ί·
Vol. XIII

OCTOBER, 1950

No. 4

THE

THOMIST
A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
Edited

by the

Dominican Fathers

I

CONTENTS

1

FATIMA: THE ROSARY AND THE HEART OF MARY

I
I
I

Marceliano Llameras, Ο. P.

**
THE DIALECTICS OF WAR AND PEACE (Conclusion)

J. T. Delos, Ο. P.

jl

THOMISM AND THE NEW THEOLOGY
David L. Greenstock, T. O'. P.

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566

J. T. DELOS

which underlies its demands. He surpasses it because he knows
and understands it, refers it to an ideal on which he judges it,
not as one revolting against it, but as a good artisan who
renders his services according to the plan of the architect, even
though he himself did not conceive this plan.
The unity of the world conscience is veritably manifest
simultaneously on two planes: outside of ourselves, in civilized
society, thanks to the social standing which justice and love of
the common good give to the international collectivity; in each
one of us, because the understanding of the total common good
and the love which we bear it carries over into our own beings
the order and the peace of the universe.

|

J. T. Delos, O. P.
Ambassade de France, près le Saint Siège,
Rome, Italy.

I
*1

THOMISM AND THE NEW THEOLOGY
*
ΊΗΑΤ World War II would bring with it, not merely
great changes in the material fortunes of many nations,
but also radical changes in the world of thought, was
something which could have been forseen by a glance at the
history of human thought throughout the ages. Even before
the outbreak of hostilities it was evident that the great civil
universities of Europe were in the grip of philosophies which
were anti-christian in character, derived as they were from
Kant, Hegel, Marx, and Engels. Once the frontiers of Europe
were opened for inspection after the liberation it soon became
clear that a new factor had arrived on the scene. This was a
new philosophy, difficult to define, even by those who taught
it, but nevertheless of great influence, especially in France.
This new philosophy was given the name of Existentialism.
Now, it is also a fact of history that few philosophies come into
being without having an influence, sooner or later, on the
science of Theology, and so it was natural that the theologian
should wait, with a certain degree of apprehension, the result
of the impact of these philosophies, especially Existentialism,
on Catholic thought. This was even more important in the
present case, since a flourishing school of Catholic existentialists
already existed in France and in some other countries.
By the year 1946 controversies in several ecclesiastical reviews
made it quite clear that the apprehensions were more than
justified.1 In that same year, in the course of two Allocutions,
one to the General Chapter of the Friars Preachers and the
other to the Jesuits, the Pope himself made some references to
F

J
g

* This article was written and accepted for publication prior to the appearence
of the recent papal encyclical, Humani Generis. Hence, the author makes no refer­
ence to that important document but his article gains significance in the light of
the Holy Father’s words.—Ed.
1 Cf. M. Labourdette, Ο. P. “ La Théologie et sea sources,” Revue Thomiste, 56
(1946), 353-371, and J. Daniélou, “Les orientations présentes de la pensée reli­
gieuse,” Etudes, 249 (April, 1946).

567

568

DAVID L. GREENSTOCK

what he called a “ new theology.”2 He pointed out that, while
questions hitherto in dispute among Catholic theologians were
still important and by no means to be neglected, nevertheless,
the modern problem which confronts all theologians, no matter
to what “ school ” they belong, is the defense of the very founda­
tions of the perennial philosophy and theology, foundations
which every intellect calling itself Catholic both recognizes and
venerates. The very centre of the problem touches upon the
intimate relations between the human intellect and that faith
which has been revealed to man by God. How far is the intel­
lect capable of penetrating into those truths in order to deduce
from them, by a process of reasoning, other truths which are
connected with them? Above all, what is the value of such
conclusion? In his Allocution to the Jesuits the Pope men­
tioned the new theology by name: “There is a good deal of
talk (but without the necessary clarity of concept), about a
‘new theology,’ which must be in constant transformation,
following the example of all other things in the world, which
are in a constant state of flux and movement, without ever
reaching their term. If we were to accept such an opinion what
would become of the unchangeable dogmas of the Catholic
Faith; and what would become of the unity and stability of
that Faith? ”
In spite of these words of warning so solemnly delivered by
the Vicar of Christ, discussion and controversy still continued,
and on the twenty-third of November, 1949, the Spanish phi­
losopher Ortega y Gasset, speaking to a packed audience in the
Barcelô cinema, Madrid, declared that European Idealism as a
philosophical system had been overcome and superseded by
another and a more modern system, so too had Aristotelianism.
He then continued: “ I am able to announce to you that the
Roman, Catholic, Apostolic Church is about to relinquish both
Aristotelianism and Thomism; and that a new theology is being
forged which is in close relationship with that of the Greek
Fathers.”8
* Cf. Act. Apost. Sed,, 38 (1046), 384-388.
• Reported in YA, 24th Nov. 1949.

P
t

I

,

[

‘

TnOMISM AND THE NEW THEOLOGY

569

In spite of all that has been said and written about this new
theology there is still no very clear idea of its basic doctrines,
even though several of its chief proponents are now well known
to us all.
*
The historical centre of the movement is in France,
with some repercussions in other countries, such as England
and Spain, where the movement has been hailed as the contri­
bution of this century to modern thought. However, the parti­
sans of this new theology make it very difficult for us to detect
their basic doctrines, for the simple reason that they do not
seem to be very interested in constructing a definite system or
method of theology. Rather they spend most of their time and
energies in attacking the old traditional system, their basic
argument being that it is to the advantage of the Church in
modern times to adopt more modern methods of approach, and
especially modern philosophies, in order to present the truths
of the faith in a way which will appeal to ordinary people.
In order to make their position clearer we shall endeavour, in
the course of this article, to study some at least of the main
doctrines put -forward by these new theologians, especially
those which seem to have some connection with the warning
given by the Holy Father in his two Allocutions already
mentioned.
The term “ new theology ” has, as we shall see, no very fixed
content. The phrase can mean something which all Catholic
theologians worthy of the name must reject, or it can be applied
to certain tendencies which, although they may be dangerous
if carried too far, may occupy a legitimate place in Catholic
theology. One thing however is quite certain, namely that this
new movement can not be separated from what M. Maritain
has called the “ New Christianity,”5 which according to him is
bound to make itself felt in the present age, and which will be
characterized by an attempt to bring the doctrines of the
Church into line with the times in which we live. We might
* Cf. Br. de Solages, “ Pour l’honneur de la Théologie,” in Bulletin de Littérature
Ecclesiatique, 48 (1947), 65-84, in which the names of the principal supporters of
the new theology are given.
eCf. J. Maritain, Humanisme Intégral, pp. 139 and 140,

1
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I

570

DAVID L. GREENSTOCK

say of the new theology that it attempts to form one of the
integral elements in the new Christianity. The partisans of this
movement are preoccupied with the “man in the street” as we
know him today. He has to be won over to Christ and to the
true Church, and yet he has been brought up on the basis of a,
rationalistic and idealistic philosophy which has effectively
sealed his mind against any approach along the old traditional
lines. Scholastic philosophy will never make any impression
upon him for the simple reason that he does not understand
the terms and the concepts which it uses. The same must there­
fore be said of a theology which makes use of the traditional
Scholasticism for its presentation or development. That is the
real problem which confronts the theologian of today, and
the whole question at issue between the new theologians and
the traditional Thomist is how it can best be solved. Con­
fronted with this problem the partisans of the new theology
have attempted a solution, but that solution is proposed in
two very different ways which can not, by any means, receive
the same criticism, as we shall see.
Both solutions imply, even if they do not state it in so many
words, the rejection of the Aristotelio-Thomistic philosophy as
a fitting instrument for use in theology and its substitution by
other more modern forms of philosophical thought. One solu­
tion has, however, gone too far, and has denied the scientific
value of those deductions made from the revealed principles of
the faith with the aid of reason as an instrument. The earlier
writings of Fr. Chenu and Fr. Charlier contain a summary of
this extreme solution. According to Chenu, the source of all
theology is the vital life of the Church in its members, which
can not be separated from history, the deciding factor in all
theology. Thus, strictly speaking, theology is the life of the
members of the Church, rather than a series of conclusions
drawn from revealed data with the aid of reason. Charlier
added to this statement the conclusion that the strict theo­
logical deduction as the result of a scientific use of human
reason is therefore impossible, since it would suppose that
reason could attain to a true understanding of the truths of

571

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THOMISM AND THE NEW THEOLOGY

•J

faith. Theology, as such, is therefore reduced to a simple ex­
planation of revealed truth in terms which need not necessarily
have a permanent value, but which can, and indeed should,
change with time and according to the demands of circum­
stances. This doctrine was far too dangerous to pass unchecked,
and in 1942 the Holy Office banned the writings in which it
appeared.8
In spite of this condemnation and the strong warning of the
Holy Father in the Allocutions already mentioned, the same
type of solution was proposed in a slightly more benign form
in articles in Reviews and especially in some of the publications
in the series, Sources Chrétiennes as well as in the Collection
Théologie and Unam Sanctam. Once again the subtle attack
on Scholasticism was evident, and it would be as well to point
out at once that the focal point of this attack was not merely
Thomism as such. There are different theories on certain mat­

I

<r

ters pertaining to theology inside the Church and many things
are open to free discussion, but up to the present all systems
have attempted to base their solutions and conclusions on the
solid rock of the perennial truth. It is that very foundation,
wherever it may be found, which is under attack from the new
theology. At the same time, the main enemy is, as always,
Thomism, partly because it is the one system which has a com­
pletely coherent philosophical basis, and also because many
other systems existing in the Church today are not entirely
free from the taint of humanism and even of nominalism. This

fact becomes very clear if we compare two articles written on
the subject of the new theology, one by Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange
in Angelicum and the other by Fr. Perego in Ciencia y Fc.1
The former sees the new theology as a dangerous innovation
which strikes at the very roots of the faith itself, and which is,
therefore, to be condemned. The latter, while by no means
agreeing entirely with this new system, tries to lay much more
emphasis on the reasons for its appearance at this point in the
V

M. D. Chenu, Une Ecole de Théologie, Le Saulchoir, 1937; L. Charlier, Essai
*
sur le problème théologique, 1938,
7 Angelicum, 1946, pp. 126-145, and Ciencia y Ee, 1949, pp. 7-30.

572

DAVID L. GREENSTOCK

history of civilization. The aim of the new theologians is pri­
marily apologetic, i. e., an attempt to approach the modern
mind by a direct use of modem methods, adapting for that
purpose philosophical terms and concepts which are in more
common use among present-day philosophers in an endeavour
to break down the prejudice against Scholasticism and all that
it implies. This divergence in the criticism of the new theology
shows us more plainly than anything else the difficulty of
obtaining any clear notion of what is really implied by this
movement, a difficulty which is increased by the fact that many
of those theologians who do attempt to criticise this new move­
ment are themselves followers of systems which have departed
from the clear lines of true Thomistic thought.
Thus it is clear that the main contention of the partisans of
this new movement is that theology, to remain alive, must
move with the times. At the same time, they are very careful
to repeat all the fundamental propositions of traditional theo­
logy almost as if there was no intention of making any attack
against it. This is very true of such writers as Frs. de Lubac,
Daniélou, Rahner and Br. de Solages, all of whom are un­
doubtedly at the very centre of this movement.
Their main accusation seems to be that traditional theology
is out of touch with reality because it takes little or no account
of modern methods and philosophical systems, and thus fails
in its main object, i. e., to present to the modern world a reason­
able explanation of the doctrine of Christ. This is especially
true, in their opinion, of neo-Thomism, which is a sterile move­
ment, destined to have little or no effect on the modern world.
As one of these theologians expresses it, “ Quand l’esprit évolue,
une vérité immuable ne se maintient que grâce à une évolution
simultanée et corrélative de toutes les notions, maintenant
entre elles un même rapport. Une théologie qui ne serait pas
actuelle serait une théologie fausse.”8 According to such teach­
ers traditional theology, with its foundations in Aristotelianism,
has lost during the centuries which followed St. Thomas, a mass
of notions, ideas, and even methods of expounding the faith
8 H. Bouillard, Conversion et Grace chez S, Thomas D'Aquin, pp. 219, sq.

1

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THOMISM AND THE NEW THEOLOGY

573

which were well known to the Fathers of the Church, some of
which have been taken over by the leaders of contemporary
non-Catholic thought. Such ideas and methods must be re­
covered if any approach is to be made to the modern world,
and they must be incorporated into theology, even if that
means rejecting Aristotelianism or even Thomism as we under­
stand it today.
The partisans of the new theology accuse the defenders of
the traditional methods of being ignorant of that dramatic
world, the human individual with all his anxieties and experi­
ences, while they wander about in a world of the abstract and
the, speculative. St. Thomas himself—so they assert—were he
alive today, would be the first to recognize the importance of
a new method of approach, and so would do all that he could
to find one which would bring Catholic teaching into the fore­
ground once more. Small wonder then that the traditional
theologians have made a counter-accusation against the new
theology that it has its philosophical basis in idealism and in
voluntarism, being descended in a direct line through Plotinus,
Bruno, Kant, Schelling, and Hegel in the remote past, and from
Von Humbolt, Nietzsche, Weber and Heidegger in more recent
years. Perhaps such a statement takes the criticism of the
philosophical angle of the new theology a little too far, but
certainly it would be quite true to say that the partisans of the
new movement are seeking their metaphysics outside Thomism,
and with bad results up to the present.
It is perfectly true to say that St. Thomas himself was the
author of a “new theology”; one glance at the history of
Thomism from the twelfth to the fourteenth centuries is enough
to justify this remark. It is also true that Thomism, far from
being a dead thing, is necessarily vital, in the sense that much
progress is made and new light is continually being thrown on
the mysteries of the faith by means of the theological con­
clusion strictly so called, that is to say, from one premise
containing a revealed truth and another which contains a truth
known for certain by human reason. St. Thomas would have
been the last to assert that Thomism had reached its term with

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DAVID L. GREENSTOCK

the last of his writings. On the contrary, he himself was always
on the lookout for new angles of approach to the many ques­
tions ‘which needed solution in his own day. However, the
position taken up by the adherents of this new theology is far
different from that which St. Thomas adopted. Perhaps we
shall be able to see this a little more clearly if we consider for
a moment the position they adopt with regard to revelation.
When God speaks to man and communicates to him divine
mysteries it is the fact which is revealed, and not the logical
proposition in which that fact is presented to us. Consequently,
very different philosophical systems can and indeed should be
used to express that divine revelation and to explain it to the
people for whom it is intended, who are not all theologians by
any means. The supernatural virtue of faith which is given to
us by God in order that we may believe the truths which He
has revealed is essentially a vital thing, part, that is to say, of
our lives, and as such it can not be separated from the age in
which we live. Only in a very secondary way is it concerned
with those formal propositions under whose form the faith is
presented to us. Faith will thus give birth to theology, because
the truths of faith are expressed in words and concepts taken
from philosophical systems, but since those philosophies will
naturally tend to evolve according to the needs of the times it
follows that theology too will be in a state of constant evolu­
tion. However, the real progress in the development of revealed
truth is to be found, not in the use of philosophical terms or
logical propositions and reasonings, but in an ever growing
penetration into the truths of faith by a deeper and more vital
Christian life.9 Since the life of the individual as a Christian
and a member of the Mystical Body can not be separated from
the age in which he lives, it will be natural and even necessary
to adopt the terms and the concepts familiar to modern thought
in order to express the truths of faith in such a way that they
will be intelligible and attractive to those outside the true
Church who are groping their way towards the knowledge and
the love of God.
• Clearly, this is very closely allied to Blondel’s definition of truth as adaequatio
realis mentis et vitae.

TIIOMISM AND ΤΠΕ NEW THEOLOGY

t

575

- Such, very briefly, is the position taken up by the new
theologians with regard to the relation between revelation and
theology as a science; and to our way of thinking it outlines a
problem which will have to be faced by all theologians, and
especially by Thomists. NcedlessJxL say, such a position, like
most errors, contains, a germ of truth.jwhich makes it all the
more dangerous. That divine revelation is. above all, a com­
munication of certain divine facts can have a perlectly legitimatemeaning for the orthodox theqlpgiam~a nd aboyg^afl for
the Thornistj^but to make such a statement the basis of a
theological systen? whichZderides; (tharp is ηο other word) the
theological conclusion, is a very great mistake. However, it is
not, by any means the only mistake made by the partisans of
the new theology, because their root error goes ever so much
deeper, consisting as it does in a false interpretation of the
relationship between faith and reason. To go too deeply into
this question would lead us further afield than the purpose of
this article warrants, but at the same time a brief statement
of the Thomist position in this matter will help to bring out
even more clearly the implications and the dangers of these
new theories.
St. Thomas’ view of this problem of the relation between
faith and reason which gives rise to the science of theology was
both deep and clear and is admirably set out and defended by
John of St. Thomas,ie Theology is a true science, indeed it is
the most noble of the sciences, worthy in every way of the
name of sapientia. The principles upon which it relies in_its
cvqlutioiLand in its investigations are those divine facts wjiielh
have been revealed by JmuT However, as~a science, those
divinely "revealed principles do not form its proper object, that
is the rôle of the conclusions which are dravvn from them with
the help of hpman ggn^nn. Such a statement,'which seems so
clear to us now, was a real revolution when it· was first made.
The object of the science of theology is the theological conclu­
sion bjiTnTy su callecl.
ow, in order to deduce these conclusions
1,0 Summa Theol., I, q. 1; cf. John of St. Thomas,' Cursus Theologicus, in loco.

576

DAVID L, GREENSTOCK

from revealed truth there is need of a fitting instrument with
which to work. Sometimes this instrument takes the form of
another revealed truth, while at other times it is a. truth which
isknown to human_reaso_n by its own unaided efforts. Now,
obviously, the minor premise" which contains another revealed
truth will have fa rgr eater influence on the conclusion than one
which contains â truth ktiown To^Euman reason alone. But,
and here is the crux of the whole question, even though the
human truth occupies an inferior position, that of a mere instru­
ment, the revealed truth in the major premise does exercise a
great influence on that human instrument, That is why St.
Thomas speaks of these natural truths which are so used in
theology as the “handmaidens” of that science, in the sense
that theology, as a true science, makes use of these human
truths for its major purpose, which is to explain revealed truth
in humanTanguage, so far as that is possible.
"
’
The position of the new theologians is very different from
that of Aquinas. Their idea is that the theological reasoning
consists in using the revealed truth in order tn denw nut the
i full latent content contained in the human truths, the contrary,
in fact, m the Thomist position. This is a logical conclusion
which follows from their vitalistic attitude, towards truth and
especially from their statementsThat the theological conclusion
strictly so callecThas little or no value.11 It also follows from
their teaching with regard to the evolution, necessarily con­
nected with contemporary history, through which theology
must pass if it is to remain alive and to play an effective part
in the modern world. As one of the partisans of the new
theology expresses it, “ Uhistoire manifeste donc à la fois la
relativité des notions, des schèmes où la théologie prends corps,
et Vaffirmation permanente qui les domine. Elle fait connaître
la condition temporelle de la théologie et, en même temps, offre
aux regards de la foi l’affirmation absolue, la Parole divine qui
s’y est incarnée’’12.Thus the human reasoning which changes
according to the dictates of its historical evolution and the
11 Cf. the two works by M. Chenu and L. Charlier already quoted in note 6.
1S Conversion et grâce chez S. Thomas D’Aquin, by Henri Bouillard, ρ. 221.

THOMISM AND THE NEW THEOLOGY

577

napaa&ities of the times, p^s-the^permanent element, whichjs^,
the divine truth, as an instrument to develop and present its
latent content.
simply one of two contrary waxs of considering the relation
between revelation andjreason. Either reason, is the instrument
in tfae development of yeyealeJtruth_pr the revealed truth is
the instrument of reason. It is our opinion that, unless the fact
which we have mentioned before of the great influence of the
revealed truths on the natural truth which is used as an instru­
ment in their full development is understood and clearly brought
to light, then this fundamental error in the new theology will
never be completely overcome. For that reason it is useful to
notice that the same conclusion could have been reached by a _
consideration of the rôle of the middle term in the theological
syllogism, which in one case—that of theTniljor prëmise2—isli
revealed truth, and in the other minor premise, a truth of
hmaaiLjeason. In order that this middle term in the minor
premise may have exactly the same sense as that which it has
in the major premise, thus avoiding four terms in the syllogism,
iFmust of necessity have the/“approval,” as it were, of the
rpjvealpd truth. If we examine it carefully we shall see that it
is just this approval which gives to the theological conclusion
its full force as an element in the expression of divine revelation
and which also brings to light the rôle of human truth as an
instrument in theology.
We know that, according to St. Thomas, the instrument has
a double activity, i. e., its own, which is attributed to its per­
sonal activity in the forming of the effect, and also another
power which it receives from that cause which uses it as an
instrument. Thus^jn the theological conclusion we are not
dealing with ^erfesof probabilities, but with stricCconclusionT

in the form of judgments which correspond to the ontological
haith virtually contained in the revealed principles/ This doctrîhe hàs” been very clearly expressed by John of St. Thomas,
when he said: “ Praemissa naturalis consideratur dupliciter.
Primo secundum quod praecise naturalis est, et sic ex hac parte

578

DAVID L. GREENSTOCK

non concurrit nisi ministerialiter. . . . Alio modo consideratur
praemissa naturalis ut conjuncta praemissae supernaturali de
fide, scilicet ut ab ea elevatur quia approbatur et corrigitur ab
ipsa, et eius certitudinem participat: et hoc modo etiam prae­
missa naturalis concurrit non principaliter, et per se, sed sub
altiori lumine.”13
From all these various angles we reach one and the same
con cl usion .jiamelv that it is the truth of faith which plays, the
active part in the theological process of reasonin g^jusing the
jiatural truth to develop the latent content in_revelation, and
using it as a strict instrument in the Thoinist sense of that
word. For this reason those theological conclusions _are more
certain than anymerely natural truth could ever be, because
they a^e l'cducedf ïn their final analysis^Q^higher principle
than natural reason, one whicF is supernatural and_divine.
which colours all-that is human-in _thp theological process,
giving it a new and a supernatural value, ^t is this divine element in theology which unifies everything, even the speculative
and the practical aspects of it .14 Because the new theology has
failed to appreciate this truth with regard to the theological
conclusion it has also failed to realize the rôle of the merely
human truth as an instrument of faith.
Clearly, these principles have a very great importance when
we come to consider the attacks delivered against Thomism by
the partisans of the new theology. Far from being a mere
development of rationalism, as they assert, Thomism is, at one
and the same time, realistic and objective in its outlook. For
this reason the present Holy Father, in an address to the
assembled students of the seminaries, institutes, and colleges
of Rome, both seculars and regulars, stressed once again the
teaching of the Deus Scientiarum Dominus, as well as that of
the Code of Canon Law, and then added: “Be full of devotion,
therefore, blessed sons, and of enthusiasm for St. Thomas:
bend all your efforts to grasp his lucid doctrine, embrace whole­
heartedly whatever clearly belongs to it and is safely regarded
13 John of St. Thomas, Cursus Theologicus, I, q. 1, a. 6.
14 Cf. John of St. Thomas, in I, Disp. 2, a. 10.

THOMISM AND THE NEW THEOLOGY

579

as essential to it.”15 In the light of such clear direction from
the Holy See what are we to think of the action of these new
theologians who wish to substitute for Thomism the terms,
concepts, and principles of a new and fluid philosophy which,
as they themselves confess, will pass in the course of time as
others have done before it? To quote once more the words of
one of the new theologians, “ Quand l’esprit évolue, une vérité
immuable ne se maintient que grâce à une évolution simultanée
et corrélative de toutes les notions, maintenant entres elles un
mère rapport. Une théologie qui ne serait actuelle serait une
théologie fausse.”18
Does it not also follow from what we have said above about
the theological conclusion and the place in it of the human ele­
ment that, jghen the Church uses certain, philosophical terms
in her dogmatic definitions, she isTeallvexercising her infallible [
judgment with regard to the value of such terms to .express the
inner meaning of divinely revealed truth? She is in no way
subordinating herself to those terms, as some seem incljjjsil to |
think; on the contrary, she is using them to express her meaninffi-anr}
they no longer-belong to the purely human or
natural order, but receive a supernatural approval from thosç
verw>same divine truths which they serve to express. That is .
the main reason why_we. as Thomists, insist on the perennial.
aspecVpf the philosophy of Aquinas, something which will
remain and be a vital element in the world long after other
systems have faded into history. Speaking of this aspect of
Thomism, M. Maritain says: “It can, therefore, claim to be
abiding and permanent in the sense that, before Aristotle and
St. Thomas had given it scientific formulation as a systematic
philosophy, it existed from the dawn of history in germ, and
in the pre-philosophic state, as an instinct of the understanding
and a natural/knowledge of the first principles of reason, and
ever since its foundation as a system has remained firm and
progressive, a powerful and living tradition, while all other
philosophies have been born and have died in their turn.”17

p

1S Act. Apost. Sed., 31-245.
19 Henri Bouillard, Conversion et grâce chez S. Thomas D'Aquin, p. 219.
lT Introduction to Philosophy, p. 100.

580

DAVID L. GREENSTOCK

We are now asked to accept, in exchange for this solid founda­
tion, the fluid concepts of a new philosophy, destined to change
with time—we are told—like everything else in this fluid world.
This, to our way of thinking, is not merely unreasonable but
also very dangerous.
Thereare certain-basic philosophical concepts which cannot,
be abandoned without danger to our faith. SkThomas saw
this very clearly in connection with certain no^ons^such as
that of subsistence as included in Conciliar decrees and defi­
nitions, in particular those of the Second Council of Constantinoplfi. It-is_absolutely necessary to retain this metaphysical
concept in exactly the same sense in which it is understockdLby
the Thomist, as the foundation of the psychological and moral
personality if we are to hope to avoid falling into the heresies
of Nestorius and Eut,y ch es. We are not told what is to happen^y
(to these ontological notions and concepts were Thomism to be 1
/ abandoned in favour of a new theology and philosophy, but
van guess! For that reason we can not accept.the statement of
jihe new theology that such metaphysical notions included in
* Conciliar decrees have no permanent value, and can be substituted hy others without any danger to thé abWn^3)i’mTrîples
of the faith itself. Thus, (speaking of tlïë notioil of formal <|îuse^
as introduced-Inin the decrees on Justification in the^Council
of Trent, gnuillard says; “ On se demandera pëut-êtres’il est
^encore possible de considérer comme contingentes les notions
impliquées dans les définitions conciliaires? Ne serait-ce pas
compromettre le caractère irréformable de ces définitions? Le
Concile de Trente, par example, a employé, dans son enseigne­
ment sur la justification, la notion de cause formelle. N’a-t-il
pas, par le fait même, consacré cet emploi et conféré à la notion
de grâce-forme un caractère définitif? — Nullement. Il n était
certainment pas dans Γintention du Concile de canoniser une
notion aristotélicienne, ni même une notion théologique conçue
sous Γinfluence d’Aristote.... Il a utilisé à cette fin des notions
communes dans la théologie du temps. Mais on peut leur sub­
stituer d’autres sans modifier le sens de son enseignement.”18
18 H. Bouillard, Conversion et grâce chez S. Thomas D’Aquin, pp. 221-222.

1

THOMISM AND THE NEW THEOLOGY

581

This doctrine alone would be sufficient to justify scepticism
with regard to the new theology and its fundamental tenets,
because we should not forget that we are being asked to substi­
tute for the clear metaphysical notions of Aquinas the fluid
concepts of modern philosophies, andjt is ygry_ difficult indeed
for us to see how that can be done without harm to the
unchangeable doctrines (jf the faith. A simple application of
whathas been quoted above about the notion of the formal
cause to other concepts such as those of relation, person, nature,
and-gubstance as they are to be found in the writings of modern
philosophers only serves to increase our sense of apprehension.
However, we shall leave this point for more detailed and posi­
tive criticism on another occasion, but before doing so a word
must be said about the connection between the revealed truth
as such and the formal proposition of that truth, i.e. the dogma
of faith. .
That there is an intimate relation between the revealed truth
and the dogma as proposed by the Church for our belief is
something which is perfectly clear to everyone. However, it is
evident that the new theologians have misunderstood that rela­
tionship, or at least have fixed their attention on one aspect of
it to the neglect· of others. The logical proposition is related to
the mystery of faith which ilex presses just as the logical asser­
tion is related to the thing which instated in it. In other words,
so far asthê Church is. concerned the dogma is only the external
expression in words of her intimate judgment of revealed trutlT.
It is a proposition expressing a truth and formulated by a
Teacher who is infallible in things which pertain to faith or
morals. Therefore the logical expression in words of any truth
of faith is something more than a mere external expression of
& Christian experience (that is the modernist view) ; it is the act
of the official teaching Church. It is very important not to
forget this fact.
Insofar, then, as the dogma is contained in a logical propo­
sition, it is something complex; whereas the mystery itself
which is proposed for our belief is something simple. This
means, in actual practice v that we do, in fact, believe the
9

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✓

^

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582

DAVID L. GREENSTOCK

but at the_same time7 that proposition is the/iûëiliim] khrouglT
which we .believe the mystery, ana therefore it must express
that mystery adequately, especially when it is"proposed to ps
by the "nTallible Church. This doctrine is nothing more than
an application, not bClogical formulae which have no real
meaning, but of common sense. The formal, logical proposition
has no value except as an expression of the inwardlTi ought.
Simple examples of this fact could be given in abundance, but
one will suffice. The phrase, ‘“man
a.Rational animal ” is a
logical proposition which is expected to express in words the
nature of man. If one agrees with that proposition he can do
so from various aspects. To any Christian that phrase should
imply that man is a composite being, made up of two parts,
the body and the soul. But the proposition could also be sub­
scribed to by a rationalist who does not believe in the soul at all,
as a spiritual entity. Are we, therefore, _to say that both the
Christian and the rationalist believe in the same basic reality
behindthe words of this logical proposition? By no means.
In otfieTwords, the phrase “rational animal must have a very
definite philosophical content which in one case is agreed to
and in the other is denied. It Js our contention that the same
thing is true with regard to_ those basic philosophical concepts
which are connected with certain Conciliar decrees and defi­
nitions, and which must be retained in their full metaphysical
meaning if the faith is not tohave, as its basis, shifting sand
instead of firm rocld
We have already observed that it is very difficult to give a
systematic outline of the doctrines of the new theology, and
that for several reasons. In the first place, the partisans of
this movement are far too occupied with their revolt against
traditional Thomism to spend much time in the building up of
a system. Moreover, they are very shy and elusive, so much
so that it is often difficult to diagnose this tendency in any
particular author. Anyone who has read the works of Fr. Ives
de Montcheuil, especially chapters nine and ten of his Leçons
sur le CKrist, will be able to appreciate something at least of

5

THOMISM AND THE NEW THEOLOGY

583

this difficulty. For that reason it is neither possible nor indeed
quite fair to attempt to give a complete list of authors who
may be regarded as partisans of this new movemen t.^Hather
we have to be on the watch for tendencies, hints, obscurities,
many_nf which are admirably hidden behind a smoke-screen of
statements whirh gppm. at first sight, to reflect the pure tradi­
tional theology, but which in fact do nothing of the kind. This
is very noticeable in such writers as Frs. de Lubac and Damélou.
From even a brief glance at their principal works it is at once
clear that they are at pains to hide anything which might be
regarded as new or startling intheir expositions under the
outward appearance of complete agreement with all the tradi­
tional formulae of theology. They claim to be amongThe most
faithfubdisciples of St. Thomas whose mam task is to set ffis
*
doctrinesin the framework of history. Their works abound in
quotations from the writings of Aquinas, although some of his
principal commentators are conspicuous by their absence! They
recognize, without exception, the full Catholic doctrine with
regard to the supernatural nature of such elements in the
spiritual life as grace, the beatific vision, the gifts of the Holy
Ghost, and the infused virtues, but they differ very much from
the Thomist position in their exposition of the whole relation­
ship between the natural and the supernatural. This difference
can be clearly seen in their treatment of that very difficult
question of the natural desire for supernatural beatitude,
especially as it is outlined in Fr. de Lubac’s now-famous book
Surnaturel. We are not concerned here with a complete criticismrOfThat work because that has already been done by
authors far more competent to judge of its merits and de-merits
than we are.19 Our task is somewhat simpler in its scope,
because it is concerned with the foundation which lies behind
the doctrine expressed in that'book.
As a preliminary observation it should be noted that it is
not correct to say that St. Thomas makes only rare use of the
word “ supernatural,” a statement, by the way, which is by no
10 Cf. the admirable article by C. Boyer, S. J., “ Nature pure et Surnaturel dans
le Surnaturel de P. de Lubac,” Greÿorianum, 18 (1947), pp. 879, sq.

584

DAVID L. GREENSTOCK

means exclusive to Fr. de Lubac. The truth of the matter is
that both the ' word itself in its full ’meaning and also the
synonyms for it occur frequently in the writings of Aquinas,
especially in the Swmna,?theh Quaestiones Disputatae and in
the single question De, virtutibus in Communi.20
™!»
*-dfiirig
«nd false, however, is the interpretation_
which de Lubac gives tp this term “supernatural ” and which^
he attributes, to St. Thomas, i.e., that itis not used in direct
contrast to “ natural.” but rather to signify anything which
lies over and beyond the merely natural powers of any creature.
This definition, apart from the fact that it is not even etymo­
logically correct, lies at the root of all the teaching contained
in this book Obviously, with .the aid of such, a definition, in
which “ supernatural ” really means “ superhuman,” the author
is able Lo) linden St. Thomas” teaching justification for his
theory that there is, in the natural order, an indficacioiis but
absolute desire for the beatific vision of God faceto face and
as He is in Himself, since man has no other ultimate end but
this vision, in the present order. Since this desire is natural,
and therefore something which is placed by God Himself in
man’s human nature, it does not have the effect of making
God1 depend on man (for it’is His free gift), nor can it produce
in us any right, to the beatific vision, to grace, or the infused
virtues. Thus?the gratuitous nature of these gifts is saved, but
at the cost of not a little effort on the part of the author.
There can be little doubt that a theory such as this, espe­
cially if it is carried to its logical conclusions, does tend to
destroy the complete distinction between the natural and, the,
supernatural, in spite ofaTT the author may say to the contrary.
Italso^SCüTiïs clear that, even if this explanation of the meaning
of the terms “ natural ” and “ sùpernatural ” preserves ,what
we may call, for want of a, better term, the “ juridical ’h gratui­
tousness of grace,-the’infused virtues, and the beatific vision,
it is very difficult to j see how_it can preserve at the same time ,
20 Cf. for example, Art. 10 of this Question, also the articles by R. W. Meagher
in the Clergy Review, Jan. 1948.

I

THOMISM AND THE NEW THEOLOGY

585

appreciate this point, which is all-important in this controversy
about the nature of the new theology, it is necessary to see
clearly what is implied in the absolute desire of which de Lubac
speaks.
Since he has given us the usual traditional meaning for the
inefficacious desire, i. e.
* one in which the means to attain it
are lacking in nature, we may presume that, when he speaks
of such a desire as being absolute, as opposed to conditional,
he is also using that .term in its traditional sense. An absolute
desire, then, is one which is concerned with some good which
is in proportion to the nature, such as the desire which the soul
has after death for reunion with the body, or the desire which
a blind man can have for the sense of sight. Even though per
accidens such a desire may be incapable of realization in fact,
it is not therefore a vain desire, nor does it cease to be natural.
Banez, with his usual penetration and clarity of thought, ex­
plains this, and defends the doctrine that such a desire is natural
in spite of the fact that it either can not be, or may never be,
realized at all.21 The reason he gives is both simple and con­
clusive. Since such desires have been realized de jacto in cer­
tain individuals of the species, they can be lawfully desired by
others of the same species. Some persons have, in fact, the gift
of sight, and so it is natural for a man born blind to desire that
gift, even though there may be no power in nature which is
capable of giving him that gift. Such is the usual explanation
given to this term “ absolute desire,” and it is the one which
Fr. de Lubac seems to accept. In that case,There is only one
conclusion which can be drawn from his opinion, pamely, that,
although juridically the supernatural under all its aspects is a
free gift of God, nevertheless, man can still have a desire for
the face to face vision of God which although inefficacious, is
still in proportion to his nature.
Now, it should be kept in mind that Fr. de Lubac in think­
ing about a desire which has for its object not God, as the
Author of Nature, but, as He is in Himself, something which
is of its nature supernatural. Nor are we able to defend this
21 Cf. Bafiez, in I, q. 76, a. I.

586

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DAVID L. GREENSTOCK

opinion on the grounds that he is speaking of the natural
power which is in all creatures to correspond with the activity
of the First Cause, either in the natural or in the supernatural
order, because such a potentia obedientialis is entirely passive,
and thus on the part of the nature of the creature there does
not and can not correspond to it any intention, tendency, incli­
nation, or natural desire; it is a mere passivity under the
Almighty Hand of God. If then this natural desire is to mean
anything at all in the sense in which it is proposed by the
author of Surnaturel it must surely imply that the end in view—
the beatific vision—is, in some way or other, in proportion to
human nature. It would appear that such an opinion does not,
and can not, preserve effectively the complete distinction be­
tween the natural and the supernatural orders, and that conse­
quently, it can not preserve intact the gratuitousness of grace,
at least metaphysically. We can see Fr. de Lubac’s point
when he insists that, since this natural desire is in itself some­
thing which God has implanted in man’s nature, it is a free
gift and so does not force God to give man grace, at least
juridically. But surely that is not enough to justify an abso­
lute desire which may never be fulfilled? Also what are we to
think of the state of pure nature? Are we to deny all possibility
to such a state—a solution which would seem the only logical
conclusion to be drawn from Fr. de Lubac’s views? If so then
we shall have to condemn not only such theologians as Bafiez,
John of St. Thomas, and Cajetan, but also Aquinas himself.
This is not the place for a detailed discussion of the true
meaning which must be given to this natural desire for beatitude as expressed in the writings of St. Thomas. There is an
admirable study of this question by Fr. Manuel Cuervo, Ο. P.
which, to our way of thinking, expounds the only explanation
of it which will answer all difficulties and objections. Our pur­
pose is somewhat easier to accomplish than that, because we
are only concerned with this matter insofar as it provides a
medium for some of the basic teachings of the new theologians,
The more one reads of their writings the more clear it becomes
that they have little positive to offer, and that their main

THOMISM AND THE NEW THEOLOGY

587

objects are to discredit the Scholastic tradition and to replace
it with modem systems. For that reason their writings are
directed towards demonstrating that, even in Aquinas, we can
find the same basic evolution in doctrine, together with the
fact that he, too, is tied hand and foot to the problems, methods,
and lines of thought of his time. For that reason, their main
points of attack against Thomism deal with such things as the
exact nature of Theology as a science, with special emphasis
on its practical aspect in relation to modern philosophical sys­
tems, especially the existential philosophy of Heidegger, Jaspers,
and Gabriel Marcel, nature and super-nature in all its aspects,
and finally—perhaps the most discussed question of all, and
one which is full of traps for the unwary — the evolution of
theology in the light of history. Thus, for example, in his book
on The Drama of Atheistic Thn/ianism, Fr. de Lubac seems
to imply that, as against the attacks of Feuerbach, Marx,
Nietzsche, and Compte, the true prophets of a geniune return
to Christianity are to be found among such writers as Kierke­
gaard and Dostoevsky, who alone are capable of understanding
the contemporary world in which they lived. I suppose that,
in our own day, he would claim that role for a Barth or a
Berdyaev rather than for any Catholic philosopher, tinged
with the Scholastic tradition! Speaking of Péguy’s writings
and influence he says: “ May that be primarily the endeavour
of those among us who are believers; may they show them­
selves more at pains to live by the mystery than eager to defend
its formulas or impose the hard outer crust of it; and the world,
impelled by its instinct to live, will follow in their footsteps.”32
However, it muclhjiot be supposed that the only ones the
new theologians have any respect for are the modern philoso­
phers; they are also very fond of the Greek Fathers, and in this
they have done a great service by making simple translations
of their main works available in French. However, the purpose
behind that action was not quite as innocent as it may seem at
first sight, as we can see from the introduction to the Collection
written by Fr. Daniélou. There it is plain that the idea first
33 The Drama of Atheistic Humanism, by Henri de Lubac.

588

DAVID L. GREENSTOCK

mooted a century ago is still active, i. e., that there are two
different currents in tradition, thatofthe Latins-and t.hnLnf
the Greeks. The"view of the new theologians is that the Church
wilf~7ïïrVT Lu "get Back to lhe methods of the Greek Fathers,
especially to those notions which have been taken over by the
modem non-Catholic philosophers, notions and terms which,
so they maintain, the Church has lost through being tied
excessively to Thomism in all its forms.
First of all, the doctrine of the “two currents” in tradition
is gradually losing favour, owing to the serious criticism directed
against it by Froget and Galtier. Also it) is not very obvious
that the modern world really has adopted anything from the
Greeks with the possible exception of the “eclecticism” of
Clement of Alexandria. Nor is it at all certain that the Church
would gain by a retumïtô either the methods or the terminology
of the Greeks at the expense of Thomism. In some casesi the
method of approach adopted by the Greek Fathers led them
into difficulties which were not solved satisfactorily untilthe
time of Aquinas”. We have a typical example of this in their
approach to^the”whole question of the Blessed Trinity. Their
method was that of the earlier Symbola Fidei, the order of
which they, followed exactly in their catechetical instructions,
.being more concefnedwith proving the divinity of each Person
rather than with questions affecting the unity of Nature" This
**
naturally led to the difficulty of explaining in any satisfactory
way how it is that, while the Father is called the Creator in
the Creeds, still the Gospel of St. John, speaking of the-So»r
says, Omnia per Ipsum facta sunt.
Also, since the doctrine of. appropriation was little known to
them, it followed naturally that they had great difficulty in
explaininffjdie common action of the three divine Persons in
all the nd eætraoperatïüïis. ItrîsTnteresting to notice that some
of these very same difficulties have already reappeared in the
writings of the new theologians, especially in certain questions
related to the indwelling of the Blessed Trinity in the soul.
Really desperate attempts _are being made to establish some
personal relationship of each divine Person to the individual

THOMISM AND THE NEW THEOLOGY

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I

589

soul in the state of grace, based on some peculiar operation of
each Person^ _Some have not hesitated to speaj^f a “ hypoastatic union” between the Holy Ghost and the soul in grace,
a statement which, apart from its theôlogival absurdity, has
already been refuted by Aquinas and by John of St. Thomas!
Who dares to suggest that a general return to these methods
would be to the advantage of the Church in modern times?
Everything points to the fact that the most desperate battles
between the new theology and traditional Thomism will be
waged in the fields of apologetics and mystical theology. Our
generation has already witnessed great changes of method in
the field of apologetics. Where before it was necessary to en­
gage in active controversy on different points of Catholic
dogma, nowadays the essential need is to bring home to the
man in the street those fundamental truths which theologians
call the preambula fidei, as well as the social teaching of the
Church. This is particularly true in France at the present time,
and undoubtedly accounts for the preoccupation of the ecclesi­
astical authorities there with new methods of approach to all
those souls under their care, many of whom have no active
religion, even though they may have been baptized in the
Catholic faith. In England the same basic problem exists, but
viewed from a slightly different aspect, namely, that of the
possibility of some kind of cooperation between the various
protestant sects and the"Cathuliu body, A glance atthe recent
^Correspondence in the Times on the subject'“of “ Catholicism
Today ” shows that there is a growing realization of the power
of the Catholic^ Church, together with a vague feeling that
something should be done about it. As one leader-writer in the
Times puts it, “ There is a widespread demand from Protestants
and from some Catholics for a renewal of exploratory dis­
cussions on dogma and worship, though there certainly does
not seem to be sufficient agreement between the Churches’ views
on their rights and jurisdiction to justify formal negotiation.”23
The Holy See has recently issued a directive on this matter
” Cf. Catholicism Today, a collection of the correspondence mentioned above
(Times Pub. Co., London, 1949).

590

DAVID L. GREENSTOCK

which serves to make certain essential points quite clear. We
I
shall have to wait some time before we see any definite results.
However, all these problems have brought to the front rank of
controversy the arguments put forward by the new theologians
for a change in the apologetic method which will serve to bring
it into line with the needs of the moment. Some theologians
have sought to use this argument as a justification for the
adoption of terms and concepts taken from contemporary phi­
losophies, not all of them existential in character. Others have
shown their sympathy for the movement by a reaction against
what they term “ too much Scholasticism ” in the normal
i
method of approach, not seeming to understand that any
I
*
attempt to find a common basis for discussion between CathoÉ
lies and their opponents must have, as its starting point, certain
clear-cut notions and definitions. Any other method is bound
ito lead to confusion sooner or later, and will thus only serve to

I

widen the gap between us instead of bridging it. The notions
of modern philosophies other than the Neo-scholastic are any­
thing but clear and well-defined; it is for that very reason that
they have found their way into the modern systems, being left
vague deliberately. The real difficulty behind all this lies in
the fact that most people outside the Church suffer from an
almost complete incapacity"Tor logical thought. Their basis
for argument is sentiment rather than reason. What is not so
generally recognized, however, is the fact that this incapacity
is a direct result of those modern philosophies, which we are
now asked to adopt and to'baptize—an~impossible task. How
can we ever expect to reconcile a materialistic philosophy, with
its theories of the dependence of the spiritual on the material
with Catholic thought in all its branches? Or, to take a more
modern example still, how are we to bring together the extreme
voluntarism of the existential theories and that basic intel­
lectualism which is part of our Catholic spiritual formation
and our Thomist tradition?
We are perfectly willing to grant that new methods must be
developed which will meet the needs of our time, but we are
not prepared to admit that there is any need to go outside the

THOMISM AND THE NEW THEOLOGY

591

traditional Thomism to discover those methods. Just as the
true Scholastic tradition is much more easily understood if it
is related to the general history of thought, so modem phi­
losophies must be studied in relation to modern history.
Although metaphysical thought and truth is, as such, inde­
pendent of time, the accidents of thought, such as methods of
presentation and the particular difficulties which have to be
solved, are certainly affected by history. The Catholic phi­
losopher and theologian must be conversant with this “ personal
*
coefficient
’ of modern thought. He must be ready to prove
that Thomism is fully capable of dealing with such modern
questions, and also he must be able to combat the idea that
Thomism is just an ingenious dialectic, manufactured in order
to bolster up a particular.brand of truth or an individual faith.
If that were all that the new theology demanded then we would
have no difficulty in agreeing with it. But that is not the ques­
tion at issue as they who support this new movement see it.
They wish to adapt modern philosophies in order to make them
an instrument of theology for the expression of Christian
thought, and it is this idea which has led them into a very dan­
gerous position so far as the traditional theologian is concerned.
"The Thomist position is simple. There are certain basic lines
within which we must work, and those lines will be found in
the traditional doctrines of Thomism, which is no mere specu­
lative theology and philosophy, but one which is deeply rooted
in all that is best and most lasting in human experience. One
excellent result of the new theology has been an increase in the
study of traditional Thomism from the historical as well as
the theological point of view, with rather startling results as
far as the new theologians are concerned, because they have
occasionally found themselves defeated, and indeed at times
utterly routed, on this, their chosen battle ground.
In the realm of mystical theology and spirituality there are
vast possibilities for the development of the doctrines of the
new theology and its method, and we can only conclude that
such opportunities have not been grasped fully up to now
because the attention of its partisans has been directed else-

1

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DAVID L. GREENSTOCK

'

where.24 Mysticism tends to regard itself as essentially an experimental and a posteriori science, rather than an a priori one,
and thus separates itself as much as possible from the super­
vision of dogmatic theology as such. We can expect to see this
tendency increase rather than decrease, and there lies a very
real danger which the traditional theologian must be fully
prepared to meet.
Once spirituality is effectively separated from dogma, then
any aberration is possible, aswe knowonlÿ too well from^bitter
experience. Every attempt must be made to bring to the fore
those great mystical principles of Aquinas, fully·’in harmony
with dogmatic theology and a logical consequence of it·, in such
a way that any attack along the lines we have just mentioned
will be defeated before it has time to develop. Mysticism has
always proved to be a fertile breeding ground for new ideas
and modes of expression, simply because the mystic finds great
difficulty in confining his experiences within the bounds of
human language, especially the cold, hard terminology of dog­
matic theology. Sometimes, indeed, these human expressions
of mystical experience do not seem to fit into the framework
of Scholastic theology, and when the theologian objects to them
on those grounds he is told that the mystic lives these vital
experiences, and consequently, is the person best qualified to
express their theological content, a statement which is often
far from the truth.
Sooner or later, then, we may expect repercussions of the
new theology in mysticism and in writings on spirituality in
general. Just as there have been new definitions of truth pro­
posed from the vitalistic point of view, so we shall see new
descriptions of grace, the infused virtues, and the gifts of
*tfie
Holy Ghost. -This applies especially to the virtue of faith and
to its act,
*
because of the intimate connection between them
and· the whole question
tgrtfiajrueTaithand with
reveaiecTtrutir'as1 such. ' ihe traditional view whicli describes**

]
j

** This does not mean to say that no attempt has been made to introduce these
new theories into spirituality. Cf. for example, J. Daniélou, Platonisme et Théologie
Mystique, also II. de Lubac, Corpus Mysticum (F. Aubier, Paris).

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593

grace as a spiritual accident operating like a new nature which
not only ITTls man" up to a supernatural level but_.which also
forms tKe remote principle of all his superpatugal activity is
already being decried as too rationalistic, anthropomorphic,
and unintelligible. Such attacks will continue, unless we, as
Thomists, are prepared to bring out the real value of such
concepts as applied to theology and show the permanent truth
which lies behind them.
From the point of view of the Thomist, then, there can be
only one valid method of defence against the inroads of the
new theology, and that will have to come through a revival of
all that is best in the Thomist tradition. If this ne w^ movement
serves as a stimulus to bring about that renaissance—and there
are already obvious signs of this—then we shall have no cause
to lament its appearance at this period in the history of the
Church.
Undoubtedly, this movement contains an element of truth,
since nulla porro falsa doctrina est quae non aliqua vera inter­
misceat, and in that sense we must be prepared to learn from it.
In the first place, every effort should be made to bring even
the mosCsuEiime doctrines of the faith down to the intellectual
level of all men, no matter of what creed, race, or state of life.
This has been the great preoccupation of theologians through­
out thVages, as witness the efforts of Justin, the Alexandrian
school, Augustine, and Aquinas. Secondly, we have something
to learn from contemporary philosophies, because all that they
contain o£ truth is but a reflection of the one, supreme divine
truth, and so can help us to penetrate more deeply into the
secrets of revelation. They can also help us, especially if
studied in relation to contemporary history, to understand the
wounds from which the modern mind is suffering, and so pro­
vide the remedies more quickly and more easily. We must, as
the Holy Father has told us, hold up a friendly hand to all,
which does not mean that we must accept blindly all that these
modern philosophies teach us, even less that we should reject
in their favour the traditional Thomism; quite the reverse.
We must learn to judge the findings and the postulates of the

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DAVID L. GREENSTOCK

moderns in the light of those perennial principles which come
down to us as our greatest inheritance from the days of Aquinas.
Obviously, the problem is one which needs a prompt solution
if Thomism is to regain its place in the world of thought.
Both as a philosophy and as a theology Thomism is essentially
a vital system which develops within certain well-defined lines.
St. Thomas would be the first to support any such development,
but not at the cost of the fundamentals on which the whole
system rests. New methods of approach and new applications
of the perennial principles can certainly be found within the
framework of Thomism which, because of their basis in eternal
truth, will stand the test of time. Thus, for example, it could
be stated and proved that St. Thomas is the greatest of the
existentialists, a fact which can not be denied and which becomes
all the more clear once we destroy for ever the false notion
that all he achieved was the “ baptism ” of Aristotle. He trans­
formed the whole system of Aristotelian philosophy by giving
to it the one unifying principle which alone could bring it to
its full perfection as üië~inslrument.of. theology .—This unifying
principle was that of existence, having its source in revelation,
which shows us a God who is the transcendent, self-existing
Being, who gives to all creatures everything that they have
and are. Thus, there is no need to go outside Thomism to find
a truly existential philosophy; on the contrary, the intellectual
realism of Aquinas is the best antidote for the excessive volun­
tarism of the non-Catholic existentialists such as Kierkegaard
and Sartre. Above all we need to bring to the fore the great
principles of Thomistic metaphysics, with special attention to
the question of the metaphysical method as opposed to the
methods and the limitations of the natural sciences. In this
way we shall be in a position to make it clear that Thomism is
always in intimate contact with experience, since its principles
are based on a rational interpretation of that experience, which
means that it is tied to facts just as much as the natural sciences,
but on a different level.
The picture of natural science as an exact demonstration
based on observation, and of metaphysics as an affair of mere

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THOMISM AND THE NEW THEOLOGY

595

words and abstractions, with little or no real meaning, a picture
which has influenced the new theologians not a little, is alto­
gether false. A glance at the proofs which St. Thomas offers
for the existence of God is sufficient to show us how closely
metaphysics is connected with the every-day facts of experience.
Natural science, which is also concerned with these same facts,
deals with them insofar as they are governed by certain stable
laws, while metaphysics seeks to attain to some knowledge of
their ultimate causes. Consequently, there will always be a
constant element in the findings of metaphysics which will be
true in all ages of the world’s history. To state, as the new
theologians do, that metaphysical systems must, of necessity,
change with the times is to assert that this constant element
in all human experience is really in a state of flux, a statement
which is not only self-contradictory but also contrary to the
facts as we know them.
We can all agree, I think, that the major problem of our day
is not one of mere politics, or even of sociology. It lies in the
field of the metaphysical, and ultimately in theology. However,
we can not agree with the new theologians when they state
that the only solution to this problem is the adaptation of the
modern philosophies to a theological end, even though that
might'mean the rejection of Thomism. The vast majority of
these modern systems seek a foundation in an exaggerated view
of the importance of the individual and of the scope of natural
science, together with a vain attempt to by-pass philosophical
thought by the use of methods which, however useful they
might be in natural science, are quite useless in the realms of
the metaphysical. The struggle at the present time is one of
the re-assertion of the rights of man in relation to the family,
to society, and to God, and that struggle will only be won by
a return to the clear synthesis of all that is best in man’s
thought which we call Thomism. It will certainly not be
achieved by any hotch-potch adaptation of those modem sys­
tems which are the real cause of the whole crisis.
Our duty, vis-à-vis the new theology, is then quite clear.
Not only have we to defend the basic principles of Thomism

596

DAVID L. GREENSTOCK

wherever and whenever they are attacked, but also we have to
present those principles in such a way that we re-educate our
generation in the art of metaphysical and theological reasoning
along those lines. These principles must not be allowed to
stagnate, but should be brought up to date in their modern
applications. If, to a certain degree, we have been careless
about this in the past, there is still time for us to remedy the
error, and if this task is faced with courage and determination,
then we shall see Thomism make its full contribution both to
the modern needs and also 'to those of God’s Church.

David L. Greenstock, T.O.P.
Colegio de Ingleses,
Valladolid, Spain,

I

BOOK REVIEWS
An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy. By A. H. Armstrong, West­
minster: Newman, 1949. Pp. 222, with index. $3.25.

With an easy style, indicative of the origin of the book in a series of
lectures at the London Headquarters of the Newman Association, Mr.
Armstrong writes a competent introduction to the ancient Western phi­
losophies from Ionian Thales, traditionally the first, to St. Augustine on
the threshold of the Middle Ages. It is well to note at the beginning that
he is dealing primarily with philosophies, with philosophers only subordinately and to the degree that their personalities reflect some light on their
thought; this is not a series of anecdotes but a preface to the history of
early thinking. The development measures up to its expressed purpose,
which is to trace out the core of philosophical evolution in European culture;
philosophical and not theological, European and not Asiatic. Since these
distinctions are sometimes non-existent in fact, especially after the procla­
mation of the New Law, a rational division must be imposed on the matter
at certain stages. This is, however, indicated in the text and causes no
difficulties. Within its boundaries the account is clear, complete and well
unified.
To span the births and growths and decays of more than one thousand
years in a subject as diverse in content and as diversely elaborated as phi­
losophy immediately forces a major problem on the author who seeks a
unified effect without misrepresentation. This author resolves the problem
by a fine articulation of progressive influence and historical context, intro­
ducing each stage of the evolution with a brief, instructive analysis of the
cultural milieu, the particular limitations and advantages of the period,
the direction of practical and speculative activity at the time, and the
peculiar aptitude or approach of the philosopher in question, wherever
these factors make a suggestive frame for the thought itself. He concludes
his stages by drawing off, as interpretive summary, the significant influ­
ences, the growth in concept, method and approach that will shape the
subsequent extensions of intellectual progress, to make a well-woven texture
of remote and proximate, direct and indirect causality. He supplements
this emphasis on internal cohesion with one external point of reference,
the conclusions of the Catholic Faith and the Philosophia Perennis, which
are the common possession of the group he is addressing. This single,
widely understood standard provides a convenient principle for a number
of simple and illuminating comparisons.
The intent of the book is to give more than a sketch of the basic princi­
ples and conclusions comprising ancient philosophies. The book is an intro-

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