κ community can enact such laws as will suit their wants or well Being, or even pleasure ; the oaTysestactlon which'is^laeed ondliem, is that none of their enactments conflict or contradict with the prin­ ciples and prescriptions of~the natural lawl Second difference.—The second difference flows from the » first, and is that the jus positivum vel civile is local, tem­ porary and variable ; it is for this place and not for that ; it can last as long as it is not altered or abolished bv the community which enacted it. and can vary according to the will and pleasure of the same. But the jus gentium, being a necessary conclusion of the natural law, easily deduced bv the human intellect, obtains in every civilized, country, at all times, and is always the same ; idem, ubique, et semper. “ Sed cum justum naturale sit semper et ubique ut dictum est hoc non competit justo legali vel positivo. Et ideo necesse est quod quid ex justo naturali sequitur, quasi con­ clusio (jus gentium) sit justum naturale ; sicut ex hoc quod est nulli injuste nocendum, sequitur non esse furandum quod quidem ad jus naturale pertinet.”—5 Ethicorum. Lect. 12. Third difference.—The jus positivum or civil requires a real positive enactment by the proper authority, at a speci­ fied time and place, together with a proper promulgation of the law. under circumstances special to each community. Otherwise the law will have no force whatever. The jus gen­ tium requires none of these conditions, any more than the on the Right of Property and of its Use. ir natural law. Dicendum quod quia eaquæ sunt juris gen­ tium naturalis ratio dictat, puta ex propinquo habentia æquitatem (that is the equity of which is easily seen from their propinquity to the first principles of natural law) inde est quod non indigent aliqua speciali institutione sed ipsa nat­ uralis ratio ea instituit, 2-2. Quest. 57, art. 3. ad 3. Fourth difference.—The jus gentium receives its force and authority and sanction from the natural law ; whereas the jus positivum draws all its force from purely human law.//) “It is to be remarked that something may originate in the natural law in two ways : in the first way as a conclusion from the premises ; in the second way as certain determina­ tions of things indefinite. Xow certain things are derived from principles common to the natural law, by way of con­ clusion and inference ; as the principle thou shalt not kill is a conclusion which can be drawn from the principle—He should not do any one evil. Certain other things, by way of determining, as, for instance, the law of nature proclaims that he who sins should be punished, but to define that this or that punishment should be inflicted on him, is a determina­ tion of the law of nature. Both are fulfilled by the human law. But the principles of the first mode are contained in the human law, not simply as laid down by it, but as having certain vigor from the natural law. Those of the second draw all their force from human law.”1 1 Sciendum quod a lege naturali dupliciterpotest aliquid derivari .uno modo sicut conclusiones ex principiis ; alio modo sicut deter­ minationes quaedam aliquorum communium. Derivantur ergo quaedam a principiis communibus legis naturae per modum con­ clusionum; sicut hoc quod non est occidendum, ut conclusio quaedam derivari potest ab eo quod est nulli esse faciendum malum ; quaedam vero per modum determinationis, sicut lex naturae habet quod We qui peccat puniatur sed quod tali poena vel tali puniatur hoc est quaedam determinatio legis naturae. Utraque igitur inveniuntur in lege humana posita. Sed ea quae­ sunt primi modi continentur in lege humana non tamquam sint solum, lege posita sed habent etiam aliquid vigoris ex lege natu­ rali sed ea quae sicut secundi modi ex sola: lege humana vigorem habent.—1—2, qu. 95, art. 2 corp. 12 The Doctrine of St. Thomas. Corollary from the definitions.—Whenever St. Thomas makes use of the expression secundum humanum condictum, ex jure humano, per ad inventionem rationis humanae, he means the jus gentium, which is the verdict of the human mind, reasoning upon the first principles of the natural law ; in other words, he means the natural law as reasoned out by the human intellect, and not a law merely and exclusively positive and arbitrary, and the sole result of the will of the human legis­ lator. This corollary is evident from the definitions we have given, and also from the particular care which St. Thomas takes of using words, always implying the act of the species or of the specific faculty, whenever he wants to mention or allude to, the jus gentium : ex jure humano procedens, secundum humanum condictum, per ad inventionem rationis humanae. Whereas when the Holy Doctor wants to point out a private contract, or the jus positivum of a community, he uses the expression privatum condictum, sicut quod firmatur ali­ quo pacto inter privatas personas ; ex condicto publico justa cum totus populus consentit quod aliquid habeatur puta adaequatum et commensuratum alteri.—2-2, qu. 57, art. 2, corp. Want have taken all these expressions in the same sense of mere positive law, and have sadly misunderstood St. Thomas’ doctrine. A few times the Holy Doctor calls the jus gentium positive jus as in the art. 2 of the qu. 57 ad 1, secunda secundæ. But from the context invariably appears the distinction which he makes between the jus gentium and the jus civile or the jus merely positive. ' CHAPTER II. Scbject Matter of the Right of Property, according St. Thomas.—Direct Demonstration of the Law­ fulness of Private Ownership in land. to Before proceeding to our next inquiry, whether, according to justice and the moral law, we can admit the private and individual ownership in land according to St. Thomas, we must premisë u 1’e ir i'Liuaihj u itü regard to the subject matter of the right ot property. Tbé'subjeet matter of the right ol property, as it is ap­ parent to every one, may be either the land and the fruits which naturally and without any cultivation spring from it, or the fruits which may be gathered from it by human labor. and which together with the first, may serve as the raw i material for human industry. Land, then, and its natural products, the industrial products of human cultivation, both natural and industrial products, resulting in artificial products, may be the subject matter of the right of property. St. Thomas takes all these things indiscriminately under various expressions, such as bona temporalia—1-2, qn. 114, art. 1, corp. J—bona exteriora ut divitiae—2-2, qu. 58, art. 10 ad 2—divitiae naturales et artificiales. Res exteriores—2-2, qu. 66, art. 2, corp. —Facultates quia sunt in dominio possidentis.—2 Dist. 24, qu. 1,. art. 1 ad 2. x The last expression he uses is·possessiones,! and though he may employ that word sometimes to^express other goods besides real estate and ownership of land, as a qenergdxsde he : restricts that expression to ownership in land. We will quote i a-few passages iu suppôtt uf~5u?~39eerti5nr * Sors accipitur pro officio vel re propria juste possessa, vel debita in divisione aliquarum personarum vel possessionum sicut vocantur sortes filiorum Israel justae portiones destina­ tae cuilibet tribui vel personae assignatae Opus. 72, art. 8. Now everybody knows that the portion allotted to each 14 The Doctrine of St. Thomas tribe of Israel was a piece of land. Therefore St. Thomas take? here the word possessiones as ownership in land. Again Utrum emere aliqua bona ut redditus vel possessi­ ones ad vitam, quæ est tempus determinatum, liceat.—Ibid., Chap. 9. Here possessiones is taken again for land, for the context does not allow the word to be taken in the sense of things perishable by use. Homo attenuatus paupertate tales redditus invitus vendit, vel possessiones suas pro necessitate cogente.—Ib. Ch. 9. In hoc contractu ipsæ res emuntur quæ vel per fructus suos referuntur ad hominis usum ut ageret possessiones aliae vel per scipsas ut triticum.—Ib., Ch. 9. Here ager is ranked among the possessiones. De pauperum necessitatibus negotiantur j (divites) et student possessiones aliorum acquirere quando tenentur ex fraterna charitate eis indigentibus accoinodare et paalatim de fructibus agrorum accipere.—Ib. Puta proprietas possessionum si enim consideretur iste ager ’ etc.—Qu. 57, art. 3, corp. "We may pass to the second question, to wit, does St. Sias admit the lawfulness of private ownership in land? f i answer, that St. Thomas, in his several works, and not e place only, as it has been asserted by a recent writer, instrates not only the' rporal lawfulness of private ownp iu land, but also the necessity which exists of such He does this by means of a twofolcldêmôïistrâtion : the first is the direct demonstration when he ex professo sets out to prove that private ownership in land is lawful and necessary ; the other demonstration is the refutation, which is found in several of his works, of all kinds of communism. We will present before our reader both kinds of demonstrations. In the Summa 2-2, qu. 66, art. 2, inquiring whether it is lawful for man to possess anything as his own, he an­ swers: “ It is lawful that man should possess things as his own. For this is necessary to human life for three reasons : First, because every one is more solicitous to procure what i>elongs exclusively to himself than that which is common to > all, or manv, since each one, shrinking from work, leaves to others what is the business of all, as it happens where there .is - on the Right of Property and of its Use. 15 a multitude of servants. Besides there will be better order iu the government of the commonwealth if to each citizen is , laid the burden and care of acquiring certain things ; and it : would cause great confusion if each one promiscuously should procure every kind of thing. “ Thirdly, the community is kept in greater peace when each one is satisfied with his own property. Hence we see ; that among those who possess things promiscuously and in common there arise frequent quarrels. ”1 . “ The possession of exterior things is necessary to procure 1 food, to educate the offspring, support the family and for other wants of the body. Wherefore the possession of riches is not in itself unlawful if the-order of reason be observed, that is to sayt that m.iii possess justly what he owns, and that he use it*~iu a piuper üïanüér tor himself and nfhe»·*"—Contr·. :Gfëntuù, Lib. 3,123r*-------------“ We must say, that possessions as to the ownership of dominium should be private, and common in a certain sense. For from the fact of private possessions follows that the acqui­ sition of possession is divided, each one busying himself about 1 Licitum est quod homo propria possideat. Est enim necessarium ad humanam vitam propter tria : primo quidem quia magis solicitas est unusquisque ad procurandum aliquid quod sibi soli competit quam idquodrst commune omnium vel multorum ; quia unusquisque laborem fugiens relinquit alteri id quod pertinet ad commune sicut accidit in multitudine ministrorum ; alio modo quia ordinatius res humanae tractantur si singulis imminet propria cura alicujus rei procurandae ; esset autem confusio si quislibet indistincte quaelibet procuraret ; tertio quia per hoc magis pacificus status hominum con­ servatur dum unusquisque re sua contentus est. Unde videmus quod inter eos qui communiter et ex indiviso aliquid possident frequen­ tius jurgia oriuntur.’’ ’ Ea quae exteritis possidentur necessaria sunt ad sumptionemciborum, ad educationem prolis, et sustentationem familiae et ad alias corporis necessitates, consequens est quod nec secundum se etiam divitiarum possessio est illicita si ordo rationis servetur quod juste homo possideat, quae habet et quod eis debito modo utatur !Ô The Doctrine of St. Thomas his own. Two good effects result from this : First, that each one takes care of his own only, and not of that which belongs to others, and thus are avoided all those disputes which happen among those who have to procure the same thing, one opining this and another opining that. “ The second is that each one will the better increase his possessions.as he will attend to them with more diligence as to his own exclusive property.” * “ With regard to the possession of things, it is best, as the Philosopher says, thatpo.uoonniona olmuld be distinct.” · Then the Holy Doctor passes to enumerate and approve of the division of land made in the old law. “ For possessions were divided among each, as it is said Num. xxxiii. 52 : I gave you the land in possession which you will divide among you by lot. And because of the irregularity of possessions many cities are destroyed, as the Philosopher says : Polit. Ch. 5, 7, therefore the law employed a threefold remedy to regulate possessions. ThefnrJt was to divide equally but according to the number of mFfif hence it is said, Numb, xxxiii. 54 : To the more you shall give a larger part and to the fewer a lesser. The fécond Remedy was that the possessions should not be alienatftq. forever, hut should return to their possessors after ■■a certain time, that thp^allotted_possessions should not be .confounded. The tljiirdjemedy to prevent such confusing w asAhat-the- nearesvrelktions should succeed to thedead, in the ni-st-degree-the-son^in—the second, the daughter, in the third, the brothers,in.the fourth, the uncle, and jn tbe fifth, 1 Oportet enim possessiones simpliciter quidem esse proprias quantum ad proprietatem dominii sed secundum aliquem modum communes. Ex hoc enim quod sunt propriae possessiones sequitur quod procurationes possessionum sunt divisae dum unusquisque curat de possessione sua. Et ex hoc sequuntur duo bona ; quorum unum est quod dum unusquisque intromittit se de suo proprio et non de eo quod est alterius non fiunt litigia inter homines quae so­ lent fieri quando multi habent unam rem procurare dum uni vide­ tur sic et alii aliter faciendum. Aliud bonum est quod unusquis­ que magis augebit possessionem suam insistens ei solicitius tamquam propriae.—Politicorum, Lib. 2, lect. 4. on the Right of Property and of its Use. '7 all other relations. And to preserve the destination of fortunes j the law enacted that the women who fell heirs should be ■ married to men of their tribe.1 The indirect demonstration which we will bring forward from the works of the Holy Doctor consists of three parts ; rhf/nrstys that in which he condemns aud-repudiates all cornrrrtrfîity of goods and possessions ; tire second is that in which he rejects even a modified form ot—«rmgyyiism, the equal division and distribution of fortunes ; tb^thirjl? finally, is that in which he peremptorily demands the inequality of fortunes and possessions in the commonwealth, as the only solution of the difficulty in conformity with the natural law i and the order established by the Almighty for the wellbeing, ‘peace, stability and good government of a community. As to the first we translate from the Opusc. 20. Book 4, Ch. 4, De regimine Principis : ‘‘ The necessity of founding a city to unite men in society being established, it remains for us to examine in what this society should consist. 1 Circa res possessas optimum est ut dicit philosophus in 2 Pol., corp. 3, quod possessiones sint distinctae. Et haec tria fuerunt in lege statuta; primo enim ipsae possessiones divisae erunt in singulos ; dicitur enim Sum. 33, 53. Ego dedi vobis, ter­ ram in possessionem quam sorte dividetis vobis. Et quia pier possessionum irregularitatem plures civitates destruuntur ut Philosophus dicit in 2 Polit., cap. 5, 7, et ideo circa possessiones regulanaas triplex remedium lex adhibuit ; unum quidem ut secundum numerum hominum aequaliter dividetur unde dicitur Sum. 33, 54 : Pluribus dabitis latiorem et paucioribus angus­ tiorem. Aliud remedium est ut possessiones non in perpetuum alienentur sed certo tempore ad suos possessores revertantur ut non confundantur sortes possessionum. Tertium remedium est ad hujus modi confusionem tollendam ut proximi succedant morientibus primo quidem gradu filius, secundo filia, tertio fratres, quarto patrui quinto quicumque propinqui. Et ad distinctionem sortium conservandam ulterius lex statuit ut mulieres quae sunt haeredrs. nuberent suae tribus hominibus ut habetur Num. 36.—1-2, q:i. 105, art. 2, corp, } 18 The Doctrine of St. Thomas “ Philosophers and sages have broached several social sys­ tems, as Aristotle relates in his Republic, wherein, in the second book, he treats at first of the opinion of Socrates and ' Plato, who admitted in their republic the communitv of every­ thing, of goods, as well as women and children, [moved, no doubt, by the beneficial effects which result from union in society and which forms the grandeur and force of a republic. Moreover, as good seeks to expand and to communicate itself, the more accessible a thing is, the more it partakes of goodness. Therefore to put everything in common displays more goodness and virtue. Besides, as Dionysius teaches, love is a unifying force. "Wherever, therefore, we find more of the essence of love, there we find more of that force which estabfishes and preserves cities, as St. Augustin remarks. There is, therefore, more of goodness in placing women and children and goods in common.”/ YSere St. Thomas, after expressing his doubts as to whether those philosophers really admitted the communitv of women and children, passes to give his opinion on the theory, nd ‘ shows that the real perfection of union does not consist in abolishing all distinction and variety, but, on the contrary, that it lies in bringing the greatest distinction and variety $ ( into unityi-J ♦ “ By this we can see the answer to the objections ; because union and love are found also in inferior beings, now in an or­ ganized body the union is the more perfect, the more the energy of the soul is extended to various operations, all centering into the one substance of the soul ; as is manifest not only in ani­ mated beings, which happen to be more perfect, but also in those which have only the sense of touch, as worms and other animals, which Aristotle calls imperfect animals. Wherefore the Apostle compares the mystical body, which is the Church, to a true and natural body, in which are different members un­ der different faculties and powers, rooted in one principle, the soul ; and hence the Apostle disapproves of the above pretend­ ed union in the first Epistle to the Corinths, saying * If the eye be the whole body, where is the hearing? and if _the hear­ ing be all, where is the smell ? ’ Showing how necessary it is in everv collective body, which is principally verified^ a city, Oh the Right of Property and of its Use. 19 to have different ranks among the citizens as to their houses and families, and as to arts and employments, but all united in the, bond of society, which is the love of our fellow-citizens, as lias been said, and about which the Apostle speaks to the Colos. .For, having enumerated all the good offices which citizens owe to each other, he adds : Above all, have charity, which is the bond of perfection and the peace of Christ will rejoice your hearts, that peace to which you have been called into one distinct body, that is. as members according to each one’s condition. “ And indeed, the more arts and employments are multiplied in it, the more famous a city becomes ; since the more easily can be found in it all that is necessary to man’s life, to provide which the foundation of city is so indispensable. “ Should any one allege against us the example of Christ’s disciples, among whom everything was common, we say that their state was an exception to every usual way of living. Because their republic did not have as an object wives and children, but the celestial city, in which · they neither marry nor give in marriage, but are as the angels of God. With regard to riches, indeed, their goods were common ; but this belongs only to the state of perfection, as the Lord says in the Gospel : ‘ If thou wilt be perfect, go and sell all which you have and give it to the poor and then come and follow me.’ This was done by the disciples of Socrates and Plato, out of contempt for temporal things, but for the rest of mankind, united in society, the usual statg is to have distinct possessions, to avoid litigations, as it is written of Abraham and Lot, etc.” 1 1 Habita igitur necessitate constituendae civitatis propter commu­ nitatem hominum nunc quaerendum videtur in quo sistat ista communitas. Circa quod diversi philosophi et sapientes diversas constituerunt politias respectu communitatis ut Philosophus refert in sua Politica, ubi primo narrat opinionem Socratii ut Platonis in 2 Polit, quod communitatem ponerent in sua politia quan­ tum ad omnia ut videlicet omnia essent communia tam divitiae quam uxores ctfliT^lnoti quidem ex bono unionis in communita­ te per quam respublica commendatur ct crescit. Amplius autem CHAPTER ΠΙ. Indirect Démonstration. So far St. Thomas has proved directly the error of com­ munism from the metaphysical reason that perfect social unity cannot be obtained except by means of variety and distinction of possessions. [We will bring forward the refu- cum bonum est diffusivum et sui communicativum quanto res communior est tanto plus de bonitate habere videtur. Ergo om­ nia communicare plus habet de ratione virtutis et bonitatis. Praeterea amor est virtus unitiva ut Dionysius tradit. Ubi est ergo unionis major ratio ibi plus vigebit virtus amoris qui civi­ tatem constituit et conservat ut Augustinus dicit. Per hoc autem paht responsio ad objecta quia unio et amor habet gradum in inferioribus entibus; quoniam perfectior est unio in corpore animato si in diversis organis virtus animae diffundatur ad diversas operationes unitas in una substantiae animae sicut apparet tam in animatis perfectis quam in animatis quae habent solum sensus tactus ut sunt vermes et quaedam animalia quae Aristotiles vocati n side an>ma imperfecta. Propter quod et Apos­ tolus comparat corpus mysticum id est Ecclesiam tero corpori et naturali in quo sunt membra diversa sub diversis potentiis et tirtribus in uno principio animae radicatas undent unionem allegatam reprobat Apostolus in 1 Ep. ad Cd^'dicens. “ Si totum corpus oculum ubi auditus etsi totum auditus ubi adoratus ?” Quasi necessarium sit in qualibt congregatione quae precipue est civitas esse distinctos gradus in civibus quantum ad domos et familias quantum ad artes et officia : omnia tamen unita in vinculto societatis quod est amor suorum civium ut dictum est supra et de quo etiam Apost. dicit ad Color. Cum enim enumerasset quaedam opera virtuoso ad quee cives ad invicem obligantur statim subdit. Super haec autem omnia charitatem habentes quod est vinculum perfectionis et pax Christi exultet in cordibus vestris in , I On the Right of Property and of its Use. 21 tation of communism from the evil results which spring from it. In the commentary on the Politics of Aristotle, Book 2, lect. 4, he says that the philosopher brings three reasons to prove the evil results of the community of goods. “ The first is, that if possessions were common to all citizens, it would be necessary to admit of two things: one, either that the fields should be cultivated by strangers or by some among the citizens. If they were cultivated by strangers, this would present some difficulty, because it would be difficult to find so many cultivators from among strangers, and yet this would be the easier way, than if they were cul­ tivated by some of the citizens, as the last mode would present many difficulties. For it would be impossible that all the citizens should cultivate the earth ; as the ablest among them would be obliged to attend to the more import- j ant business, and the less capable, to see to agriculture ; and yet this would require, at the same time, that the capable ones, who worked less as to agriculture, should receive more of the fruits of the same, and thus the receiving of the fruits would not correspond equally, according to proportion, to the labor of agriculture ; hence recriminations and quarrels, quo vocati estis injino corpore distincto videlicet per membra juxta! civium statum. ^Ex qua diversitate artium et officiorum quanto in eis multiplicatur amplius tanto civitas redditur magis famosa quia sufficientia humanae vitae propter quam necessaria est con­ structio civitatis magis reperitur in ea j quod &i forte allega­ tur de discipulis Christi quibus omni 1 fuerunt communia non importat legem communem quoniam status eorum omnem modum vivendi trascendit. / Ipsorum enim politia non ordinabatur ad ux­ ores et filios sed ad civitatem coelestem, u in qua neque nubent ne- S que nubentur sed sunt sicut angeli Dei.” Sed quantum ad divitias bona erant communia. Quod solum perfectorum est ut Dominus dicit in Evangelio. Sivis inquit, perfectus esse vade et vende om­ nia quee habes et da pauperibus et veni sequere me. | Hoc et Soc­ ratici fecerunt et Platonici sicut contemptivi rerum temporalium· In ceteris autem civibus communis status expedit possessiones habere, distinctas ad vitanda litigm sicut enim et de Abraham et Lot scribitur. 22 The Doctrine of St. Thomas because the common people would murmur at tlie prominent citizens for working less and receiving more, and at them­ selves receiving less and working more. Thus it is clear that from such law the harmony of the city would not be obtained, but rather dissensions would be the result. “ In the second place it is exceedingly difficult that a great number of men, who have certain human goods, and especially riches, in common, should live together. For we see by ob­ servation, that among those who have certain riches in common, many dissensions arise ; as it is evident in those who travel together; they frequently quarrel over the amount of what they spend for food and drink, and oftentimes for very little they separate and insult each other by word or deed. Hence it is clear that if all citizens had all possessions in common, they would give way to a great number of quarrels. The third reason is that men become highly incensed at their servants, of whom they stand so much in need for many menial services, and this on account of the familiarity of life ; for those who do not come together often have less op­ portunity of quarrelling.” 1 The second part of St. Thomas’ indirect demonstration, is that which discards the equality of fortunes. There were two philosophers, who, considering that litigations arise in cities from the fact of one having too 1 Quarum prima est, quia si possessiones essent communes omnium civium oporteret alterum duorum esse, scilicet quod rei agri colerentur per aliquos extraneos, vel per aliquos ex civibus. Et ii quidem per alios colerentur haberet aliquam difficultatem, quia difficile esset advocare tot extraneos agricolas : tamen hicmodus esset facilior, quam si aliqui ex civibus laborarent : ll0c enim, exhiberet mullas difficultates. Xon enim esset possibile quod omnes cives colerent agros; oporteret enim majores majoribus negotiis intendere, minores autem agriculturae et tamen oporteret quod majores qui minus laborarent circa agriculturam, plus acciperent defructibus et sic non aequaliter secundum proportionem correspondent perceptio fructum operibus sive laboribus agriculturae ; et propter hoc ex necessitate orirentur accusationes et litigia, dum minores qui plus laborant murmurarent de majoribus qui parum laborantes multum on the Right of Property and of its Use. much and another too little, wished to establish in their commonwealth the equality of possessions. The first was Phineas of Chalcedon, mentioned by Aristotle in his Republic, the other was Lvcurgus, son of the king of the Lacedemonians, as Justin relates, both founded their constitution upon the equal partition of goods, in such a way that one would not be more influential than another.” After explaining the different ways they followed in level­ ling fortunes, he shows the absurdity of allotting equal fortune to each citizen. “ First, from human nature, which is not multiplied equally in every family ; since it may happen that one father of a family may have several children, another none at all. It- would be absurd, therefore tr, allot; to these two equ.d puasessions ; as in that case one family would be iji want uf necessaries, and the other would have abundance of them, which would be against the providence of nature. Because that iamily winch is the more numerous serves to strengthen the commonwealth by its increase better than the one which fails in having children, and has^. therefore, by natural right the greater claim to be providea for by the acciperent ; ipsi autem e contrario minus acciperentpluslaborantes. Et quo patet quod ex pac lege nqn sequeretur unitas civitatis ut Socrates volebat sed potius dissidias. Secundam rationem ponit. ... et dicit quod valde difficile est quoti multi homines simul ducant vitam quod communicent in quibusdam humanis bonis ei preeeipue in divitiis. Videmus enim quod illi qui in aliquibus divitiis communicant multus habent dissensiones ad invicem ut patet in his qui simul peregrinantur ; freqxienter enim ad invicem dissentiunt ex his quae expendunt in cibis et potus computum faciendo, et aliquando pro modico se invicem propulsant et offendunt verbo vel facto. Unde putet quod si omnes cives haberent communes omnes possessiones plurima litigia inter eos existèrent. Tertiam rationem ponit... et dicet quod homines maxime offenduntur suis famulis quibus multum indigent ad aliqua servilia ministeria ; et hoc propter communitatem conversationis vita ; qui enim non frequenter simul conversantur non frequenter habent turbationes ad invicem. Ex quo patet quod communicatio inter homines existons est frequenter causa discordia. 24 The Doctrine of St. Thomas community. And not only does human nature repudiate the equal division of possessions, but the different condition of persons as well. For there must be difference among citizens, the same as we perceive to exist between the members of the body to which we have compared a state ; now, faculties and operations differ according to difference of members.’ since it is clear that one who is noble is subject to greater expenses than a commoner ; hence the virtue of liberality in princes is called magnificence, owing to the magnitude of his ex­ penses. This could not be if possessions were equal. The Gospel itself confirms this truth m tlie parable ot the father of the family, who, upon starting on a journey, divides bis goods among his servants ; but in different proportions, to one four talents, to another two ; to the third one, to each ac­ cording to his ability.” 1 Finally, St. Thomas contends that the inequalitv of fortunes Et primo ex parte humanae naturae quae non semper in familiis multiplicatur aequaliter ; quia contigit unum patrem ■ familias habere multos Olios, alium autem nullum. Quod ergo isti duo haberent aequales possessiones esset impossibile quia una familia deficeret in victualibus, altera superabundaret ; et hoc es­ set contra provisionem naturae quia quaefamilia plus multiplicatur in prolem amplius cedit ad firmamentum politiae propter ipsius augumentum quam quae in generatione prolis deficit, et quodam jure naturae magis meretur a republica sive politia providerit Son tamen autem ex parte naturae humanae sequitur inconveniens adaequare possessiones sed\ etiam ex gradu personae. Est enim differentia inter cives, quemadmodum inter membra corporea cui politia est superius comparata ; in diversis autem membris vir­ tus diversificatur et operatio. Comstat enim quod majores expen­ sas cogitur facere nobilis, quam ignobilis, unde et virtus liberatitatis in principe magnificentia vocatur propter magnos sumptos. Hoc autem fieri non posset ubi possessiones essent aequales,- unde et ipsa vox evangelica testatur de illo patre familias sive rege qui peregre profectus est qualiter servis suis bona distribuit sed non aequaliter, immo uni dedit quinque, talenta, alteri, duo, alii vero unum uni quique secundum propriam virtutem. De Regimine Prine., L b. 4., Ch. 9. on the Right of Property and of its Use. 25 and possessions alone is according to the order of nature and the disposition of Divine Providence. “ Thi^system (of the equality of possessions) is in contra­ diction witFlSe order of nature; according to which? pyovidentially, a certain inequality exists among created things, either with regard to nature or as regards capacity ; conse­ quently, to admit equality in temporal goods, such as pos­ sessions, is to destroy order in things, which is, according to St. Augustine, results from inequality. For order is nothing else than the setting of equal and unequal things in their proper place ; and hence, Origen has been blamed for saying that nature had made all things equal, and that they had become unequal by their own failure, that is, by the fall· Litigations, therefore, are not avoided by equalizing posses­ sions ; on the contrary, they are multiplied, since the jus of nature is violated or destroyed when we subtract from one who is in need, and who deserves more. Again, because it is against reason to have everything equal in the community, since God has established everything in number, weight, and measure, as it said in the book of Wisdom, which sup­ poses inequality in beings, and hence inequality among citizens in cities or commonalities.” 1 * Amplius autem nec ipse ordo naturae hoc, patitur in quo in divina providentia res creatas in quadam inaequalitae constituit, sive quantum ad naturam sive quantum ad meritum, unde ponere aequalitatem in bonis temporalibus, ut sunt possessiones est ordi­ nem in rebus destruere quem Augustinus respectu in aequalitatis diffinit (de Civitate Det). Est enim ordo qiarium et disparium rerum sui cuique tribuens dispositio, et ex hoc Origenes in Periarchon reprehenditur, quia omnia dixit aequalia ex sui natura sed facta sunt inaequalia propter defectum sui hoc est'propter pecca­ tum. Non ergo ex adaequatione possessionum vitantur litigia, quin potitis augunientantur, dum in hoc destruitur jus naturae quando subtrahitur indigenti qui plus meretur. . Item quia contra . ationem est esse omn ia aequalia in politia cum omnia Deus in­ stituerit in numero pondere et mensura, ut in lib. Sapientiae dici­ tur, quae graduin inequalitis ponunt in entibus et per ronsrquens m civilibus sive politiis.—Ibidem. 26 Hu Doctrine of St. Thomas We think we have given most abundant authorities from all the works of St. Thomas, in which he treated of the sub­ ject, that the holy Doctor admits and defends the lawfulness and necessity of private ownership in land and other goods. Different Ways of AciJT iuintTTHE the Right of Property or Dominium. We may proceed to the next question, that is, admitting the abstract legitimacy of the private right of ownership in land, how many ways are there, according to St. Thomas, of actually acquiring this right? In other words, how many ways are there of acquiring dominium? The dominium, according to one author, is primarily ac­ quired by occupation. The Holy Doctor admits the principle of the lawfulness of occupation in the following: “Div.es non illicite agit si praeoccupans possessionem rei quae a principio erat com­ munis aliis eticim communicet ; peccat autem si alios ab usu illius indiscreted prohibeat”—2-2, qu. 66, art. 2 ad 2. Upon the same supposition of the legitimacy of occupation. St ^Thomas justifies the occupation or appropriation of things that have never belonged to any one, prof things found after having been hidden, forgotten and lost Circa res inventas est distinguendum ; quaedam enim sunt quae nunquam fuerunt de bonis alicnjus sicut lapilli et gemmae quae inveniuntur in littore maris, et talia occupanti conce­ duntur, et eadem ratio est de thesauris antiquo tempore sub terra occultatis, quorum non extat aliquis possessor.—2-2, 66, art 5 ad 2. _ The above texts not otjlv prove the legitimacy of occnpation, but allude to its conditions, which_ ftloiift justify it They are -1st. That the object should not only be unoc- , cupied at present, but that none should have a prior title to it by former appropriation, which bas not been relin­ quished or lost, on the Right of Property and of its Use. 27 2d. The thing occupied should he made useful somewhat z to the occupant and to the community in some way or other, jt4Hrrn a reasonable time, to be determined by cir­ cumstances. 3d. The occupant should share the fruits of things he oc- cirpies in the manner to be explained, accordingtothe~sense St. Thomas attaches to this condition. Occupation, then, is the most general primary title to all kind of property, not excluding that which originates in human exertion, labor, or industry ; because, as man cannot create things from no­ thing, he must necessarily occupy the land or the natural raw material springing from it, as the object upon which to exercise his industry and his labor. —Next to occupation the dominion is acquirer^ nccnifüng / to SU Thomas, bv its being transferred from one to another^/®· which mgv-be dcini? in tb-rpp π-ατ-c ; x 1st. By natural right when the dominion passes from father to son and heirs by the death of the former (Testament). 2d. By right of favor,\when one gives what belongs to him to another without any compensation, by simply as a favor (Donation). 3d. Or a thing may be transferred from one to another when, according to the equity of jus. one offers a proper compensa­ tion in exchange for what he receives ; as it happens in all contracts of r uying and selling, or in giving a certain pay for labor. 1 (Contracts.) To these titles another must be added, that of prescription, or the right acquired by the statute of limitation, as it is called in this country. 1 ‘· Translatio rei de domino in dominum non potest jieri justo titulo nisi tribus viis, scilicet aut per jus naturae, quando sci­ licet res devolvitur a patribus vel parentibus in filios et haeredes per mortem ; aut per jus gratiae et liberalitatis, quando scilicet dominus rei dat gratis alteri, quod suum erat. Aut potest jieri suum de non suo, quando secundum aequitatem juris fit recom­ pensatio alicujus rei, sicut in venditionibus et emptionibus rerum, vel laboris, sicut quando laborantibus redditur merces laborisP —Opusc. 72. Chap. 4. 2g The Doctrine of St. Thomas. This implies that after the expiration of a certain time, one can no longer be disturbed in the possession of any­ thing. however it may have been actually acquired. Yet a distinction is to be made with regard to the conditions re­ quired by the civil law in order to grant such a right, and the conditions annexed to it by the natural law of justice to sanction such right. The civil authority which enacts such a statute, simply to maintain peace and tranquillity among the citizens, and to prevent them from being disturbed at any time in the tran­ quil possession of their property, exacts only one condition in order to grant the right of prescription, and that is the uninterrupted and undisputed possession of it for a certain limited and prescribed time. ' The natural law to sanction such a right as just and equit­ able requires more than that; it demands that the object should have been acquired and held in good faith by the actual possessor, during the time necessary. This is the doctrine of St. Thomas.1 Dicendum quod qaiprescribit bonafide possidendo non tenetur a t restitutionem etiam si sciat alienum fuisse post prcescriptionem ; quia lex potest aliquem propena et negligentia pumire in re suti et illam altem dore et concedere. Sed qui mala fide prescribit tene­ tur encendare reddendo damnum quod intulit. Circa hoc est contrarietas juris civilis et canonici (founded on natural justice and divine lau) quia secundum jus civile praescriptio tenet (men if acquired in bad faith) secundum jus canonicum talis praescribere non potest. Et ratio hujus contrarietatis est ; quia alius est finis quem intendit civilis legis­ lator scilicet pacem servare et stare inter cives quae impediretur si praescriptio non curreret : quicumque enim vellet posset dicere istud fuit meum quocumque tempore. Finis autem juris canoni­ ci tendit in quietem Ecclesiae et salutem animarum. Nullus autem in peccato salcari potest nec poenitere de damno vel de alieno nisi récompensât.—Quod libet qu. 15, art. 14. CHAPTER V. Iy what Jus is Founded, the Right of Property in Land ? The next important question is : By what right is pri­ vate ownership in land acquired by occnpation or testamënFôr donation or contracts ? \\ hat makes it just and law-fnf?—Is it so by natural right, or by positive human law, which can easily be altered, rescinded or abolished ? We answer with St. Thomas that private cmmepskFp· in J lapd is founded not on human positive arbitrary law, which / canbe abolished or Changed at the will of those~wlio made / it, or who have the same authority ; but it originates in_the zA. jus gentium, which is the necessary.'consequence and result f of the natural law and therefore cannot be altered, changed / rescinded or abolished by any lwwi.ui .nrrhority whatever. . · St. Thomas teaches so expressly in the Qu. 57, art. 3, in which, answering the query whether the jus gentium be not the same as the jus naturale, he says: “ Jus^_or_jsiat is natumHv just, is that which of its own nature befits to, or is commensjHj^-Yydtb—aether. This, however, may happen in two ways : thdfirst is>’hen the what isjust is regarded under its absolute aspect, as, for instance, the male of its own nature is commensurate with the female to obtain offspring and thp-iather with the child to support it. The second way is when we do not consider a thing in it­ self orrt-fn relation to another which follows from it.^ Take, for instance, property in land. If we consider a field in itself and under its absolute aspect, we find that it offers nd reason why it should belong to this person more than an­ other. But if we regard it in view of the opportunity of cultiyation orol the peaceful Use of the same, it mar prësënt a certain fitness why it should belong to this one rather than to another. Now, to look at a thing by comparing it to what follows from it is the proper office of reason, hence this very thing -o The Doctrine of St. Thomas is natural to man, according to natural reason, which pro­ claims it. And therefore, Cajus the lawyer says : hat natural reason establishes among all men that same is equally maintained among all, and is called the jus gentium.1 Quod, naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit id apud omnes peræque custoditur vocaturque Jus gentium. The_HAly Doctor repeats the same in the 66 quest., art. 2 s ad 1./Property of possession is not against natural right but is added to natural right by discovery of human reason. I Propiietas possessionum non est contra jus naturale sed juri naturali ■ superadditur per adinventionem rationis humanæ. Corollaries. 1. The right of property in land, as well in any other thing, is the direct consequence of the natural law, drawn by the human mind, reasoning upon the first principles of that same law. It is found, therefore, to be the same at all times and in all places among civilized nations. 2. It has never been enacted by any peculiar statute, because it is easily perceived by the human intellect the moment it reflects upon the first principles of natural right. 3. It has never been denied or contradicted by any civil- , ized nation in the whole history of the world ; on the contrary, it has been approved in thousands of regulations determining Jus sive justum naturale est quod ex sui natura est adœqttatum vel commensuratum alteri. Hoc autem potest contingere du­ pliciter . uno modo secundum absolutam sui considerationem j sicut masculus ex sui ratione habet commensurationem ad fceminam ut ex ea generet, et parens ad filium ut eum nutriat. Alio modo aliquid est naturale secundum aliquid quod ex ipso sequitur, puta proprietas possessionum ; si enim consideretur ista ager abso­ lute non habet unde magis sit hujus quam illius ; sed si considere­ tur per respectum ad opportunitatem colendi et ad pacificum usum agri hoc habet quandam commensurationem ad hoc quod sit unius et non alterius ut patet per Philosophum. Considerare autem aliquid comparando ad id quodex ipso sequitur est proprium ra­ tionis et ideo hoc idem est naturale homini secundum rationem naturalem qua hoc dictat. Et ideo dicit Cajus unsamsu tus. on the Right of Property and of its Use. more or less questions which the jus gentium leaves undecided. i iLxacciras itc foroo and sanction fronTthe natural law and not from mere human-authority. Ô. It partakes of the attributes of the natural law, which are especially inviolability and immutability. Hence no human power, no government on earth, for any reason whatever,_can_violate oFcIo^iwa}' witlTthe right of prop­ erty inland or otherwise. · 4 Solution of Objections against the Right of Property in Land. The right of property in land is strenuously objected to by some modern communists as unlawful and unjust and con­ trary to the natural law, and this on different grounds, but the principal argument they make use of, and on which they mostly insist, is that .tlie l.mil is the common gift of the Creator, that each human being, coming into this world, has a^much right to the land as any other, that according to the natural law the land must be the property of no one in par­ ticular, but must be common to all. The Angelic Doctor, in the question so often quoted, 66 art., 2 ad 1, has the objection almost in as many words : “ It would seem that none should be allowed to own anything as his own. Because everything which is contrary to the natural jus is illicit But according to the natural jus all things are common and the private ownership is in contra­ diction with this common possession. Therefore, it is unjust for any man to appropriate to himself any exterior thing.’’ St. Thomas answers the objection by fixing and defining the sense according to which we must understand that all things should be common according to the natural jus. “ To the first objection the answer is that the community of goods is~uttiibuted~Îc> the natural jus, not because the natural jus exacts that all things should be held in common ; but because, according to the natural jus, no distinction of pos­ sess ionTs made : but this is done by the verdict of human freason^svhich belongs to the positive jus, as we have said in qu. 57, ark 2, 3.” Dicendum quod communitas rerum attribuitur juri naturali non quia jus naturale dictat omnia esse possidenda commu­ ·, 2 The Doctrine of St. Thomas niter ; sed secundum jus naturale non est distinctio possessi­ onum, sed magis secundum humanum condictum, quod pertinet ad jus positivum1 ut supra dictum est quaest. 51 art. 2-3. In the third article to which the Holy Doctor refers, he explains more clearly what he means by the distinction of possessions not being made by the jus naturale ; by laying down the theory that a thing may be just, according to the natural law, either in se, and absolutely considered, or rel­ atively to what results from it In this second sense the . private ownership in land is according to natural jus. I “ For,” says St. Thomas, “ if we consider this field, there is no U reason, accorclmg-to-UiajagUliayus, considered in itself, why « it should beTon^Tt>41ûsja7ràtùrT6Tri to that one. But if 1 it be considered relatively to the opportunity of cultivating, land to peaceful holding of it, this may offer a fitness why it should belong-te—this un-g-iatker than to another.” St. "Thomas theiicoilcludes .—^-\ν he refore private ownership of possessions is not against tluaqus naturale, but is attached to \it by the verdict of human reason. ” Unde proprietas possessionem non est contra jus naturale sed juri naturali superadditur per ad inventionem rationis humanae.— Qu. 66, Art. 2 ad 1. The next objection which we will touch upon is that which is founded on what is called altum dominium. It is alleged thah_th&,gamrnment oLeyery_nationhaS the eminent right of domain over the property οΠΐΓΉΒζβη^Τ—That, therefore, in view of this light, a gutcenment tnay-afeolish all private own­ ership of land or otherwise and render everything common. Thus, for instance, the government of New York State could confiscate, without any compensation, all private property, hold it in common for all citizens, and distribute its fruits ac­ cording to some system or other. Does St. Thomas know of or acknowledge in any part of his works this pretended right of eminent domain? Not at all. though the Holy Doctor is perfectly aware of the rights which belong to a government and states them with * This is one of the few places where St- Thomas calls the / o gtniun, j„t pasiirsum, but one can easily see from the context what on the Right of Property and of its Use. a clearness which leaves nothing to be desired. But he calls confiscation and rapine anything else which goes beyond those rights. In Qu 67, art. 8, be lays down the rights of government with regard to its claims on the property of its citizens ; but as distinctly asserts that any exaction beyond these rights is rapine. “I answer by saying that rapine implies a certain violence and forcing, by means of which something belonging to anoth­ er is unjustly taken from him. Now in a civil society none should suffer violence except from the public authority; and therefore, whosoever takes away something from another by violence, if he be a private person, not making use of the public authority, acts unjustly and commits rapine, as is man­ ifest in robbers. But princes are intrusted with public authority to the end that they may be the custodian of jus­ tice and therefore it is not lawful for them to use force and violence, except according to the rule of justice and this in order to fight against enemies or against citizens by punish­ ing malefactors, and what is taken away by such violence has not the nature of rapine, because it is not contrary to justice. But if some, by means of the public authority, should take anything belonging to others by violence, such as these act unjustly, commit rapine, are bound to restitution.” 1 And again answering the third objection, which lays down the fact of princes usurping and extorting much from the citi­ 1 De mdum quod rapina quamdam violentiam et coactionem importat per quam contra justitiam alicui aufertur quod suum est. In societate autem hominum nullas habet coactionem nisi per publicam potestatem : et ideo quicumque per violenti am aliquid alteri aufert, si sit privata per­ sona non utens publica potestate illicite agit et rapinam committit sicut palet in latronibus. Principibus autem potestas publica committitur ad hoc quod sint justitiae cusi .des et ideo non licet eis violentia et coactione uti nisi secundum justitiae, tenorem; et hoc vel cor.tra hostes pugnando, vel contra cices malefactores puniendo, et quod per talem violentiam au­ fertur non habet rationem rapinae, cum non sit contra justitiam. Si vero contra justitiam aliqui per publicam potestatem violenter abstulerint res aliorum, illicite agunt et rapinam committunt et ad restitutionem tenentur.” 34 The Doctrine of St. Thomas. zens without any necessity or right ; which if it were grave sin for them, most of them would be damned ! St. Thomas says : “ If princes exact from their subjects what is due to them according to justice to maintain the public good, though they may use violence, it is not rapine ; but if princes extort by violence what is not due they commit robbery and rapine. Hence St. Augustine says, in 4 de Civ. Dei : If you remove justice from them, uliat are kingdoms but robbery on a great scale ? nay, anil the robbery itself a kingdom on a small scale ? And in Ezechiel xxii. it is said : the princes in its midst as wolves ravening their prey. Wherefore they are bound to restoration like robbers, and they sin more grievous­ ly, inasmuch as they can act more dangerously and more fre­ quently against that justice of which they have been placed the custodians.” “ Dicendum quod si principes a subditis exigant quod eis secundum justitiam debetur propter bonum commune conser­ vandum, etiam si violentia ad hibeatur non est rapina sivero aliquid principes indebite extorqueant per violentiam rapina est sicut et latrocinium. Unde dicit Augustinus in 4 de Civ. Dei: “ Remota justitia quid sunt regna nisi magna latrocin­ ia, quia et ipsa latrocinia quid sunt nisi parva reqna ? ” Et Ezech. xxii. 27. Principes ejus in medio (jus quasi lupi rapientes ■praedam. Unde ad restitutionem tenentur sicut et latrones quanto periculosius et communius contra publicam justitiam agant cujus custodes sunt positi.” We remark in conclusion that if SL Thomas ever thought of admitting such a right as the eminent domain, it would be absurd for him to speak of robbery and rapine in connection with a government, because if a government took anything or all from its citizens, it would only be availing itself and car­ rying into effect its own right ; and none could complain. CHAPTER VL Doctrine of St. Thomas on the Use of Peopeety. A modern writer has asserted in a very plausible article published in the leading paper which advocates the new form of communism and socialism, that the Angelic Doctor admits the right of private ownership in land or other things ; yet he maintains the doctrine of St. Thomas to be that aijx-wie . enjoying such right must make use of his property or its fruits for the common good! The great text alleged in support of this assertion is taken from the 2 art. of the Qu. 66, 2-2, corp., wherein St. Thomas says: “The next thing which concerns man as to exterior things is their use' and as to this man must not hold exterior things as his own, but as common.’’ Upon this text the writer alluded to has raised the grand structure of what he calls Scholastic or Medieval Communism. We will, in the first place, give here the real theory of St. Thomas with regard to the use of one’s property or its fruits, as flows logically from the right of property. In the second place, we will examine the text just quoted, and show that the writer alluded to has clearly mistaken the sense in which St. Thomas has spoken of the use of property, the Holy Doctor explaining in the self-same text in what sense are his words to be understood. Thirdly, we will bring forward all the parallel texts con­ firming the real meaning of St. Thomas on the use of prop­ erty. As to the first, St. Thomas, in the Opus. 72, Ch. 9, lavs down the theory he holds with regard to the use which a man can make of his lawful property. “ We-say in the first place that the'ownerof a certain thing iamlso_the_owner of the use of the same thing.’’ “Dicimus Primo quoTqui dominus est alicujus rei, dominus est et usus ejusdem rei.” The. Doctrine of St. Thomas " We say in th? wmiil plwe that the real owner of a thing mav transfer itto another gratisTor for a consideration, or in exchange for another thing."'■ 1 Dicimus secundo quod dominus verus alicnjus rei potest eam transferre in alterum gratis, vel etiam pro pretio et pro commutatione alterius rei. “ W e say, moreover, in the third pi,un thnf τη i.wno- may transfer the use and the fruit of his own propertyDicimus insuper tertio quod dominus potest transferre usum et fructum propriæ rei. “ We say also in the fourth place that as the true owner of a thing can give away, or sell the property of~the thing, or the use or fruits of certain possession simply for iîlt time (fee simple)7s0~he can give away or sell it for a certain definite Dicimus etiam quarto quod verus dominus rei sicut potest dare vel vendere proprietatem rei, vel usum seu fructas alicnjus possessionis, simpliciter quantum ad omne tempus, sic potest dare vel vendere quantum ad tempus determinatum vel particulare. 1Q ^Q5v if a man who is master and owner of a property is also ■master of itsjise^iugording to the Angelic Doctor and can .transfer not onli the dominion of such property as a gift, or for a price, or in exchange, but also the use and fruits of such property, if he_ caii^gangfer_the useonly of such property. reservipg_to_Iiimself flie dominium^vér it : if lie ι·.ιη give or sell the property or its use simply aZd forever, or for a cer­ tain specified time, sm-eir^-wppld-l idiculous to suppose that sucn a man is hohjj roperty foKtli perfect right over his own property and its use so that he can give away or sell or exchange either the property and its use or one or the other, and all this as he pleases forever and in fee simple or for a certain time and what more could he desire? What, more have the most zealous advocates of the right of property and its use have even claimed ? And if St Thomas grants all this to a pro­ prietor. how can he be supposed to teach that a man must not have the use of exterior things except for the common good ? on the Right of Property and of its Use. yj Could St. Thomas, the keenest and the most comprehensive intellect that ever adorned mankind, contradict himself so flagrantly and so childishly ? Add to this that St. Thomas unhesitatingly and categorically lays down the principle that all those rights of the owner of a property to do just what he pleases with it or with its use, give away one or the other or both forever or for a time, or sell both or either for a price or in exchange, all such rights follow logically from the very essence of dominium. “ Omnia ista probantur per ipsam rationem in dominii.” So that, admitting the dominium, all those rights follow as a necessary consequence. But let us come to the real meaning of the words which have given such unfounded hope to' our new reformers of numbering St. Thomas among their ranks. Here are the words in full. “ Aliud vero quod competit homini circa res ex­ teriores est usus ipsarum, et quantum ad hoc non debet homo habere res exteriores ut proprias sed ut communes.” That is to say : “ Another thing concerns man with regard to exterior things ; that is, their use and as to that man should not have exterior things, as his own.” Pray, in what sense does St. Thomas say this. lu the sense that the real owner of a thing is not the master also of its use, so that he cannot give or sell or exchange the thing or its use ? Certainly not but in the sense which the Saint explains in the next words : “ Ut scilicet de facili aliquis eas communicet in necessitate ali­ orum ; that is to say, that one may be disposed easily to com municate them when others are in want” In other words, St. Thomas exr>re°°°° nglnpddnty-·ιηή the stunemai the latter can order the confiscation of the property of every one of its citizens and hold it in common for them, and use the fruits and the rents for the common good. What a grand invention for political, social, civil, domestic slavery and thraldom ! ! It is worthy of the new reformers ! St Thomas, on the contrary, loudly proclaims, in his grand philosophy, the true philosophy of freemen, freemen who are made so by truth, that every tittle taken by the government • of a country which is not necessary for the maintenance of the government, for the internal and external peace and protection of its citizens, is nothing but sheer robbery, worse than ra­ pine, and the offensor is bound to restitution on pain of dam­ nation, be he a king, a president, an emperor or a misguided reformer and philanthropist. We conclude this essay with some words of Leo XIII., which recapitulate the whole doc­ trine of St. Thomas as we have tried to explain it “ As socialists traduce the right of property as human invention, opposed to the natural equality of men, and pre­ tending a community of goods, proclaim that poverty should I /401 46 The Doctrine oj St. Thomas. not be patiently borne with, and that the possessions of the rich should be violated with impunity, the Church of God, with greater safety and advantage, acknowledges the in­ equality among men, so different in mind and body, also in the possession of riches·, and commands that the right of dominium and property should be kept safe and inviolate to every one. For she knows that theft and rapine have been so forbidden by God, the author and avenger of every right, as to render even the lust after what belongs to another un­ lawful ; and that thieves ' and robbers, like adulterers and idolaters, shall be excluded from the kingdom of God. Nor does she néglect the care of the poor, or did ever the good Mother omit to relieve them in their wants. For she strictly enjoins the rich to give their superfluous to the poor,’’ etc. Cum enim socialiste jus proprietatis tanquam humanum inventum naturali hominum æqualitati repugnans traducant et communionem bonorum affectantes pauperiem haud æquo animo esse perferendam et ditiorum possessiones ac jura impune violari posse arbitrentur, Ecclesia multos satius et utilius inæqualitatem inter homines corporis ingeniique naturaliter diversos, etiam in bonis possidendis agnoscit et jus proprietatis ac dominii ab ipsa natura profectum intac­ tum cuilibet et inviolatum esse jubet ; novit enim furtum ac rapinam a Deo omnis juris auctore et vindice ita fuisse pro­ hibita ut aliena vel concupiscere non liceat furesque et rap­ tores non secus ac adulteri et idoiatros a coelesti regno exclu­ dantur. Nec tamen idcino pauperum curam negligit aut ipsorum necessitatibus consulere pia mater præteruit. Gravissimo divites urget præcepto ut quod superest pauperi­ bus tribuant etc. : Enciclica Quod Apostolici.