THE DOCTRINE OF THE COMMON GOOD
OF CIVIL SOCIETY
IN THE WORKS OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate School
of the University 0/ Notre Dame
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

by

Jaime Velez-Saenz

Department of Philosophy
Notre Dame, Indiana
April, 1951

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4PREFACE

The question of the common good, of civil society was never devel­
oped or discussed in a systematic manner by Saint Thomas, but the
theses which he expounded in relation to it, while treating other sub­
jects, can be summarized in a doctrinal body, which could be re­
garded as the “theory of the common good” of Saint Thomas. To or­
ganize these theses to the extent that is warranted by the condition in
which they appear in his works, as well as to examine what is needed
to complete the theory, which is not included explicitly in those works,
is the main purpose of this dissertation. The fragmentary and scat­
tered character of materials bearing· upon this cpiestion in Saint
Thomas’ writings requires a considerable amount of interpretation,
inference, and even some times harmonizing of those texts which at
least appear contradictory. This we have tried to do in writing this
dissertation. Moreover, we have taken special pains to remain within
the limits of what, historically, are the personal teachings of Saint
Thomas, as distinct from what has been a development of Thomism
from his time up to the present. On the other hand, since it is not
always easy to distinguish between what he actually declared or in­
timated, and what is merely implicit in his teaching, it has not been
possible to avoid completely recourse to Cardinal Cajetan and John of
St. Thomas, two of his greatest commentators. We have tried to use
their commentaries only in an instrumental way, so to speak, toward
ascertaining what Saint Thomas’ own thought actually was, without in­
troducing elements unwarranted by those texts.

Recent discussions among the disciples of Saint Thomas concerning
the common good of civil society have made apparent the confused and
undeveloped condition of this question in current Thomistic philosophy.
Accordingly, before proceeding to integrate into a new synthesis what­
ever may have been gained in these discussions, it would seem advis­
able, as a preliminary task, to settle the state of the problem such as
it can be determined on the basis of what is contained in the writings
of Saint Thomas.
The primary sources for this dissertation have been chiefly the
Summa Theologica, the Summa contra Gentes, the Commentaries on
the Ethics and Politics of Aristotle/and the De Regimine Princfpum~ It has been unquestionably established by scholars that of the
Commentary on the Politics only the first four books and, of the De
Regimine, the first book and the first five chapters of the second book

iii

1V

PREFACE

other four booksoTthe^^m^nt^r”138’ f^Ithough u seems that the

faithful disciple of Saint~Thorn»—F"n —Politics were written by a
hence represent the Xr's
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notes °f «« master, and
them in this dissertation for wp ha0^*’ *ittle Use has been made of
Thomas personally wrote as an add,?
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of others be attributed to him The r
safeguard lest the thoughts
Principum is known to have
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
sources: some of tte Qwata^’n·1’®®?’ Of course> used as basic
the De Veritate and Dè^CarîtateT· tï^T^^’ f°r instancef especially
a«d eveiT^Fki suchTs
th
on the Sentences,
totle, in which one would
Metaphysics of Arisof the common good, but which in fact <?° flnd an^thin& on the question
contain some materials whtoh^n^
occasionally, or

totle’sgthoigM%qhXI*S*Commentaer
Thomas’ in discussing Arispounding his oin idels^S—^ ~ ^-S and P°Htics, is ex_
indicating his own, it dies not setVih^1"^ another’s ideas without
a satisfactory and generally amont d at schoiars have as yet reached
throughout this dissertation wn Ptnd P°sition- Therefore we have
of accepting the ideas and doctrin^1*7 f°llowed the practical expedient
Aristotle as ideas and doctrines ofthe Commentaries on
also to be found in the works in wh'Î? Thomas whenever they are
teaching. With regard to the coÎ'
Thomas sets forth his own
pally, the Summas^ the^e',^

I want to give herp a
who have helped to make* thi^di ®xprfssion of my gratitude to those
indebted to the Reverend
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Possible. I am especially
assistance and encouraging intérêt?™’ C' S* C'’ for his frecluent
University of Notre Dame· to mv d
?ng my graduate studies at the
kindness and patience throughout mvwork
d
Simon’ for his
suggestions and invaluabte advice Τ^ ρηΛ
the many fruitiul
given me during the preparatton ΙΛμ eaCouraf®ment which he has
Lanigan, who carefully and thX. f|? dlssertation; and to Mr. Joseph
English version of this thesis.
g 7 corrected the language of the

Preface...........................................................................
Table of Contents.........................................................
Introduction.................................................................. ..

Chapter I................................................ ..........................
Chapter π...........................................................................

Chapter m.........................................................................
Conclusion........................ „............................................

Bibliography......................................................................

INTRODUCTION

In the works of Saint Thomas the very general concept of a “good”
which in some form or other is shared by several beings at the same
time, or towards which different beings are ordained, is usually
termed a "common good” (bonum commune). God, for example, is the
common good of the whole universe;1 the Church has a common good,12
and the Divine Good, the object of beatitude, is common to the celes­
tial society.3 Sometimes, instead of speaking of a good, Saint Thomas
speaks of an end (finis) common to an entire order of beings; but
since, according to his doctrine, everything that has the ratio of end
has the ratio of good,4 this end will be as such a common good for all
those beings which tend towards it. Thus, God, who is the supreme
end of the universe, is also the good to which all created beings as­
pire.5 And there is, of course, a common good of civil society. These
examples suffice to show that the meaning of the expression “common
good” varies very much from one case to another. The meaning, in
fact, is analogical, not only when it applies both to God and to crea­
tures, but also when it is said of various subjects within the order of
created being alone. And even when such an expression refers to the
good of an entire community, its meaning is not always the same, for
in different cases different kinds of goods are said to be common to
that community. This is why it is often rightly remarked that Saint
1. In I ad Cor.: “Deus est commune bonum totius universi."
2. Ττΐ,~ϊ11ξ 5, ad 1: “gratia gratis data ordinatur ad bonum commune
Ecclesiae. ”
3. De Car., 2: “inquantum admittitur ad participandum bonum alicujus
civitatis »... competunt ei [homini] virtutes quaedam...ad amandum
bonum civitatis; ita cum homo per divinam gratiam admittatur in
participationem caelestis beatitudinis, quae in visione et fruitione
Dei consistit, fit quasi civis et socius illius beatae societatis, quae
vocatur caelestis Hierusalem... Unde homini sic ad caelestia adscripto competunt quaedam vir tute s... ad quarum debitam operation­
em praeexigitur amor boni communis toti societati, quod est bonum
divinum, prout est beatitudinis objectum.”
4. De Ver., 21, 2: “omne id quod invenitur habere rationem finis, habet
et rationem boni. ”
5. I, 44, 4: “unaquaeque creatura intendit consequi suam perfectionem,
quae est similitudo perfectionis et bonitatis divinae. Sic ergo divina
bonitas est finis rerum omnium." I, 65, 2: “totum universum, cum
singulis suis partibus, ordinatur in Deum, sicut in finem.”

1

2

INTRODUCTION

Thomas’ notion of the common good is an elusive one, and not equally
clear or easy to grasp in all its range. However, in spite of the dif­
fering senses it bears in the usage of Saint Thomas, the notion of the
common good of civil society presents certain basic characteristics
sufficiently definite to set it in sharp contrast with other doctrines
and tendencies about what society is and what it ought to propose as
its aim. In fact, that very term is often used in order to designate
whatever kind of well-being the State is expected, by differing politi­
cal schools, to secure for all society, and within such usage it proves
to be easy to indulge in imaginings of goods which ought to be ends
for the united work of State and society. But do those things with
which the imagination fills the term ·common good” correspond with
the conception of Saint Thomas ? They do not: because his notion,
even if large and sometimes elusive, does not admit of such loose and
indiscriminate accumulation of goods.

Saint Thomas’ teachings about the common good of civil society
can be organized on the basis of three principles: the specificity of
the common good--“bonum commune civitatis et bonum singulare
unius personae non differunt solum secundum multum et paucum, sed
secundum formalem differentiam;”6 its contents, that is, the matter,
as it were, in which the common good consists, which is above all the
good life of the multitude--*civitas est communitas perfecta... ex ejus
esse provenit quod homines non solum vivant, sed quod bene vivant,
inquantum per leges civitatis ordinatur vita hominum ad virtutes,·”7 —
and its primacy over all private good--“bonum commune melius est
quam bonum particulare unius.”8 The principle of specificity leads to
the discussion of the ontological structure of society as ground for the
demonstration that a corresponding good must exist for it as a col­
lective entity. The nature of this good is ascertained through the con­
sideration of its ethical aspect, namely the bene vivere which society
is called upon to achieve as the communitas perfecta. These first
two principles can be said to characterize the common good in itself;
the third, namely, its primacy over the private good of an individual,
puts it in relation with other kinds of goods and assigns to it in rela­
tion to the rest its proper preeminence. In this dissertation a chap­
ter has been devoted to each one of these three principles.

6. II-II. 58, 7, ad 2.
7. In Pol., I, 1,#17.
8. S.c.G., III, 146.

Chapter I
THE SPECIFICITY OF THE COMMON GOOD OF POLITICAL SOCIETY

The idea that there is a good which is shared by the members of
any human community whatever--a family, a village, a tribe, a city-was a subject of important speculations in Greek moral philosophy,
hi The Republic, Plato proposes to find out what is the life of the vir­
tuous-man; and through the comparing, or rather the paralleling, of
the social organism and the individual soul, he further investigates in
the state, or polis, the elements of virtuous life. For the soul, these
elements are wisdom, fortitude and temperance, all unified in and by
justice; in like manner, whatever state oriolis possesses them will also
be just, and at the same time happy. The main theme in the political
philosophy of Aristotle, as in that of Plato, is an inquiry into what con­
stitutes the happiness of political life, and the conditions—i.e., the
different kinds of political regimes--through which alone such happi­
ness can be attained. The opening idea of Aristotle’s Politics is that
every human community tends toward some good.1 The community as
a whole has an end and this end is the “good life”; no polis is really
such which does not aim at realizing a just and good life as its proper
end.12 Furthermore, every kind of community differs specifically from
any other according to the end it purports to attain. The state or po­
litical community--or polis, as Aristotle knew it--is the all-embrac­
ing and highest form of human association; and, accordingly, the end
which corresponds to it is the highest among human goods. This good
is not greater in a merely quantitative fashion, as though it were
simply the result of adding up the goods of lower and partial commun­
ities, or those of its individual members; on the contrary, it differs in
kind, or qualitatively, from all other goods, since it is the one belong­
ing to a community whose essential traits consist in being self-suf­
ficient and in containing within itself all other kinds of human asso­
ciation. Thus, the good at which civil or political society aims as its
1. Pol., I, 1, 1252 a 1: “Observation shows us, first, that every polis
(or state) is a species of association, and, secondly, that all asso­
ciations are instituted for the purpose of attaining some good.”
2. These two ideas, namely, that the community as such has an end,
and that this end consists in the “good life’’--which is at the same
time the happy life and life according to virtue --appear once and
again throughout the Politics. The second idea is most thoroughly
discussed in Book IIlZ

3

4

SPECIFICITY OF COMMON GOOD OF POLITICAL SOCIETY

own and specific end distinguishes it from any other kind of com­
munity. Aristotle rejects the criterion of more or less in the number
of individuals that make up a community as the explanatory principle
of the differences obtaining among the various kinds of community.3

These themes are classic in the political philosophy which takes
its inspiration from Aristotle; in the works of Saint Thomas Aquinas
as well as in the political doctrines of his school they constitute the
thesis of “the specificity of the common good.” “Alia est enim ratio
boni communis et boni singularis.”4 There are many similar formu­
las which briefly and clearly express this thought. In his Commen­
tary on the Politics, Saint Thomas expounded in extenso all these
Aristotelian ideas. But they are also his own doctrines, as clearly
appears from a great many passages in some of his works, especially
in both Summas and the De Regimine Principum. Thus Saint Thomas
stresses again and again the principle of finality in human affairs:
wherever there is human activity there is an end for it, since it is in
view of an end that man acts according to his nature.5 This holds
true not only for each man acting individually but also for every so­
ciety as such: they are instituted and they exist in order to attain
some end. And so, the tendency of every human community toward an
3. Pol., I, 1, 1252 a 7: “It is a mistake to believe that the ‘statesman’
is the same as the monarch of a kingdom, or the manager of a
household, or the master of a number of slaves. Those who hold
this view consider that each of these persons differs from the oth­
ers not with a difference of kind, but according to the number, or
the paucity, of the persons with whom he deals. On this view a man
who is concerned with few persons is a master: one who is con­
cerned with more is the manager of a household: one who is con­
cerned with still more is a ‘statesman,’ or a monarch. This view
abolishes any real difference between a large household and a
small polis... But this is a view which cannot be accepted as cor­
rect. "
4. II-II, 58, 7, ad 2. The context is as follows; “Bonum commune civ­
itatis et bonum singulare unius personae non differunt solum sec­
undum multum et paucum, sed secundum formalem differentiam.
Alia est enim ratio boni communis et boni singularis, sicut alia est
ratio totius et partis. ”
5. I-II, 1,1: “omnes actiones, quae procedunt ab aliqua potentia,
causantur ab ea secundum rationem sui objecti; objectum autem
voluntatis est finis, et bonum; unde oportet, quod omnes actiones
humanae propter finem sirtt. ” Before stating this conclusion Saint
Thomas makes in the same article the distinction between “actiones
proprie humanae, ** which belong to man as endowed with reason and
will, and all those which proceed from man not as such ("hominis
actiones”).

SPECIFICITY OF COMMON GOOD OF POLITICAL SOCIETY

5

end which is its own good6 is so manifest, for Saint Thomas that when
he speaks of that end it is not in order to demons trate its existence
but to determine what kind of end it is, what its content is, how it dif­
fers from the ends of other species of community. The existence of
that good being simply manifest, it is the question of its specific con­
tent that is asked.
Saint Thomas likewise, following Aristotle, holds that civil society
(civitas or civilis multitudo, the equivalent of the Aristotelian polis),
the family and some other associations generally found among men
differ from each other,not according to more or less (“secundum multum et paucum”) but specifically.7 Furthermore, there is also a for­
mal difference between the common good of a community and the pri­
vate good of any individual;8 the good proper to civil society, or the
“civitas,” as Saint Thomas often calls it, differs from a singular per­
son’s good in the same way as the ratio of whole is distinct from the
ratio of part; that is, formally.9 This means that in order properly
to account for its formality, the common good of society must be con­
sidered as a new and qualitatively autonomous species of good.

What has just been said will suffice as a summary of the main
positions of Saint Thomas on this subject. Before proceeding to a
systematic treatment and development of them it is necessary first to
determine the meaning of the concept of “civitas” in Saint Thomas,
and to distinguish clearly between the two senses of which the notion
of the specificity of the common good admits.
6. Every end has the ratio of a good: “omne agens agit propter finem,
qui habet rationem boni.” (I-II, 94, 2). But a good can be either
real or apparent: “bonum, ad quod aliquis respiciens operatur, non
semper est verum bonum, sed quandoque verum, et quandoque ap­
parens.” (I-II, 18, 4, ad 1).
7. See text of II-II, 58, 7 ad 2, quoted in note 4, p. 4. Following that
passage and in answer to one of the objections brought in in the ar­
ticle, Saint Thomas refers to Aristotle’s doctrine (Pol., I, 1, 1252
a 7), which he evidently makes his own, when he says that “non bene
dicunt qui dicunt civitatem et domum et alia hujusmodi differre
solum multitudine et paucitate, et non specie.” (ibid.).
8. II-II, 47, 11: “ratio formalis omnium, quae sunt ad finem, attenditur
ex parte finis... Diversi autem fines sunt bonum proprium unius, et
bonum familiae, et bonum civitatis, et regni.” This is said by Saint
Thomas in the course of his demonstration that political prudence,
the object of which is the good of society, is not of the same species
as the prudence which deals with the good of an individual, just be—. cause the objects of both kinds of prudence differ also in species.
C.9.. II-II, 58, 7: “Alia est enim ratio boni communis et boni singularis,
sicut alia est ratio totius et partis.”

6

SPECIFICITY OF COMMON GOOD OF POLITICAL SOCIETY

In adopting the concept of “civitas” Saint Thomas followed Aris­
totle in his notion of the polis as the most perfect and the only selfsufficient form of community, as well as the one which includes with- *
in itself all other forms. The polis that Aristotle wrote about or,
more exactly, the one he had in view as the basis for his speculation,
was the city-state of ancient Greece. Different and larger types of
community, such as the regnum, were prevalent in the medieval world
Saint Thomas knew. He was well aware of that difference; in fact, he
sometimes seems to feel that the word “civitas” (for polls) would
rather mean something like the medieval city, and then he is careful
to mention the regnum after the civitas, even in those formulas in
. which he follows the Philosopher most closely. But it is in just such
cases made clear that he thinks that what can be said of the polis ap­
plies properly to both the civitas and the regnum.1011Whether he had
in mind the Greek city-state, or the medieval city, or the regnum, he
did not consider these historical varieties of decisive importance for
his abstract point of view as a philosopher. What concerned him much
more was rather a formalized notion capable of being attributed with
truth to any real form of society that has such self-sufficiency and
inclusiveness as meet the requirements of the Aristotelian definition.
Such a community is then what he meant by “civitas” or “civilis mul­
titudo.”
The specificity of the common good, as it was remarked above, ad­
mits of two distinct senses. According to the first of these the good
of the civitas is formally different from that of any other kind of
natural community, inasmuch as it is specifically richer and higher
in goodness than any one of them. Thus, the goods which different
types of community strive to attain have--notwithstanding their being
common goods--a corresponding difference of contents. According to
the other sense, society’s common good differs formally from the
private goods of the individuals which make it up, because it is a
whole with regard to them, which are its parts. In other words,
10. For instance in II-II, 47, 11 (in a passage quoted above, note 8,
p. 5). In the same article, after speaking of the different species
of prudence according to the different kinds of goods (the individual
good and that of the family), he concludes: “et tertia [prudentia]
politica, quae ordinatur ad bonum commune civitatis, vel regni.”
Likewise, in II-II, 50, 1: “in eo qui non solum seipsum habet regere,
sed etiam communitatem perfectam civitatis vel regni, invenitur
specialis et perfecta ratio regiminis... Et ideo regi, ad quem per­
tinet regere civitatem vel regnum, prudentia competit secundum
specialem et perfectissimam sui rationem.” According to these
texts, both the civitas and regnum are the object of the same kind
of prudence.

SPECIFICITY OF COMMON GOOD OF POLITICAL SOCIETY

7

insofar as the ratio of whole is realized in such a collective being as
a community, the good that belongs to it cannot but be different from
the goods proper to the parts just as the ratio of whole is different
from the ratio of part.
The first sense of the notion of specificity emphasizes the diver­
sity of contents of two goods both of which may well be common, yet
different, as when the good of civil society is compared with that of
domestic society. What is envisaged here is not that the family
stands in relation to civil society as a part to its whole, but only that
their respective goods are not composed of the same elements: in
fact, society’s common good is qualitatively richer and higher than
the family’s. This is the specific difference which is erroneously
denied, according to Aristotle, by those who see only a difference of
number between the household and the polis, and for whom, therefore,
there is no specific distinction whatsoever between a great household
and a small state.11 In order to refute this view, Aristotle under­
takes in the first book of the Politics an analysis of the origin, nature
and functions of the family. The latter is “the first form of asso­
ciation naturally instituted for the satisfaction of daily recurrent
needs,” and is the first thing to arise from the two elementary rela­
tionships of man and woman, master and slave.12 These two rela·»
tionships originate directly from the necessity of providing for the
reproduction and preservation of the human species; and the good for
whose attainment the family first arose does not comprise more than
the satisfaction of everyday wants. On the contrary, the polis, trans. tending even the condition of the village but yet deriving from the
domestic group, out of the primary needs of living, goes on existing
with the purpose of the “good life”--of life secundum virtutem, as
11. Pol., I, 1, 1252 a 12. The context of the Politics in which this
position is criticized by Aristotle refers only to the differences in
kind among domestic and political regimes. Why is it also consid­
ered as a source of the Thomistic doctrine of the specificity of the
common good itself? The answer can be inferred from the com­
mentary of Saint Thomas on this passage. He says that among the
four regimes considered, two of them — the royal one and that of the
politikos, or constitutional — are related to civil society; the other
two--that of the householder, or oeconomicum, and that of the mas­
ter, or despoticum--are related to the family. Cf. In Pol., I, 1, #3.
Now, since the difference between these two sets of regimes (as
well as within those of each set) is above all a difference in kind,
it is inferred that such a difference must be ultimately based on the
specific diversity of the ends and goods of society and family, the
reason being that specifically different ends call for a correspon­
ding difference in the regimes which are suitable to serve them.
12. Pol., I, 2, 1252 b 9.

8

SPECIFICITY OF COMMON GOOD OF POLITICAL SOCIETY

Saint Thomas shall say later-- the end and accomplishment of all the
possibilities of human nature.13 This “good life,” which is a life ac­
cording to what is most specific in man, namely, his reason, is the
end of the polis, and within the polis alone can it be served; it is a
richer, more noble good than the one which the family secures for
its members. Although the family and the polis differ in the number
of individuals that compose them, the greater number of people found
in the polis is only a necessary condition--relative to the material
causality--of its existence. The polis alone is self-sufficing, because
being the most perfect form of community it is the end to which all
lower communities are ordained, and, furthermore, while including
all of them it is not included by any.14 The question then arises in
what consists that supreme good which is attainable in the polis alone
and which makes it self-sufficing. To describe the content of that
good is at the same time to evince its specific formality, especially
as opposed to the end of the household, which is “the satisfaction of
daily recurrent needs.”15
It is this aspect of the specificity of the common good which is ex­
plicitly referred to in the opening chapters of the Politics and which
constitutes one of the underlying themes throughoüTthïFwork, which,
as a continuation of the doctrines of the Nicomachean Ethics on the
highest form of human life and happiness, discusses^the means that
are conducive to their realization in the polis.16 The second aspect—
the formal diversity between the whole and its parts--is not discussed
or even mentioned in the Politics; some implication of it, however, is
13. Cf. Pol., I, 2, 1252 b 32.
14. Pol·, I, 2, 1252 b 35.
15. Pol., I, 2, 1252 b 12. This statement does not represent, however,
Aristotle’s complete doctrine on the family. In Ethics, VIII, 11,
1161 a 17 he says that the three goods children receive from their
parents are their existence, nurture and upbringing; thus, he
places in the family an educational function of the offspring. He
speaks also very explicitly about all the members of the family
benefiting from the different relationships of friendship existing
among them, and from the mutual love and help deriving there­
from. Cf. Eth., VIII, 11 and 12, passim. But the family, however
high may be the good it is destined to bring about, is not a perfect
and self-sufficing community. Only a higher kind of community,
the polis, is the adequate milieu in which to achieve all the excel­
lences of which human nature is capable: these exceed the possi­
bilities of the domestic community and can be attained by man only
as a member of the city. This is the point which Aristotle intends
in the section of the Politics under consideration.
16. Cf Eth., X, 9, 1181 b 12 to 23 (final paragraph of the Ethics), where
a programme for the Politics is stated.

SPECIFICITY OF COMMON GOOD OF POLITICAL SOCIETY

9

contained in Aristotle’s criticism of those who attempt an explanation
of the diversity of regimes by means of the greater or lesser number
of their subjects. In Saint Thomas, on the contrary, this aspect is
clearly brought forth in the statement that the difference between com­
mon good and private good is equivalent to the difference between the
rationes of whole and part.
That which is chiefly and fundamentally implied in this statement
when applied to the common good is a certain position with regard to
the ontological structure of society and the specific type of being which
is brought into existence when a multitude of human beings live to­
gether in a community. This subject will be developed in the remain­
der of this chapter.17 But first of all it is necessary to reach a clear
notion of the kind of whole which society is in the ontological order;
otherwise, an adequate understanding of the common good, principally
in its relationship with the social subject in which it is embodied and
with the individuals which make up that subject, cannot be reached.
Certainly, the exact determination of the position that the individual
goods should be given with regard to the community welfare is a
problem that fully belongs in the field of ethics, and therefore it can
be solved with ethical criteria alone; yet, the starting point for a cor­
rect solution of this problem lies in an ontological consideration of
the social whole. Actually, the existence of society as a being formal­
ly different from a collection of individuals determines somehow the
existence of a common good irreducible in its turn to a sum of private
goods. The attempt to reduce the properties of a group as such to the
quantitative combinations of its individual elements or the attempt to
account for the former solely in the terms of the latter is the idea
which is common to the social and political doctrines or tendencies
vaguely called individualist.1819
Such is not the Thomistic conception of the common good. In Saint
Thomas’ doctrines that conception is inseparable—and necessarily in­
separable--from certain basic positions about the ontological struc­
ture of the “ens sociale.” The point which comes into consideration
here is whether this ens is a “totum”, and, if so, what kind of “totum”
it is in the metaphysical order. Whence it will follow that the ratio
of the good proper to a social whole and the ratio of the private good
differ in the same way that the whole and the part do.18
17. The characteristic properties of the good which only in civil so­
ciety can be realized--in other words, the content of the common
good--will be the subject of the next chapter.
18. Cf. Andre Lalande, Vocabulaire Technique et Critique de la Philo­
sophie, vol. I, 4th. edition, Paris, 1938, under the article Individua­
lisme.
19. II-II, 58, 7, ad 2: “Alia est enim ratio boni communis et boni sin­
gularis, sicut alia est ratio totius et partis."

10

SPECIFICITY OF COMMON GOOD OF POLITICAL SOCIETY

SPECIFICITY OF COMMON GOOD OF POLITICAL SOCIETY

11

What is the meaning of a whole, a totum ? In his Commentary on
there is a totum only insofar as that creature is endowed with a plur­
the Physics Saint Thomas defines the totum by repeating almost lit­
ality of powers: intellect, will, senses, etc. The ratio of whole is ac­
erally Aristotle’s words in his definition of 8λον.20 “Definitur enim
tualized in all these different kinds of beings, although in diverse
unumquodque totum esse, cui nihil deest; sicut dicimus hominem totum
ways: a plurality of elements which are mutually interrelated and
aut arcam totam, quibus nihil deest eorum quae debent habere... Cum
Which, through their integration, act in an all-embracing unity.
autem aliquid desit per absentiam alicujus intrinseci, tunc non est
For a thing to be a whole it is not necessary that it be a substance.
totum. Sic igitur manifestum est, quod haec est definitio totius: ‘totum
But the ratio of unity belongs essentially to the whole; however, there
est, cujus nihil est extra’.”21 There is a whole, then, whenever there
can be wholes which are one, which have unity simpliciter, and wholes
exists an aggregate of elements of any kind whatsoever such that,
which are one secundum quid.23 There are wholes which~without hav­
coexisting together in any way, they are destined to their mutual com­
ing a substantial unity, are nonetheless wholes, and it is in this man­
pletion and to their being integrated into one higher and all-inclusive
ner that many men form one society and many stones one heap.24
being. Thus, the ratio of whole includes that of being complete in it­
Now it is to be asked whether all that has been said about whole in
self, or being perfect. This is why, after the passage above quoted of
general holds true when said of a human community. The answer is
his Commentary on the Physics, Saint Thomas adds the remark that
no doubt affirmative; every human community is a whole and as such
whole and perfect~are either entirely the same thing or closely akin;
it shares fully in all the properties belonging to wholes. In fact,
if they are not absolutely equivalent it is because whole or totum canthe composing elements of any association whatsoever of human
not be said of what is simple, since what is simple has no parts; yet
beings are always mutually related in such a way as to form
the latter can be said to be perfectum.22 Whence the ratio of totum
one system embracing all of them in its unity.
This unity is
includes both having parts and being able to exist without depending on
sufficient for these elements thus related to be constituted into
anything else for carrying out its existence--on account of its com­
a whole.25 As for civil society, it includes in its unity not only
pleteness. On the other hand, the ratio of part has the meaning of
individuals but also all lower communities.26 It is, then, easy to see
something imperfect or incomplete in itself, which on this account is
that any community formed by men—and, specifically, civil society—
destined to be integrated into a superior and complete entity—the
meets the definition of whole. However, the kind of totum that society
whole, so as to be able to exist either in an absolute way, like the hand
is does not belong to any of the four species above enumerated, name­
with regard to the body, or at least under those properties and for­
ly, the genus, the essence, the whole constituted by the powers of a
malities which a being derives from the whole to which it belongs as
23. For a discussion of the different kinds of totality, according as they
a part. The latter possibility is realized in the case of man, who ex­
have unity simpliciter or secundum quid, see infra, p. 12 and ff.
ists as a civis, and receives benefits as a civis, only if he is member of a
24. Ι-Π, 17, 4: “Quae sunt diversa secundum substantiam, et unum
civitas.
secundum accidens, sunt diversa simpliciter, et unum secundum
Now the concept of whole is analogical in Saint Thomas. A genus,
quid: sicut multi homines sunt unus populus, et multi lapides sunt
for instance, is a whole inasmuch as it embraces the species that
/ Unus acervus; quae est unitas compositionis aut ordinis."
come under it as its parts. An essence, that is, a mere possiblity of
There is no doubt that the definition of whole holds true of any
existence, or, also, that which confronts the intellect as an object
~ community whatsoever: a whole is id, cui nihil deest eorum quae
which specifies it, is likewise a whole, for it is constituted of elements
debet habere, or also, id, cujus nihil est extra (in Phys., III, lect.
or aspects which act as parts holding and implying each other in the
10, above quoted). It could be objected, however, that this definition
unity of the essence. In the quantitative whole, the parts coexist
applies also to things that normally are only parts--and that
outside of each other. In a spiritual and, therefore, simple creature
20. Phys., Ill, 6, 207 a 10: “we define the whole--that from which noth­
ing is wanting, as a whole man or a whole box. ..the whole is that of
which nothing is outside. "
21. In Phys., Ill, lect. 10.
jj»2. .Ibid. : “totum et perfectum, vel sunt penitus idem, vel sunt propiny qua secundum naturam. (Et hoc ideo dicit [Aristoteles] quia totum
non invenitur in simplicibus, quae non habent partes; in quibus
tamen utimur nomine perfecti). ”

therefore it is a bad definition: thus, if a hand does not lack anything
of what it must have it is a whole. But, for one thing, a hand can­
not exist isolated like an independent whole. On the other hand,
nothing prevents a thing from being a whole and a part at the same
time under different respects. And only the universe is a totum
par excellence: ita haec ratio totius competit ei, quod est vere et
proprie totum, scilicet in universo, extra quod simpliciter nihil
_______________
est. (in Phys.,
III,III,
lect.
lect.
ΙΟΥ.
TÔT
26. In Pol., I, 1, #2: “Manifestum est quod civitas includit omnes alias
communitates.”

12

SPECIFICITY OF COMMON GOOD OF POLITICAL SOCIETY

spiritual substance, and the quantitative whole. What kind of whole is
then a human community ? The answer depends on the kind of unity
which is proper to it. As for this, Saint Thomas says very explicitly
that it is a unity of order: “Hoc totum quod est civilis multitudo, vel
domestica familia, habet solam unitatem ordinis, secundum quam non
est aliquid simpliciter unum.”27
The expression “unitas ordinis" is applied by Saint Thomas to
beings of very different kinds. A heap of stones, for instance, is one
by unity of order,2829
and likewise a city is one inasmuch as it is made
up of houses.™ There is also a unity of order in every number.30 All
the creatures in the universe form a whole with that kind of unity,31
which is also the only possible one for many beings in the human
world, like a family, an army,32 civil society.33 The very diversity of
the beings which, according to Saint Thomas, possess only a unity of
order indicates that the order which unifies those beings is not of one
and the same kind for all. Thus, for example, among the beings that
have “unitas ordinis’ a first group is formed by those which at the
same time are *one” simpliciter--like numbers and syllables. On the
other hand, there are beings which, possessing also a unity of order,
have only a oneness secundum quid, like an army or a city.
This diversity of meanings of the expression “unitas ordinis” as
used by Saint Thomas is brought out very clearly by a comparison of
some of the texts in which that kind of unity is predicated of several
things. In a passage of his Commentary on the Metaphysics, for in­
stance, both the syllable and the number are said to be “one” sim­
pliciter, although not in the manner in which a substance is orie^but
only with a unity derived from an order. Unlike the unity of syllables
and numbers, the unity that obtains for some other kinds of beings
which are also made up of a multitude of elements is only secundum
quid. The reason for this difference, adds Saint Thomas, is that the
27.1 In Eth., I, 1, #5.
28. Cf. above p. 11, note 24.
29. S.c.G., IV, 35: “Fit unum ex multis: uno quidem modo, secundum
ordinem tantum, sicut ex multis domibus fit civitas, et ex multis
militibus fit exercitus.”
30. In Met., VII, 17, #1673: “...compositum quandoque sortitur speciem
ab aliquo uno, quod est vel forma, ut patet in corpore mixto; vel
compositio, ut patet in domo; vel ordo, ut patet in syllaba et
numero.” For a complete context of this passage and a commen­
tary on certain difficulties raised by it, see below, note 36, p. 13.
31. De Pot., 3, 16 ad 2: “creatura assimilatur Deo in unitate, ...inquanium omnes unum sunt unitate ordinis. "
32. S.c.G., IV, 35, the same passage quoted above in note 29.
33. ïü~E~th., I, 1,#5: “Hoc totum quod est civilis multitudo, vel domestïca familia, habet solam unitatem ordinis. " Cf. I-II, 17, 4.

SPECIFICITY OF COMMON GOOD OF POLITICAL SOCIETY

13

resulting compound may be specified either by something one--which
in its turn may be either a form, or a “compositio,” or an order--;
or by the multitude itself of the parts assembled7~as in the case of a
heap of stones or any association of human beings. In these latter in­
stances, when the specification is derived from the multitude, as such,
of the collected parts, ab ipsa multitudine partium collectarum,34 the
unity is only secundum quid.
hi the passage just cited the only kind of “unitas ordinis” which is
mentioned is the one which causes a thing to be one simpliciter. But
in texts of other works “unitas ordinis” is attributed by Saint Thomas
to wholes, the unity of which is merely secundum quid. The following­
can be given as examples: “Quae vero sunt diversa secundum sub­
stantiam, et unum secundum accidens, sunt diversa simpliciter, et
unum secundum quid; sicut multi homines sunt unus populus, et multi
lapides sunt unus acervus, quae est unitas compositionis aut or­
dinis;* 35 and: “Hoc totum quod est civilis multitudo, vel domestica
familia, habet solam unitatem ordinis, secundum quam non est aliquid
simpliciter unum.”36 Furthermore, it can be inferred from these
passages that not only is there “unitas ordinis” in beings that are
“one* secundum quid, but also that no other kind of unity is possible
In Met., VII, 17,# 1672^

The complete text is as follows: “Quan-

3oque enim ex multis fit compositio, ita quod totum compositum
ex multis est unum quoddam, sicut domus composita ex suis
partibus, et mixtum corpus ex elementis. Quandoque vero ex mul­
tis fit compositum, ita quod totum compositum non est unum sim­
pliciter, sed solum secundum quid; sicut patet in cumulo vel acervo
lapidum, cum partes sunt in actu, cum non sint continuae. Unde
simpliciter quidem est multa, sed solum secundum quid unum,
prout ista multa associantur sibi in loco.”# 1673: “Hujus autem
diversitatis ratio est, quia compositum quandoque sortitur speciem
ab aliquo uno, quod est vel forma, ut patet in corpore mixto; vel
compositio, ut patet in domo; vel ordo, ut patet in syllaba et num­
ero. Et tunc oportet quod totum compositum sit unum simpliciter.
Quandoque vero compositum sortitur speciem ab ipsa multitudine
partium collectarum, ut patet in acervo et populo, et aliis hujus­
modi: et in talibus, totum compositum non est unum simpliciter,
sed solum secundum quid. "
35. I-II, 17, 4.
36. In Eth., I, 1, # 5. It might seem that there is an incongruity be­
tween this passage and that of the Commentary on the Metaphysics
above quoted, (note 34). In fact, they are rather complementary.
The text of the Commentary on the Ethics refers only to that type
of unity of order which does not constitute a being simpliciter one;
but Saint Thomas does not either say or imply that such is the only
type of unity of order. Precisely the text quoted from the Commentary on the Metaphysics mentions a type of unity of order

SPECIFICITY OF COMMON GOOD OF POLITICAL SOCIETY

14

for beings which are simpliciter multa although one secundum quid37
--undoubtedly the lowest and most imperfect degree of unity.
Now, this is the case with every collective being; all of them es­
sentially imply two things, Saint Thomas says, namely, a plurality of
supposita, and a certain order whereby they are unified.38 This holds
true, then, of both a pile of stones and any human community whatso­
ever. However different these two types of collective being are under
many other respects, Saint Thomas does not hesitate to liken them
from the formal point of view of the plurality of their ultimate subject

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36. Continued
which causes a being to be one simpliciter. Thus, for instance,
both syllable and numer, which are specified by something one, ab
aliquo uno, and are therefore "one” simpliciter (“Et tunc oporiet
quod totum compositum sit unum simpliciter”)--possess neverthe­
less a unity of order. Since the kind of order which unifies a
being depends on the nature of the things to be ordered as well as
on the ordering principle, one kind of ordo would accordingly be
fitting to a simpliciter unum whereas another one would cause a
thing to be one merely secundum quid. In other words, unity of
order would not by itself imply, without further specification, either
unity simpliciter or unity secundum quid. This is the doctrine of
such an authoritative interpreter of Saint Thomas as John of Saint
Thomas, who in commenting on this very text of In Metaphysicorum,
writes: “ex pluribus entibus in actu non fit unum per se unitate
formae, bene tamen unitate ordinis et mensurae, sicut fit ex pluribut entibus in actu unum artefactum et unum sacramentum et unum
convivium. Habent enim ista unitatem per se, quatenus opponitur
unitati per accidens, quae sumitur a multitudine et non ab aliquo
uno, sive forma sive compositione sive ordine, ut vidimus ex S.
Thoma, 7 Metaph., lect. ult.” (In this text, the expressions per se
and per accidens obviously correspond to Saint Thomas’ expressions simpliciter and secundum quid unum respectively). A little
previously in the same article, John of Saint Thomas had written:
“distinguitur unitas ordinis in numero ab unitate exercitus vel
civitatis, quae sunt entia per accidens, eo quod in istis solum invenitur ordo relationis, qui non sufficit ad unitatem per se.”
(Log., Π, 16, 2).
37. Every being that is one secundum quid is one with unity of order
alone. According to the rules of the conversion of propositions,
the converse of this A--namely, every being that is one with unity
of order alone is one secundum quid--is not necessarily (and is not
_ actually) true. See above, note 36.
38? I, 31, 1, ad 2: “nomen collectivum duo importat, scilicet pluralitatem suppositorum, et unitatem quandam, scilicet ordinis alicujus;
populus enim est multitudo hominum sub aliquo ordine comprehensorum."

.

.

--

SPECIFICITY OF COMMON GOOD OF POLITICAL SOCIETY

15

of existence, since both a heap of stones and a society are simpliciter
multa: “multi homines sunt unus populus, et multi lapides sunt unus
acervus.w3e But if they are alike with respect to the necessary plur­
ality of their supposita, they of course are widely different as to the
order which befits them and holds them together, according to the
different natures of their supposita. Now, before discussing what is
contained in the quid whereby a society is given its own peculiar unity
of order, it is proper to consider another comparison, often made by
Saint Thomas, between a society and a living being. In fact, if from
the formal point of view already mentioned the pile of stones is much
more like a human community than the latter is like a living organ­
ism, the likening, on the other hand, of civil society and a living being
is also frequent in Saint Thomas, and is often made as an illustration
of the general relationships between whole and part. In such cases,
rather than emphasize the differences between a human community
and a living body, he likes to consider both kinds of being as organ­
isms in order to point out their similarities and draw conclusions
therefrom. In his Commentary on the Politics he writes:
“singuli homines comparantur ad totam civitatem, sicut partes
? hominis ad hominem. Quia sicut manus aut pes non potest esse
sine homine, ita nec unus homo est per se sibi sufficiens ad
vivendum separatus a civitate. Si autem contingat, quod aliquis
non possit communicare societate civitatis propter suam pravi­
tatem, est pejor quam homo, et quasi bestia. Si vero nullo in- digest, et quasi habens per se sufficientiam, et propter hoc non
sit pars civitatis, est melior quam homo. Est enim quasi
quidam deus.”39
40

Following Aristotle, Saint Thomas often uses this or similar com­
parisons when he discusses the relationships between an individual
and the society to which he belongs, or seeks to show the dependency
of the first upon the second, or when he states the primacy of so­
ciety’s general good over the good of a particular individual.41* In such
39. I-II, 17, 4.
40. In Pol., I, 1,#21.
àï'· For instance, II-II, 64, 2: “Omnis pars ordinatur ad totum ut im­
perfectum ad perfectum; et ideo omnis pars naturaliter est propter
totum. Et propter hoc videmus quod si saluti totius corporis hu­
mani expediat praecisio alicujus membri, puta cum est putridum
vel corruptivum aliorum membrorum, laudabiliter et salubriter
abscinditur.^ Quaelibet autem persona singularis comparatur ad
totam communitatem sicut pars ad totum/ Et ideo si aliquis homo
sit periculosus communitati, et corruptivus ipsius propter aliquod
peccatum, laudabiliter et salubriter occiditur, ut bonum commune
conservetur. ”

16

SPECIFICITY OF COMMON GOOD OF POLITICAL SOCIETY

cases, it is obvious that the living body is not compared to the social
organism in such wise as to suggest that an individual man would
cease to exist if he were segregated from his social whole, just as a
hand dies and is no longer a hand when cut off from its body. All that
the passage just quoted means and vividly stresses is that man is so­
cial and has need of social life for the development of his nature. But
from the point of view of existence it is obvious that an individual man
can keep on subsisting in his own identity and human nature when he
separates himself from the community and lives as a solitary. Both
the supposita in a society and the members of a living organism are
the necessary condition, in the order of material causality, for the
existence of their respective wholes, but only the supposita can exist
by themselves, separately and independently of each other and with­
out losing their ontological identity, because they are complete sub­
stances. The limbs of a living body, on the other hand, become cor­
rupt if the body dies or if they are separated from it; in this case the
parts cease to be what they specifically were in the organism; a
hand amputated from a body is no longer a hand, unless equivocally,
the way a stone hand can still be called a hand.42 Bound up with this
difference between a social whole and a biological organism is the
fact that every living body, being a substance, has a form in the strict
and proper sense of this word; and this form specifies the whole and
each of its parts and constitutes them in that species whereby they
are distinct from any other species. But in a being which is “one”
secundum quid there is no form in the proper sense; in its place there
is an order, whose function is similar to that of the form only inas­
much as this order constitutes the whole, makes it be such and such
and preserves its identity throughout the fluctuation and change of its
material subject.43 But, unlike the integral parts of a living body,
the members of a society do not receive their existence as supposita

42. In Pol., I, 1, #21: “destructo toto homine, non remanet pes neque
manus nisi aequivoce, eo modo quo manus lapidea posset dici
manus. ”
(43, A form in the proper sense of the term informs, and gives exis­
tence to, both the whole and each of its parts, such as the soul
does, as it is a substantial form. But an order, or a “compositio,”
does not give existence to the parts: “quia anima unitur corpori ut
forma, necesse est quod sit in toto et in qualibet parte corporis;
non enim est forma corporis accidentalis, sed substantialis. Sub­
stantialis autem forma non solum est perfectio totius, sed cujuslibet
partis. Cum enim totum consistat ex partibus, forma totius quae
non dat esse singulis partibus corporis, est forma quae est com­
positio et ordo, sicut forma domus, et talis forma est acciden­
talis. ” (I, 76, 8).

SPECIFICITY OF COMMON GOOD OF POLITICAL SOCIETY

17

from the order that unifies them in the social whole; all they receive
from that order is precisely their being parts of it and their sharing
as parts in it.44
Owing to this lack of form, in the strict meaning of the term, and,
consequently, to the relative and imperfect unity of every community,
it is,possible, says Saint Thomas commenting on Aristotle, to attri­
bute to the individual elements of a society many actions which can
by no means be attributed to the whole as if it were their own subject.
A soldier in an army can perform actions that do not belong to the
whole of the army as such, although, on the other hand, the army has
by itself operations that cannot be attributed to any of its parts; such,
for instance, as its engaging in a battle.45* This non-complete deter­
mination of the parts by the whole in an “unum secundum quid’* (or
*per accidens”) gives the parts a certain autonomy and makes the
order that unifies them more dependent upon its material subjects
than the form is dependent upon the integral elements of an organism.
In short, the ultimate foundation of the differences between a biologi­
cal organism and a social body is the impossibility for several beings
in act to constitute at the sarpe time one being in act, unless it be one
merely with a unity of order.
Thus far, the main result of these comparisons has been to show
rather what the unity of a society is not. A positive answer concern­
ing the quid whereby a society has a unity of its own can only be
.44. A whole of this kind belongs to the genus of those called hetero­
geneous (to which, besides, all living organisms belong). In a
heterogeneous whole, the form of the whole is not found in each
of its parts taken separately: the composing elements of a com­
munity, namely its individual human beings, do not have the ratio
of community. On the other hand, a homogeneous whole is one in
which the form of the whole is also found in any of its parts, even
if separated: thus, for instance, any part whatsoever of a given
quantity of water is water. Writes Saint Thomas: “duplex est
totum: quoddam homogeneum, quod componitur ex similibus parti­
bus; quoddam vero heterogeneum, quod componitur ex dissimili­
bus partibus. In quolibet autem toto homogeneo totum constitui­
tur ex partibus habentibus forman totius: sicut quaelibet pars
aquae est aqua; et talis est constitutio continui ex suis partibus.
In quolibet autem toto heterogeneo quaelibet pars caret forma
totius; nulla enim pars domus est domus, nec aliqua pars hominis
est homo. Et tale totum est multitudo... pars ejus non habet for­
mam multitudinis.” (I, 11, 2, ad 2).
45. In Eth., I, 1,#5: “pars ejus totius [civilis multitudinis] potest
habere operationem, quae non est operatio totius, sicut miles in
exercitu habet operationem quae non est totius exercitus. Habet
nihilominus et ipsum totum aliquam operationem, quae non est
propria alicujus partium, sed totius, puta conflictus totius exer­
citus. Et tractus navis est operatio multitudinis trahentium navem.

18

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SPECIFICITY OF COMMON GOOD OF POLITICAL SOCIETY

sought through the consideration of what kind of order befits suppo­
sita which are endowed with a rational nature. In the unity made~up
by a number of stones it is because of the nature of the stones that
the order—or rather “aggregatio”- -is only a system of spatial rela­
tions, or of relations essentially associated with space (“associantur
sibi in loco”).46 A very different kind of relation must prevail in a
unity formed by “individual substances of intellectual nature/ that is,
by persons, according to the classical definition of Boetius. Thanks
to his aptness to become, and to adhere to, other beings in the manner
proper to rational intentionality, each human person is open to com­
munication with others in the identity of objects of knowledge and love.
That is why the personal is social by definition, and it is social in a
very profound way, since by behaving in terms of objects rationally
apprehended it can share with others the same life and acitivity re­
garding objects which are known and aimed at in common. This is
“convivere,”living together, in the strongest sense of the expression.
~~Now^~if this “living together” is bound up with human nature, it
cannot but manifest itself as a tendency which is towards an end, and
precisely in the way in which acting is proper to man as such: that is,
for the sake of the end. Those beings which are endowed with reason,
Saint Thomas reminds us, move themselves towards the end, “ad
finem,” since they are able to know it.47 Thus “every community is
established with a view to some good; for mankind always act in order >
to obtain that which they think good.”48 Such a tendency must always
be present in every social body; and the mutual arrangement of its
parts as well as the working of the whole thus constituted and in motion
toward the end—in short, both the structure and the dynamism of the
social body--depend upon that end and are measured by it, for the end
governs the entire system of things which tend toward it.49 Furthermore, the structure and operations through which every community
46. Cf.In Met., VII, 17, #1672; passage quoted above - note 34.
47. I-II, 1, 2: “aliquid sua actione vel motu tendit ad finem dupliciter:
uno modo sicut seipsum ad finem movens, ut homo; alio modo sicut
ab alio motum ad finem... Illa ergo quae rationem habent, seipsa
movent ad finem... Et ideo proprium est naturae rationalis, ut
tendat in finem quasi se agens, vel ducens ad finem.” Ibid., ad 1;
“quando homo per seipsum agit propter finem, cognoscit finem.”

48· poL Ir *' 1252 a ί·
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di
;

49. II-II, 87, 2, ad 3: “ea quae ordinantur in finem sunt judicanda secun­
dum quod competunt fini.” I-II, 102, 1: “oportet quod id quod est
ad finem, sit proportionatum fini; et ex hoc sequitur quod ratio
eorum quae sunt ad finem, sumitur ex fine; sicut ratio dispositionis
serrae sumitur ex sectione, quae est finis ejus, ut dicitur in 2 jPhys.,
text. 88.”
'

SPECIFICITY OF COMMON GOOD Of POLITICAL SOCIETY

19

displays its own activity participate in that kind of finality which is
proper to rational creatures. Accordingly, the activity which most
formally expresses the finality of social beings is not of a physical
type, nor even biological, as in the vegetable and animal organisms.
Social phenomena transcend the physical sensible order to which they
are subject on account of the matter--both bodies and space--by
means of which they exist. Knowledge of social facts comes, of course,
through sensible things, but social facts inasmuch as they are social
belong to a completely different order; they possess a dimension by
means of which they are orientated towards ends that are knowable
only through reason. This is why the knowledge of social facts cannot
be resolved into sensible data; their explanation can be provided solely
by their end.50
We must remark here that the end of a society need not be always
present to the minds of all its members. It does not even have to be
known by all of them. What is more, it is not always easily formulable in statements which are precise and beyond controversy. It is
not necessary either, in order that every human community be truly
said to aim at some end, that each of its members always act with an
actual view to that end. The real meaning of this truth is that the dif­
ferent forms and organizations through which the entire social ac­
tivity is carried out are objectively referred to ends, which explain
them and make them comprehensible. In other words, those forms of
social dynamics move themselves, as it were, in virtue of what they
are and according to their own inclination, towards their respective
ends, even if these ends may not be actually known or rightly viewed
by many of the individual agents who are the ultimate subjects of that
social activity, or even if the motives of some of these individuals may
be at variance with the objective social ends.51 The fact remains
50. That which specifies a thing and constitutes it as such and such
makes it thereby intelligible. Now, human actions are specified by
their ends: “actus humani, sive considerentur per modum
actionum, sive per modum passionum, speciem a fine sortiuntur.
...actus dicuntur humani, inquantum procedunt a voluntate deliber­
ata; objectum autem voluntatis est bonum, et finis; et ideo mani­
festum est quod principium humanorum actuum, inquantum sunt
humani, est finis: et similiter est terminus eorumdem." (I-II, 1, 3).
Cf. Ibid., ad 1: “finis non est omnino aliquid extrinsecum ab actu,
quia comparatur ad actum ut principium, vel terminus.”
51. Just as with regard to an action the “finis actionis” and the “finis
agentis" need not be identical, so the end of any association or any
social institution does not necessarily coincide with the particular
motives that an individual acting through them intends to attain.
The intrinsic end of an institution or a community specifies it and
gives it its objective form. It can be considered as a kind of “finis
actionis,” which, unlike the “finis agentis,” gives an act its proper
species and nature. Cf. I-II, 18, 4.

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52. Contra impugnantes Dei cultum et religionem, 2, c. 8. - Fr. Engel­
bert Kurz rightly criticizes as erroneous the idea, often held, that
this formula is the definition of civil society in Saint Thomas. (See
E. Kurz, O.F.M., Individuum und Gemeinschaft beim Hl. Thomas
von Aquin). Such a formula is too generic to constitute a complete
definition; an army, a society, a family, as well as any other form
of collective human action, are all of them an “adunatio hominum
ad aliquid communiter agendum.” What specifies society is not
included here. On the contrary, it is much more exact to say that
civil society is “multitudo adunata ad totam vitam” (Π-ΙΙ, 48, art,
unie.), although this formula is applied in the same article to the
family, also. But then both family and civil society are set off in
contra-distinction to any kind of “multitudo adunata ad aliquod
speciale negotium," such as, for instance, an army is. In a com­
plete definition of civil society a further specification would be
needed so as to have the expression “tota vita” mean not only
“vivere” but also, and chiefly, "bene vivere," --as it will be ex­
pounded in Chapter II.
53. In Eth., I, 1,#5: “tractus navis est operatio multitudinis trahentium
navem. "

21

function is to direct society toward that in which its common good con­
sists and to procure unity of action whenever there is no ground for
unanimity. In fact, it cannot be expected that all individuals, even if
agreeing upon the end, should also agree upon the way to attain it, es­
pecially when different ways of action can lead to the same results.
In such cases authority is indispensable in order to choose the course
to follow and to prescribe that course. Its precepts constitute the
law, in the most general sense of the word. Authority is thus both a
result of the end-seeking activity of every community and a necessary
condition for success in such activity.
In order to determine the nature of the order whereby a society is
one, we have thus far considered that the components of society have
rational nature, and, consequently, that society essentially aims at
some end. The next point concerns the relationships which exist
among the members of society. In any society whatever these rela­
tionships are necessarily implied by the degree of organization and
mutual arrangement of parts which its activity requires. It makes no
difference how complex and varied the relationships may be from an
empirical point of view. What is relevant here is the ontological
meaning which relationships have in the table of the Aristotelian cate­
gories. According to this schema, they belong to the category rela­
tion, so that this category is necessarily present in the essential constitution of any social being as such. Since a society does not and
cannot exist in such a manner as to be itself a substance, its sole
possible manner of being is to be simultaneously many substances in­
asmuch as these are interwoven into one body by the category relation.
In other words, the social ens has real existence independently of any
•
mental representation, but it does not exist like a substance; rather
it exists insofar as, and in the manner and condition in which, the ac­
cident relation exists among substances. This is the meaning of Saint
I
Thomas’ teaching when he writes: “licet multitudo praeter multa, non
est nisi in ratione; multitudo tamen in multis est etiam in rerum
natura.”54 But just as a society is not a collection of individuals, it
cannot be considered as a mere sum of relationships among indivi*
duals; if it were such, the unity of the whole would disappear. The
fact is, however, that those relationships are integrated into a system
which is unified by its over-all reference to the common social end.
(
Furthermore, they have a place in, and a relevance for, the entire
common operation and functioning only insofar as they are called for
by the end. Thus, it is from the end that the unity of the system orig­
inates. Now, a body of relationships which are unified into a system

that the finality of any society whatever cannot but share in the nature
of human finality, and, therefore, social ends can not only be known by
rational beings but can also be held as the rule and measure by which
to adjust the individual’s conduct in his social life.
As to the way in which the entire operation of a social body is ac­
tually carried out, the fact is that the final goal to be attained implies
some basic agreement among all the individual members and some
amount at least of ultimate convergence and congruity in their com­
mon action. It is to this that Saint Thomas refers when he speaks of
the “adunatio hominum ad aliquid communiter agendum.”52 From this
very formal point of view of the “communiter agendum” it makes no
difference whether the group in question is a small and transitory one,
like the one formed by a few men drawing a boat (“trahentes navem”),53
or on the contrary an old, complex society: the end can in both cases ·
—and in all cases intermediate--be attained only by means of some
kind of collective action converging towards it. Thus, beyond any con­
crete or historically given forms of common social activity, and re­
gardless of the particular ends a society sets out to pursue, a mini­
mum of cooperation of all concerned is at the root of the very exis­
tence of a society, and below that minimum the society simply could
not subsist. It can be said then that the very existing of any society
lies in the actual finalistic cooperating of all its members. At this
point it becomes clear why authority is necessary, since its essential s

54. De Pot., 3, 16 ad 16.

22 SPECIFICITY OF COMMON GOOD OF POLITICAL SOCIETY
SPECIFICITY OF COMMON GOOD OF POLITICAL SOCIETY 23
by their ultimate referability to a supreme end is an “order.”55 There­
calls democracy). He further remarks that the name used for this
fore, that which really causes any human community to be one is an
species of regime is the generic name given to all constitutions, or
“order of relations;” and so, the “unitas ordinis” by means of which
politias.58
a society is one is an “ordo relationis.”5S The reality designated by
This generic use of the term constitutes its second sense. Here
this expression “ordo relationis” is what Saint Thomas, following
politia denotes the general arrangement or organization of a society;
Aristotle, calls politia. This word has two senses in Aristotelianit is the “ordering of those who live in a city” (a “civitas”), and the
Thomistic politics, however. In one sense politia is applied to that
intercommunication, or body of mutual bonds, “communicatio,” among
mixed regime which consists in a combination of different elements
its members.59 In modern terms, politia is the system of those in­
of oligarchy and democracy, and which is often called respublica by
stitutions which shape a social matter~and are embodied in it, es­
Saint Thomas. In Aristotle’s classification of regimes according to
pecially insofar as they are the expression of an actual way of social
the number of persons--either one, or a few, or many--who exercise
and political living. The politias or constitutions of the Greek citythe political power in the city57politia is the name which denotes the
states, studied by Aristotle, are spoken of in this sense. Note that
regime of the many, provided that their rule is intended for the bene­
here the word constitution is given a meaning wider than the current
fit of all; (otherwise, the regime becomes the perversion which he
and technical one of source or foundation of the system of positive
law of a nation. The politia has, with regard to its community, a func­
tion similar to that of the form in a substance; it makes a society be
such and such, while distinguishing it from all others. The identity of
I 55; For an “order” to exist among things, there are two requisites: a
a society depends upon the politia to such an extent that, if the politia
criterion, or principle, --which in practical things is an end--, and
changes, the society ceases-to~be formally the same, even if it remain
the arrangement and disposition of the things to be ordered, ac­
materially identical through the sameness of its parts.60*

cording to the measure set up by the end. Saint Thomas writes:
“Ad hoc quod aliqua sint ordinata, duo requirunter: primo quidem,
quod aliqua ordinentur ad debitum finem, qui est principium totius
ordinis in rebus agendis;... Secundo oportet quod id quod est ad
finem, sit proportionatum fini; et ex hoc sequitur quod ratio eorum
quae sunt ad finem, sumitur ex fine.” (I-II, 102, 1).
56. This expression does not seem to have been used by Saint Thomas
in connection with society. Whenever he speaks of the “civitas” as
made one by a “unitas ordinis,” he does not go further to specify
what kind of order it is. In fact, the expression “ordo relationis”
is used by John of Saint Thomas when he comments on Saint
Thomas’ In Metaphysicorum; he then writes (Logica, II, 16, 2):
,
“distinguitur unitas ordinis in numero ab unitate exercitus vel
t
civitatis, quae sunt entia per accidens, eo quod in istis solum in­
venitur ordo relationis, qui non sufficit ad unitatem per se.” Cf.
note 36 above.
’
57. The criterion of the number of rulers is not the only one used by
Aristotle to draw the distinction among the different forms of gov­
ernment. Political regimes are bad or good according as the com- ·
mon good is, or is not, their aim, but, even for two constitutions,
the aim of which is not the common welfare, the distinction ac­
cording to the number of their governing bodies does not suffice.
ί
In fact, “the real difference between democracy and oligarchy is
1
poverty and wealth. ” (Pol., III, 8, 1279 b 40. See also same chap­
ter, passim).
j

58. Pol., ΙΠ, 7, 1279 a 39: “when the citizens at large administer the
state for the common interest, the government is called by the
generic name--a constitution” (or politia). - For Saint Thomas’
use of respublica (politia) in this sense, the following text can be
mentioned: "oportet quod in republica aliquo modo appareat pau­
corum status et popularis. " (In Pol., IV, 8, #7). See also Ibid,,
lect. 7, passim, for Saint Thomas’ commentaries on the politia.
59. “ordo inhabitantium in civitate” (In Pol., III, 7, #1); “ordo civitatis
(ibid., IV, 10, #3); "communicatio civium" (ibid., III, 2, #3); “vita
civitatis” (Ibid., IV, 10, #3).
60. In Pol., Ill, 2, #3: “non potest dici eadem civitas, si mutetur ordo
politiae : cum enim communicatio civium, quae politia dicitur, sit
de ratione civitatis, manifestum est quod mutata politia non rem­
anet eadem civitas... Et ita etiam videmus in omnibus aliis quae
consistunt in quadam compositione vel communione, quod quandocumque alia est species compositionis non remanet identitas...
manifestum est quod civitas est dicenda eadem respiciendo ad
ordinem politiae; ita quod mutato ordine politiae, licet remaneat
idem locus et iidem homines, non est eadem civitas, quamvis
materialiter sit eadem.” - Understood in its second meaning,
politia can be applied to two different aspects of the same reality.
(Cf. Marcel Demongeot, Le meilleur regime politique selon saint
Thomas, in which there is an analysis of the notion of politia in
Saint Thomas). Under one of these aspects, the politia is the or­
ganization of public authority; it is then variously called “ordo

/

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SPECIFICITY OF COMMON GOOD OF POLITICAL SOCIETY

SPECIFICITY OF COMMON GOOD OF POLITICAL SOCIETY

25

Let us now make, in the manner of definition, an enumeration of
the elements of the “ordo relationis” which unifies a society. This
“ordo” is the one which exists necessarily, and to the exclusion of any
other, among the components of a whole whenever these components
are substances in actu endowed with a rational nature, and consequent­
ly mutually bound by relationships which imply rational knowledge and
will--and which imply, correspondingly, ends which can be known and
pursued as such; in the pursuit of these ends the components of the
whole--that is, the individuals which make up a society--organize into
different structures and functions, all of which possess an objective
reference to ends, and finally to a supreme end.61

On thé other hand, this ordo which unifies a society has two dimen­
sions*, first, the relationships of the parts among themselves; and
second the relationships which all of the parts have to their common
end;® this latter relationship determines and measures the relation­
ships among the parts.63 The dependence of the entire social activity
upon its end is what makes a multitude of interrelated individuals to
be one whole—which is to say that the supreme end is the formal constitütïve of both the unity and being of a society, because in the things
which move towards an end the formal and specifying ratio comes
from the end, and all things receive their unity as well as their very
existence from the form which is proper to them.64 The unity of so­
ciety is grounded in its teleological character.
6Û. Continued———————
At this point it is appropriate to consider the immanent order of
principantium” (in Pol., IV, 12,#1); “ordo dominantium in civitate”
society in relation to the good. For the immanent order of society is
(ibid., Ill, 6,#2); “ordinatio civitatis quantum ad omnes principatus
nota static structure but a dynamic and teleological organism, and so
qui sunt in civitate, sed praecipue quantum ad maximum principa­
it is related to an end. But whatever has the ratio of end has also the
tum" (ibid., Ill, 5, #2). The other aspect, which is the one chiefly
:
ratio of good: an end as such is always the term for a tendency; and,
considered in the text of this dissertation, is the organization im­
whatever fulfills a tendency, or is sought as desirable for it, as its
manent to society itself. There is evidently a mutual acting of both
completion and satisfaction, has by that very fact the ratio of good for
aspects upon one another, since the general organization and moral
it. A thing is said to be a good precisely because it is perfective of
orientation of a society influence the form of its governing authori­
ties, and are in their turn influenced by the latter.
another thing by way of final causality ,65

61. These various forms of organization and activity are the social in­
stitutions, in the most general sense of the expression. AH of them >
are at least mediately directed toward an end which is not sought for the
sake of anything else. About the subordination of lower to higher
ends Saint Thomas writes: “unus finis propter alium desideratur.
Aut ergo est devenire ad aliquem finem, qui non desideratur propter
alium, aut non. Si sic, habetur propositum. Si autem non est in­
venire aliquem talem finem, sequitur quod omnis finis desideretur
propter alium finem. Et sic oportet procedere in infinitum. Sed
hoc est impossible, quod procedatur in finibus in infinitum: ergo
necesse est aliquem esse finem, qui non sit propter alium finem
desideratus.” (in Eth., I, 2, #20).
The “cooperation” which is spoken of in the text must be under­
stood in a very formal way. So understood, it does not necessarily
imply a universal agreement of wills; the conflicts and tensions
within a society are quite obvious. But in order for a purposive
common working to exist it is sufficient that these conflicting ten­
dencies do not go so deeply as to break a certain minimum of basic
agreement on the ultimate ends. Such a minimum exists beyond the
reach of any dissension whenever the moral totality of a society- ac­
cepts at least a small number of principles and values to be respec­
ted in the solution of political and social conflicts.
In Saint Thomas’ theory of the political regimes, the minimum of
unity corresponds to the democratic regime, in which government is
distributed according to the freedom which the citizens have to act
on their own initiative and discernment, without receiving from
others the rule of their actions. Cf. Marcel Demongeot, op. cit.,
about unity in the different political regimes.

έΖ/Τη Eth., I, 1,#1: “Invenitur duplex ordo in rebus. Unus quidem par­
tiurn. alicujus totius seu alicujus multitudinis ad invicem, sicut
partes domus ad invicem ordinantur. Alius est ordo rerum in
finem. "
63; II-II, 47, 10, ad 2: “bona dispositio partium accipitur secundum
habitudinem ad totum.” I-II, 102, 1: “ratio eorum quae sunt ad
finem, sumitur ex fine.”
64. II-II, 47, 11: “Ratio formalis omnium quae sunt ad finem attenditur
ex parte finis.” Concerning the existence and unity which a being
enjoys as coming from its form, Cf. _δ·£·Τ, II, 58: “Ab eodem ali­
quid habet esse et unitatem; unum enim consequitur ad ens. Quum
igitur a forma unaquaeque res habeat esse, a forma etiam habebit
unitatem." Even if not actually written by Saint Thomas himself-who is believed to have written only the first four books ofthe Com­
mentary on Politics-~the following text, probably from one of his
immediate"disciples, contains good Thomistic doctrine: “Unitas
ordinis in finem facit civitatem unam." (in Pol., V, 2, #18).
‘65. I, 5, 1: “Ratio enim boni in hoc consistit quod aliquid sit appetibile;
unde Philosophus in I. Ethic., in princip., dicit quod bonum est
quod omnia appetunt.” De Ver., 21, 2: “cum ratio boni in hoc con­
sistat quod aliquid sit perfectivum alterius per modum finis; omne
id quod invenitur habere rationem finis, habet et rationem boni.”

I

26

SPECIFICITY OF COMMON GOOD OF POLITICAL SOCIETY

SPECIFICITY OF COMMON GOOD OF POLITICAL SOCIETY

66. I-II, 102, 1; “Ad hoc quod aliqua sint ordinata, duo requiruntur:
primo quidem quod aliqua ordinentur ad debitum finem, qui est
principium totius ordinis in rebus agendis... Secundo oportet quod
id quod est ad finem, sit proportionatum fini.”
67. In Met., XII, 12, #2627: “Bonum enim, secundum quod est finis alicujus, est duplex. Est enim finis extrinsecus ab eo quod est ad
finem, sicut si dicimus locum esse finem ejus quod movetur ad
locum. (This example is taken from the Aristotelian physical sys­
tem). Est etiam finis intra, sicut forma finis generationis et alterationis; et forma jam adepta, est quoddam bonum intrinsecum ejus,
cujus est forma. Eorma autem alicujus totius, quod est unum per
ordinationem quamdam partium, est ordo ipsius: unde relinquitur
quod sit bonum ejus.” This doctrine is derived from a passage of
the Metaphysics in which Aristotle inquires “in which of two ways
the nature of the universe contains the good and the highest good,
whether as something separate and by itself, or as the order of the
parts.
(Met., IX, 1075 a 12). And he answers: “probably in both
ways, as an army does; for its good is found both in its order and
in its leader, and more in the latter. "
68. I-II, 111, 5, ad 1: “bonum multitudinis, sicut exercitus, est duplex:
unum quidem quod est in ipsa multitudine, puta ordo exercitus;
aliud autem est quod est separatum a multitudine, sicut bonum
ducis; et hoc melius est, quia ad hoc etiam illud aliud ordinatur."
The good of the leader is explained as his will of victory, and the
organization of the army is for victory’s sake--its extrinsic good:
“magis est bonum exercitus in duce, quam in ordine: quia finis
patior est in bonitate his quae sunt ad finem: ordo autem exercitus
est propter bonum ducis adimplendum, scilicet ducis voluntatem in
victoriae consecutionem; non autem e converso, bonum ducis est
propter bonum ordinis. ” (in Met., XII, l2,#2f>30).

27

A difficulty may be raised here by the simple remark that a society
can have existence while in a bad state of organization and activity , or
while in pursuit of wrong ends. A society exists only through a form
which is an order, but insofar as it is badly organized or wrongly or­
ientated, it does not really have an order and form, and therefore, it
cannoteven be said to have existence. However, the difficulty van­
ishes when one considers what good is and the different modes accor­
ding to which a thing is said to be good. The ratio of good consists, as
briefly mentioned above, in that a thing perfects or completes another
thing in the manner of a final cause. Now, the order of society is
something that perfects it, and this in a twofold way. First, insofar as
the order of a society is the form whereby it comes into existence; in
this sense, the order is always good, since it is both the act which
gives that society its very existence, and that society itself as exis­
ting; now, a thing is good insofar as it is, “intantum est aliquid bonum,
inquantum est ens.”09 Second, order is a good for a society if it con­
stitutes an improvement of any kind along the line of what is added to
the mere existence of that society; if, more specifically, that order
consists in bringing about a better condition of organization and ac­
tivity of the social body: in this sense there exists always the possi­
bility for a society to reach higher and higher levels of perfection.
Thus, if a society is considered from the point of view of its existing,
that is to say, of its being an ens in actu, then its order cannot but be
a good for it, for exactly the same reason that actual existence is a
good for whatever has a mere possiblity of existence. But if, on the
other hand, a society is considered from the point of view of that which,
added to its existence, could be for it either a further perfection, along
an always open avenue of possible improvement, or just the opposite,
then the order of a society becomes subject to a judgment by virtue of
which this order can be said to be either good or evil, according as it
is, or is not, in agreement with those ultimate ends every society must
pursue. These ends preside, as it were, over all ideal patterns of so­
cial organization; they are, above all, the object of an ethical know­
ledge—in a very general yet proper sense--and constitute, according­
ly, ethical criteria to judge of a social order. All this amounts to say­
ing that both “immanent order” and “intrinsic good” are expressions
which, applied to a society, can be taken either in an ontological sense
or an ethical one. Thus, immanent order, inasmuch as it gives a so­
ciety its act of existence, is always a good; inasmuch as it must con­
form with the true ends at which a society must aim, it can be either
good or evil, and in divers degrees.
Because society is an “unum per accidens,” the distinction between
the two lines of perfection, ontological and ethical, holds true of so­
ciety in a peculiar manner, rather different from the manner in which

It follows from this that a society’s immanent order, or politia, is re­
lated to some good for the very reason that it refers to an end; and
that order will be good if the end at which it aims is good, and if,
moreover, it is adequately proportioned to this good end. Only under
these conditions can an order really and truly be said to be such.60
Just as there is a twofold order in things—as recalled above--that
which is good as an end for something is also twofold. There is first
a good which is extrinsic to that which is ad finem; and then there is
a good which is intrinsic to a thing, namely, its form. Now, the form
of a whole which is one through an ordering “per ordinationem,” is
the order itself, which is therefore the intrinsic good of that whole.66
67
This is why the immanent order and the intrinsic good of civil society
are equivalent expressions. In like manner, the intrinsic good of an
army consists in its good organization and functioning- -its immanent
order. Its extrinsic good is victory.68

69. I, 5

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SPECIFICITY OF COMMON GOOD OF POLITICAL SOCIETY

a good has not only impregnated the external relationships of the mem­
bers but has also penetrated into their souls and achieved in them the
unifidation of all their tendencies.
Being identical in this manner with peace, unity can be considered
in the line of ethical perfection. It is indeed a high ethical excellence
fora community to achieve the harmony of all wills--and of all ap­
petites—in the love of common ends. This is social unity in its moral
sense. And from the point of view of existence, it is an absolutely
necessary requisite for a society to be one in order to exist, because
everything is insofar as it is one: “unumquodque intantum est, in­
quantum unum est.”74 Furthermore, unity belongs to the ratio of
goodness: “Unitas pertinet ad rationem bonitatis.”75 Thus, the transcendentals being, goodness and unity are also present--and necessar­
ily, of course,-in any society; they mutually imply each other and are
realized analogically, in the form which befits the nature of society.
We must again insist that in every community there is a continuity
and a mutual implication between its existential and its ethical lines.
At the lowest stage of its existence some sort of action--actually, a
beginning of “cooperation,” as shown above—is already present. At
the height of an intensely united common living, society, not being a
substance by itself, requires indispensably for its maintenance in ex­
istence such actions of the individuals as insure unity and peace. Thus,
there is in social life a gradation of increasing actuality of both exis­
tence and moral perfection. In every act of “communicatio,” of civic
living together, there appear two aspects of one and the same reality,
the social being. The entire system of those acts, inasmuch as the
very existence of a society becomes real through them, is its imman­
ent order, or form, in the ontological sense. And insofar as those
same acts are carried out in a true direction towards right social
ends, they are morally good, and they constitute the immanent order
in the moral sense. And in both senses the immanent order is identi­
cal—as already noted—with the intrinsic common good, which Saint
Thomas compares to such organization of an army as is adequate to
attain victory, which is the extrinsic good.
There is an extrinsic or separate good for civil society also. In
contrast to the immanent common good, the extrinsic is, as it were,
outside of society; it is a good external and superior to the order
which is inherent in society, and society should serve it. For Saint
Thomas, the question of concretely identifying that extrinsic end is
dominated by these two principles: that the end which suits every man
is twofold, one natural and one supernatural; and--as enunciated in
De Regimine Principum--that one and the same judgment should be

it applies to substances. In a substance, existence can be conceived
as completely stripped of any operation, as put in extra mental reality
in a state of absolute inactivity, as bare and sheer existence. On the
contrary, existing as “unum" requires necessarily for an “unum per
accidens” a minimum of operation of its parts, a minimum which in a
society would probably consist in the mere consensus, however im­
plicit and tacit it may be, of all its members to live a common life.70
This consensus is a “cooperating,” it is an acting with a view to a
common end, so that for society to exist is for men to cooperate. In­
sofar as cooperation becomes more intense and reaches more areas
in the life of a community—the “communicatio” among its members
thus becoming deeper--the “unum per ordinationem” which society
is rises to a higher degree of existence, because then the degree of
actuality in the cooperation among its parts is also higher. This higher
degree depends not so much on the complexity and number of social
relationships as on the intensity and depth with which the members of
a community engage their personal inferiority in the common living.
If, for that sort of “unum per ordinationem” which a society is, to ex­
ist is for its members to cooperate, then the intensification of their
cooperating—of their civic “communicatio”—constitutes an increase
in the actuality of the society’s very existence, while at the same time
it is a perfection along the ethical line; it is indeed a good which a
community ought to strive to acquire. Such a perfection is, in con­
crete terms, that unity which is called peace, which Saint Thomas de­
clares to be the goal intended by the ruler of a multitude: “id ad quod
tendit intentio multitudinem gubernantis, est unitas, sive pax.”71
Peace is not only the concord of all wills in a common object, but also
the harmony of all tendencies within each soul.72 Peace can exist only
if related to an authentic good;73 it is the state of a society when such*12
70. This consensus is not the acquiescence given to a compact which
has been agreed upon for utility’s sake alone, but which freely
could have not been formed--as is held by some of the so-called
social compact theories on the origin of society--; it is rather the
>
expression at the level or reason, and through it, of a fact of nature: f
the natural need of social life for man.
1
1. I, 103, 3.
·
2. II-II, 29, 1: “pax includit concordiam, et aliquid addit...Concordia
enim proprie sumpta est ad alterum: inquantum scilicet diversorum i
cordium voluntates simul in unum consensum conveniunt...concor­
dia importat unionem appetituum diversorum appetentium; pax
autem, supra hanc unionem, importat etiam appetituum unius api
petentis unionem.”
1
Ibid., 2, ad 4: “cum vera pax not sit nisi de bono," etc. Ibid., ad 3;
’‘pax vera non potest esse nisi in bonis et bonorum. ” Peace will be |
considered with some thoroughness in Chapter II, which deals with
’
the content of the common good.

29

74. I, 103, 3.
75. Ibid.

30 SPECIFICITY OF COMMON GOOD OF POLITICAL SOCIETY

SPECIFICITY OF COMMON GOOD OF POLITICAL SOCIETY

31

formed about the end of the whole society and the end of one man.76
natural authorities but to the priesthood.79 For this reason the Christ­
ian Church is present in the midst of the temporal city.
However, a doctrine of the extrinsic natural good of the multitude is
not found elaborated in his works. It is not strange that Saint Thomas
But it is precisely by applying the principle stated in the De
should have deemed it superfluous to develop a purely natural moral
Regimine that one can learn what the extrinsic end of the city in the
philosophy:77 whatever the supreme good to which man may naturally
natural order is. This end, which society is to serve after it has acattain, the fact is that in his concrete situation after Christian Reve­ I quired its own immanent unity, order and harmony, cannot be other
lation he is supernaturally destined to enjoy God in the eternal life.
than the highest good that man can obtain by his natural powers alone,
It is only through comparison with an army's double end that Saint
namely, “the happiness of which the philosophers spoke/ “felicitas
Thomas refers to what would in reality be society’s natural extrinsic
de qua philosophi locuti sunt.”80 Of this happiness Aristotle says: “If
common good, but he never ventures a further specification. On the
happiness is activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable that it
other hand, he is very explicit when he deals with the supernatural
should be in accordance with the highest virtue... This activity is con­
extrinsic good of society. Here his starting point is the principle,
templative.”81 Saint Thomas also considers the contemplative life the
above mentioned, that one and the same judgment should be formed
highest form of life.82 If this holds true for every man, it holds for
about the end of the whole society and the end of one man; it follows
society also, since, according to the above-enunciated principle of the
from this, as he clearly teaches, that the multitude is also destined
De Regimine, one and the same judgment should be formed about the
for fruition in God. It would seem, he begins, that the end of civil
end of the whole society and the end of one man; and therefore con­
society is virtuous life, since men congregate with the object of living
templation is the extrinsic end of civil life. Now, even if this extrin­
properly, and they would not secure this object if each man lived apart
sic end of society and the extrinsic end of each single man are identi­
from the rest. But the multitude has the same end as any of its mem­
cal—and indeed they are, both in the natural and in the supernatural
bers, and each man is destined through virtuous life for the divine
orders—society and the individual do not refer to them in the same
fruition; it follows, therefore, that the ultimate end of the multitude is
manner. This interpretation seems to be supported by an important
not the virtuous life itself but the possession and enjoyment of God
text of the De Regimine Principum. It is the passage in which Saint
attained through the virtuous life.78 And because that end is superior
)
Thomas says that living according to virtue is the end for which men
to all human power and shall be fully consummated only in the King­
dom of God, the office of leading to it was not entrusted to the city's
79. Ibid.; “quia finem fruitionis divinae non consequitur homo per

Reg'· 1’ 14; “Idem oportet esse judicium de fine totius multi;
tudinis, et unius. ” The reason for this statement can be found in
In Pol., VII, 2, #2, where it is said; “manifeste apparet felicitatem
<
unius hominis et civitatis esse eamdem et unius rationis... Et hoc
)
rationabiliter contingit; quoniam quorum est una natura, eorum est
unus ultimus finis. Unus autem homo et omnes cives civitatis sunt
(
unius speciei: ergo unius et omnium civium est unus ultimus finis.’’ j
77. Cf. E. Gilson, Le Thomisme, p. 421, 5th edition.
78. De Reg., I, 14: "Videtur finis esse multitudinis congregatae vivere
(
secundum virtutem. Ad hoc enim homines congregantur, ut simul
bene vivant, quod consequi non posset unusquisque singulariter
)
vivens; bona autem vita est secundum virtutem; virtuosa igitur vita
'
est congregationis humanae finis... Sed quia homo vivendo secun­
dum virtutem ad ulteriorem finem ordinatur, qui consistit in fruii
tione divina, oportet eumdem finem esse multitudinis humanae, qui
,
est hominis unius. Non est ergo ultimus finis multitudinis con­
gregatae vivere secundum virtutem, sed per virtuosam vitam perj
venire ad fruitionem divinam. ”
>
76.

virtutem humanam, sed virtute divina, ...perducere ad illum finem
non humani erit, sed divini regiminis. Ad illum igitur regem
hujusmodi regimen pertinet, qui non est solum homo, sed etiam
Deus, scilicet...Jesum Christum. ... Hujus ergo regni ministerium
...non terrenis regibus, sed sacerdotibus est commissum.”
80. De Ver., 14, 2. In the Ethics Aristotle had already declared that
happiness is the supreme end: “We call that which is in itself
worthy of pursuit more final than that which is worthy of pursuit
for the sake of something else, and that which is never desirable
for the sake of something else more final than the things that are
desirable both in themselves and for the sake of that other thing,
and therefore we call final without qualification that which is
always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else.
“Now such a thing happiness, above all else, is held to be; for
this we choose always for itself and never for the sake of some­
thing else.” (Eth., I, 7, 1096 a 30, Page 31:
If.).
81. Eth.» X, 7, 1177~i 11, ff.
82. Of the two possible forms of life for man as such, the contem­
plative life is the higher; “vita contemplativa simpliciter melior
est, quam activa." (II-II, 182, 1).

32

SPECIFICITY OF COMMON GOOD OF POLITICAL SOCIETY

congregate in society;83 and they would not be able to attain this end
if they did not congregate: “virtuosa vita est congregationis humanae
finis.”84 The perfection of human activity secundum virtutem can
thus be achieved in the community and only in the community, but the
subject in which virtue resides and by which it is practiced is the in­
dividual, and it is the individual also who is the term in which the act
of association finally redounds in perfection of virtue. The (super­
natural) extrinsic end of both society and individual is materially one
and the same thing: the possession and enjoyment of God through the
highest activity according to virtue, that is, through contemplation.
This is the extrinsic end of society inasmuch as virtue can be ac­
quired only in and through society. It is the extrinsic end of the indi­
vidual man inasmuch as he alone is the radical and ultimate subject of
the vision of God, to which he is directed by virtue.
One might ask whether there is not an incompatibility between the
principle that the judgment is one and the same with regard to the end
of the whole society and the end of a single individual, and the thesis,
on the other hand, that society’s common good differs formally from
the good of the individual. No real difficulty can be found here, how­
ever. With regard to the extrinsic common good which is materially
one and the same for both society and individual, the fact that they at
least are diversely related to it--as already said—means that the
same end is a good for both of them under different respects, and this
agrees with the principle of the specificity of the common good.
Furthermore, this principle concerns primarily the intrinsic or im­
manent good. In the first place, this principle means that the common
good is formally distinct from the private good because it alone
befits the nature of an *unum secundum quid,” like the social being,
in which alone that good is realized as in its own and proper subject.
This is equivalent to saying that such a good is identical with the good
structure and functioning of the social body. The principle means
also—as explained at the beginning of this chapter—that the total con­
tent of goods that can be realized in civil society transcends in kind
and not only in degree the goods which the domestic community is
capable of giving to man. It must be remarked, however, that the
good of a whole society at least partially coincides materially with the
private good, that is, insofar as it is also a good for each individual; if
this were not so, the common good would not be truly common. But
even so, the common good preserves its formal difference in that it
is a good for each individual without ceasing to be the very good which
is simultaneously common to many, whereas the private good as such
excludes any other: it is this individual’s own good and for that reason
is not the good of another.
83. De Reg., I, 14, the same passage quoted above in note 78, p. 30.
84. ibid*:

SPECIFICITY OF COMMON GOOD OF POLITICAL SOCIETY

33

All these considerations lead to the problem of ascertaining in
what consists that good which is realized in civil society. This as­
pect of the doctrine of the common good is more concerned with eth­
ics than have been the aspects thus far discussed. The object of this
chapter has been to investigate the specificity of society’s common
good considered only as befitting society inasmuch as it is a com­
munity, that is, an “unum secundum quid,” and in contrast to the good
which befits a being “unum simpliciter.” To this purpose a line of
reasoning more ontological than ethical has been followed. The gist
of the reasoning has been to show that the kind of “whole” that so­
ciety is consists essentially in an order, and that this order is its
good, the good which is common to the individual members. Now,
when the principle is applied that the ratio of whole differs formally
from the ratio of part, the conclusion follows that the good of the whole
cannot but differ from the private good, as a quality formally irreduc­
ible to it. At the same time the argumentation has made it manifest
that, because of the nature of the being which has only that “unitas
ordinis” which is proportionate to a human community, the minimum
existence of any community whatsoever implies already some amount
of cooperation towards one end; and, by virtue of such mutual impli­
cation in all human communities of the entitative and of what may be
called the ethical aspects, it is in their very constitution or ontologi­
cal structure that the specificity of every common good has its roots.
The question now arises: what is the content of that good which the
societas perfecta alone—not the family or any other human commun­
ity—procures for man? It will be the object of the next chapter to an­
swer this question.

Chapter Π
THE CONTENT OF THE COMMON GOOD

That civil society should be the only environment proportionate to
the realization of the highest human good does not depend on the onto­
logical constitution of that society but on the fact that it is the only
society that can be self-sufficing for living well, which is the highest
among human goods. For this reason civil society is designated by
Saint Thomas as the societas perfecta, and it is a societas perfecta
at least de jure, although the ideal of giving to man the highest good
he can reach on earth may be far from realization in fact. But civil
society is destined for that consummation and it is in this form of
community alone that the good of living well could be attained.
And so it is said that society is necessary for man. In the exposition of this classic doctrine of the politics of Saint Thomas and Aris­
totle it is often insinuated, and sometimes openly stated, that accord­
ing to these philosophers society is necessary for man inasmuch as
it succors the individual in his purely vital needs, and that it is con­
sequently like a useful invention of which the individual avails him­
self to compensate for his incapacity to achieve subsistence by him­
self alone. But if reasons of this kind are all that is said in order to
explain the necessity for living in society, clearly such an exposition
gives to the doctrine of Saint Thomas a coloring of utilitarianism
which it is very far from having. It is true, and Saint Thomas teaches
it very explicitly, that the individual when isolated can do little or
nothing to provide for his vital needs, and therefore requires the assistance of the others, organized in society, as a supplement to the
deficiencies and limitations of his nature.1 The need for supplying
these deficiencies is one of the reasons which, according to Saint
Thomas, explain the appearance and existence of society. But man
1. Not only through the assistance of his fellows but also by use of his
reason man procures that which animals obtain with the biological
means with which they are by nature endowed: “Aliis animalibus
natura praeparavit cibum, tegumenta pilorum, defensionem, ut
dentes, cornua, ungues... Homo autem institutus est nullo horum
sibi a natura praeparato, sed loco omnium data est ei ratio, per
quam sibi haec omnia officio manuum posset praeparare, ad quae
omnia praeparanda unus homo non sufficit, Nam unus homo per se
sufficienter vitam transigere non posset. Est igitur homini naturale,

34

i

j
i

’
)
‘
5

THE CONTENT OF THE COMMON GOOD

35

needs the help and collaboration of his fellows not only in the lower
order of the physical means necessary for the conservation of life,1
2
but also in the order of spiritual life; society is necessary for the
moral and intellectual culture of man.3
But there is in the teaching of Saint Thomas a more profound rea­
son than all this to explain why man is a social animal. This reason
is that the ultimate and radical foundation for life in society is man’s
rational nature, not inasmuch as reason supplies him with those
means of biological defense with which nature did not endow him, but
formally because it constitutes him in his character as a person. The
multiple forms of communication which social life implies are above
all forms of the communication of intelligent beings. Only the person
as such is made by nature to transcend itself in the manner of ration­
al intentionality, and only this transcending, thanks to which man can
in a certain way open himself to others, makes him social in an authen­
tic sense, in the sense of participating consciously and voluntarily,
with the inwardness of his person, in a common life. Saint Thomas,
following Aristotle, remarks that the word, that is, the sound charged
with intentionality, is proper to man alone, who is capable through it
of communicating with his fellows in what is useful and in what is
1. (Continued)
quod in societate multorum vivat." (De Reg., I, 1). Although Saint
Thomas assigns to reason the role of a substitute for the biological
means which man, unlike many irrational animals, does not pos­
sess, he does not, in the explanation of sociability as natural to man,
reduce the function of reason to that of a mere instrument of biolog­
ical life. This will be shown later in this dissertation.
2. This is the sphere that could be called in modern terms “the divi­
sion of labor”: Saint Thomas refers to this in the following words:
“Est igitur necessarium homini, quod in multitudine vivat, ut unus
ab alio adjuvetur, et diversi diversis inveniendis per rationem oc­
cuparentur, puta, unus in medicina, alius in hoc, alius in alio.” (De
Reg., I, 1). And in In Pol., I, 1,#17: “[civitas] componitur ex pluri­
bus vicis, in quorum uno exercetur ars fabrilis, in alio ars textoria,
et sic de aliis. ”
(]01n Eth., I, 1,#4: “juvatur homo a multitudine, cujus est pars, ad
vitae sufficientiam perfectam; scilicet ut homo non solum vivat,
sed et bene vivat, habens omnia quae sibi sufficiunt ad vitam: et
sic homini auxiliatur multitudo civilis, cujus ipse est pars, non
solum quantum ad corporalia... sed etiam quantum ad moralia.” In Pol., I, 1,#17: “ex ejus [civitatis] esse provenit, quod homines
non solum vivant, sed quod bene vivant, inquantum per leges civi­
tatis ordinatur vita hominum ad virtutes." De Reg., I, 14: “Ad hoc
homines congregantur, ut simul bene vivant, quod consequi non
posset unusquisque singulariter vivens.”

36

THE CONTENT OF THE COMMON GOOD

THE CONTENT OF THE COMMON GOOD

37

it is on the ground not of an insufficiency but, on the contrary, of an
excellence of his nature that man forms a society with his fellows.
It is to be remarked, however, that the insufficiencies which man
overcomes by living in society, are due to the fact that personality is
realized in him in the most imperfect degree. If the person is the
most noble thing to be found in nature,8 it is from consideration of the
concrete state of its realization in man, and not of the ratio itself of
person, that Saint Thomas frequently says that man in several ways
needs the society of others. Thus, for instance, he needs them for his
intellectual and moral perfection,9 and for happiness in the present
life.10 It is in this same sense that Saint Thomas can say that the
diverse forms of human living together communicationes”), which
will be surpassed in the future life, were instituted because of the in­
sufficiency of each one by itself.11 In sum, the existence of all social
life is based upon two different orders of reasons: an order of rea­
4. In Pol., I, l,#20: “loquutio est propria hominibus; quia hoc est pro- ; sons, on the one part, according to which society follows naturally
from what is most formal in human nature, namely, its character as
prium eis in comparatione ad alia animalia, quod habeant, cognitio­
person; on the other part, an order of reasons which are derived
nem boni et mali, ita et injusti, et aliorum hujusmodi, quae sermone
from the concrete condition and imperfect degree of realization of the
significari possunt. Cum ergo homini datus sit sermo a natura, et
ratio of the person in man and which are revealed in the insufficien­
sermo ordinetur ad hoc, quod homines sibi invicem communicent in
cies that reach from the level of his animality to the core itself of his
utili et nocivo, justo et injusto, et aliis hujusmodi; sequitur, ex quo
natura nihil facit frustra, quod naturaliter homines in his sibi com­
moral and spiritual life: these latter reasons do not move man any
municent. Sed communicatio in istis facit domum et civitatem.
,
less to association.

harmful, in good and evil, in the just and the unjust. This is what
causes a community to be, and what makes human social communica­
tion much more profound than, and in reality essentially different from,
the association which is found among gregarious animals such as ants
and bees.4 Much more: even on the supposition that the individual
would not require the help of others to provide for his various needs,
society would exist as a logical result of man’s rationality and spirit­
uality. For, inasmuch as the individual by his rational nature is cap­
able of communion with others in the knowledge and love of the same
ends, of devotion to the good of the community more even than to his
own life,5 of preferring life with others to living in solitude even should
he lack nothing in that solitude,6 inasmuch--in brief--as he is capable
of loving the good of the city secundum se, in order that it be preserv­
ed and diffused, and not in order that it may be of profit for himself,7

Igitur homo est naturaliter animal domesticum et civile.” Develop­
ing the same theme in the De Regimine Principum (I, 1), Saint
Thomas concludes: “Magis igitur homo est communicativus alteri
quam quodcumque aliud animal, quod gregale videtur, ut grus, for­
mica et apis. ”
5. I, 60, 5: “Naturaliter pars se exponit ad conservationem totius
corporis... Et quia ratio imitatur naturam, hujusmodi imitationem
invenimus in virtutibus politicis. Est enim virtuosi civis ut se ex­
ponat mortis periculo pro totius reipublicae conservatione."
6. In Pol., III, 5, #4: “homo naturaliter est animal civile; et ideo
homines appetunt ad invicem vivere et non esse solitarii, etiam si
in nullo unus alio indigeret ad hoc quod ducerent vitam civilem."
7. De Car., 2: “Amare bonum alicujus civitatis contingit dupliciter:
uno modo ut habeatur; alio modo ut conservetur. Amare autem
bonum alicujus civitatis ut habeatur et possideatur, non facit bonum
politicum; ...quod est amare seipsum magis quam civitatem; sibi
enim ipsi hoc bonum concupiscit, non civitati. Sed amare bonum
civitatis ut conservetur et defendatur, hoc est vere amare civitatem,
...intantum quod aliqui propter bonum civitatis conservandum vel
ampliandum, se periculis mortis exponant, et negligant privatum
bonum.” --Owing to his limitations, however, the individual cannot
help loving the common good with “love of concupiscence” (Cf. I,
60, 3), though loving it at the same time with “love of friendship.”

8. I, 29, 3: “Persona significat id quod est perfectissimum in tota
natura, scilicet subsistens in rationali natura.”
9. Il-Il, 188, 8: “solitudo competit contemplanti, qui jam ad perfec­
tum pervenit. Quod quidem contingit dupliciter. Uno modo ex solo
divino munere, sicut patet de Joanne Baptista... Alio modo per
exercitium virtuosi actus... Ad exercitium hujusmodi juvatur
homo ex aliorum societate dupliciter: uno modo quantum ad intel­
lectum, ut instruatur in is quae sunt contemplanda; ...Secundo
quantum ad affectum, ut scilicet noxiae affectiones hominis repri­
mantur exemplo et correctione aliorum ... Et ideo vita socialis
necessaria est ad exercitium perfectionis.”
1
10. I-II, 4, 8: “si loquamur de felicitate praesentis vitae,...felix indi­
get amicis, non quidem propter utilitatem, cum sit sibi sufficiens;
1
nec propter delectationem, quia habet in seipso delectationem per.
fectam in operatione virtutis; sed propter bonam operationem, ut
scilicet eis benefaciat, et ut eos inspiciens benefacere delectetur,
et ut ab eis in benefaciendo juvetur. Indiget enim homo ad bene
operandum auxilio amicorum tam in operibus vitae activae, quam
'
in operibus vitae contemplativae.”
i
11. Sent., Ill, 34, 3, 2, qla. 3, in 1: “hujusmodi [ad alterum) communi­
cationes non erunt in patria, quia omnes sufficientiam ibi a Deo
i ,
accipient. Propter insufficientiam enim uniuscujusque in se intro*
ductae sunt communications, ut patet per Philosophum in V Ethic."

38

THE CONTENT OF THE COMMON GOOD

THE CONTENT OF THE COMMON GOOD

Now, that total good which only civil society, “societas perfecta”
and no other form of community, can give to man, is the one which at
the same time succors the individual’s deficiencies and limitations and
brings to realization the most noble human faculties. The two tenden­
cies, first of seeking in society a help and a supple ment and, second,
of expressing and unfolding in it the excellences of the individual
being, are like two aspects of the same imperfect human nature in
search of its culmination and perfection in the possession of its high­
est object and good.
What is this supreme good? Its nominal definition has already
been mentioned; it is that which consists in living well, bene vivere.
This is nothing else than the right exercise, according to reason, of
man’s appetitive and cognitive faculties. And only such living pro­
duces “a life of true happiness and goodness.”12 But this supreme
human good is the end of politics, the science which deals with the
right arrangement of the city.13 On that account, “the good life” is
the rule and measure of the common good of the city and the intelli­
gible key to its content.
Consequently, society should be proportioned to that dual excel­
lence in which happiness consists: the good operation of reason itself,
and the acts of the will as regulated by reason.
Of these two aspects of the good which civil society offers to man,
Saint Thomas never hesitates to assert that virtuous life is the superior;
that living well is only living according to virtue;14 and, consequently,
that the common good is primarily the moral health of society, the
environment in which the individual begins and develops his own moral
life, and in which one person helps another to live well. The common
good is a vital store to which all virtuous men contribute, and from
which all receive beneficent influx; it surrounds men, as it were, with
an interchange of aids, examples and incentives for well doing. This
good is the object of the city in such a way that only those who com­
municate mutually in living well deserve to be called parts of the city.1516
Such is the concept of the content of the common good which Saint
Thomas expounds in unmistakable terms especially in the De Regimine |
Principum, but which appears also quite clearly throughoutrevelant
(
discussions in his other works.
!
At this point a difficulty arises. It is well known that Saint Thomas, I
following Aristotle, teaches the primacy of the contemplative life over ’
12. Pol., Ill, 9, 1281 a I.
13. in Eth., I, 2, #29: “finis politicae est humanum bonum, idest optimus in rebus humanis."
14. De Reg., I, 14: “bona vita est secundum virtutem.” Ibid., 15:
“virtus enim est qua bene vivitur.” Cf. I-II, 55, 4.
15. Ibid, I, 14: “hi soli partes sunt multitudinis congregatae, qui sibi
invicem communicant in bene vivendo. ”

i

1
.

39

the active, that happiness consists chiefly in the operation of specu­
lative reason, and that the intellectual virtues, which perfect reason,
are more noble than the moral virtues, which perfect only the appe­
tite.18 How is it possible then that the common good of society, the
only good which measures up to the supreme (naturali end of man,
the good about which the same judgment must be formed as about the
good of a single individual, how is it that this good is above all a mor ­
al good, a life according to virtue and according to moral virtue, which
is the most proper meaning of this latter word?17 The answer is that,
although the intellectual virtues--and with them the contemplative
life--are more noble, because of their object, than the moral virtues,
yet the moral virtues are more necessary for human life, and it is
only by reason of them that a man can be called good simpliciter. A
man is not called good because he is learned.18 Moreover, the final
cause of society is, according to Saint Thomas, a moral end: in the
De Regimine Principum, while surveying the ends which may move
men to congregate in society, he says that it is not the knowledge of
truth—nor corporal health nor the acquisition of wealth—but living
virtuously, which moves men to attain through virtue their fruition in
God:
Idem autem oportet esse judicium de fine totius multitudinis,
et unius. ...si quidem talis ultimus sive unius hominis, sive mul­
titudinis finis esset corporalis, vita et sanitas corporis, medici
esset officium. Si autem ultimus finis esset divitiarum affluen­
tia, oeconomus rex quidam multitudinis esset. Si vero bonum
cognoscendae veritatis tale quid esset, ad quod posset multitudo
pertingere, rex haberet doctoris officium. Videtur autem finis
esse multitudinis congregatae vivere secundum virtuten. Ad hoc
enim homines congregantur, ut simul bene vivant; ...bona autem

16. I-II, 66, 3, Sed contra: “Virtus moralis est in rationali per parti cipationem; virtus autem intellectualis in rationali per essen­
tiam... Ergo virtus intellectualis est nobilior virtute morali.” (in
II-II, 182, 1, following Aristotle in Eth., X, 7 and 8, Saint Thomas
sets forth reasons why the contemplative life is better than the
active).
17. I-II, 66, 3: “quia virtus dicitur ex eo, quod est principium alicujus
actus, cum sit perfectio potentiae, sequitur quod ratio virtutis
magis competat virtutibus moralibus, quam virtutibus intellectuali­
bus.”
18. I-II, 66, 3, ad 2: “secundum virtutes morales dicitur homo bonus
simpliciter, et non secundum intellectuales virtutes, ea ratione
qua appetitus movet alias potentias ad suum actum." I-II, 56, 3:
“non dicitur simpliciter aliquis homo bonus ex hoc, quod est
sciens, vel artifex, sed dicitur bonus solum secundum quid, puta
bonus grammaticus, aut bonus faber.”

40

THE CONTENT OF THE COMMON GOOD

THE CONTENT OF THE COMMON GOOD
vita est secundum virtutem. (...) Sed ...homo vivendo secundum
virtutem ad ulteriorem finem ordinatur, qui consistit in fruitione
divina.19

In recognizing the preeminence of moral virtue in the content of the
common good Saint Thomas does not contradict his doctrine of the
primacy of contemplation. Rather he sets forth this doctrine as valid '
in the natural order and he insists that there could not be lasting so­
cial good without the knowledge of truth and the profession of wisdom.
But Saint Thomas reserves the complete realization of the superiority
of contemplation for the supernatural life in Heaven, in which alone
man attains his highest beatitude, which is the contemplation of God.20
Virtuous life is necessary for man in this life, precisely for obtain­
ing possession of God in the next. There is no doubt, on the other
hand, that the contemplation of truth has an essential part in the con­
stitution of the common good, and that the common good cannot per­
dure in a society which professes fundamental errors with regard to
man’s nature, his destiny and his situation in the universe.
The multitude’s living properly and according to virtue is, above
all, what defines the common good for Saint Thomas. Although it is
true that this expression comprehends in reality diverse levels of
the good organized in a hierarchical order of means and ends - as
will be explained later in this chapter - the living well of the city is
the highest and determinative level of the total content of the common
good; it is the common good par excellence, and the end to which are
ultimately subordinated all the other goods which in some way may be
called common to the city. Social institutions of every kind, and corporeal possessions have worth and are justified only insofar as each
of them in some way within its own sphere, corresponds to, or con­
tributes toward the existence, preservation and promotion of the city’s
good moral condition.
Before showing in detail that this is the central idea in Saint
Thomas’ conception of the content of the common good, it is well to
explain briefly the sources of that conception in Aristotle. Repeated­
ly and unequivocally the Philosopher says that the true end for which
the polis is instituted is not mere living but living well.21 And in pas­
sages which constitute an advance rebuttal to social theories promin­
ent in the last three centuries, he states that “it is not the end of the
state to provide an alliance for mutual defense against all injury, or
to ease exchange and promote economic intercourse.*22 Nor is it the
19- De Reg., I, 14.
20. S.c.G., III, 37: "ultima felicitas hominis non consistit nisi in con­
templatione Dei.”
21. Pol., I, 2, 1252 b 30. Cf. Ibid., Ill, 9, passim.
22. Pol., Ill, 9, 1280 a 35.

,

1

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41

end of the polis simply to prevent injustices in the course of inter
change with other nations, as cities which trade among themselves du.
This intercourse through trade does not constitute these communities,
a single city, since they have neither laws nor magistrates in com­
mon, and “neither of the parties concerns itself to ensure a proper
quality of character among the members of the other; neither of them
seeks to ensure that all who are included in the scope of the treaties
shall be free from injustice and from any form of vice.”23 With this
distinction Aristotle clearly implies that the end of every true state
is the proper living of its members according to a high quality of
character and virtue. And the conclusion explicitly stated is that “any
polis which is truly so called, and is not merely one in name, must
devote itself to the end of encouraging goodness.”24 But to attain this
state of affairs is to realize happiness, which is “the energy and prac­
tice of goodness.*25 For Aristotle, then, it is evident that this excel­
lence is the supreme end of the polis. Whence it follows that in order
to attain this high state of happiness, mutual help, the communication
of friendship among men, is necessary, because however noble the
form of life a man may lead he never succeeds in becoming wholly
self-sufficient; even the philosopher may need companions in the very
contemplation of truth; and in any case the virtuous man requires per­
sons toward whom and for whom he may exercise his virtue.26
As a faithful interpreter of Aristotle’s thought, Saint Thomas makes
these ideas central points in his philosophic speculation on the nature
and end of society and on its political regime. In his Commentary on
the Politics he expounds in the following terms what may be con­
sidered a full and clear definition of civil society: “Civitas enim est
communicatio bene vivendi composita ex generibus diversis et gratia
vitae perfectae et per se sufficientis. Hoc autem est vivere feliciter:
bene autem vel feliciter vivere in politicis, est operari secundum
optiman virtutem practice.*27 The unity and thereby the being of the
city depend solely on the communication of several families in the
common purpose of proper living; it is neither military alliances nor
trade pacts of any kind which make a city one. The two causes which
specifically define the constitution of a being are the formal and the

*

i

Ibid., 1280 b 2.
Ibid., 1280 b 6.
Ibid·.VU» 13>
a 8·
Eth., X, 7, 1177 a 32: “The just man needs people towards whom
and with whom he shall act justly, and the temperate man, the
brave man...but the philosopher, even when by himself, can con­
template truth, and the better the wiser he is; he can perhaps do
so better if he has fellow-workers, but still he is the most selfsufficient."
27. In Pol., Ill, 7 ,#14.

23.
24.
25·
26.

42

THE CONTENT OF THE COMMON GOOD

THE CONTENT OF THE COMMON GOOD

43

Thus, the good ruler as such is capable of discerning the good and the
final; and, Saint Thomas observes, for society these two causes are
eril, the just and the unjust, the profitable and the harmful, not only
respectively the communication in living well, “communicatio bene
for himself but also for the whole of a community; and so is capable
vivendi,” and the intending of the perfect life, “gratia vitae perfec­
tae.”28 In Chapter 14 of Book I of De Regimine Principii m—one of the ! of presiding over the others. The man well endowed for ruling is he
who hy the high perfection of his moral virtues ---interlocked and barmost important sources for the thought of Saint Thomas on the end
and good of society—he states that the good king should chiefly see to J monized by prudence--is capable of directing the moral conduct of
the community under his care. If the good ruler then is the one who
it that the multitude subject to him leads a good life; and this solici­
can habitually give good moral precepts, the good which he secures
tude should extend not only to instituting the proper living of the mul­
for the community through good government will consist formally in
titude, but also to preserving what has been instituted, and to cease­
its good moral condition. For Aristotle—and for Saint Thomas, who
lessly perfecting what has been preserved. And in agreement with
adopted this conception and developed it in a Christian sense in his
Aristotle, he writes that the true motive for congregating into a so­
ciety is not mere living and attending to the needs of physical life;
De Regimine Principum--the ruler is a sort of moral leader, a wise
nor is it the securing of wealth—otherwise, all merchants would be­
and prudent man who by his virtue towers over the rest and is, thus,
long to a single society.29 The criterion for judging the goodness of
the one best fitted to guide them along the paths of moral life. The
virtue of the one who not only governs himself but can also govern
political systems is precisely the degree in which they are apt to at- ,
tain the virtuous life of the city; and according to this the two best
(
others is accordingly of a surpassing excellence. If greater virtue is
systems simpliciter are royalty and aristocracy, because they are di­
required for ruling the household family than for governing oneself,
rectly ordained to and fitted for such purpose.30
much greater must be the virtue necessary for the rule of a whole
Even if Saint Thomas did not frequently state that the end of the
city or a kingdom. Exercising properly the king’s office requires
city is the virtuous life, his insistence that the ruler be a “vir bonus”
therefore an outstanding virtue, the more so if one considers that the
would sufficiently intimate this thought. Politics is an art which
I
doing of a greater good demands a greater virtue; but the good of the
requires a high species of prudence, and so the good ruler will be a
[
community is precisely better and more divine than that of an indivi­
man endowed with prudence to an extraordinary degree--and there;
dual.32 In conclusion, the good legislator is he who is engaged in mak­
fore virtuous without qualification, since it is according to prudence, j
ing his subjects virtuous; and law is nothing else than the precepts of
upon which all moral virtues depend, that a man is said to be virtuous.31 i
the virtuous man who presides over the community.
Now, Aristotle says that the virtue of the good citizen consists
28. Ibid., #13: “per hoc quod [Philosophus] dicit, ‘communicatio bene
precisely in his observance of the constitution and the laws under
vivendi,’ innuit causam formalem; ...per hoc quod dicit ‘gratia
which he lives; his virtue is therefore relative to those laws.33 The
vitae perfectae etc.’ tangit causam finalem. ”
just man, on the other hand, is called just on account of an absolute
29. De Reg., I, 14: “Si propter acquirendas divitias [homines conven­
excellence, which is superior and prior to any written law, and not

irent], omnes simul negotiantes ad unam civitatem pertinerent:
sicut videmus eos solos sub una multitudine computari, qui sub
eisdem legibus et eodem regimine diriguntur ad bene vivendum.”
30. In Pol., III, 16, #7; “cum sint tres politiae recte ordinatae, ...
illa inter alia optima est, quae regitur et dispensatur ab optimo
viro vel ab optimis viris, quia ad optimum finem ordinatur: sem­
per enim quod fit ab optimo agente, ad optimum finem ordinatur
per se.” Ibid., IV, I,#8: “Adhue consideratum est in praecedenti­
bus de regno et de statu optimatum. Idem enim est considerare
de his quae significantur per ista nomina et de optima politia:
utraque enim istarum duarum intendit principaliter in finem, qui
est secundum virtutem, et ad ipsam virtutem multam et perfectam
existentis. ”
31. In Pol., III, 3, #1: “aliquis dicitur virtuosus secundum unam virtu­
tem perfectam, scilicet secundum prudentiam, ex qua omnes vir­
Non dicitur
tutes morales dependent. ” And further on (ibid., #2):

31. Continued.
aliquis esse bonus princeps, nisi sit bonus per virtutes morales
et prudens. Dictum est enim in sexto Ethicorum quod politia est
quaedam pars prudentiae; unde oportet politicum, idest rectorem
politiae, esse prudentem, et per consequens bonum virum.”
32. De Reg., I, 9: “Est praecipua virtus, qua homo aliquis non solum
se ipsum, sed etiam alios dirigere potest ...Sic igitur major vir­
tus requiritur ad regendum domesticam familiam, quam ad regen­
dum se ipsum, multoque major ad regimen civitatis et regni. Est
igitur excellentis virtutis bene regium officium exercere” ... (··.)·
“majoris virtutis esse videtur quod majus bonum per eam aliquis
operetur. Majus autem et divinius est bonum multitudinis quam
bonum unius."
33. Pol., ΙΠ, 4, 1276 b 30: “the virtue of the citizen must be relative
to the constitution of which he is a member."

44
THE CONTENT OF THE COMMON GOOD
THE CONTENT OF THE COMMON GOOD
46
relative to any constitution; this excellence is virtue without qualifi­
Now, even in the case in which the virtue of each and every citizen
cation. This is the reason for the distinction made by Aristotle be­
does.not realize perfectly the ideal of virtuous life which the system
tween a good man and a good citizen. The Philosopher wonders
proposes, there will always be an equivalence between the rommon
whether the excellence of the just man and that of the good citizen are
good which a city attains and the virtues of the citizens composing it.
identical or different; and his answer is that, because the citizen as
This equivalence consists of this, that the moral atmosphere in the
such is a part of the city, his virtue is defined with regard to the
city—the common good in its noblest aspect--depends materially on
politia or constitution according to which he lives; but tnai politia
such virtues. The countenance of the common good depends on fTie
may not be the best. But in defining the virtue of the good man simplivirtue of the members making up the city, although ordy with the de­
citer there is no reference at all to a special political system, but
pendence of material causality. The reason for this is, first, that as
only to the absolute criteria of virtue. The good citizen's excellence ) regards its nature the happiness of a man and that of the city are of
is identical with the good ruler’s only when the citizen in the best
the same ratio;36 and second, that the actions of an individual redound
system possible has the virtue which would be required both for ruling
in some way upon the social whole of which he is a part. Society is a
and for being ruled. In such a system, which would be the only one
composed whole and depends therefore, in a material way, to a high
adequate for a community of free men, one man or several exercise
degree on its parts; and the action of the parts has an influence upon
government not despotically, in the manner in which the master exer­
the whole.37 In the intention of its author an action may well not be
cises it over the slave, but politically, that is, over free and equal
directed to the good or evil of another individual or of society; never­
people, who are capable both of governing, and of being governed by,
theless, objectively, that is to say, in consideration of the finis opecis,
their equals.34 This thesis means that only in the best system is it
it redounds directly or indirectly to the good or evil of society. For
possible for the excellence of the just man and that of the good citizen
this reason the life of the just conserves and promotes the common
to coincide, for only in such a regime is the bene vivere in all its full­
good, because they are the principal part of the multitude; they are
ness the ideal of common life embodied in the constitution. Saint
that part of the social whole which realizes most perfectly the city’s
Thomas makes these theses his, but, with Aristotle, he warns that
(
end and which with its virtue produces, conserves and promotes the
even in the best city it is nevertheless impossible that all the citizens
good moral environment which spreads its benefit to the whole multi­
be equally virtuous, or even simply virtuous; but for the good of the
)
tude.38
city it suffices that each one does well what falls to him as a part of
'
But if the common good depends, chiefly in the order of material
the social whole. Yet even with these exceptions, it is always true
causality,
upon private virtues, private virtues are submitted in turn
that only in the best system is it possible for the virtue of the good
[
to the common good as to their final cause: “bonum partis est propter
citizen as such to coincide perfectly with that of the honest man.35
i
bonum totius,”39*“bonitas cujuslibet partis consideratur in proportione
34. Cf. Pol., III, 4, passim. What is expounded in the text is the substance of Aristotle’s thesis developed in this chapter of the Politics.
'
35. In Pol., Ill, 3, #1 : “Contingit aliquem esse bonum civem, qui tamen
non habet virtutem secundum quam aliquis est bonus vir; et hoc in
politiis quae sunt praeter optimam politiam... (...) impossibile est,
quantumcumque sit bona politia, quod omnes cives sint virtuosi: )
sed tamen oportet quod unuscuisque faciat opus suum quod ad
civitatem pertinet, bene... in optima politia oportet quod quilibet
!
civis habeat virtutem boni civis. Per hunc enim modum civitas
(
erit optima: sed virtutem boni viri, impossibile est quod omnes
habeant.” However, in another place (In Eth., V, 3, #926) Saint
Thomas writes thus: “Sunt enim quaedam politiae, non rectae,
secundum quas aliquis potest esse civis bonus, qui non est vir
I
bonus; sed secundum optimam politicam non est aliquis civis
bonus, qui non est vir bonus. ” This text identifies the virtue of
every citizen with that of the good man in the optimum system;
the text quoted from the Commentary on the Politics maintains

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35. Continued
the distinction between the two. The position exposed in the last
work seems to be the one which is truly representative of Aristotle’s
thought--and Saint Thomas' as well--since a little earlier in the
Commentary on the Ethics it is announced that this theme will be
treated in the Politics. The Ethics speaks rather casually about
what is examined closely in the Politics.
36. De Reg., I, 14: “Idem oportet esse judicium de fine totius multi­
tudinis et unius."
37. J-Π, 21, 3: “unusquisque in aliqua societate vivens est aliquo modo
pars, et membrum totius societatis; quicumque ergo agit aliquid in
bonum, vel malum alicujus in societate existentis, hoc redundat in
totam societatem: sicut qui laedit manum, per consequens laedit
hominem.”
38. II-II, 64, 6: “Vita justorum est conservativa et promotiva boni
communis, quia ipsi sunt principalior pars multitudinis.”
39. I-Π, 1°9’

46

THE CONTENT OF THE COMMON GOOD

THE CONTENT OF THE COMMON GOOD

47

virtue,44 but also indicate the circumstances in which that act should
ad suum totum.”40 Thus, private virtues are referable to the common
be executed. Furthermore, it can also occur that an act. which, abs­
good in two ways: either as integral parts of it, in the measure in
tractly considered according to its kind, is morally excellent ought
which each virtue is a good; or as subject to the rule which an end
common to the virtues imposes upon them. Under the first aspect, to i not however to be executed hic et nunc, because, in view of the conbe referable to the common good means to contribute to the constitu­ j crete circumstances, the common good requires otherwise. Contemting and increase of the good of the whole society; it might be said that j plation, for example, is superior by its very essence, simpliciter, to
virtue then acquires one more title of justification, namely, that which ! active life, but general justice can, nevertheless, in consideration of
is derived from its being thus a positive contribution to the common
the particular circumstances in a given situation--in cases of extreme
good; (its other title is the value which it has by itself, in its sub­
disturbance of public life, for instance--decide that it is more accorstance or content as virtue). It is also under this aspect that the com­ ) ding to virtue to cease contemplating and to come to the rescue of
mon good, in its most elevated form, may be considered materially
one’s fellow-beings in their spiritual and temporal needs.45 It falls,
(materialiter) equivalent to the virtues of the good men, in the sense
thus, to general justice to so intervene in the very exercise of virtues
in which a society is what its component elements make it. According
as to demand such exercise, to regulate it, and even to suspend it in
to the other viewpoint, for virtues to be referable to the common good
favor of a different act of more immediate urgency. If the species of
means that the common good, as the end of all virtues, demands the
■ a virtue and its particular acts are not distinguished the role of gen­
acts of all as something which is owed to it, and adapts to its exigen- | eral justice and its relation to the common good cannot be under­
cies the exercise of the virtuous life. In accordance with its essence, | stood. The expressions which Saint Thomas uses are very explicit re­
every virtue orders its act to its proper end; but it does not belong to | garding this distinction.
the essence of a virtue to be ordered to an ulterior end.41 This ulter- i
If the acts of all the virtues are the matter or field of application
ior ordering of the acts of all the other virtues to the good of society ; of general justice, it follows that general justice has an architectonic
is carried out by legal, or general, justice.42 The goodness of an act I character, for it embraces the entire domain of doing secundum virtu­
of virtue does not depend entirely on its species, but also on some| tem and determines the how, the when, and the other circumstances of
thing else which is added to the species as circumstances necessary
j the virtuous acts, according to a general order or plan and in consid­
for the rectitude of the act.43 By reason of what is owed to the good of
eration of the good of the political community. In an architectonic
the social whole, general justice may not only demand a certain act of !■. way, general justice exists par excellence in the ruler; but it exists
also in the citizen, although"only secondarily, namely, insofar as the
citizen contributes actively and of his own inclination to the realization
40. I-II, 92, I, ad 3.
of this general order, in conforming his conduct to what the ruler has
41. II-II, 58, 6, ad 4: “quaelibet virtus secundum propriam rationem
prescribed for the common good.46 In an analogous way, prudence is
ordinat actum suum ad proprium finem illius virtutis; quod autem
also architectonic in the ruler, since it is his function as such to coun­
ordinetur ad ulteriorem finem, sive semper, sive aliquando, hoc
sel, to judge and to rule rightly concerning those means through which
non habet ex propria ratione."
42. II-II, 58, 5: “pars id quod est, totius est; unde et quodlibet bonum
partis est ordinabile in bonum totius. Secundum hoc ergo bonum
cujuslibet virtutis, sive ordinantis aliquem hominem ad seipsum
sive ordinantis ipsum ad aliquas alias personas singulares, est
referibile ad bonum commune, ad quod ordinatur justitia. Et
secundum hoc actus omnium virtutum possunt ad justitiam pertin­
ere, secundum quod ordinat hominem ad bonum commune. Et
quantum ad hoc justitia dicitur virtus generalis.”
43. I-II, 18, 3: “plenitudo bonitatis ejus [actionis] non tota consistit in
sua specie, sed aliquid additur ex his, quae adveniunt tamquam
accidentia quaedam: et hujusmodi sunt circumstantiae debitae:
unde si aliquid desit, quod requiratur ad debitas circumstantias,
erit actio mala. ”

44. II-II, 58, 6: “justitia legalis dicitur esse virtus generalis, inquan­
tum scilicet ordinat actus aliarum virtutum ad suum finem, quod
est movere per imperium omnes alias virtutes.”
45. II-II, 182, 1 ad 3: “ad opera vitae activae interdum aliquis a con­
templatione avocatur propter aliquam necessitatem praesentis
vitae.” Sent., III, 35, 1, 4, sol. 1: “Vita contemplativa non ordina­
tur ad aliquid aliud in ipso in quo est; quia vita aeterna non est
nisi quaedam consummatio contemplativae vitae...; unde non restat
quod ordinetur ad aliud, nisi secundum quod bonum unius hominis
ordinatur ad bonun^ multorum, ad quod propinquius se habet vita
activa quam contemplativa."
46. II-II, 58, 6: “[justitia legalis] est in principe principaliter, et
quasi architectionice; in subditis autem secundarie, et quasi
administrative. ’’

48

THE CONTENT OF THE COMMON GOOD

J

the good of the community under his care is attained. Political pru­
dence exists in the ruler in an outstanding degree; in the .abject, in
a lower degree and as an auxiliary to the prudence of the prince.4748
49
Political prudence in its most excellent form, the prurience which
rules, the regnatiya, is one of the bases for general justice, inasmuch
as it utters the practical judgment according to which the will, the
seat of justice, moves all the virtues to the common good fi
Saint Thomas says that general justice may be had without virtue
in common and virtue in common may be had without general justice,
for they are not essentially the same: “non est eadem justitia genera­
lis cum virtute communi; sed una potest sine alia haberi.'J’ ft does
not seem that they can in fact be had one without the other except in
the lower and initial state of virtuous life, or in regimes which pur­
sue an ideal of life which is not the best and most perfect. In such
cases it may be that the citizens will have the virtue of générai justice,
inasmuch as they accommodate their conduct to the requirements of
the common good in that particular regime, and yet they may not be
purely and simply virtuous men. But, on the contrary, it is impos­
sible that general justice and virtue in common do not coexist in the
ruler, because the virtue of the prince and that of the good man are
i
one and the same:50 as a ruler, he should possess general justice in
s
its highest degree; but it is only through the aggregate of all the vir|
tues that he is a good man. In the same way that good citizen and good \
man are identified at the apex of the city’s life—in the ruler of the
I
best regime—so, at that apex and there only do the highest virtue and j
the fullest general justice join and sustain each other mutually. The
meaning of these two distinctions51 and of their final resolution to
unity at the peak of the community is that there is among the total of
the virtuous acts and the exigencies of the common good a growing
j
assimilation, which reaches the point of absolute identification in the
:
one who presides over the best of the politias. In the just man,
'
47. II-II, 47, 10: “prudentia non solum se habet ad bonum privatum
unius hominis, sed etiam ad bonum commune multitudinis, ” Ibid.,
50, 2, ad 2: “Eadem agenda considerantur quidem a rege secun- J
dum unix'ersaliorem rationem quam considerentur a subdito, qui
obedit...Et ideo regnativa comparatur ad hanc politicam, de qua
loquimur, sicut ars architectonica ad eam, quae manu operatur.”
48. II-II, 47, 10 ad 1: “sic se habet prudentia politica ad justitiam
legalem, sicut se habet prudentia simpliciter dicta ad virtutem
moralem. ”
49. II-II, 58, 6, Sed contra,
50. In Pol., Ill, 3, #4: “virtus boni viri est quae est virtus boni principis/’"'
51. These two distinctions are: between the “bonus civis” and the
“bonus vir,” and between virtue in common and general justice.

I
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THE CONTENT OF THE COMMON GOOD

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virtue tends, upon becoming more perfect, to coincide more and n.orp
with the requirements of the common good, as intimated by in.? gcner al justice. At the same time, the citizen whose viriue has come to
I coincide with the virtue of the good man, becomes worthy to smern
I and preside over the others.
;
And there is evidence more cogent that general justice cannot in
I tact be possessed without the other virtues, nor the virtues without
general justice, at least beyond a certain degree of perfection in the
I virtuous life. For the effect of law is, according to Saint Thomas, to
cause men to be good; but law contains precisely the precepts of general justice. The actions prescribed by general, or legal, justice resuit therefore in virtuous life. Just ice is called general when it orders the acts of all the virtues to the common good, and since orderbig to the common good belongs to law, general justice may be also
called legal,52 because through it man conforms with the law which
orders his acts to such an end.
Thus, the theme of law appears in close relation with the common
good and general justice. As noted above, the effect of the law is to
cause men to be good. This is Saint Thomas’ reasoning: the law is a
judgment of the ruler’s practical reason, and the virtue of the subject
or citizen consists in obeying that judgment. And as laws are given
to be ooeyed, it follows that it is a property of the law to induce those
subject to it, to exercise that virtue which pertains to them, namely,
to obey the law. And virtue being by definition that which causes the
one possessing it to be good, the effect of law will be to make good
those subject to it. (That goodness, however, can be an authentic
goodness, or it can be merely the habit of adjusting oneself to a law
which has for end, not the common good such as natural and divine
laws call for, but the mere profit or pleasure of the legislator, or
even what conflicts with God’s law; a man can thus be called a good
thief, inasmuch as he observes the rules of his trade. It can also
happen that the law in question is not the one of the best or regimes, but rather, for example, the law of the “status popularis.” In
such cases, the law certainly does not cause men to be good simpliciter and according to virtue, but only secundum quid).53 But when the
52. II-II, 58, 5: “actus omnium virtutum possunt ad justitiam pertinere, secundum quod ordinat hominem ad bonum commune; et
quantum ad hoc justitia dicitur virtus generalis; et quia ad legem
pertinet ordinare in bonum commune, ...inde est, quod talis
justitia, praedicto modo generalis, dicitur justitia legalis; quia
scilicet per eam homo concordat legi ordinanti actus omnium
virtutum in bonum commune.”
53. I-II, 92, 1: “lex nihil aliud est, quam dictamen rationis in praesidente, quo subditi gubernantur. Cujuslibet autem subditi virtus
est, ut bene subdatur ei, a quo gubernatur... Et per hunc modum

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50

THE CONTENT OF THE COMMON GOOD

effect of the law is to produce virtue in men simpliciter - that is, in
accordance with the precepts of natural and divine laws - it is pre­
cisely then that the end which the law proposes is at the same time
the common good in its highest genuine form - although with the re­
striction, already mentioned, that perfect virtue in those who govern
and the mere obedience of citizens to the mandates suffice for the
good of the community.
It has been said53
54 that Saint Thomas has developed two theses on
the end of law - that law is for the common good,55 that law is for the
happiness of the individual person - that these theses are in conflict,
and that Saint Thomas either did not find or did not expound the form­
ula of their reconciliation. But this is not a question of the end of the
law, but rather a question of the two different aspects under which
the law’s end may be considered; and these aspects are perfectly
compatible with each other. Furthermore, the ambivalent character
of the end of the law shows that the common good in the mind of Saint
Thomas is a condition and at the same time a result of the happiness
53. Continued
virtus cujuslibet subjecti est, ut bene subjiciatur principanti, ut
Philosophus dicit in I.Polit. Ad hoc autem ordinatur unaquaeque
lex, ut obediatur ei a subditis; unde manifestum est, quod hoc sit
proprium legis, inducere subjectos ad propriam ipsorum virtu­
tem. Cum igitur virtus sit,‘quae facit bonum habentem,’sequitur
quod proprius effectus legis sit bonos facere eos, quibus datur,
vel simpliciter, vel secundum quid. Si enim intentio ferentis
legem tendat in verum bonum, quod est bonum commune secun­
dum justitiam divinam regulatum, sequitur quod per legem hom­
ines fiant boni simpliciter. Si vero intentio legislatoris feratur
ad id, quod non est bonum simpliciter, sed utile, vel delectabile
sibi, vel repugnans justitiae divinae; tunc lex non bonos facit
homines simpliciter, sed secundum quid, scilicet in ordine ad
tale regimen. Sic autem bonum invenitur etiam in per se malis;
sicut aliquis dicitur bonus latro, quia operatur accomode ad
finem. "
54. In the Bulletin de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale, II, #418,
(1933-36), Dom O. Lottin, O.S.B., writes thus: “Quand, dans la2ae, q. 90, a. 2, S. Thomas se demande utrum lex ordinetur sem­
per ad bonum commune, on voit clairement dans sa réponse se
juxtaposer les deux solutions : l’une individualiste (la loi est faite
pour acheminer l'homme à sa fin dernière, la béatitude person­
nelle, si fermement établie au début de la Ia-2ae), l’autre sociale
(la partie est faite pour le tout). II faut se demander jusqu’à quel
point la synthèse a été faite par S. Thomas et donc si, dans sa
pensée, la première solution est subordonée a la seconde."
55. I-II, 90, 4: “flexj nihil est aliud, quam quaedam rationis ordinatio
ad bonum commune, ab eo, qui curam communitatis habet, promul­
gata. ”

THE CONTENT OF THE COMMON GOOD

51

which those persons who participate in the common good attain by living virtuously. The question is rather whether Saint Thomas really
believed that the two viewpoints differed so much as to require a
formula of conciliation. It does not seem that he did. Still, the diffi­
culty which this dualism might involve was removed in advance when
Saint Thomas says that the law’s effects are to cause men to be good.
One of the objections in that article states: that the law is given with
respect to the common good; but there are some who, behaving fitly
in that which pertains to the common good, conduct themselves badly
' in matters of their own private good; consequently, it does not belong
to the law to make men good.56 Saint Thomas answers that, on the
one hand, the goodness of each component element is considered in
relation to its whole, so that for the part to be really good it must be
measured by the good of the whole; but the whole, on the other hand,
cannot exist properly except through parts proportionate to it. Again
he answers that in a community in which either the whole citizenry,
or at least those who rule, are not virtuous, there cannot be a com­
mon good.57 There is, therefore, as observed above, an interdepen­
dence between the whole and its parts, between the common good and
the virtues of the citizens. In this interrelation, however, the charac­
ter of the dependence is not the same for each term. The good of the
whole depends on the good of the parts in a way similar to the way in
which a body depends, for its being, on its integral parts. On the
other hand, the perfection, in each concrete case, of the virtuous ac­
tivity of each citizen comes from the accommodation of his conduct
to the prescriptions of the law for the common good. The specific
distinction between the common good and the individual good (here
understood as the life of virtue) is not made principally on the ground
of the matter which causes the common good to be good. That matter
is, so to speak, virtuous matter for both kinds of good, and thus in
that matter a high individual virtue and the common good par
i
•
i

(

56. I-II, 92, 1, obj. 3: “Lex ordinatur ad bonum commune...; sed
quidam bene se habent in his, quae ad commune pertinet, qui ta­
men in propriis non bene se habent; non ergo ad legem pertinet,
quod faciat homines bonos.”
57. Ibid., ad 3: “bonitas cujuslibet partis consideratur in proportione
ad suum totum; ...cum igitur quilibet homo sit pars civitatis, im­
possibile est, quod aliquis homo sit bonus, nisi sit bene proportionatus bono communi: nec totum potest bene existere, nisi ex
partibus sibi proportionatis; unde impossibile est, quod bonum
commune civitatis bene se habeat, nisi cives sint virtuosi, ad
minus illi, quibus convenit principari. Sufficit autem quantum ad
bonum communitatis, quod alii intantum sint virtuosi, quod principum mandatis obediant. ”

52

THE CONTENT OF THE COMMON GOOD

THE CONTENT OF THE COMMON GOOF

53

excellence come to coincide. Society and the individual are rather to
moral law. Some less grave vices, faults and sins are to be iid.erabe opposed on the ground of other categories of the good, such as the
ted by human law, which prohibits only the vices which are most sei existence of the individual and all that relates more or less directly
ions and those which, if left unrestrained, could endanger the very ex­
to this existence. In this order there can be, and often are, cases of
istence of society.6061
62Therefore, human law must try to induce men t<sharp opposition between the social good and the individual's own
I virtue, not in a single stroke -- “subito” --but gradually
good. Society may demand for its own good the sacrifice of individual
A careful consideration of these statements regarding vices which
comfort, health and even life, or the abandonment or the limitation of
j must be prohibited because they endanger the very existence of so­
the means leading to these goods. But there is possible no individual
ciety, gives rise to this problem: whether in relation to the common
virtue, no private moral perfection, which is against or at the expense i good, virtue must be cultivated for itself, for its autonomous elhicai
of the common good. It is only in this order in which there is opposi­ i value, or whether it must rather be cultivated for the legitimate ad­
tion possible between social and individual good that it is necessary to
vantages or benefits, of any kind whatsoever, which the practice of
concede that the relationship between society and the individual is dif­
virtue produces for society. Is justice necessary for the common
ficult to define in the thought of Saint Thomas. But in the sense in
good by reason of the worth of the just man as such, namely, as the
which the good of society is life in common secundum virtutem, the
culmination of a human excellence; or is it necessary because where
fact that the law is given with reference to the common good, and the
there are just men no one will suffer harm by homicide, theft, etc.,
fact that its effects are to cause individual men to be good, are only
and so social life will be enabled to subsist? Of the virtues of truth
two aspects of the same reality, the virtuous life of the city.58
and friendship Saint Thomas says that they contribute necessary con­
Hence the accentuated moral character which Saint Thomas as­
ditions for the conservation of human society: men could not live to­
signs to human positive law. It is proper to this law to prescribe the
gether unless they believed in one another; nor can any man live with­
acts of all virtues, precisely because there is no virtue ail or some
out a minimum at least of that delectation, which the virtue of friend­
of whose acts are not referable either directly or indirectly to the
ship obtains.82 There are accordingly on one side the virtue of being
common good.59 It also pertains to human law to punish vice. This
(
truthful and that of offering friendship; on the other side, there is the
law does not prohibit all vices; but this restriction does not contra[
benefit which is derived for others and for society from truthful con­
vene the condition of morality as the very matter of human law. In
I
duct or from a person’s fFiendïînëss. It is thus also that an act of
fact, the very article which states that not all vices are prohibited by
human law itself makes manifest the moral character of human law,
60. I-II, 96, 2: “oportet quod leges imponantur hominibus secundum
in the consideration that what it punishes is designated as vice, which
j
eorum conditionem; ...non enim idem est possibile ei qui non
is contrary to virtue. The object and the effect of the law remain un)
habet habitum virtutis, et virtuoso; ...multa sunt permittenda hom­
inibus non perfectis virtute, quae non essent toleranda in homini­
failingly the moral health of the community, except that it is not pos|
bus virtuosis. Lex autem humana ponitur multitudini hominum, in
sible, because of the weakness of many men and their moral imperI
qua major pars est hominum non perfectorum virtute. Et ideo lege
fection, to impose on them the arduous task of realizing, in its en;
humana non prohibentur omnia vitia, a quibus virtuosi abstinent,
tirety and in its highest degrees of perfection, the whole content of
58. In Pol., Ill, 7, #10; “quicumque curant de bona legislatione con­
siderant de virtute et malitia, ut malitiam repellant a civibus et
faciant eos virtuosos; hoc enim intendit bonus legislator; quare
manifestum est quod bona et vera civitas et non secundum ser­
monem tantum, debet esse sollicita de virtute, ut faciat cives
virtuosos. "
59. I-II, 96, 3; “Omnia objecta virtutum referri possunt vel ad bonum
privatum alicujus personae, vel ad bonum commune multitudinis...
Lex autem.. .ordinatur ad bonum commune; et ideo nulla virtus
est de cujus actibus lex praecipere non possit. Non tamen de
omnibus actibus omnium virtutum lex humana praecipit, sed solum
de illis qui ordinabiles sunt ad bonum commune, vel immediate,
...vel mediate.”

sed solum graviora, a quibus possibile est majorem partem multi­
tudinis abstinere, et praecipue quae sunt in nocumentum aliorum,
sine quorum prohibitione societas humana conservari non posset;
sicut prohibentur lege humana homicidia et furta et hujusmodi. "
61. Ibid., ad 2; “lex humana intendit homines inducere ad virtutem,
non subito, sed gradatim: et ideo non statim multitudini imperfec­
torum imponit ea quae sunt jam virtuosorum, ut scilicet ab omni­
bus malis abstineant."
62. II-II, 109, 3, ad 1: “non possent homines ad invicem convivere, nisi
sibi invicem crederent, tamquam sibi invicem veritatem manifes­
tantibus.” II-II, 114, 2, ad 1; "sicut non posset homo vivere in
societate sine veritate ita nec sine delectatione; quia, sicut Philo­
sophus dicit in 8. Ethic, [cap. 5], ’nullus potest per diem morari
cum tristi, nec cum non delectabili.’ "

54

THE CONTENT OF THE COMMON GOOD

THE CONTENT OF THE COMMON GOOD

filial piety is a good for the son inasmuch as it is virtuous; but the
good which results for the parent from that act is the succor of his
needs, bodily or otherwise. In general, it is possible to distinguish
two aspects of goodness in any virtue, according as one considers the
ethical value of the act of virtue, or the external work by means of
which it is carried out and which redounds to the benefit of others.
The act in itself is a moral good in the strictest sense of the word;
its goodness proceeds from the effective adequation of the will to the
right precepts of practical reason; and the habitus from which that
act proceeds makes him who executes it simpliciter good. On the
other hand, the external work which a virtuous act has as its object is
a good which does not consist formally in the very act of virtue, and
consists even less in the inner willingness of the will to accord with
the rec^a ratio agibilium; it consists, rather, precisely in the profit
which is derived by another — a single individual, or many, or the
entire society -- from the execution of such act. Social living re­
quires such goods. Since man is social by nature, each individual
owes to the rest a conduct which produces those conditions without
which human society would be unable to endure.83 Those conditions
can come from the specific act of any virtue whatsoever; acts of for­
titude, temperance, etc., may be necessary for producing them in a
society, and for this reason these acts may even become due in jus­
tice and demanded by society. There are some virtues which are nec­
essarily destined by their nature to produce for others the kind of
good without which social life could not be. These are the virtues
whose specific act implies a relation ad alterum, such as justice,63
6465
principally, and those virtues connected with it.85 Justice is the fun­
damental virtue in this respect. The conservation of life and property
and, with it, the maintenance of at least a minimum of social living
together, results from abstaining from vices like homicide, theft, etc.,
which are among the most serious of those contrary to justice.66
Two remarks must be made here. In the first place, the radical
justification of the virtues is not, in the eyes of Saint Thomas, found­
ed upon the aspect of the profitable returns which society may derive
from them; there would be in this view a sort of social utilitarianism
which is completely foreign to his thought. Virtues are worthy for
63. II-II, 109, 3, ad 1 : “quia homo est animal sociale, naturaliter unus
homo debet alteri id, sine quo societas humana servari non posset."
64. II-II, 58, 2, Sed contra: “justitia est solum circa ea quae sunt ad
alterum. ”
65. These are the so-called social virtues. Cf. II-II, 80, art. un.
66. I-II, 96, 2: “lege humana non prohibentur omnia vitia, ...sed solum
graviora,... et praecipue quae sunt in nocumentum aliorum, ...si­
cut. ..homicidia et furta et hujusmodi. "

55

wi^tthey are in themselves; they have sufficient justification in the
fact that they are habitus which make well doing possible. In the sec­
ond place, the fact that there is a distinction between an act of virtue
and the external work which it may produce does not prevent them
I from being in a close union, according to which the inner willingness
is prolonged normally in the external work and in its good result ad
I alterum; and this external work is more meritorious insofar as the
I will from which it proceeds is more prompt.6768Consequently, as has
already been stated above, the life of the just is preservative of the
' common good, because their virtue abounds in those external works
which are necessary for any life in common.
Nevertheless the difference between those two aspects exists, and
it appears in a particularly notable manner in what Saint Thomas says
about the way in which that act of justice which is the matter of a legal
precept is carried out. It suffices, he says, for the purpose of human
law that the act be executed according to what is prescribed by law;
and, provided that the act is executed, it does not matter if it does not
come from the habitus of justice; it may arise, for instance, from fear
of the penalty.88 The law imposes the fulfilling of certain external
acts which are judged necessary for the good of society; if these acts
are not carried out by the impulse of virtue, or at least through obe­
dience to law, they will be fulfilled then under the sanction attached to
the precept.
From these analyses it can be inferred that for Saint Thomas, the
expression “common good" of civil society embraces goods of very
varied natures. Thus, although it means par excellence the good life
of the community according to virtue, it nevertheless surpasses the
limits of this meaning and includes, in addition, those goods which are
in any way related to that supreme end as lower ends subjected to it,
or as means intended for its fulfillment; and also those which, like
specifying objects, confront the activity in which happiness consists.
Should the concept “common good” be so extended, in accordance with
the usage of Saint Thomas, as to include all those goods which in any
way may be shared, enjoyed or owned by many, then the natures of
the goods thus included will vary, first, according as they are the ob­
jects of the good life, i.e., the objects of wisdom, knowledge, virtue;
I

67. I-II, 114, 4 ad 2: “unicuique est laboriosum et difficile quod non
prompta voluntate facit; et talis labor diminuit meritum.”
68. I-II, 100, 9: “illud directe cadit sub praecepto legis ad quod lex
cogit. Coactio autem legis est per metum poenae, ut dicitur X
Eth.; nam illud proprie cadit sub praecepto legis, pro quo poena
legis infligitur.” Ibid., ad 1: “modus faciendi actum justitiae, qui
cadit sub praecepto, est ut fiat aliquid secundum ordinem juris,
non autem quod fiat ex habitu justitiae.”

56

THE CONTENT OF THE COMMON GOOD

or second, according as the goods are embodied in the organization of
society, in which case they refer to the structure and functioning of
the social whole, its institutions, etc.; or third, according as they be­
long to the living matter, so to speak, which provides tne material
cause of society, and then the goods will be all those which are re­
lated in some way to the biological existence and conservation of the
individual; or finally, according as the goods are incorporated in
things as useful possessions, and such goods are riches, etc. Although
they belong to such diverse categories, they are nevertheless not jux­
taposed at random but, on the contrary, are organized and related to
one another in an order at whose apex is the operation regelated by
virtue, that is, happiness--insofar as happiness can in fact be reached
in temporal life. This crowning good, happiness, so imposes its rule
and measure on all the levels of that hierarchical order, that what­
ever is done at the expense of the rule of virtue can never be good,
but is, rather, an evil for the entire community.
In order to determine the order of the other goods in the hierarchy,
it is well to follow the method suggested by a statement of Saint
Thomas in the De Regimine Principum, namely, that two things are
required for the individuaPs happiness: the main thing is activity ac­
cording to virtue; the other, secondary and instrumental, is a suf­
ficient supply of corporeal possessions. A similar classification,
continues Saint Thomas, is found to be true in society; but whereas
man is endowed by nature with the unity which enables him to act, so­
ciety, on the contrary, must first acquire this unity.00 This distinc­
tion, based on the nature of the social being, whose unity is a unity
per ordinationem, is the key to the discovery of a complete order of
goods which belong to the social organization itself, and which are to
be carried out only in the social being as such. Since they are essen­
tial to the full living together of a society, and indeed to its very exis­
tence, these goods are higher than those above-mentioned which are
embodied in things, as well as higher than those belonging to the
body—“vita et sanitas corporis.”69
70 Now, the goods related to, or in­
herent in, the social structure are subordinated, in turn, to the su­
preme end of the political community.71
69. De Reg., I, 15: “Ad bonam unius hominis vitam duo requiruntur:
unum principale, quod est operatio secundum'virtutem (virtus enim
est qua bene vivitur); aliud vero secundarium et quasi instrumen­
tale, scilicet corporalium bonorum sufficientia, quorum usus est
necessarius ad actum virtutis. Ipsa tamen hominis unitas per nat­
uram causatur, multitudinis autem unitas, quae pax dicitur, per
regentis industriam est procuranda.”
70. Ibid., I, 14.
71. In Pol., III, 7, #14: “finis propter quem instituta est civitas bene
oFdTnata, est secundum virtutem perfectam vivere vel operari, et
non ipsum convivere.”

THE CONTENT OF THE COMMON ΟΟΟΓ

57

That unity which society must reach as a prerequisite for ;.!s good
acting is nothing other than its peace. This unity, nowe/cr, cannot be
reached simply by any means whatsoever, but only according to jus­
tice, which is an indispensable foundation for the good arrangement of
the city. Finally, the social being itself is the field in which the vir­
tues related to justice--piety, obedience, liberality, veracity, and
above all friendliness--spread themselves and fructify in works ad
alterum which are perfective of the common living.
Peace, which is the unity of the community,72 is the main good of
society;73 it is a condition most necessary for its existence, preser­
vation and good acting. Without the unity which is peace, the useful­
ness of social life disappears and the community becomes a weighty
burden for itself.74 Unlike the unity of each individual man, which is
a unity bestowed and preserved by nature, the unity of society, al­
though it is natural in that the existence of society is derived from
human nature, is at the same time a work of will and has continually
to be constituted and conquered by the political prudence of the ruler
and the civic virtue of the ruled. Saint Thomas insists repeatedly
that the ruler should strive to promote peace, and even states that
this should be his main purpose.7576
* And this assertion is in agreement
with the preeminent function he assigns in the social life to the unity
which is peace: just as a man needs the unity of all his parts in order
to act, so it is only when united by the link of peace that the multitude
can be conducted to the virtuous operation which is happiness.78
The concept of peace embraces both the concept of concord, which
is the union of diverse wills in a common consent, and, as an indispen­
sable element, the concept of the interior unification of the various
72. De Reg., I, 15: “Multitudinis unitas...pax dicitur.”
73. Ibid., I, 5: “Bonum pacis est praecipuum in multitudine sociali.”
74. Ibid., I, 2: “Bonum et salus consociatae multitudinis est, ut ejus
unitas conservetur, quae dicitur pax, qua remota socialis vitae
perit utilitas, quinimmo multitudo dissentiens sibi ipsi sit oner­
osa.” Ibid., I, 15; “Sicut homo nihil bene agere potest nisi praesupposita suarum partium unitate, ita hominum multitudo pacis
unitate carens, dum impugnat se ipsam, impeditur a bene agendo."
75. Ibid., I, 15: “Multitudinis unitas, quae pax dicitur, per regentis
industriam est procuranda.” Ibid., I, 2: “Hoc igitur est ad quod
maxime rector multitudinis intendere debet, ut pacis unitatem
procuret. ”
76. Ibid., I, 15: “ad bonam vitam multitudinis instituendam tria requir­
untur. Primo quidem, ut multitudo in unitate pacis constituatur.
Secundo, ut multitudo vinculo pacis unita dirigatur ad bene agendum
...Tertio vero requiritur, ut per regentis industriam necessariorum
ad bene vivendum adsit sufficiens copia."

58

THE CONTENT OF THE COMMON GOOD

THE CONTENT OF THE COMMON GOOD

59

which men make use to communicate with one another,30 is not the
appetites within each one of those who are in concord.77 These are
' only object of the law: there are also the acts of virtue whirl; the leg ­
really two inseparable aspects of one and the same peace, for the
islator considers necessary for the common happiness, Then the law
deeper the peace of the minds is--that is to say, the more ordered
both
those acts as falling under the formal aspect of what
the appetites under the influence of virtue—the deeper also and stead­ j is dueprescribes
and also provides the way to enjoin them.. The behavior thus
ier the social peace will be. And insofar as the law succeeds in
! prescribed and required by the law may be considered, in a sense, as
causing the city to be virtuous, there will be an adherence and con­
i the minimum of ethical behavior necessary for the maintenance of
sent of all to the common ends as well as an orderly unification ac­
social life. This consideration of an ethical minimum which the law
cording to those ends of the appetites of each individual. In this
imposes is manifest in Saint Thomas’ statement, above quoted, that
sense, peace proves to be not only a condition required for the good
law prohibits the most serious vices, such as homicide, robbery, etc.,
life of society but also its fruit and result. Saint Thomas says that
from
which not only the most virtuous men but also the large major­
peace is not a virtue but a fruit of virtue: “ponitur [pax)inter fructus,
ity of the multitude are able to abstain/1 On the other hand, the be­
inquantum est quoddam finale bonum, spiritualem dulcedinem hab­
havior required by justice appears always under the character of that
ens."78 As a fruit, peace is the enjoyment of the virtuous life of the
which
is due to another: and in this way justice in a fundamental way
city. But because peace has a character of unifying the multitude, at
makes possible social organization, on the basis of what must be rec­
least a minimum of peace is a necessary condition for that virtuous
ognized and guaranteed as belonging to every one and to the commun­
life. Aside from this, the unity which Saint Thomas exalts in his De
ity.
Regimine is not the one required for the mere ontological existence
t
Justice, and especially legal justice, is ordered to the virtuous life
of a community--that is to say, the formal consensus, no matter how
of the city because justice is contained and stated in the objective or­
tacit, to simply establish a community of life with a view to a miniI
der of the legal injunctions, and life according to virtue is the effect
mum of ends—but something more: it is an advanced stage in the vol- /
of the law. But justice is in itself a common good also: Saint Thomas
untary unification of all the individuals with all their tendencies and
I
writes that the judge has under his care that common good which is
appetites, under the attraction of the supreme common ends. Even
|
justice.80
82 Among the things which law prescribes, some are related
81
so, unity does not formally constitute the happy life of the multitude,
ί
directly
and immediately to the common good in its highest aspect;
but is rather a condition necessary for reaching it.
/
others, only indirectly and mediately, such as happens when there is
Social peace, on the other hand, cannot be established by negleci
a question of preserving the common good of justice and peace.83 In
ting the requirements of justice. As a good intended to be consubI
all these cases the expression common good is applied to justice in a
stantial, as it were, with the social organism, justice is not primarily I
the virtuous habitus which moves the individual “to give to everyone
(
80. II-II, 58, 8: “possunt per rationem rectificari...exteriores ac­
what is his own,” but it is rather the actual shaping of the social mat- !
tiones, et res exteriores, quae in usum hominis veniunt; ...per ex­
ter in accordance with the rules derived from the object of the virtue
I
teriores actiones, et per exteriores res, quibus sibi invicem hom­
of justice, the jus, the res justa.79 These rules are the laws issued
[
ines communicare possunt, attenditur ordinatio unius hominis ad
by the ruler for the common good, and the collection of these laws in
’
alterum; ...et ideo cum justitia ordinetur ad alterum, ... [est] circa
a body constitutes the positive law of a society. The special subject
exteriores actiones, et res, secundum quamdam rationem objecti
matter of particular justice, namely, the external acts and things of
I
specialem; prout scilicet secundum eas unus homo alteri coordina77. II-II, 29, 1: 'concordia proprie sumpta est ad alterum: inquantum
!
scilicet diversorum cordium voluntates simul in unum consensum
/
conveniunt. Contingit autem unius hominis cor tendere in diversa.
f·
...non enim homo habet pacatum cor quandiu non habet id quod vult;
j
etsi habeat aliquid quod vult, tamen adhuc restat ei aliquid volen- |
dum, quod simul habere non potest. Haec autem unio non est de
'
ratione concordiae; unde concordia importat unionem appetituum
I
diversorum appetentium : pax autem, supra hanc unionem, im/
portat etiam appetituum unius appetentis unionem."
!
78. II-II, 29, 4 ad 1.
i
79. II-II, 57, 1: “jus est objectum justitiae." Ibid., ad 1: *hoc nomen
■
jus primo impositum est ad significandum ipsam rem justam. ”

tur. ”
81. See note 60, page 53.
82. I-II, 19, 10: “judex habet curam boni communis, quod est justitia.’’
83. I-II, 96, 3: “non de omnibus actibus omnium virtutum lex humana
praecipit, sed solum de illis, qui ordinabiles sunt ad bonum com­
mune: vel immediate, sicut cum aliqua directe propter bonum com­
mune fiunt: vel mediate, sicut cum aliqua ordinantur a legislatore
pertinentia ad bonam disciplinam, per quam cives informantur, ut
commune bonum justitiae, et pacis conservent.”

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60

THE CONTENT OF THE COMMON GO. Hl

THE CONTENT OF THE COMMON GOOD

sense which is surely authentic, but yet different from (he sense according to which the common good is synonymous with· roe common
happiness of the multitude. Justice is an authentic cmmnon good be­
cause inasmuch as it is realized within a society, it consists in the
good social organization on the basis of what is due to each part andto
the whole, and such a social condition is a good for ail the members
of that society. Justice in this way proves to be an element of the allembracing common good of society; and it is such an element, both in
its character as an upright external operation of the individuals and,
mainly and formally, when it insures to the community a certain number of moral conditions without which the community could not survive. This interpretation agrees with Saint Thomas' teaching that the
intention of the legislator is directed first and primarily to the conimon good and secondly to the order of justice and virtue, bv means of
which the common happiness is achieved.81
In speaking of peace and justice, one cannot fail to mention friendship. Whereas justice is essential as a foundation for any right soI
cial structure, and is measured in accordance with the things by
means of which persons are related, friendship manifests itself
I
rather in the mutual benevolence which normally arises among those
I
who are united under any form of grouping or any common possession
I
(“communicatio”) ,35 As a sentiment of this kind, friendship facilitates
I
the cohesion of all who are in the group. To each type of communiI
catio, from the most simple to the largest and most comprehensive,
I
which is civil society, there corresponds a different sort of friendship. I
64. Ι-Π, 100, 8: “intentio legislatoris cujuslibet ordinatur primo quidem et principaliter ad bonum commune; secundo autem ad ordinem justitiae, et virtutis, secundum quem bonum commune conservatur, et ad ipsum pervenitur.” Cf. I-II, 100, 9 ad 2: “intentio
legislatoris est de duobus: de uno quidem, ad quod intendit per
praecepta legis induce re : et hoc est virtus; aliud autem est, de
quo intendit praeceptum ferre: et hoc est, quod ducit, vel disponit
ad virtutem, scilicet actus virtutis; non enim idem est finis
praecepti, et id de quo praeceptum datur; sicut neque in aliis rebus idem est finis, et quod est ad finem.” - The inclusion of virtue
with justice in this passage means that virtue can be a subject
matter for the law, and in such a case it becomes an object of
legal justice. The “order of justice and virtue” is then the same
as the total content of the positive law.
85. Π-Π, 23, I; “non quilibet amor habet rationem amicitiae, sed
amor qui est cum bene volentia; quando scilicet sic amamus aliquem ut ei bonum velimus... Sed nec benevolentia sufficit ad
rationem amicitiae, sed requiritur quaedam mutua amatio, quia
amicus est amico amicus. Talis autem mutua benevolentia fundatur super aliqua communicatione. ”

for instance, the friendship which unites fellow-soldiers .is aifferent
from the one which links the members of a family, and this friendship differs, in turn, from the friendship which unites fellow-citizens.’**
Each communicatio (xoivovm, for Aristotle) proves to he, in its
dual character as an interrelation of individuals and as the special
feeiingof friendliness which unites them in the group, a specific and
I more or less complex unit both of the structure and of the functionI ing of the social organism. In general, friendship is a manifestation
of the natural sociability (“omnis homo naturaliter omni honiini est
amicus”)86
87 by means of which men constitute their communities; but
itisalsoa conscientious and voluntary cultivation of this human tendency. Considered in this latter sense, friendship is a virtue, and its
acts are owed to the other persons on account of the delight which it
affords and which is necessary for man’s life?’8 This is why friendship, with the affection it generates, completes and perfects in a
sense the work performed by strict justice. But whereas friendship
is essentially personal, justice is impersonal by nature, since ii. depends on certain proportions among things and makes no acceptance
of persons.89 Finally, it can be said of friendship, as of peace, that
it is rather the result of virtue than itself a virtue.90
On a level lower than that of intersocial relations--justice, peace,
friendship, etc.--and subordinated to them are the things required in
the third place, according to the De Regimine, for the good living of
86. In Eth., VIII, 9, #1661: “ostendit [Philosophus] diversitatem amicitiarum secundum diversitatem communicationis. Videmus enim
quod fratribus et personis ita conjunctis sunt omnia communia,
puta domus, mensa et alia hujusmodi. Aliis autem amicis sunt
quaedam discreta. Et quibusdam plura et quibusdam pauciora. ”
Cf. Eth., VIII, 9, 1159 b 27.
87. II-II, 114, 1 , ad 2.
88. II-II, 114, 2, ad 1: “sicut non posset homo vivere in societate sine
veritate, ita nec sine delectatione.”
89. Jacques Maritain, The Person and the Common Good: “society...
cannot subsist without...civil amity, which is the animating form of
society and essentially personal. However, the relations which
make up the structure of society concern, as such, only justice,
which is essentially impersonal because it is measured on things,
and does not make acceptance of persons.”
90. II-II, 23, 3, ad 1: “potest dici, quod [amicitia] non est virtus per
se ab aliis distincta: non enim habet rationem laudabilis, et honesti, nisi ex objecto, secundum scilicet quod fundatur super honestatem vir tutum... unde amicitia virtuosa magis est aliquid consequens ad virtutem, quam sit virtus.”

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62

THE CONTENT OF THE COMMON GOOD

THE CONTENT OF THE COMMON GOOD

the multitude.91 A certain amount of “corporeal goods” is necessary
for virtuous activity, both for the decorum of happy1 life and as instruments which virtue utilizes for doing good.92 These goods occupy the
lowest level of all those comprehended in the expression “common
good,” and this expression fits them least properly. They form an
order of purely instrumental goods, the order of wealth, that is, of
those things “exterior to man, the use of which is necessary or favorable to the support and expansion of human life.”93 In the order
of nature, the instrumental goods are inferior to man and were made
for him, “infra hominem, et propter hominem facta.”94 They might
rather be called common utilities. They are common in the sense
that an entire society needs them, and can consequently give laws for
their use, employment, distribution and enjoyment by each and every
one of the citizens, in accordance with justice and with a view always
to the highest ends on which the common good depends.
It must now be asked which of the three levels in which the total
content of civil society’s common good is organized--namely, the
level of happy activity, that of social structure and functioning, or
that of the instruments favorable to human life—corresponds strictly
to the immanent good as discussed in the first chapter, and there de­
clared to be the good which most properly specifies the social being.
At once the goods of the lowest level may be excluded from such a
concept; it is obvious that they, although objects of use, are external
to what is social. On the other hand, just as the immanent good of an
army is its organization, so the immanent good of a society is the

1
'
I

'
j
!

91- De Reg·. I> 15: “ad bonam vitam multitudinis instituendam tria
requiruntur... Tertio vero requiritur, ut per regentis industriam
necessariorum ad bene vivendum adsit sufficiens copia."
92. In Eth., I, 14, #173: “Felicitas non est a fortuna... Concurrunt au­
tem ad felicitatem quaedam alia bona, in quibus fortuna aliquid
operatur. ...eorum quaedam necessaria sunt ad decorem quem­
dam felicitatis. Quaedam vero instrumentaliter cooperantur ad
felicitatem.” Ibid., 16, #194: “felicitas indiget exterioribus
bonis, vel ad decorem, vel inquantum sunt instrumenta operationis
secundum virtutem. ...usus exteriorum bonorum est bonus et virtuosus, inquantum scilicet virtus utitur eis, ut quibusdam instru­
mentis ad bene agendum."
93· Yves Simon, “Work and Wealth,” Review of Politics, 2 (1940), 2.
94. I-II, 2, 1: “in ordine naturae omnia hujusmodi [divitiae] sunt infra
hominem, et propter hominem facta.” We add here that Saint
Thomas in the Commentary on the Ethics, observes on his part
that between the Stoics and the Peripatetics there is the difference
that the latter recognize that just as the virtuous man can be af­
fected by sadness, so also he depends on external property up to
a certain point for his felicity. Cf. In Eth., I, 16, #196.

;

63

good condition of its structure and functioning. But the qualities of
that condition are, precisely, justice, as realized in social life; unity;
peace; friendship; and everything which these imply in the institutions,
habits and social customs which make living together possible, arid
which are the means and the form of the flow of social life. Thus, any
good quality of organization or of activity which is capable of reali­
zation only in a social being as such, is a part of society’s immanent
common good, in the most proper meaning of that term, because that
which is essentially relative ad alterum, — such as justice, peace,
friendship, concord, social unity, — can exist only among several.
But the righteous operation in which the happy life of the community
consists is also immanent in the community, although not in exactly
the same way as the virtues ad alterum. Common activity according
to virtue resides, by analogy~with the individual person’s acts of vir­
tue or knowledge, in the collective subject--“manet in ipso operante”
—in the measure in which this activity by itself and not its object,
constitutes happiness. That operation perfects society in the line of
What is moral, and it adheres to it in a way similar to the way in
which a virtue dwells in its individual subject. Thus, it may with all
propriety be said that the collective moral conscience and the com­
mon patrimony of virtue and good living which nourish the moral life
of each individual dwell in society itself. However, unlike unity and
justice, which when objectively realized in a community are qualities
essentially inherent in its very structure, and, therefore, necessarily
imply relations among persons, the good living of the multitude re­
sides in each one of the good men as in its ultimate subject; the virtue
of each of them is afterwards made common to many by diffusing it­
self through its own action.95 Thus, the totality of the immanent good
of society comprises a range of qualities which extend for what is
most impersonal, socialized and “relational” in its structure, through
I
the diverse states of the collective moral conscience--in different
i
degrees of interdependence with the virtue of individuals—up to the
most personal acts of virtue of good men as diffused through the com­
munity.
That this good is common means that all the component parts of
the community enjoy and share in it. Being the good of a whole, it is
thereby in an effective way common, or at least communicable, to its
y
parts. Such communicability belongs to the essence of any common
good, whereas it may be entirely lacking to some individual goods:
!
personal existence, for example, cannot, under the same ratio of goodi
ness, be shared by more subjects than its own. Now, the common
95. S.c.G., III, 69: “bonum unius fit multis commune, si ab uno in alia
deTivatur; quod non potest esse, nisi in quantum diffundit ipsum
in alia per propriam actionem."

64

THE CONTENT OF THE COMMON GOOD

good is not only communicable, but, owing to the ouioj^ical structure
of society, it cannot be completely separated nor m^Mutely distin­
guished from the good of the singular individuals: order different
respects--materialiter on the part of the citizens, am; finaliter on the
part of the common good--there is an interdependence ..md^mutual in­
fluence between the two terms. The common good m not, then, pecul­
iar to the social body as an entity separated from the. parts of the so­
cial body; it is likewise a good for the parts precist lv insofar as they
are parts.96 Whence it follows that he who seeks the common good,
simultaneously seeks a good for himself. Saint Thomas likes to
quote the saying of Valerius Maximus to the effect that the ancient
Romans preferred to live poor in a rich empire than rich in a poor
empire, which indicates that the common good is for each of the mem- ,
bers of the city a good even greater than his private good,97
The highest and most perfect form of communicability is that of a
good which, remaining wholly identical, can be enjoyed and shared
simultaneously by many individuals; this is precisely the communica- I
bility of the objects of spiritual and moral life; objects of this kind are
not submitted to quantity and so their communicability is not subject
to any form of distribution.98
i

96. De Car., 4, ad 2: “Est quoddam bonum commune quod pertinet ad
hunc vel ad ilium inquantum est pars alicujus totius; sicut ad
militem, inquantum est pars exercitus, et ad civem, inquantum
est pars civitatis.”
97. 11-11, 47, 10 ad 2: “ille qui quaerit bonum commune multitudinis
ex consequenti etiam quaerit bonum suum, ...quia bonum proprium
non potest esse sine bono communi vel familiae vel civitatis aut
regni. Unde et Valerius Maximus dicit de antiquis Romanis quod
“malebant esse pauperes in divite imperio quam divites in paupere
imperio. "
98- Saint Thomas speaks of a common good of intellects, which consists in the order of the intelligible objects: “bonum cui intellectus speculativus conjungitur per cognitionem, est communius bono
cui conjungitur intellectus practicus, inquantum intellectus specu­
lativus magis separatur a particulari quam intellectus practicus,
cujus cognitio in operatione perficitur, quae in singularibus con­
sistit.1^ Sent., IV, 49, I, 1, sol. 3 ad 1). This common good is
“separated,’’ in a way analogous to the way in which God is the
separated common good of the universe. Maritain remarks (The
Person and the Common Good) that the common good of the intel­
lects can be understood in two ways: either as the supratemporal
order of truth and beauty, or as the treasure of culture accumu­
lated in the course of a civilization and in which minds participate
as in a truly common good.

THE CONTENT OF THE COMMON C-Oôf)

6

A lower manner of communicability is that of tne- goods which
submitted to any form of distribution or of use by a multitude, in
a way as to imply either division of the goods themselves accord!
quantity, or at least a reciprocal exclusion among those who enjoy the
I goods. It may be said of none of these things that it is simply the
“common good,* but rather it may be said that they are common goods,
I in the plural. They are common, however, in the sense, either that no
! individual is assigned in advance to enjoy them privately, and to the
exclusion of the rest, or that, because of tne end for which they exist,
society has over them a supreme dominion, which is superior to all
individual appropriation or adjudication.
In the totality of the common good everything which may be com­
municated through some form of distribution is a subject matter for
distributive justice. The fact that when discussing distributive jus­
tice Saint Thomas often uses the expression “bona communia,’
(plural), is significant, because only goods which are several can be
distributed in a strict sense. Just as it belongs to distributive justice
to assign the various burdens and tasks which each one owes to the
community, in accordance with what each can contribute in equality of
proportion, so it also belongs to it to distribute the goods which are
common, which as such are owed by the whole to the part." Concern­
ing the nature of these goods, sufficient light is shed both by the ob­
jection that to distribute the common goods to many is harmful to
society’s common good, and Saint Thomas’ reply which recommends
moderation in the distribution. Saint Thomas would not have given
this answer if the expression “common goods” concerned only spiri­
tual and moral goods, which are neither exhausted by their being
shared by many,nor even subject to moderation when it is a question
of realizing them.100
99- II-II, 61, 2: “in distributiva justitia datur aliquid alicui privatae
personae, inquantum id quod est totius, est debitum parti: quod
quidem tanto majus est, quanto ipsa pars majorem principalita­
tem habet in toto; et ideo in distributiva justitia tanto plus alicui
de bonis communibus datur, quanto illa persona majorem habet
principalitatem in communitate.”
1Û0. II —II, 61, 1, obj. 1: “non enim potest esse justitiae species, quod
multitudini nocet, cum justitia ad bonum commune ordinetur. Sed
distribuere bona communia in multos, nocet bono communi multi­
tudinis: tum quia exhauriuntur opes communes: tum etiam quia
mores hominum corrumpuntur.” And Saint Thomas’ r eply :( Hoid.,
ad 1): “sicut in largitionibus privatarum personarum commen­
datur moderatio, effusio vero culpatur; ita etiam in distributione
communium bonorum est moderatio servanda, in quo dirigit jus­
titia distributiva.”

66

THE CONTENT OF THE COMMON GOOD

As a result of the foregoing discussions two things must be pointed
out: the complexity of the content of the common good, and the fact
that however complex it may be, the content of the total social good
is a hierarchical order which is commanded by the supreme end of
human happiness. This end is essentially a moral good, and whatever
is contrary to moral law will fail to attain this good- in fact, to con­
travene moral law is at the same time to attempt against human hap­
piness.
Now, several questions arise from the consideration that the good
of the whole must be shared by its parts. It might be asked, for in­
stance, whether this sharing means that the good of the whole com1;
munity is worthy only because it is useful to each individual, and so
|
is on that account subordinated to each individual, or whether, on the
11
contrary, the good of the whole is worthy by itself, not as a means
I
but as an end. And if this latter is the case, it may further be asked
whether the good of the entire community prevails over that of a sin)
gle person. These and similar problems are set by the general rela|l
tionship between society and the individual, common good and private
1
good, and their solution is not given by merely stating the constitutive
I
elements of the entire good of society. The solution to these problems I
is found, as will be shown in the next chapter, in the doctrine of the
t
primacy of the common good.
I

i
)

II;
I

i

Chapter III

j

THE PRIMACY OF COMMON GOOD OVER PRIVATE GOOD

Saint Thomas makes frequent and varied application of the prin­
ciple of the primacy of the common good over any private good, now,
for instance, to find the justification for capital punishment; now to
establish the excellence of the Eucharist over the other sacraments;
in another place, to subordinate private virtue to the common happi­
ness, or again, to teach the duty of renouncing contemplation at least
in part, in order to tend to the spiritual good of the Church, or even
the urgent temporal needs of a multitude. In these, and in many other
different cases, he never hesitates to uphold the superiority of a com­
mon good—whatever it may be in each particular case.
Historically, the principle of the primacy of society’s common
good may be traced to the political thought of the ancient world. In
the prevailing tendency of this thought, as represented mainly by
Plato and Aristotle, the state, or polis, was believed to have an in­
comparable influence in shaping the”moral life of the citizens ; and
since the end of the state is above all moral perfection, the good and
virtuous citizen is he alone who conforms his life to the constitution
and laws of his city. On the other hand, the relationship between so­
ciety and individual often assumes, on a purely practical level, the
form of disagreement and even of acute conflict between their respec­
tive interests. The solution for such conflicts has generally been
found in subordinating all other interests to that of the community.
The community was acknowledged to have a good of its own; this
fact was clearly expressed in such notions of the Roman Law as “res
publica” and “bonum publicum,” which designated those values of a
political order to which was given absolute predominance over all
private goods. With these and similar formulas of the Roman Law
there arises a second element in the formation of the doctrine of the
primacy of society’s common good. A third element comes from
Patristic literature. The Fathers of the Church introduced into the
incipient Christian philosophy many formulas of the Roman jurists
concerning the hegemony of the “res publica,” but at the same time
they made the decisive and far-reaching reservation that although the
city is what is most eminent in the temporal human order, there is
nevertheless something superior to it for which man is ultimately
destined, namely, the order of divine things. Such a reservation will,
in the long run, modify the general perspective of the problem.
67

68

PRIMACY OF COMMON GOOD OVER PRIVA 7Έ GOOD

Saint Thomas embodied this reservation—as a C.·!,· L
theologian
could not help doing—together with the Aristotelian ,νκι Roman legacy,
in the elaboration of his political doctrines. That nc'-v datum--that is,
the new meaning and value acquired by man’s person..! ny with his
supernatural destination--appears unequivocally in
Thomas’
statement that grace in a single soul is worth more than the natural
good of the whole universe. Thus, the final and decisive stage in the
formation of the problem known as “the primacy of dr. common good
of the civil society” must be ascribed directly to Patristic sources
and to the Fathers’ interpretation of formulas of Roman Law? It was
in this state of historical development that the problem reached Saint
Thomas.
In his writings the statement, in varied but more or less equivalent
formulas, of this doctrine is usually that “the common good prevails
over the private good.” Whatever may be said concerning die terms
or the post-Aristotelian conceptualization in which Saint Thomas ex­
presses the principle, it is certain that he rightly finds an authority
for the principle in the passage of the Nicomachean Ethics in which
I. What is stated above about the sources for the problem of the pri­
macy of the common good of civil society follows what Fr. I. Th.
Eschmann, O.P. writes in his article “A Thomistic Glossary on the
Principle of the Preeminence of a Common Good” (Medieval Stud­
ies, V). Fr. Eschmann presents here a collection of numerous
passages concerning the primacy of the common good of civil so­
ciety in the works of Saint Thomas. In addition to the sources for
those texts in Aristotle, in Roman Law and in some Fathers of the
Church, especially Saint Augustine, Fr. Eschmann points out that
in Saint Thomas the elements of the problem show a development
and, above all, a juridical style which they are very far from hav­
ing in their Aristotelian sources. It would be wrong, Fr. Eschmann
goes so far as to say, “to believe that we are faced here with an
Aristotelico-Thomistic doctrine. Nothing is further from the truth
... Historically speaking the principle of the superiority of a com­
mon good and related doctrines are a legacy to Scholasticism from
a Roman and patristic heritage. ” And, further on: “The authority
of Aristotle is only, if at all, in a very limited sense a source for
the Scholastic axiom [that “bonum commune praefertur bono pri­
vato”]. ” And also: “The word and notion of bonum commune are
Roman” (p. 125).
If such, historically, is the case, as Fr. Eschmann assures us,
there is no doubt on the other hand that, philosophically, Saint
Thomas is right in finding in a passage of Aristotle’s Nicomachean
I
Ethics (I, 2, 1094 b 7) a sufficiently explicit basis to support the
i
docTrTne of the primacy of the common good, and that his interpre[
tation of the passage is wholly warranted by the words which
f

PRIMACY OF COMMON GOOD OVER PRIVATE GOOD

69

Aristotle says that “even if the end is the same for a single man and
fora state, that of the state seems at all events something greater
and more complete whether to attain or to preserve; though it is
worthwhile to attain the end merely for one man, it is finer and more
godlike to attain it for a nation or for city-states.”2 This sentence
is for Saint Thomas, as it was for his medieval predecessors, a dic­
tum authenticum.3 Before examining the conditions for the validity
of this dictum it is necessary to take as a starting point what it pure ­
ly and simply affirms.
A quite typical formulation,is the following: ‘bonum multitudinis
est maius quam bonum unius qui est de multitudine.”4 The principle
contained in the dictum is, then, that the good belonging to a society
as such is worth more than any of the private goods of its members;
the former possesses more dignity and eminence than the latter and,
consequently, should be granted an effective preference in the order
of the social and political life rightly constituted. The general scope
and meaning of this preference may well be gathered from its appli­
cation to certain typical cases. Sometimes, for example, that pre­
eminence can be such that a private good may have to be sacrificed
for the sake of the common good. There is then a true conflict be­
tween what is good for the community and what is good for the indivi­
dual. Thus, in the case of a just war, the good, both spiritual and
temporal, of the community can extend so far as to require the loss
of many individual goods, even of life itself.5 There is also a conflict
2. The Thomistic texts in which the common good is called “divinius”
are inspired by this passage: Eth., I, 2, 1094 b 7.
3. A dictum authenticum is in the Middle Ages a proposition whose
truth is considered ascertained because it belongs to an author·
whose works make “authority." If its application to different cases
presented difficulties the only thing possible was to interpret it or
to fix the conditions of its right application, since its truth had to
be preserved at all events. The dictum referred to here appears
sometimes in the objections (argumenta in contrarium) to the thesis
of Saint Thomas. For the manner in which Saint Thomas uses this
dictum consult Fr. I. Th. Eschmann, O.P., “Bonum commune melius
ësTqûàm bonum unius " - Eine Studie ueber den Wertvorrang des
Pe’r'sonalen'bei' Th’omas von Aquin, Medieval Studies, VI.
4. iT-TÎ?"39, 2~ acT'2. The texts containing this principle are so numer­
would be impos s ible --as well as useless--to cite them
ous that
a collection of texts concerning the primacy of the common good, see Fr. I. Th. Eschmann, loc ■ cit.
5. II-II, 31, 3 and 2: “pro bono communi reipublicae vel spirituali vel
temporali virtuosum est etiam quod aliquis propriam vitam exponat
periculo.” II-II, 26, 3: “quaelibet pars habet inclinationem princi­
palem ad actionem communem utilitati totius. Apparet hoc in poli­
ticis virtutibus, secundum quas cives pro bono communi et dispen­
dia propriarum rerum et personarum interdum sustinent.”

70 .

PRIMACY OF COMMON GOOD OVER PRIVATE GOOD

of goods whenever the service of the community demands sacrificing,
or at least deferring, individual goods such as health, one’s own com­
fort, the repose of the philosopher or the scientist. A conflict of an­
other sort, though no less actue, is that which exists in the case of the
criminal condemned to death; here the common good is in conflict not
only with the criminal’s life, but also with the private good of his fam­
ily, which needs that life. If for the common good the malefactor’s
death is necessary, it is without doubt an evil for him and for his fam­
ily.6 Something similar happens whenever any penalty-—which is al­
ways the deprivation of some good: life, bodily integrity, liberty, ma­
terial property—is imposed on anyone who lacks fondness for virtue,
in order to restrain him from sinning.7
Now, if it is simply in order that the common good be preserved
that it is sometimes necessary to sacrifice private goods, it is pre­
cisely on that account that justice--legal justice, that is, whose object

6. I-II, 19, 10: “judex habet curam boni communis, quod est justitia;
et ideo vult occisionem latronis, quae habet rationem boni secundum
relationem ad statum communem; uxor autem latronis considerare
habet bonum privatum familiae; et secundum hoc vult maritum lat­
ronem non occidi.”
7. In the question devoted to the licitness of vindication, Saint Thomas
writes: “vindicatio fit per aliquod poenale malum inflictum peccan­
ti.” (II-II, 108, 1). And further on: “vindicatio intantum licita est
et virtuosa inquantum tendit ad cohibitionem malorum. Cohibentur
autem aliqui a peccando, qui affectum virtutis non habent, per hoc
quod timent amittere aliqua quae plus amant quam illa quae pec cando adipiscuntur; alias timor non compesceret peccatum. Et ideo
per substractionem omnium quae homo maxime diligit, est vindicta
de peccatis sumenda. Haec autem sunt quae homo maxime diligit:
vitam, incolumitatem corporis, libertatem sui, et bona exteriora,
puta divitias, patriam et gloriam.” (ibid., 3). In his Commentary
on the Politics (In Pol., I, 4,#5) Saint Thomas explains how, accor­
ding to Aristotle, it is licit, for the good of the community, that even
a learned person be submitted to slavery by the conquerors in a
war. In fact, allowing them to make themselves the owners of the
conquered, “homines incitantur ad fortius pugnandum: et quod sint
aliqui fortes pugnatores expedit conversationi humanae ad prohiben­
dum multorum malitias.” Even if it is not just simpliciter that the
learned man be made a slave of the ignorant one, “tamen servandum
est hoc etiam homini virtuoso secundum mentem, quia cum bonum
commune sit melius quam bonum proprium unius, non est infrigendum quod convenit bono publico quamvis non conveniat alicui pri­
vatae personae."

PRIMACY OF COMMON GOOD OVER PRIVATE GOOD

71

is the common good8--requires that such sacrifice be imposed only in
the measure in which it is necessary for securing such an end. To go
beyond that measure would be contrary to justice and consequently
harmful to the good of the community. This is why it is not because
he would attribute an absolute and despotic power to the state over the
individuals that Saint Thomas acknowledges that it is lawful for the
public authority to inflict the death penality, but for the very different
reason that the common good must be protected when the existence of
malefactors within a society endangers it. Saint Thomas uses for this
purpose terms which are particularly explicit and energetic: “Omnis
pars ordinatur ad totum ut imperfectum ad perfectum. Et ideo omnis
pars naturaliter est propter totum. Et propter hoc videmus quod si
saluti totius corporis humani expediat praecisio alicuius membri,
puta cum est putridum vel corruptivum aliorum membrorum, laudabil­
iter et salubriter abscinditur. Quaelibet autem persona singularis
comparatur ad totam communitatem sicut pars ad totum. Et ideo si
aliquis homo sit periculosus communitati et corruptivus ipsius propter
aliquod peccatum, laudabiliter et salubriter occiditur, ut bonum com­
mune conservetur.”9
'
A superficial and erroneous interpretation of this text would conI
sist in using it to justify the sacrifice of human life or of bodily in!
tegrity without any consideration other than public usefulness. But
I
that is certainly not the concept of the common good which, in the eyes
of Saint Thomas, makes capital punishment just. What common good
is referred to in this text? Undoubtedly it refers on the one hand to
those goods without the protection of which social life cannot be con­
served.10* But it is not only that category of good which is to be proftected by the malefactor’s punishment, but also the moral health of
the community, its life secundum virtutem. This interpretation ap­
pears as the only one possTbïëïf proper attention is given to the fact
that in the text quoted Saint Thomas speaks of sin. It is necessary to
recognize what this word means to the theologian and Christian moral­
ist. Sin is nothing else but the conscious and voluntary infraction of
the moral law;11 consequently the concept of sin refers essentially and

Î

i
i

I

8. II-II, 5é, 6: “justitia legalis est quaedam specialis virtus secun­
dum suam essentiam, secundum quod respicit commune bonum ut
proprium objectum.” Cf. also Ibid., a 5, passim,
9. II-II, 64, 2.
10. I-II, 96, 2: “lege humana non prohibentur omnia vitia... sed solum
graviora, a quibus possibile est majorem partem multitudinis ab­
stinere; et praecipue quae sunt in nocumentum aliorum, sine quo­
rum prohibitione societas humana conservari non posset; sicut...
homicidia et furta et hujusmodi.”
Ji, l-II, 71, 6: “peccatum nihil aliud est quam actus humanus malus.
Quod autem aliquis actus sit humanus, habet ex hoc quod est

72

PRIMACY OF COMMON GOOD OVER PRIVATE GOOD

directly to the moral order, and only secondarily and by its effects to
social usefulness. According to Saint Thomas, then, it is because of
the sin which a man commits that his punishment is justified; it is
only because a malefactor has endangered the moral health of a com­
munity (“si aliquis homo sit...corruptivus communitatis propter ali­
quod peccatum”) that it is licit to deprive him of life in order that that
good be conserved. Moreover, the malefactor, says Saint Thomas,
has made himself by his sin unworthy of sharing in the society of the
good.12 It is precisely in the consideration of the concept of sin that
this above-quoted text is seen quite otherwise than as tim justification
of an absolute and despotic power of the state over the individual.
Only after a man has sinned is there reason in justice t;> impose a
penalty on him; this penalty may be death if that is the only effective
means for protecting the common good against the malefactor.13 Saint
Thomas teaches very clearly that in no case may an innocent be le­
gitimately deprived of his life, and no argument can ever he drawn
’

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1 1. Continued
voluntarius." In the same article Saint Thomas adopts Saint.
Augustine’s definition of sin: “Peccatum est dictum, vel factum,
vel concupitum contra legem aeternam.” Ibid., ad 5: “a theologis
consideratur peccatum praecipue secundum quod est offensa contra Deum; a philosopho [Dionisio] autem morali, secundum quod
contrariatur rationi.”
12. II-II, 64, 2, ad 3: “homo peccando ab ordine rationis recedit; et
ideo decidit a dignitate humana... Et ideo quamvis hominem in sua
dignitate manentem occidere sit secundum se malum, tamen hominem peccatorem occidere potest esse bonum, sicut occidere bestiam.” Cf. II-II, 108, 4: “secundum rationem poenae, ...poena non
debetur nisi peccato.”
13. Cf. X. Basler, “Thomas von Aquin und die Bergriindung der Todesstrafe," Divus Thomas, Freiburg i. d. Schw., (1931), pp. 173-202.
Basler states that, according to Saint Thomas, it is solely propter
peccatum that punishment is imposed on a malefactor. Basler
brings out the character above all moral, not utilitarian, of the
penalty imposed by the public authority, and he rightly declares as
contrary to the doctrine of Saint Thomas the attempts made by
some authors in Germany to seek a moral ground for the sterilization of idiots in the Thomistic thesis of the superiority of the
common good over the private good. Basler points out that in II-II,
65, 1 (“Et ideo sicut per publicam potestatem aliquis licite privatur totaliter vita propter aliquas majores culpas, ita etiam privatur membro propter aliquas culpas minores”), the basis for im­
posing as a penalty the deprivation of a corporal member is also
a moral guilt: propter aliquas culpas minores. In regard to the
measure of the~penalty, there is no other way to determine it than
the consideration of the needs of the common good: “...das Mass

PRIMACY OF COMMON GOOD OVER PRIVATE GOOD

73

I from the common good against the life of an innocent person.13
14 Since
precisely the life of the just conserves and promotes the common good,
it would be contradictory to say that in the name of the common good
capitalpunishment—or any other punishment—can justly be inflicted on
one who has not committed sin. In summary, what should be stressed
here is that the character of the common good such as Saint Thomas
conceives it when he recognizes its primacy over all private in­
terests, is quite clearly implied in the assertion that the malefactor’s
I sin makes him corruptive of the community; it is because Saint ThomI as considers the common good above all in terms of a virtuous life
I that he teaches that a grave sin makes the one who commits it a dan' ger for the good of the community in which he lives. The good which
possesses by right and requires in fact primacy over all Others is, in
Saint Thomas’ mind, primarily the patrimony of virtues of a society
which are shared, practiced and lived in common and for the mutual
benefit of the members of that society. This primacy, being in accor­
dance with the moral order, does not warrant the attribution to public
authority of the power to dispose of lives and private properties with­
out reference to the attainment of ethical ends and solely for pragmat­
ic considerations of political success. In the conception of Saint Thom­
as, political life, and consequently the government of society, are not
regulated by laws independent of morality; on the contrary, he never
would have admitted--nor perhaps even have conceived as a possible
position--that the good of the community can be attained as something
other than precisely the highest realization possible in this life of one
and the same order which, maintaining itself identical, regulates at
the same time both public and private life.15
13. Continued
der Strafe wird sich immer richten müssen nach dem Gemeinwohl
und dessen Interessen." In fact, from conceiving the penalty as the
expiation due for a guilt it cannot be deduced that the penalty for
such a species of guilt must be precisely death. The mere idea of
the penalty as punishment is not sufficient for determining its mea­
sure in the great majority of cases; the measure must be deter­
mined by taking into account the requirements of the common good,
which are nothing else than the defense of the community’s moral
health through the malefactor’s death if the conditions of a society
make it necessary to resort to that.
14. II-II, 64, 6: “occisio peccatoris fit licita per comparationem ad
bonum commune, quod per peccatum corrumpitur. Vita autem
justorum est conservativa et promotiva boni communis, quia ipsi
sunt principalior pars multitudinis. Et ideo nullo modo licet occi­
dere innocentem."
15. The unity of political and moral order is clearly set forth by Saint
Thomas in the Introduction to his Commentary on the Ethics. All
the operations in which the human will may be concerned are

74

PRIMACY OF COMMON GOOD. OVER PRIVA TE GOOD

This is the place to point out that it belongs to political prudence
to determine the right application of the primacy of the common good
in particular social conditions. It is the role of prudence to know
the singular in order that general principles may be applied to action.
Now, Saint Thomas tells us, prudence exists not only in relation to the
good of a single man but also with regard to the good of a whole so­
ciety. This latter is political prudence.15
16 By meant- of its judgments
alone can be known, with the highest degree of approximation to con­
crete circumstances, what is conducive and what is harmful in a
given case to the good of the community. That is why it is proper to
this prudence to establish the laws, to be “legum positiva.”17
Law, in fact, is the practical judgment of the legislator when he
decides which actions are due or conducive to the common good and
which are not. Law is given with a view to the common good,18 and
consequently it is through the laws that the primacy of the common
good comes to be concretely established in a particular society.
15. Continued
considered by moral philosophy as belonging to one order: “Ordo
quadrupliciter ad rationem comparatur... Tertius est ordo quem
ratio considerando facit in operationibus voluntatis........... ad philo­
sophiam naturalem pertinet considerare ordinem rerum quem
ratio humana considerat sed non facit; ita quod sub naturali philo­
sophia comprehendamus et metaphysicam.. .Ordo autem actionum
voluntariarum pertinet ad considerationem moralis philosophiae...
Sic ergo moralis philosophiae...proprium est considerare opera­
tiones humanas, secundum quod sunt ordinatae ad invicem et ad
finem.” (In Eth., I, 1,#1 and 2).
16. II-II, 47, 10: “quidam posuerunt quod prudentia non se extendit ad
bonum commune, sed solum ad bonum proprium... Sed haec aestim­
atio repugnat charitati. ... repugnat etiam rationi rectae, quae hoc
judicat, quod bonum commune sit melius quam bonum unius: quia
ergo ad prudentiam pertinet recte consiliari, judicare, et praeci­
pere de his, per quae pervenitur ad debitum finem, manifestum
est quod prudentia non solum se habet ad bonum privatum unius
hominis, sed etiam ad bonum commune multitudinis. ” And in
article 11 of the same question, that prudence whose object is the
common good of the city is called political; “prudentia politica,
quae ordinatur ad bonum commune civitatis, vel regni,” whereas
prudentia oeconomica is concerned with the family’s common good,
and prudentia monastica, or prudence simpliciter, is related to the
i
individual good.
17. II-II, 47, 12, Sed contra.
18. I-II, 90, 3: “lex proprie primo et principaliter respicit ordinem ad
bonum commune." In The Summa contra Gentes, however, the per­
fection of the individual person is the end of the law; “finis cujuslibet legis, et praecipue divinae, est homines facere bonos"
j

PRIMACY OF COMMON GOOD OVER PRIVATE GOOD

75

All that has been stated, however, holds true only when private
good and common good are of the same kind oi' species. If such is
not the case, it may happen that the good of a single individual is
higher than the good of the community to which he belongs. This hap­
pens in a most outstanding way with regard to supernatural grace,
which is of greater worth, even in a single soul, than the natural good
I of the whole universe.19 Supernatural grace is so superior to any
I other good that in the extreme, and purely hypothetical, case of an
I absolute opposition arising between them in such a way that the conI servation of the one would require the sacrifice of the other, it would
I be the natural good of the universe which it would be necessary to
I sacrifice. Thus, to the principle of the primacy of the temporal com! mon good, as it comes down to him from Aristotle, Saint Thomas
I adds the important and decisive specification that it is valid only if
[ common good and private good belong to the same order. And this
he could not help doing, since Christian faith and ethics, with their
doctrine of man’s vocation to a supernatural life which shall be rea­
lized after this one, profoundly modify any statement of the problem
made in merely Aristotelian terms. It was to be expected that Aris­
totle, who lived before the coming of Christianity and who was, as a
philosopher, doubtful about the destination and even about the sur­
vival of the soul after death, could not conceive for man a greater
good than that which he can attain by living in the polls. But, in the
actuality of the Christian Revelation, the temporal “city” no longer
possesses incontestably the supremacy over all the goods in which
man can participate. With Christianity there is made manifest a
18. Continued
(III, 116): “intentio cujuslibet legislatoris est eos quibus legem
dat facere bonos; unde praecepta legis debent esse de actibus
virtutum" (III, 115). Dom O. Lottin says (“Bulletin de Théologie
ancienne et médiévale," V,#475, 1947), that these are two differ­
ent viewpoints, and that Saint Thomas never developed a formula
reconciling both. Such a formula, it is true, is not found in his
works, but the conciliation is implicitly contained in his concept­
ion of the common good as a moral life in common, which virtu­
ous men at once both enjoy and contribute to, as shown above in
the second chapter.
19. Speaking about the justification of the impious man (which belongs
to the order of grace and is greater than the creation of the uni­
verse, as it is achieved in the eternal good of divine participation),
Saint Thomas says, in answer to an objection based on the principle
of the primacy of the common good: “bonum universi est majus,
quam bonum particulare unius, si accipiatur utrumque in eodem
genere; sed bonum gratiae unius majus est, quam bonum naturae
totius universi." (I-II, 113, 9, ad 2).

76

PRIMACY OF COMMON GOOD OVER PHÏVATe GOOD

truth, unknown to Aristotle, which permits man, while living in time,
to surpass absolutely the destiny of the temporal socseiy, since
through grace the supernatural vocation of man has its beginning in
this life. It is then the fact that grace is a good greater than all na­
ture which leads Saint Thomas to recognize that there can be in in­
dividuals perfections which are superior by their kind to the good of
the whole of which those individuals are parts. But it is not only with
regard to grace that Saint Thomas speaks about the superiority of a
good ex genere suo, although, on the other hand, he dne< not always
appear~tô~grânt a~final and definitive supremacy over ihe common
good to private goods which are by their species higher than the com­
mon good. There arises then the problem of knowing for what reason
and under what conditions the common good eventually prevails over
those private goods which are higher ex genere suo.
Saint Thomas does not formulate the solution nor even the problem
as such, in any systematic way, but the elements of the question and,
with them, the general orientation toward the solution, may readily be
drawn out of his works.
It is necessary, first of all, to know what the expression kind
(genus) of a good means. We are told in the De Veritate that there are
two ultimate genera of good for man, namely: the supreme good pro­
portionate to human nature, in which consists the happiness of which
the pre-Christian philosophers spoke; and the good of the supernat­
ural order, which man can obtain only with Divine help.20 But at other
times, in comparing the worth of two goods according to kind Saint
Thomas refers not to these two ultimate orders but, rather, simply to
goods which pertain to the order of what is accessible to human pow­
ers alone; this does not, however, prevent there being between the
two goods a difference in value and consequently a subordination of
the one to the other. This occurs, for instance, in the case of the
contemplative life, which is in itself, without necessarily involving a
relation to revealed truths, superior to the active life; the contem­
plative life thus judged superior to the active may well involve simply
contemplation of objects of the purely natural order, since contem­
plation befits man according to an attribute with which he is naturally

20, De Ver., 14, 2: “Est autem duplex hominis bonum ultimum...
quorum unum est pr opor tionatum naturae humanae, quia ad ip­
sum obtinendum vires naturales sufficiunt; et haec est felicitas
de qua philosophi locuti sunt... Aliud est bonum hominis naturae
humanae proportionem excedens, quia ad ipsum obtinendum vires
naturales non sufficiunt... sed ex sola divina liberalitate homini
repromittuntur. ”

PRIMACY OF COMMON GOOD OVER PRIVATE GOOD

77

endowed; namely, his intelligence.21 Thus, within the enure genus of
natural goods the contemplative life is superior to the active, and ή
is superior by reason of what, specifies it as such, that is, by its kind.
This is the meaning which Saint Thomas gives to genus when hi? says
that, taking genus for species, the goodness of the mural act is speci­
fied try its object, or, as some say, by its genus, "ex genere, genere
pro specie accepto.”22 On the other hand it happens sometimes tJiat
the preeminence of one good over another because of its genus--even
when it is not a question of the double final good of man, of which the
De Veritate speaks
implies a relation of some sort to the supeγ­
ι'
natural order, as, for instance, a favorable disposition, or condii ion
I for attaining the life of grace. It is thus that virginity is superior
ex genere suo to matrimony, because virginity provides for the spirit' ual life and good of the soul, while matrimony inclines by nature to
the good of the body and the cares of this world.23 And a reason for the
superiority of the contemplative life over the active life is that it re­
sembles more that state which both by contemplation and action we
strive to reach.24
By understanding the genus of a good in the sense just explained
Saint Thomas solves the difficulties which the principle “bonum
21. II-II, 182, 1: “vita contemplativa simpliciter melior est quam ac­
tiva.” Contemplation befits man according to what is best in him,
that is, the intellect. This is the first and most important reason
of the eight that Saint Thomas gives in favor of the contemplative
life over the active life in the same article.
22. I-II, 18, 2. In his commentary on the article about the preemin­
ence of contemplative life (the article referred to in the preceding
note), Cajetan writes: “Melius simpliciter appellatur quod est
melius ex suo genere, hoc est, ex sua propria et substantiali na­
tura." In other words, genus is that which constitutes a particular
good as such and such, and is thereby the reason for its superior­
ity or inferiority with regard to another good.
23. The proof that virginity is a good greater than matrimony is given
not only by the example of Christ and the teachings of the Apostle,
but also by reason, says Saint Thomas, “tum quia bonum animae
praefertur bono corporis: tum etiam quia bonum contemplativae
vitae praefertur bono activae. Virginitas autem ordinatur ad bon­
um animae secundum vitam contemplativam, quod est ‘cogitare ea
quae sunt Dei.’ Conjugium autem ordinatur ad bonum corporis,
quod est corporalis multiplicatio generis humani; et pertinet ad
vitam activam... unde indubitanter virginitas praeferenda est con­
tinentiae conjugali.” (II-II, 152, 4).
24. Sent., Ill, 35, I, 4, sol. 1: “vita contemplativa simpliciter melior
est quam activa, inquantum magis as similatur illi vitae ad quam
per activam et contemplativam nitimur pervenire.”

78

PRIMACY OF COMMON GOOD OVER PRIVA TE GOOD

commune melius est quam bonum unius” meets in the case of the
spiritual perfection of a singular man: a good which seems less than
the common good because it belongs to a sole individual, but which,
because it refers in its content and substance to the supernatural
destination of man, is greater than the temporal happiness of an en­
tire society. The solution to the difficulty lies in the qualification of
the principle by the formula “si utrumque in eodem genere.” Now, in
order to systematize in this regard the total doctrine ox Saint Thomas,
a further distinction within the qualification is necessary. For, with­
out such further distinction, it can be inferred from this qualification
that a private good may be superior ex genere suo to the common
good, even to the good of the whole universe--and, a fortiori, to the
good of the temporal society. But such superiority is absolute and
unreserved only when the individual good belongs to the supernatural
order and is compared to a good belonging to the natural order. God’s
grace is the example par excellence of such an individual good. On
the other hand, if the comparison is made within the order of purely
human goods, the common good is always higher than the good of any
single individual. But there are some private goods which, although
not belonging to the supernatural order itself, are yet related to it as
means to an end. On this account they are higher than the temporal
common good; yet, they may sometimes, for the community’s sake,
have to be ranked below goods which are actually inferior.
The above mentioned cases of matrimony and of a virginity dedi­
cated to God, of the active and the contemplative life, are good illus­
trations of this point. Virginity, which is ordained to the spiritual
good of the one possessing and preserving it rather than to the per­
petuation and conservation of the human species, is superior ex gen­
ere suo to carnal fecundity,25 which matrimony procures and which
society needs in order to subsist. Concerning this point it seems to
be the doctrine of Saint Thomas, according to Cajetan’s interpreta­
tion, that in time of need for the conservation of the human species,
the precept of natural law -- namely, thé multiplication of men through
matrimony -- would prevail over the vow of virginity,26 provided this
25. II-II, 152, 4, ad 3: “bonum commune potius est bono privato, si sit
ejusdem generis: secj potest esse quod bonum privatum sit melius
secundum suum genus: et hoc modo virginitas Deo dicata prae­
fertur fecunditati carnali. ”
26. In his commentary on the article cited in the preceding note,
Cajetan writes: “comparatio rerum in bonita^p non est consider­
anda secundum casus et eventus, sed absolute... optime Auctor
dixit quod finis virginitatis secundum genus suum est simpliciter
melior quam multiplicatio hominum, quae est finis conjugii." And,
further on: “in casu quo speciem humanam oporteret conservari,

PRIMACY OF COMMON GOOD OVER PRIVATE GOOD

79

row were not solemn.26
27 And as regards contemplation and action,
Saint Thomas writes in his Commentary on the Sentences that the ac­
tivé life can often refer more directly to the common good than does
the contemplative, which, however, is desirable by itself and more
worthy than the active; but the active is more useful and better se­
cundum quid, and as such should be preferred sometimes, ad tempus,
because of the needs of the present life. From this the conclusion
must be drawn that contemplation should be interrupted and deferred
in the service of fellow-beings whenever any grave need of life in so­
ciety so requires. This agrees with the assertion that the contem­
plative life is not ordained to anything other than itself except in the
manner in which the good of a man is ordained to the good of the mul­
titude.28 Thus, even in cases in which one private good is superior
secundum genus suum to another which, although less worthy, is more
useful, because more directly related to the common good in concrete
circumstances, the more useful good should then be preferred, and
must determine the main course to be followed; the reason for this
preference is precisely the superiority of the good of the multitude
over that of an individual person.29 But this preference which is
26. Continued
praeceptum juris naturae praevaleret voto virginitatis... licet
simpliciter melior sit virginitas matrimonio, tempore tamen nec­
essitatis melius est nubere... Et universaliter dicitur quod dispen­
satio voti continentiae potest fieri non solum propter melius secun­
dum suum genus, sed propter melius ex circumstantia; puta hic in
tali eventu."
27. II-II, 88, 11; “in voto solemizato per professionem religionis non
potest per Ecclesiam dispensari: et rationem assignat Decretalis,
quia castitas ‘est annexa regulae monachali’."
28. Sent., Ill, 35, I, 4, qla. 3: “Duplex est ratio boni. Aliquid enim
dicitur bonum quod propter seipsum est desiderandum. Et sic vita
contemplativa simpliciter melior est quam activa... Unde et con­
templativa est finis activae et fini ultimo vicinior. Aliquid vero
dicitur bonum quasi propter aliud eligendum: et in hac via vita
activa praeeminet contemplativae. Vita enim contemplativa non
ordinatur ad aliquid aliud in ipso in quo est; quia vita aeterna non
est nisi quaedam consummatio contemplativae vitae quae per con­
templativam in praesenti quodammodo praelibatur. Unde non
restat quod ordinetur ad aliud, nisi secundum quod bonum unius
hominis ordinatur ad bonum multorum, ad quod propinquius se
habet vita activa quam contemplativa. Unde activa quantum ad
hanc partem quae saluti proximorum studet, est utilior quam con­
templativa. Sed contemplativa est dignior, quia dignitas significat
bonitatem alicujus propter seipsum, utilitas vero propter aliud.”
29. In connection with the common good of the Church, Saint Thomas,
on answering the question whether it is licit to refuse the

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PRIMACY OF COMMON GOOD OVER PRIVATE GOOD

PRIMACY OF COMMON GOOD OVER PRIVATE GOOD

81

I contemplation the time which he should give to the service of the mulgiven ad tempus and ex circumstantia to a lower good for the sake of
I titude. Neither is it licit to reject the episcopate when imposed, in­
the common good, is licit only when the good of a superior kind is not
junctum; this would be to prefer one’s private good to the necessities
so connected with the acquisition of grace that its disregard would in­
of the Church. If the good of the community licitiy requires it, vows
volve the loss of supernatural life; or, in other words, when the higher
of religion and of continence may be dispensed. The examples are
good thus forgone is not a necessary means to supernatural life, but
many. The determination of the circumstances when, how far, and in
only a natural condition favoring it. Again using examples previously
what manner one must so act as to choose what is more useful rather
cited, it is clear that in the cases considered by Cajelan the dispen­
than what is more worthy depends on prudence, in all its range, from
sation from the vow of continence for the sake of the common good,
the prudence which bears upon the individual good up to the prudence
and provided the vow is not solemn, does not imply loss of the life of
which cares for the good government of a multitude.
grace nor, consequently, does it contradict the principle “bonum
The second distinction which must be made here arises from the
gratiae unius maius est quam bonum naturae totius universi,” since
use of the idea of “genus” in these problems. This is the distinction
the acquisition and conservation of grace are compatible with the
existing between the content, substance or nature of a good—its
state of matrimony. Neither is this principle violated in the case in
“genus”—and its greater or less proximity to the good of a multitude.
which the leisure of contemplation has to defer to the needs of the mul­
The relation between this distinction and the first can be formulated
titude: because the active life is not incompatible with the state of
I by saying that the degree of dignity of a good depends on its genus;
grace—far from it; furthermore, the active life does not entirely
I the effective preference granted to it depends on its greater or less
prevent the exercise of contemplation.30
I propinquity in a concrete case to the common good. The two terms
In summary to this discussion, various distinctions must be made.
of this second distinction constitute two criteria for evaluating the
The first distinction is between the inherent dignity of a good, con­
ethical excellence of a good. The criterion of the “genus” answers
sidered objectively and absolutely, and the preference which must in
the question which of two goods is better absolutely (simpliciter mel­
fact be granted to that good in the concrete situations of a properly
constituted social life. The greater objective dignity of a good does
1 ius), and decides the question from the point of view of the objective
value of that good. With reference to this criterion, a good will be so
not always coincide with the requirement to prefer it, in an effective
way, in the orientation if conduct; the preference is granted in specI much higher the nearer it is by its nature, ex genere suo, to the su­
ial cases (ad tempus, ex circumstantia) to goods of minor ethical
I preme end of man, which is the happy life according to the order of
dignity which happen to be closer (propinquius) to what the good of the I reason. The second criterion, that is, the degree of propinquity hie
multitude at any given moment requires. Such preference then agrees I et nunc of a particular good to the common good, resolves the prob­
lem of ascertaining to which of two goods, of which one is superior
with, and is demanded by, the requirements of right conduct; in final
simpliciter but inferior secundum quid, must be granted the predom­
analysis it is in such situations more virtuous to labor for the good
inance in the practical and effective orientation of social and private
of the multitude in the exercise of the active life than to repose in
life. As has already been stated, one must in such a case choose the
contemplation. A ruler, for example, could not licitiy devote to
I
good which, according to prudential knowledge, is closer,· propinquius,
29- Continued
to the common good, for the reason that the common good enjoys a
episcopate, says expressly that, if ordered, injunctum, it must not
definitive primacy, always provided that such a choice does not in­
be rejected with the excuse that one may not abandon contempla­
which, by itself, absolutely transvolve the loss of that personal good
...............................
tion: “ad inordinationem voluntatis pertinet quod aliquis omnino,
cends the natural order: it is not licit to seek, nor is it in fact possicontra superioris injunctionem, praedictum gubernationis officium
ble to attain, the temporal happiness of the multitude through the sac­
[episcopatum] finaliter recuset” (II-II, 185, 2). Ibid., ad 1: “quam­
rifice of the state of grace in an individual soul.
vis, simpliciter et absolute loquendo, vita contemplativa potior sit
There is a question here of two different criteria, which by them­
quam vita activa, et amor Dei, quam dilectio proximi; tamen ex
selves correspond to two different problems. This is seen clearly if
alia parte bonum multitudinis praeferendum est bono unius. ” There­
one considers that to determine conduct in a concrete case with re­
fore, the episcopate to which one has been elected must not be ab­
lation to the common good, it is not sufficient to know simply that,
solutely refused.
of the two goods which are possible objects of that conduct, one is
30. II-II, 182, 1, ad 3: “ad opera vitae activae interdum aliquis a con­
simpliciter better than the other. Rather it is necessary to know
templatione avocatur propter aliquam necessitatem praesentis
further which good to choose as the end of conduct; for conduct to be
vitae; non tamen hoc modo quod cogatur aliquis totaliter contem­
virtuous it is necessary that one choose that which, in the circum­
plationem deserere.”
stances, best serves the good of society.

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PRIMACY OF COMMON GOOD OVER PRIVATE GOOD

The ultimate reason one must at times prefer a good which is more
useful to a good which is more worthy is the plurality of aspects and,
in short, the imperfection of the human condition in it me. This is the
thought which runs more or less expressly through the texts of the
Sentences and the Summa Theologica quoted in the previous pages.
Saint Thomas is very well aware that the necessities of this life ab­
solutely prevent that all the occupation of man should be a solitary
exercise in the heights of spiritual life; rather, the major part of
man’s existence in time is taken up in diverse forms of the active life
and of relations with his fellow-beings. The social nature of man,
justice and charity demand solicitude in many forms for the spiritual
as well as the temporal needs of others, in order that everyone may
finally reach to some measure, however small it may be, of contem­
plation and spiritual perfection in the present life.
The result of these analyses confirms the statement, made above,
that the maxim *si utrumque in eodem genere” is unreservedly valid
only when the terms of the comparison are the two supreme kinds of
good--supernatural grace and the natural good of the whole universe
--or, a fortiori, supernatural grace and any of the goods included in
the good of the universe. Otherwise, it is not always true that one
natural good which is higher ex genere than another is in a given case
closer than that other to the requirements of the common good. This
shows that the primacy of the common good cannot be sufficiently ex­
plained through the argument that the goods which are simpliciter
highest by reason of their genera are realized in it, for this is not
always what actually occurs. Although these goods cannot be disre­
garded, a total explanation would require some other arguments in
addition. This qualification will be expounded shortly.
But first, this point must be distinguished from another with which
it may otherwise be confused. The question is asked whether, in or­
der to preserve the principle of the primacy of a common good, it
must be held that an individual good, greater by its kind than the tem­
poral good of the community, is greater precisely because it depends
/
upon a common good higher than that of civil society. For instance,
to the objection that the sacrament of matrimony is worth more than
the Eucharist, because it is ordered to the common good, Saint
Thomas answers that the Eucharist is the common spiritual good; in
fact it is the separated common good of the whole Church, God made
man; whereas matrimony is only ordered to the common good aci
cording to the body (corporaliter).31 Saint Thomas answers the

31. Ill, 65, 3, ad 1: “matrimonium ordinatur ad bonum commune cor­
poraliter. Sed bonum commune spirituale totius Ecclesiae continetur
substantialiter in ipso Eucharistiae sacramento.”

PRIMACY OF COMMON GOOD OVER PRIVATE GOOD

83

objection which states that the practical reason is higher than the
speculative reason because the former serves the good of society di­
rectly, by saying that, on the contrary, the speculative reason adheres
to a good more common than the one which practical reason serves,
and that this indicates that speculative reason is the higher.32 These
answers are true, but it must be pointed out that the formal reason
why the Eucharist is higher than the sacrament of matrimony is not
that it makes present a good which is more common but th it it is a
good which, being also common, is of a more excellent nature than the
corporeal one. A similar thing can be said about the speculative rea' son. In reality, the fact that one good is more common than another
is not the reason why it is more excellent; the relation is rather the
inverse: it is because a good is better according to its species and
content, that its attraction and influence as a final cause is extended
to more beings, and so it is, on that account, more common. Now,
even if all this is true, a different answer must be given to the spe­
cific question why the good of the temporal community predominates
even over private goods which belong by their genera to a higher level
of goodness--or, more exactly, why it is that of two singular goods,
it is not the one greater in its genus but rather the one closer ex cir­
cumstantia to the common happiness which should be chosen and fol­
lowed as a course of conduct. In sum, the different degrees of super­
iority which are found among private goods, although entirely depend­
ent on their genera, can be associated with diverse levels of goods
which are more and more common, but the primacy of the common
good of civil society is not sufficiently explained by the mere criterion
of the genus of a good. It is time now to ask what is the foundation for
this primacy.
[The primacy of the common good is closely associated in Saint
Thomas’ mind with his conception of society as a totality composed of
human individuals. The parts exist for the whole and for its good,
and when the existence of any part endangers the whole it must be
sacrificed for the sake of the whole. Thus, there is a teleological re­
lation as well as a complete metaphysical dependence of part with
respect to whole. There are several reasons for this. First, because
the part is what it is on account of its existence within the whole. For
this reason the hand severed from the body is only by equivocation a
hand in the manner in which, say, a hand of stone is a hand; it is only
when joined to the rest of the organism that a hand is alive and real.33
32. Sent., 4, 49, I, 1 sol., 3, ad 1: “bonum cui intellectus speculativus
conjungitur per cognitionem, est communius bono cui conjungitur
intellectus practicus, inquantum intellectus speculativus magis
separatur a particulari quam intellectus practicus."
33. In Pol., I, 1 ,#21 : “destructo toto homine, non remanet pes neque
manus nisi aequivoce, eo modo quo manus lapidea posset dici
manus. ”

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PRIMACY OF COMMON GOOD OVER PRIVATE GOOD

But the point at stake is not only nor is it principally that the parts
depend in a utilitarian way upon the whole for their existence; on the
contrary, they expose themselves naturally, even without any deliber­
ation, for the conservation of the whole, even as the hand does, for
example, to protect the body.34 This demonstrates that the whole has
value in its own right and not simply because the parts exist in de­
pendence upon it. Thus, the parts belong to the whole and exist prin­
cipally in order to integrate it. Whence it follows that in cases of
accidental incompatibility between the existence of the whole and that
of the part--the case of a member, for instance, which it not isolated
could cause death to the entire organism--the part must be sacri­
ficed. The whole is that which nature principally wants to exist, and
the parts exercise the functionings necessary for this existence. The
autonomous existence of a part as such has no sense : it is by itself
something incomplete which seeks completion through integration
with a higher entirety, which is the end for which the part exists.
The preeminence of the good of society is founded on this principle.
This preeminence is accordingly valid in the measure in which human
society is a whole with regard to the individuals existing in it. Now
Saint Thomas says repeatedly that the singular man is related to so­
ciety as a part is related to its whole.3^ Besides, he says, it is mani­
fest that civil society is not only a whole but is also the most vast
and comprehensive whole of its kind.36 Consequently, it is true for

34. I, 60, 5: “Videmus quod naturaliter pars se exponit ad conserva­
tionem totius corporis; sicut manus exponitur ictui, absque delib­
eratione, ad conservationem totius corporis.”
In his commentary on this article, Cajetan writes: “ratio quare
pars exponitur pro toto, non est identitas quae est inventa inter
partem et totum. Et hujus manifestum signum habetur ex hoc,
quod pars exponitur ad perdendam identitatem cum toto, ut salve­
tur esse totius. Non ergo ratio inclinationis talis est identitas,
aut ut salvet seipsam in toto; sed ut salvet esse totius secundum
se, etiam cum non esse ipsius partis.”
35. II-II, 64, 2: “quaelibet persona singularis comparatur ad totam
communitatem, sicut pars ad totum." The same statement is
found in many other passages in his works. Eor instance: “[per­
sona] comparatur ad communitatem, sicut pars ad totum” (II-II,
61, 1); “ipse totus homo ordinatur ut ad finem ad totam communi­
tatem cujus est pars” (II-II, 65, 1).
36. In Pol., I, 1, #2.: “Manifestum est quod civitas includit omnes alias
communitates. Nam et domus et vici sub civitate comprehenduntur;
et sic ipsa communitas politica est communitas principalissima."

I

PRIMACY OF COMMON GOOD OVER PRIVA’iE GOOD

85

I society also that the whole has a metaphysical preeminence ever its
I component elements, and therefore that the law winch subjects the .>x! istence of the parts to the good of the whole--“esse partis est pi'opler
I esse totius’37--is not affected by the fact that human society is a
whole of the moral order. Now, in accordance wiui the character as
' an end which is immanent to the whole--which character is correla­
tive to the fact that the parts exist for it--the common good becomes
the end and therefore the measure of the particular goods/’8 And just
as a member cannot live separated from its organism, neither can
the private good exist without the common good,39 and, accordingly, it
is not possible that a man be virtuous if his conduct does not conform
towhat is required in justice for the good of the community.10
Now, it is evident that because the good of society is a moral one,
the criteria according to which the subordination of the parts to the
whole is regulated in a human society, are necessarily different from
the corresponding regulative criteria of an organism. Thus, for in­
stance, an individual cannot for merely biological considerations be
put to death in order to conserve the social whole in the manner in
which a hand may be cut off for the body’s sake. In order for a man
to be subjected to punishment there must first, as a necessary con­
dition, be moral malice in him; and to condemn an innocent to death
because of physiological degeneration, abnormality or imperfection
would be illicit and harmful to the common good. Now, owing to the
fact that the moral good is the end to which all other goods are sub­
ordinated, it is never licit to contravene a moral principle in order
to obtain and insure the existence of any of those other goods. The
moral good is of such a nature that it can be attained only through
morally licit means; if the means used are not licit, the good of the
city, which is before all else a moral good, will suffer detriment in
37. J5.C.G., Ill, 17.
38. Ibid.: “bonum particulare ordinatur in bonum commune sicut in
finem.” This text precedes immediately the one referred to in the
preceding note.
39. II-II, 47, 10, ad 2: “bonum proprium non potest esse sine bono
cornmuni vel familiae, vel civitatis; ...cum homo sit pars domus,
vel civitatis, oportet quod homo consideret, quid sit sibi bonum
ex hoc quod est prudens circa bonum multitudinis.” In Eth., VI,
7, #1206: “proprium bonum uniuscujusque singularis personae non
potest esse sine oeconomia, idest sine recta dispensatione domus,
neque sine urbanitate, idest sine recta dispensatione civitatis;
sicut nec bonum partis potest esse sine bono totius."
40. Ι-Π, 92, 1, ad 3: “bonitas cujuslibet partis consideratur in propor­
tione ad suum totum; ...cum quilibet homo sit pars civitatis, im­
possibile est, quod aliquis homo sit bonus, nisi sit bene porportionatus bono communi.”

.

/
f

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PRIMACY OF COMMON GOOD OVER PRIVATE GOOD

what is most essential to it. Moreover, such moral goods as justice,
peace, social unity, all of which are related to the existence and con­
servation of social living, would never be reached if morally wrong
means were used, since the observance of the moral law is the con­
dition most necessary and indispensable for the very existence of
community life.
Since it is the only self-sufficient temporal community, the civil
society is an end for all the other communities which compose it.41
It is principally under the formality of final cause that Saint Thomas
assigns to the common good--and to the good in general-~its essen­
tial property of diffusing itself. If it is true, he says, that the notion
of “diffusing itself” appears to signify the operation of the efficient
cause; it can nevertheless be understood in a more ample sense as
the proper operation of the final cause. Still more; it can with great­
er fitness be said that the good as such implies essentially the dif­
fusion which belongs to the final cause, and not to the efficient cause.
The efficient cause is in fact only the initiation or beginning of what
is caused, whereas the final cause is the measure and perfection of
all the being that is under its influence, and it is precisely in this
latter that the intelligible character of the good consists.42 The more
power a good has to diffuse itself from some beings to others, that
is to say the more capacity it has as a final cause, the more common
will it be for the beings among which it is diffused. The common
good is a final cause par excellence, and insofar as a cause is higher
it extends its causation to more beings.43 There is then a direct
41. In Pol., I, 1, #18: “cum civitas sit communitas habens per se suffi­
cientiam vitae, ipsa est finis praemissarum communitatum."
42. De Ver., 21, 1 ad 4: “Diffundere, licet secundum proprietatem vo­
cabuli videatur importare operationem causae efficientis, tamen
largo modo potest importare habitudinem cujuscumque causae si­
cut influere et facere, et alia hujusmodi. Cum autem dicitur quod
bonum est diffusivum secundum sui rationem, non est intelligenda
effusio secundum quod importat operationem causae efficientis, sed
secundum quod importat habitudinem causae finalis; et talis diffu­
sio non est mediante aliqua virtute superaddita. Dicit autem bonum
diffusionem causae finalis, et non causae agentis: tum quia effi­
ciens, inquantum hujusmodi, non est rei mensura et perfectio, sed
magis initium; tum quia effectus participat causam efficientem
secundum assimilationem formae tantum; sed finem consequitur
res secundum totum esse suum, et in hoc consistebat ratio boni.”
43. In Eth., I, 2, #30: “Manifestum est quod unaquaeque causa tanto
prior est et potior quanto ad plura se extendit. Unde et bonum,
quod habet rationem causae finalis, tanto potius est quanto ad
plura se extendit." In Met., VI, 3,#1205: “quanto aliqua causa est
altior, tanto ejus causalitas ad plura se extendit. Habet enim causa
altior proprium causatum altius, quod est communius et in pluri­
bus inventum. ”

PRIMACY OF COMMON GOOD OVER PRIVATE GOOD

87

proportion between the diffusion of the common good as a final cause
and the plurality of the beings which its causation reaches. It is pre­
cisely in this that Saint Thomas sees the reason why Aristotle should
say that it is more divine to love the common good than the individual
good, since the common good, by extending itself to many beings, imi­
tates much more perfectly the divine causation, whose influence reach­
es all things.4445Even as above, in the treatment of the specificity of
the common good, the notion of order is closely connected with the
notion of social whole, and with the notion of end thereby implied, but
here the connection is on the ethical plane and under a fresh aspect.
This is the aspect of order as a harmony which must be reached
among elements like those of a community, which are not necessarily
in accord but in fact underlie a well-ascertained conflict of tenden­
cies. An idea often expounded by Saint Thomas is that the universal
order is not only composed of parts unequal among themselves, but
also that the presence of evil contributes to it in its own way, and that
one of the manifestations of evil is the conflict which results from the
fact that each creature acts only in accordance with its respective
I nature.43 This general conception of the situation in the universe can
I be perfectly applied to society, although in an analogous way; Saint
I Thomas suggests this application when he says that a prudent ruler
must tolerate defects and inequalities in the parts for the good of the
whole.46 Since in any community there is a plurality of parts, there is
also a conflict which results necessarily from the diversity of tenden­
cies among the integrating elements, each following its natural in­
clination. Nevertheless, one essential difference must be noted: the
order of the universe exists already, previous to any consideration
by the reason; the order in society is, on the contrary, an order which
44. In Eth., I, 2, #30: “Pertinet ad amorem, qui debet esse inter hom­
ines, quod homo conservet bonum etiam uni soli homini. Sed multo
melius et divinius est, quod hoc exhibeatur toti genti et civitati­
bus... Dicitur hoc esse divinius, eo quod magis pertinet ad Dei
similitudinem, qui est ultima causa omnium bonorum.” II-II, 31,
3, ad 2: “bonum multorum commune divinius est, quam bonum
unius. "
45. S.c.G., III, 71: “Multa bona sunt in rebus, quae, nisi mala essent,
locum non haberent... Si ergo malum totaliter ab universitate re­
rum... excluderetur, oporteret etiam bonorum multitudinem dimin­
ui.” Ibid.: “esset contra rationem divini regiminis si non sineret
res creatas agere secundum modum propriae naturae. Ex hoc
autem quod creaturae sic agunt, sequitur corruptio et malum in
rebus; quum, propter contrarietatem et repugnantiam quae est in
rebus, una res sit alterius corruptiva.”
46. Ibid. : “Ad prudentem gubernatorem pertinet negligere aliquem
defectum bonitatis in parte, ut fiat augmentum bonitatis in toto.”

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PRIMACY OF COMMON GOOD OVER PH1V, i fc GOOD

must be created according to right reason.47 But the e\ H which is
present in both orders is due to the same cause, namd). the conflict
which may arise within a plurality of creatures when. they act accor­
ding to their respective natures, thus entailing almost inevitably a
contrariety of goods. Consequently, it is in the Iasi analysis because
of the primacy of the whole over the parts that it is necessary for the
component elements to restrain, limit, and even sacrifice the natural
development or exercise of their tendencies and potentialities, so that
the order indispensable for its existence may prevail in the whole. In
this way it is clear how this aspect of the notion of order is insepar­
able from the notion of a social whole and from the character of the
social whole as end for the parts of society.
Not all of the doctrine of the common good in Saint Thomas can
however be built around the notions of whole, parts and their mutual
relations, insofar as these notions are applicable to the social being.
These notions are at times presented with a certain crudeness, as in
the frequent comparisons in which man is related to the community,
as a member is related to the animal organism of which it is a part.
But there are sufficient elements in the ontology (cf. chapter 1, above)
and in the ethics of Saint Thomas to correct whatever may be unilateral
in these comparisons, and also to reestablish the equilibrium in his
social philosophy. These elements, most of which Saint Thomas re­
ceives from Christian Ethics, converge upon the characteristics of
autonomy and value which the individual person possesses in himself,
by virtue of his being destined to enjoy eternal life in God. Whence he
has said that “man is not ordained to the political community accor­
ding to all that he is and has,”48 but rather all that man is and can be
must be ordered to God. Once this has been remarked, it is no longer
possible merely to say, as a principle which would embrace all truth
in this regard, that a singular man is related to society as part to
whole. And, apart from this, one may ask whether in elaborating, hy­
pothetically, a moral philosophy which had not been informed by
Christian Ethics, Saint Thomas would also have assigned to the indi­
vidual person the realization of ends which are within the temporal and
natural order but higher than what is social as such. If he did not dis­
cuss this problem, or thought it superfluous to do so in view of the ac­
tual supernatural destination of man, it can at least be said that such a
problem does exist in his philosophy; in fact, it arises once it is
granted, in accordance with his teachings, that in each individual man
47. As stated by Saint Thomas in the introductory lesson to his Com­
mentary on the Ethics. See note 15, page 74 in this chapter.
48. ΐ”ΎΪ7~2Ι, 4, ad 3: “homo non ordinatur ad communitatem politicam
secundum se totum, et secundum omnia sua; ...totum quod homo est,
et quod potest et habet, ordinandum est ad Deum.”

PRIMACY OF COMMON GOOD OVER PRIVATE GOOD

8b
I there exist natural conditions which enable him to aci.ieve al·.,it p< r| fections of which the social whole as such--a whole with a mere unity
I of order--is incapable. Only the creature whicn in its substantial unity
possesses reason is able to attain the highest good, eapax summi noni,
not only in the supernatural order with the vision of God, out Ji.-o m
the natural order with the acquisition of natural happiness - - wit d. m
and virtue--the highest good within the reach of hmman power
m
each of the two cases, the highest good can be achieved and reside only
in the individual person, not in the collective entity, as in its proper
and immediate subject.49 Society can oe said to reach natural happi­
ness only in the sense that, within society itself, in the organization
and inspiration of civil life, due acknowledgment is given to the su­
preme human values and man is assured the possibility of reaching a
life secundum virtutem. The fact remains, however, that, in accor­
dance with their~different ontological constitutions, soeieiy and the
individual person attain the highest good in characteristically distinct
■yays; but, on the other hand, it is erroneous to use that difference to
set in opposition the common good and the good of the individual per­
son. We agree entirely with the assertion that “there is nothing more
illusory than to pose the problem of the person and the common good
in terms of opposition.”50 As has been shown above, in the discussion
of the content of the common good, the good life of the multitude and
that of each person coincide and are mutually implied in that which is
most excellent in both. And even in the extreme case in which the in­
dividual has to die for the city’s sake he is performing a virtuous ac­
tion, thus heightening his moral perfection and his value as a person.51
Insofar as the highest human goods are achieved in the city, and blos­
som there into a civilization which is determined by them in all its
manifestations, the common good is so much more human; and so
much less in the breach which may separate the requirements of com­
mon happiness from those of the individual good.
As for all those matters other than virtue in which the singular in­
dividual is related to the community, the case of the sacrifice of life
in a just war shows at the same time both the coincidence of common
I

49. Defining the modes according to which the different beings have a
resemblance to God, Saint Thomas says that only intellectual
creatures as such are images of God in a proper sense; “Ea quae
non habent intellectum, non sunt ad imaginem Dei.” (I, 9 3, 2, Sed
contra). Ibid., ad 3: “universum est perfectius in bonitate quam
intellectualis creatura, extensive et diffusive. Sed intensive et
collective similitudo divinae perfectionis magis invenitur in in­
tellectuali creatura, quae est capax summi'boni. ”
50. Jacques Maritain, The Person and the Common Good.
51. Ibid.

90

PRIMACY OF COMMON GOOD OVER PRIVATE GOOD

good and personal perfection on the level of moral values, and the
possible opposition between individual life and community interest on
the level of the good of existence, itself not properly a moral value.
Not far removed from this ambivalent relationship is Saint Thomas’
statement that spiritual goods can be possessed simultaneously by
many, but corporeal goods cannot.52 In general it can be said that op­
position between individual interest and social requirements is possi­
ble whenever the goods in question are not such as virtue and wisdom
but rather those whose possession and enjoyment cannot be diffused
among many subjects, because the goods themselves arc either ex­
clusively proper to each subject, or cannot be shared indefinitely
without decrease. On the other hand, it is evident that the total good
of a society is as a whole so much better, the fewer restrictions com­
mon happiness secundum virtutem requires regarding non-moral
goods.
A general doctrine about the relationship between society and indi­
vidual would include in a coherent synthesis the truths that every in­
dividual man is merely a part of the social body and yet that this part
is a suppositum of rational nature, which, unlike the community, is
alone capable of attaining the highest good. The synthesis of all those
elements was not so well elaborated by Saint Thomas as to exclude
possible divergent interpretations of his thought.53 A complete formu­
lation of the relationship between the community and the individual
must be made, first, in ontological terms which define what, according
52. Sent., HI, 30, a. 1, ad 4: “Bona temporalia·..possunt se invicem in
diversis impedire, quia prosperitas unius inducit adversitatem
alterius... Sed...spiritualia bona [simul] a pluribus integre possi­
deri possunt." The bona temporalia spoken of here seem to be
mainly those related in one way or another to corporeal things,
since they are opposed by Saint Thomas in this text to bona spirit­
ualia. - Contra impugnantes Dei cultum et religionem, 4:“'Quod
dat aliquis, iam non habet’: patet esse falsum in spiritualibus,
quae communicantur non per translationem alicujus dominii, sicut
accidit in rebus corporalibus, sed magis per modum emanationis
cujusdam effectus a sua causa: sicut qui communicat alii scientiam,
non propter hoc scientiam amittit.”
53. Cf. the authoritative opinion of Dorn O. Lottin, (Bulletin de Théo­
logie Ancienne et Médiévale, II, #418, 1933-36): “La pensée de
saint Thomas sur le rapport individu-société est malaisément
définissable... c’est une question de savoir si s. Thomas s’est
posé explicitement ce problème des rapports entre le bien commun
et le bien privé." (See the remarks made above, chapter 2). It
can be added here that this latter relation is a most important as­
pect of the larger problem of the relationship between society and
individual.

PRIMACY OF COMMON GOOD OVER PRIVATE GOOD

91

to the nature of things, is permanent and invariable in the mutua! posi­
tion of the social body and its parts. But a purely metaphysical solu­
tion is insufficient for a problem which essentially involves ethical
questions, since these belong to the dynamic aspect of the community­
individual relationships. In fact, the relationships between community
and individual are worked out in terms of human conduct, and, conse­
quently, it is only according to ethical criteria that principles for the
solution of the tension between man and society can be found. The re­
lation between the two terms is manifested as tension and can be sol­
ved only in motu.54
Now, aside from man’s ontological position with respect to society
and whatever the metaphysical preeminence he may be granted over it
once their interrelationships have been carefully defined, a paramount
ethical principle undoubtedly stands out: namely, that the moral dis­
position of the individual person toward the common temporal good
must always be, not the love of possession but that other love of which
Saint Thomas also speaks in the De Caritate; not the inclination to
take advantage of society’s good, but theTnclination to serve it and to
promote its conservation and diffusion. A man who acts this way
heightens his spiritual perfection much more than he would by pur­
suing his own good, for it is more godlike to seek the happiness of a
whole city than to seek one’s own happiness.
A summary and, at the same time, a conclusion of this exposition
on the Thomistic doctrine of the political common good can be set forth
in the following propositions:
1. When there are two goods of the same kind, one of which is com­
mon to many, the other private, the common good always prevails.
2. An individual good which belongs to an order higher than the
whole natural order, is always and under all circumstances superior
to any common good of the natural order.
3. A private good which by its nature belongs to the temporal and
natural order and is superior simpliciter to another private good, must
at times be renounced in favor of that other, for the sake of the common
good.
4. The primacy of the common good—understood in all its all-com­
prehensive range--is due formally not to its content or genus simpliciter, but to the fact that it is the good of the whole, to which the parts
are metaphysically subordinated.
5. At their highest level--the happy life secundum virtutem--the
common good and the good of the individual person coincide, at least
in a relative and imperfect way; on lower levels, an incompatibility may
truly exist between the two, but the primacy belongs always, and must
be accorded always, to the common good.
54. Jacques Maritain, op. cit.

CONCLUSION

Out of the numerous teachings of Saint Thomas concerning the
common good of civil, society there arises a coherent conception quite
definite in its principles and general fundamental outlines according
to which the common good in its broadest sense is an orderly struc­
ture of different kinds and levels of goods under the supreme rule and
measure of one end, the happy life of man in the exercise of his ra­
tional powers. The dominating position accorded to this end, which is
always present to the mind of the good legislator, and which the laws
are to promote, gives to the totality of social life, as Saint Thomas
conceives it, an accentuated moral orientation, since this end is the
supreme criterion as to the extent and manner in which it may be
licit to seek and enjoy other goods, or as to what should be or should
not be done, for the sake of common happiness. And common happi­
ness cannot be attained automatically through the striving of every one
to reach his own private good; the common happiness in its widest con­
tent is a good which, as an autonomous quality, is formally diverse
from the singular goods of the parts taken collectively, and it does not
result from the separate pursuit of these particular goods without a
view to the common end. The belief here rejected is common to the
doctrines vaguely and unprecisely called “individualistic.” Rather
than constituting a rigorous doctrine, they are a certain ideal of politi­
cal and social organization which, if it does not absolutely deny what
is specific in the social good, does at least tend to overlook it. Such
tendencies have appeared historically sometimes in association with
hedonistic ideas about happiness, and sometimes together with a con­
ception of society as organized merely for the acquisition of wealth.
But such a society would not truly be one, in the Aristotelian-Thomistic sense of the word; it might well be self-sufficient in an economic
sense, but not in the sense that it procures for its members the great­
est human good which can be attained in the course of time, happiness
in accordance with virtue. This is why, in civil societies organized
for economic benefit--if indeed there have ever been any in the strict
sense of these words--such expressions as common good or the like
are to be understood as meaning prosperity and material well-being-something very different from what Saint Thomas thought and taught.
In public life the end of civil society is more often completely over­
looked than misconceived. The State is so entirely concerned with
what are really only ways and means that one may wonder whether an
end is thought to exist at all. The end is completely lost sight of, and
so the means become emancipated, as it were, and are granted an

CONCLUSION

93

entirely autonomous consideration. One example of this non-subor­
dination of means is the regime, often proposed, in theory as well as
practice, for the economic life, which would enjoy an autonomous reg­
ulation, subject not to human aims superior to the economic system,
but to laws which are presumed immanent to the system itself and suf ­
ficient for its regulation. In a similar way, the conception of the whole
social activity as intended to build a super-individual entity to which
the supreme value under all respects is attributed, and of every hu­
man being as a mere instrument of that activity, without any recog­
nition of his final autonomous value as a subject of moral goods, is
completely foreing to Saint Thomas’ thought on the common good. It
is, on the contrary, to the superior human goods that every social ac­
tivity or common task should be subordinated. Now, since, according
to Saint Thomas, the highest goods a human being can attain by living
in society are virtue and contemplation, which have, as their proper
subject, the individual person, there is no doubt that, his entire politi­
cal thought is orientated concretely and in the last analysis to the hu­
man person and his destiny. This, as we hope we have shown, does
not oppose the person to the common good or to the primacy of the
common good: there is, rather, an interchange between the noblest
aspects of the common good and the excellences of personal perfec­
tion; every man must love the common good not in order to possess
it and make use of it, but in order that it may be preserved and pro­
moted. Although the individual person is called to a destiny superior
to the destiny of temporal society--which will as such finally perish
—the good of temporal society is not simply a means or instrument
whereby man may more easily attain his supra-social vocation; the
good of society is of such a nature that it deserves to be loved for
itself. In other words, man should love the social good not as a
“bonum utile,” but rather as a “bonum honestum”--because it is a
“bonum honestum.” In truth, the good which a community attains by
being self-sufficing cannot be a merely useful one. “Self-sufficiency
is,” according to Aristotle, “that which by and of itself makes life
desirable and lacking in nothing? The happy life, which is not de­
sired for the sake of anything else, is what constitutes the self-suffic­
iency of the civitas perfecta. Therefore, a good like the bene vivere
of the multitude, which as supreme end (in the temporal order) has
its complete justification in what it is itself, cannot be a bonum utile.
The common good of civil society cannot be other than a bonum
honestum. Not every bonum honestum is necessarily self-sufficing;
but a good which, because it is self-sufficing, is not desirable for the
sake of anything else, can only be a bonum honestum.
It must be borne in mind that Saint Thomas’ doctrine of the com­
mon good is placed at a high level of philosophical abstraction, and
1. Eth., I, 7, 1097 b 15.

94

CONCLUSION

that therefore many contingent circumstances are to be taken into ac­
count in order to apply the principles of this doctrine to political life.
It is legitimate and normal that, under different circumstances, these
principles should find expression in diverse views and programs des­
tined for political and social action. But these views and plans of ac­
tion, even if more concrete than the philosophical principles which
they intend to apply, are still at an intermediate stage between these
principles and its immediate application to a particular society by the
prudence of the ruler.

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Opera Omnia
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96

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VITA
Jaime Vélez-Sâenz, born in Manizales,
Colombia, attended “colegio de bachillerato”
(secondary school) in Manizales and after­
wards studied law at the National University
of Bogota, where he took his degree in 1939.
He was a student of philosophy at the Grad­
uate School of the University of Notre Dame
from 1944 to 1946, and a Spanish instructor
at Notre Dame and La Salle College, Phila­
delphia, from 1946 to 1949. After his re­
turn to Colombia, he has been teaching phil­
osophy at the “Escuela Normal Superior”
and the National University of Bogota.