THESE ESSAYS HAVE BEEN COLLECTED AND IN PART TRANSLATED BY THE VERY REVEREND J. B. SCHIMPF, S.J., RECTOR OF ST. JOSEPH'S, MOBILE, ALABAMA, U.S.A.

THE MYSTERY OF FAITH AND HUMAN OPINION CONTRASTED af DEFINED

BY MAURICE DE LA TAILLE, S.J.

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TO THE LAITY OF GOD'S CHURCH

AS LIVING STONES,
YOU ARE BUILT UP, A SPIRITUAL HOUSE,
A HOLY PRIESTHOOD,
TO OFFER UP SPIRITUAL SACRIFICES,
ACCEPTABLE TO GOD BY JESUS CHRIST.

YOU ARE A CHOSEN GENERATION,

A KINGLY PRIESTHOOD,

A HOLY NATION,

A PURCHASED PEOPLE,

THAT YOU MAY DECLARE HIS VIRTUES,

WHO HATH CALLED YOU OUT OF DARKNESS,

UNTO HIS MARVELLOUS LIGHT.

(I St. Peter, ii, 5 & 9).

EDITOR'S NOTE

Part I is a translation of a number of French papers, all of which, except one (p. 169-197) appeared in book form under the title Esquisse du Mystère de la Foi suivie de quelques éclaircissements (Paris. Beauchesne, 1923).

Of the articles collected in Part II two have been translated from the Latin (p. 349-379 and 401-419). The rest were written in English by the author.

For permission courteously granted to republish those papers we wish to extend our grateful acknowledgement to the editors of the following publications;


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FOREWORD

The opening chapter of this part was written to satisfy the desires expressed by certain persons on behalf of those who do not understand Latin. It was really an adaptation in the vernacular of the Mysterium Fidei that was wanted. to tell the truth, the craftsman who has planned a large structure will not build the same on a reduced scale; the only duplicate he can offer will be a rough model. And it is a rough model which is presented here; a mere sketch, as the title indicates. The various doctrines appear only in their general outlines; their complexity fades away, as also disappears whatever could contribute to give them a positive and documentary basis. On the other hand, the summits join together more clearly to the eye, giving the impression of a continuous chain: and thus our brief outline may prove useful even to some of those who happen to have perused our work in Latin, or render easier to others its partial reading, should they feel deterred from reading the entire volume.

Of course such a condensed summary cannot defend itself alone against attacks: It must needs rely on something more solid and substantial. Wherefore it may be well for such as have some objection to advance against one or another of the opinions herein proposed, to bear in mind that the solution must be sought elsewhere, and that no discussion can be profitable without first resorting to the sources and the arguments.

The *Outline* is followed by various *Elucidations* whose purpose it is to focus the light on a few chosen points, which either

FOREWORD

open up vaster prospects, or require a more thorough investigation.

Should the public be kind enough to give to these pages a favourable welcome, they shall have a share in the gratitude which applies to those who, as benevolent readers or indulgent critics, are responsible for the success of the preceding work.

1 Readers who are familiar with the English language will find additional information in two conferences given at the Cambridge Week of Religious Studies in 1922, and published through the efforts of Rev. C. Lattey, S.J., in the collection Catholic Faith in the Holy Eucharist (2d ed., in-12, p. IX-225, Cambridge, 1923), or in two articles of the (American) Ecclesiastical Review (1924) under the title The Last Supper and Calvary, a reply to critics. To defend and popularize these views was the object of those articles (which have since been published in pamphlet form, under the above title, by the Dolphin Press, Philadelphia).*

The same articles form the first chapter of Part II of this volume (Translator's Note).

$\begin{array}{ccc} \text{AN OUTLINE} \\ \text{OF} \\ \\ \text{THE MYSTERY OF FAITH} \end{array}$

AN OUTLINE OF THE MYSTERY OF FAITH

The first duty of man is the surrender of himself to the divine

The whole moral

goodness, which is worthy of all love.

law derives from this first obligation, which itself is not based on any other. In its own order it has the value of a first principle; as in the order of causes first comes the final cause, and in the order of final causes, sovereign goodness, first lovableness and first love. Why must we love God? Not because he has commanded it; for again it would be asked: and why must we obey God when he commands? The answer could not be, because he commands it; but, because he has a right to command. And whence does he hold that right? From his being the sovereign good, to whom all love is due. No need of seeking any further. is goodness, goodness is lovable. God by his single self is all goodness, and outside of him there is nothing good, nothing lovable, except in relation.to him. To withdraw from him is to turn one's back upon what is good, and pass over to evil, which is the privation of what is good. Behold the reason why we must obey God. The natural law goes before the positive law; and the first word of the natural law is: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God Your heart should be his: keep it fixed on him. Your spirit: look upon him as the centre whence radiates all truth upon men and upon things. Your powers: use them to seek him through all the paths traced by the requirements of the common good which Before all else, therefore, man owes himself is in his care. He owes to him the return of whatever he has to God. To the God who'gave him all, he gives received from him.

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himself whole and entire.

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And that he may be acceptable

what comes to us from him, and that God may keep to himself what has been consecrated to him. *Lailia*, eucharist, impetration (adoration, thanksgiving, petition) go side by side and hand in hand in this first approach of man towards God.

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But because man is not a pure spirit, he feels a need to translate this interior gift of himself into an outward rite which symbolizes it. For this reason he presents to God the homage of some material gift- the whole reason and purpose of which is to represent arid attest the inmost consecration of his soul.

Having its foundation in the bodily nature of man, this rite is also found to be in agreement with his social nature: the consecration of a society to God, whether it be the family or the state, not being possible except under the formalities of an outward act. This brings us to St. Augustine's definition, which is traditional in the Church: "The ritual sacrifice IS THE VISIBLE SIGN OF THE INVISIBLE SACRIFICE—invisibilis sacrificii sacramentum visibile".

Such, it seems, is the primary justification of this form of worship, justly reserved to him alone who is the first principle of our being, as well as its last end. It is the turning back to God, our sovereign good, by adoration, in other words, by the practical acknowledgment of our original dependence and of our ultimate destiny; and this again implies, as we can easily convince ourselves, thanksgiving and prayer. All of it, too, contributes to the progress and the betterment of the rational creature, and nothing in it tends to his destruction or annihilation: at least as long as sin does not enter into consideration.

With sin a new factor makes its appearance: death, of which sin is the cause; temporal death as well as eternal death—and both, in the normal course of things, form but one connected issue. Sin having entered, the sacrifice offered to the outraged divinity—the worship of adoration, gratitude, prayer—will not be appropriate unless there is manifested an sintention and an attitude of reparation. Quite naturally the sacrificial worship will symbolize the penalty of death

incurred, and so to speak, assumed by guilty humanity, at least in figure, as a just anticipation of the divine sentence. At the same time, it is no less intended to avert the rigour of that very sentence. And so the blood of victims does flow, that the blood of sinners may be spared, and a victim is offered for immolation. To adoration is joined propitiation: behold the sacrifice which mankind burdened with sin has known from the beginning. But the propitiatory element does not abolish the latreutic, which it presupposes; and the bloody sacrifice still remains a gift, the gift of something that was human property, aliment or sustenance of the natural life, and which man intends to transfer to an exclusively divine ownership, as if for the nourishment and delight of the Most High, for the bread of God, for the cup of God, for the lamb of God, unto an odour of sweetness.

The rite of this oblation may be at times the immolation itself (on condition, of course, that the immolation is performed by the sacrificer, by the priest, to whom it belongs to offer sacrifice). But it may also be, and in fact often is, distinct from the immolation understood as mactation, which is left to others, whereas the priest accomplishes the rite to him alone reserved, which consists in the oblation, the donation to God of the victim, of its life, of its blood. And according as this rite precedes or follows the immolation, we have two types of sacrifices, differing from one another in a merely accessory matter. In one case the priest presents the victim for the immolation which is to follow; in the other, he presents the victim already immolated: oblatio 'hostiae immolandae. oblatio hostiae immolatae. Of this second type there are abundant examples among the Hebrews: the blood of the victim gathered by the priest is to be poured upon the altar. Why upon the altar? Why upon an altar? Because God being incorporeal and inaccessible there must needs be something which in his place and stead receives the gifts destined for him: this function is performed by the altar, which is looked upon as the seat of God, and consequently, his vicarious impersonation.

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But so far we have considered only the part which man plays in the sacrifice. In order that the sacrifice may be completed and perfected, that it may reach its goal, we must not forget the part which God has in it. The sacrifice, the transference from the profane dominion to the sacred dominion of God of the gifts of our human indigence and unworthiness, can only be brought about by a bilateral agreement: God must accept what man offers to him. Without the divine acceptance the human oblation is a sacrifice that has failed. It is stayed on its journey: the offering does not reach its destination, and, therefore, will never attain that sanctity, that effective consecration, which was to come upon it from above, and was to transform it into the condition and state of a divine thing.

The purpose of a sacrifice is to be accepted; and it was ever the ambition of men to secure for themselves the tokens of this acceptance. Among the Hebrews assurance of the divine acceptance was had on various occasions by fire falling from heaven and devouring the victims, on God's behalf. After Moses, it was had by the sacred fire miraculously kindled at the ordination of Aaron, and perpetually kept burning by the tribe of Levi. In the absence of these heavenly tokens, there was the altar, the authentically and duly consecrated altar, which, by the very fact that it received, on behalf of God, the gifts destined for him, symbolized in a way, no matter how precarious, the divine acceptance. And for this reason we are told by Christ that the altar sanctifies the gift.

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Indeed the diyjne_acceptance in the Old Law was never
 more than figurative. If the sacrifices did please God, it was not on their own account, but only as figures of the sacrifice to come. Hence, according to the testimony of the prophets first, and later of the Epistle to the Hebrews, no sacrifice was accepted effectively and none was efficacious for the remission of sin. A propitiatory sacrifice, duly and really accepted by God, has the force of a contract, in which God binds himself to cancel the debt which that sacrifice strives

OUTLINE OF MYSTERY OF FAITH

to pay. Such an effect never followed the sacrifices of ancient times: this was reserved for the sacrifice of Christ.

It is worthy of note that after having dedicated their gifts to God, men habitually showed an eagerness to sit at table and partake of them. This proceeding would appear incompatible witlCtfie~primary idea of a consecration to God, of something that has become sacred, that is to say, set apart and reserved for God alone. And yet the proceeding is perfectly logical. The victims, it is true, belong to God alone; the altar which has received them is the table of God, and the feast, if feast there be, is God's. But if God is pleased to invite men to his table, to have them as his guests, to give them to eat and drink at the banquet that has been prepared for him, there is nothing in all this derogatory to the sacred condition, of the victims, as there would be in a sacrilegious theft, in snatching from God what had been given to him, and thus profaning what had been sanctified. On the contrary, we have here a gracious act on the part of God, admitting man to a share of the divine goods, and raising him to the condition of the holy things wherewith God befriends him. And in all this we have a figure of those eternal goods which man expects in the next life. We have a figure of the sanctity which is poured out upon the faithful and which is communicated to him by the food sanctified by the altar. This altar was in turn invested with God's holiness. Finally we have a figure of the unity established, not merely among the faithful who partake together of the same banquet, but also between them •aqd their God, with whom they all share in the same repast, .like persons dwelling under the same roof, like the members of the same family, like the familiars and kindred of God. Thus is the fruit of the sacrifice gathered, and thus is closed the cycle of that movement which, setting out from man towards God, reverts from God to man. There went up an insignificant human offering; there has come down a divine largesse.

This general economy of sacrifice, having its roots in the nature of man, and exemplified in all its parts by history, was outlined as early as the first half of the thirteenth century

by a famous teacher, William of Auvergne, bishop of Paris, It clears the way for the study of the following three points: the sacrifice of Redemption celebrated by Christ; the sacrifice of the Mass celebrated by the Church; and the sacrament of the Eucharist received by the faithful-

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Redemption, which might have been wrought otherwise, was accomplished by way of sacrifice. This is of faith: Jesus is a true priest, who offered a true sacrifice. But where shall we find in the work of the Redemption the elements of a true sacrifice? As regards the immolation, there is no difficulty: the Passion sufficiently accounts for it. But the Passion was the work of the executioners, and not of Jesus: it cannot therefore, by itself alone constitute the ritual oblation, which is properly the external and sensible action of the priest. Where shall we find this oblation, which is absolutely indispensable if the death of Jesus is to be a sacrifice properly so-called, and not a sacrifice in the broad sense, a purely metaphorical sacrifice, such as martyrdom under the New or under the Old Law? From the Garden to the Cross this oblation appears nowhere, in spite of the efforts of some to locate it in this or that stage of the bloody drama—efforts which, moreover, do not bear analysis. would indeed be insoluble, if, before Calvary and the Mount of Olives, there had not occurred the station on Mount Sion.

At the SupperJesus Christ, taking the bread, blessed it, etc., and in like manner the chalice, saying: "Eat, this is my Body, which shall be delivered [to death] foryou; drink, this is my Blood, which is poured outforyou and for the multitude [of souls] unto the remission of sins" What does it mean? Only this, that Christ, having put himself symbolically in the state of Victim, pledges to God for us that Death with whose sacramental signs he clothes himself. His mystic (symbolical and mystical are one and the same) immolation binds him to the effective and painful immolation of Calvary. Through the figure of

his Passion he hands himself over and dedicates himself to the Passion itself. He devotes himself to the expiatory death; before God he constitutes himself debtor for our salvation. He is no longer his own: henceforth the grave claims him as its prey. This is why, beginning their computation here, oriental interpreters of this text tell us that three days and three_nights shall pass unbroken over the sepulchre of Christ before his Resurrection.

The Supper follows that paschal repast of the azyms and the cup of which Jesus Christ had said when taking it: "I will; not drink of it again till its full realization in the Kingdom of* God." And yet after having thus spoken, he once more partakes of the azyms that have been consecrated and of the cup that has been blessed. What does it signify if not that there and then the Pasch' is realized and with it is accomplished! the inauguration of the Kingdom of God? But who does not! know that the realization of the Pasch is the sacrifice of the Passion, and that the Kingdom of God opens its era with the Redemption? At this very moment, therefore, the sacrifice of the Passion is going on; Redemption has already begun. BeKold here, the "Ï7amb ol God, the Lamb foretold by fifteen centuries of paschal feasts, the Lamb whose Blood at this very instant delivers from the death and slavery of sin; behold Christ's sacrifice; behold, already here at the Supper, the sacrifice of Calvary: The Supper Room faces the Cross and consigns to it the Divine Lamb.

The Supper ushers in the new covenant which abolishes the ancient one. It does not announce it; it brings it about: "This is the new testament." How so? Is not the new covenant the consequence of the sacrifice of Redemption? If so, then once more the sacrifice of Redemption is already being carried out. This is the new testament in the Blood of Christ, the price of our sins, offered to God and to be paid on the Cross.

The Supper is the sacrifice of the High Priest according to the order and rite of Melchisedech: priest, who, as we read in the *Epistle to the Hebrews*, offered but once the one sacrifice

of Redemption, the sacrifice of his Passion, by which he entered into the holies, into the state of glory, when he came forth from his earthly humiliations and tribulations; priest, who accomplished his august oblation by the power of the Most High ("by an eternal spirit", *Heb.* ix, 14): by the same power which all liturgies since then invoke or have invoked for the carrying out of the eucharistic rite through which the bread is changed into the Body, and the wine into the Blood. For the sacrifice of our Redemption was offered under the appearance of the gifts of Melchisedech.

Lastly, the Supper fulfils the promise of that bread which was to be the very flesh of Christ, given to God in ransom for the life of the world. (*Jn.* vi, 52). This is truly the flesh which is "given" (*Lk.* xxii, 19), given in the form of bread, given for the salvation of men (pro vobis; *Lk. ibid.*), given to God as a sacrifice of expiation.

In the light of all this we are not surprised that the Supper had to be included within the compass of the Passion, and marked off by Judas's treason, with which it begins. nohsurprised that the sacerdotal prayer of our Saviour should fean upon the Supper and reach out upon the Passion, joining Il together thèse two main supports of the sacrifice that unite to fQrm the arch of our salvation. This, too, gives the whole import of that mysterious expression with which Christ stresses his liturgical intent: "For them do I sanctify myself [by the sacrifice] that they also [by sharing in my sacrifice] may be sanctified [no longer in figure only, but] in truth." (In. xvii, It also explains why it is that Christ, so free of his movements and determinations till the Supper, and till then master of his life, of which he disposes as he wills, once the Supper is at an end, should fall to the ground and, prostrate as a suppliant, pray that the chalice might pass from him, "if it be possible"; and the chalice does not pass away. that is no longer possible. Escape is no longer allowed him, for he offered himself: and no one can take back, without sacrilege against God, what he has once consecrated to him. The chalice of the Supper should not have been consecrated,

if afterwards the chalice of the Passion was to be eliminated: and Christ dies, obedient, not to a special command of his ^Father, but to that law which demands that justice be respected, and consequently that obligations contracted with God be fulfilled. Now the obligation to let himself be put to death had been contracted freely by Christ in the eu<

TBlood.

Thus the Supper and the Passion answer each other. complete and compenetrate each other. The one presents to our eyes the sacerdotal, sensible, ritual oblation, wherein consists the mystic immolation; the other adds to it the real. bloody, all-sufficient immolation, of which the first was the figure. In the TSupper Room, amid a scene of splendour which he has designedly procured, Christ is chiefly the priest; on Calvary, in his silence and nakedness, he is chiefly the victim. On the one hand we have the Body and Blood symbolically separated, and under cover of this appearance, doomed to the death whose image they bear. On the other hand we have the Blood that flows till it is drained, in order to substantiate the prediction made at the Supper, realize the sacramental figure, and carry out the oblation. The whole Passion is sacrifice, because the whole Passion is bloody immolation offered by the Priest; and the Supper is the same Sacrifice, one and indivisible, because it is the gesture of the Priest, offering, in an unbloody rite, the same bloody immolation. The Passion is immolatio hostiae oblatae; the Supper is oblatio hostiae immolandae: oblation which perseveres, and that i VISIBLY, THROUGH THE TORMENTS OF THE SAVIOUR, INASMUCH j AS IT IS NOWHERE REVOKED, INASMUCH AS IT IS EVERYWHERE *

COUNTERSIGNED BY THE BLOOD THAT FLOWS TO RATIFY IT. And thus, there are not two sacrifices of our Redeemer, an unbloody sacrifice, followed by a bloody sacrifice; but there is one only Sacrifice, complete and perfect, both on the part of the Priest who celebrates with bread and wine, and on the part of the Victim put to death. Such is the teaching of the whole of patristic antiquity as well as of Holy Writ; such is the doctrine of the liturgies; such is the doctrine preferred at the Council

of Trent by the most eminent among the Fathers—those who brought about the triumph of Chapter I of Session XXII. This doctrine, however, is only complete when related to the teaching both of Scripture and Tradition on the eternity of the state of Victim in which Christ placed himself at his Death, and in which God has immortalized him in his Resurrection and Ascension.

For to the oblation of the High Priest there was of necessity to be an answer of divine acceptance. No created fire, it is true, came down to devour the Body of the Christ in the sepulchre. But there came the fire of divine glory consuming the mortality and corruptibility of the Saviour, making him pass, whole and entire, body and soul, into the proper condition of only Son, Lord, Christ; completing, consummating his Incarnation on that day of which his Father has said: Ego hodie genui te, "to-day have I begotten thee." And as of old the flesh of the victims remained "idolothyte", as long as corruption had not set in, so the Christ, safeguarded against the corruption of the grave by his glorious Resurrection, remains in his Father's presence, eternal "theothyte". The Lamb, far from losing its quality of Victim, of Sacrifice, retains it increased and enhanced by all that is added to it by the divine ratification, effective acceptance and heavenly consummation. The Gift has reached its goal. It is the price of our salvation, held in the hand of God for ever, to pay an everlasting debt.

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But this is not all. If Christ's Death on the one hand has paid the penalty of our sins, on the other, it is his Resurrection which effects our justification (Earn. iv, 25). Moral cause of our ransom by his Blood, Christ is the efficient cause, first of our grace, and then of our glory, by the divine condition in which God took him up. In other words, the atoning Victim who "maketh intercession for us" is also the vital principle by which God communicates to us the breath of life, the spiritual life.

Priest and Victim, Christ is likewise the Altar, and the eternal Altar of his Sacrifice. His Body, seat of the Divinity,

received the Blood of the Victim, sacramentally at the hands of the Priest during the Supper, and then really upon the Cross where that Body was drenched with the Blood which the wounds drew forth. No other altar would have been qualified to sanctify the august Victim of our High Priest. Translated to heaven, this altar holds up the Victim to the eyes of God. A living and "speaking" Altar, as we are told by St. John in the Apocalypse. The one and only Altar, which ours made by human hands are not meant to replace, but to recall to our watchful faith, "they having been anointed with qhrism," as the Roman Breviary reminds us, "only for the purpose of better representing Jesus Christ, who is our Altar, as he is our Victim and our Priest

Priest, Victim, Altar of his Sacrifice, Jesus Christ is also the first one to partake of the sacrificial feast, and in a sense the only rightful guest. This our Doctors have noted from the most remote antiquity with a surprising doctrinal consensus. Not only did he give to his own to eat and drink the Body and Blood of the Supper, but he himself, Head of the holy race and of the chosen people, wished to sit at the table of his Father, and eat the bread of the children, pledge of that eternal inheritance into whose possession he was about to enter, and into which he was to give us admittance by making us partake with him of the family meal, of that meal of which he alone could taste first and extend to us its benefit. Moreover no one can take his place at that table except as member of the only Son and of the divine Liturgus, even though it be true also, as will appear elsewhere, that no one can be incorporated in our Head except in virtue of the Eucharist.

But everything would have ended with the Supper and with the group of the Twelve gathered in the Upper Room, had not Jesus Christ added: "Do this in commemoration of me". This command gives rise to the Sacrifice of the Mass, Sacrifice in which the Church in her turn and in the name of -Christ, with whom she is indivisibly associated in the unity

of the same priesthood, offers to God what Christ had offered -his Death and Passion. She offers as he had offered: with the rite of a sacramental, or mystical, that is to say, symbolical, immolation which is borrowed from the appearance, of bread and wine, with which the Saviouris, Body and Blood çlothe themselves, at the voice of the priest, uttering the words with which the holy Cenacle first resounded. is here the oblation of a Victim, no longer indeed to be immolated, but already and once for all immolated in the past. But this past survives, since Christ always remains the sacrificial Victim of Calvary, even in the midst of the glory that makes of him an eternal "theothyte". Oblatio hostiae, non immolandae, sed immolatae. It is thus that all antiquity understood it; thus it is attested along the course of ages by the voice of the Doctors of the Church and of the liturgies, in the West as well as in the East, Greek as well as Syriac, and in our own as well as the Byzantine Middle Ages. Thus also spoke the little heeded voices of the Apologists of the counter-Reformation in the Netherlands, on the Rhine, in France, in Italy, in all the lands where the enemies of the faith could not be silenced by hurling at them long-range shafts that were pointless, even though forged on the anvil of a scholasticism as fearless as it was arbitrary. Thus we read in the catechisms of our forebears, in the instructions of the shepherds to their flocks. Such is the tenor of whatever theological literature has not been contaminated by lawless and unbridled speculation, in search of an impossible solution to a non-existent problem. Here is the wording of that supposed problem: -the Mass being a sacrifice, and there being no true sacrifice without a true victim, it remains to discover what Js done to Christ in the MassJin ?rder t{LphG£JliIILiIL·the state of Victim. This problem appears nowhere before the middle of the sixteenth century, and for this very simple reason— Christ needed not to be ÎLutJntojL^

Jiolds that conditionjforj^ej^Jj^^

consummated in glory. All we have to do is to re-enact what Christ had done: *Hoc facite*, *do this*. He offered, under the

appearances of his Death, the bloody reality of that Death; and so do we. We are offering his Death, when we offer him in his quality of "theothyte" of his Passion, We offer that one single immolation, when we present to God the, gift of his Body, the Body of the Crucified One, and of his Blood, the Blood of his wounds. But to make of him a Victim, to immolate him effectively! as did the Jews, is not our task.

Even if we could do so, we should not. No, indeed, it is enough that being the Victim of his Sacrifice, he should become through us the Victim of our Sacrifice. He is Victim without us.: we must make him our Victim. This we do when on our own account we repeat what took place at the Supper. Hoc facite: do ye what I have done before you; do over again My Sacrifice, and let My Sacrifice become your Sacrifice. Between what he did and what we are doing, there is, if we understand it aright, but the twofold difference which follows.

First, at the Supper he himself, in person, and he alone, offered: now we offer jointly with him. Indeed, he does not offer except through our intervention, our oblation being performed in virtue of his, in virtue of that one single oblation which once proceeded from Christ but is ever operative as a universal cause in all particular and subordinate oblations, which extend his through time and through space, to the universality of the Church. The Church, indissolubly knit to Christ, enjoys the privilege of being associated with him in his priesthood, and the whole sacerdotal Body of the Saviour must needs enter into full participation of the act by which Christ paid the ransom of the world, in order that the world may have the honour and advantage of working at

1 To immolate him effectively; for to immolate him mystically, sacramentally, symbolically, is clearly our task, since herein precisely consists the oblation which we must make after the example of Christ, as we have just explained. There is this difference between an effective immolation and a mystical one, that the former affects its subject intrinsically, unlike the latter, which remains external to him, being produced in the region of the sacramental sign only, in those outward appearances which, by the effect of the words of consecration, form themselves, so to speak, around the Body and Blood of Jesus Christ, without, however, penetrating them.

its own redemption, by paying out of its own hand the more than sufficient price put at its disposal by Christ the Redeemer.

The second difference is this: what Christ did before the Crucifixion, the same we do after the Crucifixion, in mei memoriam, "for the commemoration of me", as St. Paul explains, showing "the Death of the Lord, until he come" from heaven, where he disappeared. Hence the Mass faces the past, while the Supper faced the future.

We have then, the sacrifice of the Mass and the Sacrifice of Calvary, the former adding nothing to the latter, no more than the creature adds to the Creator, or the particular good to the universal. Still, if we consider the oblation which is performed in both—in the one case oblation by Christ alone, in the other a subordinated and joint oblation by the minister; here oblation of a Victim already at hand, there oblation of a Victim in course of being executed—we cannot reduce the two sacrifices to such perfect unity as would exclude all plurality. It is certain, as every one knows, that sacrifices are multiplied according to the diversity of sacerdotal oblations, which constitute their formal element. On the other hand, the Supper and the Cross are but one Sacrifice for the same reason, for there intervenes between them but one single oblation, accomplished in the Cenacle and persisting throughout the Passion. But the Victim of the Mass, the reality offered in sacrifice (that which constitutes not the active but the passive sacrifice) is from the Cross to the Mass, as from the Supper to the Cross, strictly and numerically one, not, only in its material aspect, which gives us the same Body and the same Blood in each case, but also in its formal aspect as Victim, which gives us one single effective immolation, the one single attribute, then acquired, and thenceforth imperishable, of Gift, of Victim handed over to God and made over to him. Our Victim is the one which Calvary made and which heaven eternizes.

The above view is not without influence on the manner of estimating the value of the Mass. There has been talk of an infinite value for each mass, infinite as regards the

multitude of those who can profit by it, infinite as regards the magnitude of the fruit which everyone may draw from it. This value, in itself infinite, is, we are told, limited in reality by a divine arbitrament in the results actually obtained, and is in keeping with a uniform and invariable standard. This opinion presents two disadvantages. On the one hand it does not add to our pleasure to see God intervene for the purpose not of increasing our goods but of curtailing our profits. Plato speaks of a goodness which is not jealous of its gifts, but takes delight in scattering them to the full measure in which they can be shared. Our classical philosophy does not speak differently, when it presents God to us as Pure Act, whose characteristic is to diffuse the act and not to limit it—for such limitation the receptive power accounts sufficiently. On the other hand, the very notion of an infinite value proceeds from this relatively modern illusion, according to which the sacrifice of our altars is looked upon as the immediate and personal work of Christ, repeating the act of oblation from mass to mass and from altar to altar. Let us once admit, accepting a fifteen-hundred-year-old doctrine, that the Mass is the action of the Church, and that she alone interposes a new oblation, subordinate, it is true, to the one oblation of Christ, Chief Priest, from whom she herself derives her power, and the above notion of the value of the Mass will undergo a change.

Then it will be seen that the Mass, in what is new and special to it, is an endeavour of men to reach God, and not Christ's own personal approach towards his Father. It is the offering, renewed by us and not by the Saviour, of his Body and Blood. It follows that what is offered is indeed of infinite value; but the active offering made of it is intrinsically limited by the greater or lesser sanctity of the agent from whom it proceeds, and in particular of the universal Church, whose sanctity is indeed indefectible, but variable. Now, as St. Thomas remarks, in the relations between man and God, no less than in those between man and man, when it is a question of appreciating an act of generosity,

it is more important to take into consideration the sentiments of the giver than the price of the gift itself. And so, the value of this our action, though deriving from the VICTIM TO which it is related an incomparable increase of value, or to express it better, an incalculable coefficient, will nevertheless remain a function of a finite quantity, which is that of the holiness of the offerers.

How do the various participants in the oblation of a particular mass contribute to determine its value? Among those participants there is in the first place the^niversal Church, who, because she alone is the Body of Christ, can alone offer the Body of Christ. There is in the second place rHe officiating priest, who is the official agent of that Body as regards the ministry of oblation/nTnThe third place, there is the hristian who supplies the terrestrial matter of the sacrifice, the amount required to satisfy the needs of the minister, who is entitled to live by the altar. In the fourth place, there are those who, gathered round the altar, are associated in a special manner in the celebration of the mystery. what extent all these offerers contribute to determine the value of the mass is a highly interesting question, the answer to which is found in the most ancient documents of Christian literature.

Let it suffice here to state that of the four above-mentioned human factors of our sacrifice, the one that transcends all others, is the Church. It may happen that no faithful are -P" present, or that no pious soul except the celebrant himself -ÿi' xjAhas provided the material elements of the sacrifice, or that the celebrant himself is guilty of sacrilege: there still remains y* the Church, that Church which is ever holy, ever pleasing , and acceptable to God. And because of the permanency of this chief factor (among the human ones) the offering of the Body and Blood of Jesus Christ is always agreeable to God, even under the most adverse conditions. And though the priest be not only unworthy, but interdicted, degraded, excommunicated, separated from the Church by formal heresy, yet whenever he offers, the Church offers through

him. To whatever extent the exercise of his unlawful ministry may be detrimental to him personally, whatever harm may befall those who dare to associate themselves with him in his transgression, at least the body of the Church profits by it, and Christ's Blood, profaned by unworthy Christians, still calls down mercy upon the faithful people.

And to whom are the fruits of the mass applied? In a general way to those for whom it is offered. But who come under this head? In the first place those who offer: for no one, if he be a sinner, can offer for the sins of others without first offering for his own sins. Every mass, therefore, brings with it a personal and inalienable benefit to the offerers. But through that charity which makes us all one man in Christ, and makes it possible for each one to offer for others as well as for himself, the fruits of the holy sacrifice reach, by way of suffrage, all those for whom it is lawful to offer it.

It must, of course, be understood that this power of oblation, which is ours only as members of the sacerdotal body of Jesus Christ, resides (even in its lowest degree) in none but such as are admitted to his priesthood by baptism and remain united to the Church by the bond of faith. alone can procure for themselves the fruits of the sacrifice by means of their own offering entrusted to the hand£ of the But no one is excluded from the suffrage, no one among the living, and no one among the dead who are in purgatory. And if it is a question of an intention for some departed individual by name, no one is debarred, at least of those who went out of this life in visible communion with the Church. All such are presumed to abide in the Body of Christ, just as, alas! all those who on earth were not in visible communion with that Body must be presumed strangers If, nevertheless (and this hope is always legitimate), there existed the invisible bond of union, those held by it have a share in the common benefit which accrues daily from the sacrifice of the Church to the multitude of unnamed souls

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So much as regards the nature of the sacrifice of the Mass and its utilization. What about the precise action by which the holy sacrifice is accomplished? It is not the communion, which being a participation of the Victim of the "sacrifice presupposes the sacrifice already accomplished, instead of constituting it. It is not the breaking of the bread, which far from symbolizing the Passion, originally was but a rite having for its purpose the distribution of the eucharistic repast among the faithful. Neither is it any verbal formula of oblation: for sacrifice-is essentially the transfer of a gift, and not the enunciation of that transfer, an nhlatinn in action, and not merely an oblation in words. Neither is it the epiclesis[^] however august its character, however suitable its placcaFiér the commemoration of the Supper. And this is true of it in all liturgies, without exception, whether it has reference to God, or to the Trinity, or to the Father, Son, or Holy Ghast in particular. This epiclesis^ moreover, is at times rather \vagub, imploring only the coming of the Holy Ghost upon the gifts, as we find in some very primitive documents like the Liturgy of Hippolytus. At other times it is more definite, asking in clear terms for t'ransubstantiation, to be accomplished either by the descent of divine power upon the gifts in order to change them into the Body and Blood of Christ or by bringing and placing them upon the true and sublime Altar, which never bore but one Victim, the victim of the one Priest and of his one Sacrifice. In either case, the *epiclesis* presupposes the sacrifice as already accomplished, and has for its purpose to ask God its acceptation and ratification (although in reality this ratification or acceptation consists in the transubstantiation already effected). Nothing of all this, impressive though it be, constitutes the sacrifice. What constitutes it is the consecration brought about by the words of Christ and by them alone. So that the acceptance of the sacrifice by God, and its oblation by man, and the commemoration of the Supper and of the Passion of Christ, all are realized at the same instant, t and through the effect of the same words. For these words may be considered as conferring upon the Body and Blood

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the very quality of sensible gifts that is borrowed from the bread and wine (oblation). They may be considered as effecting a miracle of divine omnipotence (acceptance). Finally they may be considered as perpetuating the tangible memorial of the sacrifice of our Redemption (commemoration). wonder, then, that for the understanding of the mystery and for the instruction of the faithful, it should be necessary to distinguish these various elements or aspects of one and the same complex and indivisible action, and to distribute their ceremonial and literary expressions through the successive parts of the Liturgy. For this reason there comes first the oral commemoration of the Supper, introducing the Saviour's words; then, as if to carry out the mandate with which they end, follows the remembrance or anamnesis of the Passion, Resurrection and Ascension; and this again is naturally followed by the presentation of the gifts, which, in turn, and as a matter of course, ends with the request for acceptance: anamnesis, oblation, epiclesis.

But which are those words of Christ that are essential to the accomplishment of the sacrifice? For the bread, there is no difficulty. But for the chalice, it rather appears that we must return to the teaching of St. Thomas, who requires, besides the mention of the Blood, the designation of its propitiatory function. If this is omitted, the sacramental form may well be indicative of a real presence, but not of a real presence that implies in Christ the quality of a gift, of propitiatory Gift, of expiatory Victim, of Sacrifice. But it is precisely this which Jesus Christ instituted, after having inaugurated it at the Supper. This point must be noted. He might have effected this or that transubstantiation, had it pleased him, without attaching to it the character of an oblation made to Even though the transubstantiation represented his imminent Death by a distinct designation of the Body and Blood, it was yet possible to represent that Death to men after the manner of a sacrament without presenting it to God after the fashion of a sacrifice. What will give to the transubstantiation this higher reach, and give it, not in an inward and

hidden manner, but in a manner clear and refulgent, as befits an exterior sign and intelligible rite, such as sacrifice? In other words, what stamps transubstantiation as an act of oblation? It is precisely the drift given to the rite by the words which in their sacramental form enunciate a propitiatory intention. If the Body of Christ is delivered for us, or if his Blood flows for our sake, for the expiation of our sins, then, and only then, will it be clear not only that the representation of his Death, in the reality of his Body and Blood, has the value of a living picture exhibited to our eyes, but that from the angle under which it stretches out to God that representation is a pledge of the world's ransom. Then, indeed, there is a gift; a Gift which ascends to God, before again descending to men. Thus, in our Eucharist there is no transubstantiation without sacrifice, because Christ willed to connect the one with the other. Again, there is no sacrifice without an approach towards God; and this approach does not manifest itself otherwise than by the propitiatory destination of the Gift; and this destination is not expressed, and therefore not imparted, except by a sacramental form which enunciates not only the presence but the reason for that presence. Such undoubtedly is the mind of St. Thomas and of all his most ancient commentators, in opposition to the opinion of St. Bonaventure, followed perhaps too readily by most of the modern theologians.

Furthermore, do the words of Christ, even in their entire scope, suffice of themselves? It would appear that they do not. Here Scotus may well be right against St. Thomas. Words like this is my Body, etc., this is my Blood, etc., cannot denote the Body and Blood of Christ unless they are placed on the lips of Christ. Otherwise not his Body and Blood are designated, but mine, who am speaking. The intention which makes me speak cannot alter the case. That intention has not for its task to specify or to rectify the meaning of a formula, but only to apply correctly to a suitable matter a form in itself clear and not equivocal, correct and not faulty. But, to make Christ do the speaking, it is necessary to state that he did speak, and that he uttered at the Supper the words

which we quote, and which at that very Supper he uttered over the species to which we apply them [accipiens et hunc praeclarum Calicem].

But is it also required that the narrative of the Supper be formulated in such a way, or at least be introduced by such a preamble, that it should appear clearly addressed not to men, but to God? In this case the first half of the Canon would be made to assume a not unimportant part in the consecration of the Eucharist. The arguments in favour of the affirmative, which has been held by some very orthodox theologians, may be drawn from the example of Christ, who consecrated after a prayer of thanksgiving and blessing addressed to God. Another source of arguments is found in patristic tradition, which strives to make us see in our sacrifice a prayer. Again, we are told, theological reason would hardly be satisfied if the prayer and formal liturgy of the sacrifice were carried out in a purely historical discourse, without any feature giving it a religious aspect. But Christ's example goes against the thesis; for most certainly he consecrated while addressing himself to his disciples. Besides, whether God is spoken to or not, the Fathers are justified in seeing in our sacrifice a prayer, since every sacrifice contains implicitly the request for divine acceptance, and our sacrifice is, moreover, effected, not by a material action, but by the words which we pronounce. Finally, the consecrating discourse will always be sacred and religious by the mere fact that it directs a victim to the divine cult (to the worship of God). There is no evidence that more than this is required: hence, without censuring the requirements of others, one may well refuse to follow them, and still remain a child of wisdom.

Symbol of the death of Christ, the Eucharist is also a sign, foretokening our glorious _resurrection7~and indicating" our union ivith-him as well as the union of the faithful~^ïüng themselves in the Church: for this reason the Eucharist is a sacrament. Meant for the refection of the faithful after its

oblation to God, the Eucharist possesses this quality—belonging, as we saw, to whatever is served upon the table of sacrifice—of signifying the beatitude of the future life, the sanctity of the present life, and the unity of the divine family. It accomplishes this in an eminent manner, by representing and effecting the incorporation of the members in Christ, Head of that ecclesiastical Body whose integration shall be completed in heaven.

The union with Christ symbolized and effected by the Eucharist does not consist in the mere physical presence of Jesus Christ in us. It is the effect of this physical presence, and, unlike that presence, is not transitory, but permanent. It consists in that spiritual fellowship which is established between Jesus Christ and ourselves (/ Cor. x. 16-21). It consists in the mutual indwelling of Christ in us and of us in Christ (Jn, vi, 56-57), and in the vivifying influence which Christ, the vital principle (I Cor. xv, 45), exerts upon the subject to whom he communicates himself. It consists in the consequent building up of that one integral and living body wherein we dwell. Sacramental communion binds us, through a spiritual communion, to the immolated flesh of Christ, to the sanctified and sanctifying Victim, distributed to us that it may impart to us the life it draws from the bosom of divine glory, which for evermore has become its proper element. This sap of life coursing through the veins of our soul is grace. Grace, then, does not only unite us to the divinity, it unites us also to the very humanity, of the Saviour. In a spiritual way—which does not mean in an unreal but in an immaterial way—grace unites us to his Body. The vital and never ceasing dynamic power of the flesh of Christ is that which, while preserving life in us, has for result our union with his spirit and divinity. His flesh, the flesh of the Son of man, is the link between our souls and his Soul, for the purpose of making us partakers, beyond his Soul itself, of the Divine Nature.

In every one of us grace exists as an emanation from and dependence upon the sanctifying grace which resides primarily in Christ's humanity. In him grace dwells in all its plenitude,

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that is, in "the plenitude of its perfection, and in the perfection of its plenitude." This must be taken not in the sense merely of a relative plenitude, in comparison with lower degrees of grace actually imparted to other creatures, but in the sense of an absolute plenitude, as compared to any possible grace. This plenitude is not only superior in degree to any other; it is a plenitude beyond measure, and consequently without any common measure with anything which it transcends. Any other notion falls short of him who in his very humanity is Son by nature, and not at all by adoption, as are the rest (in whom sanctifying grace imitates only imperfectly the prerogatives of natural filiation). To him who is the heir of glory by birth, and has a connatural claim to grace, nothing can be wanting of all that God can bestow. Neither would anything less have sufficed to the Redeemer, to enable him to offer for our sins a compensation equal to all the hatred they justly deserve, and a satisfaction made up of all the pain which it is their fatality to inflict. Nothing less was needed in order that the Man-God should immediately, effectively and constantly be made secure against every, even the most unsurmountable, obstacle opposing the accomplishment of God's will. Nor was less required in order that that source of our grace might, if it chose, triumph in us over all our ill will, no matter how refractory. "Of his fullness we have all received" (In. i. 16); and it all comes about through the Eucharist.

The Eucharist cannot join us to Christ without uniting us all with one another. Thus the unity of the Church—that spiritual association which builds up the Body of Christ—results from the eucharistie bread: "Because one [is the] bread, one body are we the many who all partake of the one bread" (Z Cor. x, 17). From this follows the identity, or at least the sameness, between communion in the Eucharist and communion in the Church; between excommunication which severs from the eucharistie Body and excommunication which severs from the ecclesiastical Body of Christ.

This ecclesiastical Body will be completed only in heaven, after the glorious resurrection; and this glorious resurrection

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will itself be the fruit of the Eucharist (Jn. vi. 54, 58, 63). Knit to Christ as members to our Head, how can we end in the dust of earth, while the Head is reigning in glory? What manner of Body would that be, which, with its Head crowned in heaven, would have its feet for ever buried in the grave? Let us recall, too, that grace ushered in by the Eucharist, and transformed in heaven into glory, qualifies the souls to communicate themselves with all their glory to the flesh. With a desire that is overpowering, because inborn, these blessed souls long for their bodies as their natural complement; while to animate them again without at the same time glorifying them is no longer possible. For this reason was the eucharistic banquet given us by Christ as the sacramental figure of the heavenly banquet (Mt. xxvi, 29; Mk. xiv, 25; Lk. xxii, 29, 30). At all events, on the last day, wheresoever the Body of Christ shall be in the person of his inanimate members, there shall the eagles—the holy souls of paradise—also be gathered together from the four winds, to raise up that which had been struck down, and to build up in all its parts the finished and glorious Body of the Son of God, whose glory once more shall have swallowed up completely the very last traces of corruptibility and mortality {Mt. xxiv, 28; Lk. xvii, 37).

The sensible element of this sacrament consists of the species as they are affected by the form; and this latter determines the meaning of the whole in reference to the Body and Blood of Christ. But beyond the outward sacrament, there is an interior sacrament: the Body of Christ designated by the species, and itself, in turn, designating something else, namely the Church, composed of the Head and of his members.

The causality proceeds conformably to the signification, since it is distinctive of sacraments to accomplish what they signify, in fact to accomplish by signifying it. Thus the exterior rite, constituted by the union of the form with the species, produces transubstantiation of the bread into the Body of Christ, and the Body of Christ has for effect the building up, member by member, of the universality of the Church.

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From this process, then, must be excluded all immediate causality of the first term with regard to the third, that is to say, of the sacramental species in relation to the Church. is not the multiplicity of the grains of wheat or of the grapes blended into unity which by itself represents sacramentally the unity of the Church, or contributes to it efficaciously. This symbolism, although very pious, venerable and ancient more ancient perhaps than the Christian religion itself, if it be true that it is of Jewish origin—is nevertheless one of mere adaptation. It is certainly as devoid of divine institution as the mixing of the wine and water, or the use of the unleavened The sacramental order is the one that proceeds from the exterior to the interior, from the container to the content, and thus from this priceless content to its extension throughout all mankind—in other words, from Christ's Body bom of the Virgin Mary and immolated upon the Cross, to Christ's Body gathered from the four quarters of the world and garnered in paradise.

The twofold species, of bread and wine, raises a question about the unity of the sacrament. There seems to be no satisfactory solution without conceiving the eucharistic meal as a sacrificial repast, the partaking of which in any manner whatever is sufficient to secure the whole benefit which it enfolds. For this reason, communion under one species does not deprive the faithful of any one of the fruits of the Eucharist.

In addition to this formal unity of the sacrament, there is also a strictly numerical unity across time and space, in spite of an apparent multiplicity, which arises from the plurality of the sacrifices. So real is this numerical unity, that the communicant of to-day does partake of the repast of the Supper, of this anticipated banquet of Calvary, no less directly than did the Twelve, to whom Jesus Christ dispensed with his own hands the Body and Blood of the Lamb. From thenceforth till the end of time, it is always the same Bread, the same Cup that passes from hand to hand throughout all generations. Once more, it is of this Chalice and of this Bread that Jesus

Christ said at the Supper: This—this which we priests of the twentieth century hold in our hands—this is my Body, this is my Blood. We do not merely tell the story of the Supper about the chalice and the bread of that memorable night; we do claim to refer the discourse of the Lord to our own gifts. This is what the Schoolmen mean when they say that upon our lips the words of Christ, while having the true character of a "citation", do none the less have directly in view, significative or demonstrative, the present mystery.

If the Eucharist is compared with the other sacraments, and first of all with Baptism, it will be found that Baptism does not incorporate into the Church and in Christ except by the power of the Eucharist. Baptism is the sacrament of death, despoiling us of the old Adam and of the sad life of inherited sin. But it does this in view of a new life, the life of grace and of justice, to be drawn from the bosom of the new Adam. Hence, Baptism looks to the Eucharist as to the source of that blessed life which the baptismal symbolism alone could not sufficiently designate as conferred, but only as desired. And thus with the sacramental signification of Baptism there goes forth an appeal for the Eucharist. And because every sacrament accomplishes what it expresses, Baptism introduces into the soul a desire for communion—habitual desire or actual desire, as the case may be. In this respect, Baptism may be defined as the sacrament of the communion of desire. And since desire, like a hand stretched out towards the source of heavenly goods, snatches already the waters of grace escaping therefrom, it becomes clear that Baptism, as soon as received, initiates the recipient to the fruits of the Eucharist. We can also see how sacramental communion comes to ratify Baptism, how abstention from the Holy Table gives the lie to the baptismal vows, and how the renewal of these vows finds its natural place on the first communion day.

The other sacraments confer grace only in dependence on the Eucharist. Each one of them, in its own way, has in view either a preparation for the Eucharist, or a safeguard of the eucharistie life in us. Penance is the sacrament of readmission

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to the Eucharist; Confirmation strengthens the eucharistie bond against difficulties from without; Matrimony shields it against difficulties from within. Extreme Unction, removing the last remains of sin, puts the soul in readiness for perfect union, for communion in plenitude. Holy Order is entirely directed to the oblation and consequently to the official participation of the Eucharist. Everything fronts towards it, as do our churches towards the rising sun and Mount Calvary. All the sacraments lead to it or form a bulwark around it. If it be true that a means is desirable only in view of the end, then we must admit that all the other sacraments are pregnant with a desire of that one towards which they marshal their own whole activity. this account what is special to each of them is introduced by means of sanctifying grace, which is itself truly and properly the work of the Eucharist.

These special dispositions imparted to the faithful by all the other sacraments the Eucharist either requires or utilizes. They are like so many avenues or channels or arteries, open within us to the vital influence of the Eucharist. Hence, there is between this latter sacrament and them a most important difference as regards the kind of instrumental causality which belongs to them respectively in relation to grace. In the Eucharist that causality is "perfective": it attains sanctifying grace in itself and does so by its own means. In the other sacraments it is merely "dispositive": it attains sanctifying grace by means of the various forms of one or another disposition peculiar to each sacrament, which coalesces with grace only by the power of the Eucharist.

After what has been said, it will be easy to enter, or rather to re-enter, the great stream of Catholic tradition concerning the necessity of the Eucharist. It is a necessity of means and not merely of precept. It is a necessity for which there would be no accounting if the eucharistic sacrifice were related to another immolation than that of the Cross. But it is a necessity quite intelligible if the Christ of the Eucharist is really and truly nothing else than the Lamb, the "theothyte" Victim

of Calvary, without whom it is not possible to procure for oneself the fruit of the sacrifice of our redemption. Therefore, without the Eucharist, there is no communion with Christ: without the Eucharist there is no communion with the Church. and no divine adoption. Even those who lived in times of long ago, among shadows and figures, had to unite themselves by desire to this divine flesh and to eat in spirit of this heavenly bread. For us, for every one, the words of Christ hold absolutely: "Except you eat my Flesh and drink my Blood, you shall not have life in you." The Fathers do not admit of an exception to this law any more than to the law which makes of baptism the condition for entrance into the kingdom of heaven. Actually received, or partaken of at least in desire, the Eucharist is the indispensable means of salvation.

Further, repeated reception is also the necessary means of perseverance. It alone makes sure our progress in grace, which progress is itself an indispensable condition of fidelity to the essential observance of the commandments. The reason of this may be either that as men we are bound to make progress by our very nature, which we cannot thwart with impunity, or that we are subject to a wearing-out process, which for the very continuance of the struggle against evil requires a steadily growing energy. Now, as a matter of fact, the increase of grace, in the last analysis, comes from the same source as its beginning; from the one fountain of living waters, the Eucharist. It was fitting, therefore, that Jesus Christ should institute the Eucharist under the appearances of a daily food, such as bread and wine. It was also natural that in the prayer which we have received from him there should stand at the head of all other petitions made in our own behalf that of the daily bread-for the soul even more than for the body, as it has always been understood by Catholic tradition.

We see how the Eucharist, sacrifice and sacrament, in the abundance of its richness, sums up all that the Cross offered to God and procured for men. It is the summary of the

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marvels wrought by the Almighty for the salvation of man-It is even more: it is the reliquary, living and immortal reliquary of those marvels. It is the Blood of Calvary and the dew of heaven at one and the same time: the Blood that cries for mercy, and the vivifying dew that raises up the drooping It is the price paid for us, and the blessing brought to us. It is life and the price of life. The Cross was not worth more, nor the Supper, nor the two together: and all of it endures, and all of it is fraught with all the hopes of humanity. For these reasons the Mass is well called the Mystery of Faith; not only because the whole Christian dogma-which is the dogma of our ruin in Adam and of our restoration in Jesus Christ—is summed up in it; but also, and chiefly, because the drama, the heroic action by which was accomplished that sublime uplifting of humanity and superabundant compensation for our former losses, continues in our midst by means of it. And it is not a repetition by way of a mere symbol, but actually realizes in our midst what was accomplished by Christ himself. And this Christ, protagonist of that drama, is not the hero of some vaporous myth, but of a story authentically divine; he is the author of a sacred rite which we renew in memory of him. If there was but folly in the "mysteries" of the Greeks, there is in ours the wisdom and the power of God. All Christians are "mystics", and Christ is the great "mystagogue", initiating men into the pains of his death and the grandeur of his resurrection by the mysterious words of which the Church holds the secret, and by which she evokes before us the Flesh and the Blood of Calvary, the Bread of heaven and the Chalice of eternal The daily consecration of these, the daily repast, salvation. constitute through the course of ages, the true "mystery", the awful Mystery of Christian Faith, the harbinger of heaven's theophany in that of our altars.

All that has been said thus far on the nature of the eucharistic sacrifice and on the consequences of the sacrament receives a signal confirmation from the analysis of transubstantiation. For transubstantiation proves itself essentially incapable of

having anything for its term except a pre-existent object. It is equally powerless to modify the previous condition whether substantial or accidental—of that object, while conferring upon it a new presence under the appearances of the transubstantiated matter. It is, therefore, impossible to impart to Jesus Christ a new intrinsic state. Transubstantiation cannot make life yield to death, or death to life. It cannot cause the Body to be without Soul in the Eucharist, if that Body be living in heaven. Neither could it have kept the Soul united to the Body in the Eucharist when that Body was dead in the sepulchre. It cannot diminish by one cubit, even by taking thought for ages, the stature of our Lord. But such as he is in heaven, such we have him in the Eucharist. substantiation cannot even endow him with a real relation to the species which contain him. In fact, these species, stripped by transubstantiation of the substantial content to which they referred, do now transfer to the Body of Christ that relation which they had to the bread, so far as they marked its localisation and outward appearance. In manner the species indicate and determine the presence of Christ's Body to that portion of space which they occupy. They are united indeed to the Body as to the new substance which takes the place of the bread, but that substance is not affected or modified or measured by them. For this reason the Body or the Blood of Christ is present in the species without being divided, either actually or potentially, together with them, but is always wholly and entirely in every part of them as well as in the whole of them. When they cease to be what they are actually, the connatural appearances and accidents of bread, they will also cease to be the covering and index of the Body of Christ. For they possessed and designated that Body only as taking the place of the bread to which by their nature and destiny they belonged. The effect of transubstantiation comes to an end at that instant, and the natural order of things resumes its course. The species are changed into that substance which the bread by its decomposition would have engendered. But this last transformation leaves Christ's

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Body unchanged. He is no longer present; the sacrament has disappeared: but he himself experienced no effect; nothing happened to him. He is, both in his being and in his state, beyond the reach of the sacramental operation. His presence alone depends upon it, and that presence puts nothing new into him, although it offers a new term to the relativity of the species, in consequence of the change occurring in the bread. Such being the case, it is quite impossible that transubstantiation should bring about in Jesus Christ a new intrinsic state of Victim, of something immolated. Hence the reality of that state must of necessity be independent of our action, which is limited to transubstantiation. We have here another reason for not asking ourselves what we do to Jesus Christ in order to place him in the state of Victimas if, forsooth, he was not in that state already. Never was a theological problem set down in more unhappy terms. true wording of the problem was as follows: Jesus Christ being the eternal Victim of Calvary, where is the oblation which we make of that Victim? It is found entirely in the representative immolation which we make of the Victim. after the example of Christ himself, who first did in that same manner offer once for all the sacrifice of our Redemption.

That sacrifice of Redemption was Christ's task as Mediator. The sacrifice of the Mass is the task by which the whole Church seizes hold of the price of our Redemption, in order henceforth to pay it herself. No longer is the Church, as was mankind of yore, an insolvent debtor; but she is rich and possessed of an inexhaustible treasure which enables her to honour her debts out of her own hands, as well as to pay the debts of all mankind. It is true she does this in union with her Head, and in virtue of the bond of solidarity established between herself and him. He amassed the treasures, the Church exploits them. In this sense the whole Church exercises a ransoming power, a sacerdotal power. As a result of her participation in Christ the Redeemer's unique priesthood, the Church is the faithful auxiliary of the Sovereign Priest, and the efficient co-operator in the ransom of mankind:

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conredemptrix et consacerdos. These two attributes, however, among all the members of the Church, belong in an eminent degree to the Virgin Mary, more closely united than all others to the Head of the priesthood, more intimately associated in heart and fact with Him in His sacerdotal act, and more than any one else entitled to claim the divine Victim as her own. Herein lies the foundation of the privileged mediation of the Virgin Mother, in subordination to the unique mediation of her Son. It is this that makes of her, under the chief authority of Christ, a universal cause in the order of propitiation and impétration, for the benefit of all those whom the hereditary stain has defiled.

At the root of the matter, no doubt, we find the union of the Son and Mother, but also the oneness of the Cross and of the Eucharist: of the Cross which placed a rich treasure at our disposal and of the Eucharist which is the means in our hands to exploit it; of the redeeming and regenerating Cross, and of the Eucharist which, offered upon our altars, applies to us the price of our ransom, and, received by us, is the principle of our regeneration—of the Eucharist which is in Mary's hands, as it is in those of the whole Church, the one means by which she can apply to us (but how much more excellently than any one else!) the blessings and the fruits of the Cross. Rightly, therefore, did the East hail in Mary "the root of our sacrifice", and no less justly did it acclaim her at the close of the sacred mysteries as the glorious stem "which bore our Eucharist".

Nothing, therefore, that concerns the Christian life, or exercises a charm upon the heart of the followers of the Gospel, is foreign to this *Mystery of Faith*, to this living mystery, to this daily mystery, which more deservedly than the ancient mysteries of pagan religions can claim to vivify mortal man, and to usher him into a sacred and divine circle. There, in a communion of the whole being with invisible and unveiled Truth, is offered to man participation in a higher life, the life of the one true Hero, of the God dying yesterday, risen to-day, victorious, and ready to share his triumphs with each and all

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who draw nigh, not as strangers, as unchaste and defiled, but as initiated, already prepared by baptismal death for the life that knows no end. This is the Eucharist, this is the Mystery of Faith. The Greeks and the Syrians were not the only ones to boast of mysteries (theirs were, at best, repulsive and lying mysteries); the Christians also had theirs—pure, holy mysteries and full of truth—and they proclaimed—the news (probably by the mouth of the deacons) at the most solemn hour of their liturgy. Let Mithras cover his face, and let the Great Goddess and the whole train of Hellenic and barbarian falsehoods vanish! Behold the Christ, the Blood of purification, the gates of heaven flung open, and God and his creatures face to face! Behold the banquet of incorruptible food, eternity already breathed—and possessed, the end and the beginning re-united, and all things reduced to one! Behold also diversity, in the succession of ages and in the immensity of spaces, summed up under a single head and in one body, the Church, undivided, immortal, the Bride of the Word, the Flesh of the Lamb: caro de came—they are but one! It is done. We have the Eucharist, and we have the Mystery of Faith. We have what will thrill with joy and with a feeling of sacred pride the heart of every Christian who hears or who speaks the words: Hoc est Corpus meum. Hic est calix Sanguinis mei, novi et aeterni testamenti : mysterium fidei: qui pro vobis et pro multis effundetur in remissionem peccatorum. Haec quotiescumque feceritis, in mei memoriam facietis.

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A LETTER ON SACRIFICE

ADDRESSED

TO A PUBLICIST

Although the views on sacrifices which you are kind enough to submit to me are debatable, they certainly do not appear to me either unorthodox or temerarious. I mean that in the actual state of sacred science, at the present stage of theological development, your views present nothing which from near or far justifies even the slightest censure.

For we must not forget that the doctrine of sacrifice—as Contarini justly remarked at the time of the Council of Trent —is one of the least advanced in the Church. The last three centuries, moreover, instead of marking a progress, have rather witnessed a decline. This is certainly true of theologians, if not perhaps (and here you are a better judge than I) of the historians of the religious practices of mankind. According to my opinion, the men of the thirteenth century and of the beginning of the fourteenth had a more correct, a more rational, and a more scriptural concept of sacrifice (and therefore a more historical one also) than the theologians of the second half of the sixteenth century, from whom descends directly the theological teaching of our day. First of all, these later theologians have given a false meaning to immolation and have attributed to it an exaggerated importance. In their minds immolation assumed the form of a destruction due to God, in order to honour his sovereign power over life and death. According to that view, we ought, if that were allowed us, to annihilate ourselves for the purpose of honouring the source of being (a curious notion indeed). As that may not be, and as we are moreover incapable of annihilating

anything whatsoever in our place, we will at least destroy or put out of use what is ours: we will kill animals, make libations of wine or oil, etc. Thus shall be accomplished the supreme act of latreutic worship. This view appears to me, as it does to you, radically wrong. It starts with an assumption which is the opposite of the truth, namely, that what is can, by being impaired, do honour to him who is perfect Goodness; whereas on the contrary, as St. Thomas observes, what we owe to perfect Goodness is for us to draw near it in order to unite ourselves to it by possession! On this foundation is built the latreutic doctrine of sacrifice: a sensible gift intended to manifest outwardly the inward gift of oneself, according to St. Augustine's formula: invisibilis saaificii sacramentum visibile.

In addition to the psychological need of the sensible element, and the moral obligation to enlist for the divine worship our whole human nature, physical as well as spiritual (the two causes to which you yourself call attention), we find that the necessity of the outward rite has also a basis in the social character of man. Sprung from society, formed by it, and destined by his very nature to live in it and for it, man is under a social obligation towards God, the author and lawgiver of the social order as well as its last end. Now this common duty of society cannot be performed except by a public act.

Thus far we meet with nothing in the motives and the ends of sacrifice implying destruction. There is donation, consecration to God, attribution of something to his exclusive and, as it were, personal use; in a word, there is oblation of some portion of our goods to represent all of them as well as their owner. (In this fashion does the outer world enter into the field of vision of the sacrificer: solely inasmuch as that world belongs to him. But we transcend that world by the whole difference which exists between mind and matter. All these infinite worlds and spaces are nothing, as Pascal expressed it, in comparison to the value of one of our thoughts. They are like a mere retinue, an image as it were, of ourselves, or the shadow which we cast upon the lower order of

beings.) The latreutic aspect, which is the first and most important in this question of sacrifice, will not reveal to us anything else.

One thing only it does and can imply: the action by which the creature moves towards its last end, wherein it is to find ultimate perfection. But there is here no deterioration; the reason for it could certainly not be found in divine Goodness, but in sin alone.

Once sin has intervened, the scene changes. There is now a debt in commutative justice towards God, the Sovereign Goodness, who has been virtually denied, and as a result, virtually frustrated in his right not only to our love but to the love of the whole created world. This debt demands a compensation. There is also a debt as regards retributive justice, which upholds that law according to which whosoever turns away from the Sovereign Good draws away from happiness and incurs unhappiness; happiness and unhappiness being nothing else than the possession or privation of the Sovereign Good, with the consequences which either implies and carries with it. This twofold debt ought to be paid by the sinner. But as regards the former, he is insolvent; the second, then, binds him all the more. He is insolvent in the former case, because the amount of love virtually withdrawn from God exceeds that which any creature can offer him as a He alone can suitably requite, whose human compensation. nature is by birthright endowed with charity "in the plenitude of its perfection and in the perfection of its plenitude though the sinner is insolvent, or rather because he is insolvent, he will yet offer to God a symbol of that atoning love, of whose full requital he feels himself incapable. appropriate form of that symbol will be the one which among its elements introduces death. Death is, from the natural point of view, the worst of evils. On the other hand, love proves itself chiefly by the victory over difficulties which it must overcome in order to assert itself. Love must rise to their arduousness. This accounts for the part played by suffering and death in the economy of love. They thus find, if not

necessarily, at least quite appropriately, their place in the rite whose object it is to symbolize the sovereign love due to God in compensation for sin. And so the gift presented to God will be in the form of an animal, whose immolation will render it possible to offer the blood, or the life (since these two expressions are equivalent), upon the altar. The altar, as the seat of God, will be considered as receiving in God's name the sinner's homage. Likewise, the altar, as the festive board of God, will be loaded with the repast destined to the Most High—with the Bread of God, with the Cup of the Lord, with the Lamb of God. Whereupon, in token of peace and reconciliation, God will admit men to partake of the sacred meats, as the guests of him whom the sacrifice is considered to have appeased.

Such is the place held by immolation; it is preliminary to the offering, which generally consists in the pouring of the blood either upon the top or upon the lower part of the altar.

Here it may be noted in passing that the libations of wine or oil were never intended to put these substances out of use, as if by the effect of some sort of equivalent destruction. intention was to attribute or apply them either to the sacred stone, or to the hearth, or to any other qualified substitute of God. At all events, even in the case of the sacrifice of animal life, destruction was not the end but the means of offering the life, that is, the blood, and of preparing the sacred repast. Underlying all this we find the gift. So true is this, that as a matter of fact the sacrificer is by no means the one who immolates but the one who offers, who makes the gift: mediately it is the faithful who has brought his sheep or his ox; immediately it is the priest who makes the libation of the blood. The Levite, or anyone else who merely kills, remains outside the circle of sacrificers, as the executioners of Christ were assuredly outside it. But it was he, the High Priest, who made the sacerdotal, ritual offering of his Body devoted to the torments, and of his Blood ready to flow. This he did in the Cenacle, when upon the altar of His most sacred humanity—the only true seat of Godhead, alone capable of sanctifying

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the gifts of our human indigence, and with still more reason those of the Son of man—he sacramentally shed the Blood of his wounds, the Blood of Calvary, the Blood which was to drench him upon the Cross, because of his oblation at the Supper.

One need hardly observe that suffering and death, so well fitted to figure as an element of atonement in commutative justice, are no less suited to satisfy the requirements of vindicative justice. Thus it happens that propitiation and satisfaction are usually linked together in the intention of sacrifice. And the ideal, the perfect, the adequate sacrifice will have efficacy, both to neutralize the guilt and to remit the penalty of sin. Just as in the latreutic cult there is always contained both thanksgiving and petition, since latreutic worship looks upon the Sovereign Good not only as the term of our endeavours, but also as the fountain-head of all the goods that lead us there, whether it be those we have already received or those we are still hoping for.

As for the Sacrifice of Christ, it is, to my mind, important to exclude from it, as has been done generally by the holy Fathers and the great Doctors, any idea of a special and strict ordinance, or formal requisition on the part of God. According to St. Bernard's splendidly traditional formula: Deus filii sanguinem non requisivit, sed acceptavit oblatum, "God did not demand his Son's Blood, but accepted the gift of it." True it is, Christ came into this world, as man, with that intention and in view of that undertaking. But the free intention of his heart, even initial and constant, does not constitute an obligation, any more than the divine predefinitions, which were well known to his intelligence. Christ offered himself because he willed, and willed it freely, of his human will, without any positive precept of his Father. Such a precept, as St. Gregory of Nazianzus remarks, would have been unreasonable, and, according to St. Anselm, impossible. At all events, it would hardly have been conceivable from the standpoint of the justice and the wisdom of God.

Christ offered himself, because, as born Priest of our race, in the union of his two natures which made of him the representative of men before God and the representative of God before men, he wished of his own accord, without being bound to it by any law or any command, to offer at last that one sacrifice which alone would give full reparation, and to which men had aspired in vain for centuries by means of all those impotent and disappointing sacrifices which they had multiplied without ceasing, as so many avowals of their insufficiency, so many earnest appeals to Him Who was to come one day and put an end to them.

We can say, then, that up to the Supper, Christ was free, but not so thereafter. Once bound by his sacred oblation he could no longer, without profanation, withhold the Victim from the immolation to which he had pledged it. He was thenceforth under obligation, not to a positive precept, but to that law of justice which demands that what has been devoted to God be rendered to God. It is this law of justice, of religious justice, that led St. Anselm to write that Christ did not die to comply with some particular precept as, to offer himself in sacrifice, but in obedience to a general canon of the natural law, and to obey it even to death. offered he cannot take himself back: you have here the explanation of the tragic events of Gethsemane. chalice can no longer pass, but I must drink it. . . . " It could no longer pass, because it had been drunk already at the Supper. Before the Supper it might have passed, if Christ had so willed, whose every prayer, âs he tells us himself, was certain to be heard by his Father. But now he can no longer will it; that right is no longer his.

And there is this particularity, as our Doctors have noted: in the Sacrifice of Christ, the sign, the real sign, which is the outward gift, fits exactly over the thing signified, which is the interior gift and invisible consecration made of his person by him who sacrifices. It is a sacrifice full of truth in every detail: eucharistic sacrifice by the bread and the wine which lend it their appearances; propitiatory-sacrifice by the immo-

lated Blood and Flesh which form its tragic reality; sacrifice which raised to the utmost limit the difficulties against which Jove had to contend, in order to carry off the victory and persevere till the end; sacrifice which, without being in any way a penalty inflicted on the innocent party for the guilty one, does yet make satisfaction, in a far nobler manner, for all the punishment incurred by our faults, and obliterates their All we have to do in order to profit by that sacrifice is to make it our own, in all sincerity, without belying by our interior dispositions the sign which we carry out externally. This is precisely the task on which the Church is engaged. from the first days of her establishment through the Holy Ghost till the return of him who confided to her hands the price of our Redemption. We continue to offer in the Mass the Passion and Death of the Lord, made for evermore, through his Resurrection and Ascension, a Victim not only offered by the Sovereign Priest here below, but ratified above, and accepted by God and pleasing to him, a Victim inscribed upon the eternal book of life, as the imperishable price and indefectible ransom of our faults, whose debt, in itself eternal, was to run through the unending ages, but has been for ever Thus, as we take hold of the price of our Redemption, that we may ourselves discharge it into the hands of God, we assuredly do not for that reason cease to be redeemed by Jesus Christ, but we have the signal honour of co-operating (in a subordinate manner) in our own ransom. We do not, it is true, supply the sum of atoning charity, once for all treasured up for us by our Saviour, but we associate ourselves with him in the act by which he himself, on the eve of his Passion, and once for all, presented the whole amount to his heavenly Father.

There is another advantage we enjoy, in being able to offer to God a sacrifice whose victim is beforehand pleasing to and already accepted by God; nothing remains but to render our own intervening oblation agreeable to him. This is provided for by the Holy Ghost, who abides in the Church precisely that he may ensure her holiness, which is not indeed

invariable, but assuredly indefectible. The ever faithful Bride of Christ, the complement of his humanity, and the Body indissolubly one with the Bridegroom in glory, the Church, is well aware, when exercising her power of consecration, through the ministry of her priests, that she is performing validly and in a manner pleasing to God that ritual oblation by which the eternal Victim is pledged for the salvation of the world.

We may note here, that death is not primarily intended as you seem to believe-to signify either the irrevocability of of the gift, or its totality. These two attributes of our consecration (totality and irrevocability) would retain their adequate significance in a purely latreutic and eucharistic sacrifice after the style of Melchisedech. In the supposition that sin did not exist, they could be expressed in that sacrificial form alone. Sin alone causes death to intervene, not by any means to give the impression that God rejoices in death, even the death of the sinner, but to testify that the sinner has brought death upon himself: morte morieris, "thou shalt die the death"; to confess that it is the just penalty he deserved, the wages he earned: eternal death no less than temporal death, which introduces it, both coalescing with If now the sinner, whether under the law of nature or under the law of Moses, undertakes to symbolize all this in the sight of God, it is evident that he does not do so for the purpose of carrying out on himself the effects of divine justice, but rather with the intention of turning aside its blows, by the humble avowal of his unworthiness, by the exercise of interior penance, manifested outwardly by his entreaties for mercy, so that divine justice may be pacified and divine wrath disarmed. Lastly and chiefly (for the instinct of justice is indestructible in the human heart, even where God is concerned, and among the chosen of mankind that instinct has been intensified and made sacred by revelation), the symbol of death is intended to announce and make available beforehand the perfect Victim of the High Priest. For only that Victim, whose sublime charity is fully proportioned to all

the throes of death and its most intolerable pains of body and spirit, can blot out entirely our wanton attack against divine charity.

The symbolic process displayed here, evidently has not for its purpose to enlighten God, who "beholdeth the heart", But it answers a psychological need, it satisfies a moral obligation, and it fits in with our social condition. In this sense it may be spoken of as "having no significance except for us" humans. Its import, however, is not merely for me, individual human being, but for the whole community of which I form a part. This is especially true of the Eucharistic sacrifice, which by its institution and essence is the sacrifice of the whole Church, and for this reason is also, always and everywhere, no matter what its outward circumstances may be, a public sacrifice, a public profession, a public homage and a public act of atonement.

Finally, in speaking of the Law in its relation to sacrifice, it is quite true, as you have noted, that it did to a considerable extent check and regulate the immoderate and disorderly impulse of the Semitic peoples for sacrifices. what is said of the Law is still more true of the prophets. It was necessary to maintain the principle of relativity, of a twofold relation, which was, both by nature and revelation, inherent in every sacrifice approved by God. There was the relation of the outward sign to the interior reality: and there was the relation of the present sacrifice to the sacrifice to come, of which it was the figure and the announcement. was also from this future sacrifice that the ancient sacrifices borrowed, for the time being, whatever efficacy they had with Moreover, because of the opposite errors among the inhabitants of Egypt, Chaldea, etc., it was absolutely necessary to dispel every idea of any advantage accruing to God from these sacrifices. God wanted it to be clearly understood that he had nothing to gain through their continuance, and nothing to lose by their suppression. All the advantages to be drawn from them, as well as all the motives for their existence, were to be looked for on the part of men. God did not wish to appear in the popular imagination as the beneficiary

of these sacrifices, something like a divinity receiving a human maintenance.

Finally let me draw attention to a confusion into which one may easily slip, about the merit of any one of Christ's works, on the one hand, and the propitiatory efficacy of his true sacrifice, on the other. There is no sacrifice in the strict sense unless there is an outward gift, whose purpose it , is to symbolize the interior gift. In the ordinary actions of Christ, this condition is not verified. Once only, before undergoing his sufferings, did Christ perform an act that directly and properly implied a surrender of his Body and Blood to God as Victim. This act took place at the Supper, when by the consecration under the twofold species he put his Body and Blood, in outward semblance, in the state in which they were to be put in reality by the Cross, to which he had consigned them at that moment, for the remission of the sins of the world: pro vobis et pro multis, in remissionem peccatorum, "for you and for many unto remission of sins". No other act of Christ in the previous course of his life bears this character of a sensible, pragmatic and ritual oblation. there be found an immolation, in the proper sense (that is to say effective), anywhere except in the Passion. pitiatory power of sacrifice was, therefore, never exerted before the Supper and the Passion of the Lord. It follows that it was not by some kind of an artificial and arbitrary compact, but through the natural course of events that we were not ransomed till the last hour of the Saviour's life. moment there had not occurred anything that bore the formal and unmistakable character of a redeeming act. sacrifice is contained between the two extreme limits of the Cenacle and Calvary.

LETTER ADDRESSED TO A MISSIONARY

ON THE

OBLATION OF CHRIST

AND THE

OBLATION OF ALL OUR MASSES BY CHRIST

I can easily picture your astonishment and perhaps scandal in reading certain observations on the manner in which Christ is said to intervene in our sacrifice. It is likely that I, too, some twenty-five years ago, would have been shocked; such was then the massive array of authorities in favour of an indefinite repetition of the acts of oblation by Christ. But agreement of to-day's theological authorities among themselves is not sufficient. Of greater importance is it to harmonize the present with the past; but where do we find that harmony? Moreover, doctrine must agree with Scripture: but in what sense does Scripture speak? Finally, there must be consistency of the various parts of doctrine with one another: but where is this consistency? As you yourself have noted, it is necessary that the Mass be a sacrifice subordinated to, and not co-ordinated with, the Cross. But, if there is a personal and reiterated intervention of Christ, in his character of actual and formal offerer, repeating his act of oblation indefinitely, how can m escape the conclusion that the sacrifice of our altars is really co-ordinated and not subordinate to the Sacrifice of our Redemption? For, after all, Christ is not inferior to Christ, nor is what he might do to-day less worthy than what he did long ago. How, in that case, are we to defend our theology against the heretics, who charge us with having rejected the very principle of the

doctrine proclaimed in the Epistle to the Hebrews? They accuse us of having denied the prerogatives—which, even if they were not explicitly revealed, would still be evident-of a priesthood so perfect as to secure for ever, by one single act, and with a plenitude that could brook no addition, all the fruits which Christ's activity as our Mediator had set itself to obtain for us. So that it but remains for us to take our part in that single oblation of his, in order to incorporate our offering in the one by which we were saved, and which, sufficient as it is, must yet be made our own. This, of course, we are not able to do without him; we are not able to offer at all except in dependence on, and in virtue of, that act of oblation which prompts, controls and contains our own oblations, enters into and fills them, giving them their efficacy and their unity through time and space. Should we, then, be surprised that the traditionalists of the sixteenth century should have defended this doctrine in language whose harshness, it seems, has disturbed you? The new opinion which they combated was certainly unknown to St. Thomas as well as to Scotus; nor do we meet with it in the whole scholastic tradition (as Vasquez observed somewhat later), nor in the tradition of the This new opinion, which multiplied the personal offerings of Christ from one mass to another, seemed to those conservative theologians barely tolerable, and they censured it severely. For it had not yet gained the weight of authority it acquired later, through the support lent to it by a number of great doctors. It is clear that if to-day one is still allowed to combat it, the right to censure it no longer exists, at least as long as the teaching authority of the Church abstains from giving a decision.

But, in rejecting the new doctrine, does one run the risk, which you fear, of being forced to give up a multitude of locutions and prayers in which Christ is assumed to sacrifice and to be a suppliant? Not at all. Christ is sacrificing; he is sacrificing in us and through us, who are his own, who are something of him, who in this do not act except in dependence on his sacerdotal power, *in ejus sacerdotio*, as St. Paschasius

puts it. He sacrifices anew through us, in the sense that our sacrificial function, which is being exercised indefinitely, is nothing but a participation of his, deriving from his all its virtue at every instant of its exercise. By all this is meant that Christ does not sacrifice by a new personal act, by a formal oblation, going up from him to the Father; there is no longer any need for his doing so, nor is he still capable There is nothing, absolutely nothing, to indicate or to insinuate that the numberless liturgical phrases of the Church about Christ offering our sacrifices, and sacrificing through our ministry, must be taken in the sense of a personal and immediate intervention; it is most certain that the Fathers failed to understand them in that way, and yet, they did not hesitate, when speaking their own personal sentiment, or in their catechisms, to make use of those faultless locutions, those expressions so replete with truth. But they used them without straining their meaning to the point of depriving them of their correctness. And what is true of these liturgical formulas, is true also of the modes of speech with which some saintly persons, like M. Olier, expressed the sentiments of their private devotion. Those formulas may be kept, provided they are properly understood. Perhaps it could be shown that M. Olier was personally inclined to stress their meaning too much; in any case it is certain that the predominant intention of the founder of St. Sulpice was to understand and employ them in the most catholic sense in which they could be accepted. And thus, as far as the substance of the matter is concerned, even if our rendering does not literally agree with his, yet his and ours are one and the same in spiritual content, which alone matters. much on the subject of sacrifice.

The same may be said of the prayers and supplication and petition addressed by Christ to the divine mercy. In us and through us he prays. Moreover, even in heaven, in his *own* individual person, he remains the great pragmatic Prayer, but granted ages ago and granted once for all; just as he remains the eternal Sacrifice, but consummated, and

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the eternal Victim pleasing to God, taken up and become the property of God. And all this in current language will be expressed in terms of prayer, of supplication, of impétration. And rightly so, since all this is a form and a mode of intercession and of mediation, the mediation and intercession of the Victim laid upon the Altar; not upon an earthly altar, whence God would still have to take it to himself, but upon the Altar of glory, where he retains it. It is intercession which is no longer in process of going on; it is mediation whose function no longer is to draw opposites closer together, but to keep them welded into unity. One only activity remains to Christ, and it is to cause life to circulate from the divine summits to the lower regions of our fallen humanity, from the Father to all his children.

In terms of a like analogy it is right to say that Christ in heaven adores and renders homage to his Father: he is the great life-long Adoration because he is the Sacrifice. But being a sacrifice in its terminal stage, it must be understood that his adoration is not now a homage of dependence but the fruit of past acts of homage, in the present enjoyment of his Father's independence and majesty. His adoration is no longer a movement leading back to God, but it is a repose in the Supreme Good. It is no longer a consecration in the making, but a consecration which has reached its final state of an appurtenance of God, of a union with God, and, in the case of Christ, not of any sort of union of human nature, but of the Hypostatic Union consummated in all its developments, in all the accessory reaches of that substantial unity which, dating from the Incarnation, had not from the moment of the Incarnation exerted all its connatural efficacy through the inferior faculties of the soul and the fibres of his vesture of flesh. But this plenitude which

1Will it be objected (J. Grimal, Le Sacerdoce et le Sacrifice de Notre-Seignett Jésus Christ, 3 ed., 1923, p. 192), that it is essential for a creature to adore? Then a distinction must be made: essential for every created person, yes; for every created nature, no. Let us not forget that it is not nature, but the person who is the adorer. The person of the Word could once adore by reason of its created nature, because in that created nature it was not yet in possession of the glory which properly and by inheritance belongs to the only Son of God. Even though

is in Christ is still far from being spread through all the members of the complementary body which he associated to himself in the spiritual union of our persons with his. And so the act of consecration which, in him, is completed, may still take place and be perfected in us. Under this aspect, Christ is still capable of adoring through us, who herein are but one with him, since, once more, we do not offer, do not sacrifice, do not therefore adore in a perfect manner, except together with him who is our Head, the Head of the cult, the Head of the priesthood, the Head of religion, the Head of the whole great undertaking which is the progress of our human souls and the return of creation In the Church and by the Church does Jesus adore. On earth he will continue to adore as long as we hold in our hands the sacred Host, expression of his interior adoration of yesterday, and of the present adoration of the faithful, who to-day unite themselves with him in the act of sacerdotal oblation, wherewith he did once dedicate himself. In heaven also he will adore forever in the universality of his saints.

In like manner does Christ appease the justice of his Father. Not that it is not yet appeased; but he remains that which

Christ was equally then as he is now a divine person, nevertheless he was not in the state and condition of divine person, but of human person (taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men, and in habitfound as a man). Hence, it was proper that he should conduct himself as a human person, as a servant, and therefore as an adorer. But now the times are changed; self-effacement is a thing of the past, and what actually subsists is the glory of the only Son seated at the right hand of his Father. He is in full possession of what is his due by birthright; and the glory which he enjoys even in his humanity is the glory of a God. As he does not exist in that borrowed nature of man except by communicating to it his uncreated being, so from this substantial communication results a glory which is not that of any creature, actual or possible, but the glory only of a God. And now that it has filled up everything, it leaves no more room in Christ either for the Condition or for the Attitude of a Servant, nor consequently of an Adorer. Factus servus, non remansit servus (Chrysostom, M.F., 144).

The glory of the saints, on the other hand, is not the glory exclusively proper to a nature united in community of being to a divine person. On the contrary, it is a glory that remains in an infinitely lower order and at an immeasurable distance. And this is true even when it is a question of the greatest among the saints, or even of the Blessed Virgin Mary herself. For it is a glory that adorns subjects, servants, and no matter how exalted they may be through divine munificence, divine adoption, divine maternity, their native character of servants and subjects cannot be abolished. Such glory leaves room for the attitude and condition of an inferior, and, therefore, for adoration.

has been paid, that which has been disbursed (St. Augustine would say), in compensation for our offences. Of this ransom we are allowed to seize hold, in order to pay it out of our own hands, and become co-redeemers. For we shall not benefit by this our Master's ransom, unless we make it our own and endorse it, unless we subscribe that transaction by which our wrongs were righted and our debts extinguished. And when for that purpose we offer up the cup of the Blood, and the Members of the Lamb in their apparel of death, it is still the Christ who at that moment cancels in us and through us the debt which, in his own person, he extinguished once for all. It is Christ indeed who atones, but he does so in the mystic Body of the Church militant, whose entire life derives from him and is summed up in him.

Christ also proclaims in his own person the goodness and splendour of that Holy Trinity which lavished upon and crowned with honour and glory the human nature wherein he was bom of Mary. But this acknowledgment, in his present state, is rather a tribute to justice than to mercy. As regards him, there was never mercy or gratuitousness; as regards his human nature, there was the mercy of taking it up into himself. But once that nature was taken up, or (what is the same) created to be his own, could there still be room for additional gifts? Yes, there could. By a providential dispensation, which, for a time and for the sake of the work of redemption, held in abevance certain prerogatives—not such as were essential to, but such as were normally consequent upon, the Incarnation—there could still be room for an increase of gifts. There was also room for a new state of glory and bliss, to which, apart from his birthright (inoperative for the time being), there did not exist, till the sepulchre, any strict claim of acquisition stipulated by contract. But after the consummation of the sacrifice by the Resurrection and Ascension, he was no longer capable of receiving any liberality in the strict sense; everything was due him by every right and title. And therefore his acknowledgment now of the goods of which he is possessed is a testimony rendered to justice

rather than to mercy. For the past, undoubtedly, Christ's gratitude towards divine liberality subsists in its entirety; but it need not any longer attest itself by new tokens, or trouble itself about rendering the old ones acceptable. These latter remain the eternal eucharisteria, as the Greeks called them, of our Priest according to the order of Melchisedech, and they are always equally precious in the sight of God. The Saviour's thanks were spoken for all time, and for all time they resound in the ears of him to whom was presented the Bread and the Cup. A repetition of them is not necessary, at least not by the individual person of the Saviour. But they may be reechoed without ceasing in that mystic Body into whose depths his personality descends, even to espouse the indigence, the unworthiness, the weakness of our created and sinful nature as wayfarers here below: thanks can still be spoken in that Body whose Head radiates uncreated glory, while its feet drag over the rough ways of this world, till they touch the frontier of their own land. It is we, helped from on high, forgiven from on high, consoled from on high, who must present to our divine Benefactor the eucharistic worship which one day evened up the thanksgiving of the earth to the bounties of heaven. And when, with our hands, our lips, and the movements of our heart, he is presented anew in the rite of the unbloody immolation, let us not forget that in all this we are set in motion and actuated by the power which comes from Christ, which is Christ's, which is the power of his priesthood.

We need not wonder, then, that in us and through us Christ does still give thanks and offer the gift of the Eucharist. We thus fill up in ourselves what was still wanting, if we may say so, in his Eucharist, just as St. Paul says of his Passion, all-sufficient though it certainly is, and ended, never to be begun again. On the other hand, Christ takes as his own what is from us, the more appositely as it would never be ours if it were not from him. In order to make his eucharistic virtue flow into us, and connect with himself our "thanksgiving", after pouring out upon his Church the spirit of

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holiness, has he not also marked our souls with the sacerdotal character, by which his power is imparted to us? Has he not put into the souls of the faithful the baptismal character by which they are enabled to transmit their wishes through our ministry, which itself is entirely dependent upon Christ's sacerdotal primacy? There is, then, but one Priest who officiates in the whole body of the Church: it is the Priest whose sacerdotal act we prolong through all times. This act is perfectly one and definitive, simple and yet unlimited in its importance and in its scope, the solemn ambassadorial message which the sacred precincts of our temples and the faith of the whole Church unceasingly re-echo heavenward.

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LETTER TO A THEOLOGIAN

ON

THE ANGEL OF SACRIFICE

AND

THE SACRIFICE IN HEAVEN

In your very kind criticism! of a work which already owed you a great deal, you raise two interesting points, which it is worth while to take once more under consideration. One has reference to the celestial sacrifice; the other to the prayer of the Canon: Jube haecperferriper manus sancti Angeli tui.

On this second question you bring forward, as an argument against identifying this Angel with the Word, the parallel with other sacraments, where it is certainly a question of angelic spirits. That in the present case it is also a question of angelic spirits cannot, I think, be disputed. In favour of this view we have the *De Sacramentis*, which speaks of them in the plural, as does also the *Commentary of St.* Ambrose on *St. Luke*, and the *Dialogues* of St. Gregory. In the East we have the treatise of Chrysostom *On the Priesthood* (M.F. 281 and 449), and the clear text of a parallel prayer in the Greek *Liturgy of St. Mark (ibid*, and 274.) There cannot, therefore, be any question of a choice between Christ and the angels. It is impossible to exclude the latter: they have there their authentic place. It follows that any interpretation that would eliminate the angels in favour of Christ, would be doomed beforehand

I Recherches de Science Religieuse, 1922, Bulletin de Théologie Historique, by Rev. Fr. d'Alès, to whom I wish here to render this testimony, that his revision is of the kind that combines with the utmost kindness the soundest, most intelligent, and most learned criticism. Indeed, it is only when answering true masters, that one finds true pleasure.

to failure (M.F. 448 sqq.). And this is precisely the one thing that can be proved, or that one may attempt to prove, with the authorities brought forward in favour of an angel of Baptism, or of an angel of Penance. "Ancient authors placed these two sacraments under the care of heavenly spirits: why may they not have done the same for the Eucharist?" Granted that under the name of "Angel" of the sacrifice, they thought of the angelic hosts, does it necessarily mean that they excluded the First-born of the angels (of the "Sons of God", Job vi, 21), the Prince of the heavenly messengers? Must they exclude the Word, whom, so frequently, according to the holy Fathers, both before and after Nicaea (cf. Petau, Trin., 8, 2, 5-9, and Vacant, art. Anges, Diet, de la B.), it is hard to distinguish from the angelic ministers in the ancient theophanies? Is not the Word closely associated with the angels in the New Testament predictions of the latter day theophany? Is not the Word called Angel by the prophets, in connection with the Ancient Temple whose succession he has taken over? Is he not styled Angel of the Testament, i.e. of the New Testament whose seal and sacrament is the Blood that flows in the Chalice? Do we not see the Incarnate Word, in the most ancient of all the liturgies, intervene directly in the character of Angel, in the very first sentence of the eucharistic prayer (M.F. 447)? How especially exclude Christ, when (as can hardly be questioned) it is transubstantiation which is asked for, under the metaphorical name of translation? If so, is it not clear that no mere angel can be the minister capable of bringing it about? It requires a mightier power. It admits, however, the assistance of celestial spirits, as a guard of honour to the great King, as the natural companions of his glory, as the providential agents preparing his kingdom, as yesterday's witnesses and consolers of his victorious agony, and afterwards the heralds and artisans of his triumphal ascension. It admits them as the associates to-day of that theophany of the altar which perpetuates in our midst the theophanies of the past, and prepares the theophany of eternity. There is still another

elucidations

motive for the presence of angels—to give assistance to that lowly minister of the ecclesiastical community, who may well tremble as he offers the august sacrifice, since he can never perform his sublime task with sufficient purity, nor ever do enough to procure for himself all possible co-operation, in order that he may, as far as it depends on himself personally, enhance the value of the act of oblation, and through it, the plenitude of that corresponding acceptance, which in fact, is identical with transubstantiation. For these reasons the early Middle Ages recognized in this Angel, not Jesus Christ alone, but Jesus Christ at the head of the angels, his familiars and well-nigh his peers. The same was done much earlier by Justin (whose "simplicity" in this matter may well not be what it seems); and somewhat later by the only great theologian of the fifteenth century, Thomas Walden.

Besides, is it not likely that the safest interpreter of the Liturgy is the Liturgy itself? Do we not read in the Liber Ordinum—perhaps the text has not sufficiently drawn your attention—Ille ad te sacrificia perferat, qui nos jussit offerre (M.F. 277)? It does not seem to you proper that our sacrifices should be carried up to God by Jesus Christ? All the liturgies, you say, present him coming down, not going up? yet here we have one which is most explicit in the sense of a going up. You object again that besides his three offices of Priest, of Victim, and of Altar, Christ would be burdened with a fourth office: which is decidedly too much and quite disconcerting. But the medievalists have given you the answer, by remarking that the ministry attributed to the r divine Envoy under the name of translation, is nothing else than transubstantiation, and therefore is included in Christ's priestly functions (M.F. 278-279). There is no undue attribution; there is but a statement of the sacerdotal office of Jesus Christ, with regard to that element of it which still subsists, not virtually only, but actually and formally: not the oblation as such, but the transubstantiation as such. Quite naturally this name of Angel found favour with the early Christian ages, when characterizing the priestly function

of our Saviour. Christ is the Angel who descends, and the Angel who ascends; the Messenger of God, the Interpreter of men; the Angel Mediator. The priest is such a mediator, now turned towards God in the name of men, now turned towards men in the name of God: "because he is the angel of the God of hosts", says the prophet Malachias (ii, 7); angelus . . . quia Dei et hominum sequester, Hieron in h.l.). It follows that Christ, the Sovereign Priest is, as such, the Angel of God par excellence. He is the Mediator of the New Testament, as we hear from St. Paul; the Angel of the Testament, as said Malachias, of the same Testament of which St. Paul speaks, of that New Testament, which, in the words of the prophecy, was to repair the ruins of the Old, by substituting for the house of Levi a holier and more venerable priesthood, and by replacing the sacrifices of Aaron by a clean and spotless sacrifice. This did not prevent the prophet from calling him Lord in the same verse in which he designates him as Angel. Angel, and at the same time Lord, remarks St. Augustine: idem Angelus, idem Dominus (Serm. I, n. 3). Angel without ceasing to be Lord of the very angels: sic Angelus, ut etiam Dominus angelorum (In Joan., tract. 24, n. 7). Angel, by the ministry he exercised in the flesh; Lord, as Creator of the world and of all things, angels not excepted (Serm. 256, n. 3). He is Lord by nature; he is Angel by dispensation. "For," observes in his turn the pseudo-Dionysius, "Jesus himself, for the sake of our salvation took his place among the ranks of celestial interpreters: -sr hence, he is called the Angel of the great counsel. For as he says himself, after his fashion of an Angel, 'the things that I have heard of my Father, the same I have announced to you'" (Celestial Hierarchy, 4, 4.). Let us also mention the Liturgy of the 8th book of the Apostolic Constitutions, where thanks are given to God for having created all things by his Only Son, who was begotten before all ages, "the first-born of every creature, the angel of the great counsel and sovereign priest" (8, 36, 3; cj. 2, 24, 3 and 30, 2; 5, 16 and 20, 12)? We have here probably an echo of that Apostolic Tradition,

from which the Verona Fragments have preserved for us the Gratias libi referimus. Deus, per dilectum puerum following: tuum Jesum Christum, auem in ultimis temporibus misisti nobis Salvatorem et redemptorem et angelum voluntatis tuae (aui est Verbum tuum) inseparabilem (ed. Hauler, p. 106). The Angel inseparable from the Father—such is the Word in his office of Saviour This is he who, "incarnate in the womb and Redeemer. of the Virgin", and "presented to God as his Son". "has accomplished his Father's will", "his hands extended for the ransom of his people", after first "taking the bread and giving thanks and saying: Take and eat, for this is my Body, etc." (Ibid.). Behold here the Angel of the Eucharist, the sacerdotal Angel, the Angel who is no other than the Word: Instrument of the saving will of God, and Redeemer of mankind, because he is his Father's Priest.

To this you object the sharp distinction brought forward by the Epistle to the Hebrews, between the angels and the Word. But is it not this very Epistle to the Hebrews which, while justly exalting the superiority of the Son over the angels, prefers nevertheless to call him.—not as one would expect.—Only Son, but Firstborn, as is done likewise in the Epistle to the Colossians? And this is done precisely when comparing him with the angels themselves, those official spirits and spiritual ministers, πνεύματα λειτουρνικά, who having been assigned to serve in the economy of salvation, ezc διακονίαν, are none the less the younger brothers of the Saviour as they are also the elder brothers of men, the "firstborn" of God,—inscribed on the scroll of the heavenly Jerusalem (Heb. xii, 23), long before the Church of the earth had begun to people heaven. And later on, was it not under the title of angels that the Apocalypse presented the Christian priesthood in the letter to the seven Churches? And what about the superscription of that letter: "John to the seven churches which are in Grace be unto you and peace from him who is, and who was, and who is to come, and from the seven spirits which are before his throne, and from Jesus Christ"? Here is a tangle, of spirits and the Word, not inferior to Justin's.

They are intertwined, and if their connection is not apparent in the testimonies which have come down to us about the angel of Baptism, or the angel of Penance, it may be well to remember two things. First, looking at the whole matter as it is, we find—and you will surely not controvert the statement—that there is but an imperfect likeness between the baptismal institution with its exorcisms, or the prolonged rigours of Penance, and the most holy and most august Sacrifice of the Body and Blood of Jesus Christ. Even for such as unite them, as we do, under a common genus, such as that of sacrament, it remains quite impossible to put them on the same plane. As for the ancients, such a classification is seen nowhere among them. The only arrangement we come across in the early ages is that of the rites which together form a progressive initiation to the Christian Mystery: Baptism, Confirmation, Eucharist. It would have caused not a little surprise to our fathers in the faith, if they had been told that some day theological study would lead to the discovery, both legitimate and logical, of some sort of homogeneity between those rites and Penance, not to speak of Extreme Unction and Matrimony. Though even in these latter instances the intervention of the good angels may be fitting, yet it is not required by the similarity of the other sacraments, any more than that intervention requires the similarity. The first Christians did not say to one another: there is an angel, or angels, for each sacrament, for the Eucharist as for Baptism or Penance, or inversely. Secondly, the legal claims, so to speak, or better, the canonical status of our eucharistie Angel is far better established and more resplendently clear than that of the angels of Baptism or of Penance.

The shepherd-angel of Penance has a rather paltry champion, of whom we scarcely know anything, not even if he really was that highly connected person of whom the Muratori fragment tells us: at least at this moment the matter is still unsettled (cf. G. Edmundson, "The date of the Shepherd of Hennas," Expositor, vol. 24, 1922, pp. 171-176). At all events, whatever may have been his identity,

whether brother of Pius or contemporary of Clement, there is good reason to fear that we have to take him as the ancestor of those visionaries who, at all epochs, have assailed the Holy See with their so-called divine communications, and whose brood, if we are to believe those who know, is far from extinct. With Hermas one might be tempted associate Clement of Alexandria: "He who welcomes the angel of Penance shall not repent of it when the day shall come to leave the body; he shall not blush when he shall see the Saviour come in his glory, surrounded by his army" (Quis dives salvetur, 42). But if the style here smacks of the Shepherd (which is hardly questionable), the thought is perceptibly different. The penance spoken of here is not a canonical discipline, and much less a sacramental rite (as you yourself very justly noted in your Edict of Callistus, p. 131); it is a virtue, it is repentance (40, coll. 42; $\tau \eta v \delta \varepsilon \xi i \dot{\alpha} v \dot{\omega}$? ντο τη μετάνοια κεκαθαρμένην καταφίλ, ωv) the disavowal of the past, the breaking away from the past, without excluding the exterior practices of penance, as far as they are necessary for the deadening of inveterate passions (40). The angel of this penance is, therefore, the angel of a virtue: could be found at other epochs of Christian literature. one that met with the widest success during the first centuries seems to have been the angel of peace [Sacram. Scrap, 5, 8; Const. Apost., 8, 36, 3), that is of concord, who has survived in our liturgical prayers under the features of St. Michael, Angelus pacis Michael, entrusted with the task of driving back into hell war with its train of woes: lacrimosa in orcum bella releget. Of this sort is Clement's angel, whom we may therefore dismiss in the present case. However, it is not meant that the angel of Hennas never reappears again in the writings of the Fathers: it is precisely the very same one that reappears, and always under the authority of Hermas, and on his sole responsibility [Origen, In Matth. tom. xiv, 21, and In Rom. i, 10, 31). has now been said about Penance and its angel.

As for the angel of Baptism, the few statements referring to him are of unequal weight. Origen, in the passage you

quote (In Ezech., hom. i, 7), is not very clear on the relations existing between the baptized faithful and the angels; but he closely connects all angelic ministries with that of Christ, "Prince of the heavenly militia" (ibid.). Tertullian (De Bapt., vi) is more definite—perhaps too much so, for he makes us uneasy by endowing his angel with attributes which Catholic dogma cannot ratify. Moreover he apparently authenticates him, as St. Optatus did later (De Schism. Donatist ii, 6), by a verse at best of doubtful value (In. v, 4), which may well be his only title to existence. At all events, between Tertullian and Optatus there is someone who seems explicitly to exclude that heavenly spirit—Cyprian, who makes the superiority of martyrdom over baptism consist in this: in baptism it is men, but in martyrdom it is the angels who baptize (Ad Fortunatum, de exhortatione martyrii, 4). Optatus, then, depending on Tertullian, and Tertullian depending probably on some interpolation of recent date—such is the sum total, at least up to now, of what patristic antiquity has to show in favour of the angel of Baptism.

Our liturgical Angel comes to us under more satisfactory conditions. He should, therefore, be studied for himself, according to the nature of that sphere of activity to which he is assigned, without being classified as the equal of his more or less problematic confrères. If there is dependence which is not proved—it is certainly not on his side. There appears, then, no necessity for abandoning the interpretation, both well grounded and coherent, given by the centuries which formed the golden age of Liturgy. (Remy of Auxerre, The Celebration of Mass: adstantibus ministris coelestibus Christus; Yves of Chartres, Sermon 5; Quis est iste angelus nisi angelus magni consilii? Honorius of Autun, The Gem of the Soul, 106; Stephen of Autun, Treatise on the Sacrament of the Altar, 17: id est per Filium tuum; Alger, The Sacrament of the Body ant/ of the Blood of the Lord, 1, 14: per manus et virtutem Filii tui, angeli tui; Sicard of Cremona, Mitrale, iii, 6.) This interpretation, it is true, was implicitly rejected by Innocent III, and with it also the idea of the epiclesis: the latter for

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reasons not of a scientific order, but (as he explicitly stated) of pastoral expediency.1 Curiously enough, this interpretation was to survive, inconsistently, by the inherent force of tradition, not only in St. Thomas (4 D. 13), but in such professional liturgists as Durandus of Mende (Rational, 4, 44) or Biel (Explanation of the S. Canon of the Mass, lesson 55), at least as probable. Then came the time when that interpretation flourished again in all its vigour in the Apologist Gordon Huntley (Controversies, 9), until finally Le Brun {Explanation . . . of the Mass, in h.l.) declared the matter to be beyond a doubt. This is perhaps exaggerated; for in questions of this kind, the moment we try to determine the thought of those who drew up our ancient formulas, we cannot pretend to reach mathematical certitude. Probabilities suffice, based on the spirit of the epoch, on the interpretation of the age following, and on intrinsic reasons. We are here confronted by a text which under cover of an image expresses a reality, a change presented as a displacement.

1 With regard to the testimonies placed before the reader, my distinguished correspondent has honoured me with the following reply, {Recherches, 1923, p. 239): "Do these testimonies produce the impression of a fixed tradition? Could they give such an impression, above all, if confronted by the countless witnesses who say nothing of the kind, or who say the opposite, as Innocent III or Peter Lombard (IV, D., 13), on whom I chanced to put my hands recently? " There is evidently some distraction here. Peter Lombard does not say the opposite. It is true he speaks about the angels and is silent about Christ (unless Christ is meant in the first sentence, where it is a question of the coelestis missus dispatched ad consecrandum vivificum corpus). But to call attention to the angels without mentioning Christ is not of itself to exclude Christ, nor as a consequence to weaken the testimony of those who place Christ before us as the King of angels. On the other hand, this very passage proves that Peter Lombard saw in this prayer, jube haec perferri, an epiclesis. This is sufficient to separate him from Innocent III, who must be looked upon as an implicit adversary of the "christological" explanation, precisely because tieformally rejects the epiclesis, on which that explanation is based. Besides, this same passage is also found in nearly all the authors of that epoch: Gerhoch, Baudinus, Peter of Poitiers, etc. (see M.F., 278-279). Père d'Alès speaks in the same place of "countless witnesses". who in their interpretation of the prayer jube haec perferri have said nothing of Christ Is not that word "countless" rather strong? In the early Middle Ages, i.e. before Innocent III, there was only an inconsiderable number of authors to explain this prayer, at least so far as my personal knowledge goes. Those among them who declare themselves for Christ, form a notable proportion, and they were also the most prominent in their time. 11 is of great significance, too, that their affirmation did not once, for three centuries, meet with contradiction, nor is there apparent in them the least hesitation.

The figure is calculated to give prominence to the ministry of the angels. But the inner element of the sacred action prompts the eye of faith to see the part played by the Minister, the supreme Liturgus [Heb., viii, 2), the invisible Priest, the Angel beloved of God (Justin, Dial, 93), whose Deacons are the angels, as the deacons of the visible priest are those whom the Church has ordained for a ministry like that of the blessed spirits [Roman Pontifical, ordin. of the deacon.—Cf. Origen, In Matth. Comment. Series, 10, P.G. 13, 1613 c; S. Germanus, C.P., A mystagogical Study of the Church, n. 16; J.T.S., ix (1908), pp. 261-262 : Οι δε διάκονοι ei? τύπον των αγγελικών δυνάμεων ω ? λειτουργικά πνεύματα ei? διακονίαν αποστελλομενα περιτρεχονσι; Narsai, Exposition of the Mysteries, T. A. S., viii, i, p.4, cf. pxxii; Denys Bar Salibi, Explanation of the Offices of the Church, tr. 2, c. 13, 14 and 21, G. S. G. O., 91, pp. 143-149 and 158-159, etc.). Priests and deacons, all are ministers of the Most High, comministri, in the language of the Church [Rom. Pontiff; Jesus Christ and the angels, also are ministers together, although unequally, of the heavenly Tabernacle raised by the hand of God. It is the collectivity, or rather the hierarchy, of this supraterrestrial ministry which seems to be had in view in the prayer of the Canon for the transfer of the gifts offered up. We ask that the transfer be brought about by the divine Envoy, by the glorified Liturgus seated at the right hand of the Father and intervening here as he shall intervene on the last day, "when he shall come in his Majesty and that of his Father and of the holy angels " [Lk. ix, 26). For, as the pseudo-Dionysius teaches, one is the power and virtue of every hierarchy [Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, i, 2). The deacons, of the Church are participants of that "Diaconate of Christ" of which St. Ignatius speaks [Magn. vi, 1, coll. 7ra.,iii, cf. Didasc. and Const. Apost., ii, 26, 4, and iii, 30, 2), which consists precisely in this that Christ was and remains "the Angel of the Father" [Const. Apost., loc. cit., and v, 12; cf. the Synodal Letter of the Council of Antioch to Paul of Samosata, Mansi, I, 1036). Likewise, the angels are participants of that eminent and original mission, which is that

of the Word, come forth from the bosom of the Father in order to re-enter it, come upon the earth by way of the Incarnation, and returned to Heaven by the virtue of the sacrifice of his Body and Blood: exivi a Patre --- et vado ad Patrem. Nemo ascendit in coelum, nisi qui descendit de coelo, Filius hominis qui est in coelo. This is the mysterious ladder seen by Jacob; it is he, the Christ, who inaugurated it, or rather he is that ladder itself by which earth and heaven are put in communication. Without him the intervention of the angelic powers cannot be understood; and it would be a mistake, on the other hand, to represent him apart from the angels who are hastening along the path traced by him. If the angels were kept aloof from our sacrifice, from that sacrifice which clinches the alliance of earth and heaven. they might well complain to Christ, making their own the historic words: Ouo, sacerdos sancte, sine diacono properas? Tu nunquam sine ministro sacrificium offerre consueveras. But if they offered themselves alone for the task, could not Christ tell them as he tells us: Sine me nihil potestis facere?—Per manus sancti Angeli tui; yes, it is the hand of angels, but in the hand of Christ, the sovereign Angel. But, let me repeat it, this exegesis will never impose itself with evidence; it is enough if it is reasonable and well founded. The text in this part of our Liturgy is poetical; therefore a comprehensive

1 As this discussion was carried on with Père d'Alès, there was no occasion for examining the view which identifies our Angel with the Holy Ghost, since my correspondent rejects that view, as I do. That hypothesis, however, put into circulation by Hoppe some sixty years ago, has been taken up again in our day by certain liturgists of note. It has not in its favour the authority of any spokesman of patristic or medieval antiquity. In liturgical texts only two points of support can be found: (i) an antiphon occurring in manuscripts of the tenth-thirteenth century (cf. Cagin, Te Dam or Illatio? p. 217), and wavering between the two following forms: Emitte Angelum tuum, Domine and Emitte Spiritum Sanctum tuum, Domine, "for the sanctification of thy Body and Blood" (there is nothing about a translation of the gifts, but a simple downward epiclesis); (ii) a fragment of the Liber Ordinum (M.F. 447), without any reference to the Eucharist, but having in view solely the descent of the Holy Ghost, "Angel of Truth", upon the baptismal font. It is too little to confer upon the conjectural interpretation of Hoppe a serious probability. This would be true of his opinion, even if there were not against it an imposing array of scriptural, patristic and liturgical statements in favour of the Word, the Sovereign Priest, the Head of the heavenly hierarchy, that Son of the Father whom, after all, so many other epideseis, even of the most remote antiquity, do invoke.

and elastic interpretation, and not a stiff or narrow one, will lend itself better than any other to fit over the outlines of a reality at once complex and mysterious.

Assuredly the question is not momentous; it borders on things infinitely little. Still, as you have noticed, it has some bearing on another question much more important, which relates to the celestial sacrifice. This question is capital or, if you prefer, central. And here you are not the only one to express a doubt: a Spanish critic has preceded you in the *Estudios Ecclesiasticos*. How, it is asked, can there be a celestial sacrifice, when as a matter of fact in heaven (and at this point we are or ought to be agreed) there is no place for either oblation or immolation? The question may be asked from a twofold standpoint: from the standpoint of reality, which is the more important, and from the standpoint of terminology, which is secondary.

And first, as regards the reality of things, it is true that oblation and (when it occurs) immolation make up the whole sacrificial function. There is, therefore, no sacrifice in course of celebration, once these two acts are accomplished. And since these actions are not repeated in heaven, there is not any sacrificing going on in heaven. This much is Must we say, then, that there is no sacrifice beyond a doubt. That is a different matter. If by sacrifice was meant only the sacrificial action, the question would be settled. But if sacrifice, beside the active element, admits a passive one that may endure, whereas the transitory action passes away, then there is a different solution to the problem. Then we shall say that the active sacrifice is indeed at an end, but that the passive sacrifice continues as long as that state into which it has been the purpose of the sacred rite to bring the victim. The passive sacrifice is nothing else than the gift made to God, retaining the character of gift. What is needed that the gift may remain in that state? It must not have been refused by God, but on the contrary accepted,

and as a consequence taken in hand, by him to whom it was addressed. This has been verified, in the Victim of the Sacrifice of our Redemption, in the Resurrection and Ascension. Christ is in heaven, in the quality of Gift, offered once, accepted and kept by God for ever. This is what is meant by designating him as eternal Victim, or celestial Sacrifice. He does not, of course, undergo a new immolation; neither is he in the bloody and inanimate condition into which the immolation had once the power to put him. But between this statement and the conclusion that he is no longer a Victim or no longer a Sacrifice, there is an abyss. clusion could satisfy those only who consciously or unconsciously consider destruction, deterioration, diminution, to be the formal element of sacrifice. To them (with very few exceptions, rather inconsistent) the heavenly Christ, in the state of Victim, has no meaning. And this would be the time to remind them that what was destroyed in Christ by death, namely the life inherited from Adam, the life in the likeness of sinful flesh, the corruptible and mortal life, did not reappear in his Resurrection. That life remained on the Cross, where our own must also remain, in order to give access to another life, whose principle is Divine: the divine life of the Word, breaking in upon the Humanity of Christ, in order to spread itself thence through all his members. But what is needed above all is to conjure away the false notion of sacrifice and to return to the one which alone is sanctioned by revelation and natural reason, not to say history. In this true concept of sacrifice the first and most important element is that of gift, of gift presented to God, of exterior gift offered exteriorly in order to attest and express the interior consecration of the soul to its Creator, of the creature to its last end. Under this aspect, it does not, in a certain sense, matter much whether the sensible gift has gone to God by way of immolation or by any other (as is the case in sacrifices which have no immolation). really matters is that the sacrifice should reach its goal. Every gift of this kind, offered to God personally, with the

above intention, is (in the passive sense of the word) a sacrifice, at least an intended sacrifice. When duly received by God, it is a sacrifice arrived at its destination, a sacrifice consecrated as such by the divine acceptance, and consequently (always in the passive sense of the word) a consummated sacrifice. Thus Christ is eternal Sacrifice. precisely and formally or principally on account of his stigmata, but on account of his glory. For that glory is the divine answer to the sacerdotal act he performed in time. The consummation of the sacrifice is not, therefore, the consummation of a transitory action situated in the past; but it is the consummation of the object dedicated by that action and placed finally in the state of something divine, by its very acceptance by God. This divine acceptance alone has the power to transfer that object definitely from the human to the divine domain, and consequently to cause it to pass from its (relatively) profane and earthly condition, into the condition-which will henceforth be its very own —of something sacred and celestial. Such is the process of divine consummation through acceptance; and such, too, is the process of human consummation through participation. To partake of the sacrifice by communion is not in itself to share in the sacrificial action (at the Supper the apostles did not take part in Christ's sacerdotal activity); but it is to partake of the object sacrificed, of the passive sacrifice. For pagans it consisted in partaking of the "idolothyte"; for us it consists in partaking of the "theothyte" of the redemptive sacrifice, which happens to be (by divine institution) the unique Theothyte of our eucharistic oblation. It is perfectly true, therefore, that the celestial sacrifice is but the consummated sacrifice: but to conclude thence that the celestial sacrifice is not a sacrifice in the strict sense, is to outrun the premises. Certainly, no theologian caring for precision considers it or should consider it an active sacrifice in the strict sense. But it is, in the very strictest sense, a passive sacrifice, the truest, the only true, sacrifice, true with a reality of truth which transcends the shadows

and figures and imparts to them whatever reality may have lain under their appearances of acceptable offerings, of gifts received, of goods withdrawn from this world in order to take, in a higher order, the attributes of "Bread of God", of "Cup of God", or of "Lamb of God." In this august character of sacerdotal gift carried to the uttermost heights of heaven, there is not anything in the least derogatory to the dignity of Christ entered into possession of his native glory, and seated at the right hand of God. You are a thousand times justified, when excluding from that state and that glory every gesture of a suppliant, every exterior or interior attitude of a sacrificer presenting his offering to the acceptance of the Father. Christ has not to do again what he did on earth: he did it once for all, and did it so well that even if he wished it, it could not be done again. As the Philosopher says, once the term is reached, there is no further motion towards it: and what Christ once offered has reached the term that cannot be passed. The offerings of our Melchisedech repose now in the bosom of God, under the appearances of the glorified Humanity of the Son. resplendent, as man, with the very splendour of his eternal generation. Beyond, there is nothing. And therefore Melchisedech, having no other task to perform, is seated: sedet. This assuredly does not interfere with the gift remaining what it is, a gift, and a gift of Melchisedech, a gift in the hand of God, where, for that one reason, it remains the eternal price of our salvation and the indefectible ransom of our souls

Perhaps we are in agreement on this point, the only one that is worth while in the order of realities. For you write: "The glorified Christ remains in all truth Priest and Victim of the New Testament". He remains Priest, you say, and he remains Victim; and you evidently understand it of an eternity which is the same for the Victim as for the Priest: not a relative eternity, limited to the time during which the eucharistic sacrifice of the Church will last; but of an eternity which will stretch out into the ages without end. In that

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case we agree; and the agreement on this the main issue is so precious that it ought to win for you the withdrawal of a terminology which has the disadvantage of displeasing The withdrawal would be made at once, if there were not a difficulty in the way. There is, first of all, the difficulty of stripping of their meaning certain expressions which long usage has sanctioned and which of necessity we shall continue to employ, in accordance with the whole Christian literature, such as the "participation in the sacrifice," the "consummation of the sacrifice". These expressions must be understood of the passive sacrifice, or else have no meaning: at least for any one who in sacrifice does not see a mere gesture, but a gift. Again there is also the disadvantage of deviating from the Fathers, who in a thousand passages speak to us of Christ as still being a Sacrifice, independently of us who offer sacrifice on earth, independently of the signs which still symbolize sacramentally the Truth which heaven will unfold to us. Finally (omitting quite a number of other reasons) any change of terminology would be an implicit denial of a most constant practice of medieval antiquity. It is certainly worthy of note that the word sacrificium was for centuries almost the only one in use to designate the eucharistie reservation (M.F., 502). Now, the reservation of the Eucharist is not the active sacrifice: it can only be the passive sacrifice. And if the appellation of sacrifice is admissible when applied to what remains after my sacrificial action, why not also when applied to that final state, not only sacramental, but real, into which the Sovereign Priest has brought his Victim? And how can we then speak of it as anything but "celestial Sacrifice"? If the expression is uncommon in the theological language of our day, is it not because a clear and thorough understanding of the end which the oblation of Christ had in view is also uncommon—of the end to which in general, and by its very essence, every sacrifice is directed, in a word, of the destination inherent in the Victim as such, without the possibility of assigning to it any other destination than the house of God, the sanctuary of God, the temple of

glory where God dwells and receives the gifts of His faithful people? "Dost thou wish to know," St. Irenaeus asks, "that there is an altar in heaven? Why, thither our oblations are directed." Yes, all our oblations: but first of all, that of Christ; ours reach there only because they are changed into the one which Christ presented first.

Would it be presuming too much to believe that here also we understand each other, and that you found fault only with my too great insistence in bringing before the reader the above view of a celestial Sacrifice, in order to connect with it constantly our sacrifice here below, making the celestial Sacrifice like the goal of the movement we impart to our offerings?

Once more I must plead guilty, and confess that my insistence is real and intentional. Why so? It is easy to account for it.

Some authors, highly esteemed and of real worth (M.F. 303-304), have thought that they could integrate our eucharistic sacrifice, by merely linking the oblation which we make under the form of a symbolic immolation with the real immolation which was accomplished on Calvary. That immolation is certainly not going on now; neither does it mark,—as it did at the Supper,—the course of events through which our victim would have to pass. Christ offered himself indeed to the immolation of the Cross, but the Church does not offer Christ to his bloody immolation any more than she offers his inanimate Flesh or the Blood gushing from his wounds. These are things of the past. And so the above theologians take the view that we offer Christ's past death, though there does not subsist in Christ any permanent state of (passive) sacrifice, inherent in his glorified Humanity. ask, can this be? or rather, if this were so, and this were all, would there be on our part a real sacrifice (in the active meaning of the word)? They believe it; they maintain, as much as we do, the reality of our daily sacrifice. They are as Catholic as we are; but, are they also consistent with themselves and with their belief?

Does not a true and real sacrifice require the presence of a true and real victim, that is truly and actually in the state proper to things sacrificed? And if that condition is.not conferred upon it by us (and here we must commend those authors being in agreement with a tradition of fifteen centuries), are we not driven to admit the antecedent and permanent quality of that state? It follows that the very truth and reality of our sacrifice are at stake. Though it is "terrestrial" (an expression never met with in the Fathers or in the liturgies), because of the rite employed in it, and the ministers officiating in it, and the place where it is celebrated, and the condition of sojourner proper to the Church . Militant, it is nevertheless a celestial Sacrifice, by reason of the Victim and the Gift, and of the state (of Gift or Victim) to which it refers. All this, of course, supposes, as theologians generally agree against Suarez, that the thing offered by us is the Body and Blood of Christ, and by no means the species (M.F. 109 and 209). This question will receive special attention in the lectures of the Catholic Summer School of Cambridge, about to appear in book form. 1 But what needs stressing here is that the question is not merely one of the logical coherence of thoughts, but (what from a certain point of view is more serious), of the deference due to ecclesiastical decisions. It is two centuries since the question received some attention. Without being decisive or final, the pronouncements of the French Episcopate have shown a trend of doctrine (negative it is true) which commands the respect of theologians. In 1723, Pierre François le Courrayer, canon regular of St. Geneviève (on this ambiguous person, see Nouvelle Biographie generale), wrote a Dissertation on the validity of the Ordinations of the English. In 1726 he published a Defence of the Dissertation . . . , etc. The priesthood of the English was valid, according to him, because (contrary to the Sayings of Catholic theologians) they had never perverted the meaning of the ordinations. They had always

^{*} The volume has since appeared under the title: Catholic Faith in the Holy Eucharist. See Foreword.

claimed to confer a sacrificial power. That power, however, has reference to the only kind of sacrifice recognized by Christian faith, namely "a purely representative and commemorative sacrifice" (Proposition I), in which is offered nothing else than a death of the past, there being no need "To exculpate of a real and actual state of victim in Christ. the English it is enough that they accept with the Fathers and our best theologians, the Sacrifice of Jesus Christ, commemorated and represented in the celebration of the Holy Mysteries". (Proposition V.) "We have, therefore, in the Eucharist a true sacrifice in the sense that there is made in it the offering to God of a death ever present, . . . but as that death is not renewed, that sacrifice is merely representative another". (Proposition VI.) It is against this attempt to reduce our sacrifice to two elements, a past death and a present imitation, that the "Cardinals, Archbishops and Bishops in extraordinary session at Paris", raised their protests, August 22, 1727, in their Censure of the Books of Brother Peter Francis le Courrayer, etc.: "This Holy Council (of Trent) has explicitly declared that the Mass is a true and real sacrifice: and that it is not a mere commemoration of the sacrifice of the Cross. What else is needed to anathematize propositions in which one dares to express the opinion that the Mass is but a commemorative and representative Sacrifice? it is only a representation of the Sacrifice of the Cross, and a memorial of the immolation of Jesus Christ; that in the Mass Jesus Christ offers himself merely in image? in which finally the Mass is reduced to an action which recalls the memory of what Christ suffered for us? In vain does the author attempt to defend himself by saying that he has called the Mass a representative sacrifice only because he intended to exclude a new bloody immolation, and not the reality of the offering which we make to God. This excuse cannot be accepted: for, as his Propositions show, if he recognizes in the Mass an offering, it is not anything else than the Death ofJesus Christ effected on the Cross. Now by his own admission that Death is not renewed: it is neither present, nor

offered as present, and consequently the oblation of it cannot be real, since a real oblation necessarily supposes a real victim It can, therefore, only be for the purpose of deluding himself or others that the author calls this oblation real. By his own principles it cannot be anything but a simple commemoration of an absent death, that took place long agonudam commemorationem—as Protestants have expressed it. Now, according to Catholic belief, it is necessary to recognize in the Sacrifice of the Mass, not a mere offering of a past death, but the true oblation of a victim really present, and, inasmuch as it is present, actually offered to God by the Priest." The documents are quoted at great length in the classical work of E. E. Estcourt on the Anglican ordinations (The Question of Anglican Ordinations, Lond. 1873, pp. Ixxviii-lxxxviii). Whoever speaks of offering in the Mass the Death of Christ (and the whole tradition invites us to do so), would do well not to overlook or keep in the background, as if it were of no avail, that other complementary element, which tradition presents to us also, and of which such good use was made against Luther by the apologists of the Counter-Reformation. element is the celestial element, the final and glorious term wherein alone survives, immortalized and exalted, the character of Offering and of sacred Gift with which Christ of old invested himself, wearing it through the Passion, to the very stone of the Sepulchre, in order to receive there, from above, the seal and handwriting of the divine ratification. other way can we claim to embody in our liturgical rite all the essential constituents of a true and actual Sacrifice: to wit, under the form of a symbolical immolation, the oblation of a victim truly such, the eternal Victim of the unique Sacrifice offered by our Redeemer. We do offer the Death of Christ, and we offer it really, in the sense that what we offer is the eternal Theothyte of that Death by which Jesus Christ devoted himself to God. If on earth we offer a sacrifice, it is because there is in heaven a Sacrifice, the Sacrifice which Jesus Christ, by rising from the death of the Cross, carried to There he is, there he remains: the topmost heaven.

same who hung on the gibbet for our salvation, after having been dedicated through the rite of the Bread and the Cup, the rite that continues to dedicate him till time shall be no more.

I have now, I think, advanced sufficient reasons to account for that insistence of mine which has caused you some wonderment. What a pleasure it would be to learn that your wonderment has ceased or abated! Men wonder at one another, because they fail to understand one another, even when, after all, they agree on the main issue, on the leading principles, on the necessary method, and even when they are worshipping at the same shrine of knowledge, under the same Masters, with the single purpose of discovering, not what will promote this system rather than that, but what is in harmony with Christian faith, as it is lived by the simpleminded, by the saints, by the Church whose members we are. At all events, we shall always understand each other sufficiently to profit from an interchange of thoughts, and perhaps to cause others to profit thereby.

THE JURIDICAL QUESTION
THE HISTORICAL SOLUTION
OBJECTIONS ANSWERED
A REJOINDER

The old solution of the ever present question of mass-stipends never fails when put forward, to stir up disagreement, or at least to call for explanations, among liturgists and moralists. This happened recently. Whereas Fr. Hanssens, S.J., professor of Liturgy at the Gregorian University, and Dom Bauduin, O.S.B., 2 professor at the International College of St. Anselm, gave to the thesis defended in Mysterium Fidei their fullest assent, Fr. Hocedez, S.J., 3 professor at the Scholasticate of Louvain, while marking his sympathy, could not refrain from raising a certain number of objections, closing the list with these words: "These difficulties, no doubt, will be easily solved by the Reverend Father, and we wish earnestly that they may, seeking for nothing better than to accept his argument." It would be ungracious to disregard so kind an invitation. You have now the whole reason for the present work.4

¹ Gregorianum, June 1922, pp. 307-312, article on Mysterium Fidei.

^{*} Revue des Questions Liturgiques et Paroissiales, Sept. 1922, Les honoraires de Messes.

^{*} Nouvelle Revue Théologique, February 1923, Les Honoraires de Messes.

^{*} See Appendix at the end of Part I, p. 221.

THE JURIDICAL QUESTION

Let it first of all be well understood that in what follows the subject-matter is the ordinary transaction between priest and faithful as regards not the mere celebration of the mass, but its application. The application of the sacrifice to my own ends implies its celebration, but the converse is not true. I may engage a priest to celebrate in such a place2 and at such an hour,3 before such a congregation, without stipulating anything about the application of the fruits of the mass. Nay more, I may exclude every stipulation of the kind. Nevertheless, by reason of the subjection to these conditions of time and place and surroundings (surrender of the freedom of his movements), by reason also of the inconveniences the affair may entail for the priest (discomfort), but still more by reason of the compensation due for expenses to be incurred (for instance for a journey, or a stay at a hotel), or of losses to be suffered (as that of time which he might have spent in some lucrative occupation, if it were only working in his garden, or caring for his bees),4 in a word, for all manner of reasons

¹ Sacerdoti cuilibet missam celebranti et applicanti licet eleemosynam seu stipendium recipere (Cod. fur. Can., can. 824, §1).

At great distance from his residence, in the chapel of a manor-house, in a factory chapel, in a military instruction camp, in a prison, etc.

^{*} For instance, at noon.

^{*} Mercedem quam accipit, non pro divinis accipiat, sed pro mansione quam facit apud ecclesiam aliquam vel pro aliis beneficiis quae ibifacit, vel pro recompensatione damnorum quae sustinet occasione morae quam ibi contrahit—(Innocentius IV, In Quintum Decretalium, cap. "Hepraelati" n. 3; Venetiis 1570, fol. 298 b).

Aut pro labore extrinseco, aut pro obligatione celebrandi in tali loco vel tempore, aut quia privat se facultate dandi operam aliis rebus ex quibus Hâte posset lucrum referre vel aliquid aliud facere, quae sunt pretio aestimabilia (Martinus Bonacina, De Sacram, Eucharistiae, quaesi, tdt., punct. 8, n. 2). The extrinsic title, which all theologians and canonists admit, has been sanctioned now by the Code, with regard to the simple celebration of the Mass, when binating—(can. 824, §2).

quite extrinsic to the celebration of the mass itself. I may settle with him about a repayment either in kind or in money. Thus to his prestation corresponds a counter-prestation *[auid]* pro quo) from me, and out of the two results a synallagmatic contract binding in justice (at least in conscience) both parties. It is the classical contract of hire {localio-conductio}. The subject-matter of it will be on the one hand my payment (a true salary) and on the other the extrinsic service added to the celebration of the mass. Apart from any extrinsic consideration of the kind mentioned, I may also, for the sole purpose of stimulating the practice of religious worship, without any claim on the fruit of the sacrifice, enter with a priest into an agreement, by which I pledge myself to pay him a fixed sum of money for every mass celebrated by him, under whatever condition of time and place he may choose; or, vice versa, he will accept a sum which I pay him with the understanding that he celebrate, without specifying either time or place: leaving him every facility, most explicitly, in both instances, to enter with a third party (whoever he may be) into the customary agreements with regard to the application of the mass.2 It is the same kind of an understanding as might intervene between a modem Maecenas and an epic poet or a musical composer. It may be questioned whether it creates an obligation of contractual justice, and if so whether it must be ranked among the compacts of the kind do utfacias, or rather as having the character of a conditional or modal donation (do ea lege ut facias). At all events, because as a matter of fact the celebration of Mass which I secure is not burdened with any utilitarian conditions either for my own spiritual profit or to that of a third person whom I might get to

¹ It is not at all necessary under these circumstances that the employer be a Catholic. He may be a Protestant, a Jew, a pagan, an atheist; it will not change in any way the import or the strictness of the contract. And the case is by no means chimerical. A man may stay away from Mass habitually and yet want it for the workpeople of his factory or of his farmlands. The State may be officially Protestant or schismatical and need the services of a Catholic chaplain for its Catholic soldiers, etc. There is no reason why a priest may not engage himself to such an employer in return for a salary or a soldier's pay.

take my place, I need not be uneasy on the score of simony.l There is no exchange (strictly so called) of a spiritual for a temporal advantage: which is of the essence of simony: therefore, all is well.

Such are some of the various contracts which may be made with regard to the celebration of the Mass, without touching upon its application.

The problem, therefore, does not refer to them, but solely to that other contract in constant use among the faithful who wish to secure for themselves or for a third party, the benefit of some special fruit of the Mass, which is neither the general fruit accruing to the whole Church, nor the fruit proper to those who assist, and still less the fruit reserved to the celebrant; but another, recognized and sanctioned by ecclesiastical legislation on the application of the sacrifice. The faithful (in the case we are considering) do not only intend to have a mass celebrated, as in the previous examples, but to obtain (for themselves or for some person in their stead) the special benefit of the application of the mass in their favour.2

1 See Laymann, who will be quoted further on.

s A young professor of the Royal University of Catana, since transferred to Pisa, and now a professor at the Catholic University of Milan, Signor Vincenzo Del Giudice, attorney at the Roman bar, in his book Stipendia Missarum (Rome 1922), has carefully and intelligently reviewed the solutions of a number of ancient and modem canonists to the question of the essence of the mass-contract. The inquiry proves that far from offering a unanimous solution, canonical literature presents to us the picture of a strange confusion. There is not a juridical solution that has not been tried; every one invariably had to face an imposing army of adversaries. The same conclusion would have been reached from a study of the theologians. Agreement does not exist to-day any more than vesterday. The question is the more open to debate as it is encumbered with the most diverse solutions. Following Sinibaldi (Innocent IV) and Bonacina, Del Giudice has had the great merit of clearing up the notion of mandate. If instead of restricting his researches to the canonists (which is quite excusable in a jurist) he had extended it to the theologians, he would have found himself less isolated among the moderns than he might imagine. The notion of mandate is the one defended of late in Mysterium Fidei (339 sq., 349 sq., 355 sq., 365 sq., 382, etc.), but there a different object is assigned to it, and its concept is preserved in its perfect integrity. According to Del Giudice I give a mandate to a priest to produce a spiritual good for my benefit, and I give a remuneration for the execution of that mandate. This can hardly be distinguished from contracts do utfacias, or similar ones, which will be examined hereafter. Let us change the object of the mandate, let us do away with the remuneration, and everything will become easy. Of itself a mandate (Del Giudice will not dissent), is a gratuitous contract: thus it is distinct from hire, etc. On the other hand, the mandate I deliver to the

The contract do utfacias, or any analogous contract whatever. if it should intervene here, would have to apply to a new matter, the fruit. We should be justified, then, in formulating the contract thus: Do (tibi) ut jacias (sacrum, et auidem mihi specialiter profuturum). You celebrate, and the fruit of the celebration will be mine. It is clearly a double contract. Do tibi, (i) ut facias sacrum, et (ii) ut sacri fructum mihi tribuas. Two contracts, in reality: a contract do utfacias (celebration), and a contract do ut des (application). With the first there is no difficulty; but with the second is there no reason for anxiety? I give you this money, so that in return, and in all justice, you may give me the spiritual fruit of the mass—and you do not call that buying the fruit of the mass? What does one mean, then, by buying? It is not buying, because I give that sum to the celebrant for his living. But how does that purpose, so highly respectable, weaken the contract of sale and purchase? I give my shoemaker the price of a pair of shoes. It is clearly for his living that he works, and perhaps it is for his living that I give him work. Will there be for this reason less of a contract of purchase and sale between him and me? Undoubtedly the ultimate destination, namely

Priest is not a mandate of production or of attribution to myself, as will be seen, but a mandate of oblation and transmission to God. It is essentially gratuitous, and as such involves no remuneration; but it goes with a deposit, the deposit of the object to offer or transmit. As depositary, the priest is bound in justice towards me; although I, properly speaking, have not given anything to him, but only entrusted something (from which, by a process to be studied further on, a portion eventually returns to him for his maintenance). It may be well here, for the sake of clearness, to point out that we are not using the term mandate in the complex meaning given it by the Roman Law, but in the current acceptation of everyday language, for which all the elements of the juridical meaning are not required. Del Giudice seems also to be influenced by an anxiety to withdraw the mass-contract from the cognizance of the judiciary. The arguments he brings forward seem debatable. If I understand aright, they rest chiefly on the impossibility of verifying juridically the non-execution of the mandate, chiefly as to the application. But that non-execution may be obvious, at least in certain cases. . I have handed twenty-five pounds to a priest for a hundred masses to be said for my intention. Hardly has he received them, when he is struck dumb, or paralyzed. Clearly he may be forced to make restitution by the ecclesiastical tribunals, or even, it would seem, in their default, by the civil tribunals. Likewise, if the priest were to apostatize, and afterwards boasted of never having complied with his obligation, this avowal would furnish the juridical basis for a judgment of the ecclesiastical or civil courts.

the sustenance of the priest, is an element of particular interest, as we shall see later, in the adequate explanation of the process by which my pecuniary contribution becomes legitimately the property of the celebrant. But that ultimate purpose is not sufficient by it self to dispose of simony. 1 Otherwise it would be lawful for me to stipulate with a prelate that if he grants me ten indulgences of one hundred days each, which I am asking of him, I pledge myself in justice, to supply him with ten quarter casks of wine, for his maintenance. Or I might at once place the stipend in his hands, on condition that at a given moment he grant me the ten indulgences. Now there is no doubt that a binding agreement of this sort, a contract in justice, concerning indulgences, is simony jure divino. The Code is explicit and decisive on the matter.2 What is said about indulgences holds equally with regard to the administration of the sacraments.3 If then the ultimate purpose of my stipend for the support of the priest were sufficient by itself alone to eliminate from the contract about the application of the mass all reproach of simony, it should also suffice to eliminate it from all other contracts bearing on indulgences and the sacraments: which is not the case. That ultimate purpose does indeed intervene, both lawfully and usefully, but only on condition that the contract on hand shows itself entirely free from the character of an exchange (i.e. of a reciprocal burden) between the spiritual benefit

¹ Fr. G. Arendt (De laesione justitiae commutativae in missae manualis stipendio alteri celebranti diminuto, Prati, 1914, n. 21), says very well on this subject: "Ad hoc autem (simoniae vitium) arcendum, non sufficit stipendium dari, ex mero operantis, fine, intuitu corfferendae sustentationis sacerdoti sacrificii ministro, si simul, ex fine operis, ex indole scilicet objectiva actus juridici quo stipendii dominium in sacerdotem transfertur locum reapse haberet commutatio illa pretii temporalis vel cum ipso spirituali sacrificio, vel cum objectiva labore, celebrationem hujus intrinsecus atque inseparabiliter concomitante: esset enim haec simonia palliata. And still more clearly, in n. 41: Equidem contenti sunt omnes cum S. Thoma, ad avertendam hanc simoniae labem, pecuniam non dari in pretium operis supematuralis vel fructus ejus, sed in sustentationem ministri; ut vero per hanc primam explicationem nondum elucet quomodo ex justitia commutativa minister teneatur supernaturale suum opus praestare vi supradicti initi contractus, quin reincidat in comparationem operae vel rei supematuralis quam praestat, cum stipendio temporalis sustentationis sibi procuratae ob altero contrahente; ideoque in simoniam incurrat, quam evitare voluerat. It is impossible to present the difficulty more accurately.

^{*} Can. 727, §1.

^{*} Ibid.

of a celebration and application in my favour, and the temporal emolument which the priest derives for his susten-Then, and then only will the spectre of simony vanish. Perhaps you will answer that the priest's support was already a duty incumbent on me; and, therefore, I merely pledge myself to pay a debt and satisfy a previous obligation. And since the payment was already binding for other reasons, does not the spiritual benefit conferred by the priest retain all its essential gratuitousness? But honestly, is not this an illusion. For, after all, it may well happen, and the case is very frequent, that the priest is not my pastor, at all, or again, (and in certain countries it happens often enough) it may happen that my pastor is richly, abundantly and superabundantly endowed with benefices: and yet the masscontract remains identically the same in this case (which excludes any antecedent obligation to contribute to support of the priest), as in the other cases (which let that obligation subsist).

Moreover, this same claim of antecedent obligation could be invoked in every contract about sacraments, indulgences, as above. Simony would become practically impossible, unless, perhaps, among people rude enough to believe that the temporal is worth as much as the spiritual. Now this intellectual error or heresy is by no means necessary to constitute the sin of simony. I It is true that this sin consists in treating holy things and in dealing in holy things as if one believed the above absurdity, since the spiritual and the temporal are placed side by side in a business transaction which, by its very nature, tends to establish between them a bond of justice, and consequently to place them on the same level. But this error comes in merely as an interpretation furnished by the very character of the proceedings, without the contracting parties having to adopt it formally as the object directly and properly intended by them. Hence the impossibility for a theologian to accept the following principle, proclaimed nevertheless by worthy men, such as Tataretus, in his commentary

1 St. Thomas, Sum. Theol. III, q. 100, a. i, ad I.

on the twentieth Quodlibetum of Scotus, and upon no less a matter than simony: "Purchase and sale consist in exchanging the ownership of something with the idea that this thing is of the same value as that other." On the contrary, there is no need whatever of any such idea. Whatever may be your opinion on the relative value of the two goods, the one temporal, the other spiritual, you have no right to make them enter into a commercial contract, even if in doing so you were to base yourself on a previous obligation (of filial piety or of religion) devolving on the faithful—the support of their clergy.

It is true, on the other hand, that the Church may, by taking account of this prior obligation, establish taxes to be collected on occasion of the sacraments or of other spiritual But these taxes become obligatory thereby only in virtue of legal justice, coming on top of a duty of religious and filial piety, in order to add to it the more precise and stricter obligation of obedience. Legal justice is not contractual justice.3 Ecclesiastical authority could not make us connect the tax with the administration of the sacrament. by means of a liability of contractual justice, without making us fall into the sin of simony, consisting precisely in the obligatory exchange of spiritual and temporal prestations. And yet as regards the Mass, this bond of contractual justice exists between the two activities, that of the priest and that of the faithful: and yet there is no simony. The explanation, therefore, must not be sought in the mere intervention of the Church, decreeing authoritatively an obligation in justice (commutative and contractual) which the natural condition of things would have been insufficient to create. For if that method were valid in the present case, it ought also to be valid in the other instances, so as to clear them of simony: which is not true. Again, historically speaking, there is not the slightest indication that a positive legislation of the Church

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¹ Venditio et emptio est commutando dominium unius rei, existimando hoc esse tanti caloris sicut hoc. (Reportata _ _ _ super Quaestiones Quodlibetales Scoti, s. d. P. 214.)

² Cod. Juris can., can. 1507.

³ Any violation of contractual justice obliges intrinsically to restitution. The same is not necessarily true of legal justice.

gave rise to this duty binding in justice both priest and faithful. All the evidence of history, as we shall see, points in another direction.

Minds that do not balk a paradox may be tempted to make use here of a principle formulated by certain authors (not among the least considerable), which, if it could apply to such cases as this, would have the advantage of doing away almost entirely with simony: whatever would be honourable without a pact can be made the subject-matter of a pact. What more honourable than to give alms to a priest, who is in need of means for himself and for his various activities? What more honourable for the priest than to do his fellow man the charity of saying Mass for him? Consequently the two actions may be linked together by means of a pact, carrying with it an obligation of contractual justice. The pact will be honest; it will, therefore, not be simoniacal. But anyone can see that the same reasoning, if it were valid, would hold for all the sacraments, for indulgences, etc. Quite honourable is the alms given to a prelate; quite honourable the indulgence granted by the prelate; therefore, honourable also the pact which would bind the one with the other. Not at all, says the Church, the pact is simoniacal. Similarly, quite honourable the alms offered to this priest; and also quite honourable the sacrament, whether of penance, extreme unction, any other, administered by a priest: therefore, honourable also is the contractual tie between them. Simoniacal, repeats the Church again, and simoniacal by divine law, and therefore, not unlawful because forbidden, but forbidden because The Church does not recognize in herself any The Councils, as will be right to authorize such a compact. seen later, leave no doubt on this matter. Indeed, the legitimate meaning of the maxim brought forward is very different from the interpretation foisted upon it. Undoubtedly it is always lawful to enter into a gratuitous pact about anything which without a pact would be honest. Is it always lawful to enter into a onerous pact about it? It depends upon the nature of the prestations under consideration. If prior

to the pact they may be considered as exchangeable, then yes; otherwise no. But reduced to these terms the alleged principle does not help us to make any headway. We must therefore look for something else.

Will it be said, in order to do away with all difficulties, that it is a question of an exchange of gratuitous gifts? But this solution of Scotus is nowadays contradicted by the whole ecclesiastical legislation, which asserts the existence of a contract in justice. Will it be rejoined that gratitude towards those from whom we receive special benefits creates also special duties? Certainly nothing can be more legitimate than to show my gratitude by a gift to a priest whom I know to have given me the benefit of the suffrage of his mass. Nothing more legitimate for a priest than to do me that favour in acknowledgment of a liberality with which I favoured him. But, once more, we have not in these instances the mass-contract, which binds in justice, in strict justice, and not in that broad acceptation of a debt understood as the obligation which arises from a favour received. As for the assumption that gratitude could warrant me to go further, and could, by its own virtue, exculpate or gloss over a contractus onerosus which I might make with a priest, my spiritual benefactor, or he with me, his temporal benefactor, such an assumption would be equivalent to a declaration that gratitude could also render lawful a contract in justice between priest and faithful in the case of sacraments or indulgences, which is clearly false. 2 Let us remember moreover that gratitude weakens and even fends to vanish altogether, by turning into an article of

But may I not engage myself to preach under the condition of being remunerated? First of all, preaching is a different sort of thing, because every sermon

¹ Can. 824, §2: ex titulo justitiae.

⁵ It is quite true, the faithful are bound at least by gratitude, to provide for the needs of those who dispense to them holy things. Dignus est enim operarius mcrcede sua. But the sacred ministers are not thereby entitled to enter with those concerned into an onerous agreement (all indemnification apart) with regard to the performance of the sacraments, for instance of baptism, of penance, of holy orders, of confirmation, of extreme unction. Gratis accepistis, gratis date. The two aspects of the compact, do utfacias, and facio ut des, are prohibited respectively to the faithful and to the priest, and the prohibition is imposed by divine law, which in this case is the same as the natural law.

exchange that which was either its foundation or its expression, namely, the kindness done to me, or the kindness with which I reciprocated.

Will it then be best, after all, to refrain from characterizing the two terms of the exchange? In fact, certain theologians do so, teaching on the one hand that the application of the Mass consists in this, that the priest, in return for the contribution of the faithful towards his support, renounces in their favour a fruit of the sacrifice which he might have kept for himself, or inversely. On the other hand, these same theologians teach that the bond of reciprocity between the two terms of the exchange is a bond of justice. And when you look for the name of that contract—which has one in every language—it is not forthcoming.

All that has been said thus far about the contract do ut facias holds also with regard to the modal donation, which under the circumstances would be but a sort of compound of two contracts, a free donation, and a do ut facias; and this second contract must again be split, as above, into two,

supposes a labour of immediate preparation, which may require of me several days, which sometimes takes several weeks, and which of itself is a natural labour, and not a spiritual activity of the supernatural order. Hence there is a twofold title for a contract: first the remuneration for that labour (for this reason St. Thomas, speaking of preachers, says very justly: Stipendia . . . debentur . . . «peri et labori, Quodlib. VII, 18). Second, there is the compensation for the livingexpenses or others which the labour may involve {damnum emergens} and for the cessation of earnings (lucrum cessans). Besides this twofold difference, there is still another: he who engages me for preaching does not procure for himself by his contract a spiritual good. Perhaps he will not be present at the sermon, and consequently draw no profit for himself, although the public may have been greatly benefited. He may assist at it, and nevertheless (no matter how well disposed) find in it personally no spiritual gain: for instance, if he is deaf, or distracted, or does not understand the language in which I speak, or lacks the intellectual preparation required to follow my developments, or if for one reason or another my style does not attract him. Whether the contracting party draws profit for his soul or not, whether a supernatural advantage has been gained by him or not, a contract with regard to preaching remains just as it is in every respect. The case is quite different, as soon as the opus operatum of the sacraments, or the opus operatum of the sacrifice comes into play for the benefit OF the contracting party (or of his substitute). In this case the contract does really not subsist except through the bestowal upon the contracting party (or on his rightful claimant) of a spiritual substance. And herein lies the whole difficulty.

one of them being a do ut des.! There is nobody who does not feel that we are here confronted by a very serious difficulty. 2

Because every contract do (tibi) ut facias (mihi) contains, as regards the application of the mass, a contract do ut des, which is inadmissible,—for it would be simoniacal,—wc must needs look for something else. Nay more; even if we succeeded in doing away with this contract of sale properly so called, the fact would still remain that every contract do (tibi) ut facias (mihi), by which a bond of reciprocity in strict justice would arise3 between my remuneration and the celebration together with the application of the mass to my advantage, would still constitute a simoniacal pact, for this one reason, that it would imply an exchange, that is

1 Laymann has this to say (Theologia Moralis, IV, tract. X, cap. 8, 2, n. it) " In itself it is not simony to promise, give or bequeath to somebody something temporal on which a price can be set, on condition that the recipient perform a spiritual work. . . . Example: parents who promise their children presents if they frequent the sacraments." But there is this caution: "the condition set down must not be that the recipient give or do something for the (spiritual) advantage either of him who made the present, or gave the promise, or of such other person as he may represent (ut conditio non sit de dando vel Jaciendo aliquid in utilitatem dantis aut promittentis, sed neque alterius personae cujus ille quasi vican subeat). Otherwise the transaction would by that very fact be changed into a contract of exchange at least innominate; and in the case where a spiritual work is exchanged for a temporal good, into a simoniacal contract. . . . This caution must be well kept in mind, in order not to fall under the 45th of the propositions condemned by Innocent XI: Dare temporale pro spirituali non est simonia, quand) temporale non datur tanquam pretium, sed duntaxat tanquam motivum conferendi vel efficiendi spirituale; vel etiam quando temporale sit solum gratuita compensatio pro spirituali, aut contra."

2 Difficultas tamen non levis est in reddenda ratione qua possit hoc excusari a labe simomai (Lugo, De Sacramento Eucharistiae, disp. 21, n. 1). One of the latest authors dealing with this subject, Fr. F, Arendt, expresses himselfstill more emphatically: Omnibus notum est in scholis quot et quantis difficultatibus implicata existât quaestio de modo eximendi a labe simoniae jur. div. obligationem justitiae commutativae ortam --- ex contractu particulari intercedente inter offerentem et acceptantem stipendium pro missa manuali—(op. cit., n. 41). Each author is naturally led to offer his solution as the only one to eliminate simony successfully. Thus as regards his own, which will be noticed further on, Fr. Arendt writes: Haec igitur esse videtur sola explicatio illius salebrosi problematis de simonia excludenda, etc. (n. 4g).

2 It would be different if it were a question not of an obligation in strict justice, but of a gratuitous reciprocity, or of a simple debt of gratitude, or again of a duty of simple obedience to a written law or custom. In this sense canon 730 could say, in keeping with canonical tradition: Pion habetur simonia, cum temporale dater non pro re spirituali, sed ejus occasione, exjusto titulat sacris canonibus vel a legitima consuetudine recognito.

to say, a correlation *titulo oneroso* between a temporal prestation and a spiritual counterprestation.

The difficulty here is great; history shows it, denial is useless. For centuries canonists as well as theologians have attempted the most diverse solutions, without being able to convince one another of the correctness or the harmlessness of their conclusions. Some of them fail to establish a relation of strict justice; others succeed so well in establishing it that they are defenceless against the charge of simony. for instance, is Van Espen2 who will tell you: "Just as the laity must offer the stipend to the priest as an oblation pleasing to God, so also priests are bound to receive the stipend gratefully, not as the price of the mass, but as a voluntary offering, giving evidence at the same time of their intention to sacrifice voluntarily to God." This is most edifying, but it does not grapple with the reality, far more juridical, of the transaction between priest and people, both of whom are held more strictly than that. Others, aware of the insufficiency of this counterchange of mutual gifts, bring in a supposed positive law, by which the Church forbids the priest to appropriate the gratuitous donation of the faithful until he has acknowledged the generous act by the application of a mass. Where has anyone ever seen such a law forbidding priests to accept presents, if, in return, they do not say mass?— Oh! but we are speaking only of a certain kind of presents, those offered with a view to obtain a mass.—All depends on that expression with a view. Do you mean a liberality pure and simple, absolute and unconditional, but performed

^{*}Can. 728.

^{&#}x27;Jus Ecclesiasticum universum, pars II, tit. 5, 6, 14, 1: Sicut laid illud {honorarium} tanquam Deo acceptam oblationem sacerdoti offere debent, ita quoque illud sacerdotes non tanquam pretium missae, sed ut voluntariam oblationem grato animo acdpere tenentur: unaque ostendere se velle Deo voluntarie sacrificare. Strangely enough, Noël Alexandre uses exactly the same sentence (with trifling variations) in his Theologia Dogmatica et Moralis, II De Simonia, reg. 35 (Venice, 1768, p. 523). The two authors wrote more or less at the same epoch. One may have copied from the other, or both copied from a third author. Neither one nor the other uses quotation marks. The priority could easily be established by any one having before him the first edition of Noel Alexandre (1693), which is earlier than the work of Van Espen. For lack of an extrinsic criterion, intrinsic ones would rather suggest the priority of Van Espen.

in the hope that the priest, through gratitude, will celebrate for your benefit? I venture to assert that no law of the Church nullifies the acceptance and appropriation of such a gift, on account of failure to celebrate and apply the mass. Is it a question again of a free gift, but one in return for which there has been given by the priest a spontaneous promise, binding him merely to be true to his word, without any necessary connection between the gift and the promise?! Once more it may be asserted that the Church has never added to a mere duty of fidelity freely contracted? a legislative enactment holding in abeyance, till the promise is fulfilled, the effect of a donation not really finked with the promise, but remaining entirely gratuitous. The assumption of such a law is absolutely gratuitous, at least as much as, nay more

1 This is precisely the case contemplated by Bucceroni (Institutiones Theol. Mor V, t. ii n. 632, p. 223), not as typical of the current transaction between priest and faithful, but on the contrary as differing from it essentially, and therefore, licit, even in cases when the other, owing to certain particular regulations, would be no longer permissible: for instance as regards (unless dispensed) the members of the Society of Jesus.

This gratuitousness is supposed to be sincere and undoubted; it is the very hypothesis of our opponent. If it were only assumed and illusory, then we should have in reality, under the colour of free gifts passing to and fro, a contract in justice. This is the place to recall what Laymann writes (Theologia Moralis, IV, tract x, cap. 8, 2, n. 9 and 10); there would be a strict contract, in reality if not in words, where two individuals dealt with each other as follows: "Ωοηο tibi pecuniam, seu aliam rem pretio aestimabilem, tali conditione seu modo ut mihi vicissun ex gratitudine praestare debeas rem aliquam spiritualem"; or vice versa: "praesto tibi hanc rem vel officium spirituale ea tamen conditione ut obliges te ex gratitudine mihi praesta* "For", continues Laymann, "although these turum donum aliquod spirituale arrangements are expressed in the form of a donation or a requital, they are nevertheless, as a matter of fact, simoniacal barters (reipsa simoniacae permutationes existant). This is made clear first by the following example. If some one asks me to make him a present of a book, and I answer: * I will do so, but on condition that you make me a present of a sword,' there is by this very fact an exchange and not a free donation. Then the same is proved also from reason. For the gift of an object is not gratuitous, but onerous and mutual, and therefore not a donation but a business deal, when the donor does not confer on the recipient the right to appropriate the gift, unless he give in return some other object with which, if it were not for this positive and special clause, he would not have been obliged to part. To barter on a debt of gratitude is to bring in a new obligation, a new claim, that can be rated in cash. . . . Besides, whoever holds the opposite is forced to the conclusion that there is no simony --which may not be glossed over with a like formula. I could always say: I will give you this spiritual thing free and gratis, but on condition that in return you obligate yourself to make me a cash donation through gratitude . . . which would be opening wide the door to simony juris divini ". See below, Lugo.

than the donations themselves to which that law professes to apply.

There is still another difficulty, to which Lugo calls our attention (disp. 21, n. 3): in the case where the actual payment did not precede the celebration, but only an agreement to pay after the mass had been said (which is not unusual), the faithful afterwards would not be held in justice, since the obligation arose, by supposition, from a simple promise altogether gratuitous,! to bestow later an entirely free donation. Now no one doubts but that in the daily agreement entered into about the Mass, the faithful are bound in justice to pay; nor, surely, has the Church here to step in for the purpose of invalidating the claim of ownership which they may have, or be reputed to have, retained on their goods.

At this point, however, Laymann does not hesitate to bring forward a contract by hire bearing on the labour intrinsically connected with the celebration of the mass "labor seu defatigatio corporis quae per se ac necessario conjuncta est cum sacro ministerio, puta celebratione missae", op. cit. iv, tract x, cap. 8, 5, η . 41), inasmuch as that labour is subordinate not to the specific end, which is of a spiritual nature, but to the generic end, which is to render a service.2 But unfortunately the generic end is essentially and exclusively realised in its specific determination of a spiritual benefit, and consequently it is the same relation, identically the same, which connects the action with the one and the other end.

^{*} Unless, of course, we suppose that he has pledged himself in justice to pay for the mass when said. But, then, how can it still be claimed that there is no necessary relation and binding obligation between the temporal and the spiritual? Moreover, the supposition has been changed.

[&]quot;Existimo Doctores . . . non dissentire, ac facile conciliari posse, si dicatur: quod operatio el labor corporis, in spiritualibus ministeriis ad alterius gratiam voluntatemque susceptus, duobus modis considerari possit: vel in ordine ad opus spirituale, secundum propriam et specificam ejus rationem utilitatemque; vel in ordine ad operantem secundum geneticam rationem operis aut servitii in alterius gratiam praestiti . . . Cum enim orrmbus otiis operantibus ad alterius voluntatem necessaria sustentatio naturali jure debita sit, cur non etiam iis qui in spiritualibus ministeriis occupantur? Quia tamen sustentatio ista non commensuratur valori, dignitati utilitatique operis secundum propriam specificam rationem suam, ideo non potest appellari pretium sive aestimatio operis nisi improprie et abusis*", (ibid. n. 42.)

Hence to pay for the labour as intended to render service, is exactly the same as to pay for the labour as intended to bear fruit for the benefit of the faithful. Here we may apply what Suarez [De Simonia, cap. 21, n. 8 and 9) writes on labour which is intrinsic to a task in general: "Let us conclude, says he, that the aforesaid task and labour are not to be valued at different prices, but either at one and the same price or not at all. ___ If then the task cannot be valued in cash, why not say as much of the labour indissolubly connected with the task? . . . Wherefore those, who make a distinction, in sacred things, between the task and the labour, claiming that the labour, but not the task, may be sold, advance something contradictory."

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As a consequence Suarez is not afraid of proposing a formal contract do ut facias, bearing directly on the application of the mass. "Therefore", says he, "we are facing a true obligation of justice, based on such mutual consent as is reciprocally onerous, and formulated in the words do ut facias. Now herein we have a claim in justice".38 This teaching has been taken up again in our days by Cardinal Gasparri. "There exists," writes this eminent canonist, "between priest and faithful an

¹ Fr. Arendt {op. cit. n. 47-50} has endeavoured to perfect Laymann's solution, by means of a very subtle distinction between the surrender as such of a liberty (the liberty not to say Mass for the intention of some parishioner who asks you for a mass) and the positive direction taken by my free will towards the rendering of a spiritual service. We remunerate the surrender of the liberty; we do not remunerate the service nor the will to render service. But, honestly, does any one bother about the first term except in view of the second? Who of the faithful will trouble himself about the surrender of sacerdotal liberty, except and exclusively as it bears upon the prestation he is awaiting? The two terms are indivisibly linked together in the intention of the contracting party, and if one predominates in his mind, it is the second. Besides, what form of simony, when dealing with sacraments, indulgences, etc., could not be justified by this so-called remuneration of a sacrificed liberty?

^{* &}quot;Concluditur opus et laborem dictum non esse aestimabilia duplici pretio, sed uno et eodem, vel nullo. . . . Unde fit quod si opus non sit pretio aestimabile, nec labor fac per se illi adjunctus sit aestimabilis pretio. . . . Quapropter, qui distinguunt in operibus sacris opus et laborem, etfatentur opus esse invendibile, laborem autem vendibilem, repugnantia dicunt".

^{8&}quot; Intervenit ergo ibi vera ratio justitiae fundata in mutuo consensu utrinque oneroso qui explicatur, illis verbis, do ut facias. Hic est autem titulus justitiae." (De Sacram. Eucharistiae, disp. 86, sect. 1.)

innominate contract, do utfacias, i.e. I give a partial sustenance represented by the *stipend* on condition that you celebrate and apply a mass for my intention; or facio ut des: I celebrate and apply a mass for your intention, on condition that you give me a partial sustenance". He adds at once: "This contract is not simoniacal jure divino, because the stipend representing a partial sustenance of the priest, is not the price of the mass or of the fructus medius, but is necessary for the sacrifice asked for, as was explained above." 2 So then I procure for myself, in return for money, the fruit of the mass, by a contract which connects, through an obligation in strict justice, the acquisition of this fruit with a payment that has for its immediate object your sustenance. And this is not striking a bargain? And it is not simony? Why? Because the contribution is needed for the sacrifice. By what title is it needed? I suppose (why not?) that you are possessed of ample benefices. You have no need whatever for your living of my partial support, and, therefore, no antecedent claim to it. Do you need it, then, for celebrating? Not at all, your ecclesiastical revenues are more than sufficient to cover your expenses (we are not having in mind unusual or incidental expenses).—But I am engaged in work for your benefit. course, I mean to give you my service freely, and not for money. Nevertheless, I have the right to require that you supply me with what is needed for the performance of that service. Thus a painter who decorates your walls gratuitously, will still be doing it gratuitously, even if he asks you to supply him with the paints and the brushes. Well, now, I am asking you to supply me, not merely with the religious equipment and with the matter of the sacrifice, but also with my sustenance for this day.—It looks plausible; but let us be more definite, if you please. Suppose the painter does not need

^{1&}quot; Est igitur inter sacerdotem et fidelem contractus innominatus do ut facias, seu do partialem sustentationem stipendio repraesentatam, dummodo pro me celebres et applices »«sam; facio ut des, seu celebro et applico missam pro te, dummodo des partialem sustentationem". (Tract, canonic, de s. eucharistia, n. 542)

^{*&}quot; Qria stipendium, repraesentans partialem sacerdotis sustentationem, non est pretium missae, seufructus medii, sed est necessarium ad sacrificium quod petitur, ut supra explicatum et".

to travel to reach my house: we are next-door neighbours. And if my painter now (first supposition), besides the brash and the colours necessary for painting my walls, were to ask me also to give him his dinner, I could not any longer look upon his work as altogether gratuitous. But if (second supposition) this request for dinner was made for a task not of a day but of half an hour, it would dawn on me that the gratuity had vanished. In like manner my gardener could not boast of working for me gratis, if for the labour of one day he were to ask me a week's sustenance. Such gratuities are burdens. In the first supposition there would be on the part of the painter, a prestation half gratuitous and half retributive; and in the second supposition there would be a prestation adequately remunerated. In like manner, when you require of me, besides your outlay (including in it, should it occur, any damage suffered or any loss of profit, damnum enurgtns tl lucrum cessans), a payment for your ordinary support, the gratuity has been impaired. But when for your task of half an hour you claim the equivalent of a daily meal, I reckon that the transaction is not to your disadvantage, and that you are well paid2; but of a gratuity there is no trace visible (inci-

1 Here may be applied what Lugo writes against the remuneration of the intrinsic labour: "Licet aliquando interveniat laborfortasse dignus tali stipendio, regulariter tamen non est talis; et saltem depossibili non est dubium: nam, secluso Ealesist praecepto, posset celebrari solum consecrando et sumendo utramque speciem, quod liux in uno temporis minuto fieri commode posset. Qui labor certe secundum se non esset diços stipendio tali quale pro missa datur. Sic dando pro labore missae stipendium eradas absque proportione valorem ipsius laboris, praesumetur dari pro volare sacrifici quod injungitur illi operi seu labori". (Disp. 21, n. 12.)—(VVe all have read how the persecuted priests of Mexico are allowed to shorten the Eucharistic sacrifice.)

2 Will it be objected? Not so, for the value of the mass transcends all human computation; the priest, therefore, is not paid to the amount of the service rendered? True enough; but the principle appealed to would hold for any spiritual object compared to any material object; and if to remove simony that principle sufficed, simony would never happen; there would be no need of forbidding it. But it does exist, whenever men actually negotiate either about a spiritual object, or about a temporal object intrinsically bound up with a spiritual one, in view of some temporal consideration, whatever it may be: with the understanding that the spiritual object (for instance the application of the mas! enters, were it only partially, into the matter of the contract, or that the tempers! object (for instance, your "task") cannot be isolated from the spiritual objet*. In this case simony exists actually, without any need of making one's own the absurd and contradictory pretence, necessarily foreign to even the least cultured mind, of putting the temporal price and the spiritual value on a level. Else I

dentally we may remark that a private mass, which now lasts half an hour, took much less time formerly, when there had not been any additions borrowed from the Roman stations). An appeal is made to a principle of St. Alphonsus: Unusquisque qui in commodum alterius se occupat, debet exjustitia ab eo sustentari. Certainly, in human affairs the employer owes to the employee (the owner to the hired workman, the master to the servant, shall we add, the patient to his physician or the client to his lawyer?) at least a living wage, due in strict justice. But the living wage remains a wage, that is to say, it remains precisely the price paid for a service rendered. It leaves no gratuity—neither in the case of the painter, nor with the priest, if the latter's case is the counterpart of the former.

The example of the painter is borrowed by Cardinal Gaspard (n. 541) from Cardinal de Lugo (disp. 21, n. 13), who presents it with ingenious gradations. To begin with, the painter has taken a vow of gratuitous labour. When he asks me for the tools and the material of his trade, he does not violate his vow, in other words he does not sell me his labour. But he next bethinks himself that he will not be able to proceed with the work unless he adds to his diet some special sustenance (" si ipse ad laborem cibo vel potu peculiari indigeret"). begin to feel uneasy. Still we must admit that if the practice of painting is injurious to his physical condition (this occurs in a certain comedy where the colours cause an indisposition), the matter must be taken into account, and we shall let him have the cordials and phosphates he calls for: and his vow will still be intact. And now we come to the counterpart: "Sic ergo Sacerdos". The priest does not violate the precept of Christ, who said: "freely have you received, freely give", when he demands what is needed for the accomplishment of his ministry "necessaria ad ministerium exsequendum". "Inter illa autem . . . unum et potissimum est ipse sacerdos".

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wukt stale the most simoniacal bargains, and yet escape the sin of simony, by cr-,p'y saying: Of course, I know very well that the service done to me is worth than what I give in return. This remark was made already further back: bet it bean repetition.

H IOI

Among the things needed, there is in the first place the priest himself; but, be it understood, the priest properly fed and physically fit: "nec potest sine ipso sustentato et bene disposito Therefore, everything will be gratuitous as in the case of the painter, if the priest requires that the faithful fit out a "persona sacerdotis sustentata" (m. 18). So then it is no more a question of some peculiar disorder which the practice of the profession has caused in the organism, and which requires a special fare: it is the main sustenance such as you would have to provide for yourself, whether you work for me or not—it is this compensation which is finally smuggled through the door which was so discreetly opened for indemnifications only. What would the authors of the theory say, if a priest took it into his head to apply it to confession and baptism, and a prelate to confirmation and the granting of indulgences? As for myself, he might tell you, I confess, I confirm; but on condition: for every confession heard you will have to provide me with dinner; likewise, for every one I confirm I must have a repast. And all this is to be understood as a matter of strict justice. I want none of those free-will offerings, which it is pretended are due only in virtue of obedience to the law, and not in return for, but on occasion of, my ministry. I claim from you that kind of a debt which binds you to restitution, you, your heirs and assigns, so that no power, not even the power of the lawmaker, can free you from your duty. You speak of simony—but are you not aware that in order to hear confessions, I must be a confessor properly fed and physically fit? And I think there is more reasonableness and justice here than when it is a question of the Mass; for after all, the confessor is not obliged to fast. Such reasoning, it is needless to say, meets on the part of all canonists with an

¹ Once more those offerings are allowed, without difficulty, as St. Thomas tells us (Sum. Thiol. II-II, q. 100, a. 2, <</4), "si... intentio referatur ad solam consuetudinis observantiam, ei praecipue quando aliquis voluntarie solvit", Still even here we must be on our guard against the semblance of simony (ibid.) in order to keep the precept of the Apostle; ab omni specie mala abstinete vos. But a custom that would connect the exchange of values with a duty, and consequently would sanction an obligation of justice properly so called, would be a detestable custom, in no way excusing from simony (ibid).

unqualified rebuff.1 And yet, after all, the principle remains the same in the one case as in the other. And if that principle excludes simony *juris divini* in this case, why not in the other? or *vice versa*, if it is ineffectual here, why not there?

These are matters which leave us in a rather uneasy frame of mind. Must we add that Cardinal Gasparri (n. 542) with a frankness that does him honour, acknowledges that the mass-contract, as he conceives it, would be tainted at least with ecclesiastical simony, if the Church, by its approval, had riot withdrawn it *ipso facto* from the operation of the law.2 This avowal reveals clearly and emphatically all that is inelegant and perplexing beneath that solution, which is also as artificial as it is laboured; nay, let us not shrink from the term, painful in every sense of that word. Aesthetical sense and simplicity are criteria, at least negative, of theological truth; and here they turn away from the contract do utfacias, as well as from the employment contract, or again from a modal donation which would necessarily resolve itself again, at least in part, into the one or the other of the two systems.

1 Let us at least hope so, although in the past it is not impossible to find authors not quite so circumspect (such as Sebastian Giribaldi, De Simonia, cap. 2, n. 37, Opera Moralia, Bologna, 1760, tom. 4, col. 672): "Respondeo posse ministrum pro administrations sacramentorum et rerum spiritialium petere et recipere stipendium sustentationis et de eo pacisci". St. Thomas, for his part, is so pronounced in the opposite sense, that it does not seem to him lawful to pay a priest for baptizing, even in the case of absolute necessity, such as imminent danger of death. If it is an infant, let a lay person rather baptize it. If it is an adult and there be no other minister than this venal priest, let him do without baptism, and in its stead trust to the desire of it (Sum. Theol. II—II, q, too, a. 2, ad. 1). St. Thomas does not have in view the case of one who, desiring to have his child baptized, is ignorant of the sacramental form. It seems clear that in such a case, which is the only case of absolute necessity, the minister, who cannot now be dispensed with, may be paid. The payment would be equivalent to getting rid of an unjust vexation, since baptism is then strictly due to the dying infant by any one who happens to be the only person capable of administering it. In the present instance, it is the priest, who by refusing, is guilty of a vexatious and unjust action, of which it is always lawful to rid oneself by means of money (there remains however the right to make him disgorge later, when it can be done). See on this last point, Cajetan, in h.i.

^{*&}quot; Equidem Ecclesia prohibuit, etiam praeter jus divinum, quemlibet contractum in spiritualibus, qui proinde redolet simonia, si non juris divini, saltem juris ecclesiastici; sed Ecclesia, probans eleemosynas Missarum, eo ipso ab hacprohibitione excepit celebrationem et applicationem Missae".

But after all, these contracts in justice would probably be less offensive than a certain kind of pretended gratuity. The former have the merit of sincerity, for which the latter would sometimes substitute false appearances, severely attacked by Lugo. Aiming his attack on those donations, tangled up and passing hither and thither from one party offering a present to another, on condition that this latter give up to the former the fruit of the mass, he writes: "In this fashion it would be possible to palliate any simony in any matter whatever. I could always say: I give you this money; it is not a payment, it is a free gift. However, it is given on condition that you give me such sacrament, or some relics, or a benefice, etc. The condition once realized, the donation would take This shows that it is not possible in this kind of procedure to leave the price out of sight. For whenever there is a condition, and the condition is intended as the end, in view of which I am willing to give something to the one who shall have fulfilled the condition, I do not give gratis, but I give because of what the other party gives: now this is a contractus onerosus, do ut des, facio ut facias" (disp. 21, n. 4). There is no doubt but that the faithful, with their stipend, mean to secure for themselves the benefit of the mass; and it is equally beyond doubt that a pretence of gratuity would be but a mask calculated to pass off an onerous agreement under the guise of a mutual gift. Therefore, to all the inconveniences of a true contract is added that of insincerity.

And so we are in a quandary. *Utrinque ambages*. On the one hand we have either no obligation of justice, or a disguised one; on the other we have an obligation of justice frankly admitted, but without possibility of getting away from simony. And yet one thing is certain, on which there is unanimous agreement among theologians and canonists, or rather on which the teaching of the Church is explicit. The mass-contract, the contract in reference to the application of the Mass, is equitable and nowise simoniacal. It is an agreement obliging both parties in strict justice. Here is in fact the one point on which there is agreement. It is more than a

common opinion; it is a certitude which borders on faith. Beyond that, there is no theological certitude, no common opinion. Everything said thus far leads to this conclusion. There are indeed conflicting theories, condemning one another for the lack either of adequacy or of moderation. Perfectly free, therefore, are we, not only to choose between these different hypotheses, but also to make no choice at all. By so doing we shall not forsake the common opinion, which does not exist. In fact, we remain free to give our preference to something else.

THE HISTORICAL SOLUTION

As we open our inquiry let us premise the following statement: the eucharist sacrifice, from the point of view of the thing offered (the passive sacrifice) is in reality the Body and Blood ofJesus Christ, and nothing more. That is enough. But is the point of view of the reality the only one? Not there is also the point of view of the appearances; and from that point of view our sacrifice is a sacrifice of bread and wine, a repetition of the sacrifice of Melchisedech. Now, although the appearance does not enter into the reality, it is none the less essential, by way of symbol, in order that the reality should be held in our hands and be our sacrifice. For the Body and Blood of Jesus Christ are not offered by us effectively except under the external form of an apparent oblation of sensible gifts. This fact makes it possible for us to distinguish, as it were, two sacrifices: a real sacrifice and a symbolic sacrifice, the latter enfolding the former: not that the second is real; it is by definition a mere symbol, a mere semblance: it has no existence. But it renders apparent the other which is real, but which does not by itself appear.1 The attribute of sensible gift (necessary in order that there may be sacrifice) Jesus Christ holds from these terrestrial elements, inasmuch as they are involved in the eucharistic prayer containing the words of the Lord.

From the point of view of the active sacrifice, i.e. of the act of oblation, not of this or that ceremony or accessory prayer, but of the essentially sacrificial rite whereby transubstantiation is effected, the terrestrial elements again play

a part. Transubstantiation is not the effect of the priest's words alone, but it is the effect of the whole sensible sign. This sign consists of the words and of the species; more accurately, it consists of the words so far as they tend to determine the imperfect signification of the species.

And now let us distinguish in our sacrifice, both active and passive, permanent and transitory, three elements. The first and chief one: the Body and Blood of the Lord, the only thing offered in reality. The second: the words determining the species and combining with them to effect the consecration. The third: the species determined by the words, and as such serving as a covering to the Body and Blood of Christ, the true *hostia*, in order that he may "look like" (this is absolutely indispensable) a gift proceeding from us.

Considering the first element, body and blood of the victim, the sacrifice belongs to the whole Church and proceeds from the whole Church. The Body of Christ belongs to the universality of the faithful, for the Body of the Bridegroom is in the power of the Bride, since there is made of the two but one flesh. For this reason, according to the traditional formula, no one offers the Body of Christ except the Body of Christ. Such is the common and joint fellowship in the sacrifice among all Christians, and such its original claim.

But if we look at the second element, the word of the priest, the dynamic element of the sacrificial action and the formal element of the visible host, then the sacrifice is the priest's only.

Finally, if we have in view the third element, the sensible object, the matter of the symbolical sacrifice, and carrier of the act of oblation, it will be readily admitted that the sacrifice is the affair of him whose gifts will be dedicated to God, whether he be an individual or a congregation. But what happens now? In their way these gifts undergo a change into something better and more excellent, keeping nothing terrestrial except their vesture, and becoming replete with a more divine substance, so that at the very moment of the ritual

oblation, they take on an infinite value, and fill heaven with a fragrance unknown on earth. By a process which is the, reverse of that of the son of Isaac, who was fragrant with the sweet odour of a wheat-field blessed by God, it is the wheat now that exhales the authentic fragrance of the virtues and of the charity of the blessed Christ, the Son of God crushed by the Passion and gathered into the bosom of the Father. If such a transformation in the insignificant gift of our needy humanity has taken place, should thereby his merit be lessened who did his best, and being earthly came with an earthly gift—all he had—but also with the faith that of the earthly thing would be made the bread of heaven? Should he be reproached either with the inferior quality of his gift, or with the transcendent worth of what it has become? Can we imagine God telling the Christian that his offering does not count, because God has improved it? Since when does God's grace turn against the helpless creature co-operating with it in all humility? Does not God after this fashion crown in us as meritorious what is nothing else, absolutely and in every way, than his own gifts? So too in the Christ who comes back to him from the Sacrifice of the altar, God still recognizes, with infinite complacency, the gift which a fleshy hand had deposited upon the visible altar, in order to be borne thence, by the hand of the Sovereign Priest, even to the celestial Altar upon which every consecration is effected.

Moreover, if Christ, price of our redemption, is also our sacrifice, the sacrifice of the Church, it is solely as the result of transubstantiation, and consequently not without a most intimate relation to the bread and to the wine, which were conspicuous upon the eucharistic table. To him who set the table, as well as to him who blessed it, the Church is indebted for the sacrifice she presents to God: even though they themselves are indebted to the Church for the incomparable (and indefectible) coefficient which her holiness gives to their act of oblation. *No, the* respective parts of the Church and of the priest do no injury to the initiative

of the faithful whose offering, as it travels heavenward, has made so stupendous a fortune. The Christian has invested well his earthly good, and the rich profit will be his, without failing to enrich the whole Church, and her minister, and a few others in particular.

In the light of the foregoing it will not be difficult to admit that from the beginning the lay Christian was, in his own eyes, as capable as the Jew of offering sacrifice; and the same must be said of any particular Christian community. Among the Jews, the believer brought his sheep: immolated, the priest offered it by pouring the blood upon the altar. Afterwards, as Yahweh's table guests, they divided among themselves the various parts of the victim (except in sin-offerings, where the priest took all, and in holocausts, where nobody received anything). The sacrifice was ritually offered by the priest; and because of this all the sacrifices were sacrifices of Aaron and of his sons. But the sacrifice was also, and in a very true sense, the sacrifice of the worshipper who had brought the sheep, his sheep, to offer it to Yahweh by the hands of the priest. The priest transmitted the sacrifice of the faithful; what the latter offered *(offerebat)*, the former bound himself to present (deferebat): more correctly still, the priest offered on behalf of the faithful, though he did so by divine institution and investiture. The faithful gave a mandate to the priest to offer his sacrifice as to the agent qualified from on'high. Were the priests paid? No; but of the faithful's oblation, entirely directed towards Yahweh himself, they deducted after the rite was accomplished, by virtue of a surrender which the Lord made in their favour as well as in that of the faithful, their personal share of the feast which had been prepared for the Lord, and of which his altar had received the substance under the form of blood. In this manner the priests lived by the altar, lived on the sacrifices; not as the salaried servants of the people, but as the guests of the Most High.

Are we to believe that the Christian priesthood is in this respect in a worse condition and of less nobility? Is the

priest of the New Law to be in the people's pay and not God's invited guest? Equivalently the query comes to this whether the people still continue to offer the sacrifice, their own sacrifice, by the hands and the ministry of the priest, and by preparing with sufficient abundance the table of God, so that beside the Body and Blood of his Son, there should be also the substance, at least, of a repast to which he may invite his minister? Or, on the contrary, is it the priest, and he alone, who offers a sacrifice of his own, at the people's request assuredly, and in return of the payment from the people, whom he benefits by his suffrage ?! The Hebrew worshipper did not come to ask the priest's suffrage, but his ministry. He had the suffrage at his own command, and as he pleased, since he was personally the offerer. Whoever offers, from among men encumbered with sin and misery, offers first for himself, and then for this one or that one whom charity lets him consider as another self. Thus, under Judas Machabeus. the army offered sacrifice for the soldiers slain in battle. Among those living outside the Law, but in full agreement with its theology of sacrifice, Job offered to the Lord victims from his flocks and herds for the sins of his sons and daughters. We have here suffrages for the living and suffrages for the dead: in each case the suffrage is at the disposal of him from whom proceeds the gift offered in sacrifice. offer on my behalf, you offer truly for my benefit. because I offer through you, it is I myself who direct my sacrifice, and necessarily towards the remission of my sins and the relief of my misery, in the expectation of the sovereign good of which I am still in want. If, besides, I wish to give the benefit of my sacrifice to my brother, to my friend, to my neighbour, whoever he may be, there is no need why you should trouble yourself about giving a special direction to your intention: it is enough that you offer on my behalf. You offer for my intention by the very fact that you offer

¹ On the difference between the personal gain drawn from his own sacrifice by him who offers it, and the suffrage by which he causes someone else to be benefited, see M.F., 359-360.

on my behalf. But, once more, the question to be settled is whether such is the office of the Christian priest, as it was the office of the Jewish priest. Is the parity between Jews and Christians in this matter firmly established?

St. Irenaeus has no doubt about it. According to him there has been no break of continuity between the ancient economy and the new economy of sacrifices. The 18th chapter of the fourth Book Against Heresies is perfectly clear on the matter. "It is not the generic character of the oblation that has been reprobated. There were oblations then. there are oblations now. The people (of God) had their sacrifices, the Church has hers. The specific character has been changed, for the reason that the sacrifices are no longer offered to-day by slaves, but by free men". Apart from this difference, which results from a difference of conditions,2 we may, therefore, look for parity between the sacrifices of Israel and the sacrifices of the Church. The ancients offered gifts to God; we also offer gifts to God, "the first fruits of creation",3 These gifts which we offer to God, St. Irenaeus considers not merely as to the celestial and hidden reality which they contain, the Body and Blood of Christ, but before all else, as to the terrestrial and symbolical elements involved in our eucharistic rite, the bread and the wine. In fact it is these latter which he compares directly with the oblations of the Old Testament.4 They are offerings of the earth, which we direct to the altar of heaven (cap. 18, n. 6); the gifts which we have received from God, who dispenses to us our food: "the bread that comes to us from creation". and which Jesus Christ held in his hands, saying that it is his Body; "the chalice also which comes from the creation

[&]quot; Aon genus oblationum reprobatum est; oblationes enim et illic, oblationes autem et hic; sacrificia in populo, sacrificia in Ecclesia; sed species immutata est tantum, quippe cumjam non a servis, sed a liberis offeratur." (18, 2, P.L.7, 1024-1029.)

⁸ It is meant that the Jews, slaves of the Law, not set free by the Gospel, were restricted to offer figurative and carnal sacrifice, impotent to justify. We, by the grace of Jesus Christ, are in a position to offer a sacrifice in spirit and in truth, wiping out sin.

^{&#}x27; N. I; cf. cap. 17, n. 4 and 5.

^{*} Cap. 18, n. 3-6, and cap. 17, n. 5.Ill

to which we belong", and of which Jesus Christ said that it is his Blood.1 These are our offerings, and they are very terrestrial as to the visible covering 2 of the celestial reality. The oblations of the Jews were borrowed from creation: and so are the oblations of the New Covenant, by that feature of them which is accessible to our senses, by that aspect which symbolizes to the eye the eucharistic intention of the sacrifice.3 But there is this difference, that the oblations of the Jews were parsimonious: they were but tithes, coming with regret from a servile heart; ours are liberal: they pledge the whole man and all that pertains to man. However small they may be to the eye, they are our all, like the widow's mite. They are filial offerings and they are pure, because they spring from a pure heart which has received the Word4; for it is the conscience of the offerer that sanctifies the sacrifice, by penetrating it with the purity of its intentions: "conscientia ejus qui offert sanctificat sacrificium, pura existens,\ Hence they are accepted, and rightly so, by God, at least in consideration of the Church, which offers "with simplicity," that is to say without that duplicity peculiar to him whose heart belies the gesture of oblation.5 Thus did Paul write to the Philippians: "I am filled (with gifts), having received from Epaphroditus the things you sent: an odour of sweetness, an acceptable sacrifice, pleasing to God." (Phil. iv. 18). And it is under those same conditions that the Word "wishes us also to make our frequent oblations at the altar, without ceasing "6: not that he is in need of them, but that we may practise gratitude and bring forth fruit7: "exactly as the Jewish people had received the precept of sacrifices, not because God had need of them, but in order to teach the Jews to serve God".8

¹ Cap. 17, n. 5.
2M.F., aio, sq. Cf. A. d'Alès, La doctrine eucharistique de S. Irtnle [Recherches de Science Religieuse, 13, 1, p. 24 sq.).
3 Cap. 17, 5 and 18, 6.
4 Cap. 18, 4.
5 Cap. 18, 4.

⁸ Cap. 18, 6. 7 *Ibid*, and 17, 5. 8 Cap. 18, 6.

The parity, therefore, could not be established more satisfactorily. We Christians are not less favoured with sensible oblations, with gifts to present to God, as a pledge of our interior consecration, latreutic and eucharistie, than were the children of Israel. At Philippi, as in all the rest of the world, at all times, in our own as well as at the origin of Christianity, there are oblations with which each one of us is in duty bound to gratify God. However, our oblations, though we are flesh and though they, too, at the start, are of the same condition as ourselves, differ nevertheless from the Jewish oblations in the end, when, on reaching their they are found to be celestial, without ceasing be still in communion with our nature by their outward terrestrial form. For God being called down upon our gifts has accepted them by changing them into the Body and Blood of his Son2: and his acceptance is the glory of us Christians, "for he who offers is glorified by having the gift he offers accepted ".3

Such are the chief elements of the theology of St. Irenaeus on sacrifices. We can see what room is left to the initiative of the faithful donors, of individual offerers, while giving full evidence of the joint intervention of the universal Church, and safeguarding, as befits, the sacramental prerogative of those to whom, after the apostles, have been entrusted the eucharistic prayers,4 the words of Christ,® the invocation of the Almighty.*

And if the faithful offer to God their sacrifices, doing so by the indispensable mediation of the priest, it still follows that the priest's function, as such, is not to favour them with his suffrage, but only to comply with his sacerdotal office on their account, and on their behalf. Theirs is the task of directing the suffrage in keeping with their character of

¹ Cap. 17, 5-6.

[»] Cap. 18, 5.

^{»&}quot; Quoniam û qui offert glorificatur ipse in eo quod offert, si acceptetur munus ejus." (18, 1.)

^{&#}x27;Cap. 18, 4.

^{&#}x27;Cap. 17, 5.

^{&#}x27;Cap. 18, 5.

mediate offerers of the sacrifice. The priest cannot turn aside that direction, the very moment he carries out their mandate. If it is he who, across the abyss vawning between man and God, throws the bridge by which the Divine Host is to pass, it is they who have laden it with their messages. If it is he who lends to our frail skiff the power of his arm through which passes the virtue from on high, or again, if it is he, who by the breath of the Spirit of which he disposes, fills our sails that our gifts may touch the shore where God awaits them in light inaccessible, it is we, humble givers, who are really at the helm and determine the final destination and, so to speak, the ultimate address of the vows that are our own. We regulate our offerings. And as, in the words of Irenaeus, we address them to the altar of heaven, so also, to the effect that is to return therefrom to earth, we, on our own authority, assign a destination, which will be that of our own vows.

Does the parity go further? If the priest under the law of the Gospel is the envoy, and, to use an expression of William of Paris, the bearer of their messages, is he a gratuitous messenger as in the Old Law, or is he a hired messenger? On that point St. Irenaeus gives us no explicit2 information. He merely concludes in a general way3: "Gifts, oblations and sacrifices, all this the (Hebrew) people received in figure (as was shown to Moses on the mountain) from the same God whose name is now being glorified in the Church among all nations."

But we have St. Paul and his commentators on the subject. "Nevertheless, we have not used this power: but we bear all things, lest we should give any hindrance to the Gospel of Christ. Know you not that they who work in the holy place eat the things that are of the holy place; and that they that serve the altar, partake with the altar? So also the Lord ordained that they who preach the Gospel should

^{1 &}quot;Sunt ergo [sacerdotes) velut petitionarii portitores, hoc est petitionum portatores" (William of Paris, De Sacramento Ordinis, Cap. 4).

 $^{2\,}Explicit:$ the word is not superfluous: for it is clear that the answer is given implicitly in all the foregoing as it relates to the character of the oblations.

³ Cap. 19, I.

live by the Gospel. But I have used none of these things (prerogatives) ". (I. Cor. ix, 12-15.)

There are two things in the reasoning whereby St. Paul justifies the right of which he will not avail himself. There is the subject of comparison, the sacrifices; and there is the term compared, the preaching of the Gospel. As to the first, he affirms the principle as unquestionable and as a matter of course. As for the second, he appeals to a positive law, the ordinance of the Lord, establishing the similarity. second is not a deduction from, nor an application of, the first. It is a different thing, in a different category; but it is analogous. The analogy, however, is not so clear cut that it would authorize us, by itself, to conclude to a preacher's right in the same way as to a priest's. It could only offer an insufficient foundation. But there comes the word of the Lord: and the gap between the two terms is closed; the parity of rights is established, on this: that the preacher has a right to live without any other work than that of preaching. in the same way as a priest lives -without any other work than that of his assiduity at the altar. Moreover, the sustenance of the one, as the sustenance of the other, is a charge laid upon the faithful. There remains the difference of the manner in which the maintenance of the one and of the other is procured. The preacher, perhaps, will receive the donation of the faithful as an allowance granted to him directly, yet on account of his office, and therefore, for the sake of God, and in that sense for God: so much so that the two locutions in nomine prophetae and in nomine Christi, are synonymous. Still it is to him, to the man of God without any intermediary,1

¹ We beg you to bear in mind that the description of the above process has only the value of a mere outline. In reality and in actual life, the difference between priest and preacher fades or even disappears, for the reason that: ist, priest and preacher are generally one and the same person; 2nd, between the Eucharist and preaching there is a close bond, as we shall notice again later; 3rd, and chiefly, because the resources drawn by the priest from the altar, to the extent in which they go beyond his personal needs, must be spent for divine worship and for the benefit of the faithful (see further on); and the first expense to be incurred for worship, the first charity to be done to the faithful, is to announce to them the word of God. And thus the preacher will find himself compensated by the altar.

that the transfer of the material means surrendered by the faithful is made. For the priest, as such, the case is different. God himself is reputed to have received the gifts dedicated to the altar. The altar is his table, prepared here below by the care of mortals; and God becomes the owner of what is spread upon it. To partake of the altar is, then, to partake with God of what belongs to God. The priest is nourished True, it is a question (primarily at least) of the Jewish priest. But does St. Paul's idea restrict itself to the Jewish priest, or does he enunciate a principle applicable by right to every sacrificer? That from the Jewish priest he makes a transition to the Christian preacher is not open He comes to the Christian preacher, because it to denial. is of him he wishes to speak. And to do so, there is need of a sentence of the Lord, that will extend further the principle appealed to. But to make it apply to the Christian priest, of whom express mention is not made, was there any need of an evangelical oracle? Is the application not obvious, and even afortiori, if we take into account the supreme dignity of the priesthood of our Melchisedech, as compared with that of Aaron? If to be nourished by the altar is a prerogative which St. Paul presents as the indispensable appurtenance of that priesthood to which ours, as he teaches elsewhere, has succeeded as reality succeeds to shadow, and the finished work to the rough sketch, shall we have to admit that in our priesthood that noble privilege is wanting? Is it credible? Let us see what was the mind of the ancients on the subject.

"Take note," St. Chrysostom1 tells us "of the wisdom of Paul, and with what fitness (^γαλοττρρττω) he expresses himself on this matter. He does not say: Those who attend to the sacrifices receive (properly speaking) from those who offer. No; but what does he say? They live on the things of the sanctuary: and there is neither humiliation for those who receive, nor swelling of pride for those who give. For the same reason what follows is expressed in like mariner. For here again he does not say: those who serve the altar

receive from those who bring the sacrifice, but: they partake with the altar."

St. John Chrysostom, it is true, does not say explicitly that Christian priests are equally spared humiliation, and the faithful offering gifts equally safeguarded against vanity that might arise in a man who, remunerating or providing for the ministry of the altar, thought himself thereby the benefactor, nay the superior, of the sacerdotal order. But who does not see that the application is in his mind? If he deems such a position of inferiority unworthy of the ancient priesthood, would he consider it less unworthy of the priesthood of the New Law? We confess, however, that the conclusion is not formulated.

St. Jerome, however, does not hesitate to draw that conclusion: "Altari serviens, altaris oblatione sustentor." | Servant of the altar, by the altar's gift I have my sustenance.

About the same epoch, in that compilation which has at least the merit of representing contemporary thought, not to mention the authority it enjoyed among jurists and theologians, the *Apostolic Canons*,* the aforesaid application to the Christian priesthood is made likewise, without the least hesitation: "The law of God decrees that those who are devoted to the altar be nourished by the altar."

For the jurists of the Middle Ages, the parity between the priests of the New Law and those of the Old Law in this matter is self-evident. Innocent IV, on the fifth book of the Decretals, chapter *Ne praelati*, 3 writes: "It is but right and just that he who serves the altar, whether he be rich or poor should live by the altar."

As for the theologians, it is enough to quote St. Thomas, treating explicitly of sacrifices.4 "The offerings," he says, "which the people present to god, belong to the priests, not only to be spent for their own use, but also to be dispensed

^{&#}x27;To Nepotian, n. 5, P.L., 22, 5.

^{&#}x27;Can. 41, P.G., 137, 124 and P.L., 67, 146.

^{*}h quintum decretal., tit. 4, cap. Quoniam enormis, Venice, 1570, fol. 299, cf. Tertium, tit. 5, cap. Cum secundum Apostolum.

[•]Sum. Thiol. П-П, q. 86, a. 2.

by them faithfully: one part going to maintain the divine cult!; another serving for their personal livelihood, because those who serve the altar partake of the altar, as we read in I Corinthians."

The ancients had also occasion to build up this parity upon a verse of Osee (iv, 8), where he says that priests "shall eat the sins of the people", that is to say, nourish themselves from the victims offered by the people for their sins. sin offering did in fact return entirely to the priest. ancients did not shrink from applying this somewhat raw expression to the priests of the Church. Thus Julianus Foments, in his admirable Treatise On Contemplative Life, 2 wrote: "Of clerics the following is said by the Holy Ghost: They eat the sins of my people ".3 A few lines above he had remarked that "the revenues of the Church were nothing else than the vows (sacrifices) of the faithful, the ransom of sins, and the patrimony of the poor ".4 After him, the Pseudo-Isidores repeats the passage borrowed from Osee (for whom he has a special fondness) accompanying it with a gloss, which, while spiritualizing the image, leaves intact the principle of parity between the present and the past. This false Decretal of Pope Alexander naturally found its way to the writings of Fulbert of Chartres® and Gratian.7 where we read: "Priests intercede for the people, and the sins of the people are their food ".

With the forcible image left out, the same parity, based this time on the loaves of proposition, all of which were returned likewise to the priests, appears again in a pseudo-

^{*}In the very first place, of course, by the eucharistic consecration.

^{*11,} cap. x, n. 2, P.L., 59,454: "De clericis quidem dicit Spiritus Sanctus: Peccata populi mei comedunt."

^{&#}x27;Reproduced by the Council of Aix-la-Chapelle in 816, I, c. cvii (Mansi, 14, 214), and again, under the name of Prosper, by *Gratian*, Deer. p. 2, caus. 1, q. 2, c. 7.

^{&#}x27;Cap. 9.

⁵P.L., 130, 97: "Ipsi enim sacerdotes pro populo interpellent, et peccata populi comedunt."

⁶ Decr., p. 2, c. 69.

⁷ Decr., p. 2, caus. 1, q. 1, c. 91.

⁸ It is known further that the Roman Pontifical, in the ordination of the subdeacon, gives this warning: "Oblationes quae veniunt in alteri panes propositionis appellantur."

hieronymic letter to Damasus. This letter became later on, with a slight revision, a decree of Damasus himself in Gratian,2 and as such, is found quoted by St. Thomas in his Summa.3

The impression produced by the study of all the ancients is that the strict application of the principle of the sacerdotal prerogative to the priests of the Christian religion needed no proofs, neither from St. Paul nor from them. The priest shares rightfully with the altar. He receives from God what the faithful with their own hands gave to God.

We may remark by the way that modern interpreters are not more exacting on this point than their predecessors. " (Paul) knows," writes Fr. Prat,4" that under the Old Law as under the gospel the minister of the altar lives by the altar." And yet, as was already observed, this is not stated by St. Paul; but it is implied as evident. What had to be stated was the similarity (less perfect) between preacher and priest, because for that question it was not possible to rely on the Old Testament, but only on the word of Christ. Under the Old Law the office of prophet and that of priest were two separate functions, often in opposition, at all events entirely different in their organisation and sources of income. Under the New Law, prophecy, that is to say preaching, is regularly a duty of the priesthood, and as a matter of fact creates claims to similar means of subsistence. It is one of the reasons for which St. Paul likes to describe the apostolic ministry under a liturgical colouring borrowed directly5 from the Eucharist. "The grace is given me from God to be the liturgus (minister) of Jesus Christ among the Gentiles, sanctifying the Gospel of

^{*}P.L., 13, 1214: "De panibus a fidelibus in altari oblatis, quis . . . jure uti debeat." "Si non licuit David et viris ejus adhuc sub umbra legis comedere panes propositionis, quando ab Ibimelech panes petitfame stimulante, quomodo nunc, Euangelio coruscante, persuaderi debet laicis ut oblationem panum Deo oblatorum suis usibus rapient? Dicit namque perinde apostolus: Qui altari serviunt, de altari participent. Ergo quia sacerdotes pro omnibus orare solent, quorum eleemosynas et oblationes accipiunt, qua fronte praesumunt laici oblationes, quos Christiani pro peccatis suis offerunt, vel comedere vel aliis concedere, cum ipsi non deoeanl pro populis orare?"

^{&#}x27;Decr., p. 2., caus. io, q. i, c. 15.

^{*11-11,} q. 86, a. 2. * Thioiogie De S. Paul, 1, 564.

^{&#}x27;M.F., 76.

God (iepoupyouvra το evayyéXtov) that the oblation (ἡπροσφορά) of the Gentiles may be made acceptable and sanctified (ηγιασμένη) in the Holy Ghost "—(Rom. xv, 15, 16). The analogy is the more justified as the body of Christ is for us the word of faith no less than the immolated flesh, I and because preaching is for that reason under the Christian economy, an extension of the ministry of the altars, having for purpose to nourish the members of the body of Christ by faith. But this analogy between preaching and sacrificing does not eliminate—on the contrary, it superimposes itself on the parity which properly and formally exists between the Christian priesthood and the Mosaic priesthood, as regards the table supplying the one and the other with a livelihood.

The similarity pointed out by St. Irenaeus between the cult-legislations of the two Testaments seems, therefore, clearly to extend itself to the subject of the respective revenues of the two priesthoods. They are divine sources of income; they are goods dispensed to the priest by God. It is a sharing on God's part with his priest in that which through the priest's ministry became at first God's property. The sustenance which the minister of the altar draws from the altar is a table companionship with God; it is not a remuneration from Hence, we may note, the ancients were careful to point out that the priest must not see in it a reward (praemium), but an allowance from on high for the support of his life, for the support of clerics employed with the priest in the service of the altar; and for the support of the poor, of whom the Church must consider herself in charge in the name of God, because they have but God to take care of them: so that the goods of the Church, the goods of the Father of the family, are their patrimony. We have already heard Julianus Pomerus speaking in this sense; but he has much more to say: "Those who being in the service of the Church readily accept or (even) exact (fees) of which they are not in need, under the idea that there is a debt due to them in return for their labour, are men of too carnal a disposition, since they imagine that those who

serve the Church well are entitled to an earthly salary, and not to a heavenly reward. . . . Should it happen that any minister whatever of the Church has not the means to live. let not the Church give him here below a salary, but supply him what is necessary." A little before he had said: "What the Church owns, she owns it in common with all those who have nothing." For this reason St. Thomas, in the passage quoted above, after having indicated two purposes already for which the offerings of the faithful are to be used, divine worship and the sustenance of the priest, for the rest added the following: "In part these offerings must also be used for the benefit of the poor, who must be supported from the revenues of the Church, as much as it can be done." 3 The assistance given to the poor is not at all detrimental to the right of the ministers of the altar to dispose of the resources of the altar; this right is presupposed.4

For this reason the *Apostolic Constitutions* state plainly and simply, in speaking of the oblations of the faithful, under the name of eulogies: "What remains of the eulogies, at the end of the sacred mysteries, must be distributed according to the directions of the Bishop, or of the Priests to the whole clergy." 5 We must remember that at that time the whole clergy of all orders concelebrated.6

Such being the viewpoint of the ancients with regard to the nature of the revenue which the priest draws from the altar, we are prepared to hear from them this clearly formulated principle: the faithful offer to God their own sacrifices, though

^{1&#}x27;* Qui autem Ecclesiae sermoni, et labori suo velut debita reddi oportere credentes, ea quibus opus non habent aut accipiunt libenter aut exigunt, nimis carnaliter sapiunt, si putant quod Ecclesiae fideliter servientes stipendia terrena, ac non potius praemia aeterna percipiant.
... Quod si quilibet minister Ecclesiae non habeat unde vivat, non ei praemium reddat hic, sed necessaria praestet Ecclesia."—(Cap. io, n. 2; P.L., 59, 454.)

^{*&}quot; Quod habet Ecclesia, cum omnibus nihil habentibus habet commune."—(cap. 9, n. 2.)

Sum. Theol. П-П, q. 86, a. 2.

^{&#}x27;See St. Thomas, quoted above.

^{&#}x27;VIII, cap. xxxî, 2.

^{*} It goes without saying that if a cleric, habitually engaged in the functions of his clerical office, happened to be hindered or excused {Canon. Apostolor. 8; dr. M.F., 487) from taking part in the sacrifice, he was not for that reason to be cut off from the resources procured by the collective sacrifices of the priests and denes of the Church; especially in view of the fact that every occupation of a derieal character always converges towards the eucharistic worship.

they do so by the hands of the priest. Now this is exactly what they have not failed to tell us; and this point we will use as a countertest for the interpretation of their views upon the apportioning to be made between the altar and its ministers.

We have upon this subject, first of all, the authorities previously brought forward. There are the Liturgies, and there are Tertullian, Cyprian, Ambrose, Augustine, Caesarius, Gregory of Rome, Martin of Leon, Walafrid Strabo, and the author of the Ouestions on the New and Old Testaments.

This last writer is the more worthy of note as he is more explicit, and we might say didactic, on the question which we are treating. At the same time he is also more careful to let us know that he is but stating everybody's view on the "In all instances," he says, "he is said to offer, from who proceed the oblations laid upon the altar by the priest. In this manner did Saul offer, as people offer to-day. So did David offer and Solomon and many others likewise. Did they for that reason exercise the sacerdotal ministry? (Not at all, for) whereas the priest discharges his own office, nevertheless that one is said to offer, in whose name the priest is acting. The action is imputed to him whose gifts are offered."2 Impossible to put more things in fewer words. We have here expressed: the rôle of offerer belonging to the worshipper; the indispensable ministry of the priest; the mandate as proxy3 which the priest receives that he may act in the name of the faithful: the nature of that action which consists in having the gifts reach their destination; we have, in a general way, the similarity in all these points between the New and the Old Law; finally, the absence of any doubt or of any divergence on the matter.

'The word "proxy" (procurator) appears constantly from the pen of William of Paris (op. cit.); true, it occurs in reference not to any of the faithful in particular but (as required by the subject treated by him) in reference to the whole Church.

¹ M.F., 339 sq.

² Cap. 46. This passage may be set side by side with the words of William of Paris: "Sacerdos in altari se gerit ut ministrum et gestorem alieni negotii, videlicet negotii ipsius Ecclesiae. . . Ille autem agit negotium, cujus nomine agitur; et illi fit lotum quodfit, propter quem vel cujus nominefit"—(De Sacramento Ordinis, cap. v.)

Tertullian, St. Gregory (and later St. Peter Damian) consider the case of a widower offering the sacrifice for his deceased spouse. We give their own rather expressive style. "What!" Tertullian tells the married widower, "you will dare to bring before God the memory of two wives? And you will offer for the two of them? You will recommend them both by a priest ordained as monogamous, nay consecrated in his virginity . . . and your sacrifice will have the impudence to mount up to God?" 1 Elsewhere it is a question of a woman "offering on the anniversaries of her husband's death".2 There can be no doubt3 but that it is a question in these two passages of the sacrifice of the Mass. Again we are told by St. Gregory of a woman offering, but for her husband presumed dead, although in reality a prisoner in the hands of barbarians: "On set days she was in the habit of offering for him the sacrifice." 4 As a matter of fact "it was every week that she took care to offer for him hosts; and as often as she offered *Hosts*, so often in prison were the captive's fetters broken."5 Since the similarity of the subject invites us to quote St. Peter Damian, it is worth while to note that the offerer—a true widow this time, who had been unlucky in the choice of her celebrant—had made it a practice to put up her offering in three portions, roast chicken, bread, and wine. They were the gifts of the oblation (oblationis xenia) as the context6 shows, for the eucharistic celebration. The sequel proved, according to St. Peter Damian, that it is preferable to give alms to the poor than to "entrust one's oblation into the hands of a priest leading a carnal life."7

Here we have placed before us offerers of both sexes, offering the sacrifice because they spread the table not merely for the repast of the priest, but for the liturgical celebration; whether they assist at it or not (as a matter of fact in the

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1 De exhortatione castitatis, II, P.L., s, 926-927. 1 De monogamia, 10, P.L., 2, 942. 3M.F. 221-222. 1 Dial. 4, 57, P.L. 77, 424. s In Evangelia, hom. 38, n. 8, P.L. 76, 1279. • De bono suffragiorum, 6. 'Cap. 5 and 7.
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case related by St. Peter Damian the offering is made by a delegate).

St. Augustine is in remarkable agreement with the foregoing. He bewails the captivity of Christian women, taken by force and carried off by barbarians, like the Hebrews of old, into countries where they could not sacrifice: "thus they can no longer bring their oblations to the altar of God, nor find a priest through whom they offer to God".1 Had not his teacher, St. Ambrose, written to Theodosius, when depriving him of the right to offer at the altar: "Thou shalt offer, when thou shalt have received back the power to sacrifice, when thy hostia can be accepted by God". 1 Had not St. Cyprian, and after him, St. Caesarius, both in turn, insisted on the right of the offerers in their sacrifice, to the point of charging with larceny the intruder who came to receive communion without having contributed to the offering? "You are rich and affluent", St. Cyprian tells an avaricious lady, "and you imagine that you are celebrating the mystery of the Lord ... when you come to it without (bringing) a sacrifice, when you take your share of the sacrifice which a poor person has offered".3 Here is a poor Christian who has offered the sacrifice, because he put into it something of his own; she, on the contrary, who comes empty-handed is not of the number of those offerers to whom the sacrifice, by reason of its matter, is reputed to belong. St. Caesarius says likewise: "Bring your oblations to have them consecrated upon the altar. Those who possess the means to do so should be ashamed to communicate of another's oblation ".4 Therefore, the Eucharist is by a special title, and from a certain point of view by an exclusive title, the possession of those whose offerings it represents.

Walafrid Strabo5 gives us to understand the reason. If one is author of the sacrifice because his are the oblations,

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1 Ep. in, 8, P.L., 33, 426.

1 Ep. 51, 15, P.L., 16, 1163.

7 De opere et eleemosyna, 15, P.L., 4, 612-613.

4 Appendix to the Sermons of St. Augustine, 265, P.L., 39, 2238, 8 De ecclesisticantm rerum exordiis el intrementis, 22.
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the reason is precisely because they are destined to be converted into the Body and Blood of our Victim who is the true gift, the unique Gift offered by the Church of God. Assist at the whole mass, he warns, and do not believe that it is preferable to pass with offerings from one mass to another, without assisting at any. "It is more reasonable to offer where you wish to remain throughout, in order that after having offered your gift to the Lord, you may also offer him a devout prayer, that the gift may be accepted. Not without good reason do we say at the Canon: Oui tibi offerunt, and not Oui tibi obtulerunt: it is to give us to understand that we must persist in offering until the oblations have attained the end for which they were offered". For we are not ignorant "that only one died for us all, and that (consequently) one is the Bread and the Blood, the offering of the universal Church". What could be more thorough? the part of the universal Church the offering is unique, as to its truth or reality, which is that of the redeeming Hostia. And yet it is none the less, from another angle, the particular offering of the faithful, who have their oblations consecrated in order that at the end there may be the Divine Host, offered in their name and accepted on their behalf. You have offered your gift to the Lord; try to have it accepted: this will not be done until the gift of the private individual has become by the consecration the gift of the whole Church. centuries earlier, Pope Innocent I, in his famous letter to Decentius of Gubbio, inculcated the principle that by the Canon {precem} the priest renders acceptable {commendeQ} to God the oblations of those who gave them and whose names will be read. It is their Hostia the priest offers to God {cujus hostiam Deo offeras}. The fortune of this letter among the liturgists and jurists of the Middle Ages is well known.

Finally, those who look for a complete theory, not, of course, stated in legal terminology, but yet readily intelligible in all its elements, may draw it from St. Martin of Leon, in his

1 Ep. 25, c. 2, P.L., 20, 553-554.

Twenty-third Sermon On the Supper of the Lord. He is addressing priests: "For the celebration of masses," he tells them, "do not accept a salary (praemium), for fear of incurring the condemnation of the traitor Judas. Seek not to sell for a corruptible metal, gold or silver, the Body of the Lord, dreadful to all the principalities of heaven, venerable to the powers, adorable to the angelic spirits, that you may not have to undergo in hell the just punishment for so great a crime. To sell again for money the Body of the Lamb without spot or stain, Jesus Christ, is not a profitable but a damnable thing. He, once for all, did offer himself for us with good will (sua sponte) to his Father upon the altar of the Cross. If you have received the gifts of the Holy Ghost gratuitously, do not sell them for money. Therefore, most beloved, be sure to celebrate Mass for the honour of God alone, for your salvation, and for that of the whole Church. If some one, through some necessity, requests of you to offer sacrifice in the presence of God Almighty, either for his own salvation, or for the release of his departed relatives, do not exact anything from him (nihil ab eo exigentes), but perform gratuitously (charitatice) what he asks of you. What he offers of his own accord (quae sponte obtulit), accept it, not as a payment (pretium), but as a gift of god. Churchmen are allowed to accept what the faithful offer spontaneously to god, and to offer without intermission prayers for all the faithful both living and dead. Whence this axiom: Those who sene the altar partake with the altar. Therefore, for the faithful living and dead offer to God the Father the sacrifice of the Body and Blood of our Lord Jesus Christ; and without having recourse to exaction (nulla exactione facta) or to a pact, receive what the children of the Church shall have piously offered to god. . . . The whole thing is not to seek, in return for the ministry of sacrifice, any salary (pretium), but to accept what has been freely offered to god. For the oblations are not offered to the priest only, but to the Supreme Pontiff, Jesus Christ". We should have preferred in this passage a clearer statement of

the obligation of justice incumbent upon the priest by reason of the offerings which he holds in trust as transmission agent. Perhaps it is implied; at all events the stress is laid on something else. What is the point of attack of St. Martin of Leon? It is simony. What does he reject? Every pact superadded to the one which is implied in the fact of accepting gifts for transmission to God, to whom they are destined in the minds of the faithful. That is sufficient: the priest will celebrate; God and Jesus Christ, God and the altar, will surrender to him the portion destined for his subsistence. There will be no "repayment" (praemium, pretium) from the faithful; but there will be a "gift from God." Everything will have taken place gratuitously (charitative, gratis, sponte). Not a shadow of a bargain has appeared; the divine Hostia has not been the object of an exchange, nor has the action of the priest been pledged for a temporal gain: no locatio operae, no contract do ut facias, no modal donation, etc. All that is excluded by Martin of Leon. He will have none of those pacts whereby the grant of a spiritual benefit is made subordinate to the concession of a temporal benefit. no contractual reciprocity between a sacerdotal action and a material subsidy. For there has not been any material subsidy or assistance given to the priest; but only a humble offering made to God, to Jesus Christ, to the altar; and the priest shares in it merely as the natural and rightful guest of the altar and of Jesus Christ and of God.

As for the liturgies, it will be enough to recall their general tenor. The Anaphora of Serapion, immediately after the Epiclesis, contained these words: "Receive, Lord, the eucharist of your people, and bless those who have offered the oblations and the eucharists." The same expressions are used in the Greek Liturgy of St. fames: "Remember, Lord, those who have offered to-day these oblations upon thy holy altar, and those for whom each one has offered", Still more explicit is the Greek Liturgy of St. Mark: "Accept, O God, the Hostiae, the oblations, the eucharistic gifts of those who offer them to thee". And do not we ourselves, in the Canon of

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the Roman Missal, beseech God to remember "those who offer up to (him) this sacrifice of praise for themselves and all their own, for the ransom of their souls, in the hope that he will keep them safe and sound, as well as those who pay their vows (sacrifices) to (him) true God, living and eternal"? To these texts may be added ever so many prayers (secrets and others) met with in the sacramentaries and missals, as for instance the following of the third votive mass of the Sacramentary of Bobbio: "God all powerful and all merciful, to whom vows are rendered in Jerusalem, hear the prayers of thy servant [who is having the mass said], remember his sacrifice and render his holocaust plentiful." In the Mozarabic votive mass called Singularis, the people are blessed before communion in these terms: "May your vows and your sacrifices be replenished with divine grace, clemency and benignity". Everywhere we see the one who had the mass said presented to God as the author of the sacrifice. Whether he was an individual person or a congregation, there was, as regards the essence of things, no difference whatever.

The congregation that raises funds for parochial masses, and the individual worshipper who defrays the expense of a votive mass, stand in the same identical relation to the sacred action and its term; there is no other difference than that of an individual offerer, and of a collective offerer; but offerer in either case. Such is the result reached by comparing our liturgical prayers, and such the confirmation given to the teaching gathered from the lips of the Fathers and the ecclesiastical writers.

All these documents, whether liturgical or patristic, have already been brought forward in a previous study devoted to this subject.! Others may be added.

Before all others, the liturgy of the Roman Pontifical for the dedication of Churches may be consulted, for the purpose of learning what the Church thinks of the altars she consecrates. The Pontifical's answer is eloquent. The chrism has been

flowing upon the table of stone, a cloud of incense has spread about it, and the Bishop is speaking: "Lord, our God, let thy Spirit descend, we beseech thee, upon this altar, to sanctify thereon our gifts and those of thy people {aui et dona nostra et populi tui in eo sanctificet), and to purify worthily the hearts of those who communicate let sumentium corda dignanter emundet)". What that altar will carry will be the gifts of the people as well as of the priest: and these same the Spirit is to sanctify: and once sanctified, the faithful will receive them through communion. Now what do they receive, if not the Victim of the sacrifice? But again what do they receive according to that prayer, if not their own gift? two things, but one: because the gift has become the Victim, without ceasing to be gift, and gift of those who gave it. us give ear again. A new unction is performed, and this time the Bishop turns to the faithful: "Most dear brethren, let us entreat God our Lord to bless and consecrate this stone. anointed with the oil of holy unction, that it may receive the vows and sacrifices of his people; and (let us pray) that the unction which we have performed, may be made in his name, and that this altar may carry the yows of the people." Once more the altar is incensed and the choir chants: "Moses raised an altar to the Lord God; and upon it he offered holocausts. Immolating victims, he made to the Lord God an evening sacrifice, unto an odour of sweetness. in presence of the people of Israel". And the Bishop resuming, proceeds: "Let us implore, dearly-beloved brethren, the mercy of God the Father Almighty, in order that, moved by the ministry of our (suppliant) voice, he may sanctify by the favour of his blessing this altar destined to be spread with spiritual sacrifices (i.e. heavenly as to their reality and sacramental as to their appearance, in contradistinction to the carnal sacrifices of Mosesl), and that he deign always to bless and sanctify the oblations which his servants shall place upon it with the eagerness of a holy devotion; so that appeased by a spiritual incense (i.e. by the eucharistic Sacri-

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fice), he may not delay answering the prayers of his family with his assistance, through Jesus Christ our Lord", Next, the words are addressed to God himself: "O Lord, we humbly beseech thy majesty, deign to bless and sanctify mightily this altar anointed with the libations of the holy chrism to receive the gifts of thy people {ad suscipienda populi tui munera) ... so that whatever shall henceforth be offered and consecrated upon it {quidquid deinceps super illud oblatum sacratumque fuerit may become a holocaust worthy of thee". Finally: "As thou didst accept the oblation of Melchisedech, thy sovereign priest, deign likewise ever to receive favourably the gifts with which this new altar will be loaded, in order that thy people gathered together in this holy house of the Church, may, thanks to these libations, be saved by the effect of a celestial sanctification, and that (all) may obtain the eternal salvation of their souls, through our Lord Jesus Christ. Amen". What follows from all this? Is it not that the sacrifice is looked upon as being the sacrifice (at least every time the faithful wish it) of the people? Is it not that the sacrifice is their sacrifice because it is their oblation, their gift, deposited upon the altar and transformed assuredly by the action of the sanctifying Spirit, but nevertheless offered to God, accepted by God, as the tribute of those who have defrayed it? Is this much not clear and evident? What else is necessary to make us understand what the altar is, what are the gifts of the altar, and the providers of the altar, and the ministers of the altar, and finally the sacrifice of the altar? Also what relation springs up between all these elements and factors of one and the same sacred action? Now, let any one read over again the rite of the Dedication, and he will see that the above theme is its leitmotiv rehearsal under twenty different forms, of which the above are only instances. Lex orandi, lex credendi. It would be profitable for theology, dogmatic and moral, and even for canon law, to take greater notice of liturgical data. The Pandects may be useful: but they are only next in order.

What a luminous commentary these beautiful formulas of

the Pontifical receive, in the ancient missals, from prayers like the following, for instance, for the faithful about to undertake a journey: "Accept, O Lord, these votive sacrifices of thy servants (so and so). . . . May they reach the place they desire", etc.!

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There is no doubt—it is the mass, the sacrifice, of the TRAVELLERS.

Let us come back to the Fathers. St. Augustine has already let us know his mind in a particular case. His thought is now taking the form of a general theory, intended to illustrate the dogma of the redeeming Sacrifice.2 Those who offer their sacrifices to false divinities are not aware that not only is sacrifice due to the true God alone (otherwise the devil himself would take no pleasure in usurping its honours), but that as a matter of principle "it cannot be offered in the manner required except by a priest holy and just; and then only on condition that he has received what he offers FROM THOSE ON BEHALF OF WHOM HE OFFERS: and also that it be something free from every flaw, in order to be a fit offering for the cure of our defects. At least, he concludes, such is the ambition of all those who desire that sacrifice be offered to God for them". Here you have a general theory of sacrifices, theory not based on revelation alone, but on the law of nature, since it is broad enough to cover the field of the sacrifices of the whole world, that is to say, to adapt itself (according to St. Augustine) to the intention of all those who have sacrifices offered: therefore, pagans as well as Jews and Christians. Now what, among other things, do we find in that theory? This: that the priest must receive the matter of the sacrifice from the one who has recourse to his ministry. How this applies to the sacrifice of redemption—in a manner, of course, quite analogous-St. Augustine takes pains afterwards to explain. It may be worth while to remark that this passage did not escape the notice of the Middle Ages: it

= Domine, haec famulorum tuorum N, votiva sacrificia: perveniant ad locum çsem deriderant, etc.—ififozarabic Missal, Missa de itinerantibus, bost-bridie, P.L... 9Æ997.)
'Trâ., 4, 14.

holds a place among the *Decrees* of Yves of Chartres, and of Gratian.

Before them, Heterius and Beatus, in their letter to Elipandus, 3 had appropriated the first part of it, adding to it the following significant clause which emphasizes the claim of ownership upon the Host: "And this sacrifice which is offered no one may eat or drink but those for whom it is offered".4

Is not this also the proper place to call attention to a curious expression of St. Gregory,5 in reference to an oblation sent by St. Benedict to a neighbouring Church for the repose of the souls of two nuns whom he had excommunicated: "The excommunication which they had incurred was not lifted, until THIS OBLATION HAD BEEN IMMOLATED for them" (dum pTO CIS oblatio fuisset immolata). Quite a strong realism this, stressing vigorously the continuity of the sensible gift and of the invisible Hostia.

One of the most noteworthy and most eloquent witnesses available would be St. Fulbert of Chartres, if his text did not need a correction, of the nature of which there is hardly a doubt. His forty-third letter is an answer to a question about those who offer, probably the same question that had already been raised by Walafrid Strabo: how can we say at Mass: qui tibi offerunt, if the persons of whom we speak are not there present with us to offer? We give the solution of Fulbert: "This scruple about the offerers may be solved thus: while we are sacrificing, they on whose behalf we are acting offer the sacrifice of praise to God by our hands". Therefore be at ease; absent though they be, they nevertheless do offer, for we, by sacrificing, act on their account,

¹ Deer. p. 2, c. 107.

⁸ Deer. p. 2, Can. 1, q. 1, c. 95.

³ Ado. Elipandum, 1, 67, P.L., 96, 936. "Neque potest hoc sacrificium quod offertur a quibuscumque comedere et bibere [read: comedi et bibi] nisi tantum ab ipsis pro quibus offertur."

^{*} For the question of what ground there is for this exclusiveness of the claim on the Host on the part of the offerer, consult M.F., 553.

⁵ Dial. 2, 23, P.L., 66, 178.

^{• &}quot;Scrupulus autem ille de offerentibus ita solvi potest, quod, dum sacrificamus, dii pro quibus agitur, per manus nostras offertur [read offerunt] Deo sacrificum laudis."—(Ep., 43, P.L., 186, 224.)

and therefore they offer to God, through our mediation, the eucharistic sacrifice. It is the application of the axiom of the Law: Qui mandat ipse fecisse videtur.l They transmit through our hands what they dedicated to God: present or absent, theirs is the offering. Nevertheless in this "scruple" we get a glimpse of the reason for the addition, which in his time the author of the Micrologus? deployed as contrary to antiquity: pro quibus tibi offerimus (vel qui tibi offerunt). are absent; they are not here to offer their own sacrifice: let us, then, say for greater security: "Remember, Lord, thy servants, men and women for [cya. behalf of] whom we offer to thee (notwithstanding their absence), or who (if they are themselves present) offer to thee (through us) this sacrifice of praise." They offer so truly that in common language we find no difficulty in saying that they sacrifice. Berlendi3 gives as an example the following expression of a biographer of the Empress St. Gunegond, widow of the Emperor St. Henry: "After the reading of the Gospel, according to a custom she invariably observed, she drew near the altar in order to sacrifice upon it," 4 that is to say, to carry there her gifts. And going back to her place, she is said to return from the sacrifice.5

But after all, did we not already hear St. Ambrose telling us that Theodosius, on the day appointed, would begin again to sacrifice? On the other hand, it does not seem that any account should be taken of the many instances of "celebration of masses" by lay persons, men or women, whom Berlendi® has collected in the same part of his work. Celebrare missam

¹ See above "Questions on the Old and on the New Testament," and William of Paris.

[»]C. 13, P.L., 151, 985.

^{&#}x27;De oblationibus, p. 255.

^{* &}quot;Cum post lectionem evangelii, suo solemni more sacrificatura accederet ad altare." —(Vita S. Cunegundis, n. 10, P.L., 140, 212.)

[&]quot; Post sacrificium rediens " (loc. cit.)

^{*} He might have added cases of "celebrations" by clerics of an order below the priesthood. Thus of Alcuin, who was only a deacon, his biographer writes: "Cekbrat omni die Missarum solemnia multa." (Vita B. Alcuini, n. 96, P.L., too, 104.) In spite of appearances, it is not a question of solemn masses, but of private masses, in which it is not even likely that Alcuin acted as deacon. He simply assisted at Mass.

or celebrare missarum solemnia, in all the examples adduced, can be understood of the simple fact of going to Mass or assisting at it. This acceptation of the word celebrare is thoroughly Latin. It would perhaps have been of more importance to call attention to certain passages of medieval biographies, where we meet with a layman "offering" mass. This means that he had it celebrated at his expense. For instance we read of the Emperor Otho, after a victory: "These events having been accomplished, the king with his army offered a sacrifice of praise to Christ, who in all things had granted his wish, and had given strength to his arm against the enemy."2

At all events, we may stop here our inquiry on the chief point: does the fact of setting the table of God for the sacrifice and at the same time for God's associate, the priest, constitute a claim of oblation so special that it cannot be identified with any other? It seems really that the voice of antiquity is unanimous. The authors of the sacrifice, in a manner which is proper and personal to them, are the faithful whose gifts are by the priest's hands addressed to God under the form of the Body and Blood of Jesus Christ; and as to what remains (disposal of which is not a matter of choice, but an indispensable requisite) they are gifts that must, under their natural form, serve for the maintenance of the minister of the altar, who thus is the altar's guest jure divino.

The sacrifice belongs to the faithful as it belongs to no one else. We are prepared, therefore, to see them dispose of it in a special manner, in favour of whomsoever they please. The unity which charity establishes among all the children of God, between all the members of the Body of Christ, allows each one of us to consider as another self any one who is actually or potentially incorporated in the living unity which the Church forms with Christ in God. And therefore, whoever possesses by a special right for himself

^{*} See Thesaurus Linguae Latinae. . . . Academiarum Quinque Germanicarum.

[&]quot;His itaque peractis, rex cum exercitu suo Christa offerebat sacrificium laudis, qui in omnibus suum impleverat votum, et contra inimicos confortaverat manum."—(tïta S. Mathildis, n. 15, P.L. 135, 905. See below.)

the propitiatory and impetratory power of the sacrifice, can also avail himself of it in particular for that other self, his neighbour. By so doing, he does not get away from himself; and thus the suffrage is nothing but the extension or completion of the personal benefit that accrues to every offerer from the oblation accepted by God. With the special oblation goes a special suffrage. He who has loaded the altar with his gifts not only draws a special fruit for himself, but is free to share it jointly with those to whom charity unites him.

It would appear as though the question of the *stipend* and its bearing on the celebration and application of the mass, should be considered settled. It is the Christian's sheep, as it was of old the Jew's. It goes over to God by a ministry not paid from below, but endowed from above, and the dower of the new priesthood, like that of the old, is the community of acquired goods, for ever established by God, between the priest and the altar.

In fact the question would now be settled, the conclusion would impose full acceptance, did there not remain the task of dissipating what seem to be contrary reasons, which till now, strangely enough, have succeeded in concealing from the eyes of the most skilful critics the reality of things. Berlendi himself, in spite of the habitual correctness of his views, seems to have been deceived occasionally, as well as Mabillon,* and so many others, and in our own days the distinguished author of the article *Honoraire de Messes*, in the *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*. It is time to examine these reasons.

JP. 278, sq. and 476. 'Acia Sanctorum O.S.B, Saecul. III. pars 1, praef. n. 62.

OBJECTIONS ANSWERED

All the objections are centred on one point. Their aim is to shatter that substantial identity, taken for granted in all that precedes, between the ancient "oblations" made by the faithful to the altar and the modem "stipends" of masses. Differences are adduced, which are taken from the offerer, from the offering, from the recipient of the offering, from the relationship established between these various factors.

As regards the offerer, objection is made against the transition from a group to an individual. As regards the offering, objection is made against the transition from foodstuffs to money. Objection is also made against the difference between an oblation made ceremonially during Mass, and a payment made apart from any liturgical celebration, nay, long before or long after. As regards the recipient, we are reminded that the stipend goes to a particular priest, and not to the whole clergy in a body. Finally and chiefly, it is objected, we have the contractual obligation of celebrating and applying the mass, obligation unknown, we are told, to the ancients and current in our days.2

To tell the truth, the first point, transition from a group

1 Occasionally one comes across an objection which we shall not take up here. There were in ancient times, we are told, oblations entirely unrelated to the Mass. Therefore, it is not possible to identify oblations and <code>stipends.—It</code> is quite evident that in comparing <code>stipends</code> with oblations, we are dealing exclusively with oblations made in reference to the Mass, those which the liturgies or the Fathers call the Hosts, the sacrifices of the faithful, and not with any others having no relation to the Mass. In our days also there are a number of oblations without any bearing on the sacrifice, and they are certainly very different front the <code>stipend</code>: those namely that custom approves and the law sanctions on the occasion of the sacraments.

'The objections are mainly those of the Spaniard Mostazzo, in his treatise De Causis piis, V, xii. It is difficult not to call attention to the insufficiency of this dissertation, which in thoroughness cannot compare with Thomassin, and as regards general information is far surpassed by Berlendi.

to an individual, hardly deserves notice. Whether a moral or a physical person is found at the outset of a liturgical procedure, what is the difference? May not a number of persons, for instance the whole parish, or a portion of the community, concert together to offer the sacrifice actively, let us say, to furnish the adequate matter (more or less rich and abundant) of a sacrifice? But is not such also in our days a common practice? Are there no cities that have masses said, or municipal councils, or athletic associations, or organizations of war veterans, or groups of young men, or sodalities of the Blessed Virgin, or confraternities, or clubs, or merely a chance assembly of friends who contribute together in favour of a departed companion? From the point of view we are taking at the moment, which is that of many as opposed to one, how does it at all differ from the siynaxes of the early Christians? Besides, is there in our present code a difference between that collective stipend and the individual stipend of Peter or of Paul? There is not; the same rules govern the one and the other. Again, is it true that the oblations of the early Christians were always collective? Those widowers and widows who solemnized with a sacrifice the anniversary of their dead. were they not individual offerers? Unless we take it for granted that the anniversary invariably coincided with the public synaxis, which is absurd. So true is it that they were sacrifices of individuals, as regards the oblations, that for a long time the practice prevailed of not admitting the public to the offertory at these masses, and not to give them communion (for offering and communion were in the minds of the ancients regularly associated with each other). instances of this kind are few. As we meet them in literature. yes; but as facts, what do we know? The ancients were not busy writing diaries to give us information of the doings in their daily life. Besides, those instances are quoted as occurrences by no means unusual, and even (by Tertullian) ordinary happenings. But at any rate those individual offerings took place on anniversaries only. And even if that were so, the principle was established: whether its application

was rare or not, it would still be true that the individual oblation was a matter of tradition as early as the middle of the third century, alongside of the collective oblation, and that their so-called incongruity does not seem to have struck the minds of those times. There was already in those days the individual offerer, as later on we see the title of offerers given by liturgies to each and all of the faithful who contribute towards the celebration of one and the same sacrifice. But there is something else: the case is not restricted to anniversaries. Here is an instance of an individual oblation occurring as early as the first half of the fourth century, and unconnected with any death or burial. To Thomassin2 (if I am not mistaken) goes the credit of having exhumed it from the oblivion wherein the anecdotes of Epiphanius are too readily allowed to remain buried. Epiphanius3 got the fact from a converted Jew, a person of importance, whom Constantine had created a count, by the name of Joseph of Tiberias. This count, much later, under the reign of Constantius, related the fact to Epiphanius, as having been an eye-witness "through the cracks of a door." Hillel, a descendant of Gamaliel, and "patriarch" of the Jews, had himself baptized secretly on his death bed by the bishop of Tiberias, and at the same time initiated (as was but proper) into the "sacred mysteries" of the Eucharist. After the ceremonies "he handed to the bishop a considerable quantity of gold, saying to him: Offer for me (πρόσ-φ ρε vTrep è/zoû)." It is exactly the case of a Christian offering individually, as was done neither more nor less by the widowers and widows spoken of by Tertullian, or later by St. Gregory, but with this difference, that the sacrifice is to be celebrated

¹ The same objection could just as well be made against the substantial identity of the sacerdotal action of to>-day with that of old. For of old priests did not celebrate individually, but collectively; and such is still the rule in the churches of the Oriental rite. Are we to conclude that the rôle of the celebrant of to-day is no longer the same as that of the celebrant of primitive Christianity, or that the. Latin priests and the Greek Catholic priests have different conceptions of their respective powers?

² Vetus et Nova Ecclesiae Disciplina, pars III, lib. I, cap. 70, n. 2. Berlendi (p. 295) is mistaken in mentioning the fact as never quoted before.

² Haeres. 30, n. 4-6.

for him, and not for someone departed. St. Epiphanius tells the story with its sequels, as something strange from several angles, on which he dilates at length, but he does not by any means view it as having the character of an unusual practice. It is even likely that the neophyte acted in conformity (though perhaps with exceptional generosity) with usages known to him.

Moreover, as liturgists have not been slow in observing, the increasing number of private masses2 tended naturally to favour the practice of individual offerings. This practice, in turn, received a new stimulus, and certainly a suitable expression, from the liturgy of masses called "votive", not in the present meaning of that word, but in the old meaning of masses especially requested by someone, and satisfying an individual believer's own offering, vow, sacrifice, or that of a group, in contrast with the ordinary masses of a parish or of a community. We have already seen examples of these votive masses. Here is another instance, taken from the Gelasian Sacramentary; it is a mass for the head of a family in his house3: "Infra actionem: Do thou, therefore, O Lord, we beseech thee, graciously accept this oblation of this thy servant, which he offers to thee for his vows and desires and for the safeguard of his home. Be propitious unto him, while I implore for him in his own house the help of thy Majesty,

1 One feels tempted to compare with this story an anecdote which Fr. Ortolan (D.T.C., Honoraires de Messes, col. 74) takes from the Life of St. John the Almoner by Leontius of Naptouse (c. 9, n. 50, in the Acta Sanctorum, January 23rd, Antwerp 1643,p.508; or c. 25, in P.L. 73,362). But as a matter offact, it is not a question here of a mass-offering, but of a simple alms with a request for prayer. Thereafter the saint celebrates, as it appears, without the donor being aware of it. The example of Ulthrogothe, mentioned by Gregory of Tours (De miraculis S. Martini, I, J2, P.L., 71, 926), or that of St. Benedict quoted above, has not, in the subject matter, any proving force: since it does not appear with certainty that either the queen or the saint offered alone. As for the testimony of St. Bede (Hist. Eccl., IV, 22. P.L. 95, 205-207), it deals only with mass-offerings (in kind or in money, it matters little) for people presumed to be dead, as in the case of the widow spoken of by St. Gregory.

* See how St. Gregory forcibly distinguishes public masses from those that are not such, in his letter to Felix de Pesaro (Ep. I, 6, 46. P.L. 77).

^{&#}x27;Compare the above with the letter in which St. Gregory enjoins upon John of Syracuse to allow Mass to be said in the house of Venantius, with whom he had fallen out, and even to go there himself, if it could help towards reconciliation.

that thou mayest send him thy holy angel to keep watch over all who dwell in this house "x It is his sacrifice he is offering to thee, he, the father of the family, in whose home I celebrate. This same Sacramentary, whose venerable antiquity is well known, would make it easy for us to multiply instances. There ' is a mass for a birthday anniversary: "Secret. Hear, Lord, our supplications and accept with loving-kindness the oblation of this thy servant which he offers to thee for the anniversary of his birth, the day when thou didst bid him come forth from his mother's womb "Infra actionem: This oblation, then, of this thy servant, which he offers thee in order to celebrate the anniversary of his birth, the day when thou didst bid him be bom of his mother's womb into this world, that he might know thee, the true and living God: we beseech thee, Lord, do thou mercifully accept: for with that intention does he render his vows to thee, O true and living God."2

The style is the same in the mass for the one who defrays the expenses of an agape,3 in the nuptial mass,4 in the mass for the thirtieth anniversary of a marriage,5, etc. In each mass there is someone who, through the priest's mediation, offers the mass, his mass. The individual oblation was as classical as the collective one. Was it more frequent, or less frequent, we could not say: no doubt the practice varied considerably in different countries.

The instance related of Hillel, while testifying to the individuality of the offering, furnishes also an answer to the i

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^{1 &}quot;Infra actionem: Hanc igitur oblationem famuli tui illius, quam tibi offert pro votis et desideriis suis atque pro incolumitate domus suae placatus suscipias deprecamur: pro quo in hac habitatione auxilium tuae majestatis deposco, ut mittere ei digneris angelum tuum sanctum, ad custodiendos omnes in hac habitatione. Per. _ _ _ " (Sacr. Gei. 3, 73. Ed. Wilson, p. 284. P.L. 74, 1225.)

^{3 &}quot;In natale genuinum. Secreta: Adesto, Domine, supplicationibus nostris, et hanc oblationem famuli tui illius, quam tibi offert ob diem natalis sui genuinum, quo die eum de maternis visceribus in hunc mundum nascijussisti, placidus et benignus assume." Infra actionem: Hanc igitur oblationem famuli lui illius, quam tibi offert, diem natalis sia celebrans genuinum, quo die eum de maternis visceribus in hunc mundum nascijussisti, ad te cognoscendum Deum verum et vivum, placatus suscipias deprecamur: ob hoc igitur reddit tibi vota sua Deo vivo et vero" etc.—(Sacr. Gei., 3, 53, Ed. Wilson, 269. P.L., 74, 1215-)

³ Sacr. Gei. 3, 48, Ed. Wilson, 262, P.L. 74, 1212.

^{*} Ibid. 3, 52, Wilson, 265. P.L. 74. 1213-1214.

⁴ Ibid.

objection drawn from the substitution of gifts in money for gifts in kind. We see that the equivalence of the two kinds of gifts can bring to its support ancient testimonies. If the rule of St. Chrodegang, in the middle of the eighth century, codifies, for the use of the canons of Metz, the practice of oblations in money placed, as it appears, in the hands of a particular priest, "for his mass" (pro missa sua), there is no likelihood that it was an innovation. In fact the purpose of that rule is merely to determine what is to be done with that sum of money. The priest "shall do with it as he pleases",2 that is, it shall not go to the common fund. If, on the other hand, the Christian had made his gift to the community, the community was to celebrate and appropriate the alms. This rule testifies, to such as are willing to enter into the mind of its author, that the practice of individual offerings was then current.3 but that under the conditions of common life and common revenues inaugurated among the diocesan clergy by St. Chrodegang, there were reasons for adapting the practice, under its various forms, to the new state of affairs: and so it was done.

For a long time the two varieties of offerings, in kind and money, existed side by side in the Church, and did so as absolutely equivalent. At the beginning of the tenth century, the Empress Matilda, wife of Henry the Fowler, had a practice of offering daily bread and wine for the welfare and prosperity of the Church: "Mos quippe fuerat sanctae dominae cotidie sacerdoti ad missam praesentare oblationem panis et vini pro salute et utilitate totius sanctae Ecclesiae." * "Never," her biographer

¹ There is no reason for adding, as did Fr. Ortolan (op. cit. yt and 73), St. Augustins's letter to Aurelius (Ep. 22, t, 6, P.L. 33, 92), which as a matter of fact does not treat of oblations made to the altar or for sacrifices.

^{1 &}quot;A tribuente accipiat, et exinde quod voluerit Jaciat". (Regula Canonicorum, 42, P.L. 89, 1076.)

'The statement of Thomassin (op. rit., pars III, lib. I, cap. 71, n. 8) on the

^{&#}x27;The statement of Thomassin (op. rit., pars III, lib. I, cap. 71, n. 8) on the origin of this practice b more guarded than was to be later on that of Mabillon. "Pipirti el Caroli Magni tua> jam coeperant Jideles", says Thomassin: which leaves the starting point quite undetermined. . . "Idfieri coeptum, ut ridetur, saeculo octavo": thb precision of Mabillon (Praef. ad saecul. III. S. Benedicti, pars I, n. 62) goes too far, and, to tell the truth, b untenable.

⁴ lita S. Malhildis, written by command of her great-grandson, St. Henry, n. 19, P.L. 135, 910.

tells us elsewhere. "did she draw near the altar with empty hands, neither during her wedded life nor in her widowhood." But it so happened that at the very time when she was passing from the one state to the other, that is to say on the day of her husband's death, taken unawares by the lateness of the hour, she was anxious to know whether it was still possible to find a priest who had not broken his fast, "to sing the mass of her lord's soul." One presented himself who "had not yet tasted anything." Then with a movement of her little finger she let fall from her arm two wonderful bracelets, forged with such skill that they could not have been unfastened except by a goldsmith: "Take this gold," she said, "and chant the Mass of souls 2 The holy Empress (or at least her biographer) does not seem to be aware of any essential difference between the ordinary gifts and this metal, except that of a greater generosity, prompted by her eager desire for a more efficacious suffrage.

St. Peter Damian told us a while ago of provisions presented as an offering. It is very well known, however, that in his boyhood as a little keeper of swine, ill-treated, enduring the pangs of hunger, he found one day a coin, and instead of all the sweets and all the delicacies which his fancy conjured up ("dum suavibus cunctis egeret, dulcis appetitus per mollia quaeque puerilem mentem trahebat"), he began to reflect that this treasuretrove ("tanquam subito dives effectus, gratulabundus, quid eo mercari aptius posset, diu mente revolvere coepit") would be better spent for the relief of his dead father's soul, and he gave the piece of money to a priest with the request to celebrate for that intention ("qui Deo sacrificium offerat pro patre")3 He, too, does not seem to be aware of any great difference between food and money offerings. Here we have money, elsewhere a table set with food.

¹ N. io, col. 900: "Nunquam vacua manu ad altare venit."

³ N. 9, col. 897. In much the same manner we read of St. Henry, at Cluny, offering at Mass a crown of gold—at least, if we are to credit the rather common-place author of a belated Life of the Saint. "Coronam auream pretiosissimis gemmis adornatam ad missam [quae de Cathedra S. Petri celebrabatur) obtulit"—(Vita S. Henrici, c. 4, n. 33. P.L. 140, 126.)

³ Joannes monachus, Vita B. Petri Damiani, 2, P.L. 144, 116-1:7.

But let us hear Honorius of Autun. He only repeats a tradition, according to which the people used once upon a time to supply the flour of the altar breads (evidently before Mass). This custom, he notes, gave the full meaning to the phrase of the Canon: Omnium circumstantium qui libi hoc sacrificium laudis offerunt; since all these offerers of flour were present at the mass (" nam singuli farinam offerentium missae interfuerunt"). What is more, they received communion. But communion having become infrequent, the flour became superfluous. It was, therefore, agreed that it should be replaced by money {"statutum est ut . . populus pro oblatione farinae denarios offerret"). Without questioning the fact itself, there is no doubt that in the mind of Honorius the money plays the same part as the contributions in kind. Elsewhere? he tells us in clear terms: "Lay persons sacrifice, some with gold, others with silver, and others still with some other substance." Among other substances he enumerates in the lines that follow only bread, wine and water. The equivalence of these gifts in kind and in money is illustrated in his writing by the odd remark that the bread had been baked in the shape of a coin: "Panis in formam denarii formatur." 3 There was even a decree passed in that sense: "Statutum est eum {panem} in modum denariiformari."4 And thus we see the bread itself take on the likeness, as regards its outward form, of money, after the money had been likened to the bread in its liturgical intent. People "sacrificed" gold or silver, as of old they had "sacrificed" bread and wine, because the bread and the coins were interchangeable in the priest's hands. At the proper moment the money was changed into bread, the bread of the sacrifice. It looks as though our forebears had very clear notions on the transition which fa puzzling modem scholars.® It goes without saying that the innovation did not

^{&#}x27;Gemma animae, 1, 66, P.L. 772, 564.
1 Ibid. 1, 27, col. 553: "Quidam de populo aurum, quidam argentum, quidam de aha substantia sacrificant."

[•] Ibid, t, 35, cot 555. Ilbid, 1,66,001,564.

^{*} Not all, however, as we shall see further on. Notice, in the meanwhile, that the learned Lupus (Wolf), in his Dissertatio de Simoniae crimitw, c. tt {Sinodarum}

always and everywhere take place without raising protests. We know that in those times there was no Congregation of the Council, and no Holy Office. Hence what was sanctioned by the authorities in one country might well appear like an abuse elsewhere. Moreover, it must be plain that by taking the form of money, the oblation lost its eminently sensible character of sacrificial host, and as a consequence lent itself in the minds of coarse people to be taken for a salary, a remuneration, a payment of a sacred thing, for the price of the Blood of Jesus Christ, for the coin of Judas, or, neither more nor less, for the money of Simon Magus. Hence the denunciations of saintly people, of timorous persons, against certain priests who by their mercenary ways seemed really to substantiate that vulgar view of the matter. It explains the attitude of Peter Cantorl against "the venality of masses" (venalitatem missarum). "In the matter of sin," he says, "we do not read that any turpitude, any enormity, so aroused and enkindled the wrath of the Lord as the venality of the eucharistie dove" (sicut pro venalitate columbae, maxime eucharistiae). We know that at the time it was customary in a number of churches to preserve the Eucharist in golden doves over the altar. "Greed has taken possession of this sacrament, which is beyond price.3 Whereas all other vices, seized with trembling, keep aloof from the sacred precincts, simony has dared to encroach upon the very altars ".4 And yet he does not condemn the principle; on the contrary, he complains that the principle is not respected because the

General, ac Provint. Deer, et Can., Venice 1724, t. iv, p. 86) after describing the evolution of the gifts through the three stages, bread, flour, money, concludes that our present-day stipend, in view of its equivalence with the ancient oblations, may put forth the proud claim of being "of apostolic institution." "Exinde ergo missam sibi celebrari volens eam oblato denario postulat a sacerdote: et hic est denarius, quem Wicleffistae, Lutherans et Calvinistae hostiliter insectantur. At sine fundamento. Est enim, licet non ista specie [pecuniaria'], tamen in substantia ac valore [pro sua aequicalentia ad oblationes pristinas] institutum apostolicum."

¹ Verbum abbreviation, c. 28, P.L. 205, 102.

² Ibid. c. 27, coi. 99.

s "Cupiditas dominatur in hoc sacramento, quod impretiabile est"—(Ibid. col. 100). 4 "Cum omnia cetera vitia trepident et exsulent a locis sacratis, simonia ipsa altaria invasit"—(Ibid. col. 102). In between, other epithets than those of venality and simony may be met with: leprosy of Giezi, money of Judas, etc. See the fragments from Ch. 27, which will be quoted further on.

outcome of certain manipulations is precisely to defraud the faithful of the fruit of the mass, by making one mass serve to satisfy several offertories: "Nevertheless, according to the doctrine handed down to us, the more frequent and the more special is the oblation of the sacrament of the altar for the faithful, the more abundant are the fruits they draw therefrom." | Let not the priest imagine that he can settle the matter by a general application, when he has pledged himself to special ones. It is evident that the charge of venality or simony is not hurled by Peter Chantre against every pecuniary transaction, nor against the obligation in strict justice that may arise from it; but simply against the kind of transaction that would imply a traffic, and against anything whatever that might sanction its very notion or mere semblance.

The evolution of the gifts had for result to facilitate the taxing of the offerings. It is clear that gifts in kind lend themselves less to a strict valuation. On the other hand, it is equally clear that a strict valuation lends itself more easily to a commercial interpretation. May not this be the motive which determined the General Chapter of the Cistercians in 1182 to issue the following decree, which seems to be the first of its kind in the annals of the Church, and unique in the annals of the Order: "It is forbidden to promise masses by a pact, for a fixed (sum), because it is simoniacal." * The rather loose drafting of the decree cannot fail to be noticed. From it there arises a certain lack of decisiveness with regard to the formula's true meaning, on which the context throws no light. But the third canon of the Council of Evreux in 1195 is certainly clearer, forbidding every agreement to celebrate for a "set price." * We may also quote a much later council

^{1 &}quot;Cum habeat auctoritas, quia, quanto saepius el specialius pro eis offertur sacramentum altaris, tanto amplius refrigerium percipiunt'" (Ibid, c. 29, coi. 105).

[&]quot;Peragens enim generalia non est absolutus a specialibus quae supplicans sibi intellexit promitti," (Ibid. t. coi. 106.)

[&]quot; Pro pacto certo nulla fiat missarum promissio, quia simoniacum esi."—Martene, Thesaurus Piorus Anecdotonm, tam. 4, coi. 1053.)

[&]quot;Decrevimus prohibendum ne sacerdos aliquis pro celebratione missarum pretio constituto pactum ineat; sed hoc duntaxat quod offeretur in missa recipiat"—(Manii, 25,653).

held in Toledo in 1324,1 which observes with grief (multa mentis amaritudine') that certain priests "demand money for masses they are to celebrate" (pro missis per eos celebrandis pecuniam exigunt). To this first wrong they add another, that of a shameless bargain driving " (impudenter mercantur). Men of that sort, "are selling the grace of God." think, as you watch them, that "God himself who presents himself to us under the appearance of this sacrament, is for sale" (ipsum Deum, qui nobis sub specie dicti sacramenti se exhibet, pecunia vendi posse). Wherefore "we strictly forbid priests to exact for the celebration of masses either money or any other temporal thing " (districtius prohibemus ne aliquis presbyter pro missis celebrandis pecuniam exigat vel rem aliam temporalem). "Let them be satisfied with accepting gratefully what shall be offered to them in charity by him who has the mass celebrated: without pact or stipulation of any kind" (absque pacto et conventione quacumque). It is evident that the venerable authors of these conciliary or capitularly decrees were alarmed by the semblance of a commutative transaction which the cash payment between priest and people was assuming, when once the notion of the equivalence between the primitive oblations and their transformation into money had faded from their minds. Perhaps that notion had already vanished from their own minds; this would explain why, instead of inveighing against the abuses, they attacked the principle itself. On this road the universal Church did not follow them: they appear as isolated individuals, we might say like an infinitesimal, and therefore a negligible, quantity amid the immense multitude of doctors (theologians or canonists) and of pastors, who all through the centuries of the Middle Ages assisted at this evolution of the Mass-offering, without being disturbed on its account otherwise than to explain and justify it by the reasonable reminders of the origin from which it derives and which it extends. There was no need of denying the pact, but there was need of defining it in terms calculated to safeguard the gratuitousness of the two con-

tributions of the faithful and the priest, while upholding at the same time a close bond of justice between their mutual obligations. This is accomplished by appealing to the sacredness of the deposit entrusted by the mandator to the mandatary, by the author of the sacrifice to its consecrator, by him who sends the gift to him who assumes it when transmitted.

Another effect of this same evolution was the lengthening of the intervals between the presentation of the offerings and the celebration of the mass. It does not mean that the gifts in kind never preceded the time of celebration; we have proof of the contrary in the case of the widow related by St. Peter Damian. We know it also from the grievances of those who complained that the faithful no longer came in person to turn to account their offerings at the masses which were celebrated at their request. Finally the point is made clear in the votive masses for the sick, such as the following from the Gelasian Sacramentary: "O God, to whom the vicissitudes of our life are subject, receive the prayers and hosts of thy servants and handmaids, to whom we beg thee to show mercy in their sickness, that the fear for their danger may be followed by the joy over their recovery ".x Although not brought to the altar by their own hands, these gifts were nevertheless their hosts, their sacrifices, their vows.2 In itself, a longer or a shorter interval did not change the case. But, on the other hand, it is understandable that gifts in kind, a portion of which was to be employed in the celebration, could not wait indefinitely. On the contrary, the coin could bide its time, and sometimes even it had to wait a long time for its When a worshipper arranged for several masses, he was forced to have the second come after the first, and so on. At the same time, however, the liturgical connection between

^{1&}quot; Deus sub cujas nutibus citae nostrae momenta decurrunt, suscipe preces et hostias famulorum etfamularum tuarum, pro quibus misericordiam tuam aegrotantibus imploramus, ut de quorum periculo metuimus de eorum salute laetemur"—(Sacr. Gei., 3, 70, Ed. Wilson p. 282, P. 1, 74, 224).

Wilson, p. 282. P.L. 74. »224).

* Not to mention that very early there was already established the custom of not presenting at the altar, but of carrying to the residence, the victuals destined, not for consecration, but for the subsistence of the celebrating clergy. It was a mere matter of convenience and seemliness.

the offering and the celebration became less perceptible. From this again arose an increased danger of substituting the regrettable idea of contract of exchange between a temporal contribution and a spiritual service. Nevertheless, it does not appear that this widening of intervals greatly! worried the ancients (otherwise so careful to exclude every pact of the kind, not only from the other sacraments, but also and above all4 from the Mass). For this reason one is much surprised to see modern authors using it as a weapon against the logical continuity and practical identity of the oblation in kind and the oblations in money. They might as well argue that communion, when separated from Mass, is no longer a participation of the sacrifice: for then what is it? I celebrate to-day; the faithful will receive eight days hence; it is quite true that the relation of the sacrament to the sacrifice grows dim by the delay, but it is not abolished, and it cannot be abolished, for it is an essential relation. The same must be predicated of the relation of the oblation of the gifts to their sacerdotal consecration. Time can do nothing in the matter; no more for us than for medieval Christians, or for so many before them, not to bring up again the case of Hillel and the bishop of Tiberias. And if payment were made after the mass only, what of it, if before the mass there was an agreement to pay (somewhat like the satisfaction which nowadays follows, and formerly preceded, sacramental absolution)? This point will come up again later.

At least, it will be objected, there is one irreducible difference between the ancient oblations destined for the whole clergy

¹ Once more we must except here a few isolated instances, such as the Council of Evreux in 1195, quoted above ("quod offeretur in missa"). But even here it appears clearly that stress is not laid on the time of offering, but on its spontaneity.

[!] Peter Cantor {op. cit. c. 27, col. 99-102): "Si venalitas, lepraque Giezi, et simoma Simonis adeo turpis est et damnabilis in appendiciis saaamentorum, (v. g. the canonical hours) ut supra (c. 26) innotuit, quanto magis et in ipsis substantiis sacramentorum, praecipue in eucharistia! . . . Quid periculosius quam (cf. col. 417) quod caeci ipsum Dominum patiuntur turpius vendi quam a Juda venditus fuerit, in aliis sacramentis venalitatem aperte cernentes, in hoc vero non? . . . Turpius Chrisium vendimus quam Judas. . . . Ille pro triginta argenteis, nos pro denariis et pretio vilissimo." He is here giving a lesson to those whose wrong practices caused suspicion that their thoughts were too much bent on profit and business tactics.

and the later oblations allotted to a single priest. Here again we must not allow ourselves to be unduly impressed by merely accidental differences, which leave the substance of the bond between oblation and celebration perfectly intact. It is very true, in former times in the majority of cases there was a distribution of the offerings of the sacrifice among the whole clergy; but what is there strange about it? Just as the Eucharistic synaxis brought together all the faithful and supposed the oblations of all the faithful, so, too, it was never conceived without the participation of all the clergy, each one officiating in unison with the rest, in a celebration by all the orders and all the members of each order. It was only logical that the oblations should go to all, according to their rank. They also went to the poorl: and this, too, was consistent with the nature of things, as was stated already, and as occasion will be given again to ascertain the fact. But what proof is there that in the anniversary masses requested by an individual Christian there was sufficient for everybody? It would have been ruinous in large churches like Rome or Carthage. masses, in all likelihood said by one priest, perhaps with a deacon, would naturally have their emoluments restricted to the celebrants. The principle in both cases was identical. But it still has in our own days its twofold application: if I have a low mass said, the whole offering is for the priest; if I have a solemn high mass celebrated, the emolument is regularly divided among the clergy engaged in the sacred function. It is not a discovery of to-day that St. Paul's text, examined above (/ Cor. ix, 13), applies not only to priests, but also to the inferior ministers of the sacrifice. Truly this difference, or difficulty, is as superficial as the foregoing ones.

Here is one, the only one, which is worthy to fix our attention: not that in the main it is a real difficulty; but because,

¹ If a cleric, for some good reason, such as duty or sickness, was absent from the *synaxis*, either occasionally or habitually, he naturally held the first place among the Church's poor, to whom the revenues of the Church must go. He, too, therefore, lived by the altar. It should also be noticed how the poor, supported by the oblations of the faithful, saw themselves on that account called *altars*, in the parlance of the Fathers of the Church—(M.F. t6t).

on the contrary, in spite of its more plausible appearances, it really can be retorted against the opposite thesis and thus strengthen our own, which alone can furnish its explanation.

The faithful, we are told, in former times never claimed to connect the special fruit of the mass with their offering in such a way that it had to be exclusively reserved to their personal benefit. Nobody claimed to impose upon the priest a strict obligation to celebrate just for the donor alone: whereas at present there is a contractual obligation to apply the mass for a particular intention; just as there is a contractual obligation to make the payment after the mass has been said, in case it has not been attended to beforehand. There is, therefore, something new. Our present-day concept differs by an essential element from the old practice. It is, therefore, impossible to hold that the stipend of our masses is merely the oblation of former days. It is something more, or rather it is something else. The ancient practice has died out, or very nearly; in its place there sprang up, at some undetermined moment in history, a new practice, which does not hold its titles from the previous one, but is original and independent, and admits a bond of mutual obligations in commutative justice between the offerer of a temporal prestation and the debtor of a spiritual prestation, or between the offerer of the latter and the debtor of the former: something unknown Therefore, there has been a break of continuity in the past. between then and now. The Church has innovated somewhat. at first by her tacit approval, then by her express sanction, and by thus authorizing the novelty has done away with all scruples.

All this would be very convincing, if at the outset we had to grant as beyond all question one or another of the theories elaborated by the canonists of our day, on their own responsibility and without warrant whatever from the Church, in treating of the Mass-contract. It is true that they see in it an exchange of prestations, something which does not occur in the theology of the Fathers or of the Early Middle Ages. If this supposition of theirs is correct, it follows, indeed, that the

present is not linked up with the past, and that our mass stipend cannot be likened to oblations fallen into disuse. is their supposition right? The whole problem turns on They tell us: Here is the Mass-contract, a contractual exchange of services. We answer: It does not seem so to us, but the Mass-contract is the same transaction that once depended on two factors, the contribution of the sacrificial gifts by the believer, and the priest's portion in all the acquisitions of the altar. They reply: Not at all; and the proof is that the ancient economy knew nothing of this obligation of reciprocal services which is characteristic of the contract of to-day.—Yes, we say, if it is characteristic; but once more, that is the whole point at issue. We are confronted by a begging of the question, with an equivocation superadded. The equivocation is this: if it is meant that the old practice did not admit between the parties an onerous reciprocity of prestations, then the assertion is true; if it is meant that it did not create an obligation of commutative justice, the statement is false. There was no contract of onerous service: you are right. There was no contract at all: you are wrong. There was the contract, the pact, the agreement in strict justice, which is implicitly contained in every mandate accompanied by a deposit. You ask me as your friend to go on your behalf and pay a dealer the sum of fifty pounds, which you place in my hands for the purpose. It is very true that you do not pay me; that my compliance will be absolutely gratuitous; that it has in no way the character of a counterprestation due in virtue of some previous prestation. As far as service is concerned, you do not render me any in the case: I alone render service, and do so gratis. Therefore, there is no exchange, there is no reciprocity (onerous or otherwise); there is a simple act of kindness on my part. But suppose that under pretence of this graciousness or gratuitousness, I reasoned thus: In justice I owe him nothing; consequently I shall not be guilty of an injustice if I fail to carry out my mandate. The fifty pounds which found their way into my purse may as well stay there; they shall never go to the

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dealer, and no one shall be able to complain that I robbed him.—Surely you would protest and tell me: It is true, you are not stealing your salary, since you are not receiving any. You are not in the situation of the employee who defrauds his employer of the labour contracted for and paid for. you are none the less a thief, ratione rei injuste detentae. steal, by appropriating to yourself without any more ado the deposit which was entrusted to you for transmission into the hands of him who was entitled to it. If you do not intend to pay my dealer, give me back my fifty pounds. If you do not intend to give them back, pay my debt.—This is certainly the kind of language which a Jew of old would have addressed, after surrendering his sheep, to the priest unscrupulous enough to claim it for his own profit, without offering it to Yahweh.— Either give back my sheep, that I may have it sacrificed by someone else, or sacrifice it yourself, as you proposed to do; but do not eat it before presenting it to Yahweh. I am robbed, even though I do not claim to pay you. are the table-guest of Yahweh, and you have a right in that capacity, to your share of the feast, but only after the feast has become Yahweh's. Else you are without claim.—In like manner would the Christian of the first centuries have argued, if when the table of sacrifice had been spread by his care, he had seen the priest, instead of celebrating, simply sit down for dinner, without troubling himself any further. He had not paid the priest either; but all the same he had certain rights, and in particular the right to have the gift, which had been accepted for God, reach God. It was the consecration of the bread and wine intended for transubstantiation which after all conferred upon the offerer the claim of being the author of an effective sacrifice. That title became his, as soon as under the species borrowed from his offerings the divine Host ascended to God. Thereafter, what remained of the gifts the priest could use as the co-participant of God or of the altar. But all this supposed the gift arrived at its destination, it supposed the transfer accomplished (of which mention is still made in our prayer Supplices te rogamus), it supposed the

sacrifice offered and accepted; it supposed God—at his own table, provisioned by the care of the faithful but served by the hands of the priest—inviting his minister to be his guest. 'Then, indeed, but not till then, could the latter have the use of it. Before that, it would have been robbery.

Who is there that has expressed himself better on the oblations of the early Christians than Thomassin, in this utterance of incomparable depth and grandeur? "Hostiae erant, cum portio inde aliqua in immortalem hostiam, coelestem Agnum, decer-Tributa erant, quae saa. deus reservaverat, per ministros suos colligenda fruendaque | 1 These gifts of the faithful to the altar, "were hosts, since from part of them was gathered the immortal Host, the heavenly Lamb. They were tributes which God had reserved to himself, while to his ministersbelonged both their collection and fruition".—If the nation's ruler is pleased, for just motives known to him, to relinquish to his collectors the tax which I have paid them, it is an affair between him and them: it is none of my business. if the tax-collector, after receiving my payment, refused to enter it in the public records and to give me a receipt in the name of the State, intending on his own authority to keep what has never for one instant been transferred to the credit of the public exchequer, then undoubtedly he would be guilty of an injustice, since he would leave me, in the eyes of the ruler, in the position of a debtor who failed to make payment. The comparison is clear enough to need no commentary. I wish to place myself in the eyes of God (as it is my privilege) in the relation of donor to receiver, by offering all that is required that a sacrifice may be accredited to my account, namely, both the sacramental matter and the material surplus for the priest's subsistence. I am entitled to be numbered actually among those who have paid this tribute to God. I have, therefore, the right to demand that my offering take the direction which I have assigned to it, and that at the final stage it be entered, in letters written with the Blood of the Lamb, in the book that keeps alive the memory of the

1 Vctus tl Nova Ecclesiae Disciplina, pars III, t. c. ta, n. I.

sacrifices by which our debts are cancelled and at the same time our claims on the divine liberality are multiplied. *Oblationem* . . . *benedictam, adscriptam, ratam.* All this I had a right to expect from you. You failed to respond: you failed both in fidelity as a mandatory, and in justice as a depositary. Nothing can be plainer. It was not beyond the grasp of the early Christians.

However, it is likely that our opponents will agree as to the obligation contracted by the priest in reference to the completion of the sacrifice. But they may fail back on the surrender of its fruit to the person responsible for the celebration. "There, at least, no obligation can be discovered in ancient times. There is nothing to prove that the celebrant considered himself bound to celebrate more especially for the benefit or for the intention of some particular person, rather than for this or that special end." It would be superfluous to conceal that such is the interpretation of Benedict XIV. "It is beyond doubt . . . that during the nascent and adolescent discipline of the Church, bread and money were an offering made to the Church and to the clergy in common, and not a gift made to some priest individually, that he might celebrate Mass separately, for the benefit of the donorl only". In other words the donor did not mean to keep for himself alone the fruit of the mass. Evidently it is not a question here of ah appropriation so exclusive as to leave nothing in the way of gain either to the universal Church or to the officiating priest, or to his ministers, or to those attending at Mass. Certainly such exclusiveness does not exist in our own days. It is a question, therefore, of the special fruit which theology and legislation admit for the donors

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^{1 &}quot;Indubitatum est, . . . juxta primigeniam nascentis et adolescentis Ecclesiae disciplinam, sive panem sive denarium oblatum fuisse Ecclesiae et clericis in commune, non vero datum cuipiam peculiari sacerdoti, ut Missam privatim faceret, quae uni eleemosynam offerenti prodesset." (De Sacrosancto Missae Sacrificio, 3, 21, 5, Romae 1748, p. 387). Benedict XIV relies on Thomassin (Pel. et Nov. Eccl. Disc. p. III, 1 i, c. 71, n. 8). But there is a confusion here. Thomassin remarks that among the ancients the faithful, the offerers of the gifts, did not think that they were wronging one another by having only one and the same mass celebrated in common (on this see M.F. 35/, 352). He does not say that the fruit of the sacrifice was reputed to be the same for the faithful who were offerers and for those who were not.

It is this special fruit which, our opponents of the *stipend*. hold, was not set apart for the offerers by the Canon Law of old, whereas it is precisely this which forms the whole matter, or at least the proper matter, of the Masscontract sanctioned by the modem Code. Therefore, there is a radical difference, from a juridical standpoint, between the stipend and the oblation. It appears that this so-called opposition between the past and the present proceeds entirely from a misunderstanding. Do you mean to say that in order to celebrate for the special benefit of Caius, who has handed to me his offering for that purpose, there is need on my part of an additional intention, besides that which has in view the transmission to God of the gifts of Caius? If so, you are mistaken. By the very fact that I present a sacrifice as proceeding from Caius, I sacrifice for Caius, .for his benefit and for his intentions. Caius may represent a group or an individual: it does not change the case in the least. I act for the group, or I act for the individual, as the case may be. And therefore the ancients who celebrated by transmitting to God the gifts of the faithful sacrificed on behalf of the faithful. They presented the hosts of that people or of that particular person: by so doing they promoted ipso facto the vows and desires and the prayers of those offerers, inasmuch as they were the (mediate) authors of the sacrifice, and consequently its beneficiaries by a special right, which belonged to no one else, and by which they disposed of the suffrage in keeping with their special title. If no Code existed, then to explain all this to us there were the liturgies to assure us of it. Let anyone read the collects or anaphorae quoted above, as well as the variable parts of the Roman Canon, and it will be impossible for him not to be struck by the fact that the sacrifice was the sacrifice of the offerer: without detriment, of course, to the universal Church and to the priest and to others; but yet in a manner which had nothing in common with anyone else. And that is all that could be necessary sacrifice to operate on his account. we may say so, to his credit. Nothing else is required

The mystery of faith

in order that the sacrifice should operate, just as he pleases, in favour of this or that person dear to him. This question of the special suffrage, at the pleasure of the offerer, is evident in the case of anniversary masses for the dead. But it is also exemplified, as regards the living, by documents like that of the nuptial mass of the Gelasian Sacramentary.^

"Secret: Hear, Lord, our supplications, and in mercy and goodness receive this oblation of thy handmaids (So-and-so), which they offer for thy handmaid (Such-a-Ore), whom thou didst deign to bring to matureness for the day ofher wedding."

"Infra actionem (Hanc igitur): Mercifully receive, O Lord, we beseech thee, this oblation of thy handmaids (So-and-so), which

THEY OFFER THEE FOR THY HANDMAID (Such-a-one) GtC."

What is offered is the sacrifice of certain persons, all women; and it is offered on their part for the person in whom they are interested, who is the bride. Here we have the special suffrage at the disposal of the special offerer; it is expressed in liturgical language; but that is not necessary that the suffrage may be effective. It is enough that it be included in the vows of him who acts through the priest's ministry.

The bond between the ancient offering and the celebration and application of the mass, seems, therefore, settled beyond dispute; and by the very nature of things; without any necessity of super-adding to the mediating function of the mandatory priest a pact of exchange, a contract of hire, an agreement do iitfacias, or any other form of contractual obligation of an onerous character which certainly according to the admission of everyone never existed. But if such is the case with regard to the masses of ancient times, why in our time should we be bothered with all these juridical formalities, without which our forebears succeeded in obtaining exactly the same result as we ourselves have in view in our daily transaction? The only reason for appealing to them is to account for the obligation of strict justice which rests upon the priest after receipt of the stipend, or upon the worshipper

after the mass requested has been said. But as for the priest, the explanation is clear from what has been said thus far; and for the worshipper, it is not difficult to reflect that if he requested a mass, while putting off his offering till later, he is in the situation of the person who has asked a friend to advance a sum of money on his account: he is bound to In other words, every time a priest, by the reimburse. mandate of one of the faithful, consecrates to God gifts that have not yet been entrusted to him, he makes an advance taken from his own goods, and is entitled to be indemnified. It is as if the Jew of old, not having brought a sheep, wished nevertheless to have his sacrifice celebrated with the sheep of the priest, kindly supplied by the latter for the purpose. He, too, falls under an obligation, by the very nature of things, and when making restitution of the sheep, he would not have any reason to flatter himself that he was rewarding the priest, or carrying out a contract do ut facias or facio ut des, or anything of the kind. Since, therefore, all the aspects of the Mass-contract are explained by the old transaction, which, as we are reminded in a rather loud voice, carried with it none of those forms of onerous obligation, correlated to a remuneration, what ground is there for planting in our Mass-contract that modality which the old economy rejected. and then turning round and telling us that we can see for ourselves that the stipend of to-day is not the oblation of old, since the former has recourse to a juridical process which has always been foreign to the latter? Of course, there is a difference: it is of your making; but it is all artificial, because it is based entirely on the supposition, twice false, that the old transaction did not possess the same binding force as the transaction ofto-day, and that the transaction ofto-day owes its binding force to a clause which gives rise to the prestation of an onerous service. There is no truth in either the one or the other assumption. Our present contract is as valid as the old one, and for the same juridical reasons, neither more nor less.

And now, without intending to inflict on any one the disapproval of the Council of Trent, we may be permitted to

place some reliance on that law which makes it a duty for Ordinaries to prohibit concerning masses "every kind of mercenary clauses and compacts" (cujusvis generis mercedum conditiones, pacta . . . prohibeant)l. The holy Council does certainly, not disapprove of the principle of the stipends, universally admitted in the Church and maintained afterwards. What then is intended, if not to forbid (except where there is an extrinsic claim) every onerous pact superadded to, or substituting itself for, the gratuitous agreement assumed by the priest, mandatory and depositary, to dedicate to God the gifts he received for God? Justice is involved in the proceeding, but not in a commercial way. Such is the mind of the Council of Trent: it excludes what would be simoniacal. and allows to subsist what rests on the normal condition of things, and conforms to the divine plan, because it is inherent in the very theology of sacrifices.2 Here we see the perfectly logical consistency of the Church. The Church, always so solicitous (the expression is not strong enough—so obsessed by her anxiety) to do away with all simony, and with every appearance of simony, has yet never (with a few negligible exceptions, such as we have above with much difficulty collected together to the number of three or four3) either

¹ Sess. 22, Deer, de observandis et evitandis in celebratione Missae.

² We must probably explain in the same sense the provincial Councils that came later, whose one purpose was to make the reforms of Trent the general practice among their people. See, for instance, the Council of Malines, 1570: "Pastoribus et quibuscumque sacerdotibus inhibet sancta synodus sub poena suspensionis ne per se velper alium, directe vel indirecte, stipulentur pro missis votivis adpiorum postulationem celebrandis, sed quod eis sponte oblatum fuerit, accipiant" (De decanis, etc., cap. ii. Harduin 10, 1194). See also the Council of Rheims, 1583: "Sacerdotes qui de pretio pasciscuntur ut Missas celebrent . . . habeantur simoniaci"—(Harduin, 10, 301).

³ Cistercians, Evreux, Toledo. The difficulty of escaping from commercialism was aggravated in the Middle Ages by the absence of a diocesan tax, leaving the field open for bargaining. Episcopal authorities have the right to rate authoritatively the cash amount representing the double element required to constitute the offering for the sacrifice—the matter for consecration, and the surplus for the priest's refection. He who gives that much fulfils the function of offerer. To exact more, to stipulate for more (apart from the extrinsic claim) is to practice exactions and drive bargains, which, as they bear on a matter not required to entitle the worshipper to his claim of offerer, can only be interpreted on the priest's part as simoniacal: I put a price on the service I render, I require payment for what you get from me. It is as if the Hebrew priest, to sacrifice my sheep, had required me to make him a present of a lamb into the

by the mouth of her Doctors, or by the voice of her Councils, or by the decrees of her Popes, forbidden the formation of a bond of contractual justice as regards the Mass, by means of a stipend and of the obligation involved in its acceptance. On the contrary, she forbids unconditionally, as reprobated by divine law, every kind of transaction involving a contractual obligation in connection with the administration of a sacrament. To the countless examples gathered together by Thomassin, 1 it may be worth while to add, because of its synthetical character, the following 10th canon of the Council held in Tours by Alexander III in 1163, and which was published by Martene2 as late as 1717. "It has been said that in certain localities, it was customary to give money for the reception of the holy Chrism and even for Baptism and Communion. The holy Council has condemned and anathematized this practice, declaring it a simoniacal heresy. We, therefore, forbid that in future anything should be asked either for Holy Orders, Baptism and Extreme Unction, or for Burial, Communion and Dedication of Churches. But (it

bargain. On the other hand, if of my own accord I bring a sheep with its lamb to be sacrificed together, the priest to whom I deliver them has not the right to pass the sheep to a confrère requiring him to sacrifice it, while retaining the lamb for himself without sacrificing it. Likewise, in the Church, the priest who has received an oblation worth more than the due has not the right to have the sacrifice offered by a substitute to whom he gives the ordinary due, keeping the surplus for himself. Those are matters not of ecclesiastical law, but of divine law, in virtue of the principle that the matter for eucharistic consecration and the priest's emolument constitute an indivisible whole: the latter being but a supplement of the former, or rather the two forming but one single oblation made to God for the provisioning of the altar table, which God intends to make the celebrant's table.

Another, and a rather interesting, consequence of the above doctrine is this: when the priest celebrates without *stipend*, he himself enjoys all the spiritual benefit which otherwise goes to the purveyor of the sacrifice. Thus we can see with what spiritual riches, with what incomparable patrimony, with what infinitely precious income were endowed by their founders those religious congregations that were forbidden to receive stipends.

¹ Vet. et Sov. Eccl. Discipl., par. III, lib. I, c. 49, 9-10, and c. 69-72. Consult

also Ortolan, article Casuel, in D.T.C. col. 1840 sq.

s This. Piot. Anecd. 4, 143; cf. Mansi, 21, 1183. This 10th Canon must not be confounded with canon 6 of the same series of decrees of the same Council; similar to the former as to its object, but less formal in its tenor, it is already contained in the work of Thomassin, and again in that of Ortolan.

is our will) that the gifts of Christ, since they are gratuitous, be dispensed gratuitously. Should any one decide otherwise, let him be anathema." On the other hand, for masses, the Church saw no harm in the payment of a sum of money as a condition for the celebration and application of a mass that was requested. Why this difference in a matter which the Church herself declares to be amenable to the divine law? The difference is obvious: at least it was obvious to the people of that time. In the other sacramental ministries, it is not a question of a gift going through the hands of the priest into those of God, who will afterwards give it back to the priest. The Christian receives from God, and that is all. In sacrifice we give to God. Consequently in one case there is no legitimate ground for the formation of a bond in commutative justice, whereas in the other the gift entrusted to the priest in order to be transmitted to God is, like any other deposit, the subject-matter of a contractual obligation, which affects in no way the absolute gratuitousnéss of the mandate. Here again no one has expressed himself better than Thomassin, in the following incidental remark occurring in the 49th chapter (n. 11) of book I: "If now we come to the unbloody sacrifice, it never entered the mind of anyonel to charge with simony the oblations offered spontaneously by those for whom the heavenly Host is immolated. . . . No need of looking far for this difference. It is the very voice of nature and the urgent duty of religion that oblige the faithful to offer to the priests what the priests must offer for them to God, either unto remission of sins, or in thanksgiving, or for the purpose of obtaining new favours. For this reason the other sacraments must not be dispensed for remuneration, since they are graces and cannot be valued at any price. But what is presented as a sacrificial gift to God by the hands of the priest must first be offered to the priest by the people. For the people themselves truly offer to God, and likewise every person among the faithful offers on his own account, though

he does so by the priest." Here we have the whole teaching summed up in a few words. It is also an answer to those who show surprise at this doctrine as if it were a novelty. It is not so novel after all, since it is already found in Thomassin, the most erudite, and at the same time the most intelligent of the theologians who sprang up in ancient France after Petau. After Thomassin, the same teaching was exposed ex professo by Berlendi, in his great work on Oblations,2 of which it has been said—and in one sense it is true—that it "was all that could be desired". Here are the essential elements of his thesis, as stated in the opening pages of the book. The oblations intended for the altar, the Christian counterpart of the oblations which the Jews made for their sacrifices, were at first collective among us, and afterwards became individual. They were at first gifts in kind, they became later monetary.4 But throughout all these changes, the same rite of oblation continues under different modes {quod equidem nil aliud nisi ejusdem antiqui ritus, licet sub dioerso modo usitati, continuatio fuit). Therefore, there is no break of continuity; no gap between the present and the past; no

^{1 &}quot;Jam si ad incruentum progrediamur sacrificium, nemini unquam in mentem venit simoniae infamiam aspergere iis oblationibus quas sponte offerunt ii pro quibus caelestis Hostia immolatur. . . Prompta est autem et obvia hujus discriminis ratio; quod voce ipsa naturae et lege religionis coganturfideles offere sacerdotibus quod pro ipsis offeratur Deo, vel ad eluenda delicta, vel gratiis referendis, vel novis beneficiis exorandis. Itaque sacramenta quidem alia nullo pretio dispensanda sunt, cum gratiae eae sint, nec ullo possint pretio aestimari. At offerenda hostia Deo a sacerdote pro populo prius a populo ipsi offerenda est sacerdoti. Offert enim Deo ipse populus, et pro seipsofidelis quisque, sedper sacerdotem." (Vet. et Nov. Eccl. Discipl., i, 4g, it.)

^{*} De oblationibus ad altare communibus et peculiaribus, hoc est Missae Stipendii integra secundum aetates expositio, Venice 1743.

^{3 &}quot;In qua (dissertatione) hoc argumentum erudite versat, ita ut nihil desiderari possit." (Hurter, Nomenclator). Nothing could be better deserved than this praise as regards the habitual correctness of the author's views. But from every other point of view it would be an exaggeration to say that nothing more could be desired. Some order could be desired in a very tangle of confusion. Greater clearness could be wished for in the analyses, and this in turn would have contributed to greater firmness and consistency. Erudition itself would have gained by discarding irrelevant matter, while drawing further profit (as could easily be done) from a quantity of valuable materials. It is nevertheless true that it is the best which the past has left us.

^{&#}x27;This agrees substantially with Mabillon (Acta SS.O.S.B., saecul. HI, pars I, praef., n. 62): "Oblationi panis et vini a laicis antiquitus fieri solitae successit eleemosyna pecuniaria presbytero/acta, quam stipendium vocant."

bursting forth (if we may be allowed the expression) of a new comprehension of the relations between the gift and the mass.! Nothing could be more correct than this view of history.

But before Berlendi and before Thomassin,2 we may Jay claim to a still more venerable authority, that of Blessed Robert Bellarmine, who, enumerating the various ways in which the Church, that is to say the faithful people, offers through the intervention of the priest, expresses himself thus: "The Church, properly speaking, does not sacrifice by exercising a sacerdotal act; she merely offers to the priest what is intended for the sacrifice, or else she endeavours to have the Sacrifice celebrated, or she acquiesces in it, by offering in heart and desire, while the priest is offering." 3 We have here three modes of the people's intervention, as regards the actual4 oblation of the Sacrifice. On the lowest

¹ De oblationibus, pp. 1-4; cf. 476.

² Between the two, it is certainly worth while to mention Van Esfien either in his Jus Ecclesiasticum Universum, or in his dissertation De Simonia circa Beneficia. In the first work quoted (J. E. U. pars. 2, tit. 5, n. 20) we read: "Hoc quoque indubitatum est, hodiernum missarum stipendium esse considerandum ut voluntariae cujusdam oblationis speciem, in locum oblationis in missa primitus fieri solitae surrogatam. Instruendus ergo est populus ne honorarium illud habeat tanquam pretium sacrificii, sed ut voluntariam oblationem, qua Deum tanquam rerum temporalium auctorem recognoscens, una cum sacerdote sacrificium offere, et ipsius sacrificii ac signanter precum quae pro offerentibus funduntur particeps esse mereatur." In the second work (D.S.C.B.,/wrj. 1, c. 6, 4) the thought is the same: "Oblationum usum inter Missarum solemnia a temporibus apostolicis ad nostra usque tempora continuata serie devolutum ostendimus; at id una observatum oblationum materiam, quae primitus in pane et vino praecipue consistebat, posterioribus saeculis ___ in denarios mutatum fuisse." — It is clear that what the same author writes further on in §4 of Chapter 7, on the relation of the stipend to the "labour and service and ministry" of the priest, of which the stipend is said to be the "remuneration" (merces), must be understood, as after all the immediate context shows, in keeping with the general doctrine. All that Van Espen has in view in this passage, is to exclude the notion, dear to some, that there might exist sources of ecclesiastical revenues (benefices or oblations) on which a priest would have the right to make his living without doing anything whatever, or without rendering himself useful to the Christian community. Recall the passage, very formal and even extreme, of Van Espen, and quoted in the first part of this treatise, wherein he assails every idea of remunerating the celebrant.

^{2&}quot; Ex quo etiam sequitur ut Ecclesia rum proprie sacrificet exercendo actum sacerdotalem, sed tantum offerat sacridoti rem sacrificandam, aut curet fieri sacrificium, aut certe consentiat in sacrificium, et voluntate ac desiderio offerat, cum sacerdos offert"—(De Missa, 2, c. 4).

⁴ There is also the merely habitual oblation of which Bellarmine speaks a little further: "Aliqui solum habitualiter offerunt, qui nimirum absunt, neque de sacrificio cogitant, sed tamen habitualiter cupiunt offerri." It is the whole body of the faithful in the entire world that enters into this category—(M.F., 324 and 327 sq.).

level are those who only assist at it. Above them are those who strive to promote the celebration of masses (for instance by founding a chaplaincy for the religious service of a locality). Finally, in the first rank are those whom we might call, if we were bold enough, the purveyors of the Sacrifice, whose contribution consists in the Host itself, rem sacrificandam; those whom we have called the providers of the altar, recalling the faithful of the Old Law. And then Bellarmine goes on to remark that we have here different ways of offering, different claims of offerers: "Note," he says, "that the whole Church offers all the sacrifices offered by all the priests, but not in the same manner." 1 At all events, it is certain that to offer by mere ratification or consent cannot have quite the same meaning as to offer by setting the sacrificial table and defraying But above and beyond these authorities, high as they are, there is that of St. Thomas, still more explicit and synthetical. In the admirable article 2 of question 86 in Secunda Secundae, he explains ex professo why the oblations come back to the priests (oblations in kind or oblations in money, it matters little, as is clear from art. 3). "The priest," he says, "is in a certain manner mediator and interpreter (sequester et medius) between the people and God. And for this reason . . . the things that are the people's (ea quae sunt populi), namely prayers. sacrifices, oblations, must be presented to God by their intermediary, according to the saying of the Apostle (Hebr. v): Every high priest taken from among men is ordained for men, in the things that appertain to God, that he may offer up gifts and sacrifices for sins. Consequently the oblations which the people present to god {oblationes quae a populo Deo exhibentur} belong

1 In this passage, besides the formal and immediate oblation of the priest, and the mediate and habitual oblation of the Church, Bellarmine distinguishes the mediate and actual oblation of those who are present and the mediate (and actual, but also causai.) oblation of those who intervene "by exhortation, prayer or command" (rive hortando, rive rogando, rive jubendo). This causality remains undetermined here; but evidently it must be distinguished, according as it bears, as above, on the matter of the sacrifice, in which case it involves a mandate (jubendo), or as it exclusively affects the action and the will of the priest, by creating an obligation to celebrate, without duty of applying (as in the above case of the founding of a chaplaincy). This again is a command (jubendo), but without mandate. As for prayer and exhortation, it is a very vague causality.

to the priests, not only that the priests may turn them to their own use, but also that they may dispense them with fidelity, spending them partly in what relates to divine worship, partly in what concerns their own sustenance, because they who serve the altar partake with the altar, as we read in I Corinthians, partly for the benefit of the poor, who, as much as can be done, must be supported from the goods of the Church." It may have been noticed that these oblations are given, according to St. Thomas, not to the priests, but to God, by the hands of the priest. This does not prevent them from reverting to the priests, since God has made them partakers of his altar. Will it be said that there is then a simple metaphor, a figure of speech to which St. Thomas attaches after all no importance? Let us investigate a little. The first objection against the thesis (videtur quod non) was this: among oblations the first rank is held by the hosts of the sacrifice; now, in Scripture, the alms given to the poor are called host: therefore, it is to the poor, and not to the priests, that above all others, the oblations must revert. What is the answer? It consists in a distinction: a distinction between sacrifice improperly so called and sacrifices properly so called. Alms given for the love of God may, in some sense, be called a sacrifice, because charity shown to a person out of regard for another is also directed to that other person; and so the gift made to the poor is looked upon as made to God. But, after all, it is really not made to God in person, but only to God's wards. For this reason this sacrifice is called so improperly. A sacrifice properly so called is truly a gift made to God himself, and not to others, out of regard for God. "Ea quae pauperibus dantur sicut non proprie sunt sacrificia, dicuntur tamen sacrificia in quantum eis dantur propter Deum, ita etiam secundum eamdem rationem oblationes dici possunt; n o n PROPRIE, QUIA NON IMMEDIATE1 DEO OFFERUNTUR." This

¹ Compare this with what William of Paris (De Legibus, c. 28) wrote: "Sacrificium est munus Deo immediate oblatum, propitiationis ejus impeiratorium. Immediate dicimus, propter eleemosynas, quae, etsi interdum oblationes Dei factae, sacrificium Dei, interdum inveniantur, improprie tamen sacrificia sunt."

much is clear: and now comes the second member, concerning the oblations properly so called (evidently, according to what has been specified, those that are made to God directly, i.e. to God himself, and not to a third party out of regard for God), they, too, no doubt, as was explained in the body of the article, 1 may be devoted to the relief of the poor: but will it be done in virtue of a concession made by the faithful? By no means, since the faithful did not give to the poor, but to God. It will, then, be a concession made by God? Yes and no. Yes, in the sense that if the gift goes to the poor it must needs come down again from God, since God was its first recipient. No, in the sense that from God to the poor the communication is not immediate but mediate, passing first by the priests. Therefore, St. Thomas pursues: "Oblationes vero proprie dictae in usum pauperum cedunt non per dispensationem offerentium, sed per dispensationem sacerdotum." thus for St. Thomas the point is settled, that the oblations, the true ones, although addressed to God, and coming back to the poor, must nevertheless, in the interval, come into the possession of the priests.

How many things of value in this passage! We find in it the truly divine destination of the gifts offered by the people, for the purpose of sacrifice; their return to the priest, who draws from them his sustenance; and their eventual extension to the poor, who are by right divine committed to the care of the Church. A whole theology is set before us, and how amply sufficient to justify the rigour of the obligation in justice in the matter of masses, the directing initiative of the suffrage on the part of the faithful, and finally the claim and meaning of that famous stipendium sustentationis (which comes up again in article 2 of question too). Yes, the customary offering for the Mass (whether it be monetary or otherwise), although involving a contract in justice between mandator and mandatory, depositor and depositary, is nevertheless not received by the priest as a salary, but only as a means of sustenance, precisely because it does not intervene as a counter-

1 See above.

prestation in return for a prestation, or vice versa, but simply as an oblation made to God, as a gift which the official minister, the consecrated mediator is charged with rendering acceptable: it intervenes as the intended sacrifice which by the sacramental operation of the priest will be transformed into the effective, true and perfect sacrifice, which is the Body and Blood of Jesus Christ. Out of these goods, which are divine property, the priest draws his sustenance: and so these same goods, from having been divine, by their assignment become clerical, ecclesiastical. They are the priest's property, the priest's emolument, the priest's stipend, not for the purpose of enriching him, as the theologians and canonists of the past warn us, but of supporting him.2 That done, what remains, what would only be the superfluity of a decent living, must be poured into the lap of the poor. We are assuredly far away from the current theories on the mass-offerings; far, too, perhaps, from the radical assimilation to patrimonial possessions3 which a number of modern writers have brought into

1 When the ancients insistently tell us that the priest received that emolument as a stipendium and not as a salary, they did not mean to say that being a stipendium it could lawfully be taken as a salary: as if to justify the salary it were enough that it be a stipendium. They meant to say: The priest may with a safe conscience stipulate the payment of this farthing of the sacrifice, because, even then, he will not at all receive it as a salary, but only as a stipendium. And the reason why, even though the matter is one of commutative justice, this fee is but a stipendium and not a salary is exactly the one which we have just heard from St. Thomas. In fact there is no room for the notion of a salary, when the temporal advantage has not played the part of a compensation passing from man to man, but of an offering going from man to God, no matter what may befall it afterwards, when once converted for the support of the priest (stipendium) after having first been in possession of God {oblatio, sacrificium}.

2 "Stipendium suae sustentationis" (St. Thomas, [Ston. Theol. П-П, q. too, a. 2 ad 2 "Stipendium necessitatis" {loc. cit. in corp.).

3 We do not pretend that a comparison with patrimonial goods may not be defended within some reasonable limits, keeping in mind the principle laid down by St. Thomas [Sum. Theol. II-II, q. 187, a. 6). Moreover, we must admit that, at the present time, disagreement on this point could hardly be anything else than theoretical, at least in most countries. For it may be stated that the majority of the clergy, in most countries, far from drawing from their sources of ecclesiastical income more than is necessary, obtain barely what is indispensable for a living which does not even attain the common requirements of decency, such as befits the rank and condition of the priesthood. The attempt to have the mass-stipend classified among ecclesiastical revenues would be, as far as most priests are concerned, an amendment without importance from a juridical standpoint: a mere question of nomenclature; since every saving made on those necessaries would be the result of thrift, bona parsimonialia.

credit, but which may well some day, should the lawmaker see fit, share the fate which Canon 1410 of the Code of Canon Law, inflicted on the "jura stolae within the limits of the diocesan due and legitimate custom", as also on "the voluntary and fixed offerings of the faithful, accruing to the holder of a benefice." It is quite certain that this modern conception was unknown to antiquity, just as it is still repugnant to the Christian instinct of many of the faithful.8

The old conception has three great advantages. It has the advantage of upholding the dignity of the priest, by making of him not the stipendiary of the faithful, but of God. It has the advantage of enhancing the rôle of the faithful, by restoring them to their native condition of a holy, sacerdotal race, qualified by their baptism to offer to God gifts and sacrifices, which are to be consecrated by the ministry of the priest invested with the priesthood of Jesus Christ. It has the advantage of dignifying that money transaction of the masses, which otherwise runs the risk of giving occasion to the shocking language, so unworthy of the sacrifice of the altar, and not infrequently heard in our days: "What is the price of your masses? I have come to pay for masses." Indeed the Blood of Jesus Christ is not to be had for a price: no money is paid for the libation of the eucharistic Chalice; no payment is made for the great ransom of the world and the cost of our salvation. All we claim to do is to offer him up in the sacramental covering which the power from on high and the word of the priest produce for him out of the proceeds of our oblation. Thus there is honour and reverence for the Blood of Christ, honour and respect for the faithful, honour and respect for the priest. There is nowhere indignity,

1 How legislation in the past regulated the division of these goods, see in the Decree of Gratian, part 2, cause 12, q. 2., c. 26-31. Cf. Dotn L. Bauduin, op. cit.

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* It is vigorously attacked, and justly so, by Van Espen, in the two works already quoted Jus Ecclesiasticum Universum, pars II tit. v, c. 6. n. 2, under the heading: "Honoraria (missarum) habenda sunt ut alia bona ecclesiastica", and, De Simonia circa Beneficia, pars I, c. vii, §4.) against his fellow-countryman and predecessor in the chair of Canon Law at Louvain, André Delvaux, O.S.B. (Vallensis, seventeenth century) and under the patronage of a professor of Douai, Boetius Epo (sixteenth century), author of a treatise De Jure Sacro.

nowhere humiliation, nowhere debasement: it is the last theological utterance, and it is the seal of divine institution, upon the Mass-offering.

As regards certain terms and locutions in connection with requests for masses, we can hardly pretend to reform current usage—quern penes arbitrium est et jus et norma loquendi! However, we take the liberty to observe that certain expressions, borrowed from business transactions differing entirely in character from the gratuitous mandate, and implying remuneration for service rendered, should be modified in order to become acceptable, or else avoided altogether if substantially incorrect. The Code may help in this matter. It speaks of alms or of stipend. The old word of the ancient legislation, oblationes, may yet be read on the walls of certain churches, in the posters dating from the last century, which give public notice of the rates of offerings or oblations, fixed by the bishops. That old word, which the theological language, of the past on the topic of sacrifice has consecrated, as in every other matter (and more even than in any other), that word at once so expressive and dignified, seems to be by far the tnost suitable and the most correct. Rather than speak of the price of a mass, or of payments for masses, let us say, if we have in the least a mind to do so, offerings for masses. Nothing hinders us from doing so; and we have a right to judge that not a few reasons invite us to now do so.

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Lately my attention was called, or rather recalled to an interesting article of M. E. Leroux, which appeared in the Revue Ecclésiastique de Liège, November 1925 (pp. 133-140)> under the heading A new conception of the "Stipendium Missae." It is dedicated to me, in the sense that it refers to a conception which I have exposed and defended in two articles of the Gregorianum (September and December 1923), both of which have since become part of a small volume entitled Esquisse du Mystère de la Foi, suivie de quelques éclaircissements (p. 111-251). I cannot admit that the conception is "new"; but apart from this I cannot find fault with the manner in which, like a fair opponent, M. Leroux has succeeded in reproducing my view for his readers before discussing it.

Its essential points are the following: A Christian wishes to offer sacrifice to God, as it has ever been possible for every man of every religion to do. There exists now but one sacrifice, the sacrifice of the Body and Blood of Jesus Christ. But it is our sacrifice only by means of the earthly covering with which the bread and wine, human gifts, clothe him, and which the priest, agent of the sacrifice, changes into the Bread of heaven, and the Chalice of salvation, the price and ransom of our redemption: so that, if on the one hand the starting point, as in the days of Melchisedech, is in keeping with our means and our resources, on the other hand the point of arrival of the consecration, of the sacrifiring action, of the liturgical oblation, thanks to Christ, the sovereign Priest acting through his ministers here below, is yet of a wholly divine condition and of divine value.

Again, the minister of the altar is authorized by God to participate with the altar, where he has a right to find his subsistence. The sacrifice which I offer to God must suffice. therefore, for the sustenance of the priest. It follows that my contribution will not be adequate to do duty as an offering, as it is my purpose that it should, unless it satisfies the above condition. I remit, therefore, to the priest the amount required (gifts in kind or their monetary equivalent), which is entirely sufficient. He celebrates, and takes for himself what remains of my offering after the liturgical celebration. What has taken place? That has taken place, which, under different conditions, was the regular custom in the sacrifices of the Old Law. The gift, after providing for the altar table, passes to the priest's table. The priest is endowed by God with the appurtenances of the sanctuary. In relation to me he fulfilled a mandate, in his capacity of public official. I did not pay him for the carrying out of the mandate, even though it turned to his advantage. But after consigning into his hands the amount of the symbolical tribute which I dedicated to the Divine Majesty, I had a right that he should make it arrive at its destination. It was on his part a duty of contractual justice ratione rei detentae. We have, then, on the one hand the absolute gratuitousness of his ministry, on the other a strict obligation of contractual justice. It is all that is needed to secure for the Mass-contract the highest juridical force and at the same time to free it from every blot of simony.

This view is as old as the Church; it is unique through the whole of the early Middle Ages; it is incorporated in the liturgy; it has been taught, even during the last centuries, by most prominent masters, although, to tell the truth, it remained unknown to the greater number of their contemporaries who were, perhaps, less historians than men skilled in the subtleties of abstract disputations. Without any simony, or appearance of simony, I secure for myself by a contract in justice, but a contract that is gratuitous and not onerous, a spiritual benefit by means of a pecuniary dis-

bursement. The mass bears fruit on my behalf and for my intentions (for instance the cure of my brother) for this one reason, that I am its offerer in virtue of my material con-It does not cease bearing fruit also on behalf and for the intentions of the whole Church, the whole of which is offerer by reason of its claim on the Body and Blood ofJesus Christ, the undivided property of the Church. But this general fruit does not abolish my own "special fruit," any more than a common right excludes a particular one, when they are exercised in two orders of different considerations. This contract refers therefore to the application, and not merely to the celebration of the mass; it is a monetary contract, and yet it is absolutely moral; it is even essentially pious, since it deals only with elements borrowed directly from the religion of sacrifices. It is consequently a contract worthy of the sanction of the Church and of the full protection of the jurist, a protection which has not been wanting, and which moreover extends itself to a number of other transactions regulated by the natural Law.

The opposition of M. Leroux to this view takes two forms. Convinced, no doubt, that you do not destroy but what you replace, he first presents his own theory, and then raises against ours a series of adverse reasons.

Let us first hear his theory. He believes that the origin of the mutual obligation between priest and faithful, in relation to the application of the mass and the corresponding stipend, is not properly contractual, but must be sought in the combination of the two following elements: first, a duty of justice obliging the faithful to support their priests in general; second, an ecclesiastical law defining the fulfilment of that duty by means of the mass-offering to be paid into the hands of the priest. This latter in turn is bound by the same law to let the faithful get the benefit of the application of the mass, gratuitously of course.! "Such is," writes M. Leroux,

1 Lac. cit. p. 134.-136. Briefly: "The application of the fruits of the mass is not, properly speaking, the cause of the donation of the stipends. It is only the occasion. The true cause is the obligation of justice under which the faithful are to provide for the sustenance of the priest; it is a general obligation anterior to

"the explanation of the *stipendia missarum* most generally accepted by theologians and canonists" (p. 136). In support of this contention, he quotes Suarez, Lugo, the Salmanticenses, Cardinal Gasparri, and one of my most eminent and venerable colleagues of the Gregorian University, whose opinion, however, I suspect M. Leroux of not having rendered quite faithfully, either by exceeding it or by falling short of it, as the reader may see for himself in what follows.

Since Suarez heads the list, let us first examine Suarez. The truth is that Suarez (De sacram, I, disp. 86, sect. 1, n, 1, and De Simonia, c. 46, n. 10), and likewise Fr. Vermeersch (Theologia Moralis, 2, 280), when treating of the application of the mass to be stipulated with a priest to whom i am not bound by any particular obligation (which is not only the current practice, but is the typical case, reducing the elements of the debate to their mere essence), stand both of them for the necessity of a contract do ut facias. Only they maintain (Suarez, De Simonia, 46, 10, and Vermeersch, op. cit. n. 279) that this contract has not for effect to beget an obligation ofjustice, strictly so called, between the priest and the faithful respectively. The obligation, they say, is anterior to the contract, which merely explains and declares what it is: " Per pactum non additur nova obligatio, sed explicatur et declaratur quod inest "-(Suar, and Verm., loc. cit.).

Thereupon a question springs up at once. Was I (some layman or other) or was I not bound in justice before any contract whatever, to give any sum of money whatever, to this priest whoever he may be, with whom it has pleased me to come to a monetary understanding in relation to a given number of masses? No, evidently. Have I any such obliga-

every compact, but one whose fulfilment is determined by the ecclesiastical legislator and partly dependent on present conditions. Likewise the duty of justice incumbent on the priest, of applying the fruit of the sacrifice to the donor or to the person designated by him, does not properly have its origin in the acceptance of the stipend, but in the will of the Church, enjoining upon her ministers to perform the sacred function for the benefit of the donors" (p. 135). To which applies (ibid.) the recommendation of the Lord: "Give freely." Apart from the word stipend, all the italics are ours in this quotation, as also, unless stated otherwise, the emphasized words in all citations which we shall make.

tion now? Yes. Whence this difference, if not from the new fact, which is the contract? Therefore, the obligation of justice which rests upon me now results formally from the contract, not a gratuitous one, but, according to you, one burdened with a charge, the one which you have introduced, do ut facias. This is so true that we can call in as a witness Suarez himself. When he wrote the words quoted above, or again the following: "Pactum non auget intensive {ut sic dicam) hanc {antecedentem} obligationem" {De Simonia, 46, 4), he must assuredly have somewhat lost sight of what nevertheless he had himself so forcibly inculcated on another occasion when he treated, not as here of simony in general ("hic vero generalius"), but ex professo of the Mass-offerings ("in particulari de stipendiis missarum"). I mean in the study on the stipends as we find it in his treatise on the Eucharist. Here is what he wrote then {De sacram., I, disp. 86, sect. 1, n. 4): "Negare non possumus quin in hoc negotio aliquod pactum interveniat inter dantem stipendium et sacerdotem: nam ille dat, ut hic faciat; hic vero facit quia recepit, seu ut recipiat stipendium. . . . Et ita docent, etc. . . . et ita patet ex dictis : nam sine hujus modi pacto, quod intercedat inter sacrificantem et stipendia dantem, nulla ratione intelligi posset quo pacto oriatur aut oriri possit obligatio ex iustitia."

It seems to me that this passage is emphatic enough; it also throws light on the statement he had made previously {ibid., n. i.): "Intervenit ergo ibi vera ratio justitiae, fundata in mutuo consensu utriusque oneroso, qui explicatur illis verbis, do ut facias."

It is impossible to account for the appearance of a bond of justice between the celebrant and the faithful as regards the application of the mass otherwise than by the force characteristic of a contract, and according to Suarez, of a strict contract (do utfacias'). Of an ecclesiastical law it is a question only under number 71 for the purpose of excluding it implicitly from every share in the making up of the bond of justice relative to the application of the special fruit of the mass.

¹ It is a question of determining which fruit of the mass the priest, who has received the stipend, must renounce in favour of the faithful.

This bond, in the opinion of Suarez, arises immediately from the contract. And he proves it by an argument of common sense, which, as regards the contractual origin of the obligation, if not the onerous modality of the contract, is simply irrefutable. I may very well (he says under number 5) support a priest through charity or from a motive of religion, without thereby creating any obligation on his part! (either of the natural law or of the positive law) as to the application of his masses. Inversely, a priest might very well celebrate let us say at least by way of suffrage—for my intention, and let me know about it, without this fact putting me under any obligation of justice towards his maintenance? it may even be done in answer to a desire expressed by me, but without my assuming any obligation, either explicitly or implicitly: and the case will remain the same): "Ut ergo utriusque oriatur obligatio ex justitia, necessarium est pactum, saltem implicitum." (Implicit: that is to say, it is not necessary that any formulas drawn up in juridical style should have been used; something quite foreign to ordinary usage in this matter). This is very true and self-evident, provided the conclusion is limited to the necessity of a contract, and in no wise extends to the necessity of an onerous contract.2

Answer: primo, not merely a part of the common fruit of the mass, because that goes in common to everybody and, reduced to that, the obligation would not resultfrom the stipend, but would be the effect of a general law of the Church ("non est satis ut pro eo generaliter offerat, quia hoc commune est omnibus; unde haec obligatio non oritur ex stipendio, sed potius ex communi lege Ecclesiae"). Secundo, not the personal fruit of the celebrant, for various reasons, one of which is that that fruit may happen to be null (if the priest should celebrate in the state of mortal sin), and yet even then the obligation towards the faithful is satisfied. Tertio: "ergo saltem tenetur applicare huncfructum, quem vocare possumus ministerialem. Item, quia hac ratione censetur speciali modo operari ut minister alterius." Let some attention be paid to these last words. They also have a value of their own.

^{1 &}quot;Sacerdos in hujusmodi casu non obligatur ad sacrificium offerendum pro illo (ipsum sustentante)." He may at his will dispose of his Mass intentions in favour of a third party for a stipend, and the first party will have no counterclaim: "Immo sine omni injustitia potest ab aliojustum missae stipendium accipere, utpro illo sacrificium offerat."

^{2 &}quot;Quamvis sacerdos offerat sacrificium pro me, mihique idipsum evidenter constet, non propterea tenebor ex justitia illi stipendium dare, quia ___ ex sua liberali voluntate id facit."

Suarez concludes in favour of an *onerous* contract: it is here that his conclusion, to my mind, outruns his premises. If later on he speaks, and he does so quite incidentally (n. 6), of the application of the mass as entirely *gratuitous*, lit is the result of one of those inconsistencies into which they cannot fail to fall, some time or another, who seek the explanation of the Mass-contract elsewhere than in the theology of the sacrifices.

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Let it be clearly understood that the question is not whether a law of the Church may impose a fee on the occasion of a priestly ministry, and thus give rise to a claim in justice, on the part of the minister of the Church, a jus quaesitum to emoluments. This point is not under discussion. But this is precisely what comes about without the need of a pact, of a You get married: perhaps you were contractual purpose. not aware that there was a fee to be paid on the occasion of the wedding; you are none the less affected by the law, if law there be; and the claims are not the less firmly held by the various parties concerned. You receive a bishopric, or you are promoted to the purple: if you did not know that there were certain charges, you will learn it ere long; but it is assuredly not a contract that has subjected you to these obligations, since there was on your part no contractual intention at all.2 The obligation holds without contract.

'Better still: formerly you had to pay fees for expediting a sentence of excommunication, or of suspension. All the same you were not, under the circumstances, making a contract, either explicit or implicit; and yet, in virtue of the law, a

^{* &}quot; Quamvis ergo homo ex se gratis ministret, tamen ratio justitiae postulat ut ab eo alatur, cui ministrando servit." (ibid., η. 6.) Here, to safeguard the gratuitousness, we are told that the stipend "datur . . . solum ob sustentationem . . . naturali lege ministris debitam." But only a while ago (a. 5) we were told that, without a pact ("ex mutuo consensu et ex mutua promissione, sub conditione onerosa, utrinque etiam acceptata, in quo ratio pacti et conventionis consistit") there could be no obligation of justice in the matter, neither on the part of the priest, nor on the part of the faithful. This debitum, this character of a debt strictly enforceable, inherent in the Mass-stipend, does not, therefore, come to it by reason of a natural law, which would have force already without a contract (as before any contract parents are bound to defray the expenses of their children's education); but if it does come to it from the natural law, it is in as much as the natural law universally prescribes the observation of contracts. Besides at the beginning of the same passage Suarez called timely attention to the following: ** Semper in Ecclesia licuit stipendium dare ministris sacrificiorum ad eorum sustentationem; in ratione autem stipendii intrinsece includitur pactio aliqua, sicut intrinsece ex illo oritur obligatio justitiae; et ideo mercedi operarii . . . merito comparatur."

In the matter of the special fruit of the Mass, on the contrary, as Suarez saw very well, nothing holds without a contract. With the contract, and by the contract, everything holds. There is no reason why a law of the Church may not also come in, to sanction by positive ordinances the inherent efficacy of the contract: but such an action presupposes the contract, and does not constitute it. Historically the contract has preceded any law.

And thus it is seen that there is no need of looking for a solution of the problem of Mass-offerings that will also apply to the fees collected on occasions of certain acts of the spiritual ministry. They are two entirely different classes of things. One depends on the sacredness of contracts, the other on the authority of the law (making that a matter of justice which otherwise could only be the exercise of a virtue of a less austere character, such as religion, or a sort of filial piety towards the ministers of the Gospel, or, on the part of the priests, their pastoral charity towards the faithful, gratitude, etc.). Both ways lead to obligations of justice, of strict justice, too, but of contractual justice in one case, and not in the other. But even in this second case itself, to make something which is a matter of justice, merely by virtue of the law, the object of a formal pact, would be formally simoniacal, St. Thomas tells us; * no doubt because the only contract that could be imagined in that case would be an *onerous* contract, which could not be but simoniacal.?

Let no one, therefore, flatter himself that he can exorcise simony by the mere evoking of the *stipendium sustentationis*.

tax was to be paid to the apostolic chancery, or some episcopal chancery, on the occasion of an exercise, hardly gracious, of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. This tax, moreover, was not a fine in any form or shape; it belonged to the same category, and figured on the same lists, as the fees for the absolution from a censure or for a dispensation for marriage.

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^{1 &}quot;Si autem hujusmodi (erogationes quibus pro officio mortuorum vel processionibus temporalia dantur . . . quasi sustentationis stipendium) pacto interveniente fiant, aut etiam cum intentione emptionis vel venditionis, simoniacum esset " (Sum. Theol. П-П, q. too, a. 3, ad 2).

^{* &}quot;Nomine emptionis et venditionis intelligitur omnis contractus non gratuitus". (Sum Theol. II-II, q. too, a. 1, ad 5.) Compare this with article 728 of the Code: "Cum de simonia agitur, emptio-venditio, permutatio, etc. late accipiendae sunt."

Everybody admits the *stipendium sustentationis*. But the question is to know precisely by what process it can fall due in justice.

If it is by way of an onerous contract, its character of stinendium sustentationis (allowance for sustenance) will not avert simony. If it is by way of a gratuitous contract, well and good. I see a gratuitous contract in agreement with the whole of tradition, in the economy distinctive of the sacrifices: and for that reason they hold a place by themselves. Apart from the sacrifices (with their offerings either manual or founded), I see no other possible contractual bond between the concession of a spiritual fruit and the bestowal of a temporal benefit (even if it were an allowance for sustenance) except by means of one or other of those onerous contracts, which, by definition, do not respect the gratuitousness of the supernatural. Once more, if the contract do ut facias, or any other similar compact, could be licit, it would follow. clear as day, that every form of simony could easily be eluded, provided the monetary understanding in matters of indulgence or benefices, or spiritual favours, took care not to aim at a salary, nor even a fee, but at a stipendium sustentationis, which after all may be generous (pingue), according to the character, and let us say the appetite, of the person of whose sustenance it is question. What, for instance, prevented Simon the Magician from offering his gold to St. Peter as a pingue stipendium sustentationis? He simply did not know how to set about it-

11 cannot admit that the distinction between fee and salary marks off the gratuitous contract from the onerous one. The fees of my physician or of my lawyer are not salaries, because they remunerate a kind of services which do not make him who renders them the inferior of him who receives them, whereas the opposite is the case with my footman or my workman. I give orders to my workman and to my footman; I do not give orders to my lawyer or to my physician. It is a difference between servile professions and liberal professions. But liberal here does not mean gratuitous. My physician may attend me gratuitously: but it is only when he does not charge a fee. The same is true of my lawyer. From what has been said it may txf understood why it would be hard for me to endorse the following words of a master who yet enjoys the very highest authority: "Falso supponit (Laymann) pecuniam non posse dari nisi vel gratuito cel tanquam pretium, et site medio tollit titulum sustentationis, qui, a principibus theologiae appellatus, etiam in cicilisocietate non ignoratur, ut probat ipsa distinctio linguis culgaribus usitata inter occes honorarii et salarii."—(P. Vermeersch, op. cit. n. 281.)

Let us sum up. There is a world's difference between the stipendia missarum and the fees collected on the occasion of certain acts of the spiritual ministry (Code, can. 1507, §1). The latter cannot proceed from a contract, because an onerous contract would be required, that would ipso facto be simon-The former on the contrary have a contract for their basis, but a contract that is essentially gratuitous. It is a contract required by the very nature of the gifts, which the faithful transmit through the hands of the priest, to be by him dedicated to God, who, when the transfer has been made, graciously admits his minister to a share of the perquisites acquired by the altar. On this condition, and on it alone, have we truly a right to say what Suarez says: the obligation of the priest as regards the application of the mass "results from the (material) thing that has been accepted" and kept:

"Obligatio enim caritatis oritur tantum ex necessitate alterius, non ex re recepta; haec autem obligatio [sacerdotis respectu missae applicandae-\ oritur ex re accepta: unde per se convenit, etiam omni seclusa speciali necessitate (spirituali proximi). Neque enim est obligatio orta ex religione tantum: non enim fundatur in promissione Deo facta, neque ad Deum immediate ordinatur, sed ad hominem (stipendii erogatorem), cui jit injuria, si non impleatur; et ideo ad restitutionem obligat; est ergo obligatio ex justitia, quae, in hujusmodi rebus vel actionibus, sine pacto nequit intelligi. Non est ergo in hoc pacto intrinseca malitia"—(De Sacram, I, disp. 86, sect. i. n. 5).

No, there is nothing wrong in this pact, if it is such as we have described: a pact in justice, but a gratuitous pact, a pact intrinsic to the mandate of the sacrifice together with the consignment of the matter of the sacrifice. It is from this matter thus received for the purpose of being transmitted that the obligation in justice results, tanquam "ex re accepta", without this dependency "ex re accepta" involving in the obligation thus contracted even a shadow of simony.

Nothing like it, however, is met with apart from the single case of sacrifice; nothing like it, I say, in the other spiritual

prestations. It is also worth while to point out that the Code does not favour a pure and simple juridical identification of the two subjects. If the Mass-offerings were but a particular instance of dues legally attached to certain acts, why make of the former the subject-matter of article IV {De missarum eleemosynis seu stipendiis} of chapter I {De sacrosancto missae sacrificio} of title III {De sanctissima Eucharistia} of Part I {De sacramentis} of Book III {De rebus}, whereas the latter do not make their appearance in this Book III till we come to title XXVII {De bonis ecclesiasticis acquirendis} of Part VI (De bonis Ecclesiae temporalibus), or again in Book II {Depersonis} chapter IX {De parochis} of title VIII {De potestate episcopali, etc.} of section II {De clericis in specie} of Part I {De clericis} ?

I am aware that fault is found with my solution of the problem of Mass-stipends, because it does not apply to the case of the dues contemplated in canon 1507, nor to the case of tithes (canon 1502) nor to the *cathedraticum* (canon 1504) nor to the parochial fees (canon 463). But I beg leave to see therein an advantage for that solution, just as I take for granted the falsity of every solution that does not make a distinction.

At all events, the reader can now judge whether my critic was justified in placing under the patronage of Suarez the doctrine he intended to oppose to mine, and in particular this passage: "The duty of justice, which rests on the priest, to apply the fruit of the sacrifice to the donor or to the person designated by him does not properly have its origin in the acceptance of the stipend, but in the will of the Church, enjoining upon her ministers the performance of the sacred functions in favour of the donor" (p. 135). "Oritur ex re accepta", says Suarez. As for an ecclesiastical law, there is none.

After Suarez, who gave us something of a chance to study the subject in its essence, let us come to Lugo. Lugo (disp. 21) has nothing about an antecedent obligation; on the contrary, he denies it (n. 5 and 6). He has nothing about a positive law; he denies it also (n. 3). All that he has in common with the thesis defended by M. Leroux is the assertion that the

money is not the price of the mass, but stipendium sustentationis (n.13). But this is by no means characteristic of a special thesis; it is the teaching, not the most general only, but for centuries absolutely common; our own, as well as that of everybody. Only it is not a solution, for it is the very question we have to elucidate. Lugo explains it (n. 13 and 14) by a comparison between the celebrant and a painter who decorates churches gratuitously, while having himself compensated for the expenses he incurs. M. Leroux borrows this comparison from him, seemingly without being aware that since it leads to indemnities it does not lead to an emolument. I am not going to treat this point again, having amply done so elsewhere (Gregorianum, pp. 372-376; above pp. 99-102); I merely assure M. Leroux that Fr. Vermeersch would never be tempted to associate his theory with that allegory.

Cardinal Gasparri [Tract, can. de SS. Euchar., n. 540-543) agrees with Lugo, and at the same time has recourse to a contract do utfacias; but he does not bring in any antecedent obligation of justice. As for a positive law, he attributes to it, in relation to the bond of justice existing between the fruit of the mass and the stipend, a merely negative, and nowise positive, function: a mere permission, or removens prohibitens (cf. above, p. 103).

The Salmanticenses (*Theol. mor.*, tr. 5, c. 5, punct. 1, n. 1), say not a word of an antecedent justice, not a word of an ecclesiastical law.

Assuredly something more than the documentary proofs adduced by M. Leroux is needed to convince us that his doctrine is the *most* commonly accepted in the schools.

This much on the position taken by M. Leroux. It now remains to examine the criticism he makes of my position.

First criticism: "The solution is incomplete" (p. 141), because it does not work out when applied to the jam stolae, etc.

I answer that this failure is quite intentional. The solution is for that matter based on the intrinsic difference between Mass-offerings and all other dues required on the occasion of

a spiritual ministry, etc. On this point I refer the reader to what has been said thus far.

Second criticism: "It does not harmonise with ecclesiastical legislation" (p. 141). This assertion is proved in two ways.

First proof: "Canon Law, which has regulated so minutely the question of Mass-stipends, forbids nowhere the acceptance of the stipend of a non-Catholic with the stipulation of celebrating for his intention" (p. 142).

I answer: First, the silence of the Code authorizes a conclusion in favour of liberty only in matters which are directly amenable not to the natural law, but to the ecclesiastical law. Now this second hypothesis is exactly the one I deny. To use it against me would be a begging of the question. Secondly, is it true that the silence of the Code is absolute? What the Code does not say expressly it sometimes says implicitly. Now in the very definition which it gives of the daily Mass-offerings the Code claims to know no other offerings than those coming from the faithful: "Stipendia quae a fidelibus pro missis offeruntur," etc. (Can. 826, 1; cf. Can. 836 and 839). If a non-Catholic offered me a Mass-stipend, his stipend would therefore not come under the stipendia missarum regulated by the Code.

Second proof: "Better still. There are decrees explicitly allowing us to come to such an agreement with an unbaptized person on condition of avoiding scandal and of not favouring superstition" (p. 142). Hence there is an impossibility of "reconciling the Roman decrees" with a theory which makes of the stipend the matter intended for the sacrifice; whereas most certainly the sacrifice cannot be offered except by Christians.

I answer: The documents brought forward against me have been quoted by me and examined as early as 1921, in my work *Mysterium Fidei* (p. 366). It is quite an easy task to repeat the objection without even hinting at the answer already given to it.1 I cannot reproduce that

II note in passing that this is not the manner adopted by Fr. Hocedez in his article on Mau Offerings (N.R.T., February 1923, p. 71).



answer again here, and I confine myself to a word or two.

First, as regards the meaning of the documents, there is room for some doubt, based on the Instruction which accompanies the first one of them, giving in support the authority of Bellarmine, who has in view not the Mass-contract with an infidel, but the lawfulness of a mere suffrage in favour of an infidel.

Secondly, as regards the authority of these documents, an observation is necessary. A solemn Decree is one thing, an Answer is another. We are dealing here with two Answers: one of the Holy Office (July 12, 1865), and the other of Propaganda (March 11, 1848). On the value which these practical decisions have in relation to scientific research, there is probably nothing more thoroughly thought out and more correct than an article published in this very review in January 1907, under the title "For Science." The author of it, Fr. Vermeersch, stated that there is reason for "distinguishing between the Sovereign Pontiff, plenary Congregations and those more modest commissions called *Congressi*" (p. 8). We may add: and between Decrees and Answers; between decisions that have the papal approval and those that have not. It is a mistake to believe that "the task of the professor (or) of the Catholic writer is confined ... to waiting for, and then recording, the decisions of juridical tribunals "(p. 8).

With all the respect due to the lower degrees of that doctrinal hierarchy, "let us not omit to throw upon a question the light of the principles" (p. 10).

This is admirably expressed, and it holds chiefly in matters where the decisions offer an appearance of contradiction. Now this happens in the matter we are considering. On the 19th of August 1776, Propaganda, in its general session, had declared absolutely that it was not lawful to celebrate mass for Turks.! Much more unlawful would it be to bind oneself to do so by contract. This seems to be in direct

^{1 &}quot;Non licere celebrationem missae pro Tureis et schismaticis." (Collectanea, tom. t, $5M\cdot$)

opposition to the Answer of the Holy Office, under date of July 12, 1865: "It is licit to celebrate for the intention of the Turks and other infidels and to receive from them an alms for the application of the mass," once every danger of scandal has been removed, etc. The subject is not only delicate: it is extremely intricate, and lends itself readily to confusion. There is the priest's suffrage (and that of all other offerers), which may be extended to every kind of persons, without restriction. There is the contracting layman's sacrificial activity, which is strictly reserved to the faithful, the only contracting parties recognized by the Code. There is also the contract strictly such and the conjuncture of two promises not bound up with each other; this latter, like the suffrage, is allowed without any restriction of the natural law. I may unconditionally promise a suffrage to the Turk, who promises me unconditionally an alms. But to contract in justice, under a strict obligation of payment for a suffrage in his favour, would be simoniacal. To enter into a gratuitous agreement not about the benefit of a suffrage, but about the exercise of the priestly mediation with regard to the offerings placed in the hands of the priest—this is allowed, but allowed to the faithful, and to them alone. For whoever consigns offerings, as such, is by that very fact a mediate offerer, with an altogether special title, as the evidence of things proves. and as our Doctors teach. Listen to Dominic Soto's statement: "Offerentes autem sunt in triplici gradu. Primum est sacerdos, qui immediate, per se, tanquam publicus Ecclesiae minister . . . offert. . . . Generalissime vero et mediate (hoc est per sacerdotem) offert totus christianus populus. . . . Particularius vero, sed tamen etiam quodammodo generaliter, offerunt omnes qui aliquem specialem actum circa hoc sacrificium exercent, ut . . . ministri altaris . . . chorus . . . plebs, etc. Specialissime

^{1&}quot; Aliud esi offere pro alio, hoc est nomine et vice ipsius; . . . aliud offere pro alio, hoc est in commodum ipsius (Pasqualigo, De Sacrificio N.L., tom. I, g. 136, n. i). "Inquires quibus personis prosit hoc sacrificium . . . Respondetur includi omnes istas personas in duplici genere, quia vel sunt offerentes, vel illi pro quibus offertur." (Joannes A. S. Thoma, De Sacrifie. Missae, disp. 32, art. 3, n. 17). See also Lugo, quoted in MF, 360.

famen offerunt illi qui peculiarem eleemosynam in hanc missam conterunt, ut pro se et suis offeratur." (In 4. D 13, q. 2, a. i.)

Therefore the stipends make of you the offerer, and the very special offerer. But to this very special oblation corresponds the free disposition (gratuitous, of course) of a very special suffrage: in virtue of this maxim of common sense, so clearly stated by Pasqualigo, after many others, in his huge monograph De Sacrificio Novae Legis (tom. I, q. 136, n. 9): "Praeter sacerdotem omnes alios offerentes applicare posse sacrificium pro aliis, quantam ad ipsos spectat." Nothing further is required to explain both the surrender of the special fruit of the mass to the individual Catholic who is the giver of the stipend, and the suffrage with which he no less than the priest may favour whomsoever he pleases.

After giving his objections to the thesis, M. Leroux attacks the various elements of the argumentation supporting it.

Of this number is the word of St. Paul (7 Cor. ix, 13): "Know you not that they who work in the holy place eat the things that are of the holy place; and they that serve the altar partake with the altar?"—"Much good will is necessary," remarks M. Leroux, "to discover in this text that, in the Christian priesthood as well as in the Mosaic priesthood, the priest partakes with God the things that are God's" (9.143).—It is a good will which, not to mention Chrysostom, was not lacking in St. Jerome, nor in the pseudo-Jerome or pseudo-Damasus of the Corpus Juris, nor in the anonymous author of the Apostolic Canons, nor in Innocent IV, nor in St. Thomas, nor in the theologians of the sixteenth century, such as Henriquez (Summa Theologiae Moralis, ix, c. 22, n. 2), nor in our own time, in one of the most learned and keenest interpreters

¹ Let us hear once more John of Saint Thomas, in the sequel to the passage quoted above: "Inter offerentes diversae numerantur personae. Primo, gui faciunt pro se celebrari missam. Secundo, qui assistunt, et cooperantur illi. Tertio, ipse sacerdos cujus ministerio fit sacrificium. Qui offerri faciunt adhuc dupliciter se habent: Quidam nimis remote, et quasi in habitu, offerunt (scilicet omnes fideles, qui constituunt corpus Ecclesiae, siquidem sacrificium nomine Ecclesiae offertur, cum sit publica ejus actio). Alii vero proxime et in actu, cooperantur etfaciunt offerri, ut qui dant eleemosynam pro stipendio, aut qui instituit aliquam fundationem cum onere missarum" (manual masses or founded masses).

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of St. Paul, Fr. Prat.! That same good will should not be wanting in anyone of those who grasp the two following very simple truths: first, that the New Law is in nothing inferior to the Old one in the nobility, independence and dignity of its priesthood, which is the priesthood, not of Aaron any longer, but of the divine Melchisedech; second, that to partake with the altar and to partake with God are synonymous.

It is quite true that in the New Law the true victim of the sacrifice is not an earthly aliment, the product of our fields or of our flocks, but the Lamb of God and the Bread of heaven. Most certainly M. Leroux is right in saying, "in our sacrifice there is no other victim than Our Lord." Does it follow that the sacrifice cannot be the sacrifice of the layman who offers the gifts, in virtue of the very special claim of the gifts he offers? Yes, it would follow, if the true victim was not precisely the term reached, through their consecration to God, by those symbolical gifts of the layman, who by reason of his baptism partakes of the priesthood according to the order of Melchisedech. In other words, the conclusion would hold, if our sacrifice was not sacramental.

But since there is in our sacrifice, as an essential requisite, a sacramentum tantum (a sacramental symbol), on account of which the res et sacramentum (the thing symbolized) becomes both a visible sacrifice and our sacrifice, it must needs be that the contributor of this blessed sign, which loses its substance only to be filled with that of Christ, should acquire for himself, because of his contribution, a special claim on the oblation to which he gives its initial movement and its point of earthly contact. Christ alone gives us his Flesh and his Blood, assuredly; but we ourselves supply the gifts and offerings, dona et munera, those hosts of bread and wine, hostias panis et

¹ On this text of St. Paul and its commentators, see above, 114-119, 164.

^{*} In the Old Law, the victim immolated being the property of the worshipper, it was truly the sacrifice of the latter that was offered by the mediation of the priest. But in our sacrifice there is no other victim than Our Lord. (Therefore our case does not well bear comparison with the Jewish oblations" (p. 143).) That means that the mass (according to M. Leroux) is not the sacrifice of the lay offerer of the stipends.

vini, whose place Christ himself takes for the one purpose of giving them an infinite value, and not for the purpose of excluding or annulling or diminishing our initiative as offerers. All this has already been fully explained elsewhere, and the discussion will not make any headway as long as objections already refuted are lined up as if they were new.

M. Leroux objects again that the bread and wine do not ordinarily come from the stipends at all, but from elsewhere.? lunderstand perfectly that the priest does not go for each mass and buy a bottle of wine with his manual alms in his hands. He may have a supply in his cellar. But what he draws from it will correspond to the portion of the stipend of which he would otherwise have had to dispose in favour of the wine merchant. There is compensation and equivalence. In the main the operation will remain exactly the same. If the priest, instead of buying the mass-wine, profits by the Church board's putting gratuitously at his disposal all that he needs, the case is still the same. This bread and wine coming into his possession without burdening him with any obligation as to the application of the mass, are not stipends, nor elements of stipends, but a pure and simple liberality. They do not, therefore, interfere at all with the integrity of the special fruit which the worshipper secures for himself by the mass-contract. We were told this a while ago very plainly by Suarez. I may feed, support, endow a priest, without securing for myself any of his masses, and therefore without curtailing his freedom in disposing of them to others. M. Leroux has therefore no reason for writing: "Must we, in

^{&#}x27;See also above, pp. 131, 139 sq., 147, 156 for the absolutely decisive testimonies of the Liturgy on this matter. The votive sacrifices, i.e. those celebrated by mandate of an individual for some object of a private nature, and not for the discharge of a public service, are characterized, within the Canon itself, in its variable parts, as sacrifices, hosts and oblations of that individual person, man or woman, who stipulated for the celebration.

^{2&}quot;In actual practice, the money handed to the priest is hardly ever used to procure the bread and wine for the altar. They come from another quarter, and the stipend is entirely used for the sustenance of the priest. Are we in consequence to consider the special fruit of the mass as divided up between the two contributors?" (p. 143.)

consequence, look upon the special fruit of the mass as divided up between the two donors?" (p. 143).

M. Leroux objects also that the title of offerer given to the maker of the contract is not "irreducible to any other" (p. 143). I do not know what is required to make this "irreducible" character apparent, that is to say, to make it appear specifically distinct from any other. It seems to me to be sufficiently clear from what was published on the subject in the Outline (all of which is passed over in silence or ignored), and even from what has been said above in the course of this article. To contribute by the oblation of the matter to be sacrificed (" rem sacrificandam", as Bellarmine callsit, above, p. 162), by bringing the gifts which the Sovereign Angel will carry upon the celestial altar, is "not the same manner" of offering (to speak again like Bellarmine, above, p. 163) as to consent by a habitual disposition or to ratify by actual assistance, nor the same as to celebrate or lend to the celebration the help of a subordinate ministry. To spread the table at one's own expense has never been the same thing as to serve it or to sit down to it as a guest: it has never been the same form of causality, the same claim of offerer, at no time and in no country, nor in any religion true or false.

"After all," asks M. Leroux, "why should the participation of him who offers the matter necessary for the consecration (let us add: and for the support or sustenance of the priest) create such a special right and such a distinct claim to draw profit from the fruits of the mass, rather than, for instance, the participation certainly no less active and no less liturgical, of the ministers who assist the priest at the altar?" (p. 144).

It does give him a special and distinct claim, and we have just seen why. But by that we do not mean an exclusive right. Each one enjoys a fruit in keeping with his co-operation, and a free disposal of a suffrage proportionate to that co-operation. This matter of manifold suffrages is too much forgotten,

¹ How these various fruits do not interfere with one another, see MF, Elucid. XXVIII.

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and yet the Schoolmen taught it in terms clear and explicit. "Quisquis concurrit ad offerendum, potest, quatenus ab ipso offertur, pro alio offere. Ex his colligitur quid sit audire missam pro alio: audire pro alio est audire in commodum ipsius, atque adeo transferre in ipsum fructum qui inde percipitur" (Pasqualigo, loc. cit.). The identical statement is met with in the famous Thomist Nuno Cabezedo (in 3 S. 83, 1, part 2, q. 6, concl. 4): "Etiam laid offerentes simul cum sacerdote possunt suam satisfactionem aliis Suarez says the same (disp. 78, sect. 1, n. 6); and so does Vasquez (disp. 227, c. 1, n. 2), etc. Hence it is customary in the Society of Jesus, at least in Rome, to ask the religious who are not priests, upon the death of one of their companions, to offer for the repose of his soul the next masses at which they will assist. But now, suppose you were to try to draw a monetary profit from that suffrage (were it for your clerical sustenance) by making of it the matter of a monetary contract, you would find out what the Church thinks of it. The reason is that the granting of a suffrage for money would not in any way remain a gratuitous contract, like the one which creates between the priest and the faithful an obligation of justice based on "the thing received" (ex re accepta), but on the thing, be it noted, received into the hands of the priest, or rather consigned into his hands only in order to pass on into those of God (ex re commissa). At all events, each pious participant gathers the fruit of a personal benefit, that can be extended to others by way of suffrage. The gain of the worshipper, of the offerer consigning his gifts, is by no means exclusive or restrictive of the gain of the other faithful who are not contracting parties, but are offerers by reason of other titles. However, the gain of the former, other things being equal, is the most important, because it is intrinsically connected, in a manner absolutely unique, with the matter of the sacrifice, with the gift that honours God, just as the part of the celebrant is more intrinsically connected with the form of the sacrifice, with the consecration or active oblation of the gift. All, therefore, all the

. 1 See also the explicit testimonials of the liturgy, above, p. 156.

faithful associated with the priest will be enriched by the sacrifice; but to a greater extent (servatis servandis) those who contribute to it by the stipend: "Amplius participant qui contribuunt pitantias" (Henriquez, Theol. Mor. 9, c. 20, n. 2, cf. not. 7).

Such are the objections of M. Leroux, and such the answers prompted by the very theory which they assail.

Of this theory, M. Leroux says that it "is indeed calculated to exalt the character of the mass-stipends in the estimation of the faithful, and to encourage in them the desire to become more actively associated, by the pecuniary offering made to the priest, with the oblation itself of the holy sacrifice" (p. 141). For this admission I am thankful to M. Leroux, reminding him at the same time that such happy results are seldom the outcome of error.

He adds: "It is nevertheless very doubtful whether it will find many adherents" (p. 141). Up to the present, apart from M. Leroux and the author to whom he appeals, I hardly know more than one theologian who has written against it. The latter? has made the discovery that it was out of touch with the teaching of the last centuries, even though it might claim for itself some obscure and antiquated authorities of an epoch that is quite dead and gone. "Fr. de la Taille believes he can find traces of his opinion in some rare and ancient texts almost unknown till now."—One would think, reading the above, that I had dug up some ruins of Numa's time.—" I leave to others the task of verifying his statements."—Which is a very easy and comfortable proceeding.— "But should some theologians of a distant past have defended that opinion, the fact still remains that it has against it the whole and entire theological teaching of centuries." to speak only of the last three centuries,—Thomassin,3 Van Espen, 4 Wolf, 5 Berlendi, @ do not exist. It matters not that

¹ For Henriquez (see chap. 21 and 22) pilantia, in the subject-matter, is synonymous with stipendium. This form of speech is common among the writers of his time. See Dominic Soto, Dejustitia etjure, IX, q. 6, a. i, ad 2 principale.

^{*} Fr. M. C. Forest, O.P., *La Revue Dominicaine*, Canada, Oct., 1926, p. 553. 'Above, pp. 153, 154 and 160 sq.; 4 p. 162, cf. 167.; 'p. 143.; *p. 161 sq.

they are specialists on the subject of ecclesiastical institutions; their opinion has no weight, absolutely none, as against the Cursus and the Manuals which transmit to one another, as a precious legacy, the chosen solutions which everybody knows, all of them in conflict with one another and with themselves, without leaving the least amount of space for the study of a doctrine of which they are ignorant.

With the exception of Fr. Forest, I think I had every reason to be satisfied with the other theologians who were kind enough to take notice of the thesis I have presented. Leaving aside Dom L. Bauduin, O.S.B., and Fr. Hanssens, who are quoted in it, it is proper that I should mention before all others, M. Jeannote, P.SS., professor at the seminary of Montreal, well known among the learned for his important researches on *The Psalter of St. Hilary* (Paris 1917).

From a long article he published on this subject in the Semaine Religieuse de Montreal (April 10, 1924), I pick out these sentences: "The explanation may appear new, and for that very reason somewhat suspect. As a matter of fact it is the traditional explanation, the old view" (p. 244). "This explanation, at once so simple and so natural, solves difficulties too easily not to be the true solution of the problem " (pp. 242, 243). "It will undoubtedly find its place ere long in all the manuals of theology" (p. 246). This is too optimistic. Dom Raphael Proust, O.S.B., in the Revue Bénédictine (January 1925) is certainly nearer the actual truth, when he limits his prognostications to the statement that "it will win for itself the sympathy of many." His fellow-workers on the Bulletin de Saint Martin et de Saint Benoît (May 1925) are kind enough to do my work the unmerited honour of saying of it that "it constitutes by itself alone a complete study of the question." So much generosity fills me with confusion. The Dean of the Faculty of Theology of Paris, Fr. d'Alès, with that high authority which his teaching of sacramental theology in particular has earned for him, says: "On a delicate subject, on which the Christian mind finds it at times

somewhat difficult to guard against the narrowness of the juridical outlook and the commonplaces of language, the author restores a traditional doctrine, taught by such masters Thomassin, the Blessed Bellarmine and St. Thomas Aguinas. . . . This view, at once very simple and very exalted, sets us free from paltry and artificial conceptions. Let us hope to see it received everywhere as it deserves." (Recherches de Science Religieuse, February 1926, pp. 93, 94). The Australian Catholic Record of July 1924 (pp. 82-89), by Ae pen of the secretary of its staff, Dr. E. J. O'Donnel, gave a most favourable exposition of it, without a single word of reservation. Fr. Le Rohellec, of the Roman Academy of St. Thomas, professor at the French Seminary, writes in the Echos de Santa Chiara (1925, p. 38) that "the demonstration seems truly convincing." Finally, a very short time ago, the Master of the Sacred Palace, the Most Reverend Fr. Marc Sales, O.P., had the kindness in the Scuola Cattolica (May 15, 1926, p. 378) to call attention to this theory of mass-offerings as "worthy of special consideration." I omit, of course, approbations expressed in private letters, no matter how high their origin.

Besides, it will not be out of place to state that in a paper published after mine, but, as far as can be judged, entirely independent of mine (which seems not to have been known to the author), Dr. Rohner, of Friburg, wrote thus ri "Anyone who desires to have a correct idea of the mass-offerings must first of all take a survey of their origin. Their origin is found in the oblations which the faithful of the first centuries of the Church brought to the altar for each mass. . . . These oblations were not only offered to be applied to the holy sacrifice; but they were also intended to serve for the support of the priest and the ministers of the altar as well as for the poor. The believers were acquainted with the saying of the Apostle (I Cor. ix, 13): 4 Know you not that they who work in the holy place eat the things that are of the holy place; and they that serve the altar partake with the altar? '—that is to say, what

¹ Die Messapplikation nach der Lettre des hl. Thomas, in Dious Thomas (Friburg) March 1925, p. 65 sq.

is offered on the altar. They offered, therefore, to the altar (sie opferten daher dem Altare) with the intention that the ministers of the altar should have their share. ... In the course of ages . . . the gifts in kind were changed into money. . . Little by little the alms were remitted to the priests outside of the mass, on condition of a special application of the mass. These alms in money received the name of eleemosynae or stipendia missarum: and this is still their name to-day" (pp. 65-67). Whoever holds this view holds all that is necessary about the nature of the stipend and about the obligation which follows therefrom, even if he is not as yet fully aware of it, as is the case with Dr. Rohner, who after all the foregoing still feels the need of invoking a precept of the Church2 in order to graft upon that transaction an obligation of justice and not even of commutative justice at that. Apart from this inconsistency, it is perhaps not rash to add the name of Dr. Rohner to those who in the last few years have lent their support to the historical solution of the problem of the mass offerings.

In any case, M. Leroux will allow us to be less pessimistic than he, and to opine that there is some future in store for our solution.

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My task would remain incomplete, did I not add that the criticism of M. Leroux has received the enthusiastical appro-

1 The author is right in emphasizing this point. When the gifts were presented at the altar during the course of the Liturgy, the intention which inspired the act did not need to be expressed: it was evident from the circumstances. When some one goes to the priest's residence to give him a chicken, he must needs inform him whether it is a gift pure and simple, or on condition of having mass said.

2 In the matter of precept, only the Code is cited. It is rather late.—Perhaps, after all, M. Rohner means only to explain how the obligation can be sub gravi, although the stipend does not reach a large amount. In that case two things may be said in reply. First, that, as a matter of fact, at least in Latin countries, the due of the stipendium ought to be raised considerably. Secondly, that the gravity of the obligation depends first of all upon the gravity of the mandate assumed by the priest as a public official, who is moreover pledged in justice by the deposit he has accepted. At all events, this difficulty, if it is one, is met with in every theory on the mass-stipend. It is not an ecclesiastical law that will ever be able to bring about the gravity of an obligation (obligation of justice or any other, it matters little), where gravity of matter is wanting on both sides.

bation of a priest of his diocese, M. l'abbé Joseph Clesse, author of an Étude Critique de certaines propositions du Mysterium Fidei, wherein M. Leroux is being complimented for having done "justice to the fanciful theory exposed in the article The Mass Offerings" (p. 22). It would be too fortunate if the theory of the Mass Offerings escaped with this single label of "fanciful", amid a cloud of "risky propositions" (p. 3) to which is reduced (or well nigh, it seems) my work on the sacrifice and the sacrament of the Body and Blood of the Lord. And so we see it treated elsewhere as "inept" (p. 26). It would be difficult, we must confess, to reply to this sort of criticism.2 However, since in a pathetic conclusion M. Clesse asks himself: "What becomes, according to this doctrine of the Mysterium Fidei, of the teaching of the parish priest of our childhood?" (p. 26), I am ready to come to his relief in his distress.

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This distress seems to arise chiefly from one statement of mine, which wrings from him at one time the word heresy, and which, I must admit, runs all through my work: namely that at the Mass no real immolation takes place (taking immolation in the sense of mactation directed towards the oblation), but only a mystical immolation (sacramental—symbolical—representative). "The author of the Mysterium Fidei repeats at pleasure all through his book that at the sacrifice of the Mass there is no real immolation, but only an apparent immolation. . . . Fr. de la Taille does not seem to be aware that, in ecclesiastical parlance, his assertion is equivalent to defending the heresy that the Mass is not a true and properly so called sacrifice" (p. 9). Excuse the trifle. But let us cheer M. Clesse. The parish priest of his childhood, even if he did not know (which is not proved) all that is accumulated in the

⁻ Mere are a lew more samples; nrgumeniauon aiiogemer 100 aciooauc (p. 13). "The words of the Catechism are respected, but they are emptied of their meaning" (p. 26). "The doctrine of the Mysterium Fidei puts everything awry" (p. 12). "Evacuatio trucis" (p. 13). "Preconceived ideas which are found to be unintentionally in contradiction with Catholic dogma" (p. 27), etc. Thereupon the author graciously adds that he does not wish to be "harsh" (P- 27).

. Mysterium Fidei on this question, was not necessarily condemned to total ignorance of what was being said and written around him within the boundaries of his ecclesiastical province. Now at that time, there were published, as they are still being published, Conferences that enjoy a well-earned reputation. On page 411 of the Collationes Tornacenses for the years 1853-1856, he may have read these beautiful words of Collet, which the diocesan editor accepts on his official responsibility as the only explanation that can satisfy and settle the problem of the Mass: "Hand necesse est ut in consecratione nova fiat immolatio [realis], sed sufficit realis oblatio victimae olim in crucis ara immolatae, et in altari substantialiter et sensibiliter positae sub speciebus panis et vini, in quibus repraesentantur effusio et separatio sanguinis a corpore, quae in reali Agni immaculati immolatione praecessit. . . . Ergo dici optime potest ad missae sacrificium nulla nova opus esse [reali] immolatione." This mere quotation does not pretend to be a Something else would be needed. But M. Clesse may perhaps find in it some relief to his anguish about the intellectual horizon of the parish priest of his childhood. For my part, it so happens that I shall be discussing the question of Oblation and Immolation in the near future (if my few spare moments permit it) on the occasion of a book that appeared recently in England.1

Here I confine myself to one single observation on the tone ofcensure which M. Clesse, after one or two other publicists from across the water, has seen fit to adopt towards me. I suspect that this unusual tone must have its reason in a rumour which has been current in England, whence it passed over into Belgium, according to which ecclesiastical authority has manifested or is about to manifest unfavourable sentiments in regard to my doctrine. I have never before alluded to this, although I was informed by friends of various professions and different cloth. But during the course of the year just come to a close, two bishops of the New World, having heard an English religious, on a journey over there, state that according to an eminent personality of the Roman Curia, the Holy

See was only waiting for a formal denunciation in order to fulminate, it seemed to them that I should clear up the matter. The necessary steps were taken with the eminent personality whose testimony had been invoked. The answer, which was conveyed to me in writing! was this. "There is not a word of truth in it." I should not have troubled myself about this base rumour, had I not been put under obligation to stop it. It is done; and I am not sorry. I only should be very sorry if I were forced to give proper names.

I prefer to quote here the names of those who honoured with their eminently competent approbation the thesis of the Mysterium Fidei, on the unity of the Supper and of the Passion, and on the relation of the one and the other to the sacrifice of the Mass: Mattiussi, the successor of Billot at the Roman College, who by his acquiescence2 renounced his own previous teaching (a rare occurrence in the theological world); the professors of the Catholic Institute, d'Alès3 already mentioned, and Lebreton4 (by some incomprehensible oversight, I have omitted to call attention to his highly authoritative teaching on the necessity of means inherent in the Eucharist, Diet. Apol. i, 1573-1574); Fr. Grumel, O.E.S.A.,6 one of the contemporary masters of oriental theology, who asks himself, "by what sign it shall ever be possible to recognize truth", if it does not blaze forth in the arguments of this doctrine, "and what other system, in any case, can with as many warrants solicit our assent"; prelates, like Cardinal Charost,6 one of the theological luminaries of the French Episcopate, extending to this doctrine the canonical sanction of his pastoral teaching: His Grace, the Archbishop of Tarsus. (now Cardinal) Lepicier,7 one of the most appreciated theologians of the Eternal City; and many others of every country

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1 And in English [Translator's Note],
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²Cwif/d Cattolica, 74, 3, pp. 137-151.

³ Recherches de Science Religieuse, 13, pp. 362-365.

^{*} Études, 169, 186.

⁵ Echos dOrieni, Jan.-March, 1926, pp. 118-120.

^{*} Pastoral Letter on the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass, Lent 1922, p. 20.

⁷ Introduction to the book of Dr. A. MacDonald, The Sacrifice of the Mass, p. viii.

and every tongue: Belgians, like Fr. Hanssensl and Dom L. Bauduin; 1 Frenchmen, like the Rt. Rev. Vicar General Dupin de Saint-Cyr,3 former professor of theology, Fr. Riedinger,4 theological chronicler of the *Revue Apologétique*, and Fr. Pollinger,5* professor of theology; Englishmen, like Professor Bird® of Oscott, Fr. M. C. D'Arcy7 of Oxford, and Fr. Joseph Rickaby,8 former professor of St. Benno's; Americans, like Fr. Otten,9 professor at Chicago, and the Editors of the *American Catholic Quarterly ReviewloH* Canadians, like Dr. A. MacDonald,11 Bishop of Victoria (now of Hebron), and Dr. N. McNeil,12 Archbishop of Toronto; Australians, like Dr. M. Sheehan, Archbishop Coadjutor of Sydney13; Spaniards, like Dr. S. Alameda, O.S.B.14; Italians, like Fr. F.-M. Cappello,15 etc.: all of them men who know their catechism and have read the Council of Trent.16

But besides those who have accepted the doctrine explicitly, there are those who in their account of it have shown their undoubted sympathy, as was done in the *Nouvelle Revue Théologique* itself, under the signature of a writer who knows how to combine historical science with theological acumen.17 In

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1 Gregorianum, 3, pp. 307-312.
2 Les Questions Liturgiques et Paroissiales, 7, 166-205.
3 Semaine Religieuse du Diocèse de Perigueux et de Sarlat, April 25, 1925, p. 203 sq. 4 Revue Apologétique, 34, p. 686.
5 Ibid., 41, 424.
• Adoremus, 3, 87 sq.
1 Dublin Review, Oct.-Nov.-Dec. 1925, pp. 171-178.
8 Family Life and the Mass, C. T. S., London, 1925, p. 12 sq.
• Institutiones Dogmaticae, tom. 5, Chicago, 1923, p. 523 and 546 sq. 10A.C.Q.R. 47, 261-262.
II Ecclesiastical Review, 76, 2, p. 205.
13 The Passion and the Mass, published by the Passionists of West Hoboken, New Jersey.
13 The Sacrifice of the Mass, Dublin, 1926, pp. 8-12.
11 Revista Eclesidstica, May, 1925, pp. 257-263.
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¹⁶ Gregorianum, March, 1926, p. 122.

13 Should I also add that M. G. Rabeau, former professor at the University of Lublin, at present professor at the Grand Séminaire of Nice, author of a recent and splendid work on the Introduction to the Study of Theology (Paris, 1926), among the fifty theses which he lately presented to the Catholic Institute of Paris for his fellowship in theology, did me the very great honour of placing on the list theses I-V, XII, XVI-XVII, XXIII, XXXV-XXXVIII, of my Mysterium Fidei, "Facultate Sacrae Theologiae approbante."

¹² Fr. Hocedez, N. R. Th. 1923, pp. 281-292.

this latter category, more numerous than the former one, I I intend to confine myself to one name: the same that has already been noticed a while ago in relation to the Mass Offerings, the name of the Most Reverend Master of the Sacred Palace. "On the whole," he writes, "the doctrine which he (the author of the Mysterium Fidei) defends, rests on very solid foundations (nel complesso la dotlrina propugnata poggia su basi solidissime) and is worthy of being studied thoroughly"? It would not be easy to conceive such a recommendation given in favour of "hazardous" propositions, to say nothing of "heresy."

I offer my excuses to the public for this riot of testimonials. There is, I believe, but one way to cut short certain campaigns. Any way, here is something that may be lined up against the name of my censor.

1 Which now includes also two of the latest contributors to the Dictionnaire De Théologie Catholique (fasc. 83), namely Dr. Ruch, Bishop of Strasburg (La Messe d'après la Sainte Ecriture, and La Messe d'après les Pères Jusqu'à Saint Cyprien, col. 806 sq. 870, 815, 820, 825, 846-848, 961 sq.) and Professor Gaudel, of the University of Strasburg (Ze Sacrijice de la Messe dans l'Eglise Latine, du IV siècle jusqu'à la veille de la Réforme, col. 1060 sq. 1081 sq.)

1 Scuola Catlolica, May 1926, p. 375.

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ITS SACRAMENTAL FUNCTION

Stirred by the inroads which religious ignorance is making upon the very centres most accessible to the preaching of the Gospel, a social worker drew attention, some time ago, to the following quite typical answer received from a young man of one of our Catholic junior clubs, to a question that had been put to him on the Eucharist: "Well, you see, to my mind the Eucharist, before everything is a symbol." not be difficult for anyone to imagine what a shock was caused by this statement. It was expected that the young man would begin by laying down, and as it were settling, the fact of the real presence of the Body and Blood of Christ upon our altars under appearances that are not his own, but those of the bread and wine. There were good reasons for expecting such an answer, and for being astonished at so disquieting a deficiency. On the other hand (let us be lenient to all) the young man was perhaps not entirely wrong either. What is the Eucharist? it is a sacrament. And what is a 'Sacrament? it is, before anything else, a symbol. A sacrament, acCOrdingT^he'CâtëchismT^âiLefficacious sign of a sancti-Sign and symbol are one and the same thing. fying reality. Every sacrament, therefore, is a symbol; not, of course, a symbol whose function would merely be to translate into sensible forms, to give a sensible expression to an ideal truth, for the purpose of arousing or helping the mind to reflect upon it, and, by reflecting upon it, become attached to it such as a flag, or the sign of the cross, but a symbol that effects by itself in the mind what it signifies. It is as if the flag possessed the

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power to stir up unfailingly a current of heroic energy in the soul of him who grasps it or hoists it; as if the sign of the cross possessed the virtue, every time, of imprinting in our souls the sentiments of Jesus crucified. Are we, then, attributing a magical power to the sacramental symbol? A flag possessing this virtue, this power of direct action upon souls, and upon all souls, and always, would be a magical flag. And in the same way a gesture, an attitude, that had for effect a radical change in the inmost dispositions of any subject whatever, ushering him into a new order of cognitions and mental activity, making him to pass to a new plane of life, raised above earth, above the world, above nature—would it not be that very thing which, through countless turpitudes and absurdities, the magic of all times has ever been striving to attain? Are our sacraments to take rank among this discredited category of dark superstitions, into which so many enemies of the Christian faith would fain consign them? They are the very reverse. Magic is an attempt to act upon an order of things which is not man's domain, but God's, by means of symbols that do not express a will of God, but a will of man. Sacraments are a word in action, a locution by sign, proceeding from God and conveying to man what God intends to do in him or for him. And God's word is operative: dixit etfacta sunt. Let God speak to your inmost soul, saying, "Peace be to you," and at once you are pacified. Let him speak before you, in the person of Christ telling the man sick with the palsy, "Thy sins are forgiven thee," and his sins are forgiven. Or let him speak through his ambassador, his agent, his interpreter; what difference does it make? He is judge and master of his own means. And if he pleases not only to speak by the lips of another, but at the same time to speak in signs (one says "Yes" by a nod of the head, or "Depart" by pointing to the door, or as of old God commissioned his prophet to make a shepherd boy king by pouring oil upon his head), who are we that we should presume to say to him, "Lord, this won't do; this time nothing will come of it; speak to me plainly and not in riddles?" God speaks in

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the manner he chooses, multifariam multisque modis, at sundry times and in divers manners, as Scripture tells us, but always as befits God, with full power to accomplish, by merely saying it, what his sovereign word intimates to a creature. sacraments, are signs of this description. They are signs which God has placed in the hands of his Church, in order to signify, under conditions specified by him, what he intends to effect for us in the spiritual order. It is he who once for all has determined and specified their unalterable signification, and when by the action of the Church, in accordance with the instructions God has given her, these signs are made to work, it is not the Church, it is not men who give utterance to their own thought; the thought expressed in that symbolical language is properly and personally the thought of him who through all these intervening agencies signals to us that we are regenerated, that we are reconciled, that we are strengthened, and so forth. And because he speaks through all this, it is his authority, his virtue, his sovereign power that passes through it all, for the purpose of producing what the sign is meant to convey, and of impressing on our souls what is expressed by the symbol. When a king of old said: "You are colonel, you are marshal, you are governor, you are prime minister," someone was prime minister, or governor, or marshal, or colonel. They were words that accomplished what they enunciated, not having merely for object to relate a thing because it had happened, but to say it that it might actually be, and, therefore, to realize it by promulgating it. They were promulgations of the prince's wishes. The same is true to-day of the promulgations made, not by the lips of the head of the State, but by the publications in the Official There also what is announced is verified by the fact of being announced. In a similar manner every sacrament is the promulgation, by the Church's minister, of a decree from on high, addressed to a properly disposed subject, under the required conditions: a decree, say, of regeneration, or of reconciliation, or of confirmation. And because this promulgation is made by means of a sign, it is in fine a sovereign

.utterance embodied in a symbol: visibile verbum (giving to this definition of St. Augustine its most comprehensive acceptation) a word made manifest in a sign; a word not spoken, but figured; language appropriate to our condition of sensible beings and to the social constitution of the Church.

This introduction on the sacraments was, if not necessary, at least useful in helping us to give the Eucharist its proper setting. The Eucharist is a sacrament: to have a comprehension of it we must begin by ranking it in the order of signs that have just been defined: efficacious signs of a sanctifying reality which they suggest; a sensible and symbolical rendering of a design of grace which is being accomplished by their means in favour of any one who submits himself to their influence in accordance with the order established by God.

But thence precisely arises a difficulty, which has vexed the mind from the very day when men began to speculate on the eucharistie dogma, the peaceful and invariable belief of which had for nine centuries fed the Christian life, without ever furnishing matter either for discussion or for analysis. If the Eucharist is a sign, the sign (or the sacrament, which is exactly the same thing) of the Body and Blood of Jesus Christ. how can it at the same time be the reality of that Body and of , that Blood? Sign and reality exclude each other; it Js not possible to be at once the symbol and the object symbolized. To bum someone in effigy is not to burn him in earnest. the mysteries of the Christian faith were being enacted in figure among the Hebrews: therefore they were not enacted in truth; and scarcely had truth made its appearance when the figures ceased. Umbram fugat veritas, shadows yield before the truth; and it is precisely in a hymn to the Blessed Sacrament that St. Thomas inserted that saying. In all this we have the explanation why, a little over a thousand years ago, there rose in opposition to St. Paschasius Radbertus, the first great champion of the Eucharist, one of his own confreres, a monk like himself of the abbey of Corbie. In an attempt to systematize the eucharistic dogma, this monk hardly let anything subsist of the real presence of the Body and Blood of

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Christ, except the name. He admitted a real presence, but only as a manner of speaking, as in every image there is ideally present the original which the image represents. By picturing to the mind an invisible reality, a symbol is looked upon as containing it, and as we might say nowadays of a flag, as carrying it in its folds: in like manner the Body and Blood ofJesus Christ were said to be contained in the Eucharist, according to Rathramnus (at least as far as the very vague nature of his thought and the involved style in which he expresses it allow of a correct interpretation). Thank God, Paschasius Radbertus was at hand, to uphold the faith of the Church, her faith of centuries, based on the words of the Master: This is my Body, the self-same that is about to be delivered to death for you; this is my Blood, in this cup of the New Testament, shed for you and for the multitude of mankind unto remission of sins. The same Blood of the Passion, the same Body bruised for us, and not the idea of the Blood, or the idea of the Flesh of Christ, but truly the same Flesh he brought into the world when bom of the Virgin Mary.

> Ave verum corpus natum de Maria Virgine, vere passum, immolatum, in cruce pro homine.

If we do not owe this verse to St. Paschasius Radbertus, to him, more than to any other, belongs the honour of having transmitted in its integrity, to the generations that followed, the article of faith embodied in it. Here also we have another proof that the Virgin Mother has only to come forward in the majesty of her prerogative in order to exterminate every heresy, whether it be christological, as at Ephesus, or sacramentarian, as in the present case.

But it was not enough to preserve the dogma, it was also necessary to free it from the adversary's sophism; and to tell the truth, St. Paschasius did not find it too much of a task. Undoubtedly there is in the Eucharist a sensible sign of the

Body of Christ, and that which is the sign of the Body of Christ is not the Body of Christ: hence no one ever pretended to identify the two. Yet the two things are found together in the Eucharist, just as in man body and soul are united, and yet the body is not the soul. One is the thing we see, another is the thing we do not see. The Body of Christ is invisible; the outward shape he derives from the bread in order to give himself as food is visible. But beneath that visible wrapping is concealed the hidden reality; not without disclosing itself to the eyes of faith as really present, since the sum total of the appearances, and of the words which determine their scope, is there to serve as a sign pointing to this presence: Hoc est corpus meum. This—the thing, the substantial reality, which these diverse sensible properties (colour, taste, etc.) serve to designate as underlying them—is my Body. The sensible properties are, therefore, the marks of the subjacent presence of the Body of Christ. And because they are marks furnished by the God of truth himself, they cannot be mendacious. Thus it happens that the sign, far from excluding the truth and reality of the Lord's corporal presence, does bring it about, does maintain and preserve it: so much so, that the presence will not cease until the sign attesting and proclaiming it has itself vanished. The theological duel between Paschasius and Rathramnus served, therefore, to render more luminous the principle that in the Eucharist there is both a visible sign and an invisible reality; the visible sign which, as early as the second century, St. Irenaeus had described as the terrestrial element, and which we call the accidents of the bread and of the wine; and the invisible reality which the same Irenaeus styled the celestial element, the Body and Blood of the Lord. The former is witness and warrant for the latter. That which belongs to the order of signs necessarily involves the presence of that which is signified: and so, finally, once the eucharistic prayer has been uttered over the bread and wine, their species or appearances have become the sacrament of the Body and Blood of the Saviour, not after the manner of a mere imitation, but by way of a

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mysterious covering, sealed with the divine seal, and enclosing within that of which outwardly it bears the stamp.

But scarcely had the last ripple of this debate died away, when another one more violent and more vital sprang up. The Archdeacon of Angers, formerly a student at Tours, Berengarius, less attentive to the lessons of his master, St. Fulbert of Chartres, than to the adulterated teachings which he stealthily imbibed from the writings of Scotus Erigena, discovered one day that the Body and Blood of Christ to which the sensible sign referred were themselves designated as sign or sacrament by Catholic Doctors and in particular by St. Augustine. If that Body is a sacrament, it is a sign; if it is a sign, it is not a reality, but the figure of a reality. could it be at the same time the substance of the Body of Christ and the symbol of that substance? Now it is the symbol, those great authorities of the past tell us, and therefore not the Hence the substance of the Body of Christ is not substance. really and actually present in the Eucharist. Still, it may rightly be said to be present, because it is evoked, and the evocatory sign cannot be separated, it cannot be isolated from that which gives it its meaning, under penalty of ceasing to have a meaning at all, of ceasing, that is, to be a It may even be said that it is the true Body of Jesus Christ, the same one that is in heaven, as it once was on In fact this may be said so much the more justly, as there is more ground for accusing the others—those who hold the doctrine of the real presence, that a Body is substantially present in the place of the bread—of having by so doing manufactured in their foolish imaginations a new Body of For it must be perfectly clear that the Body of Christ dwelling in heaven, cannot, while it is one and the same, be situated in a thousand places different from heaven, nor, while it is one and the same, shrink to a size so ridiculously less than The bread remains what it was; the substance his own. of the Body of Jesus Christ must actually be looked for in paradise only. Those who imagine they possess it in the Eucharist multiply it, and consequently they have no right to

say that the Eucharist contains the true Body of Christ, the unique Body of Christ, residing in paradise; it is another body, which, therefore, is not the true one. The one who alone has the right to speak of the true Body of Christ in the Eucharist is Berengarius, thanks to that ideal presence of a thing in its sign, of the reality in its figure, which by way of Scotus Erigena has come to form part of his own teaching as an inheritance from Plato. This ideal presence one would be tempted to call Platonic, if it did not claim to be, not merely ideal, but also dynamic, by the effect of a causal influence derived from the Body of Christ and communicating grace, in a way little differing from Calvin's later on.

The difficulties of Berengarius, against the plurality of eucharistic presences and against the disparity in size between the container and the content, would be simply and absolutely unanswerable were it a question of multiplying the Body of Christ itself (which is absurd). They collapse, if it is merely a question of multiplying its presence, and moreover, not a presence having extension, but a presence without any intrinsic relation whatever to the category of extension. It is a question of a presence which is not that of bulk in place, but that of substance or essence within the bulk. There is no clash between the conditions of the eucharistic presence and the laws of mathematics or of physics. We do not mean to say, however, that the eucharistie Body of Christ is without extension: it is such here as it is in heaven, being simply and totally the same: which it could not be, if we had to conceive it as devoid in our midst of those qualities and properties which are inherent in it in his own dwelling. For it must be evident that of one and the same subject it cannot be predicated, at one and the same time, that it actually has and has not this or that intrinsic qualification. But the manner in which Christ's Body exists, which is necessarily one, like that Body itself, is one thing; its manner of being present is another. The presence which that Body has in the heavenly place, or which it had once on earth, consists in a relation between two extensions, its own and that of the surrounding bodies.

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Two surfaces in contact locate each other reciprocally: and by means of the surfaces which constitute their extreme limits the two extensions find themselves located; so too by means of the extensions, the two substances to which the extensions belong. Such is the normal presence of bodies, such the presence of Christ in heaven: this kind of presence cannot be multiplied, because it is mathematically measured by the dimensions of the surface which circumscribes it, and by circumscribing it limits it, and consequently, if we may say so, exhausts it. But such is not the presence of the Body of Christ under the species or appearances of the bread. Body of Christ replaces the substance of the bread which was changed into it. Now it is quite certain that the substance of the bread did not have, in relation to its own extension (which survives after the miracle of transubstantiation), that sort of presence which consists in the comparing of two extensions; for the substance, once it is distinguished from its extension, does not any longer offer anything in itself which may still be considered as a system of dimensions. therefore, is every ground for a comparison of two extensions. And yet the substance was present, but in another way, which we cannot present to ourselves in its positive features, because it escapes our fancy, which is equipped only for what strikes the senses. And yet we cannot help affirming that mode of presence, or consequently attributing it, at a given moment, to the Body of Christ, to the substance of Christ's Body, successor and heir of the substance of the bread. the substance of that sacred Body is here present, present with regard to the species of the bread, and as it were by its own means, and not by means of its extension, as is the case with regard to its celestial location. On the contrary, here it is the extension itself which under the circumstances happens to be carried along in the wake of the substance. Instead of serving to locate the substance, extension here comes to share what the substance can communicate to it in that order of thought. And as no one gives what he does not have, the substance will impart to its own dimensions no other presence than

one which is totally foreign to the ordinary conditions of that local presence which results from the contiguity of two surfaces, the one enfolding, the other infolded. Thus we are led to speak of a sacramental presence, perfectly real, although differing in almost every point from what we know by the name of presence: a presence independent of every measure, and consequently not limited to this or to that volume, but capable of filling them all, and therefore, indefinitely multiplicable; a presence that, moreover, cannot be cut up into measurable parts, like that which develops along a surface by means of its own extension: consequently an indivisible presence, and hence a presence gathered together whole and entire in every part of the volume which it fills and which is no other than that of the species. It is a presence unique in its kind; a presence exclusively proper to the Eucharist, yet as real as the one in heaven, whatever may be the difference between the two. But a difference in the presence does not imply a difference in the manner of being or of existing. There is a sacramental presence; strictly speaking, there is no sacramental state: there is not a different state here and in heaven. Once more, Jesus Christ, being unique and not manifold, is found to be here such as he is in heaven, although the manner in which he is present is different. There is room, therefore, for a multiplication of Christ's presences, presences of his body, without thereby involving a multiplication of the Body of Christ.

The task of bringing this matter into clear lightl was to

¹ Among the disciples of St. Thomas, the most lucid on this point (till the appearance of Card. Billot) was Savonarola, who in his treatise De Veritate Fidei (Triumphus Crums') III, 17 (ed. Bâle, 1540, p. 213-214) wrote: "Aliquid enim est in hoc sacramento ex vi conversionis, et hoc est corpus et sanguis sub speciebus panis et vini: quia ad haec duo directe conversio terminatur. Aliquid vero ex naturali concomitantia: et haec certo sunt Christo semper realiter conjuncta. . . . Cum igitur quantitas corporis Christi non sit in hoc sacramento nisi ex naturali concomitantia, non comparatur Christus ad locum, ubi est sacramentum, mediantibus dimensionibus suis, ut eis locus adaequari oporteat; sed mediantibus dimensionibus panis remanentibus, quibus locus adaequatur. Unde Christus non existit in loco per se mediantibus propriis dimensionibus nisi in caelo. Cum jam dictum sit Christi corpus [et] sanguinem ex vi conversionis per suam substantiam in hoc esse sacramento, ejusque dimensiones in eo ex naturali esse concomitantia, non est inconveniens totum Christi corpus sub qualibet hujus sacramenti esse particula."

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be accomplished by the Schoolmen, and chiefly by St. Thomas. In the meanwhile the efforts of our medieval Doctors were to bear on another point, and that an eminently vital one. We must have noticed that the whole system of Berengarius rests on this basis: the impossibility for the Body of Christ to be at once reality and figure, substance and symbol. It was this foundation which had to be destroyed in order to bring to the ground the new heresy. Our Doctors grappled with the task with ever growing success. There was first Durand of Troarn, then Lanfranc, handling the subject in somewhat unskilled fashion. Then came Guitmond showing more assurance, then Alger—all of them Benedictine monks, then especially the friend of St. Bernard, William of Saint Thierry, who left nothing to be done after him, except to give to his entirely decisive solution, that methodical and scholastic turn which it was to receive in Paris from Hugh of Saint Victor, and still more thoroughly after him, from the author! of the Sum of the Sentences, which work has come down to us under the name of Hugh of Saint Victor. Certainly, the Body of Christ is real in the holy Eucharist, as real as in paradise, since it is the same. It is substantially present here in place of the bread; and yet, real and substantially present though it be, it is a figure, it is in its very reality a symbol; itself, the Body of Christ, is a sign and a sacrament. Of what, if you please? Of what can it be the sacrament and the sign? Of what can it be the symbol and the figure? That the shadows of the Old Testament should serve in advance to typify him, like the paschal lamb, like the bread of Melchisedech, we have no difficulty in understanding. That in the New Testament, the species of the bread and of the wine should serve also to figure him—this, too, fits into the order of things. But that he himself should serve to figure something else, he, the Lord of glory, the ultimate goal and term of everything-that is unbelievable. What is there beyond

¹ Still unknown a short time ago, but identified, since the above lines were written, by Fr. Chossat, as Hugh of Mortagne, who wrote some fifteen years after the death of his namesake of Saint Victor.

the Lord, beyond the Christ, what is there great and grand enough, august and sacred enough, that he should use himself to be its symbol? There is ourselves, you and I, the Christians of the whole world; ourselves, but assuredly not ourselves separated and isolated from Christ; ourselves united to Christ, aggregated to Christ, incorporated in Christ, one in Christ.:-there is the Christ living in us and we living on his life. This is why Christ in His-own person wished to become a sacrament, in order tô Eê the efficacious sign of all thaE He placed~himself in the order of signs, in the order of symbols, to have the joy of symbolizing and, by symbolizing it, of building up the mystical Body of which we are the members. The Body formed in the womb of the Virgin Mary and carried upon the Cross, the Body glorified in the heavens, is in the Eucharist the sacrament of that mystical Body which is made up of the Christ and of us, of the Head and of all his members communicating with him in the unity of the same life: final plenitude, spiritual integration of ChristJesus, which shall not be completed till the end of time, when, piece by piece and stone by stone, that temple of God being entirely constructed, and each one of the elect set in his vital place in the Son of God's economy, the Son of God shall hand over the kingdom to his Father, and present to him the universality of the saints, fused and welded in his own Person, in the Person of the only Son; when the Father, in his turn, will say to him, as he did of old on the day of his resurrection, and still earlier in the splendour of eternal stillness, Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten Thee. Eternal generation of the Word; generation of the Word incarnate in the race of David, and at the close of his humiliations promoted to the fullness of the glory of the only Son of God, the Lord of the celestial inheritance; consummated and final generation of the Christ integrally made up of all his adopted members: here is the one, single, invariable occupation of the heavenly Father; and you can see how closely it touches and grips us. We are at the last stage of this unique generation of the unique Son, like the supreme effort of divine paternity, like

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the last fibre of that texture of flesh which an almighty hand has wrapped round the immaterial substance of the Word of God. Such is the reality of which the eucharistic Christ is the sacrament; such is the meaning and import of his presence under the species of the bread and wine, common food of the children of Adam; such the effect it brings about in those privileged to eat of this sacred food whose function is to transform every one of us into Christ.

You see now how this whole discourse, with its laborious introduction and its somewhat uncertain development, was leading to a magnificent conclusion: the one which we owe to those Doctors who saved the faith in the real presence, by demonstrating its importance. There is something in the Eucharist which is merely the sign of the Body of Christ: the sensible elements which reveal and contain it. There is also the Body of Christ most truly present in its own substance in place of the bread. Both things, figure and reality, sufficed for St. Paschasius Radbertus to solve the difficulties of Rath-But the Body of Christ, which is the thing signified and contained under the species, is also in its turn a sign, the sign of that Church which fills up all times and all spaces, and forms with Christ but one flesh, et erunt duo in carne una, in a unity which is itself the effect of that sign: "Because one is the bread, one body are we, the many who all partake of the one bread." (Z Cor. x 17). When God willed to create the world, he created it by his Word, by his eternal locution, per quem omniafacta sunt, as we sing in our ancient Credo. And when God willed to raise up the world from its ruins, he did so once more by his Word, but by his Word made flesh, and what is more, in that very flesh of his (immolated and resuscitated, now invisible, but mysteriously clothed in appearances that reveal him), in his eucharistic flesh, I say, turning himself finally into something like a word uttered in figure by the Father, into a kind of subsisting speech, into a living and efficacious intimation of that plan of unity with which the divine intelligence is at work, in order to sum up all things in Christ, and through Christ in God.

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Again I repeat, this is the Eucharist, this is Christ the sacrament. Realizing this, we realize what in the real presence is of paramount interest. More important than to know how it comes about is to know why it comes about; for what purpose. You know now: it is that this presence of the Body and Blood of Christ, by the significance it assumes in the Eucharist, may produce in those who receive the sacrament the grace of union of each one with Christ, and of all with one another in Christ, till the time of the final consummation of unity in the glorious resurrection.

Therefore, the real presence must not be considered only or chiefly in itself and for itself: as if it were an end, but first of all in its bearing on the spiritual unity to which it \ | leads as a means. Hence, too, the purpose of communion, u the whole object of communion, is not to tell myself that 11 Jesus Christ is substantially present within me; this sub-Il stantial presence within me is the pledge in me of a spiritual union by which I form but one spirit with the Lord, and but Ik one flesh in the spirit. Consider on this point the difference between our Eucharist and some such presence of the Body and of the Blood of Christ as we might (by way of a metaphysical hypothesis) imagine to have been accomplished, apart from the Eucharist, by the transubstantiation of any substance whatever, without any symbolical intent, without any other purpose than that of ensuring the presence of the Saviour among men. Imagine, if you wish, precious stones or precious metals, or a flower, transubstantiated by an immediate operation of the divine power. Divine power could have done so, but one might well be tempted to ask to what purpose. To bring him nigh unto us? But this material proximity, by itself alone, is of little avail; compared to his spiritual presence in our souls it is as nothing. non prodest quicquam, spiritus est qui vivificat. But if this proximity, this presence, this *intussusceptio* of his Body and Blood happens to possess the virtue of unfolding in me the spiritual intimacy of which it has been set up as the sign and the pledge, then truly does it become supremely precious and beyond valuation.

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Compare in this respect the position of a baptized with that of'an unbaptized person. With regard to the baptized person, the eucharistie Christ is the vital principle of his soul, to whom it clings when receiving. For the unbaptized person, even if acting in good faith,' but by some unaccountable ignorance and without evil intention, he were to receive the Body of Christ, that reception is for him without effect, ex opere. operato; it remains inoperative (even if, having faith and charity, he were in the state of grace)—caro non prodest quicquam. Yet this does not happen for lack of the real presence, but because this flesh (really present) is for him, is in reference to him, no sacrament, no sign. It is a sacrament for none but the baptized, its mission being to signify union with Christ, incorporation in Christ, of those only whom baptism has already marked with the seal of the death of the sinful life of Adam. So true is it that the importance of the Eucharist, the usefulness of the Eucharist, comes to it from its character of a symbol, but not of a symbol that is hollow and empty, non inanis mysterii symbolum, as St. Fulbert of Chartres indignantly protested, but of a symbol just the same, of a symbol full of a substantial reality, which is the Flesh of the Word of life. Flesh which has itself become a word. a divine oracle, in order to express (and to effect what it expresses) the life of Christ in the members of Christ—as the eternal Word, the uncreated pattern of beings, has only to be uttered in the bosom of the divine intelligence, in order that by him all things be said and by him all things be made. There is indeed unity in the thoughts of the Godhead.

And now if we ask ourselves how and why there actually came to this Body of Christ, to this Flesh which is human like ours, the prodigious power of expressing in the supernatural order, and of impressing upon the immaterial substance of our souls, this divine purpose of unity; in other words, if we ask ourselves what has earned for the real presence its right to become the appropriate symbol of an Incarnation continued, as it were, and extended as far as ourselves, we must, to find the reason, ascend to the august origin of the

eucharistic mystery. The great stream of sacramental efficacy is derived from a word and a gesture wherewith Christ, in the Cenacle, Priest according to the order of Melchisedech, consecrated himself as Victim for the remission of the sins of the world. Victim he was to be, not only in the intent and by the trend of his offering, but also actually, by the carrying into effect, by the bloody execution of that purpose and of that pledge which constituted him the ransom of mankind. Victim he was to be by the steel of the executioner, by the wounds and bruises which were to let flow all his When dead, he was to be hallowed, immortalised in his character of Lamb of God and price of the world by the explicit consent of the other contracting party, of the receiving party, who was his Father, henceforth in safe possession in his paradise of what was paid out to him for our redemption. In this way does Christ remain the eternal Redeemer, the eternal Lamb of God, the Victim of the sacrifice offered once and eternally accepted and retained by the God of glory. Now, it is distinctive of the victim of sacrifice—and this is true of all religions, as well of those that declined from their primitive purity as of the one that was safeguarded by the sacredness of the Covenant, by the Law and the Prophets it is among all peoples distinctive of certain victims of sacrifice, once they have been offered and consecrated, to symbolize, by their return to man under the form of food, the union of the worshipper with his God, in a table-companionship which sets up between the heavenly Host and his earthly guests a community of life, a familiarity, a fusion, an association of holiness, in which we must recognize the prelude of a still closer union in the life to come. In this manner the gift made to God, by reverting to man, presents itself as a sacrament, that is to say, as a symbol of the sanctifying action of God. The first sacraments of mankind, and perhaps for a long time the only ones, were the first fruits of the fields and the firstlings of the flocks, whose type is already exemplified by Cain and Abel, as later on, under a more elaborate form, the bread and wine of Melchisedech, and finally all the

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pacific sacrifices of the Old Law. The victim of sacrifice is in the fullest sense and preeminently the sacrament. But what was true of the shadows is still more true of the reality; and if Jesus Christ is a sacrament, let us no longer be surprised, for he is victim, the Victim. Therefore he is not a \sacrament only metaphorically and in a manner of speaking; he is the Sacrament par excellence, the Sacrament of sacraments. \

Such is the way, or at least one way, of studying the real presence: it consists in not fixing the eyes merely upon the fact of the real presence, but in directing the look to the causes explaining the real presence: upon its final cause and upon its formal cause, as they say in the School. In other words, we must consider its significance, as eloquent as it is efficacious, deriving, as it does, from the august character of Victim which henceforth is inseparable from him in whose person his Father contemplates, with a complacency that works our salvation, the Lamb, for ever laid upon the altar of the Sacrifice by which heaven and earth were reconciled. Ecce Agnus Dei, ecce qui tollit peccata mundi; and again, and as a sequel. Corpus Domini nostri Jesu Christi custodiat animam tuam in vitam aeternam. Arnen. Such is the language of the Eucharist: it is for every one of us to see and experience how friendly it is, both in its tenor and in its style.



APPENDIX ON MASS-OFFERINGS

It may be rendering a service to the reader who likes precision, to give, in a scholastic form, a short summary of the necessarily long and complex discussion of the problem relating to the Mass-offerings.

Quaestio de stipendio pro applicatione missae debito ex justitia commutativa, scatet difficultatibus (ut notatum est a Lugone olim, et nostris diebus a G. Arendi), habito respectu ad prohibitionem simoniae ex iure naturali. Ouanquam enim constat inter omnes doctores catholicos,, dari et accipi illud ut stipendium sustentationis, tamen quomodo pro tali stipendio pactio fieri possit onerosa circa missae applicationem, omissis quidem illis theologis qui iustitiae debitum negant immerito, ita plerique inter se dissentiunt (appellata ab aliis locatione operae, ab aliis conventione do ut facias, ab aliis donatione modali), ut quod vitium simoniae declinare quisque contendit, affingat ceteris, nec sine validis rationibus. Ouare aliam viam inire licet. quam commendat conspectus sacrificiorum historicus. partes in sacrificiis veterum habuit ovis hominis laici per sacerdotem litanda, easdem habent in sacrificio eucharistico (servatis servandis) oblationes fidelium. Quo fit ut quemadmodum sacerdoti Hebraeorum de hostia semel litata liceret vesci, quin censeretur a laico viro remunerari, sed a Deo (cui munus iam consecratum erat) ali; sic sacerdoti Christianorum suppetit ex mensa altaris victus, non quasi a fidelibus impensus sibi, sed a Deo retributus, cui eatenus censetur a quopiam sterni mensa sacrificiorum, quatenus sufficiat oblatio et ritui eucharistico celebrando et sacerdoti sustentando, altaris participi. Quae paritas et suadetur ex Paulo, et affirmatur a testibus traditionis, et praesertim liturgiis illustratur. Unde intelligitur quomodo fideles sint suffragii, oblationi suae correspondentis, proprii directores.

Contra hanc autem solutionem objectiones moveri nonnullae solent ex variis capitibus. 1°. Ex discrimine inter oblationes collectivas

veterum christianorum et nostras individuas. Cui respondetur primo, non per hoc diversificari genus contractus; secundo, neque apud nos desiderari oblationes collectivas, neque apud veteres defuisse individuas.— II0. Ex discrimine inter pecuniarias nostras stipes hodiernas et esculenta munera veterum. Respondetur unum alteri aequivalere; quod nec veteribus ipsis ignotum fuit, et a mediaevalibus, eo tempore quo commutatio potissimum invaluit, praedicatum est; quanquam ob periculum minime spernendum speciei cuiusdam mercatoriae quidam aut obstiterunt aut torvo oculo rem consideraverunt.— III°. Ex discrimine inter continuam oblationum antiauarum cum sacrificio connexionem ac proximitatem et nostram [longissimis aliquando intervallis divisam a missa) erogationem stipendii. Respondetur discrimen esse accidentale, nec afficere substantiam contractus, auemadmodum nec communionis ad sacrificium habitudo laeditur dilatione.— IV0. Ex discrimine inter oblationes universo clero communes et stipendia nostra uni sacerdoti propria. Respondetur specietenus tantum differre, cum olim universus clerus concelebraret. Praeterea apud nos similis obtinet usus in stipendiis missarum solemniorum.— V°. Quodpotissimum est, ex obligatione hodierna celebrandi ad intentionem dantis, et quidem ex condicto; cuiusmodi obligatio veteribus reputatur fuisse ignota. Respondetur eamdem obligationem viguisse apud veteres, cui satisfaciebant deferendo sacrificium alterius; siquidem nequit sacrificium deferri ut ab altero demandatum, quin intentioni demandantis inserviat commendandae aut suffragio provehendo. Ad sacrificium autem taliter deferendum tenebantur ex iustitia commutativa tanquam depositarii simul atque mandaterii. Per modum depositi enim iacet penes sacerdotem munus a fidelibus in sacrificii lalriam destinatum, donec susceptum transmissionis seu consecrationis mandatum exsecutus ille fuerit. Cum autem par inveniatur fuisse obligatio veterum et modernorum, concluditur contra adversarium non oportere ad obligationem iustitiae verificandam confugere ad aliud pactum praeter illa duo quae ex deposito et mandato oriuntur gratuita; supervacare ergo contractum omnem onerosum, puta locationem operae, vel conventionem do ut facias, vel donationem modalem. Unde apparet, primo, cur, in ipsa applicatione missarum, " cuiusvis generis mercedum conditiones, pacta", prohibuerit Ecclesia, non autem prohibuerit bolationem seu stipendium solitum, aut inde scaturientem contractum

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institiae commutativae; secundo, cur pecuniaria quaevis pactio {exceptis titulis· extrinsecis} sit in aliis sacramentis simoniacum, non autem in sacrificio missae.

Huic autem doctrinae, vindicatur auctoritas potissimum Thomassini, B. Roberti Bellamini et S. Thomas, praeter alios, ut van Espen, Lupum, Berlendi, etc.

THE LAST SUPPER AND CALVARY

A Reply to Criticsl

I

The circumstances that have called for the present paper are still fresh presumably in the memory of most readers of the Ecclesiastical Review. In 1921 appeared a work called Mysterium Fidei on the Eucharistic mystery. The welcome extended to it in the Press has been, I am afraid, too generous; so much so, indeed, that it would make it very awkward for the author, were he to quote the appreciations of his learned brethren, the theologians of nearly every country in the Old and New Worlds. But Divine Providence, always careful to place by the side of our ills their remedy, lest perhaps the greatness of the sympathy shown me should exalt me, has seen to it that I was not left without the sting of vehement opposition on the part of two distinguished members of a well-known London community, St. Dominic's Priory, Haverstock Hill. One of them, the first in point of time and possibly of dignity, the Rev. Vincent McNabb, O.P., has published his objections in an English magazine called Blackfriars (Sept. 1923, pp. 1086 if.). The other, the Rev. Alfred Swaby, O.P., with a view to supplementing what has been left undone by his senior, has written a special article for the Ecclesiastical Review?

^{1 (}American) Ecclesiastical Review, July, 1924.

² In future references the Ecclesiastical Review will be represented by ER, and . Blackfriars by B, while MF stands for Mysterium Fidei.

It is a great pleasure for me to place here on record the debt of gratitude which I owe to several contributors to the ER; in the first place to Bishop MacDonald, who introduced the work before the American public, and lately again wrote in defence of it; to the Rev. F. J. Connell, C.SS.R., who stepped in more than once with kindly remarks; and last, but not least, to the correspondent who signi himself "Episcopus", and is, I believe, something more even than a Bishop.

THE LAST SUPPER AND CATHOLIC DIVINES FROM HENRY VIII TO THE COUNCIL OF TRENTI

On taking leave of the Rev. A. Swaby, O.P., some time ago, at the close of a discussion conducted in the American Ecclesiastical Review* I expressed the wish and hope that our difference of opinion might leave unimpaired those sentiments of mutual esteem and sympathy, which among men of good will and good faith are the natural foundation of sound friendship. Now, at the sight of his grave, unexpectedly opened to shelter him from this world of trouble and of strife; in view of his passage to the land of the unseen, where vision fails not, nor can doubt or ambiguity hamper any more our grasp of the revealed truth, I bow to his memory with the respect due by one still groping through shadows and deceits to him who sees and who knows.

This respect will not suffer from a calm scientific examination of the view which in his last days he propounded, in opposition to mine, on the bearing of the Supper to the Cross in the redemptive Sacrifice of the Lord. I hold this Sacrifice to have been made up of those two factors, Cross and Supper. He locates it in the Passion only, without the Eucharistic rite. The occasion for his last (posthumous) paper (Blackfriars, February, 1925, 'Henry VIII and a Modem Controversy') was an appeal from my friend, Bishop Macdonald, 2 to Henry VIII in favour of the above oneness of the Sacrifice, begun

XXV-June 1925.

¹ Irish Ecclesiastical Record, June, 1925.

² November, 1923, 'A New Theory of the Eucharistic Sacrifice, by the Rev. A. Swaby, O.P.; July, and August, 1924, 'The Last Supper and Calvary: A Reply to Critics,' by the present writer. (See above, pp. 229-278).

'Irish Ecclesiastical Record, October 1924, pp. 342-343- Fifth Series, Vol.

in the Cenacle and finished on Calvary. It seemed possible for Father Swaby not only to deprive us of the support of Henry, but even to turn Henry's testimony against our theses.

Many a reader, perhaps may wonder whether the authority of Henry VIII is of such import as to justify a public discussion of the side on which it leans. Yet it should be remembered that when an author calls upon an authority to support his views, he should be prepared to defend his appeal, if challenged, or else to waive it. Much more should this be done, if it be shown that the authority, far from being favourable, is contrary to the thesis. Besides, Henry's authority is not negligible. It is nothing to be compared of course with St. Thomas or any of the leading Doctors of the Church. But it received additional weight from the high praise4 meted out to the King's book by the Pope, and moreover from the success which it met with in theological circles.2 Therefore, having gone the length myself,3 even before the Bishop of Hebron, of appealing to Henry, I feel in duty bound to stand the ordeal, and either justify myself, or acknowledge my guilt. Caesarem appellasti, ad Caesarem ibis. I must be judged by Henry, at least as in an inferior court, if not in the final

1 An indulgence of ten years and ten quarantines was granted for the reading

2 As an example of this success may be quoted the following from the future Bishop of Vienna, John «Fabri (Opus adversus nova quaedam et a Christiana prorsus aliena dogmata Martini Lutheri, Romae, 1522, fol. 2): 'Serenissimus et invictissimus princeps et dominus Henricus Angliae et Franciae huius nominis rex octavus ___ tuam erroris monstrosissimam hydram gladio sacrae scripturae quasi aliqua clava Herculis prostravit, ita ut me legentem non modo maiestas illa dicendi, quae illi peculiaris est, sed et gravissimae sententiae reddiderint plane stupidum et attonitum. . . . lam in toto terrarum orbe inter serenissimos doctissimus et inter doctissimos serenissimus perpetua laude cantatur; de quo et olim, id quod de Aenea Maro cecinit, Anglia illa cui soli philosophantem regem contigisse videmus cantabit:

> Rex erat Henricus nobis, quo iustior alter Nec pietate fuit nec bello maior et armis.

Nec id* immerito fiet. Siquidem altera manu virgam pastoris, altera vero sceptrum regium gestat. These dithyrambic words must have been written a very short while after the appearance of Henry's book, seeing that the Opus which contains them bears as the date of its publication the eve of Lady Day, 1522« We may now think that Henry was only too fond of the *pastoral staff,' and needed no encouragement to couple it with the 'sceptre of royalty.'

3 MF, p. 54.

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court of appeal. But beside this reason of a moral order, I may perhaps confess to another one, less exalted, more utilitarian. It seems to me that a brief inquiry into Henry's meaning may serve as an introduction to a more general and more interesting question, namely; which was the point of view of Catholic divines in the controversy with Protestants on the problem of the Last Supper, from the outbreak of the Reformation to the conclusion of the Council of Trent? Unless you understand that, you are apt to misunderstand certain theological documents of the gravest importance.

I

But let Henry have first his due. Does he condemn us; or does he commend us?

The condemnation is alleged to be implied in the very method, followed by the King in his discussion with Luther. Luther's denial of the sacrificial character of the Mass is rebutted by Henry solely (we are told) on the ground of the connection which must be maintained between the Mass and the redemptive Sacrifice of the Cross, granted even that at the Supper there were no sacrifice. This very method shows that to Henry the Sacrifice of the Passion, on which he takes his stand, does in no wise depend on the sacrificial character of the Supper, which (according to the terms governing the controversy) must remain an open question. To interpret Henry otherwise would amount to making him assume, what he claims (tacitly) not to assume.

Such is the argument. It admits of certain reservations.

First, even supposing that the King had granted provisionally the non-sacrificial character of the Supper, nevertheless his treatment of the Cross as a sacrifice would not necessarily imply that in his eyes the Passion and Death of the Lord was a true sacrifice by itself, without the previous consecration of the

bread and wine. Once Luther had admitted, in common with all Catholics, that there certainly was a sacrifice on Calvary, then, whatever he might think of the Supper, it would do for the vindication of our daily sacrifice, to point to its intrinsic connection with the Cross, as a renewal thereof. This is what Henry did, both by appealing to the testimony of Scripture, and by arguing from an admission of Luther. Luther held that the Mass was nothing but a testament, a promise on the part of Christ, a promise of pardon and grace, with the addition of a visible token, bread and wine, conveying to us the Body that was bruised and the Blood that was shed for us in that Sacrifice of the Cross, by which the promise or testament had been confirmed.

. Henry seizes upon this idea of the Testament and its confirmation by Death: and concludes that the Mass, once identified with the Testament, must include not only the deeds of the Supper, but also the *oblation of* Calvary which confirmed them: that is, both elements of the Testament. Therefore it is not true that the Mass reproduces the Supper apart from the Cross, as Luther had assumed, but together with the Cross. It reproduces therefore the (admittedly) sacrificial *oblation* of the dying Christ. Thus the priest at Mass does alike what Christ did in the Eucharistic rite, and what he did in his bloody Passion. Therefore he *offers*, and therefore the Mass is a sacrifice.

Here are Henry's words 2:

^{1°} Est itaque Missa secundum substantiam suam nihil aliud quam verba Christipraedicta , Accipite et manducate, etc., ac si dicat: Ecce, o homo peccator et damnatus, ex mera gratuitaque charitate qua diligo te, sic volente misericordiarum Patre^ his verbis promitto tibi, ante omne meritum, et votum tuum, remissionem omnium peccatorum tuorum et vitam aeternam; et ut certissimus de hac mea promissione irrevocabili sis, corpus meum tradam, et sanguinem fundam, morte ipsa hanc promissionem confirmaturus, et utrumque tibi signum et memoriale ejusdem promissionis relicturus. Quod cum frequentaveris, mei memor sis, hanc meam in te charitatem et largitatem praedicas et laudes, et gratias agas' (De Captivitate Babylonica Ecclesiae Praeludium. D. Martin Luther's Werke, Critische Gesamtausgabe, Weimar, Band 6, 515) Iu this sense Luther, when replying later to Henry, wrote again: Ex verbis Christi probavi [in De Captivitate Babylonica] Missam esse testamentum et promissionem, ideo non posse opus aut sacrificium dici. . . Missa est vere et proprie, sicut nos de ea loquimur, ipsum verbum promissionis cum signo adiecto panis et vini '—(Contra Regem Angliae, 10 Band, Zweite Abteilung, p. 210).

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£After noting first of all that many a time within his hearing, did Catholic preachers dwell on this subject of Christ's Testament or Last Will (which Luther would have us believe that he had brought back to light), and indeed that they dealt with it 'more consistently and more correctly than Luther, in so far as they referred to the Testament not only what Christ did in the Supper, but also what He suffered on the Cross' (p. 37), the King reverts of set purpose to this point. Let others, he says, take Luther to task, and perhaps rightly, for his explanation of the Testament (p. 39)] 'I will not shake that foundation which he insists should be immovable. I will only show that the structure, which he has reared upon it, at once falls of To make this clear, let us consider for a while the origin of the whole matter (totius rei), and examine the Mass in reference to its first model. Christ then, in that most holy Supper by means of which he instituted this Sacrament, out of the bread and wine made his Body and Blood, which he gave to his disciples to eat and drink; and within a few hours this same Body, this same Blood he offered on the altar of the Cross as a sacrifice to the Father for the sins of the people: which sacrifice being finished, the testament was perfected (quo sacrificio peracto testamentum consummatum est). At the Supper Christ, being already close to his death, as the custom is with dying people, by a testament declared his mind as to "instituting then the Sacrament, after he had presented to his disciples his Body and Blood, he said to them: Do ye this in memory of me. He who diligently examines this, will see that Christ, as eternal Priest, in place of all the sacrifices which were offered by the temporary priesthood of the Mosaic Law (whereof the greatest number were types and figures of this holy Sacrifice) did institute one Sacrifice, the greatest of all, the fullness of all, and (as it were) the sum of all, that it might be offered to God, and given for food to the people.

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and ordained to be priests, that they might perform the same Sacrament in memory of him. What does this mean, but that they were to consecrate, and not only to partake themselves, but also to impart to the people and offer to God?

'For, if Luther objects that the Priest cannot offer, because Christ in the Supper did not offer, let him remember what he said himself, namely, that a testament involves in it the death of the testator, and [therefore] has no force or power, nor attains to its full perfection, till the testator be dead. Wherefore, not only do those things belong to the Testament, which Christ first did at the Supper, but also his oblation on the Cross: for on the Cross he consummated the Sacrifice which he had begun in the Supper. And thus the commemoration of the whole thing, to wit, of the consecration in the Supper, and of the oblation on the Cross, is at once celebrated and represented by the Sacrament of the Mass: so much so indeed, that [of the two] it is the Death that is more verily represented than the Supper. For the Apostle, when writing to the Corinthians [in these words]: As often as you shall eat this bread and drink the chalice, adds, not the Supper of the Lord, but: His Death shall you proclaim ' (pp. 39-41).

В

[Then again.] Luther denied that there was any work (opus) done in the Mass; only a promise given. The King replies that the Mass 'is no more a promise than was Christ's own consecration': 'did not Christ perform a work, when of the bread he made his Flesh?' Yes, and 'a good work.' Therefore 'it cannot be denied that in the Mass the priest is performing a good work, since he is doing nothing but what Christ did in the Supper and on the Cross. For this is meant by the words of Christ; Do ye this in memory of me; by which words what could he mean, but that they should represent and effect in the Mass what was done by him at the Supper and on the Cross. For he was instituting and

beginning in the Supper the sacrament which he perfected on the Cross.

As it is impossible therefore to deny that Christ did a good work at the Supper and on the Cross, nor that the Priest represents and does the same in the Mass, how can anyone imagine that the Mass is no good work?

Whereas therefore a layman only receives at the hands of the Priest (even as the apostles at the hands of Christ received on that first occasion) the Priest himself does the same as Christ then did: for he offers to god the same Body that was offered BY CHRIST' (pp. 41-43).

c

[Again :] 'Luther says that unless we hold the Mass to be a promise or testament, as [Christ's] words clearly imply, [then] the whole Gospel fails us, nor is there any solace left for us. The words [of Christ] we have heard; there remains to see the example: and the example is at once submitted. Christ (he says) in the Last Supper, while instituting this Sacrament and framing the Testament, did not offer it to God the Father, nor effect it as a good work for the sake of others, but sitting at his meal, he put before each of his disciples this Testament, and [to each] ministered the sign [or Sacrament]. These then are the words of Christ, this the example, from which Luther, and he alone, sees [the following conclusion to flow] manifestly: that the Mass is no sacrifice, no oblation.' [Here the King observes that to be a promise, and to be a sacrifice, are not things irreconcilable of themselves: for instance the sacrifices of the Law, which were promises of the Sacrifice to come. But] 4 now let us come to the example of Christ, by which Luther fancies we are to be crushed, because in the Supper Christ did not use the Sacrament as a sacrifice, nor offer it to the Father; whence he tries to infer that the Mass, being bound to correspond to its example, by means of which Christ instituted it, cannot be a sacrifice nor an oblation. If Luther wishes to bring us back to the example of the Lord's Supper so strictly that the priests be not allowed

to do but what we read there to have been done by Christ, then the Sacrament which they consecrate they will never receive themselves. For in the Gospel, where we are told about the Supper, we do not read that Christ did himself receive his Body.' [If Doctors teach that he did, if the Church sings it, this is of no avail to Luther: for he does not receive such authorities. Yet he allows the communion of the celebrant.] 'The matter then shows that not only do the Priests in this Sacrament accomplish what Christ did in the Supper, but also what he did on the Cross.' [No, the written word is not our only source of information, but also apostolic tradition.] 'If then the Priests are right in receiving what they consecrate, although there is no clear scriptural proof (the only kind acceptable to Luther) that Christ did the same in the Supper or elsewhere, Luther ought not to be surprised if the priest offers Christ to the Father: a thing which Scripture clearly and repeatedly tells us that Christ himself did on the Cross. For that the Cross too should belong to the Testament wrought in the Supper, is a thing which follows from Luther's own principle, namely, that a testament involves the death of the testator, as that which alone gives it its ultimate perfection. . . Let him cease therefore to oppose [us with] this futile argument; Christ did not offer himself in the Supper; therefore the priest should not be held to offer in the Mass. [No. this is no argument,] for in the Mass the priest does not only reproduce what Christ did at the Supper, but also what he did on the Cross, where he consummated what he had begun in the Supper' (pp. 45-49).

Such are the relevant passages. The argument of Luther is simple:—

The Mass contains only the Supper. But the Supper was no sacrifice. Therefore the Mass contains no sacrifice.

Against this argument Henry had the choice between two methods. He might be content with disproving the major.

He might also pass on to the minor. Actually he attacked the major.

To both litigants the Cross was a sacrifice. No matter how it was a sacrifice, no matter what the requisites of this sacrifice or its constitutive elements might be, the fact was there, to be held on faith: there has been a sacrifice on the Cross. Now from St. Paul's words to the Corinthians on the memorial of the Death, and again from Luther's teaching on the identity between Testament and Supper on the one hand, on the unity of the Testament with the Death on the other hand, Henry contrives to show that not only the Supper is reproduced at the Mass, but in conjunction with it, and indeed preeminently, the work of the dying Christ. Thus the action of Christ on the Cross, his oblation, found itself enclosed within the things that the Mass is reproducing and renewing. And therefore the Mass was not, as Luther said, a reproduction of the Supper only, but of Christ's sacrifice on the Cross as well. And therefore Luther's major was false. And therefore the conclusion too. The conclusion was: the Mass is no sacrifice. Henry had vindicated his right to maintain the contrary: the Mass is a sacrifice.

This line of reasoning, if Henry chose to stop there, would leave the minor unaffected, and therefore undecided: neither granted nor denied. By no means then does it imply that Henry actually considered the Sacrifice of the Cross as constituted by the sufferings of Christ alone without his Supper. It may be that his opponent did consider it in that way; it may be that Henry did not: and nevertheless even then his was a perfectly legitimate and valid argument, once both parties were agreed that on the Cross there had been a sacrifice, whatever its essential elements might, or might not be.

So far with Henry's attitude towards Luther's major. But what, if he moreover questioned the minor itself? What if he dealt with it in such wise as to imply one sacrifice only of the Lord in the Supper and on the Cross? Then not only should we be free from condemnation at Henry's court, but

we should not even leave it without Royal commendation. This is what we have now to examine.

And first of all, Henry did not grant, even provisionally, the non-sacrificial character of the Supper. He asserted it. In the passage quoted under B we read that 'when the priest offers to God the same Body that was offered by Christ,' he 'does the same as Christ then did'; then, that is at the Last Supper, 'on that first occasion' when 'the apostles received at Christ's hands.' Christ therefore did offer at the Supper.

Secondly, this sacrificial offering of the Supper is connected with that of the Cross. The reader may have noticed how three times in the passage under A, and once under C, Henry combines the Supper and the Cross into the complete unity of the *Testament*. He does the same under B with regard to the *Sacrament*, instituted and begun at the Supper, perfected on the Cross. And under A the same had already been stated of the *Sacrifice*, begun at the Supper and consummated on the Cross.

The obvious meaning is, that, as in the way of Testament, so too in the way of Sacrifice and Sacrament, the Eucharist celebrated by Christ in the Supper compares with the work on the Cross as a beginning with its termination. In this sense Bishop Macdonald and myself were perhaps justified in appealing to the phrase: 'On the Cross he consummated the Sacrifice which he had begun in the Supper.'

If in his argumentation the King harps continually on the *Testament*, the reason is not (as one would have us believe, B, pp. 90 and 98) that he had in view the composite unity of some Eucharistic sacrifice of Christ, while excluding that of his redemptive sacrifice: a view for which there is not a shred of evidence in Henry's writings; a view furthermore which would imply the most hopeless confusion of thought: as if there could be a certain sacrifice of Christ, of which a component element would be *another* sacrifice of Christ; and

¹ How, in the eyes of old theologians, the Sacrament (as well as the Sacrifice) came to be consummated on the Cross, has been pointed out elsewhere $(MF, PP\cdot 44>45)$.

the one to be part of the other would be the greater of the two! The sacrifice of redemption, thus made to begin in the Garden, would be the latter half of a more extensive sacrifice, running from the Supper-Room to the Cross, but itself not redemptive! A more patent, a more blatant absurdity could not be ascribed to Henry more gratuitously. The very reason why under Henry's pen the *Testament* is ever recurring is simply the one which his whole argument lays bare; namely, that, given Luther's admission of these two stages of the Testament, its inception in the Supper and its consummation in Christ's Death, there is for us in that notion of Testament a useful handle for the introduction of a like combination between Death and Supper into the sacrificial sphere as well. That is all; there is no other mystery about it.

It is not true therefore that Henry ever granted to Luther, even tacitly or economically, the non-sacrificial character of the Supper. What he implicitly granted throughout, and indeed most consistently and rightly, was that the Supper could not be a sacrifice apart from the Cross, self-contained, as it were, but only in conjunction and combination with the Cross, as a component part of a whole: the whole being that sacrifice of which the termination was on the Cross, while its inception was in the Supper; that is, the one, continuous, perfect sacrifice, by which the Testament that constituted us heirs of God was both drawn up and sealed, couched in the mysterious language of the Eucharist, and confirmed in Blood. A very true doctrine, indeed, which we hail as the traditional presentation of the Mystery of Faith.

Nor does it follow that Henry would have then made the Sacrifice of Redemption, relative instead of absolute. By a relative sacrifice is meant in Theology a sacrifice relative to another sacrifice: as the sacrifices of old, for instance, were actually relative to the sacrifice of the Cross, to which our daily Mass also is essentially relative. But how could the Sacrifice of Redemption be said to be relative to another sacrifice, just because it is made up of two component parts, Cross and Supper, correlated to each other? The Supper

then is not another sacrifice than the Sacrifice of Redemption, but an element of it. A man's nature, although it consists of two elements in due relation to each other, body and soul, is not human relatively, as a speech might be, or a laugh, or food, or a carved figure; but it is human intrinsically, substantially and absolutely. Christ himself is a man in no relative sense, although he would not be a man without his human nature, which is not himself, but related to himself. The sacrament of the Eucharist is not a relative sacrament from the fact that its permanent element has reference to a transient form, from which it derives some definite significance. The form is part of the Sacrament and cannot therefore be compared with it as another sacrament. Just in the same way the rite of the Supper is part of the redemptive Sacrifice, without in the slightest manner impairing the essential absoluteness of the latter. To speak otherwise would lead us to say that every sacrifice is relative, and none can be absolute, because in some respect every sacrifice is made up of two essential elements correlated to each other: one visible (the outward gift), and the other invisible (the interior self-consecration of man to God): 'invisibilis sacrificii visibile sacramentum." Internal correlation means no relativeness of the whole.1

To conclude, Henry, far from being an opponent, is a witness to the old doctrine which locates the Lord's one Sacrifice both in the Supper and on the Cross: here to complete what was left incomplete there.

In Henry's eyes, as in the eyes of his contemporaries, the rite of the Supper contained a kind of Trilogy: a Testament,

¹ Since the above appeared in the Irish Ecclesiastical Record, the Rev. V. McNabb has delivered himself of the following remark (which cannot be well understood unless the reader bears in mind that when I say oneness of the Supper and the Cross in the way of sacrifice, the critic invariably translates dependence of the sacrifice of the Cross on another sacrifice for its ritual): "Because it is the relative that depends upon the absolute and not conversely, to suggest that the Passion and Death of our Redeemer was regulated by some rite other than its own is to cast doubt upon the absoluteness and divinity of the Apostle and High Priest of our confession, Jesus." (Introduction to Rev. A. Swaby's treatise, p. 23). It is clear enough that such ratiocination defies commentary.

a Sacrifice, and a Sacrament. A Testament, or Covenant, sealed by a Sacrifice, that yielded a Sacrament. In its threefold aspect, testamentary, sacrificial, and sacramental, the work ('opus') of the Supper was bound up essentially with the doings on the Cross, as both ends of the same process. The process is entire only when leaning upon Mount Sion and Mount Calvary. Each part of it is essential to the other. Each receives from its consort some element of the complete essence of Sacrifice, as well as of Sacrament, or of Testament, Therefore, not only of the Sacrifice, not only of the Sacrament, not only of the Testament does Henry affirm this composite essence—not only of the various members of the Trilogy taken singly and individually—but of the whole concern, en bloc, in this concluding phrase, which bears on all its aspects: 'The priest does not only reproduce what Christ did at the Supper, but also what he did on the Cross, where he consummated what he had begun in the Supper.' had begun, in every possible respect, sacrificial, sacramental, testamentary.

II

Henry's meaning seems clear enough. But a priori awf one conversant with the literature of the early sixteenth century would have no hesitation. Such thoughts were familiar to the men of the time. None of them would have dreamt of interpreting Henry otherwise.

In fact, Henry's merit was not to invent something new, but only to turn as an argument against Luther what was in the minds of his contemporaries. In this he gave a lead which was followed.

In his defence of Henry against Luther, 2 Fisher 3 notes that

¹ The same of course is true of the Mass, where we do what was first done by Christ. See Berthold of Chiemsee (Theologia Germanica, fol. a i), of whom more will be said hereafter: 'In se continet tria, videlicet divinum testamentum, et necessarium sacramentum, ac etiam oblationis sacrificium.'

[!] Contra Regem Angliae, p. 213.

^{&#}x27;Assertionum Regis Angliae de Fide Catholica adversus Lutheri Bayblonicam Captivitatem Defensio, cap. 9, § 2 et 3 (1523). In ed. Wicreburg, 1597, coi. 221.

not without good proof did the King couple the Supper with the Cross, as a compound to be reproduced at the Mass. Scripture itself shows that at the Supper had been begun the sacrifice which was consummated on the Cross. Whence follows naturally that the Mass cannot be the commemoration of either without being the commemoration of both.

The Chancellorl was not behind. He, too, came forward, like the Bishop, linking in the same way with the fulfilment on the Cross that which was begun in the Supper ('quod inceperat in coena'), the work that had been done there ('quod in coena fecit'), while the work consisted of making his Body out of the bread ('dum suum corpus faceret ex pane').

Beside those two English champions of the royal theologian, who were particularly likely, from their position, to know their lord's mind, there was also in Germany John Eck,2 who undertook his defence, with no other assistance, I presume, but the very text in hand. He falls in with the above. To him the connection between the doings at the Supper ('facta in coena f and the sacrificial death on the Cross is the King's Achilles, which remains untouched ('Achillem quoque [Lutheries] reliquit intactum'). And this argument approves itself so well to him that he reverts to it several times, not only in this pamphlet, but also in his later treatise, De Sacrificio Missae.3

But we can produce a man, I will not say of greater authority than Eck, who was himself the 'Achilles' of his time, as Pole called him, but one more conspicuous by his office as

¹ Responsio ad Comitia Martini Lutheri congesta in Henricum Regem (conscripta anno 1523 a Thoma Moro, et sub nomine Gulielmi Rossei edita). Ed. Franof. ad Moen, et Lips., 1689, p. 117.

³ Asseritur hie invictissimi Angliae Regis liber de Sacramentis a calumniis et impietatibus Lutheri, 1523, cap. 18, fol X i, coll. cap. 20, fol. I, iiii.

³ Cap. 9. Ed. Ingolst., 1531, fol. 10 b, 'Id saltem ab eo impetrabo: corporis (et sanguinis) mysteria ad testamentum Christi pertinere. . . . At testamentum (etiam Lutheri testimonio) involvit mortem testatoris. . . . Constituto itaque eo, quod testamentum mortem involvat testatoris, tunc ea quae sequuntur testamento involventur, sicut est oblatio facta in cruse,' etc. Compare, in the meantime, Enchiridion locorum communium adversus Lutherum, cap. 17. Ed. Lugd., 1571, p. 171: 'Liquet iam contra haereticos missam non solum repraesentare coenam dominicam, sed et passionem, mortem et oblationem.

an Inquisitor of the Faith, the Dominican Tilmann Smelingl who in the most unmistakable manner appeals to the consecration at the Supper as bound up with the Cross for the model and pattern of the sacrifice of the Mass. The Mass follows this prototype; and because in the prototype we see the Supper Eucharist to have been the very beginning 2 of what was to be completed and consummated on the Cross, therefore we shall say that the Mass in turn is a true sacrifice.

The same trend of thought had already been discernible, if I am not mistaken, under the pen of another Dominican, Lambrecht Campester,3 who, in a brief survey of Luther's errors, raised this passing cry on the Mass; 'O impudence, O audacity, O stupidity î Christ, the most loving Saviour of the world, by taking the chalice of eternal salvation before suffering, signifies that the Testament, on the next day, is confirmed by death, in water and in blood; and Luther, the apostate, gives to his curs a [mere] supper, instead—of—[the offering of] the Passion.'

At the same time his confrère, Eustace van der Rivieren (Eustachius de Zichenis, O.P.), to the objection of Luther

1 De Septem Sacramentis Liber Unus, qui . . . adsertionem eorum defensionemque adversus haereticos continet (1538). Ed. Paris, 1550, cap. 5, fol. 118: 'Incarna . . , aperte Christus insinuavit eucharistiam . . . sacrificium esse - - in eo quad addidit quod pro vobis tradetur in mortem. Per mortem enim suam tradidit semetipsum pro nobis oblationem et hostiam Deo in odorem suavitatis. Idem ergo corpus suum quod sub specie panis discipulis por rexit in coena, sub propria specie obtulit in cruce; atque id quod in coena inchoavit, in cruce consummavit. Jussit ut quod ipsefecerat hoc ipsum etiam facerent apostoli in sui memoriam, dicens: Hoc facite in meam commemorationem; hoc, inquam quod in coena feci, et in cruce perfeci: consequens profecto est - . . missam sive eucharistiam verum eue sacrificium.' There is no doubt that Henry's argument soon became classical.

'How before Smeling, his master, St Thomas (Sum. Theol. III, q. 83, a. 5, ad 3; q. 46, a. 9, ad 1) had shown the Passion of the Lord as an immolation of which the beginning should be hallowed and consecrated by the Supper Eucharist, may be seen in Blackfriars (Dec., 1924, pp. 552-554). Likewise, in The Last Supper and Calvary (see above, pp. 235 and 245), has been pointed out how in St. Thomas's eyes (4 D. 12 lit) the Supper Eucharist had been the method for Christ of offering his redemptive Sacrifice. It may be interesting to compare with St. Thomas Jerome Nichisola, O.P., Bishop of Teano, who in the Council of Trent said: 'Christus obtulit se in coena. . . obtulitque expiatorie. . . . Kam passio Christicoepit luna 14, ut B. Thomas (Sum. Theol. III, q. 46, a. g) tradit' (Ehses, Cone. Trid., 8, 776).'

'Apologia in Martinum Lutherum, Paris, 1523, fol. ff iii 2.

that the Supper was no Sacrifice (and therefore the Mass is none either), offers no other answer than the following: what Christ did in the Supper, he fulfilled on the Cross, where his Victimhood received its consummation.

However that may be, even if all this were irrelevant, even supposing that we had misunderstood not only Henry, but Fisher, More, Eck, Smeling and Campester, and van der Rivieren as well, there would still be, in those early days of the anti-Lutheran controversy, an authority which I trust no one in future will ever be tempted to begrudge us: I mean the authority of Berthold, 2 Bishop of Chiemsee. True, this most interesting theologian was no longer in pastoral office at the time when we meet him; he had resigned his see, for the purpose of devoting all his time, all his activities, all his talents, to the fight against the new heresy, on the very ground on which it was left mostly unchallenged; the ground of vernacular literature. At the bidding of his Metropolitan, Cardinal Lang, Archbishop of Salzburg, he set to work to build up a Summa of Catholic Doctrine for the use of the cultured laity. It came out in 1528, under the title of 'German Theology' (Tewtsche Theologeÿ). Such was the favourable impression it made on His Eminence the Primate that on December 17, 1528, he wrote to his Suffragan/ begging him and exhorting him not to deprive the rest of Christendom of the benefit of such a book, and therefore to translate it into Latin for the use of other nations. Which was done; and in the year 1531 appeared the Theologia

x Sacramentorum Brevis Elucidatio, 1523. New edition in 1905 in F. Pijper's Primitiae Pontificiae Theologorum Pieerlandicorum Disputationes contra Lutherum inde ab anno 1619 ad 1526 promulgatae. On page 339 of thisvolume we read: "Quod objicis Christum sese non obtulisse pro homine in coena, cum hoc sacramentum instituisset, et ideo neutiquam offerendum, hoc tibi respondemus: quatenus Servator, cum corpus suum tradidit, dicens. Hoc est corpus meum, item addiderit, quod pro vobis tradetur, Qua voce non aliud sane praeferebat quam quod mox praestabat opere. Piam progressus a coena, passionis suae supplicium auspicatur, dum mox pavore et metu distinetur, dum sanguinem sudat tam copiose, dum fuste, ferro, loris stringitur, dum vulnerant spinae, dum lacerant flagella, donec demum affixus crucis consummatam pro nobis hostiam offeret Deo Patri."

The Supper exhibits an offering, because there Christ consecrated himseff to the Passion and Death that would on the Cross achieve his victimhood.

^{&#}x27;The surname being Pirstinger, or rather Pürstinger. As an author, his name was Bertoldus, Episcopus olim Chiemensis.

THE LAST SUPPER AND CATHÔLÎG DÎVINËS

Germanica in qua continentur articuli de fide, evangelio, virtutibus et sacramentis, quorum materia iam nostra tempestate controvert! solet. We shall quote from this translation. In the meantime it may not be amiss to note that a fresh edition of the German work was published at Munich in 1852, at the instigation of the zealous and learned Dr. Windischmann, who contributed an Introduction, in which he states that 'Berthold is a remarkable and authentic exponent of what was taught and preached in Catholic Germany before the Council of Trent.'l Likewise, the Editor, Wolfgang Reithmeier, in his own Preface, points with satisfaction to the 'surprising identity between the teaching of Berthold and the definitions of the Council of Trent.'2 We are not therefore concerned with amateur speculation, but with quite representative theology. Now the centre of the book is occupied by the doctrine of the Eucharist; it opens with a chapter on the institution of the Mass, which reads as follows:

"Our Saviour instituted the Mass both by word and by deed. By word, when he said: Amen, amen, I say to you, except you eat theflesh of the Son of Man, etc. [In. vi, 54, 56, 59]. Then by deed was the Mass instituted, when the Lord Jesus in the holy Supper took bread, and blessed it, and brake and gave it to his disciples.

1 Noteworthy, too, are the following remarks from the same pen: 'The Deutsche Theologe was well acquainted with Scholasticism and its problems, nor was he averse from it; but he was gifted also with a deep mystical sense, which everywhere used to be connected with true Scholasticism. ___ May therefore the revived work of Berthold be a witness to the vitality of the Church, and to the immutability of her teaching.'. . . [May it benefit the Clergy], so that we, men of to-day, should not incur the blame of posterity for not having been able to hand down to the coming generation the heritage of Holy Faith which men like Berthold have saved for our land' (pp. v-vi).

2 The judgment of Reithmeier and of Windischmann may be compared with

2 The judgment of Reithmeier and of Windischmann may be compared with the following, from the Protestant Theologian, J. Ficker, of Strasburg, in the third edition of the Realencyklopàdiefir ftrotestanische Théologie und Kirche, vol. XXV, 37, (art. Piirstinger, p. 313). 'The Tewlsche Theology [is] one of the first great, comprehensive, and in many respects remarkable monuments of pronounced Catholic literature at the time of the Reformation; indeed, in immediate connection with the origins of the Catholic reformation. . . . It is the greatest . . . systematic exposition of the Catholic doctrine, in direct opposition to the Reformation, on the basis of Scripture and of Augustine, with a study of diverse Scholastic views, and an effort ____ to reconcile them. Thus does the work in its own way anticipate what was done at Trent.'

There the Lord began his mass,* which he afterwards completed on the cross; in the meantime laying a charge on his disciples that they, and all other priests [after them] should celebrate the Mass, in memory of his mass, that is of ms supper and of his bloodshed and death on the cross. Likewise ('itidem') the sacrifice of the Supper and of the Cross was there [in the Cenacle] begun, and here [on the Cross] consummated; and it is down to this day continued by way of a memorial. And albeit the Lord at the beginning of ms mass, (at the supper), imposed the priests this same office of the Mass, yet ms own mass, being (as aforesaid) consummated on the cross, was of a far different form and ritual from the other masses, which the Holy Ghost through the Apostles later shaped and designed" (cap. 62, §1, fol. Y vi).

In this one word Berthold has given the origin and essence of the Mass, and besides solved (without even mentioning it) the objection which Luther and his followers were wont to draw from the marked outward difference between the rite of the Supper and the liturgy of our masses. Our Mass in outward form differs from Christ's sacrifice mainly because it has not to extend beyond the consecration: the Death of the Lord having already intervened, which then was only in view, and therefore had to come in, before the sacrifice could be held complete and final.

This thought is Berthold's dominant idea throughout the whole treatise. He has to show that the Mass had been prophesied: here is the sacrifice of Melchisedech witnessed by Abraham, sung by David, and explained by St. Paul. How it applies to Christ is shown in the following quotation:

"The Order of Melchisedech, as Sovereign Priest of the Old Testament, was to proffer bread and wine. This figure must have its fulfilment in Christ, the Sovereign Priest of the New Testament. . . And the fulfilment of this figure Christ began in the Supper by blessing the bread and wine; and he afterwards ended it by dying on the Cross" (cap. 65, §5, fol. a ii).

1 In which sense Christ may be said or denied to have celebrated Mass I have already had occasion to state in *Blackfriars* (February, 1925, p. 108), in full concordance with the doctrine here propounded by Berthold.

Does Luther pretend that the Mass is no sacrifice, but only a feast? he is wrong; Christ said Hocfacite in meam memoriam.

"This word facite does not refer to communion without Mass, but to the actual celebration itself of the Mass, through which is sacramentally repeated the Supper and Death of Christ, as the beginning and ending of Christ's Mass" (cap. 62, §2, fol. y vi.).

The Mass is a sacrifice, and no mere feast, precisely because it renews, as a 'secondary sacrifice' (cap. 65, §4, fol. a i 2) that 'primary sacrifice' of Christ, made up of the Supper, which was its inception, and of the Cross, which was its determination.

Is this all clear enough? But there is more. Not only is the treatise of the Eucharist all moulded by that view; but the question of Holy Orders is also studied in the same light.

"Christ exercised his Priesthood when he blessed, broke, and gave the bread to his disciples and likewise the wine, and entrusted to them the sacerdotal office, ordaining them as priests by these words: "Hocfacite in meam commemorationem" This exceeding great Priesthood [ofhis] the Lord carried to its completion ("complevit") on the altar of the Cross by his own self-offering" (cap. 94, fol. 1, iiii).

It is certainly to be regretted that this theology of Berthold should never have been brought to bear on the current exposition of the Mass by modern theologians. Anyhow, as I have already said, I trust that no critic in future, when confronted with the teaching of the one undivided Sacrifice of Christ in the Supper and on the Cross, will be tempted to dub it a New Theory of the Eucharistic Sacrifice.! Rather what

1 Apparently I presumed too much on human candour. Since the above was published in the Irish Ecclesiastical Record, the Rev. V. McNabb (IER, Sept. J925) PP. 286-287) denied that Berthold should be understood to unify Supper and Cross, because although he had said that Christ's Mass, begun at the Supper, was completed on the Cross, yet he had not written that the Cross was completed by the Supper. Nor do I write to my friends, when I go from Paris to England, that my crossing of the Channel was completed by a lovely ride from Paris to Calais; I write that the ride was completed by what kind of crossing I chanced to have. Nor is an afternoon generally said to be completed by the foregoing morning, but conversely; and yet morning and afternoon are two halves of die day, and thus they complete each other: although you speak preposterously if you say just of the second half that it was completed by the first. Why Berthold, to make his mind intelligible, should have been bound to use this particular form of language, I fail to see.

I expect is, that like one of those who first demurred to this 'novelty,' the critic may be heard to say: 'After all, only an old theory revived.' Quite so; an old theory: the identical one which in their first encounter with Luther the standard-bearers of the old Faith raised on high as a rallying-point for all orthodox people of Germany and France, let alone England. Taught by the Fathers and by the liturgies, schooled by the great medieval Doctors, and above all by St. Thomas, they could not fail to recognize the clear voice of Scripture, the genuine echo of Catholic Tradition, in a 'theory' which appealed at once to all unprejudiced and unsophisticated minds, at a time when no systems of human invention had covered yet with their parasitical vegetation the chaste and pure wheat of God's own field.

Nor were the pioneers of the Counter-Reformation the

1 This does not mean that it was very long before some signs could appear of the division between Supper and Cross which prevailed (not without some notable exceptions, see above, pp. MF, pp. 86 et tot) among Doctors of modern times. In fact there was an antagonist of Luther who met the latter's arguments by claiming that there had been two sacrifices of Christ: one at the Supper, and another on the Cross. But then most logically the same Clingius concluded that the first sacrifice, being void of a true victimal state of Christ, could not have been propitiatory, but only eucharistie; and in consequence the Mass too, which was nothing but the renewal of this sacrifice, lacked propitiatory force, and was only a thank-offering for the atonement of the Cross (see Summa Doctrina Catholica [1562], tit. 107, Ed. Colon., 1569, p. in, and Catechismus Catholicus [1562], lib. 3, 13, § 2 et 3. Ed. Colon., 1562, p. 160: 'utrumque opus non satis dedolatum' [Hurter]). The same may be noted of Michael Helding's treatise, De Sanctissimo ac praestantissime Missae sacrificio, Sermones 3 et 5, Ed. Colon., 1562, pp.—24 et 38, which appeared as early as 1548.

Quite different, assuredly, from such a system was the view of Eck, where, some people, curiously enough, seem to have found a trace of the dual theory: 'There are two oblations of Christ: one by which he once offered his live Body and his Blood to God the Father on the altar of the Cross for the salvation of mankind. The other oblation is a sacramental one, by which daily in the church Christ is offered and taken by the priests in the sacrifice of the Mass under the sacrament, in memory of the Passion and Death and first oblation made on the Cross. . . . Against the heretics it is quite clear that the Mass does not represent only the Lord's Supper, but also his passion, death, and aforesaid oblation' (Enchiridion, pp. 169-171). Clearly in such an adequate division between the first sacrifice, that of Christ, and ours, which is the second, there is no room for two personal sacrifices of Christ. Compare the passages of Eck quoted above. In brief: within the first twenty years of the anti-Lutheran controversy, there does not appear, as far as I know, a single witness in favour of the dual theory; whereas no less than seven can be numbered against it. Later, some indeed favoured it; and, as a consequence, gave up the propitiatory character of the Eucharist.

last apologists that made use of such an effective weapon. What else did Jerome of Fossano place in the hands of his converts from heresy, when he presented them with his treatise of The Admirable Mystery (1554), where it is shown that the Supper was necessarily a sacrifice, seeing that there the Lord had in anticipation of his death and immolation made the offering of his Body and Blood: so that in this particular case, 'one and the same sacrifice . . . might be said . . . bloody and bloodless'?! What else did Francis van den Welden (Sonnius) express (1552) in these pithy words: 'Christ then began to offer in the Cenacle, and finished up on the Gross. ... It is one and the same oblation that was made at the Supper and on the Cross'?2 What of the Elector of Cologne, writing that 'Christ under the species of bread and wine offered his Body and Blood for a sacrifice which was to be completed and carried out on the Cross by the hands of others'? What of so many bishops of the Council of Trent, whom I am loath to quote again, after having so often4 referred to their discourses? Suffice it here to say that quite a host of them spoke in perfect accord with the declaration of Peter de Xaque, O.P., Bishop of Nio: 'This [Sacrifice celebrated in the Supper, according to the rite of Melchisedechl is the same with that of the Cross. which was then begun.'

The interest lies not only in their numbers or in the distinct emphasis of their pronouncements, but also and chiefly in the result which they achieved. The Council was divided. Some would not hear of any definition about the Supper as a sacrifice. Others were willing to make it a thank-offering, but not a sin-offering. Others claimed for the Cenacle a

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¹ Quoted, MF, p. 64.

² Ibid., p. 114.

² Ibid., p. 114.

^{*} Ibid. 9 pp. 113 sq.*f Catholic Faith in the Holy Eucharist pp. 123 sq. Sec above,

pp. 270-271. The solution of them have never been exhaustive. The solution of the solution of

sacrifice both eucharistie and propitiatory. But of this third class some would view it as a different sacrifice from the sacrifice of the Cross. And there was the difficulty. which arrested the first two groups. If Christ had already made a sacrifice of atonement before his death, then before his death he had found an eternal redemption; the redemption, in other words, was wrought before the second sacrifice came in, and therefore the second sacrifice was useless: which meant that the Cross was made void. How could such an awkward conclusion be evaded? Then from amongst the defenders of the propitiatory sacrifice of the Supper a second section emerged, who did away with the difficulty occasioned by the former. The Cross would not be made void: because while asserting the propitiatory sacrifice of the Supper, we were not making it another sacrifice from that of the Cross, but the very same one, the selfsame one, not in kind only, but in number, namely, Christ's indivisible Sacrifice, beginning here, and finishing there. gave such satisfaction to the first two groups that where a majority had for a while appeared impossible there was instead unanimity.

This is the picture which the facts of the case bring before the eyes not only of modern students, who might perhaps be suspected of bias, but of one so disinterested as Noël Alexandre, O.P.I who certainly did not write to lend his support to any new-fangled theory of the twentieth century.

It is then clearly impossible that the Council of Trent should by its decree have banned the doctrine which proved to be the effective means of rallying round the text of the decree an otherwise confused and divided assembly.

Even apart from this consideration, it is unthinkable that the Council of Trent, called to check Lutheranism, should have, on this particular point, condemned not Luther but his opponents. It was Luther's guile to dissociate the proceedings of the Supper from their complement on the Cross.

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It was his opponents' policy to reunite and combine into one what he had torn asunder. And now the Council of Trent would have sanctioned not their view, but his; and the anathema would have fallen not on him, but on them. Who can believe this?

A priori such a reading of the Tridentine definition is impossible. But what a posteriori? A posteriori does it not look as if, however, something of the kind had happened? The Council says: "Because under the first Covenant (as St. Paul testifies), owing to the impotence of the Levitical Priesthood, there was no perfection, it was necessary, according to the ordinance of God, the Father of Mercy, that another Priest should arise according to the Order of Melchisedech, our Lord Jesus Christ, who should be able to perfect and bring to their consummation as many as were to be anctified. This God and Lord of ours thereafter, although ('etsi') he was to offer himself once to God the Father on the altar of the Cross by means of his death, to effect there an eternal redemption, nevertheless ('tamen') ... in the Last Supper the same night in which he was to be delivered . . . declaring himself to have been established a Priest for ever according to the Order of Melchisedech, did offer his Body and Blood under the species of bread and wine to God the Father," etc.

The question arises: why did the Council of Trent connect grammatically the oblation on the Cross with the oblation at the Supper by the adversative locutions although, nevertheless?! These locutions do not bind things together; they oppose things to each other: they imply, they emphasize a duality. If the oblation at the Supper was done notwithstanding the oblation on the Cross, it seems that far from being subservient to it, or implied by it, it must have been quite external to it and foreign to it. The latter, far from requiring the former, could very well, from such a phrase (to say the least), have done without it. And yet the antecedent probability, as we

¹¹ am not here discussing the bearing on the definition of the words concerning the institution of the Mass. This is another question.

have said, would be all the other way; indeed, not that the Council should have defined, but at any rate that it should not have disowned that unity, constantly asserted against Luther, triumphantly set forth in the conciliar deliberations, that unity which had won the day: the unity of a redemptive Sacrifice, continuously developing from the Supper to the Cross: the Cross putting a finish on what had been inchoative in the Supper.

The solution of the riddle is not to be a far-fetched one. We might perhaps say that, even though Supper and Cross were one in fact, yet, taking things in the abstract, the Cross could have been a sacrifice without the Supper, if only it had pleased Christ to discharge the office of his priesthood otherwise than according to the rite of Melchisedech. In many other ways could the liturgical offering of the redemptive Sacrifice have been performed. But, however true this may be, there is a much simpler and much more real answer: which arises from the very circumstances of the theological conflict of the time, and is forced upon us by the historic knowledge of the object at which the definition was aimed. It was aimed at the heretics' capital fallacy, I will not say at their Achilles's heel, but at their Goliath's head, at infidelity uttering blasphemy in words of piety. The Cross, the Cross, one would hear at all turns, is Christ's true Sacrifice, his one and only Sacrifice. Therefore, unless you wish to set the Cross to naught, do not say that there was a sacrifice at the Supper. The Church's attitude in presence of this negation resting on an affirmation, was bound to be this: Yes, indeed, there was a sacrifice on the Cross: we hold this as true Faith. we Catholics, no less than you pretend to do. although we believe in the sacrifice of the Cross, nevertheless we maintain that at the Supper Christ did offer his Body and Blood to God: otherwise he would not have been what we know he must be, a Priest according to the Order of Melchisedech. Does it follow that there were two sacrifices? Is that duality implied by the adversative locutions? I say that in such historic context as has been described above, the adversa-

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tive locutions imply only that one truth is not antagonistic to the other; that the truth of the sacrifice on the Cross does not exclude the truth of an offering at the Supper. Nothing more. It is for you to find out whether those two truths can or cannot be verified by one continuous sacrifice of Christ, extending from the Supper to the Cross. Whether you hold the affirmative or the negative, you find yourself within the pale of the definition. But moreover, by asserting one sacrifice and not two, you find yourself in accordance with the spirit that dictated to a large proportion of the Fathers their subscription to the decree.

Why the view, which was so effective in securing their accord, was not defined, why the argument, that had been effective in removing all obstacles to the Decree, was not incorporated in the decree, we are told by one of those bishops themselves, the bishop of Orense: 'One and the same, he says, is the oblation of the Supper and of the Cross; and from the latter did the former derive its force. However, this should not, it seems, be set down in the decree nor in the Canons, seeing that the point is not held to be altogether certain. If, however, we insert it, let us add [this rider]: ut sancti Doctores tradunt.' The point was not inserted. No one can be blamed for dissenting from a tenet which lacks ecclesiastical sanction. But no one can be blamed either— I would say more, no one should miss due praise and encouragement—for remaining faithful to 'the holy Doctors,' for echoing the voice that stemmed heresy in Germany, in the Netherlands, in Northern Italy, in France, for giving an ear to the lesson of Trent, for entertaining the views and sentiments that prevailed there, and found expression in such speeches as the following, which I here willingly transcribe, because although I have referred to it elsewhere, yet never have I quoted the actual words: .

"Christ in the Supper offered himself as a sin-offering. [If it be objected that the Cross then would be superfluous, let the answer be that the conclusion does not follow.] But that oblation 3 Ehses, Com. Trid., 8, 774.

of the Supper was one and the same with that of the Cross. . . . One and the same is the oblation of the Supper with that of the Cross, even numerically: because in the Supper the oblation of the Cross had its beginning. [Wherefore] let it be stated in the decree that Christ offered himself at the Supper, a sin-offering."

Thus spake the Bishop of Campagna, Marcus Laureus, one of those distinguished sons of Saint Dominic who in the Tridentine deliberations played such a conspicuous part, fraught with such beneficent results to the Church at large, especially for the furtherance of sound Theology. On their shoulders, apparently, had fallen the mantle of St. Thomas, with his twofold spirit of learning and sanctity. May it ever rest, in future as it did in the past, on every generation of Black Friars.

Rome, April 27, On the Feast of Blessed Peter Canisius.

POSTSCRIPT (May 21, 1925)

Blessed Peter Canisius having been this day not only canonized, but also proclaimed a Doctor of the Church, it may be fitting to recall here his pronouncement, not indeed on the Last Supper, but on the Mass, by which is renewed, as a commemoration, what was done by Christ as an anticipation of his death: 'The Sacrifice, of the Mass rightly understood is both a representation, at once holy and living, and an oblation, bloodless, yet actual, of the Passion of the Lord and of the bloody Sacrifice which was offered for us on the Cross.' There can be but little doubt, therefore, that to St. Peter Canisius the Supper itself must have been, what we have seen it to be for the above theologians, a representatiop assuredly, holy and living, but at the same time the

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bloodless, yet actual oblation of the Passion of the Lord, and of the bloody Sacrifice that was to be on the Cross offered for us furthermore.

1 Whether St. Peter Canisius however actually welded the Supper and the Passion into one Sacrifice, as we do, remains doubtful.

On the subject of the Council of Trent, and pre-tridentine and post-tridentine authorities see in Gregariarum (June 1928) Coena et passio in Theologia Apologetica contra pseudo-reformatores (pp. 177-238), and also the article which is to appear in the same review (June 1930) under the title A propos d'un livre sur la Cène, which is an examination of the book written against my views by Fr. Manuel Alonso, S.J. {El Sacrificio Eucaristico de la ultima cena del Sehor segün el Concilia Tridentino).

Father Ryan need not fear that anything he wrote in the Irish Ecclesiastical Record for May could give cause for a comparison of him with a 'wolf bent on devouring some brother theologian. Indeed, thanks are due to him for the trouble he has taken to read; thanks again, for the generous measure of approval bestowed on some portions of my book; thanks, too, for discussing what he does not find it possible to approve. Whatever my faults may be in other directions, yet I am not so dull as not to appreciate the privilege of a discussion with a member of a staff so highly distinguished as that of Maynooth College.

I do not propose, however, to follow the learned professor through all parts of his criticism: I feel I have already occupied more than enough the time and attention of the readers of the *Irish Ecclesiastical Record* with my various contributions, letters or articles; and on the other hand, expediency also advises me not to obscure what I regard as simple and clear by over-explaining it. I might add that there are limitations to the scope of my literary activities, both with regard to the Eucharist, and in respect of the English-speaking *public*. Other subjects, more directly connected with my present professorial work, call my attention, and also other sections of the public, nearer home. If I am comparatively brief, therefore, in my reply, let it be taken, I pray, not as a sign of lesser interest or regard (God forbid!), but as a necessity to which I reluctantly submit.

On the whole, regarding the Mass, and its connexion both with the Passion and the heavenly Sacrifice, I think there is substantial agreement between Professor Ryan and myself.

The point of difference is the Last Supper and its bearing to the Cross. I say one numerical sacrifice, when Professor Ryan says two. To him the Supper is a complete Sacrifice, and the Cross is another complete Sacrifice, whatever relation there may be between the two, as between the absolute and the relative. To me the Supper, pending the Cross, is no complete Sacrifice yet; it will be completed by the Cross. The Cross, shorn of its connexion with the Supper, that introduces the Victim in its garb of a gift to God, would not be of itself! a fully-constituted sacrifice.2 The Cross is conspicuous for the mactation of the Victim: that is the element which it supplies of itself. The Supper is conspicuous for the ritual offering of the Priest3: that is the element which it contributes as its own. The mactation is in view at the Supper; the offering perseveres morally throughout the Passion to the death on the Cross. And thus we have one sacrifice; one, that is, not in the order of physical events, but only in the order of signs: the sacrifice, as such, being nothing but a sign; the visible sign of an invisible self-sacrificing to God, invisibilis sacrificii visibile sacramentum. Only this kind of unity is asserted, not any other: the unity proper to a sign as such, that is the unity of signification. The meaning of what is going on is complete only when every part of that pragmatic speech, of that language in action (visibile verbum) has been uttered in terms of fact. It began to be uttered at the Supper; the uttering was finished with Christ's last breath. What was,

¹ The insufficiency of the Cross alone for the full constitution of a sacrifice, properly so called, would, I believe, be clearer to many theologians, if they had read the articles of Professor Rivière (late of Albi, now of Strasburg) quoted in MF, pp, 22, 23. Whatever else may be said of those articles from any other point of view, they certainly are, in respect of the above insufficiency, a revelation.

^{*} Needless to say, to both Father Ryan and myself, the question is about sacrifice properly so-called, the visible, sensible, liturgical sacrifice, containing both mactation and ritual oblation; not about any other kind of sacrifice, whether invisible, or metaphorical; not therefore, about a sacrifice void of a ritual oblation. I do not believe there is the slightest misunderstanding between Professor Ryan and myself on this precise point.

^{*} How the ritual oblation of the Lord's death was involved in the mystic immolation or symbolical mactation of the Supper Eucharist, has been explained many times. See MF, 38 sqq. (especially 2nd edition), 155, 156; The Catholic Doctrine of the Eucharist, 115-117; see above, pt. II, p. 231.

it may be asked, the full import of the message to be voiced by the celebration of this Sacrifice, not latreutic only, but also propitiatory? It was, together with the inward consecration to God, also universal estrangement from sin and all accompaniments of sin. When was this complex signification adequately translated into symbolic fact? Only when the gift, the animal gift, had been through death brought, so to say, within God's reach, for him to take and appropriate to himself, if he graciously willed. The fundamental notion of gift is conveyed by the rite according to Melchisedech: but the special conditions of the animal gift, of the gift through blood, are not verified actually except by the bloody Passion When death is attained, then the facts have unto death. spoken. But even though the last syllable was in blood, yet the first was in the unbloody style of the mysteries.

And thus, the two are one composite word, of a visible essence, visibile verbum, as every sacrament should be, even the sacrament of the invisible sacrifice. This is the kernel of the theory, the real crucial point. Whether it should be expressed in terms of matter and form is to me absolutely secondary. I do express it like this, because I find it convenient and perfectly justifiable by theological analogy. But what matters is, as Father Ryan rightly states, whether we may or may not look upon the rite of the Supper as part of that Sacrifice of Redemption which we call the sacrifice of the Death, or sacrifice of the Passion, because it takes in the whole of the Passion to the Death on the Cross.

Father Ryan says No. It is inconceivable, he maintains, that an incomplete sacrifice should be one and the same as a complete one. But this would appear to be the case, if the Supper were part of the sacrifice of the Passion: for the sacrifice of the Passion, the sacrifice of the Cross, is admittedly complete, as including there, on the Cross, both immolation and oblation. Such is the argument; let us examine it.

I do admit, in the first place, that the Sacrifice of Redemption, as extending from the Supper to the Cross, includes both visible oblation and bloody immolation: oblation,

Owing to the Eucharistic rite: immolation, owing to the Passion. That is not, yet, what raises an objection in Father Ryan's mind. He would not, on this score alone, have any difficulty, I believe, in admitting that one part of the entire process should be called one and the same sacrifice with the other part: say, the Supper, with the Passion: any more than he would object to confession being one sacrament with the absolution, or the baptismal form with the ablution. His difficulty is of a more subtle sort. It is concerned with a certain admission, or rather contention of mine, namely, that the oblation embodied in the Eucharistic rite perseveres. morally speaking, in a visible manner throughout the Passion: so that on the Cross itself there is, besides the mere Passion inflicted by the Jews, an oblative element to be noted on the part of the Lord. In the end it comes to this, that we have on the Cross those two elements combined, bloody immolation and visible oblation, and therefore a complete sacrifice. And now, comparing the foregoing Supper, as an incomplete sacrifice, with the subsequent offering on the Cross, as a complete sacrifice, Father Ryan says the former cannot be one sacrifice, numerically and identically, with the latter. One halfpenny will never be the same sum of one penny with two other halfpennies.

To this what do we say? We say that the objection would be unanswerable, if the Cross or Passion were a complete sacrifice apart from the Supper; or, in other words, if the outward oblation on the Cross, or at any other stage of the Passion, were anything but a formal effect of the offering performed at the Supper. But in fact the case is different. The Cross or Passion is a complete sacrifice, precisely because it carries visibly the meaning which the Supper continues to impart to it; and thus it is not a complete sacrifice (immolation plus oblation), except so far as it is outwardly and visibly determined to that specific sense of oblation by a continuous union with the Supper. Which authorizes us to speak in terms of matter and form, and, what is more, forces on us the conclusion that the Supper is one and the

same sacrifice with the Passion, with the sacrifice of the Cross, and vice versa.

Here is a simile (not new, but perhaps, overlooked). The Sacrament of the Eucharist, the outward Sacrament (signum tantum), is complete there in a pyx. Otherwise we could not say, as we ought to say, that the Eucharist is a permanent sacrament. Therefore, there is to be found in this pyx the full sacramental meaning of the Eucharist. But the sacramental meaning is made up of two elements, one contributed by the species and the other by the words. The meaning of the words as well as of the species is, therefore, here: the one carried by the other. Will you say that the sacramental form, uttered half an hour ago, perhaps a week ago, must, therefore, be a different sacrament from our permanent Eucharist: because an incomplete sacrament (such as a form, which is only part of a sacrament, and not the whole of it) cannot be one and the same sacrament with something complete, as is the permanent Eucharist? No, you will not say that, at least if you wish to side with St. Thomas with the Catechism of the Council of Trent, and with such respectable authorities as Suarez) Lugo, Billot, and others. You will say that the form remains attached to the species morally, so far as the meaning, through which the form was sacramental, has been by the form communicated to the species, with a persevering effect on them. We make the same reply with regards to the Last Supper and the Passion. The meaning expressed by the Eucharistic rite of the Supper remains attached to the whole course of the bloody passion, as communicated to it by that antecedent symbol and pragmatic utterance. Thus does it come true that the redemptive sacrifice began, as St. Thomas after Bede remarks (Sum. Theol. III, q. 46, a. 9, ad 1), on the fourteenth Nisan at night, in the Cenacle, since there by the Eucharistic rite*

¹ MF, 102, 105, 504 sqq. See above, p. 240.

a Father Ryan appears not to have been satisfied as to this answer. Reverting, to the matter in the October issue of the *Irish Ecclesiastical Record* he suggests that the conclusion of my view is "that Christ did not sacrifice in the Supper (p.387). By what canon of logic this follows, I do not know, nordoes my opponent

"Christ hallowed the beginnings of his immolation itself, that is of his Passion."

Now, to come back to Professor Ryan's argument: an incomplete sacrifice cannot be one and the same sacrifice with a complete one; perhaps, the reader may now feel the force of this Scholastic distinction; with a complete one, adequately distinct from it, I grant; with a complete one, only inadequately distinct from it, as from the formal cause of its specific meaning, I deny.

In other words: an incomplete sacrifice, that is a sacrifice which would be incomplete of itself, if not completed by some further development, not only can be, but must be, one and the same with the ulterior happenings that borrow from it part of the entire signification necessary for a complete sacrifice. This abstract and ponderous sentence means only that, if the liturgical oblation precedes the mactation, while the Victim is at the same time the Priest, then the Victim's patient bearing under the deadly blows is at once a complete sacrifice, but precisely owing to the Priest's ritual offering that continues itself through it. Continuation and inception are not two different signs in the case, but one continuous process, by means of which, from beginning to end, there resounds in the ears of the Father this 'strong cry': 'This Body and Blood is a gift unto thee through my Death for a ransom of sinners.'

show. It is true that on my own findings Christ did not at the Supper make a sacrifice that was complete on the spot. It had to be completed by what was to come. But was there, for this reason, no sacrificing of Christ at the Supper? When I consecrate the bread, my sacrifice is not complete yet, at once, since it must be completed by the consecration of the wine. But, nevertheless, I am already then sacrificing, engaged on performing a sacrifice. The sacrificial action is in fieri. Those who hold that the bloody proceedings alone, without the Supper, formed the sacrifice of Christ, must admit however that the sacrifice was not complete yet after the nailing to the cross, but was to develop till death intervened. Will they then say that Christ was not sacrificing in the actual Crucifixion? When, I wonder, did he then begin to be offering sacrifice? Not surely in the moment of his death, which (as St. Thomas points out) was no moment of his life.

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To say that the Supper and the Cross together form one sacrifice, numerically one, is not therefore by any means saying or implying "that Christ did not sacrifice in the Supper": which by the way would be rank heresy (Trid. 22, i). On this same difficulty see below, pp. 334 iq.

More than this I cannot explain. If I fail to make the point clear to others as it is to me, I have only to accuse my own inability to find a suitable garb for the native simplicity of naked truth.

There is a misunderstanding, however, which I should like to dispel. Father Ryan, if I understand him correctly, takes it for granted, that for everybody, including presumably the present writer, a propitiatory sacrifice is void of the idea of a gift to God. Certainly this is not my view. I thought 1 had made it clear enough on more than one occasion.* To me every sacrifice is necessarily and fundamentally and primarily a gift. It may be a gift through blood, through death; but it must be a gift, the gift of the thing slain to be God's own (symbolic) banquet on God's table: what Leviticus, speaking of animal sacrifices, calls God's (MF, 13). If the prophets reminded the people that God was in no need of it, their object was not to abolish this view, absolutely essential to a sacrifice, bloody or not, but to raise in people's eyes God's transcendence above earthly notions, and point to the inadequacy of every sacrifice save the pure one, of which the Law was only a shadow. The sacrifice of redemption must have been a gift, and, in the guise of a gift, tendered to God.

^{*}The only thing I can add is that if I understand aright what Father Ryan writes on page 460, then he must have misunderstood the meaning of what he quotes from The Last Supper and Calvary, above, pp. 241 sq. I do not in the least deny, in fact I hold most certainly and decidedly, that "the immolation of the Cross was retrospective to the Supper" (to use Father Ryan's words), in this sense, that it was the immolation which came to carry out the design enshrined in the Supper, and together with the Supper constitutes a complete sacrifice. The words of mine quoted by Father Ryan say nothing to the contrary. They mean only that the Supper without subsequent bloodshed would not be a complete sacrifice, for lack of one essential element (true Victimhood); whereas the Mass is at once a complete sacrifice without subsequent bloodshed, because the true victimhood is already there; and that this difference between Mass and Supper is the result of their respective positions with regard to the Cross, in point of time: the latter before the Cross, the former after the Cross. Finally, let it be understood that to speak of the supper as completed by the cross, or of the cross as informed by the supper, is not to speak of two different compounds, but of one. But these things are so plain that I am afraid it is an insult to explain them.

² See 1ER, July, 1924, pp. 77, 78; MF, p. 614, etc., with the addition of note i of page 151, in the second edition.

Father Ryan further discusses my interpretation of the adversative locutions (etsi...tamen), by which, in the Tridentine decree, the offering that took place at the Supper is set up against the forthcoming sacrifice of the Cross. I need not delay on the point here; first, because in my recent article on Father Swaby's paper I have laboured it to the full; and secondly, because Father Ryan's exception to my reading rests ultimately on the alleged impossibility for an incomplete sacrifice to be one and the same with the complete one, as above.

As to the Fathers, I would point out that none of them is called upon by me to vouch for the whole of what I hold to be the complete doctrine of the Eucharist. If the Fathers had written MF, I should not have had to write it. one is called upon to testify to a certain definite and particular point. Does he, or does he not bear it out, is the only pertinent question. For instance, Hesychius (MF, 46) is not supposed to tell us distinctly whether between the Supper and the Cross there was or was not numerical unity (1ER, 464). He is quoted in support of five definite statements, including this one: in the Supper Christ offered his Passion. Is this statement borne out by Hesychius, or not? And supposing it is, is it such a common-place view (in our days, at least) as not even to deserve noticing? Or, on the contrary, does. it not lead to certain interesting conclusions with at least a fair amount of probability?

On the other hand, the conciliar speeches or memoranda preparatory to the Tridentine definition, are not quoted by me (MF, 113-115) in support of the Supper (as) the formal oblation which, with the immolation of the Cross, goes to make up the sacrifice (1ER, 466-467); but only in favour of 'numerical unity.' And this numerical unity, I maintain is, even when not asserted in so many words, at least implied by those various pronouncements. At the same time, I am quite prepared to admit that some of them might very well be quoted also in favour of the above 'formal oblation,' although perhaps not with exactly the same force.

That we can find, not three or four times, but hundreds of times, the word 'immolation' used by the Fathers and later theologians for oblation or for sacrifice in general, and "oblation" on many occasions used for Sacrifice or even immolation, is recognized by everybody. No one could dream of building a demonstration-on merely philological grounds The case is different, when oblation is distinctly in this matter. opposed to immolation, and at the same time assigned as Christ's own share in the sacrificial work, while immolation is allowed to others, as in a sixth passage of Hesychius's commentary on Leviticus, quoted on page 47 (MF). There, clearly the author conforms to the style of Leviticus i, 5: immolabit que (homo laicus) vitulum coram Domino, et offerent filii Aaron sacerdotes sanguinem ejus, fundentes per altaris circuitum, quod est ante ostium tabernaculi. And if we further see that, directly in proof of that particular 'oblation' of his, Christ is credited with having "immolated" himself in the Supper, we shall understand that this "immolation" is a sacramental, a symbolic one, "quod sciunt qui mysteriorum percipiunt virtutem": even as must have been symbolical or sacramental the aspersion of blood," the "shedding on the altar," by means of which Christ was said previously to have in that same Supper effected his oblation of the Passion. And then from the commentary on *Leviticus* we shall conclude with the commentary on the *Psalms* (quoted, p. 47), where Christ's self-immolation in the supper appears as that which gave rise to His Passion.

On one point I think I can gratify Father Ryan's critical acumen. It is on the words of the Tridentine decree: in ara crucis semel seipsum cruente obtulit. . . . Cujus quidem oblationis cruentae, etc. I interpret these words obtulit and oblatio strictly, in the sense of formal offering, as distinct not only from immolation, but also from the more general idea of sacrifice. I do this, as I have always said, not for any reasons that could engender certainty, but for safety's sake, lest I should appear as if I wished to minimize the sense of the Tridentine words in the interest of a preconceived doctrine., By adopting the stricter interpretation, I am not by any means making my

work easier. In one respect I am creating for myself a difficulty. How the manner of offering (ratio offerendi) is different (diversa), as the Council of Trent says, in the Mass and in the redemptive Sacrifice, is a child's game to explain, when we take offerendi, in the broader sense, as equivalent to sacrificing. Clearly, that there is a difference in general style between our Mass and Christ's redemptive Sacrifice (including even the Supper) is plain to anyone who has eyes to see what lies before him. In the one case there is bloodshed: in the other there is not: and there is no more to be said. The diversity is more subtle in the stricter interpretation of offerendi as formal oblation; although even there it holds good, so far as Christ's offering, although derived from the Supper, was yet actually pursued and confirmed in blood on the Cross. 1 This stricter interpretation, on the other hand, hits those who fail to see that the real immolation is supplied to our Mass by the Cross (Sola ratione offerendi diversa). 2 But while claiming the benefit of this consequence. I have never urged the argument as decisive, except ad hominem against those who would press unduly the sense of formal oblation against my explanation either of the offering on the Cross or of the diversity between the Cross and the Mass.3 They cannot have it both ways; they cannot at the same time take their stand on a strict interpretation of oblatio, and then claim for the Mass (or consequently for the supper) a real immolation different from that of Calvary.4

I As shown in MF, p. 103, and above (quoted in IER, p. 470). See also MF, 12, cols. 2, I. 2-15. Father Ryan asks: "If the offering became bloody on Calvary, when did it cease to be so? Why is it not bloody in the Mass?" I reply: The actual offering of the Lord on Calvary was bloody, because it was there vested in the bloody Passion, as above. Our own offering in the Mass is unbloody because it is there not expressed in any actual blood-shedding; although it is there essentially relative to, or dependent upon, the bloody offering of old, which perseveres virtually, but not actually or formally, in the sacrifice of the Mass.

^{&#}x27;MF, p. 115.

³ Ibid.

II think Father Ryan would agree to this. But it would not settle the whole question for him; because he seems to think that, even though incomplete for lack of real immolation or actual Victimhood, the sacrifice at the Supper, as distinct from the sacrifice of the Cross, might yet be in its way a complete and valid sacrifice, even as Baptism may have been efficacious before the Passion, owing to God's foresight and indefatigable purpose in regard to Christ's redemy-

This is what I maintain as clear and certain. The exegetical truth of the interpretation I leave willingly for others to decide. I do not feel particularly concerned in it. I stand where I stand; but let others, if they care, make light of my tutiorism, and on their own responsibility choose a broader interpretation: they will not find me in their way.

Finally, there is one point on which I am glad to be in full agreement with Father Ryan. He expresses surprise at the circulation of my book. I am more surprised than he is. When I presented the manuscript to the publishers, I had told

tive work. May I remark here that there is a difference in this respect between sacrifice and sacrament? Sacrament of itself means an action of God, as such, towards man; sacrifice, on the contrary, a pleading of man, as such, with God. That God in his sanctifying action, whether in regard of the just of the Old Testament; or of the Blessed Virgin, or of Christ's followers in Christ's lifetime, should take into account what is already present in his intention and mind, is only natural. That man, in working out propitiation, in placating God, should have the same force in hand with or without the afflictive work, with or without the atoning death to which the victim had been pledged-in other words, through a sacrifice that yields what it vows, or that stops short of it, and therefore fails to be thorough—is not so natural. Such a course seems hardly in keeping with the human views of reparation and satisfaction, that look for an expression in sacrifice. The full reality of sacrifice requires actual victimhood: no mere pretence will do. May I quote here what I wrote once in *The Venerabile* (April, 1905, P· τθ?)· " The Supper and Calvary make up one Sacrifice, as being the component parts of a whole. Once the two compound parts were verified in the order of events, the Sacrifice was finished, but not before. As long as there was only a mystic (symbolic-sacramental-representative) immolation or mactation, there might be (and there was indeed) a real oblation; and, therefore, the sacrifice was begun; b.ut the sacrifice was not finished till the real and bloody mactation or immolation had taken place-seeing that the victim in that unbloody rite had been offered to be immolated bloodily. It had, therefore, not passed YET THROUGH ALL THE STAGES OF ITS ORDEAL AS A VICTIM, BEFORE IT WAS ACTUALLY slain. The victimhood, pending the Cross, was not complete; nor could, therefore, the sacrifice be complete." Besides, there are other difficulties. If the atoning efficacy of Christ's Passion was there (in a sacrifice previous to the Cross, as the Supper must then have been) already tendered to God for a ransom of the sin of the world by the High Priest who could not be rejected, then the world was saved before the sacrifice of the Cross. Besides, the Cross itself lacks in this case formal oblation, because assuredly, no individual unity then can be maintained between the mactation on the Cross and the oblative meaning embodied in the Supper. Finally, there is the Epistle to the Hebrews. On the other hand, where is the evidence, scriptural, patristic, liturgical, conciliary, or simply medieval, for that precious duality of sacrifices (Supper and Cross), which many theologians in modern times have indeed asserted, but only on their own personal authority, as a conclusion (to my mind, absolutely unwarranted) from the duality that prevails most certainly between the Cross and the Mass? But all those points have been touched upon in MF, and I leave them there.

1 MF, p. 103. See above, pp. 258-261.

them, honestly, that I did not expect them to sell more than . thirty copies of it: three in Rome, a dozen in Paris, and about as many in the rest of the world. And now we are. nearing three thousand. I find no other explanation for it than what occurred on the day when the last of the five censors reported to my Superior-General. The latter at once informed me that several hundred masses would be offered for the success of the book. They are at work, I trust. If any reader of MF thinks that he has benefited through the result, let him remember to whom gratitude is due, and pray for him, that God may bless him and repay his charity. In the meantime, Father Ryan, I am sure, will join with me in regarding the cause of success as less mysterious than it appeared at first sight. The Mass works wonders. And that it should do so, is to a Christian the least wondrous thing in the Mystery of Faith.

THE MASS AND THE GROSSI

A query came from a scholarly parish priest in the South of England who wondered whether the Mass ought not, like the Supper, to be counted as one Sacrifice with the Cross, in the sense, that is, of a strictly numerical unity.

The answer must consider separately the two terms under comparison: first the bearing of the Last Supper on Calvary, and second, the bearing of the Mass on both Calvary and Supper.

The Supper and Calvary make up one sacrifice, as being the component parts of a whole. Once the two component parts were verified in the order of events, the sacrifice was finished; but not before. As long as there was only a mystic (symbolic—sacramental—representative) immolation or mactation, there might be (and there was indeed) a real oblation; and therefore the sacrifice was begun; but the sacrifice was not finished, till the *real* and bloody mactation, or *immolation*, had taken place—seeing that the victim in that unbloody rite had been offered to be immolated bloodily. It had therefore not passed yet through all the stages of its ordeal as a victim, before it was actually slain, the victimhood, pending THE CROSS, WAS NOT COMPLETE; NOR COULD, THEREFORE, THE SACRIFICE BE COMPLETE.

So much for the Supper and the Cross; it is clear that (if the above explanation is correct) they make only one individual sacrifice, inasmuch as they are the essential elements of one complete sacrificial process.

Now we cannot say that the Mass is an essential element of that sacrificial process once enacted in days gone by. The sacrifice made up of Supper and Passion was perfectly complete

(short of the external complement of divine acceptance) the moment Christ was dead. It lacked no essential, no constitutive element; therefore we cannot say that the Mass was (like the Supper) a constitutive, an essential element of that complete sacrifice. Thus it appears that the relation of the Mass to both Cross and Supper cannot be the same as between the Supper and the Cross. The unity of the Mass with both or either cannot therefore be the same as the unity of those two together.

What then is the unity of the Mass with that sacrifice of old? It is, if we speak of the sacrificial process, a unity, not of composition, as between the essential elements of one sacrificial compound, but a unity of subordination; that is, the Mass is associated with the original sacrifice of Christ, as an exercise of our ministerial and delegated priesthood with the full and sovereign activity of Christ's sacerdotal power; as a participation with its source.

I say "if we speak of the sacrificial process", of the active sacrifice. If we speak of the passive sacrifice, the thing offered (and indeed as such), then the unity to be maintained between the Mass and Christ's own personal sacrifice, is no longer a unity of subordination, but one of absolute identity. The victim of our sacrifice is numerically, purely and simply, the same as the victim of Christ's historic sacrifice. In this sense, when by "sacrifice" is meant the victim and its victimhood, one has a right to say, one is bound to say, that the "sacrifice" is numerically the same in all masses, and numerically the same there as in our High Priest's own case, when he went through the celebration at the Supper and its completion on Calvary; the reason being that from thence Christ has been made for ever a Victim, an enduring Victim, an eternal Victim. consummated in his state of Victimhood for evermore. Victim, under that formality of its eternal Victimhood and no other, do we precisely offer in the Mass. aforesaid unity and identity of the "passive sacrifice."

But you cannot speak of the same bond of unity as regards the "active sacrifice" There, evidently, my celebration

THE MASS AND THE CROSS

is not by pure and simple identity the celebration of Christ in the night before he suffered, nor is yours mine, nor is mine to-day the self-same as vesterday or to-morrow. These sacrifices of ours, between themselves, form a plurality of sacrifices. We speak of a hundred masses, in the sense of a hundred sacrifices (active sacrifices, of course) of the Mass. The historic expression "the sacrifices of masses for the quick and the dead" is perfectly true in its import of a real plurality. The masses can be numbered, and can be added to one another, so as to form more sacrifices. I say the masses. between themselves: if we were to compare the Mass, all the masses of the world, as well as any single mass, to the Sacrifice enacted by Christ himself in the Cenacle and the Passion. then it would not be correct to say that our masses can be added to that one sacrifice of our High Priest, or that they are to be numbered with it, in the same way as they form a plurality between themselves. I can speak of three delegated authorities (suppose the authority of three Apostolic Delegates); but if I put in the authority of the Pope, it will not be quite so suitable to speak of four authorities (the sovereign authority, and the three delegated ones); at any rate four will not be taken here exactly in the same way as three could in the previous sentence. Why? because those three were additions to one another; and they are not additions (properly speaking) to the Pope's authority, any more than my existence or yours could be added up to God's existence. And yet they are really and numerically distinct from it: they are subordinated to it, as a participation of it; not coordinated with it.

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Such is the relation of our "active sacrifice" to that Sacrifice of Redemption, that sacrifice of the Passion and Death of the Lord, made up of the Supper and the Cross. Our sacrifice is numerically distinct from, but cannot be properly "connumerated" with that *one* personal Sacrifice of Christ.

Of course, it should be noted, that when an author has once and for all coupled the Supper with the Cross in the unity of a single individual sacrifice, he must be understood

while speaking of the sacrifice of the Cross, or the sacrifice of the Passion, or the sacrifice of the Supper, to mean that complete Sacrifice which is the Sacrifice of Redemption in its entirety!; and therefore, if he further compare the Mass with the sacrifice of the Cross, he should be understood to compare it, not with the Cross only, apart from the Supper, but with the Cross together with the Supper, that is with the whole Sacrifice that goes by the name of sacrifice of the Cross; and likewise, if he compares the Mass with the sacrifice of the Supper, as one unit with another unit, it will be a comparison with the Supper not apart from the Cross but together with the Cross.

1 Unless, of course, the context points to some other interpretation.

CONCERNING THE LAST SUPPER AND CALVARY

CONCERNING THE LAST SUPPER AND CALVARYI

I owe much gratitude to the Dublin Review for the interest it shows in a book of mine,2 on which no less than three articles have appeared in the last two numbers, 3 beside one from the scholarly pen of my Right Reverend friend, the Bishop of Hebron. The Bishop of Hebron has written in self-defence. I am happier than His Lordship. I have first of all to write words of thanks: thanks to His Lordship for having coupled my defence with his. Thanks, and indeed profound thanks, to the Rev. M. C. D'Arcy, who in his winning style has written a most splendid and effective article. I might leave my cause in his fraternal hands. Neither intelligence nor sympathy is lacking on his side. And indeed what I may have to add will be very little, and spoken in deference chiefly to those who think that I ought not to keep away from the field, lest my reasons might be misinterpreted. But before I proceed to this troublesome part of my task, I may perhaps emphasize the special debt of gratitude which I owe to the Editor of this Review for opening its pages not only to adverse criticism, but also to the other sort. He has set an example which I hope will henceforth be followed by other editors in England (I am not speaking of Ireland or America). If the iron rule, which, to the best of my information, does in certain periodicals exclude from the defence of a work anyone but its author, were from England to spread to other countries, where on the Continent would be the chance of English authors? trust there is no impertinence in asking English editors kindly

¹ Dublin Rtview, January, February, March igi6,' 1 MF (Paris, Beauchesne, second edition), 'Nos. 354 and 355.

to remember that the language of their land is no mother tongue to Frenchmen. I am particularly glad, therefore, that through the welcome appearance of a supporter in these hospitable pages I find myself relieved of the main part of what Fr. D'Arcy rightly terms an "unwelcome task."

This said, I must now turn my attention first to Abbot Ford, and then to somebody else.

Ι

My remarks on Abbot Ford's paper I will confine to his presentment of my position. In a pithy paragraph he has put together certain views, supposedly mine, "in connection with the Last Supper and Calvary, which sound strange (he says) to Catholic ears. For example: (i) there was no Mass at the Last Supper; (2) the Eucharistic Sacrifice of the Supper was, like that of the Cross, once for all and cannot be repeated; (3) there was no complete Sacrifice at the Last Supper: (4) at the Last Supper Christ did not offer up Himself, but only His coming Passion; (5) the death of Christ is not to be found in the Sacrifice of the Last Supper; (6) Christ did not die on the Cross in obedience to any command of the Father; (7) the Mass was inaugurated after the Ascen-It would not be unreasonable to suggest that a theory which either postulates or necessarily leads to so many strange views cannot itself be sound " (p. 30). Now let us go back upon these "strange views," and see how far they are mine, or how far they are strange.

First, about the Mass. Where did I ever say that "there was no Mass at the Last Supper"? In my book, I do not touch even the question whether it is correct or not to speak of a "Mass" as celebrated by Christ in the Supper-Room. This is so certain a fact, that it has been implicitly recognized in *Blackfriars* (Jan. 1525), with a view apparently to make me disclose my mind on the subject. The next issue of B contained these words of mine: "If by the Mass is meant the bloodless

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oblation of the Body and Blood of Christ under the species of bread and wine by the priests of the Church in memory of Christ's death till he come ("ab Ecclesia per sacerdotes sub signis visibilibus immolandum in memoriam transitus sui ex hoc mundo ad Patrem," Cone. Trid., sess. 22, cap. 1), which is the generally accepted sense, then there was in that sense no Mass celebrated in the Cenacle; although there Christ certainly did offer virtually all our masses; which are now offered by us in virtue of that one offering of his, to which he actually conjoins and subjoins our own offerings, as particular agencies to a universal cause. But if you choose to mean by the Mass any bloodless oblation of the Body and Blood of Christ under the species of bread and wine whether performed by the priests of the Church in union with Christ, or by Christ alone: whether intended to commemorate Christ's death, or to dedicate Christ to his death; whether having no further continuation in view, or having still to be carried on and pursued unto death il then in that indeterminate sense, which is not the current one, you will have to say that there was a Mass said in the Cenacle."

This has been my only utterance so far on the subject. It is perhaps a little more *nuance* than one would be led to believe by Abbot Ford's over-simplified wording: "There was no Mass at the Last Supper."

With No. i ought obviously be coupled No. 7, in which we read: "The Mass was inaugurated after the Ascension." I suppose by these words Abbot Ford is alluding to two Notes of mine, appended respectively to my seventeenth and twenty-sixth Dissertations. The first is entitled: De inconcessa apostolis potestate litandi per triduum mortis dominicae; the second: De inconcessa apostolis potestate litandi ante diem Pentecostes. From the very wording of those titles it appears that the question raised is strictly, solely and exclusively about the Mass as a sacrifice of the Church; not therefore, as Abbot Ford

¹ For the way in which Christ's *Masi* was described by Luther's antagonist, Bishop Berthold of Chiemsee, as begun in the Supper-Room and finished only on the Cross, while our masses end on the spot with the Eucharistic consecration, see *IER*, June, 1925, p. 578; above, pp. 397 s?

would have us believe, about "the Last Supper and Calvary." Now to the question thus restricted to the commemorative sacrifice various solutions have been given by theologians: some have stated that the apostles could offer sacrifice from the very first moment of their ordination in the Supper-Room, and, therefore, not only before Christ's Ascension, but even before his resurrection and death; others have denied it; men indeed of the greatest authority, particularly here in Rome; and these appear to me to be more faithful to Scripture, to the Fathers, and to what is commonly called the analogy of Faith. When this opinion is said to sound strange to Catholic ears, I wonder whether the opinion is not misunderstood, or the strangeness due to unfamiliarity with the problem itself, or whether for Catholic ears we should not read the particular ears of one Catholic, however distinguished. Anyhow, no clue is offered to us, as no reason is proffered, but only an expression of dislike, which we must take as it is, and leave where it stands.

No. 2 is of a peculiar character. "The Eucharistic Sacrifice of the Last Supper was, like that of the Cross, once for all and cannot be repeated." Needless to say, this sentence is not mine. What can it mean? Its probable import is that there was a certain sacrifice at the Supper (let us call it the Eucharistic sacrifice); and another sacrifice on the Cross (let us call it the bloody sacrifice), and that in the same way as Christ was not to be killed again by us, so too were we not to offer him again under the species of bread and wine. I suggest that this is the obvious meaning of the sentence meant to "sound strange to Catholic ears." And, in truth, whoever means that, is more than strange: he is either a fool or an infidel.

No. 3 runs like this: "There was no complete Sacrifice at the Last Supper." Please, add at least that it was completed. It would not have been complete had it been left there. It was made complete by the Passion. In other words, it was not the whole of Christ's redemptive sacrifice; but it was a part of it, a component part, an essential part. Nor

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was the bloody Passion, of itself, the whole of Christ's redemptive sacrifice, but a part of it, a component part, an essential If you wish for a simile, your confession is not a complete sacrament, unless absolution comes in. absolution has been pronounced, there is no incomplete sacrament left. Apply this to the present case, and do away with your fears of incompleteness for Christ's Sacrifice, even as you would for my own sacrifice of this morning, when the consecration of the bread was completed by the consecration of the wine. In one word, Christ's Sacrifice, his one and only Sacrifice, the Sacrifice of Redemption, was a most complete one. But its completeness comes from the conjunction of Supper and Passion. At the Supper, as well as through each successive stage of the Bloody Passion, Christ was engaged in performing his complete Sacrifice. Properly speaking, he never made, never offered an incomplete one; any more than I did this morning, although no part of my sacrifice was by itself the fulness of the whole.

No. 4 is perhaps the most surprising of the whole list. the Last Supper Christ did not offer up himself [italics mine], but only his coming Passion." Where, where indeed, did I ever say or suggest anything of the kind? Of course, as Abbot Ford follows the grand method of giving no references, the average reader will not be able to verify, and is apt to think, therefore, that in the bulky mass of literature that has already come from my pen on the subject I may have somewhere dropped this piece of extreme nonsense. To say that Christ did not at the Last Supper offer up himself would be a most direct denial of the Catholic Faith. It would be Luther's heresy. Perhaps there is some antecedent improbability that it should be die view held and taught by one who, after all, is no Professor of Protestant Theology. What I hold and say, most expressly, is that Christ did offer up himself; that he offered himselfup to his Father as the Lamb to be slain in his Passion; that he offered himself to his Passion, as to the immolation through which he was to go over to his Father, in the shape of a Gift for the ransom of mankind. I say so

in so many words hundreds of times; and this is again what I constantly and most plainly mean, when I use the other phrase—namely, that he offered his Passion, or his Death or his Life. I should have to quote nearly every page of my book. Let us be content with two or three passages. My first utterance on the subject is to be found in the third Dissertation, which happens to be also the opening portion of the third chapter. The title of the chapter is De oblatione passionis peracta a Christo in coena. The title of the corresponding Dissertation is Christum in coena sacerdotaliter obtulisse suum corpus ad cruentam passionis immolationem, persuadetur primo ex narratione coenae in se considerata. He offered a real, substantial thing; he offered his own Body; but he offered it to death; and this is what is called offering his death. Again now, let us see the text of the Dissertation itself. It opens like this: "Id nobis est propositi ut ostendatur Christus, in coena effigiem suae passionis conficiens, obtulisse Deo passionis suae veritatem sacerdotaliter." Then comes the analysis of this statement, including four points: first, there is in the Last Supper a merely symbolical mactation, representing some real mactation to come; secondly, there is some oblation too; thirdly, an actual and real, not merely representative or apparent, oblation; fourthly, the oblation—of what?—" Dice quarto: oblationem fieri hostiae ad ipsam immolationem veram quae repraesentaturfutura." of the Victim, of Christ himself. Then comes this summary: "Uno verbo: in imagine alicuius immolationis offiertur hic et nunc Christus ad immolationem cuiusfit imago." This is how I maintain that Christ did not offer up himself, but only his coming Passion. In the demonstration of the fourth point occur these words: "Ergo in ipsa immolatione repraesentativa . . . actualiter quaedam perficitur oblatio Christi ad immolationem cruentam." "Ouare . . . dicendum --- : esse in ritu illo mysticae immolationis ipsam passionis hostiam, ut talem, oblatam Deo a Christo sacerdotaliter." Finally comes a Recapitulation, in which I express myself thus: "Dabat se {Christus} in effigie mortis; dabat se pro nobis in mortem, atque per mortem se dabat Deo hostiam." All those passages are taken from one Disseri

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tation only.1 And Abbot Ford coolly writes that my thesis is: "At the Last Supper Christ did not offer up himself, but only his coming Passion." By this critic the reader is well informed!

But perhaps, even though my teaching is that Christ did offer up himself, I am wrong in using as an equivalent the phrase 'Christ offered his Passion.' But how could I be wrong? Abbot Ford himself acknowledges the equivalence, when on the words of Cyprian "The Passion of the Lord is the sacrifice which we offer," he volunteers this commentary: "If the letter is read carefully, it will be recognized that St. Cyprian is among the Doctors who tell us that Christ in the Supper offered up himself to his death." I think I was not totally unaware of it; and possibly some traces of this reading might be discoverable somewhere in my book.

No. 5 I profess not to understand. I am supposed to teach that "the Death of Christ is not to be found in the Sacrifice of the Last Supper." What is the meaning of this? Ought I to teach that Christ was actually killed in the Last Supper? I hope not. But then do I fail perhaps to teach that the Death was represented? I say it, or imply it at every page. Is that all? I say moreover, what others do not say, that Christ's Death was sacrificially offered by the High Priest according to Melchisedech in his Eucharistic feast. Is not that enough? I thought that in my view the Death of Christ was a little more closely bound up with the Last Supper than it would be in the views of others.

1 Elucidatio III. In Catholic Faith in the Holy Eucharist I express myself thus:
12 Christ in the Supper offered himself up to death (p. 115). "He was offering himself up to what was in store for him" (p. 118). I make mine the words of Adolph of Schaumburg: "Christ offered himself up to his Father with his own hands" (p. 124), etc. In The Last Supper and Calvaiy, I say that Christ in the Supper was "making over to God the Lamb to be slain, and by the very fact offering in the ritual sense of the word, not internally only, but outwardly, not by a mere purpose or promise to give, but by the actual giving and delivering up of the gift, not in mere figure, but most really and formally, the Victim that was henceforth sacred to God, and as such due to its ultimate fate." I call this a "sacramental donation of his own self and of his own life," again "his own self-offering." See above, pp. 232 sq.

So far we have had a glimpse of Abbot Ford's critical methods. No. 6 will give us an insight into his method as a theologian.

My sixth capital sin is to declare that "Christ did not die on the Cross in obedience to any command of the Father." A "conclusion . . . difficult to reconcile with the common belief and feeling of all Christians" (italics mine), p. 41. Nothing less. Of course, this is saying a great deal; perhaps more than Abbot Ford realizes: it means excluding from among Christians the countless theologians who for centuries and centuries have maintained with all their might that there had been no strict command of the Father to the Son in respect of the Passion and Death. Among those nearer to us suffice it here to mention these two, whose names are the glory of modern theology, Franzelin and Billot. No Christians, apparently, in the judgement of Abbot Ford. Their case is settled, without recourse even to argument, by direct appeal to mere intuition. This intuitive method I envy; it would dispense me, and many of my painstaking brethren, of the toilsome task of reading books, of getting acquainted with the Fathers and their exposition of Scripture, and, when I discuss the opinion of some theologian, of troubling about what he may have written on the subject, were it in explanation of St. Thomas or St. Anselm, whom Abbot Ford quotes against me, without knowing apparently. or at any rate without notifying his reader of the fact that I have tried to give a reasoned and coherent commentary of their many and, at first sight, rather conflicting pronouncements. Yet, however much I may envy this method, I will not recommend it to anybody. For one, I hope never to trust my lights so much as to discard the views of either Franzelin or Billot with a mere ipse dixi.

Now, this being said about the method, I revert to the doctrine, only to note this. As a matter of fact, I do not agree with those many eminent theologians who hold that Christ did *not* die on the Cross out of strict obedience. I maintain that he did; that on the Cross, and during his

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bloody Passion, he was strictly bound to incur death; that there was a law at the time, a divine law, and in this sense a divine command, making it unlawful for him to decline death. But on the other hand, I maintain that this obligation was not originated by a "particular" command of the Father. | such as 'Thou shalt die': any more than a monk's obligation to poverty, chastity or obedience has its source in any particular command of this kind: 'Thou shalt give up thy worldly possessions, and married life, and independ-Yet the obligation is there, once the vow has been taken (which you were free to take or not to take): but it is there as a special case of your general duty of religion that is, of that specific justice to God which makes it incumbent upon you not to defraud the Almighty of what has been pledged to him. Christ assuredly did not vow anything, in the proper sense of the word, but he did something more sacred and more thorough still: he did as a High Priest offer himself up to God as a Victim. This he did originally in the Eucharistic rite of the Supper: and from thence it was not permissible for him to withdraw the Gift which he had made sacred to God. Thus does the consecration of the Gift contain a pledge much more binding still than a mere vow could be. But it is not correct to say that there is in the sacrificial oblation only a pledge; there is the actual giving: which is something more; but there is contained in it implicitly a pledge not to take back, not to claim back what has been "consigned into God's hands." This kind of obligation I do admit in Christ upon the Cross: a very sacred, strict and imperative obligation; referring decidedly to the will of God, to the law of God, to the general command of God, his foremost precept: that justice should be kept, the justice which is due to all, and above all to God. It

¹ My phrase in the English text, first alluded to by Abbot Ford in his Summary, and then quoted by him in full on page 41, is this: **___ It was Christ's.duty to die, not to fulfil any particular command of His Father, which to the majority of our Doctors is unthinkable, but only to keep the law of justice even unto death " (Catholic Faith in the Holy Eucharist, p. 116).

^{*} Catholic Faith in the Holy Eucharist, p. 115.

may be that this does not commend itself to Abbot Ford, for reasons best known to himself; but it is clearly a nearer approach to the "particular" command, which he appears to favour, than the theory of either Billot or Franzelin; and if these good men still count among Christians, I fancy Abbot Ford may a fortiori reserve for me a little seat in the congregation of "all Christians," who glory in the name of Orthodox and followers of the Catholic and Apostolic Faith—if not in his own private chapel.

I am not here in the least demonstrating any of my views; nor am I even discussing the objections which Abbot Ford may think fit to raise against any of them. I think no discussion can be fruitful before the critic has read carefully and entirely the work under consideration. That this has not been the case I maintain out of respect for Abbot Ford himself, seeing that for such misapprehensions and misrepresentations as his have been, if the excuse were not to be found in lack of adequate perusal, then only unpleasant thoughts would suggest themselves, which I for one entirely dismiss. however, critics remember that even carelessness is after all only a poor excuse; that authors have a certain right not to have their views deformed; and that to fail in this respect, even unintentionally, entails, on the part of the offender, certain responsibilities and obligations which, when the matter is no trifle, may be of a serious character.

In the meantime I willingly acknowledge the civil tone of my critic, the parliamentary quality of his language, and a (comparatively) notable absence of acrimony. For these welcome features of his style let an expression of thanks be my last word to Abbot Ford.

 \mathbf{II}

The Rev. V. McNabb has already devoted to my work several articles or letters to the Press [Blackfriars, September 1923 Î October, 1924; January, 1925; Irish Ecclesiastical

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Record, June, October, and December, 1924). I have replied faithfully each time (American Ecclesiastical Review, July and August, 1924; Blackfriars, December, 1924; February, 1925; Irish Ecclesiastical Record, September and December, 1924; January, 1925). In the Irish Ecclesiastical Record (June, 1924). I was accused of "serious errors in faith," amounting even to "heresy," while in support of the charge a statement of fact was made which, when challenged,2 was neither substantiated nor withdrawn. In *Blackfriars* (October, 1924, p. 399) my doctrine was dubbed "repulsive", and, worse even than heretical, "blasphemous In the meantime a slur had been cast on my literary honesty by means of methods which I will not here characterize, but which the reader may see exposed in Blackfriars, December, 1924, pp. 551, sqq? day, the same critic comes forward with a new and remarkable discovery: Cardinal Billot opposes my view of the Eucharistic Sacrifice. And thereupon comment goes on.4 discoveries of the kind it will be very easy to make for those who care. I have in Mysterium Fidei opposed many modem writers on the Eucharist; some without naming them, others by name. Cardinal Billot is one of the latter category. Not only have I discussed his view, but I have gone the length of saying (his friendship as well as the loftiness of his mind allows of such liberty) that, if carried to its ultimate conclusions, it would, in my opinion, not only sever the Mass from all essential connection with the Cross, not only deprive it of any intrinsic propitiatory force, but even endanger the very truth of its sacrificial character. It was not perhaps, then, such a matter of surprise that Cardinal Billot, on bringing up to date the sixth edition of his treatise. De Ecclesiae Sacramentis. should in his turn, were it but to defend his theory, criticize mine. And seeing that his view is bound up with a duality of sacrifices in the Supper and on the Cross, it was only natural that he should vindicate this duality, and thus impugn the

¹ See /ER, January, 1925.

^{*} See *IER*, September, 1924 and January, 1925. 3 See also February, 1925, p. 109.

^{*} Dublin Review, p. 167 ff.

unity. This he has done, and done by way of a Scholastic That such an event should be described as portentous, and its significance endowed with the finality of a "condemnation," is perhaps well in keeping with what has come before from the same pen: but it is none the less bound to appear ludicrous " to all students of the history of theological discussion." I do not think that a single example could be found of an author converting all or even any large proportion of the writers that had previously committed themselves to an opinion different from his. Indeed, this should be accounted a miracle of the first class, a miracle which not even St. Thomas could boast to have achieved—far from it: and least of all should it be expected from the last of his disciples. The wonder is not that those whom I combat should combat me. The wonder would be the other way about; if they did not.

Nor do I in the meantime underrate the significance of dissent from Cardinal Billot: no more than I did when I first attacked him. Cardinal Billot is to my mind the greatest thinker that there is in the theological world of to-day. His authority is of the highest; and far from declining, I believe that it will rise and establish itself more and more as ages go on. But when it comes to some particular point to be decided scientifically, Cardinal Billot himself is aware and mindful of the old axiom: Tanti valet auctoritas quanti valet ratio allata. In the present case Cardinal Billot's argument is based simply and solely on his reading of a certain phrase in the decree of Trent. Why that reading seems to me historically untenable, I have been at pains lately to show in the Irish Ecclesiastical Record.2 Let that suffice. I am not here discussing the point with His Eminence, for obvious reasons. But much less do I intend to have a theological debate with one whom, much

¹ Dublin Review, p. 167.

^{&#}x27;June 1925, The Last Supper and Catholic Divines from. Henry VHI to the Council of Trent; see above, p. 302 sq. The reader may also see in The Last Supper and Calvary (see above, p. 272) how the true mind of the Fathers of Trent had already been explained in the seventeenth century by the great Church historian, Noel Alexandre, O.P. in his Dissertation on the Mass against Lutherans and Calvinists.

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to my regret, I had to tell lately in *Blackfriarsl* why such a thing was henceforth out of the question between him and myself.

Only, in view of the general public, whose mind is apt to be disturbed by such an appeal as has been made to the authority of a Prince of the Church, I here beg to submit a few specimens of the view taken of this matter by some of the highest Church dignitaries in various parts of the world since the time my book was published.

The Archbishop of Toronto, the Most Rev. Neil McNeil, D.D., in a popular instruction on the Mass (*The Passion and the Mass. The Nature of the Mass and our Participation in it*), writes:

"The primary purpose of the Supper was the offering up of the sacrifice of the Cross. At the Supper he offered his Body to be broken and his Blood to be shed in the Passion and on the Cross. The Passion of the Lord is the sacrifice that we offer, said St. Cyprian in reference to the Mass. If that is what priests offer now, then that is what Christ offered at the Supper. There he offered himself as the victim to be immolated. Now he offers himself in the Mass as the victim once immolated on the Cross. The offering of the Supper involved all that followed in suffering and death. _ _ _ In the case of our Lord, the Supper and what followed are parts of one Sacrifice. The Sacrifice of Redemption began at the Supper and ended on the Cross."

On May 27, 1923, one who had been for very many years the professor of countless generations of priests in the Papal College of Propaganda, the world-famed author of the *Instutiones Theologiae Dogmaticae ad textum S. Thomae concinnatae*, wrote as follows in his Introductory Letter to Bishop Macdonald's book: "The Supper was the Sacrifice of the Cross as Begun; the immolation on Calvary was the same sacrifice as consummated." Twelve months later the signatory of this letter, the Right Rev. A. M. Lépicier, was raised to Archiépiscopal rank, and established as Apostolic Visitor over the whole Hierarchy of India.*

1 February, 1925. p. 108 ff. • He i· now a Cardinal.

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A short while before, the Archbishop of Rennes, late Chancellor of the Catholic University of Lille, President of the Board of the Catholic University of Angers, in his Lenten Pastoral of 1922, in words which I have quoted more fully elsewhere, expressed the same doctrine:

"There (in the Last Supper) he already confronts his disciples with the sacrifice of salvation. Already he is beginning it; from this moment he offers himself up to death. He does so in a significant phrase which does not bear on the future as a promise, but affects the present as an actual decision; by means of symbols too, more expressive still than words. . . . The Saviour is here placing himself . . . as the lamb prophesied by Isaias, a victim mute and gagged, fastened by the sacramental bonds more tightly still than he is soon to be by the cords of the soldiers. Do you not understand that he wishes to make it clear to us that on his part everything is ready for the sacrifice, and that there is nothing left for him to wait for but the knife? In this unbloody rite already appears before you the Priest and the Victim, along with the offering to and destination for immolation: which intention is here, as usual, expressed liturgically by the Pontiff himself. Jesus, I say again, began in the Cenacle that sacrifice which this very day shall be perfected in actual bloodshed. Why then should we tear asunder the sacrifice of the Supper from that of the Cross, as if they were two distinct entities, each one of which had in itself the constitutive and integral elements of a sacrifice: as if Christ had offered himself twice! Does not the mystic immolation entailed by the duality of the sacramental species, connect our Victim in a quite transparent manner with the immolation on the Cross, and with it alone? Is not the Victim already offered and vowed irretrievably to that death on the Cross? . . . From all sides, then the same conclusion presses itself on us: the passion has already begun its course; it is not only morally present, as in Christ's thought, but it is virtually enacted by the offering which Christ makes of himself to his Death in this solemn moment. After all, was it not necessary that this offering should be made, and made liturgically, if Christ's Passion was to be a religious immolation and a sacerdotal sacrifice? And where shall we find it in the Gospel butat the moment of the Supper? Let Protestants exclaim that if the Eucharist was a sacrifice of his own Body and Blood offered by Christ at the Supper, then our redemption was already effected, and the sacrifice of the Cross is made void; the Fathers of Trent have replied that this was not a case of adding

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one sacrifice to another, that there was only one Sacrifice in all, extending itself from the Supper-Room to the mountain of Golgotha, and that it was continuous in the order of events, even as in the literary texture of the Gospels."

Six months after the publication of this Pastoral the same Archbishop Charost was made a Cardinal, in express recognition (the Pope said, addressing publicly the Sacred College) of his theological eminence. These are all recent pronouncements, which might easily be supplemented.

In a past generation it was the head of the English hierarchy, Cardinal Manning, who in that standard book of his, *The Glories of the Sacred Heart*, had taught the Catholics of all English-speaking lands:

"In that hour (of the Last Supper) and in that action (of the Eucharistic consecration) He (Christ) offered up the Lamb that was slain from the beginning of the world. The atoning sacrifice predestined from all eternity was then offered up. ... In this last Paschal Supper. ... He began the act of oblation, finished upon Calvary, which redeemed the world. He offered that sacrifice first without bloodshedding; but it was the same true, proper, and propitiatory sacrifice which redeems the world, because therein he offered himself. . . . No man had power to take him until he delivered himself into their hands. . . . Therefore at his Last Supper he made a free and voluntary offering of himself. He had not yet shed his Blood, but throughout his whole life he had offered his will, and he now offered his Death; and that which he began at the Last Supper he accomplished on the morrow upon Calvary by the shedding of Blood; for that shedding of Blood was the completion of his Sacrifice. Nevertheless, when he sat at the table in the guest-chamber, he truly offered himself, the one true, proper and propitiatory sacrifice that takes away the sin of the world. He died to complete the sacrifice, to fill up its perfect propitiation by the last gift that he could give, by the last drop of his precious Blood."

The past generations of the French or German hierarchy might be appealed to as well. In the meantime the English public, if perturbed, may feel reassured and realize that if

"not all theologians are of one mind in assigning the proper nature ___ of that sublime sacrifice" (as Archbishop Lépicier remarks), yet they may (and should) all vie with one another in loyalty to the Church, to the faith once delivered to the saints, to authority expressing itself through the channel of Papal or conciliar decrees, or to the daily teaching of pastors speaking in common agreement.

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OBLATION AND IMMOLATION IN TRADITIONAL THEOLOGY

DISTINCTION

BETWEEN

OBLATION AND IMMOLATION IN TRADITIONAL THEOLOGY

A question was mooted lately in reference to the terminology to be used in the doctrine of sacrifice. The question, however, is not without some bearing on the soundness of the doctrine itself. It is asked whether we ought to use the word immolation to signify explicitly (in recto) the killing or mactation of the animal, inasmuch as that killing has in view the sacerdotal oblation of the sacrifice, or whether we should not rather keep the word immolation for the sacerdotal oblation itself, as connoting by implication (in obliquo) the aforesaid killing or mactation. What gave rise to the query was the language I made use of in the Mysterium Fidei (p. ii), when, treating of the sacrifices that include mactation. I stated that in this matter authors were wont to use the word immolation in two ways: to signify either mactation as it has reference to oblation, or oblation with a connotation of mactation (also to signify equally both oblation and mactation, in other words, the whole sacrificial rite).

J.

I added, however, that the former use, as more strictly appropriate and clearer, would be habitually adopted by me in the course of my work. This is how I put it: "The word immolation, in its stricter acceptation, means the destruction or mactation of the victim rather than its oblation, not, however, without some reference to an oblation. Sacrifice is therefore made up of two things, the (external) act of offering and the immolation, since the victim either is offered to be

1 This article appeared in latin in Ephemerides Theologicae Looanienses, July 1927.

immolated, or is offered by being immolated, or is offered as having been immolated. Neither oblation, nor immolation. taken by itself alone, is sufficient to confer the state of victim, but both are required. Still among writers it happens very often that oblation and immolation are not taken so strictly. but are used to express the entire sacrificial function, of which they are only parts. This is the more natural as in very many sacrifices there is no real, but only a logical, distinction between immolation and oblation. I so that by either the sacrifice is really completed. Moreover, where both occur separately. neither one nor the other belongs to the sacrifice except as the two are related to each other. The result has been that oblation and immolation have been held as synonymous, and oblation came to mean the same as immolation, and immolation in its turn the same as oblation. . . . For my own part. while treating of sacrifice, I shall, as far as possible, always distinguish oblation and immolation from each other as two distinct concepts, to be expressed in different terms, and consequently both the one and the other as being, in part, distinct from the entire sacrificial work $\{MF, pp. 11-12\}$.

This terminology of mine had displeased two gentlemen, one of whom I shall leave out of the controversy (for a compelling motive which may be found stated above, pp. 342 sq.). The other, Alfred Swaby, O.P. [The Last Supper and Calvary, a Treatise, edited with a Preface and Introduction by the Rev. Vincent McNabb, O.P., London, 1926), in total agreement with the former, stated that in the theological tradition of the Catholic Church no real distinction was ever admitted between sacerdotal oblation and immolation. On the other hand immolation had always been really contradistinguished by the theologians from mactation or the killing of the living being; for by immolation nothing else was meant than the priest's oblation of a bloody sacrifice as such. This being the case, a theologian is not justified in forsaking the customary

¹ For instance: when the rite of oblation consists in the pouring of the blood upon the altar, then, if the victim is slaughtered upon the altar, we have in one and the same act both immolation and oblation.

language of the Church; nor can such departure be without danger of smuggling in some error. What this error is said to be, we shall quote, in a later part of this article, from the author himself. In the meanwhile we must place before the reader the terms in which the above assertions are contained.

"Tradition teaches that sacrificial oblation is logically, but not really distinct from immolation" (p. 26.).

"Immolation is not Mactation" (p. 30).

- "Immolation is the same act of oblation viewed in relation to the victim slain" (p. 23).
 - "The precise shade of meaning appropriate to the term *immolation* _ _ _ [is characterized] by implied allusion to the shedding of the Victim's Blood" (p. 27).
 - "Theological tradition does make a real distinction of meaning between immolation and mactation" (p. 50).

 "Similarly theological tradition uniformly identifies immolation
 - "Similarly theological tradition uniformly identifies *immolation* with *sacerdotal oblation*, whereas mactation has become identified with the act of the victimarius" (ibid.).

The assumption [of a real distinction between immolation and oblation] is revolutionary " (p. 30).

- "That real distinction of meaning [between tradition's sacrificial terms] . . . constitutes Père de la Tailie's initial fallacy " (ibid,).
- "The fundamental error—designated by the present writer the *initialfallacy* of his theory—Père de la Taille expresses in words already considered" (p. 48).

"His initial fallacy is not without offspring" (p. 30),

It is certainly no trifling matter, if leaving aside the sound form of words, I have put myself in such opposition to a most invariable rule of theological language ("revolt from tradition", p. 34) as to let some fundamental error creep in, the cause of all the fallacy to be discovered later on in my work on the sacrifice both of the Lord and of his Church.

T

As a preliminary remark, let it be understood that the inquiry is not what in its extra-sacrificial acceptation the

1 All references, unless otherwise stated, are to the above cited work of Alfred Swaby. The italics used are not mine but the author's.

word immolation may mean here and there in ecclesiastical documents. For it is only too evident that it must then be understood, according to the subject-matter, at one time of killing, at another of some kind of oblation or donation. Thus, when in the Breviary we read "grex immolatorum tener", "the tender flock of immolated (babes)", we know that Prudentius is presenting to us the little army not of offered but of murdered infants. The meaning is the same when, in the work of Commodianus we read that Nero Redivivus in his fury against Christ's prophets, Elias and others,

Immolat hos primum ___ Sub quorum martyrio decima pars corruit urbisl

Likewise, when St. Ambrose tells you {Exp. Evang, in Lucam, in xxii, 36): "There is also the sword of the passion, that thou mayest be striped of the body and with the spoils of thy immolated flesh buy thyself the crown of holy martyrdom", you understand that the suffering of martyrdom is not really compared to an oblation-rite, but rather to the undergoing of some sort of mactation. The same meaning occurs in the saying of St. Thomas: "But the passion of the saints is called immolation" {sanctorum autem passio dicitur immolatio}. {In II Tim. iv, 6}.

On the other hand, if in medieval documents you read: "King Idon immolated . . . one of his mansions . . . to the Church of St. Peter", or "In exchange for the kingdom, of heaven _ _ . he immolated four measures of earth to God and the Saints" (Du Cange, Gloss. 3,768), you see at once that it is not a question of having demolished a house, much less the earth, but of having given or offered the same to God or to the Saints or to the Church.

I

Secondly, we do not inquire what is the usual acceptation of *immolation* in the sacrifices of inanimate objects. For of necessity it can then only stand for the sacrificial oblation itself, since there is no mactation or killing or deterioration

^{1&}quot; Immolates these first . . . and at their martyrdom a tenth part of the city crumbles." Carmen Apologeticum, v. 858, Ed. Bernhardus Dombart, p. 171.

of any kind intended. If then anywhere in medieval writers We read of bread and wine being immolated, we must take it of being offered in sacrifice, and see therein no difference, real or logical, between immolation and oblation or sacrificing.

But in the sacrifices of living victims the case is different, and this is the point under discussion. Very often in the works of authors by the word immolation is intended the sacerdotal oblation itself, or also the entire sacrificial action, or, in an indeterminate manner, something in some way or another sacrificial; and this occurs even in those writers who elsewhere mean by it rather mactation. These uses of the word we not only have never denied, but have never failed to assert and to confirm them readily (see above). Therefore, no advantage is scored against us, if examples are brought forward of any use of this sort, of which we are neither ignorant, nor disapproving—even though we do not imitate it, for fear lest, in our writings, a confusion arise between the above mentioned use and that other which we resolved to prefer. which is indeed not less customary, but more suitable for discrimination.

As the style of pagan writers does not directly come under consideration here, it may suffice to state what Aegidius Forcellini, looked upon till now as a leading master of classical, latinity, has to say. In this Totius Latinitatis Lexicon, on the word immolo, after first giving the etymological sense— (" mola, i.e., fane tosto, molito et sale mixto, victimam aspergo") —"I sprinkle the victim with meal, i.e. with roasted com ground and mixed with salt",—he proposes the commonly received meaning in the following terms: io "rei divinae causa macto"; 2° "sacrifico". Before him Joh. Jos. Hofmanns (Lexicon Universale, Lugduni 1678, tom. 2, p. 606) in describing the order of the pagan sacrificial rites, the preparatory prayer, the sprinkling with ground and roasted com, the libation of wine, in the fourth place says: "Then the victimarians or slayers, the attendants and helpers were ordered [by the priests] to immolate and to flay the victims

you have the immolation of the ancients both distinguished from the sacerdotal oblation, and identified with the mactation.

But passing over these points as irrelevant, we take up the task of showing that immolation was freely used in the theological tradition of Christians for the mactation itself, in its relation to the sacerdotal oblation.

The chief standard of language in this matter is undoubtedly the Vulgate Translation of the Scriptures. Now when Moses publishes for the first time the law of the bloody sacrifices, his language, according to the translator, is as follows (Levit. i, 2-5): "The man among you that shall offer to the Lord a sacrifice of the cattle, that is, offering victims of oxen and sheep (v. 2), if his offering be a holocaust, and of the herd, he shall offer a male without blemish, at the door of the testimony, to make the Lord favourable to him (v. 3): and he shall put his hand upon the head of the victim, and it shall be acceptable, and help to its expiation (v. 4); and he shall immolate the calf before the Lord, and the priests the sons of Aaron shall offer the blood thereof, pouring it round about the altar, which is before the door of the tabernacle (v. 5).

To any one looking at the text it is patent that the verb to offer in verses 2 and 3 does not designate the act of a priest, but of a layman. There is indicated, first the actual destination of the object for sacrifice (v. 2), second its presentation before the priest in the place assigned (v. 3). But in the fifth verse there is à distinction made between the words he shall immolate and they shall offer. Who shall immolate? the layman. Who shall offer? the priests. And what is the layman doing when he is said to immolate? he slays. What are the priests doing, .when described as. offering? they are pouring blood over the altar. Will you pretend that it is but one and the same identical action, on the part of the layman slaughtering the cattle and on the part of the priest presenting God with the blood of a calf? Does the phrase he shall immolate express the sacerdotal oblation itself? What, therefore, does that rule of speech, authentic if ever there was one, what, I

ask, does that biblical rule attest, if not that the use of terms we profess to adopt is excellent, and that for any one to carp at it is utterly unfair? Should you doubt our exegesis, listen to a commentator who can claim the highest approbation, the most Reverend Mark Sales, O.P., at present master of the Sacred Palace. In his work La Sacra Bibbia Commentata (Turin, 1919), he distinguishes each word as follows: in the second verse "shall offer" means "the act of a layman who presents the victim at the altar 1 In the fifth verse immolabit is translated by "shall immolate", and the word is explained by "shall slay". But offerent is rendered by "shall offer", which is defined as "the act of the priest who sprinkles the blood about the altar". 3 You may also consult the annotations made on this passage in La Bible de Vente (ed. Drach, 1827).

What we have said of this opening passage of *Leviticus*, is true likewise of *Levit*, i, 11; iii, 2, 8, 13; iv, 24, 29, 33, etc. In all these passages, as is plain to the reader, by immolation is meant mactation or killing, and in not one of them is sacerdotal oblation intended.

Since the Vulgate translation is the work of St. Jerome, we have in all the above quotations a remarkable instance of patristic style, I mean of the style proper to the Doctor Maximus.

The same distinction between oblation and immolation is constantly met with in the other Fathers also, when they treat of the sacrifice of Abraham. "Isaac," says Cyprian, "who was set up as a figure unto the likeness of the divine victim, when he is being offered by his father to be immolated, is found to be patient" (De Bono Patientiae, to. C. S. E. L. 3, 404). Like Cyprian, three centuries later, Cassiodorus writes: "Abraham offeredfor immolation his own son, as a figure of Our Lord and Saviour" (In Psalm cxviii, 152. P. L. 70, 890). In both texts immolation and oblation are linked together as something

^{1 &}quot;L'atto d'un laico die présenta la vittima αΙΓαΙίατι."

^{*&}quot; Scannerd ".

[&]quot;L'atto del sacerdote die sparge il tangue attomo alPaltare.

future with something present (immolandus offertur, obtulit immolandum), in the very manner according to which, in the Paschal Hymn of the poet Sedulius, we find mactation, and not immolation, set against oblation:

Mactandumque Deo pater obtulit; at sacer ipsam "Pro pueri jugulis aries mactatur ad aram" l

Here oblation preceded mactation as above it preceded immolation. Thereby is marked both a real distinction between oblation and immolation, and a real identity of immolation with mactation.

If, however, someone is inclined to quibble2 about these examples of Cyprian or Cassiodorus, pretending that instead of the future we must understand the present tense, as for instance by the use of the gerund3 someone is said to offer by immolating {immolando}, I wonder how he will explain away the following expression of St. Ambrose, which is certainly not ambiguous: "Oblatus {est filius Abrahae} unicus ad immolandum" {De Isaac vel Anima, C. S. E. L. 32, 1, 641). Not by immolating is Abraham shown to have offered Isaac; but he offered him to undergo immolation. In this quotation from St. Ambrose, immolation undoubtedly does not mean oblation, but mactation.

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And what about this passage from St. Augustine [De Civit. Dei, 16, 32. C. S. E. L. 40, 181-183] "Tentatur [quidem] Abraham de immolando dilectissimo filio ipso Isaac," Abraham indeed is tried about immolating this his beloved son Isaac", but "because Isaac was not to be killed [quia Isaac occidi non oportebat], his place was taken by that ram, with whose immolation [quo immolato] the sacrifice was completed": namely "by the ram being immolated instead of Isaac" [Ariete illo immolato pro Isaac]? After all St. Augustine is but repeating, in no

^{1 (}I. I. w. 114-115. C. S. E. S. 10, 24, P. L. 19, 564).

[&]quot;The Fathers indicated the present action by immolandum. . . . Only present action could possibly be intended. . . . The oblation here is made in the act of immolating". A. Swaby, ibid, 188-189.

^{* &#}x27;'The gerundial sense of to be involves present action ". (ibid. 192).

uncertain terms, St. Paul's proclamation: "By faith... did Abraham offer up his only begotten son.!

But can anything be clearer than the Sermon of Faustus of Riez (18, C. S. E. L. 21, 296, 299), stating plainly that Isaac was indeed offered up by his father for sacrifice, but, there being no mactation, by no means immolated. No clearer example or more pertinent approval could be adduced in favour of our acceptation of immolation. "Abraham," he says, "offered up to God his mortal son who, however, was not to die". read that Abraham offered up his son Isaac as a holocaust In the meanwhile "not Isaac, but a ram is immolated". And why so? because by Isaac was represented the Divinity of Christ, whereby he is the Son of God; and by the ram was signified, his Humanity, whereby he is the Son of the Virgin. But it was not the Divinity, but only the Humanity that suffered. Hence it was proper that although he was offered up, Isaac should not be immolated, but that the ram should be immolated instead. "Because in the Passion not the Divinity, but the Humanity is believed to have been crucified, therefore not Isaac, but the ram is immolated."2 I do not think that a further explanation of this passage is needed.

1 Likewise in Sermon II, P. L. 38, 31-32): Abraham "led his son to be immolated" (immolandum duxit); but "when the blow is about to be struck, a voice is heard to desist; and yet the return will not take place without sacrifice and without the shedding of blood. A ram is seen among the briars sticking fast by the horns; it is immolated, the sacrifice is accomplished". Again Contra Maximinum Arianorum Episcopum (1. a, n. 9. P. L. 42, 810): "Like a sheep . . . Isaac was led to be immolated (ad immolandum ductus est) . . . Instead of his son, whom he was ordered to spare, Abraham immolated a ram". Finally In Psalmum xxix (n.g. 9. P. L. 36, 244): "He was commanded to immolate to God that same son. . . . He led his son to be immolated. . . . He obeyed (till bid) to spare. _ _ _ But in order that the sacrifice might be fulfilled, and blood might flow before returning, a ram is discovered sticking fast by the horns amongst the briars. This was immolated and the sacrifice completed". In all these passages St. Augustine tells us that instead of Isaac being slain a ram is slain, and therefore instead of Isaac being immolated a ram was immolated, and that thus was the sacrifice completed (after having begun with Isaac's oblation).

It is worth while to note how St. Thomas has imitated this passage in his lect. 4 on Hebr. xi, as reported by Brother Reginald, a most reliable witness. For the Apostle, after he had written: Zfe offered up his onlip begotten son, in whom he had received the promises, . . accounting that God is able to raise Up even from the dead, adds immediately: Whereupon also he received him for a parable. On these last words St. Thomas expresses himself as follows: "When the Apostle

To these older writers later ones may be added, down to the medieval theologians, showing an unbroken use of the same terminology. Isidore {De ortu et obitu Patrum. P. L. 83, 133) congratulates Abraham for "having neither lost his son, nor remained without a victim. For he offered his son in sacrifice and immolated a ram instead of his own son". Again in his Quaestiones in Vetus Testamentum {In Genes, Chap. 18, n. 1-13. P. L. 83, 249-25Ù): "Before the son came to the place of sacrifice, he carried the wood on which he was himself to be immolated" (n. 1). "The ram sticking fast by the horns amongst the briars is immolated, and the sacrifice brought to an end" (n. 2).

"Abraham offered as a victim to God his only begotten and beloved son" (n. 6). Therefore Abraham, having immolated a ram instead of Isaac his son, called the name of that place The Lord seeth".

Identical expressions are met with in Rabanus Maurus {In Genes. 1 3, c. 3. P. L. 107, 568-569), and similar ones in St. Bruno of Segni {In Genes. 22. P. L, 164, 199, and Sententiarum lib. 2, cap. 10. P. L. 165, 935),

But as Abraham was said by the ancients to have offered his son to be immolated, so likewise are we told by them that Christ offered himself to his Father to be immolated: denoting the same relation of a present action to one that is looked to as future. Thus Cassiodorus [Expos, in Psalm cix, 5); "He offered himself for us once to be immolated". Likewise the Ps. Primasius [In Hebr. 5, 6, P. L. 68, 716-717); "Semel semetipsum obtulit immolandum pro nobis". Alcuin [In Hebr. 5, 6. P. L. 100, 1033-34), Rabanus Maurus [In Hebr. 5, 6. P. L.

says: Whereupon he received him for a parable, he shows what Abraham obtained through faith. Because when there was nothing left than that his very son should be immolated, the angel called to him, and a ram sticking fast by the horas is immolated instead of his son. But this was a parable, i.e. a figure of the Christ to come. For the ram, sticking fast by the horns amongst the briars, is the Humanity that was fastened to the Cross, which suffered. Isaac, i.e. the Divinity, escaped, when Christ truly died and was buried. And thus it is evident that this figure expresses in a most adequate manner that which it foretokens. He, therefore, received him, namely Isaac, for a parable, that is to say, a figure of Christ to be crucified and immolated."

112, 743), and St. Bruno of Grenoble, {In Psalm cix, 4. P. L. 142, 408), speak in exactly the same terms. Nor does liturgical usage differ, witness the Gelasian Sacramentary, in the Preface of the Mass on the fourth day after Easter: round about thy altars, Lord of might, and glorying in the confession of the Spotless Lamb that offered himselffor us to be immolated, in order that his Body and Blood, whereby we have been ransomed from our sins, might nourish us with heavenly sacrifices unto life everlasting". . . (ed, Wilson, 93).1 Now both the grammatical structure of the sentences, and a comparison with the same mode of expression habitually employed in reference to the sacrifice of Abraham, 2 proves sufficiently, if I am not mistaken, that in the sacrifice of our Redeemer, ecclesiastical writers did also predicate at times a certain duality of oblation and of immolation, with a real distinction as between a prior and a subsequent event.

We may appeal to another liturgical testimony from the Gelasian as well as from the Gregorian Sacramentary, [MF, 88)! "With his Master's food still in his mouth, Judas was inviting the Jews to tear asunder that Master's limbs. But thy Son, our Lord, like a gentle victim, patiently allowed himself to be immolated to thee for us "etc. If anything is said to have been patiently allowed, it is certainly not of the sacerdotal action itself that it can be explicitly understood, since that action is not in any sense allowed by the priest, but in every sense elicited, effected, intended and willed by him. Now since the oblation is the sacerdotal action, the expression to be immolated (immolari) here necessarily means explicitly something else, namely the mactation connected with the oblation.

Certainly no one in his right senses will ever say that Christ allowed himself to be offered by himself for sacrifice: but

[»] Of this mode of expression, liturgical as well as patristic, we treated more fully elsewhere: MF, 49 s?.! above, pp. 264 ry-

s'This comparison is the more justified as the Fathers were telling us a while ago in the same breath, that Isaac "set up as a figure unto the likeness of the divine Victim" was offered by his father to be immolated, as it were "unto a mystery of the Lord, our Saviour".

rightly, to be slain "as a gentle victim". 1 How the terms immolation and mactation are equivalent, is well illustrated by the Fathers commenting on Acts, x, "Arise, Peter, kill and eat Hear St. Bede the Venerable: "What in Latin is rendered by kill, is rendered in Greek by $\theta \dot{v} \sigma o v$, which is not a general term for killing, but is proper to that killing by which victims are immolated to God..... The passage may equally be rendered: Immolate and eat (" immola et manduca". Liber Retractationis in Actus Apostolorum. P. L. 92, 1018).. In treating immolation and killing as equivalent, St. Bede is apparently following St. Gregory, who wrote (Moral. 18, 56. P. L. 76, 69): "To the very first Pastor himself it is said Macta et Manduca", slay and eat. Hence the single word $\theta \dot{o} \sigma$ -ov is rendered as slaving, immolation and mactation.

We come now to the medieval leaders of Scholastic theology. Of them we read in A. Swaby's treatise (p. 51): "Peter Lombard, St. Thomas, Blessed Albert the Great, all keep to the term occidere, never using mactare in this or in any other sense".2 In other words, they never use the word mactation either to denote killing (whether sacrificial or extra-sacrificial) or anything else. Much less, therefore, are they wont to use promiscuously mactation and immolation as synonymous. Let us see. Albert the Great wrote a certain book treating ex professo of The Eucharist, a work absolutely authentic, wherein we read as follows: "They (these eucharistic species) are also a mystery, i.e. a secret of spiritual mactation and immolation. For in this mystery he who reigns for ever in heaven is by us devoted at the altar of the Church daily to be mysteriously slain (" mactandum ") and immolated by the hands of the priests of the Church" (De Eucharistia, 3, 3, 2, ed. Paris. 1890-1899, t. 38, p. 319). Before that he had already said:

¹ Any one who wishes may find other ancient examples of immolation taken

in the sense of mactation in MF, p. 309 sq.

2 The words quoted are immediately followed by this parenthesis " (cf. Pitisco, Lexicon Anliq. Rom. tom. 2, p. 510) Do not believe that the gentleman whom the author calls Pitisco is an Italian; he is a Dutchman, by the name of Pitiscus; who neither in the place quoted nor anywhere else has a thing about the Lombard or St. Thomas or Albert. I am of opinion that in giving the reference an error was committed, probably not so much by the author as by the editor.

"Christ is contained under the sacramental forms (i.e. species) . . . as in a dark and mysterious chamber of spiritual mactation and immolation "p. 316). Here you have not once, but several times occurring in one Chapter of Blessed Albert that word mactation, which we were informed Blessed Albert never used. If he links it with immolation, do not take it as if he were marking an opposition between two things, but making use of a hendiadys: in the sense that that mactation is also immolation; not a mactation pure and simple, but a sacrificial one, i.e. a slaying of a victim to be offered.

This is made clear from the following passage of the same Book and Chapter, in which alluding to *Levit.* iv, 4. sq., Blessed Albert writes (p. 320): "Thus, then, Christ is under these species as in the mystic chamber of his spiritual mactation and victimhood or immolation". We have in this example (whether our opponent agrees or not) not only the word mactation, but what is more important to our cause, we have asserted by Albert the Great the identity between mactation (or "victimationem") and immolation.

Let us see now how immolation, in the sense in which it stands for mactation, fares in the language of Blessed Albertus, both in its relation to oblation and to immolation, when this latter term is used in the sense of oblation. In 4 D. 13. Art. 23. Blessed Albert defines immolation in a strange way, when he apparently puts into the definition the very term he is defining "This immolation of ours (in the sacrifice of the Mass) is not only a representation, but a true immolation, that is, the oblation, at the hands of the priest, of the thing immolated". This language would be absurd if the notion of immolation expressed in the definition by the word immolated, were the same as the notion expressed in the term defined by the word immolation. For the latter's definition would again be true of the former and so ad infinitum. But the notion is not the same. What it is in the term defined is made clear by the word *oblation*, expressly predicated of it. What it is in the definition appears from the words that follow immediately: "Wherefore (by our immolation) two things are meant: the thing killed, and the oblation

[that is, the thing killed, in obliquo; the oblation in redo]; because immolation is properly the oblation of something slain (oblatio occisi) for the worship of God". We have, therefore, what we were looking for: the idea of immolation conveyed, in obliquo in the definition given above, by the word immolated, was not precisely oblation, but properly slaying, which is explicitly met with in the parallel member of the other definition: oblation of something slain (occisi) for the worship of God. There is correspondence between the following two things, as things identical: oblation of something immolated and oblation of something slain for divine worship: by either one of which indifferently one and the same thing is defined. In other words, by the term immolated (immolatae) is intended the very same thing as by the word slain (occisi). Hence Albertus the Great, in one sentence, supplies us with two acceptations of the word immolation: one by which immolation stands for oblation connoting mactation, and the other by which it stands for mactation connoting oblation. This is what we learn from Blessed Albertus, and no one who has read will, I think, gainsay it.1

For the moment we leave out St. Thomas, to be heard more conveniently elsewhere; we likewise pass over a number of late writers. We do call attention, however, to a text of Dominic de Soto, which leaves no doubt in this matter: "The receiving of the Body and Blood belongs distinctly to the sacrifice. For it is there that the idea of immolation is carried out. For immolation is the same as sacrificing, namely the slaying of a living being (animalis occisio)" (4 D. 13, q. 2. a. 1). Nor is the mind of the Salmaticenses less clear (De Euckar. Disp. 13, dub. 2, n. 36), when they say: "If man had the power to produce a lamb, he could . . . produce it with

¹ Is Albert the Great the only one to make use of this apparently circular definition? By no means. The same occurs in the Institutiones of John Viguier O. P. (cap. 16, ver. n, Antwerp 1565, fol. J65A). On the words of Our Lord Do this in commemoration of me, we read: "To do this is to consecrate and immolate, or to offer the immolation and the death" ("Facere est consecrare, et immolare, sive immolationem et mortem offerre").

^{*}Such as Matthew Galen {De sacros. Missae Sacrificio, Antwerp, 1574 cap. 6. p. g7): "Immolatione seu mactatione '* etc.

the intention of offering it up for divine worship, and with subordination to immolation or mactation", Here we have pointed out first, between oblation and immolation, a real distinction, which is implied by the relation of the one to the other; and second we have stated an identity between immolation and mactation, expressed by the conjunction or (seu). And do not believe that it is spoken casually or set down carelessly. For a little further (n. 39) they put it perhaps even more plainly and forcibly: "In this sacrifice (of the Mass), as in the others, concur essentially the oblation and the immolation of what is offered to God by the sacrifice: of these the oblation is found in the consecration of the Eucharist . . . but the immolation, alteration and destruction of what is offered is found in the consuming of the sacrament by the priest", Whatever may be your judgement on the doctrine of the Salmanticenses (or of de Soto) concerning the essence of the sacrifice of the Mass, are you not certain that in this passage is presented to us, on the one hand, a real distinction between oblation arid immolation, and on the other, a real identity between immolation and mactation?

In his very remarkable work, L'Idée du sacerdoce et du sacrifice de Jésus-Christ, that most saintly man, Charles de Condren, after taking immolation and slaying as one thing ("L'occision ou immolation", part. 2, cap. 2, n. 5), made the observation later on (cap. 3, n. 1) that it was not necessary that the immolation should be performed on the same day as the oblation. It is clear enough from this statement that immolation is restricted to the slaying and discriminated from oblation.

A man of less authority, it is true, but one whose style is always thoroughly polished and accurate, Pierre Nicole (Instructions Théologiques etc., 108, pp. 122-124) writes: "The essence of a sacrifice includes several actions, the chief of which are the immolation of the victim and the oblation of the immolated victim, and these actions may be separated in time".1

¹ He adds immediately: "Now the sacrifice of Jesus Christ is finished only as regards the bloody immolation, but it continues as regards the oblation In the work L'Esprit de Nicole sta·les cerite's de la Religion, c. 17, §8, Cerveau writes: "(Jesus Christ) offered on Calvary his present Death; he offers on our altars his past and consummated Death". These words aptly explain the above.

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About this time, Michael Le Quien, O.P., a leading figure among his contemporaries, blamed that wild champion of Anglican Orders, Pierre Le Couraver, for having undermined the true idea of the priesthood with his false concept of sacrifice. The fallacy of that concept consisted in the identity which that theological pretender established between immolation and sacrificial oblation.! "The author" (i.e. Le Courayer), says Le Quien, "confounds the immolation of the victim with the oblation of the victim immolated. . . . But he ought to remember that sacrifice consists in the oblation of the victim immolated " {La Nullité des Ordinations Anglicanes démontrée de nouveau. Paris 1730, tom. 2, p. 141). Again: "For a sacrifice, immolation must be followed by the oblation of the immolated victim" (p. 145). No one will deny that Michael Le Quien is on our side; and Estcourt tells us that no one fought more successfully against the Anglican Ordinations than he \{The Question of Anglican Ordinations discussed, p. 163).

A little later, while the same controversy was in progress, Peter Collet, C.M., whom Hurter rightly hails as a Classical Doctor, first set down the following principle [Praelect. theol. Honorati Tournely Continuatio. De Euchar. pars 2, cap. 3, Venice 1751, tom. 5, p. 717):

"I maintain that it is not necessary for sacrifice that there should be an action by which the thing offered is here and now destroyed, but that it is sufficient that there be an action by which is really and truly offered something about to be destroyed or destroyed previously Hence he remarked: "Our opponent (Le Courayer) therefore, is wrong when he confounds the *immolation* of the victim with the *oblation of the immolated victim*" (p. 720). You notice how he distinguishes oblation from immolation, and makes immolation consist in destruction, i.e. in the slaying or mactation. But of these two writers, Collet and Le Ouien, more anon.

There is in the meanwhile, Francis Silvius, in his *Commentary on Leviticus* (published through the efforts of Norbert d'Elbecque,

¹¹ explained this more fully in $\textit{Gregariarum},\ 1926,\ p.\ 102-108.$ See below, PP· $309\ ^{*}?$

O.P. Antwerp 1714) who almost everywhere uses mactation and immolation as synonymous: "he immolated or slew", "but the act of immolating or slaying", "the immolation or mactation of the victim" {in Levit. 1, 5 and 6}. Not only does he treat immolation as equivalent to mactation, but he separates it from oblation, as may be gathered from his exposition of Levit., xvi, ii: "He (the priest) shall offer the calf, and praying for himself and for his own house, he shall immolate it." Silvius understands the expression he shall offer of the strictly sacerdotal and sacrificial oblation, and explains it thus: "But he shall offer it by presenting it to be now immolated and making it fit for the impending immolation."

In our own time we find in that learned compilation. Dictionnaire de la Bible (F. Vigoureux) an article on Sacrifice from the pen of H. Lesètre, wherein there is a paragraph under the heading "Immolation," t. 5, col. 1323, describing nothing else than the time and place, the manner, the executioners, the instruments of the slaving. In another paragraph, (The Use of the Blood) the pouring of the blood on the altar is assigned to the priests as their exclusive task. Still more recently M. Médebielle in his book "Atonement in the Old and the New Testament (Pontif. Inst. Bibl. 1924) speaks of oblation and immolation as of two really distinct acts, although related to each other. He first mentions "the offering which the sinner makes of himself by means of blood", then he adds: "Another element no less essential than the presentation of the blood, enters into action before that, namely the immolation: the victim is put to death " (p. 141-142).

Countless other authorities could be cited: but unless I am mistaken, it would be superfluous.

One thing is henceforth certain: no one can consider our acceptation of the terms *oblation* and *.immolation* excluded by the uniform theological tradition of centuries, unless the same one honours with the august name of tradition this or that text-book.

But much more will be brought forward in corroboration of our terminology for the eucharistic Sacrifice.

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In the meanwhile there comes up the question how a theologian making use of the above terminology is to speak of Christ in respect to his bloody immolation: did he perform it himself, or was it done by others?

The question, of course, is not about the other acceptation, which we have declared both legitimate and very frequent, although less clear, in which immolation means the sacrificing act or oblation. For then there cannot be the least doubt that Christ, and he alone, immolated himself. For the Jews certainly did not sacrifice, they certainly did not make an oblation of Christ; and therefore they did not immolate at all, as long as this meaning of immolation is retained.

Hence it can only be a question of the immolation taken in the sense of mactation in its relation to the sacerdotal oblation.

The reason for the inquiry is this: to the more distinct concept of immolation two elements contribute, one physical, the other moral. Mactation is the physical element; but its subordination to the oblation is moral. Hence it happens that for the one and the other element, now one and then another agency may intervene. Assuredly one agency is sufficient in the layman immolating his cattle before the Lord (Levit, i, 5). He himself does the slaying and refers his slaying to the oblation of the priest. He alone, therefore, is the whole cause of that immolation. But in the sacrifice of Christ there is the unique feature that the physical element proceeded from those who had not in mind any sacrificial ministry whatever, but were bent solely on evil-doing. But the moral element was contributed by Christ, and in a sensible manner, while bearing his torments patiently, in order not to be wanting in his sacerdotal oblation. Since therefore each of the two elements of immolation proceeded from a different agent, someone might ask himself

in which of the two he should rather look for the cause of immolation.

The answer may be given briefly. If stress is laid chiefly on the religious character of the event, which results from its being directed towards the sacrificial oblation, then immolation must be attributed to Christ, so that he may be said to have immolated himself: that is to say, into his passive mactation he superinduced thé moral element, without being considered in anyway to have performed himself that deed of blood. if stress is laid on the physical action by which Christ is made a victim, then immolation must be fastened on the deicides. who certainly did not invest their active mactation with a religious character, but only with impiety. Speaking in this latter meaning—not in the MF but in the ER (see above, p. 245), and Blackfriars (Feb. 1925, p. 108)—of the mystic and unbloody immolation or mactation, which could be entirely performed by Christ, and comparing it with the real immolation, that is to say the extrinsic and bloody one, I assigned this latter (as such) not to Christ, but to his crucifiers. Here are my words: "(Christ, could not be immolated really but by deicides . . . that bloody immolation of theirs was not Christ's active oblation". That form of speech can be maintained to the extent to which is maintained the terminology thus far advocated by us. And now it may be asked, was the phraseology of a bloody immolation, inflicted on Christ by others, unknown to the ancients?

The Gelasian and the Gregorian Sacramentaty have told us already: "Like a gentle victim ... he patiently allowed himself to be immolated for us". But since in this case immolation (as we remarked above) cannot mean a gesture proceeding from Christ, it must needs mean an act proceeding from his enemies; so that as Christ is said to have permitted it with patience, so also he must not be considered as having himself performed it, but merely to have suffered it, while others were the agents of it. This explanation is in itself sufficiently clear, but it receives an endorsement from a sentence of Ps. Martial, in the Epistle to the inhabitants

of Bordeaux, compiled in the Middle Ages (a sentence apparently derived from the above Liturgy): "On the altar of the cross he allows his very (Body) to be immolated (permittit immolari). But what the Jews immolated through envy, believing they were abolishing his name from the earth, we, for the sake of our salvation, place before us upon the holy altar" (Max. Bibl. Vet. Patr., t. 2, p. 108). This passage of the Epistle •was quoted freely against Protestants by the more famous theologians of the Church, as an uncontroverted text. So Toletus (Dé Sacrif. Missae, contrav. 4); so Gregory of Valencia (in III am Partem, disp. 6, 9, 11, punct. t, §8 and 21), so Suarez (disp. 74, sect. 2, n. it). Bellarmine, it is true, had a very strong suspicion that the letter was spurious; yet he calls it "pious", and he adds that it could be serviceable to refute heretics, if its genuineness were established {De Scriptoribus Ecclesiasticis).

But before all of them, Matthew Galen, without at all relying on the Pseudo-Martial, wrote quite independently: "There is, then, Christ Jesus crucified . . . present . . . upon the Catholic altar, . . . the selfsame whom the Jews once upon a time immolated as a victim. . . . Wherefore he has presented to us in himself a true sacrifice" (to be offered under the eucharistic species). {De sacrosancto Missae sacrificio commentarius, Antwerp, 1574, p. no-111).

We do not leam anything different from Bartholomew de Medina, O. P. (In *III am Partem*, q. 22, a. 2), living about the same epoch, when he says: "Christ the Lord was the cause of his *immolation* and death, not only by accepting it as it was *inflicted by others*", but also in another way, namely, by not preventing what he could prevent. Therefore, according to Medina, the immolation was inflicted upon Christ by others, no otherwise than his death.

But Medina's teacher, St. Thomas, in the very same article (Sum. Theol. III, q. 22, a. 2, ad. 2) discussing whether Christ was both priest and victim, makes the objection that if Christ offered himself for sacrifice, it follows that his sacrifice bears less a resemblance to the sacrifices of the Law than to the

pagan ones wherewith the demons received an impious worship by means of human victims: which is certainly a drawback.

He answers that in some secondary sense we may admit a comparison between the immolation of human victims and the slaving of Christ. For "the killing of the man Christ may be referred to a twofold will". "We may consider the killing of Christ in its relation to the will of him who suffers, and who offered himself freely to the Passion; and from this point of view we have the character of a victim, and no likeness with the sacrifices of the heathens In other words, as we consider the action of Christ offering, his Passion does not in any way resemble the immolation of human victims. But this same killing may also be referred "to the will of the slavers; and from that point of view it has not the character of a sacrificial victim (sc. offered up to God); for we do not say that the murderers of Christ offered sacrifice to God, but that they were guilty of a great And it is the likeness of this crime that disgraced the impious sacrifices of the gentiles, when they immolated human beings to their idols Therefore, when in the sacrifice of Christ we fix our attention upon the oblation. any similarity with the sacrifices of human victims is out of the question; but when we fix our eyes upon the action of the murderers, there is a certain likeness with the nefarious immolations of the pagans.

But St. Thomas does not only imply, he explicitly assigns some kind of immolation, I do not say to the Romans, executioners of the sentence, but to the Jews, guilty of the murder by the sword of their tongue. This he does in his exposition of *Hebr. xiii* (lect. 2, § 3), when, according to the testimony of Reginald, he explains how in the sacrifice for sin (Levit, xvi) the calf and the buck goat bore the figure of Christ, immolated indeed within the camp, but burned without the camp. For the burning was ascribed (according to the Apostle) to the Passion whereby Christ was burned without the gate, but his immolation which preceded is placed within

the camp, "because in the city was Christ immolated by the tongues of the Jews: hence, too, does Mark say that he was crucified at the third hour, whereas he was raised on the cross at the sixth hour Whatever you may think of this exegetical computation of hours (borrowed from St. Augustine together with the slaying by tongue), you must admit that according to St. Thomas Christ was immolated (although not sacrificially offered) by the Jews.

Likewise in our own time, a well known theologian, Perrone (De Incarnatione, p, 200), neatly distinguished each element of immolation, one physical, the other moral, referring each to its own respective cause, namely the latter to Christ, the former to his enemies. These, he says, "brought death upon Christ as instruments, of which Christ made use to immolate himself". Christ immolates, directing the event to his own most holy ends; the instrument immolates, bringing about the event which Christ accepts.

It is certain that modern writers, when they have in view directly the bloody event, freely state that the immolation was the work of the Jews. Thus M. Lepin (L'Idée du Sacrifice de la Messe, p. 744): "The oblation of Christ on the cross is formally distinct from his immolation: this latter is the work of the deicide Jews

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We now come to the third part of our subject, dealing with the sacrifice which the Church repeats in the Body and Blood of Christ. On this subject an "error" of mine, is pointed out, and said to be ''fundamental" (p. xxvi), because I have denied that in the Mass we bring about a true and real immolation of Christ; and defend only a mystical-sacramental—symbolical—representative one. This view of mine is thus presented by A. Swaby: "In the eucharistic oblation there is no "true" or "real" immolation of the Divine Victim" (p. xxvi). This is correct; but it would be still more correct, if meanwhile the readers were warned

that I do not exclude from the Mass every form of immolation. For as I said just now, there is a mystical immolation, representative of the once actual bloody immolation, and above all, there is the underlying state of consummated Victim, conferred once on Christ through the path of his bloody immolation, as a result of God's eternal acceptance.

My fundamental error is clearly enough a sequel to my "fundamental fallacy". For if someone by immolation understands the jnactation of the victim, it is clear that he cannot uphold in the Mass any actual immolation except in a representative or mystic sense, but not in a true and real one, On the other hand, since oblation does not expressly signify mactation but a giving over, it may nevertheless be really and truly predicated of the Mass: because God truly and really receives from us the sacrificial gift of the Body and Blood of Christ, as our very own gift, even though not put into the condition of victim by us, but by others in other times. Finally, the sacrifice of the Mass, because it is the real oblation of a victim really slain, is itself in turn real and true, or as the Council of Trent puts it, proper, i.e. a sacrifice properly so called.

We must now find out whether this view which, on the one hand, maintains in the Mass a mystical and representative immolation and on the other rejects a true and real immolation, is both as to the meaning and the wording, a departure from theological tradition, or not. I pass over the theological tradition previous to the Council of Trent for two reasons. First because it has already been exemplified by mein *Mysterium Fidei* and will again be testified to sufficiently by the authors of the subsequent period, whom I shall presently quote. Secondly, because it is chiefly against that Council that my wording or meaning is said to offend. Let us see, then, what is the post-Tridentine tradition on this subject.

I am tempted to take in preference the Belgian doctors, the first of whom is John Hesselius of Louvain, at one time (1563) theologian of the Council of Trent, who in his *Catechism*, a posthumous and unfinished work (1. 4, c, 29, ed. 6, Louvain

1573,1 P· 570) writes as follows: "From what has been said it is readily understood that the Eucharist is a sacrifice in the true sense, and is not so called by some figure of speech: as by a figure (metaphor) Christ is said to be immolated in the Mass; for since he is not put to death, he cannot be said in propriety of speech to be immolated". Matthew Galen of Douay (De Sacros. Missae Sacrificio, 1574, p. 112), rebukes those who so "force the sense of the words of Gregory of Nyssa . . . as if (during Mass Christ) were to undergo all along a new, individual and real immolation, before the communion is reached; when, as a matter of fact, that Father must be understood as speaking of a mystical mactation". On the contrary, "for the Mass the immolation is supplied by the Cross" (p. 125). John Malder, at first professor at Louvain, then Bishop of Antwerp, concludes (De Virtutibus theologicis, etc. p. 659): "Therefore, in the Mass we have a real sacrifice, but a mystical immolation ".

Unless we confined ourselves to the more famous among the leading Schoolmen, their testimonies would take too much space.

Let us then hear first Bellarmine (De Missa, c. 15): "When Peter Lombard inquires, whether that which the priest does, may be called a sacrifice and an immolation, he uses the name sacrifice and immolation for killing (pro occisione); as if he had asked in plainer terms, whether what the priest is doing should be called the killing of Christi occisio). He answers very correctly that Christ was only once truly immolated (semel tantum vere immolatum); that is He was killed only once; but that now he is not properly immolated, i.e. killed, but only sacramentally and figuratively (solum in sacramento et repraesentatione). As to whether that which the priest does is a sacrifice in the proper sense, the Lombard does not put the question, but he presupposes it as something known to everybody from the daily celebration of the sacrifice itself. In like manner also St. Thomas and the other Schoolman were not troubling themselves about the subject of our present day

controversy (i.e. whether the Mass is a true and real sacrifice), but only in what sense the sacrifice of the Mass could be called the *immolation*, that is to say, the slaying of Christ. Hence their usual answer is that it is called immolation because it is the representation of immolation, or because it has the effect (of propitation and grace) like the true and real slaying of Christ

Let us also hear Suarez (Disp. 74, Sect. 2, n. 14): "In order to understand the Fathers we must bear in mind that under the name of immolation, when they are speaking of this mystery, they mean that Christ is immolated not truly and really, but only mystically, by means of a representation of the true immolation, which took place on the Cross. For immolation in the strict and proper sense of the word (in rigore et proprietate vocis) seems to signify bloody immolation, or true mactation with a real shedding of blood. And in this acceptation it is true that we have not here a real immolation, but only its representation. It is in this sense that not only the Fathers are speaking (as Chrysostom, Ambrose and others, on the Epistle to the Hebr., and Augustine, Ep. 23, 120, and in Psalm Ixxix), but at times also the Schoolmen, the Master and others in 4 D. 12 and St. Thomas in this article of question 83.1 But immolation taken in this strict sense, is not of the essence of sacrifice as such, but only of bloody sacrifice; and therefore, when treating of sacrifice or sacrificial action, we must say absolutely that in this mystery there is not merely a figure and representation of sacrifice, but also that a true sacrifice and a true sacrificial action takes place ".*

Moreover, in his Commentary (which appeared earlier) on

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¹ Compare this with the fearless assertion lately published: "He (Père de la Taille) repeats at pleasure all through his book, that in the sacrifice of the Mass there is no real immolation, but only an apparent immolation. . . . He seems not to be aware that, in ecclesiastical language, his affirmation is tantamount to upholding the heresy that the Mass is not a sacrifice in the true and strict sense of the word". J. Qesse, Etude critique de certaines propositions du Mysterium Fidei, pp. 8-9). See above, p. 193 sq.

* This passage of Suarez, as well as the one above from Bellarmine, John

^{*} This passage of Suarez, as well as the one above from Bellarmine, John Martinez de Prado, O.P. commends and makes his own in a work entitled De Eucharistiae Sanctissimo Sacramenta et divino Missae sacrificio dubitationes scholasticae et morales, super tertiam partem Summae Docioris Angelici, a questione 73 usque 83, in quaest. 83, dub. 2, n. 27 (Compluti 1662, p. 678).

Sum. Theol. III, q. 83, a. i1 the following remark had been made: "It may also be added that if stress is laid on the word immolation, this sacrifice is not properly called an immolation; for immolation properly means a bloody sacrifice by a true killing of the animal or destruction of something else; and in this sense our mystery, although it is a true sacrifice, is yet properly speaking not an immolation. And thus it may be granted that it is an immolation analogically, because it truly represents the immolation made on the Cross".

Let now the reader, I beg, take note how Suarez insists on distinguishing immolation properly so called, understood in the strict and proper sense of the word, when the stress is laid on the word so as to make of it a true mactation, and then let him compare it all with Alfred Swaby complaining that I wronged St. Thomas and the other Doctors, because I maintained that, in its strict acceptation, immolation rather means mactation than oblation ("implied accusation", p. 26; "charge of inexactitude", p. 27; "inferentially it charges the Fathers, St. Thomas, and other great teachers in the Church with lack of precision", p. 29 etc.). No, he says, in the strictest acceptation it does mean oblation ("with exquisite precision", p. 27; "with utmost precision", p. 26) unless we prefer to admit that St. Thomas . . . "had unaccountably lapsed from the unrivalled precision of his diction" (p. 28).—Far be it from me to be guilty of such boldness as is discovered in my style by the gentleman who failed to discover that the style is not mine at all, but that of the greatest theologians in the Church, not only of those already cited, but of others also, to be cited presently. Far be it from me, I say again. For we do not charge an author with an offence against propriety of diction, as soon as we suggest that he occasionally uses certain terms in a less rigorous sense. There are, in fact, degrees in this matter, so that not everything is improper that falls short of the highest form of propriety.3

8 See above, The Last Supper and Calvary, p. 254 et passim.

¹¹ have discussed this article of St. Thomas at considerable length in Black-friars, Dec. 1924, p. 551 sq.

After this brief digression, let us return to our authorities. Cardinal du Perron, a leader among the apologists of his time, informs us in his *Traité du Saint Sacrament de l'Eucharistie* (Paris 1622, p. 767) that: "The sacrifices of the Christians contain truly, really and substantially, the same real and unique victim, but they contain the *immolation or destruction and slaying only representatively*",

Let us hear also Cardinal de Bérulle [Discours du Sacrifice de la Messe célébré en l'Eglise Chrétienne, n. g and 14); "This divine word (of the consecration) has indeed the power to have the Son and the Lamb of God placed and offered upon the altar, but not that he be slain upon it, nor that his Blood be separated from his Body and from his veins. Thereby he properly and truly appears to be our Isaac, whom God willed to be placed and offered on the altar, but whom he prevented from being slain and immolated thereon. Properly and generally speaking it is not of the essence of sacrifice, to include the slaving of the victim; and even where the destruction of the victim would be necessary it is not required that it should be done in the very act of the sacrifice; it is sufficient that the victim be doomed to that immolation, or that it was immolated previously". These words must be taken without prejudice against the mystic or representative immolation, which the Cardinal repeatedly asserts together with almost all Catholics.

Among the Schoolmen there is also John of St. Thomas (In III am Partem, disp. 32, art. 2, n. 29): "The Eucharist is called immolation, not indeed a bloody and a real one, but a mystical one, inasmuch as the Blood is placed apart under the species of the wine, and the Body apart from the Blood, under the species of the bread."

The Salmanticenses do not speak otherwise, (Disp. 13, dub. i, n. t6): "Though the immolation of Christ in this mystery is only mystical, in other words, representative and sacramental, nevertheless the nature of the sacrifice is true and genuine (ratio sacrificii est vera et propria)... Hence it is clear what was the (mind) of St. Thomas in the passage

quoted (Sum. Theol. III, q. 83, a. 1) as well as that of the Magister on 4 D. 12, and of all the Schoolmen. In fact they all took it for granted that the mystery of the Mass is truly and strictly a sacrifice; and on this account they debated whether Christ is immolated in this sacrament. . . And the answer given by St. Thomas and by others also is that this immolation is only mystical, or by way of an image (in imagine), and (as St. Augustine expresses it) by way of a sacrament. But thence it does not in the least follow that the mystery of the Eucharist is a sacrifice in figure only, and not, in the true and strict sense: for there can be a true unbloody sacrifice, even though there is no [real] immolation

Let us also hear Estius (4 D. 12, §13, ad 6m): "In reference to the text, our answer is that by *immolation* the Fathers often understand not any kind of sacrificial oblation, but the *mactation* or *slaying* performed for the sake of making the offering. In that sense, they do not admit upon the altar a *true* immolation, but only *a mystical one*, which they call unbloody immolation".

Let us now listen again to Michel Le Quien: "There is ___ a real oblation of this same body that was immolated on the Cross, and consequently there is a real sacrifice, since a real sacrifice is nothing else than the real oblation of a victim really present, which has been immolated in honour of God" (op. cit. p. 138). "It is true, there is only a mystical and representative immolation; but the Victim really immolated having been rendered really present by the consecration, there is an unbloody, but most real oblation, which Jesus Christ continues to make of his Body and of his Blood by the ministry of the priests, and therefore we have a very real sacrifice, and not merely a commemorative and representative one" (op. cit. p. 139).

Collet holds the same view: "Since for sacrifice considered as an action two elements concur, namely oblation and immolation—duly performed, the unity of sacrifice on the Cross and in the Mass must of necessity be derived mainly either from the unity of the oblation or from the

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unity of the immolation. But it cannot be from the unity of the oblation, which may be repeated many times. Therefore it must be from the unity of the immolation. . . . Hence ___ it may be appropriately stated, that for the sacrifice of the Mass there is no need of a new [real] immolation " fop. cit. p. 717).

From among modem authors I would gladly mention Cardinal Billot, who formerly {De Ecclesiae Sacramentis, 1914, t. i. ed. 5, p. 627) gave expression to this same doctrine in these words: "According to St. Thomas, Christ is said to be immolated in the Eucharist, not because he is truly immolated therein, but because the celebration of the Eucharist is a figure of the immolation which was really enacted on the Cross alone. ___ If in its character of sacrifice also we had nothing but a mere figure of the oblation on the Cross, it would follow that our Mass is not a true sacrifice, in the same way in which it is not a true immolation, that is to say mactation But to my great regret I must admit that the above statement is no longer found in the sixth edition.

Therefore I shall rather appeal, among modem theologians, to G. Van Noort [De Sacramentis], third edition, 1919, n. 468, 470, 471, pp. 318-320) who writes: "the Mass is a true sacrifice, because at consecration Christ is rendered present in the outward condition of violent death, I inasmuch as his flesh and blood are exhibited to our senses, by means of the sacramental signs, as if they were really parted in death". death, as appears clearly, is merely apparent, nay symbolical. Thereupon he proposes to himself the following objection: "You will say: this immolation is not a true and a real one. I readily grant it". Then a little further, he adds: "The external form of immolation and death which we have described, is deservedly called mystical destruction. or mactation, or immolation". He remarks, however, very appropriately: "If for this reason you would call the Mass a mystic sacrifice, you do not utter anything blameworthy,

1 Italia in the quotation from Van Noort arc his own.

provided you bear in mind that the word 'mystic' has one meaning when applied to immolation or mactation, and another when applied to sacrifice. Mystical immolation designates a non-real immolation, whereas mystical sacrifice must be understood as a true and real sacrifice" etc.

A representative of another School, Stephen Hugneny, O.P. (Critique et Catholique, tom 2, 1914, p. 237): "The immolation which constitutes this new sacrifice is no longer a real immolation; it is a mystic immolation, an immolation representative of the real immolation of Calvary". M. Lepin, already commended a while ago, expresses himself in the same language.

I wonder whether any one who has followed the subject thus far will look upon me as being "revolutionary", or in "revolt from tradition" because in the diction which I have adopted oblation and immolation stand for correlated actions rather than identical ones; or because the reality of the immolation is ascribed to the sacrifice of the Passion, whereas its representation alone is assigned to the sacrifice of the Mass. All these so-called fundamental errors or fallacies are not my own personal offences, but the common mistakes of nearly all the leading masters. I have not been the originator of the mischief, but its inheritor. The Fathers, St. Thomas, the Commentators of the Sentences, the teachers of recent date, fall under the same condemnation with me. About the only one to be orthodox is my critic.

The necessity of exonerating myself of any guilt is responsible for having detained the reader at such length on so trite a topic. But what is trite to the well-informed, will perhaps strike as something new the gentlemen who introduced Alfred Swaby's work to the public as a scientific production ("this scholarly work", Editor's Introduction, p. vii). We must, of course, be indulgent towards the man who was snatched by death before he could give the last touches to his work. But what of those who give their approval to all this, while holding however some rank in the field of theology? And what of those others, who reverently accept the others' theological

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censures and retail them on every side? The reader can form

his own judgment.

1 have, in this article, examined only fundamental charges.

Other parts of the book, which had previously come out in periodicals, were discussed by me at the time of their appearance.

11 must state, however, that the second part of the book, Immolation and Mactation (which I undertook to examine in the present article) was never published in any periodical (as far as I know), although it claims (p. 25) to be an article of

the American Establishistical Revision and August 1924, The Last Supper, A Reply to Critics; and in the Irish Ecclesiastical Record, October 1924, The Last Supper and Catholic Divines from Henry VIII. to the Council of Trent. See above, pp. 229-307.

THE EUCHARISTIC SACRIFICE IN THE LIGHT OF A RECENT DOCUMENT!

A document of more than ordinary interest on the sacrifice of the Mass has reached us lately from England in the shape of a Pastoral Letter for the Advent season, the work of a Bishop known alike for his lifelong interest in theological matters and the brilliancy of his classical acquirements. Unqualified assent is therein given to the particular theory that looks for an adequate explanation of the Sacrifice in the mystic immolation of Christ; that is, "in that eloquent portrayal of the severance [between Body and Blood] once wrought in him by Death, "which of itself and by itself" is a sign," the Bishop says, "as calculated to express and embody the purposes of a sacrifice pure and simple, as would be real bloody immolation" (p. xi); without any of the constitutive elements of our sacrifice having "to be sought outside it, say on the Cross, or in Heaven" (p. io). Consequently dissent is expressed from those who view the sacrifice of the Mass as an oblation referring to a Victim of past immolation, while they correspondingly "find in the synthesis or fusion [of the Last Supper and the Passion] a complete sacrifice " (p. 6).

As one associated of late with the defence of the latter view, I desire to place on record my appreciation of the Bishop's unfailingly courteous tone and absolute fairness of method. A discussion of his arguments would be here out of place. The sole object of this article is to specify as clearly as possible, in the light of the above pronouncement, what my position is, and what it is not; and then to note how it compares with certain utterances that came forth on the subject of the Mass

in the controversy about Anglican Orders, both from the orthodox side and the other.

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In the first place, I am glad to find myself in complete agreement with the Pastoral on two points. First, that there is a mystic immolation in the Mass (and that there was one in the Last Supper as well). I have not only stated or implied it in nearly every page of what I have written on the subject; but, going further than the Pastoral itself, I have even declared that to call it into question would be, in my opinion, unorthodox. Secondly, I fully agree on this point: that the sacrificial action to be found here and now in the Mass is not one and the same numerically with that of Christ in his redemptive sacrifice. I have always declared this numerical unity to be to me inconceivable.

On two points I respectfully beg leave to disagree. I do not believe that a merely mystical immolation (understood as above) can be sufficient to constitute by itself a true, proper and real sacrifice, such as the Mass according to our Faith In full accord with most theologians before the close of the nineteenth century, and with numberless authorities of to-day as well. I believe that over and above the merely mystic immolation something more is required to make the Mass a true sacrifice: whether it be an actual deterioration of Christ, as some maintain, or a conditional one, as is maintained by others-I follow neither view-or an intrinsic and essential connexion with the immolation of old on the Cross, as was taught, amongst many others, by St. Peter Canisius, Doctor of the Church, whose definition of the Mass I have from the very beginning made my own: "The sacrifice of the Mass, rightly understood, is both a representation, at once holy and living, and an oblation, bloodless, yet actual, of the Passion of the Lord and of the bloody sacrifice which was offered for us on the Cross". From the Cross must be

borrowed its own Victim: otherwise there is no true Victim of propitiation.

Secondly, I do not believe that the Last Supper and the Passion were two complete sacrifices, but only two parts of one complete Sacrifice: as was held by a host of pre-Tridentine theologians; at Trent itself, by those among the Fathers who saw in this unity the best answer to all objections against the proposed definition of Christ's sacrificial action in the Supper-Room; again by several conspicuous theologians of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and finally by an ever-growing number of contemporary divines: to whom the sacrifice of our High Priest was simply one, numerically one; a continuous action, beginning at the Supper, extending through the Passion, and ending on the Cross; for this reason, that the offering (or sacrificing) at the Supper was not, as it is in our masses, the offering of Christ as already made a victim by his Passion, but of Christ to be made 'a victim through the bloody Passion; and, therefore, the sacrifice was not completed till the bloody process was gone through. And yet the feast of the sacred gifts, the partaking of the Victim, could already take place in the Cenacle, because there the Victim had actually been consecrated to God by the Priest, the Death had been virtually enacted; the possession of the redeeming Flesh and Blood had already been secured to God, and God's acceptance was already signified, if not visibly by the Risen Life and the Ascension to heaven, yet invisibly, to the eyes of faith, by the transubstantiation of the elements, the work of that Eternal Spirit through whom Christ there and then offered himself without blemish unto God. Thus did it come about (to use Baldwin of Canterbury's phrase) that "the eating of the true Lamb followed neither the order of the Law nor the order of nature". but assuredly a superior rule, of the supernatural order, when on the table was laid the Flesh of "the Victim still living, but soon to be dead, and to live again From this anticipation of the death and resurrection in the sacramental banquet of our Lord's sacrifice there is nothing to fear for the unity,

the sacrificial unity, of the Supper Eucharist with the bloody Passion.

But perhaps such oneness of the divine sacrifice may appear to clash with the Hymn of the Breviary for the feast of the Sacred Heart, a passage of which is quoted in the Pastoral (p. 16) as implying two sacrifices offered by Christ: one in the Last Supper, and another on Calvary. This quotation raises a question of literary interest, on which I trust nobody will take it amiss if I beg to offer a remark. The passage in Latin is as follows (the poet addressing the Sacred Heart itself):

Te vulneratum caritas Ictu patenti voluit, Amoris invisibilis Ut veneremur vulnera.

Hoc sub amoris symbolo Passus cruenta et mystica Utrumque sacrificium Christus sacerdos obtulit.

In the Pastoral, the translation for the last strophe reads like this:

Love's symbol tells how Christ, our Priest In bloody and in mystic guise A twofold immolation bore And offered twofold sacrifice.

Now, one thing to remark is this: the first stanza puts before our eyes the visible wound inflicted on the Heart by the spear, and the invisible, spiritual wound of love, of which the former is the token and manifestation. The second stanza comments on this double wound by remarking that Christ's Heart, viewed as a symbol of love, exhibits the two kinds of pains which Christ actually suffered, the bloody ones and the mystic ones [passus cruenta et mystica]; that is, with reference to the preceding stanza, the physical wounds, visible and outward,

1 MF, pp. ago-zgt. Cf. pp. 42-44, 76-77, go, etc.

and the mystic wounds, spiritual, invisible, inward. Thereupon comes the final remark, that thus did Christ offer "both sacrifices" (utrumque sacrificium). Which sacrifices? Apparently the outward one and the inward one, the outward immolation (if you like to call it so) and the inward immolation, respectively identical with visible and invisible wounds; the combination of the two verifying the definition, classical since the days of Augustine [De Civit. Dei, x, 5], according to which in every true and proper sacrifice there must be found two sacrifices: "Sacrificium ergo visibile invisibilis sacrificii sacramentum, id est sacrum signum est". I submit that this interpretation is conformable to the trend of the Hymn. and does full justice to its text. There is no shred of evidence. either from these stanzas or from the other three, that the author had in mind the Eucharist, whether of the Mass or of the Last Supper.

This conclusion will appear more evident still to any one who cares to compare the Hymn with the Sermo Sancti Bonaventurae Episcopi, appointed to be read in the fourth, fifth, and sixth Lessons of the day. Of this discourse the hymn is only a paraphrase in verse. Now there is not a word on the Eucharist in those three fragments.

Sermo

Leet. 5. Ad hoc templum, ad haec Sancta Sanctorum. ad hanc arcam, testamenti adorabo, et laudabo nomen Domini, etc. Admitte tantum in Sacrarium exauditionis tuae preces meas . . . amplius lava me ab iniquitate mea, et a peccato meo munda me.

Lect. 6. Propterea vulneratum est Str. 3. Te vulneratum caritas cor tuum ut per vulnus visibile vulnus amoris invisibilis videomus.

Hymnus

Sir. i.. Cor, arca, legem continens JVbn servitutis veteris, Sed gratiae, sed veniae Sed et misericordiae Str. 2. Cor, sanctuarium novi Intemeratum foederis Templum vetusto sanctius

Vclumque scisso utilius.

Ictu patenti voluit, Amoris invisibilis Ut veneremur vulnera.

Sermo

Hymnus

Leet. 6. Carnale ergo vulnus vulnus spirituale ostendit.

Str. 4. Hoc sub amoris symbolo
Passus cruenta et mystica
Utrumque sacrificium
Christus sacerdos obtulit.

Leet. 6. Quis illud Cor tam vulnera tum non diligat? Quis tam amans non redamet?

Lect. 5. In Corde tuo omnibus diebus vitae meae merear habitare.

Str. 5. Quis non Amantem redamet?
Quis non redemptus diligat,
Et Corde in isto seligat
Aeterna tabernacula?

The column to the left is as void of the Eucharist as it is of the Day of Judgment or of the sacrament of Matrimony. It certainly offers no ground for reading the Last Supper into the Hymn.

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Among the other pronouncements that in this generation have come from the English hierarchy on the subject of the Mass, it may be of interest to recall the collective letter of the Province of Westminster (then coextensive with England and Wales), which appeared in 1898, on the occasion of the Papal condemnation of Anglican Orders (A Vindication of the Bull Apostolicae Curae by the Cardinal Archbishop and Bishops of the Province of Westminster, n. 12, p. 26). There was a passage in point, which ran like this (except for the italics, which are mine): "If there were no power in the words of consecration to make the true Body and Blood of Christ really and objectively present on the altar, we should not have on our altars the Victim of Calvary, and without its Victim the sacrifice could not subsist". In what high regard I hold this admirable pronouncement, may be seen in MF, p. in (both first and second edition). I do not think that it had ever been quoted before as a locus theologicus in any work on the Eucharist; and I should be glad, if this departure of mine might be taken as a special mark of my respect for the hierarchy of a land to which I feel bound by many old and sacred associations.

It may be objected however that the venerable signatories of this collective letter did not perhaps lay so much stress on the words that I have italicized, as I might wish to lay. And indeed others may be in a better position than I am to find out the truth of this matter. But one thing is certain, that the theologian who more than anybody else in the past bore the brunt of the fight against the validity of Anglican Orders, Michel Le Quien, O.P., would have hailed such a pronouncement in its strictest interpretation as a seal on his own arguments and labours.

As everyone knows, the defence of the Edwardine Ordinal by the Canon Regular of St. Augustine; Pierre Le Courayer, in the eighteenth century, was based in part on the plea that the Mass, containing nothing but a mystic immolation, could not, therefore, be to us Catholics more than the mere likeness or image of a real sacrifice: the reality was all in the past. Of course, a symbol can always be named after the thing which it symbolizes; and thus we Catholics could speak of our daily Eucharist as a sacrifice of Christ's Body and Blood. But sacrifice of this kind, he went on to say, the Reformers had never excluded. Therefore, they could not by us be held to exclude from their ministry a sacrificial power of corresponding description. It would follow then that in their Ordinal the form of ordination to the priesthood should not be taken to mean a ministry void of sacrificial activities. And consequently there was not on this ground any theological foundation for a rejection of their Orders.— The fallacy implied in this reasoning was at once laid bare by the great Dominican scholar just named, Le Quien,

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¹ Le Qiien was the outstanding figure of the Dominican Order in France at the beginning of the eighteenth century with Noël Alexandre. Of Noël Alexandre I havespoken elsewhere (pp. 270,302) in connection not with the Afass, but with the Last Supper, which he couples with the Passion, as the beginning and the end respectively of one individual Sacrifice, maintaining from history that it was on the strength of this view that many of the Fathers at Trent sanctioned the Decree on Christ's sacrificial action in the Supper-Room. In the question of Anglican Orders E. E. Estcourt rightly declares that "the principal writer in reply to Courayer (sic) was Le Quien" (The Question of Anglican Ordinations discussed, p. 163).

who in his lengthy and thorough reply to Le Courayer (La Nullité des Ordinations Anglicanes démontrée de nouveau, Paris, 1730, torn. 2) inserted a theological dissertation, penned apparently by one of his colleagues, but fully endorsed by himself. It was admitted that Christ had been really immolated ("immolation réelle") only once, namely in his Passion (p. I35). 1° the Mass, the immolation was only a mystic one, that is a sign or portrayal ("représentative et figurative", p. 136) of the Death on the Cross ("La Victime ria été immolée réellement que sur la Croix"; " Fimmolation riest que représentée dans ΓEucharistie", p. 140). Ÿet the Mass was a real sacrifice (" un sacrifice réel ", " un sacrifice très réel ", pp. 138-139), because by means of the mystic immolation we did actually and really offer Christ as the Victim of his past real immolation. The mistake of Le Courayer was, therefore, that "he failed to distinguish between immolation of the Victim and oblation of the immolated Victim; he made the sacrifice consist formally of the immolation of the Victim, . . . whereas he should consider that it consists in the oblation of the Victim once immolated. And therefore, we are to acknowledge in the Eucharist a real sacrifice"; with an oblation no less real than was made "on the Cross, or than is made in heaven, where for all eternity, it shall continue: for Christ's Sacrifice is eternal even as his Priesthood. Tu es sacerdos in aeternum" (pp. 140-141). The reality of such a Sacrifice necessarily implied the presence of that Victim once truly immolated and now for evermore sacred to God. And here again, Le Quien remarked, Le Courayer was at fault, because, while admitting the truth of the real presence, he did not admit that its scope was to provide us with a real victim, the Victim of the Cross. There is but little doubt that Le Quien's thought would

^{1 &}quot;Ily a aussi une oblation réelle de ce même corps gui a été immolé sur la Croix et par consequent un sacrifice réel, puisque le sacrifice réel n'est autre chose que l'oblation réelle d'une victime réellement présente qui a été immolée en l'honneur de Dieu" (p. 138). "La victime réellement immolée étant rendue réellement présente par la consécration, c'est une oblation non sanglante, mais très réelle, que Jésus-Christ continue de faire de son Corps et de son Sang par le ministère des prêtres, et par conséquent c'est un sacrifice très réel" (P- '39).

have' been admirably rendered by the pronouncement of Westminster: we need "on our altars the Victim of Calvary, and without its Victim the sacrifice could not subsist

A short while later the same line of argument was taken up against Le Courayer by one of the most prominent and deservedly popular professors of the day, the Lazarist Collet, in his Praelectionum Theologicarum Honorati Tournely Continuatio (DeEuchar. pars2,cap. 3,tom5,pp. 717-720). His conclusion is almost identical word for word with the above. "Male igitur confundit dissertator [i.e. Le Courayer] immolationem victimae cum oblatione victimae immolatae: oblatio victimae ad sacrificium necessaria est; non item actualis ejusdem victimae immolatio" (p. 720) 1.

Applying this principle to the Mass itself, he wrote further on: "Cum ad sacrificium ex parte actionis duo concurrant, oblatio scilicet et immolatio rite facta, necessum est ut sacrificii unitas [in Cruce et Missa] vel ab oblationis vel ab immolationis unitate potissimum petatur. Atqui non ab unitate oblationis, cum haec pluries iterari possit. Ergo ab unitate immolationis. . . . Ergo dici nec incongrue potest, ad Missae sacrificium nulla nova opus esse [reali] immolatione" (p. 717).

All this the author had prefaced with a general remark worth pondering: "Dico ad sacrificium non requiri actionem qua hic et nunc res oblata destruatur, sed sufficere actionem qua vere et realiter offeratur res, quae destruenda sit, vel olim destructa fuerit" (ibid.). Certain novelties, if one may say so, are quite surprised to find themselves couched in very much the same forms of language to-day as were used in former times by those Doctors of classical temper and classical fame: "Doctor Classicus", as Hurter says of Collet. Or

1 It is quite clear that these authors meant by immolation not the Sacrifice as a whole, nor directly the oblation or consecration to God, but the mactation or slaying of the Victim. This terminology seems to me by far the best for the purposes of Scholastic teaching. I have therefore made it my own and adhere to it in all my personal utterances, without being in the least tempted to read it into the writings of others who speak differently. A mystical immolation, or mactation, or slaying of Christ was clearly recognized as part of our work by Collet in this same place.

rather old truisms are likely to enjoy the sensation which they create in certain modern circles; and yet perhaps they may delight still more in finding some at least to whom they come home as familiar, even though never met before: for, as far as I am concerned, I must confess that only of late have those utterances of Collet or Le Quien come my way at all.

They had not however escaped the attention of those who in 1855 were responsible in the diocese of Tournai for the guidance to be given to the members of the Ecclesiastical Conferences. In the Responsa ad Quaestiones Circulis Propositas Mense Februarii, published by Episcopal authority, the question on the essence of the sacrifice of the Mass, after close discussion and stern rejection of all other views (as unfit to allay our doubts), was solved finally by appeal to the authority of Collet. His explanations and arguments were found sufficient to warrant this proposition or thesis, in which was embodied the gist of the official answer (p. 410): "Sacrificium quod in Missa offertur, nec posse nec deberè considerari tanquam sacrificium in se completum, independenter ab immolatione [olim] peracta."

To come back to Le Courayer; he rejected every point of Le Quien's theory. There was no distinction, he said, in animal sacrifices between oblation and immolation /Réponse au P. Le Quien, pp. 525ÎT.) Consequently the Mass could not be the real oblation, by means of a mystic immolation, of the ever enduring Victim once immolated in Blood. immolation he excluded, not only (in common with Le Quien) as a present work of ours, but also (contrary to Le Quien) as a necessary prerequisite on the part of the eternal Victim. He was content with a mere show. Of itself and by itself the semblance of death was enough to constitute the essence of a true sacrifice, without any recourse to the Cross or to heaven as providing a ready made Victim for our sacrifices. Whereupon he bethought himself that sacrifice with a mere figure of Victimhood could as well be void of the reality of the Victim itself. "A figurative presence is enough

for a figurative immolation "he wrote. Not that he denied the real presence; he admitted it, as he had always done; but he maintained that it was on the above principles immaterial to the truth of the sacrifice. "Such a kind of immolation [concerned with a mere figure of Victimhood] does not of its own nature require any kind of [real] presence. Not from the presence therefore does the idea of sacrifice procéed in any way".2 The conclusion was the same as before. Granting even that Anglicans did not believe the real presence, yet they might, and in fact they did admit in substance the truth (if not the name) of sacrifice, seeing that they had always recognized the mystic slaying, that is the symbol or sign o'f a slaying: which was quite enough to meet all our own requirements, and satisfy all the purposes of a true sacrifice.

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Of course, this was the theory of mystic immolation run mad. But madness is sometimes only an excess of logic. Much depends on the starting point. Anyhow, the pity of it was that Le Courayer could quote in his favour, and of course was not slow to quote, the authority of a very great man indeed, none less than the ecclesiastical ruler of the realm in the preceding century, Cardinal de Richelieu. Bishop of Lucon and Prime Minister of France, he was not only a statesman of supreme eminence, but also a busy and by no means inconspicuous theologian. As a . theologian, he may be quoted among those in the past who gave expression to the so-called theory of mystic immolation. In his treatise entitled Les Principaux Points de la Foi de L'Église Catholique (Poitiers, 1617)3 he had already maintained that "it was quite enough for a sacrifice thatsome living animal should be clothed with the appearance of

"Une telle immolation n'exige point par sa nature aucune sorte de présence. Ce n'est donc point de cetteprésence que se tire l'idée de sacrifice " (p. 531, see also p. 5581. 3 Reprinted in the third volume of Migne's Démonstrations Évangéliques, to

^{1 &}quot; Une figure ou une représentation d'immolation n'exige point essentiellement dans son idée la présence d'une victime; puisque cette victime ne devant être immolée que mystiquement ou figurément, il suffit d'une présence figurée pour une immolation figurée " {op. cil., p. 529).

which my quotations refer.

death "1; and, therefore, seeing that "Jesus Christ, as existing in the Eucharist, is found under the appearance of death, no less than on the Cross", it follows that in the Eucharist "he has all that could be noted on the Cross in the way of external signification and demonstration of God's sovereignty: which is sufficient for a sacrifice"1. But the theory had not reached yet the ultimate stage of its development. Richelieu was still contending that under the appearance of death nothing would do but the reality of the animal; not a figurative substitute for it.3 In a later work, a posthumous work, which the Editors tell us emphatically had been the most cherished of all his writings, the most fondly and painstakingly worked out to the end.4 and indeed was not only then received with great applause, but still enjoys a fair reputation (the Method for converting heretics),5 Richelieu goes one step further. His general notion of sacrifice has remained unchanged: "A mystic and figurative death is sufficient to constitute the essence of a true sacrifice". In particular, "the mystic death of Christ or the mystic representation of his Death . . . is properly what constitutes the Eucharistic sacrifice ".6 But

^{1 &}quot;Il suffit au sacrifice d'un animal vivant qu'il soit établi sous l'apparence de mort" [op. cit. ch. 6, sect. 2, col. 81].

^{2 &}quot;Jésus-Christ, comme existant en l'eucharistie, a l'apparence de la mort comme en la croix; et partant, il a tout ce qu'il avait en la croix en considération de signe sensible, démonstratif de la souveraineté de Dieu: ce qui suffit au sacrifice " (ibid., col. 80).

^{3 &}quot; Quand on dit qu'il suffit au sacrifice d'un animal vivant, qu'il soit établi sous l'apparence de mort, on n'entend pas qu'il y soit établi par représentation, comme s'il était dépeint mort en un portrait: . . . mais on entend que l'animal vivant soit en lui-même couvert de l'espèce et de l'apparence de la mort, et qu'en cet état il soit présentement offert à Dieu!"

¹ Some say that the authorship of the book belongs in the main to one of his secretaries, Amable de Bourzeis. I have seen no reason brought forward in support of this claim. Everyone knows that the Cardinal had many secretaries, who were not mere scribes. His tragedies, although always bearing his name only, were the result of a close co-operation with others. But the design was his, as is well known from the history of Corneille; and so too the responsibility, for better or for worse.

[•] Traité qui contient la Méthode la plus facile et la plus assurée pour convertir ceux qui se sont séparés de l'Église. Paris, 1651.

^{3&}quot; Une mort mystique et figurée suffit pour établir l'essence d'un véritable sacrifice. Pour bien entendre cette vérité, ilfaut savoir que la souveraineté de Dieu peut-être témoignée en deux façons par le changement de l'hostie offerte: a savoir, en détruisant l'hostie ou réellement, ou mystiquement et figurativement. Puisque la nature du signe consiste bien

then, what follows next? It follows, Richelieu assures us, that the presence of Christ (however necessary for other purposes) is not essential to the sacrifice, as such. "The Eucharist is a propitiatory oblation, whether it really and truly contains the Body and Blood of Christ or not." Consequently, "when the so-called Reformers maintain, as they do, that by the breaking of the Body and the shedding of the Blood of Christ unto the forgiveness of sins (which we read to have been instituted in the Last Supper), should be understood in the Eucharist a figurative oblation and immolation, do they not grant us absolutely everything that we ask from them in the present matter?" No wonder that Le Courayer seized upon this utterance of the great Cardinal with more than ordinary eagerness, and to no little discomfort of his opponents.

I must be pardoned, if I find it safer not to go one step with Cardinal de Richelieu in this matter of sacrifice, lest he might carry me whither I would not, and hand me over to Le Courayer, who would at once exert his efforts to make me go against the Bull Apostolicae Curae. Others who are stronger than I am may unfearingly accept the first principles of the theory, and guard themselves against the conclusion. But let them mind their weaker brethren, and be patient with them. Let it be permissible still for us to cling to the decision

plus in Papparence qu'en la réalité de la chase, qui ne signifie qu'en tant qu'elle paraît, il est évident que la mort mystique de Jésus-Christ, ou la représentation mystique de sa mort à l'Autel suffit pour témoigner la reconnaissance que nous aeons de la souveraineté de Dieu sur la vie et sur la mort; et c'est proprement ce qui constitue Pessence du sacrifice " {op. cit., liv. 4, ch. 5, p. 566-567}.

J Les Prétendus Reformés soutenant, comme ils font, que par la fraction du Corps et par Peffusion du Sang de Jésus-Christ pour la rémission des péchés, dont il est parlé en l'institution de la sainte Cène, on doit entendre une oblation et une immolation figurée et mystique en PEucharistie, ne nous accordent-ils pas absolument tout ce que nous leur demandons au sujet dont il s'agit? Il ne s'agit pas ici de savoir si le Corps et le Sang de Jésus-Christ sont vraiment et substantiellement en PEucharistie, ou s'ils y sont seulement figurativement par l'entremise du pain et du vin, qui en sont les symboles et les signes. Mais il s'agit seulement de savoir si PEucharistie est offerte à Dieu, et si elle lui est offerte pour la rémission despéchés; ce qui suffit pour dire que PEucharistie est une oblation propitiatoire, quelque qualité qu'elle ait d'ailleurs, soit qu'elle contienne réellement et véritablement le Corps et le Sang de Jésus-Christ, soit qu'elle ne les contienne pas " (loe. cit., p. 574).

of Westminster, understood in its strictest, in its fullest sense, and believe that our altars are laden with the Victim that is yielded by the Cross and kept for us on the heavenly Altar. Let us be free to agree with Le Quien and Collet and hundreds of others, Saints and Doctors, apologists and preachers, modest professors and glorious Pontiffs, Fathers of the Church and our masters of the present day, in a doctrine which certainly will not endanger any of the truths that we hold dear and sacred, any of the truths for which the Church has fought or is fighting still. The danger, if any, would seem to us to lie in the opposite direction. If we are not mistaken, the sacrifice of an animated being differs from sacrifices of things inanimate in this, that it is the sacrifice of a victim. For it to be a true sacrifice, there must be a true victim. There is no true victim without true victimhood. Therefore, without true victimhood. either prospective, or, if not prospective, present (whether as an actual work or as a preexistent state), there is no true sacrifice of an animated being; only a shadow. But for a shadow of sacrifice, the shadowy presence will do just as well as the shadowy victimhood. Not so for a sacrifice that shares with the Cross in laying before God the Victim of a true and bloody immolation. If what was effected by the Passion unto death and perfected by the glory of the Resurrection now abides on our altars, then there necessarily follows the presence of the risen Christ himself, of the Gift dedicated to God in the upper-chamber and conveyed into his hands from the arms of the Gross. The real presence is truly an essential of our Sacrifice, no less than the true Victimhood.

To sum up, the mystic immolation is as much a constituent of the Sacrifice with us, as it is with others. But when they take it to suffice with the sole addition of the presence of him who bears this mystic veil, we beg to remark that the veil is no mere disguise, but, as in the hands of Christ it clad the Victim for his death, so too does it in our hands cover the eternal imprint of death and sacrifice on the Lamb, that was once made over to the Lord of heaven through Blood, and now for ever remains God's own, "eating of his bread, and

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drinking of his cup and lying in his bosom ": a very dear and precious acquisition to the Lord; the most dear and precious ransom of our sins. This ransom we may join in paying offeach time we share by holy commemoration and vivid representation in the original self-surrender of the eternal Victim.

THE MASS AND ATTRITION

In the course of a friendly discussion with one whose name need not appear in these pages, I had occasion to maintain that the sincerity of our self-offering to God is an essential element of an acceptable sacrifice, and, therefore, a necessary factor of its efficacy in the line of impétration or propitiation. But at the same time I thought it necessary to exclude the idea, that "one's assistance at Mass is not a real offering of sacrifice unless one is contrite." The Catholic truth is, on the contrary, speaking of course of the faithful, that the sinner, still in the state of sin, by means of the sacrifice which he causes to be offered in his name, or in which he joins by devout attendance, obtains the grace of repentance which he lacks; and this, not only by the impetratory virtue of the Mass, but by its very power of atonement; according to the unequivocal teaching of the Council of Trent: "Huius quippe (sacrificii) oblatione placatus Dominus, gratiam et donum paenitentiae concedens, crimina et peccata etiam ingentia dimitt" (Sess. 22, cap 2). True, sincerity is required; but sincerity and perfect contrition are two dungs carefully to be distinguished from one another. It would be quite preposterous to say that faith or hope, however imperfect they may be while lacking the formal perfection of charity, are insincere; nor again is love itself insincere, if for lack of absolute preference for God it remains imperfect. And what applies to all virtues is true also of the virtue of sincerity. Sincerity is imperfect, if not united with charity. But yet it can exist, even though imperfect. And therefore the sacrifice may be fruitful, even to the sinner, as long as the sinner has this minimum of sincerity necessary to the existence even of faith, namely

the desire for conversion or charity.—(See St. Thomas, Sent. III. 23, q. 2, a. 5, ad 4 et 5.)

A short while after I had given expression to those views, there came to me the following query from His Grace the Most Reverend M. Sheehan, Coadjutor Archbishop of Sydney: Can it be safely taught that mortal sin is immediately forgiven to one who, though only attrite, hears Mass devoutly? My answer, which His Grace did me the honour of publishing in the Australasian Catholic Record for January 1926, was on the following lines.

One principle can be safely asserted, that excluding the case of martyrdom, the reception of a sacrament is the only means by which a sinner who merely has attrition can recover sanctifying grace; this is nowadays undoubted Catholic doctrine. Sanctifying grace will be regained per se, that is, normally and regularly, with attrition and the Sacrament of Penance; the same effect may be produced per accidens by means of other Sacraments (for instance the Blessed Eucharist, when the sinner who has attrition is unaware of his imperfect dispositions). Hence if the question means, "Can a man, while hearing Mass devoutly, yet with no other acts than those of attrition, be justified without the aid of a sacrament?" the answer must undoubtedly be in the negative.

But if we transform the question, giving it the following shape: "If a man comes to Mass with a disposition of attrition, and devoutly shares in the offering of the divine Sacrifice, will he break into acts of contrition, perfect contrition, that will enable him to be justified by sanctifying grace?" Then I should reply that this is morally certain. Why? "Because, in the first place, we presuppose attrition such as would suffice for sacramental justification. Now attrition of this kind is appretiative summa, including unconditional preference for God over any created thing that might in a given option come into conflict with him. Between it and perfect contrition the only difference is in the motive; the motive being in the latter case God's goodness, while this is not so in the former. But then, I would note that the difficulty for a man who has to come back to God is not to love him because he is good, but

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to prefer him to all things. Of course, if we were to understand the motive of God's goodness as covering only the goodness of his love for himself, and by no means the goodness of his love, his wonderful, unbounded love for us, there might be, there would be, a difficulty. But there is no truth in that restrictive view. God is love; God is substantial love for ourselves; and to love God for that love which he bears us is to love him for what he is—to love him, therefore, with true charity. Charity was what the poet had in mind when he wrote:

"And love the Love that did for thy love die."

Now, I ask, is it more difficult to love God, because he is good, because he has the goodness to love us, because he is a friend, than to prefer him to all things without regard to the rights of his friendship, without regard to the surpassing generosity of his love, without regard to that goodness of his which makes him love us, unworthy though we may be, with the heart of a friend and a father? Now, all those thoughts press themselves on him who shares devoutly in the offering of the Mass. What is proposed to him is God's charity tomankind in the climax of Christ's sacrifice; the charity of the Father, who delivered his Son; the charity of the Son, who made himself suffer in the flesh to the shedding of his Blood on the Cross; the charity of him who chose to be our Victim in order to be our Ransom; a charity, manifested in man, but manifesting itself as divine and eternal. If the devout worshipper is, as we suppose, already in the disposition of unconditionally, unreservedly, preferring God above all things, how can he be likely to withhold the better love which gives God exactly the same preference, but from a more complete and adequate motive, from a motive, therefore, more powerful and effective? There is hardly any likelihood of such stupidity and stolidity. Any man, with ordinary human qualities, will rather yield to the greater pressure than to the weaker one, once the work and (if I may say so) the trouble

entailed is the same in both instances. It is a great pity to let the faithful believe that, apart from the preference sincerely given to God, an act of contrition is difficult, or that it is more difficult than mere attrition. Of course, in both cases the grace of God is required, without which we cannot move a step towards salvation; but then is God so sparing of his grace, 'or so afraid to be loved, as just to offer what will merely suffice for attrition? True, our sins sometimes are a bar to his gifts; there is such a punishment as sin upon sin; but that is the case with the obdurate sinner, not with the poor man who has already gathered as much as attrition; and besides, here there comes in the efficacy of the Mass, in the' offering of which he shares, and indeed devoutly. proper effect of the Mass is to remove the bar, the hindrance to God's merciful activities, by appeasing his justice; it leaves God free, as it were, without injury to his justice, to give full scope to his mercy. Grace will not fail the man who with sincere attrition offers the Mass; grace for perfect contrition will not fail him, nor be delayed, as if God were in no hurry to recover his own, or as if the father of the prodigal son were more generous than he. And grace being offered, the grace of charity, who doubts that the man will consent to it, who is already, out of desire for charity (for this desire is an essential prerequisite not only of penance, but even of true faith, as St. Thomas has shown) already, I say, out of desire for charity, so disposed as to make light of everything in comparison with God's friendship? The act of perfect love, perfect contrition, will come forth as a natural fruit of the holy Sacrifice: and thus will the devout "publican" find himself fully disposed for the infusion of sanctifying grace, which, however, he will not receive without a longing, implicit though it be, for the Church's sacramental pardon; because the Sacrament of Penance is the efficient cause provided by God for our recovery, while the acts of contrition, etc., operate only as a disposition, that is, somewhat like a material cause."

1 chastise my body and bring it into subjection (I Cor. ix, 27).

As far as can be surmised, the purpose of a priestly assembly like the present one, and of the matter to be treated between us in the Latin tongue, is not to find occasion for speculating about things sublime and recondite, but rather to propose for our moral improvement some simple form of eucharistic life, drawn from the genuine sources of the Christian faith.

The subject-matter assigned us for to-day's consideration is the saying of the Apostle: "I chastise my body and bring it into subjection."

In these words the Apostle enunciates two things:

- i. The mortification of the body, when he says I chastise my body.
- ii. Some intrinsic end of that mortification when he says: I bring it into subjection.

Hence there will be two parts to our treatment: one wherein it is shown how the offering of the sacrifice and the duty of afflicting the flesh are bound up together: the other whereby the subjection of the conquered flesh and its adjustment to the spirit is traced back as a fruit of the participated sacrifice.

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With regard to the first part it is necessary first of all to consider the terms employed by the Apostle. He did not say "I bridle or hold in check" (refiaeno vel cohibeo): by

1 The Latin text of this instruction appeared in the Records of the twenty-seventh International Eucharistic Congress of Amsterdam, 1924.

which words only a certain resistance is expressed. But he said "I chastise" {castigo}, which implies some sort of doing violence, some sort of beating or bruising inflicted in order to avenge sins. For to bridle the inordinate inclinations of the body, or to restrain the body itself from unlawful pleasures, is nothing more than to keep it within its duty: and this falls under the negative precepts of the law: whose binding force applies to every single instant of our life. Besides it has not the character of retribution, but only serves as a guidance and a safeguard.

It is otherwise with chastisement, whose object it is to bring upon man's natural (and by no means dishonourable) appetite what is contrary and repugnant to it, and this by some special act of an avenging character.

The obligation of this avenging action does certainly not press us at every moment, but it allows of a certain indefiniteness of time, as is consonant with the nature of positive precepts.

Moreover, it presupposes something, namely the guilt to be avenged. For it is concerned with the violation of the law; which implies again two things: the rule which has the prince for its author, and the transgression, whereby the subject has deviated from the rule.

Therefore, it is taken for granted that before the chastisement there has existed both the good order of government, and the disorder of sin; yet not without a difference.

For the order pre-exists in the mind of the lawmaker, whence it passes to the subject's reason as to a rule at once regulated and regulating. Whereas the sin is in the subject, inasmuch as he falls short of the rule, both the proximate one and the ultimate one. And this is why the avenging of sin belongs not only to the ruler, but also to the sinner himself, inasmuch as the latter, in his higher reason, is partner of the law. Now it is to the punishment that proceeds, not from the ruler, but from the transgressor, the saying of the Apostle applies: *I chastise my body*, inasmuch as, having God's law imprinted in my mind, I avenge my own wrongdoings.

But it must be remembered that in dealing with transgressions of sins, punishment follows two methods: retributive, whose purpose is to repair the wrongs resulting from violated rights; the other medicinal, whose object is to prevent further violations of the law. The punishment which is medicinal supposes the punishment which is retributive; but it modifies it in two ways: as regards the end, and as regards the quantity. As regards the end, medicinal punishment hasfor its object correction in the future; as regards the quantity, since it proceeds with the hope of the sinner's repentance, it ought not to be exacted to the strict limits of a just proportion, either as regards duration, or as regards intensity. Not as regards duration, because according to the Angelic Doctor (4 Cg. 93) it would be unfair if, though the culprit were converted, the punishment never ceased. Not as regards intensity, because when one is visited with punishment in order to be reconciled, one is punished as a friend rather than as a foe: and for this reason in every punishment intended as a remedy, whether it comes from God or from man, God's vicegerent, in his own or in another's cause, the agent proceeds with a certain pacific disposition of mildness and leniency.

It is of this penalty that the Apostle speaks when he says: 1 chastise my body. For he indicated its remedial purpose by the words that follow: and bring it into subjection. For a remedy has health for its object; now the health of the moral life consists in this, that the inferior powers are subject to the superior, as the superior is subject to God. This subjection of the lower to the higher parts of man was originally whole and entire, but at present it is defective in many ways. In the first place it is defective because the concupiscences by some sort of violence carry off the consent of reason. This may happen in the pursuit of what is contrary to the rational order, as when the assault is directed against that charity either of God or of our neighbour by which man clings to his last end: in which case it is a question of mortal sin. Or it may happen no less in the pursuit of something which

while not opposed to the order of reason, is yet not sought in accordance with right reason, the choice not being made as it should be nor as the pursuit of the last end commands and directs: in that case it is a question of the disorder of venial sin. In the second place, this subjection of the lower appetite is also defective, apart from any formal guilt, when it tends towards what is evil, without any previous deliberation, through some instinct of our nature no longer whole or sound. but deprayed and fallen. Seeing that mere consent to this impulse is a sin, it follows that even when the consent is not there, there is in the impulse itself a matter of sin, or material sin. The health, therefore, which here is opposed to sickness, will then be perfect, when not only every formal sin is barred, but when also every movement of the lower nature towards a forbidden object is absent. This perfection will be enjoyed in our Father's home; but here on earth, with the exception of that Virgin blessed beyond all others, who was totally freed from original sin, both as to the stain and the sting, it will never fall to the lot of any one among those who are to be saved. However, the perfection of our earthly course consists in this, that man, with unrelenting constancy, draws nearer to that happy goal, as love of God and of neighbour for the most part exerts its empire over each and every tendency of the lower powers of the soul, whether rational or sensible. Thus the body itself, the carrier and source of the concupiscences that war against the spirit, is accounted (and rightly so) to have been brought well-nigh into subjection to the soul created after the image and likeness of God; and the whole man is judged as it were sound, so that we have another Francis, or another Aloysius, or another Thomas, or another Philip Neri, or another Joan of Arc or Teresa of the Child Such is the end for which the chastisement of the flesh preached by St. Paul is undertaken; so that there are, as it were, two movements answering each other in rhythmical order; one of war waged against the flesh; the other of peace possessed by the spirit. And as by the increase of peace the vigour of warfare grows apace, so from

the bitterness of the warfare comes the sweetness of peace. However the method of waging the war is not always the same for the various progressions in peace. But at certain times preference is rather given to afflictive punishment by which the members are made to feel pain; at other times preference is given to privative punishments, by which things pleasurable, though licit, are withdrawn both from the senses and from the mind: in order that there may be room for the sole enjoyment of God, loved in himself and for himself, above all gifts, whether bodily or even spiritual, that are not God. Fruition of this kind is the purest love of God, and possesses the greatest force of severing us from every contagion of the flesh and of the world; and it accomplishes in a mortal body that perfection of mortification or chastisement of which St. Paul says I chastise my body and bring it into subjection.

After this brief exposition comes the question: what has all this to do with the Eucharist? The answer to this question must be clear to those who are mindful of the twofold character of the Eucharist as a Sacrifice and a Sacrament.

In the first place, as a sacrifice the Eucharist is a sign of mortification which it represents and pledges to God. For the Eucharist is an atoning sacrifice. And as every visible sacrifice is a sacrament, in other words a sign and profession of an invisible sacrifice, so every sacrifice, under its aspect of atonement, signifies before God, and therefore does as it were vow before him, the personal immolation or mactation of the offerers themselves in expiation. If, therefore, the sacrificial oblation is sincere, it obliges him who celebrates for himself to undergo hardships, or to take them up of his own accord, so that by them he may in some way fill up the just and condign punishment which he is actually trying to avert, though he confesses that he has incurred it. Therefore the Church fitly prays on the Wednesday after Passion Sunday: hostias placationis et laudis sincero tibi deferamus obsequio, "that we may present to thee the gifts of propitation and praise with worshipful sincerity. Hence also, on the feast of the

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Most Holy Trinity (and elsewhere, as on the Monday after Pentecost) does she beg of God that he may make of the offerers of the gifts a perfect and eternal gift unto himself. For this reason is our penance described by that Doctor of spiritual life, St. Gregory the Great, under the form of some " Mindful of the eternal kind of sacrificial celebration. judgment, he says, (the Saints) daily immolate themselves to God as a sacrifice by the weeping and wailing of compunction. They, as has been foretold, chastise their bodies, and thus fulfil what is said by the Apostle of the Gentiles: present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, pleasing unto God (Rom. xii, i). For a victim is slain that it may be offered. But a living victim is the body afflicted for the Lord: and it is called a sacrifice and a living one, because it lives unto the virtues and is slain unto the vices. A sacrifice, because it is already dead to this world, being free from evil deeds; but a living one because with all the might at its disposal, it performs good deeds" (In Egech. I. 2, hom. 10, n. 19. P. L. 76, 1069-1070). Thus speaks St. Gregory.

But now, if sincere penance, both internal and external, is the meaning and intent conveyed by every propitiatory sacrifice, much more is this true of ours, which is the sacrifice of the Lamb slain for our salvation: of whose atonement no one is made a partaker unless he has been made a partaker of his Death and Passion, that is to say, unless he has died and been buried with Christ, at first indeed mystically in baptism, but afterwards practically (pragmatice). In other words, by the mortification of the concupiscences that must be made a reality in the newness of our life which was signified and pledged by us in our very initiation through our being shrouded and buried under the water of baptism. Hence the sincere · offering of sacrifice on the part of the Christian does but continue the very profession of his baptism, whereby he proves himself one with the Christ stripped, in death, of the likeness of sinful flesh. Nor does he sacrifice like a true Christian who does not sacrifice as one disposed to die, to

suffer, to be immolated, slain and (to use St. Paul's word) crucified.

While all this applies to the immediate and formal sacrificer, who is the priest, it must not be declared inapplicable to the faithful among the laity, to the believer who through our priestly hands offers to God his victim, the Victim of salvation, the sacrifice of the Body and Blood of Christ. For it must be clear to every one that this is the sacrifice of the whole Church, which the official voice of the Tridentine Council defines as proceeding from the universal Church through the hands of the priests. In other words, the immolated Body of Christ is the dowry and gift of the whole mystic Body. But the sacrificial offering is more particularly attributed to those who, as regards the matter to be consecrated, took the first step in the sacrificial function, by presenting their gifts to the altar and to God. So an ancient authority says: "In every instance he is said to offer, from whom come the oblations that the priest places on the altar. . . . To him is the sacrifice ascribed whose gifts are being offered (Quaestiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti, c. 46. P.L. 35, 2246.) Therefore all the faithful must be impressed, as we must be ourselves, with the duty, which, by virtue of the very sacrifice they have offered, obliges them to immolate their souls and bodies to God in expiation of sin; so that the words of the Apostle may be fulfilled in them also: "I chastise my body".

But while insisting on the obligation of this chastisement, we must above all exalt its importance and value (as we said above), when linked with the holy Sacrifice. For there is not merely an obligation contracted through the sacrifice; but what is more, our mortifications acquire thereby their greatest value. The reason is that they attain by this a sort of liturgical dignity; for they invest our sacramental celebration with truth and sincerity, and give it so to speak, its fullness and perfection. We know, on the one hand, that no punishment of the sinner, even of the severest kind or of the longest duration can ever, by itself) wash away the stain of sin, or

expiate its guilt. On the other hand it is certain that the comparatively light and short sufferings of the present life, when borne patiently or practised spontaneously, once they are united to Christ, the immolated Victim, once they have been laid with Christ upon the altar of sacrifice, once they are grafted upon the atonement of our Head, once they are, like the water at Cana, changed into the wine of salvation, the Blood of the Lord, into the ransom of the world, into the libation of our Priest, it is certain, I say, that they cannot fail to exert the full efficacy that belongs to the Cross. quently through these light and short tribulations, thus transformed as it were into the Lord's own, and made efficacious for salvation, all the bonds of our captivity are sundered, all our debts are cleared, all our delinquencies, for whose satisfaction we offered the sacrifice, are wiped out. rightly so; for that sacrifice was offered up sincerely, and, as St. Augustine says, truly, because truthfully: for that penitential disposition was not mendacious which the sinner betokened by the sacred Blood of the Lord, and to which he gave thereby something of an infinite efficacy and power. Such, it seems to me, are the chief points by which the chastisement of the body and the celebration of the holy Sacrifice are mutually related and linked together. Upon these associations it would be easy to build up others, as for instance, zeal for the reparation of the sins of others, (as is usual with men to offer sacrifices first for their own sins, and then for the people's; Heb. vii, 27), and the still higher and nobler desire to suffer with Christ suffering, or to take one's stand by the side of his sorrowful Mother (as one who, having paid his debt of justice, is enabled to form, in all freedom, ties of the most tender and familiar love).

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It now remains for us to consider the participation of the Sacrifice—which is the communion of the Body and Blood of

Christ in its bearing on the fruit of the bodily chastisement, which fruit is nothing else than the subjection of the body to the soul, like the peace that comes of order and like the - recovery of health. To this purpose was directed, as a remedy, the sensible punishment, as was explained above. Here it must be remembered that the sacramental grace proper to the Eucharist is to unite the soul to Christ by the fervour of charity, and hence to promote the reign of charity over the lower powers of the soul without exception, and thereby to check the rebellion of the flesh, and the wantonness of the soul's every propensity thrown into disorder by intercommunion with the flesh. In this manner is gradually brought about the reign of peace, not indeed such peace as is in store for us in our Father's home but such as is compatible with our human and earthly condition. For our peace here below must be an armed and militant one, lest after the strong man, Christ the Lord, has cleared the house of enemies, the householder grow drowsy and slothful, and the foe return with sevenfold fury, tear down the structure, level it and abandon it to unclean spirits. Moreover, the Eucharist received as nourishment will accomplish the work of peace so much the more efficaciously as there has preceded à more perfect (and consequently, in virtue of the mortification of the flesh, a more fruitful) oblation of the Sacrifice. For as to the oblation corresponds the participation, so to the generosity of the atonement answers the largesse of grace, and with the removal of obstacles comes the inflow or inrush of divine benefactions, seeing that the fruits of the sacrifice all find their crowning element in the sacramental banquet. Therefore the Eucharist will bring the body into subjection so much the more, as it finds that body more perfectly adorned with the sacrificial marks of Christ, and more generously immolated, through mortification, as victim with Him. Ht who soweth sparingly of that sacred and sacrificial wheat, shall also reap sparingly; and he who soweth in blessings, shall also reap blessings" (II Cor. ix. 6). And so great will be at times the blessing, that that divine banquet will not only bring peace, but also a delightful

enjoyment of peace. I speak of spiritual delight, not contained in the affections of the sensible parts of man; of a pure delight, not begotten by the attainment of one's own advantage or private good, but bom of charity, whereby the friend rejoices for the sake of his friend, a son delights in the goodness of his father, a bride in the bridegroom's comeliness. For among the sacramental effects of this sacrament we find enumerated in an official document of the Church, published by the Council of Florencel (D. 698), not only an increase and an enkindling of charity, but also that delight with which, while still on earth, man fits himself best and prepares himself more immediately for the blissful enjoyment of heaven, pure above all things and more than all things a hymn of praise to God.

For the more a man's taste becomes enstranged, through the spice of mortification, from every earthly savour, the better adapted does it become to relish heavenly things. whoever is granted through the Holy Ghost "to relish what is right and just", is also permitted "ever to enjoy his com-This is the purport of those many postcommunions in which we pray for our spiritual healing (as on the seventh Sunday after Pentecost), or for the body and soul's refreshment (as on the eighth Sunday after Pentecost); or ask that our every impulse of sense may be forestalled in us by the operation and effect of the heavenly gift (as on the fifteenth Sunday after Pentecost); or that all our vices may be healed by the sanctifying action of the eternal remedy (as on the seventeenth Sunday after Pentecost), or again that whatever is corrupt in us, may be made sound through the benefit of its healing power (as on the twenty-fourth Sunday after Pentecost); or finally we entreat that we may be set free from all earthly pleasures (as on the fourth Sunday after Epiphany), since we (as we add on the fifth) have already "feasted on Nothing surprising in all this, since in heavenly delights

^{1&}quot; Whatever effect material food and drink have on the bodily life by way of sustenance, growth, repair, and enjoyment, this Sacrament brings about in the spiritual life."

the Eucharist we banquet on Christ glorified and filled to overflowing with heavenly delights, in reward for his Passion by which, when on earth, he was brought to death. Wherefore we are told that "to those who receive it Christ's body communicates its own gifts", (Petr. Pictav. Sentent, i. 5, c. 13. P. L. 211, 1253). A foretaste of heaven, therefore, and a relish of eternal things, and a thrill of divine life, are the effects which this heavenly Body by its very nature imparts to, and instils in the chosen souls of saints that receive communion with increasing purity. This is confirmed by the experience, frequent enough, of men and women fastened to the Cross of Christ. Thence do they derive solace in their life, thence comfort in their exile, thence energy in their good works, thence enjoyment of fraternal charity, from where they also quaff the Blood of Christ and eat his Flesh; that in them above all others is accomplished what St. Bernard's friend, Emald of Bonneval recommended: Setting aside the dread ofdeath, Christians should in the Holy Eucharist "feed upon and be refreshed by the joyful solemnities of their anticipated resurrection"; pascant et reficiant maturatae resurrectionis laetabunda solemnia. (Lib. de Card. Oper. Christi, c. 6. P. L. 189, 1646).

But should it happen that this holy delight, which yet is a sacramental effect of the Lord's table, be not vouchsafed to us, then let us be confounded, fearing lest perhaps a lack of mortification has been or is answerable for the fact that this Sacrament cannot exert in us its full inborn power and its varied efficacy. For whoever clings to earth loathes heaven; "and because (says St. Gregory) we refuse to relish interiorly the sweetness prepared for us, we love exteriorly our famished misery" [Hom. in Evang].

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Such, however, as have been favoured by the liberality of divine mercy and have tasted the heavenly gift, must also fear and tremble, mindful of the great vigilance it behoves them to exercise, lest 'man's last stale be made worse than his first'. For it is impossible for those who were once illuminated, have tasted also the heavenly gift, ___ and the powers of the

world to come, and are fallen away, to be renewed again to penance (Hebr. vi, 4-5). In other words, they cannot, after having once been fattened on the food of the perfect, be ever again found in the number of beginners. If they ever rise again, they cannot without stumbling run along the path of Christian life, unless they enter upon the self-same path from which they strayed. And the higher the plane on which they moved, the more difficult will it be for them, in the nature of things, to come back. Nevertheless the things that are impossible with men, are possible with God {Lk, xviii, 27}.

And thus for all of us, at the close of this instruction, there is a final warning of chaste and holy fear. For all, I say, who worship and receive the divine Sacrament; but how much more for its ministers and dispensers, of whatever age or rank or merit they may be before God and men. For there is no one who is not in need of that holy and wholesome watchfulness of the Saints, so highly prized by God that for the sake of keeping and safeguarding it God preferred (says St. Augustine) to allow the final impenitence of the reprobate, rather than, by shutting out all impenitence, to leave the gate open for a security which is the deadly foe of vigilance. us then conclude with the advice of St. Gregory the Great, that true apostolic Watchman: "It is certain (he says) that the Apostle Paul had already been caught up to the third heaven, he had been led into paradise and had heard secret words which it is not granted to men to utter; and yet he trembles, saying: I chastise my body, and bring it into subjection: lest perhaps, when I have preached to others, I myself should become a castaway. Here is a man who, brought into heaven, still fears; and there are those who will not fear while still dwelling on earth. Ponder well . . . and consider that a false security is wont to be the mother of carelessness. this life there must be no security for you, by which you may grow careless. For it is written: Blessed is the man that is always fearful {Prov. xxviii, 14). And again it is written: Serve ye the Lord with fear; and rejoice unto Him with trembling (Ps. ii, 11). Therefore in the little time of this present life,

trembling must needs keep hold of your mind, in view of the enjoyment of that security which later on is to gladden it forever. May God Almighty fill your soul with the grace of his Holy Spirit, and after the tears you shed daily in your prayer, may he bring you to joy everlasting ". Thus speaks that Apostolic Watchman, St. Gregory the Great iEpist. 7, 25, P. L. 77, 878-879).