

THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST

by

JOHN OF ST. THOMAS

Translated from the Latin by

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With a Foreword by

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FOREWORD

Introducing a translation of that part of the *Summa Theologica* which treats of prayer and contemplation, Father Vincent McNabb once wrote : " Saint Thomas hardly needs an imprimatur after six centuries of full trust. But in the hard matter of mysticism, which he treated as a scholar should, it is reassuring to know that he has the approval, not only of the scholars, but of the mystics."¹

Father McNabb was referring to the fact that Saint John of the Cross based the whole of his *Ascent of Mount Carmel* on the doctrine of Saint Thomas on the essence and operations of the senses of man, on the faculties of the soul, and his treatises on the virtues and the gifts. The " hard matters of mysticism " are the subject matter of this book, where John of Saint Thomas treats them, not as a mystic, but as a scholar of his time should. Both the approval of the mystics and the scholarly attack are pertinent to our time.

For materialism has a mystic of its own ; and it is the fog of materialism that, settling gently, almost imperceptibly, over every area of life, turns the world grey and the heart of man cold. Its mystic calls for an abandonment of the controlled self, an abandonment to the surging drives hidden deep in the nature of man. It is a dark, mysterious mystic. These vague, physical things are so formless as to have little to be known about them ; and they are to be left so uncontrolled there can be little of design to be seen in them. Yet their power to lift a man out of himself and hurl him, crushed, into the depths is a fact of experience. This dim world is mysterious in the sense of evading reason and reason's control. In a sense, this mystic is even an abandonment to higher powers, for in its fetid mystery there is an invitation to a diabolic assumption of the control and direction which man has abandoned.

Christ, inviting men to share the life of God on earth and in heaven, calls men to heights beyond reason, heights to be achieved, not by abandoning reason's sway, but by perfecting and surpassing it. His is a mystic of overwhelming splendour rather than of engulfing night ;

¹ *On Prayer and Contemplation*. Translated by Very Rev. Hugh Pope, O.P., S.T.M., R. & T. Washbourne, Ltd. (London 1914).

by it, the mind of man is not darkened but flooded with divine light to see things, both of man and of God, that are proper to the eyes of God.

The contrast of these two, the mystic of materialism and that of Christ, is clear enough from the effects on men and the goals they invite men to: hulks of men crushed in sub-human depths; saints lifted to divine heights. The fog of materialism, however, has blurred the goals that make rest of labour, and we are all a little tired. Perhaps to eyes persistently afflicted with prospects of labour never begun, the contrast of these two opposed mystics is more vivid from the road each offers to the dragging feet of man.

Materialism asks only that a man let himself go, even that he let himself go to pieces. It thus offers a road which presents no threat of labour until the degradation has advanced so far, the perversion been made so complete, that only a miracle of divine grace offers any hope for escape from despair; then indeed the road is hard, whether it be the road forward to destruction or the road back to sanity and sanctity. Christ's invitation points out a road to be traversed only by a combination of persistent human effort, control, and discipline with an incredible generosity from God. The principally human part of this journey, by the help of grace and the virtues, is a matter of getting the heart ready for greater things and keeping the mind in the neighbourhood of the divine Lover—much as we do in the human order to increase love and serve in its name. The principally divine part of the journey is accomplished through the gifts of the Holy Ghost elevating the will and intellect of man to easy mobility by the Holy Spirit. The first is the human way with divine equipment and help; the second, a divine way through human faculties.

That so few are obviously saints may well be, from the human side, because we shrink from the unrelenting labour of uncompromising good habits and the sweeping demands of thoroughly virtuous living. We can escape some of the deadening of the heart that lies behind aversion to labour by avoiding the alluring contours which the fog of materialism gives to evil; but to fire our hearts to an eager demand for opportunities for this labour, we must also be enraptured of what awaits the willing and chosen labourers even in this life. It is only in this way that bitterness is turned to sweetness, and labour into rest.

John of Saint Thomas has put his hand, in this book, to a more detailed examination of that principally divine part of the journey of man to the heights of the mystic of Christ; and thus focuses the

minds of his readers on the great things God has prepared for those who love Him. He has done it, not as a mystic, but as a scholar. For all his labours, the mystery remains ; for this is a divine thing.

On the side of scholarship, the need for Saint Thomas' genius needs little urging today. Trumpeted in authoritative papal documents, the need has been more and more clearly seen, even by the most un-Thomistic, as it becomes clearer that the point at issue in our times is a defence of human reason and the human things of human nature.

Actually, we haven't gone nearly far enough with Thomas. Even those, to whom the need of him is clear and the appeal of him is deep, have been timid about following Thomas through to the ends he laid out for his own work. It is true that he makes a magnificent defence of human nature. There is no smallest human thing that is not understood, appreciated, and championed in his works. To Thomas, however, this was not the place to stop ; he was not a great humanitarian chiefly concerned with the glory of human nature. He was a theologian dedicated to the perfectibility of human nature by the supernatural gifts showered on it: its divinization by the life of grace, the breath of the Holy Spirit, and the goal of God. All the rest was to him merely preparatory work, a removal of the impediments of ignorance and error concerning the foundation on which man's supernatural life was to be built.

It is on this principal aim of Saint Thomas that John of Saint Thomas concentrates. For all his scholarly efforts, the laborious pursuit of truth by the minds of his readers is not lessened. In company with the other commentators on Saint Thomas, his efforts make for harder reading than those of his master; and naturally enough, for the work of unpacking words as tightly crammed with meaning as Thomas' were is necessarily a cluttering job. Assuredly, being a scholar's work, this book is not milk for babes ; yet that should not daunt an age that has such a fierce pride in the apparatus of scholarship. More so than any other subject of the labours of man's mind, the efforts demanded in the hard matters of mysticism are worth while. Here in this book, even the most unscholarly will get a glimpse, again and again, of the glory of God in the soul of man.

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INTRODUCTION

And though the last lights off the black West went
Oh, morning, at the brown brink eastward, springs—
Because the Holy Ghost over the bent
World broods with warm breast and with ah! bright wings.

—Gerard Manley Hopkins.

“Send forth thy spirit and they shall be created and thou shalt renew the face of the earth.” These words suggest the background of a dead and dreary world, a chaotic mass of unformed matter. No order or meaning reveals itself to the mind. No minute beauties catch the eye, no glorious vistas lead it off to far horizons. But down from the heavens sweeps the Spirit of God, and as He passes order springs out of chaos, beauty out of ugliness. With loving gentleness, the Spirit of Love conquers the inertia of matter and creates a world of mystery and splendour. What a moment before seemed an impossible task is accomplished, because God sends forth His Spirit and renews the face of the earth.

The inertia of matter is superable as wax in comparison with the hardness of a human heart turned from God. The original chaos somehow seems ordered in contrast to the chaos existing in the minds and hearts of men today. It is a fact that we cannot escape. And we must do something about it. At present the burden of our faith and the burden of our charity lie heavily upon us. Constantly we pray *God to send* forth His Spirit and renew the face of the earth.

In the first transition from chaos to order the Spirit worked alone; this is no longer universally true. By preference, He now works through and with others. In fact, He works through the Catholic Church, the mystical body of Christ, of which He is the soul. That is why the Catholic Church is the principal agency in bringing about the kingdom of God on earth. If order is to be restored to the world, it must be brought by the Spirit of God working in the Church and in her members.

The Holy Ghost, the Spirit of Love, is also the all-pervading Spirit of Wisdom. “For wisdom is more active than all active things, and reacheth everywhere by reason of her purity. For she is a vapour of the

power of God and a pure emanation of the glory of almighty God.... For she is the brightness of eternal light, and the unspotted mirror of God's majesty, and the image of his goodness. And being but one, she can do all things; and remaining in herself the same, she reneweth all things, and through nations conveyeth herself into holy souls, she maketh the friends of God and prophets. For God loveth none but him that dwelleth with wisdom. For she is more beautiful than the sun, and above all the order of the stars: being compared with the light she is found before it. For after this cometh night, but no evil can overcome wisdom. She reacheth therefore from end to end mightily and ordereth all things sweetly."¹

It is about time, therefore, that we realized the need for a new outpouring of the Holy Ghost, Who alone can guide us in the extraordinarily complex task of winning the world back to Christ and to His Church. The more we realize the need of the Holy Ghost's aid, the more we should desire it and pray for it. But further we must be sure that we are prepared to receive His assistance when He gives it. A renewed study of the traditional doctrine on the gifts of the Holy Ghost is necessary at the present time; we receive these gifts at our baptism, we hear about them during catechetical instruction, and then forget about them for the rest of our lives.

There must, then, be a deeper appreciation of the part played in the spiritual life by the gifts of the Holy Ghost, and by the Holy Ghost Himself. The classic treatise on this subject is the one by the great Thomistic commentator, John of St. Thomas, which is presented here in translation.

The translation is prefaced by two introductions. The historical introduction needs no explanation. The aim of the theological introduction is to place the treatise on the gifts of the Holy Ghost in line with the general Thomistic teaching on the spiritual life. Moreover, since John of St. Thomas treats very summarily two questions allied to that on the gifts concerning the fruits of the Holy Spirit and the beatitudes, they will receive a more detailed consideration in the introduction.

The outlines added to each chapter are the work of the translators.

¹ *Wisdom*, vii, 24-viii, 1.

A. Historical Introduction

With his soul devoted to God, his life given in the service of the Spanish crown, and his pen dedicated to the whole world,¹ John of St. Thomas bore the burdens of others in fulfilment of the law of Christ. In his measure and in his time, he *filled what was wanting in the suffering of Christ* by his wholehearted devotion to God. His pen supported beleaguered orthodoxy and Thomism in theological controversies whose reverberations have not yet subsided, while his mortal life, given to the service of his adopted nation and its king, was crushed under the burdens of the crumbling Spanish empire.

In mundane affairs John of St. Thomas was a minor actor, standing half in the spotlight, half in the shadows, while the principals were dicing for the destinies of Europe. Under the Providence of God, his very entry on the scene was occasioned by the needs of the Spanish crown. To assure the devolution of that crown to a head worthy of its imperial glory and Catholic heritage, Philip II brought to Spain, as companion of his own weak and incorrigible son Don Carlos, the Archduke Albert of Austria.² In the archduke's company during his journey to the Iberian Peninsula—while "Don Juan of Austria was riding to the sea"—was Albert's secretary, Peter Poinsoot. When Archduke Albert was made a cardinal and viceroy of Portugal, his secretary went with him to Lisbon. There, not later than 1583, Peter Poinsoot met and married Mary Garcez. Of this union of equally noble Austrian and Portuguese families were born two sons, Luis, who is rescued from oblivion by his connection with his brother,³ and John, who was born and "born again" on July the ninth in the parish of St. Mary of the Martyrs in the hectic year which followed the defeat

¹ Didacus Ramirez, friend and earliest biographer of John of St. Thomas, as well as first editor of his work, phrased it thus: "... unus persona, multus officio, Deo Regi, et Orbi deservians, mente Deo, Vita Regi, calamo orbi." Preface to Volume IV of *Cursus Theologicus*, Madrid, 1648, Lyons, 1668, Cologne, 1771, Paris, 1931.

² Cf. James Echard, *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum*, II, p. 538b.

³ Luis Poinsoot received his Bachelor of Arts degree from Coimbra at the same time as John (*Archiv. Conimbricensis Universitatis, Autos e graos*, Vol. 21, fol. 29v). He then entered the school of law. In 1610, already a professed religious in the Order of the Most Holy Trinity, he returned to Coimbra to study theology (*ibid. Provas de Cursos*, Vol. 8, fol. 256). After teaching in various places, he returned to Coimbra in 1637. He attained to the chair of theology named after Durandus in 1648 and that named after Scotus in 1653. He died in 1655 (*ibid. Processos das cadeiras*, Vol. 2, fol. 117 v). Cf. *Cursus Theologicus Joannis a S. Thoma.*, ed. Sollemne, Paris, 1931. Appendix vii, p. Ixix.

of the Armada in 1588.¹ Seven years later, because of the changing fortunes of Spain, Albert and Peter Poinsoot went to the Low Countries, but John remained in Portugal for almost a decade.²

During that space off the stage of the public activities of Albert's household, John was enrolled at the famous Jesuit University at Coimbra. There he studied the arts and philosophy while Shakespeare was writing *Macbeth* and Francis Bacon was advancing the death of philosophy with the *Advancement of Learning*.³ During his single year of theology at Coimbra⁴ he probably heard of the Jesuit-Dominican controversy on grace, begun when he was born and then entering a critical stage for the rectors of Coimbra and their confrères.⁵ Moreover, it is not unlikely that he saw but never heard Francisco Suarez, since, after his unhappy visit to Rome, Coimbra's greatest doctor did not resume his public lectures until October 1606.⁶ By that time John Poinsoot had left Portugal and had once more appeared upon the public scene with his father and the other intimates of Albert, then Governor of the Netherlands.

Continuing his theological studies in Belgium, John Poinsoot retired deep into the scholastic life of the University of Louvain. During his two additional years of theological study John came under the influence of the Dominican master Thomas de Torres. By his life and by his profound theological discourses the Dominican professor instilled in John Poinsoot a reverence for the religious life and an insatiable desire for a thorough knowledge of the doctrine of St. Thomas. For the "pearl of great price" offered him by Thomas de Torres, John Poinsoot was willing to barter the company of his parents, worldly goods, and all hope of civil or ecclesiastical dignities.

Acting upon the suggestion of his Dominican preceptor, John

¹ July 9, 1589 is universally agreed upon as the date of his birth, but his birth-place and parentage are almost as much disputed as those of Homer. Cf. Didacus Ramirez, *op. cit.*; Echard, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 555 ff. Vincentius Baron, *Duo postremi apologiae libri*, Paris, 1666, and *Cursus Theologicus*, ed. Sollemne, appendix xv, p. lxxxvi.

² Cf. W. T. Walsh, *Philip II*, Sliced and Ward, 1937, p. 708; and Archie. *Conimbric. Universit., Provas de Cursos*, Vol. 7, fol. 2.

³ In unanimous agreement the examining board of Jesuit Fathers gave John of St. Thomas his baccalaureate in arts on March 11, 1605. (*Archiv. Conimbric. Universit., Autos e graos*, Vol. 21, fol. 29 v.)

⁴ That year (October 14, 1605 to March, 1606) was spent under Fr. Jeronimo and Fr. Salvador, Trinitarians, at Coimbra. (*Archiv. Conimbric. Universit., Provas de Cursos*, Vol. 7, fol. 113 v.)

⁵ Cf. Alfred Whitacre, O.P., *Dublin Review*, vol. 186, no. 372, p. 71.

⁶ Despite the best efforts of Father Suarez, one of his propositions on confession and absolution was condemned by a decree of the Holy Office, June 20, 1602. Suarez returned to Coimbra in January, 1606. Cf. R. de Scorraile, *François Suarez*, Paris, 1913, ii. pp. 67, 81 ff.; and Benzinger, *Enchiridion Symbolorum*, 1088.

Poinsot went to the convent of Our Lady of Atocha in Madrid. There he made his novitiate and pronounced his profession under the name John of St. Thomas.¹ Although he had already received his *Baccalaureus Biblicus* at Louvain—at the same time as Cornelius Jansenius, later bishop and heresiarch²—he was required to spend three years in theological study within the Dominican convent.³ He then spent several years in Madrid, teaching as *artium lector* and exercising the important office of Master of Students, planting and watering in the minds and hearts of his younger brethren the same Dominican spirituality which was even then germinating the first flower of American sanctity, St. Rose of Lima.

In 1620 John of St. Thomas began his formal theological expositions of the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas. After teaching for a short time in Piacenza and Madrid, he was appointed associate professor of theology at the University of Alcalà.⁴ At this famous university, John of St. Thomas *communicated without envy* the teachings of the Angelic Doctor which he had *received without guile*. Under Dominican tutelage, John of St. Thomas, not unlike his baptismal patron at Patmos, had *received the book from the hand of the angel and devoured it*. His assimilation of Thomism was so thorough that his contemporaries thought of him as a “second Thomas,” and second only to Thomas in his manner of presentation. He lectured to classes larger than any others then assembled in Spain, and he laboured zealously to fashion square and solid the living stones of the “fortress of Catholicism.”

During his decade or more as associate professor as well as when he succeeded his confrère Peter of Tapia in the principal theological chair at Alcalà, John of St. Thomas exercised the office of Qualificator of the Supreme Council of the Spanish Inquisition.⁵ To him was given the task of editing the index of prohibited books and assisting in the

¹ His profession took place on July 18, 1610, according to the Catalogus of José de la Concepcion, Madrid, 1747, fol. 149B. His choice of a religious name indicates his devotion to St. Thomas, but the assumption of a religious name was not rare in Portugal even at that time. Cf. R. P. Mortier, *Histoire des Maîtres Généraux de l'Ordre des Frères Prêcheurs*, t. v, p. 435.

² Cf. *Archives générales du Royaume, Archiv. de l'État de Louv.*, no. 507, fol. 23 and 24r in *Cursus Theologicus*, ed. Sollemne, appendix viii, p. lxxvii.

³ It does not seem possible to hold that he took the full seven-year course then prescribed, despite the statement of Gabriel de Cepeda, O.P.: “... solo se dispensó quando professo, de Stimulus y Logica, concurriendo con los demas estudiantes a oír Filosofia.”

⁴ Cf. R. P. Beltran de Heredia, *Cienda Tomista*, t. xiv (1916), p. 294.

⁵ Cf. Didacus Ramirez, *loc. cit.*; Quétif, *Synopsis vitae Joannis a S. Thoma*, Paris, 1667. Cf. Echard, *loc. cit.*

preparation of difficult cases.¹ With justice and charity he fulfilled his duties in that institution, which kept from the borders of Spain the ravages of religious wars like the Thirty Years' War then raging throughout most of Europe.

His judicatory and scholastic duties, however, did not prevent him from exercising the office of preacher. On solemn occasions, whether in the presence of a bishop, or before an assemblage of dignitaries of his own Order, John of St. Thomas preached the word of God in the church as he had expounded it in the classroom.² Unimpeachable stability in doctrine and clarity in exposition marked his sermons with the same utility for souls which was so characteristic of his counsels in the confessional.

His regency of souls in the confessional extended from King Philip IV to the poorest persons in the Spanish dominions. Affable and accessible to all, John of St. Thomas was calm and benign in difficulties but adamant in maintaining the truth. Although he was confessor to Philip IV for little more than a year,³ he gave the troubled and vacillating monarch a determined course of moral action. Moreover, in many affairs of state it was the impartial and eminently practical judgment of John of St. Thomas which prevailed in factional disputes. Constantly at Philip's side, he was indefatigable in his spiritual labours for the king and the realm. On his advice Philip IV went to Saragossa in 1644 to encourage his troops to victory after so many defeats.⁴ Accompanying the king on this campaign, John of St. Thomas gave Spain and its sovereign sound counsel and heroic example. In the midst of the tumult and rejoicing of Philip's victorious army, this holy Dominican friar, the greatest Thomistic theologian of the modern era, came to the end of his mortal life. He died either from fever or from poison on July 17, 1644.⁵ In accord with

¹ Cf. *Memorial Historico Espanol* of the Fathers of the Society of Jesus, t. xii, pp. 155-156.

² Cf. José de la Concepción, *op. cit.* (*Cursus Theol.*, ed. Sollemne, Appendix iv, n. 8, p. Ivi).

³ Cf. Didacus Ramirez, *op. cit.*, and Quétif, *loc. cit.*

⁴ J. J. Panzirolus, Apostolic Nuncio to Spain, wrote to the Roman Curia: "... Si sono fatte molte consulte se era bene che S. Maesta si muovesse da Saragozza e tutti sono stati per la negativa eccetto quella del P. Fra. Giovanni di S. Thoma. . . ." *Archiv. Vatic. Nunziat. d. Spangna. Reg.* 89, April 3, 1644. Cf. *Cursus Theol.*, ed. Sollemne, appendix xiii, p. lxxxiii.

⁵ T. Souèges affirms, "D'après Ramirez et Quétif, cette mort prématurée tiendrait à des causes criminelles. Jean de Saint-Thomas aurait été empoisonné." *Année- Dominicaine*, Juín, ed. Jevain, Lyon, 1893, note on p. 365. Cf. R. P. Simonin, *Bulletin Thomiste*, Sept. 1930, p. 142. Sufficient evidence has not yet been advanced to prove any criminal cause for his death, but it would be imprudent to deny that a confessor who taught "the naked truth" to Philip IV might have

his own request, his body was taken to the Convent of Our Lady of Atocha in Madrid, where his remains now lie under the Altar of Christ.

Any evil that men may recognize in the life of John of St. Thomas has, let us hope, been washed away by the blood from Christ's wounds. The good which God willed and accomplished in him and through him gives evidence that he was a son of God, led by the spirit of God.

Hunger and thirst for God's justice were characteristic of both the zeal and the patience of John of St. Thomas. Trials and contradictions evoked from the depths of his soul a prayer for "the daily bread" of divine strength, and adversity galvanized his holy enthusiasm to even greater efforts in the service of God. When he received the command to assume the office of royal confessor which his humility dreaded, he conquered his aversion and said simply, "My life is finished, and I am dead. Pray for me."* Since his life was Christ and his death gain, with the strength of the holy ones of God, he welcomed his final hour. His soul was clad in the armour of Christ's sacraments and his powers of mind and heart, fortified by the gifts of the Holy Ghost, were intent upon the omnipotence and the mercy of God.²

The gift of fortitude which conquered human fear in the soul of John of St. Thomas was rooted in a filial fear of God. That gift of the Holy Ghost which inspires the "poor of spirit" moved him to a horror of sin. Calling upon God who "works all in all" to free him from evil, he delighted in the will of God alone and coveted only a holy disdain for earthly goods. His cell was bare and his clothing poor. He never acquired for himself the slightest profit from his labour and his publications, but with childlike simplicity he submitted all to the disposal of his superiors.³ Moreover, before assuming the position of confessor to Philip IV, he stipulated that he and his companion should receive mere sustenance and that the remainder of his annuity should be distributed to the poor. Poverty in exterior goods was complemented with paucity in the comforts he allowed his own body. God pierced his flesh with fear, and fasts and bloody scourging drained the dregs of self-love which remained.⁴ Filial fear of God was the beginning of his wisdom, but it was not its end.

aroused the hostility of the fawning courtiers and unworthy favourites to whom the king had previously delegated the conduct of public affairs.

¹ Cf. Didacus Ramirez, *loc. cit.*

² *Ibid.*

³ Didacus Ramirez, *loc. cit.* "Etsi pecuniis abundans quae ex tot librorum impressionibus repetitis profluebant nec sibi servabat partem . . . plena in magnitudine pauper, et plena in paupertate magnificus. . . ."

⁴ *Ibid.* ". . . quadregesimali medio tempore totam, pane contentus et aqua, studiorum laboribus, assidueque virtutum exercitatione saginatus . . . sanguine

Filial fear was germane to filial piety in the soul of John of St. Thomas. Moved by fear, he protested as a returning prodigal, that he was not worthy to be called a son of God, but in his piety he thanked God for the banquet of His graces. This banquet was but the pledge that he would "possess the land" because he was blessedly meek of heart. His meekness and humility of heart were founded upon a filial affection for God and the sons of God. By an impulse of the Holy Ghost he transcended his religious obligation of gratitude for the blessings he had received, and he "gave thanks to the Holy One and the Most High" because of His great glory. Moreover, God's glory participated in by His sons founded a new debt of justice which John of St. Thomas promptly rendered to all his consorts in divine life. Trusting in a divine victory over temptations against complete submission to the Holy Ghost, he prayed "lead us not into temptation." His piety towards those to whom God had given faith in His Son was put to a severe test in the Jansenist controversy. John of St. Thomas was called upon to judge the doctrines of some of the staff at Louvain, since he was adviser to Philip IV who held civil dominion over the University. Representations were made to him by the Apostolic Delegate of Spain and by several of the professors of Louvain.¹ However, he lacked conclusive evidence that the accused were actually promulgating the sinuous spirituality condemned by Pope Urban VIII. Until he had received ample information from impartial witnesses, he was unwilling to condemn as heretics Catholic theologians hitherto bound to him by their common piety toward their divine Father.

The solid piety of John of St. Thomas was not founded upon sentimentalism but upon the gift of knowledge. Led by the Spirit of God, he became supremely conscious of the depravity of sin. In this blessed mourning for his offences against God's majesty, he was comforted by prayer for the forgiveness of his transgressions, and by hope in the mercy of God. His prayer for forgiveness was implemented by the Sacrament of Penance, which he received each day before

suo sui respersi libri contestantur, disciplinarumque ac ciliciorum copiosa suppellectili perplenum scrinium proclamat." His humility was strikingly like that of St. Thomas: "Solum excaudit quando bis in Priorem Conventus Regalis de Atocha amantissimi Fratres poposcerunt, quos licet fraterali prosequeretur effectum, ardentiori tamen conatu humilitatem colebat, alia etiam extra Ordinem dignitatum (adhuc Episcopalis) munia repudiavit." *Ibid.*

¹ Cf. *Cursus Theol.*, ed. Sollemne, appendix xiii and xiv. There is absolutely no foundation for the statement, "Ce père leur (Jansenistes) rendoit de bons offices auprès du roy . . ." made by P. R. Rapin, S.J., *Mémoires*, Paris, 1865 t. I, p. 16. The Jansenists themselves did not claim him as favourable to their position, hence he could not have given them the slightest indication of approbation.

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celebrating Mass.¹ His hope had its source in a living faith. His simple assent to the authority of God prepared his soul for the gift of understanding. By the enlightenment of the Holy Ghost he was enabled to penetrate truths hidden in Sacred Scripture and in all the realms of the spiritual life. With a pure heart he saw God in all things and he prayed for the coming of His Kingdom.

For John of St. Thomas the coming of God's Kingdom meant the fulfilment of the ardent desire *of* his soul. His charity impelled him towards God, and the gift of wisdom enabled him to taste and see the goodness of God in an experiential and mystical union. Like Thomas, " . . . he gazed with the gentle eye of his intellect at . . . Truth, whereby he acquired supernatural light, and science infused by grace, for he obtained it rather by means of prayer than by human study."² " Science infused by grace," the wisdom which is the *light of life*, ordered his contemplation, his life and his writings. His contemplation revolved uniformly about thoughts of God, never deviating to lesser things nor requiring any reasoning process to elaborate the "savoury science of the saints." Wisdom produced in his soul a con-naturality to divine things, and in this prelude to future glory, he experienced an intimate and loving contact with the mysteries of salvation and the hidden things of God. By the anointing of the Holy Ghost he was taught to " hallow " the name of God and to contemplate " Divine Truth and its universal radiation." By his teaching and his writing he distributed to others the fruits of his contemplation. At his death he protested before the Blessed Sacrament that he had never taught or written anything he did not judge consonant with truth and in conformity with the teaching of the angelic Doctor.³ In virtue of the ordered tranquillity within his own soul, he was able to become a " peacemaker " among men.

The peace of Christ which John of St. Thomas brought to so many souls was evidence of the inner breathing of the Holy Ghost through the gift of counsel. Simple as a dove and wise as a serpent, John of St. Thomas gave advice which was simple in its super-natural origin

¹ Didacus Ramirez, *loc. cit.* " . . . quotidianam Missae celebrationem, quam generalis fere confessio praecedebat."

² St. Catherine of Sienna, *Dialogue*, tr. Thorold. Treatise on Obedience, ch. cxxxix. Cf. Didacus Ramirez, *loc. cit.* " . . . indefatigabili semper studio desudans pro tenenda veritate, pro Angelico Doctore defendensando, cuius verbo, voce, cuius prosecutione ministerii oratione, jejuniis, frequentique disciplina communis vigilabat."

³ Didacus Ramirez, *loc. cit.* " numquani triginta annorum spatio aut scripsisse aut docuisse quod veritati consonum, atque Angelico Doctori conforme non iudicaret. - - -"

and serpentine in its adaptability to the contingencies of human life. In Christ-like simplicity he directed to God, *who works all things according to the counsel of his will*, his humble prayer, *thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven*. With apostolic constancy, he laboured, as a good soldier of Christ Jesus, to bring about a realization of God's will among men. Prelates and the poor, royalty and theologians sought his counsel. To the poor he was a father by his advice and his alms, and for those who had no friends at court, he was a mendicant of mercy importuning the king.¹ Peter of Tapia and John of Palafox, as theologians and as bishops, found in the counsel of John of St. Thomas comfort in their anxieties and a secure guide in many difficulties.² To King Philip IV, during whose reign the etiquette of the Spanish court was more rigorous than its ethics, the advice of his Dominican confessor was salutary in both the Kingdom of Heaven and in the Spanish realm.³

The oral advice which John of St. Thomas was able to give during lifetime was confined to the kingdom of Spain, but the work of his pen was carried throughout the world. His innumerable replies to questions and difficulties proposed by prelates and theologians are for the most part either lost or buried in the dust of diocesan or university archives. Yet three of his works in the vernacular have survived, because of their popularity and wide circulation. To assist missionaries to India in the salvation of souls he wrote an explanation of Christian doctrine in 1640—the same year in which John Milton was contributing to the loss of paradise for so many souls by his second pamphlet on divorce. Seven editions of this compendium of Catholic doctrine and practices were published in Spanish before it was translated into Italian, Latin, Gaelic and Polish.⁴ For King Philip IV he wrote a directory for a general confession,⁵ and just before he died he wrote a brief treatise on the preparation for a happy death.⁷

¹ Didacus Ramirez, *loc. cit.* “Hilarior nunquam, ac nunquam ditior quam quando pauperum libellos Magno suo offerebat Regi, pro ipsis exorans usque ad ipsius taedium exoracionis, Regium dicens Confessarium Patris Pauperum, qui Regale cubile facile nequeunt adire ut suas propalent Supremo Domino petitiones, nomen et vocem habere.”

² Cf. Antonio de Lorea, O.P., *El Siervo de Dios . . . D. Er. Pedro de Tapia*, Madrid, 1576. José de la Concepción, *op. cit.*, tom. 1.

³ Quétif, *op. cit.* “. . . sitque illi ab arcanis Confessionibus intimisque consiliis.”

⁴ The work is called *Explication de la doctrine Christiana y la obligation de los fieles en career y obrar*, Madrid, 1640.

⁵ Echard, *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum*, II, 539a and 761b.

⁶ *Re piv trnfirn trq'la Mniwrtfinfo. mi? nor m/indani dp au IWmpadnd p&p-rihn pl*

⁷ *trachea y Conszderacion para ayuaar a men mont*, ib40. ci. Kchara, *op. cu.* < II, 539a.

The first major Latin work of John of St. Thomas, his *Cursus Philosophicus*, was an exposition of the philosophical disciplines according to the doctrine and the order of St. Thomas.¹ In his bipartite treatment the first section, *Ars Logica*, includes treatises on dialectical disputation and logical form as well as tracts on the predicables, predicaments and logical instruments. The second section, *Philosophia Naturalis*, is concerned with movable being in general and local motion, alteration and augmentation (psychology) in particular. No *ex professo* consideration is given to natural theology or ethics, since according to the custom of the time, these matters belong to commentaries on the first and second parts of the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas.²

Such a commentary on the *Summa Theologica* began to absorb the interest of John of St. Thomas soon after his philosophical work had been completed. The material for his *Cursus Theologicus* was accumulated during his twenty or more years of lecturing in theology. It included, besides three prefatory tracts, all his expository theological disputations arranged according to the order of the questions of the *Summa Theologica*. The work of redacting the manuscript from which he had dictated to his classes occupied a considerable part of the last years of his life,³ but it was never completed. The last disputation to benefit by his final corrections was his famous treatise on the gifts of the Holy Ghost.⁴

Throughout both his *Cursus Philosophicus* and his *Cursus Theologicus* John of St. Thomas had but a single literary objective—clarity. With the truth of his doctrine guaranteed by his faithful adherence to the teaching of St. Thomas, he subordinated all purely literary elements of his work to clarity of presentation. He succeeded in presenting his thoughts clearly,⁵ but at the same time he sacrificed many of the elements of style which would have made his work more readable. The solecisms and barbarisms which give a certain harshness to his writings were not the result of ignorance but a matter of deliberate choice. Under the Jesuit Fathers at Coimbra, who were even then renowned for their teaching of the humanities, John of St. Thomas

¹ Cf. Echard, *op. cit.*, II, 538b.

² Cf. *Cursus Philosophicus*, ed. Reiser, Turin, 1930, p. xii.

³ Cf. *Cursus Theologicus*, ed. Sollemne, Paris, 1931, pp. ix and xviii.

⁴ Cf. Didacus Ramirez, *loc. cit.* The inscription given by John of St. Thomas dates and locates the work. "Ad honorem Domini nostri Jesu Christi crucifixi, Beatissimae Virginis B. Dominici et Thomae, 21 Aprilis 1644, cum essemus Caesar-augustae in expeditione Catalonica."

⁵ R. P. J. M. Ramirez, O.P. "clair et simple quoique souvent diffus. . . ." *Dictionnaire de Théologie catholique*, Paris, 1924, Villa, p. 803.

studied the arts,¹ and in many of his prefaces he gave evidence of a graceful mastery of Latin. In his disputations, however, and especially in those of the *Cursus Theologicus*, he frequently allows the reciprocal affinity of words in Latin construction to be carried away by the torrent of his thought. His deliberate neglect of grammatical propriety and literary grace would be a blameworthy burying of a talent if he did not have a dominating purpose in view.

Desirous of simple clarity, he accommodated himself to the manner of theological teaching then current in Spanish universities. He chose to imitate the austere lucidity of Dominic Soto and Dominic Bancz rather than the more elaborate style which had been fostered by Melchior Cano.² In making this choice he was governed both by the Aristotelcan Thomistic tradition³ and by the preferences of his auditors and readers. For his disciples were for the most part that type of person—common to all ages⁴—which distrusts truth when it is presented with elegance or eloquence. They condoned rhetorical vices, but they condemned the slightest deviation from truth. John of St. Thomas gave them discourses freighted with meaning, yet he often allowed the vehicle of his expression to run upon serious obstacles. The structure of his sentences was at times elliptical, anacoluthic and pleonastic. Barbarisms and grammatical devices of his own invention were not completely eliminated even from the amended texts. However, despite this lack of attention to grammatical details, the literary style of John of St. Thomas remained vigorous and clear.

His use of illustration, comparison, repetition, and amplification—paralleled in English only by De Quincey or Cardinal Newman—gave his metaphysical language force and clarity. Even his apparent prolixity and inveterate habit of digression were natural concomitants

¹ Cf. Quétif, *loc. cit.*

² Cf. Echard, *op. cit.*, II, 176.

³ Aristotle: "The right thing in speaking really is that we should be satisfied not to annoy our hearers, without trying to delight them: we ought in fairness to fight our case with no help beyond the bare facts: nothing, therefore, should matter except the proof of those facts." *Rhetoric*, III, 1 (1404a2), tr. Roberts.

Boethius: "Adsit igitur Rhetoricae suadela dulcedinis quae tum tantum recto calle procedit cum nostra (Ratio) instituta non deserit . . ." *De Consolatione Philosophiae*, II, I, Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, LXIII, column 660.

St. Thomas: "...ex quibusdam coniecturis ad suspicionem inducendam, vel aqualiter persuadendum; quod pertinet ad rhetoricam." *Summa Theologica*, II-II, V, 48, a. 1.

⁴ St. Augustine mentions this type of person: "Sensi autem aliud genus hominum etiam veritatem habere suspectam, et ei nolle acquiescere si compto atque uberi sermone promeretur." *Confessionum Libri tredecim*, Bk. V, c. 6-Migne, *P. L.*, XXXII, 710.

of his efforts to attain his primary objective of precision of intelligibility in the expression of truth.¹

Singleness of doctrinal and literary purpose has suffused the whole body of his teaching with the light of eternal truth and perennial charm. Throughout the three centuries since his death his philosophical and theological disputations have been reprinted many times,² and for all generations they have represented one of the most profound penetrations and lucid expressions of Thomistic thought.

Of his many disputations on Thomism none was more profound in doctrine nor more eloquent of his holiness and apostolic activities than his treatise on the gifts of the Holy Ghost. At the very time he was giving his mortal life to assist Philip IV and the Spanish army at Catalonia, he dedicated to the whole world the final bequest of his theological labour for orthodoxy and Thomism. While *in all his works, he gave thanks to the holy one and the Most High in words of glory*, his treatise on the gifts of the Holy Ghost remains as his spiritual bequest to all who in docility to the Holy Ghost bear the burdens of others in fulfilment of the law of Christ.

B. Theological Introduction

Father, the hour has come! Glorify thy Son, that thy Son may glorify thee, even as thou hast given him power over all flesh, in order that to all thou hast given him, he may give everlasting life. Now this is everlasting life, that they may know thee, the only true God, and him whom thou hast sent, Jesus Christ.³

The revelation of Jesus Christ is the revelation of our eternal destiny, the clear announcement that God wills us to be happy everlastingly with Him in heaven. The life and death of Christ were *ordered* to opening the gates of heaven to all those who believed in Him and followed Him in the way of the Cross to eternal glory.

¹ In the introduction of the first volume of his *Cursus Philosophicus* he states his purpose: “. . . ut ad brevem et consciam methodum pro viribus Logicae et Philosophiae disciplinam iuxta S. Thomae sensum redigeremus. Id circo non solum visum est eius solidam sequi et imitari doctrinam, sed ordinem, brevitatem modestiamque aemulari.” ed. Reiser, Turin, 1930. However, in his preface to the second volume, he seems constrained to quote St. Jerome: “Nemo cogitur legere quod non vult. Ego potentibus scripsi, non fastidiosis, gratis non invidis, studiosis, non oscitantibus.” (II *Apol. ad Rufinum*, c. 33. *M. P. L.*, XXII, 476) ed. Reiser, Turin, 1930.

² The philosophical disputations were reprinted, in whole or in part, sixteen times between 1631 and 1930. The theological disputations were reprinted in Madrid, 1645-1666; Cologne, 1658; Lyons, 1663; Cologne, 1771; Paris, 1883; Paris, 1931.

³ *John*, xvii, 1-3.

A little thought helps us to realize what this promised life in heaven really means, although we shall never exhaust its profundities. "We see now through a mirror in an obscure manner, but then face to face. Now I know in part, but then I shall know even as I have been known."¹ Our Divine Lord has revealed to us the overwhelming truth that God wishes His intellectual creatures to be eternally happy in possessing the same good that makes Him happy. We know that God is infinitely happy; but why is He happy? If (and this is an impossible conjecture) God did not know His own inexhaustible goodness and love that goodness, He would not be happy. For happiness is the conscious possession of a good, infinite happiness the conscious possession of an infinite good. A spiritual good can be possessed only by knowledge and love; so Christ has promised us eternal happiness in the face-to-face knowledge of the divine essence and the love that follows such knowledge. Our knowledge and love of God in eternity will be a participation in the knowledge and love that God has of Himself.

It is only through an understanding of the life of heaven that we can grasp the meaning of the life of grace here on earth. For grace has always been considered in Christian tradition as "the seed of glory." Now the seed can be understood only by the fruit it is ordered to produce. Here we encounter another tremendous truth of Christian revelation; everlasting life begins, not when we die and enter the kingdom of heaven, but at the moment we receive sanctifying grace in our souls. "Grace," says St. Thomas, "is nothing but a beginning of eternal life in us."² And he is simply echoing the words of Our Lord: "He who believes in me has eternal life."³ The life of grace, the interior life of the Christian, is an imperfect participation in the life of heaven, for it, too, is basically a life of knowledge and love of God.

These two truths can be expressed graphically through an analysis of the intimate life of God and the life of grace here and hereafter.

<i>Life of God</i>	<i>Life of Grace</i>	
	<i>On Earth</i>	<i>In Heaven</i>
Divine Nature	Habitual Grace	Habitual Grace
Divine Intellect	Virtue of Faith and the Gifts	Light of Glory and the Gifts
Divine Will	Virtue of Charity	Virtue of Charity

¹ *1 Corinthians*, xiii, 12.

³ *John*, iii, 36.

² *Summa Theol.*, II-II, v. 24, a. 3, ad 2um.

*Life of God**Life of Grace**On Earth**In Heaven*

Divine Understanding	Act of Faith, perfected by the Gifts	Beatific Vision
Divine Willing	Act of Charity (Beatitudes)	Act of Charity, Beatific Love

The divisions given for the life of God are, of course, made for our understanding; in God no such divisions exist. However, we must conceive of the divine nature as the fundamental principle of all the divine operations. The intellect and will are the proximate principles, while the acts of the divine intellect and will are specified by the divine essence. We learn from faith that in knowing and loving Himself God the Father generates the Son and with the Son breathes forth the Holy Ghost. And those eternal acts of knowing and loving account also for creation and all the works that God produces outside the divine essence.

Our participation in the divine life is not a transient, fleeting thing, but permanent according to the intention of God. We must then be permanently proportioned to the object that is to beatify us, the divine essence as it is in itself. This is the reason why we receive so many virtuous habits at Baptism. Habitual grace is the fundamental reality of our supernatural life, for it is a formal participation in the divine nature; it is in us the remote principle of all our supernatural activities. Of itself, it does not operate immediately; for action we need proximate permanent principles, which are principally the virtues of faith and charity.

A glance at the outline will show the close relation between the life of grace on earth and in heaven; habitual grace, charity, and the gifts of the Holy Ghost remain the same. The only change takes place in our knowledge; for faith will pass and vision will take its place. Progress in the spiritual life on earth is measured by the progress of faith and charity, progress in the knowledge and love of God.

We have passed over a host of other virtues that also find place in the supernatural life of man; but all these other virtues are ordered to the perfection of faith and charity, for the substance of the spiritual life rests in them. The virtue of hope is needed to keep us marching toward the goal presented by faith, desired by charity; it allows us to look forward confidently to attaining the goal of life not on our own merits but by the omnipotence of God. The moral virtues, prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance, with all their parts, are required to

establish order in the manifold activities of human living. Man is a complicated being; his perfection can be won only through a multiplicity of operations, which are rectified by virtuous habits. The natural perfection of man lies in the acquired moral virtues. His supernatural destiny makes greater demands on his moral life than a natural destiny would; in order to satisfy these demands he receives from the divine mercy a full complement of infused moral virtues together with the three theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity.

Looked at from the viewpoint of God and of the infused virtues themselves, man's supernatural life is solid and stable; looked at from the viewpoint of weak human nature, the supernatural life is held in a fragile vessel that can be easily destroyed by mortal sin. For the infused virtues alone, despite their great perfection, are proportioned by God to human ways of operating; it is *human* reason enlightened by faith and infused prudence that is the guide for our supernatural activity. As St. Thomas points out: "Human reason is perfected by God in two ways: first, by a natural perfection, according to the natural light of reason; secondly, by a certain supernatural perfection through the theological virtues. Now while this second perfection is greater than the first, the first is more perfectly possessed by man than the second; for of the first man has full possession, of the second, an imperfect possession, as it were, for we know and love God imperfectly."¹

We have seen that the aim of the interior life on earth and of the life of glory in heaven is the possession of God through knowledge and love; certainly there is only One Who knows how to attain such an end, Who knows at each moment what choices will lead to God or from God, Who knows all the pathways to the goal, all the obstacles that can be encountered on the way. Only God Himself (by appropriation, the Holy Ghost, to whom our sanctification is attributed) can be the infallible guide to heaven. The gifts of the Holy Ghost are placed in the soul of the Christian in order to dispose him to receive the immediate direction of the Holy Ghost. Our souls, like training planes, have two sets of controls; one, human reason, illuminated by the virtues of faith and prudence, which is our own set of controls: the other, the gifts of the Holy Ghost, which are for His use alone. The purpose of these two sets is different from that of the controls in the plane. True, the Holy Ghost, like the flight instructor, is ever ready to assist us in an emergency, when our spiritual life is in danger of being

wrecked. Nevertheless, the purpose of the gifts is not simply an emergency control, for the spiritual life can never become an easy thing for us to handle. Progress in the spiritual life implies a taking over of the controls by the Holy Ghost. Human pride does not welcome the idea that we cannot advance very far in the supernatural order under our own control; yet if we desire to live supernaturally we must allow the Holy Ghost to lead the way. If we insist, consciously or unconsciously, on our own initiative, we are doomed to spiritual mediocrity. With sufficient instruction we can learn to fly a plane; no amount of instruction is sufficient for man to learn perfectly the ways of living in God.

We should note the final *sentence in the* above quotation from St. Thomas; and especially the reason he assigns: "for we know and love God imperfectly." That reason is always valid while we are separated from God by the veil of faith. Love is not imperfect in itself; that is why it will remain unchanged in heaven. It is imperfect here below because of the imperfection of faith. Love is always dissatisfied with the limitations of human knowledge, even when enlightened by faith. The essential drama of the interior life is played between love and knowledge, love always seeks more knowledge, not for the sake of knowledge, but because of the object loved. And as knowledge increases love increases and requires more knowledge.

The gifts of the Holy Ghost are especially ordered to overcome the inadequacy of knowledge. Of the seven gifts four are intellectual and perfect the virtue of faith: the gift of understanding gives faith a greater penetration of its own principles, the revealed truths of tradition and Scripture; counsel perfects faith in its practical extension to the multiplicity of human actions directed to the final end; it guides immediately the activity of the three affective gifts of piety, fortitude and fear of the Lord; the gifts of knowledge and wisdom perfect faith in its act of judgment, whether the judgment is concerned with creatures or with God Himself. How successful love is in its search for knowledge with the aid of the gifts of the Holy Ghost cannot be adequately indicated here. The evidence of success can be found in the lives of the great mystical saints; they knew God through the veil of faith, but so thin had become the veil that it was as though they saw God. Such for example was the faith of Moses, according to the testimony of St. Paul: "By faith he [Moses] left Egypt, not fearing the fierceness of the king: for he endured as seeing him that is invisible."¹

¹ Hebrews, xi, 27.

Further clarification of all these points will be found in the text of John of St. Thomas; there is no need to delay further on them. However, something should be added about the fruits of the Holy Ghost and the beatitudes. St. Thomas links these very closely with the gifts; John of St. Thomas refers to them briefly at the end of his treatise, with the remark that the text of St. Thomas needs no commentary. Nevertheless, in order to provide the reader with a complete notion of St. Thomas' treatment, a few pages will be added about his doctrine on these two scriptural points—the fruits and the beatitudes.

St. Thomas' consideration of the beatitudes and fruits of the Holy Ghost is contained in the two questions in the *Summa Theologica* following the one on the gifts. In these two questions he gives us some profound insights into the spiritual life, since for him the fruits and the beatitudes are a consequence of the Holy Ghost's influence in human life. His treatment of them is not psychological, but theological and scriptural; in fact, the two questions are theological commentaries on two passages of Sacred Scripture. The first passage is in the gospel of St. Matthew, the familiar section of the Sermon on the Mount known as the beatitudes. The second passage is in the epistle of St. Paul to the Galatians :¹ “ But the fruit of the Spirit is, charity, joy, peace, patience, benignity, goodness, longanimity, mildness, faith, modesty, continency, chastity.”

On these two texts St. Thomas erects his framework of the spiritual life. For purposes of this introduction a reversal of the order of St. Thomas will be made, for, as he himself says, all the beatitudes are fruits, but not all the fruits are beatitudes.

The metaphor of the Pauline phrase “ fruit of the Spirit ” is readily understandable. Our Lord said: “ For by the fruit the tree is known.”² The tree of human life is also known by its fruit : human action, good or evil. Now not everything that a tree produces is called fruit ; only what has a certain perfection and contains a certain sweetness in itself should be called a fruit. In fact, there is only one fruit of the tree of human living—eternal beatitude, which is the ultimate perfection of man and contains in itself all sweetness. In this sense, heaven is the only fruit of the Spirit. This fruit is not produced by human action but is reached by it as a reward of merit. On the other hand, the fruit of the Spirit spoken of by St. Paul is the product of human action under the influence of the Spirit. For just as a portrait is referred to as the

¹ v, 22-23. ² *Matthew*, xii, 33.

fruit of artistic action, a science as the fruit of rational action, so a virtuous life is as the fruit of the Spirit.

The fruit, or more commonly speaking, the fruits of the Holy Ghost are actions that flow from, the supernatural virtues planted in the soul by the Holy Ghost; they do not possess the fullness or maturity of the beatitudes, for they do not come from the special inspirations of the gifts, but from the ordinary motions of divine grace. Not every good action is a fruit, for many such actions, especially in the early stages of the spiritual life, are produced with difficulty and at great cost. When the soul delights in virtuous actions it is enjoying the fruits of its earlier sacrifices—it has its first assurance that it is sharing in the fruitful life of God.

The enumeration of the fruits by St. Paul might seem a haphazard arrangement; St. Thomas finds a definite order in it, for it manifests the aims of the Holy Ghost's activities in the soul. The Holy Ghost, through grace, orders human action—in relation to man himself, in relation to his neighbours, and, lastly, in relation to those things that are below him.

A man is rightly disposed within his own person when he has the right attitude towards good and evil. The fundamental disposition toward the good is love or *charity*, which is the first fruit of the Holy Ghost, the Spirit of love. From union with the good springs *joy*; he who has charity has the supreme good, God, and has joy in that possession. *Peace* is the perfection of charity and joy; it requires two additional elements besides simple charity and joy. No one can completely rejoice in the possession of a good unless he is in undisturbed possession of it and thoroughly satisfied by it alone. When the soul has overcome its attachment to created goods and finds satisfaction in God alone, it is rightly disposed toward the supreme good and is at peace. Yet, under the threat of evil, the well-ordered mind is *patient* and it is *longsuffering* of the evil implied in the deferment of a desired good.

The relations of a man to his neighbour are right when, first of all, he both wills good and does good to the neighbour; these are signified by the *goodness* and *benignity* of St. Paul's enumeration. Secondly, a man has the right attitude toward evil, when with *meekness* he bears any evil that his neighbour may do him; and, lastly, when in *faith*, or fidelity, he refrains from injuring his neighbour by fraud or guile.

The things that are inferior to man are his exterior actions and his

interior passions. These are rectified by the motion of the Holy Ghost and bear fruit in *modesty*, *continency* and *chastity*.

St. Thomas admits that more or fewer fruits might be enumerated ; he adds, however, that to these twelve all others can be reduced and that they do present a comprehensive view of the spiritual life. Nevertheless, St. Thomas seems to be more satisfied with the beatitudes as a frame for his spiritual doctrine, for his commentary on them is fuller and richer. The beatitudes are fruits of virtue brought to a riper maturity under the rays of the gifts.

In order for the reader to follow St. Thomas' exposition intelligently, several preliminary remarks must be made. First, just as ultimately there is only one fruit, so there is only one ultimate beatitude, the vision of God, wherein all the beatitudes mentioned by Our Lord find their perfection. Yet he who has the firm hope of attaining happiness is already happy to a certain degree. So the man who, by the perfection of his virtuous actions, has a solid basis for hope of eternal life is already blessed. The beatitudes, then, are actions that imitate the beatifying actions of heaven, the knowing and loving God. They are, of course, conditioned by the fact that life on earth has not the perfection of the life in heaven, that many obstacles to a full participation in happiness are found for sojourners in this world.

The second remark concerns the significance St. Thomas finds in the form of the beatitudes as they were delivered by Our Lord. Each contains two parts : the first part, except in the sixth and seventh, mentions a meritorious action: the second part promises a fitting reward. In his exposition of each beatitude St. Thomas explains the meritorious action, points out the virtue and gift that elicit it, mentions, in some cases, the obstacles that the action must overcome, and manifests the fittingness of the reward promised by Our Saviour.

Lastly, as a foundation for his explanation of the beatitudes, St. Thomas presents a résumé of his doctrine on happiness. According to the opinion of men, he says, happiness is to be found in a life of pleasure, a life of action, or a life of contemplation. In the light of divine revelation, the Christian knows that the life of pleasure is contrary to true happiness ; the life of action should be a preparation for true happiness, which really lies in the contemplation of God, perfectly in the next life, imperfectly and participatively in this life. The eight beatitudes are ordered in such a way as to remove the

obstacles of a life of pleasure, foster the active life as a preparation for contemplation, and develop those virtues that bring about immediately the contemplative life.

I. *The Life of Pleasure*

The life of pleasure consists in two things—an affluence of external goods, especially wealth, honour, power, and an indulgence of the passions both of the irascible and of the concupiscible appetites.

The objects that cater to man's pleasure are not evil in themselves; rather they are so good for the senses that they are easily chosen in preference to greater goods. There can be no true happiness unless the urge for temporal pleasures is moderated by the virtues; great happiness can be had only by those who, under the inspiration of the gifts, despise the allurements of these pleasures.

It follows, then, that the desires for wealth, power and honour must be moderated, especially by the virtue of humility, which strikes at the root of these desires, our own self-esteem; by the inspiration of the gift of the fear of the Lord one is led to despise these goods for the excellence and abundance of goodness one finds in God. *Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.*

Wealth, power, honour are fragile goods of which one is easily despoiled; yet many men place their security in them. To feel secure, they must cling to these goods, fight to retain them. All the force of the irascible appetite is aroused for the protection of these frail treasures. The virtue of fortitude moderates the impulses of the irascible passions; the gift of fortitude leaves man utterly tranquil under the providence of God and indifferent to the presence or absence of the external goods of fortune. *Blessed are the meek, for they shall possess the land;* according to the Angelic Doctor, it is not a question of the land of this world, but of the heavenly kingdom, a secure possession of God, here and hereafter.

The pleasures of sense, which are the object of the concupiscible passions, are sought by men as consolations for the trials of life. Temperance is the virtue that moderates the use of sensual pleasures; the gifts of knowledge and fear inspire the soul to a total sacrifice of such pleasures, when necessary for the good of one's own soul or of one's neighbour, and the voluntary acceptance of pain and sorrow with the crucified Christ. *Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted,* with the consolation of God's blessings.

In these three beatitudes the affective gifts are predominant; however, while St. Thomas assigns the intellectual gift of knowledge to the beatitude of the mournful, he says that the inspirations of knowledge and counsel are directive of the gifts of fear and fortitude in bringing the soul to this first degree of happiness.

II. *The Life of Action*

The fourth and fifth beatitudes are concerned with the active life, which, in this context, involves the relations of one man with another. Such relations are regulated either by justice or by gratuitousness. The obstacles to man's dealing justly or gratuitously with his neighbour are his inordinate desire to possess temporal goods and his unwillingness to associate with the needy or the miserable lest such association diminish his own poor store of happiness.

Whatever is due to another is regulated by the virtue of justice; under the inspiration of the gift of piety, man conceives an insatiable desire to fulfil all the works of justice. *Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice, for they shall have their fill.* He who even deprives himself in order to satisfy the demands of justice need have no fear, for God will reward him fully, "a full measure, pressed down and flowing over."

The virtue of liberality inclines a man to give his friends more than justice demands. The gifts of piety and counsel push him to seek out and alleviate all necessity and all misery wherever he can discover it. *Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy.* He who has compassion for the misery of others will soon discover that God has generously relieved him of all misery.

III. *The Life of Contemplation*

Since the contemplative life is not a merit, but a reward, St. Thomas' explanation of the sixth and seventh beatitudes is slightly different from the preceding. He maintains that in place of meritorious actions Our Lord mentions effects of the active life that immediately dispose to contemplation; and here he understands "active life" as embracing all the preceding beatitudes or the whole moral perfection of man. For the first three beatitudes perfect man in himself, subdue his rebellious passions and leave him purified and clean of heart. *Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God.* An analogy exists

between the clear eye that has perfect vision and the clean mind that, alone is capable *of seeing God*, whether with the darkened sight of faith or the bright vision of heaven. The virtue of *faith* and the gift of understanding give the final touches to the purification of the human mind that was begun by the previous activity of the moral virtues and the gifts.

The fourth and fifth beatitudes set a man right in his relations to his fellow man; the unity begun by these beatitudes is perfected by the virtue of charity and the gift of wisdom. *Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God.* A child imitates his father to the best of his ability and our Father is a "God of unity and peace."

St. Thomas has established a correspondence between the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost and the first seven beatitudes. But there are eight beatitudes. The eighth, says the Angelic Doctor, is a confirmation and manifestation of all the others. *Blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice's sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.* At first, this might seem like a poor explanation; yet there is a sign of its appropriateness in the fact that the greatest mystic saints and the greatest apostolic souls, the outstanding representatives of the contemplative and active lives, have eagerly desired martyrdom and have always suffered persecution.

In the answer to the last objection in the last article on the beatitudes, St. Thomas casts a quick glance over all of the beatitudes and manifests the progressive unification of the rewards promised by our Lord.

The rewards are also arranged in ascending order. For it is more to possess the land of the heavenly kingdom than simply to have it: since we have many things without possessing them firmly and peacefully. Again, it is more to be comforted in the kingdom than to have and possess it, for there are many things the possession of which is accompanied by *sorrow*. Again, it is more to have one's fill than simply to be comforted, because fullness implies abundance of comfort. And mercy surpasses satiety, for thereby man receives more than he merited or was able to desire. And yet more is it to see God, even as he is a greater man who not only dines at court, but also sees the king's countenance. Lastly, the highest place in the royal palace belongs to the king's son.¹

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¹ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, v. 69, a. 4, ad Sum.

Chapter I

THE TREATMENT OF THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST IN SACRED SCRIPTURE

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Chapter I

THE TREATMENT OF THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST IN SACRED SCRIPTURE

1. The gifts of the Holy Ghost are not within the ken of natural philosophers and pagans. Divine Revelation alone can give evidence of them, and Sacred Scripture, enumerating seven, treats of them under the titles of *gifts* and *spirits*. Some explanation, then, of the Scriptural teaching concerning these special gifts is prerequisite to a clear scholastic treatment.

2. All the divinely inspired words of Scripture both enlighten and incline toward the formation of a spiritual man, perfect in the way of God, since, as the Apostle wrote to Timothy, *All Scripture is inspired by God and useful for teaching, for reproof, for correcting, for instructing in justice, that the man of God may be perfect, equipped for every good work.*¹ With even greater reason, then, this spiritual state, a subtle motion and anointing of the Spirit, in which He raises the heart on high by intimately pouring forth His own self—*The Spirit Himself raises and assumes man as the hand of God strengthening*²—should be distinctly understood from the very synthesis of texts and doctrinal teaching of the Bible. In its serenity and light *as the light of the morning, when the sun rises, without clouds,*³ and by its rays, advancement is made in the splendour of charity. The mind is stimulated to drive out the allurements of the flesh and to cast off the works of darkness. This advancement is given by the illumination of the Holy Ghost, as by a master's instructions, according to the Prophet Isaias, *he awakens in the morning, in the morning he awakens my ear, that I may hear him as a master,*⁴ and according to St. John, *His anointing teaches you concerning all things, and it is true and is no lie.* . . .⁵

¹ *II Timothy*, iii, 16, 17. (In the New Testament text exclusive use of either the Challoner-Rheims or the Confraternity edition has not been found advisable. Trans.)

² *Ezechiel*, iii, 14.

³ *II Kings*, xxiii, 4.

⁴ *Isaias*, i, 4.

⁵ *I John*, ii, 27.

3. Only one who experiences and tastes that the Lord is sweet can know the secrets of His whispering and the exaltation of His sublime breathing upon the heart, since no one knows the hidden manna and the new name written on a white pebble except him who receives it.¹ This white pebble is the live coal which, as Isaias recorded,² one of the Seraphim had taken from the altar with tongs and held in his hand as he flew. By its enkindling and inflaming the soul, the lips of the prophet are purged—the beginning of the spiritual life, the purgative way. Moreover, even when the prophet has progressed to the illuminative way, merely by the common manner and pattern of virtues, he is still prevented from writing the new name. For the new name is in reality a new regulative principle and obligation—"name" often designates an obligation or office. The regulation and direction of the prophet's mind in a merely human manner according to ordinary prudence is not sufficient for him to receive the new name. He receives it only when he is directed by the finger of God and the excellence of divine motion. The exact discernment of these things by experience is communicated to only a few, who have a certain connaturality to divine things. For others, any inquiry into these truths must be carried on with great difficulty, by labour and the contentious struggle of controversy.

4. As Cajetan has acutely observed, it was for this reason that Christ our Lord described the action of the Spirit and the spiritual man in these words, *The Spirit breathes where he will; and you hear his voice, but you do not know whence he comes and whither he goes; so is every one that is born of the Spirit.*³ The relationship of the Spirit and of the spiritual man, who is formed through the gifts of the Holy Ghost, can be explained in no better way than by this comparison indicated by our Lord, Who is truth itself. In His words three elements in a spiritual man are described. The first pertains to the interior dispositions. It is found in the phrase, *The Spirit breathes where He will.* The second refers to the exterior communication, *and you hear his voice.* The third is related to the hidden motion of God, that impulse which cannot be grasped with complete certainty. It is expressed in the words: *And you do not know whence he comes and whither he goes.*

¹ *Apocalypse*, ii, 17.

² *Isaias*, vi, 6.

³ *John*, iii, 8. Cf. Cajetan, *Commentaria in Joannem*.

5. The first condition for discerning spiritual men is explained as an interior disposition through the gifts of the Holy Ghost. They make a man feel exceedingly free, voluntary and unimpeded in his operations. They remove confusion, impediments and restrictions, since where the *Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty*.¹ For each man is constrained by the bonds of sin. He stumbles upon the shackles of his own soul. The first thing that the Spirit does upon entering a heart is to break the bonds of sin, with which man is tied, and to crush the iron covering of his hardened heart. A man then feels as though he were relieved of a great weight and ready for action. Indeed, like a dove, he takes wing and flies, and rests in solitude. Truly there is no rest for the heart which has not flown to God. The Seraphim, for example, stand still and fly at the same time.

Now, lest anyone should err by thinking that those born of the Spirit are agitated by a frantic impulse, like those possessed by an evil spirit, the Lord requires as the very first step in the way of the Spirit that birth from the Spirit contribute to man's freedom of choice rather than take it away. For there would be a great loss in merit if the Spirit determined the will and worked in it by violence rather than by breathing and actuating its inclination. For this reason the Apostle wrote that *the spirits of the prophets are under the control of the prophets*.² This is interpreted by St. Thomas to mean that as far as the use of the power of announcing prophecies is concerned the spirits are subject to the will of the prophet and are not like delirious ravings.

The gifts of the Holy Ghost, therefore, are given to the soul after the manner of habits, so that in a rational and voluntary way the soul may be moved to those works to which it is directed by the Spirit. Thus, those who are conducted by the Spirit are moved not as slaves but as free men, willingly and voluntarily, since the principles which move them, though derived from the Spirit, are inherent in their very souls. They are impelled to operations which by their character and measure exceed all ordinary human standards. Hence, the interior disposition of a spiritual man is such that he is free and voluntary in the way of the Spirit. Those who do not feel themselves unimpeded in the things of the Spirit, and in the abnegation of comforts and delights, but easily fall back into them, give evidence of not being motivated nor strongly inspired by the Holy Ghost according to His gifts.

1 Cf. *11 Corinthians*, iii, 17. 2 *1 Corinthians*, xiv, 32.

6. The second condition required for the spiritual state is noted in the words: *And you hear His voice*. By them, as Cajetan remarks, our Lord indicates that whoever is born of the Spirit or moved by the Spirit, speaks by the Spirit, for *from the abundance of the heart the mouth speaks*. In anyone who is born of the Spirit, all sensible and exterior actions, and especially his conversations, are from the Spirit. They are fragrant with the Spirit, for scarcely anything other than God or the ordination of things to God is mentioned. From this it is manifest that exterior deportment—the control of the external senses, especially speech—is frequently indicative of a spiritual man. *If any one does not offend in word, he is a perfect man, able also to lead round by a bridle the whole body*.¹ Mortification of the tongue, moderation in speech, especially if this be confined to divine things and matters pertaining to the Spirit, is a great sign of the interior direction of the Spirit. Moreover, anyone who turns freely to pleasantries and vanities, either to hear or speak them, is still imperfect in the Spirit.

7. The third constituent is indicated in the words: *and you do not know whence he comes nor whither he goes*. This describes the profundity of the interior motion and direction of the Spirit. For the soul does not know the origin of the motion, its procedure, nor its end. The Spirit, on the other hand, knows thoroughly the inmost thoughts and secrets of the soul. *For the Spirit searches all things, even the deep things of God*.² Thus, as Cajetan remarks, although the exterior expressions and works of a spiritual man may be observed, the sources from which they spring and the divine end to which they tend cannot be known. No disturbance, therefore, should arise from the fact that it is not known whose spirit is present in these works, especially in difficult and extraordinary works. For even if the Spirit should frequently move the soul interiorly and arouse and urge it, whence this motion comes and whither it is going, its beginning and end, cannot be known on every occasion. The Spirit of God lies hidden. Many who wish to proceed in all things with excessive caution and certitude are often deterred from these motions of the Holy Ghost by their own narrowness of heart. They are not fit to be moved to great or difficult things unless their hearts are free and they have confidence in the interior assistance of God.

8. To timid souls who are crushed by pusillanimity of spirit and misfortune, and who fear and doubt, the prophet Isaiah cried out,

¹ James, iii, 2.

² I Corinthians, ii, 10.

*Why sayest thou, O Jacob, and speakest, O Israel: My way is hid from the Lord, and my judgment is passed over from my God?*¹ Troubled in heart by the uncertainty of their way of life, they thought their way was hidden from God, because they do not know whence it comes or whither it leads. Yet even then they were being moved by God to find freedom in His magnitude and not to cringe in their own pusillanimity: *Knowest thou not, or hast thou not heard? The Lord is the everlasting God, who hath created the ends of the earth: he shall not faint, nor labour, neither is there any searching out of his wisdom. It is he that gives strength to the weary, and increases force and might to those who are not. Youths shall faint and labour, and young men shall fall by infirmity* (being less fit. For they are youths in their heart and are weak in sustaining the way of the Spirit). *But those who hope in the Lord* (for in Him the heart is freed by confidence) *shall renew their strength, they shall take icings as eagles* (not as men, functioning in a merely human way, but as eagles, elevated by the gifts of the Holy Ghost) *they shall run and not be weary, they shall walk and not faints* Not without reason, then, the wings of an eagle are promised, even though it is not mentioned that men will fly, but they will run and walk as men still living upon this earth. For although these men are impelled and moved by the wings of an eagle, which comes down from above, yet the gifts of the Holy Spirit are put into practice upon this earth, and they have their place in ordinary actions. Moreover those who are moved and regulated by a communication of superior spirits and gifts are led by the wings of an eagle and they differ in many ways from those who merely practise ordinary virtues. The latter are regulated by their own zeal and industry. With toil, they walk upon their own feet unaided. But those who are moved by the wings of an eagle are swept along in the breath of a strong wind. Without labour, they run in the way of God.

*Why the gifts are called spirits and
gifts in Sacred Scripture*

9. In the Scripture these gifts are called both by the name *spirit* and by the name *gift*. An example of the use of the name *spirit* is found in *Isaías*: *And the spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him, the spirit of wisdom, and of understanding, the spirit of counsel, and of fortitude, the spirit of knowledge and of godliness. And he shall be filled with the spirit of the fear of the Lord.*³ The name *gift* is used in the sixty-seventh

¹ *Isaías*, xl, 27.

² *Isaías*, xl, 28-31.

³ *Isaías*, xi, 2, 3.

Psalm: *Thou hast ascended on high, thou hast led captivity captive; thou hast received gifts in men.*¹ St. Paul, when he was writing to the Ephesians, referred this passage to grace as given according to the measure of Christ's bestowal: *Ascending on high, he led captivity captive; he gave gifts to men.*² For although this passage may be interpreted as applying to all supernatural gifts, whether virtues or other habits, or actual helps, through antonomasia it is applied especially to the gifts of the Holy Ghost, which Christ showered so fully upon His Church after His ascension. Note the words: *thou hast received gifts in men.* These describe most accurately the gifts of the Holy Ghost. God so gives and distributes His gifts to men that through them men are made subject to Him and rendered easily movable by His Spirit. Ordinarily men receive gifts from God; by these special gifts, God gains men for Himself. By them men are led captive and made subject to Him. Receiving back His gifts, God accomplishes His works with profit and usury. Hence the gifts of the Holy Ghost, divine favours in which men are gained by God, are more receptive of divine impulse than self-moving.

10. The name of spirit and the name of gift are especially suitable to these most perfect gifts. First of all, these two names are most becoming to the Holy Ghost. He Himself is a spirit, for He proceeds as the breath of love and as an intense impulse. He is also a gift, since a will or love is communicative of itself. For a lover's first gift is his own heart, and when this gift is received and deeply appreciated by his beloved, it joins the two by an intense inner bond. David expressed this, *If you are come peaceably to me to help me, let my heart be joined to you.*³ Those pledges or gifts, therefore, by which the Spirit in a special way joins His heart to human hearts by uniting them to Him and making them movable by Him, are called spirits, since they proceed from the intensity of His dynamic love. They are called gifts, because through them He gives Himself to men and dwells in them.

11. As St. Thomas notes in his commentary on the eleventh chapter of Isaiah, these gifts are given for the perfecting of the virtues. This consideration casts more light on how these gifts proceed in a special way from love, and from the spirit of the heart of God. It likewise makes clear how they become perfect and enkindle the fire of

¹ Psalm Ixvii, 19.

² Ephesians, iv, 8.

³ I Paralipomenon, xii, 17.

love. The Holy Doctor discerns a twofold defect in virtue, one on the part of the one having the virtue, the other, on the part of the virtue itself. As regards the one having the virtue, the defect is not essential. It arises from his indisposition and imperfect participation in the habit. This defect is removed through an intensification or growth of the virtue. In the virtue itself, however, the defect is intrinsic, since such a habit has an imperfection annexed to it. Faith, for example, is of its very nature imperfect, inscrutable and obscure. The eyes remain enshrouded in darkness; according to Solomon, *The Lord promised that he would dwell in a cloud* that is in faith, St. Paul prayed that *Christ may dwell by faith in your hearts*.² This defect is removed by a further perfection, which is called a gift, because it exceeds the ordinary manner of human operation. In this case it is the gift of understanding. This gift enables the intellect to penetrate more clearly the suitability and credibility of the things of faith. It enables the intellect to discern the things of faith both from error and from things of sense.

12. These gifts adorn and gild the virtues, making them more resplendent. This adornment comes about by extending the virtues to things which through themselves they could not attain. Solitary and naked faith, for example, leaves the soul in obscurity. Because of this obscurity, men grow tired when they proceed by faith alone in the ordinary way of meditation, and they do not persevere for long. Those contemplatives who desire to penetrate the mysteries of faith need to use the gift of understanding. Those, however, who are not proficient in understanding, but, nevertheless, lay claim to reasoning and contemplation by naked faith, know little about contemplation. They wander or sleep in their meditations and are extremely tired, since faith alone is not contemplation but only assent. To such souls the things of heaven seem to be shut rather than open—*the eye of Jacob in a land of corn and vine, and the heavens shall be misty with dew*.³ While the eye is in the land of the Church militant, which is properly the land of corn and wine, that is the sacramental corn and nascent wine, the heavens shall be misty with dew, since they are hidden by the shroud of faith. Hence, while the heights are sprinkled with dew which blinds the soul, there can be no perfect contemplation in faith alone.

¹ *Paralipomenon*, vi, 1.
² *Ephesians*, iii, 17.

Deuteronomy, xxxiii, 28.

13. The heavens must at times be opened, therefore, so that the soul will not fail in its contemplation. The Holy Ghost accomplishes this through the gifts of understanding, of Avisdom, and of knowledge. There was a sign of this at the baptism of Christ: *and immediately he came up from the water. And behold the heavens were opened and he saw the Spirit of God descending as a dove and coming upon him.*¹ Purified by baptism, the soul receives the faith. Moreover, it receives as a gift from the Spirit a kind of understanding of heavenly things—an opening of the heavens no longer clouded with dew. The more the soul increases in understanding, the wider is the aperture in the heavens for the soul to behold the glory of God. The most marked evidence, then, of the opening of the heavens and of the gift of the Holy Ghost is joy and a partial understanding of the glory of God. For this reason it is said of St. Stephen, *he being full of the Holy Ghost looked up io heaven and saw the glory of God . . . and said, Behold I see the heavens open*² Notice what strides the soul takes in the abundance and plenitude of the Spirit. For when it is filled with these gifts, the heavens are torn asunder and the soul sees the glory of God. It no longer dwells in the obscurity of faith but it now explores and contemplates the magnitude of God. Of this St. Bernard wrote: “The information that the Spouse is fast approaching will be for me a salutary exhortation and preparation for the worthy reception of the supernatural visitation. *For justice walks before him*³ wrote the prophet, and he added, *Justice and judgment are the preparation of thy throne.*”⁴ The saint then adds: “If you now feel that burning eloquence and it sears your conscience into a recollection of sin, remember what the Scripture says: *Fire shall come before him*,⁵ and you cannot doubt that he is close. Furthermore, if you not only feel compunction, but totally turn to God as well, vowing and determining to guard the judgments of His justice, then you *will* know that He is already present, especially if you feel enkindled by His love.”⁷

14. It is necessary, therefore, for the soul to cast off the shroud of unadorned faith and to leap up to run with God. Through the

¹ *Matthew*, iii, 16.

² *Acts*, vii, 55.

³ *Psalm* lxxxiv, 14.

⁴ *Psalm* lxxxviii, 15.

⁵ St. Bernard, Sermon 57 on the Canticle of Canticles; Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, CLXXXIII, 1052c.

⁶ *Psalm* xcvi, 3.

⁷ St. Bernard, *loc. cit.*, *MPL*, CLXXXIII, 1053.

illumination of the gifts of the Holy Ghost, the soul enjoys a multitude of spiritual feeling and a variegated understanding of divine things. For the mind is clad in robes of many colours when garbed with the glittering clothing of the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Faith, however, cannot, in this life, be illuminated or attain to the vision of its object. It is founded upon the testimony of authority, and it cannot extend beyond that testimony, the specific object of faith, to vision.

Held captive by the bonds of faith, the soul remains in darkness. The flame of love, however, can benefit the soul in this regard, for love makes things clear. From love proceed the gifts of understanding, of wisdom, and of knowledge. They break through the mist of faith, thereby opening the heavens. These gifts, therefore, are attributed in a special way to love or to the Spirit (Who is Love). Hence St. Ambrose in his commentary on the words, *The fruit of the spirit is peace*¹ remarks "They are called fruits because they refresh minds with genuine delight."² and in the Book on Paradise, cited by St. Thomas, he observes: "The works of virtue are called fruits because those who possess them are refreshed with a holy and genuine delight."³ Inflamed by love, the intellect rises from the obscure knowledge of faith to the luminous and clear contemplation of the magnitude and certitude of the mysteries, and *the brightness of a flaming fire in the night*.⁴ This night is the veil of creatures enshrouding and hiding the majesty of His eternity, for *over all the glory shall be a protection*.⁵ Among the nocturnal shadows of this life the mind becomes aware of that lamp burning in the darkness. The intellect is perfected by a loving heart since its objects are seen better under the light of love. St. Bernard describes this beautifully.⁶ "Fire," he says, "goes forth before Him, and yet He Himself is the fire." With this difference, however, the fire which precedes brings pain but does not torment, nor does it vex. It moves, but it does not accomplish the work. It is sent in advance only to arouse, to prepare and to recall to mind what the soul is by itself so that it may appreciate what it will be by the grace of God. The fire which is God Himself consumes, but does not cause suffering. It burns pleasantly and cauterizes with joy, for it is a very devastating

¹ *Galatians*, v, 12.

² St. Ambrose in *Galatians*, v, 22, *MPL*, XVII, 368. Cf. Cornelius a Lapide in *hoc. loco*, ed. Vives, XLVII, 568.

³ *Ibid.* De Paradiso, cap. 13. *MPL*, XIV, 306, 307. Cf. I-II, v, 70, a. 1, ad 2.

⁴ *Isaias*, iv, 5.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Loc. cit.*, *MPL*, CLXXXIII, 1053.

ember which attacks vices, so that the soul may procure the recompense of God's anointing. In this way love brings more luminous knowledge to the intellect by bringing God more frequently before the eyes of the mind. Hence, souls understand that the Lord is present in the power by which they are transformed, and in the love by which they are inflamed. Any soul desirous of perfection should strive to have God present to itself, not only by the dark assent of faith, but by the illumination of the gifts of the Holy Ghost as well.

15. Furthermore, these gifts are called habits or celestial gifts of the Spirit, because they are regulated by divine inspiration. Now, inspiration indicates a motion which comes from the outside. The help of the First Cause, of course, is needed by man and every creature for any motion, and in this sense the motions of all creatures need a help which comes from the outside. Nevertheless, a special help is needed in men when the inherent principles and virtues are not sufficient for the accomplishments of that higher sphere of activity which is made possible by the elevation of the gifts. Moreover, on this plane men need to be perfected by an exterior principle and power both moving and adding a spirit, a new and higher force, a more sublime rule of action. For the Spirit is intimately related to power and strength. Hence, when a man is disposed to operate by more than human principles, which he can regulate and measure by principles proportioned to his human nature, it is necessary that he receive the Spirit, a higher power, moving him by a superior impulse and elevation. This accords with David's statement: *I opened my mouth and panted because I longed for thy commandments*—1 The mouth of the soul pants. The very inner spirit of the intellect and will which recreates the heart and gives it its vital force, gasps with an open mouth. It sighs for the fountain of supernal life. Lydia, the seller of purple, is described as she *whose heart the Lord opened to give heed to what was being said by Paul*? This opening of the mouth of the heart is prerequisite to the reception of these gifts of the Holy Ghost. For a closed mouth would not permit the Spirit to enter, while the mouth which is open does not resist the Spirit. These spirits, vital and divine, are given by God, so that the human heart will be compliant with the movements of the Holy Ghost in that higher sphere of action to which it is directed and elevated by God. They are called gifts of the Spirit, therefore, since they come from the outside through the inspiration of God, moving the soul to

1Psalm cxviii, 131.

*Acts, xvi, 14.

that higher manner of acting in which the ordinary virtues of mere human nature are insufficient. By such an inspiration and an opening of the heart, the Holy Ghost renders men readily movable for higher accomplishments. As Isaias remarks, *The Lord has opened my ear, and I do not resist: I have not gone back.*¹

16. For a man to be moved, therefore, to that higher manner of acting, which is according to the measure of the Holy Ghost and not merely according to a measure attainable through human reason, these higher gifts are required. They adorn and elevate even the virtues. They govern a man and measure his actions upon a higher plane. Job testifies that *His spirit adorned the heavens, and his obstetric hand brought forth the winding serpent.*² By their very spirituality, the powers of the intellect and will are a sort of heaven, elevated above the bodily powers. Furthermore, through the ordination and regulation of the virtues they are directed in their motion and they revolve like heavens. Adorned by the Holy Ghost with the gifts, the human heart may be raised to an even loftier plane. It may then be regulated not according to the constricted and impoverished standards of human reason, but according to the full scope of the Holy Ghost. When this is done, the winding serpent is brought forth from the heart. For the spirit of the devil not only dwells in the hearts of sinners, but even seeks to wend its tortuous way within the hearts of spiritual men, to deceive them with its false appearances and pretexts of spiritual elevations—visions or interior illusions. This winding serpent is brought forth by the same divine Spirit through whom the “heavens” are adorned. For the human mind is illuminated by the gifts of the Holy Ghost, so that it may discern the machinations of the serpent and may not be ignorant of his treachery, even when he transforms himself into an angel of light. Likewise, the gifts enable the mind to tend heavenward by a straight course and a direct route, without error and evasions. *Thy good spirit shall lead me into the right land.*³ To direct himself to that *right land* and not to wander is impossible for a man who lacks the breathing and inspiration of the divine Spirit. Through the gifts of the Holy Ghost, therefore, by which the “heavens” are adorned, the winding serpent is extracted. His wiles are made manifest and laid open to view, even when he hides coiled and entangled amid the appearances of spiritual things.

17. Finally, the gifts are called spirits, because they both adorn the

¹ Isaias, 1, 5.

² Job, xxvi, 13.

³ Psalm cxlii, 10.

soul and inspire it with the very breath of God. Embracing Him as a Spouse, the soul receives the kiss of His mouth, and the breath of His spirit. The powers of the soul are made perfect and elevated to a higher plane. *By the word of the Lord the heavens were established; and all the power of them by the spirit of his mouth.*¹ For the spirit of the mouth of the Lord establishing powers is the spirit of those gifts coming from the kiss of the Lord. Since it is impressed upon a soul burning with heavenly desires, this kiss is so completely effective that the soul drinking in His spirit becomes totally transformed by a divine participation, and it draws away from earthly things.

Sometimes this action leads to the death of the body, for it is recorded of Moses that he *died . . . by the commandment of the Lord*,² which Oleaster translates according to the Hebrew, *died by the mouth of the Lord*.³ The command of the divine mouth, then, was a kiss of the Lord so strongly impressed upon the soul of Moses that it exhausted its vitality and snatched him out of his body by the intensity of spiritual love. Many of the saints felt such a kiss, for St. Paul wrote, *For if we were out of our mind, it was for God; if we are sane, it is for you.*⁴ In that passage sobriety of action is placed in contradistinction to intoxication of spirit in which the saints abandon themselves to the powers of the Lord and become mindful only of His justice. They are out of their minds for God and sober towards their neighbour. Such is the divinely ordered wine cellar of love. In it charity is so ordered that the soul in its divine intoxication strives towards God with its full force and without restraint. Then with sobriety and modesty the soul allows its love to overflow upon creatures according to their worth and necessity, not giving itself over to them nor seeking them for themselves but for God.

18. Therein lies the true understanding of spiritual love and of that most obscure book, the *Canticle of Canticles*, which begins by mentioning the kiss of the Lord: *Let him kiss me with the kiss of his mouth.*⁵ It is as if the love of the holy Church began where the life of Moses had its end. For he died by the kiss of the Lord, but the Church began by the kiss of the mouth of God. Where the law given through Moses had its consummation, the law of spiritual love found its beginning. For

¹ *Psalm xxxii*, 6.

² *Deuteronomy*, xxxiv, 5.

³ Oleaster, Jerome, O.P., d. 1563. *Commentarium in Pentateuchum Moysi*. Cf. Echard, *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum*, t. II, pp. 182, 335.

⁴ *II Corinthians*, v, 13.

⁵ *Canticle of Canticles*, i, 1.

its beginning was the kiss of the divine mouth which is the Holy Ghost, proceeding from the mouth of God, and embracing in His kiss the Father and the Son. This abundance of love and intoxication of the Spirit was poured forth upon the Church at Pentecost, and it flowed down over the entire body of the Church through the centuries: *Like the precious ointment on the head, that ran down upon the beard (that is, the manly fortitude), the beard of Aaron, which ran down to the skirt of his garment as the dew of Hermon which descends upon mount Sion.*¹ The Church is worthy to be clothed with a more abundant glory than that of Moses. Hence, Moses reached his consummation in the kiss of the Lord, which is the Holy Ghost, and from that very point on Pentecost the Church began.² For the Lord Jesus sent His Spirit with such abundance upon the Church that it made the disciples intoxicated and many said of them, *They are full of wine.*³

19. So great and so efficacious were the gifts of the Holy Ghost which the Lord bestowed with such abundance upon His Church, that they purified it from all worldly taint. They transformed it with the purity and light of the Spirit and exalted it above every measure of human frailty and natural reason. Once the Church had tasted and drunk that wine of the Spirit, it could say with the spouse, *for thy breasts are better than wine* that is, made better by that wine of the Spirit, with which you inebriate. These breasts of the spouse are powers adorning the soul and offering overflowing breasts both to the mind and to the will. They are made better by the wine of the spiritual gifts and are made fragrant with most precious ointments, since they proceed from the Spirit of the divine mouth. This kiss of His mouth is completely spiritual and pure, not like that of passion, which although it is done by the mouth, is not of the mouth but of concupiscence and of the flesh. The kiss of the divine mouth is the kiss of speech, of communication, of understanding, the kiss of the Word, and of splendour. *By the word of the Lord the heavens were established and all the power of them by the spirit of his mouth.*³

¹ Psalm cxxxii, 2, 3.

² John of St. Thomas here follows an opinion on the origin of the Church that is not traditionally Thomistic. St. Thomas teaches that the Church was born from the open side of Christ on Calvary. His opinion is followed by Pope Pius XII in the Encyclical "Mystici Corporis". The Church was brought to its perfection in Pentecost.

³ Acts, ii, 13.

⁴ Canticle of Canticles, i, 1 ; iv, 10.

⁵ Psalm xxxii, 6.

Chapter II

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Chapter II

THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE GIFTS AND THE VIRTUES

1. The existence of the gifts of the Holy Ghost is certain from the texts of Scripture adduced in the foregoing chapter.¹ They are supernatural and infused, beyond the reach of human achievement. Coming down from heaven as divine benefactions, they are given to men through the grace of God and through His Spirit. The supernatural character of other graces, faith and charity for example, is proved from similar texts of Scripture, the sole fount of men's knowledge of such graces. Moreover, from the fact that Scripture affirmed that faith and charity were bestowed by God, St. Augustine could prove against the Pelagians the supernatural character of these graces. In this same way, therefore, it may be inferred that the gifts of the Holy Ghost are supernatural.

2. The basic fact that Scripture treats of the gifts of the Holy Ghost as supernatural is easily established. The gifts found in Christ² were described by Isaias as coming from the Holy Ghost: *And the spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him, the spirit of wisdom, and of understanding, etc. . . . and he shall be filled with the spirit of the fear of the Lord.*³ Appropriate only to supernatural and infused gifts, this text cannot be applied to acquired virtues in the natural order. Hence only at the price of destroying the faith may anyone deny that these gifts in Christ were gifts of grace, and therefore supernatural. Moreover, the gifts in Christ and in others are essentially the same. Ascribed to others as well as to Christ, these same gifts are said to be given through the Spirit as gifts of God. For the Spirit *shall fill him with the spirit of wisdom and understanding,*⁴ while *to one indeed by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom and to another the word of knowledge, according to the same Spirit,*⁵ as St. Paul affirmed. These three gifts, wisdom, understanding, and knowledge, are supernatural, since they

¹ Cf. paragraphs 2 and 1.

² Cf. IIIa, v. 18, a. 5.

³ *Isaias* xi, 2, 3.

⁴ *Ecclesiasticus*, xv, 5.

⁵ *1 Corinthians*, xii, 8.

are given through the Spirit. It may be noted, however, that the Apostle is writing of the charisms, which, though supernatural, can be had without sanctifying grace.

3. These gifts are likewise described in the book of Ecclesiasticus with the addition of fear and counsel, or prudence as it is called. *The fear of the Lord is a crown of wisdom, filling up peace and the fruit of salvation, and it has seen and numbered her, but both are the gifts of God. Wisdom shall distribute knowledge and understanding of prudence, and exalts the glory of those who hold her.*¹ Wisdom and fear are called gifts of God, and knowledge and understanding are said to be derived from wisdom. All are supernatural gifts. Fear, moreover, according to this same passage, is the beginning of wisdom, the root of wisdom, while love drives out sin. It surely could not do this unless it were supernatural and could dispose to justification.

That the gift of fortitude is infused and supernatural is derived from a passage in the book of the Maccabees, *for the success of war is not in the multitude of the army, but strength comes from heaven*² and from the Forty-third Psalm, *for they did not get possession of the land by their own sword: neither did their own arm save them, but Thy right hand and Thy arm and the light of Thy countenance*;³ as well as in Exodus, *the Lord is my strength and my praise*.*

Likewise, the gift of counsel finds mention in the Psalms, *thy justifications are my counsel*.⁵ Of the works of counsel, St. Paul wrote: *Now concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord, yet I give a counsel as one having obtained mercy from the Lord*;^{*} and it is written in the Gospel according to St. Matthew, *Not all can accept this teaching; but those to whom it has been given*.⁷

Finally, concerning the spirit of the gift of piety there is the text: *Train thyself unto piety. For bodily training is of little profit, while piety is profitable in all respects, since it has the promise of the present life as well as of that which is to come*.⁸ This passage can refer only to supernatural piety, to which is annexed the promise of eternal happiness. Nor can that text be so aptly understood of the virtue of piety as it is of the gift of which Isaias wrote. To this furthermore can be added the words of Job, *Behold piety itself is wisdom*.⁹ Thus many read the

¹ Ecclesiasticus, i, 22-24.

² 1 Maccabees, iii, 19.

³ Psalm xliii, 4.

⁴ Exodus, xv, 2.

⁵ Psalm cxviii, 24.

* 1 Corinthians, vii, 25.

⁷ Matthew, xix, 11.

⁸ 1 Timothy, iv, 7, 8.

⁹ Job, xxviii, 28.

Greek text, among whom may be noted St. Augustine,¹ although the Vulgate has *Behold the fear of the Lord, that is wisdom.*

4. As may be inferred from the foregoing paragraphs, it is a matter of faith that the seven gifts which were in Christ were supernatural, since Isaias expressly and literally wrote of Christ. It is also a matter of faith that these supernatural gifts were given to others. For although Origen² insinuates that this sevenfold power descended upon Christ alone and Tertullian³ would seem to agree with him, nevertheless, it seems that these authors are writing only in a comparative sense. They are rendering more forceful the significance of the words of the prophet, *And there shall rest upon him, etc.*, by affirming that these gifts did not descend upon others in that fullness or with that permanence with which they were in Christ, in whom that sevenfold Spirit remained without interruption from the instant of His conception. Some more recent authors are of the opinion that it is a matter of faith that Christ had the seven supernatural gifts; that others have them is for them not a matter of faith, but only a most certain opinion, whose contrary is temerarious, since it is against the common opinion of the Fathers and the Scholastic theologians. This opinion is advanced by Lorca in his disputation on the question of the gifts.⁴ Martinez affirmed in his commentary on St. Thomas⁵ that to deny the presence of the gifts in the faithful, if not temerarious, is at least proximate to error.

5. Nevertheless, I am of the opinion that the fact of the presence of the gifts of the Holy Ghost in the faithful and of their supernatural character is so much a part of the faith that the opposite would be heresy. For in the texts cited, with the exception of that from Isaias, Sacred Scripture makes express mention of the gifts as they are in the

¹ Sermon III *de Tempore*, *MPL*, XXXVIII.

² Homily VI on *Numbers*, *MPG*, XII, 668 and Homily III on *Isaias*, *MPG*, XIII, 227. Cf. translation of St. Jerome, *MPL*, XXIV, 910.

³ *Contra Iudeos*, c. 9, *MPL*, II, 623.

⁴ Disputation 25 on question 68 of the First of the Second Part of the *Summa Theologica*. Peter de Lorca, 1554-1606, Cistercian theologian, later Superior General of his Order in Spain and intimate of Philip III, was the author of Commentaria and disputations in I-IIae, H-Hae and III a partem Divi Thomae, Compluti, 1614-1616. Cf. Hurter, *Nomenclator*, 3e Edit., II, p. 392.

⁵ First difficulty on I-IIae q. 68, a. 1. Joannes Gonzalez Martinez, Doctor at Complutum, was a bitter opponent of Thomistic doctrines. He is not to be confused with Joannes Martinez, Dominican Rector of the College of Alcala, when John of St. Thomas was there, Prior at Madrid, Toledo, Segovia, who succeeded John of St. Thomas as confessor to Philip IV. Cf. P. Beltran de Heredia, O. P., "La Ensenanza de Sto. Tomas en Alcala", *La Ciencia Thomista*, t. XII, 1915, p. 407-408, and Antonius, *Bibliotheca Hispana Nova*, Madrid, 1788, t. II p. 563.

faithful. It is written in *Ecclesiasticus*, *He shall fill him with the spirit of wisdom and of understanding*,¹ and in the Book of Wisdom, *I have called and the spirit of wisdom came upon me*.² Of the gift of understanding it is written, *a good understanding to all who do it*.³ The other texts adduced expressly witness the fact that the gifts, such as fortitude, fear, and piety, are in the faithful.

There is also to be found evidence that the Church confirms this doctrine since in the hymn of the Holy Ghost occur the words: "Thou art seven-fold in gifts" and again, "give to Thy faithful who trust in Thee the sacred seven-fold."⁴ It is certain, therefore, that these sacred gifts are gratuitously given by the Holy Ghost, since they are begged for from God, and prayer, according to St. Augustine, is "a most clear testimony of grace." They are supernatural because they are called sacred and special gifts of the Holy Ghost. Who would claim that the Church would ask for gifts for the faithful which would not be given to them?

6. The common consent of saints and Scholastics agrees with this. They write of these gifts as being the most evident of the gifts given to the faithful. For example, St. Augustine,⁵ St. Ambrose,⁶ St. Gregory,⁷ St. Jerome,⁸ St. Cyril,⁹ St. Cyprian, or the author who wrote concerning the important works of Christ,¹⁰ and many other saints agree in this teaching, while all the Scholastics concur, following Peter Lombard¹¹ and St. Thomas.¹²

7. The supernatural character of the gifts and their presence in the faithful is a certainty. Difficulties may arise, however, on two points.

¹ Cf. *Ecclesiasticus*, xv, 5.

² *Wisdom*, vii, 7.

³ *Psalm*, ex, 9.

⁴ At Terce of Pentecost and in the Sequence of the Mass for Pentecost.

⁵ Sermon XVII *De Sanctis*, *MPL*, XXXIX, 1525; *II De Doctrina Christiana*, c. 7, *MPL*, XXXIV, 39; *I Sermon on the Mount*, *MPL*, XXXIV, 1234.

⁶ *III De Sacramentis*, c. 2, *MPL*, XVI, 434; *In Psalm cxviii*, 8, *MPL*, XV, 1207; *I De Spiritu Sancto*, c. 20, *MPL*, XVI, 740.

⁷ *De Moralibus*, c. 12, *MPL*, LXXV, 544; *II De Moralibus*, c. 36, *MPL*, LXXV, 592. *Commentaria in Ezechiel XIX*, *MPL*, LXXVI, 1153.

⁸ *Commentaria in Isaias XI*, *MPL*, XXIV, 144.

⁹ *Lib. II in Isaias*, *MPG*, LXX, 310.

¹⁰ *Liber de Cardinalibus Operibus Christi*, *MPL*, CLXXXIX, 1653. In the Migne Patrology this work is attributed to Ernardus Bonaevallis, Abbot, d. 1156. "Vir fuit non obscurae famae," though the name of this contemporary of St. Bernard of Clairvaux is all but lost. Ernardus' work was attributed to St. Cyprian even after the death of John of St. Thomas. Cf. édition Nicholai Rigalt, p. 393, Paris, 1648.

¹¹ *III Sententiarum*, d. 24.

¹² *IT*, q. 68.

The first concerns the genus of these gifts. The question turns on their position in the category of habits as well as on their distinction from the charisms, which are given in a transient manner. Since it is not absolutely certain from scriptural evidence that the gifts are distinct from the virtues, a second difficulty arises in distinguishing these gifts from the theological and moral virtues, both infused and acquired.

The Gifts of the Holy Ghost are Habits

8. The gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits and not merely acts or dispositions given in a transient manner like the light of prophecy and the other charisms. This is the common opinion of Scholastics, who follow St. Thomas. There are some, however, as Lorca notes, who think that these gifts are not habits but merely certain special acts of virtue.

The fundamental reason for considering them habits is the testimony in Sacred Scripture that they are given in a permanent fashion. Isaias affirms that *the spirit of the Lord shall rest upon Him, the spirit of wisdom and knowledge*, etc.¹ Concerning the same Holy Spirit, through whom these gifts are given, it is noted in the Gospel according to St. John *he will dwell with you, and be in you*.² Therefore, these gifts have a state of permanency.

9. My second point is that these gifts are given for operations similar to those functions for which virtues are established in the intellect and will. This is quite evident in the case of wisdom and knowledge, fortitude and piety, for these gifts have operations and acts of cognition; while fortitude, piety, and fear elicit acts as principles of action. Wisdom and knowledge, for example, elicit acts of *cognition*; while fortitude, piety and fear elicit acts of *volition*. As virtues, wisdom and fortitude are habits which elicit their own proper acts. Therefore, as gifts, wisdom, as well as knowledge, fortitude, and the rest may be called habits, since they too are principles eliciting their own proper acts.

10. My third point is that these gifts are given so that a man may operate with a certain connaturality toward things divine, and, moved by an impulse of the Holy Ghost, as St. Thomas teaches,³ he may, as it were, have contact with divinity. Now, no one can be rendered

¹ *Isaias*, xi, 2. ² *John*, xiv, 17. ³ I-II, q. 68, a. 3; II-II, q. 45.

connatural to divine things—no one can be in a measure spiritualized and deified—unless he is properly disposed by a permanent and habitual inclination. An ability which a man enjoys in a transient sort of way does not bring with it that special ease of connaturality. It does not dispose a man to execute new acts with the naturalness which the stability of a habit provides. Since, then, the gifts of the Holy Ghost bring a special connaturality to divine things and a certain ease in responding to the impulse of the Holy Ghost, they must be habitual and permanent dispositions.

Briefly summarized, the reasoning of St. Thomas is as follows: the gifts dispose a man to obey the instigation and impulse of the Holy Ghost, just as the moral virtues dispose his appetite to obey the reason. Hence, since the moral virtues are habits because they dispose the appetite to obey reason, the gifts must be habits disposing a man to follow and to obey the impulse of the Holy Spirit.

11. However, there arises an objection to this conclusion on the grounds that prophecy is not a habit but a light given in a passing manner to the prophet, as St. Thomas proves.¹ Yet it furnishes a principle which elicits the knowledge of the prophecy. Since in this life a man does not have a clear knowledge of the principles from which prophetic knowledge is deduced—the vision of the divine essence, the source of prophetic knowledge—it is evident that the principles of the act need not be a habit. Likewise, the gifts of the Holy Ghost do not of themselves suppose a permanent principle of knowledge from which they are derived. They are given for a man to follow the impulse of the Holy Ghost just as the moral virtues are given so that he may follow reason, as St. Thomas asserts. In the inference that the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits like the moral virtues there seems to be an erroneous argument of similarity. Using the same logic, the opposite conclusion should be reached. The moral virtues follow the dictates of reason, as manifested through the habit of prudence or *synderesis*. The gifts, for their part, follow the dictates of the Holy Spirit as manifested through an impulse. That impulse is evidenced, not through a habit, but through a passing act, as is clear in the case of prophecy.

Hence to obey this impulse there is no need for an habitual disposition. The appetite needs a habitual disposition to obey reason. Reason in turn is disposed through the habit of prudence containing

¹ II-II, q. 171, a. 1.

the seeds and principles of all the virtues. But it is not so with the gifts. The impulse of the Holy Ghost in which the principles and directive forces of the gifts are contained is not manifested in an habitual but rather in a transient manner. Therefore, just as prophecy is not given as a habit since it does not presuppose habitual knowledge of its principles, so neither are the gifts of the Holy Ghost habits, since they do not assume that their principles are known through a habit but through an impulse.

12. This fact is confirmed in the other graces "*gratis datae*," such as the working of miracles, the grace of healing, in which habits are not established in the soul, but actual motions suffice.¹ The same would apply then to the gifts of the Holy Ghost, for whose exercise an actual divine motion without an infused habit would suffice. Further evidence for this is derived from the fact that the Apostle enumerates the utterance of wisdom and the utterance of knowledge among the graces "*gratis datae*" which are given in the same Spirit. Yet from the very text the argument is derived for the existence of the gifts. The gifts then are graces "*gratis datae*," and hence not habits.

18. In reply, it must be conceded that the prophetic light is given only transiently and not as a habit, for the reasons alleged by St. Thomas and cited above.² The gifts of the Holy Ghost, on the other hand, postulate in the soul principles permanently known by which they are regulated. Though the gifts are directed by the Holy Ghost, the purpose of His impulse is not to manifest the truth of objects, either intellectually or imaginatively conceived, as is the case with prophecy. According to St. Augustine, even an impulse which the human mind unknowingly receives is sufficient. There is required merely an interior movement, a divine stimulation, by which God moves man to the immediate experience of tasting and seeing that the Lord is sweet. Thus God becomes deeply rooted in souls and makes them connatural with divine things. These supernatural objects are known in this life through faith, which is an abiding habit, determining in a way both charity and the gifts of the Holy Ghost.

By this connaturality and intimate union to things divine, a man is made capable of penetrating more profoundly divine things and the mysteries of faith, of judging according to either secondary or ultimate causes, and of taking practical counsel in his actions. In

¹ II-II, q. 177 and q. 188.

² Cf. paragraph 11, note 1.

this way the four gifts are formed in his mind. The gift of understanding is *for* the penetration and proper appraisal of things divine. The gifts of wisdom, science, and counsel are for judging concerning divine things, according to either ultimate and proximate causes or the norms of practical action.

The impulse which moves to the formation of such knowledge attains to the principles upon which it is founded, either through faith in this life, or—more permanently—through the beatific vision in the next. There is no comparison here with prophecy and its relation to the things prophesied, since prophecy is not founded upon faith nor regulated by it in the formation of its knowledge. For although prophecy is usually found in the faithful it may be found in others, Balaam, for example. The purpose of prophecy is the formation of a vision either in the intellect or in the imagination. It engenders certitude through an imaginary representation, with definite lineaments. Yet its object may not be seen intuitively, for the gift can coexist with faith. It is not necessary, then, for the formation of the image in prophecy that the principles of the vision be clearly seen. For the objects of prophecy are contained in the vision of the divine essence as their principle. They are, therefore, communicated in an extrinsic light, by which the prophecies are manifested without regress to their principle.

14. The gifts of the Holy Ghost are not given for the formation of any vision, either in the intellect or in the imagination, concerning matter pertaining to faith. They are given rather for the appraisal and judgment of these things according to an habitual principle. For example, man may discern the credibility or the suitability of some mysteries of faith and attain a correct estimate of them. He knows that these mysteries are worthy of belief and should not be doubted because of any mere appearance of error. Then too he has a sort of connatural experience of them and a taste of divine things which is acquired through charity. From this connaturality, the *gift of wisdom* judges of divine things, as St. Thomas teaches.¹ Prudence gives counsel in actions and according to a correct estimation of things to be believed, while the gift of understanding penetrates these matters of faith.²

15. In heaven, where faith no longer remains, and in the soul of Christ, in whom there was no need for faith, the gifts bring about the

¹ II-II, q. 45.

² Cf. II-II, q. 8, a 2.

penetration and the judgment of supernatural things outside the beatific vision. They are not ordained to the judgment of the credibility of such things. Rather they are ordered to the judging of the appropriateness of divine tilings to human and created needs. They proceed from a savour, a taste, and a connaturality to supernatural things, which shall be explained later. The divine impulse, therefore, moves to the further knowledge and ordering of those things known essentially through faith. The case of prophecy is not the same. For the purpose of prophecy is the formation of a vision concerning things whose principles do not appear in the vision.

For this reason, the gifts are given as habits while prophecy is not. Since the aforementioned gifts are habits, the gifts in the sensitive appetite, such as fortitude, piety, and fear, are likewise habits.

At the same time it must be admitted that these gifts are perfected and increased from a sort of *illumination given through rapture* or prophecy. This, however, is not an essential postulate of the nature of the gifts but a superabundant light. The gifts are absolutely necessary for salvation, while this enlightenment is not.

16. In reply to the second objection, or confirmation of the first as it is called, it should be noted that prophecy and the other gifts "*gratis datae*" are given for the manifestation of the Spirit. They can be founded upon principles higher than themselves and to which they do not attain. For this reason they require a light of a divine motion given in a transient manner, not founded upon nor contained in the vision of the principles. On the other hand, the gifts of the Holy Ghost, like charity to which they are annexed, are necessary for salvation. Hence, like charity, they are regulated through principles known by faith. Yet they are aroused, brought to consciousness, and made ready for action by a special impulse of the Holy Ghost. It may be concluded, therefore, that they can be granted as habits, in a permanent fashion, just as faith and charity.

The citation from St. Paul, *To one through the spirit is given the utterance of wisdom, and to another the utterance of knowledge*,² undoubtedly has to do with the charisms. These are given for the manifestation of the spirit. The grace of manifesting the Spirit is not given to all, for all are not given the ability to utter such words. Nevertheless, the wisdom and knowledge which underlie these manifestations are gifts of the Holy Spirit.

¹ Cf. II-II, q. 89, a. 3, ad 3.

² I Corinthians, xii, 8.

The Gifts Differ from the Theological and Moral Virtues

17. The gifts are habits which differ from both the theological and moral virtues. There is no doubt that they differ from the acquired virtues, which are of the natural order, since it has been established that the gifts are supernatural. While the acquired virtues of the natural order could be found in a state of pure and integral nature, the gifts could have no place there, since they are supernatural. From their separability, then, the distinction of the virtues and gifts may be inferred.

18. The distinction of the infused virtues and the gifts of the Holy Ghost, however, provides no little difficulty. These infused virtues are both moral and theological—a basic point of agreement for all.

19. In his famous opinion relative to this difficulty, Scotus¹ maintains that the gifts are not distinct from the virtues but are substantially the same as the virtues. They are called gifts merely because of a particular designation or office. This opinion numbers among its adherents Gabriel,² Palacios,³ and others among the more ancient writers. Among the more recent authors may be included Lorca⁴ and Vasquez.⁵ The latter holds that both opinions may be considered probable, and cannot determine which is the more true—though he considers St. Thomas' arguments of little efficacy and attempts to disprove them.

20. Furthermore, Scotus does not admit that the infused moral virtues are distinct from the acquired virtues, nor are they super-added to them. Yet, it cannot be denied that the gifts of the Holy Ghost are infused, for that is the evident meaning of Scripture and the consent of the Church bears it out. By antonomasia, these habits are called gifts, since they are given in a special way by the Holy Ghost—poured forth by God so that a man may be filled with the gifts of the Holy Ghost and it may be said of him: *And the spirit of the*

¹ In *III Sententiarum*, d. 34.

² In *III Sententiarum*, d. 34, a. 2. Gabriel Biel, d. 1495, nominalist professor at Tübingen, author of *Super Quatuor Libros Sententiarum*, Monte Ferrato, 1532.

³ Palacios, Michael de, f.c. 1600, professor of philosophy and theology at Salamanca, author of *Disputationes theologicae in IV Libros Sententiarum*. Cf. N. Antonio, *Bibliotheca Hispana Nova*, Madrid 1783, vol. II, p. 143. Hurter, *Nomenclator*, Ed. 3, vol. III col. 143. Vigoureux, *Dictionnaire de la Bible*, IV, col. 1962.

⁴ In *III Sententiarum*, d. 25, men. 2.

⁵ In *III Sententiarum*, d. 89, c. 1 and 2.

*fear of the Lord shall fill him,*¹ or *You shall fill him with the spirit of the Lord, of wisdom and understanding.*² In Scripture, being filled with the Holy Ghost indicates the infusion of supernatural gifts.

Since these statements cannot be denied, it would seem difficult for Scotus to explain what sort of habits these gifts really are. Of the seven gifts, some pertain to the intellect: wisdom, knowledge, understanding, counsel; and some are in the will: fortitude, piety, and fear of the Lord. Of the first four Scotus has a facile explanation, since he thinks that they pertain to the theological virtues. Moreover, he does not think that wisdom is an act of the intellect, but of charity, inasmuch as it gives a savour and a taste of faith, or a sort of delectable knowledge. From another point of view he reduces wisdom to hope, since by wisdom the soul delights in God as He is in Himself and as He satisfies human aspirations.

Moreover, he reduces the gifts of knowledge and understanding to faith, since it is within the province of faith to penetrate and judge of the things which it believes. Even Father Suarez³ considers it neither evident nor certain that the gift of understanding is a supernatural gift completely distinct from faith, although he favours the distinction of the virtues and gifts. How certain this fact actually is will be evident from the argument against Scotus.

Scotus gives no decision on the gift of counsel, yet he might have reduced it to faith, since faith is practical and capable of being a counsellor.

21. To what infused virtue Scotus reduces those gifts of the Holy Ghost which pertain to the will—fortitude, piety, and fear of the Lord—I have no idea. He does not reduce them to theological virtues, since the acts of fortitude and fear can neither be acts of charity or hope nor elicit them. They cannot be identified with the acts of the acquired virtues of fortitude, fear, and piety, since the gifts are supernatural and infused by the Holy Ghost and hence transcend the natural order. Furthermore, according to Scotus the acts of piety and fortitude cannot be infused, since he denies that there can be any such thing as an infused moral virtue. To what virtue, then, do these acts belong, and from what virtue do they proceed?

Scotus would perhaps deny that the gifts of the Holy Ghost are

¹ *Isaias*, xi, 3.

³ *I de' Grafts*, lib. 2, cu IDj. n. 11.

■ *Ecclesiasticus*, xv, 5.

supernatural and infused, but this is contrary to Scripture. Or perhaps he would care to affirm that the acquired virtues are infused into a just man merely as an accidental addition—and hence called gifts. Then, these gifts would have no place in the soul of a man proficient in moral virtue, nor would such a man receive the gifts of the Holy Ghost when he was raised to the supernatural order. All this is absurd. For the more perfected a man was in the acquired virtues, in that proportion he would lack them by infusion, while the less proficient and sinners would not lack them, precisely because they were sinners.

22. Whatever Scotus' opinion may be, the doctrine stated here is that of St. Thomas.¹ In the *Book of the Sentences* he distinguishes the gifts of the Holy Ghost from the virtues, expressly mentioning the infused moral virtues. This is the opinion of the disciples of St. Thomas and of theologians in general, who are mentioned by Suarez in the place already cited² and by Montensios and Martinez³ and others in their commentaries on this question. Authority for this distinction may be found in St. Gregory.⁴ He clearly distinguishes the theological virtues and the gifts of the Holy Ghost from the moral virtues. This distinction rests upon a twofold argument. The first is a theological deduction from Scripture. The second, somewhat *a priori*, proceeds from the proper and formal nature of the gifts themselves.

23. The gifts which pertain to the intellect—wisdom, knowledge, understanding, and counsel—cannot be identified with the theological virtues, nor can the other three gifts, which are related to the sensitive appetite, be identified with the moral virtues. Therefore, the gifts are distinct from the virtues.

The proof of the principle establishing this conclusion rests upon the fact that neither all the gifts nor any one of them can be identified with faith and hope. This in turn rests upon the hypothesis that it is a matter of faith that the gifts were found in Christ our Lord. To resolve this hypothesis we have the witness of Isaiah: *And a flower shall rise out of his root. And the spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him,*

¹ Cf. I-II, q. 68, a. 1; *In III Sententiarum*, d. 34, 1, 1.

² *Op. cit.*, c. 15 num. 9.

³ In I-II, q. 68. Ludovicus Montensios, Doctor at Complutum, called the "clear doctor," taught for 36 years and died in 1621. He was the author of *Commentaria in I-II Divi Thomae Aquinatis*, 2 vols., Compluti 1621-1622. Cf. Antonius, *Bibliotheca Hispana* l'o^ay Madrid 1788, II, p. 435.

⁴ II De Moralibus, e. 36, *MPf*, 1zXXV, 593.

*the spirit of wisdom and understanding.*¹ Since Christ had the beatific vision He could have neither faith nor hope. Hence the gifts in Christ are definitely distinguished from faith and hope. The gifts, moreover, which are in the faithful are of the same nature as those which were in Christ, since, from the same text of Isaias in which the gifts are ascribed to Christ, the Fathers of the Church and the theologians have concluded that they are present in the faithful. From the fact that seven gifts are enumerated there, seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are attributed to the faithful. On the basis of this same text the office of the Holy Ghost is said to be sevenfold. Therefore, just as in Christ the gifts were distinguished from the virtues, so they are distinct in the faithful.

24. The only rebuttal to this argument can be found in the assertion that in Christ the gifts of wisdom, understanding, and knowledge are distinct from faith, while in the faithful they are identified with faith and hope. It may be alleged that in Him infused knowledge is identified with charity, while in the faithful, during this life, the gifts cannot be distinguished from faith and hope. However, gifts similar to those in the soul of Christ will be given to the souls in heaven.

All this presupposes, of course, two kinds of gifts. There are those in us which are identified with faith, and those which are not the same as faith, as those in the soul of Christ, since there could be no faith in the soul of Christ.

25. This rebuttal is completely without basis in fact. No conclusions may be drawn concerning the gifts unless they have their source either in Holy Scripture or in the Fathers of the Church. Nowhere in Scripture are two kinds of gifts mentioned, one type for this life and another for heaven. That is a pure fiction. It is brought forward to defend an opinion which should be completely rejected, since it can be defended upon no other pretext. Furthermore, if the gifts in this life and those of heaven differ, it would be necessary that present gifts should be done away with in the future life. It is certain, however, that holy fear will remain in heaven, since it has been said, *The fear of the Lord is holy, enduring for ever and ever.*² And of wisdom, it is said, *It is glorious and never fades away;*³ while of piety St. Paul affirms *That is profitable in all respects, since it has the promise of the present life as well as of that which is to come.*⁴ Therefore, the piety of

¹ Isaias, xi, 1 ff. ² Psalm xviii, 10. ³ Wisdom, vi, 13. ⁴ I Timothy, iv, 8.

this life will not cease in heaven. The same may be said for the other gifts according to the statement of St. Ambrose¹ “The Holy Spirit, glowing with the full breathing forth more abundantly upon those heavenly spirits.” These seven gifts are surely none other than the ones which we have in this life. The same gifts, therefore, which we have here below will remain in heaven. If they cannot be identified with faith and hope in heaven, neither can they be identified with faith and hope in this life.

St. Paul’s statement that *knowledge will be destroyed*² may seem to contradict this. But it is commonly applied to that part of knowledge which is purely material to the reasoning process, merely the reflection upon the phantasms, and not a part of the habit of knowledge itself.

26. Once it has been proved that the gifts related to the intellect are not identified with faith and hope, it naturally follows that they cannot be identified with charity either. Nor should the other gifts be made one with the moral virtues. Charity cannot be the same as wisdom, since undoubtedly wisdom is substantially and intrinsically an act of the intellect—for to be wise is to know. Men are called wise who understand and judge correctly. *Who is wise and will keep these things, and will understand the mercies of the Lord.*³

In mentioning wisdom, Scripture describes it as an illumination or a light: *I chose to have her instead of a light, for her light cannot be put out** In that same chapter the spirit of wisdom is ascribed to understanding: *I wished and understanding was given me: and I called upon God and the spirit of wisdom came upon me.*³ St. Augustine affirmed that “wisdom pertains to reason and reason alone can receive it.”⁶

To reduce wisdom to charity and to an act of the will, because it is described as a tasting or savouring, would entail the destruction of the essence of wisdom, whose act obviously is related to understanding and knowledge. This understanding is had with a pleasantness or suavity for either of two reasons. First, there is the delight which accompanies contemplation, especially when that contemplation proceeds through the highest causes. This delight is found

¹ *11 de Spiritu Sancto*, c. 20, *MPL*, XVI, 740.

² *1 Corinthians*, xiii, 8.

³ *Psalms* cvi, 43.

⁴ *Wisdom*, vii, 10.

⁵ *Ibid.*, vii, 7.

⁶ *Sermon 8 de Tempore*, *MPL*, xxxviii.

even in that wisdom which is not a gift, but a savouring knowledge acquired by human power. Secondly, although the gift of wisdom is formally in the intellect, it presupposes an act of charity by reason of which a man has a love for divine things and experiences in himself some manner of loving union with God. Through this experience of divine things he is able to judge of them—but this is the burden of a later article.

27. Likewise, the gift of counsel cannot be identified with faith, despite the fact that it too is practical. Certainly the gift of counsel was found in Christ according to the enumeration of *Isaias*¹ and yet in Christ there was no virtue of faith. The other gifts which are related to the sensitive appetite, fortitude, piety, and fear, might seem to be easily reduced to the corresponding virtues, perhaps to fortitude, piety, or the worship of God—which would seem to embrace the reverential fear. These gifts in the sensitive appetite, however, are directed by the gifts in the intellect—wisdom, knowledge, and counsel. For that reason they are distinct from the moral virtues, which are regulated by prudence. The gifts are higher than prudence, which regulates the moral virtues. They do not even have the same moral aspect. For morality depends upon a regulative principle; if that principle is varied the moral aspect is changed correspondingly and consequently the very nature of the virtue.

28. The second argument to establish the difference between the gifts and the virtues proceeds from the very nature of these gifts. The Scriptures record that these gifts are given to the faithful as “breathings” through a special divine inspiration and movement of the Holy Ghost. If the gifts were not in us through a special inspiration of the Holy Ghost it would be foolish to call them “breathings” and not to use the same name for the other virtues. Inspiration or divine movement has a two-fold purpose: either to enable a man to follow the command or rule of reason, or to follow a higher principle, the divine impulse. This latter is higher than human reason and higher than anything understood according to merely human capacity.

When God moves us to follow the commands of reason and the rules of acquired and infused prudence the result is human virtue regulated at that level of morality which parallels a humanly prudent manner of acting. If God moves the soul to follow a command and

¹ *Isaias*, xi, 2.

rule higher than that of prudence, a rule which is measured by the scope of the Holy Ghost alone, then other habits on a loftier moral plane than mere human virtue are demanded. These are called the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Some of them reside in the intellect, whose function it is to measure and direct ; others are rooted in the will and they prepare for the intellectual gifts and follow them.

29. The formal distinction founded upon the different illuminations of the divine light is more readily understood in the case of the gifts which reside in the intellect. For under the aegis of divine wisdom there comes a spirit of understanding, *holy, one, manifold*.¹ This understanding is in itself one, but manifold in its participation. From this same divine wisdom are derived infused knowledge, prophecy, faith, and many other illuminations essentially diverse. In enumerating these latter, first place goes to the gifts which have as their purpose the consideration of the mysteries of faith and divine things. They proceed from a hidden impulse of the Holy Ghost affixing and uniting the soul to Himself. They make the soul understand and judge rightly concerning the mysteries of faith according to our love and experience of things divine, and also in accord with their own essential suitableness.

In the exercise of these gifts, mystical theology is founded. By the affection and fusion of man to the divine, his perception increases as if through an internal experience—according to St. Paul : *Do you seek a proof of Christ who speaks within me?*²

By reason of this interior illumination and experience of divine things and the mysteries of faith, the soul thus stirred is further inflamed to pursue the life of virtue in a way which far transcends the tendencies of those virtues themselves. He now follows a higher rule and measure, under the interior impulse of the Holy Ghost, whose illuminations are his standards of faith.

This exchange of standards engenders new moral aspects and dimensions. There is a decided difference in the pursuit of the divine ultimate when it is regulated by human zeal and industry, or even by the infused virtues, and when it is formed according to the rule and measure of the Holy Ghost. For example, although the forward progress of a ship may be the same, there is a vast difference in its being moved by the laborious rowing of oarsmen and its being moved by sails filled with a strong breeze. We read in the Gospel of St. Mark

¹ *Wisdom*, vii, 22.

² *II Corinthians*, xiii, 3.

that our Lord saw *his disciples straining at the oars*.¹² They were making progress in the way of the Lord only at the expense of great labour, since each was proceeding by his own power and industry through his own ordinary virtues. However, when the Spirit fills the soul interiorly, and measures it by His rule, then without labour and in a new-found freedom of the heart the soul moves rapidly like a sail filled with a breeze. The Psalms testify to this : *I have run the way of thy commandment when thou didst enlarge my heart* and again: *Thy good spirit shall lead me into the right land*.³

30. From all this it follows that the gifts are distinct from the virtues with a diversity over and above that founded on a difference of divine influx in the order of efficient causality. For even the theological and infused moral virtues as well as prophecy and the other charisms proceed from a divine influence and are divinely infused on the part of efficient causality. The gifts are, moreover, distinguished from the virtues by their very nature. They have a very different regulative principle and measure, and in the order of morality an object measured by a higher rule differs from the same object when it is measured by an inferior principle.

Cajetan⁴ notes quite pointedly in this connection that there is in the soul a threefold principle moving it to good, that is, according to a moral rule and not only efficiently. The first principle is the human mind endowed with the natural light of reason and prudence. The second is the human mind adorned with the light of grace and faith, but still limited to its human capacity, zeal, and industry. The third is the human mind as it is impelled by the impulse of the Holy Ghost. This new impulse not only moves it efficiently. It also rules over the human mind and directs it to actions far exceeding human capacity and the meagre standards of human industry and zeal. In this manner the unction of the Holy Ghost teaches us all things.⁵ Motions proceeding from the first principle are in direct relationship to the acquired virtues. Movement under the aegis of the second principle corresponds to the infused virtues. Human activity sponsored by the third principle is linked in a relationship to the gifts, measured and moving upon a higher plane.

¹ *Mark*, vi, 48.

² *Psalms* cxviii, 32.

³ *Psalms* cxlii, 10.

⁴ *Commentaria in I-II*, q. 68, a. 1.

⁵ Cf. *I John*, ii, 27.

31. Hence in those gifts pertaining to the intellect there is not merely a diverse illumination or infusion of light in the order of efficient causality. There is in addition, by the impulse of the Spirit, a diverse formal mode of knowing as well. The truth of the mysteries of faith springs not only from the testimony of God revealing or in virtue of a light manifesting a particular truth. Adherence to the truth is now mystically fortified by a loving experience of the supernatural, and a union with God. For this reason the gifts are called both wisdom, or knowledge, or counsel, and likewise the spirit of wisdom, the spirit of counsel, and the spirit of knowledge. The name of spirit is applied to a "breathing" which is an affections disposition of the will. It connotes an affection for knowledge and for counsel, a loving and mystical wisdom, loving and mystical knowledge, and counsel. These are special virtues of the Spirit.

In his explanation of the passages of Holy Scripture in which the force and spirit of the gifts are revealed, St. Thomas has striven to make clear the distinction of the gifts and the human virtues.

Finally, these virtues and spirits of virtues, these enkindlings and illuminations of the Holy Ghost, presuppose grace and charity. They are found only in the soul in the state of grace, since they are founded upon loving union of the soul to God.

32. To amplify the foregoing explanation of the gifts it will prove useful to consider and confute those opinions opposed to the teaching of St. Thomas. These objections may be formulated under two headings. First, there is an opinion which strikes at the foundation for St. Thomas' distinction between the virtues and the gifts. With this opinion the present objections and replies are concerned. Second, some objections attempt to prove that the gifts do not have acts which are distinct from the acts of the theological and infused virtues. They allege further that the diversity of the gifts is not sufficiently explained. These latter objections will be dealt with in the articles devoted to each particular gift.

The Objections Against the Arguments of St. Thomas

33. The first objection proceeds from the teaching of Duns Scotus. It affirms that there is no convincing argument by which the difference

¹ For the sake of clarity many of the paragraphs of the sections have been rearranged. The secondary numbers given are those of the Vives Edition, 1885.

between the gifts and the theological and moral virtues may be proved. Consequently, it maintains that no such distinction should be made.

If any argument could prove this distinction it would be the one advanced by St. Thomas. He argues that whatever is moved is moved in proportion to its disposition for receiving motion, its obediential power. A man can be moved either through reason—to which the virtues in their human mode dispose him—or through a higher mover—God. Therefore, it is necessary that he be disposed to receive the divine motion proceeding from the inspiration from God.

According to the present objection, even this argument is not convincing. The conclusion of St. Thomas, then, cannot be entertained. The weakness of the argument arises from the fact that, even through the theological and moral virtues—faith, hope, love, and penance—man is moved towards justification by divine motion and inspiration. With His grace, God touches the heart of a man through the illumination of the Holy Ghost in such a way that it cannot be said that the one receiving the inspiration does absolutely nothing.¹ Yet for a man to follow and obey this motion, this inspiration, this illumination of the Holy Spirit, no special gifts are required. The theological and moral virtues are sufficient. If the gifts are not necessary for following this inspiration and illumination of the Holy Ghost, the whole argument of St. Thomas fails. For he insists that a man needs special gifts other than the virtues to be disposed to be moved easily under the inspiration and motion of the Holy Ghost.

84. The reply : There can be no doubt that some illumination and inspiration of the Holy Ghost is necessary for the theological and infused moral virtues. Yet this illumination which is ordered to salvation and is a prerequisite *for* justification is of two kinds. The first kind is an imperfect and general sort of motion. The second is perfect and altogether special.

Although the entire supernatural order may be called special in contradistinction to the natural order, yet even within the supernatural order there are both common and special helps in matters pertaining to salvation. The theological virtues, together with the other divine assistance ennobling the intellect, cannot sufficiently penetrate and know all things conducive to salvation. Faith of itself serves only to bring about a consent to things revealed by God.

¹ Cf. Council of Trent, session 4, chapter 5. Denzinger 794, 814.

Although it is elevated above the natural order, faith alone is not sufficient to penetrate and to know the suitability and foundation of the truths believed. It cannot know to what extent they are worthy of belief, or how deeply they should be impressed upon the heart. Nor can reason and human argument penetrate and judge supernatural mysteries. Although the credibility of the mysteries can be proved with evidence, nevertheless, even when convinced of the credibility of the things of faith, the mind is not sufficiently attracted either to believe them, to adhere to them, or to act upon them. An interior, spiritual impulse is required to move a man to believe, love, and act upon the things of faith.

85. (36) This situation becomes apparent when anyone is tempted by doubts in matters of faith. At first he is not easily quieted. Then suddenly he finds such complete serenity that it seems to him that those same things are so certain that nothing could be more sure. In that case there is more than a penetration and understanding of the things of faith; there is the spirit of understanding, a spiritual, loving understanding.

In the story of St. Cecilia it is recorded that her husband, Valerian, when he stood before Pope Urban, saw the old man holding in his hands a tablet upon which was written: One God, One Faith, One Baptism. When the old man asked him, "Do you believe this?" Valerian cried in a loud voice, "There is nothing more truly to be believed." What could have moved Valerian to understand so suddenly that there was nothing more truly to be believed? There must have been some interior impulse and illumination of the Holy Ghost enkindling in him a love for those mysteries whose fire enlightened his mind so that he could express his belief.

That is not an uncommon experience. Yet the source of this serenity, the cause of such understanding and counsel, the root of this quieting of temptation from the fear of God, is not known. Although the source is unknown, it must be the Spirit, *who breathes where He will, and you hear His voice and you do not know where it comes from or where it goes.*¹

86. (84) Though it is evident that a motion, an illumination and an inspiration are required for all the infused virtues, the objection might be advanced that St. Thomas is not concerned in his proof

¹ Cf. *John*, iii, 8.

with all the illuminations and inspirations of the Holy Ghost. He refers rather to an inspiration and divine motion productive of a particular and extraordinary effect superior to the virtues. This is evident from the proof he takes from Aristotle's *Eudomian Ethics*:¹ "For those who are moved according to a divine instinct, there is no need to take counsel according to human reason." This is the text commonly cited by those who would imply that the gifts perfect a man to higher acts than the acts of the virtues.

If this is admitted, a more pressing objection may be urged against St. Thomas from his doctrine in another place.² There he teaches that the gifts are the common endowments of all who have charity, and that they are necessary for salvation.³ Yet these extraordinary movements are inspirations to unusual works which exceed the virtues. Such unusual acts are not to be found in all the just. Many live in simplicity according to a prosaic life devoid of extraordinary activities. Therefore, these extraordinary works are not necessary. Indeed, the mere observance of the commandments, by acts of virtue, suffices for salvation. If then the gifts of the Holy Ghost are given for extraordinary works, they are not necessary for salvation. But if they are necessary, then they are not distinct from the virtues.

37. There are two aspects of the question about extraordinary works being necessary for salvation. Works may be ordinary or extraordinary either on the part of the works themselves or on the part of the one performing them. In itself, an act may not be out of the ordinary. Yet a soul subject to deficiencies, confronted with obstacles and enemies and hostile forces may not attain to all the requisites for salvation. Hence, absolutely speaking, extraordinary works are not required for salvation. Remarkable things need not be revealed to the soul, nor need it perform unusual deeds. However, if such works are accomplished the operation of the Holy Ghost shines forth more brightly in them. For example, if anyone, in the spirit of fortitude, not only approaches his enemies unafraid but unarmed slays a thousand of them with the jawbone of an ass as Samson did, he has been inspired by the Holy Spirit and gives evidence of the acts of the gifts of the Holy Ghost.⁴

38. Such actions are not absolutely required for salvation. Yet there are acts, related to the same object and material of the same

¹ X/Z *Eudomian Ethics*, c. 14, 22 (1248 a 32).

³ *Ibid.*, a. 2.

² I-II, q. 68, a. 5, ad 1.

< Cf. *Judges*, xv, 15.

virtues, which are extraordinary and special because of the agent's infirmity and deficiencies. Fulfilling the commandments is, of course, sufficient for salvation. But if that observance is to be full and complete, the Holy Ghost must help the soul in the midst of so many obstacles and defects. Human reason and the virtues do not suffice, unless an impulse of the Holy Ghost supplementing human infirmity and conquering all difficulties is added. *The good Spirit shall lead me into the right land.*¹

39. It might be objected that there are some who could attain salvation without these difficulties and impediments. Adults who die immediately after baptism, or those who die as soon as they come to the use of reason would not meet them. Therefore, even under the subjective aspect of personal deficiencies in accomplishing extraordinary works the gifts are not necessary for salvation.

40. It may accidentally happen that someone may be saved without having actually exercised the gifts. The occasion for their exercise might not be present, just as the opportunity for the exercise of the virtues may be wanting. Nevertheless, it is not right to conclude that absolutely and essentially speaking the virtues are not necessary for salvation. No more so, then, is it logical to conclude that the gifts are not necessary. Accidentally, for want of opportunity, the gifts and virtues may not be used. However, there remains an habitual inclination—found even in children—and a promptitude of the soul for carrying out these movements of the Holy Ghost should the occasion demand.

41. The second objection: As alleged by St. Thomas and the theologians, the fundament for distinguishing the gifts from the virtues is not specific and essential. Therefore, the gifts are substantially virtues. The inference is evident. For if the gifts and the virtues differ only accidentally, they are substantially the same.

The objection fortifies its premises that the gifts and virtues differ only accidentally from the fact that they differ only on the part of the efficient cause, that higher mover to whose touch the gifts of the Holy Ghost dispose. But the order of efficient causality is extrinsic and accidental, not formal and substantial. Now evidently different efficient causes can produce the same effect. For example, fire may be

¹ *Psalm cxlii, 10.*

produced by another fire, by the rays of the sun, or by spontaneous combustion.

42. Reply: The gifts and virtues do not merely differ accidentally. The gifts differ from the virtues both from the point of view of the mover or the efficient cause, and from the point of view of the regulative principle and measure. In distinguishing the gifts from the virtues by means of their definition, St. Thomas¹ affirms that in the definition of virtue the words "a quality by which a man lives rightly" mean a right living according to the limitation of reason. By this phrase he distinguishes the definition of virtue from the definition of the gifts. In the latter definition the notion of right living should be understood as right living according to a divine measure which is above human capacity. Therefore, the disposition mentioned in connection with a man's being readily movable by the Holy Ghost is not to be understood as limited to the efficient movement, but as applying to the regulating and measuring principle as well. Under this aspect the gifts are similar to the moral virtues, since the virtues dispose the rational sense appetites to obey reason. Reason functions as the moving and regulating principle of the virtues. As habits the virtues are dispositions through which the will is disposed to be obedient to reason. The reason, in turn, moves the will by presenting and delimiting its object. The good as measured by reason, then, is the formal object of the virtues.

43. (46) Similarly, the gifts are habits or dispositions of the intellect and the will. They dispose these faculties to follow the impulse of the Holy Ghost, who regulates and delimits the objects of the gifts. His ordination constitutes the formal object of the gifts and specifies the good and the true according to the standards of divine illumination and not according to the standards of human reason. From it, as from an enkindling breath, which is an affection for divine things, there is born a more intimate penetration of the supernatural and a total dependence upon God. The Psalmist admonishes, *Cast thy care upon the Lord and he shall sustain thee; he shall not suffer the just to waver forever.*²

Where reason adorned with virtues may fluctuate and fail, it is God's own counsel to cast one's cares upon the Lord. His Spirit nourishes, sustains and guards the faithful lest they fail. For His gifts are their nourishment and their sustenance.

¹ I-II, q. 68, a. 1, ad 3.

² Psalm liv, 23.

44-45. (42-48) The claim has been made that the superior mover in the matter of the gifts is not in the efficient order but in the formal order. However, even if this moving principle were in the formal order it would follow that the gifts are merely higher types of virtues. It would be illogical to conclude that the gifts are not virtues. Moreover, St. Thomas asserts that the gifts are dispositions necessary for the action of the mover. But if this mover is in the order of formal causality, no such disposition is required. For, over and above its own nature, a receiver requires no special disposition to render it passive to a new form. Therefore, in proving that the gifts are dispositions, St. Thomas necessarily involved the order of efficient causality. Consequently, he was advancing an accidental and not an essential difference between the virtues and the gifts.

46.(47) In response to the latter part of this argument it should be noted that the superior moving principle referred to brings about a virtue higher than the limitations of reason will allow. Broadly speaking, it may be called a virtue, as St. Thomas concedes, since it is a good habit. However, it is called a gift, in contradistinction to the virtues, because it is above anything due to human reason.

47. (48) Moreover, a virtue is a disposition moved and regulated by reason. It is specified and delimited by its object and not merely by its efficient cause. The will is thus disposed to its object according to the regulation of the reason. By the name "mover," then, is meant the formal cause regulating and specifying. In the specification of this cause some disposition is necessary. Such a disposition is not for the introduction of a form; it is a habit in the soul. Since reason may fail to perform the specification properly, the motion and impulse of the Holy Ghost enters into the soul.

48. (44) However, according to some there seems to be no reason why the theological and moral virtues themselves do not suffice for the higher motion of the Holy Ghost. The gifts are concerned with the same matter as the infused virtues, for example, the gift of fortitude and the infused virtue of fortitude, counsel and infused prudence, understanding, knowledge and faith. All deal with these matters within the supernatural order. A new virtue is not required, therefore, that a man be moved in a higher way. All that seems to be necessary is a more intense and more perfect mode of acting in the same virtue.

It has already been admitted that heroic and common virtues, the purgative virtues and those of the soul which has been tried do not differ except according to the more and the less. Why then cannot the same be maintained with regard to the virtues and the gifts? The spirit of fortitude by which Samson killed a thousand men with a jawbone, although more excellent and strengthened by a more perfect assistance from God, would not differ, then, from the virtue of fortitude, by which many soldiers conquer in battle.¹

49. This final resumption under the second objection is not valid. The disposition even of the infused virtues does not suffice for the reception of the motion of the Holy Ghost. Distinct habits are required, since the gifts of the Holy Ghost are given to supply for the deficiency of human reason, even when it is adorned with the virtues. Since, therefore, the virtues are limited and specified by the good as regulated and attained through human reason, whatever disposes to acts and accomplishments superior to reason demands another habit outside the limits and specific nature of human virtue.

A further consideration must be entertained. Whatever exceeds human nature goes beyond it either by reason of the supernatural character of the matter at hand, the object of the action, or by reason of superiority in the mode of acting. Supernatural things attained in this life are measured by human limitations and actions. They are apprehended and desired according to human capacity. Supernatural goods are known through faith; through prudence and the other moral virtues direction is given to supernatural acts. However, because of the limited essence of these virtues, the intellect does not penetrate the mysteries of faith, except in an imperfect manner and according to the analogy of natural things. In many respects, therefore, the understanding of those things is deficient. The soul requires either a theological argument, which is subject to a thousand opinions, fallacies, and defects, or it requires a light, a celestial impulse, by which it may be directed by the Holy Ghost.

50. Likewise, infused prudence, moderating and judging actions in the supernatural order, fails in many respects if it proceeds and judges only according to the capacity of human reason. Its deficiency must be supplied by a divine impulse and motion which directs and regulates it. It is fitting, then, that there be in the will and in the

¹ I-ττ, q. 68, a. 1.

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sensitive appetites a disposition proportionate to the movement of the Holy Ghost. Human reason according to its own manner of acting cannot operate on such a plane. The divine impulse must supply what is lacking in the process of the human reason, even when that reason is helped and augmented by the infused theological virtues. Moreover, by enabling the sensitive appetite to obey and follow a higher divine impulse, the gifts compensate for the deficiencies of the moral virtues, which incline a man towards good, but only according to the limitations of human reason.

51. Furthermore, the gifts and the virtues deal with the same objects. And, of course, only a more intense and perfect act and not a new virtue is required so long as the action remains within the limits of human powers and attainments in the supernatural order. However, the example adduced of the heroic, purgative virtues of the tried soul does not remain within the bounds of human reason. Certainly some higher power than any human virtue is necessary for a man to be moved beyond the merely human manner of acting and to be directed to acts in which human reason fails. The impulse of the Holy Ghost must fill the breach when human reason can go no further. This special assistance is called a gift both because it is gratuitously given to raise the faculty to the supernatural order and because it supplements the deficiencies of the faculty.

52. This is the doctrine of St. Thomas.¹ He distinguishes the matter from the manner in human actions. The acts of the virtues are performed in a human manner and in this respect the gifts surpass the virtues. For it is connatural to human nature to perceive divine things only according to an image found in creatures and in the darkness of analogy. Thus faith proceeds. However, the gift of understanding so illuminates the mind concerning the things that have been heard that a man receives a foretaste of the beatific vision. St. Thomas,² therefore, distinguishes the gifts from the infused virtues. For although the infused virtues are substantially divine gifts their mode of acting is human and inferior to that of the gifts of the Holy Ghost.

53. The third objection: It sometimes happens that even in the theological virtues a thing is done which is beyond the common and ordinary manner of proceeding. Yet in that case there is not required

¹ *In III Sententiarum*, d. 84, q. 1, a. 1.

² *Ibid.*, ad. 2.

any gift higher than the virtue itself. Furthermore, the theological virtues are superior to the gifts¹ and hence no gift is more powerful than they. Gifts are not necessary, therefore, because of any extraordinary work in the sphere of the theological virtues.

The fact of unusual occurrences in the sphere of the theological virtues is proved by the existence of a faith which moves mountains, to which St. Paul referred,² and a charity so great that it overcomes death. These virtues, at least, involve extraordinary actions.

The statement that the virtues are sufficient for their own acts is evidenced by the fact that no works of faith or charity are so perfect and excellent that faith and charity themselves are not equal to them. Of faith it is said, *it is like a grain of mustard seed*,³ and, *you will say to the mountain, remove from hence, and it will be removed*. This is not a gift of the Holy Ghost distinct from faith. Nor is that charity which *gives its body to be burned*⁴ a gift distinct from the charity greater than which no one has than he *who would, lay down his life for his friends*.⁵

54. It must be admitted, in reply to this argument, that there are extraordinary actions even in the sphere of theological virtues. For this very purpose, there are gifts corresponding to the virtues: understanding corresponds to faith,⁶ the gift of fear to hope,⁸ and the gift of wisdom to charity.⁹

While the gifts are superior to the moral virtues, they serve the theological virtues by supplementing them. The theological virtues join the soul to its ultimate end, while the gifts serve to move it and lead it to that end. *Thy spirit shall lead me into the right land; His wind shall blow and the waters shall run.*¹¹

*Come, O south wind, blow through my garden and let its aromatical spices flow.*¹² This flowing is related to motion toward an end, and not to the rest or quiet in it. The gifts have a certain essential superiority over the virtues which are concerned with the means to the end. For the gifts move men in a higher way in the very things in which these virtues fail.

55. (57) However, the gifts cannot be essentially superior to the virtues which join the soul immediately to God.¹³ For motion of the

¹ I-II, q. 68, a. 8.

² Cf. *I Corinthians*, xiii, 2.

³ *Matthew*, xiii, 31; *Luke*, xiii, 19; xvii, 6.

⁴ *Matthew*, xvii, 19.

⁵ *I Corinthians*, xiii, 3.

⁶ *John*, xv, 13.

⁷ II-II, q. 8 and 9.

⁸ *Ibid.*, q. 19.

⁹ *Ibid.*, q. 15.

¹⁰ *Psalms* exlii, 9.

¹¹ *Psalms* cxlvii, 18.

¹² *Cantic of Canticles*, iv, 16.

¹³ I-II, q. 68, a. 8.

Holy Ghost, to which the gifts are subservient, has as its purpose union with God as the last end. Therefore, the gifts corresponding to the theological virtues help them with their proper object and certain allied matters.

For example, the gift of understanding is given for the penetration of the mysteries of faith and divine things. Yet this penetration is not an immediate and complete understanding. Attaining to the credibility of mysteries, it judges their appropriateness or the meaning of articles by discerning them from errors. Furthermore, it determines the interpretation of Scripture—*he opened their minds, that they might understand the Scriptures*.¹ The gift of knowledge is bestowed so that the soul may attain to the causes of the credibility of mysteries and their inner consistency. It disposes and prepares the mind to believe more firmly. The gift of fear is concerned with one's own nothingness. It subjects the soul to the divine eminence and restrains the soul to its proper proportions so that it will not be presumptuous but rather prepared to be wholly dependent upon God. Wisdom judges according to the savour of divine things, and it discerns supernatural things in the love of God.

All these gifts serve the virtues. They assist them by preparing for acts of virtue, not by arousing the theological virtues to an essentially more perfect act. No works of faith and charity are so perfect that they cannot in essence be accomplished by those virtues. But the object can be dealt with more perfectly when the virtues are assisted by the gifts. For the virtues are not sufficient to dispose and prepare themselves with respect to that object. Therefore, the gifts should be distinguished from the theological virtues, since although they are concerned with the same object, they do not view it under the same formality or light.

56. (54) Another objection may be raised concerning other virtues: fortitude, for example. When Samson killed a thousand men this deed exceeded neither the sphere nor the essence of the virtue of fortitude. Fortitude inclines a man to sustain difficulties and attack danger wherever that attack is evidently justified either by human reason or by an impulse of the Holy Ghost. However, it requires a special help when the work is great and extraordinary. But it is one thing to need an extraordinary help and quite another to require a special virtue or habit. The ordinary virtue together with the extra-

¹ *Luke*, xxiv, 45.

ordinary assistance should suffice for the task. How then can it be shown that extraordinary tasks require a gift of the Holy Ghost distinct from the virtues?

This is especially true since unusual works happen but rarely and are done by only a few. There is even less reason, then, to postulate special habits in all the just. Nor is there a satisfactory answer in the claim that the works are above the limitations of human reason. Even when a man is moved to these special actions, he is moved according to right reason, although it has been illuminated by an impulse of the Holy Ghost. Therefore, the gifts are not superior to the human reason when that reason is illuminated by the Holy Ghost. In other words, the ordinary virtues together with a special help are sufficient.

57. (59) There are some things which exceed the measure and essence of human virtue as judged by the rule of prudence in matters attainable by human procedure and reasoning. The formal and specific essence of the moral virtue is taken from the rule and measure by which it is judged—for morality is nothing other than a measure of things to be done. It is certain, then, that wherever there is a variation in the morality and the measure, there is a corresponding change in the virtue. Reason clothes with virtue but confined to the light and direction of a merely human manner of proceeding cannot offer a rule of life comprehending the totality of means to salvation. *For the thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain.*¹

In many things, therefore, men should give themselves into the hands of Divine Prudence to be ruled by its impulse, which is a higher and more certain and more comprehensive measure than their own reason. For human difficulties arise either from the multitude and the magnitude of the objects or from the nothingness and infirmity of the person who is unable to comprehend all the details of life even in the natural order. The gifts of the Holy Ghost alone can lead him to this comprehension.

58. (60) Great and unusual deeds can be accomplished by human effort and industry. Even in a theological virtue which presupposes supernatural faith, there may be more intense works of virtue, exceeding the limits and essence of human moral virtue. Such acts, even within their own proper sphere, require a more excellent grace and a more perfect assistance from God. Yet even in the supernatural order

¹ *Wisdom*, ix, 14.

they are always founded upon human reason and limited by human industry.

There are, moreover, great and extraordinary works which despite one's own effort and diligence are unattainable. They require an impulse superior to human direction and effort. That impulse constitutes a higher morality and regulative principle. To that morality should correspond a principle in the will which inclines it to the new and higher standard. According to human standards, Samson would have to be judged temerarious in attacking a thousand men with only the jawbone of an ass. By the same standards, it would have been judged wrong for him to break down the columns of the building to kill himself and others. The same might be said in the case of St. Apollonia who threw herself into the fire. According to the higher rule, however, these actions are judged good. Therefore, there is a distinct moral aspect.

59. (58) Furthermore, extraordinary help of a kind that varies the morality of an act is not given as connatural to virtues which are specified by a diverse moral rule. Nor is this help such that it lifts the virtues out of their own sphere of morality. Then it would be neither proportionate nor connatural to the soul. If this help is to be given proportionately and connaturally, new habits in the soul transcending the morality of ordinary virtues are required. These habits are called the gifts of the Holy Ghost.

Of course, even in extraordinary work a man is moved by his reason. His reason must be regulated by a rectifying principle transcending the scope of human effort, even in the supernatural order. This regulative principle varies the morality of the virtues subject to it.

60. (55) Finally, it may be argued that if the gifts are given for extraordinary actions above the common rule of reason and of human virtue, it is not within a man's power or judgment to act through these gifts when he chooses. Experience testifies that men do not act according to the gifts every time they wish. Therefore, they act through the gifts as through the charisms like prophecy, which is not a habit but a transient grace.¹

Men are instruments of God moved by Him to actions to which of themselves they are not suited. To this action of an instrument, St. Thomas² compares the works of the gifts. Through them men passively

¹ II-II, q. 171, a. 1.

² I-II, q. 68, a. 3, ad 2.

receive divine things and are moved by the Holy Ghost rather than move and act of themselves. *Whoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God.*¹ St. Thomas² uses this testimony to prove that the gifts of the Holy Ghost are found in the faithful and the purpose of the gifts is to make them amenable to the movement of the Holy Ghost. Therefore, those gifts are not enduring habits in the faithful. They are passing graces when, given for miraculous purposes. If they are given to the faithful as habits then they do not exceed the essence and limitation of ordinary virtues.

61. (62) Some think that the acts of the gifts, especially in exterior matters, are miraculous acts, not under the control of men. To the rejoinder that reason has no need for habits to perform these actions—since habits can be used at will—they reply that this is understood of habits which are subject to reason and regulated by common rules.

If this were the case, St. Thomas³ would have proved in vain that there are no habits of prophecy and miracles, because men do not have the power of prophesying and of working miracles at will. Against him it might be alleged that there might be habits of prophecy and miracles. For according to these theologians, there could be habits outside the subjection of reason and common rules which could be used at will.

However, according to the testimony of St. Thomas⁴ the gifts of the Holy Ghost are given as habits not as an impulse moving the soul but for a special obedience by which the soul is subject to the motion of the Holy Ghost. This obedience and disposition which is a preparation for habitual subjection to the Holy Ghost should remain constant in the faithful. However, its exercise depends upon a motion and actual impulse which is not within the power of man. It is in his power, however, to be always prepared to obey, to be docile to the Holy Ghost. *My heart is ready, O God, my heart is ready. I will sing, and will give praise with my glory.*⁵ It is not within human power to arouse and to excite that glory, yet the heart of man may be prepared to sing in harmony with God's movements. Being subject to Him is the greatest chant, since *In Thee is my song forever.*^{*1}

62. (64) When St. Thomas compares the motion through the gifts of the Holy Ghost to the motion of an instrument, he does not

¹ *Romans*, viii, 14.

² I-II, q. 68, a. 1.

³ II-II, q. 171, a. 1 and q. 178.

⁴ I-II, q. 68.

⁵ *Psalm* cvii, 2.

⁸ *Psalm* lxx, 6.

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apply it in all its aspects. Rather, he uses it from the point of view that a man needs the actual impulse of God to perform any actions. Through the gifts he performs works exceeding his own power. For the same reason other supernatural things are said to be as instruments in the faithful. Indeed all creatures are said to be as instruments of God. They depend upon His actually moving them. But men are not called instruments because they are purely inanimate and merely serving ministerially. For in lesser creatures there is no principle eliciting actions as a principal cause nor is there operation through an intrinsic principle. There is only a principle ministerially serving the motion of the principle agent, so that the whole is moved by another.

68. (65) The final statement is that men are rather in the position of passively receiving divine things than in the position of moving themselves. Of course, they are voluntarily passive and obedient to the divine motion. To be obedient and passive in this way is not precisely to be like something inanimate. It is rather to operate actively by receiving divine things by being led by the same Spirit.

64. (66) Finally, other difficulties about each gift might be raised against this doctrine. In the case of the intellectual gifts it might be argued that their essence does not differ from that of faith. Moreover, it may be alleged that those in the will do not differ from the other virtues. It is not expedient here, however, to explain the nature and difference of each gift. That will be done in the subsequent chapters.

Chapter III

THE GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING

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Chapter III

THE GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING

1. By way of preface to this more specialized treatment of the gifts, it should be noted that it is not the burden of the present tract to discuss all the difficulties which might arise concerning each gift. The treatment given here is limited to subjects which cast light upon the necessity of the gifts and upon their distinction from the virtues.

2. Isaias assigned a certain primacy to understanding and wisdom when he wrote, *There shall descend upon him the spirit of wisdom and understanding.*¹ Yet these two gifts are distinguished from faith only with great difficulty. For it would seem that their entire function could be accomplished through the act of faith. Moreover, distinguishing these gifts from one another raises the problem of assigning the act which is proper to understanding and exclusive of wisdom.

It is certain, however, that these gifts are not limited to the scope of faith and the present life, since they are to be found in Christ and the blessed. Prescinding from faith and the present life, then, the true explanation of these gifts must bring to light the exact nature of each gift, their mutual relationships, and the formal principle of their distinction from faith.

There is a judgment involved in the gift of understanding and not merely a simple apprehension of terms

3. On this subject many theologians entertain doubts because of the words of St. Thomas.² For in distinguishing the gift of understanding from the gifts of wisdom and knowledge, St. Thomas states that the apprehension of truth which is related to the speculative discovery pertains to the gift of understanding. The gift of counsel, on the other hand, perfects the practical intellect in its apprehension of truth. The judgment concerning truth is perfected in its speculative

¹ *Isaias*, xi, 2.

² *Summa Theologica*, I-II, q. 68, a. 4.

role through the gift of wisdom, and in its practical role through the gift of knowledge.

4. These statements raise difficulties. Since both apprehension and judgment can proceed from one habit, these two functions appear to offer insufficient foundation for a distinction in the gifts. Judgments are made concerning things apprehended and, consequently, apprehension is ordained to judgment. Therefore, it seems that both can be derived from one and the same habit.

Furthermore, one and the same habit of principles apprehends and assents to truth—and assent is a form of judgment. Therefore, the mere fact that one gift is ordained to the apprehension of supernatural truths and another gift to the judgment of the same truths hardly seems sufficient to distinguish the gifts of understanding and wisdom. Moreover, in the natural order apprehending and judging do not proceed from distinct habits. A man does not apprehend truths with one habit and judge about them with another. Ennobled and unified in the supernatural order, these two functions would not distinguish the gifts of understanding and wisdom. The argument is confirmed by the fact that in the will the gifts of fortitude, piety, and fear unite in themselves all the fields of activity of the various moral virtues.

5. In defence of St. Thomas' distinction it might be alleged that the gift of understanding serves both for the apprehension and the judgment of truth. Such a defence, however, is contrary to the opinion of St. Thomas. Furthermore, it assumes the inconvenient position of failing to distinguish the gift of understanding from the gifts of knowledge and wisdom. For if it belongs to the gift of understanding to judge of the supernatural truths already apprehended, this same gift should judge of these truths either through their causes or their effects. Otherwise, its judgment would not be perfect. Presuming to judge without consideration of the causes or effects, the gift would not penetrate the depths of truth. It would have a very superficial and hesitating judgment. Furthermore, if it judged in the light of a supreme cause, or even an inferior cause or some effect, it would in no way differ from wisdom or knowledge, since it would perform no new function. On the other hand, if it should judge from effects, there is no reason why its judgment should be excluded from the gift of knowledge, since it pertains to knowledge to judge from effects.

6. Moreover, it may be urged by some that the gift of understanding attains merely to a judgment of principles and in no way touches on conclusions. But this would make the gift equivalent to the habit of principles, which is called understanding. This habit of principles judges and discerns truths, yet the truths it considers are not those known and inferred from causes but those ascertained from the terms themselves. If the gift of understanding were to judge in this way, it would not differ from faith. For those truths which stand as principles are attained only obscurely in this life. Therefore, if the gift of understanding assents to them and judges of them obscurely, it surely assents to them in the same way as faith. If, on the other hand, the gift of understanding judged and assented to supernatural truths as the principle of further knowledge, it could do so in one of two ways. It would either see them clearly, and this would be the light of glory in heaven, or it would see them obscurely, and this would be faith. Furthermore, opinions and doubtful matters cannot be the endowments of supernatural habits.

7. Another defence of St. Thomas' distinction is sought in the statement that the gift of understanding does not directly pursue the truths of faith. It considers their credibility or approaches them from the point of view of their meaning.

8. Contrary to this final allegation stands the fact that all considerations of credibility and meaning stand as a preamble to faith. The evident credibility and even the suitability of the things to be believed are known before the advent of faith. A pious affection may move to an apprehension of the suitability of the things to be believed while before faith a man must have some previous knowledge of the meaning of Scripture and the articles of the Creed, otherwise he could not believe. For these acts a gift of the Holy Ghost is not required, since the gift could not antecede faith. Yet if every gift is found only in those having charity, it presupposes faith. Therefore, the gift of the Holy Ghost is not absolutely necessary for the performance of acts which precede faith. Even presupposing faith, such acts can be performed without the gift of the Holy Ghost, since even then they proceed from the same motives as before, both in sinners as in those in the state of grace. Therefore, if the gifts are found only in those who have grace, surely they are not necessary for functions which are found in those not having grace.

Furthermore, the formal motives which precede faith in the judgment of the credibility of its mysteries are not always supernatural. By natural reason, many of the motives preliminary to faith can be known. Moreover, no one can prudently believe without a sufficient motive of credibility. This situation does not require a special gift of the Holy Ghost. For these acts are common to sinners as well as those who are in the state of grace. The gifts, however, are found only in those who are just and in the state of grace. Therefore, the gifts are not required for acts concerning the credibility of mysteries or the meaning of Scripture.

9. Nevertheless, the gift of understanding is never found without some judgment of truth. This is evident from the doctrine of St. Thomas.¹ He remarks that "the reason is both speculative and practical: and in both is found the apprehension of truth (which pertains to the discovery of truth) and judgment concerning the truth. Accordingly, for the apprehension of truth, the speculative reason is perfected by understanding, the practical reason by counsel. The speculative reason is perfected by wisdom in order that it may judge rightly, the practical reason by knowledge." Although St. Thomas had taught that the gifts of understanding and wisdom are only in the speculative part, and knowledge only in the practical, he² later changed that teaching when he affirmed that these gifts perfect both the speculative and practical intellect. Similarly, faith is practical since it believes truths and acts through love. However, St. Thomas never changed his doctrine concerning the fact that the gift of understanding apprehends, penetrates and knows; and without a judgment, truth is not apprehended, penetrated, or known.

Furthermore, St. Thomas did not affirm that it pertains to the gift of understanding simply to apprehend the terms from which the propositions are formed, as is the case with the apprehension in the first act of the mind. Rather, he taught that to the gift of understanding pertains the apprehension of truth, which is related to discovery. Truth and its apprehension consist in a judgment, apprehended by a complete statement and by composition and division, which are in the second act of the mind according to St. Thomas.³ The act of discovery is not related to the simple apprehension of

¹ *Summa Theological* and II-II, q. 8, a. 1.

² II-II, qq. 8, 9, and 45.

³ I, q. 16, a. 3.

terms. It is related to truths and propositions discovered. A man learns some things while he discovers others for himself. Yet whatever is learned is not merely terms, but propositions and truths, known either from the terms or from argumentation. Similarly, then, discovery is not simply a matter of knowing terms, but includes the truths found and their expression.

10. From the way in which St. Thomas¹ enunciates his doctrine concerning the gift of understanding, it is clear that both the simple apprehension of terms and the penetrating and discerning judgment of truth pertain to this gift. He compares the gift of understanding to the light of first principles, likewise called understanding. He² notes that the reasoning process always starts from understanding and ends with it. For a man reasons from things already understood and comes to understand what was previously unknown. It is evident, then, that the complete function of understanding in the reasoning process goes beyond the mere grasp of terms. It includes propositions or truths, self-evident by the light of reason, from which are evolved the truth of the conclusion.

11. The Holy Doctor then adds this statement: "The infused light bears the same relation to truths supernaturally known that the natural light bears to truths held as primary principles." This principle establishes a direct comparison between the gift of understanding and the natural light of first principles. Certainly the natural light of principles provides for a judgment of self-evident truths, over and above the apprehension of the terms involved. According to the comparison just indicated, the gift of understanding must likewise include a judgment concerning supernatural truths.

Moreover, St. Thomas³ teaches that "the gift of understanding is concerned with the first principles of the knowledge of grace." These first principles are not mere terms but propositions or the statements of truths.

12. Finally in explaining the act of the gift of understanding, St. Thomas⁴ makes a statement which cannot be understood without involving a judgment and the formation of a proposition: "In this life the gift of understanding does not penetrate the very essence of

¹ II-II, q. 8, a. 1, ad 1.
² II-II, q. 8, a. 1, ad 2.

³ II-II, q. 8, a. 6, ad 2.
⁴ II-II, q. 8, a. 8, ad 2.

the thing known, nor is the truth of a proposition completely grasped. Yet it does understand that faith is not to be abandoned because of any outward appearances." Certainly this cannot be accomplished without comparison and judgment. Moreover, St. Thomas¹ affirms that "through the gift of understanding the Holy Ghost enlightens a man's mind to know supernatural truth." Truth, however, is known through judgment.

Furthermore, when explaining the fruit corresponding to the gift of understanding, St. Thomas² claims that faith holds that place. However, he does not consider here the virtue or habit of faith but the certitude of faith. This certitude strengthens a man in his penetration and understanding of the things of faith. It brings him tranquillity in his adherence to the things of faith so that he does not waver in his belief.

Moreover, St. Thomas³ notes that: "Faith cannot altogether precede understanding, for it would be impossible for a man to assent to what is proposed for his belief without first understanding it in some way. However, the perfection of understanding follows the virtue of faith, while an added certitude of faith in turn follows the perfection of understanding." He places this as the fruit resulting from the gift of understanding. Since faith is an assent to revealed truths through a judgment, and since the gift of understanding fructifies in this firmness of assent and certitude of judgment, certainly the operation of this gift should be a judgment. Otherwise, it could not affirm or verify any judgment and assent.

18. The gift of understanding disposes a man to understand rightly and purely, without any admixture of error. It unshackles him from the sensible images of material things, which are the greatest impediment to spiritual understanding, since the spiritual order cannot be understood in corporeal things. Only when the nature of spiritual things—or at least what the nature is not—is discerned without confusion and without any admixture of extraneous or erroneous ideas is there a correct spiritual understanding. So long as this discernment is lacking, the things are neither understood nor penetrated. For intellectual apprehension and penetration of truth means that the object known stands before the intellect with a certain clarity. The intellect can then discern the very nature of the thing—or at least what it is not—without confusing it with any other things. Likewise,

II-II, q. 8, a. 8.

II-II, q. 8.

2 II-II, q. 8, a. 4.

the eye sees sharply and penetrates the visible reality, not when it sees obscurely or confusedly, but when it sees distinctly.

The gift of understanding quickens and perfects the mind, so that it may proceed without confusion and error. For this purpose the Holy Ghost illumines the soul. Consequently, the beatitude which corresponds to the gift of understanding is cleanness of heart. *Blessed are the clean of heart for they shall see God.*¹ In teaching that this beatitude corresponds to the gift of understanding, St. Thomas² notes that cleanness of heart can be understood in two ways. It may be taken as a cleansing from all inordinate affections. This cleansing is brought about by the virtues and the gifts in the appetitive part of the soul. Cleanness of heart may also be understood as applying to a liberation from sensible images and errors, lest what is proposed by God be received in the manner of corporeal images or according to heretical perversity. Therefore, in the mysteries of faith, the gift of understanding should discern truth from error and the spirituality of divine reality from corporeal forms. Without it, the mind remains unrefined and suffers from a certain lassitude and cloudiness. But when the gift of understanding illuminates the mind, it takes away any crudeness and lassitude. Yet, this discernment, penetration, and illumination cannot be achieved without a comparison and a collation of the truths of faith with the error which is rejected. It must, likewise, distinguish between the spiritual purity and abstraction which it seeks and the materiality and dregs of corporeal forms which it casts aside. Therefore, the gift of understanding with its endowment of acumen and preparation for penetrating and knowing things clearly, should have the power of judging. Otherwise, it would not be able to discriminate and compare.

14. The objection may be raised that it is impossible in this life to remove the sensible images and corporeal forms from the act of understanding. For a soul united to a body it is proper and connatural to understand in conjunction with the senses and by an appeal to them. In the next life, of course, sensible images will be cleared away, but in this life they are necessary, since ecstasy is extremely rare and, unlike the gifts, it is not common to all the just. Therefore, to claim that the act of understanding is a discernment and judgment clearing away sensible images and errors is to offer an insufficient explanation of the nature of the gift.

This is especially true since material error does not destroy faith, so

¹ *Matthew*, v, 8.

² II-II, q. 8, a. 7.

long as there is no pertinacity—without which no one is a heretic. For material error is not a mortal sin, and it can coexist with grace and the gifts which are found in those having grace.¹ Therefore, error and the gift of understanding are in some way compatible.

15. In reply to this objection it should be noted that understanding can rise above sensible images in two ways. In the first, sensible images are not present. In the second, understanding compares its proper object with sensible images and, realizing that they are not its object, it abstracts from them. By this negation and removal of imperfection, men know God and the spiritual order of this life. For, although spiritual realities are known through their similarity to sensible things, nevertheless these same sensible images are removed from the concept of God. “Intellectual knowledge does not remain in these sensible images, but in them it contemplates the purity of intelligible truth,” according to St. Thomas.² The total obliteration of sensible images is a purification never attained in this mortal life in which the soul understands with a dependence on the senses. However, a relative purification by negation and removal of images is possible. In it realities are understood through their similarity to sensible things but not in the manner of sensible images as such. Yet this purification is brought about only through a discernment and a comparison of one thing with another—a judgment.

16. It must be admitted that faith and the gift of understanding are compatible with a material error.³ They can coexist with ignorance or nescience of the matters of faith which a man is not bound to know. It follows from this that the gift of understanding is not always perfect and consummate, so that it purges from all errors, even those which are material or accidental. For even in the angels there can be a cleansing away of this lack of knowledge by superior angels. Therefore, these facts do not prove that the gift of understanding does not cleanse away all formal errors adhered to with advertence, and those errors which, according to the degree of obscurity in the understanding of certain truths, can more or less impede salvation.

17. It might well be asked here what sort of judgment the gift of understanding offers, and how it differs from the judgment of the gifts of wisdom and knowledge and from the judgment of faith.

¹ III-II, q. 8, a. 4.

² II-II, q. 158, a. 5, ad 2.

³ Cf. No. 15.

18. The reply involves the distinction of the twofold manner of judging. The first is an analytical judgment through causes or effects, by resolving and by reasoning. The other is a simple judgment of discernment. This latter judgment decides that one thing is not another or is not like another, either through comparison and reflection in the intellect or, more simply, in the discrimination of colour and sound by the senses.

The gifts of wisdom and knowledge judge of supernatural things in an analytic manner: wisdom judges through the supreme causes, through an intimate union with God. Knowledge judges through lesser causes or effects, since it is concerned with creatures. Faith judges, or is moved to effective assent, through neither causes nor effects, but through the naked testimony of God revealing.

19. The gift of understanding does not judge analytically, nor does it reason about supernatural truths through their causes. From an interior impulse of the Holy Ghost and from an affection toward spiritual things, it discerns spiritual realities from corporeal, and separates the things to be believed from those which are not to be believed, or errors. The evidence of a reasoning process is not required for this type of judgment. It does not proceed from cause or from effect, nor does it resolve the conclusion to its principles, since the gift of understanding, like the habit of first principles, is concerned with principles. Rather, this judgement is formed from a better and keener penetration of the terms in these truths, their congruity, and the incongruity of the opposing errors.

Moreover, in natural things there are some principles known by all and called axioms, like "A thing either is or it is not." There are others, known only by the learned, whose terms are easily penetrated only by acute minds, for example: "Spiritual substances are not in place," "God alone is to be worshipped," "There are not many gods." The perception and the penetration of the terms of these latter axioms depend upon a comparison and a collation with their opposites, just as does the contrast of spiritual and corporeal realities. Nevertheless, this type of judgment is not made through an inference or a reasoning process but by a penetration of the terms in a sort of collation and comparison.

In much this same manner, the gift of understanding renders the mind keen and elevates it by an impulse and an illumination of the Holy Ghost. The mind may then seize and penetrate the terms in

which the supernatural things of faith are proposed. From such a penetration it may judge what truths must be believed.

20. A further objection presents itself. Either this penetration of the terms is done with evidence and clarity or it is done in obscurity. If it is done with clarity and evidence, spiritual things and matters of faith are clearly understood. This is contrary to experience and is not compatible with faith, which is of things that are not seen. If this penetration remains in some obscurity it should be founded upon the testimony of a witness, for it can have no other formal motive. In this case it would be the same as an act of faith. Therefore, in its formal motive and specific nature, the gift of understanding is not distinguished from faith.

21. However, according to St. Thomas,¹ the penetration and understanding of truth can be either perfect or imperfect. A thing is understood perfectly when its essence is known as well as its mode of being. A thing is imperfectly understood when its essence and mode of being are not known. Supernatural realities are known as not running contrary to truth, despite external appearances, for a man knows that faith is not to be abandoned because of external appearances. This is extrinsic and negative evidence, which is not incompatible with faith. This negative evidence of matters of faith can be experienced in an internal affection, even if the essences of these matters are not seen. The evidential certitude of faith, its credibility, and the discernment of the truths of faith from error and the things of sense (which provides an extrinsic and negative evidence) can be brought about by the interior illumination of the Holy Ghost through the gift of understanding. All this is not opposed to the obscurity of faith. For the obscurity of faith is concerned with the mystery of the realities themselves and not with credibility or certitude. Although this present life, in which the eyes of men are always veiled, does not permit positive experiential evidence of the realities of faith, a man may sometimes feel a certain tranquillity concerning the meaning of Scripture, the credibility of God's testimony, the certitude of faith and its discernment from errors. Impossible without some sort of evidence, this tranquillity cannot be acquired through a process of reasoning. Born only of an interior impulse and illumination, it is frequently the experience of simple, unlettered men who have never studied theology.

¹III-II, q. 8, a. 2.

22. It follows from all this that the gift of understanding is particularly useful in contemplation. This gift sharpens the mind, making it keen and penetrating so that it may understand and need not walk in darkness. The mind is then bathed in light, even while it treads in the obscure paths of divinity; now cleared from obstacles by the way of negation, it enters into the powers of God. Looking upon the glory of the Lord as it approaches Him, the mind is transformed from one power to another by the Spirit of the Lord.

There is a very striking sign of this change in the intellect. The Holy Ghost asserts Himself in the mind by a sublimation and elevation of the power of understanding. Yet the soul does not feel its own exaltation but the exaltation of God above all creatures. *Man shall come to a lofty heart, and God shall be exalted!* It is most proper to the gift of understanding to render the heart lofty. It elevates the mind to a sublime kind of experience. Penetrating and understanding divine things, the mind knows that they vastly exceed all that can in any way be compared to them. However, from such a loftiness of heart the heart itself is not vainglorious. Acquired knowledge too often puffs up the mind to its ruin. Through the gift of understanding the mind is raised up so that it may exult, and God may be magnified. The soul then knows that it is God alone who is great and not itself.

Solution of the Difficulties

23. The clarification of the difficulties presented at the beginning of this chapter is now possible. Concerning the statements of St. Thomas, it has already been shown that the gift involves judgment and not merely apprehension. The gift is ordained to the apprehension of truth, which cannot be had without a judgment and a statement, attained through a comparison. Wisdom, on the other hand, is ordered to a judgment through higher causes and by resolution to them. Such a judgment does not pertain to the gift of understanding. Its judgment is one of discernment only, by which truth is attained and penetrated by distinguishing truth from error and spiritual realities from the things of sense. The penetration of truth consists in entering into the interior of a thing and distinguishing it from the things which make it obscure and by which knowledge of it is impeded. This is done through a judgment of discernment, and not by a resolution to the

causes of a thing, such as occurs in wisdom and knowledge. It is only this analytical judgment that St. Thomas denies to the gift of understanding.

24. In response to the second difficulty, it may readily be conceded that apprehension and judgment in the natural order pertain to the same habit. However, the gift of understanding involves a judgment and not merely an apprehension of terms. The objection was then raised that understanding is not distinct from wisdom or knowledge to which judgment pertains, just as apprehension belongs to understanding. The reply to this has already been given. While it is proper to wisdom and knowledge to judge, this judgment is not just any kind of judgment but an analytical judgment proceeding through causes. St. Thomas denies that it pertains to the gift of understanding to judge of spiritual things according to their causes. It merely penetrates truths by discerning them from falsehoods and errors. It directs judgment, so that spiritual things will not be considered the same as corporeal. Yet it does not at the same time analyze the cause of spiritual realities. It apprehends truth as different from falsehood, just as sight distinguishes among the colours without judging their causes.

25. Moreover, according to the next objection, if the gift of understanding judged of supernatural truths without judging of them through their causes or effects, its judgment would be superficial. This would indeed be true if it pertained to the gift of understanding to judge of these truths in an analytical manner. Then, of course, it would judge imperfectly, if it did not judge through causes or effects. But such judgment is not proper to the gift of understanding, just as it does not pertain to the habit of first principles, also called understanding, to resolve truths to their causes and principles. The sole function of this habit is to judge of the truths from a penetration of the terms. Likewise, it is the function of the gift of understanding to judge according to its penetration of the terms, and to know supernatural truths which are the principles in matters of faith. St. Thomas teaches that the gift of understanding is concerned with the first principles of grace, whose terms are not known to all. The function, then, of the gift of understanding is to penetrate and understand these principles by distinguishing truth from error, and by discerning

III-II, q. 8, a. 6, ad 2.

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spiritual things from sensible. Understanding does not know from intrinsic and positive evidence the essence of the reality. It knows what the thing is not by an extrinsic and negative evidence. From this penetration and knowledge of the terms, through perception and comparison, a judgment is formed concerning the truth. It does not involve causes but only the penetration of the terms and the discernment of the truth from error. A natural example of this is offered in the case of many principles, which are of themselves not known to all but only to the learned. They presuppose a knowledge of their terms and a penetration not only through a simple inspection but through a judgment and a comparison wisely made plus the penetration of a keen mind. For this reason, they are said to be self-evident only to the learned. ¹

26. Furthermore, the next objection claims that such a judgment pertains to faith, which assents to principles, and that it is the function of wisdom to judge of divine realities, the things of God as the principles of all other things.

27. The judgment of faith is an adherence to and a belief in the realities themselves, the supernatural truths. To believe is to think of a thing with assent, as the theologians teach following St. Augustine.¹ Because of the obscurity and lack of evidence, there is hesitancy and fluctuation. This is signified by the phrase "to think of a thing," and it indicates the motion of one hesitating and fluctuating, lacking not certitude but clarity. The mind is not yet satisfied by the vision of the thing. In the certitude of assent, however, there is only firmness. This firmness does not arise from the vision of the object, but extrinsically from the testimony of God accepted by the will with pious affection.

The judgment of the gift of understanding is a judgment not of belief but of understanding. It strengthens faith at the point where faith experiences fluctuations and movements arising from lack of evidence. The gift of understanding penetrates the terms which encompass the truths. It discriminates between truth and error, between sensible things and spiritual. It understands that spiritual things—being more exalted than anything attained in this life—are not such as may be conceived through sensible images. Deleting imperfections, the gift forms an understanding of these things in such a way that it does not sulfer the wavering possible to the virtue

¹ Cf. *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, c. 2, *MPL*, XLIV, 963.

of faith. For this reason, certitude in faith is numbered among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, and, according to St. Thomas,¹ it corresponds to the gift of understanding as an effect. The function of the gift of understanding is not to judge of the thing to be believed, but to judge by discerning spiritual things from corporeal, supernatural from natural, and truth from error. In this it enjoys a certain extrinsic and negative evidence, as has been already explained. The judgment proper to wisdom will be discussed later. It may be noted here, however, that it is not repugnant that wisdom should judge of the truth of the principles when it defends them, since even theology may do that.

28. Moreover, evidence of supernatural truths does not remove faith, since in this life the gift of understanding does not comprehend perfectly. It does not have intrinsic evidence nor know the essence of these truths with positive knowledge. Rather, according to St. Thomas,² it knows them negatively and extrinsically by knowing what they are not. Understanding knows that realities which are proposed concerning God are not to be held in the same way as things of the senses, nor according to heretical perversity. It may have this evidence without being opposed to faith, which is concerned solely with the inevidence and obscurity of things as they are in themselves, and not with that extrinsic evidence through the negation of imperfections.

29. The final difficulty affirms that this extrinsic evidence, which is had concerning the credibility of the object, can be had without the gift of understanding, as in the case of one of the faithful in mortal sin. Again it may be that a convert to the faith with the use of reason may gain evidence of the credibility of the object of faith, even by an impulse of the Holy Ghost. Thus, the gift of understanding would precede faith, while according to the doctrine of St. Thomas³ it is found in those only who are in the state of grace.

80. The reply to this objection rests on the fact that the evidence of credibility in matters of faith and the negative evidence of the supra-sensible character of divine things can be had in two ways. The first way is through one's own effort and industry. The other is through an interior impulse and illumination of the Holy Ghost. This second

¹ II-II, q. 8, a. 8.

² II-II, q. 8, a. 7.

³ II-II, q. 8, a. 2.

way is also twofold. The first is more common and imperfect, and can be found even in sinners, as happened in the case of Caiphas, who had an internal impulse to prophecy, and in the case of Balaam who was prophetically illumined although he was a sinner. The other, possessed only by the just, is possessed through a correct appraisal of ultimate values. In this understanding, the faithful know that all creatures are subject to God, Who should not be abandoned under any consideration. In this second type, fostered by the illumination of the Holy Ghost, the special nature of the gift of understanding is found. Therefore, according to the Holy Doctor, the perfect essence of the gift can be had only where the will is in conformity with man's ultimate end.

31. The evidence of credibility and other extrinsic matters, the intrinsic and positive evidence of truths had by one's own effort and industry, even the illumination of the Holy Ghost which is common both to sinners and the just, all these precede faith and can remain even in the soul of sinners.

However, the evidence springing from the special impulse of the Holy Ghost and proper to the just comes only with a correct and ordered appreciation of the ultimate end. This illumination is proper to the gift of understanding. It follows faith and charity. The "understanding" is not referred to as "special" because it is extraordinary like prophecy or because it enjoys greater and more express light. It is called "special" because it is not found in sinners but only in [the just, however simple and unlettered.

The act of the gift of understanding is distinct from the act of faith and from the acts of the other gifts

32. The gift of understanding has two states, one in this life and the other in heaven. The presence of the gift in this life is evidenced by many texts in Scripture, which have already been quoted. For example, there is the text of Ecclesiasticus: *And the Lord filled him with the spirit of wisdom and of understanding.*¹ Likewise, David asked God for the gift of understanding in this life. *Give me tunderstanding that I may learn your commandments,*² and the Lord said, *I shall give you understanding and I shall instruct you in the way in which you shall*

¹ Ecclesiasticus, xv, 5.

² Psalm cxviii, 73.

walk.¹ Consequently, the gift of understanding is part of this life for those who live the faith.

Moreover, the gift of understanding pertains to the next life, being-present together with the light of glory and the divine wisdom. For according to our faith² the gifts were found in Christ, yet in Him there was no virtue of faith, since from the moment of His conception He possessed eternal happiness.

33. Difficulty: The distinction between the gift of understanding and faith in this life as well as the light of glory in the next would not be difficult to prove if it were altogether certain that one and the same gift remains both during this life and in the next. Yet it is not difficult to imagine that a habit or gift of the Holy Ghost is not the same in this life and in the next. For such a habit or gift might experience an essential change in passing from an obscure to a clear and evident vision. In this life the gift of understanding cannot be clear with intrinsic and positive evidence of the mysteries of faith. Such a positive and perfect evidence of the mysteries belongs to life in heaven. For this reason, St. Thomas³ remarks that “the perfect vision of God, through which the divine essence is seen, pertains to the perfect gift of understanding, as it is in heaven.” In heaven understanding will be clear in all matters. It will not admit of any obscurity because of the soul’s great happiness and the unique endowment called the Beatific Vision. From this vision understanding will be richly endowed, attaining to a vision of all things. Such a vision will have no obscurity ; as St. Laurence⁴ said, “My night has no obscurity, but all things shine in the Light.” Therefore, it is impossible that one and the same habit be at various times both obscure and clear. Such a change cannot be merely accidental; it must be intrinsic and substantial, because “evident” and “inevident” pertain to the formal motive under which understanding tends to its object. Evidence arises from the intrinsic predicates of a thing which manifest its potentialities. But obscurity indicates an extrinsic motive, which does not attain to the essence of the thing. Hence no habit could be changed from obscure to clear and evident without involving its own destruction.

34. Solution : Despite this difficulty it is true that one and the same habit remains both in this life and in heaven. In a general way St.

¹ Psalm xxxi, 8.

² Isaiah, xi, 2.

³ II-II, q. 8, a. 7.

⁴ Cf. Rev. Alban Butler, *Lives of the Saints*, Murphy, v. 3, p. 229.

Thomas¹ affirmed this statement when he taught that without exception the gifts of the Holy Ghost remain in heaven. Furthermore, he² specifically mentioned the gift of understanding. Nor can his statement be construed to mean that the gift of understanding remains generally and not specifically the same. St. Thomas :³ "In every gift Gregory⁴ includes something that passes away with the present state and something that remains in the future. For he says that 'wisdom strengthens the mind with the hope and certainty of eternal things'; and of these two hope passes but certainty remains. He says of understanding, 'that it penetrates the truth which has been heard, refreshing the heart and enlightening its darkness.' The hearing of such things may pass away, since *they shall teach no more each man . . . his brother*,⁵ but the enlightening of the mind remains."

From the foregoing paragraph it is quite evident that both St. Thomas and St. Gregory affirm the permanence of the gift of understanding. If the habit of this life were destroyed and if another specifically distinct gift were produced in heaven, then the statement that something passes away and something remains could not be verified. The whole specific nature of the earthly gift would pass away, and a new one would be produced in heaven. For example, according to St. Thomas,⁶ nothing remains of the virtue of faith when the light of glory is attained; the whole nature and species of the habit is dissolved. Therefore, when he remarks in this passage that something passes and something remains, he is undoubtedly asserting that the gift remains essentially the same, suffering only accidental change.

35. As St. Thomas⁷ explains, "We may speak of the gifts in two ways. First, with regard to their essence, and thus they will exist most perfectly in heaven.... In another way, they may be considered as regards the matter about which they act. Thus in the present life they operate in matters with which they will have no concern in the state of glory. Considered in this way, they will not remain in the state of glory; just as we have stated⁸ in the case of the cardinal virtues." Therefore St. Thomas is of the opinion that the gifts change their material objects but not their formal objects. They remain the same, then, in their substance and species. His doctrine is manifested

¹ I-II, q. 68, a. 6.

² I-II, q. 68, a. 6, ad 2.

³ *Ibid.*

* Cf. *1 Moralium*, c.32, *MPL*, LXXV, 547.

⁵ *Jeremias*, xxxi, 34.

⁶ I-II, q. 67, a. 5.

⁷ I-II, q. 68, a. 6.

⁸ I-II, q. 67, a. 1.

by the example of the cardinal virtues, about which there is no doubt of their remaining the same.

36. St. Thomas' general proof may be applied in particular to the gift of understanding. The general reason is based on the fact that the gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect the human mind to utilize the motion of the Holy Ghost. In heaven more than ever before the mind will be moved and will follow the motion of the Holy Ghost. Consequently, the gifts of the Holy Ghost will be present in heaven.

However, this does not prove that they remain in heaven the same as they were in this life, for the motion of the Holy Ghost can be of many kinds. In this life a man may follow one kind of motion, in heaven another. Here he may have an obscure guide, there it may be evident and clear. From this it seems that his general argument does not prove that the same gift belongs to the life on earth and life in heaven.

87. Indeed, before St. Thomas' general argument can be utilised in this particular instance a further point of doctrine must be added. The gift of understanding is ordained to understanding either perfectly or imperfectly, not to believing. The Psalmist said, *Taste and see*,² for tasting and seeing are founded upon experience, upon mystical affective and experimental evidence. Understanding, as distinguished from believing, always involves evidence, either extrinsic or intrinsic, positive or negative. The fact that it does not attain to vision in this life is not due to any deficiency in its nature. Rather, it is due to a lack of visibility in the object, since we walk by faith and an image. For example, from its very nature, the eye seeks evidence and experiential knowledge of the visible object. Accidentally, through lack of application, defective lighting, or because the object is not within the range of vision, it may happen that it sees only confusedly and imperfectly.

Since the gift of understanding moves the mind by the illumination of the Holy Ghost, it penetrates correctly and understands things proposed to it. Of its very nature it demands evidence. And it gives evidence in accord with the object proposed. In this life, where men walk by faith and where things are proposed through hearing, the gift gives an extrinsic and negative evidence. For, according to St. Gregory,³ "The gift of understanding illumines the mind concerning

III-II, q. 8. ² *Psalm xxxiii*, 9. ³ *I Moralium*, c. 32, *MPL*, LXXV, 547.

the things which have been heard.” Indeed, it makes a man see clearly that the things thus heard are truly credible and ought to be discerned from errors and the corporeal and sensitive characteristics of the imagination.

In heaven, as a continuation of the light of glory to which it is subordinated, this gift gives positive evidence.

38. It is not impossible for the one habit to have both types of evidence, now employing one kind, now another. The motion of the Holy Ghost is so universal that it extends to both. The gift of understanding, then, perfects the mind, making it alert so that it may see as clearly as it possibly can, either perfectly or imperfectly. Likewise, one and the same power of sight sometimes sees imperfectly and confusedly from a distance, and sometimes it sees clearly and distinctly. Yet it is the same power of sight.

39. This notion of two types of evidence in the same habit is better explained by the example of the subalternated sciences. Sometimes the superior science is continuous with the subalternated, when it exists in the same subject, and sometimes it is not. When the subalternated science is not a continuation of the superior science, it does not have evidence of its principles. It takes them on faith. Consequently a person knowing in this way cannot have evidence of conclusions although the science itself demands evidence. That evidence is actually had when the superior science, which offers the principles, is joined to the subalternated science.

Similarly, the gift of understanding, moving under the illumination of the Holy Ghost, perfects the mind and makes it clear-sighted in its perception and penetration of things proposed. It joins these things under one formal aspect, the apprehension and penetration of higher truths, and all truths ordained to them, through its own spirit and affection and experimental knowledge. These things are not experienced except through an affection and a correctly ordered estimation of the end. Such an understanding and knowledge of spiritual things from an experimental affection of its very nature tends to experimental evidence. For the unified and specific nature of this gift is the perfection and illumination of the mind for the connatural and experiential understanding and penetration of spiritual truths. This connaturality is had only through love—*What adheres to God is one spirit!* In heaven this affection which connaturalizes and unites

11 Corinthians, vi, 17.

souls to God is regulated and born of a plenitude of light. Then God Himself indicates to His beloved that He reposes in the full light of day. From this loving connaturality springs full and consummate evidence through the penetration and understanding of the mysteries outside the vision of the essence of God.

40. In the present life, however, love of God is born of an imperfect and enigmatic light in the shadow of faith. The spouse has said, *I sat in the shadow of him whom I desired, and his fruit is sweet to my mouth.*¹ From such a reposing in the shadow of the beloved—from faith operating through love—there arises a certain experiential sweetness of His fruit by mystic and affective knowledge.

The gift of understanding in this life has at least one thing in common with the gift in heaven. It illumines the mind with the knowledge of spiritual truths by a sort of loving connaturality to them and an experience of their sweetness. But experiential knowledge of itself always demands evidence. Consequently, of its very nature the gift of understanding involves evidence. In this life the evidence given under faith is only imperfectly perceived—as if one were to view a mountain from afar off. *Beholding them afar off, and saluting them,*² as St. Paul remarked. Hence, such an experience is more of what those joys are not than of what they are. In heaven, however, there is experiential evidence of spiritual truths as they are, evidence of their nature arising from a full love of things which are present.

41. All this brings out the efficacy of St. Thomas' reasons as applied to the gift of understanding. The human mind is moved by the Holy Ghost to follow His movements. The movement of the Holy Ghost which promotes the mystical knowledge and understanding of spiritual things, making men connatural with God and uniting them to Him, tends towards the intimate experience of divine things. It is directed to mystical, experiential and affective evidence both in this life and in heaven, for its nature involves no imperfection. Hence, it remains essentially one and the same, distinct from faith in this life and from the light of glory in heaven. If, then, the gift of understanding in heaven is separated from faith, and on earth it is separated from the light of glory, obviously it is distinguished from both faith and the light of glory.

¹ *Canticle of Canticles*, ii, 3.

² *Hebrews*, xi, 13.

42. That this movement is of one species is proved from the fact that it proceeds from the same formal motive both in this life and in heaven. Its motive is the understanding of spiritual things in an affective and experiential manner. Thus men experience what these things are—or rather what they are not—by the affection with which they are united to them. This loving interior experience in no way implies formally distinct natures and motives for this life and for life in heaven. Likewise, charity in this life and in heaven is not a different virtue, although in heaven it expresses a more abundant experience and sweetness than it does here below. Both, however, tend to *experiential* evidence according to the frequently repeated quotation: *Taste and see that the Lord is sweet.*¹ The only change is in the object experienced. In this life there is not a fullness of light; the soul experiences spiritual things by discerning what they are not, by distinguishing them from corporeal and sensible images and from errors, just as a blind man distinguishes things by touching them to gain experiential knowledge of them. Similarly, anyone looking from afar off does not know the details of a thing, but he can distinguish men from trees, mountains from valleys, although he sees them only in a confused way.

In heaven understanding gives an affection for things as they are in themselves. It has loving experience of things in their intimate reality, and it is refreshed by a torrent of delight at the fount of life.

43. There is no difficulty in admitting that the one light, the same motive and the one power should have evidence in different stages according to the diverse matter to which it is applied. One stage may even seem like darkness compared to the other, just as the light of a candle and the light of the moon seem to be darkness when compared to the light of the sun. Differing only in mode of procedure and perfection of act, the light remains the same. In this life, neither the object nor the mode of acting admit of more than negative or extrinsic evidence. In heaven, proper and essential evidence is obtained. In its proper formality, the light of the gift of understanding does not change substantially with the passage from this life to that of heaven. The light merely increases. *The light of the moon will be like the light of the sun;*² *His splendour will be the light.*³ Throughout the light is the same experiential and loving light flowing from a union with things

¹ *Psalm xxxiii, 9.*

² *Isaías, xxx, 26.*

³ *Habacuc, iii, 4.*

divine. Yet it is distinct from the light of truth or investigation and from spiritual taste which is mystical understanding.

44. Any reply to the difficulty introduced at the beginning of this section must admit as true that, according to its formal aspect, the same habit cannot be at one time obscure and at another clear. However, the same habit in one state may have but an imperfect clarity, while in another it may enjoy perfect illumination. Although the clarity of one seems obscure when compared with the clarity of the other—as the light of the moon with that of the sun—both are really clear and of the same specific essence. Both proceed under the same aspect of understanding, that is, from a simple understanding in an experiential and loving connaturality and union with divine things, which can be had by those only who are in the state of grace. It is called a simple understanding to differentiate it from the understanding which is had from causes or through causes, as wisdom, knowledge, or counsel. According to St. Thomas,² “Understanding seems to be called a simple apprehension, but wisdom indicates a certain fullness of certitude for judging of the things attained.”

The whole formal motive indicates a clarity which is neither perfect and consummate nor the obscurity of belief. For it does not pertain to the gift of understanding to assent to the testimony of the witness. Its function is rather to understand, discern, and penetrate from an experiential connaturality for spiritual things. Here below it experiences at least what things are not, while in heaven it sees what they are.

St. Thomas' discussion of how the gift of understanding is related to the vision of the Divine Essence in heaven will be reserved for later consideration.³

The distinction of the act of the gift of understanding from the act of faith and the act of the other gifts and habits

The object of the gift of understanding

45. Nearly all the answers to this question should be evident from the preceding arguments. St. Thomas⁴ teaches that there can be two

¹ Cf. III, 33.

² III, d. 35, q. 2, a. 2 qu. 3.

³ Cf. *infra*, No. 65.

⁴ II-II, q. 8, a. 6 and q. 45, a. 2.

i ways of knowing and judging. An object may be known and judged
i through inquiry and study, or it may be known and judged through
t experience and connaturality.

For example, a philosopher judges of chastity according to moral science and the speculative treatment of virtue, while a temperate man judges of it by his connaturality to continence and chastity.

Therefore, of spiritual and supernatural truths there is both knowledge and judgment through study and speculative inquiry, in an exact delineation of truth and also through connaturality, love, and experience. St. Denis¹ wrote of Hierothus in his work on *The Divine Names* that "he had not only attained to divine things, but he had suffered them as well." Anyone suffers divine things when he is stirred to love and is moved by the Holy Ghost above the level measured by human rules. The term suffer is employed since, acting under obedience and subjection to the motion of another is said to be a sort of suffering or receiving.

46. The gift of understanding does not sharpen and perfect the mind through study and metaphysical inquiry, but by mystical connaturality and union with divine truths. This union and connaturality is not in the order of being but in the order of love and is an aspiration of the will, called mystical to differentiate it from philosophical knowledge, acquired by study or speculative inquiry.

ZMere speculation moves the will but little—except to vanity. Science
q leads to pride. But the knowledge which moves a man toward a
C 'l.*" right ordering of love, in attaining greater experience of divine things,
i fb ..; pertains to the gift of understanding.

47. St Thomas² teaches this same doctrine when he remarks that "unless the human intellect is moved by the Holy Ghost in such a way that it has a correct estimate of the end, it has not yet obtained the gift of understanding, however much the Holy Ghost may have enlightened it in regard to other truths which are preambles to the faith." The intellect forms a correct estimate of the end only by the exclusion of error concerning that end and firm adherence to it as most desirable. This can take place only in those who are in the state of sanctifying grace. Thus, in the order of moral virtues, a man has a correct estimate of the end through virtue.

¹ *De Divinis Nominibus*, c. 3, MPG III, 648.

² II-II, q. 8, a. 5.

According to the doctrine of St. Thomas¹ on the gift of wisdom, it is evident that the gifts which are rooted in the intellect perfect it mystically, by reason of an experiential knowledge and judgment of things divine. Such an experience cannot be had without a love and savour which unites and connaturalizes the soul to supernatural truths.

48. Knowledge of this gift is based not on philosophical inquiry but on Sacred Scripture, which asserts that knowledge in such gifts is founded upon love and a sort of savour. *Taste and see*,² or again, *A good understanding to all who do it*³ *No one knows except him who has received*,⁴ or *The spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him, the spirit of wisdom and understanding*, etc.⁵ Therefore these types of knowledge are in a spirit of love not any sort whatever, but one resting upon and uniting itself to men. Found in simple and unlettered men, who often have very reliable judgments upon things spiritual, this mystical and loving knowledge is rooted in experience, not in study or metaphysical speculation.

There is no reason why there should be an experiential knowledge of virtue in virtuous men and should not be such knowledge from a supernatural communication by which a man is moved by the Holy Ghost. If a temperate man can judge of chastity from his exercise of it, no less than a philosopher from his speculation about it, why cannot a man know and judge of divine truths from his love and experience of them?

49. It might be alleged that this does not prove that there ought to be a special habit or gift for such knowledge or judgment, since there is no special habit for experiential knowledge and judgment.

However, these two cases are very different, since the moral virtues and their operations are connatural to the human manner of acting. Furthermore, the same is true in the case of infused virtues. By their object they are elevated above the natural order, but in their manner of acting they proceed in accord with the limits of their subject and its rational activity. Hence, for such experiential knowledge a special habit or virtue is unnecessary.

But to know and understand supernatural and divine mysteries in a superhuman manner, and to distinguish them from error, a peculiar

¹ II-II, q. 45, a. 2.

² Psalm xxxiii, 9.

³ Psalm ex, 10.

⁴ Apocalypse, ii, 17.

⁵ Isaiah, xi, 2.

habit is necessary. For in such mysteries there is a special difficulty not found in experiencing things already connatural.

50. If the foregoing is admitted, the distinction of the act of the gift of understanding from every other type of knowledge and habit is easily made. The intellectual habits related to and attaining the knowledge of truth by their own effort and industry, whether they are purely of the natural order, as in philosophy, or founded upon faith, as in theology, proceed according to their own discursive activity. All habits of this kind are distinct from the gift of understanding. For understanding penetrates and knows the things of faith from an impulse and motion of the Holy Ghost and not from the mind's own activity or natural knowledge of the terms, as in the habit of first principles.

Moreover, the gift of understanding is distinct from the other habits or infused illuminations, such as prophecy, which are found even in sinners or in those who have not the faith.¹ For prophetic understanding is merely an illumination of the mind concerning the existence of things revealed.

It is the proper province of the gift of understanding to illumine the mind to make a correct estimate of the ultimate end. The mind is illumined concerning divine things according to an interior realization, connaturality, and loving union with the supernatural. Such experiential knowledge is vastly different from the acquisition of truth by discursive rather than loving knowledge.

Furthermore, understanding differs from the other gifts of the Holy Ghost, namely wisdom, knowledge and counsel. They proceed in an analytic fashion, as is customary in science and prudence, yet their analysis differs from the intellectual virtue, as will be noted later, in the consideration of divine things and in the consideration of human actions. The gift of understanding, on the other hand, employs a simple judgment and intuition built upon a penetration of the terms, in a way similar to the habit of first principles.

51. The act of the gift of understanding differs from the act of faith, which is also concerned with first principles and divine things. According to St. Thomas,² the gift of understanding is concerned with the first principles of grace in a way quite different from the concern

¹ Cf. II-II, q. 8, a. 5, ad 2.

² II-II, q. 8, a. 6.

of faith. It is the function of faith to assent, but it pertains to the gift of understanding to penetrate. A difficulty might arise here similar to the one concerning judgment: why does not one and the same habit penetrate and assent, and why is there a difference between the gift of understanding and faith? The reply is based upon the fact that the gift of understanding assents to truth which it penetrates, not formally by believing, but by experiencing at least what these truths are not and how distant they are from sensible things, and that they should not be confused with error. Faith assents to truth by believing.

There is a difference between assent by belief and assent by penetration and experience. One who believes adheres to the testimony which has been offered and his action is restricted to assent, for he neither seeks nor probes further. Understanding, however, penetrates to the core, investigates the hidden reaches of the thing, extending even to its antecedents. It strives to lift the veil and to illuminate the darkness. Through the gift of understanding, God dispels the mists.

On the other hand, through faith a man comes to a cloud-enshrouded mountain. In faith the mind is held captive, the eye is covered, and a man walks through a deserted path to the mountain of God. Finally, in that desert land, without paths, without water, he appears in the holy place of God. This is the not uncommon experience of those who are constant in prayer with only naked and dry faith. The soul seems arid and its tongue seems to cling to the side of its mouth, for it can only believe and cannot penetrate the mysteries of God.

However, when the Holy Ghost begins to breathe upon the soul, and to melt the frozen waters with His Spirit, through the gift of understanding, He lays open the hidden meaning of things. Through the breath of His charity, which He places in the soul, there is an interior sense and taste of the sweetness of the Lord. Then, surely as a *torrent in the south*,¹ He ends the captivity of the mind, just as a torrent frozen solid is loosed by warm air. Clouds are dispersed, and the aroma of the mysteries of faith, like the odour of a ploughed field, is spread abroad. The eyes of the soul are as doves, dwelling not in the barren and arid land, but alongside a full stream. The soul is filled with marrow and fatness by the light which is poured into it, and its prayer is like incense in the sight of God. All these things are results of the gift.

¹ Psalm exxv, 4.

52. What is the basis for this doctrine? From Sacred Scripture itself is derived the difference between faith and the gift of understanding. However, in the natural order the same habit suffices for an assent to principles and a penetration of both the principles and the derived truths. Why then does not the one habit suffice for assenting to truths believed and for penetrating them through understanding? The answer to this question is based on a twofold distinction.

First, the assent of faith is founded upon extrinsic testimony, and not on matters which are intrinsic to the reality in question. Faith does not assent in virtue of a knowledge of an object's intrinsic properties. It assents merely from the testimony of the witness, which is extrinsic to the object. The gift of understanding assents to the truth by penetrating deep into the object, by searching within it, either through negative evidence, removing imperfections, or in heaven through the positive evidence.

In faith realities and essences remain clouded, since faith is founded on the extrinsic testimony. Consequently, the eye is said to be clouded and the mind held captive. The soul suffers a great thirst for the understanding and penetrating of the object in all its aspects. For this reason, St. Thomas notes quite correctly that it is the province of faith to assent to principles, while it pertains to the gift of understanding to penetrate them. This is to be understood in its precise formality. It is the function of faith merely to assent, without any discussion or investigation or understanding of the intrinsic properties of the object. All the interior aspects of the object remain so hidden to it that it adheres to its object and assents to the truth proposed by reason of extrinsic testimony alone.

The gift of understanding, on the other hand, strives to get within the object and to penetrate its interior aspects. "How shall this be done? 5.1 the blessed Virgin asked the angel. This question was not caused by any diffidence or hesitation. It was brought about by the gift of understanding seeking a full interior understanding of the mystery, in so far as it can be understood in this life.

It is necessary, then, to insist upon distinct habits for faith and for the gift of understanding, since they proceed from distinct motives or formal principles. Faith is from a motive which is so extrinsic that it in no way penetrates to the interior aspects of the thing. The gift of understanding strives to penetrate the interior of the object. In this

. ' Luke, i, 84.

life it accomplishes its end imperfectly, in heaven, perfectly. In virtue of such penetration it assents and judges, but not in the same way as faith.

53. The second difference is based upon the fact that the gift of understanding tends to knowledge and penetration of the truth in a very particular way, namely, the loving experience of things divine. Faith does not proceed from such experience but from the naked testimony of the witness. For this reason, faith may be found in sinners, who are without grace and who cannot have the gift of understanding.

However, in the natural order, the same habit of first principles penetrates truths and assents to them, since such an assent is based merely on penetration and evidence. The assent is not founded upon the naked testimony of the witness, which is extrinsic to the object, as happens in the case of faith.

*Objects of understanding*¹

54. In general, the object of the gift of understanding is whatever lies hidden and impenetrable to the light of natural reason. Along with St. Thomas, Cajetan² notes six kinds of objects. Therefore, the gift should be used for the penetration of these six types of objects, which lie hidden. A thing may lie hidden either under accidents, or under words, or under figures or similitudes, or under appearances attained by the senses, or under its causes, or under its effects. Whatever lies hidden under these six veils forms the object of the gift of understanding. Primarily, supernatural truths, as the direct object of a supernatural light, are the object of the gift. Secondly, things of the natural order, inasmuch as they are subordinate to the supernatural, fall within the scope of the gift. For, by being distinguished from errors and sensible appearances, even natural objects are illuminated.

Hidden beneath *accidents*, lies the substance, or even other accidents. It is the province of the gift of understanding to peel off these accidents. It knows that under the accidents of bread in the Eucharist the substance of bread is not found. It also knows how the whole body of Christ is substantially and not quantitatively present in the

¹ Cf. II-II, q. 8, a. 1.

² *Commentaria* in II-II, q. 8, a. 1.

Eucharist. It recognizes that in the mystery of the Incarnation there is a human nature without its proper subsistence. These and many other things are investigated by the gift of understanding.

55. Under *words*, various meanings lie hidden. It is proper to the gift of understanding to attain a knowledge of the proper and literal meaning of Sacred Scripture. *Then he opened their minds, that they might understand the Scriptures.*¹

Under *figures or enigmas* lie hidden mystical meanings, such as the moral, the anagogic, the allegorical, just as parables lie hidden in similitudes.

Beneath *sensible appearances* lie hidden intelligible and spiritual things, such as angels and God, known only by the removal of imperfections.

Effects lie hidden under the *causes*. For example, grace is concealed in the sacraments, Redemption and all its effects in the Passion of Christ.

Enveloped in causes are all their *effects*. For example, under the effects of Divine Predestination is the infinite abyss of the judgment of God.

The gift of understanding penetrates all these, in some souls more completely than in others, according to the dispensation of the Holy Ghost.

56. No difficulty should arise from the fact that many of these things can be known by study, especially by the study of theology. For, as St. Thomas often affirms, the natural light of reason is of only a finite power. Man requires a supernatural power to carry his actions through to the end, to penetrate things which cannot be known by the natural light of reason. There are many things which the intellect cannot obtain by its native light, or even by the supernatural light of faith. Many things are understood obscurely, with a thousand sensible images and with the possibility of many errors. For example, there may be a sinner who has a dead faith, but in whom there is some light. These things would overwhelm the mind were it not for the discernment of the gift of understanding. While many things may be understood with a peculiar enlightenment, without understanding there is no correct estimate of or adherence to the ultimate end. Hence, the gift of understanding is necessary to perfect the mind in discerning

¹ Luke, xxiv, 45.

errors and sensible images, as well as for experiencing the correct adherence to God, the soul's ultimate end.

57. How are cleanness and clearness of heart as well as the certitude of faith effects of the gift of understanding? For it is obvious that in many who have evil and immoderate passions there is a penetration and an understanding of Sacred Scripture. Many who are most certain and firm in their faith are sinners and hence lack the gift of understanding. On the other hand, there are many in the state of grace who suffer from a dullness of understanding and who experience many difficulties and temptations in matters of faith.

58. This doubt is resolved by considering with St. Thomas¹ the twofold aspect of cleanness of heart. The first, like antecedent disposition, is a cleansing of the heart from inordinate affections. This is not the function of the gift of understanding. Rather through the virtues of the active life and through the gifts in the appetitive part of the soul such a cleansing is brought about.

The other cleanness of heart is in the intellect through a cleansing from error and sensible images. Of course, images cannot be completely eliminated in human understanding. Yet judgment of spiritual things should not be made in accord with these limitations. According to St. Denis,² "those who tend to divine contemplation should escape from them (sensible images)." In fact, this is the whole struggle of meditation and of celestial contemplation, namely, the removal or separation of spiritual things from their corporeal forms. The words of St. Paul may be used to describe this situation, *And even though we have known Christ according to the flesh, yet now we know him so no longer.*³

The gift of understanding has as its primary purpose such a purity of heart in the intellect. By eliciting a correct understanding of spiritual things, it purges away errors and removes sensible images. Of itself it does not bring about a cleanness from evil effects in the will and sensitive appetite, for that type of purity of heart is the result of the virtues and gifts in the will and sensitive appetite.

59. There are two important notes to be added to this consideration. The first is that it is one thing to have emotions which lie dormant,

¹ II-II, q. 8, a. 7 and III, d. 24, q. 1, a. 4.

² *Theologia Mystica*, cf. *MPL*, CXXII, 267.

³ I Corinthians, v, 16.

quite another to have emotions which are cleansed. The second is that, although the gift of understanding presupposes a cleansing and pruning of inordinate affections as far as sin is concerned, nevertheless it directs and causes in the appetitive power a more abundant cleansing—struggling with the emotions to bring them to a state of rest.

Christ Our Lord said, *every branch that bears fruit he will cleanse, that it may bear more fruit.*¹ The branch bearing fruit already has the gifts of the Holy Ghost whose effects are the fruits of the Spirit. If, therefore, Christ purges the branch already bearing fruit—possessing these gifts—the gifts can coexist with affections which require further cleansing. These are the affections breaking forth from the inclination to sin, which tire the soul but do not dominate it to the point of consent to sin.

60. The cleansing of the affections and emotions from anything mortally sinful is presupposed to the gift of understanding. Hence, it must be denied that the emotions leading to mortal sin can flourish in those who have the gift of understanding. Yet, cleansing the affections to the point of quietude and rest—that they neither break forth in the soul nor tire it—is not required for the gift of understanding. This cleansing is found in but a few and in them only after a long period of intense struggle.

There is in most souls a wrestling of the emotions and the contemplation of divine things and divine illumination (however meagre) of the gift of understanding, since *the light shone in darkness and the darkness grasped it not.*² The prophet did not lack the gift of understanding when he said: *I was in misery while the thorn of my sin tortured me. . . . Thou, O Lord, art my refuge from the trouble that besets me, my joy, O save me from the enemies that surround me. I, the Lord, will instruct and teach you the way you should take.*³ The gift of understanding is granted as a protection against the enemies which surround the soul, against tribulation and the force of surging emotions, against the thorns of the tumultuous affections. A soul beloved of God is *as a lily among thorns.*^{*} It can scarcely be touched without suffering the torturous thrust of the thorns.

In heaven, however, the lily will no longer dwell among thorns but amidst the plenitude of fruit, which is gathered into the barns while

¹ John, xv, 2.

² Cf. John, i, 5.

³ Psalm xxxi, 4, 7, 8.

⁴ Cf. *Cantic of Canticles*, ii, 2.

the chaff is burned. *Thy stomach* (that is mind, the stomach of the soul) *is a heap of wheat, set about with lilies.*¹

61. St. Augustine² has described this beautifully. “What effect does concupiscence have in the flesh of the continent saint except to arouse the desires of sinning, against which, by not consenting, they wage a glorious battle? The mere desire of marriage in one who professes continence is not without evil. What effect does it have when its every act is evil, both in consent and in accomplishment? . . . In virgins and continent persons what effect does it have, I ask you, what effect does that lust which you praise in your raving, and combat when you are sane, have in them? What effect does it have where it does no good, or where no good is done for it? What is its result in those in whom whatever is done according to concupiscence is evil? What effect does it have upon those whom it compels to watch and to fight against themselves? If when in sleep any assent is stolen from them, when they awake they are forced to bewail it and amidst their groans to say, *my soul is full of ignominy!*³ What effect does it have when ‘dreams play in sleeping souls’⁴ and chaste souls, I know not how, fall into shameful consents, which if the Lord should impute, how could anyone live chastely?

“This, therefore, is evil . . . why then is it not rooted out of the continent saints? Why is it not completely taken away by the action of the mind? For you say ‘this should be the case if it were evil.’ And since it is not so in married people, where such a manner of acting is necessary, you think it good, although you see that the desire should not be aroused where there is no need for it. In fact, its presence is harmful, if not by destroying sanctity through consent, at least in diminishing the spiritual delight of holy minds, of which the Apostle wrote: *I delight in the law of God according to the interior man.*^{*} This delight is surely diminished when the soul is occupied with fighting, even if not expelling, the concupiscence of the warring carnal appetite. The soul wages these glorious battles so that it might be called from strife to the delight of intelligible beauty.”

62. The assault of the passions, without assent, does not impede the action of a good mind. It summons an abundance of contemplation

¹ *Cantic of Canticles*, vii, 2.

² *Liber IV, contra Julianum*, c. 2, *MPL* XLIV, 741, 742.

³ Cf. *Psalm* xxxvii, 8.

⁴ Cf. *Virgil Aeneid*, s., 642.

⁵ *Romans*, vii, 22.

to the battle and the trials of the wars of God, in which the glory of battle is excelled by the conquest of the mind through grace, by resistance to the assault of concupiscence and by the repression of pride. St. Augustine continues, "But since in this human misery the far worse enemy, pride, should be avoided, concupiscence is not completely extinguished from the flesh of the continent saints. While the soul fights against concupiscence it is aware of its other dangers, lest feeling secure it should become inflated. This continues until human frailty attains that perfection of health, in which none of the rottenness of lust and none of the cancer of pride can be formed. Thus power is perfected in infirmity, since it is the duty of the weak to fight. For the easier one finds it to conquer, the less he will fight."

63. It has been alleged above¹ that there are many without the gift of understanding, living in sin, who understand many things in the Scriptures and much concerning the mysteries of faith. They also have a great certitude concerning the faith. But it must be noted in reply that they have these things in another way and by another means than by the gift. This understanding is acquired by study of the Scriptures, or by reading or listening to someone expound them. It is not had by an interior impulse. *His anointing teaches you concerning all things*,² wrote St. John, and Our Lord said, *He will teach you all truth*.²

Reading, study and human industry suffice for acquiring that knowledge and the beginning of certitude which is without the charity of God. Through these, however, the kingdom of heaven is not promised to men. "While reading," said St. Hilary,⁴ "gives knowledge of doctrine, the name of Christ drives out demons."

On the testimony of unshakable divine truth, to which even sinners adhere, a sinner may have the certitude of faith without the gift of understanding. This truth does not militate against the doctrine that from its deeper penetration of the truths of faith and the terms in which these truths are proposed, the gift of understanding has another safeguard against temptations and hesitations concerning faith, which sinners do not have. It has a certitude of the mysteries of faith, a firm quietude springing from the interior illumination and experiential taste of spiritual things.

¹ Cf. No. 57.

² *I John*, ii, 27.

³ *John*, xvi, 13.

⁴ *In Mattheum*, c. 7, *MPL*, IX, 954.

64. It has been added by way of objection¹ that there are many in the state of grace who have a dullness of understanding and who suffer hesitation in matters of faith. St. Thomas² furnishes the answer. He teaches that they suffer a dullness concerning many things but not concerning anything necessary for salvation. Humbling them because of their lack of knowledge, such a dullness is useful in instructing them to flee the hidden temptations of pride. Their very ignorance gives them the highest type of knowledge for according to the Apostle *he has become a fool that he may be wise*.³

The just sometimes suffer vacillations in matters of faith, but they are taught by God to overcome them. This itself is a gift of the Holy Ghost. But concerning those things which are necessary for salvation, the just suffer no dullness of the mind, since *his anointing teaches you concerning all things**—all things necessary for salvation.

In heaven the gift of understanding is distinct from the light of glory

65. From the foregoing it is evident that the gift of understanding remains in heaven. For Scripture bears witness to its presence in Christ, who had the beatific vision.

However, it is not easy to explain just what form the act of the gift takes in heaven and how it is distinct from the light of glory. St. Thomas continually affirms that the act of this gift in heaven is the vision of God and the perfect and positive evidence of divine things and the mysteries of faith. Yet the vision of God and the mysteries of faith are provided by the light of glory. Therefore, such a gift is identified with the light of glory, if it is from it alone that the beatific vision is elicited. In the face of this, St. Thomas⁴ attributes the perfect vision of God in heaven to the gift of understanding. There is, he notes, a twofold vision. One is perfect, and through it the essence of God is seen. The other is imperfect, and through it the intellect sees, not the essence of God, but rather what He is not. Both types of vision are within the scope of the gift of understanding: consummate in heaven, incipient in this life. What could be more clear? Why does it require further consideration? St. Thomas expressly mentions the vision through which the essence of God is seen, and attributes it to the gift of understanding in heaven, while admitting only an imperfect

¹ Cf. No. 57.

² II-II, q. 8, a. 4, ad 1 and 3.

³ II-II, q. 8, a. 7.

⁴ I Corinthians, iii, 18,

⁵ I John, ii, 27.

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knowledge in this life. In this life, the imperfect vision belongs to the gift of understanding in a very proper sense as an elieitive principle. Hence it is also an elieitive principle in heaven. The fact is clearer in St. Thomas' *Commentary on the Sentences*: "The gift of understanding, whose province it is to apprehend in heaven spiritual things, attains to the divine essence by immediate experience." Therefore, the gift of understanding will be the light of glory itself, since this alone attains the divine essence by immediate experience.

Therefore, the gift of understanding does not endure in heaven, since the gift is not the light of glory, yet in heaven it is the principle of the immediate experience of the divine essence, the light of glory.

66. This argument seems to be confirmed by the fact that the gift of understanding is given for the purpose of knowing and penetrating spiritual things from an impulse of the Holy Ghost through an experiential knowledge of God and His mysteries. The greatest and clearest experience of God is vision. Therefore, the Holy Ghost moves to the knowledge and intimate penetration of divine things through positive evidence. Moreover, another manner of penetrating divine things or of receiving an experience of the supernatural which would be inferior to the vision itself is not necessary.

If, however, the experience of divine things is had by evidence, the gift of understanding has evidence of them and is not distinguished from the habit which gives the vision of divine things, the habit of the light of glory.

As a matter of fact, St. Thomas² admits this. "Those gifts which communicate with other virtues in an object which will remain in heaven will not be distinct from them in heaven, except by reason of perfection or imperfection of operation. This is evident in the case of understanding and faith, since the vision which takes the place of faith pertains to the perfect gift of understanding, according to the fifth chapter of St. Matthew." Therefore, in heaven the gift of understanding is not distinct from the power which attains to God as He is in Himself, the light of glory.

67. In spite of this difficulty it must be maintained that the gift of understanding will remain in heaven, and that it will be distinct from the light of glory, although regulated by it and by the beatific vision.

¹ III, d. 34, 1, 4 c.

² III, d. 32, q. 1, 3 ad 6.

In these intellectual gifts, then, a distinction must be made between a regulative principle and a formal principle.

In this life the regulative principle is faith. In heaven it is *l*ie vision. Here the mind is joined and united to God through faith; in heaven, through the vision. After the mind has been united to God and subjected to Him, it is moved through the gift of the Holy Ghost to various acts by reason of the presence and the impulse of the Spirit, breathing where He will and making men the sons of God. For this reason, St. Thomas¹ asserts that "the theological virtues are to be preferred to the gifts of the Holy Ghost, since through them the mind is united to God and made subject to Him. Just as the intellectual virtues are greater than the moral virtues and regulate them, so the theological virtues are greater than the gifts, since they regulate them."

If all the gifts are regulated by the theological virtues, then it follows that the gift of understanding is so regulated, and it is regulated in a special way by faith, since by faith the mind is united to truth and to the divine testimony. Through the gift of understanding the mind is illuminated, so that it may penetrate and understand what is to be believed and discern it from error. For this reason St. Gregory² remarks, "The gift of understanding illumines the mind concerning the things that have been heard." It does this in the present life, in which it is regulated by faith.

In heaven, vision takes the place of faith. The gift of understanding is then regulated through vision and attains to an intimate knowledge, just as in this life it illumines the mind concerning the things which, have been heard and it attains to the things heard with a special certitude.

On the other hand, the gift of understanding does not formally elicit the act of belief in this life, nor the vision in heaven, although it is regulated by the vision and derived from it. The gift of understanding presupposes a mind united to God, so that it may make it movable by the Spirit for the understanding of mysteries. It is proper to the gifts of the Holy Ghost to make the mind easily movable by Him for whatever actions He should wish. It should, therefore, presuppose a mind already united and subject to God so that it will be movable by the Holy Ghost. Consequently, according to St. Thomas,³ the gifts presuppose the theological virtues. The gifts do not formally constitute

¹ I-II, q. 68, a. 8.

² *I Moralium*, c. 32, *MPL* LXXV, 547.

³ I-II, q. 68, a. 7.

a union with God but presuppose it and are regulated by it. Union with God in this life is accomplished through faith ; in heaven, through vision. The gifts, therefore, do not elicit the vision, nor do they elicit faith. They presuppose both.

68. This argument is *à priori*, proceeding from the proper and intrinsic nature of the thing. In the same way, St. Thomas¹ proves that the gifts will remain in heaven. For the gifts are given so that the human mind may follow the motion of the Holy Ghost, especially in heaven where God will be all in all. Therefore, the gift of understanding is given so that the motion of the Holy Ghost may be followed. But the union and possession of God is accomplished by an eternal and immutable operation. Such an operation is not the act of that gift which is given for obeying and following the impulse of the Holy Ghost united and joined to the soul through vision. Accordingly, either this gift is not given to the blessed or its operation cannot be the same as that of the light of glory.

69. Upon this basis an effective *a posteriori* argument may be formulated. That Christ Our Lord had the gift of understanding, together with the other six gifts, is a matter of faith from the passage in Isaias.² That the seven gifts which were in Christ are found in men is certain from the common consent of the Fathers and theologians, St. Thomas included. However, if the gift of understanding in Christ was the light of glory and if its act was the beatific vision, during this life no such act is possible to the faithful. Therefore, there would be no sufficient foundation for affirming that the faithful have the gifts which were in Christ, the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost.

70. The fact that the faithful do not have the beatific vision is quite evident, since they walk the way of faith. If the gift of understanding in the blessed—such as it was in Christ—is the light of glory and has as its act the beatific vision, such a gift of understanding is not found in the faithful. The inference is certain, yet the gifts are in the faithful, because they were in Christ. Hence, the same gifts found in Christ should be present in the faithful. Otherwise the principal scriptural foundation for the gifts would be destroyed. Therefore,

¹ I-II, q. 68, a. 6.

² Isaias, xi, 2.

Note: Although there is reason to doubt that Isaias listed seven Gifts in this passage the translators have followed the text of John of St. Thomas.

if the gift of understanding in Christ, who always enjoyed the beatific vision, is the same as the light of glory, that gift is lacking to the faithful, who do not have the light of glory. Then there are only six gifts and not seven.

71. It might be objected: The gift of understanding was distinct from the light of glory in Christ, since He was at the same time blessed and a wayfarer. There remains, then, a sufficient foundation for asserting that in those who walk in faith there are seven gifts, while in the blessed the gift of understanding will be supplanted by the light of glory.

72. On the contrary, if the gift of understanding was in Christ, as it is in us, that is, for his state as a wayfarer, it was either an obscure light incompatible with the possession of the beatific vision, or an evident light and compatible, just as the infused knowledge and whatever clear experimental knowledge Christ had were not repugnant to His beatific knowledge and are even now found in Christ. If the first possibility is true such a gift cannot be placed in Christ any more than can the faith, since there was nothing obscure in the intellect of Christ, who was most completely blessed, full of grace and truth. If the second possibility is true, then why should not the gift remain in Christ even in heaven? If this gift is clear and in no way repugnant to the light of glory, there is no reason for its not remaining with Him even after He was no longer on earth. Being a perfection in itself like the infused knowledge of Christ, the gift is not repugnant to the vision. It need not cease nor be destroyed when this life comes to an end.

78. In heaven the other gifts related to the intellect, wisdom, knowledge, counsel, will remain. They will not be mingled with the light of glory. Consequently, the same may be affirmed of the gift of understanding. The inference is evident, since the same basis prevails. The light of glory attains to God, and creatures “in” God, and their natures and causes, and it directs the will to act in accord with complete unfailing union. If, therefore, from the very fact that the gift of understanding has immediate experience of the divine essence, it is to be identified with the light of glory, by the same token so are the gifts of wisdom and knowledge. They too know things through a union with God, considering things in their causes and through these causes providing a rule of action.

74. The proof for the principles of such a conclusion may be found in the words of St. Thomas d “ The gifts of knowledge and of counsel will remain in heaven just as the gifts which are concerned with the active life. They will not be concerned with the same matter nor actions which are in doubt. The act of knowledge will be occupied with God as the rule of judgment. The act of counsel will be concerned with Him as the illuminator in discovery.” Similarly, the gifts of understanding and wisdom may remain, although in a different way, Understanding and wisdom are concerned principally with divine things: understanding with penetrating and apprehending, wisdom with judging from causes and resolving to them. These gifts do not need to change the matter of their operations. They need only change the manner. They will then attain to God perfectly and in a clear manner, at least according to presuppositive and regulative principles—as will be explained in the next chapter.

75. The reason for all this lies in the fact that infused knowledge, by which things outside the beatific vision are known through divine revelation and supernatural light, is given to the blessed and was found in Christ. Likewise, there is a gift of knowledge, which pertains to supernatural knowledge under the impulse of the Holy Ghost. The gifts of understanding and wisdom are given in the same way, since they are mutually connected.² Wherever the gifts of knowledge and wisdom are found, the gift of understanding should be presupposed, since it penetrates the principles of wisdom and knowledge in a way proper and connatural to them.

76. Another question now arises. By what formal principles are the gifts of understanding and wisdom distinguished from the light of glory? Since they are concerned with the clear knowledge of God, what act do they exercise distinct from the beatific vision?

77. The reply to this question requires but a word. The light of glory elicits the beatific vision of God before there is any love, since it regulates and arouses love. The gifts of understanding and wisdom are knowledge founded upon and following after the love and taste of divine union with the soul and its being connaturalized with God through love. As far as the beatific vision is concerned, the knowledge of the blessed is of God as He is in Himself. This knowledge precedes

¹ III, d. 35, a. 4 qu. 3.

² Cf. I-II, q. 68, a. 5.

the beatific love of charity which arises from it. As far as the knowledge of God outside the beatific vision is concerned—knowledge from effects and in them—even the blessed have a manifold knowledge, both infused in the supernatural order and acquired in the natural order. The first and most effective of supernatural things known is born of the love and internal fruition by which the soul adheres to God, is made connatural to Him, and is united to Him. This effect is something created. It is the province of the light and the habit of the gifts of understanding and wisdom to penetrate and apprehend divine things and even the causes of mysteries from this connaturality and from this experience of His presence. The knowledge of divine things through their supernatural or natural effects will pertain to the other types of knowledge, either infused or natural. Because they do not proceed from an adherence to and loving connaturality with God, infused and natural knowledge are not gifts of the Holy Ghost nor even mystical knowledge. They are purely intellectual experiences of reality.

78. In heaven, this experiential, loving, and mystical knowledge of divine things presupposes the vision of God, regulating love for Him and, consequently, experience of the divine. By it the understanding is made quite adequate to divine things in a mystical and loving knowledge of truths outside the beatific vision. This mystical knowledge is not formally the beatific vision, although it is derived from it—just as in this life understanding is derived from faith and regulated by it. In heaven the soul will be so absorbed by the visual presence of the divinity that in the spirit and love by which it adheres to Him it will mystically know and touch God. God Himself becomes all things in the soul. In whatever the soul sees in Him or outside of Him, it touches and tastes God in all. This experience is the summit of all mystical knowledge of God, but it is not the beatific vision. It is rather a motion of the Holy Ghost regulated by the vision, so that in whatever it touches, and in whatever interior experience it may have, it tastes and experiences God, and is as if intoxicated with wine and the outpouring of the divine plenitude—where the flow of the river gives joy to the city of God.

79. A reply may now be formulated relative to the initial difficulty.¹ Regarding the argument from the authority of St. Thomas, it must be

¹ Cf. No. 65.

said that the Holy Doctor affirms that the vision of the divine essence pertains to the perfected gift of understanding, not as though the latter elicited it, but rather because the vision is regulative of the gift. St. Thomas does not tire of teaching that the gifts presuppose the theological virtues through which God is united to the intellect and the will. In this life He is united to the intellect by faith. In heaven the union is accomplished by vision. With God thus united and rendered connatural to the soul, the intellect is moved by the Holy Ghost to penetrate and apprehend God and His mysteries as they are in themselves, precisely as truths intelligible of themselves and known—as if speculatively—in the beatific vision. But even more, the intellect is moved so that it may lovingly and mystically know Him as He is knowable outside the beatific vision, and in His effects, that is, in an internal love, and fruition, and taste, which make the soul connatural with God and intimately united to Him through love and His indwelling. This is a created effect, the love left in the soul by the presence of Divinity. The apprehension and penetration of things divine, derived from this effect of union and connaturality with God, gives a mystical knowledge which is a result of the beatific vision and inferior to it (for the gifts are inferior to the theological virtues and hence to the beatific vision).¹

Since, however, the gift of understanding is regulated and directed by the beatific vision, the vision of the divine essence is said to be within the scope of the gift, as a presupposition and regulative norm, not as something the gift elicits. From the vision comes love, and intimate affection, and a fruition of God. From the fruition comes a loving and experiential knowledge both of God as He is in Himself—this the vision itself gives—and of God as He is attained and experienced within the soul.

80. It might be objected that all this does not seem to be more than a reflex knowledge of the beatific vision and fruition of God. The gift of the Holy Ghost would not be required for such knowledge. Quite sufficient would be the infused knowledge through which graces and spiritual gifts like the beatific vision are known.

81. However, the taste and internal experience of divine sweetness, upon which mystical knowledge is founded, is not granted without some reflection upon the act of tasting and enjoying God. This

¹ Cf. I-II, q. 68; a. 8.

reflection can be twofold. The first tends to a knowledge of the act as a being, its reality and nature. The other reflection is directed to knowledge of the exercise of that act, and the effect which it leaves in the soul experiencing God. Mystical knowledge is founded upon the second, the loving knowledge or reflection on the act by which the blessed enjoy God.

It is a vastly different thing to know an object in its nature and being, even through reflection, and to know it experientially and lovingly. Through His beatific and infused knowledge Christ Our Lord knows most perfectly His own obedience in His Passion. Yet He *learned obedience from the things that He suffered*.¹ Similarly, the blessed see God most perfectly through the beatific vision. Nevertheless, the soul learns from the things that are experienced in joy and fruition. With the inundation and pouring forth of the whole Fount of Life through the gift of understanding the soul knows how sweet the Lord is.

82. The citation from St. Thomas' *Commentary on the Book of Sentences* has no more force than the one from the *Summa*. Yet it should be noted that the gift of understanding attains to the divine essence by having an immediate experience of it, not formally, as if the vision itself were elicited by the gift, but rather that the gift presupposes and is regulated by the vision. From the vision there results a fruition and an intimate love, an experiential taste of God. This consummate and perfected gift of understanding attains to the divine essence by immediate contact, as regulated by the beatific vision which it always presupposes.

83. The gift of understanding in its formal aspect penetrates and apprehends the divine mysteries with an experiential and loving clarity, but it does not know the quiddity of divine things. It presupposes the immediate experience and experiential knowledge of God as a regulative principle. The beatific vision is intuitive knowledge of the essence of God, and in so far as it is intuitive it is experiential. From this experience arises an affection and an enjoyment of God by which the soul has fuller loving contact with Him. The presence of the Holy Ghost and the inflaming plenitude of divinity is felt in the will. *My beloved put his hand through the key hole, and my bowels were moved at his touch. . . . My soul melted when he spoke*.² The beloved has a divine contact within his soul, in the bowels of love. The very sweetness

¹ *Hebrews*, v, 8.

² *Cantic of Canticles*, v, 4, 6.

of the act liquefies the soul and totally conforms it to the beloved, and unites it to Him. Such a contact can never be felt in this in life although some shadow of it may be experienced: *In my bed by night I sought him whom my soul loveth: I sought him and found him not.*¹ Arising, the soul finds Him after a variegated experience. It finds Him in His effects, and it sighs for Him, bringing Him to the home of its mother and into her bedchamber, the eternal joys of the Lord. Accordingly, from this experiential and loving union, at its highest peak when regulated by the beatific vision, arises the knowledge which is the gift of the Holy Ghost. This knowledge attains divine things in an experiential and loving manner. It is founded upon the experience of divine enjoyment and sweetness, which presupposes the beatific vision.

84. Even in heaven where there is an intuitive experience of God the knowledge in the gift of understanding proceeding through a loving experience is not superfluous. It is not unfitting nor superfluous that God should be known in the same intellect, by both infused and acquired knowledge. So it is not unfitting that there be a twofold experience of God and divine things. One of these is intuitive and through vision, *They shall see the king in his elegance.*² The other is loving and full of the joy of contact, *His right hand shall embrace me.*³ His breasts are given to the soul since *we will be glad and rejoice in them remembering thy breasts more than wine.*¹

This conjunction with the divine breasts, more sweet than wine, will be the loving and experiential knowledge in contact. It will be less intuitive than the vision, since it is founded upon something created, upon divine enjoyment. However, it is not superfluous, since it knows God in another way and under another formality. Although it will not be a formal intuition of God, it will not be lacking in clarity. It will be similar to the knowledge of God which is had through infused knowledge or demonstration. These are not obscure, although they are not intuitive. It suffices that such knowledge be founded upon an effect derived from the beatific vision, manifesting the presence of God in the love of the soul.

85. The statement⁵ that in heaven the gifts will not remain distinct from the virtues needs explanation. St. Thomas⁶ is not referring to

¹ *Canticle of Canticles*, iii, 1.

² Cf. *Isaias*, xxxiii, 17.

³ *Canticle of Canticles*, viii, 3.

⁴ *Ibid.*, i, 3.

⁶ Cf. No. 65.

³ 111, d. 32, q. 1, a. 3 ad 6.

the substance of the gift and to the species of act which it elicits, but to the manner and regulative principle which the gift receives from the beatific vision and the light of glory. The gifts will remain indistinct from the virtues as far as their regulative principle and manner of acting are concerned, but they will be specifically and essentially distinct.

The justification for this terminology comes from the text itself. St. Thomas distinguishes three kinds of gifts. There are some which share the same object with the theological virtues, since they are concerned with God and divine mysteries, for example, wisdom and understanding in their respective penetration and judgment. Others do not share the same material as the theological virtues. For example, the gifts of knowledge and counsel are concerned with things created. Moreover, fortitude, piety, and fear share the objects of the moral virtues.

The gifts of the last group mentioned, do not operate upon the same matter in heaven that they had in this life, yet the measure by which the gifts exceed the virtues remains. It is not difficult to understand how the gifts of the second type can remain in heaven as distinct from the beatific vision, for they are concerned with different objects.

86. The difficulty arises with respect to the gifts of the first type and how they can remain, since they are concerned with the same object as the beatific vision, God. These gifts perfect the contemplative life of man here below and remain in heaven with only a more perfect mode of the same act they had in this life. Although even in this life the gifts elevate the soul to a higher manner of acting than is proportionate to the human nature, they can never attain to the mode of acting which they will have in heaven. St. Thomas¹ asserts that the gifts which share the same object with the virtues will not remain in heaven. This should be understood to mean that they will not remain distinct as far as the manner in which they are perfected or as far as the regulative principle is concerned. This does not apply to their specific natures or to the acts they elicit.

87. A final difficulty :—The gifts of understanding and wisdom seem to be theological virtues since they have the same proximate object, God.

However, this argument fails since the gifts do not have as their

¹ III, d. 32, q. 1, a. 3 ad 6.

object God as He is in Himself. They are related to God as He is experienced and made connatural and united to the soul in something created, namely, in the loving and experiential union of charity. Hence, mystical and loving thoughts are not of the essence of the object in Itself. On the other hand, the theological virtue has as its object God as He is in Himself and not as He is in creatures.

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Chapter IV

THE GIFTS OF WISDOM AND KNOWLEDGE

1. In the doctrine of St. Thomas the gifts of wisdom and knowledge are distinct from the gift of understanding—as is evident from the, preceding chapter. The gift of understanding has as its function the apprehension and penetration of truth, while the other gifts judge of that truth. This point was brought out by distinguishing simple judgment, such as is had through the habit of principles in the simple penetration of terms, from a resolutive or analytic judgment, of the scientific habits, which give the essence and the cause of the thing understood.

This chapter will be occupied with explaining how the gifts of wisdom and knowledge are distinguished from the moral virtues, which are in the appetitive potency, and from the intellectual and theological virtues and the beatific vision, which are all related to the intellect.

The formal principle of the distinction of the gift of wisdom from the other gifts and habits

2. Two things are to be noted in making any distinctions among the habits and virtues :

a) The first is the formal nature under which each proceeds, for this formal principle specifies the act and the habit.

b) The second is the object, which stands as the matter upon which the habit acts through the medium of its formal nature.

3. Accordingly, in explaining the formal nature of the gift of wisdom, St. Thomas¹ argues from a proportion and likeness to the intellectual virtue of wisdom. This is the wisdom that judges of things according to their highest causes, as does metaphysics in the philosophical disciplines. For this reason, St. Thomas frequently attributes judgment to the gift of wisdom and the apprehension and penetration

¹ *Summa Theologica*,

q. 68, a. 4.

of divine truths to the gift of understanding. But St. Thomas does not affirm that the proper, specific, and adequate nature of wisdom lies in the mere fact that it judges of divine and supernatural things. Judgment is within the province of other habits besides the gift of wisdom.

Faith has a judgment since in belief there is a determined assent to divine things. Even prophecy judges of the things revealed to it.¹ The infused knowledge in Christ, the gift of knowledge in the faithful, the knowledge preceding and regulating the pious affection before faith, and a multitude of other things which are known through the impulse of the Holy Ghost are known with some sort of judgment.

Thus any explanation of the gift of wisdom which relies upon the mere fact that it judges of divine things from an impulse of the Holy Ghost is not adequate nor has it given the proper and specific nature of the gift.

4. Father Suarez² posits such an argument in the form of an objection against St. Thomas, who states³ in a definitive manner that the gift of wisdom is given to perfect the speculative intellect in its judgment by a special impulse of the Holy Ghost. He alleges against St. Thomas all the instances proposed above, and finally decides that there is not an adequate description of the gift of wisdom in the explanation of St. Thomas.

However, none of this has any probative value against St. Thomas. In the beginning of the article the Holy Doctor presupposes that the gifts perfect a man so that he may be prompt to follow the impulse of the Holy Ghost. From this he proceeds to show how the gifts are distributed throughout the intellective and appetitive powers. Among these, he notes that it is the special province of the gift of wisdom to judge. Its judgment is unique, proceeding from a special impulse, by which the mind is elevated to judge with promptitude, and by which the soul is united and subjected to God from a connaturality and experience of divine things. This is an adequate description of the gift of wisdom. Neither prophecy nor faith can do this, since they can be found in sinners, who are not united to God by grace. Even infused knowledge does not judge from an experience or union or effective attachment but rather from the truth of the thing clearly known as it is in itself.

The gift of wisdom does not judge from any knowledge derived

¹ II-II, q. 171.

² II *De Gratia*, e. 18, a. 2.

³ I-II, q. 68, a. 4.

from study and reasoning about causes or even by a light which manifests them in themselves. It judges from a connaturality and union with the supreme cause which is possessed as it were through experience.¹

5. It must be presupposed, then, that the gift of wisdom is ordained to a resolutive and analytic judgment of divine things—not to the simple judgment in the understanding of principles. For wisdom forms its judgment through the highest causes. The task of this chapter is the explanation of how wisdom knows these causes and under what formality it judges of them.

Following upon this there is the treatment of the objects of the gift: what are the divine truths concerning which wisdom judges?

6. The formal nature by which wisdom knows the highest causes is an internal experience of God and divine things. It is a taste, love, delight, or internal contact, of the will with spiritual things. By reason of its union with spiritual truths the soul is, as it were, made connatural to things divine. Through this tasting wisdom discerns spiritual truths from the sensible and created. In this life wisdom acts only imperfectly, by means of negation, but in heaven it acts quite perfectly, through positive evidence. The soul is moved to uncover the cause or reason of whatever it tends to know through wisdom. According to St. Thomas² rectitude of judgment may be had in two ways. The first way is according to the perfect use of reason. The second is through a certain connaturality with the things to be judged. For example, in regard to matters of chastity, a man who has learned-moral science may judge correctly of them by his power of reason. But one having the habit of chastity judges of them through a connaturality towards such things. Likewise, it is the province of the intellectual virtue of wisdom to judge of divine things through speculative inquiry. But it pertains to that wisdom which is a gift of the Holy Ghost to judge of them according to a connaturality with them. Denis, in *The Divine Names*,³ wrote of Hierotheus that “he is perfect not only in learning divine things, but in suffering them as well.” Reference should also be made to St. Thomas’ *Commentary on the Sentences** in which he teaches that wisdom implies an overflowing fullness of knowledge, which imparts certitude of great and marvellous

¹ II-II, q. 45.

² II II, q. 45, a. 2.

³ *De Divinis Nominibus*, c. 3, *M.P.G.* ni, 648.

« III, d. 35, q. 2, a. 1.

things unknown to others. It is a certitude that can judge all things and order things through its fullness.

7. With the foregoing as a description of wisdom in general, St. Thomas continues by adding a distinction. "The plenitude of knowledge had by some through study and an acuteness of intellect is the virtue the Philosopher¹ called wisdom. But in others a plenitude of knowledge is occasioned by an affinity to divine things, as Denis wrote of Hierotheus who learned divine things by suffering them." Again in distinguishing wisdom from faith St. Thomas writes:²

Faith is a simple knowledge of those articles which are the principles of all Christian wisdom: the gift of wisdom goes on to a certain divine and in a way explicit contemplation of the articles held by faith in an undeveloped human way. Hence wisdom is a gift and faith a virtue."

8. Wherefore it is of the formal nature of the gift of wisdom that it proceed through causes and through divine reasons (which are the highest causes) in the search for either divine or created truths: *for the spiritual man judges all.*³ These divine reasons through which wisdom proceeds to give its account are not known in their essence by this gift of wisdom, but lovingly, mystically, and for a connaturality and union, or interior experience of divine things.

The similarity between the gift of wisdom and the virtue called wisdom (as among other gifts proportioned to virtues) arises from the fact that both are concerned with the attainment of truths through their supreme causes. Both the virtue and the gift imply an intellectual habit—indeed the highest of the intellectual habits, supreme in the order of knowledge. Since it is proper to science to know causes, the science which considers the highest causes is supreme and holds the most eminent place. For neither would be supreme if it did not have some eminence over the other types of knowledge. This should be wisdom, either the virtue or the gift.

9. The difference between the gift of wisdom and the virtue of wisdom should be founded upon their respective modes of knowing the highest causes and of obtaining through them the truths they know. The gift of wisdom in a loving and mystical way attains divine things which are the supreme causes. This mystical experience is properly considered a gift of God. For although all the supernatural

¹ VI Nichomachean Ethics.

² 333, tj. 35, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1.

³ I Corinthians, ii, 15.

habits and virtues are gifts of God, it is one thing to attain an object by means of a gift and quite another to attain to it because of the gift as if the act of giving with which God gives Himself to us pertained to the essence of the act of attaining the object. God gives Himself through His Spirit and His will, inasmuch as He opens His heart. The primary thing in any gift is that the giver should open his heart and give himself or his will to another. He should be joined to the other person in heart, i.e., in spirit and love, according to David: *If you come peaceably to me . . . let my heart be joined to you.*¹

The gift of wisdom is not just any sort of wisdom but the spirit of wisdom. It proceeds from love and a spirit, from a giving by which men experience within themselves how good the will of God is. In it they rejoice and through it they judge perfectly of divine things. Therefore, the formal aspect under which the gift of wisdom reaches the highest cause, the divine cause, is an experiential knowledge of God, in which He is united to the soul in its very depths and gives Himself to it. This is the meaning of "knowing by the Spirit," knowing not from an illumination or speculation on the divine nature, but through a loving experience of union.

10. At this point, it might be objected that the spirit of love is in the will, while wisdom is in the intellect. The light of the intellect does not become more intense by reason of the will. Consequently, judgment and wisdom cannot increase by reason of a gift which belongs to the will. Moreover, since experience and loving union are the natural consequences of the act of love in the will, they are not supernaturally added to the virtue of charity. Therefore under this aspect the gift of wisdom is not distinguished from the virtue of charity.

If a reply were to be made according to the opinion of Father Suarez, it would read somewhat like this. Love transforms the beloved into the one loving through a peculiar union. There easily arises from this a judgment through a sort of connaturality to the object. According to St. Augustine,² "The more ardently we love God, the more surely and serenely we shall see Him." One who loves is more attentive to the thing loved and is more easily pleased by it. In the words of Our Lord, *If anyone desires to do his will, he will know of the teaching whether it is from God.*³

¹ *Parafrapomenon*, xii, 17.

² *VIII De Trinitate*, c. 9, *M.P.T.*, xLn 959.

³ *John*, vii, 17.

However, this argument alone does not suffice to explain the proper and formal aspect of the *gift of* wisdom. For if divine love and union and affective connaturality alone are presupposed for the mind to be more attentive in the consideration of the object of its love, and for it to be more easily pleased by it, wisdom would be restricted to the order of efficient causality or application. The will would merely render the intellect more attentive in its consideration, not by offering more light or expounding anything in the intellect but by applying the intellect to operate under the same light with greater attention. This action would leave the type of knowledge unchanged. It would be much the same as when the will applies the power of sight or hearing to act with greater attention. The will does not perfect the potency or sharpen the sight, but merely applies the faculty to the act of seeing. If love does nothing more than this to the gift of wisdom, the precise nature of the light and the formal aspect on the part of the intellect which distinguishes this gift from faith and the virtue of wisdom would remain unexplained.

11. Wherefore it must be noted that love can be considered in two ways:

a) First, as it applies itself and other powers to action. This love is restricted to the executive or efficient order. It applies the agent to act.

b) Secondly, as it applies and unites the object to itself, assimilating it through fruition and making itself thereby connatural and proportionate to the object. Love experiences its object with a sort of loving taste, according to the Psalmist,¹ *Taste and see*. In this way the one loving takes on the condition of his object, that is, through the affective experience the object is rendered more conformed, proportioned and united to the person, more suitable to him. For this reason, the intellect is carried toward the object as something experienced, brought into agreement with it, as it were. In this sense, love is not considered precisely as moving, rather it belongs in the genus of objective cause, since through experience the object is diversely proportioned and made suitable to the intellect.

12. An objection: Love and affection cannot experience more in an object than knowledge provides. Therefore, even before the union of love and intimate affective experience there is presupposed a

¹ *Psalm xxxiii, 9.*

knowledge of the thing to be experienced and loved. What is this knowledge? Is it wisdom, is it faith, or is it something else? If it is wisdom, it precedes love and is not founded upon the taste or experience of the object. If it is faith, then wisdom knows no more than faith. The whole postulate of such love would have already occurred with faith. If it is something other than wisdom and faith, what is it?

13. Reply : Love or affection cannot experience more in the object than is presented to the will, since it cannot be attracted to a thing which is not proposed to it. Nevertheless, in its manner of attaining the object, the will can be united to an object and experience it in a better way than that proposed by the intellect. For the intellect proposes things obscurely and with a certain amount of imperfection. On the other hand, the will is attracted to the object as it is in itself. Such is the case with charity, even when God is known only obscurely through faith. Furthermore, the will sometimes desires all the more fervently to see a thing in itself and enjoy it, when the object of its desire is hidden under a veil. For the object is proposed to the will in some extrinsic testimony and not as it is in itself. It is offered under a veil in such a way that more lies hidden than is known. The very fact that the greater part of the object lies hidden arouses the will to a greater desire. The affections are united to the object which the intellect does not know how to propose.

14. Upon this basis, St. Thomas¹ shows that charity is more excellent than faith, since faith, which is of the unseen, attains to God only obscurely and at a distance. But charity attains to God immediately as He is in Himself, intimately uniting itself to Him although He lies hidden in faith. Despite the fact that faith regulates love and the union with God, inasmuch as it proposes the object, nevertheless, as a result of the union with God there is an immediate loving contact in which the intellect is moved to judge of divine things in a way superior to that offered by faith. It penetrates and knows that there is more hidden in the things of faith than faith itself manifests. The soul loves more, tastes more with its affections, and through its fullness judges what it knows of divine things in a higher way. Meanwhile it rests upon an experiential love and an impulse of the Holy Ghost moving the intellect and giving it a higher certitude in a higher way than the naked testimony of faith.

¹ I-II, q. 66, a. 6 and II-II, q. 23, a. 6.

15. The response to the argument that the will does not add greater light to the intellect should be clear from what has been noted above. The will does not formally illuminate the intellect. However, it can causally furnish the intellect with greater light, in so far as love makes the object more united to the soul, more immediately attached to it and tasted by it. Thus the object is presented anew to the intellect with a different suitability and proportion to the will. The object is felt as if by an immediate experience. From this arises an understanding that what is thus felt in love is higher and more excellent than any consideration of faith, or any other known truth. Thus the intellect proceeds to judge of these things and divine truths according as it knows them in this loving experience of God, which is more exalted than a consideration of God by any amount of human effort. Such an experience of divine things through union and love makes the object knowable in a way quite different from any other light or from the testimony of faith. The formal diversity of object in this knowledge is caused by the unifying function of love : the object is united to the knower and experienced by him.

16. Although this taste and enjoyment naturally and necessarily results from love, it is not natural in the sense of being in the natural order. It is a supernatural enjoyment and taste, following upon attainment of a supernatural love, and regulated by the supernatural knowledge through faith in this life and vision in heaven. It is not repugnant, therefore, that a supernatural gift should be founded upon such knowledge. The supernatural experience of God is derived from the Spirit, and mystical, loving wisdom flows accordingly from the union of the soul with God.

17. The formal distinction between the gift of wisdom and faith and the other gifts may be derived from what has already been noted. That the gift is distinct from the acquired intellectual virtues is already manifest. The gift of wisdom proceeds from a motion and supernatural impulse of the Holy Ghost. Consequently, it is formally supernatural. It has a connaturality and loving experience of divine things. On the other hand, the virtue of wisdom is a result of natural speculation and effort.

18. *A posteriori*, the distinction of the gift of wisdom from faith is easily ascertainable, since the two are separable. Faith is found in sinners who have not grace. The gift of wisdom is found only in the

just: *For wisdom will not enter into a malicious soul, nor dwell in a body subject to sins.*¹ Moreover, the gift of wisdom but not faith is found in the blessed, since it is said of wisdom, *my abode is in the full assembly of saints.*²

19. *A priori*, the distinction between the gift of wisdom and faith may be derived from their diverse formal aspects. Faith involves a simple assent after the manner of one believing in authority or in the testimony of a witness. It neither inquires into the thing it believes nor understands it through causes. On the other hand, wisdom understands its object through its causes, and judges of it analytically. For wisdom is the supreme science, knowing a thing through its highest causes.³ The gift of wisdom, therefore, has some knowledge of these highest causes, not indeed in their essence, but through a certain experiential and affective union. According to Our Lord, *If anyone desires to do his will, he will know of the teaching whether it is from God,*⁴ and in Ecclesiasticus it is noted: *The love of God is an honourable wisdom. And they to whom she shall show herself love her by the sight, and by the knowledge of her great works.*⁵

Wisdom, therefore, presupposes the love of God, and is founded upon it. It is a mystical and loving knowledge of divine things. Consequently, it presupposes faith, which antecedes and regulates love. In heaven, it presupposes the beatific vision, from which love and enjoyment arise. Therefore, of its very nature, the gift of wisdom is a mystical and loving knowledge which presupposes faith and is distinguished from it.

20. With this in mind, one may easily understand the words of St. Thomas: "The gift of wisdom differs from faith, because faith assents to truth taken in itself, but judgment according to divine truth is the province of the gift of wisdom. Hence, the gift of wisdom presupposes faith, since each man judges well what he knows, as is mentioned in the first Book of the Ethics."⁶

That Father Suarez⁷ finds such obscurity and difficulty in these words is really remarkable. It is not apparent to him that assenting to divine truth is different from judging according to divine truth.

¹ Wisdom, i, 4.

² Ecclesiasticus, xxiv, 16.

³ John, vii, 17.

⁴ Ecclesiasticus, i, 14, 15.

⁵ 11-II, c. 45, a. 1.

⁶ I Ethics, e. 3.

⁷ II De Gratia, c. 18, n. 2 and ff.

Apparently oblivious of this distinction made by Cajetan,¹ Suarez would object that if judgment is an assent, St. Thomas' reason for distinguishing faith from wisdom is not apparent. Faith assents to divine truth as it is in itself, while wisdom judges according to divine truth. For Suarez this is the same thing, for to assent to divine truth is to assent according to divine truth and because of it. Assent and judgment are the same thing; neither is a broader term than the other. Just as there is assent which is clear or obscure, certain or uncertain, so it is with judgment. Whatever faith does by assenting, wisdom does by judging. Both are concerned with the same object; from the point of view of the manner of acting (the formal aspect) there does not seem to be any difference between assent and judgment.

21. The reply may be formulated from the doctrine of the preceding chapter, namely, that there are two kinds of judgment. One is a simple assent, such as is had in the judgment of first principles. Assent is made to these principles from the evidence of the terms. Likewise simple assent is had in faith. In the judgment that the thing is true, there is no inquiry into the causes of the thing, but merely an assent to the testimony and authority of the witness. The other type of judgment is analytic and scientific. When a man assents to the truth, judges of it, and even gives reasons for his judgment, investigating and defending it, he not only knows the thing, but he knows the foundation and cause of his knowledge. Such an act is proper to science. It is called wisdom when it is had through the highest causes. One judgment, therefore, is analytic and scientific, the other is not scientific but simple.

The simple judgment without reasoning and investigation of causes pertains to faith. The scientific and analytic judgment is the province of wisdom. The words of St. Thomas contain no other "mystery," nor need they bear the exaggerated obscurity and difficulty Father Suarez would heap upon them.

22. The very words of St. Thomas imply what has been stated above. He writes:² "It pertains to wisdom to consider the highest causes, through which it may judge of other things with the greatest certitude and according to which it should order other things." The words "through which A" and "according to which" indicate the explanatory reason and analytic judgment of an object through its

¹ *Commentaria in II-II*, q. 45, a. 1.

² II-II, q. 45, a. 1.

causes and according to its causes. When St. Thomas adds¹ that "judgment according to divine truth pertains to the gift of wisdom," he means an analytic judgment, which judges according to divine truth as through a cause.

Faith does not have such a judgment. One who believes is concerned only with the authority and testimony of the witness; he does not consider the causes upon which that truth is founded. Wherefore, just as it is not insoluble nor difficult nor obscure to distinguish two assents of judgments, one scientific and the other simple, so it is not difficult to consider that St. Thomas attributes one judgment, the simple one, to faith; the other, the scientific one, to the gift of wisdom.

23. There is no force in the argument that it belongs to faith to judge of divine truth as it is in itself, while it pertains to the gift of wisdom to judge according to the divine truth, as if assent were one thing and judgment another. Nor is there any difficulty in this statement. What if, generally speaking, assent and judgment are the same thing? The difference lies in the fact that the assent of faith is simple and not scientific, while the judgment of wisdom is analytic and scientific. Hence, these two differ greatly.

This is what St. Thomas wishes to say in his own brief way when he affirms that faith assents to truth as it is in itself, while the judgment according to divine truth belongs to the gift of wisdom. Assent to truth as it is in itself is an immediate and simple assent. But to assent to one truth according to another is to judge of it from its cause. St. Thomas² expressly mentioned this in the words, "it pertains to wisdom to judge through causes and to order other things according to them." If there is need for a more precise statement, it may be found in his *Commentary on the Sentences*:³ "Faith is a simple knowledge of the articles, which are the principles of the whole of Christian wisdom. The gift of wisdom proceeds according to a deiform contemplation and sort of explanation of the articles which faith holds enveloped according to a human manner (of knowing)."

Therefore, Suarez should have distinguished in faith the simple assent or judgment, as the assent to first principles, from the scientific assent or judgment in the gift of wisdom, which, as it were, explains and evolves these principles and defends them. If he had done this, his exaggerated difficulty would not exist.

¹ II-II, q. 45, ad 2.

² II-II, q. 45, a. 1.

³ III, d. 35, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1.

24. The distinction of the gift of wisdom from the gifts of understanding and counsel is also quite evident. It is distinct from the gift of understanding, because the latter does not proceed analytically, any more than does faith, nor does it treat of causes. Understanding is merely a simple knowledge of terms and a penetration of them in a loving and mystical way. Wisdom is distinct from the gift of counsel because the latter is concerned with the government of actions, not with the contemplation of divine things through their ultimate causes proper to wisdom.

25. According to St. Thomas the gift of wisdom is distinguished from the gift of knowledge, which, although it proceeds analytically, judges through created causes and not the highest causes.

However, the gift of knowledge is the science of the saints, found only in those who are in the state of grace, and proceeds from a union with God through charity. It is difficult to see how wisdom should be through the highest causes, because it is founded upon that union with God, while knowledge is not through the highest causes although it is founded upon the same union.

26. The explanation lies in the fact that although faith knows God primarily, it knows many created things secondarily. One thing can be the reason and cause of another, and faith and its exercise is something temporal and created. From faith love and union with God are born primarily, and secondarily a love for neighbour and created things inasmuch as they belong to God. Consequently, a man united to God through love is made easily movable by the Holy Ghost both for understanding and judging divine things and for judging human things. Of the divine he judges according to a love and a union or experience which he has of them. He judges also of creatures through an experience of them, either in the affection ordering charity and the love of the creature to God, or in the act of faith and the virtues, or in the manner of tending to God through a removal of things created. This last cannot be done without a distinction being made between creatures and God. For wisdom, then, to judge with sufficient reason that God is distinct from creatures, it must have a notion of both God and creatures.

27. In the union with God by grace and charity, there is sufficient basis for a twofold procedure in understanding and judging divine

things. It may proceed through the First Cause Himself, to whom charity is primarily united, or it may go through human and created causes, to which it is united secondarily and through which it is led back to an understanding of the First Cause. Wisdom, the highest knowledge, is founded upon the first type of understanding and judging. Upon the second is founded ordinary and inferior knowledge. Both presuppose the union of man with his God through love or charity, and secondarily, a union with his neighbour or creatures through the same charity. By reason of the first, man is moved by the Holy Ghost to understand and judge of divine things. By reason of the second, he judges from created causes.

In Sacred Scripture there are many examples and reasons for things which belong to either wisdom or knowledge. Sometimes Scripture mentions the lesser causes, sometimes the highest. The Apostles asked Our Lord about the cause of the blindness in the man born blind, they wanted to know its lesser or created cause, namely, the sins which would cause such a punishment. They said, *Rabbi, who has sinned, this man or his parents, that he should be born blind.*¹ But Our Lord replied through wisdom by giving the cause of the blindness from the point of view of the Supreme Cause, which is divine glory: *Neither has this man sinned, nor his parents, but the works of God were to be made manifest in him.**

Moreover, the prophet judged of the wonderful things of God through the gift of wisdom when he said: *For I do not know how to write about them. I will enter upon a recital of the powers of the Lord; O Lord, I will commemorate Thy justice alone. O God, Thou hast taught me from my youth, and even until now do I declare Thy wondrous deed.** Without literary effort, his soul enters upon a recital of the powers of the Lord, and it records His justice alone, as he had been taught from his youth, since *His anointing teaches us concerning all things.*¹ The power of God and His justice (which are the supreme causes), the prophet gives as the reason and cause for the mighty deeds of God, which he announces. This surely pertains to wisdom. The same prophet, through the gift of knowledge, gives the causes of the destruction of sinners from the proximate cause of their sins. *How are they brought to desolation? They have suddenly ceased to be; they have perished by reason of their iniquity* Thus Sacred Scripture, in assigning the

¹ John, ix, 2.

² Ibid., 3.

³ Psalms lxx, 15-17.

⁴ Cf. I John, ii, 27.

⁶ Psalm lxxii, 19.

causes of these truths, cites examples either of the gift of wisdom or of knowledge. Much insight into these gifts may be obtained by anyone who grasps the cause of the distinction in Scriptural usage.

28. Finally, the gift of wisdom differs from the gift of counsel. It is true that wisdom is directive of actions inasmuch as they are regulated through eternal laws contemplated in wisdom.¹ Nevertheless, over and above this there is need for the gift of counsel corresponding to prudence, which directs the moral virtues. The virtue of prudence is distinguished from the virtue of wisdom in this, that prudence regulates according to human rules acts done here and now. On the other hand, wisdom is not immediately regulative of action. It is contemplative and knows the Supreme Cause, upon which depends the essential knowledge of the rules and of the actions. Furthermore, it establishes and defends the universal principles upon which such rules depend.

The relation of the gift of counsel and the gift of wisdom is as follows: The gift of counsel directs immediately the actions of the soul moved by the Holy Ghost to choose correctly and well and to find the mean even in things which are very doubtful. It is noted in the Book of the Machabees: *Good counsel came into their minds.*² The gift of wisdom, on the other hand, is not immediately regulative of activity. It contemplates divine things, both as they are in themselves, and secondarily, as they are the higher rule of action. Activity is still immediately directed by human rules.

29. However, an objection can be raised against this doctrine. It seems impossible that the gift of wisdom which has been possessed by a soul for a long time should be obliterated by one mortal sin. Therefore, it can remain in the soul without charity, and hence is not essentially a loving knowledge, founded upon the union of charity.

The first statement is proved from the fact that the gift of wisdom is exercised by means of ideas which represent an object properly ordered by the light called the gift of wisdom. These ideas and their representation and their ordination are not wiped out through a mortal sin. Mortal sin is an aversion of the will, not a destruction of ideas in the intellect. Hence the ideas, and consequently wisdom, should remain as before.

» II-II, q. 45, a. 5.

81 Machabees, iv, 45.

30. This is confirmed by the fact that even after a mortal sin a person can elicit acts of wisdom the same as before. He understands in the same way and he speculates and judges concerning divine things just as before. Therefore, the gift of wisdom remains in sinners. Of course it might be said with St. Thomas¹ that not every illumination of the mind constitutes the gift of wisdom, but only the one which makes for a correct estimate of the final end, which is found only in those having grace. Yet that estimate is either a speculative estimate of the nature and cause of the ultimate end, or it is a practical estimate, by which one would direct himself to the attainment of his end. The first type of estimate remains in a sinner, for a sinner can have an excellent speculative judgment of the ultimate end. The second estimate pertains to prudence, by which a man is directed in a practical way in the right estimation of actions. Thus if wisdom were essentially and primarily practical it would be confused with counsel.

31. A further corroboration is provided by the fact that the gift of wisdom knows truths either with or without a reasoning process. If it is through a process of reasoning, it is founded upon effort and one's own industry. Like theology, then, it can remain in the sinner even after the loss of grace, since sin neither harms nor removes reasoning. If this discourse is had without reasoning, it is not distinguished from the gift of understanding, which penetrates truths in a simple intuitive way. In that case it is not accommodated to human capacity, nor is there any experience of such a scientific mode of knowledge devoid of reasoning.

32. It must be noted in reply that it is most certain that when grace is lost through mortal sin the wisdom which is a gift of the Holy Ghost ceases to be. *For wisdom will not enter into a malicious soul, nor dwell in a body subject to sins. For the Holy Spirit of discipline will flee from the deceitful, and will withdraw himself from thoughts that are without understanding, and he shall not abide when iniquity comes in.*² Therefore, the arrival of iniquity signalizes the departure of the motion of the Holy Ghost. Wisdom will flee from the deceitful. This passage of Scripture cannot be understood of acquired wisdom. For it is a matter of experience that it remains even without grace. Nor is it the charism of wisdom, nor prophecy, which can be found even

¹ III-II, q. 8, a. 5.

² Wisdom, i, 4, 5.

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in sinners. It can be understood, therefore, only of the gift of wisdom.

The first premise of the objection was maintained on the ground that the ideas serving wisdom remain even when charity is no longer present in the soul. This must be conceded. However, these ideas do not remain subject to the impulse and the motion of the Holy Ghost as before, nor do they serve that taste or experience in which the sweetness of the Lord is felt. These ideas remain at the service of faith, acquired wisdom, or some other light that might be given. Nevertheless, the ordering of ideas, which is had by the gift of wisdom through the motion of the Holy Ghost leading the soul to taste and lovingly to experience God, is taken away from thoughts "devoid of understanding." It is destroyed by the intrusion of iniquity, as is mentioned in the Book of Wisdom, since then no longer can the soul lovingly taste and see how sweet is the Lord through such ideas.

What are these thoughts without understanding except the carnal thoughts of a sinner, who has become *like the horse and the mule, who have no understanding; . . . when he was in honour did not understand; he is compared to senseless beasts.*¹ If a man can have such thoughts without understanding, what is so extraordinary about his having ideas without the ordination of wisdom? Although sin is a moral aversion, it has many physical effects at least by way of demerit; it takes away grace and destroys charity, it wounds the intellect, and drives out the Holy Ghost. It impedes all His friendly motions. Whether it brings about this overthrow physically or by way of demerit is not the present question. It is sufficient to note that all is destroyed by sin.

33. To the assertion that² even after a mortal sin a person judges and speculates of divine things as before, the only answer is that he does not do this through the gift of wisdom. He does it through the acquired intellectual virtue of wisdom or through some illumination which is a charism or merely through the memory of past experience, since these ideas can remain in the memory just as the recollection of a good work.

It is impossible, however, that after mortal sin he should contemplate and judge by reason of that taste or internal experience of divine things, since only he who receives it knows that internal sweetness and peace which surpasses all sense, that intoxication of the Spirit and

¹ Psalm xxxi, 9; xlviii, 21.

² Cf. No. 30.

touch of divine union. When the loving experience of the divine union ceases, the experiential act of understanding and judging divine things no longer exists. Therefore, the gift of wisdom may cease, while the ideas it employed will not be taken away. In the case of faith, even if the faith is destroyed by a sin contrary to faith, the ideas which it used will remain, as well as the memory of the act of believing exercised in the soul. Some sort of exercise of faith concerning the other articles of faith may even remain. Nevertheless, all these things are not the products of supernatural faith. They come either from human faith or from a remembrance of the former acts of faith.

34. It is not considered impossible that faith should be destroyed by one act contrary to it, and that true acts of supernatural faith can no longer be elicited, although they may seem to be the same as before. Neither is it impossible that one act, one blow of mortal sin should obliterate the gift of wisdom, so that there could be no further understanding according to the formality of that gift. A man might speculate by similar acts of wisdom, either from acquired wisdom or a charism ordained to the enlightenment of others and not to his own internal experience and union. According to the Apostle, *To one through the Spirit is given the utterance of wisdom; and to another the utterance of knowledge, according to the same Spirit.*¹ St. Thomas² recognizes that this type of wisdom is in those who are not in the state of grace, but it is not to be identified with that state, since the charisms may be found even in sinners. Finally, those acts of wisdom may remain in a sinner through the remembrance of former knowledge, but they are not a taste or experience.

It cannot be inferred from this that anyone who feels this act of the gift of wisdom knows clearly that he is in the state of grace. For no one can know clearly that the motion he feels is from the indwelling of the Holy Ghost, although there is a strong suspicion of it.

35. The assertion that the gift of knowledge, and by the same token the gift of wisdom, is not discursive because it is a participation in divine knowledge is readily answered by the text of St. Thomas.³ "Divine knowledge is not discursive or rational but simple and absolute. The knowledge which is called the gift of the Holy Ghost is similar to this, since it is a participated similitude of it." Even if neither the gift of knowledge nor the gift of wisdom is discursive,

¹ II Corinthians, xii, 8. ² II-II, q. 45, a. 5. ³ II-II, q. 9, a. 1, ad 1.

there still remains a difference between understanding and wisdom. Understanding does not pass from one thing to another, either on the part of the thing known or on the part of the manner of knowing. It proceeds by apprehending principles and penetrates them from a knowledge of the terms. These terms are not subject to analysis. The manner of knowing is not analytical but apprehensive of truth by a simple treatment. On the other hand, knowledge and wisdom proceed analytically, at least from the point of view of the thing known. They proceed in an orderly manner through either the highest or lesser causes and they give a reason for the truth which they know. On the part of the one knowing, however, there is no discourse. Similarly, the angels have analytic knowledge since they know a thing through its causes although they know both the cause and the effect without multiple speculative acts.

36. Whether the gifts of knowledge and wisdom are such that they lack speculation to the extent that it is not present either by reason of the nature of the gift or by reason of the imperfection of the subject in this life, is not altogether certain. It would not seem absurd to affirm that the gifts are not of themselves speculative, but can admit of speculation because of human imperfection in this life, to which the gift must accommodate itself. Certainly St. Thomas merely stated that the gift of knowledge is like divine knowledge because it is simple and not discursive. This would still be true if it were not discursive by nature although by reason of the imperfection of the subject it admitted of some pondering of its object.

St. Thomas has written¹ of the infused knowledge of Christ that He could use it with a discourse or without it. Our Lord actually used a rational process when He asked Peter from whom the kings of the earth received tribute, from their own sons or from others. Peter replied, *From others*. Our Lord then inferred, *The sons then are exempt*.²

It is evident that infused knowledge is a participation of divine knowledge which is not discursive. Even the gift of wisdom is found within the scope of infused knowledge, since the latter extends to everything known outside the beatific vision. For this reason, it would not seem impossible that the gift of wisdom as well as the gift of knowledge embraces both aspects. Of their nature they could elevate the mind to understand without formal deduction, but on the

¹ *II*, q. *U*, a. 3.

² *Matthew*, *xvii*, 25.

part of the one knowing they can use deduction, because of the fact that the subject is not properly disposed and only imperfectly participates its light.

The objects of the gift of wisdom

37. Father Suarez¹ makes much ado about the matter of the objects of the gift of wisdom. He postulates a twofold manner of speaking. In his opinion, wisdom is concerned with conclusions deduced from the principles of faith. This is done in such a way that faith offers the principles, while wisdom is concerned with the conclusions. Secondly, he holds that wisdom is concerned with the dogmas of faith—especially those concerned directly with God—and this on a par with faith.

38. Moreover, Suarez finds difficulties in both of these positions. He experiences difficulty with the first because in that case wisdom would in no way differ from theology, except perhaps by reason of the fact that the gift of wisdom is infused while theology is acquired. This is an accidental difference, on the part of the extrinsic cause, and hence not essential to the nature of wisdom. He likewise finds difficulty in the second position because there would then be no differentiation between wisdom and faith, which is an assent to divine truth in obscure belief. The gift of wisdom also assents in obscurity, for it has no experience of evidence. The difference which Cajetan finds between assent and judgment is rejected by Suarez as impossible.

39. For this reason, Suarez feels that faith and wisdom coalesce under the aspect of assent and judgment. They would differ only because faith judges simply that a thing is truly revealed and true because it is revealed. Wisdom, on the other hand, does not judge whether the thing revealed is true or false; it merely judges of divine things in so far as they are suitable objects of love and belief. To anyone who objects that faith also judges that the things of faith are worthy of belief, and that supernatural mysteries are entirely congruous, Suarez would reply that faith does not do this directly. The only direct function of faith is to believe these things because they have been revealed by God. Wisdom judges by an intuition of these things, or by reason of suitableness or loveliness, or some other property in their effects. This judgment is in accord with a certain

III De Gratia, c. 18, no. 5 ff.

connaturality or love, which wisdom presupposes. It seems to seize upon an experience of the thing, since love makes it give more attention and consideration to its beloved object. Finally, Suarez distinguishes the act of wisdom from the act of faith on the grounds that wisdom is not the belief of truth, but that it presupposes belief and consists in a sort of experimental knowledge of the truth believed.

40. Despite all this, it must be maintained that the gift of wisdom judges of everything that falls under faith. For St. Paul writes, *The spiritual man judges of all things*.¹ St. Thomas² applied this passage to the gift of wisdom through which a man becomes spiritual and is moved by the Spirit in a special way. Hence St. Thomas is of the opinion that wisdom treats of the same matter as faith and that it attains an explicit contemplation of the articles of faith which faith proposes in a confused manner. For this reason, St. Thomas³ concludes: "This gift is principally concerned with divine things and with others only in so far as through the divine it can judge of all." Elsewhere⁴ he teaches that wisdom extends to things divine and human and is both speculative and practical. Therefore, according to St. Thomas the gift of wisdom judges both of divine and human and created things, though its principal concern is with the divine. It thus extends to all things upon which faith and theology touch.

41. The reason for this is derived from the nature of this gift and from the proportionate likeness it bears to the virtue of wisdom. The formal reason by which wisdom judges truth is the Supreme Cause which is God, in so far as He is known by a certain experiential and loving union in an interior taste. Known in this way, God is the cause of the knowledge of divine things and the supernatural mysteries, as well as created objects, whose cause is God, and with which faith is concerned. For the teaching of faith causes love and the affection of charity. It unites the soul to God and makes the soul love creatures because of God. Faith cannot judge God in this life except by removing from Him the imperfections of creatures and whatever has the connotation of being created. Moreover, it has a judgment that distinguishes between God and creatures. Therefore, it is fitting that the gift of wisdom should attain divine things, and judge them, and at the same time judge creatures under a divine aspect.

¹ *11 Corinthians*, ii, 15.

² II-II, q. 45, a. 1 and III, d. 36, 1, 1.

³ III, d. 36, *quaestiunc.* 2.

⁴ II-II, q. 45, a. 3.

The same thing is proved from the similarity of the gift and the virtue of wisdom. The virtue of wisdom deduces conclusions from the supreme causes. Furthermore, it judges principles reflexively to defend them. In the same way, the gift of wisdom, which has for its principles the truths of faith, should be concerned with those conclusions and created truths. Moreover, it should defend the principles of faith and reflect upon them. In this way it should judge of the dogmas of faith.

42. It does not follow from this that the gift of wisdom is not specifically and substantially different from acquired theology, as Suarez infers when he claims that they differ only in the manner of acquisition, theology being acquired by human effort and the gift from an impulse of the Holy Ghost. The contrary is true, for the gift of wisdom is not theology incidentally infused, nor is it of the same nature as the theology acquired by sweat and study in school. It is mystical and loving wisdom, which judges of divine things by an internal experience and taste.

St. Thomas¹ does not distinguish the virtue of wisdom (theology) from the gift of wisdom on the extrinsic grounds that one is infused and the other acquired. This would not sufficiently distinguish the natures of the two habits to indicate that one is a virtue and the other a gift. It would leave open the possibility of both being acquired, or even that they are the same virtue, one of which happened to be infused.

The distinction then between theology and the gift of wisdom lies in the fact that theology is concerned with truths which have been virtually revealed and are deduced from the principles of faith in a metaphysical and speculative manner. For this reason, theology frequently uses natural propositions, especially from metaphysics. It uses them merely to apprehend and judge the nature of truths, and can be found in the just and in sinners alike.

The gift of wisdom, however, is not concerned with what has been virtually revealed and what is known in its essence through a metaphysical discourse, but with what is known in affection as knowable and lovable in accord with an interior taste and experience. Accordingly, it is called the science of the saints, found only in one who has received it from God. Such wisdom is not found in a soul given to evil. Infused, like the virtues, by reason of its supernatural object, it is

¹ II-II, q. 45, a. 2.

likewise infused because of the supernatural experiential love upon which it is founded, and because of the motion or impulse of the Holy Ghost by which it is led to judge divine things through an interior union and experience.

43. Despite Suarez's opinion, it is not true that the gift of wisdom judges only of divine truths, and of them only in so far as their suitability is concerned, that is, their worthiness of belief and love. Wisdom attains to this, but this aspect seems to pertain more to a practical judgment in which divine things are judged worthy of love. Because it is a motive of love, it is a pious affection which precedes faith and is regulated by the knowledge determining what things are worthy of love.

Wisdom is also contemplative, according to the Apostle: *We all with faces unveiled, reflecting as in a mirror the glory of the Lord, are being transformed into his very image from glory to glory, as through the Spirit of the Lord.*¹ Through the transformation and the union of the soul with God, the Spirit of the Lord brings about an experience of divine things from glory to glory. That glory is reflected, since *not knowing how to write about them* (that is, not having human wisdom) *he entered upon a recital of the powers of the Lord and commemorated his justice alone.*² Is this merely to know that divine things are worthy of belief and love? Is it not rather to enter upon the divine truths themselves and to feast upon the fatness of the grain? Our Lord said to the Jews: *He who would do the will of Him who sent me will know of the doctrine whether it has come from God.*³ Any fulfilling the will of God from divine charity proves the doctrine to be divine and true, not only as worthy of belief and love, but as truly derived from God. The experience of divine things includes both loveliness and credibility and the fact that these truths are divine in themselves.

44. Objection: Wisdom judges of truths which have been deduced from principles. It does not then have as its object divine truths in themselves, since they are the principles of faith. Therefore, either it is concerned with virtually revealed truths, as is theology, or not all divine truths are its object.

The premises of this argument seem certain. The judgment of wisdom is not simple. It proceeds through a resolution to causes, indeed to the Supreme Cause. Therefore, it proceeds from some

¹ III Corinthians, iii, 18.

² Cf. Psalm lxx, 15, 16.

³ Cf. John, vii, 17.

principles. The inference is evident, since the highest causes from which wisdom judges are divine things. Therefore, it does not judge of them nor regard them as its objects, but rather as its causes and principles.

45. This objection is confirmed by the fact that the gift of wisdom remains in heaven. But it cannot judge of divine things or defend them or even reflect upon them in heaven, since divine things are then known in the beatific vision upon which there can be no reflection or judgment or defence. The things seen there are clearly seen, since this vision is above all visions. Therefore, at least in heaven the gift of wisdom is not concerned with divine things.

46. In reply it should be noted that this argument can be directed against the virtue of wisdom and acquired theology as well as against the gift of wisdom. For wisdom proceeds from principles in such a way that it reflects upon the principles, not indeed by proving them, but by explaining and defending them from contrary arguments. Theology is concerned with divine things. From a few truths about God it proves others. Still others it explains and defends. For the mystery of the Trinity, of the Incarnation, of the Eucharist, and the like, are as first principles. The virtue of wisdom does not prove them; it merely explains and defends them against errors. However, it does prove some divine attributes and their reasons, since it deduces eternity from immutability, knowledge from immateriality, will from intellect, and the like.

47. The fact that all these truths and divine attributes pertain to the primary object of faith, or to the primary object of vision, should offer no difficulty. Nor does it seem impossible that there should be proofs concerning these truths through wisdom, even though this science never proves its primary object. Many things which are immediately matters of faith can be proved and explained through other truths and principles of faith. For example, the Apostle proved our resurrection from the Resurrection of Christ; nevertheless, both of them are matters of faith. In God, the primary object of faith, it is not inconsistent to prove one truth by another, although both are immediately matters of faith. From the fact that God is One, it is proved that the Son should be consubstantial with the Father lest

there be a division in the divine nature. From the fact that God is infinite it is proved that He is omnipotent. Moreover, because He knows, He also wills. Although all these truths belong to the primary object of faith, as well as of the vision, which is God, they are truths and reasons so connected one with another that one can be inferred and explained by the other. From one miracle and mystery is gleaned an explanation for another. The virginity of Mary in giving birth to Christ is explained by His departing from the tomb sealed with a stone. In this way, it is not inconsistent that many truths and reasons should concur in the same primary object, though one may virtually include or explain or manifest another.

Similarly, one principle proves another, not by an essential and intrinsic medium, since principles are self-evident propositions which need no medium of demonstration.¹ Rather, one principle explains another by an extrinsic medium, by an explanation from a similar principle or an example. This may also occur when many inadequate reasons mutually concur in one nature or essence in such a way that one may be inferred from the other. Yet each ought to pertain to the integrity of the essence, its definition or principle. A case in point is the inference of the spirituality and immortality of the soul from the fact that it is rational.

Wisdom, therefore, reflects upon its principles not by proving them through middle terms or from intrinsic principles, as it might prove conclusions, but by explaining them from other principles used as extrinsic or similar mediums, or within the same nature by inferring one inadequate reason from another.

48. The reply to the confirmation of this objection² is based upon the fact that in heaven God and divine things are known in the beatific vision through morning knowledge, and effects and illuminations outside the vision through evening knowledge. The blessed are not deprived of the knowledge of things in themselves. They continually receive illuminations of divine mysteries just as the lower angels are illuminated and taught by the higher. This illumination is not part of the eternal and immutable beatific vision, which cannot increase nor become more luminous. Therefore, things as they are in themselves are illuminated outside the beatific vision. It is the function of wisdom, then, to judge of divine things outside the beatific vision through its effects, and to reflect upon them and defend them through

¹ cf. *I Posterior Analytics*.

² Cf. No. 45.

a connaturality and union with them. It functions just as in this life, in which it lacks a judgment or defence or reflection upon the beatific vision itself.

The distinction between the gift of knowledge and the other gifts and virtues

49. Much of the subject-matter of the present section can be gathered from what has been written concerning the gifts of understanding and wisdom. There are three items to be recapitulated here: first, the nature and "formal cause" of the gift of knowledge; secondly, its proper act and its distinctive characteristic; and thirdly, its objects.

50. The gift of knowledge, like the other gifts, should be considered on the basis of a proportion between it and the virtue of the same name. The virtue of knowledge is a habit which judges truths evidently? knowable through causes or effects. Within its scope it includes knowledge of the reason for a thing [*propter quid*], knowledge of the fact (*quia*), knowledge derived from the nature (*a priori*), and knowledge derived from effects (*a posteriori*). When this knowledge is culled from inferior or created causes, it is called science; when it is had through the highest causes, it is called the highest science or wisdom. According to St. Augustine,¹ "Wisdom is attributed to divine and eternal things, science to the human and temporal." However, St. Augustine is not referring to the matter, or to the thing understood, but to the formal aspect of the act of understanding.² For as far as the object understood is concerned, it is not repugnant that wisdom should descend to inferior things, nor that science should ascend from effects and inferior causes to God Himself.

51. From the foregoing is derived the distinction between the gift of knowledge and the gift of wisdom. In the opinion of St. Augustine :³ "According to the distinction which the Apostle laid down,⁴ to some is given the utterance of wisdom, to others the utterance of knowledge; the gifts should be so divided, that the knowledge of divine things is called wisdom, and the knowledge of human things receives i

¹ Cf. No. 45.

² *XIII De Trinitate*, c. 19, *M.P.L.* xlii, 1032.

³ Cf. II-II, q. 9, a. 2, ad 3.

⁴ *XIV De Trinitate*, c. 1, *M.P.L.* xlii, 1037.

the name of knowledge.” Therefore, just as the virtue, of wisdom and the virtue of knowledge are distinguished by reason of their diverse natures, since one proceeds from proximate causes, the other from the highest, in the same way the gift of wisdom is distinguished from the gift of knowledge. It is to be presupposed, of course, that both judge and proceed in an analytic manner.¹

52. There is a special difficulty with the gift of knowledge. How does it know created and inferior causes in order to judge of their truth? That it knows them supernaturally is certain, since it is a gift of the Holy Ghost coming from His supernatural motion and impulse. By reason of its special mode the gift is elevated above even the infused virtues and is called in a special way a gift of the Holy Ghost. The supernatural light by which these things are known is either:

- a) Faith alone by which the things are believed, or
- b) an experience arising from an internal love—just as wisdom experiences divine things, and because of the experience goes on to taste and contact, or
- c) a special infused light, by which these truths are known, as infused knowledge was in Christ.

This third possibility is evidently not to be entertained, since there is no experience or knowledge of such a light in the faithful.

The first light would not be sufficient. Knowledge of that kind would merely tend to truths virtually contained in revelation and attainable only through a scientific process. The gift would then not differ from theology, which is concerned with truths virtually revealed and capable of scientific deductions. It would merely admit of a difference arising from the fact that knowledge would be called a gift because infused, while theology would be a virtue, acquired through effort. If that were true, anyone in the state of grace would be a theologian. For he would have the science of theology because he had the gift of knowledge which would proceed in the same way as theology.

The second possibility, an experience arising from love, could never occur. The soul may experience divine things through love and union with God, but this leads to the gift of wisdom. There is no such experience as supernatural union with created things and inferior causes from which the gift of knowledge could take its origin. The taste and experience of created and human things can be had without anything supernatural; in fact, it is hard to see how it could be brought

¹ Cf. *supra* 24 and 25.

about by anything supernatural. Hence, experience of created things does not cause the guilt of knowledge. Therefore, the love and experience of created things from which the gift of knowledge proceeds does not require anything supernatural.

53. In this matter, Father Suarez¹ proceeds in the same way as before. He affirms that the gift of knowledge does not judge the truth or falsity of matters of faith but only their suitableness, either with respect to God or to men. It may even be with respect to faith itself, inasmuch as the truth is judged worthy of faith, or with respect to love, if the object is considered worthy of love.

In Suarez's opinion there seems to be no difference between wisdom and knowledge. He affirmed the same doctrine concerning wisdom,² namely, that wisdom does not judge of the truth or falsity of the truth revealed by faith but that it does judge of divine things—which surely are revealed truths—in so far as they are suitable, credible, and lovable. What difference is there between wisdom and knowledge? Both judge not of the truths revealed but of their suitableness, either on the part of God or on the part of men, in so far as they are worthy of faith or love. Perhaps Suarez might admit that wisdom judges that divine things are worthy of belief and love through superior and divine causes, while knowledge judges through inferior and created causes. This is indeed true, but it does not answer the difficulty. An explanation must be given of how created things are supernaturally known and united to the soul, so that judgment may be made through them. Again, there must be an answer to the question of why knowledge can penetrate to the truths themselves and not merely to an extrinsic suitableness—as has been considered in the case of wisdom.

54. According to St. Thomas:³ “Although the subject-matter of faith is divine and eternal things, nevertheless, faith itself is something temporal in the soul of the one believing. Hence to know what should be believed pertains to the gifts of knowledge. To know the things believed as they are in themselves through a union with them belongs to the gift of wisdom.” The objection to which St. Thomas is replying in this passage is derived from the phrase of St. Augustine:⁴ “through knowledge faith is born, nourished and defended.” But faith is concerned with divine things; so too, then, is knowledge.

¹ Cf. *11 De Gratia*, c. 20.

* Cf. *ibid.*, c. 18.

² *II-II*, q. 9, a. 2.

* *XIV De Trinitate*, c. 1, *M.P.L.* xlix, 1037.

In another response to this objection! St. Thomas teaches that “from human things the knowledge of divine tilings is nourished and defended, since *the invisible things of God are clearly seen being known through the things that are made.*”² In this latter solution to the objection St. Thomas seems to give a greater scope to the gift of knowledge, extending it to all knowledge from human and created things ordered to the knowledge of the invisible things of God. In the first answer he seems to restrict this knowledge to a created thing, not the object of faith but faith as it is found in the soul of the one believing. Such an excessive restriction of the object of the gift of knowledge would reduce it to a mere reflex action, namely, to a knowledge of faith, as something temporal in the soul of the one believing.

55. There does not seem to be much truth in such a restriction of the scope of the gift of knowledge. For, according to St. Thomas,³ “the gift of knowledge is concerned with human things, or created things.” Again he teaches⁴ that in the first place there corresponds “to the gift of knowledge a sorrow for past errors, and consequently some consolation, since through his right judgment, a man directs creatures to the divine good.” This surely indicates something more than the knowledge of faith as a temporal object in the soul of the believer.

Moreover, grace and charity are not necessary for a knowledge of faith as it is exercised in the soul of the one believing. For faith may be practised even by a sinner. Yet the gift of knowledge is found only in those who are in the state of grace. Therefore, this gift is not restricted to a knowledge of the faith as it is in the soul of the one who believes. It extends to whatever is created and knowable through faith. The example concerning the knowledge of faith as it is in the soul of a believer was used by St. Thomas so that he might reply in the very words of the objection. He wished to show that even if faith unto salvation is begotten through knowledge, there is still room for it to proceed through human and created causes, since faith itself and the act of belief are temporal and hence the concern of knowledge.

56. However,⁵ the gift of knowledge likewise belongs to mystical and loving knowledge. The *knowledge* mentioned in Scripture is not just of any sort of knowledge. It is the spirit of knowledge, the

1 III, d. 35, q. 2, a. 2, *quaestiunc. 1 ad 1.*

2 *Romans*, i, 20.

3 II-II, q. 9, a. 2.

4 *Ibid.*, a. 4, *ad 1.*

5 Solution of the difficulty expressed in No. 52.

knowledge of the saints, since it is found only in those who are in the state of grace. Founded upon a motion of the Holy Ghost, it moves the mind not by a pure and naked light manifesting exterior truths, but by an internal experience, by a sort of loving and supernatural connaturality to the things that it judges.

57. Moreover, charity, which unites the soul's love to God, is primarily concerned with God and divine things, and secondarily with creatures as they are ordained to God. Hence charity provides love with a connatural union and an experiential taste of God. At the same time love has a taste and experience of creatures. It forms a correct judgment concerning them, both to despise them, lest the soul should be distracted by them, and to love them moderately, ordaining them to God. In the words of the Apostle, *Do you seek a proof of the Christ who speaks in me? For this I have suffered the loss of all things, and, I count them as dung, that I may gain Christ.*¹ Flight from creatures and a knowledge of their limitations, bitterness, and nothingness are very conducive to the perfect union with God and an experience of His immense goodness. Consideration of creatures often helps the soul to adhere more firmly to God, since He is known by stripping off the imperfections "which are found in creatures. The Apostle had an excellent judgment of creatures: *For I am sure that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor things present, nor things to come, nor powers, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature will be able to separate us from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord.*³ He shows in this passage the sort of judgment of creatures that is born of the charity of God, lest either desire for them or fear of them should separate anyone from the love of God. An experience and taste of creatures as well as an insight concerning them are given to the soul, not that it may rest in them as its ultimate end, but that it may proceed through them to God with a correct estimate and judgment of its last end. Only he who has a correct appraisal of his last end can relate God and creatures, *know and see how evil and bitter it is to forsake God.*¹ Jeremias employed the gift of knowledge when he admonished the people to *know* (that is, through knowledge) *and see that it is evil to abandon the Lord your God.* Likewise another prophet proclaims: *The wicked have told me idle tales which are not according to your law.*⁵

¹ *III Corinthians*, xiii, 3.

² *Philippians*, iii, 8.

³ *Romans*, viii, 38.

^{*} *Jeremias*, ii, 19.

⁵ *Psalm cxviii*, 85.

The soul says in returning to God: *I will go and return to my first husband because it was better with me then than, now,*¹ and again, *Behold we come to thee: for thou art the Lord our God. Verily the hills were liars, and the multitude of mountains, truly in the Lord our God is the salvation of Israel.*² All these passages, then, evidence knowledge of creatures ascending to God through the gift of knowledge.

58. Therefore, there is such a thing as a judgment from the motion of the Holy Ghost with an ordered love of God and creatures, which distinguishes between God and creatures through a right estimate of the latter, *lest they should be a trap for the feet of the foolish.*³ This right judgment of creatures is the knowledge of the saints, founded upon the spiritual taste and affection of charity. It rests in God and overflows to creatures because of God. It forms a judgment according to properties which belong to inferior causes. Consequently, knowledge is distinguished from wisdom, which proceeds through the highest causes to which it is essentially and primarily united through charity.

59. The distinction of the gift of knowledge from faith, from counsel, and from acquired knowledge can be gleaned from the foregoing paragraphs. It is distinguished from faith in the same way as it is distinguished from wisdom. The distinction can be proved by an *a posteriori* argument. The gift of knowledge, like wisdom, remains in heaven where there is no faith. Moreover, faith can be found in sinners lacking the gift of knowledge. The same distinction can be reached by an *a priori* argument. The gift of knowledge judges of the lesser causes of things. Faith simply believes the testimony of God and does not inquire into causes. Finally, the gift of knowledge comes from a loving union with God, not indeed as He is in Himself, but as He is the reason for loving creatures in an orderly way and acting correctly in their regard.

Moreover, the gift of knowledge is distinguished from counsel. The judgment of knowledge is not purely practical. It is speculative and resolves things to their causes. Therefore, it is not immediately and precisely concerned with actions, as is the case with prudence and counsel.

The gift of knowledge is also distinguished from the acquired virtue of the same name, because the gift is supernatural and founded upon an interior experience and taste of spiritual things. The gift of

¹ Osee, II, 7.

² Jeremias, III, 22, 23.

³ Wisdom, XIV, 11.

knowledge is loving and mystical. It is not acquired by human effort nor does it strive to know the natures of things by the naked light of rational discourse. It seeks the differences of things from God in love.

60. Finally, the objects of the gift of knowledge do not differ materially from the objects of faith or the objects of the gifts of wisdom and understanding. However, in its formal aspects or motives there is a difference. For wisdom, although it is principally concerned with divine things, judges of human and created things (*the spiritual man judges all things*).¹ Yet it does this by proceeding through the highest cause and by adhering to divine things.² And knowledge, although it proceeds from created causes, can attain to divine things through them, since *the invisible things of God are clearly seen being known through the things that are made*.³

According to St. Thomas,⁴ "since man knows God through His creatures, this seems to pertain to knowledge, to which it belongs formally, rather than to wisdom, to which it belongs materially: and conversely, when we judge of creatures according to divine things, this pertains to wisdom rather than to knowledge." Wisdom is concerned with human affairs by descending to them from God. The gift of understanding, in a simple judgment, penetrates terms and apprehends what each thing is, at least through a denial of imperfection, though not by a resolution to causes. The gift of knowledge, however, considers divine truths by arising from creatures to God or by making a comparison between God and creatures. Consequently, it is evident that in the doctrine of St. Thomas the scope of the gift of knowledge is not restricted to the temporal element in the act of faith.

¹ I Corinthians, ii, 15.

² Cf. II-II, q. 45, a. 1.

³ Romans, i, 20.

⁴ II-II, q. 9, a. 3, ad 3.

Chapter V

THE GIFT OF COUNSEL

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Chapter V

THE GIFT OF COUNSEL

1. The gift of counsel is related to the virtue of prudence, for it belongs to prudence to take counsel. Its being called the gift of counsel rather than the gift of prudence indicates more clearly the divine motion or impulse by which a man is moved according to the gifts of the Holy Ghost. According to St. Thomas:¹ “ Since in the gifts of the Holy Ghost the human mind is not a mover, but rather a thing moved, it was not fitting that the gift related to prudence should be called precept or judgment, but counsel, which signifies the motion of a mind counselled by an adviser.”

2. Among the difficulties surrounding the gift of counsel the problem of distinguishing it from faith, from the gift of knowledge, and from supernatural prudence takes first place. It seems that these habits can do whatever counsel does. Consequently, either counsel is not distinguished from them or it is superfluous.

That faith can do the work of counsel seems evident from the fact that faith is eminently practical, extending to actions, if indeed it is a faith operating through love. Faith, then, can direct activity and supereminently perform the office of prudence.

Likewise, even the gifts of knowledge and wisdom, being at once speculative and practical, extend to the direction of activity. Since these gifts come from a motion of the Holy Ghost and exceed the ordinary manner of knowing and directing, they should be sufficient for acts above those common to the human mode.² Yet even if another special sort of counsel is necessary, why would not infused prudence suffice? Such prudence is a virtue regulated by faith and the gifts of knowledge and wisdom through their relation to action. Moreover, infused prudence is of supernatural value and intended for extraordinary cases which exceed the common manner of action. It is strengthened by *gnome*, one of the virtues annexed to prudence, which directs actions exceeding the ordinary standards. In supernatural or

¹ II-II, q. 52, a. 2, ad 1.

² Cf. II-II, q. 9 and q. 45.

infused prudence, this auxiliary virtue directs actions according to a special supernatural motion of the Holy Ghost. Why, then, is it necessary to postulate a gift of the Holy Ghost called counsel?

3. The second difficulty has to do with the object of the gift of counsel. Does counsel extend to all action, or does it extend only to actions performed by the will in conjunction with the sensitive appetite? In other words, do the gifts of piety, fortitude, and fear require a special type of advice through a gift? It would seem that these acts are often performed without a special gift or impulse of the Holy Ghost. For although the gifts are necessary for salvation and are found in all the just,¹ all apparently do not obtain the gift of counsel from the Holy Ghost. Many need to seek advice from others, since they cannot direct or govern themselves, especially in arduous or extraordinary actions. This certainly seems to indicate that they do not have the gift of the Holy Ghost. For if they were ruled from within by His special impulse, they would not need to seek advice from others.

4. A third difficulty arises concerning the act of the gift of counsel. Counsel is intended to remove all doubt and uncertainty concerning things to be done. Hence, the gift of counsel brings with it interior certitude that its knowledge comes from the Holy Ghost, or that it does not. If one does not know that his knowledge comes from the Holy Ghost, he remains just as uncertain and doubtful as before and has to have recourse to the rules of human prudence. The gift of counsel would then serve no purpose. The ultimate prudential resolution would flow from the virtue of prudence. The gift would not be superior nor more perfect than the virtue, but subordinate to it.

On the other hand, if the gift of counsel makes one certain of the interior impulse of the Holy Ghost, he need not seek the advice of others in difficult and extraordinary matters, nor would he need to consult the Church and its ministers concerning his spiritual illuminations. He could conduct himself according to his own private spirit, even in exterior actions. But this is contrary to the universal practice of the Church. It opens the way for the heresies of the present day, which teach that each individual should be led according to his own spirit in spiritual things and matters of faith.

5. Some are of the opinion—by way of reply to the first difficulty—that the gift of counsel differs from the virtue of the same name be-

¹ Cf. I-II, q. 68, a. 2.

cause counsel takes place without discourse and inquiry, but simply by an illumination and impulse of the Holy Ghost. The virtue of prudence, on the other hand, is founded upon discourse and inquiry. They corroborate their argument from the fact that the virtue of prudence has to do with means which are naturally proportioned to the end of its object. Consequently, in discovering that proportion some inquiry is necessary, because of the weakness of man's knowledge about the nature of things, and because of many contingencies in applying things to their ends.

Moreover, the gift of counsel does not look to means proportionate to the nature considered. It regards means in relation to divine power. Inquiry ceases. Comparison and discussion to determine proportionate means are not necessary. This opinion is voiced by Gregory Martinez.¹

6. However, this solution does not have a solid foundation. No more should be attributed to counsel in practical matters than is attributed to wisdom and knowledge in the speculative order. Yet, as has been shown, these gifts are not always without rational discourse, which is connatural to man because he is rational. The Holy Ghost does not destroy this but fulfils it and perfects it. Rational discourse is even admitted in the infused knowledge of Christ.² Furthermore there is no common experience to prove that such a light makes a man understand truths without any discourse and comparison.

Therefore, what is said of the other gifts may be said for the gift of counsel. Sometimes, of course, God may grant a sudden illumination and freedom from doubt, which bursts forth from the one inspired without previous discourse and inquiry. But this happens occasionally even with the virtue of prudence, in fact even with acquired prudence one frequently chances upon the right thing to do without having given the matter any serious thought. However, this is not a frequent enough occurrence in supernatural things to postulate the special gift of counsel. These cases in which there is an experience of sudden thoughts and counsels are few. The gifts of the Holy Ghost, especially those in the appetitive part of the soul, have frequent acts. So should the gift of counsel, which is regulative of those acts. Furthermore, it is not unfitting that anyone should use inquiry and rational discourse in choosing means which, not by their own nature, but by

¹ *Commentaria in I-II*, q. 68, a. 4, ad 2.

² Cf. III, q. 11, a. 5.

divine power, are ordered to an end. To know that these means are ordained by divine power and how and to what extent or measure involves much rational inquiry. Not without rational effort then (illuminated and guided by the Holy Ghost) can these things be known in a way connatural to reason, just as infused knowledge and the gifts of knowledge and wisdom can employ reasoning.

7. The same fundamental assertion must be maintained concerning counsel which was laid down in the consideration of knowledge and wisdom. Not just any counsel, knowledge, or wisdom is here being considered but gifts of a mystical and affective character arising from loving knowledge. According to the very spirit of counsel caution must direct the use of mystical language. Yet what has been written of wisdom and knowledge may be applied to counsel. For counsel directs actions not precisely as known by reason or by faith or prophecy (such direction can be found in sinners), but from love and an internal experience of divine things. In this experience a man is taught and is inspired concerning all things necessary for salvation, even with discourse and inquiry or the consultation of others. For the whole thing is under the inspiration of the Spirit who, as Christ promised,¹ would teach men all truth and His anointing would teach us concerning all things : discerning, inquiring, and acting.

8. Sacred Scripture often mentions taking counsel from God. Of wisdom and the pedagogy of God, it proclaims : *For her thoughts are more vast than the sea, and her counsels more deep than the great ocean. I, Wisdom, have poured out rivers.*² Scripture takes an analogy from the clouds, which arise as vapour from the water of the sea, become heavy, and fall in rivers of rain. Thus the counsel of God increases and takes its beginning in the great ocean of divinity, the ultimate end. From that immense sea of the Holy Ghost a man's thoughts become vast, no longer meagre and tenuous like the thoughts and provisions of human reason. They become heavy with the sea of divine reasons which fecundate the heart as clouds showering long-desired rains. When, by that inspiration and counsel, these reasons are showered upon the heart to such a degree that they impress upon it a correct estimate of the ultimate end, it can truly be said with the Prophet *My counsel is thy justification.*³ Anyone who acts with vigour and

¹ Cf. *John*, xvi, 13 and *I John*, ii, 27.
² *Ecclesiasticus*, xxiv, 39, 40.

³ *Psalm cxviii*, 24.

agility in attending to the justifications of God, anyone who in difficult matters determines upon what belongs to the justifications of God, certainly can verify that his counsel is the justification of God. He cannot do this solely from human reasons, or merely as a man, but rather as an angel of great counsel. Moved and led by the spirit of a great advising angel, his thoughts become vast and he derives his counsel from a great sea.

9. The same idea may be derived from another passage on wisdom, *He shall direct his counsel, and his knowledge, and in his secrets shall he meditate.*¹ Note that the direction of counsel is from God, which surely belongs to the gift of counsel or to the spirit of counsel. It is given when a man meditates upon God's secrets. What is more obscure or more hidden than the interior love of the will? For what is manifest belongs more to the intellect than what is hidden :*for everything that is made manifest is a light.*² Whoever takes counsel from the Spirit, and by love and union with God meditates upon the secrets of God, is surely filled with the spirit of the gift of counsel and derives counsel from God—he is one *who works according to the counsel of His will.*³

10. From love and union with God, therefore, wisdom and loving and mystical knowledge are derived. By them the intellect is illuminated to judge of divine and created things from an experiential knowledge of God and internal taste of Him, in which charity touches God primarily and creatures secondarily. Hence, the same source can enlighten and perfect the intellect in a practical way concerning actions.

The validity of this argument is quite clear. Prudence and counsel receive a special force and a right estimation and adherence to the end, and a discernment of the means. Since creatures are to be used as means by which a man tends to God, the knowledge of creatures which is had through the gift of knowledge also provides for a prudential direction and counsel of the Holy Ghost concerning both means and actions. Therefore, there certainly is such a thing as a gift of counsel founded upon a mystical love and union with God. j

In fine, whenever the speculative intellect is perfected, the practical intellect is likewise perfected, since the practical is founded upon the speculative, and prudence is directed by wisdom and knowledge.

¹ Ecclesiasticus, xxxix, 10.

² Ephesians, v, 13.

³ Ephesians, i, 71.

Therefore, if the speculative part of the soul admits of loving and mystical knowledge, judgment founded upon an experiential and internal taste of God, and a certain connaturality of assimilation to divine things, there should likewise be a perfection of the practical part through a union and connaturality with God. Such a perfection makes the soul more capable in judging actions and more perfect in the performance of them. It judges of means and takes counsel, not according to human reason and the ordinary human manner of acting for a supernatural end, but according to the gifts of wisdom and knowledge and according to a divine confidence and trust in God, who can order all means and conquer all difficulties.

The gift of counsel, therefore, is founded upon divine hope in a special way. It orders the use of many means which can be chosen only with divine help and the omnipotence of God, upon which hope is founded. However, hope in a sinner is quite ineffectual when it is not formed by charity. Yet, hope in a just man, who has an experience of God's will and power for helping him, and who has experience of His benignity within himself, becomes the spirit of the gift of counsel. It moves him to apply himself vigorously and to conquer whatever difficult or extraordinary things must be done, such as suffering death, *grief, and affliction*, the contempt of riches and the naked following of Christ. In a word, it assists him in performing those works which require the gifts of fortitude, piety, and fear, as regulated by the gift of counsel.

11. Reply to objections : practical faith, operating through charity, is not sufficient to accomplish the work of counsel. Faith is only practical in an eminent way as a higher and universal rule, not as a proximate rule applicable to works of the moment. Faith does not supply judgment of the means to be chosen. For such a judgment requires a more determined and particular virtue, a virtue which does not merely believe what ought to be known and done. This virtue must also discern and judge the means and manner of acting, the amount of intention and effort, the time, the measure, and such like. Faith does not treat of all these particulars. The virtue of prudence does, because its work is discretion and not belief. Faith teaches us God and shows Him as One to be loved and believed. Moreover, knowing other practical supernatural principles, it believes and it works through love. Yet it does not discern particular judgments nor does it actually judge. The virtue of prudence takes care of this

in regard to activity in the strictly human mode, while the gift of counsel performs the same function in actions of a higher mode.

12. No real difficulty should arise from the argument that the gift of counsel is unable to treat of divine things through a clear and evident light. Accordingly, it would seem to proceed through an obscure light—through faith. Hence, the directing of action would belong more to faith than to any additional gift.

13. In reply it can be noted that the same argument could be lodged against the infused virtue of prudence. It too does not have a clear and evident light since it proceeds without evidence in the supernatural order. Consequently, there would be no such thing as infused prudence and its function would be reduced to faith. The argument as applied to prudence is obviously invalid. The same, then, may be affirmed in the case of the gift of counsel.

Even if it is granted that infused prudence is not clear, it does not follow that it is identical with faith. Infused prudence is something which has its origin in faith and is derived from it, just as acquired prudence is derived from practical principles and *synderesis*. It is obscure because of its dependence upon faith, just as theology is obscure in this life because of its dependence upon faith. Yet, theology is not faith itself but a knowledge derived from faith. Prudence, then, is a practical knowledge derived from faith, but not identical with faith.

The same holds for the gift of counsel, since counsel is like the prudence of the Spirit, for counsel is prudence. The truth is that the gift of counsel is regulated by the gifts of knowledge, wisdom, and understanding. All these of themselves seek clarity, since they are founded upon an experiential and loving union with God and upon charity, which of itself demands governance by vision, although in this life it is united to God by faith. In the same way, prudence or counsel seeks practical clarity founded upon loving and experiential union, although in this life it is founded upon faith. Moreover, theology and other subalternate sciences, so long as they lack the actual influx of the subalternating science giving them clarity of principles, remain in obscurity.

14. Although the gifts of wisdom and knowledge are practical as well as speculative, there is need for a distinct gift of counsel, prudentially governing and commanding works of virtue.¹ For eminently

¹ Cf. c. v., No. 2.

practical wisdom and knowledge treat of practical principles only in an abstract and scientific way and not in the particularized and discretionary manner necessary for action. Science, unlike prudence and discretion, is not concerned with individual contingencies. Consequently, the gifts of knowledge and wisdom, even if they are practical, treat of practical things in an abstract and scientific way. Another judgment, virtue, or gift is necessary. It must treat of practical things in particular and consider the circumstances of actions in a discretionary, non-scientific manner.

15. Moreover, the infused virtue of prudence does not suffice for taking counsel in all matters to which men can be moved by the impulse of the Holy Ghost. Infused prudence is supernatural since it treats of supernatural matters by directing the infused virtues in their operations. Yet it does not know nor attain to supernatural actions except according to a human manner and the common rule of virtue.

Faith, it is true, attains to revealed truths through divine witness, yet it does not dictate what is to be done in particular cases. It leaves this to human judgment even in supernatural actions, such as religious worship, penance, and the like.

Human judgment, presupposing faith, can be moved to judge either by its own zeal and industry, or by the divine impulse and motion as regards those things in which human diligence fails. The virtue of prudence serves in the first case (human mode). For the second type of judgment the gift of counsel is necessary. Both judgments come from faith and deal with supernatural matters, yet each in different ways.

16. In reply to the second difficulty, relative to the material object of the gift of counsel,¹ it must be noted that counsel extends directly to all actions performed through the gifts of the appetitive part of the soul, namely, fortitude, piety, and fear. For, just as the virtue of prudence has as its object the actions of the cardinal virtues which act according to the rules of prudence, so too the prudence which is a gift has as its object the regulation and direction of the things which are performed by the appetitive part of the soul under the impulse of the Holy Ghost. If the gift of counsel is given to supplement the deficiencies of prudence in things that exceed the common manner of

¹ Cf. c. II, No. 3.

acting, it should of its very nature direct actions desired and accomplished beyond the common manner of acting—acts of the gift of the Holy Ghost.

Indirectly and secondarily, counsel can even direct and regulate actions on a human level inasmuch as they are presupposed or subordinated to the divine. For counsel can direct both matters of counsel and matters of precept. According to St. Thomas:¹ “The gift of counsel directs us in all the acts of the virtues and in all things ordained to the end of eternal life whether they are necessary for salvation or not.” The motion of the Holy Ghost, since it is that of the most universal mover, extends to all things. The indigence and weakness of the rational creature certainly needs the assistance of the Holy Ghost in essentially supernatural matters exceeding all created power and even in many things within the natural order. For the soul is subject to many errors and dangers and contingencies, and human reason cannot foresee all things.

Finally, to attain eternal beatitude and to be directed through temporal things to that end, the soul needs an agility and moderation in using these temporal things so that it wavers neither to the right nor to the left. Hence it is necessary that counsel moderate, at least secondarily, things of the natural order, and in a general way whatever belongs to human action, since all things are ordered to the one end. Because of the uncertainty of created things, surety is required from a higher instructor, the Holy Ghost, just as reason in its natural discourse is often corrected by faith.

17. The answer is ready at hand for the objection that all ought to perform acts of the gifts which are necessary for salvation, yet all actually do not have the gift of counsel. All the elect do have the gift of counsel. They may not have it in its higher form nor in the direction and judgment of natural and temporal matters. However, they have it concerning anything necessary for salvation, and for the disdain of temporal things lest they hinder and divert a man from celestial things. St. Gregory has expressed this most elegantly.² “Each one of the elect, while still confined to the world rises outside the world by his mind. He deplores the hardship of the exile which he bears. He rises toward the sublime fatherland with incessant stimuli of love. From this he discovers a salutary counsel in despising the things which perish. The more his knowledge of counsel increases,

¹ II-II, q. 52, a. 4, ad 1 and 2.

² I *Moralium*, c. 11, *M.P.L.* 1:xxv, 543.

inciting him to despise perishable things, the more his grief increases, grief that he cannot enter into his eternal dwelling. That is why he strengthens his soul with wise counsel, and he considers all his actions with prudence and circumspection. So that no unexpected and unfavourable outcome may ensnare his action, he feels ahead gently with the foot of his reflections. He carefully plans his course of action so that haste may not drive him ahead without caution . . . nor immoral habits conquer him in open warfare . . . nor his acts of virtue be effaced by the infiltration of vainglory. The more he strives to live by counsel, the more his mind is tried by the wearisomeness of the more narrow way." By counsel, then, all these things are brought about in the souls of the elect.

18. The attempt to prove that many lack the gift of counsel because they go to others for advice proves the point rather than destroys it. It is part of divine counsel to have recourse to others for advice, in matters beyond one's own capacity. For the Holy Ghost does not manifest His abundance to all in such a way that they do not need communication with others. He instructs through some, the great enlighten the lesser, just as the superior angels illuminate the inferior. He communicates His gifts with a concomitant dependence upon the instruction of others. St. Augustine captured the situation in the words :¹ " O Lord, you reply to all who ask of thee, and at the one time, you answer all, even though they consult you on diverse matters. Clearly you answer them, though all do not clearly understand thee. All may ask advice of thee on whatever he wills, though they do not always hear the answer they desire. He is thy best servant who looks not so much to hear from thee what he himself desires, as to will what he hears from thee."

Therefore, in matters from God not clearly heard nor fully understood, it is necessary to consult others who are more enlightened. Although Cornelius was visited by an angel and received a revelation from God, he was advised to seek out Peter for instruction. *Send and fetch Simon who is surnamed Peter, he will tell you what you should do.*² By the gift of counsel, then, Cornelius sent for Peter for his instruction. Moreover, Christ Our Lord Himself appeared to Saul and sent him to the city that he might receive instructions : *Arise and go into the city and it will be told thee what thou must do.*³ For according to St.

¹ *X Confessionum*, c. 26, *M.P.L.* **xxn**, 795.

³ *Acts*, ix, 6 and **xxii**, 10.

² *Acts*, x, 5.

Bonaventure: "The best counsel is to rise to seek the spouse and effectively find him in the street of His precepts and in the spiritual ways of His counsels. Instructed in these and aroused by an angel, the soul will find Him whom it loves. Rise, therefore, and go into the city to seek counsel, there it will be told to you what you should do."

19. The third difficulty concerning the act of counsel can be solved by stating that, absolutely speaking, counsel can exist in the determination and resolution of the act of taking counsel even without any doubt concerning the object. For this reason God, Christ, and the blessed are found to have counsel, according to the Prophet: *My counsel shall stand, and my will shall be done*,² and the Apostle, *who works all things according to the counsel of his will*.³ Yet, in this life, the gift of counsel is granted to take away doubt. There are grave doubts and difficulties in this life making men wanderers in pathless wastes, instead of on the sure road to the abiding city. Hence there is a special need for the gift of counsel for men to be moved by the Good Spirit, Who alone can lead them to the right land.

For this reason the gift of counsel should impress men with certitude and security, either by hidden inspiration and impulse, *for the spirit himself gives testimony to our spirit that we are sons of God* or by the instruction and example of others whose works God uses to enlighten them.

Consequently, in this sphere of activity there is need for a distinction. A doubt can exist concerning the object of the act—whether this action should be performed. It can also exist concerning the illumination and impulse—whether it is from God. Sometimes, there is no doubt about the thing itself, since it is good and just in itself, for example, suffering martyrdom for the faith. The goodness of the act is certain and there should be no consultation on the matter. St. Cyprian replied to the judge who said to him, "Take counsel": "Do as you are commanded. In a matter so just there is no need for consultation."⁵ The same case occurs with one entering the religious state, provided he has no impediments; there is no doubt nor should there be any consultation on the matter.⁶ However, there can be a

¹ *Cantica Canticorum*, c. 2.

² *Isaias*, xlv, 10.

³ *Ephesians*, i, 11.

⁴ *Romans*, viii, 16.

⁵ Cf. Rev. Alban Butler, *Lives of the Saints*, Murphy, Baltimore, Metropolitan Press Edition, p. 486.

⁶ Cf. II-II, q. 189, a. 10.

question and consultation on the manner of entering. Counsel then is required for the accomplishment of the good act, not because of the object involved but because a person needs to be moved and impelled by the counsel of a higher impulse.

20. When the thing to be done is certain and secure, then anyone can be led by the Spirit moving within him, unless some legitimate impediment exists which the Holy Ghost does not wish to remove immediately by Himself but through others who are to be consulted. Then the gift of counsel moves men to consult others—they rise to go into the city (that is, they do not remain alone and within themselves, but they consult the community) to learn what they should do.

It must be noted, of course, that the gift of counsel always proceeds from the impulse of the Holy Ghost. Yet the determination of things to be done is not granted by the Holy Ghost to each man immediately. Rather, it is given by means of others whom He wishes men to consult, for St. Paul *preached to them the gospel, but separately with the men of authority, lest perhaps I should be -running or had run in vain.*¹ The act of counsel then may move men to consult others, and then to accept and do what seems right. However, in the case of a just and good act, though difficult if there seems to be legitimate impediment, the gift of counsel may move the soul interiorly to accept and determine what should be done. This interior movement does not remove doubt, for none exists, but rather it conquers difficulty and strengthens personal weakness. For it belongs to prudence and right counsel to judge and to take counsel (*synderesis* and *ebulia*, virtues annexed to prudence) and also to command and apply to action, the most difficult part of prudence. Hence, the gift of counsel operating in the place of prudence and related to it, should take counsel and judge of the things to be done and also command and apply to action.

21. Once a correct and certain judgment has been made and doubt has been removed concerning the thing for which the advice of others has been sought, the problem of galvanizing the person into action remains. A man should be moved to this in a voluntary way, by an interior spirit, the gift of counsel.

Properly understood, this is not contrary to the practice of the Church. The question here is not concerned with matters of belief, nor with the judgment of truths which are to be preached to others,

¹ *Galatians*, ii, 2.

nor of approving doctrines, nor with other similar problems. On the contrary, personal industry and self-mastery in the things which are certain beyond any doubt is not against the practice of the Church. Indeed, it is quite in accord with this practice that anyone should be moved by an interior impulse to a good which is, at least with a moral certitude, undoubtedly beneficial, for such an impulse cannot come from an evil spirit.

22. *If* a doubt should arise concerning the thing, to be done—whether it is good to do it, whether all the circumstances are agreeable, or whether the impulse to act is from God, then the gift of counsel does not move immediately to judge and determine, much less to execute the act. To do so would be temerarious, so long as the doubt existed. However, counsel does move toward a determination of whether or not the impulse is from God. According to the apostolic rule: *Do not believe every spirit, but test the spirits to see whether they are of God,*¹ and again, *Do not despise prophecies. But test all things, hold fast that which is good.*² Ordinarily this examination and test should be done with the consultation and advice of others, since ordinarily the illumination of God is given with concomitant dependence upon others, inferiors being enlightened by superiors.

However, the gift of counsel is not subject to the virtue of prudence, inferior to it, or to be resolved to it. For those who judge of revelations or divine truths should not judge according to the human standards of prudence but according to the standards of faith, to which the gift of the Holy Ghost is subject and by which it is regulated. These standards of faith can be regulated by gifts of the Holy Ghost, found in some other person perhaps in a more excellent manner. If human theological reasons are employed in the examination of such things, they are to be considered as secondary, serving only ministerially to explain the things of faith or the impulse of the Holy Ghost. Hence, in the examination of spiritual and mystical matters, there is need for recourse to scholastic theologians and to spiritual men who possess spiritual prudence and know how to judge the ways of the Spirit and can discern the differences of spirits.

23. Moreover, the gift of counsel does have a certitude from the Holy Ghost, not indeed that of faith, but a prudential certitude founded upon the motion of the Holy Ghost.³ It is of the essence of

¹ *John*, iv, 1.

² *1 Thessalonians*, v, 20, 21.

³ *Cf.* c. 5, No. 4.

this prudential certitude that, when the things themselves are in doubt or are obscure, there should be a test and an examination by others who have the gift in a more excellent manner and who penetrate and understand better the standards of faith by which these spiritual ways and motions are to be examined. Since in doubt of this kind the Holy Ghost does not ordinarily give counsel and interior certitude without a dependence upon the examination of others, the gift of counsel moves a man to this examination. The Holy Ghost wishes to prove that the spirit is from God. He also wishes to have a man proceed humbly without presuming that of himself he can order all things which belong to the gift of counsel. The counsel of God is especially a counsel of humility and examination. Hence a person should not be led by a private spirit, but by one which has been examined.

24. It is true that sometimes even without consultation the Holy Ghost moves men to a course of action surpassing human prudence. Samson killed himself, and holy virgins and martyrs willingly accepted death. Yet no general rule can be laid down. The Holy Ghost Himself in inspiring these actions gives a security and certitude with regard to the manner of acting. Caution is extremely important so that no one may be allowed to follow his personal inclinations, lest he be commanded by the spirit of error rather than the spirit of truth. The rule laid down by St. Augustine¹ should be followed: "He who hears] that it is not lawful to kill himself, let him do it only when He commands whose commandments it is not lawful to condemn. Moreover, let him see that the divine command contains no uncertainty." Before following an interior spirit and counsel without the examination, the approbation and communication of others (for ordinarily the Spirit moves through examination and communication of others) one should carefully consider whether his mind filled with the Spirit is serene and calm without the shadow of passion or trouble, for *the wisdom that is from above is first of all chaste, then peaceable, moderate, etc.*²

From these effects one may determine whether or not his Counsel is from God. But even enjoying such peace and serenity he should weigh carefully whether there is any change or obscurity or fluctuation about whether the spirit is from God. For if in a sane and vigilant judgment he sees any change or doubt, it is a sign that God does not

¹ *De Civitate Dei*, c. 26, M.P.L. xlii, 39.

² *James*, iii, 17.

wish the things to be done immediately but only after an examination.
 / For if it were to be done without an examination, God would supply
 / what ought to be gained by an examination. He would leave the
 mind secure and certain that the act should be performed even without
 ' examination by others.

25. Moreover, if anyone should wish to persuade others that he has the spirit of God and speaks from such a spirit, he should not easily be believed. His case should always be submitted to the examination of wise and spiritual men. Otherwise he should not be accepted, especially in grave and extraordinary things.

If it is a question of public doctrine or a thing to be preached or taught in Church, no one should be allowed to teach merely because he says that he is sent by God (or that he has a revelation) unless he can prove it through a miracle or the express testimony of Scripture.

If it is not a matter of doctrine or a thing to be proposed for public belief but some particular and private thing, as when someone is advised by a man of approved life that something will benefit him or that God commands such and such, then, although one is not bound to believe it, he can use this advice in forming a prudent judgment. He can prudently act upon it, considering the moral goodness and fitness of the act proposed as well as the quality of life and character of the one who proposes it. This is especially true if many who have not communicated with one another agree that an act has been commanded by God. Many have been admonished by holy men to perform acts pleasing to God. St. Benedict said many things by the spirit of Tobias the prophet, and St. Catherine of Siena, St. Bridget, St. Vincent Ferrer, St. Francis de Paola and many others said things which were to the edification of others. Yet when they said them they were not first subjected to an examination. The ancient prophets told kings to do many things by divine command even without performing miracles. Their admonitions were accepted without examination because of the quality of the person and the goodness of the thing commanded. The King Sedecius took Jeremias secretly into his house (without previous examination): *Is there, he said, any word from the Lord? And Jeremias said, There is. And he said, Thou shalt be delivered into the hands of the king of Babylon.*¹ At the voice of a single prophet, Roboam and his whole army did not make war upon the sons of Israel.²

¹ *Jeremias*, xxxvii, 16.

² *II Paralipomenon*, xi, 4.

There are many other incidents scattered through Scripture which contain prophecies accepted without miracles. But a more extensive treatment of this question is not the burden of the present treatise. It is rather matter for the tract on faith and prophecy.³

³ Cf. *Cursus Theologicus*, in *Secundam Secundae*, *Questio Prima*, *Disputatio Sexta*, *De revelationibus privatis*.

Chapter VI

THE GIFTS OF PIETY, FORTITUDE, AND FEAR

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Chapter VI

THE GIFTS OF PIETY, FORTITUDE, AND FEAR

1. The gifts of piety, fortitude, and fear are found in the appetitive part of the soul, and they are related to the cardinal virtues. Just as the gift of counsel corresponds to the virtue of prudence, so the gift of piety is related to the virtue of religion and the whole matter of justice in the will. The gift of fortitude is related to the virtue of the same name in the irascible appetite. The gift of fear has its counterpart in the virtue of temperance, since from fear of God a man is withheld from carnal concupiscence—*Pierce my flesh with Thy fear for I am afraid of Thy judgment.*¹ Fear also bears a relation to the virtue of hope, since it is essentially and primarily directed to a reverence for God and an avoidance of offence against Him as well as the repression of presumption opposed to hope. According to St. Thomas²: “The gift of fear has God for its principal object, for it avoids offending Him, and in this respect it corresponds to the virtue of hope, as stated above.³ However, it may have as its secondary object anything a man shuns in order to avoid offending God. Now a man stands in the greatest need of the fear of God in order to shun those things which are most seductive, and these are the matter of temperance: wherefore, the gift of fear corresponds to temperance also.”

Concerning each of these gifts two things must be explained:

- a) their essence, by which they are distinguished from the corresponding moral and infused virtues, and
- b) their objects, or matter, to which each of these gifts extends.

gift of piety

2. Although in Isaias the gift of fortitude, subordinate to the gift of counsel, precedes piety, itself subordinate to knowledge, the present treatise will not follow that order. Religion and justice, with which piety is concerned, have greater nobility than the object matter of fortitude, for religion and justice are in the will.

¹ Psalm cxviii, 120. ² II-II, q. 161, a. 1 ad 3. ³ Cf. II-II, q. 29, a. 9 ad 1.

It is true that some do not distinguish piety from fear in this text of Isaías, since in Hebrew one word is used for both.¹

Regardless of what is in Hebrew codices recently made available, or in other private translations, it is certain that the Vulgate, which is approved by the authority of the Church, names the gift of piety as distinct from the gift of fear. Moreover, the most ancient tradition in the Fathers approves, and the common usage of the Church confesses, the Sevenfold Spirit because of the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost enumerated in Isaías.

Furthermore, although worship, which belongs to piety, and reverence, which belongs to fear, have much in common, they differ both in their material objects and in their formal notes. Piety and religion have for their object the worship to be rendered to God seeing Him as a Benefactor, indeed the origin of all good. On the other hand, fear shows reverence by shrinking back into its own littleness from God, the principle of the highest majesty, Who has the power of inflicting evil. Even reverential fear does not regard as a Benefactor the person whom it fears. Otherwise, the soul would be soothed and not fearful. But fear looks upon God as One having the power to inflict evil, even though He should never use that power. Therefore, it is completely different from piety.

3. It is now possible to delineate the objects of piety and differentiate it from the virtues.

4. A difficulty may arise in distinguishing the essence of the gift of piety from the essence of the infused virtue of religion, with which it is intimately connected. St. Thomas remarks² that the gift of piety looks upon God as a Father, while the other virtues do not; religion, for example, looks upon Him as Lord. It is proper to piety to show obedience to parents. Since it is possible for a person to be elevated to the position of having God not only as his Lord but as his Father, he may worship Him with a loving piety. This is the possession of those *who received a spirit of adoption as sons, by virtue of which we cry Abba! Father!*³ However, according to St. Thomas this distinction is not sufficient, since infused religion itself looks upon God as a Father and proffers Him worship as such. For to look upon God as a Father

¹ 'mora.' Cf. Edward Robinson, *Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament*, p. 549: Boston, Crocker and Brewster, 1805.

² II-II, q. 121, a. 1.

³ Romans, viii, 15.

is nothing other than to look upon Him as the principle of grace which He pours out upon men and through which He adopts them as sons. Infused religion does exactly this, since it looks upon Him as the author of grace and of the whole supernatural order. Consequently, if piety consisted solely in looking upon God as Father, it would not be distinct from infused religion. It would, however, be distinct from the acquired virtue of religion, which worships God only as Creator and principle of all nature.

5. It may be alleged that the infused virtue of religion considers God as a Father in an ordinary way, knowing Him as Father of grace in the articles of faith concerning salvation and glory. The gift of piety, on the other hand, looks upon God as a Father because of a special impulse of the Holy Ghost.¹

6. Even this explanation fails. A special impulse does not add anything to the knowledge of God as a Father except perhaps greater intensity. Yet intensity of action makes for a more perfect act without varying the nature of the act. No more valid is the claim that the distinguishing element between piety and religion is the special impulse in the gift of piety employed only in extraordinary cases in which even infused prudence fails. For example, by divine impulse one might remain in prayer until death overcame him, or one might seek from God a miracle for the defence of his country. Such an impulse does not belong to infused prudence, nor does it follow religion. The gift of piety, then—in the opinion of some theologians²—must have these extraordinary acts for its peculiar function.

7. Certainly this taking refuge in extraordinary cases is unwarranted. Such incidents belong to the charisms, found even in sinners, and are not restricted to those in the state of grace. Yet the gifts of the Holy Ghost belong to all who are in the state of grace and to them only. Since, then, those in the state of grace do not always perform miracles or extraordinary works, an explanation based on unusual actions does not describe the special impulse required in the gift of piety.

Moreover, St. Thomas³ does not explain the gift of piety by its conformity to an extraordinary impulse. The only difference he posits

¹ Cf. St. Thomas, *loc. cit.*

² Cf. Gregorius Martinez, *Commentaria in I-II*, q. 68, a. 6, dub. 3.

³ Cf. *loc. cit.*, ad 2.

between piety and religion is that religion looks upon God as Creator while piety looks upon Him as Father. Consequently, the gift is more excellent than the acquired virtue of religion. Nowhere does he compare this gift with infused religion, which looks upon God as the Author of the supernatural order and hence as a Father through grace. The difficulty, then, remains as before.

8. Others claim that the gift of piety is distinguished from the infused virtue of religion by the scope of its object. They contend that the gift of piety extends to all matters of justice. By it a man worships God as his Father in such a way that he looks upon all men as his brothers in the communication of grace and the Spirit. Through it he renders worship to God and their due to all men. Religion, on the other hand, is restricted to the worship of God. It does not extend to other matters of justice.

Finally, others add that the gift of piety is concerned with due reverence for the Scriptures, by not contradicting them whether their contents are understood or not. Even St. Augustine¹ attributes this to piety. Furthermore, that pious affection by which a man is attached to the things of faith, and moved to believe them even without understanding them, is generally related to the gift of piety.

9. None of these hypotheses explains fully the special formality and essence of the gift of piety. The first does not explain the formal aspect of the gift. It merely indicates the extent of its object. But why should the gift of piety have such an extension? The essence of the gift alone can give the answer. In addition to this, it is not certain that the gift of piety actually extends to all the matter of justice while the infused virtue of religion does not. If the gift of piety extends to all matters of justice because it looks upon God as Father and consequently upon all men as brothers, why should not the infused virtue of religion do the same? It too is related to God as the Author of grace and to all men as sharers in that grace. Moreover, if the infused virtue of religion cannot be concerned with all men as brothers but only with God as Father, what is the special formality by which the gift of piety is so elevated that it can embrace both?

The second hypothesis is likewise insufficient. Reverence for Sacred Scripture cannot be the total and adequate act of the gift of piety, since this gift includes also the reverence and worship of God.

¹ *III De Doctrina Christiana*, c. vii, *M.P.L.* xxxiv, 39; *I De Sermone Domini*, c. iv, *M.P.L.* xxxiv, 1234.

Furthermore, the angels and the blessed, although they have the gift of piety, do not concern themselves with Sacred Scripture. Finally, reverence for Sacred Scripture pertains more to faith or to the pious affection which disposes the soul for faith than to the gift of piety or the virtue of religion. Faith accepts the testimony of Scripture and shows it reverence by not contradicting it. Certainly if this reverence is attributed to the gift of piety, it can be assigned to the infused virtue of religion as well. Hence, this one element does not distinguish piety from the virtue of religion. Furthermore, according to St. Thomas:¹ "To show reverence to Sacred Scripture would seem to belong to *latria*."

10. To solve this question in consonance with the doctrine of St. Thomas it is necessary to pursue his intention in other passages in which he treats of the gift of piety.² In them he distinguishes the gift of piety from the virtue of the same name, always identified with the infused virtue of religion in rendering worship to God, the Author of grace. He affirms that "although piety, the virtue which is called *latria*, shows reverence to God Himself, it takes something human as its measure, namely, the benefits received from God for which it is indebted to Him. Piety the gift, however, has something divine as its measure; it shows honour to God not because of a debt, but because God is worthy of honour as He is an honour to Himself."³ Thus the gift of piety and the virtue of religion, or *latria*, differ by reason of a diverse debt. This is the more formal and intimate aspect of those virtues which involve a relation to others.

St. Thomas then has indicated how the gift of piety should be distinguished from *latria* or the infused virtue of religion by interior principles. Religion looks to the essence of the worship of God as founded upon the notion of a mutual exchange—by looking upon the benefits of God toward men and the reciprocal debt men owe Him. *What shall I render to the Lord for all the things that he has rendered to me; I will take the chalice of salvation; and I will call upon the name of the Lord**—an act of religion through retribution for a debt.

11. The gift of piety, on the other hand, transcends this notion of gifts and debt. It honours and magnifies God for His own sake, regardless of whether He bestows good or evil. In a sort of nakedness⁴

¹ *III Sent.*, d. 34, q. 3, a. 2, *quaestiunc.* 2 ad 1.
² Cf. *loc. cit.*, *quaestiunc.* 1 ad 1.

³ *Ibid.*
⁴ *p'salm cxv*, 12, 13.

and annihilation of self it gazes upon the divine magnitude in itself and for itself, saying with the Psalmist, *O magnify the Lord zoith me, and let us extol his name together,*¹ that is, let us adore Him not for what He has given us, nor according to the measure of His gifts, but for Himself and in Himself. *I am brought to nothing and I knezv not. I am become as a beast before thee: and I am alzvays with thee . . . For what have I in Heaven: and besides thee zvhat do I desire upon earth? For thee my flesh and my heart hath fainted away; thou art the God of my heart and the God that is my portion forever. But it is good for me to adhere to my God, to put my hope in the Lord God.*² That is the perfect gift of piety, the worship of God without measure and beyond a merely human manner of acting. The soul considers itself as nothing, worthless, despoiled of all created good, foolish and without understanding in wordly things, a beast fit only for sustaining burdens and following the motion of God. When the soul recognizes nothing either in heaven or on earth as its own, when the flesh faints away and is consumed, then it is alwavs in God's presence. Its very substance is as nothing before God. In such abjection and annihilation it is not led by any weighing of divine gifts. Mindful only of His justice, the soul looks upon God Himself as its eternal inheritance. It adheres to Him without any medium and it worships and venerates Him in Himself. For according to St. Thomas,³ to adhere to God is the end toward which the gift of piety tends. With an eye only for God's magnificence, piety honours Him considering neither His blessings nor His chastisements, nor honour nor shame, nor glory nor ignominy. For according to St. Paul, *Christ is magnified in my body, whether through life or through death.**

The Most Blessed Virgin evidenced the gift of piety in the words: *My soul magnifies the Lord, and my spirit rejoices in God my Saviour; because he has regarded the lozvliness of his handmaid.*⁵ For her the reason for magnifying God and exulting in Him is the loftiness of God, Who looks upon her profound humility and servile condition, rather than the most sublime benefits accorded her, even that of divine maternity.

12. Essentially different from the gift of piety which honours God as He is in Himself, the virtue of religion gives thanks and wOrship

¹ Psalm xxxiii, 4.

² Psalm lxxii, 22-28.

³ III Sent., d. 34, q. 3, a. 1, quaestiunc. 1 ad 3.

⁴ Philippians, i, 20.

⁵ Luke, i, 46-48.

to God for His Blessings, especially that of creation. Honouring God the Author of nature, it prompts the soul to say: *Worthy art thou, O Lord God, to receive glory and honour and power: for thou hast created all things.*¹ Similarly, the infused virtue of religion offers worship and thanksgiving to God as the Redeemer and the Author of the supernatural order: *Worthy art thou to take the scroll and to open its seals; for thou wast slain, and hast redeemed us for God with thy blood . . . And thou hast made us for our God a kingdom and priests.*² The supernatural benefits of redemption, man's membership in the Kingdom of God by grace, therefore, is the motive of the infused virtue of religion.

The gift of piety, on the other hand, transcends the notion of benefits received, and gives thanks and worship to God alone because He is great and holy: *We give thee thanks, () Lord, God Almighty who art, and who wast and who will be, because thou hast taken thy great power and hast begun thy reign . . .*³ *Who will not fear thee, O Lord, and magnify thy name? for thou alone art holy.*⁴ The Church sings: "We give thee thanks because of thy great glory."⁵ Worship and thanks are not offered to God because of any particular benefits given to men, nor is He revered because of any special relation with men, but because God is holy in Himself, because of the glory that is His, because He has taken great power and has reigned.

13. St. Bernard has written beautifully of the differences between three types of love: the love of a servant who hopes for a reward, that of a son who has an eye to an inheritance, and the love of a spouse. The spouse alone loves his spouse because she is another self. The two former kinds of love are typical of those looking upon God for His benefits, while the love of the spouse exemplifies the soul which loves God for Himself. In the words of St. Bernard, "With the spouse, the one care, the one hope is love. In this his spouse abounds, in this her spouse is content. Pure love is not venal, pure love does not derive its strength from hope, nor does it feel the chastisements of a Avant of trust."⁶ Such love has a higher motive, and it is more sublime. It seeks something higher than human virtue, which regulates the worship of God according to the measure of His benefactions. Without any concern for His blessings, pure love honours Him because He

¹ *Apocalypse*, iv, 11.

² *Ibid.*, v, 9, 10.

³ *Ibid.*, xi, 17.

⁴ *Ibid.*, xv, 4.

⁵ *Gloria of the Mass*.

⁶ *Sermon 83 in Canticum Canticorum, M.P.L. cxxxviii, 1181.*

is great in Himself and exceedingly praiseworthy. It worships Him with a most excellent love for a Father.

14. From all this it is evident that the gift of piety is distinct from both the infused and the acquired virtue of religion. The acquired virtue is in the natural order. It looks upon God as the Creator and Author of nature, while the gift of piety has a supernatural reason for worshipping God as Father and the Author of grace. The infused virtue of religion is concerned with God as Father and the Author of grace, but not in the same way as the gift of piety. The infused virtue of religion is concerned with God as the Author of grace and as Father not in Himself but by reason of the love He arouses in men. Hence, this gift of piety has reference to God as He is in Himself, His glory and His majesty, even should He give no benefactions, or should He give punishment and death. With the Apostle, piety exhorts : *Magnify Christ either through life or death.*¹ It does not venerate God as Jacob did, *If God shall be with me, and shall keep me in the way by which I walk, and shall give me bread to eat and raiment to put on . . . the Lord shall be my God.*² In this case, Jacob worshipped God according to His blessings, for he promised that *a tenth part of all that you give me I shall offer to you.*³

Far more elevated, however, is the habit which would offer worship to God even if He did not give any blessings. It leaves all to follow Christ, magnifying Him in both life and death. Like St. Peter, the soul can say, *With thee I am ready to go both to prison and to death*⁴ and with the Prophet it sings, *For though I should walk in the midst of the shadow of death, I will fear no evils, for thou art with me.*⁵ The very essence of this act is higher than that of the virtue. It looks upon God as a Father, since He is holy, merciful, and rich, and not because of His blessings.

15. It is true that the gift of piety extends to all matters of justice, while religion does not. Yet this material difference is insufficient to distinguish the two. For this appeal must be made to the formal difference, which touches the matter and differentiates it. From what has already been said, the formal difference is clear: infused religion inclines to the worship of God, author of the supernatural, according to the measure and the manner of the gifts of grace; piety is moved

¹ Cf. *Philippians*, i, 20.

² *Genesis*, xxviii, 20, 21.

³ *Ibid.*, 22.

⁴ *Luke*, xxi, 33.

⁵ *Psalm* xxi, 4.

by the majesty and glory of God in Himself, whether or not He confers benefits. Hence piety broadens out to embrace observance, piety, and whatever else in human affairs belongs to the matter of justice. It looks upon men, not as men, but as sons of God, or as capable of being such. Worshipping God as Father, piety sees all men as brothers by grace. How it does this will presently be explained.

16. The honouring of the saints and the complete acquiescence to Scripture, which St. Augustine attributes to the act of piety, belong more to *latria* or religion.¹ These acts, of course, also belong to the gift of piety but in a higher way. Moreover, they are not the only act proper to piety, since this gift also shows mercy to others. For this reason the beatitude *Blessed are the merciful for they shall obtain mercy*² corresponds to the gift of piety.³ Furthermore, in a general way, piety operates in all that is related to justice whether it is toward God or toward one's neighbour. Consequently, reverence for the saints and for Scripture cannot distinguish the gift of piety from the virtue of religion.

17. The object of the gift of piety is primarily and principally the filial worship of God. Secondly, however, and under the same formal specifying aspect, piety embraces justice to one's neighbour.

According to St. Thomas,⁴ "The gift of piety directs all relations with one's neighbour, but it does so according to a measure other than that of the virtue. That measure is simple and one, and hence the gift is one spiritual habit, and according to this measure all its acts are specified." This piety in the appetitive part of the soul corresponds to the cardinal virtue of justice in all its latitude. Within its higher formal motive it embraces all matters of justice.

18. For a fuller understanding of this doctrine of St. Thomas it should be noted that among the virtues which are potential parts of justice, the one which renders worship to God is called religion or *latria*. The one which gives respect to parents is called piety, while the virtue which honours superiors is called respectfulness. For piety, the gift of the Holy Ghost, is concerned with these matters in a higher way and is related principally to God. It renders fitting worship

¹ Cf. *III Sent.*, d. 34, q. 3, a. 1, quaestiunc. 2 ad 1.

² *Matthew*, v, 7.

³ Cf. *II-II*, q. 121, a. 2.

⁴ *III Sent.*, d. 34, q. 3, a. 1, quaestiunc. 2.

to Him, looking upon Him not as Lord and Creator but as Father. *You have received the spirit of adoption of sons, by virtue of which we cry Abba! Father!!* In the order of grace God is a Father. *Of his own will he has begotten us by the word of truth, that we might be, as it were, the first-fruits of his creatures.*² The faithful, then, should act towards God as towards a Father through grace, since they are His adopted children. By the virtue of religion they should render honour to Him as Lord and they should worship Him as a Father whose eternal inheritance they hope for. Since, then, among men piety is a virtue which renders honour to parents, the gift in the appetitive part of the soul which is concerned with a debt to another uses the name piety rather than religion or *latria*. For it regards God as the father of men.

19. While by its very nature the gift of piety extends to all creatures who communicate in grace or can communicate in grace, the virtue of religion is concerned with God alone, leaving the relationship with creatures to other virtues. The reason for the difference is that religion is concerned with the worship due to God under the aspect of the proper excellence and uniqueness of God Himself, in which others do not participate, *since my glory I shall not give to any other.*³ Consequently, it is wrong to honour anyone besides God with the worship of *latria*. Religion, then, from its formal motive, the unique and incommunicable divine excellence, is concerned with knowing creatures but with worshipping God alone.

Piety, on the other hand, sees in parents the notion of origin, by virtue of which honour is paid to a father as one having the authority of an originator. Wherever this notion of origin is participated, there is established a relationship to the habit of piety. Through piety a man is made dutiful to his parents, and honours members of his family. For they share in this notion of origin and generation, being born of blood and of the will of man and of the will of the flesh.

It is much the same with those who are born of God from the regeneration of the Spirit. But the habit which is concerned with the principle of such generation should also be concerned with others related to it. Secondly, then, all who share in spiritual regeneration are brothers in the communication of grace. The formal aspect of piety, therefore, directs the soul to God as Father and also extends its interest to men as sons of God, fellow-citizens of the saints, of the

¹ Romans, viii, 15.

² James, i, 18.

³ Isaiah, xlii, 8. Cf. *ibid.*, xlviii, 11.

family of God. Even the infused virtue of religion does not do this, since it does not formally look upon God as a Father but the supreme Lord to be worshipped in the order of grace according to the benefits He has bestowed.

20. The very nature of the gift of piety demands that it be extended to men as children of God, since it implies a reverence for the majesty of God, not according to the measure of His blessings but according to the greatness of His glory. Moreover, the greatness of the glory of God is considered both in His infinity itself and in the participation of it found in those who are the sons of God and consorts of the divine nature. It belongs to the greatness of God as a Father to lead many sons to glory, just as it belongs to the greatness of God as Creator to create many species of things in the universe. For this reason no habit can incline towards the veneration and worship of God precisely under the aspect of Father without being directed to His children. Since all intellectual creatures who are not damned are sons of God or can be made sons of God, the gift of piety extends to all of them. In much the same way, charity, which looks upon God as a good to be loved, is concerned with everything which belongs to God and participates in His goodness. Charity is precisely concerned with the notion of love; piety, with the notion of debt and of respectfulness.

21. Objection: Despite previous denial and protestation,¹ the foregoing would seem to indicate that the infused virtue of religion also extends not only to God but to all men in all matters of justice. Religion is concerned with God as a Father, indeed as the Author of grace in the supernatural order. Consequently, if it is concerned with Him as a Father, it should at least secondarily be concerned with His sons, just as is the gift of piety. Therefore, there is only an inadequate explanation in the statement that religion is concerned with God according to the blessings He gives to men, while piety is concerned with God Himself, to be worshipped for His own sake.

For if this were true, piety would be more concerned with the excellence of God and less with participations of the divine life, or blessings upon men, while religion would be just the opposite. Hence, piety would not be concerned with the divine excellence as communicated to men but only as it is in itself, while religion would be just the

¹ Cf. *supra*, no. 14.

contrary. To religion, then, would belong a concern for God in Himself and for men as participating in the blessings of God.¹

22. Moreover, even if piety were concerned with both God and men, it would look upon them under the aspect of a duty or veneration. Consequently, the gift need not embrace all the matter of justice, since there are many things which belong to justice by reason of a strict debt, legal or moral, which are not matters of worship and veneration. Hence, piety does not embrace all matters of justice merely because it is concerned with duty and the worship of God and men. In the same way, although piety towards parents and relatives is concerned with willing submission to them, nevertheless some other reason for a debt in rigorous justice may arise which is not carried out by piety but by commutative or distributive justice or by some other form of that virtue.

23. Reply to the objection: The inference must be denied. Religion is not concerned with God's parental right as the Author of the supernatural order but with His right as Lord of that order. The same Person, of course, is the Author of supernatural grace and the Father who adopts sons through grace, and hence He who is the object of the virtue that is concerned with God as the Author of the supernatural order is the Father. Nevertheless, diverse rights are established on the same dignity, which formally specify the diverse virtues or the various parts of justice.

While the right of friendship by which God calls men not servants but friends belongs to charity and not to piety, the dominative right—that of Supreme Lord in giving grace—and the parental right through God's adoption of men as His sons, communicating as co-heirs in the same spirit, establish relationships of both religion and piety towards the one supernatural Author.

The supernatural dominative right is the foundation in *latria* for the unparalleled worship of God as the Supreme Lord Who can, if He wills, give grace or take it away, with or without sin on man's part. For in *latria*, human reciprocation to God's supreme dominion, the infused virtue of religion looks upon the Author of the supernatural order as the Supreme Lord Who is at the same time a Father. It realizes that, because of His works within the souls of men, God deserves honour and worshipful service according to the measure of

¹ Cf. *infra*, no. 25 for reply.

His blessings, for God does not dominate a soul, nor is a soul subject to Him except by reason of what God works within it and what it receives from Him, which, of course, is His benefaction.

24. By paternal right God acts as a Father through the spirit of adoption, "in which we cry Abba! Father!" This adoption lays the foundation for the gift of piety, which worships God as the Author of the soul's generation in grace. Not concerned with worshipping and honouring God because of His blessings, piety attends strictly to God's immense glory as Father and heritage of the sons of God. It puts aside God's dominative right and is concerned with His paternal right alone. It honours and magnifies God because He is holy.¹ Yet it is so directed to God as Father that it can extend secondarily to all the sons of God and to all the things pertaining to God's pater-nity. For in the virtue of piety a man venerates his parents and likewise honours his brothers and relatives, because they are of the same parental origin.

25. It has been alleged² that since the infused virtue of religion is concerned with God communicating His blessings, while the gift of piety is centred in God as He is in Himself, piety should not be concerned with God in His bestowal of graces.

But by distributing blessings to men as their Supreme Lord, God does not give them a participation of His honour but only the inferior status of being His servants. Consequently, the virtue which is concerned with God as the Supreme Lord and which renders Him worship in the supreme servitude of *latria* does not give the same *latria* to others. Moreover, the gift of piety is concerned with God as Father—to whom sons participating in His honour are essential. Not interested in God's blessings (although it does not despise them), piety like pure love "does not derive its strength from hope, nor does it feel the chastisement of a want of trust."³ Just as the mutual and amicable love of charity communicates itself to others not as servants but as friends, piety honours God and the sons of God participating in the Divine Honour.

26. Moreover, by a willing submission to other men as the sons of God, brothers in grace, and members of the household of God, piety can act upon the whole matter of justice in two ways.

¹ Cf. *Apocalypse*, xv, 4.

² Cf. *supra*, no. 21, second paragraph.

³ St. Bernard. *Sermon 82 in Canticum Canticorum*, M.P.L. cxi, xxxix, 1181.

The first of these ways is by commanding. It may command commutative and distributive justice or the satellite virtues surrounding justice to exercise their function towards other men in order to show them honour worthy of children of God. However, by this same reason, religion may command the other virtues to do what is proper to them for the sake of worshipping God, since God is worshipped by the virtues. It is not sufficient, therefore, that the gift of piety should extend to the whole matter of justice, for the same might be said of religion.

27. In the second way, according to St. Thomas,¹ piety (as an elicitive principle) extends to all matters of justice and offers direction in all human intercourse. It has this extension under a higher aspect, which pertains to the supernatural order and concerns itself with relations with one's neighbour, not according to the human manner of social intercourse, but according to the supernatural communion among sons and members of the household of God. Eminently extended to other matters of justice, piety does not formally practise them according to their proper essences. It is not necessary that the gift of piety, in extending to all matters of justice, should treat of them under the particular and proper formality of each virtue. For example, it is not necessary that piety should treat of the matter of commutative justice or distributive justice under the notion of strict reciprocity or equal debt. If it treats of the matter of liberality or fidelity, it is not necessary that it treat of these matters according to their peculiar essences and motives. It is sufficient that piety treat of them as inadequate objects under its higher formal aspect. For its being exercised in one case through commutative justice and in another through distributive justice, fidelity or affability is only a material consideration in the gift of piety.

In its proper formality, piety looks upon such matters in their relationship to the sons and members of the household of God. Therefore, in view of piety's willing submission to God and mutual respect of brothers related by spirit and grace, brothers in the communion of faith and of the saints, these debts of justice are the least consideration. According to the Apostle, *Dare any of you, having a matter against another, bring your case to be judged before the unjust and not before the saints? Do you not know that the saints will judge the world? And if the world will be judged by you, are you unworthy to judge the smallest*

¹ *III Sent.*, d. 34, q. 3, a. 1, *quaestiunc.* 2.

matters? *Do you not know that we shall judge angels? How much more worldly things.*¹ The Apostle does not deny that the saints as such, or as sons of God led by His spirit and by the gift of piety, will judge worldly things and treat of social intercourse or extend to acts of commutative and distributive justice. He merely considers these acts as minor or material considerations. Under a more elevated formality, which men have in common with the angels, the faithful shall judge of these things. This higher formality is the spirit of piety which treats men as sons of God, spiritually related in one communion. Virtually and eminently—not formally in the inferior way of commutative justice—piety elicits acts of strict justice and of the other virtues which include a relationship to others. For in its dealing with men in the communion of the sonship of God and brotherhood of the spirit, piety does not imperate acts of virtue but elicits them in an eminent way.

The gift of fortitude

28. The treatment of the gift of fortitude is bipartite, considering both the formal and the material aspect of the gift.

29. In its formal aspect the gift of fortitude differs from the virtue of the same name because, in conquering dangers and difficulties, the gift is not founded on human powers or circumscribed by human limitations. It depends solely upon the divine power; it is, as it were, clothed with strength from on high. Some theologians,² believing that any act of fortitude can be performed by that virtue, are of the opinion that the gift of fortitude does not differ in species or substance from the virtue. Nevertheless, since the gifts are habits distinct from the virtues and superior to them, the formal nature of the gift of fortitude is specifically distinct from the virtue of fortitude.

The material object of the gift of fortitude is the conquest of every difficulty and the avoidance of all dangers. According to St. Thomas,³ while the principal object of fortitude is the danger of death, accessory matters, such as magnificence, perseverance, and patience—which belong to virtues allied to fortitude—may be considered its secondary objects.

¹ *I Corinthians*, vi, 1 ff.

² *Suarez*, *II de Gratia*, c. 21, no. 10, according to *Vanentia*.

³ *II-II*, q. 139, a. 1, and *III Sent.*, d. 34, q. 3, a. 1.

30. Fortitude implies a firmness of mind in attacking and sustaining grave and difficult evils, especially the danger of death, which is more terrible than any other. This firmness can take hold in the soul only through consideration and regulation of the powers and the means by which evil can be resisted and conquered. Since human powers are limited and fragile, especially in waging a victorious struggle amid the multitude of dangers in the pursuit of eternal life, the common virtue of fortitude is not sufficient to eliminate all dangers and to conquer evils.

Presupposing the help of God received into the soul and limited by it, the acquired virtue of fortitude implies a firmness in overcoming evils according to the limited capacity of man. According to the Philosopher,¹ "he who is strong cannot be terrified as a man"—by dangers and evils superable by a merely human mode of action.

Even the infused virtue of fortitude, although it orders actions to the supernatural end of charity, does not receive from supernatural powers any regulative principle which exceeds the natural capacity and limitations of man. Although it judges that much greater things can be done, its own infirmity and limitation detain it, thereby limiting and modifying even supernatural actions and powers.

The gift of fortitude, however, clothes the virtue from above, so that God seems to cast aside human infirmity and apparently operates in the soul according to His own power. The Psalmist expressed this in the words: *I love thee, my Lord, my strength, my stay, my refuge.*² *By the Lord I was able to leap over a wall*³—"the name 'wall' means everything that can stand as an obstacle to human infirmity."⁴

31. Thus the virtue of fortitude differs from the gift of fortitude in the degree that human strength differs from divine. The virtue of fortitude is regulated in a human way prescribed by prudence, while the gift enjoys the full scope of the divine impulse and is moved by the power of God. The Psalmist sang: *They did not get possession of the land by their own sword, nor did their own arm save them. But thy right hand and thy arm and the light of thy countenance.*⁵ The sword and arm indicate the human virtue of fortitude. However, when anyone acts by the right hand and by the arm of God, he does not act according to an ordinary rule, but according to the illumination of the face of

¹ *III Nichomachean Ethics*, c. 9, B 1117b.

² *Psalm xvii*, 2, 3.

³ *Ibid.*, 30.

⁴ Cf. *III Sent.*, d. 34, q. 3, a. 1.

⁵ *Psalm xliii*, 4.

God and the instinct of His Spirit. Not caring for his own infirmity, he does not prudently measure his strength but acts according to the power of God and His right arm. Such fortitude is more than a virtue. Above all prudential rules and beyond human fortitude, clothed in divine strength, the gift of fortitude perfects and helps a person's failures through the virtue. For according to St. Gregory,¹ "the virtues are helped through the gifts."

32. Objection: According to St. Thomas,² the virtue of fortitude is concerned with all evils but especially with the danger of death. But to conquer such dangers there is no need for a special gift. Hence, the gift is certainly not necessary for any other evil, for if the greatest danger and the greatest difficulties can be conquered without the gift, so can the lesser. Therefore, there is no need for the gift.

Furthermore, even without the virtue of fortitude one can sustain death even amidst bitter torments ; for example, there are gentiles and infidels, and suicides. Therefore, there are no difficulties so great and so arduous that they demand a special gift of fortitude over and above the virtue.

83. Perhaps this ordinary virtue of fortitude, which proceeds according to common rules, does not ordain its actions to a supernatural end through any supernatural assistance. None the less, this does not mean that the gift of fortitude is necessary, since the infused virtue of fortitude should suffice. Concerned with a supernatural end, founded upon supernatural help, the infused virtue of fortitude is regulated by supernatural prudence. Therefore, in substance it should be able to do all the difficult works in the supernatural order attributed to the gift of fortitude. For works more or less outstanding and extraordinary which demand a special motion and impulse of the Holy Ghost are merely accidental considerations—according to a greater or less perfection within the same species of supernatural act.

84. This objection is confirmed by the fact that the virtue of fortitude inclines a man to sustain even the dangers of death because of the very nobility of the virtue and because of man's supernatural end. Yet this fact does not argue to any impulse or motion of the Holy Ghost except new knowledge or a new precept. Yet for a new

1 35 *Moralium*, c. 7, *M.P.L.* **xxxvi**, 755

2 II-II, q. 123, a. 4.

precept no new virtue is needed, since the specific formality and essence of a virtue is not changed by a new precept. For, even when a new ecclesiastical precept is added, temperance is not changed in its proper formality. Moreover, although God's precept that Abraham should kill his son commanded an extraordinary thing, which could be licit only at the command of God, its execution belonged properly to the virtues of obedience and religion. In a word, heroic and extraordinary acts of virtue, despite the fact that they require special divine help and motion, and even impulse, do not pertain to virtues distinct from the cardinal virtues. Furthermore, believing a particular revelation of God does not require a new faith over and above the theological virtue. Therefore, the extraordinary works of fortitude, although they proceed from a special impulse of God, do not require any virtue other than the virtue of fortitude.

35. Reply: The virtue of fortitude is concerned with the dangers of death. If it is a question of the infused virtue of fortitude its object is still the danger of death, but from a supernatural end and with supernatural help. Precisely for this act the gift of fortitude is not required.

The gift of fortitude is required, however, for a firmness in the danger of death and in other difficulties which exceed the measure of human powers and the limitation of human infirmities. For although the virtue of fortitude has these difficulties as its object, it tends toward them with a certain weakness and trepidation on the part of the individual. This personal trepidation and weakness is lessened or taken away by the gift of fortitude, which uses divine power as its own and acts with a motion and impulse from the Holy Ghost. It strengthens human infirmity and leads men with power from on high, so that they may act with the solidity of a rock: *He has exalted me upon a rock; and now he has lifted up my head above my enemies.*¹ According to St. Thomas, "The virtue of fortitude is concerned with a work which is of its very nature difficult, however, \ not too difficult for the person acting, since it does not exceed his powers. The gift of fortitude, on the other hand, is concerned with things which exceed human ability."²

36. The firmness which the virtue of fortitude gives the soul in the face of danger and imminent evil should be measured according to

¹ *Psalm* xxvi, 6.

² *III Sent.*, d. 34. 3, q. a. 1.

the weak and defeetible powers of human infirmity. Proceeding in a human way, even when it acts for a supernatural end, the virtue of fortitude attempts to repel evils and to accomplish arduous tasks with powers which are weak and defective, but sufficient for the substance of the work. It cannot repair this defect and infirmity, since, although inclining to the conquest of difficulties, it cannot completely strengthen the weakness and defectiveness of human powers. Thus even a strong man falters and falls.

However, the gift of fortitude inclines essentially to difficult acts in such a way that by the power of the Spirit it strengthens personal infirmity and dispels natural fearfulness. Even in the face of extreme dangers, such as the dangers of death, the person is moved by a higher motive than the virtue of fortitude. For this reason in His Passion Christ Our Lord, first acting in the human way of the virtue of fortitude compatible with fear, gave evidence of His trepidation to show the infirmity of human nature, then He immediately attained strength in the gift of fortitude. According to Pope St. Leo,¹ "when the trembling of infirmity had been cast aside and the magnanimity of His powers had been strengthened, He returned to the resolution of the eternal decree." Thus the gift of fortitude strengthens the virtue in matters in which the latter admits of defectiveness and fear because of its own weakness. The gift of its very nature takes away these defects, since from an impulse of the Holy Ghost it uses divine power as its own.

37. That many should endure grave danger without either the gift or the virtue of fortitude, and even in sin, is not surprising. They do not suffer dangers from true fortitude, but rather from dejection, pusillanimity, temerity, vanity, or even ignorance, never real strength. True fortitude is not indicated so much by bodily acts as by the affections of the soul. No man is strong who is dejected, indifferent, desperate, or vain, although he may perform an act of a strong man by throwing himself into dangers. He does so not because of any strength of spirit but rather from a weakness and disturbance of his soul. For example, a weak man, not a strong one, commits suicide because of worry over temporal affairs. He cannot withstand temporal worries, and he wishes to finish them through death. The man who throws himself into the dangers of death out of vanity is not strong; he is conquered either by vanity or by the passion of daring. He

¹ *Sermon 8 de Passione.*

cannot sustain injury or opprobrium, preferring a death for which men might praise him. The truly strong man contemns not only death but even shame. Christ, *who for the joy set before him, endured a cross, despising shame.*¹ The desire of honour is removed from the heart of man only with the greatest difficulty. No one is strong who is conquered by such a desire, even though he bears bodily trials. The gift of fortitude conquers exterior evils, but especially it strengthens the interior powers of the soul.

38. Moreover, its ordination to a supernatural end does not make the infused virtue of fortitude all-sufficient. It suffices in its own order, but not absolutely nor in all matters. For it is in an essentially human manner, according to the capacity of the subject, that the virtue of fortitude deals with difficulties and dangers. Hence it frequently fails, not by reason of the virtue (which has no inclination to failure) but because of the weakness of the subject, which it cannot strengthen perfectly.

On the other hand, a supernatural command and motion of the Holy Ghost directs the gift of fortitude to these difficulties. This gift takes away all weakness and strengthens all infirmity. In the case of Samson, *the spirit of the Lord came strongly upon him: and as the flax is wont to be consumed at the approach of fire, so the bands with which he was bound were broken and loosed.*² Therefore, by the power of the Spirit coming upon him, Samson overcame all difficulties and impediments.

39. Furthermore, the impulse of the Holy Ghost upon which the gift of fortitude is founded does not consist merely in a new precept or a new relation, light or knowledge. It is rather a new constancy and firmness of soul infused by the ministration of the Holy Ghost strengthening human powers and preparing human infirmity to conquer all difficulties. The examples cited to confirm the objection under discussion³ do not prove anything. Abraham, it is right to believe, besides the divine precept had the gift of piety by which he faithfully obeyed God even in so extraordinary an action. But he had the gift of fortitude to dispel all fear and hesitation arising from the tenderness of his fatherly love. Those who receive private revelations receive also a special light for understanding them and assenting to them. This is beyond theological faith, at least according to many

¹ Hebrews, xii, 2.

² Judges, xv, 14.

³ Cf. *supra*, no. 34.

theologians. The conquest of weakness and fear, which is the function of fortitude, requires a power of spirit higher than the virtue of fortitude, which allows imperfections to remain.

40. The object of fortitude : Some distinguish the object of the gift of fortitude from that of the virtue and others connected with it by maintaining that the former is entirely extraordinary and requires a special impulse of the Holy Ghost to see it through. They give the examples of the martyrs who threw themselves into the fire, Jonathan who with only one arm attacked a whole army, and Samson who killed a thousand men.

41. St. Thomas, however, expressly states otherwise. "Although the gift of fortitude is principally concerned with works of supererogation, nevertheless it is concerned with other difficulties, just as the virtues, but not in the same way, as has been said."¹ St. Thomas had already mentioned² that the gift is concerned with both the special matter of the virtue of fortitude, namely death, and other adjoined matters such as magnanimity, magnificence, patience, and perseverance. "The one gift of fortitude extends to all difficulties which can occur in human affairs, even those beyond human ability, for according to the Apostle,³ *I can do all things in him who strengthens me.*"⁴ Consequently, the act of the gift is concerned with the same objects as the virtue. Of the virtue of fortitude St. Thomas writes : "Since it is founded upon human capability, it does not embrace all difficulties but only the greatest possible for men. To the other difficulties there are ordained other virtues which are as new capabilities."⁵ For example, the sensitive powers in man are multiplied because of the limitation and narrowness of each faculty. From the fact that sight can apprehend a more excellent object, it does not follow that it is ordered to other inferior objects, to smell or to taste. In the same way, the virtues, founded upon a human manner of acting, are multiplied because each is concerned with a limited object. Therefore, although the virtue of fortitude is concerned with the most difficult object, it does not follow that it can function with regard to lesser objects.

¹ *III Sent.*, d. 34, q. 2, a. 1, *quaestiunc. 2 ad 1.*

² *Cf. ibid., corpus.*

³ *Philippians*, iv, 13.

⁴ *St. Thomas, loc. cit.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, q. 3, a. 1, *quaestiunc. 2.*

However, one and the same intellect, since it is superior to the senses, is concerned with the diverse objects of the senses but in a higher way. Likewise, one and the same gift of fortitude is concerned with all difficulties with which the virtues deal.

42. This doctrine can be proved *a priori*. The formal motive upon which the gift of fortitude is founded is more universal and higher than any motive of virtues concerned with arduous things. Hence, it should embrace more objects than other virtues. The inference is clear, since the more universal and efficacious the motive, the more it can embrace. Therefore, the more extensive matter should correspond to the higher motive. Since the motive power of the gift of fortitude is founded upon divine power and the strength of the Spirit, which can extend to all things, the gift can embrace all matters of the virtue of fortitude. *I can do all things in him who strengthens me.*¹

43. Moreover, this doctrine can be proved *a posteriori*. If the gift of fortitude were reserved for extraordinary actions, which seldom occur, it would not be necessary for salvation, nor would it be found in all who are in the state of grace. It is evident that these extraordinary actions are not necessary for salvation and are not to be found in all the just. Therefore, if the gift of fortitude is found in all the just and is necessary for salvation as are the other gifts,² it must perform ordinary actions.

The truth of the matter is that in conquering the difficulties and in surmounting the dangers and perils which surround the pursuit of eternal life, virtues founded on human standards would fail because of the weakness of the individual. Accordingly, the gift of fortitude is necessary for acting in a higher way and for using divine power as one's own. Because of its infinity, such power can extend to all things, and provide strength and confidence to the individual. The one gift of fortitude, then, extends to all matters of the various virtues concerned with difficulties, just as hope is intent upon all things which can be hoped for as leading to eternal life.

44. However, the gift of fortitude cannot correct the weakness of the subject so that it would have a conjoined efficacious help, as the gift of perseverance. For even if it is as a motion of the Holy Ghost

¹ St. Paul, *loc. cit.*

² Cf. I-II, q. 68, a. 2.

strengthening all infirmity, the gift cannot always have its proper effect because of the mutability of the human will.

The gift of fear

45. It will not be the burden of this treatise to examine the gift of fear in its relationship with the virtue of hope, for that is proper to the treatment of hope.¹ The chief concern at present, then, is the correspondence between fear and temperance.

46. Although not all of the different types of fear pertain to the gift of the Holy Ghost, it might be well to recall St. Thomas' comprehensive treatment of them in his tract on hope.² There is worldly fear, servile fear, initial fear, and filial fear or reverence. According to St. Thomas,³ this division arises from the fact that fear, generally speaking, is a flight from evil. Evil is of two kinds, the evil of punishment and the evil of sin. Moreover, fear can be divided on the basis of its motives. One type of fear flees the evil of punishment, which cannot be avoided without sin. This is the case of one who denies the faith for fear of punishment, or loses virtue, or is afraid to reprimand anyone lest he lose his reputation. Such a fear is worldly, human, and evil.

There is another type of fear which dreads the punishment due to sin, especially eternal punishment. But in fleeing punishment it also avoids sin, which is the cause of punishment. Such a fear is servile but good. It begins in a fear of punishment, common to servants, but it does not remain there. Unlike worldly fear which flees punishment but commits sin, servile fear goes further by fleeing sin as the cause of punishment.

Moreover, the fear which primarily and essentially flees sin, not because of punishment, but because it is an offence against God and because the soul fears to be separated from Him, is filial fear. For it is characteristic of sons to dread the loss of their father or separation from him. Filial fear is sometimes imperfect—called initial fear—since it admits of an admixture of the fear of punishment. Sometimes it avoids the evil of sin because it fears the punishment, but principally it is moved by the fact that sins are an offence against God. More often

¹ Cf. II-II, q. 19. See the Appendix for treatment by John of St. Thomas.

² St. Thomas, *loc. cit.*

³ III Sent., d. 34, q. 2, a. 1, quaestiunc. 2.

filial fear is perfect, since it does not involve any admixture of the fear of punishment, for perfect charity drives out such fear. Dreading sin for the sole reason that it is an offence against God, perfect filial fear is that of a son, reverential, chaste, remaining forever.

47. Of these different kinds of fear, neither worldly nor servile fear constitutes the gift of fear. It cannot be worldly fear, because such fear is evil and sinful. For fear is called worldly because it dreads to lose the world and the things of the world rather than God, whom it prefers to abandon for temporal things.

Moreover, the gift cannot be based on servile fear which, although in itself it is not evil, can be found in a sinner. The useful fear of punishment may concur in the disposition of a sinner to justification through attrition. The Council of Trent,¹ treating of attrition born of the fear of punishment or hell, teaches that servile fear is a gift of God and an impulse of the Holy Ghost, not yet indeed as dwelling within the soul but merely as moving it. Consequently, as St. Thomas teaches,² servile fear, as well as worldly fear, is excluded from the gifts which are gifts of the Holy Ghost dwelling within the soul.

It follows, then, that the gift of fear is that fear which is filial and chaste, since it is founded upon charity, reveres God as Father and dreads to be separated from Him by sin. According to St. Thomas,³ this fear does not differ substantially or specifically from initial fear, but only according to its state and manner. Initial fear belongs to imperfect charity and the state of beginners in whom there remains some servile fear insofar as fear of punishment operates in them. However, fear of sin and separation from God, which is filial fear in substance, is the principal motive of even the imperfect.⁴ With an increase of charity servile fear is driven out. For fear befitting a slave leaves when a perfect soul ceases to fear in a servile way and fears only sin and separation from God as the most bitter evil. Jeremias warned: *Know thou and see that it is an evil and a bitter thing for thee to have left the Lord thy God, and that my fear is not with thee.*⁵ Knowing what a great evil sin is, the soul is filled with bitterness. It cannot esteem or value any created good, since it sees that it may be deprived of the

¹ Session 14, c. 4, Denz. 898.

² II-II, q. 19, a. 9, and III Sent., d. 34, q. 2, a. 2.

³ II-II, q. 19, a. 8.

* Cf. *ibid.*, ad 2.

⁵ Jeremias, ii, 19.

Eternal Good. Unmindful of created goods, it contemns even punishment. Consequently, the very magnitude of the bitterness of anyone who fears sin excludes all servile fear of punishment. According to Jeremias, *He has filled me with bitterness,, he has inebriated me with wormwood. And he has broken my teeth one by one, he has fed me with ashes. And my soul is removed far off from peace, I have forgotten good things. And I said: My end and my hope is perished from the Lord.*¹ Whoever judges rightly how bitter it is to lose his final goal and hopes in the Lord, is unmindful of other goods, feeling neither the loss of good things nor the evil of punishment.

48. Therefore, the gift of fear corresponds to temperance, and yet it produces its effect in a way far greater than temperance. There are no difficulties about the fact that the formal aspect of fear is distinct from that of temperance. From a reverence for God and a flight from sin fear proceeds to repress the rising passions which deviate from reason, especially licentiousness.

The virtue of temperance, on the other hand, does not act so much by flight or from reverence for God. But it represses the concupiscible appetite from the love of integrity.

Moreover, despite apparent resemblances, the gift of fear is distinguished from the virtue of humility. Even though humility subjugates the passions of daring, presumption and pride through subjection and submission to God,² yet formally and directly it does not produce the same flight and reverence proper to fear. Only by a participation of the gift can humility subjugate and moderate presumptive hope. It is thus, according to St. Thomas,³ that the passion of hope, a movement of the soul toward things above its capacity, is directly moderated by humility. Not directly but through its reverential attitude towards God, the gift of fear recoils within itself from the divine eminence—not so much divine benignity (the object of religion), but the divine power to annihilate.

49. In its relationship with temperance, the gift of fear extends to all matters which need moderation or subjection. In a way all its own it restrains the soul from evil: *By fear of the Lord every one declines from evil*⁴ and *With bit and bridle bind fast their jaws*⁵ and

¹ *Lamentations*, iii, 15-18.

² Cf. II-II, q. 161, a. 2 ad 3.

³ *Psalms* xxxi, 9.

⁴ *Ibid.*, a. 4.

⁵ *Proverbs*, xv, 27.

*Pierce thou my flesh with thy fear.*¹ Having the most universal motive of subjection and reverence for God in all things, fear can embrace all matters which require restraint of the soul and a moderation of the passions. Within its sphere is the whole scope of temperance, either in its principal matter, the delights of touch, or in allied matters, such as the moderation of wrath, daring, hope, presumption, and so forth. All these passions, then, are carefully restrained through fear of the Lord.

50. Objection : Pursuing the notion of its universal motive, it may be alleged that fear touches the matter of every other virtue besides temperance. Fear can restrain from all sin : *By fear of the Lord every one declines from evil.*² But if fear extends to the other virtues as well as temperance, it would seem to have no special correspondence with temperance.

51. Reply: According to St. Thomas,³ "The gift of fear is principally concerned with God and with how to avoid offending Him, and according to this it corresponds to the virtue of hope, as has been said.⁴ Secondly, however, it can be concerned with whatever anyone flees in order to avoid offending God. Man needs this divine fear to flee what is especially enticing, the matter of temperance. Hence, the gift of fear likewise corresponds to the virtue of temperance." In its universality, then, fear is concerned with God through reverence and subjection by withdrawing from His greatness into its own littleness. Secondly, it is concerned with any separation from God through sin, which it flees. Finally, it produces an effect in the soul by restraining it from exuberance and from wantonness of concupiscence and delectation. According to St. Thomas,⁵ fear brings about a restraint in the appetite itself, restricted by a weakening of its strength arising from an awareness of an oppressing imminent evil. Fear has the same effect in the body, which is chilled, restrained or dissolved, by the retreat of the vital spirits. *Therefore shall all hands be faint, and every heart of man shall melt,*⁶ and there shall be men fainting for fear and for expectation of the things that are coming on the world.⁷ On the other hand, the proper effect of delight is to dilate the soul.⁸ For, according to Isaias, *You shall see, and abound, and thy heart shall*

¹ Psalm cxviii, 120.

² Proverbs, xv, 27.

³ II-II, q. 141, a. 1 ad 3.

* II-II, q. 19, a. 9 ad 1.

⁵ I-II, q. 44, a. 1.

⁶ Isaias, xiii, 7.

⁷ Luke, xxi, 26.

* Cf. I-II, q. 33, a. 1.

wonder and be enlarged.¹ In its relationship with the passions, then, fear is opposed to delectation, since it suppresses dilation and exuberance.

52. Therefore, because of its reverence for God and its subjection to Him, the gift of fear corresponds to the theological virtue of hope, and it represses presumption opposed to hope. But because fear flees from and avoids all offences against God it is related to every virtue, for it can avoid every evil of sin. However, its peculiar effect upon the soul gives it a special relationship with temperance, for delectation, which temperance seeks to restrain, causes a dilation of spirit which fear strives to counteract in both soul and body. It pierces the flesh, dries the bones, and puts lasciviousness to flight.

53. Objection: In virtue of this effect on the appetite, the gift of fear can repress only the passion of delight, which pertains to the cardinal virtue of temperance. It cannot repress the passions related to the virtues surrounding temperance, since clemency and meekness restrain wrath, and humility restrains presumption and pride. Unlike delectation, these passions are not assuaged through any restraint of the soul.

Reply: By its restraining effects, the gift of fear directly and essentially represses delectation, and consequently every other passion which needs to be restrained. Furthermore, it keeps within bounds every other passion, whether it is wrath or presumption or vanity, for these have some delight connected with them. For example, curiosity or the pleasure arising in too great an interest in clothing have a sensible delight attached to them. Vengeance, which is aroused by wrath, is a self-gratification to the one seeking vengeance. And vanity is a great self-indulgence. All pleasure, then, whether of the flesh and natural, or apprehensive and animal, can be kept within bounds by fear. Causing a restraint of both body and spirit, fear has for its effect both poverty of spirit, the first beatitude mentioned by Christ, *Blessed are the poor in spirit*,² and the beatitude of mourning, *Blessed are those who mourn*.³ Recognizing its own poverty and nothingness, the soul is restrained and without presumption. It mourns and weeps at the piercing of its carnal desires through fear.

54. Through what act does fear achieve its end in the mattei' of temperance? Is it only through flight from sin? Or through some

¹ *Isaias*, 1x, 5.

² *Matthew*, v, 3.

³ *Ibid.*, v, 5.

more positive motion does it humble the heart, subject it to God, and repress the exaltation of pride? After all, this exaltation, as St. Thomas teaches,¹ is a difficult obstacle directly opposed to fear, while pleasure does not involve the notion of difficulty.

55. Father Suarez, following Richard of St. Victor and Duns Scotus,² is of the opinion that fear is an act of humility and that all temperance should be understood under humility, similar to piety with respect to justice. He also claims that it is consonant with the words of St. Augustine: "The fear of the Lord is befitting the humble,"³ and "Who is humble except one who fears God?"⁴ Moreover, St. Gregory⁵ opposes fear to pride, an opposition which is proper to humility. However, since humility is not formally an act of sight but an act of pursuit through which an excessive confidence of spirit is moderated, according to Suarez fear must repress delectation through an act of pursuit.

56. Nevertheless, formally and specifically divine fear is not an act of humility. It always produces the effect of temperance, either in a general way through flight from sin or through a special effect in the concupiscible appetite, the restraint of wantonness.

Suarez cannot deny that the gift of fear is distinct from the virtue of humility, since he admits the principle that the gifts are distinct from the virtues. If the gift differs from the virtue, its act should also be different, since acts are spoken of in relation to habits and habits produce acts specifically similar to themselves. Therefore, if the habit of the gift is diverse from the virtue its act cannot be the same. The answer should be sufficient for Suarez.

57. Against Scotus and others who deny that the gifts are distinct from the virtues, there is at hand a valid argument to prove that the act of fear cannot adequately and precisely be identified with the act of humility. According to St. Thomas,⁶ fear is concerned with a twofold object, namely, the evil which it fears and seeks to avoid and the person or principle from which that evil can proceed or by whom

¹II-II, q. 141, a. 1.

²II de Gratia, c. 21, n. 22.

³I de Sermone Domini, c. 9, M.P.L. xxxiv, 1234.

⁴27 de Sanctis, c. 1, M.P.L. xxxix, 1525.

⁵II Moralium, c. 26, M.P.L. lxxv, 593.

⁶II-II, q. 19, a. 1.

it is permitted. Reverencing this person, fear, in its proper formality, does not love the evil which it fears nor the person from whom it may incur evil. Fear is not love, nor is it concerned with good. Although through fear the soul has reverence for God, who is essentially good, essentially it looks upon Him as inflicting, or capable of inflicting, evil. Yet, at the same time presuppositively and concomitantly it can admit of love for such a person.

Humility, however, does not seek to avoid evil nor is it concerned with a superior capable of inflicting evil. In its act it neither flees nor trembles at the power of that superior nor does it have reverence for him. Humility is, rather, an orderly subjection to the superior, because of the individual's defects and the superior's excellence. It does not proceed through any consideration of evil which can be inflicted by the superior. For even when the consideration of evil is not present, a humble person knows what he is and what his superior is. Moreover, men can humble themselves before equals or inferiors from whom they have nothing to fear. For example, Christ humbled Himself before His own disciples by washing their feet, and St. Peter advised, *Be subject to every human, creature for God's sake.*¹

Therefore, the act of fear is not formally the same as the act of humility, although humility can flow from fear and be regulated by it as an effect. From the very fact that a person has reverence for God and is subject to Him as one capable of inflicting evil, he is constrained to seek the glory of God rather than his own aggrandisement. Even without any consideration of punishment, humility causes the soul to cast aside its pride and the notion of its own greatness. For this reason St. Augustine² attributes humility—which he understands as poverty of spirit—to the gift of fear in which, according to St. Thomas,³ God is revered. Humility, then, is an effect of fear rather than its proper act, and poverty of spirit corresponds to the gift of fear as an effect. In the words of St. Thomas,⁴ “Since showing reverence to God and being subject to Him belongs to filial fear, whatever follows from this subjection belongs to the gift of fear. From the fact that anyone subjects himself to God he ceases to seek to exalt himself. Hence, if anyone perfectly fears God, he will not exalt himself through pride.” Therefore, humility, or poverty of spirit, and the casting out of pride are the consequences of the act of reverence for God. It is

¹ *1 Peter*, ii, 13.

² Cf. *I de Sermone Domini*, c. 9, *M.P.L.* xxxiv, 1234.

³ *II-II*, q. 141, a. 2 ad 3.

⁴ *II-II*, q. 19, a. 12.

an effect following upon fear and regulated by it, but it is not its proper act. Therefore, both fear and humility subject men to God but under different formalities. Fear is concerned with the power God has of inflicting evil. Humility abstracts from the notion of inflicting evil, and subordinates its worthlessness to God. Moreover, it even subordinates self to men whom it does not fear and from whom it does not expect evil.

58. Therefore, fear has only one formal act. From that act, however, many effects are derived. These effects are attributed to fear as following from it or as imparted or regulated by it. Among these results are matters of temperance, humility for example. Since, then, in its own virtual and eminent manner fear produces effects similar to the acts of temperance and humility, it has a special relationship with them. However, the proper act elicited by the gift of fear is both reverence for God as a principle capable of inflicting evil and flight from imminent evil. This second effect is not necessarily found in Christ and in the blessed, since no evil is imminent to them. They experience only the first part, reverence for God as one having the power to inflict evil, which is to be concerned with a Good capable of inflicting evil. Hence, according to St. Augustine,¹ "Fear is chaste, remaining forever." If fear is to remain in heaven, it cannot arise from evil, which cannot occur there, but it must grow strong in the good which cannot be lost. That act which universally flees any evil that might separate the soul from God, and subjects the soul to Him as the highest and infinite Eminence, takes away all elation of spirit and pride—the first beatitude of the poor in spirit. Secondly, it represses all bodily delectation and introduces sadness and mourning—the third beatitude: *Blessed are those who mourn*.²

59. In the doctrine of St. Thomas,³ both of these beatitudes correspond to the gift of fear, the first directly, the second as an effect. The soul conceives in itself that magnitude to which all things are subject in complete servitude and dependence—in motion, in life, and in being: *Since in him we live and move and are*.⁴ Even while it knows that God has voluntarily and freely given all things to men, the soul is aware that by an act of His will God can deprive or not deprive, concede or take away, all His blessings. The soul, struck with a great

¹ *XIV De Trinitate*, c. 9, *M.P.L.*, xxi, 1045. ² *II-II-II*, q. 19, a. 12 ad 2.
³ *Matthew*, v, 5. ⁴ *Acts*, xvii, 28.

fear, becomes terrified before His face. It casts aside all its own greatness which in its own estimation was raised up as mountains. For, *his lightning shone forth* (that is, the splendour of His avenging power) *to the world: the earth saw and trembled. The mountains melted like wax at the presence of the Lord, at the presence of the Lord of all the earth.*¹ Whatever is high or exalted in worldly affairs (that is, all the earth) melts at the divine presence and is dissolved by fear, as wax in the presence of fire. God alone is elevated by being feared, and all that is exalted in men evanesces and is brought to nothing. *And the loftiness of men shall be bowed, down, and the haughtiness of men shall be humbled, and the Lord alone shall be exalted in that day. And idols shall be utterly destroyed. And they shall go into the holes of rocks and into caves of the earth from the face of the fear of the Lord, and from the glory of his majesty when he shall rise up to strike the earth.*² Causing interior desolation like a devastating fire, fear of the Lord scorches all exaltation of spirit. The soul would prefer to go into the rocks and caves of the earth rather than look upon the face of Him who is able to inflict such evil. It dreads any contemplation of the glory of His wrathful majesty. In an interior poverty of spirit, truly despoiled of all pride and exaltation, the soul flees naked from the face of a wrathful Lord into the rocks and caves of the earth. It returns to the nothingness and the misery of earthly things.

60. Of this return to the misery of temporal things is born the second effect of fear—sadness in temporalities and cessation of carnal delights. For how can the soul be wanton in sensual delights when all exaltation of spirit has been destroyed through fear of the Lord? *Blessed are those who mourn.*² Dead at heart, a person would feel himself thrown into a ditch and buried through fear of the Lord. *And he shall go into the clefts of the rocks and into the holes of stones from the face of the fear of the Lord, and from the glory of his majesty.*⁴ When the flesh is pierced by the arrow of fear, all strength, all desire, and all lust grow weak and decay. Delight of the flesh is weakened and disturbed as a result of poverty of spirit in the soul—*My strength is weakened through poverty and my bones are disturbed;*⁵ . . . *for thy arrows are fastened in me: and thy hand has been strong upon me. There is no health in my flesh because of thy wrath: there is no peace for my bones, because of my sins.*² By the nails of fear of the Lord and poverty of

¹ Psalm xcvi, 4, 5.

² Isaiah, ii, 17–19.

³ Matthew, v, 5.

¹ Isaiah, ii, 21.

⁸ Psalm xxx>

^e Psalm xxxvii, 3, 4.

spirit, the soul is pierced, the flesh wastes away and desires are repressed lest they burst forth into lust, just as *The grass is withered and the flower (of the flesh) is fallen, because the spirit of the Lord has breathed upon it.*¹

61. The nature of the effect of fear should now be evident. First, fear generates humility in an eminent way through poverty of spirit which takes away pride. Understood in this way, the authorities cited above by Suarez attribute humility to fear as an effect, not as its formal act. Secondly, fear has an effect similar to chastity and the other virtues belonging to temperance, since it suppresses delectation. Moreover, through dread of divine justice and power, fear causes mourning and sadness over miserable temporalities. While it does not flee delectation as something difficult in itself, it causes an aversion and separation from delectation, which involves great difficulty—as is evident in the overcoming of temptations.

¹ *Isaias*, x1, 7.

APPENDIX

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APPENDIX: THE GIFT OF FEAR

Chapter I

THE ESSENTIAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE GIFT OF FEAR AND THE HABIT OF HOPE AND THE OTHER VIRTUES

1. There is a controversy in this matter which should be noted at the outset. In general there is the difficulty of whether all the gifts of the Holy Ghost are distinct from all the virtues, both acquired and infused. There is a special question concerning fear, namely what sort of habit it is and what formality it has which is distinct from the other virtues. The controversy concerning the distinction between the gifts and the virtues in general is between St. Thomas and Scotus. St. Thomas² judged that the gifts are habits distinct from all the other virtues, even those of the supernatural order. Scotus,³ on the other hand, thought that the gifts are not distinct from them, since for him whatever a man can do in the supernatural order he can do through the infused virtues. Some of the older theologians follow Scotus, and among the more recent are Vasquez⁴ and Lorca.⁵ More commonly the opinion of St. Thomas is preferred both among Thomists and those outside the school. Older theologians, such as Alexander of Hales,⁶ Henry,⁷ and Durandus⁸ followed it along with the others. Valentia,⁹ Montesinos,¹⁰ and Suarez¹¹ also adhere to this opinion.

2. The teaching of St. Thomas is here presupposed¹² as more in conformity with the explanation of Scripture, which enumerates in Christ Our Lord the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost.¹³ It is, moreover,

¹ This Appendix is taken from the *Cursus Theologicus* of John of St. Thomas, T. VII, Q. XVII, Disp. VI, articles I and 2. Vives Edition 1885, pp. 373-389.

² I-II, q. 68, a. 1.

³ In III Sententiarum, d. 34.

⁴ In III Sententiarum, d. 89, c. 1 and 2.

⁵ In III Sententiarum, d. 25, men. 2.

⁶ Summa Theol., part III, q. 62, t. 2.

⁷ Quodlibet. IV, q. 23.

⁸ In III Sententiarum, d. 34, q. 1.

⁹ Commentariorum Theologicorum, t. 4, cf. Hurter.

¹⁰ Commentaria in I-II, cf. Hurter, op. cit. p. 268.

¹¹ De Gratia, c. 17, n. 9.

¹² I-II, q. 68, a. 1.

¹³ Isaias, xi, 2.

evident that the gifts cannot be reduced to the cardinal or theological virtues. The gifts belonging in the intellect, such as wisdom, knowledge, and understanding, cannot be identified with the habit of faith which is the theological virtue, since the gifts were present in Christ, though He did not have the virtue of faith. Therefore these gifts are distinguished from faith and even more so from hope and charity, which are not in the intellect.

Furthermore, these gifts cannot be the cardinal virtues, since of all the cardinal virtues only prudence belongs to the intellect, and to the practical, not the speculative, intellect at that. Hence prudence might correspond to the gift of counsel, but not to wisdom, knowledge and understanding, which are in the speculative intellect. Likewise, these gifts cannot be identified with the intellectual virtues, since the intellectual virtues, namely wisdom, knowledge, and the habit of principles are acquired virtues, while the gifts are infused and supernatural. There are no such things as infused intellectual virtues distinct from the gifts. There is no infused wisdom, understanding, or knowledge, but there is infused temperance or justice. The intellectual virtues do not treat of the object of natural sciences in a supernatural way, and the infused moral virtues are concerned with the same matters as the acquired virtues only in a supernatural way and regulated by a supernatural rule. It is certain that supernatural types of knowledge are not infused, for the natural truths with which the natural virtues are concerned are known by a natural act and reasoning, not from supernatural principles. Experience testifies to this, for like theology itself these types of knowledge may remain in sinners in whom the gifts of the Holy Ghost do not reside.

Concerning the matter with which faith deals there are, of course, the supernatural habits of knowledge, wisdom, and understanding distinct from faith, but these are the infused gifts of the Holy Ghost. Consequently, they are distinct from the intellectual virtues which are concerned with natural objects. It is quite evident then that the three intellectual gifts are distinct from the other virtues. The same type of argumentation may be applied to the other gifts, since it is not fitting that some gifts should be distinct while others are not.

3. How the gifts and virtues, even the infused virtues, are distinct is a more intricate question than can be treated fully here. It has its proper place in the *Summa*,¹ and is also treated when each gift is discussed separately. I might briefly state that the best argument

¹ I-II, q. 68, a. 1.

for distinguishing the virtues and gifts is that given by St. Thomas.¹ He teaches that the essence of a gift of the Holy Ghost should be explained as a divine inspiration, which implies a motion from outside. For this reason Isaias did not speak of the gifts as gifts but as spirits. Some theologians are deceived on this point, and they find difficulty in the doctrine of St. Thomas, because even for an act of virtue a divine impulse is required, and even a supernatural motion in the case of infused virtues. It is not clear to them how the fact of operating from divine inspiration as from an exterior mover is sufficient to constitute the difference between the gifts and virtues, however rare and excellent the acts to which that motion might be directed. For them such a motion would not diversify the species of the action, but it would give it a greater perfection within the same species. Consequently, it would not necessitate different habits but the same habit more perfectly conformed to God and moved by Him in a more excellent way.

4. Moreover, St. Thomas did not speak of inspiration and divine motion as merely helping, for it is evident that the acts of virtue are brought about with divine help and inspiration. He spoke rather of a divine inspiration and motion which regulates and supplements what reason alone cannot do, even when it is supernaturally elevated by the infused virtues. A man is moved by reason as by a connatural rule for his actions. In the natural and acquired virtues he moves toward a natural end; in the supernatural toward a supernatural end. In the latter case, however, the supernatural virtues are received according to the limited manner of their subject. The fact that God elevates a man to a supernatural end through the infused virtues can give rise to a twofold consideration. First, the virtues are drawn into the manner of acting of the subject into which they are received. They move only imperfectly, and they regulate a man, even one acting for a supernatural end, according to the way of acting customary to reason. Secondly, these infused virtues come down from God, being poured upon us to lead us to a supernatural end. It is fitting, then, that God by His inspiration and impulse should regulate us by supplying those things to which reason cannot move.

The proper act of a virtue is an operation regulated according to the manner the virtue has from the subject it is in and the reason that governs it. The operation of the gift, however, is governed by the

*1-11 q. 08 a. 1.

divine way of acting, which comes from the inspiration and impulse of God regulating the soul to its end according to His power and not our human limitation. This latter is essentially different from the operation of the virtues, since in virtues the nature of each is taken from its object as regulated. According to the different manners of regulating objects, therefore, there will be an essential difference. For a man to perform works governed by a higher principle and ride, there are required habits by which the soul is made easily movable by divine governance and obedient to it. Such habits are the gifts of the Holy Ghost.

These gifts presuppose grace for a twofold reason. First, the gifts make a man easily disposed toward eternal happiness. Secondly, in order to be easily and firmly movable by the mover, a man should be securely conjoined to Him; this can be accomplished only through grace. A man in sin is not joined to God by union which is required in order to be easily and firmly movable by Him.

This case is parallel to that of the moral virtues. They are placed in the will to follow and to incline to objects regulated by reason and prudence. If they are directed by reason to a natural end they are the acquired virtues, if to a supernatural end, they are infused. Likewise, there are habits—the gifts—to follow the lead and inspiration of the Holy Ghost, regulating as a higher moving principle in the place of reason and acquired or infused prudence. The Holy Ghost then forms the dictates for moving the will and illuminating the intellect to form judgments of things divine. For example, wisdom derived through natural reasoning indicates something of divine things as they are manifested from effects in nature. The wisdom of the gifts enlightens the mind to judge of things divine from a certain experience and taste of them arising from charity toward God. According to St. Thomas,¹ “The way connatural to human nature is that it should perceive divine things only through the mirror of creatures and the enigma of likenesses. The virtue of faith acts in this way, but the gift of understanding enlightens the mind concerning things heard so that even in this life a man might receive a foretaste of the manifestation to come.” For this reason, from the diverse manner of operating belonging to the different moving power and essential formality by which the object is attained-, habits are differentiated and the gifts placed in either the intellect or the will.

II-II, q. 45, and *In III Sententiarum*, d. 24, q. 1, a. 1.

5. Certain it is, then, that these different ways of acting belong to different formal motives and essences. In intellectual matters whenever there are judgments from diverse principles and through a different kind of argumentation, such a diversity belongs to an essentially distinct formality. For the formal and specific reason for a conclusion and a judgment is taken from its being reduced to diverse principles. Certainly a judgment of divine things is resolved to diverse principles when there is a reasoning process from revealed principles, as in the case of wisdom, which is acquired through work, such as theology, and when such a judgment, proceeding from a union of love, is, as it were, experienced and makes the soul connatural with divine things. This latter case is that of the gift of wisdom. For a divine thing as revealed through faith is a formally distinct principle from the same divine thing as made connatural to the soul through love.

In the will, moreover, wherever the motive regulating free acts is changed, the specific essence of the human act, which is taken from the object, as regulated by reason, is varied. Hence, the act of the will regulated by the impulse of the Holy Ghost moving according to the scope of His power, and not according to the manner of human investigation and reason, is concerned with a rule of action far different from that by which human acts are governed according to their own manner of investigating, even in the supernatural order. These acts, then, are necessarily distinguished by the diverse motives regulating them. Consequently the acts which are diverse require specifically different habits.

6. It should be noted in passing that the judgment of divine things given through the gift of wisdom has for its principle of judging a connaturality and union with divine things. In this union of charity is founded every consideration of mystical theology, that is, affective wisdom uniting the soul to God. Such wisdom is essentially higher than the theological wisdom which is acquired by human acts. However, because of human imperfection in participating in the gifts of the Holy Ghost, especially those which are related to the intellect, which in this life is subordinated to faith as a virtue more excellent than the gifts,¹ it is fitting for the gift of wisdom and the judgments of mystical theology to be founded upon the judgment of acquired and Scholastic theology and to be judged by it. The opposite course is very dangerous and subject to many errors.

¹ I-II, q. 68, a. 8.

The reason for this situation can be gathered from what has already been written. The principles upon which Scholastic theology is founded are the truths of the faith themselves, and through a reasoning process, which necessarily follows from these principles, acquired theology draws its judgments. The principles of the gift of wisdom and of mystical theology are the union of love for divine things through charity. For this there results in the intellect a certain adherence, a connaturality, and, as it were, an experience of divine truths. For this reason, the one who experiences such a union is considered to undergo divine things, not because the intellect does not truly and properly act in experiencing them and in feeling the divine sweetness, but because this union of the intellect does not originate in its own effort but from the experience of love. Such things should be regulated by the determinations of faith as by a higher virtue and by acquired theology as by a judgment founded on a necessary and evident reasoning process. This latter is more certain for the human mind than a mystical judgment. Hence it is necessary that those acts of the gift of wisdom should be regulated through acquired wisdom so that they may be more certain to the human intellect, and this for a twofold reason. First, because the gift is subordinated to the virtue of faith, which is higher than the gift, and contains truths more certainly. Secondly, because of the greater evidence in the reasoning processes of acquired wisdom, since the gift of wisdom is essentially lacking in any discursive reasoning.²

7. With these introductory remarks presupposed, the peculiar burden of this treatise on the habit of the gift of fear is whether it is a species distinct from the other virtues. The authors are divided on this point. Those who are of the opinion that the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not habits distinct from the virtues, reduce filial fear to charity. On the other hand, they reduce servile fear, which is good and worthwhile, to the habit of hope. Lorca³ and Torres³ are of this opinion. Those who think that the gifts are habits distinct from the virtues are divided in assigning the specific and formal nature of this habit of fear. Suarez⁴ distinguishes between filial fear and the fear which is the gift of the Holy Ghost. He remarks that filial fear is an act elicited by charity, and is consequently not an act of a gift (presupposing, of course, that even in his opinion the gifts are distinguished

¹ Cf. II-II, q. 9, a. 1.

² *Commentaria in II-II*, q. 19, d. 14.

³ *Commentaria in II-II*, q. 19, a. 9, d. 53.

⁴ *I de Spe*, sect. 4, num. 13 and 14.

from the virtues). The fear which is a gift, he asserts, is not a special habit which is concerned immediately with God by fearing Him. It is rather concerned with the matter of temperance, although in a higher and specifically different way than the virtue of temperance either infused or acquired. This he alleges to be the doctrine of St. Thomas! although the Holy Doctor has nothing on this point in the place cited by Suarez. St. Thomas, however, docs seem to favour this opinion elsewhere² when he remarks that “there is something of temperance that corresponds to a gift, namely, fear,” by which anyone is restrained from the delights of the flesh, according to the Psalm, *Pierce thou my flesh with fear*.³ This, therefore, is the gift, the habit of fear, that is concerned with the matter of temperance. The Master Cabrera⁴ considers this opinion probable because the act of reverential fear is not distinguished from the act of humility which is a part of temperance.

a. Nevertheless, the expressed doctrine of St. Thomas is that the gift of fear is a habit distinct from charity and from humility. It is concerned not only with the matter of temperance but even filial fear belongs to it. For this reason, the aforementioned opinions are quite opposed to St. Thomas and to reason. That the gift of fear is a habit distinct from charity is manifest, since St. Thomas⁵ distinguishes the gift of fear from every theological virtue and especially from the habit of charity. Moreover, he also distinguishes it from humility.

That filial fear is not an act elicited by charity but an act of a gift of the Holy Ghost, St. Thomas expressly states :⁶ “Hence it follows that the fear of God which is enumerated among the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost is filial or chaste fear.” He contradicts, therefore, the opinion of Father Suarez in this connection. Finally, the fact that fear is not concerned with the matter of temperance alone is certain from the doctrine of St. Thomas.⁷ The gift of fear is concerned principally with God, whom it tries to avoid offending, and in this it corresponds to the virtue of hope, as has been said above.⁸ Secondly, however, it can be concerned with whatever anyone would flee to

11-II, q. 65, a. 4.

2II-II, q. 141, a. 1, ad 3.

3 Psalm cxviii, 120.

4 *Commentaria et disputationes in III Summae d. Thomae*, q. 7, Corduba, 1602; cf. Hurter, *op. cit.*, p. 148 and Quetif-Echard, *op. cit.*, II, p. 322.

5 II-II, q. 19, a. 9, ad 3.

6 *Ibid.*

7 II-II, q. 141, a. 1.

8II-II, q. 19, a. 9.

avoid offending God. Man especially needs divine fear to avoid what seduce him most—and with these temperance is concerned. Hence, the gift of fear is also related to temperance.

From this it is evident that the doctrine of St. Thomas does not restrict the gift of fear to the matter of temperance. It is rather concerned with, avoiding any offence against God out of reverence for Him. Only secondarily and inadequately does it look to avoiding those things which can lead to an offence against God, among which are the delights of the senses, since they are especially seductive. With these temperance is concerned and hence fear has a special reason to be concerned with them.

9. The basis of the doctrine of St. Thomas supposes that all the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits distinct from the other virtues, even theological, as has been explained. Moreover, against the aforementioned authors St. Thomas' twofold conclusion in this question is to be examined in the case of the gift of fear. The first part of the conclusion is in the body of the article, the second is in his reply to the second and third objections. In the body of the article he proves that filial fear can be raised to the essence of a gift. In the solutions to the objections he shows that fear does not primarily and essentially assume the nature of a virtue, like love or hope. From this there is a third conclusion, namely, that fear, like joy, can be an act following upon charity. Nevertheless, so that it can exercise the function of a gift of the Holy Ghost, it should not only be an act consequent upon charity but it should have a habit distinct from charity and following from it. From this habit, then, fear would be directly elicited.

10. The first conclusion consists in this: that the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits by which a man is made easily movable by the Holy Ghost, and as a matter of fact, fear is numbered among them, *And He shall be filled with the spirit of fear.*² Therefore, fear realizes the essence of a gift of the Holy Ghost since it makes a man easily movable by the impulse and regulation of the Holy Ghost. A man is made easily movable by the Holy Ghost inasmuch as he is subject to Him, fears the commandments of God, and directs himself according to them. *But to whom shall I have respect, but to him that is poor and little and of a contrite spirit, and that trembleth at my words?*³ *The eyes of the Lord are on them that fear him** This then belongs to the formal essence

¹ II-II, q- 19, a. 9.

² *Isaias*, xi, 3.

³ *Isaias*, lxi, 2.

* *Psalms* xxxii, 18.

of filial fear, to fear God as a Father and to fear being separated from Him through sin. By reason of this effect and essential formality of filial fear it is elevated to the status of a gift, since because of this a man is made easily movable by the Holy Ghost. Therefore, filial fear as such is an act of a gift and proceeds from a habit distinct from charity (even in the opinion of Suarez). This is confirmed by the fact that fear is concerned with the matter of temperance only in so far as it strikes terror into a man and presents God to him as someone to be feared very much. *Pierce thou my flesh with fear, for I am afraid of thy judgments.*¹ Therefore, the consideration of fear is rather to look upon God and His judgments as things to be feared than to be concerned with the delights of sense as things to be moderated—the matter of temperance. Hence fear is only partially concerned with this matter. For from fear of God anyone can repress not only delights but even wrath and whatever is connected with the irascible appetite. Therefore, fear as a gift has a wider scope than temperance. Under the formality by which it touches upon the matter of temperance, namely, terrifying and causing a fear of offending God, it can touch upon other matters by fearing in them any offence against God. Fear of God, then, can avoid every sin in all matters: *The fear of the Lord expels sin.*² However, under a special formality it is opposed to sensual delight, since fear drives out rejoicing and delight.

11. The second conclusion is proved by St. Thomas from the fact that it is of the nature of love to go out to good and of the nature of fear to fly from evil. It is of the essence of virtue, however, to be ordered to good and consequently fear cannot take upon itself the notion of a virtue, like love. The difficulty is based on the proposition: It is of the nature of fear to fly from evil, yet this is not of the essence of the gift of fear. Nevertheless, the force of this consequence may be explained in this way: although fear is elevated to the nature of a gift it does not have for its principal act any flight from evil but a reverence for God by whom evil can be inflicted.³ However, fear never is concerned with attaining a good but with taking refuge from the eminence of such a good and in withdrawing into its own nothingness, since it sees in that good the power and the eminence which can inflict evil. Virtue, on the other hand, is ordered to making a man correctly disposed concerning good by following it. Hence, fear, however elevated

¹ *Psalm cxviii*, 120.

² *Ecclesiasticus*, i, 27.

³ *III*, q. 7, a. 6, ad 1.

it may be in the notion of a guilt, is not cleansed of the notion of flight. Even when fear looks upon the good it is concerned with it as capable of inflicting evil and under the common notion of fleeing from it and not trying to attain it. Hence it never attains the notion of a virtue strictly so called. Why it is said to look upon evil as its principal object when in the gift of fear the principal act is not to flee evil but to be concerned with a good is the burden of the following chapter.¹

12. Finally, from these conclusions there follows a third. Fear and hate and any sort of flight from evil opposed to the divine good can be considered in a twofold way. First, it can be looked upon as a simple motion of flight, inasmuch as from the pursuit of a good that is loved there follows a departure from the opposite evil either through disgust or hate or through fear. Secondly, the flight can be considered as it takes on a special motive by reason of which it is drawn into a special formality and distinct habit. For example, detestation of sin, insofar as it is a simple disgust and hate of sin, is elicited by charity. When this detestation is expiatory and in satisfaction for sin it is drawn into the special formality of penance.² Likewise, it is said of fear that insofar as it is a simple effect of fleeing any possible fault, it is an act of charity. On the other hand, it takes on a special essential motive, namely, it makes a man obedient to the motion of the Holy Ghost and subject to Him through reverence. It considers God Himself as someone to be feared as a father in a sort of duty and not as a friend as in charity. Hence, it assumes a special formality and requires a special habit inasmuch as it is filial fear distinct from charity. Hence, it is a gift of the Holy Ghost.

Solution of the difficulties

13. The opinion of Father Suarez concerning the first part on filial fear is in agreement with the first opinion³ and is established upon the same basis. He asserts that it belongs to the same motive and formality to love a good and to flee the opposite evil. For example, by the same motion by which a thing tends downward it flies from its place on high. By the same judgment in which the intellect assents to one proposition it resists the contrary. Therefore, it belongs to love by which anyone loves the divine good to flee from the opposite evil

¹ Cf. *Joannis a Sancto Thoma, Cursus Theologicus, tomus VII, q. 17, a. 2, n. 2.*

² III, q. 45, a. 2, ad 1.

³ Cf. *supra*, n. 7.

which is sin, and this is done through filial fear. Moreover, it is proper to desire or hope, by which anyone loves a supernatural good for himself, to flee from the evil of punishment which is contrary to it.

14. This is confirmed by the fact that there is no special habit for filial fear. It is not made a virtue or a gift but is reduced to a supernatural desire. Therefore, there is no special habit besides charity necessary for filial fear. The same notion is realized in servile fear which is good and worthwhile and is supernatural like filial fear. Finally this is confirmed by the words of St. Thomas,¹ "For the same reason a man desires his good and fears to be deprived of it." Therefore, filial fear and the love of God belong to the same motive and formality as the love of desire and the fear of penalty.

15. Concerning the second part of the opinion of Father Suarez, in which it is not in agreement with the first opinion,² besides the authority of St. Thomas adduced, there is the following line of argumentation. Just as some gifts correspond to every other moral virtue, there should be one for temperance. The gift of counsel corresponds to prudence, the gift of piety to justice, and the gift of fortitude to fortitude. Therefore, some gift should correspond to temperance and there is no other besides fear. Further confirmation for this is had from the fact that no habit can primarily and essentially be directed to fleeing from evil but it must be for pursuing some good. Consequently, there cannot be an habitual gift whose primary and essential act is to fear God. It must pursue some good. Finally, it is confirmed because the proper act of the gift of fear is poverty of spirit, as is evident from both St. Augustine³ and St. Thomas.⁴ Poverty of spirit is nothing other than an act of humility which is a kind of temperance. Therefore, the gift of fear is a habit which is concerned with the matter of temperance.

16. In reply to the first opinion proposed it should be noted that there follows upon the motion of love a flight from the opposite evil after the manner of a simple departure, either of hate or fear commonly so called. However, there does not follow that flight according to a special formality of fear which belongs to the gift of the Holy Ghost,

¹ II-II, q. 19, a. 6.

² Cf. *supra*, n. 8.

³ *V De Sermon. Dom. in Monte*, c. 4; *M.P.L.*, XXXIV 1234

⁴ II-II, q. 19, a. 12.

as has already been explained.¹ Likewise, there does not follow the detestation of sin under that formality which belongs to penance unless through the medium of the habit of penance, which is distinct from charity.

To the first confirmation it may be replied that servile fear, although it is from the Holy Ghost as something good and worth-while, does not take upon itself a special formality like filial fear, when it is elevated to the status of a gift. Hence, since servile fear is a simple motion of fear concerning the evil of punishment or the loss of the divine good—looked upon as one's own --it is sufficient to assign as its principle a supernatural desire or hope* pursuing the divine good. This is not applicable in the case of filial fear, since it takes upon itself the special notion of duty or reverence toward God as one to be feared as a father. Moreover, this fear makes a man easily movable by the Holy Ghost.

In reply to the second confirmation it should be noted that in the place cited² St. Thomas is referring to the simple motion of fear. He treats of servile fear, not of the fear that takes on the special formality of reverence toward God and of mobility by the Holy Ghost and subjection to Him.

17. Reply to the arguments for the opinion of Father Suarez: St. Thomas³ teaches that the gift of fear corresponds to the virtue of temperance secondarily and partially, inasmuch as it is concerned with avoiding what can lead to offending God. Primarily, however, and principally, it corresponds to hope, according to which it both fears God and fears being separated from Him. Hence, in reply to Father Suarez' objection, it can be stated simply that there is a gift corresponding to temperance, namely fear. This is not the complete office of fear but only partial, and a secondary part at that, since for a special reason it is opposed to the delights of the flesh.

It may be noted in reply to the first confirmation that no virtue or gift flees from evil as its first act. Consequently, the primary act of the gift of fear is not to flee from evil but to have reverence for the good which is capable of inflicting evil, as will be evident from the doctrine of St. Thomas in the following chapter.⁴

The second confirmation is answered by the reply that poverty of spirit as an act of the gift of fear is distinguished from an act of

¹ III, q. 141, a. 4.

² II-II, q. 19, a. 6.

³ II-II, q. 141, a. 4.

⁴ Cf. *infra*, n. 2.

humility commonly so called. The act of humility is a sort of a modest restraining of the excessive passion of hope tending toward undue honours. It does this according to the ordinary rules of reason. On the other hand, poverty of spirit is from a higher rule, namely from a consideration of the divine eminence, so that it withdraws into its own littleness and considers neither its own nor any other excellence as anything in comparison with the divine excellence. Hence the spirit is totally void of its own magnificence by subjecting itself to God. Thus it remains poor in spirit and not merely humble.

CHAPTER II

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Chapter II

THE PROPER ACT OF THE GIFT OF FEAR

1. In order to explain the proper act of the gift of fear, upon which the description of its nature depends so much, some consideration should be given to the complete scope of the gift. The gift of fear can be concerned with God, whom it fears as an object capable of inflicting evil; or it can be concerned with the evil which it flees or the passions, either in the irascible or in the concupiscible appetite, which fear represses. The gift of fear, looking upon the person or good whom it fears, elicits an act of reverence. When it is concerned with an imminent evil it has an act of flight. When it bears upon the passions of the irascible appetite, that is, magnificence and the self-exaltation which it represses, it has for its act poverty of spirit. When it refers to the passions of the concupiscible appetites by restraining their delights, it has for its act the beatitude of mourning.¹

Fear, therefore, has the widest scope among all the gifts of the Holy Ghost; as St. Thomas notes,² "Fear of God is compared to the whole human life regulated by the wisdom of God as the root to a tree: the root of wisdom is to fear the Lord."³ Hence, fear does not correspond* to one virtue, for example temperance or humility, but to hope as well, as is evident from the doctrine of St. Thomas adduced in the preceding chapter. The objective of the present treatise, then, is to assign the primary and secondary acts of the gift of fear among so many acts and in so extensive a range.

2. I say first of all: the principal act of fear as a gift is not flight and an outlook upon evil but a reverential act toward good, that is toward the divine eminence, which is a provocative cause of evil. This conclusion seems to be certain according to the mind of St. Thomas.

There are not lacking, however, authors who place even in the gift of fear, as part of its act, a flight from evil, at least as possible in the power of God. Under this aspect, they admit the presence of fear in

¹ II-II, q. 29, a. 12, ad 2.

² ii-ii, q. 29, a. 12, ad 2.

³ *Ecclesiasticus*, i, 25.

Christ or the blessed. Others explain this flight from evil in the gift of fear as regarding a past evil which the blessed have avoided. In either case they miss the point on the formal object of fear. Fear is not just any flight from evil but flight from evil as future and imminent. Concerning past evils one does not fear, lie rejoices. Concerning evil which is not about to come upon him no one fears since there is no cause for fear unless there is some disposition that will bring about the evil. Otherwise, a man would fear that the heavens would fall, since this can happen through the absolute power of God.

Our conclusion is based upon St. Thomas,¹ namely, that filial fear has two acts, to have reverence for God and to fear evil. The first remains in heaven, the second does not. St. Thomas asserts² that "the habits of virtues and the gifts properly and essentially are concerned with a good and only derivatively with an evil. Hence the evil with which it is concerned is not of the essence of the gift of fear, but rather the eminence of that divine Good whose power can inflict evil." St. Thomas³ had already touched the root of this when he considered how sadness differs from fear: "Sadness is concerned with evil as present and hence with the evil as it is in itself. Fear is concerned with evil and future and hence not in itself but in its causes." For this reason St. Thomas infers that fear does not look upon evil except through the cause from which it can arise and in whose power it remains as a future possibility. Fear, then, not only has a simple flight from evil like sadness, it can have a reverential striving toward good. It is concerned with the cause from which evil comes, for whatever has the power to inflict evil merits reverence and a sort of honour. When, therefore, fear is elevated to the level of a gift there should be a corresponding elevation in the essence of its act which looks upon the cause capable of inflicting evil, the divine eminence. This is true for a twofold reason. First, the act of a gift or a virtue should be concerned with some good, and not primarily and essentially with an evil. Secondly, fear is elevated to the notion of a gift inasmuch as it makes a man easily movable by the Holy Ghost, for this is the common notion of a gift. However, anything is made easily movable by another through the relationship of the thing moved to the mover. That act, therefore, by which fear looks upon the divine eminence is its principal act when it is elevated

¹ I-II, q. 67, a. 4, ad 2.

² in, q. 7, a. 6, ad 1.

³ III ad Annibaldum, d. 34, q. 2, a. 1.

to the notion of a gift, since then it is concerned with its mover and is easily moved by Him.

3. I say secondly : This principal act of the gift of fear is concerned with the notion of good in the divine eminence and indirectly with the notion of evil, that is, the divine eminence as it has the power to inflict evil. This conclusion is contrary to that of many recent theologians who wish to save that act without any contact with evil. Its most recent defender is Father Grenados¹ who cites St. Thomas² in his statement that to have reverence for God is the act of fear. Reverence, this theologian argues, is concerned with good and not with evil. In Sacred Scripture fear of God is solely because of His excellence and not because of any evil which He can indict : *Who shall not fear thee, O King of nations? For thine is the glory . . .* When St. Luke³ records of Zachary and Elizabeth that *fear came upon all their neighbours*, such a fear could arise only from the excellence of the divine majesty working so many wonderful things at the birth of John the Baptist.

4. His reasoning continues thus : if fear looks upon evil indirectly, it is concerned with it as possible either for the one fearing or for someone else or for no one. If it is concerned with it as possible to the one fearing then fear can have no place in Christ or in the blessed, who fear no evil. If the evil is considered possible for someone else then it is not the concern of fear since fear is not troubled about the evil that happens to some one else but only its own, so that it can flee from it, just as hope is concerned with one's own good. Furthermore, if it sufficed for fear that one look upon the cause which can provoke the evil of another, there is no reason why one divine person would not fear another, since each looks upon that divine eminence as capable of inflicting evil on creatures. If, finally, fear were concerned with evil such that it could happen to no one it is an impossible evil and consequently not evil at all and not to be feared.

5. Nevertheless, our conclusion is held by Cajetan⁴ and I think that it is surely the mind of St. Thomas. The latter has said⁵ that

¹ *III De Spe*, tract 3, d. 1.

² *II-II*, q. 81, a. 2, ad 1 ; q. 130, a. 2, ad 1 ; *I-II*, q. 67, a. 3, ad 2.

³ *Jeremias*, x, 7.

⁴ *Luke*, i, 65.

⁵ *Commentaria in III*, q. 7, a. 6

⁶ *I-II*, q. 42, a. 2.

the evil with which fear is concerned is not essential to the notion of the gift of fear, but the eminence of that good in whose power it is to inflict evil. "God is feared by man inasmuch as He can inflict punishment." Moreover, he affirms¹ that "God can be the object of fear inasmuch as from Him and in relation to Him some evil can overshadow us." The Holy Doctor, therefore, always explains the nature of fear through its order to the divine eminence connoting something of evil, inasmuch as this power is ordered to bestowing good or coercing or punishing evil.

The basis for this is that if the divine eminence were looked upon only according to the excellence of its good and its power to bestow good, it would not be regarded differently by fear than by charity or even religion or hope. Charity looks upon the divine eminence under the aspect of the most excellent good, and hope under the aspect of the supreme good which is the last end. Religion offers God worship as the author of creation and the supreme benefactor. According to St. Thomas, however,² "Fear implies in a way a separation, since it does not presume to make itself equal to God but subjects itself to Him. This same separation is found in charity inasmuch as it loves God above itself and above all things." Therefore, to be concerned with the divine goodness precisely as excelling in the essence of goodness belongs to charity. Hence, if fear did not look upon the same divine eminence as capable of inflicting evil it would not be distinguished from charity, hope, or religion. The reason for this is that good under the concept of good is that which all things desire. Of itself it is attractive and draws the will. Hence the eminence and magnitude of good, if it increases within the concept of good, increases in the concept of attracting and drawing. Commonly, therefore, by virtue of such eminence there is the basis for love and honour alone, which is due to an object loved and a benefactor. Charity gives love; religion, honour. Therefore, for God to be looked upon with reverence and a sort of terror it is not sufficient that that eminence of good should remain in the precise concept of good and beneficence. It should rather take on the notion of a terrible power capable of inflicting injury and not merely causing good. Thus God is not only sought and worshipped, the soul even withdraws from Him to its own littleness—and this is to fear His majesty. If the soul considered God only as capable of doing good it would not withdraw from Him. It would be united to Him in worship and love.

¹ 1 n-ii, q. 16, a. 1.

² II-II, q. 19, a. 10, ad 3.

Finally, this is confirmed since in heaven there remains only the act of fear which is to have reverence for God, as St. Thomas noted.¹ Moreover, the blessed look upon that evil through fear as possible to nature and impossible in beatitude.² Therefore, the Holy Doctor thinks that the act of fear is not purified of every connotation of an evil effect.

6. A reply may now be made to the citations adduced in favour of the opposite opinion. The citations from St. Thomas can be answered by noting that the Holy Doctor only affirms that to have reverence is an act of fear. He does not deny that in this act there is a concern for good with some connotation of the evil which it can inflict at least indirectly. On the other hand in other places he explains this latter part quite lucidly.

As far as the Scriptural citations are concerned it should be noted that if the word "glory" in the citation from Jeremias³ is taken for beauty it is not alleged as a cause of fear. The cause of fear is the power of the Lord of which the prophet spoke before:⁴ *great is thy name in might. Who shall not fear thee.* . . . When the prophet adds "for thine is the glory," according to St. Thomas,⁵ he goes on to show the unique knowledge that is in God, not to show the cause why God is feared. According to the interpretation of St. Jerome,⁶ however, the meaning of the word *decus* (glory) is truth, "since in lying there is always baseness." This is a special cause for fearing God, namely, the glory of truth with which He is clothed for judging, since there is no chance of subterfuge where truth itself becomes the judge. When St. Luke says "Fear came upon all" either he means by fear admiration, which all conceived at the birth of John the Baptist, or he took fear properly for a reverence for the divine power, considered as being capable of inflicting evil. From the unusualness of a miracle anyone can judge that God can do something similar to all the powers of nature.

7. In reply to the arguments adduced several things should be noted. For the motion of reverential fear which looks upon the

¹ III, q. 67, a. 4, ad 2.

² II-II, q. 19, a. 11.

³ Jeremias, x, 7.

⁴ Ibid., x, 6, 7.

⁵ Commentaria in Jeremias, x, 6.

⁶ Commentaria in Jeremias, x, 6; M.P.L. 24, column 747.

person as capable of inflicting evil it is not required that it be concerned with an impending evil to itself as is required for the act of flight distinct from the act of reverence, since the former looks to the evil alone and not to the person. If I should flee from an evil I must think that it is evil for me. For reverence for a person there are required only two conditions. First, the person concerned must be superior, as an outstanding personage. Because this is lacking in the Trinity one Divine Person does not fear the others since He does not look upon either as superior but upon both as equal to Himself. Christ, however, in the nature He assumed looked upon God as superior in the divine nature. The second condition is that the power of that person be considered not only as capable of doing good, but also as capable of indicting evil upon some inferior, without any consideration whether he indicts the evil on me or someone else, in this life or later. Cajetan has explained this well in his commentary on the *Summa*.¹ Consequently, for the act of fear, which is flight from evil, it is not sufficient that one look upon evil abstractly in some possible way; it must be imminent. Otherwise I should flee without a cause if the thing from which I fled were not pressing upon me. On the other hand, for the act of fear which is a reverence for a person it is not required that one look upon an imminent evil, but rather an eminent person with the absolute power of inflicting evil. Through this latter act the soul reveres a power: it does not flee from the imminence of evil.

8. I say thirdly, that the act of flight from evil is a secondary act of the gift of fear, although it does not belong to it in every state. This conclusion is asserted by St. Thomas,² when he attributes to filial fear a flight from evil, that is the evil of an offence against God. Especially worthy of note is the article in which he explains that this act of flight belongs to the gift of fear, as well as the passage³ in which he distinguishes the two acts of filial fear. These acts are to have reverence for God—and this remains in heaven—and to fear separation from Him, and this does not remain in heaven.

The reason for this is that filial fear so reveres the father that it avoids offending him and being separated from him, which without doubt can happen in this life. In like manner servile fear flees from punishment. Therefore, it belongs to filial fear to consider the offence

¹ *Commentaria in III*, q. 7, a. 6 *in fine*.

² II-II, q. 19, a. 12.

³ I-II, q. 67, a. 4, *ad 2*.

as an evil to be avoided and consequently the act of flight is contained under the gift of fear. In heaven such an evil is no longer imminent or possible, and consequently there is no efficacious act of flight. In heaven is fulfilled the saying,¹ *He that shall hear me, shall rest without terror, and shall enjoy abundance without fear of evils.*

9. There remains the difficulty that the act of flight is a simple withdrawal from a previous state, that is, from sin. This act is elicited by charity. According to St. Thomas,² "filial fear which fears a separation is virtually included in a motion of love." Therefore, such an act cannot be elicited by the gift of fear, since it would then proceed from two specifically distinct principles.

Secondly, there is the difficulty that filial and servile fear are both elicited by substantially the same habit, as St. Thomas has pointed out.³ Therefore, this act of flight is not distinguished from the flight of servile fear. Consequently, it cannot be alleged that according to their diverse natures they belong to diverse species, since they proceed substantially from the same habit.

Thirdly, there is presented the more serious difficulty that St. Thomas⁴ places this act of flight as the principal act of the gift of fear. Therefore, it is false to consider it secondary. St. Thomas has noted⁵ that the proper and principal object of fear is evil which someone flees and⁶ that "fear principally is concerned with evil and implies a flight from it."

10. It cannot be alleged that St. Thomas is speaking of a secondary act to which it belongs in a special way to be concerned with evil which it flees. If this were so, St. Thomas would not have solved the difficulty. He is replying to the objection that the gift of fear is a theological virtue, since it is directly concerned with God. He denies, however, that it is a theological virtue, since the principal object with which it is concerned is evil which it flees. Therefore, if he were speaking only of a secondary act he would not have solved the difficulty since it would remain necessary to manifest why by reason of its primary act it is not a theological virtue, since it would not be concerned with evil but with God. It is not against the notion of a theological virtue to have as its secondary act a flight from evil; charity, for example, secondarily elicits an act of hatred of sin.

¹ *Proverbs*, i, 33.

² *De Ver.*, q. 17, a. 4, ad 3.

³ *In III Sententiarum*, d. 34, q. 2, a. 1.

⁴ *II-II*, q. 19, a. 9, ad 2 ct 3.

⁵ *Ibid.*, ad 2.

⁶ *Ibid.*, ad 8.

11. The flight from evil, it should be noted in reply to the first difficulty, belongs to diverse principles according as it belongs to different motives. For example, according to St. Thomas,¹ joy follows upon charity in one way and upon hope in another. Since, therefore, the flight from evil does not of itself have a motive which constitutes a habit, except because of some good sought, it follows that fear precisely under the notion of Hight can be the secondary act of different habits according as they follow upon different motives, of charity, for example, inasmuch as it flees sin as an evil opposed to the friendship of God. It can also follow upon the gift of fear as an evil opposed to divine reverence in which the power of God is feared. However, in both cases it flows from charity as its source and prompter. Because of this, filial fear is virtually included in the motion of love, although through the medium of a different habit, as St. Thomas expressly teaches.²

12. In response to the second difficulty it should be noted that St. Thomas does not say that servile fear is elicited by the gift of fear. Rather he says that "it is substantially one habit."³ This should be understood generically and not specifically, or that it is one through imperation or co-ordination not that it is absolutely one.

The gift of fear forms and commands servile fear "when it has eliminated the imperfection of servility. This is proved by the words which follow in the text of St. Thomas: "it is substantially one habit; but one fear is perfect, namely, filial, and the other is imperfect, namely servile." He presupposes therefore that there are two habits when he says,⁴ "when charity comes it does not take away the substance of the habit of fear, but it forms what was previously unformed." Therefore that habit remains even without charity, and consequently such fear is not one of the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, as St. Thomas states expressly, since the gifts do not remain without charity. Nevertheless that fear is from the Holy Ghost just as faith and hope. For this reason it is sometimes broadly called a gift.⁵

13. The reply to the third is as follows: That solution is advanced by some, which, however, it seems to me could never satisfy the reply. Hence it seems to me easier to say that when St. Thomas says that fear principally looks upon the evil which it flees, he means that it

¹ *II-II*, q. 28, a. 1, ad 3. ³ *In III Sententiarum*, d. 34, q. 2, a. 1.

² *II-II*, q. 19, a. 9, ad 3.

⁴ *Ibid.*, a. 2.

⁵ *De Ver.*, q. 14, a. 7, ad 2.

looks upon the evil principally in its cause. Hence it flees by withdrawing into its own littleness. It does not directly flee from the evil in itself by having reverence for the cause of the evil. Hence it only connotatively and indirectly looks upon the evil. On the other hand, through its secondary act, which is directly and properly flight, it is concerned directly with the evil in itself, which in a former act it looked upon only connotatively. This suffices to prove that fear is not a theological virtue even by reason of its primary act, since virtue is concerned with good under the notion and in the line of good. In no way does it withdraw from it, but simply seeks it. The gift of fear even in its primary act is concerned with the good as the cause and the power of evil. It does not simply seek that good but also withdraws from it.

14. The question might arise whether the gift of fear differs from the theological virtues solely for the reason that in looking upon God immediately it is not concerned with Him precisely under the aspect of a good to be sought but to be revered. The response is that the gift of fear also differs from the theological virtues by reason of the proximate matter with which it is concerned, something created, namely, the subjection of oneself to God through reverence. Since the gifts of the Holy Ghost are given to make a man easily movable by the Holy Ghost, it is impossible that their proximate matter should be God Himself. It must rather be something movable by God. Especially in the gift of fear a man is made mobile by belittling himself in the sight of such great majesty. St. Thomas explained it thus:¹ "Filial fear does not imply a separation from God but rather a subjection to Him. Yet in a way it does imply a separation insofar as one does not presume to make oneself equal to Him, but subjects oneself to Him." This is how the proximate matter of the reverential act is the subjection of oneself to God. It is made through a separation, not presuming to equal oneself to God but rather making oneself small in His sight. In this, fear is distinguished from the virtue of religion, which also subjects one to God through worship. Religion performs this subjection as a duty and offers its goods to God in recognition of the fact that He is the first principle of all; *it* is a sort of paying tribute to Him as the supreme Lord. Fear, on the other hand, does not bring about subjection through a motive of duty, as a sort of worship and tribute offered to God. Rather from a consideration of the divine majesty as

¹ *II-II*, q. 19, a. 10, ad 3.

something to be feared, one subjects oneself by making oneself of no account, and by considering oneself as nothing in comparison with the divine majesty. Hence fear proceeds from exactly the opposite motive as religion, which offers worship, while fear sweeps away one's own magnificence.

15. I say finally: the act of poverty of spirit and the act of the beatitude of mourning are secondary in the gift of fear. They belong to the will, although they have their effect in the irascible appetite, as moved by the will. This conclusion is that of St. Thomas.¹ The explanation of this conclusion depends upon that notion that the gift of fear, although it has an ample and diffused scope, is nevertheless the least among the gifts of the Holy Ghost. This too is the teaching of St. Thomas based on the doctrine of St. Augustine.² The reason for this is that fear is a sort of source for the other gifts of the Holy Ghost: *the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom*.³ Of its very nature fear prepares the way for wisdom, in which is the bond of perfection. For this reason fear is a sort of disposition in the motion of the Holy Ghost, since it disposes the heart by purging and removing whatever impediments may prevent union with the Holy Ghost. Through this notion of removing impediments it has a notion of universality over all human acts. It does not bring about these acts, but it does dispose towards them.

This act is called poverty of spirit, since, according to St. Thomas,⁴ it empties and despoils the spirit of everything that might be thought magnificence, either in itself or in exterior goods. It performs this act because it is a sort of spirit and impulse descending from a consideration of the Highest Majesty as something to be feared and in comparison to which all things are as nothing: *All nations are before him as if they had no being at all, and are counted to him as nothing and vanity*.⁵ Consequently, from such an impulse and instinct of the Holy Ghost all that seems great in the eyes of man, either in or of himself, remains as nothing. In this the spirit is said to be despoiled to such an extent *that man may not presume to magnify himself upon earth*.⁶ This is the greatest disposition that the spirit thus made void of all created greatness should tend to divine magnificence alone.

¹ *II-II*, q. 19, a. 12, ad 2; q. 141, a. 1, ad 3.

² *I-II*, q. 68, a. 7, ad 1; *II-II*, q. 121, a. 2.

³ *Psalm ex*, 10, and *Ecclesiasticus*, 1, 16.

⁴ *II-II*, q. 19, a. 12.

⁵ *Isaias*, xl. 17.

⁶ *Psalm ix*, 18.

16. Likewise, it belongs to fear to wean the will away from every delight in creatures, both because of the magnitude of the divine majesty and because of the nothingness of every creature that can cause delight. It is motivated to this by the magnitude of the divine majesty since it is especially destructive of all elation and created beauty from which can arise harmful delight. This is true, according to Isaias,¹ because *the day of the Lord of hosts shall be upon every one that is proud and highminded, and upon every one that is arrogant and he shall be humbled;* and according to Jeremias:² *He hath fixed his right hand as an adversary; and he hath killed all that iras fair to behold . . .* Divine woefulness dissolves all eternal beauty that lures the eye. Because of the smallness of the creature, all perishable and transient things are considered insipid, *as dust which is blown away with the wind, and as a thin froth which is dispersed by the storm, and a smoke that is scattered abroad by the wind.*³ Such a consideration of creatures in relation to the divine magnitude draws tears rather than rejoicing; especially since in the end it leaves such bitterness, according to Job:⁴ *When evil shall be sweet in his mouth, he will hide it under his tongue . . . His bread in his belly shall be turned into the gall of asps within him . . . and the viper's tongue shall kill him.* This bitterness is especially keen at the moment of the separation of the body and soul, according to Job:⁵ *When the sword is drawn out and cometh forth from its scabbard (that is the soul from the body), and glittereth in his bitterness; the terrible one shall go and come upon him. All darkness is hid in his secret places: a fire that is not kindled shall devour him.* This is why the act which looks upon the delights of sense in this way is called the beatitude of mourning. It considers creatures as they turn the soul from God causing bitterness. Certainly this is deserving of mourning. For this reason such an act corresponds to two gifts, namely, the gift of knowledge as directing it⁶ and the gift of fear as carrying it through.⁷

17. St. Thomas teaches⁸ that poverty of spirit and the beatitude of mourning are secondary acts in the gift of fear because of the very fact that if anyone perfectly fears God it follows that he does not seek to make himself great. This act then is consequent upon that previous act by which the soul holds in reverence the divine majesty. From

¹ *Isaias*, ii, 12.

² *Lamentations*, ii, 4.

³ *Wisdom*, v, 15.

⁴ *Job*, xx, 12, 14, 16.

⁵ *Ibid.*, xx, 25, 26.

⁶ *II-II*, q. 19, a. 4.

⁷ *II-II*, q. 19, a. 12.

⁸ *Ibid.*

this previous act is taken the motive for repressing these passions of magnificence and boasting. This is fulfilled according to the Psalmist! *the mountains melted like wax at the presence of the Lord*, since first the divine eminence is feared, then the created exaltation is dissolved. Among these secondary acts poverty of spirit belongs directly to fear rather than to the beatitude of mourning, since delight does not have the same notion of difficulty as magnificence. It belongs to fear directly to destroy a difficult thing, to humiliate it and to make it small, since it descends from a comparison of the divine majesty in respect to which all things are small.

That these acts are in the will is evident, since the gifts of the Holy Ghost are in the rational appetite, not in the sensible. The rational mind is moved directly by the Holy Ghost, but He moves the lower appetite indirectly. Moreover, the proper excellence and magnificence is radicated more in the rational part which is of a superior nature. Hence it is more difficult to conquer and more resistant to examination. Those who make much of themselves in spiritual things and according to their rational will, whose spirit is not empty and despoiled but puffed up, in a hidden way put up strong resistance to divine motion.

18. From what has been already noted it is easy to gather how fear remains in the blessed and was present in Christ. Of the two acts of fear, to have reverence for God and to flee from an imminent evil, this second alone cannot be found in them efficaciously. No evil threatens them because of their state and in Christ not even the evil of sin because of His Person. It could be in them inefficaciously, that is, if they were in a state wherein evil could be inflicted on them.

The first act, however, that of having reverence for God, they have most perfectly. They consider the divine power as capable of inflicting evil. This is in an absolute sense possible. Even for Christ, as far as the nature He assumed is concerned, annihilation is possible, just as death which, as a matter of fact, He feared. The possibility and imminence of evil is not of so great importance to filial fear as the evaluation of the power that can inflict it. The evaluation increases in Christ and in the blessed, although the possibility of evil grows less. On this point Cajetan² has shown how filial fear increases with the growth of charity, since the evaluation of God increases, although the evil is made less possible, the greater the increase in charity.

¹ Psalm xcvi, 5.

² *Commentaria in II-II*, q. 19, a. 10.

CHAPTER VII

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Chapter VII

THE NUMBER OF THE GIFTS

1. There is no doubt that there are seven gifts except perhaps for those who, denying any formal distinction, number the gifts among the virtues.

These same authors are not disconcerted by the fact that Isaias enumerates seven gifts, because they maintain that later he adds faith and justice—*And justice shall be the girdle of his loins and faith the girdle of his reins.*¹ For them, then, Isaias has enumerated more than seven gifts.

This opinion is not completely repudiated by Lorca,² since he thinks that it can be defended. However, he admits that the opposite opinion is more common and should be held because of the authority of the Fathers and theologians, among whom seven gifts are commonly enumerated.

2. The enumeration of seven gifts is so well established in the tradition of the Church that no probability is left to the opposite opinion. For what probability can there be in an opinion which is opposed to the unanimous agreement of the holy Fathers, the common acceptance of theologians, and the practice of the Church? For the Church seems to have approved this doctrine by chanting in praise of the Holy Ghost: “Thou art sevenfold in gifts,”³ and again, “Give to your faithful confiding in you the sacred sevenfold.”⁴ The Fathers considered this as a determined and certain number, and not a figure or universal number. They agree on this because Sacred Scripture specifically mentions the gifts by name, which is a sign that it is treating of them as determined and certain. For Isaias enumerates these seven gifts by their proper names. He notes first *And the spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him*⁵—the spirit in general. Then he divides

¹ *Isaias*, xi, 5.

² *Commentaria in I-II*, q. 68, d. 25, n. 4. Alcalá, 1609.

³ *Veni Creator from Terce on Pentecost*. Cf. *Hymns of the Dominican Missal and Breviary*, Aquinas Byrnes, O.P. Herder, 1943, pp. 138, 144.

⁴ *Sequence of the Mass of Pentecost*.

⁵ *Isaias*, xi, 2.

the spirit specifically and calls each by its name: *the spirit of wisdom and of understanding, the spirit of knowledge and counsel*.¹ Hence Tertullian² in his explanation of this passage teaches that, "The spirit of the Lord will rest upon Him, and next he enumerates its species, the spirit of wisdom and of understanding, etc. Whenever Scriptural uses a number and names the species enumerated, that number is generally taken as determined and definite. Such is the common testimony of the Fathers, among whom are: Jerome,³ Gregory,⁴ Augustine,⁵ Ambrose,⁶ Cyprian,⁷ Bernard,⁸ Tertullian,⁹ Origen.¹⁰ All the theologians and the common opinion of the faithful follow this tradition. Hence this opinion is more than probable while its opposite is more than improbable.

No merely natural reason can be given for this number, since it is derived from revelation alone. It must be explained and defended by Scripture and the tradition of the Church; it cannot be demonstrated.

3. Two things must be considered in explaining the number of the gifts. First, in examining the argument of St. Thomas, some reason must be given why this number seven is sufficient at least according to some proportion and analogy. Secondly, an inquiry must be made as to whether these seven gifts are indivisible species or merely subordinate genera which can contain further species and hence, in an absolute sense, would constitute more than seven gifts.

4. St. Thomas has proved¹¹ that seven gifts are sufficient. These gifts can perfect all the powers of the soul which are ordained to obey and to be moved by the divine impulse, namely, reason and the appetitive faculty.

Reason is speculative and practical, and both parts are perfected by the gifts. No more are necessary. For both parts have a two-fold

¹ *Isaias*, xi, 2.

³ *Contra Marcionem*, c. viii, *M.P.L.* u, 489

³ *In Isaias* xi. *M.P.L.* xxiv 144

iv.L.L.h. LXXI, u00. (aHaS 28) MPL i 541. Homilia XIX in Ezechiel,

c. 11 De Doctrina Christiana, e & crmone Domini, c. iv, M.P.L. xxxiv, 1234; c.

1207. Spiritu Sancto c. XX' M P L XVI 740. In P^lmum cxviii, M.P.L. xv,

71 ad Quirinum, c. xi, M.P.L. iv, 685.

⁸ *Sermo L in Canticum Cantique* TM *Ar r r CLXXXIII 1020. Sermo II de*

Annuntiatione, M.P.L. cixxxiii 590

⁹ *Contra Judaeos, c. i, M.P.L. n 623.*

¹⁰ *Homilia VII in Numeros, M P i i Att xii, 668a. Homilia II in Isaias, M.P.G. u, 227.*

¹¹ *J-H, q. 68, a. 4.*

operation, to apprehend or to find truth and to judge analytically about that truth. The speculative part is perfected in the discovery of truth through the *gift of understanding*. Its judgment is perfected through the gift of wisdom. The practical intellect is perfected in the discovery of truth through the gift of counsel, and in judgment through the gift of knowledge.

The appetitive faculty is perfected in three respects. First, through the gift of piety it is perfected in its relationships with others—proper to justice in the will. Moreover, the double personal relationship of the sensitive appetite is ennobled. First, fortitude perfects a person in matters related to the irascible appetite. Secondly, fulfilling a need for a new element to perfect the habits in the concupiscible appetite, the gift of fear restrains the soul from all delight in harmful pleasure—*pierce my flesh with your fear.*¹

5. This excellent compilation of St. Thomas, embracing all the rational powers perfectible by the divine impulse, indicates the acts of all the intellectual and cardinal moral virtues with their corresponding gifts. For example, there are four cardinal virtues: prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance, to which correspond the four gifts: counsel, piety, fortitude and fear, inasmuch as it has a secondary act of repressing delights. The intellectual virtues are the habit of principles—called understanding, wisdom, and knowledge. To these correspond the gifts of understanding, wisdom, and knowledge.

Two virtues perfect the practical part of the intellect. In moral matters there is prudence, which is perfected through the gift of counsel. In artistic matters (external works) there is art, for which, according to St. Thomas,² there is no corresponding gift of the Holy Ghost. For the gifts perfect a man so that he may be docile to the Holy Ghost in matters which pertain to right living and the preparation of his soul for the attainment of eternal life. External works of art do not belong to the motion of the Holy Ghost, since the Holy Ghost does not move men with a supernatural gift and special impulse to such things as making clothes or building houses. He moves them only to tend towards eternal life. In a word, the arts are concerned with works of the natural order and there is no such thing as a supernatural work of art. Consequently, there is no supernatural virtue of art. Since the gifts of the Holy Ghost are supernatural, no gift corresponds to art, nor is the action of art an action of the Holy Ghost.

¹ *Psalm cxviii*, 120.

² I-II, q. 68, a. 4, ad 1.

6. The gifts presuppose all three of the theological virtues as their root and foundation, since it is through them that the soul is united to God and able to be moved by His Spirit. But in a special way the gifts of understanding and knowledge correspond to faith so that revealed mysteries can be rightly apprehended and judged. Fear in so far as it restrains presumption—is conjoined to hope, while wisdom is linked with charity, since from the savour and taste of love the soul experiences and enjoys loving knowledge. Therefore, from every point of view these seven gifts are sufficient.

7. Objection: The only difficulty with this collation of virtues and gifts arises from the fact that St. Thomas asserts that the gifts of understanding and wisdom perfect the speculative part of the intellect, while counsel and knowledge perfect the practical part. But understanding and wisdom are also practical, just as is faith, to which they correspond. For faith is at the same time speculative and practical because it works through charity. Furthermore, the gift of knowledge is concerned with both speculation and action, since it judges of things to be done and even the scientific analysis of truths in themselves. St. Thomas recognized this¹ and he retracted his earlier opinion that understanding was not practical.² He did the same³ about the gift of knowledge. Since, therefore, St. Thomas has retracted this present teaching upon which is founded his proof for the conclusion about the number of gifts, the whole compilation topples and has been fabricated in vain.

8. Response: It is true that St. Thomas does modify his former statement and he admits that the gifts of understanding, knowledge, and wisdom are found in both the speculative and practical intellect. A defence might be instituted upon the grounds that in the collation of St. Thomas just given understanding and wisdom, although both speculative and practical, are more eminently attributable to the speculative part. The gift of knowledge, which proceeds through lesser causes than those of wisdom, and the gift of counsel, are more eminently practical, although they too are speculative. Although this defence is not without foundation, it is not necessary. St. Thomas⁴ has clearly shown that “To some it seems that the gift of understanding differs from the gifts of knowledge and counsel by the fact that these latter

¹ II-II, q. 8, a. 3 and 6.
² I-II, q. 68, a. 4.

³ II-II, q. 9, a. 3.
⁴ II-II, q. 8, a. 6.

belong to practical knowledge, while the gift of understanding belongs to speculative knowledge. It differs from the gift of wisdom, which also belongs to speculative knowledge, because wisdom is concerned with judgment, while understanding renders the mind apt to grasp the things that are proposed, and to penetrate into their very core. In this sense we have assigned the number of the gifts.¹ But if we consider the matter carefully, the gift of understanding is concerned not only with speculative but also with practical matters, as stated above.² Moreover, the gift of knowledge is concerned with both matters, as we shall show further on,³ and consequently we must make our distinction in some other way." When St. Thomas mentions that some think this way, he implies that in his enumeration of the gifts⁴ he wrote according to a common opinion, not according to his own. He wished to reserve his own for further discussion in a more suitable place.

9. The definitive doctrine of St. Thomas, then, affirms that three gifts belong to the appetitive power: piety, fortitude, and fear. It is likewise quite clear that because of its concern with action the gift of counsel belongs to the practical intellect and that it corresponds to the virtue of prudence. On the other hand, the gifts of understanding, wisdom, and knowledge, which embrace both the speculative and the practical, should not find their total adequation in their correspondence with the virtues. Some of these virtues perfect the speculative part and others the practical, since their limited formalities can include only one or the other function of the intellect. No one acquired virtue can, at the same time, perfect the intellectual potency under both aspects. Supernatural virtues, however, are so elevated that they can embrace both. For example, faith, like the beatific vision, is at once speculative and practical. In it there is not so much a question of its limitation to a subject which it perfects as of the participation in the divine science which it represents and whose place it takes. Thus faith includes both functions of the intellect.

For this reason, the truer and more formal reason for the distinction of the gifts is to be sought, not in their relation to the intellectual virtues and their limitations in the speculative or practical intellect, but in the correspondence between the gifts and faith and their imitation of it.

¹¹ I-II, q. 68, a. 4.

³ *Ibid.*, a. 3.

³ II-II, q. 9, a. 4.

⁴ I-II, q. 8, a. 4.

10. It is in this way, therefore, that St. Thomas proves the sufficiency of the intellectual gift,¹ since these gifts are ordered to supernatural knowledge which is had through, faith. Faith is primarily concerned with the First Truth, the Divine Truth. Secondly, it considers certain things related to creatures. Finally, it directs human actions to which it extends, since it works through charity. For a man must be properly disposed in order to have a correct attitude toward the things which are proposed to him for belief. He should be able to grasp and apprehend correctly the things that are proposed. Moreover, he should be able to judge well, knowing what to take and what to cast aside. The gift of understanding renders him capable of apprehending these truths. The judgment of them belongs either to wisdom, if it is a matter of judging through the highest causes, or to knowledge, if lesser causes are concerned. Action and the direction of human life is the peculiar function of the gift of counsel.

11. Many difficulties arise from this discussion and correlation of the intellectual and the appetitive gifts. They will have as their object to prove that fewer gifts would be sufficient, or that there are actually more gifts than those mentioned.

12. The first difficulty seeks to prove that there are fewer gifts by the statement that all the functions of judgment concerning supernatural objects can be fulfilled by one and the same habit or principle. There is no reason, then, why all supernatural things cannot belong to the one habit, especially one so elevated and perfect as a gift.

The second difficulty is somewhat similar. Faith by itself includes all supernatural objects. It can extend to both the speculative and the practical functions of the intellect, just as can the gifts. Therefore, according to its superior and eminent motive principle, one and the same *gift can extend to the judgment of all supernatural things.*

Finally, there is no reason why the same habit cannot, at the same time, both apprehend and judge truth, since one act ordered to another can be included under the same formality.

13. Other objections try to show that there are more than seven gifts. The first urges that although only seven gifts are enumerated,

¹ II-II, q. 8, a. 6.

it is nowhere asserted that these seven are ultimate species. They might be subalternate genera. For example, there are said to be four cardinal virtues. Yet under these there are subjective parts or species. Under justice there are the species, called "commutative," "distributive," and "legal." Under this same virtue there are the potential parts: religion, piety, dutifulness, appreciativeness, and the like. Prudence contains the species called regnative, domestic, and military, while the potential virtues annexed to it are *ebullia*, *synesis*, and *gnome*.¹ Why can not there be contained under the gifts many species of piety, counsel, and so forth? Or else why do the gifts contain all these functions under one specification rather than under diverse specifications?

Second, there are many intellectual virtues under wisdom and knowledge. Why cannot there be many intellectual gifts under wisdom and knowledge? Why is there no gift corresponding to art?

Third, there are gifts corresponding to the intellectual and mortal virtues. Why are there no gifts corresponding to the theological virtues?

Fourth, the gifts are enumerated and ordered in pairs. The one regulated is placed with the one regulating, as wisdom and understanding, since wisdom regulates understanding. Science and piety are together, counsel and fortitude. Why is there no gift regulative of fear?

Fifth, even if Isaias enumerates seven gifts he adds two others a little later: *and justice shall be the girdle of his loins and faith the girdle of his reins*.² Finally, St. Paul enumerates several other gifts. *Now there are varieties of gifts but the same Spirit*³ *and to one through the Spirit is given the utterance of wisdom; and to another the utterance of knowledge, according to the same Spirit, to another faith, in the same Spirit, to another the gift of healing, in the same Spirit: to another the working of miracles; to another prophecy, etc.*⁴ Why are not all these listed among the gifts of the Holy Ghost?

Why there are not fewer than seven gifts

14. Passing over the possibility of all the offices of judgment being accomplished by one habit which would be of an order and essence different from that of the gifts, it must be unequivocally denied that there is any one habit of the same order as the gifts

¹ Cf. I-II, q. 57, a. 6.

² *Isaias*, xi, 5.

³ *I Corinthians*, xii, 4.

⁴ *Ibid.*, xii, 8-10.

which can do it. Whatever the possibilities may be about there being a habit so elevated that it can fulfil all these functions, there is actually no one habit that can do it all. Scripture assigns the task to a plurality of gifts and not to one. Since Scripture asserts that the gifts are actually more than one, no further proof is needed. Only the convenience of this fact is subject to inquiry. For through faith the very existence of these gifts is made known, even though a plurality of gifts is more reasonable because of human capacity and limitation, to which grace adapts itself as far as possible. Consequently St. Thomas need not prove this plurality. Presupposing then the number of gifts as established in the Scriptures, St. Thomas inquires into the convenience and the proportion of that number. His discussion and his reasons intend to prove no more than that.

15. In reply to the second objection it must be noted that there is a proportion between the relationship the gifts bear to their objects and the relationship of faith to its object. One may be of greater material extension than another, for faith attains to very many things, and the gift of wisdom is related to far more than the gift of counsel, which is limited to human actions. Yet in their essence or in their manner of operation they are distinct. Faith can no more perform the functions of the gifts of Wisdom and understanding than they could accomplish those of faith. Each operates within its own sphere. Faith believes in God revealing without involving itself in inquiry or judgment concerning matters of faith. It performs no operation other than that of believing, although it may be concerned with more objects than some of the gifts and fewer than others. The gift of wisdom judges these same matters, but it does not exercise any function of believing. The gift of understanding grasps and penetrates the things of faith, but it is not directly concerned with belief. Each of the gifts taken separately extends to many objects but not to the exercise of the function of any other gift, or at least not in the same way as another gift.

16. For the moment any consideration of the sufficiency the act of faith has for all its objects, according to its own manner of acting and not according to the judgment and intimate penetration of the terms by the gifts, must be omitted. But without hesitation it can be denied that faith is sufficient for all objects according to its own mode as well as the mode of the gifts. It is the same with the gifts :

each is sufficient for its object according to its own manner of acting but not according to the formality of any other gift or virtue. The distinction of the gifts, however, is not based solely upon the material objects to which they extend. Rather it is founded upon the formality and manner of acting of the gift in relation to these objects. Moreover, faith does not extend to all the objects of the gifts, nor does it perform all their acts. Each performs its own function. Therefore, the argument that, like one faith, one gift should be sufficient, is without foundation. Faith does not suffice for all these operations but only for believing. Other virtues are required for judging and apprehending.

17. Why should not one faith or one gift suffice for all these functions? The answer lies in the specific limitations of each virtue. For example, one science is not sufficient to perform the operations of all the sciences, nor is one sensitive potency sufficient to fulfil the duties of all the senses, since each has its specific limitation.

Could there possibly be one habit, whether a virtue or a gift, which, absolutely considered, could exercise all these functions under a more elevated formality? This is possible, but it is not in conformity with human limitation and capacity, to which it is convenient to operate through more limited forms. Moreover, as a matter of fact, no such gift is to be found. Upon what ground may it be asserted that there is no such gift? Scripture gives the answer—by revealing that these gifts are distinct, just as it reveals that the three theological virtues are distinct: *There remain these three, Faith, Hope, and Charity.*¹

18. In solving the third difficulty it must be noted that one habit or one virtue concerned with a hierarchy of things does suffice for apprehending and judging all under the same formality of judgment. Yet for apprehensions and judgments under diverse formalities one habit or virtue does not suffice. The gift of wisdom is ordained to judging under a formality different from that of understanding. The former judges in an analytic fashion, since it proceeds from the highest causes. The latter employs merely a simple, apprehensive judgment, just as does the habit of principles. This does not mean, however, that the gift of understanding merely apprehends and does not judge. It implies only that it does not judge in the analytic manner of wisdom and knowledge.

11 Corinthians, xiii, 13.

*Why there are not more than seven gifts**An inquiry into the question of whether the gifts are-
ultimate species*

19. Solution of the first difficulty: There can be no doubt that the gifts are ultimate species, although they are of a higher essence than the moral virtues. Even though one ultimate species of such gifts is the equivalent of many virtues, formally there are but seven of these species, ultimate and indivisible.

St. Thomas makes this point in writing of the gift of piety,¹ but the doctrine may be applied to the other gifts. "Piety in one and the same way directs all intercourse with others, receiving, however, a norm other than that of the virtues. Because that norm is simple and one, piety is one spiritual habit. And by comparison with this norm all its acts are specified." If piety had only the unity of a subalternate genus, it could not direct all social intercourse in one and the same way. For example, the virtue of justice does not direct all relationships with others in one and the same way. It directs in one way by commutative justice, in another by distributive, and in still another by religion and respectfulness. Absolutely considered, then, justice directs in different ways. All these things, therefore, indicate that the gifts are ultimate species.

20. This doctrine is more in conformity with Scripture and the tradition of the Church, which enumerates seven gifts and no more. If under each gift there were other gifts as ultimate species, absolutely speaking, there would be more than seven gifts. For example, absolutely speaking, it cannot be said that there are only four moral virtues, but that there are four cardinal virtues. Hence, if there were more than seven gifts, the number seven could not be used in an absolute sense. Furthermore, if there are other lesser species of gifts, some mention should be made of what they are and how many there are. For nothing should be asserted concerning these gifts other than what is given through revelation. But no more than seven gifts are ever mentioned. Therefore, it is not legitimate to make assertions concerning the gifts which faith does not explain or which the tradition of the Church does not imply.

¹ *111 Sent.*, d. 34, q. 3, a. 2, *quaestiunc.* 2.

21. Reason confirms this doctrine. In each gift the formal motives and causes are those of one ultimate species. Therefore, the gifts themselves are ultimate species, being specified by such motives. The inference is evident, since things specified cannot exceed whatever specifies them. Consequently, if their formal causes are not subalternate genera but ultimate species, the gifts themselves must be ultimate and indivisible species. Since the gifts act with a higher motive within either of the intellectual or moral genera of virtues, they can embrace and unite in an eminent fashion what is divided among the various motives of the virtues. Therefore, the motives and formal causes of the gifts are less divisible than those of the virtues. For a motive which proceeds in a higher way and embraces many inferior causes is not divided into as many species as the lesser causes, otherwise it would not proceed in so unified a fashion. For example, the power of the sun, being more eminent, is divided into fewer species than the powers of the elements; the knowledge of higher angels is contained in fewer representative species than that of lesser angels. Likewise, the architectonic arts and sciences are not divided as much as the ministerial and lesser arts and sciences are. Moreover, that a higher principle embraces more in its unity and is divided less than an inferior motive is proved from the fact that in one genus, temperance or justice for example, the virtues are divided into several species. For in a different way or according to a different rule, reason measures what is related to commutative justice and what is related to distributive justice, or the things related to God or to one's neighbour. On the other hand, the gift of piety, which measures according to a divine rule and the impulse of the Holy Ghost, can embrace all in one architectonic rule of action, since it is concerned with God as a Father and all men as brothers in grace. It pays all debts under the communication of that supernatural notion of grace, which is one. It subordinates to itself all social intercourse of the natural order. Fear, likewise, under the formality of restraining the soul and fleeing from the evil of sin, restricts all illicit delectation and subdues the excess of harmful elation. Yet this is the function of the virtue of temperance under the many diverse measurings of reason and its own intrinsic goodness.

22. It may be alleged that this same situation obtains in the infused moral virtues. Their motive in the supernatural order is higher than that of the correlative virtues in the natural order. Yet

there are as many of them as there are acquired virtues. Hence, it does not follow that because the motive of the gifts is higher there are fewer of them than there are virtues.

23. The answer to this difficulty is based upon the fact that the case of the infused virtues is essentially different from that of the gifts. The infused virtues are elevated above the acquired virtues by reason of their object and the substance of their acts, not because of a special mode of being regulated or moved. The infused virtues and the acquired virtues are proportionately the same. The infused virtues are concerned with a supernatural end and because of this they are more elevated than the acquired virtues. But even in the infused virtues the rule *of* action and manner of measuring action in relation to its proper objects and end is according to infused prudence, which regulates according to the ordinary rules and manner of understanding, inferred by the human process of reasoning. From this knowledge of these objects through faith, prudence elicits acts according to its proper limitation. This is evident in theological conclusions and practical and prudential rules. Even in supernatural matters, prudence acts according to limits and capacity of reason. Hence, it is not extraordinary that such virtues, even though supernatural and infused, should not be fewer in number than the acquired virtues. Although they are elevated above the virtues of the natural order in the matter and objects with which they deal, in their manner of regulating and measuring and knowing they are not so elevated that they operate more unifiedly, more indivisibly, and more eminently than the acquired virtues.

On the other hand, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are concerned with a knowledge and regulative principle higher than human powers can attain even with infused virtues. The gifts have as their norm the impulse and motion of the Holy Ghost. Consequently, they function in a more unified and eminent way than do the infused virtues, since they are measured by a higher rule. Therefore, they should not be divided and multiplied like the virtues. Rather they should be contained in a lesser number of habits and should unite each genus of virtue in an indivisible way. Their motive is higher, their formal cause is more elevated, and they even proceed in a higher way.

24. The reply to the second difficulty is based upon the foregoing. The gifts are not multiplied in the same way as natural science

because they function according to a higher and more simple cause. They are, then, more unified and less divisible than the natural sciences.

The difficulty concerning art is dispatched by noting that there is no gift of art because there are no supernatural works of art. All supernatural things belong to right living as ordained to eternal life. This is beyond the function of art.

25. Reply to the third objection: As has been noted above,¹ some gifts correspond to the theological virtues. They are not superior to them but serve them and prepare the object matter for the virtue. The theological virtues unite the soul to the ultimate end, and are the foundation and root of the gifts by which the Holy Ghost moves the soul to tend toward that end. Consequently, the gifts presuppose faith, hope, and charity, uniting the soul to its end. Thus all the gifts are related to these virtues as to a root.² Moreover, in a special way, the gifts of understanding and knowledge are related to faith, fear to hope, and wisdom to charity.³ In all, however, the gifts are not superior to these virtues but are their servants.

26. The reply to the fourth objection is based upon the twofold principle of St. Thomas. First,⁴ fear implies a retreat from evil. Yet the same habit directs a motion toward its term and away from its beginning. The same gifts, then, which direct the soul in its approach toward God through hope, charity, piety, etc., direct the soul in the retreat from evil by the gift of fear. Hence, fear needs no other directive principle. Secondly,⁵ fear is directed by wisdom because the Divine Excellence, the principal subject of wisdom, is the special reason for fearing God. Fear itself prepares for wisdom, since the beginning of wisdom is the fear of the Lord.⁶ Consequently, fear is a disposition to wisdom, by which it is regulated and measured.

27. It is not inconvenient for the gift of understanding to be directed and regulated through wisdom, because the latter perfects man's intellect and directs his love. It reflects upon the principles which are known by the habit of understanding.

¹ Cf. Chapter III, no. 55.

² Cf. I-II, q. 68, a. 4, ad 3.

³ Cf. respectively I-II, q. 8, 9, 19 and 45.

⁴ Cf. *III Sent.*, d. 34, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3.

⁵ Cf. I-II, q. 68, a. 4, ad 5.

⁶ Cf. *Psalm ex*, 10 and *Ecclesiasticus*, i, 16.

28. Reply to the fifth objection: The two habits enumerated by Isaias after the seven spirits are not called spirits. Consequently, they cannot be included among the spirits which make the soul readily movable by the Holy Ghost. Isaias does not assert that the spirit of justice and the spirit of faith will be the girdle of his loins. He merely notes that justice and faith will be the girdle of his loins. This is a sign that they do not belong to the group of seven, but that they are virtues which pertain to the administration of the reign of the Messias. For He was to rule in justice and fidelity (faith here means fidelity, not the theological virtue of faith). According to the Hebrew¹ this passage refers not to virtues but to faithful men who will approach and gird the Messias.

29. Reply to the sixth difficulty: St. Paid, according to the common opinion, was enumerating the charisms. These are not common to all men, nor need they be found in all who are in the state of grace. They may even be found in sinners, since they are given for the edification of others and not for the salvation of the one possessing them. *To one through the Spirit is given the utterance of wisdom, to another knowledge, etc.*² They are not given to all, but some to one, others to another.

The gifts of the Holy Ghost, however, are found in all the just, since they have as their end the preparation of the soul to be easily moved by the Holy Ghost toward eternal life. *Thy spirit lead me into the right land.*³ Yet the sevenfold Spirit found in Christ—*The spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him: the spirit of wisdom and of understanding, etc.*⁴—would remain not with sinners but with the just: *The Holy Spirit of discipline will flee from the deceitful . . . and shall not abide when iniquity comes in.*⁵

¹ Cf. **Oleaster**: *Commentarium in Pentateuchum Moysi, in loco*.

² **I Corinthians**, xii, 8.

³ **Psalms** cxlii, 10.

⁴ **Isaias**, xi, 2.

⁵ **Wisdom**, i, 5.

Chapter VIII

THE PROPERTIES OF THE GIFTS

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Chapter VIII

THE PROPERTIES OF THE GIFTS

1. There are three properties of the gifts of the Holy Ghost. The first is the connection of the gifts among themselves and their association with charity and grace, which is so intimate that the gifts never exist apart from grace. The second property is their duration throughout this life and eternity. The third property is their equality and inequality among themselves and in relation to the virtues. These properties are common to the gifts and the virtues. The moral virtues have in addition the property called moderation, since either their excess or deficiency is measurable by reason. On the other hand, the gifts of the Holy Ghost do not involve any determined rule of moderation. They are united immediately to God Himself and follow His impulse.

The connection of the gifts among themselves and with charity

2. St. Thomas¹ proves the mutual relation of the gifts in the same manner in which he establishes the connection among the moral virtues. All the moral virtues are correlated by the single virtue of prudence regulating them. Moreover, prudence itself cannot be had without an intention of the end rectified by the other virtues. In this same way, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected through charity which is had only by the indwelling of the Holy Ghost. Yet the Holy Ghost cannot dwell in the soul unless it is first made docile to Him and obedient in all things. *For whoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God.*²

3. This interrelation of habits does not refer to their acts but to the habits themselves. For it is not necessary for anyone who exercises one virtue to perform acts of the other virtues at the same time. However, he must be prepared to perform the acts of the other virtues should the occasion arise. For example, a person may feel the obligation of performing an act of justice or religion and at the same time he

¹ I-II, q. 68, a. 4.

² Romans, viii, 14.

may be lax in the matter of chastity and unprepared to preserve it in temptation. Evidently if he were faced with the absolute necessity of preserving chastity to preserve the virtue of justice, he would prefer to violate justice rather than preserve chastity. Obviously, then, his attitude toward the observance of justice is neither firm nor virtuous.

This same principle applies to the gifts. Their mutual relationship is not necessarily found in their acts but rather in the habits themselves. For example, a man prepared by union with God through the theological virtues to follow His impulse and motion toward his ultimate end, should be prepared to follow the divine motion in all things that are conducive to the attainment of that end. Likewise, anyone prepared by understanding to follow the Holy Ghost in matters related to faith and not prepared to follow Him in matters of piety, fortitude, or fear, is not sufficiently disposed to follow the Holy Ghost toward eternal life. He cannot say with the prophet: *I am prepared to follow your commandments and I am not disturbed.*¹

4. Once it is admitted that the gifts are rooted in charity and connected through it—just as the moral virtues are connected through prudence—no difficulties arise, except those similar to the objections concerning the moral virtues. For without prudence there is no true moral virtue, since the regulative principle of morality is absent. And when prudence is present none of the others is lacking, since they establish the right intention necessary for the judgment and command of prudence. In the absence of charity no gift can be found to move the soul towards eternal life. When charity is present none of the gifts is lacking. For charity cannot remain without the movement of the soul toward eternal life through the motion of the Holy Ghost.

5. Objection: The primary difficulty is in the presupposition that the gifts are united in charity, and that charity is united with them in such a way that one cannot be had without the other. The basis of this difficulty lies in the difference between the virtues and the gifts, which are necessary for operations surpassing the common and ordinary actions of the virtues, extraordinary acts which need a special motion and impulse of the Holy Ghost. Such actions, however, are not necessary for charity or for the attainment of eternal glory, since anyone can be saved through a simple observance of the commandments. Even martyrdom, detachment from the things of the world

¹ Psalm cxviii, 60.

and other works not of precept but of counsel are not required for the possession of charity. Much less necessary, then, are the extraordinary actions found in only a few, like the fortitude of Samson or other martyrs who by an impulse of the Holy Ghost surrendered to death. Therefore, since the gifts are for extraordinary actions, while the virtues without the gifts suffice for common actions under charity, there seems to be no necessary connection between the gifts and charity.

6. The objection is confirmed by the fact that in many who are not in the state of grace, and even among those who have not the faith, there are to be found many extraordinary actions. They perform great feats of fortitude and piety. They are proficient in counsel and in many other admirable and extraordinary works of virtue. And all of these they perform without the gifts. Hence these extraordinary acts do not postulate gifts rooted in charity.

7. Further confirmation is provided by the possibility of salvation for those who have charity but lack some of these gifts. Hence, the gifts are not connected among themselves nor with charity; nor are they necessary for salvation. The argument seems forceful enough, since there cannot be a necessary connection between things which can be separated. For example, many men who are in the state of grace are simple and unlettered. They lack the gifts of understanding, wisdom and knowledge. In fact, they are filled with the opposed vices of dullness, roughness and puerility. Hence, St. Augustine admits: "Many of the faithful lack knowledge though they have faith." Likewise, without these gifts in their perfection many of the faithful are saved. According to St. Augustine,² "There are those whom not the vigour of understanding but the simplicity of believing makes most safe." Hence, without the vigour of understanding proper to the gift of understanding many of the faithful are saved. Faith, with prudence and the other virtues, is sufficient.

8. The second difficulty: Since faith can exist in sinners, the gifts which serve faith can also exist there. For anything serving a virtue can remain as long as the virtue remains. This is especially true of gifts perfecting the intellect: Understanding in the perception of

¹ *XIV de Trinitate*, c. 1, *M.P.L.* xxi, 1037; cf. *II-II*, q. 9, a. 1.

² *Contra Epistolam Fundamenti*, c. 4, *M.P.E.* xlii, 175.

truth, wisdom and knowledge in its judgment. Of their very nature antecedent to charity in the will, just as faith, these gifts which perfect the intellect and serve faith can precede charity and can be found without it.

It does not suffice to reply that the gifts are ordained to Absolute Good and unite the soul to God and hence cannot be had in a sinner. For even faith is ordered to the Absolute Good. It is the directive principle of charity and good works, for faith works through love. Yet faith is found in sinners. Therefore, gifts too can be found in sinners, although of their very nature they are directive of good works and tend to eternal life. However, they may fail to attain that end because of defects on the part of the one operating through them.

Finally, there is the argument that many sinners without grace can understand, dispute, and judge in mystical and affective theology. They can know and teach truths of faith as if they were in the state of grace. Consequently, if while in charity they understood these things through the gift of understanding and wisdom, then in acting in the same way even after the loss of grace, they must still understand through the gifts.

9. On the basis of these objections, Father Lorcal denies both assertions of St. Thomas. He denies that the gifts are connected with charity in such a way that they are not found in sinners, and he denies that the gifts are necessary for salvation.

10. Yet, just the opposite of all these conclusions must be held on the authority of Scripture and the saints, whose testimony easily overcomes and solves these difficulties.

It is certain from Scripture that a particular kind of understanding, wisdom, knowledge, counsel, as well as other gifts, can be found only in those in the state of grace. For of understanding it is said, *a good understanding to all who do it*,² *give me understanding and I shall live*,³ *give me understanding and I will learn thy commandments*.⁴ Moreover, *Wisdom will not enter into a malicious soul, nor dwell in a body subject to sins*.⁵ This refers to created wisdom, not to uncreated wisdom, since (the Holy Ghost) *will withdraw himself from thoughts that are without understanding, and he shall not abide when iniquity comes*

¹ *Commentaria in q. 68, d. 25, no. 4.*

² *Psalm ex, 10.*

³ *Psalm cxviii, 144.*

⁴ *Psalm cxviii, 73.*

Wisdom, i, 4.

in ... ,¹ And because they had not wisdom, they perished through their folly.² When that wisdom fails, a man is no longer in grace. For God loves none but him that dwells with wisdom,³ and no one dwells with the uncreated wisdom unless he has wisdom within himself making him wise and beloved of God. That wisdom gave him- knowledge of the holy things.⁴ There is, then, a knowledge found only in the saints, which is called a gift. Moreover, *Thy justifications are my counsels.*⁵ Therefore, the gift of counsel is never separated from justification.

*Piety is profitable in all respects, since it has the promise of the present life as well as of that which is to come.*⁶ This can be had only through grace.

Fortitude is mentioned in the words of the Psalmist, *Act manfully and let your heart be strengthened, you who hope in the Lord,*¹ and elsewhere, *Strength and beauty are her clothing and she shall laugh in the latter day,*⁸ and *if ye endure, ye shall also reign with him.*⁹

Finally, *Fear of the Lord drives out sin, for he that is without fear cannot be justified,*¹⁰ and *The fear of the Lord is holy, enduring for ever and ever.*¹¹

11. From these citations and others like them, it is certainly safe to conclude that there are gifts which are found only in those having grace. Moreover, these words of Sacred Scripture refer to the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost. For Isaias, in mentioning the gifts all together, attributes them to the indwelling of the Holy Ghost, Who is found* only in the just: *And the Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him. The Spirit of wisdom and of understanding,* etc.¹² Therefore, wherever the Spirit does not rest, there is no spirit of wisdom or of understanding, *For the Holy Spirit of discipline will flee from the deceitful . . . and he shall not abide when iniquity comes in.*¹³ Therefore, the gifts are coeval with grace, for they are possessed only through the indwelling of the Spirit. The Fathers of the Church concur in this doctrine, especially St. Gregory.¹⁴ He teaches,¹⁵ "We have heard that the heavenly kingdom will be opened to us through the sevenfold grace which Isaias

¹ Wisdom, i, 5.

² Baruch, iii, 28.

³ Wisdom, vii, 28.

⁴ Wisdom, x, 10.

⁵ Psalm cxviii, 24.

⁶ I Timothy, iv, 8.

⁷ Psalm xxx, 25.

⁸ Proverbs, xxxi, 25.

⁹ II Timothy, ii, 12.

¹⁰ Ecclesiasticus, i, 27, 28.

¹¹ Psalm xviii, 10.

¹² Isaias, xl, 2.

¹³ Wisdom, i, 5.

¹⁴ I Moralium, c. 12, M.P.L. 120: 544, and c. 32, M.P.L. txxv, 547.

¹⁵ Homily XIX on Ezechiel, M.P.L. i, xxv, 1153.

enumerated. . . Moreover, according to St. Jerome,¹ “We understand that these gifts were in Christ, because without Christ no one can be wise or understand, nor can he give good counsel, nor be strong, nor pious, nor filled with the fear of the Lord.” The same notion is found in St. Cyril’s commentary on this part of *Isaias*.² Writing of the anointing of the Holy Ghost, the author of the work on the cardinal works of Christ³ affirms that the gifts are had through *grace*: “through this anointing, wisdom and understanding are given us by God, counsel and fortitude come down from heaven, knowledge, piety and fear are poured forth by inspirations from above.” Extensive confirmation of this doctrine can also be found among the other Fathers.

12.4 St. Thomas⁴ gives the reason underlying this doctrine. Just as the moral virtues are related to the rule of reason, so the gifts are related to the Holy Ghost moving the soul. Since the Holy Ghost dwells in the soul through charity, the gifts are connected through charity.

However, to some this would seem to be a faulty reasoning process, since it wanders from the notion of the Spirit moving to that of the indwelling of the Holy Ghost. For although the Holy Ghost dwells in the soul only through charity, He moves it even before charity is present. This is evident from the fact that, according to the Council of Trent,⁶ a sinner has attrition before he is justified. How, then, can St. Thomas conclude that the Holy Ghost should be dwelling in the soul from the relation of the gifts to the Holy Ghost moving the soul?

The answer to this difficulty lies in the fact that the Holy Doctor is not referring to the Holy Ghost as moving merely in the efficient order. In that order it is not necessary that the Holy Ghost dwell in the soul, since He is moving toward justification and preparing for His own indwelling. St. Thomas refers rather to the regulative and directive moving of the Holy Ghost, analogous to the movement and regulation of the moral virtues by prudence. St. Thomas himself makes the comparison:⁷ “Just as the virtues are related to the rule of reason, so the gifts are related to the moving of the Holy Ghost.” It is evident

¹ *Commentary on Isaias*, c. 11, *M.P.L.* xxiv, 144.

² *Lib. II on Isaias*, *M.P.L.* i.xx, 310.

³ *Ernardus, De Cardinalibus Christi Operibus*, *M.P.L.* cr.xxxix, 1653.

⁴ At this point the Vives Edition is in error on the numbering of paragraphs. The proper numbering is here preserved.

⁵ I-II, q. 68, a. 5.

⁶ *Council of Trent*, session 14, c. 2. Cf. Denzinger, 898.

⁷ I-II, q. 68, a. 5.

that if prudence moves the soul by directing and governing it, it dwells within the heart and mind. Therefore, if the Holy Ghost directs and regulates in the same manner, He must dwell within the soul and rectify the man, for neither the command of the Holy Ghost nor the actions flowing from it can be defective. Therefore, the similarity of the directive and regulative motion of the Holy Ghost and the motion of prudence is the irrefragable basis for St. Thomas' conclusion on the indwelling of the Holy Ghost.

13. The efficacy of St. Thomas' conclusion on the necessity of the gifts for salvation¹ is now more evident. The formation of the virtues according to the human manner of reasoning is not sufficient. There must be superadded a motion and impulse of the Holy Ghost leading the soul to eternal life. Consequently, a gift of the Holy Ghost is necessary to attain the supernatural end.

Father Lorca thinks he weakens this conclusion by stating that according to this all the gifts are not needed, just as it is not necessary that the soul be moved by the Holy Ghost in every way possible. Hence, all the gifts are not necessary for salvation. This seems to him especially evident, since, if a man is moved to judge of divine things by the gift of wisdom, why should he be moved by the gift of knowledge to judge of the same things?

St. Thomas, it may be noted in reply, at first draws an indefinite conclusion, namely, that a gift of the Holy Ghost is necessary to attain the end. There must be some gift directing and regulating in a way superior to that of the virtues. It must remove the defects which the virtues are powerless to overcome. St. Thomas need not specify that all the gifts are necessary. He leaves that virtually manifest. In relation to a supernatural end a man cannot be sufficiently perfected through the virtues and motions of reason. He must have a superior motion and impulse of the Holy Ghost.² But the theological and moral virtues cannot be perfected by only one gift. All seven of the gifts which correspond to the virtues and serve them are necessary. Since, then, all the virtues necessary for salvation cannot be perfected without these gifts, all the gifts are necessary for salvation.

14. Reply to the first objection : St. Thomas teaches³ that the gifts are not required merely for works which of their very nature exceed the common perfection of the virtues, as the counsels surpass the

¹ I-II, q. 68, a. 2.

² *Ibid.*, a. 2, ad 2.

³ *Ibid.*, ad 1.

precepts. Rather, they are required for a manner of action which is according to a superior principle. This has been noted above in the distinction made between the actions which are special and extraordinary by reason of their object and those which are extraordinary by reason of their subject.¹ Those objectively extraordinary treat of matters not of precept but of counsel, not commonly required for salvation. Subjectively extraordinary actions are such either because of the imperfection of the person or because it is impossible for him to conquer all the difficulties he meets in the attainment of his end.

The gifts of the Holy Ghost are not given merely to move a man in works which are difficult of themselves, but also those which are difficult in the second way as well. Since the *gifts* embrace both aspects of action, they are said to be necessary for salvation, not merely for extraordinary works but for a special manner of acting. Otherwise, because of man's weakness reason would fail to lead him to his ultimate end. But the Spirit is good, and will lead men to the right land.

15. It may be admitted, in reply to the first confirmation, that those who lack grace perform unusual and marvellous actions which are ordained to particular ends. That these actions be ordered to the full and perfect attainment of the ultimate supernatural end is impossible, unless the Holy Ghost should lift the soul from its infirmity. For not those who do wonderful works, but those who are led by the Spirit of God are the sons of God. Furthermore, men do not even know how to pray as they ought, but the Spirit Himself must pray for men with ineffable groaning.

16. The basic principle of the second confirmation can be denied without hesitation. The proof fails because many simple and uneducated persons in the state of grace, who know nothing of worldly knowledge, know all that is necessary for salvation, for *His anointing teaches you concerning all things*,² and *the Holy Spirit will teach you all truth*.³ Furthermore, the teaching of many matters of acquired knowledge also pertains to the direction of the Spirit: *The foolish things of the world has God chosen to put to shame the wise, and the weak things of the world has God chosen to shame the strong. . . .* Acquired knowledge puffs up, but charity builds well. The removal of

¹ Chapter II, no. 37.
² 1 John, ii, 27.

³ John, xvi, 13.
⁴ 1 Corinthians, i, 27.

that knowledge belongs to the Holy Ghost, who also gives to souls the knowledge of the saints, leading them through the right ways. This is the gift of knowledge which is lacking to none of the saints.

17. Moreover, St. Augustine¹ is referring to the charisms which may be common to sinners and the just. For the charism of knowledge is ordered to the defence of the faith and the instruction of others. It does not require that a person be in the state of grace. Loving knowledge, experiencing, as it were, the things of salvation, is not its end. Such knowledge is the function of the gift. According to St. Thomas,² who follows St. Augustine, it is evident that "it is one thing to know how much a man should believe to attain the blessed life which is eternal (this is the knowledge in the gift). It is quite another to know how to use this to aid the faithful and to defend the Faith against those without it. This latter, then, seems to be what the Apostle means by the term knowledge." This knowledge is either a charism or theology.

18. Father Lorca objects that St. Thomas understood this passage from St. Augustine to apply not to a charism but to the gift of knowledge.³ But Lorca has not pondered the words that St. Thomas has cited from St. Augustine. In the first argument St. Thomas⁴ affirms that "through knowledge salutary faith is born, nourished, and strengthened. But faith is of divine things, so too, then, is knowledge." St. Thomas bows to the authority of St. Augustine and asserts that the gift of knowledge is concerned with the temporal clement in faith, not with the eternal. St. Thomas, therefore, admits only that St. Augustine is referring to the gift of knowledge as it generates, nourishes, and strengthens faith in the soul. This is not related to the instruction of others but to one's own perfection, which is within the scope of the gift of knowledge. For this reason he can infer that the gift is one thing and that "it is another thing to know how to aid the faithful and defend the faith against those who do not have it." Yet even here St. Augustine is referring to the gift of knowledge rather than to the charism which the Apostle mentions, just as he himself makes clear.

19. But one part of that first objection remains to be answered. It has been *alleged that understanding—necessary for salvation—is*

¹ *XIV de Trinitate*, c. 1. *M.P.L.* xlii, 1037.

² Cf. II-II, q. 9, a. 1, ad 2.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, a. 1.

given to sharpen the mind, and yet even without this keenness many are safe in the simplicity of their belief. It must be admitted, of course, that many are safe without alacrity of understanding in argumentation and explanation. Yet without the loving and experimental alacrity of the motion of the Holy Ghost, which is derived from the simplicity of faith either actual or habitual, no one can be safe in the simplicity of his soul nor in unfeigned charity. This latter alacrity is the gift of knowledge, the science of the saints, without which *they have neither known nor understood; they walk on in darkness.*¹

20. Moreover, the gifts of understanding, knowledge and wisdom are ordained to perfect, consummate, and formed faith. They are not ordered to unformed or imperfect faith. Of course, to apprehend truth imperfectly, to judge it and discern it from error precedes faith and is required for it. However, the spirit of judgment, and understanding or knowledge and the loving experimental judgment arising from the spirit is not required to introduce faith. It can only vivify, form, and perfect it. While faith belongs to the intellect and precedes charity, its formation and its life are brought about through charity. Consequently the gifts, which serve and prepare for a formed and living faith, belong only to a man who has charity. It is very important to keep in mind, then, that the gifts of knowledge, wisdom and understanding are not just any sort of knowledge or understanding, even in the supernatural order. They are the spirit of knowing and of understanding, etc. The spirit of understanding is more than just a supernatural understanding coming from the spirit. It is born of love, and from a sort of experimental knowledge and contact with the spirit. This gift serves faith, not in its unformed stages, but only when it is formed.

21. Although faith may be ordered to perfect action tending to a supernatural end, some distinction must be made concerning the essential perfection of the act of faith. It may be conceded that it is the foundation and root of supernatural acts, such as justification, but it is not the proximate and formal principle of such acts. This formal principle is had through charity which is the bond of perfection, forming and perfecting faith. In the same way, the gifts of the Holy Ghost make their contribution, following upon charity.

¹ Psalm lxxxix, 5.

22. Sinners living without grace can acutely discern, dispute, and even treat of divine things and of mystical or loving understanding as an object and matter of disputation. But they cannot use such an understanding as the principle and motive of their knowledge. For example, I can treat of the intuitive vision of God and of the experimental knowledge of sensible things as the object or matter of a discussion. Yet I do not have the experimental contact with these sensible things nor the intuitive knowledge of God, because I do not use experience and intuition as the principal and formal reason of my knowing. In the same way, the sinner cannot use loving and experimental knowledge as a formal principle. From the very fact that he has not grace, he cannot have a connaturality to the Spirit, nor union with God and experience of Him proper to the gift. *No one knows except him who has received.*¹ He may use it as an object and treat of it as he remembers it. And in this respect the great change from the state of grace to the condition of a sinner is in no way felt. However, it is in the experimental and loving knowledge, the internal touch of the Spirit, that a great change and loss is felt. *For the Holy Spirit of discipline will flee from the deceitful, and will draw himself away from thoughts without understanding, and he shall not abide when iniquity comes in.*² The gifts of the Holy Ghost, then, are taken away from sinners.

On the other hand, those whose hearts are turned to God immediately feel a serenity and tranquillity, and they are relieved of the great burden of sin. This is a sign of the indwelling of the Holy Ghost, Who is the *inhabitant of rest*.³ This peace and serenity is an effect of confession, as the Council of Trent teaches.⁴

The permanence of the gifts of the Holy Ghost in eternity

23. Presupposing that the gifts are founded upon charity, upon loving experiential knowledge, and upon connaturality to the Spirit, it is not difficult to realize that they will continue to exist in heaven. Although regulated in a higher way in heaven, the gifts will be present just as will the charity in which they are founded, for the vision of God will govern both charity and the gifts. Moreover, if the intellectual and moral virtues remain in heaven, the gifts corresponding to

¹ *Apocalypse*, ii, 17.

² *Wisdom*, i, 5.

³ *Isaias*, xxxviii, 11.

⁴ *Council of Trent*, session 14, c. 3.

⁵ Cf. *John of St. Thomas*, *Cursus Theologicus*, q. 62, d. 17, a. 4.

them should perdure, especially since the latter are governed by a more elevated principle—the Holy Ghost. St. Thomas proves this! by affirming that the gifts are given to men to make them docile to the Holy Ghost, not only impelling and activating, but regulating and measuring as well. In heaven, where God is all in all, the soul will be much more happily and perfectly subjected to the Holy Ghost. Therefore, most assuredly the gifts will remain in heaven.

24. This line of argument proves the permanence of the gifts in heaven precisely as far as their formal aspect is concerned, the regulation and motion of the Holy Ghost.² There remains, however, a difficulty concerning the matter of the gifts and the conditions of their operation. Both imply some sort of imperfection which cannot be present in heaven.

25. First objection: As St. Thomas admits,³ the matter of some of the gifts will not be present in heaven. There will be no active life, to which piety and fortitude are ordered. Nor will there be understanding and the penetration of matters of faith to which the gifts of understanding and knowledge are ordained. No longer will the temptations against which the gifts are arrayed⁴ have to be conquered. Therefore, just as when a virtue ceases to exist when its object is permanently absent—quite as truly as if its essence were destroyed, so too the gifts will not remain in eternity as they are in this life.

26. Second objection: The intellectual gifts, at least, cannot be the same in this life and in heaven. Therefore, not all the gifts remain. For the gifts of understanding, knowledge, and wisdom proceed with a certain obscurity in this life, since they are regulated by faith and are compatible with it. However, a habit which has obscurity as an intrinsic element cannot remain in heaven where there will be no obscurity in the intellect, since darkness is an imperfection and defect, which is incompatible with the highest perfection of glory. Therefore, when the obscurity which is intrinsic to the habit is destroyed the whole entity is changed. For example, obscurity cannot be taken out of faith without destroying its very nature. Therefore, the gifts

¹ I-II, q. 68, a. 6.

² Cf. Chapter 3, no. 34.

³ I-II, q. 68, a. 6.

⁴ Cf. St. Gregory, 11 *Moralium*, c. 52, *M.P.L.*: 1xxv, 592.

involving obscurity in this life, like that of faith, cannot remain in heaven. Other gifts, which are not obscure, will take their place.

The third objection : . . . *prophecies will disappear, and tongues will cease, and knowledge will be destroyed.*¹ The knowledge referred to must be the gift of knowledge, for the Apostle mentions other supernatural gifts such as prophecy and the gift of tongues.

27. Reply to the first objection : The primary and essential matter of the gifts is not destroyed in the next life, although secondary and accessory matter or a certain state or condition of the matter may change. The total object of the gifts is not completely taken away as it is in the case of the cardinal virtues, which remain in spite of this fact.² But in heaven the objects of the virtues will not have the same imperfection as they have in this life. There will not be the struggle with passions ; there will only be the enjoyment of a great tranquillity. Both states of the virtues, then, have the same object but a diverse manner of acting under varied conditions. St. Thomas does not claim³ that the gifts change their whole object but that some of their present matter will not be their concern in heaven. He goes on to explain⁴ how some of the matter of the gifts passes away with this life, while some of it remains. Thus, not the total and adequate object of the gifts is changed but only that part connected with the imperfection of the present state. The primary and adequate object of each gift is the particular object to which a man can be moved by the impulse of the Holy Ghost. This object may be present now and in eternity, in battle or in triumph, amidst the labours of this life or in the contemplation and enjoyment of the next. Of course, the active life and its labours will cease. However, action under the impulse of the Holy Ghost will not cease even in heaven. And it is to just this action that the gifts of the Holy Ghost extend.

28. Reply to the second objection : The fundamental proposition of this objection must be denied. The gifts seek evidence arising from affective and experimental knowledge and from contact with the divine Spirit. They do not, of course, have that evidence in all matters, for the capacity of the knowing subject is not as great as the knowability of the object.⁵ For example, a subalternate science by its very

¹ *I Corinthians*, xiii, 8.

² Cf. *John of St. Thomas*, *Cursus Theologicus*, q. 62, d. 17, a. 4.

³ *I-II*, q. 68, a. 6.

⁴ *Ibid.*, a. 2.

⁵ Cf. *Chapter III*, no. 37.

nature always strives for evidence. Yet a person knowing that science can lack the exercise of that evidence by not knowing the higher science which provides the evidence of principles.¹ Consequently, even when faith is removed, the gifts remain substantially the same as in this life. However, they will be perfect, purified of the imperfection that they had when the soul walked by faith; on earth for blinded eyes there can be no intrinsic clarity of the truths believed. The gifts are, as it were, subalternate to the beatific vision, and like charity in which they are founded, they are subordinated to it. In the absence of the vision, that subordination is supplied by faith, and for this reason there is no actual evidence concerning these truths. Yet even in this life the gifts have a relationship to evident knowledge. They can have evidence at least of the things which surround faith, like credibility, for they can know evidently that the things of faith should be believed. Likewise, although the gifts without the beatific vision cannot penetrate truths of faith by a positive knowledge, by negative and extrinsic evidence they can know what those truths are not. They can separate the certitude of these truths from opposing errors, and they can discern the things of the Spirit from those of sense and imagination. Not by believing, like faith, but by understanding, penetrating, and judging with at least extrinsic and negative evidence, the gifts of the Holy Ghost know scientifically of divine things—at least what they are not. Therefore, the gifts do not have obscurity as an essential property. In this life, theirs is a clarity negative in its evidence of things to be believed but positive concerning their credibility. For nothing shows more evidently or assures more strongly that the testimony of faith is good, than the impulse and internal motion *by which the Spirit gives evidence to our spirit that we are the sons of God.*² In heaven the soul will have perfect evidence of the things seen. Without being changed essentially by the passage from this life to the next, the gifts will remain in time of vision. Only their application and regulative principle will be changed. For then the beatific vision will govern the gifts now ruled by faith. Likewise, charity does not change essentially because its object is first believed and then seen. Only its manner of application and the perfection of its regulative principle is changed. Or again, sight, which is a potency of its very nature endowed with evidence and clear knowledge, may see only obscurely

¹ John of St. Thomas, *Cursus Theologicus*, Tom. I, disp. 2, and *Cursus Philosophicus*, Tom. I, disp. 25.

² Romans, viii, 16.

because the object is poorly applied, being far away. If the object were brought closer, it would become clear and evident, not through an intrinsic change in the potency but by the extrinsic application of the matter.

29. Reply to the third objection : It is by no means certain that the Apostle is referring to the gift of the Holy Ghost. He uses the common name of knowledge, not the spirit of knowledge and the knowledge of the saints. These latter terms are customarily used to designate the gift of knowledge. Secondly, according to St. Thomas,¹ the Apostle does not affirm that knowledge is completely destroyed. He merely mentions that the state and the imperfect manner of knowledge which in this life involves a dependence upon images will be done away with.

The superiority or inferiority of the gifts

30. The gifts may be compared both with the virtues and among themselves to determine which is the most perfect. The virtues are either theological, intellectual, or moral. Of the gifts thus compared, some are in the intellectual part of the soul, others are in the appetitive part.

31. According to St. Thomas,² if the gifts are compared to the theological virtues, the virtues will be found superior. For the theological virtues unite the soul to God as its ultimate end. On the other hand, by the gifts the soul already united to God is further subjected to Him as moving and regulating it in the attainment of the ultimate end. It is more perfect to be united to God than to be subject to Him as He moves the soul. For union is a closer approach to God than motion and subjection to Him as a Mover.

32. If the gifts are compared to the intellectual and moral virtues, it is clear that the gifts are more perfect than the virtues. For where the virtues fail, the gifts perfect the soul. The very essence of the gifts evidences this, since the gifts perfect the soul to obey a higher mover than do these virtues. The intellectual virtues perfect the intellect according to the light of the reason; the moral virtues, natural or supernatural, perfect the will in its obedience to reason. The gifts, however, perfect the soul in its obedience to the guidance

¹ *Commentaria in I Corinthians*, xiii, 8.

² I-II, q. 68, a. 8.

of the Holy Ghost and His immediate rite, according to the manner and measure of His distribution of graces. From this higher regulative principle there follows a more perfect standard and a disposition to follow a higher mover.

33. If the gifts are evaluated in relation to one another, the intellectual gifts are found to be more perfect than those in the appetitive part. Wisdom is greater than understanding; understanding is greater than knowledge; and knowledge greater than counsel. Among the gifts of the appetitive part, piety holds first place, then comes fortitude, and, last of all, fear. This hierarchy refers to the absolute excellence of the gifts according to their acts in the proper faculties. In a particular order, and in relation to the matter that they regulate, counsel is preferred to knowledge, and fortitude is superior to piety. All this is the doctrine of St. Thomas.¹

34. The reason for the first part—that the intellectual gifts are higher than the others—is found in the fact that the former direct and regulate the latter, and judge concerning them. Prudence directs the moral virtues of the appetitive part and gives them their particular moderation. Consequently, prudence is the most excellent of the moral virtues. Likewise, therefore, counsel, which corresponds to prudence, will be more excellent than piety, fortitude, and fear.

Furthermore, knowledge precedes forms, and judges prudence. For knowledge is not purely practical but speculative as well, inquiring and analysing through causes. The speculative naturally precedes and is more excellent than the practical, because it is more abstract and immaterial. The foundation and reason for the practical, the speculative defends the practical through an analysis of its nature and causes.

Moreover, the gifts of understanding and wisdom precede the gift of knowledge. Knowledge is concerned with inferior and created causes. It receives its rule of action from understanding, apprehending and penetrating divine things through a simple judgment much like the habit of principles. Understanding, therefore, is more perfect than knowledge, which is concerned with conclusions.

However, wisdom judges and defends both knowledge and the principles upon which it reflects. Hence, absolutely speaking, wisdom exceeds the other gifts in nobility and perfection, just as the virtue

¹ I-II, q. 68, a. 8.,

of wisdom is superior to the understanding of principles and knowledge.

35. The reason for the hierarchy of gifts in the appetitive part is taken from the fact that piety corresponds to justice, fortitude to the virtue of fortitude and fear to temperance. Since, at least as far as object matter is concerned, justice is greater than fortitude and fortitude greater than temperance, the corresponding gifts should maintain the same order. For the more excellent the virtue, the more excellent the corresponding gift.

36. The last part of the conclusion, concerning the relative excellence of particular gifts, is explained on the grounds that in the enumeration of Isaias counsel is placed before knowledge and preferred to it. So, too, fortitude is placed before piety. Obviously, the matter upon which fortitude and counsel act is more difficult and arduous, for which special counsel and strength may be expected from God. These more formidable objects exceed the scope of piety and knowledge, which can be exercised in things not especially difficult. For piety and knowledge, without essentially involving any notion of arduousness in their object, can be found either with or without it. Absolutely considered, however, knowledge and piety are essentially more excellent.

37. An objection concerning the gift of fear: St. Thomas¹ puts fear in the last place because it corresponds to the virtue of temperance. Yet, according to St. Thomas in another place,² this aspect of fear is secondary; primarily it corresponds to hope. But, absolutely considered, the perfection and excellence of a gift, just as of a virtue, should be determined by its primary aspect, not its secondary.

38. Reply: fear corresponds to both virtues, but as a flight from evil, not a pursuit of good. Through fear the soul considers sin and flees from it. Looking upon God the soul withdraws into its own nothingness out of reverence for Him Who can inflict punishment. Related to hope, in this *less* exalted way, fear holds the lowest place among the gifts. For to withdraw from evil is not as noble as to approach to good, although in the order of generation it is first, since departure from one point is previous to the approach to another in the

1 I-II, q. 68, a. 4.

2 II-II, q. 141, a. 1, ad 2.

order of generation. *Fear is the beginning of wisdom*,¹ and *by the fear of the Lord men depart from evil*.² Fear, then, is the primary and initial gift in the progress towards perfection. Although it corresponds to the higher virtue of hope, it does so in a dispositive and preliminary way, as a flight from evil and not in the perfect manner of an approach to good.

In its full perfection fear corresponds to temperance by withdrawing men from superfluous delights and piercing the flesh. Although it still does this by restraining men from evil, the perfect victory in matters of temperance consists in fleeing harmful delights; according to the Apostle, *Flee fornication*.³ Ifcnc fear is higher than temperance in this matter because it flees and abhors evil more perfectly.

Since he is considering the gifts in the order of their perfection, St. Thomas⁴ treats only of the relationship) of the gift of fear to temperance. Yet he recognizes that in relation to justification and the theological virtues, to hope for example, it is only the beginning, and a disposition to further perfection.⁵

¹ *Psalm ex*, 10.

² *Proverbs, xvi*, 6.

³ *I Corinthians, vi*, 18.

⁴ *I-II*, q. 68, a. 7.

⁵ *Ibid.*, ad 1.

Chapter IX

THE BEATITUDES AND FRUITS: THE ACTS AND EFFECTS OF THE GIFTS

- I. The Beatitudes
 - A. The nature of the beatitudes (1)
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Chapter IX

THE BEATITUDES AND FRUITS: THE ACTS AND EFFECTS OF THE GIFTS

1. Made docile to the Holy Ghost by the gifts, the soul is led to eternal life by conquering difficulties which exceed the power of human reason and the virtues. The more the soul approaches eternal life through acts of the gifts, the more it casts off the comforts and blandishments of this life. Its separation from the things of the world, from its delight and riches, gives it an approach to true happiness which is eternal life. Moreover, in obviating difficulties and hindrances, these acts free the soul from falsehood. For many err in seeking happiness in sensible things, whose opposition to spiritual goods makes them impediments to progress. Detachment from the goods of this life and the proper disposition to approach true happiness could never be accomplished through the rule of reason and the virtues in their human and limited way. Their essential limitations and weakness prevent their overcoming all the difficulties involved in attaining heaven. Only acts proceeding from the gifts through the motion and impulse of the Holy Ghost are equal to the task. According to St. Matthew,¹ Our Lord enumerated eight of these special acts called Beatitudes through which the Spirit separates the soul from this world and leads it to eternal happiness : *Thy spirit will lead me into the right land.*²

2. The first of the three questions which naturally arise at this juncture is : How are these beatitudes described and what effect do they have in the soul? St. Thomas gives a description and an explanation.³ There are four beatitudes which exclude false happiness. There are four more which tend to the attainment of true happiness. Two of these are for the active life, and two are for the contemplative. These eight beatitudes include everything that can lead to eternal life.

3. The first three beatitudes and the last one are related to the eliminating of false happiness. The last beatitude is, as it were, a

¹ Matthew, v, 3-11.

« Psalm exlii, 10.

3 I-II, q. 68, a. 2.

confirmation and manifestation of the other seven.¹ The first beatitude, poverty of spirit, removes the inordinate love of riches, so that man will not place his heart or his happiness in them. The second, *blessed are the meek*,² removes the inordinate passions of the irascible part of the soul, so that men will not place their end in winning victory and taking vengeance on their enemies. The third, *blessed are those who mourn*,³ removes the inordinate passions of delight and joy in which many, *whose god is their stomach*,^{*} place their last end. The eighth beatitude, *blessed are those who suffer persecutions*,⁵ removes desires of human favour and applause. According to St. Thomas,⁶ in virtue of this beatitude a man would rather suffer persecution than deviate from the way of justice.

4. The fourth and fifth beatitudes are ordained to the attainment of true beatitude through the works of the active life. The fourth beatitude is a thirst and hunger after justice—a giving to each his due with a burning heart. The fifth beatitude, *blessed are the mercifull* gives justice and mercy and alms to friends, neighbours, foreigners and enemies.

5. The sixth and seventh beatitudes are ordered to the attainment of beatitude through the contemplative life. The sixth beatitude is the cleansing of the heart through purity. Without it contemplation is impossible. *Blessed are the pure of heart*.⁸ The peace which surpasses all sense and inebriates the spirit is a work of justice—*Blessed are the peacemakers*.⁹

6. The second question which comes to mind is: How can seven gifts be related to eight beatitudes, and how is it that St. Luke mentions only four beatitudes while St. Matthew mentions eight? First of all, according to St. Thomas,¹⁰ the eighth beatitude is a sort of confirmation and clarification of the others. It implies a firmness of soul in the face of human persecution, preventing it from failing to fulfil the other seven beatitudes and gifts. It makes a man spurn human favour and prefer to withstand persecution. Consequently, the seven beatitudes are related to the seven gifts, the eighth beatitude implies a firmness in matters belonging to all the gifts.

¹ cf. *ibid.*, ad 2.

² *Matthew*, fv, 4.

³ *Ibid.*, v, 5.

⁴ *Philippians*, iii, 19.

⁵ *Matthew*, v, 10.

⁶ I-II, q. 63, a. 3, ad 6.

⁷ *Matthew*, v. 7.

⁸ *Ibid.*, v, 8.

⁹ *Ibid.*, v, 9.

¹⁰ I-II, q. 68, a. 3, ad 5.

The beatitudes enumerated by St. Luke were given by the Lord in another sermon to the multitudes after He came down from the mountain, as St. Luke expressly states.¹ Because Our Lord was speaking to the multitude, He mentioned only those beatitudes which are intended to remove false happiness, for many of the crowd were inclined to seek their happiness in this world. Therefore, He mentioned poverty, hunger or labour, weeping in opposition to delight, hate or persecution of men, which is contrary to human favour and applause. In His sermon to His disciples, who were more perfect. He added the other four beatitudes which belong to the attainment of true beatitude. From this it may be concluded that it is not necessary that all the gifts be exercised by all at all times, although all are necessary for salvation should the time and occasion arise. Similarly, all the positive precepts, like the virtues, need be practiced only in their proper place and time.

7. The third question is: Do the gifts contain only works of supererogation and counsel or also those of precept? They embrace all things ordered to eternal happiness through a special impulse of the Holy Ghost. There are many works which are objectively great and extraordinary, for example, the complete detachment from riches through poverty of spirit, the calming of all passion, and the suffering of all the persecutions of this life. There are other works which, although they are not great in themselves, assume magnitude because of attendant circumstances and weakness of the person. These latter require a special gift and motion of the Holy Ghost to overcome obstacles. For example, to use riches moderately even without giving them up completely, belongs to poverty of spirit. Not being overcome by persecutions and withstanding ordinary temptations for any length of time frequently require a beatitude.

8. St. Thomas² treats the fruits of the Holy Ghost quite thoroughly. The fruits are not distinguished from the works of the gifts and the virtues. They merely connote a certain delight and taste in their execution.³ Hence there is nothing to prevent one thing's being a virtue, a beatitude, and a fruit.

The fruit produced last by the tree is received with the fullest enjoyment. The last things produced by the tree watered by the Holy Ghost are acts and effects commanded by the gifts and virtues.

¹ Cf. *Luke*, vi, 17 ft.

² I-II, q. 70.

³ Cf. II-II, q. 157, a. 2, ad 8.

When these are received with a delight of the spirit, they are called fruits of the Holy Ghost. This is especially evident in the twelve enumerated by St. Paul and explained by St. Thomas.² A beatitude is itself a fruit, for it is the act of a gift. However, according to St. Thomas,³ it adds certain excellence among the works which lead to eternal life.

9. The relation of each beatitude and each of the twelve fruits to its respective gift is treated by St. Thomas in various places where he considers each particular gift.⁴ There is no special difficulty involved in these matters.

To the honour of Our Crucified Lord, Jesus Christ,
to the Most Blessed Virgin, St. Dominic and St.
Thomas, April 21, 1674, at Saragossa during the
expedition in Catalonia.

¹ *Galatians*, v, 22, 23.

² I-II, q. 70, a. 3.

³ *Ibid.*, a. 2.

⁴ II-II, q. 8, a. 7 and 8; q. 9, a. 4; q. 19, a. 12; q. 45, a. 6; q. 52, a. 5; q. 121, a. 2 and q. 129, a. 2.