Hesburgh Libraries
of Notre Dame

From the
Sergei V. and Marina P.
Utechin Collection

ft
r

Reprint from

THE

THOMIST
Vol. XXII,

No. 4,

October 1959.

THE THOMIST PRESS
487 Michigan Ave., N.E.
Washington 17, D. C.
(Copyright, 1959, by The Dominican Fathers, Province of St. Joseph)

7é>5
THE LIBERAL ARTS IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS
/—1ODAY there is a common tendency to identify the
I
classical notion, “ the liberal arts,” with another ancient
A notion,” the humanities.” To many the term “ art ”
suggests an ability which is “creative,” imaginative, free of
any rigid standards of objectivity or narrow precision. It im­
plies the intuitive, the emotional, the “ existential response ”
of the “ whole man.” The term “ liberal ” seems merely to
emphasize these connotations by indicating that the practi­
tioner of such arts must be open-minded, tolerant of discussion
and debate, generous and sensitive to the many facets of reality.
The term “ humanities ” has similar connotations. It suggests
an approach to learning which is. humane, which takes into
account not only the object to be known, but the subject who
knows and reacts to it.1
In view of this usage it is not strange that to many the liberal
arts seem the very antithesis of the sciences. Science, as it is
conceived today, connotes objectivity, precision, a rigid adher­
ence to the “ scientific method,” a complete indifference to the
“ human equation.” It seems an activity in which man is only
cerebrally engaged and which requires the exclusion of all
subjective overtones and of all interplay of individual taste or
intuition. The scientific work must be something which can be
repeated and retested by anyone trained in the technique.
While the humanities are concerned with the inner nature and
personality of things and of men, science is concerned only
with data that can be measured.
To be sure, some scientists have hastened to tell us that their
activity is creative, imaginative, free, and that it does express
the personal passion and style of the discoverer. But it is hard
‘For the contemporary view see David H. Stevens, The Changing Humanities
An appraisal of old values and new uses (New York: Harpe/, 185S).

2

THE LIBERAL ARTS IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

3

to recover this human element from the scientific work itself,
from which it has been rigorously screened. Hence, it is thought
by many, science can take on a liberal character only if it is
treated from the viewpoint of the biography of the scientist and
the record of his investigations, or in terms of the effect of his
discoveries on human attitudes in the history of culture.
Hence it is not surprising that today even those who take
their stand for the strengthening of liberal arts education
frequently find it embarrassing to explain why, in the traditional
list of the seven arts, the quadrivium consists of mathematical
subjects which today are considered exact sciences, while from
this list are omitted many of the studies which seem most truly
humane and liberal, particularly history, philosophy, and the
plastic arts.
Although this difficulty has been felt by many, it has seldom
been faced squarely. St. John’s College, Annapolis, and the
General Program at thq University of Notre Dame have
courageously attempted to include the study of the classics of
mathematics, astronomy, and music (the quadrivium) in their
plans of liberal arts study. In somewhat different fashion the
St. Xavier Plan of St. Xavier College, Chicago, has adopted the
same policy of fidelity to the tradition.2 But most schools
emphasizing the liberal arts have preferred to group the mathe­
matical subjects with the physical sciences, and touch upon
them only as cultural influences in the context of the literary
and historical “ humanities.” Indeed the present emphasis on
more mathematics and science, fostered by the defense crisis,
has appeared to many educators as the death of the liberal arts
ideal.
One of the most carefully reasoned statements of this rather
widely held position was given recently by a thinker who is
actively engaged in promoting and developing the humanities
in Catholic education, James V. Mullaney, in his article “ The
’ See The St, John’s Program, A Report (Annapolis: St. John’s College Press,
1955); The General Program of Liberal Education (Brochure) (Notre Dame:
Notre Dame U., Indiana); and The Liberal Education of the Christian Person
(Chicago: St. Xavier College, 1953).

4

PIERRE CONWAY AND BENEDICT ASHLEY

Liberal Arts in the Aristotelian-Thomist Scheme of Knowl­
edge.” 3 It provides us a learned and direct confrontation of
the current and the traditional views and will assist us in the
following pages to judge the case on its own merits.

I: What is the origin of the Thomistic theory of the liberal arts?

Dr. Mullaney begins his discussion by reminding us that
some scholars believe that the notion of the liberal arts is of
Stoic origin. Consequently the question arises whether St.
Thomas accepted this notion merely because he mistakenly
supposed that it was a part of the Aristotelian heritage, and
apologized for it as well as he could. A similar position has
recently been taken by Robert Brumbaugh and Nathaniel M.
Lawrence, Jr., with the difference that they believe the liberal
arts to be of Platonic origin.
*
Actually neither of these views is historically tenable. It is
true, of course, that the first actual listing of the liberal arts
as seven in number is found in the work of Martianus Capella
(fifth century A. D.), who apparently derived his enumeration
by omitting architecture and medicine from a list given by the
Roman encyclopaedist Varro (first century B. C.), and that
both of these writers were, in a vague way, Stoics.5 However,
both are highly eclectic writers, and the fact that they are
important in canonizing this list, does not mean that they
originated it, or that they drew it from Stoic sources.
Indeed, as regards the problem of the quadrivium, the Stoics
• The Thomist, XIX (1956), 481-505.
‘“Aristotle’s Philosophy of Education,” Educational Theory, Jan., 1959. The
authors remark (p. 51): “Ironically, his (Aristotle’s) authority has been cited
to justify notions he would certainly not have approved. The trivium and
quadrivium which repeat the Platonic optimism in their stress on form, are an
example.” By this they mean that it is typical of Platonism to believe that some
universal formal method is the key to truth, while it is typical of Aristotle to deny
that there is any such simple clue, since there are many types of problems
which require diverse and specialized methods of solution.
‘See R. M. Martin O.P., “Arts Libéraux (SeptJ,” in Dictionnaire d’histoire et
géographie ecclésiastiques, tom. 4, 827-843; and Friedrich Ritschl, “ De M. Terentii
Varronis disciplinarum libris commentariis,” Opuscula PhUologica (Leipzig: Teubner,
1877), ΙΠ, 352-402.

THE LIBERAL· ARTS IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

5

never showed much interest in mathematics or the mathemati­
cal sciences, which played but a small role in their moralistic
philosophy. The only Stoic writers who had mathematical
interests, of whom Posidonius is the chief, are precisely those
who had undergone strong Platonic or Peripatetic influences.’
Brumbaugh’s suggestion is far more plausible, since the
liberal arts are all referred to in one form or another in the
Seventh Book of the Republic (see 522 A ff.), along with the
notion that such arts form a via by which the student rises
from opinion to true philosophy. Certainly the idea that mathe­
matics, especially astronomy, is the path by which the mind
passes to the realm of intelligible being and true science is one
of the chief notes of Platonism.
Yet Plato cannot have been the originator of the liberal arts,
for two fundamental reasons. First is the plain fact that these
arts antedate Plato. Plato tells us himself that the quadrivium,
exactly as we have it but without that title, was taught by the
Sophist Hippias (Protagoras 318 E). Indeed, it is practically
certain that these four mathematical arts go back to Pytha­
goras, or his school.7 As to the trivium, the division of literary
education into a more elementary study of letters (grammar)
and a more advanced study of composition (rhetoric) was
pre-Socratie.8 In his lost dialogue, the Sophistes, Aristotle him­
self attributed the origin of dialectic to Zeno of Elea, and
rhetoric to Empedocles.8
A second reason why we cannot admit that the seven liberal
arts are purely Platonic is that this does not agree in detail with
Plato’s conceptions. It is well known that Plato strongly de­
preciates both grammar (as the study of the poets, Republic
X) and rhetoric (Gorgias'), and that for him dialectic (logic)
is not a liberal art, but is philosophy itself.10 Hence, at the
•Max Pohlenz, Die Stoa, Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung, (Gottingen, 1948,
2 vols.), I, 50, 281; Π, 105.
’See H. I. Marrou, A History of Education in Antiquity (New York: Sheet!
and Ward, 1955), pp. 46 S. and 177 fi.
‘Ibid.
’See Diogenes Laertius, VUI, 2, 57; Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Math., I, 6-7.
10 Of course Plato’s criticisms of rhetoric and grammar are at the same time an

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PEEERE CONWAY AND BENEDICT ASHLEY

most, we can attribute to Plato some influence on the liberal
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arts tradition, but neither its origin nor its present form.
The real question is what Aristotle thought of these liberal
arts which were the practice of the schools, and to which
different interpretations and classifications might be given,
Aristotle distinguishes liberal from servile studies on the
grounds that the former are not utilitarian.11 We know that
among the liberal studies he included grammar (reading, writ­
ing) , and the study of music, to which he says that drawing
might be added.12 Music, of course, is connected with poetry,
which in turn, like rhetoric and dialectics, is rooted in logic in
the strict sense.13 Hence it safe to say that Aristotle considered
the trivium as the basis of education, although for him the
tripartite division is not significant.
The problem of the quadrivium is, indeed, more difficult, and
here Dr. Mullaney may find some grounds for his view. Ari­
stotle does not attribute the same kind of importance to mathematics as does Plato, since for him ascent to metaphysics is
through physics, while mathematics is only a bypath.
Nevertheless, it is clear from Ethics VI (9, 1142a 19) that
Aristotle believed that mathematics has a role in the education
of the young and that it precedes the study of natural science,
In our present list of liberal arts there are two features which
are distinctly not Platonic, but Aristotelian: (1) logic is con­
sidered as distinct from philosophy; (2) mathematics as a
liberal art is distinguished from natural science, which is one
of the divisions of philosophy.14
appeal for a new and more philosophical version of these arts. Nevertheless, in
Republic VU, in the account of the ideal education, these arts are left in the shade,
and the emphasis is wholly on the mathematical arts.
11 Politics VIII, 2, 1337b 6 ff.
"Ibid., S, 1337b 24.
“See the first chapter of the Rhetoric and the Poetics, 19.1456a 34.1
“It is possible, however, that Xenocrates, Aristotle’s fellow pupil, may also
have played a role in distinguishing between dialectics as it is the higher philosophy
for Plato, and logic as it is a liberal art, since Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Log., I,
1β, attributes the tripartite division of philosophy into rational philosophy (logic),
physics (which included natural science and metaphysics), and ethics to him, and
says it was adopted by the Academics, Peripatetics and Stoics.

THE LIBERAL· ARTS IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

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The tradition as we actually have it probably originated in
the schools of Athens and Alexandria under those mixed
Platonic and Aristotelian influences which reigned throughout
the Hellenistic period. The Epicureans rejected the whole
notion, while the Stoics accepted it, but it does not appear
that the Stoics added anything to it of importance unless we
may attribute to them the conception of grammar as we now
understand it. The earlier grammar was an unsystematic sub­
ject, and the Stoics did contribute to its more systematic
study.15 But even as regards grammar we must recall that the
Stoics were only developing certain suggestions already present
in Peripatetic thought, which had a vigorous growth independent of Stoicism among the literary critics of Alexandria.16
This historical survey, therefore, indicates that St. Thomas
was not unhistorical in supposing that the liberal arts were
compatible with the Aristotelian tradition. Rather his problem
was to use the scattered remarks on the subject which are to
be found in Aristotle’s writings, and to give to the common
and eclectic tradition of antiquity an interpretation which
would be consistent with Aristotelian principles. We will see
that this is exactly what he did, and that he showed rare
historical as well as doctrinal tact in freeing this tradition from
incompatible Stoic and Platonic influences.
St. Thomas quite unequivocally identifies the liberal arts
with integral parts of the Aristotelian system. More specifi­
cally, he identifies the trivium of grammar, logic, and rhetoric,
with logic, and the quadrivium of arithmetic, geometry, music,
and astronomy with mathematics in the Aristotelian scheme of
“Pohlenz, op. oit., I, 37-63; Marrou, op. cit., p. 183, notes that in the Hellenistic
period there was a strong tendency for the literary or humanistic studies to overshadow the quadrivium. “I ask those of my readers who are Greek and Latin
scholars to decide: Is it not dear from the dassics of this era that Hellenistic
culture was predominantly literary in character and had little room for mathematics?
It follows that mathematics played very little active part in the formation of the
nund.”

** See W. Jaeger, Aristotle, Fundamentals of the History of His Development
(Oxford, 1948), pp. 828 fi., and J. E. Sandys, A Short History of Classical Scholar­
ship (Cambridge, 1915), pp. 30-52.

8

PIERRE CONWAY AND BENEDICT ASHLEY

a man’s progressive learning. Thus, in answer to the objection
that natural science and divine science should not be considered
parts of speculative science since they are not enumerated
among the seven liberal arts “ into which philosophy is
commonly divided,” he states:
. . . The seven liberal arts do not sufficiently divide theoretic [or
speculative] philosophy, but as Hugh of St. Victor says in Book
III of his Didascalion certain others having been passed over, seven
are enumerated, since in these it was customary first to educate
those who wished to learn philosophy. And therefore they are
divided into the trivium and quadrivium, “ since by these, as by
certain paths [or -uiae], the lively mind enters in to the secrets of
philosophy.”
And this also agrees with the words of the philosopher, who says
in Metaphysics II that the method of science should be sought
before the sciences. And the Commentator [Averroes] states in the
same place that logic, which teaches the method of all the sciences,
should be learned by one before all the sciences. To this pertains
the trivium.
He also says in Ethics VI that mathematics is able to be known
by boys, but not physics, which requires experience. From which
one is given to understand that first logic, then mathematics should
be learned. To this (latter) pertains the quadrivium. And thus by
these, as though by certain paths, the mind is prepared for the
other physical disciplines.1’
Having identified the trivium and quadrimum with logic and
mathematics in the Aristotelian sequence, St. Thomas, in his
exposition of the passage of Ethics VI which he alludes to
above, proceeds to sketch out the full sequence of studies fit
for a man:

The fitting order of learning will therefore be as follows: First,
boys should be instructed in logical matters, since logic teaches the
method of the whole of philosophy. Secondly, however, they should
be instructed in mathematics, which neither requires experience,
nor transcends the imagination. Thirdly, they should be instructed
17In Boetii de Trinitate, q. 5, a. 1, ad 3 (Decker). All translations of works of
St. Thomas, including those from the Summa Theologiae, are by the authors, and
are deliberately literal.

THE LIBERAL ARTS IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

9

in natural things, which, even though they do not exceed sense and
imagination, nevertheless require experience. Fourthly, in moral
matters, which require experience and a mind free from the pas­
sions, as is stated.in Book I. Fifthly, however, in sapiential and
divine things, which transcend the imagination and require a strong
intellect.18
Dr. Mullaney refers to this order as “ the proper sequence
of studies, according to Aristotle.” Actually, however, it is
not contained in so many words in the text of Aristotle, but is
rather in the nature of a conclusion drawn by St. Thomas from
Aristotle’s consideration of the various disciplines in relation to
the various stages in the development of the mind, in the
Ethics.™ That St. Thomas was quite committed to it may be
seen from the fact that he already sets it down in one of his
earliest works, In Boetii de Trinitate, in connection with the
objection that, in the order of the speculative sciences, mathe­
matics should be placed before physics, since it is natural for
it to be learned before:

. . . Mathematics presents itself to be learned before natural
science, since boys can easily learn mathematics, but not natural
science until more advanced, as is stated in Ethics VI.
Whence among the ancients the following order is said to have
been observed in learning the sciences: namely, that first, logic
should be learned; then, mathematics; thirdly, natural science;
afterwards moral science; and finally men should strive for divine
science. Therefore mathematics should have been ordered before
natural science.20
In X Libros Ethicorum, VI, 1. 7, no. 1211 (Spiazzi).
** VI, 1142a 10-20. Curiously, St. Thomas found it quite hard to find a text in
which Aristotle says that logic comes first! He makes use of the brief sentence in
Metaphysics II (995a 14), “ It is absurd to study a science and its method
(τρόττοί) at the same time.” Yet anyone familiar with Aristotle’s procedure will
be convinced that he presupposes a good acquaintance with logic on the part of the
student of any of the sciences which he treats. The only works where this knowl­
edge of lope is not taken for granted are precisely in the logical works themselves
(notably the Poetics, Rhetoric, Topics, and, if it is authentic, the Categories'), where
there is an avoidance of explicit use of technical logical terms, until they have been
first defined.
20 q. 5, a. 1, obj. 10. Some may be uneary about accepting the In Boetii de
Trinitate as expressing the true mind of St. Thomas in view of the fact that it is

10

PIERRE CONWAY AND BENEDICT ASHLEY

While granting that the universal (or scientific) teach­
ings of natural philosophy, which require for their colla­
tion experience and time, come to be learned after those of
mathematics, which do not require extensive experience, St.
Thomas in his response nevertheless states that natural things,
as sensible, are naturally better known than mathematical
things abstracted from sensible matter. Consequently, the more
abstract knowledge of the object of mathematics comes into
focus subsequent to the knowledge of the object of the phi­
losophy of nature, even though the science of the former is
then acquired prior to the latter.
The same order is deliberately set down again by St. Thomas
in the Prooemium of one of his final works, the Exposition of
the Liber de Causis (1269-73), by way of showing, from that
order, how man’s intellectual progress culminates in the best
attainable knowledge of first causes:

. . . Wherefore they (the philosophers) set the science of first
causes at the end, to the consideration of which science they were
to depute the final time of their life.
a) Beginning, indeed, from logic, which transmits the method of
the sciences;
b) Secondly, proceeding to mathematics, of which even boys are
capable;
c) Thirdly, to natural philosophy, which, because of the need of
experience, requires time;
d) Fourthly, to moral philosophy, of which a young man cannot
by a suitable student;
an early work, and that in commenting on Boethius, St. Thomas is quite obviously
trying to reconcile the views of a number of authorities of very disparate phi­
losophical character. A study of the texts collected in the present article, however,
should set any such fears at rest, since the most crucial points are repeated in the
Summa Theologiae and in such late works as the commentaries on the Liber de
Causis and the Metaphysics and Ethics. Furthermore, it will be noted that the
references occur in the Prooemia of these works where St. Thomas is not comment­
ing on a text, but speaking in propria persona, or in passages where he is expand­
ing the text with the purpose of incorporating his own special views. Someone
might reasonably doubt that Aristotle had any such developed theory of the
liberal arts, but this is all the more reason for taking this theory as that of St.
Thomas himself.

THE LIBERAL ARTS IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

11

e) Finally, however, they devoted themselves to divine science,
which considers the first causes of beings.21
It should be noted, in connection with the consistency with
which St. Thomas lays down what he calls “ the fitting order of
learning,” consisting of logic, mathematics, natural science,
moral science, and metaphysics, in that order, that this is not
exclusively the ideal order of learning for philosophers, but the
ideal order of learning for any man aiming at a liberal edu­
cation, an education beginning with the liberal arts and having
as its term the most liberal of all sciences, namely, divine
science or metaphysics. Who should aim at a liberal education?
Every man, as man, is oriented toward the goal of such an
education, to be perfected in the life to come, and where the
gifts of grace will more than compensate for any natural lack
of attainment. Thus, in the Prooemium just mentioned, St.
Thomas, previous to setting down the order of study leading
to the study of the first causes, or divine science, shows that
such a knowledge is indeed the end of man:

It must be, therefore, that the ultimate happiness of man which
can be had in this life, consists in the consideration of the first
causes—since that least which can be known of them, is more
lovable and noble than all those things which are able to be known
of lower things, as is evident from the words of the Philosopher in
De Partibus Animalium I (644b 32-34).
Now accordingly as this knowledge is perfected in us after this
life, a man is made perfectly happy, according to the words of the
Gospel: This is eternal life, that they should know thee, the true,
living God.11
For those who have not attained to such an acquired science
51 Super Librum de Causis Expositio, Prooem., no. 8 (Saftrey, 1954). This order
already substantially appears in Moses Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed:
“ Whoever wishes to acquire human perfection must first learn logic; then be
gradually instructed in mathematics; afterwards, however, in physics; and after
this in metaphysics.” (See M. Friedlander’s trans. London 1904, c. 34, no. 46).
12 Super Librum de Causis, Prooem., no. 5-6. The passage cited here by St. Thomas
from De Partibus Animalium is also quoted in Summa Theol., I, q. 1, a. 5, ad
1; I-Π, q. 66, a. 5, ad 3; ΙΙ-Π, q. 180, a. 7, ad S; De Anima I, 1. 1, no. 5 (cf.
note 04).

12

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PIERRE CONWAY AND BENEDICT ASHLEY

and wisdom in this life, the reward of charity will bring with it
its equivalent and more in the next: “. . . Nothing prevents
someone who is less good from having some [acquired] habit
of science in the future life, which someone who is better does
not have. But nevertheless this will be as of no consequence
in comparison to the other prerogatives which the better will
have.”23 .
Thus, to the extent that one is educated, one will, according
to St. Thomas, follow the sequence beginning with the liberal
arts connoted in the first two steps of logic and mathematics,
continuing on to the study of the nature of things in natural
science, which culminates in the science of the first causes, divine
science or metaphysics.21 Between natural science and divine
science there is found moral science. What is its role? It might
seem that moral science, especially in its most eminent branch,
political science, constitutes a terminus or a goal in itself, that
of the perfection of the active life in comparison to the other
goal which is the perfection of the speculative or contemplative
life, attained in divine science. This is, however, neither accord­
ing to the thought of Aristotle, nor to that of St. Thomas, for
both of whom the natural course of human life is not either to
the active or the speculative, but rather from the active to
the speculative. Thus Aristotle states: “. . . We are busy that
we may have leisure, and make war that we may live in peace.
... If among virtuous actions political and military actions
are distinguished by nobility and greatness, and these are
unleisurely and aim at an end and are not desirable for their
own sake, but the activity of reason, which is contemplative,
seems both to be superior in serious worth and to aim at no
end beyond itself ... it follows that this will be the complete
happiness of man. . . .”25 St. Thomas does not differ from
“Summa Tkeol., I, q. 89, a. 5, ad 2.
’* The continuity between natural science and divine science may be seen in the
division of the sciences given by St. Thomas at the beginning of his exposition of
the Ethiu, where he states: “. . . To natural philosophy it pertains to consider
the order of things which the reason considers but does not make—in such a way
that under natural philosophy we should also indude metaphysics.
(Z £Mie.,
1. 1, no. 2).
” Ethics, X, 1177b 5-25. (Oxford translation)

THE LIBERAL ARTS IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

13

this view. Thus, speaking of the relative merits of the intel­
lectual virtues of wisdom, whose object is divine science, and
of prudence, which reaches its highest state in political science,
he quite definitely makes the latter the handmaid of the former:

... It does not belong to prudence to interfere concerning the
highest things, which wisdom considers. Rather it commands con­
cerning the things which are ordered to wisdom, namely, as to how
men are to arrive at wisdom. Whence in this is prudence, or politi­
cal science, the servant of wisdom—for it introduces to it, preparing
the way for it, as the doorkeeper does for the king.26

Because of this unequivocal subordination by Aristotle and
St. Thomas of the active to the speculative, prudence to
wisdom, moral science to divine science, it is clear that those
curricula which, conversely, rank metaphysics as a kind of
prelude to ethics, can in no way claim to be following the
thought of the Angelic Doctor.
Π. St. Thomas is explicit concerning the liberal arts and their
functions.

Today, looking at the very broad way in which the term
“ liberal arts ” is used—as applied, for example, to what may
be designated as a “ liberal arts curriculum ”—one might im­
agine that the term is equally obscure in St. Thomas. Such is
not the case. As has been seen above, St. Thomas relates the
logic oi Aristotle, considered as the indispensable learning of
the method of the sciences before the sciences themselves, and
the mathematics of Aristotle, considered as the science which
one can most easily learn, to the trivium and the quadrivium
respectively. In the same early work where he does this,
namely, In Boetii de Trinitate, he continues, describing what
each of the seven does:
Another reason why these [the seven liberal arts, which are pre­
paratory to speculative science, rather than its substance] are called,
among the other sciences, ‘ arts ’ [rather than ‘ science ’], is that
they not only have knowledge, but a certain product, which is im*· Summa Theol., I-Π, q. 66, a. 5, ad 1.

14

PIERRE CONWAY AND BENEDICT ASHLEY

mediately of reason itself, such as to form a construction [grammar],
syllogisms [logic], a discourse [rhetoric]; to number [arithmetic],
measure [geometry], form melodies [music], compute the courses of
the stars [astronomy].21

St. Thomas also underlines the distinctive “making” aspect
of the liberal arts in the Summa Theologiae:

. .. Even in speculative things themselves there is something after
the maimer of a certain product, such as, for example, the construc­
tion of a syllogism [logic], or of a fitting discourse [rhetoric]; or the
work of counting [arithmetic] or measuring [geometry]. And there­
fore whatever speculative habits are ordered to such works of reason,
are called, because of a certain likeness, “ arts,” namely, the “ liberal
arts,” in distinction to those arts which are ordered to works carried
out by the body—which are in a certain sense “ servile,” in so far
as the body is subject to the soul as a servant, and man according
to his soul is free (liber) .2S
Since, therefore, the speculative reason makes certain things, such
as, for example, a syllogism, a proposition, and other such, in which
one proceeds according to certain and determinate ways, conse­
quently, with respect to these the notion of “ art” may be main­
tained__ .2e
Since it is evident that when St. Thomas speaks of the
“liberal arts,” he does indeed mean the logical trivium of
grammar, logic and rhetoric, and the mathematical quadrivium
of arithmetic, geometry, music and astronomy, it now remains
to be seen how definitely he identifies the nature of these
“liberal arts,” which are apparently not quite the same as
either the speculative sciences or the mechanical arts. To return
to In Boetii de Trinitate, it is clear that St. Thomas does not
intend to confer upon the “ liberal arts ” a status which is
neither that of speculative science nor mechanical art, but
rather to reduce them to one of the two, and this one is
quite obviously the former, speculative science. Thus the
“liberal arts ” are not in the position of being arts which one
somehow relates to the speculative sciences, but rather in the
” In Boet. de Trin., q. 5, a. 1, ad 3.
” Summa Theol., Ϊ-Π, q. 57, a. 3, ad 3.
** Summa Theol., Π-Π, q. 47, a. S, ad 3.

THE LIBERAL· ABTS IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

15

position of disciplines organically related to speculative science,
to which, for a special reason, the name “ art ” is attributed.
In effect, in the places already cited, St. Thomas unequi­
vocally places the liberal arts in the domain of the speculative
sciences. Thus, in the article of In Boetii de Trinitate in which
he justifies the division of the speculative sciences into natural
science, mathematics and divine science, one of the objections
he answers is that logic or rational philosophy, placed by St.
Augustine under speculative science, is not included in the
threefold division of speculative science into (1) natural science
or physics, (2) mathematics, and (3) divine science or meta­
physics. St. Thomas answers by saying that speculative science
is sought for its own sake, while logic, since it is sought for the
sake of speculative science, lacks that characteristic. Yet if it
is not a speculative science, nevertheless it ministers to specu­
lative science:

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. . . The speculative sciences, as is evident in the beginning of the
Metaphysics, are of those things whose knowledge is sought for its
own sake. But the things about which logic is concerned, are not
sought to be known for their own sakes, but as a certain help with
regard to the other sciences. And therefore logic is not contained
under speculative philosophy as though a principal part thereof, but
as something reduced to it, in so far as it ministers to speculation
its tools, namely, syllogisms and definitions and other such which
wç need in the speculative sciences. Whence, according to Boethius
in the Commentary on Porphyry, it is not so much a science as the
instrument for science.30

Likewise in the Summa Theologiae, logic and its accompanying
liberal arts continue to be placed in the speculative domain:
Ç

... Even in speculative things there is something after the manner of a product—for example, the construction of a syllogism or a
fitting discourse.... And therefore whatever speculative habits are
ordered to such products are called, because of a certain likeness,
"arts,” namely, the “liberal arts.” ...
Since speculative reason makes certain things, e. g., a syllogism, a
proposition and other such . . . therefore, there is found a certain
speculative art... .31
*· In Boet. de Trin., q. 5, a. 1, ad 2.
u Summa Theol., I-Π, q. 57, a. S, ad S; U-II, q. 47, a. 2, ad 3.

PIERRE CONWAY AND BENEDICT ASHLEY

Clearly, then, logic and the other liberal arts, while not attain­
ing the name of “ science ”—since they are not for their own
sake—nevertheless do find their place as preparatory to science
in the speculative realm.
The above justifies not ranking the liberal arts as speculative
“ sciences,” namely, because they are not for their own sake,
but for the sake of those sciences. It remains to be seen why
they are ranked as “ arts.” Here again, the reasons advanced
by St. Thomas are quite unequivocal: they all have a “ pro­
duct ” of some sort, which is the characteristic of the practical
sciences in general, and the factive, servile or mechanical arts in
particular. By virtue of this “ product,” the liberal arts, while
not being “arts” in the strict sense of the word, nevertheless
may be called so by extension. St. Thomas is careful, on every
occasion, to state that they, the liberal arts, are only “ arts ”
by extension—“ according to a certain likeness.” In order to
be somewhat alike, yet not the same, the liberal arts, and the
servile or mechanical arts, which incontestably merit the name
of “ art,” must differ in something, which renders the latter
“ art ” per se, and the former “ art ” only by attribution. This
something is the fact that “ art ” in the strict sense has a
product which goes out into external matter, while the “ liberal
art ” does not have a material product but a product primarily
in the mind, and one ordained to knowledge:
Now art directs acts of making which go out into exterior matter,
such as building and sawing—whence art is called “ the right notion
(ratio) of things able to be made.”32
. . . Reason acts with regard to certain things after the manner
of a making, by an activity which goes out into exterior matter,
which properly pertains to the arts called “ mechanical.” . . .3S
Now the order which the reason, upon consideration [of natural
things], makes in exterior things constituted by human reason,
pertains to the mechanical arts.’1
... [The seven liberal arts] have a certain product, which is
immediately of reason itself. ...”
“ I Metaphys., 1. 1, no. 34.
** I Ethic., 1.1, no. 9.
"I Polit., Prooem., no. 6 (Spiazzi). “ In Boet. de Trin., q, 5, a. I, ad 3.

THE LIBERAL ABTS IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

17

. . . Those arts alone are called “ liberal,” which are ordained to
science; while those which are ordained to some utility to be at­
tained by the action are called “ mechanical ” or “ servile.”38
From the above it is clear not only that the “ liberal ” arts
and the “ mechanical ” arts are distinguished on the basis of
their product, the one internal, the other external, but also
that it is the latter which are “ art ” in the strict sense—since
when St. Thomas defines “ art ” in the strict sense, he defines
the mechanical arts. In effect, even though the liberal arts
are speculative and as such, more noble than the mechanical
arts, which are practical, this still does not entitle “ art ” to be
ranked among the speculative intellectual virtues, along with
“ understanding, science, wisdom.” Why not? The reason is
simply that the liberal arts are not arts in the true sense: the
true “ arts,” the mechanical arts, constitute the practical intel­
lectual virtue of “ art,” while the liberal arts belong reductively
to the speculative sciences,

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... Whatever speculative habits are ordained to “products” of
reason of this sort, are called, by virtue of a certain likeness, “ arts,”
namely, the “liberal arts.”
Now those sciences which are ordered to no work of this sort,
are called “ sciences ” absolutely. Yet it does not follow that, if the
“liberal arts” be more noble, they are thereby more deserving
[than the “ mechanical arts ”] of the notion of “ art.”3T
Having related the liberal arts to the speculative sciences, as
St. Thomas so clearly does, one must clarify what it is, within
the speculative realm, which distinguishes the liberal arts from
the sciences. As seen immediately above, one of the characteristics of the spéculatives sciences is to have no “ work ” of the
sort which the liberal arts have. Consequently, by having
such a “ work,” or “ product,” namely, a syllogism, a discourse,
even a melody or a chart of the heavens, the liberal arts do not
qualify fully as sciences. Why should a work or product in the
speculative order cause them to occupy a lower rank? Need­
less to say, this is not because of any defect on their part, but
*· I Metaphys., 1. 3, no. 59 (Cathala-Spiazzi).
” Summa Theol„ I-Π, q. 57, a. 3, ad 3.

ΛΊ
18

JM

PIERRE CONWAY AND BENEDICT ASHLEY

rather because it indicates a naturally subordinate position;
they are not “ for their own sake,” but for the sake of the
speculative sciences.
. The speculative sciences . . . are of
those things whose knowledge is sought for its own sake. But
the things about which logic is concerned, are not sought to be
known for their own sake, but as a certain help with regard to
the other sciences.”38 The liberal arts may be seen, therefore, as
not being for their own sake, but being for the sake of some­
thing, namely, the speculative sciences, to the attainment of
which their ministerial works and helps are ordained. Thus,
as not being for their own sake, i. e., for the sake of their
knowledge, they do not qualify as “ sciences
as having a
product, they do qualify as “ arts ”; not however, as “ arts ”
in the strict sense of the mechanical or servile arts which serve
the body, but rather as “ arts ” reducible to “ science,” by
virtue of the purpose of their products; and which, therefore,
as serving that part of man which is free, namely, the soul,
entitles them to be called the “ liberal arts.”

Now the other sciences either do not have any work, but knowledge only—as in the case of divine and natural science—whence
they cannot have the name of “art,” since art is called factive
reason, as is stated in Ethics VI, or else they have a corporeal work
—as in the case of medicine, chemistry, and the like. Whence it
is that these latter cannot be called liberal arts, since such activities
are of man with regard to that part which is not free, namely, on
the part of the body.3’

IH. What of the ambiguous position of mathematics?
While St. Thomas enumerates the seven liberal arts which
constitute the trivium of grammar, logic and rhetoric, and the
quadrivium of arithmetic, geometry, music and astronomy,40
nevertheless it would certainly be doing violence to his thought
to assume that he considered all seven indispensable to their
function as aids to the speculative sciences. In effect, in the
” Cf. note SO supra.
" In Boet. de Trin., q. S, a. 1, ad 3. Italics added.
*’ Cf. note 27 supra.

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THE LIBERAL ARTS IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

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trivium, while grammar is necessary for all methodical com­
munication, and logic for all reasoning according to art, and
therefore for the speculative sciences, rhetoric, as concerned
with the contingent as contingent, particularly in human affairs,
is not ordained directly to speculative science.41 In the same re­
spect, while arithmetic, geometry and astronomy are necessary
for the highest science, divine science, to which all the other
speculative sciences are ordained, music is not.
*
2 Since the
liberal arts, then, in their specific function as ministerial to the
speculative sciences, do not absolutely require the presence of
rhetoric or music, it is plain that when St. Thomas is speaking
of the liberal arts, he is doing so generically, and not necessarily
of all seven. It is quite in line with this generic outlook, then,
that St. Thomas, when not describing the different “ products ”
of each of the liberal arts in detail, equates the trivium to logic
and the quadrivium to mathematics without further differ­
entiation.43 With regard to the essential part of the quadrivium,
astronomy may be reduced to mathematics (or arithmetic and
geometry) as being the organic and intended application of
mathematics in line with the attainment of natural and divine
science. Certainly, in the light of St. Thomas’ own usage, his
reduction of the trimum to logic could be taken quite literally,
41 "The duty of rhetoric is to deal with such matters as we deliberate upon
without arts or systems to guide us, in the hearing of persons who cannot take in
at a glance a complicated argument, or follow a long chain of reasoning. The
subjects of our deliberation are such as‘seem to present us with alternative
possibilities: about things that could not have been, and cannot now or in the
future be other than they are, nobody who takes them to be of this nature wastes
his time in deliberation.” (Rhetoric, I, 1357a).
43 “. . . The order of this science (namely, divine science), is that it should be
learned after the natural sciences, in which many things are determined which this
science uses—such as generation, corruption, motion, and the like. It should be
learned likewise after mathematics (i. e., arithmetic and geometry), for this science
requires, in order to know the separated substances, the knowledge of the number
and order of the heavenly spheres, which is not possible without astronomy—for
which the whole of mathematics is a prerequisite. But other sciences are simply
for its well-being, such as are music and the moral sciences and the like" (In Boet.
de Trm., q. 5, a. 1, ad 9). The idea that astronomy is needed for metaphysics
seems very quaint today, but see below p. 513 S.
43 Cf. note 17 mpra.

20

PIERBE CONWAY AND BENEDICT ASHLEY

in that not only is rhetoric not necessary to speculative science,
but even grammar would theoretically not be indispensable in
the case of a man living a solitary existence, and discovering the
sciences without oral communication or reading of books. On
the other hand, logic, as the art of reasoning, would be indis­
pensable, since, as Aristotle says in the beginning of the Meta­
physics,“ the animals other than man live by appearances and
memories and have but little of connected experience; but the
human race lives also by art and reasonings.” ** The need for
art in man’s life, and specifically the art of reasoning, is equally
stressed by St. Thomas:

!

As Aristotle says in the beginning of the Metaphysics, the human
race lives by art and reasoning, in which the Philosopher is seen to
touch upon a certain property of man wherein he differs from the
rest of animals. For the other animals are led to their acts by a
certain natural instinct; but man is directed in his acts by the
judgment of reason.
Whence it is that for the purpose of accomplishing human acts
easily and in an orderly way there are different arts. For an art
seems to be nothing else than a ‘ sure ordination of reason whereby,
through determinate means, human acts attain to a due end.’
But reason is not only able to direct the acts of the inferior parts,
it is also directive of its own act. .. . If, therefore, because reason
reasons concerning the act of the hand, the art of building or
carpentering was discovered, by which a man is able to exercise
such acts easily and in an orderly way, for the same reason there is
needed an art which will direct the act of reason itself, by means
of which a man may, in the act of reason itself, proceed in a way
which is orderly, easy and without error.
And this art is logic, i.e., rational science. And it is not only
rational because it is according to reason—which is common to
every art—but also because it is concerned with the very act of
reason as its proper matter. And therefore it is seen to be the art
of arts, since it directs us in the act of reason, whence all the arts
proceed."
Now, just as experience is related to particular reason, and
custom to memory in animals, so is art related to universal reason.
And therefore, just as the perfect routine of life for animals is

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THE LIBERAL ARTS IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

through memory, conjoined with custom arising out of training,
so the perfect rule for man is through reason perfected by art or in
some other fashion. Certain ones, nevertheless, are ruled by reason
without art—but this is an imperfect rule.

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But what if someone were to object that such an icily intellectual concept of the liberal arts, whereby one might maintain
that logic alone, considered as the art of going from the known
to the unknown, without benefit of external word arrangement
(grammar) or of the techniques of persuasion (rhetoric), would
still have the essential requisites that St. Thomas prescribes for
it as a prelude to the speculative sciences, seems hardly to
connote a “ liberal education ” in the sense of the education of
a free and cultivated gentleman-citizen? An answer to this
would require a closer look at the meaning of the word
“liberal” in the context of St. Thomas and Aristotle. It is
certain that the word is associated with “ liberty ’’and freedom,” and connotes as its subject a man who is legally
a “ free ” man and not a slave. And since the attainment of the speculative sciences supposes a certain freedom from practical cares, leisure and a sufficiency of worldly
goods arelikewise presupposed to a “ liberal ” life. However,
the end of a liberal education is not the cultivation of leisure,
but’rather leisure is. a means to an end, and that end is the
attainment of truth in the speculative sciences, and ultimately
in the highest of them, divine science. Thus the meaning of
liber or “ free ” which is implied in the “ liberal arts,” while
having the basic meaning of “ that which is for its own sake,”
in contrast to servus, meaning “ that which is not for its own
sake, but for the sake of another,” is not primarily fulfilled in
the purely legal connotation of the word, as meaning a man
who, whatever his state of soul, is legally free. Rather it means
" free ” in the more essential sense of a man who, while being
legally free, and free from demanding material cares, uses this
freedom to study the sciences that are free, the sciences that
are “ for their own sake,” namely, the speculative sciences, and
principally the freest of them all, divine science:
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22

THE LIBERAL ARTS IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

23

PIERRE CONWAY AND BENEDICT ASHLEY

in the ordering of the society he lives in for the good of all—it
belonging to the intellect to order.
In effect, the characteristic of being a free man, as one of the
prerequisites for acquiring the liberal arts as a prelude to the
liberal sciences, is clearly derived, in the mind of Aristotle and
St. Thomas, primarily from nature—legality can confirm this
freedom, but it cannot of itself constitute it where it does not
already exist. This is succinctly summed up in the statement
of Aristotle: “. . . Some are slaves everywhere, others no­
where.” 48*By this is implied that the status of a man as free or
servile cannot be genuinely constituted by law or the fortunes
of war: if a man is free by nature, even in captivity he remains
a free man. What is this native freedom based upon? It is
based, according to both Aristotle and St. Thomas, upon
intellect. “ For,” says Aristotle,” that which can foresee by the
exercise of mind is by nature intended to be lord and master,
and that which can with its body give effect to such foresight
is a subject, and by nature a slave.” 40 St. Thomas elaborates
upon this statement as follows:

That man is properly called “ free ” (liber) who is not for the
sake of another, but for his own sake. For slaves (servi) belong to
their masters, and act because of their masters, and acquire for
them whatever they acquire. But free men belong to themselves,
as acquiring for themselves and acting in the same way. Now
only this science is for its own sake: therefore this alone is free
among the sciences.
And it should be noted that this may be taken in two ways. One
way is that the phrase “ this alone ” should indicate generically
all speculative science. In this case it is true that this genus of
sciences alone is sought for its own sake. Whence, too, those arts
alone are called “liberal’ which are ordained to science—while
those which are ordained to some utility to be had through action
are called “ mechanical ” or “ servile.”
Another way is that the phrase in question should indicate
specifically that philosophy, or wisdom, which is about the highest
causes—since among the highest causes there is the final cause
[which by definition is that “ for the sake of which ” something is
done, while other things are done for the sake of it].47
It is dear, then, from the above, that the “ liberal arts,” taken
in their strictest sense, mean for St. Thomas the arts ordained
to the speculative sciences.
Would it then be foreign to the liberal arts to include among
them such disciplines as rhetoric, which is of no use for the
speculative sciences, and music (including the general matter
of poetics), which, unlike astronomy which is indispensable,
contribute only to the well-being of the highest speculative
science? It is plain that St. Thomas does not intend to exclude
them, since he enumerates them among the liberal arts without
any special qualification. How can one consider their inclusion
in a concept, which is dearly that of St. Thomas, of the liberal
arts as ordained basically to speculative knowledge? Concern­
ing rhetoric, the art of persuasion in matters over which we
deliberate, one would say that it is the art which befits a citizen
who is expected to take some part in the deliberations affecting
his city or state. Such a man is the free man who, while aiming
at the contemplation of speculative things, is nevertheless
equipped, by virtue of his intellectual capacity, to play a role

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"Ibid., 1252a 30.
"I Polit., I. 1, no. 19. St. Thomas inquires in the Summa Theologiae (I, q. 96,
a. 4) whether there would have been domination oi one man over another even in

471 Metaphgs., I 3, no. 58-59.

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. . . Nature not only intends generation, but also that what is
generated be preserved.
And that this, indeed, comes about in men through the associa­
tion of ruler and subject, he [Aristotle] shows through the fact that
he is naturally a ruler and master who by his intellect is able to
foresee those things which befit preservation, e.g., by causing
profitable things, and repulsing harmful ones. But he who is able
through the strength of his body to fulfil in work what the wise man
shall have foreseen by the mind, is naturally a subject and servant.
From this it is quite clear that the same thing is in the interests
of the preservation of both, namely, that the former should rule and
the latter be subject. For he who is able because of wisdom to
provide by his mind, meanwhile would not be able to be preserved
for lack of bodily strength, unless he have a servant to carry out
what he has foreseen; nor could he who abounds in bodily strength
be preserved, unless he'be regulated by the prudence of the other.50

·

24

PIERRE CONWAY AND BENEDICT ASHLEY

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The universal outlook that in every unity of order there is
an ordering principle and other elements that are ordered, is
basic with Aristotle and St. Thomas:

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... In all things which form a composite whole and which are
made up of parts, whether continuous or discrete, a distinction
between the ruling and the subject element comes to light. Such a
duality exists in living creatures, but not in them only; it originates
in the constitution of the universe. . . .S1

;
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To whom does the ordering principle belong in a human com­
munity? It belongs to the wise man: “. . . For the wise man
must not be ordered but must order, and he must not obey
another, but the less wise must obey him.”62 St. Thomas not
only approves these statements in the works where they first
appear, but in his Prooemium to the Exposition of the Metaphysics he uses them to show first that among many sciences
ordered to one end, namely, happiness, there must be one ordering, and then that this deserves to be called wisdom. Finally,
in order to decide which science it is that has the characteristics
of wisdom that makes it fit to rule, St. Thomas has recourse
to Aristotle’s statement that it is those men who excel in
intellect who are the natural rulers, to conclude that it is the
the state of innocence. St. Thomas’ answer is in the affirmative: there would be
dominion, not of the sort which is over slaves, for the benefit of the master, but
of the sort which is over freemen, for the benefit of the latter or of the common
good. Why should this second kind occur at all? It occurs, says St. Thomas,
because man is a social animal, living in a social unity, and in any unity made of
many there is invariably a ruling factor and those who are ruled. Further, this
redounds to the greater good of all, since if those better equipped by divine
Providence in knowledge or in virtue rule, those less well equipped will benefit
more than if obliged to shift for themselves. Clearly, then, St. Thomas, while
stigmatizing slavery, or dominion for the benefit of another, as a consequence of
original sin, does however envisage dominion for a subject’s benefit or for the
common good as a normal concomitant of man’s social nature, so instituted by the
Creator. It is this natural dominion which is envisaged by St. Thomas with
Aristotle in the discussion of the composition of the domestic unity in the Politic»,
as the form of the discussion shows. Admittedly, however, those who hold, the
facts notwithstanding, for an absolute, universal and unqualified equality among
men, would term even any voluntary, non-slavish, subordination of one man to
another for mutual benefit, " slavery.”
“ Politic», 1,1254a 25. Cf. Summa Theol., I. q. 96, a. 4, c.; In Metaphys.. Prooem.

” Metaphysics, I, 982a 15.

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THE LIBERAL ARTS IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

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most intellectual science which will merit the name of wisdom
and the role of ruler:

As the Philosopher teaches in his Politics, when several things
are ordered to one, one of them must be regulating or ruling, and
the others regulated or ruled. . . . But all the sciences and arts
are ordained to one thing, namely, to the perfection of man, which
is his happiness. Whence lit is necessary that one of them be the
ruler of all the others, which one rightly claims the name of
‘ wisdom ’—for it is the part of the wise man to order others.
But what science this is, and with what it is concerned, may be
considered if one will diligently inspect what makes one fit to rule.
For just as men excelling in intellect, as the Philosopher states in
the aforesaid book, are naturally the rulers and masters of others,
while those men who are robust of body, but lacking in intellect,
are naturally slaves, so that science should naturally be the regu­
lator of the others which is intellectual above all. This science is
the science which is concerned with the most intelligible things.53

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Therefore it is plain that the man who by his intellect is
able to tend through the speculative liberal arts to the specu­
lative sciences, is more fundamentally free than the man who
is only legally free. As free, he is a citizen in the state rather
than a slave.
Furthermore, since the citizen in the perfect sense is one who
takes an active part in the conduct of the city—a characteristic
most true of citizens in a democracy—and since this active part
implies a share in the rule, and the use of the intellectual virtue
of prudence or practical wisdom, not only will the free man in
the sense of the man of intellect be a citizen, but he will be one
naturally fitted to share in the direction of the city.54 It follows
“* In Metaphys., Prooem.
““... A citizen ... in the strictest sense ... (is one whose) special characteristic
is that he shares in the administration of justice, and in offices. . . . Our definition
is best adapted to the citizen of a democracy. . . . He who has the power to take
part in the deliberative or judicial administration of any state is said by us to be
a citizen of that state. ... It has been well said that ‘ he who has never learned
to obey cannot be a good commander.’ The two are not the same, but the good
citizen [in a democracy] ought to be capable of both; he should know how to goven
like a freeman, and how to obey like a freeman—these are the virtues of a citizen.
. . . Practical wisdom [i. e., prudence political or domestic] only is characteristic of
the ruler: it would seem that all other virtues [i. e., temperance, fortitude, justice]

26

THE LIBERAL ARTS IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

PIERRE CONWAY AND BENEDICT ASHLEY

then that the man suited by nature for the speculative sciences,
the man who by virtue of intellect is the genuinely free man,
will also play a part in the life of the state. The bodies of such
freemen, while not fitted for servile labor, are nevertheless
“upright, and although useless for such (servile) services,
useful for political life in the arts both of war and of peace.” "
St. Thomas explains this uprightness as follows: “. . . The
bodies of freemen should be ‘ right,’ i. e., well disposed accord­
ing to nature, and useless for such servile activities (as digging
and the like), as a delicate complexion requires; but neverthe­
less they should be useful for civil life, in which free men are
active.”66 As students of St. Thomas know, since all knowledge
comes through the senses, excellence of intellect requires a body
conditioned thereto—not in the sense that the excellence of
the intellect depends upon the body, but in the sense that
nature, when intending a good intellect, shapes a body appro­
priate thereto. This St. Thomas underlines in the same place.'7
Consequently, then, since “man is more of a political animal
than bees or any other gregarious animal,” and a sign of this is
that “ man is the only animal which she (nature) has endowed
with speech,” which is “ intended to set forth the expedient and
inexpedient,... the just and unjust,”58 the free man will have
the occasion to use speech in political assemblies, and therefore
the study of rhetoric, which is not only useful in political
science, but even occasionally masquerades as political science
must equally belong to ruler and subject” {Politics, ΠΙ, 1275a 20; 1275b 5, 15;
1277b 10, 25).
••Politics, I, 1254b 25.
“I Polit., 1. S, no. 70.
•T“. . . Since the body is naturally for the sake of the soul, nature intends to
form such a body as will befit the soul—and therefore it intends to give those who
have the souls of freemen, the bodies of freemen, and likewise for slaves. And
there is always this agreement so far as the internal dispositions are concerned, for
it cannot be that anyone should have a well-disposed soul if the organs of the
imagination and the other natural and sensitive powers were to be badly disposed.
But in shape and external quantity and other external dispositions there can be
found disagreement [i.e., a body externally not suited for the soul of a freeman]”
(I Polit., 1. 3, no. 71).
••Politics, I, 1253a 5, 15.

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itself,'8 will not be dissonant with a liberal education. This
inclusion of rhetoric among the liberal arts, corresponds with
the inclusion of moral science, whose chief part is political
science, in the order of learning, after natural science and
before divine science; “. . . What the rhetorician persuades, the
political scientist judges. . . .”60
Would an outlook which includes rhetoric among the liberal
arts because of the civic side of the free man’s life, likewise
find a place for music (and poetics in general), which, like
rhetoric, do not have any direct bearing on the speculative
sciences? St. Thomas states that music contributes to the
well-being, the melius esse, of divine science, but is not, like
astronomy, indispensable. In what way might it contribute?
To answer this question it would seem normal to turn to the
place where Aristotle treats ex professo of the role of music in
liberal education in the Politics, The meager hints on the
subject in the works of St. Thomas indicate sufficiently that he
accepted this view of music.'1 In the Politics Aristotle not only
includes music in a liberal education, even to the extent of
advocating learning to play an instrument in youth in order to
be a better judge later, but also assigns to it an explicit role in
contributing to the highest goal of the liberal arts, the speculative sciences. It dqes this by affording a fitting relaxation
from intellectual labor. What is said of music also applies to
poetics or literary studies, which were generally considered by
the Greeks as part of music, and which are grouped, as imitative
arts, with music taken in the strict sense, by Aristotle.®2 Thus,
.
·

■*
. Rhetoric masquerades as political science, and the professors of it as
political experts. . . . (Rhetoric is useful because) we must be able to employ
persuasion, just as strict reasoning can be employed, on opposite sides of a question,
not in order that we may in practice employ it in both ways (for we must not
make people believe what is wrong), but in order that we may see dearly what
the facts are, and that, if another man argues unfairly, we on our part may be able
to confute him” {Rhetoric, I, 1356a 25; 1355a 25).
·' Summa Theol., I-Π, q. 7, a. 2, ad 3.
“ See I de Anima, 1. 7, nos. 95 and 97; Summa Theol., Π-Π, q. 91 a. 2; In Psalm.
2, and 32; also the continuation of the commentary on the Politics, loc. cit., and of
De Regimine TV, c. 21 by members of the Thomistic school.
••Poetics, 1447b 15.

28

PIERRE CONWAY AND BENEDICT ASHLEY

in addition to the useful or necessary arts, concerned with pro­
viding the things needed for sustaining life, there are those arts
which accompany the pursuit of liberal things, things desirable
for their own sake:
... Our fathers admitted music into education, not on the
ground either of its necessity or utility (for the needs of life), for
it is not necessary, nor indeed useful in the same manner as reading
and writing, which are useful in money-making, in the management
of a household, in the acquisition of knowledge and in political life,
nor like drawing, useful for a more correct judgment of the works
of artists, nor again like gymnastic, which gives health and strength;
for neither of these is to be gained from music. There remains,
then, the use of music for intellectual enjoyment in leisure; which
is in fact evidently the reason of its introduction, this being one of
the ways in which it is thought that a freeman should pass his
leisure... .·*

It should be noted, of course, that the leisure here mentioned
is not simply inactivity, but rather leisure from worldly business
and preoccupations, allowing one to devote oneself to the active
pursuit of the speculative truth. This relation of the active to
the contemplative or speculative in human life, both of which
aspects will concern the liberally-educated man, as noted when
rhetoric was spoken of, is succinctly set forth by Aristotle in the
same work:
The whole of life is . . . divided into two parts, business and
leisure, war and peace, and of actions some aim at what is necessary
and useful, and some at what is honorable. ... There must be
war for the sake of peace, business for the sake of leisure, things
useful and necessary for the sake of things honorable. All these
points the statesman should keep in view when he frames his laws;
he should consider the parts of the soul and their functions, and
above all the better and the end. . . . For men must be able to
engage in business and go to war, but leisure and peace are better;
they must do what is necessary and indeed what is useful, but
what is honorable is better. On such principles children and persons
of every age which requires education should be trained.64

Music, and generically, poetics, while having their function
"Potitia, VID, 1338a 10. Italics added.

"Potitia, VII, 1333a 80.

THE LIBERAL· ARTS IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

29

simply for the sake of pleasure, as a remedy for exertion
generally, and also having their function in forming the passions
in the moral sense, are in addition singled out by Aristotle as
especially appropriate for relaxation in the leisure devoted to
intellectual activity:
. Amusement is needed more amid
serious occupations than at other times ... for he who is hard
at work has need of relaxation. . . .” ” It is very reasonable,
then, that the liberally-educated man, just as he should be,
in acquiring the art of reasoning, equipped not only for specu­
lative matters, but also, by learning rhetoric, for practical
matters, likewise should be, in acquiring the mathematical arts,
groomed not only in those directly related to speculative truth,
such as arithmetic, geometry and astronomy, but also in those
arts, namely, music and poetics in general, so admirably suited
to provide necessary relaxation in that speculative activity.
Supposing then that one is prepared, in the concept of the
liberal arts as introductory to the speculative sciences, which
is certainly the role explicitly assigned to them by St. Thomas,
to admit non-speculative rhetoric as an adjunct to the practical
side of a liberal existence, and recreational music and poetics
as an adjunct to speculative exertion, one is then ready to
confront what is brought up by Dr. Mullaney as an objection
against the whole quadrivium, or mathematics, as liberal art.
In effect, since mathematics is listed by St. Thomas himself as
the second of the three speculative sciences, which he distin­
guishes from the liberal arts, how can it at the same time be
equated to the quadrivium which is part of the liberal arts?
Needless to say, St. Thomas is not oblivious to this situation,
which he presents in an objection in the In de Trinitate when
he is speaking of the order of the speculative sciences. Thus
St. Thomas lays down the following objection:

. . . Mathematics presents itself to be learned before natural
science, for the reason that boys can easily learn mathematics,
but not natural science, until more advanced, as is stated in Ethics
VI. Whence among the ancients the following order is said to have
been observed in learning the sciences: namely, that first, logic
•‘Politics, Vin, 1837b 35.

30

PIERRE CONWAY AND BENEDICT ASHLEY

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should be learned; then, mathematics; thirdly, natural science;
afterwards, moral science; and finally men would strive for divine
science. Therefore mathematics should have been ordered before
natural science.”

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How does St. Thomas answer this objection? One might expect
him to say that while the liberal art of mathematics is learned
before natural science, the science of mathematics is learned
after natural science. But he does not say it. His distinction

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is not between science and art, but between science and the
object of science: the object of natural science is learned before
that of mathematics; but the science itself of nature is learned
after the science of mathematics.

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. . . Although natural philosophy presents itself to be learned
after mathematics, for the reason that its universal teachings
require experience and time, nevertheless, natural things, since they
are sensible, are naturally more known than mathematical things
abstracted from sensible matter.”
This answer makes no distinction between an art and science of
mathematics, but simply states that although one knows the
object of natural science first, nevertheless, because of the time
required, one arrives at the knowledge of the science of nature,
its “ universal teachings,” only after mathematics, which can
be grasped without experience. Is mathematics, then, learned
after logic and before natural science, a science from the start?
This is indeed what Aristotle and St. Thomas say. In effect, in
the passage referred to in Ethics VI, Aristotle speaks about
“ young men (who) become geometricians and mathematicians
and wise in matters like these ” “—and to say that one is
‘ wise ’ in a subject is to say that one has the perfection of it,
has the science. That is how St. Thomas understands it, saying
of the passage:
.. They become wise in such, i. e., attaining
to the perfection of these sciences.” ** When he alludes to this
passage in the In Boetii de Trinitate in the process of assimilat­
·· In Boet. de Trin., q. 5, a. 1, obj. 10.
«Ibid., ad 10.
••Ethics, VI, 1148a 10.
·· VI Ethics., 1. 7, no. 1808.

THE LIBERAL ARTS IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

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ing the quadrivium of arithmetic, geometry, music and astrono­
my to the mathematics ai the Ethics, he refers to the knowing
of the young in this respect as scire, “ to know scientifically
“. . . He [Aristotle] states in Ethics VI that mathematics can
be known scientifically (possunt sciri) by boys, but not physics,
which requires experience.”70
But if the mathematics which is listed as following logic in
the trivium-quadrivium sequence of the liberal arts is really a
science and not an art at all, why then does St. Thomas take
the pains to classify it likewise as an art, describing, to justify
that title, the various “ makings ” that are engaged in, such as
numbering, measuring, forming melodies, computing the courses
of the stars? The correct answer to this would seem to be that
the mathematics of the quadrivium, begins as the last of the
liberal arts and ends as the first of the speculative sciences.
In other words, the student first learns mathematics as an art,
and then when he now begins to learn things as sciences, the
first science he comes to know is again mathematics. Such an
explanation concords with St. Thomas’ description of the subjects of the quadrivium as arts, and his simultaneous statement,
together with that of Aristotle, that boys and young men can
attain to the perfection of these sciences—but have still to
attain to physics·.
... He (Aristotle) raises a question concerning this, namely, as

to why a boy is able to become a mathematician, but is not able to
become a metaphysician, or a physicist, i. e., a natural scientist.
The Philosopher answers this by saying that these things, namely,
mathematical things, are known by abstraction from the sensible
things about which experience is—and therefore, for the knowledge
of such there is not required a great length of time. But natural
principles, which are not abstracted from sensible things, are considered by means of experience, for which there is required a long
time.
As to wisdom, however, he adds that young men do not believe,
i. e., do not attain with the mind, sapiential things, i.e., metaphysical things, although they speak them orally; but as to mathematical things their essence is not inevident to them, since the
” In Boet. de Trin., q. 5, a. 1, ad S.

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PIERRE CONWAY AND BENEDICT ASHLEY

notions of mathematical things are of things imaginable, while
sapiential things are purely intelligible. For youths can easily
grasp those things which fall under the imagination.’1
From this outlook, then, the meaning of St. Thomas, who
lists the order of learning as logic, mathematics, natural science,
moral science and metaphysics, without any special distinguish­
ing of the first two from the latter three, is that one will first
learn logic as an art, i. e., how to construct a sentence, form a
syllogism, compose a speech; followed by the learning of mathematics, first as an art, involving measuring, constructing and
the like, and then as a science, i. e., by beginning to see, especially through the application of logic, why things are as they are.
Thus, through the constructions made in connection with the
right triangle of the Pythagorean theorem, and which have the
character of art, one is able clearly to show the role of those
constructions as a middle term—as known from logic—linking
together the square on the hypotenuse with the squares on the
other two sides. In so doing, one shows or demonstrates why
this must be so, i. e., one induces science.
In keeping with this transitional nature of mathematics,
involving a beginning as art and a termination as science, one
would not expect St. Thomas to cite it equally with logic when
speaking of the liberal arts. And, in effect, whenever St.
Thomas chooses to give an example of the liberal arts, or to use
one type of them as a symbol of all, it is invariably logic which
is named, as though it were “ liberal art ” par excellence. Thus,
in the Exposition of the Metaphysics, when speaking of the arts
which are “ introductory to the other sciences,” a designation
he applies in the In Boetii de Trinitate to the liberal arts in
general, he mentions specifically logic as though synonymous
with all such arts:
Since therefore several arts were found with regard to utility,
some of which are for the necessities of life, such as are the mechanical arts, while others are as an introduction into the other sciences,
such as the logical sciences, those artificers are to be called wiser
whose sciences were not discovered for utility, but for the sake of
knowing, such as are the speculative sciences.12
” VI Ethic., 1. 7, no. 1209-10.

” I Metaphyc, 1. 1, no. Si.

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THE LIBERAL ARTS IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

33

. . . When they had nearly everything which was necessary for
life, and those things which are “ for leisure,” i. e., for pleasure,
which consists in a certain quietude of life, and those which are
necessary for erudition, as are the logical sciences, which are not
sought for their own sake, but as introductory to the other arts,
then first did that prudence, i. e., wisdom, begin to be sought.1’

That logic, while being learned as an art, i. e., not for its own
sake—which characteristic of being not for its own sake, accord­
ing to St. Thomas, distinguishes it as ” art ” rather than
“ science ” (although he casually calls it “ science ” above
nevertheless) —need not then be learned as a science, may be
seen from the fact that its object, as a science, unlike that of
the other sciences, is not real being, but being of the mind;74
The teacher of logic should know it as a science, but the
student, who is learning it not as an end in itself, need know
it, so far as introductory value to the other sciences is con­
cerned, initially at least, only as an art. Since the object of
logic as such, namely, the second intentions of the mind such as
genus, species, subject, predicate and the like, have a uni­
versality comparable to that of the . being of metaphysics,7’ it
would seem under this heading to be best studied later, on the
level of metaphysics.
At this point, in connection with the relation of the “ liberal
arts ” to the “ speculative sciences,” and in view of the fact
” Ibid., 1. 3, no. 57.
. . The sciences are of those things which the intellect understands. But
the sciences are of things, not of species or intelligible intentions, except for
rational science [i. e., logic] alone” (ΠΙ de Anima, 1. 8, no. 718). “. . . The
logician considers the mode of predication, and not the existence of a thing ” (VII
Metaphys., 1. 17, no. 1658).
” “ ‘ Being of reason ’ (ens rationis) is said properly of those intentions which
reason finds in the things considered, such as the intention of ‘ genus,’ * species,’ and
the like—which, indeed, are not found in the nature of things, but are consequent
upon the consideration of reason. And such, namely, the being of reason, is properly
the subject of logic. But such intelligible intentions are equated to the beings of
nature, in that all the beings of nature fall under the consideration of reason. And
therefore the subject of logic extends to all the things of which the being of nature
is predicated. Whence he [Aristotle] concludes that the subject of logic is equated
to the subject of philosophy, which is the being of nature [or real ’ being] ” (IV
Metaphys., 1. 4, no. 574).

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34

PIEBBE CONWAY AND BENEDICT ASHLEY

that St. Thomas somewhat disconcertingly not only speaks of
the former as arts introductory to the sciences, but also as
sciences introductory to the arts,™ it is perhaps appropriate to
re-state the basic differences between “ art ” and “ science.”
Clearly, in the present context, St. Thomas does not intend
to separate the liberal arts absolutely from the speculative
sciences, since he refers to them as “ speculative habits,” and
does not distinguish them from “ science ” absolutely, but
from “ the other sciences ” or “ those sciences which have no
such work.” In effect, the distinction is made between the
liberal arts and the speculative sciences, not on the basis that
the former are arts which cannot be called sciences, but rather
on the basis that the latter are sciences which cannot be called
arts. The speculative sciences are those which because “ they
are ordained to no work . . . are called ‘ sciences ’ without
qualification.” They are not arts because these sciences
which “ do not have a work, but knowledge only ... are not
able to have the name of ‘art.’”” On the other hand, it
is not said of the liberal arts that they are not sciences, but
rather that they are arts—in a manner of' speaking. Conse­
quently it is not surprising to see them referred to either as arts
or sciences. At the same time it is extremely rare for the word
“ art ” to be used of the sciences, and particularly of the
speculative sciences, and when so used it is obviously intended
to contrast, not with “ science,” but with “ that which is not
art,” namely, the state of the reason before attaining to
universal knowledge, as in the statement, “ Now art arises when
from many notions gained by experience one universal judg­
ment about a class of objects is produced.” ” Returning to
the liberal arts, it is plain that they do not differ from the
’· For example, “ whatever speculative habits are ordained to such works (oi
reason) are called by a certain similitude, ‘arts,’ namely, the ‘liberal arts’ . . .
but those sciences which are ordained to no work of this sort, are called ‘ sciences ’
without qualification, but not * arts ’ ” (Surima Theol., I-U, q. 57, a. 3, ad 3), while
at the same time, “ the logical sciences ... are not sought for their own sake, but as
introductory to the other arts” (I Metaphys., 1. 3, no. 57).
"Cf. Summa Theol., I-U, q. 57, a. 3, ad 3; In Boot. de Trm.. q. 5, a. 1, ad 3.
’•Metaphysics, I, 981a 5.

THE LIBERAI, ARTS IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

35

speculative sciences in the respect that the latter have knowl­
edge and the former do not, but rather in the respect that while
the liberal arts “ not only have knowledge, but a certain work,”
the speculative sciences “ have knowledge only.”79 This brings
one to the fundamental distinction between art and science
deriving from the distinction between the practical and the
speculative, which are distinguished by their end. Both the
latter indeed have knowledge, but in the case of the speculative,
it is knowledge for its own sake, whereas in the case of the
practical, the knowledge is not for itself but for the sake of
something else, of some product.80 This characteristic of being
* not for itself,’ consequently, will be the basis for discerning the
role of the liberal arts with respect to the speculative sciences,
namely, that the former, while being ordained to the specu­
lative, are not for their own sake, but for the sake of the
speculative sciences, to which they minister. This does not
mean, as we have already shown,81 that the liberal arts are
practical, strictly speaking. Only the servile arts (arts in the
strict sense) are practical arts. The liberal arts are arts only in
a loose sense, and hence are practical only in a loose sense, i. e.,
in comparison with the speculative sciences which have no
artistic aspect. Thus, simply. speaking, the liberal arts are
speculative disciplines, but relatively, in comparison with
natural science, metaphysics, and theology, they have an instru­
mental character and are valued not for their own sake but for
the sake of the pure sciences.
‘ Thus, with regard to logic, since it· is not sought for its own
sake, but as introductory to the other sciences, it will have the
character of “ art ” even should one attain the very science of
” Cf. In Boet. de Trin., q. 5, a. 1, ad S.
•’“Theoretic, i.e., speculative (knowledge) differs from practical according to
end. For the end of the speculative is truth, as this is what it intends, namely, the
knowledge of the truth. But the end of the practical is a work, for even though
‘practical,’ i.e., the operative, persons intend to know the truth, as to how
it is found in certain things, nevertheless they do not seek it as the ultimate end.
For they do not consider the cause of the truth according to itself and for the sake
of itself, but while ordering it to the end of an operation, or applying it to some
determined particular and some determined time” (Π Metaphys., 1. 2, no, 290).
“ See note 76 above.

36

PIERRE CONWAY AND BENEDICT ASHLEY

logic, i.e., be able to show the manner of proceeding from
principles to conclusions with necessary and demonstrative
reasons.82 Because logic is essentially not sought for itself and
its very object, or subject-matter, ens rationis or being of the
mind, is not the object of contemplation, it will therefore be
taught as intended only when taught with the practical con­
sideration of its· use in the other sciences always uppermost.
While the “ reason why ” is the end of the speculative sciences,83
such knowledge is not indispensable to the concept of “ art,”
since the knowledge is aimed at the work, and therefore,
provided the principles are correct, one need not know the
“ reason why ” in order to perfect the work: it suffices to know
“ that it is so ” from experience of the art.84 The perfection of
the art, of course, implying the ability to meet cases not already
provided for in what one has learned, involves knowing the
causes.85 In the meantime it is possible in logic for one to
acquire certain general rules—such as the rules of the syllogism
—which enable one to analyse reasoning and show that it is
true or false by, for example, some comparison, even though
one does not know as yet why such rules should be effective.88
33 Thus dialectics as a science or as docens sets forth “ the mode by which one
may proceed through them [i.e., the intentions of reason] to showing conclusions in
a probable manner in each of the sciences, and does this demonstratively—and in
this respect is a science”; likewise sophistics “as it is docens transmits through
necessary and demonstrative arguments the manner of apparent reasoning” (IV
Metaphys., I. 4, no. 676).
. The knowledge of the causes of some genus is the end to which the
consideration of science·attains” (In Metaphys., Prooeni).
. . The architects of things which are made, know the causes. But those
. . . who perform the artificial operations . . . know ‘that it is so,’ but do not
know the causes. .·. . Those with experience [' that it is so 3 are not able to teach,
because they are not able to lead to science, since they do not know the cause”
(I Metaphys., I. I, no. 28-29).
’•“Now although someone may be able to act well without universal science,
with regard to some particular, nevertheless, he who wishes to be an artisan should
tend to universal knowledge. . . . For in all things it is necessary that one not
only know the singular cases, but also that one have the science of that which is
common—since perchance things will occur which are included under the common
science, but not under the knowledge of individual happenings ” (X Ethic., 1. 15, no.
2162-63).
„ .
,,
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.
“Thus, someone knowing the rules of the syllogism could analyse the following

THE LIBERAL ARTS IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

37

But supposing that logic may be termed an “ art,” setting
down as it does a “certain and sure ordination, whereby,
through determinate means,” one is able to construct a gram­
matical sentence, set down reasoning in the form of a syllogism,
write a composition, the question remains about mathematics
as an “ art.” Here, too, one starts by learning certain deter­
minate means whereby one is able to meet the problems of
multiplication and division, whereby one learns techniques of
measuring surfaces and solids. It is here also that, as the art
of mathematics begins to turn into the science of mathematics,
one is first able to invoke the method of the sciences learned in
logic, for the learning of the sciences themselves. Thus, know­
ing how it is a “ middle term ” which allows a “ predicate ” to
be predicated of some “ subject ” to which it is not seen im­
mediately to belong, one sees the “ middle term ” exemplified in
the constructions of geometry which constitute the “missing
link ” in the proving of theorems—as in the case of the con­
struction which is the middle term through which the squares
on the sides of the right triangle are identified with the square
statement, “ Harry Watkins must be very well off, since he belongs to the Athletic
Club—to which everybody with money belongs,” as an invalid syllogism in the
second Figure. (.Major: “ Everbody with money belongs to the Athletic Club
Minor: “ Hany Watkins belongs to the Athletic Club Conclusion: “ Therefore
Harry Watkins is one of those with money.”) Should one not be able to demon­
strate by a deeper knowledge of logic why this must be so, one could set the fallacy
in relief by showing its identity of form with some obviously false example, such
as the encounter between Alice and the Pigeon:

“ I—I’m a little girl,” said Alice (whose neck had now stretched above the treetops) rather doubtfully, as she remembered the number of changes she had gone
through that day.
“A likely story indeed!” said the Pigeon, in a tone of the deepest contempt.
“I’ve seen a good many little girls in my time, but never one with such a neck
as that! No, no! You’re a serpent; and there’s no use denying it. I suppose you’ll
be telling me next that you never tasted an egg! ”
“ I have tasted eggs, certainly,” said Alice, who was a very truthful child; “ but
little girls eat eggs quite as much as serpents do, you know.”
“I don’t believe it,” said the Pigeon; “but if they do, then they’re a kind of
serpent: that’s all I can say.”
This classic exchange from Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland could be set down as
a syllogism of the same invalid form as the example above: Major. “(All) serpents
eat eggs Minor: " Alice eats eggs ”; Conclusion: “ Therefore Alice is a serpent.”

38

PIERRE CONWAY AND BENEDICT ASHLEY

on the hypotenuse in the Pythagorean theorem. By the application of logic to mathematics one is able to begin to grasp in
practice the technique through which proof takes place, while
still dealing with relatively simple and uncomplicated elements.
Even when mathematics passes, in the learner’s mind, from
the state of an “ art” consisting mostly in techniques for getting things done,’ to the state of incipient “ science,” where one
begins to see the necessary enchainment between things, and
the relation of cause to eSect, does it still bear the characteristic
of an “art”?

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As has been seen, the characteristic of “ art” in the liberal
arts arises from two facts: (1) they make a product interior to
the mind; (2) they are not for their own sake, but are ordained
by means of what they produce to aid the .speculative sciences.
As regards the product of the mathematical arts, this consists
in “ counting and measuring,” as we have already seen. But
this counting and measuring need not be understood only in
the sense of the performance of calculations as in elementary
mathematics. St. Thomas tells us that it is peculiar to the
mathematical sciences that although they demonstrate conceming real subjects, nevertheless, they define these subjects in an
abstract mode by means of constructive definitions which manifest the essences of the subject through the work of the imagination guided, by the intelligence.” This mode of definition is
peculiar to mathematics and helps to account for its highly
deductive character, its great unity as a system, and its special
mode of verification by resolution to the imagination.88 This
•’"For geometricians discover the truth which they seek by dividing lines and
surfaces. But division reduces that which was in potency to act. For the parts of
a continuum are in potency in the whole previous to division. For if they were
all already divided as the discovering of truth requires, the conclusions sought would
already be manifest. But since in the first drawing of the figures these divisions
are only in potency, the answer is not immediately manifest . . ." (IX Metaphya.,
L 10, 1888).
··“... It is evident that mathematical consideration is more easy and certain
th.n either the natural or the theological [i. e., that of divine science or metaphysics),
and much more so than that of the other sciences, the operative sciences—and
therefore it above all is said to proceed diaciplinabUter fi.e, according to the mode

THE LIBERAL ARTS IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

39

constructive character is not restricted merely to the elemen­
tary phase of mathematics but extends to its entire scope.
Indeed it is more prominent in the most advanced branches
of mathematics where the entities dealt with are known wholly
through mathematical operations, which are constructions in
St. Thomas’ sense. It is just this constructive character of
higher mathematics which has made plausible the erroneous
views of Russell and the logicists who try to prove that mathe­
matics is nothing but logic.®’
As regards the ordering of mathematics to speculation, even
though mathematics be itself one of the three speculative
sciences, to the extent that it is for the sake of something else,
it retains the character of art. And mathematics is not for its
own sake in the rising motion of the sciences toward divine sci­
ence: its ministerial character may be seen from the fact that its
speculative aspects are not considered for themselves, but are
ordained to the concrete and to material being in astronomy
for the purpose of estimating the heavenly motions in the
progress towards the first cause. Mathematics terminates,
then, in this sequence, not as being known for itself, but as
serving as a means towards the attainment of divine science or
metaphysics. (One might say the same of natural science,
which terminates at the threshold of spiritual substances with
the rational soul,80 but there is already a certain continuity
of scientific knowledge, from discere, ‘to receive science from someone’] (In Boet.
de Trin., q. 5, a. 1, ad 2 q.).
‘‘In mathematical things, therefore, it is necessary that definitive judgment
(cognitionem secundum judicium) on a thing terminate in the imagination, not in
the senses, for mathematical judgment transcends the apprehension of sense.
Whence there sometimes is not the same judgment with respect to a mathematical
line as with respect to a sensible line—as in the respect that a straight line touches
a sphere only according to a point, which befits a separated straight line, but not
a straight line in matter (Ibid., a. 2, resp.).
** See Bertrand Russell, Introduction to Mathematical Phdosophg (London,
1919). For the subsequent criticisms of this thesis see Max Black, The Nature of
Mathematics (New York: Humanities Press, 1950).
’•“The term of the consideration of natural science is concerning the forms
which are in some sort separated, but nevertheless have their being in matter.
And such forms are the rational souls. . . . But how the forms exist which are
totally separated from matter, and what they are, or even how this form, i. e, the

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PIERRE CONWAY AND BENEDICT ASHLEY

between it and metaphysics or divine science, in that they both
treat of real being, while the being of mathematics is abstracted
—being able to be defined, though not to exist, apart from
sensible matter— 91 and one arrives at the separated substances
of metaphysics through the material substances of physics.’2
Consequently St. Thomas in his division of the sciences accord­
ing to the orders reason considers, includes metaphysics under
natural philosophy) *3
Furthermore natural philosophy, since it treats of objects
noble in themselves, namely, of the universe and of the human
soul, has a certain nobility from its object, and hence deserves
to be studied “ for its own sake,” although only secondarily in
comparison with metaphysics.94 But mathematics treats of
rational soul, exists accordingly as it is separable and able to exist without the
body, and what it is according to its separable essence, these things it pertains to
the first philosopher to determine” (II Physic.,’t 4, no. 375, Angeli-Protta).
ei **
. » . Of those things which depend upon sensible matter according to being,
but not according to definition, is mathematics . .
(II Physic., 1. 1. no. 3).
. The knowledge of these sensible substances is the way to the knowledge
of the aforesaid separated substances ” (VII Meiaphys., 1. 17, no. 1648).
Now to natural philosophy it pertains to consider the order of things which
human reason considers but does not make—including under natural philosophy
also metaphysics” (I Ethic., L 1, no. £).
Therefore all speculative science is good and honorable. But also in speculative
science degrees of goodness and honor are found. For every science is praised
because of its act, but every act is praised for one of two reasons: from its object
and from its quality or mode. For example, to build a house is better than to make
a bed, because the object of the act of building is better than a bed. But in the
same [act] with regard to the same object, the quality [of the act] produces certain
grades; since in so far as the mode of building is better, so is the building better.
Thus, therefore if science or its act is considered with respect to its object, it is evi­
dent that that science is nobler which is more certain. Thus, therefore, one science is
said to be more noble than another, either because it is of better and more honor­
able things, or because it is more certain. Now this is different in different sciences,
since some are more certain than others, and nevertheless they are of things less
honorable, but others are of things more honorable and good, and nevertheless they
are less certain. The reason for this, as the Philosopher says in De Animalibus XI,
is that we desire more to know a little of the highest and better things, even if we
only know them dialectically and with probability, than to know much and with
certitude of things less noble. For the former have nobility of themselves and have
it substantially, but the latter from their mode and quality. But this science,
namely of the soul, has both; because it is certain, far everyone experiences in
himself that he has a soul and that he lives by the soul, and also because it is

THE LIBERAL· ARTS IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

41

an object which has nothing of nobility. Quantity is only an
accident, and that accident which is most material in character,
and mathematics does not even treat of it according to its real
existence, but only in an abstract and imaginary fashion. Such
nobility as mathematics has comes not from its object, but
from its mode of great certainty and it is precisely this mode
which characterizes it as a liberal art, since its certitude is
based on the simplicity of its elements and its deductive char­
acter, and these are linked with its constructive mode of
definition.’5
In conclusion, then, when speaking of the relationship of
nobler, since the soul is the most noble among inferior creatures. . . . [Aristotle
says] that the knowledge of the soul seems to be of much profit for all the truth
which is treated in other sciences. For it gives notable opportunities to all parts
of philosophy. Since if we consider first philosophy [metaphysics] we are not able
to come to a knowledge of divine and highest causes, except through what we
discover from the power of the possible intellect. For if the nature of the possible
intellect were unknown to us, we would not be able to know the order of
separated substances as the Commentator says on Metaphysics XI. But if we
consider moral science, we cannot arrive at moral science perfectly, unless we know
the powers of the soul. And thence it is that the Philosopher in the Ethics attributes
each of the virtues to different powers of the soul. For natural science moreover it
is useful, because a great part of natural things have souls, and the soul is the
source and principle of all motion in animated things” (I de Anima, 1. 1, no. 4-7).
Cf. note 22. Of course for St. Thomas the treatise De Anima is a part of natural
science, as is dear from this same lectio.
’““Now the process of mathematics is more certain than the process of divine
science [i.e., metaphysics], since those things about which divine science is, are
more remote from sensible things, from which latter our knowledge takes its rise—
both with regard to the separated substances, to the knowledge of which we are
insufficiently led by those things derived from the senses, and with regard to those
things which are common to all beings, which are most universal, and thus most
remote from the particulars which fall under the senses.
“ But mathematical things fall under the senses, and are subject to the imagina­
tion, as in the case of line, figure, and such. And therefore the human intellect,
deriving data from phantasms, more easily receives knowledge of them, and with
greater certitude, than of any intelligence [i. e., separated substance], or even of the
quiddity of substance, or of potency and act and such.
“And thus it is evident that mathematical consideration is more easy and
certain than either the natural or the theological [i. e., that of divine science or
metaphysics], and much more so than that of the other sciences, the operative
sciences—and therefore it above all is said to proceed disciplinabiliter [i.e., accord­
ing to the mode of scientific knowledge, from discere, ‘to receive science from
someone! (Zn Boet. de Trm., q. 5, a. 1, ad 2 q.).

4

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PIERRE CONWAY AND BENEDICT ASHLEY

logic and mathematics, the headings under which St. Thomas
summarizes the trivium and the quadrivium, it appears safe to
say that even should these two disciplines attain the status of
sciences in the learner’s mind, they would still be classified by
St. Thomas under the category of “ liberal arts ”—since this
category is attributed to them, not because they are not
sciences, but because they are ordained to something other than
themselves, which is the characteristic of “ art.”
At the same time it is important to note that the sequence of
studies—logic, mathematics, natural science, moral science and
metaphysics—laid down so clearly by St. Thomas, is in no
way dependent upon one’s historical outlook upon the origin,
number, and function of the medieval “ liberal arts.” Had there
been no trivium or quadrivium, St. Thomas’ reasons for the
sequence of studies would still be the same, since he derives it,
not from the “ liberal arts ” of his day, but from his considera­
tion of the order of studies in Aristotle—to which order he
shows the conformity of the “ liberal arts ” system of his time.
Thus he is unequivocal that one must begins one’s acquisition
of science with logic, which shows the method of science, as
stated by Aristotle in Metaphysics II; then, since one cannot
learn natural science immediately, because one has to wait
for an accumulation of experience, one will begin the study of
mathematics, indispensable for practical purposes, and likewise
indispensable for a later ascent towards divine science, and
which, since it does not require experience, one can begin to
learn immediately. This latter decision is in line with Aristotle’s
investigation of the requisites for the acquisition of science in
Ethics VI, and it is precisely there that St. Thomas chooses to
spell out the order of learning in clearest detail, at Aristotle’s
words, “ Indeed, one might ask this question too, why a boy
may become a mathematician, but not a philosopher or a
physicist.” “ The answer is, of course, that it is " because the
objects of mathematics exist by abstraction, while the first
principles of these other subjects come by experience.” Since
"Ethici, VI, 1112a

St. Thomas, I. 7, no. 1208 ff.

THE LIBERAL ARTS IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

43

the knowledge of metaphysics is derived from that of physics,
the knowledge of separated substances from that of sensible
substances, natural science will precede divine science. But
what of moral science? Like natural science, it too requires
experience.®7 But it requires something more than experience
also, namely, control over the passions.98 Thus moral science
requires the time necessary for natural science and more be­
sides. Why then is it not placed absolutely last, after meta­
physics? The reason for this is simple: moral science, as per­
fected in prudence, both personal and communal, is ordained to
divine science or wisdom, and not conversely.99 Consequently,
moral science will follow natural science and precede meta­
physics'. practical wisdom is subordinated to speculative
wisdom.
The presence of moral science in the sequence of disciplines
which are either ordered to, or actually are, speculative science
" “. . . A youth does not have knowledge of those things which pertain to moral
science, which are above all known through experience. Now a youth is inexperi­
enced in the activities of human life because of the shortness of time—and never­
theless the arguments of moral science proceed from those things which pertain to
the acts of human life, and also are of those acts. For example, if it should be
said that the liberal man keeps less for himself, and gives more to others, this the
youth, because of inexperience, might perchance not judge to be true—and likewise
in other civic things. Whence it is evident that a youth is not a fitting hearer of
political science” (I Ethic., 1. 3, no. 38).
** “ The end of this science is not knowledge alone. . . . Rather, the end of this
science is human action, as it is of all the practical sciences. But those do not
arrive at virtuous actions who follow their passions. And thus there is no difference
with respect to this whether the hearer of this science be a youth in age, or a youth
in behavior. For just as a youth in age fails from the end of this science which is
knowledge, so he who is a youth in behavior fails from the end which is action . . .”
(find., no. 40).
·’ “ Since prudence is of human things, while wisdom is of the highest cause, * it is
impossible that prudence be a greater virtue than wisdom unless,’ as it is stated,
‘man were the greatest thing in the world’ [referring to Aristotle’s statement,
*. . . It would be strange to think that the art of politics, or practical wisdom, is
the best knowledge, since man is not the best thing in the world’ (Ethics., VI,
1141a 20)]. . . . Prudence commands concerning those things which are ordered
to wisdom, namely, as to how men may arrive at wisdom, whence in this respect
prudence, or political science, is the handmaid of wisdom: for it introduces to it,
preparing the way for it, as the doorkeeper to the king” (Summa Theol., Ι-Π,
q. 66, a. S, ad 1).

Μ·

44

PIERRE CONWAY AND BENEDICT ASHLEY

raises the question of the nature of the education set down by
St. Thomas in his “ order of learning.” Is it purely speculative,
or is it a mixture of the speculative and the practical? This
question already arose from the presence of the non-speculative
rhetoric in the trivium. At that time it was noted that the free
or liberal man of Aristotle and St. Thomas, since he was so
basically by intellectual disposition, and since it was intellect
and its accompanying power to order which made man natural­
ly able to direct and provide, was naturally fitted to play a
directive role in that unity of order for the common good which
is society. The inclusion of moral science in the “order of
learning” corresponds to the need for the liberally-educated
man to be able to play his proper part in the striving for the
common good: he must not only have the practice of virtue
but he must also have the science of virtue, or moral science,
in order to be able to recognize and foster civic or legislative
steps towards virtue, in which the common good of the com­
munity lies.100
This of course implies that the moral science listed in the
“ order of learning ” is not solely for the personal fostering of
virtue in oneself, but also for the sake of giving one the “ reason
why ” of virtue so that one may promote it intelligently in
connection with the common good. In effect, the actual 'practice
of virtue is already presupposed as being the result of habits
inculcated from childhood. St. Thomas does not list moral
science as intended to free the mind from the passions, but as
already presupposing this freedom, attained by the actual
practice of temperance, fortitude and justice.101 Thus the moral
,M“. . . He [Aristotle] shows towards what the city is ordained: for it was first
made for the sake of living, in order that, namely, men might sufficiently find
wherewith they might live—but from its existence there came about that men
not only should live, but live well, in so far as through the laws of the city the life
Of man is ordained to the virtues
**
(I Polii., 1. 1, no. SI).
1,1 *· jje [Aristotle] shows how the hearer of such things [i. e, of moral science]
must be disposed. And he states that since in moral things we must begin from
those things which are more known as to us, i. e., from certam effects which have
been considered in connection with human actions, it is necessary that he who
wishes to be an adequate hearer of moral science, be brought up and exercised in

THE LIBERAL ARTS IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

45

virtues precede the intellectual virtues, so far as the practice
of them is concerned.102 What the liberally-educated man who

is to play his role as a citizen, that is, as one who takes a part

in the direction of the city, needs, is that intellectual virtue
which is directive of the moral virtues, namely, prudence, not
only personal, but domestic and civil, and this is what he is
now intended to acquire in

moral science.103

the customs of human life, i. e., concerning external goods and just things—that is,
of the works of the virtues, and universally of all civic things. . . . For it is
necessary to take as a principle in moral things that it is thus. Which indeed is
received from experience and custom—for example, that concupiscences are over­
come by abstinence ” (I Ethic., 1. 4, no. 53).
“’Aristotle, in the Ethics, first treats of the moral virtues, then the intellectual
virtues, “and the reason for the order is that the moral virtues are more known
(to us] and through them we are disposed for the intellectual” (II Ethic., 1. I,
no. 845).
. . He [Aristotle] states that there is a certain rule according to which
someone rules, not as a master over slaves, but as over free men, and his equals.
And this is civil [democratic] rule, according to which now these, now others axe
raised to rule. ... It is necessary that he who is a good citizen absolutely, know
how to rule and how to be subject to rule. . . . The virtue of the ruler, properly
speaking, is prudence, which is directive and governing. But the other moral
virtues, whose notion consists in being governed and subjected, are common to
subjects and rulers . . .” (Ill Polit., I. 3, nos. 374, 876). "... If anyone should
Irish by bis care to make men better, whether many or few, he should endeavor
to arrive at the universal science of those things by which one is made good, i. e., .
to be a lawmaker, and know the art by which laws are made well—since through
laws we are made good . . .” (X Ethic., 1. 15, no. 2163).
. Prudence and politics
are the same habit according to substance, since both are the right reason of
things which may be done with respect to human goods or evils; but they differ
according to their reason for being. For prudence [in the restricted sense] is the
right reason of things which may be done concerning the goods or evils of one
man, t. e., of oneself. But politics is about the goods and evils of the whole civic
multitude. ... All [the different types of prudence in the extended sense, such
as personal prudence, domestic prudence, political prudence] are species of prudence
in so far as they do not consist in reason alone, but have something in the appetite.
For to the extent that they are in reason alone, they are called certain practical
sciences, namely, ' ethics,’ ' economics,’ and * politics.’ One should also consider that
since the whole is more primary than the part, and consequently the city than
the household, and the household than one man, it is necessary that political
prudence be more primary than economic, and the latter than that which is
directive of oneself. Whence lawgiving is more primary among the parts of politics
and absolutely the most important in human affairs” (Ibid., VI, I. 7, nos. 1196,
1200-01). That the liberally-educated man in his moral science—which is useless
unless accompanied by will and action, making it prudence—should aim at that

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PIERRE CONWAY AND BENEDICT ASHLEY

From all of this one may see the position of the fivefold
“ order of learning ” in the educational concept of St. Thomas.
Starting from the very beginning of things, and following the
order of nature, there is first the care of the body, in children,
before the soul—although simultaneously in the supernatural
order both body and soul must be reborn in baptism. Subse­
quently, as the’soul awakes, the moral virtues, dealing with
sense appetites, are fostered by training, awaiting the awaken­
ing of the intellectual virtues. With regard to the intellectual
virtues, supposed as resting upon good moral practice, one
begins first with training the mind itself to the art of thinking
or logic, as a prelude to the mastery of all the other arts and
sciences “ ordered to one thing, namely, the perfection of man,
which is his happiness.” Of these, the first in order, mathe­
matics, is unquestionably practical as well as speculative. The
same may be said of natural science since, although it leads
naturally to metaphysics, nevertheless all practical inventions
are also derived from it. Among the intellectual virtues there
is also that one which is specifically practical, namely, prudence,
obtained by the combination of the knowledge of moral science
with a right will and the remainder of the moral virtues, and
which equips a man, now mature, to direct intelligently his
own life and also that of the community. Finally, this sequence
is kept in its true direction by the reservation of the ultimate
position to divine science or metaphysics, the “philosophical
theology,” subordinated only to the “theology of Sacred
Scripture,”501 ordered to man‘s ultimate end, the knowledge
of God.
This basic sequence of studies is plainly set down by St.
Thomas as following the very nature of things for man. It
tends to a speculative end, because such is the nature of man:
most honorable aspect of it, political science, which is proper to enery citizen in a
democracy, since all are called upon to share in the rule, is evident from the fact
that the young man being considered by Aristotle and St. Thomas with regard to
moral teienct (following upon previous moral practice) is referred to as a “ hearer
of political science ” (cf. note S7 tupra).
*** Cf. I» Boet. de Trm., q. 5, a. 4, c. fin.

THE LIBERAL ARTS IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

47

As the Philosopher says in Ethics X, the final happiness of man
consists in the best operation of man, which is of the supreme power,
namely, the intellect, with respect to the best intelligible thing.108

Perhaps all cannot attain to such speculative knowledge, but
everyone can begin, and reap benefits from logical training for
reading, writing, thinking, and expression; then if one can
learn anything, one can learn some practical mathematics;
subsequently, if one cannot advance in natural science specu­
latively, one can always convert the movement from specula­
tive science to practical art at any point along the road. Finally,
for those who do not arrive at acquired prudence and wisdom,
there are always infused prudence and wisdom which can more
than compensate—but this does not excuse those who can
develop the acquired habits also, from trying. At the same
time, one cannot help but note that in this time of urgency
when it is scientific method, natural science, mathematics, social
science which are being recommended as most necessary and
most timely, these are precisely what an education would have
that followed St. Thomas.

TV The doctrine of St. Thomas and the divergent views.
We are now in a better position to compare this very rich and
beautifully articulated theory of the liberal arts found in the
works of St. Thomas, with current theories.
The chief preoccupation of current educators favorable to the
liberal arts seems to be to introduce the “ humanities,’’ under­
stood as literature, philosophy, and art, grouped around history,
as the core of the liberal arts curriculum—specifically as replac­
ing the quadrivium of tradition. To these some would add
metaphysics and theology, provided that the latter be taught
in a “ humanistic fashion.”108 As Dr. Mullaney puts it, there is
a widespread “ feeling among administrators,” that “ mathe­
matics and science [which he identifies with the traditional
1,5 In Librum de Cauiit, Prooem, prin.
1M See Gustave Weigel, S.
“ The Meaning of Sacral Doctrine in the College,”
in Gerard S. Sloyan, Shaping the Christian Menage (New York: Macmillan, 1958).

>ni

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PIERRE CONWAY AND BENEDICT ASHLEY

quadrivium} are science and not art,” along with the simultane­
ous feeling that the desired and needed liberal art subjects are
“ history and literature; or, if they are particularly enlightened,
they will even say ‘ history, literature and philosophy or they
may even be more accurate and say ‘ cultural studies,’ or ‘ the
humanitiès.’” This "feeling anticipated intellectual analysis,
as it often does.”101 In effect, it appears that it is the practical
need for the inclusion of more of the “ humanities ” or “ cultural
studies,” in the face of a widespread educational indifference to
liberal education, which is causing some Thomists to abandon
the traditional theory of the liberal arts, in hopes of discovering
a more persuasive approach.
The following lines will be devoted to, first, the cited author’s
objections against St. Thomas’ doctrine; then, his realignment
thereof; lastly, the position of the “ humanities.”

A. Objections against St. Thomas’ doctrine on the liberal arts.
The current objections against the liberal arts, enumerated
By St. Thomas in the In Boetii de Trinitate (q. 5, a. 1)
as logic, comprising the trivium of grammar, logic and
rhetoric;108 and mathematics, comprising the quadrivium of
arithmetic, geometry, music and astronomy, may be summed
up succinctly in the proposition: These liberal arts, particularly
the quadrivium, are never arts and sometimes sciences.
As Dr. Mullaney expresses it, they are not arts, because “ art
is productive knowledge, a making which passes into external
matter, as in the useful or fine arts ” (p.· 24J), and this is not
true of any of the “ liberal arts.” Some of them, however, are
1βτ J. V. Mullaney, op. cit., pp. 503-4.
loe These three are described by St. Thomas (cL ad 3) as ** forming a construo·
tion, syllogisms and discourse
*
9 The first, implying the process of grammatical
construction, plainly corresponds to our idea of ‘grammar’; the last, implying the
art of composing a speech, writing a composition, quite easily corresponds to a
contemporary ‘composition and rhetoric
*
course; the second, centering on the
syllogism, would correspond to a ‘ logic * course embracing at least formal logic.
St. Thomas would certainly consider such a course as aiming ultimately at the
whole Organon and thereby comprising demonstration, dialectics, rhetoric and
poetics. Such a concept of logic, with grammar understood as a necessary pre­
requisite, would thus be identical with the whole trivium.

THE LIBERAL ARTS IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

49

science. Thus, in the quadrivium, “ two of the arts (arithmetic
and geometry) are instances of (the science of) mathematics,
and the remaining two (astronomy and music) are instances of
physical science ” (p. 25 ). Because of this, “ there is simply
no subject matter proper to the quadrivium ” (ibid.). The
same is true of grammar in the trivium: “ As a liberal art it has
no proper subject matter ” and “ usually has been interpreted
to mean the study of literature ... one of the fine arts ” (ibid.).
Later on, grammar “ as the study of language, the art of second
impositions ” is given a “ modest ” status as a liberal art. “ But
so understood, grammar is not a liberal art suited to collegiate
or university study [as ‘ liberal arts ’ are here being considered]:
it belongs where it used to be—in the grammar school ” (p.
36 ).
Furthermore, not only are these “ liberal arts ” not arts, they
are also not liberal. “ Liberal knowledge is theoretical knowl­
edge, knowledge sought for its own sake . . . but these logical
and mathematical arts, called liberal, are sought for the sake,
not of themselves, but of the theoretical knowledge to which
they lead; hence the names trivium and quadrivium. They are
propaedeutic, related as means to a further intellectual end ”
(p· 24 ) · What is the conclusion of these objections, to the
effect that the “ liberal arts ” are neither arts nor liberal, while
some of them already are the subject-matter of sciences? “ The
upshot of the present consideration is that, so far as proper
content or subject matter is concerned, there are at most two
liberal arts, namely, rhetoric and logic. But the two problems
urged above [i. e., of “ arts ” which do not regard the trans­
formation of external matter; of something “ liberal ” which is
not sought for its own sake] can be cited even against rhetoric
and logic ” (p. 26 ).
Obviously this criticism of St. Thomas’ classification of the
liberal arts reduces a handsome edifice to a pile of rubble. From
this Dr. Mullaney and others hope to erect a new building
planned on a very different principle.
But is the criticism valid? Is it true that the liberal arts in
their traditional mode, are not liberal, not arts, and in most

I

PIERRE CONWAY AND BENEDICT ASHLEY

»

cases are without any proper subject matter (since this subject
matter already is the property of some science or fine art) ?

j
j

50

First of all, what of the objection that they are not arts? St.
Thomas agrees with this: they are not—but only have a certain
likeness to art (dicuntur per quamdam similitudinem artes) ,iat
Why so? Because they have something after the manner of a
product (aliquid per modum cujusdam operis) .u0 Thus they
are arts, if one wishes, only after a fashion. What of the objec­
tion that they are not liberal, not for their own sake? This
likewise is true: St. Thomas agrees that they are propaedeutic,
introductory to the other arts (introductoriae ad alias artes) ,111
They are only called liberal, as ordered to the most liberal
sciences, or to the liberal or speculative sciences in general.112
Finally, what of the objection that certain of them have no
proper subject-matter, since their subject-matter is already
that of one of the sciences? St. Thomas would agree with this,
also, namely, that some of the liberal arts may be sciences too.
Thus he speaks of the logical sciences (scientiae logicales)113
which are introductory to the other arts, meaning universal
knowledge in general. With reference to mathematics, as
related to the quadrivium, boys can become scientifically know­
ing in these matters (mathematica potest sciri a pueris) ,11* can
even attain to the perfection of mathematical science, mathe**· Summa Theol., I-Π, q. 57, a. 8, ad 3; cf. note 28; 31; 37; 71
ll>Ibid.
1,11 Metaphye., J. 3, no. 57; cf. note 36; 47; 73; 76.
“*
.
. Only this science (i.e., divine science or metaphysics) is for its own
sake: therefore this alone is free (libera) among the sciences. . . . This may be
taken in two ways. One way is that the phrase ‘this alone' should indicate
generically all speculative science. In this case it is true that this genus of
sciences alone is sought for its own sake. Whence, too, those arts alone are called
‘ liberal ’ which are ordained to science. . . . Another way is that the phrase in
question should indicate specifically that philosophy, or wisdom, which is about
the highest causes (i. e, divine science or metaphysics) . . .” (I hietaphyr^ I, 3,
no. 58-9. Cf. note 47).
lw I Metaphye., 1. 3, no. 57; cf. note 111;
«· In Boet. de Trm., q. 5, a. 1, ad 3.
on the liberal arts may be gleaned from this
from Summa Theol., I-Π, q. 57, a. 3, ad 3,

also note 82.
The substance of St. Thomas’ outlook
article of the In Boetii de Trinitate, and
and Π-Π, q- 47, a. 2, ad 3.

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THE LIBERAL ARTS IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

51

matical wisdom (fiunt sapientes in talibus, idest ad perfec­
tionem istarum scientiarum pertingentes)
From the direction taken by Dr. Mullaney’s article, it would
seem that the most telling objection against the “ liberal arts ”
concept as stated by St. Thomas is that some of the liberal arts
are already sciences. Consequently, the sciences masquerading
as pseudo-liberal arts—and which include, for Dr. Mullaney,
the whole quadrivium—having been eliminated from the
sequence, a whole space is left empty, and the vacated area
may now be filled by the neo-liberal arts, the “ humhnities.”
On the other hand, supposing that it make no difference if the
“ liberal arts ” be considered, or actually be, sciences, then the
whole argument becomes inexistent. From the words of St.
Thomas there is clearly no objection to the liberal arts being
sciences. On the contrary, it is an ideal state which, if not indis­
pensable, is at least desirable—for example, that a user of logic
actually have the science of the various branches of logic he
uses, that a user of mathematics actually have demonstrative
knowledge of the formulas in geometry he employs.
But if they can be sciences, why then call them “liberal
arts ”? St. Thomas answers this by saying that the “ arts ” in
question are called “ arts ” as well as sciences (inter ceteras
scientias, artes dicuntur) because they not only have knowl­
edge, but also a product (quia non solum habent cognitionem,
sed opus aliquod) .”® Having been called “ arts,” they must then
be called “liberal” to distinguish them from the servile or
mechanical arts, which have a corporeal work (habent opus
corporale ... unde non possunt dici artes liberales) ?” Further­
more, they are ordained to the “ liberal ” or speculative sciences,
as seen above.”8 But how can subjects such as grammar,
rhetoric, music, even admitting it to be possible for them to be
the subject of science, be ordered to the speculative sciences?
The answer is that they cannot be directly, but rather they play
“* VI Ethie., 1. 7, no. IÎ08; cf. note 18; 68; 71; 88.
”· In Boet. de Trin., q. 5, a. 1, ad S.
Ibid.
mCf. tupra, note IIS.

^jg

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PIERRE CONWAY AND BENEDICT ASHLEY

a role in the existence of the fully-rounded liberal man. Such
a man does indeed set his goal on that wherein consists the
ultimate end of man, namely, the knowledge of divine things,
as pursued in this life by the speculative sciences ordained to
the most speculative and liberal of them all, divine science, both
natural and supernatural. However, as St. Augustine puts it,
and St. Thomas cites it, the speculative love of truth (charitas
veritatis) must recognize also the practical necessity of chanty
{necessitas charitatis) .“’Consequently, the truly liberal man
will have a contemplative life which does not necessarily
exclude the active. Apart from the motivation of working for
the common good, the active life can also in a personal sense
be conducive to the speculative life by maintaining the moral
virtues.’20 Therefore the education of the liberally-educated
man will equip him for the market-place and the forum. For
this, and in keeping with the directive role that accompanies
a trained intellect, he should first of all be literate, i. e., know
grammar. Thus, St. Thomas, elaborating on Aristotle’s concept
of natural subjection, links to some extent the latter with
illiteracy, and the leadership of reason with literacy;

Now to some those seem to be called “ barbarians ” who do not
have written speech in their vulgar tongue. Whence Bede is said
to have translated the liberal arts into the English tongue lest the
English be thought barbarians.
... It is plain that from the power of reason there proceeds that
men should be ruled by reasonable law, and that they be trained in
letters. Whence barbarism is fittingly manifested by the sign that
men either do not have laws, or have irrational ones—and likewise
that among some people there does not exist the exercise of
letters.”1***
*** Otium sanctum quaerit charitas ventatis; negotium justum suscipit necessitas
charitatis (De Civitate Dei, IX, c. 19). Cited by St. Thomas in Summa Theol^
I-Π, q. 61, a. 5, ad 3; Π-Π, q. 182, a. 2, c.
”·“. . . The active life, in so far as it composes and orders the interior passions
of the soul . . . aids contemplation, which is impeded through the disorder of
the interior passions” (Summa Theol., II-II, q. 182, a. 3, c.). _ ,
_
”* I Polit., 1. I, no. 22-3. If Venerable Bede instituted the liberal arts to offset
illiteracy, then writing, and consequently grammar, must be part o
One
notices also that this is connected with the active or civic status.

THE LIBERAL ARTS IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

53

For the same reason, the liberally-educated man will be
taught rhetoric, enabling him to put his ideas across persuasively in the open forum. Its connection with politics, the principal
part of moral science, may be seen from the fact that in the
Middle Ages a rudimentary law course was given as part of
rhetoric.122 This art, once acquired, should serve as an auxiliary
to that single intellectual virtue called “ science ” yet specifically ordained to practical action, namely, moral science, in its
most important aspect, political science.123
In this same vein, music and poetics too may be considered
as part of a liberal arts education in the context of St. Thomas
without for that reason having to be either a science or ordained
directly as an instrument of speculative science. Speculative
eSort requires relaxation even more than physical effort.124 This
may be supplied by music and poetics as “ intellectual enjoyment in leisure.”125 But in order to do this intelligently, one
should make some study of the matter. Hence some study of
the art of music, and of literary works, is well consonant with
a complete liberal education.
But while it may seem sensible enough to call those aspects
of a liberal education “ arts ” which are clearly not learned as
sciences for their own sake, but as aids to the liberal life, such
as the art of writing a sentence clearly and correctly, the art
1,1 " At least some rudiments of law were everywhere taught in the ' schools of
the Liberal Arts ’ and by the masters of these arts. The old division of rhetoric
into the three branches, * demonstrative,* ‘ deliberative,’ and ‘ judicial,’ allowed the
introduction of law-studies under the last-mentioned category without requiring
the addition of a new art to the sacred Seven” (H. Rashdall, The Universities of
Europe in the Middle Ages, ed. F. M. Powicke and A. B. Emden, 2 ed., S vols.,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 19S6,1,102). Cf. note 60. St. Thomas so divided
rhetoric in X Ethic., 1.16, no. 2173.
1,1 “. . . By prudence commonly so called a man rules himself in order to his own
good, while through political (prudence) ... to the common good ” (Summa
Theol., Π-ΙΙ, q. 60, a. 2, ad 3).
1,4
. When the soul is raised above sensible things, intent upon the works of
reason, there arises thence a certain fatigue of the spirit, whether a man be intent
upon the works of practical reason or of speculative—nevertheless more so if he
be intent upon the works of contemplation . . .” (Summa Theol., ΙΙ-Π, q. 168,
a. 2. c.).
Politics, VIII, 1338a 20.

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PIERRE CONWAY AND BENEDICT ASHLEY

of speaking and writing persuasively, the art of selecting music
and literary works and, in general, suitable relaxation, in a way
as concordant as possible with intellectual effort, what of those
disciplines which fall specifically under the head of speculative
science, namely, the various branches of mathematics? How
can mathematics, and specifically, arithmetic, geometry and
astronomy—supposing music to be cultivated more for relax­
ation than for science—be called liberal arts? They certainly
contain knowledge for their own sake, as when one learns the
properties of geometrical figures as part of the truth of things
without any reference to any practical application. But here
one may notice that just as logic may be called a liberal “ art ”
with reference to the science of mathematics, since it, for
example, teaches how to construct demonstrations which geo­
metry uses, so too the speculative science of mathematics may
be considered an “ art ” with reference to the most speculative
of all the sciences and to which the others are all ordained,
namely, divine science: “All the others are ordained to it as
to the end—whence this science alone is preeminently for its
own sake.” 128 The ordination of mathematics to divine science
is mentioned by St. Thomas as being through astronomy,m
which science is, with respect to the arithmetic and geometry
from which it is derived, an application to the concrete.128
Consequently, if astronomy is for the sake of the ultimate
science and not for its own sake, and therefore an “art”
in that it supplies something which divine science uses, so
also the principles of arithmetic and geometry, which are
not ends in themselves, find, so to speak, their perfection in
*’*
I Metaphye., Ï. S. no. 59.

*" ", . . This science (i- e., divine science) needs to know, for the knowledge of
the separated substances, the number and order of the heavenly spheres, which is
not possible without astronomy, for which the whole of mathematics is prerequisite ”
(tn Boet, de Trin., q. 5, a. 1, ad 9).
. The icientiae mediae ■ . . take principles abstracted from the purely
mathematical sciences, and apply them to sensible matter, as, for example . . .
astronomy applies the consideration of geometry and arithmetic to the heavens and
its parts. . . . Since the consideration of these sciences terminates in natural
matter, although they proceed through mathematical principles, they are more
natural than mathematical” (Π PAyric., 1. 3, no. 164).

THE LIBERAL ARTS IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

55

making possible the astronomy which divine science uses: just
as astronomy is an “ art ” with respect to divine science, they
are an “ art ” with respect to astronomy.
The idea that mathematics, and above all astronomy, is
required for metaphysics certainly appears today as a strange
notion. Of course St. Thomas has in the mind the arguments
by which Aristotle in Metaphysics XII (1078a 15) attempted
to determine the number of the separated intelligences by
means of dialectical arguments drawn from the mathematical
hypotheses of the astronomers as to the number of distinct
planetary motions.
Nevertheless, the notion will not seem so implausible if we
stop to consider that all that philosophy can know about the
Creator must be drawn by inference from a study of his
creation. Thomist metaphysicians today tend to ignore any
but apodictic arguments in metaphysics, and to reject probable
argumentation as beneath the notice of their science. Thus
many Thomists were made acutely uncomfortable by the wellknown address of Pius XU to the Pontifical Academy of
Sciences in which he made use of modem physical theory to
confirm and "illustrate” the traditional Thomistic proofs of
the existence of God.12® St. Thomas, however, did not scorn
dialectical reasoning in metaphysics. He constantly quotes the
famous saying of Aristotle that “ even a little probable knowl­
edge of divine things is worth much more than certain knowl­
edge of less noble objects.”180
Hence, metaphysics does not scorn such light as can be cast
on the nature of the divine by a study of the physical cosmos,
even if that knowledge be only probable. This knowledge is had
through natural science, but natural science is not able to go
very far in showing us the general plan of the universe without
the assistance of the conjectures of mathematical physics.
Hence the theories which modem physicists call “ cosmology ”
and which are chiefly astronomical and mathematical in char“•AAS., 44 (1952), pp. 31-43.
I <2e Anima, 1.1, no. 7; cL note 94, 92 and 22.

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PIERRE CONWAY AND BENEDICT ASHLEY

acter would have been treated by St. Thomas with genuine
respect, and Pius XII was truly of the same spirit.
This does not mean, by the way, that the only contribution
of mathematics to metaphysics is by way of astronomy. The
fact that mathematics provides us with our clearest ideas of
unity, multitude, order, relation, and beautyi31 means that it
is of immense importance to the metaphysician in forming the
analogous and transcendental concepts which he uses. Indeed
the very conception of analogy so fundamental to the method
of metaphysics is derived (by analogy) from the mathematical
notion of ratio and proportion.131 Plato and St. Augustine were
not mistaken in thinking that mathematics plays a very great
role in the development of the mind as it passes from the
sensible to the intelligible order, and Aristotle does not reject
this conception, as long as it is understood that the role of
mathematics is confined to an analysis of the order of formal
causality, and cannot substitute for natural science in the study
of the other causes.
One might then say: Why not call natural science an
“ art ” too, since it also is not wholly for its own sake but is
ordained to divine science? One could indeed do this, but
historically natural science entered the curriculum after the
“ seven ” liberal arts had become more or less sacrosanct. At
the same time, natural science already has a certain community
with divine science, since both are of the being of nature and
one leads naturally to the other:
. The knowledge of these
1,1 "Now since the good and beautiful are different (for the former always
implies conduct as its subject, while the beautiful is found also in motionless
things), those who assert that the mathematical sciences say nothing of the
beautiful or the good are in error. For these sciences say and prove a great deal
about them; if they do not expressly mention them, but prove attributes which
are their results or their definitions, it is not true to say that they tdl us nothing
about them. The chief forms of beauty are order and symmetry and definiteness,
which the mathematical sciences demonstate in a special degree. And since these
(e.g. order and definiteness) are obviously causes of many things, evidently these
sciences must treat this sort of causative principle also (i.e. the beautiful) as in
some sense a cause.” (Metaphyda, XIII. c. 3. 1078a 34-55).
“*
Cf. J. Ramirez, “De analogia sec. doctrinam aristotelico-thomiiticam." La
Cienda Tomûta, ΧΩΙ (1941), «MO; 195-Î14; 337-357.

THE LIBERAL ABTS IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

57

sensible substances is the way to the knowledge of the aforesaid
separated substances.”1” Thus the existence of the divine
substance, which is the end of all knowledge, is already attained
in the Physics, where one arrives at the First Mover—as St.
Thomas states in his Exposition of the Metaphysics.11* In
effect, St. Thomas does not look on metaphysics as proving
the existence of the divine being, but as understanding some­
thing of it, its existence having already been established in
natural science.
To sum up the cogency and importance of objections leveled
at the seven liberal arts—which St. Thomas does indeed accept
and enumerate in harmony with his contemporaries—as being
not “ liberal,” not “ arts,” but, if anything “ sciences,” with
reference to a liberal education in St. Thomas’ terms, one need
only suppose for a moment that there is no such thing, and
and never was any such thing, as the seven liberal arts, and
then ask onself what consequences that would involve for St.
Thomas’ outlook. The answer is: None. In effect, St. Thomas
says that the education leading to man’s natural end, the
knowledge of the first cause, begins naturally with logic,, which
teaches the method of all the sciences, the art thereof—and
man is intended to live by art. This done, one would proceed
to the first of the sciences to be learned, namely, mathematics.
What is involved in these two steps? It is clear that “ logic ”
means for St. Thomas, ideally speaking, the whole of the
Organon, as he himself sets forth in the prologue to his Ex­
position of the Posterior Analytics, involving thus the study of
all of formal logic in Categories, Peri Hermeneias, Prior Ana­
lytics; demonstration in Posterior Analytics; dialectics in the
Topics; rhetoric in the Rhetoric; drama and literature and
allied subjects in the Poetics; sophistics in the De Sophisticis
Elenchis. What of “mathematics”? As to the content of
this as a stage on the way to divine science, St. Thomas
“* VU Metaphys., 1.17, no. IMS. Cf. note 92.
»»♦ ·»; _ . It was proved in Physics VIÏÏ that, since one may not go to infinity in
movers and things moved, it is necessary to arrive at some First Immovable
Mover . . .” (ΧΠ Metaphys., 1. 6, no. 2517).

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PIERRE CONWAY AND BENEDICT ASHLEY

has already been cited as stating that it involves astrono­
my, for which all of arithmetic and geometry are prere­
quisite. Likewise, in this pursuit St. Thomas recognizes the
need for relaxation and certainly music and allied arts would
be approved by him. Consequently, even if there were no
“ liberal arts,” anyone who endeavored to follow the educational
pattern traced by St. Thomas would still find himself following
a course which is substantially that of the traditional seven.
So, let us concede that the liberal arts are not liberal arts—St.
Thomas’ teaching and its motivation still remain the same.
B. St. Thomas’ division of the arts and sciences as against the
realignment thereof.

The following steps are intended to express the genesis and
development of the arts and sciences, under the general heading
of the intellectual virtues, as St. Thomas himself expresses
them. The number of the steps will also be found in the
accompanying outline, indicating the sequence to be followed.
Subsequently there will be listed under each of them the
pertinent references in St. Thomas. Following this certain
differences will be noted between this outline and current
conceptions.
Steps in the genesis and development of the arts and sciences:

(1) The basic division of the arts and sciences, representing
that by which man lives as a man, and contained under the
general heading of the intellectual virtues, sees these divided
into speculative and practical, accordingly as the knowledge
in question is desired for the sake of knowing the truth of
things, or is further ordered to doing or making something.
(2) First among these habits of mind which are the intel­
lectual virtues is understanding, the habit of first principles,
which all subsequent thought, whether in the speculative or
in the practical order, presupposes.
(8) Since one must live before one can speculate, man’s
first concern is directed towards the necessities of life, and the
arts first invented, those arts comprising certain sure principles

THE LIBERAL ARTS IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

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derived from experience and ordained to the making of things,
are called, generically, the practical intellectual virtue of art.
These arts, by contrast with the subsequent “ liberal ” arts, are
called “ servile,” and also “ mechanical,” “ manual.” In con­
trast to the practical habit of doing, which causes the knowl­
edge of prudence to be called “ active,” that of the arts is called
“ factive.”
(4) Once man has mastered the arts of acquiring the neces­
sities of life, he turns naturally to those arts concerned with
pleasure and relaxation. Such arts would be, for example,
music, the dance, theatre, poetry and other literature, and
would fit under the contemporary category of the “ fine ” arts.
Such arts, while originating initially as relaxation from physical
labor, may also, as man becomes more engaged in intellectual
labor, become correspondingly more intellectual and even serve
to communicate the truth, especially moral truth, through
representation.

(5) The necessities of life and due relaxation having been
obtained, man naturally turns to the speculative. Now the
mind which, addressing itself to corporeal things, found the
various arts of agriculture, building, etc., now forms the art of
thinking itself, namely, logic, which presupposes grammar for
its external manifestation, and is geared for human affairs in
rhetoric. This art is called a “ liberal ” art because it is ordained
primarily to the “ liberal ” or speculative sciences, and is conse­
quently part of the speculative intellect, allied to science, with
which it may itself be classed.
(6) Logic involves a formal and a material side, the former
concerned with the common structure of reasoning, the latter
with the different types of subject-matter. In this latter realm,
demonstrative or judicative logic is ordained to science; dialecti­
cal or inventive logic to contingent things, including human
affairs in rhetoric, inducement to virtue by representation in
poetics; sophistic logic is ordained to a study of fallacious
reasoning.
(7) The first application of logic as an art of thinking, to
an understanding of the nature of things in science, begins with

i/U

60

PIEHBE CONWAY AND BENEDICT ASHLEY

that science which is the easiest to grasp as requiring less experi­
ence, namely, mathematics, which, with its quadrivium, suc­
ceeding to the trivium of logic, is likewise called a “liberal”
art. In effect, it is not so much for its own sake as ordained
to the knowledge of the nature of things pursued in natural
science and metaphysics. Thus arithmetic and geometry are
used by natural science and metaphysics in their application to
matter in astronomy. Music, while it can be studied as the
application of arithmetic to sensible sound (as perspective
or drawing may be considered the application of geometry to
sensible extension), is, however, more usually to be studied
simply as an art of pleasure or relaxation, a “ fine ” art with an
intellectual structure, as well as with moral influence on the
passions.

(8) Next in order of the sciences is that whose object is
best known, but whose acquisition requires experience of reality,
namely, natural science (identical for Aristotle and St. Thomas
with natural philosophy) of material being. This science leads
naturally, in the pursuit of first causes, to the ultimate science,
involving immaterial being, and embracing the totality of
being and its causes. Natural science may, however, be used in
a practical way, supplying principles used in such practical arts
as medicine and agriculture. Thus these arts originally acquired
by experience, may be further added to by the application of
the findings of speculative science.
(9) Man’s life cannot be completely speculative, and he
must therefore make decisions concerning things to be done,
on the personal, domestic, and communal level. This is the
realm of moral science, which, combined with right will, con­
stitutes the practical intellectual virtue of prudence, personal,
domestic, and civic or political. Prudence dictates the acts of
the moral virtues, already intended to be imprinted in youths
by their exercise under the direction of those in charge of
one’s upbringing. The role of prudence in general is to ordain
their voluntary acts in order to approach as closely as possible
to the speculative goal of the knowledge of divine things. Thus

61

THE LIBERAL· ARTS IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

TOE ARTS AND SCIENCES
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62

PIERRE CONWAY AND BENEDICT ASHLEY

political prudence aims at disposing the state in the practical
order in such a way as to make this possible in the speculative
order.
(10) The peace and leisure obtained under the ordination of
political prudence are intended to render possible the perfection
of the speculative life in metaphysics or divine science. This
highest and ultimate science in the natural order is subordin­
ated in turn to revealed divine science or sacred theology. This
latter, since its principles are revealed rather than acquired,
actually, in its role as supreme science, oversees and directs
human activity in all its aspects (whether speculative or practi­
cal) from the start. The corresponding speculative intellectual
virtue of these ultimate sciences is wisdom.
(The above steps regard basically man’s, intellectual develop­
ment, i. e., of the cognitive aspect of his soul. Previous to this
there is of course first, in the child, care of the body. Then, in
the soul, the imprinting of the moral virtues in the appetitive
part through directed exercise even before the use of reason,
precedes the beginning of the intellectual virtues, which start
when reason begins to function.)
References·.
(1) Enumeration of the intellectual virtues and division
into speculative and practical:

Summa Theol., ΤΠ, q. 56, a. 3
Summa Theol., I-Π, q. 57, a. 2-4

I Metaphys., 1. 1, no. 34-5
VI Ethics., 1. 3, no. 1143 ff.

Further references on the division of intellectual knowledge into
speculative—truth for its own sake—and practical—truth for
the sake of operation:

Summa Theol., I, q. 79, a. 11
Summa Theol., I, q. 14, a. 16
Summa Theol., I-Π, q. 94, a. 4
I Polit., Prooem., no. 6

IH de Anima, 1.15, no. 820
Π Metaphys., 1. 2, no. 290
VI Ethic., 1. 2, no. 1132

(2) Understanding as the first habit:
Summa Theol., I-Π, q. 57, a. 2
VI Ethic., 1.5, no. 1179

Π Post. Anal., 1. 20

THE LIBERAL ARTS IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

63

(3) Mechanical, or useful, arts are found first:
I Metaphys., 1.1, no. 32-3
I Metaphys., 1. 3, no. 57

(4) Subsequently come the arts of pleasure and relaxation:
I Metaphys., 1.1, no. 33
I Metaphys., 1. 3, no. 57

X Ethic., 1. 9, no. 2077
Summa Theol., Π-II, q. 168, a. 2

(5) Then the speculative or liberal arts, as introductory to
the sciences:

I Metaphys., 1.1, no. 33
I Metaphys., 1. 3, no. 57
II Metaphys., I. 5, no. 335
VI Ethic., i. 7, no. 1211

In de Trin., q. 5, a. 1, ad 3
In de Trin., q. 6, a. 1, ad 3
In Libr. de Causis, Prooem.

(6) Logic is divided into formal and material, and the latter
into demonstrative, dialectical and sophistic:
I Post. Anal., 1.1
(7) Logic, or the method of reasoning, is first applied in
mathematics:
VI Ethic., 1. 7, no. 1208 ff.
In Libr. de Causis, Prooem.

In de Trin., q. 5, a. 1, ad 3
In de Trin., q. 5, a. 1, ad 9
Politics, VIII, 1337b 25 ff.

(8) Next comes natural science, which, though speculative,
may be practically applied:
VI Ethic., 1. 7, no. 1208 ff.
In Libr. de Causis, Prooem.

In de Trin., q. 5, a. 1, ad 5
VII Metaphys., 1.17, no. 1648

(9) After experience, and exercise in controlling the pas­
sions, comes the study of moral science in its threefold division,
perfected in prudence, disposing human things for the sake of
the divine:
VI Ethic., 1. 7, nos. 1200, 1208 Summa Theol., I-II, q. 66, a. 5,
ad 1
ff.
In Libr. de Causis, Prooem.
VI Ethic., 1. 6, no. 1185-93
VI Ethic., 1. 10, no. 1264-67
I Ethic., I. 3, no. 87-41
I Ethic., 1. 2, no. 31
X Ethic., 1.14, no. 2146-54

64

PIERRE CONWAY AND BENEDICT ASHLEY

(10) The ultimate science, to which all previous study is
ordained, is divine science, natural and revealed:

VI Ethic., 1. 7, no. 1208 δ.
In Libr. de Causis, Prooem.
In de Trin., q. 5, a. 4, c.

In de Trin., q. 6, a. 1, ad 3m q.
In de Trin., q. 6, a. 4, obj. 5; ad
3-5
Summa Theol., I, q. 1, a. 4

Remarks:
The general division of intellectual knowledge into specu­
lative and practical may employ the word “ theoretical ” in­
stead of “ speculative,” using the Greek rather than the Latin
root, but with the same meaning of “ seeing ” or “ contemplat­
ing·”
The present outline does not contain any distinction between
“ philosophy of nature ” and “ physical sciences,” since it is in­
tended to represent these matters as considered by St. Thomas,
for whom, as is well known, no such distinction exists.135 Sciences
such as the biological sciences would not constitute an additional
group, but would simply represent integral parts of a single sci­
ence, with the exception of mathematical natural science, which
is formally distinct as a scientia media.
Practical knowledge, as to choice of terms, is not divided into
“ practical ” and “ productive,” since, following St. Thomas,
the division here is into “ active ” and “ factive,” (Cf. In Polit.,
Prooem., no. 6; VI Ethic., 1. 2, no. 1135; 1. 3, no. 1150; 1. 4, no.
1165. This corresponds to the division of prudence and art on
the basis of agibile and factibile, or operation remaining within
the agent, and operation passing into external matter, in, for
example, Summa Theol., I, q. 18, a. 3, ad 1; I-Π, q. 57, a. 4, c.;
a. 5, ad 1; q. 74, a. 1, c.; I Ethics., 1. 1, no. 13; IX Metaphys.,
1. 2, no. 1786-88; 1.8, no. 1862-65) .
“ Moral philosophy ” is not in this outline divided against
“ social science,” since moral science as understood by St.
Thomas, with its threefold division into ethics (for a man him­
self) , economics or domestic science (for a family), and politics
““For the textual proof of this point see B. M. Ashley, Ο. P., “The Role of the
Philosophy of Nature in Catholic Liberal Education/’ Proceeding
*
of the American
Catholic Phdoeophical Association, XXX (1956), 62-S4.

THE LIBERAL· ARTS IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

65

or civil science (for a whole community in city or state), fully
embraces anything considered under what is called "social
science.” (Cf. for this division in St. Thomas: Summa Theol.,
Π-ΙΙ, q. 50, aa. 2-3; I Ethics., 1.1, no. 6; VI, 1. 7, no. 1200) .
Finally, the liberal arts are not placed under practical " arts,”
but under speculative “ science,” since St. Thomas specifically
refers to them as speculative habits, in, for example, Summa
Theol., I-Π, q. 57, a. 3, ad 3 (habitus speculativi) ; Π-Π, q. 47,
a. 2, ad 3 (ratio speculativa quaedam jadt, puta syllogismum) ;
and likewise sees no difficulty in their being even sciences, as,
for example, with respect to logic in ΠΙ de Anima, 1. 8, no. 718
(scientia rationalis) ; I Post. Anal., Prooem., no. 2 (haec ars est
Logica, idest rationalis scientia) ; IV Metaphy., 1. 4, no. 576
(Dialectica ... secundum quod est docens . . . est scientia) ;
with respect to mathematics in VI Ethic., 1.7, no. 1208 (juvenes
... ad perfectionem istarum scientiarum pertingentes) ; In de
Trin., q. 5, a. 1, ad 3 (mathematica potest sciri a pueris) .
C.

The Neo-Liberal Arts: the Humanities as the new Qua­
drivium.

Some years ago Jacob Klein, Dean of St. John’s College,
Annapolis, in a brilliant lecture argued that as a matter of fact
the medieval liberal arts have today been replaced by two arts:
“ the historical or comparative method,” which reigns in litera­
ture, philosophy, and in the social sciences in large measure,
and the “ mathematical or scientific method ” which reigns in
all other fields. He attempted to trace this new arrangement
to Leibnitz’ distinction between “ facts” and “ theories.”
Those who advocate that the “ humanities ” replace the
liberal arts seem to think in terms of the same dichotomy
Thus, when Dr. Mullaney speaks of “ mathematics and sci­
ence ” as not constituting (liberal) art, he is referring under
1MOn the other hand, Jacques Mantain seems to go to an opposite extreme:
** Physics should be taught and revered as a liberal art of the first rank: like
poetry, and probably more important than even mathematics.” Education at theCrossroads (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943), p. 69. Maritain evidently
uses ** liberal art ” here amply to mean a '* liberal discipline.”

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PIERRE CONWAY AND BENEDICT ASHLEY

“ mathematics ” to arithmetic and geometry, under “ science ”
to music and astronomy, which latter two he has previously
reduced to natural science. Since these four are equated to the
quadrivium, the quadrivium, as science masquerading under
the title of “ liberal arts,” must go. In its place now come the
“humanities.” “. . . We should recognize that history is a
liberal art; and further that the humanities, understood as the
integrated study of a civilization in its history, philosophy,
literature and art, is a liberal art; and that the humanities,
grouped around history, make a perfectly sensible content for
the quadrivium ” (p. 45 ) . This author further suggests that
“ educational practice at the college and university levels has
for many years, acted on these two convictions [i. e., that
mathematics and science are not liberal art, whereas the
humanities, grouped around history, are] without ever formu­
lating them explicitly ” (p. 45 ). This may well be the case, but
the present point at issue is whether, be it in fact or in theory,
such an outlook may be considered compatible with St.
Thomas. Since history is here constituted, more or less, the
foundation of the new quadrivium—and Dr. Mullaney has
indeed established it elsewhere as very much of a liberal art
since it is a reconstruction (and hence “art”) of a culture,
studied for its own sake (and hence “ liberal ”) —it is necessary
to consider the place of history in the curriculum of St. Thomas.
It is clear that in the terminology of St. Thomas, “ history,”
or historia, refers not to any special branch of knowledge, but
rather to a way of treating any branch of knowledge, and which
consists in setting down in the beginning of that study whatever
has gone before, whether in the nature of inductive facts or in
the nature of opinions. Thus, instead of starting out from
scratch, so to speak, one starts out with the benefit of the
findings of those who have gone before. In this respect, all the
works of Aristotle begin with a “ history ” of previous opinions
wherever these exist, as may be seen in the Physics, De Anima,
Metaphysics. Is there anything corresponding to what we call
"history”? The subject-matter which would correspond to
what we call “ history,” and which consists in setting forth the

THE LIBERAL ARTS IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

67

series of events in the life of a people or peoples, would be, in
the educational program of Aristotle and St. Thomas, a prelude
to moral science, and in particular to political science. Thus
Aristotle states in the Rhetoric (1360a 30 if.) that the study
of the past history of one’s own country and of others is the
business of political science.
In effect, just as, in endeavoring to determine the nature of
the physical universe, one would begin with an examination and
appraisal of the solutions to the problem given by one’s prede­
cessors, so too, in endeavoring to determine the nature and
means of happiness, the goal of man’s voluntary endeavors,
comprising moral science, it is only natural to examine what
others have thought about it and how they have gone about
attaining it and with what success. Since man is a social
animal and his strivings for happiness and well-being inevitably
take a communal form, the examination of those strivings and
the means employed will necessarily be a study of whole peoples
and their institutions—in a word, history. Such a study is, of
course, most apt for one who is himself to be engaged in framing
general laws for the community calculated to promote the
common well-being, and consequently in his outlining of what
a future legislator must have, at the end of the Nicomachean
Ethics, Aristotle includes the study of previous laws and con­
stitutions of states. He then proceeds to give himself such a
history as the starting point of his Politics.
Such a course is, in a democracy especially,' where all the
students are, as future voters, likewise legislators, who can, by
their indifference or gullibility, allow the country to fall into
evil hands, and contrariwise, by their enlightenment and alert­
ness, ensure sensible legislation, a very vital thing. Since, how­
ever, it is in the domain of moral science, where experience is
indispensable—for in moral matters one needs to have experi­
ence to know what is really good and probable, unexperienced
conjectures being likewise unrealistic—such a study of history
is not going to be fully valuable unless one has an experiential
basis for assessing the feasibility of the courses suggested.1”
1,1

. While collections of laws, and of constitutions also, may be serviceable

■Ü

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PIERRE CONWAY AND BENEDICT ASHLEY

St. Thomas stresses the indispensability of experience in this
matter as follows:
... Those who have experience concerning individual instances,
have the right judgment as to works, and understand by what
means and in what ways such works may be accomplished, and
what works befit what persons or enterprises. But it is reasonable
that it should escape the inexperienced whether a work might be
done well or ill from what they find transmitted in writing. For
they are ignorant of the application of that which they find written
down, to practice. But laws to be made are related to political
“ works,” for they are set up in the manner of rules for political
works. Whence those who do not know [by experience] what sort
are fitting works, are not able to know what laws are fitting.138
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From the above it is clear that history so conceived is not
studied for itself, but as an adjunct of political science, and as
part of the preparation for citizenship in a democracy, where
the liberal, or free, man is expected to take a part in the government. Even in this role, it is subordinate to, and not a substitute for, experience. However, the vicarious experience of
others Can certainly contribute to sound prudential judgments
either on the personal or on the social scale, and therefore
history would be an integral part of the curriculum of St.
Thomas as an adjunct of that moral science which consists
ideally in perfecting the intellectual virtue of prudence in those
who already possess by exercise the moral virtues of justice,
fortitude and temperance. As both Aristotle and St. Thomas
stress, moral teaching has no influence over those who do not
have control of their passions,138 and consequently moral science
to those who can study them and judge what is good or bad and what enactments
suit what circumstances, those who go through such collections without a practised
faculty will not have right judgment (unless it be as a spontaneous gift of nature)
though they may perhaps become more intelligent in such matters” (Ethics, X,
1181b 5).
“‘X Ethic., I. 16, no. 2176.
Words and teaching are not efficacious with all, but it is necessary if
they are to be efficacious with someone that the soul of the listener be prepared
through many good habits to rejoice in good things and hate evil things. . . . For
he who lives according to the passions, does not willingly hear the words of the one
admonishing, nor will he even understand, in such a way as to judge that to be
good towards which he is being led. Whence no one is able to persuade him”
(X Ethic, 1. U, no. 2146).

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THE LIBERAL ARTS IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

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presupposes, rather than constitutes, moral virtue: it is for the
sake of teaching one who has hitherto been well directed by
others, now to direct himself, and others as the case may arise.
Now since prudence is a practical intellectual virtue, history,
considered as an adjunct of prudence, especially political pru­
dence, cannot be a discipline learned for its own sake. In this
sense, then, it cannot fulfil Dr. Mullaney’s definition of
“liberal ” and therefore cannot be a liberal art. But what is
against studying history for its own sake, studying it in its
broadest sense of embracing a whole culture at a given period,
comprising the literature, art and philosophy of that time?
Thus one might, in a four-year series, study successively ‘ the
classical Graeco-Roman, the medieval Christian, the Renais­
sance, . . . the contemporary secular culture ” (p. 43 ) . There
is nothing wrong with it, but neither in the mind of Aristotle
nor of St. Thomas would it occupy a very important position.
As has been seen, the study of history has a definite role in the
practical moral order. In the speculative order, in the order of
knowledge of the truth for its own sake, however, it has rela­
tively little. This is summed up in the famous words of Aristotle in the Poetics:
. . Poetry is something more philosophic and of graver import than history, since its statements
are of the nature rather of universals, whereas those of history
are singulars.”140 What does this mean? It is simply a pointing
out of the fact that history is of the contingent singular, in a
domain where the law of reason does not necessarily prevail.
Consequently, as a means of attaining to a knowledge of the
immutable nature of things, leading to first causes, as science,
it does not rank high, as may be seen from the great historical
variety of opinions on wherein lies right and wrong, on the value
of material goods, etc. This also extends to the study of
literature and art as a primary means of attaining to the truth
in things. Since for certain knowledge one must proceed demonstratively and univocally, and they proceed primarily by
metaphor and image, that is not their prime function.141
“•Poetics, 1451b 5.
141 “... It tees» to be a similar sin if one should take some mathematician using

70

PIERRE CONWAY AND BENEDICT ASHLEY

As has been seen, history in the sense of the study of the
customs and evolution of peoples, whether past or present, for
the sake of having good laws in one’s own community—and
which could well be called a study of cultures—does indeed
have a significant place in an education following the lead of
Aristotle and St. Thomas. It would not, however, be a study
of these for their own sake, as is the case with the speculative
sciences leading toward first causes. Nor could it be a liberal
art leading towards speculative science, since its purpose and
function, being that of moral science, is not speculative but
rather oriented toward practical application.1*2 The rather
short shrift that one might expect from St. Thomas for the
project of studying a culture, not to know “ what is the truth,”
but “ what did the people of this culture believe to be the
truth ” (p. 44 ), seems to be contained in his comment on the
urgency of trying to discover whether Plato’s words mean
what they seem to mean or something else, namely: “.. . The
study of philosophy [i. e., the search for the knowledge of the
causes of things] is not for the purpose of knowing what men
may have thought, but for the purpose of knowing what is the
truth of things.”143
If one endeavors to understand the substitution of history
and the humanities for mathematical and pre-natural science
courses as a foundation on which to build a liberal curriculum,
in terms of St. Thomas, it seems to connote one thing: the
de-emphasizing of the speculative in favor of the practical. In
effect, history in its best sense as an auxiliary of moral science,
leads to that perfection of moral virtue which may be called
rhetorical persuasions, and should seek from a rhetorician certain demonstrations,
such as the mathematiôan should put forward. For both cases arise from not
considering the manner which befits the matter” (I Ethic., 1. S, no. 36).
lu “. . . It is desirable when making a treatise on such, i. e., on so variable things
... to show the truth ... in a rough way, i. e., by applying universal principles
and simple things to singular and composite things, which is the area of act. For
it is necessary in any operative science that one should proceed in the ‘composite
*
manner.«But it fa the converse in speculative science, where it fa necessary to
proceed in the 'resolutory' manner, resolving composite things into simple
principles” (I Ethic., 1. 3, no. 35).
“· I De Cado, 1. 28, no. 288 (Spiasri).

THE LIBERAL ARTS IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

71

active happiness. This happiness is, nevertheless, beneath
speculative happiness,141 and therefore the education geared to
lead to the latter, as is the liberal education of St. Thomas
where the liberal arts are geared to the speculative sciences as
the ultimate, is of a superior kind:
. The consideration of
the speculative sciences is a certain participation of true and
perfect happiness.”144
145
Is there then no need at all for a reform of the traditional
liberal arts, or their adaptation to current needs? To this we
should answer that indeed it would be a great mistake today
merely to revive the liberal arts as they were actually practiced
in the Middle Ages or the Renaissance, and this for two
reasons: first, because the theory of the liberal arts as it is
given by St. Thomas was never consistently applied in the past;
second, because there have oeen real advances in each of the
liberal arts since St. Thomas’ time.
As to the first of these points^ it is well known, or should
be well known, that the so-called “ classical education ” based
on the study of Latin and Greek was in no way a pure appli­
cation of the medieval conception of the fine arts. The medieval
conception, as we have seen, ordered the liberal arts to specu­
lative truth and the contemplative life, and hence made logic
the dominant art. The Renaissance tradition was a return to
the attitude of the Sophists and of Isocrates, and of the
Ciceronians, which ordered these arts to the practical life of
the public official and the liberal active life, and hence made
rhetoric the dominant art. Even in the study of rhetoric this
144 ". . . (Aristotle states) that while he who devotes himself to the speculation
of truth is the most happy, in a secondary way he is happy who lives according
to another virtue, namely, according to prudence, which directs all the moral
virtues. For just as speculative happiness is attributed to wisdom, which compre­
hends within itself the other speculative habits as being the more dominant among
them, so likewise active happiness, which is according to the operations of the
moral virtues, is attributed to prudence, which is perfective of all the moral virtues,
as was shown in Book VI” (X EtAic., 1. 12, no. Sill).
144 Summa Theol., I-Π, q. 3, a. 6, c.; q. 57, a. I, ad 2. Cf. Π-Π, q. 182, a. 1, fc,
where St. Thomas in proof of the proposition that “the contemplative life is
absolutely better than the active,” cites the eight reasons Aristotle gives for the
superiority of speculative happiness in Ethio X-

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PIERRE CONWAY AND BENEDICT ASHLEY

classical tradition quickly degenerated. The art of rhetoric
ceased to be an art of persuasion instrumental to politics, and
became a mere art of “ style,” so that the sterile study of gram­
mar came to dominate education.148
Even in the Middle Ages the theory of St. Thomas was not
the dominant view. In the earlier Middle Ages there was a
tendency to identify the arts with philosophy, so that the
quadrivium took the place of natural science (an identification
found in current expositions, as we have seen), while ethics and
metaphysics were absorbed into sacred theology. In the late
Middle Ages the tendency was to an exaggerated development
of the dialectical and grammatical aspects of logic, but with
little appreciation of its poetic and rhetorical side. There was a
tendency, noted by Roger Bacon, to neglect the development
of mathematics, and the study of languages, which later gave
a handle to the accusations of the Renaissance rhetoricians that
the writers of the Middle Ages were logic-choppers with hearts
of lead and tongues of iron.
What is required today is the application of the theory of
St. Thomas that clearly distinguishes the speculative sciences
from the liberal arts, which are only introductory, and that at
the same time gives to the liberal arts their full range including
poetics, rhetoric, dialectics, demonstrative logic, pure and
applied mathematics.
As to the development of these arts since medieval times,
it is plain also that the sound theory of each art as developed by
Aristotle needs to be enriched with modem developments.
Thus “ grammar ” needs to be taught so as to make use of the
modem development of scientific linguistics and “ communica­
tion theory.”14T Poetics, functioning in literary criticism, needs
to be given a rightful place, as Aristotle intended, and not to be
confused with a mere grammatical analysis of a text, as in
“classical” education. Logic must be distinguished into its
“’See Richard P. McKeon, “Rhetoric in the Middle Ages,” Speculum, XVII
(1942), 1-32.
"’But see Leonard A. Waters, “Progressivist Attack on Grammar,” America,
April 12, 1958, pp. 56-58, for some dangers in the pedagogical application of struc­
tural linguistics.

THE LIBERAL ARTS IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

73

dialectical and its demonstrative parts, and the techniques of
logical calculus which we call “ symbolic logic ” must be given
their proper instrumental role. Furthermore, the very con­
siderable development of dialectics as it is used in what we
today call “ the scientific method ” of hypothetical “ theory
construction ” must be recognized.
As for rhetoric, the discoveries of “ propaganda analysis,”
“mass communication techniques,” “motivational research,”
etc., should be utilized. Along with rhetoric and dialectic the
meaning of “ the historical method ” and the techniques of
description devised by the social sciences need to be treated,
since through these instruments we are able to write and
present history much more accurately and artfully than ever
before.
In the quadrivium remarkable advances have been made
in mathematics. The “ traditional ” teaching of algebra has
neglected the axiomatic method which makes mathematics both
a true art and a true science, while Euclid’s geometry has been
very greatly improved by a more perfect employment of this
method. Today, one claims, it is possible to teach even element­
ary mathematics in terms of set-theory in a way which makes
it a much more perfect example of scientific thinking than in
its ancient formulation. Furthermore, the development of the
theory of mechanics in mathematical physics since Galileo,
makes it possible for us to present applied mathematics in a
fashion far superior to the meager achievements of the ancients.
At the same time that we enrich the liberal arts with modern
advances, however, we must be very careful to see that we
present these arts on a sound Aristotelian basis. In each field
of art there exist today many very divergent views and much
confused or erroneous doctrine. In the field of mathematics,
for example, the logicist, formalist, and intuitionist schools are
divided on the various principles of their science. If we teach a
logicist mathematics we will teach our students that the quad­
rivium and trivium are identical with each other. If we teach
a formalist mathematics we will deny that mathematics is a
science at all, and turn it into an art which has no purpose, a
mere game, with the risk of inculcating a deep scepticism in

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PIERRE CONWAY AND BENEDICT ASHLEY

young minds. If we teach the intuitionist approach we are
likely to infect our students with certain Kantian assumptions.
Similarly in the field of logic an uncritical presentation of
the modem system of symbolic logic means that we indoctrinate
our students with nominalism. An uncritical presentation of
the modem “ motivational research ” approach to rhetoric will
make them Machiavellians. An uncritical presentation of the
“ scientific method ” in dialectics will make them relativists.
And finally an uncritical presentation of poetics and theory of
the fine arts in terms of modern “ symbolism ” will make them
irrationalists and pseudo-mystics.
Nothing will do but a revival of the liberal arts, firmly
grounded and richly developed. We may recall the words of
Leo XIII in Aeterni Patris:
When philosophy stood stainless in honor and wise in judgment,
then, as facts and constant experience showed, the liberal arts
flourished as never before or since; but, neglected and almost
blotted out, they lay prone since philosophy began to lean to error
and join hands with folly.

The principle which Leo recommended to give a firm founda­
tion to such a revival was the Thomistic conviction that the
liberal arts and all the sciences to which they lead are directed
toward wisdom, and not to mere technical control or “ creative
self-expression.”
In closing one cannot help but observe again the striking fact
that it is in following the speculatively-orientated curriculum
of St. Thomas, where the core is constituted by the natural
sciences leading to divine science, that one would—in contrast
to a humanities-orientated curriculum—find oneself also in
complete accord with the curriculum now being urged most
pressingly for motives of survival, wherein mathematics and
natural science likewise occupy a central position. If this
curriculum of St. Thomas is not at present anywhere genuinely
followed, it need not be because it is seven hundred years too
late—it may simply be that it is still just a year or so too soon.

Pierre Conway, O.P.

Benedict Ashley, O. P.

Dominican Home of Studia,
Waihinjtm.D.C.

Dominican Home of Studia,
River Foreei. IB.

Announcing ...

THE DIGNITY OF SCIENCE
Studies in the Philosophy of Science
Presented to William Humbert Kane, O.P.
Edited with Introduction by James A. Weisheipl, O.P.
In collaboration with The Thomist and The Albertus Magnus Lyceum

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In recent years the practical urgency resulting from the rapid growth of science, along
with the uncertainty of some of its foundations and goals, has awakened the general interest
of philosophers, scientists, and educators. The fact is more widely accepted now that the
scientist can not insulate himself against the current of philosophic thought, nor can the
philosopher isolate himself from the facts about the universe discovered by the modem
physical sciences. The fresh streams of thought coursing over the fields of philosophy, sci­
ence, and education, if properly controlled, can make each more fertile and fruitful. The
perennial philosophy can gain immense benefit from the advances of modem sciences,
while modem science itself can find a new dignity in the self-realization of its function and
achievement within and as part of the very structure of the philosophia perennis. The educator will find in the rediscovered dignity of science that the study of nature is an integrated,
unique discipline within which the ancient science (philosophy) and the modem philosophy
(science) can be reconciled.
The true dignity of science in our modem day has been championed by the Albertus
Magnus Lyceum for Natural Science under the founder director, William H. Kane, O.P.
On the occasion of the Tenth Anniversary of The Albertus Magnus Lyceum and the Sixtieth
Birthday of its founder, Fr. William H. Kane, O.P., the staff of The Thomist joins with
eminent philosophers, scientists, and educators in presenting twenty-four important Studies
in the Philosophy of Science entitled The Dignity of Science.

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List of contributors in order of appearance
Michael Browne, O.P., Master General of the Order of Preachers
James A. Weisheipl, O.P.
Roman A. Kocourek
Sister M. Joceyln, O.P.
Edward D. Simmons
Vincent E. Smith
John A. Oesterle
Raymond J. Nogar, O.P.
Herbert Ratner
Sister Margaret Ann, O.P.
Richard P. McKeon
Albert S. Moraczewski, O.P.
Daniel A. Gillus, OJP.
Michael Stock, O.P.
William A. Wallace, O.P.
Ambrose McNicholl, O.P.
Michael A. Hoskin
Benedict Ashley, O.P.
Charles De Koninck
Sistçr M. Olivia, R.SM.
Sheilah O’Flynn Brennan
Patrick H. Yancey, S.J.
Melvin Glutz, C.P.

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