Γ I ί $-*>7.3. incological Studies FEBRUARY · 1942 The Ethics of Conjugal Intimacy ACCORDING TO ST. ALBERT THE GREAT John J. Clifford St. Cyprian and the Reconciliation of Apostates John H. Taylor Form-Criticism of the Synoptic Healing Narratives, II 1 27 < Laurence J. McGinley 47 St. Thomas’Thought on Gratia Operans, II Bernard Lonergan 69 Social Action in the Early Church, Paid Hanly Furfey 30-180 A.D., II Monotheism Process and the ■ ; 89 Historical S^dljani; McClellan 1' 109 , Current Theologx- : :.·* : ’· ’· -— *· 137 t ; ·· 146 Book Reviews THEOLOGICAL STUDIES is a quarterly devoted to articles embodying scientific research in all branches < of theology, to brief reports summarizing theological thought related to research, and to reviews of recent theological literature. It is published in February/ May, September and December, by the America Press, Grand Central Terminal Building, Room 4049, 70 E. 45th St., New York, N. Y. The subscription is: i, $5.00 in the United States, $5.50 Canada and Foreign. ·:■<>■■■ Entered as Second Class matter, Jan. 26, 1940, at the Post Office at New York, N. Y., under the Act of March 3,1879. Copyright, 1942, by the America Press, New York, N. Y. Correspondence of an edi­ torial nature should be addressed to the Editor. Cum Permissu Superiorum. « I » i »* 1 fi ?®ô EDITOR John Courtney Murray, S.J. Woodstock College . _ Woodstock, Md. •.ASSISTANT-EDITORS : i •J Albert M. CAjÊx/'S.'j..- · ·/· · .Edwin F. Healy, S. J. Professor of Sawed Scripture.. Professor of Moral Theology Alma Colt^ê V 1 .* Alma, Calif;.» _ J Thomas-J-Mqthjrway, S·J; . . Prof, of Dogma ti<> Theology: * Î ; ·. .· Vest Baden College West Baden, Ind. John C. Ford, S.J. ..... PïqfessçrOf Moral Theology * ? 4 St. Marÿ^jf-theîtiie· Seminary - ·’ · - ·. " i Weston College Mundelein, Ill. Weston, Mass. Leo A. Coressel, S.J. . Laurence J. McGinley, S.J. Prof, of Dogmatic Theology... Prof, of Fundamental Theology St. Mary’s College St. Mary's, Kan. Woodstock College Woodstock, Md. - 1 « ■1 i i per Stac* \^Α2VOLUME III · i R'Wî? FEBRUARY 1942 NUMBER 1 Theological Studies THE ETHICS OF CONJUGAL INTIMACY According to St. Albert the Great JOHN J. CLIFFORD, S.J. St. Mary-op-the-Lake Seminary Mundelein, Ill. I. Theoretical Doctrine The treatise of St. Albert the Great on the debitum maritale falls easily into two sections, of which the first deals with the theory and the second with the practical aspects of the sub­ ject matter. In the first section, Albert is preoccupied with the task of vindicating marital congress from the imputation of sin. Some fourteen articles of the treatise marshal their argu­ ments to achieve this objective. Herein are reviewed the tenets of historical theology and the discussion moves from the upper extreme of the perfect wholesomeness of the act to the nether reach of the sheer sinfulness thereof. Albert follows the order of the Liber Sententiarum upon which his teaching forms a running commentary and an enucleated development. We may depart from the traditional arrangement of the Liber Sententiarum without doing injury to the substantial con­ tent of Albert’s doctrine, and group his thought under the sub­ sequent captions: 1) the marital relation, in se, is not sinful; 2 THEOLOGICAL· STUDIES 2) but concupiscence, its unruly concomitant, needs exculpation; 3) where such exculpation is wanting, the marital relation is sinful; 4) the antidote to concupiscence is found in the natural and supernatural laws of matrimony; 5 ) there is no bonum delectabile amongst the benefits accruing from the in­ stitution of matrimony. Albert’s first objective is to estabfish the sinlessness of marital commerce in se. To do this, he sets upon the Paterniani heretics. Now heresy of any sort was a stench in the nostrils of our pro­ genitors in the faith, who anathematized its authors and damned them in unmitigated terms. Of these Paterniani who reprobated all marital relations as sinful and proudly proclaimed themselves the issue of fornication and prostitution, Albert bespeaks nought but evil in declaring them, "the lowest of heretics, with a right neither to a temporal nor to an eternal heritage; liars without understanding of what they speak nor comprehension of what they say.”1 But the fundamental argument which these heretics advanced in defense of their position demanded a very subtle distinction to sap its logical strength. They seized upon the widely admitted teaching that the voluptuousness of coition was so vehement as to subvert, temporarily, the use of reason. And this ternporary derangement of the mind, a per se effect of coition, they employed to prove that marital commerce was an evil secundum se. The force of their argument derives from the authority of Aristotle who formulated this general principle, to wit, "the complete good of man as man is the good of reason and understanding.”2 Whatever, then, undermines reason is an evil secundum se. But coitus undermines reason, to become thereby, an evil secundum se. Albert does not attempt to deny the supposition underlying this argument. He concedes, rather, the power of coition to despoil man of reason. Nothing remains but to distinguish the Wol. 30, D. 26, a. 13, Sol. The tert of St. Albert’s works followed here Is that of the "Opera omnia revisa et locupletata·. Steph. Caes. Aug. Borgnet, annuente faventeque Pont. Max. Leone ΧΙΠ.” 2Ethica X. ' 7 f : ; r [ i i j j 1 i 1 I I 4 -1 i r St. Albert on Conjugal Intimacy 3 manner of that spoliation. Accordingly Albert discriminates between two phases or functions of reason in relation to coition. The first or preliminary phase acts in regulating the circum­ stances of coition, namely, as to when, how, with whom, why, and to what degree; and this phase operates prior to marital commerce. The second phase of the same moral act of reason functions in directing the act itself and operates concomitantly with its placement. Following the lines of this distinction Albert maintains that coitus, by force of its eager pleasure, does not overcome reason in its first phase or function but only in its second or concomi­ tant phase of direction. And to a further pressing of the diffi­ culty, namely, that the act is purposeless, if concomitant or - directive reason is overcome, the ready answer of Albert is that the office of concomitant reason is directive merely in the sense of watching over and not in the sense of regulating the act. For the first phase of mental action projects its own regulatory virtue into the second phase or function thereof, much after the fashion of an energy from a motor which persists in its medium long after the motor is stayed. Where concupiscence does not dominate the primal phase of mentation, the second function of the same moral act is not purposeless. Albert makes frequent use of this distinction throughout the present treatise . and it obtains special pertinence in the field of motivation which, in the thought of our author, determines the innocence or guilt of marital intimacy. But Albert does not rest content with this first onset against the logic of the Paterniani. He proceeds to lay bare an equivo­ cation lurking in their use of the term "secundum se,” in the expression, namely, that coition is an evil secundum se. If the term "secundum se” signifies that coitus by its very nature and essence is evil, to wit, that evil is a property of the constituent elements of coitus, then the term "secundum se” conveys and implies a falsehood. Were the allegation of the Paterniani true, it would follow that coitus, even in Paradise, would have been a thing evil in itself. But if the term "secundum se” means coitus taken by itself, independently, namely, of the laws of 4 Theological Studies matrimony and its blessings or benefits, the expression conveys what is true, in as much as coitus, without the laws of matri­ mony, may be pronounced an evil secundum se3 The laws and benefits of matrimony to which Albert herein refers are offspring, fidelity, and the sacrament. These benefits are regarded by our author as the natural motives which bestir the partners to the accomplishment of marital relations. So native to marriage are these same blessings that Albert looks upon them as natural checks upon unruly concupiscence which by their presence hold libido in leash and by their absence allow passion to rush the citadel of reason. This view of Albert opens for us the natural transit from the sinlessness of marital commerce in se to its sinfulness per accidens, by reason, namely, of a lack of proper objectives concordant with the normative prescriptions of the standard of morality. For Albert and the Scholastic doctors who preceded him, the particular norm of morality pertinent to the ethical relations of coitus derives from the conformity of the act with the divine purpose of its institution. Now offspring is the primal end of marital relations in the divine economy, as this is revealed in the command of God to Adam and Eve. Whence it is, that this same primal end constitutes the principal determinant of ethical conduct in the intimacy of marriage. Prior to the advent of sin, the generation of children, was, in scholastic thought, the sole motive of this intimate relation. Referring to Adam and Eve, Albert declares, "they would never have known each other except in the hope and certitude of offspring; for each single relation would have issued in pregnancy.”4 With the advent of sin came concupiscence. A force so potent unto evil, that in the words of Albert, “there broke loose an inundating flood, because of the ravages of concupiscence. And since Noe and his sons and their wives were ordered singly to enter the ark and might, therefrom, fear to multiply the human race, a second command was given thereunto, concupiscence being especially thwarted from causing ruin by virtue 3Vol. 30, D. 26, aa. 9, 13 ad 6. Wo!. 27, D. 20, a. 4, Sol. ' ; j j ! | j $ ; | : ‘ i | | · ; 1 ? I ( St. Albert on Conjugal Intimacy 5 of holy fidelity.”5 This second institution of marriage was effected to provide a salutary remedy against the banefulness of concupiscence. Marital commerce or the use of matrimony, however, did not constitute the aforementioned remedy but an "incorruptible couch” and the “blessing of the sacrament” sup­ plied that benefit. This point is of capital importance. Nowhere does Albert, nor indeed the scholastic doctors on whose teaching he relies, maintain that the intimate relations of marriage were instituted to satisfy, in a legitimate way, the demands of concupiscence. Such a doctrine they repudiate indignantly. True it is, that the re-institution of marriage sub­ sequent to the flood was designed both as an office of nature and as a remedy against concupiscence but nevertheless this remedy was not marital commerce. For Albert makes the explicit asser­ tion that marriage medicates concupiscence, first by a proper sacramental grace which remits the ardor of concupiscence and second through legal safeguards, human and divine, which di­ vest concupiscence of the shamefulness inherent in its nature. "It is false,” he asserts, "to state that the power and permission of lying together is granted through marriage. Although lying together is found in marriage, yet matrimony is not for such a purpose. »6 Moreover a principle which merited the universal acceptance of the contemporaries as well as the predecessors of Albert in the learned world stated, in effect, that both spiritual and bodily ills were to be medicated by their contraries. If then the pruri­ tus of coitus was to be assuaged by coitus, all the world could perceive that the principle of cures by opposites was indeed faulty. Yet, in the minds of many, it was this very assumption, namely, that coitus was a remedy for libido, which underlay the doctrine that matrimony was a remedy against concupis­ cence. Whence they urged the obvious difficulty that no malady is cured by medication which increases its virulence and hence marital commerce was not a remedy against concupiscence/ !Vol. JO, D. 26, a. J, ad J. 6 Vol. 30, D. 2«, a.'8, Sol. 7VoL JO, D. 26, a. 8, obj. 1. 6 Theological Studies To this objection, there were some who replied that matri­ mony operated against concupiscence by confining it to one legitimate person and one marital couch. But a forthright answer to that point was the fact that the intensity of a disease increased with its confinement. Hereupon Albert entered the controversy to emphasize the true doctrine, namely, that the grace of the sacrament effects a remission in the virulence of concupiscence by abating its potency, not merely externally in limiting it to monogamy but likewise internally by weakening its intrinsic strength. What the nature of this matrimonial grace is and the mode of its operation against the potency of concupiscence, will be duly considered later on. i Now if the legitimate use of matrimony were a cure for the irregularity of concupiscence, no one, much less Albert, would refuse to sanction matrimonial relations on the plea of satisfying the exigencies of concupiscence. But Albert does refuse to jus- ; tify the marital act when, the motive thereof is concupiscent satisfaction. He lays down the general principle that coitus, causa concupiscentiae explendae, is at least a venial sin. Rather f than quote single and separated passages in confirmation of that | general principle, it may be well to translate in full the excerpt in which Albert deals with the sinfulness or innocence of the | marital act under the influence of various motives. I There are four reasons for consummating matrimony and three motives leading thereto. Of these reasons the first is the hope of progeny, the second is fidelity to the debitum, the third is mindfulness of the blessing of the sacrament and the fourth is a remedy against concupiscence. Of the motives, the first is virtue, namely, love of spreading, through progeny, the cultus of God, love of justice in rendering the debiium, confidence of a future union in one spirit with God; the second is the prompting of nature informed by virtue; the third is the urge of vicious nature. If therefore marital commerce proceeds, both from the first three reasons and the first two motives, the act is, in my judgement, tneritorious and claims no indulgence. But if it proceeds both from the fourth reason and the third motive in such wise however that nature anticipates concupiscence and prevents a conversion of uxorious into adulterous pleasure, then the sin is venial. But if concupiscence fore- f ! \ j | | f ? f i ? ί t i St. Albert on Conjugal Intimacy 7 stalls nature and pleasure becomes the supreme purpose of the act, the sin is mortal.”8 From this discussion of motivation, emerges Albert’s explicit declaration that marital commerce in order to satisfy concupis­ cence is either venially or mortally sinful. Venially sinful it is, when nature so restrains concupiscence as to prevent, and mor­ tally sinful when nature fails to prevent, an adulterous ap­ proach to one’s proper spouse. Modern scholastic writers, establishing the common current opinion, teach that the ends of matrimony are threefold, name­ ly, offspring, mutual aid, and medication of concupiscence. In this common opinion marriage operates as a remedy for con­ cupiscence through the use of marital relations and the enjoy­ ments of the pleasure thereto conjoined. "A secondary purpose of matrimony, at once essential, as well as a finis operis (can. 1013), is the medication of concupiscence, in so far as con­ cupiscence does not stimulate to unlawful deeds, if it obtains legitimate gratifiation through marital commerce in accord with the Apostle: 'but if they do not contain themselves, let them marry. For it is better to marry than to be burnt.’ ’” With this first phase of common current opinion, Albert, as previously indicated, is at variance. Likewise he places himself squarely against the second aspect of current common teaching when he denies that the medication of concupiscence is an intrinsic end or purpose of matrimony. Matrimony, in the Albertan concept, has a twofold finis operis. Prior to sin, it was designed, at its first institution, to propagate humankind. Consequent upon sin, it was reinsti­ tuted, after the flood, as a remedy against fornication. St. Paul’s text, “but for fear of fornication, let every man have his wife and let every woman have her husband” (I Cor. 7, 2), is used to prove this particular finis operis. Between matrimony as a remedy against fornication and matrimony as a remedy against concupiscence, there appears, at first glance, no striking differ*Vol SO, D. 26, a. 11, Sol. ’Cappello, Df Matr. n. 9; I Cor. 7:9, 8 Theological Studies ence. But to the earlier Scholastic mind, it was promiscuity which caused the flood and the reinstitution of matrimony after the flood was designed to cure that plague spot in humankind, f However there exists an immense difference of opinion be­ tween the older and the modern scholastic viewpoint on the manner in which marriage medicates concupiscence. Modern scholastic opinion looks upon the use of marital intimacy as the remedy for concupiscence. Older scholastic opinion, as em­ bodied in Albert’s teaching, called the present day tenet ridicu­ lous and placed the efficacy of the remedial function of matri­ mony in the power of sanctifying grace to temper the ardor of ; > concupiscence. J “As to matrimonial pleasure and its medication of concupiscence, this statement must be made, that the virtues of matrimony, namely, fidelity and the grace therein conferred, perform such an office. It is simply ridiculous to remedy concupiscence by the very act which in­ creases it the more and renders its cravings the more intense. Besides this, when such prurience was not, matrimony none the less flourished. Pleasure does not take into account the essence of matrimony but only indicates at times the reason in the mind of the contractor.”10 To understand the reason which prompted Albert to main­ tain the sinfulness of marital relations motivated by concupis­ cence, we are constrained to review, briefly at least, Albert’s teaching on original sin. For Albert and the scholastic doctors who preceded him, it was a common practice to distinguish, in original sin, a formal and a material element. In Albert’s teach­ ing, the formal element consists "in a lack of due justice; the material element is concupiscence.”11 This material element is present in coitus, in fact it is "an inevitable adjunct of coitus”;1’ "it is a punishment derived from original sin, it is a proof of the existence of original sin, and its shameful presence is so degrading that if a man submitted to it voluntarily, it would be a mortal sin.”15 The reason for thus censuring concupiscence is clarified by a study of Albert’s discussion of the nature of concupiscence. And 3«Vol. 30, D. 31, a. 1, ad delect. 12Vol. 30, D. 36, a. 9, ad 2. x nVol. 27, D. 30, a. 3, Sol. ’Wol. 30, D. 31, a. 19, Sol. ■ .......... rnmrwIT----- "·- V ·* - - Λ - *—· St. Albert I t I I on Conjugal Intimacy 9 in this study of the nature of concupiscence, the first problem is the nomenclature employed. Where there is no need of a close distinction, Albert employs the terms concupiscence, libi­ do, fomes in the same sense: “in truth, fomes, sive libido, sive concupiscentia, are in the soul and are properly passions and actions of the soul; but they are affirmed of the flesh, because things delectable are of the flesh.”14 The term concupiscence itself is employed, in a wide sense, to designate a reprobate will with a bent towards all evil; and in a restricted sense, it is predicated of venery and the pleasures of the flesh. Used in this narrow sense, it receives the designation of "fomes.”™ Libido may signify a will reprobate against God and surfeiting itself in lewd coition or merely the punishment of shameful concupis­ cence.1’ Concupiscence in all the senses in which it is used by Albert conveys the idea of rebellion against reason, disobedience to its command, refractoriness to its rule. The first sin is aversion from God and conversion to a mutable good; it perverts the order by which reason was subjectto God and the body subject to reason; and all this is discovered in that disorder, for habitual libido which is diffused throughout the body united to the soul, inclines towards a mutable good and declines, as far as possible, from the immutable nor does it submit to the hierarchy of reason.11 Herein, of course, Albert is outlining the nature of libido or concupiscence in general. Where he speaks of libido or con­ cupiscence in a restricted sense, his language is more vehement: I "concupiscence is the shameful punishment which is inseparably I attached to this act;18 libidinous concupiscence which snuffs out I reason by way of the pruritus of the flesh in coition;19 through s the vehemence of pleasure it snatches away reason.”20 Hence to 1 enter upon marital relations to gratify concupiscence meant to ί Albert but to foster rebellion of the lower against the higher nature of man, to threaten the dominance of reason and even to overthrow its sway. i ! «Vol. 33, q. 10», m. 2, Sol. «Vol. 30, D. 31, a. 21, ad q. 2, ad 1. «Vol. 30, D. 26, a. », ad 1. ^Vol. 30, D. 32. a. It. ad ·» 15Vol. 33, q. 108, m. 3, ad q. 1, ad obj. 1. nVol. 27, D. 30, a. 1, Sol. «Vol. 27, D. 31, a. 2, Sol. Theological Studies 10 But the ignominy of this revolt of concupiscence against reason finds no clearer illustration than in a contrast of the potency of reason over the body prior to and its impotency sub- ; sequent to original sin. How complete was the sway of reason over human conduct in Paradise can receive no better illustra­ tion than a juxtaposition of the marital relations of innocent and tainted human nature. Of our first parents in Paradise, Albert states: “They would, indeed, have had pleasure in mari­ tal intimacy but, as in eating and drinking, a pleasure subject to reason. And the organs of generation would not react, except so far, and so long and at such a time, as reason desired.”21 A more complete and detailed sovereignty of the rational faculty over the most perverse and stubbornly rebellious potencies of man could hardly be delineated. Moreover the pleasure of marital relations in Paradise, though intense, indeed more in­ tense than at present, would nevertheless have no power against reason. “For that operation would have had place without ar­ dor, namely, that pleasure which overcomes reason in action, ‘ since reason would have been fortified by the grace of innocence < and nothing, be it ever so vehement, could have distracted rea- i son from its contemplation of the Immutable First Good.”22 Outlined here is the supreme mastery of spirit over flesh, a mastery so perfect in its ambit as to include, apparently, even ‘ the reflex potencies of generation. For Albert advances so far ’ as to maintain "that the stimulation of the genital nerve-tract would not occur except at the command of reaison and the results therefrom would likewise be under the domain of rea­ son.”23 Nor does he hesitate to affirm that “the heat of passion . would have been the servant of reason and hence it could not · overreach reason; and reason moreover would have caused both the first movements of the body and regulated all activity of the same in accord with the dignity of the state of primal justice.”24 «Vol. 22Vol. 23Vol. «Vol 27, D. 20, a. 2, Sol. JO, D. 26, a. 7, Sol. 27, D. 20, a. 2, ad 2. 27, D. 20, 2, «1 J. St. Albert on Conjugal Intimacy 11 By contrast, then, with the ideal of Paradise, the present con­ dition of man is shameful and this shame is manifest especially in the rebellion of concupiscence against reason, particularly in coition. This rebellion is a punishment of original sin, and as all punishment bears the stigma of shame, so too concupiscence is termed the "turpitudo poenae.”25 To exercise marital relations then for the sake of concupiscence would, in the estimation of Albert, be to degrade the high office of matrimony to the level of things shameful. Such unreasonable conduct merited from Albert and his scholastic predecessors the stricture of sin. What alone could save the act from sin, since concupiscence was ever present in it, was the motivation furnished by the institution of marriage as an office of nature or the practice of virtue thereby afforded. "Matrimony claims indulgence not in an unqualified sense, but only in so far as coition takes place for the sake of concupiscence. Accomplished for other purposes, namely, in the hope of offspring, or by reason of fidelity or to render the debt, this act stands in no need of indulgence.”28 As in all human acts, so in this particular marital function, a congeries of the above mentioned motives may be the activating force which evokes the accomplishment of marital intimacy. And in this interplay of motives, we have an index to the norm established by Albert for weighing the serious or nonserious guilt of such relations. Where concupiscence initiates the act, but has consciously associated with it the hope of off­ spring, the act is venially sinful; the same is true when the desire of issue originates the act, but consciously shares the field of motivation with concupiscence. But where the unique mo­ tive is hope of offspring and concupiscence, because unavoid­ able, is endured, the act is virtuous at once and meritorious. The act is seriously sinful only where concupiscence is the sole and dominating motive thereof.27 There is, in the diction of Albert, a curious phrase which affords an insight into the circumstances under which concupis“Vol. JO, D. 26, a. 8, ad 1. “Vol. JO, D. 26, a. 1, ad J. KVol. JO, D. 26, a. 11. Sol. 12 Theological Studies St. Albert on Conjugal Intimacy cence assumes the dominant role in coition. "Ardentior amator uxoris” is the term employed, and while in itself the expression is innocent enough, still in the mind of Albert it connotes some- ! thing gravely reprehensible. For that husband is said to be ardentior amator who would enter into dalliance with his spouse, were she not his proper mate.28 A further analysis of this concept discloses, on the part of such a husband, a total lack ‘ of appreciation of the higher motivation of matrimonial in­ timacy and a desire to seek and rest content in his selfish carnal gratification. Clustering around this main concept are such subsidiary ideas as: "the angel spoke to Tobias of him who was an ardentior amator of his spouse, and of him it is true that he shut out God from his mind, since concupiscence held sway over . him”;29 "he is named an ardentior amator who passes beyond the permission and decencies of all matrimony.”30 Now the danger of concupiscence wresting from reason con­ trol of this act is an ever present one and to frustrate this violent power of concupiscence Albert declares the outright need of ■ supernatural aid and succor. Against this downward pull of ; concupiscence is set the upward lift of grace. For the sacrament ' of matrimony confers a special grace, due to which there is a \ remission in the intensity of the forces of concupiscence.31 But . the nature of that grace, whether it is, indeed, of the superna- i tural order, as is commonly conceived, or some aid of the purely I natural order, is not too clear. Albert scrutinizes three theories ‘ on matrimonial grace prevalent in his day, expresses his prefer­ ence, and yet fails to clarify, thereby, the nature of the aid con- ' ferred by the rite of marriage. έ Of the three schools of thought, mentioned by Albert, the 8 first maintained that matrimony imparted no supernatural ■ grace. This view, however, did not deny to marriage its sacra- | mental dignity. For its proponents taught that the appellation, ? sacrament, may be predicated of marriage and the other sacred ; «Vol- 30, D. 31, a. 6, ad 2. j 2’Vol. 30, p. 237, ad 3. s0Vol. 30, p. 213, Sol. 31Vol. 30, D. 26, a. 8, ad 1. i t 13 rites both because of what the rites symbolize and because of what they effect. Accordingly the other sacred rites are sacra­ ments in the dual sense of symbolizing and effecting; but matri­ mony is a sacrament only in so far as it symbolizes, namely, the union of the Word with human nature. A second school of theologians held that marriage is a sacra­ ment in the dual sense of signifying and conferring grace. Yet the grace imparted functions diversely from the grace of the other sacraments. For the grace of the sacrament of matrimony is not bestowed in respect to good, but rather in respect to evil, in the sense that the grace of marriage is a regression from evil and not a progression unto good. To the natural query, in what, then, does this grace consist, their ready response pro­ claimed it to be that gift which prevents concupiscence from rushing men to destruction. More fully, it is that grace which harmonizes with the nature of marriage or with some external adjunct which assuages concupiscence and keeps it within the bounds of the proprieties and benefits of marriage. This theory explains the reason why some of the Fathers apparently denied the grace-giving function of matrimony; for the granting of grace here is not for the sake of good but for the relief of evil; matrimony impedes the good, not indeed in itself, but by rea­ son of the burdens which follow in its train. This second ex­ planation of the sacramental grace finds, with Albert, greater favor than the first. Some other skilled theologians enunciated a third theory or explanation of the sacramental grace of marriage. According to them, matrimony bestows grace for the sake of good; and not of good in a general manner, but for the sake of the par­ ticular good to be done by a married person. Naturally this genus of good is made up of the loyal cooperation of one spouse with the other, in the commingling of their effects, and in the religious upbringing of their children.32 This last opinion has much probability in the judgment of Albert. However, in commenting on the efficient cause of the s2VoL 30, D. 26, a. 14, ad q. 2. 14 Theological Studies ! St. Albert on Conjugal Intimacy components of matrimonial life, Albert states that the com- j mingling of the sexes emerges from the law of nature, the dis­ tinctions of legitimate persons from the law of Moses, the love I and mutual aid of joint efforts from the civil law, but the remedial power against concupiscence proceeds in a signal man­ ner from the law of Christ; because matrimony now, ex opere operato, confers a remedy against concupiscence which it did ? not formerly confer, except ex opere operante.33 And this sue- ( cor granted by matrimony he terms in another place, where the I discussion does not turn upon the formal nature of the aid, "an i interior sacramental grace which diminishes the forces of con- r cupiscence.”34 | Despite this clear and oft repeated statement upon the office i of matrimonial grace in medicating concupiscence, there re- ! mains a feeling of uneasiness as to the surety with which Albert ; clings to that teaching under all and varied circumstances.J There is, for instance, an apparent, at least, reversal of that doc- ' trinal stand in his answer to some objections which are found i in the treatise upon matrimonial impediments. Therein it is ■ urged that priests, above all men, need a remedy against con­ cupiscence. As matrimony offers such a remedy, they should . marry. Thereto Albert replies “that matrimony is an indirect ‘ remedy which excuses rather than cures the disease. But the ; ministers of the Lord must be cured of this disease. So they ; receive a true and direct cure which is none other than the spiritual grace which cools the fires of concupiscence and the exercise of spiritual functions which, in turn, withdraws the mind from the matters of concupiscence.”35 ; If some obscurity mars the clarity of Albert’s teaching upon the maimer, though not upon the fact of matrimony’s aid against concupiscence, there is, on the contrary, not a minimal doubt either about the manner or the fact of help against con­ cupiscence from another sacrament, namely, baptism. In speak­ ing of baptism as an antidote to concupiscence, Albert throws ·_....... - 1J 33Vol. 30, D. 26, a. 15, ad q. 1. 3