WEALTH AND MONEY
λ
■
IN

THE ECONOMIC PHILOSOPHY
OF ST. THOMAS

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Committee on Graduate Study
of the University of Notre Dame
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

BY
FREDERICK E. FLYNN, M.A.

NOTRE DAME, INDIANA
*94’

ii
!fd

PREFACE
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine
the Thomistic doctrine regarding wealth and money. As a
consequence of, and as a help to, this principal purpose,
the dissertation seeks'to determine which notions are
common to Aristotle and St. Thomas, and which are pecul­
iar to St. Thomas alone. The attempt to fulfill this
subpurpose has been made by comparing St. Thomas’ view
on these problems,· as found in his commentaries on
Aristotle's Politics and Ethics with those views which
are found in his more original writings, such as the
Summa Theologica, the De Begimine Princlpum, the
Sentences and the De Malo. Whatever further enlighten­
ment has been needed to understand St. Thomas himself,
the commentaries-of such Thomists as Cajetan and Billuart
have been consulted. For instance, in Chapter III, these
commentators have been utilized to develop the notions
of just price and of cambium which are not sufficiently
developed by St. Thomas.
To those who have helped to make this disserta­
tion possible I owe a greater debt than these prefatory
Words can adequately discharge. I am especially indebted
to the Reverend Philip S. Moore, C.S.C., for his special
assistance frequently and for his thoughtfulness always;
to the Reverend Leo R. Ward, C.S.C., for his kindly in­
terest and encouragement; to my director, Dr. Yves Simon,
for the many fruitful suggestions which he has given
and for his patience throughout. As well as to the
former professors I wish to express my appreciation to
Dr. W. Gurian and Dr. W. Nutting for many stimulating
courses.

CONTENTS

Chapter

-

Page

Introduction ..........................

1

I.

Wealth................................. 21

II.

Money................................. 52

III.

Commerce............................. ..

IV.

Usury............................... ..

V.

Conclusion

. . . . .................... 7^

INTRODUCTION

THE NOTION OF ECONOMICS
ARISTOTELIAN NOTION

For Aristotle and the Greeks the term "economics"
.did not have the same connotation which it has' today.
It was used to. designate broadly that prudence by which
one managed one's household, its Greek derivation being
οικία - house, and νομος - regulation. Economics was a
prudence and it was to the head of the family what poli­
tics was to the head of the State.12 Where the latter was
concerned with the "good life," the former was concerned
with "life." However, 'the "life" of familial society
did not suggest only the satisfaction of material wants,
and household management did not concern itself exclu­
sively with procuring dally needs. It embraced the
whole life of the family—the management of one's slaves,
the "republican rule" over one's wife, and the education
of one's children:
It is clear then that household, management takes more in- 1
tereat in the human members of the household .than in its
inanimate property, and in its the excellence of these
than in that of its property, which we style riches, and
more in that of its free members than in that of slaves,3

Consequently, the term "economics" had both a wider and
a narrower connotation for Aristotle than it has today.
It was wider in that it referred to the management of
the entire life of the family, to the ordering of the
material, intellectual, and moral requirements of do­
mestic society. It was narrower in that it referred to
that prudence whose proper care is the regulation of
the household alone.
According to modern usage, "economics" designates
that science which is concerned with the wealth-getting
1. Aristotle, Nich. Ëth., VI, 5. lllfOb 8-11

2. Aristotle, Toi., I, v,J. 1259b 18-22.

■tt

INTRODUCTION
and wealth-using activities of man.3 Is there any term
in Aristotle which approaches this current meaning of
"economics”? Laistner says that "The Greeks had no word
to express what is now meant by either of these two
names (i.e., Economy and Political Economy). Perhaps
the nearest approach to such a term is that used by
Aristotle, chrematistics ^ρηματιστικη )" .4 Chrematistios
is the art of wealth-getting and is of two kinds, natural
and unnatural. Natural chrematistics is apart of house­
hold management.5 It is concerned with procuring a
"supply of those goods capable of accumulation, which are
necessary,for life and useful for the community of the
city or of the household."*
6 Unnatural chrematistics,
5
though so closely allied to the former as to be often
mistaken for it, is not related to household management.
Its aim is the amassing of artificial wealth, i.e., money
The common basis of these two kinds of chrematistics is
that each makes use of the same thing, though not in the
same way. Both are arts, but the natural art of wealth­
getting is not only a part of household management, but
also is subordinate to it, whereas the unnatural chrema­
tistics is a part of trade. The former is concerned
with procuring the means to an end; it procures the
material needs which are so utilized and ordered as to
make possible the full life of the family. The latter
alms at acquiring material goods considered as an end in
themselves; here ^wealth Is ordered to nothing higher,
for it is sought for its own sake and without limit.78
Included under the first kind are. husbandry and agricul­
ture with their various departments; under the second
are commerce, money-lending, and labor for hire.®
Is the natural art of wealth-getting exclusively
J. Cf. A. Marshall, Principles of Economics, (London: Macmillan,
1936), 1; H. R. Saager, Principles of Economics, (Jed., New

York: Henry Holt and Co., 1925), 1; F. 8. Delbler, Principles
of EtonamJcs, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1929), 1.
1».
5.
6.
7.
8.

M. L. W. Laistner, Greek Economics, vii.
Aristotle, Pol., I, Hi', 8. 1256b 28-29.
Aristotle, Pol., I, ill, 8. 1256b 29-JO.
Aristotle, Pol., I, ill, 17-20. 1257b 18-1258a 19.
Aristotle, Pol., I, iv, l-J. 1258b 9-27·

•INTRODUCTION

3

a part of economics or household management? Apparently
it is not, for Aristotle seems to imply that it is also
subsidiary to politics: "Therefore, that there is a cer­
tain art of acquisition belonging in the order of nature
to householders and to statesmen, and for what reason it
is so, is clear."® Again it is stated, "And we can
also see the answer to the question raised at the be­
ginning whether the art of wealth-getting belongs to the
householder and the statesman...."10 These are not the
only suggestions that Aristotle gives that wealth-getting
is the concern of the head of the State as well as of the
head of the household. After describing the monopoly of
Thales he adds, "...hence even some states have recourse
to this plan as a method of raising revenue when short
of funds: they Introduce a monopoly of marketable
goods.”11 Again he points out
An acquaintance with these devices is also serviceable
for the statesman, for many states need, financial aid and
modes of revenue like those described (i.e., monopoly),

Just as a householder may, but in greeter degree; hence
some statesmen even devote their political activity exclu­
sively to finance.

If we understand these provocative statements of Aristotle
correctly, then it would seem that he entertained some
notion of a wealth-getting proper to politics, which
would be analagous to the notion of political economy.
However, some such term as "political chrematistics"
would have been more proper to Aristotelian terminology
than the expression "political economy"; the juxtaposi­
tion of "political" and "economy" would, from their
derivation, imply a certain contradiction for a Greek.

9·
10.
11.
12.

Aristotle,
Aristotle,
Aristotle,
Aristotle,

Pol.,
Pol.,
Pol.,
Pol.,

I,
I,
I,
I,

ill, 9. 1256b 37-39ill, 20. 1258a 19-20.

iv, 5.
iv, 5-

1259a 20-23.
1259a 34-36.

4

INTRODUCTION
THOMISTIC NOTION

Since St. Thomas wrote no separate, unified tract
on economy, what texts there are oh the subject are few
and scattered. His notions on economics as a discipline
are to be found chiefly in his treatise on prudence in
the Summa Theologica, I-II, and in his commentaries on
Aristotle's Ethics and Politics. His treatment of the
notion of economics is hardly original, as he appears to
paraphrase the Philosopher. In approaching the Thomistic doctrine on the place and dignity of economics, ye
might well proceed on the principle that there is little
in St. Thomas which was not previously in Aristotle.
When St. Thomas uses the word "economic" he uses
it in the Aristotelian sense. Thus, he may use it to
describe the different kinds of societies: "Society is of
two kinds: one which is economic, as in the case of the
family; and one which is political, as in the case of a
city or a kingdom."*
13 Or again, he may use the term to
distinguish the various parts of moral philosophy.
Moral philosophy is divided into three parte. The first
part considers the operations of one man ordained to an
end and is called monastic. The second considers the
operations of the domestic multitude and is called eco­
nomic. The third considers the operations of the civil
multitude and is called political. 14

In a third context he uses the term "economic" to de­
scribe that kind of justice which a husband owes to his
wife, "This economic justice is different from'politica
just as the household is different from the State."3,5
I?. St. Thomas, Sent. IV, d. 37, 2. 2, a. 1 ad 4. Also "Alia vero
communicatio est oeconomica, secundum quam homines sibl in
domesticis officiis communicant." Sent. HI, d. 29, q. 1, a. 6
14. St. Thomae, Ethic, Lib. I, Leet. 1.

13. "Justum enim quod est viri ad uxorem est oeconomicum quia vir
praeest in domo sicut princeps in civitate. Hoc tamen justum
oeconomicum est alterum a politico, sicut domus est aliud a
civitate." Ethic, Lib. V, Leet. 11. See also Summa Theol.
H-H 57.4; H-H 58.7, ad 3; Sent H, d. 44, q. 2, a. 1.

INTRODUCTION

5

From these different examples it is clear that St. Thomas,
like Aristotle, uses the word "economic" to distinguish
familial society and its activities from civil society.

But these considerations indicate only the etymo­
logical part of the question, what is economics? St.
Thomas' definition has both subjective and objective
aspecte. Subjectively speaking economics is twofold; it
is,a prudence and a practical science. Prudence is the
recta ratio rerum agibilium circa humana bona vel mala.1e
"It is not in the reason alone, but has some connection
with the appetite."17 The good which prudence seeks is
a particular good; it is a good which is determined by
a set of unique, unrenewable circumstances—"omne
operabile est singulare."18 A prudential judgment is
"nothing else than the application of universal reason
to a particular task to be accomplished."19 Economics,
then, is the prudence by which one rightly orders his
household.20 Since prudence is threefold—individual
prudence, economic prudence, and political prudence—
economic, prudence is midway between the two extremes,21
and "just as political prudence is more principal than
economic prudence, so this latter is more principal than
prudence which is merely self-directive·.22 Furthermore,
the perfectibility of the various prudences is of such a
reciprocal nature that one cannot possess economic pru­
dence without possessing to some degree both individual
and political prudence, nor, conversely, can one possess
16. St. Branas, Ethic, Lib. VI, Leet. 7.
17. "Prudentia non est in ratione eolum, sed habet aliquid in appetitu." St. Branas, Ethic, Lib. VI, Leet. 7.
18. St. Thomas, Ethic, Lib. VI, Leet. 7. See also Summa Theol.
H-H, 47.2; II-H, 47.2.
19. St. Thomas, Ethic, Idb. VI, Leet. 7.
20. "Earum enim quaedam dicitur oeconomica, Id est prudentia dlspensatiya domus." St. Thomas, Ethic, Lib. VI, Lect. 7. See
also Summa Bieol., H-H, 48.1; H-H, 47.11.
21/ "Positis autem duobus extremis intelllgitur medium, scilicet

-

g
s

oeconomica quae medium est inter unum hominem et civitatem."
St. Thomas, Ethic, Lib. VI, Leet. 7. See also Summa Bieol.,
ii-n, 50.3.
22. St. Thomas, Ethic, Lib. VI, Leet. 7.

î.

Ki"

INTRODUCTION

6
4ι

1

the other two prudences without some economic prudence.23
When St. Thomas says that one must possess ‘all three In
order to possess any one, he obviously means that they
must all be present if one Is to possess prudence In a
perfect degree. Otherwise he would be forced to conclude
that all persons who have not the care of a family could
not have any prudence whatsoever! There Is an imperfect
connection between the prudences: individual prudence
enters more perfectly into the constitution of economic
prudence than does economic prudence into the constitu­
tion of Individual prudence. However, it would be a
gross misunderstanding to think that the last part of
the foregoing statement means that economic prudence
enters Into the constitution of individual prudence only
extrinsically or accidentally. Whereas in political
prudence there are two specifically different kinds—
one which belongs to the ruler alone (regulative) and
one which belongs to the subjects (politica simply
speaking)24—in economic prudence there Is no such divi­
sion. There is no paternal economic prudence as distinct from economic prudence simply speaking, precisely
because the father has not perfect power over the household as the ruler has over the state,25 Furthermore,
2J. "Et dicet quod proprium bonum uniuscujusque singularis per­

sonae non potest esse sine oeconomia, id est sine recta dis­
pensatione dccsus, neque sine urbanitate, id est sine recta
dispensatione civitatis—nec tamen sufficit politica (et)
oeconomica sine prudentia proprium. Quia recte disposita
civitate et domo, adhuc est immanlfestum qualiter oportet dis­
ponere ea quae ad seipsum pertinent. Et ideo oportet ad hoc
intendere per prudentiam quae est circa proprium bonum," St.
Thomas, Ethic, Lib. VI, Leet. 7.
2>». "et multitudo unius civitatis vel regni, cujus quidem regula
directive In principe regnativa, in subditis autem politica
simpliciter dicta." St. Thanas, simma Theol., H-II, 1(8.1.

See also Π-ΙΙ, 50.1; H-H, 50.2; H-II, 1(7.12.
25. "Pater in .domo habet quandam similitudinem regii principatus,

ut dicitur in VIH Ethic: non tamen habet perfectam potestatem
reglminljB sicut rex. Et ideo non ponitur separatist paterna
species prudentiae, sicut regnativa." St. Thomas, Summa Theol.
H-H, 5O.3, ad 3- "Et similiter oeconomica (dividitur) In
paternam, quae competit paterfamilias; et oeconomicam sim­
pliciter." St. Thomas, Sent. HI, d. 33, q. 3, a· 1. This

:

OSs®

■INTRODUCTION '

7

if prudence is of three kinds, so also is imprudence
threefold;se thus, there is economic imprudence.
However, it is not to be inferred from this that
economic prudence is absolutely one and undivided. It
can be divided into many species by reason of different
formal objects. A commentary of Cajetan's throws some
light on this point. He shows that in directing a ship
some look to the masts, some to the oars, etc. He then
adds that, "on this account economics is also divided,
for the same reason; into many species by reason of its
different formal parts."26
2728 Thus, the "formal parts" ofeconomic prudence would probably be represented by the
various prudences required in the management of a house­
hold: the ability to manage servants, the foresight neces­
sary for providing material needs, the good judgment
needed for training the children, etc.
Up to now economics has been considered accord­
ing to its classification among the various prudences.
As a prudence it is a virtue, a quality existing in a
subject. The question now is what specifies this virtue,
this economic prudence?, St. Thomas replies that the
end of economics is the common good of the family.20
The difference between the common good of the family and
the common good of the State may be expressed In the
formula: the economic end is ad vivendum, while the
political end is ad bene vivendum. It would be inac­
curate to think that the phrase ad vivendum is to be
understood in an exclusively material way. When St.
distinction as given in the Sentences between paternal economic
prudence end economic prudence simply speaking contradicts what
St. Thomas has to say on the same natter in the Summa, the only
resolution of the contradiction seems to be to accept the view
in the Summa, rather than in the Sentences, since the Summa
represents the more mature thought of St. Thomas.
26. "Imprudentia triplex: monastica, oeconomica, politica." St.
Thomas, Summa Theol., II-II, 53, 2.

27; "Propter quod etiam oeconomica in multas species dividitur eadem
ratione propter diversas partes formales." Cajetan, Coram, in
Summa Theol., H-H, 50-2.
28. "alia (prudentia) autem oeconomica quae ordinatur ad bonum

commune domus
1»7, 11.

vel familiae."

St. Ihamas, Summa Theol., H-II,

Mi

8

INTRODUCTION

Thomas speaks of the necessities of life he classifies
them as generation, nourishment, and training. The
first two elements Include such needs as food, clothing,
and shelter; the third refers to those mental and moral
conditions which are indispensable for the life of ra­
tional beings . These three necessities are, he says,
"secured to man by the domestic society of which he is a
part."28 Thus, the specifying object of economic pru­
dence is not merely the provision of material needs, but
Its "ultimate end is the completely good life insofar
as it can be attained In domestic Intercourse."29
30 In
this text it must be noted that the phrase, "the com­
pletely good life," is restricted by the phrase which
follows It, "Insofar as It can be attained in domestic
intercourse." That restrictive phrase is pregnant with
meaning. It reminds us that, although the common good
of the family Is a real good one, it Is only a relative
good; it tells us that in attaining the economic good
man realizes some achievements demanded by his nature,
but that he does not realize In It the plenitude of
achievement to which he, as a social animal, is called.
It Is only In attaining the political common good that
man realizes the ultimate In human perfect, for, In
the temporal order, the political common good Is a
final good. The difference between the domestic com­
mon good and the political common good Is not merely
quantitative, for the two are specifically different.31
29. "Primo quidem ad ea quae sunt vitas necessaria, sine quibus

praesens vita transigi non potest: et ad. hoc auxiliatur homini
domestica multitudo, cujus est pars. Nam quilibet homo a
parentibus habet generationem et -riutrlmentum et disciplinam. "
St. Thomas, Kthlc, Lib. I, Leet., 1.
JO. "Finis autem ultimus oeconomicae est totum bene vivere secundum
domesticam conversationem." St. Thcoas, Summa Iheol., n-n,
50, Jad. 1. "Quaedam multitudo est adunata ad totam vitam:
sicut multitudo unius demus vel familiae, cujus regitlva est
prudentia oeconcmlca." St. Thomas, Summa iheol., II-II,
48, 1.
51. St. Thomas, Polit., Lib. I, Leet. 1.

INTRODUCTION
[
;
*
f
!
[
t
i
i

Ϊ
s'

9

Thus, the phrase, ad vivendum, Is used in opposition to
the phrase, ad bene vivendum, not to Indicate the purely
material life as opposed to the virtuous life, but rather
to bring out In sharper detail the specific difference
between the domestic good life and the political good
life. From these considerations It can be seen that
the ad vivendum of economics does not stand In relation
to the ad bene vivendum of politics as a pure means to
an end. The economic end is a real end, desirable for
Itself. If the economic end Is related to the political
end, what Is the nature of that relationship wherein the
economic end retains Its character as end? It Is simply
that the economic end Is a subordinate end and the polItical end is ultimate In an order which Is itself, how­
ever, not ultimate.
The problem of economics as a practical science
receives scant treatment.in 3t. Thomas. In fact^ the fur­
thest he goes into the question is to mention merely that
economics Is also a practical science.32 When speaking
elsewhere of economics and politics he points out that
"economics and politics are not accepted here according
as they are sciences, but rather according as they are
prudences of a sort."33 What of the possibility of
economics being a speculative science as well? In the
Sentences St. Thomas says: "and so there is economics
which Is a speculative discipline, that Is a deliberative
discipline, and economics which is practical, that Is,
a discipline ordained to action."34. This is the only
place where St. Thomas seems to suggest that economics
Is a speculative discipline. However, it must be borne
In mind that this text comes from the Sentences which
represents the less mature thought of St. Thomas and In
which his terminology had not yet attained the precision
32. "Inquantum enlm sunt in sola ratione dicuntur quaedam scientiae
practlcae, scilicet ethica, oeconomica et politica." St. Ihomaa,
Ethic, Lib. VI, Leet. 7.
33 · "Oeconomica et politica non acclpuntur hio secundum quod sunt
scientiae, sed secundum quod eunt prudentiae quaedam." St.
Thomas, Summa Iheol., II-H, k8.2, ad 2.
31*. "Sic est oeconomica quae est habitus speculativus, Id est conslderatlvus, et practicus id est activus dentui conferentium."
St. Thomas, Sent., Ill, d. 35, 1· 3, a. 1.

10

INTRODUCTION

of his later works. Thus, he may be using the word
"speculative" with a much wider connotation than the
same word has, for Instance, in the Summa. The fact
that he uses "conslderatlvus" as a synonym seems to Im­
ply merely that he refers to a less thoroughly practical
phase in the development of practical thinking. The
conclusion would be, then, that St. Thomas regarded
economics as a practical discipline on the scientific
or prudential level. Economics as a practical science
Is less pratlcal than economics as a prudence. In the
former case it indicates a general course of action; In
the latter case it goes so far as to determine the right
course of action regarding particular and unrenewable
circumstances. As a prudence, economics regulates ac­
tions at closer range; Its practical conclusion Is
unique.
It Is necessary to recall here that the term
"economics" has been'used up to now in the sense that
St. Thomas used It. It would be a gross confusion to
Identify St. Thomas" "economics" with the modern use of
the term. The similarity is to a large extent only
nominal. The difference is sharply brought out by the
following text:
It (economics) has mors to do with men than with ths pos­
session of inanimate things such as wheat, wines and. other
things of the sort; and it should deal more with the vir­
tue by which men live well, than with the virtue by which
we procure and multiply those possessions which are called
wealth.ss

Even more strongly he insists elsewhere that "the end of
economics Is not wealth,"3® for "wealth can be compared
to economics not as the ultimate end but as an instru­
ment. "3T

I
If wealth is not the specific end of economics
phe question arises, of what discipline is it the end?
St. Thomas states the question thus:*
35· St. Humas, Polit., Lib. I, Leet. 10.
36. "Finis oeconomicae non est divitiae." St. Thomas, Ethic, Lib. I,
Leet. 1.
37»"Divitiae comparantur ad oeconomicam non sicut finis ultimus
sed sicut instrumenta quaedam ut dicitur in Pol. I." St.Thomas,
.chmma Theol., H-H, 50.3, ad 1. "Pecunia enim et omnes divitiae
sunt quaedam instrumenta oeconomicae." St. Bicma^ Polit. I, lect. 6.

-

INTRODUCTION

11

There le a certain other part of economics which is
called, wealth-getting (pecunialis), which according to
some seems to he the whole of economics; according to
others, its greatest part, from the fact that the man­
agement of the household, consists chiefly in the ac. qulsitlon and. conservation of wealth.38

He specifies the question more accurately by pointing out
that there is really a double question involved,
—of which the first is whether the art of acquiring
wealth (ars pecuniativa) is exactly the same ae eco­

nomics, or whether it ie a certain part of economics J
or, if it he not the same nor yet a oart of it, hut
rather subsidiary to it. It is clear that the art of
wealth-getting somehow pertains to economics and thus it
must he related to the latter in one of those ways sug­
gested.39

Obviously, the Thomistic phrase used here, nars pecunia
tlvaw is but the Latin equivalent for the Aristotelian
term, "χρηματιστικη"·
____ —---- St. Thomas follows Aristotle in showing that the
art of wealth-getting is not the same as economics, since
the former is concerned with acquiring wealth, while the
latter is concerned with using it.
There is no other art, except economics, whose task it is .
to make use of those things necessary for the household.
It is clear that even in other matters the art which uses
is different from the art which acquires 'or makes, Just as
. the art of sailing a ship is other than the art of ship­
building; therefore, economics is different from the art
of wealth getting.40

38. St.

Thomas, Polit., Lib.

I, Leet. 11

39· St.
AO. St.

Thomas, Polit., Llh.
Thomas, Polit., Lib.

I, Leet. 6.
I, Leet. 6.

"Similiter etiam ad

dispensatorem domus quodammodo pertinet considerare de
pecunia,·scilicet utendo ea Jam acquisite, et utendo etiam
ministerio eorum qui acquirunt: sed considerare ex quibus
rebus pecunia possit acquiri et quanodo, hoc non pertinet ad
oeconomi cam, sed ad artem subservientem, scilicet ad pecuniativam." St. Thomas, Polit., Lib. I, Lect. 8.

12

INTRODUCTION.

Since wealth-getting is not the same as economics,
the second part of the problem is to determine the rela­
tionship between the two. In short, is wealth-getting
a part of economics or subsidiary to it? There .is a dif­
ference between an art which is part of another art and
an art which is subsidiary to another. For instance,
knife-making is part of the art of tool-making, .while the
art of casting iron is subsidiary to tool-making. The
"partial art," then, is related to the other art as
species to genus, as knife-making is to tool-making.
The "subsidiary art" is related to the other art as
means to end, as iron-casting is to tool-making.
"And
because," adds St. Thomas, "wealth is used in administer­
ing a household it seems to be subsidiary rather, than a
part."41 However, there is still the problem of how ’
wealth-getting is subservient to economics, since, "one
art ministers to another in two ways—in one way by
preparing for it the tools by which it operates, and in
another way by furnishing the material with which it
operates."42 St. Thomas concludes that wealth-getting
provides the instruments rather than the materials, be­
cause "money and all sorts of wealth are instruments of
economics."43

He then follows Aristotle by describing the differenVways man has of acquiring material needs--by
fishing, by hunting, and by agriculture.44 Thus, wealth­
getting of this sort has three distinguishable features:
it is natural; it is part of economics; and it is not
Infinite. Since nature has provided animals and plants
for the use of man, "when anyone acquires what nature
has made for him the acquisition thereof is natural."45
Now since this kind of acquisition is natural, "it is
41. St. Thomas, Polit., Lib. I, Leet. 6.
42. "Invenitur enim, quod una ars ministrat alii dupliciter. Uno
modo praeparando ei organum quo operatur...alio modo, quia
exhibet ei materiam qua operatur." St. Thomas, Polit., Lib. I,
Lect. 6.
43· "Ex quo etiam manifestum fit quod pecuniativa magis subministrat
per modum praeparantis instrumenta, quam per modum praeparantis
materiam. Pecunia enim et ames divitiae sunt quaedam in­
strumenta oeconomicae." St. Thomas, Polit. Lib. I, Lect. 6.
44. St. 'ihorom, polit., Lib. I, Lect. 6.
4?· St. Thoman, Polit., Lib. I, Lect. 6.

-

INTRODUCTION

1?

part of economics to the extent that, as part, It is
subsidiary to economics."46 Thirdly,’the acquisition
of wealth cannot be infinite because "true wealth is of
' such a character that it removes want and provides suf­
ficiency to the one who has it, such that a man becomes
self-sufficient In his quest for the good life."4748
*
Furthermore, because wealth-getting being subsidiary
to economics, supplies the Instruments, and because the
"instrument of an art is Infinite neither In multitude
. nor magnitude,"46 the acquisition of wealth must be
finite.
.
.

This natural art of wealth-getting does not only
provide the Instruments for economics, but also for
politics .
It la necessary for both the statesman and the economist
(one of the few times St. Thomas uses this word), that
they may acquire those things necessary for life and. use­
ful for the community. It pertains both to the household
and to the State, for neither can be governed without the
43
necessities of life.

Again he insists that "true wealth is a sort.of Instru­
ment both for the economist and the statesman since they
are used in governing the household and the State."50
In showing that wealth-getting is the concern as well
of the householder, St. Thomas does little more than
restate Aristotle. Unfortunately, he did not draw from
any economic facts of his time to elaborate this point.
In modern times the connection between wealth-getting
and political prudence is exemplified by such govern­
mental departments as forestry, agriculture, fisheries,
mining, and commerce. By erecting such departments
modern governments are concerned with conserving natural
resources, stimulating national wealth, and regulating

k6. St. Thomas, Polit., Lib. I. Lect. 6·
47. St. Thomas, Polit.» Lib. I, Lect. 6.

'

48. "Nullius artis instrumentum est infinitum in multitudine neque
magnitudine.: St. Thomas, Polit., Lib. I, Lect. 6.
4?. St. Thomas, Polit., Lib. I, Lect. 6. "Est quaedam naturalis

possessiva quae est necessaria et oeconomicis et politicis."
St. Thomas, Polit., Lib. I, Lect. 6.
50. St. Thomas, Polit.. Lib. I, Lect." 6.

INTRODUCTION
private enterprises in the Interest of the common good.
In short, all governmental agencies which are
erected for communal utility, and which provide the
statesmen with the instruments necessary for obtaining
the good life in the state are concrete examples of
this natural art of wealth-getting which is proper to
and subservient to political prudence.
Besides this natural acquisition of wealth
there is another kind which is the acquisition of money.
This second kind is unnatural because "money was not
I
brought forth by nature, but was Introduced through* somt
experience and art."5152 The artificial character of this
type of acquisition derives, then, from the fact that
man does not acquire what nature has provided, for his
use; but rather he acquires what man has created merely
for his convenience, l.e;, money.
'
iron the fact that money began to be exchanged, into money
for the sake of gain in a certain artificial way, the art
which la concerned, with money is called the pecuniary art;
it la ordained to thia, as to an end, that it produces a
multitude of money and riches.

Besides being unnatural this kind of acquisition tends
to noendfl it Is infinite in character. "Each of the
arts is infinite in respect of its end; but the desire
of that which is to an end is not infinite, but has a
term which is regulated and measured by the end."53 £jn
other words, the end of an art is infinite, whereas the
means are finite because they are limited, regulated and
measured by the endl For example, the end of the art of
51. St. Thomas, Polit., Lib. I, Leet. 7.
52. St. Thomas, Polit., Lib. I, Leet. 7. "Sed Illa pecuniatlva quae
est campsorla multiplicat pecunias non omnibus modia, sed solum
per denariorum permutationem: unde tota consistit circa
denarios: quia denarius est principium et finis talis commuta-tlonls dum denarius pro denario datur." St. Thomae, Polit..
Lib. I, Leet. 7.
53. "Desiderium finis in unaquoque arte est in infinitum; desiderium
autem ejus, quod est ad finem, non est in infinitum, sed habet
terminum secundum.regulam et mensuram finis.” St. Thomas,
Polit.-, Lib. I, Lect. 8.

■ '

INTRODUCTION

15

medicins Is unlimited health, but thé amount of medi­
cine which it prescribes to that end is certainly limit­
ed. Thus, When one takes a certain amount of intoxicat­
ing stimulant for health's sake, his desire for that
stimulant is finite and limited by the end; when, however,
one takes a stimulant for its own sake, the desire for
it becomes infinitejsince it is no longer a means, but
an end in itself. (Ths same is true where money is the
end of acquisition. The money is no longer desired for
the sake of the good life, but is rather desired for it­
self. Therefore, this artificial kind of acquisition,
whose end is money, is infinite in character! While we

might be inclined to say that pecuniary acquisition is
not part of economics because it is infinite, St. Thomas
who is ever faithful to the teleological approach in
'"~“
such matters, reverses the formula: pecuniary acquisi­
tion is infinite because it is not part of economics.
Money is not the end of economics, but is ordained, to the.
end which la the governance of the household; therefore,
pecuniary acquisition, seeks money without limit , but eco­
nomics is limited in its quest for it.5*

It is the perversity in human nature which causes
men to pursue riches for their own sake. Some men are
interested in living the life of Virtue and so they are
content with those things which are sufficient for the
demands of nature. There are others, howevër, who are
bent on living according to their own desires. These
desires are for corporeal pleasures and by their very
nature are infinite. Thus, they seek unlimited riches
to satisfy their unlimited desire for pleasures.54
55
The former employ the natural art of wealth-getting,
since their end is the domestic good life. The latter
54, st. Thomae, Polit., Lib. I, Lect. 8.

55· "81 enim Intenderent vivere secundum virtutem eeeent contenti
his quae sufficiunt ad sustentationem naturae: sed quia
praetermisso hoc studio, student ad vivendum unusquisque
secundum suam voluntatem; Ideo unusquisque Intendit acquirere
ea per quae possit suam voluntatem implere: It quia con­
cupiscentia hominum,tendit in Infinitum: Ideo In infinitum
desiderant ea per quae possint satisfacere suae concupiscentiae...
et Ideo omnis cura eorum esse videtur ad acquirendum multas
pecunias." St. Thomas, Polit., Lib. I, Lect. 8.

Μ ·-

g

16

INTRODUCTION

employ the artificial kind of acquisition because their
end is the life of sensible delights, which they desire
.
se
to excess.

However, there is another kind of pecuniary ac­
quisition which is not wholly unnatural. It is the
kind which does not seek money for its own sake, but
which seeks it for the. sake of the necessities of life.
For this reason it is, like natural wealth-getting sub­
servient to economics.57 This kind of pecuniary acquisi­
tion is easily recognizable as commerce, toward which
St. Thomas appears to have a more tolerant attitude
tha Aristotle.
Of the two kinds of pecuniary acquisition, the act is the
same, namely the procuring of money, but they are not or­
dered in the same way. In the case of pecuniary acquisi­
tion which is subservient to economics, it is ordained,
to another end., namely the management of the household.
In the case of unnatural pecuniary acquisition its end is
the increase of money. se
Quia enim dispensatores demorum student circa acquisitionem
pecuniarum, propter hoc inducitur In curam domus altera species
pecuniativae, scilicet nummularia, praeter eam quae est propria
oeconcmicae, scilicet acquisitio rerum necessariarum ad vitam:
sed quia in excessu Intendunt frul delectationibus corporalibus,
propter hoc quaerunt ea quae possunt facere hujusmodi excessum,
scilicet multitudinem divitiarum." St. Hiemas, Polit., Lib. I,
Lect. 8.

57

"Ullus scilicet quae deservit oeconcmicae, quae quaerit

pecunias pro comminatione rerum necessariarum, et nummulariae,
quae quaerit denarios propter seipsos." St. Thomas, Polit.,
Ub. I, lact. 8.

58

"Otriusque enim pecuniativae est idem actus, scilicet acquisitio
pecuniarum, sed non eodem modo; sed in pecunlativa oeconomica
hoc ordinatur ad alium finem, scilicet ad gubernationem domus;
in pecunlativa autem, scilicet nunmularia, ipsa augmentatlo
pecuniae est finis." St. Thomas, Polit., Lib. I, Lact. 8.

"Acquirit enim pecunias usque ad aliquem terminum propter
alium -finem, scilicet propter habenda necessaria vitae. Sed ;
proprie oeconomica set circa ea quae sunt secundum naturam,
sicut ili» quae pertinent ad cibum: et haec non est Infinita,
sicut prim» pecunlativa, sed habet aliquem terminum. Vel potest

A
/. /

_________

INTRODUCTION

_______

17

Elsewhere he points out that exchange Is of two kinds:
the exchange of thing, for thing, or of things and money
on account of the necessities of life and the exchange
of money for money, or of things and money for the sake
of gain. The former kind is "praiseworthy" and the lat­
ter Is "justly condemned."*
59*
It Is necessary here to remark on the successive
changes in St. Thomas' terminology when he is treating
the art of woalth-gettihg under its different aspects.
When he first speaks of. wealth-getting he uses the term,
"ars pecunlativa,"00 as meaning natural acquisition.
Later, when, he comes to distinguish the two kinds of
acquisition he uses the generic word, "possessiva,"61
which Includes both natural and artificial acquisition.
Now the expression, "ars pecunlativa,"ea loses its
former connotation and takes on the meaning of artificial
wealth-getting, the acquisition of money. Then the
natural art of wealth-getting is called, "ars acquisitive
cibi et aliorum necessariorum vitae.03 Finally, he dis­
tinguishes natural acquisition of money, where the end
Is the necessities of life, from the artificial acquisi­
tion of money, where the end is simply gain. The former
he calls "pecunlativa oeconomica" and the latter,
Intelligi, quod Ipsa pecunlativa quae est necessaria, est
altera a non necessaria, sed est oeconcolca, et aliam non
Imitatur." St. Thomas, Polit., Lib. I, Leet. 8.

59 · "Duplex est rerum commutatio. Una quidem quasi naturalis et .
necessaria: per quam scilicet fit commutatio rei ad rem, vel
rerum et denariorum, propter necessitatem vitae. Et talis
commutatio non proprie pertinet ad negatlatores, sed magis ad
oeconomicos vel politicos, qui habent providere vel domui vel
civitati de rebus necessariis ad vitam. Alia vero commuta­
tionis species est vel denariarum ad denarios*, non propter res

60.
61.
62.
63.

necessariae vitae, sed propter lucrum quaerendum....Secundum
Philosophum autem, prima commutatio laudabilis est...secunda
autem juste vituperatur." St. Thomas, gumma Bieol., H-U,
77Λ··
St. Thomas, Polit., Lib. I, Lect. 6.
St. Thomas, Polit., Lib. I, Lect. 7.
St. Thomas, Polit., Lib. I, Lect. 7*
St. Thomas. Polit.» Lib. I, Lect. 7·

18

INTRODUCTION

"pecuniatlva nummularia. " 6 4 Thus, in the final and set­
tled state of his terminology, St. Thomas1 divisions of
wealth-getting may be schematically arranged:

ars possessiva
(wealth-gett

in général)

are acquisitive cibl, etc.
(wealth acquired, from nature)

(pecuniatlva oeconomica
1 (natural use of money)

are pecuniatlva

I

(wealth acquired by money) λ

pecuniatlva nummularia
(artificial use of
money)

The relationship between economics and the
various kinds of acquisition can be summed up briefly.
The end of economics is the good life of the domestic
society, just as the end of politics is the good life of
the civil society. Wealth-getting supplies the instruments to the economist and the statesman in order that
they may attain their respective ends. But thia wealthgetting is of two kinds, natural or artificial, The
former is as a means to an end, and so it is subservient
both to economics and to politics. The latter has the
character of an end itself and has no proper connec­
tion with either politics or economics. The natural art
of wealth-getting may be of two species; it may seek the
necessities of life from what nature itself has provid­
ed, or it may acquire the necessities of life through
the medium of commerce. These two natural forms of
■wealth-getting, then, provide the necessities of life;
economics and politics use these necessities by dispos­
ing and ordering them to their proper ends—the good of
the family or of the State.05 Thus, the relationship
between economics and wealth-getting .can be outlined
as follows:
6U. St. Thomas, Polit.» Lib. I, Leet. 8.
6$. "Facere igitur vel acquirere hujusmodi cibum non est
proprium opus et immediatum politicae vel oeconcnicae» sed
proprium opue ejus eat diepenaare ista in desuo» sicut oportet. "
St. Thcmas, Polit., Ub. I, lect. 8.

MBBs®

introduction

:

19

''bona vita
domestica
(disciplina)
Finie

y—

ars

i aequisitiva cibi
Oeconomi'
cas

I et rerum
Necessaria vitae I necessariarum
(nutrimentum) / vitae
Λ
ars

I pecuniatlva
I oeconomica
I

(naturalis)
ars

/
ars
/possessiva
l

pecuniatlva
ars
pecuniatlva
nummi 1aria
(artificialis)

Similarly, the relationship between politics and wealth­
getting could be schematized in the above manner.
Thus, for St. Thomas the term "economics” has a
much wider and narrower connotation than it has now.
For him the economist is one whose proper duty is the
management of the household. Management of the house­
hold does not imply merely looking after the material
wants of the family. It embraces all the needs—physical,
mental, and moral—whose satisfaction is necessary for
the good life of domestic society. Economy for him is
à prudence, which is midway between individual prudence
and political prudence. The practical judgments of the
"economist" are concerned with those things which per­
tain exclusively to his own family and which are
modified by circumstances peculiar to it. As such, his
judgments are unique.

Besides being a prudence,, economics is for
St. Thomas a practical science. It belongs to that
great family of sciences which are concerned with the
ends of human acts. It is one of the divisions of
ethics. Each of the subjective parts of ethics is speci­
fied by its proper end. The end of individual ethics is
an absolutely ultimate end, beatitude; the end of

L

INTRODUCTION

20

politica Isa relatively ultimate end, the good life
in the temporal order;·the end of economics la a subor­
dinate end, the good life In domestic society. By applying the principle of the hierarchy of ends, the
economic end Is measured by and regulated by the politi­
cal end; and since man's destiny as a person is super­
natural and supra-tempral, the political end, though
ultimate in Its own order. Is modified by the final end
which is absolute. From this point of view, then,
economics is subordinate proximately to politics, and
ultimately to individual ethics.ee

66. However, from another point of view économies Is directly
subordinate to individual ethics. For instance, In such

a case as buying and selling the norms which are immediately
applicable are those of individual ethics rather than of

politics.

Chapter I

1

WEALTH
In referring to Aristotle Defourny points out
that "We can study wealth in its relation a) to the in­
dividual (Nichomachean Ethics), b) to the household
(Politics I), c) and to the political society (Politics)."?
The Aristotelian discussion of wealth is predominantly
moral. That is to say, the problem of wealth is primari­
ly conceived as a moral problem whose Implications In­
volve the application of ethical, economic, and political
norms.
For St. Thomas, as well, this problem has this
triple aspect. However, in its relation to individual
ethics, the question obviously has different implications
in St. Thomas from those it has in Aristotle, since the
Individual ethics of the former is Christian. Though
Aristotle says that moderate wealth is conducive to
virtue,2 his point of view is surely not that, of St.
Thomas: ;
temporal goods must be condemned when they lead us from
.. the love and fear of God. . . temporal goods are not to
he condemned when they are Instrumental aids in helping
ub to love and fear Him.3

Thus, while AYistotle, in his Ethics IV, is discussing .
the same virtue of liberality which St. Thomas considers
in the Secunda Secundae of the Summa, their points of
view are radically different. St. Thomas agrees with
Aristotle that liberality is not the greatest virtue; in
fact, he not only agrees with the Philosopher, but he .
1. M. Defourny, Aristote, Etudes sur la Politique, 39.
2. "Hext let us speak of Liberality. IM" virtue seems to be
the observance of the mean in relation to wealth...."
Aristotle, Ethice, TV, 1, I. 1119b 23-25.
3. St. Thomas, Summa Iheol., H-U, 126, 1 ad 3.

21

WEALTH

22

goes far beyond him: "Those virtues are to be preferred
to all others which are ordained to the .supernatural
good, for the supernatural good is far above any human
good.—1,4 Consequently the Christian notion of wealth
as expressed by St. Thomas is intrinsically modified by
the conception of the supernatural character of man's
final destiny.

The term "divitiae" in St. Thomas extends broad­
ly to "external goods,"temporal goods,"® "internal
goods"7 and sometimes in the narrow sense of ’’riches, « 8
as indicating superfluous wealth. He also uses the term
analogically to indicate spiritual riches.9 Only the
first two connotations of the word will be used here. ■
"External goods" in St. Thomas suggests more than just
material things; it extends as well to goods of body and
mind, be they persons or things. In his Classification
of Desires in St. Thomas, Fr. I; Smith has a complete
schema of these various external goods.10

Things
Body

Persons

External
Goods

Mind

meat
drink
clothing
money
houses

•{prlends
Honor
Fame
Glory
.Power
friends
God

H. St. Thanas, Summa Theol., H-H, 117, 65. St. Thomae, Summa Theol., Ι-ϋ,βΗ,Η; H-11,118,1; Polit.,
Lib. ΤΠΙ, Leet. 1.
6. St. Thanas, Summa Theol., H-H, 8H, b; H-H, 118, lada.
7. Ibid., I-H, 2, 1; n-n, 118, I ad 2.
8. St. Thomas, Cont. Gent., Ill, ljU.
9. Ibid., IH, HO, 3.

10. I. Smith, 0. P. Classification of Desiree in St. Thctnas and in
Modern Sociology, 31

WEALTH

2?

Thug, we shall restrict the meaning of the term "external
goods" or "wealth" to those things which pertain to the
body. In so doing we are preserving the essential ele­
ments which are proper to the modern notion of economic
wealth—that it is external and material.

Wealth is of two kinds: natural and artificial.
Natural riches are those which serve to remove from nan his
natural deficiencies, such as food and drink, clothing,
vehicles, shelter, and such like. Artificial riches are
those which do not serve of themselves as a natural aid to
him, such as money; human art has invented it in order to
facilitate exchange by serving as a measure of the things
which he exchanges.11
/

Natural and artificial wealth are distinguished here on
the basis of final causality. Natural-vpcit.h is a
means toward the end, the satisfaction of the natural
needs of man in the material order, it is a true bonum
utile. Artificial wealth on the contrary, is a means of
means. It is for the sake of naturafwealtlrr—If ws “
tHIHk of~l~t as a bonum utile we are employing an analogi­
cal predication. Bonum utile, which is properly predi­
cated of natural wealth, is analogically predicated of,
or attributed to, artificial wealth. What desirability
natural wealth has it receives from the end which.it
serves, the satisfaction of material needs. Artificial
’wealth^'en the contrary, is not directly related to,
.
nor measured by the end; what desirability it has comes
frBtf-thtrmreanrr T^hTgL^iainifeal-Vëaixh-_-.în abort, the dif­
ference between the two is that nature] wealth is a
manna
wealth is a means j;o
a means to an end.
It is to bring out this difference between the
two kinds of wealth that Aristotle recounts the Midas
fable. This story indicates clearly that artificial
wealth, by itself, is really without an end, and that it
is put into relation to an end only through the media­
tion of natural wealth. Aristotle also points out here
that the fact that currency can be changed by those who
use it indicates that artificial wealth becomes useless
11. St. Biomes, Summa Theol.. I-U, 2.1.

24

WEALTH

when it can no longer procure the necessities of life.18
That wealth implies both utility and value was
not by any means unknown to St. Thomas:
There is a twofold use for each thing: they agree in this
that each use is essential and not accidental to the thing;
they differ in the fact that one is proper to the thing
and the other is not proper, hut common to it.12
1314

St. Thomas then quotes Aristotle’s famous example of the
shoe to illustrate his point. One use of the shoe is to
wear it, and this is its proper use. The other use for
it, which is its common use, is to barter it for some­
thing else which is needed. It is the same with every
necessary article. Its proper use is that for which
either nature or man intended it; it belongs to it
alone, such as shoes to be worn or bread to be eaten"Proper use" is but the Thomistic term for "utility.”
Common use, on the other hand, is that use which all ex­
changeable goods enjoy by the very virtue of their ex­
changeability. The common use of shoes and of bread is
the same: shoes can be used to get bread with, or bread
can be used to acquire shoes. "Common use," in St.
Thomas, is nothing more than "value."

What Zmavc says about the relationship between
utility .and value in Aristotle can, of course, be like­
wise applied in St. Thomas: "Utility is for Aristotle
indirect value, so to speak...the shoe has a utility for
the consumer, a value for the producer."1* Both utility
12. Aristotle, Polit., I, ill,* 16, 1257b 10-17.
St. Thomas, Polit., Lib. I, Lect. 7.
Taeuber has an interesting observation on this point:
"The Scholastics have understood the Midas 'fable better than
the modern conmantatora...Thanas of Aquin gave an interpreta­
tion in the spirit Of his own tine. One can no.longer pur-'
chase with denarii When the Prince or the community debases
them." W. Theuber, Geld und Kreditim Mittelalter, (Berlin: 0.
Heymanns, 1933), 3°θ·
13· "...est enim uniuscujusque rei duplex usus: et conveniunt in
hoc quod uterque est secundum se et non per accidens: dif­
ferunt autem In hoc quod unus eorum est proprius usus rei,
alius autem non est proprius sed ocmmnis." St. Thomas, Polit.,

Lib. I, Lect. 714. Johann Znavc, "Me Werththoorle bel Aristoteles und Themes
Van Aquino," Archiv firr Geschichte der Philosophie, (1099), 414

%

WEALTH

25

and value are intrinsic to the thing, for, as St. Thomas
Insists in the quotation immediately above, "they are
the same in that each is intrinsic and not accidental."
There is no difficulty in seeing that utility is in­
herently in the thing, but.St. Thomas foresaw that we
might easily conclude that value Is something extrinsic
or accidental. He makes special reference to this point:
, "Although exchange is not the proper use of a shoe, It is
notwithstanding its use per se and not just accidental­
ly; because he who exchanges it, uses it according to
its value."15 It is obviously possible that in some
cases, of course, value Is not intrinsic, but purely ex­
trinsic. For instance, a keepsake which has no value
for exchange may well have great value, for sentimental
reasons, for the person who cherishes it. In such cir­
cumstances the value does not exist in the thing so much
as in the imagination of the subject, and therefore it
is-accidental. That it is given value*results from a
peculiar psychological phenomenon which makes the thing
valued no longer a thing, but rather personifies it.
Here, evidently, is an example of "value" improperly
speaking. By using the Thomistic phrases "proper use"
and "common use" we can understand the intrinsic charac­
ter of each better than when we use the terms "utility"
and "value." We are thereby better disposed to apply
the notions of p.roper and common causality. The final
cause of a thing Is some good—"eadem ratio boni et finis
est."1516The proper final cause of shoes is a spécifie
good, l.e., It can be exchanged for some other article
which satisfies a different want. Thus, whether it be by
its proper use or common use the final cause of the
thing is some good or other. For this reason both
utility and value are intrinsic to the thing.

Though both uses are intrinsic, they do not en­
joy equal dignity. Utility is prior to value. Value
without utility would be meaningless. There would be no
value to a shoe unless it has utility for someone.
The quality of things to satisfy social necessities—that
is not those of the producer, but of someone else—this
is Its value (exchange value). And so things ere
15. St. Thomas, Tout., Lib. I, lect. 7.
16. St. Jhoaas, Mata.. lib. U, lect. H.

t'H

26_____________ ______

WEALTH

______

■

commensurable and. comparable on the basis of their being
objects of use .it

Fundamentally, utility Is prior to value as the proper
cause is prior to the common cause in the order of
finality.

Furthermore, the relationship implied by utility
is different from that Implied by value. There are three
Immediate genera of the category of relation:
Bis first, which Is founded on quantity or proportion, the
second on action and passion, the third on measure. The
first genus Is divided Into relations of equality and In­
equality, similitude and dissimilitude, agreement and di­
versity, proportion.. . .Bie third genus is divided Into
relation to measure which is either the object, or the
exemplar or prototype. Relation to the object Is divided
Into the relation of the power or habitus, or the rela­
tion of the act. And each is divided Into various species
according as the power Is active or passive, cognitive or
appetitive.. .1®
' .

i

Now utility is based on the relationship between the thing
needed and the person needing. From the foregoing analy­
sis of relation, it would appear that utility belongs in
the third genus. That Is, It belongs In that kind of
relation which is based on measure between the object
and the appetitive power. Consequently, between the
thing and the person there. Is a relationship of measure;
the utility of the thing Is measured by the need or de­
sire of the person for that thing, and the greater the
need ,or desire, the greater is the utility. Value, on
the other hand, is based on the relation between one ex­
changeable thing and another. Hence, It seems to belong
in the first genus of relation, which is founded on
quantity.' When a suit of clothes is exchanged on an
equal basis for two hundred loaves of bread, their
equality is founded on a relation of quantity. This
establishment of utility and value in the different
I
J

17. Johann Zmavc, "Die Werththeorie bel Aristoteles und Biomas
Aquino." Archly fîir Geachlchte der Philosophie, tel.
1S. John of St. Thramn. Cursus Philosophicus Biomistlcus, Logica

■_________ _____________ WEALTH

_______ 27

genera of relation Is no mere academic’exercise, but
rather It serves to show, from another point of view,
that value Is dependent on utility.
While the proper utility of a thing ie measured, by the end.
which its nature penults it to realize, the common utility
of this thing is measured by its counterpart in exchange,

a counterpart which ie also a useful thing. The first
measure Is specific for each utility, and is radically
heterogeneous from one to another; it is impossible to
compare a carriage to a cannon from the point of view of
their proper utility; we can only compare them from the
' moral point of view in respect to the ends which they
serve. The common utility of a thing, on the contrary,
is measured to another thing with cammon utility—that
is to say, to something homogeneous. Consequently It is
measured by a number or a quantity, since quantity is
the order of homogeneity. This quantitative measure of
common utility is value-in-exchange, or simply value; it
renders all things cosqiarable, and thanks to it we can
place the carriage and the cannon in balance. 10

Thus, the utility of things Is measured by their rela­
tion to human appetites; the value of things Is measured
by their quantitative relation to other useful things.20
However, this Is to give only half of the pic­
ture, for value cannot be determined exclusively by
reference to utility. Aristotle apparently never con­
sidered this aspect of the question. Zmavc’s opinion
Is that
19. A. Sandoz, "La Notion de Juste Prix," Revue Thomiste, (1939), 287.
20. "Et dicit quod omnia possunt adaequari quia omnia possunt commensurarl per allquid unum ut dictum est; hocautem unum, quod
omnia mensurat secundum rei veritatem est Indigentia, quae con­
tinet omnia commutabilia, inquantum omnia referuntur ad hu­
manam, indigentiam; non enim appretiantur secundum dignitatem
naturae ipsorum; alioquln unus mus, quod est animat sensible,
majoris pretii esset, quam una margarita, quae est res inanimata.
Sed rebus pretia imponuntur, secundum quod homines indigent eis
ad suum usum.” St. Thomas, Ethic., Lib. V, Leet. 9· Of. also,
'
St. Thomas, Summa Iheol., H-H, 77,2.

28

WEALTH
Aristotle does not explicitly give a detailed analysis of
the satisfaction of necessities and of those factors which
would have influence on the determination of prices (I.e.,
the real exchange value); he gives the exançle to empha­
size the commensurability of wares (i.e., exchangeable
goods).

As for the other determinants.of value besides
utility, St. Thomas answers that they are labor and
capital:
It is necessary, therefore, to a just exchange that so
many shoes be given for one house or for enought food for
one man, as the builder or the farmer excede the shoe­
maker in labor and in expenses. If this is not observed
there will be no exchange of things...®2

Thus, because the builder and the farmer have greater
production costs than the shoemaker, by reason of their
more considerable expenditure of labor and capital, St.
Thomas concludes that houses and food are more valuable
than shoes. Zmavc points out a propos of this Thorn!stlc
text that "St. Thomas gives a commentary in which we
can discern that he has seen some factors not mentioned
by Aristotle (i.e., labor and cost of production.)"23
A careful examination of Aristotle's Ethics at this
point2* bears out Zmavc's observation. In this matter
of labor and expenses, together with scarcity mentioned
previously, we are treated to some very rare examples of
the introduction of St. Thomas' own ideas into his Com­
mentaries.
21. Johann Zmavc, Loe, clt.. 421. For the example referred to here,

cf. Aristotle, Ethics, V. 5, 1135» 5-15>22. St. Thomas, Ethic, Lib. V, Leet. 9·
23· J. Zmavc, "Werththeorle bel Aristoteles und St. Thomas Ton
Aquin." Archly fur Ceschichte der Philosophie, 422.
St. Thomas recognizee other factors which may influence the
value of a thing, such as differences of place or time, and.
risk:";..quia pretium rei est mutatum secundum diversitatem
loci, vel temporis, vel propter periculum..." St. Thomas, Summa
Theol., H-H, 77,4 ad 2.
24. "As therefore a builder is to a shoemaker, so must such end such
a number of shoes be to a house (or to a given quantity of
food); far without this reciprocal proportion there can be no

WEALTH

29

However, it is in the Summa, where St. Thomas
speaks for himself, that we find the obvious inference
that labor is an element which must be considered in
computing value.
That is called, a wage (merces) which is paid to anyone as

a recompense for his work and. labor. Therefore, as It Is
an act of Justice to give a Just price for a thing taken
from another persoif, so also to pay the wages of work and
labor is an act of Justice.25

Again, "Remuneration for service or work...can be priced
at a money value as may be seen in the case of those who
offer for hire the labor which they exercise by work or
by tongue."ae St. Thomas, nevertheless, did not con­
sider labor as the only determinant of value.aT Thus,
the value of a commodity, according to St. Thomas, is
determined by the usefulness which it has for the con­
sumer, and by the cost of labor and other expenses in­
curred by the producer.
St. Thomas certainly recognizes that there is a I
definite relationship between wealth and scarcity.as
|
exchange and no association; and It cannot be secured unless
the commodities In question be equal in a sence." Aristotle,
Ethic, V. 5, 1155b 25-26.
25. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., I-H, 11U,1.
26. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., II-U, 78, 2 ad 5.
27. O’Brien remarks à propos of this point that, "Certain so-called

Christian socialists have endeavored to find In the writings of
the scholastics support far the Marxian position that all value
arises from labor. This endeavor, however, is destined to
failure...." G. O’Brien, An Essay on Medieval Economic Teaching,

115. . ...
28. That scarcity and plenty alternately affect the value of things
le implied by St. Thomas: "Ad quartum dicendum quod vitium rei
facit rem in praesenti esse minaris valeris quam videatur: sed
in casu praemiaeo, in futurum res expectatur esse minoris
valoris per superventum negotiatorum qui ab ementibus Ignoratur.
Unde venditor qui vendit rem secundum pretium quod invenit non
videtur contra lustitiam facere si quod futurum est non exponat.
Se tasen exponeret vel de pretio subtraheret, abundantioris esset
vlrtutie...." St. Thomas, Summa Theol., H-H, 77, 5 nd 4.

Cf. also, St. Thomas, Summa Theol., U-H, 77, 1 ad 2.

go wealth:
Speaking of the function of money as a medium of exchange
he remarks:
Nevertheless, they (i.e., metals, such as gold, etc·) can

he easily carried about to remote places because a «mall
amount of them on account of their rarity have more value
than other, things.2930

Again, where he Is speaking about the knowledge necessary
for the art of exchange he observes:
One who wants to increase his wealth must have a knowledge
of those things which are dearer and in what places; be­
cause same things abound in some places; others, in other
places. Therefore, this knowledge is necessary in order
that he may buy things in those places where they abound
and sell them where they are dear.

When, St. Thomas speaks in the second text of increasing
one's wealth, he obviously means increasing one's artifi­
cial wealth by means of exchange. The inference is that
scarcity has no direct connection with the increase of
natural wealth; one does not increase the real wealth
29. "...tamen da facili portari poterant ad remotum locum quia
modicum de istis, propter eorum raritatem, valebat multum de
aliis rebus." St. Thomas, Polit., Lib. I, Lect. 7.
30. "Oportet autem eum, qui ex his vult lucrari pecuniam, esse ex­

pertum quate eorum sint maxime cara, et in quibus locis; quia
alia istorum in aliis regionibus abundant; ut scilicet emat'in
loco ubi abundant, et vendant in loco ubi sunt cara." St.
Thcmas, Polit., Lib. I, beet. 9
In both of these texts where St. Thcmas is commenting on
the Politics, he is either drawing from his own empirical
knowledge, or is stating what he believes to be implicitly

contained in Aristotle. In the original sources of these
texts there is no explicit mention of scarcity as a determinant
of value. Cf. Polit., I, ill, 4. 1257a 35-1257b; I, iv, 1.
1258b 10-20. The only intimation which we have that Aristotle
thought of ‘scarcity as being an element in value is in the
story of Thales, who, by means of monopoly, induced an arti­
ficial scarcity, Cf. Polit., I, iv, 5-6· 1259a 5-20.

WEALTH

31

of a country by burning the surplus supply of coffee, or
by ploughing up the surplus crop of cotton. In_ather
vords^—the—se&Ecity of things does not increxiR-n^H-__
crease their usefulness, so far as the one who needs
them..is concerned.Λ'ί Thus,~~ge call see from tlrtg-pas\
sage that St. Thomas understood the law of supply and
demand, and that he realized-that it worked more direct­
ly for the production of artificial wealth than for the
production of natrual wealth, that it worked more di­
rectly to the immediate advantage of the distributor__ <
than of the consumer.

31. "The need, which is the cause of prices is notr the need, or
desire which is specified by the utility of the thing,
but the deliberate desire to acquire by exchange such an
such a useful thing (rather than another thing); and this
desire relative to exchange is demand. Similarly it is
not the absolute quantity of things which influences prices,
but only that quantity destined to exchange, that is to say,
the quantity of things which have been actually-supplied."
A. Sandoz, "La Notion de Just Prix," Revue Thomiste, (1939),

297.

Chapter 11

HOMEY
,-- In Politics I Aristotle describes the origin of
money.1 Man began to exchange goods first by barter.
When the bartering of goods became more frequent and
more irksome, owing to the difficulty of its transportaI
tion, money was introduced. Men agreed to use something
intrinsically useful, such as gold or silver, in order
to facilitate exchange. At first, the value of money
.was determined by Its weight. Later, to save the trouble
of weighing the coins each time, their value was stamped
on them. It does not concern us whether this description
given by Aristotle represents the actual development of
money In history, or whether he merely used the explanai
tion as a reasonable hypothesis In order to analyze the
nature of money.

Money,' by its very origin, Is -an artificial
thing. Itwas mventud
mart·:—^money has~lrecoiue 'by
conventlon-a—sort-of representsLtbh di*'demand; and this
is why It has the name 'moneyl~(nomlBma)--becaüsë~ft'
exists not by nature but by law (νομος) and It is In
our power to change it and make It useless."2 Consequent
upon this artificial nature and In view of Its primary
function, money does not constitute real and true
wealth.3 VanRoey points out that In the Politics Lib. I,
Leet. 7, St. Thomas makes two very pregnant observations
on the artificiality of money-wealth:
1. Aristotle, Pol., I, ill, 13-16. 1257a 35-HO, cf. also St.
Ihcaas, Pol., Lib. I, Leet. 7·
2. Aristotle, Ethic., V, v, 11. 1133a 3O-33. cf. also:
"Et Inde est quod denarius vocatur numisma: nemos enlm Lex est,
quia scilicet denarius non est mensura per natures, sed nemo, Id
est a lege; est enim in potestate naturae transmutare denarios et
reddere eos inutiles." St. Thcmas, Ethic., Lib. T, Leet. 9
3. "Stultum est dicere quod divitiae totaliter nihil sint nisi mul­
titudo pecuniarum...denarii non sunt verae divitiae." St. Thomas,
Polit.. Lib. I, Leot. 7·

32

MONEY

33

In the first place, real(wealth is independent of the will

of nan and of his arbitrary disposition; it implies an es­
sential relationship of utility with hi man life—'sed
transmutata dispositione hominum qui utuntur divitiis,
denarii nullius sunt pretii, nec aliquid afferunt ad neces­
sitatem vitae.' In the second place, it is totally unrea­
sonable to call a starving man rich; for is it not possible
that a man, though possessed of an abundance of money,
perishes for lack of food, like Midas in the fable? The
economic experience of modern nations makes the truth of
this second argument eminently clear to all.4*
6

Though St. Thomas denies’ that money is real
wealth he-TToes not thérqby repudiate IL entirely. He
even classifies I If-MWArig l.liH-Hfry-uhinh are useful to
man^—He—agrees with'Aristotle that the difference betveen money and~reai—wealth-la~not-oonslderahle; that, Is
why men confuse the two so easily.0
'
:

■

-- .. . - -

. . ..

--

.

If money is only artificial wealth, what is Its
re'latlon to natural wealth? By what right is It clas­
sified among the external goods? It enjoys its title as
an external good by reason of Its being the rule and
measure-of the value in exchangeable things—"regula et
mensura rerum venalium."7 "The quantity of a thing which
has utility for man Is measured according to the price
given It, It is to this purpose that money was Invented..8
L. For two observations in St. Thomas, Pol., Lib. I, Leet. 7, see

Van Roey, "La Monnaie D'Apres St. Thomas d'Aquin, " Revue NéoScholastique, 12 (1905), 1»2.
5- "Pecunia autem cadit sub ratione bonorum utilium: quia omnia
exteriora bona ad usum hominis sunt ordinata." St. Thomas,

Summa Theol., II-II, 117-3·
6. "Multi enim putant quod haec pars possessivae (i.e., acquisitio
pecuniarum) sit una et eadem cum praemissa (l.e., acquisitio
necessarium), propter vicinitatem quam habet cum ipsa." St.

Thomae, Polit., Lib. I, Lect. 7·
7. "In quantum moneta est regula et mensura rerum venalium." St.
Thomas, De Regimine Prine., Lib. H, c. 13· Though this text is
from the part of the De Regimine written by Ptolemaeus de Lucca
it is genuinely Thomistic in spirit.
8. "Quantitas rei quae in usum hominis venit, mensuratur secundun
pretium datum; ad quod est Inventum numisma." St. Thomas,
ftimroa Theol.. H-H, 77, 1; H-H, 77, 2, ad 5.

34______ _______

'

_______________

MONEY

and so the proper use of money is that it he spent for’
the exchange of- other things."9
The problem now is how does money measure the
value of things? Certainly it does not measure things
by establishing a relationship between the thing and its
own Intrinsic value. The measurement is not made on
the basis of the relation.the thing has to gold as gold.
There is a distinction between money considered as a
medium of exchange and the metal itself of which the
money is made. Money, then, is a measure by virtue of
its being money, not by,reason of its having intrinsic
worth as a precious metal. "Some one thing is needed
by which all things of this sort (i.e., exchangeable
goods) are measured, and which does not measure by its
, very nature, but is given its character as a measure by
men."10 In the Sentences he is even more explicit:
All other things by their very nature , have seme utility,
but money has not, for it is the measure of the utility of
other things as the Philosopher has shown in Ethic V, cap.
VIII. And so the use of money does not have the measure
of utility from the money itself, but from those things
which are measured by money according to the difference
of the one who changes the money into things.1112

St. oThomas makes use of Aristotle's example of
the house and the bed to illustrate the primary function
of money:
. .
let A represent a house which is worth 5 pounds; B a bed
worth one pound; and so the bed will have the value of
one fifth of the house. /Whence it is apparent how many
beds are equal in value to one house, namely five. It is
obvious that this is the way exchange took place before
the Invention of money: five beds were given for one
house.1®

It is clear that this example has been used to show that
even in the absence of money there is an objective
9. "Ita propius usub pecuniae est ut expendatur pro ccmnutatlone
allarum rerum.w St. Thanas, De Malo, q. 13, a. h.
10. St. Thanas, Ethic, Lib. V, Leet. 9.
11. St. Thanas, Sent. HI, d. 3T,
i» a· 6·
12. St. Thomas, Ethic, Lib. V, Lect. 9-

>

'

MONEY

JJ

proportion existing between exchangeable things.13 Money
was Introduced merely to measure that proportion. Money
Is like a scales which measures the proportionate weight
of two things: the proportion in weight between the two
things exists even when there are no scales, but they do
serve to record that proportion. So money is likewise a
means of recording the value differences in things. Price
is nothing more than value expressed-in terms-of money.14
Money measures; the things are measured. "Whence it is
called money since it makes all things measured insofar
as all things can be measured by money."1516 In this
formula it is clear that St. Thomas wants to insist that
the commonsurablllty is in things and that money merely
measures it. Again he says: "Money equalizes exchange­
able things just as a certain measure makes things
measured."le
·

The specific nature of money, therefore, is that
it belongs in the category of artificial wealth. It is
an instrument or exchange? It represents the mathematical
proportion existing between exchangeable things and as
a representation, It is a pure sign without value of its
own. Thus, money as a commodity cannot be exchanged for
something else.17 Its primary funnt-.inn is to act as a
symbol- of value. "And so money was invented to this
purpose that through it the prices of all such things
(exchangeable goods) can be measured. Thus, money has
1J. "And so Aristotle emphasizes that in the equalization of the
different products there must he a proportionality
(ίσοτρς συμμετρία) that Justice may thereby reign." J. Snavc,
"Werththeorle hei Aristoteles und S. T. Ton Aquino," Archly fur
Ges, der Phil.. 1:22.
1U. "...asnia mensurantur per Indigentiam naturaliter et per

denarium secundum condictum hominum."

St. Thomas, Ethic, Lib. T,

Lect. 9·
15- "Uhde et vocatur numisma quod quidem omnia facit commensurate
In quantum mania mensurantur numi atM-t-a. " St · Thomas, Ethic, -

Lib. T, Lect. 916. "Wimimna quidem adaequat ree commutabiles, sicut quaedam
mensura faciens res commensuratas." St. Thomas, Ethic, Lib. T,
Lect. 9.
17. "In other words," observes

Tan Roey, "When money is measured

itself by another value it loses its 'active* function...and in
losing its ’active* function, it loses at the same time its
specific character as money." E. Tan Roey, "La Monnaie D’Après
g, Thomas d'Aquin," Revue Néo-Scholastique, 12 (1905), 1:7.

MONEY

become a medium inasmuch as-it measures everything."18
However, if acting as a medium of exchange is
the principal function of money it is not its only one.
As Cajetan points out,
.the multiplicity of uses does
not impede the principal use and experience testifies to
the fact that mone^ has de facto many uses besides the
principal one.111Both Aristotle and St. Thomas knew
of another use of money which .derives from its character
as a measure of value in exchange. Because money meas­
ures the worth of things it can be a guarantee of future
need. That is, I can save some money over and above what
I need now for the necessities of life, In order to have
that with which to buy things that I shall require at
some future dat^| As an examination of the text will
show, St. Thomas (like Aristotle from whom he got the no­
tion) was well aware of the fluctuation of money over a
period of time. Nevertheless, they agree that money was
so Instituted as to have more permanent value than other
things.80 In performing this second function money is
"quasi fidejussor." It is interesting to note that this
expression comes from Homan Law. In Roman legal termin­
ology a "fidejussor" was one who assumed obligation in
the event a borrower defaulted—a "backer," we should
say now.81 Thus money is a guarantee of future use, a
pledge of security. Such are the functions of money
which flow from its proper use.18
21
20
19
18. "Et ad hoc inventa est moneta id est denarius, per quam mensuran­

tur pretia talium rerum. Et sic denarius fit quoddam medium
inquantum cnmla mensurat." St Thomas, Ethic, Lib. V, La et. 9·
19. Cajetan, Com, in S. T.. H-H, 78.1.
20. "Sic ergo pro necessitate futurae commutationis numisma, id est
denarius, est nobis quasi fidejussor quod si in praesenti homo
nullo indiget, sed indigeat in futuro, aderit sibi afferenti
denarium illud quo Indigebit...Verum est autem quod etiam
denarius patitur hoc idem quod aliae res ...id est non semper est
ejusdem valor is; sed tamen taliter debet esse institutus ut
magis permaneat in eodem valore, quam aliae res." St. Themas,
Ethic., Lib. V, Lect. 9.
m, 20
21. Justin., Inst.

MONEY

37

However, like other things, money can have a
secondary use.22 This use is not related to the end for
which money was instituted, that is, as a measure of
the value in things; it does not proceed from money, as
money. Rather it is connected with the very material
out of which the money is made. Gold, for instance,
has its proper use as ornamentation, etc., and its com­
mon use as an exchangeable article—it is both useful
and valuable. Gold money, then, inasmuch as it is gold,
has intrinsic value. Money has as its secondary use
the capability of being exchanged for other things. The
secondary use of money is really identical with the
common use of the thing out of which it is made: gold
is exchangeable; therefore, gold money is exchangealbe.
It is obvious, of course, that just as a shoe is not
primarily made for its exchange-value, so money was not
primarily Invented to be in itself a vendable commodi­
ty.23
Quite frequently it is observed: "My dollar is
not worth as much this year as last, "it is true that
a dollar may not buy so much as it did previously, but
it is improper to speak of its having inherent value as
22. "Et similiter potest esse aliquis secundarius usus pecuniae

argenteae, ut puta si quis concederet pecuniam signatam ad
ostentationem vel.ad ponendum loco pignoris...." St. Thomas,
Summa Theol., H-II, 70, 1 ad 6.
2J. St. Thomas speaks elsewhere of the uses of money: "Est autem
duplex usus pecuniae: unus ad seipsum, qui videtur ad sumptus
vel expensas pertinere; alius autem, quo quis utitur ad
alios qui pertinet ad dationes." Summa Îheol., U-U, 117,
J ad 5· However, when he speaks here of "the two uses of
money" he is employing the word "use" from the subjective

point of view; he Is concerned here with how a man uses hie
money, I.e., prudently or liberally. When he speaks of the
two usee of money above he Is employing the word "use" in
an objective way; he is concerned then with the uses money,
has in itself.

**·*■?—— - -,

'

.
_

v; ’

2&

MONEY

money.24 Actually, owing to scarcity, cost of produc­
tion, and such factors, it is the proportion in the ex­
changeable articles which has changed, and not the money.
In measuring the changing value in things money only ap­
pears to have made a corresponding change itself.25

We can perhaps help to clarify this by compar- ■
ing money with a scales as is done in the De Regimine
Princlpum.26 Supposing a scales’records the difference
in weight between a box of salt and a box of feathers
(both boxesbeing of equal size). Under normal condi­
tions, let us say, the box of salt weighs'three times as
much as the box of feathers. Now the atmospheric condi­
tions become damp. Owing to the higher rate of moisture­
absorption in the salt, the box of salt now weighs four
times as much as the feathers. It is hardly valid to
conclude therefrom that it is the scales which have
changed. .·>·.·.

24. The text on the preceding page (n. 20) appears to support the

notion that the value of money changes from time to time. The
only explanation for thia seems to he that here St. Thomas uses
the word "value" In an analogical sense. "Value1* is predicated

analogically of things and money-by an analogy of attribution.
That is, "value" exists intrinsically and formally In things
and is applied extrlnslcally to money in virtue of Its rela­
tion to things. Thus, when we speak of "value In things we
are speaking properly; and of "value” in money, Improperly.
This text is also found In Aristotle, Ethic., V,v,14. 1153b
14-15.
25. As X. Van Boey remarks: "Money as a measure renders things cammensurable, but it In turn is not made commensurable by them."
X. Van Boey, "la Monnaie D’aprbs S. Thomas d’Aquln," Bevue NéoScholastique, (I905), 46.

26. "Post haec autem agendum, est de ponderibus et mensuris, quae
necessaria sunt...quia, sicut et numismata, vitae sunt humanae
Instrumenta." St. Thomas, de Regimine Principum, U. Cii. 14.

This text is likewise from the part written by Ptolemaeus de
de Lucca, but it is consistent with the Thmistlc view of money
as a measure.

Chapter III

COMMERCE
In the Politics1 Aristotle outlines the. useful
branches of wealth-getting. The first is husbandy and
the second agriculture. These are primary branches, be­
cause they constitute wealth-getting in the most proper
sense. The third is. that which deals with exchange,
which is divided into commerce, money-lending and labor
for hire. Commerce itself has three departments,■‘~
• shipping, land transport, and marketing.p Iff commenting
on this passage St. Thomas follows the Aristotelian out­
line, except that, where Aristotle merely mentions com­
merce as a branch of wealth-getting, St. Thomas discuss­
es its technique in some detail.2 While St. Thomas in
this passage neither praises nor condeffiis^commerce ex­
plicitly, his very awareness of its goss1b111 ties for
satisfying real needs points to the conclusion that he·-*
was not so opposed to it as was Aristotle, We can best
appreciate his moderation on this point by.considering
what he has to say of the role of commerce in the State
1. Aristotle, Polit., I, iv, l-J. 12j8b 10-28.
2. "Dixit autem supra, necessarium esse pecuniativam, per quam
homo acquirit pecuniam ex rebus quae natura ministrat ad
necessitatem vitae. Hujusmodi autem ponit duas partes.
Quarum prima est secundum quam homo ex emptione et venditione
talium rerum potest pecuniam acquirere. Et circa hanc partem
dicit quod pecuniativae sunt istae partes utiles, id est utilia
quaedam documenta, ut hamo sit expertus circa bona hujusmodi,
quae ab hominibus possidentur, quae eorum sint maximi pretii,
et ubi maximo pretio vendantur, et quomodo, puta quo tempore,
vel secundum alias conditiones.. .Oportet autem eum, qui ex
his vult lucrari pecuniam, esse expertum quae eorum sint
maxime cara et in quibus locis; quia alia istorum In aliis re­
gionibus abundant; ut scilicet emat in loco ubi abundant, et
vendant In loco ubi sunt cara." St. Thomas, Polit., Lib. I
Lect. 9.

39

4θ

COMMERCE ,

There are two ways in which it is possible to increase the
affluence of any State. One, which is the more worthy way,
is on account of the fertility of the country producing an
abundance of all things which are necessary to human life;
the other is through the employment of commerce, through
which the necessities of life are brought from different
places. The former method can be clearly shown to be the
more desirable...It is more admirable that a State should
possess an abundance of riches from its own soil than
through commerce. For the State which needs a number of
merchants to maintain its subsistence is liable to be
Injured in war through a shortage of food if communica­
tions are in any way impeded. Moreover, the influx of
strangers corrupts the morals of many citizens...where­
as, if the citizens themselves devote their time to com­
merce the door is opened to many vices. For when the de­
sire of merchants is Inclined greatly to gain, cupidity is
aroused in the hearts of many citizens...For the pursuit
of a merchant is as contrary as possible to military exer­
tion. For merchants abstain from labors and while they en­
joy the good things of life, they become soft in mind and
their bodies are rendered weak and unsuitable for military
exercises...It therefore behooves the perfect State to
make moderate use of commerce.

The foregoing justification of moderate commerce,
occurring as it does in the De Regimine principum, is
chiefly based on its social necessity. In the Secunda
Secundae, where all problems are considered from the
point of view of individual ethics,'commerce is treated
differently. The question is whether it is legitimate
in trading to sell things at a higher price than at which
they were bought.* Jst. Thomas answers that exchange is
of twc kinds.5 The’RTlrst Is natural and necessary and
in this kind things are exchanged for things, or money
and things are exchanged for the sake of the necessities
of life. This kind of exchange does not pertain to
traders but rather to "economists" and statesmen whose
duty it is to provide the necessities of life, either
for the family nr for the State. The second kind of
exchange is of money for money or of things for money
for the sake of profit. This kind of exchange pertains
J. St. Thomae, De Regimine Principum, H, Ch. 3·
U. St. Thomae, Summa Theol., H-H, 77, it.
5. St. Thomae, Polit., Lib. I, Leet. 7·

nasa

COMMERCE

»H

properly to traders.® Thus, in natural exchanges the process is either Goods-Goods, or Goods-Money-Goods . In
commerce the process is either Money-Money, or MoneyGoods-Money. The specific difference, therefore, be­
tween natural exchange and commerce /negotiatio) is that
the end of the former is to acquire the, necessities of
life and of the latter, to gain profit. I

From this distinction.it is clear that "commerce1*
has the narrow connotation in this passage from the
Summa, whereas in the De Regimine it is taken in the wide
sense. It is- the wide acceptance of the term which is
in accord with modern usage, since for us "commerce"
simply, implies exchange be it for the necessities of
life or. for mere gain. It is of relevance to point out
here that the inaccuracy of modern economic historians,
in holding that the schoolmen were opposed to commerce,
proceeds from their misunderstanding of terminology;
when the schoolmen condemned commerce it was "commerce"
in the narrow sense (negotiatio). They condemned it be­
cause to them it represented an abuse in most cases.
There never was any question in the mind of medieval
theologians that the natural kind of trading had to be
justified by some extrinsic title. Its very naturalness
made it ipso facto acceptable.
I To continue with St. Thomas’ argument: the first
kind or exchange is praiseworthy, while the second is
justly condemned. The reason for this is that, so far
as it is Itself concerned, it feeds the desire for gain
which knows-no bounds. Hence, commerce, considered in
itself, has a certain debasement attached to it, insofaras, by its ver? nature^ it does not imply a virtuous or
necessary endJj Although gain does not imply anything
6. Thus, according to St. Thomas' terminology, "commerce" in the
vide sense ("commutatio") covers both kinds of exchange. "Com­
merce" in the narrow sense ("negotiatio") refers only to the

kind, which is carried on for the sake of profit.
7. St. Thanas considers a special case of buying cheaper and selling
dearer. A man may buy something without any intention of selling
it again, but owing to circumstances which have arisen after his
buying it, he must sell it. Even though he sells it far more
than he bought it, there Is no question of. casaaerce (negotiatio)

42

COMMERCE

virtuous or necessary, neither does it connote, in it­
self, anything sinful or contrary to virtue. For this
reason nothing prevents gain from being directed to some
necessary or even virtuous end and thus trading becomes
lawful. ■ For instance, a man may intend the moderate
gain which hé seeks t’o acquire by trading for the upkeep
of his household, or for the assistance of the needy; or
again a man may'take to trade for some public good, lest
his country lack the necessities of life. The gain
which he expects in this case is not sought as gain,
but rather as a payment for his labor.
The commentary by Cajetan on this article pro­
vides much light for the correct interpretation of it:
You must distinguish between the affirmation of evil and
the negation of good. Now trade for the sake of gain is
of this nature that evil is not attributed to it, hut
rather good is denied it. It is not by its very nature
evil, for if this were the case no intention could make’
it licit. Neither is it by nature good, since it is not
ordained to a necessary or virtuous end. Rather, it does
have a certain character of evil...an action which is
neither morally good nor evil can be good if it is accom­
panied by a good end, and can be evil when joined to an
evil end. Thus, trade for the sake of gain, which is just­
ly condemned because of its evil aspect, can be illicit If
the gain is the ultimate end, and can be lawful if the
gain is ordained to the preservation of the family or the
State.e

In short, the principle which Cajetan is making exlicit
here is that of the end justifying the justifiable
means. If the means are intrinsically evil no end, how­
lfootnote Continued) involved here.

A ccomercial.transaction,

formally considered, takes place when the thing is bought
cheaply to be sold dearly: "Non quicumque carius vendit aliquid
quam emerit, negotiatur, sed solum qui ad hoc «mit ut carius
vendat » Si autem emit rem, non ut vendat, sed ut teneat et
postmodum propter aliquam causam eam vendere velit, non est
negotiatio, quamvis carius vendat." St. Thomas, Summa Iheol.

H-H, 77, 4, ad 2.
8. Cajetan, Coam, in St. T.t U-H, 77» 4.

COMMERCE

4j

ever exalted, can justify them. On the other hand, If
the means are only dangerous, a good end can justify
their use. However, the end cannot merely be good, but
has to be of such a proportion to the means that its
good has to outweigh their evil consequences.
In the Secunda Secundae of the Summa, in his
[
treatise on justice, St. Thomas deals with the various'
questions which are involved;in buying and selling.®
The questions are discussed under four headings:
1. Whether one can sell lawfully a thing for more thaq
it is worth. 2. Whether the sale is rendered unlawful
or unjust because of a defect in the article sold.
3. Whether the salesman Is obliged to admit a defect in
the article sold. 4. Whether in trade one is allowed
to sell a thing for more than he bought it. A glance
at these titles will show that, however Interesting
these problems are in themselves, they have a point of
view different from that required here. Our purpose
Is to disentangle those norms which are relevant in de­
termining the just price.
Apart from fraud, St. Thomas tells us, buying
and selling can be considered In two ways.9
10 In the
first way, It Is established for the common advantage
of both parties. The exchange has to be made on a basis
of equality.11 Since the amount is measured by the price,
9. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., H-II, 77, 1-4.
■
JO . "Si autem fraus deficit, tunc de emptione et venditione du­
pliciter loqui possumus: uno modo secundum se; et secundum hoc
emptio et venditio videtur esse Introducta pro communi utilitate
utriusque, dum scilicet unus indiget re alterius, et e con­
verso..." St. Thomas, Suma Theol., H-U, 77, 1.
11. The equality of which St. Thomae speaks here is, of course, the
equality of quantity: "...secundum aequalitatem quantitatis,
quia hoc requiritur in justitia canmutatlva quae consistit in
emptionibus et venditionibus." St. Thomas, Sent. Ill, d.18,

q. 1, a. 2.,

44

COMMERCE

it should be neither less nor more than the price asked.
Thus, to sell-a thing for more than the amount of value
it has, or for less, is by its verÿ~naturë uri^usf:— Prom
the second point of view it may happen accidentally that
one is benefited to the loss of the other. In the case,
for instance, where one has great need for the thing and
the other Is injured without it, the just price will be
determined not only on the basis of_the thing sold, but
also according to the loss incurred by the seller. In
such a situation, it is lawful to sell the thing for
more than it is worth itself, since its price is really
not more than its value to the seller. Yet, if the buyer
reaps great advantage as a result of the sale, and the
seller does not suffer loss, then the latter ought not
to raise the price. The advantage which accrues here to
the buyer does not proceed from any disposition of the
seller, but from some circumstance affecting the buyer
himself.
In this article it is apparent that St. Thomas
is considering two cases of buying and selling. The
first Is normal, that is, the advantage from the transac­
tion is mutual. The problem of justice here is compara­
tively simple: the prlctr~sKould bg^pelther greater nor
less than the value__of_^he~thlng7~ The second case Is
exceptionai^ratiKer than regular. Both parties need the
article, but the buyer's need is more urgent. The jus­
tice involved here is more complex. The seller may fix
a price on the article which exceeds its customary value,
in order to be recompensed for the loss which he suffers
in selling it. · Por instance, a man has a spare automo­
bile tire which is a real need and not (as in the present
circumstances), a luxury.. Another, who has only three
tires and has certainly urgent need for a fourth, offers
to buy it. Now the seller may justly charge, not only
for the value of the tire itself, but also for the loss
he sustains by selling it. Obviously, the extra charge
for loss must be proportionate to the seller's loss and
not to the buyer's need. That the recompense cannot be
mathematically determined any more than can the price of
the thing itself is obvious.

π
COMMERCE

45

We are now at the core of the problem of just j
price. So far the solutions have been negative. The
I
positive solution is another, and more difficult, mat­
ter, In other words, St. Thomas has shown that the just
price of a thing must be proportioned to its value, but
what positive norm does he offer for determining that
proper proportion? If we expect of him an easy formula
which will help us to determine the just price mathe­
matically, we are doomed to disappointment. St. Thomas
never confused the different degrees of certitude which
hold in theory and in practice. He warns us quite
definitely that "just price cannot be precisely deter­
mined, but consists rather in a certain estimation,
such that a slight addition or diminution does not seem
to remove the equality of justice."12
Such Is the practical norm which St. Thomas lays
down for determining just price. Many difficulties are
raised by it, nor does St. Thomas attempt to cast any
further light on their solution In any other part of his
works. The most obvious difficulty, of course, revolves
about that element "estimation." With little help from
St. Thomas, we shall have to turn to his commentators
for some further illumination.

In his Commentary Cajetan points out, à propos of
the reply to the first objection, that the thing to be
noted is that the just price allows for some latitude
and that it may be determined with some laxity, with
moderation, or with rigor.13 Just price he defines as
"that which can be found among merchants, presupposing
common knowledge and removed from all fraud and,compul­
sion."14 Concerning "common knowledge" he remarks that
custom has the force of law,15 Inferring that the cus­
tomary price of an article Is a safe guide to follow.
12. St. Ihamas, Summa Theol., II-H, 77,1 al 1.
13- "In responsione ad. primum nota quod ex hoc quod Justum pretium
habet latitudinem et distingui solet In pium moderatum et
rlgorosum. ” Cajetan, Ccmm. In S. T., II-II, 77,11«». "Justum pretium rei est Illud quod nunc potest Inveniri ab
emptoribus praesuppoeita communi notitia et remota omni fraude
et coactione." Cajetan, Cama, in S. T., H-II, 77,1·
15- "Consuetudo, quae luris vim habet." Cajetan, Ccmn. in 3. T.,
n-II, 77,1.

|ι

46

'

COMMERCE

*

Bllluart is more explicit in his commentary on
the same passage. He begins with the observation that
"generally speaking, that Is the just value of the thing,
or Its just price, which measures the thing not physical­
ly, but morally, considered Inasmuch as It is ordained
to human use."1® By opposing "physically" and "morally"
he evidently Intends to show that the determination of
just price belongs properly to the ethical sciences, and
not to the physical sciences. He holds that two things
constitute the just price; it is determined either by
public authority or the common estimation of men.17 In
the first case it is called the legal price and In the
second, the popular price.10 They differ In that the
former is set, while the latter admits of some lati­
tude .ls

The popular price·is based on common estimation.·
There are two elements here of equal importance:
a) estimation, and b) common. From the very fact that
the just price can only be estimated It follows that it
must possess some latitude: "Because all do not make the
same judgment concerning the value of things, but some
judge a little more, and some, a little less—it is
necessary to have some latitude within which the limits
of the just price can be established."20 Bllluart warns
us, however, of a possible misconception of this lati­
tude which would certainly lead to abuse: "Some believe
16. "Generaliter loquendo, llle eat Justus rei valor seu Justum
pretium, quod est commensuratum rei non physice consideratae sed
morallter et In ordine ad usum et convictum humanum." Bllluart,
Comm, in Summam Sancti Uxamae, Tractatus De Contractibus, Dies.

HI, a. 3·
17. "Duo sunt quibus constituitur Justum rerum venalium.. .Justum
ergo rerum pretium illud est quod.vel ab auctore publica, vel
communi hominum aestimatione est determinatum." Bllluart, Ibid.,
Diss., HI, a. 3·
18. "Primum pretium vocatur legitimum.. .Secundum vocatur arbitrarium
seu vulgare." Bllluart, Ibid., Dise., Ill, a. 3·
19 "Haec duo pretia in eo differunt, quod legitimum consistat in
indivisibili, vulgare vero admittat latitudinem.". Bllluart,

Ibid., Diss., HI, a. 3.
20. Bllluart, Ibid., Diss., HI, a. 3·

COMMERCE

*7

that this latitude Increases proportionately with the
price Itself...Thus, if an article by Its middle price
is, worth ten (dollars), by its lowest, It will be nine
and by its highest, eleven; there is a latitude here of
three possible prices. If, however, the article should '
be worth one hundred (dollars) at its middle price, it
will be worth ninety-five at its lowest and one hundred
and five at its highest; here the latitude allows for
ten possible prices. Now while this is/generally true,
nevertheless, there should be more emphasis on the cus­
tom of the market than on the price of the thing itself—
otherwise the latitude in prices would proceed to in­
finity."01 What Bllluart is evidently trying to rule

out here is the application of any kind of mathematical,
determinism in the fixing of Just price by estimation.
Were the latitude to increase in mathematical proportion
to the increase in the price, the prudential element
so necessary to estimation would be jeopardized. On
this point Sandoz remarks:
Value is, therefore, essentially dependent on this com­
parative Judgment which men make among many useful
things: value results from an estimation. And the rea­
son is clear: although utility le defined in relation to
a determined end, values depend on the relation which
things have to the universal ends of man, and we have
seen that this relation was necessarily subjected to
choice, that is to say, to an appreciation.. .Also,
while utility is something real and intrinsic to the use­
ful thing, value is an ens rationis, always dependent on
the Judgment of men...Consequently, price is not something
real, but only has being in the mind; one can understand
how the nominalintic tinge of such a notion has frightened
well-intentioned people, and that economists and moral­
ists (they never should have been separated) have sought

to give to price the character of a real measure and a
foundation in the nature of the thing. We see that they
have been wrong, because it results from the very nature
of exchange that price is a thing of the mind.

The second point is that the estimation must be

common:
21. Bullluart. Ibid., Dies., ill, a. J.
22. A. Sandoz, "la Notion de Juste Prix,""Revue Ihcmiste, (1939),
289.· ■

48

COMMERCE
Because private Judgment is often blind and false, It Is
so easily perverted by greed. Common Judgment, on the
contrary, is regularly more prudent, more attentive and
less prone to error, therefore, when there Is a no more
certain rule to follow, common estimation concerning

the price of things must be consulted. And so it was
established by the law of the nations, and rightly so,
that the Just price Is based on common estimation,
which views the utility of things and the other cir­
cumstances, from the standpoint of common knowledge...
because commun estimation does not proceed from the
private Knowledge of one man or another, concerning the
utility of things.2324

Thus, Billuart makes clear that the just price, as based
on common estimation, derives from the law of nations.
In opposition to this, some have sought to base price on
the natural law:
Mist it be eaid. that the natural law determines the Just
price? Can the value of a thing be measured by acme quali­

ty intrinsic to it? Soma have thought so: Marx, for ex­
ample, measures value according to the quantity of work
incorporated, in each thing and. it is a current opinion that
the value of a thing depends essentially on this quality.
Every time we go back to the roots of the notion of value,
we see that this is not so. Granted the value depends on
all these elements, but it is not measured by them; we can
be convinced of this by recalling the distinction between
utility and value. Hie qualities of a thing which render
it apt to a determined use, the labor which produced those
qualities in the thing-all that is relative to the utility
of this thing, and does not concern its relation to the
end which it realizes. Value, on the contrary, belongs in
the order of exchange and is measured by its counterpart in
exchange.2* '

«

The important point to notice in both of these comments
is the insistence on the fact that price is a matter of
prudential determination. In stressing that the estima­
tion must be common Billuart is insisting that pru­
dential judgments are more prudential, "less prone to
23. Billuart, Ibid.., Dies., HI,
24. A Sandoz, loc, cit., 288-209

ae

i

COMMERCE

49

error" when, they are common. Sandoz, by contrasting
the nature of utility and value, Intends to point out
that value cannot be Irrevocably fixed by the natural
law, but that Its determination belongs by essence In
the order of prudence.
The problem of just price naturally raises the
question of the legitimacy of monopoly. Every reader
of Aristotle is familiar with his account of monopoly55
and his recommendation of this practice as a means by
which one can increase the depleted revenue of the State.
In commenting on this passage St. Thomas himself makes
no moral judgment on the practice,2® nor does he con­
sider the problem elsewhere.
In popular.language the term "monopoly" has a
certain opprobrious connotation. It nearly always Im­
plies that such a practice is by its very nature unjust.
In the popular notion of monopoly there is nearly al­
ways a necessary causal relationship between the char­
acter of compulsion which it possesses and its Injus, tice. Or, to state it in a positive way, the justice of
a commercial transaction Is formally derived from the
voluntary consent of the contracting parties. Cajetan
shows us that the proper distinction is founded on some­
thing else. He admits that exchange is not always com­
pletely voluntary, but that It frequently is character­
ized by semi-violence, since, when need characterizes
the transaction, it is not absolutely voluntary.27 He
then proceeds to the distinction which is the key to
the question: "The cause of the transaction (i.e., nec­
essity) is related accidentally to the just price, un­
less it effects the greater or less amount of value in
the thing sold."2® Thus, the element of compulsion, be
it on the side of the buyer or the seller, does not es­
sentially enter into the determination of just price.
"Thus, If the' price be just, It matters not if there Is
an admixture of compulsion (violentia)."2®
25. Aristotle. Polit ·~7~ΐ, iv, 5-

1259a 6-36.

26. St. Thomas. Polit., Ut>. I, Leet. 9*
27. "Non camino voluntaria eet casautatio sed. seal-violentia...
quia hujusmodi venditio ex indigentia non est voluntaria sim­
pliciter, sed. seal-violentia." Cajetan, Çrm·, in s, y., n-n,

77, 1·
28. Cajetan, Coma, in 3. T.. H-H, 77, 1.29
29- Cajetan, Cana, in S. T., H-H, 77, 1.

50

,

COMMERCE

The second popular fallacy regarding monopoly
Is that its evil character springs from the fact that
the" sale of products is controlled by one or, at least,
a few. Billuart makes this observations "Just price is
that which is derived from common estimation regarding
the value (quantitas) of the articles as it is commonly
known, whether the sellers be many or not...the quantity
(quantitas) of the articles is the same in the case of
one or a few, as it would be if it were divided among
many..."3031Were this not true, the sale of postage
stamps by the government, which is a conspicuous example
of public monopoly, would be per se unlawful and con­
trary to justice.
-,
The third misunderstanding Is that monopoly oc­
curs only in the sale of goods. From Billuart's posi­
tion regarding the determination of just price his stand
on this point Is eminently consistent: "Those who agree
among themselves not to sell unless at a price which ex­
ceeds the highest one (i.e., according to common estima­
tion) or those who similarly agree not to buy unless at
a price which is below the lowest> sin against justice."
Thus, buyers who join together for the sole purpose of
buying under the commonly estimated price areas guilty
of injustice as those producers who unite to maintain
the price beyond that level. In practice, obviously,
the monopolistic buyer and the monopolistic seller are
frequently the same person or group of persons. It is
quite probable, however, that individual consumers, who
have been subjected to exorbitant prices in dally necessi­
ties, might band together to buy those products at a
price below the one demanded—so long as they do not act
on the unwarranted .assumption that the justice of their
action is entirely founded on the fact of their being
buyers rather than sellers.
The conclusion, then, Is that the specific thing
which renders monopoly unjust Is not precisely the fact .
that there Is a certain element of compulsion therein,
nor that one or a few control the market, nor yet thatit is the peculiar technique of producers alone—but
rather, what does render it unjust is the fact that the
30. Billuart, Coma, in Sunman Sctl Thcanae, Tract: Pa Contractibus,
Dies. HI, a. 11 (Pe Monopoliis).
31. Billuart, Ibid., Diss. HI, a. 11 (De Monopoliis).

ΒΚΒΒΒ

—COMMERCE

price asked by the monopolists■. exceeds the just price
based on common estimation, if the monopolists are
sellers, or falls below it, if they are buyers.
In investigating the kinds of commerce (negotiatio)
according to St. Thomas, we found that there is one kind
wherein the relation is Money-Good's-Money, and another
in which it is merely Money-Money. This second kind of
commerce was given the special name of cambium or ars
campsoria by medieval theologians. We should probably
designate it as "money-changing." "Although cambium was,
strictly speaking, a special branch of commerce, it was
nevertheless usually treated in the works on usury, the
reason being that many apparent contracts of cambium
were in fact veiled loans..."3E. However, the cases
where cambium falls under the discussion of usury are
exceptional; the typical examples belong properly in
the treatment on commerce. Since we shall consider only
the regular forms we shall deal with cambium here, rather
than in the succeeding chapter.

Besides the ordinary exchange of money for nec essary goods, another kind of financial1 transactions was ;
Introduced according to which money is exchanged for
money. This is called nummularia, that is the way in
which money changers (campsores)use money. This first
came about by chance; namely, from the fact that some
men, in transferring money from some countries to others
found that it was worth more than when they got it
("carius eos expenderint quam acceperint"). Hence, from
this experience...man considered from which place the
money should be transferred and in what way he could make
the most gain. This is the special concern of the num­
mulary art."32
33 Again in the same commentary he observes:
"That kind of wealth-getting which is money-changing mul­
tiplies money, not in all ways, but only through the ex­
change of money. Whence, it is entirely concerned with
money because money is the principal and the end of such
exchange, since money is given for money."3*
32. G. O’Brien, An Bssay on Med. Scon. Teach,, IJJ.
33. St. Thomas, Polit., Lib. I. Leet. 7·
3h. "Sed ilia pecunlativa quae eat canpeoria multiplicat pecunias
non omnibus modis, sed solum per denariorum permutationem; unde
tota consistit circa denarios: quia denarius est principium

.

52

COMMERCE

These seem to be the only references made by
St. Thomas35 to money-changing, nor does he in any place
consider the justice of the transaction. The most proba­
ble reason for the omission is that, since money-chang­
ing is a species of commerce (negotiatio), everything
which was said of the latter applies equally to the
former. Cajetan, however, has an opusculum (De Cambiia)
devoted to the question.
For Cajetan the specifying element in money­
changing is that money is not considered as money, that
is as a measure, but as a thing itself.
Just as a
thing has two uses, that is, proper and common, so has
money.37 The first or proper use of money is to act as
a medium of exchange.38 Its second use is to be itself
an exchangeable commodity.39 (This is why money-changing
can be Included in a discussion on commerce.) Though
Aristotle is reported as censuring this kind of commerce,
et finie talis commutationis dum denarius pro denario datur."
St. Thomas, Polit., Lib. I, Lect. 7.
35· There are two other references to money changing; a) "Species

pecuniarum distinguens, sive artis pecuniariae, sive nummismaticam, sive campsorlam..." St. Thomas, De Reg. Prine., Lib. II,
chapter 13; b) "Et hoc etiam habet veritatem in aliis speciebue

pecuniarum, imno. amplius, ut in campsorla, quae non proprie
ordinatur ut sit mensura rerum venalium, sed magis ad permuta­
tionem numismatis." St. Thomas, De Reg. Prine., Lib. II, chap.
1U. Though these texts are consistent with St. Thomas· treat, ment of money elsewhere they belong in that part of the De Reg.
„ Prine, which was written by Ptolemaeus de Lucca.
36. "In camblis non consideratur pecunia ut pecunia, seu ut mensura
est; sed ut res quaedam est." Cajetan, Opuscula OeconomlcoSoclalla, 235, (De Camblis, Chap. IV), 107"Et hoc modo utitur pecunia ars nummularia, vulgariter
nuncupata campsaris, scilicet ut re quadam. Et propterea utitur
ipsa nimii, ut re et pretio... .Et supra hoc fundamentum consurgit
tota doctrina camblorum. Nec ulla apparet ratio quare magis
aliis rebus possimus tot modie uti...cum multiplicitas usus non
impediat usum principalem." Cajetan, Com, in S.T.,11-11, 7^ 1·
37. Cajetan, Opuscula Oeconomlco-Soclalia, 2UU (De Camblis).

38. Cajetan, Ibid., 2U539· Cajetan, Ibid., 2U6.
40. Cajetan, Ibid., 2h9·

COMMERCE

Cajetan himself takes a more moderate view of it:
experience clearly shows, many necessities of life would
be lacking if there were no merchants, and since they
cannot conveniently carry on their trading without money­
changing, it is necessary and proper that there should
be money-changing in the State—not money-changing for
its own sake (pure campsoria), but as an aid to eco­
nomics and politics."4142

The traditional classification of cambium among
the schoolmen was threefold: cambium minutum was the or­
dinary exchange of different kinds or sizes of money
within the same locality;4g cambium per litteras was the
exchange of moneys of different currencies in different
places,43 cambium siccum was the exchange of moneys from
which a profit was expected on the basis of an incre­
ment in the money itself.44 The first two kinds were
lawful, while the third was not true cambium, but really
usury masquerading under the guise, of cambium.4546
The fundamental rule for observing justice in
money-changing, Cajetan reminds us, is the same which
holds for all commercial transactions : the equality of
the thing to the thing must be preserved.43 That is,
it is unjust to give bad or defective money in exchange
for good money, or to give gold coins for silver ones,
"which," as Cajetan sarcastically adds, "hardly merit
the name of silver."47 The just proportion existing be­
tween different kinds of money is. determined, as in the
case of just price, by law or custom; for instance, "a
gold ducat may be equivalent in economic and political
41. Cajetan, Ibid., 250.
42. Cajetan, Ibid., 205. Also Bllluart, Ibid., Dise. V, a. 2, I,
4j. Cajetan, Opuscula Oeconcanlco-Socialla (De Camblis),
205Bllluart, Ccmm. in Summam Scti. Thomae, Tract. De Contract.,
Dise., V, a. 2, #1.
44. Cajetan, Ibid., 206, 209.
Bllluart, Ibid., Diae. V, a. 2, /2.
45. Cajetan, Ibid., 208, 209.
Bllluart, Ibid., Diae., V, a. 2, /2.

46. Cajetan, Ibid., 252.
4T· Cajetan, Ibid., 255·

COMMERCE

5^

transactions to ninety solidi.’’48*

If the money-changer was required by justice to
give back the equivalent of what he received by what
title was he allowed to make a profit? He could legiti­
mately charge for the money-changing on the basis of the
expenses which he himself incurred.48 Then too, if the
merchant could justly demand a certain profit on the
product which he sells as a "stipendium laboris" (as
St. Thomas allows), it would seem that the money-changer
could levy a charge on the grounds. In fact, Billuart
includes this in the various lawful titles upon which a
charge can be made: risks and other inconveniences, labor,
industry, expenses and the rarity or abundance not only
of the money but also of the money-changers.50
Do these principles of just money-changing have
any relevance today? They certainly seem to apply to
foreign exchange operations as well as to certain domes­
tic transactions. Many banks, particularly in large
cities, have departments given over exclusively to
foreign exchange. A traveler may purchase traveler's
cheques at his own bank which will be almost universally
acceptable in countries outside of his own. When the
difference between his own money and the foreign money
in question is adjusted the bank adds a charge for its
own services. If the parity between the two moneys is
preserved and if the bank charge is made on the basis of
the expense, inconvenience, etc., which it has incurred,
then the transaction is a just cambium according to
scholastic standards. Another example of lawful money­
changing occurs even more frequently. Cheques, money
orders and postal notes are exchanged for sums of money
which are equivalent to the amount indicated on them.
The bank or post-office levies a service charge which
represents the "stipendium laboris" to which they are
justly entitled. There is an analogy between the first
case and the medieval "cambium per litteras" and another
between the second example of modern money-changing and
4B, Cajetan, Ibid... 256.

Also "Servetur justum pretium (juod vel

lege vel communi consuetudine."
i»9. Cajetan, Ibid.., 259·

Billuart, Ibid., 2.

50. Billuart, Can, in Summam Sett Thomae, Tract. Be Contract..
Diss. V, a. 2, 2.

COMMERCE

55

"cambium minutum. " Titille the risks of transporting money
so real during the Middle Ages, are practically non­
existent under modern conditions, still on the basis of
the other titles and for the social convenience which
they perform, our present money-changing transactions
for the most part conform to the requirements laid down
by the schoolmen.

K?

Chapter IV

USURY

In medieval economic thought considerable space
is devoted to the problem of usury. Its conspicuous
position was no doubt due, In part, to the Aristotelian
condemnation:
Usury is most reasonably hated., because Its gain cames
from money Itself and not from that for the sake of which
money was Invented.. For money was brought into existence
for the purpose of exchange, but usury increases the
amount of the money itself (and. this Is the actual origin

of the Greek word: offspring resembles parent and usuryτοχος- le money born of money; consequently this form of
business of getting wealth is of al1 the form the most
contrary to nature.

In commenting on this passage, St. Thomas merely re­
states what Aristotle says without adding any notions
of his own.1
2 It is the Summa that St. Thomas treats
this problem most extensively.3

St. Thomas inquires in his first article whether
1. Aristotle, Polit., i, m, 23. 1258b 3-9.
2. "Et cum Ista pecunlatlva, quae est nummularia, juste vituperetur,

quaedmn alla acquisitive pecuniae est, quae rationabilissime
vituperatur, et odio habetur: quae dicitur foenus, per quod
denarius selpsum adauget, et ideo sic'vocatur. Videmus enim
quod ea, quae periuntur secundam naturam, sunt similia, generan­
tibus; unde fit quidam partus cum denarius ex denario crescit.
Et ideo etiam ista acquisitio pecuniarum est maxime praeter
naturam.... " St. Thomas, Polit.,; Lib. I, Lect. 8.
3. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., U-H, 78, 1-U. The opsculun, De
Usurlls, for son» time Included among St. Thomas1 works,
written by Aegidius de Lesslnia somewhere around 1278. of. .
Bibliothèque Thomiste, IV.

56

USURY

it is sinful to accept usury for money lent.
plies:

He re­
—'

To accept usury for a loan of money is by its nature un­
just. The injustice derives from the fact that one sells
something that is non-existent and since this is to con­
stitute an inequality It is obviously contrary to jus­
tice. To make this clear we must observe that there are
certain things whose use consists in their consumption;
thus, we consume wine in using it for drink and wheat,
In using it for food. In such cases we cannot separate
the use of the thing from the thing itself, for, whoever
is granted the use of the thing, is, by this very fact,
For thia reason, to lend, such
granted the thing itself,
Accordingly, If a
things is to transfer the ownership
man wishes to sell wine, and at the same time sell its
use, he would be selling the sans thing twice, or he
would be selling what does not exist. This is manifest­
ly unjust. In like manner., he commits an injustice who
lends wine or wheat, and asks for double payment; that
is,, one which is the return of the thing in equal measure,
the other, the price of the use-which is called usury.
On the other hand, there are some things whose use
does not consist in their consumption; thus, to use a
house is to live in it, not to destroy it. Wherefore,
is such things both may granted separately; f°r instance,
one may hand over to another the ownership of his house
while reserving to himself the use of it for a time, or
conversely, he may grant the use of the house while re­
taining the ownership. For this reason a man may law­
fully make a charge for the use of his house, and, be­
sides this, claim the house which he has lent, as hap­
pens in renting and letting a house.
<~—
Money, however, according to the Philosopher was
invented chiefly for the purpose of exchange; conse­
quently, the proper and principal use of money is its
consumption of alienation, whereby it Is spent In ex­
change. Hence it is by Its very nature unlawful to
take payment for the use of money lent, which payment
is called usury; and, just as a man Is bound to restore
4. Aristotle, Polit., I, 111, 13-14.
y V, 10. 1133a 20- 1135b.

1257a 31-1257b.

Also Ethic

sa

USURY
other ill-gotten goods, so is he hound to restore the
money which he has taken in usury.5

There are certain things, then, such as wine, wheat,
and money whose use is their consumption.6 In using
them I destroy'them. A thing can be destroyed in two
ways : it can be physically destroyed as in the case of
wheat when it is eaten, or it can be destroyed by
alienation, as when I spend money.7 We might say that
in the case of wheat it is objectively destroyed, where­
as money is subjectively destroyed; the money spent is
destroyed so far as I am concerned. In such things
whose use is their consumption, it follows that in giv­
ing them to another, I transfer their ownership as
well.· According to the definition of mutuum, the un­
conditional and complete transfer of ownership is an
intrinsic and essential characteristic of those things
which are consumed when they are used. It is,, then,
manifestly unjust to charge separately for the thing
itself and for the use of it. Either I sell something
which is non-existent, or I sell the same thing twice.
In other words, if I lend a bushel of wheat, I transfer
not only the wheat but the use and in transferring the
use I necessarily transfer ownership of it. Consequent­
ly, I can expect to get back only the bushel which I
lent. Since money is likewise consumed in its use from
the fact that its primary use is to be spent, it is
clear that in lending a sum of money I can only expect
a like amount in return. This is only consistent with
the equality of justice.

St. Thomas, 8m»w Theol., H-H, 78, 1.
The terms "fungible" (consumed in use) and "nan-fungible" (riot
consumed in use) will not be used here: they were not used by

St· Thomas· On their misuse by some theologians and économiste
cf. A. A. Beck, "Usury and the Theologians^" Dublin Review,
203 (1938), 81«.
This notion of money's being destroyed when It is spent Is not
found explicitly in Aristotle, but comes from Woman Tav (jub.
tin., Inst., U, 4). Although St. Cumas speaks of "proprius
et principalis usus pecuniae est ipsius consuetio" he does not
mean that coneumptlblllty is a spearate use of money; it is
only a property flowing from its primary use as a medium of ex­
change.

USURY

52

There are other things whose use does not con­
sist In their consumption. In using a house, for In- '
stance, I do not consume It; I merely live In It.
Thus, In transferring a house to another, I may trans­
fer only the use of it reserving the ownership to my­
self. This is the contract of letting or renting
(conductio et locatio).s It differs from the former
contract In that ownership is not Intrinsically bound
up with use. In other words, with houses and the like,
the ownership is not transferred with the result that I
can sell the house and the use of the house separately.
In renting a house I can justly expect not only the
return of the house Itself but also an additional amount
for the use thereof.
Thus, the contract of mutuum Involves only those
things whose use is their consumption; it demands that
the transfer Of the thing be accompanied by the trans­
fer of ownership. It is a gratuitous contract In
which that amount of goods or money returned Is equal
tio the amount lent. The contract of conductio et Ιο-,
elatio, on the other hand,. Is concerned with those
tnings whose use does not consist in their destruction
or alienation. It does not demand that the use of the
thing be accompanied by ownership.. It is a contract in
which the return of the thing may be justly accompanied
by an additional amount for its use. It is from the
consideration of these two kinds of contract that St.
Thomas Is led to define usury as nthe price for the use
of money which has been lent (pecunia mutuata). "8
9
As we saw in the treatment ef money in Chapter
III, money may be considered from the formal and from
the material points of view. Under its formal aspect,
8. Ab will bo remarked In the text St. Thomae Identifies ccmmadatum with locatio et conductio (he uses the phrase "domum
accomodatam"). This Identification Involves no contradiction

since he implies locatio et conductio rerum.
9. "Kt propter hoc secundum se est illicitum pro usu pecuniae
mutuatae accipere pretium, quod dicitur usura." St. Thomas,
Summa Theol., Il-II, 78,1. "Dicitur enim usura ah usu, eo
scilicet quod pro usu pecuniae pretium quoddam accipitur quasi
ipse usus pecuniae mutatae vendatur." St. Thomas,De Malo,

60

USURY

it has, as a consequence of its being a medium of ex­
change, the function of acting as a representative of
security. From its material aspect it has a secondary
use as an exchangeable commodity. St. Thomas considers
the relationship between these two uses of money and
the problem of usury in his reply to the sixth objec­
tion. If money is considered according to its primary
use, that use can not be legltimatlly sold.10
If, how­
ever, the money is considered from the point of view of
its secondary use, that use can be justly sold.11 In
this second case the money, considered as a thing,- may
be used as a pawn or as a security for debt (pignus).
When used as a thing, money, like a house, is not con­
sumed in its use and, according to the principle of
Boman Law, is for that reason capable of ususfructus.12
Thus, Cajetan points out that selling the use of money,
as a thing, comes under cambium rather than under
usury.
Perhaps owing to the practices of his time, St.
■ Thomas was well aware of the various attempts to evade
the prohibition of usury. Evidently one of the attempted
evasions was to demand goods rather than money as a
payment for a loan. He replies that to demand goods
whose price can be estimated In money is the same as to
demand money Itself, and so one who exacts goods in
payment for a loan sins against justice.1* However,

1

10. "Usus autem princlp alls pecuniae argenteae eat distractio
pecuniae in cansnutatlonea; unde nan licet eJus usum vendere cum
hoc quod aliquis velit e Jus restitutionem quod mutuo' dedit1."
St. Thomae, Summa Theol., Il-H, 7β,1, ad 6.
11. "St similiter potest esse aliquis secundarius usus pecuniae ar­
genteae, ut puta si quis concederet pecuniam signatam ad osten­
tationem vel ad ponendum loco pignoris; et talem usum pecuniae
licite homo vendere potest." St. Thomas, Swma Theol., II-II,
78, 1 ad 6. "Unde si quis pecuniam signatam in saeculo con­

cedat alicui ad hoc quod ponat eam in pignore, et exinde pretium
accipiat, non est usura, quia non est contractus mutui, sed
magis locatio et conductio." St. Thomas, De Malo, q. 13, a. li­
ed I?.
12. Justin., Decret., VU, 1, para. 28.
13. Cajetan, Ccmm. in S,T., II-H, 78, 1 ad 6.
1H. "....ita etiam quicunque ex pacto tacito vel expresso quodcumque

j

I

__________________

U3TOY

61

one may accept something which has been freely given by
the borrower in gratitude for the loan.*
1516 Consistent
to the last--even as in so many cases, to the point of
naïveté—St. Thomas adds that the lender may demand as
recompénse for the loan such things as gratitude and
love which cannot be measured by money.15
Another evasion of usury is considered. As is
often the case, the lender demands a pledge or collater­
al for the loan. If the thing which he demands can be
estimated by a price, he must do either of two.things:
he must return the collateral without having used it;
or, if he used it to his own profit, he must return not
only the collateral, but also the amount which accrued
to him from its use. Otherwise he should be making
free use of the collateral which would be the same as
taking money for the loan.1718This solution is consist­
ent with the Roman legal principle concerning the con­
tract of pignus.1B
If anyone wishes to sell his goods for more than the Just
price, so that he may wait for the buyer to pay, he evi­
dently commits usury: this waiting far the payment of
the price baa the character of a loan, so that whatever
' he demanda beyond the Just price in consideration of this
aliud acceperit cujus pretium pecunia mensurari potest, simile
peccatum incurrit." St. Thomas, Summa Theol-, H-H, 78, 2.
15. "Si vero accipiat aliquid hujusmodi, non quasi exigens,'nec

quasi ex aliqua obligatione tacita vel expressa;- sed sicut
gratuitum donum, non peccat; quia etiam antequam pecuniam
nmtuasset, licite poterat aliquod donum gratis accipere." St.
Thomas, Summa Theol., H-H, 78,2.
16. "Recompensationem vero eorum quae pecunia non mensurantur,
licet pro mutuo exigere, puta benevolentiam et amarem ejus cui
mutavit, vel aliquid hujusmodi. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., H-II,
T8,2.
17· "....si quis pro pecunia albi jmituAta obliget, rem allquan cujus
ust^s pretio aestimari potest, debet usum illius rei ille qui
mutuavit, computare in restitutionem ejus quod mutuavit; alioquin si usum illius rei quasi gratis sibi superaddi velit,
idem eat ac si pecuniam acciperet pro mutuo, quod est usurarium.
...." St. Thomas, Sumna Theol., II-U, 78,2, ad 6.
18. W. C. Morey, Outlines of Reman Law, J58.

/

ne··

USURY

62

delay le like a price for a.loan, which pertains to usury.
In like manner, if one wishes to buy a thing for less than
its Just price because he pays for the goods, before they

.

are delivered, it is usury. Such sn anticipated payment
of money has the character of a loan whose price equals
the amount deducted from the Just price. However, if a
man allows a rebate on the Just price in order to have
the money sooner, it is not usury.18

From these'examples we can conclude then that
usury is the profit coming from a mutuum. Whether that
profit be money or something measureable by money does
not effect Its essentially illicit character. St.
Thomas' central, argument, then, is that a contract of
loan is by Its very nature gratuitous.19
20 Father Beck
points out. that there are two common fallacies regard­
ing this Thomistic notion of usury. The first Is that
his argument against It derives principally from Aris­
totle's doctrine that money is by Its nature sterile.
This belief may result from the practice, more or less
common, of reading into Aristotle what properly belongs
to St. Thomas alone. The second Is that the doctrine
has to be modified according as the loan 1-s productive
or non-productive. Both ideas, Father Beck insists are
excluded by the Thomistic definition of usury.21

19. St. Thomas, Summa Theol·., II-II, 78, 2 ad 7· Here St. Thomas
shows that such apractice involves the selling of time.
20. In the Sentences St. Thomas gives a second and less profound
argument against usury. His reasoning is briefly as follows:
money is only a measure; to accept a price for a loan Is to
accept more money for less. This is to change the measure in
accepting and giving. In the Summa, which represents his more
* mature thought, St. Thomas does not mention this argument.
"Et ideo pecuniae usub non habet mensuram utilitatis ex ipsa

pecunia sed ex rebus quae per pecuniam mensurantur secundum
differentiam ejus qui pecuniam ad res transmutat. Onde accipere
majorem pecuniam pro minari nihil aliud esse videtur quam di­
versifi care mensuram in accipiendo, et dando; quod manifeste
inquitatem continet." St. Thomas, Sent., HI, d. 37, q. 1, a.6.
21. A. A. Beck, "Usury and the Theologians, " Dublin Bevlew, 203
(1938), 83-87.

, ,

·

'

USURY

6?

The argument against usury, that it makes money
breed money contrary to its nature, has long been popu­
lar. Shakespeare used it in the Merchant of Venice:
Antonio:
Shylock:

'Or is your gold ewea and rams?’
'I cannot tell, I make it breed as fast.’ 22

The crude way in which the argument has been put has
served to obscure Aristotle's real point: >he did not
say that money could not breed, money, but rather that
in doing so it is contrary to nature. It is not only
naive but wholly inaccurate to think that Aristotle was
ignorant of the fact that, in some transactions, money
does reproduce Its kind.23
Through Aristotle condemns interest....he condemns it as
παρα φυσιν, not because it is impossible to breed money
out of money (for that is Just what happens), but because
that use of it is a departure from the τέλος of money
(viz., to serve as a means of exchange.) His grievance
is that it is so misused so that it can't be. (under­
lining author's) 24 '

Now Aristotle looked with disfavor on even the profit
which comes from commerce, so’ it is to be expected that
he should a fortiori detest usury. Consequently, since
St. Thomas did not attach such odium to commerce, it is
understandable that he should modify Aristotle's notion
of usury. ■
·
In the third article of question 78 St. Thomas
asks: Whether one must return what he will have gained
from money lent at usury. He replies, that
22. Shakespeare, Merchant of Verlice, Act I, Sc. UI.
2J. "Aristote cannait la productivité de l'argent. La monnaie dans
le commerce, est στοιχειονκαί'πέρας της άλλαγης,
le

ffnTmiAnz.rtTnant et Ta fin de T’échangé »' -Elle engendre des profits:
ποιήσει κέρδος Le commerce est l’art d’echanger une somme
plus faible contre une plus forte par l'intermediaire d’un pro­
duit..... Dans le commerce, l'argent prolific, il fait des
petite. La transaction commerciale est productive. Maie le
commerce est condamnable." M. Defourney, Studes Sur La Polltque,
15.
2h. J. Bocnar (et al), "Vho Said 'Barren Metal’?", Economics H,
no. 5 (1922) 105-111. (Quoted by A. A. Beck, "Usury and the
Theologians," Dublin Review, 20J, (1958), 86.

64

USURY
there are certain things whose use is their very con­
sumption. According to lav they do not have ususfructus.
And eo if such things are extorted through
usury (l.e., money, wheat, vine, etc.), one does not

have to restore more than he accepted.

The reason is

that whatever is acquired from such things is not the
fruit of these, but of human industry,.... There are
certain things whose use is not their consumption, and
such do have ususfructus, for inutanda, a house or a
field, or something of the' like. And if one extorts
the house or field of another by usury, he must not
only return the house or field, but also the fruits
of these things. The reason is that the gain from
these belongs to the owner, and so it is owed to him?8

By applying the notion of ususfructus in this argument,
3t. Thomas shifts the emphasis from the consideration
of the sterility of money to that of its consumptibility. He reminds us here, that according to the legal
notion, ususfructus cannot be had of those things con­
sumed in use: "Neither by the natural nor .civil lav do
such things receive ususfructus.11 In making use of this
principle of Roman Law St; Thomas was able to discern
^vhat Aristotle never saw—or at least, never mentioned:
if money should not produce more money, but in fact does
in some cases, whence comes this power? : St; Thomas
knew as well as Aristotle that money left to·itself is
naturally idle. The power, then, of increasing Itself
comes from without; it comes from human industry.28
Money is the material source of the increase, while the
element which feeds the transaction is the-active
source,88 or, more precisely, the money is the
25.
26.
27.
28.

Justin.,Inst., II, 4. Justin., Deoret., TH, 5.
St. Thanas, Summa Theol., H-H, 78, 5*
Justin., Inst., U, 4. Justin., Decret., VU, 5.
"Id quod de tall re (l.e., pécunia) est acquisitum, non est
fructus hujusmodi rei, sed humanae industriae."
Summa Theol., H-IT, 78, 3-

St. Thrmaa,

29. "....radix non solum habet rationem materiae, sicut pecunia
usuraria; sed habet etiam aliqualiter rationem causae activae,
l.nqnantum admlnlatrat nutrimentum." St. Thomas, Sunaa Theol.,
n-n, 78, 3-

USURY

65

instrumental cause of-the increase and labor is the
principal cause.30 The instrumental causality of money
is brought out again In- another passage:
He who sows wheat in a field, does not yet have an ac­
tual crop but only a virtual one; similarly, one who
possesses money does not actually have gain, but only
virtually.*
31

The Thomlstic doctrine on instrumental causality
helps to remove the confusion regarding the sterility of
money,
"it happens that anything participates in the
proper action of another thing, no.t by its own power,
but instrumentally, insofar as it acts in virtue of the
other."32 Thus,
A secondary instrumental
the action of a superior
through something proper
disposition, it operates
cipal agent. 33

cause does not participate in
cause, except insofar as,
to it after the fashion of a
toward the effect of the prin­

The Instrumental cause, then, produces an effect only
by virtue of its participation in the principal cause.
From this it follows that money is virtually fecund'in
the sense that it produces gain, not by any causal
dignity proper to it, but only inasmuch as it partici­
pates in the. Inherent excellence of the principal cause,
which in this case is the human.agent.

There is a Thomlstic principle that the princi­
pal cause Is more noble than the effect, whereas the
Instrumental cause is not.34 Now, in, modern practice,
the shift in emphasis has been such that money has
JO. "....non propter pecuniam usurariam datam, sicut propter
causam instrumentales: sed propter auam industriam, sicut
propter causam principalem." St. Thomas, Ibid.,. H-H, 7®, JadJ.
31. St. Thomas, Ibid., ΙΙ-H, 62, 4 ad 1 et 2.
32. St. Thomas, Ibid., I, 45, 5.
33. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., I, 45, 5.
34. "Non est autem eadem ratio principalis agentis et Instrumenti;
nam principale agens oportet esse potius; quod non requiritur
in agente instrumental!." St. Thomae, Summa Theol·, II-II,
I65, 2adl.
.

66

USURY

gradually come to be considered the principal cause in
producing -wealth and human Industry, the instrumental
cause. The result of this perversion is that money has
become exalted and man has become degraded by the very
fact that money has come to be considered greater than
its effect, i.e., the production of wealth. The right
order of things demands that human industry become the
principal cause and that it receive, the honor, as
principal cause, which is its proper due: that it be
more noble than its effect. .Only in this way can the
dignity of the human person in economic society be re­
stored.3536

A popular fallacy regarding the doctrine of
usury is that it is intrinsically modified according as
the loan is productive or non-productive. This misun­
derstanding is obviously closely connected with an im­
proper notion of the character money has as an in­
strumental cause. Benvenisti seems to think that the
productivity or non-productivlty of the loan is the es­
sential point upon which the injustice or justice of
usury rests.33 In his pamphlet on usury, Belloc like­
wise has the same interpretation.3738 Pope Benedict XIV
explicitly condemned this view in 1?45, in his Encycli­
cal, "Vix Pervenit."33
.

The crux of the problem rest on the distinction
between two essentially different contracts. The first
is the contract of mutuum. The second is the contract
of partnership, or societas, as it was termed in Roman
Law.. Both involve the transfer of goods consumed in
use; the difference is that in mutuum the ownership of
the money is transferred with the money itself, while
35. Marltain has soma Interesting remarks on the consequence of
thia reversal of values in which money and human industry have
changed places so that the former has became the living or­
ganism and the letter, the mere feeder, in productive enter­
prises. J. Mari tain, Freedom in the Modern World, 127-128.
36. J. L. Benvenisti, The Iniquitous Contract, (London: Burns,

Oates, Washbourne, 19379, 2-14.
37. H. Belloc, Usury, (Landon: Sheed and Ward, 19319, 11.
38. Pope Benedict ΧΠΓ, Vix Pervenit, Pars Theor., 2.

USURY

67

in a societas the ownership pf the money is not trans­
ferred :
He who lends (mutuat) money transfers the ownership of
the
who
way
fer

money to the one to whom he lend» it..... But he
commits his money to a merchant or to an artisan by
of partnership (per modum societatis) does not trans­
the ownership of his money to him, but keeps it.38

It is Important to note that in speaking of transferring
the money St. Thomas is careful to employ the word
"mutuat" in the first case, and "committit'1 in the
second. This precision in terminology serves to show
that the two kinds of contract are essentially differ­
ent .
As we have already seen to charge a price for
the
when is a mutuum is usurious,
______ and
theloan
contract
in se. unjust. "What is the justice of charging for a
loan when the contract is a societas? St. Thomas an­
swers that since the lender takes a risk when the mer­
chant trades with the lender’s money, he can justly ex­
pect a certain portion of the profit which comes from
the transaction, just as if he made the transaction
himself.40 In the contract of societas how is the
character of a true partnership maintained? It is ful­
filled by the fact that in forming such a contract the
lender provides the capital for the transaction and the
borrower provides the labor. Though St. Thomas does
not devalop this notion explicitly here it follows
from what we have already seen of his theory that capitai and labor together combine to produce wealth, A
propos of this Marltain points out:
Granted, a sane theory of values, of work and. of owner­
ship, the mechanism of the contract of partnership or
co-operation affords a Justification in lav and equity
for the profits that accrue to invested, capital and. in
thia sense ve have Just pointed out that the capitalist
59* St. Thomae, Sunma Theol.,H-H, 78,2 ad 5.
ho. "....ita quod cum periculo ipsius mercator de ea negotiatur,
vel artifex operatur; et ideo sic licite potest partem lucri
inde provenientis expetere, tanquam de re sua." St. Thomas,
Summa Theol., H-H, 78, 2 ad 5.

68

USURY
economy is accredited to an Ideal type which is not ob­
jectionable or sinful In itself. But.In the order of

concrete reality It ie a vicious economy; In actual fact
this contract of partnership operates as a moneylending
contract and usury makes its appearance as the sovereign
mistress of the bourgeois world.41

In this last sentence Maritain is evidently re­
ferring to the modern failure to distinguish between
contracts of mutuum and contracts of partnership. It
is essential to the latter contract that the lender as­
sume risk along with the borrower; it follows from the
fact that in such a contract the lender retains owner­
ship of the money lent. The present tendency is to de­
mand a sum additional to the principal, whether the
venture be successful or not. In such, a case the lender
gets his increment win or lose, and thus assîmes no risk
In the transaction. In other words, the contract which
appears to be a partnership is, in reality, a mutuum.
This is apparently what Maritain refers to when he says
that "this contract of partnership operates as a moneylending contract.”

There could not be a greater mistake to think
that, in prohibiting usury in all cases, the medieval
theologians likewise prohibited interest. However,
when they spoke of interest they did not mean what we
do now. For us there is a quantitative difference only
between the two such that usury implies excessive interest. For the schoolmen there was a qualitative differ­
ence entirely abstracted from any considerations of
quantity. The formal distinction between the. two goes
further back than to the Middle Ages; a clear dlstlnction between usury and interest was made In Roman Law.
Interest implied.the difference in the lender's condition before and after making the loan (i.e., "id quod
interest"). In other words, it covered the damage which
the lender occasioned in lending money to another.
41. J. Maritain, Freedom in the Modem World, 128-129.

In the

note immediately below this passage Maritain remarks that in
medieval teaching a clear distinction was drawn between in­
vesting capital and lending money at interest. They are two
operations opposed even in principle.

■

,

i
I
t
>

USURY

69

Thus, if I should lend another one hundred dollars gra­
tuitously, and in the meantime had to borrow the same
amount· myself, paying five dollars for the loan, I
should be entitled to recompense on the basis of that
loss I suffered. The recompense was called "interesse"
and according to Roman Law it should cover not only ac­
tual damage but even loss of profit.*2 It la on the
basis of interest in this legal sense*3 that theologians
are led to justify loans by the various extrinsic
titles, damnum emergens lucrum cessans, ____________
poena conventipnalis periculum sortis and titulus legis civilia.

Damnum emergens is the loss which the lender ac­
tually incurs as a result of the loan. The example
given just above represents this kind of loss. Lucrum
cessans is the loss occasioned the lender by the fact
that-in lending the money he foregoes the profit he
might be able to make with it. Poena conventionalis is
the loss which the lender suffers when the loan is not
returned within the stipulated time. Periculum sortis
is the risk the lender takes of losing the principal
with the consequent loss to himself by reason of the
expenses he Incurs in trying to regain it. Titulus
legis civilis is different from the other titles in
that it does not jjistify interest on the basis of loss
to the lender, resulting from the loan Itself. It
•justifies it on the grounds that the civil ■ law does
not entirely prohibit usury, but rather permits it with­
in certain quantitative limits in order to avoid great­
er evil. This title is not mentioned by all theologians.

There was never any argument concerning the
legitimacy of damnum emergens. St. Thomas lays down
the principle governing this title very clearly:*
42. "£t hoc (l.e. intéresse) non. solum in damno, sed etiam in
lucro nostra amplectitur constitutio, quia et ex eo reteres
quod.Interest statuerunt." Codex Justin., TH, 47·

43. Cleary outlines the several special connotations the term
"intéressa" had tar medieval theologians. However, interest­
ing the point is to historians, it need not concern us here.
We shall take it in its generic sense to mean damage to the
lender and as including the five extrinsic titles as species,
p. Cleary, The Church and Usury, 93-98.

'λ

MBH

70

'

USURY

A lender may without sin enter Into an agreement with the
borrower to be recompensed for the loss he Incurs as a
result of something owed, to him; this is not to sell the
use of money, but to avoid loss. It may also happen that
the borrower avoids greater loss than the lender incurs,
wherefore the borrower may repay the lender With what he
has gained.
'

In the same objection from which the above text
la taken St. Thomas mentions the title lucrum cessans.
On this point he is not so clear. In fact, Cajetan re­
marks that "concerning this second principle there Is
some doubt because it seems false and contrary to the
Author" (i.e., St. Thomas).44
4546 The principle as found
in the text is as follows:
,
•
Γ
The lender cannot enter into an agreement for compensa­
tion for loss on the ground that he makes no gain out
of his money, because he must not sell what be has not
yet got, or what he may be prevented from getting in
4β
many ways ·

In this passage St. Thomas certainly seems opposed to
granting interest on the basis of lucrum cessans. His
argument is that, in contradistinction to damnum emer­
gens where the loss is actually suffered, the loss suf­
fered through lucrum cessans is merely probable.

Cajetan seems to think that St. Thomas contra­
dicts himself on this point. "....it will be shown
that this principle is repugnant to the principles're­
garding restitution."47 He is referring to a previous
article where St. Thomas treats of the obligations of
restitution:
A person may suffer loss in two ways: that may be
taken from him which he actually has and such a loss
is to be restored according to equal compensation....
in the other way he is Injured when he is prevented
from having what he was about to have; in such a case
44.
45.
46.
47.

St. Thomas, Summa
Cajetan, Com, in
St. Thomas, Sunna
Cajetan, Comm, in

Theol., II-II, 78, 2. ad.l.
S.T., H-H, 78, 2.
Theol., II-H, 78, 2 ad 1.
S.T., H-II, 78, 2.

USURY

21

the inflmrml -fl cat! on need, not he on the basis of equal!- .
ty, for it is less to have a thing potentially than to
have it actually and he who is merely about to have '
something has it’only potentially.40

Cajetan applies the principle involved in restitution
to the case of lucrum cessans. He shows that In lend­
ing there are two things to be considered—one lends
the money and also the gain from that money which is
potentially contained within It. Furthermore, just as
In buying and selling, It is lawful to sell a thing for
more than it Is worth In Itself, by the fact that It
may have a special value for the seller, so in lending
money it is lawful to estimate the money at more than
its absolute value, by reason of the value It may have
for the lender. Thus, one may demand a certain recom­
pense for the loss which he has sustained In foregoing
the gain from the money which he has lent. The recom­
pense here does not have to be equivalent to the loss,
for according to the principle of restitution, an amount
equal to the loss must be returned only when the loss
Is actual. To accept such a recompense is not to ac­
cept something In addition to the capital lent for the
use of the money;, it Is only to accept something for
the loss of the power for gain which the money has.
The lender can incur the loss of something already pos­
sessed in two ways iln one way, from the fact that the
48. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., H-H, 68, 4.
49. Cajetan, Comm, in S.T., H-H, 78, 2. Though I have included
this argument from Cajetan in which ‘he intends to show, that
St. Thomas contradicts himself In not allowing lucrum cessans,
I am not so sure that there is a real contradiction in St ■
Thoma. If we accept Cajetan*s argument for lucrum cessans
we are apparently brought around to the view that money has an

■

active power of Itself for producing gain. Cajetan says in
this same commentary that money has two powers: "potentia
pecuniae quia ipsam absolute comitatur" and "potentia pecuniae
ut substat industriae." This seems to be the same as the Im­
proper view of the trans-lnstrumentaS-character of money,
which was discussed some pages back.

,?
y

72

USURY
money le not returned to
such a case the borrower
Second way, he may incur
Here the borrower cannot

him at the appointed time. In
can be held to interest. The
loss within the time stated.
be held to interest. The lend­

er ought to take precautions lest he incur loss. Ifor
should the borrower incur loss because of the foolish­
ness (stultitia) of the lender.50

In thia passage St. Thomas is considering the
titles poena conventionalia and periculum aortis. With
the former there is little difficulty. In common with
damnum emergens it allows recompense for actual loss.
It is different, however, in that the loss is outside
the currency of the loan and results from a failure on
the part of the borrower to repay the loan at the
stipulated time.
St. Thomas quite definitely excludes periculum
sortis as a valid title. His reasoning seems to be
that it is unjust to force the borrower to recompense
the lender for his own foolishnes's. The grounds upon
which the theologians accept this title is that, in
lending to another whose credit is poor, the lender
risks the return of the principal. However, it is dif­
ficult to see, in such a case, how demanding recompense
for that risk guarantees repayment of the principal.
If the principal is repaid there has been no loss; if
the principal is defaulted; but only the recompense de­
manded is repaid, it is surely a slight consolation to
the lender. Economic factors by their very nature are
immersed in contingency and this existential condition
of their being precludes any possibility of necessity's
entering into their constitution. Consequently, since
insecurity is thé lot of mankind in the temporal sphere,
it is difficult to see how justice could demand that the
borrower be taxed for conditions which belong to the
very nature Of things in. the practical order.

St. Thomas seems to deny the validity of titulus
legis civilis. Unlike the other titles this does not
claim to justify a recompense for the loss incurred in
the loan itself, but rather for the loss which one is
50. St. Thanas, De Malo, q. 13, a. 4 ad 1H.

USURY

73

occasioned by the fact that others practise what Is for­
bidden to him, with the consequent disadvantage to him.
To the objection that the Divine Law had permitted usury
to the Jews and that usury is therefore allowable, St.
Thomas replies: "it was not granted to them as being
licit, but permitted in order to avoid greater evil."51
Similarly, of the civil law he says:
Human laws leave some sins unpunished on account of the
conditions of imperfect men in which many advantages
would be Jeopardized if all sins were strictly prohi­
bited and if penalities were provided, and so human law
allows usury, not believing it to be according to Jus­
tice, but only not to impede the advantage of many.52

Thus, St. Thomas argues here that, owing to the imper­
fect conditions among men, the daw permits acts which
are intrinsically evil. Such permission does not change
their essentially vicious character. The permission is
given only because some recalcitrant individuals act in
a consistently unjust manner. Only to protect the just
from being victimized by the unjust, does the law per­
mit such actions to all. Though it penults such unjust
actions generally, that permission does not remove the
unlawful character which such actions have for each
person.
It must be observed that, with all these
titles, if any one of them is interpreted in an abso­
lute manner and abstracted from all prudential deter­
minations, then the fundamental philosophical argument
for the per se injustice of usury becomes academic and
wholly futile.

JI. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., H-H, 78, 1 ad 2; De Malo, q. 13,
a. 4 ad 1; Sent., XU, d. 37, q. 1, a. 6 ad 1.
52. St. Thomas, Summa Iheol., H-H, 78, 1 ad 3; De Malo, q. 13,

CONCLUSION

The exposition of St. Thomas' notions on wealth
and money has showed how close he has remained to the
Aristotelian notions, and at the same time, how he has
made some departure. Apart from the interesting his­
torical questions which the comparison and contrast of
Thomistic and Aristotelian economic doctrines can raise,
there is raised the even more provoking problem of
methodology. Like all good commentators, St. Thomas is
content to explain what Aristotle has said. Consequent­
ly, it is not surprising that we should find St. Thomas
adhering closely in his Commentary on the Politics to
the Aristotelian notion of economics. Even when Aris­
totle merely implies that wealth-getting is the concern
of-the statesman as well as of the householder,1 St.
Thomas does not draw out the consequences of that im­
plication.2 What is surprising, however, is that in
the Summa, which represents his own thought, St. Thomas
does not mention the art of wealth-getting as belonging
to the prudence necessary to the statesman. In view of
the fact that he shows how necessary the military art
is for the ruler,3 his omission of a consideration on
the importance to the statesman of a knowledge of fi­
nance seems incomprehensible.
Though St. Thomas adheres closely to Aristotle's
concèption of wealth, he does add a refinement which
apparently escaped the Philosopher. Even though he
does not thoroughly analyze the connection between
scarcity of wealth, St. Thomas does indicate that he is
aware of the influence which scarcity has in determin­
ing the value of things. In treating of this considera­
tion St. Thomas departs somewhat from his customary
1. Aristotle,. Polit., I, ill, 9.
1258a 19-20; Ibid., I, It, 5.
1259a 34-36.

1256b 37-39; Ibid., I, ill, 20.
1259a 20-23; Ibid., I, It, 5.

2. St. Thanas, Polit., Lib. I, Loot. 6.
3. St. Thomaa, Sunna Theol., H-II, 50, 4.

/74

;■ .

ϋϋΗΙΙΜΗ·

CONCLUSION

75

practice of remaining close to the text of Aristotle.
He speaks of the increased value of things owing to
their rarity,4 and again he advises the prudent trader
to buy his goods where they are abundant and sell them
where they are scarce.5
Another example of St. Thomas’ adding some no­
tions of his own to his commentary appears in the case
of commerce. While he is explaining the Aristotelian
view of commerce, St. Thomas shows himself to be more
interested than the former in its various forms.6 How­
ever, his frank admission of the necessity for the
State to develop commerce-albeit under certain restrictions--is found in the De Regimine Principum.7 Further
more, in the Ethics Aristotle apparently uses commer­
cial transactions chiefly to illustrate how commutative
justice differs from distributive justice by showing
that the former is à kind of reciprocity.6 When St.
Thomas deals with commerce in the Summa8*he treats it
as something which is worth considering for its own
sake. He is not insensible to its moral dangers, nor
is he'1 unaware of its advantages when controlled by the
proper ethical standards.
St. Thomas' treatment of usury owes less to
Aristotle than do any of his other economic doctrines,
for his principal argument against usury, as well as
much of his terminology, comes from Roman Law.1011 If
St. Thomas shows any genius for original economic
thought it is in his treatise on usury in the Summa.
4. St.

Thomas, Polit., Lib. I, Leet. 7.

5. St.
6. St.

Thomas, Polit., Lib. I, Leet. 9«
Themes, Polit., Lib. I, Leet.9.

St.
Thomas, De Regimine Principum, H, Ch. 3Aristotle, Ethics, V, ▼, 6-16. 1132b 31- H35b 29.
St. Thomas, Sunna Theol., II-H, 77, 1-4.
There is an Interesting historical question Involved here:
Did St. Thomas get his notions directly from Roman Law, or
through some such medium as Gratianf Whether he consulted
primary sources or secondary sources la of little consequence
for our consideration. What is liq>cirtant is that Roman legal
concepts were the basis far St. Thomas* chief argument against
usury.'
11. St. Thomas, Siam Theol., H-H, 78, 1-4.

7.
8.
. 9·
10.

76

■

■ÇOTCTjUSION

"Where hla originality lies is in the synthesis of Aris­
totelian and Roman legal concepts of the question.

"What conclusion may we draw from a comparison of
Aristotle and St. Thomas on wealth and money? We may
observe that, whereas Aristotle may have been true to
the spirit of,his own epistemological principles in his *
discussion of these economic notions, St. Thomas was
not quite so faithful to thia spirit: the Angelic
Doctor did not apparently consult so much empirical
data as he might have in developing his principlea,
since moat of his notions derive less from his own ex­
perience than from that of Aristotle. This phenomenon
carries with it a suggestion for modern Thomists: if
Thomistlc economic philosophy is to remain true to its
character as the economia perennis, two factors must be
kept In mind. First, extreme caution must be exercised
in the uae of Thomistlc terminology. Second, modern
economic conditions have to be carefully considered be­
fore the application of Thomistlc principles can pro­
vide a solution for our problems.

LIST OF SOURCES AMD REFERENCES
PRIMARY SOURCES

Aristotle:

Ethics.

English Translation, by H. Backam.
London: V. Helneman (Loeb Classical Library),
1939.
Politics,. English Translation by H. Backam.
London: W. Helneman (Loeb Classical Library),

1932.
St. Thomas Aquinas:

Commentaries:
In Decem Libros Ethicorum ad Nlchcmachum.
Paris: Vives ed., 1875·
Politicarum. Paris: Vives ed., 1875·
In Librum Sententiarum. Paris: Vives ed., 1875»
De Emptione et Venditione ad Tempus. Paris: Vives ed.,
1875.
De regimine Principum (De Bege et Begno). Paris : Vives
ed., I875.
Quaestiones Disputatae:

De Malo, q. 15.

Thomas de Vio Cajetanus:

Commentary:
In Summam Theologicam. Hornae:
1891, II-H, qq. 77 and 78.
Opuscula Oecanomlco-Soeialia.
Mlssicnaria Dominicans, 1954.

Bllluart, ?· CH:
Summa Sancti Thomae, TTT
De Contractibus. Paris:

Bcmae:

Leonine ed.,

Ex Tÿpographia

PaIti»»

Corpus Juris Civilia (Justiniani, Institutiones et Decretales)

Band I and Band H.

Berlin:

77

.

Apud Weldemannoe, 1928.

SECONDARY SOURCES

BOOKS

Cleary, P. The Church and Usury, Dublin:
Defourny, M.

Gill and Son, 191^.

Beachesne,

Aristote, Etudes sur la Politique, Paris:

1932.
Laistner, M. L. W.

1923

Greek Economics, London:

J. M. Dent and Sons,

.

Maritaln, J.

Freedom in the Modern World, New York:
Ward, 1935.

Marshall, A.

Principles of Economics, London:'
1936.

Morey, W. C.

Outlines of Homan Lav, 2ed., New York:
nam's Sons, 1914.

O’Brien, G.

Sheed and

Macmillan and Co.,

G. P. Put­

An Essay on Medieval Economic Teaching, London:
Longmans Green, 1920.

Buras,

-----------

Economic Effects of Reformation, London:
Oates and Washbourne, 1923.

Seager, H. R.

Introduction to Economics, 3ed., New York:
Holt, 1908.

Smith, I.

Henry

Classification of Desires In St. Thomas and in Modern
Sociology, Washington: Catholic University Press,
1915.
.......

Taeuber, W.
Tawney, R. H.

Geld und Kredlt Im Mlttelalter, Berlin:
Heymanns, 1933-

Carl

Religion and the Rise of Capitalism, New York?
Harcourt Brace and Co., 1926.

78

ARTICLES

Beck, A. A.

"Usury and the Theologians,"
(1958), 78-89.

Sandoz, A.

"La Notion de Juste Prix,"
285-505.

Van Roey, E.

Zmavc, J.

Dublin Review, 205

Bevue Thomiste, (1959),

"La Monnaie D’Après Saint Thomas d’Aquin,” Revue
Néo-Scholastique, 12 (1905), 27-5*, 207-258.

"Werththeorie bel Aristoteles und St. Thomas von
Aquino," Archly fur Geschichte der Philosophie,
Berlin: (1899), *O7-*55·

79