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of the principle of Anselm as it is outlined in the fourth and
fifth forms. It is not an expression of thought which ends with
the mere understanding of it. Rather, it is a constant spur to
the student of Marian theology. The axiom has been an active
force which eventually carried the theology of the Church to
a position where it became clear that Mary’s privilege of being
immaculately conceived was contained in the deposit of Faith
Again, in the question of the doctrine of the Assumption, th
principle has played its part, is still effective, and if this doc­
trine is defined in the future, it will have helped in this triumph
for Mary. So too, it will have its deserved place and contribute
its mighty force in the discussion of the Marian theses which are
yet more fully to be worked out—her queenship, her interces­
sion, her place in the Mystical Body of Christ, and the complete
theology contained in the Eve-Mary contrast. Nor need theo­
logians fear the heights to which their studies may guide their.
In tradition the place of Mary under God is clear; but it re­
mains to investigate fully how near God the Queen of Heaven
is. She is on a plane immensely lifted above that of other men—
indeed so far above us is Our Lady that our eyes will ever neec
to look up even when we arrive at the last station to which
theological journeying will carry us.

Γ
SAINT THOMAS AND THE ULTIMATE
PURPOSE OF CREATION
PHILIP J. DONNELLY, S.J.
Weston College
Weston, Mass.

OGMATIC theology treats many truths of momentous
import, but there is not one of more fundamental importance than the question of the ultimate purpose or end of
creation. For if the end holds the primacy among all causes
and if, from it, all other causes depend for the exercise of
their causality,1 then there can be no theological doctrine deal­
ing with the relations of creatures to God, whose objective
truth is not dependent ultimately on the first of all causes,
which is the ultimate end of creation. This truth is not
merely basic in dogmatic theology but also constitutes the neces­
sary foundation of Christian morality and of all asceticism that
is not chimerical.
However, in common with similar problems concerning the
relations of the finite to the infinite, this question, simple
though it must necessarily be in its objective reality, contains
many obscurities for the human intellect; and these inherent
obscurities of thought can be multiplied easily by the very
terminology intended to clarify them; a fact that will be
conceded by anyone acquainted with the common terminology
of modern dogmatic manuals and with the extraordinary diffi­
culties of students in comprehending the doctrine so proposed.
The ordinary exposition of the purpose of creation in many
modem manuals is based almost exclusively on the doctrine of
Leonard Lessius? Summarily, it is proposed as follows: God’s
extrinsic glory is the absolutely last end of creation, the supreme
end, the ultimate finis-qui. Finis-qui is defined as bonum
ipsum quod appetitur vel intenditur. The ultimate end is de­
fined as finis in quo ultimo sistit intentio agentis. The finis-cui

D

lCa*tre Gent. ΙΠ, It.

!Dr Perfection ibni Moribrnquc Drvmis, Lib. xiv, cc. 1, 3.

54

w

i

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ultimus of creation is God Himself and the finis-cui is defined
as the subject or person for whom the finis-qui is intended; in
addition most modern authors define finis-quo but do not apply
it to the last end of creation; simultaneously with the above
explanation and application of terminology, the same authors
maintain that no created goodness could have been a motive
determining God’s creative act and, consequently, that God’s
intrinsic perfection is in no way changed by creation and is in
no way intrinsically affected by His extrinsic glory.’
Now this method of explaining the Catholic doctrine on the
last end of creation has been criticized severely by two out­
standing theologians of the present generation. In the opinion
of the first, the Reverend Johann Stuffier, S.J., the affirmation
of so many modern theologians that the absolutely ultimate
end of creation, the finis-qui operis, is not God Himself, but
rather a created good, namely, His extrinsic glory, is entirely
untenable. The same author furthermore states that only by
a noteworthy lack of logic can modern authors of manuals
place the finis-qui operis in a finite entity such as extrinsic
glory, since they admit in agreement with Saint Thomas that
the Divine goodness is the sole ratio creandi and that God can
only intend created things (and consequently His extrinsic
glory which is finite) inasmuch as they are images of His in­
finite goodness.1
*4
Cardinal Billot was equally severe in his strictures of the
terminology and method of exposition which would place
the finis-qui in extrinsic glory. Of this method he states:
"Indeed this first way (of understanding the problem) cannot
even be considered. For thus the glory which is derived from
creatures would be a means of God’s enrichment; it would
be God’s purpose precisely as it is the purpose of worldly
men who place their highest good in extrinsic glory and oi
whom it is truly said that if, perchance, they receive the re1The following authors may be consulted in their treatises, De Deo Crera/e; Berazi
Boyer, Huarxe, Mazella, Otten, Stentrup; confer also Pinard de la Boullaye, in Diet, it
TbioL Ctib. m (2), sect, vii, colL 2165-2167, 2191.
♦Zeitschrift fûr katholische Théologie, 1917, pp. 698-699.

Aquinas

on the

Purpose of Creation

55

ward sought for, they receive it in vain; whom Sacred Scrip­
ture chides and the unerring authority of the Saints reprehends,
blaming them likewise for those actions which they perform
and are otherwise excellent, generous and just, unless they be
done for an end that is truly good and not for the windiness
of human praise. Moreover, this method makes the goodness
of human praise the finis-qui, intended by God, while God
Himself would be nought but the finis-cui, namely, the sub­
ject for which God would will this glory, i. e., for Himself.
And what else is this than to place in God love of concupis­
cence, to make Him greedy for His glory, despite the fact
that Augustine says and says it most truly, most certainly and
most evidently, ’by so much is each man more like God, by
the degree in which he is freed from the desire of glory.’
Finally, nothing is more manifest than what Saint Thomas has
in I, II, Q. 2, a. 3, where, showing that it is impossible for the
good of man to consist in fame or glory from creatures, he
says: 'The object known is in different wise proportioned to
Divine and human knowledge. Whence the perfection of
human good, which is called beatitude, cannot be caused by
human recognition, but rather human recognition of the be­
atitude of another proceeds from and is in some way caused
by beatitude itself, either inchoative or complete.’ Thus far
the Angelic Doctor, excluding the goodness of fame or glory
from a true good of man, and rightly. How much less there­
fore will the good which God has as the end of all His works
consist in such glory?’” These lines sum up the objections
against the terminology of Lessius’ followers.
The basic difficulty with the terminology so strongly re­
jected by Stuffier and Billot is its logical implication that, if the
principal and ultimate intention of God’s creative will is some­
thing finite (extrinsic glory as the finis-qui ultimus), then the
ratio creandi or finis operantis, which motivated and deter­
mined the creative act, was something distinct from God’s in­
finite goodness. This apparently unavoidable logical impli5 Dr Deo Uw et Trino, (1926) p. 249.

S6

Theological Studies

cation is, of course, openly inconsistent with the affirmati®
of all theologians that the finis operantis cannot possibly be
finite or in any way really distinct from God.’ For it is cler
that the absolutely last end of creatures, whose existence, nature
and every action are principally due to the efficient activity
of God, the First Cause of all things, must be identical vic
His finis operantis, that is, His infinite goodness, which con­
sequently must be considered to be the sole sufficient reason
of the creative act and at the same time the unique ultimo '
end or first final cause of everything finite, including of cows
the operations of creatures, in which extrinsic glory conss
principally. Nor is the difficulty with this terminology solve:
as simply as some would imply, by insisting that, althouc
something finite is the ultimate finis-qui of creatures (and, :
logical implication, of the creative act itself), neverthels
God Himself is the ultimate finis-cui for Whom extrinsic glc<
is intended; for no entity whatsoever is a true finis excer
inasmuch as its own intrinsic goodness exercises final causalir
Hence, since the absolutely last finis-qui is placed in soffit
thing finite and since nothing finite can in any way affect Gal
intrinsic goodness, then, if God be the last end of creation on·
inasmuch as He is the finis-cui, that is, the subject for whe:
extrinsic glory is intended, it is very difficult to see how Get
is in any way intrinsically and really the last end and first catf
of all things.
Now there can be no doubt that all Catholic theologiae
no matter what terminology or method of exposition they for
low, must and do hold that God Himself, in His own intrins.·
and infinite goodness, is, by no means metaphorically, but, *
a most real and true sense, the absolutely last end and the fii
final cause of all finite being. For this truth is too dearb
contained in revelation to admit of denial. ' On the other hai>
it would be open heresy to deny that the world was creati

Aquinas on the Purpose of Creation

57

for the glory of God,8 which all theologians understand as
extrinsic glory, namely the finite manifestation of God’s in­
trinsic perfection and the finite communication of His intrinsic
goodness.
It is however equally clear that extrinsic glory, as a finite
entity, cannot be the absolutely last end of creatures, since it is
itself a creature, and hence is caused ultimately by God whose
intrinsic goodness is the final cause of all things. Conse­
quently, though the terminology used so commonly seems in­
adequate to explain the fulness of Catholic doctrine, this by no
means implies that the authors who make use if it are guilty of
theological error, though they may, it seems, be rightly charged
with logical inconsistency. This inconsistency, as already
noted, seems due in large part, to a literal following of Lessius
and a corresponding neglect of Saint Thomas. Now it is a
rather startling fact that Lessius, in his entire treatment of
the last end of creation, never cites or follows either Saint
Thomas or Suarez, both of whom treated the question fully
and with precisely the same terminology, which leaves no room
for ambiguity and embraces adequately all the data of revela­
tion and sound philosophy.
Consequently, the scope of this article is to propose syste­
matically the doctrine and terminology of Saint Thomas and
to indicate briefly Suarez’ complete conformity. This mere
exposition, with short comments will suffice, it is hoped, to
show how much modern theologians have lost in clarity and
effectiveness, by practically deserting these two recognized
masters for the more subjective and anthropomorphic presen­
tation of Lessius. In other articles, it may be possible to show
in greater detail the logical inconsistency of the treatment based
on Lessius and the conformity of Saint Thomas and Suarez
with the doctrine proposed in the Councils of Cologne and
the Vatican.
•"Eadem sancta Ecclesia tenet et docet, Deum, rerum omnium principium et finem,

•Confer decree of the Council of Cologne, Collectio Locensn, Vol. V, coL 291.

"Ego Alpha et Omega, principium et fini», dicit Dominus Deus; qui est et qui tr*
et qui Tenturus est, omnipotens.” (Apoc. 1, I). The traditional exegesis of this text suststf
the these on fait.

natural: humanae rationis lumine e rebus creatis certo cognosci posse.” Concilium Vatica­
num, Sen. ΙΠ, cap. 2 (DB. 17SS). Confer also the third iftcButn in the ith Canon (DB.
1I9T): **Si quis aut mundum ad Dei gloriam conditum esse negaverit, A.S.”

58

Theological Studies

Finis Operis

et

Operantis

of

Aquinas on the Purpose of Creation

Creation

According to Saint Thomas, the finis operantis is that whic
an agent principally intends.9 Then in the same place, apply­
ing this definition to God’s creative activity, he continue
“Whence—also in the case of God operating, the end of Hi
action must be considered, which is the goodness of God:’
Himself.”10 The perfect agreement of this definition and application of Saint Thomas with the definition and applicatio:
of the Council of Cologne, whose dogmatic value is very hig:
because of the unrestricted approbation of the Holy See,"
evident from a cursory reading of the latter: “If the *···
operantis, or that which impelled God to create, be sought,:
should be stated that nothing which is distinct from God cou.:
have impelled Him, since, being self-sufficient, He could inten:
nothing for Himself. Since, however, it is clear that God c:
create and that, whatever He effects, He does it out of love c:
His absolute goodness, we rightly maintain that God wt
moved by His goodness freely to create the world. Moreovt'
in this same sense Saint Augustine said: ’Because He is gowe exist’.”11
Saint Thomas never deviated from this definition of R
operantis, but rather, in his later works develops more cor
pletely the notion of voliti principalis. "The principal obje.
desired is for everyone the cause of volition. For, when*
say: 'I wish to walk for health’s sake’, we are conscious
assigning a cause, and if it be asked: 'Why do you wish fc
health?’ we proceed in the designation of causes until we retf
the ultimate purpose which is the object principally intend
which in itself is the cause of volition.”13 This is the fa
operantis according to Saint Thomas’ definition.
This passage shows clearly that Saint Thomas identifies r
volitum principale, the finis iilthnus intentus and the finis C

59

erantis. This identity is made even clearer by the following
citation: "Furthermore, for every person making an act of
volition, the object principally intended is his last end; for the
end is per se intended and that on account of which all other
things are intended. The ultimate end, however, is God Him­
self, because He is the highest good. He therefore is the prin­
cipal object of His will.”14
From this citation, it is clear that God Himself intrinsically,
and not something finite and totally extrinsic to Him, is at
one and the same time the finis operantis and the ultimate end
of all things finite which are intended by Him in the creative
act. Certainly, no one could maintain that in this text Saint
Thomas teaches that the last end of creatures is indeed some
Divine good, but a good that is not intrinsic to and identified
with the Divinity—a doctrine not uncommonly proposed in
theological and philosophical manuals.15
If therefore the intrinsic goodness of God is the unique prin­
cipale volitum, it follows that absolutely nothing outside of
God can possibly be His finis operantis. This is a truth which
Saint Thomas proves many times from a further analysis of the
volitum principale. “The object of an appetite is proportioned
to the appetite as the object moving is proportioned to the sub­
ject that is moved; and likewise is the object willed propor­
tioned to the will, since the will belongs to the genus of ap­
petitive potencies. If therefore there be any other principal
object of the Divine will than the very goodness of God, it will
follow that there is something superior to the Divine will which
moves it.”1’
The absolute and supreme unicity of God’s finis op­
erantis in no way conflicts logically with the concept of
creation, as if God could not intend beings outside of Himself
unless they were in some way His finis operantis, for this is a
uIb»d. cap. 4.

•II Sent., d. 1, q. 2, a. I.

l5Confer. Ferd. Stentrup, S.J., Tractains de Deo Uno et Trino, (Oeniponte, 189J),

l*Loc. rit.

ρ. 2ίβ, Thesis LXX: "Supremus creationis finis aliquo bono ipsius Dei, non tamen interno

ilCollectk> Lecenat, VoL V, col. 266-270.

sed externo, externa scilicet divinae gloriae manifestatione, continetur.”

liIbid. cd. »1.
Grw/. I. 74, J.

’’Coefr* Gent. 1, 74, 1.

Aquinas on the Purpose of Creation

Theological Studies

60

61

stituted by its appetibility, which is the end, which, moreover,
false and undemonstrable concept of creation; but it does im­
moves the agent to act. Wherefore goodness is said to be dif­
ply, on the contrary, that the finis operantis is the entire an:
fusive of itself. But this diffusion is found in God; therefore
sole sufficient reason for that intention of the Divine will whir
God is truly good.”19
terminates in finite being. "It must be stated that in ώκ
Hence the intrinsic goodness of God moves His
things which we will on account of an end, the entire reasc:
will to create, precisely inasmuch as it is difiusivum sui and
for so willing is the end. And this is supremely clear in ths
therefore it is not only God’s unique finis operantis, but is also
things which we will solely on account of the end. Hen;,
the unique ultimate end and first cause of all creatures, since
since God does not will things other than Himself excepte
according to St. Thomas: "It must be said that goodness is
account of the end which is His goodness, it does not follow th
called diffusive of itself in the precise way in which the finis
something other than His goodness moves His will.... It mu
is said to move and thus the axiom: 'because God is good, we
be said that from the fact that Divine goodness is suffice
exist’ is to be referred to the final cause.”20 The objection
unto the Divine will, it does not follow that God wills nothin:
maintained that the axiom referred to the efficient cause.
else, but that He wills nothing else except by reason of HAre we, however, to understand the intrinsic goodness of
goodness.”1T
God, which is simultaneously and uniquely the finis operantis
It is scarcely necessary to add that the volitum prim­
and supreme last end of creation, as the ontological, Le., essential
pale, which according to Saint Thomas, moves God to vgoodness of God or His moral goodness i.e. the virtue of bene­
creatures and is the sole reason why He intends finite beinn
ficence? Saint Thomas replies unequivocally that we should
is not to be understood as a strict cause, but rather as the unk>
understand it as the essential goodness of God: "Every good
sufficient reason of the creative will and only mentally disti.n
which is not its own goodness is said to be good only by par­
from it. "Whence, since the will of God is His essence, it is
ticipation; but that which is predicated by participation pre­
moved by another, but by Itself alone ; after that fashion fc
supposes an anterior being from which it receives its goodness.
which intellection and volition are called motion; and *
But this process cannot be infinite, because there is no infinite
cordingly Plato said that the Prime Mover moves Himself·
process in final causes. ... We must therefore arrive at some
Thus far we have seen that St. Thomas maintains that ώ
first good which is not merely good by participation in sub­
intrinsic and, therefore, infinite goodness of God is the unk
ordination to something else, but which is, by its very essence,
finis operantis of the creative act. We are now in a positions
good. This being, however, is God.”21
show more intimately and precisely what he understood by
From these last three citations, Saint Thomas so obviously
intrinsic goodness of God and how it is identified with Γidentifies, in the intrinsic, essential and infinite goodness of God,
absolutely ultimate finis operis. "The communication of en:the finis operantis, the supreme end of creatures and the first
and goodness proceeds from goodness; a fact which is cb
final cause of all finite being, that it is not a little strange how
both from the very nature of goodness and from its inteà;
so many modern authors can profess their adherence to the
bility. For according to its nature, every being’s good is ·Angelic Doctor and, at the same time, assert that the supreme
act [existence] and perfection. Moreover every being acts pfr
cisely because it exists. By acting, it diffuses being and g*·:
“Conir* Gnt. 1, 37, 4.
Tbeol. I, q. J, ». 4, ad 2.
ness into other beings. The intelligibility of goodness is c&17
18
nCoeto G«rf. 1, 38, 2.

17Sm«>w< Tirol- I, Q· 19, i. 2, id 2, id 3.
18Ibid- sd 3.

IP

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or absolutely ultimate purpose of all things, principally in­
tended by God in creating, is His extrinsic glory, which, »
evidently, is a good only in virtue of its participation in the
Divine goodness itself.
How then does God’s goodness, as the sole sufficient reason
or finis operantis of creation, move the Divine will? Saint
Thomas replies that the creative will is moved by God’s good­
ness as it is apprehended intellectually by Him: "The will s
moved to act by some apprehension (cognition) ; for, gooc
apprehended is the object of the will. Hence every agent mus
act accordingly as it possesses a similitude of its effect. But in
every voluntary agent as such, there exists a similitude of the
effect according to the apprehension of the intellect.””
This Divine apprehension, therefore, inasmuch as it is identi­
fied with God’s essential perfection, is the Divine goodnes
apprehended: inasmuch as it is a similtude of every creature,
actual or possible, it is called an idea. Whence is this ida
derived? Saint Thomas replies: "Whoever knows an object per­
fectly, knows everything that is in it. But God knows Himse?.
perfectly. Therefore, He knows all things which are in Him­
self according to His active potency. But all things according
to their proper forms are in Him with respect to His active
potency, since He is the first principle of all being. Therefor?
He has a proper knowledge of all things. Whoever knows as'
nature, knows whether that nature is communicable. But th
Divine nature is communicable through similitude. God there­
fore knows in how many ways something similar to His essena
can exist. God therefore has knowledge of things according ®
their proper forms.”13
Inasmuch, however, as "God, in His essence, is the similitui
of all things, whence an idea in God is nothing else but lb
essence”,24 it follows that we must not attribute to God ide
entitatively distinct from each other. Nevertheless we are jus-

Aquinas on the Purpose of Creation

63

tified in predicating a certain multiplicity of ideas in God with
respect to creatures. Furthermore, the fundament of such a
predication is not derived from creatures; for according to
Saint Thomas: "It must be said that these varying respects,
according to which Divine ideas are multiplied, are not caused
by finite beings, but by the Divine intellect comparing its own
essence with them (creatures).””
Furthermore, "these respects which multiply ideas are not in
created things, but are in God; they are not, however, real rela­
tions such as those by which the persons are distinguished, but
they are relations comprehended by God.”2’
From this doctrine on Divine ideas Saint Thomas proves that
God, that is, the ideas themselves which are identified with His
essence, is the exemplary cause of all finite beings: "There
must be in the Divine wisdom species of all things, that is, ex­
emplary forms existing in the Divine mind. And these, though
multiplied with respect to created beings, are nevertheless not
really distinct from the Divine essence, inasmuch as its simili­
tude can be variously participated by finite beings. Thus, there­
fore, God Himself is the first exemplar of all things.””
In answering the difficulty that, since every effect of an ex­
emplary cause must be a similitude of its exemplar and since
no creature can bear a similitude to God, therefore God cannot
be an exemplary cause, Saint Thomas replies: "It must be stated
that although creatures do not arrive at a similitude with God
according to His nature by a specific similitude, nevertheless
they do attain to His similitude according to the representation
of the form apprehended by God.”“
But, as we have seen, this form apprehended by God is in no
wise derived from creatures; rather it is identified with His in­
trinsic goodness as known by the Divine intellect; it is therefore
really identified with God’s finis operantis and with the ab­
solutely last end of all creatures.
Tbeol. I. q. U, a. 2, ad J.

i3Coittra Gmt. 2, 24, 1.

•ftii. »d 4.

-^Contre Gmt. 1, $0, 7-1.
Theol. I, q. S, ». 4, ad 2.

•ftid- ad I.

TbttA. I, q. 44, a. 5, corp.

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In addition, Saint Thomas gives a penetrating and exhaustive
analysis of what is required that the Divine ideas, to which each
creature is perfectly assimilated by way of finite representa­
tion, be truly an exemplary cause: "It is to be noted that some­
thing may imitate a form in two ways. First by the intention
of the efficient cause, as a picture is produced by a painter
precisely that it may imitate him whose figure is reproduced
sometimes, however, the imitation is accidental, fortuitous an:
quite removed from any intention. But that which imitates :
form by chance cannot be said to be formed unto it, for unto
implies finality. We see moreover that one may act on accoun:
of an end in two ways; in the first way, so that the efficient
cause determines the end for himself—sometimes, however, the
end is determined for the agent by another principal efficient
cause as in the motion of an arrow.... If, therefore, somethin:
be produced in imitation of another by an agent which doe
not determine its own end, the form imitated will not posses
the attribute of an exemplar or an idea. For we do not say tha:
the form of a man who generates is the exemplar or idea of the
man generated, but we say this only when the agent acting on
account of an end determines the end, whether the form in
question be within or without the agent. This, therefore, is the
proper notion of an idea that it be a form which something
imitates because of the intention of an agent who determine
for himself the end. Accordingly, it is clear that in the opini»
of those who assume that all beings proceed from God by »
natural necessity, Divine ideas cannot be postulated, because be­
ings which act from a necessity of nature do not determine for
themselves the end. But this cannot be, for in the case of eve*
being which acts for a purpose, if it does not determine the esfor itself, then the end must be determined by some super»*
being; and thus there is some cause superior to the agent; which
cannot be, because all who speak of God, understand Him to be
the first cause of all being.. .. But, because an exemplary forte
or idea possesses in a certain way the attribute of finis and be­
cause from it the artificer receives the form by which he acts

Aquinas on the Purpose of Creation

65

if it be extrinsic to him; because moreover it is not proper to
postulate that God acts on account of an end other than Him­
self and thus receives extraneously what is required for acting,
therefore, we cannot place ideas outside of God, but in the
Divine mind alone.”29
Therefore, according to the doctrine of Saint Thomas on
exemplary cause, every creature arrives, by way of finite par­
ticipation, at a perfect imitation or representation of the Divine
ideas. These Divine ideas are identified with the goodness of
God intellectually apprehended by Him as communicable in
vary ing degrees by finite communication. The goodness of God
thus apprehended is, at one and the same time, God’s finis op­
erantis and the first final cause or absolutely last end of all
creatures. We conclude with Saint Thomas, therefore, that the
‘i’Mi operantis is absolutely unique, namely, the intrinsic good­
ness of God inasmuch as it is communicable, even if God had
freely chosen never to create; it is the principal object intended
r y the Divine will in creation, because of which alone God free­
ly intends those beings which He actually creates, and hence it
done is the unique absolute and ultimate end and the first final
cause of everything finite without exception: "It must be stated
that all beings intend God as their end, in intending whatsoever
zood, whether by intellectual, sensible or natural appetite; for
nothing has the attribute of the good, except in as much as it
participates in the similitude of God.”30 The similitude, as we
have seen, in the citation from the Summa, Part I, q. 5, a. 4,
ad 2um, is identified with the essence of God.
That the doctrine of Saint Thomas was held completely and
identically by Suarez, is evident from the following citation:
For any agent, the supreme end is that which constitutes for
him the best and highest good; but for the First Agent, nothing
except His own intrinsic goodness, is the greatest and highest
zood; therefore nothing can be the last end of His actions and
effects, except Himself, by reason of His own goodness. FurVtriMe,
», a. 1.
Tbetjl. L φ 44, a. 1, ad J.

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Aquinas on the Purpose of Creation

thermore, because the concept of final cause is perfect anc
in itself pertains to unmixed perfection, therefore, it is prop:
to God in the highest degree of perfection and because, since
goodness is the reason of final causality and God is the higher
good, it is necessary that He possess in the highest degree ώ
attribute and perfection of final cause. . . . Finally the axior.
that the order of ends is according to the order of efficien:
causes, is here pertinent. For the more perfect and universi!
the agent, the more perfect and universal is the end which be
intends. But God is the most perfect and universal agen:
therefore, He intends the most perfect and universal en:
Therefore to the objection previously raised, 1 we answer that
although God does not act on account of Himself, as on accour.
of His own end [that is, final cause in a strict sense of causali?
as opposed to sufficient reason], nevertheless, there can beb:
one supreme end of all things, not because God seeks that end
for His own satiety or that in this end He may possess a sus
ciency of all goods, but, on the contrary, because He ahead'
possesses in Himself all good and the highest perfection, b
which alone He could be moved or attracted to benefit other·
because of Himself. Whence, though it be true that among th
beings created by Him, God orders some unto others as endsor rather, connects all in such a way that all in turn serve ea?
other and in this way, under God, there can be assigned other
universal ends to which each creature, apart from individui·
ends, is ordained by the Creator, and in particular, to the order
and beauty of the universe [ in which the highest degree ot
extrinsic glory is found], nevertheless, absolutely nothing aptf
from God can be called the last end toward which the Divi#
intention or action tends.”35
The superiority of Saint Thomas and of Suarez, in excluding
from God’s creative activity any semblance of acting to acqurand in excluding from creatures any semblance of being eit}g
the finis operantis or the absolutely ultimate finis operis, is
3,The objection was that the last end of all things is the order of the universe in
extrinsic glory, in the highest degree, consists.

i3Mrtapb. Disp. 24, sect. I. (Edit. Berton, Vol. 21, 89J-Î94)

67

from the following citation of Lessius, whom most modern
authors perpetuate: "The end which God intended in the crea­
tion and government of the entire universe must have been
something extrinsic. . . . Although God most freely intends
and most freely produces all being outside of Himself, neverthe­
less, if He wishes to produce something, He must necessarily
will this effect out of a desire and intention of His glory. For
even as He is necessarily the first and most eminent agent, so is
he necessarily the last and most eminent end, for whom all
things are. And hence in every operation ad extra He necessar­
ily intends some good of His own. 33 But there is no conceivable
genus of goods which God can acquire for Himself, except
extrinsic glory, which moreover is the most excellent of external
goods.... It is clear that the end which God ultimately intends
in all His operations ad extra is His own glory. . . . From this
it is evident, how God is the ultimate end for whom all things
exist;14 secondly what is the finis-qui [gloria extrinseca], which
He intends to acquire for Himself; thirdly, in what the glory
of God, for which He produced all things, consists.”35
Finis Operis

of

Creation More Specifically

According to Saint Thomas: “Finis operis is that to which an
effect is ordered by an agent.”3’ He understands, of course an
intrinsic ordination, produced, it is true, by an extrinsic effi­
cient cause, but which consists in a permanent internal ten­
dency or appetite. Hence, as we have already seen generically,
once the finis operantis is known, it is not difficult to find the
absolutely ultimate finis operis in the case of an infinite agent
who implants in his effects an intrinsic appetite for the ultimate
end and is, moreover, the first efficient cause of every action of
his creatures. It is indeed true that the creative will of God, as
33Ths good, according to Saint Thomas and Suarez, is God’s intrinsic goodness, which
, ·.-.«, a* '-he principal object intended, moves God to create.
^’According to Lessius and many modern authors God is the finis-cni mtenditnr gloria

'

ritriastci.
^Dr Prrftctionibns PAoribusqne Divmfa, Herder Edition, (1861) p. J16.
»Π Sr·/. d. 1, q. 2, a. 1.

moved by Hu mtnm* goodntv* mulleetuaily apprehended, »
the Hbcamc uuw of every hru« bong and that all cmum
corwquetxty. *rv peeuve commun* auum of the Divine, atrim* goudnew. it · equally true that, due to the Imutatw .

of human language. the great SchdaeuCK including Smk
Thoma*» senctunn ri prew th*i pruceM by uuog the foflowiq

of equivalent term* regarding (xd i creative activity: aï rw■aMérrf. */ nw*»Ufude*i fowte/ra* ma·*, etc; bet et
muet be moat careful, l«K. understanding thew ex pre» .
merely m thru ordinary ayntactacal une. we interpret theta a

meaning that the pawvc and finite communicatum of Donat
gmidncM. which n eat nm* glory, and not the Divine. mtnau
goodnew «twif. n the «m o>nn/n and the lupreme
o>m
or first final cause oi the world. The modern follower! of U> i
um mually quote only those pawcagw of Saint Thomas wbet
he use* thew cxpmejom and art thu» convinced that they in
of one mind with the Angel* Doctor. However, that meh »
interpretation of he mind i· clearly erroneous, Saint Thon»
who « he own best interpreter, demonstrates beyond the p»nbdity of a doubt in the following objection and answer*. *14

The ultimate end of the Divine will is the communicatiofl #

His goodness; for on account of the He produces creature,
namely, that He may communicate His goodness. To 14.
must be stated that the communication of goodness is not dr
Ur/ rm/, but the Divine goodness itself out of whose love Goi
wishes to communicate it; for He does not act on account ot
His goodnew as one who deures what He does not possess, W
as one who wishes to communicate what He poswuev been*
He acts not from a desire of the end. but from love of th
end/**’
It is obvious therefore that, according to Saint Thomas, *
God were to act on account of the finite communication d
His goodness and not on account of His goodness itself as th
supreme end of creation, He would be acting on account of »
good, previously not possessed but to be acquired for Htmsell ,

Therefore, it is to be noted that in the passages, in whid
”0* PefeW* q. }, *. If, sd. 14.

Saint Thomas says that God acu

r*/r* m order to com*

ί

municate His goodness. he by no means en pi xs that the brute
communication ts either the supreme fines ofirrn or m am w

the finis opertnhs, but he wishes eMy to exclude from God
any motive by which He might even teem to be c reatmg. M

to communicate, but to *r^«/rr some gxxdnrm not already Has
from all eternity. Always presupposed in the phrase ·/
munieft is the /irwi itself. that η,

Da wxrf tvdara/aJrw»

ut communicet.
That this is Saint Thomas* mind n clear from the fotU* mg
passage; "Goodness in God implies the notion of fines, in which
there ts the fullest perfection; the end however m»?vc· the <b*

cient cause to act; whence abo the gcxxlnew of (tod, m a certam

fashion, moves Him to operate, not indeed that He may λ /aw/
goodness, but that He may communicate 11» giodnr» to œhm
For, as has been said, God does not act out of doire for an end.

but out of love for the end, when He wishes to communxau
His goodness inasmuch as it is poanblc and proper us accord

with His providence. And therefore, as the end in all opera*

tions is the first principle, so the Divine goodness is the first
principle of the entire commumcatjoc by which God lav-nhe
His perfections on others.

From this passage, it is evident that the Divine intnns*c good­
ness is not only the finis opertnfrs of God. as the efficient tiww
of all creatures, but that the tame Divine goodne·* « the w

preme finis opens or the first final cauw of the mtm fimtr
communication of Hi* goodness

It is true that there are other

texts in which, because of their immediate scope and he* auw
he supposes the complete doctrine to be otherwise kapwn, Samt

Thomas does not assert that the Divine goodness

m

the finit

o perentn and supreme end of creatures but Kaus umply that
God acts because of His goodness to communicate it : “('wod pro­

duced all things unto bang, not from a necessity of Hn nature
but through His intellect and will. There can be no ocher end of

His intellect and will except His goodness, that He may com­
municate it to finite bangs as w evident from the premise*·
**n 5r»i a. 1. e 2. » ■

Wfaw .

* ■

^;18|

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Theological Studies

Despite the fact that the mind of Saint Thomas is so ck
from other passages, Ferrariensis in commenting on the ur.
just cited calls attention to those other passages and is inter,
lest the Angelic Doctor’s clear intention be misinterpreted
"Regarding this proposition, ‘there can be no other ultimate er
of the Divine intellect and will except His goodness, name;
that He may communicate it,’ it must be noticed, as in previ­
ous animadversions regarding the mind of Saint Thomas, tint
this is not to be understood as if the communication itself of t
Divine goodness were the last end of the Divine will; for tie
the communicated similitude and consequently somethin*
created would be God’s purpose; but (it is to be understock
that His goodness is His end, out of whose love He wishes ::
*
*
communicate
it. 9)40

te. i

The same is assorted by the Salmanticenses, who with Sure
and Ferrariensis, are probably the best commentators of Sais:
Thomas on the end of creation; "Creatures cannot be usefu
for God nor unto God. Nor is this disproved, if one were ε
say that creatures have an influx into the manifestation, com
munication or attainment of the Divine goodness and therefore
exercise utility in regard to these. For this is either to be unde
stood of active manifestation and communication, which retto God and is not really distinct from Him, or it is to be urdstood of a passive manifestation and communication which s
not distinct from creatures themselves. If it be understood^
the first (active communication), it is certain that creatur'
can have no influx, since this is something uncreated. Of
second, whatever be said has no bearing on the present disci
sion, because the end for which God loves creatures and th
the relation, derived from an ordination to this end, which .
the formal reason for the termination of God’s love in creatu.*5
is not the passive communication and manifestation of $
goodness and attributes of God, but the uncreated goodness*'
self because of whose love God communicates Himself to cr$

Aquinas on the Purpose of Creation

tures, as the Angelic Doctor well says (De Pot. q. 3, a. 15, ad
14). Hence the formal reason on the part of creatures of
terminating the love of God is not to be derived from any rela­
tion to passive communication, but from their immediate rela­
tion to the Divine goodness which is communicated; and it has
been shown that this relation cannot be one of utility. Further­
more, such a passive manifestation and communication is not
something outside creatures, but is included in them.”11
From this passage we see again that the passive communica­
tion of the Divine goodness is neither the finis operantis nor
the absolutely ultimate finis operis, because such a doctrine
would imply that God created for some goodness to be acquired
for Himself precisely through passive communication, which
would, in this absurd hypothesis, have been the final cause of the
creative will. Hence, such a doctrine logically would lead to the
denial of God’s transcendence, His infinite perfection, His very
Divinity.
Having established one of the cardinal points of Saint
Thomas’ doctrine, let us now see how he further applies what
we have thus far seen, from the precise way in which God is
moved by His intrinsic goodness to the ordination of creatures
unto their end: "The order of ends follow upon the order of
efficient causes. For as the supreme efficient cause moves all
secondary causes, so all the ends of secondary causes must be
ordained to the end of the supreme efficient cause. But the
supreme efficient cause produces the actions of all subordinate
causes, moving them all to their proper actions and consequent­
ly to their ends. Whence it follows that all the ends of secondary
causes are ordained by the first cause to His proper end. The
first efficient cause of all things however is God. But there is no
other end of His will except His goodness, which is Himself.
All things therefore whatsoever, that are produced either im­
mediately by Him or through secondary causes, are ordained
unto God as their end.”43
<'Salx3tke&sa, Csnau Theologicus, Vol. J, <L 2, dub. 5, (p. 82).

of Saint Thotnxs. Vol 14, p. 1*2).

71

72

J

Theological Studies

Hence according to Saint Thomas’ definition of the finis ob­
eris, namely, that to which an effect is ordered by an efficie::
cause, it is clear from the passage just cited that God Him.* :
that is, His intrinsic goodness quae est ipsemet, and not so~:
goodness totally extrinsic to Him is the supreme, unique fiv.
operis of all things; not indeed in the sense that the Dwiat
goodness is increased or perfected by creatures, but in the ma:
perfect sense of finis, namely, that it is the one good from whic
all created good is derived.
The unicity of the supreme finis operis is brought out eve
more clearly by the following citation from the same passage
"From this, it is apparent that all things are ordered unto oa
good as their ultimate end. For if no being tends towards an­
other as its end except inasmuch as the latter is good, it nns
therefore be that good, precisely inasmuch as it is good, is r
end. Therefore that which is the highest good is par excelled
the end of all things. But the highest good is one alone which a
God; all things therefore are ordered, as unto their end, un:
one good which is God.”43
Granted therefore the truth of this citation (and it wouk
seem impossible to disprove it), whoever would place the ®·
preme end of creation in something outside of God, if he pos­
sesses any correct notions of final causality, must logically eitbe
place the summum bonum in something created or adhere tt
some form of pantheism. Moreover from the same chapter jus
cited it is clear that the supreme finis operis is identical withtfc
first final cause and that neither can be placed in anythin;
finite: "The end holds the primacy among all causes and free
the end all other causes derive the exercise of their causale
For the efficient cause does not act except on account of s
end as has been shown. Moreover, by the efficient cause, matï
is reduced into the act of the form; whence matter becoc?
actually the matter of this being, and similarly the form of
thing is derived by the action of the efficient cause and ccfr
sequently from the end. In addition the posterior end is à
«Ibid. 1.

Aquinas on the Purpose of Creation

73

cause why the preceding end is intended as an end ; for a being
is not moved unto a proximate end except because of the ulti­
mate end. Therefore the ultimate end is the first of all causes.
But to be the first of all causes is necessarily proper to the first
being which is God. God therefore is the last end of all things.”44
Saint Thomas now moves on to inquire how God is the end

can be first in causation, though it be last in existence. Such
an end is called technically a finis constituendus or efficiendus
(for example, extrinsic glory, which is an effect of God as
primary, and of creatures, as secondary efficient causes). But
God is in nowise such an end with regard to creatures. Saint
Thomas concludes thus: "God therefore is in this way the end
of creatures, namely, as something to be obtained by each
creature in its own manner.” For, "God is simultaneously the
last end of creatures and the first efficient cause. But an end
constituted by the action of an efficient cause cannot be the
first efficient cause but is rather the effect of the efficient cause.
God cannot therefore be the end of ceatures as something con­
stituted by them, but only as something preexisting to be ob­
tained.”*
From this citation again, all those are refuted who claim that
the supreme finis operis of creatures is anything produced by
creatures, such as their operations or the effect of their finite
operations. For any such finite entity is indeed a manifestation
and communication of the Divine goodness but it is not some­
thing preexisting; it is rather something constituted by the
concurrent action of the first cause and of secondary causes;
it is neither the first cause nor the second cause, but is really
distinct from both; consequently, if it be termed the absolutely
ultimate finis operis of all things, then we must deny that God
is the supreme preexisting end, even as He is the supreme pre­
existing cause of all things.
Ve must conclude therefore with Saint Thomas: "It re­
mains therefore that God is the end of creatures, not as some­
^Contre Gent. 3, IS. 1-Î

74

Theological Studies

thing constituted or produced by creatures [as extrinsic glor·
nor in such wise that something is acquired for Himself free
creatures [again, for example, extrinsic glory], but in this w.
alone that He is acquired by creatures.”4*
For if God were solely the last end of creatures, in the se»
that He acquires for Himself (as the finis-cui) some extrs.·.;
and finite goodness such as extrinsic glory, one of two alter;
tives follows: 1. If He is really transcendent Divinity, then
the above hypothesis He is only metaphorically the last enc
all things, since His intrinsic goodness can in no wise be affecuby anything finite and no being whatsoever is constituted as
true end except by reason of its own intrinsic goodness; 2
such an acquisition of an extrinsic good could constitute G
intrinsically (and not merely anthropomorphically) as a rev­
end of finite beings, He would no longer be a transcendent r.
infinite God, for there would now be a new intrinsic perfect
in Him, not previously existing, which would have its ή»
cause, in the strict sense of cause, in something finite.
Having established the one absolutely ultimate and supncs
finis operis of all creatures, namely, the intrinsic, communica?
goodness of God to be acquired by each creature, we must ac*
investigate in what this finite acquisition of the supreme e*
consists. If, as we have already seen, the goodness of
though communicable even though He had never created, ce
not be communicated actually by identity or even by a speo£
similitude, but only by an imitation or manifestation of tb·'5
intentional and proper forms of the Divine intellect, which a·”
nevertheless, identified with God’s essential and infinite good­
ness, it clearly follows that God ordains His creatures to
acquisition of His goodness by a finite communication which >
altogether deficient and far removed from the infinite reality
the supreme end, which is none the less actually acquired. T»
deficient and limited communication, manifestation or ùjbp
tion of the Divine goodness, which Saint Thomas design*»
with one word, namely, an assimilation to the Divine gorxire»

Aquinas on the Purpose of Creation

nee it is, according to the degree freely determined by Divine
providence, the ultimate intrinsic and finite perfection, by
which each creature according to its nature obtains God the
ibsclutely ultimate end, can be called and is truly the end of
each creature and moreover the ultimate in the order of finite
and created ends: "If every being tends toward a similitude of
Divine goodness as an end; if a being is assimilated to the Divine
goodness with regard to everything that pertains to its own
goodness; if the goodness of a being consists not only in its
existence, but in all things else required for its perfection as
has been shown, then, it is manifest that creatures are ordained
to God as their end, not only according to their substantial bemg, but also according to their accidental perfection and morecr according to their proper operation, which also pertains
to the perfection of a being.”47
It is true that Saint Thomas frequently calls this created
. initiation the last end of creatures, but he must be undertood as intending, not the absolutely last or supreme end, but
rather the attainment or acquisition of the supreme end, for
: he had intended to affirm that the supreme end consisted in a
creature, he would have contradicted all the passages which we
have seen in this section, and especially the place in his De
Γ'-tentu, where he says that "the communication of goodness
a not the last end, but the Divine goodness itself out of whose
iove it is that God wishes to communicate it” (q. 3, a. 15, ad 14,
ct. above 67 ff.) ; for then the finis operantis and the supreme
opens would not be identical; God’s infinite goodness
would not be the supreme final cause of all finite being; more­
rer St. Thomas would then have contradicted what we shall
see immediately in the following section.
Relation

of

Finis-Qui

and

Finis-Quo

Saint Thomas teaches clearly that the unique ultimate finis;·Λί of all things is God Himself, whereas the ultimate finis-quo,
aame.r, the finite attainment of the finis-qui, is neither unique
GeW J, 20. ad

wIW. I.

75

76

Aquinas on the Purpose of Creation

Theological Studies

77

deputation we distinguished a two-fold end, the objective (finor even specifically the same for all creatures: ”Ccnc._-r
and the formal (finis-quo), that God is not the ulti­
although God is the ultimate end of all things, neverS»
mate formal, but rather, the ultimate objective end of creatures.
there is not for men and for other creatures which lack
And the reason is, because the formal end is not the absolutely
the same last end as regards its attainment. It must be str..-,
end, since it is ordained unto the objective. Likewise,
the Philosopher says, that there is a two-fold division ot ··;
though God be the summum bonum, nevertheless,
namely, cuius and quo, that is, the object itself in which r
creatures do not attain this summum bonum except by some
ness is found and the use or attainment of it, for examp e. 2
·, rt : participation; whence the attainment of the summum
say . . . that the finis of a miser is either money as the .h
■■
is always something created. Whence, in passing is
or the possession of money as use. If, therefore, we spe>.
. Ived the objection put above, namely, how such a great
the last end of man with regard to the object, which is th :
met) of beings and natures can be ordained to the same last
thus, all other beings share in the last end of man; for G
end For the reason is that this same and identical last end is
the last end of man and of all other creatures. But if we
n : the
nment itself, but the good attained. Different beof the last end of man, with regard to the attainment :?.<* .
r.p. however, though they have in common the same ultimate
in this end of man irrational creatures do not share. Foe rc
•j. fiîfer in the attainment of it, even as they have the same
and other intelligent beings attain their last end by k"·
: principle, but differ in the mode or degree of their emanaand loving God, which is not proper to other creatures -ten from it.’’1*
obtain the last end, inasmuch as they participate in some >
F urthermore, Suarez asserts explicity that the extrinsic glory
tude of God, accordingly as they exist, or live or posse»
Gcd 5 not a finis-qui, but the finis-quo of creation, a posi­
sort of cognition.’*48
to exactly contrary to that taken by the modern followers
What, therefore, is the relation between the objects'* c*
t Lcsuus: "Thus, therefore, in answer to the difficulty, we
(finis-qui) and the formal end (finis-quo), which in the c#
cKtdc that the glory of God is something outside of Him; for
of the ultimate end of creatures are infinitely distinct one fr*
anrrtnaliy, glory, taken in its proper sense and likewise accord­
the other, both in entity and in goodness? In other words whe
ât to primitive meaning, is a good that is extrinsic to him
is the absolutely ultimate or supreme end? Saint Thomu œ
it a. Nevertheless, God can intend His glory as an end,
wers: "Since, as has been said above (previous citation). Λ
became He does not intend it as a finis-qui but as a finis-quo,
end is sometimes the object [ finis-qui] and sometimes the «
ch not only is not repugnant but is necessary.”31
tainment [ finis-quo] of the object, even as for a miser tbeesi
Therefore, according to both Suarez and Saint Thomas, the
absolutely speaking, the ultimate end is the object itself; fa &

..

ml

s
Ill

■Λ

I

frmi-quf* and the supreme finis operis are identified.
7^2.^

self.”*
Suarez likewise insists that the finis-quo or formal end b
and cannot be the absolutely last end of creatures, since it à χ·

-riioro a absolutely identical and unique, not merely gen•<l;v or even specifically, but numerically, and is God Himλ Ha intrinsic goodness on account of Whom alone created
·> ϋ*«Λ* LÀ ». cap. l. (Lût. Bertoa, VoL 9, p. 512)

78

Theological Studies

Aquinas on

the

Purpose of Creation

79

goods can be desired as proximate ends, since all theu ?.·
: urthermore, Saint Thomas frequently states that the order
goodness has its source in Him as the first final cause, it «. ! the universe is a more primary intention of God than the
beyond any possibility of doubt that, on the part of each rs
vkiual perfections of single creatures: "Created things parrate creature, the intrinsic and created participation of c.z m the Divine goodness by way of similitude, inasmuch
Divine goodness (extrinsic glory), inasmuch as it is a i s
ii they are good. But that which is the greatest good in created
entity and is specifically distinct in creatures of different sp«
·. ngv is the goodness which consists in the order of the uni­
and is, moreover, numerically distinct in all individual crer-verse. which is most perfect. ... It pertains to providence to
whether of the same or different species, cannot be the
rda;n things unto the end. But after the Divine goodness,
bonum and hence cannot be the numerically identical la:
which is an end separated from created beings, the principal
of all creatures without exception. Therefore no one can c.~
good rus/ing in the being themselves is the perfection of the
harmony with Saint Thomas and Suarez, if he holds tbit
anivene.’”*
The goodness of the order of the universe, therefore, is the
finis-qui ultimus, the absolutely last end of all creatures b '
ghest end in the finite order of ends, precisely because, in this
God Himself, but a good totally extrinsic to Him, name ly i
.mverul order consists the highest communication of Divine
extrinsic glory.
; odness; nevertheless, it is clear, both from the passage just
Saint Thomas renders his mind doubly clear on this very
. ted and from the one immediately preceding (P.I, q. 103,
portant point by insisting that the supreme end of creature
»2 . that the order of the universe (in which the definition of
not merely extrinsic to each individual creature, but is
; - > ultimus is evidently verified, inasmuch as it is the
to the entire universe of created beings: "Since the end
• gheu created attainment or representation of the Divine
responds to the beginning, it is impossible to be ignorant of à
ci.dne«) is not the finis supremus or absolutely last end, but is
end of things, once their principle is known. Since there:
rdaitxd to the extrinsic end (finis-qui). For Saint Thomas
the principle of created beings is something extraneous t
:ut« dearly that the very perfection of the universe, which
entire universe, namely God, it is necessary that the fa* *
its order, is the last intrinsic end existing in creatures
created beings be some extrinsic good. Whence that good
•hr--.velvet and therefore finite, but that it is subordinated to the
is the end of the entire universe must be distinct from the π “
^jprene end, namely the Divine goodness. Hence, whenever
universe. (To the second) Something extrinsic can be ant®*
S* nt Thomas teaches that the created manifestation, communnot merely as an effect produced, as for example, the end $ ·
,r imitation of the Divine goodness is the ultimate end,
carpenter is not to build but the house itself, but also as *
must be understood, as is clear from his own words, to be
object possessed, obtained or even represented, as when we s»"
:eak;ng
of the f.nis-quo, not of the finis-qui, of the last end
that Hercules is the finis of the picture which is made to reft
• the order of created and finite ends, not of the supreme or
sent him. Thus, therefore, it can be said that a good, extranet
» au y ultimate end. Therefore those who would maintain
to the entire universe, as a good to be obtained or represent
the supreme end of creatures, their ultimate finis-qui is
is the finis of the governing of creatures. (To the third) Indre
'a a good extrinsic to the entire universe, but is rather a
there is an end of the universe existing in it, namely, the or#
” r.te good intrinsic to the created order, are in open variance
of the universe. But this is not the list end, but is ordered ua·
·· .th the dearly expressed mind of Saint Thomas.
an extrinsic good as the ultimate nW.**
I.

q.

1. i, >.

L < M. t. ♦, eorp.

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Theological Studies

Aquinas on

the

Purpose of Creation

81

The Finis-cui of Creation

$

f

We have seen that, according to those who place the -t
qui ultimus of created beings in the finite entity called extras
glory, God Himself is only the finis-cui and that, by dus ar
they mean that God is the subject for whom the created
perfection of extrinsic glory is intended. By this termine,
moreover, they sincerely wish to vindicate for God the fui
perfection of final cause and of the ultimate end of all ώζχ
in accord with the data of revelation and of sound phi».;
But, despite all good intentions, the terminology is in \
defective, because extrinsic glory, as we know both from ’
and from reason, can in no wise affect God intrinsic!/- ε
therefore it is metaphysically impossible that He be in anv E
sense the last end of all things, precisely and solely, terminology contends, because He desires this finite ent::· ”
Himself. Moreover, such terminology is entirely fore::' Saint Thomas. It is true that he never uses this technical T-3
of finis, as he does the technical terms finis-cuius and
Λ
but he never loses sight of the fact of paramount imponi'-'
namely, that finis and final cause as applied to God a creatures are strictly analogical. Hence, he is never mnW ·
experience with created ends into attributing the imperfect*
of finite ends to the infinite end of all things; conseque*:
such an application of the term finis-cui as that made by b*
sius and so many moderns is clearly excluded in the writing**
Saint Thomas: An effect must tend toward the end in 0*
way in which the agent acts on account of the end. But G*
who is the first efficient cause of all things does not so act &
by His action He acquires something; for He is solely in peffir
ACT, whence He is able to bestow. Creatures, therefore. J?
not ordered unto God, as unto an end for Whom something
acquired, but, so that from Him they may attain Him sis
He is the end.”^ Again, "The last end, on account ηί

mv perfection. Whence, He does not wish to communicate His
perfection to a creature in order that something may accrue to
Himself from it.”*
But, if God were the ultimate end only as a finis-cui, if He
were the finis-cui only because He intends His extrinsic glory
t c Himself, would He not, in these hypotheses, either depend
upon those things which are ordained unto Him as the finis-cui,
r w<>uld not this application of finis-cui to God, who can in no
woe be intrinsically affected by extrinsic glory, be purely
chunencal? In other words, according to Saint Thomas: "God,
therefore, is liberal to the highest degree, and He alone can
properly be called liberal; for every other being, except Him,
- . acting acquires some good which is the finis intended.”31
This terminology which makes God the finis-cui because of
a finite finis-qui (extrinsic glory) seems impossible, not merely
because it logically deprives God of the intrinsic perfection of
final causality’, but also because, according to Suarez, extrinsic
ri n does not constitute a true good for God ; hence it seems
2 ub’.y impossible that He be truly and solely the last end (finis.u .because He intends for Himself a good which not only
cannot affect Him intrinsically, but moreover is, in no proper
<nw. a true good for Him: "For among men those extrinsic
mations (such as extrinsic glory) would be rightly conudered not to be a real good, unless they were useful for some
•ntnnac perfection; because therefore this glory brings no
utibty to God, it cannot properly be considered His good.”™
If. therefore, one wishes to apply the term finis-cui, accord-

trriy called a finis-cui, that is the subject for whom the finis-qui
3 ..-/.ended, consists in His own intrinsic goodness, which is His
unique fixu operantis; this is the unique ultimate finis-qui of

on

•W f.

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Theological Studies

of His infinite happiness, God possesses by identity; this H:
loves with an infinite and necessary love, and finally, He visbe
this to be the summum bonum of creatures, the source ar.:
unique first final cause of all their perfection according to ei:
one’s nature. Hence intellectual creatures, who alone in a propt
sense act for an end by their own determination instead
merely being directed toward their end, cannot attain to du:
subjective created perfection to which they are intrinsic^
ordained, unless they deliberately recognize the essential sub
ordination of themselves and all their intrinsic perfection to t.\
source of their entire being and operation, namely, the Divis
goodness, or unless they love this Divine goodness as belong:·:
primarily, absolutely and by identity to one subject alone wb::
is God and merely secondarily, conditionally and by partie s
tion to themselves. That the essential order intended by Ga
is this, namely, that He be, in the sense just explained, r
finis-cui for whom His infinite goodness should be loved r:
intended, not only by Himself, but by men, is clear accord:*,
to Saint Thomas from the fact that rational creatures ought :
ordain their will unto God, "not only thus in order that r.r
may enjoy the Divine goodness, for this pertains to that 1c
which is called love of concupiscence, but rather, according
as the Divine goodness is in God Himself, which pertains to ri
love of friendship. For this cannot be from God, that anveo.
do not will the Divine goodness as it is in God Himself, sic
on the contrary, God inclines every will to will what He
but God wills the summum bonum as it is in Himself.
We may conclude this article by summarizing briefly Saas
Thomas’ position. How widely divergent it is from the order
exposition in modern manuals, which depend on Lessius, ttr
be seen by aligning their position summarily in parallel colure
This table will make clear what has been developed in the fa*
going dissertation, namely, that while Saint Thomas and
who have followed him closely have been careful never to mi',
a finite good an ultimate Divine end, Lessius fails in this its

Aquinas on the Purpose of Creation
Sarnt Thomas, Suarez
Ferranensis, Salman licenses, etc.
I. The end ultimately intended by
God in creating is not the finite
communication of the Divine

2. The end ultimately intended by
God and the supreme finis op­
ens are identical, namely, the
Divine intrinsic goodness.
' The created communication of
Divine goodness or extrinsic
glory is indeed the ultimate end
of all creatures in the finite or­
der (finis-quo) ; but it is
neither the absolutely last end
(finis-qui) nor in any way the
4. God v in no wise the finis-cui,
tn the sense that He is the sub­
ject for whom a finite good, to
be acquired, is intended.

»Dt MJo, q- 1. x λ corp.
*

83

Lessius and many modern
theologians
The end ultimately intended by
God in creating is the finite com­
munication of the Divine goodness,
i.e. extrinsic glory.
The end ultimately intended by
God and the supreme finis operis
are indeed identical namely, the
Divine goodness, not however intrinsic, but extrinsic.
Extrinsic glory is the supreme, absolutely last (finis-qui) end of all
creatures. The finis-quo is gen­
erally not assigned.

God Himself is only the finis-cui,
and this, because of a finite and
created good, extrinsic glory, which
He wishes for Himself.