CURRENT THEOLOGY
A RECENT CRITIQUE OF P. DE LUBAC’S SURNATUREL
The burden of defending his theory of the supernatural order has been
considerably increased for Père de Lubac by the solid scholarship of Père
Guy de Broglie, S.J., professor of theology at the Institut Catholique dt
Paris and the Pontifical Gregorian University, in his recent treatise, De
fine ultimo humanae vitae.1 Although more than two hundred pages were
actually printed before the publication of Surnaturel in 1946, they offer
tacitly a deeper challenge to the entire elaboration of P. de Lubac’s theory
than any explicitly ad hoc critique written during the past two years; more­
over, due to the inevitable delays of post-war publishing, P. de Broglie was
able to add an appendix,2 in which he marshalled and fused all the resources
of his vast and minutely exact erudition into an explicit and masterly criti­
cism of Surnaturel.
The scope of this note is merely to give in brief outline De Broglie’s
major arguments; a detailed discussion and evaluation of his contribution
to the theology of the supernatural order will follow, it is hoped, in a sub­
sequent issue of Theological Studies.
the essential aims

or Surnaturel

As all previous critics have done, De Broglie stresses the need of grasping
clearly the primary aims of Surnaturel before attempting an evaluation.
These aims, he maintains are entirely theological,3 and may be reduced to
the following four propositions.
1) Neither Saint Thomas nor any other theologian before Cajetan ever
taught, explicitly or implicitly, a real possibility that finite spirits could be
ordained by divine providence to a destiny inferior to the beatific vision;
1 Paris: Beauchesne et ses Fils, 1948, pp. vi 4- 299.
* Ibid., Appendix ΙΠ: “Senserintne Aquinas et antiquiores generarim Scholastici
creaturas spirituales ad visionem Dei necessario vocatas esse?” (pp. 245-64).
3 Ibid., p. 245: “Paucis: liber est historicus materialiter, theologicus formalite, seu
ex parte finis manifestissime intenti. Minime quidem nova est apud theologos illa xstoriae conscribendae ratio; nec ullam reprehensionem per se meretur. Ac tamen fatendo
est hoc describendi genus summe salebrosum esse: cum studium opinionum conânœmdarum mentes impedire soleat ab objectiva illa factorum agnitione quam historia per se
intendit. Hinc factum est ut, non obstante auctoris plane singulari ingenio et eruditione,
assertiones eius non paucae objectionibus multis occasionem praebeant— .Ut ergo judi­
cium de densissimo illo libro ferri possit, fines eius primo intellegendi sunt, i. e., determina­
tae theses theologicae ad quarum propugnationem tendit.”
554

CURRENT THEOLOGY

555

rather, they taught that men and angels must be destined uniquely to this
end.4
2) This doctrine in no wise conflicts with the gratuity, either of the
beatific vision itself, or of all the other gifts which are proportioned to it
The true concept of gratuity does not in the slightest degree imply or re­
quire that these gifts could have been refused to man (supposing, of course,
hisexistence by the negatively gratuitous gift of creation). On the contrary,
gratuity involves uniquely the denial of any strictly juridical exigency
i intrinsic to human nature whereby God, in bestowing supernatural gifts,
would be subordinated to His creatures in that precise degree of dependence
proper to one who owes a debt in commutative justice.5
3) This sound and traditional theology of the supernatural order was
unhappily disrupted in the sixteenth century by entirely new speculative
reveries directed toward showing a necessary connection between the gra; tuity of the supernatural and the possibility of a state of pure nature.6
i There were three chief causes of this departure from tradition: (a) Cajetan’s
theory’ of natural desire, whereby man cannot exceed in aspiration what he
can attain through natural means; therefore, a true natural appetite for the
beatific vision is impossible, and human nature could be completely satis­
fied in the attainment of a “natural” end; consequently, Cajetan excluded
any line of reasoning which might indicate that a possible vocation to the
beatific vision is inherently postulated by the very concept of a spiritual
nature, (ό) The second factor was an excessively juridical outlook which
became prevalent in sixteenth-century theology; theologians of this era
at first neglected, and then deserted completely, the traditonal doctrine
that God cannot be conceived as a debtor to His creatures; the next step
was to maintain stupidly that all ontological exigencies of human nature
exercise a strict juridical claim on God; consequently, the conviction be­
came widespread that a divine economy which would be regulated entirely
by the ontological exigencies of a creature could not be motivated by pure
liberality, in such wise that from eternity God would have simultaneously
decreed, not merely the existence, but also the necessary internal faculties
and external aids postulated by the ontological exigencies of human nature;
such a divine economy, it was maintained, would not be regulated by a
transcendent and disinterested love, but by a rigid order of commutative
justice. Although Surnaturel offers no documentation to establish the
prevalence of this intellectual decadence, nevertheless, it contains the apodictic assertion that an excessively juridical view of man’s relations to God
pertained to “les conceptions générales qui formaient en quelque sorte
« £gC

· Ibid., p. 246.

· Ibid., p. 247.

556

l’atmosphère intellectuelle respirée alors indistinctement par les théologiens
de tout parti.”7 By the reduction of all ontological exigencies to a species
of juridical claims, there remained only one way to safeguard the gratuity
of grace, i.e., to deny any exigency, even ontological, on the part of human
nature for supernatural gifts; such a denial, however, is identical with the
affirmation of the possibility of a divine economy in which man would in
no wise be destined to the beatific vision. In such an intellectual atmos­
phere, then, only two alternatives were open for Catholic theologians:
either to adopt the absurd and blasphemous theory that God grants grace as
the fulfillment of an obligation in commutative justice, or to elaborate the
unfortunate revery of a state of pure nature.8* (c) Finally, the errors of
Baius and Jansen indirectly but manifoldly contributed to the diffusion
and almost universal acceptance of the new system. Baius, according to P.
de Lubac, was completely dominated by the juridical outlook, to the estait
that he reduced all relations between man and God to a scheme of commuta­
tive justice.’ The same basic viewpoint, though by no means so overt, was
characteristic of Jansenism.10 The strong condemnation of these two sys­
tems by the Holy See had the curious effect of making orthodox theologians
more indissolubly wedded to their theories of pure nature; however, it was
precisely their own juridical outlook which prevented them from realizing
the true import of the papal condemnations; according to P. de Lubac, the
Church authoritatively proscribed only a strict juridical exigency, and by
no means that ontological exigency for the supernatural which was the
common heritage until the sixteenth century.11
4) The primary and most important aim of P. de Lubac is to plead that,
since he has exposed the stupidity of the theological legalism of the six­
teenth century and has uncovered the only true sense of the Baio-Jansenistic heresy and of the papal condemnations, his theory of the super­
natural order should win universal acceptance as a return to a more sane
understanding of the gratuity of grace. Therefore, modem theology should
discard entirely the useless, unfortunate and dangerous hypothesis of pure
nature; it should espouse the view that human destiny to the beatific vision
is so necessarily connected with the existence of a spiritual creature, that

7 De Lubac, Surnaturel, p. 150. To this sweeping statement de Broglie adds a gios:
‘*Ac tamen interpretatio praedicta eo magis confirmatione textuum indiguisset quod
Scholastici saeculi XVIi et XVIIi fere omnes eam explicite excludunt. Expresse earn
consentire solent Aquinati neganti Deum posse se habere ad creaturam ut debitorem ut
et eorum commentariis in lam, q. XXI, a. I, satis patet” (pp. cit., p. 248, note 2).
8 De Broglie, op. cit., p. 248.
* De Lubac, op. cit., p. 18: “Baius, ou le juridisme pur.”
10 Ibid., pp. 40-45.
u De Broglie, op. cit., p. 249.

557

CURRENT THEOLOGY

THEOLOGICAL STUDIES

God could not in accord with His wisdom and goodness ordain man to any
inferior goal.12
an important equivocation in

Surnaturel

As a preliminary to his positive critique, P. de Broglie points out several
evidences of confusion and equivocation, of which all except one have been
at least noted by other writers.13 Completely original to P. de Broglie is
the observation that Surnaturel never distinguishes between the possibility
of a state of pure nature, and the possibility that men and angels might not
have been called to the beatific vision. The first question is not dogmatic,
but purely theological and systematic; it supposes that some determinate
end can be predicated of human nature as “natural,” i.e., an end strictly
proportioned to man’s unaided activity, to which man has a necessary in­
clination. Obviously, for a Nominalist, maintaining that God could ordain
any man to any end and different men to different ends according to His
unconditioned beneplacitum, the notion of a concrete determinate end of
man, conceived as a stable nature with universally valid and permanent
attributes, would make no sense. But the Church does not forbid under
pain of heresy the habit of philosophizing irrationally ; hence, no matter how
unsustainable Nominalism is philosophically, it does not seem to merit a
theological censure; therefore, because of a philosophically untenable com­
prehension of the term “nature,” one could deny boldly the possibility of a
state of pure nature and still in no way offend against Catholic doctrine.1*
The second question, however, much more simple and readily within the
grasp of untrained minds is, according to P. de Broglie, not merely a matter
of theological speculation; it is a dogmatic question: Could God create finite
spirits and not destine them to the beatific vision? And it must be answered
in the affirmative. P. de Lubac not only confuses these two totally distinct
questions, but for all practical purposes identifies them and gives a negative
answer to both. Precisely because of this confusion of two distinct ques­
tions, P. de Lubac considers the following assertions to be identical: (1)
systematic speculations on the possibility of a state of pure nature by no
means pertain to the faith and were not evolved by theologians until the
sixteenth century; (2) the possibility of our not having been called to the
beatific vision does not pertain to the faith and was unknown to Catholic

u Loc. cit.
u Cf. the present writer’s “Current Theology,” Theological Studies, VUI (1947),
483-91, and “Discussions on the Supernatural Order,” IX (1948), 213, note 2.
M De Broglie, op. cit., p. 250.

558

CURRENT THEOLOGY

THEOLOGICAL STUDIES

theologians before the sixteenth century. According to P. de Broglie, the
first assertion is quite true and the second is wholly false.15
p. de brogue’s reputation of Surnaturel

In his positive critique, which can only be summarized here, P. de Broglie
shows that Saint Thomas’ view on the gratuity of the supernatural necessarily involves the possibility of our not having been called to the beatific
vision. The main sources of this demonstration are from St. Thomas’
doctrine on the state of infants who die without baptism;16 from his distinction between the ratio debiti of natural and supernatural gifts, which in the
case of the latter excludes not merely all juridical claims, but also any onto­
logical exigency in human nature;17 and finally, from his doctrine that it
belongs to the natural rectitude of human nature to be able to love God
super omnia.™
Next, P. de Broglie explains why an explicit and evolved theoiy of pure
nature did not appear before the sixteenth century; this was due, he argues
acutely, to the anthropomorphic notion of divine omnipotence common to
all the early Scholastics and even to St. Thomas in his earlier writings, and
consequently, to a vague and vacillating grasp of the notion of possibility
itself. In the year 1266, however, St. Thomas formulated the golden
principle by which the dogma of divine omnipotence was expressed for the
first time in full accord with God’s infinite transcendence: “In nobis, in
quibus potentia et essentia aliud est a voluntate, et iterum intellectus aliud
a sapientia et voluntas aliud a iustitia, potest esse aliquid in potentia quod
non potest esse in voluntate iusta vel in intellectu sapiente. Sed in Deo
est idem potentia et essentia et iustitia. Unde nihil potest esse in potentia
IS Loc. cii.; cf. also note 1: “Praedictae confusionis incommodum speciatim apparet
ubi auctor verum sensum damnationis Baii sic illustrare conatur: ‘La pure nature, définie
comme nous l’avons dit, ne préoccupait pas beaucoup les premiers adversaires de Baius.
Au reste, celui-ci lui-même n’en avait guère parlé (op. cil., pp. 103, 104).’ Hoc quidem
verissimum est, si de systemate philosophico ‘purae naturae’ accipiatur. Si vero (ut in
libro citato fieri solet) quaestio ‘naturae purae’ confunditur cum quaestione merae possi­
bilitatis non-vocationis nostrae ad caelestia, falsum est Baium et primos Baii adversarios
de hac quaestione non fuisse sollicitos, aut theologos tunc dubitavisse quin damnatio Pii
VI ipsam hanc quaestionem solvere intendisset. Oppositum enim manifestum est, non
modo ex Explicatio doctrinae quam Facultas Lovaniensis anno 1586, jussu Gregorii ΧΠΓ,
composuit, sed etiam e Bellarmino, qui, Lovanii docens (1570-76), opusculum composât
ad sententias Baii damnatas refutandas, in quo possibilitatem non-vocationis praedictae
exponit ad intellegentiam pianae damnationis in primis pertinentem (Le Bachelet, Auc­
tarium Bellarminianum, Paris, 1913, pp. 204 et 315).”
16 St. Thomas, In II Sent., d. 33, q. 11, a. 2.
17 St. Thomas, Sum. Theol., I-Π, q. 3, a. 1, ad 2m; I, q. 21, a. 1, ad 3, a. 4.
u St. Thomas, Sum. Theol., I, q. 60, a. 5.

559

iivina quod non possit esse in voluntate iusta ipsius et in intellectu sapiente
eius.”19
Formerly, divine omnipotence had been conceived as if it needed to be,
as it were, extrinsically controlled and directed by other divine attributes,
lest it produce created effects in themselves stupid or evil; however, after
the Summa Theologica had become widely known, it was recognized universally, except by Nominalists, that nothing which would be contrary to
1 any other divine attribute is truly possible as an effect of divine omnipotence.
Therefore, since the true gratuity of our supernatural destiny postulates a
true possibility of our not having been called to this lofty goal,20 it would
have been entirely in accord with God’s wisdom, justice, goodness, and
liberality, if He had freely destined us to some inferior end. Once this
hypothesis was recognized as an objective possibility and not as a chimerical
phantasy based on an unsustainable concept of divine omnipotence, it
became immediately legitimate to elaborate a systematic theory of pure
nature. That St. Thomas himself did not take this step is not surprising
in view of the circumstances and preoccupations of his last eight years.21
During the next two centuries, the fourteenth and fifteenth, Thomism was
engaged in a mortal struggle for its very existence, and had practically no
opportunity for evolving the doctrine of St. Thomas; furthermore, the chief
rival of Thomism during these two centuries, Nominalism, because of its
excessive emphasis on divine voluntarism, was far removed from asserting
the necessity of the beatific vision as man’s uniquely possible destiny; thus,
there was no polemical necessity or utility in elaborating a theory of pure
nature. It was not until the sixteenth century, then, that Thomism could
avail itself of the necessary academic leisure to evolve the doctrine of St.
Thomas. P. de Lubac is quite right in attributing to Cajetan the first
speculations on a state of pure nature; but why does he feel obliged to dis­
parage Cajetan’s attempt, tentative and unsatisfactory though it may have
been, as an outstanding indication of theological decadence? Was it no

u St. Thomas, Sum. Theol., I, q. 25, a. 5, ad Im.
a In the opinion of the present writer, De Broglie has proved this proposition beyond
all possibility of doubt in the main part of his book; cf. especially, pp. 126-63, and pp.
184-86.
a De Broglie, op. cit., p. 262: “Quod ipse 5. Thomas (iam tunc quadragenarius, et octo
post annos decessurus) praedicti principii non omnes consequentias distincte evolverit,
nihil mirationis habet. In qualibet enim disciplina vel arte humana, consuetum est ut
ipsi magistri qui principia inveniunt et proponunt quibus cetera renovanda sunt non
omnes illorum applicationes distincte praevideant et evolvant. Et hoc eo magis attenden' dum est quod S. Thomas, praesertim ultimis suae vitae annis, nullatenus ducebatur pruritu
illo omnia, in theologia renovandi cui juvenes aetatis modernae immoderate indulgere
solent.”

560

THEOLOGICAL STUDIES

rather a clear sign of a living Thomism, which was not afraid to grapple with
new problems, or to try to bring to full maturity principles which St. Thomas
had not had the opportunity to develop?22 Finally, the errors of Baius
and Jansen enforced and accelerated the development of a theory of pure
nature, which could no longer remain a matter of purely academic interest,
but was accepted by all theologians, except the Augustinian school with its
nominalistic tendencies, as the sole effective antidote to an insidiousheresy.
CONCLUSION

P. de Broglie summarizes his criticism of Surnaturel in five brief conduelusions. The fourth and fifth are so strongly worded that it is difficult to
see how P. de Lubac can avoid answering them; for they state unequivocally
that the theory of the supernatural order set forth in Surnaturel, as under­
stood not only by P. de Broglie but by all who have written on it (whether
in its favor or in opposition),23 is not compatible with Catholic doctrine or
sound philosophy:
1) Non videtur esse verum quod theologi saeculo XVIo anteriores necessitatem
nostrae vocationis ad bona caelestia vel implicite admiserint.
2) Neque verum est theologos saeculi XVIi et XVUi cum catholicos, tum
haereticos (Baium, Jansenium) unquam concepisse exigentias ontologicas natura­
rum creatarum ut exigentias juridicas, quibus Deus fieret debitor erga creaturam et
ab ipsa dependeret.
3) Quod proinde documenta ecclesiastica, cum asserunt dona Adamo concessa
‘indebita’ fuisse, tantummodo intendant excludere a natura titulum propriejuridi­
cum ad illa dona (quem nemo unquam propugnaverat), hoc non videtur rationabi­
liter sustineri posse.
4) Sed intellegenda sunt illa documenta in eo sensu in quo a theologis catholicis
constanter intellecta sunt: ut sci. excludentia exigentiam ontdogicam seu necessita­
tem illorum donorum. Ad doctrinam ergo catholicam pertinere censendum est
quod praedicta dona homini, etiam innocenti, vere potuerint non concedi.
5) Quamvis affirmatio illa (dogmatica) possibilitatis nostrae non-vocalionis ad
bona caelestia non aequi valeat affirmationi (mere systematicae) possibilitatis
oeconomiae naturae purae, haec tamen ex illa legitime deducitur, dummodo mens, a
puerilibus nominalistarum aut aegidianorum imaginationibus liberata, notionibus
‘naturae’ et ‘omnipotentiae’ et ‘possibilitatis’ vere philosophicis utatur.14
Weston College

Philip

j.

Donnelly, S.J.

11 Ibid., p. 263.
11 Cf. note 13, supra.
14 De Brogiie, op. cit., p. 264; it may be of interest to note that in the “Hebdomada
Theologica” which was held at the Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome during the
week of September 25th, P. de Broglie, together with PP. Lennerz and Boyer, took
part in the papers and discussions on the supernatural order; it is to be hoped that these
papers will soon be published.

THEOLOGY IN SOUTH AMERICA

To most theologians in North America and Europe, South America is as
well known as the heart of Africa. For many reasons the work of the South
Americans has not reached the attention of students in other parts. More­
over the South American conditions imposed on intellectual activities of a
zore abstract nature are not sufficiently propitious to make a significant
contribution probable. In consequence the last edition of Ueberweg’s ob­
jective and accurate history of philosophy in its five volumes dismisses all
d Latin America with a single meagre paragraph.1 However, since the
publication of that work in 1928, South America, especially in Buenos Aires,
hs shown that it must be reckoned with, when philosophical discussions are
in order.
What has it done in theology? Obviously, Catholicism has had much to
io with the formation of South American mores and Weltanschauung. Great
saints loved and labored in the southern continent. St. Peter Claver worked
among the negro slaves in what is today Colombia. Blessed Mariana of
Jesus hallowed the Quito of her time. St. Toribio, St. Rose of Lima, St.
Francis Solano and Blessed Martin de Porres were contemporaries in six­
teenth-century Lima, the metropolis of colonial Spanish America. Saintly
missionaries found the martyr’s death in Brazil, Chile, and Argentina. Ca­
tholicism not only erected monuments of sanctity, but also built temples of
learning. The University of San Marcos, the oldest university in the new
world, antedating anything in the United States, is no longer a Catholic
university, but it was founded by the Church. The Church also founded
many other universities, most of which have disappeared, though some still
thrive under other auspices, for example, the University of San Felipe, which
today is a flourishing institution known as the University of Chile. These
universities were centers of theology; for in colonial times university activity
was principally dedicated to divinity and law.
Obviously, then, South America had a theological tradition. What is
left of it, and what does it produce? First of all, it must be admitted that
South American theology, whether of yesterday or today, has made no
transcendental contribution; on the other hand, it has not been reduced to
sterile stagnation. No great movements can be discerned, although genuine
life is evident in many places. Hardly any South American name rings
familiar to northern theologians, though Penido of Brazil, by reason of his
1 Cf. Friedrich Uebeneegs Grundriss der Geschickte der Philosophic (12th ed., Leipzig,
1928), V, 414.
561