ttii

I Prophecy
and
Inspiration
A Commentary on the Summa Theologica
II-II, Questions 171-178

by

Paul Synave,

o. p. (f) and

Pierre Benoit, o.p.

DESCLEE COMPANY
NEW YORK — ROME — FARIS — TOURNAI

1961

Originally published in French by Desclée & Cie, Tournai (Belgium) and
Les Editions de la Revue des Jeunes, Paris, under the title. Traité de la Prophétie.
First published in English in 1961. Translation by Avery R. Dulles, S. J. and
Thomas L. Sheridan, S. J.

IMPRIMI POTEST :

August 26, 1958

Thomas E. Henneberry, S. J.

MEDIEVAL!
INSTITUTE

NIHIL OBSTAT:

Myles M. Bourre, S. T. D.
Censor Librorum

IMPRIMATUR :

March 1, i960

Francis Cardinal Spellman
Archbishop of New York

The nihil obstat and imprimatur are official declarations that a book or
pamphlet is free of doctrinal or moral error. No implication is contained therein
that those who have granted the nihil obstat and imprimatur agree with the
contents, opinions or statements expressed.
s
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number : 60-10164

AH rights reserved.
In quotations from the De Veritate of Saint Thomas abundant use has been
made, with the permission of the publishers, of the English version Truth in the
Library of Living Catholic Thought (3 vols., Chicago, © Henry Regnery
Company, 1952-1954). The excerpts of the Pontifical Documents on the study of
Holy Scripture have been adopted with minor modifications from the translations
which appear in Pome and the Study of Scripture (5th edition) with the permission
of Grail Publications, Saint Meinrad, Indiana.

Printed and bound in Belgium by Desclée <5· Cie, Editeurs, S. A., Tournai.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword

Preface

7

to the

English Edition .

13

Part I: Explanatory Notes on Summa Theo­
logica II-II, qq. 171-178

Part II: Notes on Thomistic Doctrine.

15

61

A) The Gift of Prophecy according to
St. Thomas
.

61

B) Scriptural Inspiration

84

Appendix

169

Bibliography

171

Analytical Index.

175

Outline

185

’

FOREWORD

In Part II of the Summa Theologica St. Thomas considers
man's return toward God. After describing the goal of this journey
and the general principles of natural and supernatural psychology
which must direct man's steps (I-II), he makes a detailed study
of the various means which men have for traveling along this road
(II-II). He first discusses those means which are the property of
all Christians, sc., the theological and moral virtues (qq. 1-170),
and then those which are given only to some and which correspond
to special vocations (qq. 171-189). The latter class includes: (a)
particular gifts (called “ charisms, " after the practice of St. Paul,
v.g. i Cor 12: 4 ff.) which are conferred on certain individuals for
the benefit of the human community (qq. 171-178) ; (b) various ways
of devoting oneself to the service of God, sc., the active life and the
contemplative life (qq. 179-182); and (c) various offices which must
be filled in the Mystical Body, and which lead to different degrees
of perfection (qq. 183-189). In the present volume we shall study
the first of these three categories.
The common element which unifies the charisms is the fact
that they are all designed to assure the effective communication
of divine Revelation to men through the mediation of certain privileged
persons on whom these gifts are conferred. This mission is primarily
of the intellectual order: it is concerned with proposing to human
minds a message which contains the thoughts and purposes of God.
7

Thus the messenger first of all receives a gift of knowledge: his mind
is enlightened from above in order to make him perceive with divine
clarity the words which he is to communicate to other men on God’s
behalf. This is the gift of -prophecy (qq. 171-175). And yet, important
as it is, this interior illumination is not enough; the prophet receives
his message only to transmit it to others, and natural powers of
expression are inadequate for this supernatural mission. His mind
has been assisted by a divine grace; similar help must be given to
his tongue. To this end he will receive the gift of tongues and the
gift of speech (qq. 176-177). Finally, in order that men may believe
in the supernatural character of his words and accept them with
faith and submission, God will place in his hands the power of pro­
ducing " signs ” which will certify the divine origin of his mission.
This power is the gift of miracles (q. 178).
Here we have all the gratuitous favors which assure and guarantee
the divine process of Revelation. Their importance is evident, for
on them depends the exalted character of the message which God
has destined for men — its integrity, its fruitfulness, its persuasive
power, and, above all, its truth. These gifts affect the very source
of the “ revealed data ” which are offered to the faith of believers,
and which come to them through the twofold channel of Scripture
and Tradition. It is because the ministers of Revelation are endowed
with these charisms that the Church is sure she possesses through
these two fonts the authentic word of God.
On the other hand, we must remember that while the charismatic
gifts marvelously elevate the thoughts, words, and deeds of these
living instruments of the Holy Spirit, they do not make them cease
to be men, with all the limitations which the human condition
necessarily implies. For example, the gift of prophecy, which gives
supernatural clarity and certitude to their knowledge, is nevertheless
so adapted to their concrete processes that the divine truth becomes
clothed with their individual ideas, images, and feelings. This fact
accounts for the human, concrete, and temporal determinations
which are found in the inspired Scriptures.
Modem discoveries and advances in criticism, by resurrecting
before our eyes the historical surroundings in which the Bible was
bom, have made us more conscious of these human factors. Some
difficult problems have in fact arisen when scholars, making use of

8

these profane sources of information, have thought that they detected
in the Sacred Books, not only limitations and omissions, but even
contradictions and errors. This occasioned the great biblical crisis
of modem times. While Rationalist exegesis was unhesitatingly
abandoning the traditional belief in the divine inspiration of Scripture,
and saw in the Bible nothing more than a religious book of purely
human origin, Catholic theology attempted to solve these difficulties
through a better understanding of the true nature of biblical inspiration
and of the guarantee of inerrancy.
To achieve this understanding, recourse was had to the traditional
doctrine of the Fathers and theologians. Among the latter, St. Thomas,
with his treatise on Prophecy, holds a position of the first rank. In
the Thomistic school many difficulties were cleared up, and gradually
a body of opinion began to crystallize about his teaching. The Magis­
terium of the Church has itself recognized his great authority in
this matter. Pius XII in his most recent Encyclical on biblical studies,
Divino Afflante Spiritu (Sept. 30,1943), wrote as follows:

It is worthy of special mention that Catholic theologians, following
the teaching of the Holy Fathers and especially of the Angelic and
Common Doctor, have examined and explained the nature and effects
of biblical inspiration more exactly and more fully than was wont
to be done in previous ages (fiSS, no. 33; cf. EB [556]).

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For this reason it seemed opportune in this commentary to
advert to modem problems and to show how many valuable insights
St. Thomas affords for a proper understanding of scriptural inspiration.
Such inspiration, as we shall see, is not exactly the same as the charism
** prophecy ” here treated by St. Thomas. But it is still a gift of
of·
the same order. The directive principles which the Master has laid
down can, therefore, be fruitfully applied to the matter of scriptural
inspiration, if care is taken to avoid all distortion by noting the
differences between the two charisms and indicating the required
accommodations.
This volume had been entrusted to Fr. Synave, O.P. Since his
premature death prevented him from seeing it through, I agreed
to finish his work. A feeling of grateful devotion to my former teacher
encouraged me to undertake this task; in the same spirit I felt that
I should discard nothing of what he had already written, but merely
complete what he could not do.

The Translation had already been made; it needed only a last
and slight revision. The Explanatory Notes had been finished in
part; I completed some of them to the extent I deemed necessary.
The following are my work: the last two paragraphs of Explanatory
Note 15 and the entire Explanatory Notes 18, 24, 26, 35, 36, 46, 47,
50-52,75,77, and 80. Finally nothing of Appendix II had been written;
for this I alone am responsible. Although it might be thought that this
section, especially toward the end, gets somewhat away from the topic
of " prophecy ” by which it was occasioned, it seemed to me that the
whole subject constitutes a single unit, and that the final conclusions—
e.g., those concerning the '* literary types ’’ and the " senses of
Scripture ” are a necessary complement to the matter that precedes.
The fruitfulness of St. Thomas’s doctrine will also, I hope, be obvious.
When his principles are carried out to their ultimate implications,
it becomes dear that he is a very reliable guide for those seeking
a path through the most concrete and pressing difficulties which
confront the biblical scholar today.
Jerusalem, Feast of St. Jerome
Sept. 30,1945

Pierre Benoit, O.P.

ABBREVIATIONS

EB

A AS — Acta Apostolicae Sedis.
DB — Enchiridion Symbolorum. Ed. 30; 1955.
— Enchiridion Biblicum. Ed. 1; 1927. Ed. 2; 1954. *
PL — Pairologia Latina. Ed. Migne.
RSS — Rome and the Study of Scripture.
Ed. 5. St. Meinrad, Ind., 1953.

* References to the second edition are given in brackets.
II

PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH EDITION
It was fifteen years ago that the original French edition of this
book appeared. Since then my thought has been clarified, enriched,
and likewise corrected on many points by useful criticism. I returned
to the subject in a chapter in Initiation Biblique1 and in some
occasional papers.4 I intend to do so again in the near future in two
articles for the encyclopedia Catholicisme and, more fully, in a supple­
mentary volume of Bible de Jérusalem. While these essays extend
the lines of my research, they suppose the first presentation of my
thought in the treatise La Prophétie which was written with my
deceased teacher, Fr. P. Synave, O.P., in the fight of St. Thomas
following a deliberately theological and systematic method.
Hence, when Fr. G. S. Glanzman, S.J. suggested that I publish
this treatise in an English translation, I readily and gratefully agreed
to this wider circulation of a work which I consider still valid and
which I have no intention of beginning over. I had only to make
1 Ed. A. Robert & A. Tricot, Initiation Biblique (3rd ed.. Tournai,
Ï954). PP- 6-45·
»" La Septante est-elle inspirée? ’’ in Vom Wort des Lebens (Max Meinertz
Festschrift) (Münster, 1951), pp. 41-49; " Note complémentaire sur l’inspi­
ration, ’’ Revue Biblique 63 (1956), pp. 416-22; “ Les analogies de l’inspiration
scripturaire, ” Sacra Pagina. Miscellanea Biblica Congressus Internationalis
Catholici de Re Biblica, I (Gembloux, 1959) 86-99.
IS

some adjustments, as the translators and editors invited me to do.
I have modified or complemented my text in many places; the
following are the most important: revision of the material on the
relations between prophecy and faith (p. 75); clear recognition
of instrumentality in the proper sense in the case of scriptural
inspiration (pp. 80-81, 83,118-19) ; clarification that one of the aims of
the practical judgment, guided by scriptural inspiration, can be
simply to transmit something to posterity, without implying teaching
(p. 104 f.) ; substitution of " cognitive ’’ inspiration for " prophetic "
inspiration (pp. 109-in) ; new analysis of inspiration into " dramatic, "
“ prophetic ” or " apostolic, ” and “ scriptural ” (pp. 125-27) ; in the
matter of inerrancy, some expressions have been polished (pp. 133,
135, and 137), older material has been reworked on pp. 140-142;
correction of denial of the inspiration of the Septuagint (p. 146);
revision of the terminology and classification of the senses of Scripture
(pp. 147-51) ; proposal to revive the ancient tradition of an “ ecclesias­
tical ’’ inspiration (p. 165).
Finally the Bibliography has been brought up to date. It remains
selective and can in no way claim to give a complete survey of the
vast literature. It covers especially the question of inspiration, and
not those of hermeneutics nor of canonicity which are treated only
indirectly in this book.
Pierre Benoit, O.P.

PART X

Explanatory Notes
On Summa Theologica, II-II, qq. 171-178

EN [x]
Q. 171, Frol.: “ Uno quidem... diversas gratias gratis datas. ”
We use the term “ charisma ” to translate the Latin words gratiae
gratis datae—literally, “ graces given gratuitously. ” In scholastic
terminology, as is well known, gratia gratis data is contrasted with
gratia gratum faciens. The latter renders its possessor pleasing to
God, whereas the former is granted, not for the personal good of
the subject who receives it, but for the general good. See I-II, q. in,
a. i, and Note 45 in the French translation of Fr. Mulhard, O.P. (Paris,
Editions de la Revue des Jeunes).

EN [2]

Ibid.: " Est autem attendendum circa gratias gratis datas... ”
In the list of charisms given by St. Paul (1 Cor 12: 8-11) and
followed here by St. Thomas, three pertain properly speaking to
knowledge: " prophecy, ’’ " faith, ’’ and “ the discerning of spirits ”;
four are connected with speech: " the word of wisdom, " “ the word
of knowledge,” "interpretation of speeches,” and " diverse kinds
of tongues ”; two concern action: “ the grace of healing ” and “ the
working of miracles. ” [See Appendix.} But as Cajetan remarks,
the "interpretation of speeches” requires a light, and both the
" word of wisdom ” and the “ word of knowledge ” involve cognition—

either that of wisdom (sapientia) or that of knowledge (scientia).
St. Thomas likewise, in his Prologue, reduces not only “ faith ” and
" the discerning of spirits, ” but also explicitly ” the word of wisdom ’’
and " the word of knowledge ” to the knowledge properly so called
of " prophecy. " " Interpretation of speeches, ” considered precisely
as interpretation, could also be classified trader the heading of
“ prophecy. ’’ This explains why St. Thomas in his treatise on Prophecy
actually studies all the charisms of the cognitive order. Although
“ prophecy ” held a rather subordinate rank in St. Paul’s list, it
occupies such an important position in St. Thomas’s discussion
because he is fundamentally thinking of this gift not in the Pauline
sense but rather in the sense of the Old Testament, where it is actually
treated as the great charism of knowledge and revelation.

EN [3]

'

Q. 171, a. i c: " Unde possunt dici prophetae a ‘ phanos ’... ’’
St. Thomas shows a particular fondness for this etymology
borrowed from St. Isidore of Seville: he cites it at the beginning
of his commentary on Isaiah and in the De Veritate, q. 12, a. 1.
" Prophecy ” is alleged to come from pro (" that which is afar ”)
and phanos (’’ an appearing
But πρό is never used in the sense
of πόρρω. πρό indicates a preference over something else; either
a local preference, whence arise the basic meaning, " before ” (with
the idea of place), and the figurative meanings, “ in defense of, ”
“ in preference to, ’’ “ instead of, ” “ in the place of, ” " in exchange
for, ” " for, ” and “ because of
or a temporal preference, whence
arises the basic meaning of "before” (with the idea of time). As
regards the second part of the word προφήτης, it is derived not from
φανός (φαίνειν), " an appearing, ” but from φημί (φάναι), " to speak, ”
" to say. ” The prophet, therefore, is one who speaks in the name
and place of another, here in the name of the divinity who inspires
and sends him. Thus the true etymological meaning of the term is:
an interpreter of God. The meaning later attributed to it, " he who
foretells the future, ” is only a derived meaning; cf. Van den
Oudenrijn, De Prophetiae charismate in populo israditico (Rome,
1926), p. 4 fl.

16

EN [4]
Ibid.

This threefold conclusion of St. Thomas considerably broadens
the meaning of the word ** prophecy. ” Although prophecy implies
first and foremost an act of knowledge, it also designates sometimes
an utterance, and sometimes a miraculous proof or confirmation
of that utterance. In short, " prophecy ’’ serves, or can serve, to
signify any of the charismatic gifts.

EN [5]

Ibid.: ad 5m.
St. Thomas distinguishes two phases in prophecy: (1) An elevation
of the prophet’s mind whereby the range of his intellect is extended
so that it becomes capable of perceiving divine truths; here he reserves
the word inspiration to designate this elevation, which is due to the
action of the Holy Spirit. (2) The actual perception of the supernatural
truths, for the sake of which the inspiration has been given; to this
perception he assigns the term revelation.

Etymologically inspiration suggests the active intervention of
the Holy Spirit (in-spiraiio) ; revelation evokes the idea of a veil
(velamen) which is removed (re-velaiio). Inspiration calls for revelation,
and revelation presupposes inspiration; neither occurs without the
other. Thus we have here a theological, as well as an etymological,
justification for the classical definition of prophecy given by Cassiodorus: " prophetia dicitur esse inspiratio vel revdatio. ” But,
notwithstanding what Cajetan asserts in his Commentary, St. Thomas
makes no appeal whatever to any impulse given to the will, as the
objection would maintain. Everything takes place in the prophet’s
mind (mens). When St. Thomas speaks of an elevation of the range
of the mind (intentio mentis), one should not understand it as referring
to " intention ” in the sense specified in the treatise on Human Acts
(I-II, qq. 6-21). There the term intentio does signify an act of the
will, but here it is rather a question of the range of the mind as
a whole.
I?

EN [6]
Q. 171, a. 2: " Utrum prophetia sit habitus. ’’
The term habitus, as is well known, has no equivalent in English.
The word " habit " is a poor translation, for the Latin habitus signifies
a permanent quality of our faculties, no matter how acquired. The
habitus enables us to perform acts in a connatural way, with speed,
security, and delight. One who possesses a habitus exercises it at
his good pleasure, when and as he wills. The title of the article might
be translated: Does prophecy exist in a habitual state in the prophet?
But even this translation is inexact, and thus it seems better to keep
the term habitus in the technical sense explained above.

EAT [7]
Ibid., c: " Et hujus ratio est... lumen manifestatur. "
As St. Thomas observes in the De Veritate, q. 12, a. 1, the stability
of our knowledge comes from the fact that we are able to reduce
it to its first principles. So long as we are unable to effect this reduction,
our knowledge of truth in a given order is unstable and insecure;
at best it takes on in our minds some sort of probability. " Quamdiu
enim non fit resolutio cognitorum in sua principia, cognitio non
firmatur in uno, sed apprehendit ea quae cognoscit secundum proba­
bilitatem quamdam utpote ab aliis dicta. ’’ The intellectual light
which perfects the mind by inhering as a permanent and perfect
form gives it this stability and security, for it enables one to reduce
everything to a single principle which illuminates all the conclusions
by its own evidence.

Cajetan (Comm. n. Ill) stresses the two adjectives which
St. Thomas uses here: an intellectual light which inheres as a permanent
and perfect form.
(1) A permanent form is not simply a form which lasts or remains:
that is a mere question of fact. A permanent form is one which of
itself, in its mode of being, inheres like those forms which depend
upon their efficient cause for their coming-into-being but not for
their continued existence. Air, for example, “ remains ” bright as
long as the source of its light remains in place. This is a fact; yet
18

that brightness is never in the air as a permanent form. Hence forms
which are by their nature permanent are specifically different from
those which are by their nature transitory. Further, it is possible
for a form which is of itself permanent to be present accidentally
(Per accidens) in a transitory way. Thus, for example, the light of
glory, which is a permanent form in the blessed, can exist in a
transitory fashion in St. Paul or in Moses.
(2) A perfect form is one which has attained its final stage of
evolution in its own order. The embryonic forms of an animal, for
example, are not perfect forms. Only a form which enables the animal
to perform its proper functions, those of sensation, would be perfect.
In the intellectual order, a perfect form is one which gives vision.
This criterion excludes the light of faith (lumen fidei), which, although
a permanent form, does not cause one to see. It does not give evidence
for the truths of faith. Properly speaking, the light of faith is not
even a purely intellectual light; it is a light of the intellect as moved
by the will. Here we have an extended meaning of " intellectual
light
for faith enlightens the intellect not within its own proper
limits, but insofar as it is subject to something else, namely, the will.
Cajetan adds (Comm., η. V) that the light of faith does not cause
one to see either the principles or the conclusions, but a limited facet,
that of credibility, which remains extrinsic to the revealed truths
which we believe.
This last explanation of Cajetan is based on a reply (ad 4m eorum
quae sunt in contrarium) in the De Veritate, q. 12, a. 1.

EN [8]
Ibid., ad am: " Ad secundum dicendum.... iterato illustretur. ’’
In the De Veritate (q. 12, a. 1), St. Thomas grants that this
aptitude (habilitas) once again to receive divine inspiration may
be called a habitus. He is obviously influenced by Avicenna, as he
explicitly states: " Avicenna writes [in the sixth book of his De
Naturalibus] that the habits (habitus) of the sciences are nothing
but certain aptitudes (habilitates) of our soul to receive the illumi­
nation of the active intellect and the intelligible representations flowing
from it into our soul. " Nevertheless, St. Thomas adds with his usual

19

formal precision: “ However, it cannot properly be called habitus,
but an aptitude (habilitas) or disposition (dispositio quaedam) by
reason of which one is called a prophet even when he is not actually
being inspired. ”
EN [9]
Ibid., ad 3m.
An act which in its substance surpasses man’s faculties is one
which exceeds those faculties by its physical essence. An act which
surpasses man’s faculties only in its mode exceeds them merely
because of some moral condition. Man can love God, for example,
by his natural powers, but he cannot love him in a meritorious way
except by infused charity. Among those acts which in their substance
surpass human nature, some are absolutely incommunicable, such
as to create; others, such as to raise the dead or to stop the sun, are
not actually communicated to man except as a result of his prayer
or desire (deprecative seu optative) ; others, finally, are as a matter
of fact communicated to men, such as to see God. In this last case
the act in its physical essence may be said to surpass the faculties
of human nature and of any other creature, and to be connatural
to God alone; but, once the human faculties have been elevated
by a divine gift, the act in its very substance really pertains to man:
it is a vital act, proceeding from an intrinsic principle of life, even
though this intellectual life is one which has been elevated by a gift,
whether a habitual gift as will be the case in heaven, or even
a transitory gift as in the case of prophecy (Cajetan, Comm.,
nn. VI-VIII).
EN [10]

Q. 171, a. 3 c.
In order to ascertain what can be the object of prophecy,
St. Thomas in the De Veritate (q. 12, a. 2) reasons as follows:

In all things which are ordained to an end, the material object is
determined according to the exigency of the end, as is clear in the
Physics [Bk. II]. But the gift of prophecy is given for the use of the
Church, as is clear from I Corinthians [12: 7], " And the manifestation
of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit...” Therefore,
20

f
i

all those things the knowledge of which can be useful for salvation
are the matter of prophecy, whether they are past, future, or
eternal, or necessary, or contingent. But those things which cannot
pertain to salvation are outside the matter of prophecy. Hence,
Augustine writes [De Genesi ad litteram, II, 9], " Although our sacred
authors knew what shape heaven is, [the Spirit] wants to speak
through them only what is useful for salvation. ” And to the Gospel
of St. John [16: 13], "But when he, the Spirit of Truth, is come,
he will teach you all truth, ” the Gloss adds, " necessary for
salvation. ” Moreover I say necessary for salvation, whether they
are necessary for instruction in the faith or for the formation of
morals. But many of the things which are proved in the sciences
can be useful for this, as, for instance, that the intellect is incor­
ruptible, and also those things which when considered in creatures
lead to admiration of the divine wisdom and power. Hence, we find
that mention of these is made in Holy Scripture.

EN [11]
Ibid., ad 2m.
Concerning this answer to the second difficulty Cajetan writes:

Note with the greatest care the difference between faith and
prophecy. Faith gives, not knowledge of the things which one
believes, but an assent to that which is learned from others, that is,
at least from the divine Persons. Prophecy, on the contrary, gives
knowledge.
At this point there arises a question which we should not
overlook: is the knowledge denied to faith and attributed to prophecy
evidential knowledge? On the one hand, it seems that we are dealing
with evidential knowledge. But on the other hand, can one say
that the prophets had evident knowledge of the Holy Trinity without
having seen the divine essence? This same remark might be made
about the Incarnation of the Word, etc.
To this question, a reply will be given in article 5, in which the
certitude of prophetic knowledge is treated. [See Explanatory
Note 15.]

EN [12]
Ibid., ad 3m.
This reply of St. Thomas is one of the most typical in his treatise
on Prophecy, He has shown, first, that prophecy involves inspiration

s.j

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from the Holy Spirit (a. i, ad 4m), i.e., an impulse which elevates
the range of the human mind and, secondly, that this inspiration
is given only in a transitory fashion, not as a habitual state (a. 2).
Now he specifies that this passing gift is a light which constitutes
the formal element of prophecy and gives it its specific unity
notwithstanding the diversity of the objects of prophecy. Cajetan
calls the reader’s attention to the fact that this reply appears to
conflict with q. 174, a. 1 ; but it seems too categorical and too expressive
of St. Thomas’s doctrine for us not to regard it as a definitive
judgment on the part of the Master.

EN [13]
Q. 171, a. 4 c: " Respondeo dicendum quod... et alia non cognosci. ”·

Here we have in summary form the principle which accounts
for the unity of all the moral virtues in prudence and of all the super­
natural infused virtues in charity. This principle likewise governs
the unity of knowledge. Each individual can escape dissipation in
his personal life only by adhering to some single principle which
assembles all his energies and enlists them in the service of an ideal,
the focal point of man’s activity, on whatever level it takes place.

EN [14]

Γ:

Ibid., ad 2m: “Ad secundum dicendum... in genere divinae
revelationis.”
This statement of St. Thomas should be kept in mind in connection
with the general classification of prophecy. Divine revelation is
considered a genus (in genere divinae revelationis), in which prophecy
constitutes an imperfect grade (quid imperfectum). In its highest
grade (perfectio divinae revelationis), divine revelation is realized
only in heaven : there the most exalted mysteries and contingent futures
are perfectly revealed in God, who is seen by the blessed thanks
to a light known as the lumen gloriae. This light exists as a permanent
form and is the perfection of the lumen propheticum, which is given
only in a transitory and imperfect manner.
22

EN [15]

Q. 171, a. 5, c: “ Respondeo dicendum... super Gen. ad litt. "
St. Thomas contrasts formal revelation with what he calls quidam
instinctus, a term borrowed from St. Augustine. Modem writers have
often translated this term as " inspiration. ’’ But, in the theological
language of St. Thomas, " revelation ” and " inspiration ” are
correlative, and indicate the two phases of prophecy in the strict
sense (see Explanatory Note 5). To avoid confusion, it would be
better to translate the quidam instinctus of St. Augustine, as adopted
by St. Thomas, by the expression " a certain impulse "; one could
also say, understanding the expression in a higher sense, “ a certain
prophetic instinct, ’’ or even, while excluding express revelation,
" a certain divine influence. ”

This impulse, instinct, or influence is something imperfect in
the genus of prophecy (quid imperfectum in genere prophetiae). From
the fact that St. Thomas said in the previous article (ad 2m;
cf. Explanatory Note 14) that prophecy is something imperfect in
the genus of divine revelation (sicut quid imperfectum in genere divinae
revelationis), it is evident that one cannot speak of the prophetic
instinct as a case of perfect divine revelation, or even as a case of
prophecy, since it is only something imperfect in the genus of prophecy.
In other words, formal revelation is prophecy in the proper sense,
or prophecy absolutely speaking (simpliciter), while the prophetic
impulse or influence is prophecy only in a very qualified sense
(secundum quid).

Formal revelation, as opposed to the prophetic instinct, gives
rise to two certitudes in the prophet’s mind. The first concerns the
truths which are revealed; the second, the fact of their revelation.
A prophet who is instructed by a formal revelation knows clearly
what has been revealed to him, and he knows with equal clarity
that God is revealing this. The prophetic instinct cannot give either
of these certitudes.
The first certitude, which concerns the truths which are revealed,
is only indirectly related to the present article; we shall return to
it in q. 173, a. 4, where the question will be asked whether prophets
know what they are prophesying.

23

The second certitude, which concerns the very fact of divine
revelation, that is, whether the prophet, when he is thinking or speaking
prophetically, knows that God is revealing to him, is directly at
issue in the present article. Three proofs are given for the existence
of this certitude: the authority of Jeremiah, the certitude of our
faith, and the action of Abraham (see Cajetan, Comm. η. I).

These two certitudes are evidential certitudes, which make the
prophet no less certain of the fact that he is receiving revelation
and of what is revealed to him than we are, by the natural light
of reason, of the first principles and of the conclusions that flow from
them. Such is unquestionably the view of St. Thomas here and in
the De Veritate, q. 12, a. 3 and in the Contra Gentes, III, 154. It does
not follow that the prophet sees the essence of the mysteries which
are revealed to him, for this evidential certitude bears on their existence
(quia est), not on their essence (quid est) (Cajetan, Comm., η. II).
This evidential knowledge enjoyed by the prophets is necessary
to provide a solid basis for the faith of other men, inasmuch as their
faith does not cause them to see, but only to " assent to things known
by others" (a. 3, ad 2m; cf. Explanatory Note 11). Some must have
seen in order that the rest may believe on their word. It is quite true,
of course, that the faith of ordinary Christians rests on that of the
Church, but this fact presupposes that the Church’s faith is in turn
vouched for by authentic expressions of divine truth. These expressions
are, in the concrete, the testimony of the Prophets, the Apostles,
and the Evangelists, who, favored by a special light from above and
charged with a social mission to the human race, have learned with
infallible certitude the truths which God intended to communicate
to mankind by their mediation, and have incorporated them at his
bidding into the twofold deposit of Scripture and Tradition (see
Cajetan, Comm., η. V).
EN [16]

Ibid.: " Sed ad ea quae cognoscit... ut ibidem Gregorius subdit. "
In this last case St. Thomas evidently has in mind holy prophets
who might think that they were speaking in God’s name while actually
expressing only their own thoughts. Holy prophets who speak by
24

■

■ ■

virtue of a prophetic instinct without knowing it have no need of
being corrected by the Holy Spirit, since they are his unconscious
mouthpieces.

EN [17]
Q. 171, a. 6 c.
In the De Veritate (q. 12, a. 11) St. Thomas says in answer to
a difficulty which can be raised concerning any prophecy: " The
way in which God’s foreknowledge of changeable things can be
unchangeably true is explained in another question, on God’s
knowledge. Consequently, it is not necessary to repeat it here, since
the whole immutability of prophecy depends on the immutability
of the divine foreknowledge. ’’ See the treatise on God, French
translation by Fr. Sertillanges (Paris, Editions de la Revue des Jeunes),
II, 356 ff. and 400 fi.

EN [18]

Ibid., ad am.
Hence a minatory prophecy which is not fulfilled is not on that
account false. What it says remains rigorously true—for example,
that the existing dispositions of the Ninevites by their nature called
for severe retribution from the divine justice, and that God was
resolved to decree such vengeance if they did not mend their ways.
As a matter of fact, the Ninevites, frightened by that threat, were
converted, and consequently God no longer had to punish them.
These facts, however, in no way impugned the truth of the previous
oracle, which affirmed the moral necessity of imminent chastisement,
but did not affirm that its actual infliction was certain. Thus, if we
consider only the precise terms of the revelation, God neither deceived
nor was deceived.
The prophet can likewise avoid being deceived if he does not
extend his certitude beyond the strict limits of what is revealed
to him; regarding other matters which the Holy Spirit has not revealed
to him, he can only make conjectures. Thus Jonah had evidential
knowledge that the crimes of tire Ninevites made them worthy of
imminent destruction, but he did not know whether that destruction

25

was efficaciously decreed by God. For this reason he fled, wishing
to avoid a mission which he thought likely to fail (Jon 4: 2; cf. De
Ver., q. 12, a. 10, ad 14m; Cajetan, Comm, on q. 173, a. 4). He knew
enough to doubt, for he was, in this case, a true prophet, and was
therefore able to distinguish between those elements in his thought
which were from God and those which were from himself. But if he
had been favored only with a “ prophetic instinct, ’’ he might have
made a mistake, and, by confusing his own conjectures with God’s
revelation, have believed that the destruction which God had
announced only in the form of a threat was irrevocably decreed
in the divine counsels.

S:’i

1

We should not be surprised at such uncertainty, or even possible
error, on the prophet’s part. As soon as he goes beyond the bounds
of what has been revealed to him, he is thinking as a private person:
Jonah " quantum ad hoc quod non intelligebat, propheta non fuit ’’
(loc. cit.). This distinction is legitimate, for prophetic inspiration
enlightens the mind only partially and discloses only certain particular
truths (a. 4). In other matters, the prophet is, as it were, left to himself.
He is capable of deceiving himself and attributing to the Spirit of
God-what comes from his own mind (a. 5). Such are inevitable
consequences of the fact that prophecy is an imperfect form of
revelation (a. 4, ad 2m), and that the Holy Spirit possesses in man
only a “ defective instrument ’’ (q. 173, a. 4; cf. Cajetan, Comm.).

But God remedies this disadvantage by correcting his interpreter
as soon as his personal mistake might become a source of error for
others (a. 5). We have an instance of this in the case of Nathan
(2 K 7: 3 ff.); and the same principle, in the matter of scriptural
inspiration, is the reason for the guarantee of inerrancy (see infra,
p. 140).
EN [19]
Q. 172, a. I c: " Et hoc videtur esse... secundum corporis puritatem
diversam. ’’
St. Thomas here presents only part of Plato’s theory of the soul.
According to the Greek philosopher, the human soul exists from all
eternity and from its inception is endowed with all knowledge. Once

26

it is united with a body, however, its knowledge is obscured. St. Thomas
makes no mention of this eternal existence of souls, and reports the
Platonic position only as regards participation in the ideas.

EN [20]
Ibid.: “ Sed quia verius esse... claritas intelligentiae. "
In the De Veritate (q. 12, a. 3), St. Thomas applies the term
“ natural prophecy " to this experimentally acquired natural know­
ledge of future events. But in the present article of the Summa he
denies it the name of prophecy: and rightly so; for, as he wrote in
the De Veritate, this type of knowledge of future events pertains
rather to the arts of medicine and meteorology: “ Talis autem
futurorum cognitio non dicitur esse divinationis vel prophetiae,
sed magis artis. ”
Such natural knowledge of the future is favored by two natural
dispositions: perfection of the imaginative power and clarity of
intellect. Avicenna, from whom St. Thomas borrowed this doctrine,
added a third disposition: the power of the soul over external matter.
St. Thomas was aware of Avicenna’s view, for the 9th objection
in the De Veritate, q. 12, a. 3 is worded: “ Ad prophetiam non
requiruntur nisi tria: scilicet daritas intelligentiae, et perfectio virtutis
imaginativae, et potestas animae ut ei materia exterior obediat,
ut Avicenna ponit in VI de Naturalibus. " But the Angelic Doctor
rejects the third of these dispositions, adding that even angels have
no such power over external matter, “ cum etiam nec ipsis angelis
ad nutum deserviat materia corporalis, ut Augustinus dicit [De Trin.,
III, 8] ” (ibid., ad 9m).

EN [21]
Q. 172, a. ac.
It is the constant teaching of St. Thomas, set forth at the end
of Part I of the Summa, that no created intelligence can illuminate
another by giving it a light of nature, of grace, or of glory (" tradendo
illi lumen sive naturae, sive gratiae, sive gloriae ”). See I, q. 106,
a. i, ad 2m.
27

This doctrine is here taken for granted, but it is expressly stated
in the De Veritale (q. 12, a. 8). Here are St. Thomas’s exact words:
Two things concur in effecting prophetic revelation: the illumination
of the mind and the formation of the representations in the
imaginative power. Therefore, the prophetic light itself, by which
the mind of the prophet is enlightened, comes from God as its primary
source. Nevertheless, the human mind is strengthened and to some
extent prepared for its proper reception by the angelic light. For,
since the power of the divine light is most simple and most universal,
there is no proportion between it and the reception of it by the
human soul in this life, unless it is limited and specified through
union with the angelic light, which is narrower in scope and more
commensurate with the human mind. But the formation of the
representations in the imaginative power must be attributed properly
to the angels, since the whole of bodily creation is under the direction
of the spiritual creation, as Augustine proves [De Trin., Ill, 4].
Now, the imaginative power uses a bodily organ; hence, the formation
of representations in the imaginative power is part of the work
proper to the angels.

Concerning the action of spiritual agencies, whether angels or
men, on the human intellect, St. Thomas makes an application of
the general law that every master, whoever he be, must in some way
approach the mind he wishes to instruct, rather than try to soar
above those who are looking to him for the truth. He must play
a twofold role: (r) strengthen and tighten the disciple’s mind, showing
him how to make use of middle terms in order to reason to
scientific conclusions; (2) present him with less universal pro­
positions so as to lead him to discover those which are more
universal, or give him examples drawn from experience, either by
way of comparison or contrast, or any other such means, with the
help of which the disciple can discover new truths. (See I, q. in,
a. 1; q. 117, a. 1).
EN [22]

Q. 172, a. 3 c.
St. Thomas clearly does not deny that prophecy demands
dispositions in the prophet. But he answers that if these dispositions
exist, God uses them; if they are lacking, God produces them. As
in the case of all other divine gifts, the presence of a previous disposition
does not necessarily demand the bestowal of the gift which it prepares

28

for. God’s good pleasure is not limited by anything, and, if it pleases
him, he can simultaneously create the subject, the disposition, and
the grace, just as he can simultaneously create the matter, the
disposition, and the form.
This case is entirely different from that which is called prophecy
in the broad sense, and which St. Thomas in the De Veritate (q. 12, a. 4)
still terms prophetia naturalis. In that case the dispositions—sc.,
the perfection of the imaginative faculty, and the acuteness and
clarity of the intellect—play a leading part.

EN [23]
Q. 172, a. 4 c: “ Si vero consideremus... per morum malitiam. ’’
The incompatibility of prophecy with certain defects comes from
the fact that they impede its exercise. St. Thomas calls attention
to this in the De Veritate (q. 12, a. 5) :
Some of the sins by which charity is lost hinder the use of prophecy,
and some do not. For, since the sins of the flesh draw the mind
entirely away from things spiritual, by the very fact that one is
given to sins of the flesh he is rendered unfit for prophecy. For the
mind must be eminently spiritual in order to have the revelation
of prophecy. But sins of the spirit do not to the same extent interfere
with the mind’s spirituality. Therefore, it happens that one who
is subject to sins of the spirit, but not to those of the flesh, or even
to the endless cares of this life, which withdraw the mind from
its spirituality, can be a prophet. And, therefore. Rabbi Moses says
that the entanglement in the pleasures and cares of this world is
a sign that one is a false prophet.
St. Thomas’s conclusion may perhaps be summarized as follows:
prophecy does not require holiness of life (charity), but it does require
purity of life for its actual exercise.

EN [24]
Ibid., ad itn: " Qui sunt quasi instrumenta divinae cognitionis. "
This is one of the two texts in this treatise in which St. Thomas
compares the prophet to an “ instrument ’’ of God. On this subject,
see below, p. 77 f., especially p. 82, note 3.

29

EN [25]
Ibid., ad 4m.
The divine wisdom is the sole judge of what gifts it will bestow.
On this question St. Thomas remarks in the De Veritate (q. 12, a. 5,
ad 6m) :

Not every good man is more fit to become a prophet than every
sinner. For some who lack charity have minds more fit to perceive
spiritual things, since they are free from carnal affections and
worldly cares, and are gifted with a natural clarity of understanding.
On the other hand, some who have charity are occupied with worldly
business, are busy begetting children, and do not have a naturally
acute understanding. Therefore, because of these and similar
conditions, the gift of prophecy sometimes is given to some evil
men and denied to some good men.

EN [26]
Q. 172, a. 5, ad am.
In addition to these two methods used by demons to manifest
the future, St. Thomas in the Contra Gentes (III, 154) enumerates
a third: " by certain external indications such as the flight and
chattering of birds, signs perceived in the entrails of animals, figures
outlined by certain points, and the like. ” But this pertains rather
to divination, which he has discussed at length elsewhere: see II-II,
q. 95, treatise on Religion, French translation with notes of
Fr. Mennessier, (Paris, Editions de la Revue des Jeunes) II.

EN [27]

Ibid., ad 3m.
The differences between divine and demonic prophecy can be
reduced to three: (1) divine prophecy extends to everything known
to God alone; demonic prophecy can include only what pertains
to the understanding of demons; (2) divine prophecy involves an
enlightenment of the intellect; demonic prophecy can give no such
intellectual light; (3) divine prophecy cannot be false; demonic
prophecy sometimes contains errors.

30

EN [28]
Q. 172, a. 6 c: " Respondeo dicendum... alicuius veritatis. *’
We can here see St. Thomas’s optimism, both in the intellectual
and moral order and in the real order. There is no reality which does
not include some good, and there can be no error which does not
contain some truth. This optimism is apparent in St. Thomas’s
insistence on the providential order by which God governs the
predictions of demons, as explained in the reply to the first objection.

E2V [29]
Ibid., ad un: " Ad primum... praedixerunt de Christo. "
Against the opinion of many Christians, St. Thomas admits
that the demons can sometimes make true predictions because they
are sometimes instruments of God himself, who makes use of them
to instruct good men. The reasons which he gives for this providential
disposition—to make the truth more credible and to lead men more
easily to the faith—are unusually cogent and, unfortunately, rather
rarely understood in this age of general pessimism.
Concerning the Sybils, the reader may consult what has been
asid in the treatise on Faith, q. 2, a. 7, ad 7m.

EN [30]

Ibid.: " Sed etiam quando... a Spiritu Sancto est. "
Even when false prophets are the instruments of demons,
St. Thomas still succeeds in detecting the elements of truth which
may be present in their prophecies. He does not forget that every
nature, whatever it be, comes from God, and he holds it as certain
that there can be communication between good and evil spirits. Under
these two aspects the Holy Spirit may still be credited, in the last
analysis, with inspiring the truth which is discernible in the statements
of false prophets.
EN [31]
Q. 173, a. i : “ Utrum prophetae ipsam Dei essentiam videant ”.
The question is stated differently in the De Veritate (q. 12, a. 6) :
Utrum prophetae videant in speculo aeternitatis ?But the problem studied
31
N-Y7. —3

in the Summa is actually the same, as may be seen from the body
of the article. The expression, " mirror of eternity, ’’ seems to come
from Avicenna. The sixth objection in the De Veritate is phrased
as follows: " Avicenna says that sometimes the mind of man is elevated
so high that it is united to the mirror of foreknowledge (speculo
•praescientiae). ” * It is obvious that the prophet cannot normally
see God's essence (cf. q. 171, a. 2), but is it not possible for him to
contemplate the divine essence under a particular aspect, insofar
as it is a reflection of creatures and of future contingent events?
St. Thomas replies in the negative, but at the same time tries to save,
by his explanation of it, the traditional expression, “ mirror of
eternity, " which had been adopted by the masters. This " mirror
of eternity, ” as he understands it, is no longer God himself
contemplated by the prophets insofar as he reflects realities, but
rather a created reality in which God’s own eternity is reflected,
so that consequently the “ mirror of eternity " is not itself eternal,
but is that which reflects eternity.
Quod autem a magistris dicitur, -prophetas in speculo aeternitatis
videre, non sic intelligendum esi quasi ipsum Deum aeternum videant
prout est speculum rerum ; sed quia aliquid creatum intuentur, in
quo ipsa aeternitas Dei repraesentatur: ut sic speculum aeternitatis
intelligatur non quod est aeternum, sed quod est aeternitatem reprae­
sentans (De Ver., q. 12, a. 6 c).
• The English translation in the Library of Living Catholic Thought
series (Chicago, 1953) gives the following note on this text of the De
Veritate:

In this and in the following difficulty, the Leonine text has the world
of foreknowledge, higher world, and world of intelligible substances,
saeculum in each case; the earlier editions have mirror (speculum). This
use of saeculum seems a bit unusual, but the meaning is clear enough.

— Trans.

EN [32]
I !,i
t ,1
I id
1 i
•f .
I i
4 d

Ibid., c: " Fuerunt autem quidam... speculum aeternitatis. ... “
The expression "mirror of eternity" (speculum aeternitatis)
is metaphorical, and is thus explained by St. Thomas in the De Veritate
(loc.cit.):
·
Properly speaking, a mirror exists only in material things. But
spiritual things something is called a mirror in a transferred
32

sense, because of the likeness taken from the material mirror. Thus,
in spiritual things we call that a mirror in -which other things are
represented, just as the forms of visible things appear in a material
mirror. Therefore, some say that the divine mind, in -which all the
intelligible characters of -things shine forth, is a kind of mirror,
and that it is called the " mirror of eternity ” because it is eternal,
inasmuch as it has eternity.

EN [33]
Q. 173, a. 2 c: “ ...vel etiam divinitus ordinatas ex his quae a sensibus
sunt acceptae. ... ”
When God thus arranges in a special way the imaginative forms
of things which have been perceived by the senses, there is an
intervention ol the prophetic light, as is explained in the reply to
the second objection. The prophet’s mind discovers a deeper truth
in these imaginative forms, thanks to the influence and brightness
of a light higher than that of his own intellect. This light can come
from no other source than God; it is the prophetic light.

EN [34]
Ibid.: " et ad hoc pertinet interpretatio sermonum. ”
Evidently for St. Thomas, 0 interpretation of speeches " is a
charism which can give the ability to comment on Holy Scripture,
rather than merely that of interpreting words spoken with the gift
of tongues. This charism belongs to the same order as that of prophecy,
in accordance with the principle: " Sacra Scriptura eodem Spiritu
interpretatur quo est condita ” (In Rom. XII, lect. 2 ; cf. Quodl. XII,
q. 17). (See Explanatory Note 73.)

EN [35]
Ibid.
Hence there are three cases to be considered, accordingly as
God supematurally gives the prophet: (1) light and representations,
(2) light without representations, or (3) representations without light.
In the third case, there can be question only of imaginative
visions or sensory apparitions not understood by the prophet; obviously
there could be no question of intelligible representations since, in

33

the absence of a light, there can be no intellectual knowledge.
A charism of such an inferior grade does not deserve the name of
prophecy, except in a very improper sense (quiddam imperfectum
in genere prophetiae), or even not at all: "si cognitio sit secundum
acceptationem tantum supematuralis, non dicetur ex hoc aliquis
propheta ” (De Ver., q. 12, a. 7 c).

'11

On the other hand, in the first two cases there is true supernatural
knowledge and true prophecy. As is demanded by all knowledge,
there will be in each of these cases a light and intelligible represen­
tations; further, these representations will have imaginative forms
as their basis, since human thought cannot exist without recourse
to phantasms. In short, these two cases will have the same
psychological structure, sc., that found in any intellectual knowledge.
But the intelligible representations will be conferred on the mind
in different ways, and this will give rise to the different grades of
prophetic knowledge.

fi

ί

y ■
|i ;

a) In the normal case of full prophetic knowledge, the supernatural
light conferred on the inspired subject will not only enlighten his
judgment, which is its essential role, but will also previously contribute
to the formation of the concepts which serve as the material of that
judgment. This can take place in either of two ways:

•5.

i) Sometimes the prophetic light will be strong enough to impress
intelligible representations directly on the prophet’s mind, or to
rearrange in a supernatural way representations which he already
had (see Explanatory Note 37). In the brilliance of the supernatural
illumination, the prophet will immediately grasp the truths being
communicated to him, and will do so in the best possible way, sc., by
means of ideas. Here we have the case of directly infused intelligible
representations, the highest grade of prophetic knowledge. It is obvious
that, in order to apprehend these intelligible forms, the prophet will
need some imaginative substrate, in conformity with the general
requirements of human knowledge. But the phantasms already
stored up in his memory will provide sufficient materials to enable
his mind, illuminated by the contemplation of infused truths, to
evoke suitable imaginative forms (cf. q. 174, a. 2, ad 4m, and Cajetan,
Comm., n. Ill; De Ver., q. 12, a. 12 c prope finem, and ad im, 2m,
and 4m).

i

?

4

I
1
ΐ
3

5

34

s

.

>
ï
1

'

'

ü) At other times the prophetic light will not be strong enough
directly to imprint on the prophet’s mind the ideas which God wishes
to communicate to him. In such cases he will receive these supernatural
representations in an inferior way, as either imaginary or even sensory
forms, and will himself have to abstract from these forms the ideas
which will serve as the material of his judgment. But he cannot do
this by his unaided reason; he will need a light commensurate with
the supernatural datum he has received, i.e., a supernatural light.
This will be the prophetic light, and in this case too, besides its essential
role of enlightening the judgment, it will play a part in the formation
of the concepts on which the judgment bears; but in this case, the
action of the prophetic light in the formation of concepts will be
indirect, and will involve abstraction from imaginative data, rather
than direct, as in the preceding case, where the concepts were
immediately infused.

This second case includes various subspecies which vaiy in dignity
according to the way in which the prophet receives the required
images. There will sometimes be a properly imaginative vision,
involving either the reception of totally new images or a new
combination (effected by God) of images previously acquired in
a natural way. At other times, in an inferior grade, the prophet will
be favored only with sensory apparitions and will himself have to
' derive from them the imaginative forms which will, in turn, supply
the intelligible forms. Or, finally, he might receive the imaginative
or sensory vision only mediately, through the agency of another
man who has received it, without the required light, and submits
it to his judgment.
The recourse to phantasms of which we have just spoken must
be carefully distinguished from that previously discussed in connection
with directly infused intelligible representations. In the preceding
case, the mind first received the intelligible representations and
only subsequently turned to naturally acquired imaginative forms,
as to a necessary psychological support. Here the mind begins with
imaginative representations which it has received in a supernatural
way, and abstracts its intelligible representations from this imaginative
data. Each process is the reverse of the other. The first process,
moreover, dearly corresponds to a more powerful supernatural light

35

and hence to a more excellent grade of prophetic knowledge (see
q. 174, a. 2 and Explanatory Note 48; De Ver., q. 12, esp. ad 2m).
b) But another case is also possible. The prophetic light may
be granted to the mind only to enlighten the judgment, without
playing any part in the formation of its ideas. God, in such a case,
does not give the inspired subject either new ideas or new images;
he lets him make use of data acquired in a natural way by the ordinary
exercise of his senses, imagination, and intellect. Under these
circumstances the knowledge of the inspired subject is limited to the
intelligible representations which he has been able to acquire naturally
by his own powers (quae cursu naturali homo apprehendit) ; he learns
nothing new from the supernatural light, but is indebted to it only
for his ability to make judgments with divine certitude and clarity
about things which he has learned through natural processes. This
is the case which we have above referred to as “ light without
representations, ’’ and it is now clear how this phrase should be
understood: without supernatural representations. This is also what
modern terminology calls “ inspiration " as opposed to “ revelation, ”
inasmuch as the latter implies supematurally bestowed representations
and embraces all the previously described cases. The prophetic light
here acts in a less powerful way, and St. Thomas deems this case
inferior to those of prophecy in the proper sense.
Accordingly as one or another of these types of prophecy is had,
the ideas on which the prophet’s judgment bears may be either
supernatural or natural. But it should be noted that there is here
question of the way in which they are acquired (quoad modum),
and not necessarily of their intrinsic formality (quoad substantiam).1
From this last point of view the situation is not the same. There
can be " revelations ” which disclose intrinsically natural truths—
for example, Elisha’s discovery of what Gehazi was doing at
a distance—and, conversely, simple " inspiration ” can bear on
truths which are in themselves supernatural—for example, St. Luke’s
description of the Annunciation which he had learned in a natural
way through listening to the Blessed Virgin’s account of it.
1 The distinction between quod modum and quoad substantiam is here
understood in the sense generally accepted in the Thomist school; the viewpoint
of q. 171, a. 2, ad 3m is quite diSerent and less common. Cf. M. Labourdette
in Revue Thomiste 50 (1950) 409-ir.

36

the following
The preceding analysis may be summarized in
diagram, in which the grades are listed in descending order (for this
classification see, in addition to the present article, q. 174, a. 2 and 3;
De Ver., q. 12 a. 7,12 and 13) :

il |

t
L

ACCEPTIO

Species
supra
Prophetiam
proprie
dictam

intelugibiles

1) infused (supematurally)
a) Directly:
i) by impression of new
ideas
ii) by new arrangement of
old ideas (with further
recourse to a natural
imaginative support)
b) Indirectly, i. e., abstracted
with the help of a pro­
phetic light, from:

Prophetia
proprie
dicta
(esp. i)

infra
Prophetiam
proprie
dictam
Prophetia
secundum
quid

g
g
I

LUMEN
and
SPECIES

i) imaginative visions
a'’) infusion of new
images
br) new arrangement
of old images
ii) sensory visions from
which the inspired
subject has to derive
his images
iii) imaginative or sensory
visions granted to another who submits them
to the one inspired

2) acquired (naturally)

a) imaginative
forms
b) sensory
forms

supernatural,
but not understood by the inspired subject

" Revelation "
(in modem
sense)

|
|
1

1

LUMEN
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EN [36]
Ibid., ad %m.
Cajetan {Comm., n. Ill) correctly remarks that the mind actually
cannot, without the aid of a prophetic light, organize its natural
images in such a way as to discover in them supernatural truths.
But it can subsequently organize its images so as to contemplate
these truths once they have been revealed. This is likewise what
we ourselves do when we engage in contemplating the mysteries
which have been declared to us by witnesses of God.

EN [37]
Q. 173, a. 3 c: “ ...secundum immissionem intelligibilium specierum.... ”
f
As Cajetan remarks, St. Thomas evidently does not wish to
exclude here the case of new combinations of intelligible ideas. Just
as God can recombine imaginative forms which have previously
been acquired, so too he can rearrange ideas which already exist
in the prophet’s mind.
EN [38]

Ibid.: " Manifestum est autem... significabatur Ecclesia. ”
The spiritual meanings, in virtue of which events or realities
mentioned in the Old Testament prophetically symbolize events
or realities of the New, are willed by divine Providence. St. Thomas’s
example is significant: the ark of Noah is a symbol of the Church.

EN [39]

Ibid.: " Sed quando fit revelatio... ab his quae imaginabiliter
videt....”
In short, transport (“ abstractio a sensibus ’’) is required in
only one case, that of prophecy which takes place with the help
of imaginative forms. Such transport is necessary to prevent the
prophet from confusing the forms in his imagination with the external
objects which his senses could perceive.
38

Transport is never possible in the case of prophecy which is
effected with the help of sensory forms, for the prophet needs the
use of his senses to perceive these forms.
Such transport, moreover, is not necessary to enable the prophet
to make a supernatural and infallible judgment by means of the
prophetic light, nor to make him understand the intelligible forms
which God either gives him by way of infused knowledge or wisdom,
or rearranges so that new ideas may arise.
There is one case, however, in which transport is demanded
for the exercise of prophecy; sc., when there is question of contem­
plating the highest truths (see ad 3m). In this case, the more withdrawn
the prophet is from his senses, the better he is able to contemplate.
This law, as Cajetan observes, is likewise verified in the natural
order: “ Quoniam disponentes aut judicantes de sensibilibus, non
abstrahimur, sed sensibus immergimur; ad altiora autem speculanda,
quanto magis abstrahimur, melius perspicimus ’’ (Comm., η. II).

EN [40]
Ibid. : " Talis tamen alienatio a sensibus... super eum manus Domini. ”
St. Thomas, according to Cajetan, expresses a '* golden maxim "
(aureum verbum) and a " divine stipulation ” (divinam conditionem)
when he writes that transport or alienation from the senses in cases
of prophecy cannot be the effect of a natural disorder. And Cajetan
judiciously adds that such transport is even more incompatible
with moral disorder, for grace in general has the function of perfecting
nature and morals, not of destroying, diminishing, or violating them.

EN [41]
Ibid., ad 4m.
This reply is a restatement of the sed contra of the article:
prophetic discourse is always subject to the prophet’s mind, even
though the Holy Spirit is specially responsible for the prophetic
revelation. When he speaks, therefore, the prophet must not give
the impression that he is doing so with a disturbed mind, as though
another were speaking through his mouth; he must know what he
39

is saying and speak of what he has seen. It would be unfitting if those
who are taught and enlightened by God for the edification of the
Church were to conduct themselves like irrational beings when
proclaiming the divine mysteries (see Cajetan, Comm., η. IV).
EN [42]
Q. 173, a. 4 c: " Sciendum tamen quod... Spiritus intendit. ”
How are we to understand the expression here used by St. Thomas
in reference to the prophets—that they are defective instruments
of the Holy Spirit who acts upon them as principal cause? Separate
consideration will be given to this question (see infra, p. 77 ft).
EN [43]

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Ibid.: "Et per hoc patet... illustratur perfecte. "
According to this reply, the objections at the beginning of the
article have reference to genuine prophets, whose mind is perfectly
enlightened by God. St. Thomas admits the validity of these objections,
and concedes the conclusion to which they lead. Now these three
objections tended to grant that the prophet has evidential knowledge.
Cajetan observes that St. Thomas has already (q. 171, a. 5, Comm.,
η. II) recognized that the prophet has two sorts of evidence: that
of the fact of revelation — namely, that it comes from God — and
that of the truths which are revealed (see Explanatory Note 15). But
he points out that certain prophets have only a light which is, so to
speak, shaded: at times they know contingent future events only
in their causes and not in themselves. Thus Jonah, for example,
did not know whether Nineveh would really be destroyed, for that
certitude was not communicated to him by the Holy Spirit, in whose
hands he was merely a defective instrument (see Explanatory Note 18).
EN [44]

g. 174, a. i c: “ Et horum est prophetia... non sunt in nobis. "
In the De Veritate (q. 12, a. 10), St. Thomas gives the examples
of the resurrection of Lazarus and the conception of Christ. In
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connection with the latter he remarks (ad 6m) : “ The consent of the
Blessed Virgin intervened in the conception of Christ as something
which removed a hindrance and not as an operative cause. For it
was not fitting for so great a favor to be given to one who was
unwilling. "

EN [45]

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Ibid.: " Et quia praedestinatio sub praescientia comprehenditur. "
As will be recalled, St. Thomas has already maintained (q. 171,
a. 3, ad 3m) that there is no room for distinguishing between different
species of prophecy, for the formal element in prophecy is the prophetic
light, and there is but one such light (see Explanatory Note 12). Here,
on the contrary, St. Thomas concedes that there are several species
of prophecy. This is because he finds himself confronted by a gloss
ascribed to St. Jerome, which distinguished, three kinds: prophecy
of threat, prophecy of foreknowledge, and prophecy of predestination.
He justifies this distinction in terms of a distinction of objects. At
the end of the article, however, St. Thomas reduces the division to
two kinds: prophecy of threat (or promise) and prophecy of forek­
nowledge (under which he includes predestination). Equivalently
he says that there are only two kinds of prophetic revelation: the
revelation of future events in their causes, and the revelation of
future events in themselves. But the distinctive note of prophecy
in the proper sense is the knowledge of future events in themselves
(q. 172, a. 1). And since future events can be known in their causes
by natural means, it follows that there is only one species of prophecy
properly so called, in which the formal element is the prophetic light.
This is the prophecy of foreknowledge, which can bear upon different
objects accordingly as it reflects one or another aspect of the divine
knowledge.

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Q. 174, a. 2 c.
As was said above (Explanatory Note35),the prophet’s knowledge,
in the two cases which are here being compared, necessarily involves
intelligible representations and imaginative forms. But in the case
of pure " intellectual vision, " the intelligible representations are

41

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directly infused into the mind by the powerful prophetic light itself,
and the imaginative forms, natural in origin, are evoked after the
event as a help for contemplating the infused ideas. Conversely, the
prophetic light in the other case is of an inferior order and is unable
to give the mind this direct grasp of the truth in itself. This truth,
therefore, has to be presented to the mind in an inferior way, containing
sensory elements, i.e., in an imaginative vision. Subsequently the
mind, aided by the prophetic light, abstracts from this vision the
intelligible representations which it would not have been able to
perceive directly. Since the brightness of the supernatural light is
what determines the excellence of prophecy, the second case is
obviously of a lower grade than thefirst (see De Ver., q. 12, a. 12,
ad im and 2m).

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Ibid., ad yn: ” Qui etiam ex hoc... divini luminis. ’’
St. Thomas here contrasts the prophets, who contemplate
supernatural truth, with the hagiographers, who more frequently
treat only of truths of the natural order. But the reservations " more "
and " more frequently ” (plures, frequentius) should not be overlooked.
For the sacred writers too were sometimes empowered to make
judgments about supernatural truths, as St. Thomas observes elsewhere
(De Ver., q. 12, a. 12, ad 10m). And since they do not normally arrive
at these truths by imaginative visions, which are the distinctive
attribute of "prophets, "it follows that they receive infused intelligible
representations. In this case their charism becomes superior to that
of the prophets. St. Thomas accordingly ranks David above Isaiah
and Jeremiah (De Ver., q. 12, a. 13 c; cf. q. 174, a. 4, ad im).

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Ibid., ad 4m; " Ad quartum... qualiumque. *’
Imaginative visions should not be confused with the images
which are necessary for all human thought. In prophecy involving
imaginative visions, these visions present the truth itself by means
of symbols and comparisons. In prophecy which presents supernatural

truths in the pure state, the images serve as a support for the
understanding of these truths. In keeping with man’s natural processes
of knowledge, these images are normally derived from sense-experience
(see Explanatory Note 35).

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Q. 174, a. 3 c: " Magis autem est... ad supernaturalem veritatem. "
The cases of Samson and Solomon are not alike, although
St. Thomas ranks them both below prophecy in the proper sense.
In the case of Samson, we are dealing with an interior instinct (interior
instinctus) which impels the recipient to perform external actions.
To reduce every supernatural influence to prophecy is actually to
take the term in a broad sense, as we read in the De Veritate (q. 12,
a. 13): "largo modo accipiendo prophetiam, secundum quod omnis
supematuralis influxus ad prophetiam reducitur. ” In the case of
Solomon, on the other hand, we are dealing with a true interior light
(interius lumen) which enables the recipient to form supernatural
and infallible judgments about truths surpassing the limits of human
knowledge.
Even though these two grades are inferior to prophecy in the
proper sense, they cannot be classified as cases of prophetic instinct,
as understood by St. Thomas when he calls it something imperfect
in the genus of prophecy (quid imperfectum in genere prophetiae,
q. 171, a. 5; q. 173, a. 4), unless we assume that Samson and Solomon
were unconscious of the charism conferred on them by God. These
two grades still belong in the genus of prophecy, but are on a lower
level with respect to prophecy which, in its formal sense, reveals
some supernatural truth.

EN [50]
Q. 174, a. 4, ad 3m.
Moses is the greatest prophetic figure of the Old Testament,
both because of his intimate and sustained relations with God
(concerning his vision of the divine essence, see Explanatory Note 59)
and because of the exceptional mission he received, sc., to promulgate
43

the Law and to preside over the marvelous events that would be the
inspiration of all the later history of Israel. Though God’s servants
in the New Testament were even greater than Moses, their superiority
did not consist in their personal gifts, which were perhaps less
remarkable, but rather in the fact of belonging to the new economy
established by Christ, which essentially surpassed the old order,
just as grace surpassed the Law. More particularly, " there is a clearer
revelation in the New Testament; as is written in 2 Corinthians
[3: 18], ' But we all, beholding the glory of the Lord with faces
unveiled ... ’ Here, the Apostle distinctly puts himself and the other
apostles on a higher plane than Moses ” (De Ver., q. 12, a. 14, ad 5m).

EN [51]
Q. 174, a. 5, ad j,m.
Several times in his works St. Thomas returned to this question
of the prophecy exercised by Christ; and his thought gradually
progressed. An account of his doctrine and its development may
be found in the treatise on The Incarnate Word (III, qq. 1-59) in the
French translation of Fr. Héris, O.P. (Paris, Editions de la Revue
des Jeunes), II, 346-51.

EN [52]
Ibid., ad 4m.
Following the lead of St. Augustine, whom he cites in II-II,
q, 95, a. 4, ad 2m, St. Thomas considers two possible explanations
of how the witch of Endor summoned Samuel: (1) either it was
genuine, riot because the demons themselves had any power over
the soul of this just man, but because God may have deemed it
appropriate to satisfy Saul’s wishes and to inform him in this way
of his impending ruin; (2) or it was a mere diabolical illusion, in which
the real Samuel took no part. But he hesitates to advance this second
explanation because of the explicit text of Ecclesiasticus (Ben Sira)
46: 20 (Vulg. 23). In I, q. 89, a. 8, ad 2m, he questioned the canonical
authenticity of this book of the Bible, something which we can no
longer do since the Council of Trent. Still in the footsteps of

St. Augustine (II-II, lac. cit.), he here observes more correctly that
the sacred author might have been speaking only according to the
opinion of Saul and his companions, and have called by the name
of Samuel what was really a mere phantom.

EN [531

Q. 174, a. 6: " Utrum gradus prophetiae... temporis processum. "
Here we have the counterpart of the problem in the treatise
on Faith (II-II, q. 1, a. 7) : " Have the articles of faith increased with
the passage of time? ” In the treatise on Faith, St. Thomas replied
rather succinctly that all the articles of faith were contained implicitly
in certain primary truths, sc., belief in the existence of God and
in his providence as regards the salvation of men. Here we have a more
detailed reply, which brings in the mysteries of the knowledge of
God and of the Incarnation, and makes distinctions between the
various epochs. Besides, he alludes to revelations which teach men
how they should act. It should be kept in mind that St. Thomas
admits as subjective factors making for progress in revelation both
the prophetic light and the new images and ideas which lead to new
supernatural truths. From the objective point of view, however, these
new supernatural truths constitute only a development from the
implicit to the explicit, from the imperfect to the perfect. In the
treatise on Faith he was speaking principally from this latter point
of view.
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EN [54]
Ibid., c: " ...quod quidem nomen... ineffabilis nominis. "
“ Adonai ” is the word used in place of the Tetragrammaton
" Yahweh, " the personal name of God which the Jews out of reverence
never pronounced. Whenever they met the Tetragrammaton in
a text of Holy Scripture, the readers were warned by the special
vocalization that they should substitute for this ineffable name
either the word “ Adonai ” or the word " Elohim. ” The vowels of
the name “ Yahweh ” were never written, but were replaced either
by those of the word “ Adonai ” (whence originated the erroneous
pronunciation " Jehovah, ” so long in use) or by those of the word
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45

" Elohim " (which gave rise to the pronunciation, " Jehovih
Concerning the Tetragrammaton and its theological meaning, see I,
q. 13, a. 9; a. 11, ad im.
EN [55]

Ibid., ad 2m: " Ad secundum dicendum... quae gentibus imperaret. ”
The foundation of Rome in B.C. 753 is approximately
contemporaneous with the beginnings of prophecy in Israel: Amos
and Hosea were hardly before that date, and the mission of Isaiah
took place in the second half of the eighth century B.C. We may
likewise ascribe to this and the following century the definitive editing
of certain historical works, which were themselves unquestionably
based on much older sources that had not yet received their final
form. Thus it would seem that on the eve of the catastrophe which
was about to disperse his chosen people, and at the birth of the empire
which was to complete their ruin, God saw to it that his Revelation
was set down in a written form which would be able to survive these
material disasters and even reach the peoples of pagan lands. Such,
at least, is the hidden harmony which we, following the lead of
St. Augustine, can discern and admire in the dispositions of God’s
providence.
EN [56]

Ibid, ad 3m: " Et singulis temporibus... actuum directionem. "
Prophecy did not cease with John the Baptist, or even with
the end of the Apostolic Age. God continued and still continues
through the centuries to assist his Church with this charism (see
p. 165, note 2). We must, however, make several important
reservations in this delicate matter.
(1) In the first place, there can be no question of innovations
in the doctrines of faith. For revelation closed with the end of the
Apostolic era, and nothing can ever be added to this deposit. When
the Church from time to time makes dogmatic definitions, she does
not, as is well known, proclaim any new revelation, but merely states
in explicit form what was already contained in the deposit of faith.
The revelations received by holy mystics, such as a St. Catherine
of Siena or a St. Teresa of Avila, add nothing substantial to Christian

46

doctrine, but merely clarify it. The Church, moreover, rigorously
examines the orthodoxy of these private revelations before recognizing
their divine origin.

(2) The new prophets, therefore, cannot be bearers of really
new revelations except as regards the practical conduct of Christians
(ad humanorum actuum directionem), which necessarily varies with
the passage of time. But even in such cases these prophets should
not be indiscriminately obeyed. On this point we must make
a distinction, (a) If their directives or reforms concern the public
life of the Church, the Church herself must officially approve before
they may be heeded. And the Church will not approve them unless
they give manifest signs of their supernatural mission, such as miracles
or incontrovertible scriptural proofs. The Church has thus given
official recognition to the revelations of St. Margaret Mary concerning
devotion to the Sacred Heart, (b) If they claim to direct only the
■private actions of certain persons or groups, and if their prescriptions
are also in agreement with the general laws of the Church, those
interested are free to follow them if they think proper. But if their
directives are at variance with the general laws of the Church, or
with laws of some group which have been approved by the Church,
or if they are even suspected of such variance, then they are not
to be believed or obeyed. The reason is simple: it is certain that the
laws of the Church are good and approved by God, but there is no
evidence that the innovator is a genuine prophet. There can be no
doubt as to the choice dictated by Christian prudence between the
unquestionably good and authorized conduct prescribed by the
general laws, and the supposedly better, but dubiously authorized,
conduct which is proposed as a substitute. Let no one be afraid of
"despising the prophets” by acting thus; for the Apostle, having
written these words, immediately adds, “ but test them all, retaining
only what is good, and avoiding every kind of evil ’’ (1 Th 5: 20-22).
See Cajetan, Comm., nn. III-V.
These rules of discernment are very wise. If Christians had
always observed them, the Church would not have had so many
times in her history to deplore the excesses of certain " spiritual "
persons who, imprudently accepting the innovations of those falsely
claiming to be inspired, have fallen into gross disorders or even plunged
into heresy.
47
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ΕΛΓ[57]

Q. 175, a. I c: “ Hujusmodi autem abstractio... ex virtute divina. ”
To these three causes we may add a fourth which St. Thomas
himself mentions elsewhere, sc., the intensity with which the soul
engages in contemplation (see q. 173, a. 3 c fin. and ad 2m; De Ver.,
q. 12, a. 9; q. 13, a. 3) or in love (see following article; I-II, q. 28, a. 3),
whereby it can be totally absorbed to the point of transport. This,
however, is a cause intrinsic to the soul and for that reason is not
listed by St. Thomas with the three extrinsic causes here mentioned:
God, the devil, and, finally, the body; although this last is intrinsic
to the human composite, it is extrinsic to the soul.
As is well known, the Angelic Doctor was able to become
abstracted at will and could immerse himself so deeply in contem­
plation as to feel nothing of a painful medical treatment. But other
ecstacies which caused him to be raised above the ground make it
evident that the activity of God also intervened in his case (Cajetan,
Comm, on a. 2).

EN [58]
Q. 175, a. 2, ad im.
Ecstacies of love are more natural to man in his present status
than mental raptures. For the will even now has an unlimited tendency
toward the Absolute Good, whereas the intellect cannot attain Truth
except through the medium of sensible objects. The mind must suffer
violence and abandon its proper mode of operation in order to rise
to the plane of ideas without going by way of images. The appetitive
power, on the other hand, merely follows the bent of its nature when
it goes out of itself and embraces the infinite. Here we have a good
illustration of, or even the reason for, the primacy of love over
knowledge in this present life.
E1V [59]

Q- 175. a- 3 cAs proof that St. Paul saw the divine essence, St. Thomae appeals
to two authorities: that of St. Augustine and that of the Apostle
himself. Cajetan has a " scruple ’’ regarding the words of the latter.
48

St. Paul says that he heard, not that he saw, and that he perceived
words (in the plural), not a single object, as would be appropriate
for an intuition of the divine essence.
But St. Thomas himself replies to this objection (In II Cor. XII,
lect. 2) : “ dicit autem audivit pro vidit, quia illa consideratio fuit
secundum interiorem actum animae, in quo idem est auditus et
visus...” Actually it is certam that the Apostle, not knowing whether
he was in the body or out of the body, could not have here intended
to oppose hearing to sight, nor to attribute to the term " words ”
a concrete and multiple meaning.
It must be acknowledged, however, that Scripture does not
oblige us to think that he saw the divine essence. The " third heaven, ”
" paradise, ” and “ ineffable words ” can mean a very high mystical
experience without necessarily demanding the beatific vision.
As for the case of Moses, to which Thomas appeals as the basis '
for an a priori argument (ad im), the most explicit scriptural text
(Nm 12: 8) does not distinguish him from the other prophets except
by the fact that he saw God while awake, rather than asleep, and
under a proper (i.e., human) form, rather than by enigmatic symbols.
Elsewhere God refuses to give Moses a direct vision of his face, for
" man cannot see me, and live ” (Ex 33: 20).
It was the authority of St. Augustine which influenced St. Thomas,
and the medieval theologians in general, to concede that Moses and
St. Paul had actually seen the divine essence. But the other Fathers
of the Church make no categorical assertions on this matter. The
reflections of St. John Chrysostom and Theodoret rather oppose
this view. Modem writers prefer to abandon this earlier theological
opinion as less probable.

EN [60]

Ibid., ad am: "Et ideo talis raptus... ad prophetiam pertinet. ”
The comparison that St. Thomas here draws between the light
which enraptured the mind of St. Paul and the prophetic light is
valid only as regards their mode of inherence, not as to their specific .
nature. For Paul’s light, by hypothesis, caused him to see the divine
essence, whereas the prophetic light does not confer this vision
49

(q. 173, a. 1). In the terminology used previously (q. 171, a. 2), one
might situate St. Paul’s light midway between the light of glory and
the prophetic light, saying that it was a " transitory " form like
the latter, but “ perfect ” like the former. In other words, it was
essentially the same as the light of glory, but accidentally it was
received in the same way as is the prophetic light. (On this matter
the reader may consult Cajetan, Comm., q. 171, a. 2, particularly
η. IV.) Some reservations should also be made regarding the
“ perfection ’’ of the light granted to St. Paul and its specific identity
with the light of glory. St. Thomas concedes (a. 6, ad 3m) that it
was in some sense less perfect, for it did not disclose to the Apostle
all that the blessed are able to see in the divine essence (see Explanatory
Note 71).
EN [61]

Ibid., ad yn; " Fuit tamen in eo simul fidei habitus. "
On the supposition that St. Paul saw the divine essence, we
may find it surprising that he kept even the virtue of faith, since
he could not have believed things which he had already seen with
certain evidence, and which he remembered even after the vision
had ceased.
The answer is that he did not see everything in the divine essence
(cf. De Ver., q. 13, a. 5, ad 6m). He could still have faith in what
had not been manifested to him. And even as to the mysteries which
he had contemplated, he could still retain a certain conditional faith
with respect to them; that is to say, the interior disposition which
rendered him ready to believe them even if he had not seen them.
This solution is applicable to the faith of prophets in general,
with reference to the objects of their visions (Cajetan).
In the De Veritate (q. 13, a. 2, ad 5m) St. Thomas says that
St. Paul’s hope after his rapture was similar to his faith. But it seems
easier to see how he could have still possessed hope—even actual
hope—in this state, inasmuch as he realized that the possession
of the divine mystery was not yet granted to him in a definitive
way, and that he had not earned it as a reward (see Explanatory
Note 63). St. Thomas no doubt deliberately omitted this point in
his reply in the Summa.

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50

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EN [62]
Ibid., ad 4m: " Ad quartum... aquei sive crystallini. "
On the number and nomenclature of the heavens, see In II Sent.,
d. 14, q. i, a. 4 and Summa, I, q. 68, a. 4. On the empyrean heaven
in particular, see In II Sent., d. 2, q. 2, and Summa, I, q. 66, a. 3.

EN [63]
Ibid.: " Et quia visio Dei... delectationis consequentis. ”
The delight which flows from contemplation depends ultimately
on love, of which it is a fruit (cf. ΙΙ-Π, q. 28). Hence St. Thomas
admits {De Ver., q. 13, a. 2, ad 6m) that, besides having the vision
of the blessed, St. Paul had also their act of charity. The love which
he experienced in this rapture, Uke that of heaven, therefore had
no meritorious value—no more, indeed, than the vision itself was
merited {ibid., ad 8m). Thus this love would likewise be a grace as
extraordinary at it was transient.
EN [64]

Q. 175, a. 4, ad im: “ Ad primum ergo... et sensibilibus. ”
Among the blessed after the resurrection, the body, then purified
and totally subject to the soul, will not only cease to interfere with
the mind’s contemplation {De Ver., q. 13, a. 3, ad im), but will even
be associated in that contemplation by an overflow which it will
receive from the glorified soul (I-II, q. 3, a. 3; q. 4, a. 5 and 6). The
senses, of course, will not be able to perceive the divine essence, which
is immaterial, but they will discern its reflections in the glorified
universe (I, q. 12, a. 3; Suppl., q. 92, a. 2).

EN [65]
Ibid., ad am: " Erat autem viator... dispensative... ”
Concerning this "dispensation of the divine power” which
prevented the glory of Christ's soul from redounding upon his body,
and the beatific knowledge of his mind from overflowing into the
51

sensory powers, see I-II, q. 14, a. 1, ad 2m; q. 15, a. 5, ad 3m; a. 6;
a. 9, ad 3m; q. 45, a. 2 c and ad im, etc.
Christ had complete control over all the parts of his soul and
body. He could make each of them act in its own connatural way
and independently, so as neither to draw the others along nor to
interfere with their activity, as happens in us because of the
interrelations of the faculties. Thus he was able to contemplate the
divine essence with his mind and still remain attentive to the objects
present to his senses (De Ver., q. 10, a. 11, ad 3m; q. 13, a. 3, ad 3m).
EN [66]

•j

Ibid., ad 3m: " Ad tertium dicendum... phantasmata, memorabatur. ”
The intelligible representations which remained imprinted on
St. Paul’s mind after his vision were there only in a habitual state.
In order for them to be reactivated in acts of knowledge, he was
obliged to connect them with forms supplied by his imagination,
according to the mode of knowledge which man necessarily exercises
in the present life. Thus it was possible for him to remember them
even though the memory is of itself a power of the sensory order;
for in this case it served only as an imaginative support for purely
intellectual data (De Ver., q. 13, a. 3, ad 4m).
The origin of these intelligible representations may be attributed
to the direct action of the divine light on the Apostle’s passive intellect.
This is the explanation which St. Thomas seems to accept here and
in the De Veritate (loc. cit.). But conceivably also they could have
been actively formed by the mind of Paul himself on the basis of what
he contemplated, in accordance with the natural tendency of the
intellect to represent to itself in intellectual similitudes whatever
it sees; on this point see I, q. 12, a. 9, ad 2m (Cajetan).

EN [67]
Q. 175, a. 5, ad 3m.
It is true that, in themselves, the vegetative functions of the
human body operate instinctively, without requiring the attention
of the mind and hence without disturbing its activity. In an indirect
52
?

way, however, these functions have certain repercussions on the
mind, inasmuch as they influence man’s sensory functions, on winch
the operation of his intellect directly depends. In the De Veritate
(q. 13, a. 4) St. Thomas calls attention to this accidental connection
between thought and the most material functions of the body; and
Cajetan in turn emphasizes this in his Commentary. Digestion, for
example, can hamper the free activity of the mind, and conversely
intense exertion of the mind can impede the work of the nutritive
functions.
This conflict does not arise, St. Thomas adds, in the contemplation
of the divine essence, which by definition excludes any activity of
the sensory faculties. But the indirect connection between the mind
and the vegetative functions is still an important factor in the lower
grades of ecstacy and rapture, which involve a certain exercise of
the imagination. And the same must be said for the corresponding
grades of prophecy.
EN [68]
Q. 175, a. 6, c: " Sed hunc sensum improbat... apparet in somniis. ”
The De Veritate (q. 13, a. 5 c) adds at this point: “ Thus, it would
not have been necessary to distinguish between what he knew and
what he did not know, since he would know equally that
he was in heaven and that he was transported in the body, i.e., in
a likeness of the body, as happens in dreams. ’’ This sentence clarifies
and completes the argument which, in the Summa, is somewhat
elliptical.
I
4

EN [69]

t

Ibid.
The whole argument set forth in the body of this article reappears,
often with greater clarity, in the De Veritate (q. 13, a. 5). It is also
restated, but in briefer form, in In II Cor. XII, lect. i. St. Thomas
concludes, in agreement with St. Augustine, that St. Paul knew
very well that his body had not been raised to the third heaven with
his soul, and that his ignorance concerned only the following point:
had his soul, in that unnatural state, been separated from the body
in a merely accidental way, sc., by being withdrawn from the sensory

53

»··Μ·Μ···ί|ι.... . .. .

functions, or had it left the body entirely, in an essential way, to
such an extent that the Apostle was truly dead, even though only
in a miraculous and temporary manner (see the following Explanatory
Note)?
St. Augustine’s reasoning, however, does not seem irrefutable.
St. Paul might have known that he had been really taken up to the
third heaven without thereby knowing whether this heaven was
purely spiritual or also corporeal, or in other words, whether his soul
alone was there or whether it needed the offices of the body. So sublime,
indeed, was his vision that he was unable to understand in precisely
what state he experienced it, nor, consequently, to what kind of
world he had been transported. Besides, the idea of journeys to the
celestial spheres, not only in spirit but also in body, was rather
widespread among his contemporaries, both Jewish and pagan. It is,
therefore, quite possible that St. Paul would have put the question
in this sense, which was disapproved by St. Augustine and after
him by St. Thomas, but which, on the contrary, was accepted by
St. John Chrysostom, and is clearly preferred by all the modem
exegetes. Fundamentally, the argument of St. Augustine has
demonstrative force only insofar as he holds also that St. Paul saw
the divine essence, which obviously implies that the “ third heaven ”
is of a purely spiritual nature. But we have seen that this opinion
too is disputable, and today abandoned (see Explanatory Note 59).

EN [70]
Ibid., ad rm.
* " Nihil etiam prohiberet mortem... raptum dici. "
If we suppose that the soul of St. Paul was really separated from
his body during this rapture, we may call this exceptional state
“ death. ” But it differed from ordinary death in that it was temporary
and was effected, not in a natural way, but by a miraculous intervention
of God (De Ver., q. 13, a. 5, ad 4m).
The use of the term “ death ” can be extended yet further and
applied to states in which the soul is withdrawn from the operations
of the body, as when we say, " dead to the senses ” (De Ver., q. 13,
a. 4, ad am). It is obvious that " death ’’ is here used in a very relative
sense, and is rather a figure of speech.
54

EN [71]
Ibid., ad un: “ Apostolo arrepto... extra corpus esset, nesciebat. ”
This was not the only lack of knowledge which prevented
St. Paul’s contemplation from being equal to that of the angels.
St. Thomas, indeed, remarks (De Ver., q. 13, a. 5, ad 6m) that he was
raised to this rapture only in order that he might subsequently become
a witness among men of the blessedness of the elect. In his vision
of the Word, therefore, he saw only what was necessary for that
mission, and not all the mysteries reserved to the blessed, especially
after the resurrection.

EN [72]
Q. 176, a. 2, ad zm.
The body of this article (tertio....) and the reply to the second
difficulty make it apparent that the " gift of tongues ” was not always
that speech in foreign languages treated in article 1. It might also
involve mysterious words, addressed to God alone, not understood
by the hearers nor even, on occasions, by the speaker himself, and
likely to give an impression of madness. As a matter of fact, it seems
that two distinct phenomena took place in history: on the one hand,
the real gift of expressing oneself in foreign languages, given to the
Apostles by the miracle of Pentecost; and on the other hand, an
ecstatic effervescence of a much lower order, which caused its recipients
to give utterance to strange, interrupted, and more or less incoherent
words, and which was perhaps largely derived from an imitation
of pagan practices. This second form was particularly prevalent
at Corinth, and Paul had to regulate it. Since these two extraordinary
manifestations, in spite of their diversity,had points of similarity—the
strange words of the second were often foreign words — it became
common to confuse them. For this reason St. Thomas treated them
under one heading, in accordance with the tradition. It is evident,
however, that he perceived the difference. This is especially apparent
in his In I Cor. XIV, in which he several times mentions these two
possible meanings of " speaking in tongues. ” See Allo, O.P., Première
EfAtre aux Corinthiens (Paris, 1935), Excursus 15, " La ' glossolalie ’
et le miracle des langues à la Pentecôte, ” pp. 374-384, esp. p. 379,
note i, the texts from St. Thomas.

55

EN [73]
Ibid., ad 4m.

From this reply it can be seen that *' interpretation of speeches ”
should not be reduced to “ the gift of tongues, ” but should actually
be classified among the charisms pertaining to knowledge. The
gratuitous gift which St. Thomas here mentions has as its function
the explanation of those mysteries of Holy Scripture which are the
most obscure, either by reason of the difficulty of the subjects treated,
such as the Blessed Trinity, the Incarnation, etc., or because of the
difficulty of the comparisons and parables used (see q. 173, a. 2,
and Explanatory Note 34).
EN [74]
Q. 177, a. x, ad irn.

The art of oratory and the " gift of words, ” which serves as
a short title for the " word of wisdom ” and the " word of knowledge, ’’
are concerned with the same things: both aim to instruct, to please,
and to move. But they differ in their point of departure and in the
further end to be achieved. In the art of oratory the rules of rhetoric
itself are the point of departure, and the end is gain or glory, peace
or war, etc. ; in the gift of words, the point of departure is a commission
from the Holy Spirit, and the end is the edification of the members
of Christ. Hence it happens that, if the preacher forgets his own
proper point of departure or the end for which he is speaking, and
puts all his effort into attracting a large audience, he sets up an obstacle
to the divine liberality, which is ordered toward the bestowal of
grace (cf. Cajetan, Comm.).
EN [75]
Ibid., ad 4m.
St. Thomas elsewhere specifies that the word of wisdom gives
instruction in the divine mysteries, while that of knowledge has for
its object created realities; see C. Gent., Ill, 154; In I Cor. XII,
lect. 2; XIV, lect. 2.
56

ΧΛ

Although he here rejects the word of faith, in other texts, following
the lead of St. Paul (i Cor 12: 9) he gives it a place among the charisms
alongside of the two preceding gifts, and looks upon it as a particular
excellence or certitude of the virtue of faith which enables the recipient
to discourse on matters of faith with an altogether special accuracy
and ability; see I-II, q. in, a. 4, ad 2m; I-II, q. 4, a. 5, ad 4m; In
I Cor. XII, lect. 2.

Finally, the spiritual delight which results from this certitude
also gives faith a place among the fruits of the Holy Spirit (Gal 5: 23),
as issuing particularly from the gift of understanding (I-II, q. 4,
a. 5, ad 4m; q. 8, a. 8).

EN [76]
Ibid., a. 2 c: " Alio modo, publice alloquendo totam Ecclesiam. ’’
These two conditions are to be taken in combination. The abbess
or prioress actually addresses her monastery, in chapter for example,
publicly. She does not, however, speak before the whole Church, laity
and clergy together, but only before a small determinate group,
before one or a few persons.

EAT [77]

Ibid., ad am: " ...ibi non est masculus et femina. ”
A fortiori the beatific vision could not take account of any
difference in sex. Women who have achieved greater charity than
men will enjoy a higher degree of contemplation and glory; see III,
q. 65, a. I, ad 3m.

EN [78]
Q. 178, Frol. : “ Deinde... de gratia miraculorum. "
We are not here dealing with miracles in general. St. Thomas
has treated them in Part I, insofar as they pertain to God’s omnipotence
(q. 105, a. 6 and 8) and can be accomplished through the ministry
of angels (q. no, a. 4) or counterfeited by demons (q. 114, a. 4).

See also De Potentia, q. 6. Here the discussion will be restricted to
the charism occasionally granted to men, as it is to angels, of being
God’s instruments in effecting miracles.

to do so merely by invoking the name of Christ or by using the
sacraments, without submitting oneself to this supreme law by a holy
life, is to produce only signs of that public justice.

EN [81]

EN [79]

Ibid., ad 4m.

Q. 178, a. i, ad im: " Utrolibet tamen modo... Deo voci hominis. ’’

In what sense should we understand this term "instrument”
as St. Thomas uses it here? As instrument properly so called? Or
should this term be taken in its broad meaning? Cajetan rightly
observes (Comm., η. II) that St. Thomas does not mean instrument
in the strict sense: " He is here taking instrument as any secondary
cause, whether it be a cause which by its own proper causality produces
the very effect itself, or disposes for an effect, or a cause by way
of merit. ’’ In this sense, even an act of creation could have a creature
as instrumental cause; for, although the power of creating cannot
be communicated to another even instrumentally, man can antece­
dently place an act which, by reason of a divine disposition, calls
for an act of creation. Cajetan concludes as follows:

This reply of St. Augustine is sheer common sense, but often
quite forgotten. Cajetan very correctly emphasizes it: “ St. Augus­
tine's observation is contrary to the opinion of the common people
and to the general error of mankind. It is usually thought that men
who perform miracles are saints and in some sense gods, while no
esteem is given to those who are simply upright. Our view should
be the direct opposite, for such is the truth. ”

St. Thomas seems to wish to designate as an instrument a previous
human act antecedently ordered by the eternal providence of God,
after which God himself produces the miracle. God, then, is said
to use this act instrumentally, for he has ordained that he would
himself effect the miracle, either mediately or immediately, but
in any case through the intermediary of this previous human act,
whether this act be a prayer, a word, a speech, a touch, etc.

EN [80]
Ibid., a. 2, ad 3m: “ Unde Augustinus dicit... publicae justitiae. ’’

For the interpretation of this text of St. Augustine, see I, q. no,
a. 4, ad 2m. If the world is considered as a large dty, then to employ
the power of particular creatures such as demons in order to accomplish
prodigies is to make contracts with private persons. On the other hand,
to work miracles while living according to divine justice, which is the
law of this City of God, is to perform an act of public justice. But

58

59

PART II

Notes on Thomistic Doctrine
St. Thomas’s treatise on prophecy is often used to clarify the
notion of biblical inspiration, and has afforded many valuable insights ·
It should be noted, however, that the “ gift of prophecy ” and
" scriptural inspiration " are two distinct charisms, and that neither
of them can be explained by the other without some adaptation.
This fundamental observation has not always been kept sufficiently
in mind, and as a result the subject has been obscured by confusions.
It seems advisable, therefore, to explain St. Thomas’s doctrine
for its own sake and as clearly as possible before we study its bearing
on modem discussions.

A. THE GIFT OF PROPHECY ACCORDING
TO ST. THOMAS

,<

In his works St. Thomas more than once touched on the subject
of prophecy. His two principal treatises are in the De Veritate, q. 12,
and in the Summa Theologica, II-II, qq. 171-174. Of secondary
importance are shorter treatments which again deal with the essentials
of the question, v.g., those in the Contra Gentes, III, 154 and in the
Commentary on the First E-pisÜe to the Corinthians, c. XIV, lect. 1
(with scattered observations in the following lectiones). Finally, we
can gather a large number of texts, particularly in the biblical
commentaries, in which some particular aspect of prophecy is
examined in passing. References to these parallels may be found
in the various editions of the Summa, v.g., Marietti; we have used
these passages in the Explanatory Notes. For the following synthetic
exposition we shall draw chiefly on the treatise in the Summa, which
represents the final alignment of the Master’s thought on the subject,
while also using the other works for certain particular points.
I. A SOCIAL CHARISM OF KNOWLEDGE

/ By " prophecy ” St. Thomas understands essentially knowledge,
supematurally given to man, of truths exceeding the present reach
of his mind, which God teaches him for the benefit of the community^
It is, first of all, a docrg&charism-which imparts divine revelation toT'
the world through the mediation of certain privileged persons upon
61

jl'
whose vision the faith, and consequently the rule of life, of others
depends. The function of prophecy is to instruct the human race in
/ ""whatever is necessary for salvation "J(De Ver., q. 12, a. 2 c).1
1L

1

i
ft
1
l·
U

■I

Λ

i

•J

I

$

Further, this gift is essentially a charism of knowledge.
Consequently, it will involve words to give external expression to
the prophet^s-message, and even actions, such as miracles and symbolic
gestures, to^confimHt (q. 171, a. 1; q. 173, a. 4; q. 174, a. 3 and 4).
But primarily (-primo et principaliter) it affects the prophet’s mind.
This fact differentiates prophecy from the “ gift of tongues " (q. 176),
the " gift of speech ” (q. 177), and the ’’ gift of miracles ’’ (q. 178),
all of tEënTchàrisms which concern speech and action not merely
as a resultant, but as their proper and primary effect.
For this reason St. Thomas places the effect of this charism in
the (rffellectpWhen the objection is raised that prophetic inspiration
ought to involve the will (q. 171, a. 1, obj. 4), he replies in the negative,
and makes it an elevation of the mind (contrary to Cajetan, see
Explanatory Note 5). Elsewhere he returns to this point: " Charitas...
est perfectio voluntatis..., sed prophetia est perfectio intellectus ”
(q. 172, a. 2, ad rm; see ibid., a. 4 c). An intervention of the will,
to be sure, isjnquiiEd_after_the_m£Ssage-hes been received in order
to transmit it to others and to adapt it, with the help of the practical
judgment, to their capacities and needs. But that is a further stage
which St. Thomas does not consider when he is speaking of prophecy
in the strict sense, sc., the communication of the divine message to
the mind of the inspired subject; it is one which pertains rather
to the “ gift of speech. ” But this further stage has a central place
in scriptural inspiration. The latter influences the will and practical
judgment of the writer as much as, and sometimes even more than,
his intellect and speculative judgment. This is the first very important
respect in which St. Thomas’s doctrine on “ prophecy ” must be
adapted if one wishes to extend it to “ scriptural inspiration. ”
1 In addition to this broad meaning, -which is predominant in the systematic
treatises, the De Veritate and the Summa, St. Thomas sometimes adopts
a restricted meaning which limits the gift of prophecy to prediction of the
future, and considers it a charism that " confirms " revelation (which he
elsewhere calls prophecy in the wide sense) just as does the gift of miracles:
see C. Gent. HI, 154; In I Cor. XII, lect. 2: Sum. Theol., Π-Π, q. 172, a. 5,
obj. 3.

62

2. IT DISCLOSES HIDDEN TRUTHS

The things which this gift manifests to the prophet are normally
truths hidden to his mind, and which are not known to him except
through supernatural intervention. St. Thomas often returns to this
point, which he confirms by an etymology (incidentally, a false one) ac­
cepted in his own day. Prophecy makes" appear ” (phanos) to the eyes
of the prophet knowledge which is " distant ” (procul) from his mind,
either because its remoteness in time or place renders it inaccessible;
or because, exceeding the natural range of reason {supra naturalem
rationem, q. 171, a. 2 c), it belongs to the supernatural order {visio
quaedam alicujus supernaturalis veritatis, q. 174, a. 5 c). and emanates
from the divine knowledge (q. 173, a. 1 c; q. 174, a. 1 c), whence
it is communicated to him “ by way of instruction ” {per modum
cujusdam doctrinae, q. 171, a. 6 c). Thus the truths manifested in
ptophetiG-revdation may be either supernatural or natural according
to their intrinsic formality (quoad substantiam), but are always
supernatural as regards their manner of acquisition (quoad modum)
(see supra, p. 36).
This hidden quality of the truths disclosed by prophecy is so
essential that prophecy is verified more or less completely according
as the truths are more or less inaccessible to the prophet’s mind.
Thus it is realized most perfectly (propriissime) with regard to future
events (see supra, p. 62, note 1) which, having as yet no existence
except as possibles, are unknowable in themselves and to all men.
It is realized in a lower degree when it concerns truths knowable
in themselves, but which are actually unknown to the human mind
because of its own weakness, such as the mysteries of the Godhead.
And the degree will be lesser still if the things which it discloses to
the prophet are accessible to reason, and in fact known to some men,
but elude bis mind only because of some particular contingency
(q. 171. æ 3)·1
In any case, however, prophecy discloses to the prophet something
which he did not know. This is the condition which is necessary
* According to Sum. Theol., Ill, q. 7, a. 8, it would suffice, strictly speaking,
if the truths were unknown merely to the contemporaries and hearers of
the prophet, not to the prophet himself. But here we have a unique case which
St. Thomas proposes solely to justify the title of prophet given by Scripture
to Christ.

63
N-Y7. — 5

and sufficient in order that we may speak of prophecy in
the proper sense.
3. LUMEN AND SPECIES

Since human knowledge always involves two distinct elements,
the prophet can receive this supernatural instruction in either of
two ways. On the one hand, there is the interior power which
illuminates the object and causes one to form a judgment about it;
this is called thejnteHectnal light tfuînèïi intelligible), and constitutes
the principal element. On the other hand, there are the representations
(species) which furnish the subject-matter of the judgment: ideas,
and, antecedently, sensations and images from which the ideas are
abstracted: this is a necessary but secondary element, the role of
which is rather material and preparatory to the judgment which is
the formal term of knowledge (completivum cognitionis, q. 173, a. 2).
The prophet may be gratuitously favnred regarding either of
these elements, and receive from God either a supernatural light
or infused representations· or evenboth. But the nature of his charism
will differ accordingly (see Explanatory Note 35).
He will not be a prophet in the proper sense unless a new and
supernatural light is granted to him, enabling him to judge " according
to divine truth. ’’ For judgment is the essential and specifying element
in knowledge (formale in cognitione prophetica est lumen divinum,
q. 171, a. 3, ad 3m). If, on the other hand, he receives only represen­
tations without light for interpreting them, he can be called a prophet
only in an improper sense (quiddam imperfectum in genere prophetiae,
q. 173, a. 2 c), or even not at all (Pharao non est dicendus propheta,
De Ver., q. 12, a. 7 c).1
So essential is the light which causes the judgment that it can
ce by itself tn characterize the true prophet and distinguish
ihetic knowledge from all other types. 2 It is not necessary that
1 Cf. In Joan. XI, lect. 7 (verse 51) : Caiaphas " non magis potest dici
propheta quam asina Balaam. ”
2 In C. Gent. Ill, 154. St. Thomas insists even more strongly than in the
Summa on the preponderant importance of the light. Imaginative and sensory
visions are presented only as " helps ’’ which are " sometimes ’’ (aliquando)
granted in addition to the light. Of course. St. Thomas is here speaking formally
of " divine revelation ” and not of " prophecy, " which he makes just one of
the " confirmations " of Revelation (see supra, p. 62, note 1).
64

£1

the prophet himself should, have received the representations
concerning which he judges) Thus, Joseph was truly a prophet when he
interpreted in God’s name the visions of Pharaoh, whereas the latter
was not a prophet, for he had received only visions without the light'
to understand thegi^y
The maximum case is obviously that of the prophet whose mind
receives from above both new representations and the power to judge
about them (q. 173, a. 2; cf. Ill, q. 30, a. 3, ad rm). But even here,
prophecy varies in dignity according to the nature of these represen­
tations. Sensory visions are lower than imaginative visions, and these
in turn are inferior to intellectual reprecpntatinns (q 174, a. 2).
Nevertheless, since the distinctive note of prophecy is to know hidden
things only in a mysterious fashion, imaginative visions, although
less excellent, are in general more proper to it (ibid., ad 3m).
Finally, let us note that the visions which accompany the prophetic
light do not necessarily involve the granting of entirely new
representations. Often, even generally, it is sufficient that the divine
action should rearrange natural representations which are already ’
in the prophet’s mind imagée
(see Cajetan’s Commentary
on q. 173, a. 3) which he has previously acquired, so that these new
groupings, under the influence of the prophetic light, may give rise
to Mtherto
which will comprisfiJhfi^bjecLoLhis
message. This explains why the visions of the most authentic prophets
are often very close reflections of their, experience and temperament^
their past, and thair-political and social"CtTCnmstances. In spite'
of their human origin these ideas of the prophet are truly supernatural,
at least as regards their manner of acquisitionTlor they result from
a new disposition of mental schemata which the prophet could not
have produced by himself, but which is supematurally'effected’by
an intervention of God (q. 173, a. 2, ad 3m). Such ideas are in the
last analysis of the same order as directly infused ideas, and belong
to the same general class in which God gives the prophet both the
light (lumen) and the representation (species).

4.

LUMEN WITHOUT SPECIES

Quite different is the case of the prophet who weivet only a light
without any sort of new representations. We have said that, since
65

the light is the formal element in knowledge, we can still speak of
genuine prophecy in this case. But the question calls for further
clarification.
If the visions are not granted to the prophet, but are granted
to another who submits them to his judgment, the result is in effect
the same as when he himself receives them: with his prophetic light
he illuminateg-th» bUpël'iiaLmal datS-^nd discloses the hiddéntruths
which God has deposited in if, in short, he truly does the work of
a prophet. In this way Joseph explained the dreams of Pharaoh,
Daniel interpreted the visions of Belshazzar, and, in a more general
way, the Apostles and their disciples clarified the oracles of the Old
Testament by the light of the Christian faith.

But another case is possible, namely that the supernatural light
might be given to the prophet simply to make him judge in a divine
way about human matters which were already represented in his
mifid, and to illuminate these naturally acquired representations
without altering their intrinsically natural character.1
St. Thomas considers this possibility on several occasions, in the
De Veritate (q. 12, a. 12; see also a. 7 and 13) and in the Summa
Theologica (q. 173, a. 2 ; q. 174, a. 2, ad 3m; q. 174, a. 3). This is a matter
of great importance, for the present case is one which occurs very
frequently in Holy Scripture.
1 This case may be compared, under the precise aspect we are here
considering, with that of a hagiographer who writes about supernatural truths
which have come to his knowledge through ordinary
such, for example,
as St. Luke narrating·the miracle of Pentecost. The truth with which he is dealing
is formally supernatural, but he has discovered it through the normal and
natural processes of human communication. No doubt, he needed supernatural
faith in order to accept these accounts, but that is another matter. From the
point of view which presently interests us, his case is certainly one of “ light
without infused representations, " or, as we should say today, of " inspiration ’*
without “ revelation. ” It is not exactly the same as the case mentioned above
of the prophet who judges about visions received by others (e.g., Joseph and
Pharaoh, the Apostles and the oracles of the Old Testament), and who, thanks
to his light, discovers more about them. The charism which St. Luke received
merely enabled him to understand the revelation granted to others, and consisted
principally in making him see that it ought to be written down and how it should
be written. In short, his case pertains more to scriptural inspiration than to
jprophetic revelation; that is why St. Thomas does not here explicilty consider it.

66

One may still ask, to be sure, to what extent the essence of
prophecy is verified in this case. As we have seen above, the distinctive
note of prophecy is that it discloses remote and hidden truths. Can
we still acknowledge prophecy in a charism which merely illuminates
human and everyday truths with divine clarity?
Yes, in part, but not absolutely. St. Thomas himself speaks
of this matter in a complex fashion. On the one hand he still places
this case under the heading of -prophetica revelatio (q. 173, a. 2 c)
and calls it prophetia intellectualis (q. 174, a. 2, ad 3m), for this light
causes the mind to judge according to divine truth {secundum divinam
veritatem, q. 173, a. 2 c) with God-giyerTcertitudeT^scnnt/wm certitu­
dinem veritatis divinae, q. 174, a. 2, ad 3m). But, on the other hand, .
he declares that it is inferior to a vision, even a merelyjmaginativeone, which leads to the discovery of a supernatural truth. Following
the lead of St. Jerome, he adopts the term “ hagiographers ” to
distinguish these inspired persons from true “ prophets. ” In another
place he even says dearly that their case is " inferior to prophecy
in the proper sense, for they do not attain to supernatural truth ”
(q. 174, a. 3 c).1
The reasons for these subtle distinctions are evident. To the
extent that the prophetic light lends the judgment a new certitude
of a supernatural order, we can say that the mind sees in a fresh
light what it formerly thought it knew. It is somewhat as though
it discovered these truths anew. Often this firmness of judgment,
derived from the divine light, itsdf involves a real progress in
knowledge: the mind thus fortified reasons and reaches condusions
with a speed and security which it would not have had if left to its
own unaided power. Thus, thanks to the supernatural light, the mind
discovers truths previously hidden trvit anH in this wav the~hagiol
grapher approaches-th^status-of-th^-true-prophet.
But these truths still belong to the natural order, and for this
reason the present case does not formally attain the levd of prophecy
in the proper sense. The judgment which is formed is not supernatural
1 See also q. 171, a. 3, ad 2m, in which prophecy is contrasted with the
other intellectual charisma because, unlike them, it can have no bearing on
truths accessible to natural reason, but always concerns knowledge attainable
only by divine revelation. Here St. Thomas is clearly speaking about “ prophecy
properly so called “ in the strict sense.

67

except in an extrinsic way, quoad modum, by virtue of the light which
evokes it and the certitude thereby conferred on it. It is not super­
natural in an intrinsic way, quoad obiectum. for the divine light does
not alter the natural character of the concepts which it employs.
In brief, this is ^ajfrPfderlmelsse of the prophetic charism, Imd we
can readily understand "why St. Thomas scarcely stops to consider
it in this treatise, in which he is studying rather the typical case of
the prophet who receives from God a properly supernatural message.
Nevertheless, even if the hagiographers fall short of the prophets
in quality, they exceed them in number. It can even be said that
most biblical writers tail in the category of hagiographers, and modem
biblical science has been chiefly concerned specifically with them.
It is with reference to their case that efforts have been made to
define scriptural inspiration by recourse to St. Thomas. It is, therefore,
important to remark once again that his treatise on prophecy cannot
be used for this purpose unless we read it in a slightly different
perspective than that of the Angelic Doctor. Certain elements which
he rather neglects have to be brought into prominence, and not all
that he says about prophecy in the proper sense is applicable to
biblicaL-inspiration. By overlooking such fine points some authors
have built up unacceptable theories leading to blind alleys.
5.

INSPIRATION AND REVELATION

Consequent upon a text of Cassiodorus, which St. Thomas cites
on several occasions (q. 171, a. 1, obj. 4; a. 3, obj. 1; a. 6, sed contra;
q. 172, a. 2, obj. 3; a. 5, obj. 1; see q. 171, a. 4, obj. 2),1 these two
words have had a remarkable histoiy in modem discussions. They
have become a convenient means of distinguishing between the two
cases we have just been studying. Today we speak of inspiration
when the mind of the prophet receives only a light without representations, and of revelation when it receives both the one and the other.
* These two words appear in the citation as St. Thomas takes it from
Peter Lombard’s Commentary on the Psalms {PL 191, 58). See also the Glossa
ordinaria {PL 113, 842). But the text of Cassiodorus himself, at least as given
in the Migne edition {PL 70, 12), is a little different: " Prophetia est aspiratio
divina, quae eventus rerum, aut per facta aut per dicta quorundam, immobili
veritate pronuntiat. "

68

W»1 ~wW^I ·ΙΓIΓιιΓnt,

1

Can the authority of St. Thomas be invoked in favor of this
terminology? 1
Yes, fundamentally, but with certain reservations. It is not
found in his writings with that precise and almost technical clarity
with which we understand the terminology today. For him the two
terms, inspiration and revelation, do not designate two separate
and mutually exclusive notions. They are rather two closely associated
ideas which interpenetrate. The term “ revelatio, " indeed, is the
one he ordinarily uses as an equivalent of the prophetic charism in
general. He uses the term “ inspiratio " much more rarely, and only
for some special reason. A simple statistical fact is rather enlightening"
on this point. In the four questions, 171 through 174, the term
“ revelatio ” (or its derivatives) appears no less than 106 times, of
which 30 occurrences are in the stereotyped expression “ prophetica
revelatio, ” while the word " inspiratio ” (or its derivatives) is found,
onlyjy times.1
A) Revelation.
St. Thomas ordinarily uses the word “ revelatio ” because it
expresses for him the essential note of prophecy: the disclosing of
a truth which was unknown^to-the-prophet. A “ veil ” hiding the
unknown is drawn aside. The close connection between these two
notions is well indicated by the composite expression “ prophetica
|
revelatio ” which he uses so readily.
i
But we have seen that " prophecy ” is sometimes taken by him
in a wider sense to include cases which do not fall under prophecy
in the proper sense. The same must be said of " revelation. ” St. Thomas v
i
continues to use this term even when there is no disclosure of any \
formally new truth, for example, in the case of the prophetic light
granted by itself, without representations. Some very clear texts/ * ^4/
cSTEecited in this sense; tor instance, q. 173, a. 2 c fin.: " Prophetica
revelatio quandoque quidem fit per solam luminis influentiam,
quandoque autem etiam per species de novo impressas vel aliter
1 On this subject, see the remarks of P. Synave, O.P., in Bulletin Thomiste
2 (1925) [201H207].
’ In De Ver., q. 12, the totals are 66 (revelation) as opposed to
21 (inspiration).
69

I

ordinatas. 1 Whether the prophet has received new representations
or merely a light, in either case St. Thomas sees " prophetic
revelation. ”
Thus, just as he still speaks of the genus " prophecy ” with
regard to specific instances in which the definition is no longer fully
verified, so too he speaks of revelation even when there is nothing
properly " revealed. ” That is to say, he takes the word “ revelatio ’’

we assign it today. I am not familiar with a single text in which
St. Thomas gives this term the restricted sense of a light accompanied
by representations, as opposed to a light without representations.
B) Inspiration.
But what of inspiration, that other word which is found in the
citation from Cassiodorus? Does it not have a more precise sense
■ than revelation in the usage of St. Thomas?
Taken in itself, this term suggests a different aspect of the
prophetic charism, sc., not the discoveiy that results from it, but
rather the divine influence which is its cause. '* Inspiration " in fact
, I signifiësnothing but an ujguenœ coming from outside (inspiratio
significat quamdam motionem ab exteriori, I-II, q. 68, a. i), which
is appropriated particularly to the person of the Holy Spirit when
it comes from God, and which can produce its effect in the
*untelle£
>
orthefwjlfjk the case may be. Since prophecy is a charism of
knowledge, the inspiration which it involves will be primarily of
the intellectual order as in the case of revelation (see Explanatory
Note 5)
This is how St. Thomas explains the two terms in the only passage
in which he expressly juxtaposes and undertakes to distinguish
between them, q. 171, a. 1, ad 4m: inspiration is the fmtecedent)
influence which raises the mind above its ordinary level and endows
it' with greater—intellectual vigor: revelation results from it, and is
found in the judgment which is formed by the mind thus elevated,
and by which it perceives divine truthsW^.
Understood in this sense, inspiration ■ always accompanies
revela tinn-and is a necessary prerequisite for itTThe mindTc unable
1 See also De Fer-, q. 12, a. 7. obj- 1 : const. fin. ; ad 3m eorum quae sunt
in contrarium; a. 12, obj. 10.

70

/i

to discover divine mysteries unless it has first been reinforced from
above. There is no revelation without inspiration. But.can there
be inspiration without revelation? No, if we restrict ourselves to
prophecy in the proper sense, for this, as we have seen, necessarily
involves some revelation. On the other hand, there is the case in
which the mind is dealing with truths of the natural order, already
known^ and uses the supernatural light mm-oly in order to judge
about them with divine certitude. This case, as we have seen, does
not really pertain to prophecy and is scarcely touched on by
St. Thomas; he does not even call it " prophecy ” or “ revelation ”
except in a generic and improper sense. Does he then designate it
by the word inspiration, as we do today? The matter is not quite
settled, but we can sense that this word does not have such a definite
meaning for St. Thomas.
Often he uses this term, in preference to “ revelation, ” simply
because of the context. This occurs when he contrasts the influence
of God with that of the devil (q. 172, a. 6, seven times), or even merely
< with reason and other natural causes (q. 172, a. 1, ad 3m; q. 172, a. 3 c).
Even in q. 174, a. 3 c, where the context would seem to lend special
interest to the use of the term, “ ex divina inspiratione ” is actually
opposed only to an implicit '* ex humana ratione ” and not to an
“ ex revelatione. ’’
Two passages, nevertheless, seem to suggest that the word
" inspiration ’’ is used in a narrow sense for the precise case of a light
without representations: they are in q. 174, a. 2, in the third objection
and in the '* sed contra. ’’ But this latter text is a citation frntn the
Gloss, which cannot be taken as involving the terminology of
SL-4h&ærS?There remains the former text, in which he contrasts
the hagiographers, sicut ex inspiratione Spiritus Sancti scribentes,
with the prophets who received intellectual and imaginative visions.
We may admit that there is here some authorization for the precise
sense which modem authors give to the term “ inspiration. *’1 But
1 We might also note in De Ver., q. 12, a. 12, the following passage:
” quandoque ... in prophetia non est aliqua supematuralis acceptio, sed judicium
tantum supernaturale; et sic solus intellectus illustratur sine aliqua imaginaria
visione; et talis forte fuit inspiratio Salomonis, inquantum de moribus hominum
et naturis rerum, quae naturaliter accipimus, divino instinctu ceteris certius
judicavit. ”

71

it should be observed that even here St. Thomas does not contrast
this " inspiration ” of the hagiographers with a “ ryvolatinn ” of the
prophets, as though this latter term normally meant for him the
supernatural visions characteristic of the prophets.x
It is evident, then, that the terminology of St. Thomas does not
perfectly coincide with that which we use today. If some texts seem
to authorize our narrow sense of inspiration, sc., light without
representations, none of them clearly contains our narrow sense
of revelation, light with representations. He always uses this latter
term in a wide sense which includes both inspiration and revelation
in the restricted sense.
But it does not follow that our modem distinction is not well
founded in St. Thomas as regards the reality signified; that is the
main point. He clearly formulated the distinction between the
prophetic light accompanied by infused representations and the
prophetic light without such representations as two possible types
of the prophetic charism. This distinction is essential, and has been
of great service in enabling modem discussions to advance beyond
the impasse in which they were caught. When we designate these
two types by the convenient labels of “ revelation ’’ and “ inspiration, ”
therefore, we are merely expressing St. Thomas’s teaching and
clarifying, by making slightly more precise, a terminology which
was still rather unsettled in his own writings.

6. the prophet’s awareness of his gift
(.Is the prophet necessarily conscious of the divine gift which is
bestowed on him? In St. Thomas’s opinion, no. Undoubtedly he
often knows expressly that he owes such knowledge to God’s influence;
in many cases he has supreme certitude of that fact, and his hearers
may base their belief upon that certitude. But it is also possible for
him to be unaware of the divine gift, or at least uncertain about
it, and to imagine that he is thinking by his own unaided powers}
Since God is inspiring him, he is still a true prophet; but obviously
his knowledge no longer possesses the same divine certitude as when
1 Besides, in the parallel passage of De Ver., q. 12, obj. 10, St. Thomas
speaks of " revelatio " with reference to both categories.

72

t
I
i
|
ί
I
'

|

he is fully conscious that he is receiving it from God.1 Consequently
such knowledge does not provide an equally solid basis for the faith
of his hearers. Unless they have guarantees from another source
(such as, for Catholics, the authority of the Church), they cannot
help but be doubtful, just as he is and even more so, as to the fact
that he is inspired. Hence this case, which St. Thomas calls “ prophetic
instinct ’’ (q. 171, a. 5; cf. q. 173, a. 4), is in his opinion an imperfect
instance of prophecy, quiddam imperfectum in genere prophetiae.
We should not hastily assume that this distinction coincides with
that previously discussed (sections 3 and 4, supra), and say, for
example, that the infusion of supernatural representations, in addition
to a light, necessarily implies that the prophet is conscious of his
charism, while the mere bestowal of a light without infused represen­
tations always leaves the mind in ignorance of its supernatural gift.
Normally, of course, a prophet favored with visions would be aware
of their charismatic origin. But even this does not seem to be necessary,
especially in the case where the divine intervention merely gives
a new arrangement to already acquired representations. Nor is it
evident that in the other case, where a light alone is granted, the
prophet is necessarily left in ignorance of his divine gift. Undoubtedly
this will happen more frequently: the hagiographer, not having
received any vision from above, will think that he is struggling and
working alone, as the author of 2 Maccabees and St. Luke clearly
give us to understand in their prologues. But we can also very well
imagine a chronicler or poet who would be conscious of being impelled
by the Spirit to write about historical events or the natural world
(see Explanatory Note 49.) *
It would not be in any better agreement with the texts of
St. Thomas to designate these two alternatives — awareness and
unawareness—by the terms revelation and inspiration (see Explanatory
Note 15, at the beginning). 3 In the two articles in which he treats
of this point (q. 171, a. 5; q. 173, a. 4), St. Thomas does not even
* It should be noted, however, that the inspired subject is not prevented
from having greater objective certitude in his knowledge simply because he
is not subjectively conscious of his inspiration. Without being aware of the
divine assistance, he nevertheless benefits from it.
* See also Synave in Bulletin Thomiste 2 (1925) [204].
* See also ibid., p. [205].

73

once use the word “ inspiration, ” but calls unconscious prophecy
" instinctus propheticus. ” Moreover, " revelatio prophetica ’’ in the
beginning of q. 173, a. 4, includes the two cases of awareness and
unawareness which are dealt with in the course of the article. If the
prophet is able " to grasp only the object " (quod solum apprehendat
rem illam) without knowing also that it is " revealed ’’ to him (haec
sibi esse divinitus revelata), the implication is that this object is
nonetheless “ revealed ” to him even though he is not conscious of
the fact. At the beginning of q. 171, a. 5, where “ expressa revelatio ’’
is contrasted with " instinctus occultissimus, " it is the word
" expressa, ” not the word " revelatio, ” which indicates the conscious
character of the first case.
In short, revelation, as we have defined it above following the
lead of St. Thomas, can be either conscious or unconscious; the same
is true of inspiration, which necessarily accompanies it. But it remains
true that inspiration without revelation is a case that more easily
verifies the idea of unawareness, while revelation is, more normally,
conscious.
7.

PERFECTIONS AND DEFECTS

We have seen that prophecy admits of grades, according to which
it is more or less perfect: conscious or unconscious, accompanied
by infused representations or unaccompanied by them, involving
intellectual visions, imaginary visions, or even merely sensory visions.
We must conclude, with St. Thomas, that, even where it is perfect
in itself and fully verifies the notion of prophecy, it will be imperfect
in its character of charism of knowledge, and in relation to the end
to be attained, which is divine Truth.
The perfection of divine revelation will be realized only in heaven.
In comparison with the beatific vision, the knowledge which prophecy
gives is something very imperfect, quiddam imperfectum in genere
divinae revelationis (q. 171, a. 4, ad 2m).
The fundamental difference is that prophecy does not make
one see the divine essence in itself, but only through likenesses which
are, as it were, its mirrors (speculum aeternitatis), and which disclose
only fragmentary aspects of divine Truth (q. 173, a. 1; I, q. 12, a. 11).
Since it falls short of giving a vision of the Source, in which everything
would be clearly seen, the prophetic charism must progressively unfold
74

as a succession of illuminations; these will be as many as there are
partial truths. Hence it is essentially transitory (q. 171, a. 2), and
supplies each prophet with only a limited number of supernatural
insights, those which God judges suitable for his mission (q. 171, a. 4).
Moreover, prophecy is not a " gift of the Holy Spirit ” in the
strict sense,1 but only a charism of an essentially social character
(I-Π, q. 68, a. 3, ad 3m), which does not call for personal sanctity
in the prophet (q. 172, a. 4; cf. II-II, q. 6, a. 2, ad 3m). At most it
demands that he should be of good moral character and possess
certain natural dispositions; and these qualities can be divinely
imparted at the time if the prophet does not have them beforehand
(q. 172, a. 3).
The perfections and defects in prophecy can be brought out
by a comparison with faith. Under one aspect prophecy is superior
to faith; the former attains evidential certitude, while the latter
must rely on the prophet’s evidence to found its assent (q. 171, a. 3,
ad 2m; and a. 5 with Explanatory Notes 11 and 15). It follows that
prophetic knowledge has something more extraordinary, less
proportioned to the natural powers of the human mind (q. 171, a. 2,
ad 3m). If, however, these two types of knowledge are compared
from the viewpoint of their object, which determines their intrinsic
formality, the case is different. Prophecy does not give a vision of
the same object which faith makes one believe. The object of faith
is the very mystery revealed by God; its formal motive is the divine
Truth itself which confers on the believer the supernatural power
to adhere to this mystery (Π-Π, q. 1, a.; see q. 6, a. 1). The object
of prophecy is only the revealed manifestation of this mystery, and
its formal motive is the certitude that this manifestation is
authentically divine. Through his vision the prophet indeed has
evidence; this evidence, however, is only of the attestation by God
of the truth to be believed, and not of this truth in itself, for such
a " vision ” could be nothing less than the beatific vision, which
the prophet does not enjoy (q. 171, a. 2; q. 173, a. 1; see q. 5, a. 1).1
1 St. Thomas sometimes classifies it among the gifts of the Holy Spirit,
understood in the broad sense; e.g.. De Ver., q. 12, a. 8, ad 2m.
• As M. Labourdette has well said: “ La foi, à travers l'énonciation, fait
adhérer au mystère divin; la prophétie fait voir que l’énoncé créé du mystère
est attesté par Dieu ’’ (Revue Thomiste 50 [1950] 413). I have corrected the
present paragraph in view of the relevant criticisms of this theologian.

75

Just as any other believer, the prophet must make his act of faith;
of course, the credibility of his object of faith is imposed on him in
a different way — with direct and constraining evidence — but this
does not affect the substance of his faith which remains the same as
that of all believers. Since he attains the mystery to be believed
only in the obliqueness of its charismatic manifestation, his charism
of prophet is supernatural only “ in its mode. ” On the other hand,
not only his faith but the faith of all believers who rely on his testimony,
attains the divine truth in itself, though imperfectly and obscurely;
consequently, that faith is supernatural " in its very substance, ”
and so is intrinsically superior to the charism of prophecy.1
This superior excellence of prophetic knowledge is due ultimately
to God’s direct and sovereign intervention, which it presupposes,
in the mind of the prophet. And it is in this, likewise, that it differs
from natural divination (q. 172, a. 1) and from the revelations which
can be obtained, to some extent, from diabolical spirits (q. 172, a. 5).
It owes to this divine origin its inability to teach anything untrue
(q. 171, a. 6).
But the penalty for this excellence is that the human mind
finds it difficult to adapt itself to such sublime knowledge. Separated
from the mind of God by an infinite distance, it needs the ministry
of angels to receive this message from above (q. 172, a. 2; cf. I,
q. in, a. 1). If, moreover, the revelation comes to it by means of
imaginative visions, it will have to lose the use of the senses, either
partially or totally as the case may be, in order to receive these visions
(q. 173, a. 3). In any event, the human mind will never be anything
but a " defective instrument ” in the hands of God, and, even in
the optimum case in which it has full awareness of having supernatural
visions and a divine light for interpreting them, its knowledge will
still fall short of the intentions of the Holy Spirit (q. 173, a. 4). There
will always remain a certain margin by which the message surpasses
* The distinction ” quoad modum ** and " quoad substantiam *' is here
understood from the standpoint of intrinsic formal causality (according to
the terminology most common in St. Thomas and the Thomist school), and
not from the -viewpoint of efficiency, which would lead to a reversal of the
terms (as happens in q. 171, a. a, ad 3m). From the aspect of efficiency, the
act of prophecy surpasses the natural human powers more radically than does
the act of faith (see M. Labourdette, art. cit., pp. 409-411).

76

the messenger and retains infinite latent potentialities for all who
hear and read it.

8.

THE INSTRUMENTAL CHARACTER OF PROPHETIC KNOWLEDGE

In modem discussions great importance has been attached to
the instrumental role which the prophet plays in the hands of God.
By applying this philosophical notion to the case of inspiration,
recent theologians have drawn conclusions of far-reaching significance.
Now it is noteworthy that St. Thomas uses this idea with great
reserve. He occasionally takes up this traditional figure, but only
in secondary texts and, as it were, in passing (see In Hebr. XI, lect. 7;
Quodl. VII, a. 14, ad 5m; a. 16 c fin.; De Pot., q. 4, a. 1; In Cant.,
Expositio altera, Prooemium). In the treatises in which he systema­
tically studies the notion of prophecy, the idea of instrumental
causality plays hardly any part at all. It does not appear anywhere
in question 12 of the De Veritate, and in the Summa it is found only
twice (q. 172, a. 4, ad im; q. 173, a. 4).1 This reserve suggests that
we should be circumspect and inquire to what extent the charism
of prophecy is truly a case of instrumental causality.
In the precise and formal sense of the term (cf. Ill, q. 62, a. 1),
an instrument does not have the source of its movement in itself.
It acts, to be sure, according to its own nature, but only insofar as
it is moved by the principal cause, whose power passes through it
and makes use of its activity. This fact gives rise to two consequences,
which may be regarded as signs of its status as an instrument: (1) it
does not act all the time, nor (if it be a conscious agent) whenever
it wills, but only when used by the principal cause; (2) the effect
is not commensurate to its own form, but to that of the principal
agent, which is the true cause.
Understood in this way, this notion of instrument is fully
applicable to the sacraments, for example (in which connection
St. Thomas makes much use of it), and also to mirade-workers (II-II,
q. 178, a, i, ad im; De Pot., q. 6, a. 4). Is it equally valid for the
case of prophecy? Yes and no. The case is complex. While the first
of the above-mentioned criteria is well verified here, the second is
not absolutely fulfilled.
* In q. 172, a. 2, ad 3m, the discussion concerns the angels in their role
oi intermediaries; see likewise De Ver., q. 12, a. 8, ad 3m and 5m.

77

(A) Let us first speak of the genuine prophet, who receives a light
and forms a judgment. St. Thomas tells us that he receives the
prophetic light as a transient and imperfect form (q. 171, a. 2 and 4).
These are reservations which clearly distinguish the prophet’s causality
as regards his supernatural knowledge from that of ordinary men
as regards their rational knowledge, or even that of believers as
regards things known by faith. They make him much more strictly
dependent on the divine Cause, and justify in large measure the
designation of instrument which is applied to him.

(1) In the first place, the prophet does not use his charism
whenever he wishes. The supernatural light is given to him only
as a transient “ passio ” which is momentarily supplied to him, but
does not belong to him (q. 171, a. 2). It is not a habitus which he
uses at his pleasure, as an ordinary man uses his knowledge, or even
a Christian his faith. He has to receive a new light each time God
wishes to disclose anything to him (semper indiget nova revelatione,
ibid.), and this light can vary with the case (q. 174, a. 3, ad 2m;
cf. De Ver., q. 12, a. 13, ad 3m eorum quae sunt in oppositum). His
vision is fragmentary, intermittent, and fades out as soon as the
ray from heaven ceases to enlighten it. The prophet is completely
dependent on God’s initiative both for the inception of his activity
and for the whole duration of his actual prophetic knowledge. Now
here we certainly have one of the features of an instrument:hi acts
only when moved by the principal cause, and receives from the latter
not only an initial impulse, but a continuous influence upon which
its own activity unceasingly depends.

(2) Besides, the prophet does not receive the light from above
in a perfect way, for it does not cause him to see the first principle
of supernatural truths, which is the divine essence (q. 171, a. 2).
It shows him only some of these truths, and does not reveal to him
how they flow from this principle (q. 171, a. 4). He sees, but after
the fashion of a disciple on whose mind the master imprints elements
of his own knowledge without handing over to him the principles
1 It is precisely on this question of the transitory influence that St. Thomas
in De Pot., q. 6, a. 4 c fin., compares the charism of prophecy with that of
miracles as graces of an instrumental character. See also Sum. tkeol. Π-Π,
q. 178, a. I, ad rm.

78

of that knowledge. The prophet’s knowledge, then, in respect to the
evidence of what he sees, ranks midway between faith and the beatific
vision (see supra pp. 75-76).
But the object which he perceives is only a created and imperfect
manifestation of the mystery. He sees in a mirror certain reflections
of a light whose source still eludes him (q. 173, a. 1). Thus he is not
as fully the cause of his own knowledge as when he knows natural
truths by reasoning in the fight of first principles.
In this way he verifies, at least partially, the second feature
of any instrument: the effect of his activity, namely his knowledge,
is not fully commensurate with his mind, even as elevated by the
prophetic light, since he does not possess the principle which fully
accounts for his own knowledge. This knowledge to some extent
surpasses him and finds its complete explanation only in God’s own
light. Consequently, even on this score, the prophet cannot be called
in the full sense the principal cause of his knowledge; he is rather
its instrumental cause.

(3) Nevertheless we must here make a reservation which forbids
us to liken him to an instrument pure and simple. However transitory
and imperfect the prophet’s possession of the supernatural light,
it is none the less truly given to him in an intrinsic way, and so as
to perfect him in himself. This is a crucial point, heavily stressed
in St. Thomas’s whole treatment.1 The prophet actually receives
this light in his intellect; it reinforces the natural light of his reason
and becomes for him an active principle of knowledge. Once he has
received it, and in so far as he makes use of it, he formulates with
its help judgments which truly issue from him. His mind is first
passively elevated by “ inspiration, ” but then he actively perceives
in the stage of " revelation ” (we are here taking these terms in the
1 Cajetan in turn frequently insists on this vital activity of prophetic
knowledge. " Dens... movet hominem rationali motu ad prophetiam....
Quod est contra illos qui putant prophetiam haberi quasi per influxum in
intellectu sine nobis " (Coram, on q. 171, a. 1). The prophet's act of knowledge
is supematuraily elevated " quoad substantiam actus
but yet " hujusmodi
actus quoad substantiam suam vere est hominis elevati, et vere causatur ab
homine elevato, et vere est actus vitalis et ab intrinseco hominis elevati per
divinum donum, sive habituale, ut in patria, sive per modum passionis, ut in
proposito de prophetis dicimus ” (Comm, on q. 171, a. 2, η. VIII).
79

H-Y7,— 6

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sense of St. Thomas in q. 171, a. 1, ad 4m).1 Whether he is favored
with a purely intellectual vision or perceives infused images illuminated
by a prophetic light, or even if he only receives a supernatural light
by which to form judgments about things naturally known (see
Explanatory Note 35) — in any case, he reacts vitally in the act ol
judging, and sometimes also by producing intelligible species which
must be formed before he can judge.
We must therefore supplement what has been said in the preceding
paragraph, and acknowledge that the effect of the charism,
sc., prophetic knowledge, is nevertheless in great measure commen­
surate with the prophet’s mind. Between this mind and this knowledge
there is a relation altogether different, for example, from that between
a sacrament and the grace which it produces, or even between the
act of a miracle-worker and the absolutely disproportionate effect
which flows from it.
In these circumstances, it is no longer possible to speak of
instrumental causality in the proper sense. John of Saint Thomas does
not hesitate to say that the prophet is principal cause· of his own
knowledge.1 This mode of speaking is perfectly legitimate so long
as one maintains that he is secondary principal cause in quite special
subordination to the first cause. · If, on the other hand, in order
to emphasize this subordination, the prophet be termed instrumerdd
cause, this also is a legitimate way of speaking, provided the term
be understood in a broad, and improper sense which St. Thomas is
* Cf. De Ver., q. 12, a. 1, ad ita eorum quae sunt in contrarium:
" Prophetia ... quantum ad ipsam visionem prophetae est actus quidam mentis;
quantum vero ad lumen, quod raptim et quasi per modum pertranseuntis
recipitur, est similis passioni prout in intellectiva parte receptio passio dicitur. "
* " Lumen propheticum etiam est qualitas constituens intellectum ut
causam principalem cognitionis propheticae " (John of St. Thomas, Cursus,
Theologicus, De Ineam., q. 9, a. 2, no. 27; ed. Vivès, VIII, 318). See P. Synave,
'* La causalité de l'intelligence humaine dans la révélation prophétique, ”
Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques 8 (1914) 223 fi.
* Here I am correcting my first edition after M. Labourdette in Revue
Thomiste 50 (»95°) 417· According to A. Bea, " Die InstrumentalitAtsidee in
der Inspirationslehre, " Studia Anselmiana nos. 27-28 (1951) 63, Henry of
Ghent for the same reason avoids considering the sacred writers as instruments
and prefers to call them '* auctores secundarii et ministeriales. ** Bea, however,
feels he should maintain an instrumentality " im vollen und eigentlichen Sinn *’
(p. 61f ).

80

very familiar with, and even uses many times. In this wider sense
(magis communiter), he tells us (De Ver., a. 24, a. i, ad 5m), any
cause which acts through being moved by another, even though
it has within it the principle of its own activity (and whose effect
is consequently connatural and commensurate with itself) is called
an instrument. This, he adds, is the case of the human mind which,
even though moved by God, nevertheless moves itself and acts freely.1*
Such an extended meaning of the term makes allowance, in our
present case, for the genuinely human, intelligent, and free character
of prophetic knowledge, and permits us to apply to it the term
“ instrumental cause. ’’ This terminology is better since it indicates
that in its exercise prophetic knowledge is more dependent than
the other types of human knowledge, whether in the order of natural
reason, or faith, or glory.

(B) Hitherto we have been speaking of true prophecy, by which
the prophet, favored with a supernatural light, actually comes to
know what God manifests to him. * But there are instances in which
this perfect form of prophecy is not fulfilled, either because the inspired
subject receives no supernatural light, but only sensory or imaginative
visions which he does not understand; or because, even in a genuine
prophet, the light which is granted to him has limited efficacy and
does not disclose to him all that the Holy Spirit has put into the
vision (on the question of secondary senses, see infra, p. 149 f.).8 In
1 As a matter of fact St. Thomas many times in bis works uses this broad
and improper sense when he is speaking of creatures acting under the divine
influence; e.g., " Anima nostra operatur sub Deo sicut agens instrumentale
sub principali agente " (C. Gent. Ill, 149). See Synave, art. cit., p. 227 ft.
* Moreover, we have also considered the case of the typical " prophet ’’
contemplating supernatural truths. All this is certainly applicable to the
" hagiographer, ’’ who is likewise equipped with a supernatural light. But it
should be observed that the latter, in judging supernatural truths (we are
presently considering him in the restricted sense of q. 174, a. 2, ad 3m; but
see Explanatory Note 47), possesses within him the principle of his knowledge.
On this score it may be said that he is more like a principal cause.
• We are not here speaking of the subjective consciousness of being inspired,
which may be lacking in the prophet (q. 171, a. 5). This defect is one of the
consequences of the imperfect nature of his charism, and emphasizes the instru­
mental aspect of his knowledge (supra pp. 78-79); but it in no way alters
the vital and truly human character of his knowledge in the objective order.
See Synave, art. cit., p. 231 fi.

8x

' v r:

:

‘

I; ’ ;

:

'

!

these two cases the prophet’s mind no longer forms a judgment
or elicits a vital act of knowledge. It can therefore be said that he
is now an instrument in the proper sense with respect to those truths
which elude him and with which his mind is not commensurate.1
But it will be noted also that in these cases we no longer have
“ prophecy ” except in a very improper sense, or even not at all
St. Thomas states clearly that one who receives only representations
without light is not a prophet (q. 173, a. 2; De Ver., q. 12, a 7;
Explanatory Note 35 and p. 64) ; andj^e even says of the true prophet
that he ceases to deserve this title when he no longer understands
what he is seeing, saying, or doing^J4
Now it is only when speaking of this case of prophecy in an
improper sense that St. Thomas, in the Summa, calls the prophet
a " defective instrument, ” that is, when there is question of hidden
senses of which he is unaware (q. 173, a. 4) ; ’ and when in his other
works he makes use of this idea of instrumental cause, it is generally
in connection with this same matter of the prophet’s defects.4
1 See ibid., p. 233 fi.
* In Hebr. XI, lect. 7: " Hoc est ergo de ratione prophète quod cognoscat
illnd quod videt, vel dicit, vel facit. Quando autem non cognoscit, non est
vera propheta, sed participative tantum. " De Ver., q. 12, a. 10, ad 14m:
" Jonah . .. quantum ad hoc quod non intelligebat, propheta non fuit. "
* In q. 172, a. 4, ad rm, the other text of the Summa which must be
taken into account here, the prophets are called " instrumenta divinae
operationis " to the extent that they receive their gift only " ad utilitatem
aliorum, " without being helped by it " propter propriae mentis illustrationem. "
Whether we understand by these last words the enlightenment of their minds,
or, better, in view of the subject matter of the objection, the holiness of their
souls, the fundamental thought remains the same : they are " instruments "
to the extent that the divine influence passes through them as through a passive
channel, without producing a vital reaction in them.
Likewise in q. 177, a. i c fin., the tongue of the sacred orator is an
" instrument " in relation to the conversion of his hearers, an effect of grace
which does not come from him, but from God, who alone can operate
" interius. "
* See e.g„ In Hebr. XI, lect. 7, which is closely parallel to q. 173, a. 4:
Quodl. 7, a. 14, ad 5m and a. t6, where there is question of justifying the
spiritual senses of Scripture which were not conceived by the sacred author;
De Pot., q. 4. a. 1, where there is question of accommodated senses which
he could not have foreseen; In Cantio., Expositio altera. Prooemium, where
St. Thomas dearly declares that he is going to explain the spiritual senses, and
is therefore httle concerned with the human author, a mere instrumental cause.

82

This very remarkable fact is a strong confirmation of the foregoing
conclusions. In short, St. Thomas, who likes to use terms in their
formal meaning, rarely calls the prophet an instrument of the Holy
Spirit except when he can use this expression in its proper and rigorous
sense, i.e., when there is question of secondary and hidden meanings
to which his light does not extend. But when he is speaking of a true
prophet in the full exercise of his knowledge, he prefers to avoid this
term, which would no longer be applicable except in a broad sense.1
It is well to keep all these points in mind, and not to use this
philosophical analogy without caution and discretion. In itself, the
term is flexible and unstable; it must be adapted to the concrete
case. It will be fruitful if we apply it with due regard for the
peculiarities of the matter which it is intended to explain; in the
present case, it is the activity by which God actuates the human
mind without doing violence to its proper mode of operation. But
the term is dangerous if one claims to use it according to its strict
meaning and then, rather than adapting it as needed, violently forces
the theological facts to fit the term. Such a method would lead to
awkward consequences, as we shall see below in dealing with the
theory of Cardinal Franzelin.

1 When one considers the Sacred Book, the product of the charism of
scriptural inspiration, the matter of secondary senses takes on greater importance;
it is a regular thing for God, tàe author of the whole Bible, to go beyond the
sacred writer (see infra, p. n8 f.). In this case, the idea of instrument applies
in its proper sense; St. Thomas himself, too, prefers it in his biblical
commentaries.

ïflâgaeaHauâi

B. SCRIPTURAL INSPIRATION
I. THE EXISTENCE OF SCRIPTURAL INSPIRATION

A) The Existence of Inspired Books.
It is an accepted fact in the Jewish and Christian religions that
there exist books inspired by God which, for this reason, are called
” sacred, “ “ Holy Scripture. ” They are also called " canonical ”
because they are contained in the two “ Canons ” of the Old and
New Testament.
By " inspiration ” is meant that these books were composed
under a_§pecial .influence of-the Holy Spirit. It was at God’s bidding
that Moses wrote the " Book of the Covenant ’’ (Ex 24: 4 ff. ; 34: 27),
that Jeremiah committed to writing the oracles of Yahweh (Jer 30: 2;
36: 2), or that the Seer of Patmos drafted his Apocalypse (Ap. 1:1 ff.;
22: 6 ff.).
Thus Jewish tradition1 accepted a certain number of works
as coming from God, and these it assembled into an authoritative
tripartite collection (the Law, the Prophets, and. other Writings).
These are the Kitvê Haqqodtsh of the Rabbis, books so holy that
they " soil the hands, ’’ that is, after handling them a man must
wash his fingers before touching any profane object. Likewise the
1 See J. B. Frey, " La révélation d'après les conceptions juives au temps
de Jésus-Christ. " Revue Biblique, New Series 13 (1916) 480 fi.

s

Hellenistic Jews such as Philo and Josephus speak of them as " sacred
writings, ” the product of a “ divine inspiration, ” κατά την έπίπνοιαν
τήν άπδ του Θεού (Josephus, Against Apion i: 7, 57)·
The Church received these Scriptures, as well as faith in their
inspired character, from the Synagogue.1 Jesus cited them as the
word of God (Mt 22:31 ; Mk 7:13 ; Jn 10:34 ff.) which must be entirely
fulfilled (Mt 26: 54; Lk 24: 44 ff.). His Apostles and their disciples
followed his teaching: it was the Holy Spirit who spoke through the
mouth of David, says St. Peter (Acts 1: 16; 4: 25), or of Isaiah, says
St. Paul (Acts 28: 25). They argued from Scripture as from a divine
authority (Rom 3: 2; 1 Cor 14: 21; Heb 3: 7; 10: 15; etc.). Two New
Testament texts are particularly explicit about the fact and nature
of inspiration: according to 2 Tim 3: 16, all Scripture (πασα γραφή
referring to the ιερά γράμματα of the preceding verse) is inspired by
God (θεόπνευστος to be taken in the passive sense), whence comes
its normative value; and 2 Pt 1: 21 specifies that the prophets, or
in general the men of pod (who composed the Sacred Books), acted
not on their own initiative, but " under the influence of the Holy
Spirit. ”
Moreover, the Church soon added her own Scriptures to those
of the Synagogue. Had she not received from Christ the fullness of
the Spirit and of Revelation? The New Testament took its place
alongside the Old, worthy of equal respect as regards inspiration
(cf. 2 Pt 3:16), and superior to it as regards its object (cf. 2 Cor 3:4 ff.).
The Fathers received this collection of Sacred Writings from
the hands of the Church; and they vied with one another in eulogizing
their inspired character, affirming that God is their true author, that
he “ dictated ” them to the human authors. They employed numerous
figures to illustrate the subordinate role of the human authors; they
are " instruments ” in the service of God, ” zithers *’ and ** plectrums ”
which pulsate under the hand of God, " mouths ” of the Holy
Spirit, etc.
x
The official teaching of the Church’s Magisterium has continually
repeated and darified this fundamental doctrine. From the Canon
» As is well known, the Church took over from Hellenistic Judaism the
" Alexandrine Canon, " which includes several books more than the '* Palestinian
Canon. ” These books are sometimes called " deutero-canonical, ” and are
rejected by Protestants as “ apocryphal. "

85

- . ^iimhiïmrîiiiiMi

of St. Damasus (4th Cent.), adopted by the Decree of Gelasius
(5th Cent.), until the Vatican Council and the latest Encyclicals,
the Church has unfailingly affirmed that the Sacred Books listed
in the Canon of Scripture were composed under the direct influence
of the Holy Spirit, and that consequently they have God for their
author, a fact which makes them eminently authoritative in matters
of faith.
Thus the Council of Florence declares: “ Unum atque eundem
Deum Veteris et Novi Testamenti, hoc est Legis et Prophetarum
atque Evangelii, profitetur auctorem, quoniam eodem Spiritu Sancto
inspirante utriusque Testamenti sancti locuti sunt..." (DB 706;
EB 32 [47]). The Council of Trent repeats and develops this doctrine
in its Decree on the Canonical Scriptures (DB 783 f.; EB 42-45 [57-60]).
So, too, the Vatican Council: [Libri integri V. et N.T.]... “ Spiritu
Sancto inspirante conscripti Deum habent auctorem” (DB 1787;
EB 62 [77]). These decisions are once more inculcated by Providentissimus (DB 1952; EB no [125]).
^B) The Criterion of Scripturaljlnspiration.1
But how are we to know which books God inspired? As we have
said, it is the Church which teaches this, and we cannot do otherwise
than submit to her authority. This is a matter of faith.

In point of fact, it is clear that, since inspiration is a charism
of the supernatural order, by definition it lies beyond the reach of
reason and experience. God alone knows whether he inspires and
whom he inspires. The prophet himself, or the sacred writer, is not
necessarily conscious of it (see supra, p. 72 f.). And even if he knows
and says so, we cannot accept his testimony as a sufficient proof,
under pain of falling into a vicious circle; he must at least give some
external signs of his supernatural mission. What are we to do if the
author is unknown, remote, or if he has not furnished any such signs?

Some have tried to argue from the exceptional qualities of
Scripture: its majesty and the sublimity of its teachings, its beauty
and richness, the light and warmth which it radiates — all so many
1 See M. J. Lagrange, O.P., Histoire ancienne du canon du Nouveau
Testament (Paris. 1933), pp. 171-75.

signs which touch the heart with unmistakable force. This is how
the Lutherans argue. But it is immediately obvious that such
a subjective criterion could not suffice. It is deceptive, and some
uninspired works could be cited which are more instructive and
moving than many books of the Old Testament or even some of
the New.
' Others have suggested an appeal to the divinely guided function
of the sacred author. Thus the apostolic character of a New Testament
writer would of itself be a sufficient guarantee that the book is inspired.
But, besides the fact that this criterion is very hard to apply to the
Old Testament, it does not seem justified even for the New. Of course
it contains an element of truth. The Church actually did establish
her Canon of the New Testament by such considerations: she kept
the books which came to her from Apostles, or from disciples of the
Apostles, and rejected the others. But for the Church herself this
historical consideration was only a human and contingent preliminary
to her dogmatic decision, an investigation in the natural order which
was as different from her declaration of faith as are the schemata
and discussions of a Council from the resultant infallible definition.
The fact is that between the stage of human inquiry and that of
dogmatic promulgation there intervenes the action of the Holy
Spirit which guarantees the defined truth against all error.x
Thus consideration of the prophetic or apostolic character of
an author can be at most, even for the Church, only a criterion of
the natural order and one which is extrinsic to the dogma of inspiration.
A fortiori, it cannot be a sufficient norm to serve as basis for the belief
of the ordinary faithful who must submit to the Church and found
their faith on the traditional and defined belief of the supreme
Magisterium—a belief which is itself based on the divine mission
and the assistance of thé Holy Spirit which the Church has received
from Christ. This, in a word, is the sole legitimate guarantee of the
supernatural fact of inspiration.
1 This pertains to the charism of infallibility, which must be carefully
distinguished from the charism of inspiration, of which we are speaking in this
treatise; see however infra p. 165, note 2. On the natural kinship binding
the Sacred Scriptures to the Church and guiding it in its determination of
the Canon, see the interesting reflections of K. Rahner, " Uber die Schriftinspiration, ” Zeitschrift für hatkolische Theologis 78 (1956) 163-65.

It is also the only safe one. If, -per impossibile, critical investigation
were one day to succeed in proving that a certain writing of the
New Testament came neither from one of the Apostles nor from
one of their immediate disciples, even then the Christian’s faith
would have no reason to be disturbed. The Church had her reasons,
basically supernatural, for admitting this book into her Canon;
it is not up to the believer to ask what these reasons were. He has
only to believe on the word of the Church that, even in this book,
it is God who is speaking.
λ

'

2. THE NATURE OF INSPIRATION

On the basis of the data of faith described above, theology has
long tried to evolve the notion of scriptural inspiration. But not
all of these attempts have been equally successful.
The fundamental problem is to discover how the concurrence
of divine and human activity is realized in practice. Solutions have
fluctuated between two opposite extremes, depending upon whether
the emphasis is placed on the part of God or on that of man in the
composition of the book.

A) False Notions.
The early Lutherans and some Renaissance Scholastics took
too literally certain figures employed by the Fathers and hence
reduced the sacred writers to the merely passive role of copyists
writing at God’s " dictation. ”1 For them inspiration was like
" revelation " in the strict sense, whereby the entire book, complete
with ideas and words, descended from heaven into the mind of the
» We should be careful, moreover, not to understand the word “ dictation, ”
every time it appears in the -writings of the early theologians, in the sense
of “ purely passive dictation, *’ i.e., " revelation " of the very words of God.
This would be to caricature the traditional doctrine of the Thomistic school
(see J. M. Vosté, O.P., De divina inspiratione et veritate Sacrae Scripturae
[ed. za; Rome, 1932] p. 81 fi., note; pp. 98-100]. The term " dictare " does
not necessarily have, and did not have for the older authors, the restricted
meaning which we give it today. Forcellini’s Lexicon lists as equivalent
expressions, not only ” lente pronuntio id quod alius scribendo excipiat, ’’
but also “ lubens dico, compono, praescribo, doceo, suadeo, suggero, pronuntio ”
(see A. Bea, S.J., De Scripturae Sacrae inspiratione [ed. za; Rome, 1935] p. 28).

88

writer, in somewhat the same way as Mohammedans even today
conceive the revelation of the Koran to Mohammed. It is easy to
see the dangerous consequences of such an idea: the sacred book
is presented as an absolute, and God is entirely responsible even for
the imperfections. To say nothing of the diversity of ideas and points
of view in the Bible — of which the theologians of that time were
hardly aware — how can this system explain such a simple and patent
fact as the diversity of styles? It would be a rather naive solution
to answer that God was careful to use different styles in dictating
to the various authors in order to imitate the diversity of human
personalities.

Others understandably wanted to shake off the yoke of such
a narrow conception. But several theologians did this imprudently
and went to the other extreme. For them the sacred writer, completely
on his own initiative, composed his work by himself just like any
other human author. Inspiration was now nothing but a simple
negative assistance which merely prevented him from falling into
error, or even a subsequent approbation by which God approved
an accomplished fact and in some way appropriated to himself a work
which had been written by a man.
This was to surrender too much. According to such solutions
God was no longer truly the author of Scripture as understood by
the faith of the Church.

B) Decisions of the Church’s Magisterium.
And so the Vatican Council condemned as erroneous the systems
of negative assistance and subsequent approbation: these books
" the Church holds as sacred and canonical, not because, having been
composed by human industry, they were afterwards approved by
her authority; nor only because they contain revelation without
errors, but because. Shaving been written under the inspiration of
the Holy Spirit, they have God for their author and have been handed
on as such to the Church ’’ (DB 1787; EB 62 [77])· Providentissimus
repeats this condemnation.
The Magisterium, however, did not stop at these negative
condemnations. It affirmed explicitly what the dogma of Inspiration
demands: that the Sacred Books be composed entirely under the

89

positive influence of the Holy Spirit. Providentissimus especially
emphasized the extent of this divine influence, enumerating therein
the three psychological steps involved in the composition of a book:
the Holy Spirit has acted on the intellect of the human author in
order that he might conceive with certitude what God was ordering
him to write, on his will in order that he might will to write it
faithfully, and on his executive faculties so that he might express
it in a suitable fashion and with infallible truth.1 Later, Spiritus
Paraclitus repeated this three-fold analysis of inspiration in similar
terms, showing that this traditional view had already been held by
St. Jerome.1

*
1*

But if the Church clearly affirmed the essential point of her
doctrine, she did not daim to define in minute detail the way in which
inspiration directs the human faculties; she left it up to the theological
schools to darify this point in free discussions.8

In the debates which followed, two principal theories came into
conflict. One was mainly the work of Cardinal Franzelin, an eminent
theologian of the Sodety of Jesus ; the other advocated a more complete
return to the doctrine of St. Thomas and was supported especially
by Father Lagrange, O.P. We must now examine these two points
of view, for it is not a question merely of a scholastic quibble, but
actually of two mentalities approaching the problem of Scripture
with different perspectives.

»
!

1 ” Nam supernatural! ipse (Spiritus Sanctus) virtute ita eos (se., scriptores
inspiratos) ad scribendum excitavit et movit, ita scribentibus adstitit, ut
ea omnia eaque sola, quae ipse juberet, et recte mente conciperent, et fideliter
conscribere vellent, et apte infallibili veritate exprimerent: secus, non ipse
esset auctor Sacrae Scripturae universae " (DB 1952; EB no [125]).
* EB 46! [448] : *' Cernere licet, inter Hieronymi verba et communem de
inspiratione catholicam doctrinam nihil omnino interesse, cum ipse teneat,
Deum, gratia collata, scriptoris menti lumen praeferre ad verum quod attinet
• ex persona Dei ’ hominibus proponendum ; voluntatem praeterea movere
atque ad scribendum impellere; ipsi denique peculiariter continenterque adesse,
donec librum perficiat. "
• Though in their formulation the Vatican Council and the Encyclical
Providentissimus used the works of Cardinal Franzelin, who will be mentioned
below, they never wanted to give sanction to the debatable detail of his opinions.
See G. Courtade, ” J.-B. Franzelin. Les formules que le Magistère lui
a empruntées, " Recherches de Science Religieuse 40 (1952) 317-25.

!

DO

C) Cardinal Franzelin’s Opinion.
As early as 18701 Franzelin had proposed a solution midway
between the contrary extremes mentioned above. Distinguishing
between the formal and material elements in a book, the ideas and the
words, he adopted the new theory of simple negative assistance
for the latter, but maintained the old theory of real intellectual
dictation for the former. The sacred writer received from God the
entire content of his book: ideas, thoughts, judgments. Even those
portions of the contents which he might already possess naturally
from his own previous experience had to be, as it were, suggested
to him anew and in some way “ revealed ” (in a wide sense) by a special,
supernatural illumination. Only the words and phrases, in short,
the literary clothing, escaped this divine influence; the writer
discovered them by himself and was aided in his task only by a simple
assistance from God which prevented the words from being unfaithful
to the thought.
The key idea which governed this solution was that God must
be truly the Author of Sacred Scripture. This is Franzelin’s point
of departure, the dogmatic axiom which he wishes to analyse. Now
for someone to be the author of a book it is necessary and sufficient
for him to have conceived all its ideas and to have ordered their
recording in writing; it is not necessary for him personally to have
supervised the actual drafting of the work down to the smallest
details; he can leave that for some secretary. In the same way, in
order that God be legitimately called the author of Sacred Scripture,
it is necessary and sufficient for him to have conceived and willed
all the ideas; as for their verbal formulation, he has entrusted that
to the care of the human authors, leaving to them a certain latitude
in the matter.
At first this solution enjoyed great popularity. It seemed to
explain the diversity of styles, and even of ideas, which distinguish
the different books of Scripture. And at the same time it safeguarded
the properly divine origin of their content.
But precisely on this last point the solution was just as inflexible
as were the older systems on the " dictation ” of Scripture. By requiring
that each idea in the Book be proposed to the mind of the writer
1 Tractatus de divina traditione et Scriptura (ed. 4a; Rome, 1896) p. 304 fi.

91

by God himself, whether by means of a new infusion or by a super­
natural recall, Franzelin attributed to these ideas an absolute character
which seemed hardly in keeping with reality. Each phrase of the
Bible contained a divine truth, conceived in some sort by the mind
of God, which must be accepted as a kind of " revelation. " Such
an abstract and theoretical view was scarcely compatible with
a concrete study of the Bible.
Moreover this system seemed questionable as regards its
philosophical and theological presuppositions. How was it possible,
within the framework of a valid psychology, to conceive how God
communicates ideas to the mind without the intermediary of words?
Our thought has its origin in the senses, and its most interior
mechanism cannot dispense with verbal images. It is, therefore,
difficult to conceive how God can suggest ideas, while leaving to the
man the task of discovering the literary expression by himself.
This philosophical difficulty is, moreover, simply the consequence
of a deeper theological notion. Franzelin thus disassociates the interior
activity of thought and its external manifestation because he needs
two areas in which the two causes, divine and human, may each
exercise its activity like two juxtaposed causes. This is a curious
theory of divine and human concurrence, one which belongs to a whole
theological system and which flows more proximately from the strict,
univocal way in which he applies the notion of instrumental causality
to the case in point.
In the concurrence of the divine and human activities he considers
only two possible cases:1 (i) either the man is an instrumental cause
1 Ibid., p. 316 fi.: "Distinguimus causam primam sine cnjus concursu
causa secunda agere nequit, causam per se deinde, quae etiam dicitur princi­
palis, agens nimirum sua inhaerente virtute in distinctione a causa instru­
mentait, quae non inhaerente sibi virtute agit sed dumtaxat ex motione (uti
aiunt) h.e. ex virtute derivata et transeunte causae principalis. lam dum
dicitur auctor libri, nunquam intelligitur efficientia dumtaxat per concursum
generalem causae primae, nec sensu proprio efficientia causae instrumentons;
sed semper significatur causa per se, quae potest esse prima vel secunda. Habitudo
vero inter has duas causas est hujusmodi. Si Deus (causa prima) dicitur auctor
(adeoque per se causa) libri, excluditur causa secunda agens ut causa per se
h.e. virtute propria sibi inhaerente; unde vicissim si homo (causa secunda)
sensu proprio est et dicitur auctor libri, eo ipso negatur Deum (causam primam)
esse libri auctorem, non tamen excluditur, ut per se constat, generalis concursus
causae primae, qui nullatenus importat Deum esse auctorem libri, nisi absurde

92

j

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i

j
I

and then, like every real instrument, he does nothing by his own
power but solely by the divine influence which uses him; in other
words he receives everything from God and completely loses his
autonomy; (2) or else the man is a principal cause, who acts by himself,
while God moves him only according to the ordinary concurrence
of the First Cause with every secondary cause.
Beyond these alternatives Franzelin does not consider a third
possibility — one which we shall develop later on — whereby the man
receives a special, positive influence from God (different from the
" ordinary concurrence, ” and hence a charism), but nevertheless
acts freely by himself. In this case he might be called a dependent
principal cause or an instrumental cause in the broad, improper sense.
Since he does not consider this possibility, Franzelin is forced
by his alternatives to effect a compromise between the two authors,
divine and human, of the Sacred Book.1 (a) In the domain of ideas
God must be the principal cause in the proper sense (and not only
in the capacity of First Cause) in order to be truly the author of the
book; the man then can be only a passive instrument in this regard;
he must receive all his ideas from God, even those which he could
already have acquired previously by his own resources, (b) On the
contrary, in the domain of words, where it is no longer necessary for
God to be the author, the man can now become the principal cause,
and make his own choice of expressions, receiving from God only
the extrinsic assistance required to guarantee his work and prevent
him from falsifying the thought. Thus God and man are both the
authors of the book, but on different levels: God is the author with
respect to the content, man with respect to the form.

D) Principles of a Thomistic Solution.

Some theologians thought that the doctrine of St. Thomas,
followed integrally, might offer the elements of a better solution,
based on a different conception of the concurrence of divine and
human causality. St Thomas himself had outlined a concrete
application to the case of prophecy. By starting out from this properly
loquendo Deum dicere velis auctorem omnium librorum. Sive vero Deus sive
homo sit auctor libri, in neutra hypothesi excluditur causa instrumentons, per
quam causa principalis (Deus vel homo) agat et efficiat sui libri existentiam. ”
1 Ibid., p. 319 ff.

93

theological notion rather than from a human concept such as that
of author, they believed it possible to reach conclusions more faithful
to the specific peculiarities of scriptural inspiration.1

y i) The Sacred Author as God’s ” Instrument. "
There is no doubt that St. Thomas, in line with the whole
Christian tradition, compares the sacred author to an " instrument ’’
in the hands of God, but that analogy must be flexibly conceived
in terms of the particular case of divine and human concurrence,
and not in a rigid, univocal way which would liken man to a sheerly
material instrument. For the idea comes up here only as a philosophical
illustration in the service of a theological doctrine. ’ It has the
advantage of using a comparison traditional with the Fathers; but
it labors under the serious handicap of being vague and subject to
various applications. We have shown above (p. 77) that it can be
taken either in a rigorous and formal sense, or in a wider and improper
sense. Now it is in the latter sense that St. Thomas here understands
it. For him, only the imperfect prophet, who sees certain things
without understanding them — or even a true prophet with respect
to the secondary senses which he does not foresee — would be an
instrument in the proper sense. But in other cases of genuine prophecy,
that is, when the inspired person truly knows and forms his judgment
under the influence of God, he cannot be called an instrument except
in a wider sense which does not exclude the free and personal activity
of his own mind. If one insists on calling the prophet an “ instrument "
of God — and St. Thomas in the Summa does so very rarely and only
in cases where the prophet is an instrument in the proper sense — this
general term should be explained according to the particular doctrine
of divine and human concurrence, and not vice versa.
Understood within these proper limits, this analogy is useful
and fruitful. * It illustrates clearly how the same effect can be at once
i

1 See especially M. J. Lagrange, O.P., " L'Inspiration des Livres Saints, "
Revue Biblique 5 (1896) 199-220.
■ This does not mean that this philosophical datum is not authentically
integrated into the conception and formulation of the theological doctrine
which takes it in and transposes it to its own plain; on this subject, see the
remarks of M. Labourdette in Revue Thomiste 50 (1950) 419.
• See Th. M. Pègues, O.P., " Une pensée de St. Thomas sur l'inspiration
scripturaire, " Revue Thomiste 3 (1895) 95-112.

94

wholly the work of two causes, one subordinated to the other —
the principal and the instrumental, — each contributing to its
production according to its own proper nature. In the words of
St. Thomas, “ Non sic idem effectus causae naturali et divinae virtuti
attribuitur quasi partira a Deo et partira a naturali agente fiat, sed
totus ab utroque secundum alium modum; sicut idem effectus
totus attribuitur instrumento, et principali agenti etiam totus ”
(C. Gent., Ill, 70). In the present case, this means that the whole
book, form and content, ideas and words, results from the double
activity, not juxtaposed but superimposed, of God as the principal
cause and of man as the instrumental cause.
We shall speak again of the actual execution of the work and
show that the influence of inspiration reaches even the literary
expression of the divine message. Then we shall see that the sacred
writer, in producing a book whose effects always outstrip him, much
more truly deserves the title of instrument in the proper sense
(see infra p. 118). Suffice it to recall for the present that in the very
process of thinking, which is the essential element of the prophetic
charism, the one who is inspired is a special type of instrument — an
instrument which acts in a vital manner and, though under the divine
influence, remains truly the author of its own thought.
2) The Divine Concurrence in the Thought of the Inspired Author.
For St. Thomas, God moves man in such a way as not to suppress
but to utilize his own natural mode of action. This is true not only
when he moves him in the capacity of First Cause setting in motion
every secondary cause, but also when he acts upon him by means
of a direct influence of the supernatural order, such as sanctifying
grace or a charism (gratia gratis data), and even when he gives him
a particularly efficacious determining impulse, as is the case in the
charism of inspiration. Now it is natural for man to act freely, in an
intelligent and voluntary manner. Hence God respects this natural
mode of action of his creature and is able to move him by his supreme
power without paralyzing him. Undoubtedly, this freedom of man
under the all-powerful influence of God is a mystery, but one which
must be accepted as a datum and which recurs in all theological
problems, whether of nature or of grace.
In the problem which we are at present considering this implies
that the sacred writer retains his own intellectual personality even
95

N-ï 7. - 7

under the divine influence. The divine light implements and elevates
the natural light of his mind, but does not supplant it. Grace does
not destroy, but rather perfects nature. The charism of inspiration
does not suppress the normal activity of the mind; it elevates and
strengthens it. This may be shown briefly with respect to the two
operations of the mind, apprehension and judgment.
a) As regards apprehension, two cases are possible, says
St. Thomas: either God by a supernatural intervention gives his
prophet new ideas, or else he lets him use knowledge already acquired
by the natural exercise of his mind. In the first case, which today
we call “ revelation, ” God certainly takes the initiative, but even
then he does not do so without the active collaboration of the prophet’s
mind. Whether the divine light directly infuses the ideas, or causes
the mind to derive them from sensible or imaginative visions, the
latter does not remain passive, but reacts vitally to abstract,
understand, and assimilate this new data (see Explanatory Note 35).
In the second, case, which we call “ inspiration, ” the activity of the
mind is still more in evidence. The divine light allows it to work
out its ideas or receive its knowledge in the ordinary, natural way.
It takes the result of this human inquiry just as it is, without changing
its intrinsic nature in any way, and does nothing more than cause the
mind to form a judgment on it from a new and supernatural point
of view, in accordance with God’s purposes.· There is no reason to
believe, as Franzelin does, that even here God must propose the
truth to the mind of the one inspired.1 On the contrary, the distinctive
feature of this case is precisely that the Holy Spirit allows the speaker
or writer to work and discover his ideas just like any other man,
though with the help of a supernatural light (cum adjutorio tamen
divini luminis, q. 174, a. 2, ad 3m).
b) Whether the one inspired receives infused ideas from God
or uses his own acquired ideas, he must still form his judgments
on them with the aid of the divine light. The judgment is the essential
act by which intellectual life shows itself. It is with this, says
1 " Si revelatio intelligitur sensu minus quidem stricto sed frequentissimo,
veritatis propositio ab ipso Deo facta, sane inspiratio quaevis ad scribendos
libros sanctos erat revelatio, quae primum quidem fiebat interne in mente
hominis inspirati...” (Franzelin, op. di., p. 322). See M. J. Lagrange,
art. cit., p. 211 fi.

96

St. Thomas, that the charism of inspiration is principally concerned.
Hence it is chiefly in this area that God respects the autonomy of
his instrument, if he does not wish to destroy its role of thinking
being. By means of the “ lumen propheticum ” God illuminates this
judgment with a special, supernatural power, differing from the natural
concurrence given to every created intellect, and gives it a penetration,
a clarity, a certitude which man could not have achieved if left to
his own resources. But in so doing, God does not form the judgment
in place of his instrument; rather God causes his instrument to judge
vitally and humanly, so as to make the divinely impregnated thought
of the instrument a source of truth.

Thus it is clear how, in the two stages of apprehension and
judgment, God moves the mind of his interpreter from within, and
causes him to act in a vital way so that he is truly the author of his
own thought. The mind of the prophet, to be sure, receives the divine
light only transiently, according to God’s good pleasure. Moreover,
if there is question of supernatural truths, the prophet will be
instructed like a disciple; the conclusions will be given, but not the
principles on which they depend. These limitations, as has already
been seen, indicate clearly that the prophet is subject to God in
a special and truly instrumental way {supra, p. 78 ff.). But on the
other hand, to the extent that God enlightens him, he receives the
divine light in a genuinely vital manner, and reacts by an act of
knowledge which is truly his own. Far from paralyzing his own activity
in forming concepts and judgments, the divine light elevates and
strengthens that activity.

In order to safeguard the human and spontaneous character
of the prophet’s thought, it is not enough to say that it is exercised
freely before the infusion of the prophetic light, as though, once this
light were given, the mind became passive and had to receive by
" suggestion " or “ revelation ” from God the thoughts and judgments
which it had previously conceived by itself. On the contrary, the
spontaneity of his intellectual activity, which existed before he
received the charism, lasts and continues to flourish still more under
its influence. When strengthened by God’s light, the prophet’s mind
apprehends more clearly, perceives more deeply, and judges more
surely than it could have done if left to its own resources. True,
it is an instrument, but one which acts fully in accordance with its
97

nature as a human intellect which apprehends, forms judgments,
and reasons. To use an apt expression of Father Pègues, the minds
of those who were inspired " were not channels; they were springs,
though not primary ones. ” 1
One manifest sign of the delicate, yet all-powerful gentleness
with which the divine influence controls its instrument is the fact
that the latter is frequently unaware that it is being helped by God.
Consider, for example, the Prologues of St. Luke and of the Second
Book of Maccabees. Surely nothing shows more clearly how completely
the human author remains “ himself ” in God’s hands.

3) The Bible as the Work of two Authors — A Divine and Human
Book.

It follows from what has just been said that the inspired subject
can really be called the author of the thoughts which he conceives
under the influence of inspiration, and of the book which contains
them. He is, nevertheless, the author only in a secondary, subordinate
capacity. Above him there is someone who is Author by virtue of
a primary, superior title, that is, God.
Indeed our psychological analysis of the process of inspiration,
made with the help of St. Thomas’s teaching, fully justifies this title
of Author of Holy Scripture which Christian Tradition attributes
to God. The truly human freedom which it allows the instrumental
cause in no way detracts from the sovereign primacy of the Principal
Cause. Whether in the task of conception or in that of judgment,
it is really God who is at the origin of everything. It is his light which
makes the mind judge supematurally. In the case of “ revelation, ’’
it is this light which infuses images or new ideas into the mind; and,
even when he only " inspires, ’’ it is still his light which stimulates
the sacred writer in the conception of his book. Later on we shall
assert that his sovereign action extends still farther, reaching even
the ultimate execution of the book, but in a completely unique way
which belongs only to him, by his interior and all-powerful control
of a living, intelligent instrument.
The Bible will bear the marks of this double influence which
produced it; it will be at once divine and human — not divine with
1 Pègues, art. cit., p. 108.

respect to the thoughts and human with respect to the words, but
divine and human with respect to both. It will be divine in its sublimity,
its holiness, its truth, the effectiveness which the action of the Holy
Spirit will give to the thoughts and expressions of the human author.
It will be human in its limitations, and even in its imperfections,
which the divine action will allow to remain in the mind and the
language of its instrument.
Even in the " revelation ” of supernatural truths, the divine
thought will have to clothe itself in human concepts and words, and
thereby inevitably suffer certain unavoidable weaknesses. But these
will be defects in form and will scarcely affect the excellence of the
content. It is especially in cases of simple “ inspiration ” that the
thought which the hagiographer is divinely enlightened to incorporate
into the Book will retain the marks of human origin. It may have
merely relative value, conditioned by the period and the milieu in
which it was bom; it will reflect the human mind which conceived
it, with its good qualities, but also its defects. Undoubtedly the light
of inspiration will be at hand to elevate and purify it, but will not
change it essentially, nor will it render it divine to the same extent
as a truth which has been revealed in the proper sense of the word.
It will leave all those imperfections which do not directly impair
the dignity and efficacy of the divine message.
Consequently we realize that the Bible takes on an entirely
different aspect according as we see in it only " revelations ” from
God, or, on the contrary, recognize in it, more often than not, the
product of simple “ inspiration. ’’ In the first case there is danger
of looking upon it as a catalog of absolute truths, in which each
proposition comes directly from God through the passive, almost
negligible channel of the human instrument. In the second case it
appears more under the human aspect, which it really has, with the
limitations, the lacunae, and even the defects which that implies,
not only in the language, but even in the thoughts.1
1 This embodiment of the divine message in human thought with all its
imperfections, error excepted, has often been compared to the Incarnation
of the divine Word in human flesh, beset with weaknesses, sin excepted. We
should, then, avoid what Vosté, op. cit., p. 70, has aptly called “ biblical
Docetism, ’* which would deny the reality of the human self-abasement of the
divine thought in Holy Scripture!

99

Hence the Bible can resemble any other book, as a concrete
study of it shows. At the same time it is also, in the true sense of
the word, a divine book, different from any other. For it is in truth
God who immediately originates the entire thought process of the
interpreter whom he inspires. He is quite truly the Author of the
Book, of the entire Book, just as man too is its author, each in his
own degree: God is the principal Author, and man his faithful
instrument.

4) The Question of Method.
As we have seen, our method of procedure has been the reverse
of Franzelin’s. Whereas he begins with the human notion of author
and, by analyzing this concept, deduces what inspiration must be,
we begin with the theological notion of inspiration and develop it in
such a way as to justify the traditional axiom that God is the Author
of Holy Scripture.
There have been many discussions on this question of method.
Some have exaggerated its importance; others have minimized its
real bearing on the case. The problem, in short, is to explain two
closely connected ideas, each of which clarifies the other: the notion
of God the Inspirer of the Sacred Writer and that of God the Author
of the Sacred Book. There is no doubt that, in the real order of things,
the first of these facts is the cause of the second: it is because God
inspired the sacred writer that he can be called the author of the
book written by the latter. The very words used in the official decisions
of the Church clearly suppose this order. Thus the Vatican Council
declares that the books of the Old and New Testament are sacred
and canonical " propterea quod Spiritu Sancto inspirante conscripti
Deum habent auctorem ’’ (DB 1787; EB 62 [77]): they are canonical
because they have God for their author, and they have God for their
author because they were written under the inspiration of the Holy
Spirit. Consult likewise the Council of Florence (DB 706; EB 32 [47])
and Providentissimus (DB 1952; EB no [125]).
But logical sequence is not necessarily the same as ontological
sequence. When two notions are linked by a causal relation, it is
legitimate to explain the cause by the effect, or the effect by the cause,
as the case may be. The two processes are equally legitimate and
those who favor the one or the other have equal reason to defend

100

their point of view. This is what has happened in our problem and
has given rise to endless discussions in which one party was right
and the other was not wrong.
And yet, while the two methods of procedure are equally legitimate
from the point of view of strict logic, they are not equally appropriate
or fruitful. The better method will be that which begins with the notion
which is more exact and more easily known. And it is precisely this
point which has been the basis of the entire dispute.
Franzelin and his followers thought that the notion of author
would furnish a clearer, more accessible point of departure; this
is where, we think, they were wrong. This notion is a vague one,
for there are many ways of being the author of a book. The ancients,
for example, had a very different idea of literary authorship than
we have; and, above all, it is essentially a human term. The experience
of men, reflected in their manner of speaking, is familiar only with
books composed by men. For this new, unheard of fact of God himself
being responsible for a work, our words are inadequate. The word
" author ’’ cannot be used unless it is so broadened that it becomes
an analogous term. If it is taken just as it is, in its human and univocal
sense, there is danger either of not being able to adapt it to the
transcendent case of the divine psychology, or of making a forced
adaptation which lowers God to the level of human psychology.
Franzelin has, in fact, opted for the latter, which is precisely what
we wish to avoid.1
How are we to form an analogical idea of author? A material
analysis of the sacred book would not suffice for our purposes: it is
a well-known fact that it resembles any other human book (unless
one wishes to have recourse to the internal criteria of the Protestants).
Only the formal study of its composition can enlighten us on God’s
role in it. It is because God inspired the Bible that he can be called
its author; and he is the author in the degree and manner in which
he inspired it.
Hence we are led to study the notion of inspiration in itself.
It is an exact notion, and above all a theological one, by definition
adapted and restricted to the unique case of God. It may seem less
dear and less familiar than that of author; this is precisely why it
1 See M. J. Lagrange, in Revue Biblique, New Series 2 (1905) 621.

ΙΟΙ

is more reliable. There is no danger of beginning with an equivocation
and thus starting off on the wrong track. Moreover it is not as obscure
as some make it out to be. It brings into play tried and familiar
theological theses, such as those of grace and the charisms, of the
divine and human concurrence, and of instrumental causality—
admittedly a mysterious concept. But the notion of God as Author
of Holy Scripture, if it is understood accurately, without anthropo­
morphism, is no less mysterious; it is even more so.
We will therefore begin by developing this theological datum
of God influencing a human writer by means of his charism of
inspiration. And at the end of this analysis, if it has been well carried
through, we should be able to say that God is truly the Author of
the inspired book, and to understand in what sense. This will be
a broadened, analogical sense, rich in theological implications, one
which will not confine God within the narrow limits of human
authorship, but will respect his transcendence as divine Author.
It is certain that, among men, the author of a book must at least
have conceived the ideas; this seems to be a minimum requirement,
and it is this minimum that Franzelin demands. But there is another
possibility of which human psychology offers no instance, that of
one mind causing another to think by communicating an interior
light to it: it is this which the doctrine of inspiration teaches us to
be the case with God, and which transforms the ordinary meaning
of the word " author. ’’
To be sure this is more than just a question of method which
might appear inconsequential or antiquated — and has actually
seemed so to some writers;1 it is a very important question of attitude.
Two mentalities are at work, two ways of looking at Holy Scripture,
depending on the point of departure each one takes in his study
of the question. Franzelin begins with a human notion — what an
" author ” must be — and ends up with God, to whom he makes
a forced application of that notion. We prefer to begin with
a theological notion, the divine action of inspiration, and end up
with man, the recipient of this action. The two procedures are contrary,
and their results are opposite. The first of these procedures projects
the sacred book into the mind of the divine author in a univocal
1 See A. Bea, op. dt., p. 24, no. 32.

102

fashion; this confers upon it an absolute quality which is hardly
in agreement with the concrete reality of Holy Scripture, and which
reduces the human writer to being author only of the words. The
second procedure puts the book back into the human mind from
which God draws it forth by a process as powerful as it is gentle,
one which, though making the product divine and perfect in its
teaching, in other respects leaves untouched its defects as a human
book. The result is that God and man simultaneously merit the name
of author, but each by a different title and in an eminently analogous
fashion which can be detected in the book itself, at once divine and
/human, perfect and imperfect.
E) The Speculative and Practical Judgments — Prophetic and
Scriptural Inspiration.

Up to this point we have spoken of the judgment in general
terms; we must now be more specific. Inspiration is a charism of the
social order. The persons inspired do not think in a vacuum; they
have a message to communicate to other men. Now the task of speaking
or writing for another’s benefit is quite difierent from an act of pure
knowledge. We might clarify this difference by contrasting the
speculative judgment with the practical judgment. We shall do so
first of all from the viewpoint of psychology in general, and then
by way of application to the case of inspiration.
i) The Speculative and Practical Judgments.

<

•

The speculative judgment has for its object the true. It is the
culmination of an investigation: the mind has inquired, reflected,
debated, and finally gives its assent to what it sees to. be the truth.
The practical judgment has for its object the good. ,It comes into
play at the outset of a work: a man sets for himself a practical goal,
and, after deliberation, decides which means seem best suited to attain
this goal. In the case of a speaker or writer the practical judgment
works in dose harmony with the speculative in order to achieve the
best posable presentation of the thoughts which the author has
conceived and wishes to communicate.
Nevertheless, the relations between these judgments can take
on many varied forms. Sometimes the speculative judgment comes
first, while the practical judgment follows : a truth is first contemplated

103

in itself, in a disinterested way, and then, only afterwards comes
the idea that it would be good to make it known to others. At other
times, the practical judgment comes first and stimulates the speculative
judgment: a man wishes to produce a certain effect on the public
and decides, for that purpose, to compose a speech or a book; after
selecting the most suitable literary type, he then begins to reflect
on the ideas which will be developed in it.

This latter case, however, involves more than a mere question
of temporal priority. The crucial point here is the predominant
influence of one type of judgment on the other; this is a matter which
will greatly affect the resulting literary work. For the practical
judgment of a speaker or writer is often wider in scope than his
speculative judgment; it can serve other ends. The latter is restricted
to truth for its own sake; when it predominates in the thinker’s
mind, the practical judgment is confined to the very secondary role
of presenting this truth under the clearest, most objective literary
form possible. The practical judgment, on the other hand, has
a particular good in view; it is no longer an act of pure understanding;
it channels and expresses an attraction of the will. And it can happen
that the practical judgment in its turn predominates. In the case
of an orator or a writer this means that it will require his voice or
his pen to produce that particular effect on his listeners or readers
which he judges to be good, and which is not necessarily an increase
in their knowledge. He will, of course, to a great extent, want to
enlighten and instruct them; but he can also appeal to their affective
side, working on their feelings and emotions. There are many objects
which an author can have in view — to console, threaten, charm,
relax, amuse, entertain, etc. — all of which are quite distinct from
the search for pure truth; they may even hinder or supplant it.
Finally, his purpose may be simply to hand on to posterity the memory
of some customs or beliefs which he wants to save from oblivion,
without, however, proposing them as models for imitation or as truths
for belief.
It is easy to see that, according as these different objectives
enter in, the practical judgment can at times have a great influence
on the speculative judgment It makes use of the speculative judgment
as one element in the psychological complex which it wishes to deposit
in the book, but not the only one, since the presentation of truth is

104

not its only purpose. It limits the formal object of the speculative
judgment or regulates its degree of affirmation and of presentation
according to its assigned function in the plan of the work. The author
does not disregard truth or do violence to it simply because he regulates
its use in this fashion. He is free to give the intellect the role he wishes
it to play in his book, and he does well to plan carefully how he is to
present the truth, so that he can thereby render it more pleasant,
more palatable, and hence more useful.
Not only does the practical judgment direct and moderate the
expression of the speculative judgment; it can even do without it.
This will be the case when the author says certain things merely for
the sake of elegance, amusement, or relaxation, without attributing
to these statements any importance in the intellectual or doctrinal
order and without making any appraisal of their intrinsic truth.
This will also be the case when he cites the remarks of another author
without having himself thought them through or made them his
own, but simply because he thinks it opportune to make them
known.
It would be possible indefinitely to multiply the many subtle
variations according to which the viewpoint of expediency — that
of the practical judgment—can be related to the viewpoint of objective
truth — which belongs to the speculative judgment. It is enough to
have called attention to the principle which governs these mutual
relations. Now we wish to see its consequences in the question of
inspiration.
2) The Prophet and the Sacred Writer.
Can we apply these elementary rules of human psychology to
those who are inspired? Yes, certainly, since we have recognized
that inspiration is a grace which moves the human mind while
respecting its own proper mode of action. By elevating and totally
penetrating the mind’s activity, the divine impulse undoubtedly
directs it toward ends especially willed by God and differing from
the ends of ordinary men. It will be particularly orientated toward
the instruction of minds and education of hearts in view of the service
of God. This is precisely what, generally speaking, distinguishes
our sacred books from profane books. Nevertheless, that does not
mean that the inspired authors can do nothing but propose doctrines
105

> -'■■■ ' RliinnnriS^tt

or prodaim laws. Such a consequence of inspiration would be
unfounded in theory and is contradicted by actual facts.
It is enough to open the Bible to realize that the sacred writers,
under the divine impulse, spoke with all the varying shades of meaning
which men employ in their daily speech and that they had in view
other objects besides doctrinal instruction.1 At times they also
threaten or console, encourage or call to penance, delight or entertain.
And, when they wish to instruct, we see them using all the resources
of human psychology to convey to simple minds sublime thoughts
by making them attractive and easy to grasp. Finally, we note more
than once that even they are anxious to transmit to posterity the
recollection of ways of acting or of thinking which they thought
it useful to preserve, without intending to inculcate them or to teach
them. *

In other words, then, even in their case the practical judgment
intervenes and acts more or less, as the case may be, upon the
speculative judgment. As a result, the practical judgment too receives
its share of inspiration, and it does so in a higher or lower degree
according to its relative importance in the actual thought processes
of the inspired subject.
To which of the two judgments will the first, principal impulse
of inspiration be directed? This depends on God’s intention, that
is to say, on the mission he is entrusting to the one inspired. In this
regard we might distinguish two distinct vocations, as it were: the
first one impels one to repeat an oracle which has come down from
heaven; the other impels one to compose a book. We shall designate
them by the two standard terms, " prophet ” and " sacred writer. ” *
Inspiration will take on different forms in each case.
» On this question, 2 Tim 3:16-17 is very significant: " All [Holy] Scripture
is divinely inspired, and useful in teaching, in reproof, in correcting faults,
and in training in uprightness, so that the man of God will be adequate, and
equipped for any good work. " These are diverse practical ends, and teaching
is but one among them.
* See F. J. Schroeder, " Père Lagrange: Record and Teaching in
Inspiration, *' Catholic Biblical Quartely 20 (1958) 206-17.
* The latter might be called " hagiographer, *' taking this term in its
etymological meaning. But in current usage the term has taken on a more
technical meaning which could easily lead to confusion. For biblical scholars,

106

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a) For the prophet, who receives from God a message to deliver,
the speculative judgment occupies the foreground and directly receives
the illumination. For knowledge is here the prime consideration.
God wishes to reveal to his representative — and ultimately to other
men—truths which will inform them of his mind and his will. Hence
the essential feature of the divine gift is a light which illuminates
the intellect and causes it to know and contemplate these truths
in a judgment that possesses divine clarity and certitude.

On the other hand, the practical judgment has, in this case, only
a very minor and secondary role. The inspiration affects it only
indirectly and gives it very little to do. To be sure, the prophet must
give external expression to the truth which he has perceived, but
this task scarcely allows for any reflection. He does not have to wonder
whether it is advisable for him to speak, or what he should say. God
has revealed his message to him and is ordering him to transmit
it with the greatest possible care and accuracy. At the very most
he has to make a choice about the method of presentation, the form
of his discourse. Even here there is a limit; the more his thought
has been illuminated by the divine light, the more forcibly do the
very words suggest themselves to him, for he could not have thought
without verbal images.
b) The case of the sacred writer is quite different. He receives
from God an impulse to compose a book, and this book, as was said
above, is not a mere transcription of revealed teachings, but has
in view other ends besides instruction; it must make use of all the
resources of human psychology to move the minds and hearts of men.
This is a concrete, complex objective which calls for much more
initiative on the part of the writer’s practical reason than the mere
promulgation of an apprehended truth. This time the action of
inspiration will first affect his practical reason and will have for its
primary object the practical judgment whereby the writer will decide
how to accomplish his assigned task.
the ** Hagiographa ” constitute one of the three great divisions of Scripture,
in addition to the Law and the Prophets. The “ sacred -writer " of whom
we are here speaking means any author or editor of an inspired writing,
including the Pentateuch as well as the Hagiographa, and the Prophetic
writings as well as the New Testament.

107

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This inspiration of the sacred writer will, of course, necessarily
involve also an illumination of the speculative judgment, but only
as a consequence and to the degree that the latter actually comes
into play. Moreover, as we have seen, in this case the speculative
judgment no longer has the dominant role. Just as the practical
judgment of the writer, as has been shown, directs and moderates
the use of his speculative judgment according to the needs of his
book, so the action of inspiration, conforming itself to the psychological
activity of the author, of which it is also the supreme cause, illuminates
his knowledge only to the extent to which he will make use of it in
his work, which may be very much or very little.
It may be that the sacred writer categorically affirms a doctrinal
truth which he has thought out by himself. In that event, his
inspiration will include as complete an illumination of his knowledge
as in the case of the prophet. It may happen, on the other hand, that
he makes no affirmations, that he speaks or cites other authors’
accounts without vouching for them as his own thought. In that case
inspiration will affect only his practical judgment. Or finally — and
this is the most frequent case — it may happen that he expresses
a judgment of truth, but one which is conditioned in its formal object
and in its degree of affirmation by the general demands of the end
he has in view; in this case the light of inspiration will illuminate
this judgment, not as an absolute, but to the exact extent to which
the author conceives and expresses it.

Here again, one might mention an endless variety of combinations
in the psychological processes actually to be found in concrete cases;
hence also an endless number of variations in the charism of inspiration
which directs these processes. It can happen, for instance, that
a prophet is raised up, not simply to repeat a message received from
God, but to exhort, threaten, console, etc., by the use of his own
mental resources, stimulated by a practical impulse from the Holy
Spirit. Or one might find, on the other hand, a sacred writer who
has been favored by God with genuine revelations, and whose scriptural
activity consists merely in transcribing them as faithfully as possible.
This is not too important. In contrasting the two typical cases of
" prophet ” and " sacred writer ” we have sought only to indicate
the two fundamental relationships which can obtain between the
speculative and practical judgments, according as the one or the

108

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other dominates. And we have attributed these combinations to the
two types of inspired subjects because that is what actually occurs,
as in so many other instances, in the providence of God. The roles
of the speculative and practical judgment can, as a matter of fact,
be differently apportioned, but the possibility of such exceptions
in no way affects the truth of the principle which we have stated,
for that principle is psychologically and theoretically sound.
U3) Revelation, Cognitive Inspiration, and Scriptural Inspiration.
Hence we see that the task of the prophet and that of the sacred
writer — and consequently the charism each receives — are clearly
distinct. Nor can this difference be reduced to a mere question of
the material execution of the work (of speaking or writing), as
a superficial view of the matter might lead us to believe. The essential
differentiating factor in these two typical cases, the one which explains
the many varying degrees of importance which must be attached
to the practical judgment in one instance or the other, is the nature
of the message which God confides to his representative. In the case
of the prophet, God reveals to him supernatural truths which he
could never have attained by himself and which he therefore has
only to repeat. The sacred writer, on the other hand, retains the task
of acquiring and ordering by himself — with God’s help, to be sure —
natural truths, or even supernatural ones, which he has been able
to learn by human methods of inquiry.

In other words, once again we meet the familiar distinction
between revelation and inspiration (in the modem sense of these
*
terms). But its meaning is now much deeper and it implies more
than just the presence or absence of infused " species ” in addition
■
to the " lumen ” which causes one to form a judgment. This time
j - the very nature of the inspired judgment enters into the question.
For, besides the distinction based on the material cause, now there
j
is also the matter of finality.

In the prophet’s revelation, the judgment is essentially speculative,
because God’s purpose in giving the charism is the teaching of truth.
In the sacred writer’s inspiration, on the other hand, the judgment
is first of all practical, and only secondarily and to a limited extent
speculative; for in this case God indicates to the one whom he inspires
log

more extensive and more varied ends, among which the teaching
of truth is only one of many, |ln prophecy, the divine charism first
affects the intellect}; in literary inspiration, God acts initially on the
will. The intellect of the sacred writer is later influenced only to the
extent required by the divine plan, which, as we have seen, may be
very great or very slight.
We might clarify these distinctions and try to establish a set
terminology — something which is often, unfortunately, too vague
in this field1 — by recognizing three possible formalities in the divine
charism:

a) Revelation: a gift of supernatural knowledge to the mind
by way of infused species;
b) Cognitive Inspiration: a light which illuminates the speculative
judgment and raises it to a supernatural fiiode of knowledge;

c) Scriptural Inspiration: a supernatural impulse which stimulates
the will and directs the practical judgment with a view to the
composition of a book which is io produce a certain effect.1
* Ed. Hugon, O.P. (La causalité instrumentale en théologie [Paris, 1907],
p. 48) calls the three formalities distinguished here: revelation, illumination,
and inspiration. However, we think it better not to restrict this last term
to the affective order, but to use it also with regard to knowledge in accordance
with its primary meaning, which is the only one used by St. Thomas. In the
first edition I spoke of prophetic revelation, prophetic inspiration, and scriptural
inspiration. This division could and did lead to misunderstanding. In spite
of my context, I was interpreted as denying to the prophet any impulse that
might extend to writing, and to the sacred writer any illumination of his
knowledge or revelation of supernatural truths. Besides, this division was not
perfectly homogeneous: " prophetic ” connotes a class of inspired persons,
while " scriptural " indicates a human activity. Now I prefer to restrict the
term prophetic inspiration to a classification of persons under the formality
of their ecclesiastical missions; thus it will be distinguished from " dramatic *'
and " hagiographical " inspiration (see infra, p. 126 f.). On the plane of human
activities, I prefer to speak here of inspiration to think (" cognitive ") and
inspiration to write (" scriptural"). See Sacra Pagina I, 86-99.
1 As far as concerns our present viewpoint, the composition of
a “ discourse " can be likened to that of a " book
the same practical finality
distinguishes them from properly speculative knowledge. The one can be called
" oratorical " inspiration, the other, " scriptural. "

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Most of the time, io fact, these formalities, which we have above
outlined in the abstract, are in the concrete found united, although
in varying proportions. The first is characteristic of the prophet,
while the third belongs most properly to the sacred writer. The second
can be found in either: in the prophet, when he himself judges the
meaning of the visions he has been granted (this is the normal case
with the genuine prophet); in the sacred writer, when his inspired
practical judgment causes him to form speculative judgments. Finally
it can happen — though this is more rarely the case — that a prophet
also receives scriptural inspiration, in addition to his mission asprophet,
or that a sacred writer is favored with genuine supernatural revelations
for the sake of his book.1
These distinctions will enable us to diagnose the two errors,
by excess and by defect, which have been made in this field. In so
doing we shall confirm the soundness of the distinctions themselves.
4) The Error by Excess.

The error by excess consists in considering as the object of
inspiration only the speculative judgment concerning truth, and in
failing to recognize the frequently preponderant importance of the
practical judgment. This is the conclusion to which Franzelm’s
reasoning leads, and it is inevitable once the ideas of the book are
looked upon as being in the mind of God who dictates and suggests
all of them. Whenever inspiration is thus conceived after the fashion
1 The different possible combinations of these charisms may be
schematically presented ad follows:
a alone: Pharaoh or Belshazzar receiving a revelation which he does not
understand;
b alone: a prophet or apostle making use of a divine light to judge about
what he has come to know without revelation;
c alone: a sacred writer quoting on the authority of another or writing
about incidentals, without vouching for the truth of the matter;
a and δ: a genuine prophet making a judgment concerning his supernatural
knowledge;
a and c: an author who would write down, at God's bidding, revelations
which he has received but does not understand;
b and c: a sacred writer making a speculative judgment concerning the
things about which he is writing;
α. δ and c.
* a prophet (or sacred writer) committing to writing revelations
which he has received and understood.

XXX
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of a revelation, the mind of the human author is despoiled of that
initiative which we have described in terms of the influence of the
practical judgment on the speculative. All that is left is a very limited
initiative in what concerns the choice of words, but which has nothing
to do with the ideas. This, in short, would be the case described
above as the typical case of the prophet. In Franzelin’s system the
prophet alone figures, and the sacred writer loses his identity to him.
In other words, using the terminology proposed above, cognitive
inspiration is confused with prophetic revelation; and scriptural
inspiration as such is reduced to nothing but an assistance which
guarantees the executive faculties against error.
The awkward consequence of such a theory is that the thoughts
of the human author, which are immediately those of God, all take
on an equal, absolute value. One fails to recognize the sometimes
considerable relativity which is introduced into the act of knowledge
by the pursuit of practical objectives other than instruction.

Occasionally the authority of St. Thomas has been cited in order
to justify this misapprehension. Some believed that his treatise on
prophecy could be applied immediately to scriptural inspiration.
Does he not speak of a motio ad loquendum which normally follows
the illumination of the intellect (q. 171, a. 1; cf. q. 173, a. 4; q. 174,
a. 3 and 4)? And is not the difference between speaking and writing
a purely material one? If so one may, with no difficulty at all, apply
to the latter what has been said of the former.

But we have shown that what distinguishes the sacred writer
from the prophet is not at all the mere detail of whether the material
execution of the work be oral or written. The decisive factor here
is the judgment, and the character of the judgment differs profoundly
according to the extent that the speculative or practical formality
predominates in each instance. Now it has to be admitted that
St. Thomas treated formally only the gift of prophecy; he considered
it a charism of knowledge and he took his stand especially from the
point of view of the speculative judgment (see supra, p. 61 f.). Even
when he speaks of the hagiographers — and he does so only in passing,
as of a borderline case—he is still exclusively interested in their
knowledge, maintaining that, even when it bears on natural objects,
it judges such objects " secundum certitudinem veritatis divinae ”
112

(q. 174, a. 2, ad 3m; ci. q. 173, a. 2 c). This is still a question of the
speculative judgment.1
On the other hand, he scarcely considers the role of the practical
judgment. In connection with the " gift of words " (q. 177, a. 1),
he dearly sets forth the concrete goals which the sacred orator is to
keep in view: not only to " instruct, ” but also to " please ” and to
"move"; and this remark is even more applicable to the sacred
writer. But he does not inquire further into how such goals affect
the thought processes of the inspired subject and the supernatural
action directing them. * He does not do so because the case of the
prophet ” — which is his only concern — is entirely different in this
matter from that of the “ sacred writer, ” and does not call for the
same remarks. In short, while treating of the " gift of words, ”
St. Thomas has given us a sketch of " oratorical inspiration, ”
something already distinct from cognitive inspiration, but not yet
scriptural inspiration.
The fact remains that in one illuminating phrase he does give
us a hint of how the thought processes of the prophet differ funda­
mentally from those of the hagiographer. When he says that the
former speaks " ex persona Domini, " while the latter speaks " ex
persona propria” (q. 174, a. 2, ad 3m), is he not clearly suggesting
that difference in the messenger’s initiative which we explained in
terms of the greater or less importance of the practical judgment?
This indication is very meaningful. St. Thomas would undoubtedly
have developed it further had he studied scriptural inspiration in
itself. He did not do so, because the state of biblical studies in his
time, unlike our own, did not demand it. We must be mindful of this
when we wish to apply what he says of prophecy to scriptural
1 What has been said above concerning St. Thomas’s terminology (p. 68 fl.)
is more easily understood in the light of these reflections. He almost always
speaks of “ revelation, ” even with reference to the hagiographer, because
he always has in mind the case of the typical prophet, and is not considering
the hagiographer except in relation to the prophet, and thus on the plane of
knowledge. On the other hand, the term “ inspiration, ” which of itself designates
a practical impulse not necessarily restricted to the intellectual order, is for
the same reason used but rarely in this treatise.
* This explains how Franzelin could use what St. Thomas says about
the gratia sermonis, while limiting its influence to the ratio materialis of the
book, i.e., its literary form [op. cit., p. 324).

113

inspiration. We may regret his silence; we should not take advantage
of it to misrepresent his thought.

5) The Error by Defect.
If it is an excess to think that the inspiration of the sacred writer
affects the speculative judgment first and always, it would be no less
so to think that it never affects it and to restrict inspiration
exclusively to the practical judgment. And yet this opinion has been
held and deserves to be considered in its turn.
According to some,1 inspiration is absolutely nothing more
than an "orientation” imparted to the practical reason, or even
an impulse given first to the will, with no resulting “ illumination "
of the speculative intellect whatsoever. To be sure, cognitive activity
is required for the composition of the book, but it has no share in the
charism of inspiration. Supernatural knowledge, they would hold,
implies a “ revelation ” in which the mind is passive and receives
the truths which God reveals to it. Natural knowledge, on the other
hand, is acquired by the ordinary operations of the human faculties
left to themselves, as happens with every other writer. In either
case, the activity involved is of another order, that of pure knowledge,
with which inspiration properly so called is not directly concerned.
The latter, let us repeat, is of the strictly executive order. Its function
is not to impart knowledge of the truth. It presupposes that such
knowledge has been acquired and is concerned with its transmission.
This opinion is the result of a reaction against Franzelin; the
reaction is understandable, but it goes too far. Under pretext of
distinguishing between the notion of revelation and inspiration,
which had been unduly confused with each other, this theory
disassociates them excessively, to the great detriment of the speculative
element. The latter now has for its sole divine guarantee only the
charism of " revelation, ” which is not always involved. When the
objects to be known are in the natural order, the mind is left to its
1 See e.g., E. Levesque, in Revue Biblique 4 (1895) 421 ff.; his " Essai sur
la nature de l'inspiration des Livres Saints, ” Revue des Facultis catholiques
de l’Ouest, (1886), pp. 4-7 of the offprint; and his remarks in Revue Biblique
6 (1897) 325 ff.
Fr. Lagrange, in Revue Biblique 5 (1896) 499, made some explicit reser­
vations regarding the opinion of Levesque. See also Vosté, op. cit., p. yf ff.

II4

own resources to form its speculative judgment of truth concerning
them. But the speculative judgment is the essential element in
knowledge, its formal constituent, the basis of its truth and its
authority. Can it, then, be removed from the sphere of divine influence
without destroying the truth and the authority of the sacred book?
The defenders of this opinion will no doubt say that, as they
understand the term, inspiration still retains a certain influence
on the speculative judgment. It does not illuminate it directly, but
it controls it in an indirect manner. True, it immediately affects only
the will and the practical reason, but through these faculties it exercises
a mediate action, if not on the speculative judgment in itself, at least
upon its expression in the book.
This consideration is not enough. The most it attributes to
inspiration is a certain negative control of the speculative judgment,
preventing it from being erroneous; it does not acknowledge its role
of positive illumination which is necessary for this judgment to assume
a divine authority. Moreover, this is what is required in order that
the sacred book really have God for its author: each speculative
judgment which is formally affirmed, and insofar as it is affirmed,
must be directly attributable to God; consequently, it must have
been expressed by the human author who is his instrument, under
the immediate action of God illuminating his mind. And this must
be true even for judgments which bear only on natural objects;
for there are such judgments, which the author affirms and which
are therefore part of the divine teaching.
For the writer’s judgments to have this divine authority it is
not required that God deposit them ready-made in the author’s
passive mind. We have already explained, with the help of St. Thomas,
how the human mind can operate, think, and work in a completely
normal manner and still be moved at the same time by divine
inspiration, thereby producing a judgment which is truly authorized
by God. This is what the adherents of the opinion now under discussion
have failed to understand. Basically they wished to avoid the
consequences of the Franzelin solution, but were unable to break
away from his principles. They wished to discard the theory of
intellectual dictation of the entire book, but, instead of directing
their criticism at the principles on which this theory of dictation
was based, they simply restricted dictation to the " revealed ” elements

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of the book. Instead of rejecting the notion of a purely passive mind
which simply receives what God imparts to it, they merely limited
this case to supernatural truths. After making what they considered
a necessary minimal concession, they compensated for it in their
treatment of what remained, that is, the naturally knowable truths.
Rejecting the " suggestion ” which Franzelin here used to maintain
the hegemony of the dictation theory, they freed the writer’s mind
from all divine control over its knowledge in this area, and consigned
inspiration in this matter to the role of practical and voluntary
execution. Whence this alternative, either of whose terms is equally
awkward: in the case of supernatural truths, which the mind receives
by revelation, it is a purely passive instrumental cause, expressing
a judgment which is entirely divine; in the opposite case, when the
human mind receives only inspiration, it is the principal cause of its
own knowledge and it expresses an entirely human judgment.
All this results from failing to understand that God can illuminate
knowledge otherwise than by revelation or dictation, namely, by
that " cognitive inspiration ” which we, following the lead of
St. Thomas, have discussed, and which harmoniously reconciles
the action of God and man. To the two alternatives mentioned above,
we add a third possibility: the entirely unique case in which the mind
of a man, at once directed and autonomous, passive and active, is
an instrumental cause which acts at the same time as it is moved,
thus forming a judgment which is both divine and human. This
illumination of the speculative judgment (motio ad cogitandum),
that is to say — to use the terminology proposed above — this
" cognitive inspiration, " furnishes us with an element which was
missing in the opinion under discussion, the link between “ revelation ”
and " scriptural inspiration " (motio ad scribendum).

6) We think, then, that the correct solution is a happy medium
between the two opinions just examined. In agreement with the
second against the first, we admit that inspiration is distinct from
revelation, and, in the case of the sacred writer, is first of all an impulse
in the practical order. In some cases, indeed, it can be only that
and may not involve any judgment, and therefore any charism, of
the speculative order.
But, in agreement with the first opinion against the second, we
maintain that every speculative judgment of the writer must be

116

produced under the positive enlightenment of the Holy Spirit and,
consequently, that “ scriptural inspiration ’’ necessarily implies
" cognitive inspiration ” whenever the sacred writer forms a judgment
of truth and to the extent that he affirms it.

Finally, whereas these two opinions artificially separate or
isolate the two orders of the speculative and the practical, in our
theory they overlap. Now the consequences of this are of supreme
importance: scriptural inspiration penetrates and specifies the writer’s
cognitive inspiration; his practical judgment commands and moderates
his speculative judgment. The result is an inspired thought which
exhibits all the nuances, restrictions, and limitations characteristic
of human thinking, and which is nonetheless God’s thought, precisely
as he wishes to make it known to the children of men.
Moreover we find this practical finality of inspiration, even in
the intellectual order, clearly affirmed in the official pronormcements
of Pravidentissimus and Spiritus Paraditus (cf. supra, p. 90, notes
i and 2). The words " ut recte mente conciperent ” of the former
cannot be restricted to a pure act of speculative knowledge except
by taking them out of context. The sentence in which they are
contained, taken in its entirety, clearly indicates the practical, concrete
end in view of which inspiration sets in motion all the author’s powers,
including his intellect: it provokes and moves him to write; it assists
him in bis work, with the result that he forms a correct idea in his
mind of everything that God is ordering him to write and nothing
more, etc. To put it most aptly, scriptural inspiration does not induce
speculation in a void, but causes the matter of the book to be conceived
in the way in which God judges fitting that it should be presented. The
Encyclical Spiritus Paraditus likewise makes an immediate connection
between the light of inspiration and the presentation of the truth,
thus restating in another way that the formal object of the illumination
granted to the writer’s mind — that is, the object which specifies
and limits that illumination — is the truth such as God wishes to
make it known and to the extent that he wishes to make it known.
But, even though this light orientates the writer’s work toward
a practical end, it still remains fully and especially a “ light ’’ which
illuminates his mind as much as is necessary. For God can teach
nothing which is not rightly conceived and true.

117

y) The Sacred Writer as an Instrument in the Strict Sense.1
I remarked above (pp. 77-83, 94-95) that the prophet cannot
be called instrumental cause of his knowledge except in a broad
and improper sense. This was true of the prophetic charism; but
if we consider scriptural inspiration, as we have just done, the case
is different. For the end product of this inspiration is no longer an
immanent act of knowledge necessarily proportioned to the mind
producing it; it is rather an external effect which goes beyond the
conscious intent of its author and frees itself from him to take its
place in a vaster complex. This effect is the objective book for which
God, in having it composed, has destined a role in the history of
Revelation which the human author could never suspect. Not only
has he prepared it for a reading public far beyond the author’s contem­
poraries to whom it was addressed, but he has given it a place in
a great literary collection, the Bible of the Old and New Testament;
here this particular book receives new dimensions, being explained
by the other books in the collection and in turn explaining them,
in order to join with them in the total teaching of the full Revelation.
We realize how much an individual author, no matter how strong
the illumination given him, is outstripped by the providential finality
of the Sacred Book. Beyond what he has consciously included
in his text, the text itself will always contain seeds of further
development, refrains and resonances which are beyond his power
of dear perception; but they have been put into the text with his
concurrence, if not his knowledge, by the Sovereign Author of the
whole Book. This is the whole richness of the secondary senses which
are a continuation of the primary sense known by the author (see
pp. 149 f.). For this whole residue of which he is not conscious, he
is dearly an instrument in the strict sense of the word. This is,
moreover, nothing more than an application of the theological prindple
previously discovered in St. Thomas himself. The difference is in
the extent of application. While from the formal viewpoint of prophetic
knowledge the surplus of truth which escaped the judgment could
be considered a secondary and relativdy rare case, from the viewpoint
of scriptural inspiration, however, this surplus becomes the rule.
* By making this addition to the first edition, I wish to do justice to the
observations of M. Labonrdette in Revue Thomiste 50 (1950) 418

118

In order that the Sacred Book be filled with a richness of meaning
that fits it for the total Revelation in which it holds a place, it is
obviously necessary that God preside over its literary production
in a very different way than by the simple " assistance ” of Cardinal
Franzelin, sc., it must be directed by a quite immediate and efficacious
impulse directed toward the executive faculties of the human author.
We shall see this when we discuss the extension of inspiration to
all the faculties of the sacred author. Furthermore, we shall have
to abandon the somewhat theoretical consideration of an author
viewed as an isolated individual; we shall have to see how inspiration
must take in many minds and many hearts through many centuries
in order to have them collaborate, even without their knowledge,
according to a concerted plan to produce the great literary collection
which is the Bible, both one and diverse, multiple and harmonious.

3.
A) Inspiration
Writer.

THE EXTENT OF INSPIRATION

Extends to all the

Faculties

of the

Sacred

The practical judgment presupposes, as we have said, an attraction
in the will which provides the judgment with a definite end. Once
it has fixed its choice, the practical judgment, in turn, needs an act
of the will for the execution of the decision which it has made. Under
an impulse of the will, directed by the practical judgment, the executive
faculties then come into play: imagination, memory, feelings, the
physical activities of speaking or writing. These all contribute to
the final result of expression in oral or written form, according as
the author has decided to express his thought in a speech or
inabook.

This entire process of the executive faculties must also be under
the influence of inspiration, if we wish the result to be truly the work
of God. For the words of the prophet to be divine oracles, for the
work of the hagiographer to be a “ divine writing, " it is necessary
for the orator or writer to have been assisted by the supernatural
charism during the entire course of his work, and not only in the
conception of the ideas. Otherwise, there will be no guarantee that
the truths inspired by God have not been misrepresented by an
«9

expression which was purely human.1 Moreover, this influence upon
the will and the executive faculties is mentioned explicitly in the
pronormcements concerning inspiration in Providentissimus and
Spiritus Paraditus (cf. supra, p. 90, notes 1 and 2).

But how must we conceive this influence of inspiration on the
execution of the work? If we take the general teaching of St. Thomas
as our guide, there will be no difficulty in admitting that the influence
of inspiration moves and directs the will and the executive faculties
in a maimer quite as positive, peremptory, and flexible as it moves
the intellect. Here too, as in the case of the intellect, the inspired
subject will be considered as an instrument in the hands of God,
the principal cause; but under the divine influence this instrument
will continue to act by its own connatural power, and it will remain
nd less free and personal in its deliberation, its determination, and
its literary execution than it was in its thought processes. One
concession will be made — the charism of inspiration varies its action
in accordance with the different faculties, and adapts it analogously
to the proper mode of activity of each faculty.
1) Influence on the Will.
First of all, inspiration makes the sacred writer will what God
wills, and yet in a human way, that is, as a free and responsible person.
The writer’s will receives a supernatural impulse which takes the
form of an immediate physical motion. This is necessary if God is
truly to retain the whole efficacious initiative of a book which will
be his work. A merely moral stimulus would not suffice, though God
may at the same time act in this fashion; as we know, God sometimes
1 This is what distinguishes the depositaries of official revelation, first
Jewish and then Christian, from private mystics. The latter may have received
revelations no less authentic and sublime — even more sublime — than the
former; but they did not have the charism to express them inerrantly. When
it is said that " Revelation " closed with the last Apostle, it is understood that
whatever further revelations God may have granted, or may still grant, do not
have the same essentially social character as regards doctrine and are not
authoritative for faith (see Explanatory Note 56). The saints can mingle with
the accounts of their visions formal errors coming from their own minds. From
this the inspired writers of the Old and New Testaments were preserved. See
Levesque in Revue Biblique 4 (1895) 421 ff.

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uses external occasions to stimulate his writer, for example, the
requests made to the evangelist St. Mark by the Christians at Rome.
This action on the will should be conceived as closely paralleling
the influence on the intellect, since, in any case, these two faculties
cannot be divorced from one another in the concrete. In his will,
as in his intellect, the inspired writer finds himself much more
intimately dependent on the divine Cause than he is when he receives
only the ordinary divine concurrence. Thus he becomes a perfectly
docile instrument. He does not wish to deliver his message in the
same way as he might wish to perform some natural action or even
acts of supernatural virtue, that is, he does not act when he pleases
and of his own accord. He is moved to work by the stimulus of transient
but peremptory impulses, which come upon him now and then in
the same way that the prophetic light illuminates his intellect; but
these impulses then ineluctably determine him to will the work that
God wills and they sustain him during the entire time that he is
working.
And yet, just as the intellect retains its vital activity and the
spontaneity of its judgment under the brilliance of the divine light,
so too the will begins to act and deploys its energy under the divine
impulse without any violation of its own proper mode of action;
in other words, it acts rationally and freely. In the order of volition
as in that of knowledge, the inspired writer is a special type of
instrument, one which is alive and human.
In the last analysis, how are we to understand this peremptory
action which determines the will without suppressing its liberty?
This question belongs to a much larger problem in theology, that
of the efficacy of grace. Each school solves this problem according
to its own system, and this is not the place to go into that dispute.
Suffice it to say that Thomist theologians will have recourse to the
doctrine of physical predetermination.

2) Influence on the Executive Faculties.
Let us now consider the activation of the executive faculties,
which particularly determines the choice of expression and the literary
composition. It is not necessary, in order to safeguard the individual
qualities of the human author which are so strikingly evident in this
part of his work, that the divine intervention be reduced to a mere
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negative assistance, as Franzelin proposed.1 He can remain an
instrument in the sense we have mentioned and still retain that
liberty of action which is reflected in the finished product. While
remaining constantly subject to the direct and positive action of
God's inspiration, he is just as free in his literary effort as any other
writer. The divine impulse which directs him from on high merely
gives him greater security in choosing his modes of expression. ’
He does not necessarily find his task easier, any more than he is
necessarily conscious of the help which is being given him. But,
whether he knows it or not, the hand which guides him insures him
against falsifying the truth of his message. Even more than that — for
here we are dealing with a positive influence — he selects, under the
gentle impulse which guides him, the expressions, the turns of phrase,
the literary types which will best serve the end which God has in
view for 1rs work. This is what we call “ verbal inspiration. ”
Some have felt alarmed at verbal inspiration, seeing in it a return
to the old fheory of the “ dictation ” of Holy Scripture. The reason
is that they do not understand this liberty of action which we claim
for the human instrument working under the divine influence, and
because they still confuse inspiration with revelation.
Others have thought the expression unfortunate and have
preferred to speak of " total inspiration. ” * This is hardly more than
a quarrel about words. The latter formula does have the advantage
of laying greater stress on the continuity of inspiration. It is actually
one and the same charism which affects all the writer’s faculties. This
charism is, of course, diversified according as it affects the intellect,
the will, or the executive faculties. But it is the very same impulse
which moves all of them together and which, in particular, brings
about the discovery of the words while causing the conception of the
ideas. Indeed, is any other explanation possible? We have criticized
Franzelin for having introduced an impossible separation here between
the ideas and their literary expression. It is thus evident that " verbal ”
or " total ’’ inspiration is in better agreement with the laws of
1 Franzelin, op. cil., p. 322 fi.
* This is fundamental in order to establish the fuller sense which God
prepares in the words, even though the author whom he made choose them is
unconscious of this fuller meaning; see p. 150 f.
• See Lagrange in Revue Biblique, New Series 3 (1906) 308.

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psychology. Here we have an additional proof that the truly Thomistic
theory of the way in which God moves man makes the whole process
of inspiration and the composition of the sacred book more intelligible
and more human, without, for all that, being any the less divine.

B) Inspiration Extends to all who Took Part in the Composition
of the Book.
Modem biblical criticism makes us more and more aware that
the origin of Holy Scripture was often a very complex matter, especially
as regards the Old Testament. The old idea of a single author personally
composing and writing the entire work which bears his name hits
gradually had to give way to less simple but more realistic conceptions.
Manyof the prophetic books todayappear to be collections—sometimes
rather disorderly collections — of oracles and speeches compiled by
later disciples. Some of these are perhaps not even the work of the
principal prophet to whom they were ascribed. Instead of believing
that a given sapiential book is the work of Solomon, we distinguish
in it numerous fragments from different sources. As for the five books
of the Pentateuch, very few exegetes today would dare to hold that
they were written in their entirety by the hand of Moses.
This is not the place to investigate these critical problems. We
do not even say that all of them have been solved. What is important
is that they have been raised and that, in some case or other, we are
forced to admit that the sacred books, in their present state, have
undergone many alterations, that they contain many glosses, or even
entire sections which are the work of diverse hands — in short that,
besides the known authors, many anonymous authors or collaborators
have had a share in their composition.
What interests us is the theological question which results from
all this: how are we to conceive the action of inspiration in such
a complex process? We would be hard put for an answer if we insisted
upon Franzelin's solution. Did God reveal or suggest his thoughts
to all those who took up the pen to add something to the inspired
work? Undoubtedly this is possible, strictly speaking, in a situation
where their addition was of a doctrinal character. But what are we
to say if these men did nothing but insert some element of no
intellectual significance, v.g., merely improve the style? Besides
the inspiration-revelation which communicates God's thoughts to
man, Franzelin admits only a negative assistance as a protection

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for the literary composition. Are we then to consider those alterations
which do not really affect the thought as not properly inspired?
Our distinction between revelation and inspiration and our
insistence on the importance of the practical judgment seem to offer
easier solutions to these problems. If inspiration does not essentially
demand either the revelation or even the suggestion of truths already
conceived by God, but implies only a light and an impulse directed
toward the writing of a book, there is obviously no difficulty in holding
that everyone who had a hand in the composition of the book was
favored with this charism. It is enough that someone has decided,
under the divine light, that such a substitution or addition would
make the work more useful and beneficial. This much is necessary
and sufficient in order that the altered or completed text which leaves
his hands may be genuinely inspired.
We therefore admit that the charism of inspiration may have
been shared by a large number of individuals, but in different degrees.
As in the case of the human faculties, the distribution of the divine
influence must here be conceived in an analogical and proportional
way. The share which each one receives of this influence will depend
on the extent to which he collaborates in the composition of the
sacred books. This can occur in the most varied ways, beginning
with the known prophet who consciously receives divine revelations
and personally writes them down, and extending to the anonymous
editor who makes only some slight alteration in the sacred text,
without even being aware that God is inspiring him to do so. It even
includes the case of the man who does nothing but introduce a profane
book into the Canon of Sacred Scripture because he has discovered
in it, under the light of inspiration, a meaning which is applicable
to the things of God.1 Between these extremes we might cite the case
of a secretary-editor, such as the editor of the Epistle to the Hebrews,
who composes a writing for which the Apostle has given him only
the main ideas. He is obviously inspired to the extent — a rather
large extent — to which he contributes to the production of the work.
On the other hand, the case of the simple copyist must be considered
as falling outside of the influence of inspiration: he has no real share
in the composition of the sacred book. But this condition would
1 As is well known, some very competent exegetes explain in this way
the origin of the Song of Songs.

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change if he deliberately allowed himself to correct the text which
he was copying, and if his correction were accepted in the Church’s
canonical text.1
Let us not forget this last, indispensable condition. In the final
analysis we have no way of knowing the existence of the charism of
inspiration other than the authority of the Church presenting us with
a text which she declares to be canonical and inspired. We say, then,
that whoever has contributed to the composition of this text can and
must have participated, according to his degree, in the gift of
inspiration. And our conception of this charism permits us to see
how it might be present in many minds in the most varied ways.
It is hardly likely that we can know in detail how it was distributed.
It matters little that many inspired writers must remain forever
unknown to us. The question of inspiration is entirely distinct from
that of authenticity. And if biblical criticism sometimes call the latter
into question, it in no way touches the former. A certain book may
not be the work of the author to whom it was formerly attributed.
It is nevertheless inspired, since it is contained in Holy Scripture. *
Should we not go further, go back beyond the various collaborators
in the writing of the book to those who prepared for this writing
by their words and deeds? » Before God had his history of salvation
written down, he had it . delivered orally, and even before that he
had it lived. It was the Holy Spirit who moved the patriarchs, Judges,
and kings to play a role in the drama of salvation (Is 63: 11 fi. for
Moses; Jgs 15:14 for Samson). The same Spirit had the prophets
or the Apostles speak many things which directly served the education
of the People of God, though they have not all been collected in
the Scriptures. These are other aspects of inspiration which, though
distinct from scriptural inspiration, do not oppose but complement it.
* On the problem of the inspiration of the Septuagint, which the early
Church received as its canonical Bible, cf. infra, p. 146.
* This does not mean that the problems of authenticity become secondary
and no longer concern faith. They can be supremely important for other reasons.
Thus it would not be inconsequential if one of the Gospels were not by the
apostle or evangelist to whom tradition ascribes it. While remaining inspired,
it would lose its authority as the testimony of an eyewitness.
* The following reflections, to the end of this Section, are a supplement
to the first edition. They are more fully developed in Sacra Pagina I,
86-99.

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They deserve a terminology of their own, for example, dramatic
(in the etymological sense of the word) and -prophetic or apostolic
inspiration; they differ from hagiographical inspiration which is proper
to the sacred writers. For these categories partial appeal may be
made to the distinction set up by St. Thomas himself (q. 173, a. 4)
between the prophetic charism (ad aliquid apprehendendum) and
the impulses (ad aliquid loquendum and ad aliquid faciendum) which
accompany them; see also q. 171, a. 1; q. 174, a. 3. The point of
view, however, is different, and here again the emphasis must be
shifted. St. Thomas is making a formal study of the charism of
prophecy; he is concerned only with secondary activities which
in the same man accompany the principal activity of knowledge.1
We, on the other hand, are considering the Sacred Books and the
history of Revelation in its concrete totality; our concern is with
activities which were principal, even unique, in inspired men, and
which characterize their social — or better, ecclesiastical — mission
in the formation of the People of God. In the history of salvation
their inspired acts or discourses are set apart from the writings in
which they have been partially collected; they have a value of their
own and, though they have prepared for the book, they are vaster
than it, for not everything has been deposited in the book.

Such distinctions are rich in consequences. Thus, “ dramatic ’’
inspiration will serve as a theological foundation for the typical
sense, i.e., the meaning which God has put into the events themselves
(cf. p. 151); "prophetic" or "apostolic” inspiration will do
the same for Tradition, that oral and living transmission of the
Revelation, which has been condensed in the Scripture, but which
overflows and waters it.
These distinctions will shed light on still other problems, for
example, that of the possible divergence between the word of a biblical
personage and the way the sacred writer uses it; * or, again, the false
1 St. Thomas (q. 174, a. 3) indeed considers for its own sake the inspiration
of Samson, bnt it is significant that he judges it to be " the lowest grade of
prophecy
this is because he is speaking from the standpoint of knowledge.
Such inspiration is entirely on the periphery of his subject.

* See Revue Biblique 63 (1956) 421 f., and Sacra Pagina I, 86-99 : a study of
the problem of St. Peter’s speech as reported in Mt 16:16.

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problem arising from the question whether the inspiration of the
Sacred Book ought not to be limited to the “ last editor! "
Likewise, they can do justice to the expression, " collective ”
inspiration (in the correct sense), by supplying safeguards against
any danger in it. Indeed, the inspiring charism circulates through
the entire Holy People and calls for multiple and diverse energies.
But it does not lay hold on some anonymous and shapeless mass;
it illuminates and directs a structured society through individuals
chosen and personally endowed with charisms to serve the group.
There is here an anticipated realization, with special application
to the constitution of the revealed message, of the Holy Spirit’s
charismatic action in the Church as St. Paul depicts it. Obviously,
this diffusion, homogeneous but diverse, flowing from one source
but with many ramifications, must always be conceived analogously
and proportionally.
The division of the charism of inspiration here proposed from the
viewpoint of ecclesiastical missions in the development of the
Revelation differs from that established above (p. no f.) ; the latter
starts from the psychological varieties of human activity. The
terminology can be assembled as follows: Biblical inspiration (as
distinct from ecclesiastical inspiration; see p. 165, note 2) may be
termed cognitive (an illumination of the understanding), oratorical
(a practical impulse to compose a discourse), or scriptural (a practical
impulse to compose a book); biblical inspiration will be dramatic,
prophetic-apostolic, or hagiographiccd, according as it moves a man
to communicate the divine message by his concrete life, by his words,
or by his writings. Further, these two divisions flow into one another
and blend in different ways; see p. in, note 1.

C) Inspiration Extends to the Entire Content of Holy Scripture.
Finally, we have no difficulty in accepting as inspired the whole
of Sacred Scripture in all its parts.
Some suggested that inspiration be limited to " res fidei et
morum, " but the Church has clearly condemned this restriction
as an error. The Vatican Council, repeating a decree of the Council
of Trent (DB
f.; EB 42-45 [57-60]), had already declared “ sacred
and canonical, " and therefore inspired, all the books of the Old
and New Testament with all their parts: '* Veteris et Novi Testamenti

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libri integri cum omnibus suis partibus” (DB 1787; EB 62 [72]).
Providentissimus, in answer to new errors, explicitly condemned
the restriction of scriptural inspiration to matters of faith and morals
{DB 1950; EB 109 [124]).
Once again, this restriction is merely the result of a false notion
of inspiration. If inspiration is thought of as a revelation dictating
God’s thoughts, it does actually seem difficult to apply it to the large
number of incidental and profane elements which are contained in
the Bible but which do not present any divine teaching. One is thus
led to restrict inspiration to matters which God truly wishes to teach
to men, that is to say, to doctrinal and moral matters.
But if inspiration is conceived as an action which causes the
human mind to think and to work with a view to producing a concrete
book, the question takes on a different aspect. On the one hand,
its influence necessarily extends to the entire book, since the entire
book is the result of the human effort operating under the divine
impulse. On the other hand, this total influence causes no difficulty
since it does not amount to making each element in the book the
revelation of a divine thought.
When it is said that the minor details are inspired exactly as
are the essentials, this does not mean that they are inspired to the
same degree, or for their own sake. They are inspired in a subordinate
capacity, to the extent that they act as a valuable adjunct to the
essentials. The sacred writer actually intends to write only for the
glory of God, that is to say, in practice, to acquaint his readers with
the things of God and to improve their moral life. But writing as
a man for other men, he uses a thousand different devices to win
acceptance for his message. Wishing to instruct and to edify, he does
not think it beneath him to please and to entertain. No detail seems
superfluous to him provided it contributes to making his book more
beautiful, more pleasant, and therefore more useful. When he writes
that Tobit’s dog wagged its tail, he does so with the deliberate art
of a narrator who wishes to catch the interest of his readers by means
of the picturesque. But he does not affirm this detail for itself; he
uses it only in relation to his entire book, in accord with its admittedly
very modest role as a literary ornament. In like manner, each element
of the work must be judged according to its contribution to the
over-all effect; we cannot, if we wish to be faithful to the author’s
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intentions, separate it from its context and assign it an absolute
value; we must look at it in the whole into which it has been inserted
and then evaluate its relative worth.
Our theory of inspiration permits us to apply these fundamental
rules, which are valid for every human book, to the sacred books
themselves. By causing the human mind to operate without violating
its proper mode of action, the influence of inspiration actually
penetrates everything which results from that operation, but it
guarantees each element only to the extent that the author intends
it, that is to say, according to the role which each plays in the work
as a whole. God wished, as did his interpreter, to speak to us of the
tail of Tobit’s dog. Hence this detail, is inspired as is all the rest.
But it is willed and inspired to the extent—here a very slight extent—
that it contributes to the effect of the book. And so of each element.
In other words, here again the " total ” distribution of inspiration
must be conceived in an analogous and proportional way. As with
the various faculties of the writer and the different authors who
have collaborated in making the Bible, so too all the parts of the
Sacred Book have a share in the divine influence of inspiration, but
in widely varying degrees. We would be misrepresenting the divine
gift if we failed to recognize this scale of values and demanded that
each element in Scripture, taken as an absolute, offer the same divine
guarantees of truth, beauty, moral utility, etc.
A certain element of primary importance—the expression of some
dogmatic truth — will be fully illuminated; whence its perfection
of truth, darity, and lucidity; whence also its fully guaranteed
expression. For even its verbal formulation will receive a very special
share of the divine influence, commensurate to the supreme importance
of its content. On the other hand, a certain secondary element, or
even one of trivial importance, will receive only a very dim and
distant ray of the divine charism, just enough to cause it to be inserted
in this spot to which it adds its slight shade of meaning, while in all
other respects its substance can remain full of imperfections.1
*
♦

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1 On St. Thomas’s distinction between the dogmas de substantia fidei
and the credibilia fier accidens in the Bible, see Lagrange in Revue Biblique 9
(1900) 136.

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We might illustrate these reflections by means of an allegory.
Let us take a cathedral. If we analyze it we discover that it
possesses elements of varying importance: the foundation stones
and the huge pillars differ in worth from the ruble used for filling;
the vault-ribs have a different value than the small blocks resting
on them. And even among the indispensable elements there are many
shades of difference: the pillars in the choir support more weight
than the columns in the side asiles, etc. But all these diverse elements
go to make up one and the same monument, and each one plays its
proportionate part in the over-all effect. This edifice which rises up
as a single unit is vibrant with an immense total dynamism which
is diffused proportionately through all its parts. The force which
gives it cohesion and thrusts it skyward passes through every stone,
no less through the base of the mighty pillars than through the summit
of the spire. But it passes through each stone only according to its
position and function in the whole. In short, the force is one and
everywhere the same in its essence, but it is diffused through the
diverse elements analogically, with different quantities and even
infinitely varied formalities.
A The Bible is this cathedral. Its architect is God. The craftsmen
and laborers are the sacred writers. The materials are the different
elements of the Sacred Book. The force which vibrates through the
entire monument is inspiration^
Those who wish to restrict inspiration to “ matters of faith and
morals ” are like the man who would be willing to tear down all the
non-essential elements of the cathedral and keep only theframework—
the essential structure, the ribs — which is strictly necessary in order
that it remain standing. Certainly the monument would remain
standing, but it would be hideous and uninhabitable; all those so-called
accessories played their part in ornamenting and brightening it.
If the Bible were thus stripped, it would still contain the essentials
of revelation, but it would be dry, lacking human beauty, psycho­
logically uninhabitable. This is not what the divine Architect wanted
when he decided to construct this edifice to shelter the religious
thought of mankind.
Those who reject " total ’’ inspiration (ad verba) try to make
us believe that the dynamism of the cathedral passes indeed through
the stones, but not through the partides of the stone. What is a stone

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without the partides which make it up? What is a thought without
the words which dothe it? Ideas and judgments are necessarily
embodied in words chosen and arranged in such and such a way,
just as a stone is made up of particles of such and such a nature,
more or less dense or closely packed. The building materials of
a St. Paul are not the same as those of a St. John; we mean thenvocabulary and their literary style.
And even their thoughts differ. Variety conduces to the beauty
of a cathedral. And so the architect entrusts the north portal to one
artist and the south portal to another. Each one will contribute his
artistry and his imagery, and the resulting symphony in stone will
be all the more artistic for it. Thus God uses an Isaiah and a Jeremiah,
a St. Mark and a St. Luke, to erect his monument in which each
mind will find the sustenance which suits it, and perhaps a favorite
comer in which it can pray with greater fervor.
Besides these first class artists, many craftsmen and laborers
contribute their share of knowledge and toil; the cathedral is
a collective work. So too is the Bible, with its numerous workmen,
often anonymous, who have erected it stone by stone.
Along comes the theorist who has no understanding of the living
cathedral and who, in order to study it, razes it and arranges all
its stones side by side, on the same level, in a museum gallery; it is
easy for him now to be shocked at the imperfections in a certain
stone which came from the upper vaulting and which, since it had
little weight to support, might be of inferior quality or, since it was
seen only from afar, might be only roughly polished. This is how
the purely speculative theologian would act were he to consider
the Bible as a museum of " sed contra’s ” in which everything is
of the same value, and any verse at all can be considered in itself,
apart from the whole, and must present the same guarantees of divine
truth and perfection. He will have many occasions to be shocked.
If we wish truly to understand this divine monument which
is the Bible, we must never lose sight of its vital unity. To this end
we must spare no effort, examine the triforia as well as the nave,
climb up to the tribunes and the roof, study each element in the
place it occupies where alone it takes on its true worth. It is only
after such minute study and long years of familiarity that we will
be able fully to grasp the meaning of the whole as well as of each

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detail. Then we will no longer be surprised at anything; we will,
on the contrary, perceive such a splendor of order as could be
attributed only to the hand of God.
4.

INERRANCY

A) Inerrancy is not the purpose of inspiration; it is its result —
or better, it is one among several of its results. It would be its only
result if God’s sole purpose in enlightening his messenger was to
have him teach truths. Now this is not the case. Instruction is only
one of the aims proposed to the practical reason of the inspired subject;
there are other ends which belong especially to the affective order,
such as to encourage, console, reprimand, etc. Truth will then be
one of the qualities of the inspired word, but not the only one; it will
stand side by side with holiness, beauty, persuasive force, imaginative
appeal, etc.1
This point has been too often misunderstood, and excessive
importance has been attributed to the single aspect of truth. Men
have become bewitched by it and have tried to find it in the least
phrase of Scripture. This has come about — once again we mention
it—because they have equated inspiration and revelation and have
neglected the role of the practical judgment with its varied aims.
The theory developed above restores the truth of Scripture, and the
inerrancy which guarantees it, to their rightful place among the
effects of inspiration — the first place perhaps, but not the only one.
Inerrancy, then, does not come into play as often as inspiration,
or at least not in the same way. There is no doubt that, when God
teaches and insofar as he teaches, he can neither be deceived nor
deceive us; his word is necessarily exempt from all error. This is what
1 This point may be clarified by a comparison with the charism of
infallibility. Infallibility is only a negative assistance, having for its formal
object to guarantee against error, and bearing solely on " res fidei et morum **
which are subject to the decision of the Church. Inerrancy is the specific goal
of infallibility. Inspiration is a positive influence which bears on the entire
content of the sacred book, and which, among other effects, guarantees the
infallible truth of this content to the extent that God teaches therein. It is,
therefore, obvious that the infallibility of the Church is not a substitute for
inspiration, or a lower order of inspiration, as we are sometimes led to believe;
it is a charism of a different order.

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is called the privilege of " inerrancy. ” But God is not always teaching
and, when he has his interpreter speak without vouching for the
truth of his statement, inspiration operates without entailing
inerrancy; or, more exactly, in such a case inerrancy consists precisely
in preventing the interpreter from vouching for the truth of matters
which are not pertinent to the teaching willed by God. As a matter
of fact, the latter is not a distinct charism ; it is a corollary of inspiration
which comes into play only when inspiration affects the speculative
judgment and to the extent that it enlightens it.1
That it is a corollary is clearly indicated by the formulas employed
in the official documents. ’ This fact explains why inerrancy by
itself has never been made the object of an explicit solemn declaration
of the Church’s Magisterium. * Inerrancy is certainly a matter of
faith, but it is the object only of joint definitions, in the texts dealing
with inspiration of which it is an immediate and necessary result.
It is part of one and the same dogma, as we read in a decree of the
Biblical Commission: “ prae oculis habitis... dogmate item catholico
de inspiratione et inerrantia sacrarum Scripturarum ” (DB 2180;
EB 433 [420]).

B) If instruction is not the sole end of inspiration it is none
the less the most fundamental element of the divine education. For
1 We could perhaps speak of a certain inerrancy in the practical judgment.
Thus God does not err when he makes his interpreter choose a certain means
of expression in view of a particular end for the sacred book. This means is
actually the one best adapted to achieve that end; here, we have a sort of
practical truth. But this is only an improper aspect of inerrancy; it is not taken
into account when we speak of inerrancy, and of itself gives rise to no difficulty.
We may therefore omit it.
1 Providentissimus : ” tantum vero abest ut divinae inspirationi error ullus
subesse possit, ut ea per se ipsa, non modo errorem excludat omnem, sed tam
necessario excludat et respuat, quam, necessarium est, Deum, summam
Veritatem, nullius omnino erroris auctorem esse " [DB 1951; EB 109 [124]).
Also Spiritus Paraclitus: " Porro cum divina Sacrorum Librorum
inspiratione summaque eorumdem auctoritate docet Hieronymus immunitatem
et omni ab errore et fallacia vacuitatem necessario cohaerere ‘‘ (EB 463 [450]).
• We might, however, call attention to the 14th point of the Letter of
Clement VI Super quibusdam on the errors of the Armenians: " si credidisti
et credis Novum et Vetus Testamentum in omnibus libris, quos Romanae
Ecclesiae nobis tradidit auctoritas, veritatem indubiam per omnia continere "
(DB 570 r; EB 3r [46]).

I33

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in us everything begins with knowledge. Consequently, though truth
is not the sole quality of the sacred books, it is nevertheless the
primary one.

a

Thus it is all the more important to know how to determine
exactly when the truth of a statement is being vouched for, and to
what extent. Now here we must introduce some distinctions.
Instruction involves many modes of expression which commit the
writer’s thought — and hence the truth of his statement — to a greater
or lesser degree. It all depends on his ideas, his convictions, his
intentions. Since God has seen fit to submit the expression of his
message to the conditions of human psychology, we have only to
analyze briefly the general nature of truth in the judgment, and then
apply our findings to the case of an inspired judgment.
Truth is the " adequatio rei et intellectus. ” It exists only in
the judgment. And by " judgment ” we obviously do not mean every
proposition made up of subject, verb, and predicate, but the formal
act by which the intellect (intellectus) affirms its conformity
(adequatio) to the object of knowledge (res). Now this formal
judgment, and hence the truth which it contains, is subject to
limitation from three principal sources:

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. 5

1) First, the object of the mind’s knowledge is not the thing
in itself (objectum materiale), but a certain “ representation" which
is drawn from it by " conception " and which is considered in isolation
(objectum formale). This formal object can, at least in theory, express
the material object in its very essence. Actually, it is more often
restricted to one limited aspect which may be of greater or less
importance and which varies according to the interest of the knowing
subject. An astronomer studies the moon under its formality of
celestial body; a poet speaks of it from an aesthetic point of view.
Here we have the first source of limitation of the judgment,
and it is one which must never be forgotten. An author does not
speak of everything in an absolute way; we must always inquire
into his point of view. He tells the truth or he is mistaken only within
the limits of the field of vision which he has established for himself
and in which he forms his judgment.
2) Furthermore, he does not always make an affirmation. He
may assent either totally or in a restricted way to the objective truth
134

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J

i

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I.

p

j

contained in the proposition which he is enunciating. Sometimes
his affirmation will be categorical; sometimes it will be made with
reservations of one sort or another: he accepts it as probable, he
thinks it likely, he considers it possible, a matter of conjecture, etc.
This all depends on the investigation which has preceded his judgment ,
and which authorizes him to assent more or less firmly, according
as it has been fruitful or sterile, diligent or cursory.
This is a second source of limitation and it is one which arises
from the subject rather than the object. The author’s mind is not
committed, and hence the truth of his judgment is not at stake,
except according to the note by which he qualifies his conformity
with the object about which he is thinking. We can reproach him
for being mistaken if he falsifies the degree of certitude which the
matter of his judgment objectively warrants; for example, if he
categorically affirms something which is in reality only doubtful,
or, on the contrary, presents something certain as impossible to
prove. But he cannot be denied the right to limit the extent of his
own subjective conviction and to involve himself only to the extent
he wishes. We must therefore respect the varying degrees of his
assent, rather than take all his sentences as categorical affirmations.

3) Finally, a third factor must be considered, one which transfers
the question from the intellectual to the moral order and introduces
the possibility not that the author will himself be mistaken, but
that he will deceive others. Here we are concerned with the commu­
nication of the ideas to the minds of the hearers or readers. The
formulation of the judgment in the intimacy of the author’s mind
may be followed or not by the communication of this judgment
to other minds. The theoretical statement,1 which up to the present
has been made for its own sake, now becomes a “ teaching. ” A new
factor has come into play: it is the intention which the judging mind
has of offering us its judgment, that is to say, of presenting it to us
for our assent.
This is the third source of limitation of the judgment and its
truth. The author assumes a social responsibility only for what he
1 After A. Lefèvre in Recherches de Science Religieuse 43 {1955) 452,
I am using the more neutral term " statement ” in place of the term " affir­
mation " which was too categorical.

ISS

ίί

voluntarily submits to another for his assent. He cannot be accused
of deceiving us if this intention is lacking. Now this can happen in
several ways: he may involuntarily betray an opinion which he
actually has, but does not mean to propose for the reader’s assent;
or he may deliberately adopt a fictional type of literary presentation,
intending not to be believed in what he appears to be affirming.
In this last case, of course, the author must somehow or other
indicate his intention, just as in the preceding cases he must let us
know, by the words he uses, from what point of view he is speaking
and to what extent he is making an affirmation. Once the reader
has been furnished with these indications, which he discovers by
a conscientious study of the text, he must remain within the limits
chosen by the author, in order to be able to judge honestly whether
the latter is correct or mistaken, whether he is telling the truth or
misleading his readers.
We have spoken above of the influence of the practical judgment
on the speculative judgment. It is this influence which, in the last
analysis, explains these limitations which we have just examined.
If the author restricts himself to one or other aspect of the matter
he is treating, he does so in view of the particular objective for which
he is writing his book. This is also why he investigates the matter
more or less thoroughly, and why he sometimes makes categorical
affirmations and at other times is content to make suggestions or
passing references without committing himself. Finally, whether
he employs the strictly didactic method or prefers to use the figurative
language of fiction, it is still in accord with the purpose he has in
writing.
[Ίη the last analysis, then, the best way for the reader really
to understand the author and to be faithful to his thought will be
to acquaint himself with his practical intentions, to discover why
he is writing and what interests he has at heart in his work.1
C) The inspired author thinks and writes like any other man,
but under a special divine impulse. As a result, his judgments and the
truths they contain have a divine authority. It is therefore all the
more important to discern their exact significance in order to accept
with faith and reverence what the author is teaching, and also in
order not to attribute to God errors which neither he nor his interpreter
has actually made.
136

1) First of all, therefore, we will be careful to determine the
sacred writer’s formal object, that is to say, the point of view from
which he is treating his subject. For example, we will not consider
the Bible to be a work in astronomy or the natural sciences, as
Concordism recently did. It is quite dear that the inspired author,
and behind him God, treats many subjects only for their religious
interest. The sun and the moon speak to him of the wisdom and
omnipotence of God; he is not interested in the sdentific laws which
govern their revolutions.
It would, however, be an oversimplification to banish from
consideration everything which does not directly concern faith and
morals. We would fall back into the condemned error which limits,
if not inspiration, then at least inerrancy to the “ res fidei et morum. ’’1
And we would be going against the evidence, for there is no denying
the sacred writers' interest in thoroughly profane subjects; this is
especially true of history. The fact remains, however, that even then,
under the divine impulse, they retain their ultimate preoccupation
with the religious order, and this has an influence on the way in which
they look at the facts. Scientific histoiy, which seeks the minutest
accuracy for its own sake, is one thing; quite different is history
of a religious or apologetic tendency, which is intent on bringing
out the important lessons from the dusty past and is concerned with
events for this sole purpose. While it assuredly does not falsify the
events, it does not worry about minute exactitude.
(Now this is merely an example. The rule to be followed is always
to look for the formal aspect which interests the sacred author in the
subject he is treating. It is this aspect alone which enters into the
dynamism of the book. It is on this point that he judges and that
he commits himself. It is therefore this alone which God wishes to
tell us, which he illuminates, and which receives the benefit of
inspiration and inerrancy

2) The affirmations of the sacred author, like those of any human
author, are not necessarily categorical. This would be the case if
he received the thoughts of God ready-made, for in God truth is never
1 See Spiritus Paradiius (DB 2186; EB 467 [454]).
* For fuller discussion, see Revue Biblique 63 (1956) 418-21.

137

uncertain.1 It is, therefore, actually the case whenever " revelations ’’
are granted him. Then the truth imposes itself on him with an evidence
which allows no room for doubt. This is not so, however, when he
is granted only an inspiration, and when God makes him seek out
the truth in his own human fashion. Then he attains a greater or
less degree of certitude as it pleases God to enlighten him, and he
modifies his assertion accordingly.
It is for this qualified statement2 that God accepts the
responsibility, and for this alone. To be sure, he cannot permit his
interpreter to strengthen or weaken it unduly in relation to the
objective order, that is, to present as certain what is really doubtful,
or to affirm as only doubtful what is in fact certain. For in that case
there would be an error. But he authorizes him — or rather impels
him — to limit his own inquiry and subsequently his personal assent,
to the degree of certitude demanded by the subject’s importance
in the over-all plan of the book. On a point of capital importance
he will be stimulated to pursue his investigation until he has obtained
a solid conviction. On another point of secondary interest he will
be allowed to speak briefly, making only a passing reference or
conjecture. This reduction of cognitive activity may reach a point
where all speculative judgment is suspended. That depends on the
directives of the practical reason, and ultimately on the ends which
God has proposed to it. ’
1 In the case of a minatory prophecy which will not necessarily be carried
out, there is question not of an uncertain truth, but of a conditional truth,
certain in its own order, i.e., the normal connection between such a cause and
such an effect (see Explanatory Note i8).
* See p. 135, note 1.
• In this connection we may look into the interesting question of citations.
When an author cites another’s words, to what extent does he make a judgment
and vouch for the truth of the words cited?
That depends on the particular case. It is possible for him to approve,
to disapprove, or to do neither.
[1] In this last case, he makes no speculative judgment on the content of
his citation. He is satisfied with finding it suitable for the purposes of his book.
This is a practical judgment which, being inspired, possesses that " practical
truth ” of which we have spoken above (p. 133, note 1). It is truly suitable
in God's judgment to make this citation in Scripture, for example, in order
to keep this document for posterity. But it is not otherwise guaranteed.
[2] If he approves or disapproves, this can be (a) because he has made

138

In accordance with these different degrees of affirmation the
inspired author vouches more or less for the truth of what he says,
and consequently makes God vouch for it to a greater or less extent,
since the expression of his thought is immediately directed and
endorsed by the Holy Spirit.

1

3) Can we now apply to the sacred authors the third
reservation, sc., that which concerns the intention of communicating
to another an interior thought, an intention which entails the moral
responsibility of telling the truth or deceiving?
To be sure, the distinction between " author ” and " private
person ” is verified just as much — in fact, even more so — among
those who are inspired as it is among ordinary men, and, in the case
of the inspired writers, it takes on a very special importance. For,
where an ordinary man is concerned, there is only an accidental
difference between one formality and the other: he thinks for himself
or for his public, but in both cases his thought remains exactly the
same as far as its essence is concerned. But in the case of the inspired
writer, the distinction broadens and takes on a theological significance:
he is inspired only insofar as he is an " author
he is not inspired
as a “ private person. ’’ The charismatic influence affects his mind
only when he is to transmit a message in God’s name, and to the
a personal judgment concerning the value of the opinion cited, or (b) simply
on another’s authority.
(a) In the former case, there is a speculative judgment which implicates
the truth of the author's statement and the inerrancy of Scripture: the content
of this citation is affirmed, or contradicted, with the same guarantee as anything
else the writer himself asserts.
(b) In the second case, there is still, it would seem, a speculative judgment,
which, however, no longer bears on the actual thought of the person cited,
but rather on the fact of his natural credibility, or his supernatural credibility
(if there is question of an inspired author, such as St. Luke citing a sermon
of St. Paul). " This man whom I am citing is certainly telling the truth and
deserves to be believed. ’’ Here we have a judgment of the speculative order,
which vouches for a truth and is, therefore, favored with inerrancy. This suffices
indirectly to guarantee the truth of what is alleged in the name of another.
If this other was a profane author, his words thus embodied in Scripture receive
the guarantee of scriptural inspiration. If he was a prophet or apostle his words
possess a twofold inspiration — prophetic inspiration insofar as they are really
his words, and scriptural inspiration insofar as they are quoted by the
hagiographer.

I39

—.........

....................æâgaiSSfflêâÎisaâ^

extent that he devotes himself to this. At other times and apart
from this precise activity, he is not specially enlightened. Whereas
his thought as an inspired writer is elevated to the supernatural
order, his thought as a private individual remains in the natural
order, subject to error. This is a crucial difference and one, moreover,
upon which all will agree.
But a more delicate problem presents itself. Is it not possible
for the thoughts of the private individual somehow or other to slip
into the work of the inspired writer? There is no watertight bulkhead
between the two activities, natural and supernatural; it is one and
the same mind which is doing the thinking. Are we not to expect,
therefore, a certain compénétration?
Some have, on occasion, admitted this possibility and have
thought that it offered a convenient solution to some difficulties.
If a certain assertion of the Bible causes us embarrassment, why
not say that the author proposed it on his own authority and not
as the interpreter of the Holy Spirit? The reply of the Biblical
Commission which we have already cited, in answer to the first
difficulty, formally condemns this subterfuge (DB 2179; EB 432 [419]).
It forbids anyone to hold that the Apostles, even while not teaching
any error under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, were nevertheless
able to express (in their canonical epistles) personal, human ideas
which might themselves be erroneous.
In the light of dubium 2 of the Decree cited above, the term
" to express ” appears to be understood of a statement which calls
in a positive, though it may be reserved, way for the reader’s
approbation. What is denied is that the Holy Spirit may allow an
inspired man to mingle with formal, guaranteed teaching his own
erroneous personal views, without giving the reader any means of
spotting them. To allow this would obviously be to destroy the
authority of Scripture. It would also be contrary to the very idea
of inspiration which we have worked out with the help of the Thomist
doctrine: an impulse which totally subjects the mind of a man to
the divine influence, which penetrates his will and his practical reason
as well as his intellect, and which extends to the ultimate realization
of the work, " ad verba. *’ With such a close and complete
compénétration of divine and human causality it is impossible that
the writer express anything whatever contrary to the divine pleasure.
140

■;

j

i

(in accordance with this sovereignly efficacious direction, the
divine influence will lead the author to teach only the message entrusted
to him, and will keep him from giving the same guarantee to his
personal views which have not been included in the message. This,
in brief, is what formally constitutes the privilege of inerrancy. It prevents
the inspired author from in any way introducing into the work which
he is composing trader the divine influence, the teaching of errors
which might be the result of his own thought processes working
outside the influence of inspiration^
Though God may restrain his interpreter from bringing his
teaching to bear on them, he certainly cannot prevent him from using
in one way or another these erroneous views and, consequently,
from letting them show through in his text. For example, no one
will deny that the biblical authors had now outmoded cosmological
ideas in which they believed, and that they employed them in their
writings because they were unable to think apart from contemporary
categories. But they do not claim to be teaching them for their own
sakes; they speak of them for a different purpose, sc., to illustrate
creation and divine providence. This is so because the charism which
moves them to teach as theologians (inspiration) prevents them
from posing as physicists (inerrancy). They do not vouch for their
own private opinions, or even convictions, because God does not
want them to do so and has them write accordingly. How will we
know this? By objective study of the book; not of this or that
proposition taken in isolation and considered as an absolute, but
of the whole ensemble in which the intent of the author is expressed,
and upon which depends the role of each individual proposition.
We no longer say that this or that statement could not have been
taught because it does not pertain to “ faith or morals ”; that would
be merely a return to a false criterion which arose from atomistic
analysis, and which stops with the material subjects of the text,
forgetting the living mind which speaks in it.1 Rather, we try to
get into the intentions of this mind as they are objectively manifested
by the whole work, or even to get into the intentions of God by putting
the work back into the ensemble of the Bible. With this formal criterion
and aided by serious and very careful exegesis, we can tell whether
1 See Revue Biblique 63 (1956) 418-21.

MI

the author speaks as an inspired interpreter or as a private individual,
whether this or that statement has to do with teaching proposed
in the name of God, or whether it is merely an inevitable reflection
of his personal opinions for which neither he nor God vouches.
For an example we can return to the case of St. Paul; we will
admit that he could very well let us catch sight of his hope for an
imminent Parousia (i Th 4: 17; 2 Cor 4: 12). What matters is that
he never “ expressed ” anything affirmatively on the subject, even
by way of " insinuation, ” as the Biblical Commission has asserted
(DB 2179; EB 432 [419]). This is proved by the fact that when obliged
to declare his opinion St. Paul expressly denied that he had any
knowledge or teaching on that subject (1 Th 5: 1 f.; 2 Th 2: 1 fl.).
After that we are free to make our own conjectures and to reconstruct
his personal thought on the subject by means of what he did not
intend to say. But we have no right to force his reservation nor to
confuse his private opinions with his apostolic teaching.

We must finally raise the question whether the sacred writer,
like any profane author, can adopt an artificial mode of expression
with the intention of not being taken literally? This is the problem
of fictional literary types, which some have declared to be “ unworthy ’’
of God. But we cannot decide a priori what is suitable for God and
what is not. The question can be answered only by study of the
actual biblical usage. Now it seems quite evident that the Bible
contains some of these fictional types: parables, allegories, romantic
histories, and historical romances. Nor do we see how this could
deceive the reader, provided, of course, the author supplies the
necessary means of recognizing the fictional type he is using. We
shall return to this subject later on; but we wish to make it dear
at present that, if this be true, it is of crucial importance to determine
what literary type the inspired author has selected in each case,
in order to avoid misunderstanding the intention and the real meaning
of the words which God caused him to write.
D) It is the practical judgment, as we have said, that ultimately
controls all the possible formalities and limitations of the speculative
judgment, and it is the practical judgment itself that comes primarily
under the influence of inspiration. It is because God sets up a certain
goal as the purpose of his interpreter’s activity that he causes him

to look at a given aspect of his subject, to make a stronger or
weaker affirmation, to instruct to a greater or less degree — in short,
that he causes him to choose a certain “ literary type. ’’ The first
principle of exegesis, then, will be to discern God’s intentions through
those of the author.

But is not this attitude condemned by Pravidentissimus, when
it reprimands “ those who erroneously believe that in a question of
the truth or falsehood of a passage we should consider not so much
what God has said [quaenam dixerit Deus] as the purpose he had in
saying it [quam ob causam dixerit] ” (RSS, p. 24; EB 109 [124])?
Not at all. We are indeed looking for “ quaenam dixerit Deus, ’’
for this is precisely his formal utterance on a given subject, and it
is this, in the last analysis, that we wish to grasp. If we consider
the “ quam ob causam, ’’ that is to say, the practical end and the
literary type which it suggests, we do so only to arrive by this means
at the " quaenam. ”

The attitude condemned by the Encyclical would seem to consist
in thinking that the end justifies the means, even for God, and that
he could, therefore, admit into his book formal errors on minor points
not pertaining to revelation because these errors do not run counter
to, but may even favor the purpose of his teaching. This sort of
opportunism would be inadmissible in an honest author, and
unthinkable in God. On the contrary, the significance of the
affirmations (quaenam), studied in the light of the end pursued (quam
ob causam), will always point to the conclusion that the affirmation
under this aspect is absolutely true.
E) Can we not, however, speak of " relative truth? ” This is another
question, and it has given rise to heated discussions. We must first
agree upon the meaning of this formula. If it means that the Truth
in itself is not an absolute, then it is an error which is as incompatible
with the Christian faith as it is with the " philosophia perennis. ”
Loisy, for example, in line with many other ancient and modem
philosophers, held this thesis, which subjects God himself to the
gradual growth implied in universal evolution and makes him nothing
but the immanent force behind it. This we cannot admit. God is an
Absolute, and his thought is the basis for an order of truth, which
is itself also absolute.

143

142
N-Y 7. —10

But if one speaks, not of the Truth in itself, but of our manner
of acquiring and expressing it, then the question takes on a new
aspect. It is quite evident that we are unable to grasp the Truth
in all its plenitude of certitude and objectivity. Our mind is finite.
God made it to know and, to the extent that it really attains truth,
it comes into contact with the absolute. But this is only a restricted
extent, subject to those limitations of viewpoint, assent, and commu­
nication which we have just analyzed. If this is what is meant by
" relative truth, ” then the expression can be allowed. Yet we must
grant that it causes confusion. This is why it is dangerous and should
preferably be avoided. We might better speak of " the relative
expression of truth. ” 1

A simile might clarify these reflections. For us the sun is a sort
of absolute of light and heat. But passing clouds, the distance which
separates us, and the inclination of the earth on its axis, are all able
to introduce countless variations in its rays. Finally, we can examine
its surface only piecemeal, or in a reflected image. The same is true
of the sun of Truth. The brilliance of this absolute takes on many
shades, depending on one’s angle of vision and the more or less dense
curtains of mind and word. Human things give us only a reflection
of it and, even then, we catch only some of its rays.
In view of these explanations and distinctions, we may conclude
as follows: it is indeed absolute Truth which speaks through Scripture.
To the extent that it manifests itself it brings our minds into contact
with the absolute. But it has chosen to make itself known to us by
the instrumentality of human thought, thereby agreeing to submit
to finite and relative modes of expression. We must always be mindful
of this, not in order to debase it to our level of contingency, but,
on the contrary, to free it from what is not properly its own, and to
avoid imputing to it the veils and imperfections which it had to assume
in order to make the splendor of its brilliance bearable to our eyes.
Sometimes it will shine brightly and will reveal to us the most sublime
mysteries; at other times it will cloak its light and allow only a few
rays to filter through, those which are useful for the general economy
of Revelation. It will never let itself be falsified by formal error,
1 Fr. Bea expresses the same though differently: " Sua cuique generi
literario est veritas " [op. cil., p. 106, no. 90).

144

and this is enough to assure the faith of the believer. From this point
it is up to the believer, by means of careful exegesis, to discover what
the author is teaching him and to what extent he is teaching. For
it is to this extent that God is pledging his Truth.
[inerrancy, like inspiration from which it derives, is a divine
gift which is operative in all of Scripture, not univocally, but
analogically?).

5.

EXEGESIS AND BIBLICAL CRITICISM

In order to know exactly what God has wished to tell us in his
Holy Scripture, to discern his intentions, to sift out his teachings,
to recognize when he is speaking without involving, or at least only
partially involving, his own truth, we must make a very careful
study of the text which the human author has drafted under his
guidance. We must examine its style, fathom its thoughts, determine
its literary type. For God accepts responsibility only for this concrete,
limited message. Such is the conclusion which follows from all that
we have said up to the present. This study will be the lofty but difficult
task of exegesis. The exegete, taking into account the directives
of Faith and the Magisterium, but proceeding according to his own
scientific and critical methods, will devote himself to the task of
reconstructing the original text, discovering its meaning, and verifying
or evaluating its historical significance. It would be out of the question
here to treat these methods at any length. We shall speak only briefly
of them, in order to indicate their connection with the theological
principles which have been worked out in the preceding analyses.

A) Textual Criticism.

The influence of inspiration extends, as we have said, even to
the drafting of the text, usque ad verba. But this obviously refers
to the original text as it came from the hands of the author (or authors)
and was received into the Canon. Neither later corruptions nor
translation into other languages have any share in the charism of
inspiration. The Latin Vulgate is not inspired. Since it was composed
after the close of the scriptural Canon, it can claim at most to offer
a faithful translation.

The Greek version of the Septuagint poses a more delicate
problem,1 since it is less a literal translation than a rather free
interpretation which was composed during the period of Revelation,
and into which Alexandrian Judaism introduced new data, sometimes
of great doctrinal importance, making this version a very important
intermediary stage between the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament.
It is not hard to imagine that divine inspiration did not neglect such
a critical phase in the growth of the Book. Actually, New Testament
writers have most frequently cited the Old Testament in its Greek
dress; they considered it in this form to be the word of God and based
their arguments for the faith on texts where the Septuagint clearly
goes beyond the Hebrew original. Most of the Fathers, too, including
St. Augustine, maintained the inspiration of the Septuagint, not
alone because of the unfortunate legend of the 70 elders, but also
and more importantly because they saw in this Greek Bible a change
deliberately prepared by the Holy Spirit for the universal Christian
Church. Jerome’s return to the hebraica veritas was a somewhat
excessive reaction; his prestige caused the ancient tradition of the
inspiration of the Septuagint to become suspect and practically
abandoned, especially from the Renaissance to our own times. It has
never been, however, officially rejected by the Church; the Council
of Trent deliberately refrained from deciding for or against. The
question is open and deserves reexamination precisely now when
biblical criticism is rediscovering the great originality of this Greek
“ Targum, ” when a nicer historical sense is making us more clearly
realize the importance of this link in the development of Revelation,
and when, finally, a more flexible and comprehensive idea of
inspiration, such as we have tried to develop here, easily overcomes
the obstacle formerly created by the obvious human imperfections
of this version.
In any event, it is extremely important to restore the original
and inspired text, whatever it may be, to its pristine purity, as far
as can be done with the help of manuscripts and versions which
reflect the history of its transformations. Whence, too, the increased
* See P. Benoit, " La Septante est-elle inspirée? " in Vom Wort des Lebens
(Max Meinertz Festschrift) (Münster, 1951), pp. 41-49: P. Anvray, " Comment
se pose le problème de l'inspiration des Septantes. ” Revue Biblique 59 (t952)
321-36.

146

interest in ancient languages, both Semitic and Greek, since it was
in the forms of these languages that God once saw fit to mold his
message for mankind.
Especially during the past fifty years, which have witnessed
such remarkable strides in these technical fields, exegetes have been
pressingly urged by the Magisterium of the Church to undertake
these labors of textual exegesis and ancient philology. In particular
the latest Encyclical, Divino afflante- Spiritu (September 30, 1943),
earnestly reiterated the urgency of this work and explained that,
while the " authenticity ” (i.e., juridical authenticity) accorded to
the Latin Vulgate by the Council of Trent guaranteed the substantial
soundness of its doctrine, and therefore its authority in theological
discussions, it by no means gave that text precedence over the original
texts, which alone are inspired and to which we should first have
recourse.1
B) Literary Criticism.

Once the text has been established, its meaning must be
determined. To this end account must be taken of the two authors,
divine and human, who have concurred in the production of the
sacred book and whose dose collaboration has made this book different
from any other.

1) The Primary Sense.
It follows from what we have seen of inspiration that we must
look first of all for the meaning which the human author intended.
For this meaning is the immediate and essential effect of the influence
of inspiration. This is what the Holy Spirit, as author of Holy Scripture,
proposes to us first and foremost. Following St. Thomas (I, q. r, a. 10:
" sensus litteralis est quem auctor intendit ”), it is often called the
" literal ” sense; but I prefer to call it the “ primary " sense, in order
to reckon with the " fuller ’’ sense which is also found in the letter
of the text, though it is not perceived by the author (see p. 150 f.).1
1 See AAS 35 (1943) 3°6-o9; EB [546-5°]·
* I am correcting the terminology adopted in my first edition (see the valid
observations of A. Fernandez, " Sentido plenior, literal, tfpico, espiritual, *’
Biblica 34 [1953] 305 f.). The previous terminology incorrectly mingled two
distinctions taken from different viewpoints: the subjective viewpoint of the

I47

This primary meaning, and it alone, is what we have been
considering up to now in our analyses of the judgment; and we have
done so designedly. For some are only too prone to ignore or despise
it. It is true that, since inspiration is something utterly unique, other
senses are possible; we shall speak later of this matter. But these
other, senses are erected upon the primary sense, which remains
the indispensable foundation.
IThe primary sense is that which results immediately from the
letter of the text, as the human author understood it and wanted
to communicate it. It is found everywhere, for an author does not
speak in order to say nothing. But it may be “ proper ” or
“ improper, ”1 according as the words are taken in their direct or
their figurative meaning. *
Furthermore, it is normally one (unicus), for a reasonable author
wants to say only one thing at a time. He might, to be sure, choose
words which have a double meaning. Human language lends itself
to many ambiguities. But such “ plays on words ” are good only
to provide amusement by leaving the mind in a state of incertitude.
Equivocation is a defect which every profane author seeks to avoid;
it is all the more unsuited to the word of God. It is of the utmost
author’s knowledge (the " primary " sense which he perceives, the “ secondary "
sense which escapes him) and the objective viewpoint of the reality which
God has charged with meaning (the '' literal " sense of the words, the " typical ’’
sense of things). It is this second distinction which St. Thomas actually makes
(loc. cit.): " Prima significatio, qua voces significant res, pertinet ad primum
sensum, qui est sensus historicus vel litteralis. Illa vero significatio, qua res
significatae per voces iterum res alias significant, dicitur sensus spiritualis. ”
Consequently, he identifies the literal sense with what the author intended,
i.e., with our " primary " sense, because in his time the category of the
” fuller ” sense was, if not ignored in practice, at least not yet developed in
theory.

* Improper or figurative modes of expression include, e.g., synecdoche,
metonymy, simile, metaphor, or their longer forms, parable, allegory, or even
fable and riddle.
* Origen, to be sure, wrote that certain sacred texts ” had no corporeal
sense ’ ’ ; but he understood by this the proper literal sense, and promptly conceded
that the same texts have a figurative sense, which is itself also a literal sense.
See A. Fernandez, S.J., in Institutiones Biblicae I (Rome, 1925) 297; de
Lubac, S.J., Origine: Homilies sur la Genise (Paris, 1943) p. 43 fi.

148

importance to know without any ambiguity what God is saying and
asking of men.1
Of course, the multiplicity of literal senses which we here reject
applies only to those meanings which are genuinely disparate,
absolutely independent of one another, and which introduce
equivocation into the very marrow of the text. It would be otherwise
if it were a question of varied interpretations of one and the same
word whose meaning is obscure. This would be rather a situation
involving secondary and adapted senses, such as those of which
we shall speak later on (p. 152), senses which revolve about one single
but vague primary meaning. This is what has led to that “ plurality
of literal senses ” held by St. Augustine and St. Thomas, which
has been the subject of so much discussion. *

2) Secondary Senses.

But the human author of the sacred text is not alone; he is led
by the divine Spirit who outstrips him to an infinite degree. This
fact may give rise in his work to other senses beyond the primary,
such as are unknown in the works of profane authors. A principal
cause, as we have insisted, moves its instrument to operate according
to the instrument's own proper mode of action; but this does not
mean that it is brought down to the level of the instrument or is
confined within its limitations. The principal cause retains its superior
power and virtuality, which are manifested in the effect over and
above the influence of the instrument.
This is all the more true when the principal cause is God, in
comparison with whom the most gifted man is only a “ defective ”
1 The Fourth Gospel deliberately employs expressions whose material
meaning, the one immediately grasped by Jesus’ audience, must give way to
a spiritual meaning (Jn 2: 19-21; 3: 3-5; 4: 10-14; 6: 33-35; etc.). But this
pedagogical method is not just a game of equivocations since between the
two possible meanings there is a real and organic bond such as exists between
the " proper " and the " metaphorical ” sense.
’ See F. Talon, S.J., " S. Augustin a-t-il réellement enseigné la pluralité
des sens littéraux dans l’Ecriture? ’’ Recherches de Science Religieuse
(1921)
24-26; Blanche O.P., “ Le sens littéral des Ecritures d’après S. Thomas
d’Aquin," Revue Thomiste 14 (1906) 207-09; P. Synave, O.P.,''La doctrine
de S. Thomas d’Aquin sur le sens littéral des Ecritures, ’’ Revue Biblique 35
(1926) 61-64.

149

instrument (q. 173, a. 4). The divine Spirit who makes use of a human
mind to communicate with men does not thereby surrender the
possibility of ever going beyond the latter’s narrow limitations.
He agrees not to break away from it completely by using unexpected
and disparate senses which would make his message completely
obscure. Yet God reserves the right to go beyond his interpreter
in the same direction as his thought is tending, and to enrich his words
by broadening their meaning and adding new overtones which, far
from confusing or contradicting this thought, will actually deepen
and extend it. Thus the primary meaning of Scripture may be
supplemented by secondary meanings which prolong and amplify it.1

3) The Fuller and Ty-piccd Senses. *

The divine Spirit surpasses the mind of his interpreter first
of all in that he is the author of the entire Bible, and not merely
of some particular book. He has remained steadfastly at work all
the while his collaborators have been following one another in a long
series. As a result, even though they were unaware of it, the ideas
and the words which they received from his inspiration took on a much
broader and loftier significance. In his progressive revelation the
later, definitive phases have brought with them a clarification of
the earlier, preparatory ones. This may have taken place in either
of two principal ways:
a) The very words used by the earlier inspired writers have
acquired, in the vast perspective of the divine plan, a wealth and
fullness of meaning undreamed of by their first authors, but from
which future readers were to draw profit. It is clear, for example,
that when men of later ages were able to compare the messianic
prophecies of Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Daniel with one another, or
even with their final fulfilment in Christ, they had a much clearer
and deeper understanding of them than had even the first recipients
of these revelations. Or, to cite another example, the knowledge
1 With regard to these secondary senses the prophet becomes an instrument
in the proper sense, and no longer only in the broad sense; see supra, p. 81 S.
and p. 1x8 t.
’ In my first edition, I followed St. Thomas in using the term " spiritual, "
but now I prefer the more exact and more formal term " typical
thus, the
" spiritual " sense can include both the " typical " and the " fuller ’’ senses.

ISO

of the mystery of the Trinity has enabled us to read the words of
the Old Testament on Wisdom in a new light. In this way God has
made use of his own word as a commentary upon itself and has clarified
the ancient oracles by means of the new, giving them a deeper meaning
which is called the " sensus plenior ” or *' fuller ” sense.

b) Moreover, the Holy Spirit has not been satisfied with thus
enriching the words of his human interpreters. In his omnipotence
he has caused the very objects expressed by these words — objects
which he himself has raised up for this purpose — to be signs of his
thought.1 This is what is called the " spiritual " or, as some term it,
the “ typical ” or “ mystical ” sense. Thus he impelled Moses to lift
up a bronze serpent in the desert; he then stimulated the hagiographer
to recount this narrative of miraculous cures: this is the primary
sense. But beyond this primary sense he had another one in view;
this healing serpent mounted on a pole was to be the figure of Christ
on the Cross: this is the typical sense which is based on the primary
sense and transcends it. *
c) Unlike the primary sense, the " fuller ” and “ typical ’’ senses
were unknown to the human author unless God made them known
to him by special revelation. The human author was not aware of
them and did not consciously intend to express them. They are
therefore secondary senses.
Nevertheless, they derive immediately from Scripture, that is,
from the events which it recounts (typical sense) or from the
comparison of several of its passages (fuller sense). That is why they
properly deserve to be called “ scriptural ’’ senses. They were directly
intended and expressed in the sacred text, if not by its human author,
then at least by its divine author. ·
• Through inspiration to act or " dramatic ’’ inspiration; see supra, p. 126.
• This typical sense is ordinarily divided into: allegorical, tropological
or moral, and anagogical, accordingly as things under the Old Law are considered
in their application to the messianic Kingdom, to moral duties, or to man’s
heavenly destiny (cf. Sum. theol., I, q. 1, a. 10). We must be careful not to confuse
the allegorical typical sense with allegory, which is one of the forms of the
improper literal sense.
• Though the " type " is first a reality raised up by God antecedently
to its introduction into Scripture (hence it is the object of the " dramatic "
inspiration of the Bible and entails a " biblical, " though not ’’ scriptural, "
I5X

4) Consequent and Accommodated Senses.
We cannot say the same for the consequent and accommodated
senses. These are the names given to new applications which may
be derived from the sacred text, whether by way of a logical deduction
employing a minor premise drawn from reason (consequent sense),
or by adaptation to some new situation or doctrine, based on some
more or less close similarity (accommodated sense). There is no doubt
but that the biblical text, because of its outstanding richness, invites
such applications. And it is an established fact that, with the
progressive development of science, philosophy, and culture, men
have always been anxious by such appeals to bolster their opinions
with the great weight of the Bible’s authority. But are these appeals
always legitimate, and can such deduced or transposed senses be
considered genuinely “ scriptural, ” approved and willed by the
Holy Spirit? This is another matter.
Undoubtedly the Holy Spirit again surpasses his instrument
in that he has foreseen even all the possible interpretations which
his words would receive from readers through the centuries. But
this does not mean that he has approved them. For he has likewise
foreseen the heretical interpretations. In order to be able to say
that these deduced or adapted meanings were permitted or willed
by God, we must at least be able to prove that they contain no error
and do no violence to the literal meaning of the text. These are the
two conditions laid down by St. Augustine (Confess. XII, 23 fi.),
and repeated by St. Thomas (De Pot. q. 4, a. 1). And even if these
conditions are realized, the most one can say is that these senses were
willed indirectly by God with the sacred text as an occasion, but not
that they are taught directly by means of this text. For they do not
derive immediately from Scripture, even taken as a whole, but require
some intervention of the human mind. Hence they are not “ scriptural ”
senses, except in a wide and improper sense.1
sense), only -when it is brought into Scripture does the " type ” enter the economy
of Revelation (it is even possible that a “ type get its existence only from
Scripture, v.g., the lack of parents in the case of Melchizedek [Heb 7: 3]); thus
it becomes properly " scriptural ” and may be in some way classified, alongside
the fuller sense, under the literal sense. See A. Fernandez, " Sentido plenior,
literal, tfpico, espiritual, ’’ Biblica 34 (1953) 299
326,
*
esp. 308-14 and 326.
1 If we were to admit, with St. Augustine (Confess. XI, 31), that the inspired
author could have known by special revelation all those interpretations which

152

5) The Value and Use of the Different Senses.
It follows from all that has been said about these different senses
which can be drawn from Scripture that they differ greatly from one
another as regards authority and that, in order for them to be used
legitimately, certain conditions and restrictions must be observed:

a) First of all, they must be connected with the primary sense
and be only a development of it. We have said that new, entirely
disparate senses would cause such harmful confusion that they could
not be willed by God. St. Thomas clearly affirms this dependence
of the spiritual typical sense: qui super litteralem fundatur et eum
supponit (I, q. i, a. io; cf. Quodl. VII, a. 14, ad rm); and the same
is true by definition of the other derived senses, which only broaden
the primary meaning of the text.

b) Secondly, these spiritual or secondary senses derive all their
force from their connection with the primary sense. They are certain
and useful if they flow immediately from it, but they become doubtful
and worthless — sometimes even dangerous — if their connection with
the primary sense is remote and arbitrary.
The typical sense is particularly difficult to determine. Only
God knows what realities he has destined to be the " types ’’ of things
to come and it is not up to the readers of the Bible to decide this
matter on their own initiative. Such a sense must not be considered
certain unless it has been affirmed in Scripture by Christ or the
would be given to his statements, and that he chose his words accordingly,
we should have to grant these interpretations the value of properly scriptural
senses, and even in some way that of literal senses, at least by a derivative
and extended title. But this opinion did not win general acceptance in the
Christian tradition. Even in St. Augustine, it is but a momentary sally of his
genius which finds few parallels in the rest of his works (see also a less categorical
allusion in the De doctrina Christiana III, 27: forsitan vidit}.
Though St. Thomas takes up this opinion {De Pot., q. 4, a. 1), he does so
in order to give a respectful exposition of the thought of the great doctor;
moreover, he speaks with notable reserve (non est incredibile . ... as contrasted
with the sensit ille omnino of St. Augustine). Besides, in the Summa (I, q. I,
a. 10 c fin.}, which is in other respects a summary of the thought of the De
Pot., he makes no mention of this opinion and, contrary to the contention of
Synave (art. cit., p. 59), omits all consideration of the spiritual senses. Cf. Blanche,
art. cit., pp. 202, 205 fi.

ISS

f

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b
;
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Apostles, or has been taught by the constant tradition of the
Church.
c) Furthermore, these different senses, taken by themselves,
never have strictly probative force in matters of faith. This authority
belongs only to the primary sense: ex quo solo potest trahi argumentum
(I, q. I, a. 10; cf. Quodl. VII, a. 14, ad 4m). It is impossible for a truth
of faith to rest only on a spiritual or derived sense. The spiritual
sense contains " nothing necessary to faith which Scripture does
not clearly teach elsewhere by means of its literal sense ’’ (I, loc. cit.
ad im; Quodl., loc. cit. ad 3m). The same is true of the “ faller ’’ sense
which, by definition results from the use of the primary sense of other
passages of the Old or New Testament. As for the “ consequent "
and " accommodated ” senses, the fact that they involve the
intervention of human reasoning makes them at best legitimate
theological conclusions, but not major premises of faith.
d) Finally, it is evident that we must employ great flexibility
in making these different classifications. Here again we must insist
on the analogical nature of this matter. The effects of inspiration
are diffused throughout the different senses of the text in a gradually
decreasing progression which cannot be divided into clear-out stages.
When and to what extent is the exegete allowing his own reasoning
to enter into his interpretation of Scripture? This is not an easy
matter to determine. A “ fuller ” sense can easily become a “ con­
sequent ” sense, or even slip into a mere “ accommodated " sense.
These shades of difference must be evaluated in each case in order
to determine to what extent the sense is “ scriptural ” or not even
scriptural at all.
It must never be forgotten that God has seen fit to make use
of a human intermediary in order to speak to us. Consequently, the
surest way of discovering the divine thought is first to discover the
thought of his interpreter, that is, the primary sense, " ceteris
excelsior, ’’ as St. Augustine says {Confess., XII, 32), or the " sensus
principalis, ” as St. Thomas calls it {In IV Sent., d. 21, q. x, a. 2,
qa. I, ad 3m). Everything else is derived from that.
6) Ecclesiastical Directives.

3
3

Modem exegesis has devoted more and more attention to positive
investigation into the primary literal sense, and in this it has been
154

encouraged by official directives of the Church. Divino afflante Spiritu
specially emphasized this point.1
The Encyclical forcefully recalls the primacy of the literal sense;
exegetes are urged to use all the resources of modem methods in
order to discover before all else the literal meaning of the sacred text.
Of course, the value of the spiritual or mystical sense is recognized,
but -with wise reservations: besides the fact that it is based on the
literal sense, it is very difficult to deal with and cannot be affirmed
with certainty unless it is explicity indicated in the New Testament,
or taught by the Church herself in her tradition or her liturgy. As
for the adapted or “ accommodated ’’ sense, it may sometimes be
useful for the spiritual life or for preaching, but it still remains
secondary, "extrinsic and accidental” (externum et adjectum) to
Holy Scripture, and may easily become dangerous or ridiculous.
Whatever some may think, adds the Encyclical, the literal sense
correctly understood remains the best and surest source of nourishment
for the soul.
In view of all that we have said of inspiration how could it be
otherwise? It is the sense which God directly willed and caused to
be written. By penetrating the thought of the man inspired by God
we are sure of walking hand in hand with God. If we pay no attention
to this human guide and try to discover the thoughts of the divine
Spirit by ourselves, we run the risk of finding only the inventions
of our own mind.

a
s'
3
I

C) Historical Criticism.
If the Bible contained only unverifiable mysteries, its meaning,
once determined, would offer no further difficulty to the assent of
the believing mind. But it also treats of human realities, of scientific
and historical matters, and is thereby susceptible of empirical
verification. This test gives rise to grave problems. If the truth of
the Bible taken as a whole emerges victorious from this comparison
with human sources of information, we must still admit that there
remain some particular cases which appear difficult to reconcile.
The critical mind thinks it sees discrepancies and even contradictions
between the Bible and what it knows from profane sources, and even
» AAS 35 (1943) 3™ fi·: EB [55<>-53l·

155

a

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between different passages of the sacred book itself. And scriptural
inerrancy is apparently called into question.
One solution which is often useful is to explain these paradoxes
by means of corruptions which have crept into the original text.
This solution is especially valuable in certain cases, for example, in
the matter of numbers and proper names. It is by no means sufficient,
however, for many other less superficial problems. Hence several
other solutions have been tried in the endeavor to answer these
difficulties.
We have already outlined the theoretical principles which must
guide us in solving the problem of inerrancy. Here we wish to speak
only of the practical solutions which have been proposed, in order
to evaluate them in the light of these principles and to come to a better
understanding of the Church’s decisions in rejecting some and
approving others.

i.

1) The restriction of inerrancy, or even of inspiration, to matters
of "faith and morals” was one of the first attempts—actually a very
radical one — to suppress all possibility of conflict. Any defense of
the truth of the holy books in profane matters was thus abandoned.
We have already shown (pp. 127 f., 137) why such a surrender of
a considerable portion of the Bible is unacceptable. There is no need,
therefore, of returning to the point.
Another, more subtle expedient gave good promise of exempting
from the divine guarantee many passages of Scripture whose truth
seemed difficult to defend. It consisted in acknowledging the existence
of " implicit citations. ’’ An author does not commit himself when
he quotes, as he does when he speaks for himself. All will agree that
this is true of explicit citations, in which the author lets it be known
that he is quoting the words of another. Why not grant the existence
of cases in which the author does the very same thing — without
informing us, he would introduce into his text passages borrowed
from other sources? These passages might then contain real errors
and yet cause no difficulty at all: they are not the work of the inspired
author; they are not even approved by him. And thus inerrancy
is saved.
This solution is based on a valid principle, but simplifies it to
the point of falsifying it ; and the practical application which it proposes
is obviously unjustified:

i

fi:

156

3

ii

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I
i

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ί

a) It is possible for an author not to vouch for citations which
he makes, but it is also possible for him to approve them (cf. p. 138,
note 3). The latter is even more frequently the case, especially
if, according to the supposition, he cites them without informing
his reader. Is it not true that this way of acting, which was undoubtedly
in more common use among ancient peoples than among us, is itself
a sufficient sign that the author approves and makes his own passages
which have been thus incorporated into his text? It is difficult to see
how he could avoid assuming responsibility for a thought which he
appropriates to the extent of obliterating its origin.

b) Moreover, how are we to know when we are in the presence
of an " implicit citation ”? Such passages are, by definition, very
difficult to identify, especially since we are dealing with ancient times,
and most of the documents have been lost. It is easy to see, therefore,
how this solution leaves the door wide open to a dangerously arbitrary
procedure. It becomes too easy to dispose of any embarrassing text
by attributing its falsity, without any other proof, to some anonymous
source which God has not guaranteed.
The Biblical Commission, therefore, in a special decree (DB 1979;
EB 153 [160]), condemned the systematic use of this expedient,
while, however, recognizing its validity in some cases where certain
precise conditions are verified, viz. when it is solidly proved That :
(i) the author is citing, and (ii) he does not lend his approval.
2) The system which we have just examined sought to save the
truth of the inspired author’s judgment by considering it under
the aspect of the internal assent which is given (cf. supra, pp. 134 f.,
137 ff.). The system of " historical appearances ” approaches the
judgment rather from the point of view of its formal object (cf. supra,
pp-134.137)·
This system took its origin from an rmjustified interpretation
of Providentissimus. Leo XIII had explained that the sacred writers
did not err when they spoke of natural phenomena according to their
" sensible appearances ” (ea quae sensibiliter apparent, cited from
St. Thomas, I, q. 70, a. 1, ad 3m), and he advised that principles
analogous to those which he had developed concerning science should
be applied to allied disciplines, notably to history (DB 1949; EB 108
[123]). Some went about this transposition in too literal a fashion.

157

They thought they could say that the sacred writers had recounted
historical facts only according to their “ appearances, ” that is to
say, according to the manner in which they were spoken of by ordinary,
poorly informed people, and not according to their authentic reality
as guaranteed by good sources. Benedict XV, in Spiritus Paraditus,
emphatically condemned this unjustified interpretation of his
predecessor’s words {DB 2187; EB 469 [456] f.).

As a matter of fact, these two disciplines, natural science and
history, are related to the message of Scripture in entirely different
ways. Their formal objects, indeed, are essentially of the same order:
to discover and explain the essence of the facts, whether natural
or historical, on the basis of their external appearance. But these
facts most certainly do not have the same importance in relation
to the end which the inspired author has in view. The writer, and
above him the Holy Spirit who is directing him, had no intention
of giving men information concerning the inner reality of natural
objects; that has no bearing on salvation.1 On the other hand, the
reality of historical facts has an immediate bearing on the message
of Revelation since, in the divine economy, the work of salvation
has been inserted into the framework of human history. This is why
the inspired author may, under the divine influence, have to exercise
great care and completely vouch for the truth of his statement in
such a historical affirmation, whereas he can speak of an astronomical
phenomenon in ordinary, everyday language, without verifying
or even calling into question the common opinion. His formal object
is entirely different in each case. In one, he remains on the surface
of things; in the other, he inquires into their essence. It is this concrete
formal object of the writer which determines the interpretation of
his judgment and the evaluation of its truth.

And yet, even if history plays an entirely different role in the
sacred book than do the natural sciences, this does not mean that
the sacred authors always used history as a strict scientific discipline.
Their attitude toward it varies, and their formal object lays stress
upon different aspects of the events — more or less profound, more
1 “ Spiritum Dei... noluisse ista [viz., intimam adspectabilium rerum
constitutionem] docere homines, nulla saluti profutura " (Providentissimus,
quoting St. Augustine; DB 1947; EB 106 [121]).

IS»

or less superficial — according to the different relations of these events
to the concrete message which they intend to transmit. There are
various ways of writing history; this brings us to the question of
literary types.

|

3) By "literary type” is meant a certain way of presenting
a thought in a literary dress which comprises both the form and the
content. The form is characterized by the use of a certain vocabulary
or a certain style: the medium of expression is either prose or verse;
the language employed is either direct or figurative; in the latter
case, many varieties are possible: parable, allegory, fable, etc. It is
immediately evident that the choice of form itself affects the content,
which is so intimately related to it. But the content is even more
directly affected by the writer’s intention, because of which he will
prefer one type rather than another, depending upon the end he has
in view. According as he wishes to instruct, convince, or entertain,
his exposition will be didactic, apologetic, or a romantic fiction.
One type will be aimed at the intellect, another will move the heart,
and still another will appeal to the imagination.
Again we return to what has been outlined above concerning
the influence of the practical judgment on the composition of a literary
work. The choice of the " literary type " is, in short, nothing more
than the concrete application of the principles already analyzed.
The great importance of this choice is that it explains the author’s
judgment, not merely under one or other particular aspect, but under
every aspect. The fact that an author chooses one literary type rather
than another dominates his work and reveals to us: (a) the formal
aspect which he is considering in his subject matter; (b) the extent
to which he assents to what he enunciates; and (c) whether or not
he intends to propose his thought to us as genuine teaching. The
literary type of a work is, then, like the key-signature which gives
us its pitch and enables us to understand it.1
1 In the present systematic exposition, we speak as though each work
had but one literary type which dominated it as a whole. But it is self-evident
that the author can in fact change types in the course of his book. A musical
composer changes his key and makes modulations at will. A writer, then, has
the same liberty to vary his mode of expression. The reader, in his analysis,
must take account of these variations and evaluate each passage in the light
of its own literary genre.

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This is why, ever since biblical scholars recognized the fundamental
importance of the human authors of the Bible and of their concrete
thought processes, they have been aware of the need fully to understand
the authors’ literary types in order correctly to grasp their thoughts
and intentions.1
As for the existence of literary types in the Bible, the fact is
so evident and so universally recognized that it is beyond question.
It is treated here simply because of the delicate problem of determining
whether even in historical narrative we may acknowledge literary
types which would modify the presentation of the facts.
The actual existence of different historical types is not questioned.
It seems likely a priori that they should exist, and experience leaves
no room for doubt on the subject. In the literature of every country
and of every age, we meet with works of scientific history, apologetic
history, romantic history, or historical romance. * The erudite treatise,
which inquires into the truth of the slightest details, is one thing;
the text-book or synthetic survey, which keeps only the broad lines
and passes over the details, is quite another. Accordingly the
objective truth of the events is minutely investigated, or treated
with a certain amount of liberty, or even mingled with a greater
or less amount of fiction.
Do we find these different historical types in the Bible? This
is precisely the point which has given rise to so many disputes. Some
have a priori denied the possibility; their reason is that, however
slight the liberties or fictitious elements in these types may be, they
are " unworthy ” of God’s truth. Others have answered that it is
not for us to decide which modes of expression are suitable for God;
we should rather examine that book which is a concrete reflection
of God’s intentions, viz. the Bible.
1 This practice is not novel. Some of the Fathers were already very much
aware of this question; are the " modes ’’ of which St. Thomas speaks anything
else than our " literary types ”? " Modus sen forma in sacra Scriptura multiplex
invenitur. Narratives... et hoc in historialibus libris invenitur. Admonitorius
et exhortatorius et praeceptivus... Hic modus invenitur in lege, prophetis
et libris Salomonis. Disputativus: et hoc in Job et in Apostolo ... Deprecativus
vel laudativus: et hoc invenitur in isto libro (sc., Psalmorum), " In Psabn.,
Prooemium (ed. Vivès, XVIII, 228).
• The difference between these last two types is easy to see. Romantic
history describes historical events in a free and somewhat fanciful form; a histo­
rical romance presents imaginary events in the form of a true history.

160

We think that this latter attitude is the better one. It is not
evident why divine inspiration should, as a matter of principle, forbid
the sacred writers to make use of literary types which their contem­
poraries used without in any way deceiving their readers.1 For no
one was misled by these "fictitious” literary types in the ancient
Orient, where the concept of history was so different from ours. The
tenor of the book itself and, above all, the literary usages of the age
sufficiently apprized the public of the author’s real intentions. Therefore
God did not deceive anyone if he had his interpreter speak through
the medium of fiction or by means of an approximation. *
It may be that Westerners of the twentieth century who have
been brought up on Aristotelian logic and schooled in the most rigorous
techniques of historical research will have some difficulty in recapturing
the somewhat crude simplicity of ancient times. But it is up to them
to make the effort and to adapt themselves. For God has chosen to
speak to them, not directly and in their own language, but through
the intermediary and according to the practices of ancient Orientals. *
It will be the task of the exegete to rediscover and to understand
these literary usages of the ancient East. He will have to be on his
guard against any system which works a priori, 4 against any artificial
* There is, however, one type which must be a priori exluded from the
Bible as unworthy of God, i.e., any kind of " myth ’’ which would introduce
error or fiction into the very essence of religious speculations about the Deity.
Cf. Syllabus, prop. 7 (DB 1707; EB 60 [75]); Cone. Vatican., can. 4 de Fide
(DB 1813; EB 65 [80]; Providentissimus (EB 85 [100]); Conun. Bibl., Decree
of June 30, 1909, dub. II (DB 2122; EB 333 [337]). See Lagrange, Mithode
historique, pp. 139, 201 ff.
’ In answer to the false notion that the ancient Orientals were naive and
lackingin critical sense, see Lagrange in Revue Biblique, New Series 2 (1905) 621 β.
* In Initiation Biblique (3rd ed. ; 1954), PP· 42*43. I have given a brief
explanation of the attitudes which set ofi the Semitic authors of the Bible tram
our Greco-Roman modes of thought and communication, and their religious
spirit from our lay spirit; these attitudes entail different ways of discovering
and expressing the truth. In forthcoming publications I plan to treat this
extremely important topic at greater length.
4 We should not postulate the existence of certain literary types in the
ancient Bast simply on the evidence found in Holy Scripture and in order to
vindicate it. See Bea, op. eit., p. 104. Fr. Lagrange (art. cii., p. 622) had already
written: "The distinction of literary types should be maintained only if
determined according to sound methods, and not according to the exigencies
of a particular case, as a means of avoiding objections. "

16l

•1

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classification.1 In this matter, objective reality must always be the
deciding factor. But if he then believes that in the sacred books,
as in the literature of the period, he has found certain historical types
which are rather free in dealing with facts or somewhat interspersed
with fiction, he will bow to the facts and will not be afraid to allow
that God may have thought fit to make use of such types without
compromising his Truth.

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4) The exegete can, moreover, take heart from the official
encouragement of the Church. It is her prerogative, rather than that
of the private theologian, to declare what literary types are worthy
or unworthy of God. Divino afflante Spiritu has seen fit to treat this
subject at some length and to make an explicit recommendation
of the method of literary types. ’ After having exhorted exegetes
to study the " literary types ” of the ancient East, making use of
the marvelous discoveries of our day, the Encyclical adds:

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Nevertheless no one, who has a correct idea of biblical inspiration,
will be surprised to find, even in the Sacred Writers, as in other
ancient authors, certain fixed ways of expounding and narrating,
certain definite idioms, especially of a kind peculiar to the Semitic
tongues, so-called approximations, and certain hyperbolical modes
of expression, nay, at times, even paradoxical, which even help
to impress the ideas more deeply on the mind. For of the modes
of expression which, among ancient peoples, and especially those
of the East, human language used to express its thought, none
is excluded from the Sacred Books, provided the way of speaking
adopted in no wise contradicts the holiness and truth of God, as,
with his customary wisdom, the Angelic Doctor already observed
in these words: " In Scripture divine things are presented to us
in the manner which is in common use amongst men. ” ...Not

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1 Such, e.g., as that of Fr. Hummelauer; cf. Bea, op. cit., p. ro2 fi.
Fr. Lagrange (Méthode historique) gives some more careful observations on
this whole question.
* Provideniissimus made no mention of this question, which had not yet
arisen at the time. In 1905 and 1909, the Biblical Commission (DB 1980 and
2122; EB 154 [161] and 333 [337]) showed itself rather unwilling as a matter
of principle to admit in the Bible the presence of more or less fictional historical
types. However, it couched its replies in cautions terms which left the road
open for the research of prudent and conscientious exegetes. In 1920, Spiritus
Paraelitus (DB 2188; EB 474 £461]) made an unfavorable but cursory reference
to this method.

162

/

infrequently... when some persons reproachfully charge the Sacred
Writers with some historical error or inaccuracy in the recording
of facts, on closer examination it turns out to be nothing else than
those customary modes of expression and narration peculiar to the
ancients, which used to be employed in the mutual dealings of social
life and which in fact were sanctioned by common usage.1

Thus the official Magisterium of the Church approves the principle
of this method, which follows necessarily from a sound theory of
inspiration and inerrancy. As for the detailed application of the
principle, it mentions explicitly, among other things, the approxi­
mations, hyperboles, and paradoxes which were in current use among
the ancient Semites. Now these figures of speech are not necessarily
limited to particular expressions, but may affect the tone of an entire
book and may result in free or partly fictitious types of historical
narrative. * As a matter of fact, the Encyclical does not explicitly
mention these last forms, but we may believe that it does not exclude
them. It undoubtedly leaves to the exegete the task of further
discussion on these delicate problems which are not yet sufficiently
resolved, and refrains from definitively deciding whether the types
postulated by scientific inquiry in any way " contradict the holiness
and truth of God. "
D) Rational Exegesis and the Rule of Faith.

Now the Church always retains the supreme right to direct and
control exegesis. This is the last conclusion which we wish to deduce
from the concept of inspiration.
Because two authors, God and man, concurred in the production
of the Scriptures, they must be explored by a twofold method, sc., faith
and reason. Just as there exists a perfect harmony between God,
the principal cause, and man, his instrument who is totally
subordinated to him, so too there can be no conflict between the
interpretation postulated by reason and that demanded by faith.
* After the translation given in ESS, nos. 36-38; cf. EB [559-60].
• See Chr. Pesch, S.J., De inspiratione Sacrae Scripturae (Fribourg. 1906),
p. 503: " Quia parabola potest esse historia ficta, patet etiam fictas narrationes
posse inspirari. Si hoc valet de brevioribus narrationibus, potest etiam valere
de longioribus.
Brevitas vel longitudo non videtur ratione inspirationis
constituere essentialem differentiam. '*

163

J
And, on the other hand, just as the divine Cause, in the very act
of moving the human mind, allows it to retain its autonomy and
spontaneity as a free and intelligent cause, so too the rule of faith,
while directing work of exegesis from above, does not thereby impede
it in the free use of its proper methods.
These are the principles which must direct the practical activity
of exegesis and preserve it in a golden mean between two opposite
extremes.

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i) One error would, in effect, consist in wishing to free scientific
exegesis from all control on the -part of faith and the Church. This is the
error which inspires the attitude of Protestant exegetes and particularly
of modem Rationalists, the so-called “ independent ’’ critics. It is
also the basis of that oft-repeated complaint that Catholic exegesis
is bound by irrational " prejudices ” which prevent it from being
scientific.
Such an attitude is unacceptable from the point of view of Catholic
faith, because it either refuses to recognize the existence and the role
of the Church as a Magisterium instituted by God (the Protestant
exegetes), or even denies the divine origin of Scripture, the existence
of supernatural inspiration, and, in general, the whole supernatural
order, including God himself who is relegated to the status of an
immanent Idea in the world (Rationalists).
It is the task of other disciplines to refute these errors. Once
one admits the existence of supernatural revelation and the divine
mission of the Church, it necessarily follows that the Church must
control the interpretation and use of Scripture. Actually, in order
to have a genuine understanding of this divinely inspired book, the
exegete must penetrate the thoughts of the human author and thereby
discover the very intentions of God himself, which he cannot know
apart from the complete context of Revelation, according to the
"analogy of faith.” Now God has confided the deposit of faith — and
Scripture in particular1 — to the Church alone. For Scripture is but
one of the expressions of this deposit, one which is, moreover,
incomplete and insufficient of itself. It is the exclusive prerogative
of the Church to give an authentic interpretation of Scripture, in
* See Prmidentissimus (EB 93 ff. [xo8 ff.J); Litt. Apost. Vigilantiae (EB
134 [141])·

•7

conformity with its living Tradition. The private exegete is, therefore,
incapable of discovering the true and divinely intended meaning
of Scripture if he restricts his study to Scripture alone (Protestant
exegesis), and above all if he is willing to follow only his reason
(Rationalist criticism). A genuine penetration of Scripture will demand
that he read it with the light of faith and draw his inspiration from
the judgment of the Church, studying the spirit of her Tradition,
following the interpretations of the Fathers, especially when these
unanimously agree,1 and, lastly, remaining subject to the decisions
of the official Magisterium.a

In so doing he in no way impedes his scientific research nor
does he impair his use of critical methods, for that is a different sphere
of activity which retains its own internal autonomy. We shall see
this when we speak of the opposite error.
2) The contrary error would be to refuse the exegete freedom
in his rational work under the pretext that the book which he is studying
has a divine origin and belongs to the Church alone. Such an attitude
overlooks the role of the human author, just as the preceding error
overlooked that of the divine Author.

In order to penetrate the thought of the writer whom God willed
to use, we must place ourselves on the level of a man speaking to
other men, in a particular time and under concrete circumstances.
This is the task of textual, literary, and historical criticism, as we
have described it above. Each of these disciplines has its proper
method which pertains to reason and concerning which faith has
nothing, at least directly, to say. If we scorn these rational procedures
1 See Providentissimus (DB 1944; EB 95 S. [no fi.]).
* In this connection we may even speak of a type of “ inspiration ” of the
Church and in the Church; it would not, of course, be the same as biblical
inspiration, but analogous to it because of the positive illuminating motion
which it entails; in order to distinguish it from biblical inspiration, it could well
be called " ecclesiastical inspiration. ’’ This terminology, which appears contrary
to present theological usage, actually is in harmony with a well accepted doctrine
of the patristic and medieval periods. It is based on the theological principle
that the same Spirit who had the books written is necessary for an authoritative
interpretation of them. See M. Labourdette in Revue Thomiste 50 (1950) 406-407;
G. Bandy, "L’Inspiration des Pères de l'Eglise,” Recherches de Science Religieuse
40 (1951-1952) 7-26; P. Benoit in Sacra Pagina I, 86-99.

165

and claim to do without them, we are belittling the human means
which God has adopted in order to speak to us and we expose ourselves
to the danger of interpreting God’s Scripture in a recklessly arbitrary
fashion.
Furthermore, it would be wrong to be afraid of such scientific
exegesis. “ Rational ” does not mean " rationalistic. " In the very
name of reason and impartial science this exegesis strives to penetrate
the thought of the author as it was in reality and, for that very reason,
does not allow itself a priori to exdude the supernatural. On the
contrary, it is ready to admit the influence of the supernatural upon
thoughts and deeds, provided its faithful investigation obliges it
to recognize the reality of doctrines or events which transcend unaided
reason.
•
All thinking, especially all religious thinking, implies certain
philosophical and theological principles. One cannot study the content
of a religious book such as the Bible without adopting certain
philosophical and theological positions. This is so true that the selfstyled " independent ” exegesis also presupposes some such principles,
which are no less " biased ” than those of which Catholic exegesis
is accused. But they suffer from the great defect of being purely
rational prejudices, and hence entirely out of keeping with a book
whose content is essentially supernatural. The prindples of faith,
on the other hand, are quite well suited to Scripture, since they
derive from it and, in general, from divine revelation.

It will be neither possible nor licit for the Catholic exegete to
forget these principles as he goes about his study. But the light of
faith will in no way jeopardize the properly scientific worth of his
exegesis. For it will respect the autonomy of his methods and will
exercise only an indirect control over them, by testing the results
of his labor. The Catholic exegete will be entirely free to establish
his philological, archaeological, historical, etc., conclusions as
scientifically as possible. Only when these are contrary to faith,
will faith have the right to tell him that he has made a mistake, and
that he must revise his work. For there can be no contradiction
between faith and reason.
3) The " rule of faith, ” and the decisions of the Church which
are its expression, are, therefore, a norm extrinsic to scientific exegesis,
166

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necessary to guide its progress from above, but which in no way
interferes with the free exercise of its proper methods of procedure.
We might emphasize the discretion which the Church exercises in
this matter by making some distinctions which are too often
overlooked:

a) The Church ordinarily sets forth definitive interpretations
only in what concerns " matters of faith and morals. "1*4As for the
rest of " the vast material contained in the sacred books, ’’ it can
certainly decide in the same way. Actually there are " but few texts
the sense of which has been defined by the authority of the
Church. ” *

b) Only those interpretations which are taught by the solemn
definiti<ps of the Councils or of the Sovereign Pontiffs bind the
exegete iri faith. The Decisions of the Sacred Congregations, and in
particular those of the Biblical Commission which is similar to these
Congregations, do not have the same force; they impose a strict
obligation on the exegete only with regard to the social expression
of his opinions. Of course, they also call for his sincere respect and
even his interior assent,,but this can be suspended for serious reasons,
for such decisions are neither infallible nor irrevocable. ’
c) As for the “ unanimous agreement ” of the Fathers, this
constitutes a certain argument only in matters of faith and morals,
and there are admittedly very few texts of Scripture for which
it is established. *
1 " In rebus fidei vel morum, ad aedificationem doctrinae Christianae
pertinentium, is pro vero sensu Sacrae Scripturae habendus [est], quem tenuit
ac tenet sancta mater Ecclesia, cuius est indicare de vero sensu et interpretatione
Scripturarum Sanctarum ’’ (DB 1788; EB 63 [78], repeating a decree of the
Council of Trent, DB 786, EB 47 [62]). On this question see Lagrange in Revue
Biblique 9 (1900) 135 fl.; id., New Series 2 (1905) 399 fi.
• Divino afflante Spiritu, in RSS no. 47; cf. EB [565].
* See A. Fernandez in Institutiones Biblicae, I, 399 ff. ; J. Dupont, '* A
propos du nouvel Enchiridion Biblicum, ” Revue Biblique 62 (1955) 414-19;
E. F. Siegman, " The Decrees of the Pontifical Biblical Commission, A Recent
Clarification, " Catholic Biblical Quarterly 18 (1936) 23-29.
4 " There are but few texts whose sense has been defined by the authority
of the Church; nor are those more numerous about which the teaching of the
Holy Fathers is unanimous " (Divino afflante Spiritu, in RSS no. 47; cf. EB
[565])·

167

These restrictions obviously leave room for a great deal of freedom
in the exercise of scientific exegesis. In Divino afflante Spiritu, Pope
Pius XII has thought it wise to lay special emphasis on this point
and to encourage exegetes to labor zealously and courageously
according to the approved scientific methods of the most modem
criticism. He has likewise instructed the other children of the Church
to respect and esteem this very necessary research in a spirit of justice
and charity.
An exegete who rejects the divine Author and the means necessary
to approach him, — Faith and the Church, — condemns himself to
remain on the outer surface of the sacred book, and even to do violence
to its meaning. One who neglects the human author and the rational
methods of procedure which are necessary to understand him, also
exposes himself to the danger of remaining on the outside of Scripture
by introducing subtle and arbitrary interpretations which were not
willed by God. The exegete who takes both authors into account
and maintains an exact hierarchy between the directives of faith
and the demands of reason is able to penetrate Scripture in
a harmonious and truly comprehensive fashion. On the solid
foundation of a scientific and critical exegesis, which takes into
consideration every human quality of the book, he will be able to
erect a theological and spiritual exegesis which will disclose the
intentions and teachings of God with the firmest guarantees. He
will achieve this rich and fruitful result, which should be the end
of all his work,1 if he always keeps before his eyes the true nature
of the charism of inspiration as found in the doctrine of St. Thomas
and as taught by the Church in her official approbation of this
doctrine.

1 Divino afflante Spiritu deplores the fact that some Catholic commentaries
restrict themselves to explaining the sacred text from the point of view of
history, archaeology, philology, etc., and do not go on to set forth its theological
teaching (see in RSS no. 24; cf. EB [55r]). This second step is undoubtedly
the more important, and, indeed, constitutes the true purpose of exegesis.
Rational criticism should not be cultivated except as an auxiliary and
preparatory discipline, as a means of discovering the doctrinal content.

168

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

The Ecclesiastical Documents are conveniently collected in Enchi­
ridion Biblicum. 2nd ed.; Rome, 1954.
J. B. Franzelin, Tractatus de divina traditione et Scriptura. Rome, 1870;
4th ed.; 1896.
E. Levesque, “ Essai sur la nature de l’inspiration des Livres Saints, ”
Revue des Facultés catholiques de l’Ouest (1895).
T. M. Pègues, " Une pensée de St. Thomas sur l’inspiration scripturaire, ’*
Revue Thomiste 3 (1895) 95-112; “ A propos de l’inspiration des
Livres Saints, " Revue Biblique 6 (1897) 75-82.
M. J. Lagrange, " Une pensée de St. Thomas sur l’inspiration scrip­
turaire, ” Revue Biblique 4 (1895) 563-71 ; “ L’Inspiration des Livres
Saints, ” ibid. 5 (1896) 199-220; " L'Inspiration et les exigences
de la critique, ’’ ibid. 5 (1896) 496-518; and see his reviews of Nisius,
ibid. 9 (1900) 135-42, and Pesch, ibid. 15 (1906) 303-14.
Id., La méthode historique. Paris, 1903. Eng. tr. by E. Myers, Historical
Criticism and the Old Testament. London, 1905.
D. Zanecchia, Divina inspiratio sacrarum Scripturarum ad mentem
sancti Thomae. Rome, 1898; Scriptor sacer sub divina inspiratione
iuxta sententiam Cardinalis Franzelin. Rome, 1903.
*
T. Calmes, Qu’est-ce que ΓEcriture Sainte f Les livres inspirés dans l’antiquité
chrétienne. Théorie de l’inspiration. 8th ed. ; Paris, 1907.
F. Prat, " Les historiens inspirés et leurs sources, " Etudes 86 (Jan.-Mar.,
1901) 474-500; La Bible et l'histoire. 5th ed. ; Paris, 1908.

E. Mangenot, " Inspiration ” in Dictionnaire de la Bible 3 (1903) 887-911;
" Inspiration de l’Ecriture ” in Dictionnaire de théologie catholique
7 (1923) 2058-2266.
L. Billot, De inspiratione sacrae Scripturae. 4th ed. ; Rome, 1929.
C. Pesch, De inspiratione sacrae Scripturae. Fr. i. Br., 1906; Supplementum,
ibid., 1926.
E. Hvgon, La causalité instrumentale en théologie, c. 2. 2nd ed.; Paris, 1924.
A. Durand, “ Inspiration de la Bible ” in Dictionnaire apologétique de
la foi catholique 2 (1911) 894-917; " Inerrance biblique, ’’ ibid. 752-87!
“ Critique biblique, ” ibid. 1 (1911) 760-819.
E. Merkelbach, L'Inspiration des divines Ecritures. 2nd ed.; Liège, 1913.
J. M. Vosté, De natura et extensione inspirationis biblicae secundum
principia s. Thomae. Rome, 1924; De Scripturarum veritate iuxta
recentiora Ecclesiae documenta. Rome, 1924; De divina inspiratione
et veritate sacrae Scripturae. 2nd ed.; Rome, 1932.
M. van den Oudenrijn, De prophetiae charismate in populo israelitico.
Rome, 1926.
A. Lemonnyer, " Apparences historiques " in Dictionnaire de la Bible,
Supplément 1 (1928) 588-96; " Citations implicites, ’’ ibid. 2 (1934)
Si-55H. Lusseau, Essai sur la nature de l’inspiration scripturaire. Paris, 1930.
A. Colunga, " La inspiration divina de la Escritura, " La Ciencia Tomista
42 (1930) 58-77.
B. Decker, " Die Analyse des Offenbarungsvorganges beim hl. Thomas
im Lichte vorthomistischer Prophetietraktate, " Angelicum 8 (1931)
195-244·
G. M. Perrella, " Ispirazione profetica e ispirazione scritturale: origine
e natura, ” Divus Thomas (Piacenza) 36 (1933) 121-43.
S. M. Zarb, " Num hagiographi sibi conscii fuerint divinae inspirationis, ’’
Angelicum 11 (1943) 228-44.
A. Bea, De Scripturae sacrae inspiratione quaestiones historicae et dogma­
ticae. 2nd ed. ; Rome, 1935.
Β. Decker, Die Entwicklung der Lehre von der prophetischen Offenbarung
von W. von Auxerre bis zum Thomas v. Aquin. Breslau, 1940.
A. Bea, "Deus Auctor Sacrae Scripturae: Herkunft und Bedeutung
der Formel, “ Angelicum 20 (1943) 16-31.
.
G. M. Perella, " La nozione dell’ ispirazione scritturale secondo i primitivi
documenti cristiani, ” Angelicum 20 (1943) 32-52.
G. Courtade, " Inspiration et innerance ” in Dictionnaire de la Bible
Supplément 4 (1949) 482-559.
172

G. Castellino, L’inneranza della Scrittura. Turin, 1949.
M. Labourdette in Revue Thomiste 50 (1950) 408-21.
J. Schildenberger, Vom Geheimnis des Gotteswortes. Heidelberg, 1950.
E. Florit, Ispirazione biblica. 2nd ed.; Rome, 1951; La verità nella
s. Scrittura. 2nd ed.; Rome, 1951.
Bea, " Die Instrumentalitâtsidee in der Inspirationslehre, ” Studia
A nselmiana nos. 27-28 (1951) 47-65.
G. Courtade, " J.-B. Franzelin. Les formules que le Magistère lui
a empruntées, ” Recherches de Science Religieuse 40 (1952) 317-25.
J· Leipoldt, " Die Frühgeschichte der Lehre von der gôttlichen
Eingebung, ” Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft 44
(1952/1953) 118-45·
S. Tromp, De sacrae Scripturae inspiratione. 5th ed.; Rome, 1953. ■
J. Seynaeve, Cardinal Newman's Doctrine on Holy Scripture according
to His Published Works and Previously Unedited Manuscripts.
Louvain, 1953.
N. I. Weyns, " De notione inspirationis biblicae iuxta Concilium Vati­
canum, ” Angelicum 30 (i953) 315-36·
J. Fischer, “ Die Enzyklika ' Divino Afflante Spiritu ’ Pius XII. und
das Problem der Inerrantia Sacrae Scripturae, ” Münchener
theologische Zeitschrift 4 (1953) 213-22.
K. Smyth, " The Inspiration of the Scriptures, " Scripture 6 (1953 /
1954)67-75·
P. Benoit, " L’Inspiration " in Initiation Biblique (3rd ed. ; Tournai,
1954). ΡΡ· 6-45·
A. Ibanez Arana, “ Las cuestiones ' de Prophetia ' en St. Tomas y la
inspiration biblica, ” Scriptorium Victorieuse 1 (1954) 256-312.
M. de Tuya, " Inspiration biblica y generos literarios, ” La Ciencia
Tomista 82 (i955) 25-63.
J. P. Weisengoff, " Inerrancy of the Old Testament in Religious
Matters, " Catholic Biblical Quaterly 17 (1955) 248-57.
J. Levie, " L'Ecriture sainte, parole de Dieu, parole d’homme, ” Nouvelle
Revue Théologique 78 (1956) 561-92; 706-29.
K. Rahner, “ Über die Schriftinspiration, ” Zeitschrift für kalholische
Théologie
(1956) 137-68.
M. de Tuya, “ Revelation profetica oon inspiration biblica, ’’ La Ciencia
Tomista 83 (1956) 473-506.
L. Alonso-Schôkel, “ Preguntas nuevas acerca de la inspiration ” in
XVI Semana biblica espanola (Madrid, 1956), pp. 273-90.
P. Benoit, “Note complémentaire sur l’inspiration. " Revue Biblique
63 (2956) 416-22.
173

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J. Coppens, “ L'Inspiration et l'inerrance bibliques, " Ephemerides
Theologicae Lovanienses 33 (1957) 36-57.
J. ScBiLDENBERGER, " Inspiration und Irrtumslosigkeit der heiligen
Schrift ’’ in Fragen der Théologie heute (Einsiedeln, 1957), PP· 109-21.
R. A. F. Mackenzie, " Some Problems in the Field of Inspiration, ”
Catholic Biblical Quarterly 20 (1958) 1-8.
J. T. Forestell, “The Limitation of Inerrancy,” Catholic Biblica
Quarterly 20 (1958) 9-18.
F. J. Schroeder, “ Père Lagrange: Record and Teaching in Inspiration, "
Catholic Biblical Quarterly 20 (1958) 206-17.
B. Brinkmann, " Inspiration und Kanonizitât der heiligen Schrift in
ihrem Verhâltnis zur Kirche, ” Scholastih 33 (1958) 208-33.
D. Stanley, " The Concept of Biblical Inspiration " in Proceedings
of the Thirteenth Annual Convention of The Catholic Theological
Society of America (Yonkers, N.Y., 1958), pp. 65-95.

In addition to the specialized works cited above, the following manuals
of general introduction to the Scriptures may be consulted:
J. Balestri, Biblicae introductionis generalis elementa. Rome, 1932.
H. Lusseau & M. Collomb, Manuel d’études bibliques, I. Paris, 1936.
R. Cornely, Introductionis in s. Scripturae libros compendium. 12th ed.
by A. Merk; Paris, 1940.
G. M. Perella, Introduziane generale alla sacra Bibbia. Turin, 1948;
Span. tr. by J. Prado, Introducciôn general a la sagrada Escritura.
Madrid, 1954.
J. Renié, Manuel d'Ecriture sainte, I. 6th ed.; Lyon, 1949.
H. Simon & J. Prado, Praelectiones biblicae. Propaedeutica biblica sive
introductio in universam Scripturam. 6th ed. ; Turin, 1950.
Profs, of the Pontifical Biblical Institute, Institutiones biblicae scholis
accomodatae, I. 6th ed. ; Rome, 1951.
A. Robert & A. Feuillet, Introduction à la Bible, I. Tournai, 1957.
H. Hôpfl, Introductio generalis in s. Scripturam. 6th ed. by L. Leloir;
Rome, 1958.

174

ANALYTICAL INDEX
N. B. The references given below are principally to the Summa
Theologica II-II. EN refers to the Explanatory Notes (Part I) ; page
nos. refer to the pages of Part II.
angels:

The communication of prophetic revelation to men is part of their
proper work, q. 172, a. 2; EN 21.
They themselves cannot be called prophets since they contemplate
the mystery of the divine essence as beings fully united to God,
q. 174, a. 5, ad 2.
AUTHOR OF HOLY SCRIFTURB:

God is the principal Author of Holy Scripture, but man, in a sub­
ordinate capacity, is also a true author, pp. 98-100.
Since the notion of author is a human one, it can be applied to God
only by analogy, pp. 100-103.
A single inspired book may have had several human authors, each
of whom participated in the charism of inspiration, pp. 123-27.
AWARENESS AND UNAWARENESS I

The prophet may be unaware that God is inspiring him; in this
case his knowledge is less certain and his charism less perfect, q. X71,
a-51 q· i73> »· 41 PP· 72-74·
BALAAM:

Even though he was the demons' prophet, he spoke under divine
inspiration, q. 172, a. 6, ad 1.
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BLESSED, THE.'

See the divine essence without transport, q. 175, a. 4, ad 1.
Cannot be called prophets, q. 174, a. 5.
In his rapture, Paul became " blessed " only in a relative and
transitory manner, q. 175, a. 3, ad 3; a. 6, ad 3.
caiphas:

Was moved by the Holy Spirit to say certain things, but did not
receive the light to understand them, q. 173, a. 4.
canonicity:

The criterion of the scriptural inspiration of the Sacred Books,
pp. 86-88.
christ:

Saw the divine essence without transport, q. 175, a. 4, ad 2.
Can be called a prophet only in a relative sense, q. 174, a. 5, ad 3;
EN 51.
Had the gift of tongues, but did not have to use it, q. 176, a. 1, ad 3.
0:

dreams:

Sleep gives the soul a greater receptivity, but weakens its power
of judgment, q. 172, a. 1, ad 2.
Visions in a waking state constitute a more elevated degree of
prophecy than do dreams, q. 174, a. 3.
ecstasy:
Is merely a " going out of oneself, ’’ as distinguished from rapture,
which further implies the notion of violence done to the soul, q. 175,
a. 2, ad I.
exegesis:

Has as its task to rediscover the thought of the inspired author
in all its varying shades of meaning, and thereby to discover the
the thought of God, pp. 164-65.
Agreement between its proper methods and the rule of faith,
pp. 165-67.
Scientific and critical exegesis is to serve as a foundation for
theological and spiritual exegesis, p. 168.

CITATIONS IN SCRIPTURE:

faculties, executive:

Are guaranteed by inspiration and inerrancy only to the extent
that the sacred writer approves their content, p. 138, note 3.
Recourse to " implicit citations " cannot be erected into a system,
pp-156-57·
david:
Since he was endowed with intellectual vision, like Moses, his
penetration of the mystery of Christ was better, but Moses better
understood the mystery of the divinity, q. 174, a. 4, ad 1.
Was himself enraptured by intellectual visions, q. 175, a. 3, ad 1.

Those of the sacred writer receive in an analogous way their share
of the inspiration, pp. 121-23.
faith:
The Christian’s faith is ultimately based upon the testimony of
those who have seen by means of prophetic revelation, q. 171, a. 3,
ad 2: EN 11; q. 171, a. 5.
Prophetic knowledge is superior to the knowledge of faith insofar
as it enables the revealed truth to be seen with evidence, at least
in its " quia est, " EN 7 and EN 15.
The prophet can retain a conditional faith with respect to the object
of his vision, EN 61.
In his rapture, Paul could not have made an act of faith, q. 175,
a. 3, ad 3.
Faith is confirmed by miracles and, in addition, helps to produce
them, q. 178, a. 1, ad 5.
God can use the dead faith of a sinner to produce a miracle, q. 178,
a. 2, ad 2.

demons:

Can reveal to a man truths which surpass his understanding, but
this is not prophecy properly so called, q. 172, a. 5.
Their revelations can contain truth, owing to the divine concurrence,
and with God's permission, q. 172, a. 6.
Can work false miracles, q. 178, a. 1, ad 2; a. 2.
DISPOSITIONS, REQUISITE:

Prophecy supposes certain natural dispositions in the subject, but,
if these are lacking, God can give them at the same time that He
gives the charism, q. 172, a. 3.
Sanctifying grace is not necessarily required in the prophet, but
a certain freedom from passion and wordly occupations is necessary,
q. 172, a. 4.
176

FUTURE EVENTS, KNOWLEDGE OF:

Natural knowledge of future events in their causes is not to be
confused with prophecy in the proper sense, q. 172, a. 1.
Can be had even by animals, ibid., ad 3.
Can be obtained through the superior understanding of the demons,
q. 172, a. 5.
177

FUTURES, contingent:

t-

Constitute the proper object of prophetic knowledge, q. 171, a. 3.
A prophecy concerning them is not to be judged false by the mere
fact that what is foretold does not take place, q. 171, a. 6, ad 2;
EN 18.
glossolalia:

See: tongues,

,

gift of.

GRADES OF PROPHECY:

Are determined by the type of vision (sensible, imaginative,
intellectual), by its object (action or knowledge), and by its
circumstances, q. 174, a. 3.
Prophecy varies also according to the particular stage in the progress
of divine revelation, q. 174, a. 6.
Prophecy by way of intellectual vision is essentially superior to
prophecy by way of imaginative vision, q. 174, a. 2.
But the notion of prophecy is more properly realized in imaginative
vision, q. 174, a. 2, ad 3 ; a. 3.
A single prophet can, at various times, enjoy different grades of
prophecy, q. 174, a. 3, ad 2.

'

habitus:

The gift of prophecy is not a habitus, but a transitory impression,
q. 171, a. 2.
The prophet’s mind, however, retains a certain " habilitas, ”
ibid., ad 2.

'

;1 '

hagiographer :

Makes supernatural judgments about things known naturally to
him, and speaks “ ex persona propria, ” whereas the prophet makes
judgments about supematurally known truths and speaks “ ex
persona Domini, ” q. 174, a. 2, ad 3.
The hagiographers can also make judgments about infused super­
natural truths, EN 47; p. 108.

‘

heaven (third):

;

Can be understood to mean the empyrean, an intellectual vision,
the knowledge of God in himself, or the degree of knowledge possessed
by the highest angels, q. 175, a. 3, ad 4.
HISTORICAL APPEARANCES:

An unjustified application to history of Leo XIII’s statements
concerning " scientific appearances, ” pp. 157-59.
178

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IMPERFECTION OF PROPHETIC KNOWLEDGE:

Prophecy is an imperfect species in the genus of divine revelation,
whose perfection is in heaven, q. 171, a. 4, ad 2.
The prophet discovers only partial, limited truths, without possessing
their principle, q. 171, a. 4; pp. 78-79.
He does not use his charism whenever he wishes, q. 171, a. 2 ; p. 78.
The perfection of prophecy varies according as the prophet is aware
of the fact that he is inspired, q. 171, a. 5; pp. 72-73.
The prophet may lack full understanding of what he prophesies,
q. 173, a. 4.
inerrancy:
Prophetic knowledge, reflecting as it does the divine Truth, cannot
be false, q. 171, a. 6.
Prophecy is not false merely because the events which it foretells
do not take place, q. 171, a. 6, ad 2; EN 18.
Inerrancy is one of the results of inspiration, pp. 132-33.
Inerrancy is in question only when and to the extent that the formal
judgment of the one inspired comes into play, pp. 133-42.
It must not be limited, as a matter of principle, to " res fidei et
morum, ’’ pp. 137, 156.
INSPIRATION, COGNITIVE:

An elevation of the mind which prepares it for revelation, q. 171,
a. I, ad 4; EN 5.
In modem usage, which is not the terminology of St. Thomas, this
term is reserved for the case of the supernatural light without infused
representations, pp. 68-72.
INSPIRATION, SCRIPTURAL:

Is more than a " negative assistance " or a “ subsequent appro­
bation, ’’ pp. 88-89.
Involves a positive influence of the Holy Spirit on all the faculties
of the sacred writer, pp. 90, 119-23.
Can be called " verbal, " since it extends even to the words of the
text, pp. 122-23.
Is distinguished from cognitive inspiration by the concrete end
which it has in view and by the dominant role of the practical
judgment, pp. 105-111.
Must not be confused with revelation, pp. m-14.
Must not be reduced to a purely practical impulse, pp. 114-15.
Involves a positive illumination of the speculative judgment
whenever there is question of the latter, pp. 115-17.
instrument:
To the extent that he himself knows, the true prophet is an instrument
of the Holy Spirit only in a broad and improper sense, pp. 79-81,94-95.
179

The prophet is an instrument in the proper sense of the word with
respect to the secondary meanings which are hidden from him,
q. 173, a. 4; p. 83.
Another instrument in the proper sense is the inspired subject who
receives infused representations without the light necessary to
form judgments about them, pp. 81-82.
The thaumaturge is an instrumental cause of the miracles which
he works, q. 178, a. 1, ad 1 ; a. 2, ad 2.
intellect:

The primary sphere of action of cognitive inspiration, q. 171, a. 1;
q. 172, a. 2, ad 1; a. 4; p. 62.
INTERPRETATION OF SPEECHES:

This charism can be related to prophecy and is superior to the gift
of tongues, q. 176, a. 2, ad 4.
JOHN THE BAPTIST:

Already belongs to the New Testament and surpasses Moses, the
greatest prophet of the Old, q. 174, a. 4, ad 3.
judgment:

Formal element of prophetic, and even of all knowledge, q. 173,
a. 2; p. 58.
Can have either infused or acquired representations as its material
element, q. 173, a. 2; q. 174, a. 2, ad 3.
Although primarily speculative in the case of the prophet, it is
primarily practical in that of the sacred writer, who is directed
thereby in forming andutilizing his speculative judgments, pp. 103-109.
The formal judgment of the inspired writer, which is favored with
inerrancy, must be considered according to its formal object, its
degree of affirmation, and the writer’s intention to instruct, pp. 136-42.
light, prophetic:

The formal element of the prophetic charism, q. 171, a. 3, ad 3.
Suffices by itself, without the need of new representations, in order
to have true prophecy, q. 173, a. 2; EN 35; pp. 64-68.
LITERARY TYPES:

Definition, p. 159.
There are different literary types, even in history, pp. 159-61.
The sacred writers could use the current literary types of their
age; we must be familiar with these types if we are to make a fair
evaluation of their thought, pp. 161-63.
.
180

MIRACLES, GIFT OF Z

Normal accompaniment of prophecy, for the purpose of confirming
it, q. 171, a. 1; q. 178, a. 1.
Ordinarily presupposes holiness in the thaumaturge, but it can
be granted to the sinner who preaches the truth and invokes the
name of Christ, q. 178, a. 2.
The thaumaturge is merely an instrument in the hands of God,
q. 178, a. i, ad I ; EN 79.
God alone can effect true miracles, q. 178, a. 2.
The demons can perpetrate false miracles, q. 178, a. 1, ad 2; a. 2.
Healing occupies a special place in the category of miracles, q. 178,
a. i, ad 4.
MIRROR OF ETERNITY:

Not the divine essence itself, but the likenesses which reveal to
the prophet the truths contained in the divine intellect, q. 173, a. 1.
MORALITY OF THE PROPHET:

Prophecy can be had without holiness of life, and even without
charity, but it requires a certain freedom from passion, q. 172, a. 4.
moses:

Was the greatest of the prophets, q. 174, a. 4.
Saw the divine essence while in a state of rapture, q. 174, a. 5, ad 1;
q. 175, a. 3. This opinion, which St. Thomas adopted from
St Augustine, seems to be abandoned today, EN 59.
OBJECT OF PROPHETIC KNOWLEDGE:

Everything divine and human, but most especially things which
are hidden from natural knowledge, and particularly the contingent
futures, q. 171, a. 3.
Not only supernatural truths, but also natural ones, q. 173, a. 2.
q. 174, a. 2, ad 3; a. 3.
PAUL (st.):

Caught up to the third heaven, he saw the divine essence, q. 175, a. 3.
This opinion, which St. Thomas adopted from St. Augustine, is no
longer held today, EN 59.
In his rapture he was transported, but his soul was not completely
separated from his body, even though he himself suspected that
this had happened, according to the opinion of St. Augustine, q. 175,
a. 4, 5, and 6; EN 69.
Was favored, along with the other Apostles, with the gift of tongues,
q. 176, a. i, ad x.
181

peter (st.):

Was carried out of himself by an imaginative vision, q. 175, a. 3, ad 1.
Had the gift of miracles, even without the necessity of previous
prayer, q. 178, a. 1, ad 1.
prophecy:

A social charism which has for its purpose to instruct the human
race in " everything necessary for salvation, " q. 172, a. 1, ad 4;
EN 10; pp. 61-62.
Is principally concerned with knowledge and involves speech or
action only concomitantly, q. 171, a. 1 ; q. 173, a. 4.
Discloses to the mind truths which either necessarily or by reason
of circumstances, surpass its natural ability for understanding,
q. 171, a. 3; pp. 63-64.
Is not granted as a habitual state, q. 171, a. 2; pp. 75, 78.
The prophet is not necessarily aware of it, q. 171, a. 5; q. 173, a. 4;
PP- 72-74Discloses only partial truths, q. 171, a. 4; q. 173, a. 4; pp. 74-75,78.
Cannot be false, q. 171, a. 6.
True prophecy always has God for its author, even if it is given
through the intermediary of angels or of demons, q. 172, a. I, 2, and 5.
Does not enable the recipient to see the divine essence, q. 171, a. 2;
q. 173, a. I ; q. 174, a. 5.
Necessarily involves the granting of a supernatural light; may
also involve the infusion of new representations, q. 173, a. 2 ; EN 35 ;
pp. 64-68.
Reveals not only supernatural truths, but also natural ones, q. 173,
a. 2; q. 174, a. 2, ad 3; a. 3.
Is most especially concerned with the announcement of future
events, q. 171, a. 3.
Most properly takes the form of imaginative visions, but can also
be communicated by sensible or intellectual visions, q. 173, a. 2:
q. 174, a. 2 and 3.
Tradition has made a distinction between prophecies of threat,
of foreknowledge, and of predestination, q. 174, a. 1 ; EN 40.
Prophecy is found neither among the angels, nor the blessed, nor
even, absolutely speaking, in Christ, q. 174, a. 5.
It has varied in the course of time, according to the particular stage
in the progress of divine revelation, q. 174, a. 6.
rapture:

I?

1
t

9

An elevation of the soul toward supernatural realities, accomplished
by the Spirit of God and accompanied by transport, q. 175, a, 1.
Involves both cognitive and affective powers, q. 175, a. 2.
Moses and St. Paul, in their raptures, saw the divine essence,
q. 174, a. 5, ad 1; q. 175, a. 3; cf. moses, paul (st.).
182

REPRESENTATIONS (SPECIES):

Prophecy normally, but not necessarily, involves the infusion or
supernatural rearrangement of new representations, whether these
be sensory, imaginative, or intelligible, q. 173, a. 2; EN 35; pp. 64-65.
Prophecy which enables its recipient to form supernatural judgments
about naturally acquired truths is still prophecy, though of an
inferior sort, q. 174, a. 2, ad 3; a. 3; pp. 65-68.
revelation:
Divine revelation is a genus the perfection of which is found only
in heaven, and of which prophecy is an imperfect species, q. 171, a. 4,
ad 2; EN 14; p. 74.
It has developed in the course of time, q. 174, a. 6.
Divine revelation closed with the end of the apostolic age; private
revelations do not have the same social character and must submit
to control, q. 174, a. 6, ad 3; EN 56.
Revelation enables the recipient to perceive divine realities; it
is prepared for by an elevation of the mind or inspiration, q. 171,
a. I, ad 4: EN 5.
In modem usage, which is not the terminology of St. Thomas, this
term is reserved for the case where the prophet receives infused
supernatural representations, pp. 68-72.
Not everything in the Bible is revealed, but everything in it is
inspired, pp. 91-100, 111-12, 127-29.

Samuel:
Summoned by Saul, his soul prophesied the latter’s impending
death, q. 174, a. 5, ad 4; EN 52.
scripture:
Is inspired by God in all its parts, not only with regard to the
thoughts, but also the words; this must be understood analogously
and with a certain flexibility, pp. 91-92, 121-23, 127-29.
God is principal author; the hagiographer is also an author, pp. 98-100.
senses of scripture:

The primary sense is the primary object of scriptural inspiration;
it is found everywhere and serves as the basis for all the other senses,
pp· 147-49.153-54·
There is only one primary sense properly so called; the plurality
of which St. Augustine and St. Thomas spoke refers rather to
secondary, adapted senses, pp. 148-49, 152, note x.
The secondary senses, “ fuller " and " typical, " are truly scriptural
senses, even though their human author was not aware of them,
pp. 149-51·
The " consequent " and ** accommodated *' senses are not properly
scriptural, p. 152.
183

sibyls:

Made many true predictions concerning Christ, under the influence
of divine inspiration, q. 172, a. 6, ad 1.
species:
See REPRESENTATIONS, VISIONS, LIGHT.
TONGUES, GIFT OF:

The normal complement of the gift of prophecy, q. 176, a. 2, ad 1.
Inferior to the gift of prophecy both by reason of its nature as well
as of its object and its end, q. 176, a. 2.
Unlike prophecy, this gift could be possessed habitually and in its
perfection, q. 176, a. 2, ad 3.
The Apostles and the first disciples of Christ were thereby able
adequately to express themselves in every language, q. 176, a. 1.
To be distinguished from simple “ glossolalia, " EN 72.
transport:
Is absolutely required only if the prophet receives infused images,
q. 173, a. 3 ; EN 39.
Disposes the soul more readily to perceive the influence of spiritual
substances, q. 172, a. 1, ad 1.
Is one of the characteristics of rapture, q. 175, a. 1.
truth or falsity:
See INERRANCY, CONTINGENT FUTURES, DEMONS.
visions:

The prophet does not see things in the divine essence, but only
in created likenesses, q. 173, a. 1.
Prophetic visions can be of the intelligible, imaginative, or sensoiy
order, q. 173, a. 2.
Only imaginative visions require transport, q. 173, a. 3.
Imaginative or sensory visions may come from demons, but not
intellectual ones, q. 172, a. 5, ad 2.
■will:
The will of the inspired subject receives its share of the influence
of inspiration; it is moved efficaciously without ceasing to be free,
pp. 120-21.
■words, gift of:
The normal accompaniment of the charism of prophecy, q. 171, a. 1.
Enables the recipient to speak effectively, so as to instruct, please,
and move his listeners, q. 177, a. 1.
Can be called the " word of wisdom " and the " word of knowledge, ’’
but not the " word of faith, " q. 177, a. 1, ad 4.
Can be granted to women to address only private groups, not the
public assemblies of the Church, q. 177, a. 2.
184

.

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OUTLINE
FOREWORD . . . . ....................................
ABBREVIATIONS
................
PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH EDITION
............
., ,.
PART I : EXPLANATORY NOTES...........................
PART II : NOTES ON THOMISTIC DOCTRINE

J

7

7
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13
*5

...............

A. The Gift of Prophecy according to St. Thomas.. ...... 61
1. A Social Charism of Knowledge
..............................
61
2. It Discloses Hidden Truths
.. ..............................
63
3. Lumen and Species
.......................
64
4. Lumen without Species
............................................. 65
5. Inspiration and Revelation
.....................................
68
A) Revelation ......................................
69
B) Inspiration........................................................... 7°
6. The Prophet’s Awareness of His Gift
.......................
72
7. Perfections and Defects
............................................. 74
8. The Instrumental Character of Prophetic Knowledge .. 77
B. Scriptural Inspiration
.............................
84
1. The Existence of Scriptural Inspiration.......................
84
A) The Existence of Inspired Books..............................
84
B) The Criterion of Scriptural Inspiration
.. .. .. 86
2. The Nature of Inspiration
.....................................
88
A) False Notions
.................................................... 88
B) Decisions of the Church’s Magisterium
................
89
C) Cardinal Fxanzelin’s Opinion
..............................
91
D) Principles of a Thomistic Solution .......................
93
1) The Sacred Author as God’s “ Instrument
. 94
2) The Divine Concurrence in the Thought of the
Inspired Author .. .....................................
95
3) The Bible as the Work of Two Authors—A Divine
and Human Book .....................................
98
4) The Question of Method
.................................. 100
E) The Speculative and Practical Judgments—Prophetic
and Scriptural Inspiration .. .... .. .. .. 103
1) The Speculative and Practical Judgments .. .. 103
2) The Prophet and the Sacred Writer .. .. .. 105
3) Revelation. Cognitive Inspiration, and Scriptural
Inspiration....................................
.... 109
4) The Error by Excess .. .. .. .. .. .. iix
185

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Œ S S S S S a E H e e æ B H fc ·

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5) The Error by Defect .. .................................... 114
6) The Correct Solution .......................................... 116
7) The Sacred Writer as an Instrument in the
Strict Sense
.................................................. 118
3. The Extent of Inspiration
...........................................119
A) Inspiration Extends to all the Faculties of the
Sacred Writer
........................
119
1) Influence on the Will
.. .. .....................120
2) Influence on the Executive Faculties .. .. 121
. B) Inspiration Extends to All Who Took Part in the
Composition of the Book
................. .. .. 123
C) Inspiration Extends to the Entire Content of Holy
Scripture.......................... . .. .. .. 127
4. Inerrancy
......................................
I32
A) A Result of Inspiration
.................
132
B) Factors Which Determine the Truth of a Judgment 133
1) The Formal Object of the Judgment '... .. 134
2) The Quality of the Assent Given to the
Judgment by the Person Who Makes It .. 134
3) The Reason for the Communication of the
Judgment
............................... .. .. i35
C) Application of these Factors to Inspired Judgments 136
D) Role of the Practical Judgment in Inspired Judg­
ments
.. .......................................................... 142
E) The Theory of " Relative Truth ” .................' .. 143
5. Exegesis and Biblical Criticism
.. .... .... 145
A) Textual Criticism
.. ............................... .. 145
B) Literary Criticism
.. ....................................
147
. 1) The Primary Sense ........................................... 147
. 2) Secondary Senses
.................
149
3) The Fuller and Typical Senses............................ 150
4) Consequent and Accommodated Senses .. .. 152
5) The Value and Use of the Different Senses .. X53
6) Ecclesiastical Directives ...... .. .. 154
C) Historical Criticism .. .. .. .. ..................... 155
1) The Theory of " Implicit Citations *’ .. .. 156
2) The Theory of "■ Historical Appearances ” .. 157
3) The Theory of " Literary Types " .. .. .. 159
4) The Position of the Church
.. ...... 162
D) Rational Exegesis and the Rule of Faith .. .. .. 163
appendix
.. .. · · · ·
· · · ........................ .... 169
BIBLIOGRAPHY
.... ........
......... .. .. .. 171
ANALYTICAL INDEX

..

..

..

..

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..

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