1

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA
Studies in Sacred Theology No. 58 ·

THE POSSIBILITY OF INVINCIBLE
IGNORANCE OF THE NATURAL

LAW
BY·

■'

Reverend Stanley JJertke, S.T.L., A.B.
OF THE ARCHDIOCESE OF CINCINNATI

A DISSERTATION

,

Submitted to the Faculty of the School of Sacred
Theology of the Catholic University of America in
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Doctor of Sacred Theology

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA PRESS
WASHINGTON, D. C.
1941

Nihil Obstat:
FRANCISCOS CONNELL, C.SS.R.,
Censor Deputatus

Imprimatur :
^JOANNES TIMOTHEUS McNICHOLAS
Archiepiscopus Cincinnatensis
Cincinnatis, die 29a Januarii, 1943

4

Copyright, 1943, by
’·
The Catholic University of America Press

r

MURRAY &'HEISTER—WASHINGTON, D. Q

1

PRINTED IN UNIT® STATES

X

2.16982

,B Hl·

ACKNOWLEDGMENT
I am very grateful to His Grace, the Most Reverend John T.
McNicholas, S.T.M., Archbishop of Cincinnati, for the oppor­
tunity of pursuing graduate study at the Catholic University.
My gratitude is also due to the Reverend Francis J. Connell,
C.SS.R., who supervised this work with unfailing interest, and
to the Reverends John F. McConnell, M.M., and Pascal P.
Parente who read the manuscript.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE

CHAPTER

Introduction............................................................. vii

1

I.

On the Natural Law’s Existence and Essence .

II.

Of the Notion, Obligation, and Division of τπε
Precepts..........................................................................24

III. Of

the

Action

Function of the Intellect in Human

............................................................................ 46

IV. Of the Possibility of Invincible Ignorance of the
Natural Law................................................................. 63

V.

Special Problems and Application

of

Principles

84

Conclusions............................................................... 121

Bibliography............................................................... 123
Alphabetical Index

.

.

v

.

.

.

.

. 127

INTRODUCTION

Moralists have often been accused of legislating for men who
exist only as empty abstractions in the minds of the moralists
themselves.1 Theories of morals may be evolved, it is said, but
the actions of men, which are morals in practice, admit of no
confined codification. The undeniable variability of human con­
duct and of codes of morality is adduced as evidence that the
moralist is divorced from reality; enclosed within the austere
monastery of abstract thought, he does not see the changing
facts of life.
Though these accusations might conceivably find a target if
directed at the followers of Rousseau in the eighteenth and nine­
teenth centuries,2 or perhaps at some chimerical scholastic, they
would be completely wide of the mark if pointed at the living
thought of Thomas Aquinas. One who demonstrated human
freedom on metaphysical grounds 3 could not fail to see that noth­
ing in the visible universe is so versatile as man, for he alone is
master of his actions. The recognition of these possibilities of
variation led St. Thomas to conclude that the nature of certitude
obtained in speculative sciences is considerably different from that
obtained by the practical science of morals.4 He saw no less
clearly that the pursuit of happiness, necessarily inherent in
every human action, would not be directed toward a constant and
1 “ Le premier postulat des moralistes consiste à admettre l'idée abstraite
d’une nature humaine, toujours identique à elle-même. Toutes les mores
théoriques supposent ce postulat. Il faut que leurs impératifs puissent se
présenter comme ayant une valeur universelle, pour tous les temps et pour
tous les lieux. Il faut que la loi morale avec toutes ses consequences se
présente comme une système organique dont aucune partie ne depend de cir­
constances locales et accidentelles.” Lévy-Brühl, L-, La morale et la
science des moeurs, Paris, 1903, p. 67.
2 Cf. Deploige, Simon, Le conflit de la morale et de la sociologie, Lou­
vain: Institut supérieur de philosophie, 1911, p. 289.
3 L q. 59. a. 3, c.
* I-II, q. 91, a. 3, ad 3um.

vii

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Introduction

common object in the concrete. Diversity of judgments regarding
right and wrong produces diversity of laws.5* Moreover, even
though the general principles of conduct be clear, their applica­
tion to a particular act may be a matter of only probable knowl­
edge.®
Nor is Thomas content merely to observe the variability of
custom. Again departing from experimental facts he proceeds to
give an adequate solution of the problem. One cause of such
variability is the dual, animal-spiritual nature of man. Conflict
is inevitable between his spiritual striving for the universal and
his animal tendencies to the particular. It often happens that a
man sees clearly universal truths but does not act according to his
knowledge of them.’ The disordered passions of his corporal
nature entice him toward things of only specious goodness.8*Other
members of the group may accept his example; new principles
are formed, and soon perhaps an entire nation follows an erro­
neous moral principle.0
Another cause of the changes in custom is the lack of clear per­
ception of right and wrong. The most general principles of moral
conduct are indeed perceived by all, but these principles must be
applied to action by human reason, an instrument of varying
effectiveness.10 One individual or group is gifted with sharp in­
telligence, others are slow and dull-witted. This results in di­
verse standards of morals in the various cultures.
A legitimate cause of variation is found in actual human situa­
tions. These vary considerably, and the moral law must be adapt8 “ Propter incertitudinem humani judicii, praecipue de rebus contingenti­
bus et particularibus, contingit de actibus humanis diversorum esse diversa
judicia, ex quibus etiam diversae et contrariae leges procedunt.” I-II, q. 91,
a. 4, c.
« Ibid.
r “ Experimento patet quod multi agunt contra ea quorum scientiam
habent” .1-11, q. 77, a. 2.
8 I-Π, q. 9, a. 2.
° Compare the present practice of birth control with the statement of St.
Thomas concerning unnatural vice among primitive peoples. I-II, q. 94,
a. 6. ■
’» I, q. 113, a. I, ad turn.

Introduction

ix

ik«
Jiji
i4

able enough to care for them.11 As an example of this adapt­
ability St. Thomas points out that the virtuous act of one state in
life may be vicious in another.12 Further, though homicide is un­
doubtedly wrong, the killing of another is not immoral under
certain circumstances.13 His perception, however, of the mar­
velous adaptability of the law did not cloud his vision of its essen­
tial unity and immutability.14 Man has not been left to wander
aimlessly and alone in an otherwise ordered universe. If there
are many wrong roads that man may travel, there is only one
right road he should follow.
This study attempts to point out the existence and the nature
of this highway, and then to examine the status of those who de­
flect their journey into the by-lanes of immoral action. Do they
always know they are swerving from the right course of action?
If they do not know it, are they responsible for not knowing it?
In other words, can there be, and how far can there be, invincible
ignorance of the natural moral law?
11 “ Diversificatur ea quae sunt de lege naturali, secundum diversos status
et conditiones hominum." Supp., q. 41, a. I, ad 3um.
12“Propter diversas hominum conditiones contingit quod aliqui actus
sunt aliquibus virtuosi, tamquam eis proportionati et convenientes, qui tamen
sunt aliis vitiosi, tamquam eis non proportionati.” I-Π, q. 94, a. 3, ad 3utn.
12 “ Si aliquis occidat aliquem pro defensione vitae suae, non erit reus
homicidii." Π-Π, q. 64, a. 7.
141-II, q. 94, a. 4 and a. 5.

CHAPTER I
On the Natural Law’s Existence and Essence
THE NATURAL LAW'S 1 EXISTENCE

A mere casual reading of the history of political thought in
America prior to the Declaration of Independence is enough to
demonstrate that Jefferson’s document was not the advancement
of a new political theory, but the apt expression of ideas already
inherent in Western Culture.2
Alexander Hamilton expressed the theory which lay behind the
Declaration in the following: “ God has constituted an eternal and
immutable law, which is indispensably obligatory upon all man­
kind, prior to any human institution whatever. This is what is
called the law of nature.”3 In other words, the self-evident
truths of the Declaration are part of the natural law. Moreover,
the natural law is so bound up with man that rights flowing from
it, however denied and abused by the vagaries of human conduct,
can never be taken away. The men of the time were convinced
that they had come to grips with the only political principles based
on the realities of human nature. So strong was this conviction
that cautious promulgation of the principles was spurned; they
declared them “ self-evident.”
Less than two centuries later, an Englishman, calling atten­
tion to the naive metaphysics of the Founding Fathers, submitted
1 By the natural law is meant the natural moral law as distinguished from
physical laws.
2Cf. McNabb, Vincent, Ο. P., Frontiers of Faith and Reason, London:
Sheed and Ward, 1936, pp. 92-95, for indications and authorities on the
Thomistic influence to be seen in American political thought at the time of
the Revolution. Cf. also Wright, Herbert, Catholic Founders of Modern
International Low, Washington, D. C., 1934, 25 p.
3 Works of Alexander Hamilton, New York : Senator H. C. Lodge (2
ed.), 1904. V. I., p. 59.

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The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

that a contention for the self-evidence of the ambiguous term
equality in relation to man could find support only in sentimental­
ism.4 At the same time, an American, after a thorough investi­
gation into the content, use, and essence of the natural law idea in
American History down to the present day, came to the con­
clusion that “ the essential element in the concept of natural law
is not its content ; certainly it .is not a particular content at any
given time or place. It is the attempt to answer the problems of
politics which seemingly cannot be answered in any way capable
of objective proof. In other words, natural law in its essence is
the attempt to solve the insolvable.”56
Wright reflects a school that presumably would have no trouble
in recognizing, with Cicero, the desirability of a clear knowledge
that rights are based, not on opinion, but on nature itself.® How­
ever, it would not proceed, as Cicero did, to the recognization of
the law’s actual existence.7 It would admire the confidence of
Aquinas when he asks whether the natural law is the same among
all men and then answers, with scholastic distinctions, in the
affirmative,8*but would be inclined to be skeptical about the valid­
ity of any speculative argument in the face of the divergency of
views that American history brings forward both as to the nature
and content of the elusive idea. When, as a matter of fact, the
natural law has meant now the revealed divine law, now the law
of reason, now that which is in keeping with established custom
or legislation, now the ideal as distinct from the actual, and now
the appropriate or useful,8 a discussion of a natural law which is
absolutely the same among all men, at all times and places, would
4Hollis, Christopher, The American Heresy, London: Burns, Oates and
Washburn, 1929, p. 54.
5 Wright, Benjamin, Jr., American Interpretations of Natural Law,
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931, p. 254.
6 " Nihil est profecto praestabilius, quam plane intelligi ... neque opinione,
sed natura constitutum esse jus.” Cicero, De Legibus, 1, 10.
7 “ Est quidem vera lex, recta ratio, naturae congruens, diffusa in omnes,
constans, sempiterna.” Cicero, De Legibus, 1, 10.
8 I-Π, Q. 94, a. 4, c.
8 Wright, op. cit., passim.

On the Natural Law’s Existence and Essence

3

seem to be futile when related to the historical fact that men have
differed so widely even as to its fundamental meaning.10
However, Catholic thought has never succumbed to this de­
featism. It has maintained constantly that the existence of the
natural law not only can be proved by reason but also has become,
by the inspired pronouncement of St. Paul which has been con­
stantly reflected in Christian tradition, an object of divine faith.
Catholic theology defines the natural law as a participation of the
eternal law in rational creatures.11 Its existence can be proved
from Scripture, Tradition, and reason.
SCRIPTURE AND THE NATURAL LAW

Explicit statements concerning the natural law’s existence are
not to be found in the Gospels, though the precept, “ All things
therefore whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do
you also to them,” is one of its fundamental principles of action.
St. Paul explicitly states that " When the gentiles, who have no
law, do by nature what the law prescribes, these having no law,
are a law to themselves : They show the work of the law written
in their hearts. Their conscience bears witness to them, even
when conflicting thoughts accuse or defend them.”12 St. Paul—
speaks here of the Gentiles, pointing out that pagans, who follow
a natural guide to action, perform the same moral works pre­
scribed for the Jews by positive law. That St. Paul, in referring'''
to the law, speaks of the positive moral law as promulgated in
the Decalogue, and not of Jewish ceremonial law, is clearly indi­
cated by his indictment of pagans in the immediately preceding
context.13
In the Greek text φΐχ^ι (nature) belongs grammatically to
■κοΰύσιν· In other words, the Gentiles do by nature the things
of the law. Had Paul wanted the word φύσα to modify the
10 For a discussion and solution of the phenomenon of the diversity of
views, cf. Brown, Brendan, Natural Law's Function in America, Notre
Dame Lawyer, Vol. IS. n. i.
11I-II, Q. 91, a. 2, c.
12 Romans, 2, 1413 Romans, 1, 24.

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The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

phrase “ who have not the law ” thus excluding the concept of a
natural law, then perforce φύσα would have had to be placed
either before the article
or between τά and ί-χοντα·14 In the
actual construction φύσα can only belong to νοιώσιν- The identity
of the Gentiles in the passage is clearly determined by the apposi­
tional phrases used in their description. The phrases τά μη νόμον
ίχορτίκ and èvroc νόμον μη exopres in verse 14 can mean only
that Paul is speaking of pagans in the strict sense of the word,
i.e., people with, at best, only primitive revelation.15
The precise meaning of φύοα in the passage may be gleaned
from the consideration that it stands in opposition to the vbpos
of the Jews, the divinely revealed law of Moses. This is to say,
negatively, that the Gentiles perform the actions without super­
natural revelation, and positively, that they act by means of
natural judgments. That the Gentiles do perform such actions
leads Paul to say they are a “law to themselves.” This law
“ written in their hearts,” is intimately connected with their ra­
tional nature, “ their conscience bears witness to them, even when
conflicting thoughts accuse or defend them.”
Summing up, we know from revelation: first, that men have
a norm of moral conduct based on their very nature, secondly,
this norm is comparable to the revealed moral law of the Jews or
to the commandments of the Decalogue, and thirdly that this
norm can be known by the light of natural reason, for it is
" written in their hearts.” 16
I4Quirmbach, Joseph, Die Lehre des Hi. Paulus von der naturlichen
Gotteserkenntinis und dem naturlichen Sittengesetz, in Strassburger Theologische Studien, Band VII, Heft 4, 1906, p. 67. “ Paul ne s'inquiète pas
ici du principe des actions, mais de leur nonne extérieure. La nature, c’esta-dire la lumière de la raison naturelle, à defaut de la Loi, a dit aux gentils
ce qu’ils devaient faire et éviter.” Lagrange, M. J., O. P., Epître aux
Romains, Paris : J. Gabalda et Fils, 1914, p. 49.
15 St. Augustine’s interpretation restricting the term to unbaptized cate­
chumens may be explained by polemical duress against the Pelagians. Cont.
Jul. L. 4, c. 3, n. 25 ; P. L. 44, 750. Cf. also Lagrange, op. cit., Ibid.
16 “ Aujourd’hui tous les cxegètes sont d’accord ; les gentiles, quoique
n’ayant pas le Loi écrite, ont en eux-mêmes le principe de l’obligation, cette
loi naturelle que Sophocle et Cicéron ont exprimée d’une manière admir­
able.” Lagrange, op. cit., p. 49.

On the Natural Law’s Existence and Essence

5

By this explicit and authoritative teaching of St. Paul, the
natural law was given a function in the organism of Christian
thought, which it has retained ever since.17
TRADITION AND THE NATURAL LAW

An examination of Christian tradition reveals that the Pauline
doctrine of the natural law was accepted at once by Christian
teachers. Tradition has deepened our understanding of the orig­
inal doctrine. The Fathers as a group recognized only a single
natural law. This law contains precepts common to men every­
where, the knowledge of which does not emanate from human
instruction or promulgation, but from nature itself. Nature is
the teacher, the human soul is the scholar.18 These precepts are
substantially identical with the precepts of the Decalogue, and,
after a period in which they were somewhat obscured through
abuses and sin, they have been restored to their pristine purity
by the teaching of Christ. These ethical norms are immutable
guides and ideals to which all merely human laws should seek
to conform themselves ; they prescribe, for example, that God
is to be honored, that it is wrong to injure our fellow man. The
Fathers were not inclined to give a systematic treatise of all the
precepts contained in this law, but they emphasized its chief
prescriptions.
Christian writers immediately following Paul have nothing ex­
plicit concerning the natural law ; when they speak of morals
this law is presupposed, as in the moral prescriptions of St. Igna­
tius (φ 110) in his letter to Polycarp.1®
The Apologetes make a positive advance in their treatment of
the natural law by comparing their own doctrine of the “ Logos ”
with that of the Stoics. For the Apologetes, the Logos is reason
personified in Christ.20 He is the supreme norm of action, and
17 Schilling, Otto, Naturrecht und Staat nach der Lehre der alien Kirche,
in Gorres-Gesellschaft, Sektion für Rechts-und Sozialwissenschaft, Heft, 24,
Paderborn: Ferdinand Schôningh, 1914, pp. 42-43.
18“Magistra natura, anima discipula.” Tertullian, De Test, an., C. 5;
P. L, I, 616.
18 C. 4 & 5 ; P. G., 5, 721, 724·
20 St. Justin, Apol. II, 6, 8; P. G., 6, 453, 457.

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The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

those pagans are to be commended who approach this norm.
The Stoics especially have many good norms of action, and live,
in part, according to the Logos by following right reason.21
Tatian, (T c. 180) who studied under St. Justin, criticizes the
pagans according to the same norm, reason. Civil legislation
violates this norm in some instances, as is evidenced by the de
facto existence of divergent laws about the same matters.22
Those people who have legislation opposed to this norm are to be
censured, for their customs violate not only Christian principles,
but right reason itself. For Clement of Alexandria, (Ï c. 215)
right reason (gpflos λόγοϊ) is the expression of the Teacher him­
self. It is a rule based on human nature, and actions must con­
form to it23 for he who acts contrary to reason sins.24 The pas­
sions are to be subject to right reason, not reason to the passions.25
Origen (Ϋ 249) distinguishes a twofold law, the law of na­
ture, and the law of the State. Christians are bound to obey the
former at all times, while the latter depends on its conformity
1 to the natural law for its binding power.

Do you say that law is the ruler of all peoples? If
you speak of the laws by which individual states are
ruled, your axiom will be false, for in reality the same
law is not the ruler of all. Rather one should say, laws
are the rulers of all. For, although nature is the ruler
of all and is law in the proper sense, nevertheless, just
as some thieves violate laws, so also some nations fall
away from the norm and establish laws which are fit
for thieves. We Christians, however, recognize the
natural law to be a divine law and seek to conform our­
selves to it. We reject laws which are contrary to the
laws of nature.26

In the Latin tradition, Tertullian, (ψ 245) a lawyer, uses the
expression ius naturae everywhere. Christians and pagans are
21 Ibid.
22Orat. ad Graec., 28; P. G., 6, 864.
23 Paed. I, 12; P. G. 8, 372.
24 Paed. I, 13 ; P. G. 8, 372.
25 Ibid.
26 C. Co/. 5, 41 ; P. G. II, 1244, 1245.

On the Natural Law's Existence and Essence

7

brothers according to the natural law, for nature is their com­
mon mother. Christians, however, have an extra title of prox­
imity, in that they recognize a common Father.27 Nature is our
teacher and in her school we must learn that her teachings are
really the teachings of God.2829The content of these teachings can
generally be expressed by the prohibition of evil thoughts, words,
desires and deeds, also by the general law against violation of
the rights of others.28 This natural law, or the law of reason, is
the measure of the civil law.30
Lactantius (’F c. 325) “ the African Cicero,” identifies the
natural law with the 5P0OS λόγοϊ of the Alexandrians. It is a
constant and perpetual law prescribing duties and establishing
prohibitions. It stands in need of no positive human promulga­
tion and cannot be legislated out of existence. It is the same at
Rome and Athens, now and forever. All peoples are included
in its extent. It is an expression of God’s plan for man. He who
disobeys this law, flees himself.31
The Cappadocians, of whom we consider St. Basil ("f1 379)
and St. Gregory Nazianzen (f 390), repeat the Christian tradi­
tion of a law of nature known by man independently of positive
laws. St. Basil speaks of the virtues to which man is inclined
aside from all human instruction, and institutes a comparison be­
tween the physical laws which rule the body and the moral laws
which rule the soul. Just as the body fights against physical
disease, so the natural duty of the soul is resistance to evil in­
clinations. The objects of the soul’s natural inclination to the
good are charity, prudence, justice, and fortitude. As a matter
of fact, St. Paul has added nothing to the natural law, though
he brings higher motives to bear on its object.32
27 “ Fratres autem vestri sumus, iure naturae matris unius. ... At quanto
dignius qui unum patrem Deum agnoverunt." Apol., 39, P. L. X, 471.
28 De test. an. 5, P. L. 1,616.
29 “ Male enim velle, male facere, male dicere, male cogitare de quoquam
ex aequo vetamur.” Apol. 36 ; P. L. I, 616.
30"Lex erit omne iam quod ratione lex constat." P. L. 2, 81.
31 Div. insti. 6, 8; P. L. 6, 660.
32"Numquid non hoc idem natura praecepit? Nihil ergo novi Paulus
hortatur, sed astringit altius vincula naturae.” In Haex. 9, 4, P. G. 30, 902.

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The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

St. Gregory Nazianzen retains the Pauline influence completely.
God gave men the Law and the Prophets, but before all he gave
them the natural law. It is not to be understood that the advent
of later positive law abrogated the natural law, but rather that it
restored the fundamental rules of moral relations which had be­
come obscured.83
x
While previous Fathers have treated of the natural law only in
passing, we find St. John Chrysostom (φ 407) giving it a pro­
found and somewhat lengthy treatise. The doctrine of Paul is
the fulcrum of his proof,34 though he insists that revelation is not
necessary for a knowledge of the natural law and of its obligation.
Knowledge of good and evil is implanted in human nature; we
don’t have to learn from others that certain things are wrong.
From the first use of our rational powers we know these things.
This knowledge has to do with those elementary and necessary
precepts which-are necessary if life is to be lived. These norms
are absolute and unchangeable, and bind every human being with­
out exception. His persistence in maintaining the universality of
the natural law which emphatically does not depend upon custom
is interesting:

We use not only Scripture but also reason in arguing
against the pagans. What is their argument? They say
they have no law of conscience, and that there is no law
implanted by God in nature. My answer is to question
them about their laws concerning marriage, homicide,
wills, injuries to others, enacted by their legislators.
Perhaps the living have learned from their fathers, and
their fathers from their fathers and so on. But go back
to the first legislator! From whom did he learn? Was
it not by his own conscience and conviction ? Nor can it
be said that they heard Moses and the prophets, for
Gentiles could not hear them. It is evident that they de­
rived their laws from the law which God ingrafted in
man from the beginning.35
33 “ Ille eum maximis in rebus commiseratus est cum ei praeter coetera
legem prophetas, ac prius etiam naturalem legem, non scriptam eorum quae
geruntur censorem dedit arguens, admonens, castigans.” Orat. XIV, 14,
27; P. G. 35, 893.
34 P. G. 49, 1321·
35z4d pop. Ant. 12, 4; P. G. 132.

On the Natural Law’s Existence and Essence

9

St. Jerome (i* 420), basing himself on St. Paul (Rom. 2, 14),
maintains that there is a law written in the heart which is com­
mon to all nations. No man with the use of reason is ignorant
of this law.36 Jews need not boast, for the Gentiles have the law
(of nature) as well. The law of Moses was given only because
this first law was disobeyed and almost forgotten.37 This law
rules not only the just, but also sinners.3839Grace, in the new dis­
pensation, should have the effect that men no longer live accord­
ing to the letter but according to the spirit, for the natural law is
renewed in their hearts.38 St. Jerome excuses violations of the
law by children who have not reached the use of reason. How­
ever, they are responsible on coming to its use, for they know the
law.
An infant knows not this law ; not having the law, if it
sins, it is not held to the law of sin. It insults its father
and mother, but because it has not received the law, it
sins not. However, when it does come to the knowledge
of the law, that is, when it understands, it must seek
good and avoid evil, then sin begins to be, and the infant
begins to die, for he.is guilty of sin.40

St. Ambrose (1* 397) was well versed in both Christian and
pagan sources, and, as might be expected, his teaching on the
natural law reflects his background. His Christian concept of
society, wherein he conceived both the State and the Church as
organisms in which everyone is related as members to a body,41
is reflected in his doctrine on the natural law. Nature is the basic
guide of society, and he who violates its norms injures the entire
organism. He also injures the Church whose members are bound
together by the bonds of faith and charity.42 The laws of nature
36 Ep. I2i; 8; C. S. E. L., 56; Vindobonae: F. Tetnpsky, 1918, p. 33.
37 Comm, in Is. 8, 24, 6; P. L. 24, 283.
38 Comm, in Ecc. 2 ; P. L. 23, 1971.
39 “ instaurantem* legem in cordibus suis ” Comm. in Is. 74, S1, f·· P- L.
24, 486.
il3Ep. 121; 8; C. S. E. L., 56, 33.
41 De Off. 3, 3, 17 f·; P. L· 16, 749·
42 Ibid.

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The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

are the laws of God. Consequently, it is false to conclude that an
action is licit because it is not forbidden by positive law. The de­
cision in that case is up to nature43 for actions in accord with
nature are good, while those contrary to nature are bad. How­
ever, since men did not keep the primitive natural law, positive
law has been added to it. The natural law is the unwritten law
proper to man, and is not learned through study but flows from
nature as from a font.44
When treating of the natural law St. Augustine (f 430) is
easily the master of all previous Christian thinkers. Though no
strictly scientific treatment of the natural law in the Scholastic
sense of the term is to be found in his writings, the concept of
natural law is nevertheless an-integral part of his organic syn­
thesis of thought. It is for this reason that his thought cannot be
understood without reference to the Eternal Law of God, of
which the natural law is but an expression in time. His clarity
on this relationship is a definite contribution. The Eternal Law
is the divine plan or will commanding that the order established
by God in nature be observed.45
In the eternal wisdom of God, creation is constituted a mar­
velously related whole in which each part, by its quest of peace
and perfection, shows forth the glory of God.4® Of all visible
creatures, man participates in the Eternal Law in the most perfect
way, for his soul is, so to speak, the mirror of the Law, and the
ideas grounded therein harmonize with the order prescribed. The
natural law is in man’s reason and is written in his heart in a
natural way.47 The natural law prescribes that we do unto others
as we would have them do unto us. Only thus will justice and
order be preserved.48 The commands of the natural law are hid43 Ep. 60, 5; P. L. 16, 1185.
44 H/>. 73. 3 : P. L. 16, 1251.
45 C. Faust. Munich. 22, 27, 78. “ Lex aeterna est ratio divina vel voluntas
Dei ordinem naturalem conservari iubens, perturbari vetans.” P. L. 42,
418.
43 De Civ. Dei. 19, 12; P. L. 4L 637.
47 Enarr. in Ps. 57 ; P. L. 36. 373·
48 Enarr. in Ps. 118; P. L. 37. 1574·

On the Natural Law's Existence and Essence

Ji

den from no one with the use of reason.48 In this way all peoples
know that adultery is wrong, not because there is a law forbid­
ding it, but it is forbidden by law because it is wrong.*50 This is
the inner law of man, written in his heart, or rather, imbedded in
reason, by which the soul mirrors the light of God.51 St. Au­
gustine is not afraid of drawing the conclusion; pagans, even
when they do not abide by the law, know good from evil.52 The
natural law is the “ lex gentium,” whose subject is man as man.53
It is distinguished from the Mosaic law (lex Hebraeorum) and
the New Law (lex veritatis). However, as to content, the
natural law is identical with the Mosaic, while the New Law is
the fulfillment of both.54
These quotations from the Fathers clearly show that the doc­
trine of the natural law is undoubtedly a part of man’s heritage.
The various schools and regions represented by the Fathers
quoted justify the statement that it is a universal tradition. What
tradition holds, reason, in this case, is able to demonstrate. The
existence of the natural law is now to be considered from the
viewpoint of reason.
PROOF FROM REASON

Today, irony is found in the fact that a more general agreement
exists about scientific ideas, which make no pretense of being
self-evident, than prevails about any axioms which have ever been
advanced by metaphysical schools.55 Nevertheless, a rational
demonstration of the natural law’s existence presupposes many
truths.
That the intellect can receive truth as it exists objectively in
the world outside ourselves ; that because the mind bears this re­
lation to things it cannot but give assent to certain propositions
48 De sp. et lit. 28 ; P. L. 44, 230.
50 De Lib. Arb. 1, 3, 6; P. L. 32, 1224.
81 Enarr. in Ps. 145, 5 ; P. L. 37, 1887.
S2De Trin. 14, 21; P. I,. 42, 1052.
83 Enarr. in Ps. 118, 25, 4 ; P. L,. 37,1574.
84 De sp. et lit. 14, 23 ; P. L. 44, 215.
88 Hook, Sydney, The New Medievalism, New Republic, V. 103, n. 18, p.
602.
.

12

The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

whose truth cannot be doubted under sanction of absurdity ; that
words apparently expressing doubt concerning these principles
really affirm what they seek to deny; that the intellect from the
perception of visible things can rise by this measure to the divine
Measure of things themselves, in other words, that the existence
of God from the existence of finite things can be proved ; that the
mind can reason to an Eternal Law that is identified with the
essence of God; that this Eternal Law is carried out in respect
to creatures by Divine Providence—all these truths are taken for
granted in the present dissertation. They are demonstrated by
the Catholic masterpieces on the subject.56
The rational proof for the natural law’s existence begins with
experimental facts verifiable in the daily life of everyone. These
facts lead us inevitably to the conclusion that man, by nature, has
within himself a certain guide or norm of action antecedent to
all positive law. Because man is physically free, and consequently
can ignore this guide, we call it a moral law in contradistinction
to a physical law implying necessary physical conformity, like the
law of gravity. Because this moral norm is within man’s very
nature, independent of any human promulgation, we call it the
natural law. The experimental facts which form the basis of the
proof are the inclinations to certain modes of action which as
history proves, and present experience corroborates, have always
and everywhere been the property of man. . Men have always
built fires to warm themselves in winter, they have followed the
hunt and planted the seed in order to bring themselves the food
necessary for the conservation of strength and health., That men
are alive today-is proof they have followed the instincts leading
them to mate and to protect and foster the offspring of these
unions. They have used their powers of speech to communicate
their thoughts to other members of the group.
These facts are bound up with human life. That all men,
despite the diversification of time, place, and physical constitution,58
58 Cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, Reginald, Ο. P. God, His Existence and His
Nature, St. Louis: Herder, 1934, 2 v.
Sheen, Fulton. God and Intelligence in Modem Philosophy (London:
Longmans, Green and Co., 1925).

On the Natural Law’s Existence and Essence

13

have acted according to these common inclinations, is proof that
they spring not from what is diverse or individual, but from that
which is common to all. They emanate from human nature.
Analyzed, these inclinations fall into three general categories.
The first set of inclinations is had in common with all other
beings. With these, man tends to the conservation of his own
being. The second category of inclinations is common to other
animals as well as to man. He is led by nature to a common life
with a person of the opposite sex, and to all acts in accordance
with this instinct, that is, to the act of procreation as well as to
the protection and education of his offspring. In the third cate­
gory of inclinations fall all those actions proper to man as a
rational being·, thus man seeks after truth and lives in society
with other men. He recognizes certain norms which have to be
followed in order to make this possible.5’
Thus, by experience, it is known that man has three sets of
inclinations by which he tends to preserve his being and his race,
and to live in society. Now this threefold inclination is a mani­
festation of God’s plan for mankind. The proof of this state­
ment stands or falls on the proof for the existence of a Supreme
Being, the Source of all participated being, who is both omnis­
cient and omnipotent.
Starting from the data of sensory experience, St. Thomas
proves the existence of a Supreme Being possessing ail perfec­
tions, the First Cause of the universe.58 Being all-wise, God must
have created the universe according to a plan by which all things
have a definite end. They tend toward that end according to
definite norms in accordance with their particular nature.57
59 God’s
58
plan for a creature is made known from the adaptation of that
creature to a particular mode of perfection. The inclinations and
the powers of the creature serve to indicate the type of perfection
and consequently the creature’s end. Consequently, God’s plan
for man is made known to man through the threefold category
of natural inclinations which are part of man’s nature.
57I-Π, q. 94, a. 2, c.
581, q. 2, 4, in toto.
58 I-II, q. 92, a. I, c.

14

The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

Thus far two truths have been seen : (a) the existence of God
who created the world according to a rational plan and governs
it accordingly, and (b) the existence of certain natural inclinations
in men, that are nothing else than manifestations of God’s plan.
Now if the mind of man recognizes these inclinations as good,
independently of any human promulgation, and further recog­
nizes an obligation of acting in accordance with these inclina­
tions under the guidance of his rational nature, then there exists
in man a guiding norm of action which is called the natural law.
That man does recognize he should act according to these in­
clinations under the guidance of reason is evident. It is a fact
of universal experience that man reflects upon himself and his
inclinations. Further, acts in accordance with these inclinations
under the guidance of reason are judged good and consequently
must be done, while acts contrary to these inclinations are con­
sidered evil and must be avoided. Thus, to preserve one’s own
life in accordance with reason is good and a thing to be done,
while actions irrationally tending to the destruction of that life
are rightly regarded as evil. In other words, man makes judg­
ments based on these natural inclinations and these judgments are
the norms according to which he should act. Thére are certain
natural inclinations in man which are manifestations of God’s
plan. Man recognizes the inclinations, forms judgments about
them which are guides to action. Therefore, the natural law
exists.
OF THE NATURAL LAW’S ESSENCE

A reading of the authors on the essence of the natural law
brings to light what at first sight seems an apparently useless jug­
gling of terms. Following the constant Christian tradition that
the law is impressed on the very nature of man and therefore is
a natural law,60 moderns hasten to qualify the term innate in a
60 Cf. St. Paul., Ad Rom. 2, 14; St. Augustine, Confess. 1.2, c. 4; St
Thomas, I-Π, a. 106, ad 2um—“Ad secundum dicendum, quod dupliciter
est aliquid inditum homini : uno modo quasi pertinens ad naturam humanam,
et sic lex naturalis est lex indita homini.”

On the Natural Law’s Existence and Essence

15

way that undoubtedly justifies the use of the term, but neverthe­
less excludes a strictly literal interpretation of the word.®1
This preoccupation with the term innate has several underlying
reasons that have bearing on an understanding of the essence of
the law. In an ordered universe it is unthinkable that man alone
is outside the plan whereby all things tend to their ends accord­
ing to the nature of their being. To deny that man has a mode
of action peculiar to his nature is to deny the principle of finality,
the doctrine of specific differences, and ultimately, the principle
of sufficient reason. Evidently, if man has no action proper to
himself by which he tends toward the end his specific nature de­
mands, no sufficient reason can be adduced for his being. In
other words man, like all other creatures, must tend to his end
according to laws bound up with his very nature. He must have
a natural law. Consequently, when Catholic tradition talks about
the natural law as innate to man it is only stating that man, like
every other creature, tends to his end according to laws which
agree with his nature.
> On the other hand, authors have been careful to qualify the
term innate on psychological grounds. St. Thomas speaks of law
as “ aliquid rationis.” 61
62 Thus to use the term innate in the strict
sense in relation to ideas or propositions is to posit a Platonism
discarded by St. Thomas and now generally regarded as unten­
able. Authors, led by the statement of Thomas that the “ natural
law is something established by reason, just as the proposition is
a work of reason,”63 have concluded that the essence of the
61 “ Dicitur naturaliter indita non quasi ipsa cognito, sive in actu secundo
sive in actu primo (idea), sit innata, sed quia innata est homini inclinatio
et facilitas statim, ubi primum rationis usus evigilat, abstrahendi ex sensi­
bilibus notiones communissimas ordinis practici (ut est notio boni et mali)
et formulandi ex iis principia universalissima ordinis practici.” Gredt, op.
cit. Vol. II, p. 34Ï. “Non quasi ipsa cognitio sit naturaliter indita, sed quia
homo naturaliter ita dispositus est ut sibi illam cognitionem statim post­
quam ad usum rationis pervenerit, facile acquirat.” Damen, op. cit. Vol. I,
p. 9i.
621-II, q. 90, a. i, c.
631-II, q. 94, a. i.

e

16

The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

natural law lies solely in the proposition of reason/4 but to this |
position there is a seemingly unanswerable objection. Ideas and |
propositions are not innate in the strict sense of the term, yet |
because of the principle of sufficient reason which has absolutely |
universal extension, children and those unable to exercise the |
faculty of reason must come under the natural law. The natural |
law is the law of man as man. To respond that the intellect l
assents to the proposition immediately on coming to the knowl- |
edge of the terms is to place them only potentially under the I
natural law, while the principle of sufficient reason would seem |
to require actual participation.
A careful reading of St. Thomas reveals that the essence of
the natural law may be understood in a sense that protects both
its innate character in the strict sense of the word, and at the
same time does not sacrifice the relation of the intellect to being,
which is difficult to hold along with the supposition of innate
ideas. Farrell65 and Merkelbach66 arrive at this solution by
distinguishing three elements pertaining to the essence of the
natural law, i. e., the natural inclinations, the faculty of reason,
and the proposition of reason. The first two are innate to man,
the third, though strictly speaking not innate, is natural in the
sense that the proposition is accepted once the terms are known.
St. Thomas speaks of these elements, now singly, now combining
them all according to the point of truth he wishes to illustrate.
Speaking of the natural inclinations of man he says :

Wherefore it (human nature) has a share in the
Eternal Reason whereby it has a natural inclination
to its proper act and end: and this participation of the
eternal law in the rational creature is called the natural
law.6’
e* Cf. Lehu, Leonardos, Ο. P. Phil. Moralis et Socialis, Paris : J. Gabalda,
1914, T. I., p. 239. Cf. also Aertnys-Damen, Theologia Moralis, Turin:
Marietti, 1932, T. I., p. 91.
65Farrell, Walter, Ο. P., The Natural Moral Law, Ditchling: St
Dominic's Press, 1930, pp. 82-103.
“ Merkelbach, Benedictus Hcnricus, Ο. PSumma Theologiae Moralis,
Paris: Desclee, T. I., p. 227.
6T I-II, q. 91, a. 2.

On the Natural Latifs Existence and Essence

17

Treating of the light of reason,, or the second element, he has
this to say :
Thus implying that the light of natural reason
whereby we discern what is good and what is evil which
is the function of the natural law is nothing else in us
than the imprint of the divine light.68

The third element, or the proposition of reason, is illustrated by
St. Thomas in the following :
Hence we find in the practical reason something that
holds the same position in regard to operations, as, in
the speculative intellect, the proposition holds in regard
to conclusions. Such universal propositions of the
practical intellect that are directed to actions have the
nature of law. And these propositions are sometimes
under our actual consideration, while sometimes they
are retained in the reason by means of a habit.69

That all three elements belong to the essence of the law is evi­
dent from the following passage in which he combines all three
in a single exposition of the law :
Law being a rule and measure, can be in a person in
two ways, in one way as in him that rules and measures,
in another way as in that which is ruled and measured,
since a thing is ruled and measured in so far as it par­
takes of the rule and measure. Wherefore since all
things subject to Divine providence are ruled and meas­
ured by the eternal law, as was stated above, it is evident
that all things partake somewhat of the eternal law, in so
far as namely, from its being imprinted on them, they
derive their respective inclinations to the proper acts and
ends. Now among all others, the rational creature is
subject to Divine providence in the most excellent way,
in so far as it partakes of a share of providence, by being
provident both for itself and others. Wherefore it has
a share of the Eternal Reason, whereby it has a natural
inclination to its proper act and end; and this participa­
is Ibid.
®·1-II, q. go, a. I ad zum.

18

The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance ~

tion of the eternal law in the rational creature is called.
the natural law. Hence, the Psalmist after saying
“ Offer up the sacrifice of justice,” as though someone
asked what the works of justice are, adds, “ Many say,
Who showeth us good things ” ; in answer to which ques­
tion he says : “ The light of thy countenance, O Lord, is
signed upon us ” : thus implying that the light of nature
or reason whereby we discern what is good and what is
evil, which is the function of the natural law, is noth­
ing else than an imprint on us of the Divine Light. It
is therefore evident that the natural law is nothing else
than the rational creature’s participation of the eternal
law.70
The italicized portions indicate how Thomas combines all
three elements in giving an explanation of the law. When he
says all things partake of the Eternal Law from which they de­
rive their respective inclinations to their acts, man is not excluded.
On the other hand, it is only by the use of his reason, by form­
ing propositions, that he can become “ provident both for him­
self and others.” When he says the nature of good and evil is
discerned by the “ light of reason ” he implies the second element
of which we have spoken.71
St. Thomas defines the natural law as “ the rational creature’s
participation of the Eternal Law.” It has been seen that this
participation consists in a combination of three elements; the
natural inclinations, the light of reason, and the proposition
formed by the use of reason. What is the nature of their com­
bination? It is evident both from the definition of law in gen­
eral,72 and the specific difference between man and brutes, that
the proposition of reason will be the most important element.
Because animals do not rationally participate in the Eternal Law,
St. Thomas says they only have a law by an analogous use of the
term (per similitudinem).” Animals are ruled; man participates
70I-II, q. 91, a. 2, c.
71 For a multiplication of texts on these points, cf. Farrell, op. cit., p.
82 sq.
72 “Ordinatio rationis ad bonum commune ab eo qui curam habet com­
munitatis promulgata.” I-II, q. go, a. 1, c.
73 I-II, q. 91, a. 2, ad 3um.

/V A / W

I

On the Natural Law’s Existence and Essence

19

formally in the Eternal Law by taking part in the ruling of him­
self. St. Thomas brings the predominance of the proposition of
reason into clear light when he says, " the natural law is some­
thing constituted by reason, just as the proposition is a work of
reason.”74
However, the superiority of the proposition of reason does not
obviate the necessity of the natural inclinations and the light of
reason, for the proposition depends for its all-important right
ordaining of actions to the end on its conformity with the inclina­
tions. Though the correct aligning of the inclinations in relation
to the means depends on the practical intellect, “ the relation to the
natural inclination is the measure of truth in the practical
reason.”73
The light of reason, which has been called the second element,
is also important, for the inclination to the end could not be
recognized and regulated without it. Summing up this doctrine
on the essence of the natural law it can be said that the proposi­
tion of reason pertains to the essence in “ actu secundo,” or as
presupposing the other two elements, while the inclinations and
the light of reason pertain to the essence in “ actu primo,” or as
necessarily presupposed by the proposition of reason.70
THE PRINCIPLE “ DO GOOD ”

The importance of this principle for an understanding of the
precepts makes a thorough exposition of it necessary. Its roots
are found in the natural inclination of man to the human good
explained by St. Thomas in his distinction between the will con­
sidered solely as a principle of action, and the will considered in
its function as a rational appetite.
V

Every created nature is divinely ordained to the good,\
and seeks this good naturally. Hence, there is in the will ! y,
a natural appetite for the good congruent to itself: over:
and above this it has an appetite to seek things accord- ;
ing to its own determination and not of necessity. The !
I-II, q. 94, a· Tn VI Ethic, lect. 2 circa media.
10 Merkelbach, op. cit., p. 227.

n

20

The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

4

,

'

-

i
;

object of this second inclination is the good which is
sought by the will qua will. Moreover, the relation between the objects sought by the will qua nature and the
objects sought by the will qua will are the same as the
relation between nature and will. And therefore, just as
nature is the foundation of the will, so also the object
naturally sought by the will qua nature is the foundation
of the things sought by the will qua will. In the objects
of the appetite, moreover, the end is the foundation and
principle of those things which lead to the end, since
they are sought only in relation to the end. And therefore the object of the will qua nature is perfect
happiness ..."

This passage, attentively read, contains the explanation of the
/first moral principle. Its three basic ideas must be coordinated
to arrive at an understanding of the principle, i.e., (a) that every
created nature is ordained by God to the attainment of the good
congruent to its nature, and in man this ordination is toward the
! human good or perfect happiness, (b) that consequently, every
/ created thing has an appetite for its peculiar perfection, which
it seeks of necessity, but man, in addition to this necessary iniclination (in the will qua nature), has an appetite which he fol­
lows by his own determination (in the will qua will), (c) that just
’ as in all creation the specific nature is the foundation of its necesI sary appetite for the perfection of that nature, so in man the
object of the necessary inclination of the will qua nature to the
perfect human good is the foundation or principle of the objects
' sought by the will considered strictly as the rational appetite.
“ ■'^The relation of all created natures to their peculiar perfection
is an idea often repeated by St. Thomas. In the Commentary on
the Sentences he says : “ Every creature tends to its divinely es­
tablished goal according to the demands of the nature it has
received. And since, according to St. Augustine, everything pro­
ceeding from God is good, therefore every creature tends to the
good according to the exigencies of its peculiar nature.” 78 It
follows that the goodness of an object sought is to be judged

I

i

T

” Ver. 22, 5.
78 In 4, dist. 49, q. 1, a. 3, sol. »·

‘i

£

On the Natural Law’s Existence and Essence

21

according as it is connatural and proportionate to the sub­
ject.”
Moreover, this universal ordination of creatures to their own
perfection includes man. This is to say that man .by, nature is
ordained to the perfect hwwan good, just as other. creatures. are
"ordained to their own peculiar good.... This good, which con­
stitutes thé final goal of man, must be an unlimited good, corre­
sponding to the unlimited capacity of his intellect to conceive and
his will to desire such a good. In so far as this good is the neces­
sary object of the will qua nature, it remains, in the present life,
in the abstract (beatitudo in communi).
The second idea brought out by St. Thomas concerns the appe- ' ,
tites consequent upon the ordination of the various natures to j
their ends. His thought goes back to the rationality and plan of /
creation and presupposes an intelligent Creator. _If .the existence /
of a God_of wisdom js . posited, then . variety, of natures means :
diversity of purpose. ^Qw^if_çfëatureSL^^i£Î^OK-tdJibtaiïrj
their end, inclinations must be presenL.urging..thexn.taJict-toward
it, for if these inclinations..were not present the plan of..creation
would be doomed to frustration. The argument amounts to this :
either the appetites of creatures to the attainment of their various
goals are admitted or they are denied. If they are admitted the j
order of creation is capable of completion and fruition; if they )
are not admitted then order is not possible and with the denial !
of order the rationality of the universe is overturned. All créa- <
lures, therefore, have a natural or necessary appetite for the
perfection of their being and this includes man as well. In the
passage cited above, St. Thomas brings out that there is in man
a natural appetite for the human good. The connotation of this
term is made clear by his contrast between the will qua nature
and the will qua will. The will qua will, according to St. Thomas,
seeks things in line with its own determination and not of neces­
sity. The will qua nature, on the contrary, seeks its object
necessarily and it is in this sense that the word natural is to be
79 “ Unicuique bonum est quod est sibi connaturale et proportionatum."
I-Π, q. 27, a. I. “ Bonum in unoquoque consideratur secundum considera­
tionem suae naturae.” I-Π, q. 59, a. 5, a. 3.

22

The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

understood in the passage. This necessary inclination of the will
qua nature is not to be understood in the sense that the will must
always act; it may here and now refuse to do so (libertas exer­
citii). It only means that when it does act the will qua nature is
incapable of selecting imperfect happiness in preference to what
is presented as perfect happiness. , Succinctly, in scholastic ter­
minology, there is no libertas specificationis (velle hoc vel illud)
in this regard.80 After noting the appetite for completion that
man has in common with other creatures, St. Thomas treats of
man’s appetite considered in its specific nature—the .will qua will
which seeks its object freely, in distinction to The necessary or
natural inclination of the will qua naturtT The objects freely
/sought bythe"wiir‘qudTvill~af^tfie^ultimate end in the concrete
I and the means to the total human good in the abstract which conj stitutes the necessary object of the will qua nature. ^This is
i brought out by the principle of St. Thomas that just as every! where in creation the necessary appetite for perfection is based
l on the specific nature, sp in man the necessary inclination to the
total human good is the pnnçipïêjôEtfieZobîects sought by Æë~~will
considered strictly as a rational appetite.
--“^"Thi^^^SpleTs^anTmportant for insight into,_the„function of
^.-.the first moral principle._JThe goal of man, perfect happiness, is
established by_God ; nothing can change this. Because he has,an
end, man seeks the means to the end. As St. Thomas says, “ The
end is the foundation and principle of those things which lead to
the"'end.” However, the dependence of the will qua will on the
will qua nature is not the same as that of the will qua nature
upon nature itself, for, whereas the will qua nature is drawn
necessarily toward the goal established by nature, the selection
of the final goal in the concrete and of the means to the goal,
which are the objects of the will qua will, are left to man’s selfdetermination. Further, man in his present state can deliberately
80 The power of the will to refuse to act is easily understood if we keep
in mind the fact that the total good is not seen clearly in our present state
(we see now through a glass in a dark manner) and thus is presented to
the will in a limited manner. Under the influence of the “ lumen gloriae ”
there will be no "libertas exercitii.” Cf. Gredt. V. I, p. 481.

On the Natural Law’s Existence and Essence

23

choose a false goal of happiness and means that do not lead to
the trûê"goâr"of"his”nàtürë in the concrete. ~ The whole question
'oTthe moraToïdef' springs radically from man’s possession of
freedom ; if he were not free there could be no moral law. How-?
çyer, because Eerisfree'in the selection of the^concrete final end
aud of means to his happiness, the moral law becomes necessary. >
S The principle, “ do good,” enters here. It is the first principle i
of the moral order. It is not the mere expression of man’s I
necessary inclination to perfect happiness considered in the ab- |
stract. Though it is based on this inclination, in itself it has I
solely to do with the choosing of the particular end and the means,
for only concerning these is man free, and only where man is
free can there be a moral law. The principle, “ do good,” is
only another way of saying, “use the means that lead to your
end,” “ act for your true end.” As will be seen later, man neces­
sarily perceives the first moral principle, though he does not of
necessity follow it.·.— --- -------- ------------- -------- ---------—

' CHAPTER II
Of the Notion, Obligation, and Divisions of the Precepts
precepts

A discussion of the precepts of the natural law in all their de­
tail would entail the writing of a book treating of the ethical
field as a whole, and is beyond the point we are trying to make.
However, some general notions of the nature, scope, and mutual
relations of the precepts are a prerequisite to any conclusions re­
garding the possibilities of error and ignorance of the law.
These fundamental notions are therefore to be treated according
to Thomistic doctrine.
notion of the precepts

The natural law’s function in creation is the guidance of man
to natural perfection. This natural perfection is obtained by the
actuation of potencies—man can gain the purpose of life only by
living. Living, moreover, because of the intricate complexity of
man’s nature, implies an infinite variety of acts. If, therefore,
the law is to be a guide for life, then it must be a complex guide,
for life itself is complex. The various norms, some general, some
particular, ruling this diversity and reducing it to unity are called
precepts. The precepts of the law are the lights placed in the
labyrinth of life guiding human acts to the right paths and turns.
It is of the precepts’ nature to guide man to a correct realization
of his capacities, to inform him what must be done if he is to
arrive at his ultimate end. Through the precepts the general
proposition of the law which has to do with the means in general
is carried into actual practice. The precepts concern the means
used to obtain the total human good that is the object of the will
qua natural appetite.
Obviously, precept in the active sense, or in the one giving the
command, pertains both to the intellect and the will. In so far
24

Of the Notion, Obligation, and Divisions of the Precepts

25

as it is a transition from potency to act, it is of the will, as the
capacity for motion lies in that faculty. In so far as it implies
a particular sort of motion or an ordination of motion to a specific
object, it belongs to the intellect. That this act of the intellect is of
prime importance in the imposing of a precept, or with more pre­
cision, that a precept, in the active sense, is essentially an act of
the intellect, becomes more apparent when we consider the func­
tion of the command. By following the precepts of the natural
law man assumes his correct relations to everything else in the
realm of being; order is brought out of the apparent chaos of
many conflicting tendencies. The conflict between matter and
spirit inherent in the complexity of man’s nature,1 is resolved by
obedience to their mandates, and harmony in relation to his prime
purpose in life is obtained. When it is further considered that
this presupposes a perception of values and relations, it becomes
evident that the act of command belongs formally to the intellect.
Precepts are judgments concerning the relative values of means
to an end; the perception of relation and values is a function of
the intellect; therefore precept is of the intellect. However, since
a precept not only ordains, but does so actively, it presupposes an
act of the will in the one who imposes the precept.2
S
In the passive sense, which concerns us here, the precepts are
the propositions formed by the act of command. In the case of
the natural law the active command is an act of the divine in­
tellect; passively, it is the actual ordination as perceived by the
creature. It is well to note that St. Thomas uses the term ,
“precept” in two different senses. Now it is a generic term
one of whose species is the term “ law ” ;3 again it is used to de­
note those propositions by which particular inclinations are
brought into harmony by being directed to the common end.4
1 Apparently contrary statements in St. Thomas must be understood in
the light of his consideration in these passages of only two states of nature
—the natura integra and the natura corrupta.
s Π-ΙΙ, q. 47, a. 8, ad 3um. “ Ad tertium dicendum, quod movere absolute
pertinent ad voluntatem; sed praecipere importat motionem cum quadam
ordinatione; et ideo est actus rationis non autem voluntatis."
31-II, q. 98, a. 6, ad sum.
* I-II, q. 90, a. 2, ad lutn.

,1

26

The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

Here the latter meaning is taken, namely, that it implies an ap­
plication of the law to those things regulated by the law.
OBLIGATION OF THE PRECEPTS

s

*

t

A consequence of the very nature of the precept is its binding
or obligatory power. Physical science is built on the assumption
that certain effects constantly follow certain physical causes, and
the science of morals depends no less on the necessary connexion
between cause and effect. However, the clean-cut distinction be­
tween the objects of physical science and the science of morals
makes for diversity in the nature of their laws. Physical science
deals with substances intrinsically determined to one mode of
action; the material quality of.being with which it is concerned
precludes variation of action when the same causal conditions are
present. Thus its laws are invariable. But moral science has for
its object another sort of being;5 it treats of man as a free agent.
This freedom is rooted in the spirituality of a mind able to con­
ceive ideas independent of individual conditions. Because of this
universality of concepts the particular things presented to the will
are seen to be limited and capable of giving only an inadequate
satisfaction. The will, proportioned to the good in general, can
accept or reject them. Here the distinction between physical and
moral laws becomes apparent. Both are necessary in the sense
that they are inherent to the nature of the substance concerned,
but laws treating of man as a free agent (moral laws) constrain
him by no physical necessity.
We say a man “ ought ” to obey, not that a man “ must ” obey.
Why? Certainly not because the notion of necessity is entirely
eliminated. True, by reason of an intellectual nature he is lib­
erated from physical necessity, but he is not thereby free from
all necessity—there remains a moral necessity to obey, the
" ought.” This moral necessity flows from the necessity of per­
forming certain acts if he is to obtain the true perfection of his
being. Though man is free to disregard his proper ultimate end
and thus lose the very reason of his being, if he wills his true
perfection certain acts are incumbent upon him.
5 Supp. q. 65, a. 2, c.

fi

·■

ϋβ

Of the Notion, Obligation, and Divisions of the Precepts
In modern times the term “ ought ” has been surrounded with
the aura of mystery. It is the object of a moral “ sense ” more
esoteric than any scholastic faculty, by which we “ feel ” we
should do certain things and avoid others. Discussion and con­
troversy about the term “ ought ” are a large part of what is
called the moral problem. On the other hand, we find no such
preoccupation in St. Thomas. No explicit treatise on obligation
is to be found in his tract on law.6 The reason for the varying
attitudes is to be found in diverse fundamental conceptions of
law. When law is merely the expression of arbitrary custom
there are obvious difficulties in explaining obligation; it requires
ingenuity to prove a rule necessary, when previously defined as
arbitrary. ^Conceived, however, as an ordination of reason ex­
pressing necessary means to a necessary end, the natural law
. contains within itself the concept of obligation.7 It is then a
necessary or obliging norm of action. Hence there is no problem
of subjective obligation once the law has been promulgated—
the very perception of the law entails the perception of obliga­
tion. Our problem, therefore, reduces itself to the investigation
of the foundation of obligation.
Moral obligation, said above to be based on the relation of
certain acts to man’s perfection, becomes more evident through
analysis of the nature of this perfection. £?t. Augustine8*speaks
of the restlessness and discontent of man apart from the posses­
sion of God. This is only another way of saying that the will,
proportioned to the total good by reason of the spirituality of
the intellect, can never find complete satisfaction in particular
created things. Man cannot attain the fullness of his being, or
perfection, through limited things. St. Thomas brings out the
same idea in his treatise on perfect human happiness.® He examines created goods to see if any of them have, in themselves,
the power of satisfying the will in its pursuit of perfect happiness.
The power of riches is examined, then glory, honors, power,
I-Π, q. go to 109.
’“Virtutem obligandi . . . quod est proprium legis.” T-Π, q. 88, a. 4, c.
8 Confess. L. I, c. i.
~\8 I-Π, q. 2, in toto.

28

The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

health, pleasure, and the development of the powers of the soul.
Finally, he asks whether any created, or limited, good can satisfy'
man’s quest for happiness, and the analysis reveals that none of
these things is sufficient. There is a common reason for their
failure; all of them are particular, all leave something to be de­
sired by the spiritual power of a will capable of going beyond
them to desire the fullness of perfection.

Total good is the object of the human appetite or the
will, just as total truth is the object of the mind. It is
evident, therefore, that nothing will satisfy the will
unless it be the total good. And this is not to be found
in any created thing.10
Thus, from the spiritual nature of man, St. Thomas reasons to
the perfection to which man is essentially ordained by the Eter­
nal Law. This is the true end of man, the one to which he is
directed by his very nature.
Now, if man is ordained by nature to the total good he will
obtain it only by acts in accord with his nature. The whole order
of causality demands that specific natures have specific activi­
ties,11 and this specific activity has an essential relation to the
___ end. ^Man’s nature is rational and only through rational action
will he obtain his en<£\ Thus we are confronted with a double
necessity; the necessary end to which man is ordained by nature
and the necessary relation of certain acts to the attainment of
that end. This essential order is the proximate basis of moral
obligation.
The psychology of the human act throws further light on the
concept of obligation, when it is seen that only in virtue of acting
for the supreme good does man act at all. We touch here a deep
reality which distinguishes man from the animal. For it is
proper to man to act for a definite purpose, which is to say, he
acts for an end in the formal sense of the term. Other creatures,
indeed, have purposes in accord with their peculiar natures.. But
they do not achieve this purpose of themselves, they are moved
10 I-Π, q. 2, a. 8.
11 “Si enim agcns non esset determinatum ad aliquem effectum, non
magis ageret hoc quam illud.” I-Π, q. i, a. 2.

Of the Notion, Obligation, and Divisions of the Precepts

29

by another, they are acted upon, they have only a material per­
ception of their proper end. Man alone, because of the spiritual
nature of his knowledge, moves himself.12 In this order of in­
tention, the principle of finality reigns supreme ; the end and, in­
deed, the ultimate end is first in the order of intention, last in
the order of execution. All human action tends to an ultimate
end, for, without the willing of an ultimate end, intermediate
ends or means could not be the object of the will act. The very
definition of a means or of an intermediate end implies a relation
to something ulterior. If every object of the will were wished
only as a means or as an intermediate end, the process of volition
would never start, and consequently there would be no activity.
Again, we see the absolute necessity of the willing of an ultimate
end for human activity. The human person is free not to act ;
but when he does act, of necessity he must tend to an ultimate
end. This ultimate end must be the total good of the person as
proposed by the intellect.13 Hence, underlying every human
action is the desire for complete happiness. Everything willed is
ordained to'this ultimate end. From the analysis of St. Thomas
regarding the goods which might be considered by the intellect
as complete, we found that no created things fitted the definition.
Only in the possession of uncreated being, the essence of God,’
will satisfaction for the will and perfect happiness be found. But
here tragedy enters. Man does not always seek the true perfection of his being. He can seek the ultimate in things which, of/
theirMature, are particular,14 by deliberately turning aside from
the true ontological end of his nature.
With this understood, the function of the precept becomes
clear. We have seen above that the essence of the precept lies
12“Illa ergo quae rationem habet, seipsa movent ad finem, quia habent
dominium suorum actuum per liberum arbitrium, quod est facultas volunta­
tis et rationis; illa vero quae ratione carent, tendunt in finem propter na­
turalem inclinationem, quasi ab alio mota, non autem a seipsis, cum non
cognoscunt rationem finis." I-II, q. I, a. 2.
13 “ Omnes conveniunt in appetitu finis ultimi ; quia omnes appetunt suam
perfectionem adempleri, quae est ratio ultimi finis.” I-II, q. 2, a. 7.
14 “ Sed quantum ad id in quo ista ratio invenitur, non omnes homines
conveniunt in ultimo fine. Nam quidam appetunt divitias tamquam con­
summatum bonum.” I-II, q. 2, a. 7.

30

The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

in its ordination of acts to the end. Man must tend to an ultimate
end; the precepts prescribe that he take the necessary means to
his true ultimate end. The transcendental relation between the
acts ordered by the precepts and the ultimate end is the proximate
source of the natural law’s obligation.
This is not to say that the essential order of things is the
ultimate basis of moral obligation, for this essential order depends
in the ultimate analysis on the Eternal Law,15 but it is the proxi­
mate basis.
Though the basis of obligation is to be ultimately found in the
Eternal Law, it is not to be supposed that the perception of the
idea of obligation depends upon a knowledge of the Supreme
Being. St. Thomas holds that the basic precept “ do good ” is
self-evident to all men18 while God’s existence is not self-evident,
quoad nosP And since this self-evident precept implies obliga­
tion, it follows that the concept of obligation may be perceived
prior to, or even without, a knowledge of God’s existence. In
practice, all that is required for the notion of obligation is the
general and confused .knowledge of human nature and its end
together with its essential relations (though not necessarily all of
them)? Mor is knowledge of a perfect sanction or punishment
required ; everything necessary is contained in the perception that
an action leads to, or is useful for, attainment of the end of
human nature18 and that its contrary, being out of harmony
with such an end, leads to unhappiness. This view is hot at
variance with the doctrine of the Church as expressed in a con­
demnation by Pius IX,18 for, as will be seen later in more detail,
15 “ Ut breviter aeternae legis notionem quae impressa nobis est, quantum
valeo, verbis explicem, ea est, qua iustum est, ut omnia sint ordinatissima.”
St. Aug. De lib. arb., I, 6, 15.
18 I-Π, q. 94, a. 4, c.
11 C. Gen. L. i, c. ii.
18"In omnibus honestis, utilitas honestis conincidit.” Com. in II Sen.
d. 21, q. 1, a. 3.
18 “ Humana ratio, nullo prorsus Dei respectu habito, unicus est veri et
falsi, boni et mali arbiter, sibi ipsi est lex.” 3d prop, condemned by Pius
IX in the Syllabus Errorum; D. B. U., 1703.
“ Morum leges divina haud agent sanctione, minimeque opus est ut
humanae leges ad naturae jus conformentur, aut obligandi vim a Deo
accipiant." Prop. 56. Ibid., D. B. U., 1756.

Of the Notion, Obligation, and Divisions of the Precepts

31

though the natural law is a secondary and true .causa..P.f „moral
obligation, it is only a causeinyirtue ofJheJEternal^Law. It has
the~same relation of dependence on the Eternal Law as all sec­
ondary causes have upon their first cause.
DIVISION OF PRECEPTS

We have spoken above of the obligation or moral necessity
contained in the natural law, using the term law in the singular.
On the other hand, the phrase laws of our nature is often recur­
rent in writings on the subject. The singular and plural are
seemingly used interchangeably. Is this due to a lack of precision
in terminology, or has the diversified usage a basis in fact? Is
unity to be exclusively predicated of the law, or are the terms
unity and multiplicity to be used in a comprehensive predication ?
In one of the most beautiful, though most difficult, articles of
the Summa20 St. Thomas subjects this problem to analysis and
concludes that the natural law is both one and multiple; one in 1
the unity of its first principle from which all precepts flow, mul- j
tiple in the plurality of its precepts that, in turn, participate of j
the unity of the first principle. St. Thomas finds the basis for
his proof in the analogy between the precepts of the moral law
and the deductions made in the realm of speculative thought.
Both speculative deductions and precepts depend for their validity
and objectivity on their relation to self-evident first principles.
The mind directly arrives at the truth of first principles with­
out the intermediation of other judgments. The first principle of
the speculative intellect is the principle of contradiction which is
based on the most simple concept possible—that of being. In
the practical intellect the concept of good is the first thing per­
ceived, and the principle based on this notion is first in the whole
field of practical action.21
20Grabmann, Martin, “Das Naturrecht der Scholastik1 von Gratian bis
Thomas von Aquin,” in Archia für Rechts und Wirishaftsphil., Band i6,
Rotschild (Berlin, p. 50).
21 " Sicut autem ens est primum quod cadit in apprehensione simpliciter,
ita bonum est primum quod cadit in apprehensione praeficae rationis, quae
ordinatur ad opus . . . primum principium in ratione practica est . . .
bonum faciendum . . . hoc est ergo primum praeceptum legis.” I-II, q.
94, a. 2, c.

fi

f
F-f , ;

32

The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

That this proposition must be first in action is clear from the
nature of action. Rational action is always purposeful; to act
rationally means to act for an end.22 Now, an end is only the
last in a series of related goods. Consequently, the principle
“do good” is only the expression of the nature of rational
action, i.e., to act for an end conformable to human nature or
the rational goodj If an action is to remain rational in the full
sense of the term it must tend toward the rational good. This
tendency to the rational good is common to all moral action and
therein the natural law finds its unity.
The microcosmic quality of man’s nature, virtually including
within itself the natures of all creatures below it in the scale of
being,23 and consequently all their inclination to particular goods,
is the reason for the multiplicity of the precepts. Because of his
multiple nature, man can attain to his ultimate perfection only
by the use of various means or particular goods, but this cannot
be a helter-skelter, aimless seeking. The precepts which rule
these inclinations all participate in the first principle, inasmuch
as the general object of all, the rational good, is contained
therein.24 This may be illustrated by reducing a more particular
precept to the first principle. If the question is asked whether
it is permissible secretly to appropriate to oneself the lawful pos' sessions of another, the answer will be in the negative, for the ac­
tion described is theft and theft is forbidden by the natural law.
But the response may be more deeply probed—why is theft for­
bidden? To which the reply will be given that theft is incompatible
33 I-Π, q. i, a. 2.
33 De Ver., l6, I.
24 “ Contingit autem ad unum finem multa esse necessaria, vel expedientia.
Et secundum hoc possunt de diversis rebus dari diversa praecepta inquantum ordinantur ad unum finem. Unde dicendum est quod omnia praecepta
legis veteris sunt unum secundum ordinem ad unum finem, sunt tamen
multa secundum diversitatem eorum quae ordinantur ad illum finem." I-II,
q. 99, a. I, c. Though St. Thomas speaks expressly of the Old Law, never­
theless it is to the point, as he considers the moral precepts of the Old Law
as proximate conclusions from the first principles of the natural law. Cf.
I-Π, q. too, a. 3, c.

Of the Notion, Obligation, and Divisions of the Precepts

33

with that mutual recognition and maintenance of rights and duties
which is essential to the social life of man. jKmd why must man
live a social life? The social life is the result of a natural in­
clination which flows from man’s nature as a rational animal, is
therefore a good and therefore to be donej Thus must we come,
ultimately, in every human action to the foundation stone which
supports the whole edifice-—the first principle of the moral law—
“do good, avoid evil.” This principle is founded on no other
principle; it is first and gives unity to all others. Metaphysical
bases for this principle may be given, but an appeal to another
and more ultimate moral principle is impossible.25*
27
The natural law is both one and multiple. The diversity of
order in its multiplicity is now to be examined. St. Thomas per­
ceived this manifold order, and used it again and again. He
speaks now of primary precepts in the order of promulgation or
knowledge, and of proximate and remote deductions from them.28
Again he treats of precepts necessary by their ontological and
real connexion with the ultimate end of man, and of those
necessary only in a secondary sense, in so far as they are objects
of natural inclinations but confer only to the end in the sense of
making it more easily obtainable.22 Further, he speaks of pre­
cepts graded according. to the natural inclinations. There will
be a threefold division here according to the three inclinations
arising from nature, animality and rationality.28
y
Different orders of precepts arise from these various aspects.
However, every precept is essentially an ordination of reason,
regulating man’s desire for some particular good, and all are
unified by their relation to the first principle by which they are
directed to the Summum Bonum. To be considered in detail are
(a) the division according to their ontological connexion with the
ultimate end, and (b) the division according to the order of
promulgation or knowledge.
25Cathrcin, Victor. Moralphitosophie, Freiburg, Herder: 1893.
1. P. 334“ I-Π, q. 94, a· 3, «·
,
27 Supp. q. 65, a. I, c.
2S Ci. p. 13.

Band

34

The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance
(a)

ONTOLOGICAL DIVISION OF PRECEPTS

Obviously, there are various degrees of value in human acts;
insulting remarks about pet dogs are not taken as seriously as
barbs directed at their owners. Moreover, should the object of
contumely be, not a mere man, but God Himself, a different
evaluation altogether must be employed. We measure the value
of acts according to the importance of the end to which they are
directed and according to the manner in which they conduce to
that end. The rude strokes of a pen guided by a childish hand
in a laborious letter to teacher have not the artistic value of
Shakespeare’s writing in the composition of Hamlet, though the
subjective effort may be greater. The sportsman who uses more
energy in rowing his boat to a distant part of the lake than the
ditchdigger taking his time between lunges is nevertheless per­
forming a less important function. Recreation is less important
than the life’s work to which it is only a means. It is the same
with actions considered in relation to the Summum Bonum or
ultimate end of human life. Those actions which have God for
their immediate object are the most important, and consequently
the precepts of the natural law guiding these actions, by reason
of their direct connexion with the ultimate end, are first in the
hierarchy of precepts. Man, however, encompassed by the ma­
terial conditions of his present existence, though capable of
directing acts to God, can never in this life arrive at the direct
vision of the Divine Essence. It is in the nature of man that
he realize the potentialities within himself by contact with matter ;
he must deal with creatures. If he were able to arrive at his
ultimate end without this contact, then means themselves would
have no meaning.28
Thus, if man, of necessity, can arrive at his ultimate perfection
only through relations with creatures, these relations take on new
meaning, and the precepts guiding these actions necessarily are
to be observed. They contain a necessary, though mediate, re­
lation to perfect happiness. An examination of the various acts
of love of which man is capable will bring out this point.30 The*
2aRousselot, Pierre, The Intellectualism of St. Thomas, London: Sheed
and Ward, 1931, p. 212.
Mcrkclbach, of. cit., p. 234, v. 1.

Of the Notion, Obligation, and Divisions of the Precepts

highest act of love proper to man is obviously the love of God,
for God is Goodness, while all other beings have goodness in
varying degrees of participation in the Perfect Good. But, as
previously seen, man, because of his dual animal-spiritual nature,
must arrive at the Summum Bonum by using creatures. Even
the love of God is impossible without the necessary predisposi­
tion of love of self. This love of self is also the measure of love
directed to our fellow man.31 Man can understand love only
from his own irrepressible striving after.the. realization...of-.self,
and this tendency “ ad bonum nostrum ” is virtually present even
in the highest flights of benevolent love of God. Similarly, this
love of self is reflected in man’s love of his fellow man, for only
through the love of neighbor is society possible, and man’s attain­
ment of perfection apart from society is impossible. Thus the
precepts guiding love of self and love of neighbor are necessary
in relation to the Summum Bonum, though only mediately neces­
sary. In a word, those precepts are said to be primarily intended
which command all those things that are necessary in order that
men may attain their true ultimate end, whether those things are
immediately concerned with God, or are immediately concerned
with creatures and only mediately with God.
Those precepts are said to be secondarily intended which pre-4/
scribe those things that, while not strictly necessary for the re­
quired direction of men to their ultimate end, render the attain- ,
ment of the end better and easier, or are directed to the secondary
end of a creature. Thus, the primary end of wedlock is un­
doubtedly the begetting and education of children, and this very
conceivably could be obtained by the simultaneous contracts of
one man with a plurality of women; but for the successful and
harmonious attainment of the primary end, that, peace which is
a condition for the “bene esse” of men associated in common
enterprise would be required. And this is not conceivable or at
least is rendered very difficult in the case of a plurality of wives.32
31 Aertnys-Damen, Theologia Moralis, Turin : Marietti, 1932, V. I, p. 240.
82“Non facile potest esse pax in familia, ubi uni viro plures uxores
junguntur; cum non possit unus vir sufficere ad satisfaciendum pluribus
uxoribus ad votum, et uno officio causât litem ; sicut figuli corrixantur ad
invicem et similiter plures uxores unius viri." Supp. q. 65, a. 1.

36

The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

Thus, in the case of matrimony a primary and a secondary pre­
cept is seen. The former is bound up with the very purpose of
matrimony, for without it the natural tendency to the bonum
animale could not be realized; the precept dealing with it con­
cerns the primary end of the marital state. Secondarily, the unity
of marriage, or monogamy to the exclusion of a plurality ol
wives, is prescribed. It has to do with a means conducive to the
better and easier attainment of the primary end, and nature in­
clines us to its observance. Though both are precepts it is evi­
dent that their binding force is not on an equal plane; the one
binds of necessity, the other by reason of the “ bene esse.”
The division of the precepts which guide human actions ac­
cording to their real relationship to the end may also be con­
sidered from a negative point of view by specifying the manner
of opposition possible to their ordinances. According to St.
Thomas this opposition may be twofold :
V .

Everything which renders an action incompatible with
the end to which it is naturally ordained is said to be
contrary to the law of nature. An action may be incom­
patible with either the primary end or secondary end
and to both in two ways; first it can altogether impede
the attainment of the end, secondly it may render the
motion toward the end either difficult or less in har­
mony with it.33

This opposition to the ontological division of the precepts re­
sults in a series of negative prescriptions. Speech is the human
action intended by nature to bridge the aloofness which holds the
mystery of the human person and to make possible the life in
society which is necessary for man’s development. A lie, by its
very nature, frustrates the natural purpose of speech as pri­
marily intended by nature, and consequently is forbidden by the
primary negative precept “do not lie.” Similarly, polyandry is
forbidden because it is contrary to the primary end of marriage,
whereas polygyny is opposed only to the secondary end, and is
therefore forbidden by a secondary precept. The question of
MSupp. q. 65, a. I.

Of the Notion, Obligation, and Divisions of the Precepts

37

opposition to the secondary ends of actions will be treated below
when we inquire into the possibility of defections from the
natural law. The possibility of defection may be on one of two
counts; either the law itself does not hold, or the subject is
ignorant of the law.34 Ignorance presupposes possible knowledge.
This brings out the need for a consideration of the precepts ac­
cording to their cognoscibility.

(2)

DIVISION OF PRECEPTS ACCORDING TO THEIR
LOGICAL CONNEXION

Since a precept must be known in order to guide human action
to the proper end,35 it will be seen that this division of the pre­
cepts is of the highest importance. The practical reason in man,
not less than the speculative, is discursive; it draws conclusions
from general principles which are, so to speak, their causes. As
principles are better known than conclusions, it becomes evident
that some precepts of the natural moral law will be better known
than others. There will be a hierarchy of order according to
their cognoscibility.
Now just as in the speculative order there are self-evident
principles, so also there will be self-evident principles or precepts
in the practical order. Here it is well to remember that St.
Thomas distinguishes two sorts of self-evident propositions ; those
which are self-evident considered in themselves, and those which
are self-evident in relation to the subject knowing.36
A self-evident proposition for St. Thomas is one whose pred­
icate is contained within the subject in such a way that one know­
ing the subject will necessarily know the predicate; this copula­
tion of the two terms of the proposition must be made, for the
predicate is of the subject’s essence. From this it does not fol­
low that every proposition that is, of itself, self-evident is also
self-evident in relation to intellects capable of knowing it. If
the nature of the subject is not adequately known there can
»* I-II, q. 94» a. 4, c.
« I-II, q. 89, a. 4. C.
seI-II, q. 94, a. 2, α “Dicitur autem aliquid per se notum dupliciter:
- uno modo secundum se, alio modo quoad nos.”

38

The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

be no knowledge of the relation between subject and predicate.”
However, some propositions are self-evident not only from their
nature but to all men as well because the subject of the proposi­
tion is known to all. In the speculative reason such propositions
as the whole is greater than its parts and the same thing cannot be
affirmed and denied simultaneously and in the same respect, are
examples of propositiones per se notae quoad se et quoad nos.
For the determination of a hierarchy or precepts in the natural
law according to their cognoscibility, attention will be directed in
the first instance to those propositions or precepts that are selfevident et quoad se et quoad nos; for they will be first in the order
of knowledge.
As this question is psychological, we shall have to draw criteria
from the principles of psychology in order to determine the logi­
cal relation of these principles. The speculative reason and the
practical reason are not two distinct faculties but different func­
tions of one and the same power. The speculative intellect con­
siders being in itself, apart from any relation to action or utility.
The practical intellect, on the other hand, considers being as it
has a relation to action, or being as the object of the appetitive
faculty, for action is always toward the good. Consequently,
though this distinction of relation exists between them, the same
psychological rules will apply both to the speculative and to the
practical intellect.’
One psychological criterion which should be of great assistance
in determining the logical hierarchy of precepts springs from the
nature of the intellect itself: "in the intellect knowledge of the
more common is prior to the knowledge of the less common.” 88
The Thomistic proof for this principle may be indicated by stating
that the intellect is a faculty proceeding from potency to act,
which, following the nature of all faculties, arrives at complete
actualization through partial actualization, or through " incomaT “ Homo est animal rationale, est per se nota secundum sui naturam ;
quia qui dicit hominem dicit rationale, et tamen ignoranti quid sit homo
haec propositio non est per se nota.” I-Π, q. 94, a. 2, c.
ss I, q. 85, a. 3, c. “ Secundum intellectum cognitio magis communis est
prior quam cognitio minus communis.”

Of the Notion, Obligation, and Divisions of the Precepts

39

plete acts.” This complete actualization to which the intellect
is ordained is knowledge of reality as it is in itself. The more
completely the individual notes of a thing come within the range
of the intellect the more completely it fulfils its function ; it does
this perfectly when it arrives at a clear and distinct knowledge
of its object. The stages of partial realization of the intellect
tending toward this distant knowledge will be marked by a proc­
ess from the more general and more vague to the more particu­
lar and more distinct. In other words, the more universal is the
first object of our intellect. As an example, St. Thomas cites the
fact that the concept of animal as animal is more universal and
less distinct than the concept of animal in so far as it is rational or
irrational. When he says the concept of animal presents itself to
our intellect prior to the concept of man who is a rational animal,
it is to illustrate the general principle that our knowledge pro­
ceeds from the more universal to the less universal, from the
obscure to the distinct.38
Another criterion which should be of aid is the influence of
natural inclinations on our reason, coupled with the principle
that our intellectual knowledge is derived from the senses. The
influence of sense perception will become apparent in the forma­
tion of those principles which have to do with the sensible order,
while facility in the acceptance of . a precept guiding an in­
clination will be in proportion to the strength of the inclination.
The more strongly a man is inclined to a certain good, the more
vehemently is the desire of the good liable to influence his in­
tellect, which will be inclined to judge the attainment of the good
as lawful with a minimum of reflection.
Moreover, the inclination will be stronger in proportion as it is
further removed from the conscious activity of man, or the less
dependence it has on conscious reflection and consequently upon
free will. Since this conscious activity flows immediately from
58 “ Cognoscere animal indistincte est cognoscere animal inquantum est
animal. Cognoscere autem animal distincte est cognoscere animal inquan­
tum est animal rationale vel irrationale ; quod est cognoscere hominem, vel
leonem. Prius igitur occurrit intellectui nostro cognoscere animal quam
cognoscere hominem.” I, q. 85, a. 3, c.

40

The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

man’s soul, these inclinations will be stronger in those regions
farthest removed from the conscious life.40
If we take these psychological criteria into consideration we are
now in a position to arrive at some knowledge concerning the
logical hierarchy of the precepts. As a conclusion from the first
criterion, i.e., that the intellect knows the more universal before
it knows the less universal, it becomes evident that the practical
intellect will be apt to know precepts which deal with human
action in general before it becomes aware of those norms which
guide particular actions, and the deeper we descend into the
realm of particular action surrounded by various circumstances,
the more difficulty is encountered by the intellect in determining
the correct norm to follow.4142
A consequence of the second criterion, which has to do with
the influence of the natural inclinations on the intellect, will be
that inclinations related to a good to which the will is directed of
necessity will more easily give rise to the recognition of precepts
than inclinations to particular goods to which the will is indif­
ferent. It is paradoxical that the intellect will more easily assent
to precepts guiding to the attainment of those goods which are
farthest removed from conscious life as such, while the easiest
assent of all will be to that precept which guides us to the good
which is possible only because of the nature of intellectual ap­
prehension. The reason lies in the strength of the inclination.
As we have seen previously, man must seek the total human good,
or perfect happiness; this is man’s strongest inclination, and a
precept finding its wellspring therein will most easily find ac­
ceptance in the intellect. Moreover, the inclinations to particular
goods, even though so strong that, so to speak, we must do
violence to ourselves not to seek them,41 do not physically deter­
mine us to seek their objects. These inclinations, because they
have a relation to the particular, can be overcome.
Applying now these criteria to the precepts of the natural law
40 Cf. Kuhlman, Dr. B. C., Der Gesetsbegriff beim Hl. Thomas von
Again, Bonn : Verlag Peter Hanstein, 1912, p. 148.
« We see here the necessity for positive law, and the congruity of divine
revelation embracing precepts and truths in themselves natural.
42 De Per. 22, I,

Μ
i
!Λ ΰ

Of the Notion, Obligation, and Divisions of the Precepts

41

we are able to see that the proposition of reason, included within
the essence of the law itself, “ Good must be done ; evil must be
avoided ”48 is the first principle to which the mind assents in the
order of action. All precepts are derived from this first principle ;
it is first in both the ontological43
44 and the logical orders. We
have seen above that this principle is self-evident45*in the sense
that the predicate is contained within the notion of the subject.
That it is self-evident “ quoad nos ” as well becomes evident when
we apply the psychological criteria. For the concept of the good
in general is the most universal notion possible in relation to the
order of action. As the intellect grasps the more universal more
easily than the less ' universal, it will apprehend the self-evident
proposition contained in the nature of “ the good,” easiest of all,
for it is the most universal of all. In view, therefore, of the uni­
versality of the proposition of reason and the strength of the
inclination upon which it is based we conclude that “ Good must
be done; evil must be avoided ” is the first principle of the prac­
tical reason in the logical order.48
As St. Thomas says, all other precepts of the natural moral
law flow from this principle as from their source, for all others
are particularizations deriving from this most universal of prin­
ciples; they qualify the good to be sought. If we seek to de­
scend further in the hierarchy of precepts of this division, we
must further determine the good as apprehended by the intellect.
From the psychological criteria we know that the precepts next
in the order of knowledge will be less universal than the first
principle and will be norms guiding man’s natural inclinations.
Man, despite the unity of his being, is of a complex nature.
He has something in common with everything in existence, with
unorganic matter, plants, and animals. But as a rational creature,
he is at the same time distinct from all these. Now each distinct
43 Cf. above p. 19.
44 “ Ontological ” is here taken to mean the transcendental relation of an
action to an end.
45 Cf. p. 32.
48“Hoc est ergo primum praeceptum legis, quod bonum est faciendum f
et prosequendum, et malum vitandum: et super hoc fundantur omnia alia I
praecepta legis naturae.” I-II, q. 94, a. 2, c.

* s.

42

ί

The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

class of being has an inclination to the good which is in con­
formity with its nature. We find similar inclinations of all these
types in man by reason of his complexity.
Common to each existing thing is an inclination to the con­
servation of its being, which places it in opposition to all that
which tends to take it out of existence. This inclination belongs
also to man in so far as he partakes, virtually, of the nature of
all existing things considered merely as beings. As a being ca­
pable of sensation man is considered in a more restricted sense.
The good to which he is inclined according to his participation in
this realm of being will be more restricted, “ and according to
these inclinations those things are of the natural law which
nature teaches all animals, as the commingling of man and
woman, the bringing up of offspring, etc.” 47 Beyond these in­
clinations man has the faculty of reason with its corresponding
appetite, which also tend to their own realization. The per­
fection of man as man is dependent on their actualization. Pre­
cisely in order to reach the goal of his higher intellectual nature
he possesses, among other inclinations, the natural inclination to
live in society. Thereby, with the help of others, he may acquire
the perfection to which he, as an individual, may aspire, but can­
not reach.48
Under the influence of this threefold category of inclinations
which man possesses by reason of his complex nature, the reason
will deduce a series of precepts which, though less universal and
therefore less easily known than the first principle, are neverthe­
less self-evident to all and therefore constitute with it the first
class of precepts. They guide man in a general way but need
to be particularized for particular actions. We have therefore:

a. According to the inclinations of man in common with
all other beings—the precept of conservation of
being ;
47 I-II, q. 94, a. 2, c.
48 "Tertio modo in est homini inclinatio ad bonum secundum naturam
rationis, quae est sibi propria, sicut homo habet naturalem inclinationem
ad hoc quod veritatem cognoscat de Deo, et ad hoc quod in societate vivat;
et secundum hoc ad legem naturalem pertinent ea quae ad hujusmodi in­
clinationem spectat.” I-II, q. 94, a. 2, c.

Of the Notion, Obligation, and Divisions of the Precepts

43

b. According to the inclinations he has in common with
animal life—the general precepts guiding him to the
conservation of the species, e.g., the obligation of
parents to care for their offspring.
c. According to the inclinations proper to himself—the
general precepts guiding his life in society and his
rational nature in general, e.g., act according to your
rational nature, do unto others as you would have
them do unto you, give everyone his due.
Descending from this classification of self-evident general prin­
ciples to the more particular we find a second group of precepts49
which are easy deductions from the first class, and which have
to do with determined actions or means to the realization of the
general goods proposed to man’s reason by the various inclina­
tions. St. Thomas places the precepts of the decalogue in this
group,50 expressly omitting the circumstance of time in the third
precept. In the consideration of this group St. Thomas gives a
further, and striking, exposition of the natural law when he says
that all the precepts of the natural law are contained in the
decalogue, but in different ways. Explicitly, of course, only the
precepts belonging to the second group are included, but im­
plicitly there are to be found both the first precepts, and further
deductions from the second group. The first precepts are to be
found in the decalogue as principles are contained in conclusions
drawn from them, while the remote precepts are contained in
the decalogue as conclusions in principles.51
49 It is evident from the psychological criteria that not all the precepts
of the first group are recognized with the same ease. The precept for the
conservation of being, for example, will be recognized with more facility
than the precepts governing man in society, for these latter depend on the
perception of a relation to other rational beings, while the former does
not Nor will all the precepts of a group be recognized at the same time.
Education and environment play a part here.
60“Illa ergo praecepta ad decalogum pertinent, quorum notitiam homo
habet per seipsum a Deo. Hujusmodi vero sunt illa quae statim ex prin­
cipiis communibus primis cognosci possunt modica consideratione." I-II,
q. too, a. 3, c.
51 I-II, q. ico, a. 3, c.
In the precepts of the decalogue we find that three of them concern
man’s relation to God. We find that most authors place one general pre-

44

The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

Further deductions from the principles of the natural law fall
into a third class which may be called remote conclusions. Treat­
ing of actions in concrete circumstances, they are less universal
than the precepts of the Decalogue and are, consequently, known
with more difficulty. St. Thomas says these precepts are not
evident to the ordinary man who will depend on the judgment of
wiser persons and on positive legislation for the correct norm of
action.52 Examples of precepts contained in the third group
would be : the deordination of revenge when assumed by a private
person; the prohibition of a lie in all circumstances so that no
utility can justify it.
Having investigated the existence and nature of the natural
moral law, together with the nature and divisions of its precepts,
we see that it is not an arbitrary, exterior prescription dictating
the mode of human conduct, but a guide springing from man’s
rational nature and conformable to it. Since the law is “ aliquid
rationis,” the success of man’s activity depends on his ability to
subordinate the material to the spiritual, or as St. Thomas says,
“ the good of man is to live according to reason.”55 In the state
cept governing man’s relation to God in the first body, i.e., among those
which are self-evident to all. Cf. Cathrein, op. cit., p. 338, Merkelbach,
op. cit., p. 233, and other manuals of moral philosophy and theology. *
Strictly speaking, from the viewpoint of the natural moral law which can
be known by the individual man’s unaided reason, a general precept guid­
ing man’s relation to God, though self-evident (predicate contained within
the notion of the subject), would not be self-evident for all. For this
precept depends on a knowledge of the existence of God to which reason
can arrive from sensible data, only after a reasoning process. However,
the natural inclination of man to live in society, and the fact that our
society is de facto largely impregnated with Christian thought, coupled
with the fact that children in our present civilization arrive at a knowl­
edge of God the Creator at a surprisingly early age, would seem to war­
rant the inclusion of some such precept in the very first group. For
experimental data on this knowledge of children, cf. “The Moral and
Religious Development of the Preschool Child,” by Sister Mary, Ph.D.,
and Margaret Mary Hughes, A.B., in Studies in Psychology and Psychi­
atry, Vol. IV, η. I. April, 1936, p. 46.
511-II, q. too, a. I & 3. c.
83 I-Π, q. 94, a. 2, c.; II-II, q. 123, a. 12 (the gradation of virtues ac­
cording to their relation to reason).

Of the Notion, Obligation, and Divisions of the Precepts

45

of integral nature, characterized by the perfect subordination of
man’s lower nature to reason as informed by faith,54 all of man’s
actions were pervaded by right reason, but the loss of these super­
natural gifts through original sin has brought him face to face
with the possibility of ignorance and error in human conduct.55
Our problem is the investigation of these mental states in their
relations to that norm of morality which is the natural law. Since
error is not the normal fruit of the mind, but necessarily has the
character of a defective by-product,5657
and ignorance is a state in
which the mind has no relation of being to its object,5’ an under­
standing of such abnormalities presupposes a preliminary grasp
of the normal function of the mind in human action. Conse­
quently, before proceeding to the evaluation and possibility of
ignorance in relation to the natural moral law, the following
chapter develops (a) the function of intelligence in human action
and (b) the states of ignorance and error in general.
54 The four immunities—from concupiscence, ignorance, pain arid death
—were consequences of the original elevation of man to the supernatural
order; their existence in our first parents is a certain doctrine of the
Church. Cf. St. Th. L, q. 94.
55 It is commonly held today that man, in the state of fallen nature, has
the same powers, at least intrinsically, as he would have had in a hypo­
thetical state of pure nature. Cf. Tanquery, Synopsis Theologiae Dog­
maticae, v. Π, p. 569, for the theological opinions.
50Cf. De Ver. 18, 6, where St. Thomas compares error to “monstrous”
births in nature.
57 It is well to state preliminarily that ignorance and error are distinct
states, though moralists and St. Thomas sometimes use them indiscrimi­
nately. “. . . sed intemperatus habet ignorantiam circa ipsum finem, in
quantum scilicet judicat hoc esse bonum, ut irrefrenate concupiscentias
sequatur.” II-II, q. 156, a. 2 ad tum.

I? l
ft. ?
1 ·■'

CHAPTER III
Of the Functon of the Intellect in Human Action
(a)

THE FUNCTION OF THE INTELLECT IN HUMAN ACTION

HÉ****-»**

Though man’s ultimate perfection in the present supernatural
order consists in an-act of the intellect1 by which he sees God
“ face to face ” and the basis of his perfection will be the greater
or less clarity of the beatific vision, in his present state intellectual
insight into the natures of things ceases to be the criterion of
value. There is no intuitive possession of the final end here on
earth; only by the progressive realization of potentialities will
that end be attained. Consequently, perfection is judged accord­
ing to the capacity for action. A man is said to be good accord­
ing to the disposition of his will. The value of the idea, then,
will be judged according to its influence over the will, or, ac­
cording to the extent it is a force in human action. Such phrases
as “the primacy of the intellectual,” “the will follows knowl­
edge” which recur frequently among Thomists and are used by
St. Thomas himself2 might lead us to suspect that his doctrine
falls into a kind of psychological determinism. Closer examina­
tion of the theory, however, reveals that he neither abandons free­
dom nor does he take from the idea its force for action. When
St. Thomas speaks of the will act as the effect of knowledge3 he
understands it in the sense of a final causality which by no means
forces the will to action. “ The good perceived moves the will
in the same way as a man who counsels or persuades, that is to
A

1 " Consequimur autem ipsum (finem) per hoc quod fit praesens nobis
per actum intellectus.” I-II, q. 3, a. 4, c.
2“Proximum autem motivum voluntatis est bonum intellectum, quod
est suum obiectum, et movetur ab ipso sicut visus a colore." Contra
Gentes, ΙΠ, 88.
3 In Rom. 7, 3.

46

i

ΜβΜΙΙΜ·ΐ

Of the Function of the Intellect in Human Action

47

say, by pointing out the goodness of an object.” * Though no
action, good or bad, takes place without the precursory intellectual
judgment, the will is always the efficient cause while the judgment
has the nature of a quasi-material or dispositive cause.456 This
reciprocal causality by which the intellect proposes various goods
to the will as capable of attainment, and the will freely chooses
between· the goods proposed, while retaining within itself the
power to direct the intellect to the consideration of particular
goods, helps us to understand the statement of St. Thomas that
“the judgment which decides that a certain action is to be placed
can never be out of harmony with appetite,”5 and “ evil desire
is always linked up with some error of practical knowledge.”7
To understand the function of the intellect in action it is im­
portant to observe that there are two kinds of knowledge, the
universal and the particular. According to St. Thomas, uni­
versal knowledge is of much less importance for moral life.8 It
has no value whatever unless particularized for the action itself,
which, as concerned with concrete things, is always the result of
a particular judgment acting as the dispositive cause.®
Thus the closer we come to action or moral life itself, the more
important the practical judgment becomes. Further, it may be
said that the efficaciousness of the practical judgment depends
upon the influence it wields over the entire organism. Thus a
man may perform one virtuous act by acting under the influence
of a universal principle, but he is not a virtuous man unless the
4 De Mat. 3, 3.
5 De Ver. 28, 7.
6 De Ver., 24, 1.
7 De Mol. 16, 6, ri.
® In II Eth. I. 4·
® People who seem to think the demands of moral life are satisfied by
the apprehension of a series of universal principles, are described by Aris­
totle who says “ they take refuge in theory and think they are being
philosophers and will become good in this way, behaving somewhat like
patients who listen attentively to their doctors, but do none of the things
they are ordered to do. As the latter will not be made well in body by
such a course of treatment, the former will not be made well in soul by
such a course in philosophy.” II Ethics, 1. 5.

48

The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

act proceeds from prudence which presupposes certain disposi­
tions even on the part of the body.10
However, if the practical judgment is powerful in the cause
of virtue, it is no less powerful in inducement to sin. Because
it is concerned with the particular it is so closely allied to sense
knowledge that, in the case of the intemperate man, ignorance
of his whole purpose in life can ensue.11 In such cases the
triumph of the practical judgment over the abstract principles
of synderesis is almost complete.12 This sketch of the function
of the intellect in moral action, which will be of aid in the con­
sideration of our main problem, leads us to the investigation of
the intellect in relation to morals, when it is not informed by
knowledge.
THE INFLUENCE OF IGNORANCE ON THE MORAL ACT

The notion of the causal part which the intellect plays in the
human act implies, as a correlative, the idea that ignorance, de­
fined by St. Thomas as “ a privation of knowledge in a sub­
ject capable of knowing,’’13 can have a decided influence on
morality.
Ignorance may be considered according to different aspects of
its effects on morality; it may be the cause (causa per accidens)
of sin, it may be an excuse from guilt, or again it may increase
guilt, and finally it may be a sin in itself. These various ways
in which ignorance affects morality depend on its relation to the
subject and to the act itself. Catholic theology through the
course of centuries has codified the divisions of ignorance. This
traditional usage is followed.
The lack of knowledge a subject could acquire if he used
10“Ad prudentiam requiritur moralis virtus, per quam fit appetitus
rectus.” I-II, q. 5, a. 4; “ex necessitate habet secum adiunctas virtutes
morales tamquam salvantes sua principia.” In II Eth. 1. 4; “quod autem
habeat rectam intentionem finis circa passiones animae, hoc contingit ex
bona dispositione irascibilia et concupiscibilis.” I-II, 9.56, a. 4 ad 4.
11II-II, q. 156, a. 3, ad lum.
13 Rousselot, Pierre, The Intellectualism of St. Thomas, London : Sheed
& Ward, 1935, p. 212.
13 I-II, q. 76, a. 2, c.

Of the Function of the Intellect in Human Action

49

moral diligence, but actually does not possess because of a failure
to use such diligence, is called vincible ignorance.14 When, on
the other hand, the lack of knowledge which would prevent an
action still persists after such diligence has been used, the subject
is said to be in a state of invincible ignorance. This is also the
case when the possibility of error, or the obligation of inquiring
further, has not occurred to the subject.15
From the standpoint of the relation between the will of the
subject and the act which he performs, ignorance may be ante­
cedent, concomitant, or consequent. Antecedent ignorance is the
cause of the act in such a way, that, if knowledge were present,
the act would not have taken place. The will of the subject
being habitually contrary to the act which actually takes place,
the act is thus involuntary. Concomitant ignorance accompanies
the act, but has no causal relation to it. Because of the habitual
dispositions of the subject the act would take place even if knowl­
edge were present, but since it is not present, the ignorance
renders the act non-voluntary. Consequent ignorance always fol­
lows an act of the will, but not the sinful act of which it is the
cause.
St. Thomas, both in De Malo16 and the Summa11 asks
“whether ignorance can be the cause of sin.”18 In the reply
his concern is with the actual deordinations from the objective
moral order which may be caused by ignorance, and consequently
he abstracts from the manner in which it affects the subject of
14 Moral diligence is the effort a prudent man is wont to use in acquir­
ing knowledge and will vary according to the particular case and the per­
sons involved.
15 Moralists use the adjectives vincible and culpable interchangeably
- when speaking of ignorance, though it might be said that, strictly speak­
ing, vincible ignorance is only culpable when there is an obligation to
know the truth. Merkelbach, op. cit., p. 81.
18 q. 3, a. 6.
” I-II, q. 76, a. I.
lsAs an efficient cause, the will performs a double function in the sinful
act. It is the causa per se of the act qua act, and the causa per accidens,
of the sin qua deordination. The inversion of order in the sinful act is
caused by the will’s defection from the guiding influence of law. I-II,
q. 65, a. I.

50

The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

action. The causal action of ignorance in sin is determined by
its nature as a privation. This privation can be defined only in
relation to knowledge. Since rational action is impossible
unless an object is presented to the will by the intellect (nihil
volitum nisi praecogitum), it follows that ignorance, which is the
privation of knowledge, can never be a per se causa in action.
Its part consists in this, that it is the absence of something which,
if possessed, would prevent the action.18 As St. Thomas says,
it is a causa removens prohibens, and this is the nature of its
causality whether the knowledge of which it is a privation is
universal or particular.28 The example of parricide serves to
illustrate: ignorance of the principle that parricide is immoral
may cause the act, but because the act will always concern a
particular case, ignorance that the particular person is father
may cause the act as well. St. Thomas limits causality to that
ignorance which takes away knowledge that would prevent an
act, thus excluding concomitant ignorance which merely accom­
panies the act and has no influence toward its completion.21
In his next article (art. 2), St. Thomas considers ignorance,
not as a cause of sin, but as a sin in itself. Holding man to his
humanity, he says that everyone has an obligation to know those
things without the knowledge of which he cannot act as a man.22
These things would include, for everyone, the universal principles
of the law, and the knowledge each individual is bound to have in
order to perform his peculiar duties in life. The failure to know
these things, provided one is capable of knowing, constitutes a
sin of omission. Vincible ignorance is recognized here, though
St. Thomas is careful to say that vincible ignorance concerning
things not necessary for the conduct of moral life is not sinful,
as a lawyer’s ignorance of involved mathematical principles.
A somewhat more complicated problem is presented when the
18“Et hoc modo ignorantia potest esse causa actus peccati; est enim
privatio scientiae perficientis rationem, quae prohibet actum peccati inquantum dirigit actus humanos." I-Π, q. 76, a. 1, c.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 “ Illa scilicet sine quorum scientia non potest debitum actum exercere.”
I-Π, q. 76, a. 2.

216982
Of the Function of the Intellect in Human Action

51

question is asked whether ignorance can be simultaneously an
efficient (per accidens) cause of an objective moral infraction
and a cause which more or less excuses the subject from the guilt
of the deordination.*23 From the previous discussion it is obvious
that, considered in itself, ignorance as a “ causa removens pro­
hibens ” causes acts which are involuntary24 and thus relieves
the act of any responsibility for sin. However, St. Thomas sees
two kinds of acts proceeding from ignorance as a cause in which
the agent does incur guilt. In the first sort the ignorance itself
is voluntary, in the second, a lack of knowledge concerned with
the object excuses the agent from part of the responsibility,
though not completely.
When ignorance is voluntary—that is, when it is consequent
ignorance—it pertains not only to the intellect, but also to the
will in which it is rooted as effect to cause.25 Ignorance, as an
excuse, then, will lose validity in proportion as the will is inclined
toward it. When ignorance is the result of an explicit and direct
act of the will, as in the case of one who wilfully deprives him­
self of knowledge in order that he may sin more freely, theolo­
gians call the resulting state affected ignorance. This sort of
ignorance, because of the strong inclination of the will from
which it proceeds, does not liberate the agent from the guilt of
the act, but, on the contrary, increases it. When, on the other
hand, ignorance does not result from a direct act of the will but
follows only indirectly because of repugnance to the labor in­
volved in learning the truth, as when other occupations hinder the
search for knowledge, or weakness impels to excesses which take
away or diminish the powers of reason, the acts resulting there­
from are rendered less guilty in consequence of the ignorance.
However, though in one case the guilt is increased and in the other
the guilt is diminished, in neither case does ignorance completely
exonerate.
The second sort of act mentioned by St. Thomas in which
ignorance is a cause, but does not entirely excuse from guilt,
23 Ibid., articles 3 and 4.
’♦These acts are not only without the necessary knowledge, but the will
is contrarily disposed.
23 De Mat., q. 3· a· 6 ad Sum.

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52

The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

concerns the object. Cases may be imagined wherein some un­
known circumstance might be sufficient to repel the sinner from
action if he were aware of it, yet sufficient knowledge is present
to bring about the sinfulness of the act from another standpoint
—v.g. adultery committed with a married person whose status
is unknown suffices to excuse from the act of injustice to the
other’s spouse, but not from impurity.
An interesting development of opinion is to be seen in the
concepts of ignorantia iuris and ignorantia facti. Simon of
Tournai was the first of the medieval theologians to use the dis­
tinction between the two concepts as advanced by Gratian.26
Following the jurists closely he held that ignorantia facti excuses
from sin—as when a stone is hurled and it strikes someone with­
out the knowledge of the one throwing. Ignorantia iuris may be
twofold: ignorance of the positive law and ignorance of the
natural law. Ignorance of the positive law may sometimes ex­
cuse from sin—as when a traveler is ignorant of the positive law
in a strange land; ignorance of the natural law, however, never
excuses from sin, for the natural law is innate to human reason.
If, therefore, homicide is committed, and the guilty party pleads
ignorance of the natural law, he is not to be excused. The
natural law is so easily known that it must be concluded that
noluit enim scire quod naturaliter posset.27 Simon of Tournai
would therefore hold that ignorance of the natural law never ex­
cuses from sin for the very ignorance is a sin in itself.
William of Auxerre (f 1220), the first Scholastic to treat
systematically of the natural law,28 had a fully developed treatise
28 " Est enim ignorantia alia facti, alia iuris. Facti alia quod non
oportuit eum scire, alia quod oportuit eum scire . . . Quod oportuit eum
scire, sicut ignorantia ludeorum . . . haec neminem excusat. Item ignoran­
tia iuris alia naturalis, alia civilis. Naturalis omnibus adultis damnabilis
est; ius vero civile aliis permittitur ignorare, aliis non.” Dicta Gratiana
ad c. 12, C. I., q. 4. Corpus Juris Canonici, Editio Lipsiensis II (RichterFriedberg), Leipzig, 1922.
27 Paris Nat. Lat. 14886, i. 29. Cited by Lottin, D. O., ° Le Problème de
rignorantia luris,” Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Medievale, Vol.
S. 1933, P- 352.
*
28 Cf. Graltmann, Martin, “ Das Naturrecht der Scholastik von Gratian
bis Thomas von Aquin,” Archiv für Rechts und Wirtshaftsphilosophie,
Band 16, Rothschild : Berlin, 1922-23, p. 25.

Of the Function of the Intellect in Human Action

53

on ignorance as well. He distinguished a triplex ignorance:
ignorantia simplicis negationis, which is the absence of knowledge
when there is no obligation to know ; ignorantia privationis, which
is the absence of knowledge one is obliged to possess ; and
ignorantia dispositionis qua quis aliter opinatur de re quam sit,
which implies not only the absence of knowledge but a positive
error to the contrary. This last may be applied either to igno­
rantia iuris or ignorantia facti. Though the latter may excuse
from sin when it cannot be overcome, the former is always cul­
pable. His formula is absolute—ignorantia iuris neminem excusat. According to William, the erroneous speculative judgment which
prepares the way for the error of the practical judgment might
not be a sin—if it remained purely speculative. As a matter of
fact, however, it does result in the erroneous practical judgment
and is thus contrary to the virtue of prudence per suppositionem.
The fact of its being contrary to the virtue of prudence is sinful,
for it depends on free will, it is voluntary.28
A definite shift of opinion is observable in the early Dominican
school. Roland of Cremona, Hugh of Saint Cher, Richard Fish­
acre, and John of Treves all follow William of Auxerre when
speaking of the divisions of ignorance. They expound the con­
cepts of Ignorantia simplicis, privationis, et dispositionis in much
the same way as William but are unanimous in their suppression
of the absolute formula ignorantia iuris neminem excusat.30 Evi­
dently they refuse to follow the rigorism of William in the solu­
tion of the question whether ignorantia iuris excuses from sin.
28“Et indicium primum, quo indicat ratio quid sit faciendum, et secun­
dum, quo imperat ratio de faciendo quod fiat, prudentiae virtutis est; sed
secundum eius est per essentiam, primum eius est per suppositionem; et
ideo uterque error, et ille qui est contrarius primo iudicio et secundo, con­
trarius est prudentiae et est peccatum. Error enim qui est in primo iudicio
non tantum est contrarius scientiae iuris naturalis quia ei convenit per
essentiam, sed etiam contrarius est prudentiae virtuti per suppositionem.
. . . Talis scientia (iuris naturalis) non subest libero arbitrio, sed error
ille voluntarius est et ideo subest libero arbitrio.” Summa aurea in quatuor
libros sententiarum a subtilissimo doctore magistro Guillermo Altissiodorensi, Paris, 1500, f. 93. Here cited from “ Le Problème de l’Ignorantia
Iuris," op cit., p. 355. (The Summa is obtainable in America only at the
Boston Public Library.)
50“Le Problème de l’Ignorantia Iuris,” op cit., p. 357.

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54

The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

In the early Franciscan school John of Rochelle taught that
ignorance of a particular fact excuses from sin if it concerns
something not pertaining to salvation. With the exception of
those lacking the use of reason, however, ignorance of facts per­
taining to salvation does not render one inculpable. When treat­
ing of ignorance of the natural law he follows the rigorism of
Gratian. The natural law is written on the hearts of men;
therefore, ignorantia iuris naturalis nullum adultum excusat, sicut
dicit Decretum.31
Alexander of Hales follows this same rigorism in the response
to two questions: quae ignorantia magis excuset et quae minus?
and an actus malus per ignorantiam iuris perpetratus sit pec­
catum? In response to the former he holds that the more one is
held to know the law, the less is ignorance an excuse for trans­
gressions. Since every one has an obligation to know the law of
nature, no one who is ignorant of it is excused from sin which
flows from that ignorance.32 The latter question finds its solu­
tion in the statement that adults can never be excused from sin
due to ignorance of the natural law.33 Up to this point, we see
that the first members of the Dominican school temper the rigor­
ism of William of Auxerre, while the Franciscans mentioned
resolutely adopt it. After these men the Ethics of Aristotle
affects the stream of scholastic thought. We treat of St. Albert
the Great, St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas.
In his Commentary on the Sentences, St. Albert the Great asks
31 ftmma de Vitiis, 228, f. XI.
12 “ Quanto plus tenetur homo ad cognitionem iuris, tanto minus ex­
cusatur. Quia vero unusquisque tenetur ad scientiam iuris naturalis, ideo
nullus adultus excusatur; nulli enim adulto licet legem naturalem ignorare,
quoniam ipsa scribitur in corde humano naturaliter.” Alexander of Hales,
Summa Theologica, ed. Quaraccht, 1930, t. 3, no. 325, p. 330.
33“Actus perpetratus per ignorantiam aut perpetratus est per igno­
rantiam iuris naturalis, aut per ignorantiam iuris divini, aut per ignorantiam
iuris humani canonici vel civilis. Si per ignorantiam iuris naturalis, actus
huiusmodi malus sic perpetratus est peccatum. Ignorantia enim iuris
naturalis neminem excusat qui usum potest habere sciendi, sicut dicitur I,
quaesL 4, Notandum, ubi dicitur quod ‘ ignorantia iuris naturalis omnibus
adultis damnabilis est,’ adultis dico, qui habent usum rationis, propter
furiosos et huiusmodi." Ibid., no. 679, p. 659.

Of the Function of the Intellect in Human Action

55

whether ignorantia iuris is a sin. He replies that, in the case of
those having the use of reason, ignorance of the moral truth
necessary for salvation, for example, those truths relative to
fornication and homicide, constitutes no excuse. The same ap­
plies to the knowledge necessary for one’s state in life.34
Further, St. Albert asks whether ignorantia iuris excuses one
from the sinful nature of the act which follows in its train. The
response points out that ignorance contains a double element ; the
affective and the intellectual. In so far as it is affective or volun­
tary the consequent act is sinful, in so far as it implies a lack of
knowledge, there is an excusing cause. Ignorantia facti, more­
over, constitutes a complete excuse, for the resulting act is posi­
tively involuntary. Ignorantia iuris can only partly excuse from a
consequent sin.35*
38The principle that ignorance, in so far as it is
voluntary, does not excuse from sin is applied to the natural law
by St. Albert, and it is discovered that ignorance of this law,
which can be, and should be, easily known does not excuse from
sin. Indeed, it is ignorantia crassa et supina.w Thus St. Albert
abandons the earlier caution of the Dominican school to advocate
once more the rigorist position of William of Auxerre.
St. Bonaventure, in his Commentary on the Sentences, analyzes
the circumstances in which ignorance is a sin. If the ignorance
in question concerns some truth of no great importance in the
moral order, it may be inculpable; but if it deals with truths
34 In II Sent. d. 22, a. 7.
35 " Ignorantiam secundum quod est peccatum . . . aliquid habet in
affectu secundum quod affectata dicitur; habet aliquid in intellectu, scilicet
privationem habitus regentis in operabilibus pertinentibus ad vitam vel
officium. Dicendum igitur quod quantum ad primum, peccatum est;
quantum autem ad secundum, non est peccatum et excusat vel a toto, si
est particularis et facti; vel a tanto, si est,iuris vel universalis, quod idem
est; quia ex illa parte facit ignorare circumstantias in quibus est actus et
ita est causa involuntarii quod meretur ignoscentiam et misericordiam
aliquam." Ibid., a. 9.
38“Ignorantia iuris est duplex; quia quoddam est ius universale, ius
naturale quod omnibus imponitur ad sciendum; et quoddam est particulare,
quod non scitur nisi per studium. Et puto quod prima est crassa et supina,
non excusans; secunda autem excusat vel a tanto vel a toto, si est casus
multum difficilis.” Ibid., a. 10.

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The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

necessary for salvation or the moral life, then, if one can know
them and does not, he is guilty of sin. If he cannot come to
a knowledge of them, the person is excused.3’’ Although the
expression ignorantia iuris is not to be found in this exposition,
St. Bonaventure is without doubt speaking of the same concept.
Does ignorance constitute an excuse from sin? St. Bonaventure
responds in the affirmative provided the said ignorance deprives
the act of the knowledge necessary for the voluntarium. Igno­
rantia facti excuses entirely if the necessary prudent effort has
been made to know the truth. Ignorantia iuris is vincible or in­
vincible. Vincible ignorance does not excuse entirely from sin,
for the ignorance itself is culpable; however it does partially ex­
cuse the act. Ignorantia affectata no doubt increases the guilt of
the consequent sin, but even here the malice of the sin may be
less serious in view of the general principle quod privat cogni­
tionem privat de ratione voluntarii. Thus, ignorantia affectata
ex una parte excusat quod ex alia parte magis aggravat.33 Igno­
rantia iuris, if it is invincible, that is, if it does not proceed from
previous sin, excuses the subject entirely. Thus, while St. Albert
the Great isolates himself from the first masters of the Dominican
Order to accept a more rigorous view, St. Bonaventure abandons
the earlier narrow views of the Franciscans to advance a milder
doctrine.
Texts in St. Thomas might be quoted which apparently prove
that he believed ignorantia iuris always contained at least some
culpability.38 However if we go to his ex professo treatments
of ignorance we find that St. Thomas departed from the rigorous
teachings of St. Albert the Great to agree with St. Bonaventure.
He holds that ignorance considered in itself, and as the cause of
the acts, constitutes an excuse from sin, for the consequent act
is involuntary as a result of the previous ignorance. True, the
ignorance itself may be voluntary and thus a sin, as in the case
SI St. Bonaventure, Commentara in quatuor libros Sententiarum, in II
Sent. d. 22, a. 2, q. 2.
*8 Ibid., q. 3.
89 “ Ignorantia iuris peccatum est." De Ver. 17, 4. ad Sum.; “Ignorantia
iuris ad negligentiam reputatur,” De Malo q. 3, a. 8.

Of the Function of the Intellect in Human Action

57

of ignorantia affectata. Another case in which ignorance itself
may be a sin happens when one is obliged to know a truth, but
neglects to acquire the knowledge because of laziness. This is
true only when the person is obliged to know the truth and can
know the truth—dummodo sit eorum quae quis scire tenetur et
potest.*0
The few texts which can be cited in favor of the view that
St. Thomas considered all ignorantia iuris as sinful are to be
interpreted in the light of the scire tenetur et potest. For in­
stance, to the objection that St. Thomas taught that ignorantia
iuris peccatum est a text in De Malo may be cited :

Be it stated that the notion of sin contains the volun­
tary, and ignorance excuses from sin in so far as it takes
away the voluntariety of an act. It is to be considered
that ignorance can take away the voluntariety of a subse­
quent act, not however that of a preceding act. Since
ignorance is of the intellect, the relation between igno­
rance and the voluntary may be considered from the rela­
tion of the intellect to the will. The act of the intellect
necessarily precedes the acts of the will since the object
of the will is the good presented by the intellect, and
therefore if knowledge of the good is taken from the
intellect through ignorance, the will act cannot follow.
Thus, voluntary action is impossible in relation to the
thing of which the subject is ignorant. Wherefore, if
in the same act something is known and something is
not known, it can be voluntary only in relation to the
thing known. However, it will always be involuntary
in relation to the thing which is not known. As, for
example, when a person does not know fornication is a
sin. The person in such a state indeed commits fornica­
tion voluntarily, but he does not voluntarily commit
a sin.*1
‘““Dummodo sit eorum quae quis scire tenetur et potest ... Si vero
sit talis ignorantia quae omnino sit involuntaria, sive quia est invincibilis,
sive quia est ejus quod quis scire non tenetur, talis ignorantia omnino
excusat’ a peccato.” I-II, q. 76, a. 3, c. “Si autem ignorantia nullo
praedictorum modorum sit voluntaria, puta cum est invincibilis, et tamen
est absque omni inordinatione voluntatis, tunc totaliter facit actum
sequentem involuntarium.” De Malo, 3, 8, c.
41 De Malo, 3, 8, c.

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Of the Function of the Intellect in Human Action

58

59

The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

The example given by St. Thomas is a clear case of ignorantia
iwris, and he just as clearly says the invincibly ignorant person
was innocent of sin. That St. Thomas arrived at the correct
conclusion is to be known from a Jansenistic proposition con­
demned by the Church. The condemnation implies that persons
can be invincibly ignorant of the natural law, and in consequence
be free from formal guilt in its transgression.42
How is the inflexible rigorism of Gratian, William of Auxerre,
Alexander of Hales, St. Albert the Great, and others to be inter­
preted ? The clue is perhaps to be found in their insistence on
the phrase -written in the hearts of men in relation to the natural
law. This insistence would seem to indicate an overemphasis on
the innate or self-evident character of the law, i.e., they re­
stricted their notion to the first principles of the law and the
evident deductions therefrom. Interpreted in this light, their ap­
parently unmitigated rigorism comes very close to the teaching
of modern theologians. As we shall see later, it is generally
held today that invincible ignorance of such principles and de,
ductions is not to be admitted, apart from exceptional
circumstances.
|
ERROR

It has been stated previously that error and ignorance, though
distinct states of the mind, are, in practice, used indiscriminately
by moralists 43 because they affect the morality of the act in the
same manner. This has also been recognized by the Church
law.44 It will be seen that when ignorance is the cause of sin,
the actual result is an error in the practical intellect, for ignorance,
of itself, implies no judgment, and every action is preceded by a
practical judgment. Before every sinful action there is an
erroneous judgment of the practical intellect, for, according to
42 " Tametsi detur ignorantia invincibilis iuris naturae, haec in statu
naturae lapsae operantem ex ipsa non excusat a peccato formali.” D. B.
U. 1292.
43 “ Quae de ignorantia diximus applicari possunt . . . error." Merkelbach, op. eit., 84.
44 "Quae de ignorantia statuuntur valent quoque de inadvertentia et
errore,” can. 2202, §3.

St. Thomas, “ evil desire is always linked up with some error of
practical knowledge.”43 This error in the practical intellect con­
sists in a judgment that proposes an apparent good as a true good,
though even here there must be some element of truth to solicit
the intellect.45
46 Now, in order to understand those errors of the
practical intellect by which something actually contrary to the
natural law is judged to be good, an understanding of the cause
of error is necessary.
That error can exist in the human intellect is evident; to ex­
plain how it happens is not so easy, especially when the intellect’s
relation to being, so emphasized by St. Thomas and neoThomists,47 is considered. If the function of the intellect is to
become actualized by the intelligible thing—intellectus in actu est
intelligible in actu48—and intelligence is nothing else than the
. knowing subject’s becoming, so to speak, the thing known, how
can the mind contain something that does not exist?. If the in­
tellect is actuated only by the form of a thing49 how can it be
actuated by anything else? This objection is based on the con­
viction that simple apprehension, of itself, does not contain the
false, and, in a sense, St. Thomas is in agreement with this posi­
tion.50 However, the objection overlooks the fact that the form
apprehended by the simple act of the intellect is not a perfect
likeness of the object’s essence; knowledge of that sort would be
intuitive and it has been seen that the mind begins with very
general and confused concepts51 which are gradually perfected.
The composition of the synthesis presupposes judgments and
herein we have the possibility of conceptual error.
45 Oe Malo, 16, 6, 11. In an interesting passage St. Thomas goes so far
as to say that all error is accompanied by some sort of sin—“ error mani­
feste habet rationem peccati.” Mal. 3, a. 7.
46“Omne falsum fundatur in aliquo vero.” I, q. 17, a, 4, ad zum.
47 Cf. Rousselot, op. eit., passim ; Sertillanges, S. Thomas d'Aquin, II,
c. 2, and ff., 3rd ed., Paris, 1922; Gilson, Le Thomisme, c. 13, 3rd ed-,
Paris, 1927.
48 Comment in Vi Met., loc. 4.
49 “ Sic cnim actu intelligit res, cum species rei facta fuerit forma intel­
lectus possibilis." Comp. Theo. 83 fin.
50“Circa quod quid est intellectus non decipitur.” I, q. 17, a. 3, c.
511, q. 14, a· 6, c.

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The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

The real problem of error, however, is the problem of the false
judgment. Both truth and error belong properly to the judg­
ment.51
52 Both affirm their composition exists in reality. How,
then, is the false judgment to be explained? The answer is to
be found in the nature of our knowledge in which the senses and
the will play a part.
The proper object of 'knowledge in the present state of union
between soul and body is the sensible thing which can only be­
come a part of the knowing subject through the avenues of the
senses.53 These avenues are often by-paths which lead to error
as they grasp only outer qualities which may be shared by
diverse but apparently similar things.54 It must be carefully
observed, however, that the senses are not the cause, but the
occasion of intellectual error.55 If the senses present some­
thing to the intellect which has the appearance of gold, there is
no absolute necessity for affirming the extrasensory object is
gold, however close the similarity. But it will be seen that the
intellect’s dependence on sense knowledge is a fertile ground for
error, especially when it is remembered that the phantasm pre­
sented to the intellect is not the work of a single faculty but the
collaborative product of a manifold faculty-action in which not
only the external senses, but especially the internal senses have
a part. Obviously, associations and combinations may be effected
which have no corresponding realities, and this disproportion may
51 “ Intellectus autem conformitatem sui ad rem intelligibilem cognoscere
potest; sed tamen non apprehendit eam, secundum quod cognoscit de
aliquo quod quid est. Sed quando judicat ita rem se habere sicut est forma
quam dc re apprehendit, tune primo cognoscit et dicit verum.” I, q. 26,
a. 2 c.; "Quando falsam sententiam iam fert de his quae nescit, tunc
proprio dicitur errare." De Malo, q. 3, a. 7.
” In De An. III lect 8 n. 70s, 709, 711 ff.
64“Et ideo quando in aliqua re apparent sensibiles qualitates demon­
strantes naturam quae eis non subject, dicitur res illa esse falsa, unde
Philosophus dicit in VI Metaphisicorum quod illa videntur falsa quae nata
sunt videri aut qualia non sunt, aut quae non sunt; ut aurum falsum.” De
Ver. q. 1. a. 10, c.
55 “ In quantum natura est facere falsam aestimationem in intellectu,
quamvis non necessario faciat, sicut de rebus dictum est quia intellectus
•
· ■■ ■ ·
■*
his quae a sensibus offeruntur.” De Ver.

Of the Function of the Intellect in Human Action

61

be enhanced because the work of the internal senses may be, in
part, subconscious and not subject to the direct control of
reason.6
58
57
The influence of the senses on the intellect, though giving us
some clue to the existence of error, does not explain it as a
cause. If we seek the cause we must examine the judgment
itself. The act of judgment for St. Thomas is no mere juxta­
position of concepts which happen to have a similarity with
reality. For a genuine judgment the mind must have not only
the form of the thing, but also must add something of its own
that does not exist outside itself,57 namely the synthesis by which
the mind knows and says the form it possesses really is that of
the thing known. This synthesis is called “ assent ”58 by St.
Thomas and takes place in two ways; according as it is made
under the commanding influence of the proper object,59 or by
persuasion on the part of the will.60 The will act can have place
in assent only when it is a case of belief (that is, faith) or
error;81 internal evidence is the motive of every other assent.
S6Koeler, Leo, S.J., The Problem of Error from Plato to Kant, Rome:
Gregorian University Press, 1934, p. 93.
57“Quando incipit judicare de re apprehensa, tunc ipsum iudicium in­
tellectus est quoddam proprium ei, quod non invenitur extra se—quando
dicit quod aliquid est vel non est.” De Ver. q. I, a. 3, c.
KDe Ver. 14, 1.
59 Under the influence of its proper object the intellect may place the act
of assent in two ways, mediately and immediately. “Ab intelligibili
quandoque mediate, quandoqud immediate: immediate quando ex ipsis
intelligibilibus statim veritas propositionum intelligibilium infallibiliter
apprehenditur, et haec est dispositio intelligentis principia . . . mediate vero
quando intellectus determinatur ad alteram partem contradictionis virtue
primorum principiorum, et ista est disposito scientis.” De Ver. 14, I.
80 “ Quandoque vero intellectus non potest determinari ad alteram partem
contradictionis neque statim per ipsas definitiones terminorum, sicut in
principiis, nec etiam virtute principiorum, sicut in conclusionibus demon­
strationis est, determinatur autem per voluntatem quae eligit asscntire uni
parti determinate et praecise propter aliquid quod est sufficiens ad moven­
dum voluntatem non autem intellectum et ista est dispositio credentis.”
De Ver. 14, x.
81 Cf. previous citation from De Malo, 3. 7, where St Thomas says error
always involves sin ; “ dissentire (infidelity) est actus intellectus, sed motus
a voluntate sicut et assentire.” Π-Π, q. 10. a. 2.

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The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

The psychological process of error and belief, by which the in­
tellect places the act of assent under the influence of the will, are
so similar that justification can be found for placing error under
the heading of belief. Moreover, as in belief, so in error the
part of the will must not be overemphasized ; in both cases the
act is essentially of the intellect but imposed by the will.63 Here
we see again that reciprocal causality of the intellect and will®3
which results from the fact that they are not autonomous agents
but pertain to the one person who is the subject of the
action—actiones sunt suppositorum. In the case of a false judg­
ment the will acts on the mind by focusing· its attention on cer­
tain motives to the exclusion of others, making the object more
vivid to the mind because of its desire. Since the intellect will
never assent unless solicited by at least some semblance of the
truth,8® the good desired by the will must be, under some aspect,
a true good. This is especially the case when the will solicits the
intellect in a practical judgment under the influence of a sensible
good, the possession of which is here and now contrary to the
natural law. This would seem to be the doctrine of St. Thomas
on error; it will help in the understanding of the next chapter on
the possibility of ignorance, and its moral equivalent, error, of
the natural law.
“"assensus accipitur pro actu intellectas in quantum a voluntate deter­
minatur ad unum.” II-II, q. 2. a. 2 ad gum.
63 "voluntas quadammodo movet intellectum dum intelligo quia volo, et
intellectus voluntatem, dum volo quia intelligo illud esse volendum." III
Sen. dist. 23, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3.
e< "Omne falsum fundatur in aliquo vero," I Sen. q. 17, a. 4, ad 2.

CHAPTER IV
Of the Possibility of Invincible Ignorance
of the Natural Law

In the previous chapter the relation of ignorance to human
conduct was investigated and it was seen that, under certain
conditions, ignorance excuses the trespasser from formal guilt
entirely, in other cases it diminishes guilt, while in still others it
increases it.1 We now consider it in relation to the guidance of
human conduct. Since a violation of the natural law caused by
invincible ignorance is not a formal sin 2 we treat of :

(a)

invincible ignorance of the natural law—

its possibility

When it is affirmed that all men know the first principles of
the natural law, while there is a possibility of invincible ignorance
concerning some others, opponents are found in strangely different
camps. Luther and the reformers, Traditionalists, modern ration­
alists, and even some Catholic theologians of an older school
oppose the position for one reason or another. Luther and the
reformers admit, indeed, the possibility of invincible ignorance,
but, under the influence of dogmatic preoccupations concerned
with original sin, deny it as an excusing cause.3
’Cf. p. 48 ff.
2 “ Si vero sit talis ignorantia quae omnino sit involuntaria, sive quia est
invincibilis, sive quia est ejus quod scire non tenetur, talis ignorantia
omnino excusat a peccato.” I-II, q. 76, a. 3, c.
’ " Eine (Unwissenheit) heîset man unüberwindlich, die andere grob, die
dritte angenommen. Die unüberwindlich ist, wenn ich von beschreibenen
Rechten nichts weiss, sie seien gôttliche odor menschliche, und die entschuldiget und muht allé Volker und Heiden unschuldiget? . . . entschuldiget bei vernunftigen, weltweissen Lenten, dber in der Théologie gilts
nicht. Denn Paulus spricht, ‘Sie Sind allzumal Sunder?" Dr. Martin
Luther’s Sômmtliche Werke, Erlangen: Heyder & Zimmer, 1850, Band
216, p. 84; again, in his Comm, in Gen. c. 12 he says: "Scholastici invin-

63

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The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

Traditionalism, a reaction against Rationalism, opposes our
position in that it transfers all knowledge of religious and moral
truths to the supernatural order, thus denying natural knowledge
even of the first principles. It is condemned by the Church.*4
Again, exponents of modern theories of law, holding that all
law is either the dictate of the State,5 the evolution of custom, or
a mere a priori conviction of reason,6 logically decry as futile
the affirmation of universal knowledge of first principles.
Christian literature before the time of the Scholastics gives us
no explicit treatise on the relation between ignorance and the
natural law. The Fathers of the Church, as with the natural
law in general, touch it only in passing, and then more particularly
from the viewpoint of the universality of knowledge. Few
attempts are made to'specify the exact content of this universal
knowledge. Thus, Tertullian says that the human soul gives
testimony of a natural law, which, by its very simplicity, is com­
mon and natural, and divine because it is natural.7 Origen8*and
Ambrose® repeat the same idea. St. Augustine is more explicit
cibilem ignorantiam dixerunt excusabilem, quae simpliciter a toto excuset,
id est, peccatum prorsus tollat, tota coecitas est in Papae scholis.” Cf. also
the condemned proposition of Baius, D. B. U. 1046 wherein he eliminates
the notion of the voluntary from the notion of sin, thus cutting under in­
vincible ignorance as an excusing cause.
4 Cf. D. B. U. 1649, 1650, 1651, 1652.
5 Hoblies, De Cive, c. 12, n. 1.
Savigny, Vom Beruf unserer Zeit fiir Gesetsgebung und Rechtsmssenshaft (1840) 8.
e Leanings, Richard, Uber Wiirzel & Wissen des Rechts, lena (1907), 21.
Since these positions inevitably follow from other presumptions their ref­
utation follows from the falsity of their theories. Against Luther’s as­
sumption that human nature is totally corrupt through original sin cf.
D. B. U. 771. Against the assumptions of modem jurists, cf. proof for the
natural moral law’s existence, p. 13 ff.
r ” Haec testimonia animae quanto vera, tanto simplicia, tanto vulgaria,
quanto vulgaria, tanto communia; quanto naturalia tanto divina.” De Test.
An., C. 5· P· L. I. 616.
8 In Epis, ad Rom. P. G. 14, 890.
» “ Non scribitur, sed innascitur, nec aliqua percipitur lectione sed profluo
quodam naturae fonte in singulis exprimitur et humanis ingeniis hauritur.’’
Ep. 73. 3; P. L· 16, 1251.

Of the Possibility of Ignorance of the Natural Law

65

when he says there is no soul so immersed in evil that conscience
is entirely eliminated, since conscience is the natural law which
God has written in the hearts of men.10 He also is concerned
with the determination of content :

“ Don’t do unto others what you would not have hap­
pen to you : this forces you to acknowledge an inner law
written in your very hearts. ...
“Is theft a good action? ‘No.’ I ask, ‘Is adultery
good?’ All cry that it is an abomination.”
“To desire illicitly your neighbor’s goods, is that
good? There is a unanimous opinion that it is not.
Everyone, therefore, when asked concerning the good­
ness of these actions has a negative reply.”11
St. Gregory the Great expresses the general opinion of tire
Fathers when he says, "everyone knows the manner of acting
toward his neighbor through natural knowledge.”12 Thus, the
Fathers, by affirming the universality of at least some knowledge
of the natural law, exclude the possibility of invincible ignorance
of the entire law.
The Scholastics consider the question explicitly, though their
method of approach varies widely. St. Bonaventure, Scotus, and
the Franciscan theologians view synderesis, a habit dealing with
the first principles of moral knowledge, as a perfection of the
will,1’ while St. Thomas and the Dominican school place it in
the intellect.14 They are unanimous, however, in teaching that
the first principlesT^sThe object of synderesTsT cannot TieThvincibly ignored15* This conclusion has come down intact
through Suarez18 and the post-reformation theologians and is
10 De Ser. in Mon. P. L. 34. ΐ2θ3·
11 Enarr. in Ps. 57, n. 1. Cf. also Enarr. in Ps. 118, Serm. 25, n. 4.
12 Hom. 31 in Evang., P. L., 76» 1228.
13 S. Bon., 3, dist. 29, a. 2. q. 2.
t* De Ver. q. 16, a. 1.
15“Itaque si sertno fiat de lege naturae, iuxta priorem acceptationem,
ipsa sic scripta in cordibus nostris, ut omnino sit indelibilis." Scotus, 3, d.
37, n. 8; cf. also 3, d. 27; also. St. Bon. 3 d. 29 q. 2, a. 2 and St. Thomas,
De Ver. q. 12, a. 3.
10 Omnia Opera, V. 5, p. H7·

/. /

'i

/

66

The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

now unanimous. This constant doctrine concerning the universal
knowledge of the natural law restricts itself to the affirmation
that first principles are so known.17 Further, it is concerned
with persons who have the normal use of reason, excluding in­
fants, the insane, and all those whose reason, for whatever cause,
is impeded.18 However, these exceptions made, there are no
others.
Our position includes all peoples whether they have come under
the influence of Christian and Mediterranean culture or not.
Here, strict adherers to the positivist’s scientific method would be
inclined to question our procedure. A statement of this kind
would require, for them, an investigation of all peoples, or at
least all of the various cultures. A conclusion arrived at by
another method would be in their eyes an unwarranted assump­
tion. However, it does not seem that the Fathers and the
Scholastics were presumptuous in arriving at the present con­
clusion by the method of deduction, for it follows from the na­
ture of man. Just as before the advent of modern anthropology
it was not an unwarranted assumption to make the statement that
all normal men convey their ideas by means of speech, neither
were the Scholastics precipitous when they affirmed this universal
knowledge. Both statements have a basis in the nature of man.
We don’t need a series of endless inductions to prove man is a
moral being. It is a deduction consequent upon his nature.
St. Thomas explains this universal knowledge of first prin­
ciples with his doctrine of synderesis.1® This doctrine is an in­
tegral part of the Thomistic synthesis which sees everywhere a
gradation of things according to the greater or less participation
of being they enjoy in Being itself, or the Ens a se. There are
no gaps in the universe ; each grade of being has some perfection
proper to itself, and some perfection which approaches, but does
not equal, that possessed by those of a higher degree.20 As St.
” In the present chapter we take first principles to mean those which are
first in the logical, as distinguished from the ontological order. For their
content, cf. p. 42.
Ver., 16, 3.
1β I, <1- 79, a. 12; Sent. Π, d. 24. a. 2, a. 3; De Ver. 16, 1, 2, 3, & 4_
20"Unde ct inferior natura attingit in sui supremo ad aliquid quod est
proprium superioris naturae, imperfecte illud participans." De Fer. i(j χ.

Of the Possibility of Ignorance of the Natural Law

67

Thomas says, “ the top of the lower touches the bottom of the
higher.”21 Thus, animals approach, in an imperfect way, the
reasoning powers of men22 and men, by insight into first prin­
ciples, transcend their ordinary powers of discursive reasoning to
approach, imperfectly, the intuitive powers of the angels.
Whence the human soul, in its supreme heights,
touches something which is proper to the angelic nature,
that is, by insight or intuition it sees certain truths, im­
mediately and without a discursive process of reason­
ing; however, even in this, it is less perfect than the
angelic nature for it must receive these truths through
the avenue of the senses.23

I
I
I
I

This immediate insight into certain truths concerns both the
speculative and the practical orders, and upon it depends the
whole of both. The constant disposition of the intellect by which
it immediately sees first principles is called, in the speculative
order, intelligence {habitus intellectus), in the practical order,
synderesis.21
The truths which are the objects of intelligence and synderesis,
though not subject to direct discursive proof, are not groundless
assumptions. They are simply so fundamental that every discur­
sive truth in its respective order is based upon them. Every truth
of the speculative order is reducible to the principle of identity,
while every truth of the practical order, as we have seen pre­
viously,25 is reduced to the first principle of the practical order,
“do good and avoid evil.” The intuitional judgment, to which
the intellect is disposed by synderesis, sees clearly and affirms at
once the truth of the first principles of the moral order, immedi21 De Ver. i6, i.
33 De Ver. I, 9.
33 De Ver. 16, 1.
24 In De Ver. 16, i. St. Thomas is indifferent whether synderesis is called
a constant disposition, or the faculty of reason in conjunction with it. In
the Summa, he considers it solely as a habit I, q. 79» a. 12. In other places
he talks of the “ actum synderesis,” or the principles themselves. De Ver.
15, 3, Thus when he asks “Whether synderesis can be obliterated," he
really treats of our problem—also “omnia mutabilia reducuntur ad aliquod
primum (principium) immobile;”—“Ex universali judicio synderesis.” 1. c.
23 Cf. P- 3«-

Λ

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Of the Possibility of Ignorance of the Natural Law

The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

69

logical analysis, give us an idda of the constancy of action at­
ately consequent upon the presentation of the concepts. Nor
tained by the intemperate man through habit, while revealing the
can the concept of the rational good be absent from anyone who
unsteadiness of the incontinent person. It will be seen that knowl­
has the normal use of reason. The principles based upon this
edge of the universal moral principle still presents itself to the in­
concept are self-evident to all.26
continent man in the very act of election. The difficulty lies in the
St, Thomas finds no difficulty concerning the fact of the ac­
explanation of the intemperate man. No consideration seems to
quisition of first moral principles. When he asks whether they
be given to a moral principle ; the habit of sin is so ingrained that
can be lost,27 complications arise. The very question presupposes
the subject finds a certain equilibrium in sin. His ignorance
previous knowledge. However, is it possible, through sin, to
extends to the end and is, consequently, worse than that of the
lose this knowledge ? Of a universal nature, it can be applied to
incontinent man, for in him the principle, at least, is conserved?1
action only by a particularization, and we have already seen the
i However, not even in the case of the intemperate is ignorance of
power of the practical idea.28*30
I
the first principles to be admitted. True, obscured by habits of
The problem is best considered from the point of view of sin­
I
sin,
the universal moral principles do not affect the immediate
ner psychology as brought out by St. Thomas. He distinguishes
I
question
of action. However, speculatively, when no action is
two sorts of sinners, the incontinent and the intemperate. As the
I
involved
the
intemperate man will still admit the first principles?2
act of sin is according to the election of the will following an in­
tellectual judgment, in every sin there is a more or less syllogistic
(b) INVINCIBLE IGNORANCE OF IMMEDIATE CONCLUSIONS
deduction.28 Moreover, there is a difference between the syl­
I
Were
men of an angelic nature this problem would present no
logism of the incontinent and the syllogism of the intemperate.
I
difficulties,
for where now the truths presented by the secondary
The intemperate man uses three propositions, while the inconti­
precepts are deduced by a discursive process, they would, in the
nent uses four, e.g.
hypothesis of an angelic nature, be the object of intuitional
Syllogism of the Incontinent
knowledge. It is the discursive nature of these precepts that dis­
Maj. No sin is to be committed.
tinguishes the problem from the one we have previously seen con­
Maj. Regardless of reason, pleasure is to be enjoyed.
cerning the first principles. When we speak of invincible ig­
Min. But this sin is a pleasure.
norance we bring the problem down into the concrete acts of life,
Cone. Therefore it is to be taken.
for here and now there is question of excusing the subject from
the voluntariety of an act and therefore from culpability. The
Syllogism of the Intemperate
problem, then, is this: Is it possible after the use of moral dili­
Maj. Regardless of reason, pleasure is to be enjoyed.
Min. But this action is pleasurable.
gence, or the sort of application men ordinarily use according to
Cone. Therefore this action is to be done?0
their environment and state of life, that the immediate deductions

I

I

These syllogistic forms, though by no means a complete psycho26 " Ad legem naturalem pertinent quaedam praecepta communissima quae
sunt omnibus nota.” I-U, q. 94, a. 6, c.
IT De Per. r6, 3. .
33 Cf. p. 46 ff.
39 De Malo, q. 3, a. 9 ad yum.
30 De Malo, q. 3. a. 9 ad yum.

»»“ Sed intemperatus habet ignorantiam circa ipsum finem . . . inconti­
nens est melior intemperato quia salvatur in eo optimum principium.’'
Π-Π, q. 156, a. 3, ad jum.
32 "Ad tertium dicendum, quod ille qui'habet habitum alicuius vitii est
quidem corruptus circa principia operabilium, non quidem in universali, sed
in particulari operabili, inquantum scilicet vidi deprimitur ratio ne universale
judicium ad ejus particulare operabile applicet in eligendo.” De Ver. 16, 3,
ad 3um.

MJ

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Of the Possibility of Ignorance of the Natural Law

The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

from first principles may remain" invincibly unknown, so that the
natural law is violated without culpability?
Two factors must be considered in the solution, namely, the
variability of human action with its attendant influence on moral
knowledge, and the discursive process by which we arrive at the
principles.
The particular and contingent quality of the goods which man
uses as means to his ultimate end, coupled with man’s liberty,
make for an infinite variability of human acts. Moral science,
therefore, in considering these acts and formulating principles,
has variable material as its object and cannot expect to obtain
absolute certitude. If, in the speculative reason, the conclusion is
made that the sum of the angles of a triangle equals two right
angles, its truth will always and everywhere be the same, pro­
vided I have committed no logical error in the deduction from
premises. However, if in the practical order I reach the con­
clusion that it is wrong to take another's property, I would be
rash to conclude that it is wrong to take another’s property in !
every circumstance. The material object of the science is con|
tingent, and perfect certitude in the application of principles at
1
• times cannot be obtained. As St. Thomas repeats again and !
again, the deductive precepts of the law hold in the majority of I
cases, but in any particular case circumstances may so change
I
that it no longer falls under the apparently applicable precept.33 * *I
This is the " change in material ” of which theologians speak and ■
it in no way militates against the uniformity of the natural law
which finds its unity in the universal command to rational action
contained in the first principle.31
The second factor to be noted about these precepts is their dis33 " Conclusiones praedictae a primis legis naturae praeceptis non pro­
cedunt, ut semper efficaciam habentes, sed in majori parte, talis enim tota
materia moralis." Supp. q. 65, a. 2, c. Cf. also Supp. <j. 65, a. 2, ad rum;
De Malo, q. 2, a. 4, ad J3um.
84 No objective " collision " is to be admitted among precepts of the
natural law for they all flow from reason, and reason cannot contradict
itself. The apparent collision sometimes seen may be resolved by a more
complete enunciation of the principle involved, e. g. : Do not take the goods
of others who are rationally unwilling.

71

cursive nature. Though obtained by an obvious deduction, never­
theless, it has been seen that where composition is present, in­
ordinate will-influence may cause error. It is possible here.
When we further consider that the sense faculties vividly entice
the will to goods of their own order, the possibility of error is
increased.
;
This last factor alone is enough to justify the conclusion that
I
error concerning the second class of precepts is possible, though,
I
because of their close connection with self-evident truth, we may
I
say that, as a general rule, they will be known by the majority of
men.33 A minority, however, may be in ignorance of one or the
other of these precepts considered as a whole or in part. St.
Thomas enumerates various causal factors for this ignorance
among which are tradition or custom, education, and depraved
habits.36
Whether this ignorance will be invincible37 or not depends on
the individual person. But when we consider the overpowering
weight of long tradition and custom justifying an action which
may be objectively contrary to the law and yet the object of a
strong lower appetite, inculpable ignorance may be possible. In
such circumstances it is only with great difficulty that the con­
viction of the surrounding culture could be discarded; that is,
more diligence would have to be exercised than required for ordi­
nary invincible ignorance. Theologians generally admit the
possibility of invincible ignorance in the case of rudes or the un­
cultured. The term rudes may very well be applied to the fin­
ished products of some modern education where all values are
relative and the moral order is considered a collection of taboos
and customs.
The possibility of such ignorance is further enhanced in prac­
tical action, for circumstances may affect the act in such a way
that the subject may conceive it as justifiable in a particular case,
while fully admitting the prohibition as a general proposition.

I

83 I-II, q. 94, a. 4 & 6.
33 I-II, q. 94, a. 6.
87 As will be seen, this problem resolves itself into an analysis of the
potest of the scire tenetur et potest of the Scholastics.

1 ■

L
'·

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The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

Thus, the intrinsic evil of stealing may be overlooked in a par­
ticular case when there are seemingly good reasons for its justi­
fication.
Summing up, we may say that normally the knowledge of the
proximate conclusions is possessed by every human being ; how­
ever, factors may be present in extraordinary cases which im­
pede this knowledge and render the subject invincibly ignorant.
In the next section this conclusion will be compared with the
actual practices of men brought out by anthropologists.
(c)

REMOTE CONCLUSIONS

The possibility of invincible ignorance concerning these more
remote deductions of the natural law is already contained in the
conclusions we have reached concerning the immediate deductions,
for all the causes which affect the knowledge of the latter will
a fortiori influence the former. The distance removed from first
principles increases such possibilities. Men occupied chiefly with
material things in the struggle for existence are not always capa­
ble of correct conclusions in these matters, nor is it given to all
to be instructed by good moralists. Hence, prescinding from
other causes, the very difficulty of arguing to the conclusions
would lend itself to the increased possibility of ignorance. St.
Thomas says :

Some matters cannot be the subject of a judgment
without much consideration of the various circum­
stances which all are not competent to do carefully,
but only those who are wise ; just as it is not possible for
all to consider the particular conclusions of sciences, but
only for those who are versed in Philosophy.38

Examples of these conclusions are multiple; the intrinsic evil of
deliberate lies under every circumstance, the justification of occult
compensation, the morality of mental reservations, all come under
this classification. Several objections to this position have been
brought forward by Catholic theologians. One has to do with
88 I-Π, q. io, a. I, c. C£. also q. loo, 94· *· 6-

I

Of the Possibility of Ignorance of the Natural Law

73

I thecause of this ignorance. Daelman38 and Steyaert40 admit
I that many are ignorant of the natural law, but find the cause of
I this ignorance solely in the evilly disposed will of the subjects,
I who, through proper effort in combating bad habits, could arrive
I at the proper knowledge.
I
This objection does not consider the intrinsic obscurity of the
. third-class precepts which remain obscure even after the most
I forthright efforts to overcome the inclinations of the sensitive ap! petite. St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure were both of the highI est intelligence and moral integrity, yet differed concerning cer!
tain remote conclusions, e.g. : St. Thomas 41 held that a judge is
’
bound to condemn a defendant who though known to the judge
(to be innocent, as a matter of fact, is judicially proved guilty,
while St. Bonaventure taught the contrary.42 Now, both of these
men were leading lives of heroic sanctity, yet one of them erred.
The obscurity of the involved question, rather than bad habits,
was the cause of one's being invincibly ignorant. The whole con«
troversy concerning the principle to be used in a state of positive
J
doubt is another example. If we hold to the objective unity of
'
truth, the defenders of one theory must be in error and invincibly
ignorant.
ANTHROPOLOGICAL EVIDENCE

The Codes
If the conclusion concerning the universality of the natural law
in the order of knowledge is based on the nature of man, an ex­
amination of all ethnological divisions is no more needed in
concluding to universal knowledge of the first principle than com­
plete experimental evidence is necessary for the conclusion that
all normal men are capable of making judgments. Ignorance of
the first moral principle is no more to be expected than ignorance
”Daelman, Carolus, Theologia, Antwerp: Apud Jacobum Bernardum
Jouret, 1735, Tom. I. Observatis in I-II, p. 12.
40Steyaert, Martin: Opuscula, Louvain: Martin-Overbeck, 1742, T. 4,
P. 441II-II, q. 67, a. 2.
42 Cited by Billuart, Tom. II, p. 471.

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The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

of the principle of contradiction. Yet, considerable variation is
to be expected in deductions in moral matters. St. Thomas often
speaks of the variable factors in the field of morals.43 Modern
anthropology has demonstrated this by the positive scientific
method. In modern times, attempts have been made to study all
the known peoples and the results of some of these studies will
be indicated here.
In the weighing of this evidence caution must be used lest
hypothesis be accepted for fact, or mere subjective theory for ob­
jective-evidence. Anthropologists are usually quite willing to
acknowledge that conclusions once accepted as scientific should
be modified when more· complete evidence is brought to light.44
The first accumulation of scientific evidence concerning the
moral practices of mankind presented facts proving the variabil­
ity of moral codes. This led to the belief, still prevalent in some
popular works, that the term “morality,” though present under
the concept of moral obligation among all peoples, had, never­
theless, no definite and universal signification. Moral codes ap­
parently differed as much as dialects; the good to one people
was evil to another, and the moral law, in the sense of a universal
binding norm, was a fiction foisted on our culture by the un­
critical acceptance of Greek and Roman persuasions. With the
advent of stricter scientific investigation during the last two or
three decades, the idea of hopeless confusion has been giving way
to the opinion that a certain basic, even though very general,
code exists behind the apparently complete variability.45* As early
as 1915, anthropologists began to speak of a “permanent moral
consciousness of mankind.”40 If anthropology now knows no
such animal as the “ lawless savage,”47 this is an admission that
all primitive peoples lived under codes of morality, some having
systems quite as intricate as our own.
43 Supp. q. 65, a. 3, c.
44 Cf. Cooper, Primitive Man, V, IV, n. 3, p. 48, where the important
question of primitive dissociation of religion and morals is discussed.
45 Cooper, Primitive Man. V. IV, n. 3, p. 35.
40 Hobhouse, L. T., Morals in Evolution; New York, Henry Holt, p. 422.
47 Cooper, Primitive Man, Ibid.

Of the Possibility of Ignorance of the Natural Law

75

Without examining, at this point, the motivation behind such
codes, it may be said that herein can be found the notion of the
first principle, “do good” which we have designated as selfevident. The very fact that codes everywhere exist proves this
at least, that men everywhere recognize certain actions as good,
certain actions as evil. This may not be construed as “ reading
in.” For, if such codes exist everywhere, the least they can do
is to distinguish between actions considered good and actions
considered evil. They bespeak a definite " oughtness ” bound up
with certain actions. The realization that actions recognized as
good are to be done, is the content of the first principle. To
speak of the permanent moral consciousness of mankind would
seem to be speaking of the first principle in different terms.
Thus, by means of scientific induction, modern anthropology as­
serts the truth of deductions scholastics had made from the nature
of men.
We have previously stated that the content of the obligatory
good will be recognized, roughly, in the precepts contained in
the Decalogue, though we concede that errors from various
causes may arise, and admit the possibility of some ignorance
concerning these precepts. Experimental evidence tends more
and more to confirm the conclusion. As the high ethical concep­
tions of Babylon,48 Egypt,48 Greece, and Rome are well known,
we confine ourselves to more primitive peoples. Duties to the
Supreme Being or the gods will be treated first, then duties to
neighbor.
The existence of the concept of a Supreme Being and, con­
sequently, the recognition of moral duties among these peoples
have been the object of some debate among anthropologists.
Thus, after an exhaustive review of the evidence, Hobhouse con­
cludes that: (a) the concept of a Creator certainly has arisen in
some peoples of very low cultures apart from the influence of
civilization; (b) high gods, as a supreme sun or sky god are
more common; (c) a supreme god is very rarely the object of a
cult, but high gods are frequently the originators of custom and
« Morals in Evolution, op. cit.
p. 454-

M.

76

The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

concerned with its maintenance. These are occasionally ad­
dressed in prayer.50 In this opinion it would seem that wide­
spread ignorance exists among primitive peoples concerning
duties to God.
Schmidt,51 on the other hand, strenuously holds that, although
in primary and secondary cultures the Supreme Being may be
conceived as having little or no concern with mankind, primitive
man, in general, had not only the concepts of the Supreme Being,
but believed himself to have direct relations with Him. These
comprised a dependence on Him for life and sustenance together
with systems of rewards and punishments meted out for obedi­
ence or disobedience to His laws. Primitive man prayed to the
Supreme Being now orally, now mentally, with only slight ges­
tures as outward signs, and again in action, by sacrifice. More­
over, he considered himself to have a moral duty to perform these
actions.52
The conclusions of Schmidt are based on most of the known
fieldwork, and it is likely that future investigations will not
change the basic theory that primitive man, in general, had quite
a thorough knowledge of his duties toward God.
Reciprocal rights and duties of the parent-child relationship
comprised in the fourth precept of our Decalogue are taken for
granted among primitive man. Provided mothers permit their
children to live beyond a certain point, there is no question of
their not caring for them. The duties of men to care for their
wives and children are also beyond question.53 Duties, moreover,
in the parent-child relationship are not confined to parents alone.
When parents grow old, their support, if needed, is incumbent
upon the children. Isolated cases of abandonment and patricide
may be regarded as exceptions brought about by physical needs*
61

1.

■t

i’

50 Morals in Evolution, p, 396.
M Storia Comparata dette Religioni; Brescia; Morcelliana, 1934, p. 45.
61 These are general rules. Exceptions in one or the other point are found
in numerous tribes. Conclusions arc based on the exhaustive work—Die
Ursprung der Gottesidee; Munster: Aschendorf, 1933, 6. v.
ss Cf. Westermarck, The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas; Mac­
millan, London, 1912, v. 1, p. 527, for mass of evidence on these two points.

4 ·

sw

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Of the Possibility of Ignorance of the Natural Law

77

or misapplied kindness.54 Among existing savage tribes, chil­
dren, though seldom punished corporally, are subject to parents,
principally to the father, secondarily to the mother.55
Some idea of the fifth precept is held to be universal among all
known peoples. Westermarck56 cites with approval the state­
ment of Professor Taylor that “ no known tribe, however low
and ferocious, has ever admitted that men may kill one another
indiscriminately.” However, as in theft, primitive peoples dis­
tinguish between their own tribes and all others.57
Anthropology has collected an overwhelming mass of facts
concerning the primitive acceptance of the sixth precept, taken
literally. Though polygamy and polyandry58 have been the prac­
tice of many peoples, there exists a universal prohibition of
adultery. Severe punishments, sometimes the death penalty, are
given to those guilty of wife-seduction.59 To prevent the occa­
sion, and also to avert the extreme jealousy of their husbands,
married women, in many tribes, deliberately make themselves
ugly. At times this is carried to the point of mutilation.60* In
some tribes young men pray for the virginity of their brides.61
However, unfaithfulness on the part of the husband is much
more prevalent.62
The expression of the various duties concerning property
rights of others contained in the seventh precept finds an echo
54 Ibid., vol. I, p. 534.
55 Ibid., vol. I, p. 599.
56 Ibid., vol. i, p. 331.
57 Cf. Cooper, op. cit., p. 36.
Vanoverbergh, Morice C. I. C. M., The Isneg Life Cycle, Catholic
Anthropological Conference, Washington, 1936, p. 137.
Westermarck, V. 1, p. 331.
58 Polyandry seldom implies promiscuous and simultaneous intercourse of
many men with one wife; but rather a succession of men at different
periods. Cf. Westermarck, The History of Human Marriage, London:
Macmillan, 1891, p. 116.
89 Westermarck, Ibidem, pp. 51-133 passim.
m Ibid., p. 118.
p. 12368 Vanoverbergh, p. 182.

0

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78

in the norms of primitive tribes. That theft is quite generally
looked upon with disapproval may be inferred from the universal
custom of subjecting the thief to punishment or revenge. At
the very least, thieves are compelled to restore the stolen prop­
erty to its owner.®3 Personal effects become so bound up with
the personality of their owners that a not infrequent practice of
burying them with their owners is extant.04 The moral evil of
theft, however, has very definite limits. In most primitive peo­
ples, respect for property rights does not extend beyond the tribe
or clan.es Thus, while the concept of property rights and the
evil of violating them exists among primitive man, widespread
ignorance is prevalent concerning the extent of this norm.
The regard for truth inculcated by the eighth precept is almost
universally prevalent among savage peoples, at least within the
limits of their own tribes. Though travelers are sometimes de­
ceived, this may be explained by primitive or uncultured man’s
concepts of right which, at times, do not extend beyond tribal
limits, or by his desire to respond in a way which they see is ac­
cording to the wishes of the inquiring person.00
Monsignor Cooper, the noted anthropologist, has this to say
about the codes of primitive peoples:
The peoples of the world, however much they differ
as to the details of morality, hold universally, or with
practical universality, to at least the following basic
precepts. Respect the Supreme Being or the benevolent
being or beings who take his place. Do not "blas­
pheme.” Care for your children. Malicious murder or
maiming, stealing, deliberate slander or " black ” lying,
when committed against friend or unoffending fellow
clansman or tribesman, are reprehensible. Adultery
proper is wrong, even though there be exceptional cir­
cumstances that permit or enjoin it and even though
e3 Wcstermarck, Origin of Moral Ideas, v. 2, pp. 3-13.
ai Hobhouse, Evolution of Morals, p. 318.
33 Cooper, p. 36.
Hobhouse, p. 319.
63 Cf. factual evidence in Westcrmarck, Origin and Development of '
Morah, pp. 73-86.

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Of the Possibility of Ignorance of the 'Natural Law

The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

79

sexual relations among the unmarried may be viewed
leniently. Incest is a heinous offence.®7

The actual codes of conduct indicate that primitive peoples
have very comprehensive ideas of the natural law’s content.
When, however, the motivation of actual conduct is examined,
another problem is suggested. Can these peoples be said to have
knowledge of the natural law when the very term is unknown in
their language? It might be claimed that, though codes may be
recognized as obligatory, the conviction of oughtness may arise
from reasons or emotions apparently not even distantly related
to the true basis of obligation. In these cases, can it be said that
knowledge of the natural law is present, or are the precepts
merely accidental similarities of code that happen to follow from
peculiar superstitions ?
The intrinsic difficulty of motivation analysis is increased by
imperfect knowledge of the languages when dealing with primi­
tive peoples, and, as might be expected, varying opinions are pre­
sented.
One view holds that the scientific onlooker will see that cus­
tom is the real moral force behind the codes, though primitive
man may think he acts according to the norms for various other
reasons.08 These subjective notions of obligation arise from the
manner in which punishment consequent on the violation of
norms is conceived. Roughly, it may be said to follow, now
automatically or magically, now from the anger of spirits, or
again from a combination of both.®8
Thus it is given as an example of the automatic sanction that
the natives of Rotuma seek to adhere strictly to a code of hon­
esty, but this arises not from any motives civilized people might
propose for the virtue, but because enemies might kill them with
the stolen food,67
*70 while the Aleuts avoid contact with women dur­

I
I
’
I
I
I
I
I

67 Primitive Man, Vol. IV, n. 3, p. 36.
es Hobhouse, Evolution of Morals, p. 419.
e® Ibidem, p. 420·
70 Gardner, Journal of the Anthropological Institute, V. XXVII, p. 409.

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The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

ing the whaling season, for whales avoid dissolute tribes.71 Mo­
tives connected with the anger of spirits range from the crude
animism ascribed to the Roro (Cook Islands) tribes by Seligrnann,72 to the high ideal of the Comanches who believe the
Great Spirit punishes them for lying and other offences.73
Schmidt, on the other hand, while admitting that a limited
number of tribes have apparently very low motives for moral
conduct, maintains that the vast majority of the primitive peoples
associate the moral order with the Supreme Being. In general, it
may be said that the Supreme Legislator is concerned with the
observance of the ceremonies, sacrifices, and prayers which he
has introduced, together with obedience to parents and elders,
and due respect for human life. He forbids sexual immorality
and enjoins honesty and the aid of the poor, the weak, and in­
firm.74 In this view, the problem whether primitive peoples actu­
ally have knowledge of the natural law is almost eliminated, for
the majority of them live by the high motivation that the moral
order is the result of God’s command.
However,- some restrictions on this opinion are necessitated by
the evidence pointing to certain cases of automatic sanctions, and
the question may still be asked : Can those peoples who apparj
ently have no concept of a Supreme Legislator and have only
foolish and superstitious motives of action be said to know the
natural law?
Before attempting to answer, it is well to consider that two
theories concerning the relationship between religion and morality
among primitive peoples have arisen. The theory until recently
held more commonly by anthropologists speaks of a primitive
dissociation, the moral order gradually becoming permeated with
religious elements following the evolution of culture. The other
proposes that morality and religion were linked together primevally, while the dichotomy, now observable in some instances,
T1 Roclus, "Primitive Fold" in Comparative Éihnology, 1889, p. 52.
rt Quoted by Hobhouse, p. 425. In these tribes excessive quarreling
among the women disturbs the ghosts who withdraw hunting luck.
” Schoolcraft, Historical and Statistical Information Respecting the
Indian Tribes, 1851-1860, v. IV, p. 53.
74 Schmidt, Wilhelm, Storia Comparata della Religioni, p. 448.

Of the Possibility of Ignorance of the Natural Law

81

occurred only later and is to be explained by various factors not
yet fully brought to light.75 It would seem that both theories are
proposed with some preoccupation.
The preoccupation of the dissocianist theory would seem to be
evolutionary progress. It would say that “ custom is binding
upon primitive man and binding upon him in truth because it is
i . custom.”76 This custom, though binding, is constantly changing.
I What men are really working for is a code of ethics which is equally
I removed both from materialism and the half-naive creed of the
I churches.77 Thus the thesis would be the primeval dissociation
I of human conduct from religion, the antithesis the dominance of
! the moral order by an “ overruling Providence," and the synthe! sis, a condition wherein religion in relation “ to morality will be
iuCTeasingly restricted to emphasizing ordinary moral rules and
less preoccupied with inculcating special duties to the deity
(sic!)."78 Primitive dissociation fits in with the theory which
holds that, if moral codes exist without conscious dependence
on God, it follows that no real nexus between God and the moral
order exists, thus paving the way for theories of a more modern
day. This is reasoning beyond the premises, which contain, ac­
tually, only material for an “ actu ad posse ” illation. Moral
codes exist and are known without a knowledge of dependent re­
lation on God, therefore they can exist without such knowledge.
It does not follow that God is not the Supreme Legislator. A
child’s ignorance of the dependence of the electric current on a
central dynamo has no effect on the real relation between light
and the dynamo.
Moreover, a closer examination of automatic bad-effect code
reveals that it is capable of explanation in terms of the natural
law, when it is. remembered that knowledge of obligation (at
least in a limited degree) presupposes only a realization of
human nature and the essential relations flowing therefrom,
though not necessarily all of them. It requires, merely a shift

i

75 For an exposition of the two theories, cf. Cooper, op. cit., p. 46.
T« Hobhouse, Evolution of Morals, p. 419.
” Ibid., p. 637·
»8 Westermarck, Origin and Development of Moral Ideas, v. 2, p. 746.

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The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

or transfer from the consciousness of having violated the rules of
this nature and the consequent subjective feelings of remorse to
objectivate them into the physical aspect of a person or thing
and a taboo is ready to be formed. Back of every taboo and
every custom are actual men who began them. The argument of
St. John Chrysostom is so interesting in this connection that it
bears repetition. He says, “ They say they have no law of con­
science, and that there is no law implanted by God in nature.
My answer is to question them about their laws concerning mar­
riage, homicide, wills, injuries to others, enacted by their legis­
lators. Perhaps the living have learned from their fathers, and
their fathers from their fathers and so on. But go back to the
first legislator! From whom did he learn? Was it not by his
own conscience and conviction? Nor can it be said that they
heard Moses and the prophets, for Gentiles could not hear them.
It is evident that they derived their laws from the law which God
ingrafted in men from the beginning.” 79 The discovery of tribes
who hold fast to a moral code without knowledge of a Supreme
Legislator does not militate against their knowledge of the nat­
ural law.80
On the other hand, the preoccupation of Schmidt to prove the
primeval association of religion and morality with scientific facts
is understandable in the light of Genesis, where primitive man’s
responsibility to God is stated clearly.81 For the Catholic there
can be no question of a primitive dissociation of God and moral­
ity in the order of being, any more than there can be a question
of the independence of any form of created being. God is the
Creator of all things, visible and invisible, and we are certain
from Genesis that there was no such dissociation in the order of
knowledge.8’ However, if the part of the divine will is overem­
phasized in the interpretation of the relationship, confusion of the
dependence of the moral order on God in the order of knowledge
and being may easily arise. This confusion would spring from
™ Ad pop. Ant., 12, 4, P. G. 49, 13380 Farrell, A Companion to the Summa, v. II, p. 385.
81 “ If thon do well, shalt thou not receive? But if ill, shall not sin forth­
with be present at the door.” Gen. 4, 7.
88 This is not to exclude a later dissociation in the same order.

Of the Possibility of Ignorance of the 'Natural Law

83

the idea that obligation is an extrinsic dependence on God’s
will.83 For St. Thomas the natural law is a participation in the
Eternal Law that really causes obligation, though in the order of
secondary causes. Those who hold that obligation depends on a
special act of the will of God84 will be disturbed by scientific
facts that are alleged to prove a primitive dissociation of morality
and religion, provided they also wish to maintain that men every­
where have some knowledge of the natural law. On the con­
trary, these facts, even if proved,85 have no bearing on the
universality of moral knowledge in the Thomistic system, where
the natural law is the true secondary cause of obligation and the
first principle of the natural law is self-evident.
The objection that the sanctions proposed by many tribes for
moral acts are not the complete sanction of the natural law does
not imply they do not know the law, for knowledge of the per­
fect sanction is not at all necessary. All that is required for a
truejsanction is the knowledge that unhappiness will in some way
follow violations of the law of nature.86 Summing up, it may be
said-tnat tiievarious moraPcodes discovered by anthropologists
tend to confirm the previous deduction based on the nature of
man.
83 For a comparison of the doctrines of St. Thomas and Suarez on this
point, cf. Farrell, The Natural Moral Law, pp. I5®-I55·
84 Cf. Suarez, De Legibus, c. 6, 13.
85 Cf. Cooper, op. cit., p. 48, where the classical dissociative theory is said
to have received a body blow.
88 That frequent aberrations from the natural law may be proved is a
manifestation of the moral necessity of supernatural revelation.

J<

f

CHAPTER V
Special Problems
of

Practical Application
Principles

and

SPECIAL PROBLEMS

In treating the essence of the natural law it was seen that
every human person participates in this law to a greater or less
degree. Everyone has the requisite inherent inclinations and, at
least, the latent powers of reason; thus it is possible to declare
that all partake of the law at least in actu primo. Since, how­
ever, not everyone has the use of reason, participation in the law
in actu secundo admits of limitations. Difficulty will be found in
any attempt at a more precise determination of many of these
limitations, but since they are of great practical import in the
priestly ministry, at least the boundaries of this region must be
explored.
In this connection the question of moral maturity arises. Is it
possible for a person to be fully developed physically and intel­
lectually and yet remain, to all intents and purposes, a moral in­
fant? The eminent Cardinal Billot distinguishes two classes of
adult people: (a) those mature in the formal sense of the term,
i.e., physically, intellectually, and morally, and (b) those who,
though perhaps mature physically and intellectually, are, never­
theless, quite immature morally. They are called adults only in
the material sense.1 Further, he argues, since these people have
no concept of the moral order they have no responsibility and
consequently do not stn. An obviously sympathetic, perhaps
sentimental, attitude toward modern atheists may be deduced
from this opinion.
According to Billot, moral maturity is attained the moment the
» Billot, "La Providence de Dieu,” Etudes, V. 164, 1920, p. 387. Cf. also,
Bouuaert, S.J., “ Tous les athées sont-ils coupable? ” Nouvelle Revue
Théologique, April, 1921, 169-185.

84

Problems and Practical Application of Principles

85

reason of the subject comes to a knowledge of God and of His
law? This knowledge of God is necessary for the “ sentiment ”
of moral obligation,8 for man cannot be the source of his own
obligation. If he were, all distinction of good and evil would
ram'sh.4 Essentially, formally, and precisely, morality is an oricotation toward God, the ultimate end. Therefore, those holding
that a knowledge of God’s existence is unnecessary for moral obI ligation fall into the categorical imperative of Kant with its
I autonomy of human reason. Billots quotes St. Thomas in sup! port of his opinion, adducing the text in De Veritate where it is
I stated that conscience obliges in virtue of the divine precept.8 St.
I Thomas therefore, according to Billot, implicitly holds that with! out a knowledge of God’s existence there can be no conception
I of moral obligation.
I
Further proof is found by Billot in the condemnation of the
I theory of peccatum philosophicum by Alexander VHI.T Since,
I Billot says, the peccatum philosophicum does not exist, those
' lacking a knowledge of God’s existence have no moral obligation
and therefore, even when objectively transgressing the law of
God, do not sin.8 His opinion is clear—those entirely ignorant of
God's existence have no conscience, no moral obligation, and
cannot sin.®
J
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I2 "* La
* *condition
* * 8 9 d’adulte ne commence qu’à partir du moment ou la raison
est parvenu a la connaissance de Dieu et de sa loi.” Ibid., p. 389.
’ Ibid., p. 390.
iIbid., p. 391.
5 Ibid., p. 393.
8 " Constat quod conscientia ligare dicitur vi praecepti divini.” Ver. 27,
3, c.
2 “ Peccatum philosophicum seu morale est actus humanus disconveniens
naturae rationali et rectae rationi; theologicum vero et morale est trans­
gressio libera divinae legis. Philosophicum, quamvis grave, in illo, qui
Deum vel ignorat vel de Deo actu non cogitat, est grave peccatum, sed non
est offensa Dei, neque peccatum mortale dissolvens amicitiam Dei, neque
aeterna poena dignum." D. B. U. 1290.
8Billot, “La Providence de Dim*," Etudes, V. 164, 1920, p. 403,
9 “ Répétons de donc encore une fois, sans la connaissance préalable de
Dieu e de la loi de Dieu, il n’est aucune conscience possible de l’obligation
morale, aucune, aucune.” Ibid., p. 395.

86

The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

In criticism of Billot it may be said that he proposes a seem­
ingly faulty interpretation of Alexander VIII.10 In effect, he
says the condemnation constitutes an absolution of all those ob­
jectively sinning while subjectively not adverting, either habitu­
ally or at the moment, to God’s existence. The condemnation
would rather seem to point out that, provided the subject knows
the act is contrary to the law of morals, he sins in its commis­
sion whether he thinks of the existence of God or not.11 Where
Alexander VIII seems to affirm responsibility, Billot denies it
altogether.
Nor does it seem consistent with the principles of St. Thomas
that he be quoted in support of Billot’s opinion. St. Thomas cer­
tainly upholds the self-evidence quoad omnes of the first moral
principle,12 while his insistence on the contrary for the knowledge
of God’s existence is well known.13 Therefore, apart from other
influences, the first moral principle will be known before the ex­
istence of God. Moreover, when Thomas says that conscience
obliges in virtue of the divine precept he does nothing more than
state that the obligatory force of the natural law depends ulti­
mately and objectively on God. The whole point of the article is
that conscience really obliges, that it is a real, though secondary
and proximate, cause of obligation.14 When he says it obliges
in virtue of the divine precept he affirms the ontological and ob­
jective dependence on God, which, as has been seen previously,
does not, of necessity, include the logical and subjective depend­
ence. The first objection of the article15 seems to state Billot’s
10 If the interpretation is applied to one adversative it must hold for the
other since both are included. “Philosophicum, quantumvis grave, in illo,
qui Deum vel ignorat vel de Deo actu non cogitat.” D. B. U. 1290.
11 “ It is a common doctrine of the moralists, who hold that full advert­
ence is required for mortal sin, that it is sufficient to have a confused ad­
vertence, in the sense that the quality and quantity of the sin are perhaps
seen only indistinctly.” Damen, V. I, p. 165; Merkelbach, V. I, p. 352.
12 I-II, q. 94, a. 4.
13 C. Gen. I, u.
14 “ Respondeo dicendum quod conscientia procul dubio ligat” De Ver.
27, 3· c.
13 Ibid., ad lum.

Problems and Practical Application of Principles

87

case, maintaining that obligation cannot be found in man him­
self.16
Obj. “The obligatory character of acts comes only in
virtue of law. But man is not a law unto himself.
Therefore, since conscience is the result of a
human act, it does not oblige.
Res. " To the first objection be it stated that man him­
self does not make the law, but is obliged by the
act of his own knowledge by which he knows the
law made by another.”
Again, St. Thomas affirms the truly obligatory character of con­
science in the order of secondary causes. The important point
is that the law must be known, but not necessarily the one mak­
ing the law.
When confronted with the possibility that men who deny the
existence of God may yet recognize moral obligation, those fol­
lowing the opinion of Billot have recourse to the statement that,
in the case described, while God’s existence is explicitly denied,
it is implicitly held.17 It is true that a knowledge of moral prin­
ciples may lead one to the knowledge of the existence of God,
but this is hardly the knowledge of God Billot has previously re­
quired for moral obligation.
In Billot’s opinion the way seems to be opened to a complete
separation between the moral and juridical order, for responsi­
bility is denied men otherwise normally developed.
The whole problem of deliberate but amoral actions involves
an analysis of the human act Though men quite often act in a
manner not consonant with their rational nature—and it might
be said that human beings are often less than human—it is unde­
niable that there are certain actions proper to man’s specific na­
ture. These actions proceed, proximately or remotely, from rea­
son and rational appetite—powers distinguishing man from
merely animal creation. By reason of the intellect’s power to
recognize and to compare particular goods in relation to the uni16 Billot, Ibid., p. 391.
17 Bouaert, P. Claeys, S.J., “Tous les athées sont-ils coupable?"
Nouvelle Revue Théologique, April, 1921, pp. 169-188.

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The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

versai idea of good, and the relation of various means to it—
indifferentia judicii, as it is called—the will is free, at least to act
or not to act, whenever an object is proposed by the intellect as
a limited good.
An action becomes moral when it falls under the rule of
morals, norms or guides that lead man to the ultimate end of
human life. It has been seen that every specifically human act
is a free act because it proceeds from an intellect capable of see­
ing various goods at the same time, thus giving the will an op­
portunity of choosing between them. To determine the relation­
ship between free acts and moral acts is to answer the question
whether every free act falls under the rules of morals. It does.
This follows from the nature of free actions. According to St.
Thomas, the first principle of rational action is do the good,
which precept is explained by a comparison between the specula­
tive and practical order. The abstract idea of the good is the
first idea in the practical order, just as the idea of being is the
first concept in the speculative order.18 Now in order to act at
all, the rational being must have an end, for “finis” is the ex­
trinsic principle of action. To act rationally, man has to act
for an end considered under the formal aspect of end, i.e., he
must have an abstract idea of the good under which the singular
concrete good is placed and in relation to which he judges its
goodness. Further, every means to the end must be judged ac­
cording to an abstract, universal idea of its utility toward the
proposed end. These abstract ideas, necessary to free action,
give the key to the solution of the problem for, flowing from the
general idea of the good, is a self-evident principle of the moral
order, which governs every free act.
Obviously, in the theory of St. Thomas, there is a definite cor­
relation between the power of reasoning and the principles of mo­
rality for it is the same intellect arriving at speculative truth and
giving the command to action.1® Considering truth in itself,
apart from other considerations, the intellect is called speculative,
considering truth in relation to action of any kind, it is called
18 I-Π, q. 94, a- 41S I, Q. 79, »· I1,

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Problems and Practical Application of Principles

89

practical. However, one and the same intellect performs both
functions. In the speculative order the intellect forms the first
principle, the principle of contradiction, by a comparison between
being and non-being. By a comparison between good and its
contrary the practical intellect forms the self-evident first prin­
ciple of action; do good, avoid evil, just as the principle of
contradiction is contained in the concept of being and must be
known when the concept is known, so the first principle of action
is contained in the general idea of the good, and must be known
when the intellect culls it from material accompaniments.
When discussing synderesis,20 St. Thomas, again comparing
speculative and practical reasoning, points out that just as specu­
lative reasoning is impossible without first principles as bases, so
also rational action, proceeding from the practical intellect, must
rest on the first principles of synderesis.2* The principles of
both orders are equally self-evident, and deliberate but amoral
action is as foreign to the mind of St. Thomas as speculative rea­
soning without the principle of contradiction. The distinction
between material and formal adulthood affirmed by Billot, though
a courageous attempt at a solution of a perplexing problem of
salvation, does not seem to rest on solid ground. The evidence
of modern experimental psychology seems to confirm the opinion
denying a purely moral immaturity.22
It seems to be sufficiently established that a deliberate act can­
not be amoral and that there are no adult moral children. But
201, q. 79, a. 12, c.
21 “ Ratiocinatio hominis cum sit quidem motus progreditur ab intellectu
aliquorum, scilicet naturaliter notorum absque investigatione rationis, scilicet
a quodam principio immobili. Constat autem quod sicut ratio speculativa
ratiocinatur de speculativis, ita ratio practica ratiocinatur de operabilibus.
Oportet igitur naturaliter nobis esse indita sicut principia speculabilium, ita
et principia operabilium.” I, q. 79> a· 12, c.
22 Cf. Moore, Dom Thomas Verner, Ph.D., M.D. Dynamic Pschology,
Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1926, p. 380, where, after the relation of a case
history he states, “ A case of this kind approaches as closely to the psychi­
atric phantom, 'moral insanity,’ as anything I have ever met. Normal in­
telligence and apparently no moral perception. But what we find is not a
lack of perception of the difference between right and wrong, but a de­
ficiency of the emotional life.”

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The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

what of those who are actually children ? Are they ignorant of
the natural law? No dpubt they are included within the scope of
its binding force, for they, no less than other men, are human
persons. Nor can deliberate amoral acts be admitted in one case
more than in another. If children are capable of deliberate ac­
tion, the same principles and the same arguments apply.
The Canon Law of the Church seems to presume a correla­
tion between deliberate action and responsibility, if we can judge
from canon 88, §3.23 As is the case with all law, this is not in­
tended to be a scientific determination but a practical norm for
human affairs. When the child has reached the age of seven
years it is presumed to have the use of reason and therefore re­
sponsibility. However, that this is not intended to be an absolute
norm may be seen from the legislation on Holy Communion
which applies to children younger than seven provided they have
reached the use of reason.24
The criterion to be used in an attempted solution of the prob­
lems rising from knowledge, or lack of knowledge, of the natural
law in children is the deliberate act. The determination of the
nature of the deliberate act pertains to Theology, but the actual
capabilities in children for such acts can only be learned by ex1
periment. In other words, experimental psychology must supply
I
the facts used by theologians.
I
A deliberate and therefore responsible act is defined by theoI
logians as an act proceeding from an intrinsic principle with perI
ception of the end.25 By the intrinsic principle in the case of
j
human acts is meant the will, while perception implies intelj
lectual knowledge. As has been stated repeatedly, every human
I
23"Impubes, ante plenum septennium, dicitur infans seu per vel parvulus
et censetur non sui compos; expleto autem septennio, usum rationis habere
praesumitur. Infanti assimilantur quotquot usu rationis sunt habitu desti­
tuti.”
24 Cf. Can. 854, § 5. Also, Deer. S. C. de disciplina Sacram., 8 aug.
lyio, “De aetate admittendorum ad primam Communiam Eucharisticam,”
cited by Cappello, Tractatus Canonico-Moralis de Sacramentis. V. I, n.
4<Kt; also Vermeerscb-Creusen, Epitome luris Canonici, T. II, n. 118.
25 Cf. Aristotle’s definition, Eth. Ill, c. 1. This definition has been ap­
proved by all theologians. Cf. Merkelbach, V. I, p. 60.

Problems, and Practical Application of Principles

91

ad is directed toward an end in the formal sense of the term.
Men apprehend, at least vaguely, the concepts of end and means,
and, under the light of this universal knowledge, compare the
particular means to the end and concrete ends with each other,
thus being able to give reasons why they choose these ends and
means. They perceive the proportion of means to end and thus
move themselves.28
/
St. Thomas himself does not descend to a precise statement as
I to the age when children reach the use of reason. However, fol! lowing the logic of his system, he holds them morally responsible
i
for action when they have reached the use of reason. Since
every consciously motivated action is directed to an ultimate
end,27 he states that all those capable of such action should direct
it to the true ultimate end—not only mature people, but children
as well.28 The theologians of Salamanca point out that the use
28 Merkelbach, V. I, p. 61.
'
27 I-Π, q. I, a. 6, c.
28 “ Si vero non ordinet seipsum ad debitum finem, secundum quod in ilia
aetate est capax discretionis, peccabit mortaliter non faciens quod in se est.”
I-II, q. 89, a. 6. c. Cf. the contrary view in Scotus, 4, d. 17, n. 18. Thomas’
apparently rigorous doctrine is explained by Cajetan and the theologians of
Salamanca. Cajetan brings out that the ordination to the ultimate end con­
sists in a right ordination to the essential order of things. “Unde si sibi
appetendum (puer) censuerit bonum honestum in confuso, ut aetas illa
consuevit, bene deliberavit de seipso, finem suum in vera beatitudine col­
locans, quamvis imperfecte et inchoative: non plus exigitur a puero.”
Commentary in 1. c. The theologians of Salamanca bring out that
even those laboring under invincible ignorance of God’s existence are
held by the natural law and really fulfill it when in such ignorance. “ Com­
munior sententia tenet sufficere amorem Dei finis naturalis implicitum, con­
tentum in ipso amore et electione boni honesti et in proposito vivendi secun­
dum rectam rationem. ... Multi sunt qui in illa aetate (in primo instanti
usus rationis) nondum cognoverunt Deum explicite neque ejus nomen aut
rationem audierunt, sed laborant ignorantia ejus invincibili. Quisque ex­
presse et efficaciter diligit bonum honestum et hoc quod est vivere secundum
rectam rationem ibi iam implicite et virtualiter diligit ipsum Deum.... Con­
stat omnibus ad tale instans pervenientibus per lumen synderesis bonum
honestum et obligationem amplectendi ipsum, sequendique legem naturalem,
neque censetur completum tale instans quousque totum hoc cum plena
advertentia et deliberatione innotescat.” Sal. De Titiis et Peccatis, tr. 13, d.
20, dub. I, n. 17, 18, 19, 20.

RT

90

92

The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

of reason is not reached in a physical, but in a moral, moment
varying in length according to the capacities of individuals.
Moreover, full responsibility cannot be expected until the child
can be said to have fully reached the age of reason.29 Summing
up, it is seen that theology requires in the subject a capacity of
abstraction and judgment for the deliberate act. In particular
are required the universal ideas of the good and of means, to­
gether with the capacity to judge concerning them.
Before examining the evidence of experimental psychology.it
is well to remark that controversies exist among psychologists as
to the values of some of the various tests used. As they doubt,
it would not be fair for others to claim certainty.30 The object of
the investigation is man at his most variable period. This gives
rise to intrinsic difficulties not obviated to any extent by the rela­
tivistic attitude toward moral values assumed by not a few mod­
ern psychologists.31
Experiments on the moral perceptions of children have been
carried on in America, Italy, and Germany during recent years,
demonstrating the world-wide interest in the problem. Though
the experiments do not lay claim to final certainty, they may be
indications of strong probability.
The experiments conducted by Galli in the University of the
Sacred Heart, Milan,32 though testing children beyond the pre­
sumed age of discretion, are interesting by reason of his insist­
ence that a definite correlation exists between moral judgment
capacity and general intelligence. He maintains that the lowest
age level capable of moral judgment will certainly bear some
»/Md., D. XX dub. r, i2.
30 For a discussion of various methods, cf. Moers, Zur Prüfung des
Sitilichen Perstandnisses Jugendlicher l Zeitschrift fur angewandte Psy­
chologie, 34, p. 431 f. Leipzig: Barth.
31 Cf. Jones, Vernon. Children’s Morals in Handbook of Child Psy­
chology by Murchison, Clark University Press, Worcester, Mass, pp.
482-533·
31 Galli, Arcangelo, Contributo allo studio del Ciudizio morale nei fancuilli normali ed anormali in Pubblicazioni della Università del Sacro
Cuore, Serie scsta, Scicnze Biologiche, V. 6, pp. 325-367.

Problems and Practical Application of Principles

93

relation to the time of general intellectual development.33 Galli’s
tests further proved that children in the first years of school life
are capable of moral judgments requiring some delicacy of per­
ception.34
The experiments carried on by Dr. Moers in Germany33 pro­
ceed from the recognition that the subjective motive of action is
of great importance in morals.36 The motivation of the child is
to be determined by objective tests though the difficulties of the
attempt are well seen. A series of moral actions are related to
the children who judge concerning the relative good or evil of the
participants, e.g. :

1. Joseph’s parents had forbidden him to skate on a
neighboring pond as they feared thin ice. Joseph,
however, thought his parents too fearful. That
afternoon while his parents were away, he went skat­
ing, taking his little brother along. Both broke
through the ice, and though Joseph was saved, his
brother was drowned.
2. While skating, Ernst saw that Karl approached a
dangerous place on the pond. Ernst knew the thin­
ness of the ice in that spot though Karl did not.
Ernst would have warned Karl of the danger, but
because Karl had insulted him the day before he
■» thought to himself, “Let him skate on; if he breaks
through the ice, it serves him right” However, as
Karl neared the dangerous place another boy saw his
danger, warned him, and thus there were no bad re­
sults.

In a series of such tests the children were asked to judge the
comparative morality of the participants. The conclusions drawn
by Dr. Moers were :
33 “ Se si pone il quesito e il limite inferiori di età entra il quale il
fanciullo normale è capace di un adequato giudizio morale, ci sembra di
poter dedurre legittimamente dalle richerche discritte che quel limite è
certamente in rapporto con lo svillupo intellectuale del soggetto.” p. 363.
3* Ibid., p. 364.
Zur Prüfung des sittlichen Verstândnisses Jugendlicher in Zeitschrift
für angewandte Psychologie, 37, 56-74. Leipsig: Barth, 1930.
38 “ Der sittliche Wert einer Handlung îst bestimmt dur die Motive, von
dcnen sich der Handelnde leiten lâsst.” Ibid., p. 56.

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94

The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

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1. The child in the six- to ten-year bracket is quite ca­
pable of judgments concerning moral values. They
are able to abstract from the effect and to judge con­
cerning motivation.
2. He is heavily influenced by the mature people around
him and is often uncertain in his judgments.
3. Virtue and vice known to him in a practical way
(Obedience, Disobedience, Carefulness, Negligence)
are the most important standard of moral evaluation
in the child’s mind. The extraproportional value
given to these concepts and the uncertainty of judg­
ment are to be attributed to a lack of life-experi­
ence. There is no doubt, however, that children of
this age (6-10) are capable of moral judgments.37
Experiments concerning the moral concepts of preschool chil­
dren have also been conducted,88 and it has been discovered that
children apparently have some moral concepts at a surprisingly
early age.3® In the Detroit experiment in which 1218 children
were examined, more than one-fourth of the children tested at
the two-year level recognized the concept of obedience in re­
sponse to a direct parental command.40
One question asked of the children was interesting from the
point of view of obligation. To ask the child, “ Why must you
do what mama tells you to do?” is to presuppose the child has
some notion of obligation. More than sixty per cent of the an­
swers before the five-year level lacked a reason. However, some
37 Ibid., p. 73.
3S Cf. Mary, Sister, I. Η. M., Ph. D., “ The Moral and Religious Develop­
ment of the Preschool Child" in Studies in Psychology and Psychiatry,
Catholic University, vol. LVI, April, 1936. Cf. also “Research Find­
ings in the Moral Development of Children,” The Catholic University of
America Educational Research Bulletins, I, 6, Washington, D. C., 1925, p.
31, and “ Some Research Findings in the Moral Development of the Pre­
school Child ” in The Catholic Educational Review, Mar. 1926, pp. 145-153,
both by the same author.
39 Piaget brings out clearly the difficulties of children with introspection.
Cf. Piaget, Jean, Judgment and Reasoning in the Child, New York: Har­
court, Brace and Co., 1928, pp. 136-146. Evaluation of experiments based
on a question-answer technique is thus rendered difficult.
40 Moral and Religious Development of Preschool Child, p. 10.

Problems and Practical Application of Principles

95

of the children were able to give such reasons as, “ You must be
obedient;” “ God wants you to,” etc,41
Another question presupposed an abstract ideal of goodness—
"When are you a good little boy or girl? ” Though some very
young children recognized right concepts, no more than forty per
cent of any level of preschool children had right concepts of the
constitutive elements of childhood goodness.42
Later in the study43 the statement of Rand-Sweeney-Vincent
concerning the conscience of children is quoted with approval.
These authors hold that conscience, or judgment of morality, is
clearly evident in children of three, while at four or five, clearly
defined notions of right and wrong are present.44
Do these experiments signify that very young children have
and use the principles of synderesis? Do they know the natural
law? The opinion of the theologians of Salamanca, holding that
the use of reason is not reached in a physical but a moral mo­
ment, is to be remembered. This is to say that the first instant in
which a child reached the use of reason is not physically and indivisibly one, but presupposes the whole duration of time needed
by the child in order to distinguish between the sensible good and
the rational good, and to deliberate which of the said goods is to
be chosen. In this moral moment the first act placed by the child
is related to the good in general. The personal equation is su­
preme here ; he conceives this good as that which is agreeable to
his own person, prescinding from the agreement or disagreement
with right reason upon which morality is based.
Consequent upon this perception of the intellect there follows
the love-act of the will toward the same object. It also considers
it under the same aspect. After these preliminary acts of the in­
tellect and the will, in which the child’s reasoning powers find
41 Moral and Religious Development of Preschool Child, p. 12.
4î Ibid., p. 27.
43 Ibid., p. 45.
44 Cf. Rand, Winifred; Sweeny, Mary; Vincent, Lee; Growth and Devel­
opment of the Young Child, Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Co., 1930, p, 366.
With the above conclusions it is also held that “ young people have no other
judgment for what is right or wrong than a reflection of the beliefs of per­
sons about them.” Ibid.

.ιιιηιη^Μί··^^

96

The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

their functional beginnings, there follows another act of the intel­
lect by which he distinguishes between moral good and moral
evil, or between that which tends to his total happiness in accord
with right reason and that which does not. Herein lies the pri­
mary function of the practical reason, namely, to distinguish be­
tween good and evil. This function is expressed by the first
principle of synderesis, do good, avoid evil. Consequent upon
this there is some determination of the obligatory good and the
evils prohibited. The completion of this process marks the at­
tainment of the use of reason, or the fulfillment of the moral
moment of which the Scholastics speak.45 Moreover, full re­
sponsibility is not present until the child has fully reached the age
of reason, i.e., until the child has completed the moral moment in
which the use of reason is reached.46 Further, if the intellectual
activity of young children is distinguished by an absence of con­
scious realization, general propositions, and deductions,47 it would
be unwary to say absolutely that formal knowledge of the nat­
ural law is present, at least in the sense theology demands.
The facts as presented by experimental psychology are as yet in­
complete.48 However, there is a strong probability that some
45 Cardinal Cajetan makes an interesting comment in regard to the prin­
ciple, do good, avoid evil. He holds that the child, on the perception of this
principle, will as a rule choose the good and thus turn to the true end of
his nature. The reason adduced is that the will process of the child, having
its inception in the willing of the general good to himself (amor concupis­
centiae), sees that his total good will consist in the bonum rationis and that
all others are only partial goods. Since he began by an ordination of things
to himself, he will choose that good which perfects his entire being, and not
that which is good only in relation to- some part.—“ Et quoniam ipse secun­
dum seipsum est magis amatus, quam ipsemet secundum partes seu partiales
rationes suas, consequens est quod sibi secundum seipsum totum, non secun­
dum hunc vel illum respectum appetendum est.” Comm, in I-II, q. 89, a. 3.
46 Sal., De l/itiis et Peccatis, D. XX, dub. 1, 12.
47 Cf. Piaget, Jean, Judgment and Reasoning in the Child, op. cit., p.
5748 This does not militate against the value of the conclusions reached by
Sister Mary that (a) the bases of some basic moral concepts have their be­
ginnings in the preschool years, (b) considerable progress is made with
some of these concepts, (c) heed should be given these facts in preschool
education. Moral and Religious Development of the Preschool Child, p. 47.

Problems and Practical Application of Principles

97

preschool children have a knowledge of the natural law.48*
APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES TO SOME MODERN PROBLEMS

Birth Control
The word control has a fine human sound about it. In the
modern ear it is joined with such forthright words as scientific,
rational, and mature. Never, moreover, has it been accepted
more heartily than when coupled with the word birth to form
the phrase Birth Control. That actually the term is a cloak to
hide the moral ugliness of contraception50 only causes it to be
drawn more closely around the soul. Birth Control is condemned
as a serious moral evil by the Church.51 Does ignorance exist in
the United States concerning the immorality of this practice ? Is
it widespread? It is understood that actual knowledge in indi­
vidual cases can only be determined by examination.
4B If so, they can sin ; if they can sin, they should receive Extreme Unction
in danger of death, even if they haven’t received First Holy Comtnunion.
There seems to be at least enough evidence for the conditional conferring
of the sacrament spoken of in can. 941. The above experiments also prove
that at least a prudent doubt may be had as to -whether children under ca­
nonical age are completely devoid of the use of reason. When such doubt
exists “ children (below the age of, seven) should be instructed if possible in
the essentials of the faith (and the other requisite conditions), before the
sacrament of Baptism is administered. On the other hand, children of
eight or nine years in danger of death could be baptized conditionally (’si
capax est’), even if they have manifested no intention or dispositions.
There is a possibility they have not reached the use of reason.” Cf. Connell,
Francis, C. SS. R., in The Ecclesiastical Review, June, 1927, p. 578.
50 Contraception is defined as the use of carnal copulation in any way
that positively (as opposed to negatively) excludes generation.
51 Cf. Pius XI, “ Casii Connubii," D. B. U. 2239, 2240, 2241, where it is
shown that the abuse of marriage in this way is contrary to Scripture,
Tradition, and reason. It is interesting that the Pope's argument from
reason is on the basis of an intrinsic evil—"At nulla profecto ratio ne
gravissima quidem, efficere potest, ut quod intrinsece est contra naturam, id
cum natura congruens et honestum fiat.” The intrinsic evil of Birth Control
lies in the deliberate perversion whereby the essential order between the act
and the end is destroyed. As all sin, it is an inversion of order. Its
gravity is measured by the importance of the end rendered impossible by
the act qua act, i. e., the being of the human race.

et rM».

98

The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

It is well to preface any remarks on this question with the
statement that the United States has a culture predominately
Protestant in tone. People taking part or interest in current af­
fairs are certain to hear the Protestant view on ethical questions.
Now the practical Protestant view of contraception is certainly
not inclined to universal condemnation of the evil. Many Prot­
estant ministers actively further the Birth Control movement.
As a matter of fact, it may be safely said that the majority of
Americans favor artificial contraception.52 If, in many instances,
the only moral teachers they know not only permit the practice
but crusade for it as well, this condition is to be expected. But
what of Catholics? Can they be in a state of inculpable ignorance
of the moral prohibition of contraception?
A distinction must be made here. Objectively, and in the ab­
stract, it may be stated that inculpable error of the malice of the
practice would seem almost impossible for the average Catholic.
The teaching of the Church is well known in this matter. Even
in the supposition that a Catholic doubts about the matter, he
would normally seek the solution of the doubt from competent
authority. In other words, he would advert to the obligation of
investigation. Opportunities are not lacking for the resolution
of these doubts.
Subjectively, the case may be somewhat altered. The average
Catholic reads the newspapers every day; he associates with his
fellows. He is apt to find that his labor union chief, his doctor,
and the local university professors all heartily approve of the
idea.” Moreover, it is presented as a “ means of bettering the
present economic order,” 54 as the democratic, the scientific, the
52 Gallup polls at least indicate trends. Cf. New York Times, Jan. 24,
10(0, 22: 4, where the Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup) holds that 77%
of the American people favor ** distribution of birth control information to
married persons by government health climes.” It also relates that “re­
gardless of the manner in which the issue was stated all studies have found
sentiment running between 70 and 80 per cent favorable to the birth control
program.” Add as cumulative evidence the enormous industry dealing with
contraceptive devices.
81 Cf. New York Times, Jan. 24, 1940, 1:4.
54 Ibidem.

Problems and Practical Application of Principles

99

progressive thing to do. It is superfluous to say that Catholics
want to be as democratic, as progressive, and as scientific as any­
one. Add a circumstance or two or apparent justification in the
individual case and it is not difficult to imagine that in a rare
case a Catholic (particularly one who is somewhat lax in religious
practices) may think Birth Control is not so bad after all, or at
least may reason that the malice of the sin under the circum­
stances would not be grave.
Purely from the standpoint of the natural law, which is to say,
from the standpoint of reason as uninformed by faith, the per­
ception of the evil of Birth Control requires the ability to make
rather fine distinctions. It is certainly not among the immediate
and evident deductions from first principles and it has been seen
that even acute minds are capable of erring concerning remote
conclusions. The mind must evade such intellectual shoals as,
“Birth Control is only the harnessing and controlling of nature
and man is made for that purpose,” or, “ The use of food for
pleasure alone generally does not exceed a venial sin, and food
concerns a primary inclination to the preservation of individual
being.” The comparative obscurity of the doctrine itself from
the point of view of the natural law, together with the whole
weight of environment and the inclinations of the lower appetites
involved, would tend to produce error in these matters. This
error is a judgment made not in the armchair of abstract thought
but in the noisy traffic of daily life. The issue may be presented
as a choice between two evils in which the apparent good of the
wife or family is at stake. The power of these influences together
with the force of public opinion may combine to so obscure the
issue that the final miserable error is inculpable. The writer be­
lieves this to be true in some instances. This is not to say the
condition is to be condoned in Catholics. The solemn duty of
pastors and others who have care of souls is clear. Not even the
suspicion that the Church may condone these errors may be tol­
erated.55 The full truth must be taught.
55 “ Sacerdotes igitur, qui confessionibus audiendis dant operam, aliosque
qui curam animarum habent, pro suprema nostra auctoritate et omnium
animarum salutis cura, admonemus, ne circa gravissimam hanc Dei legem

100

The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

Another question in the same category of unnatural perversion
is voluntary pollution. Though objectively a lesser evil than
Birth Control,56 it has its origin in the violation of the same
order, i.e., the essential ordination of the sexual act to the pro­
creation of children.
In the sin of self-abuse the circumstances of apparent justifica­
tion, including public opinion and danger to the life partner or
personal possessions, do not obtain as in Birth Control. For this
reason the possibilities for invincible error will be much less
among adult persons. However, the case might be otherwise
among children. They may be invincibly ignorant of the evil of
self-abuse from the simple fact that the evil of the action has
never occurred to them.
fideles sibi comissos errare sinant, et multo magis, ut ipsi se ab huistnodi
falsis opinionibus immunes custodiant, neve in iis ullo modo conniveant.”
Pius XI, Casti Connubii, D. B. U. 2240.
The Church, in a response of the Sacred Penitentiary (March to, 1886),
while enjoining confessors as a general rule to question penitents concerning
this practice when suspicion arises, nevertheless recognizes that in an
extreme case the good faith of the penitent may be left undisturbed.
I. Quando adest fundata suspicio, poenitentem, qui de onanismo omnino
silet, huic crimini esse addictum, num confessario liceat a prudenti et
discreta interrogatione abstinere, eo quod praevideat plures a bona fide ex­
turbandos, multosque Sacramenta deserturos esse: Annon potius teneatur
confessarius prudenter ac discrete interrogare?
IX. An Confessarius, qui, sive ex spontanea confessione, sive ex prudenti
interrogatione, cognoscit, poenitentem esse onanistam, teneatur illum de
hujus peccati gravitate, aeque ac de aliorum peccatorum mortalium, monere,
eumque (uti ait Rituale Romanum) paterna charitafe reprehendere, eique ■
absolutionem tunc solum impetire, cum sufficientibus signis constet eumdem
dolere de praeterito, et habere propositum non amplius onanistice agendi?
Sacra Poenitentiaria, attentio vitium infandum, de quo in casu, late in­
valuisse, ad proposita dubia respondendum consuit, prout respondet :
Ad. I. Regulariter negative ad primam partem : affirmative ad secundum.
Ad. II. Affirmative, juxta doctrinas probatorum Auctorum.
Datum Romae in S. Poenitentiaria, die ro Martii 1886.
Cf. also, Damen, op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 592 and 593.
68 "Dicendum est quod gravitas in peccato magis attenditur ex abusu
alicujus rei quam ex omissione debiti usus. Et ideo inter vitia quae sunt
contra naturam infimum locum tenet peccatum immunditiae (voluntary
pollution)." II-II, q. 154, a. 12, ad 4um.

Problems and Practical Application of Principles

101

To appreciate the evil quality of self-abuse from the point of
view of the natural law, some knowledge of the sex function is
necessary.57 Before the concept of perversion can be had, a
knowledge of the purpose of the natural act is necessary. Since
objectively the full evil of self-abuse may be present before the
age of puberty,58 the habit may be deeply ingrained before correct
knowledge of the natural function is present, which is to say,
children may be invincibly, and therefore inculpably, ignorant of
the malice of their action.59
Euthanasia
Among the evident deductions from the first principles of the
natural law is the precept, Thou shall not kill. Proof that it is
an easy deduction may be had by both the a priori and the a pos­
teriori methods. By the former method it will be seen that the
precept is but a combination of two first principles both of which
are norms guiding fundamental human· inclinations. To arrive
at the conclusion, Thou shalt not kill is but to apply the selfevident principle, Do unto others as you would have them do unto
you, to another self-evident principle guiding man to the con­
servation of his being. The former principle flows from the so­
cial nature of man, while the latter is based upon a tendency man
has in common with other things. By thus reasoning from selfevident principles based on the very nature of man it is seen that
the precept expressed by the Fifth Commandment of the Deca­
logue will be an evident deduction.
The a posteriori argument has been seen previously. No
known tribe, primitive or otherwise, has condoned indiscriminate
57 It is evident that the evil of self-abuse could be recognized by the child
through the strict prohibitions and warnings of parents and superiors
(natural law because of the precept of obedience to superiors). However,
this is seldom the case—such warnings are not given before the age of
puberty for fear of exciting undue curiosity.
58Cf. Noldin-Schmitt, De Sexto Praecepto. Innsbruck: Pustet, 1932, p.
27.
59 Aertnys-Damen, Theologia Moralis, Vol. I, p. 92; Noldin-Schmitt, De
Sexto Praecepto, p. 16.

MM

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The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

killing.60 Though primitive peoples have often qualified the gen­
eral principle, Thou shalt not kill, by a distinction between their
own tribes and other peoples, this universal condemnation of in­
discriminate killing is a powerful argument for the conclusion
already'made from the nature of man, i.e., that the Fifth Com­
mandment is an evident deduction from first principles.
Contained in the respect for the right to life of others com­
manded by this deduction is the prohibition of Euthanasia or
mercy killing.61 As in the case of Birth Control the modern
world chooses a euphemism to cover up an evil. The aura of re­
finement and culture surrounding this word with the Greek root,
combined with a sentimental reluctance to accept the fact of
physical pain have gained wide acceptance for the practice. A
similar sentiment prompts the erection of well-equipped dog hos­
pitals while, at the same time, many men lack elemental care.
Euthanasia was practiced by some doctors during World
War I,62 when hopelessly wounded soldiers were drugged in lethal
quantities.63
This suggests the query whether people can be invincibly ig­
norant of the evil of euthanasia—the direct killing of a man in

P
ί

60 Cf. Westermarck, Edward, The Origin and Development of Moral
Ideas, Vol./i, p. 33.
61 “ Denn irgend einen Menschen toten, es sei denn einen ungerechten
Angreifer zur Verteidigung aber einen todeswurdigen Verbrecher auf offendlicher Autoritât hin za Strafe, ist stets ein groszen Verbrechen vor
Gott, auch wcnn es sich dabei nur um die Lebensverkurzung von einen paar
Minuten aber Sekunden handeln sollte.” Luhmkuhl, August, Theotogisch
practische Quartalshrift, Linz, 1916, Heft 4, p. 804. As is evident, this
practice deprives men of the opportunity for repentance; if they are in the
state of grace, of the faculty of increasing merit by virtuous acts. It is con­
demned by Catholic moralists as a direct killing of an innocent party. Cf.
Merkelbach, op. cit. Vol. 1, p. 360 ; Damen, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 392.
62 Lehmkuhl, August, op. cit., p. 802.
63 Lethal quantities of morphine vary according to individual physical
constitutions and the degree of habituation in the subject. The ordinary
man can stand in the neighborhood of .01 gram per day. Drug addicts are
capable of assimilating from .02 to .05 grams while exceptional cases have
been known where even 1.0 gram was not fatal. Cf. Cappelmann-Bergmann,
Pastoral Medicin, p. 70.

f

Problems and Practical Application of Principles

103

order to eliminate suffering or for the apparent good of the
State.
In the theoretical treatment of the possibility of invincible ig­
norance the conclusion was made that per se such ignorance is not
to be admitted concerning proximate and evident conclusions
from first principles. However, it was conceded that per accidens
the subject may conceive an action as justifiable in practical ac­
tion surrounded with all its circumstances while fully admitting
the general prohibition. This would hold in the present consid­
eration. The aversion to physical pain that causes men to sub­
vert the value of life to the value of physical well-being is no
doubt due to a long series of sins on the part of both individuals
and society. However, as has been seen, ignorance which is a
consequence of sin is not always culpable ignorance.41 If it is a
result of a previous sin it is not culpable unless it had been fore­
seen. Though its admission constitutes an indictment of modern
society, the possibility of invincible ignorance of the evil of
euthanasia is to be admitted. The same principles can sometimes
be applied to suicide.

I

Divorce
The prevalence of divorce in the United States suggests the
question whether inculpable ignorance can be admitted in any of
these cases. Here only the complete dissolution of the bond of
a ratified and consummated marriage involving freedom to marry
again is considered.
Today the vast majority of Catholic authors declare marriage
is indissoluble by the precept of the natural law.65 It is argued
that divorce places very serious obstacles in the way of the pri­
mary end of marriage, i.e., the procreation and education of chil­
dren. The dissolution of the marriage bond deprives the child of
at least one parent. He needs the care and guidance of both;*
85
«* Bouquillon, Thomas, De ^ignorance invincible des conclusions éloignées
de la loi naturelle, p. 9.
85 Joyce, George Hayward, Christian Marriage, London; Sheed and
Ward, i933> P- 284

104

The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

nature intends the child to be reared in the normal atmosphere of
the family.66
Moreover, when it is considered that divorce is contrary to the
secondary end of marriage, or the mutual love of the respective
parties, the case for the indissolubility of marriage becomes much
stronger. The possibility of divorce would militate against that
mutual acceptance of lifelong partnership which is a necessary
condition of marital peace.61 However, when it is said that di­
vorce renders difficult the primary, and is incompatible with the
secondary, end of marriage, it is to be understood that these pre­
cepts are primary and secondary in the ontological order. It may
be otherwise in the order of knowledge. Even if the permission
of divorce in the Old Law be overlooked,68 it is well to remember
that some prominent Catholic theologians have upheld the licit­
ness of divorce under certain circumstances in a purely natural
society, provided it be under the authority of the State.69
While there is no doubt that the dissolution of a ratified and
consummated marriage is declared by the Church to be absolutely
forbidden,70 the mere fact that absolute indissolubility of the
marriage bond from the point of view of the natural law has been
questioned seriously by sound theologians is enough to prove it is
not an evident deduction from first principles. If it falls, there­
fore, within the class of principles known as remote conclusions,
invincible ignorance could be admitted in some cases.
However, the case mentioned is purely hypothetical as far as
Catholics are concerned. Marriage attains the dignity of a Sac­
rament in the New Law, and every valid marriage between bap­
tized persons is a sacrament.11 To be invincibly ignorant of the
evil of divorce, therefore, the Catholic would have to be ignorant
66 Supp., q. 67, a. 2, c. and ad wm.
67 C. Gen., 3, 123.
83 Dent., 24, 1-2.
69 Cf. Bellarmine, De Matr., lib. 1, c. 4 ; Suarez, De Legibus, lib. 2, c. 14,
n. 20; Sanchez, De Mat., lib. 2, disp. 13, n. 4; Palmieri, Tractatus de
Matrimonio Christiano, Rome: Polyglot Press, 1880, p. 140.
70 “ Matrimonium validum ratum et consummatum nulla humana potestate
nullaque causa praeterquam morte dissolvi potest.” Can. 1118.
71 Cf, Canon 1012,

Problems and Practical Application of Principles

105

of the teaching of the Church in regard to one of the sacraments,
and such ignorance is rare. If any Catholic doctrine is known in
the United States by Catholics and non-Catholics alike, it is the
teaching of the Church on divorce.’2 It is difficult to conceive
then of any Catholics being in the state of ignorance regard­
ing the sinfulness of divorce. Nevertheless, many applications
for divorce are made by Catholics. Prescinding from legitimate
petitions of legal separations, are all the remaining Catholics who
seek the complete dissolution of the marriage bond consciously
guilty?
If the opportunities for knowledge of the moral evil of divorce
are considered, corresponding ignorance which is not the result
of some sin is hardly conceivable. However, a distinction ad­
vanced by Bouquillon might be made here. John of St. Thomas
holds that the axiom, “ He who can do a thing, has an obligation
to do it and then does not do it, commits a sin,” is to be inter­
preted as demanding not only the remote but also the proximate
and facile powers of action. If the power is only remote and the
action can be performed only with great difficulty, then the sub­
ject having the obligation to act does not sin by inactivity. In
order for an action to be voluntary it must proceed from the will
itself.” Basing himself on this doctrine, Bouquillon distinguishes
between culpable ignorance and ignorance that is purely a conse” The Council of Baltimore says : “ Manifeste apparet gravissimae culpae
illos esse reos, qui a magistratu civili matrimonium dissolvi postulant, vel,
quod gravius est, divortio civili obtento, novum matrimonium inire attenant
legitimo vinculo posthabito, quod coram Deo et Ecclesia adhuc manet. Ad
haec crimina compescenda poenam excommunicationis statuimus, Ordinario
reservatam, ipso facto incurrendam ab eis, qui postquam divortium civile
obtinuerint, matrimonium ausi fuerint attentare.” Tit. IV, C. II. This
decree would seem to retain its force even after the publication of the New
Code, Cf. Barrett, John, A Comparative Study of the Councils of Balti­
more and the Code of Canon Law, Washington, D. C. ; The Catholic Uni­
versity of America, 1932, p. 22.
r«John of St Thomas, I-II, q. 6, disp. 3, dig. 4—"Illud axioma:—qui
potest et tenetur et non facit, peccat, intelligo de eo qui proxime et expedite,
non remote tantum et impedite, quia ut supra diximus omnino ut sit
voluntaria debet procedere ab ipsa voluntate.”

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The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

quence of sin.74 Culpable ignorance is always vincible, but ig­
norance that results from sin is not always in the proper sense
vincible, unless the necessity of avoiding the sin lest ignorance
follow was foreseen. In almost all countries matrimony has been
transferred from ecclesiastical to civil control.75 All these coun­
tries permit absolute divorce.76 The influence resulting from the
prevailing attitudes of government, the wretchedness that will in­
evitably happen in at least some marriages, and sins from which
the effect of ignorance is not foreseen make the above principle
applicable in some extreme cases. Though the door is thus left
open, it must be stated emphatically that a very strong presump­
tion exists against the admission of invincible ignorance among
Catholics concerning the evil of divorce.
Fornication
Fornication is defined as a sexual relation between two unmar­
ried persons with mutual consent. The demonstration of St.
Thomas proving the defined act is contrary to the natural
law points out that it is gravely injurious to the good of
children and thus to the common good.77 Those performing the
act of fornication will the pleasures of the flesh without the con74 Bouquillon, Thomas, De l’ignorance invincible des conclusions eloignees
de la loi naturelle, Arras, Laroche, 1881,—“C’est sur ce principe qu’est
fondée la distincion entre l’ignorance coupable et l’ignorance qui est seulemente la suit d’un fauté. Toute ignorance qui provient d’une faute, ce qui
pourrait etre appelée vincible en tant que la faute aurait pû etre évitée, n’est
point, par cela même, coupable: car elle peut n’etre point volontaire.” p. 9.
Cf. also Francisco de Victoria, Rel. de Indis, c. 33; Vasquez, I-II, disp. 120,
c. 4 ; Sanchez, In Decalogum, lib. 1, c. 16, n. 35.
75 Joyce, George Haywood, Christian Marriage, p. 21.
78 Cf. Department of Commerce and Labor, Bureau of Census, Special
Report on Marriage and Divorce, 1876-1908, Washington, D. C, Govern­
ment Printing Office, 2 V., Part 1, p. 331. Except in the state of South
Carolina. “Divortium a vinculo matrimonii numquam permittitur in hoc
Statu (Constitution, Art. 17, § 3).” Alford, Culver Bernard, Ius Matri­
moniale Comparatium, New York: Kenedy, 1938, P. 482. This work is
an exhaustive comparison between the marriage laws of the Church and
the individual States.
77ΙΙ-Π, q. 154, a. 2, c.

**
»«
Problems and Practical Application of Principles

107

comitant obligation and burdens of wedlock. This is patently
contrary to the good of society, for the education of children de­
mands not only a mother’s care, but care on the part of the father
as well. Therefore, fornication is clearly contrary to the natural
law. If it be objected that in some cases children might be cared
for without marriage, the act will still be a sin for "a thing falls
within the scope of the law according to that which happens as a
general rule, and not according to that which might happen in a
particular case.”78
Is the prohibition of fornication an evident deduction from the
first principles of the natural law? Though in a Catholic culture
the malice of the sin may be evident to all those capable of receiving instruction,70 the same cannot be said for a pagan civilization. In two different places St. Thomas states that the
Gentiles at the time of the apostles thought simple fornication
was not evil.80 The following is an excerpt from the moral code
of the Isneg people, a primitive island race.
All Isneg boys should bé careful not to render a girl
pregnant; this is one of the delinquencies that are abhorred more than anything else among the Isneg. You
may be inclined to sow your wild oats; that is but natural, but here you have to look out. You should never
under any pretext impregnate a girl whom you could not
many afterwards, and even though you could make her
your wife, it would still be a dangerous thing to do;
suppose some obstacle comes in the way, you know the
consequences ; you know very well that the relatives of
the offended girl will get the awat; they will raid your
house and carry away your precious jars, your beads
and all that is valuable. There is no mercy for a boy
78 Ibid.
70The following proposition was condemned by Innocent XI: “Tam
clarum videtur fornicationem secundum se nullam inviolare malitiam et
solum esse malum quia interdicta, ut contrarium omnino rationi dissonum
videatur.” D. B. U. 1198.
80 “ Fornicatio autem prohibetur specialiter quia gentiles non reputabant
eam esse peccatum.” I-II, q. 103, a. 14, a. 3um. “ Quia apud Gentiles for­
nicatio simplex non reputabatur illicita propter corruptionem naturalis
rationis." II-II, q. 154, a. 2, ad rum.

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The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

108

who has committed a crime like that ; so do not be rash ;
fornication is a dangerous thing.81

Evidently the Isnegs do not consider fornication an evil in it­
self ; young men are cautioned against impregnation for the sim­
ple reason that circumstances might prevent subsequent marriage
in default of which the girl’s parents would be certain to take
revenge.
The above case has to do with a non-Christian culture. When a
de-Christianized civilization is considered, the same ignorance
may obtain. Education plays a large part here. With the de­
struction of other ideals, many young Americans lose the one of
chastity as well. Free-love sounds much more attractive than
mortal jin. If the concept of sin is an outmoded convention
(and this is taught!) not all of these young people will see the
malice of fornication. This would hold for non-Catholics. It is
difficult to imagine a Catholic’s being in a state of ignorance, even
though he had received only very limited instruction.

Adultery

Adultery is defined as the performance of the marriage act’
with the spouse of another. It may be simplex or duplex accord­
ing to the state of life of the respective parties. If one party is
single and the other married, simplex adultery is committed. If
both are married, both are guilty of duplex adultery.
If fornication is contrary to the natural law, a fortiori adultery
is evil, for the reasons adduced to demonstrate the evil of the
former apply to the latter as well. It is said that adultery is
a fortiori evil for it adds the further malice of a grave sin against
justice. By the matrimonial contract the parties acquire exclusive
sexual rights over the body of each other. This right concerns
acts per se apt for the generation of children. Adultery violates
this right. If duplex adultery is committed, each person is guilty
of three sins; one of fornication, the other of injustice toward his
81 Vanoverbergh, Morice, The Isneg Life Cycle, Washington, D. C.:
Catholic Anthropological Conference, 1936, p. 152·

Problems and Practical Application of Principles

109

own spouse, and still another against the spouse of his accomplice.
According to some theologians, if a married person is guilty of
masturbation, this also constitutes the sin of adultery.82
As has been seen previously, the sinfulness of adultery is an
evident deduction from a first principle of the natural law. It re­
quires no great mental ability to deduce that the prohibition of
adultery is a particularization of the first principle, Don't violate
the rights of another. The evidence of modem anthropology
bears out this conclusion. Though polygamy has at times been
tolerated, the peoples of the earth have been unanimous in their
condemnation of adultery. The grave penalties placed on the act
of adultery by positive law are a witness to this universal agree­
ment.83 It follows that, as a general rule, invincible ignorance of
the malice of adultery cannot be admitted.
Is such ignorance possible in particular acts? St. Augustine
relates the historical fact that such a case happened shortly before
his time. It seems that a certain judge in Antioch promised a
citizen that he would be released from the death penalty if the
prisoner’s wife could be induced to give in to the judge’s
wishes. As the prisoner was innocent of crime, he consented.
Under the circumstances neither he nor his wife thought the act
sinful.84 That St. Augustine thought similar cases possible is
evident from a previous passage where he states that adultery
may be thought (erroneously) permissible in extreme circum­
stances when permission is given by the other spouse.85
If divorce is thought licit, the consequent adulterous acts of
the second marriage may not be thought of as adultery. Persons
committing such acts would be invincibly ignorant of this objec­
tive evil.
82 Noldin, De Sexto Praecepto, n. 31.
sa Westermarck, Edward, The History of Human Marriage, pp. 5I-*33>
passim.
84 “Nullo modo judicaverunt, sub istis circumstantiis, actum illum esse
adulterinum.” De Serm. Dom. in Monte. I, c. 16, P. L., 34, 1254.
«s “ Quamquam nonnullae causae possint existera ubi et uxor, mariti con­
sensu, pro ipso marito hoc facere debere videatur, sicut Antiochiae factum
esse perhibetur ante quinquaginta ferme annos.” Ibid.

HMM·

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The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

Abortion
For the purposes of this discussion abortion will be understood
as the violent, voluntary, and complete interruption of the physi­
ological processes leading to the maturation of the human fetus.
So defined, it includes not only the delivery of a non-viable fetus
or embryo but also operations in which it is destroyed by various
means while yet in the womb.se
The easiest and most direct argument against the practice of
abortion in any and every stage after the first moment of con­
ception rests on the assumption that the rational soul is infused
into the embryo immediately upon the fertilization of the ovum
by the male sperm. If this assumption is correct then the embryo
is essentially a human person and has all the rights consequent
upon personality even though incapable of asserting and defend­
ing them.
On the other hand, if the embryo is informed with the rational
soul only after a certain length of time, then practitioners of
abortion before that time cannot be accused of injustice to a
human person, for without the soul the embryo is not rational,
and without rationality there is no personality. This is not to ex­
clude other arguments against the practice, but if at some stage
of development the embryo is not possessed of a rational soul,
the argument of injustice to an innocent person cannot be
brought against an abortion performed in that period, for injus­
tice connotes a deprivation of rights bound up with the human
person. In the hypothesis that the embryo lacks a soul, there
could be no rights, for, strictly speaking, there is no person.
But what sort of evidence bears upon the problem? Is it bio­
logical or philosophical? Or a combination of both? At first
glance the question would seem purely philosophical, for it has to
do with the existence or non-existence of the rational soul. Now
8® Conception consists in the fertilization of the female ovum by the male
sperm. During a period of six weeks after conception the fertilized ovum is
called an embryo. Before the seventh month of pregnancy the fetus is
immature and generally non-viable though cases have been known where
incubation has saved a child delivered successfully only six and a half
months after the time of conception.

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Problems and Practical Application of Principles

111

the rational soul is spiritual and consequently beyond the scope of
the measuring tactics of experimental science. This is true, but
the philosophical process must build itself upon the foundation
of experience. All processes of reasoning to the nature of a substance must begin with its outward manifestations; for example,
the whole doctrine of species is discovered by means of the physi­
cally visible variations of activity in diverse classes of being.
Likewise, in the present question, the ability to demonstrate the
existence or non-existence of the rational soul in the embryo de­
pends upon the evidence available. The proper operations of the
rational soul are the processes of intellection and volition; if
these operations are present, then a deduction to the presence of
such a soul is justifiable and certain. If, however, such evidence
■ is not obtainable, then no certain judgment concerning the spir­
itual soul’s presence is possible. Now, the embryo gives no evi­
dence of intellection and volition. Certain responses to stimula­
tion would seem to argue to the existence of a nervous system,
but beyond this the evidence warrants no certain conclusion. On
the other hand, since the form may be present in a subject only
temporarily incapable of exercising its proper activities, we can­
not scientifically come to the conclusion that the rational soul is
certainly not present.
It will be seen that in the lack of conclusive evidence on the
subject only a probable judgment concerning the existence or
non-existence of the rational soul in the embryo is possible. The
opinion which seems to rest more solidly on philosophical princi­
ples and biological fact will be the more probable.
The chief argument for the immediate infusion of the rational
soul rests on the fundamental unity of the life process of the
human being, apparently indicating a unity of the vital force be­
hind it. Since the ultimate result of the process is undoubtedly
the human person, if the same vital force is present at the incep­
tion of the process, the embryo possesses a human soul. In other
words, “ This embryo becomes this adult human being by the
organizing activity of one and the same living principle which
determines growth and development in the embryo, and mani­
fests intelligence and the power to control conduct in the

I
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I
)

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The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

adult.”87 Gredt adds the argument that from the very moment
of conception the special and proximate dispositions necessary for
the infusion of the rational soul are present and sees no reason
to believe that it is not infused at the time.88
In objection to the above opinions it may be stated that both
seem to take for granted the point at issue. If the vital force is
one and the same through all stages of development it follows
that it cannot be other than the rational soul. But is it one and
the same? Likewise, if the matter is properly disposed for the
form as presupposed in the second argument, the form or the ra­
tional soul will undoubtedly be present provided the theory of
hylomorphism is true. But is the matter so disposed ? A physi­
cal argument against the potential unity of the embryo is the
proved biological fact of polyembryony. It is a well-known fact
that polyembryony normally obtains in some animals and can be
induced at various stages of growth. In other words, what is
actually one as a fertilized ovum, is potentially many in reality.
If for some reason at the two-cell stage (or later) the cells are
separated, the parts will develop into several individuals. This
phenomenon has not been physically demonstrated in the case of
the human embryo, but arguing from analogy, biologists believe
it has a similar structure to the animal. If the analogy is correct,
then if a human embryo becomes disjoined at the two-cell stage,
each may develop into an individual human being. The phe­
nomenon of identical twins would seem to point this way. Now,
if the human embryo is potentially two, it cannot be potentially
one. The fact of polyembryony must be answered by those de­
fending the thesis of the fundamental unity of the embryo.
The arguments of those defending the second theory—that the
human soul is infused into the embryo only after a period of
time—are. based, for the most part, on the theory of hylo­
morphism. If the specific form actualizes its proper matter, just
as every act is the realization of its proper potency, then the
human soul can only be the form of a human organism, in such
81 Moore, Dom Thomas, Principle of Ethics, Philadelphia: Lippincott,
P- »5988 Elementa Philosophine slristotelico-Thomisticae, Berlin : Herder, 1937,
vol. I, n. 536.

Problems and Practical Application of Principles

113

a way that the combination of both constitutes the human person.
Since the embryo cannot be said to be a human organism at the
very moment of conception, proponents of the second theory deny
that it is informed by the rational soul until such time as it is
sufficiently developed. Moreover, since the form is the terminus
of generation, not the principle, before the embryo becomes a
human organism there can be no justification for positing the
infusion of the rational soul.89 Hence, they believe that for a
time the embryo is animated by a merely vegetative or animal
soul.
If the arguments are to be judged merely on the basis of the
evidence presented it would seem that St. Thomas and the
Scholastics have the better of it ; it seems more probable that the
rational soul is infused into the embryo only after a period of
time allowing for proper organic development. Now, in the
hypothesis that the Scholastic theory more nearly approaches
reality than the more modern theory of immediate infusion, how
would the argument against abortion be affected? As we have
seen previously, the position that abortion is the killing of an in­
nocent person would certainly be weakened, for until an organism
capable of receiving the form were evolved, the embryo cer­
tainly could not be called a person. However, abortion would
none the less remain an intrinsic and grave evil. It is, at least, a
violent and unauthorized interruption of the natural process
which God intends shall terminate in the formation of a human
89 Cf. Ill, q. 33, a. 2, ad 3 tun. Cf. also, I, q. 118, a. 2, ad 2um; III, q.
33, a. 2; Ibid., q. 34, a. 2, ad 3utn; de Pot., q. 3, a. 9, ad gum; de Anima,
a. il, ad mm; de Sp. Creat., a. 3, ad 13 um; II, dist. 18, q. 2, a. 3; II, dist. 3,
q. 5, a. 2. " L’embryogenie confirme d'une maniéré frappante ces vues
spéculatives des anciens scolastiques ... De même, s'il est permis de s'en
rapporter aux observations de M. Preyer sur la physiologie de l’embryon,
les contractions du coeur et la circulation du sang se remarquent, chez le
poulet et le cabaye, par exemple, plusieurs jours avant que l'on aperçoive
aucun indice de motilité; la motilité elle-même precede les manifestations de
la sensibilité, de sorte, que, morphologiquement et physiologiquement;
l’ontogenèse, se revèle comme un processus d’évolution de l’indeterminé au
déterminé, de la vie organique a la vie sensitive, ainsi que l’avaient présenté
les hommes de genie du XIII siecle.” Mercier, Card., Psychologie, LouvainParis, 1920, pp. 339, 340.

1

j. / /

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The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

person. If the embryo is not a human person, it certainly is in
proximate potency to becoming one, and for the creature to in­
terrupt violently the laws of the Author of life in the serious mat­
ter of man’s procreation is a grave evil. If artificial contracep­
tion is a grave evil, a fortiori abortion, even of a non-rational
embryo, is to be condemned. Thus, even though the theory of
the Scholastics concerning the later infusion of the rational soul
be followed, direct and deliberate abortion is always and every­
where intrinsically wrong.
Historically, the Church has always taken a firm stand against
the practice of abortion90 and present legislation is no less rigor­
ous. The present code of Canon Law promulgated by Benedict
XV in 1917 states :

i

1. That all who effectively procure abortion, the mother
included, incur excommunication reserved to the
Ordinary; and, if they are clerics, they are to be de­
posed (Can. 2350, §1).
2. That all who perpetrate voluntary homicide or who
effectively procure abortion of a human foetus, and
all who cooperate thereto, incur criminal irregularity
(Can. 985, §4).
■I

It will be noted that no distinction is made in this legislation be­
tween a fetus animatus and inanimatus. The silence of the
Church concerning the distinction is not to be understood as an
attempted solution of the philosophical question concerning the
precise moment the human soul is infused into the embryo. Since
even in the hypothesis that the fetus for a time is not informed
by the rational soul, the practice remains intrinsically and gravely
evil, for practical purposes of legislation the human embryo is
considered to be informed by a human soul from the very moment
of conception. It is to be noted that we are speaking of direct
abortion, for according to Catholic principle, it is sometimes al­
lowed to give a pregnant woman medical or surgical treatment
with the prevision that the death or expulsion of the fetus will
follow as an indirect effect.

Λ

4

i

®°For an historical note on the legislation of the Church, cf. Coronata,
Matthaeus, Institutiones Iuris Canonici, Turin: Marietti, Vol. IV, p. 402.

- ii ■
'4 ■

>

MM

Problems and Practical Application of Principles

115

The morality of direct abortion is then certain ; any and every
act of this kind is intrinsically evil by the natural law. However,
a dispassionate view of the moral knowledge possessed by our
present civilization leads one to the conclusion that the objective
guilt of many abortions is excused by invincible ignorance.
Where sentiment rules instead of reason, and where the voice of
the Church is no longer heard, sincere judgments concerning the
licitness of direct abortion in certain circumstances are possible.
In some extreme cases even Catholic theologians taught that di­
rect abortion was permissible.9192If these masters of moral prin­
ciples erred egregiously in their desire to save the life of the
mother, it is easily seen how the participants in a practical case
could do likewise. If reputable physicians practice therapeutic
abortion, it is not because they treat the wastage of infant life
lightly ; as a rule, the medical profession is conscious of its grave
responsibility and is anxious to uphold its tradition of high
ethical standards. It simply happens that’ the standard in this
case is wrong, and sincere physicians are following it in good
faith.
INVINCIBLE IGNORANCE AND THE MODERN TOTAL DENIAL

OF ABSOLUTE MORAL PRINCIPLES

Mortimer J. Adler, in a recent address to the Conference on
Science, Philosophy, and Religion, offered the stock Thomistic
indictment of modern thought as exemplified in some presentday educational methods.82 After an enumeration of eight
fundamental truths of philosophy93 he stated that those denying
them “might just as well call philosophy opinion and deny its
existence.”94 After a similar enumeration of religious truths he
91Ballerini, Opus Theologicum Morale, Tom. II, p. 645. Cf. a list of
these authors in Coronata, op. cit., p. 459. This opinion was held by some .
before the decree of the Holy Office on May 28, 1884 (Collectanea Sacrae
Congregationis de Propaganda Fide, Π, η. 1618), which condemned alt
direct abortion.
92 A reprint of his text may be found in The Daily Maroon, student
newspaper at the University of Chicago, Nov. 14, 194°, PP· 3, 483 The Daily Maroon, op. cit., pp. 3-5.
94 Ibidem, p. 4 : I.

116

The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

Problems and Practical Application of Principles

117

maintained that their denial was the teaching of positivism and
I attitude toward all truth, and especially toward moral princi­
naturalism which is “at the root of modern secularized culples.101
ture.”85
As might be expected, these proponents of change themselves
Adler’s paper drew vitriolic criticism. Professor Wright of the
exhibit varying attitudes and approaches to morals?02 Moreover,
University of Chicago had this to say: “And now abide Positi­
if any inconsistency is latent here, it is not a source of concern.
vism, Pragmatism, and Scholasticism, these three; but the worst
Variety of opinion in these matters is joyfully embraced as a
of these is Scholasticism.”88 Another professor, sensing an
creative difference more valuable than subjection to any system
invasion of American liberties by the Catholic Church, said : “ It
of absolutism?03 A good example of these different opinions is
is high time to subject this and related matters to thorough study.
found in the modern notions of God. In atheistic naturalism,
Such a study might begin with an examination of the relation
God is Symbol; in naturalistic theism, God is Process; in Ideal­
between the public school administration in Chicago . . . and the
ism, God is Mind.10*
Catholic hierarchy."91 Sydney Hook, a disciple of John Dewey,
The notion that God is Process or an ever-evolving Mind has
proffered this in regard to fixed truths : “ The history of science
,
its effects on the modern concept of man’s goal. Since the
shows that it is possible to keep an open house to ideas and at
Î morality of an act is judged according to its end, the notion of
the same time to build up a great body of reliable knowledge
that end is tremendously important. Moderns generally disagree
commanding universal agreement . . . without the dogma of
with the predication of personality to the object of worship. It is
final and absolute truths.”88 The highly emotional character of
said that the religions of the past are outworn. In place of the
the opposition to Adler is the result of very strong convictions
( traditional goals the more scientific purpose of a social idealism
against the acceptance of absolute moral truths. To appreciate
is to be substituted.105 Humanity, not God, is man’s ultimate
this it is necessary to have a notion of modem ethical thought of
end.
which an outline is indicated here.
Starting from the postulate that the traditional notions of
Modern ethical thought is dominated by the notion that a
God and the goal of man’s life are inadmissible, the new Thecomplete rupture with the past is necessary if it is to be applied to
i ology logically abjures any maintenance of absolute values in the
a changing world.98 Some authors still speak in traditional
J moral order. Sin and virtue, it is argued, are relative to the age
language, but none of them holds to the traditional meaning of
1
and development of culture. For if the goal of man is a social
the words.100 There exists almost a mania to be a man of the
I idealism and this idealism is always in flux, it follows that the
times. This is interpreted to mean the possession of a fluid
I motion toward the goal will have to change in accord with this
evolution. It is in this predominant note of change that the
bewildering
variety of modern ethical opinion tries to find its
K Ibid., p. 4·· 2.
unity. It is insisted that the musty atmosphere of antiquated
m Ibidem, p. 5: 4.

Î

ar Sharp, Malcom, "Positive Positivist," The Daily Maroon, Nov. 14,
1940, 2: 5.
98 Hook, Sydney, " The New Medievalism," reprinted from The New Re­
public in the Chicago Maroon, ibid., p. 1:5.
m Cabot, R. C, The Meaning of Right and Wrong, New York : Mac­
millan, 1936, pp. I and 3.
100 Wieman, N. H.; Mefand, B. E., American Philosophies of Religion,
Chicago: Willet, Clark & Co., 1936, p. viii.

!
1

■ É

101 Aubrey, E. E., Present Theological Tendencies, New York: Co­
lumbia University Press, 1936, p. 10.
102 American Philosophies of Religion, p. 5.
103 American Philosophies of Religion, p. 325.
104 Cf. Sheen, Fulton John, God and Intelligence, London: Longmans,
Green and Co., 1935, PP- 47-61 ; also American Philosophies of Religion, p.
10.
i®8 Aubrey, E. E., Present Theological Tendencies, pp. 167, 258.

118

The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

doctrine must be exchanged for a new intellectual and moral
climate.106 The insidious character of this doctrine is brought out
by Farrell, who in a comparison between Thomism and the new
Theology says : “ The former rests on the immutable mind of
God, is absolute, rational, objective, and personal ; the latter, with
no unchanging foundation, is relative, irrational, subjective, .and
collective. ” 107
How is this welter of opinion to be related to the natural
moral law? Advocates of relativity in the field of moral truth
would not only say that they are ignorant of the entire natural
law; they would deny its existence altogether. They thus rule
the question out of court. Is their denial of first principles to be
taken at face value? Are they invincibly ignorant of the entire
natural law?
The problem resolves itself into the question asked by St.
Thomas, i.e., whether synderesis can be obliterated from the
human mind?
>
In reply be it stated that the obliteration of synderesis
can be understood in two ways. One way concerns the
habitual light of the intellect and in this way it is im­
possible that synderesis be blotted out just as it is im­
possible that the soul of man be deprived of the light of
the active intellect whereby we know the first principles
of the speculative and the practical order: for this light
is of the very nature of the soul. Through its agency
the soul is of an intellectual nature. The other way
concerns the act of synderesis which may be considered
under a double aspect. Under the first aspect the act of
synderesis is blotted out in those not possessing the use
of reason. This may happen because of an injury to
the corporal organs used in the act of reason. The
second aspect concerns the deflection of synderesis to
the contrary act of sin, and in this way it is impossible
for the universal judgments of synderesis to be blotted
out. However, in a particular action it is extinguished
when a sin is committed in making a choice ; the force

;

Present Theological Tendencies, pp. 9-12.
107 Farrell, Walter, A Companion to the Summa, New York: Sheet! and
Ward, 1939, Vol. II, p. 456.

Problems and Practical Application of Principles

119

.·<

of concupiscence or some other passion so absorbs the
reason that the universal judgment of synderesis is not
applied to the particular act. But this is not to extinguish syndersis as such but only its application. Wherefore we conclude that synderesis is never blotted out.108

κ ve::.
fci;.-: A·.:
IL· ; p ;
;
« Be . -

This article of St. Thomas contains the solution of the problem
presented by relativists. Relativists do not come under the
category of those without the use of reason. If they are invincibly ignorant, atrophied cerebra cannot be given as the cause.
St. Thomas would therefore say of relativists that “ It is impossible for the universal judgments of synderesis [first principles of the natural law] to be blotted out.” The reply of the
relativists to this will most certainly.be: “But this is mere
assertion, mere groundless assumption. This is the dogmatism
of which we have been accusing you before the world.” Here a
distinction must be made between assumption and perception.
The intellect of man is capable of arriving at objective truth. It
becomes, so to speak, one with the thing known.109 It does not
assume the first principles of the speculative or practical order;
it perceives their truth by an intuitional judgment.110
As is evident, these first principles can be proved only by
indirect arguments—simply because they are first principles. To
deny them is to lapse into absurdity. Men trying to disprove the
principle of contradiction by logical· argumentation are no less
absurd than others who heatedly uphold the right of free speech
while simultaneously denying all the principles on which it is
based. As an opponent of Professor Adler has surprisingly
said: “Positivism (Relativism in morals) is not likely to be
taken very seriously apart from verbal disputation, since its
central principle is contradicted by any action, including argu-

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108 De Ver. i6, 3, c.
io» “ Quanto aliquid magis intelligitur, tanto conceptio intellectualis est
magis unum. Nam intellectus secundum hoc quod actu intelligit, secundum
hoc fit unum cum intellectu.” I, q. 27, ad 2um.
u· For a discussion of these points cf. Rousselot, Pierre, The Intellectualism of St. Thomas, New York: Sheed and Ward, 1935, pp. 17-60.

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120

The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

mentation itself.”111 It is difficult to imagine a relativist holding
to the logic of his position under the stress of practical action,
v.g., when requested by a much smaller (and unarmed) gangster
to hand over his ready cash. Only in argumentation can the first
principles of the moral order be denied. In actu exercito all
admit them. Nor can men argue themselves into a practical
denial of these principles—not even relativists.112
111 Knight, Frank H., " God and Professor Adler and Logic," Chicago
Maroon, op. cit., p. 5: 4.
112 For a practical dialectic to be used in argumentation with relativists, cf.
Adler, Mortimer, " A Dialectic of Morals—I," The Review of Politics, Vol.
3, no. I, pp. 3-32.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Holy Scripture, Tradition, and reason attest the existence of
the natural moral law. The entire tradition of Western
civilization, with only recent exceptions, holds to the exist­
ence of this law which is nothing other than the law of God
binding man as man.
2. The natural moral law essentially comprises the natural
tendencies inherent in man’s nature, the light of reason by
which these tendencies are made known, and the proposition
of reason by which these tendencies are properly regulated.
Of these three elements the proposition of reason is the
most important.
3. The precepts of the natural moral law guide man in the
right choice of means leading to his ultimate end. They
bind man because they indicate the means that must be
taken if the ultimate end is to be attained. There are
various divisions of the precepts ; the ontological division,
indicating the gradation of precepts according to the direct­
ness and proximity of their relation to the ultimate end, and
the psychological division, a series ordered according to the
facility by which they can be known, are the most important
of these divisions. Under the latter series fall the selfevident first principles, those known by evident deduction
from the first principles, and conclusions arrived at only
after a difficult and lengthy deductive process.
4. The intellect is very powerful in human action even though
it acts only as a dispositive cause. Ignorance may be a
cause of sin (removens prohibens), a sin itself, or an effect
of sin. It may excuse the subject from the guilt of sin
entirely, or only in part, or it may increase the guilt. The
formula ignorantia iuris neminem excusat, rigorously held
by many early Scholastics, was modified by St. Thomas and
St. Bonaventure.

121

122

The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

Invincible ignorance of the natural moral law in relation to:
(a) The first principles in the psychological order—this
is impossible for any normal and mature person, though
deep-rooted contrary habits may sometimes take them out
of consideration in practical action in particular instances.
(b) The evident deductions from first principles—con­
cerning the essence of these precepts no invincible ignorance
is to be admitted for the majority of men. Such ignorance
concerning certain applications of these principles is easily
conceivable among primitive peoples ; also when an action is
surrounded by many circumstances of apparent justification.
(c) Remote conclusions—because of the intrinsic diffi­
culty of knowing these conclusions, invincible ignorance is
very easily admissible in their regard.
6. Complete moral immaturity is impossible; no person of
normal intelligence can be invincibly ignorant of all moral
principles. Many children below the age of seven know
some principles of the natural moral law. On the other
hand, some children above the age of seven may not have
i
reached a knowledge of moral principles. Though it con­
stitutes an indictment of our present civilization, in practical
life many people, including even some Catholics, may be
invincibly ignorant of the malice of such practices as Birth
Control, Euthanasia, and the possibility of the complete dis­
solution of the bond of a ratified and consummated mar­
riage. We may regard with relative skepticism the position
of relativists , who deny first moral principles.

5.

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sjù,'

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y, —7_-.fr y,-*».»·*-.

The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance

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SELECTED ARTICLES

Billot, Louis, “ La Providence de Dieu,” Etudes, V, 164, 1920, p. 328 ff.
Bouaert, Charles, “Tous les athées, sont-ils coupable?” Nouvelle Revue
Théologique, April, 1921, p. 168 ff.
Brown, Brendon, "Natural Law’s Function in America,” Notre Dame
Lawyer, Vol. 15, no. I.
Cooper, John M., “The Relations between Religion and Morality in Primi­
tive Culture,” Primitive Man, Vol. IV, No. 3, p. 33 ff.
Eberle, A., “Die letzen Grundlagen der Sittlichkeit,” Theologisch-praktische Quartalschrift, 1937, p. 19 ff.
Galli, Arcangelo, “ Contributo allo studio del giudizio morale nei fanciulli
normali ed anormali,” Publicazioni dell Università del Sacro Cuore,
Vol. 6, p. 325 ff.
Grabmann, M., “Das Naturrecht der Scholastik von Gratian bis Thomas
von Aquin,” Archiv fiir Rechts und Wirtschaftsphilosophie, Band 16,
p. 165 ff.
Hook, Sydney, “The New Medievalism,” New Republic, Vol. 103, no. 18,
p. 602 ff.
Jones, Vernon, “ Children’s Morals,” Handbook of Child Psychology, p.
482 ff.
Lehmkuhl, August, “Euthanasia,” Theologisch-praktisch Quartalschrift,
1916, p. 802 ff.
Lottin, D. O., “Le Problème de 1’Ignorantia iuris de Gratian à saint
Thomas d’Aquin,” Recherches de Théologie ancienne et medievale,
1933, P- 345 ff.
Mary, Sister, “The Moral and Religious Development of the Preschool
Child,” Catholic Educational Review, Mar. 1926, p. 145 ff.
“ Research Findings in Moral Development of Children,” Catholic
Educational Review, Mar. 1926, p. 145 ff.
Moers, Dr., “Zur Prüfung des sittlichen Verstândnisses Jugendlicher,”
Zeitschrift fiir angewandte Psychologie, Band 37, p. 56 ff.
Quirmbach, Joseph, “ Die Lehre des Hl. Paulus von der natiirlichen Gottesverkenntnis und dem natürlichen Sittengesetz,” Strassburger Theologische Studien, Band 7, p. 67 ff.
Schilling, Otto, “Naturrecht und Staat nach der Lehre der alten Kirche,”
Gorrs Geselschaft, Sektion fiir Rechtsund Sozialwissenschaft, 1914,
p. 294 ff.
Schulte, J. B., “Natürliches und übernatûrliches Sittengesetz,” Scholastik,
Vol. 13, p. 392 ff.

ALPHABETICAL INDEX
Abortion, I io, 115.
Action, human, 46 ff.
Adler, Mortimer, 115.
Adulthood, 89.
Adultery, 52, 108.
Anthropology and natural law, 73 ff.
Animals, 18, 39.
Apologetes and natural law, 5.
Association of religion and moral­
ity, 82.
Atheistic Naturalism, 117.

Divorce, 103.
Dogma of absolute truths, 117.
Dominican school, 53.

Education,
factor of ignorance, 71.
Embryo, human, 114.
End, 19 ff., 28, 91.
Error, 24, 45, 58 ff., 71Essence of natural law, 14 ff.
Eternal law, 10, 12, 18, 30.
Euthanasia, 101.

Billot, Louis, 84.
Birth Control, 97
Bouquillon, 105.

Canon Law, 90.
of abortion, 114.
Cappadocians and natural law, 7.
Causality, 28.
Certitude, v.
Children and natural law, g, go ff.
and voluntary pollution, 101.
Christ, 5.
Church, g, 30, 58.
and Birth Control, 97.
Clement of Alexandria, 6.
Conscience, 85.
obligation of, 87.
Conservation of being,
principle of, 42.
Contraception, cf. Birth Control.
Criteria, psychological, 40.
Culpability, 69.
Custom, 71.
factor in ignorance, 71.
among primitive peoples, 81.
variability of, vi.
St. John Chrysostom on, 82.
Decalogue, 3. 43, 44, 75 ffDeclaration of Independence, 1.
Deliberate lies, 72.
Determinism, psychological, 46·
Dispositive cause,
intellect as, 47.
Dissociation of religion and moral­
ity, 82.

Factors of ignorance, 71.
Farrell, 16.
Fathers and natural law, 11 ff.
cf. Tradition and natural law.
Fetus animatus, inanimatus, 114.
Fornication, 106.
Franciscan school, 54.
Freedom, 46.
Free acts, moral acts, 88.
Free love, 108.
Galli, 92.
Gallup Poll, 98.
Glory, 97.
God, 8, to, 12, 13, 29, 34, 35·
and moral obligation, 86.
Good, total, 28, 40.
Gratian, 52.
Habits, factor of ignorance, 7X.
Hamilton, Alexander, I.
Happiness, 29, 34.
Health, 28.
Holy Communion, 90.
Holy Scripture, 121.
Homicide, vii.
Honors, 27.

Idealism, 117.
Ignorance, 24, 121, 122.
antecedent, 49.
affected, 51.
and moral obligation, 85.
concomitant, 49.
influence on moral act, 48·
invincible, 49, 63 ff.

127