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# MARRIAGE: ITS MEANING AND PURPOSES

JOHN C. FORD, S.J.

## Introduction

**D**URING the last few years Catholic theologians have devoted a considerable amount of attention to the doctrine of marriage. Books and articles have appeared in which the Church is invited to reconsider various phases of marriage. The relative importance of each phase and the tendency has been to emphasize the primacy of conjugal love, the sanctity of marriage or at least the sacramental nature of marriage commonly understood. In the true Catholic tradition, however, the emphasis was placed on the primary purpose of marriage, the procreation of the human community of life. In this sense, marriage is the primary means by which the human race is perpetuated. In the words of St. Thomas Aquinas, marriage is the primary means by which the human race is perpetuated.

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The *importance of this book* is vouched for by the assent of comment it has evoked. It is the work of a scholar who requires, but repays, careful study. Its subject matter is of such importance and its viewpoint so provocative that it is to the mind it will not be time wasted to deal at some length with it.

The present paper will be divided into three parts. The first part will give a brief summary of that part of Dr. Dorn's work in which he gives a "systematic exposition" of the theory of marriage and its relation to the ends of marriage. The second part will deal with many other things in Dr. Dorn's work besides this, but I am interested only in the theory of marriage and so will restrict myself to that subject. In the second part I shall attempt a "systematic exposition" of my own theory of marriage and its ends: and I am going to call it "traditional" theory of the ends of marriage because it is that for the most part it will be found to represent the common teaching of Catholic theologians during the last few centuries. From the placing of these two expositions side by side, the reader will be able perhaps to draw some conclusions.

ÜU, CXXXIV (1938), *ii* «.», review of Sinn a«J Zi 4 ' ' J? Z' ror :f. Er.ch Pr.- D.;, S.J., "Psycholog« oJer Th«>î<8« dec " (1917), 233 ff. t. O.G.. "ens et fin du n.arüs@. l.e" .. erieijje," *He. :e Té.-iû/e*, XLIV (1938), 7-7 ff; "The Imerpreurw « - . Ac: and r w Theolog- yf Marnage. Apr pas of Recznt 36, ;:î ' ' W. me nouvelle «'·-·bèse H âme du (1? 3; ■, 2A ff' A. M. ' I \* mariage état de uh liard L'ai"?ur ■: l'enfant les fins de manage—le 'ser. *ibid.*, \*\* ff. F LAt» "La vie commune dans " mariage XXVIII (19? 6-7), i. -' ff.; \*T - ...mr ;ie de rt-Âf, XXXIX <1. ??-»). 2V U. î 5- r.eië:: ' i?u S/βΔβ XIH 3je ff M-7 ūei livre récent/ Rnw LXVIT daprès S. Th.-'.a', ' Xr;w XLV r-cr.(;i: nr : \*c-î j ■- d \_ 'î-î... ' , 'Kecenc T' oL,;: \* l \ \ -M R. , j, Ji

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... tions as to what criticism I think should be made of Dr. Dorns' theory. But in order to indicate more directly the points of agreement and disagreement between the two theories, I shall divide this into a third part, which will be a criticism of certain points of Dr. Dorns' theory in the light of the traditional theory.

I. Dr. Dorns' Theory

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as the principal and primary purpose, not the child but the mutual formation and perfection of the partners in the natural order and above all in the supernatural order" (p. 105).

The above summary is too brief to do full justice to Dr. Durrant. But in it one can find the principal points which he singles out for criticism. The points which he singles out for criticism are these: (1) that marriage has an inherent meaning which is ready-made from its purposes; (2) that procreation should not be the primary end of marriage; (3) that the *Encyclical on Marriage* supports these views.

But before making the particular criticisms of the *Encyclical* I shall consider at length (in Part II) what I have to say about the traditional theory of marriage and its ends; for it is only in the light of such a positive exposition of the traditional marriage that these criticisms will be intelligible.

## II. THE THEORY OF THE ENDS OF MARRIAGE

I. *The Essential Meaning of Marriage*.—A search for the essential meaning of marriage, or an attempt to define its intrinsic content or immanent value, seems to me to be impossible. Perhaps those who dislike metaphysics shy of abstractions would prefer not to discuss it. I do not see how in a philosophical inquiry into marriage a thing the problem can be avoided. If you want to know the meaning of a thing or tell somebody what its intrinsic value is, you must begin by defining the thing, which means indicating what is essential in it. "The intrinsic value of a thing may be much more essential than its being" but it must at least include it. A thing may have an essential meaning and an accidental meaning, which is to say that it can have, and undoubtedly has, certain perfections and accidental perfections.

It may be, too, that the accidental perfections which are required for its *hence else*, may be so numerous that





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irrimige relation. Not that all the authors here cited say explicitly that the essence of marriage is all four of these things. In these four points, if explained as I am about to explain them, can be said to be at least implicit in the teaching of all of them. In other words I think my explanation reflects substantially the teaching of these theologians.<sup>4</sup>

These four points all amount to the same thing; they are different ways of speaking about the same reality. The four points, in other words, coincide. Payen sums up the common theme when he gives this fourfold definition of marriage: "It is the exclusive and perpetual union for the procreation of children; (2) the matrimonial bond: (3) the exclusive and

perpetual right, considered radically, to conjugal acts; perpetual and real relation.”<sup>5</sup> And he adds: "Rightly **jJ**. that is, taken for the essence of marriage in *hcL*; ■ four definitions come to the same thing."

It is readily understood that the ideas "marriage bond" "marriage union" coincide. Likewise the ideas "marriage bond" and "marriage right" coincide: for the principle which is the *forma!* element or bond  $\bowtie$   $\delta$  r. society com/sis in the *rights and duties of* the *rr.cr* Bonaventure says: "Illa autem conjunctio quie rs.ncst ' Cli;-/unccmn er o>t *matrimonium essentialiter non est a& jniirtorum vel approximatio corporum sed quoddam vises quod non perimitur sive corpore sive affects jj-entur.* ' 1 his obligatory bond is the *jus in corpus* wfud *zi-thors identity with the bond and with the union.*' And though we speak of *jus hi corpus* in die singular, it man worthwhile noting that the marriage bond or union co® of 3 SroliP or\* rights and corresponding obligations. 'IIIó' appear from what follows.

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in which: (or rather, since a right is as indefinable as the notions of justice, the following analytical explanation) represents the meaning of the authors, and corresponds with the common sense: "A right is a moral relation of preference by which a person prevails exclusively over a thing which is naturally destined to his good or utility."

Hi return to the ideas "moral" and "relation" shortly. In this case, as the conclusion and *raison d'etre* of this analysis of the action of a right, it should be noted that the ideas of "right" and "marriage relation" do coincide. As we have seen how they can coincide, and why theologians have considered marriage both a right and a relation, once it is shown that a right fundamentally is a relation. And in the case of the four ideas—marriage union, marriage bond, marriage right, and marriage relation—which centuries have been asserted to be the essence of marriage, henceforth we can speak of the marriage bond as the essence of marriage realizing that it is a bond *constituting of* and *constitutes* the relationship of man and wife, *constitutes* marriage itself. This is the bond which is realized in existence by the exchange of consent. This is what is therefore called *matrimonium in facto esse*: theologians and canonists in contradistinction to *matrimonium in iure*, or the exchange of consent (the celebration of marriage). And, of course, it is in the essence of marriage that we are principally interested.

As stated some pages back that in philosophizing about marriage it is necessary to keep in mind that marriage is an act of the moral order, not of the physical order. And now we must see the marriage relation which is the essence of marriage as a moral relation (because the essential marriage right is a moral relation). What does it mean to say that something is in the moral order of being and not in the physical?

u & i η to me that tho o a part of ontology wh.;' sufficiently cultivated. The phrases *in ordine physic*;<sup>111</sup> *metazh'.sico*, *in ordine entium rationis*, are explained d^roi iy em-uch, but the order of beings referred to as t.ties. or *intentional* entities, or *moral* entities, doe a'' ;: much attention. Those authors who hold the op>.nu?n causality of the sacraments is in the intentional order et? the nature of the intentional order of being when dealing? that question. Lercher, for instance, says:

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W ntn we say, therefore, that the essential marriage w.' thing that constitutes the essence of marriage, is a 'e V moraj order, the word i< rot :!<eJ as the iTP-htic f ■ ~ But tr refers *zo rhar really existing i-rder of being'* ivn called juridical or intentional or moral, to distimru s'l from the order of physical be?ne'. .And wherever d'-' l with *winch* metaphysicians may atten'·: i> r.ithom d' l ·

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 et )«FR.....lff.  
 Vs-ritt.· ·<■,· ◇ a', · -

\* such being, our common sense tells us that there are such things as jurisdiction, contracts, etc.; that they really exist as juridical entities, and that they are neither physical beings nor metaphysical beings (in the sense of speculative *entia rationis*).

The reality we call marriage exists, therefore, in this moral order of being.

Later on I shall answer the question whether this moral bond, existing in the juridical order, which is an essential thing in marriage, has an inherent value or meaning independently of its ends. The answer will be in the negative. And to prepare the way for that answer we must now consider what the relationship is that this essential bond has to the essential ends of marriage.

T *The Essential Ends of Marriage*.—The traditional theology of the Church names the three ends of marriage as procreation and education of offspring, remedy for concupiscence, mutual help?

Procreation and education of children are so obviously one of the purposes or ends of marriage that no one has ever doubted; moreover, what is meant by procreation as an end of marriage is perfectly clear: it means the normal union of man and woman with resultant conception and birth of a child.

It is not quite so clear what is meant by education of offspring. It is difficult to indicate just what is meant by education considered as an end of marriage. But immediately pervenit to the point

...ga- >" l ...-J n . ■-■>re about it here.  
L-tewis. , 'ie -en-.d. t l l '-cup:>v%.n-<. L-c been vs end, or  
=rp+\*.. of riaruags s n^e die t a.i. ■-■ c \* - mt, ni-art tnat  
I vn!igC ,lII-« ;:t extm^ ..tshinu J r — ■. . ii-? #qAlli: \*«xua

desire. But it means, first, that marriage is calculated in its legitimate scope to sexual desire; secondly, that inasmuch as it imposes the obligation of marital chastity it acts as a restraining influence on the partners in their dealings with one another and forbids all indulgence outside marriage; thirdly, that it directly forestalls inordination through the grace of sacrament; fourthly, that it ennobles the sexual act in the mind of the partners, because in it they make real for themselves the central fact of marriage, namely, that they belong to one another, that they have made a self-sacrificing sumende of their persons to one another, that they have given up to a large extent their individual lives in the interest of that communion which is marriage. As the ritual admonition says: "Begin your married life by the voluntary surrender of your individual lives in the interest at that wider horizon which you are to have in common. Henceforth you will belong entirely to each other; you will be one in

parenth^ p'irz nec 5^ 3nd this is true whether fherir.t.'

of DOt and > --v<< the

" "0" The <<"<<\*" -o-upiK.^ . tM. - -

«niugal fiddit' .T Ay-mVh. -Y " " \*". ' " " ' of de unity of

Mp" «pii "nri tO \* \* <<<< <>i 5!aE!

spouses that y ^-partnership which gives u'fr

~><<mic c,,XiT' . P^M l' Psychological, sexual, &ade

another. Only ciie °PP<<<e sexes can

the^p fields. compknient one another in

meant that m SaV £ 3t mutual help is an end of βi'\*

' | ||| as an institution^ is aimed at @te ■reci^nai

" Cut t



life-complecion of the sexes. Hence it includes the ideas of cohabitation, life in common, conjugal society, and conjugal svi. I believe that mutual help as an end of marriage can be explained in such wise that it turns out to be \*ery much like that cwo-in-oneship which Dr. Doms calh the meaning of marriage.

Now, although all these ideas are included unJu thv teini mutual help, it does not follow that all of them are v"er.ti.il to be considered as an end of marriage. We saw just nov. that it is difficult to indicate the essential content of "education" as an end of marriage. The same difficulty occurs :n trying to define Miat h essential in mutual help. I have nut seen the attempt made elsewhere, and will be satisfied mcteij by s.v. ng that it is something much more than the mere sex-reiatio.' m marriage, and that I am inclined to extend rather than to rv-tr ct c.u. concept. In other words, I am inclined tu believe U'at mutua-an ec-ertial end of marriage includes a larce arm c,nr.-  
 ■, < 'aricity of the coniugal acts that go to mak^ up the  
 ■\_:-T.:p .-r community of lift of the -spouses.

Vi:.- ugard to these three end- of marr.ane—and ill x. atn-  
 .δ «err « be agreed in enumeratinc t 'e-e three—t'f.crj aft  
 : t rportant points to be noted.

), ., they a-c not three entirely distinct ends, aitb.u-- v--  
 <pa'frcni f->r purpose, of inalysis. They are bound up  
 \*ogulie.- mb p.-; :-o-er.ap m man;- r>j'e^ts h r \* stance,  
 t's sane acts wii-ci'. i'rir.g aeeu; t;< r" cr. u -' fvi:  
 : η tue remedy of concupiscence. V t a .e-< 'i' 't...:  
 ■ -ri.ti.pj help is the fact that by it the partner form  
 i) iJicj.it. pr .:c:p v for tHc educati--n <'f the children Ucd  
 r'i' send them. Th.- a.:? wn:c' '■-- -ducr.:c ■-ct i ar.  
 t ■ -! vunul help. The sexual act. me- ' ■.'t' r-'t-

Kirtners are obliged to pertorm it. s -J' J~  
 ■ . - i- wih as a pr icreative act. And in ši Aher'  
 11-r ,r . i r piuk-de there is only a limited sense η f

it can be called procreative—it is principally an act of mutual help. It is a mistake, therefore, to take the division into three purposes too literally. The institution of marriage is all these ends together, and they are inextricably intertwined with one another.

Secondly, though marriage aims at all these ends, the actual realization of none of them is essential to any given marriage. This is obvious upon a moment's reflection. A marriage which produces no children is still a marriage. A marriage which is never sexually consummated is a real marriage. A marriage in which lust is not remedied, but reigns, is still a marriage in which there is no mutual help, no life together, no hatred instead of love, and complete separation, both physically and spiritually, remains a true marriage in the sense that the essential of marriage is still there; that is, the partners are still **fin** and in virtue of the essential marriage bond they are bound to one another.

Nevertheless, though the actual attainment of the three ends of marriage is not essential to any marriage, it is generally held that the three ends of marriage are essential to marriage, so that in the presence of things, marriage cannot exist without being ordered to the three ends. The partner, may, of course, have any other ends in view in making the contract. But marriage itself, the thing they consent to, cannot exist without being ordered to the three essential ends—procreancy and education of children, remedy for evil, and mutual help.

Now, what can it mean to say that the actual realization of the ends of marriage is essential to marriage, and yet all three ends are always in marriage.

^Cappel., D., fut  
 (Romae. I-:;), V, ... i Afc-A \*  
 P^n«. W. - JI; y,,. l a. V4 S»-.. .. l .  
 «l, n ... . I., SF.,u .. , . ,I ««¶  
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we look at the *institution* of marriage in general it is not  
 -i.j i-j ice how this is true. An end is a good to be produced.

.iisthution we call marriage, according to the intent of  
 sature and the intent of Almighty God, is aimed at producing  
 >> three ends, and does produce them in many cases. When in  
 i particular marriage the ends fail to be realized, this is *per*  
*tridens* as far as the institution of marriage is concerned.

But our difficulty is not solved merely by looking at the  
 institution of marriage. If the three ends are essential to mar-

then no individual marriage can exist without being

W uef<sup>o</sup>'A t0 these three ends. Otherwise it would not  
 K i marriage; something essential to it would be lacking. In  
 -wr *sense*, then, can we say that procreation is the essential  
 end of a marriage in which the partners are physically incapable  
 0l producing children? In what sense is mutual help an essen-

ena of a marriage in which the partners are separated from

Cotner completely and forever? Are these marriages, are

- c .Turrjgc bonds, objectively ordered to ends both unat-  
 l \* and jV *tact'j* unattainable?

' àri'wer is that in such cases (and in all cases) the mar-  
 ¼'v bind is ordered objectively to the ends of marriage simply  
 λ'."MIî , *trnculum obligatorium*-¼ to use St. Bonaventure's  
 •i,i.«.uc. That is, it is a bond consisting of rights and duties.

» 'iif a;<i duties regard the acts by utnch the ends

¼ .;'i>¼ un' 'raltz-.d. In a marriage in which for one reason

¼ -'cr¼ ¼< oi the ends all of them) is unattainable, it

¼ .-viiutns true that the marriage is *related* to that end, inas-

¼¼ ¼ tlx marr-age bond always consists in a right to the acts

-· a .ven ,s attainable. The act may be impossible to

or

¼.v.i- -Aiv-j 'he right to perform it—at least the radical

• e. u-t '.«nunon doctrine that all three ends are essential

'Je-ir.y i,Q imply that the marriage bond -consists in the

\*<ii o» Ku by which all three ends are attained, and

*that consequently even when the ends are unattainable there is still a sense in which they can be said to be essential to individual marriage.* I believe, therefore, *that the right to the sexual act, by which the procreation of children and renewal for concupiscence are attained, but a right to all the acts in which mutual help and a loving life in common are attained.*

But there are two points in connection with this that require further elucidation.

The first has to do with the propriety of calling procreation the end of an individual marriage in which, for example, partners, when they marry, are so old that they are certainly sterile. (The same difficulty occurs in other cases where the sexual act is certainly *not going to be fruitful*.) It has been objected with considerable cogency that there is very little in calling procreation the end of such a marriage, to solve the difficulty to say that procreation is still the end inasmuch as the marriage bond consists in a fruitful creative acts. The whole point is that the sexual acts of partners are not procreative. Nor is it satisfactory to treat their acts as *per se* procreative, and fail to actify them only *per accidens*. For if anything is clear it is that the acts of old persons, let us say, eighty years old, are by their nature unfruitful. It would take a miracle to make them otherwise. It seems to me to be an unrealistic use of words to say that they are sterile only *per accidens*, or that it is *per accidens* that such acts do not result in new life. Hence, that in cases where procreation is impossible there is a special sense in which the sexual act can be called procreative is, however, procreative in the sense that it is the type of organs whose biological purpose is to perform an act which is either procreative or in these persons is specifically procreative.

In other words, I am willing to admit that to call procreation an essential end of an individual marriage which turns out to be sterile is to use the word procreation in a very broad sense, and unless one understands the special meaning it has, one would be misled. However, Canon Law intimates clearly that the acts *in* which the marriage bond is essentially related need only be *in apta ad generationem*. And this merely means, according to the interpretation given it by canonists and theologians alike, that the sexual acts be normal ones, whether conception is physiologically possible or physically impossible. Hence the meaning that is intended by the law when it says that the purpose of marriage is procreation as an end of marriage can only be realized and satisfied in such a marriage. And it is abundantly clear that for most individual marriages the institution of marriage itself is not satisfied.

And point that needs further exposition is that the fundamental marriage bond or marriage exists in the acts by which the couple help each other to achieve why this point is especially important is that especially canonists, whether they are of the school of the essential object of marriage or of the school of the right to the marriage contract, also implies that the marriage contract is not very little about a right to the marriage. Some even go so far as to say that marriage is not a contract, but a sacrament, so that the right to the marriage contract would pertain only to the integrity of marriage. This is an erroneous interpretation of the meaning of marriage, and is of very little importance. It is this that is the right of the marriage contract, and is the right of the marriage contract.

that has led writers like Dr. Dorns to seek another syndie]. believe with Dr. Dorns that a true interpretation of Cri'd theology will give much more emphasis to the life-par:ne: of the spouses, which he calls their two-in-oneship. Bu: i not believe that in order to make this emphasis it is net.': to leave the traditional framework in which the doct'r.e oi ends of *marriage has for* centuries been proposed.

Elsewhere I have attempted to prove ar length that rii tial *ius it; corpus* of marriage includes the radical right i-i acts by which mutual help as an essential end of carriage realized without, however, trying to determine with the exact extent of those acts.<sup>16</sup> (But I believe them co -- e numerous and extensive.) I shall not repeat here that a'? mentation in full, but merely indicate the sources ironl wh it is drawn.

The principal argument is the one already indicated. mutual help is an essential end of marriage, there J@' the rights which constitute the marriage bond the radicl- ru to the acts by which this mutual help is realized, \* it is meaningless to say that mutual help is an e<sent:u ver of marriage in any sense. For what is that objective and a' tial ordination chat the marriage bond bears to its ends-' & t a *juridical* bond, an entity of the moral order, the oruaxat i> l be nothing else but the rights and obligations of t.r.e part regard to the realization of those ends. This ss true «X in general. Let us sav. for instance, that tnc essential e- \*| certain contract «t insurance xs to receive muem....? ■ accident. This is the same thing as saying that tru ' . . essentially consists in the right to receive and the oh ' pay the indemnity in case the accident napper--.

Another argument ;« derived from the tact that -f'- . " mutual help is essentially involved in the right - l . ' ' children that may result from the union. The argv"- . ; ' is this: Marriage is essentially ordered to the educ.cinn )■

^nng; mutual help (life in common) is *per se* necessary for this education; therefore the right and obligation to life in common is essential to marriage.

In addition to these arguments one can appeal to the Code itself (canons 1081 and 1082 taken in conjunction), to the classical definitions of marriage in Canon Law and theology; they do not mention *jus in corpus* explicitly but only the *intra vitae consuetudo*, and to many theologians, especially Palmieri, who makes it one of the fundamental points of analysis, that life in common is essential to marriage. Nowadays, of course, the whole trend of writers like Dr. Dorns and Professor von Hildebrand is to make much of

serve to confirm the position taken here:  
in appeal tellingly to this view of  
out to be married. It would be

, that the relation  
- man, ... to the marriage act is the other element of mutual love,  
the C other element of mutual love,  
love is, C V. 1027. A. 1. 1. U. b ei one inot<<>  
e. \$ . I (t secondary importance m w.irc. 'cc'oen-")

-bixil i "U i' : I z η>; iΔ< (b-Tolim. . - I : f■;-

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rightness of this view. I think it reasonable to suppose that when a husband and wife, immediately after giving their consent, are asked to join hands and make the following promise (as the Catholic Ritual in English speaking countries generally requires), they are assuming obligations that are just as essential to their new state of life as the right to sexual intercourse. The words of the Ritual read 'T, N.N., take thee, N.N., for my lawful wife, to have and to hold, from this day forward, for better for worse, for richer for poorer, in sickness and in health,

is justified: the right which constitutes marriage is a radical one to the acts by which all three essential ends are realized.

5. *Conjugal Love as an Essential of Marriage.*—Besides the essential bond and the essential ends in marriage there are also essential properties: unity and indissolubility. But since they

therefore, no further mention will be made of them.

π. α τ- Γλ. (>NV in marriage which is made

- monists? That is the element  
 T. < -P λ, of the present inquiry is to  
 > 1 i', and whether there is a true sense  
 a, rlags.

general definition:

,f f-xrShip \*.>!  
 r> . Wi-'l :-V

•h

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..1 ..\*

<v. "

communicate benefits to one another. And if we apply ideas to conjugal love we can attempt the following def.' hoping that its explanation will be its justification: Ct. love is the virtue by which man and wife wish to commua to one another the benefits proper to marriage. Each l deserves explanation.

Love. Love may be considered as a habit of the ð<iti of the rational appetite. The Jove spoken of here is i b the rational order, as befits a rational being. N··γ :-'s. natur.il acti\itics of the sensitive appetite' do not l.» rational beings, The exercise of sensitive appetite' r- beings is natural to them and in itself involves no >'< In fact, in tne case of conjugal love it would be a m s.:· condemn those natural instincts and that natural I sensitive order which play so important a parr -a ai: relations. The love oi man and wife, to be ci?rir.-t-') include not only a rational and not only a sensit.se " inclination to one another.'" And so in restricting rs.' c to the rational appetite it is not meant to imp:y tu: st-\* elements have no place in marriage. But these of thens- cannot be the essential thing in marriage for ratterb. « They are too fleeting and uncontrollable c<?) be ( f tr- :# 'A permanent union. And =uch love if taken alcre.e II the noble name of conjugal love at all. It is too muta · ti ■casual union of animals. Let us speak, therefore. '■' a v the rational order which nay or may not include » redt. in the sensitive appetite, and which to be T Γ- ought to include such a redundance.

Virtue: that a natural permanent d.'-r.'':- rational order, though, a> just explained, this d >> ncf t̄ l-

MT'e ir-irortj.-c. ;S' - . . d n. ■ ■.²■-.-. ; -z  
-".s.- P .-e hs.' hī. -i :. e :en: -  
- Ot Zii.er, Ngvj Micrinunii Jehn::jr" ??■«<: i, ' X {191:1. \*\* \*  
>f congruil lere ' f.· '■.-r..' ve.- :Hcc-rs ' '² ■'■ Tori: ' «  
Aa-:, I'Λ. c: t;<: j iir. jr.'. i l l i ~c . »-■. -  
i--c to ap 2r. jJea.' ir .npGstrbie ii Jtu ----'lf fo a  
peopk.

insitive and sexual appetites from the field of conjugal love, it is called a virtue, first, to distinguish it from mere acts of conjugal love, and secondly, because it is a natural virtue in the ordinary sense of that Word.<sup>26</sup>

«r. *Man and wife:* for it is a mutual love. It is a love of friendship primarily, although like every love it necessarily includes the element of concupiscence.<sup>27</sup> We say between man and wife because thus the subject of conjugal love is distinguished from other

cases of friendship.

l.-: *When to communicate benefits to one another,* for all love is a tendency to union. Real union is the effect of love. But love is not union; it is an affective union.' By the

cn. j,at onc ,cs,res to communicate a good thing to another, principally to another, nor to oneself—only to another person. This is the affective union Union. It means a tendency to be united. It is not a wish; it is a reality. It is not a wish; it is a reality. It is not a wish; it is a reality.

v. It is the nature of love to unite the beloved. But it seems to me that the union of love is not a union of the beloved with the lover, but a union of the lover with the beloved. It is not a union of the beloved with the lover, but a union of the lover with the beloved. It is not a union of the beloved with the lover, but a union of the lover with the beloved.

1.-: R o-w. A X . rP. .... r'c 9 S, «1. η .I» iv. Sa. «, TArc^, l->, q I- » » Λ i f .,t| r η Hl«4 #U -uh "4 #r- os axi y i< vtJc a)piri han.'S' r an x u r . . . \* @i- f\* . j. 2 .? 2: Z9 â i corp,, -o 2. » "p4. ' v l "Arnr r ,:τ-10Γ4 . . . ^ - r l r \* r - r- #»; rmt.âilâ ftOciifn.OuJ ur ^- r. # " - .

J)S

Theological SrcoiEs

Im m-uike, c.Kic a Christmas gilt which a wife raa^  
 ..us -1.^ .l η .<(Λ?.iriy an .act of conjugal love, even if  
 . a, xvùrd», conjugal iove must be dDt.;;  
 §.π uu,c, lu, v 7lut on!^ jn t]e persons loving anc i.¶  
 "is" l\> t.jv Tr.d or gooj or benefit which, ntreegr. bvc  
 ueatc u> give urie another. The fact that a man loves h  
 .l. «my way at all is undoubtedly a virtue, and .n an  
 sense can be c.ii.ed rhe virtue of conjugal love. Butlta^e  
 jugs! love to rite in something more, it refers to an i.nfū.  
 of conjugal benefits. I knee l spoke in the definition of i  
 fits prope.- to r-urriage."

W hat art- tnesc benefits (Jo h j) which conjugat 'ovu 3»  
 tinct from every orner kind of iove, wishes to communit  
 Tnev can oe norrnig else tiian the acts oi conjugii life; tcJ  
 the marriage act and the acts of mutual help. Tcsse ð  
 benefits marriage is calculated to produce (the ;'W-  
 i.enda) ; these are the ends tor which marriage wa- r.ti'-'.  
 Toe considering marriage in j<icin rise tne oriv a-"i ~!>.â." \*  
 meats are the bond, consisting of rights and ociiga--"3' :...  
 enus, to which the rights and obligations arc uirc.cec.  
 the conjugal love which is proper to marriage as J ...■ '   
 by t>e «·«./ ω onc ,nMka eii: t.e

X n ' hlve ..... ■■ I  
 - ri bün'f “ > --■-■ '   
 <d , eonwal benefit. η? elmim f  
 cOvfmenlu, ot  
 .« pertetm o the A  
 S r,r T eni ” bon“ . ω<< TM >> <<l,l \*  
 W«al love. But thst act of low i, cas. a,, ,!al.  
 re ourmd. The bond » there ,!lii; tilfv ,,n,, r  
 take it away from one another We ar. .'s,-.-"!  
 love which is proper to the s/ek of matrin'fn- .  
 this love can actuate itself only by- a communication '■

¶be ...a ē-vtut V.IJS  
 : ð , .njvr-ütrh -di çSâ; ' ■-L'  
 '■T.rats e,, #L; CS Wt rexe- r-ere-

rrJi-u 'de, which realize the ends for which the bond was  
l - tt-ric. rhe'C are the *bona producenda* of marriage.

'd.a: acts can be imagined which could more perfectly  
the purpose of love than these? In the marriage act there  
i u-uig union of the most intimate and comprehensive kind—  
'nron of body and mind, of sense and heart. When properly  
P iormed, it is an act not only of the rational love of benevo-  
ces-; "e and concupiscence, but also of sensitive and sexual love.  
aaÿ, - an act of self-surrender in which two become one flesh, one  
W- "Kipie of generation. Love desires union with the beloved  
" s ccjomunication of good. Can one discover a more appro-  
-ite act for the expression and fulfilment of love than rhe  
~3rruge act?"

Revise the acts < f nutuai help .-re by rreir eery nature  
'd to k mi d i-c. Id. n<t .'tempt to say tu-r wrat  
"5 are or ho~s π-.-iy t'. .n. but l am temored t. extend  
^J'trthan n :t tk . me.?... m in? will pr "'biv  
admitted cl it a r...-j > mcludes tr.e äct- ■? < h.-b tar.:::  
r:c aus by wi Λ. , ' > : vi-nerm.-p md rd-, educ;  
(“ rhe in d” ■ : r. ?v.-.' mem- ;i /'.a; ~z or  
"iners ,ivi- - < rk :? Td°J.. the 'e/t ir. rhe ot  
!înt.i| ! m a p-.-'-,- Ar- i ■ t-ie-e act-  
'ii, 'i t. . . - > j-t \_f t..T .) · li.e. ” h.cii  
'irs-;r.. - (iT.e.! and desires to bene-t t.e oelt”ic  
at ri.: <</'

|| · " ' ■ \* re are ic o : - ab'e ' be lefits prove  
\* ■ ) : sin :h- 1e's ui conjugal I'fe ar. ĉminer -  
r' ■ ' (ions oi c>rjugal love, I conclude that tro-  
l < i.l ■ wniih the virtue of conjugal love ot its  
\* l : nrij.iicatc. It is too evJe.u. pe-;?v^ "  
IK V P' . . . .ii-!.

..... ' . -rt = 7 "V' \*  
■ . ■! A: ... !! ,X. ,, . - a. \_u . . ' ■  
' . " :? j p ti ' ěre indo »Ul. ■ r i U - -'

This, then, is my attempt at a definition of the virtue of conjugal love. Understanding the term thus, I am ready to answer the question proposed: Is this virtue essential to marriage?

The answer, of course, must be in the negative. The virtue of conjugal love is not essential to marriage. In thousands of marriages we find no trace of it; yet they are real marriages. The actual virtue of conjugal love is no more essential to marriage than the acts of conjugal life themselves. Just as there can be true marriage where the acts of conjugal life are absent, so also there can be true marriage when the expression of which these *acts should be* the expression is absent. But, on the other hand, just as there can be no true marriage without the radical right and obligation to the acts of conjugal life, so also the radical right and obligation to the virtue of conjugal love is essential to marriage.

It is enough to consider these acts of conjugal life themselves to see that they must suppose the virtue of conjugal love if they are to be performed in a manner worthy of its dignity. Above, when trying to give the definition of conjugal love, I said that, supposing there is such a thing as conjugal love, I could find no more appropriate expression than that which the ends of marriage are realized. I can also argue the other way and say that in the supposition that there is a right and obligation to these acts, there must also be a right and obligation to practice them lovingly. In other words, these acts are not merely appropriate expressions of the virtue of conjugal love; they are necessarily expressions of love. They are expressions of love that one cannot imagine an obligation to practice them without presupposing that they be acts of the virtue of conjugal love.

I do not say that it is impossible for a man of good will to perform these acts without love. It is possible to perform a marriage act and the acts of long mutual affection, with inner reluctance, even without love. It is possible that it would not be in keeping with the nature of the act.

» nr ' id rational nature of man to say that he is obliged to these acts  
 f s ; except as proceeding from the virtue described. The acts of  
 married life are to be performed in a manner consonant with the  
 human dignity of the partners. They are not mere animal acts.  
 They are not merely the legal fulfillment of a contractual obli-  
 gation. They are such an intimate fusion of two human per-  
 sonalities and they connote such a complete surrender of person  
 to person that they cannot be conceived as really human acts  
 unless they are conceived as acts proceeding from the love of  
 friendship and benevolence defined above. And since marriage  
 is radically obligatory, so also it must make the  
 radical right and obligation to the virtue of con-  
 jugal life. «...in marriage.»<sup>32</sup>

But until a statement made by Father Zeiger in connection  
 with the *in fieri*. "Matrimonial consent differs greatly  
 from that of a contract by its object. A man and woman deliber-  
 ately surrender themselves to one another for a complete  
 and exclusive union of their whole life, an intimacy both bodily and  
 spiritual. Such a surrender, if  
 it cannot but oppose at least a certain  
 resistance; while the free consent to that sur-  
 render is the result of an internal love which is the  
 basis of the marriage."

Such a conception to marriage *in facto esse*  
 is the "right" and obligation to such  
 conjugal life involve cannot but sup-  
 port at least some virtue of conjugal  
 life. *in fieri*; for the true of marriage

*ht facto esse.* For the acts from which the argument is are the same in both cases.

One may conclude, incidentally, that there is a grain in the statement of the marriage reformers (as there is a *truth in every error*): Marital intercourse is immoral **A** has ceased. It is true in the sense that the acts of ωηι<> are not performed in a manner worthy of human J-'gr'F. they *proceed* from love.

But it is false in the concept it has of love: for th; rd-J *generally* mean instinctive sexual attraction, if not *principally* and *exclusively, at least essentially.* And their wnCe r'-

*something that man controls.* Ho falls into it are Will last.

The concept of love proposed here, on the contrary, *it does not deny the importance* of instinctive, pi";;... the. and .sexual factors, is a love of the rational etc;'. other factors may have been the occasion which gave C 'o',e. *and they* are certainly of immense help in *casemag* strengthening >t as far as the natural order is concerned- " w-'at is *essential to conjugal love* is voluntary. It \* And just as it is within *our* power to practice \* charity toward ail. *so it is possible for m.u. and* c --'■ l ag iries of passion and *sentiment, to practice* the ewviit' of *conjugal love.* *There is an Italian nronrb »F >|/' 'I-'amore non si comanda."* Mevcrhc'e-s, there ■■■' lz J'hich commands it: for the love of Cod is \*re".- , rsc commandmen*and* the second is 'H love cf "t"

Another consideration will help m establish Γ'' ... \* *ldical light and obligation to acts* of mutual heli? † Jfl marriage—*thi<* has already been proved. New. aithvcf ;nere may be rme doubt *rf* the extent of the concept 'W-' 'tefr.'" j-k..... l j .< .....





husband,' express not only a law of justice but j .π charity.'\*\*' The Encyclical also *deciars that this lo?e u of conjugal faith; it is demanded by conjugal faith: 1-.. jugal faith, of course, is essential to marriage.*

Ally argument then, proceeds from the common cari authors and the teaching of the Encyclical/ from which » I draw a *conclusion that not all theologians draw explicit the acts of mutual help* are essential to marriage and it *pertains to these acts* as an all-pervading property, then as is essential to marriage just as the acts are; that is to say radical *right to the acts essentially implies the radies: r;p< obligation* to the virtue of love. And therefore I beie - no satisfactory definition of marriage can be formed which not include *conjugal love.*

*Let the conclusion of this part of our study, then, λ t ' lowing essential definition of marriage. It must be uerre in the light of all that has gone before. The essevre wr> rs a moral bond between man and woman ubk'h cond c \* perpetual, evchtsiie right to one another'sfcrw ad'e l to the acts of conjugal life and love.*

HI. Criticism of Dr. Doms' Th & w .

If I were to go back now to the passages l have .-fcJ y Dr. Doms in the first part of *this essay*, and ge rhrc.O' i-' sentence by sentence, I *hare no doubt* that I could rn.' E'n' for comment and criticism in almost every line. Fee · \ be statements with *which Γ would agree, statements ' ■-- want to distinguish, statements I would consitier wmnr.\**

«ISIL. p° «<°  
;!"/t.·/, pr. fi- -1- \*' e  
f<»vç are j conSrznjsc.oc ni tSe ul °üyv J'  
etient.-aiZv diitrenc item whrt has bean propnas

riaje and c?

statements I could not understand—and the process would be endless. I shall not attempt it.

The criticism of these minutiae, in view of the apparent differences of our philosophic backgrounds (and also because of the difficulty of doing justice to a man's thought in translation), probably find us at cross purposes. It would be a waste *u lime*. And so, although I am tempted to make some remarks on what I consider to be Dr. Dorn's misconception of the notion of end in general, and of a certain haziness, as it appears to me, in the handling of other philosophical concepts, I shall be content to pass these matters over and restrict myself to some general points of criticism.

The first of these is the fundamental nature of the distinction between meaning and purpose as applied to marriage, which is not a contradiction to say that Dr. Dorn's whole theory or the relation between marriage and its end. In fact, of course, his whole theory is based on this distinction. It rests upon the conviction that without this distinction the theory itself collapses. It is hardly to be regretted that again the summary made by Dr. Dorn states that this distinction is the life-blood of his theory.

Dr. Dorn's opinion that the distinction, as applied to marriage, will stand up to philosophical scrutiny. Perhaps it is in other marriages—I would take it to be in the domain of marriage itself, as far as the meaning is concerned, that it is to be with its meaning.

If the analysis made above of the nature of marriage is correct, if marriage exists in the ontological order as a rational or juridical entity, constituted essentially by rights and duties; if these rights and duties are nothing more nor less than the rights and duties of performing all the conjugal acts by which alone the essential ends of marriage are realized. Then marriage is meaningful except in the light of its ends.

In other words: The essence of marriage is a moral bond; but

what that moral bond is, what inherent value it has, what *meaning is*, can only be discovered by looking at the three essential ends of marriage. The ends of marriage are its *telos*. Without them it is meaningless.

Dr. Doms might object that it is taking a very cautious way to identify marriage with the *juridical* bond that binds partners to *one another*. As he says; "The living content, reality of marriage is not identified with the exclusion of the other, nor with the usual juridical consequences of the contract, but is something much more living, concrete, and personal, for which the juridical guarantees serve essentially as a support." But it is not true that marriage is a legal bond in a literal sense. The only living things in marriage are the spouses and their living acts—the acts of conjugality. But the partners are not marriage. Their acts are not marriage. Marriage is something different from both. It has a moral bond (with its ends and *properties*) created by the consent of the partners. That is the one thing that is found in marriage and without which marriage cannot exist. It is those acts of conjugal life and love by which the partners form a community of life (two-in-oneness), and which, as the *remedy for concupiscence, are conjugal only because they are performed by persons linked together by such a bond*. Inasmuch as they are living acts in the physical order, they can be performed by unmarried persons. Their spiritual character is determined by the fact that they are performed by persons bound together by the bond of marriage. by persons, therefore, who have the right and obligation to fulfill them. Or, to consider them from the other side, they are *specifically conjugal because they are determined by the ends by which the essential ends of marriage are achieved*. Accordingly the marriage bond has meaning only in an objectively ordered context of these three ends.

Marriage: Its Meaning and Purpose,

' - D -> says: "Marriage > fr->t of al; H itself, a reality t-f ( st., -J n',vin-ng before burg 'or somcthg else' wmc h is i./ Ksd.fIf thi, means that mart age ;. a rv'.'.i: basing a .π-foundmeaning independentb, of its undo. the 'tateo-en; can->t st-ind. The ontological reality v.l ien o n'.trritge, '.,, th

In..! bond, has meaning only when -n-c h w, v/ru t\ "η %c "e tor which God created it. and towards r :vC' : ' .l 'ct.ei., --rdered. Look at the marrage bond .nce:'-'n.Ln'd. ■ - e>-Is. VVha' is it? What is it w<rJi? īnicrrm: >:.

>sgrrmp -t nn-iaaj rights and obligatu ns. It i' unis -al v. the sec what the object of these rights and ob .ga'i<> -s ll / T>r>:iee mean .n. thing. V ben yoa dreevef that tb.Λe : <r; -•i. bligation to a'li the acts -f corugai life and !>.v. b- .hi. ■><- \* ir'rra's n.c ache'-cd t"e' v 'u kn> ". t'i- .η v - n.a ' ge :rc. r : before

! ' " " " " — īit-| i c sc a.huh r-'t r-t:t ->.. Λ;o. net. Th. ηó ■: Tarrug '■'it', consule cd a, y-mt tiling !,ut' de of it. When w. 'a. Λ.λ the ends of marnage ar-| c^cent il tr it v e mein ci 'rv u-| ' y -- or it. N., řrr->ee in ! st \* i v: -'x-'c •X , < I,.... - ;\r t --crt.:'. \.i:iriii, f ' "i P ^Γ F i' vSSC'IG t > Π'ΓΓH'ed. ■ ;h? ends uf marriage go to make it up. \* is both c< rfu'-i-'c

lgggii|lgft3fl|3iM

' ' i : ' ř.η.: . § i: η ' T)' T'" "ns t.ierry ř that 'f v .'.i. ... : ;iΛ,-\_ -e er \ : 'maze. Is there \*■ -ch u. . m at-ept the tr:-: ' ' K t - is th. t 'neri eno 'nd the other s .! j- v- \Mrhc γ Γ -ns aür.-ts th:t Canon . i ;; j i , uii n ■ c pr.marv end, <t seems ' \* 1. i,- 'h\_., -,)rk ' - c n>al » -'lat prepositi »n. ■ r . -m. sAs in he race c' li' whole .. :rt "V would ' letter for



*the future to give up* the terms primary and secondary ends of marriage. I speak in a purely realistic and descriptive manner of the ends inherent in marriage, and of procreation, discussing both of these from the meaning of marriage."<sup>1</sup>

iv. The term primary and secondary ends of marriage has been accepted with practical unanimity for centuries past—the terms laid down in the carefully considered language of Canon Law; they are the terms employed by Pope in the solemn teaching of the *Casus Connubii*. In Vatican's teaching it seems to me improper for a theologian that we should "give up the terms primary and secondary ends of marriage or is this impropriety" avoided by the statement that Canon Law is "entirely justified" in calling procreation the primary end; for that statement has little meaning coming at the end of a systematic treatise written to show that procreation is *not* the primary end in any real sense, and that it is a mistake to call it that.<sup>13</sup>

But since I say that it is improper to reject the terms primary and secondary' (as being in a sense the official language of the Church) *it is* incumbent on me to show that the traditional language of the Code and of the Encyclical is justified.

In discussing the ends of marriage, I avoided as much as possible referring to procreation as the primary end. I spoke of the various ends of marriage, calling them all essential, showing, too, that they are inextricably bound up with another. The present inquiry is: What does it mean to call procreation the primary end of marriage, and is this terminology justified? And our question really names the mutual comparative importance of procreation and mutual adaptation, for all would agree, I believe, that the remedy for concupiscentia is of less importance than either of these, though bound up with both.

In the first place, to call procreation the primary end means that it is more essential than the other ends of marriage.

ir. ; I have shown sufficient/ that all three ends are essential to mar-  
par- -age in the present order; and there cannot be degrees of essen-  
@é- tfulness, though there can be degrees of importance. Nor does  
it mean that the other ends have value and meaning only in so  
uf" v « they are subordinated strictly to the primary end, i.e.,  
the insofar as they serve as a means of attaining the primary  
kv; cT It cannot be denied that this view underlay the thought  
' v Augustine and other theologians who wrote in the past.  
But theologians nowadays (and for a long time), in their  
■S! jtheoretical exposition of the ends of marriage, and especially in  
' § ' n.-.cth'sl teachings on the morality of the use of marriage,  
. .-.-"iplet.ciy with rhe idea that the secondary ends  
■' < .tord-JMte to the primary end in the vîn«c that they can  
J.. .n. ' be iu.-tided when they are a means to the irtainment of the  
de j primary end. The secondary end' and especially mutual help  
! ?th conjugal love are universally recognized as having inde-  
! "nc 'nt -zalue, and the subordination to the primary end which  
μ † ' 'u. ?d when the sexual act is exercised for other reasons is  
i- §. Av preservation of the physical integrity of the act. If  
: n. '-n-ige ,-ct itself is normal and natural, the supremacy of  
' ; I ti.iry end is sufficiently protected.  
■' d.-m ore, "primary end" does not mean that procreation  
■T I '9 uppermost in the intention of the contracting parties  
■ g 'ra.'v, or that they must choose it as the most important  
f> Purpose of their marriage. They need only mcent marna.ge  
:d.' l 't As j- ,7 jj s,jj'ecci<lj related ; three ends, and  
n. 'n-'ardv' s. r-e .kr.^e .'-be" to pr.wreat-on. | ncir inun-  
"ft'dd not be positively at variance with these ends, but they do  
' τ.: :? :i ry by t'j primary md or marriage when fej  
I ' § '3 τ» p-j irjve interference with the marriage act. They  
\*it not bound ordir.iril-., in. ■nC'.vjd't.'u cast'- l-> rea.-/- < †  
..... e-tt-aty end of mat- l Tn» ' 'hex ^3 .Γ.« :îîî τ. ·  
I : :■ rrm'. be sub r.'mai.d t-.. die pr.r.->-y c.iu h se  
l "'. η» 'h», sense that no pnrirv? nterference w?'-a the prim v

... (.. ) : \*  
"V. S. jte B...  
...KBSr  
...S&it  
WIM: A-...  
J. /CpBe

In what sense, then, is procreation called a primary purpose? In the first place, it is properly called so because, though not more essential than mutual help, it is more fundamental. That is, procreation and education of children implies and *includes mutual help to a certain extent*; mutual help does not necessarily imply procreation.

Secondly, to call procreation the primary end of marriage if we look at marriage as a natural and divine institution, for the intention of God procreation is an end of greater importance or greater value than mutual help. Perhaps it is rash to speculate on the comparative importance or pre-eminence in the mind of God. Dr. Dorn's seems to think we have no right to do so. On the other hand, it is not impossible to compare a natural institution like marriage, nature herself has given us a clue as to what is more fundamental, the personal purpose (mutual help) or the purpose that serves the species (procreation). Undoubtedly, procreation is of more importance to the species. It is of more importance to human society in general, and hence in natural law, both Civil and Canon. One can, therefore, find philosophical reasons call procreation primary (and more fundamental) by saying that since the good of nature is more important to nature than the good of man, procreation is a more important aim of marriage.

These intrinsic reasons amply justify the "primary end." It is not strange, therefore, that philosophers and theologians in the Scholastic tradition in practical unanimity called procreation the primary end. If we have this philosophical and traditional justification for the term, it is hard to find any good reason for the overemphasis which has been placed on the "primary end"; writers can be corrected without *giving* the term that has been consecrated by usage and tradition. If a false overemphasis is due to a misconception of the



!gk· that constitute the marriage bond and not to a misuse of the örd "primary."

The third general point on which I should like to offer a cnriom r-f Dr. Dorns is his use of a certain text from the *Casti*

l .■ I to support the thesis that community of life (two-in- onesh p . not procreation, is the primary thing in marriage.4

he Encyclical, after declaring that conjugal love should make tin partners aid one another to supernatural holiness of life,

•vs: "T ih mutual interior formation of the partners. •Jii-

l - k<rc f perfecting one another, can be said in a certain

<■ <. a- th.· Roññ/u'î Chzk. h. n/ teaches, to be the

r - t aid re.'>.n of mirriage :f only marriage is taken

a l -..It as an :->t.tuti.-n fur the proper procreation and

■ - i -: children. Put m a bruder sense i' a sharing, a com-

' j· · i ar. '-n ,·t 'u.r whole Lrc.'" Does the Encyclical here

ve .,p the traditional doctrine and terminology

- - c uc.pt a new primary end or primary meaning o; carriage?

T.ii ; unthinkable <\_f ctiur-e. Ir Inconceit able that a

J't a : ch 'las an epitome of the teaching of the past

neaat tn orrik suddenly from a doctrine and way of «pearûng

' ■ 'a: " .e.t'Kr-.ud l'". - many centuries ot trait.on.

It isincarc'."able that a d.oz^n year' · r h· after tne Coce had

i · · · >r.· .l -urtrn. try · f that traditi inard declared pro-

evvnti . 'F pr:'" ..'d. the Frc'.c'.ca- -hoid make in

i.-fiuu uew.T in rentra lier an of the C-ode. And wx whatever

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\_c · j · a hr.al. with 'it W.l! e>tabii»ncJ doctrine

' \* W .", £ : ,c pa<r

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R ir-i-?» acr η Å\_- r.-· ·; marner For in'tar.ce: Since

t; er"f->™ the ton..gal act destined by -t· aer.' nature tor tDe

begetting of children, if those who in exercising it deliberately frustrate its natural power and purpose sin against nature... And again: "For in matrimony as well as in the use of the matrimonial rights there are also secondary ends such as mutual love and the quieting of concupiscence» which husband and wife are not forbidden to consider so long as they are subordinated to the primary end in: in long as the intrinsic nature of the act is preserved."<sup>4</sup>

Furthermore, the passage referred to speaks in such guarded terms that it almost appears as if the writer wanted to assure that he would not be misunderstood, and would not be taken to be speaking about the essential ends of marriage. He says that there is a "certain" sense in which this interrelation can be called the primary cause and reason, that it is not marriage strictly so called, but marriage in a broader sense of the word that has this as its primary cause. Then, too, the Encyclical is speaking of the supernatural perfection of the partners, and it is not likely that this perfection would be set up as the primary purpose of marriage as an institution of nature. And when we speak of the primary and secondary ends of marriage we mean ends within the natural law.

It seems more likely that this passage of the Encyclical is directed to the motives or the contracting parties rather than to the objective which marriage is objectively and essentially related to. The interpretation given to it by Father Franz Hurthig's opinion perhaps has peculiar weight. And the Encyclical *Casti Connubii* strengthens this view; for in the section on the subject of marriage we find that the ends of marriage are not merely the objective *finis operis* of the institution, as the subjective motives or purposes for which the couple marry. This is not meant to deny, however, the objective nature of marriage so ably proposed by the Council.

<sup>4</sup> p. 559. p. 111.  
 Encyclical *Casti Connubii* (Romae, 1931), II, c. 11 P.

...emphasize mutual help as an objective end of marriage much more than some of our modern manualists. And in this my mind it gives a truer picture of marriage.

...to me, therefore, that though there is some doubt as to whether this passage of the Encyclical is to be understood, it cannot be taken as a denial of the traditional doctrine and terminology with regard to the primary and secondary ends of marriage.

My main criticism of Dr. Dorn's theory is this. His purpose in theorizing at all about the relation of marriage to its ends, and about their relative importance, is obviously to explain and safeguard certain values in marriage which he feels (as a theologian, especially as a pastor of souls actually engaged in the world) to be insufficiently protected in the traditional view.

...mention only the principal thing, he feels that the personalist theory in marriage, the two-in-oneness of the partners and all the other things which are tied not sufficiently accounted for or mentioned in the theory that holds procreation to be the primary

...my contention that in the traditional theory of marriage, if properly understood, and if it is properly proposed, there is ample room within its framework to

...Preserve and harmonize all these personalist values which Dr. Durrs is chiefly concerned to make here is no need to go outside that framework. to describe the distinction between meaning and purpose, and to describe the various proprieties in marriage to make clear the values which Dr. Durrs is chiefly concerned to make clear. ...that practical things he emphasizes and explains eloquently, such as the domestic life, the life of the family, the life of the partnership, the life of the community, their mutual supernatural life, and their mutual supernatural life synthesized within the traditional

"I am taken in this. Anyone who tries, to make a comprehensive and

intricate a subject as marriage in relation to its ends he?::" announce that he has achieved success and that there in more problems. I make no such announcement. I® believe that I can solve *all the* problems. Sut I hope that » I have written *will* contribute to an understanding of the ruf

Dr. Dorns has said: "I am well aware chat this me in for a good deal of opposition from some ... religion, even from theologians of certain scnoo;?. ^ . aware, of course, that what I have written a such «W-

just 7 ΓMI'; writ'n8s oi a frffcw priest. 'Γ believe tht i s U ^ r. "Dr.Dr " — chci ^ ' c&rbm e-C II, 1'2Xi from overemphasizing *then;* tiXX T8hw K do IWif:

things *whi-h'L^ZtrimS* C° *exp,ain ai fct® w* believe g° *to mate ap ^stri^e.* .-U Ooms ajîd *thoi* *World* *debt of* rr i- on the essent'-/ *Wnters Wi'° in m°dern times* 11 '1 **partnership** " " \*

«Position oΓ)ζη°XPη,7 " — " ' '»

-O' for the rMKns t

fairly the common Catholic teaching, and as sai'-o' matrimonial s alues which both Dr. Doms a:iu ? # 3 preserve. But whether I have succeeded in this *others to judge.*

# ST. THOMAS' THEORY OF OPERATION

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Working out St. Thomas' thought on habitual grace as  
intrinsic and co-operative, it was possible to avoid specu-  
lative difficulties by appealing to parallel passages which suffic-  
iently combined the analogies involved and the ideas employed. Un-  
fortunately, now that we have to deal with actual grace,  
the procedure can no longer be followed. St. Thomas,  
found the idea of the habit ready made, but he had to think out  
the analogy of nature that corresponds to it. And, if in this long labor he did not draw upon the  
resources of the Ambrose, Iliad, etc. - merely  
turns to his, d. p. 'd. it ic'. ' - :-'te'rr,r."s h;..'

marked procli t> -.xplu-t th.' " ' ;es  
neglected. Acco-.!i-c'v. A §.>■ r '3 ' -v Γ,if. "'y'  
-■iü',ht »i arru.iî c.'iv". ■; mu-t art. " '•'."e :...m...arity w,tn  
"historical and speculative background; in rrrricrhr we must  
fr.. re id..?; a i i p. -/-, 'ñ ide. . n c r.itur; ct ope. -  
it&n, premotion, appl . it l n. r-c ccre.t -gt r yr .':-ience, un-  
"«rsai instrument i'."», and the v'dcc- :>: rrc : on: we mu<  
&s> snow the dk' eh'n n. # ; ' , t^'. : " " tr. i;:, ' 't tre^..  
the various v.-v, i wh,, ' at l hi. ->■-  
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transcendence and, to som.. uAtent - -tion to'U^e-  
A'ent theories. Such questions naturally d' Ci. into two 'vu-  
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J # " l n-?t r.f.r s'x.Tcilly to the "r" ■-d to divine c- n-  
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\* »a: , m ff ljsc vi, of St. Tr.orni l-voçht »f coetH\*\*" ,n^  
■ l -■ k\_l( ii c>\*i; , rrr .1.\*îî- \*\*.<\*.  
1954