WEST

BADEN

READINGS

in philosophy and theology

MIRACLES

JOSEPH

DE

TONQUEDEC,

S.J.

Article entitled “Miracle” in
Dictionnaire A apologétique de la Foi Catholique

Translated by

FRANK M. OPPENHEIM, S.J.

WEST BADEN COLLEGE

West Baden Springs

Indiana

. __

___________________

“Miracles” is an authorized translation of an article by J°seP
e
Tonquédec, S.J., entitled Miracle, which appeared in the ' iicTh’N'-A’RE
Apologétique de i.a Foi Catholique, (vol. Ill, cols. 5 1 / ■’ ‘
'c
by A. d’Alès, and published originally by Beauchesnc et Scs
'' UC
de Rennes, Paris, in 1926. All rights reserved.

IMPRIMI POTEST

William J. Schmidt, S.J., Provincial
May 15, 1955

NIHIL OBSTAT
Rev. Merwin Lenk, Censor Librorum
May 30, 1955

IMPRIMATUR

Alexander M. Zaleski, Vicar General of Detroit
June 7, 1955

Copyright, 195 5
WEST' BADEN COLLEGE
WEST BADEN SPRINGS

INDIANA

TABLE

OF

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION..........................................................................
AUTHOR'S FOREWORD ..................

xiii

THE STATE OF THE QUESTION....................

PART

THE

v

1

FIRST

THE PHILOSOPHICAL ATTITUDES PRESUPPOSED
FOR THE EXAMINATION OF THE FACTS........................

5

Chapter

I

Naturalism..........................................................

5

Chapter II

Determinism.......................................................

9

Chapter ΠΙ

The Philosophies ofContingency and
Continuity..............................................................

20

The Attitude Which Should BeAdopted:
Natural Explanations and Supernatural
Explanations........................................................

26

Chapter IV

Section I

The objections against God’s intervention
in this world......
27

Section II

The view of the world which is consonant
with divine wonders..................

40

The physical possibility and the efficient
cause of miracles.........................................

40

The moral possibility and the final cause
of miracles....................................................

45

How are the principles just established
applied to concrete cases?..... ..............

51

Conclusion to Part the First..................................................

66

I

II
III

PART

THE

SECOND

THE CRITICAL ATTITUDES PRESUPPOSED FOR
THE EXAMINATION OF THE FACTS..............................

67

The Facts Which We Ourselves Witness . .

67

Chapter

I

iii

The Facts Certified by Another’s Testi­
mony: Historical Criticism of Wonders . .

69

Section I

General Rules.................................................. .

69

Section II

Particular rules for the various types
of criticism.........................
76

Chapter II

I

II

Textual criticism, historical criticism,
and interpretative criticism.....................

76

Criticism of the testimony, or historical
criticism properly so called....................

78

1

Conditions concerning the facts .....

78

2

Conditions concerning the persons:
Ancients, Middle Ages, Orientals, Non­
professionals, Crowds, and Believers .

80

CONCLUSION...............................

94

BIBLIOGRAPHY
I

Π

Π

BOOKS

A

Treating Directly About Miracles........................

95

B

Treating of Miracles in More General Studies .

97

C

Treating Particular Miraculous Phenomena
(Gospel miracles, Lourdes, Theresa Neumann,
etc.)............................................................................ 101

PERIODICALS

A

Treating Directly About Miracles........................

B

Treating Particular Miraculous Phenomena. . .
(Gospel miracles, Lourdes, Theresa Neumann,
etc.)............................................................................ 107

C

Treating of Methodology and Background
Needed for the Study of the Miraculous........

104

Ill

SOURCES OF THE CLASSIC OBJECTIONS
AGAINST MIRACLES WHICH FR. DE TONQUEDEC
DISCUSSES IN THIS ARTICLE.................................... 115

INTRODUCTION
The article here translated into English for the first time
came originally from the gifted pen of Father Joseph de
Tonquédec, S. J. It was written in 1918 as one of his contri­
butions to the Dictionnaire Apologétique de la Foi Catholique
under the title of “Miracle.” Here it appears with an extensive
bibliography of books and articles on the miraculous written
from 1918 to 1955.
At first sight it might seem strange that an article almost
forty years old should now be judged worthy of an English
translation. A survey of the facts, however, will make it
clear that Fr. de Tonquédec’s article still stands today as one
of the outstanding presentations of the theology of miracles.
Both his book on miracles, Introduction a l’étude du merveil­
leux et du miracle, as well as his resume of that book found in
the present article are frequently referred to and used as a
basis in many scholarly works touching on this subject.
Moreover, a brief perusal of the bibliography appended to
this study will disclose the present dearth of Catholics who have
taken upon themselves a defense of and a positive proof for the
principles underlying the Catholic position on miracles. This
scarcity of excellent Catholic expositions becomes all the more
noticeable if one limits his view to the works in English on the
Catholic theology of miracles. Surprisingly enough, very few
Catholic answers have come forth in English dress to counter
the disproportionately large number of non-Catholic expositions
on the subject. Hume, Stuart Mill, Tyrrell, and Dewey — to
mention only a few outstanding English-speaking opponents of
the very idea of miracle — have had many popularizers and
elaborators to keep their negative views before the minds of
the English-speaking world. This present translation, along
with its companion volume on Mystery and Prophecy, has been
undertaken in an effort to counterbalance these negative ideas
and to reduce somewhat the genuine lacuna in English apolo­
getics on the Catholic theology of miracles.
As a help toward this goal and as a possible guide to those
wishing to investigate further into the facts and theory of
miracles, a fairly extensive bibliography has been appended to
v

this present translation. It embraces books and arti* les,
Catholic and non-Catholic, treating of the miraculous and re­
lated subjects. The general limits of this bibliography are
writings in the English language after 1918, although îhe
special worth of some books and articles has led the translator
not to apply these limits in an iron-clad fashion.
To his knowledge, it is the first arrangement of systematic
references to books and articles touching such various aspects
of the miraculous as the following: the idea of a miracle itself,
the source of the classic objections against miracles, the usual
treatment given miracles by well-known American educators
and by general studies in philosophy and religion, the back­
ground and methodology needed in studying the miraculous,
and — what is probably most interesting of all — the concrete
instances of miracles, whether real or alleged. Regarding
this last category, the bibliography offers some hints and
suggestions for those interested in the resurrection of Jesus,
the other miracles of His life, the miracles connected with the
Saints, the Eucharist, and the Church. Special emphasis has
been given to Lourdes, Therese Neumann, stigmatization, and
the other physical phenomena connected with mysticism, since
these topics are especially under discussion today. Finally,
cross-references to other bibliographies touching on one or
other of these subjects have been woven into the bibliography
wherever this seemed helpful.

♦

♦

*

At the beginning of this study it seems well to call attention
to the precise aspect from which Fr. de Tonque'dec is viewing
miracles. He is writing as an apologist. Hence, he is con­
cerned here with establishing just the first of the two proposi­
tions which form an argument in favor of the religion founded
by Jesus Christ and represented by the Catholic Church. The
two propositions forming this argument are:
1. Certain external recognizable facts can take place which
indicate God’s special intervention in this world as well as His
will to guarantee certain religious doctrines.
2. Facts of this type have taken place in favor of the doc­
trines taught by the Judaeo-Christian tradition — and never in
favor of any other teaching.
The boundaries of the present article are marked out by the
complexus of statements contained in this first proposition.
Therefore, it is not to be expected that Fr. de Tonquédec will here

vi

take up individual cases of miracles or examine the reports of
doctors, scientists, and witnesses regarding such cases and
the phenomena closely connected with them. If one wishes to
investigate these and to prove the second proposition just
mentioned, he is immediately directed by Fr. de Tonquedec to
other articles in the D.A.F.C. For instance, he should con­
sider Apocrypha, the Acts of the Apostles, Biblical Criticism,
Fetishes, Miraculous Cures, Hysteria, Lourdes, Magic, Spiri­
tualism, and many other topics touching on wonders and mir­
acles. However, Fr. de Tonquedec is careful to single out
the illuminating article on Jesus Christ, especially its third
chapter, (D.A.F.C. Π, cols. 1288-1538), because the Gospel
miracles are the central point sustaining the proof that mir­
acles have occurred, and thus establish the second proposition.
Concentrating in this article upon the first proposition, Fr.
de Tonquedec has made it his task to examine the very concept
of miracle, subject it to the acid tests of philosophical and
historical criticism, and show that it comes out from them un­
impaired. Hence, the aim of this article is to prove that there
is no a priori reason which has any weight against miracles
and, moreover, that a sound philosophy and true historical
method should be disposed to accept miracles.
Both philosophers and historians appreciate the import of
miracles since it is a subject that cannot fail to cause deep re­
percussions in morals, science, and other fields. Being of
such interest, the subject of miracles arouses the close atten­
tion of many different groups, but for a variety of reasons.
For example, a “miracle” to the ordinary person will in­
volve an exciting account of something that is different from
his humdrum routine. If he is religiously inclined, it may
even offer some external confirmation of his belief that the
supernatural world is a real one.
But for those among the more cultured who have been led
by their education to discredit the whole idea of the super­
natural, “miracles” will be interesting either because they are
regarded as discomforting, unshakeable vestiges of medievalism
or because they shout out as direct challenges to their seemingly
snug naturalism — challenges that would have them give ear to
the very words of God and follow His directives. Evidence of
this latter type of concern is clearly mirrored in the fifth thesis
of the now famous Humanist Manifesto. This manifesto was
subscribed to by thirty-four outstanding leaders in American
university circles who thereby styled themselves as “religious
humanists.” In this document these men first decided to
vii

employ the modern label of «cosmic guarantees” in place of the
old-fashioned word «miracles.” Then they launched their at­
tack against miracles by proclaiming the thesis «that the nature
of the universe depicted by modern science makes unacceptable
any supernatural or cosmic guarantees of human values.” (Cf.
The New Humanist, First Series (May-June, 1933), Vol. VI, No. 3,
Thesis 5.) Such is one present-day non-Catholic view of miracles.
There is, finally, the Christian apologist, for whom miracles
hold a key position. He knows that miracles and prophecies are
the best God-given criteria available to men for recognizing
with certainty that a particular doctrine actually stems from God
and deserves acceptance as His word. He also sees that the
historicity of the Gospels stands or falls with the reality of
miracles. And he realizes that any defense of the reasonable­
ness of the Faith must ultimately be founded upon miracles (and
prophecies). They are the convincing signs of God’s super­
natural intervention in the course of history and of His actually
teaching an authoritative message to men. Such are some of
the chief reasons lying behind the efforts which the apologist
puts forth to explain and defend miracles.
These same reasons are, moreover, clearly appreciated by
the discerning eye of the rationalist opposition. For if they
once admit a miracle, they cannot avoid an obligation to be­
lieve. That Renan, Strauss, and other rationalists manifest
their acute awareness of the crucial importance of miracles
can be seen by anyone who studies the introductions to their
Lives of Christ. And with each side —both apologist and
rationalist - keenly aware of miracles’ significance, it is not
surprising that this subject has frequently raised strong con­
troversy. Too much is at stake to be indifferent.
It is hoped that this sketching of the two opposing parties
will offer a background of some sort to the reader as he
enters into Fr. de Tonquédec’s presentation.

*

*

♦

A few words regarding this English translation. Accuracy,
precision, and fidelity to the original French have been the
main objectives of the translator. He has also tried to present
these ideas in smooth-flowing, idomatic English. In some in­
stances the complexity of the reasoning and the abstractness
of the subject have forced the translator to give his preference
to fidelity rather than to some off-hand paraphrase that would
only approximate the original. The effort to concur with modern
viii

usage has led to the division of the longer French paragraphs
and the frequent break-down of an involved sentence into
several in the English.
The translator would like to render grateful acknowledge­
ment to Beauchesne et Ses Fils, copyright owners of the
Dietionnaire Apologétique de la Foi Catholique, for granting
the translation rights to this article. To Rev. E. R. Smothers,
S. J. and Br. F. H. Snider, S.J., to the painstaking readers of
the manuscript, and to all whose cooperation has made this
translation possible, the translator wishes to express his very
sincere appreciation.

Frank M. Oppenheim, S.J.

West Baden College,
February 11, 1955,
Feast of Our Lady of Lourdes.

ix

MIRAC LES

Dictionnaire Apologétique de la Foi Catlwlique

Paris, 1926, 3:517-578

AUTHOR’S

FOREWORD

What will be explained succintly in this article was treated
more at length in our work, Introduction à létude du merveil­
leux et du miracle, Paris, Beauchesne, 1916. The necessity
of treating things here in resume" and only along broad lines has
forced us to delete many nuances and shades of thought, to re­
ject the idea of following up certain discussions to their crucial
turning-point, and lastly, to drop certain arguments that were
quite helpful, if not indispensable. In certain places we have
had to content ourselves with a simple assertion, since it was
impossible to present the complete proof briefly. Practically
all the concrete examples have disappeared. The presentation
of contrary views has become very summary. Of them we have
preserved only what was strictly necessary to impart some
understanding of the objections which could be brought against
our theses. Thus it would be making a mistake to form a judg­
ment about certain systems of ideas, which are quite complicated
at times, from the few things we say about them here. More­
over, we have been forced to free this study from the mass of
references contained in the book. Consequently, even though
explicit citations from our Introduction are given at times, we
wish, once and for all, to direct to that book those persons who
may not be satisfied with the presentation and the proofs here
offered.
However, it is our belief that this expose" is as complete as
a resume" should be, and that everything essential has at least
been pointed out, if not explained. By way of rare exception,
some special point may be treated more precisely than in the
book, due to further thought on the subject and to suggestions
which we have considered well-founded. For example, confer
pages 49-50 (footnote 42), 70-74, and 88-94.

xiii

THE STATE OF THE QUESTION

When we use the word “miracle,” what meaning do we at­
tach to the term? Just what are we talking about in this
article? Is there really a problem concerning miracles? If
there is, what does it consist in? and why does a person have
to face this problem?
While the world follows its course and continues to reel
out its fabric of ordinary events woven of natural laws and
human freedom, there arises at times in the minds of men the
question of mysterious events. These events seem to be in­
tentional and appear as snags in that uniform fabric; or, to
speak more accurately, they seem inserted into that fabric as
the work of some unexpected cooperator. Many people are con­
vinced that these mysterious events are actually the flowering
forth into our world of influences from another world. And one
cannot decide for no reason at all and without some definite
method that these people are wrong at all times and in every
case. Here then is a problem claiming our attention. We will
call it the problem of the wonderful.
Consequently, we will use the word WONDER throughout this
study to designate those exteriorly verifiable phenomena which
can suggest the idea that they are due to the extraordinary
intervention of some intelligent cause other than man. This
definition contains no preconceived notion about the nature of
the facts or about their origin. It limits itself to setting down a
mere appearance, the basis for the opinion attributing the facts
under consideration to supernatural agents, such as the one God
or several gods, or spirits, angels, sprites, demons, or the souls
of the dead. The definition does not even contain a preconceived
notion about the reality of the facts, for it remains to be seen
whether there were any facts that may have produced just this
mere appearance. Here then we have a completely nominal and
extrinsic definition that cannot conflict with any doctrine. Its
only purpose is to point out the subject we are going to treat. A
few words will suffice to delimit its meaning.
a) We are speaking of exteriorly verifiable phenomena in the
wide sense which means not only those phenomena that can be
observed directly, such as a sudden cure, but also those which

1

would simply be inferred to be real from exterior events, such
as a prophecy that was fulfilled. The main thing we have in
mind are events in the physical order. These are our direct
and immediate concern. And the discussions will turn mainly
about such physical events. However, what we say will be ap­
plicable, servatis servandis, to what people sometimes call
the “moral miracle”; namely, that unusual occurrence wherein
human intelligence and will play their roles without apparently
offering a sufficient explanation for the event. Here, too. it
really seems that a higher intervention has occurred which is
exteriorly verifiable. Consequently, the only phenomena we
are leaving completely outside our field of investigation are
those purely internal and psychological ones which can be re­
vealed to us only through the testimony of the experiencing
subject; for example, subjective visions, or what the mystics
call supernatural states. And yet, even in these cases, the
principles we are establishing would be applicable; for example,
if an individual who thought he was experiencing such states
undertook to pass judgment on them.
b) Moreover, in our definition we are speaking of the extra­
ordinary intervention of some intelligent agent. It is a fact that
the ordinary appearance of the universe, the order reigning in
it, and the clear tokens of coherent design stamped upon it can
already suggest the idea that some higher intelligent agent is
at work here. Nevertheless, since this activity is constant,
common, expected, and not at all exceptional, it is by that very
fact outside our subject matter.
We bring no philosophy into play in order to insert that per­
fectly plain distinction between the ordinary and the extraordinary,
which is enough for us to start this study. We call upon no par­
ticular conception concerning the “laws” of nature. In no way do
we attempt to define the meaning of rarity or frequency. We
take just one point for granted, and assuredly few people will
want to contest it. This point is that there exists a means of
distinguishing the interventions of any kind of liberty from the
ordinary course of nature. This means that an event which stems
from some particular free choice or some deliberate arrange­
ment of circumstances directed towards special goals will stand
out in sharp contrast to the general order. We accept the ground
on which Renan placed the problem. He says that in the universe
“everything is in perfect order and harmony; and yet there is
nothing particularly intentional.... If there were beings acting
in the universe as man acts on the surface of his own planet,...
you would notice it. ” Just so. We are setting aside the operations

2

of nature and man and trying to discover whether there is
something else besides.
c) For us a phenomenon will not at all be considered as
wonderful just because it is new or unusual or rare or because
its cause is unknown. What is needed beyond this is that the
phenomenon show some sign of being the result of definite
choices by some intelligent being other than man. In spite of
their puzzling mysteriousness, the new properties discovered
by the physical sciences — such as the transmission of electro­
magnetic waves, radioactivity, and so on — clearly do not possess
this characteristic in any degree.
We will call a REAL WONDER that event whose appearance
is in conformity with reality.
We will reserve the word MIRACLE for that particular cate­
gory of wonders which can be attributed to the intervention of a
God who is unique and distinct from the world, such as the God
of the Christians or simply of a spiritual philosophy.
Why must we deal with the problem of wonders and miracles?
For the same reason that we have to deal with the problem of
religion. The idea of supernatural or extra-natural prodigy is
one of the most widespread and fundamental of concepts in the
positive religions. A person cannot possibly solve the problem
of religion without making up his mind on this question — I mean
the question of miracles in general, and not the question of some
story about wonders that might seem at first sight to be deservedly
unacceptable. We are not concerned with this or that detail. We
are looking at the whole picture. Are we permitted to brush
aside this entire question without examination? May we, under
the sway of scornful prejudice or instinctive disgust, reject the
very hypothesis of supernatural interventions in this world?
What if behind one or other of those extraordinary events the
divine was concealing itself? What if underneath those lowly
sensible appearances there was an invitation or possibly an
order coming to us from the Infinite? Would we not be guilty
of having neglected them? So long as the supposition has not
been judged to be obviously absurd, the duty of examining it
remains.
Once a person admits that a problem about religion does
exist and that every man should consider and solve this problem
without eliminating any of its factors, then he cannot take refuge
in ignoring the present question. When face to face with an
idea so persistent and so deeply rooted among men as the idea
of miracles, and when confronted with facts, which if once es­
tablished might possibly modify the very foundation of our moral
3

life, no man who is sincere with himself can be satisified with
shrugging his shoulders and passing on. He has to face the
troublesome subject, if only to prove to himself that he can
legitimately be unconcerned with it.

PARI'

THE

FIRST

THE PHILOSOPHICAL ATTITUDES PRESUPPOSED FOR
THE EXAMINATION OF THE FACTS

The majority of those who deny miracles have made up
their minds against them because of philosophy or because of
critical method. As these men scan the facts or documents, they
are persuaded in advance that miracles are either impossible
or unrecognizable, or at least that it would be imprudent from
a critical point of view to admit them. Consequently, the result
of their investigations is predetermined; it can only be negative.
Hence, it is the presuppositions that are more important than
anything else in this matter. In them are found at least the
most important difficulties, if not all of them. And that is why
we are going to examine in two successive parts the philosophical
attitudes and the critical attitudes which precede the examination
of the facts. We shall always contrast the correct attitude with
those attitudes which are shown to be defective.

Of the various philosophical attitudes that exclude miracles,
the only ones that should be considered here are those which
propose specific arguments directly opposed to miracles.
There are other philosophical attitudes that exclude miracles
by way of necessary consequence and without having to bother
about them in particular. For example, miracles are obviously
incompatible with atheism, materialism, and fatalism. In these
doctrines the denial of the supernatural flows out of some gen­
eral world outlook as a simple corollary that lacks interest or
any special difficulty. Moreover, it is clear that once certain
persons have embraced premises like these, the thing to be
discussed with them is these premises and not the question
about wonders. Consequently, we pass by such systems of
thought and fix our attention on those attitudes which are aimed
directly and specifically against the idea of miracles. The at­
titudes which are most important today can be arranged under
three headings: naturalism, determinism, and philosophies of
contingency.

CHAPTER I
NATURALISM

EXPOSITION. Naturalism consists precisely in the direct
denial of miracles as supernatural facts. According to natur­
alism, the world we live in is a closed system into which nothing
enters from the outside. The events occurring in it, however
strange they may be, must all find their explanation in the
forces or elements composing our world and in the influences
that regularly operate in it. The manner in which beings and
realities develop proceeds according to a single pattern which
4

5

is identical with itself — regardless of whether this be contin­
gent or necessary, reducible to matter or spirit, or rather, a
resultant of various factors.
“As far as I’m concerned,” writes T. H. Huxley, “I must
confess that the term nature embraces the totality of existing
things.... I cannot conceive of any reason for cutting up the
universe into two halves, one natural and the other super­
natural.” And Anatole France says, “Either this thing exists
or it does not exist; and if it does exist, then this thing is in
nature and therefore natural.” As a result everything can be
explained in the same manner as the things which have already
received a scientific explanation. To find the nature of any­
thing whatever, all we have to employ are the given facts which
the universe presents to us. This includes data from physics,
chemistry, biology, psychology, and other such fields. We
shall encounter only what we know already and, possibly lying
behind these things, other similar facts that we will be able to
discover some day.
If liberty exists on this earth, we must seek its source in
man. This liberty is a part of the world; and although it is the
opposite of necessity, it inevitably shows itself at one moment
or another in the ordinary course of events. If spirits exist,
our only concern will be with those that have bodies. The use
which other spirits might possibly make of their freedom sur­
passes our powers of observation. If there is a God present
and active in His work, then His activity is wrapped up in the
activity of secondary causes and never shows itself separately.
These fundamental theses take on varying shades of mean­
ing with the various philosophers. There are the ordinary
deists for whom the invariable decrees of the divinity allow
of absolutely no exception. There are pantheists and monists
who identify Him with nature or with spirit or with reality.
Moreover, there are agnostics, positivists, and others who
claim that every attempt to transcend experience is useless;
for example, to seek the causes of some phenomenon. Be­
yond philosophical circles, naturalism is gaining ground and
permeating everything. Whenever confronted with any extra­
ordinary happening, many learned persons, litterateurs, and
historians instinctively assume the intransigent attitude which
we just heard Huxley and Anatole France describe. Religious
groups and even Christian circles are not immune from this
contagion.
Since the time of Reimarus (whose Wolfenbuttel Fragments
were published by Lessing in 1777 and 1779) and of Paulus

6

(1761-1851), there has arisen an exegesis which claims to
answer the two following questions in regard to every account
contained in the Sacred Writings: (1) Did the narrated event
actually take place? (2) How could it have taken place natur­
ally?1 Since the time of Schleiermacher (1768-1834), there
have been some theorizers about dogma who have tried to
attach a purely natural meaning to the creeds and to wipe out
the line of demarcation between miracles and other events.
Liberal Protestants belong to this group as well as the Mod­
ernists of Catholicism.2 All of them, with varying degrees of
clarity and complexity, are again eagerly adopting the defini­
tion proposed by their common ancestor, Schleiermacher:
“Miracle is just the religious name for an event. As
soon as any event presents itself to the receiving sub­
ject in such a way that the religious aspect is the dom­
inant one, then, even if it be the most natural and most
ordinary of events, it is a miracle. The more religious
you are, the more you will see miracles everywhere.”3
CRITICISM. You can see that naturalism is a Protean doc­
trine, capable of spreading out into the most varied of systems
and of fitting in with the most disparate of ideas. The impor­
tant thing, when judging naturalism, is certainly not a survey
of all its evolutionary developments. On the contrary, sound
method demands that we view it as detached from its occasional
associates and confined to its own arguments. And it should be
free, too, from those artificial restrictions which it might under­
go in this or that situation.
Consequently, we will not consider those cases where natu­
ralism seems ruled by broader, more fundamental principles;
for instance, those of agnosticism or positivism. We can also
set aside the objections which naturalists could urge against
any intervention into this world by the God of the Christians or
the God of a spiritual philosophy. Really, such objections do
not come from the naturalists alone. They do not spring from
the basic position of naturalism. They do not attack the super­
natural as such but only a certain type of the supernatural. And
even then they have a special reason for urging their objections.
1 Cf. the Encyclopédie des sciences religieuses of F. Lichtenberger,
Tome X, p. 303.
2 Cf. the numerous examples and references in our Introduction, pp.
22 ff.
1 Fr. E. Schleiermacher, Reden uber die Religion an die Gebildeten
unter ihren Verachtem, Berlin, 1799, pp. 117 f.

7

For these can be turned into makeshift arguments, sometimes
aimed merely ad hominem, against persons clinging to theism.4
If you look at naturalism as it is in itself and in its whole
extent, you will see it either as a mental outlook deemed selfevident, or else as a logical system built upon several steps
of induction or deduction.
It would be a mistake to think that this first type of natu­
ralism is rare. Quite the contrary. The “self-evident ” natu­
ralism is rather common, especially among the learned, among
litterateurs and historians. It has become a kind of instinct
with them. Many of them do not bother to set clearly before
their eyes the basic formula of their naturalistic thinking. For
them naturalism needs no proof, and they are willing to pr e­
suppose it as holding true in all cases. For some people
naturalism is an axiom, while others put it forth as an indis­
pensable “postulate5* for the mind of man.
Now the least that can be said is that this axiom or postulate
is not at all self-evident. How can a person know right from
the start that over and beyond this world of ours which lies
open to our investigation there certainly does not exist in re­
serve another world into which we cannot penetrate easily?
Maybe there are different planes of reality that do not nec­
essarily intersect. Maybe some beings exist who exercise
their influence upon cosmic actions and reactions only in an
accidental sort of way because of a free choice on their part.
If God is ceaselessly present in the world to conserve and
control it, perhaps He has at His disposal various ways of
operating, including one that He uses only on rare occasions.
These are a number of problems which do not at all appear
to be absurd if you simply consider what they say. As far as
we are concerned, we will examine them and make an effort to
render a reasonable solution to these problems,5 For the
time being, we should note the fact that naturalism is not so
strikingly clear that it automatically makes these problems
vanish and that consequently this doctrine of naturalism is not
self-evident nor does it force itself upon the mind as an axiom
does. You have to look for reasons to support it.
Then there is the second type of naturalism, the one that
tries to prove its claims. Its arguments are identical with
4 We will examine these objections later when reviewing the agents
possibly involved in producing miracles. Cf. below, Chapter , Sec­

tion I, pp. 27 ff.
5 Cf. below, Chapter IV, Section Π, pp. 40 ff.

8

those of determinism. We shall take them up in the chapter
that follows immediately. Spinoza says all things are natural
because in its essence reality can only be one. Hume or Renan
says that all things are natural because a sufficient induction
has established the fact that supernatural activity never inter­
feres with cosmic activities. To grasp the details of these
arguments and of the critique which should be urged against
them, all the reader has to do is to replace the word or idea
of determinism in what follows with that of naturalism.

CHAPTER II

DETERMINISM
We are not going to speak here about the type of deter­
minism which denies human freedom.6 Rather, we shall con­
sider the determinism which will not admit that supernatural
agents are capable of modifying the ordinary course of events
by exercising their freedom. The basis for such determinism
can be either deduction or induction.
I. DEDUCTIVE DETERMINISM

One type of strict universal determinism makes necessity
the essential law of reality and argues from this necessity to
the impossibility of miracles. This determinism consists,
therefore, in a thesis from metaphysics plus a simple corollary
concerning wonders. This determinism does not level a single
objection directly and specifically against wonders. Rather, it
excludes them because of a general principle — in the same way,
for example, as it excludes free creation. Strictly speaking, we
should not take up this type of determinism here. Yet, to make
this study a bit more complete, we shall say a few words about
one author who adopted this determinism in order to make an
open and prolonged attack against miracles. We are speaking
of Spinoza.
8 See Fr. Munnynck’s article on “Déterminisme” in the Dictionnaire
Apologétique de la Foi Catholique, I, 928 ff. (Subsequent references
to this source will be indicated by DA..F.C.)

9

EXPOSITION. According to Spinoza, only one substance
exists — the divine substance, with its attributes and its modes,
“Particular realities are nothing but modifications of the at­
tributes of God. They are also called modes.” The determin­
ation of these modes comes from the necessities of the divine
essence. Therefore, contingency is banished from reality.
Since the laws of nature are the divine decrees and there are
no other divine decrees than the very laws of the divine es­
sence, it follows that there are definitely not two types of
effects, some attributable to nature and others attributable to
some special divine volitions.
This necessity in all things acts as the foundation for our
intellectual edifice. Those who advocate miracles topple the
edifice by introducing arbitrariness into the world. We need
necessity in order to live and think. We need it especially in
order to prove the existence of God, because for this proof we
must have ideas that are necessary and cannot fail to square
with reality. If we thought that some sort of power could mod­
ify these ideas, or if we suspected that their exactness might
be altered, then our conclusions about God’s existence would
have no foundation and we could no longer be sure of anything.
Consequently, we should give up miracles so we can safe­
guard our belief in God and the soundness of our own thinking.7
CRITICISM. We do not have to make a complete investi­
gation of pantheism here. All we have to consider is that aspect
of this “system of identity” which touches on miracles. Pan­
theism excludes miracles for the same reason that it excludes
free creation, for in the eyes of the pantheist it is impossible
for contingent effects to emanate from a necessary being.
However, pantheism is really placing itself in very difficult
straits by proposing this type of objection. For according to
pantheism, phenomena are ceaselessly changing and disap­
pearing — not indeed as produced effects, but as necessarily
connected modes, as phases of an intrinsic evolution, and as
natural expressions of some limitless existence that is eternal
and necessary. This tight unification puts contradiction right
at the heart of being.
On the other hand, if a simple relation of cause to effect is
set up between the necessary and the contingent, this danger is
avoided. For then, the two elements remain distinct; they are
no longer just one being, but a plurality of beings. And the re­
lation which is proposed between these beings not only avoids
7 Cf. below, pp. 39-40.

10

self-contradiction, but is imperiously demanded by the nature
of reality. Actually, events that are passing and variable de­
mand a necessary being as their original source and their
indispensable support. In order to give a full explanation of
change, a person cannot call a halt at some cause which under­
goes change in itself to produce this change; but by further
analysis he must actually penetrate to a cause that cannot
change. As long as he calls a halt at the first cause he en­
counters, no ultimate explanation is given, since some ex­
planation has to be given for this cause itself and for the
change taking place in it. Consequently, one is forced to place
over and above all contingent beings a primum movens im­
mobile.
You can see that this entire discussion is moving right
back into general metaphysics. We are viewing miracles as
a particular case of the relations existing between the finite
and the infinite. All we can do here is to remind our reader
of the elements of a problem which certainly lies beyond our
present scope and which has been thoroughly treated in the
articles on “Creation” and “Pantheism.”8
The objection that miracles would wipe out necessity and
therefore do away with the starting point for all our reasoning
is founded on an incredible begging of the question. Miracles
do not necessarily transform the world into some arbitrary
realm where nothing is fixed or certain. A miracle can be
viewed as an extremely rare exception that never occurs ex­
cept for a good reason which has to be evident. Besides this,
the miracle will be surrounded by special and very distinctive
circumstances that will keep a person from confusing a mir­
acle with any other event. Moreover, if we suppose this ex­
ception has taken place, it would never be anything but an
existing fact. A miracle does not at all detract from first
principles or from logical reasonings, since a miracle belongs
to a completely different sphere, that of contingent events.
The sphere of necessity remains intact and undisturbed. It
retains its time-honoured boundaries.9
Finally, the miraculous exception itself will have to fulfill
several conditions before it can be acknowledged. It could
never be some chance event that would turn the general order
upside down without regard for anything. Nor could it be some
fantasy that has no threads tying it into the texture of reality.
Cf. ZJ-A.F.C. I, 722-734; and ΠΙ, 1303-1333, respectively.
9 Cf. below, pp. 17 and 39-40.

11

No, the miraculous exception must fit in harmoniously with
the general system of the world.1 We will see that a. person
can simultaneously believe in a miracle and God’s existence
without renouncing his own absolute principles of thought.

Π. INDUCTIVE DETERMINISM

Metaphysical determinism is not nearly so widespread as
another type of determinism that appeals to experience and
rests upon induction. It is this inductive determinism that is
met with everyday. It lies at the bottom of objections coming
from historians and the learned who will have nothing to do
with miracles. Sometimes it is said that these people reject
miracles a priori. Such a statement is both true and false. It
is true in the sense that these persons believe they possess
certitudes that free them from the need of ever examining any
particular case to see whether wonders exist. But it is false
if understood to mean that these people actually drew these
certitudes just from experience. We shall investigate the
method that they use.
First Type: Induction that claims to produce certainty
A. The Direct Objection. Induction is the reasoning pro­
cess used to extract a general law from a certain number of
cases observed. If applied carefully to a sufficient number and
variety of phenomena, this procedure leads to conclusions that
are certain. It is at the source of all those laws of nature which
are confirmed by our daily experience. Now some people claim
that this inductive procedure can be applied to the question of
miracles. The truth of the matter, so they say, is that nature
constantly shows itself to be of one pattern. This has been
found true for cases beyond numbering, in circumstances that
have been altered in every possible way, and before observers
who were as different as could be. Never has the experience of
any of them stretched out into some larger sphere of reality or
gone farther than this natural world of ours. From these facts,
therefore, according to the inductive process, the following
legitimate conclusion can be drawn: nature’s course unfolds
itself in the most uniform of patterns, without leaving room for*
10 Cf. below, Chapter IV, Section Π, pp. 40 if.

12

any contingency, any miracle, This is the way that Hume,
Stuart Mill, Renan, and others argue.11
Let us examine this line of thought. What kind of exper­
ience are these men speaking about?
Is it the experience gained from ordinary phenomena? It
is quite true that the only thing revealed to us by an extended
experience embracing the farthest reaches of known history is
nature’s tightly knit and quite imperturbable continuity in the
events of this world. If somewhere events take place which
seem marvellous, we must admit that they do not come within
the scope of the ordinary man’s experience. Out of a thousand
persons, nine hundred and ninety-nine have never seen any
marvellous events and never will see them. But what follows
from these facts is the direct contradictory of the conclusion
some people draw. Ordinary experience pertains only to
events that lie outside our present question. Consequently,
ordinary experience is not a suitable source for forming any
decision about wonders.
If the mass of mankind were put directly in the presence of
facts that appeared marvellous, then their opinion on them
would have some weight. But this is not the case. Most men
have nothing upon which to base their induction except events
that do not even appear to be marvellous. And therefore, of
what value is an opinion they may form about events that are
different? The truths which this induction from common sense
does establish are that there exists an ordinary course of
events which is constant for all practical purposes, that pru­
dence bids us live and think as if miracles were never going to
sprout up along our path, and that, practically speaking, “they
don’t happen.”
On the other hand, wonders and miracles are known pre­
cisely as exceptions, as anomalies that are extremely rare
and practically negligible as far as the ordinary course of life
goes. These wonders and miracles presuppose uniformity as
the regular thing. Thus ordinary experience furnishes them
with that precise circumstance which they must have if they
are going to be recognized. It offers, to speak figuratively, the
dull backdrop against which these wonders, if existent, will
stand out in brilliant contrast. But about the wonders them­
selves, ordinary experience has nothing to say, either pro or
con. Ordinary experience works within a sector of reality
11 Texts and references will be found in the author’s Introduction, pp.
38 ff.

13

where wonders are, by supposition, not to be found.
Consequently, what must be investigated are the phenomena
which at least give the appearance of being wonders. Only ex­
perience that centers on such phenomena is of any value in our
present question. Now does such experience offer any basis
for a sound inductive argument against miracles?
Erroneous induction. Let us not forget that if a person fails
to sift out from these phenomena certain natural influences, the
result will be an illegitimate generalization. No longer will
there be an induction, but only an instance of the common soph­
ism: ab uno or a quibusdam disce omnes. (From one case or
from several, you can figure out what all the cases are like.)
Renan made this mistake by reasoning in the following way: the
prodigies reported by Livy and Pausanias were make-believe;
therefore, the same holds true for Gospel miracles; and these
latter should be rejected without examination. Renan also be­
lieved that three references to the Gazette des Tribunaux were
sufficient to bolster his statement that “no present-day miracle
stands up under examination.”12 Such procedure is a bit
superficial.
Correct induction, a) its positive task: to discover the
causes.
If we proceed in a more mature fashion, can we not use
induction to extract some certainties? For example, I make
a collection of quite a large number of cases in which, despite
the great variety of circumstances, the people’s belief in a
miracle is explained by fraud, ignorance, credulity, or excited
imagination. I notice that when these factors are present, leg­
ends about miracles sprout forth spontaneously, and that these
legends evolve so much the more readily in proportion as the
aforementioned factors are realized more fully. From these
observations I induce a general law: there is a natural causal
connection between credulity and ignorance and the acceptance
of prodigies. Posita causa ponitur effectus; variata causa
variatur effectus. (When the cause is in operation, the effect
follows; when the cause is altered, the variation is reflected in
the effect.) In this way my induction arrives at a positive con­
clusion which is unassailable.
So far, so good. But this conclusion does not at all mean
that wonders are impossible. That ignorance or credulity may.
often lie at the bottom of belief in wonders no one denies. But
what has to be ascertained is whether ignorance or ere ulity
12 Ci. Introduction, pp. 41 and 44.

14

are always at the bottom of such a belief, and whether they
alone are present —in other words, whether with these factors
we are in possession of the solution which alone covers all the
cases. Up until now, it has not been proved that some other
factor — for example, the actual occurrence of wonders — could
not substitute for ignorance and credulity in producing this
belief. The third law of experimental reasoning has not been
applied: sublata causa tollitur effectus. (If the cause is re­
moved, the effect ceases.)
The close connection between causes and effects is not al­
ways reciprocal, even on the plane of physical phenomena.
And from the fact that some particular cause never fails to
bring about some particular effect, it does not follow that this
effect could not possibly stem from any other cause. Take the
objection just presented as an instance of this. Have we not
already seen that excited imagination and fraud — which are
perfectly distinct antecedents — both tend to produce exactly
the same result; namely, belief? And it has not at all been
proved that tills belief could not possibly arise from still dif­
ferent sources. The same thing occurs in other spheres where
ignorance, credulity, and so on, play their part in the origin
of belief. But this does not prevent objective truth from simul­
taneously playing its own role. Men give too ready a credence
to fictitious tales because they make a mistake or because
someone deceives them; but there are also times when they
believe for sound reasons, because they have solid grounds
for belief. What reason is there for saying that the same thing
does not hold true in this question of wonders?
Correct induction: b) its negative task: to exclude causes.
The positive results of this induction are not far-reaching
enough to wipe out the possibility of wonders. But there is a
negative role which induction can play. It is capable of point­
ing out not only what is at work but also what is not at work.
At times induction can definitely eliminate certain phenomena
from the class of possible causes. For example, it is through
induction that we learn that an oak tree never sprouts up from
a grain of wheat and that hydrochloric acid will never be ob­
tained by making oxygen react upon carbon. In like manner,
why should induction not be able to teach us that no true super­
natural fact is ever the source of belief in wonders?
There is no parallel between the examples just mentioned
and our question about wonders. In the examples induction
works upon several pairs of data, and experience supplies the
induction with both terms of these pairs. But in the case of
15

wonders, as the objection presents it, induction gains hold of
just one of the terms. We know experimentally what an oak
tree is and what a grain of wheat is, and that is why we can den;
with certainty that certain relations exist between them. On the
other hand, when we are treating of wonders and of belief in
wonders, it is taken for granted that belief is the only term we
experience. Therefore, we cannot decide directly about its re­
lations to some other term that lies beyond our experience.
I admit that induction succeeds indirectly in eliminating the
unknown element. But this occurs only in cases where the in­
duction finds some known factor to take the place of the unknown
element. For example, I know that water never fails to result
every time I unite oxygen, hydrogen, and an electric spark in a
test-tube. Therefore, these antecedents themselves are suf­
ficient to bring about the result. When they are present, it is
useless to look beyond them for some explanation of the phe­
nomena. In such a case the experimenter is not at all tempted
to attribute the origin of the water to the influence of some
planets or to some unknown cause whose action has remained
hidden.13 Why? Because the spot is taken, the sufficient
reason has been found, the other circumstances and the un­
known element itself have been set aside as superfluous, with­
out having to bother about them directly.
Now in all this there is nothing resembling an all-inclusive
rejection of wonders that is based on the experience of several
instances of error and fraud. When applied to our subject, this
present procedure simply proves that there is no need of having
recourse to a supernatural cause when an adequate natural ex­
planation has been found — and this is a platitude. Wonders will
be indirectly eliminated each time that adequate natural causality
is proved to be present. This is the only truth that follows, and
it is little enough.
Consequently, induction does not lead to any decisive con­
clusion opposing the wonderful. This is because induction
actually is not concerned with questions of possibility or im­
possibility. What it is concerned with is factual regularity. It
does not say, “This phenomenon must always necessarily ac­
company or follow that other phenomenon”; but rather, “this
phenomenon does accompany or follow that other phenomenon
when the desired conditions are fulfilled.” Induction does not
13 For the detailed argumentation that makes this conclusion certain,
cf. Introduction, p. 59.

16

know whether unknown agents can change, impede, or substitute
for the activity of those agents which it has discovered.
B. The Indirect Objection: the anti-scientific results
of adm i t ting wond e rs.
Some people think that admitting miracles is incompatible
with experimental science. The existence and success of ex­
perimental science are founded on observation and induction.,
and this science constitutes an enormous accomplishment which
cannot be ignored. However, the central core of the science so
constructed is the principle of determinism. This principle as­
sumes that “the conditions of existence for every phenomena
are determined in an absolute manner. Put in other words, this
means that once the condition of a phenomenon has been dis­
covered and fulfilled, then the phenomenon must always nec­
essarily be reproduced at the experimenter’s good-pleasure.
To deny this principle would be tantamount to denying the ex­
istence of science itself.’* — Claude Bernard. “Every predic­
tion is an impertinence, if there is an unsettled force that can
modify the laws of the universe at its whim.. .” — Renan.14
At this point there is need for us to treat of a gross mis­
representation of the thesis under attack. A person can accept
miracles without having them occur everywhere. Most people
who believe in miracles consider them as rare exceptions that
are likely to occur only in certain circumstances and then
never without good reasons which a careful investigation can
discover. The opposition, however, assumes that miracles are
likely to occur everywhere at all times. People point to them
in churches and on pilgrimages; and that is reason enough, so
they say, for being on the look-out for them in the laboratories.
Since there can be no exception to a rule unless first there
is a rule, the idea of a miracle presupposes the idea of that
habitual constancy in nature’s way of acting which is the object
of experimental science. The opposition, however, assumes
that a miracle destroys all order in the universe. This amounts
to saying that a single exemption, which suspends the law in
just one case among billions and trillions of similar cases, de­
stroys the law itself. It even means that this single exemption
could keep people from seeing the law operate ordinarily there­
after or from being able to predict the law’s application with a
practically infallible certainty!
14 Cf. below, pp. 39-40.

17

are using the inductive method in handling this problem, the
only way we have of discovering their worth is to examine the
I
According to Matthew Arnold, it must be conceded that no
explanations one by one when they are brought up to explain the
complete and rigorous inductive argument exists against
facts. Such an examination is the only one that can give us the
miracles. Nevertheless, he feels that there are indications
information, and neither we nor anyone else has the right to
pointing in this direction and that these are constantly becoming
anticipate the results of this examination here and now. The
stronger. Just as men are becoming more educated and more
person who keeps these various remarks in mind will find the
critical, so the explanations which rely upon wonders are be­
basis for the objection shrinking considerably. The number of
coming fewer and fewer. Is this itself not an indication that
events that formerly were considered as miraculous but now
wonders will eventually disappear?
are indisputably held to be historical and natural will no longer
We will break down this objection into two clearly distinct
appear so vast to him. Above all, the hypothesis about wonders
parts. The first will concern those real events, once considered,
being found everywhere in primitive times will appear in the
miraculous, which scientific criticism has put back in their
light of history to be a pure fiction.
place. The second part of the objection will embrace miracu­
b) But even if all the premises of this objection were valid,
lous events, once considered real, which historical criticism
no decisive conclusion would follow. Actually, they presuppose
has found to be fictitious.
that the wonderful is not completely explained, for past explana­
First Part, a) It would be quite a task to discuss the basis
tions are only adduced as indications of future explanations
of the first part of the objection, for certain authors have made
which have not yet been found. Now it is impossible to conclude
it as wide as they pleased to fit the needs of their own case.
from these former to the latter.
Loisy (using the pen-name of Firmin) and Renan inform us of a
Just because a large number of cases have been solved, it
certain period in history when men were in the habit of seeing
does not follow either with certitude or even with positive prob­
miracles everywhere, when the notion of an order in nature had
ability that the other cases are going to be solved, and solved
not even entered their minds. Such a statement is marked with
in the same way. For maybe these cases will be different. Here
a great deal of make-believe, because the people of ancient
is that “maybe” which keeps the whole problem in suspense and
times, for all their credulity, were nevertheless accustomed to
it cannot be removed except by metaphysics. This “maybe”
distinguish between a prodigy and the ordinary course of events.
springs up from the facts themselves, because if they are the
The proof of this fact lies in the attention itself which they
only thing we look at, we could just as easily make up an hypo­
gave to a prodigy and in the care which they took in noting it
thesis contrary to the one proposed to us. If energized re­
down. For example, both in the Bible as well as in the classi­
agents have attacked some residue and it has not become liquid,
cal historians the course of ordinary events was presupposed;
perhaps this is because of the solidity of the residue. And if
and generally it was quite a rare occasion for wonders to break
certain chemical elements offer resistance to the very same
in upon this procedure. Moreover, a very large number of
methods that were used successfully on other elements, ap­
events which the ancient writers presented as extraordinary
parently this is because these elements are different. With
would still deserve such a classification if they actually occurred.
probability on either side, each man will pick that probability
And lastly, we still have to find out whether the wonders rejected
which pleases him more. However, their mutual opposition
by modern scientific criticism were rejected according to correct
will keep the conjectures from becoming fixed either in one
procedure. Surely no one will ask us to accept such a verdict
sense or in the other.
without examination and merely on the say-so of the objectors.
Second Part. The efforts of historical criticism have been
Even the most radical naturalists openly admit the inaccuracy
far more successful than those of scientific criticism. The
and at times the ridiculousness of some of the explanations
chief way by which it has disposed of many wondrous events is
excogitated by their predecessors in naturalism.
that of calling into question the testimony connected with these
It follows that it would be completely unreasonable to deter­
events. Later on we will give a detailed evaluation of the
mine in advance that the natural explanations, which have been
principles and the method which guided these efforts. Here
put forth in such profusion, are not open to examination. we
and now we find no difficulty in acknowledging the beneficial
must see how much these explanations are wort .
d since we
19
18

/

Second Type: Induction proceeding from simple conjectures

results of a large number of its findings.
However, there are no grounds at all for assuming that
some day this historical criticism will make wonders disappear
completely. For the refining activity of criticism has occurred
in a good number of other fields, and no one dreams of pre­
dicting that criticism will suppress those fields completely.
There have been legends that contained purely natural events
as well as those that contained wonders. Amazing feats have
been invented, transactions of tremendous import have been
imagined, and striking historical utterances have been devised.
And the number of natural facts that have been scientifically
established has decreased all along the line. But does this
mean that some day we must cancel out the whole of history?
Granted that some of the witticisms of Henry IV are not his
own. Does this mean that he never uttered any at all ? Granted
that historical criticism has cut down their number. Does this
give us ground for suspecting that his other witticisms are just
as likely to disappear?
To summon onto the stage some unreal future objections
that are considered to be as valid as genuine objections, even
though here and now they are nothing but pure non-entities, is
a critical method that is a bit ridiculous. Such a technique
could be applied to anything. And if it were, we would have to
distrust everything that we hold for certain; for we would tell
ourselves that although this is the way we actually see the
thing here and now, perhaps there may arise some unsuspected
objection in the future that will ruin everything. This would be
universal scepticism. People can adopt such a course; but if
they do, they should admit the fact instead of bringing up a
specific objection against wonders.

CHAPTER ΙΠ

THE PHILOSOPHIES OF CONTINGENCY AND CONTINUITY
The philosophies of contingency and continuity take their
stand as the direct opposites of determinism. Instead of rejecting miracles, these systems embrace them, but only in
order to have miracles melt into a milieu amid the other phe­
nomena where all differences of species and even all individual

characteristics cease to exist. If every event is just as unex­
pected and continuous as every other event, then miracles can
no longer stand out either as free actions or as distinct facts.
If the system of contingency were taken in its radical form
and pushed to its limits, it would rule out the idea of continuity
and would consist in imagining the universe as a chaotic en­
semble of events without dependence, without connection, and
without order. Under this reign of non-coherent change, any­
thing could follow anything whatsoever; and hence, nothing
would be particularly miraculous. But the experience gained
through centuries — yes, that very experience upon which we
saw determinism trying to build — sharply contradicts this
paradoxical dream which no philosopher has adopted. We can
pass by such a system.
However, if the doctrine is worked out philosophically, it
will keep the ideas of continuity and contingency closely con­
nected and draw converging arguments from them. Such a
brand of philosophy is particularly noticeable in two Christian
thinkers who have made it the basis for their theories about
miracles; namely, Maurice Blondel and Edouard LeRoy. In
this paper we cannot analyze the thought of these men in all
its nuances and variations. We have made this detailed study
elsewhere and take the liberty of referring the reader to this
work in justification of the assertions we are going to make.15*
EXPOSITION. While differing about some items that we
will omit here, the two authors just mentioned agree substan­
tially upon the following ideas which are the starting points
for their entire critique of miracles.
1. Contingency. Reality is unending novelty, ceaseless
variation. Reality never repeats itself exactly. No two events
are perfectly similar. The uniform laws which pretend to repre­
sent nature only paint a false picture. The way these laws
are formulated is by passing by each non-useful or uninteresting
item. These laws are a convenient norm for action, but they are
not accurate from a speculative viewpoint. — When such a position
is taken, the notion of miracle (at least as it is understood here)
vanishes in thin air. Since uniformity and determinism are no­
where to be found, a real exception is obviously unthinkable.
15 See La notion de vérité dans la “philosophie nouvelle,” 1908. —Dieu
dans “l’Evolution créatrice,” 1912. (Or Études, March 5, 1908, and
February 20, 1912.) — Immanence: essai critique sur la doctrine de
M. Maurice Blondel, 1913; and lastly, Introduction à l'étude du mer­
veilleux et du miracle, 1916. Cf. also the Note at the close of this
chapter, pp. 25-26.

21

2. Continuity. All being is bound together. No being can
be set apart from the whole without losing its true aspect.
“Piecemealing” is first brought in by the senses and the in­
tellect since they make us view separately what in reality is
one. Knowing is thus a deforming operation. Consequently, a
miracle does not exist as a distinct fact upon which we might bas·.
a valid argument. Moreover, any special argument is itself a
“piecemealing, ” and this for two reasons: first, because it
consists of abstract ideas; and secondly, just because it is
something special and considered as valid in itself. Hence, it
is impossible to conclude to a divine intervention by starting
from wonders and miracles.
CRITIQUE. 1. Contingency, a) Reducing everything to
contingency is just as much an insult to sound judgment as re­
ducing everything to determinism. Willy-nilly we find our­
selves in the presence of two elements in this world, neither
of which can absorb the other. The free activity of men does
cut across the path of nature; and whatever be the metaphysical
opinion which people may devise about the one or the other,
still, as far as experience goes, it is impossible to confuse
these two elements. It is in experience that these two phe­
nomena are different and discernible. Consequently, if some
free activity besides our own should intervene here below, it
would be just as discernible as our own.
When people start high-lighting the diversity of detail among
physical phenomena as well as the continual variations in it
and the suddenness of its unexpected events (all of which make
it difficult to form a sure and accurate prediction about them),
they are not at all demonstrating the “contingency” of these
phenomena, but merely showing how extremely complicated is
the determinism of these things. There is no analogy between
them and free activities, and it is only playing with words when
the same label is used to confuse such completely different
realities. If it is difficult to predict physical phenomena down
to the last detail, and if there are even times when the pre­
diction is completely false, it nevertheless remains true that
the man who sticks to the ordinary cases and the substance of
the facts finds that the actual results are really those he ex­
pected. The expert makes mistakes in his forecasts, but not
the mistakes he would make if he were dealing with wills capable
of freedom and caprice. When the expert thinks something out
according to what he calls his “laws, ” his conclusions are
usually correct, and error will be an accident ere. On the other
hand, when a prophecy about free future actions is
®d,

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22

people signal it out as a rare exception, as a very unlikely
occurrence. These are different cases, and all that has been
said shows how reality is divided into two clearly distinct
zones whose boundaries it would be foolish to erase.
b) Scientific “laws” are not purely arbitrary constructs.
They depend upon two elements and the devotees of contingency
tend to forget about the second. These two elements are the
convenience of expression and the data to be expressed. The
expression can follow convention and thus symbolize reality
instead of representing it. The starting point for science and
the plotting of its course have been conditioned by chance
circumstances and practical conventions. But none of these
things prevents reality from being expressed through some
sort of language or signs. Approach it any way you want — you
will not be so much in command as to see in it whatever you
want.
To be specific, there exists an objective basis for the uni­
formity of laws; namely, the mutual similarity of phenomena.
While every event is an “exceptional case” in certain aspects,
still in many other aspects it remains quite ordinary. Nature
has her own customs, and all one has to do is open his eyes to
see that she rarely breaks them. It is legitimate to group
these similarities under a single formula. Those men who
prescind from these similarities so they can look just at the
differences are deforming reality as much as those who look
only at its similarities. If a person follows Blondel and LeRoy and strips thought and observation of all cognitive value,
it is logical to throw out the idea of a stable regular nature as
if it were some sort of false god. However, this ultimate re­
jection, which sweeps miracles along with it, is nothing but a
simple corollary of a general theory concerning the value of
the mind’s operations; and it is not our task to study such a
matter here.10
c) What is less paradoxical and more to the point is the
objection drawn from the instability of scientific hypotheses.
How can we accept that uniformity in nature which is the nec­
essary foundation for miracles when the “laws,” which were
recognized for a while, are later on incessantly modified by
new discoveries?
Now let us weigh the meaning of the fact just alleged. Na­
ture surely has not made a complete revelation of itself to men.18
18 We made this study in La notion de vérité, pp. 61 ff.; and especially
in Immanence, Part Π, Chapter 2. Cf. also, Introduction, pp. 113 ff.

23

1
i·?

The knowledge we acquire about nature moves forward and
grows deeper, becomes more precise and undergoes cor­
rection — as is true of all our knowledge. However, what is
discovered fits into the same category as what was already
known; the new is like the old. Scientists correct the “law of
Mariotte,” but by means of new “laws.” The regularity of
events is more deeply understood, but it is always regularity
that is understood. In all of this there is nothing that resem­
bles freedom or arbitrariness; if there were, it would cut
across everything else.
2. Continuity. Again there is a general philosophy and a
whole theory of the world implied in the objection which is in­
spired by the principle of continuity. The objection implies
that everything lies within everything else; or at least, that
everything is connected with everything else. We cannot treat
of these difficulties here for they lie far beyond the scope of
this article and even beyond that of apologetics. Without fur­
nishing the whole argument, we shall confine ourselves to the
following statements of things we have proved elsewhere:
The principle of continuity or of universal interdependence
is neither self-evident nor deduced from self-evident premises.
Experience does not force us to see in every phenomenon
the influence of all other phenomena.1718
Rather, the contrary is true; for experience shows us cer­
tain boundaries between events and objects which sometimes
are poorly defined and sometimes are clear-cut.
In this world there are complete series of phenomena which
act toward each other as if they were complete strangers. Even
in an object which is changing, there is some element that per­
dures. The fleeting connections and the trifling accidents which
every alteration of the slightest element generates throughout
the whole unit still leave subsisting in a clearly recognizable
way the substance of the other elements.
And even among phenomena joined together by influences
that are deep and real, certain antecedents can be replaced by
others without causing any corresponding change in what
follows.
Lastly, a partial cognition does have some value and does
not necessarily deform reality.18 Consequently, a person can
consider certain facts separately and base distinct arguments
upon them without deviating from the truth.
17 Cf. Immanence, Part Π, Chapter 1.
18 Ibid., pp. 71 ff.

A Note on the Preceding Chapter^

“The constructive ideas in Le Roy’s theory”
In the course of this study, we will encounter several specific
objections from Le Roy which do not pertain essentially to the
philosophy of contingency and which we had no occasion to con­
sider in that connection. As far as the constructive part of his
theory goes, we have also left it outside this study because it is
only a modernized version of naturalism. However, since it
has enjoyed a certain popularity during its day, we add a brief
analysis of it in this note.
For Le Roy, as well as for his teacher, Bergson, there is
at the source of this world one single current of life. From
this current proceed both spirit and matter, but matter is de­
rivative and spirit is primary.19
20 Therefore, a hidden liberty
lies at the bottom of everything. This liberty does not succeed
in manifesting itself completely except in man. However, the
contrivances and ceaseless variations of nature are also the
attempts it is making at gaining freedom — attempts which are
more or less held in check. A miracle is one of nature’s rare
successes. The spirit, which is the primary source and the
lawful master of bodies, ordinarily does not accomplish with
them what it wishes. It is only at rare intervals, when the
spirit is raised up, so to speak, to a level of higher power by
the influence of religious faith, that it flashes out upon the world
with unexpected achievements. The spirit’s mastery and its cre­
ative power suddenly assert themselves, and then everything
subsides into calm and routine.
In this thaoçy you can see that it is the natural and innate
energy of the spirit which comes to the fore in a miracle.
God’s power does not operate apart from secondary causes or
in a way superior to them. It is faith which works the cure —
faith that is viewed not as a moral fitness, nor as a preparation
for heavenly favors, nor as a meriting activity on the soul’s
part, but as the direct producer of some profound physical
change. And the effectiveness of this faith depends more
19 Translator’s note: In the original article Fr. de Tonquédec also in­
cluded a note on the interpretation of the writing of Blondel. This
note does not seem needed in the English translation. In it Fr. de
Tonquedec showed Blondel’s views to be in a state of flux and stated
that he was criticizing Blondel’s original positions.
20 See Introduction, pp. 89 ff., for the details of this idea which cannot
be explained in a few lines.

25

upon its intensity, on its capacity of injecting a physiological
jolt, than upon its own perfection. Faith works out into its
consequences inevitably, just as some “force of nature” does,
Such a theory does not contain any a priori difficulty
against miracles, beyond those of naturalism and determinism,
Once these two have been set aside, the only thing to be done is
to wait for the investigation of the facts. This is the way to
find out what cure faith has worked and whether it is not a
caprice devoid of all likelihood which credits faith with such
prodigies as a resurrection, a multiplication of loaves, or a
walking on the waters.21

CHAPTER IV

THE ATTITUDE WHICH SHOULD BE ADOPTED: NATURAL
EXPLANATIONS AND SUPERNATURAL EXPLANATIONS
Now that we have discarded the prejudices that seemed to
force themselves upon us in this question of wonders, we still
have to indicate the attitude we are going to adopt in studying
this question. It will be the attitude which is least exclusive.
We shall not reject a priori any plausible explanation, any
principle that might solve the question. It is possible that the
wondrous events people talk about may be fictitious. It is
possible that science may have furnished accepta hl p explana­
tions for these events. It is even possible that the activity of
the unknown natural forces may at first sight look like free
supernatural interventions — later on we will see whether a
person can distinguish these latter from the former.22 How­
ever, the one thing we shall not do is to decree right from
the start that the explanations just mentioned are adequate
for every case.
Thus, without further ado, we throw open the question of
supernatural explanations. Among these explanations, the
first to come to mind and the one around which the most im­
portant argument turns is the explanation based upon God —
upon a personal God, who is intelligent, free, and t e sovereign
21 See Appendix II of Introduction.
22 Cf. below, pp. 54-58.

26

master of the world. Many people admit His existence while
rejecting miracles. Several doctrinal systems claim to prove
God’s existence without appealing to any revelation. We pre­
suppose that this proof has been given.23 Hence, our present
task is to show how miracles fit into a theistic system. We
will do this first by solving difficulties (Section I), and then by
adducing positive arguments (Section II). Far from using
miracles as a starting point for proving the existence of God,
our chief task is quite the contrary; namely, to maintain that
miracles are possible against those who base their denial of
it upon the existence of God and His attributes.
SECTION I: THE OBJECTIONS AGAINST GOD’S
INTERVENTION IN THIS WORLD24

First Objection: Miracles lower God to the level of a secon­
dary cause.
Proposed by Sabatier, Tyrrell, and Loisy.
Several theorists about religious matters do not want God to
show Himself in certain historical events more especially than
in others. They think that for Him this would be leaving the
plane of the Absolute and entering that of the relative, decending
from the Infinite to the finite. Such a change of rank, such a
lowering of Himself appears to them quite logically as a contra­
diction and an absurdity. If God intervened in a miracle, it
would make Him “a particular cause among phenomena like the
other causes.” — Sabatier. “By a kind of self-limitation, God
would leave His position of first and final cause and take the
place of some secondary finite cause.” — Tyrrell.
23 See the article, “Dieu,” D.A.F.C., I, 941 ff.
24 In the examination of these objections, we shall mention the possible
answers of those who favor miracles, without as yet speaking in a
definitive manner. Our aim is to show that the objections are without
force, rather than to expound some system. Consequently, the as­
sertions made here are made on a temporary and hypothetical basis.
Throughout this section there is a condition understood, which runs
as follows: “if there are, on other grounds, positive reasons for ad­
mitting miracles in principle.” It is only after we have presented
those positive reasons that the ideas mentioned here will take on
their full significance. (N.B. References to the original sources
of these eight objections will be found on the last two pages of the
Bibliography. — Transi.)

27

All these remarks do not exactly hit the point maintained
by those advocating miracles. For these do not really sup­
pose that God leaves His position of first cause to lower Him­
self to the role of a secondary cause. On the contrary, they
claim that God preserves His normal essential role; and that
even in so far as He takes the place of secondary causes,
He does not act as a secondary cause. There can be no
question of setting up some equality between a secondary cause,
which never does anything but make use of energy that has come
from elsewhere, and the first cause, which is the unique source
of its own energy. It is true that a miracle, as the term of
God’s activity, is a fact among other facts; but this does not
make its cause enter into the fabric of phenomena or into the
interplay of cosmic elements. This cause remains what it was,
always inaccessible to experience and mysterious.
Moreover, according to the hypothesis of those advocating
miracles, the miraculous fact itself, by reason of its structure
and its extraordinary surroundings, allows one to conclude
that it is not like other facts and that it depends upon the first
cause in a special way. This special dependence consists in
its proceeding immediately from God and doing without the
ordinary intermediaries. For the objection to be valid, it would
have to be proved that the First Being could exert His influence
in only one way; namely, through secondary causes. This is the
point which the objection neither proves nor can prove without
formally contradicting its own presuppositions. For whoever
admits, when faced with created activities, that there is a God
who is Creator and Lord, is forced to admit two types of acti­
vity in God: the immediate activity of creation or of the dona­
tion of being, in which there is no intermediary that collaborates;
and the mediate activity, which consists in obtaining a result by
activating secondary causes. Miracles are similar to the first
type of activity.
Second Objection: Miracles imply changeableness and weakness
in God.
Proposed by Voltaire, Anatole France, and
others.

This objection supposes that the purpose of miracles is to
correct various physical defects in the world. “God could not
disturb His machine except to make it run better.”—Voltaire.
“The ponderous machine needs.. . the helping hand of its maker.”
— Anatole France. Moreover, the objection supposes that God
28

changes His ideas; that after having fashioned the world in
accord with a certain plan, He changes His mind so He can
introduce some modifications. We are presented with a ridic­
ulous picture of a God who determines to “change His eternal
ideas” (Voltaire), so as to make several “timid retouchings”
(Anatole France) from time to time upon His work.
All these ideas are perfectly absurd. If there are some
people who mix such childish fancies into their idea of miracles,
we should pity them. But no sensible mind with even the slight­
est philosophical training will pause over such ideas. Why
limit the purpose of miracles to the physical? Can they not be
conceived as ordered to higher and strictly moral ends? It is
not a question of making a machine run better; but, for example,
of making men attentive to some divine revelation. Miracles
do not take up some task that creation would have failed to
carry out; no, they begin another undertaking — one that is
completely different. Miracles are the contact point between
two orders, the place where a higher order makes its entry
into the natural order.
And what naive anthropomorphism it is to imagine that
some new and distinctive event demands a change of plan on
God’s part or a succession of different ideas! Just as God, by
means of a single infinite decree that is identified with His
essence, chooses the countless variety of beings and laws, so
by one and the same eternal design He wills both the order in
nature and the miraculous exceptions. It is only the two end­
products that are different. They are equally contingent,
equally subordinated, coming from the activity of God. It is
between themselves that they form the contrast. They are
opposed to each other, they follow each other, and the one
changes into the other. However, neither the order of nature
nor the miraculous exception is opposed to any kind of divine
choice. Neither the one nor the other presupposes on God’s
part some special choice which might be a sufficient reason
for the one but not for the other, and against which some other
choice might be opposed.

Third Objection: Miracles imply a lack of wisdom or dignity
in God.
Proposed by Voltaire, Seailles, and others.
Everything connected with a miracle is cheap. First of all,
the end is ignoble. The people who benefit by it are just a few
individuals picked out at random; or at most, the human race,
29

which is pretty much like “one little ant-hill” in this vast uni­
verse, as Voltaire puts it. There is no proportion at all be­
tween an interruption of the cosmic order and such trivial
concerns.
Moreover, the means employed in miracles are not any
loftier either. As Seailles says, they are a few unhappy “snags
inserted arbitrarily” by God in the magnificent order that He
Himself has established. Or they are a couple of cures that
succeeded here and there — successes that are ridiculously
meager when compared to the innumerable cures that human
medicine brings about every day. Now things like these are
unworthy of God’s dignity and His wisdom.
As with the preceding objection, these difficulties betray a
complete misconception of miracles. Here again, the moral
nature of miracles and the purpose assigned to them by those
favoring miracles are completely forgotten. The “snags” that
were mentioned are ennobled by their sublime end. The in­
struction of humanity, its moral betterment, and its sanctifi­
cation are not ignoble goals. There is no question of God’s
competing with medical science, or of His outdoing the thera­
peutic powers of nature which He Himself created; but rather
of His speaking to souls. Moreover, the instantaneous and
majestic manner with which God brings about this sensible
achievement and even those imprints of absolute sovereignty
that He stamps upon His work by “arbitrarily” choosing His
own moments and the recipients of His favors are all char­
acterized by a touch of independence that is in keeping with
the Most Perfect Freedom.
One isolated individual or even the whole human race cer­
tainly is a trifle if their material mass is compared with the
universe. But are we concerned with mass here? “When man
shall have been wiped out by the universe, he will still be nobler
than the thing that killed him. ...” And people understand that
what especially attracts the gaze of the “Father of souls” is
spiritual values, which are of greater interest to Him than the
whole material universe. Of course, neither an individual soul
nor all souls taken together ever merit God’s tender care.
There is nothing in God’s eyes which has a dignity previous to
His own choice. We must give up trying to find among finite
beings an object measuring up to the action of the Infinite.
Nevertheless, people realize that if creatures cannot bring
themselves up to God’s level, His condescension can stoop
down towards them. There is nothing so trivial that it is
overlooked by Limitless Intelligence; there is no moral action
30

without meaning for Absolute Justice; there is nothing too low
for Eternal Mercy and Love. That explains why God can lavish
excessive care on areas which are sometimes so tiny; those
are some of the reasons which can make an extraordinary in­
tervention by God seem plausible a priori, whether that inter­
vention works in favor of all mankind or just in relation to
some privileged souls.

Fourth Objection:

The testimony of experience weakens the
probability of a divine intervention.
Proposed by Hume and Stuart Mill.

We have seen25 that Hume and Stuart Mill used induction
against miracles. Their line of reasoning has nothing special
about it except that, by using a manoeuvre aimed at embarrass­
ing believers, they introduce determinism as a rule of God’s
government rather than as a simple natural law. This does
not change the core of the difficulty at all.
What is novel here are the other controversial propositions
in which Stuart Mill clothes the difficulty. With an eye welltrained in logic, he has caught sight of the precise point where
he must strike the argument of his adversaries to immobilize
it. He spends all his efforts on devaluating the very type of
proofs brought up against him. Here is how he proceeds.26
1. First of all, he says that the regular concatenation of
phenomena, upon which determinism is based, is an object of
experience. But the possibility or the reality of a divine in­
tervention can only rest on a “speculative inference” — an oper­
ation which is far less immediate and therefore less sure.
Reply, a) It is false to say that deterministic naturalism
does not employ speculative inferences and limits itself to the
simple registration of facts. It, too, does its reasoning, and a
good deal of it.
First of all, even if naturalism is seeking for nothing but
invariable antecedents, for all its referring to them as “causes,”
nevertheless, it is not brute experience that will supply it with
these antecedents. Stuart Mill himself has formulated the
logical rules for isolating such antecedents from the amorphous
25 In Chapter Π, pp. 12-13.
26 A serious difficulty arises about the meaning Stuart Mill gives to the
word “cause.” In Introduction, pp. 151 ff., we have shown that it
must be taken in an ontological sense if the very objections of Stuart
Mill are to have any meaning.

31

;i

f

<

mass of facts. It is a question of interpreting experience, of
discovering in the phenomena some connecting bonds that are
necessary, some consequences that are unfailing or “uncondi­
tional” as Stuart Mill would say. Now this whole process is
not completed simply by opening one’s eyes. To put it briefly,
this whole operation consists in making the experimental data
fit into certain “speculative” forms.
But if the word cause is given its full meaning of an effica­
cious and determining antecedent — and this occurs quite fre­
quently in the sciences27 — then metaphysics itself comes into
play. Causality is always reached by inference, discovered
by thought. It is never seen and touched by the senses or
grasped by instruments.
Finally, since the discussion is here concerned with phe­
nomena that appear to be wonders — that is, phenomena which
by hypothesis have no natural cause that is apparent here and
now — it is necessary for all of us, whether determinists or
not, to seek for the explanation outside of experience since ex­
perience does not give it to us. And this is clearly what Stuart
Mill and the others are doing when, instead of going back to
God, they propose for our acceptance some natural hidden
cause. This is admitting that since experience is silent, some
inferences and some speculation must be called upon to come
to a decision.
b) True enough, they will say; but nonetheless, the reason­
ing which concludes to some natural hidden cause is the one
which separates us least from experience. This cause which
we imagine has the advantage of being similar to the causes
we observe. It is modeled after them and someday may show
itself among them and like to them. But God, on the contrary,
is always and essentially an extra-experimental Being.
All right, but these remarks in no way establish the point
to be proved; namely, that this conclusion was obtained by a
procedure which is more immediate than inference. Let us not
confuse the goal and the path to the goal. It is by a reasoning
process that they are trying to prove the superiority of the
concept which they patterned after experience. This reasoning
process has no right at all to pass for an “experimental”
process. It is useless to wish to identify it — I shall not say
with ordinary experience — but with the logical operations that
are applied to experience and render an interpretation of it.
In this situation we are undoubtedly in the realm of the abstract.
27 Cf. Introduction, pp. 59 and 153.

32

When people reject or classify as doubtful everything that
is unobtainable by observation, they are being guided by an a
priori element that belongs to a strictly metaphysical order.
It is by setting up a critique of cognition, by establishing a
hierarchy among our faculties, and then by choosing from the
data furnished by these faculties that people make the value of
experience come to the fore. They make use of ideas of certi­
tude, of error, and of truth. They employ metaphysics and
“criteriology.” Now if all these mental operations do not com­
prise a group of “speculative inferences,” I wonder where the
phrase will be used. Stuart Mill’s philosophy, even when ap­
plied to miracles, is not science. Like all philosophies, it is a
doctrine which rises above and beyond science. And conse­
quently, it has nothing more “immediate” about it than its rivals
have.
It should be added that Mill’s philosophy is also a particularly
fine example of sophistic speculation. If a person draws up into
form the propositions which Stuart Mill directed against miracles,
he will arrive at some genuine monstrosities of logic. Here are
some samples from which to judge:
Experience teaches us that phenomena exist which are cer­
tainly natural but whose cause is unknown; therefore, every
phenomenon whose cause is unknown is natural.28
Experience is a more immediate operation than inference;
this fact gives experience sufficient grounds for reducing the
value of inference to nil and for doing away with its conclusions.
2. But even if a person admits the value of speculative in­
ference in general, he can still take issue with that particular
argumentation which claims to prove the existence of miracles.
This is what Stuart Mill does. According to him, this argumen­
tation runs into two difficulties. The first is that there is always
a probability that some hidden natural cause is present. The
second is that our knowledge of God’s activity in the universe
leaves us in doubt about the compatibility of miracles with His
attributes.
Later on we shall see29 whether and how and where the un­
known natural cause can be excluded with certainty. As far as
God’s attributes go, the question breaks down into two parts.
a) God’s goodness and omnipotence are put forward by
believers to show that miracles are probable a priori. But
Stuart Mill notes that the very facts, which are supposed to
™Ibid., pp- 160 f.
29 Cf. below in Section Π, pp. 54-58.

33

manifest this goodness and power, actually render them so
much the more doubtful. Indeed, everyone agrees that miracles
are a rare exception. How does it happen that Infinite Goodness
shows itself so stingily? Why should a Power without bounds
confine itself to such narrow limits?
On this subject we shall content ourselves with pointing out
the fact that the questions raised here lead back to a far wider
problem which is taken up in theodicy; namely, the problem of
the boundaries which Sovereign Liberty sets to its exterior
activity and the problem of the evil which it allows to exist
without remedying it. These problems lie beyond oui' present
scope.30
b) The way in which Divine Wisdom governs the universe
furnishes Stuart Mill with a separate argument. It is a fact,
says Mill, that we see God acting ordinarily by means of sec­
ondary causes, according to the normal course of events.
Therefore, if He wished mankind to embrace certain doctrines,
He ought to have arranged causes and natural events towards
this end, rather than act just by Himself in some miraculous
way. Hence, one can hold, for example, that God caused
Christianity to bloom at its proper time as the full-flowering
of the development of the human spirit, rather than that He
sought to impose it upon men by strokes of prodigy.
Such an hypothesis is the direct negation of the idea of
revelation. If God wishes to reveal to men a doctrine con­
taining some mystery, or even if He wishes to endow certain
natural truths with His own authority in order to assure them
of a wider and easier propagation, then it is absolutely neces­
sary for Him to furnish some stamp marking His plan. But
what other stamp could be used for this purpose except some
“deed divine”? Revelation is not a necessary occurrence. On
God’s part it is a free act. Hence, it should be realized in some
exterior manifestation which is likewise free. It should take
shape in some event which is simultaneously contingent and
divine. Now what is this event if not a miracle? It may be an
external miracle or an internal and psychological one. It may
be a social-moral miracle or it may be physical; but at any
rate, the sign must be something else than a “natural develop­
ment” of the forces of the spirit, or of matter, or of society.
People must recognize in it an unquestionable intervention
from above, something that lies beyond nature. Here is the
30 Ct. the articles “Dieu” and “Providence” in the DA.F.C , I, 9411088; IV, 433-474, respectively.

only suitable means for authenticating a revelation. And Divine
Wisdom cannot avoid using this means if we suppose that it
wishes to authenticate a revelation.

Fifth Objection: The conclusion that miracles are positively
possible cannot be deduced from God's omni­
potence.
Proposed by Le Roy.
Like Stuart Mill, Le Roy also attacks the argument of God’s
omnipotence and the comparisons which are used to illustrate
it — such as the power of a worker over his machine or of a king
over his realm, and so on; but Le Roy approaches the problem
from another viewpoint. “God can do anything,” says Le Roy,
“except the absurd,” or the contradictory. But perhaps miracles
are contradictory. Perhaps unknown to us there exists in the
immense unfathomable depths of reality some hindrance that
prevents a miracle from taking place. We know nothing about
it. And since we are incapable of grasping the whole of reality,
we cannot know anything about it. Consequently, the argument
drawn from God’s omnipotence comes down to “a simple ‘Who
knows?’ ; ” and no one can give a positive answer to it.
Here we recognize the famous principle of immanence or
universal interdependence: everything belongs to everything
else, everything is within everything else, and nothing can be
known with certitude if known separately. We have studied
this principle elsewhere and shown its exaggerations and as­
sumptions.31 We have seen that a partial science can be exact.
In particular, as far as possibilities are concerned, it is certain
that we judge about them quite a while before they are realized
and without having an exhaustive knowledge about the universe.
For example, whether we look upon them as truths or as recipes,
as Le Roy does, nevertheless, mathematical theorems and even
physical laws are certainly verified in thousands of happenings
and realities which we have never seen and many aspects of
which would be completely new for us and possibly rather
disconcerting.
But the argument of Le Roy, like that of Stuart Mill, is above
all opposed to every speculative and transcendent use of reason.
If the human mind is confined to experience and to the immediate
interpretation of experience, if it is incapable of making any de­
cision in the abstract while reasoning about ideas, then all meta­
physics has been condemned, including the rational proof for the
31 Cf. the references and resumé given above on p. 24.

35

existence of God. And it must be added that Le Roy allows this
consequence. To estimate the value of such extreme positions,
the argument must center — let us say it just once more —not
about miracles, but about metaphysics or general criteriology,
So as not to get too far afield, we shall simply note that Le
Roy paints the position of those holding miracles quite other­
wise than they themselves do. For these latter, the possibility
of miracles is not at all some vague possibility stripped of
special proofs. It is not a possibility about which all direct in­
formation is lacking and which can be deduced only in a confused
way along with other possibilities from the general principle of
God’s omnipotence. They do not say that God can do all things
and consequently should also be able to do this thing. Rather,
they say quite precisely that it is impossible for God not to be
able to do this definite thing. Contradiction not only does not
appear in miracles, but it does appear in their impossibility.
It is this point that we hope will become quite evident after we
have put forth the positive arguments that are the basis for the
possibility of miracles.32

Sixth Objection: To guarantee a revelation by means of prodi­
gies is a procedure that is unworthy of God
because it is too simple, too crude, and too
extrinsic both to the truth advanced and to the
mind addressed.
Proposed by Seailles, Blondel, and Le Roy.
There is an “artificial tone” (Blondel) about the reasoning
that proceeds from a properly established miracle to the fact
of a divine revelation. Being clear and easy, it involves none
of the “learned complicated methods” (Blondel) which please
men of thought. Simple souls can allow themselves to be taken
in by such reasoning, but not “minds capable of reflection and
persons who have any sense of the interior life.” (Le Roy) If
one takes the miracle by itself as a sufficient motive for belief,
if one does not “add something to the demonstration” (Le Roy) for example, by stuffing the facts with symbolism — then the
facts remain without any relation to the truth they are supposed
to certify. Le Roy says that to use “the argument from mir­
acles in this way is to act like a mathematician who would tell
his pupils, ‘Look, here is the statement of the theorem. You
are not intelligent enough to grasp the proof. But I am going to
52 Cf. below in Section II, pp. 40-41.

prove to you that it is true by working right here before your
eyes a set of wonderful feats which will show you how strong I
am.’ ”
a) The charge of excessive simplicity directed against the
proof for the fact of revelation is strange, to say the least. If
God wants to speak to everybody, He must speak in a simple
way. If He is concerned with all mankind and not merely with
“minds capable of reflexion,” then His work must be popular so
that simple souls can interpret it by means of non-complicated
reasonings. If God wants to be understood by man, He must
speak to him in an “anthropomorphic” language. And generally
speaking, it can be said that Infinite Goodness owes it to itself
to set within the reach of everyone those truths which lead to
salvation. Even the most mysterious of truths — such as those
about God’s action in the world —do not have to be reserved
for the exclusive use of persons who are distinguished and
souls that are cultivated and profound. Humble folk—yes, even
coarse folk — should be able to obtain some non-misleading
ideas about these mysteries; for example, by means of those
parables that are so much disdained.
b) The nature of the reasoning just criticized will become
more evident when we again take it up for our own purposes.
Let us only mention that there is no similarity between the
showman’s flourish imagined by Le Roy and the “argument
from miracles.” As a matter of fact, even if a miracle is not
a symbol or a parable in action, it has to have certain moral
characteristics. The argument supposes this. For in order to
be attributable to God, the prodigy must harmonize with our
moral sense both in its intrinsic marks and in the manner in
which it takes place. The same thing holds true concerning the
doctrine to which the prodigy testifies. This doctrine may sur­
pass our highest aspirations, but it cannot contradict them. It
may go beyond them, but it must go in the same direction.
Moreover, a divine miracle has locked up within itself a
significance that is intrinsic and essential, a significance that
is independent of any allegorical meanings which may be added
to it. It is this inner significance which saves the reasoning
criticized by Blondel and Le Roy. A miracle announces that
God is intervening, that God is speaking, and that consequently,
man ought to listen on his knees. A miracle, so to speak, wears
the trappings of the Supreme Majesty and of the Sovereign Power.
It is the voice of God and as such it takes on an awesome char­
acter. This religious meaning is inseparable from a miracle
and connects it intrinsically not to the content but to the form

37

of the message to which the miracle attests.
In the caricature which Le Roy compares to the reasoning
he is attacking, the proofs have no connection with the conclusion,
A clown’s act is not a proof in the science of mathematics. But
in reasoning on a miracle, even if this reasoning is of the “most
extrinsic” type, the terms are on the same plane. There is an
essential connection between God’s power and His truthfulness.
In this instance, a person goes from God to God. He concludes
from God shown clearly by a supernatural deed to God as author
of some revelation.33
Seventh Objection: Since a miracle itself is a doubtful event, it
cannot guarantee a revelation with certainty.
Proposed by Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau professes the most extreme indi­
vidualism. According to him, everything emanates from the
individual — the motives for belief as well as authority and
social ties. He would like a revelation made directly to him­
self- a “tête-à-tête” with God, such as Moses had. He finds
it repugnant to accept prodigies attested by others as an indi­
cation of the truth which he should believe. “How’s this!” he
cries, “We’re always talking about human witnesses.... How
many men between God and me ! ” The human witnesses stand
in need of testimonials themselves and as a result here we are
tied up in a “horrible dispute” before entering upon God’s
revelation itself.
These demands implicitly reject the value of human testi­
mony. If nothing is certain for an individual except what he
has been able to perceive and experiment with by himself, then
all historical certitude vanishes. However, if one views testi­
mony as a canal through which truth can be carried — if for
example, one accepts testimony as Jean-Jacques does when
II
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33 If a person considered the argument from an external miracle as too
coarse and wished to contrast it with another more refined demonstration based upon psychological and moral phenomena, he would
have to remember that these latter phenomena do not prove except to
the extent that they are distinguished from natural phenomena. (Cf.
what we said on p. 33 regarding Stuart Mill, and also Appendix Π of
Immanence.) However, this remark does not at all touch the two
authors whose objections we are refuting. Both of them understand
'internal apologetic” in an entirely different and less intellectual
sense. (Cf. Immanence, pp. 174 ff. and 188 ff.; also Notion de vérité,
pp. 35 ff.)

38

treating of profane history — then that person can no longei'
logically refuse God the right to make use of it.
But, insists the author of Emile, God could well have
avoided such a procedure and spoken directly to me. — Of
course He could, but was He obliged to? Why forbid God to use
a means quite suited in itself for His purpose and in step with
the customs of human society where so many truths, especially
moral and religious truths, are transmitted by testimony? We
do not see why God would be bound to bypass this simple natural
means and have to prefer the countless and ceaseless psychologi­
cal miracles that individual revelations suppose. If the super­
natural shocks and startles when it makes its appearance outside,
it is strange that people should require that it be multiplied in­
definitely within themselves.
But after all, revelations to the individual would be more
certain and easier for everyone to grasp. Maybe so; but re­
velation known through testimony is sufficient, providing it too
can be reached when good will is put forth, and providing it can
produce certitude under certain conditions. If these conditions
are fulfilled, revelation through witnesses is possible, and we
have an explanation why God may choose it. Moreover, we have
experience to show that the means, against which Jean-Jacques
protests, is an efficacious means. It works. Whatever you may
think about the reality of miracles and in particular about the
miracles of Jesus Christ, there can be no argument that it is by
means of witnesses reporting these miracles that Christian
teaching has spread throughout the world. Mankind has believed,
not at all because of the guarantee furnished by individual reason
— which Rousseau would wish to make the universal criterion —
but on the authority of prodigies which only a handful of men
could have witnessed.

Eighth Objection: A miracle would ruin the foundations of
certitude and morality. Consequently, God
could not work a miracle.
Proposed by Spinoza, Kant, Renan, and
others.

This objection resumes, develops, and completes certain
ideas which we have already met. Our psychological and moral
life supposes as a prerequisite a certain fixed order in reality
upon which we can rely. In order to think, we must have ideas
that are rigorously determined and unchangeable. In order to
act, we must believe that the data acquired in our previous
39

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experiences do remain the same. But a miracle sets all these
prerequisites tottering and throws them into confusion. We can
no longer rely upon science if we believe that phenomena, insteac
of obeying stable laws, are ruled by arbitrary whim. If one’s
sense of responsibility is to be maintained, the conscious sub­
ject must be sure that he is master of his own human acts and
that every hidden supernatural cause is excluded. Finally,
belief in miracles, by permitting man to hope for everything
and to fear everything independently of his own effort, takes
from him the thought of aiding himself and the sense of the
real conditions with which his action can be fruitful.
All these conclusions have one common mistake. They sup­
pose that once miracles gain a foothold in this world, they will
invade everything. Nothing is more false. We must state the
fact yet once more. Miracles are conceived by the majority of
those advocating them as extremely rare exceptions which are
practically negligible as far as the conduct of life and the de­
velopment of science go. Before a miracle can be admitted in
some concrete case, this exception has to be surrounded by
indications that make it probable hic et nunc. Moreover, the
area in which it can occur is strictly marked out; namely, the
realm of contingent happenings. Everything bearing the stamp
of necessity remains outside this realm, including the evident
truths of reason and conscience. Finally, even if we suppose
that miracles are brought about by malicious supernatural
agencies within the sphere where miracles can occur, never­
theless, like every event, miracles remain subject to the con­
trol of a wise and equitable God, who cannot allow just anything
to happen.34
SECTION II: THE VIEW OF THE WORLD WHICH
IS CONSONANT WITH DIVINE WONDERS
I.

The physical possibility and the efficient cause of miracles.

1. The world has a cause distinct from itself —the crea­
tive, conserving, infinite power that directs all things and is
absolute master of its work. In all finite activity, it is active.
This means that not only all energy originally stemmed from
this source and is here and now drawing upon it, but also that
every starting-up of an activity depends upon this source. To
34 Concerning all this, cf. above, pp. 11-12 and 17.

40

use a figure, this power does more than carve out within the
field of possible being the precise structure and special archi­
tecture of created causes. It also keeps them in being and
activity — rerum Deus tenax vigor — and exerts influence within
the depths of each one causing it to spring up into action.
2. The Supreme Cause is free. Nothing necessitates it. Its
independence in relation to everything can only be absolute. And
it is a contradiction in terms to suppose that this Cause was ob­
liged to create or that it could not suspend or modify in whole
or in part those existing beings and powers that proceed from
it. Of course, God cannot at one and the same time produce ef­
fects that are mutually exclusive. He cannot simultaneously
give opposite characteristics to one and the same subject. For
example, He cannot confer the properties of a square upon a
circle. But a miracle is not at all like this. It is one way of
existing, acting, or receiving, that follows upon some other
way. It is a change, a removal or an addition, that is introduced
into the work by the will of the Creator.
Le Roy wonders whether such an idea is actually not a con­
tradiction. Our reply to him is a very definite "no,” since the
opposite of a miracle would be the contradiction. We reject
the impossibility of miracles for the same reason that makes
us reject a square-circle. It really is impossible to make these
two ideas co-exist: a free Cause from which everything proceeds
essentially and perpetually plus some real being that cannot in
any way be changed by this Cause. If the whole embraces ele­
ments that are distinct and mutually independent, then it is a
contradiction to say that this whole rules out every modifica­
tion in its parts. This is where the positive reason for the
possibility of miracles comes to light. For our mind not only
perceives no obstacle to this possibility, but even finds its con­
trary inconceivable.
3. If God works miracles, this operation lies no more be­
yond our grasp than do His other exterior activities. As St.
Augustine repeats so often, there is just as much mystery in
the production of an event which we call ordinary as there is in
a miracle. Both the miracle and the ordinary event have their
roots in the Infinite; and in order to understand either of them
fully and profoundly, our gaze would have to penetrate into the
great abyss. God’s action in a prodigy is no more powerful and
no more complicated than it is in the most insignificant hap­
pening. The growth of a grain of wheat is a marvel just as dis­
concerting to the mind that scrutinizes it as is the multiplication
of a few loaves. The surge of God’s omnipotence remains the

41

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same whether it achieves its goal without using any medium or
whether it canalizes itself, so to speak, in order to pass through
secondary causes and set them moving. The manner in which
God’s action unleashes the created springs of activity and the
secret of their cooperation with His divine activity are certainly
no easier to fathom than the question of miracles.
Thus we do not believe in a God absent from the world and
existing out beyond its exterior — a God who after having created
the world would have left it to itself and only come on the
scene again by way of exception when He would use a miracle
to alter some detail. This ridiculous dream is absurdity itself,
if looked upon from a metaphysical point of view. We hold that
God is always dwelling within His work and that He is just as
intimately present in the most ordinary events as He is in the
most surprising prodigies.
This is the efficient cause to which we attribute miracles.
It is this Cause which makes them physically possible. In such
a view of the world, miracles no longer appear as unrelated
events lacking any connections with the rest; nor do they seem
improbable and inconceivable a priori. Miracles have their
place in the ensemble and in the system. For an ensemble is
not the same as the uniformity of a law or a formula. And a
system does not necessarily mean universal determinism or
monism or immanentism.
Let us now consider miracles from their created aspect,
studying the divine action as seen in the event produced.
1. In itself and by reason of its material element, the socalled miraculous phenomenon takes its place among other
phenomena. It can be perceived and observed like the others.
It has its component parts and its surroundings. It is not a
rent or a hole in the web of events. It has its place in time and
space. It is defined from the historical and scientific point of
view by its relations with the rest of the world. If positive sci­
ence and history are unable to free themselves completely from
all metaphysics, they should limit themselves to recording a
miracle as just another phenomenon that appeared in its turn
during the unfolding course, not of causes and effects, but of
antecedents and consequences. Metaphysics alone is qualified
to pierce down to the deeper regions where causes lie, or
rather, to discover them amid the material data which have
been presented to metaphysics by the other disciplines.; Once
the question has been brought to this level, the only thing left
to do is to decide which is the best metaphysic.
t
Consequently, as long as science has not absorbed any
42

datum that belongs to philosophy, there is no need for science
to render any decision about real causes. Science surely does
not have to affirm or deny the miraculous nature of a phenome­
non. Science is only required to leave the phenomenon un­
touched in itself and in its surroundings, neither deforming it
nor diminishing it. For example, it must set down as facts, if
such be the case, that the phenomenon took place without any
of the ordinary antecedents which are known and considered to
be sufficient.

At this point Le Roy objects, “You cannot regard something
as a datum in the class of phenomena when you start off by en­
dowing it with characteristics opposed to those constituting the
notion of phenomenal datum. . , . The reality of an. event is the
intersection of the relations which it supports, the convergence
in a loom of the threads connected with the event as with their
center.... The phenomenal datum should be conceived as a
knot of relationships or as a stationary wave whose immobility
comes from the interference of contrary motions.” Hence, Le
Roy concludes that miracles are “unthinkable,” since, by sup­
position, they are phenomena that have no connection with any
phenomenal condition.
But I ask Mr. Le Roy whether in thus expressing himself
he means to speak the language of science or that of meta­
physics? Is he considering the interference of conditions that
exercise a real influence, in the ontological sense of that
phrase? That is, is he speaking of the intersecting-point of
causal influences; or is he simply viewing the convergence of
different data and the fabric of interwoven phenomena? It
seems that his thought swings from one meaning to the other.
It comes and goes from phenomena to causes and from causes
to phenomena. From the fact that every phenomenon should
have its component parts and its surrounding circumstances
in the phenomenal order, he concludes that an event which has
no efficient ontological cause in this world cannot appear in
this world as a phenomenon. The error in this reasoning is
obvious. A choice has to be made. If a person keeps himself
outside the plane of metaphysics, if he excludes the considera­
tion of causes — understood in the strong scholastic sense of
the word — then all that lies before him are successions of
phenomena; and these, despite all their constancy, are not there­
by rendered necessary. Necessity does not exist for the eyes
of simple experience.
When a person says that a preceding phenomenon exercises
43

1

à

an influence upon those that follow, when he says that it fur­
nishes these latter phenomena with elements that make them
similar, or when he sets up between these and the prior
phenomenon some connection of proportionality or of sufficient
reason or of infallible succession, then he is no longer observing
events but rather philosophizing about them. Thus, whether he
admits it or not, the person is thinking about some unseen
“power” exercised between the distinct phenomena. He is think­
ing about some communication of forces or elements. But if he
ascends to the plane of metaphysics, then all these speculations
will be in order. He may take his stand, for example, upon the
deterministic postulate which explains everything by rigid laws
and infallible connections. But then he should no longer speak
simply of a “phenomenal datum. ”
Consequently, to avoid all this confusion, we will say that if
miracles exist, they are phenomena that appear in the sensible
world surrounded by other phenomena and closely connected to
them. Nevertheless, the causes behind miracles and the other
phenomena, while equally invisible, are not identical.
2. If we continue to view miracles in themselves, but now
focus on their formal element — that is, on miracles considered
as interventions by some free agent in the midst of sensible
phenomena — then miracles present the same problem that our
own created freedom does or that is found in the reactions of
mind upon matter.
One brand of materialistic determinism does not hesitate
to give the same treatment to miracles and to free will. “From
the deterministic principle,” says Mr. Goblot, “these two corol­
laries follow immediately : (1) miracles do not exist; (2) free
will does not exist.” Basically, this is very logical. In
either case there really is a question of some energy of the
spiritual order that does not fall under sense experience, is
neither weighed nor measured, and does not have to operate;
but nonetheless it does modify the interplay of materialistic
determinism. Let us not be so naive as to consider God’s
freedom as on an exact parallel with our own. Let us not for­
get that we experience our own freedom and only conclude to
God’s. After all, what remains true is that an inescapable ex­
perience sets right before our eyes something that the opponents
of miracles are so reluctant to admit; namely, that there are
material changes without a cause in the same order, and that
there are sensible phenomena which are not sufficiently ex­
plained by any necessary antecedent.
The physical possibility of miracles seems to result from

44

the cumulative effect of the ideas we have just indicated. We
possess a view of the world into which miracles fit without in­
consistency. The man who accepts this view will be able to
admit the reality of an extraordinary intervention from God
without interior strain or violence and without completely up­
setting the principles and grounds of his intellectual life, if
some day such an intervention does impose itself upon him.
II. The moral possibility and the final cause of miracles.

The viewpoint which we have just sketched is, nevertheless,
still too limited and superficial. It must fit into another deeper
and broader view, the kind of view which has never been so
well depicted as in several pages from Newman. We shall give
the gist of those pages here, quoting him directly at times.35
1. THE EXISTENCE OF THE MORAL ORDER. Anyone who
admits a wise and good God sees that the physical order in the
world can only be a portion of a far vaster system. The physi­
cal order must be encased within the framework of the moral
system and be absolutely subordinated to it. For God is not only
“the Great Architect,” the fashioner of the world,but most im­
portant of all, He is Supreme Goodness and Truth, Infinite Love,
Justice, and Wisdom. And His highest purposes can only be
those of truth, justice, and love.
From the idea of God alone we can deduce in regard to man
that God’s intentions for him are that man should direct him­
self towards truth and virtue and that this physical world — in
so far as it is related to man — has no other purpose than to
help him in doing this.
However, to those who may find this metaphysical reasoning
unintelligible, the facts will undoubtedly speak a clearer lan­
guage. You will recall that it was over this realm of facts that
Hume wished to guide us.36 He said it is impossible for us to
know what God wants to do or what He will do unless we examine
what He actually is doing.
Very well then, let us admit that much for a while. However,
the precise point is this: what God is doing does not lie entirely
within the physical order alone. The divine masterpiece con­
tains moral elements which are also revealed to us by experience
and which none of us can ignore. Here below, we discover cer­
tain moral realities. For example, certain laws about good and
35 Newman, Essays on Miracles, Essay I, pp. 16-22.
36 Cf. above, pp. 31 ff.

45
Π

evil are evident to our conscience; and there is a spiritual
growth in man quite different from his physical growth. The
sense of responsibility, the instinctive approval of good, and the
spontaneous rejection of evil —all these profound moral traits
within our nature come just as much from God as does the
structure of our organs. In like manner, the direction of our
mind towards truth, its innate desire to know — and especially,
to know causes and ultimate purposes — the need of getting to
the bottom of the problem about our spiritual destiny and of
knowing what lies beyond the veil of death — all these things are
a type of impulse from God who is pushing us in a certain di­
rection. Besides this, a judgment which we have to make de­
clares that spiritual values are the principal ones and that in
God’s plan all the physical order is subordinated to these
values.

2. THE MORAL ORDER AND REVELATION. Now these
aspirations and tendencies in our nature stretch out in vague
appeals for some divine aid to help us satisfy them. Almost
everyone feels the need of positive religious observances to
fill out and concretize our moral obligations, or rather, to ab­
sorb them completely in the very act of transforming them.
For the most part, men do not think they could be moral with­
out relation to God. Just as soon as conscience gets beyond
the primary notions of good and evil, it begins to hesitate. It
is troubled to find sharp opposition existing between its own
decisions and those of other consciences. For all its indepen­
dence, conscience appreciates at times the benefit of being
guided from the outside by some precise infallible law, by
some authority which would also serve as a guiding light. The
soul longs to possess the necessary truths in a way that is
firm and stable. It wants them removed from dispute and made
accessible to all. Among men this longing gives birth to the
aspiration for “some heavenly guide, ” and “that inextinguishable
desire for a divine message which has led men in all ages to
acquiesce even to pretended revelations rather than forego the
consolation thus afforded them.”37 We should reread the Phaedo
and the melancholy words of Simmias on the difficulty of attain­
ing certainty in the problem of our destiny: “I would have him
take the best and most irrefragable of human theories (άνθρωπί'νων λόγων) and let this be the raft upon which he sails
through life — not without risk, as I admit, if he cannot find some
word of God ( λόγου θείου ) which will more surely and safely
carry him.”38
17 Newman, loc. cit., p. 19.
38 Plato, Phaedo, c. 25.

Here we have the type of aspirations that are found widespread
among mankind, the sort of prolongations of the moral order
that draw it quite close to God.
Of course, these aspirations are indefinite, fluctuating things
that would be deformed were they concretized into strict exi­
gencies that had as their object the supernatural in the strict
sense. But the very indefiniteness of these divinely fashioned
beginnings makes them apt to be successfully completed and
crowned in various ways. And therefore, a revelation which
could come to the aid of such tendencies, which would give di­
rection to them and lead them to their end, which would be a
divine remedy for the feeble groping of moral conscience and
for the weaknesses of the human intellect in seeking out the
necessary truths — such a revelation does not appear as some­
thing unlikely and improbable in advance. And if someone, in
the name of the methods of positive science, should refuse to
take notice of these indications, then he would have to be in­
formed that his mind has been running down grooves too nar­
row to catch those realities in human nature which are the
most delicate, most vital, and most profound.
3.

THE PLACE OF MIRACLES IN THE MORAL
ORDER, AS A MEANS OF REVELATION

Thus the physical world is penetrated and surrounded by
the moral world. These two form just one totality. And if a
miracle took place, it would be only a modification of the less
important part for the advantage of the more important and
dominant part. Neither would this modification imply any in­
trinsic inconsistency, any lack of harmony in the whole system.
Rather, it would imply the subordination of the system’s com­
ponent parts. We see the same thing happening in a machine, in
which certain springs set other parts into motion, counter­
balance them, or, if need be, stop them so as to contribute to
the smooth running of the whole in accord with the desired
goal.
Now if we have been able to point out the place in the di­
vine work where a revelation could possibly and fittingly occur,
we have by that very fact been pointing out the place for a mir­
acle. A miracle is the means and the necessary condition for
revelation. We explained this in connection with the objections
of Stuart Mill, Blondel, and Le Roy.38 Revelation is a teaching39
39 Cf. above, pp. 33-35 and the note on p. 38.

47

which is presented as founded upon the authority of God. And
this is its distinctive and special title for being believed, its
formal and decisive reason for the adherence it demands.
Consequently, the least that could be asked before believing in
the revelation, is that this authority should show itself, should
attest its own intervention here and now. The sign of this in­
tervention can only be some fact. And it must be some con­
tingent fact since revelation to begin with is itself a contingent
fact. Revelation does not come forth as a deduced doctrine, as
a conclusion from necessary principles or from data possessed
by reason.
On the other hand, the natural longings and the vague antici­
pations that we mentioned prove nothing except the fitness
and probability of a revelation. They do not at all certify its
existence. These desires incline a person to regard revelation
from a certain viewpoint. They keep him from holding that the
discovery of revelation is improbable; and they perhaps even
incline him to hope for it.40 But they do not at all constitute
the revelation. Far less would these desires by themselves be
able to determine the quality and the content of the revelation.
Some people seem to forget this. For they would want the di­
vine message to be connected with these desires as to its own
special guarantee. Apt internal dispositions do prepare a place
within us for the supernatural truth. They put our soul in har­
mony with this truth beforehand. They make it possible that
once the heavenly food has come down within us, it can be
assimilated there. They are the dispositions which a revela­
tion should bring to fulfillment. But they cannot be its special
guarantee, the characteristic and distinctive sign of a revelation.
The reason for this is that a religion with an earthly origin for example, some old institution which had been fashioned
through the years upon the needs of man — could also show a
striking agreement with human nature and supply the individual
with some moral support. A sage traditional teaching, elabora­
ted by men of old and developed along poetical as well as
reasonable lines, would give a good deal of satisfaction to a
man’s conscience and mind. And from the viewpoint of agree­
ableness, the traditional teaching would even have an advantage
over any supposedly revealed doctrine, for it would not contain
any mystery nor any surprising facts.
40 At least to hope for it in some general way — as a support about
which one knows not whether it will be supernatural or just provi­
dential.

48

Now all these things are a far cry from being a proof of
supernatural origin. Obviously, a divine revelation could not
contradict any justifiable element in our aspirations. But this
is a purely negative norm; and once a divine revelation has
been recorded, people always expect some positive proof.
Moreover, if one bears in mind all the unexpected things which
God’s infinite knowledge and love could wish us to find in the
vast rivers of truth and grace that He could channel down to
us, one realizes that a revelation can be something else than
the fulfillment of our inner needs, that it does not have to be
measured and, so to speak, designed ahead of time in accord
with those desires. It can be just as disconcerting for them as
it is enriching. Sometimes mystery attracts, but it also shocks
and repels.
In any case, therefore, the mystery could not be its own
proof. Some sure sign capable of easy interpretation41 must
accompany it to show to the simplest as well as to the most
learned that it is God who is presenting the message and that
it is absolutely necessary to assent to it. And so once more
we find ourselves wondering what sign could fill this role if we
exclude miracles in the strict sense — that is, an exterior,
physical miracle or one of its equivalents.42
41 Despite all the theoretical discussions about miracles, it is certain
that on the practical plane and with the ordinary individual this sign
leads quickly and persuasively to a conclusion. Cf. above, p. 39.
42 Cf. above, p. 34. I am speaking of exact equivalents. It is im­
possible to conclude rigorously to a divine revelation in the strict
sense when one starts from a near miracle or from a miracle taken
in a wider sense or from some providential happening.
However, there are some people who set up the fact of the Church
as a motive of credibility opposed to the argument from miracles.
Let us avoid any confusion of ideas on this point.
The Church can be considered under two aspects. First, as being
in itself “a work of God”; that is, a reality which natural and human
forces are insufficient to explain and which requires some divine
extraordinary intervention — in short, a genuine social miracle.
Understood in this sense, the Church is within its own sphere a fact
of the same type as a physical miracle is in its sphere. She ex­
hibits the same title and it is stamped with the same seal.
The Church can also be considered from a completely natural
viewpoint, prescinding from her causes and from her ultimate ex­
planation. In this case, she would appear as the most venerable and
most beneficent institution of mankind, as an unparalled teacher of
morals, etc., and consequently as eminently worthy of belief. In this
case, she is only a witness to the supernatural, and not the super­
natural itself. If then a person puts his faith in what she tells him,

49

Hence, before all positive verification of a miracle, one is
led to admit its probability. There appears some sublime re­
ligious goal, or, according to Newman’s expression, “some
lofty moral object,” which is a sufficient motive to justify an
interruption of the physical order. And this motive fits in
harmoniously with what natural experience teaches us about
God’s intentions for the spiritual betterment of mankind. It
squares with what reason teaches us about the ultimate goal
for which our souls were sown within this visible universe.

■vÿ

Conclusion. If then we conclude to a real miracle some
day, it will not be simply because we find ourselves without
any physical explanations. We will make no appeal to God’s
causality in a desperate effort to find some cause. For us
God will not be the unknown X that is supposed to exist behind
events whose reason escapes us. He will not be just a name
that is given to an unsolved difficulty. The supernatural will
not be a storehouse from which we can drag out some im­
provable but convenient explanations for the embarrassing
cases. Nor will the supernatural be some obscure region
about which we know nothing and can therefore suppose any­
thing. Such a recourse to the supernatural would be unrea­
sonable. That type of flight into the shadows or that kind of
“leap into the dark” would for once justify the jeering of the
unbelievers and the charges of intellectual feebleness and
eccentricity.
Neither will we view the miraculous as that ever unsolved
residue which science leaves behind, as that terra incognita
whose boundaries diminish in the measure that investigations
are carried on, or as that little isle which we can predict will
disappear some day since its banks are being gnawed away con­
stantly by the mounting flood of discoveries. No, these com­
pletely negative characteristics are not at all those of a mira­
cle, as we see it. We have been led to admit that miracles are
possible and likely because of positive reasons from philosophy.
And these reasons will remain the same no matter how much
progress science makes in the future. It will be eternally true
he believes upon her testimony first in an extraordinary divine inter­
vention, and then because of this divine intervention, he believes in
the divine character of the doctrine proposed.
Briefly then, in order to accept a doctrine as revealed, it is first
of all necessary to accept the fact of a revelation. Now this fact
always implies some sort of miracle. To say “God revealed,” comes
down to saying, “God showed by supernatural signs that a certain
doctrine was His own.”

50

that there is a God and that this God can intervene in His work,
that reasons exist which can justify such an intervention, and
finally, that the whole event fits in with the indications of moral
design which we notice in this world. Miracles gre not presented
to us
as unconnected and unmeaning occurrences, but as
holding a place in an extensive plan of Divine govern­
ment, as completing the moral system (known already
from other sources) connecting Man and his Maker,
and introducing him to the means of securing his
happiness in another and eternal state of being.43
ΠΙ. How are the principles just established applied to concrete
cases?
1. THE CONDITIONS REQUIRED BEFORE ATTRIBUTING
A PRODIGY TO GOD
In accord with the foregoing remarks, it will not be any sort
of extraordinary phenomenon which will make us think of the
supernatural. And all those statements that are sometimes
made about the “marvellous” nature of scientific discoveries
or about their similarities with miracles do not pertain to the
present question at all. There is not the least likelihood that
the exceptional properties of radium are due to some special
intervention from God. And even folks with just a bit of in­
struction would be reasoning poorly if they took the phono­
graph or the telephone for miracles. As a matter of fact, these
phenomena are, first of all, constant, repeating themselves in
the same way. Thus, without knowing how to explain them, a
person can find out the definite conditions on which they take
place or even the means of producing them. In treating of
things like these, a person is encountering a law, unknown per­
haps, but regular. Moreover, none of the circumstances sur­
rounding this sort of phenomena would make a person suspect
some religious or moral end for which God might have pro­
duced them.44
Therefore, the only extraordinary phenomena that might
put in a bid for the title of miracle are, to begin with, ex­
ceptional phenomena — happenings which bear the stamp of
43 Newman, op. cit., p. 22. Parenthesis added by Fr. de Tonquédec.
44 Cf. above, pp. 3 and 17.

51

freedom and which seem at least to originate in the intentions
of some will which is master of its goals and its moments.
Moreover, only those phenomena which furnish some indica­
tion that God is using them as interpreters will be able to
square with the plan for governing the universe. These phe­
nomena should not only contain nothing that contradicts
right reason or shocks a well-developed moral sense, but in
addition they should in no way be non-committal, silent phe­
nomena which have nothing to say through their manner of
occurrence to a soul preoccupied with religious problems.
Some commentary is required so that people can grasp the
meaning of the phenomena. This commentary may be explicit,
furnished by the preaching of the wonder-worker or by the
prayers of the believers; or it may be implicit, contained in the
action, in the surrounding circumstances, or in the spiritual
atmosphere enveloping the events.
“Besides the strangeness of miracles,” writes Father Bros,
“there is one single characteristic which gives them a dis­
tinctive mark. It is that either before or during or after the
event, they are connected with religious phenomena. Of
course, these phenomena are not always the same. Sometimes
it is a prayer, sometimes a command in God’s name, or even
a simple act of trust in a supernatural power. But all of these
religious phenomena have one common mark, and this is
striking enough to be noted by an impartial scholar. In this
situation you have indications of a causality that can perhaps
be easily discovered.”
The above remarks, make it clear that a divine miracle is
not a mere prodigy, τίρα,ζ, but a sign, σημεΓον. Matthew
Arnold charges no interest for the absurdities he loans to his
adversaries when he gives the following summary of their
view:

In the judgment of the mass of mankind, could I visibly
and undeniably change the pen with which I write this
into a pen-wiper, not only would this which I write ac­
quire a claim to be held perfectly true and convincing,
but I should even be entitled to affirm, and to be
believed in affirming, propositions the most palpably
at war with common fact and experience.45
Here is a complete distortion of the idea of a divine mir­
45 Matthew Arnold, Literature and Dogma, A. L. Burt Co., New York,
p. 143.

acle and the confusing of it with magic or simple sleight-ofhand.
Let us say some trickster does perform his type of feat
for us, or that a sorcerer — if such there be — does stupify or
terrify his audience. Still, this gives neither the one nor the
other so much as the appearance of being ambassadors of in­
fallible truth. What has yet to be seen are the means used in
accomplishing the prodigy. Were devices employed that were
proportioned to the result obtained, or are there no natural
means that can be assigned to explain it? If the latter case is
true, the question has not yet been settled. For then the char­
acteristics of the event, its milieu and surroundings, and even
the message which the prodigy accompanies and is supposed to
authorize46 must be studied as the basis for deciding whether
the prodigy could possibly be viewed as some work of God. As
long as this last question remains unsolved, the phenomenon
itself remains at least equivocal, enigmatic, and suspect. It is
a hieroglyph which is studied by intrigued onlookers without
their being able to decipher its queer figure. It is a letter that
comes from who-knows-where and bears the traces of an un­
known hand.

2. THE ATTRIBUTION ITSELF: PROCEDURES AND
VALIDITY
Now let us suppose there is a man who is furnished with
all the philosophical certainties and all the empirical indica­
tions which we mentioned. In his travels this man encounters
a marvellous event and attributes it to an extraordinary inter­
vention by God. What logical and psychological procedures did
he employ? And how valid are they?
A) The hypothesis is as follows. The facts to be interpreted
are real events, clearly recorded and beyond question, which
48 Elsewhere we have stated how this latter idea could enter into a
reasoning process without a vicious circle. “The direct basis for
deciding about a prodigy should in no way be the doctrine to which the
prodigy testifies or gives expression. Rather it should be some other
independent doctrine from which a person can judge this doctrine and
consequently the prodigy itself. ... To evaluate the fact and the doc­
trine attested, I employ principles that come from a different source.
Before considering either the fact or the doctrine, I already possess
a formed conscience, certain ideas about honesty and decency, as well
as certain philosophical or religious convictions.” — Immanence,
p. 225.

53

science leaves unexplained. The occurrence of these events
favors a certain doctrine claiming to be a revelation, since the
events either announce this revelation or confirm it. These
take place at the sanctuaries of some definite religion, following
upon some invocation of the God or the saints of this religion, οτ
upon a command from its founder or its apostles. Moreover,
the way in which these prodigies take place, the ideas to which
they testify, and the accompanying circumstances are not only
morally irreproachable, but they actually tend to lift souls to­
ward God, to ennoble them, and to urge them on towards good­
ness. If some mystery is proposed, there is nothing puerile
about it nor anything resembling those ill-founded sterile
absurdities which are thought up at random to amuse or shock
the mind of man. From the mystery’s shadows luminous traits
appear. The mind does not know whether these are genuine or
not, but at least it perceives that there is no evident deformity
in them. Finally, this doctrine’s power for good is confirmed
by its influence upon human society.
Does the conclusion now follow necessarily that the prodigies
worked in favor of this doctrine are divine ? and that therefore
this is a pure revelation from God, and not some human teaching
with particles of gold buried in the ore? Would it not be better
for a person to suspend judgment, to admit that he is face to
face with the inexplicable and confronted with coincidences
which, while quite exceptional, may possibly have been brought
about by chance through the interplay of unknown natural causes?
We do not know the whole of nature, its powers and its hidden
resources. Maybe the unknown is involved here. Who can tell ?
Perhaps the future with its scientific discoveries will uncover
this point. Consequently, how can you rule it out legitimately?
This brings us to the most delicate and most difficult point in
the interpretation of the facts.
Why prefer God to the unknown ? Because all the positive
evidence is for God, while there is no evidence at all in favor
of the unknown. I possess a perfectly satisfactory explanation,
which also gives an exact answer to the whole question proposed.
I know a cause Capable of producing the result. I know that it
is present. I see it all around the marvellous event guiding
material things towards certain intelligent and moral purposes
similar to the purposes I am aware of here. Moreover, all the
indications I have gathered make the activity of this cause quite
likely in this event. Then why should I turn away from this
I
cause and go running off to the unknown? For, according to the
hypothesis itself, this unknown is a pure X about which I know

54

nothing — neither its existence, its presence, nor its activity.
Besides, I know that this unknown factor leaves no clues of its
own activity; for if it did, it would no longer be the unknown.
Thus it is a simple possibility, an undetermined abstraction
stripped of any positive probability; and I conjure it up pre­
cisely to avoid concluding to God.
This brand of thinking would not be employed in any other
field. Anytime a man knows just one isolated thing as the
likely cause for an event, he concludes that it was this cause
which acted and definitely not some unknown X. When an
expert has found the conditions for a phenomenon, then, once
he knows that these conditions are present and that he can
suppose them free to operate, he will pronounce without any
hesitation that these conditions are operating, and he will at­
tribute the result to them. And it never even occurs to him
that some unknown cause has slipped into the place of these
conditions to imitate their way of acting.
Now let us not deceive ourselves here. Concluding to a
cause because it is the only likely one is not a unique occur­
rence in our thinking —a procedure that works just in apolo­
getics. People reason like this everywhere. On more than
one occasion we have called attention to the fact that there
are no circumstances wherein a person sees the cause pro­
ducing the effect. A cause’s influence is not an object of
experience nor an object of positive science. From the con­
nection between two facts a person concludes to their causal
relationship.
But how are we going to answer a person who would say,
“The first fact is merely an antecedent without any efficiency,
and what produces the effect is some hidden cause”? No reply
could be given that would be immediately evident as far as ex­
perience and reasoning go. This is why occasionalism47 is so
difficult to refute. It is not refuted on the basis of facts. It
denies no evidence obtained through observation. It is refuted
only by an appeal to the principle of sufficient reason — an ap­
peal of exactly the same type as is used in the case of miracles.
For example, you will say that the red-hot coal brought
close to a piece of wood is the cause of its burning. Why? Be­
cause in the coal we have a cause that is proportioned to the
effect, capable of producing it, and possessing in itself some­
thing similar to what will appear in the result. There is no
♦7 This doctrine of Malebranche denies all real efficiency in secondary
causes.

55

reason for seeking further. Even though it is theoretically
possible, once the principle of sufficient reason has been set
aside, it should not be thought that some “malicious demon” to use Descartes’ phrase — has substituted its own activity for
that of the fire, and produced the burning in its place.
The same thing holds true when dealing with a. miracle.
The only likely cause is God. Even though it is theoretically
possible, once the principle of sufficient reason has been set
aside, it should not be thought that some hidden cause is at
work where God seems to be acting and where He has every
reason to act. Thus we see the reason why this seemingly
sound objection, which is sometimes formulated against re­
course to God’s causality, turns out to be false. For it is said
that the activity of any kind of natural cause is more likely
than God’s miraculous activity. We reply to the contrary.
There are some cases where God’s activity, because of all the
considerations we have adduced, is more likely than any other
kind of cause, and in fact, the only likely one.
The opponents can twist this difficulty of unknown causes in
whatever way they wish, but they will not find in it anything to
urge against miracles beyond a pure negative possibility. Past
events upon which they try to base their case or predictions of
the future towards which they direct the difficulty do not help a
bit and do not change the nature of the difficulty at all. To bring
this topic to a close, a brief summary is in order.
Some events, formerly held as miraculous, have been ex­
plained scientifically. Therefore, the conclusion is drawn that
everything which today lacks a natural explanation may receive
one tomorrow. One condition is required if our views about
God’s plan and the antecedent likelihood of miracles are not to
remain just pure theory without any concrete application. That
condition is the existence of some facts which have no natural
explanations. Now this condition varies as science develops.
The indefinite perfectibility of science brings up before our
eyes the vision of the gradual disappearance of miracles. Con­
sequently, since the foundation supporting our conclusion be­
comes smaller and smaller and threatens to disappear, the
conclusion itself begins to totter.
We have already encountered these ideas; and while with­
holding our final response — which could not precede an exam­
ination of the facts — we have pointed out that the indefinite
perfectibility of science is a simple postulate which has no

56

positive support at all.48 We have no assurance that some day
science should have an explanation for everything. Moreover,
in the argument for such a view, we noted a passage that went
quite beyond bounds. We realize that an unknown cause may
produce something that looks like a miracle, and that people
can make mistakes and have made mistakes in this matter.
However, it does not follow from this that a person has the
right to suspect the presence of error everywhere. We will
soon see with what
4g degree of strictness this presence of error
can be excluded.
Be this as it may, if a person reasoned in other matters as
our adversaries do in the question of miracles, no certainty
would remain intact. Just because certain calculations have
proved false, must no calculations be accepted, except pro­
visionally? Just because certain explanations in science have
turned out to be inaccurate, has one the right to mistrust the
whole of science? Is it positively probable that everything in
science is false because of corrections in some of its parts ?
For example, is it positively probable that scientists will
some day discover that water is not composed of hydrogen and
oxygen, but that it comes from some third element which has
remained in the dark until now? Of course, this matter of
miracles — with its religious, psychological, historical, and
metaphysical aspects — is infinitely more delicate to handle
than such evident commonplaces of science. But these latter
are useful precisely because they render strikingly clear the
illogicality of a procedure which would otherwise pass unno­
ticed. Consequently, let us put aside these general suspicions
which only confuse the issue. The only thing we are concerned
with here are some questions about appearances.
It happens in the problem of miracles, as in all other prob­
lems, that a person confuses an apparent cause for the real one.
It also happens sometimes, as in other problems, that a more
profound examination will allow a person to make a choice be­
tween two causes, both of which seemed likely at first sight.
48 Cf. above, pp. 16 and 18.
On these pages we saw that the cases
were comparatively rare in which natural explanations were given to
supposed miracles. If a person prescinds from nervous diseases,
which simulate organic diseases and are cured instantly by sugges­
tion, these cases are reduced practically to nil. It is historical criti­
cism rather than the natural explanations which have reduced the

Lastly, as in all other problems, the question may sometimes
remain undecided. Up until this point you have seen good solid
ground upon which you can get your footing and push forward.
But to go on and say, “Since a man makes mistakes sometimes,
maybe he is making them all the time,” is to dig up the old
“Who knows?” query of universal scepticism and to apply it to
some particular subject. It is broadcasting an airy assertion
and conjuring up a possibility that has no positive foundation.
B) What are the characteristics and the quality of the certi­
tude whose acquisition we have just described?
a. The minimum of certitude. In general, certitude implies
at least the following points. The bare, negative, theoretical
possibility of unknown causes does not constitute a sufficient
reason for doubting. Doubt is still possible, but it would not
have any reasonable foundation. Prudence permits and even
advises assent. For the unknown is improbable, not only be­
cause it lacks any foundation but also because there are posi­
tive reasons for excluding it.
In the non-controversial subjects, which we compared with
that of miracles, no one but a wit of exceptional originality will
prefer a mere possibility to some positive likelihood. Yet in
those subjects, too, the event would be feasible. But it would
be a clear-cut freak, an eccentricity without any interest or
profit. Not so in the question of miracles; for this problem has
so much significance in itself and in its consequences, and it
controls the management of our moral life so immediately that
we can understand why the mind might shy away from some
positive conclusion in this matter. It is clear that the certitude
with which we are dealing here is not the certitude obtained in
a mathematical demonstration. There the truth imposes it­
self with strict necessity; it hems in the mind at every turn
without leaving open any corner of escape. But here we have
a certitude wherein practical wisdom, an upright will, and
prudence have their role to play.
b. The maximum of certitude. Frequently, however, in as­
senting to a miracle, there will be far more certitude than we
have described. Certain cases will arise where the mere pos­
sibility of some unknown natural cause will not even exist. In
vain has emphasis been laid upon the hidden resources of the
physical and psychological worlds and upon our ignorance with
regard to them. For there are limits here which a sound mind
will obstinately refuse to transgress. We ao not know the posi­
tive limits of natural forces, but we do know some of their
negative limits. We do not know exactly in what direction these
58

forces are moving; but we think we can say that they definitely
are not going in this or that direction. In combining oxygen
and hydrogen, you will never get chlorine. In sowing wheat,
you will never get roses. And similarly, one human word will
never be sufficient by itself to calm storms or to bring the
dead back to life.50
Over against these facts, there is no possibility — not even
a negative one —which stands up. There is no “maybe” that
can survive on such a nebulous supposition. If someone, while
sowing wheat, thinks that maybe rosebushes will sprout up
from these grains; if, while combining oxygen and hydrogen,
he thinks that maybe he will get chlorine; or if he thinks that
maybe his word will have power over storms and the dead, then
this man is abnormal. Experiences that are infinite in number
and variety, experiences that have occurred in every imaginable
circumstance since the world began assure us that these results
are completely impossible for nature left to itself. If nature
possessed the power to produce them, surely at some time or
other amid that infinite variety of circumstances, it would have
produced them.
And yet, it is especially in certain circumstances, quite
clearly brought about by a Will which has control of all things,
that impossibilities like these will make their appearance. “On
opening the mouth of a fish caught in a lake, there is a possi­
bility of my finding a didrachma there. But after Peter had
been asked whether his Master, too, would not pay the temple
tax, the fact that Jesus should say to him:

I do not have to pay. However, we must give these
men no offense. Go down to the sea, throw in a
hook, and land the first fish to come up. Then open
its mouth, and you will find a stater. Take that, and
give it to them to pay for me and you;51
plus the fact that all this occurs just the way He said it would,
makes one ask how anyone can refuse to see a miracle here.
The fact may be denied, but once the circumstances have oc­
curred in this way, no one will deny the transcendent character
of the fact/’52 The accumulation of such coincidences eventu­
ally forms such a heavy weight of evidence that it becomes
almost impossible to resist, providing the facts are real.
50 The objection comes to mind which Loisy brought up against Le Roy:
“The mind’s power over matter certainly does not go so far as to
reanimate cadavers.”
51 Mt. 17:27- The English translation of J. A. Kleist, S. J., has been used.
52 j.-V. Bainvel, Nature et Surnaturel, p. 299.

59

“Here is a man who professes himself an ambassador sent
from God, and he works miracles to prove his ambassador­
ship. .. . This man is surrounded by enemies who hedge him in
whenever he makes a move. Their whole intent is directed at
exposing him as an impostor, at ripping away the mask from
his false miracles; and we see them trying their best to achieve
their goal. And yet, not once do they catch him pretending.
They themselves are the first to recognize that he wrought a
cure, that he brought someone back to life, and that he worked
all kinds of miracles....
“And this man does not perform just one prodigy of a cer­
tain particular type in just such and such a circumstance. No,
he works hundreds of them — every species and manner of mir­
acle. He tells the sea to become calm, and it becomes calm.
He tells the dead to rise, and they rise. He multiplies loaves
of bread, and he changes water into wine. He curses a tree,
and it dries up. He says, ‘It is I,’ and the soldiers drawing near
to capture him fall backwards. He says, ‘Cast your nets on this
side,’ and suddenly the nets are filled afer a thousand useless
tries during the whole night. He cures every kind of disease
with a word or a simple touch, both those near at hand and far
away, sometimes demanding faith and sometimes working the
miracle without the patient’s suspecting anything, and so on
and on.. ..
“I do not know all that we can expect from nature, but I am
sure that nature is not under the control of men in this way.
Before this multitude of facts and this variety of circumstances,
all the causes of error are eliminated. The transcendency of
the fact becomes obvious.”53 Finally, if all these marvels are
put to the service of a moral revolution which is the profoundest
and most beneficial that humanity has undergone, then the
'I divine intervention appears so evident that no avenue of escape
Γ is left open.
And yet, despite all this, I believe that a mind which has
i
firmly taken sides against the supernatural could still hold fast j
against these proofs. Perhaps it would not state frankly that it
j
had a good enough explanation in unknown natural causes, but at
I
least it would refuse to form any sort of conclusion. I mentioned I
the condition, providing the facts are real. In the cases we are
j
speaking about, it is actually in regard to their reality that
I
doubt will arise more easily. People will most frequently
I
Bainvel, Nature et Surnaturel, pp. 299-300.

60

escape from miracles by falling back upon critical difficulties,
such as the authenticity and the interpretation of documents.54
c. Certitude in this matter is a moral certitude. The role
played by the will. The certitude we are speaking about can
consequently be called moral, in the sense that Olle-Laprune
has given the word. This means it is a certitude which has to
do with religious and moral questions, where doubt is always
possible, where the will’s dispositions can suggest doubt as an
escape. In many cases, if not in all, this certitude may be
free; but this does not mean that it is an arbitrary or illfounded certitude. Actually, this certitude does not consist in
twisting a person’s mind so that it is turned violently towards
some preferred hypothesis. It does not make a person view
the unreal as real because of some subjective decree. Rather,
this certitude results from a loyal, straightforward will — a
will that does not fear the light, that freely and meritoriously
assumes the attitude it should assume to view the problem
correctly. It is not a mattei’ of seeing what one wants to see,
but of freely taking the position where he will see what does
exist. By itself, the possibility of an unknown natural cause is
too vacuous and insignificent to make the mind hesitate about
it. But external influences, prejudices, or advantages can en­
large and exaggerate this possibility. To cause the mind to
embrace this hypothesis (of the unknown cause), there must be
present an indomitable repugnance or a fixed idea against the
supernatural. If this is present, it will suffice; if absent, it
will not.
This influence of moral dispositions is especially notice­
able in those minds which I shall call critical, without attach­
ing any favorable or unfavorable connotation to the word.
I am speaking of those people whom any motive at all in the
intellectual or affective order will arouse to a more than or­
dinary investigation of the reasons for doubting. The other
people — who are assuredly the greater portion of those ad­
mitting the antecedent certitudes that we mentioned — will not
even think about doubting. The abstract possibility of unknown
causes will not even present itself to them, and it is perfectly
natural that they instinctively adopt the only hypothesis which
is supported by sufficient reasons, the only positive and satis­
factory cause that they know. However, this does not imply
that the will plays no part in this case. The will may possess
54 These questions will be examined in the Second Part of this article.
Cf. PP- 67 ff·

61

deep habits, certain attitudes meritoriously acquired, and a
freedom from passions which account for these movements in
it that seem to rise entirely by instinct.
The foregoing remarks should not convey the impression
that the certitude about miracles is a poorly founded certitude.
Indeed, this would be making as serious a mistake as to con­
fuse a person’s dispositions with the motives for his judgments.
It should not be thought that for every certitude wherein the
will plays its part there must be some corresponding unstable
or uncertain object. It is well known that in philosophy, for
example, as well as in history, the most solidly established
theses are not insured against attacks which spring up very
often from the varying tendencies of people’s feelings. And it
is superfluous to insist on the following well-known fact: that
the clear perception of certain truths, even necessary truths
— such as God’s existence or the soul’s immortality — requires
some moral preparation, at least under ordinary conditions.
The Catholic Church also teaches that the certitude of the
Faith is a free certitude and yet the most securely founded of
all certitudes. In the same way, the moral quality of the certi­
tude about miracles takes nothing away from its stability. It
is enough that the motives for it are solid and that they impose
themselves on one whose view is in no way obscured.
d. The connection between a miracle and the truth to which
tt testifies. Finally, how strong is the link connecting the certi­
tude of the truth attested by the miracle with the certitude of
the miracle itself? We do not have to inquire whether the certi­
tude about the truth attested could possibly fail, once certitude
about the miracle has been obtained and continues to perdure for example, because of some weakness in the will. That would
be taking up a question which is not of direct interest to our
present study. But we must say that if the certitude about
the miracle disappears, then the certitude about the truth at­
tested by the miracle simply cannot stand. If the foundation
collapses, the building it supports will crash in the same col­
lapse. But since the certitude about a miracle depends upon
moral dispositions as we have seen, so the certitude about the
truth likewise depends upon them and to a similar degree.
I
Briefly then, it follows that these dispositions in the will
must continue to exist after the acceptance of the attested
I
truth, as an indispensable condition of that truth. But once
this has been grasped, it is important at this point, more so
than elsewhere, to recall the distinction set up between the
motives for belief and the dispositions of the believer. Granted
I

62

that these dispositions are contingent, this does not keep the
basis for belief from being metaphysical and absolute. In the
present case, this basis is nothing else than God’s truthfulness.
God could neither work miracles nor allow them to be worked
for the spread of falsehood. If certain events such as we have
described were presented to a man, and if that man in using the
path we indicated should err in his decision about them, then it
is God Himself who would be leading him into error.
When it comes down to an actual concrete case, the
miracle is expressly connected with the doctrine. For ex­
ample, the wonder-worker refers to the miracle as proof of
what he teaches. He tells his hearers, “To prove to you that
I come from God, I am going to make this paralytic walk.”
And the paralytic walks. There are other connections of the
same type that come from the circumstances in which the
miracle takes place. When confronted with such a spectacle,
the ordinary man who is free from any prejudice will always
and invariably say, “The finger of God is there.” He will say
it instinctively, spontaneously, and naturally. On the other
hand, a man who is aware of the difficulty and has a critical
mind will arrive at the same conclusions, if his reflections
follow the path marked out in this chapter in accord with the
rules of logic, of prudence, and of moral integrity. He will
conclude by rejecting every other explanation except the super­
natural explanation.
And yet, despite all this, both of these men would be de­
ceiving themselves ! They would be deceiving themselves, and
not accidentally through some circumstance of time, place, or
character, through some ignorance or some special moral
failing, but normally and naturally, by following the straight­
forward movement of their minds, by using all the intelligence,
all the loyalty, and all the prudence that they have. Such an
error would be forced upon them. They could not avoid it. And
this error would touch upon the most important of problems;
namely, the will of God towards His creatures, the channel of
truth and goodness in religious and moral matters, and the path
of salvation.
This whole case appears incredible if there is a just and
truthful God. Such a God could not allow events that would neces­
sitate an error of this type. He could not allow these intimate
connections to be established precisely between some false
teaching and these undeniable prodigies which are stamped
with His seal. For such connections could not fail to bring about
the unfortunate and irreparable aftermath that we mentioned.

63
$

i
j

Μ

Λ

For the same reason God could not permit some real or appar­
ent prodigies that were performed by any sort of agent for the
spread of error to be actually indistinguishable in themselves
from divine miracles.55
This impossibility becomes more and more striking in pro­
portion as the error spreads over more and more time and
space. Should such a deception come to be accepted for several
centuries by a large portion of mankind, it would be the greatest
scandal imaginable. Consequently, if God takes an interest in
the moral destiny of his creatures, He owes it to Himself to
ward off this misfortune from them. Otherwise, in order to ex­
cuse themselves and to put the blame on Him, they would have
the right to repeat that famous saying, “Lord, if there is error
here, it is You Yourself who have deceived us!”

A Note on the Preceding Chapter
I. “Inferior supernatural agents”

Μ

On a plane beneath God we can imagine, as has been done by
those who write about wondrous events, that there are various
good or evil supernatural agents, like spirits, demons, and so
forth. We know of no argument a priori against their activity
in our world.
It is very easy to scorn belief in “spirits, ” and to poke fun
at those who hold such a belief. It is quite true that many people
believe in these spirits for reasons that are perfectly ridiculous.
The present question, however, is not concerned with such
things, but wants a yes-or-no answer to the following : does
reason furnish arguments that prove either the non-existence
of the beings in question or the impossibility of their activity
around us? No. Does positive science bring up any experi­
mental proofs which point in the same direction? It certainly
does offer some proof against such supernatural interventions
as would be similar to the interventions of human freedom and
as noticeable and ordinary as these latter are. The mysteri­
ous actors with which we are concerned are not constantly
upon the stage of this world. But as for scientific proofs
I
55 Could God even allow Himself in some way to authorize a teaching
whose content was true but which falsely claimed to be revealed? I
do not think so, providing His testimony bore precisely on the origin
of the doctrine. For here again it would be a case erf concealing error
and leading man into idolatry, which consists in adoring words that
come from men as if they came from God.

64

establishing in advance the impossibility of an occasional ap­
pearance by such a spirit — there are none. We proved this
point sufficiently when treating of induction.
On the other hand, it is no more evident that anything de­
cisive can be brought up in favor of the possibility or the
antecedent probability of this special type of supernatural
intervention. Without reference to a revelation, which is also
in need of proof, the existence of such an intervention could
only be proved by some observations of the fact.
We will content ourselves with waiting for the facts. Ob­
serving the facts will be very difficult since it is a question of
supernatural agents acting as God’s instruments; and how can
we distinguish with certainty between their action and His?
Fortunately, it is not important from the practical viewpoint
to distinguish between an effect coming immediately from God
alone and an action carried out by His orders. However, when
evil preternatural agents act for immoral purposes, this very
fact will render them certainly recognizable. Therefore, if it
can be shown in this or that case, that a person found himself
in the presence of a freedom that was malicious and distinct
from human freedom, then the experimental proof of a non­
divine supernatural reality would be furnished.
For the time being we will remain in ignorance about this
question — in an unbiased ignorance that assumes no definitive
nor unchangeable attitude, but rather holds itself in readiness
to receive all the evidence that the facts may adduce. However,
here again, let us note that all such information — although quite
interesting and useful — will not be of capital importance. It is
of far less importance for us to decide definitely whether the
positive cause of some assuredly non-divine phenomenon is
natural or preternatural, than it is for us to know whether God
has revealed Himself to humanity. What does not come from
Him can only have an indirect bearing on the direction of our
moral and religious life, and its explanation can be postponed
or suppressed without much loss.

II.

“The cases that have no explanation”

It would be rash to pretend that an investigation concerning
the marvellous will in all cases give us explanations that are
completely clear and satisfying. We should expect to meet
some obscure points, and perhaps, some enigmas that cannot
be solved. We shall be neither amazed nor bothered by them.
If a residue is left without explanation, it does not destroy the

I
{
i
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65

J

explanations that have been gained. One group of facts may
have revealed its cause while neighboring groups remain im­
penetrable. Partial science has its worth and does not imply
omniscience.
PART

CONCLUSION TO PART THE FIRST

W

I

Such is the philosophic attitude which we advocate for the
study of wonders. It is the only one which does not run the
risk of blocking off some pathway for the person who searches
in good faith. It allows him to use the largest number and va­
riety of principles for solving the problem — all the principles
which the human mind has ever devised for the present question.
Error or make-believe, known or unknown natural forces, inter­
vention from God, or even — should their existence become
factual — from other supernatural agents, nothing has been re­
jected a priori. Each one of these hypotheses can be valuable in
its proper place, and none of them should be allowed to stifle the
others. It is the examination of each individual case that will
bring to light the particular hypothesis that fits. And if none of
the hypotheses offers grounds for a definite solution, then a per­
son has to be able to remain quietly in his doubts.
The detailed criticism which we made of the different
positions always resulted in the same thing. It showed the nar­
rowness and exclusivism of these positions. We admit every­
thing that they admit as sources for an explanation plus some­
thing else besides. In the real world there is some determinism
and some contingency, something natural, and perhaps also
something supernatural. Those who do not admit this latter
possibility possess a freedom of thought that is far more re­
stricted than ours. “In many cases, which might, but do not
necessarily have to, be explained by the supernatural, we have
the right of withholding our judgment. But those people never
have such a right. Once they find themselves face to face with
some wondrous happening or account, ... they must come out
with a dogmatic negative, no matter what kind of witnesses are
on hand, no matter what be the condition of the text, its origin,
the obvious meaning of the author, or his sources of information.
- B. Allo

66

THE

SECOND

THE CRITICAL ATTITUDES PRESUPPOSED FOR
THE EXAMINATION OF THE FACTS

When we determined the philosophical attitude with which a
person might undertake an examination of the facts, we did not
present a complete picture. This examination itself can be
conducted along lines that are quite different. And at this point
it is a good thing again to throw some light on the ground to be
covered so that a person can choose the path to be followed in
critical method as well as in philosophical attitude. The reason
for this is that some people, who would agree about metaphysics,
might nonetheless argue among themselves about history. And
many people, who would have no objections against the possibil­
ities hitherto mentioned, will now find the realm of experience
bristling with difficulties. Hence, we are going to investigate
what method a person should use in examining seemingly
wondrous events and in forming an opinion about them.

CHAPTER I

FACTS THAT WE OURSELVES WITNESS
A few brief remarks will suffice at this point since the dif­
ficulties will arise more in connection with historical criticism.
The difficulties which now present themselves will reappear in
a larger and more widespread way upon the field of historical
criticism.
When confronted with some fact that seems marvellous, a
witness may discover that he is pulled by opposite tendencies
in accord with his own opinions and temperament. These ten­
dencies will prevent him either from getting a good view of the
event he has seen or from interpreting it correctly. First of
all, there are the tendencies in favor of wonders, such as cre­
dulity and a love for the extraordinary, religious enthusiasm and
67

excessive impressionability. All of these render the soul
thoroughly susceptive to mental contagions. There is impetu­
osity in forming one’s conclusions, as well as the urge to find
apologetic proofs in such happenings, and so forth. Not one of
these tendencies can be claimed to be simply non-existent; and
we should be on our guard against all of them both in ourselves
and in others.
On the other hand, we have the negative prejudices, the ten
dencies that are not in favor of wonders. Scepticism will keep
a person from paying attention to them. Individualism in re­
ligious or philosophical matters will make a person distrust
anything coming from without. A good faith that is only half
genuine will become apprehensive about the vast religious is­
sues connected with verifying a miracle. Disdain for tilings
that fascinate simple souls, human respect, and fear of dis­
qualifying oneself by paying attention to the extraordinary — all
of these will cause the mind to turn aside or to rest content
with any sort of explanation at all.
All the tendencies just mentioned are more or less directly
inspired by feeling or passion. But now we come to the purely
intellectual instincts. If a thing is extraordinary, it is suspect
both to common sense and to the scientific spirit. It turns up­
side down men’s ordinary ways of acting — all those unconscious
or conscious habits of theirs which have been tried and fashioned
by experience and shown to be excellent for the uses of every­
day life. So rather than accept some strange fact, a person will
figure that he did not see or judge too well, that he became the
plaything of some illusion or even of some hallucination.
Now this brand of prudence borders on a prepossession. To
tell yourself that you have judged poorly is not always reason­
able, nor is it always even possible. There are some experiences
so simple and so evident that there is no way of getting around
them; for example, a wound’s being open or closed, a bone’s
reknitting after it was broken. There are some decisions so
well pondered and mature that it would show inconstancy to in­
vestigate them again. The hallucination hypothesis — which may
be a bit humiliating, but is such an easy way out — cannot be used
except for a special reason. Otherwise, one would be questioning
the very truthfulness of one’s own faculties, and the problem
that has been raised would go right back to general psychology.
Consequently, if a person has no preconceived ideas along uni­
versal lines, it is clear that having recourse to this hypothesis
will only be rendered legitimate by reason of some accidental
circumstances concerning the subject or the milieu or something
else.

CHAPTER II
THE FACTS CERTIFIED BY ANOTHER’S TESTIMONY
HISTORICAL CRITICISM OF WONDERS
SECTION I:

GENERAL RULES

Everyone knows that psychological and metaphysical judg­
ments are incorporated in historical appraisals. Pure history
does not exist. This is why differences sometimes occur be­
tween historians who are equally well informed. As far as the
criticism of wonders is concerned, there is one problem es­
pecially which comes up for discussion. This concerns the role
which should be played in this matter by the philosophical ideas
of the probable and improbable, of the possible and impossible.
Both in the camp of those advocating miracles and among those
opposed to them the opinions are far from being unanimous.

First Opinion: Miracles are ruled out because of the notions
of possible and impossible supplied by the ex­
perimental sciences, and this no matter what
sort of testimony is witness to the miracles.

Messieurs Langlois and Seignobos say that when “a fact
obtained by a historical conclusion contradicts some scientific
law, ... the solution to the conflict is obvious.” History must
yield. The fact must be ruled out. Such a radical view cannot
be allowed. The experimental sciences limit themselves to a
statement about existing things and furnish no data about the
possible and impossible. We have proved this when treating of
inductive determinism. 56 Questions about possibility should be
debated before a different tribunal than that of experimental
science; namely, the tribunal of philosophy. And this is what
both Messieurs Langlois and Seignobos admit without at all
realizing it.
Moreover, the “conflict” which they point to is a completely
imaginary one. If history should record some marvellous event,
it would in no way be contradicting the sciences. These sciences
give us the “law” — that is, the formula for what happens ordinarily.
56 Cf. pp· 12

69

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One isolated wondrous event, one exception produced by the
interference of a cause that is ordinarily absent, would not
destroy this law. And after all, it would be very unreasonable,
even from a scientific point of view, to establish the general
rule that a fact may not be admitted unless it conforms with
facts already known. This would be to suppose that no new facts
ever occur, and it would limit the scope of the idea of what is
possible to the extension of present-day science. In the past,
when this general rule was applied, it brought about the most
regrettable results. Certain facts that were fortified with excellent testimony — facts like meteorites, stigmata, and so on were in former days excluded from history as impossible.
Agreeing on this point, Messieurs Langlois and Seignobos are
forced to admit that the motive for this exclusion was ignorance
pure and simple.
Second Opinion: Miracles are ruled out because of the
notions of probable and improbable .

In the giving of human testimony some inaccuracy, be it
deliberate or not, is always infinitely more probable than some
supernatural exception to the laws of the universe. Consequently, the wise thing to do in every instance is to rest on
the first explanation rather than the supernatural exception.
The lesser of two miracles is always to be chosen. Such is the
reasoning of Hume and Stuart Mill. This view has a semblance
of truth because it makes use of principles that are undeniable
in the realm of generalities. Its only flaw, however, is that it
leaves them there.
If we look at events taken in general and as a whole, it is
certain that miracles are far less likely a priori than common­
places such as error or lying; for a miracle is a rare excep­
tion, a supernatural intervention that demands serious reasons.
From such a point of view, a person would be right in expecting
to find more fables than facts in the realm of wonders. But
such a view does not solve any particular case.
In like manner, an excellent general rule for criticism has
been established, stating that among several possible explanations a person should choose the most likely, the one which is
“least miraculous.” But once this choice is made, we must get
down to the facts, one by one, and find out what is “the most
likely explanation” for each one of them. Then the question
takes on quite a different complexion. What is most frequent
in the general run of things, what is most probable if all the
70

| cases are studied, is not the most likely in every particular
I case. This holds true in all fields, even in those farthest reI moved from the criticism of wonders. Everybody knows that
I phenomena which are rare, exceptional, abnormal, and monI strous — for example, certain moral perversions — do appear
I upon investigation to be the only likely explanation in certain
I given circumstances. Nobody finds any difficulty in admitting
such explanations when there are serious proofs adduced to
guarantee them. A priori, however, and from an over-all
point of view, they would rank as the least likely hypothesis.
Consequently, if the principle of criticism just invoked is the
only one employed, it will leave all the questions in suspense.
Something is being added, and quite a bit, when one surrep­
titiously implies an equality between “the likely” and “the”
natural.” These two words are not at all synonomous; and it
is begging the question rather crudely to suppose that they are.
Let us now apply the rules just formulated to the facts.57
These are reducible to two types.
First Case. A wondrous story is found recounted in some
document. I examine its internal structure. I conclude that
the supernatural could be there. There are many indications
pointing in this direction. Here then is a probability beginning
to form, a likelihood taking concrete shape around some re­
ported event. It is true that I am aware of another probability
opposed to this one; namely, that of error or of a lie. At this
point in the investigation, these latter explanations still remain
probable. But why should they be considered more probable?
From the philosophical point of view that I have adopted,58 and
57 Hie alternative we are discussing should be conceived with rigorous
accuracy. It is a question of choosing between two hypotheses that
are considered possible, of choosing between these two alone, and of
choosing before a person forms any preconceived notion about the
reality of the concrete fact. This means, first of all, that a miracle
is explicitly supposed as possible. It is this which makes the second
opinion different from the first; for if the possibility of a miracle is
not included, the alternative would no longer have any meaning, since
one of its elements would have been ruled out. Secondly, it means
that the two explanations exhaust the possibilities — on one side, a
miracle; on the other, a lie or an error — without leaving any room,
for example, for some unknown natural cause. Lastly, it means that
the weighing of the likelihoods takes place before judging the reality
of the event. Otherwise the reason for weighing them would cease to
exist.
58 Cf. above, Part I, Chapter IV, Section 2, pp.

71

after verifying the concrete likelihoods that are sketched in the I wonder-worker, the results following the event, the neighbor­
narrative, I find it impossible to bestow any prejudiced favor
hood where other authentic divine marvels have occurred, and
upon these unfavorable explanations.
I so on are all against such an idea. Nor is there any more probIt may even be that the antecedent probability of a lie or er­ j ability in favor of some unknown natural cause intervening at
ror is reduced even more by the nature of the events reported,
I this spot ad nutum, and never showing up again. No, the only
by the connections which these events have with sublime truths
I solid likelihood is that of pious make-believe. There is an anteand with facts known from other sources, as well as by the
I cedent probability, a very strong likelihood, that we are in the
moral beauty and beneficial results of the events. But to be
I land of legend. Before consulting the testimony, we feel ourbrief, so long as this probability (of a lie or an error) subsists, I selves quite justly inclined towards admitting error or fraud in
it is the documents that have the final word. It is these docu­
I this case.
ments and these alone that will decide between the conflicting
I
But now, look at the documents, and see how sharply they
hypotheses.
I contradict our diagnosis. It is a sudden change of scene. Backed
But we meet in history some unimpeachable documents that
I up by the clearest possible documentary support, the fact turns
allow us to rule out the very possibility of error and fraud with
I out to be real. What was previously devoid of likelihood and had
certainty. Suppose that here and now such is the case. Then
I in its favor only a bare possibility now compels recognition.
the question is solved. The fact is real and it is a miracle. How
There is no getting out of it:
can such a conclusion be avoided ? It was the very principles of
'
“The truth may sometimes be what doesn’t look like truth.”
Hume and Stuart Mill that brought us to it. Once it has been
A person does not decide whether a thing is real by simply
granted that the testimony adduced is of high quality, then the
I
balancing probabilities. Some element of reality itself must
non-existence of the fact would be a genuine moral prodigy, “a
I
appear,
and like some irresistible weight it must pull the ques­
greater miracle” than its existence. For to have competent,
I
tion at issue down with itself into the realm of certainties. In
sincere, and well-informed witnesses testify to error would be
|
the present case, it is the testimony that plays this role. The
a completely inexplicable event— we would even say absurd and
I
tiniest speck of reality has more weight just by itself than a
contradictory.
I
mountain of likelihoods.
Second Case. Let us press the analysis of the problem to
I
Now that the hypothetical case has been changed so radically,
the point where it gives rise to conflicting considerations. We
I
to what are we going to attribute the prodigy? At this point we
are faced with contingencies more difficult to appraise than beI
can no longer keep abstracting from likelihoods. A fact that is
fore. I am thinking now of accounts of wonders that are strange.
I
certified as true does not have to be likely. But an explanation
Looking at the reported fact just by itself, I find no positive
I
that is unlikely will not be an explanation. The causal influence
likelihood in it that favors a supernatural intervention from God. I
producing an event does not manifest itself as the event does.
It is an obscure wonder, without any noteworthy spiritual reverI
In searching out this influence, reason goes into the unknown.
berations and without much apparent usefulness. It was perI
It determines the cause by taking its stand upon its plausibility.
formed for the benefit of some individual or some small group
I
It chooses the cause from among others either because of its
to satisfy a lowly desire or to enhance the halo of some saintly
I
greater probability, or at least because all the others seem
personage with a passing ray of glory. Of course, God is inI
positively improbable. However, in our present case, only one
finitely good, and quite capable of condescending to answer the
I
cause has not been excluded absolutely. We have noted certain
longings of a childlike piety; and moreover, His designs can lie
/
tenuous, fleeting probabilities pointing to a divine intervention;
beyond our grasp. However, the fact remains that a priori there
j
and these were counterbalanced by some very strong probabil­
seems to be no positive reason why He should be manifested in
j
ities in favor of the story’s being fictitious — but not in favor of
this way and in this place in preference to every other situation.
/
any other cause, if we suppose that the fact was real.
Hence,
The contrary is more probable.
j
once the fiction has been excluded, divine intervention is the
On the other hand, one finds it impossible in this case to
I
only thing left that can be admitted. It becomes likely a poste­
accept the idea of a lesser supernatural agent — for example,
I
riori, because of the considerable change introduced into the
a diabolical power. The moral milieu, the character of the
I
data of the problem by the fact’s actual occurrence which is
72
73

now recognized. Consequently, if no new evidence comes in to
alter the state of the question radically, we will be forced to
conclude humbly that we are here in the presence of a miracle
that was unexpected, but real.

Third Opinion: In the criticism of wonders, no consideration
should be paid to the ideas of the possible
or impossible, but only to the value of the
testimonies.
Many apologists for Christianity uphold this opinion which
is the exact opposite of those just examined. This opinion seems
exaggerated to us. We think that the intrinsic likelihood of events
is a datum of reality and not pure make-believe. Reason and
reflective thinking are grounded upon this likelihood, and there­
fore it should be taken into consideration. This will become clear
as we vindicate the following opinion, which we adopt as our own.

Fourth Opinion:

The ideas of the possible and impossible,
of the probable and improbable, ought to be
considered along with the estimate of the
value of the testimony.

Why should we make an exception in favor of miracles by
not following the method used in all other matters? When facts
are proposed for our acceptance, they always set before our
eyes a twofold coefficient — the one being the value of the testi­
mony upon which the facts are based, the other being the in­
trinsic possibility or probability of these facts. And if one of
these coefficients is low, we insist that the other be increased
proportionately. A commonplace account, narrating ordinary
daily facts, is accepted on any kind of testimony; there is no
indication that it might have been invented. But the same does
not hold true of a story that is quite exceptional, very exciting,
and genuinely surprising. Before putting our faith in such a
story, we demand better guarantees. Finally, there are some
tales so extravagant that we simply cannot put faith in them.
This is the view of common sense, and of a critical sense as
well. Historians and theorizers about the historical method, be­
lievers and non-believers, Father de Smedt as well as Messieurs
Langlois and Seignobos vie with each other in acknowledging
74

the value of this internal criterion. How then should one en­
deavor to prove its illegitimacy when applied to some special
subject like that of wonders ?
What the apologists really fear is that miracles will not
stand up if this criterion is used, since miracles are extra­
ordinary phenomena. These fears lack all foundation. Judg­
ments about possibility and probability have their place and
usefulness in a study of documents concerning wonders just as
much as they do in other studies, and even more so.
a) Judgments about probability. We have shown how judg­
ments about probability are used in regard to the second opinion
that we examined. When looked at in general, a miracle is more
unlikely than any natural phenomenon whatsoever. For it to be­
come admissible a priori, some distinct and peculiar circum­
stances that are quite exceptional in their own way must alter
this lack of likelihood in some particular case. In order for
the miracle to be admitted, there must be testimonies that are
bolstered by strict guarantees — guarantees that become all
the stronger in proportion as the concrete likelihoods diminish.
All enlightened believers view the situation in this way. Tri­
bunals for canonization debate about miracles with a super­
abundance of precaution, which they dispense with when verifying
other important traits in the lives of the saints.
b) Judgments about possibility. Here the question becomes
far more delicate. An event that is absolutely impossible can
never be admitted. An instance of this would be something that
is intrinsically contradictory, or something to which could be
assigned neither a cause capable of producing it nor a purpose
that could justify it. Just because a person admits a God and
spirits and demons does not at all mean that he has good grounds
for attributing whatsoever he likes to them. This would not be
logical. For these supernatural beings also have their “nature,”
which rules out certain actions or manifestations for them. For
example, actions that are purposeless or immoral are beyond
God’s power. To decide that the wondrous events contained in
a fairy tale are unreal does not take an investigation of the
testimony upon which the story rests. The intrinsic nature of
the events is enough to classify them. The same thing holds
true for the extravagant and purposeless marvels recounted in
certain religious legends.
Let us remember, however, that the norm about which we are
speaking cannot be handled with too much circumspection. We
have already seen what stupid mistakes resulted from using this

75

k'i

I application and cannot be clearly understood without some
norm too enthusiastically and precipitately.50 Let. us not con­
I
details and examples that have no place in a resume like this.
fuse the unexplained with the impossible, nor a physical law
I
1. Textual criticism, which consists in establishing the
whose necessity is not absolute with a mathematical or meta­
I exact wording of a document, can be influenced by preoccupaphysical truth. We would do well to recall the fact chat God’s
! tions connected with wonders. If the text is read this way, the
designs may lie beyond our grasp and can be disconcerting to
I
wonder is brought in; while reading it another way does away
us. Consequently, let us not come out with the word impossible
I with it.
unless we are confronted with an obvious absurdity.
I
2. Regarding historical criticism, which investigates the
Should we propose the extreme case in which a conflict
I
origin
of the document, its author, its sources, and so on, it is
would appear to exist between the testimony and the intrinsic
I fitting to recall two general laws of psychology that are very
possibility of the facts? Can our two coefficients have contra­
I important for the subject with which we are now concerned.
dictory meanings and thus cancel out each other? What solu­
I (a) Historical data that have not yet become fixed are likely
tion exists if an excellent testimony has as its object an obvious
I to undergo changes in proportion to the number of intermediabsurdity? Here is a conflict far more keen and fundamental
! aries transmitting them. This transformation takes place
than the one mentioned above which arose from pure lack of
I especially along the lines of exaggeration and embellishment.
likelihood. Briefly then, can such a conflict occur?
I (b) The farther removed these facts are in time or place, the
First of all, it is certain that this type of conflict could not
I easier this deformation becomes; the closer they are, the less
take place in reality. It could only be caused by appearances,
I need there is to believe such a deformation may have taken
since what cannot exist cannot be observed and testified to
I place.
validly. And moreover, it would seem to be a very difficult
I
From these facts there flow the following consequences.
case, if the efforts of an enlightened and loyal investigator could
I The wondrous event that has been handed down from mouth to
not break through such appearances. Ordinarily, a deeper and
more impartial examination of the philosophical questions implied I mouth for a considerable length of time will be quite deservedly
I
suspect of having been embellished along the way, and this susin the judgment about possibility, or a more attentive considera­
tion of the testimony will bring some weak point to light here or
j ! picion will be increased just as much as the transmission route
there. But whatever the case may be, and as long as the problem I I is lengthened. The wondrous event that is contained in a docu­
remains unsettled, the critic’s task is clear. He must avoid any
I
ment bearing a later date will deserve just as much caution, for
forced compromises that stem from a desire to reach a soluI
the wonder has had the time to take shape as the product of the
tion at any cost. He must suppress none of the data in the enigI
laws just mentioned. But the case is different when the wonder
ma and allow it to exist as a complete unit without laying a
I
is reported by one who lives at the time of and close to the
finger on it.
I
facts. Conversely, wondrous events can be used to date a docu­
ment. If wonders abound in some document of unknown date,
this points to the improbability of the document’s antiquity.
SECTION Π: PARTICULAR RULES FOR THE
3. Interpretative criticism has as its end to determine what
VARIOUS TYPES OF CRITICISM
is the meaning of the document, what the author wanted to say,
and what he was trying to have us believe. It includes that
I. Textual criticism, historical criticism, and interpreta­
whole complex of delicate analyses wherein the abilities of the
tive criticism
philologist or the humanist have as much a part to play as does
the insight of the psychologist. The same words can be under­
We will be brief about these preliminary operations in
stood in their literal or in their figurative meaning. Of the
criticism, not because they contain no difficulties regarding
declarative statements, some are intended to put forth a solid
wonders, but because these difficulties are difficulties of59
historical truth, others are there only for the sake of eloquence
or description or ornamentation. A writer of this sort may have
59 See p. 69. Cf. the many examples of this in Introduction, p. 176,
wished to draw up an apology, or an allegory, or some symbolical
note 2.
narrative, or, perhaps, an historical novel or a pious fiction, and
not an historical account in the strict sense. <
76
77

How are we going to penetrate into the writer’s meaning
and distinguish the reality he intended to communicate from
the literary devices he employed? There are many clues that
can help us here. We might mention, for example, the nature
of the incidents narrated, the light or serious tone of the author,
the technique of his composition, the more or less realistic
temperament and behavior of his characters when they come on
stage, the more or less artisitic character of the narrative,
the use of descriptive commonplaces, of cadence, of settings
used before, the degree of accuracy found in his links with
concrete reality, the presence or absence of details that allow
one to locate the event in time and place, and so on. You can
see how complicated all this is and how an account interwoven
with wondrous events might not contain a single indication that
the wonders were real.

II. Criticism of the testimony, or historical criticism
properly so called.
Once the document’s exact text and meaning as well as its
author and date are known, then the time comes to make use of
the document from a historical point of view. How valuable is
the testimony which it transmits to us? In order for such testi­
mony to be accepted, certain conditions have to be fulfilled con­
cerning both the facts attested and the character of the witnesses.
1. Conditions concerning the facts, a) A person will accept
the facts with greater or less caution in proportion as the facts
are public or private in nature, known by experience or by con­
jecture, by everybody or by a few, and capable of an easy check
or not. Strange happenings that took place in broad daylight will
be less suspect than those that are cloaked in mystery.
b) While the miracle is an extraordinary fact and can occur
when not expected, this does not at all mean that it is therefore
essentially unobservable, as Edouard Le Roy has claimed. As
a matter of fact, an onlooker can see an event that takes him by
surprise, and he can see it quite well. Surely not all the effects
of surprise are unfortunate. Surprise vigorously stirs up our
attention; and instead of dulling our sense faculties, it puts a
keen edge on them. Moreover, in certain places and around
certain people, miracles sprout up in large numbers. Such cir­
cumstances — which are real exceptions, even though instances
of them are encountered in almost every age — do promote the
observation of wonders to a striking degree. Then, too, a mir­
acle is not an essentially “fleeting” phenomenon, as the same
78

author maintains. It is not something like an elusive flash of
lightning. For usually a person can give leisurely study to the
situation both before and after the event; for instance, when
there is question of a bone that was broken and then is knit to­
gether, or of a purulent wound that has been healed, and so
forth.
c) In order to have sufficient control over a miracle, is it
necessary for it to behave like a laboratory experiment, so that
it can be produced and repeated at will under the circumstances
chosen by the experimentei' ? Voltaire and Renan have put forth
such demands. The “commission of physiologists, physicists,
chemists, and so on,” of which Renan dreamed, has become
famous. Others are loud in their protests that they will believe
nothing unless certain processes of control have been used which
are not the only possible methods; for example, the use of X-ray
when there is question of a fracture.
These requirements show a lack of reasonableness. Why de­
mand such means of observation if other methods are sufficient?
A broken bone can be discovered most certainly without being
X-rayed. On the other hand, some certainties drawn from direct
observation are not a bit less firm than those drawn from experi­
mentation. Astronomy, which is a well-founded and exact sci­
ence, contains a large number of certainties like this; for the
stars do not step down into the observatories in order that they
can be handled and controlled by men. Moreover, there are a
number of natural phenomena that are rare, exceptional, and
erratic. These have to be recorded precisely at the place and
time they occur. They not only escape man’s control but also
his foresight. These phenomena may be excellent raw material
for the science of tomorrow, but for the present they do not al­
low us to discover their laws; they recur only at long, irregular
intervals.
Should a person reject these phenomena on such grounds?
He should, if he would impose on them the same requirements
that are forced upon miracles. An historical event takes place
only once. Are people going to ask that it take place again just
as they wish before they will believe it? We have to take the
facts as they are, together with the precise circumstances in
which they are clothed. We should not force them into some
official uniform that they have to wear under pain of not passing
muster. We do not have to furnish these phenomena with a
schedule to be followed, but must bring ourselves into line with
theirs. This is the only scientific procedure. The lofty re­
quirements of seances in an amphitheater and of academic

79

commissions dreamed up by Voltaire or Renan are a bit
exaggerated.
According to a famous dictum, the scientific spirit consists
in “submitting to the facts.” Therefore, if it really is a free
agent who is producing the wonders, how do you know that he
will consent to keep in step with all your caprices, that he will
judge that it is good, useful, and in accord with his dignity and
purposes to act or refrain from acting precisely in those con­
ditions which you have excogitated? And if this free agent is an
infinite God who deserves the greatest possible respect, and if
it is actually He who is said to resist the proud and grant His
favor to the humble, do you think that such an attitude would
influence Him to manifest Himself? If in the data placed before
your eyes you have everything that you need to become con­
vinced, provided you are willing to examine these data, why do
you wish more to be given you?
2. Conditions concerning the persons. All the difficulties
on this point are summarized in a certain number of exceptions
that are usually thrown up against statements about wonders.
Right from the start, certain types of people are ruled out as
suspect; and this takes in at least the larger portion — if not the
whole assembly — of possible witnesses. A few general state­
ments about the lack of critical spirit in the ancients, about
lying being in the blood of certain races, about the ardent
enthusiasm of the faithful, about the lack of judgment in the
common folk, or the disturbed mentality of mobs, and so on,
are enough to erect a composite block against any testimony
that favors wonders. This is a very easy way out of an embar­
rassing situation. It is quite necessary to consider this point
a bit more closely.
A. THE ANCIENTS. The idea that the authors of antiquity
were in all seriousness accorded some sort of “permission to
lie” is pure phantasy. The basis for this idea is a false inter­
pretation of texts.00 Nor is it any more accurate to attribute
indiscriminately to the “ancients” the idea that history is merely
a field for inventive literary creations. Among these ancient
writers are men who unquestionably are concerned about the
objective truth of what they report; for example, Thucydides
and Tacitus. It is Cicero who is the source of that famous, oftcited dictum which sums up the historian’s duties in conscience:
“Ne quid falsi audeat; ne quid veri non audeat.” (“Let him not
dare to say anything false, nor fear to say anything true.”)
80 Cf. Introduction, p. 329, note 3.

80

The following admission should be made — at least in regard
to certain ancient writers, for not even this holds true for all
of them. Of the two steps involved in the historian’s labor —
namely, the documentary research and the composition — the
second was the one which the ancients described and possibly
appreciated more than anything else. Those among the early
historians who were most intelligent and sincere achieved some
type of critical work by instinct. But it is evident that they did
not delve down nearly so deeply into historical method as has
been done during the past three or four centuries. They did not
use reflexion and analysis to grasp the rules of this delicate,
complicated science whose theory is quite recent. Perhaps they
did not set a fitting value on the importance and the difficulties
of these rules. But as a compensating factor, artistic careful­
ness was developed to a high degree among them. Cicero tells
us that history should be “ornate”; and this does not mean that
bistory should embellish the facts, but that these facts should
be arranged in an attractive style. There is a way of polishing
the facts without changing them. Moreover, literary careful­
ness has not disappeared among modern historians; nor can it
disappear from history as such, since it belongs to the nature
°f historical composition.
Therefore, as regards the ancients and those who have in­
herited their style in later ages, it is both fair and prudent not
to proceed by means of sweeping prohibitions. Among those
ancients we will find some pleasant story-tellers, some brash
Prevaricators and also some conscientious scholars. Each
one must be studied individually to find out the amount of con­
fidence he deserves. In particular, each work must be studied
to discover in what degree the author’s care to produce a work
of art may have outweighed his pains to produce a work of
truth.
B. THE MIDDLE AGES, a) In the Middle Ages literary
manners were not what they are today, and on that score there
ooed be no difficulty in admitting we have made progress. At
that period plagiarism was not regarded as thievery. People
ransacked the works of another writer without scruple and
plucked from them the descriptions or arguments or speeches
that would fit the end they had in view. In this way “stock”
miracles passed from the life of one saint into that of another.
A very crude concern for references allowed a pseudo-epigraphic
literature to sprout up and deceive the non-suspecting reader.
For example» one could see in circulation some hagiographical
accounts that were headed with the name of the saint’s discinles
or companions in order to gain authority.
81

For the most part, however, these simple frauds can be
easily recognized. Their falsifying techniques are barefaced
and awkward, and our modern criticism does not find in them
much scope for very involved siftings. Moreover, these fail­
ings do not discredit the Middle Ages in their entirety — and
that is the important thing. For alongside these plagiarisms
and pseudo-epigraphic writings, there exist perfectly authentic
accounts that come from original sources. This even holds
true of the hagiography of that period. These works came from
witnesses who believed they had seen miracles and told their
accounts with an unquestionable sincerity.
b) A more serious charge, at least from the historical if
not from the moral point of view, is our ancestors’ proverbial
credulity and their eagerness for wondrous events. If their
excesses in this matter were as radical and actually as exten­
sive as is claimed, that ends it. For them every medieval
document about miracles would remain under a blanket of sus­
picion. However, if closer attention is given to this matter,
one realizes that this widespread depreciation implies a gen­
eralization and an extension that are simply unfair.
The teaching of the Church, which was generally received
during the Middle Ages, always gave miracles a position of
secondary importance in the lives of the saints. You can sense
the influence of this teaching upon the saints’ biographers of
this period. Some of them focus their attention and interest on
the holiness of the saints rather than upon their miracles. You
encounter some biographers who limit themselves to a descrip­
tion of the virtues and exterior lives of their heroes, without
placing the halo of “wonder-worker” upon their brows. Or you
will hear those tellers of wondrous events, the mirabiliarii —
who should apparently be the ones most in love with the mi­
raculous — putting physical miracles on a lower level than the
interior marvels of grace.
And there is another element. The tendency towards criti­
cism is so deep an instinct in the human mind that no one can
really expect to see it totally eclipsed everywhere. Man has
always been somewhat suspicious of the words of his fellowman.
Thus, even in the Middle Ages, even among priests and monks,
there were men who did not at all like the idea of being “taken
in.” There were “exploders of legends.” There were writers
who tore off the mask from fake miracles, who became indig­
nant at them, or treated them with ridicule. Consequently, here
again the prudent thing is not to pass any verdict except upon
82

individual cases. The mere fact that an author is from the
Middle Ages is not enough to make him unworthy of belief.
C. THE ORIENT. These same remarks should be repeated in regard to the psychology of “the Oriental,” as sketched
by Renan. He endows every story-teller from the Orient with
the two following traits: complete lack of concern for objective
truth; inability, when faced with facts, to adopt a different attitude than that of art or experience or emotion. These traits
would be like some incurable blemish or a defect that is con­
genital to a race. And these sweeping statements are used to
support some very definite conclusions against the Bible and
the Gospels.
However, the Orient, and especially that part of the Orient
of which Renan is speaking, has produced something besides
legend. There are some works both among the canonical writers
as well as outside their circle which no critic may allow him­
self to disregard —no matter how little faith he possess. The
Jew, Flavius Josephus, despite all that could be brought against
him, is a genuine historian. The authors of The Books of Kings
or of the first book of Maccabees are sober-minded annalists
who intend to give us exact information about facts. They are
not “haggidists” [imaginative moralizers] that would not be
bothered about truth or error. St. Mark is the model of the
guileless historian who is straightforward with his convictions.
St. Luke is a conscientious writer who is preoccupied with
exactness. These are all undeniable facts. In the Orient, as in
other places, one meets with historical sources worthy of
trust. The proof of this lies in the fact that some people, while
not believing in miracles at all, do draw heavily and confidently
upon these sources to compose their Lives of Jesus or their
Histories of the People of Israel.
D. THE NON-PROFESSIONALS. Is special training nec­
essary to recognize a miracle? We have heard Voltaire and
Renan requiring the erection of scientific commissions for this
purpose. And in our days some non-believing doctors, who
carefully study the cures at Lourdes, completely reject all testi­
mony that does not come from fellow-doctors. Obviously, such
a procedure is a very effective way of getting rid of miracles.
But it has no right at all to be ranked among those procedures
which are inspired by impartial investigation.
Why discard as completely worthless the testimony of a man
of good sense and sound judgment who speaks about events that
took place before his own eyes? Medical training can purify
the findings, and it can direct attention into certain important

I
I
I
I
1
I
I
!
I

83
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channels; but does this mean that every person who lacks this
medical training will perceive nothing? Does it mean that some
simple, striking, external phenomenon — such as a hemorrhage,
a running wound, and so on —- requires scientific learning in
order to be perceived? It will only be the expert who can ex­
plain these phenomena thoroughly; but he is not the only one
who can verify them. Moreover, doctors base about half of
their diagnosis upon the information gathered from the sick
person or from those around him. By this very fact doctors
admit that observations made by ordinary folk have some value
in their eyes. One of these doctors put this truth humorously
when speaking about recent controversies, “It doesn’t take a
tailor to see that a coat has holes.”
No doubt an extraordinary phenomenon does demand more
rigorous control; but this does not mean that the specialist
alone is capable, nor even that he is always capable of exer­
cising this control. Just as a doctor, despite all his skills,
can become distracted, can give superficial or improper at­
tention, and can err in jotting down something he saw, so too,
some unskilled person may possibly bring penetrating insight
and scrupulous attention to the task. The only thing that mat­
ters is to know whether the phenomenon has been seen and
described just as it took place. Once this has been proved, the
professional rank of the witnesses matters little.
E. CROWDS: CONTAGIOUS IDEAS AND GROUP HAL­
LUCINATIONS.
The inferiority of crowds in evaluating events can be con­
sidered from two different points of view. The complaint can
be made that examining facts in a crowd is difficult, for the
observer finds himself swept along in the current of the crowd
where vague indefinite rumors spring up that can be exagger­
ated as they go the rounds. But this is only a combination of
normal circumstances. What is more, these difficulties are
not found in every crowd, nor are they insurmountable. Certain
events are so visible that a large number of people can make
sure of them at one and the same time. And often enough,
everyone can leisurely re-examine the events and verify them
for himself. We have all learned from experience that, even
in a crowd, a prudent man is not irresistibly swept along by
the current of rumors spreading out from unknown sources.
Besides this, the crowd has certain advantages over isolated
witnesses. If the persons composing the crowd preserve their
normal state, they create a courtroom in which the numerous
jury-members with their varying opinions and temperaments

84

form independent verdicts that serve as mutual checks upon
each other. The very publicity of the proof is then a guarantee
against fraud.
However, the pathology of crowds presents us with another
point of view. Here the appearance of abnormal phenomena in
large gatherings is emphasized. In crowds, persuasion is
brought about without recourse to solid reasons or logic. An
idea or an image induces hallucination, and mental contagion
spreads everywhere. The chief cause of group hallucinations
is what is called “wide-eyed expectancy.” Renan says, “Ex­
pectancy ordinarily creates its objects.” According to Dr.
Gustave Le Bon, these morbid phenomena occur even in small
groups. “As soon as several people get together, a crowd is
formed... Immediately there disappears that power of dis­
cernment and critical spirit which each of them possesses.”
Undoubtedly there is a grain of truth in these theories.
Wide-eyed expectancy can produce hallucination in special cir­
cumstances. Mental contagion is a fact. The exception, how­
ever, should not be proposed as the rule. It is not true that the
simple fact of becoming part of a crowd makes normal people
lose their power to see and judge, and makes them blind and
hallucinated. Personality is not at all wiped out in this crowd
atmosphere. Divergent opinions still exist there. The large
number of believers at places where miracles are thought to
occur is not enough to convince the unbelievers about them. We
see this happening today at Lourdes. Crowds may be divided.
Within those vast expanses of human beings, various cross­
currents of opinion often circulate, each one as powerful as the
other. Then the claims of the enthusiastic believers run head­
long into rock-like resistance and merciless requirements.
Only Renan, with his quick pen, would risk that sweeping dictum:
“Expectancy ordinarily creates its object.” You can see quite
frequently at Lourdes the most eager expectancy or the greatest
yearning for a miracle or the most ardent petitions ending up
in nothing. The cases of group hallucination in crowds are the
exception. We have all been mixed up in crowds more than
once — crowds that were quite enthusiastic — and yet we dis­
covered nothing like that hallucination. To sum up then, a
crowd is far more frequently not hallucinated than hallucinated.
What is more, when this thinking takes on the radical form
which Dr. G. Le Bon professes, its final consequences are
really absurd. This author informs us, “A crowd need not be
large,” to be suspected of hallucination. If this were once ad­
mitted, no historical testimony at all could stand. Everything
85

to cast upon all believers, in order to strike particularly at
could be denied simply by having recourse to group halluciChristians, has an especially poor foundation. For a natural
nation. Even the concordant testimony of eye-witnesses, far
alliance between the Christian Faith and dishonesty would be a
from acting as a guarantee, would become a reason for being
very
strange combination. In Christianity, lying really is a sin.
on one’s guard.
This
fact
is recorded in a score of places in the Old and New
F. BELIEVERS. Here is the most important class of re­
Testament. And for rendering service to the God of the Chris­
jected witnesses, a class in which some people think they find
tians, certainly no authorization is given for lying: “Numquid
the greatest number of invalidating defects. They claim that
indiget Deus mendacio vestro?” (“Is God in need of your lie?”)
religious belief gives the mind a strong leaning toward credulity,
Actually, would it not be psychologically unlikely for such a
that it develops in it an habitual tendency towards the irrational,
clear-cut
command always to be growing dim, as if by magic,
and that it deadens the critical powers within a man. Besides
among the very perscns who are rightly considered the most
this, religious belief undermines a man’s morals. It gives birth
zealous in religious matters? What non-believer of good will
to a religious enthusiasm which no longer heeds right or wrong,
i
would
dare, in his calmer moments, to say that such is the
but is only concerned with what promotes some sacred cause.
case? Who is he who cannot find, among all the Christians
Thus speak Hume, Renan, and thousands of others. We must
around him, some souls lofty enough not to be capable of stoopexamine this indictment thoroughly.
1. There is no constant connection between belief and error I ing to deliberate religious trickery? The very least that can be
or fraud.
I said is that sincerity and honesty are not the exclusive property
a) The instances of error or fraud that are alleged against
I of non-believers.
c) Moreover, incredulity itself may also be connected with
believers give no grounds for any general conclusion. Maybe
!
those defects for which the faith is blamed. Not all non-believers
the ranks of believers have contained some dupes and simple- I
tons — and these in numbers as large as one might like. Maybe j are enlightened, far-sighted persons; and at times “primitive”
an interest in religion has inspired deliberate deceit at times.
I rationalism does invent some very amusing explanations con­
Nevertheless, these facts are not enough to prove that there is
! cerning wonders. Strong anti-religious feeling can blind the
mind and warp the will, nor are examples lacking wherein this
any constant connection between religious beliefs and misfor­
tunes such as these. Just because it has been proved that
, feeling has inspired unfair attacks and calumnious charges.
From instances of this sort no one will conclude that every non­
certain believers are unreliable witnesses does not mean that
a general prohibition has been established which rules out all
1 believer employs such underhand methods, or even toys with the
thought of them. I wish the same generalization were similarly
testimony from believers.
I
avoided when the question concerns believers.
b) Certain facts no less characteristic of believers can just i
d) Conviction of any kind — be it true or false, pro or con —
as easily be alleged in support of the opposite view. These facts j
can occasion some unfortunate accidents within the mind that
are actually so numerous and so forceful for an unbiased mind
holds it. Such a mind is forced in season and out of season to
that one feels some embarrassment in bringing them forward.
search out reasons justifying the conviction, to defend it with
For example, there has been an energetic hunting down of error
makeshift arguments, and to push on blindly toward every con­
and deceit carried on within the bosom of Christianity and of
clusion that might strengthen it. Besides this, it sometimes
Catholicism. Men of vigorous belief, who surely were not af­
happens that in the unanalysable jumble of feelings and percep­
fected with any scepticism in this matter of miracles, have
tions, the heart tries to serve what it takes to be the truth by
followed this hunt. For instance, the Belgian Jesuits who have
making use of deceit or treachery. Abuses like these are not at
made famous the name of Bollandists have made a good many
all necessary. They occur everywhere, and hence give no
enemies for themselves since the seventeenth century by their
grounds for a prepossession against anything in particular.
absolutely unsparing openness in matters pertaining to the
2. The relation of religious beliefs to error or fraud.
lives of the saints. Episcopal or pontifical investigations into
It follows that the general exclusion which some wished to
miraculous events end up by eliminating more than two-thirds
urge against all testimony coming from a believer cannot be
of such events.
admitted. What we hav® already said is sufficient proof of this.
Then the suspicion of deception which Hume and Renan try

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86

87

However, we must study the question positively, and see what
influence religious belief can exert upon a witness’s state­
ments about a miracle.
No difficulty can arise from the fact that the witness believes
in the very wonder about which he testifies. Taken just by itself,
such a belief offers no grounds for suspecting either partiality
or deceit. As a matter of fact, prejudice is not present since,
by hypothesis, the influence of previous belief is excluded. Nor
is any deceit present since, by hypothesis again, the witness be­
lieves what he says. Moreover, no situation exists in which the
demand can be imposed upon witnesses that they are not to form
any ideas for themselves about the meaning and import of the
event they recount. You cannot reduce man to the role of a
simple recording apparatus, nor is there any need of deadening
his interpretative powers to safeguard the accuracy of his ac­
counts and impressions.
Let us then pass on to the case that may stir up some dis­
cussion and doubts — the case which involves antecedent beliefs,
which can influence the recognition of wondrous events and the
testimony given about them. First of all, is it true that non­
belief is the preferable attitude for forming such a judgment;
and does it safeguard impartiality?
A. The respective value of belief and non-belief in the
inves tigation of wonders.61
There is an accidental trustworthiness which clings to testi­
mony contrary to the convictions of the witness. It is obvious
that a wondrous event becomes much more worthy of belief if a
non-believer testifies to the basic facts of the case. And it is
just as certain that a miracle no longer possesses much credit
when it has been rejected by those whose faith it would have
strengthened and who are disposed by this very faith to admit
its existence. From this purely external viewpoint it is some­
times the non-believer, sometimes the believer, who enjoys
the upper hand as occasion serves. Being in inverse proportion
here, the advantages balance each other, so that there is no
argument on this score.
But what we have to compare are two intellectual attitudes,
considered in themselves, to see the advantages which each
61 The non-belief mentioned here is not the methodical and conditioned
doubt that is always ready to yield to proofs of fact. Rather it is that
fixed negative attitude which holds for certain that the real wonder
neither exists nor can exist.
Belief here simply means the acceptance of miracles or of any
other data that would lead to such acceptance.

88

adnnf ^^iura^y aru^ ordinarily upon those persons who have
attit d
Tiüs is the wa>’ tiie objection contrasts the two
lieved θ8* ^^out forming any verdict concerning what is be­
sets ο 0Γ ®va^ua^n^ the motives for non-belief, a person simply
each nff
over against the other to see what advantages
that th frs/Or an investigation of wonders. And it is alleged
indent e^ever> by the simple fact that he is a believer, and
advanf11 en^y °f the quality of his belief, finds himself in a disageous position. This is what we are going to examine.
with h&re *S n° constani connection or necessity that links belief
®ent
StuPidity or non~helief with correctness of judg! Viet' ana wtii· Within different minds, any idea or any con/ with°n Can
associations that are either helpful or harmful,
I tak f
losing its own inner worth. That much we can
/ in& '°T £rante^.e2 But the fact remains that antecedent belief
/
mir^cles naturally inclines the mind in a certain direction;
I th °eS maice the acceptance of a new miracle easier. Actually,
I of H»>rOklem ab°ut wonders is no longer wide open in the mind
I B . believer. At bottom it is solved; for him, miracles are
f Possible and some have taken place. Consequently, whether one
Oracle more or less should take place does not stir up any
special difficulty nor any particularly new problem. Moreover,
; « is obvious that the believer is interested in seeing his belief
Justified by some new proofs, since he would like to see others
■ share his belief. And this may give rise to partiality or the
Use Of dubious means in his efforts to persuade others. To be
iruthful about the matter, none of these effects of belief can be
denied.
However, non-belief has precisely the same disadvantages.
Π also sets up a prejudice. Take, for instance, the case of a
non-believer working right alongside his believing neighbor in
the investigation of some wondrous event. Neither one nor the
°«ier is unconcerned about the result of this investigation. Each
one naturally wants to see this research end in a justification of
his own convictions and in a greater glorification of them before
the eyes of everyone. Therefore, if the principle were laid down
that a nerson had to be free of all interest before he could recog­
nize facts clearly and testify to them sincerely, then both be­
lievers and non-believers would be equally suspect as witnesses.
On the other hand, however, the man who believes in wonders
has some decided advantages over the non-believer. First of
all as regards the introductory question about the possibility of62

62 Cf. above, PP· 86~87‘
89

I

pm"?

a miracle, it is the believer who has the right answer, If the
occurrence of a wondrous event is possible — as we already
proved it is — then a person must be prepared to recognize it
should it occur. The non-believer lacks this indispensable
predisposition which the believer possesses. Moreover, the
non-believer has based his intellectual position on a starting
point that is erroneous. Now an erroneous starting point leads
directly and by its very nature to other errors. But a true
starting point is a precise instrument for research and can only
be abused by accident.
And we can go a step farther. If other things are equal, the
believer will find impartiality easier just because of his own
presupposition. Actually, he has a freer field in which to move
about. The reason for this is that his investigations into mir­
acles can have more than one outcome. The results may be
positive or negative, favorable or unfavorable. He is under no
obligation to come up with a miracle in every case. There is
nothing against his admitting many cases of deliberate trickery,
of illusions, or of unexplained facts. But it is quite the contrary
with the non-believer. He finds his path rigorously plotted and
his goal marked out in advance. For him it is absolutely nec­
essary that every case involve error or illusion. He cannot ad­
mit the slightest instance of a real wonder, because if just one
exception were recognized, his thesis would go toppling to the
ground.83
Lastly, not only does the believer bring a keener, more sym­
pathetic curiosity and a livelier zest to the study of facts that
are thought to be wonders; but he also is very much interested
both in discovering whether God has actually intervened and in
not confusing God’s own activities with those of others. Here
we have some excellent dispositions to begin an investigation.
Of course, these can accidentally be impeded or overlaid by
other dispositions. But the fact remains that they are natural
to the believer just because he is a believer.
B. The respective value of various beliefs in the investi­
gation of wonders.
What we have said thus far does not, however, exhaust the
question. We cannot get to the bottom of it if we continue to
disregard what is the quality of the beliefs and what are their
truth and falsehood. We have already seen what is implied in
every belief and what are its advantages over non-belief by the
very fact that it is some type of belief. But this common ground63
63 Ci. Part I, Conclusion, p. 66.

Γ

ùfbelief can be improved or altered depending on the way it is
used. It is time to distinguish the various types of belief and to
draw up rules that an investigation should follow in relation to
each of these beliefs and its adherents.
a) Ill-founded belief. In examining a witness, an investi­
gating committee may become certain about the falsehood and
absurdity of his previous beliefs. Then it is obliged to take
into consideration the harmful influence that such beliefs may
exert upon the witness. Things like foolish tales and weird ac­
counts from mythology and legends wherein wonders mushroom
without rule or restraint do twist a man’s mind and warp his
sense of what is possible and probable. Certain practices of
sorcery or of spiritism as well as a terror of the supernatural
or a yearning for it do excite the soul excessively, keep it from
seeing correctly, put it into a daze, and sometimes stultify it.
Moreover, the dogmatic nonsense involved can have some prac­
tical repercussions. There are some legends that are both
marvellous and immoral, filled with perverse examples and
allurements. And if, as sometimes happens in certain unquiet
circles, all this is tied up with charlatanism, imposture, or
something still worse, there is no need of insisting on the cau­
tions demanded by the “testimonies” arising from such sources.
Without going to such extremes, every case that is solved
incorrectly creates an irksome precedent for the solution of
similar cases. Since the question of miracles is so important
from a religious point of view, it could also happen that an er­
roneous belief in this matter might have unfortunate moral
reverberations. It is only the examination of the concrete cir­
cumstances that will reveal what the situation actually is.
Lastly, the steps by which the error was introduced into a per­
son’s thinking may also reveal some defects such as levity,
blind passion, and so forth. These will legitimately bar such a
witness.
It is clear that in all these cases the advantages possessed
by belief over non-belief will be counterbalanced by disadvan­
tages more or less serious. There will be instances where one
error is opposed by its opposite, and each will have a certain
amount of influence against the other. It is difficult to decide
in the abstract which error will be less harmful. The char­
acter and mentality of the individuals together with the nuance
of the particular errors they hold will be the indispensable
factors for deciding in this matter.
b) True belief. We have recognized the possibility of won­
ders. This obliges us to examine the case in which a wonder
91

would somewhere occur and a witness would have strong
reason for believing in it.
If this should actually happen, it is clear that such a witness
would definitely not be disqualified by his belief, and that his
subsequent testimony would lose none of its force. What is more,
since we know that he possesses the truth about a question that
is connected with the one we are trying to solve, we should, if
anything, put a special value on his judgment. Truth is the seed
of truth. He who possesses truth has pushed farther into reality
and is in a better position to see what is real. Truth is also the
seed of honesty. A sound evaluation of divine and human reali­
ties is the foundation for right action. Therefore, providing all
other things are equal, those people will be most trustworthy
whose religious ideas are the most correct. And if authentic
supernatural interventions have put a stamp of approval upon
some code of conduct, then those who draw their inspiration
from this code will by that very fact be more likely to be the
most honest. The reason for this is that a moral code bearing
divine approval would evidently be the best. Moreover, it
would be the most effective restraint against dishonesty, for
nowhere would an alliance between religion and fraud be less
likely than where a moral code of this kind has been recognized.
However, it may be objected that as regards the believer
there has been no removal of that tendency which we mentioned
as naturally inclining him to be partial towards the object of
his convictions. Obviously true. Against this tendency the be­
liever does not have that exceptional bulwark which is actual
non-belief. You cannot reasonably ask him to abandon that con­
dition which he shares with anybody who professes a decided
opinion about anything. Yet, at all events, this condition is only
a temptation for him — that is, an evil which is in the realm of
pure possibility and which can remain there. On the other hand,
the advantages pointed out above are real advantages at work in
the here and now. It would really be strange if the very posses­
sion of speculative and moral truth created a barrier to anything,
or if the truth, when once gained, were to be considered as a
dangerous occasion of error!
c) Belief of questionable worth. But very frequently it will
be difficult to decide in advance about the objective worth of
the witness’s belief. Then the only thing to do is to appraise
the witness himself. Is he serious and honest? Would you say
he is simple or clever, endowed with a sluggish or a creative
imagination? Was he in a good position for seeing clearly the
fact to which he testifies ? Did he have means for deceiving

92

supposing that he would have wished to do so? The an1 fam t °;“ese questions will very frequently make further
^shgation unnecessary.
^Actually, ^e witness may have given the event close attenitiief11
sPea^n£ sincerely in spite of his erroneous
i cire 8* t We ^ave Pro°f that such is the case, then the other
’(Slid*311CeS ma^ter little. Once it is known that the witness
all th n°* ^aVe sP°ken falsely, there is no need to bother about
4o βοθ ^reCe<^n^ causes which might possibly have lead him to

Supposing, therefore, that a witness should give his word
1 is un some wonder which we cannot check and which we think
’.
eai and perhaps even preposterous, nevertheless, in cercircuinstances, we can put stock in his testimony.
idea th1”168 βθϋθί in wonders hardly gives any support to the
ret ‘
m*rac^es are possible — an idea which, let us not for"other SOund. People believe with an habitual, impersonal sort
'
ief, with some vague general idea, that miracles take
’ ^ce at times, that they did occur long ago. But they are
I
ior ancient history. Their details and sharp outlines
,
grown dim in the distance and have become blurred and
“distinct from the use religious teaching has made of them.
' «really would be astonishing to encounter such events in toQay’s busy world. This kind of belief really adds very little to
j
simple undeveloped idea that miracles are possible.
f
Sometimes too the supernatural interpretation wherein the
i author’s beliefs are reflected is purely an explanatory interpre, J^on, subsequent to the facts both logically and chronologically.
Thus it leaves undisturbed the data of his observation. And even
*hen his interpretation has been found faulty, a person may be
Educed to retain the valid data which were enclosed by the in­
terpretation without harm or distortion.
Finally there are times when false or even absurd beliefs
will not at all affect the powers needed for observing facts.
People who imagine they have seen a phantom during the night
do not oZ that amount become unfit for recognizing in broad
daylight that a broken leg has been reset. Other people who
accent tnn easily
rumors circulating in a crowd will none­
theless be able to state quite exactly what they themselves
have spcn Of course, there are borderline cases, obscured in
the shadows; and there are elusive’ indefinite phenomena that
win hl distorted by a preconceived notion. However, “there
are some facts so obvious that it is difficult to see them awry.”
Such facts impose themselves forcibly upon the mind; and, to
93

Τι

speak figuratively, their impact chokes off the power to inter­
pret them. Consequently, it can sometimes be stated that ante­
cedent belief was present without influencing the observation of
the facts.
At any rate, the mere fact of not being able to control a wit­
ness’s views about wonders does not authorize a person to reject
without fuller information all the testimony offered by the wit­
ness in this matter. For, first of all, these opinions are not
clearly absurd since, by hypothesis, we do not know what should
be thought of them. Besides, even though these opinions establish
a precedent, as we have mentioned, they do not have a deter­
mining influence in evaluating new cases. No logical procedure
nor any irresistible force leads from the admission of a miracle
here and there to the admission of them everywhere. Of course,
the logical fallacy of jumping from one particular case to another
or to many other cases is possible; but this can be avoided, even
by the uneducated. And some reason must be at hand for sup­
posing that this mistake has been made.
No more can the questionable value of an antecedent belief
be enough, on moral grounds, to disqualify a witness. As a mat­
ter of fact, without knowing what his belief is worth, you will
often be able to estimate its practical consequence by the varying
degrees of directness, action, and extent characterizing its ef­
fects. Each error does not necessarily taint every move a man
makes. And there are many errors from which you will not be
able to draw anything that even resembles a positive incentive
to dishonesty.

CONCLUSION

These are the general principles which govern the question
of miracles. Their complexity is summed up in the apologetic
proposition which we undertook to prove; namely, that a divine
wonder can occur and trustworthy means exist for discovering
it. As a matter of fact, the principles are nothing but a com­
plete unfolding of this proposition. They show us that this prop­
osition is supported in each of its constitutive parts by motives
which the mind can examine and by arguments from philosophy
or historical criticism. It seems to us that a non-believer who
tackles the question of wonders should first of all take his
start from these motives and arguments. And if we are not mis­
taken, these may lead him both to handle this huge question as
Christians who are Catholic do, and perhaps, later on, with the
help of divine grace, to arrive at their conclusions.
94

'

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Tn addition to the references given in this article on mir­
acles, Fr. de Tonquédec judged that in 1918 there was no need
of mentioning any work of importance on the subject beyond
those already listed in the D.A.F.C., II, cols. 1471-1472, in
connection with the miracles of Jesus Christ. The translator
has thought it fitting that an almost exclusively English bibli­
ography be drawn up from among books and articles written
about miracles and miraculous phenomena after the composi­
tion of Fr. de Tonquédec’s article. Although fairly extensive,
the bibliography makes no pretense at completeness. Some
works were judged sufficiently important to be included even
though they are in a foreign language or of a pre-1918 vin­
tage. In the bibliography’s first part dealing with books, an
asterisk indicates a non-Catholic author. In the second part,
where the periodicals have been pre-classified, and in the
third part, which contains the classic objectors against miracles, the asterisk has been judged unnecessary. A t sign
indicates a work considered to have special value.

I

BOOKS

A. TREATING DIRECTLY ABOUT MIRACLES:

(
■
;

ff
J

I

* Best, John H. Miracles of Christ in the Light of Present
Day Knowledge, New York, Macmillan, 1937.

i
fl
|
|

* Box H. S. Miracles and Critics, New York, Morehouse,
1935.

g
I

* Brabant F. H. Religion and the Mysterious, New York,
Longmans, 1930.
* Brewer, E. C. Dictionary of Miracles, imitative, realistic,
and dogmatic, Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1934.

j
i
J
J,

f Dhanis, Edward, S.J. Tractatio de Miraculo, Rome, 1951,
(mimeographed notes of Gregorian University
Lectures, with copious bibliographies on various
aspects of the miraculous).

|
I
5

95

* Garvie, Alfred Ernest. “Miracle,” The Encyclopaedia
Britannica, New York, Encyclopaedia Britannica
Inc., Fourteenth Edition, 1929, vol. XV, pp. 587589.
* Gerdtell, L. von. Miracles under Fire, St. Louts, Bethany
Press, 1930.
* Grant, Robert M. Miracle and Natural Law in Graeco­
Roman and early Christian Thought, Amsterdam,
North Holland Publishing Company, 1952.
Hellé, Jean. Miracles, New York, McKay, 1952.

t Joyce, G., S.J. The Question of Miracles, London,
Herder,1914.
* Kohler, Kaufman. “Miracle,” The Jewish Encyclopedia,
New York, Funk and Wagnails, 1916, vol. VIII, pp.
606-607.
t la Boullaye, P. H. de, S.J. Jésus Messie, Le thaumaturge
et le prophète, Paris, Editiones Spes, 1932.

Lepicier, Card., O.S.M. Le miracle, (Transi. C. Grolleau),
Paris, Lethielleux, 1936.

t Leroy, Oliver. Miracles, Tournai, Desclée, 1951.
* Lewis, C. S. Miracles, a Preliminary Study, London,
Macmillan, 1947.
* MacCulloch, J. A. “Miracles,” Encyclopaedia of Religion
and Ethics, (Edit. James Hastings), New York,
Scribners, 1916, vol. VIH, pp. 676-690.

* Mellone, S. H. Miracles and Modem Knowledge, London,
Lindsey, 1932.

t Michel, A. “Miracle,” Dictionnaire de théologie catholique,
Paris, Letouzey, 1928, vol. X, cols. 1789-1859.
Newsholme, H. P. Matter, Man, and Miracle, London,
Burns Oates, 1952.
* Rogers, Clement F. The Case for Miracle, London, S.P.
C.K., 1936.
* Roos, A. M. Possibility of Miracles, London, Rider, 1930.
* Tennant, F. R., D.D. Miracles and its Philosophical Pre­
suppositions, Cambridge, at the University Press,
1925.
96

Thielecke, Dr. Helmut. Das Wunder, Leipzig, Hinricks,
1939.

I Van Hove, A. La Doctrine du Miracle chez S. Thomas,
Paris, Gabalda, 1927.
* Warfield, Benjamin B. Counterfeit Miracles, New York,
Scribners, 1918.

* Wright, C. J. Miracle in History and Modern Thought,
London, Holt, 1930, (with extensive bibliography
to non-Catholic articles on the subject).

’
I

B. TREATING OF MIRACLES IN MORE GENERAL
STUDIES:

I
J

* anon. Contemporary American Theology (Edit. Virgilius
Ferm), New York, Round Table Press, 1933.

:;1

I
I
‘I
I
,1

* anon. Contemporary Thinking about Jesus, (esp. the essays
by Dmitri Merejkowski and Rudolf Otto), New
York, Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1944.

anon. Pensee scientifique et foi chrétienne, (Recherches et
Débats, cahier 4), Paris, Librairie Arthème
Fayard, 1953, pp. 195-218.

* Barnes, Ernest William. The Rise of Christianity, New
York, Longmans, 1948, c. IV.
* Barth, Karl. The Word of God and the Word of Man,
(Transi. Douglas Horton), Grand Rapids, Zondervan, 1935, pp. 90 sq.
Bellwald A. M. S.M. Christian Science and the Catholic
Faith, New York, Macmillan, 1922, c. XIV, (with
bibliography ).
* Bennett C. A. A. Dilemma of Religious Knowledge, New
Haven, Yale University Press, 1931.
* Bertocci, Peter A. Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, New York, Prentice-Hall, 1951, pp. 125 sq.

I
.■
a

,■

1
I

■
V

■
.1

I

* Broad, C. D. Religion, Philosophy and Physical Research,
London, Routledge, 1953.
* Cadoux, Cecil John· The Case for Evangelical Modernism,
Chicago, Willett, 1939, pp. 137-156.

i
t

97

J

* Dibellius, Martin. From Tradition to Gospel, (Transi.
Bertram Lee Woolf), New York, Scribners, 1935.
* Dewey, John. A Common Faith, New Haven, Yale Univer­
sity Press, 1934, pp. 31-32.

Dingle, Reginald J. The Faith and Modern Science, London,
Burns Oates 1935, c. VIII.
* Ducasse, C. J. A Philosophical Scrutiny of Religion, New
York, Ronald Press Co., 1953, pp. 270 272.

* Einstein, Albert. Out of My Later Years, New York,
Philosophical Library, 1950, pp. 26-29,

t Fillion, L.-OL, S.S. Les miracles de notre Seigneur,
Jésus-Christ, 2 vols., Paris, Letouzey, 1909.
* Fosdick, Harry Emerson. The Man from Nazareth, New
York, Harpers, 1949, c. Π.
* Haldane, J. S. The Sciences and Philosophy, Garden City,
New York, Doubleday, 1929, p. 114.

* Harnack, Adolf. What is Christianity, New York, Putnam,
1904, pp. 27-29,163-165.
---------------- . The Acts of the Apostles, (Transi. Rev. J. R.
Wilkinson), London, Williams Norgate, 1909, c.
IV.

* Hegel, Georg Wilhelm. Early Theological Writings,
(Transi. T. M. Knox), Chicago, University of
Chicago Press, 1948, pp. 78-79.
* Hbffding, Dr. Harald. Philosophy of Religion, (Transi. B.
E. Meyer), New York, Macmillan, 1906, pp. 28,
388.

* Huxley, Thomas H. Essays on Hume, New York, Dutton,
1896, pp. 153-155.
---------------- . Science and Christian Tradition Essays, New
York, Appleton and Co., 1909, c. V.

* Inge, William R. Labels and Libels, New York, Harpers,
1929, pp. 70-71.
---------------- . Christian Ethics and Modern Problems, New
York, Putnam, 1930, p. 198.
98

* James, William. Varieties of Religious Experience, New
York, Modern Library, 1936. pp. 225-226; 232;
472-473.
* Klausner, Joseph. Jesus of Nazareth, (Transi. Herbert
Danby), New York, Macmillan, 1944, pp. 266-272.
* Kroner, Richard. The Religious Function of Imagination,
New Haven, Yale University Press, 1941, pp. 4243.
t Lagrange, M.-J., O.P. Évangile selon St. Matthieu, (4th
Edit.), Paris, Lecoffre, 1927.

--------------- . Evangile selon St. Marc, (5th Edit.), Paris,
Lecoffre, 1929.
---------- —. Évangile selon St. Luc, (4th Edit.), Paris,
Lecoffre, 1927.

•-------- - ----- . Évangile selon St. Jean, (5th Edit.), Paris,
Lecoffre, 1936.
t Lebreton, Jules, S.J. History of the Dogma of the Trinity,
(Transi. Algar Thorold), London, Benziger, 1938,
vol. I.
t le Grandmaison, L., S.J. Jesus Christ, Vol. II, (Transi.
Dom Basil Whelan), New York, Macmillan, 1932.
* Lewis, Edwin. “Miracles of the New Testament,” Abingdon
Bible Commentary, New York, Abingdon, 1939,
pp. 921-930.
* Lippmann, Walter. A Preface to Morals, New York, Mac­
millan, 1929, pp. 118-119.

* Macintosh Douglas C. The Reasonableness of Christianity,
New York, Scribners, 1926, pp. 2-3; 6-7.

* MacKinnon, James. The Gospel in the Early Church, New
York, Longmans, 1933, pp. 193-207.
* McFadyen, Joseph. “Life of Jesus Christ,” Abingdon Bible
Commentary, New York, Abingdon, 1939, p. 903.
* Merejkowski, Dmitri. Jesus Manifest, New York, Scrib­
ners, 1935, pp. 31-32; 34; 47-50; 116-122; 137140.

99

* Morrison, J. H. Christian Faith and Science 'Today, New
York, Cokesbury Press, 1936.
* Nicholson, John A. Philosophy of Religion, New York,
Ronald Press, 1950, pp. 32-33; 229-242.

* Niebuhr, Reinhold. Faith and History, New York, Scrib­
ners, 1949, pp. 148, 166.

* Oman, J. W. natural and the Supernatural, New York,
Macmillan, 1931.
* Paine, Thomas. The Age of Reason, New York, Willey,
1945, p. 328.

* Pfleiderer, Otto. The Development of Theology in Germany
since Kant and its Progress in Great Britain since
1825, (Transi. J. F. Smith), New York, Macmil­
lan, 1923.
t Prat, Ferdinand, S.J. Jesus Christ, (Transi. John J.
Heenan, S.J.), Milwaukee, Bruce, 1950, I, pp.
236-254; 328-341; 518-520; II, pp. 60-66; 137149; 410-454.

* Pratt, James Bissett. The Religious Consciousness, New
York, Macmillan, 1928, pp. 445-446.
* Pringle-Pattison, A. S. The Philosophy of Religion, Ox­
ford, at the University Press, 1930, pp. 224-225.

* Santayana, George. The Idea of Christ in the Gospels, or
God in Man, New York, Scribners, 1946, pp. 7990.
* Schelling, F. W. von. The Ages of the World, New York,
Columbia University Press, 1942, pp. 22-23.

* Schweitzer, Albert. The Quest of the Historical Jesus,
New York, Macmillan, 1950, cc. V, VU, XIII.
* Smith, Norman Kemp. Hume's Dialogues Concerning
Natural Religion, London, Thomas Nelson and
Sons, 1947, c. IV.

* Stace, W. T. Religion and the Modern Mind, Philadelphia,
Lippincott, 1952, cc. VU, Vni, X.

* Stolz, Karl R. The Church and Psychotherapy, New York,
Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1943, cc. II-IV.
100

* Taylor, A. E. Does God Exist, New York, Macmillan,
1947, p. 149.
--------- ----- . David Hume and the Miraculous, Cambridge,
at the University Press, 1927.
t Thorndyke, L. A History of Magic and Experimental Sci­
ence, I, New York, Columbia University Press,
1943.

* Tillich, Paul. Systematic Theology, London, Nisbet and
Co., 1953, vol. I, c. V.
* Underhill, Evelyn. Man and the Supernatural, New York,
Dutton, 1928.

Windle, Bertram C. The Church and Science, St. Louis,
Herder, 1926, c. XIV.
C. TREATING PARTICULAR MIRACULOUS PHENOMENA:

1. The Resurrection of James
* Lake, Kirsopp. The Historical Evidence for the Resurrec­
tion of Jesus Christ, London, Putnam, 1912.
t Lunn, Arnold. The Third Day, Westminster, Md., Newman,
1945.
j
* Smith, P. Gardner. The Narratives of the Resurrection,
London, Methuen and Co., 1926.

}
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2. Other New Testament Miracles

I

* Cairns, D. S. Faith that rebels; a re-examination of the
miracles of Jesus, New York, Harpers, 1929.
* Crafer, T. Healing Miracles in the Book of Acts, London,
S.P.C.K., 1939.

j
j

t Fonck, L., S.J. Die Wunder des Herm, Innsbruck, Rauch,
1907, vol. I.

J

* Headlan, A. C. Miracles of the New Testament, London
Murray, 1915.
’

* Lamsa, θ· M· Biblical Marvels, Philadelphia, A. J Colman Co., 1938.

1

|

?
|
I
!
i

t McGinley, L. J., S.J. Form-Criticism of the S\ mptic
Healing Narratives, Woodstock, JVict., Woodstock
Press, 1944.

* Taylor, Vincent. “The Life and Ministry of Jesus.” The
Interpreter's Bible, New York, Abingdon-Cokes­
bury, 1951, vol. VH, pp. 122-124, 144.
t* Trench, Richard Chenevix. Notes on the Miracles of Our
Lord, London, Kegan Paul, 1886, cc. l- V'L

3. Lourdes

anon. Cahiers Laënnec, “Les Guérisons de Lourdes/’
Nos. 1-4, Paris, P. Lethielleux, 1948, (with
select bibliography, no. 4, p. 24).

4. Theresa Neumann

Graef, Hilda C. The Case of Theresa Neumann, West­
minster, Md., Newman Press, 1951.
t Moore, Dom Vernon, M.D. Critical Study of the Recent
Konnersreuth Controversy from a Medical View­
point, 1951, (unpublished MS, reserved at West
Baden College).
t de Poray-Madeyski, B. Thérèse Neumann de Konnersreuth,
Étude Analytique et Critique du Problème, Paris,
Lethielleux, 1940.

Siwek, Paul, S.J. Riddle of Konnersreuth: a psychological
and religious study, (Transi. Ignatius McCor­
mick), Milwaukee, Bruce, 1953.

Biot, R. Lourdes et le miracle, Paris, Bloud and Gay,
1933.

Teodorowicz, Josef. Mystical Phenomena in the Life of
Theresa Neumann, St. Louis, Herder, 1949.

t Carrel, Alexis. The Voyage to Lourdes, New York,
Harpers, 1950.

Von Lama, F. Theresa Neumann, Milwaukee, Bruce,
1929.

Imbert-Gourbeyre. La Stigmatization, l'Extase Divine, les
Miracles de Lourdes, Paris, J. Vie and Amat.,
2 vols., 1894.
t Izard, Dom Francis, O.S.B. The Meaning of Lourdes,
London, Catholic Book Club, 1939.

f Le Bec, E., (Président du Bureau des Constatations Médi­
cales, 1920-1923), Medical Proof of the Miracu­
lous, (Transi. Dom H. E. Izard, O.S.B.), New
York, Kenedy, 1923.
t Leur et, F., (President du Bureau des Constatations Médi­
cales, 1948---- ), Les guérisons miraculeuses
modernes, Paris, 1950.
t Marchand, A., (Président du Bureau des Constatations
Médicales, 1923-1925), The Facts of Lourdes and
the Medical Bureau, (Transi. Dom Francis
Izard, O.S.B.), London, Burns Oates, 1924.

5. Miscellaneous
anon. Satan, (Edit. Bruno de Jesus Marie), New York,
Sheed and Ward, 1951.
; * Carrington, Hereward, and Fodor, Nandor. The Story of
the Poltergeist down the Centuries, London,
Rider, 1953.
t Crehan, Joseph, S.J. Father Thurston, London, Sheed and
Ward,’1952.

* Huxley, Aldous. The Devils of Loudun, New York, Harpers,
1952.
* Rhine, J. B. New Frontiers of the Mind, New York,
Ferrar and Rhinehart, 1937.

----------- —Extra-Sensory Perception after Sixty Years,
New York, Faber, 1940.

♦ Saunders, Edith. Lourdes, Oxford, at the University
Press, 1940.
t Vallet, Auguste, (Président du Bureau des Constatations
Médicales, 1927-1947), Guérisons de Lourdes en
1927, 1928, 1929, Paris, Tequi, 1930.

102

------------- Reach of the Mind, New York, Faber,
ίστΟ.
‘

pstory of Witchcraft and
y> ^οη<*οη, Kegan Paul, 1926.
103

Thurston, Herbert, S.J. Ghosts and Poltergeists, (Edit.
J. H. Crehan, S.J.), Chicago, Henry Regnery Co.,
1954.
—-------------- . The Church and Spiritualism, Milwaukee,
Bruce, 1933.

---------------- . Beauraing and Other Apparitions, London,
Burns Oates, 1934.
Tyrrell, G. N. M. Apparitions, London, Duckworth and
Co., (rev. ed.), 1953.

Vander Elst, Robert. Vraies et Fausses Guérisons
Miraculeuses, Paris, Beauchesne, 1924.

II

PERIODICALS

Abbreviations frequently employed for
Non-Catholic Periodicals

Catholic Periodicals
AER American Ecclesiasti­
cal Review
CBQ Catholic Biblical
Quarterly
1ER Irish Ecclesiastical
Review
M
Month
Tab Tablet
TS
Theological Studies

HJ

Hibbert Journal

JR

Journal of Religion

JTS Journal of Theological
Studies

(N.B. In this section the asterisk is not used to indicate
non-Catholic authors.)

A. TREATING DIRECTLY ABOUT MIRACLES (their nature
and various relationships):
Adeney, Walter F. “Miracle and Prophecy,” HJ, Oct. 1920.
Ashton, J., S.J. “Miracles and the Supernatural,” Af, Feb.
1925.

Collins, B. Abdy. “Is there a Force Unknown to Physics?”
HJ, Apr. 1945.
Dougall, Miss Lily. “Miracle Inconsistent with Christianity
HJ, Jan. 1921.

104

Dubs, Homer H. “Miracles — A contemporary Attitude,”
HJ, Jan. 1950.
Fox, Thomas A. S. “Miracles and Conversion,” AER,
May, 1939.

Gannon, P. “Sign of Bernadette; the rejection of the
miraculous vs. the advance of knowledge,” 1ER,
July, 1943.
t Gerard, J., S.J. “Hume and Huxley on Miracles,” M, Apr.
1879.
t Hardon, John A., S.J. “The Concept of Miracle from St.
Augustine to Modern Apologetics,” TS, June,
1954.
Inge, William R. “Miracle, Myth, and Mystery,” HJ, July,
1942.

Johnson, H. “Angelican Archbishops on Miracles,” Tab,
July 29, 1939.
Knight, Canon H. T. “The Moral Rationale of Miracle,”
HJ, July, 1926.
Little, A. “Miracle of modern thought: review of Miracle
in History and in Modern Thought by C. J.
Wright,” Studies, Mar. 1931.
Lunn, Arnold. “Miracles, good and bad,” Tab, 2/13/54.
----------------. «Miracles—The Scientific Approach,” (a
reply to H. H. Dubs’ article), HJ, Apr. 1950.

t Martindale, C. C., S.J. “Credulity and Criticism,” M,
Oct. 1953.
t McMullin, Rev. Ernan. “Abnormal Physical Phenomena,”
Irish Theological Quarterly, Jan. and June 1953.
Miller, Robert H. “An Appreciation of Miracles,” The
journal of the National Association of Biblical In­
structors, Garden City, N.Y., 1934, Part II, pp.
69 sqq.
Montgomery, W. “St. Augustine’s Attitude to Psychic
Phenomena,” HJ, Oct. 1926.

t Moynihan, H “Miracles and Modern Thought,” AER, Mar.
Ji y jl o «

105

Nowell-Smith, Patrick. “MiraclesThe Philosophical
Approach,” (a response to Arnold Lunn's article),
HJ, July, 1950.

Ottaviani, Monsignor Alfred, “True Christianity, Signs and
Wonders,” 1ER, 1951, pp. 334 sqq.; or Catholic
Mind, July, 1951.
Quinn, Rev. Fr. Edward. “The Natural and Supernatural,”
HJ, Apr. 1944.

t Paul, C. K. “Miracles — Definition and Explanation,’’ M,
Oct. 1892.

Pius XI, Pope. “Excerpts from an address,” Tab, 3/22/30.

---------------- . “Miracles and sanctity — excerpts from an ad­
dress,” Tab, 4/5/30.
---------------- . “Holy Father and the witness of miracles,”
Tab, 2/4/33.

t Rickaby, Joseph, S.J. “J. S. Mill vs Miracles,” M, May,
1876.
---------------- . “Miracles and Unknown Natural Forces,”
Jan. 1877.

Rynd, R. “Bishop Gore on Miracles,” HJ, Oct. 1931.
Samuel, Viscount. “Does Religion Stand to Reason,” (Mir­
acles claimed unproveable), HJ, July, 1951.

t Sheen, Fulton J. “Miracles in the Light of New Scientific
Wonders,” AER, Mar. 1928.
Smith, S. F., S.J. “Contemporary Miracles,” M, Dec.
1914; Feb. 1915.
---------------- . “Ecclesiastical Miracles,” M, Mar. 1915;
Apr. 1915.
---------------- . “Anti-Miraculous Presuppositions,” M, July,
1915.
Stebbings, Rev. T. R. R. “More about Miracles ” HJ Oct
1921.
Tyrrell, G. N. M. “The Natural and the Supernatural,” HJ,
July, 1943.

106

Walsh, James J. “Healing Religions and their Cures,”
AER, Sept. 1927.

'
B.

TREATING PARTICULAR MIRACULOUS PHENOMENA
1. The Resurrection of Jesus

Edwards, R. A. “The Evidence for the Ressurection,” HJ,
Apr. 1942.

Enslin, Morton S. “And That He Hath Been Raised,” The
Jewish Quarterly Review, July, 1952.
Harman, N. Bishop. “Resurrection,” HJ, July, 1942.
Morris, A. E. “The Narratives of the Resurrection of
Jesus Christ,” HJ, Apr. 1941.

Stewart, R. H. J., S.J. “The Resurrection,” M, Mar.-Apr.
1945.

2. Other New Testament Miracles
Boobyer, G. H. “The Eucharistic Interpretation of the
Miracle of the Loaves in St. Mark’s Gospel,” JTS,
Oct. 1952.
t Brennan, T. J. “Miracles Attributed to the Child Jesus
in the Apocrypha,” AER, Jan. 1918.

Grant, Robert M. “The Resurrection of the Body,” JR,
Apr. and July, 1948.
Hardon John A., S.J. “Miracle Narratives in the Acts of
the Apostles,” CBQ, July, 1954.

t Maas A. J. S.J. “Defense of the Gadarene Miracle, Luke
Vni, 26-39, against Huxley,” AER, June, 1891.
McGinley, Lawrence J. “Form Criticism of the Synoptic
Healing Narratives,” TS, June, 1942.

------ ---------- “The Synoptic Healing Narrative and Rabbinic
Analogies,” TS, Mar. 1943.
-----__--------- “Hellenic Analogies and the Typical Healing
Narrative,” TS, Sept. 1943.
Moran, J. S.,-S.J. “Apologetics of the Man Born Blind,”
AER, Feb. 1952.

107

t Moynihan, H. “Oxford Attack on the Miracles of Christ,”
AER, Eye. 1915.

Pierce, F. X., S.J. “The Miracles of Our Lord,” AER,
Jan. 1934.
Smith, S. F., S.J. “Gospel and the Non-Miraculous,” M,
July, 1913.

3. Old Testament Miracles
Gruenthaner, M. J., S.J. “Two Sun Miracles of the Old
Testament,” CBQ, July, 1948.

McKenzie, John L., S.J. “God and Nature in the Old
Testament,” CBQ, Jan. and Apr. 1952.
M’Fadyen, Rev. John E. “Miracle in the Old Testament,”
HJ, July, 1923.

Stebbing, Rev. T. R. R. “Thaumaturgy in the Bible,” HJ,
Jan. 1920.

4. Miraculous Phenomena connected with
the Blessed Virgin and the Saints
Broderick, James, S.J. “Francis Xavier Goes to Japan,”
M, Aug. 1949.
t Collins, J. B., S.S. “Heroic Virtues of Bl. Pius X,” AER,
Apr. 1951.
Considine, J. J. “Miracle of Old Goa; official examina­
tion of the body of St. Francis Xavier,” Field
Afar, July, 1932.

Hardon, John A., S.J. “The Miracles of St. Francis
Xavier,” AER, Oct. 1952.

t Henry, H. T. “Centenary of the Prodigies of Our Lady,”
AER, July, 1896.

Hughes, T., S.J. “St. Francis Xavier’s Miracles Defended
vs. Rationalists,” AER, July, Aug., and Sept.
1897.
f McCormick, Vincent A., S.J. “The Doctrine of Virginal
Birth and its Consequences,” AER, May, 1924.

108

I O’Briain, Fr. Félin, O.F.M. “Miracles in the Lives of
’ ,
Irish Saints,” 1ER, 1945, pp. 331 sqq.

Thurston, Herbert, S.J. “The Miraculous Brief of St.
Antony of Padua,” M, Dec. 1901.
--------------- . “The Brief of St. Antony,” M, July, 1902.
--------------- . “The Miracle of St. Januarius,” Tab, 5/22/09;
Tab, 5/29/09; also cf. book-review in M, Mar.
1909.
------------- -. “St. Januarius,” Catholic Medical Guardian,
Apr. 1926.
------------- —. “Postscript on St. Januarius,” Catholic Medi­
cal Guardian, Jan. 1927.
-------------—. “ “The Miracle” of St. Januarius,” M, Feb.
1930.
---------------- . “Blood Prodigies,” Studies, Mar. 1921; June,
1921.
-------- ------- . “The Blood of St. Januarius,” M, Nov. 1921.

5. Eucharistic Miracles
McNamara, R. “Corpus Domini; notes on Eucharistic
miracles in the Middle Ages,” AER, June, 1943.
Thurston, Herbert, S.J. "A Famous Eucharistic Miracle
(St. Juliana Falconieri),” M, Aug. 1927.

6. Lourdes and the Miraculous

Bévenot, Maurice, S.J. “The Miracles of Lourdes,” HJ,
Jan. 1937.
Boissarie, Dr. “Lourdes: Double Miracle,” M, Mar. 1893.
Cairns, David.

“A Parallel to Lourdes,” HJ, Jan. 1937.

Clarke, R· F·, S.J. “Lourdes: Medical Estimate,” M, July
and Aug. 1892.

Connell, F. J· “The Cures at Lourdes,” TS, Dec. 1949.

Dingte, Reginald J.
Aug. 1938.

“Lourdes and Psycho-Therapy,” M,

109

Lattey, C., S.J. “Lourdes: de Rudder Case,” M, Nov 1900.

Leith-Ross, “The Miracle of Lourdes, ” HJ, Oct. 1936.
t McGrath, Owen A. “The Apologetic Value of Lourdes.'
AER, Nov. 1933.
Thurston, Herbert, S.J. “The Nineteenth Century and the
Miracles at Lourdes,” M, Nov. 1895.

---------------- . “Faith-healing and Lourdes,” M, Aug, and
Sept. 1910.
---------------- . “Scientific Procedure at Lourdes,” M, Feb.
1924.
---------------- . “The Debut of Lourdes before English Opin­
ion,” M, May, 1924.
---------------- . “An Interview with Bernadette,” M, June,
1924.
---------------- ■. “The Martyrdom of Bernadette,” M, July,
1924.
--------------- -. “B. Bernadette in the Light of Official Docu­
ments,” M, Aug. 1926. (Cf. Father Joseph
Crehan’s bibliography in his Father Thurston
under title of “Lourdes” for other articles on
Bernadette.)
-------------—. “The False Visionaries of Lourdes,” M, Oct.
1927.
t Walsh, J. J. “Mental and Spiritual Cures: Medical Investi­
gation of Cures at Lourdes,” AER, Oct. 1927.

7. Personages connected with the Miraculous

a) Anne Catherine Emmerich
Thurston, Herbert, S.J. “Anne Catherine Emmerich,” M,
Sept.-Dec. 1921.

---------------- . “The Authenticity of the Emmerich Visions,”
M, Jan. and Mar. 1924. “The Emmerich Problem
yet again,” M, Apr. 1925.

110

b) Theresa Neumann

■

Fairfield, L. “Theresa Neumann: an apparent case of
hysteria,” Tab, 3/3/51.

I
■

I t Peter, T. “Prolonged Fasting and Theresa Neumann,”
I
AER, Dec. 1951.
Siwek, Paul, S.J. “The Problem of Konnersreuth,” AER,
Feb. 1954.

I
I

Urban, H. J. “Reply to ‘Theresa Neumann: An apparent
case of hysteria5 by L. Fairfield,” Tab, 5/26/51.

I

Van der Veldt, J. H., O.F.M. “An Evaluation of the Kon­
nersreuth Controversy,” AER, June and July,
1953.

--------------- e “Reply to Father Siwek,” AER, Feb. 1954.
C.

TREATING OF METHODOLOGY AND BACKGROUND
NEEDED FOR THE STUDY OF THE MIRACULOUS:

1. Methodology in studying the miraculous and mysticism

Boland, J., S.J. “Psychology and Mysticism,” M, Oct.
1925.
t Halley, T. S., S.J. “How Saints are Canonized,” AER, Nov.
1946.
t Luke. “A Case of Functional Paralysis: Problem for the
Theologian,” AER, Jan. and Feb. 1924.

*
sI·

Thurston, Herbert, S.J. “The Work of the Bollandists,” M,
Jan. 1891.
. «The Bollandists,” Tab, 4/8/22.
_ _____. «Limpias and the Problem of Collective Hallucination,” M, Aug.-Dec. 1920.

____________ “Hysteria and Dual Personality,” M, Oct.
1936.
_______---- . “Fact and Legend in Hagiography,” Studies,
Sept. 1925.

_____—. “Alleged Miraculous Phenomena in the dead
Bodies of Saints,” Catholic Medical Guardian,
Jan. 1928.
Ill

i
■

■

!
<
;

Thurston, Herbert, S.J. “Two Pious Stories. (Hallucina­
tion), ” M, Mar. 1923.
Slater, T., S.J. “Mysticism, True and False,” M, Jan.
1923.

t Walsh, J. J. “Mental and Spiritual Cures: Our American
Healing Religions,” AER, Aug. 1927.

f ---------------- 1 “Mental and Spiritual Cures: Healing Reli­
gions and their Cures,” AER, Sept. 1927.
2. Background on “rare” phenomena
(Telepathy, Poltergeists, etc.)
Bousfield, W. R. “Telepathy,” HJ, Apr. 1922.

Hollaind, R. J., S.J. “Physiological and Moral Aspects of
Hypnosis,” AER, Jan. 1895.
Kerr, Nigel. “Pestered by a “Poltergeist,” ” HJ, Apr.
1922.

t McMullin, E. “Abnormal Physical Phenomena,” Irish
Theological Quarterly, Jan. and June, 1953.

Soal, S. G. “The Present Status of Telepathy,” HJ, Apr.
1950.
Thurston, Herbert, S.J. (N.B. For Thurston’s works on
Poltergeists, cf. his Ghosts and Poltergeists,
Burns Oates, London, 1953, and the bibliography
under title “Poltergeists” in Joseph Crehan’s
Father Thurston. )

---------------- . “Rationalism vs Telepathy,” M, Feb. 1918.
---------------- . “The Knowledge of Things Distant,” M, Dec.
1926, and May 1927.
---------------- . “Memory and Imminent Death,” M, Jan. 1935.
---------------- . “Lifting,” M, Apr. 1936.
---------------- . “Mental Radio,” M, Apr. 1938.
3. Background on Spiritualism

f Driscoll, J. J. “Spiritism Today,” AER, Oct. 1947.
Johnson, Humphrey, J. T. “The Quest of the Occult,” At,
Dec. 1953.
112

Thurston, Herbert, S.J. (N.B. For Thurston’s works on
Spiritualism, of. his The Church and Spiritualism,
Milwaukee, 1933, and the bibliography under title
“Spiritualism” in Joseph Crehan’s Father Thurs­
ton, )
4. Background on Stigmatization, as a
physical phenomenon of mysticism
Coulton, G. G. “The Stigmatization of St. Francis: a Reply
to Dr. Seton,” HJ, Jan. 1926.
Martindale, C. C., S.J. “Stigmata and Sanctity,” Clergy
Review, Nov. 1952.
--------------- . “A Problem for the Psychologists: case
history of a stigmatisée,” M, Aug. 1951.

I
[
!

Schleyer, F. L. “Contemporary Dutch Stigmata, Johanna
G.,” M, Nov. 1947.
Seton, Dr. Walter. “The Stigmatization of St. Francis,” HJ,
July, 1925.
Thurston, Herbert, S.J. (N.B. In general, cf. Crehan’s
bibliography. )
__________ “problem of Stigmatisation,” (with bibliog­
raphy), Studies, June, 1933.
----------------- «The phenomena of Stigmatisation,” Proce edines of the Society for Psychical Research,
vol. xxxii, d921)> PP’ 179~208·

5. Background on other physical phenomena of mysticism
Broderick, James, S.J. “Spiritual Healing,” M, Oct. 1924.

t Cavanaugh, J. R., M.D. “Nervous Mental Diseases,” AER,
Sept, and Oct. 1943.
Graef Hilda. “Father Thurston on fasting,” Tab, 9/13/52.
Pater, T. “Father Thurston on fasting,” Tab, 9/6/52.

Thurston, Herbert, S.J. Some Physical Phenomena of
Mysticism: 1. Levitation, M, Apr. 1919; Catholic
Medical Guardian, July, 1924; M, July, 1923.
__ ———· 2. Telekinesis, M, June, 1919.

113

Thurston, Herbert, S.J. 3. Tokens of Espousals, M, De»·.
1919.

Thurston, Herbert, S.J. “Witchcraft,” Studies, Mar. 1922.
----- -------- -

“Diabolism,” Studies, Sept. 1927.

-----------------. 4. Odour of Sanctity, M, Jan. 1920.
---------------- . 5 Absence of Cadaveric Rigidity, M, Mar.
1920.
-----------------. 6. The Mystic as Hunger-striker, M, Feb.
and Mar. 1921; Living without Eating, M, Sept,
and Oct. 1931.
-----------------. 7. Incorruption, M, Apr., May, and June, 19.2,1.
-----------------. 8. Incendium Amoris, M, June, 1923.
-----------------. 9. Blood Effusions, M, July 1923; Studies,
Mar. and June, 1921; M, Nov. 1921; Tab, 6/5/26;
M, Jan., Feb., and Mar. 1927.
----------------- . 10. Pithiatism or Hysteria, M, Aug. 1923.
----------------- . 11. Multiplication of Food, M, Nov. 1933.
----------------- . 12. The Healing Hand, M, Sept., Oct., and
Dec. 1932; M, Jan. and Apr. 1933.

6. Background on demonology, witchcraft, magic, etc.
Langton, Edward. “The Reality of Demoniac Powers, Fur­
ther Considered,” HJ, July, 1935.

Lynch, K., C.P. “Black Magic and the Magi,” AER, Jan.
1942.
Martindale, C. C., S.J. “Satan and all Wicked Spirits^” M,
Nov. 1948.
Spence, Lewis. “Sorcery and Witchcraft in Old Mexico,”
HJ, July, 1936.

Spencer, Frederick A. M. “Demonic Powers, The Case for
Their Reality,” HJ, Apr. 1935.

Thurston, Herbert, S.J. “Pacts with the Devil,” M, July,
1940.

ΙΠ SOURCES OF THE CLASSIC OBJECTIONS
AGAINST MIRACLES WHICH
FR. DE TONQUEDEC DISCUSSES
IN THIS ARTICLE

Blondel, Maurice. “Le problème du miracle,” Bulletin de
la Société française de philosophie, Paris, Li­
brairie Armand Colin, 12 ann., 1912, pp. 85-168.

---------------- . “Miracle,” Vocabulaire Technique et critique
de la philosophie, (Edit. A. Lalande), Paris,
Presses Universitaires de France, 1947, pp. 613615.

France, Anatole. Le jardin d'Epicure, Paris, 1897, pp.
203-209.
Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understand­
ing, Chicago, Open Court, 1935, Section X, esp.
pp. 120-122.

Kant, Immanuel. Religion Within the Limits of Reason
Alone, Chicago, Open Court, 1934, pp. 79-83.
Le Roy, Edouard. “Essai sur la notion de miracle,”
Annales de philosophie chrétienne, Paris, CLHI,
(Oct. 1906-Mar. 1907), pp. 8-9, 184, 242-255.

- --------------- . “Le problème du miracle,” Bulletin de la
Société française de philosophie, Paris, Li­
brairie Amand Colin, 12 ann., 1912, pp. 85-168.

Loisy, Alfred. The Origins of the New Testament, (Transi.
L. P. Jacks), London, Allen and Unwin, 1950, pp.
9-32.
---------------- . The Gospel and the Church, (Transi. Christo­
pher Home), New York, Scribners, 1912, pp. 3743.

-----------------. “The Church and Witchcraft,” The Catholic
Magazine, June, 1895.

----- —.------ . My Duel with the Vatican, (Transi. R. W.
Boynton), New York, Dutton, 1924, pp. 69, 176.

----------------- . “Broucollaccas, A Study in Mediaval Ghost­
lore,” M, Nov. 1897.

Mill, John Stuart. A System of Logic, New York, Harpers,
1860, Bk. ΠΙ, c. 25, pp. 374-382.

114

115

Renan, Joseph Ernest. The Life of Jesus, New York,
Modem Library, 1927, pp. 3, 33, 59-60.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. Émile* (Transi. Barbara Foxley), London, J. M. Dent, (Everyman Library),
1948, pp. 260-265.

Sabatier, Auguste. Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion,
New York, Doran, pp. 80-81; 83-84.
Seailles, G. Les affirmations de la conscience moderne,
Paris, c. 1910, pp. 33-34.

Spinoza, Baruch. Opera Omnia, (Van Vloten and Land edi­
tion), The Hague, 1914, Tomus Secundus, Tracta­
tus Theologico-Politicus , c. VI, “De Miraculis,”
pp. 157-159. Cf. also pp. 94, 106.
Tyrrell, George. Christianity at the Cross-roads, London,
Longmans, 1909, pp. 85-86.
----------------- . Oil and Wine, London, Longmans, 1907, pp.
89-95.
Voltaire, François Marie. “Miracle,” Dictionnaire Phil­
osophique, quoted by Bergier, Traite de la vraie
religion, Tournai, 1927, vol. IV, pp. 380-385.

116