Ntljtf ttbctst Die XII Septembris, MCMXXXIII ■ WILFRIOUS T. CRAUGH Censor Deputatus Jœjtrtmater E Curia Roffensi die XVI Sept., MCMXXXIII GULIELMUS M. HART Vicarius Capitularis Dioeceseos Roffensis Copyright 19SS by JOSEPH J. BAIERL, S, T. D. The Seminary Press, P. O. Box 1004, Rochester, N. Y. *ehveen· tbÊ^Pein^id_R<âiyâti2^^ SJnceJto^Rg^tifia^QeâSS^jft^^oggip in^god HimselL·. Now, there would be such a contradiction, if supernatural Divine Revelation completely excluded rational knowledge from the spiritual activity of man’s spirit. Therefore, the possibility of distinguishing marks of God’s Revelation to man cannot reasonably be called into ques­ tion.8 7) Gutberlet, ibid., II, pp. 91, 92. 8) Hettinger-Weber, ibid., p. 167. Introduction 5 As Revelation is the voice of God to man, so Faith N«MBityOf is the voice of man to God. If Faith is to be a morally free CrlterU· and reasonable act, as is demanded by the dignity of the human personality, man must be in a position to recog­ nize Revelation with certainty as coming from God. Now, nearly all the great world religions ultimately appeal to Divine Revelation or to sacred books. It is evident, therefore, that there must be certain objective signs or criteria at hand, which will enable man to draw a clear distinction between Divine Revelation and all other in­ spirations. “For at times”, as Dr. Schanz says, “the human mind, wandering among odoriferous flowers of fancy, or giving play to invention, calls into being creations that seem and, in a sense, are Divine. Then, again, the mind is acted upon by influences which, though superhuman, are not Divine. The angel of darkness can clothe himself in a vesture of light. How is one to be distinguished from the other? How shall man distinguish the Revelation that comes from God, from superhuman impulses and the creations of fancy? No man has penetrated far enough into the inner shrine of his inmost self to be able to discern the nature of his thoughts, or to trace them to their source. And yet, such proof is absolutely necessary, because the gravest issues are at stake. The attitude that man adapts towards Revelation is big with consequences. It is a question in whose bosom lie buried eternal life and eternal death. On its right solu­ tion depends whether eternal weal or eternal woe shall be man’s lot. Revelation has exerted a magic influence on the whole history of mankind. By Revelation Judaism prepared the way for Christ, and for eighteen centuries Christianity has scattered the blessings of Revelation over the face of the earth. Who could be so indifferent, or so senseless, as to scorn or to despise this most wonderful phenomenon in the history of mankind? ... If, then, there be a Divine Revelation, there must also be certain, infallible tests for recognizing it as such. God’s Revelation must bear God’s stamp, so that man acting as a free, reasonable being, may, by its means, work out his salvation.”9 9) P. Schanz, A Christian Apology. Translated by Michael Glancey and Victor J. Schobel. N. Y. (4’ revised ed.), vol. II; “God and Reve­ lation”, pp. 288, 289. We shall always cite from this edition, unless otherwise stated. 6 11 [ Introduction <Β!β!Γώ<ί«· Sacred Scriptures challenge both the organs of edition. Revelation and the believers “to try the spirits, if they be of God”.10 Ecclesiasticus warns us against a careless and hasty faith.11 The Evangelists, especially St. John, insist that the Lord appeals to His Miracles * in confirmation of His teachings: “But I have a greater testimony than that of John. For the works which the Father hath given me to perfect: the works themselves, which I do, give testimony of me, that the Father hath sent me”.12 St. John narrates in detail the healing of the man born blind and the resuscitation of Lazarus, since both of these events were motives of faith for many.18 He also calls attention to the fact, that faith follows upon the Miracles wrought by the Lord.14 This clear teaching of the Bible is confirmed by Christian Tradition. To mention only a few of the many testimonies that might be cited. Justin Martyr points out to the pagans that the Christians do not adore the Crucified without good grounds ( μή άλογον )1B; he calls Miracles and Prophecies μβγίστη καί άληόεστάτη άπδδειξις.ΐ· In the beginning of his Apologeticum, Tertullian pleads that the truth ought not to be condemned without a hear­ ing: “Unum gestit interdum, ne ignorata damnetur”. He appeals to the grounds of credibility for the Chris­ tian Faith: “Nihil interim credam, nisi nihil temere credendum; temere porro credi, quodcumque sine orig­ inis agnitione creditur”.11 Theophilus sees an ώιόδειξις in Prophecies ;18 Origen likewise calls Prophecy and Miracle an άπόδειξις «νεύματος καί δυνάμεως.19 Clement of Alexandria shows how knowledge prepares for faith. “We do not say”, he writes, “that there is no truth without philosophy, or that it is the cause of Chris­ tian knowledge, or, again, that it contains the matter of Revelation itself ; but we hold that it is a preparation for i®) I John iv, 1. 12) v, 36; cf. also x, 18) ix,xi. 16) Apologia, 1,3. 18) Ad Autolycum, 18) Contra Celeum, 11) xix, 4. 25, 27, 38; xiv, 11, 12; xv, 24. 14)ίϊ, 11, 23;vii, llsq; xii, 87; xx, 30, 31. 16)Ibid., c. 30. 17 )Adv.Marcionem, 5,1. 1, 14. 1, 2. Introduction 7 faith, and co-operates in its attainment”.20 St. Augus­ tine, in various of his writings, describes clearly the function of reason in the assent to the motives of credi­ bility. For instance, he writes: “Quis enim non videat prius esse cogitare quam credere? Nullus quippe credit aliquid, nisi prius cogitaverit esse credendum” 21* Scholasticism seized upon this thought and made it its own. Thus, St. Thomas Aquinas observes : ‘ ‘ For he (i.e., the believer) would not believe unless, ÿjt fihp t dence_of ,si.anst or of something similar, he saw that they ought^toTte Relieved ; ’)22 “faith has not that'research of natural reason wlïîck demonstrates what is believed, but a research into those things whereby a man is induced to believe, for instance, that sucll tilings have been uttered by God and confirmed by Miracles”;23*again, “the be­ liever has sufficient motive for believing, for he is moved by the authority of divine teaching confirmed by Mira-t cles”.2i Finally, Richard of St. Victor exclaims: “Lord if we are in error, by Thine own self we have been de­ ceived; for these things have been confirmed by such signs and wonders in our midst, as could only have been done by Thee”.25 20) Paedagogo, 1, 6. Ed. Potter, p. 115. In his Stromata, 1, VI, c. XV, he argues for the divine origin of Christianity and divine Sonship of Christ from the Prophecies of the Old Testament and the various testimonies and Miracles which are narrated in the New Tes­ tament, especially from the wonders wrought after Christ’s Ascension and the marvelous diffusion of Christianity. 21) De praedest. Sanctorum, c. 2, 5; cf. also De diversis quaest. ad Simplic. i, 1. q. 2, 21: “Quis potest credere, nisi aliqua vocatione, h. e., aliqua testificatione tangatur”; Ep.120 ad Consent; De vera religione, c. 24 : “Neque auctoritatem ratio penitus deserit cum con­ sideratur, cui sit credendum”. For a more detailed account cf. P. Gardeil, O. P; art. “Crédibilité chez les Saints Pères", in DCT. col. 2239—2258. 22) ST. II, II, q. 1, a. 4 ad 2. 23) Ibid. q. 2, a. 1 ad 1. 24) Ibid., q. 2, a. 9 ad 3. The same thought runs through the entire sixth chapter of St. Thomas* SCG. 25) De Trinit. 1, 2: “Si error est, quem credimus, a Te decepti sumus; iis enim signis doctrina haec confirmata est, quae nisi a Te fieri non potuerunt’’, cf. also Hugh of St. Victor, Summa Sent. 1 ,1; Suarez, De fide disp. 4, 2; Lugo, De fide disput. 5; Gregory de Valen­ tia, Comment, theol. Ill, disp, i, q. 1, p. 1. I 8 Introduction Reason precedes Faith. Hence, it is the clear teaching of the Bible and of Christian Tradition that in adults the assent of faithj by which the believer enters into personal possession of God’s supernatural message, is preceded bu an activity on the part of human reason^ Indeed the very nature oi ihe human spirit l'and"o/morality demands that the Act of Faith be ethically grounded; for Faith is not merely a “blind impulse of the religious sense”, rather it is essentially aidassent to ^trntJuhased^on the grounds^pf, reason and.of,conscience^ Reason mus^lnv^the founda­ tion of belief, otherwise the assent of Faith will be blind and arbitrary. Such has been the consistent teaching of historic Christianity, until the so-called Reformers of the sixteenth century rejected the rational ground\vork of Revelation and Faith, as will be shown in detail below. ApoIoKetlc· and the Criteria of Revelation. The history of converts to the Christian Catholic Faith opens up for us the records of the many and varied paths, by which individuals have arrived at a certain knowledge of God’s supernatural Revelation. Oftentimes it is doubtless difficult to establish with precision the mo­ tives, rational and irrational, which co-operate in the conversion of individuals. Moreover, many of these mo­ tives are, in part, only argumenta ad hominem. How­ ever, when there is question of presenting a scientific defense of Divine Revelation, obviously it is necessary to stress primarily those signs or distinguishing marks (criteria) of God’s revealed message, which possess ohiestiv# and universal validity and cogency. Hence, it is the specific function of apologetics to offer a scientific vindication of these criteria or the grounds of belief (motives of credibility).26 / This proximate preparation of the Act of Faith renders Faith an obsequium rationable ( λατρεία λογική, Rom. xii, 1), and the believer becomes conscious of the t 26) J. Mausbach, Grundziige der katholischen Apologetik. Müns­ ter i. W., 1921 (3’—4’ed.), p. 21; cf. B. Guldner, art. “Conversion", in CE. IV, pp, 347 sq; Dr. J. Didiot, art. "Conversion", in DAFC. fasc. Ill, colls. 697 sq; G .K. Chesterton, The Catholic Church and Conversion. New York 1926. Introduction 9 grounds upon which his Faith rests. piyine^.Rev.el&..tipa. jg, indeed, something new; something that .transcend^ humaiLyeasoiL But it is not something ^solutely foreign to reason and devoid of all connecting links with reason. On the contrary, God’s revealed message is for the think­ ing mind and, therefore, reason ought to strive to attain it by the exercise of its native powers. In other words, reason has a right to a critique of Divine Revelation (examen fundamentale et externum.)21 At the same time, however, it must not be forgotten that apologetics has neither the'' function nor the power of compelling the assent of the intellect to God’s Revelation by reason of the scientific demonstration wliich it presents. Our sci­ ence can, indeed, show with certainty the evident credi­ bility of God’s message; but it is powerless to compel the intellect to assent. Fajth ^essentially a free assent. Before beginning this scientific demonstration, it is necessary to call attention to a problem of terminology. Credibility or Science T The end or aim of this proximate preparation for the Act of Faith is not to make the content of Divine Revela­ tion evident, in the sense that the truths of God’s message become truths of reason ; for that is tantamount to Rationalism. Its, purpose, is rathgr .to jJP.duce ffle.firm conviction that a supernaturaLD.ivine.Revelation is an actual Fact Apologetics essays to realize this end in a scientific manner. However, thisis_by no^means th^pnly. way in which this end may be' attamea.01For actual life also ieads to this conviction in many ways, and—the claïity of vision thus acquired admits of varying degrees in accordance with the intellectual powers, the education and the personal efforts of the individual. However, both in the case of apologetics and of actual life the necessary conclusion is the morally certain knowledge of the credibility of supernatural Divine Revelation—the morally certain judgment of conscience that we may and ought to believe (credibile et credendum27 27) Hettinger-Weber, ibid., p. 23; cf. Wm. Turner, The Scholas­ tic View of Faith and Reason, in The New Scholasticism. Baltimore, Md. 1927, vol. I, pp. 24sq. 10 Introduction esse). A similar conviction must also lie at the basis of the Faith of a person who has been reared as a Catholic from birth.28 Now, all the older theologians have demanded, as a first step to faith, only an evidentia credibilitatis, an indirect knowledge or certitude as regards the Fact of Divine Revetion. They did not exact an evidentia testificationis or a direct knowledge and certitude. In marked contrast with this traditional terminology is the mode of expression used by a considerable number of the more modern apologists, who insist that a direct knowl­ edge (i. e., science, scientia) of God’s existence and of the Fact that He has supernaturally revealed Himself to man­ kind must always precede the Act of Faith, as its prelimi­ nary condition. These recent writers confuse the two distinct methods of preparing for the Act of Faith mentioned above, namely apologetics and actual life. In other words, that which is the ideal end or purpose of apologetics as a science they transfer to the life of the individual. St. Thomas Aquinas keeps these realms distinct. He teaches that the criteria of Revelation, like-the proofs for God’s existence, do not pro­ duce knowledge in the strict sense of that term (science, scientia) in the case of all believers. In his Sent. 3 dist. 24, q. 1, a. 3 he says : “Fidei substernitur naturalis cognitio, quam fides praesupponit et ratio probare potest, sicut Deum esse et Deum esse unum, incorporeum, intelligentem et alia hujusmodi; et ad hoc etiam sufficienter fides inclinat, ut, qui rationem ad hoc habere non potest, fide ejs assentiat” A pure and certain knowledge of God can be achieved by most men only with difficulty and, for that reason, Reve­ lation is a necessity, as we have shown in the chapter on the Necessity of Revelation. St. Thomas consistently accommodates himself to the mode of expression used by St. Augustine. Speaking of the content of Faith, St. Augus­ Îütftiruii tine lays down the axiom : “Crede, urmteluga^y (Sermo 43, 9) ; but as regards the genesis of Kai|h he writes: “Nullus quippe credit aliquid, nisi prius cogitaverit esse creden­ dum.”29 St. Thomas says : “Non enim crederet, nisi videret ea esse credenda”; that which is believed is known “sub communi ratione credibilis”.30 In like manner the later Scholastics assert only an “evidentia credibilitatis”, not an 28) J. Mausbach, Kat holis che Moraltheologie. Munster i. W. 1921, II, p. 26; IDEM, Grundzüge der katholischen Apologetik, p, 155. 2S) De praed. sanct. 5, 3. 30) ST. II, II, q. 1, a 4 ad 2. i Immediate Revelation 11 “evidentia testificationis” ; they call the grounds of our assent to the Fact of Revelation the “motiva credibilitatis.”81 The Vatican Council employs the same terminology.82 Despite this difference of terminology as used by the traditional apologists and these more recent writers, there is really no essential discrepancy ; for these modern apolo­ gists use the term knowledge (scientia) only in the sense of “moral certitude”. Nevertheless, for various reasons the older mode of expression is the more felicitous and we will adhere to it in this treatise.83 In the first section of the “Theory of Revelation” we have shown that God’s self-disclosure to man may be either immediate or mediate. Hence the apologist must establish the rational knowability (1) of immediate and (2) of mediate supernatural Divine Revelation. IMMEDIATE REVELATION The immediate recipients of Divine Revelation Prophetic the prophets of the Old Testament) were imbued with a ConvicM<” certitude, of their divine enlightenment and vocation, which nothing could shake. This firm conviction is one of the clearest facts of history. Let us listen to some of their typical utterances. “I am not a Prophet, nor am I the son of a Prophet : but I am a herdsman plucking wild figs. And the Lord took me when I followed the flock, and the Lord said to me: Go, prophesy to my people Israel. And now hear thou the word of the Lord”.84 Thus Amos replied to Amasias, when the latter wished to prevent him from prophesying at Bethel. That is to say, the role of Prophet was imposed upon Amos by God Himself, when he was least thinking of it; he was not free to renounce it. Isaias describes the vision which inaugurated his pro­ phetic ministry. He saw Jahve seated on a throne of glory. After a seraph had purified his lips, the prophet heard the -------------. ®i) J. Mausbach, Grundzüge etc., p. 155, 153; IDEM, Kat holis che Moraltheologie, II, p. 26. 32) DB. n. 1794; 1812; DCD, pp. 226, 235, 236. 33) Mausbach, Grundzüge etc., p. 155. 84) Amos, vii, 14-16. 12 Introduction command : “Go !" and he received the mission of announcing to the people the terrible judgments of the Lord.35 Jeremias also heard the irresistible command of Jahve : “ThouJ shalt go to all that I shall send thee : and whatsoever I shall command thee, thou shalt speak".886 God revealed to him the message that He had consecrated him from his mother’s womb and appointed him prophet of the nations. Jahve touched his lips as a token that He had made him His instrument to proclaim His just and merciful judg­ ments?7 a duty so painful, that Jeremias endeavored to be excused and to conceal the oracles committed to him. He could not, however ; for his heart was consumed by a flame which forced from him that touching complaint: “Thou hast deceived me, 0 Lord, and I am deceived: Thou hast been stronger than I, and Thou hast prevailed”.88 Ezechiel sees the glory of God borne on a fiery chariot drawn by celestial beings. He hears a voice commanding him to go and find the children of Israel, that rebellious nation,. with hardened heart and brazen face, and without prevarication to deliver to them Jahve’s warnings.89 Zacharias speaks thus: “You shall know that the Lord of hosts sent me".40 Although the other prophets are silent on the subject of their vocation, doubtless, they also received it as clearly and irresistibly, so that there could be no mistake.41 The same is true of the New Testament prophets, particularly of the Apostles. St. Peter sums up the traditional faith of the Old and New Testament believers in the words : “Prophecy came not of the will of man at any time: but the holy men of God spoke, inspired by the Holy Ghost”.42 This compelling certitude is demanded by the very nature of the case. .For revelations, which are granted to private persons, generally attain their end without such an irresistible conviction; but the promulgators of a public message of salvation must be dominated by an explicit and most certain conviction of their divine mis­ sion, in order that they may be able to demand Faith on the part of their -hearers and reject pseudo-prophets.45 8S) 38) 41 ) CE. II, 42) vii, 14sq., cf. iii, 8. 3e) vi. S7) i, 10. xx, 7; cf. xxiii, 9-29. 8β) ii, 2-5. 40) ii, 9. cf. Jean Cales, art. “Prophecy, Prophet, and Prophetess", in p. 479. II Petr, i, 21. 48) Mausbach, Grundziige etc., p. 20. Immediate Revelation 13 It is certain, therefore, that the prophets did not re­ gard themselves merely as providential men, such as have appeared at definite times among the various peo­ ples of antiquity,—religious reformers, sages, geniuses, like Confucius, Buddha, Zoroaster, Plato and the rest. On the contrary, they were firmly convinced of the fact, that their vocation to the prophetic office was super­ natural. We employ the term “supernatural” according to its strict theological connotation, namely, to signify that whiçliJiai^ceiid^he^owers,an^n^igen^^^ature. The prophets were dominated by the intensely personal and certain conviction that they were sent by God Himself in an extraordinary manner ; that they were not merely exceptions as compared with the mass of humanity, but that they were raised up by a direct, miraculous intervention on the part of God, apart from the laws of ordinary Divine Providence.44 Now, what is the value of this conviction! Are these v.iueojthie testimonies of the prophets really credible? The answer to this question is obviously of supreme importance ; for if the prophets are only “providential” men, without a supernatural mission in the strict sense, the entire econ­ omy of the Old Testament crumbles at the base. The mission of the Messias, the Religion of the New Testa­ ment, likewise rests upon the Prophecies ; for, our Blessed Saviour and the Apostles appeal to them. If the mission of the prophets is only natural, these Proph­ ecies are merely the previsions of certain men of genius, the religious hopes of certain holy souls, the aspirations towards an approaching ideal, if you will; in a word, pure conjectures whose realization only shows the per­ spicuity of their human authors. If, on the other hand, the Prophecies are really divine testimonies, as apos­ tolic doctrine and Catholic tradition teach, we must rec­ ognize in them the very clear and unmistakable word of God Himself speaking through the human convictions of 44) A. Condamin, S. J., art. "Prophétisme Israélite", in DAFC. fasc. XX, col. 395. 14 Rational fe tie Interpretations. Fraud Theory. Introduction the prophets; we must proclaim with St, Paul that the people of Israel were indeed favored with divine com­ munications of a very special kind, which were “Revela­ tions” in the strict sense of that term. “What advantage then hath the Jew (over the Gentile) Δ The Apostle of the Gentiles answers: “Much every way. First indeed becatise the words of God were committed to them.”** Rationalists question the supernatural mission of the prophets. They continue, indeed, to employ the terms “Revelation”, “supernatural”, “Miracles”, but they give to them a totally different meaning. For them, the “supernatural” is only the “natural”, as we have pointed out,before.45 4647The naturalistic viewpoint may be summarized under the following three headings·. a) The prophets, so it is claimed, openly and solemnly affirmed that they had a supernatural mission. But in point of fact they never received a direct vocation from on high ; that is to say, they were jmpps^^ Such is the opinion of the physician Paul Garnauït^wno accuses the prophets of haying fraudulently substituted their bwn voice for the voice of Jahve. Renan48 writes that the great moral blem­ ish attaching to the Jewish prophets is their claim to a supernatural mission advanced without proofs, or with only quack proofs. It is not necessary to delay long on this theory, which nowadays even Rationalists quite generally discredit. It finds its advocates chiefly among romancers, like the phy­ sician mentioned above, who are enlisted in the cause of gross Materialism, or among litterateurs of the stamp of Renan. One has only to read a chapter or two of Renan’s "Histoire du peuple d’Israel”, in conjunction with the writ­ ings of Israel’s prophet^, in order to see at once which of these two classes of writings is characterized by insincerity and charlahtism. Tainted in its very source by hateful par­ tiality, this fraud theory flippantly contradicts the most 45) Rom. iii, 1, 2; of. Condamin, S. J., ibid., col. 396. 4e) cf. J. J. Baierl^TÆe Theory of Revelation, Rochester, N. Y. 1927, Part I, Sect. I, pp. 40-43, 49, 50, 57, 58. 47 ) Ventriloquie, nécromancie, divination, in Revue scientifique, May 26, 1900. 48) Histoire du peuple d’Israel, 5 vols. Paris 1887-1894, II, pp. 484, 485; III, p. 159. English translation, ’‘History of the People of Israel”, by J. H. Allen & Mrs. E. W. Lattimer (Roberts Bros., Bos­ ton, Mass. 1888-1896). cf. Jean Calés,Recherches de Science Religieuse. 1922, pp. 96-101.' Immediate Revelation 15 certain testimonies in regard to the personal holiness, the unimpeachable sincerity of mind and language, the disin­ terestedness even unto martyrdom, of the great prophets of Israel and of Christianity.49 b) A second naturalistic interpretation freely admits that the prophets were in good faith; but their zeal, their so it is urged, led themSoJraug. forny.a”desirejnjft^ajceaqty : they believed that they had received direct commands’from God, but in this they were deceived, by. thein own.hallucinationi^ Hallucination Theory. This theory is without the least vestige of probability in the case of Isaias and Jeremias, whose ministry extended over forty years. Their writings, their actions, their whole life, bear witness to a sane temperament, a perfect equilib­ rium, a reasoned and persistent conviction, which do not betray the least signs of a morbid enthusiasm. This natur­ alistic conception is powerless to explain the prophetic clairvoyance of these alleged visionaries, and the “signs” by which they authenticated their mission. Finally, it cannot explain why, after Malachias, during the last centuries of Old Testament history, in analogous circumstances, in an age of ardent conflicts, such as obtained in the Machabean period, the same phenomena do not recur.61 c) The so-called psychological explanation asserts that the prophets.looked..upon their mission as a duty only, which was imposed on them by the circumstances ot the time, a role conformable to the divine plans, which they felt called upon to play and which permitted them to claim that they were “sent by God”. However this mission must be understood in a wide sense, merely as “providential”, not as an immediate and direct divine vocation. Hence, the affirmation of the prophets : “God sends me ; it is God Who speaks”, simply means their inmost conviction that they were performing the work of God ; that they were pro­ claiming the will of God. But this will is not made known to them through a personal Revelation by God. Their mis­ sion was only an interior impulse, whose origin is their own consciousness, working in some hidden fashion in their inmost soul.62 49) Condamin, S. J., ibid., colls. 398, 399. B0) cf. Marcel Dieulafoy, Le Roi David. Paris. 1897, p. 126. 61) Condamin, S. J., ibid; col. 399; cf. P. Schanz, A Christian Apology, II, p. 290-292. Condamin, S. J., ibid., col. 398. Psychological Explanation. -î 16 t I I I Introduction This theory is elaborated in many specious Protestant and rationalistic publications.53 Professor Kirsopp Lake84 expresses it thus: “Does the experience of controlling force, wh i ch_ the. prophet, feels,, really come from some exfernâl "influence, or is it jnerely^His^own consciousnessTof ordinarily unknown depths’of'his own natureT'lFis’obvious^ that a theory of Prophecy could be made on lines rendered familiar by psychologists, by suggesting that what happens in a prophetic experience is the sudden ‘coming up’ of what is ordinarily subliminal”. Wm. James of Harvard works out this conception in his "Varieties of Religious Experi­ ence”. “Psychology and religion”, so he writes, “are thus in perfect harmony on this point, since both admit that there are forces seemingly outside of the conscious indi­ vidual that bring redemption to his life. Nevertheless psy­ chology, defining these forces as ‘subconscious.’, and speak­ ing of their effects as due to ‘incubation’, or ‘cerebration’, implies that they do not transcend the individual’s person­ ality; and herein she diverges from Christian theology, which insists that they are direct supernatural operations of the Deity”.66 Hence, instead of a light through which some truth comes from above abruptly, suddenly, we have here “subconsciously maturing processes eventuating in results of which we suddenly grow conscious”.68 “It thus is ‘scientific* to interpret all otherwise unaccountable invasive alterations of consciousness as results of the tension of subliminal memories reaching the bursting point”. At the same time, however, James admits that “there are occasional bursts into consciousness of results of which it is not easy to demonstrate any prolonged subconscious incuba­ tion”. Perhaps these “would have to be ascribed to a merely physiological nerve storm, a ‘discharged lesion’ like that of epilepsy; or, in case it were useful and rational . . .to some more mystical or theological hypothesis”.87 “It is one of the peculiarities of invasions from the subconscious re­ gion to take on objective appearances, and to suggest to the Subject an external control”.68 In James' opinion this theory of the subconscious ac­ counts for “the visions, voices, rapt conditions, guiding im-* 64 M) For instance, Albert Réville, in Revue deft Deux Mondes, June 15’, 1867, pp. 826-832; Auguste Sabatier, Esquisse d’tine Philos­ ophie de la. Religion (4’ed.), pp. 158, 159. 64 ) Landmarks of the Early Church, N. Y. 1920, p. 43. Ee) Varieties of Religious Experience. A Study in Human Nature Being the Gifford Lectures on Natural Religion Delivered at Edin­ burgh in 1901-1902. N. Y. & London. 1925 (35’ Impression), p. 211. w) Ibid., p. 207. 57) Ibid., p. 236, foot-note. 58) Ibid., pp. 512, 513. Immediate Revelation 17 pressions and 'openings’ ”, both as regards all the great reformers, the great saints, the heresiarchs, as well as the Hebrew prophets. Inspiration, “automatic or semi-auto­ matic”, appears to have been frequent or only occasional.68 In a previous section of this same volume automatism is described as follows: “One’s ordinary fields of conscious­ ness are liable to incursions from it (that is, a strongly developed ultra-marginal life), of which the subject does not guess the source, and which, therefore, take for him the form of inaccountable impulses to act, or inhibitions of actions, of obsessive ideas, or even of hallucinations of sight or hearing. The impulses may take the direction of auto­ matic speech or writing, the meaning of which the subject himself may not understand even while he utters it; and generalizing this phenomenon, Mr. Myers has given the name of automatism, sensory or motor, emotional or intel­ lectual, to this whole sphere of effects, due to 'uprushes’ into the ordinary consciousness of energies originating in the subliminal part of the mind”.60 Before showing how groundless this so-called psycho-*logical explanation of Prophecy is, two remarks must be borne in mind, a) In the first place, it is ^ot_a,.question.o£ knowing how the divine communication can rake placet whether ETy'rrieans of a voice which seems to come from without and strike the senses, or by a vision in a picture offered to the imagination, or by a word which is wholly interior and addressed only to the understanding. It is entirely irrelevant as to what form the manifestation as­ sumes. The, questioiL·isj-DidJjQd^reallv Did He speak in a «i manner? in a waythàïmakes it im­ possible to attribute that word to the natural operation of the human faculties? And is it possible to^Anow^foese b) "The ?emmis^tip.n ofthe super­ natural and miraculous character of tR^reyelation ...does not rest merely upon expressions such as, for instance : "God has seht“'me“f*"God*has*;’spoken to me”. For such formulas do not, of themselves, necessarily imply a Revela­ tion in the proper sense. A good thought, a sudden enlight­ enment, can be called the “voice of God” in a wide and non­ literal sense; and when a person says: “God sends me to console you”, he may be uttering only a probable interpre­ tation of a providential design; he may not be laying claim to a divine mission in the proper meaning of that expres­ sion. Hence, it is necessary to inquire into what the E9) Ibid., pp. 478, 479. βθ) Ibid., p. 234. Introduction 18 prophets really wished to assert when they claimed a divine mission.61 1. From the testimonies cited above,62 it.is clear that.the prophets themselves wishedTaFthe outset? to protest against Vubcônsci^ü^T^TÆta'"tiiedry^is^in*'direct*an(Tformal ^contra­ diction with the persistent claim of authentic Prophecy: In the most energetic terms the prophets themselves de­ clare that the “word of Jahve” does not proceed from their own thoughts” (millibô), “their own heart”, that is, from their own spirit. On the contrary, genuine Prophecy knows exactly when this idea came to it; it is absolutely certain that it is due to a divine communication. This conviction asserts itself particularly in the struggle against the pseudo-prophets. Authentic Prophecy reproaches the false prophets with having usurped a ministry which they did not possess; with not being truly God’s messengers; with having made their own words “the words of Jahve”. Thus, Ezechiel protests against the prophets, who prophesy on their own authority (millibarn) : “Woe to the foolish proph­ ets that follow their own spirit !... saying : The Lord saith ! whereas the Lord hath not sent them . . . And you say : The Lord saith! whereas I have not spoken”.63 Jeremias like­ wise denounces the imposters: “And Jeremias the prophet said to Hananias, the prophet: Hear now, Hananias: the Lord hath not sent thee, and thou hast made this people to trust in a lie. Therefore, thus saith the Lord : Behold I will send thee away from off the face of the earth: this year shalt thou die : for thou hast spoken against the Lord. And the prophet Hananias died in that year, in the seventh month”.64 In the twenty-third chapter (v. 16-22) Jeremias cautions the people : “Thus saith the Lord of hosts : Hearken not to the words of prophets who prophesy to you, and deceive you : they speak a vision of their own heart, and not out of the mouth of the Lord! ... I did not send the prophets, yet they ran : I have not spoken to them, yet they prophesied! If they stood in my counsel, and made my words known to the people, I should have turned them from their evil way, and from their wicked doings”. Renan®5 seeks to exploit this latter passage in his own way. He claims that Jeremias is attacking his fellow prophets by way of irony. But they could meet his chal­ lenge with the retort: “Et tu quoque!” Therefore, so he 61 ) 62) β8) 66) Condamin, S. J., ibid., colls. 401, 402. cf. above pp. 11, 12. xiii, 3-7; cf. also xxii, 28. 64) xxviii, 15-17. Histoire du peuple d*Israel. Ill, p. 161. i Î Immediate Revelation 19 concludes, the prophet is guilty of a vicious circle from which there is no escape.—It seems strange that Renan did not understand that it is impossible to assume such an atti­ tude as regards Isaias, Jeremias and Ezechiel. If these prophets possessed no other titles to credibility than the personages stigmatized as “false prophets”, one could in­ deed raise the charge of a gross and revolting “vicious cir­ cle”. For, in that case, their severe accusations against their “confrères” could easily have been turned against themselves. Moreover, the strongest ^pr oofs were necessary to enable the people to j u dge“"is tothe^au trientw*rm ssion the prophets, with their hard and threatening words, and to -04., x- prevent them from turningto the optimistic predictions and r. t' the flattering language of the adversaries of the prophets, if ** Jeremias speaks and acts with certitude as regards his — own mission ; he is certain that Hananias is deceived and is ^H*****a8**aM· deceiving the people in assuming the role which God did not confide to him.66 The only possible explanation of such a certitude is that a supernatural Revelation has disclosed to4Jeremias the infallible truth of the divine designs. What­ ever,1 therefore, is affirmed by the others in a contrary sense is^’nghtly called a “lie” by him.67 If one holds with Kuenen68 to a purely “providential” order, one remains within the confines of mere similitude, of pure probabili­ ties, where Hananias would have the same right as Jeremias to ascribe to himself a divine mission.69 2. Another decisive objection to the psychological ex­ planation, as proposed by Wm. James and similar writers, is the fact, that the subconscious “tncufrutwn” of which they speak _doe&.not exist ifi^'clear""and strongideaTwE^eViTdden^appariliMiis^able to produce the illusion of an influence imposing itself from without, must be prepared slowly and secretly. This phase of unconscious labor and of latent maturation always precedes sudden in­ tuitions, and from these generally spring scientific discov­ eries. Henri Poincaré79 has given us a very good descrip­ tion of this phenomenon based on his own personal experi­ ence. He tells us that the sudden and immediately certain inspirations in reference to certain mathematical problems, which he experienced, were produced only after several 6e) cf. Jeremias, xxviii. GO xxiii, 25-32. 68) Τ’/te Prophets and Prophecy in Israel. An Historical and Critical Inquiry. (English transi.). London, 1877. β9) Condamin, S. J., ibid., col. 403 ; cf. Geo. Parks Fisher, The Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief. N. Y. 1922 (Revised edi­ tion), Appendix, pp. 456-459, for a discussion of Kuenen’s deistic viewpoint. 79) Science et Méthode. Paris, 1909, pp. 51-54, 60. 20 i I 1 » ' Introduction days of voluntary efforts. A period of conscious prelimi­ nary labor always preceded all unconscious fruitful efforts. Now, it is possible to establish the fact, that, in the history of Israel’s prophets, the sudden illuminations of the proph­ ets were not preceded by a more or less lengthy incubation of an idea in the subliminal consciousness. Balaam, called upon by Balac, king of Moab, to utter maledictions against the people of Israel, pronounces benedictions instead. After five repetitions, despite all the efforts of Balac, Balaam de­ clares that he is incapable of saying anything save what Jahve wills;11 “I cannot go beyond the word of the Lord my God, to utter anything of my own heart” (mil-, libi) ,71 72* —David dreams of building a temple to the Lord. “He said to Nathan, the prophet: Dost thou see that I dwell in a house of cedar and the ark of God is lodged within skins? And Nathan said to the king: Go, do all that is in thy hearty because the Lord is with thee. But it came to pass that 'night that the word of the Lord came to Nathan” to correct his answer.78—Micheas, the son of Jemla, consuited unexpectedly in regard to a prospective expedition of the kings, Achab and Josaphat, manifests the firm inten­ tion of announcing whatever the Lord will say to them. He predicts the defeat of the kings and is sent to prison.74— Ezechias was suffering from a mortal malady. Isaias went to him and said: “Thus saith the Lord God: Give charge ' concerning thy house, for thou shalt die, and not live”. Ezechias turned his face to the wall and prayed to the Lord with much weeping, and before Isaias was gone out of the middle of the court, the word of the Lord came to him to utter an oracle directly contrary to the first, saying: “I have heard thy prayer, and I have seen thy tears : and behold I have healed thee”.7B Wm. James himself recognizes that his theory does not explain everything, but that some results would have to be ascribed to some “more mystical or theological hypothe­ sis”.™ Now, it is precisely this “more mystical or theological hypothesis” which ought to be invoked on behalf of the prophets, particularly since they were convinced that their struggles were in vain ; it was impossible to escape from the Divine commands. “Prophecy”, says St. Peter (Π, i, 21), “came not by the will of man at any time: but the holy men of God spoke, inspired by the Holy Ghost”. Chosen to lead the Israelites into the Promised Land, Moses 71) 72) * 75) 7«) Numbers, xxiii, 8, 12, 20, 26. xxiv, 13. 7«) Π Kings, vii. 74) HI Kings, xxii. IV Kings, xx, 1-5; Condamin, S. J., ibid., col. 404. cf. above, noté 57. * Kf' Immediate Revelation 21 seeks to evade that mission, saying: “Send whom thou wilt send** (that is, anyone save me).77 Eliseus and Amos were taken by the Lord to be His ministers without any prepara­ tion. Isaias, called in a vision, is at first dismayed by the majesty and sanctity of Jahve.*79 Jeremias alleges his own weakness: “I am a child**.79 Later on, he complains in vehement terms of the derision and threats which the spirit of Prophecy brought upon him and which he was powerless to resist.80 “Woe to me’* says Baruch, “wretch that I am, for the Lord hath added sorrow to my sorrow: I am wearied with my groans, and I find no rest*’.81 The conditions under which Ezechiel was sent were not more attractive and congenial.82 It is evident, therefore, that we are far removed from that phase of conscious and free effort, which, as H. P. Poincaré maintains, always precedes unconscious effort or labor. Hence, the theory of the subconscious is really a deus ex machina. It is infinitely more probable that the prophetic message, with its intense individuality and its obvious ele­ ments of novelty, “was a ‘downrush from the supercon­ sciousness’—the voice of the Spirit of God, as the prophets themselves so imperiously insist*’.83 Difficult as it may be for the modern mind to acknowledge that the prophets were influenced by some mysterious force, lying behind the veil of ordinary phenomena, “there seems to be no other way of doing justice to the historical facts’*.84* This compelling certitude, which the prophets and apostles enjoyed with respect to their divine enlighten­ ment and mission, could be imparted to them by God in a twofold way: a) immediately, namely, by virtue of the so-called lumen propheticum,86 just as He immediately communicated to them the content itself of the divine message, or b) mediately, that is, by means of definite criteria, which would assure the prophets of the higher origin of the divine self-disclosure beyond the possibility of error. Instances of such criteria are the marvelously 77 ) Exodus, iv, 13. 78) vi, 79 ) i, 6. 8°) xx, 7-9. 81 ) Jeremias, xlv, 3. 82) if, 4-8; Hi, 6-7 sq. N) Chas. Gore, The Reconstruction of Belief, Part I: “Belief in God**. N. Y. 1926 (New edition in one volume), p. 106. 8*) E, Kônig, art. “Prophecy (Hebrew)’*, in ERE, X, p. 392, cf. also, C. von Orelli art. “Prophecy and Prophetic Office’’, in SHERK. IX, ». 275. w) cf. J. J. Baierl, The Theory of Revelation, Part I, Sec. 1, pp. 27-39. Immediate and Mediate Evidence 22 Introduction new and exalted character of the intellectual content of the message, Miracles and Visions, which accompanied the vocation to the prophetic office and its execution.86 However, this compelling insight into the origin of the divine message does not exclude the possibility, on the part of the organs of Revelation, of embracing by a free act of Faith the doctrinal content of the message, especially if it be supernatural and mysterious. A logical conclusion, an indirect proof, as to the truth of the doctrine would indeed be possible. But the God-fearing recipient of the Revela­ tion could and would be obliged to prescind from this cold, logical deduction and, in a spirit of willing obedience, to accept the doctrine because of the divine veracity and majesty.87 A final questi°n remains to be discussed, namely: What kind.of certitude did the prophets enjoy? The answer to this question will largely depend on general theories of the genesis of faith and of natural cognition.8889At any rate, there is question here of an objective experimental fact; hence, the evidence con­ nected with that fact may be qualified as intrinsic?9 However, since the fact is not grounded on any natural law, but rests on the supernatural intervention of God Himself, the corresponding certitude^ must^be^termed supernatural. But this su penial ural certitude cannofbe called metaphysical, physical, or moral, for, it does not rest on natural laws at all. Nevertheless, since it is cer­ titude as regards an experimental fact, it is most akin to physical certitude ; therefore, it may be so designated by analogy. The evidence of the fact of supernatural Divine Revelation, like every kind of evidence, is a compelling evidence ; otherwise it could not generate certitude in the mind of the recipient. 86) Mausbach, Grundziige etc., pp. 20, 21. 87 ) Mausbach, Die Religion und das moderne Seelenleben, in RCK, I, p. 121. 88) cf. P. Schanz, A Christian Apology, vol. II: “God and Revelation”, N. Y. 4’ed, pp. 293, 294; Al. v. Schmid, Wissenschaftliche Richtungen auf dem Gebiete des Katholizismus. Munich, 1862, pp. 98. 270. 89 ) The student is referred to any good text-book for a discus­ sion of the concepts and kinds of “evidence” and ’ “certitude” ; e. g., P. Coffey, Epistemology. London & N. Y. vol. II, p. 262 sq. Immediate Revelation 23 Strictly speaking, God could indeed disclose Himself im­ mediately to each individual soul, if He so chose. In fact, the early Protestant Reformers maintained that God does reveal Himself immediately to each man, without the inter­ vention of an agent. Hence, while reading the Bible, so they insist, the individual receives the immediate inspiration of the Holy Spirit, Who discloses to him the right meaning of the divine message. Therefore, each man becomes his own prophet and apostle.90 That this viewpoint is erroneous is shown ex professo in the third part of apologetics, namely, the Theory of the Church. Moreover, experience confirms the conviction that the private interpretation of the Bible is really not the work of the one Spirit of truth, but rather that each one is simply following the impulse of his own spirit. For, all the countless sects of Protestantism, as well as the still greater divergencies of opinion within each sect, owe their origin precisely to the private interpretation of the Bible.91 The Bible itself plainly asserts that God does not reveal Himself immediately to each human soul.92 The ordinary way to faith is through the office of oral preaching, to which the Lord sent His Apostles and their lawful successors.93 When the legitimate teaching office preaches the revealed message of God, Christ Himself is present with His grace, which enlightens and moves interiorly and produces faith.94 This illumination and inspiration are necessary, in order that the intellect and will of the hearers may be able to per­ form the Act of Faith. But this interior and mystical ele90) cf. J. J. Baierl, The Theory of Revelation. Part I, sect. 1, pp. 48-50. 78. 81 ) C. Gutberlet, Lehrbuch der Apologetik,,vol. Ill: “Von der katholischen Religion”, Münster i. W. 1910 (3’ed), p. 57. 92) cf. Exodus xiv, 31; Hebrews i, 1; John i, 7; Rom. x, 14-17. ") Mark xvi, 15, 16; Matt xxviii, 20. St. Thomae Aquinas says that “to some, as to the Apostles and Prophets, they (i. e., the things which pertain to faith) are revealed immediately by God; to others, they are proposed by God through the ministry of His preachers, according to the saying of the Apostle: ‘How shall they preach, un­ less they be sent?’ ” (ST. II, II, q. 6, a. 1). 94 ) Matt, xviii, 20. The Council of Trent (VI sess., canon 3, de justificatione) teaches: “If anyone saith that without the prevenient inspiration of the Holy Ghost and His help man can believe ... as he ought ... let him be anathema” (DB. n. 813; DCD, p. 49); cf. Augustine, Tract 3 in Joan, ii-13 ; also his warning (de doctrina christ. Proleg. 5); “Ne . . . decepti . . . nolumus ire in Ecclesias et... praedicantem hominem audire et expectemus . . . rapi in tertium coelum ... et ibi audire Dominum Jesum et ab illo potius quam ab hominibus audire Evangelium”; cf. also Karl Adam, Das Wesen des Katholizismus. Düsseldorf, 1927, pp. 56-73; English transi., “The Spirit of Catholicism”, by Dorn Justin McCann, O. S. B. N. Y. 1929. Immediate Reve­ lation not granted to all men. Mediate Revela­ tion the ordinary way to faith. 24 Introduction ment does not usurp the place of oral teaching, for, God has linked the genesis of faith with this oral preaching as a necessary factor. Therefore, _&>ralpreuchfog.is .the ordinary way toJaith^ Only specially selected"persbns^lilie’StT’Paul," "can say: “For neither did I receive it (i. e., the Gospel) of man, nor did I learn it; but by the Revelation of Jesus Christ” (Gal. i, 12; cf. also, I Cor. xi, 23). Texts, such as John vi, 45 and I John ii, 26, obviously presuppose this pri­ mary factor, that is, the oral preaching of God’s messen­ gers, which, together with the interior grace of Christ, is truly a divine instruction. That is the true meaning of the words of I John ii, 26; Eph. vi, 11 and II Tim. iv, 2.95 Therefore, the question arises: How can the faithful, to whom God has not immediately disclosed Himself, arrive at a certain knoivledge of supernatural Divine Revelation® What are the signs or criteria, which authenticate a mediate self-disclosure of God and make the word of God’s legate rationally credible for their hearers and for mankind generally Î MEDIATE REVELATION i Before beginning the apology of the motives of credi­ bility, or the criteria of a mediate supernatural Divine Revelation, we shall present a brief outline and explanation of the teaching of the Catholic Church with respect to this proximate preparation for the Act of Faith. The purpose of this summary is not to refute adversaries, but rather to furnish the student with a handy survey of the Catholic position. The divergent views of non-Catholics will be treated in detail in the body of this volume. Catholic Doctrine bn the Credibility of Mediate Divine Revelation. The authentic Catholic teaching in regard to the credibility of mediate supernatural Divine Revelation may be summarized under the following heads: a) -(Objectively). The mysteries of faith are rationally credible, inasmuch as the divine origin of the Chris\ tian Religion can rightly be proved by most certain signs. M) Het tin ger-Weber, ibid., p. 167. Mediate Revelation 25 The Vatican Council teaches that “if anyone shall say that Divine Revelation cannot be made credible by outward signs and that, therefore, men ought to be moved to faith solely by the internal experience of each, or by private in­ spiration; let him be anathema”; likewise, “if anyone shall say that Miracles are impossible, and, therefore, that all the accounts regarding them, even those contained in Holy Scripture, are to be dismissed as fabulous or mythical ; or that Miracles can never be known with certainty, or that the divine origin of Christianity is not rightly proved by them; let him be anathema”.06 This teaching is more fully developed in the corre­ sponding chapters of the Council. For, even though Faith is above reason, “nevertheless, in order that the obedience of our Faith might be in harmony with reason, God willed that to the interior help of the Holy Spirit, there should be joined exterior proofs (argumenta) of His Revelation, to wit, divine facts and especially Miracles and Prophecies, which, as they manifestly display the omnipotence and wis­ dom of God, are most certain proofs of His Divine Revela­ tion adapted to the intelligence of all men”.07 Furthermore, “to the Catholic Church alone belong all those many and admirable tokens which have been divinely established for the evident credibility of the Christian Faith. Nay more, the Church itself, by reason of its marvelous extension, its eminent holiness, and its inexhaustible fruitfulness in every good thing, its Catholic unity and its invincible authority, is a great and perpetual motive of credibility, and an irre­ futable witness of its own divine mission”.08 • b) (Subjectively). Before accepting the Faith hu­ man reason can know with certitude the rational credi­ bility of the mysteries of Faith, or the* divine origin of Christianity. This is evident from the definitions just cited, inasmuch as the most certain signs of Revelation are said to be “adapted to the intelligence of all men”.09 The Church in86 ) Dogmatic Constitution on the Catholic Faith (III Sess., 3’ and 4’ canons attached to chapter 3, in DB. n. 1812, 1813; DCD. pp. 235, 236. θ’) Ibid., DB. n. 179Û; DCD. p. 224. 0β) Ibid., DB. n. 1794; DCD. p. 226; cf. also the Syllabus of Pope Pius IX, DB. n.1707; DCD. p. 188; likewise the oath against Modern­ ism, DB. n. 2145: “Profiteor . . . secundo: externa revelationis argu­ menta, hoc est facta divina,, in primisque miracula et prophetias ad­ mitto et agnosco tamquam signa certissima divinitus ortae Christianas religionis, eademque teneo aetatum omnium atque hominum, etiam hujus temporis, intelligentiae esse maxime accomodata”. W) Ibid., DB. n. 1790; DCD. p. 224. I Introduction 26 sists against Fideism, that these signs can be known with certitude by human reason before it embraces the Faith.100 ù-j Pope Pius XI affirmed the same teaching against the followers of Hermes.101 c) A scientific demonstration of credibility is not ’ required for each and every believer. The Vatican Council stressed this doctrine, when it con­ demned those who maintained that “Catholics may have a just cause for doubting, with suspended assent, the faith which they have already received under the teaching (mag­ isterium) of the Church, until they shall have obtained a scientific demonstration of the credibility and truth of their Faith”.102 We shall show below that the certitude of com­ mon sense, or moral certitude, suffices. 1 d) However, only a probable knowledge, a mere subç jective knowledge, or only an internal experience, or a X private inspiration, is not sufficient. This is clear from the Church’s condemnation of the doctrine of certain probabiliste, who assert that “the assent of supernatural Faith ... is consistent with a merely prob­ able knowledge of Revelation”.103 It is likewise evident from the rejection by the Church of the twenty-fifth propo­ sition of the Modernists, who claim that “the assent of Faith rests ultimately on an accumulation of probabili. ties”.104 It follows also from the censure imposed by eccle­ 100) 102) 226 sq. DB. n. 1622-1627. 101) DB. n. 1637. DB. n. 1815; DCD. p. 236; cf. also DB. n. 1794; DCD. pp. 103) DB. n. 1171: “Assensus fidei supernaturalis et utilis ad salutem stet cum notitia solum probabili revelationis, imo cum formidine, qua quis formidet, ne non sit locutus Deus”. 104) DB. n. 2025: “Assensus fidei innititur in congerie proba­ bilitatum”; cf. also Encyclical of Pius X, "Pascendi dominici gregis", DB. n. 2072 sq.—This thesis, however, has nothing in common with the theory of the "cumulation of probabilities" in Cardinal Newman’s system of thought Xcf. "An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent", London & N. Y. (New Impression), 1898, p. 288). For the latter has in mind the method of reasoning in concrete matters, “from things to things, from concrete to concrete, from wholes to wholes”, as con­ trasted with the logical form of inference. Newman is dealing with cases, in which from the individual characteristics of an historical fact, a certain “mental comprehension of the whole case” (Ibid., p. 291) is obtained by intuition. At any rate, he demands ultimately a certain judgment of conscience (cf. Ibid., pp. 105 sq; 389 sq., J. Mausbach. Religion und das moderne Seelenleben in RCK. I, p. 125; P. Coffey, Epistemology, II. p. 278, foot-note; S. P. Jeurgens, S. M., "What is Newman’s] deepest message?" in AER. vol. LXXVIII, No. 2, Feb. 1928, pp. 142-151; IDEM, Newman on the Psychology of Faith in the Individual. N. Y. 1928.) 1 i ■ Mediate Revelation F 27 siastical authority on the teaching of certain pseudo-mys­ tics, who defend a merely subjective knowledge of credi­ bility,105 106 and of Protestants, who appeal to the internal experience of the believer alone, or to the private inspira­ tion of the Holy Spirit.108 The Church demands a certain knowledge of the divine origin of Revelation.107 Thus, according to the Catholic viewpoint, before assenting to an alleged Revelation by Faith, we must be nerent dignity of certain of its divine supernatural origin; this .certitude Ι' * upon rohowat evidence. Non-mtellectual grounds of ce Γ­ tïtude^whichdo not appeal directly to the intellect, but rather to the whole complex nature of man, such, for in­ stance, as arise from the will, the temperament or men­ tality, the inclinations, likes and dislikes, passions, feel­ ings, emotions, etc., doubtless help us to discover the truth; but, of themselves alone, they are insufficient to beget certitude. For "they have no direct bearing on the truth of any judgment to which we assent, and do not help us to discern or decide its truth—except in so far as we may consider them, on reflection, to have per­ haps a certain legitimate weight as tests or guides to the truth of the judgment to which they incline us to assent”. The intellect or reason is "the ultimate court of appeal for deciding between truth and error”.108 Therefore, the Catholic Church recognizes the inherent dignity of man as a rational being, when she demands that the believer base his judgment as to the divine supernatural origin of Christianity primarily upon the grounds of reason. Now, a twofold method of arriving at certitude in regard to the divine provenience of mediate supernatural Revelation presents itself to the inquirer on the basis’ of rational evidence. The one is direct, the other is indirect. In the first place, the inquirer may reflect on the inmost essence or the content of the revealed message itself trln·1®· 105) DB. n. 1273. io«) DB. n. 1812; DCD. pp. 235, 236. 107) P. Fr. Reg. Garrigou-Lagrange, Ο. P., Theologia fundamen­ talis secundum S. Thomae doctrinam. Romae et Parisiis. 1918, vol. I, pp. 516-518; (3’ed. 1925), pp. 267, 268. 108) p, Coffey, Epistemology, II, pp. 257. 260, d 28 Introduction (intrinsic evidence); or secondly, he may weigh the rea­ sons which proclaim that a given Revelation proceeds from God, as its Author, and is guaranteed by His authority or testimony (extrinsic evidence or evidence of credibility). The former method, as will be shown later, is not applicable to Christianity with which we are immediately concerned; for the Christian Revelation is, on its own allegation, essentially supernatural; it contains mys­ teries in the strict sense and is, therefore, inaccessible to human reason. The latter method, on the other hand, is certainly feasible. For, the inquirer may examine, in the light of ^hilpspphy and history, the evidence which shows that a certain message is really witnessed to and guaranteed by God Himself, essential truth and good­ ness, Who vouches for the truth and goodness of that message by most certain signs. Thus, that message ap­ pears evidently credible to human reason.109 In order to obtain this evidence of credibility, it sufgceg that tfce inquirer be able to judge with certitude . that, here and now, there are sufficient grounds for be­ lieving that something has really been revealed by God in a supernatural manner. It is not necessary that the inquirer should perceive either the revealed object, or the divine utterance itself.110 For, credibility does not consist in the object proposed or in the divine testimony, but rather in that quality in a person or thing, which renders that person or thing worthy of belief. This evi­ dence of credibility arises from a simple narration of the signs which confirm a supernatural Divine Revela­ tion. The certitude resulting therefrom is moral certi­ tude based on the testimony of men. Hence, the credi­ bility of the mysteries of faith signifies their aptitude Notion of cred- ibiiity. 109) A. Gisler, Der Modemismus. Einsiedeln. 1913 (4’ed.), p. 225; cf. also Hettinger-Bowden, Revealed Religion, N. Y. (2'ed.), pp. 1-25. no) This kind of evidence (evidentia revelationis seu evidentia in attestante) is of a higher order than the evidence of credibility and is rare, being peculiar to the immediate recipients of God’s message “sub lumine prophetico” (cf. ST. II, II, q. 17, a. 5). Credibility 29 for belief, inasmuch as most certain signs make it evi­ dent to human reason that they have been revealed in a supernatural manner by God.111 kl D t CREDIBILITY N, Uo Owing to the fundamental position, which the concepi of credibility occupies in the problem of the natural c«diMuty. knowability of mediate supernatural Divine Revelation, it is of the greatest importance that the student should possess clear ideas in this respect. It will be helpful, therefore, to enter somewhat more deeply into the sig­ nificance of this basic concept. This may perhaps best be done by comparing the Catholic definition of credi­ bility, as applied to Divine Revelation, with the concept of credibility required in human faith. There are two ways or means by which we may arrive seiraeeeM at knowledge: sciencerand.faith,· “I may know a fact be- F*tth. cause I have seen" it' with my own eyes ; but I may know it also because some one has told me. I may have performed an experiment in chemistry or proved for myself a theorem in geometry; but I may have just as much certitude about it on the word of another, fioth- ways of knowing are natural, both reasonable”.112 Through science I have my own knowledge, my own ideas, the truth seen by me per­ sonally. Such direct or personal knowledge is doubtless more perfect than faith. On the other hand, by faith “I unite my mind to the mind, of those who know and thus appropriate their knowledge. They have searched, they have observed, they have thought, they have found. If I am willing to believe them, their researches, their observa­ tions, their reflections, will become mine”.113 Thus, besides direct knowledge (science) there is also an “indirect knowl­ edge gained by appropriating the knowledge of others. This TTTWr.114 ni) Garrigou-Lagrange, Ο. P., ibid.,I,pp. 520, 521; (3’ed.),pp.271. 272.—Rational and external credibility must be carefully distinguished from supernatural and intrinsic credibility. The former is known by reason atidjs the remote aptitude of the mysteries of faith for belief; the latter is known by faith and is the proximate aptitude of these mysteries for belief, accordingly as they actually exist under the supernatural light of Divine Revelation to which we adhere in a super­ natural manner. Cf. P. Gardeil, Ο. P., art “Crédibilité”, in DCT. col. 2202). J. V. Bainvel, S. J., Faith and the Act of Faith. Authorized Translation from the third French edition by Leo C. Sterck, St. Louis, Mo. 1926, p. 6. 1W) Bainvel, S. J., ibid., p. 7. n<) Ibid., pp. 8,9. Italics inserted. 30 Introduction This indirect knowledge is based on the evidence of the truth, appearing, not in itself, but in the authorized word of the witness, or upon the evidence of testimony or credi­ bility. The character and competency of the witness are the evidence for the truth of the statement which I accept by faith. These two conditions: the knowledge and the trustworthiness (scientia et veracitas) of the witness guar­ antee the truth of the judgment on which I rely, and ground my firm assent thereto. “It is obvious that we should be induced to distrust the most natural and plausible state­ ment when made by a person whom we suspected of a wish to deceive, or of relating facts which he had no sufficient means of knowing”.115 Before assenting to the judgment of the witness, I ought first to be certain of these two other judgments: “The authority in question is not deceived, but well-informed”, and “The authority is not deceiving me, but is trustworthy”. Now, these grounds of belief, these reasons which incline or move the intellect of the believer to assent firmly to the judgment, namely, that the testimony of the witness is true, are called the motives Since, at the same time, they are also the tests "bi'the Truth of the judgment, they are sometimes termed criteria,. But they must not be confounded with the motive of faith. For, the motive or formal object of faith is the authority of the witness, that is, his knowledge and trust­ worthiness. We believe because of^FKe authority of the wit­ ness who makes the statement. The motives of credibility, on the other hand, make it plain to me that the witness is really competent and honest, that he has authority and that, therefore, his statement is worthy of belief (credible). Extrinsic evi­ The_evidence, which the motives of credibility present, dence not abso­ lutely cogent. is ncvey absQlufedY>CQgen^· It does not beget a certitude and Function of the a^cdnvJction which Is irresistible, like the immediate judg­ TFiU. ments of experience, such as “I am writing”; or the selfevident axioms of mathematics, such as “the whole is greater than its part”, and the conclusions derived by pure T^^deductive reasoning from such axioms. For.lhe^vidence^gLr^ credibility,isjQ.tintrinsic Jbhe^ Λ Motives of Credi­ bility. i ί J·** y \ ' i J * ' ^^^KjQ2Lfi^^Xsc£KurErnwic_grounds of its trutK grounds and motives on accountof which I hold a judg4» ment as certain, » I am conscious that those grounds and 115) John Henry Cardinal Newman, Two Essays on Biblical and. Ecclesiastical Miracles. London & N. Y. 1897 (ll’ed.), p. 72. Credibility 31 motives have effectively excluded from my mind all prudent fear of error, and so I adhere to it with that steady, firm, unwavering mental grasp which constitutes conviction or certitude. There can be no doubt in my mind as to the credibility of the judgment of the witness on whom I rely, that is, about the reasonableness of holding it firmly, or with conviction, as true. But I am also conscious that, with these grounds and motives still before my mind, I could loosen my mental grasp on the judgment and allow myself seriously to question it. I feel that I should be acting rashly and unreasonably, and possibly also against the clear dictate of my conscience, in doing so, but nevertheless that I am free to do so, that though it would be unreasonable and reprehensible it is not impossible.116 As long as I continue to entertain (what is really) an imprudent fear of error, the intellect remains undetermined. An act of the will is required to determine and fix the mental assent as a conviction. Thus, this rea­ sonable and prudent act of assenting firmly is performed by my intellect freely, i. e., under the command of a free act of my will.117 In the case of ordinary facts, it is “needless, as indeed verification of it would be endless, to inquire rigidly into the credibility of tesri^OfaUhen’ the testimony by which they are conveyed to us, because scientific. they in a manner speak for themselves. When, however, the information is unexpected, or extraordinary, or improbable, our only means of determining its truth is by considering the credit due to the witnesses; and then, of course, we exercise that right of scrutiny which we before indeed possessed, but did not think it worth while to claim”.118 In other words, it is possible to make the assent of faith strictly scientific by verifying the testimony. “By means, which in their last analysis are synonomous with science, I can ascertain that under given circumstances the witness is trustworthy; that he knows and that he tells the truth. It is after, or more exactly on account of and under the in­ fluence of, this verification that I give my assent. My adhe­ sion to his statement is measured by the results of my verification. In one case, I will adhere completely, because it is clear to me that the author has spoken the truth ; in the other, I will assent, but reservedly, because to me it is only probable that he has spoken the truth; or again, I suspend my judgment, or simply refuse to accept his testi­ mony, according as his word may seem to me without foun­ dation or clearly false”.119 P. Coffey, ibid., II, p. 49. 118) Newman, ibid., pp. 72. 73. n’) Ibid., pp. 50 sq. 119) Bainvel, S. J., ibid., p. 14. 32 Faith 1* di»eurrtra. »uthort^. Summary. Introduction It is plain, therefore, that “faith is essentially * dis cur­ sive', as the Schoolmen say. It reminds me of a discourse,1?0 which may be simply implicit, bordering on the boundaries of the unconscious, hardly noticeable to the psychological analysis of faith. But on closer investigation one finds it at the bottom of all assent of scientific faith. As is often the case in other easy reasoning processes, the mind glides, so to speak, over the self-evident premises. However, the premises have not been entirely forgotten; attentive reflec­ tion shows that the conclusion was reached only with the help of those premises. However rapid the process of rea­ soning may be and however direct it may seem, the assent of scientific faith is based upon a syllogism, which runs somewhat in this fashion : *A man tells me such and such a thing under such and such circumstances. Now, a thing said under these circumstances is a thing which I may hold as true. Consequently, I can hold as true what this person has said. Therefore, I believe it’. Or, in a simpler form: Ά statement that' is duly guaranteed is a true statement. Now; this statement is duly guaranteed; therefore, it is true and I believe’ ”.120 121 Thus, scientific faith.is reducible to this form­ ula: “I believe because (I see that) you speak the truth”. For the sake of completeness, it might be well to add there is another kind of faith, which may be termed the faith of simple authority, since it rests solely upon the authority of the witness, upon his word ’ alone, “logically unsupported by the perception of the nexus between the testimony and the truth”. It is more trusting than the faith of science, for it says : “I believe because you say it”. However, this faith, like scientific faith, to be reasonable, supposes the implicit or explicit judgment: “What the wit­ ness tells me is true”.122 It may be transformed into scien­ tific faith by the verification of the testimony. To sum up: A statement is said to be rationally credible by human faith, inasmuch as it is guaranteed by witnesses 120) The term “discourse” is used because it comes closest to the Latin “discursus” and expresses better the idea of the “process” or “progress” of thought (Bainvel, S. J., ibid., p. 15, foot-note). 121 ) Bainvel, S. J., ibid., pp. 15, 16. Italics inserted. Sometimes this syllogistic assent of faith is mistaken for the assent of “mediate” science and is regarded as the evident conclusion from two evident premises. However, the conclusion, “Therefore this saying is true", is not yet an act of faith, which is not à judgment upon the truth of a statement, butfan affirmation of the thing stated. To affirm that this statement: “God has become man” is true, is quite different from affirming that “God became man”. (Ibid., p. 16, foot-note). W)Ibid., p. 17. I Credibility 33 worthy of credence, that is to say, because the witnesses are reputed 1) to know what they affirm, 2) to be truthful, and 3) because they really affirm the statement in ques­ tion. Hence, “the credibility or incredibility of a statement has nothing to do with its intrinsic probability or improb­ ability; it depends solely upon the credentials of the author­ ity who makes the statement”.122 In the same way a statement is said to be rationally credible by Divine Faith, inasmuch as it is vouched for by the testimony of God Himself, Who can neither de­ ceive nor be deceived. The credibility of a divine state­ ment is correlative with and proportionate to the cre­ dentials of the divine testimony. “Now the credentials of God are indubitable, for the very idea of God involves that of omniscience and of Supreme Truth. Hence, what God says is supremely credible, though not necessarily intelligible to us”. Therefore, the question., at issue re­ garding the divine authority is not “asto the creden­ tials of God (namely, His _ knowledge and veracity), or the credibility of what He says, butas of the statement that God has spoken'^** Accordingly, the problem resolves7tself info ImsV Is'the Fact that God has spoken, or that He has disclosed Himself evidently credible J Is the miraculous intervention of God in the mind ofthe prophet evidently worthy of beliefs If that Fact, which is supernatural as regard^ the manner of its production (supernatural# quoad modum), can be made known to human reason through certain signs (namely, the criteria of Revelation, the motives of credibility), that Fact is said to be rationally credible by Divine Faith.125 This concept of credibility is necessarily involved in the Catholic concept of Revelation and Faith. For, ac­ cording to Catholic teaching supernatural Divine Reve­ lation proceeds, not indeed from man’s subconsciousness, but from God Who is essentially distinct from the world and from man’s own soul. On the other hand, the Act of ««) Hugh Pope, O. P., art. “FaitA”, in CE. V, p. 754. 124) Hugh Pope, 0. P„ ibid., p, 754. 126) Garrigou-Lagrange, 0. P., ibid., I, p. 521; (3’ed.), p. 271. Credibility and Divine Faith. 34 Introduction Divine Faith is not a mere religious experience, but an assent of the intellect to truth upon the authority of G-od revealing.126 Obviously, therefore, a statement cannot be said to be credible by Divine Faith, save in so far as it appears to our reason as revealed by God. Every other definition of credibility is inadequate, as will be shown in detail below, when we shall discuss the various definitions of credibility proposed by Rational­ ists, Protestants, Pragmatists, Modernists, etc. But even •now, it is already evident that a certain statement cannot be said to be credible by Divine Faith, for instance, sim­ ply because it appears to be conformable with our aspir­ ations. For, such a statement would indeed be worthy of our affections; it would be only probable, the object of a consoling opinion. Credibility, therefore, ought to be proportionate to the exigencies of Divine Faith, not merely to the exigencies of reason, or sentiment, or re­ ligious experience, or practical needs.127 It must appear worthy of belief, inasmuch as certain signs demonstrate beyond every reasonable doubt, that it has really been uttered by God Himself, Who can neither deceive nor be deceived. God Himself must authenticate that statement. Reflecting on the concept of credibility, as explained above, the student can easily discern its chief properties. For convenience sake wo shall group them together un­ der the following heads. a) Credibility is something that is common to all re­ vealed truths, St, Thomas' Aquinas says: “The things which come under Faith may be considered in two ways: First, in par­ ticular; and thus they cannot be seen and believed at the same time. Secondly, in general, that is, under the common aspect of credibility (‘sub communi ratione credibilis') ; and in this way they are seen by the believer. For, he would not believe unless, on the evidence of signs, or of something I2fi) cf, J. J. Baierl, The Theory 0/ Revelation, Part I, Sect. 1, pp. 20-62; Vatican Council, III Sess,, chap. 3, DB. n. 1789; DCD. pp. 223, 224. { iZ7) Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P., ibid., I, p. 521; (3’ed.),. p. 271. 1 Credibility 85 similar, he saw that they ought to be believed”.128 Thus, credibility belongs indiscriminately to all revealed truths, inasmuch as human reason views them all in their relation to the signs which show that they have been revealed by God. b) The evidence of credibility is extrinsic to the things believed. It is obvious that the evidence of the credibility of the mysteries of faith is not intrinsic to the mysteries them­ selves ; for their inmost essence remains obscure, even after the fact of their existence has been made manifest to us by Divine Revelation, They are evidently credible, accordingly as certain signs, extrinsic to the mysteries themselves, make it plain to our reason that they have been Divinely dis­ closed. This extrinsic evidence interferes in no way with the freedom and the supernatural character of the Act of Faith, and Faith remains obscure, “the evidence of things that appear not”, as the author of the Epistle to the He­ brews says (xi, 1). c) Credibility is both a speculative and a practical truth. It is not merely speculative, because it looks to the positing of an act, namely, the act of faith. Credibility makes a statement appear worthy of belief. At the same time, however, this aptitude for belief is not evident, unless the Fact of Divine Revelation is speculatively certain, at least with moral certitude, just like any other historical fact. For, moral certitude can be not only practical, but also speculative, if it has reference not merely to the positing of an act, but also to an existing fact. d) Evident credibility is a conditio sine qua non of the act of faith. This holds true both in regard to faith in general and to Divine Faith in particular. 1) Faith in general. Nothing is rationally credible, unless it be evidently credible. For, nothing is knowable by a determinate judgment without some kind of evidence.129 For, whatever is absolutely obscure, is also absolutely un­ knowable. Hence, just as nothing is knowable without the evidence of knowability, and just as nothing can be said to be an opinion which has not the evidence of probability, 128) ST. II, II, q. 1, a. 4 ad. 2. 129 ) cf. Aloysius Rother, S. J., Certitude. A Study in Philosophy. St Louis, Mo. 1911, pp. 30 sq. 36 Introduction so, too, nothing is credible without the evidence of credi­ bility. Therefore, in order that a- statement may be said to be credible to reason, it is not sufficient that it be only prob­ ably credible. For, in that case, faith would not be distin­ guished from a mere opinion. An opinion, which implies the fear of error, supposes the evidence of probability or of mere likelihood ; and as long as this evidence persists, the opinion is probable and not imprudent, but only as an opinion without the firm adhesion of the intellect.130131 132 But faith in general is without the fear of error ; for, we firmly believe what is seriously affirmed to us, for instance, by our parents or by a friend. This firmness of adhesion to the statement in question does not proceed from thé evi­ dence of the object affirmed, but rather from a special motion of the will, which determines the intellect to assent, to believe. Now, this motion of the will would be imprudent, if there were only the probability of credibility at hand; that, is, if the will, without sufficient reason, were to move the intellect to hold not only as an opinion, but to believe firmly. Such a faith would be irrational, light credulity. It is obvious, therefore, that faith Jn_general demands, not merely probability., but the.evTd^c^f^redigjlj^111^ 2) Divine Faith. The same principles hold for Divine Faith. Hence, nothing is rationally credible by Divine Faith, unless it be evidently credible. However, this evident credi­ bility must be proportionate to the firmness and immuta­ bility of this Faith. Obviously, there is an infinite abyss between these two judgments: “This is credible by human faith, because some man, for instance, Aristotle, affirms it” and “This is credible, because it is witnessed to by God Him^ self”. Divine Faith differs essentially from merely human faith as regards the firmness by which the intellect adheres to the truth. For human faith, even though prudent, does not rest upon infallible testimony. Divine Faith, on the con­ trary, is grounded upon infallible testimony. Therefore, it can never legitimately be called into question; in fact, we ought to be ready to undergo martyrdom rather than to deny the Faith or deliberately to doubt concerning it.133 This firmness and irrevocability of Divine Faith, which objectively is grounded upon the infallible testimony of God, proceeds subjectively from the will under the “illumi­ nation and inspiration of the Holy Ghost”.133 But the will, Ibid., pp. 30 sq. Garr igou-Lagrange, O.P. ibid., I, p. 525; (3’ed.), pp. 275,276. Garrigou-Lagrange, Ο. P., ibid., I, p. 525; (3*ed.), p. 267; cf. Vatican Council, DB. n. 1815; DCD. pp. 236, 237. 133) DB. n.'1791. n. 1794; DCD. p. 225. 130) 131) 132) Certitude 37 even under the influence of grace, cannot rationally and irrevocably move the intellect to believe firmly and im­ mutably, unless there be at hand a sufficient and legitimate reason for that impulse; for, nothing is willed unless it is first known, and this sufficient reason can only be evident credibility. In other words, nothing is rationally credible by divine and immutable faith, unless it appears to our rea­ son as evidently credible by this same immutable faith.134 Certain signs (the motives of credibility, or the cri­ teria), which are extrinsic to Divine Revelation itself, make the Fact of Divine Revelation, inasmuch as it is supernaturally produced (supematurale quoad modum pro­ ductionis suae)—a miraculous intervention of God in the mind of the prophet—appear credible to human reason. But reason alone cannot know Divine Revelation, inas­ much as it is substantially supernatural (supernaturalis quoad substantiam), namely, as proceeding from God as the Author of grace and glory ; for, under this higher and more intimate aspect, Divine Revelation is known only by Divine Faith and is the formal motive of infused Faith. In this sense it is called in Sacred Scripture “the voice of the heav­ enly Father”, or “the voice of the Son”, or “the testimony of the Holy Spirit”.135 CERTITUDE We shall now present a more detailed explanation of the Catholic position regarding the nature of th(L^ce.rti.tude, which the recipients of mediate Revelation may acquire concerning Jhe Tlact,pf God's revealed message and secondly? in reference to Sie ways in which they may arrive at certitude. Strictly speaking, a scientific demonstration of the Fact of Divine Revelation is not, per se, necessary for nec^’jg*eJ"r eli each and every believer. For, in the first place, such a proof is not possible for all men. This is quite evident in the case of çhildreni and the unlettered, who are inca­ pable of reducmgTSe motives of credibility to the first principles of reason in a distinct and scientific manner, 1S4) Garrigou-Lagrange, Ο. P.; ibid., I, pp. 525, 526; (3’ed.), pp. 276, 277. 13B) Ibid., pp. 458-514; (3’ed.), pp. 249-265. JK 38 Introduction or of arriving at a knowledge of their existence through the application of the rules of historical criticism, and by solving the objections advanced by Rationalists. The cer­ titude of common sense or of natural reason suffices, such as men generally possess in regard to the existence of God, the supreme lawgiver, and the existence of free will. Even without scientific training, the average man of good will can know with certitude the evidential value of the chief signs of the divine origin of Christianity by the light of natural reason, especially when assisted by actual grace. Secondly, neither is physical certitude re­ garding the Fact of Divine Revelation possible for all men. The immediate witnesses of evident Miracles, wrought in confirmation of Divine Revelation, enjoyed this kind of certitude. Thus, for instance, the persons who saw the resurrection of Lazarus from the tomb were physically certain of Christ's divine mission by rea­ son of this most evident sensible sign.188 However, St. Thomas137 teaches that this kind of certitude is extremely rare, and this has remained the dominant conviction of all the great theologians ever since. Scientific Certi­ tude moet fitting for the Collec­ tive Faith of the Church. But ^.scientific demonstration of credibility, grounded on philosophy and history, a scientific proof of the divine origin of Christianity, is most fitting for the faith of the ' Church as a whole. For, as St. Thomas says: “Men of higher degree, whose business it is to teach others, are under obligation to have a fuller knowledge of matters of faith, and to believe them explicitly”.188 Hence, the apologist ought to possess a scientific knowledge of the motives by which Divine Faith is rationally defended.188 Then too, the faithful in general appeal to the science of the Doctors, who are supposed to possess a scientific knowledge of the motives of credibility and to be able to solve the objections advanced by adversaries, in the name of philosophy and history. ï36) Garrîgou-Lagrange, Ο. P., ibid., I, pp. 528, 529; (3’ed.), pp. 278, 279. 137) ST. II, II, q. 5, a. 2. 188) ST. II, II>q. 2, a. 6. 139) cf. II Peter, iii, 5. . I Certitude 39 TFfta/ are some of the ways by ivhich man arrives at a certain knowledge of the Fad of a Divine Revelation? In the first place, experience teaches that most men arrive at that certitude through history. In genera^ this testimony does not approximate to : the certitude, which rests upon the laws of nature (physical certitude), nor the certitude with which self-evident necessary truths are known, or necessary truth demonstrated from selfevident truth (metaphysical certitude).140 Its sources are monuments and documents of various kinds, but espe­ cially the accounts of credible witnesses. Hence, some deny to history the character of a science properly so-called or regard it, at most, as a science of “.faith”. However, at times, the testimonies may be so numerous and cogent, that a doubt would be unreasonable; more­ over, certain psychological combinations, moral and economic laws, the nature of man and his dispositions, may be such that free “belief” gives place to scientific “insight”. But the instances in which the certitude is compelling are, after all, very rare; and if they do obtain, they touch only the exterior and the surface, not the inner kernel of the historical occurrence. In general, therefore, r moral ce rti t ude3 in which "doubt, while indeed possible, is u n war ran tech There are a great many questions, which from the viewpoint of science are regarded as settled, but which from the practical standpoint are never at rest; facts, which experts admit and which, nevertheless, continue to be disputed for partisan, na­ tional or sectarian reasons. Pertinent examples in the religious realm are, for instance, .the historical existence of Christ, the existence of the primacy in Patristic times, the falsity of the alleged rule of the Jesuits that “the end justifies the means”. In point of fact, hot every inter­ vention or intermingling of the will and the feelings is necessarily excluded from certain historical knowledge. If the matter in question touches the interests of our will 14°) cf. M. J, Ryan, art. “Certitude”, in CE. Ill, pp. 539 sq. Historical Certitude. I I 40 , ;, J and emotions; if, because of its sublimity, grandeur and manysidedness the problem demands a special sublimation and concentration of the soul’s faculties, often enough the proper kind of knowledge, even though logically demanded, is not actually forthcoming, because of the lack of the corresponding psychological adjustment of the whole man to the circumstances of the case. The history of Christianity offers us many instances of knowledge, which objectively is indeed reliable, but which, for volitional and emotional reasons, continues to be con­ troverted. The systematic combination and vindication of this kind of knowledge is the special task of apologetics.141 f I ! . ■ ί ; ! j I i I i 1 ■» f Certitude of Human Faith. Introduction Another path leading to the judgment of credibility is human faith (fides humana). It is not necessary to enlarge upon the general significance of faith and trust, as representatives of and substitutes for science, in the ordinary affairs of life. How little of our knowledge of the earth and its history, of our scientific and political education, have we acquired by our own independent investigation P42 In the religious life, too, tradition and education, the reputation of human teachers and wit­ nesses, occupy a prominent position. So also in Revealed Religion the way to Faith in God’s word often enough passes over the testimony of human authorities. The Saviour reprimands Thomas and others because of their scepticism and hardness of heart: “because they did not believe them who had seen Him after He was risen again” (Mark xvi, 14). The first heralds of the Gospel were to influence men, not only by the fact that they authenticated themselves as God’s messengers through their Miracles; but they were likewise to convince their hearers, as human, historical “witnesses of the resurrec­ tion of Jesus” (Acts i, 32). The moral reputation of such a legate may be so great, that it is capable of gain­ ing converts to the Faith, even without Miracles ; just as Hi) J. Mausbach, Die Religion und das moderne Seelenleben, in RCK. I, pp. 122, 123;^ 1«) ef. Ibid., I, pp. 100-107. Certitude 41 we know of no Miracles wrought by St. John the Baptist. In modern times we put such a great emphasis upon the self-assertiveness of Jesus, in respect of His dignity, pre­ cisely because Mi racles are called into question by so many adversaries. Whoever recognizes the purely eth­ ical grandeur of Christ, cannot but be overwhelmed by the sublimity and power of this testimony and be moved to accept His divine mission and dignity. St. Thomas says expressly that Christ moved men 'to Faith by His teachings, His Miracles, the intrinsic charm of His per­ sonality, His mercy; “and even though He had worked no visible Miracles, these other means would have re­ mained, to move to faith; and men would have been obliged to obey them”.14* So, too, in our own day, within the bosom of Christianity the oral testimony of parents and educators, the unanimous tradition of the Christian communities, the testimony of the Church, as a natural society, venerable for her age, wisdom and marvelous expansion, are mighty factors for producing apologetic certitude.144 · Thus, the paths of knowledge are manifold and diver­ sified according to the various conditions and degrees of education of individuals; but they all lead to the one end, namely, to the certitùde of the credibility o.f Divine Revelation. The evidence of credibility, which the Catholic Church Mor*1LSutude demands, as an absolute postulate for the Act of Faith, is the clear and t^t.a_person.max^ea~soiiajJ^ap^J^a^l}^açflsBt.Qfld^i Re velati on _ iU-^Ch n stiani t^. It is the same kind of cer­ titude as is required/itoenable a person to act morally in cases, in which grave issues of the natural order are involved. Divine Faith does not demand a higher than moral certitude. Forythcj Jdgment of credibility is not the formal motive upon which Divine Faith is intrinsic­ ally grounded. It is only the necessary prerequisite for 1*8) Quodl. 2, a. 6. 144) J. Mausbach, Die Religion und das moderne Seelenleben, in RCK. I, pp. 124, 125. 42 Introduction the assent of Faith, the conditio sine qua non, for making the Act of Divine Faith a prudent act. Hence, it is ex­ trinsic to Divine Faith, its function being simply to en­ able a person to act with the prudence that is demanded, when grave matters in the natural order are at stake. However, as noted above,145 this moral certitude is not merely practical, as Hermes would have it.146 It is not concerned only with the rectitude of an act to be per­ formed here and now, such as, for example, an act of mercy toward the poor, or an act of humility. It is also a speculative act that looks to an existing or a past fact.147 a difficulty met· * The following difficulty might be raised against this theory of grounding the Faith. What about the natural grounds of belief of so many ill-instructed Christians, or of those who have been led to the Church by purely personal experiences? How often has not the painful struggle of a martyr, the word and example of a herald of the Gospel, brought about the sudden transformation of a pagan into a believér ! Then too, how imperfect and far from conclusive is oftentimes the proof from reason and authority, which a poorly instructed Catholic offers to justify his convictions! How can our theory be reconciled with these facts? We answer that such events present a difficulty only for those theologians, who absolutely insist that for the natural grounding of the Faith a direct knowledge (scientia), even though only in popular form, of the historical Fact of Divine Revelation is necessary. They cannot evade this difficulty by appealing to the grace of God, which is supposed to sup­ ply for the déficiences and the lacunae in the evidence. For an inner, mystical help of grace—apart from Miracles—can­ not offset the lacunae and weaknesses of an objective his­ torical grounding of the Faith. The events referred to in the difficulty fit far more easily into our conception of con­ version. For, what we have demanded, as an absolutely necessary postulate for the assent of Divine Faith, is a clear and morally certain judgment of conscience, that a person may reasonably and honestly embrace God’s Revelation in Christianity.148 Like all judgments of conscience this, too, is not purely abstract; rather it is a moral judgment which i48) 146) 147) pp. 281, cf. p. 35. cf. Vacant, Etudes sur Cone. Vat., I, pp. 125-126. Garrigou-Lagrange, Ο. P., ibid., I, pp. 530-532: (3fed.), 282. ~'*Λ48) cf. above, pp. 10, 11. Certitude 43 touches one’s personality and conduct. Therefore, in this judgment due consideration may be given to the degree of education that obtains among individuals—not all are obliged to make the same thorough examination. Hence, grace, which governs all ethical action, may also make itself felt, to perfect and complete the process.149 For instance, grace can direct one’s attention to the motives of credibility which are being preached in the mysteries of Divine Faith ; it can also correct one’s intention, so as to be able to judge rightly and not according to the inordinate inclinations of egotism or pride.150 Moreover, let us remember that human faith and trust play a very important and far-reaching part in human affairs. How remarkably strong, how incalcu­ lable and withal how genuinely ethical, is oftentimes this trust of man in a religious leader! Finally, let us not forget that there is also a grain of truth in the religious "experiences”, which Protestants and modern apologists stress in such a one-sided manner! A stirring vital experi­ ence has for many a convert been a decisive factor; the, purely inner need of escaping from the emptiness of soul and despair has led many modern souls, through an impulse of the will, to embrace a belief in Christ and in God ! Thus, even these rarer forms of preparation fit easily and natur­ ally into our theory.151 In the light of these principles it is clear, that the ΜθΓ?Λ evidence of the credibility of JDivine Revelation is not restricted to those who devote themselves to scientific apologetics. a) It is possible also for children and the unlettered (the so-called “rudes” of the theologians), so that they, too, can arrive at the certitude of Faith. For, evidence admits of different degrees according to the diversified educational status of the person to whom something is evident.162 They can know, with full clarity, that they are guilty of sin, if they refuse to believe their parents, teachers and pastors, who attest the credibility of Revelation. Of course, this grounding of the Faith would not suffice for an educated understanding; for, such an understanding realizes all too J. Mausbach, Die Religion und das modems Seelenleben, in pp. 125, 126. Garrigou-Lagrange, Ο. P., ibid., I, pp. 535, 536; (3’ed.), 282, *51) J. Mausbach, ibid., I. p. 126; cf. Gardeil, La crédibilité et l’apologétique. Paris. 1908, pp. 98 sq.; De Smedt, Notre vie surna­ turelle. 19Î0, pp. 188 sq. *52) cf. A. Rother, S. J., Certitude, pp. 81 sq. *40) RCK, I, *50) pp. 281, 44 i / ! I 'I t 1 1 Introduction clearly the possibility of its being deceived by parents and teachers in religious matters. However, for the undevel­ oped intellect of children and the unlettered this difficulty, like so many others, does not present itself. Hence, it can be convinced, with all firmness, of the truth of Christianity upon the word of parents and educators?63 It is true that children, who have been educated in heresy and infidelity, have the same motives of certitude, inasmuch as they also confide in the authority of their parents and teachers. But one may not, therefore, conclude that sufficient motives of credibility are not offered by the authority of educators. The children of heretics are really obliged to believe the heresy upon the authority of their parents, as long as they have not arrived at a better insight. They cannot indeed perform an act of genuine Faith, for the lumen fidei cannot be given as the co-operating factor for the production of an erroneous conviction. The motive of authority is unquestionably sufficient for a low degree of education. But something more is required' for the later spiritual development of the child; that is to say, the parents and teachers must also make it more or less evident to the child, that their teaching rests upon a solid ground. To do this, they have only to point to the existence of the Church, to her perpetuity and expansion, to her Saints. The wonderful life and activity of our Lord are presented to every Christian with such perspicuity by means of the Church year, that every child can readily recognize that there are sufficient grounds for believing the statements of its teachers. Thus, even for the uneducated, there is no dearth of motives for believing, and particularly for the evident judgment that they are obliged to believe?64 b) For-Catholics, who have received a good catechetical training, the rational grounds of belief, despite their un­ scientific form, are incomparably more certain and tenable than is the case in regard to the believers of other denomi­ nations and tendencies. For, in the first place, the Church’s teaching presents in simple, but objectively true form, the most important doctrinal and historical grounds of Faith. Then, too, the immediate organs of this teaching, the pastors and catechists, appear credible, not indeed by reason of the accidental accomplishments of person or position, but because of their dogmatic agreement with and their subordination to the Bishop, and ultimately, to the Pope, the successor of St. Peter. That of itself is an imposing link of 163) Gutberlet^Le/ir&uc/i der Apologetik, II. p. 490. Ibid., II. p?490. Certitude 45 I wo rid-wide significance, which makes itself felt even in the smallest village. Moreover, the monuments and objects of worship, the Saints and sacred relics, the constitution and liturgy of the Church, give evidence, in popular and per­ spicuous form, that the Church of today reaches back,, in point of time, into the Middle Ages and Christian Antiquity. Finally, the life and sufferings of the- Saviour, the perpetual adoration paid to Christ throughout all the Christian cen­ turies, the immensely conservative steadfastness -of the Church in faith and piety, her institutions of charity and of social benedictions—all these things unite to form a judgment of credibility, of which the average Christian is perhaps unconscious, but which, nevertheless, is essentially sound and satisfying.156 c) In regard to admits who are invincibly ignorant of the Church’s preaching, it is of faith that such persons receive sufficient grace, at least remotely, to find the path to salvation ; hence, if they do what in them lies, they also can arrive at a sufficient certitude of credibility “by the operating power of the divine light and grace”.155 For, if they are heretics, they can know at least some of the prin­ cipal mysteries of Faith and sufficient motives of credibility through the preaching of their own sect, which often enough retains certain truths of Faith mixed with errors. Thus, while embracing the errors by human opinion, they can, at the same time, believe «some of the mysteries of Faith by Divine Faith. d) But if a person has been reared entirely outside of the pale of Christianity ("si aliquis nutritus in silvis”) and is, therefore, invincibly ignorant of all Christian preach­ ing, how can such a one.obtain the certitude of credibility? If such a person follows the guidance of natural reason in his desire for the good and his aversion of evil, so St. Thomas teaches,1;57 God will reveal to him the truths neces­ sary for Faith through an internal inspiration, or will direct some preacher of the Faith to such a one, even as He sent Peter to Cornelius (Acts x). It is, therefore, certain that all men can arrive at moral certitude Concerning the Fact of Divine Revelation, at least with the assistance of internal grace. Still, it would be 158) Mausbach, t&id., I, p, 126; cf. Karl Adam, Das JVesen des Katholizismus. Dusseldorf. 1927, pp. 67-73. 15«) Encyclical “Quanto conficiamur moerore”, Aug. 10', 1863, DB. n. 1677. 167) De Veritate, q. 14, a, 11 ad 1. Grace Not AbeojS^nt of Credibility.158 * i ’ I j i f ■’ » η I h i| I ; i I , ? I 1 ’ λ *1 I ' ’ f. I i I 46 Introduction erroneous to assert that internal grace is absolutely necessary for a certain judgment of credibility. ffoy. as will be shown below, the motives of this judgment, for instance, Miracles, are divine signs,whicn'are^riaVurally> Hence, theologians commonly teach "ÎTtât'th'é* èvîdenijudgment of credibility can be arrived at without internal Snay more, it is possible to retain*that judgment" e a pertinacious resistance to grace.168 Thus, many Pharisees saw the Miracles of Christ and yet they rejected the grace of God, which might have disposed them for the Act of Faith.168 In the same way, many adversaries of the Catholic Church often acknowledge the more than human life of the Church and still persist in attacking her. Even the demons, so theologians teach, can know with certitude the Fact of Divine Revelation without the assistance of internal grace.160 summary. To sum Up ; it is not necessary, neither does the Church demand that every believer should, by his own personal investigation, arrive at a rational conviction of the truths, 1) that God exists and, 2) that He has disclosed Himself to man supernator ally. The individual can accept both of these truths of reason by natural faith from others (the Church) and thus advance to supernatural Faith. Such indeed is always the case as regards ’ children and the unlettered; nay more, also in regard to most believers, when there is question of these two truths, which really are united intrinsically, since the second depends upon the first. For, in matters of con­ viction relative to natural truths, faith in authority generally takes the place of personal investigation. Therefore, the principle may be stated thus; No one can believe, before he knows in some way that he may and must believe. The Church does not demand a direct knowledge (scientia) from every convert, as a preliminary step to x Faith. She contents herself with the acceptance of both facts (namely, God’s existence and Divine Revelation) by the believer together with the Faith based thereon. î However, she holds in principle to the possibility of a itt) cf. P. Hugon, Hors de V Eglise point de salui. Paris. 1914 (2’ed.), chap. 4: “Le Salut des Patens”, p. 105. 1W) Acts iv, 16; John xv, 24. IM) GarrigonsL^grange, O. P., ibid., I, p. 537; (3’ed.), p. 283. Certitude 47 rational proof for all men, even though she allows reality to pursue its own course. Hence, it suffices, if the simple believer finds his support, or the grounds of his Faith, in the conviction of catechists, teachers and the aggre­ gate Church.151 We shall next consider the problem of scientific certitude more in detail. The Church’s position in regard to the possibility of a scientific demonstration of the credi­ bility, or the divine origin, of the Christian Religion has been indicated above.162 We now propose to present a rational defense of this position. Even though reason can discern with certitude the primary criterion of Divine Revelation, namely, a Mir­ acle as a Miracle, and its organic connection with the doctrine which it is said to confirm, still, so it might be objected, a scientific demonstration of credibility is im­ possible; for, a scientific demonstration is either a priori or a posteriori. Now, the Fact of Divine Revelation can­ not be known either a priori, that is, from its own proper cause, since this is supernatural, or a posteriori, that is, from its own proper effects, £pr they, too, are super­ natural, just as grace which transcends human reason. Therefore, the Fact of Divine Revelation cannot be proved scientifically. To answer this objection, it is necessary to distinguish between a twofold kind of scientific demonstration, namely, direct and indirect. a) A direct or ostensive proof is either causal or a proof of fact. A causal proof is one by which we know something through a knowledge of its causes, and of the way in which it is produced by its causes. A proof .ofr fact gives us çgrtitude that a thmg is so Kithqut explaining. why it is so. A causal proof is called a priori , because it proceeds from what is naturally or really prior, to that which is naturally or really posterior. And since the effect 1β1) B. BartmannLehrbuch der Dogmatik. Freiburg i. B. 1920 (4’ed.), I, p. 49. ie2) cf, p. 24 sq. ·*·«<*». I’ 48 Introduction is naturally or really posterior to the cause, an argument which proceeds from effect to cause, is called ‘a pos­ teriorir **.163 b) Where it is impossible to prove the truth directly, “it may be possible to show indirectly that a judgment is true, by showing that if it were false and its contradictory ’ true, something impossible, absurd, or self-contradictory would follow. This method of establishing the truth by dis­ proving its contradictory, is obviously less satisfactory and less scientific than direct proof; for it does not give the mind any insight into the positive, intrinsic causes or rea­ sons why the established proposition is really true. Never­ theless, it is of great importance as a path to certain knowl­ edge, and is used extensively in every department of re­ search ... It is by this process of indirect proof we know that inductively verified laws are de facto true, or show why they are true”.164 e· Now, which of these two methods of scientific demon­ stration may be employed, to establish the evident credi­ bility of the Divine origin of Revelation! wject Proof Rationaihm. Λ The attempt has, indeed, been made by certain Catholios to justify the contents of Christian teaching on -in? trinsic grounds, so that the appeal to a positive super­ natural Divine Revelation would appear to be super­ fluous. Thus, Baader, Günther and others, have claimed that all Christian dogmas can be shown to be rationally necessary. Now, it is, of course, possible to show that all dogmas are in harmony with sound reason; hut it is not possibl9_tfl_m:fiaiçptia_reali.rj)tionaj deffon^tratioix_gf^ll Take, for instance, the dogma of original sin. No one is able to demonstrate that the sin of Adam must necessarily have become such an awful catastrophe for the human race. For, here it is a question of a free design of God, Who made Adam the represen­ tative of his race. We believe in the fact of original sin only because Divine Revelation guarantees it. Moreover, it is possible to show that all the attempts of Rationalism 163 ) P. Coffey, Science and Logic. London & N. Y. 1912, vol. II, pp. 232, 233. 164) Ibid., II, pp. 233, 234. Certitude 49 to construct a purely rational system of Revelation have failed. Therefore, when there is question of “mysteries” in the rationalistic interpretation, either the proofs pre­ sented are not cogent, or else, to make a mystery appear capable of demonstration, a different sense is substi­ tuted for the mystery,, which degrades it from the realm of the supernatural into that of the purely natural.165 Hence, a strictly scientific demonstration, a direct or ostensive proof, of Divine Revelation cannot be used. When Catholic theologians assert that we cannot have the certittide^of science- as regards the Fact of Divine Revelation,166 obviously they are employing the term “science” in the sense of “knowledge of a thing through its cause”» that is, knowledge that enables us to see that the thing cannot be otherwise than it is. Such a proof, however, is not necessary. A scientific InJ!^Jroof demonstration in the broad sense, an indirect _r)roof, suffices. Such a proof is based on an extrinsic .sign~ di­ vinely produced in confirmation of Πβή^α^οηΐ16'^ AM?acle, for instance, as will beshown indetai! below, is such a sign ; for it directly demonstrates the intervention of the divine omnipotence, and indirectly the divine origin of the doctrine which it confirms. This kind of demonstration, per absurdum- (reductio ad impossibile), does not, indeed, offer intrinsic evidence of the thing in question, but it does exclude the fear of error by reason of the absurd consequences. It concludes that a thing is so, by showing that if it were false and its contradictory true, something impossible, absurd, or self-contradictory,168 168) Fr. Sawicki, Die Wahrheit des Christentums. Paderborn. 1920 (4’ed.), p. 338. ιββ) Tiîüs, Cajetan commenting on St. Thomas' ST. Ill, q. 55, a. 6 concerning the sufficiency of the signs, which guarantee Christ’s Resurrection, says: “InteUige sufficientiam ad causandam certitudinem fidei, non certitudinem scientiae”. i«7) Cf. ST. Ill, q. 55, a. 5; P. Gardeil, O. P., La Crédibilité et l'apologétique. Paris. 1912 (2’ed.). La Démonstration rigoureuse de la Crédibilité, pp. 78-126; IDEM, art. “Crédibilité”, in DCT coll. 2215-2220. 50 ^Function of of’credibmty ”cf pinh”1’ Introduction would follow. In the present instance, the absùrd conclusion is that God, the Author of a Miracle,168 «■ would be T.■ |ia*. 11 ■—yr 1 t11 "V"1**" "*■*"■*■ ·ι i WI ! i^ig^fa miyrw·» witnesAj^Jalsehopd. As will be shown below, the Fact of Divine Revelation is also manifest from certain effects, for example, from the marvelous life of the Church, inasmuch as this life, visible in its external marks,” obviously transcends the natural powers of humanity. But this argument, derived from these marks in so far as they are naturally knowable, is always an argument from signs.189 Before concluding these introductory remarks, it might be well to recall briefly the function of the judgment of credibility in the genesis of the Act of Faith. There, is a twofold judgment concerning the credi­ bility of Divine Revelation, which the student must care­ fully bear in mind. a) In the first place, this judgment may be the proxi­ mate motive of Faith; for, I cannot believe without the sup­ port of some motive or ground, and the will itself cannot command the intellect to believe, unless there be a suffi­ cient ground of knowledge at hand.170 For the believer this proximate motive is the authority of God, Who speaks to us, or the credibility of Divine Revelation. Hence, a judg­ ment of credibility must precede Faith, as the motive in which Faith finds its support. However, this judgment is not evident, at least not in the sense that it compels us to believe, otherwise Faith itself would be necessary. This judgment asserts the supernatural credibility of the mys­ teries of Faith, or what amounts to the same thing, the truth of the articles of Faith.171 It is due to the light of Divine Faith, inasmuch as the authority of God revealing is, as theologians express it, both “id quo et quod supernaturaliter creditur1 '.172 We are not concerned here with this judgment of credibility. It is treated ex professo in the tractate on Divine Faith. 188) cf. St. Thomas, Quodl. II, a. 6 ad 4; ST. II, II. q. 5, a 2; III, q. 43, a. 1, 3; in II These., c. 2. lect. 2; SCG. 1, III, c. 155; 1. I, c. 6; in Joan. c. 9, lect. 3, n. 8. 169) Garrîgou-Lagrange, O. P-, ibid., I, pp. 552, 553; (3*ed.), pp. 290, 291. 170) cf. above, p. 29 sq. 171 ) C. Gutberlet, Lehrbueh der Apologetik, II, p. 488. 172) cf. Garrjgou-Lagrange, Ο. P., ibid., I, pp. 458-511; (3'ed.), pp. 249-265. \ Certitude 51 b) The judgment of credibility, in which we are directly interested, has reference to the activity of rea­ son before the Act of Faith. It is the remote motive of Faith, and its object is the moral goodness, the reason­ ableness, or also the obligation, of believing. In the latter respect it is called more definitely the judicium credenditatis. Now moral goodness, reasonableness, and obli­ gation, can move only the will, whose object they are, not the intellect. They can work upon the intellect only through the medium of the will; and since the will is not coerced by moral goodness and obligation, the intellect, the proximate subject of Faith, can even less be deter­ mined by its influence. Hence, the judgment of credi­ bility and credendity, even when perfectly evident, can­ not render Faith necessary. The judgment, with which this treatise on the natural knowability of Divine Revelation deals, asserts the natural credibility of the mysteries of Faith. Hence, the Act of Faith is not the conclusion of an apologetic syllo­ gism, rather this syllogism ends in the judgment of cred­ ibility. It runs somewhat in thistfashion: Whatever God reveals is rationally credible; now,.God,has.reypaledjhe mysteries of the_Christiaji_Faith,.as..is^e_videnLfr_QmJhe sTgns by which they have been confirmed ^therefore,.!he mysteries of 'the Christian Faith are rational Iy_ cred­ ible.174 "- -” - The importance of this tractate is, therefore, obvious. If the apologist is to lay a solid foundation for Faith, in the objective and the subjective sense, he must defend the motives of credibility, or the criteria of Divine Reve­ lation, in a scientific manner. This we now propose to do in the following order: snbSm»tter. first, we shall establish the genuine concept and the kinds of criteria (Chap. I) ; secondly, we shall show the relative value of the internal and the external criteria π») C. Gutberlet, ibid., II, pp. 488, 489. 174) Garrigou-Lagrange, Ο. P., ibid., I, p. 541; (3’ed.), p. 287. Chapter I 52 ( Chap. II ) ; next we shall treat of the criteria of Protes­ tantism (Chap. Ill), Pragmatism and Modernism (Chap. IV), and of the so-called “.New Apologetics” (Chap. V) ; finally, in the remaining chapters we intend to defend the value of external criteria, Miracles and Prophecies. Chapter I. CONCEPT AND KINDS OF CRITERIA Generic Concept of Criteria. If God has conferred a Revelation on men, it stands to reason that He must have attached to it plain and evident signs that will enable all men, even the un­ lettered, to recognize His message for what it is, and to distinguish it from all false claimants. For, a divine supernatural self-disclosure, that would be unknowable as such, would be useless and, therefore, irreconcilable with divine wisdom. a knowledge ot the F actior the divine origin, of Kevelatiamand togeppinp from airpse”dyrevefaiÎQnSj aiæ callecLits-noTe^ f ηο/αβ J^^^ierïa^t from κρίνεΐν, fb separate, to sift) bv._rcaspn o? their proxyaαίΰ_ίπΐίΕΌΐ^ριΐΓηο5Β; They are also termed . the ηιη/,ίήρκ Γmotiva- credibilitati.s) Jpccausebof their ultimate purpose, which is to make the Fact bi'Jji- -tnil , -Ill' ΓΓρ ·)ΐι^χΤ·>ΤΐΗ|τΓ>Τί?·»ι,·|Γ«ί·<^\ί7ι··νΓ·^·,·,|·,-*^< Wliniir,·. vine Revelation rationally^credible? Th es e motives oner ll as worthy of belief, and his message as credible. The judgment of credibility (judicium credibilitatis), which these motives enable the mediate recipient of Divine Revelation to form, is directed in the first place to the promulgators, or the human witnesses, of God’s revealed message. For, it is through their mediation that the Fact of God’s self-disclosure and, at the same time, the con­ tent of His communication appear credible to their hearers. Hence, the motives of credibility have reference D H. Felder, Ο. M. Cap., Apologetica. Paderbornae. 1920, I,p. 55. ί Concepts and Kinds of Criteria 53 primarily to the first announcement of the message ; for once the Fact of the divine origin of Revelation has been established with certainty, this proof suffices for all time.2* Theological Rationalism blundered not because it turned the search-light of human reason upon the credibility of the organs of Revelation, but rather because, after their cred­ ibility had been established, and despite that fact, it in­ sisted upon subjecting the content of Revelation to criticism after its own standards, and was disposed to accept that content only in-so far as it judged proper. For, once the Fact of Divine Revelation has been demonstrated, the cred^ ibility of the'content of the divine message is, eo ipso, also guaranteed, because God, Supreme Truth, can neither de­ ceive nor be deceived.8 “As Divine Revelation itself (assuming it to exist), ^erai proper. and its eventual human agent, so, too, the selection of ”*° Cpitena* definite criteria by which revealed truths may be. known with certainty, depends upon God’s free choice. Per se men would be obliged to believe any human witness who claimed to have received a communication from God, as soon as his natural credibility was well established. Therefore, it is only from revealed documents (the his­ torical authenticity of which will be demonstrated pres­ ently) that we can ascertain which criteria were pro­ vided by God. In other words, the criteria of Revela­ tion, like the concept of Revelation itself, must be sought for in the Bible. Reason is able to suggest only the prop­ erties which every general criterion must possess, and which consequently must be found also in the criteria of supernatural Revelation.”4S) * Human reason is able to enumerate the following gen­ eral properties of criteria: a) Criteria must be connected somehow with Revela­ tion itself This lies in the very nature of things ; for, we 2) J, Brunsmann, S. V. D., Lehrbuch der Apologetik. St. Gabriel bei Wien. 1920, I: “Religion und Offenbarung”, p. 145. English adap­ tation by Arthur Preuss, “A Handbook of Fundamental Theology", St. Louis, Mo. & London. 1929, II, pp. 61, 62. S) J. Pohle, Natur und übematur, in RCK. I, p. 469, Ji Brunsmann, ibid., I, p. 146; Brunsmann-Preuss, ibid., 11, pp. 62, 63. 54 3 Chapter I are to arrive at a knowledge of the divine origin of Reve­ lation by means of the criteria. Obviously, this would not be possible, unless these signs were connected in some way with the doctrine that claims to be divinely revealed. b) Criteria must be objective. For, a purely subjective factor, such as emotion, taste, pleasure, etc., is an unreli­ able guide. Many things may indeed satisfy one’s senti­ ments, but they may likewise be wholly at variance with the content of Divine Revelation. Hence, the criteria must be so constituted, that they can easily establish the Fact of Revelation by reason of their own intrinsic force. c) Criteria must possess universal validity. For, they are designed to be the means, enabling all men to arrive at a certain knowledge of Divine Revelation. Consequently, they must be so clear and easy of comprehension, that every man of sound understanding can readily grasp their sig­ nificance. This does not mean, of course, that all the cri­ teria must be so clear, that every individual is able to dis­ cern their proving force; for the power of human judg­ ment varies according to the talents and knowledge of the individual mind. But at least some of the criteria must be of such a nature, that any person honestly searching for the truth can, through their help, arrive at certitude as regards the divine origin of Revelation. That is to say, all the criteria together (collective criteria) must possess such clarity and intelligibility, that they suffice, absolutely speaking, for even the most learned. If some of these signs presuppose a deeper knowledge as regards their proper application, the rest, at least, must be sufficiently clear, so that even the least educated and talented among men may be able, by their assistance, to arrive at certitude relative to the divine origin of Revelation.5 d) Finally, criteria must be certain. They must be so constituted, that they offer full certitude, that is, certitude, which excludes every prudent doubt as to the Fact of Reve­ lation. In the concrete order of things, it is not necessary that each and every individual should be absolutely certain of that Fact. In view of the great diversity among men, relative certitude must be deemed sufficient. Thus, a boy acts reasonably, when he assents to the simple authority of his parents or teachers; an unlearned person relies upon the testimony of reliable witnesses; but the learned, and particularly sceptics, are scarcely convinced even by the 5) J. Brunsmann, S. V. D., ibid., I, p. 146; Brunsmann-Preuss, ibid., II, p. 64; cf. Schill-Straubinger, Theologische Prinzipienlehre, Paderborn. 1923 (5’ed.), p. 195, Concepts and Kinds of Criteria 55 strongest reasons. Since, however, criteria ought to be adapted to all men, it is obvious that all the criteria taken together ought to possess not merely relative, but absolute certainty.6 One may not, of course, look for metaphysical or physical certitude; for the question at issue concerns mainly historical facts. Hence, in most cases one will have to be content with moral certitude, which excludes all rea­ sonable doubt as regards the Fact of Divine Revelation, as noted above.7* In the light of these considerations, the criteria of Divine Revelation may be defined as “the sum-total of c?teJ;ia> those objective and generally valid and certain notes or /\f i signs, which exclude every reasonable doubt as to the ——— Fact of Divine Revelation” .* Criteria are of various hinds. I. In the first place, we distinguish between internal and external criteria. They are so designated by reason of the source whence they emanate. a) A Revelation may disclose its divine supernatural origin by the sublimity of its content, and by its value for life. These attributes of its essence are termed internal or intrinsic criteria,® because they are derived from the content of the divine communication, that is, from its thoughts, doctrine, laws and rites of worship.10 If God speaks to us, the content of His message must be worthy of Himself in every respect. His word must be charac­ terized by superhuman wisdom and holiness, for He is wisdom and holiness itself. Superhuman wisdom and holiness must diffuse over human reason a supermun­ dane light, and impart to the human will a supermun­ dane power, so that man may be led" to his final end, which consists in likeness to God and in communion with 6) H. Felder, O; M. Cap., ibid., I, p. 55; cf. A. Rother, S. J., Certitude. A Ittyudy in Philosophy. St. Louis, Mo. 1911, pp. 81 sq., for an explanation 'of the various grades of certitude. 7) J. Brunsmann, S. V. D., ibid., I, p. 147 ; cf. Introduction above, pp. 37-46. 8) J. Pohle, Natur und übematur, in RCK. I, p. 470. ·) Fr. Sawicki, Die Wahrheit des Christentume. Paderborn. 1920 (4’ed.), p. 341. 10) J. Mausbach, Grundzüge der katholischen Apologetik. MQnster i. W. 1921 (3’-4’d ed.), p. 22, Γ I 56 Chapter I Him.11 Or, as Dr. Schell puts it, a supernatural divine Revelation must, in harmony with its essence, communi­ cate to the final end of Religion a supernatural transcen­ dence. It must exalt man to a perfect vital communion with God, the origin and end of all existence. Hence, Divine Revelation must manifest itself, a) as a higher communication of truth, which is distinguished by the criterion of divine wisdom and the power to beget con­ viction; b) as a law of higher morality, of supernatural finality, with really supernatural motives, tasks and aids, for the redemption and salvation of all men; that is to say, it must possess the distinguishing mark of sanctity. Both these criteria are evidence that Revelation is a supernatural communion of the soul with God, inasmuch as He is truth for the intellect and holiness for the will; therefore, the kingdom of God for the soul. They show that the kingdom of God is interior, and hence they are termed internal criteria.12 Critwi»1 k) The divine origin of Revelation may also be.guar­ anteed by certain sensible signs or facts, which accom­ pany its entrance into the world, or bear witness to it as i after-effects.1* These tokens are called external or ex­ trinsic criteria; for, they are historical facts, really dis­ tinct from the content of the revealed message, although externally associated with the Fact of Divine Revelation, and either go hand in hand with, or follow upon, its promulgation.14 For instance, a divine legate must be duly accredited. God’s power must be with him, which is called omnipotence or the power of Miracles; God’s knowledge must be with him, namely, omniscience, which looks into the future as Prophecy, in which the fulfilment of God’s plans are visioned with such absolute certainty, as though all were lightsome, present and clear as the noon-day sun.16 In other words, the kingdom of God or U) I. Kug,DerkatholischeGlaubensinha.lt. Paderborn. 1915, p. 47. 12) H. Schell, Apologie des Christentums. Paderborn. 1907 (3’ed.), I: “Religion und Offenbarung”, p. 266. is) J. Mausbacn, Grundzüge etc., p. 21. 14) J. Brunemann, S. V. D., ibid., I, p. 147; i6) I. Klug, Apologetische Abhandlungen. Paderborn. 1913, II: “Gottes Wort und Gottes Sohn”, p, 14. Concepts and Kinds of Criteria 57 supernatural Revelation will manifest its internal essence and divine origin also outwardly in the evolution of the world ; for, whatever is internal acts outwardly, and must prove itself in the world of external reality, a) The divine origin of Revelation will, therefore, show itself by the successful realization of the kingdom of God in the world, by the victorious domination of all wicked powers, of all the forces of corporeal and spiritual corruption, whether in Nature or in the world of the spirit. Hence, Revelation itself is a Miracle of divine power and, therefore, also authenticated in detail by miraculous deeds and miraculous effects, b) If the kingdom of God proceeds from God, its historical realization will mani­ fest itself as a purposive and conscious progressive ful­ filment of a definite plan of salvation, that is, as a pro­ phetic prediction in general and in particular. Thus, the external criteria, Miracles and Prophecies, appear as supernatural power and certainty for the realization of supernatural perfection.16 Dr. Klug expresses the same thought perhaps in clearer language. By Prophecy, he writes,17 the future consumma­ tion or perfection of the world and of humanity is antici­ pated in thought, in order that the recipients of Revelation may be able even now, to a certain extent, to direct their vision towards what will take place one day, despite all the difficulties and obstacles, which at present oppose the reali­ zation of a moral world order. By a Miracle we have most certain evidence that a supernatural divine power, of a personal kind, is able to conquer all these difficulties and, in spite of them, to bring about that blessed condition of moral perfection, in which the world of matter and the world of the spirit is made subservient to the eternal God, and thus finds its permanent rest. Miracles exert their influence, in the first place, upon their contemporaries, Prophecies upon subsequent gen­ erations. The after-effects of Divine Revelation consti­ tute moral Miracles or show the fulfilment of Prophecies. 1«) H. Schell, ibid., I, p. 266. 17) I. Klug, Der katholische Glaubensinhalt, p. 48; IDEM, Ein Sonntagsbuch, Paderborn, 1914, pp. 12-15. 58 Negative Criteria. Positive Criteria. Negative Inter­ nal Criteria. Chapter I The external criteria, or testimonies of fact, are in accord with the character of Revelation; for, the latter is itself a fact, a free act of God. They also coincide with the end or purpose of Revelation, which aims at leading mankind to Faith; for Faith does not postulate insight, but is grounded on the fact, that God, Truth itself, has spoken. There is also an intimate connection between the in­ ternal and external criteria. For, Prophecy includes wis­ dom, while Miracles are raised far above meaningless artifices. Moreover, the beneficent results of Religion are not only facts, but also a practical exposition of its doctrine.18 II. Looking at criteria from the viewpoint of the end or purpose for which they are used, we distinguish be­ tween negative and positive criteria.19 a) Negative criteria enable us to know that there is no obstacle in the way of accepting the divine origin of a doctrine. That is to say, they are evidence that the divine origin of an alleged revelation is possible. Their absence from a given doctrine is proof that it is not divine. b) Positive criteria, on the other hand, show, at least in their ensemble, that the doctrine in question, is really from God.20 Both internal and external criteria may be negative and positive. This distinction is important and requires a detailed explanation. A. Negative internal (philosophical) criteria consist in the immunity of an alleged revelation from any teach­ ing, speculative or moral, which is manifestly erroneous, or self-contradictory, or in the absence of all fraud and immorality. By immunity from manifest error is meant the absence of evident opposition, on the part of an alleged revelation, is) J. Mausbach, Grundziige etc., p. 22. i8) H. Felder, Ο. M. Cap., ibid., I, p. 56. 20) J. Brunsmann, S. V. D., ibid., I, p. 147; Brunsmann-Preuss, ibid., II, p. 68. Concepts and Kinds of Criteria 59 to natural truths already known with certainty. For, re­ vealed truths can indeed be above reason, but not contrary to reason, although, of course, they may be at variance with philosophical systems, such as pantheistic evolution­ ism, which have never been validly demonstrated. Immunity from contradiction consists in the harmony and logical consistency of the truths, which are proposed as divinely revealed. Immunity from fraud and immorality signifies: a) the absence of all deception on the part of those who deliver the supposed revelation to the world and b) the absence of all immoral effects that flow from a doctrine claiming to be of divine origin.21 The evident presupposition, lying at the basis of these criteria, is that Divine Revelation cannot contradict human reason, since both Revelation and Reason come from the same Divine Author. Surely, nothing irrational or unholy can emanate from God, Who is truth and holiness itself. The standard of judgment is a truth already known with certainty.22 1. Negative internal criteria manifest the PP^sibilitik that a doctrine distinguished by these signs isofawuie origin. They are of great assistance in the task of discerning and refuting spurious revelations, but they are of less value, when there is question of arriving at a positive knowledge regarding genuine Divine Revelation. For doc­ trines, which lack these notes are eo ipso, that is, without further inquiry, proven to be pseudo-revelations. But it is not, therefore, immediately evident that a doctrine, which possesses them is, for that reason alone, of divine origin. Hence, human reason must make a further inquiry with the help of positive criteria, either internal or external.28 2. The simultaneous presence of these criteria in a given doctrine, gives rise to a probable presumption as to the divine origin of that doctrine. For it is practically impossible for man, without some special help from God, to teach*speculative and moral religious truths without zi) Garrigou-Lagrange, Ο. P., ibid., II, pp. 13, 14; (3’ed.), p. 306. 22) J. Mausbach, Grundziige etc., p. 21; Gutberlet, Lekrbuch der Apologetic, II, p. 93; J. Pohle, ibid., I, p. 471. 88) H. Felder, Ο. M. Cap., ibid., I, p. 57; cf. Al. v. Schmid, Apologetik als spekulative Grundlegung der Théologie. Freiburg i. B. 1900, pp. 167 sq. Evidential α ue‘ Chapter I 60 Positive Inter­ na] Criteria. b Evidential Value. J t I the admixture of error, as we have shown in the chapter on the Necessity of Divine Revelation.24 B. The intellectual content of an alleged revelation may be a positive criterion of its divine origin, inasmuch as it transcends the purely human measure of religious wisdom by reason of its special fulness, its purity and grandeur, and especially because of its new and original thoughts, or its vital and systematic conception, when viewed in its totality.25 Such is the case, for instance, if a doctrine marvelously unites the highest and the lowest, things supernatural and things natural, the riches of the divine mercy and the misery of mankind, without im­ pairing the rights of divine justice; if a doctrine, at the same time, addresses itself to all men of all nations and times, thus uniting the oldest and the newest; if it pro­ poses mysteries, which, despite their obscurity, appear most perfectly united with one another and with man's final end. This union of things, so diverse and far re­ moved from one another, which, at first sight, seems im­ possible, appears truly miraculous to human reason, and even calls forth tears from the earnest inquirer. jSuch harmony· and sublimity is as miraculous, in the intellec­ tual and moral order, as a Miracle is, in the sensible order.26 Thus, the critical norm is the positive reason^, ableness, truth and sublimity of an alleged revelation.27 Positive, internal criteria show, with more or less probability, nay more, under certain circumstances, even with moral certitude, that a given doctrine is of divine origin. This probability increases in direct proportion to the harmony, logical sequence, holiness, wisdom and sublimity of the alleged revelation and according to the degree, in which it offers a loving response to the needs of the human intellect and heart, or incites to high moral perfection, or presents motives which are known to be psychologically efficacious.28 Fenelon rightly remarks 24) 25) 26) 27) 28) cf. J, J. Baierl, The Theory of Revelation, I, sect. I, pp. 123 sq. J. Mausbach, Grundzüge etc., p. 21 Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P., ibid., II, pp. 16, 17; (3*ed.),p. 308. J. Pohle, ibid., I, p. 471. Gutberlet, ibid., II, p. 94. Concepts and Kinds of Criteria 61 ) J. Mausbach, Grundziige etc., pp’. 154, 155. 41 ) J. Brunsmann, S. V. D., ibid., I, p. 148; Brunsmann-Preusa, ibid., II, p. 69. 42 ) J. Mausbach, ibid,, p. 22. 43 ) I. Ottiger, S. J., Theologia fundamentalis, Friburgi Brisgoviae. MDCCCXCVII, vol. I: “De Revelatione supernatural·?*, p. 167. Concepts and Kinds of Criteria I 65 It is, of course, possible that God may employ in par­ ticular instances godless persons, such as Balaam (Num. xxii-xxiv) and Caiphas (John xi, 49-52), even against their will, to be the promulgators of certain particular revela­ tions, to testify to the truth; for the truth and power of the doctrines are from God and, per se, do not depend upon the morals of the witness. Nevertheless, the inappropriate­ ness of such a procedure seems obvious, when there is ques­ tion of founding a Revealed Religion, or of bringing about a true reformation of divine doctrine. For, under these circumstances it seems absolutely incredible that God should employ, as His legates and representatives, persons of corrupt morals. For in that hypothesis God Himself would be choosing persons, who are His enemies, to dis­ charge an honorable and extraordinary office of the greatest moment. Surely, a wise king never confers the office of legate extraordinary upon a subject, who is known to be hostile and infamous for his crimes. Neither may we, there­ fore, presume that God, infinitely wise and holy, would act differently. Moreover, nothing is stronger than virtue to captivate men’s minds to the true Religion and morality, for the axiom holds true, that “exempla trahunt, dum verba tantum movent”. Surely, then, it is scarcely reasonable to suppose that the all wise and holy God would commission a person for the office of promulgating His will, of inter­ preting His message and of reforming the human race, who is immoral, and who, by his wicked example, would rob his preaching of all moral power and, by his bad con­ duct, would bring discredit upon the great authority which he had received from God ; a person, in brief, who would be­ come not only useless as regards the attainment of the end intended by God, but also its greatest obstacle. Finally, men who are immoral lend color to the suspicion that the marvelous deeds which they perform, are really not genuine Miracles at all.44 Absolutely speaking, it is not indeed necessary that all the ministers and heralds of a Divine Revelation, which has already been established and whose truth shines forth be­ fore all men, should be persons of the highest purity and holiness; for the vices of the few or of many, which are due to their own fault and not to the Religion which they preach, cannot blot out the knowledge of the truth from the minds of men, who judge rightly and sanely.45 Therefore, godless servants of Religion, for instance, bad popes and bishops, who have only to preach a religion already estab44) I. ottiger. S. J., tÔMÎ., I, p._167. «) Jbid., I, pp. 164, 165. Ji Chapter I 66 lished, do, indeed, inflict incalculable injury upon the good name of the Religion, which they preach both as regards their contemporaries and posterity. But they do not, on that account, present an argument against the truth of their preaching, since they do not act as the immediate commis­ sioned instruments in the hand of God. Just as precious jewels do not lose any of their intrinsic value, by falling into soiled hands, so, too, God’s word preserves its purity and power, even though it be preached by unworthy mouths. Nay more, unworthy priests offer involuntary testimony, by their very preaching, to the truth, which they trample under foot by their unworthy lives and examples.46 2. It is evident, that a doctrine cannot be of divine origin, if it is propagated by wicked or immoral means, by falsehood, violence, fire and the sword, calumny, the servile adulation of princes, and especially by avarice and lust.47 3. The manifest effects of an alleged revelation in the moral order, both as regards individuals and society in general, may constitute a negative test of its divine origin. For instance, if a doctrine that claims to be divinely revealed, natura sua, produces evil effects, for example, the dissolution of morals, pride, the neglect of ^good deeds, the contempt of lawful authority, the cupidity of earthly things and the forgetfulness of things eternal, such a doctrine, far from being divinely revealed, is rather a commentary of human perversity. The fact that it happens to enjoy a widespread, by no means argues the truth of that teaching; on the contrary, this expansion simply manifests the credulity and corrupt nature of those who embrace it. We say “natura sua” ; for it may happen that many, who are blessed with a most excellent religious doctrine, live very wicked lives ; but this is not the fault of the good doc­ trine itself, but is due rather to the wicked will of the men in question and, therefore, is no argument against the goodness of the pertinent doctrine. On the other hand, it may sometimes happen that a person, who has been reared in a doctrine that lays claim to a divine origin, but which is 4«) 47) J. Pohle, ibid., I, p. 474. I. Ottiger. S. J., ibid., I, p. 168. | j, j p ; 1 | I , < j i | j Concepts and Kinds'of Criteria 67 really thoroughly. perverse, leads an honest life, free from serious sins and is better than the religion, which he pro­ fesses, either because of the tacit, efficacious influence of Revealed Religion upon his will, or because of a certain hidden natural law and the grace of God. It is quite obvi­ ous that, in these circumstances, one may not conclude that the religion in question is of divine origin.48 B. 1. The positive qualities of clarity and wisdom, of moral dignity and holiness, which distinguish the person of a divine legate, guarantee with probability the credi­ bility of his claims.49 This probability in creases in direct proportion to the degree’ in which these qualities are realized in his person. They may prove his claims even with moral certainty, if they manifest themselves in an altogether eminent· degree, so as to call forth the-admiration of grave and prudent men, even as a Miracle does in the physical order.50 It is self-evident that a person who claims to be the founder or the first herald of an alleged Revelation, ought to be properly qualified for his high office. He ought to appear before men: clothed with legitimate authority.. This implies, in the first place, that he be*duly instructed in the doctrine which he proposes in God’s name, and that he be truthful. Knowledge and trustworthiness are indispensable pre-requisites ; for such a one seeks to persuade men to be­ lieve that what he preaches, is really of divine origin. Now surely, men would never be induced to put faith - e) J. Pohle, “Natur und Übernatür”, in RCK. I, pp. 475, 476. 7) De Fide, disp. 4, sect. 3, n. 2. Relative Value of Internal and External Criteria 83 human will, the essence of man ; God’s own word must first awaken the true needs of the human soul and stifle those which are already at hand.8* b) According to Hermann Schell “all the individual criteria constitute a single collective criterion, in which is expressed the divine value and origin of Revelation. In this connection the higher value and the fundamental significance belong to the internal criteria”? Apologet­ ically Miracles are “not efficacious apart from their con­ nection with the internal criteria, the intrinsic convinc­ ing power\of religion-ror a philosophy of the world”.10 Christ Himself announces the principle: “If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they believe if one rise again from the dead” (Luke xvi, 31). By these words, so Schell insists, “Christ means the spiritual leaders of Israel : hence, not the acknowledgement of the authority of Revelation, but the internal understanding of its teachings and purposes! The Synedrium believed in Revelation according to the meaning of the letter: for that reason it rejected the doctrine and person of Jesus Christ despite Miracles”.11 Thus, from the apolo­ getic viewpoint Schell puts-Miracles in the second place, and makes them dependent upon “the infernal criteria, the intrinsic convincing power of religion or a philosophy of the world”.12* There can be no doubt about the fact, that Schell wished to remain faithful in principle to the objective foundation of Scholasticism, as he himself tells us;18 but, in point of fact, he frequently abandoned this objective .basis and lapsed into subjectivism.14 For he was irenical to an exag­ gerated degree. This attitude of mind exposed him to a cer­ tain weakness and confusion as regards the Catholic posi­ tion, into the. understanding of which he penetrated less 8) Hettinger-Weber, Lehrbuch der Fundamentaltheologie oder Apologetik. Freiburg i. B. 1913, (3*ed.), p. 186. 9) Apologie des Christentums. Paderborn. 1907 (3’ed.), I; “Re­ ligion und Offenbarung”, p. 280. 10) Ibid., I, p. 370. H) Ibid., pp. 36S, 370.. 12) A. Gisler, Der Modemismus. Einsiedeln. 1913 (4’ed.), p. 250. is) Apologie des Christentums, I, pp. xiii sq. 14 ) Gisler, ibid., p. 240. I ι t Pi 84 Chapter II thoroughly and carefully than into that of its opponents.16 Misunderstanding the Pauline text: “The Jews require signs and the Greeks seek after wisdom’* (I Cor. i, 22), he maintained that the signs of Divine Revelation are to be deduced primarily from the divine message itself, rather than from Miracles and Prophecies. Despite his eloquent defense of Miracles, he made concessions which essentially weakened the evidential value of these external criteria. The same stricture holds good as regards his solution of the difficulties which adversaries raised against the credi­ bility of the Miracle accounts, the knowability of the boun­ dary lines between natural and supernatural events, the possibility «of demonstrating Divine Revelation from an individual historical fact; finally, his answer to the diffi­ culties arising from the law of substance is weak and far from thorough.18 We agree with Schell that the internal criteria, from the viewpoint of their content, are of greater value and more ίntimately'connecred’witTTthe purpose of Divine Reve­ lation than the èxternal criteria ; furthermore, that certain individuals may be able to arrive at Faith and to persevere therein with the help of the internal criteria. However, for apologetics the decisive question is : What.proving.! orce^da the criteria possess of themselves in relation το the iVtci of Dîvn^ëVëWoi^ tèna rank ' above the internal. These latter are derived t from the content of Revelation, which is either natural or supernatural. In the former case the conclusion from the content of the doctrine to its divine origin is not stringent, as we have shown above.17 On the other hand, if the doc­ trine is supernatural, e. g. the Trinity, the very fact that it has been proposed at all to mankind, as well as its value for man’s religious life, may indeed suggest the thought of its divine origin; however, the primary question after all is whether its content is true. And this question can be de­ cided only after it has been shown that it actually does proceed from God.18 In other words, the basic thought of Schell’s apologetics, namely, that one may deduce the supernatural character of Christianity from its unique power of truth, its incompar­ able value for life, is not true. No method of demonstra­ 16) Ibid., p. 248; cf. A. Seitz, Zur Apologie des Christentums von Hermann Schell, in Katholik, Bd. VI, p. 164. 16) Gisler, ibid., p. 249; Seitz, ibid., pp. 168-175. 17) cf. above, pp. 59, 60. 18) Schill-Straubinger, Theologische Prinzipienlehre. Paderborn. 1923 (5’ed.), pp. 196, 197. Relative Value of Internal and External Criteria 85 tion leads from what God is said to have spoken,_touthe«fact truths, WlRJSë ëkistencê "and content are in no way accessible to reason alone; for they are strict mysteries. On the other hand, there are Christian truths, whose content can be grasped only in part by mere reason; the human mind can traverse, as it were, only a small fringe of the coast, not the entire ocean of their content. Surely, a person who knows only the coast will hesitate to lay claim to more than a conditional and reserved knowledge regarding the wide open sea.—But even granting that reason alone can meas­ ure and weigh the whole range of Christian truth, the most that could be claimed for reason is that it could arrive at a merely personal, individualistic apologetics; for judg­ ments regarding the beauty, sublimity and consoling power of religious truth, fluctuate and change often from age to age, from person to person.19 e) To show how perfectly the Christian Religion is in BûU*au11· harmony with the deepest aspirations and affections of human nature, the learned Bishop of Laval, E. Bougaud,™ utilizes what he terms the “methode intime”, which gives the primacy to the internal criteria. In the first volume (“La Religion et VIrréligion”) of this*mas­ terly apologetics, he presents not a dry demonstration of the truth of religion and the fallacy of unbelief, but a scholarly and splendid, exposition of the essence of religion, its beauty, its necessity for the individual, the family and society in general, and, at the same time, an annihilating critique of unbelief on the basis of the deplorable havoc, which irréligion has wrought in all the spheres of human life. We may heartily agree with the learned author, when he asserts that thetask_ofthepr esen t^day apologi st ^consists in establishing £he foundations of^he Truths ofNafaraZ Religion; for*mTE^iSriiSS^r^HjrT^cbme so radical, that it Questions not only revealed truths, but casts doubt even upon the existence of God Himself and the immortality of the soul. But it seems to us that Bougaud overshoots the mark in the emphasis which he puts upon the internal criGisler, ibid., p. 251. Le Christianisme et lee temps présents, Paris. 1917. (12’ed. 1923, from which we cite). 1») 20) 86 i Rationaihm. Chapter II teria. It is, of course, true that he does not despise the proofs based on the external signs of Divine Revelation; but he does regard this method of demonstration as char­ acteristic of the eighteenth century, and less convincing than the argument based on the beauty, sublimity and efficacy of the doctrinal content of religion. « As noted above, we must make a distinction. If there is question of leading some one to the Faith dr of winning one back again to Faith, Bougaud’s method seems to deserve the preference. To be sure, only he can call it the easier method who has at his command the power of language, the brilliant conception of religion, the deep knowledge of the world and of man, which one must admire so much in this apology. However, ighen therejs^questibn^f. arriving at the Qjounds^ofJjelief, proofs upon whi^reits^the certitude of 'Failli, we cannot dnfpërlse with the motives of credi­ bility drawn from Miracles and Prophecies. The chapters in Bougaud’s apology, in which he describes, in unsurpassed beauty, the “marvelous effects of religion, particularly the divine treatment of sorrow”,21 may indeed of themselves suffice to move many a broken heart to seek again its own comfort in religion. But if a person is to come into posses­ sion of an unshakable Faith and to preserve it, it is not sufficient that Faith be comforting, rather the decisive point be tru^, and "this dan" be "estaBlished with moral certainty onlÿ**With the aid of the external criteria.?2 Because of lack of space we cannot discuss the views of other Catholics who unduly stress the internal criteria.23 These suffice to indicate the general trend of thought along this line. St, Thomas Aquinas24 also appeals to the internal signs;>but his purpose is not to demonstrate the divinity of Revelation by means of these criteria. It is rather to make it appear acceptable to human reason, by showing that it is in consonance with reason, by appealing to the analogy be­ tween Revelation and philosophical·truth, etc.25 Π. The enemies of Divine Revelation place a far greater emphasis upon the internal criteria. By stress­ ing the application of these signs, they desire to reject God’s revealed message at the very outset; in fact,.·they are altogether unwilling to investigate the external 21) Ibid,, p. 440 sq. 22) Gutberlet, ibid., II, pp. 95,'■96. 28) For' instance, Chateaubriand, Le génie du Christianisme. Paris. 1802; cf. G. Bertrin, art. “Chateaubriand", in CE. III, pp. 641 sq; also many of the French pulpit orators. 2*) cf. Summa contra Gentiles. 28) J. V. Bainvel, S. J., De vera religione et apologetica. Paris. 1914, p. 168. Relative Value of Internal and External Criteria 87 grounds of Faith. As indicated above, we do not oppose the provisional use of the internal criteria; on the con­ trary, we advise their utilization. For obviously, it is very much to the point to inquire more closely into the content of an alleged revelation for the purpose of rejecting it-immediately, that is, without entering fur­ ther upon the consideration of its éxternal signs, if that revelation appears to be unreasonable and immoral, as in the case of Buddhism, Parsism and Mohammedanism. However, Rationalism assumes an altogether different attitude. H is willing, to admit_ a^iyen revelatioji^nJy if it appears as* the expressioii^£j.mLLelI^on-tof,reaso_n. orJjfwthenatural moral law and, in consequence, it repu­ diates every revelation YEich^bnlâinê~s3% flfèl^u^^p na tur afl acts "and" àocï rTnes. TEus ihe ' Vaflonalistie cnienon^PfWr^S^T^^T’^ given religion and ethics is its conf ormity with, the dictates of natural human reason. That this method is untenable, we have already shown in the chapter on the Possibility of strict Mysteries;2® we shall· add further reasons when Ave come to deal with the possibility of Miracles and Prophecies?7 As a matter of fact, the rejection of the external criteria and the strong attachment to the internal signs of Divine Reve­ lation, in modern times, find their psychological explana­ tion in the modern man’s shyness bf Miracles. For in­ stance, 0. Pfleiderer maintains that “the' Miracle accounts” are “the most difficult adjunct of Faith and for not a few the rock on which their Christian Faith is shattered”. However, it is really only at the price of surrendering Theism that the thinking man can question the possibility of Miracles and external Revelation?8 Moreover, to demand, as Rationalists do,, a thorough investigation into the content of an alleged revelation and a demonstration of the logical consistency of all of its propositions with rational knowledge, as prelimi26) cf. J. J. Baierl, The Theory of Revelation. Rochester, N. Y, 1927, Part I, sect 1, pp. 99, 100. / μ 27) cf, Gutberlet, ïbid., II, p. 96. f x *8) J. Pohle, ibid., I, p, 481, 88 Chapter Π naries to its acceptance, precludes the possibility of ever arriving at the end and of assenting to supernatural Revelation. For, prescinding from mysteries, whose in­ trinsic harmony cannot be proved by a positive"'dêmoirs irati on; ~and pas sihg" over' a is^llie^ufilet tereâ^Vli(Tare quite incapable of entering upon such an investigation, we cannot even solve all the philosophical objections, which can be raised against a rational proposition of Revelation by every philosophical system. For, even though all the real objections, which may be proposed at a given period, be successfully answered, it will always be possible to surmise that new difficulties will be brought forward by a later system or by a more acute thinker, and in respect of a given mystery difficulties will be ad­ vanced, which are perhaps for the time being insoluble. Then again, the philosophical systems do not agree with one another. Which system is to serve as the criterion of the reasonableness of a proposition in an alleged revelation! Therefore, whoever is willing to believe only after he has examined into the reasonableness of a putative revelation must either reject it absolutely, since it does not accord with many systems, or he must first 4 establish which one among all the religious and ethical systems really represents what is reasonable, and since this is morally impossible, without Divine Revelation, this rationalistic method necessarily results in the rejec­ tion of supernatural Revelation.29 The most that one might logically conclude from the application of this criterion is that a doctrine, which is in harmony with human reason, is true, not that it has been revealed by God in- a supernatural manner?0 Sa a) Rationalists41 erroneously object that our method of demonstration, by means of the external criteria, involves the fallacy of the vicious circle, since it seeks to demon­ strate the supernatural (i. e., doctrine) by means of the Gutberlet, ibid., II, pp. 96, 97. 30) Aemil. Dorsch, S. J., Institutiones theologiae fundamentalis. Oeniponte. 1916, I, p. 465. *1) For instance, Reimarus (Lessing, Werke, VI, p. 523); Wegscheider, institutiones theoL christ, dogm. § 11; Daub, Die dogmatische Theologis jetz tiger Zeit. Heidelberg. 1883, 153. Relative Value of Internal and External Criteria 89 supernatural (i. e., Miracle). For, as naturally known facts and truths can serve as the medium for-demonstrating naturally unknown facts and truths, for example, the royal seal authenticates the royal handwriting, so, too, super­ natural (unknown) facts and truths can be attested by supernatural (known) facts and truths. This method is em­ ployed in every proof that is arranged according to the method of induction. Surely, one cannot be expected to demonstrate the supernatural by means of the natural ! For instance, if an alleged apostle eats and drinks and takes life easy, that is no proof that he has a supernatural mission. But if he performs an act which God alone can do, as a sign of his claims, he offers a valid proof for his divine mission. Therefore, a supernatural doctrine and a super­ natural mission are demonstrable by means of a super­ natural criterion. Of course, we learn about these miraculous deeds from the sacred writings. The believer, it is true, acknowledges these writings as divinely inspired; but they are not that only. They are likewise historical sources worthy of human credence, which have been composed by ocular and auricu­ lar witnesses. And, as such, apologetics regards their testi­ monies regarding the historical fact of Miracles. There­ fore, it is not a vicious circle, if w& appeal to the accounts of these witnesses, because we do not view them from the same coin of vantage. Moreover, the external criteria and Miracles themselves are attested not only by the sacred writings, but also by a series of ήοη-inspired ecclesiastical and profane historians, nay more, by the very existence, history and perpetuity of Christianity itself?2 b) The pseudo-reason advanced by Hegel,** namely, that “the spiritual and the necessary are not demonstrable by means of the temporal and the sensible”, is just as falla­ cious as the analogous argument of Lessing,82 *84 that is to say, “accidental truths of history can never serve as proofs of the truths of reason”. For, the external criteria of Revela­ tion are not the immediate proofs of the truth of the con­ tent of the revealed doctrine, but rather of the accidental fact, that God has disclosed that content to us supernaturally. But if the truths revealed are really from God, it fol­ lows with absolute necessity that they are true. The ration­ alistic method of.reasoning, lying at the basis of this objec­ tion, is precisely’ the same as in the following argumenta82 ) Gutberlet, ibid., Π, p. 97 ; Hettinger-Weber, ibid., p, 188. M) Werke, VI, 884. •4) Beweis dee Geietee und der Kraft, ed. Lachmann-Malzahn, X, 89. 90 Chapter II tion : The binding authority of a law cannot be proved by means of the royal seal, for, in that case, the spiritual would be demonstrated by means of· the sensible, the permanent by means'of the?accidental. What would a Judge say to a criminal who offered such an excuse? The subterfuge> of Rationalists is not a whit better.55 * In the matter under discussion, there is ho question at all of rational· insight into truth. Faith is a moral surren­ der of'man to God, which, rests, to be sure, upon the rational truth that God is truthful: The immediàte purpose of the historical truth of à Miracle is to confirm the historical truth of the divine mission of the apostle; hence, a sensible fact is to demonstrate a spiritual fact, a * perfectly valid conclusion from the viewpoint of epistemology, as*we have noted in the answer to the preceding:objection.^1 Once the divine mission of the apostle has been authenticated; the “necessary”, eternal truths are not deduced, but believed ‘upon God’s ‘word.56 1 ~ - 4 — , : Consequently, both Hegel„and.· Lessing have overlooked the fact, that apologetics employs the’ sensible,’ temporal and, historical, •simply as conceptual helps for the ..purpose of proving in turn the temporal· and thè historical,'namely, the historical fact, that. God has spoken': .But'apologetics does not deduce the conclusion that, the content of Revela­ tion is true from what history narrates, but rather .from what reason itself knows, about God.” From the truth* of reason, namely, that God can.speak only the truth, apolo­ getics concludes that likewise in Christ and His Apostles only truth has spoken.85 87 86 * ζ . The final and decisive reason that the external, and not the internal, criteria are the court of last, appeal, is because the supernatural fact of Revelation can be authenticated only by the infallible historical testimony of God Himself. And in this respect the divine seal, -impressed upon “the divine communication”-are primarily Miracles and Proph­ ecies.88 · ■ • - c) According to 0. Pfleiderer^ most believers of the present time accept the Christian Faith not because of Miracles, but rather in spite of thein; hence, for the modern man Miracles do not possess evidential value. The same is 85) Gutberlet, ibid., II, p. 98. 86) J. Mausbach, ibid., p. 24. a?) Kleutgen, Théologie der-Vorzçit, IV, 412. 88) J. Pohle, ibid., I, pp. 481, 482. . » , a. &).Die Religion, ihr Wesen.und. ihre Geschichte, Leipzig.* 1869, Relative Value of Internal and External Criteria f r I f E I I [ L I [ J b J j ' ■< ' , I : $ 91 true, so Pfleiderer thinks, as regards the ocular witnesses of Jesus’ Miracles, as is evident from Christ’s own attitude in reference to Miracles. He did not wish to awaken Faith by performing Miracles. The reason is not difficult to understand; for Faith generated by such sensible signs, would be only a sensible Faith; a Faith in a Saviour from sensible evil, not a Faith in a Saviour from sin. Such a Faith Christ was not disposed to generate or promote. Hence, His shyness to perform spectacular deeds and His unwillingness to allow the people to promulgate the news of authenticated Miracles.—We reply that this is a one-sided interpretation of Christ’s Miracles. In the Gospel accounts the Miracles of Jesus appear as deeds of power, not as deeds of benevolence; as signs of divine “power, they demonstràtè the divine mission and veracity of the wonder-worker. What the purpose of this mission is, whether temporal or eternal, .s told us by His word and-teaching.40 The judgment of Mohler41 is very much to the point in this connection. He writes: “What a whimsical—we cannot say wonderful— race are thé idealists of our time ! St Paul, who had such a spiritual but at the same time ecclesiastical conception of all things, instituted so living a relation between his faith and the conviction of the Lord’s ^resurrection, that he expressly declared, Tf Christ be not risen from the dead, then our faith is in vain’. And how was it otherwise possible, since in Christianity, which is a divine and positive Reve­ lation, the abstract ideaand the historical fact-—the: internal and the external truth are inseparably united? Our ideal­ ists and spiritualists have no need of Miracles for the con­ firmation of their faith ! Yes, truly, for that faith is one of their own making, and not the faith in Christ!”—Nay more, if Christianity contains no Miracles, then Christ Himself is no longer a Miracle;, -then He entered into this temporal order, not as a higher manifestation sent by God, but only as the fruit that has grown on the tree of humanity itself. Then Christianity is not something absolutely new and supernatural, something absolutely and forever warranted, but merely something relatively valid, not our unsurpassed and unsurpassable ideal, but only a transitory condition. And the day will come, when mankind, having arrived at. a higher degr?e of culture, will pass beyond Christ and look back upon the position of Christianity as vanquished and gone.42 40 ) Mausbach, tbid.^p. 24. 41) Symbolik. Regensburg, 1921 (10’ed. by F. X. Kiefl), p. 344; English transi. “Symbolism” by Janies'Burton Robertson. London. 1906’(5’ed.), p. 268. ' ~ 42 ) Hettinger-Weber, ibid; pp. 189, 190. F 92 Summary, Chapter II To sum up: The external criteria of Divine Revela­ tion are of greater apologetic value than the internal signs for the following reasons. 1. They manifest the divine origin of an alleged revelation ivith greater certainty than the internal cri­ teria. ""....... .... As stated above, under certain circumstances, the posi­ tive internal criteria beget certitude; but they exert this influence only on those who, by reasonof their greater intellectual powers, are ableTo examine the content οΐ the doctnhe in all ità aspects and properly to evaluate it. On the other hand, there is always the danger that man’s judgment of a given doctrine, especially as regards its sublimity and its capacity for satisfying the innermost needs of man, may^ bztoo^subjeçtyve, The positive external criteria, on the contrary, can' be appreciated by all, even the ignorant and unlettered, because they rest upon historical facts which are easy to ascertain. For the same reason (namely, because there is question of objective facts) the danger of deception is practically excluded.43 2. They can be known also more easily. In applying the external criteria it suffices to investigate a few historical facts, whereas the application of the in< ternal criteria demands a careful analysis of the entire content of the doctrines said to be divinely revealed. It is obvious, however, that the more varied and comprehensive the subject-matter to be examined, the easier it is for error to creep in. 3. The fact of Divine Revelation can be known more quickly by means of the external criteria. ~ This is plain from the fact that, instead of the many truths which constitute the subject-matter of an alleged revelation, only one needs to be considered, that is, the question relative to the Fact of Divine Revelation. Once this has been proven with certainty by the application of the external signs, there can be no doubt as to the divine origin of the content of the Revelation. The whole inquiry is focused on the question of the credibility of the witness48 48) J. Brunsmann, S. V. D., Lehrbuch der Apologetik. St. Gabriel bei Wien. 1924, 1: "Religion und Offenbarung”, p. 149; English adap­ tation, “A Handbook of Fundamental Theology”, by A. Preuas, St. Louis, Mo. 1929, Π, p. 71. The Subjective Criteria of Protestantism 93 of the alleged revelation, that is to say, the divine mission of the legate and the divine origin of his message.43 At the same time, however, it must be admitted that the internal criteria, per se, are in many respects superior to the external signs. They lead the inquirer into the essence of the subject in question, and are calculated to awaken a more joyful mood or attitude, since they demonstrate not only that Christianity is a Revealed Religion, but also open up its intrinsic value and its content of truth. Moreover, they are perhaps more congenial to the character and mentality of the “modern^man , 'who*^educated in the thought of natural sciS5ce*an(Î*ïor whom Miracles are, often enough, a difficulty and an obstacle rather than an aid to Faith. Nevertheless, despite these advantages the application of the external criteria may not be dispensed with. For their proving force is far more conclusive. The sublimity of the doctrine and the world renewing power of Christianity do not disclose its divine origin so palpably as Miracles do, since it is very difficult to establish the precise measure of achievement, which the power of man, relying on his native resources alone, can attain in spiritual and moral respects. Therefore, the proper method to be employed is that which seeks to combine the external and tKe internal cri­ teria into a harmonious unity.4* Chapter III THE SUBJECTIVE CRITERIA OF PROTESTANTISM From the earliest Christian times to the present, there have been advocates of an internal proof “of spirit and power” for the truth of Christianity, based on a higher intuition and an experience of the heart. The external proof ot fact-^namely, Aliracles and Prophecies—, so it has been said, ought either to be wholly abandoned or <>) Brunsmann, S. V. D; i&td., I, p. 149; Brunsmann-Preuss, ibid., II, pp. 71, 72. 44) Fr. Sawicki, Die Wahrheit des Christentums. Paderborn. 1920 (4’ed.), p. 342; cf. Ad. Tanquerey, Synopsis, theologiae dogmaticae. Romae, Tornaci, Parisiis. 1922 (19’ed.), I, pp. 134-137.