was and remains certainly different from the "John Paul II?" question.

But this second question exists because it is one of the consequences of the first. Just as it is impossible to believe with certainty that a proposition is true *because* Vatican II affirmed it, even though Vatican II recalled many truths, so it is impossible to believe with certainty that John Paul II is Pope because he is the legitimately elected Pope of a Conclave on which hangs the same mortgage as on Vatican II. One can ask oneself if God "supplements", one can consider it impossible that He does not do it, not in conformity with His Wisdom that He does it in favor of a pope who would only be *materialiter...* One would like to be delivered from the interrogation, but one cannot evade the fact that there is both *yes* and *no*.

- The faithful who are attached to Tradition give answers to these tragic questions which differ to the point of opposition. All are inspired by the instinct of faith; all have the humble and fervent desire to put into practice the advice of St. Peter: "Always be ready to answer, but with gentleness and respect, anyone who asks you about the hope that is in you"[[13]](#footnote-14). Hope is, in this case, the hope of keeping the Faith and Life, through fidelity to Tradition. And it is this fidelity which, especially with regard to the Pope's question, requires justification.

Here are some observations concerning each of the three options according to which the faithful attached to Tradition present this justification.

### First option. The duty to disobey.

It is alleged: "It is better to obey God than men"[[14]](#footnote-15). The formula is a shocking one, and moreover it meets with the connivance of voluntarism; but it does not explain anything, and it is negated in the contradiction. For the opposition between "God and men" is deprived of meaning, if it is a question of a man to whom God gives the exercise of a power which He Himself, act by act, guarantees. Now this is the case with the promulgation of an *ordo missæ* in the Catholic Church[[15]](#footnote-16). *Of itself,* such an act belongs to the ordinary infallible Magisterium, in the practical order[[16]](#footnote-17). To disobey the Authority when it makes such an act would be, *of itself, to* disobey God; and it would not be "to disobey men in order to obey God".

We say "of itself", because obviously all the clauses that are part of both internal and external criticism must be taken into account. If enactment consists not in ordering but in permitting[[17]](#footnote-18), there is obviously no need to obey. But then the "duty to disobey" is misleading. The truth is that there is no order. And, if there is no order, the "duty to disobey" is as absurd as the duty to obey.

This first option turns out, with the wear and tear of time, to have been only a seduction. It is not impossible that the "duty to disobey" is a painful reality. But this is only in cases where the non-infallible Magisterium alone is involved. Let us evoke again by way of example the question, *so debated*, *moreover, of the* "Action française".

### Second option. The "post-conciliarism of Vatican **I.**

We say infallibility.

The faithful who follow this second option, generally instinctively by education, live "existentially" the dogma of papal infallibility defined on July 18, 18703. They refuse even to ask any questions about the Pope. Touching the Pope? Impossible, since *unthinkable*. The Pope *is* the infallible and *untouchable[[18]](#footnote-19)*!

These faithful see, and especially feel, something right. Their error comes from being captured by only one aspect of the truth; therefore, the "duty to disobey", far from edifying them, can only irritate them.

These faithful are perfectly sincere in their attachment to Tradition. In reality, their fidelity consists in being consumed by the regret of what they have never been.

### Third option. The "theological traditionalism".

This behaviour consists in researching, with a view to accommodating it, everything that theologians have said on the controversial question. Cajetan, Bellarmine and Suarez have never enjoyed such popularity. The "traditionalists" of the third kind do not know that the excellent authors to whom they refer spoke "in time of peace," without being able to foresee the conditions of war, and that they stated conditional clauses. IF such and such an occupant of the Apostolic See does not behave in such and such a way, then he is no longer pope or never was.

The question is *whether the* if *applies*. This can only be determined by confronting *the* observed *facts* with certain *principles.* To shed light on the situation that results from an *unprecedented* crisis cannot result from a slavish return to what was different, on the pretext that it preceded. Theology consists, at least sometimes, in reflection and not only in repetition.

This is the third reason why we are publishing these "reflections" under the pontificate of "John Paul II", without making any changes to them; it is true that they concerned the pontificate of "Paul VI" directly, but they refer expressly to a revealed fact which we hope will be the subject of further elaboration.

May they help the reader to resolve in the near future, "by induction", that is to say from observation, taking into *account actions* [[19]](#footnote-20)rather than words, the question we inherit from the recent past.

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"*Stat crux dum volvitur orbis*". In order to guide our steps, it is important to analyse the eventual framework of reality. It is therefore necessary to recall the principles, unchanged, whose implementation is required in order to clarify their scope.

"I am with you every day, until the consummation of time"[[20]](#footnote-21).

The Church is one, holy, catholic, apostolic. Nothing can be "of the Church" and therefore be in the Church, which would be incompatible with one of the "notes of the Church".

God, of course, supplements in favor of an Authority that has and *usually* manifests the intention of promoting the Divine Good which Christ committed to the care of His beloved Bride.

These are the assured principles. We have the imperative duty to implement them in a detailed manner, without haste or timidity, with as much realism in firmness as discernment in humility. May the Holy Spirit help us, and in Him His Spouse the Mother of the Church. "*Revelasti ea parvulis*".

On the Feast of the Apparition (February 11, 1979).

M.L. Guérard des Lauriers, o.p.

## I - LET US PRAY FOR THE POPE

To pray, whether we adore or implore, is to believe in action, under the gaze of God. The act of prayer achieves, in the depths of the soul, a secret osmosis which reflects the very simplicity of the uncreated Mystery; the believer passes into the speaker, and the speaker into the believer, as Light is Wisdom and vice versa.

The famous adage is therefore a transcendent norm, since it is divinely founded. *Lex orandi, lex credendi.*

We observe, moreover, that this norm imposes itself, inexorably one might say, either for good or for evil, dominating all vicissitudes in the absolute of the equal. And if we do not fail to use it, very opportunely in these troubled times, as a cry of alarm, we must discover in depth, in the mental consonance between believing and praying, a discreet harmonic of the divine Simplicity.

The nome of which the liturgy is the implementation is invested with the imperative requirement which is, according to St. Augustine, immanent to the whole sacred order: "Hoc versetur in corde quod profertur in ore". Augustine, immanent to the whole sacred order: "*Hoc versetur in corde quod profertur in ore*".

It is, therefore, a religious duty to God, a duty of loyalty to oneself and of truth to one's neighbor, to express accurately in the formulas of prayer the conviction which the instinct of the most holy Faith arouses, nourishes and justifies.

It is neither rationally nor theologically coherent to resist the Pope on the one hand, and on the other to proclaim, when one prays for him as one should, what are the foundations of the submission due to him. One must *either* obey by making mention of that which imputes the duty to do so, *or* not make mention of it if one considers that the duty no longer exists. "Either or": one or the other; not: both. No one has explained how the famous "duty to disobey" is compatible with sound metaphysics.

This is the serious motive which determines us to propose certain "amendments" concerning the *Oremus pro Pontifiee notro Paulo*.

We must pray more than ever for him who remains, at least potentially, invested with the charism of infallibility. We have an even more sacred duty, that of not accrediting any untruth. What we think, what inspires our action, it is this and not the opposite that we must express, especially when we pray.

So this is what we are proposing.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *OREMUS PRO PONTIFICE NOSTRO PAUO* | LET US PRAY FOR OUR PONTIFF |
| *Dominus convertat eum, et illuminet eum, et fortem faciat eum in terra, ne jam tradat Ecclesiam in animam inimicorum ejus.* | May God convert him, may He give him light and strength on earth, so that he will no longer hand over the Church to the enemies of the Church. |
| *Oremus!* | Let us pray! |
| *Omnipotens sempiterne Deus, miserere famulo tuoPontifiee nostro Paulo;  et dirige eum  tuam clementiam in viam salutis œternœ; ut, te donante, verbis ET ACTIS, VERITATEM custodiat  et tota virtute PERFICIAT.* | Almighty and eternal God, have mercy on your servant, our Pontiff Paul; direct him by your powerful goodness in the way of eternal salvation; so that, by your grace he may remain faithful to the Truth, proclaim it in words and with all his strength carry it out in deeds. |
| *Per Christum Dominum nostrum.* | Through Christ our Lord. |

Let us now set out the recitals that require the proposed amendments, or equivalent ones.

Among the faithful attached to Tradition, some are "unconditional" of the Pope, others believe that Paul VI is no longer Pope, or even never was. Some give the expression "*Pro Pontifice nostro Paulo*" the same meaning as "before", while others contest that it can still be used. We will simply clarify the scope of a formula which, in fact, is still commonly used.

## II - CARDINAL J.-B. MONTINI IS STILL POPE *MATERIALITER*

1. Let us first observe that Cardinal J.B. Montini is still pope under the name of Paul VI.

Was not the election of Cardinal Montini rendered invalid by the *violent* coercion which was allegedly exercised to obtain the withdrawal of Cardinal Siri?

Those who are qualified to affirm this, refuse to testify to it. We must therefore hold, until proven otherwise, that Cardinal Montini is still pope under the name of Paul VI.

1. It was sought to prove the contrary, by charging Cardinal Montini with heresy. The arguments that have been developed are certainly impressive, especially for their convergence. We do not believe, however, that they induce in the mind the rigorous certainty which alone would impose a conclusion of such grave import.
2. So we hold that Paul VI is still pope, but he is only *MATERIALITER*.

We mean that Paul VI occupies the Apostolic See. And that, consequently, there can be no other occupant[[21]](#footnote-22). It is in this sense, but only in this sense, we will explain, that Paul VI is "our Pontiff".

But it is enough that Paul VI is our Pontiff *materialiter*, that is, as occupant of the Apostolic See, for us to have the duty to pray for him; and this, not only as for any other, but as our Pontiff.

Now comes the most important part. Although Cardinal Montini occupies the Apostolic See, he is no longer Pope *FORMALITER*.

This third statement does not contradict the first two, it merely completes them. This is what needs to be clarified in order to be able to prove it.

## CARDINAL J.-B. MONTINI IS NO LONGER POPE *FORMALITER* MEANING OF THIS STATEMENT

1. Cardinal Montini "is no longer pope *formaliter*" means that Cardinal Montini is *deprived of* that which *formally* constitutes the Pope as the head *in act of* the Church militant.
2. "Deprived of" means that Cardinal Montini no longer has what he should have (if he ever had it) to be able to rule the Church militant[[22]](#footnote-23).
3. What Cardinal Montini is "deprived of", what constitutes the Pope as the *de facto* head of the Church militant, is the "being with" that was promised by Christ: "Behold. I am with you always, until the end of time"[[23]](#footnote-24). Christ spoke in the present tense: "I am with you", with those whom he requires to be with him: "He who is not with me is against me"[[24]](#footnote-25). It is the same "being with" which, by its very nature, requires reciprocity.

Cardinal Montini is no longer a *formal* pope because, according to the economy[[25]](#footnote-26) proper to the supernatural order, it is impossible (cf. *below*) for Christ to "be with" him, at least in the pontifical government. He is *incapable of* exercising pontifical power, because he is no longer a "subject" who is metaphysically "capable" of doing so.

1. In fact, concretely and objectively, even if unwillingly, Cardinal Montini gave up the keys as well as [[26]](#footnote-27)the tiara.
2. No one, *therefore, need* be subject to Cardinal Montini, according to that religious and theological submission which is due to the Pope, inasmuch as he is the Vicar of Jesus Christ.
3. This amounts to saying that Cardinal Montini is no longer "one with" the Church. Since he is indeed pope *materialiter*, if he were "one with" the Church, he would be in act the head of the Church militant, i.e. he would be pope *formaliter* *[[27]](#footnote-28)*.
4. It follows that Paul VI should not be named in the Canon of the Mass. This Canon, which Cardinal Montini tried to obrogate[[28]](#footnote-29), simply by substituting another canon[[29]](#footnote-30), this Canon, which is that of *the* Mass, must remain untouched by the name "Paul VI".

We must pray for the one who *materially* occupies the Apostolic See, but we must refuse to consider him as one (*una cum*) with the Catholic Church. In the "*Te igitur*" we must say: "*una cum Sede apostolica*", and not: "*una cum famulo tua papa nostro P.*"[[30]](#footnote-31).

1. So this is what we mean when we say that Cardinal Montini is no longer Pope *Formaliter*.

Christ "is no longer with" him, at least in the pontifical government. Because Christ, as He promised, "is with" the Church, and Cardinal Montini "is no longer with" the Church. It is the metaphysics of "being with" that inexorably brings this condemnation, as a consequence of the principle of non-contradiction.

1. In what follows, we usually identify the present occupant of the Apostolic See with Cardinal Montini.

We shall return to this question at the end68. We should make it clear from the outset that the argument whose development we are about to follow concerns formally the present occupant of the Apostolic See. That is to say, we are considering the physical and moral person of this occupant, not in so far as he is (?) the person of Cardinal Montini as God alone knows him, but in so far as he engages, by his acts, his responsibility; in so far, therefore, as he gives all the signs which unmistakably manifest the exercise of authority. It is to this *public* personage, whose acts are observable, it is to him that we should be subject; it is therefore this *public* personage that we regard *as such*.

We hold, moreover, that this personage is most probably Cardinal MONTlNI; but *this consideration does not formally enter into our argument*. The situation of the Church compels us to examine the relationship maintained by the present occupant of the Apostolic See with the acts which are supposed to emanate from him, and to judge of this relationship according to the norms proper to it. But we expressly do not intend to pass any value judgment on Cardinal Montini himself.

## IV - CARDINAL J.-B. MONTINI IS NO LONGER POPE ***FORMALITER*** PROOF OF THIS STATEMENT

This proof rests on the unity of correlation that is organically realized, within the Church militant, between two data.

These data differ as much by their intrinsic nature as by the mode of apprehension that they respectively specify. We will first recall what these two data are (A); we will then be able to specify what their unity is, from the concrete point of view (B).

### A) THE TWO DATA TO BE CONSIDERED: "THE CHURCH, HUMAN COLLECTIVE"; "THE CHURCH, MYSTICAL BODY OF CHRIST".

Since divine government is exercised in the Church, it subordinates the natural order to the supernatural order.

The Church militant is a *human collective*. This collective is placed *under the influence of Christ* who is its Head.

These are the two data that must not be confused or separated, and which, for this reason, must be distinguished.

#### 1. THE CHURCH IS A HUMAN COLLECTIVE

This collective includes in particular the Relationship the Authority maintains with the End[[31]](#footnote-32).

##### a) The members who constitute this human collective.

The Church is a human collective, in the sense that it is composed of human beings who, by grace and free choice, have a common End. This End, which can be called the Divine Good, is the Glory of God realized in the sanctification of the members who make up the Church.

##### b) The subject of Authority in this human collective.

The Church has an Authority, which is divinely instituted in view of the Divine Good whose realization is committed to the Church.

This Authority is branched into three powers; it is exercised in two ways: ordinary and extraordinary; it is constituted by a hierarchical group of consecrated persons.

But, whatever these modalities may be, Authority *subsists as Authority only as the subject of the Relation* which it sustains with the Good-End whose realization is committed to the Church by Christ who is its Head. In other words, Authority subsists as such only in the relationship it maintains with the purpose of the Church. We will explain this in the next paragraph (2).

##### c) The "Relationship" between the Authority and the End, within this human collective.

The Church is, from both these points of view (a and b), similar to any other human collective.

And in particular, the "Relationship" (which we designate by quotation marks) that the Authority maintains with the Good-End, is the *foundation* and the norm of all the ordinations[[32]](#footnote-33) that emanate from the Authority; this same "Relationship" is, on the other hand, object of observation, on the part of the subordinates.

It is this "Relationship" which, if it is what it should be, "specifies" the "submission" that the subordinates must make; all at once to the realization of the Good-End and to the Authority[[33]](#footnote-34).

It is up to each member of the collective, in accordance with the situation that he occupies, to appreciate if the "Relationship" is what it should be. One must *a priori* assume that it is; and therefore be subject to the Authority. But if a *prolonged* and *generalized* experience shows that the "Relationship" is not in fact what it should be, we must conclude that, since "authority" has lost its raison d'être, there is no longer any need to be subject to it, and that it should even be resisted.

These are the principles that apply to every human collective and therefore, *positis ponendis*, to the Church. They have been recalled, in word and deed, by the faithful, by the priests, by the bishop, who remain attached to Tradition.

#### 2. THE CHURCH IS THE MYSTICAL BODY OF CHRIST.

##### (a) This is the most important fact.

It is an object of knowledge only by being an object of faith. It is, so to speak, the "form", and therefore the reason for being and the end of the Church, inasmuch as the latter is a human collective. *Nothing subsists in the Church except in relation to Christ who is its Head.*

This is the principle from which it follows that, in the Church militant, the relationship between the Authority and the subordinates is *formally*, that is, according to form, different from what it is in any other human collective. The "form" that belongs to the supernatural order "informs" that which belongs to the natural order, and plays a material role. One is a member of the Church militant only because one is a member of Christ, and for the better to become so.

##### b) What formally constitutes Authority in the Church.

Just as a human being is constituted as a member of the human collective "Church militant" only by habitually receiving the Communication of Life from the Head of the Church, so Authority is constituted as Authority in the Church militant only by habitually receiving the "being with" that Christ communicates to it.

The "subjects", i.e. "the member of the Church militant" or "the Authority of the Church militant", exist *materially* as "subjects", before the Communication which proceeds from Christ; but they are *formally* members *of the Church* or Authority *of the Church* only in virtue of and in the Act of the Communication which *the Head of the Church exercises*.

It is possible for a human being to refuse the Communication of Life which proceeds from Christ. This is possible because, as the Council of Trent observes, "although *Christ died for all*[[34]](#footnote-35), only those receive the fruit of his death, to whom the merit of his Passion is communicated"[[35]](#footnote-36). And if a human being refuses the communication [[36]](#footnote-37)which proceeds from the Head of the Church, *he is in no way a member of the Church, although it is* not impossible that he should become one.

In the same way, the "authority" which would refuse the Communication of the "being with" which proceeds from the Head of the Church, *would in no way be Authority of the Church*. It could be *materialiter*, in the capacity of a "subject" whose Authority it is not impossible that it *become*; but this "subject", deprived of what constitutes *formaliter* in the Church the Authority, would have, in the Church, no Authority.

The analogy we have just indicated concerns *states*. Being a member of the Church is a state; being the Authority in the Church is a state.

The Communication of Life or of "being with" which proceeds from Christ involves, as regards reception in each of the "subjects" respectively interested and who can always refuse it, a first moment; but, inaugurated, it is *habitual* in the "subject" who is the end of it, as it is permanent in Christ who is the principle.

##### c) The submission that is due to the Authority in the Church.

This shows how the communication of "being with", which usually founds the existence and exercise of Authority in the Church, is normed, even though it "overflows" it, by the actuation of the charism of infallibility when it comes into play[[37]](#footnote-38). When this charism comes into play, it is certain that the Communication of "being with" is received by the Authority; and it is manifest that the submission which is due to the Authority concerns in it *formally* this Communication of which it is the instrument, and necessarily by derivation the propositions which are declared under the note of infallibility[[38]](#footnote-39). Now, what the act of the Extraordinary Magisterium shows in an evident manner is true, as to structure, usually. Authority as Authority is founded *formally*, in the collective Church and in that alone, on the Communication of "being with" which proceeds from the Head of the Church: "I am with you always until the consummation of a time" 20. I am with you always; it is a presence, it is a permanent communication, to which, of itself, corresponds a state for those to whom there is presence. And the religious and theological submission which is due to the Authority in the collective Church and in that alone, is founded [ormaliter on the fact that the Authority is supposed to receive habitually the Communication "of being with" which proceeds from Christ. It is to Christ Himself that, in the Authority, submission is addressed; since Christ "is with" [[39]](#footnote-40)the Authority: "Whoever listens to you, listens to me! [[40]](#footnote-41)This presupposes, of course, we repeat, that Authority usually receives the Communication of "being with", which alone constitutes it *formal* Authority.

#### 3. THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT IN THE CHURCH.

Divine government in the Church is exercised by Christ, who is the Head of the Church.

##### a) Two communications proceed from Christ in the Church.

On the one hand, the Communication of Life which constitutes the humans who receive it members of Christ and "sons in the Son". On the other hand, the Communication of "being with" which constitutes *formaliter* as the Authority, the "subjects" who are objectively capable of receiving it.

These two Communications, which differ in nature, must be "one" in effect as they are in Principle. They therefore support a *unity of order* between them.

Let us confine ourselves to observing that, from the point of view of the "end-intention", the Communication of "being with" which founds Authority and submission, is ordered to the Communication of Life: the "subject" who holds Authority calls himself "*servus servorum Dei*", whereas, from the point of view of realisation, the Communication of Life is effectively received only in the Church, that is to say, as being immanent to the Communication of "being with" on which the Hierarchy is founded[[41]](#footnote-42). The permanent interference which is effected between these two Communications corroborates their existence, and respectively for each, their nature.

##### b) The Communication of "being with".

The fact of this communication is evidently mentioned in all the treatises of the Church. It is, however, usually referred to as the "help" or "assistance" promised to the Church.

It is to signify, in terms of the Church, that which in reality proceeds from Christ; and it is, moreover, to signify it as arising in the Church in an extrinsic way. Hence the notion of Authority is degraded into juridicism.

This confirms, *a contrario*, that it is better to retain the expression used by Jesus Christ himself: "being with". It should also be made clear, with regard to the exercise of the Extraordinary Magisterium, that the gratuitous help constituted by the communication of "being with" is of the "charism" type, and not of the "actual grace" type. Let us insist on this distinction.

First, as to the fact. That the Pope has the graces of state which his office calls for, belongs equally to all Christians; it is not, therefore, peculiar to the Pope, nor can it coincide with the "being with" of which Christ promised the Communication, *not to all*, but to the Apostles and their successors, distinctly and eminently to the Successor of Peter.

As for the nature of the distinction, the gratuitous help constituted by the communication of "being with" is to state grace what the *bonum operis* is to the *bonum operantis*. The grace of state is ordered to the *bonum operantis*, to the good of the person who receives it, the primary good being sanctification. The "being with", and in general the charism, are given in view of the *bonum operis*, so that the *opus*, that is to say, the work that is accomplished, may be good.

The proper character of state grace is manifest in the case where there is no charism. Supposing that the same task is entrusted to several subjects, supposing also that these subjects all correspond adequately to the graces of state that they receive, all sanctify themselves equally. The tasks performed, however, will be of unequal value, in accordance with the natural capacity of each of the subjects. The servant who has done five talents and the servant who has done two talents receive the same reward in *substance*: "Enter into the joy of your Master"[[42]](#footnote-43). This joy is measured, not by the value of the work done, but by the intention to do it well.

If there is a charism, the communication of it is accompanied by appropriate graces of state; but the proper role of the charism is to ensure the perfection of the work accomplished. Whether the charism "rectifies" or "supplements", it always assures a mode of action that transcends the connatural measure in terms of the effect produced.

We therefore say that the "being with" communicated by Christ to the Head of the Church militant is of the "charisma" type, and not of the "actual grace" type, without obviously ignoring that such actual graces are also communicated.

The expression "to be with" bases the analogy of faith on that of being. It means that the Head of the Church wants to be always present to his Church, the "presence" consisting in an actuation which is common, on the one hand, to what is "present", and on the other hand, to what, or to what there is "presence". And as the "presence" thus signified, radically, is reciprocal, it is thus consigned that this "being with" is the very condition of possibility20.

### B) THE UNITY BETWEEN THE TWO DATA: "THE CHURCH AS A HUMAN COLLECTIVE" AND "THE CHURCH AS THE MYSTICAL BODY OF CHRIST

This unity is organically realized in the Church, and notably in the Authority of the Church, between on the one hand the "Relationship" that the Authority maintains with the "Good-End", as in every human collective; and on the other hand the Communication of "being with" that proceeds from Christ, since the Church is His mystical body.

We will first specify what this unity is in law (paragraph 1); we will then be able to understand how the consequences which directly concern our subject, flow ineluctably from the "broken unity" (paragraph 2); we will finally report on these consequences, showing what is the requirement of truth for the faithful deserted by the "occupied" Church (paragraph 3).

#### 1. THE NATURE OF THE UNIT BETWEEN THE TWO DATA.

##### a) The paradigm of unity: the analogy constituted by the act of justification.

We call "paradigm" a "model", which in fact is well known; the form is, by the same token, a monstration for the unit in question.

This paradigm is constituted by the *act of "justification"*.

The free act by which the intelligent and free "subject" acquiesces to its own end in the supernatural order is concomitant to the infusion of grace. In such a way that acquiescence is the *condition* of the infusion inasmuch as the act proceeds from the "subject"; and acquiescence is the *fruit of* the infusion, inasmuch as the act is caused by God.

The operation of the "subject" does not condition the divine Operation; but, entered into the divine Operation, the operation of the "subject" conditions and measures its reception in the "subject.

##### b) Consequence of this analogy.

The analogy, the basis of which is the "act of justification", carries the following consequence.

The *intention* that the Authority must have, to carry out as it should be the "Relationship" that the Authority maintains with the Final Good, is *concomitant to the* reception of the "being with" that proceeds from Christ. In this way, the behaviour of Authority must be considered in two ways.

On the one hand, the behaviour of Authority being considered as *proceeding from Authority*, the intention to realise the "Relationship" as it should be, is the *condition* for receiving the "being with" that proceeds from Christ.

On the other hand, the behavior of the Authority being considered *as caused by Christ*, the intention to realize the "Relationship" as it should be *follows from* the Communication of "being with" which proceeds from Christ.

The behaviour of the Authority does not condition the Communication of "being with" exercised by Christ, but it conditions and measures its reception.

##### c) Christ's way of governing the Church.

Thus Christ, who sanctifies the Church by the Communication of His Life, governs the Church, infallibly ex parte Sui (as regards Him), freely *ex parte Ecclesiæ* (as regards the Church), exercising in the whole Church hierarchically, and primarily in Authority, the Communication by which He "is with" His Church, Present to His Church.

Such is the order of Wisdom.

#### 2. THE BREAK IN UNITY BETWEEN THE TWO DATA.

##### (a) The break-up considered objectively.

The imperfections that are inherent in sinful humanity, especially in the Authority of the Church, suspend in effect the government of the Church, if and only if they annihilate its *essence*.

The essence is, in this case, the unity of order that exists in the Authority, between, on the one hand, the *habitual aim* of realising, as it should be, the "Relationship" to the Final Good, and on the other hand, the *reception of* the "being with" that proceeds from Christ.

###### aa) Existence of the Authority, if the intention to achieve the End is real.

If this is true, the reception of "being with" is assured, the Authority is constituted as such, and the Church is governed.

We understand by a *real* statement that which is manifested in a *habitual manner*, not only in words but *especially in deeds*. It may be that, for a particular *act*, that of the extraordinary Magisterium being reserved, the Authority is not inspired by the Holy Spirit. S. Peter denied, Honorius the gold lacked firmness[[43]](#footnote-44). "*Errare humanum est*"; Christ uses human instruments. "He knows what is in man"[[44]](#footnote-45); and He does not suspend the Communication of "being with" because of accidental failures which He remedies by bringing souls of good will back into the right "Way" [[45]](#footnote-46)which He Himself is, and thus into "the Truth" 45.

In this case, the Communication of "being with" exercised by Christ is not adequately received, that is, "as" and "as much" as it should be. But it is sufficiently so that, first of all, Christ can exercise it; so that, exercising it, He infallibly draws out the good from the evil, making error itself serve the manifestation of the truth.

Let us specify, then, that Authority is constituted as such, *formaliter*, in the Church, by the fact that Christ *exercises the Communication of "being with"* towards it. And that Christ exercises, as He promised, this Communication, if the Authority receives it in a *habitual manner*; and that, having in a *habitual* manner the real purpose of realising as it must be the "Relation" to the divine Good, the realisation of which is the proper end of the Church militant.

###### ab) Non-existence of the Authority, if the purpose of achieving the End is not real.

If this purpose *is not real*, that is, if "authority" does not *usually* aim at realizing as it must the "Relation" that it sustains with the Good-End, then "authority" is no longer a "subject" metaphysically "capable" of receiving the Communication of "being with" that could be exercised by Christ; and as this Communication cannot be received, it *is not exercised*. The Shepherd, though he leaves them to work, "is not with" the wolves. Christ "is not with" those who destroy the Church. Christ is not divided against Himself.

Would one consider this statement to be contrary to revelation, since the promise, "I am with you always," is expressed in an unconditional way?

We reply that it is also revealed: "Christ died for all"34. And yet, as we have been reminded above with the Council of Trent, with regard to some men Christ does not in fact exercise the Communication which would constitute them members of Christ and members of the Church.

In the same way, Christ no longer exercises the Communication of "being with" with regard to such and such a "subject" who occupies the Seat of Authority, but who does not fulfil the necessary and sufficient conditions to receive from Christ that which, *formally,* would constitute him as Authority. Communication" is by nature an act common to the communicator and the receiver. God, who is "He who is" [[46]](#footnote-47)cannot make the laws of being not be. If it is impossible for Communication to be received in any way, then it is not exercised.

It must either be accepted or refuted.

###### ac) Conclusion.

The nun of the government of the Church as instituted by Christ is the same nun who governs the communications that God exercises in the supernatural order with regard to spiritual subjects who must use their freedom.

Christ exercises the communication of "being with" which constitutes *formal* authority, if the latter receives this communication, even if sometimes imperfectly, but *habitually*; and this, with the real and effective aim of promoting the Good-Final which is committed to the Church.

In the absence of this *usual*, *real* and *effective* purpose, there is no longer any Communication proceeding from Christ, *nor any Authority really exercised*.

Assuming that this is so, that is, if Christ no longer exercises the communication of "being with" that *formally* constitutes Authority, it does not follow that Christ no longer governs the Church militant. He governs it provisionally in other ways than by Authority: by "being with" those of its members who "are with" Him; and by possibly maintaining "authority" in place.

And it goes without saying that Christ can give, and certainly does offer, the graces that can bring them back from their guilty wanderings, to the "subjects" that He must deprive of the Communication of CI: being with" that would *formally* constitute them as Authority.

##### (b) The breakdown of unity as it can be observed.

We will now consider the break in unity between the functional role of Authority and the Communication of "being with" that *formally* constitutes Authority, from the point of view of the observation that must be made.

###### ba) Essence and condition of Authority.

We can summarize what has been said above by saying that Authority exists as such, *if it effectively fulfills the functions it is supposed to fulfill*. But this statement of common sense has, in the case of the Church, a very special significance: because the real foundation of it is, in the case of the Church and only in this case, of a *supernatural* order.

We shall, as is only natural, find again, from the point of view of *praxis*, the distinction which we have recalled above (A). The Church militant cannot be *adequately* defined as being the whole of the faithful subjected to the Pope. It is, *first of all,* the Mystical Body of Christ; it is composed of those members of Christ who wander on earth. Being subject to the Pope is normally a *necessary condition* for being a member of Christ on earth. But to be a member of Christ *is not* constituted *by that which is only the condition*. To be a member of Christ is to receive the Communication of Life which proceeds from Christ.

Similarly, Authority cannot be *adequately* defined in the Church as the moral person to whom the realization of the Good-End immanent to the Church is committed. This is the condition usually necessary for Authority to subsist in the Church collective as in any other human collective. But Authority *is not* constituted *by that which is only the condition*. Authority is *constituted by* the communication of "being with" that proceeds from Christ.

Here, then, are two things which concern the very existence, the existence *in act*, of Authority; one is its *condition*, the other its *essence*. Now, between these two things, there are two differences. The fact that we do not have to mention it in "times of peace" explains, without justifying it, that we ignore it, not without great damage, "in times of crisis".

We will specify what these two differences consist of. One concerns the *nature of* the observed reality (bb), the other the *way of observing* (be).

###### bb) Difference in nature between the essence and the condition of the Authority.

This first difference concerns the alternative of the *existence* or *non-existence* of a "*plus or minus*".

- The alternative is considered for the essence of the Authority.

That the Authority should remain, in accordance with its essence, *does not entail a "plus or minus"*.

For the Communication of "being with" exercised by Christ, the Communication that *formally* constitutes Authority, is or is not. This Communication exists, that is to say, it is exercised by Christ, if the moral subject who is capable of receiving the Authority *usually* has the *real* purpose of receiving this Communication. And this same Communication does not exist, is not exercised by Christ, if this same moral subject does not have this same *real* intention because it is *habitual to* receive it.

*IS, NOT, tertium non datur.* At such a moment, the Authority is or is not.

Correlatively, at such moment, *either* submission is due to the legal person who holds the Authority *formiter* *[[47]](#footnote-48)*, *or* no submission is due to the legal person who has the "authority" only *materialiter*.

The formal ground of submission no more takes in the various acts of Authority, than the formal ground of Faith takes in the various revealed articles. The formal ground of submission is taken from the Communication of "being with" exercised by Christ, as the formal ground of Faith is taken from the Truth Revealed.

A proposition is not "more or less revealed", it is or it is not. It must be believed in the first case, it does not have to be believed in the second. Similarly, such "ordination" of the moral person who appears to be invested with Authority, requires submission if that person is really the Authority; if not, not. Submission is not circumstantiated by the content of the "ordination", it is linked to the (*supernatural*) "authenticity" of the subject from whom the ordination proceeds.

- The alternative is considered for the Authority's condition.

That the Authority "realizes" the "Relation" that it supports with the Good-End, includes the "more or less".

"More or less" must obviously be understood in a broad sense, qualitatively, and not only in terms of the increase and decrease that are proper to quantity. The persons who hold the Authority have their talents and their deficiencies; they receive "more or less" adequately the Communication exercised by Christ. The whole history of the Church bears witness to this; there is no need to insist on it.

- The alternative of "more or less" is in a different situation, for the essence and for the condition of the Authority.

We see, then, that for the Authority, as for any other reality, the concrete essence or substance does not include the "plus or minus", while the conditions, even the necessary ones, of realization include the "plus or minus".

The Authority would be nullified if it did not have the *real* because *usual* purpose of realizing the Good-Final. But this purpose is sufficient, even if the Authority only realizes the divine Good imperfectly, rather "less" than "more", with regard to what seems "sufficient". And this is because, *formally speaking,* the Authority is constituted Authority, not by the fact of realizing the Good-End, but in virtue of the Communication of "being with" exercised by Christ.

###### (be) Difference in the manner of observation between the essence and the condition of the Authority.

This second difference, between the essence of the Authority and the condition of the Authority, concerns possibility:

* that one and the other be observed respectively;
* that Christ exercises the Communication of "being with" that constitutes Authority, this is only knowable in Faith.
* that the Authority aims at the realization of the Final Good, this also requires the light of Faith in order to be estimated with exactitude. But it can, on the other hand, be appreciated, as it were, "from the outside", with the *verisimilitude* that is proper to reasoning of the *inductive* [[48]](#footnote-49)type, a verisimilitude that is increased by the convergence of differentiated observations.

That Cardinal Montini, pope under the name of Paul VI, makes declarations to the O.N.D. statements which are, to say the least, in radical dissonance with the *catholicity* of the Church; that he multiplies spectacular protestations of compromising benevolence towards notorious *heretics*; that he *leaves in place* those whom he recognizes as being harmful to the Church... these things and many others are, *even for non-believers*, anti-signs, in view of the aim of "realizing the divine Good which is committed to the Church". On this point, we will limit ourselves to evoking what has often been said[[49]](#footnote-50), and whose scope we will clarify below (3 aa).

- However, it is appropriate to emphasize an aspect of the truth that is in fact neglected.

This can be understood by the analogy of Faith. God, when He asks to believe, gives signs of Himself. The first miraculous catch of fish confirms the first four apostles in their vocation49. Faith requires rational justification, which, moreover, it *transcends*. No reason is the basis of faith, but one should not believe *without reasons*. On the contrary, one must "be ready to justify, to anyone, the hope that one carries in oneself"13. This is Wisdom. God the First gives the example, by justifying the act of believing with regard to the believer himself.

These principles are, it will be observed, "classic". This is not a reason to forget that they apply. This is not a reason, on the contrary, to forget that they apply.

That Christ exercises the communication which constitutes *formal Authority in* relation to the Authority, and that he therefore makes himself subject to this Authority, is an object of Faith.

But to make this act of Faith requires that this act be *rationally founded*. One can only believe that Christ exercises the Communication that constitutes Authority if this Authority fulfils the condition for this Communication to be exercised. And the *observable* sign that Authority fulfils this condition consists in the fact that it *usually* has the purpose of realising the divine Good. We can, and *indeed must*, apply to Authority what Leo XIII observed: "We cannot judge the intention which, by its nature, is internal; but we must judge it in so far as it is manifested externally"[[50]](#footnote-51).

Thus, for any object of Faith, for the existence of Authority in particular, the act of believing must be underpinned by the signs of credibility that it must moreover transcend.

Authority does not exist as Authority, it is only a "look-alike" of Authority, if the exercise of it is not accompanied by the "sign" of realizing the Good-End; but one would be mortgaging the notion of Authority *such as it is proper to the Church* with a very dangerous naturalism[[51]](#footnote-52)if one were to confuse the reality of Authority with that which is only the condition of this reality, and a necessary one at that.

#### 3. The break-up of unity shows the need for Truth for the faithful who are deserted by the "occupied Church".

We can now account for the above statement, namely: Cardinal Montini is no longer pope *formaliter*, although he occupies the Apostolic See *materialiter.*

##### (a) Proof of thesis

###### aa) This thesis is, it seems to us, proven; and it is proven by induction48.

- It is, in fact, linked to the *negative and categorical* answer that must be given to the question which, for the sake of clarity, we shall recall: does the "authority" of which Cardinal Montini is the *materialiter* "subject" have the *real* intention, that is to say, *verba et facta*, to achieve the divine Good?

- It is true that, in answering this question, we encounter two difficulties.

First, there is a "passage". For we know the intention only by those external realizations that are observable.

Secondly, these realizations involve, in fact and even in law (§ 2, aa), the "more or less"; this makes it even more difficult to know whether what one observes of the Authority, manifests that it does or does not *usually* aim at realizing the Divine Good. The data which are accessible contain the "more or less"; what they mean, and what must be concluded, excludes the "more or less". The "passage" cannot be *demonstrated by deduction*.

We thought it best to spell out these two difficulties. Indeed, it could be argued *a posteriori* that they constitute flaws in our proposed argument. But it is easy to see that this is not the case, simply by referring to the commonly accepted standards for certainty based on inductive reasoning.

###### ab) The concrete ordering of reasoning by induction.

Consider, for example, the discovery or confirmation of a physical law.

- Inference has two premises which are of a different nature48, and therefore two phases. These two phases, which are therefore also of a different nature, both consist in criticizing the result of an experiment, and in discerning in it the objectivity of a permanence in the randomness that comes from contingency. But if there are two phases, the reason is that contingency itself ineluctably presents two modalities, one objective, the other subjective.

On the one hand, the observed phenomenon belongs to a universe in which physical matter, distinct but inseparable from matter understood in the metaphysical sense, is by nature a cause of contingency. And the fact that norms called "laws of large numbers", other than the distinctly specified physical laws, are both immanent and inadequate to this contingency, this fact therefore confirms the existence of this contingency as contingency.

On the other hand, observing is the act of a subject who uses instruments and organizes an experiment in order to ask reality more and more specific questions. There are three causes of contingency: the errors made by the observer, the choice of instruments and experimentation, and finally the possible modification of reality by the very process that is ordered to observe it. These three causes are ultimately related to the subject who observes; the resulting contingency can therefore be called "subjective".

- Now it is commonly admitted that repeated experiments, convergent because differentiated, establish such a physical law with certainty, the inference being considered necessary in accordance with the type of necessity which is proper to physics. And we justify that an inference can be necessary, although the basis is doubly affected by contingency, by the two following arguments.

The first is based on the very nature of contingency. Objective contingency has no reality except as a function of permanent principles[[52]](#footnote-53), which also exist in reality. And as the experiments concern this same reality, their convergence, which is obviously permanent, refers to what is permanent in reality, that is to say to the principles of which the law is precisely the expression, the latter receiving an ultimate confirmation from the fact that it is generally quantified.

The second argument is based on the randomness that is inherent in contingency. If an error is truly accidental, it occurs about as often by default as by excess. If an experiment reveals only one aspect of reality, the need to explain it gives rise to other experiments that discover, one by one, the other aspects. In the course of different experiments, each one being repeated, the deviations that are really accidental also occur in all directions, and consequently compensate for each other as regards the observation of the cause.

Thus induction allows us to prove *with certainty* a necessary law, while taking into account, on the one hand, the contingency of which this necessity is the very condition of possibility, and on the other hand, the equal distribution of deviations from permanence with which this same necessity is affected.

###### ac) That being said, the proof of the "thesis" is based on induction.

In the light of what we have just said (ab), here is the transposition scheme.

- To the physical law, whose objective scope is to be proved, corresponds the fact that Cardinal Montini does not have the real intention, that is to say *verba et facta*, to realize the divine Good. To the data of experience correspond the words and acts of Cardinal Montini. There are also the two forms of contingency which seem to cause difficulty as to the scope of the inference; and, similarly, the respectively appropriate arguments which resolve each of these difficulties.

- The second of the above-mentioned difficulties corresponds to the "subjective contingency".

Subjective contingency" is inherent in the very act of observation. It manifests itself in the fact that there appears to be no total coherence between the data thus observed. And it is resolved by the fact that the discrepancies, *presumed to be accidental*, compensate each other in the course of repeated experiments. But if the supposedly accidental deviations from the supposedly true law always or even usually occur in the same direction, and if this anomaly is the same for different observers using different instruments, then it is no longer possible to attribute it to "subjective contingency", It is not, in fact, an anomaly; it is an observational fact that requires the formulation of the law to be modified, so that it corresponds as it should to the observed data. What the physicist does in a more precise way, every human being usually does in the experience of life.

In this case, the law presumed to be true is that of "normal" human behaviour, and the acts and words of a particular person concerning the same object must be consistent with each other. This coherence is all the more required when the person in question assumes a greater responsibility. From the Pope, inasmuch as he is the Authority, and is therefore "with him" the One who is the Truth5, it is expected that the "subjective contingency", that is to say, the gap between word and deed, should have no other measure than human frailty.

Now it is observed that *usually* the relationship between the words and acts of Cardinal Montini, far from being coherent, is a sort of dialectic which introduces all the more effectively by the acts the opposite of what the words mean, that the latter appear more reassuring. The promulgation of the *Constitutio Lumen gentium* is accompanied, but *afterwards*9, by the *Nota previa*, which is published in the *Acta* separately, after the *Constitutio,* and is destined to remain without effect. The promulgation of the said new Mass was accompanied, eight months later, by the reassuring speeches delivered on November 19 and 26, 1969; and then by the "amalgam" operation concerning first of all article 7 of the *Institutio generalis*, and then the entire *Institutio* preceded by a vast introduction, which aimed at justifying the evolution of the rite in fidelity to Tradition. But not an *iota* is changed in the *ordo* itself. And this *ordo* is imposed by the Episcopal Conferences, which the Pope commands to allow, in order to better accredit that he himself allows them to command. The said Conferences, by the terms of the Decrees, moreover exceed their powers; but the Pope makes this abuse effective if not valid, by making no provision to the contrary. Communion in the hand is proscribed by a Decree, the last paragraph of which in fact authorizes it to be prescribed. Etc. etc.

Under these conditions, i.e., in view of the Pope's eminent responsibility as the Authority on the one hand, and the impressive stability of the observed behavior on the other, it is impossible to attribute it to "subjective contingency", i.e., to thoughtless inadvertence. The presumed true law, i.e. the consistency between actions and words, is not the true law. In reality, *verba* serve to better ensure the effectiveness of *facta*. This is what Cardinal Montini requires us to conclude, whatever the ultimate intentions of which we are not to judge, the first part of the reasoning by induction as it is commonly admitted[[53]](#footnote-54).

We have thus answered the second of the difficulties indicated above. It is true that the rectitude of human behaviour, even that of the most authentic Authority, involves the "more or less", and consequently introduces a "subjective contingency" into the moral order and into the observation that can be made of it. But if a behavior, however aberrant, is always the same, in all domains and for fifteen years, it is not possible to account for it by this consideration, that is to say, as if it were "contingent", This stable behavior can only have a stable principle, namely the will of the subject, whatever it may be, we repeat, of the motivations of which God Alone can judge.

We therefore consider that what should be mentioned in the data observed, i.e. the words and acts of Cardinal Montini, are the *acta*; the *acta* and the consequences which were and are observable by the "authority" itself, and *not the verba* which were simply intended to give to the acts a scope supposedly in conformity with Tradition, different from that which they had and still have in reality.

- The first of the above-mentioned difficulties corresponds to the "objective contingency" which is inherent in the second phase of reasoning by induction.

The observational data having been criticized, and made to conform as closely as possible to reality, in other words, the consequences of "subjective contingency" having been reduced if not eliminated, it remains that certain data may be disturbed by as yet unknown phenomena, foreign to the law that one proposes to establish or confirm. It also remains that several laws can in general account for the observed facts. The difficulty is solved by the convergence of differentiated experiments[[54]](#footnote-55). In this way, with the certainty that is peculiar to the field of physics, one "passes" from the observed facts to the law whose objective scope is thereby proven.

These considerations relate to the relationship that the mind maintains with being; they are based on the theory of knowledge called "realism", a theory according to which the mind attains, in the observed phenomena, the objective norms of reality. These same considerations apply, therefore, analogously, to any other relationship of being and mind, to the knowledge of the moral order in particular. The "passage" by which we are concerned consists in discerning an intention, and more precisely an absence of intention, in the observable behaviours that correspond to it.

Here is the expository syllogism, which summarizes this second phase of reasoning by induction:

* The purpose of realizing the Divine Good requires *that usually*, in such circumstances, the "authority" behaves in such a way;
* Yet, *usually*, in these same circumstances, the "authority" has not behaved in this way;
* Thus, *usually* and concretely, the "authority" did not have the purpose of realizing the divine Good.

Let's observe that the similar syllogism, in induction considered in general, would be the following:

* Such a presumed true law requires that, in most experiments, the measurements are such;
* However, in most experiments, the measurements are not such;
* So, *in reality,* because in practice, the presumed true law is not true.

Since to disprove is, of itself, more certain than to affirm, we are consequently in particularly favorable conditions to conclude *with certainty*. The difficulty does not lie in the reasoning, but in the singularly unusual character of the conclusion we repeat: "authority" does not have the purpose of realizing the divine Good.

But obviously reasoning must prevail.

*The convergence of differentiated experiences proves with certainty.*

This is the principle that everyone spontaneously applies in any field.

The "convergence of different experiences" is evident in this case. First of all, it is appropriate to recall the fact that constitutes the analogue of a "crucial experience", that is to say, a decisive experience in itself, namely, the promulgation of the *Declaratio Dignitatis humanae personae*. We refer to what we have explained in the Warning7, 8.

Would there be any doubt in favour of the Pope, although not of the Council? Did Cardinal Montini not let himself be "surprised"? Shouldn't we grant him the favorable prejudice of an [improbable] inadvertence? whereas in his address to the Sacred College on December 20, 1976, he raised the question of religious liberty, without taking up the Declaration or, moreover, without invalidating its contentious assertion.

We must answer in the negative. This "favourable prejudice" would only be apparently charitable, because it would not be in conformity with the truth. In fact, there are many cases, as has been said over and over again, and we will not return to them[[55]](#footnote-56), in which "authority" has not behaved in the way that the realization of the divine good requires, and requires permanently[[56]](#footnote-57). The conclusion is therefore imposed with the certainty that is proper to the moral order, and which is commonly reported in the course of human action.

###### ad) The proof of the "thesis" from the facts, founds the certainty whose quality is required by the act.

By "act" we mean to perform those acts impelled by the instinct of Faith, acts ordered to endure in Faith, and consequently 14 to manifest what is the relationship of the faithful believer to the "authority" which should be "guardian and teacher" [[57]](#footnote-58)for the Deposit of Faith.

Now, concerning any order of things, there is a type of knowledge, a mode of evidence, a quality of certainty, a form of wisdom, that is appropriate to that order. In conclusion, we would like to draw the reader's attention to this important observation.

- To demand, in order to justify action, a certainty whose quality overrides the order of action, is only a fallacious utopia, or even calculated laziness. Consequently, in practice, there is a duty not to judge and a duty to judge, whose respective objects are obviously different.

The duty not to judge, to which we shall return in the following subparagraph (b), concerns the ultimate motivation of Cardinal Montini, or the intimate relationship that Cardinal Montini maintains with God. We are not judging the intention insofar as it pertains to the *finis cujus gratia*, to the end in view of which one acts, which immediately conditions the moral qualification of the act. So we don't say that Cardinal Montini is "evil or reprobate", nor even that he is hated. [[58]](#footnote-59)or even that he is a heretic. That only God knows.

The duty to judge, on which we insist in concluding this paragraph (a) devoted to the proof of the "thesis", concerns the *finis cui*, i.e. the end which is the result and the term of the action.

We repeat with Leo XIII: "One cannot judge the intention which by its nature is internal [This is the duty not to judge]; but one must judge it in so far as it is manifested externally [This is the duty to judge]"50. We attribute to Cardinal Montini, quite simply, the fact that he had the intention of doing what he did, of making what resulted from what he did happen, and of which he could not, with the passage of time, be unaware. We therefore say that Cardinal Montini had this intention, which is *practically incompatible* with that of achieving the Divine Good. To judge in this way is a duty, the fulfilment of which does not, moreover, entail, as we shall make clear,68 judging the "authority" as such.

We therefore believe that the "authority" has done *or omitted* enough, especially in leaving the troublemakers in place, to make it impossible to impute to it the *usual* purpose of realizing the Good-End which is committed to the Church. In making this judgment, we consider the Church in terms of the general norms that are inherent in every human collective. There are limits beyond which the subordinates commonly consider that the authority has "resigned", that is to say that it no longer has the purpose which alone justifies it, namely, to fulfil the functions which are assigned to it.

Being therefore *practically certain* that "authority" does not have the *usual* purpose of realizing the Divine Good, it follows, according to the above (§2.a), that "authority", as Authority, no longer exists. This conclusion would not hold for any collective; it has to do with the formal constitutive of[[59]](#footnote-60)Authority in the collective "Church militant" (cf. *infra* bc).

###### (ae) The evidence for the thesis is not invalidated by the argument from tradition.

It should be noted that theologians have not foreseen such a case of "vacancy" for the Apostolic See.

The objectors, we reply, are like the hunter who, sure of his science, one day ventured... into reality. The panther, a modernist, arrived on the left, whereas the event was, in the book, foreseen "on the right". The hunter concluded that the animal *had made a mistake* and, as the panther's second mistake, was killed by it.

And don't let us hear about the "anti-liberals" who make it the "Exercise of the Exercises. The one proclaims: "Let's walk straight", and insists on the closest submission to the Pontiff of the zig-zag; he falls straight with his Pontiff into the pit of liberalism. The other holds as true only what has already been said: *diminutæ sunt veritates a nepotibus Ignatii*.

Theology must not be subservient to historicism. It certainly consists in repeating; but, especially in times of crisis, it consists first of all in reflecting, in going back to the principles *from the facts*, and in enlightening the latter by those facts. Would it be surprising, then, if a crisis which is unprecedented in the Church culminated precisely in the Apostolic See, in a type of vacancy which is itself unprecedented?

We could, in support of what we believe to be the truth, bring forward highly authoritative testimony.

We believe, however, that it is within the bounds of discretion not to reveal the author of these lines written on January 31, 1976.

We can really think that the acts of the present Pope are all null and void. I am more and more convinced of this. Thus the Council, the post-conciliar acts would be null and void, and we would be *sede vacante* by right if not by fact. I think that this is the only real solution which obliges us to persevere in Tradition and not to take into account the persecution which still exists.

This could not be better said, except that evidence whose certainty is *based on observed facts* requires that it be expressed in the indicative rather than the conditional tense.

We therefore hold that Cardinal J.B. Montini was pope *materialiter*, but that he ceased to be pope *formaliter* at least from December 7, 1965.

This thesis is opposed by three opinions. We will examine them successively, and gather the support of each of them respectively.

##### b) First opinion contrary to the "thesis".

Cardinal Montini is no longer pope, not even *materialiter*.

The reason alleged for this is that Cardinal Montini is a heretic or schismatic.

We do not subscribe to this thesis. For the observed fact seems to us sufficient to have to conclude: "the "authority" does not have the *usual* purpose of realizing the Good-End"; while it does not seem to us sufficient to conclude: "Cardinal Montini is heretic or schismatic".

###### ba) We insist on the significance of this difference between: "not having the usual aim of realizing the Good-End" and "being schismatic".

For, *formally,* this difference does not concern "degrees"; as if the probability of the second judgment were further from certainty than that of the first. The difference is certainly one of "degree". but because first it is one of *nature*.

The reason for this is that if both judgments take into consideration the action of Cardinal Montini, they do so, respectively, from formal points of view that are different.

If, in fact, we affirm: "the "authority" does not have the *usual* intention of realizing the Good-End", the action of the "authority" is considered in the relation that it maintains with the Good-End. It is simply attributed to the Authority to have the intention that what precisely is observed to be realized occurs.

To make such an assumption is consistent with universal usage as well as common sense. If a person who acts freely, and who can control the results of his actions, has behaviors that converge permanently for fifteen years, anyone will believe that this person will have the same behaviors tomorrow, because he wants what happens precisely through these behaviors. By attributing to this person an "intention", we are only affirming the *existence of* a principle that bases an induced stability of behaviour for the future on what has been observed in the past. But no judgment is made about the *nature of* this principle.

Because Cardinal Montini's behaviour has proved, in its overall convergence over the last fifteen years, to be inadequate to the realisation of the Good-Final which is committed to the Authority, it is concluded that it will be the same tomorrow as it has been up to now, and that this is the result of a certain state of Cardinal Montini. But *no value judgment is made on this state*.

Thus, in the first judgment, Cardinal Montini's action is obviously attributed to Cardinal Montini; but *this action is considered* formally *insofar as it is referred to the Final Good whose realization it should ensure*.

Whereas if one affirms: "Cardinal Montini is a heretic or schismatic", in order to judge in this way, one certainly considers the action of Cardinal Montini, and the results that this action produces; *however, formally, this judgment refers the action of Cardinal Montini*, not to the results that this action produces or should produce, *but to a qualification that is personally attributed to Cardinal Montini*.

Both judgments take into consideration the action of Cardinal Montini, but they do so respectively from formal points of view that are different. The first judgment refers the action to the End-Good that specifies it, the second to the person who produces it. Making the first judgment does not imply judging the pope. To utter the second judgment is to judge the pope. This is the main reason why we subscribe to the first judgment and reject the second.

For we do not intend to judge who is Pope, even if only *materially*; for no one can pass categorical judgment on a particular Pope, except another Pope. For it takes the supernatural help promised to the Church and to her alone to judge *categorically* an intention in itself, and not only *inductively* in the consequences which manifest it.

Would this difference between "not having the intention of realizing the BienFin" and "being schismatic" be inconsistent?

This is what the extremists will probably allege, for whom Paul VI is no longer pope, not even *materialiter*.

They could in fact consider that: "not having the intention of realizing the Final Good, the realization of which is committed to the Church", is not being in communion with the Church, and is consequently being schismatic. They will thus believe to discover a contradiction in our own thesis, between the "premises" and the "conclusion",

###### bb) Clarification of the meaning of the locution: "Not to have the intention to achieve the Good-End".

- This precision results, as usual, from a distinction. This distinction is as follows.

Not *having the purpose of realization* means: "absence of purpose". This absence is *objectively* manifested in the deficiencies that result from it; in particular, in the fact of leaving in place the subordinate authorities whose proper function is to realize the End-Good. The locution we are using therefore has an *objective* meaning. And only if it is understood in this sense is the statement based on observation.

*To have the intention* not to *realize* means: "rejection"; and in fact: opposition of annoyance", because "to want not to realize the good-final" inevitably leads in the course of the action to do things that are opposed to the good-final. The locution is taken in a subjective sense. For it is impossible to determine exactly, in each concrete case, what the "intention not to realize" consists of; it is *therefore impossible to affirm with certainty that such an intention exists*.

Now, one could only affirm: "Paul VI is schismatic", by attributing to him the intention of not realizing the Good-End. The deficiency which consists in "not having the intention of realizing the Final Good" implies a very serious failure; it is, so to speak, an "opening to schism", but it does not constitute schism. In other words, having distinguished the two meanings, one *subjective*, the other *objective,* of the two aforementioned expressions, only the *objective* meaning is based on the observation of facts, only the *subjective* meaning would allow us to affirm: "Paul VI is schismatic".

- It follows that there is no contradiction in our thesis. It is possible to hold, in view of fifteen years of experience, that the present occupant of the Apostolic See "has no intention of realizing the Good End" (in the objective sense) and is therefore no longer pope *formaliter*, without affirming that the pope ({has the intention of not realizing the Good End} (in the subjective sense) and is therefore schismatic, and that he is therefore no longer pope, not even *materialiter*.

- We answer, in advance, to the following question. In the concrete psychology of a human subject, and Cardinal Montini is one of them, is it possible to "not have the intention to realize" without "having the intention not to realize"? In other words, in the order of the "lived", doesn't the objective meaning constitute an insidious and permanent *manuductio* that induces the *subjective* meaning?

We answer that this connection between *subjective* and *objective* meaning must be considered from two points of view.

First of all, from the point of view of reality, that is, in the psychology of Cardinal Montini. It is certain that, at least in the subconscious, the disposition that corresponds to the *objective* meaning is stable only by giving rise to a permanent tension towards the *subjective* meaning. But it does not necessarily follow that this tension ends in a deliberate statement corresponding to the subjective meaning. Now this is what would be required in order to affirm that Cardinal Montini is a schismatic. We therefore maintain that, even from the point of view of concrete psychology, (< having the intention not to realize" does not necessarily follow from "not having the intention to realize"; and that, consequently, Paul VI can be pope *materialiter* without being *formaliter*.

The connection between *subjective* and *objective* meaning can, in the second place, be considered from the point of view of our knowledge of it.

In this perspective, we can only declare our thesis contradictory if we claim to be able to "pass" from the objective sense which does not imply contradiction, to the subjective sense which implies contradiction. And in this case, we call "passage" in the order of knowledge the fact that a first certainty leads to a second.

The first certainty, based on the observation of the facts, is that the objective meaning corresponds to reality: "Cardinal Montini does not intend to realize". The second certainty would be that the subjective meaning also corresponds to reality. Does the second certainty follow from the first? This is the question. In natural light, the answer is obviously negative. There is no *necessary* inference that allows us to "pass" from the objective meaning to the subjective meaning. We have just explained this and will not return to it.

Nevertheless, the following remains. The fact that, in the concrete order, the *objective* meaning is realized is a sign that the *subjective meaning* is also realized. Can we "pass" from the sign to what it is a sign of? Can we induce the existence of an intention from what possibly manifests it? In order to make this "passage", a divine assistance is necessary, the communication of which has been promised to the Church and to her alone. Only Leo XI could have declared Anglican ordinations invalid, although he gave no other reasons than those of theologians.

We thus find, by way of intelligibility, the above question examined from the point of view of reality. No one can judge this pope, except another pope. Although indefinitely convergent indications show that, in concrete terms, the "objective sense" tends towards the "subjective sense", no one but the divinely inspired Authority can "cross the line", Only a Pope will be able to declare, if it is true now: "Cardinal Montini has gone astray in the schism".

It can be seen, therefore, that in affirming: "Cardinal Montini is no longer Pope *Formaliter*, because he does not have the purpose of realizing the Good-End which is committed to the Church", we are in no way obliged to affirm, and we expressly refuse to affirm: "Cardinal Montini is schismatic"

###### bc) Clarification concerning the scope of the conclusion: Cardinal Montini is no longer pope formaliter".

By "scope" we mean the relation that the stated proposition bears to reality, from the point of view of intelligibility; "scope" measures, and thus has as its sign, the certainty with which this proposition is asserted as true.

This certainty is that which is proper to inductive reasoning. This follows from the general line we have followed, and we have already said so. We'll simply specify it by placing ourselves at the point of view which characterizes any inference: that of the *medium*.

The concrete question posed by the crisis in the Church for the reflective faithful is schematically the following. One must infer what practical behavior should be, from controlled observations.

Now this is the general economy of inductive reasoning. This reasoning starts from the facts, and ends up there. It uses an intelligible medium48, which is derived from the observed data as an explanatory hypothesis, and which constitutes the principle from which the conclusion is deduced. The *medium* of induction therefore does not belong to the same order of reality as the facts whose connection it shows. It can therefore be *more or less* "distant" from them. It is the choice, within the field of this "more or less", that interests us directly.

The behaviour of Cardinal Montini: these are the observational data, the "premises" of the induction. What should be the attitude of the faithful towards the present occupant of the Apostolic See? The answer to this question must constitute the conclusion of the same induction. To "pass" from the premises to the conclusion requires, *for anyone who believes in the realism of knowledge,* a *medium*. We leave aside the two opinions which we shall hereafter examine: for the second disregards the facts, while the third neglects intelligibility.

We therefore confine ourselves to comparing our own thesis with the first opinion, and we observe this.

The premises are the same, since they are the facts observed and, it must be assumed, correctly interpreted. The ultimate conclusions, which concern the order of action, are also the same, namely, that there is no need to mention the acts which are officially attributed to the present occupant of the Apostolic See; in particular, that the said new Mass is deprived of validity. But the first opinion and our own thesis, while agreeing on the two extremes of the inference, differ in the *medium*. This *medium* consists, according to the first opinion, in the fact that Cardinal Montini is schismatic. Whereas we refuse to affirm this. And we assign, as a *medium,* the fact that "the present occupant of the Apostolic See has no intention of realizing the Good-End which is committed to the Church"; which, as we have just shown, does not necessarily imply that Cardinal Montini is schismatic. The two *media* are therefore different. Which of the two should be retained?

- Here are three reasons for the choice we are proposing.

*The first reason* is that the fundamental standard of proof is rigour in conformity with the truth. To prove less, but better, outweighs proving more in a less assured manner. Now, supposing that "the present occupant of the Apostolic See has no intention of realizing the Good-End which is committed to the Church" (a proposition which we refer to as the "objective *medium*"), it is, as we have just seen, impossible for anyone, except the Pope, to infer with certainty that "Paul VI is a schismatic" (a proposition which we refer to as the "subjective *medium*"). And so, although the objective medium affirms less than the subjective medium, it is the latter that should be retained as the basis of an inference whose primary quality must be certainty, rather than amplitude.

*The second reason* is, so to speak, the reason of the first. Since the *medium* of reasoning by induction is always of another order, less close to the senses, than that to which belong the extremes whose connection the *medium* shows, this *medium* is all the more adequate to the whole of the reasoning, the closer its nature is to that of the extremes. In other words, the intelligible flight of the *medium* must remain, so to speak, level with the extremes; he who wishes to make the eagle makes the elephant. The facts observed lead us to conclude, as if on the same level, that "the present occupant of the Apostolic See has no *intention of* achieving the Good End". We say "on the same level" because, as we have explained, the purpose is referred to the Good which specifies it, not to a qualification of the person in whom it subsists.

Thus, we already knew by comparison, that the *objective medium* is better insured than the *subjective medium*. Now we see the reason for this. The *objective medium* is closer to the extremes of which it shows the connection. In order to affirm that a person's behaviour will be tomorrow, on the average, what it has been for the last fifteen years, it is useless to mention the most intimate determinations of this person; it is enough to consider the immediate motivations of this behaviour. It is true that this explains less. But what is important in this case is not to explain better, but to be *certain* of the explanation. This is the reason why, as we have assigned *a priori, it is* appropriate to retain the *objective medium* rather than the *subjective medium*.

*The third reason* is nothing more than the theological foundation of the first two.

S. Joseph is confronted with a fact: "Mary is pregnant"[[60]](#footnote-61). He decides on a practical behaviour: "Send Mary away in secret"[[61]](#footnote-62). What was the inference by which Sr. Joseph "passed" from the premises to the conclusion? We can discover this from the expression used by Matthew. We will identify the two facts that are implicitly meant: Joseph rejects the idea that Mary is guilty, Joseph refers to the law of Israel.

Let us remember that, according to Jewish law, the adulterous wife was to be denounced and stoned: "Thus you shall put away the evil from among you, or from Israel"[[62]](#footnote-63). Mary is only a fiancée, but Joseph assumes the responsibility, to the extent that he already has a right over her.

Let us then suppose that Joseph judged Mary unfaithful, and let us show that this hypothesis is excluded by the mode of signification which S. Matthew uses. If indeed Joseph judges Mary to be unfaithful, he should, "*being righteous*" in Israel, denounce her if she had been his wife; at the very least, since she is his fiancée, he must "remove the evil from him" and send Mary away. To send her away publicly is equivalent to denouncing her. Because Mary is only his fiancée and not his wife, Joseph can be just according to the law by sending Mary away secretly.

That Mary was judged guilty by Joseph therefore requires that the text of Matthew be understood as follows: "Joseph being just, (he should therefore have sent Mary away either publicly or secretly); but not wishing to expose her to public decry, he resolved to send her away secretly.

Now, the but, which the hypothesis makes indispensable for the text to be intelligible, is precisely not in the text. In fact, Matthew writes: "Joseph was just *and* did not want..." and he does not write: "Joseph was just *but* did not want...". Not but, but and. From this we must conclude that the alleged hypothesis is false; that is to say, Joseph did not judge that Mary was guilty.

Let's explain it again in broader formulas.

If Matthew had written: *but,* the meaning would have been as follows: "Joseph, being just and judging Mary guilty, had therefore to denounce her. But, because Mary was only his betrothed and not his wife, Joseph was sufficiently just, that is to say, he conformed sufficiently to the law of Israel, by sending Mary away secretly.

S. Matthew having written: *and*, the true meaning is as follows: Joseph, not judging Mary guilty *and* being just, it is in virtue of this perfect justice and in view of the scandal: that, first, "Joseph decides to send Mary away, for to keep her would have led to the supposition that the child was his; that, secondly, he sends her away in secret, for an official dismissal would have been to defame Mary."

This apparent digression was necessary to ensure the foundation of what we are now going to outline.

The question was, for St. Joseph, what it is for the Catholic attached to Tradition, namely: "to pass" from observed facts to practical behaviour. It goes without saying that the comparison does not concern the object of the question at all, but rather the way in which it is posed *subjectively*. The *subjective medium* of the inescapable inference was, in the situation of St. Joseph, to judge: "Mary is unfaithful"; and, in the present situation, to judge: "Paul VI is a schismatic". The *objective medium* consisted, in the situation of St. Joseph, in *not judging* Mary and in *only* mentioning *what the circumstances imposed,* namely: the common law, the risk of scandal. The objective medium consists, in the present situation, in not judging the present occupant of the Apostolic See, and in stating strictly what the circumstances dictate, namely: the general laws of being as they are accessible to the common sense, and the tutiorism imposed by the gravity of the matter. This is sufficient to conclude *with certainty* that the present occupant of the Apostolic See has no practical intention of pursuing the good purpose which is committed to the Church.

In these conditions, we ask the supporters of the first opinion (of what spirit they are): "Which of the two media is the one that S. K. has the most influence over the other? Which of the two *media was chosen by* S. Joseph chose? Which one should we choose? S. Joseph did not judge. The facts, however, forced him to "infer". The situation of the Church similarly compels us to do so. We must follow both the advice and the example: "Judge not, that ye be not judged"[[63]](#footnote-64). It would be futile to invoke St. Joseph as the patron saint of the universal Church. Joseph as the patron saint of the universal Church would be futile if we did not find in the depth of his silence the sanctifying paradigm for our painful inferences.

###### bd) The question remains open whether Cardinal J.B. Montini was ever pope.

We owe it to the truth to publish without delay an important testimony which Mr. Winckler has kindly entrusted to us (Appendix 1); it seems, from this document, that at the time of his election, Cardinal J.B. Montini had the intention of not realizing the Good-Finished committed to the Church. The reader will judge. If this was so, we hold that Cardinal J.B. Montini was never pope. But we believe that the assertion must remain conditional. We repeat, only the Authority *will be able to* decide categorically on a question which concerns intention.

##### c) Second opinion contrary to the "thesis".

Paul VI is pope; he is therefore entitled to unconditional obedience.

This opinion is based on an intuition that is right in itself, although it is concretely at odds.

###### ca) The right intuition has as its object the formal constituent of59 Authority in the Church, namely the Communication of "being with" exercised by Christ with regard to the (physical and) moral person who holds the Authority.

*If* the Pope is truly Pope, it is he who is the judge of the relationship that such and such a possible determination bears to the Good-End that is committed to the Church. *If*, therefore, the Pope is truly Pope, he must be obeyed; it is Christ Himself who is obeyed in the person of His vicar: "He who listens to you, listens to Me"40.

*If* the Pope is truly Pope, it is futile, in order to challenge any of his ordinations, to allege that this ordination is contrary to the divine Good which is the End of the Church. This is vain because it is always the Authority that judges what a thing has to do with the common end; and because, *if* the Pope is truly Pope, he has the Authority.

The proponents of this opinion, therefore, base themselves on a correct intuition, namely, that in the Church authority has an absoluteness of its own: *formaliter*, it proceeds from "on high"[[64]](#footnote-65); reference to the Final Good is the *sine qua non* condition of it, and therefore its foundation in the created order; it is not the divinely instituted constituent of it.

###### cb) But the zealots of unconditional obedience forget that the fulfillment of the promise, "I am with you always," is contingent upon the general conditions of acceptance of salvation. 20is subordinate to the general conditions of the acceptance of salvation. The desire for quiet security has led to the conception of the Game of Wisdom, which infallibly moves free wills, as a rigorous automatism.

The stability of the Church is certainly of a different nature, and not only greater, than that of private persons. But it is an error, favored by the incoercible inclination to ease, to consider the Church immune to the vitiations which affect private persons. S. Peter has denied. The "I am with you always" can be *accidentally* denied: this is the reverse of freedom. This is what the advocates of unconditional obedience ignore. This is what turns a right intuition into a wrong opinion.

###### (cc) The following analogy has been put forward in vain: analogy of paternity.

A father who indulges in misconduct remains a father. Therefore, it is asserted, he would still have the same right to respect from his children, and it is added, to obedience. This erroneous conclusion is rejected by the very reason that seems to underpin it. Let us quote article 379 of the Civil Code:

Forfeiture pronounced under the two preceding articles applies by operation of law to all the attributes, both patrimonial and personal, attaching to parental authority. Failing any other determination, it extends to all minor children already born at the time of the judgment.

A father is constituted a father, and remains so eternally, by the first act that brings about the *potentia generandi* in him. But a father can behave in such a way that he loses "all the attributes attaching to paternal authority".

The father who is fallen remains a father; and, similarly, the occupant of the Apostolic See remains Pope *materialiter*. The father, even if fallen, must be respected. Likewise, it is always a duty to pray for the pope, even if he is only *materialiter*.

But the father, who is deprived of the paternity of which he remains the subject" and whose enjoyment and exercise he can recover, this deprived father, therefore, has no right to any obedience or submission whatsoever. Is, no. He is fallen or he is not. If he is forfeited, and as long as he remains so, "he loses by right all the attributes attaching to paternal authority"; he is no longer, either legally or morally, a "subject" capable of exercising authority over his children.

Similarly, a pope who, by his *habitual* and notorious behavior, makes it impossible for Christ to communicate to him the "being with" that would constitute him pope *formaliter*, such a pope loses *by divine right*, that is to say in virtue of the holiness of Christ and of the Church, *all the* attributes attached to pontifical authority. Such a pope remains, we repeat, pope *materialiter*, he is a "subject" immediately capable of becoming or becoming again pope *formaliter* if he renounces his "erring ways". But as long as he persists in remaining a prisoner of them, he is not a "subject" capable of exercising Authority.

##### (d) Third opinion contrary to the thesis.

Paul VI is pope when he's Catholic. Cardinal Montini is not "pope", or at least does not have to be followed, when he's not a Catholic.

###### da) This third opinion assumes that we ignore the "intuition" which apparently founds the second opinion.

To admit that the "pope" can be Catholic, but only occasionally, is to admit that Authority is, in the Church, *exactly* what it is in any human collective. Authority which no longer assumes the responsibility it should, can nevertheless carry ordinations which are objectively valid, and which in fact oblige, because they are *justified* by the common good; and because, in the natural order, authority "which comes from God" [[65]](#footnote-66)has no other proximate basis than the realization of the common good.

In the Church, however, this cannot be the case.

The Pope cannot be "Catholic" only occasionally. Either the Pope is "Catholic", and he is Pope in all his acts; he must be followed in each of his ordinations, i.e. usually. Or the Pope is not "Catholic"; and he doesn't have the right to be followed, because he's not formally Pope. Either one or the other. One excludes the other.

The reason for this, let us repeat (§ 2, b 2), is that "realizing the End-Good" is only, in the Church, the condition *sine qua non*, and therefore the sign of Authority. The "formal constituent"59 of Authority is the communication of "being with" exercised by Christ with regard to the (physical and) moral person who is capable of receiving it.

This Communication is *permanent on the* part of Christ, as the purpose of accomplishing the Good-End *must be habitual* in the Authority.

It is not a question of a Communication *per modum actus*, which would be given for certain acts and not for others, which would make the Pope "Catholic" on certain occasions, and not on every occasion. Such a Communication, *per modum actus*, is indeed given in the exercise of the extraordinary Magisterium. But to extend this regime to the exercise of the ordinary Magisterium would be to ruin the principle of authority as it is instituted in the Church. It would amount to dissociating from each other two entities; on the one hand, the pope as a physical person, a permanent entity; on the other hand, the pope as pope, a sporadic entity existing only in those acts where the pope is "Catholic"[[66]](#footnote-67).

This third opinion is therefore unacceptable.

It is seriously mortgaged to naturalism, since it equates Authority as divinely instituted in the Church with what authority is in a human collective that is only of the natural order.

This third opinion aims at reconciling the "duty to disobey" and the recognition of Authority. It is negated by non-coherence. For if there is Authority, there is a duty to obey; and if there is no Authority, the "duty to disobey" is as absurd as the duty to obey.

###### db) This third opinion is the culmination of the thesis: "Paul VI is a liberal; everything is explained because Paul VI culminates in liberalism".

That liberalism accounts for the behavior adopted by Cardinal Montini is possible. But we must not confuse the formal cause with the efficient cause, confuse "what a thing is in itself" with what concerns only its genesis. If it is true that "one knows well only what one sees being born", it is the error of historicism and psychoanalysis to identify all realities, the human personality in particular, with what is only the process from the origin.

That Cardinal Montini is "connaturally" a liberal, and how and to what degree, God knows, God alone; Cardinal Montini is viscerally ignorant of it.

That Cardinal Montini is divinely inspired in revealing what is, in fact, the subversion to which the Church is prey, through spectacular manifestations of mental fornication with the enemies of the Church, that God knows, God alone; Cardinal Montini himself is most probably unaware of it; he does not have to know it, as an executor. That Cardinal Montini "suffers persecution for the sake of justice", that he is violated, reduced, scorned, and the holiest Pope that ever was, this God knows, God alone absolutely. Because, certainly, Cardinal Montini' knows it only "maybe", since he himself has affirmed it:

In some of our personal notes, we find on this subject (of the pontifical election): "Perhaps the Lord has called me to this service (of the Sovereign Pontificate) not because I had any aptitude for it, not so that I might govern the Church and save her from her present difficulties, but so that I might suffer something for the Church, and so that it might become clear that it is He, and not someone else, who is guiding and saving her. We entrust this sentiment to you, not in order to make a public - and therefore vain - act of humility, but so that you too may enjoy the peace we ourselves feel when we think that it is not our weak and inexperienced hand that is in Peter's boat, but the invisible hand of the Lord Jesus, his strong and loving hand. [[67]](#footnote-68)

But those things which we are destined, in the final analysis, to ignore, *we do not need to know* precisely *because, above all, we do not need to know them*. It is not indispensable, nor even useful for the faithful, to scrutinize the internal dispositions of Cardinal Montini, to try to determine if he is "liberal" and to what degree, if he is not the New Testament replica of the prophet Hosea, or a martyr sacrificed to the Truth? [[68]](#footnote-69)

These dispositions, by their very nature and considered in themselves, belong to the relationship that Cardinal Montini maintains with God. No one can or should judge them: "Do not judge"63; "The Church does not judge the disposition of the soul or intention, which by its nature is interior; but the Church must judge it in so far as it is manifested"50. What the faithful need to know is not what Cardinal Montini's liberalism or prophetism or holiness might be. What they have a duty to seek to know, *from what they observe* of Cardinal Montini, is this: Is *Formaliter* pope or *not*? *EST, NON, tertium non datur.* If he is Pope *formaliter*, he must be obeyed. If he is not pope *formaliter*, *he must not be mentioned*: not even and especially not by asking anything of him; or by naming him "*una cum Ecclesia sancta catholica*", during the Canon which he tried in vain to obrogate28. It is this second attitude which seems to us to be the true one, because *it* alone *is consistent with the facts*.

Pentecost Sunday, 14 May 1978.

Mr L. Guérard des Lauriers, o.p.

# ANNEX 1

## Letter from Mr. Winckler

Mr. Winckler has given us permission to publish this letter. The testimony which this letter constitutes concerns a question different from the one we have treated. That question would be whether Cardinal Montini was ever Pope? To elucidate this question requires many considerations, and it is not our intention to do so. It is better to conclude with certainty in a more circumscribed field, than to have to be satisfied with the probable because we are aiming at a more general resolution. However, the existence of a power which observation proves that, if it is real *in actu primo*, it is *in law* unfit to be exercised, the very existence of such a power is unusual and even unnatural. The question to which we have given a negative answer, that of knowing whether power is still capable of being exercised in law, thus refers to the very thing that is its condition: has this power ever existed?

In a word, the question that the observation inescapably imposes is so strange that the position itself is a question. Here is a second question. Because it follows organically from the first, we believe we must publish Mr. Winckler's testimony. But to consider only this "second question" and thus believe oneself dispensed from really confronting the question of the "vacancy" and that of the "validity" as they are objectively posed for the Apostolic See and for the so-called "new Mass" would be to give up the prey for the shadow, to betray the Testimony and to play into the hands of Satan.

My Reverend Father,

You have asked me to write down the story of some thirty-year-old Roman memories.

The hazards of war had led me to Italy after various adventures and misadventures, including several arrests by the Germans, especially after a newspaper article, published in 1942, which designated me as a Jew. And here was a Catholic who was first put to the sword, then to all sorts of caresses and honours when the wheel had finally turned. It began to turn in my case in spiritual joy, until the day it turned badly.

Enjoying the immense privilege at the time of the Poste aux Armées, which allowed the correspondence of the many Monsignors, Reverends and Reverends of all colours (of habit) residing in Rome to be sent to France and vice versa, I had met many people and learned many things, for the Pontifical Court was still a Court. Halfway between the East and the West, between yesterday and tomorrow, it was full of survivals and flavours that we no longer know since the Heads of State are people armed with ten kinds of police and transported at breakneck speed in a kind of armoured catafalque train.

As an officer and interpreter of Italian, I devoted myself to the usual tasks in the Staff. I had some leisure time left. Probably because of all the above, I was invited to the first post-war meeting of the leading figures of the Jewish community in Rome. One of the topics discussed was how to put an end to anti-Semitism. This became known among Catholics of Jewish origin who worked in the Vatican's Special Secretariat (a sort of financial department). They wanted to know me. We became friends. On the occasion of meetings organized by the Association of University Graduates, these people wanted to introduce me to the chaplain of this association.

It was Monsignor Montini, then Substitute for the Secretariat of State.

My new friends gave me an enthusiastic portrait of him, adding: "He is one of us". Understand who can. I have dazzling memories of those Masses and homilies in the extraordinary baroque chapel of La *Sapienza*, a chapel for fairy tales, where the warm assembly created a kind of atmosphere and a kind of sensitive grace, although I don't know to what extent I can attribute it. I am sorry that I have not kept any precise memory of any passage of these homilies; it was shimmering, there were words that played like light in a high stained glass window.

We were happy and so was he. In fact, eloquence was the fashion. The reigning Pontiff had involuntarily imposed his style and everyone was trying to be slender, to be an ascetic, to be mystical, to have long hands (I don't know if they even slept on the floor). In his office, Bishop Montini was active, direct and precise. He would have liked me to push, in Paris, for the creation of an association similar to his. The Parisian graduates did not need me; as for the students, they were able to show, in 1968, what they are capable of once they are well impregnated and warmed up.

The *lobby* that had thought at the beginning of the century that it had succeeded with Cardinal Rampolla, that is to say, that it had raised one of its own to the top of the Church in order to remodel it in its own image, had not disarmed. And the hope of victory was all the more lively, the impatience all the greater, since circumstances had worked in its favour since the death of His Holiness Pius X. The revolution had based its power on a prodigious financial system, on the "victory of the democracies", on a strengthened Soviet empire, on new world-wide means of propaganda and pressure, and on the discrediting, because of the collapse of Hitler, of everything that resembled anti-communism; and in the Church, on the fear, for many bishops, religious and seculars, of being seen as defeated or backward.

I still remember the distinctions made by Pius XII in his Christmas speech in 1944 about the word "democracy", which, as they say, did not pass muster. And I remember the desolate confidence of Cardinal Suhard who had followed the advice of the Nuncio to rally to the Vichy Government, whose "legitimacy" was not recognized by that of "Free" France, The good Cardinal could not get over the missed handshake. As for Cardinal Tisserant, he was ruminating on what became, at the Council, the starting point of the decree on religious liberty. He was, for his part, the undisputed leader of the "Gaullist party in cassock", and he had his eye - if one may say so - on all the bishops of France. Who will contradict me if I say that Roncalli and Montini owe their election to him?

But who, on the other hand, has been preparing for the possibility of these elections, one of which has made the next possible? It is easy to answer, but please record that it is dangerous to venture on this ground. I understand perfectly the prudent attitude of those who prefer to believe that it was the Holy Spirit who manifested His choice. Perhaps He manifested it in another way, perhaps it was not taken into account, only the Good Lord can tell us since the Cardinals, it seems, are committed to secrecy...

In any case, since the arrival of Jacques Maritain as ambassador to the Holy See, a stupid and nasty gift from Georges Bidault, I had stopped serving Mass to Bishop Montini. For at that time, the members of the association no longer shied away from affirming their progressivism. My friends, let us say the word, were frankly modernists. Maritain had invaded the Montini group, and there was only integral humanism. I had fled.

But since it is a testimony that you are asking me for, I affirm that there was in Rome precisely what you are seeking to know, and which you will allow me to call the Montinian lobby, or the Rampolla group, and that an active Monsignor, with a lot of connections, whom I often met and for whom I had a sincere friendship, hearing that I had been introduced to Monsignor Montini, that I admired him and that I seemed to follow him, probably believed me to be mature enough to take a decisive step towards effectiveness.

I remember the mysterious tone he took - Monsignor Pignedoli, that's who he was - to tell me about the great revenge that was being prepared. He told me all about Austria's veto, which, in his opinion, had led to the Church being plunged back into the obscurantism and isolation of the Middle Ages for half a century; he insisted on the need for openness and adaptation on the part of the Church; finally, he gave me a glimpse of a new era, and one that would soon be successful, thanks to the one who would succeed where Cardinal Rampolla had the misfortune to fail.

I looked at him with big eyes. He thought that it meant: "But who is it?"; he answered without parable: "You serve him Mass every Thursday".

I confess I must have looked foolish; and I was, for I was a hundred leagues from suspecting what was expected of me for the success of Montini, the new desired of the temporal hills and of the nations (united).

But I had to come to my senses. It was serious. The sympathetic Monsignor Pignedoli was very close to Montini, since he followed him in his "honourable" departure from Milan; he is currently a cardinal in charge of delicate missions (such as urging the Catholics of Vietnam to welcome, for the honour of God and for peace, the communist troops of Vietnam).

It was January 2, 1945, the evening was falling; there was a reception at the home of the venerable Prince E. of Naples Rampolla, and my dear Monsignor had invited me. It was in a well-to-do palace, in the style of 1880; the salons were brilliant, the chandeliers were gleaming, the hosts and the guests breathed ease; the perfumes of the girls and the women, the smell of the alcohol, of the blond cigarettes, all this atmosphere, at the same time sumptuous and worldly, changed me from the *papalini*, those patricians who, since the capture of Rome, had condemned the main door of their palace as a sign of protest and from then on had not benefited from the favours of the House of Savoy.

As you already know, my dear Father, I did not respond to the advances of the "Venerable" prince who was, so to speak, the lure of the famous *lobby* (there too, "you have understood me"). As I left that reception, I thought of the title of a little Italian book that I read as a child: "*Le cose più grande di lui*" (The things that are bigger than him); and I was thinking even more about the famous *Santo* de Fogazzaro...

No doubt there have been, and there will continue to be, characters of a particular calibre, capable, in defiance of blades and blood, of saying: "I will arrange for..." and "I will see to it that...", but to push deceit to the degree of perfection in which we see it today, that has to do with the *mysterium iniquitatis*, a mystery so powerful that it goes so far as to make even the best of them blind and deaf, not forgetting the "holy" priests who are disciples of St. Timothy. For example, they have never heard of the illnesses and strange death of Pius XII, and when they are given proof, they hasten to deny it or to remain silent. They are the silent ones of the Church, the good dumb puppies.

Fortunately, there are still some "Domini canes"!

Yours faithfully, etc.

February 11, 1977. Winckler.

# ANNEX II

## A text by Cardinal Montini

To sum up: work is certainly a profane work, but it is also a human work. Human work is guided by a spiritual faculty, the intelligence, which marks the work with the signs of thought. Thought is the element that gives a human aspect to the work accomplished, it reflects itself in it, imprints itself on it. Now, thought, especially scientific thought, is guided by principles that postulate the absolute, are based on necessity. Without realizing it, we are dealing with religion, we are in the presence of God. It is not without reason that Galileo affirms that in mathematics (and how is it that mathematics today does not succeed in doing so) our knowledge "equals divine knowledge in objective certainty, because it manages to grasp necessity", and thus "participates in divinity", by the mere fact that the human intelligence understands the nature of numbers, "I know this very well, and I would not be far from making the same judgment" as Plato in this respect (cf. Varisco). The same could be said when work tends to its best expression, to perfection: perfection is a concept eager for transcendence, it has a taste of mystery, because it becomes the reflection of a hidden beauty, of a metaphysical harmony that sends a divine message to those who know how to grasp it (cf. Gentile).

The divine message becomes even more eloquent and fascinating today, when the realms of space are open to the conquest of man's instruments and daring enterprises. When the first Sputnik was launched into the sky, how could anyone think and even proclaim that it was a victory for atheism instead of an invitation to better contemplate this universe that sings the glory of God? Will not modern man come one day, as his scientific studies progress and discover laws and realities hidden behind the mute face of matter, to listen to the marvellous voice of the spirit that palpitates within it? Will this not be the religion of tomorrow? Einstein himself saw the spontaneity of a religion of the universe (cf. Scremin). Or will it not be, perhaps, my religion of today, which already tells me, to the point of filling my mind and making it overflow with wonder and joy, the infinite power and infinite wisdom of the God whom I adore and love, the living and true God? Why should we hide this boundless horizon and intoxicating joy from work, when work is precisely the most daring and assiduous explorer of nature, the work of God? Is not work already engaged in the direct path that leads to religion? Why block its way? Why make work only a means and forbid it to aim at the supreme end; why not give it the sublime reward of prayer? Why deny the active life the faculty of finally crossing its path with that of its elder sister, the contemplative life, and of taking with it the final steps towards the great common goal? (Cf. Leprince-Ringuet; Laloup).

With very different considerations, we could arrive at similar conclusions by recalling that work, however profane and material it may be, is guided and sustained by another spiritual faculty of man, the will. This, in turn, gives to the activity directed towards the work to be accomplished its moral qualification, which, likewise, whether we like it or not, derives its true value from duty, which requires the relationship of man with his final end, which is God (cf. Taparelli). Here, too, an act of intelligence will be necessary to make work something other than a mere instrumental value, to raise it to its full moral value, which, by its very nature, is in the same measure as man's relationship with God.

(*Religion and Work*. Conference of Cardinal Montini, March 27, 1960 in Turin. Cf. *Documentation Catholique*, 19 June 1960, No. 1330, columns 764-765).

We cannot present here the critical reflections that this text calls for. Let us confine ourselves, for the first part, to two observations.

The human mind studies the properties of numbers, but it does not know their nature. To think so is to believe that man gives himself the very matter on which he operates, that is to say that man is a creator in the true sense.

On the other hand, we must not confuse two "necessities", namely: that of the formal sequences which are the object of mathematics; that of the metaphysical principles which found the knowledge of reality. To set up the purely formal necessity as an absolute, entails equating human knowledge with divine knowledge, and in fact makes it impossible to trace back with certainty to God from reality.

Cardinal Montini's thought is radically vitiated by atheistic rationalism.

As for the second part of the quoted text, it constitutes a disturbing profession of faith in the Teilhardian doctrine. Which leads ineluctably to the cult of man, and not to revealed religion.

"That the full moral value [of work or anything else] is, by its nature, in the same measure as man's relationship to God", is what Cardinal Montini asserts. Now this is clearly false, if man's relationship to God is that which is founded on faith in Jesus Christ. This relationship, *essentially supernatural*, requires moral values, but it transcends them absolutely. To reduce "man's relationship with God to the measure of moral values" is to implicitly deny that this relationship can be supernatural.

This text confirms, as we can see, the apprehension raised by Mr. Winckler's testimony.

Did Cardinal Montini have faith when he was elected pope? Was the election valid? We merely point out that the question remains open.

1. 1 Jo. 1.1. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. Matt. 28:10 (see note 20). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. Vatican Council I. *Constitutio Pastor æternus*, 18 July 1870. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. Pius XII. Encyclical *Mystici Corporis Christi*. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. John 14:6. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. Gal. 6.7. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. The phrase "universal ordinary magisterium" was used by the Vatican Council 1. *Constitutio Dei Filius, de Fide catholica*, cap. 3. 3. "All things which are contained in the word of God, whether written or handed down by tradition, and which are proposed to be divinely revealed and to be believed by the Church, whether by solemn judgment or by the ordinary and universal magisterium [*sive solemni judicio sive ordinario et universali magisterio*  
    ], are to be believed in divine and catholic faith."   
    The two words we underline *and universali were* added to the third outline, discussed and approved chapter by chapter, from March 18 to April 12, 1870. They were retained, and they became part of the final text, unanimously approved by 667 "fathers" present, on April 24, 1870. The reason for this addition was officially expressed by Bishop Martin. "So that no one can suppose that it is a question here of the infallible Magisterium in so far as it is proper to the Apostolic See. It has not been our intention in any way to raise, either directly or indirectly, the question of the infallibility of the Supreme Pontiff.", These are the detailed recitals of which this amendment was the result. The last sentence of this paragraph was, in the third outline, (Cf M.L. Guérard des Lauriers. *Dimensions of Faith*, vol. II excursus I, pp. 213218), worded as follows: "and which are proposed by the Church as to be believed, whether by solemn judgment or by the ordinary magisterium [*sive solemni judicio sive ordinario magisterio*]. Several amendments were proposed (Mansi, vol. 51, p. 304 A9-D7, Em 48-53) requesting either the deletion of this formula which seemed unclear, or its explanation: replacement of *proponuntur* by *definiuntur*; precision of each member of the dichotomy: "*sive solemni in concilio generali judicio, sive ordinario Romani pontificis... magisterio*"; specification of the motive of faith "*tanquam divinitus revelata de fide credenda proponuntur*". The fourth and fifth schemas retained this last suggestion (of Bishop Dupanloup); they added the word universali to the word ordinario, "so that no one could think that it is a question here of the infallible magisterium of the Holy Apostolic See, this infallible magisterium being opposed to the general councils. The word *universali* has the same meaning as in the apostolic letters of the Holy Father, namely, *magisterium of the whole Church spread throughout the universe* (*magisterium totius Ecclesiæ per orbem dispersæ}*" (Mansi, vol. 51, pp. 322 B 15-17).  
    This formula recalls that of Pius IX: "The assent of faith is not due only to what is defined by the Ecumenical Councils or the Supreme Pontiffs; it must also extend to all that is presented as divinely revealed by the ordinary magisterium of the whole Church spread throughout the universe [*ordinario totius Ecclesiœ per orbem dispersæ magisterio*]" (*Tuas libenter*, December 21, 1863, Denz. 2879)  
    The "ordinary universal Magisterium" referred to in these two texts, one by Pius IX himself, the other approved by him, enjoys infallibility, since it is attributed affirmations which must be believed of divine Faith. And since "universal ordinary" is contraposed to "solemn judgment", these two documents confirm that the Magisterium can be infallible, even if it is not exercised according to the extraordinary mode specified by Vatican I. What does this "universal ordinary" mode of the Magisterium consist of? In accordance with the explanations we have just cited, confirmed by Pius XII in the Encyclical *Humani generis*, the "universal ordinary" mode includes at least certain Encyclicals, and certainly those which reaffirm and clarify a traditional doctrine. And since, as Pius IX specifies, this infallible exercise must be attributed to the Magisterium of "the whole" Church: when the Church is "*dispersed*", it belongs a fortiori to this same Magisterium, when the whole Church is *gathered*. If the Pope and the Council, gathered together, make a magisterial act, this act is *ipso facto* an act of the universal Magisterium, whether it be "ordinary" or "extraordinary"; otherwise, one would have to deny the very existence of the universal ordinary Magisterium. It must therefore be concluded that the promulgation of the Second Vatican Council by Paul VI constitutes a solemn act of this Magisterium; and that, consequently, the documents promulgated should have been true, and that those whose nature requires it should have been promulgated under the note of infallibility. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. This affirmation follows from what has been said above, namely: from the theological point of view, the three reasons we have given; and, from the canonical point of view, the documents we have just quoted (note 7). On the other hand, we must not fail to mention the Declaration by which Paul VI confirmed what the Second Vatican Council had affirmed about itself. Let us quote the *Osservatore Romano* of January 13, 1966, giving the account of the audience of Wednesday, January 12, 1966  
    "Some ask what authority, what theological qualification, the Council intended to attribute to its teachings, since it avoided giving solemn dogmatic definitions binding the infallible Magisterium of the Church. Anyone who refers to the conciliar declaration of 6 March 1964, reiterated on 16 November 1964, knows what the answer is. Given the pastoral character of the Council, it avoided proclaiming in the "extraordinary" mode dogmas affected by the note of infallibility. Nevertheless, the Council has attributed to its teachings the authority of the ordinary supreme Magisterium, which is so manifestly authentic that it must be accepted by all the faithful according to the norms assigned by the Council, taking into account the nature and purpose of each document.   
    In this text, two formulas are to be noted, which have generally been attributed a categorical scope, to which we shall return below, even though they are, in reality, insidiously evasive. It is   
    said, in fact, that the Council has attributed to its teachings the authority of the ordinary supreme magisterium; it is not said that the Council *belongs to the ordinary magisterium*. How can this be said? Is not an ecumenical council an extra-ordinary event in the Church? Or did Paul VI and the Council together want to suggest, while being careful not to affirm it, that in virtue of Vatican II it is the "conciliar state", "conciliarism", which must become the ordinary state in the Church...? At least that's what happened. And since the "authority" at least tolerated it, we must conclude that this was indeed the intention of the "authority".   
    The second evasive formulation concerns infallibility. "The Council has avoided proclaiming, in the extraordinary mode, dogmas affected by the note of infallibility". Paul VI does not say: "the Council did not proclaim...", but "the Council avoided ....."; did the Council succeed? Moreover, the note of infallibility is excluded according to the "extraordinary mode"; but since "the teachings of Vatican II have [only] the authority of the ordinary supreme magisterium", it is not excluded that some of these teachings are proclaimed under the note of infallibility, having regard to "the nature and purpose of the document" in which they are inserted.   
    It can be seen, therefore, that if we analyze it rigorously, the Declaration of Paul VI does not negate what is evident. An ecumenical council approved by the Pope belongs at least to the universal ordinary Magisterium of the Church. *Of itself*, that is to say, if things are in conformity with their nature, the documents which emanate from such an assembly, which formally come under the light of Faith, and which deal with a doctrine already solemnly promulgated, are *ipso facto* promulgated with the note of infallibility. Vatican II may have claimed to be "ordinary"; but it did not and could not make a promulgation whose clauses entail infallibility not to be infallible. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
9. We refer to the study published in the magazine *Forts dans la Foi*, supplement No. 24: *Le cheval de Troie dans la Cité de Dieu, quel est-il au juste?* [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
10. See *Strength in Faith*, No. 46, pp. 257-259. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
11. Newmann, not yet converted, wrote: "And probably to her children it is not the least persuasive argument of the infallibility of the Church to see her, alone among all the churches, make this claim, as if some secret instinct and involuntary presentiment restrained the rival communions which almost affect her. Ch. 1, section 2: *An infallible developing authority to be expected*). [First published in London, 1845].   
     Do the "People of God", subverted by "Paul VI - Vatican II", still have authentic children of the [untraceable] Church? [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
12. Two observational facts govern any definition of time. On the one hand, time is subordinated to movement; on the other hand, time is in the mind; the mind knows things by distinguishing and uniting them, that is, by placing them in the number. The mind knows movement by distinguishing and uniting its phases, that is, by placing them in the number that together constitute the before and after. In this sense, time is "the number of movement".   
     These metaphysical data can and must be assumed in the theological definition of time. The analogue of movement is, for the Christian, sanctification; and this: from birth to death, from Baptism to Extreme Unction. And just as the nature of movement is intelligibly manifested in the coordination between the before and after which is proper to time, so the nature of sanctification is manifested, according to the Light of Faith, in conversion: "*Convert us Domine ad te, et convertemur*" (Convert us to you, O Lord, then we shall be converted) (*Lamentations of Jeremiah* 5:21). Every moment of every human duration, every moment of the Church militant, is justified in divine Wisdom as being the fabric in which God embroiders the indefinitely deep conversion that is measured by the freedom of each one. Christian time is neither cyclical nor evolutionary; time, the instant, is, for the Christian and for the Church, the mental place of theological conversion. And since the past is gone, this "definition" applies existentially to the present and to the future, which is constantly becoming present; it applies, finally and already, to Eternity, where conversion itself is converted into the infinite desire to be fulfilled. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
13. 1 Pet. 3.15.  
     This monition of the Apostle takes on a serious and unexpected significance today. "The hope that is in us" is, whatever the cost, to keep the Faith. It is the instinct of Faith that inspires the irreducibility that the adversaries turn into a fight. It is the Deposit of Faith that constitutes the stake of the combat that God does not cease to transform into "Victory" (1 John 5.4). It is the Faith that reflects on earth the "alpha and omega" whose radiance proceeds from Jesus (Rev. 1:8; 21:6; 22:13), the "Author and Finisher of Faith" (Heb. 12:2). But it would be impossible to make any act of Faith, unless one believed, in the same act, the Magisterium which infallibly presents the articles of Faith as divinely revealed; and unless one was willing to believe any of these articles with the same Faith. It would be possible, in a charismatic church, to aim at preserving the faith, while dissolving into an indecisive obscurity the question of the relation which one maintains to "authority": in such a church the "Spirit" is supposed to supply ... everything, and especially unity. But such a conception is absolutely incompatible with the nature of the Faith as it is defined, and lived, in the Roman Catholic Church "which is the Mystical Body of Christ" (Cf. note 4), i.e. of Him who is the Truth.  
     It is impossible, on pain of introducing a contradiction into the theological order, to follow the monition of St. Peter, "giving an account of the hope that is in us", if, at the same time, we do not give an account of the relationship that we maintain with the "authority" that occupies the See of Peter. It is impossible to make an act of Faith in the divinity of Jesus Christ, without being, in that very act, disposed to make an act of the same Faith in the doctrine of religious liberty as the Church has defined it. And it is impossible to make an act of Faith in the doctrine of religious liberty as the Church has defined it, without specifying the situation in which one intends to be in relation to the "authority" which has overruled that doctrine. In other words, it is impossible, within the Roman Catholic Church which is the Mystical Body of Christ, to uphold the Faith and administer the sacraments in opposition to "authority", without specifying the nature of the relationship one intends to uphold with said "authority", which should be Authority. This is what we propose to do in the present study. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
14. Acts 5:23. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
15. "Catholic" comes from the Greek: "κατά" meaning "according to"; "ὅλος", which denotes "an ordered whole", and which is found, for example, in "holonomy" (the quality of that which has one law, of that whose law is "one"). [Whereas "pan" denotes a formless whole; the workings of a watch constitute a "ὅλος", a pile of stones is a "pan"]. The Church is the Mystical Body of Christ. It derives from its Head to have an organic unity. That is to say, by nature, she is "Catholic"; and by nature, she is not a "mosaic"... in the ecumenical fashion. Catholic by its very nature, and in virtue of its Head, the Church becomes unceasingly universal, in the sense that it spreads, as it must, throughout the universe. "Universal" means the consequence, in extension, of what "Catholic" means in understanding. It is in law that the Church is universal, *because she is Catholic*; the confirmation of this is that, wherever the Church is, whether in a "locality" or in a capital city, there *must* be found the unity of order which is proper to the Church. We can therefore measure the pernicious scope of the doctrinal alteration in which the substitution of *universalem* for *catholicam* in the text of the *Creed* would have consisted. On the   
     other hand, "the Mystical Body of Christ being the holy Roman Catholic Church" (note 4), when the Pope addresses the Roman Catholic Church juridically, he is in fact addressing, in the name and in virtue of the Head, the Mystical Body of Christ, which *in essence* enjoys "catholicity", and consequently in law universality. This recital must be stated in order to interpret correctly the clause specified by the *Constitutio Pastor æternus*. "[The Roman Pontiff is infallible] if he defines as to be held by the universal Church a doctrine which concerns faith and morals (*doctrinam de fide vel moribus ab universa Ecclesia tenendam definit*)." We say, then, that the clause *ab universa Ecclesia* does not exclude the promulgation of an *ordo missæ from* belonging per se to the infallible Magisterium. This is for three reasons:

    The main reason is that the First Vatican Council laid down conditions which are sufficient for infallibility in the theoretical order. But the Council expressly signified (see note 7) that it did not intend to rule on all the cases in which there is infallibility. Now the promulgation of an *ordo missæ* is not of a theoretical order, but of a practical order. The clauses stated by *Pastor æternus*, especially *ab universa Ecclesia*, are therefore not required for the promulgation of an *ordo missæ to* be infallible.

    We must not confuse such a thing considered in itself with what is only a condition for its realization. This extremely important principle has been recalled in a detailed way, precisely in the *Constitutio Pastor æternus*. "It is not by reason of the Church's consent, but by themselves [ex sese], that the definitions of the Roman Pontiff are irreformable" (ch. 4, end). The fact that the "definitions" which emanate from the Pope are received by the Church, the fact that they are addressed to the "universal Church", these facts are simply Criteria. *If* this is so, and if other conditions are met, then there is infallibility. But these conditions are not the *essence of infallibility*; so that infallibility can be realized, without these conditions being realized. Infallibility results, as *Pastor æternus* again states, from the "divine assistance promised to blessed Peter"; infallibility consists in the "being with" which Jesus promised the Eleven (note 2), thus making humanly close another expression of the same promise: "I will not leave you orphans" (John 14:18). Now, when the Pope addresses the Catholic Church, even if juridically only the Roman Catholic Church, he can do so only in the name and in virtue of Christ the Head of the Church. In the Catholic Church, whose unity is, we repeat, a unity of order, to address the Body [clothed, or not clothed, with "Romanity"] requires being the Head, or intervening in His Presence, in His "being with"; hence, error is impossible. It is the catholicity of the Church which entails that the promulgation of an *ordo missæ* is *inherently* [*ex sese*] infallible *in the practical order*, even though juridically it is addressed only to the Roman Catholic Church, which is supposedly distinct from the universal Church.

    The third reason is set out in the following footnote (16). [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
16. And this, *a fortiori*, if this act is made in virtue of the *universal* ordinary Magisterium of the Church. Now, at least as far as the appearance is concerned, this is indeed the case in this instance. Paul VI, in the course of the *Constitutio Apostolica Missale Romanum*, refers four times to the Second Vatican Council, and more precisely to the *Constitutio Sacrosanctum Concilium* on the liturgy:

    This *Constitutio* "laid the foundations for the general renovation of the Roman Missal (*generalis renovationis Missalis Romani fundamenta locavit*)",

    "In accordance with the prescription (*prœscriptum*) of the Second Vatican Council, which...".

    "In accordance with the notifications (*monita*) of the Second Vatican Council..."

    "By virtue of the prescription (*præscriptio*) of the Second Vatican Council..."

    The Constitution is indeed signed by Paul VI personally, but the Pope presents himself as being the qualified representative of the Council, which he approved. Thus, we see that in this case, the "authority" which apparently promulgated the n.o.m. is, as Paul VI himself says, "the ordinary supreme Magisterium" (Cf. note 8), more precisely, "the universal ordinary Magisterium" (note 7). Consequently, there is, at least "of itself", infallibility.   
     In order to prove the contrary, the hypothesis of a pope who, without committing infallibility, would compose a "new but Catholic" Mass, out of pious fantasy, has been evoked. But apart from the fact that this hypothesis is in itself utopian, it is not at all "in situation". Whatever may be the secret motives of which God alone is the Judge, it is certain that, far from acting merely *motu proprio*, Paul VI expressly joined the Council in promulgating the n.o.m. It is indeed a question of the Supreme Magisterium, even if it insists on being "ordinary". Whatever the case, therefore, of the "ordinary" or "extraordinary" character, if, as Paul VI says (note 8), this Magisterium had been "authentic", it would have been impossible for it to err. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
17. The *Constitutio Missale Romanum*   
     only "*establishes*" the so-called "*new Mass*" on a permissive basis. The three lines which prescribe the implementation for the first Sunday of Advent, November 30, 1969, were added before the last paragraph in the second edition of the document. Does this strange procedure not invalidate the very scope of the "Constitution"? This is what we believe. However, it is up to the canonists to examine it and it will be up to the Authority to decide.   
     Let us add that two arguments can be invoked in favour of the binding scope that should be attributed to the *Constitutio Missale Romanum*. On the one hand, the use of the new consecratory formulae is prescribed, and this in categorical terms: "*jussimus*", "*volumus*", and "volumus". On the other hand, Paul VI made it known publicly, but only on May 24, 1976, in the course of a Consistory, that he had had, and still had, the intention of abrogating (cf. note 29) the traditional Mass. We consider such a design to be futile, because the Traditional Mass can neither be obrogated nor, still less, abrogated. As for the scope of the expressions "*iussimus*" and "*volumus",* it is subordinate to that of the Document as a whole. "If this n.o.m. is used in accordance with the permission we give, then we order that, we will that.   
     It must therefore be maintained that in virtue of the *Constitutio Missale Romanum*, the said n.m. is only permitted. However, discussions of procedure will not convince anyone. It is the observation of the facts which establishes what we believe to be the truth, namely, that *the said n.m. is deprived of validity*; and this because the *Constitutio Missale Romanum* is not and cannot be "of the Church". We shall show this in the present study by means of external criticism.  
     We shall establish it, by internal criticism, at the cost of a much more delicate analysis, the essence of which is as follows. The priest who uses such and such a rite *ipso facto*   
     assumes the intention of the Authority which promulgated that rite. Otherwise, neither the priest nor the faithful could be assured that the celebrant has, as he should, the *intention of the Church*. Now the observation which has been going on for ten years confirms unceasingly a certainty which has now been acquired. In spite of purely verbal protests which have not been accompanied by any effective measures, the "authority" which promulgated the new rite had the "objective" intention, effectively revealed by the facts (whatever may be a secret design of which God alone is the Judge), of introducing equivocality into the "Mystery of the Faith itself", and hence into the unity of the Faith. Such an intention is incompatible with the holiness of the Church; it is not "of the Church". Within the Church, such an intention is: nothing.  
     And it is not within the power of any priest, minister of the Church, to fabricate a so-called valid "Mass" by coupling an intention he supposedly holds from his own "faith", with a rite that betrays the Witness of the Faith. The "good priests" who act in this way serve the father of lies by duplicity: they are not the ministers of the Sacrifice which He who is the Truth cannot offer through them. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
18. Eminently typical in this regard is *Editorial* I, pp. 5-7; *Catholic Thought*, No. 176. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
19. This point cannot be overemphasized: "You will know them by their fruits" (Matt. 7:16, 20). It is the convergent and persistent behaviors that best manifest the true intention. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
20. Matt. 28:20. Jesus promises the Eleven to "be with them". And since this promise concerns the future, which is always uncertain, Jesus specifies its effect from the point of view of temporality. The IC being with them will be *co-extensive* with a certain duration; it will be carried out not only at certain moments, but usually, "every day", that is, in the daily life of the militant. But what is this duration, signified by the word: *aiôn*, which the Vulgate translates *sœculum*? It is a determined duration, since on the one hand it must be consummated [St. Thomas evokes the completion of the number of the elect], since on the other hand *aiôn* specifies CI all the days" which is indeterminate; and besides, the "*sœculi*" of the Vulgate does have a determined meaning: *of the century*, in the singular. What is this determined duration? That is the question.   
     The answer is given in substance by the traditional doctrine. CI [We propose as to be believed by all the faithful] the doctrine concerning the primacy of the Apostolic See, as to institution, perpetuity, and nature (*doctrinam de institutione, perpetuitate ac natura sacri Apostolici primatus... cunctis fidelibus credendam et tenendam...*)". (Vatican I. *Constitutio Pastor æternus; prœmium*, Denz. 3052). This statement confirms the Encyclical of Pius IX: "so that this same Church... remains until the consummation of the centuries, always stable and unchanged in accordance with its own nature (*eadem Ecclesia... in sua propria natura semper stabilis et immota usque ad consummationem sæculorum permaneret*)" (*Jam vos omnes* 13 Sept. 1868; Denz. 2997).  
     But, on the other hand, the moment when this determined duration must be "consumed" does not seem to be that of the Parousia; would Jesus not have said so? Would He not have said, "I am with you until I come again," ["Will the Son of Man, when He comes again, find faith on earth?" (Luke 18:8)... "the Son of man coming in the clouds of heaven with great power and glory" (Matt. 24:30)]. Why, then, does Jesus not say that the completion of this definite period must coincide with the Parousia? He certainly does not mean to imply that "after" He will no longer be "with" His Church. And S. Thomas excludes this by making this "after" consist of the universe of Glory. We therefore strive to respect the secrecy with which Jesus' words remain shrouded. That is why we translate: "I will be with you all the days until the consummation of a time".   
     "*A time*" is a certain period of time; it is also, for human beings and for the Church, a set of behaviours which are proper to that time. Jesus does not exclude that, "this time being consumed," which may take place before the Parousia, He is still and *always* "with" the Apostles and "with" their successors. But did He not mean, by speaking neither of the Parousia nor therefore of the end of time or the consummation of the centuries ("*sæculorum*", according to the formula of Pius IX, contrasts with "*sæculi*" of the Vulgate), that this "being with" would provisionally remain in abeyance and in expectation: in abeyance on the side of "His own", in abeyance on His own side, as long as "the mystery of iniquity is being accomplished" (2 Thess. 2:7), "until the Lord Jesus destroys the ungodly with the breath of His mouth and annihilates him with the brightness of His coming" (*Ibid.* 8). "We need not know the day nor the hour" (Matt. 25:13). What matters to us, who are well aware that we are living in "the end of a time", is that Jesus, the "Author and Finisher of Faith" (Heb. 12:2), "be with" those whose only desire is to preserve on earth the Faith that will welcome Him there. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
21. This occupation of the Apostolic See by Paul VI is not merely a *fact*. It is a reality of *law*, in the sense that the See cannot receive another occupant until the juridical loss of the Sovereign Pontificate by Paul VI is consummated. It is beyond the scope of our study to discuss the modalities of this consummation. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
22. That is, he is deprived of the right to govern the Church. His acts of magisterium and government are therefore, by themselves, invalid. We have pointed out, in the Warning, the question of the "substitution" assured *in favor of the faithful*, by the Church, or by God Himself, for acts concerning the power of sanctification. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
23. Cf. Note 20. S. Mark (16:20) confirms this "being with," *post factum*: "For they, being Departed [after the Ascension], preached everywhere, the Lord working with them (του κυρίου συνεργούντος: the Lord being in unity of act with them), and confirming their word by the miracles which accompanied it." This is what S. Paul also testifies, "Nevertheless the Lord assisted me and strengthened me, that the word might be fully spoken by me" (2 Tim. 4:17). These things are now past, but the promise remains: "I will not leave you orphans; I will come to you" (John 14:18). [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
24. ο μη ων μετ΄ εμού, κατ΄ εμού εστι (Matt. 12:30; Luke 11:23) (a).  
    ος γαρ ουκ έστι καθ΄ ημών, *υπέρ* ημών εστιν (Mark 9.40) (b). Whosoever is not *against* you is *for* you  
     ο θεός υπέρ ημών τις καθ΄ ημών? (Rom. 8:31) (c). If God is for us, who then [would be] *against* us?  
     The semantic play of these assertions rests on the three prepositions we have underlined: κατά = against; υπέρ = for; μετά = with.   
     "Against" excludes "for" and "with". That much is clear. But Jesus' assertions remain fraught with mystery, because they concern relationships arising from contrary dispositions. "If one is not against" or "if one is not with". then what does this mean? To locate accurately the answers (a) (b) (c) made to these questions, requires to make explicit two data.   
     The first is a distinction. "For ..." corresponds to a purpose, and therefore to an action. "With" does not exclude this point of view (Mark 16:20, cited in note 23); but "with" is open to a metaphysical scope, and has a full meaning only in reference to being: "I *am* with you...". The second datum is precisely what Jesus intends to inculcate, namely: "I am with you, God is with you, God is for you". But, in order to make this clearer, Jesus expresses apparently paradoxical consequences which, as we shall see, can only be founded on the "being with" and the "being for" of which God is the Principle.  
     How can we explain: "He who is not with me is against me"? Is "neutrality" therefore impossible? Yes, it is impossible; but in order to understand it, we must refer to the "being with" which proceeds from God, or from Jesus. Let us express ourselves, to simplify, from the concrete point of view of a given human subject. God is with me: this is what is presupposed. The "being with" being, by nature, reciprocal, I "am therefore with God". Or at least I should be. If I am not, the only reason can be that I am opposed to the communication that God intends to make of "being with", and consequently I am against God. Thus, if I am not with God, I am against God. This is what Jesus affirms (a). To live this affirmation existentially, applying it to oneself, leads to the rediscovery of the truth that is revealed in the depths of one's being: *ex parte Sui*, God "is with" me. It is the "being with" that comes from Jesus that resolves, in the sweetness of intimacy "more intimate to myself than I am", the violence of the apparent paradox: "he who is not with me is against me"  
     Similarly, how can we account for the extraordinary benevolence and optimism expressed in (b) and (c)? "God is for me": such is the "key to the figure", If indeed it is so, God orders what depends on Him, that is, everything, to my own good. "To him who loves God, all things work together for good" (Rom. 8:28). Who then can be against me? Whereas God, who is all-powerful and is "for me," causes to be used for my own good even that which intentionally but ineffectually is done against me. And if someone is not against me, he enters unconsciously perhaps, but objectively wanting to, into the Game of God who is for me. This someone is therefore also for me.   
     So we see that Jesus had prepared the eleven, by a teaching which was general in scope and negative in form [(a), (b)], to accept spontaneously the positive promise which He made to them personally in a precise manner: "Behold, I am with you always, even unto the end of the age". The absence of Judas, who should have been present, suffices to show that the inexorable sentence: "He who is not with me is against me" applies also to the Twelve and to their successors "until the end of time". [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
25. " Economy" means both: *structure* and *reality*: "reality" of the supernatural order, as divinely instituted. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
26. We say "given up the keys", not understood by the following. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
27. Since it is the "being with" promised by Christ that formally constitutes the occupant of the Apostolic See as the head in act of the Church militant (cf. III 2 b). [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
28. *Obroger*: legal term for the process of ousting a law, *without formal repeal*. This process is legally deprived of scope, against a law rooted in custom. Cf Neri Capponi. *On the reform of the liturgy. Some juridical considerations* (*Catholic Thought*, No. 170, Sept.-Oct. 1977, pp. 10-34). [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
29. This admission is contained in the consistorial discourse delivered by Paul VI on Monday, May 24, 1976: "The new *ordo* was promulgated as a substitute for the old one, after mature reflection, and following the instances of the Second Vatican Council. It was not otherwise that our holy predecessor Pius V had made the reformed Missal obligatory under his authority, following the Council of Trent".   
     Very insidious assertions. For, on the one hand, there is no question of such a substitution in the *Constitutio Missale Romanum*; and on the other hand, St. Pius V proceeded in a completely different way than did Paul VI (Cf. note 10, note 68). [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
30. Both the pope and the local bishop are appointed *solely* by virtue of their *jurisdiction* over the place where Mass is celebrated. The proof of this is that the celebrant always appoints the local bishop, even if he is not the celebrant's own ordinary. We can see the "inconsistency" of appointing another bishop, "by devotion" or for any other reason. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
31. In what follows, we capitalize words whose meaning concerns the Church. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
32. That is, all measures taken by the Authority to ensure the achievement of the End. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
33. In other words, it is this "Relation" of the Authority to the End of the Church, which determines the nature of the submission due by the subordinates. This submission is relative, in the same act, to the realization of the End and to the Authority that impels this realization. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
34. 2 Cor. 5:15. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
35. *On Justification*, chapter 3; Denz. 1523. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
36. This Communication is, of itself, that of the divine Life. It can, in general, temporarily be reduced to the Communication that the "Author of Faith" makes of the grace of Faith. Whoever has Faith, even if dead, remains a member of the Church. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
37. In fact, the implementation of the charism of infallibility realizes in a maximum way the promise of Christ to "be with" the Authority that governs his Church. It thus reveals, since the completion of a thing manifests its nature, the very *structure* of the Communication that Christ exercises with regard to the Authority. This structure is found in the other acts of Authority. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
38. The faithful, in fact, by adhering to the infallibly defined propositions, submit themselves to the divine Authority which alone guarantees their Truth, in the act of infallibility. The formal motive for submission is therefore the Authority of God revealing. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
39. This is true even when it is not a question of the promulgation of a dogma of faith. Thus, except in cases of manifest error, the faithful are bound to acquiesce in the dogmatic decisions of the Supreme Pontiff. Likewise, he must respect his disciplinary decrees and obey his orders, except in the case of an impossible sin. In all these cases, the faithful exercise a religious and theological submission which, in the final analysis, is rendered to Christ, whose Vicar is the Pope. The degree and manner of submission are obviously a function of the nature of what is decreed by the Authority. But always, this submission is formally based on the Authority of Christ in so far as He communicates it to His Vicar, the not always infallible instrument of the invisible Head of the Church. The submission of divine faith to the defined dogma corresponds to this Communication, in the case where this is best assured, and perfectly assured. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
40. Luke 10:16. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
41. That is to say, submission to Authority in the Church has as its goal the Communication of divine Life. But this Communication of Life is realized only through submission to the divinely instituted Authority. This submission is the normal condition for receiving the Communication of divine Life. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
42. Matt. 25:21, 23. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
43. Did Honorius Ier  
     (625-638) really err? The two letters on which this accusation is based were written by Honorius Ier in 634 to Sergius, Patriarch of Constantinople and "Prince of the Monothelians". On the other hand, these letters as they have come down to us do not contain any errors as such. They do, however, show an inadmissible casualness about doctrine.   
     "Let us leave to the grammarians the question whether, because of the divine works and the human works manifestly accomplished by Christ, who is personally one principle of operation, we must attribute to him a divine operation and a human operation... Let us set aside the scandal of novelty. We do not have to define that there are either one or two operations in Christ; but by the locution 'one operation' let us confess Christ to be the one and only operative; and by the locution 'two operations', a locution which some use and which it is advisable not to retain, let us confess the existence of two natures... which .operate in their own way" (Denz. 487, 488).

    The error of Honorius, *if, whatever S. Robert Bellarmine thinks, there was an error, consisted above all in the fact that the Supreme Pastor failed in the duty of his office, which consists in the formulation of the revealed Truth. Robert Bellarmine thinks*, was that the Supreme Pastor failed in the duty of his office, which is to see to the formulation of the revealed Truth  
     But, whatever may be the case with Honorius himself and the judgment of God, it is certain that the Sixth Ecumenical Council held at Constantinople (November 7, 680 - September 16, 681) condemned Honorius in Session XIII on March 28, 681 (Denz. 550). Were the "fathers of the Council" misinformed by the two aforementioned letters, actually written by Honorius but possibly falsified? Whatever may be the case with these tenebrous stories, two things are certain.   
      
     The first is that an Ecumenical Council has admitted *in fact*, has therefore admitted *as possible in principle*, that a pope manifests a grave casualness in the performance of that one of his duties which is most imperative, because that duty is divinely made possible by a sacred prerogative  
     The second certainty is that the same Ecumenical Council formally condemned, with equal violence and solemnity, the sinful behavior which it admitted to exist in fact, and consequently in law, as a possibility.   
     From these two aspects, both of which are certain to be the same "dogmatic fact", two consequences follow concerning the parallel that has actually been proposed between Paul VI and Honorius 1er  
     .  
     The similarity has been emphasized in order to excuse Paul VI. The latter, while recalling in words the essential truths, *in deeds* "lets go", all agree. But some excuse Paul VI because of the precedent set by Honorius Ier; others condemn Paul VI in advance to the condemnation issued by a future Council, and become, so to speak, the leaders of the panurges while awaiting this Council and this condemnation  
     The similarity of behavior, if it exists at all, between Honorius Ier  
     and Paul VI is therefore a fallacious argument, either because it is intended to excuse or because of the way it is used to accuse. The reason for this is that this similarity itself is fallacious, because in reality it covers up a profound dissimilarity, and it is this point in particular that interests us here.   
     The inadvertence, even the casualness, of Honorius Ier  
     , if it was real, was only occasional; it did not exclude the *usual* purpose of serving the Good End which is committed to the Church. This failure, if it occurred, did not deprive Honorius Ier  
     of the Communication of "being with" which, proceeding from Christ, constituted him Pope *formaliter throughout* his pontificate. While the deficient behaviors of Paul VI are multiple and convergent. It is only this accumulation that allows, and unfortunately requires, the conclusion that the present occupant of the Apostolic See does not have the usual intention of realizing the Good-End that is committed to the Church. Hence it follows that, unlike Honorius, he is not a *formaliter* Pope.   
     Another parallel has been evoked by M. Madiran (*Itinéraires* N° 229, pp. 1-13: *La question de la messe*), with a view to showing that, while remaining a "pope" in his own right, Paul VI was able to commit an "*abuse of power*" by imposing the exclusive use of a new *ordo*, the drafting of which is "at least a *failure*" etc  
     We owe it to truth to criticize the conclusion of this article in passing. "One can dream...; one could imagine a Mass of Paul VI corrected and redone, deleted and repaired by John Paul II..." (p. 13). Indeed, when reading these words, one thinks one is having a bad dream. Would the making of a Mass therefore be an amusement conceded to the Pope, provided he respects the rules of the game: "that this Mass be integrally Catholic, that it be unequivocally so; that it not be a means or an occasion for suppressing the traditional rites". Thus there could be, in the Catholic Church [ καθόλου; cf. note  
     15], two Masses, one Catholic and the other; that is, there could be a duality in the norm of the *mysterium fidei* which is concretely the very principle of unity? This would be the ruin of unity; some of the faithful, simple but deeply religious, have spontaneously observed this. Moreover, it is incompatible with the sanctity of the Church that any residue of the satanic enterprise whose aim was, and still is, to destroy *the* Mass should co-exist with *it*.

    The argument which, supposedly at least, is the basis for this conclusion, can obviously only have the same value. This argument consists of a comparison between Paul VI and Sixtus V. Just as the latter claimed to impose on the Church an edition of Sacred Scripture which alarmed several cardinals and theologians, notably S. Robert Bellarmine, so Paul VI imposed a new *ordo which was* strongly criticized by Cardinals Bacci and Ottaviani. Sixtus V nevertheless remained Pope. And even *his* edition, amended, was published under his name by Clement VIII; thus the Mass of Paul VI, "corrected and remade, suppressed and repaired" could be maintained, "the traditional Mass" necessarily retaining at least an inalienable primacy of honor" (p. 9). We have just observed that this hypothesis, even as a pure hypothesis, is inadmissible. The parallelism that seems to make it plausible is no less so. In order to establish it, let us confine ourselves to considering an aspect whose   
    extreme importance we have already stressed (note 19), especially from the point of view of Faith, namely the primordiality of the facts  
     The bull Æternus *ille* of Sixtus V. (dated March 1, er1589, that is, erMarch 1, 1590 in our present way of counting the years from erJanuary 1; at that time, in the Vatican, the year began on March 25), which was to prescribe his edition of the Vulgate, was not, it seems, officially promulgated. At the death of this pope, the bull, "printed for fifteen months, covered in advance with all the official signatures... [remained] buried in the Vatican archives. It is not inserted in the bullary; the publication is not mentioned, according to the usage, after the signature of the *cursors*; it becomes, consequently, dead letter, without it being necessary to revoke it" (Ferdinant Prat, *la bible de sixte-quint*, études, t. LI, September 1890, p. 59)  
     It is moreover what Mr. Barrois   
     had written: "Sixtus V was thus confronted with an opposition of the Roman clergy, and of all his entourage, immediate, firm and public. He gave up promulgating the bull which declared his edition alone authentic and imposed its use to the exclusion of all others; but he did not interrupt the sale of it. Sick for several weeks, he soon died." (*Itineraries* No. 209, p. 96)  
     One does not understand that, referring to M. Barrois, Mr. MADIRAN does not take into account what M. Barrois says so clearly, "Sixtus V renounced to publish the bull...". While Paul VI published the "*Constitutio Missale Romanum*", and he publicly signified on May 24, 1976 (Cf. note 29) that his intention had been to oblige universally in serious matters by the said *Constitutio*. What counts is not what Sixtus V had intended to do and did *not do*, but what he *did do*. What matters is not that Paul VI, in his speeches of November 19 and 26, 1969, had the intention, at least in words, of preserving the Mass of old; What matters is what Paul VI *did*, namely, to take the steps by which the traditional Mass would supposedly have been obrogated, for, according to Leo XIII, "the Church does not judge of the intention, which is by its nature something interior; but the Church *must* judge of the intention in so far as it is externally manifested" (*Apostolicæ curæ*, 13 Sept. 1896).  
     On the essential point of reality, therefore, there is no parallelism between the two "cases" of Paul VI and Sixtus V. Christ did not cease to "be with" Sixtus V, who first of all collected the fruit of a truly scientific work carried on for thirty-four years (1546-1590), in parallel with that of the congregation presided over by Cardinal Carafa; who secondly, in the final analysis, renounced imposing a version of the Bible into which he had introduced only "insignificant changes" on his own authority (Le Bachelet, *Bellarmine and the Sixtus Clementine Bible*, Paris, 1911; pp. 130-134, 44-45). Whereas Christ "was not with" Paul VI, who first of all "covered up" the hasty fabrication of the new *ordo*, by a suspicious team whose abnormal liturgy constituted a grave vitiation from the point of view of orthodoxy; and who secondly, and above all, pretended to impose universally (Cf. note 29) this new rite by abrogating the traditional one by a disloyal process (note 68). Sixtus V never ceased to be Pope *Formaliter*. Cardinal J.-B. Montini was only pope *materialiter*, at least from December 7, 1965. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
44. John 2:25. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
45. Cf. John 14:6. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
46. Exodus 3:14. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
47. Except in the case where, impossibly, the Authority would command something manifestly in contradiction to the divine Law: "It is better to obey God than men" (Acts 5:29). We have examined this point in note 43. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
48. It is proper to the mind, in the human condition, to divide and compose in order to understand. Dividing and composing are thus inherent to each of the operations of the mind, in particular to reasoning, which is the precise way in which the connatural inclination to "pass" from one judgment to another, that is, to "infer", is exercised. This "passage" can be carried out in two ways, to which correspond two types of reasoning.   
     Deduction (*de-ducere*) consists in the mind being *led from*; induction (*in-ducere*), in the mind being *led into*. It will be rightly observed that, even in deduction, the mind is led *to* or *into* the conclusion; and that, even in induction, the mind *starts from the* premises. We must, however, maintain the precision which etymology signifies. For in deduction the mind starts from two premises which are *laid down in parity*, and which are connected together by a common term called *medium*. In induction, the mind is *led* from the first premise *to* the second, before being led from the two premises together to the "conclusion". It is the second premise that contains the real *medium* of reasoning; but it is an *intelligible medium* that expresses the nature of the reality whose "conclusion" is asserted, and which is therefore more abstract than that reality itself. The original phase of reasoning by induction consists, therefore, in the fact that the mind is led into (*in-ducere*) the   
     intelligible *medium* from which it descends to the "conclusion". This conclusion must be confronted with the facts that formed the basis of the induction.   
     The iteration of this process allows us to affirm with increasing plausibility that the intelligible *medium* is precisely the nature of the reality under consideration. By "plausibility" we mean simply the "*likeness of the true*". The iteration that induction calls for makes it more and more in conformity with the truth that it circumscribes. The *plausible* leads to the true. The spiral of truth then fixes the mind in certainty, which consists in the avoidance of any supposition that would be contrary to what is certain. Reasoning by induction, properly conducted, thus produces certainty in the mind.   
     However, we must observe that the epistemological qualification of the certainty to which induction leads depends on the domain of reality in which this type of reasoning is exercised. It is indeed by induction that the first principles are discovered: identity, non-contradiction. But, in this case, the proper role of the inference that the mind makes from sensible data consists in the fact that the mind, in the very act in which it knows them, has the evidence that it is made to be. The incarnate spirit does not therefore have the intuition of being, but rather that of being, by nature, "capable of being", *capax entis*. From this evidence, the most primitive of all in the natural order, derive the "first principles". Induction thus leads, in this case, to certainty whose quality is maximal, since it is founded on an evidence which is intimate to the mind.   
     If we consider, not the being as being, but the different domains of reality, from the physical universe to human action, contingency is introduced *objectively* in an increasing manner. And since, by its very nature, contingency as such is not intelligible to the human mind, the   
     intelligible *medium* that is proper to inductive reasoning can become less and less adequate to reality, as the latter contains a more marked contingency. The notion of law is qualitatively differentiated, depending on whether we consider it in astronomy or in biology, for example. It follows that the quality of the certainty of the induction by which these laws are respectively established is also differentiated. In each domain of knowledge, corresponding to each domain of reality, there is a specific type of certainty. To compare these different types is a matter of epistemology, and is beyond the scope of this study.   
     Let us limit ourselves to observing that the object is human action. Consequently, the certainty that we must expect from the induction we are proceeding with is that which is commonly considered sufficient in the order of human action. It is usually referred to as "moral certainty". The *norms* of human action can be known, in essence, with a certainty akin to that of metaphysics. Whereas *the implementation of* these norms must obviously take into account the contingency that affects human action; it is therefore a matter of moral certainty, and it would be a kind of sin against the "spirit", even against the Spirit, to expect, in order to act, to have a certainty whose quality would transcend the domain of action  
     Let us add that the certainty of theological Faith qualitatively transcends all human certainty. It is irreducible to an accumulation of probabilities. S. Pius X condemned the proposition: "The assent of faith is founded ultimately on a set of probabilities" (Decree *Lamentabili*, July 3, 1907; Prop, 25). Theological certainty transcends even metaphysical certainty, for it is, so to speak, restful in the attraction which the subsistent Truth exerts on the believing *mens.* It is by reason of this very transcendence that theological certainty can, if need be, confirm the moral certainty that is inherent in the realm of human action. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
49. Luke 5:1-11. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
50. "*De mente vel intentione, utpote quae per se quiddam est interius, Ecclesia non iudicat*": *at quatenus extra proditur, judicare de ea debet*" (Leo XIII. *Litt. Enc. Apostolicæ curæ*, 13 Sept. 1896; Denz. 3318). [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
51. This would be to reduce the Church to its natural aspect as a human collective, where the legitimacy of authority depends only on its effective purpose of achieving the common good. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
52. These permanent principles are, ultimately, the "natures"; which are, metaphysically, principles of measurement. And they constitute, intelligibly, by their definition, the medium which is in itself (Cf. note 48) that of reasoning by induction. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
53. Here are, among others, two confirmations which, *positis ponendis*, play exactly the role of the "crucial experience".   
     1. The maintenance of Latin in the liturgy.   
     In 1967, I observed that the use of French was gradually being introduced into the recitation of the canonical hours in the convent of Le Saulchoir. Now the Pope had officially asked the Benedictines, Dominicans, to preserve Latin and Gregorian for the choral office. Surprised, I wrote to Bishop Philippe, then Secretary of the S.C. of Religious. Here is the topical passage from the reply Cardinal Philippe sent me:  
    "June 27, 1967  
     If I have not yet replied to your good letter of May 26, it is because the Sacred Congregation for Religious received, a few days after the arrival of your letter, the order of the Holy Father himself to concede to those communities which will freely request it (by secret ballot) the permission to recite the choral office in the vulgar language in the ritual clauses of the Instruction *In edicendis normis* (of November 23, 1965is only to obey  
    (signed) † Brother Paul o.p."  
     Thus, in the moment when the pope officially gave an order, he personally gave the order to let the opposite of what he officially commanded be done. What happened, that is, the substitution of French for Latin, and the suppression of the Gregorian, that *was the Pope's will*. The assurance he gave *in words was* betrayed *in deed*.  
    2. The encyclical *Humanœ vitæ*.  
     Every month, the parish priest of St. Peter's Cathedral in Angouleme gathered the men of the parish. In February or March 1969, Bishop Kérautret, then Bishop of Angoulême, presided over the monthly meeting during which he promised to answer any questions that might be put to him. I should point out that I was a very quiet parishioner at the time. I pointed out to Bishop Kérautret that we noted with surprise a contradiction between the Encyclical *Humanæ vitæ* of Pope Paul VI and the communiqué of the French episcopate dealing with the same subject of birth control: a surprise all the greater because the communiqué in question was subsequent to the Encyclical  
     Bishop Kérautret recognized the contradiction, and revealed that the episcopate's communiqué had been published with the Pope's agreement.  
     The Pope let us know," said Mgr. Kérautret, "that he, the Pope, could not write anything other than what he had written in the Encyclical; and that he regretted not being able to take into account the needs and expectations of the men of the present day. "I remember perfectly that Bishop Kerautret put these words into the mouth of Paul VI  
     Such is my testimony.  
     07380 Lalevade d'Ardèche, March 6, 1976PhilippeVANNIER".  
     That such were the intimate dispositions of Paul VI is confirmed by the following notification: "Pope Paul VI recently asked the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith to suspend the investigation opened against the Viennese theologian Adolf Holl, for his declarations on the encyclical *Humanæ vitæ*, which he had severely criticized on television shortly after its publication, even extending his criticism to the person of the Sovereign Pontiff  
     (Kipa News Agency, May 14, 1969).   
     (*La Documentation catholique* N° 1543, July 6, 1969, p. 647 column 2)  
     What happens is that an episcopate collegially refuses a pontifical teaching and the ethical demands recalled therein, this *the Pope wanted*; the Pope "does not admit the attitude of those who transgress the [said] demands", but this assurance, confirmed *in words* on May 24, 1976, continues to be betrayed *in deed*.  
     We say that these two confirmations of our reasoning by induction are "crucial", that is to say, they alone are decisive. Cardinal Montini is obviously the "witness" par excellence, if it is a question of specifying the scope of his own behavior. We must therefore believe him: in this set of observable data constituted by Cardinal Montini's words and deeds, we must, in case of non-coherence between the one and the other, that is to say usually, take into account only the *acta*, exclusively the *acta* and *not the verba*. "*Acta manent*"! [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
54. A good example is given by the law of large numbers. It turns out to be the same in all domains, and is due to the pure repetition made possible by the lack of determination which is proper to matter. The objective basis of this law remains absolutely obscure, although its quantified expression is perfectly specified. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
55. A non-exhaustive but well ordered and sufficient list can be found in a very timely book, which we recommend reading. (Albert Briault and Pierre Fautrad. *Le ralliement de Rome à la Révolution*. Éditions Pierre Fautrad, Fyé 72490 Bourg-le-Roi; pp. 89-95).  
     The authors explain the three phases of the "Rally", under the Pontificates of Leo XIII, Pius XI, Paul VI. We have reason to fear that they will soon feel incited, by the same zeal in the service of truth, to write, under the same title, a second tragically detailed volume. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
56. Archbishop Lefebvre summed up in particularly happy terms all that can be said in this regard during the homily he gave at the Ordination ceremony on Saturday, *April* 3, 1976, in the chapel of the Seminary in Ecône. At that time I was accredited in that establishment where I gave courses. I returned there on purpose to attend this ordination, which was of decisive importance. The only reason for it was to allow the twelve new deacons to be ordained priests on the following 29th June. However, the solicitations, objurgations, threats and supplications had been extremely strong, insidious and harassing, coming not only from "Rome" but also from a "traditionalist" left which was even more turbulent outside of Ecône than inside, with a view to obtaining that the Ordinations not take place. Archbishop Lefebvre held firm. In the fervour of the Spirit, the fear of God, whose substance is Wisdom, prevailed over that of the disavowals which were otherwise inconsistent. But, in a very pastoral way, which surprised no one, the Bishop thought it good to reassure the families of the ordinands.  
     Before commenting on Heb. 5.1 and to show vigorously that if "the priest is taken from among men", it is expressly to be "consecrated to the things of God", Archbishop Lefebvre announced calmly as being very probable the sanctions which he was ready to face, and justified the position which consists in accepting to be "in opposition" because of the acts which one believes one must carry out. "The law is at the service of life, the law therefore is at the service of Faith, at the service of grace, at the service of supernatural life. And if it should happen that this law is used, as unfortunately often happens in civil legislation, that this law is used to abort life, to abort spiritual life, then it is clear that we cannot submit to laws which, instead of being used for the end for which they were made and created by God, would be used instead against God. That is why in certain circumstances we find ourselves obliged not to obey certain laws. You know this very well in the case of civil laws, and unfortunately it can happen eventually in the case of ecclesiastical laws too.   
     We are not saying anything else, but we are intelligibly explaining what Archbishop Lefebvre implicitly and practically admits. The "authority" no longer exercises the functions which are proper to it, that is to say which, in law, can only be exercised by the Authority. So much so that it is necessary, God helping us to believe, to "substitute". Ecône is justified against "authority" only because, as Archbishop Lefebvre recognizes, "authority" no longer performs the functions which are proper to Authority. We say that "authority" no longer has, *and usually does* not have, the purpose of achieving the Good-End which is committed to the Church; if it were otherwise, Ecône would have to close  
     On the other hand, we point out the obvious fact that in the Church authority is divinely instituted, and that it is ultimately exercised, albeit mediately, by Him who is the Truth. It is impossible that *in the Church*, usually, Authority   
     should not perform the functions which are proper to Authority. Such a hypothesis is contradictory, contrary to the principle of non-contradiction which plays out not only in the natural order but in the order whose permanent principle is the Incarnate Word (cf. note 20). If, therefore, "authority" does not usually perform the functions which are proper to Authority, it follows that "authority" is not Authority; for if "authority" were Authority, it would, in virtue of the "being with" promised to it, usually perform the functions which are proper to Authority. Ecône, by subsisting, bears concrete witness to what we intelligibly affirm. If Archbishop Lefebvre refuses to admit that "authority" is not Authority, it will sooner or later inexorably follow that Ecône will be emptied or amalgamated. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
57. "[God, through His Son, instituted the Church] so that she may be recognized by all as the guardian and teacher of the revealed word (*ut ea tamquam custos et magistra verbi revelati ab omnibus posset agnosci*)." (Vatican I. *Constitutio Dei Filius*, cap. 3; Denz. 3012). [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
58. Let us quote three propositions condemned by the Council of Constance (1415); they clarify the position of our thesis.   
     Proposition 8, attributed to Wyclif: "If the Pope is reprobate and evil (*præscitus et malus* ) and therefore a member of the devil, he has no power over the faithful that can be given to him except by Caesar" (Denz. 1158).Proposition 20, attributed to John Hus: "If the Pope is evil, especially if he is reprobate (*Si Papa est malus et prœsertim si est prœscitus.* ), then, like the apostle Judas, he is the devil, he is a thief and a son of perdition; he is not the head of the holy Church militant, since he is not a member of it  
     Proposition 22, attributed to John Hus: "The pope or pastor who is evil or reprobate is a pastor only equivocally; in reality, he is a thief and brigand" (Denz. 1222).   
     The error which underlies these propositions consists in making the relationship which the Pope maintains with the Church dependent on the relationship which the Pope maintains with God from the point of view of *justification*. Such dependence exists only from the point of view of Faith: the heretic is no longer, or never was, Pope. But precisely, as we have repeated several times and will insist below (b, and note 68), we intend to pass no judgment on the relationship which Cardinal Montini as a private person maintains with God. We judge the intention, in so far as it is externally manifested in acts actually observed. We do not judge the intention in so far as it intervenes in the internal forum in justification.   
     The errors condemned by the Council of Constance consist in connecting two affirmations. Now we do not affirm either that Cardinal Montini is not pope, since we hold that he is materially so, or that he is reprobate or evil, since we expressly refrain from judging this. [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
59. We call "formal constitutive" of the Authority, "that which formally constitutes the Authority", or "the determining reality that *in itself* gives it being". [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
60. Matt. 1:18. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
61. Matt. 1:19. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
62. Deut. 23:21; 22:24. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
63. Matt. 7.1. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
64. John 8:23. [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
65. Rom. 13.1. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
66. We can see, then, in what sense it can be affirmed that "every Catholic exercises a legitimate right of scrutiny over the Authority and over the form of its decrees".  
     This is true *simpliciter*, that is to say, absolutely, *a priori* and positively, within a human collective that belongs only to the natural order. Whereas in the human collective "Church", whose Authority and norms are divinely instituted, the right to see belongs to the subordinates only *a posteriori and negatively*.   
     We say *A POSTERIORI*, because the object of this "right to see" is neither the Authority itself, nor the very form of its decrees; the object of this right is the consequences of the acts that the Authority carries out. *The "right to review" relates formally to the* consequence*. It is a posteriori.* We say negatively, because it is not up to the faithful to judge *positively* that such and such an act of the Authority is indeed in conformity with the "notes" of the Church. But it is excluded that what *really* emanates from the Authority, either in acts or in words, supports the opposition of *contradiction*, or practically the opposition of contrariety, with the "notes" of the Church. The faithful have the right to observe this exclusion; that is to say, they have the right to observe that this exclusion manifests itself concretely, in the form of antagonisms and tensions, in reality. Thus the consequences of what really emanates, either in word or in deed, from the Authority, must not imply contradiction or contrariety with the notes of the Church. In this sense, then, the "right of scrutiny" can be exercised; and it can only be, as we see, in the negative: must not.   
     It must be added that, this "right of scrutiny" being thus specified, its exercise is not only a right, it is a *duty*; a duty impelled by the instinct of Faith, and expressed in the witness of Faith  
     The fulfilment of this duty does not imply that the faithful have an *a priori*   
     "right of scrutiny" over the Authority. For if the opposition which is excluded by law is manifestly and continuously produced, that is, if it turns out that there is *really a* contradiction and in fact a contradiction between the notes of the Church on the one hand and what emanates from what appears to be the Authority on the other, then the faithful must conclude that *in reality there is* no exercise of the Authority, or that even the Authority no longer exists. The "right to observe" of the faithful is then *not about the Authority, but about the fact that the Authority does not exist*.   
     This right and duty consists in observing that such and such a "subject" is no longer *metaphysically capable*, according to the ontology proper to the divinely instituted order, of exercising Authority, even though he occupies the Seat of Authority. This subject holds the "authority" *materialiter*, he is not invested with it *formaliter*. Therefore, the faithful are never required to oppose the Authority *formiter*. The "duty to disobey" is only a mirage, whose facticity only takes shape through the elasticity of language. [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
67. Paul VI, General Audience of 21 June 1972 (*Catholic Documentation* N° 1613, 16 July 1972, p. 660). [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
68. These three hypotheses are far from being the only ones. What they have in common is the assumption that the person who is generally believed to be performing the functions of the Pope at the present time is a genuine and healthy person, in other words, not a sophisticated one. There are other hypotheses, which may correspond to reality, but which, as we shall show, we need not bother with. We will however mention them, because   
     they *eventually* confirm the thesis we have exposed  
     These hypotheses, which are of a different kind, consist in admitting that there is a duality in the present "official" occupant of the Apostolic See. An *objective duality,* if one may say so, pertaining to the order of nature, and not merely a subjective duality, pertaining to the moral order, as is assumed in the three hypotheses mentioned above. This *objective duality* itself has several meanings, depending on whether it concerns the "psychological" (conditioned pope), the "psychic" (drugged pope), or the physical (duplicated pope). Let's stop at this last hypothesis, because it is in a way "typical": it constitutes the maximum in the genre of "objective duality", and it is devoid of verisimilitude.   
     This hypothesis is the following. The person who, at present, apparently performs the functions that are normally those of the Pope, would only be a *look-alike*. Cardinal J.B. Montini would still be alive, but sequestered in the Vatican. As far as we know, it was the seeress of Bayside who first announced this surprising "news" several years ago as "coming from Heaven". We consider this hypothesis because it brings to light an important aspect of the argument we have developed. For the sake of clarity, let's concretize this hypothesis and call "Mr. Paul VI" the person who, at present and "officially", seems to reign in the Vatican; and who, according to the "look-alike" hypothesis, would be a quidam who is neither Cardinal Montini, nor Paul VI. The argument we have developed formally concerns Mr. Paul VI. Indeed, this argument essentially states the observed fact. It is on the basis of the multiple behaviours, of which no one can be unaware, that we have concluded: the present occupant of the Apostolic See does not have, in fact and in act, the intention of realizing the Good-End which is committed to the Church. From this it follows, as we have shown, that if this person is pope *materialiter*, he is not pope *formaliter*. The argument therefore concerns, as it should, according to Leo XIII, the intention "*in so far as it is manifested*", and consequently the public figure, that is to say, Mr. Paul VI. What we affirm, then, is very precisely that Mr. Paul VI is not a *formal* pope. It is important, in view of the many confusions that have arisen, to make this clear by means of two observations which are mutually complementary. The   
     *first observation* is a response to the error of those who "dialecticize" the supposedly real otherness in the physical order between the person of Mr. Paul VI and the person of the true Paul VI as antagonism in the moral order  
     We hold, against this error, that the affirmation: "Mr. Paul VI" is not a *formal*   
     pope is sufficient. It is enough to found and to guide the action of the traditional phalanx. In other words, in order to say no and not to follow, we do not need to know if this Mr. Paul VI is, *yes* or *no,* the authentic Montini-Paul VI. In   
     fact, the one to whom we are supposed to owe religious and theological submission is the one who is adorned with the signs of authority. He is the one who receives every Wednesday, who signs the decrees, and who so abundantly blesses. It is the same person, *and therefore the same physical person*.  
     Let us explain the two recitals that make this clear. On the one hand, submission is due, by the subordinates, according to such and such an "ordination", to the "Authority" *who takes responsibility for* this "ordination", On the other hand, how is it possible to discern the subject who is invested with the Authority and who consequently assumes the responsibility? Once again, we must answer with Leo XIII: the subject who is invested with "Authority" is the one in whom the exercise of "authority" is *manifested*. It   
     is to him who receives, who signs, who blesses, that is to say, to him and not to another, that we should be subject, *supposing him to be Pope formaliter*. It is enough to have established that Mr. Paul VI is not Pope *formaliter* to justify the behavior of the traditional phalanx  
     This conclusion is confirmed and enlightened by the error which is opposed to it. This error is still rampant in most places of apparitions. It presupposes that a distinction equivalent to the one we have proposed be made. And it consists, *first of all, in* attributing to Mr. Paul VI, by exonerating the authentic Montini-Paul VI, all the viciosity observed; then in professing, *verba et facta*, an unconditional submission to the ordinations of Mr. Paul VI  
     It is thus to claim that submission is due to a "pseudo-authority", which is recognized as being unable to take responsibility for what appears to be ordered. It's at once separating Mr. Paul VI from the real Paul VI thus cleared, and identifying with the real Paul VI Mr. Paul VI thus inflated with "authority D." It's formally contradictory; it's not a question of the real Paul VI. This is formally contradictory; it is therefore, as far as reality is concerned, deprived of all significance.   
     *Second observation*, responding to the error of those who demolish Mr. Paul VI, but who in fact identify him with an untouchable and authentic Paul VI.  
     We hold, against this error, that the affirmation "Mr. Paul VI is not a *formal*   
     pope" concerns the authentic Montini-Paul VI *if* he is the same physical person as Mr. Paul VI  
     The gravity of this accusation only measures the tragedy of the situation. We must, loyally, accept the one; and, consequently, bear the responsibility for the other, even and especially if the "look-alike" hypothesis is only a joke. Let us assume, then, as the most pertinent critics of the present Vatican generally do, that Mr. Paul VI is the authentic Montini-Paul VI. We therefore make the following observation.  
     It is inconsistent to accuse Paul VI because, for example, *he tried* to obrogate the traditional Mass, if, on the other hand, he is asked with spectacular insistence: "Give us back the D. Mass. This inconsistency is sufficiently harmful that it is appropriate to point it out.   
     To ask Paul VI to *give back* the Mass is to recognize, in fact, *by this very request*, that he has obrogated it. This being the case, it is necessarily considered, on the other hand, that, in reality, Paul VI *either* did *or did* not obrogate  
     If it is considered that he obrogated, then it is not only *the fact that he did so,* through the request made, that is recognized; it is also recognized that Paul VI had and has, for this purpose, the authority that alone can suffice in this case: that of Christ Himself. Therefore, there is nothing to ask for, but to submit.   
     And if one considers that Paul VI did not obey, one is propagating and giving credence to what one knows to be an error, by acknowledging in fact, by the request addressed, that he did obey.  
     We believe that Paul VI did not obrogate, and that he can neither obrogate nor abrogate. We believe, therefore, that criticizing the present holder of the Authority must result not in "dialogue" but in silence.   
     Not in the "*dialogue*" of demands which, moreover, are not likely to move a comedy character, whether or not he is a "look-alike", and which, in any case, disperse in the ease of vain desires the profound resources *that* true action   
     requires. *But in silence*, which is the jewel box of prayer and the cradle of irreducible fidelity, a silence that implies, above all, *ignoring* the current holder of "authority".  
     The duty, therefore, is not to "disobey", but to ignore. This is why we reject the following instance. Is it absolutely true, it is alleged, that asking Paul VI: "Give us back the Mass", as we suppose, entails *ipso facto* acknowledging that Paul VI obrogated the said Mass? Would it not be possible to hold that Paul VI did not obrogate because he could not, and yet not solicit his intervention as the only way to remedy a desperate situation? "We are deprived of the Mass. You can *give it back to us*, in the sense that you can see to it that we are no longer deprived of   
     it. Since you can, we ask you to intervene".   
     Now, we consider that even if it is understood in this way, such a "postulation" is harmful by itself, vein: harmful, because vain.  
     The "postulation" is harmful by itself because to make the act is to accredit the "authority", as if it were the Authority when it is only a pseudo-authority. This is best understood through a comparison. Attending the so-called "new mass" is, by itself, harmful. For by attending it, one justifies its celebration; and one induces *others* into the worst error of all, namely to consider that what is not Mass is Mass. Likewise, to ask anything of "authority" is to recognize it as such; it is therefore to lead *others* into this error: that which is not Authority is Authority  
     The "postulation" is vain. Because the "authority" has answered it in advance, in terms that, if we may say so, are perfectly clear even because of the ambiguity they cover.   
     Let us recall one of the typical passages, contained in the speech delivered before the Consistory on Monday, May 24, 1976: "The adoption of the new *ordo missae* is not at all left to the free will of the priests or the faithful. The instruction of 14 June 1971 provided for the celebration of Mass according to the old rite, with the permission of the ordinary, only for elderly or sick priests who offer the divine sacrifice *sine populo*. The new *ordo* was promulgated to be substituted for the old one, after mature reflection, and following the instances of the Second Vatican Council. It was not otherwise that our holy predecessor Pius V had made the reformed missal obligatory under his authority, following the Council of Trent. With the same supreme authority which comes to us from Christ Jesus..." (Cf note 29).  
     We will analyze this text in the third part of our work on the so-called "new Mass". We will retain two things which directly concern our object.   
     The first is that the "authority" had, from the beginning, the intention of obrogating the traditional *ordo.* The admission of this was only made clear on May 24, 1976; but the intention itself presided over the making of the new *ordo*, since this one: "was promulgated in order to be substituted for the old one". "Most Holy Father, give us back the Mass!" The postulation is neanticized in derision. It is futile to count on "authority" to recover what precisely "authority" has always had, in fact, whether or not it can do so in law, the intention of obrogating.   
     But there is more. Indeed, the "authority" does not want to appear to take responsibility for the obrogation it intends to perpetrate. Paul VI neither abrogated nor obrogated the traditional *ordo*, no more on May 24, 1976 than before. He promulgated a new rite as *permissible*. Consequently, in order to substitute the new *ordo* for the old, that is, to impose the new rite and obrogate the old, Paul VI refers to the instruction issued on June 14, 1971, by a *subordinate* authority; whereas this instruction, which allegedly amounts to an obrogation, could have had no real effect, even if it were possible (*dato non concesso*), unless it had been promulgated *immediately by an* act of the Authority supposed to be authentic, having the same qualification as the Bull of S. Pius V. Pius V.  
     Thus Paul VI, officially responsible, *commands* the episcopal conferences to *permit* the use of the new *ordo*; this is the Bull *Missale Romanum* of 3 April 1969. Paul VI, acting concretely, allows the episcopal conferences to order the use of the new *ordo*; here is the consistorial discourse of 24 May 1976, "sanctioning" the instruction of 14 June 1971. *Paul VI commands to allow; and, thus, he induces to believe that he allows to command.* This succeeded. Paul VI achieved his goal. The "new *ordo*" has been substituted for the "old" one. But that, by what means! "Most Holy Father, give us back the Mass!" This could be sublime addressed to a father. But to present this "postulation to the one who, before history, will remain Paul the double, it is vain, it is *nothing*. Postulation is harmful, because it is *vain*.   
     This observation comes from the point of view of *praxis*. To present as possible something which is objectively vain is in fact, whatever one wants, to seduce; for it is to make one glimpse what in reality it is impossible to hold. This seduction is all the more harmful because, on the one hand, what is at stake is more important; on the other hand, it involves a greater probability of success.   
     And secondly, observation shows that more than half of the faithful who profess at least verbally to remain attached to the traditional Mass have little more than an affective preference for it which is unrelated to doctrinal reasons. The proof of this is that on occasion, or even habitually, they also attend the so-called "new Mass", without asking themselves any questions.   
     These "good faithful" maintain in the groups the contagion of facility which paralyzes the instinct of Faith, and which pushes to seize any pretext to capitulate in front of the hard fight which fidelity to the traditional Mass often imposes.   
     Now, "postulation" is, among these pretexts, as experience shows, one of the most effective. "The Holy Father has been asked to re-establish the traditional Mass; indeed, documents are ready and will *soon be* published which will make it possible to attend. Let us be patient: there is no need to trouble ourselves, in order to have now what we will have very soon in the comfort of regularity". The "very soon" is not likely to come; for the "postulation" in reality is *vain*; that is to say, it can have no effect. Tomorrow, we will shave for free... Postulation seduces, no matter how much we want it to, in the manner of the false prophets who always announce happiness; it seduces and it is harmful because it is vain, because it leads the nascent desires away from reality, and deconverts them into wishes.   
     Even if asking Paul VI to return the Mass does not ipso facto entail recognizing that he has obrogated it, we consider that this "postulation" is harmful in itself, that it is vain in itself, and that it is harmful because it is vain. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)