[The Title-Page of the Edition of 1621]

A WORK ON THE THREE THEOLOGICAL
VIRTUES FAITH, HOPE AND CHARITY
Divided into Three Treatises, to Correspond with the
Number of the Virtues Themselves

by Doctor
FRANCISCO SUAREZ
of Granada
Member of the Society of Jesus and Sometime Primary Professor Emeritus of Theology
of the Royal Academy of Coimbra

Dedicated to the Most Illustrious and Most Reverend
Lord D. JOÀO MANOEL
Bishop of Vizeu, &c.

With the Privilege of the Inquisitors, of the Ordinary, and of the King

Printed at Coimbra
By NICOLAUS CARVALHO, Printer to the Academy
In the Year 1621

•---------------

: I

i

'Ί

-

-é;

[iü]

TO THE MOST ILLUSTRIOUS LORD D. JOÂO MANOEL,
MOST EMINENT BISHOP OF VIZEU, WISEST OF COUN­
SELLORS TO THE CATHOLIC KING
The Jesuit College

of

Coimbra

Far more tardily than befits us, most illustrious Bishop, this Col­
lege of Coimbra, belonging to our Society, and by many titles yours
also, offers to you this gift, such as it is. For this College is keenly aware
that in you alone there are combined in the highest degree all those
qualities by which authors are customarily moved to pay such tribute
to their benefactors. They are the glory of your name, and of your
truly royal lineage, the distinction of episcopal rank, choice literary
culture, and what surpasses and almost eclipses all other titles, an
admirable union of all the virtues that adorn a man and a prince.
For if it is not unbecoming to pass over other considerations, it would
seem to betoken not a human, but (as it were) a divine excellence, that
one who excels in every way, should be unassuming in his mode of life,
not elated by honours, and, though of an exalted position, not disdain­
ful even of humble friends. For those reasons, indeed, Father Francisco
Suarez, while living, had long been aware that he ought by some
outstanding product of his talents, to manifest in unique fashion the
gratitude due to you before all others. This, I bear witness, was the
perpetual and constant -wish, this the ardent endeavour, of one whose
last wishes it would be wrong, in our judgment, utterly to disregard,
especially as he could have found no more favourable advocate for his
teachings, no readier champion of his labours.
However, we found at hand no work of this kind by which the
debt could be completely discharged, and which could be considered
a gift worthy of your acceptance.
[iv]
But, lo ! there now speaks one from above (in my belief, none other
than the author), who says: ‘You have here the treatise on the theo­
logical virtues, by means of which you may carry out the wishes of
Suarez, and which you may quite fittingly lay before the illustrious
Bishop of Vizeu, so that he who is known to have cultivated these
virtues long and well, shall also be the patron of that teaching concern­
ing them, by which the minds of men are disposed to harmony?
Doubtless, Suarez had foreseen that this posthumous offspring of
his talents, when it had come into our possession, and being bereft of
its parent, would have need of your protection and your guardianship,
so that, should it chance to be exposed to the arrows of the envious,
I5Î9.74
5A

Ίο the Readers

73°

it might be sheltered as by a rampart. For though the author was one
whom the plaudits of the world, already universal, had raised above
the reach of envy, nevertheless, now that he has attained to that more
blessed felicity, far removed from human intercourse, he has been able
to look, for this solicitude, to you alone, his strongest and most loving
defender.
In truth, how’ever, our College has been moved [also] by this
consideration, namely, that the work should by preference be dedicated
to you, if not as an [adequate] manifestation of the cherished hope
that we may requite our own debt of gratitude, yet as some slight
testimony of the sentiments which, each and every one, we entertain
for you. Even though you accord but scanty credit to our own labours
in connexion with this work, yet the author was one on whose behalf
those labours will seem not unfruitful, and to you, most Eminent Lord,
before all others, the fruits of that author should be dedicated. Vale.
[v]

BALTHASAR ALVARUS, DOCTOR OF THEOLOGY, OF THE
COLLEGE OF COIMBRA OF THE JESUIT SOCIETY
To

the

Readers on

behalf of the

Author

There are three chief reasons which have urged us not to confine
within the enclosure [of our College] these lectures on the theological
virtues. First, one might in all justice anticipate that a discussion of
theological virtue by so great a theologian would be worthy, indeed,
of so eminent an author and so weighty a subject. Secondly, the greater
part of this wrork, which treats of faith, is (as it were) the last offspring
of Suarez, generated that he might give a final proof, from his exalted
position, of the wealth of his genius and the rich vein of his wisdom.
Although, in Spain or in Italy, before he was summoned to this Academy
of Coimbra, Suarez dealt more concisely (as he WOuld do in the schools)
with the subject-matter of the other two treatises, yet, they cannot
fail to evince traces of the author’s power and artistry. Thirdly, since—
owing to the reasons which we have just mentioned—many copies of
those lectures on faith were transcribed incorrectly, and since the
number of these copies increased daily, we have decided to make them
public, thoroughly freed from copyists’ errors, and readily accessible to
all students, thanks to the help of the press.
It will, however, appear that in this work one thing is lacking in [vi]
doctrinal method—though you would hardly find any other writer
so successful and scrupulous in the observance of that method—that is
io say, the author ought first of all to have discussed the theological
virtues in general, and then treated thereafter of the points proper to

To the Readers

731

each. But a reply is ready to hand. For since all habits that accompany
grace, chief of which are the theological virtues, go by the name of
holiness, there remained hardly anything to be said as applicable to
them in common, that would not be applicable also to sanctifying
grace. The matter has been treated by Suarez in his work De Gratia *
lately published, in questions such as these: first, are there any such
habits per se infused and dwelling in the soul ? Are the principles of
their acts adequate (a point fully treated in Book V I) ? Secondly, do the
aforesaid habits demand a special co-operation of grace, in order that
they may be actualized, or is the general co-operation sufficient (a ques­
tion accurately treated in Book II) ? Then again, thirdly, can these
habits become more intense or remiss or be lost altogether (treated in
full in Books IX, XI)?
However, if an explanation as to other more common elements in
these virtues is desired, it will be published, God willing, in the fourth
treatise, that on Passions and Habits, where the treatment by St. Thomas
(I.-II, qq. 62 et seq.) will be amplified. Fale.
1 [No part of Suarez’s treatise De Gratia is included in these Selections.—Ta.]

FRANCISCO SUAREZ

A WORK ON THE
THREE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES

FAITH, HOPE AND CHARITY
Of this treatise On Faith, Hope and
Charity, only the following Dispu­
tations are included in these Selec­
tions: Disputation XVIII of On Faith
and Disputation XIII of On Charity

CONTENTS
Page

ON FAITH
Disputation XVIII: On the Means which may be used for the Conversion and
Coercion of Unbelievers who are not Apostates
• 737

ON CHARITY
Disputation XIII: On War

.

800

FRANCISCO SUAREZ

A WORK ON THE
THREE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES
FAITH, HOPE AND CHARITY
ON FAITH: DISPUTATION XVIII

[467]

DISPUTATION XVIII
ON THE MEANS WHICH MAY BE USED FOR THE CONVERSION AND
COERCION OF UNBELIEVERS WHO ARE NOT APOSTATES

The means by which men may be drawn to virtue and faith, or
, recalled from ·vice and unbelief,z are. ·*·partly
thosea which
The mccins dv which
,*
unbelievers may be move the will through persuasion, instruction or
468 converrt^> differ in kindness ; and partly those others, which hold man to
his duty through punishment or coercion.
Of such means, the former class are, without doubt, more in har­
mony with faith, because their influence is brought to bear more
upon the will, and faith should be voluntary. But the latter class are
sometimes necessary, if there is not to be a lack of power; and con­
sequently, we are bound to treat of both groups, beginning with the
former. Nevertheless, since the second group depend especially upon
A twofold coercion: authority, which must reside in some individual, in
direct, and indirect, order that he may coerce or punish another, we must
first state that this coercion may be twofold, direct and indirect.
As to this issue, in order that coercion may be directly applied,
two things are required. One is that it should be derived from the
power of jurisdiction; the other is that this means should be used to
draw men to the faith. Indirect coercion will be present, when com­
pulsion is exerted not intentionally but in self-defence, or else in
order to punish the injustice or crime of another.
Therefore, this latter sort of compulsion might be exercised withEcciesiasticai juris- out anY Power of jurisdiction. With regard to this
diction is twofold in power, it is well to note at the outset that jurisdiction
this matter.
-n
Qlurc}1 js twofold, spiritual and temporal.
Hence, unbelievers may be subject to the Church in either of two ways,
namely, with respect to the spiritual jurisdiction, as apostates are, or
merely with respect to the temporal jurisdiction, as in the case of un­
believers who are not apostates.

SECTION I1
HAS THE CHURCH THE POWER AND RIGHT OF PREACHING THE GOSPEL
TO ALL UNBELIEVERS EVERYWHERE ?

I. In the caption introducing this question, two words, power
_Explanahon
,
t (-potestas}
and· right
(ius\ must be noted
andi-disof what H
·
j
r '
i
constitutes the right tmguisned, since they do not mean the same thing,
and power of preach- ρ0Γ there are two ways in which one may have the
power to perform a given act. First, there is the per1 [It should be borne in mind by the reader that this Disputation and the one following are divided
by Suarez into Sections and Sub-sections instead of Chapters and Sections, as elsewhere.—Tr.]

740

Mark, last
chap.

Colossians, i.

Luke, xxiv.

The Three Theological Virtues: On Faith

missive sense; since one may be allowed to perform an act, although
he may have no peculiar right to do so, no proprietary privilege (so to
speak) with regard to the practice or act in question, as when I am
allowed, for example, to enter the house of another. In the other sense,
this power is coupled with right, as in the case of the powrer to make
use of one’s own house or of common property. Hence, in the question
propounded above,1 the power referred to must be understood in both
senses.
Therefore, we must assert, first, that the Church has that power
[The first proposi- by which it may legitimately preach the Catholic faith
tion:] the Church everywhere and to all kinds of unbelievers. This is
has lawful power to./
, .
.
,
r r . ,
.
.
preach the Catholic obvious and is clearly a matter of faith, as is proved
faith in all regions,
fay- the words of Christ in the following passages:
{Matthew, Chap, xxiv [, v. 14]) ‘And this gospel [of the kingdom,] shall
The foundation [of be preached in the whole world, for a testimony to all
this proposition].
nations’; (Chap, xxviii [, v. 19]), ‘Going [therefore],
teach ye all nations’ ; and (Mark, Chap, xvi [, v. 15]), ‘preach the gospel
to every creature.’ For He Who gave this command, gave also the power
of carrying it out, as the event has proved. Paul said (in the Epistle
to the Colossians, Chap, i [, v. 6]), speaking of the Gospel: ‘It has come
unto you, even as it is in all the world bringing forth fruit and growing.’
The reason [for the existence of this power] is also clear. For faith is
necessary to all for salvation; and therefore, it was likewise necessary
that there should be some way of announcing this faith to the whole
world, since otherwise there would not be salvation for all according
to the ordinary law, in view of the fact that, by the common and
ordinary process, faith comes only through hearing and preaching, as
Paul bears witness in the Epistle to the Romans (Chap, x [, w. 14 et seq.]).
For this reason also Christ Our Lord said (Luke, Chap. xxiv[, w. 46-7J:
Thus it is written, and thus it behoved Christ to suffer, and to rise
again from the dead [, the third day]: And that penance [and remission
of sins] should be preached in his name [...].’ Consequently, this act of
preaching the faith is righteous in its very nature and by reason of its
object; hence, it is permissible of itself; and therefore, the power of
executing that act is everywhere essentially legitimate, and proper to
the Church. Finally, the [possession of the power] in question is also
in harmony with natural reason. For the reproval of a brother by
fraternal correction, and the instruction of the ignorant, especially
regarding those things which relate to good conduct are [acts pre­
scribed] by natural law, and the power of performing these acts—
nay more, the obligation to do so at an opportune time—is there­
fore given to all; consequently, when once the fact of revelation and
1 [Le. the heading for Section I. ‘Has the Church the Power and Right of Preaching the Gosoel
to All Unbelievers Everywhere ?’—Tn.]

Disp. XFIII: On Means for the Conversion of Unbelievers

741

the necessity of faith, are assumed, the act of communicating that
revelation through speech and teaching, and the permission to do so,
follow (as it were) from the natural law, and therefore, the power of
preaching is also derived from it.
We may infer incidentally that this simple power (so to speak)
The inference [from normally belongs in some degree to all believers, if
the first proposithey are sufficiently instructed to exercise it, and are
tionl*
not otherwise forbidden. This is obvious, for the
reason that [such preaching] is a work of charity, and one of the works
of mercy, a fact which will be more fully expounded in connexion with
the next proposition.
2. My second proposition is as follows : the Church has not only
The second proposi- the simple and (so to speak) the permissive faculty of
tion concerns the preaching the Gospel everywhere, but also the right
ChÏÏSiï power to *° preach thus, coupled with a special power. This
469 preach the true faith is evidently the opinion of St. Thomas, as expressed St. Thomas.
everywhere.
jn & passage (Π.-ΙΙ, qu. io, art. 8), on which Cajetan Cajetan.
and other commentators are in agreement; as are other scholastics
(on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, Bk. II, dist. xli), especially Major Major.
(ibid., Dist. xliv, qu. 3), others on the Sentences (Bk. IV, dist. iv), Soto.
including Soto (ibid., Dist. v, the sole question, art. 10), and V ictoria Victoria.
(Relectio I: De Indis, Sect. II, no. 9 [Relectio V: De Indis, Sect. Ill,
no. 9]).
The basis of that opinion is that Christ our Lord had this power
Rack of the second over all men, as His heritage. For that heritage was
proposition.
to j,e obtained by means of preaching the faith; and
since all the nations were not to be instructed by Himself, Christ
bestowed the power of giving such instruction, coupled with the
corresponding right and authority, to His apostles, and through them
to the Church ; therefore, the Church has this special right. The entire
first proposition of the foregoing argument may easily be drawn from
the Old and New Testaments. For in Psalms, ii [, v. 6], the Psalmist, Psalms, d.
speaking in the person of Christ, says : ‘But I am appointed king by
him over Sion his holy mountain’, while the mode of acquiring the
kingdom is indicated by the phrase [ibid.], ‘preaching his command­
ment’; and then these words are added [ibid., v. 8]: ‘Ask of me and
I will give thee the Gentiles for thy inheritance, and the uttermost
parts of the earth for thy possession,’ plainly declaring a plenitude
of jurisdiction over the whole world. That this prophecy was fulfilled
last
in and through Christ, Our Lord Himself has testified, saying, Matthew, Mauhm,
rhap.
last Chap. [chap, xxviii, v. 18], ‘All power is given to me in heaven and
in earth’; then follows the command [ibid. v. 19], ‘Going [therefore],
teach ye all nations’, whereby He communicates His own right and i Comtfaasu,
power to the Apostles. This is Paul’s meaning in the words(2 Corinthians,

742

Three Theological Virtues: On Faith

Chap, v [, v. 19]), ‘hath placed in us the word of reconciliation’; to
which he adds [ibid., v. 20], ‘For Christ therefore we are ambassa­
dors’ ; and an ambassador, indeed, represents his prince and shares in
Ephesians, iv. his power. Accordingly, Paul also said (Ephesians, Chap, iv [, w. 11—12j),
‘And He gave some apostles [. ..] and other some pastors and doctors
[...] for the edifying of the body of Christ’ ; and, in his Second Epistle
2 Timothy, a. to Timothy (Chap, ii [, v. 9]), ‘[I labour even unto bands, as an evildoer,]
but the word of God is not bound’; that is to say, it is not bound,
because the Church has this right of spreading the word, and not
merely the right, but the necessity and obligation as well, according
j
t0 tjie passage
Corinthians, Chap, ix [, v. 16]), ‘For woe is unto me if
I preach not the gospel, for a necessity lieth upon me.’1 Finally, the
John, soi.
words of Christ to Peter (John, Chap, xxi [, v. 17]), ‘Feed my sheep,’
support this truth; for the term ‘Feed’ refers not merely to an in­
definite sort of power, but to one coupled with jurisdiction, which is
exercised, or rather, is begun, by preaching. Therefore, since this
power was given to Peter that it might persist in the Church forever,
the Church possesses such right and power.
3. Moreover, if we regard the end to be achieved, a reason can
_
c «.· be given for the existence of this authority, namely,
authority, in terms tnat the power of teaching the faith was necessary, as
of the end m view, is j have said, for the salvation of men, and in order that
the redemption of Christ might be brought to all
men. Therefore, in order that the said power of teaching might be
efficacious, it was necessary to communicate it not only with a simple
authorization and (as it were) permission, but also with its own proper
right and power. The Lord Christ was able to give that power in
this way; hence, He did so give it. Furthermore, although the exis­
tence of such power cannot be demonstrated by natural reason, it is
still entirely in harmony therewith, since, as I have said, the right of
teaching the ignorant is (as it were) connatural to every man. There­
fore, assuming the necessity for faith, it is entirely consonant with
reason that the Author of faith should leave to His ministers and
especially to His Vicar this special right of instructing men in the
doctrines of the faith.
4. From this second proposition, a third follows, namely: the
Church has the right of defending its preachers, and
The third proposi­
of subduing those who by force and violence hinder
tion : the Church
has the right of pro­ or do not permit this preaching. This is the opinion
tecting its preachers,
held by the authors above cited, and especially by
and of punishing
those who hinder its Major and by Victoria. It is possible also, in a sense,
preaching.
to confirm this proposition by an example from Paul
(Acts, Chap, xiii [, w. 8-11]), who condemned Elymas the sorcerer to
Acts, xiii.
1 [The word order, as given by Suarez, varies somewhat from the Vulgate.—Tr.]

Disp. XVIII: On Means for the Conversion of Unbelievers 743

a perpetual blindness for resisting the ways of the Lord, as Jerome
stated in his letter Ίο Riparius against Vigilantius [= Letters, cix. 3]
and cited in Decretum, Pt. II, causa xxm, qu. viii, can. xiii, where
there are many references to the Fathers who confirm this truth; see
also Decretum, ibid., can. xi, and other passages therein.
Reasons in support of this proposition are easily inferred from
The first reason in
what we have already said. The first is that if the
proof of this proChurch has the right of preaching the Gospel every1,051 on’
where, then whoever by force or violence prevents the
exercise of this right, does an injury to the Church. Therefore, the
Church may repel such violence and protect its own right; for this
[secondary right] follows naturally from the original right [of preach­
ing], especially since the authority in question is supreme within its
own order, as is this right in the Church.
Secondly, this same reason is reinforced by another principle of
_
.
both canon
and civil
law,7 namely:
when jurisdiction
The second reason. .
,
, .
,,
J
.
is granted, everything morally necessary for the exer­
cise thereof is granted as well, because otherwise the grant would be
minimized and inefficacious {Digest, II. i. 2; and likewise Decretals,
Bk. I, tit. xxix, chap, v and other similar passages). But the right in
question has been given to the Church as a true power and jurisdic­
tion over the whole world, a fact which has been proved by the words
of Christ, ‘Feed my sheep’; and the exercise of that jurisdiction
470 should begin with the preaching of the Gospel; therefore, it is neces­
sary that the Church should at least have the power of protecting
[its preachers].
The third reason, which is very cogent, concerns a power that is
.
natural (so to speak) though indirect. For every state
has the power to protect innocent persons who surfer
grave injury from those stronger than themselves; but whoever hinders
the preaching of the Gospel does the gravest injury to many who per­
chance might have been converted if they had heard it, and who would
willingly have heard it, if it had been preached to them; therefore,
the Church has the power of protecting those who in that respect are
innocent and who suffer a grave injury.
Finally, there is another analogy showing that the existence of
this
power is consonant
with. natural
reason. It, is as
The fourth reason.
ri.r
,
,
,
r
follows: every state has the right of sending ambassa­
dors to treat of peace with another state, and consequently the former
has the right of protecting those ambassadors and of avenging an injury
if they are ill-treated ; therefore, much more has the Church this right
with respect to her own ambassadors who are the preachers of the
faith, especially since the Church, as was proved above, has the power,
given by Christ, to expand and to occupy the whole world.

Jerome.

744

^he Three "Theological Virtues: On Faith

5. But first we must inquire: In whom is vested this right or
power which we have said exists in the Church ? This
mg the faith rests question may be asked either with regard to the immem pastors separ- j.
J
_ °
ately, and is one of diate power of preaching the Gospel, or secondly,
common right.
with regard to the right to send forth preachers, or
thirdly, with regard to the right of defending those preachers and of
removing any obstacle in their way.
As to the first phase of the question, it must be said that this
power is vested as one of ordinary right in each of the pastors of the
Church respectively; and by delegation it is vested in those only who
are legitimately sent forth by those pastors.
The first half of the immediately preceding statement is clearly
true, because this power is not only highly necessary to the pastors
of the Church, but, more than that, it belongs by virtue of their
office to them alone. For the sheep of Christ are to be fed chiefly
with the word of faith, and Christ committed His sheep to the charge
of these pastors. Moreover, I have said, ‘respectively’, because the
power in question, in so far as it is supreme and universal over the
whole world, resides in the Roman Pontiff alone, as Salmeron (on
the Acts of the Apostles, Vol. XII, tract, xxxviii) well taught.
And by delegation,
t^ie case bishops, this power is limited to each
the power in ques- one’s own diocese, with dependence on the supreme
oniy fwho^are
Pontiff. In the case of parish priests, it exists in a
fully sent out to proportionate degree, as I assume from other paspreach.
r
sages.
The second half of the same statement1 is proved by the custom
of the Church. For the practice which has always been observed,
from the beginning, is that the ministers of the Gospel should
be sent out by the Apostles or by other pastors, according to the
passage (2 Corinthians, Chap, iii [Chap, viii, v. 22]), ‘And we have
sent with them our brother,’ &c. More explicitly, elsewhere occur
these words also (Romans, Chap, x [, v. 15]) : ‘And how shall they preach
unless they be sent ?’ Secondly, this restriction is necessary for the
observance of due order, upon which depend the peace and the tran­
quillity of the Church, and also for the sake of purity of doctrine; for
errors would easily be implanted if any person whosoever should as­
sume to himself the power of preaching the faith; and consequently,
this office must be exercised by commission from the Church or from
its pastors, a rule which is laid down in the Decretals (Pt. V, tit. vn,
chap. xii). Finally, the right in question pertains to the power of
jurisdiction ; nor can any one of his own authority usurp the jurisdic­
tion of another, particularly not when this jurisdiction is spiritual
and supernatural, and should therefore flow from Christ immediately,
The power of preach-

Salmerôn.

2 Corinthians,
iii [viii].
Romans, x.

1 [FÙÙ two paragraphs above.—Tr.]

Disp. XVIII: 0?i Means for the Conversion of Unbelievers

745

or from him to whom Christ directly granted such jurisdiction when
he said, ‘Feed my sheep’, or, ‘I send you’.
However, all this must be understood as referring to public
This must be under­ preaching, which is carried on by virtue of special
stood as referring authorization; inasmuch as private instruction and
to public preaching,
and not to private teaching can be conducted by any one of the faithful
instruction.
sufficiently learned, when the principle of charity and
the occasion should so demand. This is the meaning of the statement
in Ecclesiasticus (Chap, xvii [, v. 12]), ‘And God gave to every one of
them commandment concerning his neighbour.’ For this sort of in­
struction is not a usurpation of jurisdiction, since such private teaching
is given, not as though by virtue of the pastoral office, but by reason
of a duty or counsel of charity. St. Thomas (on Romans, Chap, x) adds
also that the passage in Romans refers to theordinary [public church] law;
for the Holy Spirit, by a private law, may send whomsoever He shall
wish, inspiring such a minister with a special impulse to this service. But
in that case the Church must be assured by some supernatural act or sign
of the validity of this private law, a fact which is brought out in the
Decretals (Bk. V, tit. vn, chap. xii). Otherwise—that is to say, if anyone
wishes to exercise this gift contrary to the precept and [right] order of
the Church (as Innocent III said in a similar case, Decretals, Bk. I, tit. ix,
chap, x), such an inspiration must be judged as proceeding from an
evil spirit rather than from a good one.
6. In accordance with the foregoing statements, and in regard
to the second phase1 of the question above propounded it must be
The supreme and asserted that the absolute, supreme and universal
^ndfrSaforthWer °f
of sending preachers of the Gospel to such unpreachers°resides in believers resides in the supreme Pontiff alone; because
the supreme Pontiff. he a]one is the supreme pastor of the whole flock of
Christ, according to the words of Christ, ‘Feed my sheep’ ; and further­
more, because the special duties of extending the bounds of the
471 Church and of disseminating the faith pertain to him, since the other
bishops have their jurisdiction limited within definite territorial
boundaries. Hence, if there should be any unbelievers of this kind
within such territory, any bishop within his own diocese could send
to them preachers, or teachers. But as to the territory outside his
own diocese, by the ordinary law (as it were) and normally speaking,
no bishop below the Pope has this power. However, if necessity
presses, or if there should arise a fit occasion for converting any one to
the faith, the bishops, as a duty of charity, could send preachers to
neighbouring provinces with the approval and the tacit, or interpreta­
tive, consent of the supreme Pontiff, who always in such cases should
1 [Le. ‘In whom is vested . .. the right to send forth preachers?’ See the first paragraph of Sub­
section 5 of this Section, supra, p. 744.—Tr.]
>569.74

ς c

746

The Three Theological Virtues: On Faith

be consulted as soon as is conveniently possible, that he may, in ac­
cordance with his office, provide for the necessity or take advantage of
the occasion which has arisen.
7. With regard to the third aspect1 of our question, there is even
The right of protect- greater reason to observe that the duty of defending
the PenemerS even t^ie a^oresa^ right, even by coercion and war, if such
through war and by defence should be necessary, belongs solely to the
coercion, resides in supreme Pontiff. In defence of this statement, we
the supreme Ponr
~
,
. . . .
.
tiff; and in what argue, tirst, tnat it is ms duty to defend the universal
way this is true.
rights of the Church. Secondly, such defence involves
the waging of war, and therefore normally requires power of a sove­
reign order; this power does not reside per se in temporal princes, for
it is derived from a spiritual right which is not granted to them, but
is, on the contrary, joined to spiritual power, the latter being indirectly
De Legibus,
extended to temporal affairs, as was shown elsewhere. Therefore, the
Bk. Ill, chap.
via and in other power in question resides only in the supreme Pontiff.
places and De­
It must be added, however, that this power does not so belong
fensio
Fidei,
Bk. Ill, from to the Pope that it should be exercised by himself or through eccle­
chap, xxii.2
siastical persons. For it is no part of the priestly office, nor of the
ecclesiastical status, to take up corporeal arms, as was rightly held by
Ambrose.
Ambrose [Letters, xx. 8, To Marcellina], who is cited in the Decretum
(Pt. II, causa xxm, qu. viii, can. xxi), where, throughout the first sir
chapters [of the Causa], this fact is supported by manifold evidence.
Consequently, the Pope has the pow’er of entrusting this defence—
that is to say, its execution—to temporal princes, and may even com­
mand them to undertake the change {Decretum, Pt. II, causa xxm,
qu. viii, can. viii with other canons in said question viii).
It follows, therefore, as Major and Victoria [De Indis, Sect. Ill,
Major.
Victoria.
The supreme Pon­ no. 10] rightly observe, that the Pope can distribute
tiff may entrust this among temporal princes and kings the provinces and
right of defence to
_
_and
_ ____
kings,
distribute realms of the unbelievers; not in order that the former
to them the king- may take possession of these regions according to their
doms of unbelievers. own
for tbat WOuld be tyranny, as I shall explain
later, but in order that they may make provision for the sending of
preachers of the Gospel to those infidels, and may protect such preachers
by their power, even through the declaration of just war, if reason and
a rightful cause should require it. For this purpose, then, the Pope may
mark off specific boundaries for each prince, which that prince may not
later transgress without committing an injustice. This, as we read, was
done by Alexander VI in the case of the kings of Portugal and of Castile.
The chief reason of all [for asserting this principle] is the fact that
1 [Le. ‘In whom is vested.. · the right of defending... preachers and of destroying any impediments
in their way ?’ See the first paragraph of Sub-section 5 of this Section, supra, p. 744.—Tr.]
2 [Not included in these Selections.—Tb.]

Dis'p. XVIII: On Means for the Conversion of Unbelievers 747
it is expedient that this matter, w’hich most gravely concerns the
Church, should be conducted in an orderly manner. For that is most
necessary, both for preserving peace among Christian princes, and also
in order that each of these princes may procure with the greater care
the welfare of the people committed to his charge. Therefore, this
prerogative belongs wholly to the Pope as one who gives the first im­
pulse (so to speak); for kings are (as it were) his organs and instruments,
and consequently no [temporal prince] can transgress the limits pre­
scribed to him, since he cannot act unless he has received this impulse.
8. A further inquiry may be made regarding this same doctrine,
and especially regarding the third proposition: an inquiry that is, as
Whether the defence to whether such defence of preaching and of preachers
of preachers of the of the Gospel is allowed only after injury has been
faith is allowed be­
fore any injury has inflicted by unbelievers, or some obstacle has been
been done to them. placed in the way of the preaching of the faith; or
—The
affirmative
opinion of some is whether that defence is permitted as a precautionary
stated.
measure (so to speak) and soldiers may be employed in
order to prevent injury to the preachers, or in order that their ministry
may not be hindered.
For some have said that a Christian prince may justly seize the
The affirmative
territory of a pagan king on this ground alone, namely,
opinion of certain in order that the Gospel may be preached with greater
persons.
ease anj securjty under a Christian prince.
But since this opinion understood, without limitation,is incredible,
as will be made clear from what we shall say later on, some have modif
fied it by declaring that Christian princes may send forth preachers
accompanied by a military force, sufficient, not for the waging ot* war,
but in order that the preachers may proceed in security. They add
also that a Christian prince may build towers and fortified strongholds
in the lands of unbelievers, especially at the national boundaries, in
order that entrance and access to such lands may be made easier and
472 more secure for the faithful. Finally, they hold that a prince may
collect, from the unbelievers who inhabit the territory in question,
whatever expenses he has incurred in such enterprises, since that sum
is spent for the benefit of those unbelievers; and that, consequently,
he may resort to violence and warfare in order to exact payment, if it
is denied, and may proceed even to the occupation of the territory if this
should be necessary. That is the opinion of Major ([on the Sentences,] *ÿor·
Bk. II, dist. xliv, qu. 2 [qu. 3], and it is based solely upon the principle
that preferential favour should be shown to the faith.
9. But this teaching is not to be approved, according to the
The negative
sounder opinion of Victoria, Bânez, and other modern
opinion is approved, authors, as set forth in the passages cited above.
First, because it has no foundation in the teachings of Christ, but

748

The Three Theological Virtues: On Faith

is rather repugnant to his very words (Matthew, Chap, x [, v. 16]
and Luke, Chap. x[, v. 3]), ‘Behold I send you as sheep in the midst of
wolves’, words by which He plainly meant that the preaching of the
faith was introduced not by arms, but by gentleness, patience, and the
power of the word, and also by living example, according to the asser2 c^nnthians, tjon θρ pau]
Corinthians, Chap, x [, v. 4]), ‘For the weapons of our
warfare are not carnal, but mighty to God.’
Secondly, the opinion in question is opposed to the custom and
practice of the Church, for the Apostles and their successors assuredly
did not preach the Gospel in that way, nor were the Popes, even after
the conversion of the emperors to the faith, accustomed to send forth
preachers to unbelievers in such fashion, a fact which is evident from the
caseofGregory,whosent preachers toEngland,andfromsimilar instances.
Thirdly, the practice under discussion is, in point of fact, not
defensive, but aggressive; therefore, it is a virtual coercion to the
adoption of the faith, or at least, to a hearing of those who preach the
faith ; and such coercion, as we shall presently explain, is not permissible.
The first member of this proposition may be explained thus: if
preachers are sent with an army, those to whom they are sent may—
morally speaking, and not without obvious reason—presume that these
preachers have come to seize their territory rather than to provide for
their spiritual welfare ; hence, even as a general rule, [these unbelievers]
may justly defend themselves, acting upon a prudent presumption;
accordingly, an occasion for a just war is given them, and under these
Φ
circumstances, the practice in question becomes an aggressive rather
than a defensive measure; and on the other hand, if [the unbelievers]
are not able to resist, and yield through fear, that, in turn, is coercion,
even in the highest degree.
From this explanation is derived a confirmation of the [concluding]
statement [of our proposition, namely,] that such means are not fitted
for the introduction of the faith. For they lead to its injury and
defamation; since the infidels will think, [if we resort to these means,]
that our faith gives us the privilege of violating the ius gentium, and
even the law of nature, by our seizure of the property of others against
the -will of the owners and by our waging of war without any just
ground; and since these same infidels will consequently become more
hardened, and more indisposed to receive the faith. Therefore, this
mode of introducing the preaching of the faith is not permissible.
10. Accordingly, it should be stated that one ought first to try
In what way Chris­ peaceful means, inviting and repeatedly urging infidel
tian princes ought to
conduct themselves princes and states to permit the preaching of the faith
with unbelievers, in in their realms, and to offer or allow security to persons
order that the latter
may provide oppor­ who come into or dwell within their domains for the
tunity for preaching. purpose of performing that task of preaching. This

Luke, x.

Disp. XV111: On Means for the Conversion of Unbelievers 749
is clearly what Christ Our Lord meant, when He counselled the Apostles
whom He was sending forth to preach, that above all things they
should proclaim peace {Matthew, Chap, x [, v. I2]). But if the unbeliev­
ing princes resist, and do not grant entrance, then, in my opinion and
on account of the reasons given above, they may be coerced by the
sending of preachers accompanied by an adequate army.
In like manner, if, after the preachers have been received, the
infidels should kill them or treat them wrongfully, when the victims
are blameless, and for no other reason than that they have preached
the Gospel, then an even better reason for just defence and, indeed,
for righteous vengeance, has arisen, the latter sometimes being neces­
sary in order that other infidel chiefs may be coerced and may fear to
practise like acts of tyranny. For such [defensive action] is in harmony
with the natural law and is not opposed to any command of Christ;
and if, during the first years of the Church, this mode of coercion was
not customarily practised, the reason was, not that this coercion was
impermissible, but that the Church in those days had not the temporal
means of resisting the enemies of the faith. For in the beginning, Christ
our Lord willed to conquer the world by the power of the word and
by that of miracles, in order that His own power and the truth of His
doctrine might be made more manifest.

SECTION II
IS IT PERMISSIBLE FOR THE CHURCH AND CHRISTIAN PRINCES TO
FORCE THESE UNBELIEVERS TO GIVE EAR TO THE FAITH ?

I. With regard to this point, there are two opposing opinions.
The first affirms absolutely and unconditionally that
opinion.
such coercion is permissible. This appears to be
Major’s opinion ([on the Sentences,] Bk. II, dist. xliv, qu. 2 [ qu. 4]), M
although he does not state it in set terms.
473
Moreover, this view may be suggested by what we have already said
{supra, p. 741, Sect. I, sub-sect. 2). For if the infidels could not be forced
Argument I in sup- to listen, then the power to teach would be superfluous,
port of the affirma- or, at least, in the highest degree useless, since teaching
tive opinion.
vajn> jf there is no one to hear; but we have said
that the Church does possess the power and the right to teach the faith ;
and therefore it has, accordingly, the power to obtain a hearing through
compulsion.
Secondly, the force of the foregoing argument is clear from analogy.
For Christ said to his Apostles [John, Chap. xx. v. 23] :
gument '
‘Whose sins you shall forgive,’ &c., wherefore the
Church very properly infers that He commanded the faithful to con­
fess their sins, inasmuch as sins cannot be forgiven unless they are
The affirmative

750

Valentia.

Salmerôn,

Luke, ίχ.

The Three Theological Virtues: On Faith

heard and known; hence, by the same reasoning, if He gave to the
Church the power of teaching unbelievers, He therefore gave it the
power to force unbelievers to hearken, since there can be no teaching
without an audience, or since, at least, such teaching would be vain
and useless.
Hence, the opinion in question is founded, thirdly, upon the
.
principle
that
when ionei of two correlatives
is ®granted,
Argument III.
r
i
·
i
.
tne other is granted also; since the one cannot exist
without the other, as is usually taught in the matter of privileges in
a like connexion. What has been stated elsewhere {De Legibus, Bk. VIII,
chap, xi)1 may be consulted. Another principle set forth above has a
like bearing on this point, namely, the principle that when jurisdiction
has been granted, everything is granted without which that jurisdiction
could not well be exercised.
Finally, I contend, in the fourth place, that an argument is derived
.
x __
from what was stated above, namely: it is permissible
to employ coercion m order to prevent resistance to
the preaching of the faith; but if the pagans are unwilling to listen, in
that very unwillingness they resist and impede the preaching of the
faith; therefore,. . .
2. The second opinion denies unconditionally that the coercion in
The second and
question is permissible with respect to any unbelievers
negative opinion.
whomsoever, whether or not they are temporal sub­
jects of the Church or of Christian princes. This opinion was held by
Valentia ^Commentariorum Theologicorum,] Vol. Ill, disp, i, qu. x,
point 6, near end), and Salmeron (Vol. XII, tract, xxxviii [, on the Acts
of the Apostles^ appears to have upheld the same doctrine.
The proofs of the negative opinion are, first, that we do not read
that Christ gave this coercive power to the Church; neither does it
necessarily accompany the power of preaching, since the latter may
have been given with respect to those who wish to hear, and since we
often see that a given person has the power, the duty and the right of
teaching, but has not the power to compel others to hear him.
Secondly, such coercion does not seem to be in harmony with the
example of Christ. For we read (in Luke, Chap, ix [, w. 54-5]), that
once, when He went into Samaria, and the Samaritans proved un­
willing to receive Him, certain of His disciples said : ‘Lord, wilt thou
that [we command] fire [to] come down from heaven’, &c. ; to whom
Christ replied : ‘You know’ not of what spirit you are. [The Son of Man
came not to destroy souls, but to save’,] as if to say that force and
threats were not to be used against the Samaritans ; and accordingly,
He peacefully withdrew. The same principle of conduct may be
observed in other passages, also. According to one of those other passages
1 [Not included in these Selections—Tr.]

Disp. XVIII: On Means for the Conversion of Unbelievers 751
[Matthew, Chap, x, v. 14], He said to His Apostles, ‘And whosoever shall
not receive you, nor hear your words: [.. .] shake off the dust,’ &c.
Thirdly, there is an excellent reason, namely, that faith should be
voluntary; therefore, the means to faith Should also be voluntary;
consequently, coercion to the faith in the case of the unbelievers in
question is not permissible, as we shall observe in the following Section ;
and accordingly, coercion to the hearing of the faith is also impermis­
sible. The proof of this deduction is as follows : the essential desirability
of the means is the same as that of the end, especially when the means
are entirely necessary, and desirable solely on account of the end.
The fourth is the principal argument and is as follows: the coercion
which we are discussing is either direct—that is, it employs fear, which
it inspires with the intention of forcing these unbelievers to the
desired act—or else it is indirect—that is to say, it employs fear which
is instilled on some other ground, but one from which it is hoped that
the act in question will result, even though this result is not intended
directly and for its own sake ; this latter method of coercion ordinarily
has no place in cases of the sort under discussion, because subject­
matter and occasion for such coercion are lacking with respect to un­
believers of the kind in question; the former sort of coercion, indeed,
is always illicit; therefore, . . .
The truth of this second proposition is established thus : without
jurisdiction, there is no just coercion; the Church has no jurisdiction
over unbelievers who are not its [temporal] subjects, while over
those infidels who are its subjects it has at most a temporal jurisdic­
tion, which does not extend to spiritual affairs ; and to give ear to the
preaching of the faith pertains to the spiritual sphere.
3. A third opinion, which is intermediate between these two, and
The third and true which distinguishes between infidels subject to Chris°Pinion·
tian princes and those who are not subject, seems to
me worthy of approval.
Accordingly, I hold, first, that it is permissible for Christian
The first proposiprinces to force their own infidel subjects to hear the
tionfaith. Such is the opinion held by Pezant and Binez
(on II.-II, qu. 10, art. 8). Moreover, although the latter author
shrinks from the view because he thinks that this practice was never
customary on the part of the Church, nevertheless, the example of
Rome has great weight with me.
For the Roman Pontiffs use coercion upon the Jews who are their
This proposition is subjects, compelling those Jews to hear the preaching
proved by means of of the faith once a week, and imposing a penalty upon
an example.
those who refuse to hear. On this point, one may con474 suit the Bull of Nicholas III which begins ‘Fineam*, and that of
Gregory XIII beginning ‘Sancta Mater Ecclesia’.

MaUhn, x.

Pesant.
Bâôex.

752

Some persons, however, reply that this imposition constitutes, not
of the a penalty, but a species of tribute, which may justly be
foregoing proof.
imposed upon such infidels, in their capacity as subjects,
but which is remitted by the kindness of the prince in the case of those
who hear the preaching; so that the practice in question is not coercion,
at least not coercion of a direct kind, but, at most, indirect—or rather a
method of inducement through the kindness displayed in the remission
of the tribute, a method the use of which is permissible, as we shall
explain in the following Section.
This evasion of the difficulty, however, although it cannot be clearly
This means of eva- refuted, would nevertheless seem to have been devised
sion is precluded,
without any foundation; for that sum of money whichis
imposed upon those refusing to hear, is levied, not on the extrinsic title
of a just tribute, but only on account of an omission, or act of dis­
obedience; and apart from this tax, there are other sufficient tributes
which are levied upon such infidels because of their temporal subjection.
4. Our proposition, then, may be maintained by an appeal to
The rational proof reason· For there are two ways in which the subjects
of the same proposi- in question may be compelled to hear the preaching
tion·
of the word.
First, they are bound by divine command to hear the faith, as
Victoria maintained (Pt. I of the aforesaid Relectio, no. 36 [De Indis,
Sect. II, no. 12]). To be sure, this point does not suffice to justify
coercion, at least, direct coercion ; for the observance and enforcement
of that command do not pertain to temporal jurisdiction, a fact which
is self-evident.
Secondly, then, it is possible that there might intervene in this
matter some just command issued by the prince himself, for the
observance of which he might use coercion upon his subjects. This
assumption seems entirely plausible; for the hearing of preaching,
is not, in itself and of its own nature, an action that falls within the
supernatural sphere, and under the present circumstances subjects
could be convinced that it was right and calculated to be for their
advantage. Indeed, [such a command on the part of the prince] could
even be referred to that welfare of the realm which a temporal prince
may and ought to preserve—that is to say, the greater concord and
peace of all the subjects: either in order that the unbelievers them­
selves may be set free from the errors [of whose falsity] they can be
convinced because these errors are opposed to natural reason as are
those which the Gentiles adopt; or else because such errors are opposed
to what they themselves admit and believe, as happens in the case of
the Jews ; or, finally, because this action [on the part of the prince]
may be directed to enabling the subjects to choose the true religion and
the true worship of God, since in every human state that is well
An evasion

Victoria.

The Three Theological Virtues: On Faith

Disp. XKIII: On Means for the Conversion of Unbelievers 753
governed this care must be taken. Therefore, such a mandate, issued
by the prince, is just and does not exceed his jurisdiction; and conse­
quently, he may, by imposing a penalty, compel his subjects to obey
the mandate in question.
5. The arguments adduced in support of the second [and wholly
The arguments ad­ negative] opinion,1 then, do not militate against this
duced in connexion proposition, for they relate only to non-subjects.
with the second
Thus, in reply to the first argument, we confess that
opinion do not mili­
tate against this
this act [of coercion] is not to be ascribed to any special
proposition.
power given by Christ, but we maintain that the
ordinary power of a temporal prince is sufficient. Therefore, the
second argument is fallacious in appealing to the example set by Christ
and His Apostles ; for they did not assume or make use of a temporal
principate. As to the third argument, indeed, regarding coercion to
belief, although the introductory statements2 may be admitted, the
final inference3 is denied : partly on the ground that one may be forced
to hear, but not be forced to believe (just as a person may be forced to
hear the preaching of the evangelical counsels or that on the grant of
indulgences, without on that account being forced either to follow the
counsels or to gain the indulgences) ; and partly on the ground that it is
not necessary that the command in question be imposed for the specific
reason of belief in a given supernatural faith, but for the general reason
of choosing the true religion and of avoiding errors which are repugnant
even to reason. The same reply may be made to the fourth argument.
Bânez, however, adds two limitations to the proposition in quesA twofold limitation tion·4 The first is that this coercion may be allowed
of the proposition, solely for the sake of a single hearing of the faith; since
by Bânez.
otherwise, if it took place frequently, there would be
a virtual compulsion to belief. The other limitation is that it be
attended by a moderate punishment [in case of disobedience].
But I disagree as to the first of the two limitations: I do so, partly
because the contrary is proved by the Roman custom mentioned above;
partly because, practically speaking, the [single exercise of] coercion
The first limitation would be useless, since, for the acceptance of faith, it is
is rejected.
not enoughthat its preaching should be heard once, and
especially not, in the case of men who have grown accustomed to their
errors; and partly, in fine, because there is no reason, if the coercion has
been licit once and has had no effect, to prevent it from being licit again.
Neither does there follow from such a procedure any virtual coercion to
the faith; for our assertion is not that it is permissible for princes to
1 [Supra, p. 750.—TR-]
2 [i.e. ‘faith should be voluntary; therefore, the means to faith should also be voluntary; conse­
quently, coercion to the faith in the case of the unbelievers in question is not permissible. ..TtJ
3 fi_e. ‘and accordingly, coercion to the hearing of the faith is also impermissible.’—Tr.J
♦ [i.e. the first proposition under the third opinion, supra, p. 751.—Tr.J
1569.74
- d

754

I Corinthians,
ii.

The Three Theological Virtues: On Faith

impose this burden simply at will, but that it is permissible for them to do
so with prudence and moderation, and in accordance with the attendant
circumstances, as may be seen in the case of the example set by Rome.
The other limitation, however, is decidedly acceptable. For judge- 475
The second limitament in the case of such coercion should be passed on
tion is approved.
the same grounds as in the case of a penalty imposed
upon one who fails to observe some civil law, the transgression of which,
politically speaking, neither causes great disturbance to the state nor is
considered to be a very grave matter.
6. Secondly, I hold : it is in nowuse permissible to coerce unbelievers
The second proposi- who are non-subjects, to a hearing of the faith. This
tion·
proposition is much more nearly a certainty than the
first ; and is commonly accepted as such, being furthermore proved by
the first and second reasons in support of the second opinion, and,
especially, by the fourth.
The sources of proof
I set forth and urge [the second proposition], in the
for this proposition, following manner: all coercion, whether it be direct
or indirect, requires in the person exercising it a certain jurisdiction or
power over the person coerced, since—in view of the fact that all coer­
cion is executed by the infliction of some ill—it cannot be licit except
in virtue of a superior power; but Christian princes have no power or
jurisdiction over the unbelievers in question; therefore, . ..
This minor premiss is proved both by the very terms themselves,
in that these unbelievers are assumed to be non-subjects ; and also by
the fact that the Church has no spiritual power over such persons (a
point which I shall for the present assume to be true, and which I shall
discuss more fully in the next Section) ; nor has the Church a temporal
jurisdiction, since that jurisdiction resides in the princes and kings of
the said unbelievers, these rulers being supreme in their own order;
and therefore, such coercion cannot under any title be just.
7. Neither do the arguments relating to the first opinion1 avail
against this proposition. For to the first argument, we
The answer to the
first argument.
reply that the power to preach is not formally a power
of jurisdiction, but merely the virtue (so to speak) of
The arguments re­
enlightening through teaching ; so that the efficacy of
lating to the first
opinion are
this power resides, not in any coercive virtue, but in
answered.
the efficacy of the word and in the showing of the
Spirit and power,2 as Paul said [z Corinthians, Chap. ii]. Nevertheless,
it does not follow that this power is fruitless ; for it is morally certain that
there will be some who will give ear voluntarily, if there is one to preach.
1 [Supra, p. 749.—Tr.]
2 [virtus, translated ‘virtue’ immediately above, and probably having the same significance here;
whereas the ‘power’ referred to earlier in the same sentence is potestas, not virtus. The slight inconsistency
in translation is due to the fact that the Biblical passage here cited (Douay version) contains the phrase,
‘in shewing of the Spirit and power.’—Tr.]

Disÿ. XVIII: On Means for the Conversion of Unbelievers

755

Accordingly, the reply to the second argument, which was derived
by analogy and by similitude with the words, ‘Whose
second argument.
sins y0U shall forgive,’ is easily evident. For the power
to remit sins is one of jurisdiction, and applies to the subject as such;
so that, in this respect, there is involved in such power a very different
essential principle from that involved in the power to preach. But a
certain proportion may be preserved with regard to this point, since,
just as the divine precept to confess is joined with the power to give
absolution, even so a divine precept to hear and to embrace the faith
is imposed together with the power and the right to preach the faith.
There is, however, a difference. For the precept enjoining confession
falls upon those who are members of the Church, and they can certainly
be compelled, through that same Church, to fulfil the said precept;
whereas the other precept includes also those persons who are not
subject to the Church, and over them the Church can certainly exercise
no compulsion.
The answer to the third argument is as follows: the principle
The answer to the there set forth, with regard to correlatives, applies
third argument.
only jn the case of those things which are necessary
to the use of a power granted in connexion with one of the correlatives;
whereas, in the case under discussion, it is not necessary, in order to
use the pow’er of preaching, that it should be possible for others to be
forced to hear; rather does it suffice that they are licitly able to do so,
and that they ought to hear voluntarily. Moreover, the same is true
of the other principle adduced.
Hence, the reply to the fourth argument is evident, since the
The answer to the reasons for maintaining the power to resist those who
fourth argument.
place unjust impediments in the path of preaching the
faith, differ greatly from the reasons for maintaining the power to
compel a hearing of the same. For the former power is a means morally
necessary, and assumes that an injury which one is allowed to repel, has
been committed; whereas neither of these conditions can be found to
exist in the latter case, and thus the grounds [for maintaining the
existence of this second power] are entirely different.
8. But hereupon a difficulty arises, since it follows from what has
.
been said that if, perchance, in the case of any infidel
kingdom both the king and the leaders of the realm are
unwilling to admit the preachers of the Gospel, or to permit them to
come into the kingdom, the Church cannot use any violent means or
coercion in order that the Gospel may be preached there; and this
seems unfitting, because such a nation would not be sufficientlyprovided
for ; therefore,... The truth of the [primary] inference is evident. For
in such a case, the entire nation is unwilling to hear the Gospel ; and—
as has been said—they cannot be compelled to hear it; therefore,. . .
The answer to the

756

The Three Theological Virtues: On Faith

As to this argument, some simply concede the inference; since
follows thence, not that men are insufficiently pro­
certain persons to vided for, but only that they are not thus effectually
this objection.
provided for, because under such conditions, men
may by their own malice, hinder the means of salvation given them, as
it is probable that they will do.
Nevertheless, I think that, as a general rule, some coercion is 476
allowable under the circumstances posited. In par­
The true solution.
ticular, if any pagan state wishes to hear preachers,
and if the pagan king prevents the people from so
What should be
done if the king and doing, then the said state may resist him ; and in this
the leaders of the
matter it may be aided by Christian princes, in order
realm hinder
preachers from
that
the unwilling king shall permit the preaching of
preaching.
the faith; for in thus [restraining] his subjects he does
them an injury, by setting obstacles in the way of their salvation.
According to the same reasoning, if the king consents to and desires the
preaching, but does not dare to allow7 it on account of the resistance
of the leaders or of the realm at large, the king may bring force to
bear upon his subjects; and if he lacks the power, then, in this matter,
also, he may be aided by Christian princes, for the reason given
above.
Finally, if both the king and kingdom offer simultaneous resistance,
I think that they may be forced to permit the preachers of the Gospel
to live in their territories; for this tolerance is obligatory under the
ius gentium and cannot be impeded without just cause. Moreover,
that king and that people may be forced to permit these preachers
to declare the word of God, without suffering violence or treachery,
to those who are willing to hear; since it is probable that there will
never be lacking individual persons who will hear voluntarily. For,
even if we assume that the king and his kingdom are offering resistance,
still, not absolutely all individuals are included under the term ‘king­
dom’, but rather, the Councils or chief men, or else the greater or
greatest part of the kingdom; and always, without exception, the
Church retains unimpaired its right to preach in that kingdom, and
to defend the innocent (so to speak)—to defend, that is, individuals
who may wish to hear the word. Accordingly, under such circum­
stances, there is involved no coercion to the hearing of the faith, but
only a coercion to refrain from impeding the preaching of the Gospel,
or placing obstacles in the way of those persons who may voluntarily
choose to give ear to such preaching.
The reply made by

Disp. XFLII: On Means for the Conversion of Unbelievers

757

SECTION III
AFTER A SUFFICIENT PRESENTATION OF THE GOSPEL, IS IT ALLOW ABLE
TO USE FORCE TO COMPEL BELIEF ON THE PART OF THOSE INFIDELS
WHO HAVE BEEN SUFFICIENTLY INSTRUCTED ?

[1.] This question may be discussed both in its relation to those
. .
unbelievers who are in every sense non-subjects, and
e rs opinion.
.q
re]atjon to those who are temporally subject
to the Church. Hence, we have the first opinion, which teaches that
it is permissible to use force upon unbelievers, even upon those who
are not subjects, in order that they may accept the faith after it has
been sufficiently expounded to them. Such is the opinion of -Major
(on the Sentences, Bk. II, dist. iv [dist. xliv, qu. 4]); and—so it
is said—in the time of Charles V, and with reference to the Jews, a
certain Genesius Sepûlveda [, De Fato et Libero Arbitrio] strenuously
defended the same view.
This opinion may find a basis in the words of Christ {Luke, Chap.
xiv [, v. 23]):‘Compel them to come in’, that is, into
The first proof.
Church, as Gregory (Homily XXXIX [Homily
XXXVI], On the Gospel) and Chrysostom explain (Homily XIV, [On
Matthew}1 in their discussion of that point. Therefore, Christ gave
the power to compel unbelievers to come into the Church; and that
power given by Christ extends to every one. This point is confirmed
by the example of Christ, who used force upon Paul to make him sub­
mit to the faith. Augustine {Letters, xlviii [xciii, no. 5]) makes use of
this example in a similar case.
I base a second argument upon reason, as follows: these pagans
, , sin grievously in not accepting the faith after it has
The second proof.
,
°
mii
it
t
t
r
been sufficiently heard by them; therefore,on account
of this sin, they may justly be punished, and through punishment
coerced to accept the faith; consequently, men have power to punish
the sin in question, for it pertains to the Providence of God so to order
human affairs that public crimes shall not remain unpunished; there­
fore, the power under discussion resides in the Church alone, because
that power presupposes the existence of the faith which is found in
the true Church and there only.
Thirdly, expediency may be adduced as an argument. For through
,
such coercion
great bgood
may
be anticipated;
since,
The third proof.
,
i
b i
i
S
r
i
l
granted perhaps that those who are coerced may be
converted less sincerely or even fictitiously, still those who follow,—
and wrho will greatly outnumber the former—will believe the more
easily, and many innocent children will be saved through baptism.
1 [St. Chrysostom there speaks very indirectly of the Church. His main point is that St. Matthew
was speaking of the kingdom of God.—Reviser.]

Major.

Genesius
Sepulveda.

Luke, xiv.
Gregory.

Chrysostom.

Augustine.

758

Gregory.

Scotus.
Gabriel.
Angelus.

Council of
Toledo.
Decreturn.
Decretals.

Gregory.

Augustine.

The Three Theological Virtues: On Faith

Therefore, because of this beneficial result, the coercion in question
may be allowed. For if any evil follows therefrom, that evil is not
wrought, but [merely] permitted, by the Church. This argument may­
be supported by the authority of Gregory ([Letters,] Bk. IV, letter vi),
according to a passage in which, for a similar reason and with regard
to a similar case, he uses almost the same words.
2. According to the second opinion, the Church and Christian
. . .
princes -,
may
compel
acceptance
of the
faith on, the
The second opinion. x
7
,r
r
,,
, .
part 01 those who are temporally subject to them,
although this is not the attitude taken with regard to those who are
not subj'ects. Scotus (on the Sentences, Bk. IV, dist. iv, qu. 6) upholds
this second opinion; while Gabriel and Angelus follow him, but on
the condition that the coercion be indirect, not direct, a limitation
which will be discussed later.
The opinion in question is founded first of all upon the arguments
in favour of the first opinion, which a fortiori support this one.
Secondly, the practice of the Church may also be adduced in 477
support of the latter view, for the kings of Spain used the power of
which we are speaking. Ferdinand forced the Moors to accept the
faith; and before Ferdinand, King Sisebut, he who is called ‘most
religious’, had done likewise in the case of the Jews, and is praised for
that deed by the Fourth Council of Toledo (Chap. Ivi [Chap. Ivii] cited in
the Decretum, Pt. I, dist. xlv, can. v and the Decretals, Bk. Ill, tit.
XLii, chap, iii, last section). The Sixth Council (Chap, iii), and the
Seventeenth Council of Toledo (Chap, viii), have also expressed a
favourable opinion of the act of Sisebut. The Decretum (Pt. II, causa
xxiii, qu. vi, can. iv) quotes Gregory, too, as declaring in his Letters
(Bk. Ill [Bk. Π ], letter xxvi), with regard to the Jews who were subject,
that : ‘They should be burdened with such a weight of fines that they are
compelled through punishment [to accept the faith].’ Lastly, there
is the rule of Augustine (Letters, cciv [clxxiii. 2, in Migne ed.]),‘Wicked
men are to be restrained from evil and compelled to do good’, cited
in Decretum (Pt. II, causa xxm, qu. iv, can. liv). Unbelievers are
wicked, and the faith is for them a great good; therefore, they may be
forced by their princes to accept this good.
3. Finally, a special argument may be added as to these unbelievA confirmation as to ing subjects, namely: that the coercion in question is
unbelieving subnot repugnant to the faith; that with respect to such
jects’
unbelievers the power to coerce is not lacking, nor is
there lacking a suitable reason for such coercion; and that therefore,
the coercion is permissible.
The major premiss of this argument may be proved, first of all,
from the example of heretics, on whom the Church imposes the faith
Therefore, the sort of coercion under discussion is not repugnant to

Disp. XV111: On Means for the Conversion of Unbelievers

759

the faith. Hence, there does not seem to be any solid and true basis
for the contention urged by some persons, in this connexion, namely,
that faith resulting from coercion is slavish and involuntary, and there­
fore a sacrilege. For in the example mentioned [that is, in the case
of heretics] this contention appears to be proven erroneous. Its erro­
neous nature may also be proven by reasoning, as follows : when the wish
is forced it retains, absolutely speaking, its character as a wish, although
relatively it may be involuntary; but it is sufficient for the acceptance
of the faith that the act be voluntary, absolutely speaking. To this we
may add the consideration that a man is very often induced by punish­
ment and coercion to change his will utterly and absolutely; and there­
fore, coercion is permissible with respect to many benefits which could
not well exist without an absolute wish, as Augustine teaches at some
length (in the aforesaid Letters, xxiv [Letters, cciv, which is clxxiii, no. 2,
in Migne ed.]) and as we read in the Decretum (Pt. II, causa xxm, qu.
iv, can. xxxviii).
The minor premiss1 of the chief argument may be proved as follows :
the unbelievers in question are assumed to be subjects of Christian
princes ; and a prince has powrer to coerce his subjects, especially as to
those matters which are necessary for their salvation; moreover, the
prince or the immediate prelate may compel a subject to obey not
only his owm commands, but also the law of a superior sovereign; and
therefore, much more certainly may a temporal prince compel his
subjects to obey the law of the Supreme Heavenly Prince, and to obey,
consequently, the law of faith. Furthermore, a prince may forcibly
restrain a pagan subject from blaspheming against the Christian reli­
gion, and from inflicting any injury upon it; but those unbelievers
have blasphemed in not believing a faith sufficiently set forth to them,
for they think and declare that it is false, and therefore may justly
be punished and through punishment forced to conversion. This is
especially true since these pagans may be convinced that what is set
before them is much more prudently credible than the errors in which
they themselves live. Therefore, the power in question is not wanting
to Christian princes. Finally, and in accordance with the preceding
remarks, it is easy to prove the remainder of this minor premiss,
namely, that a suitable reason [for such coercion] is not lacking. For
it is to be hoped that much good will result from this coercion, either
to the parents or to the children or to those who follow, as we have
gathered from Gregory [Letters, Bk. IV, letter vi]. Neither is there
any reason to fear greater evils, for it is worse that unbelievers should
persist in their errors than that their conversion should be fictitious.
They and not the Church are responsible for that fiction, and conse1 [ix. the statement that, ‘with respect to such unbelievers the power to coerce is not lacking, nor
is there lacking a suitable reason for such coercion’. See the first paragraph of this Sub-section.—Ti.]

Augustine,

760

St. Thomas.
Cajetan.

de la Palu.
Durandus.
Soto.
Richard
Middleton.
Antoninus.
Abulensis
[Tostado].
Sylvester.
Castro.
Victoria.
Salmeron.
Henriquez.

The Three Theological Virtues: On Faith

quently, there is no reason to consider this coercion as an evil in
itself.
4. Nevertheless, the third and common opinion of theologians is
The third and true that unbelievers who are not apostates, whether sub­
opinion.
jects or not, may not be coerced to embrace the faith,
even after it has been sufficiently proposed to them. So St. Thomas
teaches (IL-II, qu. 10, arts. 8 and 12); as do also Cajetan [on II.-II,
ibid.], de la Palu (on the Sentences, Bk. IV, dist. iv, qu. 4), Durandus
(ibid., qu. 6), Soto (ibid., dist. ix, qu. I, art. 3 [dist. v, sole question,
art. 10]), Richard Middleton (ibid., dist. vi, art. 3, qu. 1), Antoninus
(\Summa Theologica,'] Pt. II, tit. xn, chap, ii), Abulensis [Tostado] (on
Kings, Bk. I, chap, viii, qq. 34, 182, 183), Sylvester (word baptismus,
Pt. iv, qu. 6), Alfonso de Castro (De lusta Haereticorum Punitione,
Bk. II, chap, iv), Victoria, at length (Relect. De Indis, Sect. II, no. 15),
Salmeron (Vol. XII, tract, xxxvii) and Henriquez (Summa Theologiae
Moralis, Bk. II, chap, iv, no. 8 [Bk. II, chap, iii, no. 8]). This is abso­
lutely a true and certain opinion, which we shall prove, in separate
sections dealing first w’ith non-subjects, then with subjects. More­
over, we shall speak first of direct coercion, and shall then add some
remarks as to indirect coercion.
5. We hold, first, that it is essentially wTong to force unbelievers
who are not subjects, to embrace the faith.
The first proposition: to
The proof of this proposition is that such
compel unbelievers who
are not subjects to em­ coercion cannot occur without lawful power, as is
brace the faith is essen­
self-evident, since o thenvise all wars and all acts
tially wrong.
of violence could be called just; but the Church
The proof of the first pro­ does not possess this lawful power with respect
position.
to such unbelievers. Therefore, . . .
The minor premiss of this argument may be proved as follow's:
the power in question has not been given by Christ, 478
tïnuXpÎemiif. nor does it: reside in the princes of the Church from
the very nature of the case—not, at least, with respect
to the unbelievers mentioned. The first half of the foregoing state­
ment—namely, the assertion that Christ did not give this special power
to the Church—may be proved, first, from what we have said in the
preceding section [Sect, n, subsect. 2], where we demonstrated that
Christ did not give such power of forcing these unbelievers to hear the
faith, therefore, neither [did He give the power of forcing them] to
embrace the faith after hearing it; for the same reasoning is valid in
both cases.
Secondly, this minor premiss may be proved by a negative
argument, since, in the tradition of the Church, there
thTSTrVimiil· is no trace of sucil P°wer> either in its practice, or in
Scripture; for the words of Christ, ‘Compel them to

Disp. XVIII: On Means for the Conversion of Unbelievers

761

come in’ have a meaning very different from this, as I shall show
below.
Thirdly, the same premiss is established affirmatively by the
words of Paul (z Corinthians, Chap, v [, w. 12-13]), I Corinlhùuu,
‘For what have I to do to judge them that are without ? For them [. . .] God will judge ; words based,
surely, upon the fact that these persons are not under our jurisdiction.
This was the opinion expressed by Innocent III in the aforesaid Decre­ Dtcretals.
tals (Bk. Ill, tit. xlii, chap, iii) and enunciated by the Council of Council of
Trent (Session XIV, chap, ii), as follows: ‘The Church passes judge­ Trent.
ment upon no man who has not first entered it, through baptism.’
Innocent III upholds this same view in another Chapter of the Decretals Innocent III.
Chrysostom.
(Bk. IV, tit.xix, chap, viii); and it is the common opinion ofChrysostom, Theophylact.
Theophylact, Ambrose, Anselm, St. Thomas, on the text cited (on Ambrose.
i Corinthians, Chap, v, v. 13), and of Augustine (De Verbis Domini, Augustine.
Sermon VI, chap, vii [in Sermones supposititii, Sermon λ I, chap, vi, Vol.
V, col. 1751 Migne ed.]). Therefore, Paul, loc. cit. [z Cor., v. 13] in order
to make it clear that this power was not given to men, added, ‘For
God will judge them that are without.’ The judgment, then, and
consequently the punishment and coercion of such unbelievers, have
not been committed to men. Wherefore, Christ our Lord instructed
the Apostles (Matthew, Chap, x [, v. 10]) whom He sent forth to preach, Maiûm, x.
not to carry a staff or a sword; and with respect to this passage, Jerome Jerome.
[on Matthew, Chap, x] notes that Christ forbade methods of coercion
and taught peace, concluding His instructions with the words: ‘Who­
ever will not receive you, it shall not be remitted to them on the day
of judgment’, meaning thereby that God has reserved to Himself
the punishment of this crime, just as He said elsewhere (Matthew, MaUkrtr. la*t
last chap. [Mark, Chap, xvi, v. 16]): ‘He that believeth not shall be ch*p.
condemned.’
Fourthly, the same premiss is proved by the canon law, for
this coercion is prohibited therein (Decretals, Bk. V,
tit- VI, chap, ix; Decretum, Pt. I, dist. xlv, cans, iii
and v). The prohibition, however, arises, not so much
from a prohibition of the Church, as from an explanation of the same.
Hence, in the Decretals (Bk. II, tit. xlii, chap, iii) such coercion is said
to be contrary to the Christian religion. Pope Gregory was of the '
same opinion (Letters, Bk. I, letter xci [letter xlvii] and Bk. XI, letter xv
[Bk. IX, letter vi]) as were Ambrose (on Luke, Chap, x), and Chrysostom Ambrose.
Chrysostom.
(on Matthew, Chap, xxxiv).
From the foregoing, the strongest argument is derived, namely,
that if the power in question had been specially granted
prSiiif by Christ it WOuld not be vested immediately in
temporal princes, because Christ granted no power
1569.74
.5*

762

The Three Theological Virtues: On Faith

immediately to them. Therefore, this power would reside in the
bishops, and especially in the supreme Pontiff. But the pastors of the
Church themselves do not acknowledge the possession of this power,
nor have they ever used it ; and Christ our Lord said to Peter simply
this: ‘Feed my sheep.’ Therefore, it is certain that Christ has not
given this power to the Church.
6. Finally, an argument may be derived from the end in view;
for such a coercive method of drawing men to the
the ïïmePpremis.
would not befit the Church; on the contrary, it
would be much more expedient that the first accep­
tance and profession of the faith should be absolutely and entirely
spontaneous.
This spontaneity is desirable, first, in order that the power o£
the divine word and of the grace of God may be manifested in this
work of conversion, which is especially the work of God, as Christ
John,™.
said (John, Chap, vi [, v. 29]). Accordingly, Paul wrote (2 Corinthians,
2*Conntkians,
χQv
. ψΟΓ tpe weapOns of our warfare are not carnal’, &c.,
i Corinthians, and again (z Corinthians, Chap, i [, v. 26]): ‘[there are not many wise
according to the flesh,] not many mighty [, not many noble].’
The same spontaneous element is desirable, secondly, because
the coercive method in question would involve many disadvantages,
since it would, as a general rule, be followed by feigned conversions
and innumerable acts of sacrilege. The unbelievers also would be
much scandalized and would blaspheme the Christian religion if, by
any human power, they were forced to embrace that religion, which
is entirely supernatural. Therefore, the special supernatural pow'er of
which we are speaking has not been given to the Church.
Again, as to the fact, no proof is needed that this power, in so
far as concerns pagans who are not subj ects, does not reside in the Church
from the very nature of the case ; for this truth is expressed in the terms
themselves, since from the very fact that we assume that these pagans
are not subjects—at least, not temporal subjects—we consequently
imply that the Church has no temporal power over them; therefore,
it has no other power with respect to them from the nature of
the case; for there exists no other power derived from the law of
nature over human beings as members of a human state. Moreover,
even the power in question comes not immediately from God or from
the law of nature, but mediately through man’s devising and from
the ius gentium. Therefore, to no state or prince is this power given
with respect to aliens, but only with respect to the members of that
particular state; and these unbelievers, in addition to the fact that
they are not members of the Church, are supposedly not even members
of a secular state under the rule of a Christian prince. Therefore, the
power in question does not extend to them.

Disp. XV111: On Means for the Conversion of Unbelievers

763

7. Secondly, the following proposition must be laid down: the
Church may not exercise compulsion even upon those
tion·
pagans who are temporally subject to it, in order that
they shall embrace the faith. This proposition is easily proved from
479 the preceding one, since the reference is to direct compulsion, which
requires power and jurisdiction. For from what has been said, it is
evident that the Church has not such power over the infidels in
question, by any special grant from Christ; inasmuch as the proofs
adduced above are universal, and the canon laws, when they forbid
any coercion [of subjects] and declare it to be contrary to the Christian
religion, refer to pagan subjects in particular. Yet the Church is not
forbidden to wield temporal power over these pagan subjects, for the
latter can be members of a civil state, although the supreme temporal
power of that state resides in a Christian prince. Nevertheless, that
power does not extend to the act of punishing such subjects because
of their sin in not embracing the faith after it has been sufficiendy
proposed to them; for the power in question, being proximately
derived from men, is accordingly directed only to a natural end, and
especially to preserving the peace of the state, and natural justice, and
the virtue appropriate to such an end ; whereas the aforementioned sin
of unbelief is a matter entirely apart from that purpose and end, so
that the punishment of it does not fall within the scope of this [tempo­
ral] power. Therefore, the power of coercion to effect an acceptance
of the faith cannot rightfully be claimed by virtue of such [temporal]
power; for that coercion cannot be justly exerted unless it be in the
form of a just punishment for an offence opposed [to the acceptance
of faith]. Hence we see, even in the case of the Church, that to what­
ever extent it may justly compel unbelieving apostates to return to the
faith, to precisely that same extent it may justly punish them on ac­
count of apostasy from the faith professed by them in baptism ; and
therefore, wherever the power for the punishment of unbelief is want­
ing, there is lacking also the power to compel an acceptance of the
faith. This fact is further confirmed by all the arguments from
inexpediency w’hich have been adduced in this, and in the preceding
Sub-section.
8. From this proof it may easily be understood that the preceding
proposition refers to direct coercion exerted directly
The fourth [third]
proposition: in­
to this end, namely, the prevention of unbelief and
direct coercion to
the acceptance of the faith. Accordingly, we must
compel acceptance
of the faith is not
make an additional statement as to indirect coercion,
intrinsically evil.
to the effect that such coercion is not in itself and
intrinsically evil, if applied under the proper conditions. This is the
opinion of Saint Antoninus, Angelus in passages already cited, and
V alentia (Vol. Ill, disp. i, [qu. x,] point 6, [ad 4]); and the same view is
The second proposi-

St. Antonin».
Angelus.
Valentia.

764
Gregory.

The Three Theological Virtues: On Faith

to
derived from Gregory {Letters, Bk. VII, letter xxx [Bk. II, letter
xxxii] and Bk. IV, letter vi [letter xxvi]), for in the first mentioned
place he advises that a portion of the just tribute be remitted
to pagan subjects, so that through kindness they may be drawn to the
faith; and in the latter place, he says that if some of the pagans
become too contumacious, they are to be loaded with burdens in order
to recall them to their senses, a course of action which is indirect
coercion. He states a like view elsewhere {Letters, Bk. Ill, letter xxvi,
cited in Decretum, Pt. II, causa xxm, qu. vi, can. iv).
The reason [supporting the proposition that such indirect coerThe reason for the cion is not intrinsically evil] is as follows: coercion is
proposition stated
indirect when any right [asserted] or punishment inabove‘
flicted under one particular title or on account of a
given offence is secondarily directed by the one exercising [the right,
or inflicting the penalty,] to the end of inducing another to exercise
some act of the will ; and in the case under consideration, the power
to punish or to exercise compulsion on account of a just end is not
lacking, while the secondary end, consisting in the conversion of
another to the faith, is not evil, but, on the contrary, is in itself vir­
tuous. Therefore, the act of indirect coercion [to this secondary end]
is not in itself evil, but can be justified. The truth of the major
premiss and of the consequent is clear. The minor is also proved bv
the fact that the Christian princes in the case under discussion mar
justly punish the pagan subjects on account of offences other [than
unbelief], or they may impose tributes upon such subjects. Therefore,
if the princes should judge that this [imposition of penalties or of
tribute] WOuld be useful for the conversion of the subjects, they mar
bear in mind this additional intention and may impose the burden in
the manner best adapted to such a [secondary] end.
9. However, as I have said, this indirect coercion should be apUnder what circum- P^ed under the proper conditions ; for there are two
stances indirect coer- conditions, above all others, which must be observed,
cion should be used.
Qne that ·η impOSing any burden or in inflicting
any evil, the bounds of justice are not to be transgressed, since if they
should be transgressed, the coercion would, for that reason, be inequit­
able. Take, for example, the statement of Gregory, [Letters, Bk. IV,
letter xxvi] to the effect that greater taxes could be imposed on such
pagans for the purpose in question, provided, however, that these
taxes be just; for within the limits of just taxation one tax may be
heavier than another even to the maximum amount, which, for the
rest, is termed ‘rigorous’ ; up to that limit, then, a tax may be increased,
but no further. The same is true as to punishment, which may be
increased or diminished at the will of the prince; and thus a rigorous
punishment, which is nevertheless just, may be imposed. In the same

Disp. XFIII: On Means for the Conversion of Unbelievers
way, Catholic princes have, when there is just cause, the power to
prohibit unbelievers from dwelling in their kingdoms: as when [such
fellow-countrymen] would be dangerous to the faithful; or after un­
believers have been conquered in a just war, so that they may be
expelled on that ground and punished (as it were) by exile; or surely,
if they are strangers and aliens, and may [on that account] be forbidden
to acquire a domicile in the kingdom. In such cases, then, a Christian
prince may prohibit unbelievers from dwelling in his realm unless they
are converted, as was stated in the Sixth Council of Toledo (Chap, iii);
and that act on his part is, indeed, a form of indirect coercion. It is
necessary, however, that this act of expulsion be just.
io. The other condition [to the proper exercise of indirect coer480 Prudence must be cion] is that the end of conversion shall be sought
observed in the use prudently. For the kind of coercion in question, even
of indirect coercion
·* ·
·..
to convert unbe- though indirect, carries with it the danger of a counter­
lievers to the faith. fei t conversion, and therefore thorough precautions
must be taken lest unbelievers be admitted to the faith and to the
Sacraments without sufficient examination, and without a moral certi­
tude that their conversion is real. On this point it must be especially
noted, that to take such precautions is the duty of the pastors of
the Church, rather than of temporal princes; for the princes may
work piously in this way, by striving for the just conversion of un­
believers, but it is not for them to admit to baptism those who are thus
converted and ask for baptism. This function pertains rather to the
pastors of the Church, and therefore it is for the latter to test and
examine such conversions, and to avert in all cases the moral peril of
a pretence.
ii. From all of the above it may be gathered that this indirect
indirect coercion to coercion, strictly speaking, takes place only in regard
takes^piace'oniy7 to su^Jects> because lawful power to inflict ills upon
with respect to7
non-subjects is lacking, unless they are first reduced
pagan subjects.
to subjection by reason of an offence committed in a
kingdom not their own, or by the title of a just war.
However, I have used the term ‘strictly speaking’, because even
though non-subjects may not positively (as it were) be afflicted with
punishments and loaded with burdens, nevertheless, they may be de­
prived of gratuitous benefits, advantages, or favours; and such means
also may be well adapted to drawing them to the faith or to a favour­
able inchnation towrard it, and may be considered as a kind of indirect
coercion. Without doubt, coercion exercised only in this way is per­
missible, because no jurisdiction or superior power is required in order
to deprive any one of such benefits. Moreover, since it is entirely per­
missible to entice these unbelievers to the faith by kindness and good
deeds, when there is hope of success, as is evident from the statements

Council of
Toledo.

y66

isaias, xxviii.

Chrysostom.

The Three Theological Virtues: On Faith

made by Gregory (Letters, Bk. XIII, letter xii [in Migne, P.L.,
p. 1268, col. 2]); therefore, conversely, when kindness is of no avail,
these same pagans may rightfully be deprived of such benefits, in
order that ‘vexation may give them understanding’ [Isaias, Chap.
xxviii, v. 19]; for this vexation is legitimate, as I have already ex­
plained.
12. The first argument in support of the first opinion1 was
T
.
derived from the words of Christ, ‘Compel them to
first argument in
come in’, words which Augustine (in Letters, xlviii and
opCfiontSu^sec^if1
Lxc^· 2 and clxxxv]) interprets as referring to real
the passage in Luke, compulsion by means of a penalty. However, he applies
plained literally*'
t^ie Passa£e *n question to heretics and apostates; for
he explains that the first group who have been invited,
are the Jews; the second, who have simply been called, are the Gentiles;
while the third, who are under compulsion, are the heretics. Concern­
ing the latter, we shall answer, first, that it is indeed permissible to use
force upon them. But the literal interpretation would seem, in my
opinion, to be that adopted by Chrysostom and others, who say that
this passage refers to the end of the world, at which time, in order to
complete the number of the elect, there will be used a kind of compul­
sion upon the number lacking—compulsion, not by means of punish­
ments or real violence, but by the might of signs and miracles and by
the efficacy of preaching and of inner grace. Such was the power
manifested in the conversion of Paul, which is cited as an example by
the authorities above-mentioned.
The second argument in support of the first opinion is based
The answer to the
uPon tiie Power of punishing wrongdoing, to which
second argument for we reply that God has not given men the power of
the same opinion,
punishing all the evil deeds of mankind; since He has
reserved some of these deeds for His ow*n tribunal, because otherwise
the human race could not be governed with peace and justice. And
among these sins which God has reserved for His own judgement, is
the sin of unbelief, in those who have not professed the faith through
baptism. This inference we may well derive from the words of Christ
and of Paul, quoted above; for without such a divine reservation,
even greater evils would necessarily result.
Therefore, as to the third argument, based upon expediency and
The reply to the
upon the fact that the successors of such unbelievers
third argument.
might, [by the coercion in question,] be more easily and
more surely converted, it should be replied, first of all, that evil should
not be done in order to bring about good. Furthermore, experience

^Sëi-V

1 [Le., the opinion that: ‘it is permissible to use force upon unbelievers, even upon those who are
not subjects, in order that they may accept the faith after it has been sufficiently expounded to them.’
Vidt the first paragraph of Sub-section i, p. 757.—Tr.]

Disp. XVIII: On Means for the Conversion of Unbelievers

767

has taught that such success is not obtained by that kind of coercion,
but rather, that the contrary is true. Hence, Gregory did not adduce
the argument of expediency, save in the case of indirect coercion, to
be exercised only in a lawful manner and with due circumspection.
13... As to the arguments in favour of the second opinion,1 the
......
_ ina examples set by the Spanish kings which are cited,
The arguments
ffavour of the second chiefly regard indirect coercion applied in virtue of a
opinion, and set
just title, such as was the practice of Catholic kings.
forth in Sub­
sections 2 and 3, are For if formerly Sisebut somewhat exceeded due limits,
answered.
his intention only and not his action is to be praised;
and similarly if, perchance, a proper moderation is not observed in
indirect coercion, although that fault may be excused on the ground
of good faith, yet the result proves that the act was not fitting.
As for the second argument in support of the second opinion,
the argument regarding the law of a superior, the reply is that this
holds good with respect to subjects and in connexion with delegation
by a sovereign prince; but, as I have explained, God has not com­
mitted such pow’er to men.
Finally, it is not enough that the faith should be capable of being
made clearly credible; for authority {potestas) is requisite to coercion,
and authority is lacking in the case under discussion.

481

SECTION IV
MAY UNBELIEV ERS BE FORCED TO ABANDON THOSE OF THEIR ERRORS
AND FALSE RITES WHICH ARE CONTRARY NOT ONLY TO FAITH BIT
ALSO TO REASON ?

I. In the subject-matter of faith we have distinguished, in former
Chapters, between two main categories—one concern­
Two kinds of un­
belief are dis­
ing the entirely supernatural mysteries; another con­
tinguished.
cerning a group of either divine or moral truths which
can also be known through a natural process [, that is, by reason].
Therefore, a twofold kind of unbelief may, in like manner, be dis­
tinguished ; the unbelief which is opposed to supernatural truths only,
and with which we have hitherto been chiefly concerned; and the
unbelief which is opposed also to natural reason, and concerning which
something remains to be said.
Now in regard to the latter point, we may also assume, from
1 [i.e. the opinion that, ‘the Church and Christian princes may compel acceptance of the frith on
the part of those who are temporally subject to them, although this is not the attitude taken with regard
to those who are not subjects.’ Vide the first sentence of Sub-section 2 of this Section, p. 758.—Tt]

768

what has already been said, that unbelievers may not be coerced to
accept this [set of truths] as revealed, and as something
believers may be
to be believed by faith ; but we ask whether or not, in
ercori whidTtS
t^s m^tter, they may at least be compelled to think
contrary to natural
correctly in accordance with reason or with some kind
understanding.
of ]luman faith, anj consequently to abandon external
rites contrary thereto, such as idolatry and the like. In the consideration
of this question, the usual distinction must be made, with respect to
those unbelievers who are civil subjects of the Church, or of Christian
princes.
2. Concerning non-subjects, Major (on the Sentences, Bk. II,
dist. xliv, qu. 4) and Sepûlveda {De Fato et Libero
The first opinion
affirms [that com­
Arbitrio), then, have logically maintained that pagan
pulsion may be
idolaters may be forced by the Church to worship
used] even against
non-subjects.
the one God and to relinquish the rites of idolatry,
and that if these pagans refuse [to do so], they may justly be punished
and deprived of their liberty and their kingdoms.
Possibly, the basis of this view is the fact that a Christian state
The basis of this
has the right to defend the divine honour, and to supview·
press and avenge blasphemies against God ; but idolatry
is a serious offence to the Almighty and connotes blasphemies against
Him, as St. Thomas (II.-II, qu. 94, art. 3, ad 1) teaches; therefore,...
The major premiss of the argument is also derived from St. Thomas
{ibid., Qu. 10, arts. 8 and 11), where he asserts specifically that un­
believers may be forcibly prevented from uttering blasphemies against
God’s name. The same opinion can also be supported by reasoning,
as follows : one man may licitly defend the life or the honour of another;
and therefore, still more rightfully may a man defend the honour
of God.
The first confirmation of such a view is this: if the heathen
The first confirma- sacrifice grown men or children to their gods, they
tion of the view in may be forcibly compelled to abandon this practice,
question.
least on the ground of defence of the innocent;
therefore, Christian princes may take the same measures towards any
heathen people, on behalf of the honour of God.
The second confirmation is that the Romans have been praised
The second confir- for the reason that they made subjects of the barbarian
mation.
nations, in order to recall those nations to a better way
of living; as is evident from Augustine {On the City of God, Bk. V,
chaps, xii and xvii), and from St. Thomas {De Regimine Principum,
Bk. Ill, chaps. iv et seq.).
The final confirmation is that certain peoples are so barbarous,
The third confirma- so unfitted to acquire naturally the knowledge of God,
tionthat they seem fashioned by nature for a state of
Whether un-

Major.
Sepulveda.

St. Thomas.

Augustine.

St. Thomas.

The Three Theological Virtues: On Faith

Disp. XVIII: On Means for the Conversion of Unbelievers

76c)

slavery, as Aristotle {Politics, Bk. I, chap, i [, §§ 4-6] and chap, iii [Bk. I, Aristotie.
chap, ii, § 15]) has remarked; therefore, even on this ground, they
might be forced to true knowledge and to an upright way of life.
3. Nevertheless, the true and certain opinion is that those un. ..
believers
who are. not subjects,
cannot normally
be
The second and true r
.
. J, .
J.
opinion denies the forced even to change their errors and their rites.
tru* ί
This is the view of the commentators on the above
men
a ve. cjtejartjcjesjn.Thomas, namely,on[II.-II, qu.10,] St. Thomas.
arts. 8 and 11, and by Cajetan (on II.-II, qu. 66, art. 8), Victoria in Cajetan.
Victoria.
the aforesaid Relectio, no. 40 [De Indis, Sect. II, no. 16], Soto (on the Soto.
Sentences, Bk. IV, dist. v, sole question, art. 10), Covarruvias (on Covarruvias.
Sext, in rule peccatum, De Reg. Jur., Pt. II, § 10, no. 3), Valentia (Vol. Valentia.
Aragôn.
Ill, disp. i, qu. 10, point 7), and Aragôn (on II.-II, qu. 10, art. 8).
This true opinion may be proved, first, by appeal to divine
example; for when God wished to destroy or punish
The proof of the
true opinion,
the people living in the Promised Land, He willed,
through an example.
not that they should be conquered by the Israelites
solely on account of idolatry, but that they should thus be conquered
on account of the wrong they had committed in denying to the
children of Israel a peaceful transit through their lands, and because
of other similar wrongs; a fact which one deduces from the Book of
Numbers (Chap. XX). Augustine, too, has noted this point (on Num- Augustine.
bers, Qu. xliv [in Questions on Heptateuch, Bk. IV, qu. xliv]; on Josue,
Qu. x [in Questions on Heptateuch, Bk. VI, qu. x]) ; and it is also brought
out in the Decretum (Pt. II, causa xxm, qu. ii, cans, ii and iii). From
this example the general rule is inferred that it is not permissible for
a prince to make war on the peoples in question, save in order to avert
or vindicate some injury inflicted upon himself or upon his subjects.
Therefore, the sole purpose of overthrowing idolatry is not a sufficient
ground for a just exercise of coercion. Hence, Pope Nicholas, in reply P<4*
i3‘
to the questions of the Bulgarians, said : ‘As to those who sacrifice to
idols, we can say nothing more than that such persons must be reclaimed
by reason rather than by force.’
The reason supporting the true opinion is the same as that
which has been suggested in previous passages,
The proof of the
true opinion,
namely, that the Church has no jurisdiction over the
through reason.
unbelievers in question, and that coercion or punish482 ment without jurisdiction is unjust; for both these points have been
proved. Therefore, just as one private individual may not punish or
coerce another private individual, and just as one Christian king may
not be accorded such treatment by another Christian [king], nor an
infidel ruler by another infidel [ruler], so neither may an infidel state,
supreme in its own order, be punished by the Church on account of
its crimes, even if those crimes are contrary to natural reason; and
1569.74

//ο

The Three Theological Virtues: On Faith

consequently, it may not be compelled to give up idolatry or similar
rites.
4. Neither is it pertinent that such sins (as was noted in the basic
The reply to the
argument [for the first opinion])1 are sins against
grounds on which
God. For as I have already said, God has not made
the^rst opinion is
men judges to avenge all wrongs done to Him by any
man; on the contrary, He has willed that due order
be observed in this respect, [namely,] that subjects should obey their
princes, while, on the other hand, He has reserved sovereign princes
for His own tribunal in those matters which relate to the natural order,
because greater evils would result from the opposite course.
Moreover, in reply to the observations made concerning blas­
phemy, it should be said in the first place that idolatry is not formal
blasphemy, but only virtually and inclusively such. It should also be
said that a Christian prince may compel the unbelievers to cease from
blaspheming, when their blasphemy is in contempt of the Church and
to the injury of the Christian religion, because from such an act on
their part there arises a just ground for war; even as these same infidels
may be forcibly prevented from harming Christians, and from dragging
the latter into error or compelling them to desert the faith; whereas
the case is far otherwise when the sins of infidels, although contrary
to religion, are against God alone.
The reply, then, to the first confirmation [of the first opinion]2 is
The reply to the first eyident. It wras in view of this reply, moreover, that
confirmation [of the I inserted [the limiting term,] ‘normally’, in my statefirst opinion].
ment [of the second opinion].3 For, in order to defend
the innocent, it is allowable to use violence against the infidels in
question, that they may be prevented from sacrificing infants to their
gods; inasmuch as such a war is permissible in the order of charity
and is, indeed, a positive duty if it can be conveniently waged. It
should be added that this course of action is licit, not only in order to
free children, but also for the purpose of freeing adults, even though
the latter may consent and wish to be sacrificed to idols; because in
this respect, they are worse than madmen, and because, moreover,
they are not the lords of their own lives, so that, accordingly, any man
can be restrained by another from committing suicide. But what
has been stated [concerning sacrifice] must be limited to cases where
such killing is unjust. For if infidels had a custom of sacrificing to
idols only those criminals who were justly condemned to death, such
infidels could not be coerced solely on that ground, since in this prac1 [i.e. the opinion that even in the case of non-subjects, ‘pagan idolaters may be forced by the
Church to worship the one God and to relinquish the rites of idolatry, &c. Vide Sub-section 2 of this
Section, p. 768.—Tr.]
* [Vide Sub-section 2 of this Section, p. 768.—Tr.]
» [Vide the first sentence of Sub-section 3 of this Section, p. 769.—Tr.]

Dis}. XV111: On Means for the Conversion of Unbelievers

771

tice they would sin, not against justice, but against religion only, and
the excuse of defending the innocent would therefore cease to avail.
5. The reply to the second confirmation [of the first opinion]1 is
this: the practice of the Romans is praised, not as
The answer to the
being virtuous in an absolute sense, but as a lesser evil
second and third
confirmations [of
possessing some semblance of virtue because of its
the first opinion].
material object. As for the saying of Aristotle quoted
in the last [and third] confirmation,1 it would indeed be duly applic­
able, if there existed any people so barbarous that they were neither
united in a civil society, nor capable of exercising government. For in
that case, it would be not on the ground of religion, but on that of the
defence of humanity (so to speak) that they might be forcibly subjected
to the government of some state. But, in my opinion, no people so
barbarous have yet been found.
6. As to infidels of the kind in question, who are nevertheless
infidels who are
subjects of Christian princes, it should be said that,
subjects of a Chris- in the first place, they may be forced by such princes
to profess the worship of the true God, and conseto profess the cult of quently to cease from professing errors contrary to
the true God.
natural reason and to the faith. So St. Thomas teaches, St. Thomas.
as do the other theologians, in the passages cited.
Moreover, the truth of this assertion can be proved, first, from
The first roof of a Passa§e
Deuteronomy (Chap, xiii), wherein God
this assertion, from orders that unbelievers of this kind—namely, unDeuteronomy, Chap, believers who are in any way subjects [of a faithful
state]—shall be put to death on account of such wrong­
doing. On this passage, and others like it, one may consult Cyprian’s C>TnaB·
Exhortation to Martyrdom (Chap, v), and other references given there
by Pamelius.2
Pamela»,
Secondly, the assertion in question can be proved from the prac__
J
t . tice of the Church, since from the beginning, the
the same assertion Christian emperors followed this course m so far as
based upon the prac- tbe circumstances of the times rendered it advisable,
tice o e urc . pOJ. Constantine forthwith ordered that the temples,
of the idols should be closed and that idolatry should be abolished, as
we may gather from Eusebius (On the Life of Constantine, Bk. II, Eusebw.
chaps, xliii and xliv and Bk. IV, chap, xxiii), Rufinus (Ecclesiastical Ruhnus.
History, Bk. II, chap, xix), and Nicephorus (in Bk. λ III, chap, xxxiii Mcephons.
and also in Bk X, chap, xxxix), where he cites a similar order issued by
Jovinian.3 Later, indeed, Theodosius entirely destroyed the temples,
1 [Vide Sub-section 2 of this Section, p. 768.—Tb.]
3 [Jacobus Pamelius (Jac. de Joigny de Pamele, 1536-87), Flemish priest, edited the works of
Cyprian.—Tb.]
3 [Suârez probably refers to Jovian or Jovianus Flavius Claudius who became Emperor of Rome
m 363 A.D.—Tr.]

772

Ambrose.
Council of
Carthage.

African
Council.
Council of
Toledo, &c.

St. Thomas.

Romans, xiii.

The Three Theological Virtues: On Faith

according to Rufinus (Bk. II, Chaps, xxii and xxiii]), and Nicephorus
(Bk. XII, chap. xxv). Subsequently, the same Theodosius framed
many laws in which he condemned the worshippers of idols and which
are to be found in the Theodosian Code (tit. On the Pagans [Code,
XVI. x]). Moreover, he was imitated by Justinian in his Code, same
title [Code, I. xi]. Augustine {Letters, xlviii, 1 and xxiv [Migne ed.
Letters, xciii, clxxxv and cci]) approved of these laws, while Ambrose, 483
too {Letters, xxx [xl]), and many Councils also, approved of the practice
in question : for the Fifth Council of Carthage (Chap, xv [Chap, xvi])
declared that the Emperor must be petitioned to destroy the remnants
of idolatry; the same view was upheld by the African Council under
Boniface (Chap, xxv) ; the Third Council of Toledo (Chap, xvi) ordered
that idolatry be uprooted from the lands of the faithful, a decree which
was also issued by the Twelfth Council of Toledo (Chap, xi), and the
Sixteenth (Chap, ii); and finally the Council of Elvira (Chap, xli)
ordered that Christians having pagan servants should not allow the
latter to keep idols in their homes.
7. The reason [for the opinion under discussion1] is that these
Christian princes do not lack jurisdiction with respect
The assertion set
i
» v
·
·
·
,
.
r
forth [in Sub-section to the unbelievers in question, since the latter are
6] is confirmed by assumed to be subjects, and since the action of which
we are speaking does not exceed the limits of that
jurisdiction.
A second reason [for the same opinion] is as follows : it is the duty of
a civil state, by virtue of reason and the natural law, to provide for the
true worship of God within its borders ; accordingly, in that same state
there exists a directive power for the government of men with respect
to this sort of worship; consequently, that state possesses also a coercive
power for the punishment of offences contrary to such worship and
for the coercion of men, lest they become involved in errors of the
kind (for a directive power WOuld be ineffective, and of insufficient
use to the state, without an accompanying coercive power); and this
coercive power, in so far as it is natural, resides in Christian princes;
therefore, Christian princes may thereby exert force upon their own
subjects, in the manner above-mentioned, even if the latter are un­
believers. The entire argument is clear. Its foundation, moreover,
which is expressed in the first antecedent, is laid down by St. Thomas
{De Regimine Principum, Bk. I, chap, xiv, and Bk. II, last chapter).
This assertion is, furthermore, a self-evident truth. For the power
in question is of God, as Paul testifies in Romans (Chap, xiii [, v. 1 J),
adding, immediately thereafter, the words, ‘And those [powers] that
1 [Le. the belief that infidels who are subjects of Christian princes, ‘may be forced by such princes
to profess the worship of the true God, and consequently to cease from professing errors contrary to
natural reason and to the faith.’ Vide the first sentence of Sub-section 6 of this Section, p. 77Γ.—Ta.]

Disp. XVIII: On Means for the Conversion of Unbelievers

are, are ordained of God.’ Hence, this power has pre-eminently been
given for the honour and worship of the one God, of Whom human
princes are the ministers, as Paul says, in the chapter cited. The
confirmation of our argument is that the purpose of such power is
to maintain the state in peace and justice, which cannot be done un­
less the state is also induced to live virtuously; but men cannot live
according to moral and natural virtue, without true religion and the
worship of the one God; therefore, natural power and the jurisdiction
of a human state are extended to include this purpose.
8. From this reasoning I infer, first, that even a pagan—that is,
c
„
a non-Christian
—king, if he has a knowledge of the
The first corollary
i
r
i ·
i ·
of the immediately
true Lrod, may use force upon nis own subjects to
menÿÙlg
cause them to believe that truth, either by their own
reasoning if they are intelligent, or by putting human
faith in more learned men, if they are ignorant; and consequently, he
may compel those same subjects to cease from the worship of idols and
from similar superstitions contrary to natural reason. The proof of
this inference is that there resides in such a king all power which,
according to natural reason, is suitable for a human state.
Secondly, it follows from that series of statements that the princes
in question not only have the aforesaid power, but
The second corol­
lary of the same
are moreover bound to use it in the manner indicated.
statements.
The proof of this second corollary is as follow’s: by
virtue of their office they are under an obligation to govern their sub'
jects well, in accordance with the purpose for which they possess
power; and good government demands this use [of such power],
as has been proved; hence, this obligation is more weighty in the case
of Christian princes, because they have a greater knowledge of truth,
and because in Christian kingdoms this coercion is especially necessary
in view of the welfare of the Christian subjects also; consequently,
princes of the kind in question are bound to frame laws prohibiting
offences in this matter [of worship], for they cannot inflict punishment
for such offences, if they observe a due order, unless they first prohibit
the offences in their laws.
Thirdly, it follows that such power is to be exercised by public,
The third corollary not private authority; and hence a private citizen
of those statements. wh.o is a Christian may not force another and infidel
citizen to refrain from the worship of idols; neither may that Chris­
tian citizen, acting on his own private authority, destroy those idols,
[a prohibition] which is indicated by the civil law {Code, I. xi. 3
and 6). In this sense, also, one should understand Canon 60 of the
Council of Elvira, according to which a Christian who breaks an
idol and does so on his own private authority, is not reputed a martyr,
even though he be slain for that action, because he thrust himself

774
Mendoza.

Matthew, xüi.

Augustine.

The Three Theological Virtues: On Faith

forward indiscreetly and on his own initiative, as Mendoza explains
at length, in dealing with the said Council ([Λetustissimum et Nobilis­
simum Concilium Illiberitanum cum Discursibus . . .,] Bk. Ill, chap,
xlv).
9. Finally, there remains for discussion an obvious question connected with the foregoing, a question of which St.
Are the rites of un­
Thomas
(II.-II, qu. 10, art. 11) treats, namely: are
believers to be toler­
ated in Christian
the
rites
of
unbelievers to be tolerated in the kingdoms
kingdoms?
of the faithful? From what has been said, it would
seem that such rites ought not to be tolerated; for they are supersti­
tious and injurious to God, Whose true worship the princes of those
kingdoms are bound to advance.
However, St. Thomas makes a valid distinction between two kinds
of rites: those which are contrary to natural reason, and opposed to
God as known by the light of nature, for example, idolatry, and so4S4
forth; and those others which are indeed superstitions, by comparison
with the Christian faith and its precepts, but which are not intrinsi­
cally evil or contrary to natural reason, for example, rites of the Jews,
and perhaps even many of the rites of the Saracens and of similar
infidels who worship only the one true God.
As to the first group, then, the inference stated at the beginning
of this section1 is valid; for the Church ought not to tolerate these
among her infidel subjects, a point proved by all the passages which we
have cited and by the fact that, in such toleration or permission, there
is no advantage either to the unbelievers themselves or to the Christian
state. This assertion must be understood, however, only in a general
sense ; for it often happens that a Christian king is not able to destroy
these rites entirely, without great loss to his kingdom or to the other
Christian subjects, in which event he may, without sin, connive at and
allow [the continued observance of the rites]. This concession has
its foundation in the words of Christ {Matthew, Chap, xiii [, v. 29J
as set forth in the parable in which the servants asked the head of
the household whether the cockle should be rooted up, whereat the
latter replied: ‘No, lest perhaps rooting up the cockle, you root up
the wheat also together with it’. So it is that the Church often
tolerates grave sins even in the faithful, lest schisms still more grave
result. Such is the doctrine upheld by Augustine refuting Parmenianus
Contra Epistolam Parmem am, Bk. Ill, chap, ii [, no. 13]), and set
forth in Decretum (Pt. II, causa xxm, qu. iv, can. xix). The reason for
this view is clear, namely: prudence teaches that of many evils the
least should be chosen, while the rule of charity demands that correc­
tion should not be exercised save for a fruitful result; and therefore,
much less should coercion be exercised when greater harm would ensue.
1 [Sect. 9; Le. the inference that, ‘such rites ought not to be tolerated’, &c.—Tk.]

Disp. XVIII: On Means for the Conversion of Unbelievers

10. As to the other rites of unbelievers, those which are opposed
only to the faith but not to natural reason, it is a cer­
Unbelievers are not
tainty that unbelievers, even though subjects, should
to be compelled,
even when they are not be compelled to abandon them; on the contrary,
subjects, to abandon
such rites should be tolerated by the Church. So St.
rites which are
merely in opposition Gregory teaches (Letters, Bk. I, letter xxxiv [Bk. Gmr>ty.
to the faith.
XIII, letter xii]), especially with respect to the Jew’s,
when he forbids that the latter be deprived of their synagogues, and
urges (Bk. XI, letter xv) that they be permitted to engage in their
ceremonies therein. He likewise teaches that the Jews should be per­
mitted to celebrate their solemn rites.
The reason for such a view is that these rites are not intrinsically
The proof of this evil according to the natural law, and that therefore,
assertion.
the temporal power of the prince does not per se in­
clude the authority to prohibit them ; since no reason for the prohibi­
tion can be given, save that the rites in question are contrary to the
faith, and this is not a sufficient reason in the case of those who are not
spiritually subject to the power of the Church.
The confirmation.
The congrmatjon of this argument is the fact that
such a prohibition would be (so to speak) a coercion to the acceptance of
the faith ; and this coercion, as we have said, is not permissible. The fore­
going argument applies in general to the Saracens and to the other
unbelievers who know and worship the one true God, in so far as
pertains to those rites which are not contrary to natural reason.
However, the Church has always considered that this tolerance is
especially advisable in dealing- with the lews, because
Why the Jews are to
.r
7
r -?
·
J
l
r· l
be permitted to ceie- the errors of the latter furnish a testimony to the faith
brate their own rites jn many particulars. In the first place, the Jews admit
m hnstian states.
Messiah was promised, and they accept the
Scriptures from which we clearly prove that the promise has been ful­
filled. Secondly, we see fulfilled in them what the Prophets and Christ
foretold regarding their desertion of Him and their hardness of heart.
Finally, Augustine has said (On the City of God, Bk. XV III, chap, xlvi) a
that the Jews should be preserved and allowed to five in their own
sects, in order that they in turn may preserve a testimony to the
Scriptures such as the Church received, even from her enemies; and,
in this connexion, Augustine quotes the words of Paul (Romans, Chap,
xi [, v. 1i J), ‘But by their offence, salvation is come to the Gentiles’ ;
and also a passage from the Psalms (Iviii [, v. 12]), ‘Slay them not, lest
at any time my people forget, scatter them by Thy power, &c.’ Augus­
tine cites similar examples in his first sermon, on Psalm xl, near the end.
II. However, it should be added that the Church has allowed
these rites within certain bounds and limitations.
The first and general limitation is that such rites are not to be

776

Three Theological Virtues: On Faith

celebrated to the scandal of the faithful ; a fact which one may gather
from the Decretals (Bk. V, tit. vi, chaps, iii, iv, vii and
these rites should be xv) and from the Code (I. ix, throughout many laws
allowed to the Jews, there given). Among the Laws of Spain, too, there are
many of the same sort ([Las Siete Partidas,\ Pt. VII, tit. xxiv, laws
I et seq. and Pt. I, tit. iv, law 63).
Secondly, and specifically, although the Jews are permitted to
retain and to keep in repair their old synagogues, they are nevertheless
forbidden to erect new synagogues. On this point, see the Code (I. ix.
18), and the Decretals (Bk. V, tit. vi, chaps, iii and vii).
Thirdly, although it is forbidden that their synagogues should be
taken away from them, nevertheless, if these are once so taken, and
consecrated as churches, they are not to be restored, and the loss must
be made good in some other way; as Gregory indicates in Letters (Bk.
VII, letter Iviii [Bk. IX, letter Iv]).
Fourthly, the Jews are not allowed to do anything which has not
been ordained in their law, a limitation which is laid down by Gregory
in the same Letter Iviii [Iv].
Fifthly, they are not allowed to have their synagogues in the
neighbourhood of Christian churches, according to the same Gregory 485
(Bk. XII, letter xviii [Bk. I, letter x]).
Sixthly, on the day of the Passover, Jews are forbidden to go out
in public; nay more, they are ordered to keep their doors and
windows closed, as we read in the Decretals (Bk. V, tit. vi, chaps,
iv and xv). According to this same authority, they are also commanded
to wear an outward sign by which they may be externally distinguished
from the faithful. And in general, they are to be severely punished if
they do anything or make any public manifestation, in opposition to
the honour of the Christian religion ; a fact which is also brought out
in the Decretals (Bk. V, tit. vi, chap, xv) and in the Decretum (Pt. II,
causa xxiii, qu. viii, cans, viii et seq.), and in the civil laws cited above.
Finally, for the reason already expounded, the ancient rabbinical
books which were written sincerely and without any hatred of the
Christian religion are tolerated; but the Books of the Hebrews, who
later corrupted the Scriptures, are banned, as Cajetan has noted (on
II.-II, qu. 10, art. 11).
Within what limits

Gregory.

Gregory.

Caje tan.

SECTION V
MAY THE UNBELIEVERS IN QUESTION BE DEPRIVED OF ALL SUPERIOR
POWER WHICH THEY HOLD OVER CHRISTIANS, THAT IS TO SAY, OVER
THE FAITHFUL?

I. This power may be manifold, but it can be reduced to four
heads. First, there is the power of jurisdiction, whether it be supreme

Disp. XVIII: On Means for the Conversion of Unbelievers

777

as in kings, or inferior as in their ministers. The second sort is
The fourfold power t^ie P°wer oftrue dominion, to which absolute slavery
of unbelievers over corresponds. The third is the power which may be
Christians.
called domestic, to which sendee corresponds. The
fourth is the patria potestas.
The question stated above may be applied to all these forms of
power, but w'e shall speak chiefly of princes; and that point being
made clear, the other headings will be disposed of easily. Moreover,
all these forms may be treated as relating to non-subjects [as well as
subjects]; and in either case a twofold procedure is distinguishable by
which the holders may be deprived of this power—that is, they may
be deprived directly, merely by reason of the unbelief of the superiors,
or because of the faith of the subjects ; or only indirectly, on account
of other intrinsic purposes.
2. In the first place, then, as to those non-Christian princes some
or many of whose subjects are converted to the faith,
The opinion of cer­
tain persons, who
there is the opinion of certain persons who hold that
affirm the right
these unbelievers may be absolutely and directly de­
even of direct
deprivation.
prived by the Church of their power over their Christian subjects. Hostiensis (Summa, Bk. Ill, De Koto, p. 263, at end) has Bitwise,
been cited as supporting this opinion; but he does not really hold such
a view, although in other matters he differs from what we have said
above, expressing himself in a somewhat inconsistent manner. Alvaro Αλ-aro Paet.
Paez (De Planctu Ecclesiae, Bk. I, chap, xviii [chap, lix]), however,
inclines more definitely to the view in question. The ground on
which that opinion is based is the contention that it is not fitting, but
on the contrary, seems wholly disgraceful, that the faithful should be
governed by unbelievers. This statement is made in the Decretals
(Bk. V, tit. vi, chap, i) and is derived from Paul’s writings (z Corinthians,
Chap. vi). Moreover, there are cited in favour of this view other
Scriptural testimonies which I shall not discuss here, since I speak ot
them in another passage presently to be cited. However, the opinion
in question is wholly false.
3. The following proposition must, then, be laid down at the
outset : unbelieving princes may not simply and direcdy
The first proposi­
tion: unbelieving
on the ground [of unbelief], be deprived by the Church
princes may not be
of the power and jurisdiction which they hold over
deprived of their
jurisdiction over
Christian subjects. This is the common opinion, and
their Christian sub­
it
is drawn from a passage in the works of St. Thomas St. Thome.
jects, simply and
directly [on the
above cited ([II.-II,] qu. io, art. io), in connexion
ground of unbelief].
with which Cajetan and all the more recent commentators uphold such a view; as do the other Scholastics, especially Duran­ Duraadus.
dus (on the Sentences, Bk. II, dist. xliv, qu. 3), the canonists, in general,
on the Decretals (Bk. Ill, tit. xxxiv, chap, viii), St. Antoninus Antonuna.
1569.74

- c

77%
Sylvester.
Waldensis.
Driedo.
Victoria.
Soto.
Salmerdn.

Romans, xiii.

Titus,ni.

Eusebius.

The Three Theological Virtues: On Faith

(Pt. II, title x, chap, xv, § i, at end [tit. xn, chap, iii, § I, at end]),
Sylvester (word infidelitas, Qu. 4), Waldensis {Doctrinale Antiquitatum
Fidei, Bk II, chaps. Ixxxi et seq.), Driedo {De Libertate Christiana, Bk.
Ill, chap, ix, at end), Victoria (Relect. De Indis, 'passim), Soto
{De lustitia, Bk. IV, qu. ii, art. 2) and Salmeron (Vol. XIII,
tracts, xxxvii and xxxviii [Vol. XII, tract, xxxviii]). Other authorities,
who will be referred to below, support the same opinion.
4. The basis of this truth rests on the fact that either the princes
The basis of the
Question may be deprived de facto of such jurisfirst proposition
diction and power, on the ground that they do not
stated as a dilemma. ρθδδ€δδ ^tiis jurisdiction and power by divine right,
or else they are unworthy on account of their unbelief to hold
the power which they may actually have, and consequently may
justly be deprived of it; but neither of these arguments is valid;
therefore, . . .
The first part of the minor premiss, which I have elsewhere
An exposition Of the proved at length {Defensio Fidei, Bk. Ill, chap, iv,
first part of the no. i),1 is most certainly true. Briefly, the argument is
dilemma.
as foj]ows. Chj-jst our Lord has not deprived the afore­
mentioned princes of the power in question; nor does baptism—
whether ipso iure or de facto—exempt the Christian from the power
of his king, even though the latter be an unbeliever.
The proof of this argument is sufficiendy evident, both in the
fact that neither from Scripture nor from tradition can such depriva­
tion or exemption be derived; and, more especially, in the fact that486
both Scripture and tradition clearly uphold the contrary practice.
This is true of Scripture, because Paul said {Romans, Chap, xiii [, v. 1]) :
‘Let every soul be subject to higher powers’; an admonition which,
under the expression ‘every soul’, manifestly includes the faithful, and
under ‘higher powers’, includes the emperor and the princes of those
days, who were unbelievers; wherefore in the Epistle to Titus (Chap.
iii [, v. I]), Paul also said, ‘Admonish them to obey princes’,2 and Peter
wrote (r Peter, Chap, ii [, v. 13]), ‘Be ye subject,’ &c. Again, as to
tradition, [viewed in relation to our argument,] it is well-known from
the ancient custom of the Church, which I have elsewhere pointed out,
in the work cited [Defensio Fidel], in accordance with the comments
of many of the Fathers. To these citations I now add only the name of
Polycarp as quoted by Eusebius {Ecclesiastical History, Bk. IV, chap, xiv,
or xv [chap. xv]). The former, speaking of non-Christian princes, says,
‘We are taught to render to the magistrates and the powers constituted
by God, in proportion to their dignity of rank, such honour as is in no
1 [Not included in these Selections.—Tr.]
2 [The Vulgate reads: * Admonish them to be subject to princes and powers, to obey at a word’,
&c.—Tr.]

Disp. XV 111: On Means for the Conversion of Unbelievers

j"j<)

way detrimental to our salvation orto our religion.’ St. Thomas (II.-II,
qu. io, art. io) also defends this view very cogently by argument, when
he reasons as follows : the political powerin question springs from natural
law and the ius gentium, whereas faith springs from divine and super­
natural law; and the one law does not destroy or alter the other; neither
is the natural law founded on the divine positive law; rather is it in
a way subject thereto, constituting (as it were) the presupposition of
the latter; and therefore, positive power is not founded on faith in such,
a way that one may lose that power on account of unbelief nor, on
the other hand, is positive subjection, i.e. [subjection in the political
sense] to one who is an unbeliever, repugnant to faith or to the
baptismal character, so that, consequently this subjection is not auto­
matically dissolved [by faith and baptism].
5. The other part1 of the proposition which we have stated as 2
dilemma follows clearly from what has been said
An exposition of
the latter part of
above. For the unbelieving princes of whom we speak,
the dilemma.
may not rightfully be deprived of their possessions
without some just ground; and included within those possessions is
the jurisdiction which they are assumed to have over Christian subjects;
therefore, they may not be deprived of such jurisdiction, simply and
directly [on the ground of unbelief].
The truth of the antecedent in both its parts is self-evident.
The proof of the consequent is as follows : there is no just ground on
which such an act of deprivation may be committed; for the pretext
would be specifically that very unbelief, since strictly speaking, no
other ground exists or can be conceived; and in truth, unbelief is not,
per se, a just ground. For if we consider it purely as an absence of faith,
we must admit that, as I have said, such a lack does not destroy the
basis of political power; and if, on the other hand, unbelief is con­
sidered as a sin worthy of such punishment, even so, it is not within
the power of the Church to punish these unbelievers, since the Church
has no jurisdiction over them, as I have also proved. Therefore, just
as they may not be punished by the loss of other temporal goods, in
view of the fact that their ownership of those goods is not based upon
faith, similarly, they may not be deprived of the power in question.
Proof of this fact may be derived by analogy. For if there were
a demonstration by two sovereign princes who were unbelievers, and one
anaJ°gyof them worshipped the true God as known by the
light of nature, while the other prince was an idolater some of whose
subjects worshipped the true God, the latter prince could not, on the
ground of his idolatry, be deprived by the former of his jurisdiction
1 β-e. the assumption that the princes in question, ‘are unworthy on account of their unbelief to
hold the power which they may actually have, and consequently may justly be deprived of it.’ Vide the
first sentence of Sub-section 4 of this Section, p. 778.—Tr.]

780

The Three Theological Virtues: On Faith

Over such subjects, since the prince who worshipped the true God
would have no jurisdiction over the other, and since the idolatrous
prince would not lose his jurisdiction over the subjects in question
owing to the mere fact of his idolatry. There is, then, an indication
from natural law that this order must be preserved, because that
preservation is expedient to the welfare and peace of the world and
to a just equity; but the power given to the Church does not interfere
with natural rights, since it has [rather] been given for edification and
is to be used in the way best adapted to the preservation of the faith;
therefore, the Church has not been given the aforementioned power
of deprivation, a power which would serve for destruction instead [of
serving for edification], inasmuch as it would result in harm to the
faith and in scandal to those who are not of the faith.
6. Nevertheless, we must state, in the second place, that the
The second proposi- Church may indirectly 1 deprive these non-Christian
may indkecUyUdeh Pr^nces
their power over those subjects who are
prive non-Christian believers, if the welfare or defence of the latter makes
princes of their
this necessary. St. Thomas so teaches (II.-II, qu. 10,
power over those of
their subjects who art. 10), as do others cited above; and I also have
are believers.
touched upon this subject in the Defensio Fidei (Bk.
Ill, chap, xxiii, no. 21).2
The reason in support of this second proposition is as follows:
The reason suppor- the baptized faithful, by the fact of their faith and
ing this proposition, their baptism, are subjects of the Church in spiritual
matters, so that the Church has the power to rule them to the extent
that is necessary or highly expedient for the welfare of their souls;
and therefore, if it should become necessary to this end, to free such
persons from the power of non-Christian lords, the Church may do so,
and consequently may deprive those non-Christian princes of their
power over the persons in question. For he who gives the form, gives
also those things that are consequent upon the form; and whoever
gives power and jurisdiction in order to attain any end, gives conse­
quently, all the means necessary to reach that end.
This argument is confirmed by the example of a marriage contracted between unbelievers, one of whom is later
converted to the faith. For if either party wishes to 487
remain in wredlock without injury to God, the other may not sever
the bond; but if, on the other hand, the unbelieving spouse is the
occasion to the Christian partner of evil living, then the latter both
may and ought to be separated from that unbeliever, as Paul declares
(z Corinthians, Chap, vii [, v. 15]). Thus the unbelieving partner,
indirectly (as it were) and for the good of the faith, is deprived of the
1 [Le. incidentally, in the process of attaining some other end.—Tr.]
1 [Supra, p. 700.—Tr.]

Disp. XVIII: On Means for the Conversion of Unbelievers

781

power and dominion which he has over his spouse. Therefore, the
same holds true to a far greater degree in the case which we are dis­
cussing; for the marriage bond is of its nature more nearly indissoluble
than the bond of political subjection.
7. It should be noted, however, that there are two ways in which
such Christians may be freed from the power of un­
The first mode of
believers.
freeing the faithful
from the power of
The first primarily affects the subjects themselves,
non-Christian
who may change their domicile and pass over to the
princes, viz.
through change of
realms of Christian princes; for then it follows of
domicile.
necessity that they are no longer subject to their for­
mer prince. This method is easy and entirely just; and therefore, it
may be employed by any Christian subject, acting on his own authority,
for he is not bound to remain always in the same territory. Conse­
quently, if any prince attempts to prevent his Christian subjects from
thus transferring their domicile, he may be forcibly resisted by Chris­
tian princes, and justly subdued in war in defence of these subjects,
because they are being deprived of their right which they wish to
exercise.
8. These unbelieving princes may be deprived of their power over
their Christian subjects in another way, which affects
The second mode of
[primarily] the princes themselves; that is, though the
depriving an un­
believing prince
subjects in question remain in that territory, the
either of his sove­
reignty, or of his prince may be deprived [either of his sovereignty],1 or
power over the
at least of his power over such subjects. But this result
faithful.
could hardly be effected without a change of ruler, so
that the second method is more difficult [to follow’ than the first]; and
therefore, although the power [to employ that method] is not lacking
[to the faithful], nevertheless, great caution is necessary in its employ­
ment. In the first place, [if this second method is to be used,] the
faithful should constitute a great multitude; or, if they be few, it must
be practically impossible for them to change their domicile to a place
where they may practise their faith without scandal. Furthermore,
the successful issue of the enterprise must be morally certain, lest it
come to pass that in wishing to eradicate the cockle, these Christian
subjects should pull up the wheat.
Durandus requires
Durandus [on the Sentences, Bk. II, dist. xliv, qu. 3]
that some injuries
be committed on the holds, moreover, that it is necessary, [in order to justify
part of the prince
[before the second the method in question,] that the non-Christian prince
mode may be em­ shall first have been the cause of injuries and obstacles
ployed].
to the faith—such as attempting to entice his subjects
to unbelief, or impelling them to observe his own rites, or prohibiting
1 [The bracketed English phrase has been supplied from the Latin phrase, sd regno, which occurs
in the marginal note, but not in the body of the text.—Ts.]

782

St. Thomas.

The Three Theological Virtues: On Faith

them from practising the Catholic rites and. from obeying their own
spiritual pastors, or similar injuries—since both necessity and the ground
of justice would then exist.
St. Thomas (PI.-II, qu. 10J art. 10), however, thinks that,
although these factors may, in a general sense, be necessary for the
Yet the moral peril exercise of the power in question, yet the Church
of injury is suffi- has the power, even before the infliction of this kind
of injury, to remove such non-Christian sovereigns
solely on the ground of moral peril to the faithful. This opinion I too
have approved, in the aforesaid Defensio FideifBk. Ill, chap, xxx, no. 6),1
because, in moral questions peril must be guarded against before any
specific injury occurs, a principle which certainly is very true when
the peril is imminent and concerns the moral order. Therefore, as
regards the matter specifically under discussion [—that is, the second
mode of depriving an infidel prince of power—] all the circumstances in
any particular case must be taken into consideration, and [in view of
them], such peril to the faithful must be judged to exist [before resort
to that second method is justifiable].
9. Furthermore, I note that this indirect power, which we hold,
in whom this inexists in the Church for the removal of the above­
direct power resides, mentioned princes, is a public power and not a private
one, a fact which is self-evident. Therefore, it may be considered as
residing either in the Pope, or in some sovereign Catholic king. The
Pope has, by reason of his supreme spiritual jurisdiction, the power to
secure and watch over the salvation of souls ; whereas this power exists
in a temporal prince only as a means of defending his neighbours, and
especially the faithful, for such a prince has no spiritual jurisdiction.
Consequently, a temporal lang may not use this power on his
own authority until a non-Christian prince has inflicted violence upon
his own Christian subjects, since measures of defence are not lawful
before an act of aggression occurs. But both the Pope, and a king as
moved by the Pope and as his instrument (so to speak) may well take
preventive measures solely on the ground of peril, since the power of
jurisdiction extends to the prevention of evils lest they occur.
These remarks will suffice as to sovereign princes. In due propor­
tion, the same conclusions might easily be applied to other and inter­
mediate rulers, as well as in the case of all unbelievers not subject to
the Church who exercise jurisdiction over the faithful.
10. In view of the foregoing, it is easy to deal with the second
_
. division [of
power],2 that which relates to Christian
The third propos- ,
4 ,r. .
. .
tion:infidel masters, slaves and tneir infidel masters, ror, following a simi1 [Not included in these Selections.—Tr.]
2 [secundum membrum, referring to true dominion, the second of the four divisions mentioned in
the first paragraph of this Section. The various series of numbers used by Suarez in the course of the
section are somewhat confusing.—Tr.]

Disp. XV1I1: On Means for the Conversion of Unbelievers 783
lar line of reasoning, we must state that these masters,
who are not in any other respect subjects of the
Church, may not be deprived of their Christian slaves,
directly [on the ground of unbelief], whereas they may
indirectly1 be deprived of those slaves.
The first half of this proposition is certainly true and commonly
accepted. With regard to it, and in addition to the authors already
488 cited, Sylvester (word furtum, Qu. 6), may be consulted ; and by him,
at that place, Rosella ([word furtum,] No. 25) is quoted, although in
another passage {ibid., No. 24) Rosella seems to hold a different opinion.
In the latter case, however, he was probably speaking of Christian slaves
captured in an unjust war; otherwise he would be speaking incorrectly
and contradicting himself. Angelus de Clavasio (fSumma, word domi­
nus,] No. 56) may also be consulted on this point. The statement in
question is upheld, too, by Navarrus {Summa, chap, xvii, nos. 103 and
104), Covarruvias (on Sext, rule Peccatum, De Reg. Jur., Pt. II, §11,
no. 6), and Molina {De lustitia, Bk. I, disp. xxxù).
The argument supporting this statement is similar to that given
above. For Christians who before baptism were subject to unbelievers
are not released from temporal servitude to the latter by the simple
force of divine law, that is, of baptism; and, therefore, infidel masters,
who are not in any other respect subjects of the Church, may not,
directly [on the ground of unbelief,] be deprived by the Church of
their dominion. The truth of the antecedent, Paul clearly assumes,
when he says in the Epistle to the Ephesians (Chap, vi [, v. 5]) : ‘Servants
be obedient to them that are your lords according to the flesh [...] as
to Christ.’ This injunction is repeated in the Epistle to the Colosstans
(Chap, iii [, v. 22]), in that to Titus (Chap, ii [, v. 9]), and in the First
Epistle of Peter (Chap, ii [, v. 18]). Wherefore Augustine (on Psalms,
cxxiv [, no. y]), also, rightly says : ‘Christ did not make free men out of
slaves, but made good slaves out of bad ones.’ He upholds this same
doctrine at some length in his thirty-first sermon, on Psalm cxriii,
and under His name in Questions on the Old and New Testaments (Qu.
xxxv). From what has been said above, the truth of the consequent
is also evident, namely, that these non-Christians, since they are not
subjects of the Church, may not justly be deprived of their slaves.
ii. The second half of our third proposition,2 indeed, that half
Heverthei
these
re^ates to the power [to deprive infidel masters]
infidel masters may on indirect grounds of their dominion over Christian
suffer such depnva- slaves—is applicable when non-Christian masters are
tion, indirectly.
,
fs, _...
hostile to their Christian slaves, especially if that hos­
tility involves matters of faith. In that case, these very slaves have
not subjects of the
Church, cannot be
deprived of their
dominion over their
Christian slaves,
directly [on the
grouncfof unbelief].

1 [i.e. incidentally.—Tb.]
2 [Vide the first paragraph of Sub-section io of this Section, p. 7S2.—Tb.]

Sylvester.
Rosella.

Angelus.

Navarrus.
Covarruvias.
Molina.

Ephesians, vi.

CnlAtrtAut' yj.

Psalms, otxnr.
Augustine.

784

St. Thomas.

The Three Theological Virtues: On Faith

the right to defend themselves, or to recover their original freedom if
they can do so through flight; and certainly, in view of the arguments
already set forth, the princes of the Church have the right, in this
connexion, to exercise coercion upon unbelievers.
From the above statements, we derive sufficient enlightenment as
The same holds true to what should be said on the third point,1 which
as to servants.
relates to servants and the power of the head of the
household over them ; for the solution [in this case] should preserve a
similar proportion.
With respect to the fourth point, however [—that which relates to
the patria potestas—] there arises a serious question, of
iVIay tne children of
1 · i_ c
τί.
/γττ tt
π
\
unbelievers be bap- which bt. Ihomas ([11.-li, qu. io,J art. 12) treats,
tized against the win namely: may these unbelievers who are non-subjects
be forcibly deprived of their infant children in order
that the latter may be baptized ? But this question pertains to the
subject of baptism, with which I have dealt in Vol. Ill, disp. xxv, §3
[De Sacramentis].2 Enough has been said, then, as to unbelievers who
are not subjects.
12. We must consider, secondly,3 [whether] unbelievers who are
The fourth proposi- [themselves] subjects of Christian princes [may be
tion·
deprived of power over Christians]. Under this head
those four topics discussed above may be examined and treated.
As to the first point, indeed—that which relates to jurisdiction—
the question has no application with respect to a sovereign prince; for
we are assuming that these unbelievers are subjects of some Christian
sovereign. Therefore, we have only to inquire as to
Infidel judges
under a Christian
the inferior judges or governors ; and on this point it
king may be de­
prived of their power should be stated briefly that the Church can deprive
either directly or in­ such unbelievers, either directly or indirectly, of all
directly.
jurisdiction of this kind over Christians, or—what
amounts to the same thing—it may determine that in a Christian king­
dom the faithful shall not be governed temporally by infidel judges or
other infidel officials.
The direct power to do so clearly exists, because it is a Christian
The first proof:
prince who has jurisdiction over the subjects in quesfrom reason.
tion, and he may require in his judges and officials
such qualifications as he deems necessary for honour, or for distributive
justice, or for the peace and safety of his state. On this ground, then,
it is easily possible to exclude certain persons from the offices men1 [Le. domestic power. Vide the first paragraph of Sub-section 1, pp. 776-7.—Tr.J
1 [Not included in these Selections.—Tr.]
J [Le. ‘secondly*, as opposed to ‘In the first place’, the opening phrase of Sub-section 2 (p. 777),
where Suarez introduces the discussion relating to non-Christian princes whose subjects are converted
to the faith.—Tr.]
♦ [Vide the first paragraph of Sub-section 1 ; and also, footnotes, 2, p. 782 and 1, this page.—Tr.]

Disp. XVIII: On Means for the Conversion of Unbelievers 785

tioned. The existence of the indirect power, on the other hand, is a
self-evident fact; for the act in question is highly expedient to the
welfare of the faith, an argument which proves the existence, not only
of the power, but even of the obligation.
13. This teaching agrees with the words of Paul (z Corinthians, iCerinAunt,
The second proof:
Chap, vi [,v.6]), ‘But brother goethto law with brother **·
from Paul.
and that before unbelievers’, clearly reproving such
behaviour as indecorous ; at least, in cases in which it can be avoided.
To the same effect is his saying elsewhere (2 Corinthians, Chap, vi
[, v. 14]), ‘Bear not the yoke with unbelievers’. For although there may
be other interpretations of this passage, this also is a probable one; or,
in any case, the phrase may well be adapted to such an interpretation
by a parity of reasoning.
Furthermore the existence of this power may be clearly proved
The third proof:
from the application of human laws. For in the Code
from law.
(I.
Justinian forbids the Jews to hold public
offices affecting Christians. Innocent III makes a similar ruling in the innocent
Decretals (Bk. V, tit. vi, chap, xvi), when he imposes a penalty upon
Jews who accept or hold such offices. Moreover, the application of
this rule is extended to the pagans,1 that is, to Saracens, as may be
learned from the last chapter of the same title [, i.e. Decretals, Bk. V,
tit. vi, chap, xviii], in which Portugal is expressly enjoined to obey this
law, with an additional statement to the effect that she may not sell
tribute or royal grants to the Jews except when the latter are joined
[in partnership] with some Christian, who will take care lest injury
4891 be done to believers. A similar law is laid down by the Third Council Council of
Toledo.
of Toledo (Chap, xiv [cited in] Decretum, Pt. I, dist. xxiv, can. i [Pt. I,
dist. Liv, can. xiv]) ; and in the Fourth Council of Toledo (Chap. Ixiv
[cited in] Decretum, Pt. II, causa xvn, qu. iv, can. xxxi), it has been
enacted that those who entrust such offices to Jews should be ex­
communicated. The reason given is that, relying on this authority,
the Jews take occasion to*do injury to the faithful. Finally, the same
rule is laid down in the First Council of Macon (Chap. xiii).
14. Secondly, as to slavery, it should be stated that the faithful
may not be slaves of the unbelievers in question, [i.e.
of
those unbelievers who are subject to a Christian
tion : Christians may
not be slaves of
prince
or state,] and consequently the Church has
those unbelievers
been
able
3 to deprive her infidel subjects of such power
who are subjects of
the Church or of
over
Christians
. So the Emperor Justinian also ordered,
Christian princes.
in the Code (Lx, only law) ; and in the Decretals (Bk. V,
tit. vi, chap, v) there is a similar rule with respect to Jews. Gregory, Gregory.
1 [Paganos, where one would expect infiddes. Cf. note to first paragraph of Sub-section 15, infra,
p. 787.—Tr.]
* [The Latin text incorrectly has ‘493’.—Tr.J
3 [potuisse. Possibly Suarez intended posse.—Tr.]
1569.74
5h

y86

The Three Theological Virtues: On Faith

too {Letters, Bk. II, letter xxxvi or Chap. Ixxvi [Bk. Ill, letter xxxviii])
and the Decretum (Pt. I, dist. liv, cans, xiii and xiv, with other Chapters
of the same dist. liv), have rulings to this effect.
A special reason for such provisions may be inferred from the
danger that would result to the faithful themselves if they should be
allowed to dwell under the dominion of unbelievers. Another reason
is that occasions of blasphemy, contempt of faith, and injury to the
faithful might arise from such a relation.
These reasons pertain rather to the question of indirect power,
although I may add that they have to do also with the direct power of
Christian princes. For, in the first place, a Christian king may issue a
general decree to apply throughout his realm, to the effect that Chris­
tians are not to be made the slaves even of other Christians, a rule
which many kingdoms even now observe; because, though the civil
power is not directly derived from the faith, nevertheless, when it is
joined thereto, it is directed, and (so to speak) elevated thereby, so that
it may do much for the welfare of the faith ; therefore, the same law
may far more readily be decreed with regard to unbelieving masters.
Secondly, a king may impose upon his subjects such tribute and burdens
as he deems necessary for good government ; therefore, in like manner,
he may impose upon infidel subjects the burden of an incapacity to
be masters of Christians.
So it has been ordained that if an unbeliever, the slave of another
unbeliever, is converted to the faith, by that very
By what right the
conversion he shall be emancipated. In the same way,
Christian slaves of
unbelievers are
if a Christian is bought by an infidel as a slave for
freed from servitude.
purposes of servitude, he shall become free, by the
very nature of the transaction, and the buyer shall lose his purchase
money. But if the said Christian be bought for purposes of trading,
he shall be sold to a believer within three months ; otherwise, he be­
comes free. The same provision is laid down in the Code (I. ix, last
law [only law] and I. iii, last law, last section [Code, I. iii. 54 (56),
§§ 8 et seql\).
However, the canonists note, with respect to one of the chapters
cited above {Decretals, Bk. V, tit. vi, chap, ii), that these rulings do not
prevent a Christian from working as a farm-servant, whether as a new­
comer to the lands or estates of an unbeliever, or as one born thereon,
for the following reasons: the permission to do so may be inferred
from the passage in question; moreover, such labour is not servitude,
and consequently is not included under the aforesaid prohibition; and
finally, in the case of farm-servants there does not exist the same peril
[to the faith], or likelihood of scandal, since the believer and the un­
believer do not live together or engage in frequent and familiar inter­
course by reason of such occupation.

Disp. XVIII: On Means for the Conversion of Unbelievers 787
15. Thirdly, on the question of servants it must be stated that
the Church has this same power to prohibit Christians
The sixth proposi­
from acting even as free servants of unbelievers. This
tion : the Church
has the power to assertion may be proved without difficulty by applying
command that
Christians shall not to the present case the reasons given above,1 an applica­
act as servants of tion which is easily made and which I therefore omit.
unbelievers who are
For this
subject to her ; and Usage also confirms the same assertion.
the Church does in principle is laid down in a Chapter of the Code (I.
fact so order.
iii. 55, § 5 [54, §§ 8 et seq.f), already cited; and its
application is extended to the pagans,2 in the Decretals (Bk. V, tit. vi,
chap, viii [chap, xiii]), in a passage where the Saracens are expressly
mentioned.
Finally, with respect to the patria potestas, it is certain that the
x
. .. son of an unbeliever, as soon as he is baptized, must
regarding the power in view or that very fact be treed from the power of
chddren^ °ver thek
unbelieving parent, for the sake of the safety of the
faith, and because by reason of baptism he is now
under the law of the Church. This rule has been laid down in the
Councils of Toledo, cited above, and is proved by the Decretals (Bk.
Ill, tit. xlii, chap. iii). Whether the infant children of these unbeliev­
ing subjects may be baptized when the parents are unwilling, and
whether the former may be taken from the parents with that end in
view, are, however, disputed questions, which I have discussed [in De
Sacramentis], Vol. Ill, pt. m, disp. xxv, §§ 4, 5 and 6, to which the
reader may refer.3

SECTION VI
WHETHER EVERY OTHER FORM OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN CHRJSTIANS AND UNBELIEVERS IS OR MAY BE PROHIBITED

1. Three kinds of communication between Christians and un­
believers must be distinguished: the first may be
The three kinds of
called formal, that is, communication in the works of
communication
between Christians
unbelief; the second is communication in the works
and unbelievers.
of our religion, and in a way this approximates to formal communication; the third is purely secular and human, and with
490 respect to faith and unbelief, it is merely material [, i.e. incidental].
2. The first kind is certainly forbidden by the divine and the
The first kind of natural law. This prohibition, by its very nature, is
communication, ^in directed primarily to Christians; yet it may be apte°forbiddtmby the plied to the unbeliever himself, either because unbelief
natural law.
js itself forbidden thereby, or—again—because the
1 [Püfc 785 ; the fifth proposition in the preceding Sab-section.—Ta.]
2 [Paganas again occurs where infideles would seem to be the more appropriate term. Cf. note I,
p. 785.—Tr.]
2 [Not included in these Selections.—Tr.]

/88

1 Corinthians,
x'
2 Corinthians,

*

Azor.

The Three Theological Virtues: On Faith

act of drawing a Christian into the intercourse or co-operation in
question, is per se an evil act. However, this negative command regard­
ing Christians is issued primarily to us, to whom these words were
addressed (z [2] Corinthians, Chap. vi[, w. 14,16,15]) : ‘For what fellow­
ship hath light with darkness [...] or what agreement hath the temple
of God with idols [ . . . ] or what part hath the faithful with the
unbeliever?’ Paul repeated this admonition in the same Epistle (z Corinthians, Chap, x [, v. 20]) : T would not that you should be made partakers
with devils.’ And a similar sense may be given to the passage (2 Corinthians, Chap, vi [, v. 14J): ‘Bear not the yoke with unbelievers.’ The
same prohibition, both in its general form and with reference to many
specific points, is found in the Sacred Canons (69, 70)1 of the Apostles,
in the Canons (61, 62) of the Trullan Synod, held after the Sixth
[General] Council, in the Collection (71 to 75) of Martin, Bishop of
Braga, compiled after the Second Council of Braga, and in the
Council of Laodicea (Canons 37 et seq.), and also in the Decretum(f\. II,
causa xxvi, qu. v, can. iii).
Now the reason [for this prohibition] is that such intercourse is
A proof by reason- both irreligiously superstitious and opposed to the
“<·
profession of the faith. Therefore, all that we said
above about the necessity of professing the faith has due application
at this place, as have our remarks in Vol. I : De Religione (Tract. Ill,
_
. bk. n)z 2 on , the. sin . of
superstition. .
The appearance and
, , r
,
moral suspicion of
VV e need only add that not merely actual commumto beavoia>d°n
cat^on
unbelievers] must be avoided, but also the
appearance and moral suspicion of the same, such as the
frequenting of the synagogues and temples of unbelievers, especially at
the hours when their rites are celebrated. For this practice may give
rise to scandal and provide occasion for the suspicion that those temples
and rites are acceptable or approved.
Azor (Moral Institutes, Vol. I, bk. vm, chap, xxii, qu. 3 and
ah i-.-_-.n-ii.Li:
·
IX’ c^aP
Qu· 3) maX ke consulted on this point,
the wô^E^o^un!
as may also my own work, the Defensio Fidei (Bk. VI,
believers is stiu
chap, ix),2 in which I have added that all co-operation
moreto be avoided.
.
x
,z
.
. . , r i
·
·
·
i
is much more to be avoided [than is communication].
However, it is difficult to determine whether or not any co-operation
takes place in particular cases: as when [Christians] sell to Jews or to
pagans any animal or other object necessary for the sacrifices of the
latter. But wfith respect to this point, one must observe the rule that if
a thing cannot possibly be put to a good use, the sale of the same is
co-operation; whereas if the object in question can be put to a licit use
and in itself is neither good nor bad, then, normally, its sale is not co1 [Canons 70, 71 in the edition of Funk.—Reviser.]
2 [Not included in these Selections.—Tr.]

Disp. XVIII: On Means for the Conversion of Unbelievers

789

operation. This is the rule laid down by Cajetan (on II.-II, qu. 10, art. Cajetan.
4), a rule which conforms with the opinion expressed by St. Thomas St.Thomaj.
(II.-II, qu. 169, art. 2, ad 4); moreover, the same view is held by
Sylvester, Angelus de Clavasio, and others (on word infidelitas)', while Sylvester.
I, too, have touched upon this subject in the aforesaid Chap, ix [Defensio Αηβ'1“·
Fidei, Bk. VI, chap, ix],1 and have discussed it at length in the treatise
on The Sacraments in General,1 andon Oaths,1 and in other passages ; for
this question is indeed of a very general application.
3. The second kind of communication of unbelievers with beJ, lievers, that which takes place in connexion with
communication is sacred matters and with the works or our own religion,
prohibited by the js at times forbidden by divine and natural law as
natural law.
z
being intrinsically evil.
An instance of such a forbidden act is the admission of an un­
believer to partake of the Sacraments, this act of admission being
absolutely and directly prohibited to believers; but unbelievers, too, are
forbidden to obtrude themselves into the rites in question, and ac­
cordingly, they may be punished as injurious to the Christian religion,
if they do so forcibly.
Under this part of our discussion, we may include the prohibition
of marriage with unbelievers, although an infidel who has been con­
verted to the faith may remain in wedlock already contracted with
another infidel, provided that no offence2 to the Creator results there­
from. Nevertheless, a baptized Christian is forbidden to contract
marriage with an unbeliever, as I assume from the treatment of the
subject of matrimony. It is true indeed that this prohibition is eccle­
siastical rather than divine; and yet it seems to have been enacted not
only on account of peril [to the faith], but also because of reverence
for marriage, which, among the faithful, has been elevated to the
character of a Sacrament.
Accordingly, other acts of communication of this sort are for­
bidden by human law; for example, it is prohibited that unbelievers
should be present at the sacrifice of the Mass, or should behold the
Sacrament of the Eucharist, prohibitions recorded by St. Thomas St. Thoma.
(Summa, Pt. Ill, qu. 80, art. 4, ad 4) commenting on Dionysius (Eerie- Dwcysra».
siastica Hierarchia, Chap. vii). This view is supported by Clement (Con- Oenx-nt.
stitutions, Bk. VIII, chaps, viii and xii), whereon Turrianus comments Tuman™-.
at length; by the Fourth Council of Carthage (Chap. Ixxxiv); and in
the Decretum (Pt. Ill, dist. iv [dist. 1, can. IxviiJ). According to the
latter passage, unbelievers are allowed to be present at that portion
491 of the Mass which is called the Mass of the Catechumens, and far
1 [Not included in these Selections.—Tr.]
2 [‘offence’. The Latin words contumelia, injuria, are used indifferently to express any grievous sin
which the unbaptized partner induces, or might induce, the Chrkiffon partner to commit.—Reyisul]

79°

St. Thomas.

Chrysostom.

St. Thomas.

Gregory.

The Three Theological Virtues: On Faith

more readily are they allowed to be present at discourses on sacred
matters delivered for their benefit; just as it is also permissible to
pray privately for them or even to instruct them in the mysteries of
religion.
In this connexion, there arose also a question of which St. Thomas
treats ([II.-II,] qu. 10, art. 7), namely: is it permissible to debate with
.
unbelievers, on sacred matters ? The discussion of this
detet?w^unbe- point, I shall reserve for Disputation XX [, i.e. De
iMttM3?0n sacred Remediis Ecclesiae contra Haereses et Haereticos,] Sect.
i),1 in which we are to ask the same question with re­
gard to heretics, because that aspect of the question involves the same
principle. For the present, I shall state briefly that such debating is
not in itself evil, since it is often essential to the conversion of those
unbelievers ; but it should be conducted under proper circumstances,
of which we shall speak in the Disputation above-mentioned.
4. The third kind of communication is secular, or human, and
it is with this kind in particular that we are now deal­
The third kind of
communication,
ing.
In this connexion, three points should be briefly
that which takes
discussed.
place in secular
affairs, is not in­
The first is that the sort of communication in
herently evil, nor is
question is not in itself evil or forbidden by divine
it forbidden by
divine law; but inci­ law. This is certain; for Paul (r Corinthians, Chap,
dentally, in certain
cases, it may be for­ vii [, w. 12-14]) permits complete domestic and human
bidden.
communication between a Christian spouse and an
unbelieving partner, and in the same Epistle to the Corinthians [Chap, x,
v. 27] he allows the faithful to eat with unbelievers, upon invitation
from the latter, a fact which both Chrysostom thereon (in Homily XXV
[on First Corinthians, Chaps, vii and x] and Homily XXV, on Hebrews)
and St. Thomas ([II.-II, qu. 10,] art. 9) note. Furthermore, a general
prohibition with regard to such matters would not be expedient, because
the conversion of unbelievers would thereby be rendered practically
impossible. This would be the result, in the first place, in so far as
preachers are concerned; for how could they approach those unbelievers
for the purpose of instructing them, without first having had human
intercourse with them ? Therefore, this kind of communication is not
only not prohibited, but even encouraged, as wre learn from she Decretals
(Bk. V, tit. vi, chap, x) and from the Decretum (Pt. II, causa xi, qu. i,
can. xl), following Gregory {Letters, Bk. Ill, letter xxvi). Secondly, in
so far as the unbelievers themselves are concerned, how could a father be
converted to the faith, if he were to be immediately cut off from com­
munication with his children or with his entire family, or even with his
friends ? This kind of communication, then, is not evil in itself; neither
do we find that it is forbidden by divine law. The fact is simply that
1 [Not included in these Selections.—Tr.]

Disp. XVIII: On Meansfor the Conversion of Unbelievers

"91

any believer is bound by virtue of the natural and the divine law to
avoid that kind of human communication or converse with unbelievers
which threatens peril to himself or is scandalous to others. This dis­
tinction as to different sorts of human intercourse is clear from general
principles, but in a particular case it is based upon circumstances and
the exercise of prudence.
5. Hence, secondly,1 it must be stated that the Church can prohiNevertheiess, the
bit this sort of communication between Christians
third kind of com- ancj unbelievers. This is evident, because there is no
forbidden by eccie- lack of jurisdiction for the making of such a law; and
siasticai law.
subject-matter is also capable of being placed
under such a prohibition, since the latter may be conducive to the
peace and security of the faithful. Therefore, that prohibition must,
as a general rule, be held to fall directly upon Christians alone, because,
as St. Thomas noted (II.-II, qu. 10, art. 9), they are the true subjects
of the Church. We must add, however, that the law in question may
also [in special cases] be directly applied to non-believing subjects,
either in punishment for some offence—as is the case with many laws
which we shall presently cite—or in order to promote sound external
government of the state, or even for the sake of the security of the
faithful. Consequently, there are times when a Christian prince can,
for the sake of religion, place a ban, directed even to foreign and non­
subject unbelievers, upon this intercourse within his own kingdom.
6. Thirdly,2 the statement must be made that the Church has,
in actual fact, laid down many prohibitions with respect to the sort
of communication under discussion.
In the first place, indeed, familiarity with Jews is placed under
„
.
a general prohibition.
On this
point, the
Decretal Tw
Moreover, familiar.
....
, f
111
'
ity with tfie jews is V, tit. vi, chap, vui) may be consulted. In fact, it
«^actual fact for- WOuld seem that absolutely all converse and communi­
cation with them was forbidden by the Fourth Council
of Toledo (Chap. Ixi [Chap. IxiiJ). However, that prohibition has refer­
ence, not to all the faithful, universally, but to those who have been
newly converted to the faith from among the ranks of the Jews them­
selves. To these new Christians, converse with those of their own people
who persevere in Judaism is forbidden, because of the peril attending
such converse. Therefore, this prohibition should be understood to refer
to frequent, or continued converse, which may result in peril. Thomas
Sanchez {Opus XIorale in Praecepta Decalogi, Bk. 11, chap. xxxi), following Sanchez.
St. Thomas, Sylvester, and others, limits this general prohibition in such St. Thoms,
a way as to exclude its application in the case of those believers who
1 [Le. this is the second of the three points to be discussed in connexion with secuhr, or human,
communication. Vide the first paragraph of the immediately preceding Sub-section, p. 79c.—Tr.]
2 [This is the third of the three points to be taken up in connexion with secular, or human, com­
munication. Vide, Sub-section 4, p. 790.—Tr.

792

Council of
Orleans.
Council of
Agde.

The Three Theological Virtues: On Faith

are firm in the faith and with respect to whom there can be no fear of
moral peril. However, if the prohibition contained in a law is general,
it does not cease to bind in an individual case, even if the purpose of
the law does, in a purely negative sense, cease to be realized in the
individual case, as I assume from the treatise on laws. I therefore thinl
that there is a limitation to the prohibition in the case of those persons
whose care it is to convert such infidels as we speak of, because the
purpose of the law then does not simply cease to be realized in a nega­
tive sense, but in addition, it ceases by contrariety.1
7. Secondly,2 living in the same house with Jews is specifically
Secondly, living in forbidden (Decretum, Pt. II, causa xxvin, qu. i, can. 492
the same house with
Decretals, Bk. V, tit. vi, chap. v). The reason for
forbidden.^
this prohibition is the avoidance of harm.
But the objection may be made that a Christian
An objection.
can own a sfoye who is an unbeliever, and that conse­
quently, he can live with that unbeliever. The antecedent is supported
in the Decretals (ibid., chap. xiii).
Our reply is as follows : either this fact constitutes an exception
The solution.
to t^ie prohibition set forth above ; or else it cannot
properly be said that the master dwells with, the slave,
but rather the converse, so that the prohibition in question does not
apply to such a master; or, at least, a certain equality of fellowship
and familiar intercourse is required for ‘dwelling together’, in the true
sense of the phrase, so that the Christian master, in accordance with
other laws above-mentioned, must avoid also this equal association with
an unbelieving slave.
Thirdly, a Christian is forbidden to invite an unbeliever to his
banquet table, or to accept such an invitation from
Furthermore, it is
forbidden to eat at the latter; for this also is dangerous association. This
the same table with prohibition was especially directed against Jews in the
Jews.
Third Council of Orleans (Chap, xxiii [Chap, xiii]),
and in the Council of Agde (Chap, xl cited in Decretum, Pt. II, causa
xxvin, qu. i, can. xiv), the special reason being given that Jews dis­
criminate among different sorts of food, a practice which is not permis­
sible to Christians. However, as a special concession, this eating in
common is permitted to preachers who are sent forth to convert
unbelievers.
Fourthly, in these same laws, and in the Apostolic canons cited
1 [Le. harm to the individual. The above is what is taught by all theologians on law, viz. if law
ceases to secure its purpose negatively in a given case, it still binds ; if, however, it ceases contrarie, as
is said, it ceases to bind, Le. if a law does some real extrinsic harm to a person, it would not bind him.
This is clearly seen in the laws of fasting and abstinence. If such a law would make a person unwell,
it is said to cease contrarie. However, the law against reading certain books may cease negafttvly, but
never contrarie.—Reviser.]
2 [This introduces the second of the prohibitions mentioned at the beginning of the preceding
Sub-section. Six more, making eight in all, are discussed in the immediately succeeding pages.—Te.]

Disp. XVIll: On Means for the Conversion of Unbelievers
above, Christians are specifically forbidden to eat the unleavened
bread of the Jews; an act which is evil in itself, if it
The eating of un­
leavened bread is
is understood to involve the consumption of such food
also forbidden.
as a Jewish rite; but this rule is also interpreted as a
prohibition, in order to avoid suspicion and peril [to the faith], against
any partaking of the azyme with the Jews themselves or receiving it
from them. When there is no danger of scandal, however, and espe­
cially if necessity requires, the eating of this food as ordinary bread is
not forbidden, as the eating of idolothytes is forbidden in the Decretum
(Pt. II, causa xxxn, qu. iv, can. viii).
8. Fifthly, in case of illness, Christians are forbidden to call in
Jews; at least they are forbidden to do so for the pur­
It is forbidden,
moreover, to call in pose of [medical] treatment (Sixth Synod, Chap. XI,
Jews in case of
cited in Decretum, Pt. II, causa xxvin, qu. I, can.
illness.
xiii). This rule may have been made not merely be­
cause of special peril to the soul, but also to avoid bodily contact.
Hence, a further rule has been laid down against receiving medicine
from Jews, a prohibition which is chiefly understood to mean medicine
is not to be received at their hands and administered by them, lest
familiarity and peril result. But these and like prohibitions should be
interpreted as applying only when the case is not one of necessity,
since necessity knows no law.
Sixthly, Christians are further ordered not to bathe with Jews
at the same time at the same public baths, a prohibition
It is likewise for­
which is laid down in the above-mentioned Chapter
bidden to frequent
the baths in the
xiii [Decretum, ibid.']. This rule should be understood as
company of Jews, if
this be done in ac­ applying only in a general sense, namely, as referring
cordance with a pre­ to the act of walking to the baths with them, that is
vious agreement.
to say, [the act of bathing together] as the result of
an intention to do so. For this deliberate practice involves true social
intercourse and familiarity, against which, on account of the danger
involved therein, all the prohibitions under discussion are especially
directed. If a Christian, then, should come accidentally to a public
bath where a Jew is bathing at the time, the rule has no application,
and it is not necessary that the Christian should on that account forgo
what is convenient to him, or postpone it.
Seventhly, it may be especially noted that Christian women are
forbidden to act as nurses for Jewish children, a fact
Furthermore, it is
forbidden that
which
is brought out in the Decretals (Bk. V, tit. vi,
Christian women
should nurse _Jewish chap. viii). However, this qualifying phrase is added:
children.
‘in their homes’—that is, in the homes of the Jews—
so that apparently, the rule in question is made solely to guard against
the practice of dwelling together. Consequently, the inference may
be drawn that a Christian woman is not forbidden to nurse a Jewish
1569.74

5 i

794

Three "Theological Virtues: On Faith

child, in her own home; since the words of the law do not include such
a case and should not be so extended. However, although this is true in
so far as the strict letter of the law is concerned, nevertheless, the
situation in question should be avoided because of the familiarity and
peculiar affection which, as a general rule, result therefrom.
9. Eighthly, it is forbidden that Christians, in their wills, should
It is also forbidden name Jews as their heirs and legatees. This is the doc­
to make heirs or trine of the canonists {Decretals, Bk. V, tit. vi, chap,
legatees of
of Jews.
legatees
Jews.
anj eSpecjaHy of Felinus (on Decretals, ibid., no. 3),
the Gloss thereon, and Sylvester (on the word iudaeus, Qu. 1 [, no. 2]).
The Code (I. ix. 1) may be cited on the same rule; but in the Code the
prohibition refers only to the Jews as a whole, that is, as a community,
and prohibitions expressed in such terms are not usually extended to
apply to individuals, as the Gloss thereon indicates. In this case, how­
ever, the extended application is allowed in the interests of the faith
and of religion. Yet another chapter in the Decretals (Bk. V, tit. vn,
chap, v) and one in the Decretum (Pt. II, causa xxiv, qu. ii, can. vi)
may be mentioned in this connexion, in which the said prohibition is
imposed upon bishops, in particular, while in the Decretals (Bk. V,
tit. vn, chap, vi) it is extended to clerics.
The Doctors, however, apply that rule to all Catholics, either by
the same process of reasoning, or at least a fortiori ; and such should be
the practice observed by all Catholics, especially since there exists a
general warning lest they render aid and favour of this sort to Jews.
This was the ruling of the Fourth Council of Toledo (Chap. Ivii).
One must note, with respect to these and like questions, that the 493
prohibitions involved are grave, both because of their subj’ect-matter
and because of the purpose they serve; and that by their nature, and
generally speaking, they are binding under pain of mortal sin, although
occasionally, when the particular instance happens to be of slight
importance, the transgression may become venial.
Moreover, since a prohibition of the sort under discussion is part
of the common law [of the Church], dispensations therefrom cannot
usually be given by bishops; but when in any given case the necessity
is urgent and delay would be dangerous, then, according to the com­
mon teaching on law, the granting of such dispensations is within the
power of a bishop.
10. Finally, it may be asked whether the laws in question are to
be interpreted as applying universally to all unbelievers,
Are these prohibi­
or whether they have reference only to the Jews.
tions extended to
apply to all unbe­
The cause of the doubt is that the laws cited speak
lievers ?
expressly of the Jews, so that some persons hold that,
the said laws being penal in nature, there should be no extension of
their application. A special reason which is customarily given is that,

Disp. XV111: On Means for the Conversion of Unbelievers
according to the Decretals (Bk. V, tit. vi, chap, xiii), the Jews are not
only subjects but also slaves. Hostiensis (Summa, Bk. V, De ludaeis, Hosier»·,
p. 349) holds that the passage in question refers only to one’s own
purchased slaves, a view which certain of the Summists adopt. How­
ever, such a limitation is certainly not contained in the text, where, on
the contrary, it is stated that the Jews have indeed inherently merited
this slavery, but that in point of fact they are tributaries with the civil
status of subordinate subjects, as Panormitanus (on Decretals, Bk. V, Panormuan
tit. vi, chap, xiii) notes with reference to this point, and as St. Thomas St. Thomas.
(II.-II, qu. 10, art. 12, ad 3 and Pt. Ill, qu. 68, art. 10, ad 2) and Soto Soto.
(on the Sentences, Bk. IV, dist. v, sole question, an. 10, ad 2) have also
explained. Therefore, the true reason for this discrimination against
the Jews is thought to be the fact that intercourse with the Jews
involves more peril on account of their greater peninacity and their
hatred of the Christian religion.
Nevertheless, it is my opinion that the prohibitions which we are
discussing, apply also to the Saracens1—that is, the Mohammedans —
both because such an extension of their force is repeatedly indicated
in the civil and canon law (Code, I. iii. 57, § 5 [I. iii. 54 (56), §§ 8 (3)
et seq.~\ and Decretals, Bk. V, tit. vi, chaps, viii, xvi, xv, xix, v); and
also because there is an analogy in the reasoning applicable to both
cases, inasmuch as these [Mohammedan] unbelievers are also enemies
of the Christians, and attempt with all their strength to pervert the
faithful.
As for other unbelieving pagans, however, they do not seem to
have been included in the aforementioned laws, a fact which has been
noted by Sanchez ([Opus Morale in Praecepta Decalogi, Bk. II,] chap. ^chex.
xxxi, no. 25), of whose opinion I approve in so far as relates to this
matter. Many statements concerning these prohibitions may also be
found in the writings of the jurists on the laws in question, in the
comments of the Summists (on the word iudaeus), and in the state­
ments of St. Antoninus (Pt. II, tit. xn, chap, iii), as well as in those s«. Antoc.no·.
of Azor and Sanchez, already cited; and these authorities quote A«cr.
many others.
The foregoing may suffice on the subject of unbelief.
1 [The Code refers to ‘pagans’.—Tb ]

FRANCISCO SUAREZ

A WORK ON THE

THREE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES

FAITH, HOPE AND CHARITY
ON CHARITY: DISPUTATION XIII

641

TO THE GENTLE READER

The primary cause, gentle reader, of the unusually brief form in
which the following treatises on Hope and Charity are published, was
the fact that even the members of the very school over which Suarez
presided at Rome, during the time when he lectured on these subjects,
became wearied of extremely diffuse and excessively elaborate disser­
tations, wherefore he readily bowed to the precepts and wishes of
that school, such was the simple sincerity of this noble Doctor.
Furthermore, this treatment is brief, because he disregarded not
a few matters that are usually dealt with, especially on the subject of
Charity, for these matters are either entirely or in great measure appli­
cable to grace, a subject which Suarez, in his work thereon, had very
cogent reasons for thinking to be distinct from Charity (De Gratia,
Bk. VI, chap, xii).1 Such matters concern the supernatural entity of
Charity, the production, increase, and loss of habits, the power of
sanctifying and meriting. These are explained at length in that same
work, and partially, in his treatise on the resuscitation of merit (section
3).2 Grace itself, which of its nature precedes Charity, demanded that
all of those matters should have a prior claim to treatment, and if the
reader should here find them to be missing, they will be fully supplied
in the passages indicated above.
However, the fact that these treatises, if compared with others
which the author has already published, are briefer, is no indication
that they are in any respect unsuited to the character of his genius and
judgment. On the contrary, we venture to assert that when the
author employs this concise method of composition, he appears, not
merely to be equal to, but in a certain sense, to surpass himself. For
the discursive reasonings of his profound genius and keen discernment,
as well as the cogency of the arguments set forth by him, which attain
a felicitous amplitude in other works of his, are here compressed into
small compass, and more readily understood, without any loss of
efficacy and force. Consequently, these treatises contain the pith and
marrow of the subjects at hand, as you yourself, gentle reader, will (I
hope) admit, when you have made the test of experiment. Nor will it
be difficult, if you observe the similarity of this work3 with others, its
order and method, to divine the author of both the one and the others,
recognizing (as it were) the lion by its claws.
In addition, in order that all this matter may be readily intelligible
even to those who are not very well versed in the works of Suarez, we
1 (Not included in these Selections.—Tr.J
* [Opusculum; Relectio de Meritis mortificatis, &c., Disp. I, sect, in, which is not included in these
Selections.—Tr.J
j [hujus operis, referring evidently to both disputations (those on Hope and Charity).—Tr.]

800

The Three Theological Virtues: On Charity

indicate in the margins of these disputations on Hope and Charity
identical or similar points which Suarez discusses elsewhere more at
length.1 For the author will thus come to his own assistance, where
there might seem to be need, without help sought from any other source.

DISPUTATION XIII
ON WAR

An external contest at arms which is incompatible with external
peace is properly called war, when carried on between
sense is manifold.
two sovereign princes or between two states. When,
however, it is a contest between a prince and his own state, or between
citizens and their state, it is termed sedition. When it is between
private individuals it is called a quarrel or a duel. The difference
between these various kinds of contest appears to be material rather
than formal, and we shall discuss them all, as did St. Thomas (II.-II,
qq. 40, 41, 42) and others who will be mentioned below.
War in a genera]

SECTION I
IS WAR INTRINSICALLY EVIL?

The first heresy [in connexion with this subject] consists in the
assertion that it is intrinsically evil and contrary to
The first error. On
this and the follow­ charity to wage war. Such is the heretical belief attri­
ing error see Bellar- buted by Augustine to the Manichaeans {Against
mine, De Laicis,
Bk. Ill, chaps, xiv Faustus, Bk. XXII, chap. Ixxiv), whom Wycliffe fol­
and xvi. Molina, De lowed, according to the testimony of Waldensis {De
lustitia, Disp. xc.
Sacramentalibus [which is Vol. Ill of Doctrinale Antiquitatum Fidet\ last title, next to last chapter). The second error
is the assertion that war is specifically forbidden to
The second error.
Christians, and especially, war against Christians.
In opposition to
So Eck maintains (Enchiridion Locorum Communium,
these heretics,
others are also cited Chap, xxii) ;2 and other persons of our own time, who
by Cenedo, Collect.,
are heretics, advance the same contention. They
LIX, pt. I.
distinguish, however, two kinds of w’ar, the defensive
and the aggressive, which we shall discuss in Sub-section 6 of this
Section. The conclusions that follow will elucidate the matter.
2. Our first conclusion is that war, absolutely speaking, is not
_ c_,
, .
intrinsically evil, nor is it forbidden to Christians,
which is negative, I his conclusion is a matter of faith and is laid down in
2th a matter of the Scriptures, for in the Old Testament, wars waged
by most holy men are praised (Genesis, Chap, xiv
I.

Genesis, xiv.

1 [Of the volume De Triplici Virtute Theologica, only Disp. XVIII of the treatise On Faith, and
Disp. XIII of the treatise On Charity are included in these Selections.—Tr.]
’ [Eck speaks of the lawfulness of Christians waging war against Turks and heretics.—Reviser.]

797

Disp. XIII: On War

801

[, w. 19-20]) : ‘Blessed be Abram [...·] And blessed be God by whose
protection the enemies are in thy hands.’ We find similar passages
concerning Moses, Josue, Samson, Gedeon, David, the Macha bees,
and others, whom God often ordered to wage war upon the enemies
of the Hebrews. Moreover, the apostle Paul {Hebrews, Chap, xi [, v. 33])
said that by faith the saints conquered kingdoms. The same principle
is confirmed by further testimony, that of the Fathers quoted by
Gratian {Decretum, Pt. II, causa xxm, qq. 1 and 2), and also that ot
Ambrose {On Duties, various chapters).
However, one may object, in the first place, that the Lord said to
The first objection: David
Paralipomenon, Chap, xxviii, v. 3]: ‘Thou
based on i Paralipo- shalt not build my temple because thou art a man who
menon, xxviii.
has shed blood.1
Secondly, it will be objected that Christ said to
The second objec­
tion: based on
Peter {Join, Chap, xviii [, v. 11]) : ‘Put up thy sword
Matthew, Chap, xix
[John, Chap, xviii] into the scabbard,’ &c. ; and that Isaias also said {Isaias,
and on Isaias,
Chap, ii [, v. 4]) : ‘They shall turn their swords into
Chaps, ii and xi.
ploughshares [. . .] neither shall they be exercised any
more to war’ ; and, in another Chapter (Chap, xi [, v. 9]) : ‘They shall
not hurt nor shall they kill in all [my] holy mountain.’ The Prophet is
speaking, indeed, of the time of the coming of the Messiah, at which
time, especially, it will be made clear, what is permissible and what
is not permissible.
Thirdly, at the Council of Nicaea (Chap, xi [, can. xii]), a penalty
_ xt_.
.
was imposed upon Christians who, after having received
based on the Coun- the faith, enrolled themselves for military service,
letter οΓρορ ^eo Furthermore, Pope Leo {Letters, xcii [Letter clxvii,
inquis, xii]) wrote that war was forbidden toChristians,
after a solemn penance.
Fourthly, war morally brings with it innumerable sins; and a
The fourth objec­ given course of action is considered in itself evil and
tion: based on
forbidden, if it is practically always accompanied by
reasoning.
unseemly circumstances and harm to one’s neighbours.
[Furthermore,] one may add that war is opposed to
A confirmation.
peace, to the love of one’s enemies, and to the forgiveness of injuries.
3. We reply to the first objection that [the Scriptural passage in
The answer to the question] is based upon the unjust slaying of Uriah;
first objection.
and, also, upon the particularly great reverence owed
to the Temple.
798
[As for the second objection, we may answer, first, that] Christ our
1 [Suare?\ quotation of Paralipomenon, Chap, xxviii, v. 3, reads: Non aedificabis mihi templum, q<aa
tir sanguinum es. The same passage in the Vulgate reads: Non aedificabis domum nomini meo, eo quod su
tir bellator, et sanguinem fuderis.—Tr.]
1569.74

; K

Hebrrrs, xi.

Gratian.
Ambrose.

802

The Three Theological Virtues: On Charity

Lord is speaking of one who on his own initiative wishes to use the
sword, and in particular, of one who so desires, against
the
of
prjnce_ Moreover, the words of
Isaias, especially in Chap, xi, are usually understood as referring to the
state of glory. Secondly, it is said that future peace was symbolized in
the coming of the Messiah, as is explained by Jerome on this point
[onlsazas, Chap, xi], Eusebius {Demonstrations, Bk. I, chap, i), and other
Fathers [of the Church]; or, at least, that Isaias is referring to the
spiritual warfare of the Apostles and of the preachers of the Gospel,
who have conquered the world not by a material but by a spiritual
sword. This is the interpretation found in Justin Martyr, in his Second
Apology for the Christians, and in other writers.
The Council of Nicaea, indeed, dealt especially with those ChrisThe answer to the tians who, for a second time, were assuming the unithird objection.
form of pagan soldiers which they had once cast off.
And Pope Leo, as the Gloss (on Decretum, Pt. II, causa xxxm, qu. iii
{De Paenitentza), dist. v, cans, iv and iii) explains, was speaking of those
Christians who, after a public penance had been imposed upon them,
were returning to war, before the penance had been completed.
Furthermore, it may have been expedient for the early Church to for­
bid those who had recently been converted to the faith, to engage in
military service immediately, in company with unbelievers, and under
pagan officers.
To the argument drawn from reason, Augustine replies {On the
The answer to the City oj God, Bk. XIX, last chapter [Chap, vii]) that he
fourth objection.
deems it advisable to avoid war in so far as is possible,
and to undertake it only in cases of extreme necessity, when no alter­
native remains ; but he also holds that war is not entirely evil, since
the fact that evils follow upon war is incidental, and since greater evils
would result if war were never allowed.
Wherefore, in reply to the confirmation of the argument inquestion
The answer to the one may deny that war is opposed to an honourable
confirmation.
peace; rather, it is opposed to an unjust peace, for it is
more truly a means of attaining peace that is real and secure. Similarly,
war is not opposed to the love of one’s enemies ; for whoever wages war
honourably hates, not individuals, but the actions which he justly
punishes. And the same reasoning is true of the forgiveness of injuries,
especially since this forgiveness is not enjoined under every circum­
stance, for punishment may sometimes be exacted, by legitimate means,
without injustice.
4. Secondly, I hold that defensive war not only is permitted, but
_ ___ .
sometimes is even commanded. The first part of this
sion, which is two- proposition follows from the first conclusion, which
fold·
even the Doctors cited above accept ; and it holds true
The answer to the
second objection.

Jerome.
Eusebius.

Justin
Martyr.

Gloss.

Augustine.

Disp. XIII: On War

803

not only for public officials, but also for private individuals, since all
laws allow the repelling of force with force (Decretals, bfCrelais.
Bk. y, tjt XXXIX, chap. iii). The reason supporting it
is that the right of self-defence is natural and necessary. Whence the
The proof of the
second part of our second proposition is easily proved.
second part.
For self-defence may sometimes be prescribed, at least
in accordance with the order of charity; a fact which I have elsewhere
pointed out, in Disputation IX [: De Ordine circa Personas Servando in
Praecepto Charitatis, &c., Chaps, xxv, xl, § 3].1 The same is true of the
defence of the state, especially if such defence is an official duty. See
the statement of Ambrose (On Duties, Bk. I, chap. vii). If any one
objects that in the Epistle to the Romans (Chap, xii [, v. 19]) these words
An objection
are ^ounc^: ‘Revenge not yourselves, my dearly be­
loved’, and that this saying is in harmony with the
passage {Matthew, Chap, v [, v. 39]) : ‘If one strike thee on the right
cheek, turn to him also the other’, we shall reply with respect to the
_
,
first ipassage,
that the, reference
is to vengeance,
so that
The solution.
®
rn
9.
\
another version reads [Romans, Chap, xn, v. 19J: Aot
avenging yourselves’, and that the Greek word, Ικδικοΰντ€ς, has both
significations ; but the meaning is clear from what follows: ‘For it is
written: Revenge is mine’, &c. The meaning of the second passage
cited is the same, if it is interpreted as a precept; although it may also
be understood, in accordance with Augustine’s explanation (Vol. IV in Augustine,
the book On Lying, Chap, xv and elsewhere), as referring to the prepara­
tion of the soul, at least when such a process is necessary ; for otherwise
[the passage in question is] merely a counsel [of perfection, and not
a commandment].2
5. My third conclusion is, that even when war is aggressive, it is
The third
not an evil in itself, but may be right and necessary,
conclusion.
This is clear from the passages of Scripture cited above,
which make no distinction [between aggressive and defensive wars].
Proof from
The same fact is evidenced by the custom of the
authority.
Church, one that has quite frequently been approved
by the Fathers and the Popes, according to an extensive collection of
all such instances, made by Roffensis3 (Contra Lutherum [Assertionis Rofimse.
Lutheranae Confutationem,] Art. 4 [Art. 34]). In this connexion, we
may refer also to Torquemada (on Decretum, Pt. II, causa xxm, qu. i, Torquemada.
nos. I and 2), as well as to many other passages, in Decretum, ibid.,
qu. viii, cans, vii et seq.
The reason supporting our third conclusion is that such a
The proof of the
first part.

1 [Not included in these Selections.—Tr.]
2 [St. Augustine here means that one must be prepared to be struck on the other cheek, if this s
a necessary part of persecution for the faith ; when it is not necessary, the words of St. Matthew, cited
above, express a counsel, not a precept.—Reviser.]
3 [John Fisher, Cardinal, and Bishop of Rochester, lately canonized.—Tk.]

804

Decretals.

The Three Theological Virtues: On Charity

war1 is often necessary to a state, in order to ward off acts of injustice
A proof from
and to hold enemies in check. Nor would it be posreasomng.
sible, without these wars, for states to be maintained
in peace. Hence, this kind of warfare is allowed by natural law; and even
by the law of the Gospel, wdiich derogates in no way from natural law,
and contains no new divine commands save those regarding faith and
the Sacraments. The statement of Luther that it is not lawful to
resist the punishment of God is indeed ridiculous; for God does not
will the evils [against which war is waged,] but merely permits
them; and therefore He does not forbid that they should be justly
repelled.
6. It remains for us to explain what constitutes an aggressive war,
What is a defensive anc^ w^at, on the other hand, constitutes a defensive
war; and what, an war; for sometimes that which is merely an act of
aggressive war?
defence may present the appearance of an aggressive
act. Thus, for example, if enemies seize the houses or the property of
others, but have themselves suffered invasion2 from the latter, that is 799
no aggression but defence. To this extent, civil laws {Code, VIII.
iv. I and Digest, XLIII. xvi. 1 and 3) are justified in conscience
also, when they provide that if any one tries to dispossess me of my
property, it is lawful for me to repel force with force. For such an act
is not aggression, but defence, and may be lawfully undertaken even on
one’s own authority. The laws in question are extended3 to apply to
him who, w’hile absent, has been ejected from a tenure which they call
a natural one, and who, upon his return, is prevented from recovering
that tenure. For [the same laws decree] that any one who has been
despoiled may, even on his own authority, have recourse to arms,
because such an act is not really aggression, but a defence of one’s legal
possession. This rule is laid down in Decretals, Bk. II, tit. xin,
chap. xii.
Consequently, we have to consider whether the injustice is, practically speaking, simply about to take place; or whether
it has already done so, and redress is sought through
war. In this second case, the war is aggressive. In the former case, war
has the character of self-defence, provided that it is waged with a
moderation of defence which is blameless.4 Now the injury is con­
sidered as beginning, when the unjust act itself, even physically re­
garded, is beginning; as when a man has not been entirely deprived of
his rightful possession; or even when he has been so deprived, but
immediately—that is, without noteworthy delay—attempts to defend
[i.e. an aggressive war.—Tr.]
[invadent should be replaced by invaserint. Cf. the edition of Paris, 1858.—Tr.]
[Read extenduntur in the Latin text, as in the 1858 edition above cited.—Reviser.]
[That is, when the act of self-defence is not excessive, and out of all proportion to the attack.—
Reviser.]
1
2
3
4

Disp. XIII: On War

805

himself and to reinstate himself in possession. The reason for this is as
follows : When any one is, to all intents and purposes, in the very act
of resisting, and attempts—in so far as is possible—to protect his right,
he is not considered as having, in an absolute sense, suffered wrong,
nor as having been deprived of his possession. This is the common
opinion of the Doctors as stated by Sylvester (word bellum, Pt. II), and Syiv^-r.
also by Bartolus and the jurists on the aforesaid Digest, XLIII. xvi. 3, ihrtUus
§ 9 [§§ I et seqJ\.
7. Our fourth proposition is this: in order that a war may be
The fourth
justly waged, a number of conditions must be ob­
conclusion.
served, which may be grouped under three heads.
On this conclusion,
see Bellarmine, De First, the war must be waged by a legitimate power;
Laids, Bk. Ill,
secondly, the cause itself and the reason must be just;
Chap, xv ; and
thirdly, the method of its conduct must be proper, and
Molina, De luslitia,
Disps. X et seq.
due proportion must be observed at its beginning, during its prosecution and after victory. All of this will be made clear in the
following sections. The underlying principle of this general conclusion,
indeed, is that, while a war is not in itself evil, nevertheless, on account
of the many misfortunes which it brings in its train, it is one of those
undertakings that are often carried on in evil fashion; and that
therefore, it requires many [justifying] circumstances to make it
righteous.
SECTION II
ΚΉΟ HAS THE LEGITIMATE POWER OF DECLARING WAR?

I. Our question relates to aggressive war; for the power of defend­
ing oneself against an unjust aggressor is conceded to all.
I hold first : that a sovereign prince who has no superior in ternThe first
poral affairs, or a state which has retained for itself
conclusion.
a like jurisdiction, has by natural law legitimate power
to declare war. This is the opinion held by St. Thomas (ΙΙ.-Π, qu. St. Th.
40, art. 1); and he is supported by all. Reference may be made to
Covarruvias (on Sext, rule peccatum, Pt. 11, § 9), who cites many laws, Covamm»
as well as certain theological divines.
A reason in support of this conclusion is, first, that this sort of
The first roof
war *s at t^mes Permitted by the natural law, as we
have demonstrated;1 hence, the power of declaring
such a war must rest with some one; and therefore it must rest, most
of all, with the possessor of sovereign power, for it is particularly his
function to protect the state, and to command the inferior princes
[within the realm].
1 [Vide second paragraph of Sub-section 5 of Section I, supra, p. 804.—Tb.j

806

Victoria.

The Three Theological Virtues: On Charity

A second reason is that the power of declaring war is (so to speak)
. a rpower. .of J
jurisdiction, . the
exercise...of which rpertains
The second proof.
. .
to punitive justice, which is especially necessary to a
state for the purpose of constraining wrongdoers; wherefore, just as the
sovereign prince may punish his own subjects when they offend others,
so may he avenge himself on another prince or state which by reason of
some offence becomes subject to him; and this vengeance cannot be
sought at the hands of another judge, because the prince of whom we are
speaking has no superior in temporal affairs; therefore, if that offender
is not prepared to give satisfaction, he may be compelled by war to do so.
In this first conclusion, I used the words, ‘or a state’, in order
that I might include every kind of polity; for the same reasoning holds
true of all polities. Only it must be noted of a monarchical regime
that, after a state has transferred its power to some one person, it
cannot declare war without that person’s consent, because it is no
longer supreme; unless the prince should chance to be so negligent in
avenging or defending the state as to cause public and very grave harm
to that state, for, in'such a case, the commonwealth as a whole could
take vengeance and deprive the sovereign of the authority in question.
For the state is always regarded as retaining this power within itself, 800
if the prince fails in his duty.
2. I hold, secondly, that an inferior prince, or an imperfect state,
The second
or whosoever in temporal affairs is under a superior,
conclusion.
cannot justly declare war without the authorization
of that superior. A reason for the conclusion is, first, that a prince
of this kind can claim his right from his superior, and therefore has not
the right to declare war; since, in this respect, he has the character of
a private person. For it is because of the reason stated that private
persons cannot declare war. A second reason in support of this same
conclusion is that such a declaration of war is opposed to the rights
of the sovereign prince, to whom that power has been specially en­
trusted; for without such power he could not govern peacefully and
suitably.
Victoria [De lure Belli, no. 9], indeed, sets certain limitations to
what has been here stated,1 and Cajetan and others seem to hold the
same opinion.
The first limitation to this second conclusion is as follows: proThe first limitation vided no contrary practice shall have been observed by
of this conclusion, very ancient custom. This provision may have force
rom Victoria.
when a war has been declared against those who are
not subjects of the king who governs the declarer of war. But if on
the other hand the war should be declared against another portion of
the same realm, the custom in question would certainly appear to be
1 [Haec verb limitai Victoria supra.—Tr.]

Disp, XIII: On War

807

contrary to the natural law; for when there exist a tribunal and an
authority superior to both parties, it is contrary to the law of nature
to strive for one’s own right by force, and acting (as it were) on one’s
own authority. Moreover, in the case of private persons, such an
attempt is without doubt contrary to natural law; and yet, in the case
which we have supposed, these two members of the same state, although
they may be of more importance [than single individuals], are never­
theless in the position of private persons.
To the same conclusion, Victoria [ibid.] sets a second limitation,
The second
namely: provided that the sovereign prince is not
limitation.
negligent in avenging a wrong. For, if he is negligent,
an inferior prince may avenge himself.
Nevertheless this course of action is not [entirely] commendable,
Such a course of especially when the conflict occurs between two por­
action is not en­
tions of one and the same state. For, although a private
tirely commendable.
’’ person, when he cannot obtain his rights at the hands
of a public tribunal, may secretly and without scandal protect himself,
nevertheless he may not do so by force and through war; and still less
may he avenge himself [after an injury has actually been inflicted], if
he is not able to obtain such vengeance through the judge. For apunishment inflicted by one’s own private authority is intrinsically evil, and
tumults and wars might easily be provoked within a state, on this pre­
text. But the right of punishment possessed by a portion of the state,
or that possessed by a mere private person, are equally imperfect, and
in the former case, there is greater likelihood of the harm in question;
therefore, licence [to exact private vengeance] must not be granted to
a portion of a state or to a private person, save only within the limits
of just defence.
3. But it must be added, first, that [provided the need for declarr
ing war arises,] it is sometimes sufficient to interpret
the wish of the sovereign in the cases above-mentioned,
if the matter is pressing, and recourse [to the sovereign] is not immedi­
ately possible; particularly if the war is to be undertaken against
foreigners, and above all if these foreigners are on other grounds overt
enemies of the sovereign.
Secondly, I must also note that if at any time enemies of this kind
are seized within the boundaries of some imperfect
state, not only is a just defensive war against them
then permissible, but so also are aggression, vengeance,and punishment;
for by reason of the wrong committed in the territory of that state they
have made themselves its subjects.
Finally, it should be added that more things are allowable to a
given state or commonwealth with regard to its own
Note 3‘
defence than to a given private individual; because

808

The Three Theological Virtues: On Charity

the good defended in the former case is common to many, and is of
a higher grade, and also because the power of a state is by its very
nature public and common; therefore, it is not strange that more
things are permissible to a state than to an individual.
4. But it may be asked, what is a perfect state ; or, who is a sove.
.
reign prince ? The reply is, first, that all kings are in
with respect to the this respect sovereign. Innocent 111 so states (Decrefirst and second
tais.
IV, tit. xvii, chap. xiii). Manv counts also
conclusions.
. .
·, .
.
r
TTZ
J
,
claim this sovereign power. Hence, certain of the
canonists are mistaken in saying that only absolute power is sovereign
in this fashion. Consequently, the issue depends on the mode of juris­
diction exercised by each particular prince, or state; and it is the mark
of supreme jurisdiction when, under such a prince or
The mark of
supreme
such a state, there exists a tribunal before which all
jurisdiction.
cases of litigation in that realm are decided, and from
which there is no appeal to any superior tribunal.
But when there is room for an appeal, that is the mark of an im­
perfect state, since an appeal is the act of an inferior towards a superior.
Hence it must be noted, first, that not all the states which are subject
to one and the same king are necessarily of the imperfect sort. For it
may happen that such a bond of union has been effected incidentally,
a fact indicated by a diversity in laws, taxes, and so forth. And this
distinction between a perfect and an imperfect state, although it is
of no great importance in relation to the power of which we now treat,
since the latter is already vested in the king, has, nevertheless, an impor­
tant relation to the power which such a state may possess in opposition
to its own king, if he lapses into tyranny. For if the state be a perfect
one, it has power against its own king, even when the latter rules also
over other kingdoms. But the case is otherwise if the state be an im­
perfect one, and a portion of one kingdom; for then nothing can be
done without the consent of the whole. All of the foregoing state­
ments, since they are founded upon natural law, are applicable to both
Christians and unbelievers.
5. In the case of Christian kings, however, a second point must 801
Christian kings are be noted, namely, that the supreme Pontiff, although
subject to the Pope.
no direct power in temporal affairs outside of
his own domain, nevertheless does possess such power indirectly, as is
Décrétais,indicated in certain passages of the Decretals (Bk. I, tit. vi, chap, xxxiv;
i.xiii. Bk. II, tit. I, chap. xiii). Therefore, under this title, he has a right to
require that a cause of war be referred to him, and the power to give
a judgment thereon, which the parties in question are bound to obey,
unless his decision be manifestly unjust. For such [authority on the part
See Defensio
Fidei, Bk. ΙΠ,
of the Pope] is certainly necessary for the spiritual welfare of the Church
Chap, xxii.1
1 [Not included in these Selections—Tr.]

Disp. XIII: On War

809

and for the avoidance of almost infinite evils. Accordingly, Soto said (on
Romans, Chap, xii [, v. 18]), that war between Christian princes is rarely
just, since they have at hand another ready means of settling their
mutual disputes.
But sometimes the Pope does not interpose his authority, lest
perchance greater evils result. In that event, to be sure, sovereign
princes are not bound to secure any authorization from the Pope, and
may urge their own right as long as they are not forbidden to do so.
Nevertheless, they should take care lest they themselves be a cause ot
the fact that the Pope dares not intervene; for in that case they will
not be free from blame.
6. Thirdly, I hold that a war which, according to the preceding
The third concluconclusion, is declared without legitimate authority,
sion; and the reason is contrary not only to charity, but also to justice, even
m support of it.
-pa ]egitimate cause for it exists. The reason support­
ing this conclusion is that such an act is performed without legitimate
jurisdiction, and is consequently an illegitimate act. Therefore, it
follows that a war of this kind gives rise to an obligation of making
restitution for all ensuing damages.
Therefore, it is indeed true that if anyone merely recovers his own
property in such a war, he will not be bound to restore
e rst coro ary.
prOperty. but jæ vv£[] Held Hable for all injuries
and losses inflicted upon others. The reason for such a distinction is
that in the latter case he has done an injustice, since there was no just
cause for all that damage; whereas, in recovering his own property, he
has not, strictly speaking, committed an injustice,—save possibly in the
means used, from which, in a strict sense, there arises no obligation to
make restitution.
Whence follows the conclusion noted by Sylvester (word bellum,
The second coroi- Pt· I, qu. io [qu. 11, no. 4]), that he who makes war
lary; from Sylvester, without the authorization in question, even if he has,
in other respects, a just ground for so doing, nevertheless incurs the
penalties imposed upon those who wage an unjust war; so that if, for
example, he be an incendiary, he will incur the excommunication pro­
mulgated against incendiaries.
7. But it may be asked whether a Christian king or prince subject
The solution of a only to the Pope sins against justice or merely against
doubt which arises. His duty of obedience, if he wages a just war, of the
kind in question, in defiance of the papal prohibition. For it is upon
this point that the judgment regarding the obligation of making·
restitution depends.
My reply is that so long as the Pope does not so issue his prohibition
as to remand the case for his own hearing, constituting himself as its
judge, the prince does not sin against justice in prosecuting his own
1569-74

ς L

8io

The Three Theological Virtues: On

rights, irrespective of whether or not the Pope has done wrong in not
[thus] forbidding the war. The reason is that in such a case, the prince
[, notwithstanding the want of papal approval,] nevertheless retains his
own jurisdiction and power. If the Pope, however, by his own authority
and power justly issues a prohibition against the war in question as
being opposed to the spiritual welfare of the Church and thereby, as
he may, deprives the prince of all right to make war; then, the prince
[who persists in waging the war] will sin against justice, and will be under
a binding obligation to make restitution. The reason for this assertion
is that under such circumstances he no longer has any title whereby he
may justly, through war, cause harm to another prince; and therefore,
when he causes such harm, he does so in opposition even to commu­
tative justice, and consequently justice demands that reparation for
those injuries shall be made. Neither is the situation affected by the
fact that, when the Pope deprives the aforesaid prince of the right to
make war, he acts only by means of his indirect power, provided that
he is acting on the genuine ground of the common good, as we assume
to be the case.

SECTION III
IS IT PERMISSIBLE EVEN FOR CLERICS TO DECLARE WAR
AND TO ENGAGE THEREIN?

I. Since it may be that sovereign power in temporal affairs resides
in ecclesiastical princes, it is necessary to discuss the
pounded.
question of whether the aforesaid right is common to
all of them; and at the same time we shall consider the inquiry of
St. Thomas (II.-II, qu. 40, art. 2) as to whether it is permissible for
clerics and bishops to engage in battle, a question which concerns
offensive, not defensive war. For just as the latter sort of war is allowed
by the law of nature, even so it is not forbidden by positive law, whether
one is defending his life, or his property, or the life and property of
another—especially if that other be his father,1 or if the matter relate
to the common good. The above-mentioned question, however, 802
relates only to positive law, both divine and human. For the acts of
waging and declaring war are not in themselves forbidden to any one
by the natural law, unless perhaps to those persons who are unable to
render military service, as, normally, women are said to be. But even
in the case of women, there is no absolute prohibition, and without
doubt they may declare war, if they are sovereign princes. Hence wre
shall speak only of positive law, which alone is applicable to ecclesiastical
persons.
The question is ex-

St. Thomas.

1 [patris, an erratum for patriae (native land)?—Tr.]

Disp. XIII: On War

8n

2. I hold, in the first place, that episcopal Prelates of the Church,
# there are any such who are sovereign in temporal
unquestioned, and
affairs, may licitly, and even without fear of irregucommoniy held.
larity, declare war, assuming the presence of the other
required conditions. This conclusion is unquestioned and commonly held.
The reason [supporting it] is that such a right is inherent in the
The reason support- complete and perfect sovereign power which resides
mg this conclusion. £n princes of this character. Moreover, the fact that
such a course of action is not forbidden to them is evident from many
decrees (Decretum, Pt. II, causa xxm, qu. viii). Again, these princes
themselves do not directly incite men to homicide or mutilation, but
rather to an act of fortitude.
The conclusion is confirmed by the fact that the princes in ques­
tion are, for a like reason, allowed to set up judges who
A confirmation :
concerning which
may rightfully give judgment in criminal cases.
see the work De
Furthermore, Sylvester adds (word bellum, Pt. Ill,
Censuris,1 Disp.
XLVII, sect. I, from no. 2) that this right may pertain to bishops by virtue of
no. 5.
their spiritual power, though indirectly, for the reason
that it is essential to spiritual welfare. This statement may easily be
credited in the case of the supreme Pontiff; but in the case of other
[ecclesiastical] princes, not sovereign in temporal affairs, it can exist
only on the ground of self-defence; for with respect to offensive war,
the latter are not supreme in spiritual matters, and may easily have
recourse to their supreme head.
3. I hold, secondly, that although by divine law clerics are not
The second conclu­ necessarily forbidden to engage in war, nevertheless,
sion: twofold in
by ecclesiastical law, they are forbidden to do so.
form.
The first member of the conclusion is proved by
the fact that there exists no divine precept to this
effect, whether in Scripture or in tradition ; neither is
The exposition of
the first member of the prohibition absolutely inherent in the priestly
the conclusion.
office; nor is [clerical participation in warfare] intrinsi­
cally repugnant to right reason. This argument is confirmed by the
c
analogous
consideration
that
a cleric
is not
forbidden
by, . i
A confirmation.
,
,.
,
,
. ,
.
.
, .
. ,
the divine law to be judge in a case involving bloodshed.
The second part of the same conclusion is incontrovertible; and it
The second member *s derived from Decretum, Pt. I, dist. l, can. v, wherein
is supported by the Pope Nicholas forbids [clerics to engage in war], under
penalty of suspension. Many canons relating to this
matter are contained in Decretum, Pt. II, causa xxni, qu. iv. Argu­
ments from reason and congruity in support of this prohibition are
obvious. In connexion with this, St. Thomas mav be consulted (II.-II, =t- r-iocus.
qu. 40, art. 2).
The first conclusion:

* [This work of Suarez is not included in these Selections.—Ta.J

8l2

The Three Theological Virtues: On Charity

4. It follows from the first part of this conclusion that the supreme
Pontiff can grant a dispensation from the precept in
conclusion.
question because it is a human one. Gratian held the
contrary opinion (Decretum, Pt. II, causa xxm, qu. viii, at the beginThe opinion of
ning), but without any grounds therefor.
Gratian is rejected.
The inference in question is also clearly to be drawn
from many chapters of the [canon] law; and the granting of dispensation
is usually held to be justified by a case of grave necessity, if the common
good of the Church is at stake, for in such cases clerics may even be
obliged by natural law to engage in war of the kind under discussion.
It is, indeed, true that this kind of war is then more allied to defence
than to aggression; for in an aggressive war there is not normally so
great a necessity. See Cajetan (on II.-II, qu. 40, art. 2) and Covarruvias
(On the Constitutions of Clement, c. si furiosus, Pt. II, § 3, no. 2).
5. Thirdly, I hold that the precept in question is binding under
The third
pain of mortal sin, on those who have been ordained
conclusion.
to holy orders. First, because the matter is most
serious, and because it is forbidden under the gravest penalties and
censures [that clerics should engage in war]. That this precept is in­
deed binding upon all those who are ordained to holy orders, even
upon subdeacons, is the common opinion of St. Thomas (II.-II, qu. 40,
art. 2), Cajetan (ibid.), Sylvester (word bellum, Pt. Ill, qu. 2 [qu. 3]),
Antoninus (\Summa Theologica,] Pt. Ill, tit. xxvm, chap, ii, § 6),
Covarruvias (loc. cit.), and others also (on Decretals, Bk. V, tit. xn, chap,
xxiv). The reason for this opinion is readily apparent, namely: that such
persons are already at the threshold of the sacred ministry and are
bound to its [duties].
As to others, however, constituted in minor orders, since they
participate but imperfectly in the clerical state, it is probable either
that they are in no way bound, especially if they have already entirely
renounced that state ; or else, at most, that they are bound under pain
of venial sin. This is the opinion of Soto (De lustitia, Bk. V, qu. i,
art. 4) and Covarruvias (On the Constitutions of Clement, c. si furiosus,
Pt. II, § 3, no. 2), except with reference to those
Sanchez, De Sancto
who chance to hold an ecclesiastical benefice; for
Matrimonii Saaa~
mento, Bk. VII, Disp. in the latter event, such individuals are already ex
XLV, discusses at
officio ministers of the Church, and under an obliga­
some length this
obligation to aspire tion—as so many persons believe—to aspire to higher
to higher orders.
orders, or, at least, not to create any impediment to
those orders while they will to remain in their office. Therefore, these
individuals are bound under a grave penalty.
However, it must be noted that this sin on the part of clerics is
Note
not precisely a sin against justice, but rather one
against religion or obedience; and hence, if the other
A consequent of this

Cajetan.
vovarruvias.

St. Thomas.
Cajetan.
Sylvester.
Antoninus.
Covarruvias.

Soto.

Covarruvias.

Disp. XIII: On War

813

conditions of a just war are fulfilled, such clerics are in no wise bound
to make any restitution, [in case they have committed the sin in
question]. Sylvester (on word bellum, Pt. Ill, qu. 4), indeed, holds a
contrary opinion, saying: ‘Just as a prince could not authorize a cleric
to wage war, so he could not authorize him to engage in plunder.’1
Refutation of
But this argument is not conclusive. For [the prince],
Sylvester’s view.
although he may not have been able to grant [to
clerics] the authority to engage in war legitimately, can nevertheless give
803 [them] the power to engage therein without violating justice; provided
the Pope does not, in the manner explained at the end of the preceding
section, deprive him of the right to do so; and this authorization on the
part of the prince is enough to free [the said clerics] fromtheobligation
of making restitution; just as the same principle is clear in the case of
a cleric who, as a minister of justice, puts some one to death, since he
does not thereby sin against justice,andisnotbound to makerestitution.
6. But what of irregularity? This question is answered as follows:
Whether clerics en­ if a war is unjust, and if, in the course of the same,
gaged in war incur any person is slain or mutilated, then all the soldiers
an irregularity.
incur irregularity, whether they be priests or not, and
whether
they kill directly or through the help of
Vide De Censuris,
Disp. XLVII, sect. others. This is the opinion of Sylvester, as stated in
vi, by the author.2
a passage (on word bellum, Pt. Ill, qu. 3), wherein he
cites certain laws which, to be sure, are not sufficiently convincing to
me. Nevertheless, since the matter is doubtful, his position is the safer
one; for this reason, that all those fighting in such a manner are held to
be co-operating in the homicide, because practically all are guilty of
unjust co-operation, proximate or remote.
If, on the other hand, the war be a just one, we must make a
further distinction. For if the cleric sins by becoming a combatant,
and kills another person by his own hand, he contracts an irregularity;
for clearly, he is a voluntary homicide; but if he himself does not kill,
although others do so, then he incurs no irregularity, a fact which may
V.
be gathered from the Decretals (Bk. V, tit. xn, chap, xxiv ; ibid., tit. xxv, Decretals,
chap, iii ; ibid., chap. iv). The basis of the foregoing distinction is the ]III. xxrr.
fact that the war is in itself just, and the harm done follows incidentally, 1
so that, under the circumstances, this harm is not to be morally imputed
to any one and therefore may be imputed only to that person who was
the physical cause of the same. If a cleric, however, while legitimately a
combatant, kills or mutilates some one by his own hand, but does so in
absolutely necessary defence ofhis life, he does not contract an irregularity.
1 [Although this passage is printed in the Latin text as a quotation, it is in fact a paraphrase of Svivester. Suarez has: quia Princeps sicut non potuit dare clerico auihoritatem bellandi, ita nec praedandi,
while Sylvester reads thus : quia sicut bellandi ita rapiendi non potuit ei suus dominus auctoritatem dart.—

Tr.]
2 [Not included in these Selections.—Tr.]

814

The Three Theological Virtues: On Charity

Apart from this case, indeed, Cajetan holds (on II.-II, qu. 40,
art. 2) that irregularity is always incurred [by clerics in the situation
Navamis.
described], Navarrus ([Consilia seu Responsa,} Chap, xxvii, no. 213), is
of the same opinion. The reason for their view is that self-defence is
the only exception mentioned in the law {Constitutions of Clement, Bk.
V, tit. iv, only chapter). Moreover, their view is confirmed by the
fact that in Decretals, Bk. V, tit. xn, chap, xxiv, and in connexion with
a certain just war in defence of [the subjects’] own town, the reply of
the Pope was to the effect that it was advisable for clerics engaging in
that war to refrain from the ministry of the altar. So it is that St.
St. Thomas.
Thomas (II.-II, qu. 64, art. 7, ad 3) simply cites this text, [in his dis­
cussion of the question]. It is true that the reason for the Pope’s
reply might possibly have been that those clerics had exceeded the
limits of self-defence. And therefore, there are some who hold, not
without reason, that he who fights legitimately does not incur irregu­
larity, even if he be a cleric and commit homicide. Others limit this
exemption from irregularity to cases [of homicide] in defence of the
common good, a motive which is not merely equal to, but higher than
defence of one’s own life, and which might, upon occasion, make it
obligatory [for clerics] to engage in war. In such a situation, then, it
seems to me practically certain that there is no irregularity, an opinion
Sylvester.
which is confirmed by that of Sylvester (on word bellum, Pt. Ill, qu. 2).
For, in the first place, it is not reasonable that evil consequences should
result from an action to which one is absolutely bound in charity.
Vide De Cen- Furthermore, Cajetan, for this same reason, has said (on II.-II, qu. 33,
XVLI sectPùî1 art· 7)
w^° brings an accusation in a criminal case, if he is bound
to do so, does not incur irregularity. If, however, the war be legitimate,
but not a matter of obligation, then the question is very doubtful;
because in that case there is not the pressure of unavoidable necessity.
Consequently, under such circumstances, it is safer [for clerics who pro­
pose to engage in the contest] to obtain a dispensation. We must note,
however, that if, at any time, a cleric is permitted, by a papal dispensa­
tion, to engage personally in warfare, he contracts no irregularity in the
course of that warfare; for a dispensation with respect to the principal
act is held to cover any consequence that accompanies that act.
7. On the other hand, one may argue thus: the foregoing dis,
.
cussion
would. imply
that it is. not fitting
for ·,clerics
to
A twofold objection.
,
r
... 0
1
1
take any part in war, or to exhort soldiers to do battle;
and that clerics who do so, incur irregularity. Moreover, the same
The answer to the would seem to hold true of clerics who advise other
said objections
persons to go to war. One may reply that the latter
treated in De Cen­
suris, Disp. XLVII, part of the objection presents no difficulty, because
sect, vi, no. 8.‘
such advice is not in itself evil, nor is it forbidden.
Cajetan.

1 [Not included in these Selections.—Tr.]

Disp. XIII: On War

815

On the contrary, it is the custom of the Church [to give counsel of this
sort], as is evident from a passage in the Decretum^t. II, causa xxm, qu.
ii [, can. iii]) ; for [in so doing, the Church] exhorts men not to homicide,
but to an act of fortitude and justice, even as one rightfully admonishes
a judge to make a just decision. However, Sylvester (earlier, on word Sylvester
bellum, Pt. Ill, qu. 2) holds otherwise, asserting that [such a course of
action on the part of clerics] is permissible only in a defensive war, and
that even in a war of this kind irregularity is incurred, if a cleric urges
on the soldiers during the actual progress of the combat. With this
view, Hostiensis agrees (on Decretals, Bk. V, tit. xxxvn, chap. v).
11 ..tH!
As to the first part of the objection, it should be observed that the
exhortations mentioned are not evil in themselves; nor are they for­
bidden by law; for custom indicates that the contrary is true. It is
more fitting, however, that [clerics] should not deliver these exhorta­
tions without the permission of the bishop or superior, a fact which is
brought out in the Decretum (Pt. II, causa xxm, qu. viii, cans, xxvii and
xxvi). Similarly, I believe it more correct to hold that no irregularity
is incurred in such cases, unless the cleric intentionally and directly
incites to homicide. But if he merely exhorts the combatants to act
bravely, irregularity is not incurred; for the law does not expressly
state that it is incurred, nor does the cleric morally co-operate in
homicide, and, in short, the same reasoning holds good [with regard to
exhortation] as that which we applied to the matter of advising. This
is the view of Navarrus (\Consilia seu Responsa or Enchiridion^ Chap. 5ava.-ru-.
xxvii, no. 216) and Covarruvias, as already cited [on the Constitutions Cr.vanu% -of Clement, c. si furiosus, Pt. II, § 3, no. 2].
Finally, it may be asked, Who has the power to grant dispensations
„
,
in the case of such an irregularity? On this question
tions vide De Cen- see Sylvester, as cited above, and Cajetan (word trregu- '
suris, Disp. IV, sect, laritas). I reply briefly that only the supreme Pontiff ' "
can grant a dispensation, unless the matter is occult,
in which case, the power is expressly granted by the Council of Trent
to the bishops (Session XXIV, chap, [canon] vi, De Reformatione).
Such a situation, however, rarely occurs in connexion with questions
of war, and it is with these matters that we are dealing.

SECTION IV
WHAT IS A JUST CAUSE OF WAR, ON THE BASIS OF NATURAL REASON:

There was an old error current among the Gentiles, who thought
that the rights of nations were based on military
hy strength, and that it was permissible to make war
Molina, De lustitia, solely to acquire prestige and wealth; a belief xvhich,
This question and

1 [Not inchided in these Selections—Tr.}

The Three Theological Virtues: On Charity

8l6
Treatise

ii,

disps.

CÜ, civ, cv, cvi.

I. Therefore I hold, first: that there can be no just war without
. .
an underlying cause of a legitimate and necessary
nature, lhe truth of this conclusion is indubitable
and clearly evident. Now, that just and sufficient reason for war is
the infliction of a grave injustice which cannot be avenged or repaired
in any other way. This, the consensus of opinion of all the theologians,
is also to be deduced from the Decretum (Pt. II, tit. xxm, chap, ii)
and from a mass of evidence collected by Covarruvias on the Con­
stitutions of Clement, c. si furiosus, Pt. II, § 3, no. 2].
The first reason in support of such a conclusion is the fact that
_
war is permissible [only] that a state may guard itself
from molestation; tor in other respects, war is opposed
to the welfare of the human race on account of the slaughter, material
losses, and other misfortunes which it involves ; and therefore, if the
cause in question should cease to exist, the justice of war would also
cease to exist.
Secondly, in war, men are despoiled of their property, their
_.
.
, liberty, and their fives; and to do such things without
just cause is absolutely iniquitous, for if this were
permissible, men could kill one another without cause.
Thirdly, the sort of war which we are chiefly discussing is aggresr—, sive war, and if is frequently waged against non-subjects. Consequently, it is necessary that the latter shall
have committed some wrong on account of which they render them­
selves subjects. Otherwise, on what ground could they be deserving of
punishment or subject to an alien jurisdiction?
Furthermore, if the grounds or purposes which the Gentiles had
in view (for example, ambition, avarice, and even vainglory or a display
of ferocity) were legitimate and sufficient, any state whatsoever could
aspire to these ends; and hence, a war would be just on both sides,
essentially and apart from any element of ignorance. This supposition
is entirely absurd ; for two mutually conflicting rights cannot both be
just.
2. But in order that this matter may be explained more clearly,
there are several points which should be noted.
First, it is not every cause that is sufficient to justify war, but only
Note j
those causes which are serious and commensurate with
the losses that the war would occasion. For it would
be contrary to reason to inflict very grave harm because of a slight
injustice. In like manner, a judge can punish, not all offences whatso­
ever, but only those which are opposed to the common peace and to
the welfare of the realm. In this connexion, however, we must remem-

_

Decretum.

even from the standpoint of natural reason, is most
absurd.

Disp. XIII: On War

817

ber that not infrequently a wrong which appears to be slight is in fact
serious, if all the circumstances are weighed, or if other and similar
wrongs are permitted [as a consequence], since thereby great harm may
gradually ensue. Thus, for example, to seize even the smallest town,
or to make raids, &c., may sometimes constitute a grave injustice, espe­
cially when the prince who has done the wrong treats with scorn the
protest that is made.
3. Secondly, it must be noted that there are various kinds of
Note 2
injuries which are causes of a just war. These may be
grouped under three heads. One of the heads would
be the seizure by a prince of another’s property, and his refusal to
restore it. Another head would be his denial, without reasonable cause,
of the common rights of nations, such as the right of transit over high­
ways, trading in common, &c. The third would be any grave injury
to one’s reputation or honour. It should be added that it is a sufficient
cause for war if an injury of this kind be inflicted either upon a prince
himself or upon his subjects; for the prince is guardian of his state and
also of his subjects. Furthermore, the cause is sufficient if the wrong
be inflicted upon any one who has placed himself under the protection
of a prince, or even if it be inflicted upon allies or friends, as may be
seen in the case of Abraham (Genesis, Chap, xiv), and in that of David
(1 Kings, Chap, xxviii). ‘For a friend is a second self*, says Aristotle
(Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. IX, chaps, iv andix). But it must be under- Ar“
stood that such a circumstance justifies war only on condition that
the friend himself would be justified in waging the war, and consents
thereto, either expressly or by implication. The reason for this limita­
tion is that a wrong done to another does not give me the right to
avenge him, unless he would be justified in avenging himself and
805actually proposes to do so. Assuming, however, that these conditionexist, my aid to him is an act of co-operation in a good and just deed ;
but if [the injured party] does not entertain such a wish, no one else
may intervene, since he who committed the wrong has made himself
subject not to every one indiscriminately, but only to the person who
has been wronged. Wherefore, the assertion made by some writers,
that sovereign kings have the power of avenging injuries done in any
part of the -world, is entirely false, and throws into confusion all the
orderly distinctions of jurisdiction; for such power was not [expressly]
granted by God and its existence is not to be inferred by any process
of reasoning.
4. Thirdly, we must note that, in regard to an injury inflicted,
two arguments may be alleged, [to justify- a declara0 3’
tion of war]. The first is [that such a declaration is
justifiable], in order that reparation for the losses suffered should
be made to the injured party. For this cause, indeed, it is not to be
1569-74

5

μ

818

Genesis, xiv.

Numbers, xxv.
2 Kings, x and

The Three Theological Virtues: On Charity

questioned that war may legitimately be declared; for if this declaration
is to be permitted because of an injury [already done], then it is in the
highest degree permissible when the object is that each one may secure
himself against loss. Many examples illustrating this point are to be
found in the Scriptures (Genesis, Chap, xiv, and similar passages). The
other argument is [that war should be declared] in order that the
offender may be duly punished; a contention which presents its own
difficulty.
5. Secondly, then, I hold that a war may also be justified on the
The second [and]
ground that he who has inflicted an injury should be
commonly accepted justly punished, if he refuses to give just satisfaction
for that injury, without resort to war. This conclu­
sion is commonly accepted. In connexion with it, and with the preced­
ing conclusion, we must assume that the opposing party is not ready
to make restitution, or to give satisfaction ; for if he were so disposed,
the warlike aggression would become unjust, as we shall demonstrate
in the following sections.
The conclusion is proved, first, by certain Scriptural passages
Its exposition and
Chap, xxv; 2 Kings, Chaps, x and xi),
proof. First: from according to which, unconditional punishment for
Scripture.
offences was carried into execution, by the command
of God.
The reason in support of this same conclusion is that, just as
The second proof,
within a state some lawful power to punish crimes is
by reasoning.
necessary to the preservation of domestic peace; so in
the world as a whole, there must exist, in order that the various states
may dwell in concord, some power for the punishment of injuries
inflicted by one state upon another; and this power is not to be found
in any superior, for we assume that these states have no commonly
acknowledged superior; therefore, the power in question must reside
in the sovereign prince of the injured state, to whom, by reason of that
injury, the opposing prince is made subject; and consequently, war
of the kind in question has been instituted in place of a tribunal
administering just punishment.
6. But, on the other hand, one may object, first : that to fight in
this manner seems opposed to the admonitions in the
The first objection,
Epistle to the Romans (Chap, xii [, v. 17]): ‘To no
drawn from
Romens, xii. Its
man rendering evil for evil’, and [ibid., n. 19]: ‘Not
solution.
avenging yourselves.’ The reply to the objection is that
the passages quoted refer to acts performed by private authority and
with the intention of doing evil for its ovyn sake, to another. But if the
acts in question be done under legitimate and public authority, with
the intention of holding an enemy to his duty and of reducing to its due
order that which was disorderly, then they are not only not prohibited

Disp. XIII: On War

819

but even necessary. Hence, in that same Epistle (Romans, Chap, xiii
[, v. 4])> we find this additional passage: ‘For he beareth not the sword
in vain. For he is God’s minister: to work vengeance upon evildoers.'1
Secondly, it is objected that [if our second general conclusion
The second
be true,] then, as a consequence, the same party in
objection.
one and
same case is both plaintiff and judge,
a situation which is contrary to the natural law. The truth of the
conclusion is evident, since the prince who has been wronged, assumes
the role of judge by his act of aggression.
The objection is confirmed, in the first place, by the fact that the
The first confirma- r^ht to avenge themselves is denied to private indivition of this
duals, for this reason, namely, that they would pracobjection.
tically exceed the bounds of justice; and yet the same
danger exists in the case of a prince who avenges himself.
A second confirmation of the same objection is that, by a like
reasoning, any private person who might be unable to
The second con­
tinuation of the
secure such punishment through a judge could take
second objection.
the law into his own hands, executing it on his own
authority; since this privilege is granted to princes, on the sole ground
that there is no other way of securing a just vengeance.
7. Our reply is, that it cannot be denied that in this matter [of
The soluti n.
public vengeance], one and the same person assumes,
in a sense, the role of plaintiff and that of judge; even
as we perceive that God, to Whom there is some analogy in the public
authority, assumes this double role. But the cause [of such an assump­
tion on the part of public authority] is simply that this act of punitive
justice has been indispensable to mankind, and that no more fitting
method for its performance could, in the order of nature and humanly
speaking, be found. This is especially true, since we must presuppose,
prior to the war, the contumacy of the offending party in not wishing
to give satisfaction; for then (contumacy being established) if he finds
himself in subjection to the offended party, he may impute his own
misfortune to himself.
Neither is this case analogous to that of a private individual. For
The reply to the
in the first place, such an individual is guided by his
first confirmation.
OWn [unaided] judgment, and therefore he will easily
exceed the limits of vengeance ; whereas public authority is guided by
public counsel, to which heed must be paid, and consequently authority
of this sort may more easily avoid the disadvantages arising from
personal inclination. In the second place, this power of punishment
has for its essential purpose not private but public good, and hence it
has been committed not to the private individual, but to the public
1 [Suarez’s quotation for the latter part of this passage reading: ad vindiciam mali jactorum, varies
somewhat from the version found in the Vulgate which reads: vindex in tram à qui malum agit.—Ttj

Ramans, xiii.

820

Covarruvias.

Victori i.

Soto.

The Three Theological Virtues: On Charity

body. Therefore, if the latter is unable or unwilling to punish [an
injury], the private individual shall patiently endure his loss. From
the foregoing remarks, then, our reply to the first confirmation of the
objection is evident.
As to the second confirmation, it has been said by some persons
The
1 of certain
t^ie situatæn referred to, a private individual
authorities to the is allowed to avenge himself secretly; and in the Code
second confirmation there is a title, Ouando liceat sine iudice Γ.. .1 se vindicare [. . .] (when it is permitted to avenge oneself
without recourse to a judge = Code, III. xxvii). But this must be
understood as referring to restitution for losses suffered; for in so far as 806
it refers to the punishment of an offence, it is an inadmissible error. An
act of punitive justice, indeed, is an exercise of that jurisdiction which
private individuals do not possess, and cannot obtain through an offence
committed by another. For if they could possess it, there would be no
need to employ the public power of jurisdiction; or at least, since this
power of jurisdiction is derived from men themselves, each one would
have had the power to refrain from transferring it to the state official,
retaining it, on the contrary, for himself; a conclusion which would
be opposed to the natural law, and to the good governance of the
human race.
Therefore, we deny the consequent involved in the second conA dear reply
firmation. For laws regard those things which are
true in an absolute sense, and private individuals,
absolutely speaking, may obtain a ready revenge for offences because
there is a public authority, while the fact that sometimes they are not
able to do so, is an accidental occurrence which, for that reason, must
necessarily be endured, as we have said. But the relationship between
two sovereign powers is based on an absolute necessity. It is in the
light of this necessity that certain civil glosses cited by Covarruvias
(on Sext, rule Peccatum, Bk. I, pt. ii, § 9), should be interpreted. On
this point, Victoria fie Potestate Civili, no. 6 fie lure Belli, no. 56])
and Soto fie lustitia, Bk. IV, qu. iv, art. 1) may also be consulted.
8. Thirdly, I hold that whoever begins a war without just cause,
The truth of a
sins not onty against charity, but also against justice;
third condusion is and hence he is bound to make reparation for all the
harm that results. The truth of this conclusion is
manifest.
The only question which arises in connexion with this point is
A doubt which
whether or not there may sometimes exist a cause for
ariseswar which absolves one from the charge of injustice,
but not from the charge of sinning against charity. The reply must be
that such a situation rarely occurs; and yet it is by no means incon­
ceivable. For just as it happens among private individuals that one

Disp. XIII: On War

821

person may take what is due to him from another, an act which is not
opposed to justice, but which is opposed to charity at times (namely,
when the debtor incurs very serious losses in consequence, while the
property in question is not in great degree necessary to the creditor);
even so, a similar situation might arise between princes or states. In
this connexion, however, it should be noted that in a war of the kind
described, it is possible to consider, first, the loss to the state against
which the war is waged; secondly, the loss to the state which com­
mences the war; thirdlyandfinally,thepossiblelosstotheentireChurch.
With respect to this third contingency, we may easily find support
A discussion of the for our assertion. For although a Christian king may
tolie^hurch1 harm ^ec^are war on some particular just ground, it will
nevertheless be possible for him to sin against the
would result from
war.
charity due to the Church, in pursuing his rights. For
example, he may foresee the consequent growth in power of the enemies
of the faith, and so forth; so that, in that case, it may be a sin to wage
war, and yet there arises no obligation to make restitution, since the
particular just ground that he has extinguishes such an obligation.
When the harm is of the kind first mentioned, [a harm, that is, to
the state against which war is waged,] then there is no
Discussion of the
great obligation to make restitution, since the mali­
cases in which
harm to the enemy
cious intent of the state inflicting the original injury
would result.
was the cause of the loss in question. Nevertheless, if
in a particular case the latter state should be unable to give satisfaction
or make restitution without suffering great injury, and if such satis­
faction should not be necessary to the prince of the other state, then
the latter, by insisting that satisfaction be given, would clearly be
acting against charity.
Finally, turning to the second case mentioned, if one prince begins
A discussion of the a war upon another, even with just cause, while ex­
casesm which harm pOSing his own realm to disproportionate loss and
would result tothe r ., ® ,
,
.„ t
·___·_
_r .
,
peril, then he will be sinning not only against charity,
party that com­
mences hostilities.
but also against the justice due to his own state. The
reason for this assertion is as follows: a prince is bound in justice to
have greater regard for the common good of his state than for his own
good; otherwise, he will become a tyrant. So a judge who condemns
to hanging a criminal deserving of execution but very necessary to the
state, would act in a manner opposed to his official obligations, and,
consequently, to justice. Similarly, a physician would sin against the
justice required by his profession if he should give medicine which would
heal a present disease but would cause more serious diseases to ensue.
9. However, with respect to this last point, we must take into
consideration the fact that a single king who rules over
A modification of
the last statement.
several kingdoms, can often make war for the sake of

822

The Three Theological Virtues: On Charity

one of these to the detriment of another. For though the various king­
doms may be distinct from one another, nevertheless, inasmuch as they
are subject to one head, they can and should be of mutual aid, since the
defence of one contributes to the benefit of another and in this way,
the principle of equality is preserved. For in its own emergency, one
kingdom might require the aid of another. In addition to all these
considerations, the mere fact that their [common] prince is rendered
more powerful, is in itself extremely advantageous to each of the king­
doms involved. In short, greater peace, and other advantages, may
perhaps accrue to a state so supported ; and many other [similar] points
can easily be perceived upon reflection. There are, then, numerous
considerations which may oblige a prince to abandon his right to make
war lest his realm suffer loss.
io. Furthermore, we should call attention to the conclusion,
The conclusion of drawn from these primary considerations by Cajetan
Cajetan.
(on Π.-ΙΙ, qU> ç>6, art. q [qU. qO, art. i]), namely,
that for a war to be just, the sovereign ought to be so sure of the degree
of his power, that he is morally certain of victory. The first reason for
this conclusion is the fact that otherwise the prince would incur the 807
evident peril of inflicting upon his state losses greater than the advan­
tages involved. In the same way, says Cajetan, a judge would do
wrong in attempting the arrest of a criminal without a force that, to
his certain knowledge, could not be overpowered. Secondly, w’hoever
begins a war assumes an active role; and the one who assumes such a
role must always be the stronger, in order to vanquish the one who
plays a passive part.
But this condition [of certitude] does not appear to me to be
How much truth is absolutely essential.
First, because, from a human
there in this con- standpoint, it is almost impossible of realization,
elusion?
Secondly, because it is often to the common interest
of the state not to await such a degree of certitude, but rather to test
its ability to conquer the enemy, even when that ability is somewhat
doubtful. Thirdly, because if the conclusion were true, a weaker sove­
reign could never declare war upon a stronger, since he is unable to
attain the certitude which Cajetan demands.
Therefore, the following rules should be laid down. A prince
[w’ho declares war] is, indeed, bound to attain the maximum certitude
possible regarding victory. Furthermore, he ought to balance the
expectation of victory against the risk of loss, and ascertain whether,
all things being carefully considered, expectation is preponderant. If
so great a degree of certitude is impossible of attainment, he ought at
least to have either a more probable expectation of victory, or one
equally balanced as to the chances of victory or defeat, and that, in
proportion to the need of the state and the communal welfare. But if

Disp. XIII: On War

823

the expectation of victory is less apt to be realized than the chance
of defeat, and if the war is offensive in character, then in almost every
case that war should be avoided. If [, on the other hand,] rhe war is
defensive, it should be attempted; for in that case it is a matter of
necessity, whereas the offensive war is a matter of choice. All of these
conclusions are sufficiently clear in the light of the principles of
conscience and justice.

SECTION V
CAN CHRISTIAN PRINCES HAVE ANY JUST GROUND FOR WAR
BEYOND THAT WHICH NATURAL REASON DICTATES .’

I. The first opinion [which we shall discuss in this connexion]
is affirmative, and is defended by Hostiensis, Panormiaffirmative.
tanus, and other canonists (on Decretals, Bk. Ill, tit.
xxxiv, chap, viii), as well as by Alvaro Paez (De Planctu Ecclesiae,
Bk. I, chap, xxxvii [chap, xiii and Bk. II, chap, xlvi]), Gabriel (on the
Sentences, Bk. IV, dist. xv, qu. 4) and other authorities to whom
Covarruvias refers (on Sext, rule Peccatum, Pt. II, § 10).
But these authors do not all express themselves in the same manner,
for they mention varying grounds for the opinion in question.
The first ground is that of simple unbelief [on the part of the
enemy], that is, a refusal to accept the true religion.
The first ground
which may be ad­
But this is a false ground, a point with which we deal
vanced is rejected
in the treatise De Fide.1
by the author, in
the treatise De
The second ground is that God may be avenged for
Ftde(Disp. xviii).1
injuries which are done to Him by sins against nature,
by idolatry. Alfonso de Castro (De lusta
The second ground and
is also rejected.
Haereticorum Punitione, Bk. II, chap, xiv) supports
this latter contention. But this opinion is also false, and it is $0 first
of all, even if we speak of ‘vengeance’, in the strict sense. For God
did not give to all men the power to avenge the injuries they do to
Him, since He can easily avenge Himself, if He so wills. Moreover, it
would not have been well for the human race had men received this
power from God, for the greatest disorder would have resulted there­
from. The same argument holds true with respect to the plea of
defending [the majesty of God]; since the sins against Him would thus
be multiplied rather than prevented. On this same ground, moreover.
Christian princes could declare war even upon one another, for many
of these princes also are offenders against God. Likewise, since such a
ground of aggression could never be sufficiently established, those who
were so attacked could justly defend themselves, and the war would
thus become just for both sides.
The first opinion:

1 [Supra, p. 754.—Tb.]

HortiensM.
Panormi Un u».

Gab rid.

Covamiviw.

824

The Three Theological Virtues: On Charity

2. The objection may be made that the people of Israel were
permitted to make war against idolaters on this very
upon Leviticus,
ground, aS is clear from the Old Testament (Leviticus,
XV111·
Chap, xviii [, w. 24-8]).
I reply that various grounds are assigned for [the justification of]
its solution by
the war in question. Augustine (Sermones, CXV, De
Augustine, Epipha- Tempore [also C\ = Sermones De Scripturis, xxxiv,
nius and Cassian.
in γθρ y, Appendix? coL l8n> Migne ed.]), Epiphanius ([Panarium Adversus LXXX Haereses, Lib. II, tom. 11,] haeres Ixvi,
[no. Ixxxiii]) and Cassian (Collationes, V, chap, xxiv) hold that the [dis­
puted] land belonged by hereditary right to the children of Israel as
descendants of Sem, to whom Noe had given it as an inheritance, and
that it had been forcibly seized by Cham, the brother of Sem. I neither
accept nor reject this ground, because the arguments adduced on both
sides are insufficient.
Others say that the title in question was a gift of God, and this
is indeed a valid title. Augustine adds, however (Ques­
The solution of
other authorities
tions on Josue, Qu. 20 [= Questions on Heptateuch,
is approved.
Bk. VI, qu. 20]), that although this title was just,
nevertheless, since it could not be proved, other reasons, more firmly
and clearly established, have always been sought, namely: that the
enemy forbade [the Israelites] passage over common highways; or again,
that the former were the aggressors, and began the war. It may also
be said that these enemies were not only idolaters, but homicides, since
it was their custom to sacrifice innocent little children ; hence, on the
ground of the defence of the innocent, it was permissible to subdue
them in war.
3. It must be noticed, however, that the second ground men­
tioned1 has been virtually accepted by a number of
A further explana­
tion of the second authorities, with respect to cases in which it happens
ground mentioned that a state worshipping the one God inclines toward
above.
idolatry through the wickedness of its prince; these
authorities claim that it is allowable to make war upon
that prince. Their contention would be valid if the
Concerning this
prince forcibly compelled his subjects to practice 808
second ground,
see De Fide, Disp.
idolatry
; but under any other circumstances, [such a
XVIII, sect, rv.2
ground] would not be a sufficient cause for war, unless
the whole state should demand assistance against its sovereign. For
where compulsion does not intervene, defence has no place.
This position is supported, first, by the fact that, if the reasoning
in question were valid, it would always be permissible to declare such
a war on the ground of protecting innocent little children. Secondly,
An objection based

1 [That is, the avenging of God for sins which are against nature, or idolatrous.—Tr.]
1 [Supra, p. 767.—Tr.]

Disp. XIII: On War

825

on the basis of that same reasoning, Christian princes would always be
permitted to wage war among themselves, upon their own authority.
Finally, by whatever arguments this ground for war may be justified,
[the title urged] is not confined to Christians alone, but is possessed in
common with all unbelievers who worship only the one God; and
accordingly, these unbelievers could rightfully defend those who wished
to worship the same God, and who were forced by others into idolatry.
4. A third ground for war is advanced, namely, the supreme
The third ground is temporal dominion [of Christians]. That is to say, the
absolutely rejected, authorities mentioned above maintain either that un­
believers are not true owners of their possessions ; or else that the Chris­
tian Emperor, or—at least—the supreme Pontiff, has direct temporal
dominion over the whole world.
But all such claims are vain inventions, a point which we discuss
π „ r .t
elsewhere, on the subject of dominion and laws. In the
in, chap, vii [chap, second place, even if we grant that such a title does inyj], Defensio Fidei, deecf exist, still it would be impossible either to demonBk. IILchaps.ijiv.v.’
.
.
,
J r
r.
.
strate its existence to the satisfaction of infidels, or to
force them to believe in the existence of such dominion ; and therefore,
they could not be forced to obey. Finally, on that same ground, the
Pope or the Emperor could make war [even] upon all Christian princes.
Wherefore, it must be observed that although the Pope has indirectly
supreme power in temporal affairs, nevertheless, the existence of such
temporal power is always based, essentially, upon the assumption of
direct power in spiritual matters; and therefore, this indirect power
does not essentially extend to unbelievers, over whom no direct spiritual
dominion exists even in the Pope himself. Butluse the term, ‘essentially’
(per se loquendo), because ‘incidentally’ {per accidens) the case may be
otherwise, as I shall presently show.
5. A fourth ground urged is that unbelievers are barbarians and
A fourth ground is incapable of governing themselves properly; and that
examined.
the order of nature demands that men of this condi­
tion should be governed by those who are more prudent, as Aristotle Anstc
{Politics, Bk. I, chap, i) has taught, saying {ibid., chap, v [Bk. I, chap,
iii, § 8]) that a war is by nature just, when it is waged against men born
to be under obedience but unwilling to accept that condition; a ground
[for war] which is approved by Major (on the Sentences, Bk. II, dist. Major,
xliv, qu. 3), and at great length by Sepûlveda (Bk. MI, chap, ii [De s?chRegno et Regis Officio, Bk. Ill, near end]).
In the first place, however, such a contention cannot have a
general application; for it is evident that there are many unbelievers
more gifted by nature than are the faithful, and better adapted to
1 [Of these chapters, only chap, v of Bk. Ill of the Defensio Fidei is included in these Selections. Vide
supra, p. 667.—TR.]
1569.74
ς x

826

The Three Theological Virtues: On Charity

political life. Secondly, in order that the ground in question may be
valid, it is not enough to judge that a given people are of inferior
natural talents ; for they must also be so wretched as to live in general
more Eke wild beasts than like men, as those persons are said to live
who have no human polity, and who go about entirely naked, eat
human flesh, &c. If there are any such, they may be brought into
subjection by war, not with the purpose of destroying them, but rather
that they may be organized in human fashion, and justly governed.
However, this ground for war should rarely or never be approved,
except in circumstances in which the slaughter of innocent people,
and similar wrongs take place; and therefore, the ground in question
is more properly included under defensive than under offensive wars.
Finally, Aristotle, in the passage cited above, declares that a war
of this sort is permissible only when those men who are subdued in
order that they may be governed, are as different from the rest of man­
kind as is the body from the soul ; a proposition from which one must
conclude, however, that the said ground for war, if it really exists, is
valid not only for Christians, but also for every sovereign who wishes
to defend the law of nature, which, when understood in an absolute
sense, gives rise to that ground.
6. Therefore, the assertion must be made that there is no ground
for
war
so exclusively
reserved to. Christian, rprinces
The true solution
,
. ,
.J . .
.
of this question,
that it has not some basis in, or at least some due relaby means of three
tion t0 natural law, being therefore also applicable to
conclusions.
.
,
. ..
σ
rr
princes who are unbelievers.
By way of explaining this assertion, I conclude, first, that a Chris_ e—. . ·
tian prince may not declare war save either by reason
of some injury inflicted or for the defence of the inno­
cent. We have already given sufficient proof of this fact, by rejecting
all the invalid grounds for war, [advanced above]. The arguments we
have adduced are a proof of this same fact ; for the law of grace has not
destroyed, but on the contrary completes the natural law.
7. Secondly, I must say that the defence of the innocent is perThe second conclu- missible in a special sense to Christian princes, and that
ston·
the same proposition holds true, proportionately, with
respect to avenging injuries. For if a state subject to an unbelieving
prince wishes to accept the law of Christ and the unbelieving sove­
reign prevents that acceptance, then Christian princes have the right 809
to defend that innocent people; but if the same kingdom wishes to
submit to the law of unbelievers—for example, to the Mohammedan
—and its prince is opposed to this submission, then an unbelieving
Turkish prince would not have a similar right of war against that
other sovereign. The reason for this distinction is that to prevent the
acceptance of the law of Christ does indeed involve grievous injustice

Disp. XIII: On War

827

and harm, whereas there is no injury at all in prohibiting the accep­
tance of another law. Likewise, if [a given people] are willing to listen
[to the Gospel], they may be convinced through reason that this is the
more credible faith and that it ought to be believed; and therefore,
it is just to assist them, under these circumstances.
Similar examples may be adduced, relating to the first1 part of
our conclusion, as when injuries are inflicted upon preachers of the
Gospel; or certainly when unbelieving princes act to the harm of the
faithful, for this is an injury to the Church which she has a special
right to repel and avenge. This right is in part supernatural, that is,
in so far as the power from God to preach the Gospel is concerned, and
in this sense, it surely is not possessed by unbelievers; all of which we
have sufficiently proved in treating of faith (De Fide, Disp. XVIII,
sect, i).2
8. I hold, thirdly, that all of the foregoing considerations are so
The third conclufounded on the natural reason that they may, to a
SIOncertain extent and in due proponion, be applied to
unbelievers. The explanation of this conclusion is that if any state
wishes to worship the one God and observe the law of nature, or to
listen to preachers who teach these things, and if the sovereign of
that state forcibly prevents it from doing so, there would spring up
in consequence a just ground for war to be waged by some other
prince, even if the latter should be an unbeliever, and guided solely
by natural reason; because that wrar would be a just defence of inno­
cent persons.
In like manner, if any nation should worship the one God and
observe the laws of nature, while another nation practised idolatry and
lived contrary to natural reason, then the former state would have the
right to send missionaries to instruct [the citizens of the latter state],
and to free them from their errors. And if this action were forcibly
prevented, then war could justly follow; first, for the reason that such
a right is entirely in harmony with nature; secondly, because the
defence of the innocent would be involved in that procedure, since,
speaking generally, there would not fail to be some who wished to be
taught the natural truths necessary for an upright and virtuous life,
and who would be wickedly impeded in the attainment of this wash,
and finally, because of other reasons which we have set forth in our
discussion of faith (De Fide, Disp. XVIII)2 and which, in due pro­
portion, are applicable to the point under discussion.
1 [Sie (primam) ; but the reference is apparently to the second conclusion. which relates to ‘avenging
injuries Vide the first sentence of Sub-section 7 of Section V, supra, p. 826.—Tr.]
2 [Supra, p. 739.—Tr.]

8z8

The Three Theological Virtues: On Charity

SECTION VI
WHAT CERTITUDE AS TO THE JUST CAUSE OF WAR IS REQUIRED IN
ORDER THAT WAR MAY BE JUST

Three kinds of persons must here be distinguished, to wit: the
sovereign king and prince, the leading men and generals, and the com­
mon soldiers. It is to be assumed that practical certitude is required of
all these persons, a certitude which may be expressed in the statement :
‘It is lawful for me to make war.’ The whole doubt is concerned with
theoretical certitude, which is to be expressed as follows: ‘This cause
of war is just in itselF, or, ‘This thing which I seek through war is
rightfully mine’.
I. I hold, first, that the sovereign ruler is bound to make a diliThe first conclusion : gent examination of the cause and its justice, and that
which is twofold.
after making this examination, he ought to act in
accordance with the knowledge thus obtained.
The basis of the first part of this conclusion is that war is a matter of
The proof of the first the gravest character; and reason demands that in any
P*111·
matter whatsoever, deliberation and diligence should
be applied, commensurate with its importance. Furthermore, a judge,
in order to pass judgment in a private matter, ought to make diligent
investigation ; hence, the necessity for such diligence exists in due pro­
portion in a public cause of war. Finally, if the ruler were not bound
to make this investigation, the rashness of princes would easily result in
universal disturbance. With regard to the first part of this assertion,
then, there is no difficulty.
2. The explanation of the second part of the conclusion is as
The
second
The second part
part of
of follows. Let us suppose that the ground for a war is
this conclusion is the fact that a certain king claims a certain city as
explained.
**·
belonging to him, or as falling newly to him by heredi­
tary right. Now if, when the matter has been carefully examined, the
truth of that claim is clearly established, what I have asserted is ob­
viously true. But when the case of each side contains [an element of]
probability, then the king ought to act as a just judge.
Therefore, if he finds that the opinion favouring his own side is
What [should the t^ie more probably true, he may, even justly, prosecute
king do] when [the his own right ; because, so I believe, the more probable
arbore1 puLdbie opinion ^should always be preferredHn passing judg[than those of the ment. For that is an act of distributive justice, in
other side] ?
which the more worthy party is to receive the prefe­
rence ; and he is the more worthy party w-ho enjoys the more probable
right, as we shall explain below’ at greater length. For the same reason,
however, if the more probable opinion favours the opposing side, the
prince in question may on no account proceed to war.

Disp. XIII: On War

829

3. If, finally, after diligent investigation, the probabilities on both
What should the sides are found to be equal, or if, at least, equal uncer­
king do, when the tainty exists—whatever the ground of the uncertainty
doubt is equal on
both sides and the —then, if the opposing party is in possession, he ought
opposing side is in to have the preference, because even in a judicial pro­
possession?
cess, that party is favoured, inasmuch as he has the
greater right. On this account, the party who is not in possession
cannot proceed to war against the possessor; while the latter, on the
other hand, is secure [in his conscience] and may justly defend himself.
Adrian (on the Sentences, Bk. IV, concerning restitution, and in Adrian
Quaestiones Quodlibeticae, Qu. ii, art. 2), however, maintains an opinion
contrary to this last statement. ‘For that person’(he says) ‘is in doubt as
to whether he is retaining the property of another. Therefore, he is not
secure [in his conscience].’1 Soto (De lustitia, Bk. IV, qu. v, last arg.) Soto,
also says that the one who is in doubt is bound to divide with the other
party, or to give satisfaction to that other in proportion to the doubt.
This would be true if in the beginning he had taken possession, while
doubting [the justice of his action]; for that sort of possession confers
no kind of right. But if, on the other hand, he held possession at the
beginning in good faith, if a doubt has arisen since that time, and if he
has made diligent inquiries into the truth but has not been able to
ascertain it, then he may, [with a] secure [conscience], continue in
possession of the whole of the property in question; for the doubt
remains purely theoretical, and such possession confers absolutely the
right to the whole of the thing possessed, a fact which we have estab­
lished universally and more fully, in our discussion of conscience ([De
Bonitate et Malitia Humanorum Actuum,'] Treatise III, disp, xii, §§5
and6).2 The same fact is stated specifically by Covarruvias(onSext, rule >
possessor, Pt. II, § 7) and by Victoria (aforesaid Relectio [De lure Belli, \,· ,r·.
no. 29]). Soto (Relectio: De Secreto, Memb. iii, qu. 2)3 does likewise. > ■·.
Nevertheless, Victoria observes that a possessor of the kind in question
is bound, when the doubt arises, to inquire diligently into the truth;
and that, if he refuses to do so, he can be forced into this inquiry by
the other party, even through war, for the principles of justice and
right judgment do indeed demand that such an investigation be
made.
4. Another aspect of the question regards the situation in which
no one is in possession and the doubts and probabilities
What should the
balance each other. The more common opinion seems
king do when
neither side is in
to
be that either party has the right to seize first the
possession?
thing in dispute. In accordance with this opinion, the
810

1 [If cgrtainty of true ownership cannot be attained, the possessor, being in doubt, must relieve his
conscience by giving the thing (possessed) to the poor (loc. at. i” punctum, secundo dico).—Réviser.]
2 (Not included in these Selections.—Tr.]
3 [Soto, De ratione tegendi et detegendi secretum, relectio theologica (Salamanca, 1574).—Reviser.]

830

The Three Theological Virtues: On Charity

war would become just simultaneously, on both sides; but this point
is of no importance, when ignorance intervenes. The reason, indeed,
which is offered in support of this opinion is that in a similar case a
judge could awrard the property by his own decision to either one of
the parties to the litigation, as he might choose.
However, I am unable to persuade myself that a judge may act
thus in the case supposed. For certainly, under those circumstances,
the judge is merely a distributor of property over which he personally
has no right ; consequently, if the rights of the parties in question are
at all times entirely equal, there is no reason which would allow him
to allot the whole property to either party; and therefore, the judge
is bound to divide the property. Or, if this cannot be advantageously
done, it will be necessary to satisfy both sides, in some fashion. Hence,
in a question involving war, the princes shall be bound to this same
attitude. Accordingly, they must either divide between them the
thing in dispute, or cast lots for it, or settle the matter in some other
way. But if one party should attempt to seize the whole possession to
the exclusion of the other party, by that very act he would be doing
the other a wrong which the latter might justly repel, thus seizing, on
this just ground of war, the entire disputed possession.
5. But the question may be asked whether, in cases of this kind,
It is more probably sovereign princes are bound to submit the matter to
true that in case of the decision of good men. This question, moreover,
doubt as to the jus­
arises from the standpoint of natural law only, so that,
tice of a war, a
prince is bound to
in our discussion, we shall not include the authority of
submit the matter to
the judgment of a the Pope, of which we have already spoken.1
good man.
Indeed, I am of the opinion that the affirmative
answer to this question is, in all probability, correct. For the said
princes are bound to avoid war in so far as is possible, and by upright
means. Therefore, if no danger of injustice is to be feared, the abovementioned [arbitration] is plainly the best means of decision, and
consequently resort should be had to it.
This opinion is confirmed as follows: it is impossible that the
Author of nature should have left human affairs, governed as they are
by conjecture more frequently than by any sure reason, in such a
critical condition that all controversies between sovereigns and states
should be settled only by war; for such a condition would be contrary
to prudence and to the general welfare of the human race; and there­
fore it would be contrary to justice. Furthermore, if this condition
prevailed, those persons would as a rule possess the greater rights who
were the more powerful; and thus such rights would have to be
measured by arms, which is manifestly a barbarous and absurd sup­
position.
1 [Cf. Sub-section 5 of Section II, supra, p. 808.—Tk.]

Dis}. XIII: On War

831

6. In this connexion, however, we must observe, first, that a
Concerning sovereign prince is not bound by the decision of those
the decision that is whom he himself has not constituted as judges. Theregiven·
fore, it would be necessary for the arbitrators to be
chosen with the consent of both sides. Resort to this method, indeed,
is a most rare occurrence, inasmuch as [these princes] seldom favour it ;
for very frequently one or other of the princes holds the foreign judges
in suspicion.
Secondly, it should be noted that a sovereign prince, if he is acting
Note 2
in good faith, may ascertain his own rights through
prudent and learned men [of his own choice]; then
he may follow their judgment (if by it his rights are made clear to
him) ; and under these circumstances he will not be bound to abide by
the judgment of other [and foreign arbitrators]. The reason in sup­
port of this statement is that the rights in question must be judicially
ascertained in the same manner as a just decision of a court; and in the
latter sort of decision, [only] two objectives are involved. One is an
811 examination of the cause and acquaintance with the rights of both
sides ; for which process, not jurisdiction, but knowledge and discretion,
are necessary. For since this decision is not sought through war, but,
on the contrary, a substitute for war [i.e. a judicial inquiry] is employed,
there is no occasion to call in any arbitrator. The other objective is
the enforcement of the right after it has been made clear. For this,
jurisdiction is indeed required; but such jurisdiction is inherent in a
sovereign prince when in other respects he is sufficiently certain of his
right. In that case, then, there is no reason binding him to await the
judgment of another, although he ought to accept just settlements if
they are presented to him.
7. Secondly, I hold that generals and other chief men of the
The second conclu- Inngdom, whenever they are summoned for convul­
sion, in two parts.· tation to give their opinion on beginning a war,
rating to generals. are j50unj t0 inqUfre diligently into the truth of the
matter; but if they are not called, they are under no greater obligation
to do so than others who are common soldiers. The first part of this
conclusion is clearly true; because these generals, having been sum­
moned, are bound in justice to give a just opinion, for if they did not
do so, any injustice that there might be in the war will be laid to their
charge. The proof of the second part of the conclusion is the fact that,
when they are not summoned [to give advice], their part in the affair
becomes simply that of private soldiers, since they are merely set in
action by others, but do not control action; while it is only inci­
dental (per accidens) that they are wealthy or of noble birth. Never­
theless, Victoria (De lure Belli, no. 24) adds that such generals are Victor,
bound in charity to inquire into the justice of the war, in order to give
Note i

832

Cajetan.
Soto.
Victoria.
Sylvester.

The Three Theological Virtues: On Charity

warning when it shall be necessary. But if this obligation is derived
from charity alone, it will exist only in case of necessity; and therefore,
generally speaking, apart from these cases where there is such need,
they will not be so bound.
8. I hold thirdly, that: common soldiers, as subjects of princes,
are in
The third conclu*n no wise
w^se bound to make diligent investigation,
sion: relating to
but rather may go to war when summoned to do so,
common soldiers.
provided it is not clear to them that the war is unjust.
This conclusion may be proved by the following arguments: first, when
the injustice of the war is not evident to these soldiers, the united
opinion of the prince and of the realm is sufficient to move them to
this action; secondly, subjects when in doubt (i.e. doubt of a theoretical
character) are bound to obey their superiors {Decretum, Pt. II, causa xxm,
qu. i, can. iv, which is cited from Augustine, Against Faustus, Bk. XXII,
chap. Ixxv). This last statement is based upon the best of reasons,
namely, the fact that in cases of doubt the safer1 course should be chosen;
therefore, since the prince possesses rightful authority, the safer course
is to obey him.
The assertion is confirmed by the fact that the official subSee Suârez in a
ordinate of a judge may execute a sentence without
similar passage in any previous examination, provided that sentence is
torarvoi° aSee3Cen- not manifestly unjust. Such is the common opinion
suris, Disp, in,
of Cajetan (Summa, word bellum), Soto (De lustitia,
sect.xv.fromno.9.2 Bk IV> qu
art
Victoria (De lure Belli, no.
25), and Sylvester (word bellum, Pt. I, qu. 9 [qu. 5]).
9. Nevertheless, Sylvester would seem to limit this conclusion.
A limitation of the For
says that, if the common soldiers have doubts,
third conclusion ;
they are bound to make inquiries in order to dispel
by Sylvester.
those doubts; but, if they cannot do so, it will be
permissible for them to fight. Adrian (Quaestiones Quodlibeticae, II)
indeed, absolutely denies that it is permissible to go to war with such
Adrian likewise
doubts; both because it is never permissible to act
limits this conclu- with a doubtful conscience ; and because soldiers who
^Sy ; OT ^auSThe ^id act
wou^ be choosing the [morally] more
[absolutely] denies
dangerous course, since they would be exposing themxt'
selves to the peril of unjust slaughter and plundering;
whereas, if they abstained from going, they would sin only by dis­
obedience, and justice imposes a more rigorous obligation than that
of obedience.
The reply to this objection, however, is that the doubt in such
a case is not practical but speculative, and therefore
Adrian is answered.
joes
renc[er the conscience doubtful. Further1 [Le. morally safer.—Tr.]
2 [Not included in these Selections.—Tr.]

Disp. XIII: On War

833

more, it would not be safer to disobey; for as a natural result of such
disobedience, it would become impossible for princes to defend their
rights, and this would be a serious and general misfortune.
With regard to Sylvester’s limitation, we should observe: first,
Sylvester is
that the doubt may be a purely negative one, namely,
answeredthat the soldiers are entirely ignorant of the basis of
the justice or injustice underlying the war; in which case they are in no
wise bound to make inquiry, being sufficiently supported by the fact
that they have relied upon the authority of their sovereign; secondly,
that the doubt may be positive, having its source in conflicting argu­
ments adduced in favour of one side and the other. Indeed, if the
arguments showing the war to be unjust were such that the soldiers
themselves were unable to give a satisfactory answer, then they would
be bound to inquire into the truth in some way. Even this obligation,
however, is to be imposed, not readily, but only in case those argu­
ments render the justice of the war extremely doubtful, for in that
case, it would seem that the soldiers have inclined towards a moral
judgment that the war was unjust; otherwise, however, if they have
probable reason for thinking that the war is just, they may legitimately
conform their conduct to these reasons.
io. A greater difficulty arises in connexion with soldiers who are
The more common not subjects and who are called mercenaries. The
opinion with respect opinion commonly held seems to be that these soldiers
mercenarv
r ,
.
.·'..
...
r
.
to mercenary
are bound to inquire into the justice of a war, before
soldiers, who are
not subjects.
they enlist. This is the opinion of Sylvester (on Sylveter
word bellum, Pt. I, qu. io), who even states definitely that such
soldiers, when doubtful, cannot legitimately engage in the war.
Cajetan {Summa, word bellum) holds almost the same view; although Gyna,·..
he makes this limitation: ‘Unless they receive their pay in time
of peace also, and are bound to go forth to war whenever called.’
For in that case, [according to Cajetan], mercenaries may conduct
themselves as if they were subjects, since they are really such, by reason
of the pay which they receive. The basis of the foregoing opinion is
The basis of the
r^e ^act t^iat æ suc^ a situation it is safer for one who
opinion above set
is not a subject to abstain from fighting; because if he
fortb·
so abstains he does not expose himself to any peril;
812 whereas, if he does fight, he exposes himself to all the dangers enume­
rated by Adrian; and in doubtful matters the safer pan should be chosen.
This assertion is confirmed, first, by the Sexi (Bk. λ, tit. xii, De
_
Regulis luris, rule io) and the Digest \(L. xvii. J38
The first confirma- r
tion from the rule of L3°D’ which states that he is not exempt from
law and from Am- blame who thrusts himself, with peril to another, into
affairs that do not concern him; wherefore Ambrose
1569.74

1 [In the Latin text *Cajetan’ is incorrectly placed before ‘Sylvester’.—Ti.]
ξO

834

The Three Theological Virtues: On Charity

(On Duties, Bk. Ill, chap, ix and cited in Decretum, Pt. II, causa xiv,
qu. v, can. x) makes the general statement that no one ought to assist
one party to the prejudice of another.
It is confirmed secondly by the fact that, in a similar kind of doubt,
The second conand for the reason set forth above, the laws hold that
firmation·
a spouse who is in doubt [as to the title to the act]
may render the conjugal debt, but may not ask for it. By the same
reasoning, it may also be said that princes who are kinsmen or friends
may not assist one another until they have duly examined the cause.
11. However, such an opinion comes into conflict with the follow­
ing difficulties.
First, it would be necessary for each individual mercenary soldier
The first argument to inquire into the cause of the war. But such an
against this opinion, investigation is contrary to all custom, and humanly
speaking, is impossible; for, as I have said above, the reason for the
war cannot be explained to all, nor are all capable of appreciating
that explanation.
Secondly, [if the opinion in question were valid,] even soldiers
The second arguwho were subjects could not take part in a doubtful
ment·
war without examining the cause, save when they
were under strict orders of such sort that they would be disobedient
in not going; for in that case their obedience would alone excuse them.
But as long as they wrere not under orders, it would be [morally] safer
not to fight. However, this consequent is contrary to all custom, and
that1 obligation [to investigate the cause of war] would be harmful to
the state.
Thirdly, if permanent mercenaries could, previously to a war,
..
.
bind
themselves
to fight
even
in doubtful
cases by
The third argument.
. .
. .
.
.
.
.
.
_ .
/
giving their consciences into the keeping of the pnnce s
conscience, why could not those mercenaries do the same who enlist
at the outbreak of a war? For, from a moral standpoint, the same
principle is involved in the performance of an action and in binding
oneself to perform it.
The confirmation of this argument lies in the fact that just as one
The confirmation
*s not allowed to proceed to an unjust war, neither is
of the third arguhe allowed to undertake the obligation of serving in such
a war, nor even in any war indiscriminately, whether
just or unjust ; and the reason for these restrictions is that to fight in an
unjust war is to act unjustly. Therefore, conversely, if one is permitted
to bind himself to service in a doubtful war, the obligation involved in
such a case is not 'wicked ; and therefore, it would be permissible so to
bind oneself for pay, here and now, although no previous obligation
exists. Nor does it seem to be of much importance that a given
’ [Reading ilia for alia.—Reviser.]

Disp. XIII: On War

835

[mercenary] was already regarded as a subject before the war, by
reason of his pay. For one might say the same thing in the case of a
contract made on the eve of the outbreak of the war, since, at such
a time also, soldiers bind themselves to obedience in all matters in
which obedience is legitimate ; so that it makes no difference from the
standpoint of justice, whether this contract was made before the war,
or whether it is made now, [at the moment when the conflict begins].
Fourthly, in a similar doubtful situation, any person is permitted
The fourth arguto sell arms to these princes and to the soldiers; neverment·
theless, if they do so, the same danger is present,
namely, that the act may contribute to the injuiy of innocent persons,
if by any chance, the war is in fact unjust. The antecedent is commonly
accepted as true. The proof of the consequent is, that both kinds of
co-operation are very pertinent to actual wars; and although soldiers
seem, in a sense, to co-operate more immediately, nevertheless the
persons who furnish arms are ordinarily able to do more harm.
Fifthly, any individual is permitted to enter the service of a
rv
x merchant, on a wage contract, with the intention of
co-operatmg with the latter m those of his contracts
whose injustice is not manifest to the employee; neither is that em­
ployee under an obligation to examine the nature of the contracts;
and accordingly one should adopt a similar view with respect to the case
under discussion.
Lastly, there is one argument that is commonly applicable to all
the cases mentioned above, namely, in all of them, the
The sixth argument.
first and essential element is that one who is not a
subject, submits himself to another for the sake of payment, and in so
doing, inflicts no injury upon any person; neither, generally speaking,
does he expose himself to the danger of any wrongdoing. And for the
rest, he is [simply] exercising his right, when he sells his own property
or his own labour, a right of which he certainly is not bound to deprive
himself to his own detriment. With regard to these [mercenary]
soldiers, there is, in addition, a special argument; for each of them has
the authority of the prince and that of the whole state to support him,
a fact which involves a great probability [that their conduct is just].
Hence, all the circumstances being weighed, it would by no means
seem that mercenaries who serve in that contingency,1 are choosing
the course that is [morally] less safe.
12. These arguments are clearly convincing; nor do I find any
The author’s deci- difference in actual fact between subjects and nonsion: in two parts,
subjects. So it is that Victoria (supra, in his Relectio Vk-tom.
[De lure Belli], no. 24 [no. 25]), too, speaks simply of‘soldiers’, with­
out distinction.
1 (Le. when there is great probability that the war is just.—Revises. ]

The Three Theological Virtues: On Charity

836

However, since the question is one of moral conduct, and in
order that we may proceed with less risk of error, I lay down this
conclusion: if the doubt [as to the justice of a war] is purely negative,
With respect to a it is probable that the soldiers in question may [right­
negative doubt.
fully] take part in that war without having made any
examination of the question, all responsibility being thrown upon the
prince to whom they are subject. We assume, to be sure, that this
prince enjoys a good reputation among all men. This is clearly the
opinion supported by Victoria and agreed to by other Thomists.
813
If, however, the doubt is positive, and if both sides advance plauWith respect to a sible arguments, then, in my opinion, [those who are
positive doubt.
about to enlist] should make an inquiry into the truth
of the matter. If they are unable to ascertain the truth, they will be
bound to follow the course of action which is more probably just, and to
aid him who is more probably in the right. For when the case involves
doubt with respect to a fact, such as loss affecting one’s neighbour, or with
respect to the defence of the innocent, that course which appears to
be more probably just should be followed, in accordance with the rules
on conscience above set forth (Sub-sect. 6). To this end, indeed, it will
be sufficient if the soldiers consult prudent and conscientious men upon
the question of whether or not they are in an absolute sense able to take
part in such a war. And if the soldiers in question form a single poli­
tical body, and have their own chiefs, the inferiors will certainly satisfy
all requirements, if each person examines the question of the justice of
the war, through his own chief or prince, and follows the judgment of
that authority. Finally, if the arguments on both sides contain an equal
[element of] probability, the soldiers may under such circumstances con­
duct themselves as if the doubt were purely negative; for the balance
is then equal, and the authority of the prince turns the scale. Sylves­
ter, too (on the word bellum, Pt. I), has clearly suggested this conclusion.
The foregoing may suffice for the question under discussion.
SECTION VII
WHAT IS THE PROPER MODE OF CONDUCTING WAR?

Three periods must be distinguished [with respect to every
war]: *ts inception ; its prosecution, before victory is
tion of this ques- gained; and the period after victory. The three classes
tMm*
of persons already mentioned must also be distin­
guished, namely: the sovereign prince; the intermediate group of
leaders; and the soldiers of the rank and file.
All of these persons may be considered in certain specific relationA fourfold relation- ships. First, with respect to the enemy, that is to say:
ship is outlined.
how may these classes justly conduct themselves toI.

Notes for the soiu-

Disp. XIII: On War

837

ward the enemy? Secondly, with respect to their mutual relations :
how should the king conduct himself toward his soldiers? Thirdly,
[and again in connexion with their mutual relations,] how should the
soldiers conduct themselves toward their kings? Fourthly, how should
they conduct themselves toward other persons, for example, those per­
sons in whose houses the soldiers are quartered during the march?
At present, we are dealing in the main with the first question; but
we shall also treat briefly of the others.
2. With respect to the fourth relationship, then, we may repeat
On the fourth reia- briefly the admonition of John the Baptist (Luke, Lût. ■.
tionship.
Chap, iii [, v. 14]): ‘Do violence to no man; [...] and
be content with your pay.’ Hence, none of these soldiers may take
anything from his hosts, beyond that which has been determined by
the king; otherwise, he sins against justice and is bound to make restitu­
tion. The same is true if he does any other damage to houses, fields, &c.
To be sure, the leaders [of intermediate rank] and the princes are
bound, by virtue of their office, to prevent such acts in so far as they
are able. If they fail to do so, the whole duty of making restitution
falls upon them, in default of the soldiers.
Concerning the third head, just as the kings are under an obligaOn the third reia- tion to give pay to the soldiers, so the latter are bound
tionship.
to discharge all the duties pertaining to their office.
Hence, justice requires of them brave conduct, even to such a degree
that they shall not take to flight, nor desert their stations or fortifica­
tions; a matter concerning which there are many laws (in
XLIX.
xvi). Cajetan, also, should be consulted in his brief treatise on the ejecta,
subject (Opusculum, Bk. IV, last question but one [Bk. Ill, treatise ix:
De Vinculo ObedientiaeJ) ; for he holds that commanders of forts are
under an obligation not to surrender through any fear of death or
starvation, since they have made a contract with the prince not to do
so, and since they receive their payment because of this contract, whence
there arises an obligation binding them in justice.
Finally, with regard to the mutual relationship of the private
soldiers, we may remark that, apart from the ordinary rules of justice,
they are especially bound after victory to make a just distribution in
sharing the booty. What that just distribution may be, however, it is
not possible for us to determine; for in every kingdom the rules laid
down by the monarchs or generals should be observed, or, at least,
those rules which may have been established by usage and custom.
Only the first head, then, still remains for discussion.
5. I hold, first that before a war is begun the [attacking] prince
On the first relation- is bound to call to the attention of the opposing state
tiro C°n" t^ie existence of a just cause of war, and to seek adeparts. ’
quate reparation therefor; and if the other state offers

838

Augustine.

Major.
Driedo.
Cajetan.
Sylvester.

Deuteronomy,
xx.

The Three Theological Virtues: On Charity

such adequate reparation, he is bound to accept it, and desist from
war; for if he does not do so, the war will be unjust. If, on the
other hand, the opposing prince refuses to give satisfaction, the first
prince may begin to make war.
This conclusion is commonly accepted in its entirety, and the
latter part is clearly true because, assuming the obsti­
It is commonly
accepted. The latter nacy of the opposing prince or state, and the other
part of the conclu­ conditions specified, there is no [other] point that
sion is clearly true.
calls for consideration.
The first part is derived from Augustine (in Decretum,
Pt.
II, causa xxiii, qu. i, can. iii [which is cited from
The first part is
Augustine, Letters, clxxxix, no. 4, To Boniface]', Decre­
proved by citing
authorities and by
tum, ibid., qu. ii, can. ii [cited from Augustine, On
reasoning.
Josue in Questions on the Heptateuch, Bk. VI, qu. 10,
Migne ed.]). Moreover, this view is accepted by all Doctors: Major
(on the Sentences, Bk. IV, qu. 20); Driedo (De Libertate Christiana,
Bk. II, chap, vi); Cajetan (on the word bellum) and Sylvester (ibid.,
qu. iv, concl. 2 [qu. i, concl. 2]). And it would seem that the same
principle may correctly be inferred from a passage in Deuteronomy
(Chap, xx [, v. 1]) : ‘If thou go out to war [against thy enemies and see
horsemen and chariots, and the numbers of the enemy’s army greater
than thine, thou shalt not fear them : because thy God is with thee]’.
The reason supporting this part of our conclusion is that any other
manner of making war would be unjust, and therefore the cause of war
itself would become unjust. For where a full and sufficient satisfaction 814
is voluntarily offered, there is no ground for violence; especially not,
since reason demands that punitive justice be exercised with the least
possible harm to all, provided, however, that the principle of equality
be observed. Moreover, one sovereign has no coercive power over
another sovereign, unless the latter acts unjustly, as is the case when he
is unwilling to give satisfaction.
4. But Cajetan limits this conclusion by stipulating the following
Cajetan’s limitation condition: namely, that the satisfaction in question
of this conclusion,
shall ke offered before the actual encounter in war.
For after the war has commenced, he who brings it to a victorious
conclusion is not bound to accept such satisfaction ; since, in that con­
flict, he is as a judge who, once the action has been undertaken, finds
the cause within his jurisdiction, having acquired the right to proceed
to the end, so that the vanquished party has only himself to blame,
in that he did not offer satisfaction at the proper time.
But, I ask, what does Cajetan mean by ‘actual encounter in warThis limitation is ex- fare?’ If he refers to the last actual battle in which
ammed·
the whole war is to find its conclusion, there is no
doubt that, if the affair has already been entered into and victory is

Disp. XIII: On War

839

beginning to favour the side of the just belligerent, the latter is not
bound, under such circumstances, to accept any reparation short of
complete victory; for such victory now seems to be in all probability
close at hand, and, indeed, to treat of peace at that juncture is, to all
intents and purposes, impossible.
If, on the other hand, by actual encounter in warfare, Cajetan
means a war in which several conflicts have occurred, I do not see how
it may be asserted with any solid assurance that, under these circum­
stances, [the just belligerent] has the cause under his jurisdiction any
more than he had before the commencement of the war. For pre­
viously, he had the same right to begin the war that he now has to
proceed with it; and the sole difference is that the injury has grown
greater, and that consequently an increased right to a greater satisfac­
tion has arisen. Moreover, the arguments set forth above apply equally
to both of the situations in question. For the continuance as well as
the beginning of the war ought to be dictated by necessity. And, in
addition to all these considerations, there is the fact that, [in the wake
of both situations,] similar wrongs against the general welfare follow,
wrongs which should be avoided while preserving intact one’s indivi­
dual rights. These are preserved when satisfaction is offered, because
nothing further than this satisfaction can be claimed even when vic­
tory is achieved, a point which we shall discuss below’.1 In short, the
right to make war is prejudicial to others,2*and the punishment in­
flicted through war is of the severest kind; therefore, that punishment
ought to be inflicted as sparingly as is possible.
5. Therefore, the opinion contrary to Caj etan’s appears to be in
The [author’s] solu- everF respect nearer the truth, with the sole proviso
tion, which is abso- that complete satisfaction shall include the following
ci et7an’s°iùSion° conditions : all property unjustly withheld shall be reit is more fully ex- stored; secondly, reimbursement must be made for all
plained.
expenses due to injuries inflicted by the enemy, so
that, once the war has been begun, a claim may justly be made for all
its costs, to date ; thirdly, something may be demanded as a penalty for
the injury inflicted, for in war, regard must be had not only for com­
mutative justice, but also for punitive justice; and finally, a demand
may justly be made for whatever shall seem necessary to preserve and
also to guard peace, in the future, since the chief end of war is to
establish such a future peace. It should also be added that the state
of war has its rightful source in justice and that, consequendy, if war
is made contrary to justice, there arises from that fact an obligation to
make reparation for this injury.
1 [Jnfra, P· 840, Sub-section 7.—Tr.]
2 [Jus belli odiosum. The expression has a legal connotation, namely, that one man’s right may
restrict the action of another, and is, therefore, prejudicial to the latter.—Reviser.]

840

The Three Theological Virtues: On Charity

6. I hold, secondly, that after war has been begun, and during
the whole period thereof up to the attainment of vic»on·
tory, it is just to visit upon the enemy all losses which
may seem necessary either for obtaining satisfaction or for securing vic­
tory, provided that these losses do not involve an intrinsic injury to
innocent persons, which would be in itself an evil. Of this injury, we
shall treat below, in the sixth conclusion. The reason in support of this
conclusion is as follows : if the end is permissible, the necessary means
to that end are also permissible ; and hence it follows that in the whole
course, or duration, of the war hardly anything done against the enemy
involves injustice, except the slaying of the innocent. For all other
damages are usually held to be necessary for attaining the end to which
the war is directed.
7. In the third place, I hold that after the winning of victory, a
prince is allowed to inflict upon the conquered state
The third conclu­
such losses as are sufficient for a just punishment and
sion : commonly
applicable, and
satisfaction,
and reimbursement for all losses suffered.
undoubtedly true.
This conclusion is commonly accepted and un­
doubtedly true, both because the exaction of such penalties is the
object of war, and also because in a righteous judgment at law this
same course of conduct is permissible. But it should be observed that
in computing the sum required for this satisfaction, one should in­
clude all the losses by the state in question throughout the wrar, i.e.
the deaths of men, conflagrations, &c.
In the first place, however, the additional comment made by
Sylvester (word bellum, Pt. I, qu. 9 [qu. 10]) and
The first observa­
tion: An additional by λ ictoria (above-cited Relectio, no. 20 [De lure
comment is not im­ Belli, no. 51]) is not unacceptable, namely, that mov­
properly attached to
this observation, by able goods captured by soldiers during the war are not
Sylvester and by Vic­ to be reckoned by the prince as part of the restitution.
toria.
For this rule has become a part of the ius gentium,
through common custom. The reason underlying it is that, since the
soldiers’ lives are exposed to dangers so numerous and so grave, they
should be allowed something; and the same is true of their prince.
Secondly, it is necessary to observe with regard both to this, and
The second observa- the previous conclusions,1 that soldiers are not allow’ed
t»00·
to seize anything on their own authority, whether after 815
or even before the victory is won ; because they have in themselves no
power, but possess it solely through their prince, as his agents, so that
they may not justly take anything without his express or implied
authorization.
Thirdly: it follows from this conclusion that, if all the penalties
The second conclu-

1 fie. the first conclusion, Sub-section 3 of this Section ; and the second conclusion, Sub-section 6
of the saine.—Tr.]

Disp. XIII: On War

841

just enumerated seem insufficient in view of the gravity of the
wrong, then, after the war has been entirely ended,
The third observa­
tion, involving a
certain guilty individuals among the enemy may also,
twofold corollary
with justice, be put to death; and, although the slay­
based upon this
conclusion.
ing of a great multitude would be thus permissible
only when there was most urgent cause, nevertheless, even such slaugh­
ter may sometimes be allowed, in order to terrify the rest, as is indicated
in the following passage from Deuteronomy (Chap, xx [, w. 13-14]):
‘When the Lord thy God shall deliver the city into thy hands, thou
shalt slay all that are therein of the male sex, with the edge of the sword,
excepting women and children,’ &c. And from this passage it follows
that with much more reason the guilty who have been vanquished
may be reduced to captivity and all their property seized.
Fourthly, it is to be noted that one should interpret in accord
The fourth observa- with this conclusion the civil laws which assert that,
ouT lawT1^ardln' t^lrouS^1 t^Le
gentium, it has been established that
this conclusion are all the property of the enemy, both movable and immade clear.
movable, passes to the victors. This fact is brought
out in the Digest (XLIX. xv. 24, 28), the Code (VIII. liii. 36), and the
Decretum (Pt. I, dist. 1, cans, ix and x). The same point is made by
Ambrose (on Abraham, Bk. I, chap, iii), and by St. Thomas {De Regi­
mine Principum, Bk. Ill), while Covarruvias (on Sext, rule peccatum,
Pt. II, § 13 [§ 11, nos. 6-7]) discusses the subject at length. More­
over, similar laws are found in Deuteronomy (Chaps, xi and xx), as
Abulensis notes thereon [on Deuteronomy, Qu. 3]. But all of these
passages must be interpreted in conformity with the rule previously
laid down, namely, that a just equality must be preserved, and regard
must be had for the future peace; a matter of which we shall treat
below. For it is necessary to preserve in war the same quality as in a just
judgment; and in such a judgment, the offender cannot be visited
with every sort of punishment nor deprived of all his property without
any restriction, but may be punished only in proportion to his fruit.
8. A doubt, however, arises; for it sometimes happens that among
the goods of the enemy there are found many of which
The first doubt: con­
cerning goods which they themselves are not the owners. May these goods,
did not belong to the then, be seized, if they are necessary for reparation?
enemy.
The reply is, that if the property is immovable, [the
victors] certainly cannot retain it; for those from
First, a decision is whom it was taken were not the owners; therefore, the
given as to immov­ victors themselves do not acquire any ownership there­
ables.
in; and consequently, they must restore such goods to
the true owners. This is the rule laid down in certain laws of the
Digest (XLIX. xv. 20, § 1, XLI. i. 44).
However, the civil laws apparently lay down the contrary rule in
1569.74

5 p

Dtulemu^,

Ambrose.
St Tbomas.
Covurovu*.

tbriasn.

8^.2

The Three Theological Virtues: On Charity

regard to movable property, as Covarruvias contends at length (on Sext,
rule peccatum, Pt. II, § ii, nos. 6-7). But, putting
secondly, as to mov- aside the positive law, if such property has been
ables.fromthestand, ,r
tie
,
, r .r, '
,
point of the law of acquired through theft, so that the title thereto does
nature.
not vest in those in whose custody that property is
found, but rather in its former owners, the reason stated above proves
incontestably that the said property must be restored to those former
owners. Nevertheless, the victorious soldiers may demand a just reward
for their labours, and may exact it from the true owners of the property
in question; or the victorious prince may make the demand, if it so
happens that he has already recompensed his soldiers. The foregoing
is, indeed, a provision of the natural law.
9. But positive laws in favour of those making war against the
..
... . enemies of the state could have granted to the soldiers
given from the
tnemselves the ownership of such property, when it
tive^aw^ °f posi' ^as ^een found by those soldiers to be already in the
peaceful possession of the enemy. Accordingly, the
effect of these laws could have been to deprive the former owners of
their title to the property, for the benefit of the state, to which such
a practice may often be advantageous, particularly with respect to mov­
ables, the true ownership of which it is difficult to ascertain, while
it is nevertheless desirable that the rights of ownership should in some
other way be rendered unimpeachable. This is the case especially when
the property in question comes into the hands of subjects, a practice
which, according to Covarruvias, was allowed by the laws of Spain.
For, as a general rule, it would be rather difficult to believe that this
practice prevailed, since the laws of one country cannot bind [the
citizens of] other countries, nor deprive aliens of their rights of owner­
ship. Thus the civil laws seem, in this respect, to have sprung from
the unjust manner in which wars were at that time carried on. For
The unjust mode of
Romans believed that the wars which they waged
war employed by the against the enemies of the state were just on both
ancient Romans.
sjdes. and in fact, they preferred to fight as if upon
the tacit and mutual understanding that the conqueror should become
absolute master. Hence, they were accustomed to consider that all
property of the enemy, whatsoever its origin, passed absolutely to the
captors; and that the latter would thus possess this property, whatever
might be its source. This standpoint is clearly brought out in the
Digest (XLIX. xv. 5, § 2). Accordingly, they thought it unnecessary
to restore these goods to the former owners, since the enemies of the
latter,1 as soon as they had taken the property, had acquired the title
to it. Furthermore, arguing conversely, the laws deny this right [of
postliminiumJ to pirates and robbers. On this point see the Digest
A decision is given,

1 [Who had subsequently become the enemies of the Romans.—Tr.]

Disp. XIII: On War

843

(XLIX. xv. 19). Assuming that all this is true, the question of whether
or not such a practice would imperil the conscience is a matter which
will be better explained below, in Sub-section 22 [of this Section].
816
10. But another doubt remains, namely: whether it is equally
_
j j v. allowable
to inflict
damages
of this kind upon
all those
The second doubt:
.
,
.
°
/
who on the enemy’s who are numbered among the enemy. In answering
side are liable to
this question we must note that some of these persons
punishment?
x. ,
,
.
T . Λ
.
are said to be guilty, and others innocent. It is implicit
in natural law that the innocent include children, women, and all
unable to bear arms ; by the ius gentium, ambassadors, and among Chris­
tians, by positive [canon] law {Decretals, Bk. I, tit. xxxiv, chap, ii),
religious persons, priests, &c. And Cajetan (on Decretum, Pt. II, causa Cajetia.
mu, qu. iv [causa xxiv, qu. iii, can. xxv, word bellum]) holds, indeed,
that this provision of law has been abolished by custom, which
should be observed. All other persons are considered guilty ; for human
judgment looks upon those able to take up arms as having actually
done so. Now, the hostile state is composed of both classes of persons,
and therefore, all these persons are held to be enemies {Digest, XLIX.
xv. 24). In this respect, strangers and foreigners, since they form no
part of the state and therefore are not reckoned among the enemy un­
less they are allies in the war, differ from the persons above mentioned.
ii.
Assuming that the foregoing is true, I hold, fourthly,1 that
The fourth
if the damages inflicted upon the guilty are sufficient
conclusion.
for restitution and satisfaction, those damages cannot
justly be extended to affect the innocent. This fact is self-evident as
a result of what has already been said, for one may not demand greater
satisfaction than that which is just. The only question that might
arise is whether or not victorious soldiers are always bound to observe
this order in their procedure, taking vengeance upon the guilty and
their property rather than upon the innocent. The reply is briefly
that, other things being equal, and within the limits of the same class
of property, they are so bound. For the principle of equity clearly
imposes this rule, a fact which will become moreevident from what follows.
12. Fifthly, I hold that if such a course of action is essential to
The fifth conclusion complete satisfaction, it is permissible to deprive the
and die reason un- innocent of their goods, even of their liberty. The
®eriyinglt·
reason is that the innocent form a portion of one
whole and unjust state; and on account of the crime of the whole, this
_
part may be punished even though it does not of itself
share m the fault.
This argument is confirmed as follows: first, it is on this very
ground that the children of the Saracens are made slaves by the
1 [The Latin reads: hoc posito, ii. Dico quarto-, Le. the new section actually begins after the phrase
‘Assuming that the foregoing is true.’—Tr.]

844

i

Victoria.
ί·

The Three Theological Virtues: On Charity

Christians ; secondly, a son is sometimes punished for a crime committed
by his father, as we have said in the treatise on faith, in dealing with
heresy (Disp. XXII, sect, v, and Disp. XXIV, sect, in, no. 3).1 In this
connexion, the canon law (Sext, Bk. V, De Regulis luris, rule 23) states
that, ‘No one is punished save for guilt or for a just cause’2; from which
The opinion of Syl- one infers the falsity of the opinion expressed by
▼ester is expounded. Sylvester (word bellum, Pt. I, qu. 10 [qu. 11]) that, after
victory is attained, the property of the innocent must be restored to
them ; unless he is speaking of cases in which property has evidently been
seized in excess of the amount required for satisfaction, for in that case,
if anything is to be restored, reason demands that a beginning be made
with what was taken from the innocent ; but if the property seized does
not exceed the required amount, then, just as it was permissible to take
such property, so also it is permissible to retain it, as Victoria has noted
[Relectio, De lure Belli, no. 40].
13. In this connexion, however, some [special circumstances] existThe first observa- ing among Christians must be noted. First: by the
tion·
ius gentium the custom has been introduced among
Christians that prisoners of war are not to be made slaves by mancipiu m,
although they may justly be detained until they are sufficiently
punished or redeemed by a just ransom; a point which is confirmed
by a royal decree ([Las Siete Partidas,] Pt. II, tit. xxix, law 1). But
since this privilege was introduced for the benefit of the faithful, it is
not always extended to apostates. Therefore, if war be waged against
those baptized persons who have entirely forsaken the faith, as is the
case with those who pass over to paganism, such persons may be made
slaves by mancipium. This is the custom. For they themselves wholly
deny Christ, and consequently, they may not reasonably profit by the
privilege of Christians. However, it has been customary for heretics
to enjoy this privilege, since in a sense, at least, they confess Christ.
For [this privilege], inasmuch as it has been introduced by custom, is
to be interpreted equally in the light of custom. Covarruvias (on Sext,
rule peccatum, § 9, no. 4 [Pt. II, § 10, no. 3]), indeed, quoting Innocent
The____ .j:™ made an^· ot^ers> seems not to have spoken truly with respect
by Covarruvias con- to wars waged against apostate subjects, in which the
cem^g war against latter, [according to him,] may not be enslaved by
mancipium, ‘since’, says Covarruvias, ‘it is not properly
war, but (as it were) an exercise of ordinary jurisdiction’.
In the war against Granada, however, we see that the contrary
The point made by procedure was adopted, with the approval of all the
Covarruvias is re- most learned and conscientious men. Ayala, too, takes
jected’
this stand ([De lure et Officiis Bellicis et Disciplina
1 [Disputations XXII and XXIV are not included in these Selections.—Tr.]
3 [This quotation, as given by Suarez, varies slightly from the text of the canon law.—Tr.]

Disp. XIII: On War

845

Militari,Bk. I, chap, ii, no. 15). The argument in favour of such a
view is that the apostates in question are subjects and that, therefore,
they may justly be punished. Moreover, if [the practice in question] is
permissible with respect to foreigners over whom there is less jurisdic­
tion, why is it not permissible with respect to subjects? Finally, it is
false to assert that the action described above is not war; for when sub­
jects are rebels the ordinary mode of procedure is to subdue them anew
through war.
14. Secondly, we must note that among Christians the immunity
The second observa- of ecclesiastical persons and property has also been intion·
troduced, both because of reverence, and because these
persons or goods seem to form a kind of spiritual realm distinct from
the temporal state and exempt from temporal jurisdiction.
817
F urthermore, Sylvester (word bellum, at end) adds that all property,
How far the state- to whomever it may belong, if it is placed within a
ment added by Syi- church, enjoys this same privilege; for consecrated
▼ester is true.
places cannot be attacked. But this last statement is
true only in a general sense. Therefore, if men seek retreat in such
places solely to protect their own lives, they should enjoy ecclesiastical
immunity; but if an enemy use a church as a citadel or as a defensive
camp, that church may be attacked and burned, even if some dis­
advantages follow therefrom; for such disadvantages would be of an
incidental nature. However, with respect to other temporal goods,
there is no fixed rule; although, in such cases, the customary practice
should be observed.
15. Sixthly, I hold that innocent persons as such may in nowise
The sixth conclube slain, even if the punishment inflicted upon their
sion: in two parts,
state would, otherwise, be deemed inadequate; but in­
cidentally they may be slain, when such an act is necessary in order to
secure victory.
The reason supporting this conclusion is that the slaying of innoThe reason support- cent Persons
intrinsically evil. However, one may
ing the first part of object that this is true with respect to killing- upon
this conclusion.
private authority and without just cause, but that the
case in question involves both public authority and a just cause.
Nevertheless, such a plea must be rejected when the slaughter is not
necessary for victory (a condition which we have already assumed to
exist), and when the innocent can be distinguished from the guilty.
The conclusion is confirmed by the difference existing between
The first confirma- life and other possessions. For the latter fall under
tionhuman dominion; and the state as a whole has a
higher right to them than single individuals; hence, individuals may
be deprived of such property because of the guilt of the whole realm.
But life does not fall under human dominion, and therefore, no one

Λ

846

Deuteronomy,
xxiv.
Exodus, xxiii.

Decretum,

Josue, vi.
I Kings, xv.

Judges, xx.

Deuteronomy,
XX.

Deuteronomy,
ix.

Abulensis.

The Three Theological Virtues: On Charity

may be deprived of his life save by reason of his own guilt. For this
reason, undoubtedly, a son is never killed on account of the sin of his
father ; which is in accordance with the passage in Deuteronomy (Chap,
xxiv [, v. 16]), and Exodus (Chap, xxiii [, v. 7]), ‘Do not put to death the
The second
innocent.’ [Another] confirmatory argument is that,
confirmation.
[f the innocent were able to defend themselves, they
would act justly in so doing; hence, an attack upon them is unjust.
The third confirma- There is a final confirmation of the same conclusion
tion·
in the act of Ambrose, who visited Theodosius with
a major excommunication because of a like slaying of the innocent; a
fact which is recorded in the Decretum (Pt. II, causa xi, qu. iii, can. Ixix).
But one may ask, who actually are the innocent, with respect to
.. .
this issue? My
reply is. thati theyi include
not
only
the
Who are the innoJ
i
-t
7
cent, with respect to persons enumerated above, but also those who are able
tiie conclusions un- t0 bear arms if it is evident that, in other respects,
they have not shared in the crime nor in the unjust
war; for the natural law demands that, generally speaking,1 no one who
is actually known to be free from guilt, shall be slain. But what shall
we say, if certain persons are not known to have participated either
[in the crime or in the unjust war], and if there exists only the presump­
tion that they were able to bear arms? On this point, I shall speak
shortly.
16. However, there is an argument [opposed to the sixth concluAn argument from
sion] which. runs as follows : In two passages of the
Scripture against
Old Testament {Josue, Chap, vi [, v. 17] and 1 Kings,
this conclusion.
Chap, xv [, v. 3]) the people of God were ordered to
kill all of the enemy, not excepting the children. Again, according to
the account in the Book of Judges (Chap, xx), as many as possible of
the tribe of Benjamin were slain indiscriminately by the Israelites,
even after victory.2 In Deuteronomy (Chap, xx [, w. 16-17]) we read
that after a city had been captured authority was given to kill all the
enemy, including the women and children.
As to the first two passages cited, the reply must be that only
The reply to the first God could have given such an order, and accordingly,
two passages.
that this command was a special judgment of God
designed to terrify the nations in question and caused by their iniquity,
as may be gathered from Deuteronomy (Chap. ix).
In the event described in the third passage [, that concerning the
slaughter of the Benjamites,] the children of Israel
o e
pA^ge. acted wrongfully. On this point, see Abulensis [Tostado] ([on Judges^ Chap, xv, qu. xxxvii).
1 [per se ; i.e. apart from specific cases in which such slaughter is needful, for incidental reasons.—Tr.]
2 [citra victoriam is a rather obscure expression, but the context appears to favour the translation
given above.—Tr.]

Disp. XIII: On War

847

St. Thomas (I.-II, qu. 105, art. 3, ad 4), explains the fourth pasSt. Thomas’s reply sage as meaning that permission was given to kill all
to the fourth pass- who refused to accept peace; therefore he would seem
“***
to conclude that this permission applied only to the
slaughter of the guilty. Nevertheless, the commentaThe sense in which tors generally appear to think that it applied to the
this passage is more slaughter of all adult males who might have been
commonly taken.
capable of bearing arms ; for the presumption of guilt
existed with respect to all of them and therefore their destruction was
lawful, if there was no proof of their innocence. Abulensis adds
Refutation of the another reason [for the authority to slay, mentioned
reason given by Abu- in this fourth passage], namely, that [otherwise] the
thT^rSisÏJn men- enemies in question might renew the warfare against
honed in Deutero- the Chosen People. But this reason, simply in itself,
HOmy’ xx‘
is not sufficient ; and consequently, Abulensis (above
cited, Qu. xxxvii) himself later refutes it on the ground that no one may
be punished for a prospective sin, provided that he is not otherwise deserv­
ing of death ; this refutation being especially applicable because the pre­
sumption in question does not of itself seem to warrant the slaughter
of human beings, since in a criminal trial particularly there should be
sufficient proof, and since, furthermore, he who is not proved guilty is
presumed to be innocent. Finally, it is practically certain that, among a
whole multitude, some may be found who neither consented to the
war nor gave any assistance in it, but who, on the contrary, urged the
acceptance of peace; and therefore, all may not be indiscriminately slain.
These arguments prove beyond a doubt that, after victory has
A reply especially
keen attained, those only who are clearly guilty may
adapted to the first
be slain. As for the law above referred to [see Josut,
S°4^sion’e· ChaP· vi> ν· v; I &W Chap, xv, v. 3 and Judgts,
Chap, xx], we may say that this was a positive law
laid down by a special act of God’s will.
What of the second
With regard to the second part of that same law,1
part?
indeed, we may even observe that it was given in time
818 of actual combat and upon an occasion of the kind when, according to the
customary phrase, a rebellious city is justly handed over ‘to blood and to
the sword’. For sometimes this is permissible, either on account of the
enormity of the offence, or for the correction [by example] of other
cities; since, to be sure, upon such occasions it is scarcely possible to
distinguish the innocent from the guilty, except through age and sex.
Hence, the slaughter of all those whose innocence is not dearly evident
for reasons of age or sex is, in general, permitted, as long as the actual
combat continues; but the case will be otherwise after the cessation of
combat, and the attainment of victory.
][De posteriori veto parte illiusmet legis. This appears to be interpolated in the Lacn text.—Rtvisnt.

848

The Three Theological Virtues: On Charity

17. The latter part of the [sixth] conclusion is also commonly
accePted> and is clearly true in the case of certain
ing the latter part of means essential to victory, which, however, necessarily
^on *-sixthJ condu· involve the death of innocent persons, as in the burn­
ing of cities and the destruction of fortresses. For,
absolutely speaking, whoever has the right to attain the end sought
by a war, has the right to use these means to that end. Moreover, in
such a case, the death of the innocent is not sought for its own sake,
but is an incidental consequence ; hence, it is considered not as volun­
tarily inflicted but simply as allowed by one who is making use of his
right in a time of necessity.
A confirmation of this argument lies in the fact that it would
A confirmation of be impossible, through any other means, to end the
this argument, from war.
In like manner, a pregnant woman may use
the inconvenience
medicine
necessary to preserve her own life, even if
that would other­
wise follow, and
she knows that such an act will result in the death of
from an example.
her unborn child. From these arguments it is to be
inferred that, save in time of necessity, the means in question are not
legitimate.
18. On the other hand, one may argue, first: that in the case
Arguments against described, one really co-operates, in a positive sense,
sbrt^condusionfthe *n brmgmg about the death of an innocent person;
The first argument. hence, one cannot be excused from sin.
In the second place: it may be alleged that to
The second argu­
ment.
kill an innocent person is as intrinsically evil as to kill
oneself; and to kill oneself in this manner, even incidentally,1 is
evil; as, for example, when soldiers demolish a citadel and a w*all,
although they know with certainty that they will be crushed at the
moment [when the fortifications fall]. An indication of this fact
is that Samson, who committed such an act [of self-destruction], is
exonerated by the Fathers, Augustine (On the City of God, Bk. I, chaps,
xxi and xxvi), Bernard (De Praecepto et Dispensatione [Chap, iii]),
St. Thomas (II.—II, qu. 64, from no. 5 [art. 5], ad 4) only because he
acted at the prompting of the Holy Spirit.
In the third place: evil may not be done that good may ensue.
The third argument.
Fourthly: [in the parable of our Lord] (Matthew,
The fourth argu­
Chap,
xiii [, v. 29]) it is forbidden to pull up the tares
ment.
lest the wheat should be pulled up with them.
The fifth argument.
Fifthly : the innocent persons in question would be
justified in defending themselves if they were able to
do so; hence the aggression against them is unjust.2
Sixthly: the past] argument mentioned in favour of the sixth
The reason support-

Augustine.
Bernard.

St. Thomas.

1 [Per accidens, i.e. incidentally to the attainment of a justifiable end.—Tr.]
» [According to the principle that war (or combat) cannot be justly waged on both sides.—Tr.]

Disp. XIII: On War

849

conclusion may be reversed, to prove the contrary contention; for
a mother is not allowed to use a particular medi­
es
argument. cjne^ ·ρ
certainty that it will cause the
death of her unborn child, and especially not after the infusion into
that child of a rational soul. This seems to be the opinion more com­
monly held by Antoninus ([Summa Theologica,\ Pt. Ill, tit. vi [tit. Antoninus,
vn], chap, ii), Sylvester (word medicus, Qu. 4), Navarrus ([Surnwu,] Sylvester.
Chap, xxv, no. 62). The reason supporting it is that, if help cannot be
given to one person without injuring another, it is better to help
neither person. On this point, see the Decretum (Pt. II, causa xiv, L
can. i [Pt. II, causa xiv, qu. v, can. x]).
19. The reply to the first of the foregoing arguments is as follows :
The reply to the first if .the matter be viewed from a physical standof the foregoing
point, the victor does not really kill, for he is not the
ar^uments·
cause of the death in an essential, but merely in an
incidental sense; and even in the moral order, he is not guilty of
homicide, because he is exercising his own right, nor is he bound to
avoid to [his own] great detriment, the resulting harm to his neighbour.
As for the second argument, I deny that [the act in question] is
The reply to the
intrinsically evil, basing my denial on that same ground,
second argument.
namely, that the person described does not in fact
kill himself, but merely permits his own death. The question of
whether or not this may be allowed under such circumstances must be
considered in the light of the order of charity ; that is to say, one must
consider whether the good at stake in the case is to such an extent the
common good,1 that there is an obligation to expose oneself in its
defence to a peril so great. There are some who think that Samson's
action may be excused from this point of view; but such a reason would
not seem to serve as a sufficient excuse for that action, because, it the
matter is looked at from a purely human standpoint, the punishment
of one’s enemies would not seem to be a good so great as to justify
Samson in killing himself therefor, even though his death would be
only incidental [to the attainment of his end].
With respect to the third argument, it is true that morally evil
The reply to the
deeds may not be performed that good may ensue,
third argument.
but is permissible to inflict the evils of punishment
[for that purpose]; though, [in point of fact,] in the present case, the
evils in question are not so much brought about [with deliberation],
as they are allowed to follow [incidentally].
As to the fourth argument : in the first place, I deny that the case
The reply to the
[set forth in Matthew, Chap, xiii, on the tares and
fourth argument.
wheat] involved a legitimate necessity [of pulling up rhe
1 [The Latin reads : an ibi intercedat tam commune bonum. If for tarn, we substituted tantum, the
translation would be: * Whether the common good at stake is so great that, &c.’—Reviser.]
1569-74

5Q

850

Ambrose.

The Three Theological Virtues: On Charity

tares]. Moreover, there was no power to do so. Again, the pulling
up of the tares was inexpedient to the end sought by the head of the
household.
To the fifth argument, some persons reply that, under such
The reply to the fifth circumstances, the war may incidentally be just for
argument.
both sides. Excluding cases of ignorance, however,
this seems impossible. Accordingly, my reply is that the innocent
persons in question may indeed protect themselves in so far as mere
self-defence is concerned: by preventing the burning of the city, for
example, or the destruction of the citadel, &c. For such actions involve
solely the protection of their own lives, and may lawfully be performed.
I maintain, however, that they may not adopt an aggressive defence
(so to speak) combating those who are justly engaged in the war; for,
in point of fact, such combatants are doing them no injury. But these
innocent persons may fight against those who are responsible for the
war, since the latter are truly doing them an injury.
As for the last argument, the judgment set forth above must be
The reply to the
understood to relate to a situation in which the medisixth argument.
cine jg not indeed absolutely necessary to save the 819
mother’s life, but is perhaps necessary simply as an aid to her better
health; for in such a case the life of the child should be given the
preference. This would seem to be the teaching of Ambrose (on
Duties, Bk. Ill, chap. ix). That same judgment must also be held to
refer to medicine administered with the deliberate intention of killing
the foetus. But otherwise, if a case of necessity coupled with a right
intention be present, then without doubt it is permissible [to take the
medicine]. This is clearly true, even apart from the arguments ad­
duced above; because, if the mother were allowed to die, then, in
most cases, both she and the child would perish; therefore, it is prefer­
able, if possible, to save the mother’s life while permitting the child to
die, rather than to allow the death of both. The matter would, indeed,
be somewhat doubtful, if it involved a comparison of the mother’s
physical existence with the spiritual life of the child; for possibly the
latter could be baptized [if he were not deprived of physical life].
With respect to this question, however, the order of charity mentioned
above must be observed.
20. Seventhly, I hold that, in addition to all the losses which
The seventh conclu- have previously been enumerated and which may be
Sion commonly held, claimed as necessary to satisfaction, a prince who has
obtained a just victory may do everything with the property of the
enemy that is essential to the preservation of an undisturbed peace in
the future, provided that he spare the lives of the enemy. Therefore,
if it is necessary, he may on this ground seize cities, provinces, &c.
That is the doctrine supported by all, and the rational basis thereof

is derived from the very purpose of an honourable war; since war is
The rational basis of permissible especially for this reason, namely, as a way
this conclusion.
(so to Speak) to an upright peace.
This reasoning is confirmed by the fact that within the state itself,
.
wrongdoing is punished in accordance with what is
The confirmation.
°
r
i
, i· i
i
it
necessary for the public peace with the result that,
frequently, some person is ordered into exile, or visited with a similar
punishment, &c. From this example, one infers that, if a [precautionary]
measure of this sort is taken under circumstances such that it may at
the same time come into the category of a penalty, this step should
be taken on both of these grounds1; nor is it permissible to multiply
without cause the harm inflicted upon the enemy.
21. Finally, I hold that a war will not be unjust, if all the preThelast conclusion: cautions which we have enumerated are observed in
m two parts.
it, and if at the same time the other general conditions
of justice are fulfilled; and yet, such a war may contain some evil
element opposed to charity or to some other virtue. The first part of
this conclusion is sufficiently proved by what has already been said
(Sect, iv, sub-sect. 8). Some examples confirming the second part have
been mentioned above, examples relating to cases in which a war is under­
taken in opposition to charity, but not in opposition to justice. Another
illustration would be a situation in which the conditions above set
forth are fulfilled, yet the war springs from hatred.
22. However, some doubts which need elucidation are attached
The first doubt con- to
conclusion. The first doubt is as follows: if
ceraing this conclu- both sides voluntarily engage in war, without just
aon'
cause, should that war be considered as opposed to
charity, or as opposed to justice; and does it give rise to a consequent
obligation to make restitution? Covarruvias (on Sext, rule peccatum, Pt.
The affirmative
II, § 21 [§ 12]) indicates that a war of this kind is conanswer of Covarru- trary to justice ; for he says that goods captured therein
nas.
ms'
must be restored, since an unjust war creates no right.
But, while there is no doubt that in the sight of God such a war
The author’s soiu- is, in its essence, opposed to justice, because of the
tion of the doubt,
homicides—actual or potential—which are involved
in it, nevertheless, there would seem to be no injustice involved, in so far
as regards the combatants themselves.
For injustice is in no wise done to a person who knowingly consents
e
[to an action] ; and Γ, in the situation under discussion,]
the two sides are voluntarily lighting with each other,
since, as I assume, the war is waged by mutual agreement, and after
proclamation.
1 [Le. the grounds of precaution in the interests of future peace, and punishment for past wrong­
doing.—Tr.J

-

851

—

Disp. XIII: On War

852

The Three Theological Virtues: On Charity

In the second place, for the very reason that the parties in question
.
make this agreement, they surrender fas it were) their
own rights, and join in a pact to the effect that the
victorious party shall acquire the property of the vanquished; and once
this compact—unjust though it is in the sight of God—has been made,
the victors become the true owners of such property, since they possess
it by the will of the former owners. Therefore, [the victors are not
bound to make restitution for property thus acquired].
In the third place, for these same reasons, there exists no obligation
_
.
to make reparation, not, at all events, for the losses
inflicted; and therefore, the conquerors may also re­
imburse themselves from the property of the enemy, at least to the
extent of the expenses which those conquerors have incurred in the war.
Finally, because of the mutual and voluntary agreement, there
_ .
arises in the case of a private duel which is voluntary
on both sides, no obligation to make restitution, nor
any act of injustice. Therefore, . . .
These arguments, then, would seem to prove that there results
no obligation of making restitution for losses inflicted—not, at least, in
a war of the kind in question; but as to other questions of property,
the case is doubtful. Nevertheless, it is extremely probable that the
same rule holds with regard to this matter, also; just as a game which
is in other respects wrong, but in which there is no injustice committed
among the players, may result in the transference of property from
one to another without any consequent obligation to make restitu­
tion. The same may be said of adultery, if a price is given in exchange
for it ; however, we do not deny that the opposite opinion may perhaps
be correct; and much less do we deny that it is [morally] safe.
23. A second doubt, according to St. Thomas (II.-II, qu. 40,
art. 3), is whether stratagems are permissible in war.
The second doubt :
drawn from St.
To this we must briefly reply, in agreement with him,
Thomas.
that they are permissible in so far as relates to the
prudent concealment of one’s plans ; but not with respect to the telling
of lies. Regarding this point, what we have said elsewhere (Disp.
XIV, sect, iv)1 on the concealment of one’s religious faith should be 820
consulted.
From the foregoing, another doubt is resolved a fortiori, the doubt
Vide Bk. vi of the as to whether it is permissible in war to break faith
Defensio Fidei,
plighted with the enemy. For we must say that,
cnap.ix.1
generally speaking, such an act is not permissible,
since it involves patent injustice; and consequently, if the enemy
suffers loss for this reason, full reparation should be made. However,
all this is true only provided that the promise shall have been made
_

1 Not included in these Selections.—Tr.]

Disp. Xlll: On War

853

from the beginning of the war, by a just and mutual agreement (as it
were) in such a way as to be binding; and it is also necessary that this
promise shall have remained and persisted in full vigour and force,
since, if one side has perchance broken faith, the other side will be
entirely freed from its own obligation. For the equity of law demands
that this condition be understood to exist. The same holds true if any
change in circumstances has occurred, such that the promises in ques­
tion cannot be hept without grave loss. In that event, the opposing
side must be warned that it is not possible to keep the promise made
to it; and, after [either side] has issued this declaration, it is freed from
the pledge. However, such a declaration is seldom to be permitted.
24. A third doubt, also derived from St. Thomas (ΙΙ.-Π, qu. 40,
art. 4), turns upon the question: is fighting permissible
The third doubt :
drawn from the
on feast days? The reply is that such fighting is per­
same St. Thomas.
The author treats of missible, in cases of urgent necessity. Cajetan adds
this point more fully that, if mass is heard, there is no mortal sin involved
in De Diebus Festis
[inDe Virtute et Statu in fighting on feast days, even when there is no neces­
Religionis,'] Bk. II,
sity for so doing; although such an act may be a
chap, xxviii, no. 7.1
venial sin, because it is characterized by a certain lack
of proportion, especially if the fighting could be postponed without
detriment. Sylvester (word bellum, Pt. I) extends this permission to
the season of Lent, relying on the canon law {Decretum, Pt. II, causa
ΧΣΙΠ, qu. viii, can. xv; Decretals, Bk. I, tit. xxxiv, chap, i), but custom
does not sanction that view, a fact which is noted in the Gloss on the
passages above cited.
25. A fourth doubt concerns the question of whether or not a
The fourth doubt is Christian prince sins in calling to his aid infidel soveresoived by means reigns, or, conversely, in giving them aid in a war
of examples.
which is otherwise just. We must answer that such
an action is not in itself a sin, since it is not opposed to any virtue, and
since examples [of this sort of conduct] are supplied by the Scriptures
in the case of David (r Kings, Chap, xxviii) and the iMachabees (f 1 JTwip.'**·*·
Macbabees, Chaps, viii and xi).
tSlaAtl·**.
Furthermore, it is permissible in war to employ the aid of wild *"
animals; therefore, why not the aid of unbelievers?
Jrlvedbyreasoni^g0 Conversely, it is permissible to sell arms to unbelievers
for use in just wars; hence it is permissible to aid them.
Sometimes, however, such a course of action may militate against
charity, because it involves public scandal, or some peril to believers,
or even lack of trust in divine aid. In this connexion, an example may
be found in the Old Testament (2 Paraltpommon, Chap, xvi), where
King Asa is gravely rebuked and is punished for having sought the
x“
human aid of another and infidel prince, through his want of trust in
1 [Not included in these Seleciims.—Hl]

«54
Abuiensis.

The Three Theological Virtues: On Charity

divine aid. Abulensis [Tostado] should also be consulted, in this con­
nexion (on i Kings, Chap, xxviii, qu. 17).

SECTION VIII
IS SEDITION INTRINSICALLY EVIL?

I. Sedition is the term used to designate general warfare carried
on within a single state, and waged either between two
parts thereof or between the prince and the state. I
The first conclusion. hold, first, that sedition involving two factions of the
state is always an evil on the part of the aggressor, but just on the
defensive side. The truth of the latter statement is self-evident. The
truth of the former is proved by the fact that no legitimate authority
to declare war is discernible in such a situation, for this authority, as
we have seen (Section II [su'pra, p. 806]), resides in the sovereign prince.
The objection will be made that, sometimes, a prince will be able
The objection to the to delegate this authority, if urgent public necessity
contrary is
demands that he do so. In such a case, however, the
enswered.
prince himself, and not a part of the state, is held to
be the aggressor ; so that no sedition will exist in the sense in which we
are using the term. But what if one part of the state actually suffers
injury from another part, and is unable to secure its right through the
prince? My reply is that this injured part may do nothing beyond
that which a private individual may do, as can easily be gathered from
what we have said above.1
2. I hold, secondly, that a w’ar of the state against the prince,
The second conclu
even
aggressive> not intrinsically evil ; but that
sion, on which see the conditions necessary for a war that is in other rew^chap iv***’ Bk’ sPects just must nevertheless be present in order that
this sort of war may be righteous. This conclusion
holds true only when the prince is a tyrant, a situation which may occur
in one of two Ways, as Cajetan notes (on II.-II, qu. 64, art. I, ad 3
[art. 3]). In the first place, the prince may be a tyrant in regard to
his [assertion of tyrannical] dominion, and power; secondly, he may be
so merely in regard to his acts of government.
When the first kind of tyranny occurs, the whole state, or any
portion thereof, has the right [to revolt] against the prince. Hence, it
follows that any person whatsoever may avenge himself and the state
against [such] tyranny. The reason supporting these statements is that
the tyrant in question is an aggressor, and is waging war unjustly against
the state and its separate parts, so that, in consequence, all those parts
have the right of defence. Such is the opinion expressed by Cajetan
What is sedition?

Cajetan.

1 [Cf. Section II, sub-section 2, of this Disputation, supra, p. 806, especially the third paragraph.—
* [Supra, p. 705.—Tr.]

Tk.]

Disp. Xlll: On War

855

(loc. cil.'); and this conclusion may also be derived from a passage in
St. Thomas’s works (on the Sentences, Bk. II, dist. xhv, qu. 2, art. 2).
John Huss upheld the same doctrine with respect to the second
kind of tyrant, and, indeed, with respect to every unjust superior.
But this teaching was condemned at the Council of Constance Comal <>f
(Sessions VIII and XV). Consequently, it is most certain that no
private person, nor any imperfect power, may justly begin an aggres­
sive war against this kind of tyrant, and that such a war would be
sedition in the true sense of the term.
The proof of these assertions is as follows : the prince in question
is, we assume, the true sovereign; and inferiors have not the right of
declaring war, but only that of defending themselves, a right which
does not apply in connexion with this sort of tyrant; for the latter does
not always do wrong to individuals, and in any attack which [these
individuals] might make, they would be obliged to confine themselves
to necessary self-defence. The state as a whole, however, may rise in
revolt against such a tyrant; and this uprising would not be a case of
sedition in the strict sense, since the word is commonly employed with
a connotation of evil. The reason for this distinction is that under the
circumstances described the state, as a whole, is superior to the king,
for the state, when it granted him his power, is held to have granted it
upon these conditions: that he should govern in accord with the public
weal, and not tyrannically; and that, if he did not govern thus, he
might be deposed from that position of power.
[In order that such rebellion may justly occur,] however, the
situation must be one in which it is observed that the king does really
and manifestly behave in a tyrannical manner; and the other conditions
laid down for a just war must concurrently be present. On this point,
see St. Thomas (De Regimine Principum, Bk. I, chap. vi).
st-Tbon»»
3. I hold, thirdly, that a war of the state against a king who is
The third conclu- tyrannical in neither of these two ways, is sedition in
aon·
the truest sense and intrinsically evil. This is certainly
true, as is evident from the fact that, in a such a case, both a just cause
and a [rightful] authority are lacking. From this, conversely, it is also
evident that the war of a prince against a state subject to himself, may
be just, from the standpoint of rightful authority, if all the other
required conditions be present, but that, in the absence of those
conditions, that same war is entirely unjust.
821

LAST SECTION [SECTION IX]
IS A PRIVATE WAR, THAT IS TO SAY, A DUEL, INTRINSICALLY
EVIL?

I. A private contest of this sort, which in Greek is called μονο­
μαχία (single combat), may be entered into, in one of two ways : either

——1

856

Cajetan.

Torquemada.
Henry of
Ghent.

The Three Theological Virtues: On Charity

suddenly (as it were) and by chance, and viewed in this light, the treat­
ment of such contests is part of the subject-matter of homicide; or else,
by the agreement and consent of both parties. In the latter case, if
certain public conditions are satisfied, the contest is called a duel
{duellum) ; but if the affair is conducted privately, it is termed a diffidatio1 or single combat, that is, in our common tongue,2 a desafio.
I hold, first : that if a just cause be lacking, a duel is always wicked.
.
Thi£·. · is clearly
true, since such a contest .is a kind of
The first conclusion.
, . J
tvar, and since it is even possible that in the course of
that contest the dèath of a human being may occur.
Again, a duel tnay be fought in order to display prowess and
courage ; or in order.to win a reputation, as is wont to be the case, from
time to time, among soldiers during a war. Duels fought for such
reasons are also evil, because the participants rashly expose themselves
both to the peril of death and to the peril of killing another.
This view is confirmed by the fact that a sham battle3 is a mortal
sin, if it involves evident danger of death; for those who die therein
are denied the right of ecclesiastical burial, in accordance with the
canon law {Decretals, Bk. V, tit. xm, chap, i) ; therefore, . . .
For a like reason, the same opinion should be held with respect to
duels fought for the sake of revealing some truth or clearing oneself of
some charge. This is the doctrine laid down by Cajetan (on II.-II,
qu. 95, art. 8 [, ad 3]), and supported by Decretals (Bk. V, tit. xxxv,
chap, i), by the Decretum (Pt. II, causa 11, qu. v, can. xxii), by Torque­
mada thereon, and by Henry of Ghent {Quodlibeta, IX [V], qu. 32).
The reason supporting this view is that such contests are not really
a means of revealing truth and innocence, seeing that sometimes an
innocent man is slain in a duel. Neither, [in situations of this sort,]
is there sufficient reason to justify killing another; and therefore, there
is not sufficient reason for making an attack. Furthermore, such conduct
See
the
author *s contrary to the charity due to oneself; for if the
[Suarez,] De irreii- person who issues the challenge is innocent, he exposes
fritteetsiatu^Rdi- himself to the peril of death; and, on the other hand,
gionis, Tract, ill, if he is guilty, his sin is far greater in that he attempts
Bk. I, chap. iu].4
t0 c]ear
jn a superstitious manner. Finally, in
these contests, God Himself is tempted, since His aid is hoped for,
through unfitting means.
2. I hold, secondly: that every private duel, that is, [every contest
The second conclut^s sort] that is not characterized by all the consion and the proof ditions of a just war, is intrinsically evil. This is the
common opinion of the Summists (on wrord duellum).
r [An impromptu armed combat following a challenge—Tr.]
3 [fulgo ; in this case, Spanish.—Tr.]
3 [Bellicum exercitium (a warlike exercise). Or Suarez may have had in mind a tournament, to
which his canon law reference applies.—Tr.]
4 [This treatise is not included in these Selections.—Tr.]

Disp. XIII: On War

857

Regarding the challenger to a duel, indeed, the truth of such an
. assertion is admitted without any limitation or dis[
rs pom .
tinction, and may be proved as follows: the killing of
any man on mere private authority is intrinsically wicked, except in
the necessary defence of one’s own person and property; and the chal­
lenger to a private duel sets out to kill upon his private authority;
822 therefore, . . .
Secondly, the same proof applies in regard to one who accepts a
. x challenge
; .for
in his
veryr acceptande
he wills to..
under- ,
. A second point.
.
° ’
.
. J
. r
take the slaying of that other person who issues the
challenge.
>
This argument is confirmed by the fact thL· such duels are, in
Confirmation from
general, condemned by the law, « laid down in the
both forms of law.1 Code (XL xliv. i); while the Council of Trent (Session
XXV, De Reformatione [, chap, xix]) has also imposed the penalty of
excommunication, and many other penalties, upon those who fight,
counsel, participate as spectators, &c., in connexion with these duels.
In a certain Bull of Pius IV [Contra Pugnantes in Duello, &c., Nov.
13, 1564],2 such excommunication is reserved [for absolution] to the
Pope, save with respect to the persons of the emperors or kings
[who are not included in the penalty]. And although these laws
may seem to refer only to public duels, Gregory XIII [Bull Ad Ίollendum, Dec. 5, 1582]3 nevertheless extends such duels to include single
combats between individuals; but he does not reserve [to himself the
absolution of] the excommunication.
3. It is to be noted, indeed, that some writers have limited this
conclusion with reference to the person who accepts
A limiting clause
the
challenge, if he does so in order to defend his
which some writers
impose upon this honour and for the reason that, otherwise (that is, if
conclusion.
he did not accept the challenge received), he would
incur disgrace.
An argument in favour of this stand is based upon analogy: for
The basis of their a nobleman attacked by another is not bound to flee,
limitation.
but may lawfully stand his ground and kill his
aggressor in self-defence ; and this merely to protect the honour
befitting his rank; therefore, in like manner,...
This is the point of view suggested byNavarrus in one passageof his
work {Summa [Enchiridion sive Manuale Confessariorum,] Chap, xv, at
end) ; although in another Chapter (Chap, xi, no. 39), he expresses a
different opinion.
However, the contrary is in every respect true, as is evident from
1 [Le. civil and ecclesiastical.—Tr.]
2 [Bullarium Romanum VII, p. 85 (Turin, 1862).—Réviser.]
3 [Bullarium Romanum VIII, p. 400 (Turin, 1862).—Reviser.]
1569.74

5 R

Council of
Trot.

BdloIPnaFV.

Gregory

xu:

858

The Three Theological Virtues: On Charity

the laws above cited, and especially from the Bull of Pius IV, in
which the following words are to be noted: ‘To allow
is rejected: first, by [duelling], for whatsoever cause, even for one not
citing authorities.
disapproved by the [civil] laws, or on whatsoever
pretext’, &C.1
The reason, a posteriori, for such a stand is derived from nature;234
Furthermore, it is f°r> 3n t^ie judgment of every prudent person, each
rejected by reason- of the combatants in the situation described, chooses,
ing'
contrary to right reason, to smite his adversary.
Furthermore, I maintain that the alleged disgrace is not truly such,
although the ignorant crowd may judge it to be disgrace. The reason,
a priori for this same opinion, is clear, to wit : [acceptance of a challenge]
is not an act of defence but one of aggression, since there is occasion for
The reply to the defensive acts only when force is repelled by force and
bases of the asser- sjnce no force has entered into the case in question.3
bons made by those
.
..
.
,
who offer this
1 herein lies the difference between this case and the
opinion.
analogous one that was adduced. For in the latter
instance, the nobleman suffers actual violence, and is forced into an
action which would not otherwise be permissible to him; whereas, in
the former instance, [as we have said,] there is no use of force. More­
over, in that [supposedly analogous] situation, a man is provoked to an
act of simple defence ; but in this matter [of the duel], one is provoked
to an act of aggression, and such a challenge may be refused, for a
righteous reason. Such is the stand taken by Cajetan (on II.-II,
qu. 95, art. 8, ad 3) and in his Summa (word duellum), and Armilia
thereon ([on word duellum,'] no. 1). See also Soto {De lustitia, Bk. V,
qu. i, art. 8, clause quod si hinc), and Abulensis [Tostado] (on 1 Kings,
Chap, xvii, last qu.).
4. Secondly, there is an exception to the conclusion in question,4
a second limiting in the case of an innocent person who is unjustly
dause·
accused and condemned—or who, at least, is going to
be sentenced to death—if that person is challenged by his accuser to
a duel, and wishes to substitute the peril of such a contest, for the
certain death to which he must shortly submit as the result of a judicial
decision. For, under these circumstances, his agreement to undertake
the duel would seem to be an act of just [self-]defence. This is the
opinion held by de Lyra (on 1 Kings, Chap, xvii), Navarrus {[Summa
or Enchiridion], Chap, xi, no. 39 and Chap, xv, no. 9), and Cajetan (on
II.-II, qu. 95, art. 8 and [Summa,] on word duellum).
This limiting clause

Cajetan.

Armilia.
Soto.
Abul ensis
[Tostado].

de Lyra.
Navarrus.
Cajetan.

1 [The words are not in the Const, of Pope Pius IV (1560), but very similar words are found in the
Const, of Pope Julius II [Regis pacifici, Feb. 24,1509).—Reviser.]
2 [naturalis.—Tr.]
3 [i.e. the case in which a given person has been challenged to a duel.—Tr.]
4 [i.e. the second conclusion : * Every private duel that is not in every way characterized by the con­
ditions of a just war is intrinsically evil.’ Supra^ sub-section 2 of this Section.—Tr.]

Disp. XIII: On War

859

The latter, however, adds a provisional clause to the effect that
this duel shall be undertaken, not upon one’s ovn
,
.
,
1
r r
·
authority, but upon that of the prince.
The proof of the second limiting clause is as follows: the accuser
in question attacks an innocent man with the sword
The proof of the
second limiting
of justice; therefore, self-defence is permissible to that
clause, as drawn
from the authorities innocent person; and consequently, it is also permisdted above.
sible for him to avail himself of the means of defence,
which in the case supposed is none other than the duel.
This argument is confirmed by the fact that, occasionally, as we
_
.
have said above,1 what is material aggression is formal
A confirmation.
, r
,
1 · r
l
·j
1 ·
defence; so that this fact, too, must be considered, :n
connexion with the situation described.
5. But this [second] exception is not established to my satisfaction.
The [second] limit- Moreover, it is rejected by Sylvester (word duellum),
ing clause is
Abulensis [Tostado] (supra), and Antoninus ([Summa
rejected.
Theologica,] Pt. Ill, tit. iv, § [chap.] iii), with other
authorities there cited. Soto (De lustitia, Bk. V, qu. 1, art. 8, near
end) appears to hold the same view.
If, indeed, we put aside [the cases sanctioned by] the authority of
_
the prince,
we may argue
that, ini reality, the
act in
with respect to
··
/· j
/·
[casesnot sanctioned question is not one of defence but one of aggression,
by] the authority of ρΟΓ defence is possible only where force is applied by
the prince.
.
r
, /
.
, . r.r
an actual aggressor; and the accuser, in this instance,
does not resort to force, since he does not compel the other to fight,
but merely invites him to do so, being an aggressor, strictly speaking,
„,
,
only in his false accusation ; whereas calumny is repelled
Salon also agrees
J ,
. ,
,
,
,
·
z
1
with this, on 11.-11, not by violence, but by the manifestation of trurn.
qu. 64, art. 3,
Moreover, if the latter course of action cannot be
controvers. 3.
r ,,
....
.
·
,
followed, it is in no wise permissible to resort to
irregular means which are not truly means. On the contrary, death
must be patiently endured just as if an innocent person were found
guilty because of false witnesses.
This argument is confirmed [, first,] by the fact that, if the accepA confirmation de- tance of a duel under these circumstances had a defenrived from a three- sive character, then, surely, the challenge also would
fold absurdity.
have the same character, provided no other means [of
exonerating oneself] were available. For this act [of challenging, on the
Cajetan adds a proviso to this second
limiting clause.

Sylvester.
Aboleasè
[Tostado].

Astomous.

of
the- violence, inflicted
with
the sword of/justice. .And.
,
.
r
therefore, such a challenge [on the part of the accused]
to a duel [of this sort] would be permissible; a proposition which,
how’ever, the very authorities cited above deny. [Secondly,] a further
The first absurdity.

* [Cf. Section I, sub-section 6, of this Disputation.—Ta.)

I

86o

The Three Theological Virtues: On Charity

consequent [of the assertion which we are rejecting] would be that the
The second
accused, should he be able to do so, might legitimately
kill his accuser in secret, if he hoped thereby to escape 823
death. This consequent would clearly follow, since in a just defence it is
allowable to anticipate a future situation. Another [and third] conse„ ,. Λ
quent of the assertion in question would be that one
The third.
±ιτι··ι
i
in
·
··
τ
could licitly accept the challenge in question m order
to prevent any other person from depriving him through a judicial
decision of his reputation or his entire fortune. For not only in defence
of one’s life, but also in defence of one’s external possessions, it is per­
missible to kill another. This consequent is rejected by Cajetan, who
argues as follows: armed defence is permissible only
Cajetan’s evasion
[of these argu­
when one person makes an armed attack upon another;
ments].
in a criminal action, however, while the aggressor does
not attack with his own weapons, still he does attack with the sword of
the judge; but this is not true of a civil action, wherein the sole weapon
employed is an unjust judgment. However, this point is of no signiThis evasion is re- ficance; for in the first place, as far as the moral quesjected.
tion jg concerned, such a distinction is wholly of a
material nature, and consequently has no application to upright
conduct.
Therefore, other authorities make an assertion which, even if it is
less probably true, is nevertheless more logical; since
Among these autho- they admit that the same reasonin? holds for both
nhes are Molina,
. , '
—,, .
.
.
_
°
.
Treatise in, De iusti- sides. Inis assertion is that, when an innocent per­
it? Commutativa, son
pe condemned, even if it be [merely] to serious
Disp. XVII, no. 7; ,
2,
L
and sinchez, with loss of reputation or or fortune, he may accept or issue
others whom he a challenge to a duel.
Furthermore, Cajetan even
cites, Decalogue, Bk.
,
J3.
r .r
J 1
n,chap.xxxix,no.8. makes a false assumption; for if some unarmed person
should attempt to steal my property, and if I were
unable to ward off the injury without arms, it would be entirely per­
missible for me to use weapons for that act of self-defence; and there­
fore, in like manner, it would be allowable for me to avert by armed
defence the above-mentioned loss of reputation or property, while
accepting my calumniator’s challenge to a duel. There are some, how­
ever, who deny that the cases are similar, on this ground, namely, that
no one is allowed to expose himself to the peril of death for the sake of
external possessions. The denial which they rest upon such a basis is
erroneous. For, indeed, as was pointed out in Sub-section 3 [of this
Section] the nobleman [in the case supposed] is not bound to flee,
although, by awaiting the aggressor in order to protect the honour
befitting his rank, he exposes himself to the danger of death.
6. Finally, the defendant who is thus falsely accused may not slay
his accuser; and therefore, he may not attempt to do so by means of

Disf. XIII: On War

861

a duel. The truth of the consequent is evident; for it is not per­
missible to attempt that which it is not permissible
The second and
to
do. The truth of the antecedent also becomes dear,
principal rejection
of the limiting
both from what has been said above, and from the
clause.
following example: if Peter, for instance, knew dial
Paul had given money to another person in order that the latter might
slay Peter, it would not be permissible for Peter, acting on his own
authority, to slay Paul, even if he believed that there was no other way
in which he could escape death at the hands of that third person; and
this would be true for no other reason than that Paul would not, in his
own person, be inflicting violence ; therefore, and in like manner, one
who has been falsely accused before a judge may not for that reason
slay his accuser.
In fine, the foregoing is confirmed by the fact that much unjust
e
slaughter
would
undoubtedly
result, to the great,
A confirmation.
.9
r ,
r
J
detriment of the state, from the acceptance of the
contrary opinion. For any one might easily persuade himself that he
was being unjustly accused in court and that there remained no other
means of protecting his life, honour, or property, than that he should
slay his accuser. It would also follow that, if one person should, out of
invincible ignorance, accuse another—in good faith, to be sure, but
nevertheless falsely—the accused could slay that innocent accuser, in
order to protect his own fife or reputation. For even such an accuser
attacks another person with the sword of the judge, no less than if he
were making the accusation out of malice; since, in point of tact, he
also is about to take from that other, through a false accusation, his life
or his good fame. Consequently, although the opinion opposed ro
that which we are defending may seem convincing from a theoretical
point of view, still, it is by no means admitted in practice.
7. Cajetan’s statement, indeed, that it is permissible to accept the
.. .
, challenge in question, at least, with the permbiion
the limiting clause, of the prince, does not seem to be sufficiently sound,
as qualified by Ca- por a prince may not justly give such authorization,
jetan s proviso.
sjnce according to the allegations and the proofs, he is
certain either that the accused person is innocent or that he is guilty,
or that neither the one nor the other fact [is manifest]. If the first
alternative be true, then the sovereign is bound to acquit the accused
and cannot righteously involve him in the peril of a duel. In the third
case, exactly the same assertion applies. For the laws and the principle
of justice demand that when the accuser does not prove his charge,
the defendant shall be discharged; and in case of doubt, the defendant
is to be favoured. If, however, the second alternative shall prevail, the
judge is bound to condemn the accused, according to the ordinary law.
Moreover, if it be argued that a sovereign prince, out of the

86z

The Three Theological Virtues: On Charity

plenitude of his power, may set free even a convicted person, especially if
Evasion is preprivately he knows that person to be innocent, we say
duded·
in rebuttal, not even then may he permit the duel; for
if the prince has the power to acquit, right reason demands that he
shall wholly acquit this person and not expose him to the peril of
a duel. There is the additional consideration that, with respect to the
accuser, an injustice would be committed. For, even though the prince
may be able to acquit an innocent person who has been found guilty,
still he may in no wise punish a guilty person who has not been con­
victed of guilt ; and the accuser, in his turn, even though he may be in
fact a calumniator, nevertheless has not been convicted of this offence
in court ; and if, eventually, he is punished, it will at least be through
a just punishment, and not through a duel. It may be urged that the 824
contest in question is not a punishment nor a wrong, because, so we
assume, the duel is voluntarily sought or accepted. I reply, indeed, that
The reply is over- it is true that on this account no wrong is done to the
thrown.
private person involved; but a wrong is nevertheless
done to the state and to good government, whenever, in violation of
due process of law, any person is exposed to the peril of death without
sufficient public cause.
Finally, if it should be contended that in any given situation, the
The final argument sovereign may allow such a duel in order to avoid
is refuted, and the greater evils, just as in actual fact prostitutes are
defended as genetolerated; even so, he can in no way confer the right
rally applicable.
and the power to engage justly in this practice of
duelling, although he may not have been sinful in permitting it [, in
a particular instance]. For the innocent or accused person in the case
has no right, acting for himself and on his own authority, either to slay
or to attack the other ; and consequently, the prince cannot grant such
power to innocent persons of this sort. The truth of the consequent
is evident, since the sovereign may not grant that any one shall, with­
out sin, kill another person, unless the latter has previously been legally
convicted and condemned, circumstances which do not exist in the
situation supposed. Therefore, the conclusion propounded above1 is
applicable in general without qualification.
8. Thirdly, I hold that a private armed contest—that is, one
The third conduby two or by a few individuals—is not intrinsision: commonly held cally wicked, if engaged in by public authority; on
and consisting of two the contrary, if in other respects the contest in ques­
tion comprehends the conditions of a just war, it may
be justified, for in that event it has the nature of war;—at least, war of
a limited sort—rather than that of a duel. This is the commonly
accepted conclusion.
1 [i.e. the second conclusion. See Sub-sections 2 and 4 of this Section.—Th.

Disp. XIII: On War

863

The prior part of the conclusion is proved, in the first place, as
follows: slaying on public authority and for a just
Provedcause is not intrinsically evil; hence, it will not be
evil to resort to the means necessary in order to effect that slaying
(in which means there is included the [private armed] contest in
question.)
This argument is confirmed by the fact that a war in which many
T
persons
are iengaged,
andi which is characterized
bv the
Confirmation I.
r
,. .
· i j
,
.
it
conditions laid down above, may be just; and there­
fore, the same assertion holds true of a contest carried on among a few
persons ; for a mere difference in the number of persons involved does
not affect the righteousness or the justice of a cause.
Secondly, the argument in question is confirmed as follows: any
„ „
. „
one condemned to capital punishment may legirimately, on the authorization of the pnnce, be put to
death by any private person whatsoever, if it shall prove necessary for
such an authorization to be given; and under these circumstances,
the private agent will not be guilty of any sin in such killing, since he
acts as a minister of justice; therefore, in the case described, the same
procedure will be permissible.
9. Now the latter part of [this third] conclusion may be estabThe proof of the
fished, in the first place, from the [special] use of the
latter part.
word duel {duellum). Ordinarily, indeed, the term
refers to a combat which is entirely private, i.e. undertaken solely upon
private authority and on account of a private matter. Such a duel, to
be sure, is intrinsically wicked. But the combat of which we are speak­
ing, although it may in appearance be private, because it involves only
a few persons, is nevertheless held to be public in point of fact, for the
reason that it is undertaken under public authority and for a public
cause; and therefore, it is not characterized by the intrinsic wickedness
of the duel, but has, on the contrary, the true character of war. Accord­
ingly, in order that such a contest may licitly be undertaken, it mu>t
be clothed with the conditions characterizing a just war; and this may
come about in either one of two ways.
First, the whole business of a war may be reduced to an armed
.
contest
among a few combatants. No, doubt
exists
The first way in
.
r
- ·
which this kind of a on the question of whether or not such [a cause] is
S αΐΛ7 h*
righteous, provided that, in addition to the fact that
the war is just, precaution is taken by the prince not
to make victory more doubtful than it would have been in case of
actual warfare. Cajetan [on II.-II, qu. 95, art. 8, comment, x],
indeed, maintains that the prince is not allowed to reduce a war
to an engagement among a few combatants, unless he is sure that
he would be defeated in the general war. But the rule already laid
The first part is

864

Navarros.

Caje tan.

The Three Theological Virtues: On Charity

down1 is more widely applicable and contains more truth. For when
the hope of victory is not diminished and does not become less
sure because the war has been reduced to a duel, no harm or wrong is
done to any one, and for the rest, a great deal of slaughter is avoided.
Accordingly, [the arrangement in question] will be righteous and just.
However, since this sort of advantageous transformation of the war is
a rare occurrence, prudence must be used in allowing it. For if the
prince does perchance allow such [a procedure] rashly and without
sufficient cause, he will not sin, to be sure, against the justice owed to
the enemy state, provided that, in other respects, he is waging a just
war ; but he will be sinning against the due rights of his own state, for
which, by virtue of his office, he is bound to make careful provision and
take careful thought; and he will also be sinning against those subjects
whom he exposes to the peril of a duel without reasonable cause.
In a second way, the contest in question may be righteous. Not
_
.
because the entire war is (so to speak) virtually conwhich this kind of tamed therein, but because it is a portion of a war,
duel may be justi- justly undertaken and begun, which it is perhaps
expedient to carry forward in this fashion to the attain­
ment of victory, inasmuch as the act of reducing the war to a duel
deprives the enemy of certain of their bravest soldiers or else dis­
heartens that enemy, while, on the other hand, one’s own men may be
heartened ; or there may be other, similar reasons, which will possibly
arise. Thus Navarrus taught ([Summa,] Chap, xv, at end). However, the
true reason [for the legitimacy of the contest] is that a lawful cause and
power underly it, in this case. Moreover, if the war as a whole is legiti­
mate, the same is true of a part thereof; and this armed contest is (as
it were) a certain portion of the whole, and a portion, so w’e assume,
which is necessary or useful to attaining the end of the war in its 825
entirety; therefore, . . .
The foregoing argument proves that it is as permissible to pro­
pose such a contest as it is to accede to the proposal; for if that
contest is allowable in itself, it will also be allowable to obtain the
authorization to engage in it, from the possessor of authority. Cajetan
(word duellum), however, seems to hold an opinion opposed to this
one regarding the second manner [in which the contests in question
may be justified]. But Navarrus explains the statement of Cajetan as
referring to those occasions when the war is confined to a few comba­
tants, without justice and without cause.
10. Now it is maintained in opposition to the above conclusion,
The first objection to first, that whoever offers a challenge to such a duel,
Hnsinnregoing C°n” Pæ^ed he is waging a righteous war, consequently
1 [i.e. the rule that the prince may resort to such a procedure, if the chance of victory is not rendered
more doubtful thereby.—Tr.]

Disp. Ill: On War

865

invites and incites another to an action which the latter cannot
without sin accept ; hence the challenger himself sins by the act of
The second objec- provocation.
ϋοη·
Secondly, he exposes innocent people to the peril of
death, an act which in its very essence would seem to be evil.
...
.
Thirdly, he binds himself not to defend his own
The third objection.
, ./ ;
· t j l
·
j
people, if they are vanquished by their adversaries orare
in most evident danger ; yet, to bind oneself thus seems to be opposed to
natural law, which places us under the obligation of protecting the
innocent.
In reply to the first objection, we must say that the prince in
The reply to the first question provokes not to evil [as such], but to a lesser
objection.
[alternative] evil; for he is directly concerned with
seeking his own rights; and he may, on the ground that the other side
is sinning, and for the purpose of preventing war on a large scale, seek
to substitute for that war a lesser evil, such as this engagement involving
peril to only a few persons.
To the second objection, one may reply that sometimes it is
The reply to the permissible to endanger the fives of innocent per­
second objection. sonSj for the sake of the common welfare. For in the
general engagement, also, innocent persons—in much greater number—
are exposed to the peril of death. In individual cases, however, care
must be taken that these single combats be entered into only
with serious reason and that, as far as possible, the peril be diminished.
To the third objection it may be replied that, just as the
The reply to the
duty of defending the innocent is a precept that
third objection.
binds, not without intermission, but only when it
can advantageously be carried out; so, conversely, to bind oneself in
a given situation to refrain from defending the innocent, is not intrinsi­
cally wicked, and may be allowed when such an obligation is entered
upon, under circumstances that to the prudent mind may render the
defence of the innocent impossible for the reason that it would clearly
involve grave and general disadvantage; these being, indeed, the cir­
cumstances assumed in the course of our argument.
We might deal at this point with the penalties inflicted for duelling,
Vide Suârez, Vol. De as well as with the punishment of those who encourage
™s,rns’LDis?*
the practice; matters which are, however, more suitii ; Disp. xxxi,
ably discussed in connexion with censures, Here, then,
sect, iv, no. 48.
we may conclude the entire treatise on charity, written
for the glory of God and of His Virgin Mother.
PRAISE BE TO GOD
1 [This work is not included in these Selections.—Ti·]
1569.74

53