COPYRIGHT, 1940
BY THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY

OP MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY

PRINTED AT THE MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY PRESS
MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN

The Aquinas Lecture, 1940

NATURE
AND FUNCTIONS
OF AUTHORITY
Under the Auspices of the Aristotelian Society
of Marquette University

BY
DR. YVES SIMON
Associate Professor of Philosophy at
Notre Dame University

MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY PRESS
MILWAUKEE
1940

Nihil ©hâtai
Gerard Smith, S.J., censor deputatus
Milwaukee, Die 8 Mail, 1940
f?

imprimatur
Milwaukee, Die 8 Maii, 1940
4- Moyses E. Kiley
Archiepiscopus Milwaukiensis

THE AQUINAS LECTURES
The Aristotelian Society of Marquette
University each year invites a scholar to speak
on the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas.
These lectures have come to be called the
Aquinas Lectures and are customarily deliv­
ered on the Sunday nearest March seven, the
feast day of the Society’s patron saint.
This year the Aristotelian Society has the
pleasure of recording the lecture of Yves Simon,
associate professor of philosophy at Notre
Dame University. Born at Cherbourg, France,
1903, M. Simon pursued higher studies at the
Catholic Institute of Paris and at the Uni­
versity of Paris, 1920-1929. He has taught
philosophy at the Catholic University of
Lille, France, 1930-38, and at the University
of Notre Dame, 1938-,
Editor of the collection Cours et Documents
de Philosophie (Paris, 1934-1938); contribu­
tor to several philosophical and political maga­
zines, in particular to the Revue de Philosophie,
Paris, and to the Review of Politics, Notre
Dame, M. Simon is the author of the following

works: Introduction à L’Ontologie du Con­
naître (Paris, 1934) ; Critique de la Connais­
sance morale (Paris, 1934); La Campagne
d’Ethiopie et la Pensée Politique française
(Paris, 1936) ; Trois Leçons sur le Travail
(Paris, 1938); Travaux d’approche pour une
Théorie du Déterminisme, in Etudes philoso­
phiques, Ecole des Hautes Etudes of Ghent,
Belgium (1939).

Nature and Functions of
Authority
HIS paper intends to set forth the present
state of an investigation which is still far
from being complete, although it was started
many years ago. In order to characterize the
purpose and the spirit of this research, I should
like to specify the problems which stimulated
it. These problems arise from commonplace
• observations. Kadical anarchists excepted, no
social thinker ever questioned the fact that
social happiness is based upon a felicitous
combination of authority and liberty. However
vague and ill-defined our concepts of author­
ity and liberty may be, we realize at once that
authority and liberty are at the same time
antinomic and complementary terms. By say­
ing that they are antinomic terms, I do not
mean that their antinomic character is absolute
and unqualified. I mean only that, in a certain
sense and to some extent, those terms are un­
deniably opposed to one another. As to their
complementary character, it is quite clear that

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2

NATURE AND FUNCTIONS

authority, when it is not fairly balanced by
liberty, is but tyranny, and that liberty, when it
is not fairly balanced by authority, is but
abusive license. Each of these terms destroys
itself at the very moment when it destroys the
other term by its excess. Therefore, both un­
restricted liberty and boundless authority are
fictitious conceptions, each of which im­
plies its own negation together with the an­
nihilation of society. There would be hardly
any exaggeration in the statement that the
essential question, for every social group, is
that of combining rightly the forces of author­
ity and liberty.
In the practical solution of such a question,
the social virtues of the responsible persons
play the decisive role. Whatever the consid­
ered community, small or large, familial,
economic or political, its happiness depends »
on the ability of its head to determine exactly
the right limits of his authority, together with
the ability of those who must obey to recog-

OF AUTHORITY

3

nize that their claim for freedom cannot
reasonably exceed certain limits. Inquiring in­
to the nature of this ability to delineate the
boundaries of one’s field of action, let us say
that it consists in a particular form of the
virtue of prudence, in a wisdom which is
practical in the full sense of the term, and
proceeds from the virtuous dispositions of the
will, justice, moderation, and charity.
Like any kind of prudence properly socalled, this prudence of the head and this
prudence of the subject have to utter, in refer­
ence to singular and unrenewable circum­
stances, indemonstrable judgments. Owing to
the contingency of their object, and to the fact
that they are finally determined by the mys­
terious forces of the appetite, those judgments
remain inevitably obscure. Now prudence is
not self-satisfied with its obscurity. Although
the proper mystery of the prudential deter­
mination cannot be discarded, the truly pru­
dent man, the true man of action, wants to

4

NATURE AND FUNCTIONS

have his prudence enlightened by principles.
Knowing very well that universal necessities
are involved in the contingencies of existential
occurrences, and that a sound understanding
of those necessities can helpfully reduce the
field of his uncertainties, the true man of
action proves very anxious to receive, from
those who are acquainted with the laws of the
universal and necessary objects, principles en­
abling him to guide himself in his action.
Now, this is the problem which de­
termined our research on the nature and
functions of authority: is it possible at all to
discover principles to which we can refer, in
our endeavor to proportion exactly authority
and liberty in any given situation? I ask the
reader to notice that this statement of the
question in no way overlooks the indispensa­
bility of the prudential inquiry. No ethical
science, no casuistry will teach the head and
the subject what they must do, in reference to
singular circumstances, to maintain the just

OF AUTHORITY

5

relationship between authority and liberty.
All that philosophy can possibly do is de­
scribe the laws of essences engaged in the
stream of contingency; how to behave in the
midst of contingent circumstances is a ques­
tion which can be solved only by the virtue
of prudence.
The general problem which determined
our research might be stated in a slightly dif­
ferent and more concrete form. Political and
social consciousness, in modern times, evi­
dences an obscure belief that the progress of
freedom is synonymous with social progress,
that social progress is, at bottom, the progress
of freedom. This identification of the progress .
of liberty with social progress is proclaimed
by those who call themselves liberals or
progressives; it is rarely denied by those
who call themselves conservatives or even
reactionaries. It is very striking to observe
that conservatives, in most cases, content
themselves with accusing progressives, liber-

6

NATURE AND FUNCTIONS

als, even revolutionaries, of precipitating the
pace of social progress by asking for an
amount of liberty that society, in its factual
state, cannot stand. Thus they admit, no less
than liberals and progressives, the basic as­
sumption that social progress is identical with
the progress of liberty. Now this progress of
liberty is ordinarily conceived as implying a
decay of authority, so that three terms, social
. progress, the progress of liberty, and the de­
cay of authority, are currently identified.
What are the implications and what is the
value of these identifications? This is a ques­
tion that we shall be able to solve insofar as
we shall be able to point out the principles
involved in the notion of authority and liberty
as opposite and complementary forces.
Although a satisfactory definition of au­
thority can result only from a complete analy­
sis of the functions of authority, it seems that
a provisional definition based upon common
conceptions can be of help at the starting

OF AUTHORITY

7

point of our inquiry. Let us propose the fol­
lowing one: *
Authority is an active power, residing in
a person and exercised through a command,
that is through a practical judgment to be
taken as a rule of conduct by the free-will of
another person.
*
Concerning the first element of this defini­
tion—the seat of authority is a person—it
should be noticed that no authority can ever
take the form of an impersonal necessity.!
When Rousseau urges the educator to have"
his pupil taught by nature rather than by men,
to have him dependent on things rather than
on persons, to have him led by inflexible laws
rather than by the edicts of any human will;
when he says that the child must act by neces­
sity and not by obedience, we realize that, he
establishes the formula of every anti­
authoritarian pedagogy.1 In that connection,
we can already perceive a difference between
the closely related notions of authority and
law. Although the traditional definition of law

8

NATURE AND FUNCTIONS

rightly includes the issuance by a lawgiver,
who is a person or a group of persons, per
eum qui curam communitatis habet promul­
gata, yet the law can be conceived in a state
of impersonality.2 This is the way that we
speak of natural laws immanent in the imper­
sonal course of physical events. On the con­
trary,1 an immediate reference to a personal in­
tellect and a personal will is apparently essen­
tial to the notion of authority.
By stating that the active power we call
authority is meant to be exercised through a
• command, we state a distinction between two
notions which are often identified, that of
authority and that of coercion. The notion of
t coercion refers to the use of some physical
force. Typical instances of coercion are found
in a mechanical causality exerted by man over
man, for example, in the arrest of the law­
breaker or in the repulsion of an invading
army. Coercion, as a causal process whose
-proper effect is a physical one, is opposed to
persuasion, a causal process whose proper

OF AUTHORITY

9

effect is a moral one, namely the origination
of a certain disposition in the will of persons.
Both coercion and persuasion are instruments «
of authority, and neither can be identified
with authority as such.3
The third element of the definition, as a
rule of conduct, implies that authority is not
essentially a principle meant to determine any
theoretical judgment. A theoretical judgment,
that is, a judgment which refers to the reality
of things, a judgment which states what the
things are, is, de jure, to be thoroughly de­
termined by its object. The theoretical judg­
ment is not perfect unless the object is the
only sufficient principle of its determination.
Whenever any principle extraneous to the
object has to intervene, be it the will of the
knowing subject or the authority of a master,
it is always on the ground of some deficiency
in the knowing intellect. It does not mean that
the part played by authority in the theoretical
order is not very considerable;4 it only means
that the function of authority, insofar as the

entame

10

determination of the theoretical judgment is
concerned, is but a substitutional one.
Consider what occurs in sciences. The be­
ginner is requested to trust his master and to
believe what he is taught: oportet addiscentem
credere. Now the good master does not want
to have pupils who will believe his words

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NATURE AND FUNCTIONS

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blindly and permanently. He wants to have
them perceive, as soon as possible, the evidence of his demonstrations. Then only, when
they will be able to see the truth of statements
that they are at present provisionally believing, will they have become scientists, and this
is the aim of the teacher. His authority pro­
visionally substitutes for an evidence still un* disclosed to the student, because it is indispensable, at least in many cases, to have be­
lieved in a scientific truth before becoming
able to grasp it scientifically, that is, as an
evident object.
Consider, furthermore, the character of
supernatural faith as an assent given because
of the authority of God and His Holy

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OF AUTHORITY

11

Church to some truths which cannot be seen
here below. Supernatural faith is, from every
point of view, more precious and more certain .
than any rational knowledge. However, inas­
much as it implies an assent to an unseen
truth, it implies a state of imperfection to
which a state of perfection will succeed when
the mysteries of the divine life will become
evident objects for the beatified intellect.
Faith is the beginning of the eternal life and
it will no longer be necessary or possible when
the eternal life will be fully possessed. In
other words, the authority of God and His
Church, which determines the faith-assent,
substitutes here below for the evidence of the
divine Truth which will beatify our intellects
in the promised Vision.
Consider, finally, the meaning of authority
in historical matters, namely when it is said
that we believe in the actual occurrence of an
event because of the authority of some reliable
witness. Here, the term authority is taken in a
less rigorous sense, since witnesses, even those

12

NATURE AND FUNCTIONS

who are reliable, are not, to speak properly,
empowered to oblige us to believe in their
accounts. It is clear, on the other hand, that
this authority improperly so-called, is but
substituted for the evidence of facts which we
are unable to see for ourselves.
Let us now inquire into the reasons why
it may be good that a person be regulated in
his conduct by some other person rather than
by his own reason. To be ruled by another
may be expedient or even necessary on the
ground of one’s inability to rule one’s self.
This is the case with children and this is also
the case with the insane, the feeble-minded,
or the criminal, who are legally considered,
as well as children, to be minors. A minor is
a person supposedly unable to govern him­
self, that is, to provide for the right order to
be assured in his actions, even within the field
of his personal aims. A minor is supposed
to be incapable of knowing what is good for
him—this is why another person has to guide
him in the very pursuit of his proper good.

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OF AUTHORITY

13

The inability of the minor to govern himself,
to pursue his proper aims by himself, is always
based on some deficiency. This deficiency may
be unnatural and abnormal, as in the case of
the insane or feeble-minded, and then it is a
privation in the strongest sense of the term,
an evil. It may be, on the contrary, natural and
normal, as in the case of the child, and then
it is no evil, but only a privation in the broad
sense of the term. In any case, the notion of
minority always refers to the lack of a quality
which should be possessed if one is to be a
person in the full sense of that word. The
governing reason of the father is substituted
for the reason of the child which is not yet
fully developed; and when the working of
reason is pathologically hampered in an adult,
an officer representing society substitutes his
reason for the deficient reason of this insane
or feeble-minded person.
ThusfTt is not only in the theoretical order,
which is in no way its proper sphere, but also
in the practical order, that authority enjoys

14

NATURE AND FUNCTIONS

substitutional functions. The question is now
whether authority has any essential function;
whether the necessity of authority always re­
sults from some deficiency; whether authority,
when necessary, is necessary solely on the
ground of some defect in the one who is sub­
jected to it. The idea that authority has no
• essential function but only substitutional ones,
is in fact very widespread. It is current among
anarchists and liberal theorists. Let us men­
tion, as particularly representative, Proudhon
and J. S. Mill. With regard to Proudhon,
many persons found it hard to understand
that a man whose motto was: "Anarchy is the
best government,” obstinately maintained,
whenever the family-society was concerned, a
theory more authoritarian than the most tra­
ditionalistic ones. The reason why Proudhon
opposed so intensely the ideas for the emanci­
pation of women, which were universally up­
held by his fellow socialists, is that he con­
sidered, on the basis of a psychology and
physiology of his own, that woman is consti-

OF AUTHORITY

15

tutionally bound to remain a minor, unable to
provide for her government by herself.5 J. S.
Mill, on the other hand, at the beginning of
his famous booklet On Liberty, warns the
reader that his theory does not hold for primi­
tive peoples, but only for highly civilized '
ones, in which the general development of
reason renders the average man capable of
self-government.
The assumption that authority has but
substitutional functions has far-reaching con­
sequences, for if authority is made neces­
sary by deficiencies alone, it will be des­
tined to disappear insofar as the deficiencies
which make it necessary disappear. This
assumption does not mean that authority
will ever vanish completely: it is clear that the
child will never be able to accomplish selfgovernment, that there will always be feeble­
minded and wicked people. It means that the
amount of authority necessary in a society is
inversely proportional to the perfection reached by that society and by the persons

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16

NATURE AND FUNCTIONS

and the elementary groups which compose it.
At the ideal term of human progress, the field
of authority would be limited to the govern­
ment of the youngest children. Thus, the law
of progress would take the form of an
asymptotic curve at whose unattainable term
there would be a complete elimination of
authority.
(The best method of ascertaining whether
there is such a thing as an essential function of
authority is to consider a community of adults,
intelligent and of perfect good will, and to
inquire into the requirements of the common
life of that community. (A community com­
posed only of intelligent and good-willed
persons is no utopian fiction, provided that
we have in view a very small group, for in­
stance, one formed by a husband and his
wife.) This community, however small it may
be, must be regulated in its common action by
decisions which bind all its members. How
will these decisions be made? They can be
made unanimously, but the unanimity is not

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OF AUTHORITY

17

guaranteed. There is no steady principle
which could indefectibly assure this unanim­
ity. Any member of the community under con- ·
sideration can disagree with the others as to
the best course to take in the common action.
In case of a persistent disagreement, either the
unity of action of the community will be
broken, or one judgment will prevail, which ·
means that some person or some group of
persons will be recognized as having author­
ity. I say: a person or a group of persons, be­
cause the decision which is to prevail can be
issued by a single individual or by a majority­
vote of the whole community, or by a
majority-vote of a selected group within the
community as well: as far as the principle of
authority is concerned, it makes no difference.
And thus we have pointed out the essen­
tial function of authority: to assure the .unity
of action of a united multitude. A multitude
aiming at a common good which can be at­
tained only through a common action, must
be united in its action by some steady princi-

18

NATURE AND FUNCTIONS

pie. This principle is precisely what we call
authority.
It is evident that the core of the theory
consists in the statement that some disagree­
ment is always possible concerning the course
to be taken in the common action, or, what
amounts to the same thing, that unanimity, in
those matters, is but precarious and casual.
This is the point that we want to clear up
now. In this purpose, we must inquire into the
conditions which render a judgment com­
municable to a plurality of minds. The prob­
lem that we have to deal with is the episte­
mological problem of the intersubjectivability
of judgments.
The scientific judgment is intersubjectivable par excellence on the ground of the evi­
dence and the universality of its object. The
character of scientific objectivity is the steady
basis of the communicability of scientific judg­
ments. It should be noticed, however, that à
judgment which is, de jure, intersubjectivable
or communicable without limits, may enjoy,

OF AUTHORITY

19

in fact, a very limited intersubjectivability.
Every demonstrated statement has within it­
self all that is necessary in order to determine
the assent of any mind whatever. But, in order
to have a demonstration determine one’s as­
sent, one must be able to follow the demon­
stration. In this connection, there is between
the condition of philosophy and that of posi­
tive sciences a singular difference of which the
philosopher must be fully aware. Many per­
sons, including philosophers, overwhelmed by
the conspicuous fact that schools of philoso­
phy everlastingly disagree, conclude from
what is an inevitable fact to what is mistaken
for an essential necessity. Observing that philosophical theses are not, in fact, assented to
beyond the boundaries of a group of kindred
minds, they infer that philosophical proof is
devoid of de jure intersubjectivability and con­
sequently that it has no scientific objectivity.
This disastrous inference can easily be avoided
if only we take into account how rarely the
numerous and delicate conditions of a clear

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20

NATURE AND FUNCTIONS

understanding of philosophical problems can
be fully realized. Positive science, on the ·
other hand, because of the functions it has to
serve in social life, wants to obtain the agree­
ment of as many minds as possible. The posi­
tive scientist purposively remains within a
field of considerations where his conclusions
are likely to be unanimously accepted by his
fellow scientists.’
Now, there are statements which, although
true and certain, will not necessarily obtain â
unanimous assent, even under ideal condi­
tions; statements which, however sound they
may be, do not enjoy any de jure iritersubjectivability because they do not refer to
any necessary and universal object; statements
which, even when entirely true, cannot make
their truth evident. Statements of this kind
can occasionally be assented to by numerous
persons—they can possibly obtain the uni­
versal agreement of those who are interested
in them: such a unanimous agreement is but
casual, and consequently precarious. Any

OF AUTHORITY

statement which lacks evidence, lacks the
objective principle o£ unanimous agreement,
even under the best conditions.
Among those statements, which, despite
their certainty, lack the objective principle of
intersubjectivability, the most typical are prudential decisions. Let us recall, in this connection, some basic theses of the theory of
prudence.
1. There are dispositions of the mind, as
opinion for instance, which are unsteady by
nature and able to lead to error as well as to
truth. There are dispositions of the mind
(science for instance) which are steady by
nature and which can lead to truth alone. Such
an intellectual habitus as science is an indefectible principle of certainty. Of course, the
indefectibility of science is but an essential
indefectibility, obviously compatible with ac­
cidental failures. The scientist errs, science
does not err. The scientist is not led into error
by science, but rather by the imperfection of
his science. In a like manner, the just man can

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22

NATURE AND FUNCTIONS

occasionally sin against justice. Now this
occurs because he is but imperfectly just.
2. Fundamentally considered, the prob­
lem of prudence can be stated as follows: in
the order of ethical knowledge, envisaged
under its fully practical aspect, can we secure
an intellectual determination steady by nature,
and meant to lead to truth only, just as science
does ? Asking myself what I must do in order
to behave well, here and now, I, such as I am,
with my personality and my unique history,
amidst this particular and unrenewable set of
circumstances,—I wonder whether the answer
can be furnished by some steady determina­
tion of the mind, by some essentially inde­
fectible principle of certainty.
The most common observations on the
\ psychology of moral conscience can give us
\ very significant suggestions. When a man has
( made a decision after a fully conscientious
I and honest deliberation, he knows that his deI cision is good, he knows that it is, in some
sense, certainly true, and that its soundness

OF AUTHORITY

23

cannot be invalidated, whatever the factual
consequences may be. Consider a simple and
homely example: the head of a family makes
up his mind to take a trip to the sea-shore
with his family on a summer vacation. Since
there is no insignificant matter in the govern­
ment of a family, this decision has been care­
fully weighed: taking into consideration his
financial situation, the state of his business,
the health advantages of sea air, this honest
man sincerely concluded that this trip was
good for his family, and that it was reasonable
to make it. A train-wreck occurs. A child is
killed. In fact, the vacation trip has not been
good for this family. However, it cannot be
said that the decision proved unreasonable be­
cause of the accident. The accident could not
reasonably have been foreseen and this is
why, although the possibility of the accident
could not be entirely discarded, the decision
was reasonable, good, certainly true, and the
father of the family has nothing of which to
accuse himself.

24

NATURE AND FUNCTIONS

3. On the other hand, this decision im­
plied a judgment which proved to be untrue,
namely that this vacation trip was to be good.
In fact, the trip has been no good thing, it has
been a calamity. And thus we are led to recog­
nize that there is, in the practical judgment, a
twofold truth. In the practical judgment some
theoretical consideration is always involved,
namely some consideration referring to the
reality of things, to what the things are and
to what the things will be; in the cited ex­
ample the theoretical consideration was that
the trip was to be a good thing. This theoreti­
cal consideration proved untrue: the follow­
ing course of events showed that it was not
in conformity with what was to happen in
fact. The truth of the theoretical consideration
implied in the practical judgment cannot be
established with an entire certainty because
we are unable to overcome the mysteries of
contingency, because we are unable to foresee
the future with certainty. However, we are all
convinced that a decision may be certainly

OF AUTHORITY

25

true despite this inability to foresee with cer­
tainty its possible consequences. The certitude
of the practical judgment does not concern
the theoretical assumptions implied in it, but
the very practical aspect of the practical judg­
ment. Speaking of the certain truth of the
practical judgment, we do not refer to its con­
formity with the reality of things—this con­
formity cannot be perfectly ascertained—we
refer to its conformity with the requirements
of a will which is supposed to be sound,
healthy, honest. According to the so enlighten- ♦
ing view of Aristotle, the certain truth of
which the practical judgment is capable is no
theoretical but a practical truth; it is not the
truth of a cognition but the truth of a direc­
tion; it does not consist in a relation of con­
formity between the mind and things, but in a
relation of conformity between the judgment
of the mind and the requirements of a right
appetite of the end to be pursued. Whatever
the factual consequences of a decision will be,
owing to the unpredictable interference of

26

NATURE AND FUNCTIONS

contingent causes, one who made a decision
honestly, in full accord with the exigencies of
a virtuous will, has not to repent: his decision
was what it ought to have been; it was true,
undoubtedly true, even if, for lack of knowing
things that we could not know, it implied
some assumptions that the factual course of
events invalidated.7
Thus, the practical order, despite the con­
tingency which reigns in the field where
human practice takes place, can be the object
of a steady principle of indefectible truth. We
recognize that prudence, like science, is an in­
defectible principle of certainty, provided that
we distinguish between the theoretical impli­
cations of the prudential judgment, which can
be but probable, and the prudential judgment
itself which, as a rule of direction, enjoys an
, absolute certainty. Now, this distinction be­
tween the theoretical implications of the pru­
dential judgment and the prudential judgment
itself, this possible discrepancy between those
theoretical implications which are, at best,

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OF AUTHORITY

27

probable, and the prudential judgment which
is, as such, certain, do not mean in any sense
that the virtue of prudence is not intensely·
interested in the theoretical implications of
the judgments that it has to utter: it only
means that the prudential judgment is not
• intersubjectivable, or, better, lacks the objec­
tive foundation of a regular intersubjectivability. A prudent decision is always preceded
by a careful deliberation: a decision is no
prudent one, indeed, if it is made hurriedly
and rashly. Now, deliberation includes, in the
first place, an investigation of the real dis­
positions and possibilities of the persons and
things concerned With the decision to be
made; an investigation which is, at bottom,
theoretical, since it intends to reach conclu­
sions in conformity with what the things are
and what they will be. Were this investigation
able to conclude with certainty and to bring
forth a demonstration of its conclusions, then
there would be no possible discrepancy be­
tween the practical validity of the prudential

28

NATURE AND FUNCTIONS

judgment and that of its theoretical implica­
tions. Then, the theoretical implications of
the practical judgment being demonstrated,
the practical judgment itself would follow
from them necessarily and share their evi­
dence. Then, the prudential judgment would
be steadily intersubjectivable. Then, decisions
concerning the common action of a multitude
could be taken unanimously, at least under the
ideal conditions of a community made up of
intelligent and virtuous persons alone. This
is not the case, because contingency prevents
us from knowing exhaustively the factors
with which our decision is concerned and
from predicting their future with any kind of
certainty. In the complex matters of collective
behavior, more than anywhere else, the theo­
retical considerations on which the prudential
judgment is based, cannot be demonstrated.
Accordingly, it can never be shown evidently
that this or that practical judgment, to be
taken as a rule for our common action, is the
' best possible one. However conscientious the

OF AUTHORITY

29

deliberation may be, since it cannot afford to
prove its conclusions, anybody can, at any
time, object that a better course of action
could be conceived, and the unity of action
which is supposed to be required by the pur­
suit of the common good will be ceaselessly
jeopardized unless all members of the com­
munity agree to follow one prudential de­
cision and only one—which is to submit them­
selves to some authority.
Thus, beyond necessities and conveniences
which result from the unreasonableness, ig­
norance and wickedness of men, the principle
of authority answers a necessity which is in no
way accidental, which is not a consequence
of any sin, evil or deficiency, a necessity which
is but a metaphysical consequence of the
nature of things. Considered in its principle,
authority is neither a necessary evil nor the
consequence of any evil, nor a lesser good, nor
the consequence of some lesser good, but an
absolutely good thing founded upon the
metaphysical goodness of nature. Considered

30

*

■

NATURE AND FUNCTIONS

? in its essential function, as identical with the
■ prudence of society in its collective action,
authority is the everlastingly good principle
of the social unity in the pursuit of the com­
mon good.8
A new light can be thrown upon the ques­
tion by comparing the notion of authority
with the notion of law. We already alluded to
this comparison at the beginning of this talk.
I want now to consider the fiction of a society
ruled by laws only and which, on the basis of
its being perfectly ruled by laws, should be
able to do without any authority. This fiction,
familiar to many liberals and to some anarch­
ists, is most clearly described in the earliest
writings of P. J. Proudhon.® There, we find
the idea that there are objective laws of social
behavior which are as determined and
necessary as physical laws, and are immanent
in the course of social events just as physical
laws, previous to any consideration by the
human understanding, are immanent in the
course of physical events. For the lack of a

OF AUTHORITY

31

sufficient knowledge of the social Nature, for
the lack of a reason sufficiently aware of the
objective laws of society, we seek a precarious
salvation in our reliance on the wisdom of a
king, or, what amounts to the same result, on
the wisdom of popular sovereignty/Now,
only the objective laws of the real are truly
reliable. Sovereignty should not belong to any
will, be it that of the king or that of the peo­
ple. It should belong to reason alone as an im­
personal interpreter of laws which are in no
sense to be issued by man, but only to be
recognized by him as deriving from the nature
of social things and finally identical with it/
The progress of social sciences is, in fact,
meant to enable us to do away, step by step,
with authority, by making us realize more and
more perfectly the objective requirements of
the social nature. At the ideal term of that
process, government, if still necessary at all,
would have no other duty than compelling
those who do not understand the law or re­
fuse to obey it. Thanks to social science, a

a

32

NATURE AND FUNCTIONS

rational society would be installed, in which
the reign of reason would be the realization
of anarchy.
In this description we recognize the ordi­
nary features of the rationalistic mind, char­
acterized, as everybody knows, by a singular
aversion for the proper mystery of con­
tingency, by a constant tendency, in social
philosophy as well as in philosophy of nature,
to disregard the contingency, which plays,
indeed, such an overwhelming part, both in
the physical and human world. Whatever may
be the true nature of social laws, something at
least is certain: namely, that the laws of the
social world, insofar as they are previous
to any positive intervention of human wis­
dom, insofar as they are to be discovered
and recognized rather than made and issued
by man, express but the universal and neces­
sary aspects of the social beings. Consequent­
ly, the knowledge of these laws, even if sup­
posed to be perfect, would not provide us
with any demonstrable rule of conduct, re­

OF AUTHORITY

33

garding our particular behavior amid the
contingencies of existential positions. If the
development of social sciences ever reaches a
state of perfect achievement, authority will
remain necessary then, just as it is now, as a
social prudence, able to maintain the unity of
society in its common action.10
After having surveyed the main func­
tions of authority, we have to consider now
the two great kinds of dominions which con­
stitute, in a sense, the most basic divisions of
the forms of authority. I refer to the distinc­
tion made by St. Thomas between the so-called
dominium super servos and the so-called
dominium super liberos, let us say dominion
of servitude and dominion of freedom. This
distinction is taken from the ends pursued by
the authority exercised by one man over an­
other. When a man is governed for his own good or for the common good of the society ·
of which he is a member, this man is said to ·
be free. On the contrary, one who is governed ·
for the private welfare of a master is said to

34

NATURE AND FUNCTIONS

be a slave. Thus the notion of servitude is de­
fined in St. Thomas by the alienation of the
human effort. One who works for the com­
mon good does not undergo any alienation,
since the common good is in no way alien or
extraneous to the line of development of the
person. One who works for the private good
of another person has his activity, at least in
part, alienated. We have in this way a defini­
tion of servitude which does not imply the
special connotations ordinarily conveyed by
the words slavery or serfdom. However free
a man may be to choose and to change his
trade, his residence and his master, as long as
he works for the private good of a master, he
undergoes an alienation of his activity and
remains an unfree man.11
It should be noticed that the set of oppo­
site notions, dominion of servitude, dominion
of freedom, is often erroneously thought to
be equivalent to two other sets of opposite
notions. Some might think that the opposition
made between the dominion of servitude and

OF AUTHORITY

35

the dominion of freedom fully coincides with
the opposition between regtmen politicum and
regimen despoticum. We are touching one of
the most equivocal aspects of the social philos­
ophy of Aristotle. On close examination, it
seems that there are in Aristotle two defini­
tions of the slave, which can easily be mis­
taken as equivalent (and possibly were mis­
taken as such by Aristotle himself12), and
which in fact do not cover the same object,
either in comprehension or in extension. From
the point of view of final causality, the slave
is one whose activity undergoes alienation,
while a free man is one whose activity is not
alienated. Now, from the point of view of
efficient causality a free man is one who is en­
dowed with some power of resisting the
orders he receives (regimen politicum or
statutory regime), while a slave is one who is
not given such a power of resistance (regimen
despoticum). It is clear that those definitions
are not equivalent in comprehension, since
the point of view from which they proceed is

36

NATURE AND FUNCTIONS

not the same; nor are they equivalent in ex­
tension, since one who does not enjoy any
power of resisting the orders he receives is not
thereby necessarily bound to serve the private
welfare of his superior. The classic example of
regimen despoticum is that of the dominion
exercised by the father over his children. Just
as the slave, the child is devoid of any power
of resisting the orders he receives. Now the
child is not at all the slave of his father if the
notion of slave is envisaged from the point of
view of final causality, since the leadership
exercised by the father over his child does not
aim at the private good of the father but
rather at the proper good of the child and at
the common welfare of the family community.
Moreover, none of those sets of opposite no­
tions can be identified with the opposition we
stated between the essential and the substitu­
tional functions of authority. The essential
functions of authority can be exercised in the
form of a political or despotical regime as
well; the substitutional functions of authority

OF AUTHORITY

37

can be exercised both in the form of a domin­
ion of servitude and in that of a dominion of
freedom. It is of high importance, in our
opinion, to keep sight of the irreducibility to
one another of those three sets of notions,
since the expediencies which may justify the
despotic regime or the substitutional interven­
tions of authority are sometimes wrongly
taken as a justification for the dominion of
servitude. If one is incapable of self-govern­
ment, it does not follow necessarily that one
should be treated as a slave and placed at the
service of the private good of a master. If the
members of a society have not reached a suf­
ficient degree of political maturity as to de­
serve a statutory regime, it does not follow
necessarily that they are to be exploited for
the private profit of their leaders. Thus, the
dominion of servitude cannot be justified by
the principles which justify the substitutional
intervention of authority or the non-statutory
regime. If it is justifiable at all, it must be
justified by principles proper to it.

38

NATURE AND FUNCTIONS

It can be asked, indeed, whether the do­
minion of servitude, the alienation of human
effort, the exploitation of man by man can be
at all justified, except by quite accidental and
temporary considerations.13 At first view it
might be said that the using a person for the
private good of another person without refer­
ence to the common good is but unlawful
violence. Now, if there is any reference to
common good, it seems that the considered
dominion is no longer a dominion of servi­
tude. It should be observed, however, that the
activity of a person may be related to the
common good in two very different ways. The
relation may be direct, and then there is no
alienation and no servitude. Now, besides that
direct relation to the common good which is
proper to the free man, another relation to the
common good, namely an indirect one, can be
conceived as follows. It might be said, indeed,
that the common welfare of the society re­
quires that there be a privileged class enjoying
leisures, luxuries and special consideration,—■

OF AUTHORITY

39

all being things which are reputed to be ob­
tained only at the price of the exploitation of
a number of men. Such is at bottom the
eternal argument of those who uphold that
there is no sound social order without an
aristocratic constitution of society. In view of
these considerations, the problem of the legit­
imacy of a certain dominion of servitude—
limited indeed, and wholly respectful of the
inalienable rights of the human person—may
be reduced to the question whether the pro­
duction of superior individuals, obviously in­
dispensable for the general welfare of society,
can be secured only at the expense of an aris­
tocratic constitution. All that I wish to add is
that apparently, as man masters more thor­
oughly physical nature through science and
machinery, it becomes less and less necessary,
in order to have superior individuals enjoy
leisure and means of culture, to maintain a
number of alienated workers at their service.
Let us not forget, in that connection, that,
according to Aristotle, society would be able

40

NATURE AND FUNCTIONS

to do without slaves if only the shuttle could ’
weave by itself: this is precisely what we see
happening more and more in modern in­
dustry.
This is the survey I wanted to present to
you on the nature, function and forms of
authority. Let us summarize, by way of short
theses, the results of our inquiry:
First: authority is not identical with co­
ercion, which is but one of the instruments
possibly used by it.
Second: the proper field of authority is the
practical order. In the theoretical order, au­
thority can but substitute for an insufficiently
enlightened object
Third: within the practical order, the func­
tions of authority are of a substitutional char­
acter when authority provides for the govern­
ment of a person in the very line of the pur­
suit of his personal welfare. The essential
function of authority is to provide for the
unity of action of every multitude which can­

OF AUTHORITY

41

not attain its common good but through com­
mon action.
Fourth: authority, at times, is used for the
private good of the one who exercises it. It is
in no way essential to authority to take this
form of a dominion of servitude. In particu­
lar, to conceive political authority after the
pattern of a dominion of servitude implies a
most fanciful idea of the nature of the state.
And now, we have to come back to the
questions we stated at the beginning of this
paper. We asked ourselves whether it is possi­
ble to find out principles to which we can
make appeal in our endeavor to proportion
exactly authority and liberty in any given »
situation. Moreover, we asked what was the
meaning and value of the current identifica­
tion of social progress, progress of liberty and
decay of authority.
Before trying to answer those questions,
it is necessary to remove some equivocations
by clearing up, as briefly as possible, the no­
tion of liberty that we have in view. I should

42

NATURE AND FUNCTIONS

like to refer to the theory so splendidly de­
veloped by Maritain in the first chapter of his
book Freedom in the Modern World. Among
the various meanings of the notion of liberty,
we have to distinguish, fundamentally, an
initial liberty and a terminal liberty. Initial
liberty is the sheer power of choosing, I mean
the power of choosing the good and the evil
as well. This liberty, which immediately flows
from our rational nature, this liberty that we
are provided with by the very fact that we are
given our rational nature, can be used rightly
as well as wrongly, and has the value of a
means rather than that of an end. Now, at the
term of our endeavor to improve our nature
by supplementing it with virtues, another
liberty appears, which is a power of choosing
the good alone. The process through which
this terminal liberty is secured consists in an
interiorization of the law. The virtuous man
is no longer subjected to the law, since the law
has become interior to him and rules him from
within. The prescriptions of the law are truly

OF AUTHORITY

43

identical with the dynamism of the virtuous
nature. Terminal liberty does not mean only
freedom of choice, but also autonomy.
Now, while initial freedom is but a mixed
perfection, a perfectio mixta in the precise
meaning this expression has in metaphysical
language, terminal liberty is an absolute per­
fection, a perfectio simpliciter simplex, a per­
fection whose concept does not involve any
kind of imperfection and which must be at­
tributed to God in a formal sense. So defined, ·
. liberty is a divine name.14 I would even say i
that it occupies a singular position among the
absolute perfections.! Consider, indeed, that
every being, inasmuch as it is, enjoys some
amount of autonomy. The basic statement
that every nature is the realization of an idea
implies that every nature has within itself a
law of activity which is its own law. Let us
recall the thomistic definition of nature, ratio
artis divinae, indita rebus, qua moventur ad
fines, an idea of the divine art, which is in­
corporated into things and by which things

44

NATURE AND FUNCTIONS

are directed to their ends. The more a being
is elevated in the hierarchy of things, that is,
the more perfectly it participates'in the idea
of being, the greater is the amount of auton­
omy it enjoys. Autonomy, on the one hand,
immediately springs from the perfections of
being and, on the other hand, makes those
perfections evident, conspicuous and admira­
ble. Autonomy is the glory, the splendor of
. being. Now, terminal freedom, since it is both
freedom of choice and autonomy, is the kind
. of autonomy which properly fits the rational
nature as such. Terminal liberty is the glory
of the rational nature.
From these metaphysical considerations,
the obvious conclusion is that the progress of
. liberty is rightly identified with the very
4 progress of man and society, provided we
• have in mind terminal liberty. As to whether
the progress of liberty implies the decay of
authority, this is a question that we shall try
to answer by considering the forms, functions

OF AUTHORITY

45

and instruments of authority in reference to
the idea of liberty as meaning autonomy.
Let us do away, first, with the dominion of
servitude. It is exceedingly clear that the ex­
ploitation of man by man, even when possibly
legitimate, is opposed to the requirements of
autonomy. Thus, the progress of liberty im­
plies the decay of authority insofar as author­
ity takes the form of a dominion of servitude.
As regards the instruments of authority,
it is no less clear that a leadership exercised
through persuasion agrees better with the
autonomy of those who are led, than a leader­
ship exercised through coercion. Thus, the
progress of liberty implies the substitution of
persuasion for coercion wherever this substitu­
tion can be reasonably realized.
Third: the substitutional functions which
authority exercises within the practical order
are justified, as we have seen, only because of
the inability of some persons, or some groups,
for self-government. Accordingly, the prog­
ress of liberty implies the decay of authority

46

NATURE AND FUNCTIONS

insofar as authority assumes substitutional
functions.
On the contrary, the progress of liberty
does not imply the decay of authority insofar
as the essential function of authority is con­
cerned. The more effectively a society be
united in its common action, the more perfect,
happy, and free this society will be.
Thus, as we suggested at the beginning of
this paper, the antinomy between authority
and liberty is no absolute one. Viewed in the
purity of their metaphysical goodness, author­
ity and liberty fully agree with one another
and their complementary character definitely
prevails over their opposition.
To conclude: it seems that we are now able
to set forth, according to our initial wish,
principles of a nature to guide us in our en­
deavor to proportion exactly the forces of
authority and those of liberty. Let us call
these principles the principle of authority and
the principle of autonomy. They can be form­
ulated as follows: Principle of Authority.

OF AUTHORITY

47

Wherever the welfare of a community re­
quires a common action, the unity of that com­
mon action must be assured by the higher or­
gans of that community. Principle of Autono­
my. Wherever a task can be satisfactorily
achieved by the initiative of the individual or
that of small social units, the fulfillment of
that task must be left to the initiative of the
individual or to that of small social units.
From the association of the principle of
autonomy with the principle of authority re­
sults an order which is hierarchical. In such an »
order, the autonomy of the inferior social unit
supplements and balances the authority of the
higher social unit. This is what the upholders
of tyranny seem to understand perfectly well.
Materializing a dream of Rousseau, the totali­
tarian state indefatigably pursues the destruc­
tion of every social group within the state, so
as to establish an absolute domination over a
crowd of individuals that no autonomic organ­
ization is able to protect. In contrast with that
abomination, I should like to end with the

48

NATURE AND FUNCTIONS

image of social happiness, made up of author­
ity, autonomy and hierarchy, that is found in
the following page of Thomas Jefferson:
**.. . it is not by the consolidation, or concen­
tration of powers, but by their distribution,
that good government is effected. Were not
this great country already divided into States,
that division must be made, that each might
do for itself what concerns itself directly, and
what it can do so much better than a distant
authority. Every State again is divided into
counties, each to take care of what lies within
its local bounds: each county again into town­
ships or wards, to manage minute details; and
every ward into farms, to be governed by its
individual proprietor. Were we directed from
Washington when to sow, and when to reap,
we should soon want bread. It is by this
partition of cares, descending in gradation
from general to particular, that the mass of
human affairs may be best managed, for the
good and prosperity of all.”1®

OF AUTHORITY

49

NOTES
1. Rousseau, Emile, II, (Flammarion ed., Paris,
vol. I, pp. 79-81).—"There are two kinds of de­
pendences: that on things, which is from Nature,
that on men, which is from society. Dependence
on things, having no moral character, is no handi­
cap to freedom and does not engender any vice;
dependence on men, for lack of regulation, en­
genders all vices, and, owing to it, master and
slave corrupt one another. If there is any means of
remedying this evil in society, it consists in substi­
tuting law for man, empowering the general wills
with a real force superior to the action of any par­
ticular will. If the laws of nations could have, as
those of Nature do, an inflexibility that no human
force could ever overcome, dependence on men
would become identifiable with that on things . . .
Keep the child solely dependent on things; you
will have followed the order of Nature in the
process of his education. Never oppose to his un­
reasonable wishes any but physical obstacles or
punishments resulting from the actions themselves
—he will remember these punishments in similar
situations. It is enough to prevent him from doing
evil without forbidding him to do it. Experience
and impotency alone must take the place of laws
for him. Do not vouchsafe anything to his wishes
because he asks, but only because he needs. Let
him not know what obedience is when he acts, nor
what dominion is when somebody acts for him . . .
I have already said that your child must not get

50

NATURE AND FUNCTIONS

anything because he demands it, but because he
needs it, nor do anything by obedience but only by
necessity; thus the words, obey and command, will
be excluded from his vocabulary still more rigor­
ously than those of duty and obligation ; but those
of force, necessity, impotency and coercion will
have an important place in it.”

2. In order to understand exactly the relationship
between the notion of law and that of a governing
person, it might be helpful to inquire into the
genesis of our conceptions concerning the various
kinds of laws. Significantly enough, the definition
that St. Thomas gives of the law (Summa theo­
logica I-II, 90) refers properly to the law issued
by the state society: this is, indeed, the kind of law
which is prior in our cognition. Considering the
several kinds of laws as an analogical series, let us
say that the civil law is, for us, the first analogate
of the whole series. Now civil law is no selfsufficient and independent rule; the very way that
everybody (including the maintainers of juridical
positivism) speaks and thinks of positive laws
proves that the positive law participates in a higher
law, i.e., in the body of self-evident principles that
we call natural law. Thus, the primary conception
of the natural law is that of a body of statements
issued by the reason. These statements, on the other
hand, refer to the nature of things which are prior
to the exercise of the reason. Just as the principle
of identity actually rules the real previous to its
being recognized and uttered by the reason, so the

OF AUTHORITY

51

principles of morality are immanent in the nature
of man previous to their being recognized and
promulgated by the human reason. Better: just as
the theoretical reason, when uttering the principle
of identity, recognizes in it the supreme law of
being, so the practical reason, when uttering its
self-evident principles, intends only to recognize
and to express, in the form of obligatory state­
ments, the fundamental tendencies of human
nature (op. cit. I-II, 94, 2). Thus, the natural law
exists in human nature before existing in human
reason. This is why it is necessary to go a step
further, and to acknowledge that the natural law
participates in the eternal law, which is identical
with the reason of God. Should we not make this
step, the supreme law would appear to be that
which exists within nature, and thus the first and
most essential element of the definition of law, an
ordinance of reason, would be finally nullified, the
implication being that the rational universe would
be ultimately dominated by irrational nature.
Here, it should be noticed that in the hierarchy
of laws, a twofold relation of subordination takes
place. Two different laws, each of different con­
tent, may be subordinated to one another. This is
the way that positive laws are subordinated to
natural laws. On the other hand, the relation of
subordination can take place between two existen­
tial conditions (or two states) of one and the same
law. Observing the behavior of cab-drivers in a
crowded city, I see that it embodies a certain rule ;
this rule has been issued by a governing reason, it

52

NATURE AND FUNCTIONS

has existed in a governing reason before existing in
the factual behavior of these cab-drivers. We must
say that the rule, as existing in this factual behavior,
is subordinated to, or participates in the rule as
existing in the governing reason. Now the rule is
one and the same; if rightly enforced, it has the
same content, both in the factual behavior which
embodies it, and in the governing reason which
issues it, in mensurato et in mensurante. This is
the way that natural law, as a precept of the human
reason, is subordinated to the natural law immanent
in human nature, and the natural law immanent in
human nature to the eternal law, which is the di­
vine reason. The content of the law remains the
same, its existential condition, or its state, is di­
verse. In the divine reason, the natural law, as an
aspect of the eternal law, enjoys a state of person­
ality; in nature, a state of impersonality; finally,
in the human reason, it enjoys again a state of per­
sonality.
A new light can be shed upon the whole ques­
tion by considering the hierarchy of laws in the
synthetic order, beginning with the term which is
the first analogate quoad se. Then, we understand
that the eternal law engrafts participations of itself
in created natures; these participations of the
eternal law, insofar as the human nature is con­
cerned, are recognized and promulgated as obliga­
tory precepts by the human reason, while, in be­
ings devoid of reason, which do not act freely,
but by natural necessity, they retain the condition
of physical laws. Physical laws, on the other hand,

OF AUTHORITY

53

can be taken by the human intellect as objects of
science and expressed (more or less successfully,
always inexhaustively) in theoretical formulae
(scientific laws).
3. Concerning the functions of coercion, see Sum­
ma theologica I-II, 95, 1 (Utrum fuerit utile ali­
quas leges poni ab hominibus).
St. Thomas takes in the most rigorous sense
both the term laws and the clause stated by men.
Stated by men means that we are dealing with laws
issued by a temporal community; on the other
hand, a community endowed with the power of is­
suing laws properly so called is a perfect commun­
ity, Church or State (op. cit. I-II, 91, 1). In fact,
the question treated by St. Thomas in this article
is that of the raison d’être of the state. St. Thomas
understands the power of coercion to be the dis- ·
tinguishing feature of state society. This does not
imply that every community distinct from the state
is devoid of any power of coercion, it only means
that the state alone enjoys a power of unconditional ·
coercion, according to the felicitous expression
used by Georges Gurvitch. Let us observe, more­
over, that the power of unconditional coercion does
not constitute the essence of the state; it is but a
characteristic property following from its essence.
The definition of the state implied in this article
is no essential definition, but a definition taken
from a characteristic attribute (propria passio).
Thus, considering the state as a community
endowed with a power of unconditional coercion, *

54

NATURE AND FUNCTIONS

St. Thomas justifies it on the basis of pedagogical
expediencies. Every man needs education and vir­
tuous training. Paternal training, whose proper
instrument is persuasion (disciplina paterna, quae
est per monitiones), provides sufficiently for the
training of youths who are prone to virtue; on the
contrary, those who are prone to vice must be pre­
vented from doing wrong by coercion (vis) or
fear (metus). By compelling bad boys to refrain
from doing wrong, a twofold result is secured:
first, the tranquillity of honest people is assured;
secondly, the bad boys themselves get used to act­
ing honestly, so that they may finally become virtu­
ous, having become able to do voluntarily what
they previously did by fear of punishment.
This elevated conception of the pedagogical
function of coercion rests upon the psychological
fact that a good habit generated by fear, although
non-virtuous in its origin, makes virtue easier, the
substitution of good will for fear taking place
easily when the exterior acts of a virtue have be­
come habitual. Coercion, in the long run, paves
the way for persuasion, because habitual automa­
tism turns to voluntariness. Let us recall the fam­
ous analyses of Pascal on religious habits as a
preparation to faith. (See Georges Desgrippes,
Etudes sur Pascal. De l’automatisme à la foi, Paris,
Téqui, 1935).
Thus, there is a transition from coercion to
persuasion and coercion can be used as a means
for persuasion. Conversely, there is a transition
from persuasion to coercion, and persuasion, as

OF AUTHORITY

55

soon as it takes hold of masses, gives birth to co­
ercion. For instance, a campaign to influence publie opinion, if successful, can eventually marshal
coercive forces (strike, boycott, etc.). In a like
manner, the ecclesiastical practice of the Interdict,
such as it was used in the Middle Ages to curb
temporal powers, was a measure of persuasion
turning to coercion.
Liberals fail constantly to recognize the peda­
gogical function of coercion, and accordingly limit
the role of coercion to the protection of others
against misdemeanors. Note L. T. Hobhouse,
Liberalism, Henry Holt & Co., N. Y., 1911, p.
143: "If we refrain from coercing a man for his
own good, it is not because his good is indifferent
to us, but because it cannot be furthered by coer­
cion. The difficulty is founded on the nature of the
good itself, which on its personal side depends on
the spontaneous flow of feeling checked and guided
not by the external restraint, but by rational self­
control. To try to form character by coercion is to
destroy it in the making. Personality is not built
up from without but grows from within, and the
function of the outer order is not to create it, but
to provide for it the most suitable conditions of
growth. Thus, to the common question whether it
is possible to make men good by Act of Parlia­
ment, the reply is that it is not possible to compel
morality because morality is the act or character
of a free agent, but that it is possible to create the
conditions under which morality can develop, and
among these not the least important is freedom

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NATURE AND FUNCTIONS

from compulsion by others." The point is, pre­
cisely, that good habits possibly determined by co­
ercion are to be numbered among these "conditions
under which morality can develop."
In the same connection, I should like to men­
tion that the modern forms of propaganda, such as
they are carried out, most of all, by the National
Socialist Party, are relevant to coercion more than
to persuasion. The process of persuasion is char­
acterized as an appeal to free will; the process of
coercion is characterized by its bringing into opera­
tion some natural determinism. Until recently, man
was hardly able to compel man save by means of
corporeal determinisms (strokes, wounds, starva­
tion, confinement, etc.) ; at the present time, skilled
propagandists know how to produce by psychical
means, i.e., by repetition of carefully chosen stim­
uli, a state of nervous exhaustion which is just as
intolerable as starvation, imprisonment or strokes.
• Consider a man who is subjected to intensified
propaganda in favor of a policy that he deems to
be criminal. Walking in the street, he sees every­
where posters praising that policy; reading news­
papers, listening to the radio, he everyday, possibly
several times a day, reads the eulogy of that policy
and listens to it. No doubt, he will resist for a
while and oppose his judgment, let us say: these
men are criminals, to that judgment which propa­
ganda intends to impose on his mind. Tliis very
resistance to ceaselessly repeated stimuli implies a
number of emotional reflexes which soon tire out
the organism and result in a state of depression;

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57

then continued resistance is possible only at the
cost of a greater fatigue. A moment comes •when
the abandonment of any resistance appears to be
the only way to avoid exhaustion. The art of the *
propagandist is based upon the law, well known
by psychiatrists, that among the several forms of
overexertion, emotional overexertion is the one
that the organism is less able to stand.
In order to understand the true character of
modern propaganda, and to realize the tremendous
threat it represents for societies, one must bear in
mind that a quantitative change in the stimulation
means a qualitative change in the biologico-psychical reaction. Moderate propaganda is a process of
persuasion, intensive propaganda a process of
psychical coercion. Since it is difficult to trace a
borderline between moderate and intensive propa­
ganda, the democratic state, whose dynamism is
based on a process of persuasion, is generally un­
willing to prevent moderate propaganda from de­
generating into intensive propaganda. Thus, private
groups get endowed with a power of coercion
which, although using merely psychical means, may
enable these groups to substitute their leadership
for that of the state in extensive sections of so­
ciety. At the term of that process, the men who
have established, thanks to their power of psychical
coercion, a state within the state, solemnly declare
that they are the state. Then the totalitarian revolu­
tion is achieved.
Of course, this notion of psychical coercion,
as opposed to persuasion (which is also a psychical

"~ί**~°'ΠΓπ····αηΜΐΐΜΒ

58

NATURE AND FUNCTIONS

process) implies the recognition of two causal
systems within the psyche·, there are psychical
processes which are determined, just as physical
processes are determined. These psychical processes,
when considered only for the sake of knowledge,
are the object of theoretical sciences, namely posi­
tive Psychology and philosophical Psychology
(which is a part of the Philosophy of Nature) ;
when considered for the sake of action, they con­
stitute the object of a technique (let us say, ap­
plied Psychology). Such psychical processes, obey­
ing natural determinations, belong to the physical
world, physical being, then, understood in contra­
diction to moral. On the other hand, there are
psychical processes whose proper cause is the will,
which is no determined source of activity, but a
-super-determined or free one; these processes are
the matter of morality, morality itself consisting
in their conformity or non-conformity with the
- rules issued by reason. This moral world does not
fall under the consideration of any theoretical
science, either positive psychology or philosophy
of nature. Moral Psychology (up to now a poorly
systematized discipline, whose best elements are
found in works of essayists, novelists, dramatists)
is subordinated to Ethics. It can even be ventured
that it is but a part of Ethics: although the moral
psychologist does not necessarily intend to direct
human action, some practical purpose seems to be
essential to the discipline he is practicing. When
this practical purpose is fully disentangled and
definitely prevailing, in other terms, when the con-

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59

sideration of moral facts is immediately related to
action, the intellectual habitus which deals with
moral reality is no longer any science, because of
the immediate relation to action; it is not a tech­
nique either, because of the moral character of its
object. Its name is prudence.
4. One of the most constant, profound and per­
nicious features of the liberal mind consists in its
refusal to recognize the part that authority has to
play in the fostering and protection of theoretical
truth. See, in particular, J. S. Mill, On Liberty, and
the already quoted book of L. T. Hobhouse, Lib­
eralism. While many liberal minded persons, on
the basis of a skeptical agnosticism, show little
interest in theoretical truth (mostly in metaphysical
and religious matters), the above writers endeavor
to prove that even if one rejects every skepticism,
the claim for an absolute freedom of thought and
expression remains justified, their idea being that
in any circumstance whatever, truth can but profit
by unrestricted freedom. Summarizing his discus­
sion on the freedom of expression, J. S. Mill
writes: "First, if any opinion is compelled to
silence, that opinion may, for aught we certainly
know, be true. To deny this is to assume our own
infallibility. Secondly, though the silenced opinion
be an error, it may, and very commonly does, con­
tain a portion of truth; and since the general and
prevailing opinion on any subject is rarely or never
the whole truth, it is only by the collision of ad­
verse opinions that the remainder of the truth has

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NATURE AND FUNCTIONS

any chance of being supplied. Thirdly, even if the
received opinion be not only true, but the whole
truth, unless it is suffered to be, and actually is,
vigorously and earnestly contested, it will, by most
of those who receive it, be held in the manner of
a prejudice, -with little comprehension or feeling
of its rational grounds. And not only this, but,
fourthly, the meaning of the doctrine itself will
be in danger of being lost, or enfeebled, and de­
prived of its vital effect on the character and con­
duct: the dogma becoming a mere formal profes­
sion, inefficacious for good, but cumbering the
ground, and preventing the growth of any real and
heartfelt conviction, from reason and personal ex­
perience.” (On Liberty, McMillan ed. 1936, p.
20). The following page of L. T. Hobhouse is
found at the beginning of a chapter significantly en­
titled The Heart of liberalism, p. 116: "The Liber­
al does not meet opinions which he conceives to be
false with toleration, as though they did not matter.
He meets them with justice, and exacts for them
a fair hearing as though they mattered just as much
as his own. He is always ready to put his own
convictions to the proof, not because he doubts
them, but because he believes in them. For, both
as to that which he holds for true and as to that
which he holds for false, he believes that one final
test applies. Let error have free play, and one of
two things will happen. Either as it develops, as its
implications and consequences become clear, some
elements of truth will appear within it. They will
separate themselves out; they will go to enrich the

OF AUTHORITY

!
j
r

i

I
i
•

j

61

stock of human ideas; they will add something to
the truth which he himself mistakenly took as
final; they will serve to explain the root of the
error; for error itself is generally a truth misconceived, and it is only when it is explained that it
is finally and satisfactorily confuted. Or, in the
alternative, no element of truth will appear. In that
case the more fully the error is understood, the
more patiently it is followed up in all the windings
of its implications and consequences, the more
thoroughly will it refute itself. The cancerous
growth cannot be extirpated by the knife. The root
is always left, and it is only the evolution of the
self-protecting anti-toxin that works the final cure.
... Liberalism applies the wisdom of Gamaliel in
no spirit of indifference, but in the full conviction
of the potency of truth. If this thing be of man,
i.e., if it is not rooted in actual verity, it will come
to nought. If it be of God, let us take care that we
be not found fighting against God.”
The idea that error may occasionally favor the
progress of truth is in no way a specifically liberal
one. Now, it is quite obvious that error can be but
an accidental cause of truth; the contribution of
error to the development of truth is but a happy
occurrence, whose regularity is not guaranteed by
any steady principle. Liberals ascribe to accidental ·
occurrences a regularity that accident does not ad­
mit of. At the heart of Liberalism lies an almost
religious belief in a kind of Demiurge immanent
in the stream of contingent events, or better, identical with the very stream of contingencies (cf. the

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NATURE AND FUNCTIONS

"Providence” of the school of Bastiat). Owing to
this benevolent Spirit of Nature, contingency and
chance are supposed to result indefectibly in happy
achievements. Wrong use of the human freedom,
in the long run at least, does not matter. Regarding
both truth-values and economic values, the Liberal
confidently relies upon the laissez faire laissez
passer system. Liberalism is an optimistic natural­
ism.
5. P. J. Proudhon, De la Justice dans la Révolution
et dans l’Eglise, 1858, Études X et XI.
6. On intersubjectivability as a property of the
scientific knowledge, see: Auguste Comte, Discours
sur ΓEsprit Positif, ch. IV; Whitehead, Introduc­
tion to Mathematics, Henry Holt & Co., N. Y.,
1911, p. 11; E. W. Hobson, The Domain of
Natural Sciences, MacMillan, N. Y., 1923, p. 37 ;
H. Dingle, Science and human experience, Mac­
Millan, N. Y., 1932, p. 94 ff.

7. Concerning prudence and the nature of practical
truth, see Aristotle, Ethics, VI; St. Thomas, Ex­
positio in decem libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad
Nicomachum, VI; Summa theologica I-II, 57; IIII, 47-56; Commentary by Cajetan on the Sum­
ma; John of St. Thomas, Cursus Theologicus, I-II,
disp. 16, a. 4-5. Let us quote, as particularly rele­
vant to our subject, two texts of Cajetan. In his
commentary on I-II, 57, 5 ad 3, (St. Thomas
Opera Omnia, Leonine ed. vol. VI, pp. 369-70)
he asks himself whether any intellectual virtue

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63

can deal with contingent objects: "Si enim {aliquis
habitus] est intellectualis virtus, ergo semper verus,
ac per hoc, non contingentium: quia contin­
gentium multa est falsitas. Et si est contingentium,
ergo non semper verus: ac per hoc, non est
virtus intellectualis . . . Hanc difficultatem
non potest effugere quisquis perfectionem in­
tellectus practici in sola cognitione ponit. . . .
Nam quantumcumque intellectus noster discur­
rat, numquam ad hoc pervenire potest, ut de
particularibus contingentibus habitum per se verum
semper, acquirat. Quoniam, cum ab eo quod res est
vel non est, oratio sit vera vel falsa (Arist. Cat.
Ill, 22) ; et contingentia aliter et aliter se habeant:
impossible est quod intellectus nostri cognitio con­
formetur infallibiliter contingentibus . . . Tu
autem, sectator Aristotelis and Divi Thomae, cui
datum est videre quod praedicta duo [scilicet quod
prudentia sit virtus intellectualis et quod sit circa
contingentia], si referantur ad perfectionem cog­
nitionis, incompossibilia sunt, inspicias litteram in
hac responsione, et invenies quod divinum Auctoris
ingenium videns dixit quod propter hanc rationem,
scilicet hujus incompossibilitatis, nulla virtus in­
tellectualis ponitur in intellectu speculativo, cujus
perfectio consistit in cognoscere, circa contingentia.
Unde, ut haec duo coeant, necesse est ad intel­
lectum digredi ejus perfectio: ac per hoc, veritas
non consistit in cognoscere, sed in alio actu, qui
perfectus verusque infallibiliter circa contingentia
esse possit. Talis est autem intellectus practicus, ut
sic: quoniam ejus perfectio ac veritas in actu diri-

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NATURE AND FUNCTIONS

gendi consistit, quae directio infallibiliter est vera
circa contingentia, si consona sit appetitui recto
precedenti. Et sic Auctor virtutem intellectualem
semper veram respectu contingentium salvavit, non
inquantum cognitorum, sed inquantum attingibilium ab humano opere, propter conformitatem ad
appetitum rectum.” In a still more explicit way,
Cajetan writes (in II-II, 47, 3, ad 2, Leonine ed.
Vol. VIII, p. 551) : "adverte quod certitudo pru­
dentiae est duplex. Quaedam in sola cognitione
consistens. Et haec in universali quidem est eadem
cum certitudine scientiae moralis, cujus universale
est verum ut in pluribus. In particulari autem non
excedit certitudinem opinionis, cum de futuris con­
cludit aut absentibus. Et haec non est propria pru­
dentiae. Quaedam autem est certitudo practicae
veritatis, quae consistit in confesse se habere appe­
titui recto. Et haec est propria prudentiae, quae non
in sola ratione consistit. Et talis certitudo semper
adest prudentiae, etiam respectu singularium ab­
sentium et futurorum. Quoniam prudens praecipi­
ens sic agendum pro republica, quamvis non eveni­
at intentus finis aut impediatur actio, habet tamen
actum praecepti verissimum, optimum et certum,
utpote consonum rationi et appetitui rectis.”

8. St. Thomas, De Regimine Principum (On the
Governance of Rulers), trans, by G. B. Phelan,
St. Michael’s College, Toronto, 1935, pp. 30-32.
". . . the light of reason is placed by nature in
every man, to guide him in his acts towards his
end. Were man intended to live alone, as many

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65

animals do, he would require no other guide to his
end. Then would each man be a king unto him­
self, under God, the highest King, inasmuch as he
would direct himself in his acts by the light of
reasoiLgiven him from on high.
<_However, it is natural for man to be a social
and political animal, to live in group ... If, there­
fore, it is natural for man to live in the society of
many, it is necessary that there exist among men
some means by which the group may be governed.
For where there are many men together, and each
one is looking after his own interest, the group
would be broken up and scattered unless there were
also someone to take care of what appertains to the
common weal. In like manner the body of a man,
or any other animal would disintegrate unless
there were a general regulating force within the
body which watches over the common good of all
the members. With this in mind Solomon says
(Prov. XI, 14) :JWhere there is no governor, the!
people shall fall?'1
’
"Indeed it is reasonable that this happen, for
what is proper and what is common are not identi­
cal. Things differ by what is proper to each: they
are united by what they have in common. For di­
versity of effects is due to diversity of causes. Con-<
sequently, there must exist something which impels
towards the common good of the many, over and
above that which impels towards the private good
of the individual. Wherefore, also in all things
that are ordained towards a single end there is
something to be found which rules the rest.” Cf.

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NATURE AND FUNCTIONS

also Commentarium in Librum Sententiarum Π,
d. 44, q. 1, a. 3; Summa theologica I, 92, 1 ad 2;
1, 96, 4.
Leo XIII, Immortale Dei. "Man’s natural in­
stinct moves him to live in civil society, for he
cannot, if dwelling apart, provide himself with the
necessary requirements of life, nor procure the
means of developing his mental and moral facul­
ties. Hence it is divinely ordained that he should
lead his life—be it family, social or civil—with
his fellow-men, amongst whom alone his several
wants can be adequately supplied. But as no society
can hold together unless someone be over all, di­
recting all to strive earnestly for the common good ;
every civilized community must have a ruling
authority, and this authority, no less than society
itself, has its source in nature, and has, conse­
quently God for its author. For God alone is the
true and supreme Lord of the world.”
Taparelli d’Azeglio, Essai théorique de Droit
Naturel, Nos. 424-426. "Society consists in a union
of intelligent beings which tend toward a common
end; now, whence comes to these essentially free
intellects this common tendency? A common end
is already a principle of social unity. However, in
the present case, the end is not connected with any
determined means in such a close way that all
minds be bound, and spontaneously agree, to con­
sider it as a necessary means; reason and experi­
ence show, on the contrary, that unanimity of
opinions and sentiments is a thing rare and difficult
to obtain. On the other hand, the good and the

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67

perfection of society pressingly requires the con­
formity of tendencies, the coordination of internal
and external means in relation to this end; since,
for lack of such a coordination, the aim is not at­
tained, or is attained but in an imperfect way. In
short: being endowed with intellect and free-will,
the members of a society must tend by several
means toward a common end; they can choose
between those means. Since diverse and opposite
means would abolish social unity and destroy the
essence of society, it is necessary to have an in­
telligent principle regulate the minds and impress
the same tendencies on all the wills. Now, we call
authority this power which binds all members of
society. Thus, authority is an essential element of
society.”
D. Lallement, Principes Catholiques d’Action
Civique, Desclée De Brouwer, Paris, 1935.
"Let us observe that the function of authority
cannot be limited to declaring or notifying
what is fitting for the common good. Its
essential role is to issue a decision which binds
the wills. Love for common good, even if general
in society, could not substitute for authority. In­
deed, the point is to determine, among the several
possible means that various ones might prefer, the
one to which everybody shall be true, in order to
secure the unity of the common action. It is the
very choice made by authority which, deciding
upon this convenient means rather than another
one, establishes a necessary connection between

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NATURE AND FUNCTIONS

this means and the common good, and thereby
makes this means to be obligatory.”

9. P. J. Proudhon, De la Célébration du Dimanche,
Marcel Rivière ed., p. 40. "The government of the
Hebrews was not, as some persons believe, a
democracy after the pattern of the Social Contract.
It was not, either, a theocracy in the sense of a
government of the priests. Moses, when he
founded his republic and requested the people to
swear allegiance to the Covenant, did not intend
to submit his work to the judgment of the multi­
tude: that which is just in itself and absolutely true
cannot be the object of an acceptance or a pact.
Man is free to obey, at his own risk, the voice of
his conscience, he is not permitted to compromise
with it: this is the way that the Jewish people was
subjected to the Law;.” Qtf est-ce que la Propriété?
1840, p. 148. (In the previous passage, the writer
has stated a distinction between progress and revo­
lution·, he means that an 1789, a struggle and a
progress did take place, but no revolution). "The
people, for so long a time a victim of the selfish­
ness of the monarchy, believed that they were get­
ting rid of it forever by declaring that they were
the only sovereign. Now, what was monarchy?
the sovereignty of a man. What is democracy? the
sovereignty of the people, or, better, of the national
majority. It means, in both cases, the sovereignty of
man instead of the sovereignty of law, the sover­
eignty of the will instead of the sovereignty of the
reason, in short, the passions instead of the Right.”

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69

Idée générale de là Révolution au XIXe siècle,
1851, p. 436. "We, anarchists, we say, on the con­
trary: a social science exists. Political economy has
stated its principles and develops them constantly.
These principles, free from any character of per­
sonality and arbitrariness, pure ideas of the uni­
versal reason, are the immutable and necessary
axioms which lead societies, first, in an uncon­
scious way, later, consciously. Such axioms, when
promulgated by the people, are exclusive of every
political convention and of every human legisla­
tion.” In De la Justice dans la Révolution et dans
l’Êglise, 1858, Proudhon states that no system of
unrestricted liberty will ever be realized, because
social science will never be perfectly rigorous and
will never admit of infallible applications. In Du
Principe -fédératif, (1863) he acknowledges the
permanent necessity of authority as a principle of
arbitration in particular cases for which law lacks
provision: "However wisely and precisely the
rights and duties of citizens, the competence of
public officers are determined ; however wisely and
precisely contingencies, exceptions and anomalies
are provided for, the possibilities of the unforeseen
always go far beyond the provisions of the states­
man, and the more numerous the legislations, the
more numerous are the litigations. All this requires,
on the side of the men in power, an initiative and
an arbitration which cannot be obeyed unless
granted with authority. Take away from the demo­
cratic principle, take away from liberty, this su-

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NATURE AND FUNCTIONS

preme sanction, v.g., Authority, and the state dis­
appears immediately.” (p. 41).
10. βη order to supplement our considerations con­
cerning the relationship between the notion of
authority and that of law, we note that if both
terms are taken in their most formal sense, they
are opposed just as the concrete and contingent
aspects of the real are opposed to universal neces­
sities. It does not follow therefrom that prudence
has nothing to do with the issuance of lawplet us
survey, indeed, the several categories of laws issued
by the human reason. We have in the first place
the natural law, which is the formula of evident
truths. The knowledge of the natural law is rele­
vant to a habitus (synderesis) which is anterior to
moral science and enjoys a greater evidence and
certitude than any moral science, just as the intel­
lectus principiorum is superior to a.ny theoretical
science in evidence and certitude.^rudence does
not elicit the principles of morality, but presup­
poses them. Now, when passing from the natural
laws, which are self-evident principles, to positive
laws which are principles devoid of self-evidence,
we observe that the latter fall into two widely dif­
ferent categories, according as they are or are not
deductively connected with the self-evident princi­
ples of the natural law. This is the way that St.
Thomas accounts for the traditional distinction
between the law of nations (jus gentium) and the
civil law properly so called (jus civile). Every
μ positive law, of course, must derive from the

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natural law, otherwise it would not be just, and
then it would be no true law. Now, a positive law
may derive from the natural law in the way that a
deduced conclusion derives from a principle, "for
instance, one ought not to kill may be derived as a
conclusion from the precept one ought not to do
any evil.”) On the other hand, a positive law may
proceed from the natural law inasmuch as it states
in a determined way what is stated by the natural
law but indeterminately, "for instance, the law of
nature demands that the sinner be punished, but
the penalty to be applied is a determination of the
law of nature” (Summa theologica I-II, 95, 2).
The body of positive laws which are deductive­
ly connected with the natural law, constitutes the
law of natione·, these laws are most generally recog­
nized by human societies, precisely because, being
deductively connected with self-evident principles,
they can be made evident by demonstration and
thus enjoy the foundation of unrestricted de jure
intersubjectivability. On the ground of their being
demonstrable, the statements of the law of nations
are relevant to moral science rather than to pru­
dence and thus are not comprehended in the field
of authority, if authority is to be identified with
governing prudence. On the contrary, the civil
laws properly so-called, which cannot be deductive­
ly connected with an evident principle, are elabo­
rated by some prudential reasoning and thus are
relevant to the principle of authority. Consider, for
instance, the problem of private property. It is cur­
rently, and rightly, said that the right of property

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NATURE AND FUNCTIONS

belongs to the law of nations·, it is possible, in­
deed, to demonstrate that the welfare of persons
and society is better provided for, under ordinary
circumstances, by private ownership than by com­
munity ownership. Now the limits and modalities
of the right of. ownership vary greatly according
to historical conditions and cannot be in any way
rigorously deduced from any evident principle;
they can but be appreciated, estimated by the pru­
dence of governing persons in reference to the
historical data that a given society has to cope
with. In short, the connection of the positive law
with the natural law, so long as it has the form of
a deduction (per modum deductionis) is to be es­
tablished by the scientific reason and does not be­
long to authority as such; the connection of the
positive law with the natural law, as soon as it has
the form of a determination (per modum deter­
minationis) can be established only by prudential
reason and belongs to authority. The law of na­
tions is above authority, the civil law is issued by it.
According to this conception, it would be a
gross error to identify authority with the executive
power, as if the legislative power would have only
to recognize and promulgate evident statements
contained in the natural law or rigorously deduced
from it. Insofar as the legislative power has to
issue statements which are but determinations of
the natural law (or civil laws in the sense defined
by St. Thomas), it acts as governing prudence and
authority. It remains true, however, that law and
authority, when taken in their most typical forms,

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are said in contradistinction to one another. A law
which is a self-evident or demonstrable rule of
conduct (natural law or law of nations) realizes
more completely the ideal notion of law than a
law which is but a prudential determination (civil
law). On the other hand, authority realizes more
completely the ideal notion of social prudence
when it deals with more particular and concrete
circumstances (decrees of the executive power)
than when it deals with more general and lasting
situations (civil laws).

11. Summa theologica, I, 96, 4 (translated by the
Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Lon­
don. Bums, Oates & Washbourne Ltd., London,
1922). "Mastership has a twofold meaning: first
as opposed to servitude, in which sense a master
means one to whom another is subject as a slave.
In another sense mastership is commonly referred
to any kind of subject, and in that sense even he
who has the office of governing and directing free
men can be called a master. In the first meaning
of mastership, man would not have been ruled by
man in the state of innocence; but in the latter
sense man could be ruled by man in that state.
This distinction is founded on the reason that a
slave differs from a free man in that the latter has
the disposal of himself, as is stated in the begin­
ning of the Metaphysics, whereas a slave is ordered
to another, so that a man rules over another as his
slave when he refers the one whom he rules to his
own—namely, the ruler’s—use. And since every

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man’s own proper good is desirable to himself,
and consequently it is a grievous matter to yield
to another what ought to be one’s own; therefore
such dominion implies of necessity a pain inflicted
on the subject; and in the state of innocence such
a thing could not have existed between man and
man.
"But a man is the master of a free subject by
directing him either towards his proper welfare, or
to the common good. Such a kind of mastership
would have existed in the state of innocence be­
tween man and man, for two reasons: first, because
man is naturally a social being, and so in the state
of innocence he would have led a social life. Now
a social life cannot exist among a number of people
unless under the presidency of one to look after
the common good; for many, as such, seek many
things, whereas one attends only to one. Where­
fore the Philosopher says, in the beginning of the
Politics, that wherever many things are ordered to
one, we shall always find one at the head directing
them. Secondly, if one man surpassed another in
knowledge and virtue, this would not have been
fitting unless these gifts issued to the benefit of
others ...’’ cf. also, Sent. II, d. 44, q. 1, a. 3.
12. "At all events we may firstly observe in living
creatures both a despotical and constitutional rule
(δ«σΐΓθτιχψ> αρχήν χαΐ ττολιτι^ν) ; for the soul
rules the body with a despotical rule, whereas
the intellect rules the appetites with a constitution­
al and royal rule.” (Politica, I, 5, 1254 b, 3). Re-

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ferring to this text in a psychological connection
(Summa theologica I, 81, 3, ad 2), St. Thomas
says that the despotic regime is that which is ex­
ercised on slaves (servi) who have no power of
resisting the commands of their master, ("quia
nihil sui habent”) ; the political regime (princi­
patus politicus et regalis) is that which is exer­
cised over free men who, although they are sub­
jected to the government of a ruler, are able to
resist the commands of their head, since they enjoy
a certain autonomy, "tamen habent aliquid pro­
prium, ex quo possunt reniti praecipientis im­
perio.” Now this is the way that the equivocation
we are alluding to takes place in the text of Aris­
totle. Immediately after the passage we have quoted
he writes "And it is clear that the rule of the soul
over the body, and of the rational element over the
passionate, is natural and expedient; whereas the
equality of the two or the rule of the inferior is
always hurtful. The same holds good of animals
in relation to men; for tame animals have a better
nature than wild, and all tame animals are better
off when they are ruled by man; for then they are
preserved. Again, the male is by nature superior
and the female inferior; and the one rules, and the
other is ruled; this principle, or necessity, extends
to all mankind. Where, then, there is such a differ­
ence as that between soul and body, or between
men and animals (as in the case of those whose
business is to use their body, and who can do noth­
ing better), the lower sort are by nature slaves,
and it is better for them as for all inferiors that

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NATURE AND FUNCTIONS
they should be under the rule of a master. For he
who can be, and therefore is another’s, and he who
participates in the rational principle enough to ap­
prehend, but not to have such a principle, is a slave
by nature.” Now a slave, in Aristotle’s sense of the
word, is a man whose activity is alienated for the
profit of a master (even completely alienated). The
reasoning of Aristotle can be summed up as fol­
lows: Whetever there is such an inequality between
two men as to make it expedient for one of them
to be ruled despotically by the other one, the for­
mer must be the slave of the latter. This reasoning
does not hold unless it be established that despotic
rule over a person necessarily implies the alienation
of that person for the benefit of the ruler. Since it
is apparently impossible to show that every despotic
regime necessarily implies on the side of the sub­
ject a state or condition of alienation, it seems to
us unquestionable that a sophistical confusion lies
at the bottom of the Aristotelian theory of servi­
tude.

13. To explain: let us consider, for instance, an in­
dustrial region where, because of the exceedingly
low rate of wages, the working population, within
living memory, has always undergone a dreadful
misery. The business situation is such that wages
could easily be raised, if only the employers would
be willing to reduce their profits. We have to deal
with a regime of exploitation which is obviously
iniquitous. Now, in such matters as just salaries
(or just prices), individual conscience is so largely

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dependent on the data of collective conscience that
many employers (I have in view a precise instance)
are not at all aware of the serious faults they are
daily committing against justice: let us admit that
most of them are honest persons, living in an in­
vincible ignorance. Those who can do anything to
better the situation, either by enlightening the
conscience of the employers or by organizing labor­
pressure, cannot remain idle. It is not evident, how­
ever, that the complete abolition of that exploitation
is to be sought immediately. Besides that a con­
siderable increase of the wage-rate, if secured
hastily, would cause harmful disturbances in the
economic life, I imagine that men of good will,
suddenly realizing that their whole social behavior
has been based on iniquity for years and genera­
tions, would be driven to despair and undergo a
moral breakdown serious enough to disable them
from fulfilling any longer their social task. Thus,
it can happen that a state of exploitation, even if
decidedly contrary to justice, should be temporarily
z- tolerated (at least to some extent) for the only
reason that its immediate suppression would cause
a great deal of harm to many persons, including
the exploited ones. This is the kind of situation I
have in view when I speak of a justification of
alienation by “quite accidental and temporary con­
siderations.”
14. This is what contemporary critics of liberalism
have often lost sight of. In the first years of his
power, Mussolini was widely cheered for having

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78

boasted of the readiness of Fascism to trample
upon the "more or less decomposed body of the
Goddess of Liberty.” It is quite true that the lib­
eral philosophy of the last centuries implied an
idolatrous deification of the human liberty. In
fact, fascist-minded censors of liberalism did not
care for distinguishing between true and false lib­
erty, and it soon became evident that their con­
tempt for liberty covered indiscriminately both an
out of fashion goddess and a divine name.

Th. Jefferson, Autobiography (The Writings of
Thomas Jefferson, Taylor and Maury, Washington,
D. C, 1853), vol. I, p. 82.

15.