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Outline of Rational Psychology

PREPARED BY

ALEXANDER A. SCHNEIDERS, Ph. D.
ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF PSYCHOLOGY
LOYOLA UNIVERSITY (CHICAGO)

WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF

REV. CHARLES I. DOYLE, S. J„ Ph. D.
CHAIRMAN. DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY

LOYOLA UNIVERSITY (CHICAGO)

UNIVERSITY LITHOPRINTERS
YPSILANTI, MICHIGAN
1944

£>?
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Cof>yri<ht I94I
ALEXANDER A. SCHNEIDERS

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Printed and Lithoprinted in V. S. A.

University Lithoprinters, Ypsilanti, Michigan

1944

TO THE STUDENT

Thia Outline has been written primarily for the
student, and we have tried at all times to keep in mind
his needs, Interests, and background. It is an outline
only—not a complete text—and as such it is, or purports
to be, a digest of the principal facts, problems and
theories that come within the scope of Rational Psychol­
ogy as we conceive it and teach it. In many respects it
goes beyond the purely formal boundaries of the philoso­
phy of mind; but, as will be made clear later on, this
Is necessary to an adequate treatment of the subject. ,
A word of warning to the student is necessary if he
is to derive the greatest.benefit from this summary pres- ,
entation. As a digest, the Outline presents the subject­
matter of rational psychology In the very briefest form,
and the student is cautioned therefore against the tend­
ency to use the Outline to the exclusion of other sources.
In an outline much is necessarily left unsaid; and, while
the student may expect further development of the various
topics in the classroom, it will nevertheless be neces­
sary for him, if he expects to achieve the knowledge and
mastery of the subject that will be demanded of him
later on, to supplement the presentation In the Outline
with continuous reading in collateral texts. Throughout
the Outline will be found suggested readings, and the
student is urged most strongly to consult these refer­
ences on every possible occasion. Particular attention
is called to the books by Father Maher and Father Gruender
Included in the suggested readings and the selected bibli­
ography. In them the student will often find the answers
to questions prompted by his reading of this Outline.
We wish to direct the student's attention also to
the proofs in the Outline. For several of the more im­
portant propositions a brief summary proof has been pre­
sented approximating to a more or less strict syllogis­
tic form. In other cases the proof is summarized in one
or two expository paragraphs. Here the student may well
exercise his wits in putting the matter into strict form
for himself. In any event, he should thoroughly master
ill

__________ ______

TO THE STPDENT______________________

ths expository matter preceding the proof so as to be
able to explain as veil as to state -his brief formal
summaries. To achieve such mastery,-we would like to
suggest to the student the method of active learning
which involves thinking and talking and writing about
the material he is studying, and not just passive read­
ing or listening.
In the writing of this outline we have tried to
adhere to a scheme of development in which each new
topic flows logically from those which preceded It.
Thus Chapter I deals with the Nature of Rational Psychol­
ogy, a clear understanding of which is Important to theentire discussion that follows. In Chapter II Is treated
the problem of the Nature of Thought, the correct Inter­
pretation of which is essential to a solution of all sub­
sequent problems. Chapter III Is taken up with the Na­
ture of Volition and Freedom of the Will. The answer to
this problem depends upon an adequate analysis of thought,
and at the same time has serious Implications for the
various problems that follow It. Having thus laid the
groundwork for a philosophy of mind,we are prepared to
take up, In Chapter IV, the questions of the existence,7
nature, origin and destiny of the human soul. And then,
having established the existence and nature of 'the soul,
we are ready to deal with the question: What is the re­
lation between the soul and the body? This constitutes
the subject-matter of Chapter V. The last part, Chapter
VI, Is devoted to a summary of the contents of the Out­
line and the conclusions reached therein.
A.A.3.
C.I.D., 3.J.

September
1941

TABLE OP CONTENTS

TO THE STUDENT ..........................................................................

'ΐ
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Chapter
I.
INTRODUCTION ............................................................
1
■
II.
THE NATURE OF THOUGHT .
......................................... 9
THE NATURE OF VOLITION AND FREEDOM OF THE
VTLL .......................................

37

THE MIND AND SOUL IN RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY .

58

THE MIND-BODY RELATIONSHIP ................................

76

III.

‘■i
IV.
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V.

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VI.

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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION . . .

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

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OUTLINE OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY

I. INTRODUCTION
A. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY
There are few issues in science or philosophy
that are more important than those that are raised
and discussed in rational psychology. Under the
influence of materialism, determinism, evolutionism,
and hedonism, the modern world has arrived at a con­
cept of man that is totally at variance with truth,
and that is wholly inimical to the best interests of
society, of law, of religion, of morality, and—
worst of all—of man himself. This is the concept
that man is one with the material world; that there
is in reality no spiritual principle in man whose
existence insures a future life; that man, after
all, is the product of biological evolution so that,
between him and the brute animal there is only a
difference of degree and not one of kind; that the
final end of man is not supreme happiness in the
possession of God, but mere sensuous pleasure to be
enjoyed with little regard to the demands of con­
science or morality; in short, that man is an animal
to whom the qualifying term "rational" is added
only after it has been explained that it means noth­
ing.
Opposed to this viewpoint is the conception of
the Scholastics and all truly Christian thinkers
that man is a rational creature in the strictest
sense of the term. Ibis means in the last analysis
that man is possessed of a spiritual soul, and that
he is not therefore the end-product of evolutionary
development. It means, also, that man possesses the
power of self-determination, and that his destiny is
not completely defined in terms of pleasure or the
gain of the moment, but rather that there is marked
out for him a future life whose precise nature he
partly determines by his free acts in this life. It
means, finally, that man is a moral creature bound
by moral law, and not a mere animal whose nature
and actions are regulated by purely physical factors.

_ _____________OUTLINE OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY

I. INTRODUCTION, Cont'd
The implications of these two mutually opposed
viewpoints are of the most serious kind. There is
hardly any phase of life that is not affected by
the viewpoint we take of the nature of man- Our
science of ethics and our system of law proceed on
the assumption that man is a free agent who, under
normal circumstances, is responsible for his ac­
tions, and thus may be held accountable for them.
Our democratic system of government is also founded
upon the same principle. Any religion that is
worthy of the name must assume that man is not
wholly material in nature, that in him there is a
spiritual soul whose origin and destiny cannot be
explained in terms of the laws of physical nature.
Society, too, is dependent upon a correct interpre­
tation of the nature of man. To conceive of the
end of man in terms of material gain and momentary
pleasure is to cut away one of the cornerstones of
society, since the unbridled pursuit of pleasure
Instead of the good is the first step towards the
disintegration of any civilization. For these
reasons, the materialistic interpretation of human
nature must be combated at every turn. And it is
to this task that rational psychology devotes
itself.
B. THE PROBLEMS OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY·
In the pursuit of the aim just described, ration­
al psychology concerns itself with four main prob­
lems: (1) The proof of man's rationality, and the
refutation of those doctrines, such as sensism and
evolutionism, that deny this fact. This is formally
described as the Problem of the Difference between
Intellect and Sense. (2) The vindication of man's
freedom, against the influence of deterministic
theories. This is the Problem of Free Will. (?)
The existence of a spiritual soul, and the refuta­
tion of such theories as materialism and positivism.
This is the Problem of the Existence and Nature of
the Mind and Soul. (1|) The vindication of Causality
in Psychology against the Influence of positivism.
This is the Problem of the Relation between Soul and
Body.

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OUTLINE OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY
I. INTRODUCTION, Corit'd
C. THE NATURE OF PSYCHOLOGY
1. The Origins of PsychologyIn order to understand the nature of rational
psychology, that is, its problems, methods and
aims, and its relation to other disciplines, it
is necessary to review briefly the nature of
psychology itself. Psychology, like all other
sciences, is closely related to philosophy in
that it originally stemmed from philosophy. Like
the other sciences,:however, it has tended to
establish itself as an "independent" discipline;
and there has always been much dispute as to
whether psychology is, or ever could be, a true
science in the strictest sense of the term. To
develop a clear viewpoint with respect to this
dispute, let us Inquire briefly into the nature
of philosophy and of science. In doing this, we
will clear the ground for an adequate definition
of rational psychology as well as of psychology
in general.
2. Philosophy and Science
a. The Meaning of "Science"
Before discussing the nature of science and
philosophy, we should realize that tlie use of
the word "science" in contrast with "philosophy"
is inappropriate, since the word "science" is a
general term that embraces both philosophy and
so-called science. The term, as ordinarily
used, means "natural science," as e.g., physics,
biology, chemistry, and thus stands in contrast
with "metaphysical science" or philosophy.
b. Philosophy: Its Nature, Data and Method
- Philosophy, then, ’is defined as the science
of ultimate causes, that is, it deals largely
with realities, or those aspects of reality,
that are not directly observable. Its method
therefore, since observation is precluded, is
that of deductive inference.
c. Natural Science: Its Nature, Data, and Methods
The natural sciences concern themselves with
proximate realities, that is, observable facts
and phenomena. The method of the sciences,

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______ OUTLINE OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY____________________

I. INTRODUCTION, Cont'd
x
therefore, is characteristically inductive
Inference, since they begin with observed
facts and reason to the laws and principles
governing them. Their data are gathered by
observation, either casual or controlled. In
the latter case, we speak of the experimental
method.
3. The Nature, Data, and Methods of Psychology
Psychology is the study of human nature, that
psycho-organic unity called man.> While it lays
particular emphasis upon one aspect of human
i
nature, namely "mind, " it is also vitally inter­
ested in man as a whole, a unity made up of body
and soul. Insofar, then, as it concerns itself
with proximate realities - mental processess and
' behavior - and uses the methods of observation
and inductive generalization, psychology ranks
with the other natural sciences. But, Insofar ?
as it deals with the "ultimates" of human nature
- the existence, nature, destiny of the human
soul, etc., - and uses the deductive method, it
must be characterized as a metaphysical science.
4. The Present Status of Philosophical Psychology
a. The Development of Modern Psychology
1. The Influence of Positivism, Experimentalism,
Evolutionism
.
The foundations of the modern science of
psychology are.to be found in the empiricism
and associationism of such men as Locke,Hume,
Hartley, the Mills, etc., who, while philoso­
phers at heart, were interested in developing
.. a purely empirical psychology. This tendency,
coupled with the researches of men like Weber
and Fechner, and the medical psychologists,
eventually culminated in the modern, experi­
mental phase of psychology.
This attempt to convert psychology into a
purely natural science was motivated by a de­
sire to emulate the other natural sciences.
And since these sciences were characterized
by a positivistic attitude - the notion that
knowledge Is limited to observable data - and

OUTLINE OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY_____________;
I. INTRODUCTION, Cont’d
the method of experimentation, it was inevi­
table that psychology should develop along
these lines. It was not long, therefore,
before psychological laboratories were being
established, and men were speaking confident­
ly of the "new science of psychology."
At about the same time, a parallel phase
of thought was developing within science the concept of evolutionary development. This
notion fitted In neatly with the positivistic
attitude in psychology, with the result that
psychology became Increasingly naturalistic
in character. What followed, of course, was
the total rejection of philosophy. The Im­
portant questions of the existence, nature
and destiny of the human mind were scorned as
being unscientific, and as having no place
within the framework of a scientific psychol­
ogy11. New Definitions
Strangely enough, the very tendencies
' that united to divorce psychology from phil­
osophy brought discord to psychology Itself.
On the one hand were the evolutionary-minded
psychologists who wished to stress the dynam­
ic character of the mind and Its utility as
a biological mechanism. From this tendency
developed the schools of Functionalism, repre­
sented by J. R. Angell; Purposlvism, identi­
fied with William McDougall; and Psycho­
analysis, whose founder was Sigmund Freud. On
the other hand were the positivists and ex­
perimentalists who were more Interested In
the structural and cognitive features of the
mind. Out of their writings grew the schools
of Structuralism, whose chief exponents. were
Wilhelm Wundt, E. B. Tltchener, and 0. Kulpe;
and Conflguratlonlsm or Gestalt Psychology,
represented principally by K. Koffka and W.
Kohler. Finally, there is the school of Be­
haviorism, which may be regarded as the cul­
mination of all of the tendencies we have

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OUTLINE OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY
I. INTRODUCTION, Cont'd
described. For Behaviorism, whose founder
is John B. Watson, is at once positivistic,
mechanistic, evolutionistic, experimentallstic, and deterministic, and its vagaries are
striking testimony- of the fate of a psychol­
ogy that strives to become purely naturalis­
tic in character.
b. The Scholastic Viewpoint on a Philosophical
Psychology
Opposed to all of these schools in the
matter of the nature of psychology and its
relation to philosophy is the scholastic in­
terpretation. According to this view, there
is need for a philosophical as well as a
scientific psychology, since man is a composite
of soul and body, and psychology studies the
whole man. This need is supplied by Rational
Psychology.
D. THE NATURE OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY
1. The Subject Matter of Rational Psychology
a. The Soul and Mind in Rational Psychology
Rational Psychology proper is concerned
with the existence, nature, origin and destiny
of the human soul, and its relation to the
body. Knowledge of these truths, however, de­
pends upon a prior knowledge of the activities
of the soul, particularly the "higher" or
rational mental processes. For this reason,
rational psychology has an Important secondary
alm, namely, an understanding of man's higher
mental powers - his intellect and will.
b. Classification of Mental Processes and Facul­
ties
The mental processes of man fall naturally
into two categories: those that are distinctly
rational in character, and which are peculiar
to rational beings, namely, thought and voli­
tion; and those which are distinctly sensory in
character, and common to man and the lower ani­
mals, such as sensation, Imagery, sense memory,
and sense appetite.
It is possible also to.
distinguish cognitive and appetitive mental
6

OUTLINE OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY

'

I. INTRODUCTION, Cont'd
,
processes on both the sensory and the rational
plane, but for our purposes the more important
distinction is that’ between the sensory and
the rational processes.
Corresponding to all of these processes are
certain powers or faculties, a faculty being a
capacity of the mind to act, or be acted upon,
in a certain way. Thus, the faculty of intel­
lect corresponds to, and is the source of, the
thought processes; the faculty of will is the
immediate principle of the volitional procesesses; and the various sense faculties corre­
spond in their turn to the processes.of sensa­
tion, Imagery, memory, and so on. All of these faculties and processes are of course
closely related and Interdependent, even
though between some of them, as we shall have
occasion to see later, it is necessary to
recognize an essential distinction. It is
with the rational processes and faculties of
the human mind that rational psychology is the
more directly concerned.
It may be noted in passing that the distinc­
tion between the sensory and the rational proc­
esses which forms the basis of this classlficatory scheme is asserted for purposes of analysis
and description in general psychology. It is
■ in rational psychology that we shall prove the
validity of this all-important distinction.
2. The Method of Rational Psychology
Its primary problem being the existence and
and nature of the human soul, the distinguishing
method of rational psychology is deductive in­
ference. Since, however, it approaches this
knowledge through an analysis of mental processes,
the method may be defined more concretely as in­
ference from observed fact in the light of funda­
mental principles of reason.
J. Suggested Readings
Brennan, R.E., General Psychology, Problems 2, 7,
35.
Brennan, R. E., Thomistlc Psychology, Cbs. 1,2,1J.

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OUTLINE OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY

I. INTRODUCTION, Coat'd
Dwight,T., Thoughts of a Càthollc Anatomist.
Harmon, F. L., Principles of Psychology,Chapt. 1.
Maher,M., Psychology, pp.1-^1,225-2^0,^59-^60.
Questions and Exercises

1. What is the primary alm of rational psychology? How
does this alm bear on religion and society?
2. Why does rational psychology begin with the study of
thought and volition?
3. Describe briefly the background of thought which led
to the rejection of philosophical psychology.
,
ή. What Is the Scholastic position with respect to a
philosophical psychology?
5. Why are the doctrines of materialism and evolutionism
opposed to rational psychology?
6. On what bases are mental processes classified into
sensory and rational? Explain the difference between a
cognitive and an appetitive process.

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OUTLINE OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY
II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT AND THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
INTELLECT AND SENSE
. A. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
1. The Rejection of Rationality in Man: Sensism and
Evolutionism
Running throughout much of modern psychology
is the thought that in man there are no charac­
teristics or activities that make it possible to
distinguish him in an essential manner from the
lower animals. This thought is engendered by
the psychological doctrine of sensism, which
teaches that all of man's mental processes are
essentially sensory in character, and by the bio-!
logical theory of evolution, according to which
man's mind as well as his body is developed from
lower forms.
2. The Problem
Thus are we faced immediately in rational
psychology with the problem: Caii all mental
processes of whatever kind be reduced to or ex­
plained in terms of sensations, images and feel- ·
Ings as the sensists claim? Or, are thought and
volition - those processes we have classified as
rational - essentially different from mere sen­
sory experiences? . In brief, is Intellect essen­
tially different from Sense? In order to answer
these questions it will be necessary first of
all to analyze thoroughly the several processes
of thought, and secondly, to, develop and prove
two distinct but closely related propositions:
(I) WE HAVE UNIVERSAL IDEAS.
(II) THESE IDEAS CANNOT BE IDENTIFIED WITH,
OR REDUCED TO, SENSORY EXPERIENCES OF
ANY KIND.
3. The Nature and Scope of the Intellectual (thought)
Processes
'
a. The Meaning of the Terms "Thought" and "intel­
lect"
, The term thought is used to embrace all
those rational processes that are of a cogni­
tive nature. The term intellect is used to
designate the faculty or power of rational
cognition.

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OUTLINE OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY

_________

II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Cont'd
b. Intellect and Intelligence
These two terms, while very closely related,
are not to be confused, and should not be used
Interchangeably. ’ Both, it is true, refer to
the capacity to think; but intellect is a qual­
itative term which distinguishes man's power of
thought from mere sense cognition; whereas
intelligence is a quantitative term which re­
fers to the degree of intellectual capacity a
person possesses. It is conceivable, therefore,
that intelligence can be measured; whereas
intellect, being qualitative, cannot in the,
strict sense of the term be measured.
c. The Scope of the Thought Processes
The thought processes Include Attention,
Abstraction, Comparison, Conception, the Ap­
prehension of Relations, Judgment and Reason-:
ing. While this list is not exactly complete,
it does Indicate the more important acts of
rational cognition.
ή. Suggested Readings
Brennan,R.E.,General Psychology,Problems 10,16,
22,23,24,25,29.
Brennan,R.E.jThomistic Psychology,Ch.7·
Gruender,H.,Experimental Psychology,Chs.l4,15,16.
v
----------------- ,Problems of Psychology,Chs.1,2.
Harmon,F.L.,Principles of Psychology,Chs.5,8,11,
15.
Maher,M.,Psychology,Empirical and Rational,Chs.
XII-XVI incl.
B. THE PROCESS OF ATTENTION .
1. Attention, Abstraction and the Process of Form­
ing Ideas
Before beginning our analysis of the process
of attention, we wish to point out that the
several processes of thought, particularly at­
tention, abstraction and conception, are not in
any sense discrete psychological acts, even
though they are logically separable. As psycho­
logical processes, one merges into the other so
Imperceptibly that it is difficult to discern,
introspectively, where one leaves off and the

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OUTLINE OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY

II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Coat'd
other begins. The unity of the mind Is more than
a unity of parts; It is a unity of action, and
the Interrelatedness of the mental processes
Illustrates this at every turn.
2. The Definition of Attention
Attention Is defined simply as the concentra­
tion and direction of cognitive energy to some
object that Is present to the mind. It Is es­
sentially a narrowing of consciousness to an ob­
ject in such a way as to bring the object into
clearer awareness., ?. The Kinds of Attention
a. Voluntary Attention: Attention and Will
For a complete account of attention,-it Is ■
necessary to describe the various forms that
attention takes. There are three kinds of at­
tention: Voluntary, Involuntary, and Non­
Voluntary (Habitual) Attention. The first of
these may be described as that act by which we
organize, concentrate and direct mental energy
to some object, act, or situation, to the ex­
clusion of other and Irrelevant experiences.
It Is, by definition, under the Influence of
the will. However, it is not an act of the
will - a volition -as such. Rather, It Is an
Instance' of the Intellect functioning under
the direction and control of the will. Atten­
tion of this kind must be rational, that is,
supra-sensuous in character, since any purely
sensory process Is determined by the causal
stimulus and the organic basis In which It Is
founded. Voluntary attention however, as re­
vealed both by Introspection and casual exper­
ience, Is self-initiated and self-controlled,
and Is therefore independent of either an ex­
ternal stimulus or any organic factors. It Is,
thus a type of mental process which can only
be described as rational, and which is pecul­
iar to rational beings.
b. Involuntary Attention: Attention and Sensation
The concentration and direction of con­
sciousness that characterizes the attentive

11

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OUTLINE OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY
II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Cont'd
process occurs at times Independently of, and
even contrary to, our willing it, and this we
call involuntary attention. In such cases it
is not our will, but rather the intensity of
the stimulus that determines the organization
and the direction of the attentive process.
While ordinarily originating in some external
stimulus, this is not always the case, since
.
some internal experience (such as an obsession)
may also act as a distracting influence, thus ·
causing us to attend Involuntarily. Where attention is determined by, and bound up with
sensation, it may be described as sensory in
character, and it is this type of attention
;
that seems to be manifested in some of the
lower animals. After all, there is nothing
in the nature of attention as such which pre­
cludes the possibility that a concentration of
conscious energy can occur on the sensory as
well as the rational level. It is only volun­
tary attention that is distinctively rational.
c. Non-Voluntary (Habitual) Attention
Besides the two types of attention described,
there is also a third type, which is neither
controlled by the will nor contrary to it. For
this reason it is called non-voluntary atten­
tion. Attention, like all human actions, can
become habitual or automatic in character, and
thia is particularly likely to occur in those
- situations where the factor of interest is at
work. In these instances it is not the inten­
sity of sensation, nor an effort of the will
that causes the organization of mental energies,
but the automatic character of the act itself,
engendered by the factor of interest or attrac­
tiveness. This is well illustrated In the read­
ing of a book that is intensely interesting. In
such a situation the act of attending is easy,
effortless, and automatic.!
^Whether such an act is sensory or rational is difficult to de­
termine. It seems Indeed to involve elements of both THnda, its pre­
cise nature at any time therefore depending upon those factors that
ere predominant.
12

OUTLINE OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY
II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Cont'd
if. The Attributes of Attention
There are four characteristic attributes
manifested by attention: Quality, Intensity,
Duration, and Range. The quality of attention
Is that character which enables us to distin­
guish types of attention, as we have just done
in the preceding paragraphs. Intensity is the
attribute which makes it possible to distinguish
different acts of attention In quantitative terms,
as when we say "I did not pay much attention to
what he was saying. " Duration refers to the
period of time covered by any single act of at-’
tention. This Is generally assumed to be very
limited, since careful introspection reveals
that attention Is more intermittent than contin­
uous, although this probably varies with the
type of attention involved. Duration would seem
to be Inversely proportional to the effort ex­
pended In attending. The fourth attribute of
attention - range - refers to the scope of the
attentive process, that Is, the number of objects
which can be brought within the field of clear
awareness at any one time. Here, again, It Is
generally assumed that there are distinct limits
to the process, especially since It Is the very
nature of attention to Involve a narrowing of
* consciousness; and this narrowing precludes at­
tending to very many objects or acts at a time.
Rapid oscillation of attention from one thing to
another Is often mistaken for a widening of the
range of attention.
5. The Conditions of Attention
The effectiveness of attention Is determined
by certain Internal and external conditions that
are invariable concomitants of all acts of at­
tention. Prominent among the internal condi­
tions are self-control, Intelligence, fatigue,
and Interest. Among the external conditions
occur such factors as the quality of the object,
the environmental setting, and distractions. Any
one or all of these factors, or any combination
of them, may operate In any situation, so that

13

_ ________ OUTLINE OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY___________
II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Cont'd
it well behooves the student particularly to
take stock of the influence of these factors in
his own work.
6. The Effects of Attention
Attention is probably the most important
single factor in learning and in the utllzatlon
of past experience. Because it brings an object
into clearer awareness through concentration, it
intensifies and clarifies our experiences in such
a way that they become more meaningful and more
completely learned. Attention brings out rela­
tionships between old and new experiences, and
in that way brings into operation the forces of
association, so that retention and recall are
greatly benefited by careful and efficient at­
tention. This whole process can be described in
one word, apperception, which may be defined for
our purposes,as the integration of new experi­
ences with old through the processes of atten­
tion and associative memory, these processes
leading to the eduction of relationships. With­
out such integration, efficient learning is all
but Impossible.
C. THE PROCESS OF ABSTRACTION
1. The Nature of Abstraction: Abstraction and At­
tention
■ Abstraction may be defined as the mental
separation of certain qualities or,aspects of an
object or a group of objects. This separation
is accomplished through the special direction of
cognitive energy in the act of attention. Thus,
when I attend to the color of an object, this
particular quality becomes abstracted (i.e.,
mentally separated) from the other qualities of
the object. Abstraction, therefore, is simply a
special form of attention. It should be noted
that abstraction can occur with respect to acci­
dental qualities like color, size, shape, etc.,
as well as with respect to those qualities like
rationality, triangularity, etc., that are de­
scribed as essential.

14

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[aij -

OUTLINE OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY
II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Cont'd
2. The Kinds of Abstraction
a. Positive and Negative Abstraction
These are two aspects of one and the same
process. In the general process of abstrac­
tion, certain qualities are mentally separated
from the object in which they occur, and are
explicitly attended to. This Is positive ab­
straction. At the same time, certain other
aspects of the object are necessarily neglected:
this Is the negative phase of abstraction. Thus,
when I attend to (l.e., abstract) the color of
an object, Its other qualities tend to be less
clearly apprehended; they fade, as It were,
into the background of consciousness. These
qualities are said to be negatively abstracted.
b. Generalizing Abstraction
This form of abstraction occurs when we
concentrate our mind on a quality or qualities
of an Individual which that individual has In
common with others. In doing this, we general­
ize the qualities thus retained In conscious­
ness. The conscious process that results re­
presents, therefore, no longer an Individual
but the common nature of several individuals,
and Is called the universal Idea. More prop­
erly, It is called a direct universal Idea,
since at this stage we are not yet aware of Its
universality. (See D, 1 below).
c. Isolating Abstraction
This form of abstraction occurs whenever
certain quantités of an object are mentally
separated and treated as though they exist
Independently of the object. The result of
this process Is the abstract Idea. Thus, mo­
tion, energy, justice, beauty, virtue, white­
ness, number, etc., are all abstract, 'torsonl■ fled 11 qualities which are Invariably thought
of as being Independent objects, whereas act­
ually they always occur as qualities of objects.
3. The Results of Abstraction
The mental separation of qualities which
occurs In the process of abstraction results In

15

OUTLINE OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY
II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Cont'd
the formation of Ideas or concepts. Abstraction,
therefore, Is a necessary prerequisite to the
conceptual process.
D. THE CONCEPTUAL PROCESS
1. The Formation of the Concept: Direct and Reflex
/
Universals.
The process of abstraction Is but one stage
in the formation of a concept. In addition to
the mental separation of qualities, there Is nec­
essary an explicit awareness of these qualities,
and this awareness constitutes the mental process
called an idea or concept.1 This simple awareness
of common notes is called a "direct universal,"
which becomes a "reflex universal" when we become
explicitly aware, by reflection and comparison,
that the qualities we have abstracted can be ap-.
plied to a class of objects. Thus, in the forma­
tion of the concept "man," I abstract and become
aware of the qualities "rationality" and "animal­
ity" (direct universal), and then, by reflection,
become aware that these qualities taken together
can be predicated of a whole class of objects
(man-in-general), and this is the reflex univer­
sal idea.
2. The Nature of the Concept
a. Definition of the Concept
The concept Is a mental representation of
the nature or essence (i.e., the essential
qualities or notes) of an object.2 It Is a
consciousness of those qualities which make
an object what It Is. Thus my Idea of man:
rational-animal; my Idea of triangle: threesided, three-angled, plane figure;, my idea of
God: InfInlte-just-eternal-etc.,-Being; and
so on. In each case it will be noted that I
have abstracted, become aware of, and

!ln the discussion that follows, the tenia "idea" and "concept"
will be used interchangeably.
^"Object" Is used here in a broad sense. It <nninden acta and
situations and relations as well as concrete things, since it must
be quite obvious that our ideas embrace more than the concrete
material realities around us.
16

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OUTLINE OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY
II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Cont'd
generalized those qualities which enter into
the very make-up of the thing represented.
b. Kinds of Ideas
1. The Universal Idea
The universal idea may be defined as a
mental representation which can be applied
univocally and individually to a class of
objects. "Univocally" means that the uni­
versal idea is applicable in exactly the
same way to all members of the class; "in­
dividually" means that it can be applied
just as well to each member taken singly.
Thus my idea of triangle can be applied to
triangles taken as a class, as when I say
"Triangles are plane figures;" and of each
triangle taken singly as when I say "This
triangle is right-angled." This is possi­
ble because my idea of triangle embraces
only those aspects (three-sidedness, threeangleness, planeness) which every triangle
possesses and has in common with every other
triangle no matter what its size, shape,
color, and so on may be.
it. The Abstract Idea
The abstract idea may be defined as a
mental representation of a quality or group
of qualities considered as existing apart
from the subject in which they inhere. For
example, such concepts as necessity, truth,
virtue, justice, beauty, freedom, morality, ,
law, redness, motion, etc., represent real
things, but they do not represent them in
the way in which they exist in the world of
reality. Thus the concept "roundness" repre­
sents something that really exists, as do
beauty and virtue, but' what exists in the
order of concrete reality are round objects,
beautiful things, virtuous persons, etc.
ill. The Singular Idea
The singular idea is a mental representa­
tion of a particular object in terms of
those qualities which make the object what.

17

OUTLINE OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.
II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Cont'd
it la. My idea of a particular nan is a
singular idea, since it embraces those
qualities which make this person the par­
ticular individual he is. In forming the
singular idea we apply the process of ab­
straction to one thing instead of to a
class.
c. Characteristics of the Idea
- All ideas of whatever kind possess the fol­
lowing features. They are rational (that is,
supra-sensuous) , immaterial, universal, and
relatively stable. These characteristics, as
.
we shall see later, are diammetrically opposed
to those of sensory experiences.
d. Theories of the Nature of the "Universal. "
1. Exaggerated Realism (Plato): The universal
idea exists by itself, Independently of a
thinking mind.
11. Conceptualism (Stout): The universal
exists (in the mind) but there is nothing
in external reality corresponding to it.
It is a pure mental construct.
ill. Nominalism (Bain, Sensists generally) : The
universai as such does not exist - what is.
universal is the name of objects only.
iv. Senslsm, or the Image Theory of Thought
(the Mills, Hartley, Spencer, Tltchener,
etc.): There is no such thing as a uni­
versal idea, or rational thought. So-called
ideas are merely blends of sense experiences,
that is, sensations and images.
v. Moderate Realism (Scholastics): The uni­
versal idea exists as a mental reality,
with a "foundation" in objective reality.
This foundation is the perfectly similar
natures existing in a class of objects.
This theory, therefore, stands opposed to
all four of the other theories described.
J. The Existence of Universal Ideas
a. The Problem: Do ideas - rational, universal,
and Immaterial in character - really exist in
the mind, or are ideas as the sensists claim

18

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OUTLINE OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY

II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Cont'd
reducible to mere blends of sense experience
and nothing more? Or, as the nominalist con­
tends, is there nothing truly universal -in
the mind other than the names we give to ob­
jects? It is the contention of the scholastic
psychologist that such truly universal ideas
do actually exist in the human mind. And this
contention is supported by proofs based upon
our understanding of common vocables, and our
ability to classify and define objects.
b. Arguments for the Existence of Universal Ideas
1. The Argument from Meaning
1
,
All of us use words - nouns, verbs, ad­
jectives, etc., - and ordinarily at least we
are aware of what these words mean; that is,
we understand them. But to be aware of mean­
ing is to possess ideas, since the idea is
the embodiment of meaning. In other words,
it is the possession of ideas that makes
words meaningful. Put in another way: Words ■
have meaning for us only when we are aware
of the nature of the objects which the words
signify; and such awareness as we have seen
constitutes the idea. Thus, the word circle
has meaning for me because I know what a
circle is, that is, I am cognizant of its
nature. If, on the other hand, I am not
aware of what the word signifies, it is mean­
ingless to me as is the case when words of a
strange language, or words with which I am
unacquainted, are used. Meaning (or under­
standing) of these words arises when the na­
ture of the object signified by the word is
designated. Thus, a word like "myoma" may be
unintelligible to a person; but once he is
told that it is a "tumor consisting of muscu­
lar tissue" (its nature indicated), the word
acquires meaning. A little reflection will
show that this argument refutes both senslsm
and nominalism, since it demonstrates that
truly universal ideas really exist, and that,
while they correspond to, they are not the
same thing as the names of objects.
19

OUTLINE OF RATIONAL-PSYCHOLOGY
II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Cont'd
The foregoing argument can be restated as
a formal proof in the following manner:
. We understand the common vocables which we
use.
But to understand common vocables is to have
universal ideas. .
'
Therefore we have universal ideas.
The major is evident from contrasting our
experience with a familiar language and our
experience in reading or hearing a language
we do not know.
,
Proof of minor:
To understand a common vocable is to ex­
perience mentally or represent to ourselves
what is common to many objects and applica­
ble to each in the same sense.
But to experience mentally or represent
£o ourselves what is common to many objects
and applicable to each in the same sense is
to have a universal idea.
Therefore to understand common vocables
is to have universal ideas.
Corollary: Thought and Language. What
relation exists between thought and language?
Are they the same? If not, is one prior to,
or dependent upon the other? To use language
intelligibly, of course, there must be mean­
ing or understanding first, so that in this
sense thought is prior to language, and lan­
guage is dependent upon thought. The nomina­
lists, therefore, are wrong in implying that
thought and language (words) are the same.
It is true however that language, like thought,
possesses universality. A word like "man,"
for example, can be applied to a class of
objects univocally and individually. But
this universality of the word is a derived
or functional universality, - that is, words
have universal applicability by reason of
the fact that they symbolize ideas. If the
ideas did not exist, these words would be
particular symbols only, as is often true

20

OUTLINE OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY

II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Cont'd
when children are first learning to speak.
This concept of derived universality can he
applied also to word-images, as might be ex­
pected since they are merely representations
of words.1
11. The Argument from Definition.
To define anything (adequately at least)
is to indicate its essential qualities, that
is, its nature, as when we define a circle
to be "a round, plane figure." But, in order
to so define an object, I must first of all
be aware of the qualities expressed In the
definition; and this awareness constitutes
the idea,
ill. The Argument from Classification.
In.order to assign objects to a class, I
must be aware of those qualities which they
possess In common, and if my classification
Is to be adequate or scientific, it must be
in terms of essential features. But, again,
in order to do this I must first beaware of
those essential qualities, and this aware­
ness constitutes the universal Idea.
The foregoing arguments can be stated as
____________ a formal proof In the following manner; _____
iThe whole precarious structure of nominalism, rests upon an as­
sumption it is itself forced, to deny. Words only are universal, ac­
cording to the nominalist. But such universality can he explained
only by assuming that these words represent or symbolize that which
is common to several objects. In other words, for a word to become
universal at all, it is necessary that we first of all became aware
of those common aspects which it symbolizes. And it is just such an
awareness, as we have seen, that constitutes the universal idea. It
is this assumption which the nominalist must assert and deny at the
same time.
Moreover, the nominal1st finds himself in the unhappy position
of being unable to explain how persons without a verbal language can
think; or how one word, such as "bar," can symbolize five or six dif­
ferent t.hlngs; or how it is that we often know what we wish to say,
but cannot find the "right word" for it. Nor can he explain the fact
that a strange language cannot be learned by the simple process of
acquiring the symbols of that language. As e»eryoiie knows, a language
can be learned only by acquiring the meanings that accrue to the words
of that language. And meanings, as we have seen, depend upon the pos­
session of ideas. On every count, therefore, the nrmri nan wf. theory
proves hopelessly Inadequate.

OUTLINE OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY
III THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Cont'd
We all classify objects and define things.
But to classify or define, we must have reflex universal Ideas.
Therefore we all have reflex universal Ideas.
The major' Is evident. No argument Is
needed to prove something attested so often
by experience.
Proof of minor:
To classify or define, we must know-fea­
tures common to many objects and applicable
to each In the same sense, and must know
moreover that these features are common to
many objects and applicable to each In the
same sense;
But to know common features In this way
Is to have reflex universal Ideas.
Therefore, to classify or to define, we
must have reflex universal ideas.
It goes without saying that the three
abilities described In these arguments - to
understand, to define, and to classify - lie
at the basis of all knowledge, science and
philosophy. The student can picture for him­
self what the situation would be If we did
not possess Ideas.1
4. Ideas and Sensory Processes
a. The Nature of Sensory Processes
Sensory processes of whatever kind - sensa­
tions, percepts, or Images - are mental repre­
sentations of particular things or objects em­
bracing their material, sensible qualities,
such as color, odor, sound, taste, shape, size,
etc. The Instruments of such representations
are the various sense faculties. Moreover,
each of these processes Is psycho-organic, In­
volving always cooperation of the nervous sys­
tem.
b. Ideas and Sensory Processes Contrasted: Re­
jection of Senslam
From the above description. It will be seen
that sensations and Images are sensuous,
lln this connection, see Moore, T.V., Cognitive Psychology, pp.
53^3^9.
22

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OUTLINE OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY

-

.

II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Cont'd
particular, concrete, material and organic In
character. And, In the case of images partic­
ularly, they are extremely variable, varying
from person to person, and even within the
same Individual over a period of time. In con­
trast, as we have already seen, Ideas are
rational, universal, immaterial and stable in
character. To put It concretely: when I have
an idea of man, I am aware of the nature of
man, divorced from all accidental Irrelevancles; when, on the other hand, I have a per­
cept or image of a man, I am aware of a partic­
ular individual as he appears now, or has ap­
peared, to my senses in the past. The con­
clusion from all this Is obvious: no two ex-,
perlences, so dlammetrlcally opposite In char­
acter, can possibly be identified.
The foregoing argument against the Identi­
fication of.ideas and sensory experiences can
be stated as a formal proof In the following
way. This proof holds equally well whether
the sense elements referred to are sensations
from objects present, or Images revived from
the past, whether they are few or many, whether
they are sense impressions of ordinary objects,
of words, or of other symbols.
Universal ideas are representations of fea­
tures common to many objects and applicable to
each In exactly the same sense.
But clusters and blends of sense experiences
are not representations of features common to
many objects and applicable to each in exactly
the same sense.
Therefore universal Ideas are not clusters
or blends of sense experiences.
The major is obvious, being a definition.
The minor Is proved below.
Clusters and blends of sense experience are
representations of.some exterior qualities of
individual material objects, and nothing else.
But representations of exterior qualities
of Individual material objects are not common
to many objects and applicable to each In ex­
actly the same sense.
23

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OUTLINE OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY

.

II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Oont'd
Therefore .clusters and blends of sense ex­
perience are not common to many and applicable
to each in exactly the same sense.
For these reasons the sensist interpreta­
tion of thought as being composed of sensations
and images is unacceptable. If this theory
were accepted it would follow, as Gruender
points out, that thought is "kaleidoscopic" in
character, that is, undergoing constant change,
since images, out of which thought is supposed­
ly composed, are essentially variable in nature.
This would make of language a totally inade­
quate vehicle of thought, since no two persons,
ordinarily, would be "thinking" of the same
thing. And, finally, a logical sequence of
thought would be impossible, since sensory
processes, being organic in character, follow
the law of "neural habit, " that is, their se‘ quence is determined by casual factors, and
not by the logical connections existing between
the objects of thought. Contrast, for example,
the haphazard sequence that occurs in day-dream­
ing (imaginai process) with the marvellously
logical sequence of thought that occurs in the
solving of a mathematical problem. Yet, if the
sensist theory were correct, no such sequence
of thought would be possible.
c. Experimental Studies: The Theory of Imageless
Thought.
Corroboration for the rejection of pure
eensism has been forthcoming from a number of
' experimental studies, which have given rise to
the theory of "imageless thought.” ■*· Such
iThe theory of imagelees thought must not he confused with the
scholastic contention, developed in the preceding pages, that
thought and imagery are essentially different. The former theory
merely states that there are conscious contents whose makeup seems
to have nothing of imagery in it, without talcing a stand on the pre­
cise question of whether or not these "pure thoughts" are essentially
different from sensory experiences, although much the same thing is
Implied in.the very statement of the theory. The Scholastics for
their part maintain that while thought is not imagery, nevertheless
there is no thought which does not have some imagery as an invariable
concomitant. In this restricted sense, the Scholastic view on thou^rt
actually opposes the imageless thought theory.
24

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-

II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Cont'd
prominent investigators as Woodworth, Binet,
Spearman, and Buehler found that their subjects
often reported mental content that could not be
reduced to, or explained in terms of, the con­
ventional sensist categories of sensations and
images. The thought content seemed to be image­
less, and entirely unlike anything of a sensory
nature. "Pure thought," "conscious attitudes, "
"pure awareness," are some of the terms used to
describe,this imageless content. These findings,
for which the Wurzburg School is well known, are
directly contrary to the results obtained at the
Cornell laboratory under the direction of Titchener. But it should be noted that Titchener was
an avowed sensist, whose credo precluded from
the outset the discovery of anything more than
sensations, images, and feelings. Influenced
by this bias, Titchener in his investigations
violated the rules of scientific procedure and
thus rendered his findings open to the severest
criticism. 1
d. Relations Between Thought and Sensory Experi­
ence.
i. Association between Ideas and Images.
Despite the essential difference between
ideas and images, they are nevertheless close­
ly associated, so much so that some writers
contend that there is no idea without its
corresponding image. For our purposes, three
types of images can be distinguished: Object­
images, word-images, and symbolic images. The
first two are well known. Symbolic images are
those used to symbolize an object, or an idea.
For example, when thinking of liberty, I may
imagine the statue of liberty.
Between each of these types of images and
ideas there occur associations which will of
course vary from one person to another. Thus,
I may associate an image of a particular trl________
angle (object-image) with the idea of triangle.
ISee Gruender, H., Problems of Psychology, Ch. I, for an excel­
lent criticism of the scientific vagaries of the experimental
sensista.
25

OUTLINE OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY______________ .

A

II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Cont'd
This is called a natural association. Again,
I may associate a word-image of man with the
idea of man - a conventional association.
Lastly, I may associate an image of George
Washington with the idea of freedom - an ar­
bitrary association. In any event, depending
upon my experience, training, and habits of
thought, it is very likely that for every
idea or thought there will be associated with
it one.or another of the kinds of images de­
scribed. It is this very common occurrence
that has led some Investigators to the un­
warranted conclusion that thought and images
are identical, since they Invariably discov­
ered images when trying to introspect the
thought processes.
This close connection between thought and
sense experience is a very natural one - in
view of man's composite nature - and very im­
portant. Thus, because of this relationship,
impairment of the sensory processes (due to
brain injuries, etc.) may cause "impairment"
of the thought processes, as seems to be the
case, for example, in aphasia.^· In any event,
our recognition of the essential difference
between thought and sensory experience in no
way precludes a recognition of their related­
ness.
11. The Origin of Ideas
The relation between thought and sense ex­
perience looms large also in the problem of
the origin of ideas. The position of the
Scholastics is clearly indicated in the aphor­
ism: "There is nothing in the Intellect which
was not first in some way in the senses." This
is in harmony with the contention of moderate
realism that every idea has a foundation in
objective reality; and means dimply that the
idea is generated by the Intellect on a basis

lAphasia is a pathological condition characterized by word­
blindness or word-deafness.
26

OUTLINE OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY
II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Cont'd
'
of sense experience. All intellectual knowl­
edge is derived, directly or Indirectly, from
sense. The presence of the percept or image
(of some object) in consciousness stimulates
the intellect to abstract the essential quali­
ties, and the awareness and generalization of
'
these qualities results in the formation of
the idea.
Admittedly, this unadorned account of the
origin of ideas would be of little help in
accounting for many of our concepts. And
this is particularly true of abstract notions.
To what sense experiences, for example, would
one trace the origin of the ideas of liberty,
virtue, justice, and the like? Careful re­
flection on one's past experiences reveals in
fact that these ideas, as well as many uni­
versal notions, are not actually derived from
sensory data here and now, but are obtained
ready-made, as it were, from other sources books, teachers, parents, dictionaries, and
the like. Thus we know what a mountain is,
not because we actually experienced those
physical objects called mountains, but because
we read a description or definition of them
somewhere, or were told what mountains are.
So, too, with Innumerable other ideas we pos­
sess. However, this is not to abandon the
above viewpoint, or to capitulate to the innatist or conceptualist theories. Far from
it. To say that some ideas are not derived
from personal sense experience is certainly
not to say that they are pure mental fabrica­
tions Or that they are innate. Indeed, just
the opposite is implied; since it is clearly
Indicated that ideas must be derived from
some source other than one's own mind. What
the statement does mean, however, is that the
accumulation of ideas depends as much (if not
more so) upon cultural heritage as upon actual
experience; and that, while a particular idea
cannot be traced back to personal experiences

27

OUTLINE OF RATIORAL PSYCHOLOGY
II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Cont'd
of the Individual who possesses It, neverthe­
less it is ultimately traceable to sensory
experiences, however far back we may have to
go in an attempt to discover its origin. Were
it not for this cultural heritage, - were we
in fact dependent upon our own experiences
for the genesis of all of our notions, - we
would find it very difficult to carry on the
business of the mind.
The above analysis does not take into ac­
count either the genetic development of ideas
from childhood, where many of the answers to
this difficult question lie. Here one would
have to deal with the origin and development
of language, rudimentary forms of abstraction,
the process of comparison, the development of
exact meanings, and so on, in order to give
anything like an adequate account of how Ideas
originate In the slowly developing Intellect
of children. But, that accomplished, much of
the obscurity of the problem would disappear. ■*·
E. THE PROCESS OF JUDGMENT
1. The Nature of the Judicial Process
A judgment Is a mental act by which we per­
ceive and mentally assent to the agreement or
disagreement between two Ideas. Thus: a circle
is round. A careful analysis of this process
reveals several distinct steps: Apprehension of
the object (circle); Emergence by abstraction or
recollection of the notion "round"; Separate
mental grasp of the two tenus (circle - round);
Their comparison; Perception of agreement or dis­
agreement; Awareness that the mental synthesis of
ideas corresponds to objective reality; Assent or
dissent. From this It can be seen that the judg­
ment involves both analysis and synthesis, active
abstraction, awareness of relations, a universal
idea for a predicate, and unity of consciousness.
1 It will be Been quite readily that this account of the «rigin
of ideas involves a rejection of both innatlsm md conceptualism. To
Bay that ideas are derived from sense experiences 1b directly con­
trary to the fundamental tenets of both of these theories.

28

OUTLINE OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY__________

II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Cont'd
. 2. The Kinds of Judgment
a. The Necessary Judgment
The necessary judgment is one in which the
relationship between the subject and predicate
of the judgment is such that its contradictory
is inconceivable. The fact expressed in the
judgment is necessarily so, and cannot be
otherwise. Thus: God is good; two plus two
equals four; circles are round, etc. In these
cases, given an understanding of the terms, the mental acquiescence in the truth of the
proposition is enforced,.and ho amount of voli­
tional effort would enable us to think the con­
trary. This mental agreement or acquiescence
is called assent, and is always an act of the
intellect. It is thus to be distinguished
from consent which is an act of the will. Con­
sent is always voluntary, whereas assent may
be free, as when the evidence is of such a na­
ture as not to compel it, or it may be necessary, as occurs in necessary judgments.
. b. The Contingent Judgment
This type of judgment is one that is based
on evidence the contradictory of which may be
true. That is, the truth of the judgment is
contingent upon other facts. Thus the judgment
"Water satisfies thirst" is dependent upon
other factors, such as the composition of the
water, etc. In these judgments the assent is
not enforced, since that which the judgment refers to is not necessarily true.
.
3. Judgment and Belief
a. The Nature of Belief
Judgment takes several forms, one of which
is belief; and belief in its turn is related
to other states of mind, such as opinion,·
doubt, certitude and faith. Belief means
either a state of mind that is founded in authority, or one that relates to probable and
future events that are not fully evident. Thus,
I believe that Napoleon ruled France; I believe
that the sun will rise tomorrow; and I believe
29

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II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Cont'd
that I can "break" 100 in agame of golf. On
the other hand, a judgment based on experience
either past or present, or on reasoning,.is
described as knowledge. The firm conviction
that may follow upon either belief or knowledge
is called certitude, which may be as great in
the one case as in the other depending upon the
source of the judgment. Ordinarily, however,
belief engenders moral certitude, whereas know­
ledge develops either physical or metaphysical
certitude.
Closely allied to belief are opinion and
doubt. In fact, opinion may be described as a
form of belief. In many Instances, however,
opinion falls somewhat short of full belief,
and here conviction awaits more evidence or
greater authority. It is then a state of mind
in which we are loath to give complete assent
to a proposition because the facts do not war­
rant it. Opinion of this kind does not develop
conviction or certitude.
The state of mind called doubt represents a
suspension of judgment, and occurs in those cir' cumstances where there are mutually opposing and
equally strong lines of evidence or authority.
In this case, assent is withheld completely, and
conviction is impossible. Doubt should not be
' confused with dis-belief, since dis-belief with
respect to any thing really signifies a belief
in the opposite.
There is one other state of mind that is
closely related to belief, and that is faith.
Faith is that form of belief that is founded in
authority. Ordinarily, the term is used to
designate a belief that is rooted in very high
or unimpeachable authority, as when we speak of
religious faith. Thus, divine revelation is ‘
said to develop faith, and not mere belief.
However, where human authority is of the highest,
■ordinary belief is also converted into faith.
The assent rendered in the case of faith is com­
plete, and the conviction unshakeable, as long

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II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Cont'd
as the authority remains unquestioned.
·
b. The Causes of Belief
While the above analysis of belief has re­
vealed the primary origins of belief, it should
not be thought that evidence and authority are
the sole causes. Our beliefs play a very im­
portant part in our lives, and a knowledge of,
their causes is necessary to employ them ju­
diciously. Besides the Intellectual factors
we have mentioned, there are also volitional
and emotional factors that often play a part in
generating beliefs; and it is from this fact
that the terms "emotional" and "wishful" think­
ing are derived. Actually, it is not always
possible to distinguish clearly between emo­
tional and wishful thinking,x because the latter
is often a derivative of the former, that is,
the will to believe is generated by some emo­
tional factor. In any event, what is more im­
portant is the realization of the part the emo­
tions may play in determining our thinking, so
that we may learn to base our beliefs on ade­
quate authority or sufficient evidence, rather
than on feeling.
ή. The Functions of the Judicial Process
Judgment is fundamentally an instrument of the
mind by which an increase of knowledge is made
possible. Just as the' formation and acquisition
of concepts extends knowledge, so subsequent
analysis and synthesis of our experiences results
in greater knowledge. In fact, this process is
necessary to the development of knowledge since
the process of conception is inadequate to a com­
plete representation of reality. Were human
knowledge intuitive rather than discursive in
character, the judicial process would be unneces­
sary. Being what it is, however, the human mind
needs the judgment process in order to acquire
and develop its knowledge.
5. Judgment as a Rational Process.
a. The Sensist Interpretation of Judgment
In the same way that the sensist explains
ideas as associated blends of Images, so he
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II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Cont'd
reduces the judgment process to association of
Images, but in this case the association is
successive rather than simultaneous.
b. The Scholastic Interpretation.
There are several factors in the judgment
process that indicate without question Its
rational nature. First of all, there is the
fact that the judgment necessarily Involves
attention, abstraction, comparison, and con­
ception, all of which have been shown to be
rational. Again, the judgment involves the
apprehension of relations (of Identity or non­
identity between the subject and predicate),
and this is necessarily rational in character.
Any sense faculty is designed only to experi­
ence sensuous, material qualities, and there­
fore no sense power could function in the ap­
prehension of relations, since they are neithersensuous nor material in character. Yet,, it is
an obvious fact of experience that these rela­
tions exist objectively and that we are aware
of them. Therefore, their apprehension can
only be ascribed to a power of the mind that
surpasses all sense powers.
This summary presentation should not lead to
the Impression that· the mental act by which we
perceive relationships is relatively unimpor­
tant. On the contrary, the eduction of rela­
tionships is one of the most characteristic
• features of the rational mind, and, incidentally,
one of the greatest stumbling blocks in the path
of an all-out sensist interpretation of thought.
The sensist can make some headway in his account
of ideas by asserting that they are mere blends
of sense experience; but he encounters an im­
passe where the awareness of relationships is
concerned. To speak of a sensation or image of
a relationship is patently absurd, with the re­
sult that the sensist interpretation of thought ‘
has no explanation of how we become aware of
these factors. The only alternative is to deny
that such awareness exists at all. This,

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______ _

II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Cont'd
obviously, Is no solution of the problem;
rather, it Is a tacit admission of the Inher- ,
ent weakness of the whole sensist Interpreta­
tion.
F. THE PROCESS OF INFERENCE
1. The Nature of the Inferential Process.
Inference or reasoning Is that mental opera­
tion by which a new judgment Is derived from some
other judgment or judgments already known.- Thus:
All wood floats In water; therefore, this object,’’
which Is wood, floats In water. Reasoning com­
prises, of course, an exercise of judgment and,
therefore, analysis and synthesis; and, In addi­
tion, it Involves "identification": the expli­
cit perception of an element that Is only im­
plicit In the previously known relations.
2. Types of Inference.
a. Immediate: when the new judgment is quite ob­
viously contained in the one known.
b. Mediate: when by more or less explicit com­
parison of two judgments we derive a third.
c. Deduction and Induction
Deduction Is a mental progression from a
more general to â more particular truth; In­
duction a progression from facts to general
laws and principles. Both Involve establish­
ment of a relation between two notions by the
mediation of a third.
d. Implicit Reasoning: the Enthymeme.
J. The Functions of the Inferential Process.
The functions of the process of. reasoning are
substantially the same as those of judgment,
namely, an Increase of knowledge. Just as judg­
ment Is needed to go beyond the process of con­
ception, so reasoning Is needed to develop know­
ledge to a point beyond the simple Judgment. It
is reasoning that opens up the horizons of meta­
physical reality, and without It, both science
and philosophy would become stagnant.
ή. Reasoning as a Rational Process.
Whatever we have said with respect to the
rationality of the judgment process applies with

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II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Conf d
even greater force in the case of reasoning. All
the rational processes of attention, abstraction,
■- comparison, conception, judgment and the aware­
ness of relations are Involved in the process of
reasoning, and therefore what applies to them ap­
plies to reasoning as well.
G. THE ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INTELLECT AND
SENSE
1. The Nature of the Intellect
Intellect, we have said, Is the faculty of
thought, that is, of the rational cognitive
processes. But these processes, as we have seen,
exhibit characteristics that are dlammetrically
opposed to those Involved in sense cognition;
and therefore intellect, which is the source or
principle of these processes, must also possess
such characteristics. Thus Intellect is said to
be:
a. Rational, that Is Supra-sensuous, which means
that it produces effects which transcend the
powers of the senses, as In the formation of
Ideas, perceiving relations, etc.
b. Non-organlc, which means that it does not oper­
ate through a material organ, as the senses do.
It must be non-organlc, since Its effects trans­
cend what any material organ could produce, as
In Its knowledge of abstract Ideas;
c. Spiritual, which means that It can and does
operate Independently of the body or any part
of the body. This must be so since its know­
ledge embraces the immaterial, the abstract and
the universal. Were the Intellect completely
dependent upon a material substrate (such as the
brain), its knowledge would necessarily be
limited to the material, the concrete and the
particular. Thus,, the Intellect is said to be
Intrinsically independent of matter. Yet, as
we have seen, there is some dependence, as In
the association between thought and Imagery, and
In the origin of Ideas. This relationship Is
expressed by saying that the Intellect is extrinsically dependent upon matter (l.a.. the

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'

II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Cont'd
nervous system). This Intrinsic Independence,
linked with extrinsic dependence, may be
briefly expressed by saying: We do not think
with the brain, but we are unable to think
without It.
2. Intellect and Sense Contrasted
As contrasted with thought, sense experience
Is limited to the material, the concrete and the
particular, and we say therefore that the vari­
ous sense powers (for which the term "sense"
stands) are sensuous, organic and material In
character. These characteristics stand In di­
rect opposition to those of the intellect and
our only conclusion can be that Intellect and
sense are essentially different.
H. SUGGESTED READINGS
Adler, M., What Man Has Made of Man
Gruender, H., Psychology Without a Soul
Muckerman, J., Humanizing the Brute
Wasmann, E., Instinct & Intelligence In the
Animal Kingdom

Questions and Exercises
1. Why Is the senslst interpretation of thought Incapa­
ble of explaining the apprehension of relations?
2. In what way are sensism and nominalism related?
3. Describe three arguments against nominalism.
What Is the difference between "intellectand "in­
telligence"?
5* What processes does the term "thought” embrace?
6. Why do the scholastics reject Innatlsm?
7· Describe briefly the implications of the senslst
interpretation of thought.
8. Describe In your own words one argument for the
existence of ideas.
9. In what way Is abstraction related to attention and
the conceptual process?
10. Why Is voluntary attention described as a rational
process?
11. Which of the three theories of nominalism,·sensism,
end conceptualism comes closest to the scholastic
viewpoint?
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-

11. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Cont'd

12. What part does emotion play in the origin of belief?
13. What Is the difference between assent and consent?
14. What Is the basis for the assertion that thoughts
and sensory processes are essentially different?
15. Describe two Important relationships between thought
and sense experience.

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"

III. THE NATURE OF VOLITION AND FREEDOM OF THE WILL
A. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
.
1. The Rejection of Volition and Freedom In Man:
Materialism, Senslsm, and Determinism.
The problem of the nature of volition and
freedom of the will is closely bound up with the
preceding problem of the nature of thought and
the essential difference between sensory and In­
tellectual cognition. The denial of the one In­
volves, Implicitly at least, a denial of the
other. For this reason, the present problem has
its origins In much the same tendencies In modern
thought that concerned us In the preceding chap­
ter. Modern Senslsm, for example, not only
denies the existence of the rational cognitive
processes, but of volition as well; and In doing
so, destroys the very bases of psychological
freedom.. Materialism, in Its turn, denying as
It does the existence of any reality apart from
matter, denies also the reality of all rational
processes, and of a rational principle In man.
From these two, and from other tendencies as well,
flows the doctrine of determinism, - the theory
that all of man's actions are causally determined
by some internal or external factor or factors,
and are beyond the control of man himself.
2. The Problem
Thus, again, are we faced with two problems:
Do volitions exist as mental facts, or are they,
as the senslsts and others claim, reducible to
sensations, images, feelings of strain, etc?
What of free volitions? Is there any such thing
as free will, or Is every act of man rigidly de­
termined by the laws of nature, or by such fac­
tors as experience, character, emotions, and mo­
tives? In order to answer these questions we
shall undertake first of all an analysis of our
mental processes, in which we will establish the
existence of such acts as desire, choice, etc.;
and secondly, we shall determine the nature of
freedom and establish the truth of the following
proposition:
(I) SOME ACTS OF THE WILL ARE FREE, AND THERE­
FORE DETERMINISM IS A FALSE INTERPRETATION
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rational psychology

III. THE NATURE OF VOLITION, Cont'd
J. The Nature and Scope of the Volitional Processes
a. The Meaning of the Terms Will and Volition
The term will is used to signify the faculty
of rational appetency; and the term volition is
used to designate all appetitive processes on
the rational level.
b. The Scope of the Volitional Processes
The volitional processes include such mental
tendencies as rational desire, choice or deci­
sion, resolution, intention, purpose, and the
"higher" emotions.
4. Suggested Readings
Brennan, R.E., General Psychology, Problems 26,
27, 37
Brennan, R.E., Thomistic Psychology, Ch. 8
Gruender, H., Experimental Psychology, Ch. XVII
-------------- —, ρΓΘΘ W111
, Problems of Psychology, Chs. Ill,IV
Hannon,----F.L., Principles of Psychology Ch. 19
Maher, M., Psychology, Chs. XVIII, XIX
Moore, T.V.,Dynamic Psychology, Pt.TV,Chs.I,II;
and Pt.V.
Sheen, F.J., Freedom Under God, Chs.II,III,X,XIII
B. THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF VOLITIONS
1. Rational Appetency and Cognition
In addition to the rational cognitive processes
of conception, judgment, inference, etc., dis­
cussed in the previous section, careful intro­
spection as well as common-sense observation re­
veal the presence in the mind of other rational
activities that are appetitive rather than cog- ·
nitive in nature; that is, they incline the mind
to or away from some object.·1· In contrast with
the sensory appetitive processes which are organic
in nature and which are stimulated by the appre­
hension of a material object as such, these ration­
al tendencies are aroused only when an object is
■^Thla appeal to experience Is all that Is needed to refute the
sensist claim that appetitive processes do not exist, since Intro­
spection is the last court of appeal in determining the existence of
mental processes of any kind. The Introspective reports of the sensists on this point must be viewed in the light of their fundamental
assumption that only sensations, Images and feelings exist, this as­
sumption leading to prejudiced findings.

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III. THE NATURE OF VOLITION, Coat'd
Intellectually apprehended as a good. The fac­
ulty of inclining towards such objects is called
Will, and the acts themselves are designated the
rational appetitive processes, or more simply,
will-acts or volitions. Such volitions are al­
ways and necessarily preceded by a cognitive
.process: hence the phrase "Intellectually appre­
hended." Stated concretely: I perceive an ob­
ject (cognitive process), I judge it to be good
(also cognitive), and then I desire it (volition-,
al process). In addition, therefore, to the bare
cognitive process, there must be an evaluative
process (perception of the thing as good), since
the will is stimulated or moved only by its form­
al object, namely, the good. Thus, if I do not
apprehend an object as good, I do not experience
the volitional tendency called desire. In such
cases, I remain Indlfferônt; or, if the object
is apprehended as evil, I experience an opposite
volitional tendency, a turning away from It, or
aversion.
2. Volitions and Voluntary Acts
a. The Nature of Voluntary Acts
Volitions are called Internal or elicited
acts of the will to distinguish them from
voluntary acts, which are called external or
commanded acts of the will. Thus, even sub­
jective acts like voluntary attention are ex­
ternal to the will. Accordingly, such acts as
desires and resolutions are called volitions,
whereas walking or talking (at least ordinarily)
are voluntary actions. These actions are char­
acterized by the fact that they are, for the
most part, objective and observable in charac­
ter. They are initiated by the will (and
therefore are truly voluntary), but executed
by the total animated organism. This distinc­
tion should always be borne in mind, because
the problem of freedom is not entirely the
same for both types of willed actions.

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III. THE NATURE OF VOLITION, Cont'd
b. The Kinds of Voluntary Actions
i. Actually Voluntary Actions
An action is said to be actually voluntary
when we expressly will its execution. Thus,
the thought occurs to me to write a letter,
and I set about writing it. The writing of
the letter is described as actually voluntary since the action is executed in accordance with an act of the will here and now
present.
il. Virtually Voluntary Actions
Actions are described as virtually voluntary when they are executed in accordance
with a previously formed volition, such as
an intention or purpose. In such cases I do
not here and now will the action, but rather
I.have willed or formed the intention or purpose which eventually results in and governs
the action. The.act is voluntary by virtue
of the Intention governing it.
ill. Habitually Voluntary Actions
Many actions that at first are actually
voluntary gradually become mechanized and
'
eventually crystallize as stereotyped habits.
Such actions are called habitually voluntary
actions: "habitually" because they are per­
formed in the manner of a habit, - they are .
facile, mechanical, stereotyped ways of act­
ing; "voluntary" because originally they were
Initiated by the will. As full-fledged
habits, however, they are characterized by a
lack of volitional control and by a compara­
tive absence of consciousness and attention.
These factors are important to a full understanding of the problem of freedom, as we
shall have occasion to see in a later section,
especially in view of the fact that a large
part of our everyday actions are of this kind.
. VOLITION AND DESIRE
C.
1. The Nature of Desire
a. Definition
Desire is the simplest of the appetitive
processes. It can be described as a mental
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III. THE NATURE OP VOLITION, Cont'd
tendency or want aroused by the apprehension
of an absent good. Desire involves therefore,
as necessary conditions, the representation of
some object not actually enjoyed, and the ap­
preciation of this object as good. The result­
ing want or craving constitutes the essence of
desire. :
b. Desire as Sensuous and as Rational
It must be recognized of course that desire
of a kind exists also on the purely sensuous
plane, as when we desire an object or experi­
ence that here and now appeals only to the or­
ganic side of our nature. Such inclinations
are sometimes referred to as sensory impulses
or appetites, but in so far as they definitely
Involve cognition of some good, the term desire
is not Inappropriate. In this case, however,
the object is not intellectually apprehended as
a good; since, if it were, the desire would be
an act of the will. Instead, an object that
excites, or is known to excite sense pleasure,
■ stimulates the sense appetite, and the resultIng inclination is called sense desire.
c. Desire as Necessary and as Free
When an object is intellectually perceived
merely as good, the will necessarily tends
towards it, since the good as such constitutes
the formal object of the will. In such in­
stances, therefore, the first impulsive move­
ment of the will is necessary - I cannot help
desiring what I conceive as a good. In this
sense, then, the will is said to be the source
or principle of necessary as well as of free
acts. However, once I realize that the desire
is present, I can consent to it, or not. If I
do, the desire becomes a free act, since it is
also within my power to reject it. Thus the
desire, originating as a necessary, spontaneous
act of the will, is converted into a free act
by my consent.

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III. THE NATURE OF VOLITION, Cont'd
D. THE NATURE AND PRINCIPLES OF MOTIVATION
1. The Nature of Motivation
a. Definition
By the term motive we mean simply that which
moves the will. This Is merely a verbal defi­
nition. Defined specifically and more adequate­
ly, It is some aspect of good intellectually
perceived in an object.1 It is not the object
In Itself, but the object as apprehended, that
constitutes the motive. In simple terms there­
fore, it is my reason for acting in a particu­
lar way. The motive then arouses desire, and
the desire in turn may or may not be translated
into action, depending usually on our decision
in the face of conflicting motlvies.2
b. Motive and the Will
:
Since desire is necessarily aroused when an
object is apprehended as good, it can be said
that the motive determines the will to act in
the first instance. But it does not determine
the will finally, since over and above the bare
spontaneous desire is the power of consent, and
in this stage the motive can be accepted or re-,
jected.
c. Kinds of Motives
The foregoing description of motivation
shows that there are intellectual factors in­
fluencing our desires, choices and actions.
It is only to these that, in strict propriety,
we apply the term motive. A looser usage, how­
ever, leads many writers to use the same word
motive for any factor that in any way causes or
results in action, thus confusing motives with
needs, impulses, stimuli, etc. In recent years,
too, the term unconscious motivation has come
into vogue, and is used to designate the
-'-It should be kept in mind in this connection that the term "good"
is used in several ways. It may mean something that is useful (bomm
utile), or something nleasurable'(bonum delectabile), or something
that is rationally satisfying (bonum honestum). or finally, complete
happiness (girrrnm bonum). ■ The tendency towards an object may be for
any one of these reasons.
^Cf. Maher, M., Psychology, p. 3θ5, footnote.

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III. THE NATURE OF VOLITION, Cont'd
Influence on actions of experiences, wishes,
desires, etc., - quasi-instinctive urges as It
were- of which a person is totally unaware.
z
’
Such factors may at times Influence our actlons. In so far as they do, the will plays a
lesser part In such actions, or may even he
entirely In abeyance since, strictly speaking,
the will Is directly Influenced only by Intel­
lectual presentation of good. And thus the
use of^the term motivation for these other in­
fluences is hardly appropriate. For our pur­
poses, therefore, the term motive will retain
Its original meaning.!
E. THE PROCESS OF DELIBERATION
1. The Nature of Deliberation
Deliberation occurs whenever two or more
opposed motives (and thus desires) are experi­
enced simultaneously. It may be defined simply as the mental weighing or balancing of opposed
motives. More strictly, It Is a process of re­
flecting upon values, prior to deciding, by
means of which I determine which motive I will
accept, which I will reject. It is an experi­
ence which every normal person easily recog­
nizes, since contrary desires occur In all of
us at one time or other. It goes without say­
ing, of course, that in many instances where
opposed motives occur, protracted deliberation
Is not necessary: one of the alternatives
might be, and often Is adopted In one way or
another: Impulsively, or from force of habit,
or after very brief reflection. But where mo­
tives are of nearly equal strength, more ex­
tended deliberation Is likely to ensue.
2. Deliberation and Spontaneous Action
In this connection we must bear in mind that
the greater number of our everyday actions are
^The doctrine of unconscious motivation has its origin in the work
and writings of the Viennese psychiatrist, Sigmund Freud, the founder
and foremost exponent of Psychoanalysis. It was Freud's contention
that most of our everyday actions are determined by unconscious
"motives." As a result of this position, Freud stands out as one of
the most ardent exponents of present-day determinism.
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III. THE NATURE OF VOLITION, Cont'd
habitually, or at the moat virtually, voluntary
actions - the outcome of usual, ordinary ways of
acting and thinking. Such unreflective action
is called "spontaneous"; and many of our acts are
the result of this spontaneous tendency of the
will. Even in many actions of which we are ex­
plicitly conscious, the consent given is only
virtual or implicit, - we do not formally will
their execution. Such actions are not free in the
strict sense; since, as we shall see later, the
conditions necessary for freedom are not fulfilled
in these instances. If such actions, however, have
a moral aspect, they Involve responsibility, since
thSy are voluntary-in-cause; that is, they were
originally initiated by the will, and we are therefore Indirectly responsible for them.
F. DECISION OR CHOICE
1. The Nature of Choice
The process of deliberation is ordinarily fol­
lowed by our acceptance of one motive to the ex­
clusion and rejection of opposing motives, and
this act of acceptance is called decision or
choice. We may describe this, or even express
it at the time by a (free) practical judgment:
"This is what I want."; and as a result I identi­
fy myself with (that is, accept) the preferred
motive. Such common phrases as "I decided," "I
yielded," "I made up my mind," "I made a choice,"
etc., exemplify clearly the act of choice as it
occurs in our daily lives. Both processes of
deliberation and choice exemplify free or selfdetermined volition in the strictest sense.
2. Kinds of Decision
a. The Reasonable Decision: One made on grounds
of reason
b. The Impetuous Decision: One made to escape
indecision
c. The Acquiescent Decision: One in which we
follow the line of least resistance; where we
• follow the spontaneous tendency of the will,
yielding to motives, and influenced strongly
by character, past experience, etc.

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OUTLINE OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY
III. THE NATURE OF VOLITION, Cont'd
d. The Anti-impulsive Decision: A decision
that is contrary to our instincts, natural
inclinations, etc. It involves a distinct
feeling of effort. In this type of decision,
our power of self-determination is perhaps
most clearly evidenced.
G. FREE WILL, OR PSYCHOLOGICAL FREEDOM
1. Determinism: Its Nature and Types
Many scientists, philosophers and psycholo­
gists regard man as a being whose actions are
as rigidly regulated and determined by the in­
exorable laws of nature as are those of the
lower animals and of inanimate things. This
follows, of course, from their denial of ration­
ality in man, and the doctrine itself is called
•determinism. Determinism is founded on the as­
sumption that man's actions are controlled by
external or internal factors and it involves
therefore the denial of free choice, along with
any form of self-control. Two types of determin­
ism are distinguishable: 1) Physical Determinism,
according to which man's actions are regarded as
functioning in accordance with the same laws
that govern the physical universe; that is, man
is a mere machine, his mental processes having
nothing to do with his actions; and 2) Psycho­
logical Determinism, according to which man's
actions can be entirely explained in terms of
his genetic or personal history, his character,
or his motives; that is, his conscious states
determine bis actions, leaving no room for free­
dom.
2. Indeterminism: the Doctrine of Free Will
Opposed to the above doctrine is the conten­
tion of the scholastics called Moderate Inde­
terminism, according to which some of man's ac­
tions are free; that is, they cannot be explained
as an Invariable sequence of external cause and
effect, nor solely as the result of character,
heredity, motives, etc. This doctrine contends
therefore that, under certain conditions, human
beings have free choice and the power of

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III. THE NATURE OF VOLITION, Cont'd
self-determination. It Is opposed to any form
of determinism.
J. The Meaning and Hinds of Freedom: "Free Will"
explained
To avoid confusion, it should be kept in mind
that the term "freedom" has several meanings,
and that indeterminism is concerned in estab­
lishing the reality of only one kind of freedom.
Thus there is:
a. Physical Freedom (Freedom from coercion or
external restraint)
This is freedom of spontaneous action and
is common to man and the lower animals. Thus,
I am physically free to walk across the· room,
and a horse is physically free to roam within
the confines of its pasture. This means
merely that the individual is neither coerced
nor constrained by physical factors.
b. Moral Freedom (Freedom from Obligation; Free­
dom of Independence)
In a certain sense man does not possess
moral freedom, since the obligation imposed by
the moral law binds with absolute necessity.
Thus, a man is not morally free with respect
to the dictum that one must avoid doing wrong.
Man's ability to .act contrary to this dictum
is a result of his freedom of choice. This
paradoxical situation can be summed up in the
phrase: He can (disobey the moral law), but he
may not. This statement, however, Involves a
transition from the psychological order (he
can) to the moral order (he may not). It as­
serts psychological freedom and denies moral
freedom.
Moral freedom, in a wider sense however,
does exist in those situations where no moral
obligation is operative. Moral freedom of
this kind pertains simply to actions not com­
manded or forbidden.
c. Psychological Freedom ("Free Will"; Freedom
from Internal Necessity; Free Choice; Freedom
of Active Indifference)
46

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III. THE NATURE OF VOLITION, Cont'd
1. Nature and Definition of Psychological
Freedom
*
Psychological Freedom means immuni ty
from that internal necessity which regu­
lates the actions of all purely animal or
material helngs. It is the freedom of
rational helngs to choose between alterna­
tives, to determine within limits their own
course of action, to regulate their own
destiny. It Is expressed in the term free
will, and it should be kept in mind that
this appetitive faculty alone Is free.
•
Strictly speaking, no other powers In man
are free, except with the freedom they de­
rive from the will. Furthermore, not every
act of will is free: will-acts are free
only when certain requisite conditions are
fulfilled; thus the distinction between
deliberate acts (actus humani) and indelib­
erate acts (actus hominis).
Psychological Freedom therefore may be
described as that capacity whereby man,
when all requisite conditions are fulfilled,
1s free to act or not to act, to act this
way rather than that. The phrase "to act
or not to act" signifies what is called
freedom of exercise, and this means the selfdetermination to move towards a good or not
to move towards It. The phrase "to act
this way rather than that" signifies freedom
of specification, and this means the power
to choose one good to the exclusion or re­
jection of others. Freedom of the will may
be said to reside formally in freedom of
- exercise. Thus, when two unequal goods are
presented to me the act of preference Is
certainly not free - I necessarily prefer
the better - but there Is nothing which ne­
cessitates me to choose one or the other,
that Is, to move towards or adopt either one,
however strong my preference may be. I ex­
ercise my freedom, then, not In preferring,
but in choosing, thus determining myself by

17

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-

III. THE NATURE OF VOLITION, Cont'd
^consenting to one of the alternatives, or hy
rejecting both.
.
11. The Basis of Free Will: The Source of
Active Indifference
Psychological freedom arises from the
fact that the will, through the Instrumen­
tation of the Intellect, can embrace both
: the absolute and the universal good. It Is
a rational appetite which, strictly speaking,
embraces nothing of necessity except the
absolute and the universal good. Therefore,
as long as any object Is apprehended as a
limited good, the will can reject It, no
matter how attractive It may be. And It
goes without saying that no object in this
life is ever apprehended as the absolute
good. The clear apprehension of this good
would remove freedom. It is for this rea­
son that, with respect to contingent goods,
the will Is described as actively Indiffer­
ent, since no one of these goods can com­
pletely satisfy the will.
In the psychological sense, then, freedom
of will flows from man's powers of abstrac­
tion and generalization - the ability to
form the concept of the good and to appre­
hend values. Given this power, man can per­
ceive both good and non-good In an object
(what Is generally called the process of
evaluation), and it thus becomes possible
for him to form an indifferent judgment. The
judgment In this case Is described as objec­
tively indifferent, that is, It Is one In
which an object Is appraised on the one hand
as desirable, and on the other as not neces­
sary, since the perceived object, while good.
Is not good in every respect. Were the ob­
ject apprehended as necessary, the will would
not be free with respect to this object. From
the foregoing It will be seen quite readily
that while freedom resides formally In the
will. It has Its roots In man's Intellectual
power.
'
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III. THE NATURE OF VOLITION, Conf fl
ill. The Conditions of Free Choice
It is important to remember that the
doctrine of Moderate Indeterminism asserts
that man·is free only when certain condi­
tions are fulfilled. The first of these
is the active functioning of consciousness
and attention. Acts, therefore, performed
unconsciously or in a state of abstraction
cannot be said to be free. Moreover, both consciousness and attention admit of de­
grees, and thus there are degrees of free­
dom, which means that when either conscious­
ness or attention is at a low level, we are '
1
that much less free. The student himself
can apply this principle to such states as
coma, intoxication, habitual acts, drugged
states, delirium, hypnosis, sleep and the
like. It is instructive to recall in this
connection that our legal system fully recog­
nizes this factor in judging responsibility.
The second condition requisite for free
choice is the power and the employment of
intellectual deliberation. Every free voli­
tion must be preceded by an objectively in­
different judgment. To the extent that de­
liberation is made difficult or impossible,
to that extent are we less free or actually
determined in our actions. This situation
arises in the case of individuals with re­
duced intelligence, as in dementia and fee­
blemindedness, in many of the states of
clouded consciousness described above, and
also in cases where one motive is so attrac­
tive that it sometimes overpowers the will,
as seems to be true with such motives as life
itself. In this connection it should be re­
membered that if a person is responsible for
his inability to deliberate, the act, while
not free here and now, is nevertheless Im­
putable to the person as an act voluntary in
cause.
The third condition for freedom of choice
is the presence of at least two motives,
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OUTLINE OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY
III. THE NATURE OF VOLITION, Cont'd
since obviously it would be impossible to
make a choice if only one motive were pres­
ent. "If there be but one motive within
the range of intellectual vision, the voli­
tion in such circumstances is not free, but
necessary.11 (Maher: p.396). In this life,
however, such a situation seldom endures for
more than an Instant, since for every motive
there is an alternative, if it be nothing
more than the alternative of not acting at
all. From the foregoing it can be seen that
Moderate Indeterminism subscribes neither to
causeless volition, nor to motiveless voll-tion. The will is the cause, and it acts
only when influenced by motives, and chooses
only when there are at least two alterna­
tives.
iv. Factors Influencing Psychological Freedom
1. Character, Habits, Emotions
Experience teaches that the way we act
Is more often than not seriously influenced
by our character, our habits, and partic­
ularly our emotions. And certainly our
power of self-determination or freedom is
lessened or even eradicated to the extent
that these factors influence or determine
the course of our actions. What actually
occurs of course Is that these factors at
times abolish the conditions requisite for
\free will. This is clearly illustrated in
emotionally controlled actions, where the
power of deliberation may be practically
suspended.~ To admit the influence of these
factors, however, is quite different from
the assertion that they determine our
every action. It is possible of course
that degraded persons are controlled en­
tirely by such factors; but is this true
in the case of normal, -healthy individuals?
Has not every such person had the experi­
ence of acting contrary to his character,
his habits, and his emotions?

-

Λ

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III. THE NATURE OF VOLITION, Cont'd
2. The Influence of Motives
We have already seen that motives by
their very nature influence the will, and
that when conditions requisite for free­
dom are absent, they actually determine
the will to act. Now the question arises:
Does the stronger motive always prevail?
This question Is Important, since It Is
often contended that action Is Invariably,
determined by the stronger motive. Our
solution of this problem will depend on
our Interpretation of the above question.
First of all, It Is certainly true that In
many Instances we freely elect the more
appealing of two alternatives, and thus It
may be that In this case the stronger
motive actually prevails. Again, it may
occur that I freely deliberate before
electing a course of action, and by this
process strengthen what was originally a
weaker motive. Here, again, - provided I
actually choose the strengthened motive it may be said that the stronger motive
finally prevails.
Finally, there Is the circumstance In
which an objectively weaker motive Is made
stronger by my choosing It; and here, too,
It may be argued that the "stronger" mo­
tive actually prevails. It Is "stronger"
by reason of my making It my own. In no
one of these cases, however, Is the motive
a determining factor because of its greater
strength. Rather, the "stronger" motive
prevails because I have freely elected It,
or because either by deliberation or by my
choice I have made It the more appealing
of two alternatives.!
1The fact that the will is basically Independent of the strength
of the motive Is clearly Illustrated in those Instances where a
motive is strengthened by deliberation. Here, even after a motive
has been made Intensely appealing by careful evaluation, it is still
within ny power either to accept it or to reject it. Were the native

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III. THE NATURE OF VOLITION, Cont'd
4. Proofs of Psychological Freedom
a. The Psychological Proof: Freedom of the Will
as a Datum of Experience
The most certain and convincing arguments
for freedom of the will come from experience
itself, - arguments that possess the virtue
of being verifiable by anyone who cares to do
so. There is first of all the fact of volun­
tary attention which, by experience and defi­
nition, is the free direction of cognitive
energy to some object present to the mind. A
conspicuous instance of this is the voluntary
direction of thought, such as occurs in the
solving of a problem. Another instance is
the experience of deliberation, and this per­
haps, more so than any other example, clearly
denotes freedom of the will, since if the mo­
tive were a determining factor in every sense,
the process of deliberation would be a psycho­
logical absurdity.
Allied to these experiences is another the ability to adhere to a resolution or de­
cision, no matter what the strength of con­
trary impulses and tendencies. It seems a bit
absurd here to speak of being necessitated by
impulse to act in one way, when myaction here
and now is exactly contrary to those Impulses
which, of and by themselves, possess a greater
determining power. Should I, in a given situa­
tion, yield to those influences, the conse­
quence would likely be an experience of remorse
and repentence; and these, too, connote free­
dom. It is not likely that I would experience
remorse or repentence for something which I
could not help doing. If such were the case
a determining factor, it is certain that in these instances particu­
larly the will would he forced in its choice. To the contrary, how­
ever, experience teaches that the final choice depends upon ry free,
self-determined election; and in this sense I am independent of the
strength of the motive whatever the source of that strength may be.

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III. THE NATURE OF VOLITION, Cont'd
I might feel regret or sorrow, hut never re­
morse. Such experiences are the most inexplic­
able, psychological oddities unless the will is
free.
In the act of choice itself, the fact of
freedom can be verified from experience.
Faced with making a choice, I perceive clearly
that I am being influenced by conflicting mo­
tives, that they are of equal or. varying
strength, and that the issue is decided by my
free election of one of the alternatives or
the rejection of both of them. This freedom
of action becomes especially clear in impor­
tant questions, such as choosing a vocation,
deciding on a dangerous operation, etc.
Finally, there is toe fact that our atti­
tude with respect to future conduct and
events becomes psychologically inexplicable
unless freedom of will exists. It would be
both presumptions and foolhardy, for example,
to make promises, or to predict what one is
going to do, or to ask for advice with respect
to certain of our actions, if it were not with­
in our power to so regulate and control our
actions that these promises and predictions
could be realized, or advice acted upon. In
brief, our actions attest the fact of freedom
at every turn because we know from experience
that we are free.
The foregoing proof of freedom of the will
can be stated formally in the following maimer:
If I have actual experience of self-deter­
mination, the will is free;
But I do have actual experience of selfdetermination;
Therefore, the will is free.
The major is evident.
The minor is evidenced in various situa­
tions in which every normal individual finds
himself at one time or another:
(1) Before choice, when we attend to motives,
deliberate, hesitate, consult others, etc.
about various modes of action;
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OUTLINE OF RATIONAL· PSYCHOLOGY
III. THE NATURE OF VOLITION, Cont'd
(2) During the act of choice, when we make
important decisions, adhere to resolu­
tions under strong temptation, or decide
on trivial matters (as shown also in lab­
oratory studies);
(3) After choice, when we experience remorse,
self-approval, etc.
These experiences, had repeatedly by every­
one, lie at the basis of the universal convic­
tion of freedom held-by all who are unpreju­
diced by deterministic theorizing.
b. The Proof from Moral Concepts
This argument can be stated very briefly
by saying that certain moral concepts such as
responsibility, obligation, justice, merit,
reward and punishment, are practically mean­
ingless if the will is not free. It is diffi­
cult to understand, for example, how a person
can be held responsible for an act if he was
not free not to do it. Yet," responsibility
is the keynote of justice in a human society.
Allied to this is the notion of obligation.
If I am Obliged (i.e., morally necessitated)
to obey the law, it certainly must be within
my power to do so. The very notion of justice
itself demands freedom of actipn, since it is
founded on the assumption that individuals are
really responsible for their actions under
certain conditions. It would be a strange
situation, indeed, if everyone were to plead
in our courts of law that they were determined
in their actions, and therefore should not be
punished!
The same holds true with respect to the
other concepts mentioned: merit, reward, and
punishment. Do we bestow merit, or reward for
actions over which a person had no control?
Or do we punish men for actions when it was
not within their power to act otherwise? It
can be seen from these arguments that freedom
of the will not only makes these various no­
tions Intelligible; it makes society Itself

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III. THE NATURE OF VOLITION, Cont'd
intelligible. The student can picture for him­
self the moral anfl social havoc that would
ensue if the determinlst interpretation were
accepted as a guiding principle.
The proof from moral concepts may be stated
formally as follows:
All moral concepts derive from one funda­
mental precept: man must do good and avoid
evil;
But this precept would be unreasonable if
man is not free;
Therefore, man is free.
The major is a statement of fact. '
The minor becomes evident upon a little
reflection; for, without freedom, to be
obliged to do what I cannot do and to avoid
what I cannot avoid, is manifestly unreason­
able.
The foregoing proofs, added to the preced­
ing analysis of the processes of volition and
the influence of various factors on these
processes, render the doctrine of determinism
in either of its forms wholly unacceptable.
The cardinal error of determinism, as with so
many other theories, consists in starting from
false premises and preconceived notions, and
forgetting or ignoring the overwhelming evi­
dence of reason and experience. The determinist argues that because there is determinism
in the physical order and in the order of
brute life, there must be a corresponding de­
terminism in the human order. This, however,
is not the case. Such a conclusion would fol­
low only if an unbroken continuity between the
various orders of existence could be estab­
lished. And this, we have seen, is itself im­
possible. Man is a rational animal, and there­
fore the explanations and theories that fit the
purely organic and inanimate worlds do not
necessarily apply in the case of man. There­
fore, to arrive at a true concept of man, and
a satisfactory solution of the problem of
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OUTLINE OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY
III. THE NATURE OF VOLITION, Cont’d
human action, It la necessary to start from
reasoned principles and experience, - not from
preconceived theories and hypotheses. If ex­
perience taught that man Is not free, no amount
of argument or theorizing would suffice to keep
alive the universal conviction of freedom that
has always existed In the minds of men. By
the same token, however, no amount of theoriz­
ing will ever suffice to eradicate this con­
viction of freedom as long as experience and
reason testify that man Is free.
5· Experimental Investigation of Volition
The foregoing explanations of volition and
freedom have been confirmed by laboratory
studies. Important In this connection Is the
work of such men as Mlcbotte and Prum, Avellng,
Boyd-Barrett, Lindworsky, etc'., whose researches
have shown clearly that the restricted view of
the eensists and determlnlsts cannot be sus­
tained In the light of experimental results.1

Questions and Exercises
1.
2.
3.
4.

5.
6.
7.

8.
9.

10.

What Is the Scholas'tlc doctrine on free will called?
How do volitions differ from voluntary acts?
What Is meant by the term "psychological determinism"?
Describe the Influence of habits and emotions on
human actions.
Explain the phrase: "Not all acts of the will are
free."
What Is the difference between a sensuous and a
rational desire?
Does the will execute the bodily movements In volun­
tary actions? Explain.
How does a spontaneous act differ from a free act?
Explain the statement, "An act, even though voluntary,
Is not necessarily free."
What Is meant when it is said that freedom is rooted
In the Intellect?

■^For a summary presentation of these important investigations and
their results, see Gruender, H·, Experimental Psychology, Ch· IV·
.
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III. THE NATURE OF VOLITION, Cont'd
11. How do you distinguish moral from psychological free­
dom?
12. Explain the assertion that we are sometimes responsi­
ble for voluntary acts even though they may not be
free.
13. Which conditions must be fulfilled before an act is
free?
14. What is a motive? Why is unconscious motivation im­
possible?
15· What is meant by "freedom of exercise"?

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IV. THE MIND AND SOUL IN RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY
A. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
1. The Rejection of a Rational, Substantial Soul:
Senslsm, Materialism, Evolutionism arid Positiv­
ism.
It should be clear to the student by now that
the several problems of rational psychology fit
Into a closely-knit pattern. A denial of any
one of Its major contentions Involves, by impli­
cation if not by explicit assertion, a denial of
the others. In a sense, therefore, the problem
of the existence and nature of the soul, with
which we are now concerned, Is simply a continu­
ation of the preceding problems, although It is
basically more philosophical In character. It
should not be a matter of surprise, then, that
our arguments In this connection should be di­
rected against much the same tendencies in modern
thought that we encountered in discussing the
problems of thought and volition. All four Qf
the above-named theories - senslsm, materialism, ·.
evolutionism and positivism - denying as they do
the rationality of man and the reality of the
spirit, destroy the foundations for a philoso­
phy of the human soul. Senslsm, In its rejection
of rational activities leaves us nothing but-a
sensory consciousness Indlssolufily linked to the
material organism. Materialism, of course, Is an
outright denial of the existence of a mind or
soul of any kind. Evolutionism would trace the
origin of whatever mind does exist to lower forms,
and-ultimately to matter. And positivism scoffs
at the concept that anything beyond the purely
sensible exists.
2. The Problem
Thus do we face the problem: Do human beings
possess a mind or soul that is something apart
from the mental processes, and distinct from the
material part of man's nature? Or is the mind
nothing more than a sum of mental processes, and
the soul a figment of primitive superstition?
If the soul does exist, what Is Its nature? What
characteristics does It possess? What Is Its
.

.

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!

1
J

IV. THE MIND AND SOUL Cont'd
origin and-destiny? What, incidentally, is the
relation between the concepts of "mind" and of
"soul"?
3. The Nature of our Knowledge Concerning Mind and
Soul
The student should keep in mind that whatever
knowledge we derive regarding the existence and
nature of the human soul Is the outcome of reason
and not of Introspection, experiment, or measure­
ment. It Is true that our development of this
problem takes its start from knowledge gained by
Introspection and casual observation, but this
knowledge by itself, unaided by deductive in­
ference, would not reveal the existence and na­
ture of the soul. The concept of the soul Is a
metaphysical one, arrived at by inference, and
our knowledge of it is necessarily philosophical
in character.
4. Suggested Readings
'
Brennan, R.E., General Psychology, Problems 22, ?8.
-------------------- , Thomistic Psychology, Chs. 1, 12.
Gruender, H., Problems of Psychology, Chs. 5, 6* 7·
Maher, M., Psychology, Chs. XXI - XXVI incl.
B. INTERPRETATIONS OF THE MIND
1. The Senslst-Structurallst Theory: Mind and Cons­
ciousness
According to this view, championed by Tltchener and his followers, mind is merely the sum, or
structured totality, of those processes ordinarily
referred to as "conscious." Mind, we are told, is
structured consciousness. This "structuration" of
the mind Is accomplished through the mechanisms of
association working on accumulated experience. It
will be seen from this that the structuralist em­
ploys the same principle of explanation - associ­
ation - whether he 1s dealing with mental processes
or with the mind itself.
2. The Functionalist-Evolutionist Theory
This theory takes the stand that mind is the
product of a long process of evolution from lower
forms, and is regarded as a functioning totality
of conscious processes by means of which an indi­
vidual, human or animal, responds adaptively to
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OUTLINE-OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY
r. THE MIND AND SOUL Cont'd
Its environment. It stresses what the mind does-'
that is, its function - rather than what it is.
Chief among the exponents of this view is Angell,
whose-viewpoint has gained many adherents among
the rank and file of psychologists.
3. The Psychoanalytic View: Mind and Psyche
The psychoanalysts extend the concept of mind
to include not only conscious processes, hut un­
conscious ones as well. Since the terms mind and
consciousness are so nearly identical, the ana­
lysts adopt the term psyche, employing it to mean
the totality of conscious and unconscious pro­
cesses by means of which an individual responds
to his environment. The term is often used by
these writers as a substitute for both mind and
soul, although they do not mean to imply that
the psyche is a substantial, immaterial princi­
ple. Like the preceding view, the psychoanalytic
Interpretation is based on evolutionary principles.
'I. The Scholastic Position
Scholastics mean by mind, not a mere sum of
processes, but the ultimate principle by which
we feel, sense, think and will; the root and the
source of the conscious processes. This princi­
ple is shown to be distinct from the acts which
it produces. It is also shown to be a substan­
tial, immaterial principle, which has its origin
in a creative act of God, and which is destined
for immortality. Our task will be to explain
and prove these several assertions, and thereby
refute all the non-Scholastic theories.
C. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MIND AND SOUL
These two notions, while not altogether identi­
cal, are very closely allied; It is well to dis­
tinguish them carefully. Let us express it this
way: The concept of mind has its origin in the
attempt to answer the question, What is the ulti­
mate source of our sensations, images, feelings,
thoughts, volitions, etc., that is, of our con­
scious life? The concept of soul, on the other
hand, originates in the answer to the question:
What is the ultimate source in man of all living

60

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r “

......... Σ'.

.. J..·:..i.~-,Γ,·f,.....

OUTLINE OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY

iv. THE MIND AND SOUL Cont’d
activities? What la the principle, not only of
his conscious processes, but of those that are
purely vegetative as well? Thus, the mind is re­
garded as the source of those vital activities
which are distinctly mental in character, while
the soul Is thought of as the source of all vital
activities, mental and non-mental alike. Careful
analysis will reveal, therefore, that soul and
mind, while conceptually or logically distinguish­
able, are not distinct In reality. There are not
two vital principles in man,- a soul and a mind but rather the mind is the soul acting at a psychi­
cal level. We may conclude, therefore, that the
terms mind and soul, when used to signify the
ultimate source of mental life, are synonymous.
This interpretation will enable us to dispense
with the dual terminology in future discussion.
D. THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF THE SOOL
1. The Existence of the Soul: Materialism and
Vitalism
According to materialists, all reality Is
fundamentally material in character, and all
processes, living and non-living, mental and
bodily, are explainable in terms of the purely
physical and chemical properties of matter. For
materialists, therefore, the problem of the
existence and nature of the soul does not exist.
The modern school of Behaviorism is an outstand­
ing example within psychology of this viewpoint,
since it denies the very existence of conscious­
ness and the soul along with it.
Opposed to this theory is the view that all
living things - plants, animals, and man - are
differentiated from non-living things by the
possession and manifestation of properties and
activities that cannot be ultimately explained
in terms of merely physical and chemical energies.
Thus, at the organic or vegetative level, there
are the processes of nutrition, growth, and re­
production; at the sentient level are the activi­
ties of sensation, imagination, feeling, etc.;
and at the supra-sensuous level are the processes
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IV. THE MIND AND SOOL, Cont'd
of rational thought and volition. It la these
distinctly vital aotlvltlea that lie at the haaia
of the contention that In all living thlnga
there la a apeolal principle that la auperlor
to the chemical and physical properties of In< organic matter. It Is thia vital principle
which la designated by the term "soul," which in
plants is vegetative, In animals Is sentient,
and in man Is rational In nature.
On what grounds do we assert the existence of
such a distinct vital principle In man? On the
best grounds possible, namely, that every effect
must have an adequate cause. Non-living matter
cannot be an adequate cause of living processes,
and therefore, to account for the vital activi­
ties we have described above, we assert that be­
sides the material principle In living things
there exists also a vital principle which is the
source of the distinctly vital activities mani­
fested In all living things including man. This
tells us nothing of the ultimate nature of the
vital principle - whether It is simple or ex­
tended, material or Immaterial - but It does tell
us that such a principle must of necessity exist.
2. The Unicity of the Human Soul
Some earlier writers, because of the differ­
ent kinds of living activities In man, inclined
to the view that there Is more than one such
vital principle or soul in man. Scholastics,
however, and vltalists generally, are agreed
that there Is in man but one actuating principle,
the rational soul, which is the source of all
vital activities whether of a vegetative, senti­
ent or rational nature. In other words, the
three types of activities In man do not demand
but rather exclude a plurality of souls. This ·
can be seen from the Interrelatedness and mutual
interdependence of all vital activities In man.
For example, disturbances in digestion (vegeta­
tive function) can cause emotional disfunction
(mental function); worry, In turn, can disrupt
bodily efficiency; thought (rational function)
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IV. THE MIND AND SOUL, Cont'd
Is dependent upon sensation (sensory function);
image can be compared with idea; will can direct
the process of thought; and so on. Obviously,
if these several processes originated in distinct
principles such Interrelatedness would be impos­
sible, and we are thus forced to the conclusion
that the rational, sentient, and vegetative
processes in man originate in one principle, and
that is the rational soul. This is saying no
more than that the human soul subsumes the func­
tions which, at lower stages of life, are acti­
vated by the vegetative and sentient souls.
J. The Soul as a Substantial Principle
The question of the substantiality of the
soul is crucial since it is this characteristic
that is denied, implicitly or explicitly, by all
those who assert that the mind is nothing more
than the sum of conscious processes. Moreover,
unless it can be shown that the soul is substan­
tial, it is impossible to prove from philosophy
either its continued identity or its immortal­
ity. 1
a. The Concept of Substance: Its Meaning and
Validity
Substance is defined as that which exists in
sa, or that which subsists in itself. It stands
in contrast to accident, which is defined as
that which of its nature inheres in something
else as in a subject of inhesion. Thus, such
qualities as color, taste, shape, size, etc.,
are accidents, and that in which they inhere is
called substance. Substance must not be thought
of as an inner core or substrate which would be
revealed if only the accidents could be removed
iThe denial of a substantial mind is an inevitable result of the
trend towards positivism in psychology. The concept of substance
being metaphysical, and therefore beyond the pale of observational
science, the positivist in psychology regards "mind" as being con­
stituted of that which is observable, end that of course is the men­
tal processes. Since, therefore, mental processes are by nature ac­
cidental, this view leads Ineluctibly to a denial of mind aa sub­
stance. The doctrine of structuralism is perhaps the most systematic
expression of this viewpoint, which claims many adherents annng ail
classes of psychologists.

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IV. THE MIND AND'SOUL, Cont'd
from the object. The thing itself is substan­
tial (the tree, horse, man, water, etc.), and
the qualities or properties which it exhibits
are the accidents, these qualities being logi­
cally separable but never all actually separated
from the subject in which they inhere. What is
known by observation, therefore, are these acci­
dents, and from them we pass on to a knowledge .
of the substance. Substance, then, is an object
of thought, not of Immediate sense experience,
and is known by means of inference rather than ■
by direct observation.1
b. Proof of the Substantiality of the Soul
Whatever exists must in the last analysis
either subsist in itself or Inhere in another being, that is, it must be substantial or acci­
dental in nature. Now since it is the nature
of mental processes to be accidental - to re­
quire something in which to Inhere - the soul
Itself must be substantial. Our ideas, judg­
ments, inferences, volitions are not "self­
existing" things, nor do they subsist in each
other - they necessarily presuppose a subject
of which they are the modifications, just as
color or shape require something in which to
inhere. We implicitly recognize this fact in
everyday conversation when we say, for example,
"I have an idea" or "The thought preyed on his
mind. " Herein is implied the distinction be­
tween the thinker and the thinking process
itself, between the mind as a subject of in­
hesion, and the thought as something inhering
in the mind. Philosophic reasoning bears out
this common-sense distinction.
Moreover, mental processes are acts and thus
require for their production a principle that
is substantial in nature. It is Inconceivable
that an accident could cause itself or be the
*This point requires special emphasis. One must be careful al­
ways to distinguish between substance and substantial thing. The
latter, of course, may be observable; whereas substance as such is
known only by inference.

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IV. THE MIND AND SOUL, Coat'd
adequate cause of other accidents. Therefore,
mental acts, like all Other activities, must
proceed from a cause that Is substantial In
nature.
c. The Soul as Incomplete Substance
A complete substance Is defined as one which
of its nature Is not ordained to form part of a
natural unit of a higher order; whereas an In­
complete substance Is one so ordained. Thus, a
human being is a complete substance, whereas the
soul Is an Incomplete substance since It Is or­
dained to form with the body a unit of a higher
order - the human person. The body, therefore,
Is also an Incomplete substance In this sense.
Both body and soul are real substances, not
accidents, but each requires the other for com­
pleteness: the body without the soul Is life­
less, a mere unstable aggregate of non-living
substances; the soul without the body cannot
function on the vegetative or sensory levels.
4. The Permanent Identity of the Soul
a. The Concept of Identity
Many psychologists, adherelng to the con­
cept of mind as a sum of mental processes, have
been led to question or deny the continuing
Identity or essential sameness of the mind,
since It Is quite obvious that mental phenomena
are constantly undergoing change. This stand­
point, therefore, Is a natural corollary of the
denial of mind as a substance, although it
should not be Inferred from this that substan­
tiality and Identity are essential to each
other. Substances do change, and are therefore
deprived of their identity In some instances.
But in the case of the human soul It Is, argued
that, besides being substantial, it Is a being
that remains essentially the same throughout
the unceasing changes of consciousness.
b. Proof of the Identity of the Soul
That the soul or mind continues the same
throughout life Is attested by many facts. The
simplest act of reflection reveals clearly the
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IV. THE MIND AND SOUL, Cont'd
distinction between.the constantly changing
mental processes and the mind or subject that
remains the same throughout these changes.
Again, the processes of judgment, reasoning and
volition are possible only to an agent that per­
sists the same during the progression from sub­
ject to predicate, from premise to conclusion,
or from one motive to smother. Particularly Is
this true In acts of recollection, whereby the
past Is telescoped Into the present. Such an
act Is possible only because the experience
which is’here and now reinstated In conscious­
ness occurred originally as a modification of
the self-same, identical agent who now recog­
nizes It as his own. The facts of memory are
inexplicable apart from the assumption of a
continually abiding mind.
Were the mind, then, merely a succession of
conscious processes, such identity would be im­
possible, so that the question of identity Is
closely bound up with the problem of substan­
tiality. Moreover, were the body regarded as
the substantial principle in which these proc­
esses Inhere, Identity would again be precluded
since It Is a well-known fact that the material
part of man’s nature Is constantly changing; and
from this we may conclude that not only Is the
mind substantial, but It Is a reality that can­
not be Identified with the organic part of man's
nature.
The Importance of this characteristic of
mind cannot be overestimated. Our ability to
remember, to reflect, to plan our future, to
\
hold fast to the hope of a future life - all of
these depend upon the continuing identity of
the mind. Arguments to the contrary notwith­
standing, the conviction of personal identity
Is rooted deeply In the minds of all men - even
those who argue against it.
5. The Simplicity and Indivisibility of the Soul
a. The Nature of Simplicity
To describe a thing as simple is to say that
it is not made up either of spatial parts
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IV. THE MIND AND SOUL, Cont'd
(quantitative simplicity), or constituent
principles (entltatlve simplicity) of any kind;
that It Is, therefore, unextended. Such an
object Is of course Indivisible, since to be
divisible a thing must first have parts into
which It can be divided. When reference is
made In every-day speech to the "immense com­
plexity" of the human mind, this is not to be
taken as a denial of simplicity, but merely
as a reference to the-diverse ways in which
mind expresses Itself, and to the interre­
latedness of the many mental processes.
b. Proof of the Soul's Simplicity
The fact that the soul is not composite,
but is both quantitatively and essentially
simple, is derived from the unity of conscious­
ness, and from the nature of the mental pro­
cesses themselves. First of all, it is an in­
contestable fact that all processes of mind
appear as modes of one being. Now this being
must be Indivisible, since If it were com­
posite, mental states would appear as discrete
bits of consciousness, quite as unrelated,
disconnected and uhlntegrat'ed as are the sepa­
rate consciousnesses of individuals in a crowd.
It is the ability of mind to bring unity into
the multiplicity of conscious processes that
establishes beyond doubt its essential Indi­
visibility. If a composite substance (as, for
example, the brain) were the ultimate subject,
and. not merely the "tool" of consciousness,
such unity would be impossible.
This fact of simplicity Is borne out also
by a consideration of mental processes. Ideas,
for example, are of their nature simple, indi­
visible acts, since it Is Impossible that they
should be In any way extended. And therefore,
in view of the dictum that an effect must be
proportionate to its cause, it must be that the
source of these processes is Itself simple and
indivisible. Again, the acts of judgment,
Inference and choice are possible only to an
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IV. THE MIND AND SOUL, Cont’d
Indivisible being. Were the mind a composite
entity, the two terms of the judgment, infer­
ence, or volition would then occur as modifi­
cations of discrete parts, and any assent, con­
clusion or decision would be as impossible as
would be the case were the two terms experi­
enced by different minds. To form a judgment,
it is necessary that the terms be simultane­
ously apprehended by one indivisible agent,
and the same holds true for inference and
choice. This is what is meant by the unity of
consciousness, and of its very nature it de­
mands indivisibility in the principle of con­
sciousness.
6. The Spirituality of the Human Soul
s
a. The Nature of Spirituality
To define a being as spiritual is to signi­
fy that in its existence and at least in some
of its activities it is Independent of matter.
As for the hüman soul; it is contended that in
its existence, and in some of its operations,
it must be regarded as independent of the body
and that it is therefore spiritual in nature.
b. Proof of the Spirituality of the Soul
That the soul is intrinsically independent
of matter in some of its operations follows
from what was said previously of the nature of
thought and of the intellect, since the intel­
lect is simply a power of the soul. There it
was pointed out that thought is immaterial in
character, and as such it must be produced in­
dependently of matter. The power to apprehend
abstract and universal ideas, to grasp neces­
sary truths, to apprehend relations, and above
all, the power of self-conscious reflection,
are all non-organic in character, utterly op­
posed in nature to the properties of matter.
Such obviously immaterial processes could not
proceed from a material agent, since an effect
can never transcend its cause; and therefore
the soul, which is the agent of thought, must
itself be immaterial in nature.

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IV. THE MIND AND SOUL, Cont’d'
Volition, too, can be shown to be intrins­
ically independent of matter. Man oan desire
and choose immaterial goods, a power no pure­
ly material being possesses. Moreover, if
the soul were not of its nature independent
of matter, free volitions would be impossible,
for an agent Intrinsically dependent on mat­
ter would be subject to the laws governing
matter, and all acts of the will would· thus
be reduced to a mechanical sequence of cause
and effect. Free will is possible only to an
agent that can transcend the limitations im­
posed on material things by the laws of
nature; so that spirituality of the soul 1s
as much a fact as Is freedom of the will.
We see then that the human soul, as the
agent of thought and volition, acts Independ­
ently of matter (the body); and for a being
to act Independently of matter in any way at
all, it must be Intrinsically independent of
matter In Its existence. It Is Inconceivable
that a being immersed in, or identified with,
matter could ever act independently of it.
Thus, our only conclusion can be that the soul
is a spiritual substance.
E. THE ORIGIN OR THE HUMAN SOUL
1. The Evolutionist Interpretation of the Origin of
"Mind"
To avoid confusion in this discussion of the
origin of the human soul, it should be kept in
mind that the terms "mind" and "soul" are not
used synonymously by non-Scholastic writers
generally. Ron them, as we have seen, the mind
Is nothing more than a structured totality of
conscious processes, and the soul a metaphysical
concept or reality which they do not discuss,
ecause of this distinction the problem of the
origin of the mind (as defined by these writers)
®different from the question of the orlSOU1 '(conceived as a substantial and
nrmn θΓ
reallty)· Since, however, these two
ep s are closely related, a discussion of
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IV. THE MIND AND SOUL, Cont'd
non-Scholastic theories of the origin of the mind may well serve as a preface to a discussion of
the Scholastic view of the origin of the human
soul.
According to the evolutionist viewpoint the
human mind is evolved from lower forms of con- sclousness, just as the body in their view Is
evolved from simpler, organic structures. It
does not, for them, differ In nature from the
animal mind, hut only In degree of complexity ,
and organization. More recently, the obvious
difference between animal and human minds Is
accounted for by the principle of emergent evo. lutlon, according to which each higher form of ‘
mind Is a new "emergent" which, while derived
from lower forms, Is nevertheless not contained
formally in them. Instead, it is thought that
the laws of organization governing the general
process of evolution produce a new element - an
emergent - which cannot be wholly accounted for
In terms of the structures and functions that
preceded It. While a distinct improvement over
the older evolutionary concepts, this Interpre­
tation Is yet Inadequate to account for the ori­
gin of human minds, since, as we have shown, the
human mind is an Immaterial substance. It must
be quite obvious that no degree of organization
or complexity can work to bring a rational. Im­
material substance out of something that is purely
organic and material.
2. Panpsychism and Psychic Monism
Allied to the above theories are the concepts
of panpsychlsm and psychic monism. According to
the former all reality, whether organic or In­
organic, has a psychic quality to it; while the
latter notion means that, ultimately, there is
>
nothing but psychic reality. Both of these
theories represent attempts to account for the
mentalistlc element in both animals and man; and
both are discredited on the simple grounds that
they contradict both experience and reason. The
difficulty In all these views flows from an

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IV. THE MIND AND SOUL, Cont'd
attempt to apply the theory of evolution to
facts of the mental order - an application
which the facts do not warrant.
J. The Scholastic Position
The Scholastic starts, It will he recalled,
by postulating for all living things a vital
principle distinct from the physical and
chemical properties of matter. What la the
source of this principle? In lower forms,
It Is educed from the matter in which it ap­
pears, and in man it is produced by a special
creative act. This creative act becomes ne­
cessary in the case of man's soul because any
form of generationlsm Is precluded by the dis­
tinguishing characteristics of the human soul,
Its spirituality precludes both material generatlon by the parents, and evolution or eductlon from lower material forms, since an effeet cannot be greater than Its cause, Its
simplicity makes Impossible a generation of
the soul from the souls of the parents in the
manner, for example, that the body Is gener­
ated from the parental cells, for the simple
reason that the parents' souls are themselves
simple, and therefore could not generate a new
soul. To account, then, for the origin of the
human soul, the Scholastics argue that It Is
brought into existence by a special creative
act of God, Who accepts the Initial formation
of the body (l.e., the fusion of the germ
cells) as a condition for the creation of a
human soul.
F. THE DESTINY OF THE HUMAN SOUL: THE PROBLEM OF
IMMORTALITY
The characteristics of the human soul dis­
cussed in the preceding pages enable us to gain
some insight into its destiny, although it
should be noted that psychology by Itself can­
not give a final and complete answer to this
question. Appeal must be made at times to both

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-

IV. THE MIND AND SOUL, Cont'd
natural theology and revealed religion, since the
question of the unending existence of the soul is
inseparably bound up with the existence and nature
of God, and a clear understanding of the relations
of God to man. However, by a careful considera­
tion of the nature and characteristics of the soul,
It Is possible to adduce several clear-cut argu­
ments for the continued existence of the soul
after the death of the body.
1. The Ontological Argument
This argument, deduced from the nature of the
soul as a simple, spiritual substance, can be
stated very briefly. Whatever ceases to exist
perishes either by breaking down into parts
(corruption), or by complete and absolute cessa­
tion of being (annihilation). Now the soul can­
not be corrupted per se or directly, - that is,
broken down into parts as is the body after
death, - because it is a simple, non-extended
being. Nor can it be corrupted per accidens or
Indirectly, - that is, by destroying the subject
In which It Inheres, - since' it Is a substantial
entity subsisting In Itself and Intrinsically In­
dependent of the body. Neither can the soul be
annihilated either by itself or by any other
contingent being, since annihilation (the reduc­
tion of a thing to nothing) Is possible only by
the withdrawal of the conserving (or creative)
power which has sustained the thing In existence;
and this power of course rests only with the
Creator of all things. It Is absolutely possible
for God to annihilate the soul which He has
■ created, but that He will not do so can be con­
cluded both from philosophic and psychological
considerations. The philosopher In Natural The­
ology shows that the purpose for which the soul
was created - the extrinsic glory of God - ex­
cludes its annihilation. For, since the end for
which the soul was brought Into existence remains
eternally, the act of conserving the soul In ex­
istence ought Itself be eternal. Psychological
considerations presented in the teleological

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IV. THE MIND AND SOUL, Cont'd
argument, point to the same conclusion.
2. The Teleological Argument
The teleological argument for the continued
existence of the soul after death Is derived
from the purpose or end of the rational powers
of the soul.-1· The argument may he stated in
this way: man has the natural capacity and' the
connatural desire to know truth and to achieve
complete happiness. Now it is an obvious fact
of experience that these capacities are not and
cannot be satisfied in this life; so that, if
they are to be satisfied at all, the soul must
continue to exercise its powers when this life is
ended. It is contrary to reason to suppose that
the soul would be endowed with these aspirations
if, from the very moment of its creation, it was
destined never to achieve them. It is true of
course that these ends are partly realized in
this life; but it is just this fact that they
are only partly realized that enforces the con­
clusion that there must be a future existence
in which they are wholly achieved.
3· The Moral Argument
Perhaps the most convincing argument on this
question is that derived from justice and moral­
ity. It is epitomized -in the assertion that
"Immortality makes morality reasonable. " Exper­
ience teaches us that right action in accordance
with principles of justice and morality are not
always (if ever) adequately rewarded in this
life; nor are injustice and evil adequately pun­
ished. Yet, if morality is to be reasonable, it
must be that action in accordance with, or con­
trary to, the dictates of morality will eventu­
ally be met with the reward or punishment it has
merited. Otherwise, it would be more reasonable,
at least in many situations, to be guided by ex­
pediency rather than by a strict moral code.
Therefore, since the moral law binds with neces­
sity, and since the sanctions imposed in this
^Teleology is the philosophical study of evidences of design.
Hence it relates to purposes or ends.

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TV. THE MIND AND SOUL, Cont'd
life are obviously Imperfect, It can only be
that there Is a future life In which action In
accordance with moral law will be adequately re­
warded, while action contrary to morality will
be just as adequately punished. If justice Is
reasonable, then the scales of justice must be
balanced, If not In this life, then In a life
after death.
ή. The Argument from Universal Conviction
A final argument for the continued existence
of the human soul Is derived from the practically
universal belief In immortality. While It may be
argued In this connection that men often believe
what they want to believe, It Is nevertheless
difficult to conceive how a belief could be so
widespread and so deeply rooted In the minds of
men unless It la grounded in man's very nature.
On such an important Issue, It Is incredible
that the Author of nature would lead men to be
forever deluded.
G. RECAPITULATION
In the present section we have dealt with the
problems of the relation between mind and soul,
the existence and nature of the human soul, and
Its origin and destiny. We have seen, first of all,
that the distinction between mind and soul Is not
an adequate one; that the terms mind and soul,
when rightly understood, signify different aspects
of one and the same reality. As regards the nature
of the soul, we have shown, through a consideration
of Its activities, that It Is a simple, spiritual
substance; and that therefore It cannot be evolved
or generated In any way, but must be produced by a
special creative act. And finally, from a consid­
eration of the nature and powers of the soul, we
demonstrated that the soul Is immortal, this con­
clusion being confirmed by the arguments from the
reasonableness of morality and from universal
belief. In view of these conclusions, such theories
as senslsm and evolutionism, which attempt to ac­
count for the nature and origin of the human mind, k
must be rejected as wholly inadequate and contrary
to fact.

OUTLINE OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY' '
IV. THE MIND AND SOUL, Cont'd

Questions and Exercises

1. Name four theories that are opposed to the Scholas­
tic doctrine of the human soul.
2. Why is a study of the soul necessarily philosophical
in character?
.
J. In what way is the problem of the soul linked to the
problems of thought and volition?
4. With what theories of mind are Angell and Titchener
identified?
5. How do you distinguish the concepts of mind and soul?
6. Describe briefly the Scholastic viewpoint on the na­
ture of the mind.
7· What is meant by "vitalism"? Why is it opposed to
materialism?
8. Which psychological theory is directly opposed to
the concept of mind as substance?
9· Describe the relationship between the substantiality
and identity of the human soul.
10. Explain why the evolutionary theory is at variance with the concept of a rational, spiritual soul.
11. Why is the teleological argument for thé continued
existence of the soul so-called?
12. Why is the soul Incorruptible?
13· Explain the difference between simplicity and
spirituality.
14. On what principle is the moral argument for immor­
tality based?
15. Is the soul the vital principle of the human person?

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V. THE MIND-BODY RELATIONSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE HUMAN PERSON
A. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
One of the most obvious facts about human na­
ture Is the reciprocal influence of the mind and
body. Nerve action "causes" sensation, emotional
states react upon the physical constitution, a
blow on the head produces unconsciousness, and
brain Injuries are reflected In a disturbance of
the thought processes and even of the total person­
ality. The fact seems to be obvious, but Its ex­
planation has proved one of the greatest problems
In psychology, both ancient and modern. What,
then, Is the nature of the relationship between
mind and body? Do they Inter-act, or is their
Inter-action only an apparent one? Or is It possi­
ble that both "Inter-actlonlsm" and "non-lnteractlonlsm" are faulty Interpretations? Whatever view
one takes In this matter, one final question pre­
sents itself: What is the nature or constitution
of the mind-body entity? What, In other words, Is
meant by the terms, Ego, Self, Person?
B. SUGGESTED READINGS
Brennan, R.E., General Psychology, Problems *1, 38
—------- ---------- 1 Thomistlc Psychology, Chs. 3, 11
Gruender, H., Problems of Psychology, Chs. V, VI
Harmon, F. L., Principles of Psychology, Chs. 21,22
Maher, M. , Psychology, Chs, XXII,XXIII,XXV,xX.VI
C. THEORETICAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE MIND-BODY PROB­
LEM
1. Monistic Theories
Many writers have conveniently rid themselves
of the mind-body problem by declaring that either
mind does not exist or that matter does not. The
first of these is called Materialistic Monism,and
the latter Spiritualistic or Idealistlstic Monism.
Closely related to these theories are Psychic Mon­
ism, according to which all reality Is fundamen­
tally mental In character; and the Double-Aspect
Hypothesis, In which mental and bodily processes
are regarded as two aspects of one and the same
reality.
In all of these theories the problem
Is "resolved" simply by denying the existence of
one or the other of the factors. These are
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V. THE MIND-BODY RELATIONSHIP, Cont’d
therefore not■solutions at all, hut mere evasions
of the problem. 1
2. Dualistic Theories
a. Exaggerated Dualism: Psychophysical Parallelism
The theory most in favor at the present time
with non-Scholastic psychologists who still
cling to some form of dualism is psychophysical
parallelism, according to which both mental and
physical processes actually exist, but neither
one is conceived of as influencing or causing
the other. They run as it were parallel
courses, every mental process having its count­
erpart in the physiological order of nervous
events; and every nervous process, at least at
, the higher levels, having a counterpart in the
order of mental events. It is conceived as
impossible, however, that mental processes
should in any way cause or interrupt a chain
of events occurring in the nervous system. .
This notion stems indirectly from the Exagger­
ated Dualism of writers like Descartes who,
while insisting on the ultimate duality in
nature of existing reality, could not conceive
of an essential relationship between reality
that is material in nature, and that which is
non-material or spiritual in character.
A development of parallelism is the theory
of Epiphenominalism, which regards mental pro—
cesses as phenomena that accompany nervous ex­
citations, but which exert no influence on
bodily reactions or, for that matter, on each
other. Even more so than in parallelism,
mental processes are here regarded as entirely
devoid of causal efficacy - as mere epiphenomena

Hfithln the framework of modern psychology may he discerned repre­
sentatives of several of these theories. Behaviorism, for example,
Is both materialistic and monistic, while both Structuralism and
Gestalt theory at times closely approach the double-aspect hypothe­
sis. Idealistic monism and penpsychism, however, are championed
only occasionally, having lost ground before the onslaughts of the
materialists and positivists.
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II
P

OUTLINE OP RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY_____________
♦
V. THE MIND-BODY RELATIONSHIP, Confd
that have no purpose or function whatever. It
goes without saying that both parallelism and
epiphenominalism shed little light on the mind­
body problem. If anything, the problem is made
more difficult by these theories, since they
make it impossible to account in any way for
the very origin of the mental processes. Like
monistic interpretations, they are at best
only restatements of the central problem.1
b. Methodological Dualism: Interactionism
Interactlonlsm cuts the Gordion knot of the
mind-body relation by boldly asserting a sys­
tem of reciprocal causation between conscious
and bodily processes, whatever the ultimate
metaphysical structure of the human person may
be. It generally assumes a dualism of mind and
body as a methodic device for description and
proximate explanation - hence the term "method­
ological dualism" - but it refuses to commit
itself to a metaphysical dualism in which mind
and body are regarded as essentially different
realities. Interactionism veers towards the
common-sense view of the relation between mind
and body, and is certainly a distinct improve­
ment over the preceding theories; but it is in
the last analysis merely a description of what
seems to occur, and is in no sense an adequate
explanation of the relationships between the
mind and the body.2
c. Moderate Dualism: The Scholastic Position
1. The Constitution of the Ego
For the Scholastic, the answer to the
question of the mind-body relation flows

___________

IParallelism has its ablest exponents in the writers of the struc­
turalist school of thought, while epiphenominalism is defended by
some Gestaltists. It must be recognized that only a very thin line
separates these views from the monistic theories described above.
2pn modera psychology Interactionism fits into the framework of
Functionalism, Psychoanalysis, and the Hormic Psychology developed
by William McDougall. In some of his writings, however, McDougall
veers towards panpsychism as the only consistent explanation of the
seeming Interaction between mind and body.

78

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OUTLINE OP RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY

V. THE MIND-BODY RELATIONSHIP, Cont'd.
from his explanation,of the nature and make­
up of human personality. According to this
view, called Moderate Dualism, human beings
are composed of two incomplete substances,
the material body and the spiritual soul
which are joined together into a "psycho­
physical, " substantial unit of a higher
order called a person or ego. Following the
Aristotelian theory of matter and form, the
soul is shown to be the informing or deter­
mining principle by which the composite is
constituted a living human being; and the
body the determined principle which, through
its union with the soul, becomes a distinc­
tively human body. What results from the
union of these two substances, then, is a
,
real unit, in which soul and body are re­
lated not in any merely accidental or dynamic
way, but are substantially united to form a
unitary being - the Self or Person - to which
all actions of whatever kind are ascribed.
Thus, I rightly say "l think," "I will," "I
walk," etc., and not "My mind thinks," or
"My body walks." While it is clear that the
soul, in producing thoughts and volitions,
acts with intrinsic independence, neverthe­
less it is a substantial part of the whole
, person, and therefore any actions exercised
by it are attributable to the Person or Ego.
The problem of interaction between mind
and body, therefore, is an artificial one >
created by those who assume an exaggerated
dualism, wherein the disunion rather than the
union of mind and body is emphasized. For
Moderate Dualism, with its insistence on the
substantial unity of the Person, the "prob­
lem" of Interaction between two realities is
resolved in the concept of a higher unity
that is composed of these realities. Instead
of interaction between a body and a mind,
this theory substitutes the action of a
single, composite substance - the human per-

OUTLINE OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY___________
V. THE MIND-BODY RELATIONSHIP, Cont'd
Thia concept of the Intimate, substantial
- union of body and soul must not blind us to
the fact of the ultimate duality of matter
and spirit. To say that they are substan­
tially united does not mean that they are not
really distinct. Matter is not spirit, nor
is spirit matter, even though they are united
to form a composite being. Spirit, then, can,
and does remain Itself; it can and does act,
on its own level, in thinking and willing,
even while it uses data presented by powers
of the material body of which It Is the coprlnclple. It is true, as we have seen,
that we are correct In saying "I think," mean­
ing by the pronoun "I" the total Ego; it Is
also true that the brain makes some Indirect
contribution to thinking; but there Is noth­
ing In these facts to render false the con­
tention that, in thought and volition, the
soul Is acting with Intrinsic Independence.
The substantial union of these co-princlples in the human person does not mean that
their essential natures are transformed, nor
that their natural functions are thereby in­
hibited. The fact that the soul informs the
body must not be taken to mean that it thus
becomes material in nature. It is a spirit­
ual principle, capable of spiritual activi­
ties; but one which is also by its nature
ordained to activate the material body with
which it is substantially united.
it. The Relationships between Soul and Body
For all that we have said with respect to
assuming too rigid a dualism of mind and
body, it Is nevertheless possible and profit­
able, without falling Into the errors of
exaggerated dualism, to define the relation­
ships between the material and spiritual
principles In man. Thus, as regards the
purely rational processes of thought and
volition, the soul Is described as being
intrinsically independent of the body, which
80

OUTLINE OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY
V.THE MIND-BODY RELATIONSHIP, Cont'dmeans that the soul in producing these func­
tions acts alone, since a material agent
could not cooperate in the formation of im­
material acts. However, even in the ration­
al processes, the soul is not entirely inde, pendent of the body, since it depends upon
sense faculties and their bodily organs for
the material from which thought is derived.
This relationship is expressed by saying
that, as regards the rational processes, the
soul is extrinsically dependent upon the
'. ;
body. Finally, there is a third relation­
ship where the sensory and organic processes
'
are concerned. Since the soul could not in
any way exercise these functions without the
cooperation of a material principle, this
relationship is expressed by saying that, as
far as these functions are concerned, the
1
soul is intrinsically dependent upon the
body with which it is united. It will be
noted that in every function the soul is in
• some manner dependent upon its material co­
principle; while without the soul, the body
would not be what it is, nor exercise any of
its characteristic activities; so that here
- again we are reminded of that fundamental
unity of the Ego which arises out of the
union of the two principles.
D. THE NATURE OF HUMAN PERSONALITY
1. The Psychology of Personality
In recent years much emphasis has been laid
upon the study of personality, and attempts have
even been made to measure personality objective­
ly. Unfortunately, however, clear thinking
along these lines has been made extremely diffi­
cult by a severely muddled terminology, wherein
such concepts as personality, character, temperment, self and ego have been used with too little
regard at times for their exact meanings. In
order to round out our discussion of the consti­
tution of the human person, it becomes necessary
to define and distinguish these allied notions.
81

OUTLINE OP RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY___________ _
V. THE MIND-BODY RELATIONSHIP, Cont'd
a. Person, Self, Ego
While these three terms cannot be used in­
terchangeably in every situation, careful
analysis will reveal that they signify much
the same thing. Each term refers to' the total
Individual composed of body and soul, and the
question of their nature is at bottom a philo­
sophical one. These terms, however, partlcu- ··
larly "self" and "ego," have been brought over
Into psychology, with some confusion as a re­
sult. This Is seen, for example, in the
widely discussed concept of the "empirical
ego, " by which Is meant the ego as experienced
by Itself. Contrasted with this Is the "pure
,
ego," a term used to signify an abstraction ■ the empirical ego as experiencing subject,
apart from its experiences. Now It is true
that I do have some knowledge of myself, In
the sense that I am aware of my own thoughts,
desires, attributes, ambitions, etc., which I
loosely gather Into a concept of ray own ego. .
But these qualities and attributes, as appre­
hended by me, no more constitute a self or ego,
than do my experiences of the color, size and
shape of an object constitute a book. More' over, the ego as experienced Is not radically
different from the ego that experiences, and
the two brought together do not constitute a j
self or person. The self Is a substance, not
a psychological abstraction.!
b. Personality, Character and Temperament
The term personality symbolizes an abstrac­
tion and means literally the "being person" or
the "possessing self-hood." Just as we say:
He Is a man, and therefore possesses humanity;
■
so we can say: be is* a person, and therefore
possesses personality. Personality, then, is
not some thing which exists as such; rather,
it Is a term used to designate a group of
10n this point cf. Gruender, H., Problems of Psychology, Ch. V,
especially pp. 116-120,

82

i

OUTLINE OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY
V. THE MIND-BODY RELATIONSHIP, Cont'd
qualities, - abstracted, Isolated and personi­
fied, - which exist as attributes of a real
being. It is a conceptual construct, derived
by abstraction and then treated as though it
exists independently. Thus, the concept- of
personality as a sum of traits is wholly mis­
leading, since it involves a faulty transition
from the logical to the real order, and fails
to bring to light the essential unity of the
person. The personality appears as multiplex
because of the manner in which it is conceived;
the person Is a unity because of the manner in
which it is constituted. Hence, whenever we
speak In psychology of personality, we must be
careful lest we forget that what really exists
are persons.
With these limitations of the term "person­
ality" in mind, we offer the following defini­
tion: Personality refers to that dynamic
organization within man of those mental, physi­
cal and psychophysical systems which, under
the influence of Intellect and will, determine
as Individual's unique adjustment to his en­
vironment. Obviously, a full understanding of
this definition of personality requires much
more elaboration than the limits of time allow
in this connection. The development of this
concept is undertaken in more advanced courses
in psychology.
What we have said above of- personality ap­
plies also to the terms character and tempera­
ment. Whereas the term personality designates
all of the unique characteristics of an indi­
vidual, character and temperament refer to
special groups of such characteristics. Thus
the term character embraces those qualities of
the personality that, for the most part, have
a moral aspect. It Is therefore related to
Will, and is defined in existential terms as a
disposition to act according to regulative
principles. Temperament, on the other hand,’
is that disposition in a person to respond
83

1Λ

_____________ OUTLINE OF RATIONAL· PSYCHOLOGY

V. THE MIND-BODY RELATIONSHIP, Cont'd
emotionally to a variety of stimuli, and thus
embraces those aspects of personality Involv­
ing emotional resonance or expression. Char- ..
acter, while partly rooted In native consti­
tution, Is largely acquired through training
and experience; whereas Temperament, while
partly acquired, Is for the most part derived
from innate, constitutional factors. Together,
these two aspects of human nature make up a
large portion of what many psychologists In­
clude under personality.!
2. The Philosophy of Personality
We have already Indicated that the essential
nature of personality Is a philosophical ques­
tion, and for that reason we have drawn a dis­
tinction between the psychology and the philoso­
phy of personality. Person Id defined In philo­
sophical terms as an Individual and incommunica­
ble substance of a rational nature; and hence
personality. Is here regarded as that quality of
a being that renders it unique, Incommunicable,
etc. In the definition, the term individual
means that a person is a unique being, that he
is sul juris, an end in himself, and thus pos­
sesses a dignity that precludes anyone's use of
a person as a means. The term incommunicable
signifies that persons do not exist as an Inte­
gral part of another being; nor can they, like
many other substances, be united with other
things to form a new substance. And, finally,
the term rational indicates that not all indi­
vidual substances are persons, but only those
possessing the powers of thought and volition.
A person, then, is a unique, thinking, self-de­
termining being whose existence is freighted
with dignity and Individuality. Thus, personal­
ity becomes a quality that distinguishes man
from all other forms of created things, and
brings him nearer to God, in Whose Image and
likeness he is created.
k)n the meaning of character, see Hull, E.H., The Formation of
Character.

8H

___

______ OUTLINE OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY

. .

V. THE MIND-BODY·RELATIONSHIP, Cont'd

Questions and Exercises
1. What is the difference between Moderate Dualism and
Interactionism?
2. With what mind-body theory is Behaviorism identified?
J. Is the Scholastic concept of the mind-body relation­
ship monistic or dualistic?
4. Explain what is meant by saying that in one respect
the soul is intrinsically independent of the body
while in another respect it is intrinsically depend­
ent upon the body.
5. Describe what is meant by the terms personality,
character, and temperament.
6. In what sense is the soul Intrinsically dependent
upon the body?

85

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-

OUTLINE OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY

VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In thia brief outline of Rational Psychology we
have attempted to solve four main problems: (1) The
nature of thought and the difference between thought
and sense experience; (2) The nature of volition and
freedom of the will; (3) The nature, origin and destiny of the human soul; and (4)"the relation between
soul and body, and the nature of human personality.
As a background for these problems, we first of
all concerned ourselves with the nature of rational
psychology. Thus, we had occasion to see that
rational psychology Is fundamentally a philosophical '
science, concerned with ultimate reality, and employ­
ing the method of deductive Inference. It was pointed out, however, that while rational psychology is
primarily a study of the human soul, our knowledge.
of the human soul Is derived from a study of Its
activities, and that therefore It was necessary first
of all to analyze carefully the Intellectual and
volitional processes, and their relation to organic,
sensory activities. Thus It became evident that
the scope of rational psychology is considerably
broader than its essential definition would lead us
to expect, and that other problems besides the na­
ture of the soul would have to be dealt with.
Having defined the nature and scope of rational
psychology, It became our task to determine the na­
ture of thought and Its relation to sense experience.
Careful analysis revealed that the term thought em­
braces attention, abstraction, reflection, compari­
son, conception, judgment and Inference; and that all
of these processes possess a common element in that
they are supra-sensuous In character. It was shown
too, by analysis of our human experience, that unlversai Ideas as such really exist; and that these
Ideas, as well as other thought processes, are essentlally different from sensory activities. From this
we concluded that Intellect and sense are essentially
different; and that Intellect Is non-organlc and 1mmaterial, and that the sense powers are organic and
material In nature, Despite this radical difference,
however, it was also Indicated that between thought
and sense experience there are very Important

86

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_______ OUTLINE OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY_______ ____

VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION, Cont'd
relations: that intellect, while Intrinsically in­
dependent of the nervous system, is nevertheless extrinsically dependent upon it; that all knowledge
has its ultimate origin in sense experience; and
that thoughts are invariably associated in one way
or another with sensory elements. Thus, while re­
jecting the sensist and nominalist interpretations
of human thought, our own conclusions were in no
sense at variance with common-sense observation and
experience.
In addition to the thought processes, our analy­
sis revealed that there is another group of mental
acts called volitions which, like thought, are
rational in character; but, unlike thought, are
appetitive rather than cognitive states of mind. The
attempts of sensists and others to reduce such acts
to sensory, cognitive processes were therefore re­
jected. In addition to this distinction, we also
pointed out the difference between volitions and
voluntary acts. Volitions we defined as internal
acts of the will, and voluntary acts as external or
commanded acts of the will, the first being purely
subjective and involving the will alone, the latter
being preponderantly objective (observable) and
usually Involving the entire organism composed of
body and soul.
Of the volitional processes we selected desire
and choice for more detailed consideration. Desire,
we found, is aroused whenever an object is intellec­
tually apprehended as good, such an object constitut­
ing a motive. When two or more such motives influ­
ence the will at the same time, deliberation may re­
sult, especially if they are more or less equally
appealing to the will. This process of deliberation
eventuates in the act of decision or choice, by which
is meant acceptance of one motive or course of action
to the rejection of others. Analysis of this experi­
ence revealed that, when certain conditions are ful­
filled, the act of choice is free and self-determined;
and therefore deterministic interpretations of any
kind must be rejected.
87

·

-__________ OUTLINE OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY_____________

VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION, Cont'd
The argument for psychological freedom derived
from experience was further bulwarked by a considera­
tion of certain moral concepts such as responsibility,
justice, merit, reward, 'etc. which, we found, would
be meaningless If the will were not free. Further­
more, these same general conclusions were found to be
supported by experimental research into the nature of
volition. For these reasons, then, we concluded that
■ volitions really exist as distinct, rational pro­
cesses, and that certain of these are free, self-de­
termined actions.
Having defined the nature of the rational pro­
cesses of thought and volition, It became our task to
determine the nature, origin and destiny of the
human soul. By way of preface, however, we first
analyzed the relation between the concepts of mind
and soul, this analysis revealing that the two terms
refer ultimately to one and the same reality - the
term mind being used to signify the source of those
activities that are conscious In nature, the term
soul signifying the principle of all vital activi­
ties.
As regards the nature of the human soul we found,
by a careful analysis of Its activities, that It Is
a simple, spiritual, self-identical substance. This
substance we defined as incomplete, because it Is
destined by its nature to form with the human body a
complete substance of a higher order, - the human
person or ego. From the simplicity and spirituality
of the soul, we deduced further that It could not
have been generated or educed in any way, and that
therefore It is produced by a special creative act
of God. Also from its nature as a simple, spiritual
substance, we were enabled to conclude that it will
outlive the body, because It cannot be corrupted in
any way. Adding to these arguments certain consid­
erations from the aspirations of Intellect and will
for supreme truth and happiness, and others from the
principles of justice, and excluding the possible
annihilation of the soul by God because of the reason
for which It was created - we concluded further that
the human soul Is destined not only to outlive the
88

I

OUTLINE OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION, Coat'd
body, but, to live immortally,- For these reasons,
then, we rejected materialistic, sensistic and
evolutionistic interpretations of the nature, origin,
and destiny of the human mind as being at variance
with truth and reason.
Our final problem consisted of determining the
relation between soul and body, and the nature of
human personality. Various theories, such as inter­
actionism, parallelism and panpsychism,' were ana­
lyzed and rejected as being unable to explain either
the relationship between the mental and the physical
in man, or the make-up of human personality.
In their stead we presented the Scholastic inter­
pretation of the nature and constitution of the
human ego, wherein soul and body are regarded as in-·
complete substances, united together to form one
complete substance - the human person. In this view
the soul is regarded as the substantial form, that
is, the determining principle by which the composite
(the united soul and body) is rendered distinctively
human. This soul, however, is a spiritual substance,
and therefore its relationship with the body is ex­
pressed differently depending upon the nature of the
processes under consideration. Thus, in the case of
- the spiritual processes of thought and volition, the
soul is described as being-Intrinsically independent
of the material body, though even here there is ex­
trinsic dependence; while, for the sensory and vege­
tative processes, the soul is shown to be intrinsi­
cally dependent upon the body. In every case, how­
ever, since soul and body are united to form one com­
posite substance, every act is predlcable of the
entire composite, so that it may be rightly said that
the Ego is the principle of all actions of the com­
posite, whether they be acts of thought, of volition,
or acts of the purely sentient or vegetative kind.
This substantial composite of body and soul is
called a person - person being defined as an indi­
vidual substance of a rational nature. The abstrac­
tum thereof - personality - is then regarded as that
quality of a human being that renders him individual,
unique, incommunicable; A person is sui juris, the
89

Μ

OUTLINE OP RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION, Cont'd
master of hia own acta, a free, aelf-determined
creature, far above the brute animal to which modern
thought would reduce him.
Prom the considerations adduced in this Outline,
then, we can see that Rational Psychology is at
once a criticism of, hnd a bulwark against, the many
attempts on the part of senslsts, materialists, and
evolutionists, to explain human nature in purely
material terms, and thus bring man down to the level
of the animal. It is an attempt, within psychology,
to describe man as he really is, and not as a par­
ticular hypothesis or methodology dictates he should
be. It constitutes a recognition and an affirmation
of the truth that man is first and foremost a ration­
al creature, and as such can strive after moral and
religious values as well as those that are purely
material; and that he can, within limits, plot the
course of his own destiny. In its insistence upon
the spiritual in human nature, it recognizes, im­
plicitly at least, man's relation to God, and thus
elevates human nature to a plane which could never
be achieved in a purely materialistic universe.

90

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.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Adler, M., WhatjMan Haa Made of Man. New York:
Longmans, Green & Co., 1937.
2. Allers, R., The Psychology of Character. London:
Sheed & Ward, 1931.
3- Allers, R., The New Psychologies. New York: Sheed
& Ward, 1933■
Ί. Allers, R., "Causality In Psychology," The New
Scholas., 1939, 13, 91-92.
- 5. Avellng, F., Personality and Will. New York: D.
Appleton, 1931·
6. Avellng, F., The Immortality of the Soul In Westmlnter Lectures, Vol. I. St. Louis: B. Herder,
1906.
7. Barrett, J.F., Elements of Psychology, second edit.,
'
Milwaukee: Bruce, 1931.
8. Barrett, J.F., This Creature Man. Milwaukee: Bruce,
Ï ·
1936.
9- Brennan, R.E., General'Psychology. New York:
Macmillan, 1937.
10. Brennan, R.E., Thomlstlc Psychology. New York:
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11. Castlello, J., A Humane Psychology of Education.
New York: Sheed & Ward, 1936.
12. Fell, G., The Immortality of the Human Soul, trs. by
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L. Filling. St. Louis: B. Herder, 1906.
i
13. Gruender, H., Psychology Without A Soul, second edit.
St. Louis: B. Herder, 1917.
14. Gruender, H., Free Will, second edit. St. Louis:
B. Herder, 1916.
15. Gruender, H., Problems of Psychology. Milwaukee:
Bruce, 1937.
16. Harmon, F.L., Principles of Psychology. Milwaukee:
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,
Ϊ
17. Heron, G., Spirituality and Immortality of the Soul,
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In Man and Eternity, 1937.
f
18. Llndworsky, J., Training of the Will. Milwaukee:
Bruce, 1929j
19. Maher, M., Psychology: Empirical and Rational,
ninth edit. New York: Longmans, Green, 1926.
[
20. McCarthy, R.C., The Measurement of Conation. Chicago:
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Loyola University Press, 1926.
i

■

91

OUTLINE OP RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY Cont'd

21, Mercier, D., Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy,
2 vols., second rev. edit. St. Louis: B, Herder,
> , 1919'.
22. Moore, T.V., Dynamic Psychology, second rev. edit.
Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1926.
2J. Moore,'T.V., Cognitive Psychology. Philadelphia:
Lippincott, 1939·
24. O'Connor, W.P.,"The Concept of the Human Soul,"
Phil. Studies, 1921, vol. XI.
25. Phillips, R.P., Modern Thomistic Philosophy, 2 vols.
London: Burns, Oates & Washbourne, 193,4.
26. Pyne, J.X., The Mind. New York: Benziger, 1926.
27. Rickaby, J., Free Will and Four English Philosophers.
London: Bums & Oates, 1905.
28. Sharpe, A.B., Freedom of the Will, in Westminster
Lectures, Vol. I. St. Louis: B. Herder, 1906. .
29. Sheen, F.J., Freedom Under God. Mllawukee: Bruce,
1940.
30. Spearman, C., Psychology Down the Ages, 2 vols.
London: Macmillan, 1937.

92