646

[Bk. VII

If, however, the prior custom was opposed to general law, which
was not completely abolished by that earlier customfor the reason that the custom that derogated from
it was not a universal, but a particular one—then it
is probable that a subsequent prescriptive custom, of ten years’ stand­
ing, is sufficient. The reason for this is that this prescriptive custom
is not of its essence opposed to the law, since the general law, to
which a return is made by this custom, always stands. In that case
the argument of Felinus stands [on Decretals, Bk. I, tit. 11, chap, viii,
no. 30].
I could not approve it, however, if the prior custom were universal,
and had completely annulled the universal law previously existing; for
When forty years in that case, I think that a canonical prescription of
are required.
forty years is necessary against such a custom, because
the subsequent custom is then completely contrary to the general
law established by the previous custom. For any other law more
ancient than either custom is as if it had not existed before the other
two, because it has been entirely abolished. Let this suffice for our
treatment of custom.
When the period of
ten years is suffi-

Felinus.

On Laws and God the Lawgiver

[The 'Title-Page of the Pdition of 1613]
A DEFENCE OF THE
CATHOLIC AND APOSTOLIC FAITH
IN REFUTATION OF THE ERRORS OF THE ANGLICAN SECT

Reply
To the Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance
and to the admonitory Preface of
His Most Serene Majesty James, King of England
By
Father FRANCISCO SUAREZ
with a

of Granada, Member of the Society of Jesus
Primary Professor of Sacred Theology at the celebrated Academy of Coimbra

Dedicated to Their Most Serene Majesties
the Catholic Kings and Princes of all Christendom

COIMBRA
By privileges of his Catholic Majesty

From the Press of DIOGO GOMEZ DE LOUREYRO

Printer for the Academy
In the Year of Our Lord 1613

[iü]

FOR THEIR MOST SERENE MAJESTIES
THOSE KINGS AND PRINCES WHO ARE THE CHILDREN AND
DEFENDERS OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH

Francisco Suarez of the Society of ftsus desires temporal
and eternal blessedness
His Most Serene Majesty James, King of Great Britain, in his
recently published work, has called upon the Catholic Kings and
Princes, as with a friendly trumpet blast, to share in his own religion,
that those whom the King of Kings has bought with His own blood
for the defence of the Church of Rome, and whom Christ, the Lord
of Lords, has armed with supreme power, might be incited, by the
counsel he has imparted, to attack that Church. His Most Serene
Majesty, however, has wielded his pen in a vain attempt. For the gates
of hell shall not prevail against the Church, nor shall the chill raging
of the north wind have power to scatter those who have taken their
stand upon the rock of Rome, and have been united by Christ, the
corner-stone, in the strongest of bonds, that of true piety. Would
that King James, following in the footsteps of his unvanquished
royal ancestors, might rather combine with you to exalt the majesty
of the Catholic Church, in such fashion as to be not inferior, in the
zeal of true piety, to those whose peer he is, in power and sovereignty!
Would that he preferred to be numbered among the kings whom
divine authority has constituted guardians of that Church, rather
than among those whom impious madness has inflamed against the
Lord, and against His Christ !
Therefore, since the King of England has published a work
testifying to his religion, and since he is waging war upon the Catholic
Church, not with the regal majesty adorning him, nor with the clash
and might of arms (whereunto the priest of Christ and religious cannot
[iv] oppose resistance), but rather by the sharp edge of his unaided human
talents and pen—I repeat, since this is the case—I have deemed it
proper to my office and purpose that I should advance to the line of
battle ; not with the intention of dimming the lustrous renown of so
great a king, an end which I am neither capable nor desirous of achiev­
ing, but in order that the mists exhaled from the fetid pools of the
Reformers, wherewith he attempts to obscure Catholic truth, mav
vanish into air and smoke, being dispelled by the rays of true wisdom.
That I might accomplish this purpose, I have with all my strength
besought that light from God, the Father of light, that knowledge of
the uncorrupted truth, which—handed down by Christ the Lord
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6ξο

The Judgment of the Censor

through His Apostles, and expounded by the wakeful toil of the Holy
Fathers—should be striven after by one who desires to keep to the
true path in his life and his beliefs. May my undertaking be granted
the favour of that Divine Spirit in Whose hands he the hearts of kings.
And do you—O Kings and Princes of the Catholic world, who in your
sincere affection earnestly desire that His Most Serene Majesty, King
James, should be even as you yourselves are—do you receive this work,
such as it is, under your patronage, to be defended by your authority.
For it is yours, and it is well said that, We make those things our own,
to which we impart our authority. Therefore, receive the work as your
own, that it may be made public, defended by the royal authority of
your patronage, adorned by [your] renown and secure from danger;
that it may make a brilliant entrance into the world ; that it may be
deemed not unworthy of kingly eyes. For only under the protection
of your name can wre oppose this book of ours, wherein we defend God’s
cause, to that of His Most Serene Majesty. I have, indeed, been
inspired by one sole design: the dedication, in dutiful humility, of
this product of my labours to you who—as heirs to the sovereignty and
piety of your forebears—have devoutly undertaken and unwaveringly
administer the guardianship of the Catholic Church. For others, our
work may serve as an antidote, but you yourselves, do not lack an
antidote (namely, supreme piety, divinely inspired) against the madness
of the Reformers ; for their poisons, drawn from Stygian streams, are
powerless to injure you, who—joined in the bond of divine virtue—
are protected as subjects in the unity of the true Catholic faith, under
Christ the Lord and His earthly Vicar, the Supreme Pontiff, even as
the noblest members of the body are subject to its head. And for so
long as your supreme power is firmly founded upon Him, may it grow
to a greater imperial glory and aid you toward eternal blessedness.
Coimbra,
On the thirteenth day of June,
In the year 1613.
[v]
THE JUDGMENT OF THE CENSOR, HIS MOST ILLUSTRIOUS LORDSHIP
D. AFONSO DE CASTELLO BRANCO, BISHOP OF COIMBRA,
COUNT OF ARGANIL, LORD OF COJA, ETC.,
MEMBER OF THE ROYAL COUNCIL OF HIS CATHOLIC MAJESTY

By commission of the most illustrious Bishop, D. Pedro de Castilho,
Viceroy of Portugal, and Supreme Inquisitor in matters of the faith,
I have read with the greatest care, and have studiously examined as
Censor, the Defence of the Catholic Faith in Refutation of the Errors of

The Judgment of the Censor

651

the Anglican Sect, with a Reply to the Apologie and Epistle to Christian
Princes of His Most Serene Majesty, James, King of England, published
by the illustrious Doctor, Francisco Suarez of the Society of Jesus.
Not only do all the contents of this work accord scrupulously with the
authority of Holy Writ, not only do they piously conform to Apostolic
traditions, not only are they in learned agreement with the Oecu­
menical Councils and the Decrees of the Popes, but, furthermore, the
wisdom of so great an author—drawn from the Holy Fathers rather
than from human study—shines forth afar from this book. So fre­
quently and appositely does this author with the most scrupulous
fidelity introduce their testimony, that they have all spoken through
his mouth (so I venture to affirm) and have combined to strengthen
this Defence, which is accordingly to be published with great benefit
to the Catholic Church and great profit to Christian doctrine. The
perusal of the work has recalled to my mind many admirable state­
ments made by the Church Fathers, statements which I had read long
before; and I also, most enjoyably, became acquainted with many
more. Would that the vision of the heretics, dulled as it is by the dark­
ness of perfidy, might be able to endure a fight so radiant. For they
would then easily laugh to scorn the unstable falsity of their own beliefs,
the foundations of which would be completely overthrown by a perusal
of the present work, as they would most clearly perceive. And if it
wrere permitted a Bishop who has attained to mature years in the
School of the theologians, one who has grown old among the books of
the Holy Fathers, to address personally His Serene Majesty the King
of England, I should proclaim in all truth that which was attested by
the Most August and Saintly Mary, his Mother, with her voice and
her blood. Credence should be accorded to Irenaeus, Dionysius,
Augustine, Jerome, and other Doctors of the Catholic Church, whose
opinion we offer as presented in this book and whose sanctity of
life is known to all ; rather than to Luther and Calvin, men whose evil
deeds cannot but give rise to shame and condemnation even on the
part of their own disciples (if the latter should read [the said book])
and whose capricious and inconsistent doctrine, alien to true religion,
sufficiently demonstrates their ignorance. I should advise submission
to Francisco Suarez—the devout disdainer of things temporal, and a
most vigorous defender of one sole piety and religion, whom I regard
(because of his rare wisdom, confirmed by so many tokens) as the
universal master of this age and a second Augustine; rather than sub­
mission to the Reformers of England, who, in order not to confess
that they have erred, cling with an obstinate disregard of consistency
to their errors and, led astray by the enticement of their desires, have
made shipwreck (in the words of Paul) concerning the faith. More­
over, I shall lay down the same declaration and admonition as did

■^1

652

The Judgment of the Censor

Augustine formerly, under similar circumstances : let not the Fathers,
Doctors of the Catholic Church, prevail, nor yet Luther and Calvin,
those impious deserters from the true faith; let not Suarez prevail,
the devout disciple of the Fathers, nor yet the Reformers, unhappy
shades of Luther and Calvin ! Rather let the victor be truth in her
purity, illuminated by the dissertations contained in this book, which
I deem so worthy to be printed and set before the eyes of all, for the
common advantage of the Catholic Church, that I furthermore con­
gratulate our age, and with good reason, on its possession of so great
a teacher; as I congratulate the Society of Jesus because of such a
disciple.
Given at Coimbra,
On the twelfth day of June,
In the year 1613.

N]
THE JUDGMENT OF THE CENSOR, HIS MOST ILLUSTRIOUS LORDSHIP,
D. FERNANDO MARTINZ DE MASCARENHAS,
BISHOP OF ALGARVE,
MEMBER OF THE ROYAL COUNCIL OF HIS CATHOLIC MAJESTY

Not only because of the letter regarding this matter which was
sent to me by the most illustrious D. Pedro de Castilho, Bishop and
Inquisitor General of all Portugal, but also because my own pleasure
inclined me to this course, I have attentively read in advance and care­
fully examined in my capacity as Censor the Defence written by that
most celebrated Doctor, Father Francisco Suarez, wherein with mar­
vellous skill he upholds the Catholic Faith and assails the errors of the
Anglican sect, making reply, moreover, to a certain Apology and Episde
of His Most Serene Majesty, James, King of England. In this Defence
I have assuredly1 come upon nothing that offends against the orthodox
Faith, but have, on the contrary, found much that defends that Faith.
For in my opinion, the work in question is another fateful shield, like
that which by divine command the Hebrew leader so felicitously
lifted up, in times gone past, towards the city of Hai. For thus indeed
it shall come to pass that the Anglican errors will be completely wiped
out by this Defence—as by the shield of Josue, lifted up on high in the
hands of so great a leader and member of the Society of Jesus towards
the armed forces of those errors, forces incited not by the King’s own
mind, which of its own natural bent is inclined to piety (inasmuch as
it was formerly trained by his most saintly and martyred mother),
1 [palne, in the Latin, is evidently a misprint for plane.—Tn ]

The Judgment of the Censor

653

but rather by the mad fury of the Reformers that has of late sounded
the war-trumpet in England, calling to Christian princes. And further­
more, it is to be hoped that His Most Serene Majesty, the King of
England himself—possessing as he does a keen mind and highly exalted
spirit—when he weighs all the content of this Defence in the balance
of his own reasoning and poises it on the scales of his judgment, when
he remarks at the very outset the submissiveness and modesty which
(as is proper) characterize the most learned Father Suarez throughout
the entire dispute with His Royal Majesty—it is to be hoped, I repeat
—that the King of England will then be divinely inspired to turn his
truly royal spirit towards saner counsels of the Mother Church ; imitat­
ing Clovis, indeed, that first, most Christian King of the Franks who,
when he was near death, crowned the Roman Pontiff himself with the
royal diadem, because he knew that the Pope was the only visible head
of the whole Church, and who after doing so gave the Kingdom of
Gaul as a pledge for the aid of, and in allegiance to, the Church of
Rome. For that Crown was allotted to the Confession of Saint Peter,
representing the kingdom. By this example of piety Clovis fortified
his own kingdom uncommonly wrell upon a stable foundation—that
is to say, upon the Rock and upon the successor of Peter ; and if his
deed is imitated by the King of England, the latter will imitate also
that most blessed end [attained by Clovis].
But I must return to the Judgment of the book. To the immense
benefit of the Christian Commonwealth, and from a fertile and fruitful
soil (as it were), this writer—pre-eminent in authority as in piety—has
brought forth many evidences of his own genius, which the whole
world reveres, admires, and cherishes. But, in very truth, the present
Defence contains his shining masterpiece in its choice wording, its
sublime thought, and its forceful arguments—abounding in efficacy
and vigour. Thus the entire book is compact of strength, vitality,
and inspiration. Admirable judgment is joined therein to erudition;
facility of composition to care; orderly arrangement to a wealth of
learning. In juxtaposition with memory, it reveals unwearying study;
with Scholastic theology, skilled knowledge of both canon and civil
law; with the genuine explanation of Sacred Scripture according to
the mind of the early Church Fathers,1 the free and somewhat cor­
rupt interpretations of the preachers ; and finally, in juxtaposition with
that more sublime science that relates to God, the separate divisions
in the chain of time and a manifold knowledge of the chronology of
the realm of Christendom. My Judgment of this book would grow
into an overwhelming eulogy, were that not precluded by the well1 [The Latin text reads: geminae iuxta antiquos patres Sacrae Scripturae explicationi (to the explana­
tion of both [Testaments of] the Holy Scriptures, &c.) ; but geminae would seem to be a misprint for
genuinae, in which case the correct translation is that given above.—Revisse.]

654

Fhe Judgment of the Censor

known modesty of the eminent Father Suarez, who is wont to regard
praises as darts, and encomiums as wounds, believing that eulogists
are enemies. There is reason, then, to offer our congratulations to
the Society of Jesus, as to a most excellent parent, on the fact that—
although many men who are very princes in piety, in learning, and in
probity of life have already streamed forth from that most holy Insti­
tute as from a Trojan horse—it furthermore possesses one man at the
present time, this exceedingly eminent Doctor, Father Suarez, who
hastens from battle to battle like some glorious warrior that he may
quiet the sudden insurrections of error, displaying an eager activity
that exceeds the allotted duties and the strength of the aged. Where­
fore I judge that this work, examined and approved by me, is most
worthy of pubheation, and destined to illuminate the dense shadows
of error.
Given at Faro,
On the sixth day of the month of December,
In the year of our Lord, 1612.
D. Fernando Martinz de Mascarenhas,
Bishop of Algarve.

[vii]

THE JUDGMENT OF THE CENSOR, HIS MOST ILLUSTRIOUS LORDSHIP,
D. MARTINHO AFONSO DE MELLO, BISHOP OF LAMEGO,
MEMBER OF THE ROYAL COUNCIL OF HIS CATHOLIC MAJESTY.

By commission of his most illustrious Lordship, the Inquisitor
General, I have carefully perused the Defence of the Catholic Faith in
Refutation of the Errors of the Anglican Sect, with a Reply to the Apologie
for the Oath of Allegiance and Epistle to Christian Princes of His Most
Serene Majesty, James, King of England. The said work was produced
by Francisco Suarez, that Doctor of surpassing wisdom and Primary
Professor of Sacred Theology at the Academy of Coimbra. This author,
so exceedingly famous for his burning zeal on behalf of the faith, this
most eminent theologian, who by the power of his wisdom lends strong
support to the Church of God, now sinking into ruin in England, has
engaged his pen in battle with the heretical pestilences raging in that
Kingdom. He strives against the errors of the heretics, taking his
stand upon an exposition of the Holy Scriptures, and the interpretation
thereof in the authentic sense that accords with the design of the divine
Author and with the text. In order to confirm the truths of the faith,
he adduces the decrees of the sacred General Councils and the Supreme

The Judgment of the Censor

655

Pontiffs ; for those who disobey the infallible authority of these decrees
have ever been regarded by faithful Christians as enemies of the Church.
He avails himself of the most apt, pertinent, and select testimony
afforded by the Holy Fathers, whose piety and wisdom the Church of
God has always esteemed and venerated. He so weighs all things
minutely upon the most irrefutable scales of reason, as to pass over
no point unconsidered and in silence ; but he treats with [a special]
clarity those questions which are extremely troublesome and delicate,
hastening to meet all difficulties of whatsoever origin, that the truth
may be made known. With firm and unshaken arguments he defends
the supernatural power of the Supreme Pontiff, showing that the
King, enmeshed in errors, has acted with the greatest injustice in
arrogating spiritual power to himself, and that the attribution to
him of that power by the heretics of the Anglican sect is manifestly
heretical. With discernment and wisdom he lays bare the errors
opposed to the faith which lurk in the oath exacted by the King of
England from the latter’s subjects; and he demonstrates that infidelity1
to Christ and His Church, as well as injustice towards the said subjects,
are contained in that oath, so that in the very act of swearing it
the subjects are compelled to deny the Catholic Faith. [Our author]
treats of this matter vigorously, but with truth and moderation. His
work is undoubtedly most learned, overflowing with rare piety and
erudition, and such that even one who excelled in the art of writing
would be unable to praise and extol it as it deserves. By means of the
authorities quoted, and by the force of the reasons presented, the
errors of the Anglican sect have been so refuted that the author’s
adversaries are left with no means of evasion, no opportunity for
reply, unless perchance that may be termed a reply which is but a
battle waged with empty words, and a display of abuse, such as is
customary among the demented and the furiously insane. May it
be God’s will that, once consideration has been accorded to this’most
efficacious and judicious defence of the faith (the faith which, con­
firmed by miracles and upheld by martyrdom, has persevered in the
Roman Catholic Church in one and the same form, ever since the first
days of its origin, under the instruction of the Apostles), His Most
Serene Majesty, King James of England himself, giving heed, as befits
his kingly mind, to the truth of Catholicism wrhich has been adequately
expounded to him, will attach himself and his Protestant subjects to
the Catholic Church, the Bride of Christ. It is my judgment that the
present work of this surpassingly wise Doctor, Francisco Suarez, is
most worthy of being printed and published, to the end that a signal
1 [The punctuation of the Latin text may seem to indicate that infidelitatem is in apposition with
errores, rather than one of the subjects of contineri ; but that text is not free from errors in the matter
of punctuation, and the Translator has not found it advisable to strain the sense merely in order to
account for the semicolon that intervenes between infidelitatem and imusliiiam.—Ta.]

Authorizations, &c.

656

victory may be achieved by our faith over the heretics, and for the
public and universal advantage of all Christendom.

Given at Lamego,
On the twenty-fourth day of November,
In the year 1612.
Martinho, Bishop of Lamego.
[viii]
AUTHORIZATION OF THE PROVINCIAL

I, Juan Alvares, Visitor and also Provincial of the Society of Jesus
in the Province of Portugal, in virtue of the power conferred upon
me by the Most Reverend Father Claudio Aquaviva, General of our
Society, do authorize the printing of this work regarding the Anglican
schism, a work which was composed by Father Francisco Suarez of
our Society, Doctor in Sacred Theology and Primary Professor at the
Academy of Coimbra, and which has been approved by the judgment
of grave and learned men of the said Society. In testimony whereof we
have given this writing, signed by our hand and confirmed by our seal.
Given at Coimbra, on the fifth day of April, in the year of our
Lord, 1612.
Juan Alvares.
AUTHORIZATION OF THE SUPREME SENATE
OF THE HOLY INQUISITION

We declare that this book opposing the English heresies may be
printed, in view of the reports which we have examined concerning
it; and that, after it has been printed, it shall be returned to this
Council for comparison as well as for permission to go into circulation,
without which permission it shall not circulate.
Given at Lisbon,
On the seventh day of January,
In the year of our Lord, 1613.

The Bishop

Elyas.
The Bishop of Nicomedia.
Bartholomeu da Fonseca.

of

THE LICENCE OF THE COURT BOARD

This book concerning the Anglican schism, composed by Father
Francisco Suarez, Primary Professor at the University of Coimbra,

Authorizations, tAc.

may be printed, in view of the Licence accorded it by the author’s
Superior and by the Council of the Holy Office; and after being
printed, the said work shall be returned to the Board for determination
of the price.
Given at Lisbon,
On the fifth day of February,
In the year of our Lord, 1613.

Luis Machado.

D. Barbosa.

AUTHORIZATION OF HIS MOST ILLUSTRIOUS LORDSHIP,
D. AFONSO DE CASTELLO BRANCO, BISHOP OF COIMBRA, ETC.

We grant to Father Francisco Suarez of the Society of Jesus,
permission to print his volume opposing the Anglican sect, a volume
destined to be universally beneficial.
Given at Coimbra,
On the fourteenth day of June, 1613.
The Bishop Count.
[ix]
THE CENSORS’ JUDGMENT OF THE ACADEMY OF
ALCALA DE HENARES

We have perused with all the diligence and care in our power,
this treatise dealing with the Anglican schism and comprising A Defence
of the Catholic [and Apostolic] Faith, in Refutation of the Errors of the
Anglican Sect, with a Reply to the work of His Most Serene Majesty,
James, King of England, as well as to his Dedicatory Epistle to the
Kings and Princes of Christendom ; a treatise produced by that most
authoritative Doctor, Francisco Suarez of the Society of Jesus, Pri­
mary Professor of Theology at the Academy of Coimbra, handed over
by the Supreme Senate [of the Holy Inquisition] for the judgment of
the Academy of Alcala de Henares, and committed by that same body
to our care and good faith. In this work there is discerned nothing
alien to the truth of the Catholic faith, nothing departing from or
discordant with that truth. On the contrary, the author has waged
such successful warfare upon the said Anglican schism and upon the
Reformers of our day, that he has won over them all a glorious victory ;
and truly the said work contains naught undeserving of approbation
and praise. For its pages radiate the author’s vigorous and active talent
in the revelation of heretical artifices andin the painstaking and diligent
exposition of the testimony proffered by Holy Writ, by the Sacred
1569.74

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658

Privilege of the King

Councils, and by the Holy Fathers, as well as of the records of all
antiquity; as they radiate, too, his marvellous dexterity in wielding
the weapons of argument. In fine, there is in the entire work nothing
repugnant to our undivided opinion, for on this point we are all of
one voice, one mind, and one view. Wherefore, if he who is responsible
for the said work orders it to be put into print with all possible speed,
he will be judged to have championed aright the cause, not of the
author, but of the whole Catholic and Apostolic Church; for [this
work] will greatly solace the adherents of the true faith, and will
confound those who have forsaken that faith.
Given at Alcala de Henares,
On the twelfth day of May in the year of our Lord, 1613.

D. D. Prospero Spinola Doria,
D. Enrique de Villegas
Rector [of the Academy]
D. Luis Montesinos
D. Andrés Pérez
D. Melquior Fernandez
D. D. Juan de Pereda y Gudiel
Bolivar
Maestro Fray Lorenzo Gutierre

de

M
PRIVILEGE OF THE KING

Whereas, We have been informed on your behalf that you, Fran­
cisco Suarez, Religious of the Society of Jesus, have printed in our
Kingdom of Portugal and with permission, a book entitled, A Defence
of the Catholic and Apostolic Faith, &c., destined to be of great utility
and benefit to the Christian Commonwealth;
Whereas, to the end that the work thus printed might be brought
to Our Kingdoms of Castile and sold therein, We have been asked and
supplicated to order that permission be granted you enabling you to
introduce the said book into these Our Kingdoms and to sell it there,
together with a privilege embracing a period of twenty years or of
such extent as We might be pleased to grant;
And whereas, the above requests have been considered by the
members of Our Council, and such measures have been taken by their
order as are provided for in the decree that We recently issued con­
cerning the printing of books,
It has been agreed that We should command this Our Order to be
drawn up for you in regard to the said matter ; an agreement which
has met with Our approval. And through this Order We bestow per­
mission and authority for the introduction of the aforementioned book
into Our Kingdoms, although it was printed in the Kingdom of Portu­
gal; as We furthermore permit and authorize that, for the period of

Privilege of the King

659

the next ten years (reckoned as beginning from the date of this Our
Order), the said book, having thus been introduced into Our King­
doms, may by you or by your duly authorized representative, and by
no other person whatsoever, be printed and sold in the original form
seen by Our Council, which original carries at its close the endorse­
ment and signature of Jeronimo Nùfiez de Leon, Secretary for the
Constituents of Our Supreme Council ; to which permission and au­
thority we affix the following provisions :
Prior to the sale, you shall bring the work before the said Constitu­
ents, together with that original, in order that the Council may see
whether or not the impression in question conforms with the original ;
or, you shall present a certificate in official form to the effect that the
Corrector appointed by Us has seen the said impression, which he has
collated and corrected on the basis of the original; and on the book
shall be placed the Corrector’s Censure together with this Our Order ;
And We furthermore command the Printer to omit the first part
of the first signature when he prints the said book; neither shall he
deliver more than one copy, together with the original, to the author
or the person at whose expense the printing is done or to any other
person whatsoever, for purposes of the above-mentioned correction
and the fixing of the price, until the said book has first been corrected,
and its price fixed, by the members of Our Council ; which having been
done and under no other conditions, it shall be permissible to print
the aforesaid book, with its beginning and first signature, whereon
there shall appear forthwith this Our Order and grant of privilege,
together with the statements of approval, the evaluation, and the list
of errata;
[These commands shall not be disobeyed,] on pain of falling under'
and incurring the penalties set forth in the above-mentioned decree
[on the printing of books] and in the laws of Our Kingdoms which
deal with this matter.
We furthermore order that, throughout the said period of time,
no person whatsoever shall print or sell the book without your permis­
sion, under penalty of forfeiting—by so printing it—all books, moulds,
and apparatus that he may possess, of whatsoever kind, and of incurring
a fine of fifty thousand maravedis, a third part of which fine shall go
to Our Supreme Council, another third to the Judge who passes the
sentence, and the remaining third to the person who makes the
accusation.
And as for the members of Our Council, the President and the
Criers of Our Courts, the Alcaldes and the Constables of Our Resi­
dence and Court City and Our Chanceries, all the Corregidors,
Officer[s] of Justice, Governors (of major or ordinary rank), and other
Judges and Justices whomsoever in all the cities, towms, and villages

66ο

Setting of the Price

within Our Kingdoms and domains—as for all these persons, let them
uphold in your behalf, and comply with, this Our Order, bestowed on
you by Our grace ; and let them in no wise go against nor act in de­
fiance of its form and content :
Given at San Lorenzo,
On the ninth day of the month of June,
In the year 1613.
I, THE KING.
(By command of the King our Sovereign. Jorge de Tobar.)
SETTING OF THE PRICE

I, Jeronimo Nûnez de Leon, Secretary of the Court of the King
our Sovereign, and Resident of his Council, certify that :
The members of the said Council, having given their permission
for the introduction into these kingdoms of the books composed by
Father Francisco Suarez of the Society of Jesus and entitled A Defence
of the [Catholic and Apostolic] Faith, &c., together with their permis­
sion for its free sale, and also a privilege for a period of ten years,
Have rated each signature of the said work at . . . maravedis ; and
Have ordered that the said work shall be sold according to that
evaluation, not at a higher price, and that this statement regarding
the price shall be placed at the beginning of each copy;
And in order that this matter may be made known, by command
of the said members of the Council and at the request of the afore­
mentioned Francisco Suarez, I give this certificate.
Madrid,
On the twenty-fourth day of the month of June,
In the year one thousand six hundred and thirteen.
Jeronimo Nûnez de Leon.

FRANCISCO SUAREZ

A DEFENCE OF THE CATHOLIC
AND APOSTOLIC FAITH
Of this treatise, only the following Chapters
are included in these Selections: Book III,
Chapters V and XXIII ; Book VI, Chapter IV

CONTENTS
Pege
Book

III. CONCERNING THE SUPREMACY AND POWER OF THE POPE
OVER TEMPORAL KINGS:

Chapter v: Do Christian Kings Possess Supreme Power in Civil, or Temporal
Affairs; and [, if so,] by what Right?
...... 667
Chapter xxiii: The Pope May Use Coercive Power against Kings, even to the
Point of Deposing Them from their Thrones, if there be a Valid Cause
. 685
Book

VI. CONCERNING THE OATH OF ALLEGIANCE EXACTED BY
THE KING OF ENGLAND....................................................................... 703

Chapter iv: Does the Third Part of the Oath [Exacted by King James] Contain
any Requirement in Excess of Civil Obedience and Contrary to Catholic
Doctrine ? .
.
... 70?

FRANCISCO SUAREZ

A DEFENCE OF THE CATHOLIC
AND APOSTOLIC FAITH
BOOK III
CONCERNING THE SUPREMACY AND POWER OF
THE POPE OXER TEMPORAL KINGS

CHAPTER V: DO CHRISTIAN KINGS POSSESS SUPREME POWER IN CIVIL,
OR TEMPORAL AFFAIRS; AND [, IF SO,] BY WHAT RIGHT?

’569.74

+Q

-

237

CHAPTER V
DO CHRISTIAN KINGS POSSESS SUPREME POWER IN CIVIL, OR
TEMPORAL AFFAIRS; AND [, IF SO,] BY WHAT RIGHT?

I. A given power may be called supreme, when it recognizes no
superior. For this word, ‘supreme’, connotes a denial of the existence
of any superior whom the other party—the one said to possess supreme
power—is bound to obey.
But it is understood that we are speaking of earthly, or human
superiors, inasmuch as we are not instituting a comparison with God.
For what human prince, if he were neither an atheist nor a madman,
would presume to withdraw himself from .divine authority, or even
to attempt such a withdrawal? This denial, then, is one which
excludes subjection to a human and mortal superior.
However, this denial may be interpreted in a number of different
ways. Consequently, in order that the title relating to this question
may be understood, and may be distinguished from other questions
which could be raised at this point, it is necessary to provide a clear
explanation of the manner and meaning of the said denial. For, first,
it is possible to deny in an absolute sense all subjection to any human
superior, whether in spiritual matters, or in civil ones. Secondly, it
is possible to deny subjection in these temporal and civil matters.
Moreover, even though the gravest disagreement exists between our­
selves and the King of England with respect to the former question
(since he desires to be subordinate to no earthly being, even in spiritual
matters, a desire which we regard as contrary to the faith and to
Christian obedience), nevertheless, we are not treating here of that
question; for we have not yet discussed spiritual power, and without
knowledge of this power, it is in no wise possible to arrive at an in­
telligible solution of the said question. Accordingly, we shall postpone
its discussion to the closing portion of this Book1; and, for the present,
we shall apply the term ‘supreme temporal power’ to that power which
is not subject to any other within the same order, or [sphere of]
subject-matter.
2. Furthermore, it is customary, in connexion with the question
under discussion, to distinguish two forms of subjection, namely,
Two forms of sub ^^reCt an<^ in<Krect·
jection: direct and
That subjection is called direct which is confined
of^ac^ ThenatUre w^bin t^ie object and bounds of this [civil] power
itself; and that is called indirect which is derived
solely from a striving towards an end that is nobler, and pertains to a
superior and more excellent authority. For true civil power in its
1 [Not included in these Selections.—Tr.]

668

A Defence of the Catholic and Apostolic Faith

[Bk. Ill

essence, serves directly no other end than the fit condition and temporal
felicity of a human commonwealth during this temporal life; and
consequently, such power itself is also called temporal. Thus civil
power is said to be supreme in its own order, when the ultimate
decision in that order and with respect to the end thereof is referred
to the said power, within its own sphere, that is to say, within the
whole community subject to it; so that all inferior magistrates possess­
ing power in such a community or in a part thereof, are dependent
upon such a supreme prince, whereas this supreme sovereign himself
is subject to no superior, in regard to the said purpose of civil govern­
ment. For temporal and civil felicity must of course be related to
spiritual and eternal felicity; and therefore, it may happen that the
very subject-matter of civil power will require, for the attainment of
a spiritual good, such direction and government as would not appear
to be demanded otherwise, by reasons of a purely civil nature. Under
such circumstances, even though the temporal prince and his power
may not be directly subject, in regard to his own acts, to any other
power within the same order and serving solely the same [civil] end,
nevertheless it may become necessary for this prince to be directed,
aided, or corrected in his ovn field of activity by a higher power that
governs men in relation to a more excellent and an eternal end. In that
case, the dependence in question is called indirect dependence, since
such a superior power is concerned with temporal affairs, not in them- 238
selves nor for their own sake, but (as it were) indirectly, and often on
account of some other factor.
3. So it is that this denial of subjection in temporal matters,
which is thought to be included in the prerogatives of supreme
temporal power, is further subdivided into two phases. For one may
either deny all subjection, whether direct or indirect, or else deny the
direct form only; and thus another twofold question arises. The first
[phase of the question] is this : is the power of a Christian king supreme
in the former sense; that is to say, does it neither directly nor indirectly
recognize any superior in civil and temporal matters? The second
[phase] is as follows : is such power supreme, in the latter sense, at
least ; that is, does it recognize no direct superior in temporal matters ?
So great is the difference between these two questions that the first
relates to the dogmas of the faith, and practically constitutes the crux
of the whole controversy between ourselves and the King of England;
while the second does not relate to the subject-matter of the faith,
nor is there any dissension between us on that point.
Nevertheless, the present discussion is not to be interpreted as
referring to the former phase of the question, nor is it to be interpreted
as referring to indirect subjection—or rather, exemption from such
subjection. For, if the matter is carefully considered, this discussion

Chap. V]

Do Kings have supreme Power in Civil Affairs?

turns about a question of spiritual power; inasmuch as such indirect
subjection can only be subjection to a spiritual power; or (and this is
the same thing), inasmuch as any conceivable power to which supreme
temporal power is indirectly subject, must be solely spiritual, as we
shall see in discussing that [form of power]. Therefore, we shall
postpone this question until we come to the said discussion.
The title, then, of the question in hand must be understood to
relate.. exclusively
to. that supreme
power which
does
Explanation of the
,
'
Γ
. r . , .
. .
sense in which the not directly recognize any superior within this same
question
question is
is [here] [temporal] order. For though, as I have said, there
interpreted.
is no dissension between the King and ourselves on
this point, nevertheless, in view of the fact that he frequently com­
plains, with regard to Catholics, that we deny the jurisdiction of
Christian princes and the obedience due to them, I have come to the
conclusion that this question should not be passed by in the present
context ; my purpose being to show clearly, by the solution of the said
question, that the royal power of Christian princes is preserved
unimpaired, according to Catholic doctrine, in all those respects in
which such power is consistent with natural law.
4. Therefore, certain Catholics, and especially certain jurists,
The first negative have held the opinion that within the Church of
opinion.
Christ not only spiritual, but also temporal govern­
ment is monarchical; that, consequently, in the whole Catholic Church
there exists but one supreme temporal prince, who holds, per se and
directly, supreme civil power over the entire Church; and that this
supreme prince is the Pope, by the institution of Christ. Whence
these authorities have drawn the further inference that no common­
wealth, and no king or emperor, possesses supreme power in temporal
matters; since there cannot be two supreme, heads within one and
the same order, and since therefore, if the Pope holds supreme tem­
poral power, directly and per se, it necessarily follows that there is no
supreme power in any other temporal prince, inasmuch as there will
be no other temporal prince who does not recognize a superior in
temporal matters.
Some persons even go so far as to add that all the rights of king­
doms and all powers of dominion were conferred upon Peter, as the
vicar of Christ, and that the Roman pontiff accordingly succeeds to
these rights, so that supreme civil power resides habitually (to use
their own expression) in the Pope alone, although he administers it Gloss.
through other rulers as the result of a tacit or express concession. This Innocent.
Hostiensis.
is the view expressed by the chief authorities among the early inter­ Giovanni
preters of Pontifical law: the Gloss, Innocent, Hostiensis, Giovanni d’Andrea.
Panormitanus.
d’Andrea, Panormitanus, Felinus, and Decio (on Decretals, Bk. II, tit. 1, Felinus.
chap, xiii; Bk. IV, tit. xvn, chaps, vii and xiii; Bk. I, tit. xxxin, Decio.

A Defence of the Catholic and Apostolic Faith

Bartolus.
Oldradus.
Castro.
St. Antoninus.
Alvaro Paez.
Augustinus of
Ancona.

2 Kings, v.

[BE III

chap, vi; Bk. Ill, tit. xxxiv), and others (on Decretum, Pt. I, dist. x,
chap, viii and Pt. I, dist. xcvi, chap. vi). Among the interpreters of
civil law, the following uphold the same opinion : Bartolus, Oldradus,
Paul de Castro, and others mentioned by Navarrus and Covarruvias
(who will be cited below). To these, may be added the names of
St. Antoninus {[Summa Theologica,] Pt. Ill, tit. xxn, chap, v, §§ 13
and 17), Alvaro Paez [, De Planctu Ecclesiae] and Augustinus [Trium­
phus] of Ancona [, Summa de Potestate Ecclesiastica] as well as manyother authorities referred to by those above cited.
5. They base their opinion, first, upon numerous decrees of the
The first basis
Popes, who apparently uphold this view; decrees to
which we shall refer below, in expounding the opinion
of the said pontiffs.
A second basis is found in usage, and in the various effects pointing
to the existence of the power in question. Examples of this sort are
the transference of empire from the Greeks to the Germans, the
institution of the mode of electing the emperor, the confirmation of
his election, and even, at times, his deposition, all of which are the 239
acts of a superior temporal power. Moreover, if the emperor is not
supreme, far less can the other rulers be supreme. Wherefore, kings
also have on certain occasions been deposed by the Popes.
A third basis for the same contention is the assumption—so that
the Scriptures, too, may be adduced in proof of the said contention—
that Christ possessed direct power, not only of a spiritual, but also of
a temporal nature. This argument rests, partly, on the fact that
He said : ‘All power is given to me in heaven and in earth’ [Matthew,
Chap, xxviii, v. 18]; partly, also, on the fact that He was the natural
Son of God {filius Dei naturalis}. Whence the authorities in question
infer that He committed both kinds of power alike to His vicar. For
in the first place, He Himself made no distinction, but laid upon Peter
the general injunction, ‘Feed my sheep’ [John, Chap, xxi, v. 17], and
this term ‘feeding’ embraces civil no less than spiritual government,
inasmuch as it is said of David (2 Kings, Chap, v [, v. 2]), ‘[.. .] the Lord
said to thee: Thou shalt feed my people Israel [. . .]’; and, in the
second place, such [a twofold commission] was expedient for the good
government of the Church, as well as for its peace and unity.
Consequently, a fourth argument, founded upon nature, is added,
as follows : in one body, there should be only one supreme head, from
which, as from a primary source, flow all vital actions, whether they
serve the body, or the spirit; and the Church is one mystic body, as
has already been explained ;* therefore, it requires one supreme governor
over both orders, and furthermore, both powers must reside in one
person, for if they reside in different persons, an infinite number of
1 [In Defensio Fidei Caihoiicae, Bk. I, chap, xvi, § i r, which is not included in these Selections.—Ta.]

Chap. V]

Do Kings have supreme Power in Civil Affairs?

671

dissensions and disputes will arise, of a character that can hardly be re­
solved by human diligence and reason, as actual experience has shown.
6. Nevertheless, we must assert that Christian kings do possess
The true opinion is supreme civil power within their own order and that
laid down.
they recognize no other person, within that same
temporal or civil order, as a direct superior upon whom they essentially
depend in the exercise of their own proper power. Whence it follows
that there exists within the Church no one supreme temporal prince
over that whole body, that is to say, over all the kingdoms of the
Church ; but that, on the contrary, there are as many princes as there
are kingdoms, or sovereign states.
This is the more widely accepted and approved opinion, among
Catholics, and we shall shortly refer to those [authorities who sup­
port it].
But the proof of the first part thereof depends upon the proof of
the latter part. For if there exists no one temporal head, the in­
ference necessarily drawn is that the many kings are all supreme, in
accordance with the proposition which we have already laid down;
since it is not our intention at this point to examine specifically the
question of whether this or that particular king is supreme, nor to
compare the various temporal princes one with another, inasmuch as
these are matters quite foreign to our present purpose.
7. It is for the same reason that we do not deal here with the
The emperor does question of whether or not the emperor1 is superior
not possess supreme jn jurisdiction over all Christian provinces and kingtnmnnral
·*
·*
tCIXiUUxcll
UxJ "infer
11*
f
over the Universal doms, being consequently the supreme monarch of
Church.
tiæ whole Church. For though this question might
be related to the latter part of our assertion, still, it bears scarcely any
relation at all to the explanation of the dogmas of the faith. Therefore,
we shall briefly assume that—whatever may be the opinion of Bartolus
and certain other jurists—the emperor does not possess such dominion,
or supreme temporal jurisdiction, over the whole Church; for he either
never has possessed it, or else, having once done so, has lost the greater
portion of it.
Indeed, the proposition that he never did possess this power is
very probably correct; inasmuch as he did not receive it in a super­
natural or an extraordinary manner from Christ the Lord, nor from
the Roman Pontiff, as will become evident, a fortiori, from what we
say below; neither did he acquire it by any human right, since at no
time, whether through election or through a just war, has a single
emperor subjected to his sway the w’hole world, or the whole Church.
For even granting that the early Christian emperors were lawful
princes over their entire domain, it still does not follow that they were
1 [i.e. The Holy Roman Emperor.—Tr.]

672
S. Prosper
Aquitanus.

Pope Leo I.

Major.
Cajetan.

Victoria.
Soto.

Bella rmine.

Covarruvias.

Navarrus.

Bertrandi.

A Defence of the Catholic and Apostolic Faith

[Bk. Ill

also supreme princes over all Christians, since there may have been
many Christian peoples outside of their territories and, as Prosper
Aquitanus {De Vocatione Omnium Gentium, Bk. II, chap, vi [chap,
xvi]) rightly said : ‘Christian grace is not content to be bounded by the
same limits as Rome; and it has subjected to the sceptre of the Cross
of Christ, many peoples whom Rome herself has not conquered with
her own arms.’ Thus we have also the words of Pope Leo I {Ser­
mones, i,1 Apostolorum), regarding Rome: ‘That thou might est govern
more widely by divine religion than by earthly domination.’ There is,
too, the additional argument that this Roman Empire was itself
divided into the Eastern and the Western Empires, and that, further­
more, the latter (which alone has remained Christian, the Eastern
Empire having been seized by the pagans), though it continues to
reside within one person in so far as [imperial] dignity is concerned,
has been divided with respect to jurisdiction among many princes and
kings. And of these, although some are subject to the emperor, many
are regarded as lawfully exempt by right of prescription (to which is 240
adjoined, at the same time, the consent of the peoples concerned),
or by a title acquired by just war.
Accordingly, we assume for the present that there are, in addition
to the emperor, many temporal kings entirely independent of his
jurisdiction, such, for example, as the kings of Spain, of France and
of England.
8. Therefore, only the assertion concerning the Supreme Pontiff
remains to be proved. For if he does not possess true dominion, in­
volving supreme temporal jurisdiction, over all the kingdoms of the
Church, it is not possible to conceive of any other person who holds
such a primacy, and consequently, there will be a number of kings
who are temporally supreme.
The proposition, then, that such temporal jurisdiction over the
whole Church is not possessed by the Pope, has been supported, among
the theologians, by the following persons, in particular: Major (on
the Sentences, Bk. IV, dist. xxiv, qu. 3), Cajetan {Opuscula, Tom. I,
tract, ii, chap, iii [chap, iv] and on II.-II, qu. 43, art. 8), Victoria,
in his Relectiones [De Indis, Sect. II, no. 3; De Potestate Ecclesiae,
no. 2], Soto {De lustitia et lure, Bk. IV, chap, ii [Bk. IV, qu. iv, art. 2])
and Bellarmine {De Potestate Pontificis, Bk. V, chaps, i et seq.), who
refers to various other persons as holding the same opinion. And as
for the jurists, this proposition is upheld by Covarruvias (on rule
Peccatum, Pt. II, § 9, no. 7), by Navarrus (at great length on Decretals,
Bk. II, tit. I, chap, xiii, notab. 3, and when citing several others,
no. 41), and by Petrus Bertrandi (tract. De Origine et Usu lurisdictionis,
Qu. 3). Furthermore—and this is most important—from the very
1 [Sermon LXXXII, In Natali Apostolorum Petri et Pauli in Migne, PJL liv, col. 423.—Reviser.]

Chap. V]

Do Kings have supreme Power in Civil Affairs?

673

Popes themselves we obtain in many passages a simple admission of
this same truth.
9. Accordingly, the truth of the assertion in question should be
The truth of this Provec^ ^rst °f aU, on the basis of their laws.
assertion is proved
For Pope Nicholas {Decretum, Pt. II, causa xxxm,
the^oi»sthOrity °f qu· can' v0 wrote to Archbishop Albinus as follows :
‘The holy Church of God has no sword save a spiritual
sword.’ But the word ‘sword’, in canon law, customarily denotes
temporal power. And therefore, this statement should be interpreted
particularly as referring to the direct power and the jurisdiction which
the holy Church possesses, of itself and (so to speak) by its intrinsic
nature. For, within their own territory, it is possible for the Church,
or the Ecclesiastical Prelate, to possess a temporal sword under another,
additional title, as the Pope, for example, possesses it within his own
proper domain. Furthermore, this same Nicholas in a letter to the
Emperor Michael (contained in Decretum, Pt. I, dist. x, can. viii,
and Pt. I, dist. xxxm [dist. xcvi, can. vi]) declared: ‘The emperor
has not appropriated papal rights, nor has the Pope usurped the title
of emperor, inasmuch as Christ has so separated the functions of the
two powers into the respective acts and dignities proper to each,’ &c.
Pope Gelasius lays down the same doctrine for us, when he writes
{Letters, x [viii], Ίο the Emperor Anastasius) that ‘there are two
[forces] by which the world is chiefly governed: the sacred authority
of the Popes, and kingly power’. Again, Pope Gregory I (Bk. II,
indict, xi, letter 61 or chap, c [letter Ixv in Migne, Patrologia Latina,
Vol. Ixxvii, col. 662]) addressed these words to the Emperor Mauritius:
‘To this end has power over all men been granted to the piety of my
lords, namely, in order that the earthly kingdom should serve the
kingdom of heaven.’ Pope John I, also, in a letter to Justinian (con­
tained in the Code, I. i.1 8) recognizes the supreme princely authority
and royal power of that ruler.
10. Furthermore, Innocent III clearly holds (in Decretals, Bk. II,
tit. i, chap, xiii) that the King of the French possesses a supreme
temporal jurisdiction which the Pope does not wish to unsettle or
diminish; so that he adds: ‘For we do not purpose to pass judgment
concerning the fief, a matter which it is for the king {ipsum) to judge’,
clearly meaning that this judgment does not pertain to himself [as
Pope]—not, at least, in a direct sense—a point which is rightly noted
by the Gloss and by Innocent himself. The latter provides a fuller
explanation when he adds: ‘Save, perhaps, in the case of derogation
by common law through a special privilege or through custom.’ For
in making this exception, Innocent clearly declares that no derogation
1 [The Latin text gives this title of the Code as De Sacra Trinitate. It should read De Summa Trini­
tate.—Tr.]
1569.74

4R

Pope Nicholas.
Decretum.

Decretum.

Pope Ge Iasius.

Pope
Gregon’ I.

Innocent HL

Innocent.

674

A Defence of the Catholic and Apostolic Faith

[BE III

from kingly rights is effected by divine law. Moreover, this same
Pontiff expressly says {Decretals, Bk. IV, tit. xvn, chap, xiii) of the
French King that this ruler recognizes no superior in temporal affairs;
and with respect to the Apostolic See, he observes : ‘Within the patri­
mony of Saint Peter, [the Pope] may order [all things] freely (that is
to say, directly and absolutely), for within this territory, he not only
exercises the authority of the Supreme Pontiff, but also wields the
power of a sovereign prince (that is to say, a temporal sovereign)’,
clearly meaning that, within other realms, he may not order temporal
matters thus freely. In like manner, Innocent admits {Decretals, Bk. I,
tit. xxxin, chap, vi) that the emperor ‘is supreme in temporal matters,
within his own domain,’1 and says of the royal power that ‘in carnal
matters, it is supreme.’1 Again (in Decretals, Bk. IV, tit. xvn, chap, vii)
Alexander III makes the express assertion that it is for the king, not
for the Church, to pass judgment regarding temporal possessions; and
he refers specifically to the King of England.
It is, then, sufficiently evident that the Roman Pontiffs themselves
have never assumed power of the sort in question. This point will be
brought out more fully by our later remarks.
11. The second and principal proof that the conclusion2 in question
, is true consists in the fact that no just title can be
The same conclu.
,,
1 · i_
1
τ»
-t
1·
sion finds addi- assigned by which the rope properly possesses direct
tionai support in jurisdictional dominion in temporal matters overall the
kingdoms of the Church, so that, consequently, he
does not possess such jurisdiction, since it cannot be acquired without
a just title.
The assumption that no just title can be assigned may be proved
as follows : such a title would be based either upon positive divine law,
or else upon human law, since it is evident from what has already been 241
said that this title cannot be based directly upon natural law; for we
have demonstrated that only a perfect human community incor­
porated politically in one unified state, is endowed directly by natural
law with supreme temporal jurisdiction over itself; whereas the con­
gregation of the Church—though it is the single spiritual, or mystic
body of Christ, and possesses in this spiritual sense a unity in faith,
in baptism, and in its head—nevertheless is not unified after the manner
of a single political congregation ; rather does it contain various king­
doms and commonwealths not possessed of any political unity binding
them one with another; therefore, by the force of natural law, there
exists within the whole community of the Church no one immediate
1 [This quotation, as given by Suarez, varies slightly from the text of the Décrétais—Tr.]
2 [i.e. the conclusion that the Pope lacks supreme temporal power, with the corollary that no
prince is temporally supreme over the whole Church. (Vide the first paragraph of Sect. 8 above.)
The first proof of this contention was drawn from the papal decrees themselves. (Vide the first
sentence of Sect. 9.)—Tr.]

Chap. V]

Do Kings have supreme Power in Civil Affairs?

675

and supreme jurisdiction of a temporal and universal nature, extending
over the Church as a whole; for, on the contrary, there are as many
supreme temporal jurisdictions as there are separate political com­
munities which do not form part of one unified political kingdom or
commonwealth.
12. Whence we draw the equally evident conclusion that the
said power does not exist in any ecclesiastical prince, by any human
_
.
title through which this natural power might have
does not pertain to been transferred to such a prince.
iawPop€ by human
For that title would consist in one of several
alternatives. It might be a title by election and by
the consent of the people; an alternative which (as is self-evident)
cannot be applied to the case under discussion, since it has never come
to pass that all Christian peoples have of their own volition and by
their own consent, subjected themselves to one man as their supreme
temporal prince. Or, it might be a title by just war; and this alter­
native, too, is clearly inapplicable in the case of an ecclesiastical prince.
Again, it might be a title by lawful succession; another hypothesis
which is untenable in the present instance, if we take our stand strictly
upon human law. For it presupposes the existence of a legitimate title
and dominion in the predecessor, so that, tracing it back in this fashion,
we must necessarily come to some person w’ho acquired such dominion
independently of succession, by some other and earlier human title,
one which must consist either in the consent of peoples, or else in a
war that was just from the beginning, or was made just by the tacit
consent of the subject persons, extending throughout the lawfully
required period of time; but none of these suppositions is tenable
in the case of any Pope, of whatsoever period or past age. Or finally,
the title in question might be founded upon some grant made by
human agency; and this hypothesis may be answered with very'
nearly the same reasoning as that applied to the hypothesis of title
by succession. For no one can give that which he does not himself
possess; and no prince, even of a temporal sort, has ever possessed
supreme temporal jurisdiction directly over all Christian provinces and
kingdoms (a point on which I have touched, above) ; therefore, there
is no person who can have made such a grant to the Church, nor to
the Pope.
13. All these observations are, properly speaking, confirmed by
the canon laws which declare that the Pope possesses a legitimate
right to, and temporal dominion over the kingdom of Rome—or, as it
is called, the patrimony of St. Peter—through a grant made by the
Emperor Constantine, as is evident from various passages in the canon
law {Decretum, Pt. I, dist. xevi, canons xiii and xiv; Sext. Bk. I, tit. vi,
chap, xvii and Decretum, Pt. II, causa xn, qu. i, can. xv). For these Deaoum.

6~6

Maukew,-xvi.

A Defence of the Catholic and Apostolic Faith

[Bk. Ill

passages clearly point to the conclusion that the Pope possesses
direct temporal jurisdiction only over the kingdom and the states
pertaining to the patrimony of Peter; a patrimony under which we
include all temporal dominion now held by the Pope, whether the
whole patrimony was granted by Constantine, or whether it originated
with him and was subsequently increased by other kings and princes.
14. The title based upon positive divine law is yet to be men­
tioned, a title which could have originated only through the gift of
Christ the Lord, and which could have persisted only through legitiThe same point is mate succession. But no such gift was ever bestowed
proved in connex- by Christ the Lord; consequently, there can be no
ion with divme law. iegitimate succession with regard to such temporal
jurisdiction; and therefore, jurisdiction of the kind in question does
not pertain to the Pope by this title. Moreover, the contention that
Christ did not bestow the said jurisdiction upon the Church is proved,
first, by the fact that, if He had granted it to any one, He would most
surely have granted it to Peter (as I assume, for the present, on the
basis of certain statements to be made below, regarding the primacy
of the Roman Pontiff); but the inference that Christ did not endow
Peter with that jurisdiction is indicated clearly enough by a passage
in Matthew (Chap, xvi [, v. 19]), wherein, to the words,
whatso­
ever thou shalt bind [. . . ,]’ and, ‘whatsoever thou shalt loose [...
Christ prefixes the promise : ‘[. . . ] I will give to thee the keys of the
kingdom of heaven [. . .]’. Therefore, Christ did not promise to Peter
the keys of the earthly kingdom ; and accordingly, it was spiritual power,
not direct temporal dominion or jurisdiction, that He promised.
Consequently, the words which Christ straightway adds, ‘[. . .] what­
soever thou shalt bind [. . . ,]’ and, ‘whatsoever thou shalt loose
should undoubtedly be interpreted in relation to the power which 242
He had promised under the name of the keys. Similarly, the saying,
‘Feed my sheep’, should be interpreted in relation to that same
power, for in these words Christ fulfilled the promise previously made.
Nor is there any other passage in which Christ has indicated that He
gave temporal dominion, or a kingdom in the literal sense of the word,
directly to Peter or to His Church. Nor, indeed, does ecclesiastical
tradition indicate that He did so; rather, it supports the opposite
view, as we have seen. Consequently, we cannot know through any
supernatural channel of the possession of such direct, temporal juris­
diction by the Pope. And therefore, the attribution of this juris­
diction to him is unfounded, inasmuch as he cannot possess it save in
some supernatural manner.
15. The most acceptable supposition, then, is as follows: Christ
Himself, in His humanity, did not take for Himself an earthly or
temporal kingdom with direct, temporal dominion and jurisdiction,

Chap. V]

Do Kings have supreme Power in Civil Affairs?

677

such as the emperor or other human princes possess, so that, con­
sequently, He did not bestow that jurisdiction upon His earthly vicar.
We base the antecedent [partly] upon what we have already said
in Pt. hi of Tom. I, On the Kingdom of Christ* and partly upon a brief
demonstration of its truth, given here, and drawn from the Scriptural
comments on the poverty of Christ the Lord. Take, for example, that
passage in 2 Corinthians (Chap, viii [, v. 9]): ‘[. . .] you know the grace
of our Lord Jesus Christ, that being rich he became poor, for your
sakes; that through his poverty you might be rich.’ Accordingly,
Pope John, when he declares {Extravagantes loannis XXII, Tit. xiv,
chap, iv) that Christ, despite His poverty, did have dominion over
some few articles of ordinary use, obviously assumes that He did not
take for himself dominion over kingdoms, nor over those other posses­
sions whose ownership constitutes human wealth. Moreover, the same
meaning was contained in the words of Christ Himself {Matthew,
Chap, viii [, v. 20] and Luke, Chap, ix [, v. 58]) : ‘[. . .] the son of man
hath not where to lay his head.’ Again, He spoke {Luke, Chap, xii
[, w. 13, 14]) with the same meaning of temporal jurisdiction, when
to the one petitioning Him, ‘[. . .] speak to my brother that he divide
the inheritance with me’, He replied : ‘[. . .] Man, who hath appointed
me judge, or divider, over you ?’—as if to say that He had not assumed
these judicial functions nor had He come into the world to exercise
temporal jurisdiction; even as Ambrose, Theophylact and Euthymius
have correctly observed.
16. Moreover, our Lord Himself has confirmed this [interpreta­
tion], saying {John, Chap, xviii [, v. 36]): ‘[. . .] My kingdom is
not of this world’, meaning that it was not temporal and earthly, as
was the kingdom of Caesar. So this passage is expounded by Cyril
(on John, Bk. XII, chaps, x et seq,), by Chrysostom {Commentary on
John, Homily LXXXII), and most excellently, by Augustine who says
([Ολ the Gospel of John,\ Tract. CXV [, § 2]): ‘Hear ye, all ye earthly
kingdoms ! I do not obstruct your dominion in this earth; my kingdom
is not of this world.’
Wherefore, all the Fathers maintain that Christ took for Himself
a spiritual kingdom which was in no way incompatible with true
poverty. So it is that, in the Old Testament {Zacharias, Chap, ix
[, v. 9]), it is predicted that there will come a Saviour, Who will be a
king, and poor; a prophecy which the New Testament {Matthew,
Chap, xxi [, w. 4 and 5]; and John, Chap, xxii [Chap, xii, w. 14 and
15]) declares to have been fulfilled in Christ.
In the Psalms (ii [, v. 6]), also, it is said of Him : ‘But I am appointed
king by him over Sion, his holy mountain,’ to which is straightway
1 [Referring to Suarez’s work, De Verho Incarnato, Pt. Ill, disp. xlviii, § a, which is not included
in these Selections.—Tr.]

Disp. xLvtn,
$2’
a Corinthians,
V1U'
Pope John

XXIL

ytauhev, viii.
Luke, ix and
xu‘

John, xvm.
Cyril,
Chrysostom.
Augustine.

Zacharias, ix.

Matthm,vd.
Psalms, li­

678

Augustine.

Hilary.

Epiphanius.
Jerome.

A Defence of the Catholic and Apostolic Faith

[Bk. Ill

added the phrase : ‘preaching his commandment,’ in order to indicate
that this kingdom is spiritual, not earthly. Thus Augustine {On the Gospel
of John, Tract. CXV, § 2) asserted that the mountain over which Christ
was appointed king, was not of this world ; ‘for the believers in Christ,
who constitute His kingdom, are not of this world’.1 Hilary, too, has
declared that this kingdom is not the earthly, but the heavenly Jeru­
salem. Moreover, the angel in like manner foretold [Luke, Chap, i, v. 32]
concerning Christ : ‘[. . .] the Lord God shall give unto him the throne
of David his father,’ straightway adding [vv. 32 and 33] : ‘and he shall
reign in the house of Jacob forever. And of his kingdom there shall be
no end’ ; for it was to be not a temporal, but a spiritual kingdom, a fact
which has been noted by Epiphanius {Panarium Adversus LXXX
Haereses, XXIX) and also by Jerome (on Jeremias, Chap, xxii
[, w. 29, 30] and Zacharias, Chap, vi [, vv. 9 et seq.f). The reason for
this fact is that the temporal kingdom was not necessary to Christ for
His honour and majesty, while it was expedient, as an example to us and
for our redemption, that He should not take that kingdom for himself.
17. Thus, on the basis of our foregoing remarks, it is easy to
An objection
prove the truth of our first conclusion,2 namely, that
Christ did not confer upon His vicar, a power which
He did not Himself assume.
It will be objected that Christ, although He possessed no tem­
poral kingdom of a perishable and imperfect sort, nevertheless did
possess in His humanity, by the grace of [His] union [with the God­
head], a superior dominion, through which He could have used at will
all temporal things or kingdoms whatsoever, so that, furthermore,
He could have availed Himself of that dominion to bestow temporal
kingdoms and a direct temporal jurisdiction upon His vicar.
We reply that we do not deny that He could have done so, even as
_ , .
He also could have assumed [such kingly power and
j urisdiction] for Himself; but we infer that He did not
bestow [this gift], since He did not assume for Himself this [temporal
kingship and] since He left behind Him on earth only His vicar for that
kingdom which He did in actual fact assume for Himself ; a kingdom 243
which is spiritual, as we have shown, and which, indeed, attains its per­
fect consummation in glory, yet has its beginning in this world, in the
Church militant. Moreover, inasmuch as Christ Himself held perfect
spiritual power without direct temporal jurisdiction, it was likewise
possible for Him to impart to His vicar a spiritual jurisdiction that
1 [This is a translation of the Latin of our text (quia credentes in Christum qui sunt regnum eius, non
sunt de hoc mundo), italicized to indicate that the words are a direct quotation from Augustine. The
passage in Augustine which is evidently referred to, however, reads as follows in the Patrologia Latina
of Migne, Vol. XXXV, coL 1939 : Quod est enim ejus regnum nisi credentes in eum, quibus dicit, De mundo
non estis, sicut et ego non sum de mundo? (For of what does His kingdom consist, if not of those who
believe in Him, to whom He saith: ‘Ye are not of this world, even as I am not of the world?')—Tr.]
1 [Vide the first paragraph of Section 15 supra, p. 676.—Tr.]

Chap. V]

Do Kings have supreme Power in Civil Affairs?

6~()

was perfect—that is to say, sufficient—unaccompanied by any other
jurisdiction of a directly temporal nature. And finally, just as it was
expedient that Christ Himself should not assume temporal jurisdiction,
so also was it fitting that he should refrain from communicating such
jurisdiction to His vicar, lest He should disturb the kings of the earth,
or should seem to mingle the spiritual with the secular.
18. Thus we draw our final proof from reasoning, as follows:
temporal dominion with direct jurisdiction of a civil nature over the
whole Church was not necessary for the spiritual government of the
Church, as is self-evident, nor was it even of use for that same purpose;
on the contrary, it might rather have proved to be a grave impediment ;
and therefore, it is improbable that such jurisdiction was granted
by Christ.
The truth of the minor premiss is proved, first, by the fact that
temporal government differs widely from spiritual government, and
involves men in worldly affairs, which are a powerful factor in diverting
mankind from spiritual matters, wherefore Paul has declared (2 Ti- 2 Timothy, ii.
mothy, Chap, ii [, v. 4]): ‘No man, being a soldier to God, entangleth
himself with secular businesses [. . .].’ Consequently, it is incredible
that Christ the Lord should have united these two supreme and
universal forms of power in one supreme pontiff of the Church, in­
asmuch as it is morally impossible that one man should be able to
support the burden of universal government in both of these forms.
19. The objection will be made that, according to such reasoning,
,.
.
neither
the Pope
nor any
other bishop
can or should
An objection.
,
,
* .
J
.
1
be at the same time a temporal prince.
We reply, first of all, that it is true that Christ the Lord did not
The first re i
establish such [a twofold principate], nor order its
e
rep7'
establishment, neither did He bestow a temporal
principate upon any of His ministers, or pastors. This point is proved
by the foregoing discussion, and confirmed by our remarks concerning
the kingly rule of Christ the Lord; [namely,] that He assumed no tem­
poral principate, nor secular power of judgment, whether over the whole
world or over some portion thereof, so that, furthermore, that principate
and power were not imparted by Him to any of His bishops or vicars.
Accordingly, the words which Christ Himself uttered [Luke, Chap, xii,
v. 14] concerning Himself, ‘[. . .] who hath appointed me judge [.. .]
over you?’ are also applicable to every bishop. St. Bernard, too st. Bernard.
[De Consideratione ad Eugenium, Bk. I, chap, vi and Bk. II, chap, vi),
proves this same point by means of other testimonies and a lengthy
discussion.
We must add, however, that Christ did not forbid that a Pope
or bishop should be at the same time a temporal lord. For no prohibi­
tion to this effect can be found, a fact on which we have already

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A Defence of the Catholic and Apostolic Faith

[Bk.III

touched and which will be made still more evident by our later
remarks ; nor is it to be inferred from the line of reasoning propounded
above, inasmuch as it is not in itself an evil that one and the same
person should be an ecclesiastical pastor and a temporal prince. On
the contrary, even though a temporal charge that is excessive in its
demands and of a universal character is not properly compatible with
spiritual cares, a temporal principate of a limited nature may neverthe­
less be not only permissible but even expedient for the conservation
of the Church’s majesty and authority, for necessary expenses and for
Sext, 1.V1.XVÜ. similar good ends, as theS^rt rightly declares (Bk. I, tit. vi, chap. xvii).
Therefore, Christ the Lord did not forbid this [combination of
powers], but left the matter to human management, regulated by right
reason and taking into account the requirements of [varying] times.
20. A different reply may be made, however, to the argument
adduced above; [namely, the reply] that the said argument proves
J , x.
merely
that ,the , exercise
1 of. both forms .of universal
A second solution.
.
. .< .
,
.
.
jurisdiction should not have been entrusted to the same
person at one and the same time, but that it was nevertheless possible
for the twofold jurisdiction to be granted in a primary sense to the
Pope, as it has indeed been granted, subject to the law and condition
that he shall ordinarily exercise the spiritual jurisdiction directly,
and the temporal, through other persons.
But this reply may, in its turn, be easily attacked; not only on
the ground that such primary jurisdiction cannot, by any title, nor
in any convincing manner, be shown to exist (a point which has
„ already been proved),2 but also on the ground that
the said jurisdiction would be either irrelevant or
extremely odious.
For, from one standpoint,3 he who holds this jurisdiction must
never make direct use of it in his own person, and thus such juris­
diction will be idle and useless, since it will never be possible for any
one to exercise it through the agency of others, until he has first
exercised it in his own person, when delegating it, at least, or com­
mitting it to another’s charge as ordinary [, that is to say, official]
jurisdiction. If, on the other hand, it is contended that the juris­
diction in question has indeed been granted to him to be used in this
particular manner, I shall furthermore inquire whether the Pope, in
committing such jurisdiction, for example, to another, altogether
renounces his own share therein, divesting himself completely of all
charge over it; or whether his commission of that jurisdiction is such
that he nevertheless retains his temporal superiority, together with
* [The italics are not in the Latin.—Tr.]
2 [Supra, this Chapter, pp. 672 et seq.—Tr.]
3 [Simply Aut enim, in the Latin, the correlative of Aut apparently being verô (on the other hand),
in the following sentence.—Tr.]

Chap. V]

Do Kings have supreme Power in Civil Affairs?

681

the power to revoke or at least to limit the charge committed, or
even the power to correct or amend at will the acts performed as a
part of that charge.
If the primary jurisdiction in question be conceived of in accor­
dance with the former alternative, it is barren and useless. For of what
avail is it, that the Pope should possess that power in a primary sense,
if he has of necessity been obliged to bestow it upon others, to be
exercised by them, and if, having thus bestowed it, he is no longer
244 able to act as a superior within that [temporal] order ? On the con­
trary, it even follows that he no longer possesses the said power, and
is merely represented as having possessed it at one time, in order that
its derivation in the case of secular princes may be attributed to the
Pope, a claim which is regarded as replete with envy and exceedingly
odious; and which, for the rest, is both futile and groundless.
21. If, on the other hand, the power in question is to be conceived
of, in accordance with the second alternative, as existing in a primary
sense in that it may issue as action at any time that is pleasing, or at
any time that is opportune, then the hatred and envy involved will
be greater still. For [, in the light of such an hypothesis,] temporal
princes will no longer be sovereign rulers; the words of the poet
Sedulius—accepted by the Church and widely celebrated—will be
false: ‘The Giver of heavenly kingdoms, does not seize upon perishable
things;’1 and the Pope will be able to destroy or transfer temporal
kingdoms at his own pleasure, and to arrogate to himself at will the
function of judging and dispensing in temporal matters, as well as
other, similar functions, and he will be able to do so validly, at least.
For though such action [on the part of the Pope] might perhaps be
undesirable, owing to the resulting disturbance of the [temporal]
order, the completed action would nevertheless be valid, since it
would be derived from that supreme jurisdiction on which the inferior
depends. And such a situation would not only be odious and capable
of disturbing (not without cause) the minds of kings, but is, moreover,
essentially inconceivable, being opposed to the universal peace of the
Church and to her universal and unbroken custom.
Consequently, even those jurists who hold that the Pope does
have supreme temporal jurisdiction, do not admit this hypothesis.
On the contrary, they absolutely deny, in the case of many acts of
temporal jurisdiction, that the Pope is able, outside the bounds of his
own temporal domain, to exercise these temporal functions in such
a way that his action is even valid. This is the common opinion, for
example, of the Doctors, in their commentaries on the Decretals
(Bk. IV, tit. XVII, chap. xiii).
1 [These are words from the hymn used at Vespers of the Epiphany, beginning Crvdelis Herodes.—
Revises.]
1569.74

4. $

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A Defence of the Catholic and Apostolic Faith

[BE III

And finally, if the Pope did thus possess a primary temporal
jurisdiction over the whole Church, he would be obliged to exercise
solicitude for the proper temporal government of all the kingdoms of
the Church, no less than for the spiritual government of all her
episcopates, since in due proportion the same reason and the same
obligation exist [with respect to both charges] ; and consequently, the
argument adduced above holds good, that is to say, the argument
that this twofold universal care is excessive, practically speaking, for
human strength and human capacity, and is entirely contrary to
reason and to custom.
22. Of the basic arguments for the contrary opinion, the first and
The bases of the
secon^ apply only with regard to the indirect
contrary
opinion power [of the Pope]; and, assuredly, many of the
are destroyed.
authors cited in defence of that opinion are referring
solely to this same superior power, as we shall explain at the end of
the present Book.1
The third basis, on the other hand, is derived from a false prin­
ciple, since Christ the Lord did not assume temporal dominion for
Himself, as has been pointed out.2
The fourth basic argument is likewise faulty. F or the Church is not
a single temporal commonwealth, as it is a spiritual commonwealth,
and it therefore requires, not one directly supreme temporal power,
but a single spiritual [sovereignty], extending in its application to
temporal affairs, as we shall learn below.3
1 [Not included in these Selections.—Tr.]
2 [Supra, p. 676, § 15, this Chapter.—Tr.]
3 [Chap, vi of Bk. ΠΙ, not included in these Selections.—Tr.]

■

FRANCISCO SUAREZ

A DEFENCE OF THE CATHOLIC
AND APOSTOLIC FAITH
BOOK III
CONCERNING THE SUPREMACY AND POWER OF
THE POPE OVER TEMPORAL KINGS
CHAPTER XXIII: THE POPE MAY USE COERCIVE POWER AGAINST KINGS,
EVEN TO THE POINT OF DEPOSING THEM FROM THEIR THRONES, IF

THERE BE A VALID CAUSE

Chap. XXIII]

The Pope may use coercive Power against Kings

685

CHAPTER XXIII
THE POPE MAY USE COERCIVE POWER AGAINST KINGS, EVEN TO THE
POINT OF DEPOSING THEM FROM THEIR THRONES, IF THERE BE
A VALID CAUSE

1. This, as I have said, is the very heart and the chief point of
the present controversy.
For King James, who denies the existence of papal jurisdiction
Th chief
int of over t^ie w^°^e Church and, in particular, over kings,
the* Controversy0 is in truth not greatly troubled -with regard to [papal]
with the King of directive power. He is, on the other hand, anxious
England.
and fearfui as t0 the coercive power of the Pope, and
especially as to that phase of it which extends to confiscation of his
kingdom, since, by persisting in his error, James causes himself to
doubt his own security upon his throne, if it should be believed by his
subjects that the said power does reside in the Pope.
Accordingly, in order that he may be free to persist in his blind­
ness, he desires to deprive the Church of Christ of every remedy against
heretical princes. The same stratagem was devised before him, by
Marsilio of Padua and other enemies of the Church.
But the contrary opinion is supported by all the Catholic Doctors
whom I have mentioned above, and whom Bellarmine (in the recent
treatise already noted, [Tract. De Potestate Summi Pontificis^ cites more
fully. Nor is this contrary opinion less certainly true than the other
statements already-made. Indeed, if the latter are carefully weighed,
it will not be difficult to refute the error that has been propounded
and to defend, moreover, the Catholic truth that is confirmed by
custom, by authority and by reason.
2. For, in the first place, it clearly follows from what has been
_Coercive power over said above,’ 1 that there, does. reside in
the Pope
coercive
,
S
.
,
wicked kings does power over temporal princes who are incorrigibly
pod^ed feSide m the
and especially over schismatics and stubborn
Pope.
heretics.
He must possess this coercive weapon because directive force is
This assertion is inefficacious without coercive force, as Aristotle points
proved first by a out (Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. X, chap, ix [, § 12]);
logical process.
so
the pOpe
directive power over temporal
princes, he necessarily has coercive power also, in cases where they
have been unwilling to obey the just direction laid down by laws or
precepts.
The truth of the inference is proved as follows: those things
which are from God, are well ordered and perfectly appointed; and
1 [Bk. Ill, chap, xxii of Defensio Fidei Catholicae, which is not included in these Selections.—Tl.J

Bellarmine.

Aristotle.

686

St. Thomas,

2 Corinthians,

x’

Chrysostom.

Theophylact.

•

A Defence of the Catholic and A-postolic Faith

[BE III

therefore, if God has endowed the Pope with directive power, He will
have endowed him with coercive power, inasmuch as any different
system would be imperfect and ineffectual. Accordingly, the theo­
logians, by reasoning to the contrary, maintain that the Church has
_ not the power to prescribe acts of a strictly internal
prescribe acts of a nature, since it is not possible to pass judgment
nature internal
regarding such acts, nor, consequently, to impose
penalties for them, a process which pertains to
coercive power. This is the opinion laid down by St. Thomas (I.-II,
qu. 91, art. 4 and qu. 100, art. 9). And therefore, conversely, since the
Pope is able, by his command, to direct temporal power efficaciously in
its own sphere of action, he is also able to coerce and to punish those
princes who disobey his just commands.
3. The foregoing logical argument is doubtless sufficient. HowThis view is sup- ever, inasmuch as our opponents demand [further
ported by the Scrip- proof, from] the Scriptures, we are also able to draw
tures‘
a clear confirmation of this truth from Scriptural
sources.
For Paul,—having first spoken (2 Corinthians, Chap, x [, v. 4]) as
follows :
. .] the weapons of our warfare are not carnal, but mighty
to God unto the pulling down of fortifications [. . .]’—subsequently
adds [ibid., v. 6] : ‘[. . .] having in readiness to revenge all disobedience
[. . .]’ and again, [ibid., v. 8]: ‘For if also I should boast somewhat
more of our power, which the Lord hath given us unto edification,
and not for your destruction, I should not be ashamed.’ In these
words, indeed, the Apostle clearly maintained that he had received
from God the power to avenge and punish all disobedience on the
part of any Christian whatsoever, in so far as such vengeance and
punishment might be needful for the edification and welfare of the
Church. But the power to avenge or punish is a coercive power, as is
self-evident. Wherefore, Chrysostom has spoken in this connection
(on Second Corinthians, Chap, x = Homily XXII) as follows: ‘Wehave
received the power to this end, namely, that we may edify. But if any
man shall oppose it and struggle against it, being so disposed that
he can in nowise be cured by reasoning, then only let us have recourse
to yet another power by means of which we shall overthrow and
destroy him.’ Theophylact also expounds [the words of the Apostle],
thus : ‘We have in readiness punishment and vengeance. [. . .] To be
sure, I have received it (namely, the power in question) principally
for the purpose of edification, but if any man proves to be incorrigible,
we shall resort to destructive force. [. . .] If I should wish (continues 334
Theophylact) to boast because God hath endowed me more amply,
to this end chiefly, that I may have the power to do good, and even
if I am forced to inflict punishment as well, I shall not be ashamed;

Chap. XXIII]

The Pope may use coercive Power against Kings

687

that is to say, I shall not be conducting myself arrogantly nor men­
daciously.’ Moreover, a similar literal exposition of the passage from
2 Corinthians is offered by Theodoret and others, from among the
Greek Fathers, and from among the Latin Fathers, by Anselm,1
Cajetan (on that text) and Augustine {Letters, 1 = clxxxv, Chap, vi,
Migne ed.) where he avails himself of this testimony [on the part of
Paul], in order to prove that the Church has power to coerce heretics,
by means of punishment, to a recovery of their own sanity.
4. Paul referred symbolically, under the term ‘rod’, to this same
power of punishment, when he said (1 Corinthians, Chap, iv [, v. 21]):
Coercive power is ‘[What] will you ? shall I come to you with a rod
symbolized in the [. . .],’ in accordance with the words of Scripture
Scriptures by a rod.
ü β v. 9]). ‘Thou shalt rule them with a rod
of iron,’ and other, similar passages [The Apocalypse, Chap, ii, v. 27
and Chap, xix, v. 15], and the Twenty-second Psalm2 [, v. 4]: ‘[.. .]
Thy rod and thy staff, they have comforted me.’ Such is the interpre­
tation offered by Jerome (in his commentary on Zacharias, Chap, i);
and he expresses the same opinion with regard to the words of Paul
already quoted {To the Galatians, Chap. vi). A clearer exposition still,
is given by Augustine {Contra Epistolam Parmeniani, Bk. Ill, chap, i
[, no. 3]), who says : ‘Now it is apparent that he is speaking of punish­
ment, to which he refers under the term “rod”.’ xAnd Ambrose,
too, has written {Letters, xviii, To the Sister of Marcellus [Letter xli,
Migne, P.L., xvi, col. mi: Frater Sororï\): ‘He whom the rod has
barred from participation in the divine sacraments has by clemency
been restored, to that participation.’ The same writer elsewhere {De
Poenitentia, Bk. I, chap, xii [chap, xiii]) declares: ‘The denunciation
of fornication, the indictment against incest, the censuring of swollen
passion, and finally, the condemnation of the guilty person—these
indicate the meaning of the phrase “to come under the rod”.’ The
view taken by Gregory {Letters, Bk. I, epist. iv [epist. xxv]), and that
of Tertullian {On Chastity, Chap, xiv) are similar, as are the views
expressed on the same passage by other commentators whose names
I shall omit.
5. Nor do I see what answer can be given in the light of the
passages above cited; unless, perchance, it is argued either that Paul
is addressing the common people of the Church, who are subject to
him, and is not addressing kings, who are his superiors; or else that
he is referring to a power bestowed specifically upon himself and not
affording a permissible basis for conclusions as to the ordinary govern­
ment of the Church.
1 [The Commentary on the Epistles of St. Paul by Herveus Burdigolensis Monachus [Migne, P.L·,
clxxxi] was attributed to St. Anselm.—Reviser.]
3 [The Twenty-second of the Douay version of the Bible, but the Twenty-third of the King James
version.—Tr.]

Theodoret.

Anselm.

Cajetan.
Augustine.

I Corinthians,
iv.

Psalms, ii.
Psalms, xxii.

Jerome.

Augustine.

Ambrose.

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[Bk. Ill

Either answer, however, would be futile. For why should Paul’s
aPPty to Christian kings who are both disthe opponents of obedient and obstinate? Was it, forsooth, because
futed°Pini°n
re" t^iere were no kings within the Church at the time
[when he wrote] ? But it is possible that at that time
there were no Englishmen either, within the Church; and do those
words consequently have no application to any Englishman ? Perhaps
the reason is that kings are superior in temporal power and dignity?
But this fact does not prevent them from being subject to the yoke
of Christ and to the power of the Church, as we have shown them to be.
Therefore, if the power in question is a coercive power over wicked
Christians, in accordance with the testimony of Paul, it is also a
punitive power over Christian kings. And if the King of England
boasts that he is exempt therefrom, let him either confess that he is
not a Christian or else let him give proof of a divine privilege and an
exemption granted by the word of God; for otherwise, he loses his
cause from the standpoint of justice, though he may sustain his position
in actual fact. Moreover, even though this power possessed by Paul
may have passed away with him in so far as it was related to his person
and his apostolic dignity, it does not follow that this same power rested
only temporarily in the Church; for it was lodged in Peter in a more
perfect manner, by ordinary law, with the purpose of transmitting it,
since such power was necessary (as has been demonstrated above)1 in
order to discharge the task of feeding [Christ’s sheep] and to govern
the Church fittingly.
6. Finally, our position is confirmed by the power of binding and
loosing, which was granted especially to Peter; for the power to bind
includes also coercive and punitive power.
The power Of bindif our opponents deny this confirmatory
ing indudes coer- argument, they will be obliged to point out the
are power.
exception, inasmuch as Christ spoke in universal
terms, saying [Matthew, Chap, xvi, v. 19]: ‘[. . .] whatsoever thou
shalt bind [. . .]’. Moreover, Christ Himself so interpreted that power;
Matthew, xvüi. for after saying (Matthew, Chap, xviii [, v. 17]) : ‘[... And] if he will not
hear the church, [...] let him be to thee as the heathen and publican,’2
He added [v. 18]: ‘[. . .] whatsoever you shall bind upon earth,
shall be bound also in heaven [. . .]’. It is as if Christ had said: If he
will not obey the Church when she binds [him], let him be to thee as
the heathen, since the Church shall not lack a power to bind, so effica­
cious that whatsoever she binds, shall be adjudged bound even in
heaven. Accordingly, the Church has always understood from this
passage [in Matthew} (though Calvin and his followers distort its
The arguments of wor^s not

1 [Supra, p. 670 ; Defensio Fidei Catholicae, Bk. Ill, chap, v, § 5.—Tr.]
2 [This quotation, as given by Suarez, varies slightly from the Vulgate.—Tr. ]

Chap. XXIII]

The Pope may use coxrfivcTPowii JJginju___ -

meaning, as they distort that of other passages) that there resides in
her pastors the power to coerce—through the censure of excommunica­
tion, at least, which is a spiritual penalty.
The words of Paul (z Corinthians, Chap, v) afford sufficient
evidence that this practice of excommunication was customary within
_Excommunication
.
the Church. in apostolic
times
; while the
fact that...this
r
,
, .
was practised even same practice was preserved in an enduring tradition
a ^e^1116 °f the *s attested by all the laws and Councils [of the Church],
all the decrees of the Popes, all the writings of the
Holy Fathers, and, finally, all [ecclesiastical] histories; so that it would
be superfluous to cite [each of] these authorities [individually].
However, it should be noted that Paul shows this form of coercion
to be especially necessary against heretics, when he says ( Titus, Chap, iii Titus, ni.
[, v. io]): ‘A man that is a heretic, after the first and second admoni­
tion,1 avoid.’ The same necessity is indicated by the words of
i John, Chap, ii [2 St. John, Chap, i, v. 10]): ‘[. . .] nor say to him, [2] Stϋ.
God speed you.’
7. One point only—a point which is of the greatest importance
335 to our contention—I shall not pass over, namely, the fact that the
The Popes have quite P°Pes have most certainly made frequent use of the
frequently availed
said form of censure when opposing emperors and
themselves of the
Unoc
above-mentioned
censure, against
For
kings and emperors.

.

Innocent I excommunicated Arcadius and Innocent I
because of the crimes committed against
St. Chrysostom, as is clear from the last of Innocent’s epistles {Letters,
xiv), and also from the statement of Nicephorus Callistus (Bk. XIII, Nkephoms
chap, xxxiv). Moreover, Gregory VII (Registrant, Bk. VIII, epist. xxi)
records the same event. Gregory II bound the Emperor Leo and Gregory 11.
those who followed him in his iconoclasm, by a synodical anathema,
a fact recorded by Baronius ([Annales Ecclesiastici a Christo Nato ad Baroniu..
Annum 1198,] Anno 726, no. 24), on the authority of Zonaras and
others. The same anathema was later confirmed by Gregory III, as
Platina relates. Moreover, Gregory VII excommunicated the Emperor
Henry IV, in the Roman Synod [vii], after repeated admonitions, a
fact recorded in Gregory’s Letters (Bk. Ill, epists. v and x). This
sentence of excommunication, confirmed by succeeding Popes and
by the Councils, was learnedly defended by Cardinal Beharmine Beiiarmine.
(Contra Barclaium, Chap, ix).2 The same Gregory' VII, in another Gregory.
Roman Council, bound with the chain of excommunication [incurred]
ipso facto—as is brought out in another book of the Letters (Bk. VII,
after epist. xiv)—the emperors, kings, and other temporal princes who
1 [Our Latin text has correctionem (correction, or improvement) which may be a misprint for corrtptionem (reproof), the term used in the Vulgate.—Tr.]
1 [Tractatus de Potestate Summi Pontificis in Rebus Temporalibus adversus Guüelmum Barclaium.—
Reviser.]
1569.74

4T

A Defence of the Catholic and A-postolic Faith

[Bk. Ill

were usurping the powers of the investiture of bishoprics and other
ecclesiastical dignities. And this same Pope, according to Baronins
{Annales, Anno 1079, no. 40), laid an interdict upon Poland, because of
the most grievous crime committed by her King, in slaying St. Stanislas.
Again, Alexander III excommunicated the Emperor Frederick I,
Platina.
an incident related by Platina in his account of Alexander III [De Vitis
Summorum Pontificum Omnium], where he also records many other
evidences of this supreme power on the part of the Pope. Later,
Innocent III, as Platina says (in his biographical account of that Pope),
π. xiv.ii. ‘branded the Emperor Otto V with an anathema.’ The Sext (Bk. II,
tit. xiv, chap, ii) informs us that Gregory IX excommunicated the
Emperor Frederick II. And, finally, John XXII excommunicated
Albertus
Louis of Bavaria, the interloping Emperor, as Albertus Pighius recounts
Pighius.
at length
yisibilia Monarchia, [in Hierarchice Ecclesiastica Assertio,
Bk. N, chap. xiv]).
Moreover, the power in question was assumed to exist in the
The Lateran
Church, by the Lateran Council held under Innocent III, when that
Council.
Council ordered (Chap, iii) that the secular powers, whatsoever the
offices they filled, should be compelled by an ecclesiastical censure—if
necessity demanded such a course—to take a public oath as defenders
of the faith, &c. This imposition of censures in a form embracing
kings and emperors occurs with great frequency and is a rather ancient
device, not one newly resorted to, since mention thereof is found in
a privilege granted by Gregory I to the Monastery of St. Medardus,
as we learn from a postscript to the letters of Gregory.1 This passage
Gregory vu.
in his letters is also referred to, by another Gregory (the Seventh)
who derives from it the same argument (Registrum, Bk. VIII, epist.
xxi, Ad Herimannum).
8. Furthermore, the Emperor Basil confessed that the said power
over emperors resided in the Pope, when he said (Eighth Synod,
action 6 [in Mansi, Consilia, xvi, col. 93]) : ‘Pope Nicholas, and the Holy
Roman Church, have pronounced an anathema against those who
resist a decree and sentence of this kind. Moreover, we, being long
since aw’are of this and fearing the promulgation of a decree of
anathema, have deemed it necessary to comply with the synodical
judgment of the Roman Church.’ The same power was recognized
by Philip I, King of France, who having been excommunicated by
L rban II was later restored [to membership in the Church] by Paschal
and sent to Rome, moreover, for absolution, as we read in [the Annales
Baronius.
[of Baronius (An. 1100 [, no. 19] and 1101 [, no. 7]). King Louis of
France likewise acknowledged this power, when he wrote to Alex­
ander III earnestly importuning him to exercise his authority against
Baronius,
^°[IO79].

1 [The postscript is an appendix to the Letters of Pope Gregory I [Migne, Patrologia Latina, VoL
Ixxvii, cot 1328].—Reviser.]

Chap. XXIII]

The Pope may use coercive Power against Kings

691

the King of England because of the death of St. Thomas of Canterbury.
Nor did Henry himself, the King of England, dare to resist, for he
humbly submitted to the penance imposed upon him by the Pope, as
Platina relates. Peter of Blois (Letters, cxlv) records a similar instance,
in connexion with Queen Eleanor of England, who, in seeking to
defend herself and her son (the latter being unjustly held in prison
by the King of France), requested the aid of the Pope and the drawing
of the spiritual sword against that king. And finally, the existence of
such papal power was acknowledged by the King of England, who
accused the King of France before Innocent III in order that [the
Pope] might reprove the accused1 and [even] excommunicate him if
he would not hearken to the papal admonition.2 This is the inference
which we draw from a passage in the Decretals (Bk. II, tit. 1, chap, xiii),
in which the Pope speaks as follows: ‘We do not undertake to judge
as to the fief.’ And later [ibid.]: ‘But we do undertake to pass
judgment concerning sin, the censuring of which indubitably pertains
to us, a censorship which we can and should exercise against any person
whatsoever.’ And, in accordance [with this same principle of papal
power], Innocent III—so Matthew Paris relates ([Historia Maior,]
Anno 1204 [Anno 1209])—excommunicated King John of England
and interdicted his kingdom.
9. Wherefore, they say that Marsilio of Padua himself has not
dared deny that the Pope has power to coerce princes and kings,
336 especially those who are heretical, by ecclesiastical censures of ex­
communication, or even of interdict. Marsilio did, however, deny
the Pope’s power to proceed further than this, against such rulers.
King James, too, in defending his exaction of the oath of allegiance,
would seem to resist the power of excommunication less vehemently
than he does that of temporal punishment. Thus he bases his defence
of the oath chiefly upon the ground that he thereby compels his sub­
jects, not to abjure the papal power of excommunicating kings, but
simply to deprive the Pope of kingly dominion and power. For King
James holds, as he declares in his Preamble3 (p. 12): On no lawful
ground has the Pope acquired the right to depose kings. And this
unjust usurpation and secular violence (so James describes it) on the
part of the Popes, greatly exceeds the power of excommunication,
which is a spiritual censure.’ From these words it is sufficiently
evident that the King does not oppose the spiritual censure to the
same degree as he does temporal coercion.
10. Accordingly, it remains for us to press still further our
1 [Simply euni in the Latin.—Tr.]
2 [ipsum in the Latin.—Tr.]
3 [Le. a preamble, as King James himself designated it, to his Apologie Jar the Oath of Allegiance.
The full title of the preamble is *A Premonition to all most Mightie Monarches, Kings, Free Princes and
States of Christendom’.—Tr.]

Platina.
Peter of Blots.

Deaétais, II. I.
xiii.

Matthew
Paris.

Azor, Moral
institutes,
Pt. Π, bk. IV,
chap. xix.

692

A Defence of the Catholic and Apostolic Faith

[Bk. Ill

argument against him, against Marsilio, and against other persons,
It is demonstrated
demonstrating that this same papal power may
that the Pope has extend to the coercion of kings by means of temporal
temporal kings even punishments, and deposition from their thrones, if
with temporal
necessity so demands.
punishments.
This demonstration can be satisfactorily accomplished on the basis of Scriptural passages already cited,1 and by
practically the same process of reasoning. For Christ the Lord gave to
Peter and his successors the power to correct all Christians, even kings,
and, consequently, the power to coerce and punish them when they are
disobedient and incorrigible. Nor did He limit this to the authority for
imposing ecclesiastical censures. Therefore the said power cannot be
limited by us nor by any prince within the Church; rather does it
pertain to the Pope of Rome to decide and prescribe the fitting
punishment for the occasion or necessity that may arise.
We have already given sufficient proof of the first proposition.
And the second we can prove by means of Christ’s words (which we
have quoted many times), if they are correctly interpreted; for His
admonition [John, Chap, xxi, v. 17], ‘[. . .] Feed my sheep,’ is not
limited, and accordingly, since the term Teed’ {pascendum) embraces
even coercive power, which must necessarily reside in every pastor,
the said power is not restricted to the imposition of censures, but rather
remains to be shaped through prudence and equitable justice into
some [appropriate] form of punishment or coercion. For every shepherd
has power to coerce his sheep, not [simply] in some predetermined
manner, but in accordance with what may be suitable and expedient
for those sheep.
11. Moreover, we draw the same inference from these other words
uttered by Christ [Matthew, Chap, xvi, v. 19]: ‘[. . .] whatsoever thou
shalt bind [. . .]’, inasmuch as this phrase, too, is of a general and
indefinite nature.
And if it be contended that a later passage {Matthew, Chap, xviii
[, v. 18]) interprets the same phrase and limits its connotations to
the binding force of censures, we shall reply that the latter passage
a way of escape does indeed declare that this general power to bind
from[Suârez’s]con- includes the bond of excommunication, but that it
elusion is precluded. joes not
the
poWer to the sole imposition
of this penalty. Our reply is based partly on the fact that no such
limitation is found in that context; and partly on the fact that forms
of censure other than excommunication—such as interdicts, sus­
pensions, and additional penalties of a similar ecclesiastical nature—
fall under the power in question, even though the passage cited makes
mention only of excommunication. Furthermore, the bond of precept
1 [Supra, pp. 685-7, §§ 2-3 this Chapter.—Tr.]

Chap. XXIII]

The Pope may use coercive Power against Kings

693

and of law is also included under that same power; and by the very
force of these terms, such power, viewed as directive, is not limited to
a specific form of direction by personal precept or by fixed law that
is binding in this or that particular way, but, on the contrary, em­
braces all fitting direction, in an unrestricted manner. Therefore, the
same conclusion applies to this power in its coercive aspect. And so
it is that the existence of such power is deduced from the passage in
question by Innocent IV and the Council of Lyons (in Sext, Bk. II,
tit. xiv, chap. ii).
12. Moreover, Bede shows (on Luke, Bk. Ill, chap, xl)1 that [the
exercise of] that power is exemplified in the act of Peter, at whose
The same conclu- rebuke Ananias and his wife fell dead. Bede asserts
sion is drawn from that they perished as the result of the words spoken
the act of St. Peter.
^ρθ5ΐ[ε peter, because it was expedient, even
in [the days recorded by] the New Testament, that such punishments
should be inflicted occasionally, though with comparative infrequency,
for the correction of persons other [than those punished]. Again,
there is a statement ascribed to Augustine {De Mirabilibus Sacrae
Scripturae, Bk. Ill, last chapter [chap, xvii]) to the effect that this
punishment was imposed ‘in order to demonstrate the weightiness
of Apostolic authority and the gravity of the sin, [. . .] and also to the
end that others might be admonished by the example afforded.’
Gregory, when treating {Letters, Bk. I, epist. xxiv [epist. xxv]) of the
office of pastor, and of the benignity, strictness, and zeal for justice
demanded by that office, adduces Peter [still] more clearly as an
example, saying: ‘For so it is, to be sure, that Peter, who was prince
over the holy Church by divine authority, refused to be venerated
excessively by the just man, Cornelius; yet when he perceived the
guilt of Ananias and Saphira, he straightway showed how extensive
was the power by which he had been exalted above other men; for
by his very utterance, he struck at their fife, seeking it out and finding
it with the sword of the spirit, and thus confirmed his supreme power
337 in the Church, as the enemy of sin.’ Consequently, though this act
may have been of an extraordinary nature and performed under the
special inspiration and by virtue of the Holy Spirit, nevertheless, as
Gregory declares in a subsequent passage: ‘The zeal of vengeance
revealed the force of power.’
13. Moreover, Paul points out the existence of this same power,
.,
_
in his First Epistle to the Corinthians (Chap, v Γ, v. 5]),
tion of this conclu- when he has not only excommunicated the fornicator,
o^Paui111 the words but has also ‘delivered him [. . .] to Satan for the
destruction of the flesh, that the spirit may be saved
in the day of [our] Lord [Jesus Christ].’ For the use of the phrase,
1 [Bede, On the Acts of the Apostles, Chap. v.—Reviser.]

Innocent IV.
The Council of
Lyons.
Bede.

Gregor}’.

I Corinthiam,

694

Chrysostom.

Theophy-

Anselm.

Pacian.

Ambrose.

Gregory Π.
Baronius.
Vide Sigonius,
Fe Regno Itahae, Anno 716
[-Anno 730].

Λ Defence of the Catholic and Apostolic Faith

[Bk. Ill

‘for the destruction of the flesh’, clearly indicates that the culprit
was punished with vexation of the flesh, in addition to the spiritual
censure, and was forced to do penance in order that his soul might be
saved. It is thus that Chrysostom explains the passage cited (in
Orations, XV [Homily XV], on First Corinthians, v. 5, on that text),
saying that the fornicator was delivered to an evil spirit for the destruc­
tion of the flesh, as was Job (though not for the same cause), in order
—says Chrysostom—that ‘[this demon] might scourge him with a
hurtful ulcer or with some other disease.’ Theophylact says: ‘In
order that [the demon] might ravage him with a disease, and cause
him to waste away.’ And Anselm, too, though he suggests another
possible interpretation prefers the one just set forth. For at the end
of Chapter xxiv [Chapter iv],1 when explaining the action of‘the rod’,
or Apostolic power of coercion, he writes : ‘by excommunicating some,
by severely rebuking others, and by scourging still others (as becomes
a father)’; and in a latter passage (Chapter v), he interprets the phrase,
‘destruction of the flesh’, as signifying ‘a grave bodily affliction
brought about by a devil.’ He declares, moreover, that Paul possessed
a power, ‘such that any person whom he had excommunicated would
straightway be seized by a devil and tormented for as long a time and
writh as much severity as the Apostle might wish.’ This particular
form of torment demanded a peculiar executive virtue, or power of
command, over the evil spirit, of a sort not ordinarily bestowed upon
other men [than Paul]; yet it does imply [the possession by Paul’s
successors of] the authority to coerce not only through excommunication, but also by other means. Again, Pacian suggests {Paraenesis de
[ad] Poenitentiam) the same interpretation when he infers from the
text in question that bodily punishment and affliction are sometimes
necessary. Ambrose {De Poenitentia, Bk. I, chap, xii [chap, xiii]) takes a
similar view, inasmuch as he, like Chrysostom, compares this destruc­
tion of the flesh with the trials of Job.
According, then, to this Patristic interpretation of the said text,
we find that ecclesiastical correction and punishment consist not in
spiritual censure alone, but also, on occasion, in corporeal afflictions,
so that the pastors of the Church may resort to temporal punishment
for the sake of spiritual welfare.
14. Secondly,2 we may demonstrate the truth of this conclusion
by appealing to the authority and practice of the Church.
For among those Popes whose excommunication of emperors and
Papal usage con- kings we have mentioned, we find Gregory II, who
caused Rome and the whole of Italy to be withdrawn
sion.
from the empire of Leo, as Baroni us relates {Annales,
i [The reference is to the Commentary of Herveus, which was attributed to St. Anselm.—ReviskkJ
a [i.e. in addition to the first, or Scriptural basis of demonstration.—Ta.]

Chap. XXIII]

The Pope may use coercive Power against Kings

695

Anno 730, nos. 3 and 4, following Theophanes). And Sigebert (in
Chronicon, Anno 731) has attributed the same act to Gregory III,
saying: ‘He convicted the Emperor Leo of error, and took awav
from him the city of Rome and the Italian (Hesperiae') revenues.’
Moreover, Gregory VII deprived Henry IV both of his empire and
of his kingdom, as is clear from the decree above cited, which runs
as follows : ‘Blessed Peter, Prince of the Apostles, heed us, we beseech
thee’; and further on: ‘Therefore, resting on that assurance, and
acting for the honour and defence of the Church, as agents of
Almighty God, the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, through thy power
and authority, I deprive King Henry, son of Henry the Emperor, who
with unheard of arrogance has risen against thy Church, of his govern­
mental powers over the whole kingdom of Germany and Italy; I free
all Christians from the bond of the oath which they have sworn or
may swear to him; and I forbid that any of them should serve him
as king.’ Similarly, Innocent III ‘stripped the imperial titles’—as
Platina declares—from Otto, whom he also excommunicated. Inno­
cent IV, too, at the Council of Lyons [Sext, Bk. II, tit. xiv, chap, ii],
deprived Frederick II—who had already been excommunicated by
Gregory IX—of his imperial power, not only absolving Frederick’s
subjects from their oath of allegiance, but also, ‘for the rest, strictly
prohibiting by apostolic authority that any person should obey or
heed him, as Emperor or King.’ Moreover, he bound, ipso facto, by
the censure of excommunication, those persons who should thereafter
show favour to Frederick, as Emperor or King, lending him counsel or
assistance. Finally, Clement VI deposed Louis of Bavaria—already
excommunicated by Clement’s predecessors—from the imperial throne
which that ruler had unjustly seized; and the election of another and
lawful emperor—namely, Charles IV—was brought about by Clement.
15. Furthermore, in addition to these incidents relating to the
Empire, Pope Zacharias, in a similar case affecting the Kingdom of
France, transferred the royal title from Childeric the King to Pepin,
as we read in the letters of Gregory VII (Registrum, Bk. VIII, epist. xxi ;
also in Decretum, Pt. II, causa xv, qu. vi, can. iii) and in the Annales of
Baronius (Anno 751, beginning, and Anno 841, no. 3). In this [latter]
context, Baronius tells also of the change transpiring in the kingdom
of France in the time of the Emperor Lothaire and his brothers,
Charles and Louis. These two, supported by the authority of the
bishops, divided the kingdom between them, depriving Lothaire of
his share in it, because of his crimes. Boniface VIII, too, issued a
declaration depriving Philip the Fair, King of France, of his kingdom,
publishing—on that very occasion—the Extravagant beginning ‘Unam
Sanctam’ (Extravagantes Communes, Bk. I, tit. vm, chap. i). This fact
1 [This reference is incorrectly placed after the reference to Innocent III in the Latin text.—Ta.]

Sigebert.
Gregor}·.

Innocent III.

Platina.
Innoc. IV.
Sex4ll.xiv.u.

Clement.

Pope Zacha­
rias.

Gregory VII.

Baronius.

Boniface.

696
Aemilius.

innocent

in.

Polydorus.

The Council
of Lyons.

The Council
Lateran

A Defence of the Catholic and Apostolic Faith

[BE III

is recorded by Aemilius, in his life of that same Philip. In like manner, 338
Gregory VII, when he laid his interdict upon Poland because of the
murder of Stanislas, deprived King Bonislas of his realm, as Cromer
relates, in his History of Poland (Bk. IV). And England herself provides
us with a notable example in King John. Because of the monstrous
crimes that this king was committing against religion and against
priests and other innocent persons, and also because he refused in a
disobedient and stubborn fashion to return to the ways of reason1
—though Innocent III had frequently admonished him to do so—but
rather grew worse from day to day, he was stripped of his kingly
dignity by that same Innocent, after lengthy consultation with the
Fathers (so Polydorus says); while the peoples subject to him were
absolved by the said Pope from their oath of allegiance, and Christian
princes, notified of the situation, were admonished that they should
pursue him as an enemy of the Church. Daunted by this sentence and
stricken with the fear of imminent peril, John at last swore to abide by
the will of the Pope, and, having taken the crown from his head, gave
it into the hands of Pandulphus, the papal legate, [declaring that]
neither he nor his heirs would ever accept it, save from the Pope
of Rome. These things are recorded by Polydorus (Bk. XV).
16. Moreover, all the acts above mentioned and others of a
similar nature were performed not in a hasty or obscure manner but
rather, in some cases, at the largest councils, and sometimes, at general
councils, such as that of Lyons. They were performed, too, in the
sight of the whole Christian world, which approved them and ordered
that they be carried through, so that one cannot possibly conceive of
them as acts of usurpation rather than of true authority. Furthermore,
the Council of the Lateran (Chap, iii), under Innocent III, assumes
existence of such [papal] power, saying: ‘If a temporal lord, after
being admonished by the Church, should neglect to purge his domain
of heretical vileness, he shall be excommunicated by his metropolitan.
And if he should neglect to make amends within the year, this fact
shall be reported to the Supreme Pontiff, so that the latter may
declare the vassals [of the said lord] to be absolved from that time
forth from their obligation of allegiance to him, and may throw open
his territory for occupation by Catholics.’
On the basis of all these considerations, one may draw up the
following argument: the Universal Church cannot err in those
matters which pertain to faith and morals; she has given her consent
to acts of the sort under discussion and has approved them as being
in harmony with divine and natural law; and, similarly, she approves
1 [resipere (to savour of) appears to be used here in the place of resipiscere (to become reasonable, &c.).
Du Cange’s Dictionary records a fourth conjugation form, resipire, with the meaning of resiptsceri.

The Pope may use coercive Power against Kings

Chap. XXIII]

6yp

canon laws which impose penalties of the kind in question upon
temporal princes, because of the gravest crimes and contumacy on their
part, and especially in the case of heresy ; therefore, it is as certain that
the Pope may coerce and punish temporal princes with such penalties,
as it is that the Church cannot err in matters of faith and morals.
17. Thirdly,1 the same truth may be proved by reasoning. For
this power was required in the supreme head and pastor of the Church,
on two grounds : that is to say, both from the stand­
The same truth is
point of the emperors or kings and temporal princes
convincingly de­
monstrated by
of
all kinds, and from the standpoint of the peoples
reasoning.
subject to them.
The said power is required, on the first ground, in order that the
Pope may correct and reform, or may even fittingly punish, a rebellious
prince. For both the corrective and punitive functions are proper
to the office of a pastor ; and it frequently happens that censures alone
do not suffice for these purposes, an inadequacy sufficiently brought
out by daily experience ; therefore, one must conclude that Christ did
bestow the power in question upon His Aricar, since He made that
Vicar pastor over Christian princes no less than over the rest of
Christendom.
Accordingly, in so far as pertains to the first ground, and in cases
turning wholly or chiefly upon the reformation of a prince who has
sinned, the Popes are wont for the most part to employ censures, since
this is the proper curative penalty, of which Christ spoke (Matthew,
Chap, xviii). And if it so happens that the prince is corrected and
reformed as a result of the censure, then it is not the custom of
the Church to pursue the strict course of resorting to penalties of a
severe and public nature. Nevertheless, the Church can and usually
does impose some punishment, both for the reparation of damage, if
such damage has perchance been caused by the guilty parties, and
also in order that some satisfaction may be given by the latter, to God
and to the Universal Church. For the obtaining of reparation for
damage and of compensation for injuries inflicted is not so much
punishment as it is a restitution (so to speak) and discharge of a debt;
although coercion to such an end may require superior power. How­
ever, the principle of the common good and of legal justice demands
that, in addition to this compensation which is due by the rules of
commutative justice, some strictly punitive expiation of the offence
be exacted, in order that the Church may receive satisfaction and an
example may be set before other men, instilling fear into them.
Moreover, when the king, disregarding the censure, continues stub­
bornly and incorrigibly to offend, then graver penalties should be
1 (The first and second bases of proof were respectively, Scriptural passages, and ecclesiastical
authority and practice. Cf. the first sentence of Section 14, and the accompanying footnote.—Ik-]
1569.74

-

± TT

Matthew, xviii.

698
St. Thomas.

Decretals, N.
VII. ix.

Augustine.

A Defence of the Catholic and Apostolic Faith

[BE III

imposed; and almost all the cases mentioned above fall into this
category, as St. Thomas has noted {De Regimine Principum, Bk. Ill,
chap. x).
18. This part of our argument may be further confirmed by the
fact that the Church does have power, with respect to all others among
A confirmation [of the faithful—that is, all other baptized Christians—
this argument].
not merely to coerce them through censures in order
to correct their faults, but also to avenge offences already committed,
by means of other, temporal or corporal punishments, and in the 339
manner suited to an ecclesiastical judge and pastor; wherefore the
lawful prelates of the Church, and particularly the Pope, possess this
same power with respect to temporal princes, even those of sovereign
rank.
The assumption is clearly proved by the unvarying practice of
the Church. For the canon laws frequently impose pecuniary penalties,
amounting sometimes to a confiscation of property. Again, they at
times impose corporal punishments, short of peril to life or limb, such
as the punishment of flagellation; at other times, they impose even the
penalty of condemnation to the galleys ; and, when the death penalty
is necessary, the ecclesiastical judges—although, out of regard for the
dignity of their position, they do not make a practice of passing such
sentence—may nevertheless commit the accused to the charge of a
secular judge, instructing the latter to inflict upon the criminal such
punishment as is demanded by just laws. All of these facts may be
accorded special consideration in connexion with the charge of heresy;
for heretics are not only excommunicated by the Church, and sub­
jected to other spiritual punishments, but are also deprived of all their
temporal goods, by virtue of the canon laws as well as by the laws of
the Emperors. And finally, in the case of a stubborn heretic, or one
who has returned to his errors, the imperial laws impose capital
punishment, while the canon laws deliver that heretic to the will of
the secular judge, that the culprit may receive the punishment suited
to the nature of his crime. This point is brought out in the Decretals
(Bk. V, tit. vu, chap, ix, and similar chapters).
19. The practice of the Church affords sufficiently convincing
proof that these penalties are most just, and the same conclusion finds
excellent support in the works of Augustine {Letters, xlviii and 1
[ =Letters, xciii and clxxxv, Migne ed.] and Contra epistolam Parmeniani,
Bk. Ill, chap, ii [, no. 14]). Moreover, the fact that such power must
necessarily reside in the Church of Christ as instituted by Him is conThe power to punish clusively proved through reasoning; since if the subby means of tem- jects of the Church could not be coerced with penalties
porai penalties is 4 c ,. r
.
r
necessary to the
oi this [temporal] nature, they might easily scorn the
Church.
spiritual penalties and do grave injury to themselves

Chap. XXIII]

The Pope may use coercive Power against Kings

699

and to others. For, as we read in the Book of Proverbs (Chap. xxix[, v.
15]): T· · ·] t^ie child that is left to his own will bringeth his mother to
shame.’ Accordingly, the Christian Church would not have been
properly appointed, nor would sufficient provision for it have been made,
if it did not possess the power to coerce rebellious members, who
are unwilling to submit to its censures. Nor is this issue satisfactorily
[evaded] by asserting that the existence of such power in temporal
. Christian princes is sufficient. For, in the first place,
A
of tacit i
*
i
i
it·
escape from this the princes themselves may transgress and be in need
conclusion is pre- of correction, a point which I shall discuss presently.
And, in the second place, the punishment of wrong­
doing essentially pertains to the civil magistrates exclusively, in so far
as those wrongful deeds are opposed to the political ends of the
commonwealth, to its peace, and to human justice; but coercion, with
respect to those deeds which are opposed to religion and to the salva­
tion of the soul, is essentially a function of spiritual power, so that the
authority to make use of temporal penalties for the purposes of such
correction must have been allotted in particular to this spiritual power,
whether the penalties are to be inflicted directly by the said power, or
whether it avails itself of the ministry of its temporal arm that all
things may be done decently, in order and efficaciously.
20. It remains for us to prove our earlier conclusion, namely, that
if the Church possesses the power in question with
exempt from liabi- respect to other Christians, of subordinate rank, it
chre^powe^o^Thë
have received that same power with respect to
Pope than are other temporal sovereigns, and it will have done so most
persons.
especially in the case of Peter and his successors.
The consequent, then, may be proved on the basis of the principle
already laid down, that is to say: such sovereigns are as truly the sheep
of Peter as are all other [members of the flock]; neither does their
temporal dignity nor their temporal power render them immune
from the force of the said papal power, nor exempt from liability to
the punishment in question, inasmuch as one cannot infer from the
words of Christ, nor from any other basic principle, nor by any process
of reasoning, that there resides in them such liberty, or rather, such
licence to sin. On the contrary, it is far more essential that the Church
should possess the said power for the coercion of such princes, than
that it should possess the same power for the coercion of their subjects.
This is, indeed, the case because in the first place, the princes themselves
are the more apt to err, and the more difficult to correct once they
have fallen into error, in that they are more free. And, in the second
place, the sins of princes—especially those sins which are opposed to
the faith and to religion—are more pernicious [than the sins of other
Christians]; for princes easily lead their subjects to imitate them,

~oo

Ecclesiasticus,

Cicero.

Gregory.
Pope Nicholas,

Claudian.

A Defence of the Catholic and Apostolic Faith

[Bk. Ill

whether by their [bare] example, or by favours and promises, or even
by threats and intimidation. Wherefore the Wise Man has rightly
said (Ecclesiasticus, Chap, x [, w. 3 and 2]) : ‘An unwise king shall be
the ruin of his people [. . .]’, for ‘[. . .] what manner of man the ruler
of a city is, such also are they that dwell therein.’1 The same doctrine
has been upheld by the philosophers who are attracted to it by reason
and by practical experience. We have an example in Cicero (Letters
[to his Friends,] Bk. I [, epist. ix, § 12]), where he follows Plato. Thus
it is that this same Cicero has also rightly said in the Laws (Bk. Ill
[, chap, xiv, § 32]): ‘Vicious princes do not simply harbour vices within
themselves, but also infuse those vices into the whole state.’ For, in
fine, ‘Princely transgressions are graver than those of other persons,
and therefore, the punishments inflicted upon princes by their pastors
should be likewise more grave’, as Gregory [the Great] remarked when
discussing the pastors themselves (in Liber Regulae Pastoralis, Pt. Ill,
chap, v),2 a remark quoted by Pope Nicholas [the First], opposing
Lothaire, King of France,3 in his letter to that same King (cited in
Decretum, Pt. II, causa xi, qu. iii, can. iii).
21. Finally, in view of the foregoing, we may readily establish
another ground for the existence of such power over kings, namely, 340
that it exists for the defence of the subjects. For it is the function of
a pastor not simply to bring back the wandering sheep to the right
way and recall them to the fold, but also to ward off the wolves,
defending his charges from enemies, lest they be dragged beyond the
fold and perish. But a bad king, and especially one who is schismatic
and heretical, places his subjects in grave danger of perdition (as is
evident from what we have just said), wherefore Claudian has declared
[Fhe Fourth Consulship of Honorius, Lines 299-300, 302]: ‘The whole
world adapts itself to the example set by a king. [. . .] Always the
inconstant crowd changes with the prince.’ Accordingly, it is a
function of the papal office to defend the subjects of an heretical or
perverse prince, and to free them from that evident peril ; and for this
reason Christ, Who did and ordered all things well and excellently,
conferred upon Peter the power in question, including it under the
term ‘Feed’, and under the power of binding and loosing. Con­
sequently, [the Pope] can, through this power, deprive such a prince of
his dominion; he can prevent the latter from injuring the subjects;
and he can release those subjects from their oath of allegiance, or
1 [In the Latin text, the Nam (For) which connects these two passages is also italicized, implying
that one continuous quotation is given, as follows : Rex insipiens perdet populum suum. Nam qualis est
rector civitatis, tales & habitantes in ea. In point of fact, parts of two verses are quoted in inverse order,
for the Vulgate reads: [.. .] et qualis rector est civitatis, tales et inhabitantes in ea. Rex insipiens perdet
populum suum [...].—Tr.]
2 [A footnote to Decretum, Pt. II, causa xi, qu. iii, can. iii corrects this reference as follows: Gregory,
Pastoralis, Pt. Ill, chap. iv.—Tr.]
3 [Lothaire was King of Lotharingia or Lorraine.—Tr.]

Chap. XXIII]

The Pope may use coercive Power against Kings

701

declare them to be released, since such an oath is always understood
to carry with it the condition that it may be thus dissolved.1
22. This ground for the existence of the said power has seemed,
to St. Thomas and other approved theologians, to be so weighty
and so moving that it would suffice in itself alone to deprive an infidel
king of his dominion and power over the faithful, even if the reason
previously expounded—that of vengeance and just punishment—should
disappear.
For, according to the teachings of Paul [z Corinthians, Chap, v,
v. 12], the Church does not judge ‘them that are without’; whence
Even if the Pope has these same theologians conclude that the Pope has
not power to punish not power to punish an unbaptized and heathen king,
a heathen king, he r
r.
,
. r .
. .
does have the power for infidelity or other sins; but, notwithstanding
to free Christian
facr
(]oes have power, if there are Christian
subjects from the
. .
,
·.
.1
i i·
i
r
dominion of that subjects under that king, to deliver them from
subjection to their ruler, on the ground that they are
in evident peril of moral destruction. Such is the doctrine laid
down by St. Thomas (II.—II, qu. io, art. io), and implied by Paul St Thomas,
(z Corinthians, Chap. vi). For Paul rebukes the believers who go to rCorinthians,
law before unbelieving judges, assuming that the Church has power to
create judges who will decide between the faithful even in temporal
questions lest they be compelled to appear before unbelievers, and
demanding [Ibid., v. 3], in order to establish this point: ‘Know you
not that we shall judge angels ? how much more things of this world ?’
These words are cited by Gregory {Letters, Bk. VII, epist. xxi),2 who Gregory,
is led by them to say: ‘Is he, then, to whom hath been given the power
of opening and closing the gates of heaven, prohibited from judging
of earthly matters ? This cannot be.’
For the same reason, and in like manner, a Christian wife may
—so Paul teaches (z Corinthians, Chap, vii)—be separated from an tCortnthani,
unbelieving husband if she cannot dwell with him without wronging vu'
the Creator. Moreover, on the same principle, children who have
been baptized are liberated from the power and the society of un­
believing parents, that they may not be enmeshed anew within
the errors of those parents, according to the statement made at the
Fourth Council of Toledo (Chap. lix). Accordingly, by a similar, or Council of
even more forceful process of reasoning, a Christian king (that is, one ToIedo*
subject to the Church by virtue of baptism) may be deprived of his
power and dominion over his vassals; and therefore, the ground [of
defence for the subjects] is in itself sufficient to endow the Pope with
power to punish such Christian princes, lawfully depriving them of
1 [Simply ilia conditio, in the Latin.—Tr.]
1 [Migne refers the reader to Letter Iii, indict. 2 in his Pairologia Latina, VoL lixvii, col. 875,
note.—Revises.]

~02

A Defence of the Catholic and Apostolic Faith

[BE III

their kingdoms and employing for this purpose the sword of other
princes, so that sword shall thus be under sword, for the sake of mutual
aid in defending and protecting the Church.
23. At this point, I might expound, confirm, and defend still other
grounds on which the Pope would be entitled to order temporal
matters for just cause; as he has done when transferring the Empire,
when establishing the manner of electing the Emperor, when taking
charge of that Empire during a vacancy on the imperial throne, and
also, on yet other occasions, when laying down the law in temporal
cases. But the brevity of a work of this kind forbids a full discussion
of all these points; nor are they essential to our purpose and plan.
Consequently, I must refer the reader to other authors, who have
treated most learnedly of the points in question.

FRANCISCO SUAREZ

A DEFENCE OF THE CATHOLIC
AND APOSTOLIC FAITH
BOOK VI
CONCERNING THE OATH OF ALLEGIANCE

EXACTED BY THE KING OF ENGLAND
CHAPTER IV: DOES THE THIRD PART OF THE OATH [EXACTED BY
KING JAMES] CONTAIN ANY REQUIREMENT IN EXCESS OF CIVIL
OBEDIENCE AND CONTRARY TO CATHOLIC DOCTRINE?

Chap. IV]

Does Oath of King James exact more than Civil Obedience? 705
CHAPTER IV

DOES THE THIRD PART OF THE OATH [EXACTED BY KING JAMES] CON­
TAIN ANY REQUIREMENT IN EXCESS OF CIVIL OBEDIENCE AND
CONTRARY TO CATHOLIC DOCTRINE ?

I. To the preceding parts of the oath, a third is added, as follows:
‘I do further swear that I do from my heart abhor, detest and abjure,
as impious and heretical, this [damnable]1 doctrine and position; that
princes which be excommunicated or deprived by the Pope, may be
deposed or murdered by their subjects or any other whatsoever.’1
2
In connexion with these words, three points must be taken into
consideration : first, the doctrine itself; secondly, the right by which
this [portion of the] oath is exacted of the subjects; and thirdly, the
extent of the inconsistency between the words in question and those
in which the king promises to show that the said oath exacts nothing
beyond [due] civil obedience.
With respect to the first of these points, in view of the fact that
the king—anxious for his own security—insists repeatedly upon the
well-worn question of whether or not it is permissible for a private
individual or for his subjects to kill a tyrannical king, and inasmuch as
an understanding of this and other parts of the oath is contingent to
a great extent upon a correct solution of that question, I have deemed
it necessary to prefix a few words on the subject.
The theologians, then, distinguish two kinds of tyrant.
There is one kind of tyrant who has seized the throne, not by a just
The two kinds of title but by force and unjustly. These tyrants are not
trrant·
kings and rulers in reality, but simply usurp the posi­
tion of king and imitate the role of royalty.
There is another sort of tyrant who, although he is the true ruler
and holds the throne by a just title, nevertheless rules tyrannically in
so far as concerns his use of governmental power. For, to be specific,
he either turns all things to his private advantage, neglecting the
common advantage, or else unjustly oppresses his subjects by plunder,
slaughter, corruption, or the unjust perpetration of other similar
716 deeds, with public effect and on numerous occasions. Such a ruler,
for example, was Nero, whom Augustine (On the City of God, Bk. V, St. Augustine,
chap, xix) numbers among those tyrants whose dominion God does
at times permit. For Augustine thus reads the passage in Proverbs Proverbs,wL
(Chap, viii [, w. 15-16]): ‘By me kings reign and tyrants by me hold
1 [This word is omitted in the Latin text of Suarez.—Tr.]
2 [The English translation of this quotation is taken from G. W. Prothero’s Select Statutes and Other
Constitutional Documents Illustrative of the Reign of Elizabeth and James I (3rd ed„ Oxford, rço6), p. 259.
-Tr.]
1569.74
, T

706

St. Thomas.

Cajetan.
Soto.

Molina.
Azor.
Toledo.

Bartolus.
Alexander.
Socinus.
Gigas.
Lucas of
Penna.
Conradus
Brunus.
Thomas
Actius.
Restaurus.

Paris.

Covarruvias.
I Peter, ii.

A Defence of the Catholic and Apostolic Faith

[Bk. VI

sway over the earth.’1 Moreover, among Christians, that prince is
particularly to be included within this class who leads his subjects into
heresy, or into any form of apostasy, or into any public schism.
2. The question under discussion, then, has to do chiefly with
lawful princes who rule tyrannically, since it is to such princes that
A prince cannot t^ie King of England refers, and since he himself is
iicitiy be slain on regarded by us as one of this group of lawful sovereigns.
?v^atethoaiïhOniüs
Accordingly, we hold that a [legitimate] prince
government be
cannot justly be slain on private authority, on the
tyrannical.
ground that he rules tyrannically, or because of any
crimes whatsoever.
This proposition is commonly accepted and certainly true. It has
been laid down by Saint Thomas in the De Regimine Principum
(Bk. I, chap, vi), where he confirms it by means of excellent moral
arguments. The same doctrine is supported by Caj'etan (on II.—II,
qu. 64, art. 3). And on this same passage of St. Thomas, we have the
comments of other modern authors, including Soto (De lustitia, Bk. V,
qu. I, art. 3), Molina (Vol. IV, De lustitia, Tract. Ill, disp. vi), Azor
(Vol. I, bk. vin, chap, xii, qu. 17, and chap, xxvi, qu. 7, and Vol. Ill,
bk. ii, chap, ii, qu. i,and chap, vii, qu. 30),2 the Cardinal Toledo (on
the Summa, Bk. V, chap, vi), and the Summists generally, on the word
Tyrannus. The j’urists—for example Bartolus, Alexander [of Imola],
Socinus, the Cardinal3 and others who are cited and followed by Gigas
(throughout the entire treatise On the Crime of Lese-majesty, Qu. 65)—
agree in upholding the same truth. Lucas of Penna, too (on Code, XL
xlvii. 1), supports this assertion, as do Conradus Brunus (De Seditiosis,
Bk. V, chap, ii, nos. 9 and 10), Thomas Actius (Opusc. De Ludo
Scacchorum sive Latrunculorum, Qu. 2, no. 50), Restaurus Castaldus
(throughout the entire treatise De Imperatore, Qu. 82), at length, with
excellent effect, and by means of many citations ; and Paris de Puteo
(tract. De Sindicatu, § An liceat occidere Regem), who tends toward the
conclusion in question, although he expresses himself confusedly, as I
shall later point out. Covarruvias (Epitome of Decretals, Bk. IV, pt. ii,
De Matrimonio, chap, iii, §4, no. 6 [no. 13]) is of a similar opinion.
Moreover, this truth is in conformity with the precepts of 1 Peter,
Chap, ii [, v. 13]: ‘Be ye subject therefore to every [human] creature
for God’s sake: whether it be to the king’, &c., and later [v. 18]:
‘Servants, be subject to your masters [. . .], not only to the good and
gentle, but also to the froward.’
1 [St. Augustine gives the citation as Proverbs, Chap, viii, v. 15, and quotes the text as follows:
Per me Reges regnant, & tyranni per me tenent terram. The Vulgate, however, has : Per me reges regnant,
.. . per me principes imperant, and the English of the Douay version reads : * By me kings reign,...
By me princes rule. ’ Moreover, the quotation would seem to include parts of two verses (15 and 16) rather
than the whole of verse 15.—Tr.]
2 [Azor, in all these passages, deals with much more than the precise point under discussion.—
Reviser.]
3 [Gratian.—Tr.J

Chap. IV]

Does Oath of King James exact more than Civil Obedience? 707

3. The same truth was, indeed, laid down more specifically, and
The contrary doc- t^le contrary belief condemned as heretical, at the
trine is condemned Council of Constance (Session XV), where (as I have
as heretical.
recorded in Book V)1 there was passed a condemnation
of the following proposition: ‘A tyrant may and should be slain licitly
and meritoriously by any of his vassals and subjects whomsoever, and
even by means of secret snares and subtle blandishments or adulation,
notwithstanding any oath sworn to that ruler or any pact made with
him, and without awaiting12 the sentence or mandate of any judge
whatsoever. ’ Furthermore, according to the declaration of the Council,
those persons are heretics, and deserving of punishment as such, who
persist in defending the said proposition.
For this declaration applies (by the interpretation of all modern
authorities) to those rulers who are tyrants simply in their manner
of ruling, and not from the standpoint of their title to or usurpation
of the throne. This fact is implied by the very language of the deci­
sion, since the terms ‘vassal’ and ‘subject’ are properly used only in
connexion with a true prince and superior; and since, moreover, the
phrase, ‘notwithstanding any oath sworn’ must include even the oaths
lawfully taken before true kings, inasmuch as the wording is general.
Accordingly, there is no doubt but that the author of the proposition
in question is at least referring generally to all tyrants, whether they
be tyrants with respect to their titles, or with respect to their manner
of ruling. His terminology and elaborations clearly indicate that this
is the case. There is, too, the additional argument that the proposition
is derived from the doctrines of Wycliffe and John Huss, who held that
temporal lords lost their supremacy ipso facto, in consequence of my
The error of Wy- mortal sin whatsoever, and could be rebuked at will
ciiffe and of John by their subjects, on that ground. Such was the
Huss‘
interpretation of the said proposition reached by this
same Council of Constance (Session VIII). Furthermore, the Council
condemns the proposition because of its sweeping universality, and
the headlong rashness instantly discernible in all its clauses and ampli­
fications ; and it is particularly condemned by that body in so far as it
applies to true kings and princes who are ruling in tyrannical fashion.
The proposition may, indeed, be extended to apply to tyrants,
in the strictest sense of the term—those w’ho have unjustly usurped
and retained the throne—if [the said proposition] is rashly maintained
together with all those additional expressions, namely, the words,
‘notwithstanding any oath sworn to that ruler or any pact made with
1 [Not included in these Selections.—Tr.J
2 [Suarez here writes non spectata (which might be translated ‘without reference to*); but the text
of the condemnation appearing in the Enchiridion Symbolorum (p. 235) and Suarez, too, in subsequent
passages on the subject, have non ex(s)pectata (without awaiting). Vide notes land 30η p. 717. Moreover,
according to the Du Cange Glossarium, the two verbs came to be interchangeable in meaning.—Tr.]

The Council
of Constance.

708

Augustine.

A Defence of the Catholic and Apostolic Faith

[BL VI

him’. For this is a false belief and one contrary to natural reason,
which demands that pacts, and especially pacts which have been
solemnized by oath, shall be kept.
4. Moreover, the principle underlying the assertion in question
is as follows : a king ruling in tyrannical fashion might be slain by any
The basis of the private subject whatsoever, either on the ground of
true doctrine.
just vengeance and punishment, or on that of just
defence, whether of the subject himself or of the state.
The first of these grounds is altogether false and heretical, because
the power of avenging or punishing offences resides, not in private 717
individuals, but in their superior or in the whole of a perfect com­
munity; consequently, a private person who on that ground slays his
prince, usurps a jurisdiction and power which he does not rightfully
possess; and therefore, he sins against justice. Our major premiss is
certain, as a matter of faith, and has been upheld by Augustine,
who writes (On the City of God, Bk. I, chaps, xvii and xviii):1 ‘It
is not permissible for any one to slay, on private authority, a man
who is guilty of wrongdoing but whose slaughter is not authorized
by any law’,1
2 and again (Bk. I, chaps, xxi and xxvi): ‘He who slays
another when unauthorized by public power and not endowed with
just dominion over him, is a homicide.’2 Moreover, the reason under­
lying this position is, in the first place, the fact that the avenging and
punishment of crimes are ordained for the common good of the state,
and have therefore been entrusted solely to him who has also been
entrusted with public power for the government of the state. Secondly,
there is the fact that punishment is the act of a superior and of one
possessing jurisdiction, so that, if this act is performed by a private
individual, it is one of usurped jurisdiction. Thirdly and finally, if
the assertion in question were not true,3 infinite confusion and disorder would result within the state, and the way would be opened to
civil discord and to murder.
But if, in accordance with this reasoning, it is homicide to slay
a private individual on one’s own [unofficial] authority, even if that
individual is himself a homicide, a robber, or an assassin, it is a far
greater crime to lay hands upon a prince solely on one’s own authority,
even though he be an unjust and tyrannical prince. In fact, if this
were not a crime,3 there could be no security among kings and princes,
since vassals readily devise complaints of unjust treatment on die part
of rulers.
5. As to the second ground [for the slaughter of tyrants by private
individuals], the ground of defence, it might perhaps be tenable in
1 [This quotation is found in Bk. I, chap, xvii, of Augustine’s On the City of God.—Tr.]
2 [This quotation, as given by Suarez, varies slightly from Augustine's text.—Tr.]
3 [Simply alias (otherwise) in the Latin.—Tr.]

Does Oath of King James exact more than Civil Obedience? 709

connexion with certain situations, but it is not tenable in connexion
with the question we are discussing, namely: whether or not a king
may be slain by a private individual solely because of his tyrannical
government.
Thus it is necessary to distinguish between cases of self-defence and
those in which one is defending the state. And we must further dis­
tinguish, with respect to the former group of cases, between those in
which one defends his life or limb (that is to say, his body, which is
threatened with grave mutilation), and those in which he is merely
defending his external and adventitious goods.
For it would not be permissible to slay a kingly aggressor, solely
on the ground of defence of one’s external possessions : because, in the
first place, the life of the prince—owing to the dignity of his office
and the fact that he is, in a unique sense, God’s representative and His
vicar—must be preferred to such external goods; and furthermore,
because the prince possesses a superior form of administrative power
over the property-of all his subjects, and because although he may
possibly exceed the limits set to that power, he may not therefore be
resisted to the point where he himself is slain, since it is enough that
he should subsequently be bound in justice to make restitution of or
compensation for all things forcibly seized, and that a private individual
may exact such [restitution or compensation] in so far as he is able to
do so without resorting to violence.
On the other hand, if one acts in defence of his very life, which the
,Is it. permissible,
.
king
is attempting
to take violently
from
him, then
or
γ
.1
J
. .. , r
,
not, to slay the to be sure, it will ordinarily be permissible for the
prince, in defence subject to defend himself, even though the death of
of one’s own life?
, J
, r
r>
· i
the prince result from such defence, ror the right to
preserve one’s own hfe is the greatest right; nor does the prince, in
the situation described, labour under any need that obliges the sub­
ject to sacrifice his life for his sovereign’s sake, since, on the contrary,
the prince himself has voluntarily and by his unjust behaviour placed
himself in this perilous position. I say, ‘ordinarily’, however, for if the
state would be thrown into confusion by the death of the king, or
would suffer from some other grave injury detrimental to the common
welfare, then the charitable love of one’s country and a charitable
regard for that common welfare, would bind one—even at the peril of
his own life—to refrain from slaying the king. But this obfigation
falls within the order of charity, and with that order we are not at
present dealing.
6. Again, if the question relates to cases in which the commonwhat of those
wealth itself is to be defended, this [violent method of]
in which the state defence is impermissible unless we assume that the
is defended."
acrtuajjy attacking the state, with the unjust

—

Chap. IV]

710

St. Augustine,

A Defence of the Catholic and Apostolic Faith

[Bk. VI

intention of destroying it and slaughtering the citizens, or that some
similar situation exists. Under such circumstances, it will assuredly be
permissible to resist the prince, even by slaying him if defence cannot
be achieved in any other fashion. One argument in favour of this
assertion is as follows : if such action is licit in order to protect one’s
own life, far more certainly will it be Heit for the sake of the common
good. A further argument resides in the fact that the state or com­
monwealth itself is in that case engaged in a just defensive war against
an unjust invader, even though he be its own king; so that any citizen
whatsoever, acting as a member of that commonwealth, and impelled
—whether expressly or tacitly—by it, may therefore defend the said
commonwealth, in the course of that conflict, in whatsoever way is
possible to him.
However, we are not at present concerned with those cases in
which the prince actually wages an offensive war against the state
itself, with the intention of destroying it and slaying great numbers of
the citizens. Rather are we concerned with those occasions when he
rules the state peacefully, but disturbs and injures it in other ways
[than by offensive warfare]. And in such cases, defence of the state
by violence or by wiles directed against the life of the king is not to
be permitted since the state is subjected, on these occasions, to no
actual violence, such as might Hcitly be repelled by violence. Con­
sequently, an attack upon the prince, under these circumstances, would
be tantamount to the waging of war upon him, on private authority;
and such warfare is in nowise Heit, ‘because that1 natural order which
is accommodated to the peace of mankind, demands that the authority
to engage in a war should reside in the state, or in princes,’ as Augustine 718
declares (Contra Faustum, Bk. XXII, chap. Ixxiv [chap. Ixxv]). Another
reason supporting the same conclusion is as foHows: even as it is not
permissible that one should, on his private authority, punish the
wrongful deeds of any person by means of that person’s death, just
so is it impermissible to avert on one’s private authority, and by the
slaughter of that individual, the wrongful deeds which one fears he
may in the future commit ; and the principle involved is the same [with
respect to both private and princely wrongdoers]; moreover, its
validity is manifest in the case of private malefactors ; therefore, the
said conclusion holds good, and with stiH greater reason, when apphed
to offending princes.
7. In order, however, that we may elucidate our doctrine more
1 (St. Augustine has ordo . . . ide, which defines his meaning perhaps more clearly than does the
Suàrezian quotation. The latter omits ide and varies slightly in other respects from the text of Augustine,
which runs : . . . ordo tamen ille naturalis mortalium paci accommodatus hoc poscit, ut suscipiendi belli
auctoritas atque consilium penes Principem sit.. . . Suarez quotes as follows : quia ordo naturalis, mor­
talium paci accommodatus hoc poscit, ut suscipiendi belli authoritatem [corrected to auctoritas in the Paris
edition of 1859] Penes rempublicam, seu Principes sil.—Tr.]

Chap. IV] Does Oath of King James exact more than Civil Obedience? 711

satisfactorily, and may the better apply the foregoing remarks1 to the
,It is. permissible
.
clause quoted
above
2 from the oath, it will
be necesto
1
,
....
,
.
slay a tyrant whose sary to make a prior declaration as to whether or not
title to the throne the doctrine already laid down holds good with reis tyrannical.
.
\
,
spect to the second group, that is, with respect to
rulers whose very title is tyrannical.
For ordinarily a distinction is made between these two classes of
tyrants, inasmuch as it is asserted that the tyrant whose title is ac­
quired in tyrannical fashion, may be slain by any private person
whatsoever belonging to the state wdiich is subjected to the tyranny,
provided that there is no other way in which the said person can free
the state from that tyranny.
So St. Thomas has held (on the Sentences, Bk. II, dist. xliv, qu. 2,
art. 2, main part and conclusion), and his opinion has been adopted by
almost all the Doctors above cited. The treatise of Conradus Brunus (De
Seditiosis, Bk. VI, chap, iii), wherein he records various examples, may
also be cited in this connexion, though his examples have been com­
piled from both just and unjust acts, so that they provide proof with
regard not to what is just, but to what is customary. The reason, then,
on which the said opinion is founded, is the fact that, under the cir­
cumstances described, it is not the king or prince who is slain, but an
enemy of the state. Thus it is that St. Thomas (De Regimine Principum, Bk. I, chap, vi), similarly defends the deed of Aod, who—though
he was merely a private person—slew Eglon, King of Moab, to whom
Israel was subject, on the ground that Eglon was not the true King
of God’s people, but was rather an enemy and a tyrant (Judges,
Chap, v [Chap. iii]). Abulensis [Tostado] gives the same account (in
his commentary on that passage [on Judges, Chap, iii], qu. 26), and
adds that this tyrant could [licitly] have been slain by any Israelite
whatsoever. So, too, did Judith slay Holofernes (Judith, Chap. xiii).
And Jahel performed a similar deed when she killed Sisara judges,
Chap, iv), a deed for which she is praised (Judges, Chap. v). In like
manner, St. Thomas approves, in the passage previously cited [on the
Sentences, Bk. II, dist. xliv, qu. 2, art. 2, main part and conclusion], of
the opinion expressed by Cicero when the latter praises [in Philippics, I]
the slayers of Caesar, usurper of sovereign power, not by a just title, but
through violence and tyranny. Accordingly, the Doctors, too, maintain
that the crime of lese-majesty is not committed against a tyrant
of this sort, since no true majesty resides in him. They furthermore
hold that the title of ‘prince’ does not apply to such tyrants and that
1 [Reading dicta with the 1859 Paris edition, not dictam with our own Latin text, and that of Mayence,
1619.—Tr.]
1 [Propositam in our text. The 1619 and 1859 «lirions have praepositam which is perhaps the clearer
term in this context. In any case, the clause here referred to is evidently the entire third part of the
oath quoted in the first sentence of this Chapter.—Tr.]

St. Thomas,

Comadus

Abt/.ns·,
iT«’*do].

Jud.ih, xin
Judges.^.

Tullius

(,cero·

7I2

Gigas.
St. Thomas.

Abulensis
[Tostado].

A Defence of the Catholic and Apostolic Faith

[Bk. VI

consequently the decrees declaring that it is not permissible to slay a
prince do not refer to the said tyrants ; a fact which is made evident
by Gigas in his Treatise On the Crime of Lese-majesty (Qu. 65).
8. However, St. Thomas (on the Sentences, Bk. II, dist. xliv, qu. 2,
a limiting condi- art. 2., main part and concl.) adds [, to the propotion·
sition that the slaying of these tyrants is permissible,]
a limiting condition, as follows: such an act is permissible when
no recourse can be had to any superior through whom judgment
may be passed upon the usurper. This limitation has force most
particularly when the tyranny is practised not by a sovereign prince but
by some inferior. For not only [foreign] kings, but also powerful inferior
lords are able to usurp through tyrannysome form of dominion, or juris­
diction, or magistracy. Accordingly, under such circumstances, although
the people may resist an invader while he is in the act of making the
attack, nevertheless, when the attack has once been made, and he has
obtained possession and the power of dominion, they may not, on their
own [private] authority, slay him or begin a new war against him, as
long as it is possible for them to have recourse to a superior, inasmuch
as they may not draw their swords on their own authority when they
have a superior; and still less would this be permissible to every private
individual whatsoever. For if it were permissible,1 general disorder
would result, and great confusion would spring up within the state.
Furthermore, and for the same reason, even in cases where there
is no superior to whom recourse may be had, it is necessary that the
tyranny and injustice be public and manifest. For
The circumstances
which must exist in if there is doubt of their reality, it will not be per­
order that a ruler missible to remove by force the person who is in pos­
whose title is tyran­
nical may licitly be session, since in case of doubt his position is the
slain by a private stronger, unless it is at the same time certain that
individual.
his seizure of possession was tyrannical.
Again, in order that such a tyrant may licitly be slain, this slay­
ing must be necessary to the liberty of the kingdom; for if the tyrant
can be removed by any method that is less harsh, it will not be licit
to slay him straightway without the sanction of any superior power
and an examination of the case.
9. The commonly accepted opinion must also be understood [to
include a further limitation, namely]: provided that no treaty, truce,
or pact confirmed by oath shall have passed between the tyrant and
the people; a point noted by Abulensis [Tostado] (on Judges, Chap,
iii, qu. 26). For pacts and oaths, even those entered into with enemies,
should be observed unless perchance they were manifestly unjust, and
exacted by coercion.
Yet another limitation should be added as follows: provided
1 [alias, in the Latin.—Tr.]

Chap. IV]

Does Oath of King James exact more than Civil Obedience? 713

that there is no fear lest the state suffer, in consequence of the slay. x. ......
ing of the tyrant, the same ills as those which it endures
Another limitation.
j
·ιι
r™
r»
i
under his sway, or ills even more grave. I hus Bartolus
has declared (in his Treatise On the Guelphs and Ghibellines, N0.9)1 that
719 it is permissible, under the circumstances described, to put to death a
tyrant for the sake of the common good, not for one’s private advantage.
For if any person slays a tyrant in order that he himself may by means
of a like tyranny obtain possession of the sovereign power, he cannot
but be held guiltyof homicide, as well as of fresh tyranny. Again, if it is
believed that the son of a tyrant, or another person similarly allied to
him, is destined to inflict the same ills upon the state, it will not be
permissible [to slay that person], because [in the event of such slaughter]
evil is done without hope of effecting thereby a greater good, and
because, in such a case, the state is not actually defended, or freed from
tyranny,yet these a re the sole titles by which that death maybe justified.
And finally, it is required that the state shall not expressly oppose
...
[the act of tyrannicide]. For, if the state offers an
The last condition. u
i
r · r
express objection, it does not merely retrain from
bestowing authority upon private individuals, but furthermore de­
clares that [such a] defensive act is not desirable for it ; and the state
must be believed on this point; so that, under these circumstances, it
is therefore illicit for a private individual to defend the state by putting
the tyrant to death.
10. Yet, in spite of the foregoing arguments, there are authors
The opinion of
who do not accept the distinction and opinion above
other authors.
set forth, believing rather that it should be uncondi­
tionally ruled that private individuals cannot licitly slay a tyrant,
whether he be tyrannical solely in his exercise of the ruling power, or
tyrannical even in the acquisition of his title.
This is the view that Alfonso de Castro takes {Adversus Omnes
Haereses, Bk. XIV, word Tyrannus), inasmuch as he expresses himseii
unconditionally and interprets in this fashion the pronouncements of
the Council of Constance. Moreover, all of his doctrines point to that
conclusion. Azor has committed himself {[Moral Institutes,] \ol. II,
bk. xi, chap, v, qu. 10) to the same stand more expressly, rejecting the
commonly accepted opinion above set forth. His position is founded
first, upon the fact that the Council of the Lateran2 treats of tyranny in
absolute and general terms; secondly, upon the assertion (also absolute)
of Augustine {On the City of God, Bk. I [, chap, xviij, that it is not per­
missible to slay any person without public authorization; thirdly, upon
the indefinite nature of St. Thomas’ statement that the slaying ot the
tyrant in question is laudable, whereas he does not say that the slaying
1 [In Consilia, Tractatus, Quaestiones (1527 Lugduni).—Revises.]
2 [SuArez, no doubt, intended to say ‘Council of Constance’.—Tr.]
1569.74

4 y

Bartolus.

Caatro.

Azor.

714

Cajetan.

A Defence of the Catholic and Apostolic Faith

[Bk. VI

of the said tyrant by any private individual whomsoever is laudable; and
fourthly, upon the fact that no malefactor can rightfully be put to death,
nor can he who is in possession be dispossessed forthwith, without first
being heard and judged. Nor does evidence of an accomplished crime
suffice, unless a pronouncement of sentence precedes [the act of tyran­
nicide].
ii. But these arguments are of little force when opposed to the
Rejection of this commonly approved opinion.
opinion.
For, as j have said, the Council of the Lateran1
does not lay down the definite and universal negation, that no tyrant
may be slain, but simply condemns the universal affirmation that every
tyrant may be slain, a condemnation stated not in an absolute form but
rather with a number of qualifying terms, so that the declaration of the
said Council is reduced to the following loose formula : ‘Not every tyrant
may be slain before sentence has been pronounced against him.’ And
one cannot draw from this formula any argument in contravention of
the common opinion. To the words ofAugustine I reply that the private
A reply to Augus- individual who slays a tyrant of the kind in question,
tine·
does not commit this deed without public authoriza­
tion, since he is acting both12 by the authority of a tacitly consenting
state, and2 by the authority of God, Who has granted to every man,
through the natural law, the right to defend himself and his state from
the violence inflicted by such a tyrant. To the argument drawn from
St. Thomas, we reply;that his words are sufficiently clear, for in the body
of the article cited [on the Sentences, Bk. II, dist. xliv, qu. 2, art. 2] he
says : ‘When the authority [to do so] exists, any person may repel domi­
nion of this kind’ ; while in the reply to the fifth objection, St. Thomas
makes it clear that he refers to a private individual in using the expression
‘any person,’ since he so interprets the words of Cicero concerning the
slayers of Julius Caesar, and since, moreover, he comes to the following
conclusion: ‘For he who under such circumstances slays a tyrant, in
order to liberate his country, is accorded praise and given a reward.’ As
to the [fourth and] last argument, we may say that it has force when
any one is to be put to death in punishment for his offence, or deprived
of those goods which he holds in peace and as possessions at the moment
uncontested, whether formally or virtually; but the case with which we
are dealing relates to defence, not to punishment ; nor is the tyrant in
possession peacefully, but rather by actual violence, since the state—
though it may perchance refrain from opening battle, owing to its inabi­
lity to do so—is nevertheless waging incessant and implicit war, as Cajetan rightly notes, in that it offers all the resistance of which it is capable.
1 [Here also Suarez, no doubt, intended to say ‘ Council of Constance *.—Tr.]
2 [This interpretation of the correlatives vel... vel, attested by Du Cange’s Glossary, is in the trans­
lators opinion preferable here to the classical interpretation (or ... or).—Tr.]

Chap. IV]

Does Oath of King James exact more than Civil Obedience? 715

12. A new difficulty, however, thus presents itself, namely, the
fact that according to the doctrine expounded above
there is no difference between the two cases, or two
kinds of tyrant. For by that doctrine it is not permissible to slay
on private authority even those whose titles are tyrannical, since, on
the contrary, public authority is required; yet if the latter form of
authority exists, it is also permissible to slay those [true] kings who rule
in tyrannical fashion.
Accordingly, I argue further as follows. Even a tyrant whose
title is tyrannical should be slain [only] in punishment for his crimes
or on the ground of defence. In the former case (as has already been
pointed out), he may not be slain simply by any private person acting
on private authority, because, in the first place, the imposition of
punishment is (as I have remarked above) an act of jurisdiction, to be
performed by a superior, and because, secondly, not even the very
state that has been wronged by such a tyrant may thus punish him
save by the intervention of a public council and after a hearing and an
720 adequate judgment of his case, so that the tacit or presumed consent
of the state does not suffice to authorize the commission of this deed
by a private individual, but rather, an express declaration made by
special—or, at least, by general—commission is required. Wherefore it
would be impermissible for a foreigner in a private capacity, or, indeed,
for one in a public capacity but not endowed with jurisdiction over
the said tyrant, to slay the latter on this [punitive] ground, save by
express commission of the injured state. But if the act in question is
permitted to a private individual only on the ground of defence, there
is, consequently, no distinction between the two kinds of tyrant,
since it is also permissible for a private individual to slay on that
defensive ground a true king, who tyrannically assails [the rights of]
his own kingdom, or state, as we have already pointed out. Moreover,
on the same ground, it is not a power tacitly granted by the state to its
members that makes such an act of homicide permissible; rather is it
rendered permissible by the authority of God, VVho through the natural
law has bestowed upon every person the right to defend himself, his
country and, furthermore, every innocent individual. Therefore, the
killing of a tyrant on this ground is permitted not only to the members
of a state, but also to foreigners, in either case and with respect to
either kind of tyrant, so that no difference exists.
13. To the last question I reply that, in the first place, it is true
The difficulty is
that a tyrant wrho seizes kingly power without a j ust
title thereto may not justly be slain by any private
individual whomsoever, as a measure of vengeance, or punishment.
For this negation is conclusively established by the arguments set
forth in connexion with the first part of our twofold proposition.
A new difficulty is
presented.

7i6

A Defence of the Catholic and Apostolic Faith

[Bk. VI

Consequently, I grant that with respect to this point no distinction is
made between a tyrannical king of the kind in question [and one whose
title to power is lawful], in so far as the essential principle of injustice is
concerned ; although, in the case of a lawful king, the crime committed
is much more grave and constitutes an act of lese-majesty, which does
not occur in the case of tyrants of the other group, for such a crime,
when committed against them is a simple act of injustice and of
usurped jurisdiction. We are thus left to conclude that only the right
of self-defence makes it permissible for private individuals to slay
[even] this latter sort of tyrant.
There is a great difference, however, between such a tyrant and
a wicked [but legitimate] king. For [a true] king, though he may
govern in a tyrannical manner, is not inflicting actual violence upon
the state subject to him, so long as he does not begin an unjust war
against it; and consequently, in so far as he is concerned, no occasion
for defence is offered, and no subject may attack him or wage war
against him on defensive grounds. A true tyrant, on the other hand,
is inflicting continual and actual violence upon the state as long as he
unjustly retains the royal power and reigns by force; so that the said
state continually wages against him an actual or virtual war, not
vengeful in its character (so to speak), but defensive. Moreover, pro­
vided the state makes no declaration to the contrary, it is always
regarded as willing to be defended by any of its citizens, or, for that
matter, even by any foreigner ; and therefore, if it cannot be defended
in any way save by the slaying of the tyrant, any one of the people can
licitly slay him. Thus it is indeed true, strictly speaking, that this act
of slaughter is committed, under the circumstances described, not by
private but by public authority; or rather, by the authority either of
a kingdom willing to be defended by any citizen whomsoever as by its
own members or organ, or else by the authority of God, the Author
of nature, Who gives to every individual the power of defending the
innocent.
Accordingly, even in this respect no true distinction is made
between the two kinds of tyrant, since neither of them may be put
to death on private authority, public power being, on the contrary,
always a necessary factor. The difference between the two cases,
however, is as follows: owing to the distinction explained above, the
power in question is considered to have been entrusted to every private
individual as against a true tyrant, while this is not the case as against
a true sovereign [who rules in tyrannical fashion].
14. But in view of the foregoing, still another difficulty arises,
,
one whose treatment is necessary
to our rpresent
Another difficulty.
'
purposes.
For from the comment just made regarding true tyrants, it follows

Chap. IV]

Does Oath of King James exact more than Civil Obedience? 717

that the preceding comment regarding [true] kings who govern tyranni­
cally, is applicable only when sentence of deposition has not yet been
passed against such a king, and not after the passing of that sentence;
this is an inference which will not be pleasing to the King of England,
and it is one which merits examination.
For it has a firm basis, first of all, in the Council of Constance,
inasmuch as that Council refers only to persons slaying tyrannical
princes on private authority ‘without awaiting1 the sentence or man­
date of any judge whatsoever’ (since it is thus that the Council of
Constance condemned the contrary proposition) ; so that consequently,
if any judge possessing lawful jurisdiction with respect to such a
[legitimate but tyrannical] king, whosoever that king actually is or
may be, has pronounced against the latter a just sentence whereby
the said king has ipso facto been deposed from his throne—if, I say,
this should be the case2—the declaration laid down by the Council no
longer holds; and therefore, the argument expounded above would
cease to be valid, with the result that our comment regarding true
kings, in the form previously propounded, would no longer be tenable.
For under such circumstances, it is assumed that the sentence which
has been awaited3 is a just and lawful one. Accordingly, the tyrant’s
assailant acts not upon private authority but by virtue of the said
sentence and, consequently, as an instrument of public authority.
In short, when a king has been lawfully deposed, he is no longer a
721 legitimate king, or prince; and therefore, the statement [of the Council
of Constance], which has reference to legitimate kings, cannot hold
true in his case. And furthermore, if after the lawful deposition of
such a king he should persist in his obstinacy and forcibly retain the
royal power, he will become a tyrant even in regard to his title, since he
is not a lawful king, nor is it by just title that he holds kingly power.
This truth is more clearly evident in the case of a heretical king.
For in a sense, and by reason of his heresy, such a king is forthwith
The reason for* de- deprived, ipso facto, of his dominion over and propnving a heretical prietary rights in the kingdom, since the latter awaits
nion over the king- confiscation, or is to pass ipso ture to nis lawtul
dom·
Catholic successor; and nevertheless, [this heretical
ruler] may not be deprived at once of the kingdom itself, but on the
contrary justly continues to possess and administer it, until at least
he is condemned through a declaratory judgment of his crime. This
point is brought out in the Sext (Bk. V, tit. 11, chap. xix). On the other Sat, v.n.xix.
1 [Vide footnotes 2, p. 707 and 3 of this page. Suarez has expectata, here.—Ta.]
2 [This parenthetical clause translates a single word in the Latin, tunc.—Ta.]
3 [expectata. Cf. notes 2, p. 707 and 1 of this page. One is tempted to give the term its late connotation
of spectata, here, and transfate, ‘ the sentence referred to ’, or, ‘ the sentence in question’ ; but the closely
preceding quotation from the declaration of the Council of Constance, in which expectata would seem
to have the usual classical significance, makes such a translation inadvisable. Probably Suarez's
implied meaning is, * the sentence which has been awaited before the ty rant is put to death.’—Ta.]

718

Vide Soto, De
lustitia, Bk. V,
qu.3 i, art. 3.
Azor, Vol. II,
bk. XXI, chap,
v, qq. 8 and 9.

St. Thomas.

Soto.
Bànez.

Molina.
Paris de
Puteo.
Antonio
Massa.

A Defence of the Catholic and Apostolic Faith

[Bk.VI

hand, once the sentence has been pronounced, he is deprived altogether
of the said kingdom, in such a way that he cannot by any just title
continue in its possession; and therefore, from that time forth, he may
be treated absolutely as a tyrant, and consequently may be put to
death by any private individual whatsoever.
15. This difficulty1 depends upon the assumption that even a king
A solution of the who is supreme in temporal matters may be punished
difficulty.
with deposition and sentenced to be deprived of his
kingdom; an assumption which the King of England declines to con­
sider, but which is nevertheless true and follows clearly upon the.
principles laid down in Book III.2 Moreover, we shall have occasion
to repeat it in a subsequent part of our discussion.
To be sure, the question, By whom may such a sentence be
imposed ? is a grave one. But for the present we shall assume, briefly,
that this power to depose a king may reside either in the state itself
or in the Pope, although differently in the two cases. For it resides
in the state solely by way of a defence necessary to the preservation
thereof, as I have already remarked (Bk. Ill, chap, iii).4 If, then, a
lawful king is ruling in tyrannical fashion, and if the state finds at hand
no other means of self-defence than the expulsion and deposition of
Under what circum- this king> the said state, acting as a whole, and in
stances the state accordance with the public and general deliberations
may deprive ajtrue^ θ£
communities anj leading men, may depose him.
tyrannical fashion, This would be permissible both by virtue of natural
of his kingdom.
[aWj
renders it licit to repel force with force, and
also by virtue of the fact that such a situation, [calling for measures]
necessary to the very preservation of the state, is always understood
to be excepted from that original agreement by which the state trans­
ferred its power to the king.
This is the sense that we should give to St. Thomas’ declaration
(II.—II, qu. 42, arts. 2 and 3 [art. 2, ad 3]) that it is not seditious to resist
a king who is ruling tyrannically, provided at least that this resistance
is offered through the lawful power of the community itself, and
prudently, without causing greater injury to the people. Moreover,
it is thus that St. Thomas himself has expounded this very point
(De Regimine Pnncipum, Bk. I, chap, vi), as have his disciples, Soto
(De lustitia, Bk. V, qu. 1, art. 3), Bânez (on 11.-I I, qu. 64, art. 3,
doubt 1), and Molina (Vol. IV, De lustitia, Tract. Ill, disp. vi).
Others, however, from among the jurists previously cited, take
a mixed view of this matter. For Paris de Puteo, [De Sindicatu, § An
liceat occidere Regem] and Antonio Massa (tract. Contra Usum Duelli,
1 [See Sect. 14, supra, p. 716.—Tr.]
Bk. Ill, chaps, v and xxiii.—Tr.]
1 [For ‘4’ read ‘qu.’—Tr.]

2 [Supra, pp. 667 et seq.; Defensio Fidei Catholicae,
4 [Not included in these Selections.—Tr.]

Chap. IV}

Does Oath of King James exact more than Civil Obedience? 719

Nos. 78 and 79) support the statement in question in such a way that
they apparently concede even to individual citizens the licence to act
thus. Yet, on the other hand, Restaurus Castaldus ([De Imperatore,} Rettai.ru*
aforesaid Qu. 82) supports the contrary view to such a degree that he CastalJu4·
would seem to deny such license even to the community. But [these
two extremes of opinion] should be modified, in accordance with our
preceding remarks.
16. Nevertheless, the power of which we are speaking does indeed
reside in the Pope, as in a superior possessed of jurisdiction for the cor­
rection of kings, even supreme monarchs, these princes being regarded
as subject to him. This is a point which we have already demonstrated.1
Accordingly, in the case of crimes relating to spiritual matters, such as
the crime of heresy, the Pope has direct power to inflict punishment
therefor upon the king, even to the point of deposing the latter from
his throne if his obstinacy and a consideration for the common good of
the Church should so demand. Again, in the case of faults relating to
temporal matters, in so far as these faults constitute sins, they, too,
maybe corrected by the direct power of the Pope, to the extent, indeed,
of their temporal harmfulness to the Christian State ; and punishment
of these faults may at least be inflicted by his indirect power, in so far
as the tyrannical rule of a temporal prince is always pernicious also to
the salvation of souls.
17. Moreover, another point should be noted, as follows: even
a Christian king- though a state, or human kingdom—regarded solely
d°m thePopendhet ^rom t^ie standpoint of its own nature, as it existed
h^epo^s^tyran" once among the Gentiles and exists still among the
nicaiking.
heathen—possesses the aforesaid power to defend
itself against a tyrannical king, and to depose him with a view to
such self-defence, in cases of necessity, I repeat, even though this
be true, nevertheless, Christian kingdoms, when they so defend
themselves, are in a sense dependent upon and subordinate to the Pope.
This assertion is true because, in the first place, the Pope may
demand of any [Christian] kingdom that it shall not rise hastily against
its king, nor depose him, unless the cause and reason therefor have
previously been examined by the Pope himself. The latter possesses
this power because of the moral dangers and the loss of souls almost
certainly accompanying these popular tumults, and also for the sake
of averting sedition and unjust rebellion. Thus history records that
Π.
in such cases the kingdoms involved have almost always consulted the Decretum,
xv. vi. iii.
Pope, or even have petitioned that he should be the one to depose Duarte Nunez
Liaô, Pn722 a wrongful king or a tyrant. We are told that this occurred in the do
metra Parte
case of Childeric, King of France, when Zacharias was Pope (Decretum, Dos Chronias
Dos Reis dè
Pt. II, causa xv, qu. vi, can. iii), and in the case of other persons whom Portugal,
ados
1 [Supra, pp. 685 et seq.; Defensio Fidei Catholicae, Bk. Ill, chap, xxiii.—Ti.J

Capello.

720

A Defence of the Catholic and Apostolic Faith

[Bk. VI

I have mentioned previously.1 Moreover, the histories of Portugal
relate at length that Sancho II, king of that country, was deprived of
his royal administrative powers by Innocent IV, when the latter was
Pope, although Sancho’s kingdom was not taken from him. This incil.vin. ii. dent is recorded also in the Sext (Bk. I, tit. vm, chap. ii).
Secondly, a Christian kingdom is dependent upon the Pope in
that the latter not only has power to advise or consent to the deposition
by the kingdom of a king destructive to itself, but may even command
and compel the said kingdom to take this course, when he shall have
concluded that such an act is necessary for the spiritual welfare of the
realm and, especially, for the avoidance of heresies and schisms. For
Vide Αζοτ,
under these circumstances the exercise of [his] indirect power with
Vol. Ill, bk.
respect
to temporal matters for the attainment of a spiritual end is
II, chap, vii,
most
admissible.
Another argument is afforded by the fact that, in a
qu·3°·
Castro, De
situation
of
this
sort,
the Pope 'per se possesses direct power to depose
lusta Haereti.
Punit., Bk. II, the king; and therefore, he possesses the power by which he may
chap. xiv.
coerce the kingdom, in cases of necessity, to the execution of this
purpose, since otherwise his power [of deposition] would be not only
inefficacious, but also insufficient. And the final argument is, that
such a papal command, under such circumstances, is [in itself] an
exceedingly just command.
18. Accordingly, granting the truth of this basic assumption, we
In what way a king maF assert>
regard to the point last proposed,
may be punished, that, after the rendering of a lawfully authorized
after a just deciar- condemnatory sentence by which a kin? is deprived
atory sentence.
r, .
.
J
J
°
*.
01 lus realm, or—ana this comes to the same thing—
after a declaratory sentence for a crime entailing ipso iure the punish­
ment in question, the person who has passed the sentence, or the one to
whom that person has entrusted the task, does indeed possess the power
to deprive the said king of his realm, even by slaying him, if no
other means will avail, or if a just sentence includes such an extreme
penalty. However, the deposed monarch may not be slain forthwith
simply byany private person whatsoever, nor may he even be driven out
by force, until that private individual has been commanded to act
thus, or unless a general commission to this effect is contained in the
sentence itself or in the law.
The first part of our assertion2 follows clearly upon the principle
above set forth. For he who can justly condemn a given person, is also
able to execute—whether by his direct intervention or with such
assistance as may be necessary—the punishment he has imposed; other1 [Supra, Defensio Fidei Catholicae, pp. 685 et seq. ; Bk. Ill, chap, xxiii.—Tk.J
2 [The assertion as a whole would seem to include both sentences of the immediately preceding
paragraph in the English, and * the first part ’ of the assertion is evidently contained in the first, or
affirmative sentence. Suarez undertakes to prove the second, or negative statement, in Section 19.
-Tk.J

Chap. IV] Does Oath of King James exact more than Civil Obedience? 721
wise, his power to declare the law, unaccompanied by any effectively
coercive power, would be vain. It is for this reason, indeed, as Augustine
says (On the City of God, Bk. I, chap, xxvi), that an agent of the king
acts rightly in slaying a man at the king’s command, since under those
circumstances he is carrying into effect the power of that monarch,
rather than his own. Similarly, then, when a state can justly depose
its king, the agents thereof act rightly in coercing that king, or—if it be
necessary—in slaying him; for in such a case they are acting not on
private, but on public authority. Thus Soto has well said (De lustitia,
Bk. V, qu. I, art. 3), that even though a king who is a tyrant solely in
his manner of rule [and not in his title to the throne] may not be slain
simply by any one at all, ‘nevertheless, when sentence has been passed
(these are the words of Soto) any person may be appointed as the agent
for its execution.’ In like manner, then, if the Pope deposes a king,
only those persons whom the Pope himself has charged with the task
will have the power to drive out or slay that king. And if the Pope
does not enjoin upon [specific] persons the execution of his decree,
the said task will fall to the lot of the lawful successor to the royal
power; or else, in the event that no such successor has been found, the
kingdom itself will be charged with this function. Moreover, the
Doctors hold that the same principle is to be observed in connexion
with the crime of heresy, when declaration is made by public sentence
depriving a heretical king of his kingdom. Castro (De lusta Haere­
ticorum Punitione, Bk. II, chap, vii) and Didacus de Simancas (Institu­
tiones Catholicae, Tit. xlvi [, chap, xlv,] no. 75) may be consulted on
this point.
19. The foregoing remarks also afford a ready proof for the second
part of our assertion.1
For even though a given person has been justly condemned to
a private individual death’ be raaï not be slain at will simply by any
may not on his own private individual whatsoever, unless this individual
slay anmanawho°has bas been commanded or in some other way impelled
been condemned to to the act of slaughter by one in authority. This condeath‘
dition holds because one person may not kill another,
unless the slayer is either a superior possessing in himself the power to
do so, or else the agent of such a superior; and he may not be called an
agent unless his act is instigated by the authority of his principal. But
if all this is true with regard to any malefactor, it will surely hold true
with greater reason in the case of a prince.
It will perhaps be argued that these requirements are satisfied
by the implicit or tacit instigation of the state, which by virtue of the
very fact that it has deposed the king declares its will that he be driven
1 [Le. the negative part, prohibiting completely unauthorized private persons from executing the
sentences in question. Vide footnote 2, p. 720.—Tr.J
1569.74

. z

Augustine.

Soto.

Castro.
Simancas.

722

A Defence of the Catholic and Apostolic Faith

[BE VI

out, coerced, and even—in case he resists—put to death, by the agency
of [any or] all persons. Such a contention, however, is false, a fiction
devised in defiance of reason. For a judge, in condemning a heretic
or malefactor who is a private individual, does not by that very act
empower all persons to punish such an individual; and consequently,
when the state, or the Pope, condemns a king who is heretical, or
tyrannical in some other fashion, such [punitive] licence is not—even
in a tacit or implicit sense—granted to every one [indiscriminately].
The consequent is true because there is no just reason to assume the
existence of this licence as against a king, more readily than as against
other persons. For prudence and just procedure in the actual execu­
tion [of a sentence] are always essential; and furthermore, a greater
danger of disorder and excess attends the coercion of the person of a
prince or king than that which attends the coercion of other individuals.
Therefore, if the Pope issues a decree declaring that a given king is
heretical and deposing him from his throne, but containing no fuller 723
specifications with regard to the execution of the sentence, all other
princes are not forthwith empowered to make war upon the deposed
monarch, since they are not (so we assume) his temporal superiors, nor
does that Pope invest them, by the sole force of his decree, with the
power to make such a war.
Consequently (as I was saying) only the lawful Catholic successor
of that monarch is invested under these circumstances with the said
authority ; or, in case he should be disregardful of it, or no such successor
should exist, the kingdom as a whole body, provided that it is a Catholic
body, will succeed to the right in question. But if this kingdom itself
seeks the aid of other princes, they may lend such aid, a fact which is
self-evident. Furthermore, if the Pope bestows upon other kings the
power to invade the kingdom of the deposed ruler (and the examples
which we have adduced in Book IIP prove that the Pope has quite
frequently done this), such an invasion may, under those conditions,
be justly undertaken, inasmuch as they lack neither a just cause nor
the necessary authority.
20. In the light, then, of these true and unquestionable principles,
we find clear and convincing proof of the fact that the
The principles ex­
third part of the oath exacted by King James in­
pounded above
afford convincing volves, under various heads, an excessive assumption
proof of the error
involved in the of power, injustice opposed to righteous custom, and
oath exacted by
error in contravention of true Catholic doctrine.
King James.
To prove the first of these points, i.e. the fact that
an excessive assumption of power is involved, I ask : By what authority
does the King of England compel his subjects to swear that a certain
proposition is heretical, when it has not been so condemned by the
1 [Supra, pp. 701-2 ; Depensio Fidei Catholicae, Bk. Ill, chap, xxiii, at end.—Tr.]

Chap. IV]

Does Oath of King James exact more than Civil Obedience? 723

Catholic Church ? For if the King maintains that the said proposition
was condemned by the Council of Constance, we may object, in the
first place, that it is impossible for him to make such an assertion
consistently, inasmuch as he rejects the authority of the Councils, and
particularly that of the modern Councils. By way of a second
objection, we may ask where he can find, in the decrees of the
Council of Constance, the words, ‘princes which be excommunicated
or deprived by the Pope’; or these, ‘by their subjects or any other
whatsoever?’ Accordingly, in view of the fact that the addition of
these phrases to the proposition in question effects an immense change
in it and in its purport, the inference by which [the condemnation of]
this [altered] proposition is attributed to the Council, is fallacious and
misleading.1 On the other hand, if King James condemns the said
proposition, not on the authority of the Council of Constance, but
simply on his own authority, then, beyond any possibility of doubt he
exceeds and abuses a power which is not [even rightly] his. Moreover,
it is very strange that he should repeatedly disparage the papal power
of defining points of faith, while he himself dares to arrogate this same
power to himself; for though he does not make this claim in so many
words, he professes to do so by his acts. In this arrogation of power,
the king is guilty of further inconsistency, inasmuch as he boasts in
another passage of this Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance that he
himself does not, after the fashion of the Popes, fabricate new articles
of faith. In fine, since he holds that nothing is of faith save what is
contained in the Scriptures, he should show us the Scriptural text
condemning the proposition in question as heretical, or the text
whereby the contrary proposition is divinely revealed, before we may
regard as a heresy the one [condemned by him]. To be sure, Paul said
[Romans, Chap, xiii, v. i]: ‘Let every soul be subject to higher powers’;
but nowhere did he add: Let all be subject even to powers that have
been excommunicated or deprived [of their authority] by the Pope.
Neither may the one injunction be inferred from the other; for they
are quite different from each other, not to say mutually opposed (as it
were) since a king who has been deposed is no longer a higher power.
Wherefore, I further conclude that the profession of the said oath of
allegiance, in so far as this [third] part of it is concerned, is tantamount to
an acknowledgement of the royal authorityand power both to condemn
propositions as heretical at the king’s own pleasure, and to lay down rules
for the faithful, on his own authority, as to what they should believe as
proper to the faith and what they should denounce as heretical. On the
part of the king, [the exaction ofjsuch anoath is anabuseand usurpation
1 [The translator has preferred here the ecclesiastical Latin connotation of illusorius (implied under
illusio in Harper’s Latin Dictionary), although the classical Latin interpretation would not be inaccept­
able: ‘the inference ... is a fallacy and a mockery.’—Tr.]

724

A Defence of the Catholic and Apostolic Faith

[Bk.VI

of spiritual power, and on the part of those who take this oath, [its pro­
fession] is virtually equivalent to a profession of false faith.
21. Moreover, the very words of the oath are a clear proof of the
AA convincing
. . proof, fact that
King
James, in ..exacting
the same, exacts
.
0 J . .. .
0
of this same fact, more than mere civil obedience; that is to say, more
based on the very than an oath pledging such obedience.
words of the oath.
. l·
0
...
ror something in excess oi civil obedience—which
is a matter on a far lower plane than the Christian faith—is obviously
involved in an oath by which one is pledged tc detest a given proposi­
tion as heretical. This is particularly the case when the injunction
[condemning that proposition] is new to the Church, so that the king
[issuing the injunction] does not simply compel Christian subjects to
detest a proposition that is in any event already condemned by the
Church (an action which is at times permissible to a Catholic king if
it is executed in the proper manner), but even compels these subjects
to detest a proposition which he himself newly condemns, upon his own
authority. Such is the conduct of King James in the present situation.
The foregoing remarks also afford satisfactory proof of [our second
point],1 the fact that the oath in question is unjust on the part of
King James, because it exceeds in many ways the proper limits of
his power and so becomes a form of coercion by violence, and usurpation
of another’s jurisdiction.
Again, on the part of the faithful, acquiescence in the said oath
is unjust. It is unjust partly for the general reason that they would be
swearing either unlawfully or to a lie; since if they believe, solely on
the King’s authority, that the [rejected] proposition is heretical, their
act merits condemnation even on this ground alone. [But such
acquiescence is also unjust] for a much more potent reason, namely,
because the proposition condemned in this oath is altogether true, and
is rendered certain by the true principles of the faith, as we have
previously proved;12 and if, to all outward appearances, the subjects
abjure a proposition of this sort, not believing in their hearts 724
that it is heretical, they are guilty of open perjury, a fact that is selfevident. Moreover, 'the profession of such an oath involves also a
special and personal injury affecting the Pope, whose power and right
to command obedience they deny, moved by the fear of man.
22. Finally, it is easy to draw from the remarks made above, the
A twofold error in- inference [embodying our third point]3 as follows:
voived in the third this third part of the oath of allegiance also involves
part of the oath.
,
v
erroneous doctrine.
1 [i.e. the second defect noted in the third part of King James’s oath : ‘ injustice opposed to righteous
custom. ’ Vide the first sentence of Section 20 of this Chapter.—Tr.]
1 [Defensio Fidei Catholicae, Bk. Ill, chap, viii, which is not included in these Selections.—Tr.]
3 [i.e. the third defect in this part of the oath: ‘error in contravention of true Catholic doctrine.’
Vide the first sentence of Section 20 of this Chapter, and footnote 1 on this page.—Tr.]

Chap. IV]

Does Oath of King James exact more than Civil Obedience? 725

One error is the contention that the Pope is not endowed with
power to depose a heretical or schismatic king who is dragging or
perverting his kingdom to the point where it will embrace the same
schism or heresy. For this error is upheld by the words of the oath
most particularly, and more directly than by any other [words pro­
nounced on that matter], as will be immediately evident to every
person reading the oath, and as we have previously proved1 by manifold
arguments.
A second error is not so definitely expressed in the wording, to be
sure, but it is implicit in the very substance of the oath, and is virtually
included therein, namely, the implication that a temporal king may
even exact of his subjects a sworn belief in regard to those matters
having to do with the doctrines of the faith and with the renunciation
of heresies; and, indeed, the further impheation that the decree of
the king is to be preferred, even on these points, to the decree of the
Pope. And all this is surely equivalent to declaring that a temporal
king holds the primacy in spiritual—or ecclesiastical—affairs. For the
primacy of Peter includes no greater dignity, nor any that is more
necessary to the conservation of the Church and the unity thereof,
than the supreme authority to lay down the articles of faith and con­
demn heresies ; an authority which the King of England arrogates to
himself, in the words already quoted. Therefore, the profession of
the oath in question is an open profession of schism and error; and
consequently, true Catholics are bound in conscience to reject the
same.
1 [Defensio Fidei Catholicae, Bk. VI, chaps, i—iii, which are not included in these Selections.—Ta.]