yR hit, A The Catholic University of America Studies in Sacred Theology No. 92 £4^4i$ THE QUALITY OF FACILITY IN THE MORAL VIRTUES BY THE Reverend Robert Florent Coerver, C.M., S.T.L. A DISSERTATION This dissertation was conducted under the direc­ tion of Rev. Francis J. Connell, C.SS:R., S.T.D., as major professor, and was approved by Rev Joseph L. Lilly, CM., S.T.D., S.S.L., and Rev. Alfred Rush, C.SS.R, S.T.D., as readers. Submitted to the Faculty of the School of Sacred Theology of the Catholic University of America in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Sacred Theology μιΊ 1946 This dissertation was conducted under the direc­ tion of Rev. Francis J. Connell, C.SS'.R., S.T.D., as major professor, and was approved by Rev. Joseph L. Lilly, C.M., S.T.D., S.S.L., and Rev. Alfred Rush, C.SS.R., S.T.D., as readers. The Catholic University of America Studies in Sacred Theology No. 92 THE QUALITY OF FACILITY IN THE MORAL VIRTUES BY THE Reverend Robert Florent Coerver, CM., S.T.L. ' 3 f ί J ‘V A DISSERTATION Submitted to the Faculty of the School of Sacred Theology of the Catholic University of America in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Sacred Theology Imprimi Potest: MARSHALL F. WINNE, C.M.V., Provincialis Saint Louis, March 8, 1946. Nihü Obstat: FRANCIS J. CONNELL, C.SS.R., S.T.D., Censor Deputatus June 3, 1946 Imprimatur: MICHAEL JOSEPH CURLEY, S.T.D., Archbishop of Baltimore-Washington June 3, 1946 Copyright, 1946, by The Catholic University of America Press, Inc. MURRAY & HEISTER—WASHINGTON, D. C. PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 9 i ί ■ . ί 4 ' TABLE OF CONTENTS ' : '■ PAGE Dedication to Mother and Father........................................... v Table of Contents........ vii Introduction........................................................................... ix I CHAPTER I. t u i ■ I ί > , 4 » · ’φ,ι /Ji f Jr ' -·’ ί ! t j .r . Ί 4/ and Division of the Virtues . 1 Article I. The General Meaning and Notion of Virtue............................................................................. 1 Article II. The Division of the Virtues . . 3 Article III. The Controversy Regarding the Infusion of the Moral Virtues .... 5 Article IV'. Facility in the Acquired Moral Virtues 18 Article V. Facility in the Infused Moral Virtues . 22 [ >* , f !. / General Notion . II. Facility in the Infused Moral Virtues . . 35 Article I. Facility in the Infused Moral Virtues by the Repetition of Natural Acts of the Acquired Virtues.................................................................. 35 Article II. Facility in the Infused Moral Virtues by the Repetition of Supernatural Acts of the Infused Virtues .......................................................... 40 Article III. The Opinion of Medina, Sylvius, Suarez, and Mazzella Regarding Facility in the Infused Moral Virtues........................................ 44 Article IV. The Opinion of Molina, Ripalda, Billot, and Merkelbach Regarding Facility in the Infused Virtues ...... 52 Article V. The Opinion of John of St. Thomas, Gonet, Billuart, and Schiffini Regarding Facility in the Infused Virtues........................................ 63 Article λ7!. Conclusion and Critical Estimate of the Various Opinions Regarding Facility in the Infused Virtues......................................................... 65 vii viii III. Table of Contents Historical Development of the Question of Facility in the Virtues........................................73 Article I. Facility as a Quality of Virtue Accord­ ing to the Pagan Philosophers (460-322 b. c.) 73 Article II. Facility as a Quality of Virtue Accord­ ing to the Early Christian Writers (Time of Christ—300 a. d.)................................................ 79 Article III. The Progressive Patristic Period (300500 a. d.).......................................................... 82 Article IV. The Late Patristic and Early Mediaeval Period (500-1100 a. d.)....................................... 85 Article V. The Early Scholastic Period (1150— 1350)....................................................................... 93 Article VI. The Post Scholastic Progressive Period (ca. 1500-1700).................................... 103 Article VII. The Modem Period (ca. 1700-1943) 108 IV. General Conclusions and Practical Applications 115 Article I. General Conclusions to be Drawn from the Doctrine of Facility in the Practice of the Moral Virtues.............................................115 Article II. The Importance of Natural Habits in Acquiring Facility in Virtue . . . .117 Article III. Practical Application of the Doctrine on Facility in Virtue as Applied to Preaching . 120 Article IV. Practical Applications of the Doctrine on Facility in Virtue as Applied to the Confes­ sional ......................................................................... 122 Article V. Practical Applications of the Doctrine on Facility in Virtue as Applied to Religious Education......................................................... 124 Article VI. Summary . . . . . .134 Bibliography......................................................................... 128 Index ........................................................................................... 134 INTRODUCTION '* Whatever things are true, whatever honorable, whatever just, whatever holy, whatever lovable, whatever of good refute, if there be any virtue, if anything worthy of praise, think of these things.” 1 In these words, Saint Paul commends to us the subject of the virtues as most worthy of our thoughts. And rightly so, for according to the teachings of spiritual writers, the contemplation of virtue is the first advance to spiritual knowledge; and the practice of the virtues forms the steps whereby the soul ascends to God. According to the theological teaching of St. Thomas, the virtues inhere in the potencies of the soul and are the quasi faculties of spiritual operation.2 This being true, it is evident that the infused virtues constitute a very important cog in the spiritual mechanism, since they are the means whereby sanctify­ ing grace is operative. To take an illustration from the natural order, just as the soul does not operate immediately, but only mediately, through its faculties of intellect and will, so also, sanctifying grace acts through its quasi faculties, the infused virtues and gifts. In either case, a normal and healthy function of the faculties is necessary for the complete and adequate well­ being of the principle. By this illustration, the importance of the infused virtues and gifts is more readily understood. 1 Philippians, 4:8. De cetero fratres, quaecumque sunt vera, quaecumque pudica, quaecumque justa, quaecumque sancta, quaecumque amabilia, quae­ cumque bonae famae, siqua virtus, siqua laus disciplinae, haec cogitate. 2 Aquinas, St. Thomas. .S'unmta Theologica. (Ex Typographie Forzani, Rome, 1894). I-IIae, q. 56, art. 1., c. “Dicendum quod virtutem pertinere ad potentiam animae, ex tribus potest esse manifestum: primo quidem ex ipsa ratione virtutis, quae importat perfectionem potentiae; perfectio autem est in eo, cujus est perfectio : secundo ex eo quod est habitus operativus : . . . omnis autem operatio est ab anima per aliquam potentiam; tertio ex hoc quod disponit ad optimum : optimum autem est finis, qui vel est operatio rei, vel aliquid consecutum per operationem a potentia egredientem, unde virtus humana est in potentia animae sicut in subjecto.” ÎX X Introduction St. Paul urges us “to think of these things.” 3 Yet to the average person the idea of virtue is so vague that it is incapable of being the object of clear contemplation. Treating the subject of virtue, the Dominican theologian, Father Farrell, says : “ Prob­ ably there is no part of our human equipment that has been more thoroughly misunderstood and more viciously maligned.” 4 And later on, speaking of the attitude of Catholics toward virtue, the same author adds: “Virtue is looked upon as something to be taken cautiously, in small doses and in careful correlation to the individual temperament.” 5 Why should such an attitude as this exist even among Catholics? Perhaps it is due to insufficient instruction, faulty education, or a variety of other reasons. But regardless of what the cause may be, the fact remains that this is a challenge to Catholic moral theologians. After all, moral theology is a science which directs man’s human activity toward God, his supernatural, ultimate End. How can this be done without sufficient emphasis on the infused virtues, the quasi faculties of supernatural operation ? Certainly, there is no insinuation made here to the effect that the teaching of Catholic moral theology as a whole is inadequate or insufficient in regard to the virtues. This charge might well be urged against particular theologians, but it cannot be applied to the general teaching of theology. Again, there is no attempt made here to lay all the blame for the present-day ignorance of virtue at the door of the moral theologians. However, it does seem that there is need in current moral theology for a more complete treatment of the virtues. Some of the modem texts have fairly extensive treatises on the virtues, but there is no denying that others are woefully deficient. Writers and preachers are criticized sometimes on the score that their work is too nega­ tive, that they constantly tear down but never build up. Some theologians are open to criticism on more or less the same score in so far as they emphasize the negative part of morality, sin, to the neglect of the positive part, the virtues. 3 Philippians, 4:8. « Farrell, W., A Companion to the Summa (Sheed and Ward, New York, 1939), II, 177. * Ibid., 178. ?■·? Introduction xi In an article in the American Ecclesiastical Review, the need for more positive theology on the virtues has been pointed out in these words : The virtues are considered as sort of an appendix to moral theology rather than its essential framework. . . . We do not go to God merely by avoiding sin. The moral life is not something negative. There is also a positive aspect which must be taken into consideration. It might be conceded that by avoiding sin, we escape hell, but surely no theologian would want to say that that is all there is to heaven. Yet many people look upon it just that way.6 Pertinent to this point, Merkelbach, in his learned treatise on moral theology, says the following : Modern authors of manuals (moral theology) are wont to treat very little of the virtues, because their entire occupation is in distinguishing, numbering, and measur­ ing sins, so that someone has rightly remarked, their theology is nothing more than a listing or a summary of sins. And if this is true of particular virtues, it is much more true of the virtues in general.7 Perhaps the theologians at fault excuse themselves on the grounds that the virtues are treated in detail in ascetical theology. But this is hardly justifiable, since moral theology must set down the norms and guiding principles for ascetical theology. Be that as it may, the fact remains that, there is room for expansion of the moral theology on the virtues. We cannot say that the treatment of the theological virtues is neglected, but most of the treatises on the moral virtues and the virtues in general still leave much to be desired, especially in regard to the interrelation of 6 O’Brien, James, “The Priest and Modern Moral Theology,” The Ameri­ can Ecclesiastical Review, 48 (1938), 33. 7 Merkelbach, B., Summa Theologiae Moralis (Desclée de Brouwer, Paris, 1938), Vol. I, Pars I, Q. I, n. 558, note 1. “De virtutibus non multa soient haberi moderni auctores manualium, qui toto sunt in distinguendis, numer­ andis, mensurandis peccatis, ita ut recte dixit aliquis, quod eorum theologia moralis jam nil sit nisi elenchus seu codex peccatorum. Et si id verum sit de virtutibus specialibus, multo magis verificatur de virtutibus in genere.” xii Introduction the acquired and infused moral virtues. For example, we can cite the following topics : the relationship of the acquired and infused moral virtues, the meaning of facility in the virtues, which of the virtues confer facility. These topics, to mention a few, are not discussed at any length and, in some aspects, not even touched upon by the great majority of moral theologians. It is with this thought in mind that the author has chosen the subject of this thesis. It is to be noted, however, that in this present work the author does not attempt a solution for all of the problems with regard to the moral virtues. The point of this thesis is directed at only one of these problems, namely, the question of facility. Need­ less to say, this requires that something be said of the interrela­ tion of the acquired and infused virtues, but, for the most part, the scope of this work is limited to the topic of facility in the virtues. Under this heading, we shall attempt to establish the fact that some small degree of facility is conferred by the infused moral virtues, and that this facility can be increased by the practice of the acquired virtues. In this connection, we shall demonstrate the importance of the acquired virtues in their relation to the infused moral virtues. On the historical side, we shall trace the development of the teaching on facility from the time of the pagan philosophers, through the Fathers of the Church, and into the Scholastic period. After this, we shall summarize the opinions of modern theologians in regard to this same question. Finally, in the conclusion, we shall present some practical corol­ laries of the doctrine on facility applied to the moral life of the individual, and also incorporate some suggestions for the use of confessors, preachers, and instructors in catechetics. In short, by this work we hope to contribute something positive toward the unquestionable need for a more extensive theological treatment of the virtues. CHAPTER I Ï GENERAL NOTION AND DIVISION OF THE VIRTUES Article I. The General Meaning and Notion of Virtue According to its etymological meaning, the Latin word virtus is derived from the words vir and intus, and signifies the inward force or energy of man. Lactantius says, “ Man (vir) is so named, because there is more force {vis} in him than there is in woman, and hence the word virtue {virtus} receives its name.” 1 The Greek words αρετή2 and δύναμις3 are used in much the same sense as the Latin word, virtus; and in Sacred Scripture these words invariably signify interior vigor, power, or force of. soul. Thus, in its widest acceptation, the term virtue signifies a certain forcefulness or strength of action, a vigorous use of our natural potencies. This demands strength of will, and it is in this sense that Saint Augustine remarks that “ all virtues are in the will.” 4* 8 1 Lactantius, De Opificio Dei, Chap. 12 {PL 7:57) : "Vir itaque nominatus est, quod major in eo vis est, quam in foemina; et hinc virtus nomen accepit’’ N.B. This work of Lactantius, De Opificio Dei, is not contained in the Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum (CSEL) published by the Academy of Science in Vienna. This work is not yet complete, but because it affords a more critical text than Migne, we shall quote it when­ ever this is possible as well as give reference to Migne. 2 The Greek word, αρετή, is used to signify power or strength. Thus, in the Second Epistle of St. Peter, 1:3, we read, καλέσαντος ημάς διά δόξης καί αρετής, "qui vocavit nos propria gloria et virtute.” More commonly, however, this word is used to signify moral goodness, as in Wisdom, 4:1 and 5:13, and Philippians, 4:8, εΐ τις αρετή καί εί τις έπαινος ταΰτα λογίσεσόε, “siqua virtus, siqua laus disciplinae, haec cogitate.” 8 The word, δύναμις, signifies strength, ability, power. In the following Scriptural passages it is used in this sense. Luke, 1:17, Acts, 4:7, I Cor. 4:20, II Cor. 1 ;8, υπέρ δύναμιν, supra virtutem, beyond our power. ♦Augustine, De Libero Arbitrio, L. 2, C. 19 (PL 32:1268): “In eo (voluntate) sunt etiam virtutes omnes, quibus mali uti nemo potest.” 1 2 The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues All men are logically forced to recognize and to admire the virtues understood in the broad sense of vigor of soul and strength of character. Even the skeptics and unbelievers, who disown the term “ virtue ” in theory, are compelled to admit its excellence in practice. As one modern author notes : The world which has made trial (of the virtues) rein­ troduces them by new names. It still admires pluck in hunting field or battle plain; what used to be called fortitude. It praises judgment in its sportsmen and ex­ plorers ; what used to be known as prudence. The world does not speak much of temperance; but it still believes in self control. And it has to admire fair play: Even its gamblers feel the necessity of a “ square deal.”. . . Thus they may expel virtue or morality by one door ; it returns by another. As long as human nature endures, it will need virtues, call them by any new or old name.5 So far, we have considered virtue according to its widest mean­ ing. However, we are concerned here with a more specialized meaning of virtue, namely, the signification that it has in Catholic Theology. The classic theological definition of virtue is given by Saint Augustine, “Virtue is a good quality of the mind by which we live rightly and which cannot be put to an evil use, which God produces in us without our cooperation.” 6 Saint Thomas adopted this definition from Augustine but suggested a twofold change in its content. First, he proposes that in the place of “ quality ” the term “ habit ” should be substituted, since habit designates the more proximate genus of virtue. He adds also that the last phrase must be dropped if the definition intends to include the acquired as well as the infused virtues.7 Examining this definisPierse, Virtues and Vices (Browne and Nolan, Dublin, 1935), Preface, pps. ix-x. 8Augustine, De Libero Arbitrio, Bk. 2, Chap. 19. (PL 32:1268) : "Virtus est bona qualitas mentis, qua recte vivitur et nemo male utitur et quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur.” This definition is gathered from several other places in St Augustine’s writings besides the citation already given. Cf. Contra Julianum, Chap. 3, n. 15-20 (PL 44:743-748), super Psal. lid cone. 26 (PL 37:1577). 7 Cf. Aquinas, Summa Theologica (Ex Typographia Farzani : Rome, 1894), I-IIae, q. 55, art 4, a General Notion and Division of the Virtues 3 tion, we see that virtue is a habit, in other words, a permanent quality which perfects the potencies of the soul toward placing good acts. It is obvious, therefore, that one or two isolated acts do not necessarily indicate the presence of a virtue. Thus, a man cannot be said to possess the virtue of honesty if he is truthful only on occasions, for virtue supposes a fixed and con­ stant manner of action. This is the distinction between the wide and strict usage of the term virtue. As previously noted, a single act can possess the particular kind of moral goodness that specifies a good habit and in a wide use of the term, we sometimes hear individual acts referred to as “ acts of virtue.” However, in its strict sense, virtue deals only with habits. St. Thomas has summed up the entire essence of virtue in his brief but complete definition: “Virtue is a good operative habit.” 8 Article II. The Division of the Virtues The virtues are divided into different categories. The fourfold division which we list here is taken from Tanquerey,9 and is common to most theologians. He divides the virtues as follows: (1) By reason of the subject, into theological and moral. The theological virtues have God, as He is in Himself or as the Author of grace, as their immediate material and formal object; the moral virtues are concerned immediately with the means whereby we tend to God, and have as their immediate object some created good. (2) By reason of origin, into acquired and in­ fused. Acquired, which are formed by the repetition of natural acts; infused, which are immediately placed into the soul by Almighty God. (3) By reason of end, into natural and super­ natural. Natural virtues are those which tend toward God as the Author of nature. These arise from the powers of nature and dispose the faculties of the soul to exercise their connatural operations. The supernatural virtues tend toward God as the 8 Aquinas, op. cit., I-IIae, q. 55, art. 3, c. “ Unde virtus humana, quae est habitus operativus, est bonus habitus et boni operativus.” e Tanquerey, A., Synopsis Theologiae Moralis (Desclee: Paris, 1936), II, Art. II, n. 579. Some theologians give more extensive, others, less extensive divisions of virtue, but this division given by Tanquerey seems to be adequate. 4 The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues Author of grace and surpass all the exigencies and powers of nature. These are infused into the soul by God so that the potencies of the soul are enabled to elicit acts of a supernatural nature. (4) By reason of subject, into intellectual and appetitive. Intellectual reside in and perfect the intellect ; appetitive reside in and perfect the appetitive faculties. This is a general classification of the virtues, yet it is fairly complete. For our purpose, we ask that the reader keep especially in mind the moral virtues, since the subject matter of this treatise concerns itself almost exclusively with these virtues. The moral virtues are classified under the four general heads of prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude, called the cardinal virtues, and they regulate the entire moral life of man. The divisions of the acquired and infused virtues should also be carefully noted, for these terms will reappear constantly throughout the present work. It is to be noted, moreover, that the moral virtues can be either acquired or infused, natural or supernatural, depending on their principle, their mode of acquisition, and their object. We shall develop this point at length within the next few pages. It is quite obvious that natural and acquired moral virtues exist in this life. We know from our own experience that there are even some persons having no specific religious or supernatural belief who habitually practice one or several of the moral virtues. If we were to question such persons as to why they practice these virtues, we would discover that their motives are entirely natural. Reason tells them that this is the right way to act, that this is the decent thing to do. Such moral virtues as these are both natural and acquired. They are natural because they pro­ ceed from the powers of nature ; they are acquired because they are obtained by a repetition of similar acts. We know that the moral virtues were practiced to a very high degree of perfection by some of the pagan philosophers purely from a standpoint of natural reason.10 This same thing is true of many persons of our 10 Xenophon, for instance, draws the following picture of his master, Socrates, “ No one ever heard or saw anything wrong in Socrates ; so pious was he that he never did anything without consulting the gods ; so just that he never injured anyone in the least; so master oi himself that he never preferred pleasure to goodness ; so sensible that he never erred in his choice General Notion and Division of the Virtues 5 own time who lead good lives and practice moral virtue accord­ ing to the natural light of reason. We say of such persons that they are “ naturally virtuous.” However, man is not left to natural aids alone in the matter of virtue. Through the good­ ness of God, supernatural and infused virtues have been granted to man which supplement and perfect the natural and acquired virtues. Article III. The Controversy Regarding the Infusion of the Moral Virtues We know by divine revelation that man is destined, not to a purely natural end, but to a supernatural end, namely, the beatific vision of God.11 It is evident that man cannot attain his super­ natural end by the use of natural means, for in this case, there would be no proportion of means to end. For this reason, God confers supernatural and infused virtues on man in order that he may attain his supernatural, ultimate end. The question arises, how many of the virtues are infused? All theologians agree that the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity must be infused, since they can in no way be attained by acts of man’s natural powers. But what of the moral virtues? Are they also infused? Nothing is defined by the Church. Saint Thomas and his followers answer in the affirmative; Scotus and his adherents answer in the negative.12 As to which of these opinions is more correct, we are inclined to believe that the better arguments, though not definitive, are on the side of the Thomists. Since this question of the infusion of the moral virtues has con­ siderable bearing on our topic, we shall discuss the matter at some length. Later on, we intend to discuss the question of between w’hat was better and what was worse. In a word, he was of all men the best and the happiest.” Xenophon, Memorabilia, I, 1. Cf. Turner, History of Philosophy (Ginn and Company: Boston, 1903), 78. This ac­ count while undoubtedly exaggerated, is an indication of the naturally vir­ tuous life led by Socrates. 111 Cor. 13:12. “Videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate tunc autem facie ad faciem. Nunc cognosco ex parte : tunc autem cognoscam sicut et cognitus sum.” 12 The opinions of both the Thomists and the Scotists are discussed at some length in the follow’ing pages. 6 The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues facility in the infused moral virtues. We must first establish the fact that such virtues are actually infused. There are no texts in Sacred Scripture which prove conclu­ sively that the moral virtues are infused.13 However, there are certain texts in both the Old and the New Testament where the infusion of the moral virtues seems to be indicated. Thus, in the following text from the Book of Wisdom, the infusion of the moral virtues is insinuated: “For she (Eternal Wisdom) teaches temperance and prudence and justice and fortitude, which are such things as men can have nothing more profitable in life.” 14 Again, the words of St. Peter are used : “ For indeed His Divine power has granted us all things pertaining to life and piety.”15 Theologians reason that the infusion of the moral virtues would be included among those things “ pertaining to life and piety.” Such arguments as these, however, are indirect and inconclusive. It is, therefore, to the teachings of tradition and reason that we must look for our proofs, and both of these sources seem to favor the Thomistic opinion. There are several quotations cited from the Fathers of the Church in proof of our doctrine. Perhaps the best of these is the testimony of Saint Augustine in his homily on the First Epistle of St. John, where he says the following : He that praises God with his tongue cannot be doing this always; he that by his life and conduct praises God, can be doing it always. Works of mercy, affections of charity, sanctity of piety, incorruptness of chastity, modesty of sobriety, these things are to be kept in prac­ tice always: whether we are in public or at home, 13 Suarez censures, as frivolous, the opinion of Medina that the existence of the infused moral virtues is sufficiently proven from Sacred Scripture. “ Quod autem Medina dicit, ex sola Scriptura sufficienter probari de fide dari aliquas virtutes morales infusas, valde frivolum est; nam testimonia quae adducit nullius sunt momenti, ut late ostendunt alii recentiores scrip­ tores in illum locum.” Suarez, Opera Omnia, Vol. IX, Bk. VI, Chap. 9, n. 14. (Apud Ludovicum Vives, Paris, 1858.) 14 Wisdom, 8:7. “ Sobrietatem et prudentiam docet (Sapientia Aeterna) et justitiam et virtutem, quibus utilius nihil est in vita hominibus." 15II Peter 1:3. “ Quomodo omnia nobis divinae virtutis suae, quae ad vitam, et pietatem donata sunt” General Notion and Division of the Virtues 7 whether before men or in private, whether speaking or keeping silent, whether occupied with something or free from occupation, these things are always to be kept, because all the virtues I have mentioned are within. But who is sufficient to name them all ? There is as it were the Army of an Emperor seated within your mind. For as the Emperor does by his army what he will, so the Lord Jesus Christ, once beginning to dwell in our inner man, uses these virtues as His ministers.16 These expressive words of St. Augustine offer an argument of considerable weight for the doctrine of the infusion of the moral virtues. Again, the infusion of the moral virtues is certainly indicated in the official teaching of the Church. Thus, Pope Innocent III seems to take it for granted that “ Faith, charity, and other virtues ” are infused with the baptism of adults. The only question that he raises is whether these same virtues are infused at the baptism of infants.17 Pope Clement N seemed to regard the Thomistic opinion as more probable in his day judging from his declaration at the Council of Vienne.18 Furthermore, the 16Augustine, In Epist. Joan, Tract 8, 1. (PL 35:2035, 2036.) “Qui Deum laudat lingua non semper potest: qui moribus Deum laudat, semper potest. Opera misericordiae, affectus charitatis, sanctitas pietatis, incorruptio castitatis, modestia sobrietatis, semper haec tenenda sunt : sive cum in publico sumus, sive cum in domo, sive cum ante homines, sive cum in cubiculo, sive loquendo, sive tacentes, sive aliquid agentes, sive vacantes ; semper haec tenenda sunt; quia intus sunt omnes istae virtutes quas nomi­ navi. Quis sufficit omnes nominare? Quasi exercitus est imperatoris, qui sedet intus in mente tua. Quomodo enim imperator per exercitum suum agit quomodo placet; sic Dominus Jesus Christus incipiens habitare in in­ teriore homine nostro, id est in menta per fidem, utitur istis virtutibus quasi ministris suis." 1T Innocent III, Majores Ecclesiae Causas (DBU, 410). “Quod opponen­ tes inducunt, fidem aut caritatem aliasque virtutes parvulis, utpote non con­ sentientibus, non infundi, a plerisque non conceditur absolute . . . , aliis asserentibus, per virtutem baptismi parvulis quidem culpam remitti, sed gratiam non conferri ; nonnullis vero dicentibus, et dimitti peccatum, et virtutes infundi, habentibus illas quoad habitum, non quoad usum, donec perveniant ad aetatem adultam.” 18 Clement V, Ex Const. De Summa Trinitate et fide catholica (DBU, 483). “Verum quia quantum ad effectum baptismi in parvulis reperiuntur 8 The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues Catechism of the Council of Trent affirms that “ a most notable company of all the virtues are poured into the soul along with the infusion of grace.”* 19 Obviously the moral virtues were 18 intended to be included in this group, for the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity taken by themselves hardly form “ a most notable company of all the virtues.” These statements, although not definitive, are certainly indicative of the mind of the Church in this matter. The best proof for the Thomistic argument seems to be based on the appeal to reason. St. Thomas in his argument makes use of the philosophical axiom that the “ order of means must corre­ spond to the order of end,” and he states the argument in these words : The effect is proportioned to its causes and principles. All the intellectual and moral virtues which are acquired by our acts, proceed from natural principles pre-existing in us. In the place of these natural principles, the theo­ logical virtues are given to us by God, by which we are ordinated to the supernatural order. Whence it is fitting that there should be other habits divinely caused in us which proportionately correspond to the theological virtues as the intellectual and moral virtues are related to their natural principles.20 doctores quidam theologi opiniones contrarias habuisse, quibusdam ex ipsis dicentibus, per virtutem baptismi parvulis quidam culpam remitti, sed gratiam non conferri, aliis e contra asserentibus, quod et culpa iisdem in baptismo remittitur, et virtutes ac informans gratia infunduntur quoad habitum, etsi non pro illo tempore quoad usum : Nos autem attendentes generalem effica­ ciam mortis Christi, quae per baptisma applicatur pariter omnibus baptizatis, opinionem secundam, quae dicit, tam parvulis quam adultis conferri in bap­ tismo informantem gratiam et virtutes, tamquam probabiliorem, et dictis Sanctorum et doctorum modernorum theologiae magis consonam et con­ cordem, sacro approbante Concilio duximus eligendam.” 18 Cathechismus Concilii Indentini, Pars 2, De Sacr. Bap. C. 2., q. 50.· " Hinc (gratiae sacntihcanti) autem additur nobilissimus omnium virtutum comitatus, quae in animam cum gratia divinitus infunduntur.” 20 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I-IIae, q. 63, art. 3, c. “ Oportet effectus suis causis et principiis proportionates : omnes autem virtutes tam intellec­ tuales, quam morales, quae ex nostris actibus acquiruntur, procedunt ex quibusdam naturalibus principiis in nobis praeexistentibus; loco autem quorum naturalium principiorum conferuntur nobis a Deo virtutes theo­ General Notion and Division of the Virtues 9 In other words, just as man in the natural order is habitually well-ordinated not only toward his ultimate end by natural prin­ ciples, but also toward the means to that end by the acquired moral virtues ; so also in the supernatural order, man should not only be habitually well disposed toward his supernatural ultimate end by means of the theological virtues, but also well disposed habitually toward the means to this supernatural end by the infused moral virtues. Another argument, closely allied to the one already given, is based on the Scholastic axiom that '* God does not provide less in the supernatural order than He does in the natural order.” 21 In the natural order, God has given us a principle of life, the soul, and has attached to this principle permanent faculties of intellect and will whereby we can habituali}· place acts toward a purely natural end. And so if God is no less generous in the supernatural order, we should have corresponding permanent quasi faculties of operation toward our supernatural end. These permanent quasi faculties should include the moral infused as well as the theological virtues, otherwise God would seem to confer something to nature which He has not conferred to our super-nature, namely, proximate and immediate principles of operation relative to the use of created things. The whole difficulty between the Thomists and Scotists seems to center about the question of whether or not acts of the super­ natural order require an immediate and proximate habitual supernatural principle of operation. The Thomists affirm that such a principle of operation is necessary, at least ordinarily, if the acts are to be considered as intrinsically and entitively super­ natural. The Scotists, on the other hand, seem to be inclined to the opinion that a remote supernatural principle can sufficiently logicae, quibus ordinamur ad finem supernaturalem ; unde oportet, quod his etiam virtutibus theologicis proportionaliter respondeant alii habitus divinitus causati in nobis, qui sic se habent ad virtutes theologicas, sicut se habent virtutes morales, et intellectuales ad principia naturalia virtutum.” 21 St. Thomas notes that just as nature is not deficient in supplying neces­ sary things, neither is grace deficient in providing those things which are necessary for our supernatural ultimate end. Cf. Summa, I-IIae, q. 62, art. 3, c., also q. 63, art. 3, c. 10 The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues ordinate and determine our actions toward their supernatural end. Since we have already investigated some of the proofs for the Thomistic assertion, we shall now discuss the opinion of the Scotists. It is unfortunate that there is no critical edition of the works of Scotus. We understand that such a work is in preparation at the present time. However, from the texts of the works of Scotus which are available, there seems to be no doubt concern­ ing his denial of the infused moral virtues. We quote from the Opus Oxoniense of Scotus, one of his few works which appears to be of certain authenticity.22 Again, we use the Parisian Edition of this work, which is supposedly the best available text. In this work, treating the question of whether or not the moral virtues are infused, Scotus says the following : Although many things have been said concerning the in­ fusion of the moral virtues, namely, that they seem to be necessary on account of the mode, the means and the end, nevertheless, every end which they cannot have by reason of their own species, is sufficiently determined by the inclination of charity; the mode and the means are determined by infused faith; therefore there seems to be no necessity of positing infused moral virtues, but acquired virtues only suffice in those persons who have the acquired virtues or are able to have them, nor need they be posited in those persons who are unable to acquire them on account of a defect of free will, because there is no greater reason that these latter should have them than the former.23 22 Cf. Balic, Les Commentaries de Jean Dims Scot (Louvain, 1927). Also, Simonis, “ De Vita et Operibus Joanis Duns Scoti,” Antonianum, 1928, ΠΙ, 151. 23 Scotus, Joannes Duns, Opus Oxoniense (Apud Ludovicum Vives; Paris, 1894), Lib. Ill, Dist 36, n. 28. “ Licet de istis virtutibus moralibus multa dicantur, scilicet quod videntur necessariae propter modum, medium et finem, quia tamen omnis finis, quem non possunt habere ex specie sua, determinatur sufficienter ex inclinatione charitatis ; modus autem et medium determinantur per fidem infusam; ideo non videtur necessitas ponendi virtutes morales in­ fusas, sed acquisitas tantum in his, qui habent eas acquisitas, vel habere possunt; nec etiam in aliis, qui scilicet non possunt eas acquirere propter defectum usus liberi arbitrii, quia non est major ratio, quare isti debeant habere, et non illi.” General Notion and Division of the Virtues 11 In this passage, Scotus certainly seems to deny the infusion of the moral virtues. Furthermore, he states the reason for this denial, namely, that there is no need for such virtues since the per­ formance of good acts centred about creatures and directed to supernatural ends is achieved by the acquired virtues informed by the infused virtues of faith and charity. In short, the asser­ tion of infused moral virtues, according to Scotus, seems to be a multiplication of virtues without necessity. The Franciscan commentators have supported Scotus in this assertion, notably De Montefortino and Frassen. In his scholarly commentary on the works of Scotus, De Montefortino 24 treats the topic of the moral virtues in a particular question where he denies that the moral virtues are infused. As his principal argu­ ment, he quotes the argument of Scotus which we have just cited.25 Frassen, another Franciscan commentator, neither denies nor affirms that the moral virtues are infused. He grants that they can be infused by the liberality of God. but not in the same sense as the theological virtues, because the theological virtues are infused per sc and necessarily while the moral virtues would be infused only per accidens inasmuch as they can be acquired by human labor and industry.26 Frassen adds that the moral virtues would be infused not merely for the purpose of ordinating man’s actions toward their supernatural end, but also toward their natural end, as for instance, when man elicits moral actions from a motive of public peace or human honesty.27 In short, 24 De Montefortino, H., Ven. Joannis Duns Scoti Summa Theologica (Ex Typographia Sallustiana, Rome, 1902). 25 Cf. Ibid., Vol. IV, Quaest. 63, art. 3, c. 26 Frassen, C., Scotus Academicus (Ex Typographia Sallustiana, Rome, 1901), Tom. VII, Sect 2, q. 2, n. 3. “Quod etsi morales virtutes humano studio comparentur, nihilominus etiam divinitus possunt infundi, quaemadmodum et theologicae, cum hoc tamen discrimine, quod virtutes theologicae infundantur per se et necessario, quia nullius naturae viribus, nulloque homi­ num labore ac studio possunt obtineri : morales autem dicuntur infundi dum­ taxat per accidens quia licet ex hominum industria, et exercitatione com­ parari queant, tamen citra omne hominis studium divinitus possunt ex summa Dei liberalitate in animam infundi.’’ 27 Ibid., n. 3. “ Non quidem ea solum ratione, qua ordinantur ad finem supematuralem, puta cum illae virtutes (infusae morales) hominem ordinant ad operandum ex motivo charitatis et propter gloriam Dei, sed etiam cum 12 The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues although Frassen does admit the possibility of the infused moral virtues, he seems to minimize their importance, and he agrees substantially with Scotus in asserting that acts of the moral virtues are ordinated to their supernatural end by infused faith and charity and not by infused moral principles.2829 It is to be noted that by infused moral virtues, Frassen means those which are called infusae per accidens, i.e., virtues which are intrinsically natural. Minges, a more recent and perhaps a more authoritative com­ mentator on Scotus, likewise affirms Scotus’s denial of the in­ fused moral virtues. In his commentary on the citation from Scotus already referred to, Minges has this to say : It is far from the mind of Scotus to deny to the faithful, here on earth or in heaven, any grace and gifts which are necessary or useful. However, he thinks it is not necessary to place besides the theological virtues which are properly infused, and virtues which are acquired by the supernatural help of God, although not properly in­ fused, other gifts and virtues formally infused w'hich would be lost by mortal sin formally opposed to them, since Scripture does not seem to demand it, and plurality of objects should not be induced without some intrinsic or extrinsic need.28 Minges, however, is not as direct as De Montefortino. Nowhere in his entire commentary does he ever openly assert that Scotus referuntur ad finem naturalem; puta cum eliciunt suos actus ex motivo pacis publicae, et propter honestatem humanam.” 28 Ibid., “Enimvero, si virtutes morales quatenus infusae, per hoc dis­ tinguerentur a seipsis, quatenus acquisitae, sequeretur neminem per virtutem moralem acquisitam elicere posse actum studiosum in ordine supematuralem et ex motivo charitatis, quod est aperte falsum.” 29 Minges, P., Joannis Duns Scoti Doctrina Philosophica et Theologica (Ad Claras Aquas, Quaracchi, 1930), Vol. II, Chap. 8, η. 25. “ Scotus ergo longe abest, fidelibus in via vel in patria ullas gratias vel dona necessaria vel utilia denegare; tantummodo putat non necesse esse, praeter virtutes theo­ logicas proprie infusas et virtutes adjuvante auxilio Dei etiam supernatural! acquisitas, etsi non proprie infusas, statuere alia dona et virtutes formaliter infusas et eo ipso per peccatum formaliter oppositum perdendas, cum Scrip­ tura id non postulat, et sine necessitate exteriore vel interiore non sit ponenda pluralitas.” General Notion and Division of the Virtues 13 denied the infusion of the moral virtues except insofar as this may be implied in the passage which we have just cited. How­ ever, he does seem to indicate this fact by his terminology, as for instance, when he defines the moral virtues as acquired and the theological virtues as infused.30 However, it is interesting to note that in his own manual, Compendium Theologiae Dog­ maticae Generalis, Minges teaches that the moral virtues are in­ fused. In the Second Volume of this work, speaking of the virtues and gifts which are infused into the soul along with sanctifying grace, Minges lists the following : The moral virtues, or those whose object is not God Himself immediately, but some created moral good de­ sired from supernatural motives. All these virtues are comprehended in the four cardinal virtues, namely, prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. Theo­ logians derive the infusion of these virtues from certain places in revelation . . . especially in Psalm 118.31 This could indicate either that Minges himself does not follow the opinion of Scotus or that he changed his opinion and adopted it at some later date, since his manual of theology was an earlier publication than his commentary on the works of Scotus.32 Be that as it may, let us examine the principal argument of the Scotists in support of their contention that the moral virtues are not infused, namely, that there is no need for them. In the words of Scotus,33 these virtues are needed neither on the part of the end, nor on the part of the mode or means. They are not needed by reason of supernatural end, because this is suf­ 30 Cf. Ibid., Vol. I, Sectio Tertia, η. 15. 31 Minges, P., Compendium Theologiae Dogmaticae Generalis (Joseph Kostel and Frederick Pustet, Ratisbonae, 1903), Vol. II, Chap. 2, η. 15. “Virtutes morales seu illae, quarum objectum est non immediate Deus Ipse, sed aliquod bonum creatum morale ex motivis supematuralibus appetendum. Omnes hae virtutes comprehenduntur in quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus, scilicet, prudentia, justitia, temperantia fortitudine. Quarum infusionem derivant theologi ex locis revelationis praesertim in Ps. 118.” 32 The Second Edition of Minges’s Compendium of Dogmatic Theology was published in 1903. His commentary on the works of Scotus was not published until 1930. 33 Cf. Opus Oxoniense, Lib. Ill, Dist. 36, n. 28. 14 The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues ficiently taken care of by the presence of infused charity in the soul, which is capable of ordinating the acquired virtues to their ultimate end. Neither are the infused moral virtues necessary by reason of mode or means, for the theological virtue of faith communicates to the inferior virtues the mode and means of operating in the supernatural order. We shall attempt to demon strate this point by an example. Let us suppose that a pagan possesses the acquired virtue of temperance in an eminent degree, having practiced this virtue from purely natural motives over a long period of years. At length, moved by the grace of God, this man is converted and baptized thereby receiving sanctifying grace along with the virtues and gifts. What is to be said of his acquired virtue of temperance? According to the opinion of Scotus, this acquired virtue would be enlivened and supernat­ uralized entirely by the infused theological virtues without any need of the infused moral virtue of temperance. Its super­ natural mode of operation would come from the infused virtue of faith, and it would be ordinated to a supernatural end by infused charity. In this way, all of the acquired virtues are supernaturalized by their conjunction with the infused theological virtues, so that there is no necessity for the infused moral virtues. At first sight, this theory seems plausible enough ; however, it presents several difficulties. We grant that the presence of the infused theological virtues in the soul can, as an extrinsic cause, ordinate certain of our intrinsically natural actions toward their supernatural, ultimate end. But this does not entirely solve the present problem. The congruity of the infused moral virtues is urged not merely for the purpose of ordinating our actions toward our supernatural end as an extrinsic cause, but in order that the faculties may perform intrinsically supernatural actions in the use of the means to that end. In other words, the theological virtues are conferred upon us to perfect our faculties for the performance of actions in direct reference to the means to this end. While we grant that the theological virtues, espe­ cially charity, can supernaturalize the appetites intrinsically re­ garding our supernatural end, we deny that they could also intrinsically supernaturalize these appetites regarding the means to end. This is the function of the infused moral virtues. General Notion and Division of the Virtues 15 The argument of the Scotists seems to be based on the assump­ tion that the will, by the mere fact that it tends toward the end, tends necessarily toward the means to the end. '4 Hence, the in­ fused theological virtues, by the fact that they tend toward our sujpernatural end, tend also toward the means to that end, and for this reason they are able to supply all the functions which are attributed to the infused moral virtues. But in trying to prove too much, this argument really proves nothing at all. In the first place, the assumption upon which their argument is based is not strictly true. It is very possible for a man to will an end and later by a subsequent act reject the means to that end on account of the difficulties and hardships involved in its prosecu­ tion. Arguments from theology, philosophy, and experience, all attest to the fact that there is a difference between the willing of an end and the choosing of the means to that end. Therefore, since the particular objects of end and means remain distinct, the Scotists do not seem to be justified in associating the objects of the theological and moral virtues. Both virtues have different functions in the soul, and they are infused by God for different reasons, the theological virtues to attain the supernatural end directly and immediately; the infused moral virtues to attain the same end indirectly and mediately. In respect to the other assertion of the Scotists, that the infused virtue of faith communicates a mode of supernatural operation to the acquired virtues, once more we must make a distinction. We grant that faith might supply a remote mode of operation, but not a proximate and immediate mode of supernatural opera­ tion. In reference to this point, we quote the words of Cardinal Cajetan: For just as in the acquired virtues, synderesis places a medium of acting by means of prudence, and the appeti­ tive moral virtues execute that medium ; so in the infused virtues, faith gives the ultimate end and places a medium for the infused moral virtues through infused prudence. Faith, therefore, does not give a medium unless re34 This argument is not explicitly developed by the Scotists. However, it seems to be contained implicitly in the general argument of Scotus against the infusion of the moral virtues. Cf. Opus Oxoniense, Lib. Ill, Dist. 36, n. 28. 16 The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues motely, while infused prudence gives the proximate medium. It is fitting, however, that the works of God should be perfect, and therefore that He give these principles as proximate and primary.85 Again, if the Scotistic assertion that acts of the natural virtues are directed to God only by infused charity is true, it follows that such acts would be only extrinsically and quoad modum supernatural. This follows logically, for such acts would remain intrinsically natural and would have only an extrinsic ordination to their supernatural end by means of infused charity. Garrigou-Lagrange develops this point at length in his division of supernatural actions quoad substantiam and quoad modum.*36 According to Garrigou-Lagrange, an act of natural virtue ordinated to the supernatural and by reason of charity is only ex­ trinsically and quoad modum supernatural,37 and this same opinion is taught by other theologians.38 Thus, in the system of Scotists, acts of the moral virtues would receive only an extrinsic ordina­ tion to their supernatural end, whereas it is fitting that these acts should be intrinsically supernaturalized. This can be effected only by the infusion of the moral virtues, since these virtues supply immediate and proximate supernatural principles of opera­ tion. ** Cajetan, Summa Sancti Thomae, cum commentariis Thomae De Vio Cajetani (Lugduni, 1581), I-IIae, q. 63, art. 3. “Nam sicut in virtutibus acquisitis synderesis non ponit medium nisi mediante prudentia, et morales appetitivae medium illud exsequuntur: ita in infusis fides finem ultimum firmans et largiens, mediante prudentia infusa medium moralibus infusis im­ ponit, et illas oportet medium illud habilitare. Fides ergo medium non dat nisi remote, prudentia autem infusa proxime. Oi»ortet autem Dei opera perfecta esse, et ut prima et proxima habeantur principia.” 36 Garrigou-Lagrange, R., De Revelatione (Ferrari: Rome, 1918), I, Cap. VI, Art. 2. Divisio Supematuralitatis. 3T Cf. Ibid., Sect B. “ In secundo categoria scilicet, in supernaturale quoad modum ex parte finis extrinseci, est aliquid essentialiter naturale supernaturaliter ordinatum ad finem supernatural em, ut e.g. actus virtutis naturalis ordinatus a charitate ad vitam aeternam.” 38 Cf. Sylvius, Commentarium in I-IIae (Ex typographia Balleoniana, Venetiis, 1726), Tom. II, q. 63, art. 3, ad 1. Also, John of St. Thomas, Cursus Theologicus, De Gratia, Disp. XX, art. 1, n. 4. W W ;, ·■ General Notion and Division of the Virtues 17 This seems to answer the main objection of the Scotists against the infusion of the moral virtues. However, there is another popular argument against the Thomistic opinion which is based upon the apparent absurdity which follows from its conclu­ sions. This argument can be stated as follows. If the moral virtues are infused with sanctifying grace, contrary habits of virtue and vice would exist in the same subject simultaneously. For instance, a man having depraved habits of vice, including intemperance and injustice, now becomes justified and receives sanctifying grace and the infused moral virtues. Such an in­ dividual would have the habit of virtue and the habit of vice at the same time and in respect to the same object, which is not admissible according to the principle of contradiction. The best answer to this difficulty is to distinguish between the infused and the acquired virtues. The acquired virtues are habits in a strict, univocal and predicamental sense, whereas the infused virtues are not ; they are habits only in an analogous sense. Mazzella 39 answers the objection in this way, saying that an acquired vice is directly contrary only to the corresponding acquired virtue, not to the corresponding infused virtue. For this reason, the infused virtue does not formally remove the acquired tendency to place acts of the opposite vice. Other Thomistic theologians maintain that in this case, the acquired vice ceases to be a habit and remains in the soul only as a disposition.40 We shall treat this objection more thoroughly in a subsequent article. It is sufficient to say here that since the acquired and infused virtues are not habits in identically the same way, it is not admissible to institute a strict parity between them. If this could be done, the same difficulty wmuld present itself in regard to the theological, virtues in the case where an individual having an acquired habit 89 Mazzella, C., De Virtutibus Infusis (Ex Typographia Polyglotta, Rome, 1884), Disp. I, Art. 3, n. 1. “Unde sicut Concilium Tridentium dicit in justificatis relinqui fomitem ad agonem, ita nos dicere possumus, in justifi­ catis relinqui habitus pravos, si eos antea acquisiverunt, vel saltem fomitem relinqui sine temperamento virtutis acquisitae, ut pugnando cum Dei gratia contra vitia mereantur, et ut justitiae infusio sit ipsis occulta.” 40 Cf. Sylvius, F., Commentarium in I-Ilae, Tom. II, q. 63, art. 3, n. 2. 18 The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues of uncharitableness would become justified and receive the infused virtue of charity. In summarizing the controversy regarding the infusion of the moral virtues, we can only conclude that authority, though not definitive, seems to be on the side of the Thomists; and their opinion is the common teaching of theologians. The arguments from Scripture, Tradition, and reason seem to substantiate the claim that there are infused moral virtues ; and in deference to the Scotists, we cannot see how any one of these sources offers sufficient warrant for their conclusion. We have not attempted to give anything approaching an exhaustive treatment of this question. Our only purpose was to discuss the matter with suf­ ficient thoroughness to arrive at a workable conclusion, namely, that there are infused moral virtues accompanying sanctifying grace. From this point on, therefore, we shall consider the moral virtues as certainly infused. Article IV. Facility in the Acquired Moral Virtues Since there are both acquired and infused moral virtues, it is evident that the moral virtues can exist in the soul under a two­ fold aspect. The virtue of justice, for example, can exist in the soul as an acquired habit formed by the repetition of natural acts; it can also exist there as an infused habit directly implanted by the goodness of Almighty God. The same is true of all the other moral virtues. Quite logically, then, the next step is the dif­ ferentiation of the infused and acquired moral virtues. Noldin states this distinction quite generically in the following words : The acquired and infused virtues are similar in this re­ spect that they are both habits by which we are disposed toward good acts; they differ, however, both by reason of origin and effect.41 The first part concerning their agreement is quite clear, namely, that they are both habits or qualities modifying the faculties of 41 Noldin, H.-Schmitt, A., Summa Theologiae Moralis (Fdiciani Rauch, Oeniponte-Lusiae, 1940), Vol. I, Lib. V, Q. 1, n. 258, c. “ Virtutes acquisitae et infusae in eo conveniunt, quod sint habitus, quibus ad bene operandum disponimur; differunt tamen tum origine tum effectu.’’ ■ . j . . ‘ General Notion and Division of the Virtues 19 the soul. The fact that they are both good operative habits ordinates them toward the placing of good acts. In regard to their differences, we know that they differ by reason of origin because according to their definition the acquired virtues are formed by the repetition of good acts, while the infused virtues come directly from God and are conferred with sanctifying grace. Just as they differ by reason of origin, so also do they differ also by reason of effect. The effects of an acquired virtue are intrinsically natural acts; the effects of an infused virtue are in­ trinsically supernatural acts. However, we are concerned with another distinction in regard to the effects of these virtues, the question of facility. Can the acquired and infused moral virtues be differentiated by reason of the amount of facility which they confer, or is exactly the same degree of facility conferred by both virtues? This topic is not treated very thoroughly in most manuals of moral theology, despite the fact that it does have certain practical and important consequences. Perhaps it would be well to explain what is meant by facility. This term has various significations as shall be seen presently. However, for the present, let us consider facility according to its most common usage. In this sense, facility means nothing more than a readiness or promptitude of action, a tendency to repeat the same action constantly, easily, and almost uncon­ sciously. It is in this sense that we say a certain individual has “ facility in speech,” “ facility in writing,” and so on. Thus the trained athlete, the skilled musician, the expert linguist, all of these professionals exercise difficult tasks with an ease and smoothness that makes one remark that “ they make these things seem easy.” Whence does this ease and facility arise? Is it from nature or from the constant repetition of similar acts? Sometimes we hear it said that a man is a “ born actor ” or a “born orator” implying that this facility is entirely from nature. Such statements are not strictly true. The habits adapted to these activities are rooted in nature, but they are not perfected there, they are perfected by the repetition of similar acts.42 Facility, 42 St Thomas affirms this same thing to be true of the acquired virtues, Summa Theologica, I-IIae, q. 63, art 1, c. “Virtutes in nobis sunt a natura 20 The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues then, comes primarily from practice and not from nature, although nature in itself might confer more aptitude toward one habit than toward another. Even in those cases where nature has not be­ stowed any special inclination toward a particular habit, we know that facility can still be acquired by oft repeated acts. This certainly seems to prove that facility is more from the exercise of certain similar acts than from nature. If we consider the beginnings of a habit, especially one that is opposed to our natural inclination, we know that it is accompanied by many difficulties. The initial acts performed are hesitant and awkward. But by the constant repetition of acts, these motions become more co­ ordinated and perfect, until finally after a long period of time the action is performed freely and easily. This is true of most natural habits such as learning to play golf, driving a car, learn­ ing to study. In some cases facility will come more readily de­ pending on natural aptitude and the frequency with which the acts are repeated. However, as a general rule, facility is achieved only after long and constant practice of the habit. The notion of facility is well stated in the following words : . ' ’ The best way then to conceive a habit is to suppose that a track has been formed by frequent acts. A pathway has been beaten through a hitherto trackless region. A furrow has been formed along which the movement will almost invariably tend to flow in the future ; it is the line of least resistance ; for impediments have been removed.* 43 The first question is whether or not the acquired moral virtues confer the same facility, the same ease and readiness of action, which is afforded by natural physical habits. The answer is in the affirmative. As has been seen, the acquired virtues are habits in the strict sense, and as such they are governed by the psycho­ logical rules of habit. Thus, the practice of the acquired virtues will follow the principles of natural habits, and the more fre­ quently and the more perfectly their acts are exercised, the easier they become, until finally, the subject is disposed toward a constant secundum aptitudinem, et inchoationem ; non autem secundum perfectionem ; praeter virtutes theologicas, quae sunt totaliter ab extrinsico.” 43 Pierse, G., op. cit., 27. ΐ General Notion and Division of the Virtues 21 manner of action and exercises acts of the acquired virtues easily and readily. St. Thomas gives testimony to this fact, for in speaking of the acquired virtues, he says the following: “Opera­ tions proceeding from habit are pleasurable, and they are used promptly and exercised easily.’’44 However, there is one differ­ ence between the acquired moral virtues and natural physical habits. Because of the ever-present opposition that is encountered from concupiscence, the acquisition of the moral virtues is more difficult than the attainment of certain other natural habits which will encounter less resistance from the forces of nature. Yet despite this fact, we know that the moral virtues can be and actually are acquired to an eminent degree, and that in many cases they are practiced with readiness and ease. From all this, it is evident that the acquired moral virtues confer a facility of action, a fact which is admitted by all psychologists, theologians, and by anyone who has even slightly observed human nature. The most striking examples of facility in these virtues are to be found in the lives of the saints. By repeated acts, concentrated effort, and the assistance of actual graces, they so conformed their lives to goodness that they actually make the practice of virtue seem easy and effortless. In this way, we can easily see the great bearing that habits have on our moral lives. Man is said to be a “ bundle of habits,” to be “ what his habits are,” and these truths are certainly verified in experience. If habits are so important in educational and cultural training for the acquisition of facility along professional lines, certainly they are no less important in religious training for the acquisition of facility in the practice of virtue. The importance of the acquired virtues, therefore, should be stressed in our Catholic training. If it is not, we are neglecting a strong psychological factor in the de­ velopment of virtue. In regard to this point, one modern theologian says : It is indeed most incongruous when one who has had the advantages of a Catholic training show’s himself to «Aquinas, De Veritate (cura Frette-Mare, Paris, 1895), Dist XX, 2 c., T. 1, n. 493. “ Operationes ex habitu procedentes delectabiles sunt, et in promptu habentur, et faciliter exercentur.” 22 The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues be inferior in the practice of some natural virtue, such as courtesy, truthfulness, or temperances, to one who has little or no religious belief.4® This incongruity can result from insufficient emphasis on the necessity of the acquired moral virtues. For since they confer a facility of action, these virtues contribute much to the practice and perfection of virtue. Article V. Facility in the Infused Moral Virtues Having established the fact that the acquired moral virtues confer a facility and promptitude of action, the next question to be determined is whether or not this same truth can be affirmed of the infused moral virtues. All theologians who admit the infusion of the moral virtues affirm that these virtues ordinate the natural faculty to a new and supernatural mode of opera­ tion. This is what the theologians mean by saying that the in­ fused virtues confer the “ posse ” of supernatural action. The question that concerns us here is this: Besides the “posse” of supernatural action, do the infused moral virtues confer a facility of action as well, a “ posse facilius." We have already defined facility according to our present use as a certain readiness or promptitude of action whereby acts are placed constantly and easily. Applied to the infused moral virtues, this would mean that once these virtues were infused, their acts would flow readily and easily. This does not seem to be confirmed by experience, and for this reason the theologians commonly assert that the infused moral virtues per se confer no facility of action in the sense defined. Their case is well drawn up by Mazzella45 46 in his treatment of infused moral virtues. If the infused moral virtues, he asserts, confer a facility of action, there should be a greater facility in those persons who have these virtues in a more intense degree, than in those who either do 45 Connell, F., “ The Natural Virtues,” Journal of Religious Instruction, II (October, 1940), 120. 46 Cf. Mazzella, op. cit., Disp. I, art 4, n. 61. In this passage, Mazzella refutes the opinion of Gregory Valentia, who affirms that the infused moral virtues do confer a facility of action. < ’ i / ,, General Notion and Division of the Virtues 23 ’ not have them or who possess them in a less intense degree. ‘- ■‘J . ? t’< ’ T : ÎI · . ·. . )1 I * ; , ( ; ρ. , ' ! ' ; But this does not seem to be confirmed by experience. The author then goes on to illustrate the truth of his assertion by three concrete cases. The first case concerns a person who lives in the state of sanctifying grace but is tepid and careless in the practice of virtue. He receives the sacraments frequently and places acts of virtue occasionally, even though remissly. In such an individual, all of the infused virtues are increased both ex opere operato by the reception of the sacraments, and ex opere operantis byhis own acts of virtue. Nevertheless, he experiences no greater facility in the practice of virtue after a time than he did in the beginning. Mazzella’s second illustration also deals with a man in the state of sanctifying grace who performs heroic acts of virtue, gains supernatural merit for himself, and intensifies the infused virtues within his soul. Suddenly he lapses into mortal sin and remains in this state for a long time, neglecting all exercise of virtue and practicing all kinds of vice, until at last he has entirely lost his acquired virtues. Then moved by the grace of God, he goes to confession and (according to the doctrine of the revival of merit), recovers the same degree of grace and the infused virtues that he had accumulated before his fall. Nevertheless, as experience testifies, he feels the same difficulty in practicing virtue after justification as he did before its acquisition. The third and final case concerns the increase of the infused virtues in the soul. It is true that by an act of one infused virtue, sanctifying grace and all of the infused virtues are increased. Therefore, a man who practices acts of justice should experience a greater facility not only in the virtue of justice, but also in the virtue of tem­ perance and all the other infused virtues. This is not true, as is proven by experience. Thus, Mazzella concludes that the infused moral virtues do not confer a facility of action.47 His argu­ ments are substantial and their probative force cannot be disputed since they are so well grounded in experience. Besides, a con­ firmation of these arguments seems to be found in the case of the 47 Ibid., n. 66. “ Utriusque sententiae momenta exhibuimus (utrum virtutes infusae conferant facilitatem) ; nobis tamen verior apparet sententia negans.” 24 The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues recidivist in venial sin. If the infused moral virtues confer a facility of action, why is it that there are so many persons who confess the same venial sins week after week, month after month, without making any apparent progress in the practice of virtue? Certainly such persons cannot be said to receive a facility of action through the increase of the infused moral virtues. Sacred Scripture does not throw any light upon this question, though there are certain passages in Scripture which seem to indicate proof of the assertion that the infused moral virtues do not confer a facility of action. St. Paul, for instance, in the Epistle to the Romans, describes the difficulty of practicing virtue in these words: For I know that in me, that is, in my flesh, no good dwells, because to wish is within my powers, but I do not find the strength to do what is good. For I do not the good that I wish, but the evil that I do not wish, that I perform.48 Such texts from Sacred Scripture, however, are of a general nature, and offer no substantial evidence for our point. The same thing is true of Tradition. We might mention, however, that St. Augustine seems to attest the fact that the infused moral virtues do not remove the obstacles remaining from former vicious habits. In his Confessions, even after his conversion, he describes in some detail the struggle that took place within his soul as a result of the remembrances and inclinations of his former habits.49 48 St Paul, Romans 8:18, 19. “ Scio enim quia non habitat in me, hoc est in came mea, bonum. Nam velle adjacet mihi : perficere autem bonum, non invenio. Non enim quod volo bonum, hoc facio; sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago.” This text cannot be urged too strongly as a proof for our assertion since there is a controversy among Scripture Scholars as to whether St. Paul refers to regenerate or unregenerate man in this passage. Cf. Prat, F., Theology of St. Paul (Burns, Oates, and Washboume, London, 1938), I, 228-229. «» Augustine, Confessiones, Lie X, Cap. XXX (PA 32:796) (CSEL 33:257). “Sed adhuc vivunt in memoria mea, de qua multa locutus sum, talium rerum imagines, quas ibi consuetudo mea fixit, et occursantur mihi vigilanti quidem carentes viribus, in somnis autem non solum usque ad de­ lectationem sed etiam usque ad consensionem factumque simillimum. Et tan­ tum valet imaginis illius illusio in anmia mea et in carne mea, ut dormienti 25 t . General Notion and Division of the Virtues ; ί, j < ’ But the best proof for our thesis is to be found in the argutnents from experience such as were given above. All we need do is compare the effects of the infused and acquired moral virtues, and it is obvious that the acquired virtues confer a tendency to repeat their acts easily and readily, something which cannot be affirmed of the infused moral virtues. Among the theologians, only one, Gregory De X'alentia, dis­ sents from this opinion. In his Commentariorum Theologiarum, Gregory states his views as follows : ' h 14 ■ ? d Î q ο i ■1 j ‘ ; „’f It is absolutely false that all things being equal, a justified man is not more prompt to the practice of virtue than anyone else. However it must be admitted that the promptitude which the acquired virtues bestow is per­ ceived more clearly in a certain sense on account of the past exercise of good acts by which the contrary passions are subdued and, as it were, crushed. Nevertheless, the infused virtues too so perfect the appetite that they bestow upon it a certain new and special faculty for resisting the passions and for eliciting proper actions toward our ultimate end, according to that of Malachy, 3: 18, “ Be converted, and you shall see the difference between the just and the wicked.” 60 As far as can be determined, Gregory is the only theologian who ever attributed a strict facility of action to the infused virtues, and as we can see from his statement, he makes a distinction between the kind of facility conferred by the acquired and infused virtues.* 50 falsa visa persuadeant quod vigilanti vera non possunt Ubi est tunc ratio, quae talibus suggestionibus resistit vigilans et, si res ipsae ingerantur, incon­ cussus manet?” 50 De Valentia, G., Commentariorum Theologicorum (Typographia Adami, Ingolstadii, 1603), Tom. II, Disp. V, q. 6, resp. ad 4 um. “Falsum est ab­ solute, quod justificatus aliquis, non sit promptior ad virtutum studium, quam alius, ceteris paribus. Quamquam fatendum est, promptitudinem, quam praestant virtutes acquisitae, magis quodammodo sentiri, propter praeteritum exercitium bonorum actuum, quibus contrariae passiones edomantur, et quasi comprimuntur. Caeterum infusae quoque virtutes ita appetitum perficiunt, ut praestent illi peculiarem quandam et nowm facultatem ad resistendum passionibus, et eliciendos actiones rectas propter ultimum finem, juxta illuti (Malae. III : 18) ‘ Convertimini, et videbitis, quid sit inter justum et impium.’ ” 26 The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues Gregory’s opinion is at variance with the common teaching of theologians, and in criticism of his views we can say that he exaggerates the effects of the infused virtues. All theologians who admit the infusion of the moral virtues, as previously stated, likewise admit that they confer a new faculty or “ posse ” toward placing acts in the supernatural order. If this is what Valentia refers to as the “ new and special faculty,” then he is in agreement with the common teaching of theologians. But obviously he means more than this, since he goes on to say that this new faculty is for “ resisting the passions.” If the infused virtues did bring with them such a faculty, then they would confer a facility of action because they would remove impediments which is one of the principal functions of facility. However, this opinion does not seem to have a solid basis in fact. For if the infused virtues do confer a faculty for “ resist­ ing the passions,” this is not apparent in the soul, otherwise how could the case of the recidivist in venial sin be sufficiently ex­ plained, to say nothing of the hardship and difficulty of practic­ ing virtue even after conversion? In brief, Gregory’s statement seems to be entirely gratuituous, and the arguments already cited in proof of the fact that the infused virtues do not confer a facility of action are sufficient refutation to his assertion. So far, we have seen that the theologians do not admit a strict facility of action in the infused moral virtues. The next question is whether or not the infused moral virtues can be said to confer any facility at all. Some theologians answer this question by establishing a distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic facility. They assert that the infused moral virtues do confer intrinsic facility, which consists in the intrinsic strengthening of the faculties and the intrinsic inclination to acts of virtue. But they deny that the infused moral virtues confer extrinsic facility, which consists in the actual ease and readiness of extrinsic acts of virtue. Since extrinsic facility is effected only by the removal of extrinsic impediments and the discipline of the faculties through repeated acts of virtue, they maintain that this facility is conferred only by the acquired and not the infused moral virtues. Suarez is the first theologian to make use of this distinction of intrinsic and extrinsic facility with regard to the virtues, and ' ! i ’ } j I j j j * \ '■ j General Notion and- Division of the Virtues 27 he, in turn, seems to have borrowed the general notion from the teaching of St, Thomas. This same idea is expressed by St. Thomas in his treatise De Veritate, and we quote as follows : Something is said to be easy (facile) in a two-fold man­ ner; in one way by the removal of impediments, in another way by the placing of assistance, for a habit inclines a potency to act.51 From these words of St. Thomas, Suarez formulated his own distinction of intrinsic and extrinsic facility as applied to the in­ fused virtues. In his explanation of this distinction, Suarez says the following: Facility . . . can be distinguished into two kinds ; one is intrinsic which is per se in each faculty in respect to the act to which it is inclined. The other is by the removal of impediments which occur per accidens. These virtues (infused moral) confer the first kind of facility, inas­ much as they give an intrinsic facility of operating to the act, to which they are connaturally inclined as to their end, and their ultimate end. Hence since these (virtues) are intrinsically in their faculties, they are as certain weights inclining the potencies to their acts. In this way, they give intrinsic facility, as we have said concerning the theological virtues. But they do not give an extrinsic facility, because the contrary difficulties come either from natural ignorance, or inconsideration, or from concupiscence of the corruptibility of the body; these impediments are not removed by the infused virtues.52 51 Aquinas, De Veritate, Quaest. XXIV, art. 4, ad 1. “ Aliquid dicitur esse facile dupliciter: uno modo propter remotionem impedimenti; alio modo propter appositionem adjutorii. Facilitas igitur pertinens ad habitum est per adjutorii appositionem : nam habitus inclinat potentiam ad actum.” 52 Suarez, F., Opera Omnia (Apud Ludovicum Vives, Paris, 1858), Torn. IX, Bk. VI, Cap. 9, n. 9. “Duplex enim facilitas vel difficultas (ut supra tetigi) distingui potest : una est intrinseca, quae per se inest cuicumque facultati respectu actus ad quem inclinatur; alia est per ablationem im­ pedimentorum quae per accidens occurrunt. Hae igitur virtutes priorem dant facilitatem, eo ipso quod intrinsecam conferunt operandi facultatem ad actus ad quos connaturaliter inclinantur tanquam ad finem suum, et ultimum actum. Unde cum hae virtutes intrinsece insint suis potentiis, sunt veluti 28 The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues This same distinction is made by the Salmanticenses, and their idea agrees substantially with that of Suarez. They define in­ trinsic and extrinsic facility as follows : Intrinsic, which consists in this that the elicitive prin­ ciple of the act be sufficiently proportioned and complete in respect to its act ; extrinsic facility which comes from the removal of impediments or indispositions W’hich im­ pede or render difficult the exercise of operation even when the aforesaid principle exists, perfect and com­ plete.53 Gonet54 quotes verbatim the opinion of the Salmanticenses in regard to intrinsic and extrinsic facility. We shall examine these opinions briefly to see if there is any basis for such a distinc­ tion. Since they all teach substantially the same opinion, we can bracket together the teaching of Suarez, the Salmanticenses, and Gonet, and give a critical estimate of their doctrine. Mazzella 55 seems to think that the distinction of intrinsic and extrinsic facility is useless because, in his opinion, it identifies in­ trinsic facility with the supernatural “ posse ” which the infused virtues confer to the faculties for placing acts of the supernatural order. Understood in this sense, all theologians, who admit that the infused moral virtues confer a “ posse ” of supernatural action, would also admit with Suarez and the Salmanticenses that pondera quaedam ad suos actus inclinantia potentias. Hoc ergo modo dant intrinsecam facilitatem, sicut supra etiam de Theologicis virtutibus tetigimus. At vero extrinsecam facilitatem non praebent, quia contraria difficultas pro­ venit aut ex naturali ignorantia vel inconsideratione, aut ex fomite con­ cupiscentiae, vel corporis corruptibilitate; haec autem impedimenta per has virtutes non auferuntur.” 53 Salmanticenses, Cursus Theologicus (Apud Victorem Palme, Paris, 1878), Tom. VI, Tr. 12, q. 63, Disp. 3, n. 5, ad 3. “Aliam per se et in­ trinsecam, quae consistit in eo quod principium elicitivum talis actus sit sufficienter proportionatum ac completum respectu illius: aliam extrinsecam, quae provenit ex remotione impedimentorum, aut indispositionum, quae, etiam existente perfecto et completo praedicto principio, impediunt vel reddunt difficile exercitium operationis.” 34 Gonet, J. B., Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae (Ludovicum Vives, Paris, 1876), Vol. IV, Disp. 1, q. 4, ad 3um. 55 Cf. Ibid., Disp. I, art 4, η. 65. General Notion and Division of the Virtues 29 they confer an intrinsic facility. Therefore, according to Mazzella, this distinction is useless, and in reality solves nothing. It simply gives a new name to an old idea. However, we are inclined to disagree with Mazzella’s under­ standing of intrinsic facility. We believe that Suarez, and the Salmanticenses intended to include not only the “ posse ” of supernatural action, but also some general notion of facility, in their idea of intrinsic facility. Contrary to Mazzella’s opinion, we are inclined to believe that there is a basis for the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic facility. Inasmuch as the in­ fused moral virtues strengthen the potency and incline the will to good, they intrinsically dispose the subject toward acts of virtue. Intrinsically and in se, the individual who possesses the infused moral virtues can be said to possess a facility for virtuous acts despite the fact that due to the opposition of nature and the presence of impediments, this facility cannot be exercised extrinsically. Perhaps we can best illustrate our meaning by an example. Let us suppose that a certain man is blessed with a fine voice and has an excellent talent for singing, but never uses this ability because he is of a very shy and bashful nature. It cannot be denied that he possesses a certain intrinsic ability and facility for singing, despite the fact that he never uses his talent extrinsically due to his impediment of shyness and self-conscious­ ness. The same thing seems to be true of the man who possesses the infused moral virtues. It cannot be denied that he has a certain intrinsic ability and facility for virtuous acts, although in the exercise of virtue he may not be conscious of this facility due to extrinsic impediments. Such intrinsic facility is more than a simple potency, since it is a positive inclination and ability. This idea seems to be expressed by Suarez, in his words that the “ infused virtues are as weights inclining the potencies to their acts.”56 The Salmanticenses express this same idea by saying that the infused moral virtues give not only the “ posse ” of supernatural action, but also communicate a certain facility to acts of virtue as well.5' This is the interpretation that is applied 58 Loc. cit., n. 9. “ Unde hae virtutes . . . sunt veluti pondera quaedam ad suos actus inclinantia potentias.” 67 Loc. cit., n. 24. “ Si vero inquiras, an virtus infusa non solum det 30 The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues to the teaching of Suarez and the Salmanticenses by certain other theologians,*58 and we shall see this idea more fully developed in the teaching of Cardinal Billot. The infused moral virtues, therefore, can be said to confer intrinsic facility. But this facility can become extrinsically opera­ tive only in conjunction with the work of the acquired moral virtues, for it is the task of the latter virtues to remove impedi­ ments and to overcome the resistance of the passions and the lower nature. By this fact, there is illustrated the importance of exercising both the acquired and infused moral virtues. With­ out the practice of the acquired moral virtues, the intrinsic facility afforded by the infused virtues must remain intrinsic and im­ perceptible as far as practice is concerned. But with the practice of the acquired moral virtues, the infused virtues become more operative, so that both intrinsic and extrinsic facility assist in the practice of virtue. This seems to be the teaching of Garrigou la Grange, for in speaking of acquired and infused prudence, he says the following : Of itself (infused prudence) confers an intrinsic facility to judge well practically concerning the affairs of the Christian life, and its exercise is extrinsically facilitated by acquired prudence which is exercised at the same time.6® potentiae praedictam facilitatem complendo ipsam, quod praestat in genere causae formalis, sed etiam efficienter eam communicet actibus? Respon­ dendum est affirmative juxta dicta de virtutibus acquisitis disp. 1, n. 81.” 58 Cf. Aertnys, J.-Damen, C., Theoloffia Moralis (Typis M. Alberts. Galopiae, 1918), Vol. I, Tract V, Cap. 1, η. 279, 3. “Judicium de alicujus virtute non est sumendum ex externa facilitate opera virtutum elicendi. Potest enim aliquis vel ex vehementia passionum naturali, vel ex habitus vitiosis antea acquisitis, magnam experiri difficultatem in operibus virtutis et nihil­ ominus eminentem gradum virtutis habere, uti in pluribus sanctis videre est. Imo, difficultas vincenda intensitatem virtutis arguit.” Cf. Van Noort, De Gratia Christi (Pauli Brand, Hilversum in Hollandia, 1934), Cap. II, art. 3, n. 16S-167. Also Schiffini, De Virtutibus Infusis (Herder, Friburg, 1904), Disp. I, Sect 1, n. 6. 69 Garrigou-Lagrange, R., Les Trois Ages de la Vie Intérieure (Les Editions Du Cerf, Paris, 1938), Vol. II, Chap. VIII, p. 109. “Elle nous donne par ellemême une facilité intrinsèque pour bien juger pratiquement General Notion and Division of the Virtues 31 There is another theory in regard to the question of facility in the infused moral virtues which cannot be overlooked, namely, the opinion of Cardinal Billot.®0 Billot agrees substantially with the opinion of Suarez and the Salrnanticenses, but his treatment of the subject is more clear and more complete. The infused virtues, according to Billot, are habits not in an univocal but in an analogous sense. Furthermore, these virtues participate both of the nature of potency and habit. They partake of the nature of potency because they enable man to act according to that superior nature of which he is made a partaker by grace. Before man receives the infused virtues, he can act supernaturally only by the transient motion of actual grace, but after the infusion of the virtues, he has an operative and permanent faculty of plac­ ing supernatural acts. In this sense, the theologians say that the infused virtues confer a “ posse ” of supernatural action. The infused virtues also participate of the nature of habits, for they are qualities which modify already existing potencies. Thus, the proximate principle of a supernatural act is not the infused virtue, but the natural faculty as informed by the infused virtue.81 These notions having been clarified, Billot goes on to discuss the topic of facility. If by facility is understood the “ posse ” which the infused virtues confer, then it must be said that the infused virtues confer facility. However, facility means more than simply a “ posse ” ; it is a positive inclination of the faculty to those things which are of virtue. He continues in these words : But this inclination (facility) is of two kinds. One which we can call the inhesion to the good which is the object of virtue. The other which we can call an in­ clination to the acts of virtue. These two inclinations are distinct not only by formality and concept, but they are so diverse that the first can be had without the sec­*60 61 des choses de la vie chrétienne, et son exercice est extrinsequement facilité par la prudence acquise qui s'exerce en meme temps.” 60 Billot, L., De Virtutibus Infusis (In Universitate Gregoriana, Rome, 1921), Prolegomenon (I-IIae, QQ. 49-61), pars 2, n. 1. 61 Ibid., n. 2. “ Quare proximum supematuralis actus principium non tam virtus infusa est, quam potentia naturalis prout infusa virtute informata.” 32 The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues ond, and the second is not always in proportion to the first.62 In other words, facility can be directed toward the object itself, virtue, or toward the acts to that object. Billot goes on to illustrate his meaning by an example. He considers the case of two men in poor health. One man has a very strong desire to be healthy, but he has no inclination to take medicine because of an aversion and dislike that he has for it. The second man, on the contrary, has no special desire for health, but he ex­ periences no difficulty in taking medicines because of an acquired and ready disposition toward their use. In one respect, the first individual is better disposed than the second, because his intense desire for health will prompt him to take medicine despite the repugnance that he feels toward it; in another respect, the con­ dition of the second man is better, because of his promptitude toward using the means of acquiring health.63 If we apply this analogy to the matter of the infused and acquired virtues, we arrive at Billot’s notions of facility. Accord­ ing to him, the infused moral virtues do confer the first kind of facility which is nothing more than a strong inclination and tendency toward virtue and goodness. However, they do not confer the second kind of facility, for they do not destroy evil inclinations, restrain the passions, or incline to the prompt and ready practice of virtue. All of these functions are achieved only by the practice of the acquired moral virtues. However, since it cannot be denied that the infused moral virtues confer a special inclination to good which is their object, they do confer a facility in the broad sense. This facility might not be apparent, it might not be manifest enough to come under the observation of ex­ perience, yet it can be called facility in a broad sense of the term. This opinion of Billot’s seems to be a development of the in62 Ibid., Sed sciendum est inclinationem (facilitatem) esse duplicem. Unam quam possumus dicere inhaesionis ad bonum quod est objectum virtutis. Alteram quam possumus appellare proclivitas in exercitium actus illiusmet. Certe duo ibi sunt non solum formalitate et conceptu distincta, sed etiam inter se diversa, ut primum possit adesse absque secundo, et secundum non sit semper in proportione cum primo. 63 Ibid., n. 2. General Notion and Division of the Virtues 33 trinsic and extrinsic facility expressed by Suarez and the Salmanticenses, for the conclusions of both teachings are practically identical. However, Billot does not refer to their teachings, neither does he use the terms intrinsic and extrinsic facility. In concluding this chapter, we shall attempt to summarize the teachings of the theologians in regard to the question of facility. The one conclusion regarding which practically all theologians seem to agree is that ger sc the infused moral virtues do not confer facility in the ordinary sense, namely, a promptness and readiness to acts of virtue. The proof of this fact is to be found in experience. Gregory of Valentia 64 is the only dissenter from this opinion, and even he is not too positive in his assertion of the contrary doctrine. Can the infused moral virtues be said to confer any facility at all ? Understood in the sense of intrinsic facility, an intrinsic inclination and inherence to good, the infused moral virtues can be said to confer facility. For if this notion of facility is not admitted, then one would be forced to the con­ clusion that a person having the infused virtues would fall a victim of sin just as readily as the unregenerate man, supposing both to have the same degree of acquired virtue and to be sub­ ject to the same temptation. We are inclined to believe that the infused moral virtues would produce some inclination to good, some manner of facility for the regenerate man which the unre­ generate man would not possess. We cannot appeal to authority other than the opinions which we have cited in this work. Besides the authors already quoted, this also seems to be the opinion of the theologian, Marc, who expresses his opinion in the following words: Therefore the infused virtues give the faculty of exercis­ ing supernatural acts, along with a certain intrinsic facility W’hich is scarcely perceptible.65 64 De Valentia, G., Op. cit., ut supra. This opinion has already been quoted and discussed on p. 25 of this chapter. es Marc, C., Institutiones Morales Alphonsianac (Ex Typographia Della Pace, Philippi Cuggiani, Rome, 1902), Vol. I, Tract V, art. 2. n. 412 in finem. “ Ergo, virtus infusa tribuit ipsam facultatem efficiendi actus supernaturales, cum quadam facilitate intrinseca vix perceptibili.” 34 The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues This also seems to be the opinion of Doctor Parente, for in his recent work, The Ascetical Life, he says: By means of such infused principles (infused virtues), supernatural acts are made possible, but it does not always follow that they are made easy, although the in­ clination to the good that they involve removes some of the difficulty .ee In conclusion, one fact is obvious, the infused moral virtues do not confer the same ease and promptitude toward acts of virtue as do the acquired virtues. They do not make acts of virtue easy, in the commonly accepted sense of the term. God could and perhaps sometimes does attach facility of action to the infused moral virtues, but according to his ordinary Providence, He does not give by infusion what man can acquire by his own natural activity. Human industry, therefore, plays an important part in the development of virtue, and facility in the practice of virtue will come only in direct proportion to our own efforts. This is the practical conclusion to be drawn from this chapter. ee Parente, P., The Ascetical Life (B. Herder: St. Louis, 1944), 125. , <ι< CHAPTER II FACILITY IN THE INFUSED MORAL VIRTUES Article I. Facility in the Infused Moral Virtues by the Repetition of Natural Acts of the Acquired Virtues s-‘ ‘ u t • t i 1 b i ; . In the preceding chapter, we stated that the infused moral virtues conferred a “ posse ” of supernatural action and, most probably, some general motion of facility. However, we also asserted that these virtues, unlike the acquired moral virtues, confer no facility of action immediately and per sc. The next question to be determined is whether or not there can be any facility of action accidentally attached to the infused virtues. This question is raised by theologians, because from observation and experience it seems that there is a certain facility developed by the practice of the infused virtues. Molina implies this in reference to the virtue of faith, remarking that a heretic, who loses supernatural faith by denying one revealed truth, still retains natural faith in regard to the remaining articles of faith.1 Such natural faith could not be the infused habit because it is now lost. Therefore it must be an acquired habit developed by previous acts of the infused virtue. This same argument can also be applied to the other infused virtues both theological and moral, because after these virtues are lost, there still remain in many cases distinct tendencies toward their objects as a result of acts performed when the infused virtues were present in the soul. 1 Molina, L., Concordia Liberi Arbitrii (P. Lethielleux, Paris, 1876), Question XIV, Disputation VII, Tertio. “Qui cum pertinacia errat circa unum articulum fidei, amittit fidem supernaturalem, qua reliquos omnes credebat, neque deinceps elicit actum supernaturalem fidei, sed naturalem circa reliquos articulos, in quibus non errat: cum ergo experientia constet haereticos, amissa fide, assentiri reliquis rebus quae sunt de fide, tamquam Dei revelationibus.’’ 35 36 The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues From all this, it is obvious that there can be a certain facility developed by the practice of virtuous acts in one possessing the infused virtues. The problem presents itself in explaining the source of this facility. How do we account for it? Whence does it arise? In our response to these questions, we shall center our attention as much as possible on the point of facility in the infused moral virtues, but of necessity, much of what we say will be applicable to the theological virtues as well. In seeking the cause of facility in the infused virtues, Suarez, the first of the great theologians to treat this question thoroughly, mentions the possibility that it might come from either or both of the following sources, (1) that by repeated supernatural acts of the infused virtues, other habits are acquired, (2) that by the repetition of natural acts of virtue, which are elicited in regard to the same matter as infused habits, natural habits result.2 Between these two kinds of acquired habits, there is a clear dis­ tinction. The first type of acquired habit proceeds directly from repeated acts of the infused virtues, while the second type pro­ ceeds from repeated acts of natural virtue, connected with the infused virtues only in as much as they both have the same object. Thus, in the first theory, an acquired habit of prudence would result directly from repeated acts of the infused virtue of prudence ; in the second theory, an acquired habit of prudence would result from repeated acts of natural prudence, and this acquired habit would be connected with the infused virtue only in so far as it has the same object. Suarez mentions these two modes of acquiring facility as possible solutions to explain the ease found in the practice of t'irtue by those possessing the in­ fused virtues. We shall discuss both these possibilities, as well as the opinions of other theologians, in an attempt to arrive at the source of facility in the infused virtues. First, we shall consider acquired habits resulting from natural acts and attempt to determine whether or not they contribute to 2 Suarez, Opera Omnia, Vol. IX, Liber VI, Chap. XIV, n. 1-2. Primo, quia per eosdem actus supernaturales et infusos, qui ab habitibus infusis, vel per divinum auxilium eliciuntur, alii habitus acquiruntur. Secundo, quia per alios actus naturales, qui circa easdem materias habitutim infusorum fieri possunt . . . producuntur habitus talibus actibus proportionati. Facility in the Infused Moral Virtues 37 the facility of the infused moral virtues. We can phrase our question as follows: Can the repetition of purely natural acts, elicited in regard to the same manner as that of the infused virtues, effect a natural habit which will in some measure facilitate the practice of the infused virtues? To take a concrete illustra­ tion, let us consider the case of a pagan who has acquired a habit of temperance from purely natural motives. At length, he is converted, baptized, and receives the infused moral virtues. The question is, will his natural habit of temperance bring any measure of facility to the practice of his newly acquired super­ natural habit of temperance? Again, let us consider the case of a man in the state of sanctifying grace who places at one time purely natural acts of temperance, and at another time, super­ natural acts of temperance. There is no doubt that his natural acts of temperance can be extrinsically supernaturalized by the virtue of charity, and thus his supernatural merit is increased. However, the question is, will the repetition of such natural acts lend any facility to the placing of supernatural acts of temper­ ance? Some theologians who have written on this point concede that there is a connection between the supernatural infused and the natural or acquired virtues whereby a certain facility is com­ municated from the latter to the former. Suarez, commenting on this point, says that although such acquired habits do not aid per se in the placing of infused acts, nevertheless they can be of assistance by inclining the faculty to similar acts of the same generic substance. Moreover, as Suarez goes on to say, acquired habits aid to the placing of infused acts negatively, by removing impediments, by moderating the affections, and by excluding habits which are repugnant to virtue.3 Ripalda agrees with Suarez in affirming that acquired habits can be of assistance to the faculty in performing supernatural 3 Ibid., n. 24. “Quod vero juvent, postquam sunt acquisiti, facile potest ostendi, quia licet non juvent per se influendo in actus infusos, nihilominus juvare possunt inclinando ad similes actus in substantia generica. Item pos­ sunt juvare, ut apprehensio vel cogitatio de tali re facilior sit et suavior, ac denique juvare possunt tollendo impedimenta, moderando aliquos affectus, vel habitus aliquo modo repugnantes excludendo.” 38 The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues acts of virtue.4 According to Ripalda, acquired habits aid the faculty toward placing supernatural acts of virtue since they remove obstacles which would otherwise impede the placing of such acts. By way of example, he points out that a will which easily and promptly exercises natural acts of love brings this same facility to bear in eliciting supernatural acts of love The reason for this is clear, namely, that in its elevation to the supernatural order, the faculty retains its natural dispositions and aptitudes, and since in this case the faculty already has an aptitude for acts of love, this facility is retained in the supernatural order. This certainly seems to be logical enough, and in conformity with the principle that “ grace perfects but does not change nature.” Not all of the theologians are as explicit as Ripalda in this affirmation, but they all seem to concede some communication of facility from the acquired to the infused virtues. Thus, Caje­ tan takes this fact for granted in his commentary on the virtues,® as do most of the other theologians/ Among the more recent authors, C. Mazzella can certainly be cited in favor of this opinion since he follows the same line of thought as Suarez.8 He is not too explicit as to the exact manner in which this facility is con‘Ripalda, J. M., De Ente Supernaturali. (Apud Ludovicum Vives ; Paris, 1871.) Tom. H, Uber III. Disp. Ill, Sectio IV. 5Ibid., n. 14. “Ita eadem potentia naturalis, potens facile in amorem naturalem ejus aequitatis, elevatur per habitum supematuralem ad facilem amorem supematuralem; nam non minus elevabilis est potentia simpliciter potens, quam facile potens.” • Cajetan, Thomas De Vio, Summa Sancti Thomae (Patavii, Ex typo­ graphic Seminarii, 1697), I-IIae, Quaest. 63, art. 3. T Medina, B., Expositio in Primam Secundae Angelici Doctoris D. Thomae Aquinatis (Venice, Apud Petrum Mariam Bertanum, 1602), Quaest. LI, art. 4, ad secundum. “ Non potest, quod aliquis diu et multo tempore se exerceat in aliqua virtute infusa, quin habeat multas operationes naturaliter bonas, quibus comparat habitum acquisitum, qui manet amisso infuso, sicut patet in eo, qui credit propter motiva divina et humana.” Cf. etiam, Sylvius, Com­ mentarii in Totam Primam Secundae S. Thomae Aquinatis (Venetiis, Ex Typographia Balleoniana, 1726), Quaest. LI, art. 4. John of St. Thomas. Cursus Theologicus (Paris, Ludovicus Vives, 1885). Tom. VI Quaestio LXII, Disputatio VI, Art VII. 8 Cf. Mazzella, C., De Virtutibus Infusis, Disputatio I, Art. V, Sectio I, n. 73. Facility in the Infused Moral Virtues 39 ferred on the infused virtues, but it is obvious that he does grant some form of communication? Cardinal Billot can also be listed as favoring this opinion as is evident from his treatment of the virtues. This is especially evidenced by his commentary on the Second Chapter of the Canticle of Canticles, verse 11, “ For now the winter is past, the rain is over and gone, Howers have ap­ peared in our land, now is the time of pruning.” According to his figurative interpretation of this passage, the winter and rain signify the sins and vices which precede justification. The flowers which appear are the infused virtues which accompany justification. However, since the deordinate passions and affec­ tions are not formally corrected by these infused virtues, the time of pruning signifies that we must work to cultivate and acquire good habits, so that the infused virtues may be made less difficult of operation.10 Thus, he illustrates the influence of the acquired on the infused virtues. The fact that some measure of facility is afforded to the in­ fused virtues by the concomitant acquired virtues seems evident not only from the teaching of theologians but from reason and experience as well. Thus, in the case of a pagan who has prac­ ticed certain of the natural virtues over a long period of time, it seems obvious that after his conversion, the operation of the corresponding supernatural and infused virtues will be rendered more easy by his previously acquired facility in natural virtue. The same thing is equivalently true of a man in the state of sanctifying grace and the infused virtues. The greater the degree of acquired virtue he possesses, and the more that he uses all the natural means of acquiring virtue which are at his command, so much the more easy will he find the practice of the infused virtues. On the contrary, all things being equal, the lesser degree ® Ibid., n. 73. “ Quatenus per alios actus naturales, qui circa easdem ma­ terias habituum infusorum fieri possunt, producuntur habitus talibus actibus proportionati . . . talis habitus nullo modo acquiritur per efficientiam habitus infusi, aut per se, aut per actus suos, sed per exercitium aliorum actuum, qui per accidens et successive, ac diversis temporibus contingit misceri, seu interponi cum actibus infusis.” 10 Billot, L., De Virtutibus Infusis. Prolegomenon (I-Π Qq. 49-61), n. II, s. 1. 40 The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues of acquired virtue that is possessed, the more difficult will be the practice of the infused virtues. The implications from the foregoing truth are obvious, namely, that the development of the acquired virtues is important for producing aids toward facility in the practice of the infused moral virtues. It must be emphasized here that we are speaking only of a negative disposition, since the natural cannot help or dispose positively toward a supernatural act. In this way, a person would make a serious mistake in depending totally on the infused virtues without at the same time using all the natural means at his disposal for acquiring virtue. The place of the infused virtues is most important, and considered in themselves, they are obviously more noble than the acquired virtues, yet on this account we cannot minimize the position of these latter virtues. For as Waflfelaert notes, the acquired virtues are useful both to the sinner and to the just man in attaining their super­ natural end.11 Again, since our Divine Saviour and the Saints possessed the natural virtues in an eminent degree, it would not only be foolish on our part, but dangerous as well, to neglect these important means of sanctification. This is especially true in the light of what has just been seen, that these virtues contribute a certain facility of action to the infused virtues enabling us to place acts of these virtues readily and easily. Article Π. Facility in the Infused Moral Virtues by the Repetition of Supernatural Acts of the Infused Virtues After establishing the fact that repeated acts of the acquired virtues contribute facility to the placing of acts of the infused virtues, the next question to be determined is whether or not this same truth can be affirmed of repeated acts of the infused virtues. As we have seen, Suarez states as a possibility that by the repetition of supernatural acts of the infused virtues, habits might be produced which would result in facility in the practice 11 Waflfelaert, G. J., De Prudentia, Fortitudine et Temperantia (Bruges, Vandenberghe-Denaux, 1889), p. 10. “Ex his jam concludere licet ejusmodi virtutes acquisitas, neque peccatori neque justo inutiles, etiam in ordine ad finem supematuralem.” Facility in the Infused Moral Virtues 41 of these virtues?2 We shall investigate this possibility, attempt­ ing to determine, first of all, whether or not any habits are actually produced from repeated acts of the infused virtues, and if so, exactly how much they contribute to the facility of the in­ fused virtues. It is to be noted that most theologians teach that besides the facility which comes from repeated natural acts of the acquired virtues, there is another facility in the infused virtues which comes properly from the repetition of supernatural acts of these virtues. This opinion is taught by Suarez,13 Vasquez,14 Francis Sylvius,15 John of St. Thomas,16 Billuart,17 Ripalda,18 Mazzella,18 Billot,20 and other theologians. The reason for teaching this opinion is very clear, namely, that the facility which is experi­ enced in the infused virtues cannot be entirely accounted for simply by having recourse to the concomitance of natural acts of the acquired virtues. As an instance of this, let us consider the case of a man who does not have any natural habit of temperance. Let us suppose that he goes to confession, repents of his past, and begins to practice supernatural acts of infused temperance. Who will say that after many such repeated acts there is not acquired a facility of action? Obviously, facility would be present after a time, and this facility would increase with the multiplication of acts of the infused virtues. Yet this facility would not seem to come from natural acts of the acquired ™ Op. cit., Vol. IX, Liber VI, Cap. XIV, n. 1-2. 13 Ibid., n. 7. 14 Vasquez, Gabriele P., Commentariorum ac Disputationum in Primam Secundae Sancti Thomae (Lugduni, Sumptibus Jacob Cardon, 1681), Tom. I, Disp. 77 Cap. X, η. 48. 15 Sylvius, Francis, Commentarii in Totam Primam Secundae S. Thomae Aquinatis (Venetiis, Ex Typographia Balieoniana, 1726), Tom. Π, Quaest. LI, art. 4, conclusion 3. 16 John of St. Thomas, Cursus Theologicus (Paris, Ludovicos Vives, 1885), Tom. VI, Quaest. LXII, Disputatio XVI, Art. VII, n. 38. 17 Billuart, F.C.R., Summa Sancti Thomae (Editio Nova, Paris, Letouzey et Ane), Tom. II, Tractatus de Passionibus et Virtutibus, Dissertatio II, Art III, Resp. ad Obj. 3. 18 Ripalda, op. cit., Disputatio LUI, η. 3. 18 Ορ. cit., Disputatio I, Art. V, n. 75. 20 Ob. cit., Prolegomenon (I—II, qq. 49-61), η. II, s. 2. 42 The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues virtues, for this man never practiced natural acts of temperance as such. Hence the facility can be attributed solely to repeated supernatural acts of the infused virtues placed after he attained the state of grace. Exactly the same situation can exist in regard to any of the other moral virtues. Therefore, theologians admit that facility of action seems to be generated in some way from repeated acts of the infused virtues. Again, the question arises, how account for this facility? Here we shall consider the various opinions of theologians in explanation of this problem. First Opinion. According to Mazzella,21 there are certain Thomistic theologians (whom he does not mention by name), who teach that facility in the infused virtues is a result of the in­ terior increase and intensification of these same virtues. Hence, with an increase of sanctifying grace, the infused virtues are intrinsically increased, and this intensification of the virtues, in turn, results in facility. This opinion is rejected by Mazzella 22 and Billot23 and seems to lack any fundament of truth. As we have already said, it is not the function of the infused moral virtues to confer per se and immediately any facility of action. Therefore, we can argue that what an infused virtue cannot produce per se, it can hardly produce by becoming more intense. Another and a better argument against this theory is that an increase of one of the infused virtues automatically effects a proportionate increase in all of the infused virtues. Hence, by the practice of one of the moral virtues, a stronger facility of action should be felt in all of the virtues alike. Experience teaches this to be absolutely false, for a man who places repeated acts of the infused virtue of justice does not thereby feel a greater facility of action in the virtue of temperance. Therefore, this opinion is rightly rejected by practically all theologians. 21 Op. cit., n. 76. “ Etenim primo aliqui, inter quos Thomistae nonnulli, tenent eam facilitatem oriri ex habitibus per se infusis intensioribus factis per actus.” It is difficult to say exactly what theologians did hold this opinion. Mazzella does not mention them by name, and the author, in his research, was unable to find any theologians in favor of this theory. Obviously, this opinion could not have been very wide-spread. 22 Ibid., n. 76. 23 Op. cit., Prolegomenon (I-Π, Qq. 40-61), η. II, s. 3. Facility in the Infused Moral Virtues 43 Second Opinion. Another theory7 for explaining the facility in the infused moral virtues was taught by Hurtado De Men­ doza 24 and some more recent theologians. They state that the repetition of supernatural acts quoad substantiam produces a supernatural acquired habit, and this acquired habit is the source of facility in the infused virtues. Supernatural acts, they argue, are not less efficacious than natural acts, but the repetition of natural acts produces an acquired natural habit, therefore the repetition of supernatural acts produces an acquired supernatural habit.25 This second opinion is likewise rejected by Suarez,26 Ripalda,27 Mazzella,28 and most theologians. The obvious reason for discarding this opinion is the common teaching of theologians that supernatural habits can be produced by God alone from the obediential potency of the soul. For this reason, theologians teach that supernatural habits can only be infused, not acquired. But even granted for the sake of argu­ ment that such supernatural habits were acquired, the question arises, what would happen to these habits when the state of grace is lost ? Either they would remain in the soul or they would not. If they remained, then the subject would have the habitual facility of performing supernatural actions without having the habitual posse of placing such actions. This is an obvious absurdity. Again, if these habits were lost with mortal sin, another difficulty would arise inasmuch as acquired habits are not totally lost by one contrary act. Moreover, experience show’s that a person can retain, even after he sins, facility in virtue previously acquired by the exercise of supernatural acts. Ripalda 29 gives the best refutation of this theory, stating that the followers of this opinion are not justified in asserting a strict parity between natural and supernatural acts, and in taking it 24 Ripalda who was the disciple of Hurtado de Mendoza, is the authority for this assertion. Since the author could not avail himself of Hurtado’s original work, he had to content himself with this testimony. Cfr. Ripalda, De Ente Supernaturali, Tom. II. Disp. LII, Sect. 1. 25 Ripalda, De Ente Supernaturali, Tom. II, Disp. LII, Sect. 1. 28 Op. cit., Vol. IX, Liber, VI, Chap. XIV, n. 3. 27 Op. cit., Sectio II, n. 7-8. 28 Op. cit., Disp. I, Art. V, n. 77. 29 Op. cit., Disp. LII, Sect. Ill, n. 10—11. 44 The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues for granted that since natural acts produce acquired natural habits, supernatural acts produce acquired supernatural habits. Ripalda goes on to show that because one thing is more perfect than an­ other according to a certain mode, this does not necessarily mean that it includes in itself all the activities of the less perfect form. For example, fire is able to reproduce itself because it is accord­ ing to its nature to do so. Yet, the sun, which is a more perfect form than fire, cannot reproduce itself, because to do so is not according to its nature. So also, concludes Ripalda, natural acts produce natural habits, but supernatural acts do not directly produce supernatural habits, for this is not according to their nature.30 Furthermore, as we shall see presently, the facility of the infused virtues can be satisfactorily explained by natural habits without having recourse to supernatural acquired habits. Article III. The Opinion of Medina, Sylvius, Suarez, and Mazzella Regarding Facility in the Infused Moral Virtues Next, we come to the real subject of controversy, namely, whether or not supernatural acts of the infused virtues produce any natural acquired habits. As we have already seen, prac­ tically all of the theologians admit that there is a facility of action which results from repeated acts of the infused virtues. The two opinions which we have just investigated do not account for this facility, so now we shall discuss the next possibility, whether or not repeated acts of the infused virtues produce a natural acquired habit. If it can be established that such a habit is formed, then the problem is solved, and the facility of the infused virtues is to be attributed to the formation of an acquired natural habit. If, on the other hand, this line of reasoning is rejected, then another explanation must be found for the facility in the practice of the infused virtues. The opinion of theologians is divided on this point, some affirming, others denying that an acquired natural habit is gen­ erated by the practice of the infused virtues. The controversy on this issue began shortly after the time of St. Thomas Aquinas, and has continued down to the present day. St. Thomas treated 30 Ibid., n. 10. Facility in the Infused Moral Virtues 45 this question both in the Summa Theologica and in the Quaes­ tiones Disputatae de Virtutibus, but it is very difficult to determine his exact teaching on this point. As a result, the controversialists on both sides of this issue appeal to the authority of Saint Thomas, interpreting his words in the light of their own opinions. We shall discuss this controversy at some length, and attempt to give some critical estimate as to which opinion is more correct. Third Opinion. The followers of this opinion maintain that, through repeated acts of the infused virtues, no acquired habit is produced, either natural or supernatural. Medina, the Dominican commentator, was one of the first theologians to formulate this opinion. In his Commentary on the Prima Secundae of St. Thomas,31 Medina discusses this question. He admits that there is a facility in the practice of the infused virtues, but he denies that this facility is the result of an acquired habit, since it is impossible to conceive of supernatural acts producing an acquired natural habit. For habits, according to Medina, are always of the same species as the acts from which they proceed, and for this reason, supernatural acts cannot give rise to acquired natural habits.32 In turn, however, Medina does not give any satisfac­ tory explanation for the facility of the infused virtues. He simply states that the facility which remains in the potency after the infused virtues are lost, is not to be attributed to the fact that the person has an acquired habit, but to the fact that he had an infused habit, whose facility still remains in the potency.33 Medina does not explicitly state that the facility of the infused virtues is supernatural, but this inference is clearly contained in his other teachings. 31 Medina, B., Expositio in Primam Secundae Angelici Doctoris D. Thomae Aquinatis (Venice, Apud Petrum Mariam Bertanum, 1602), Quaest. LI, art. 4. 32 Ibid., Quaest LI, art. 4, ad primum. “ Nam actus similes producunt habitum ejusdem speciei, ut asserit Aristotelis, . . . actus enim temperantiae non producunt habitum justitiae, ergo actus virtutum infusarum non pro­ ducunt habitum acquisitum alterius speciei.” 33 Ibid., Quaest. LI, art 4, ad tertium. “ Dicendum est quod iste invenit se promptum et facilem ad credendum et amandum, non quia habet habitum acquisitum sed quia habuit virtutem infusam praecendentem, ex cujus exer­ citatione praecedente manent passiones moderatae et difficultates superatae.” 46 The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues Francis Sylvius34 agrees with the opinion of Medina that no natural habit is generated by repeated acts of the infused virtues. If such an acquired habit were generated, says Sylvius,35 it would incline the faculty either to natural or to supernatural acts. However, it could not incline the faculty to supernatural acts, for supernatural acts are beyond the capacity of an acquired habit; neither could it incline the faculty to natural acts, for the habit was not acquired by natural acts, and habits incline only to acts of the same species as the acts from which they were formed. Hence, from repeated acts of the infused virtues, there is generated no habit at all. As for the source of facility in the infused virtues, Sylvius goes on to explain that it could come from (1) concomitant natural habits generated by naturally good acts which the person performed in addition to his supernatural acts, (2) the fact that the passions are moderated and difficulties overcome by the practice of the infused virtues, (3) that although repeated acts of the infused virtues do not generate a habit, properly so called, nevertheless they could so strengthen and confirm a preexisting natural habit that a certain amount of facility and promptitude would be afforded to the faculty towards the practice of the infused virtues.36 This is the explanation given by Sylvius for the presence of facility in the exercise of the infused moral 34 Sylvius, Francis, Commentarii in Totam Primam Secundae S. Thomae Aquinatis (Venetiis, ex Typographia Balleoniana, 1726), Tom. II, Quaest. LI, art 4, conclusio 3. 35 Ibid., Quaest LI, art. 4, conclusio 3. ° Confirmatur : Si generaretur aliquis (habitus acquisitus); vel ille inclinat ad actus supematurales; vel ad naturales. Non ad supematurales, cum habitus acquisitus non inclinat ad eliciendos actus superantes suum facultatem. Non enim ad naturales, quia habitus solum inclinat ad actus similes illis, a quibus fuit causatus : non est autem causatus ex actibus naturalibus.” 36 Ibid., “Id (facilitas) accidere; vel quia praeter actus virtutis infusae exercuit alias moraliter bonas, ex quibus quidam habitus fit acquisitus : vel quia ex virtutis infusae exercitio passiones manent moderatae et difficultates superatae; vel denique quia licet ex actibus virtutis infusae non fuerit ge neratus proprie dictus habitus, eo ipso tamen, quo per eas corroboratus et confirmatus fuit habitus praeexistens, potentia, in qua est talis corroboratio et confirmatio, facta est propensior et promptior ad similiter operandum.” Facility in the Infused Moral Virtues Γ -1 : - I * '·.-■> . : 47 virtues. Sylvius lists Cajetan as favoring this opinion,37 but in reality, Cajetan does not treat this problem very thoroughly. It • is true that he affirms that acts proceeding from an infused habit do not cause any other habit but confirm a pre-existing habit 33 but in saying this, he simply restates the words of St. Thomas 39 without commenting on them. Besides Cajetan, Granadus and Conrad are also mentioned by Sylvius as favoring the present opinion.40 After Sylvius, the next and perhaps greatest proponent of this opinion was Suarez.41 Suarez follows the opinion of his predecessors in affirming that there is a facility in the practice of the infused virtues, but like them, he denies that this facility is caused by an acquired habit. What then is the source of this facility? According to Suarez, this facility comes per se from the grace of God, which either physically increases the effective power of the infused habit or contributes a greater suavity in performing the acts of virtue. Per accidens, this facility comes from the repetition of acts of the infused virtues whereby impediments are removed and the faculties are better disposed to acts of virtue.42 Above all, this facility is not to be attributed to an acquired habit, neither is it to be regarded as something intrinsic 3T Ibid., conclusio 3, in finem. 38 Cajetan, Thomas De Vio, Summa Sancti Thomae (Patavii, Ex Typo­ graphia Seminarii, 1698), Commentarium in Primae Secundae, Quaest LI, art. 4. “Actus procedentes ex habitu infuso non causant aliquem habitum, sed confirmant praeexistentem.” 38Aquinas, Summa Theologica (Rome, Ex Typographia Forzani, 1894), I-IIae, Quaest. LI, art. 4, resp. ad tertium. “ Dicendum, quod actus qui pro­ ducuntur ex habitu infuso, non causant aliquem habitum, sed confirmant habitum praeexistentim.” 40 Op. cit., conclusio 3, in finem. 41 Suarez, Opera Omnia, Vol. IX, Liber VI, Chap. XIV. 42 Ibid., η. 7. “ Unde facilitas quae in exercendis actibus infusis invenitur, per se quidem provenire potest ex gratia Dei, vel physice augente virtutem effectivam habitus, vel moraliter dante majorem suavitatem, aut illustrationem, vel affectionem majorem in operando. Per accidens autem potest ex con­ suetudine provenire, quatenus per illam vel tolluntur impedimenta aliqua, vei naturales potentiae, aut organa ministrantia his actibus, usu ipso melius disponuntur.” 48 The Quality of Facility in the Moral Fir tues and absolute in the act as distinct from the substance of the act.43 To substantiate his assertion that repeated acts of the infused virtues do not generate an acquired habit, Suarez gives essentially the same arguments as his predecessors. Acts produce only those habits which tend to the same material and formal objects as the acts themselves. But supernatural acts cannot produce an acquired habit tending to their own proper material and formal objects. Therefore, supernatural acts produce no acquired habits at all. He proves the minor of this assertion by stating that supernatural acts cannot produce supernatural acquired habits because such habits can be produced by God alone from the obediential potency of the soul. Again, supernatural acts cannot produce natural acquired habits because such natural habits would not tend to the same material and formal objects as the super­ natural acts. For the object of supernatural acts is supernatural, while the object of a natural habit is only natural, and natural habits have no aptitude for supernatural objects. This reasoning is obvious, says Suarez, for supernatural acts can no more pro­ duce an acquired natural habit than natural acts could give rise to a supernatural habit.44 Gregory Valentia follows the same opinion as Suarez and uses much the same line of argumentation.43 De Lugo can also be cited as favoring this opinion, although he does not treat this question very thoroughly in his theology.46 After discussing the problem of how to account for the facility in the infused virtues, *3 Ibid. "Probatur primo, quia illa facilitas, ut dixi non est in actu aliquid intrinsecum, absolutum, et distinctum a substantia actus.” ** Ibid. “Tertio, quia habitus qui acquiritur circa actus naturales inclinat ad actus ejusdem rationis cum his a quibus genitus est, et ad idem objectum sub eadem ratione formali; in praesenti autem habitus acquisitus non potest inclinare ad idem objectum sub eadem ratione formali, quia illud objectum supematurale est, ut libro superiori vidimus ; neque etiam potest talis habitu.-, ad actus infusos inclinare, tum quia naturalis qualitas non habet natura:em appetitum ad supematuralia ; tum etiam quia naturalis inclinatio habitus ad actum fundatur in virtute activa naturali talis actus ; hanc autem virtutem non habet habitus acquisitus circa actus infusos, ut ostensum est” 45 Valentia, Gregory, Commentariorum Theologicorum, Vol. II, Disp. IV, Quaest. Ill, p. 4. 46 De Lugo, J., Disputationes Scholasticae et Morales (Paris, Apud Ludovicum Vives, 1868), Vol. I, Disp. IX, Section 4. Facility in the Infused Moral Virtues 49 De Lugo states that he cannot agree with the opinion of those theologians who maintain that this facility is the result of an acquired habit. For just as natural acts cannot produce a super­ natural habit, supernatural acts cannot produce a natural habit. He does not mention the opinion of Suarez that this facility is to be attributed to the grace of God, but he does affirm that this facility is supernatural. It is not simply and rigorously super­ natural, but it is said to be supernatural secundum quid, inas­ much as the supernatural character of the facility comes not from itself but from the supernatural acts whence it proceeds. The facility in the practice of the infused virtues, according to De Lugo, is said to be supernatural by participation, or in other words, dispositively and secundum quid supernatural.47 Camillus Mazzella likewise maintains the foregoing opinion, and besides using the basic arguments already given, he cites two passages from Saint Thomas in proof of the contention that supernatural acts do not generate any acquired habits. The first quotation is taken from the treatise, Quaestiones Disputatae de Virtutibus, where St. Thomas says the following: It is to be said that acts of the infused virtues do not cause any habit, but through these acts pre-existing habits are increased, just as neither from acts of the acquired virtues is another habit generated, otherwise habits would be multiplied in infinitum. * 3 The other passage is taken from the Summa Theologica, and is almost identical with the passage just cited : Acts which are produced by an infused habit do not cause another habit, but confirm a pre-existing habit, 47 Ibid., n. 79. “ Aliunde ergo dicendum est ex iis, quae insinuavi in supe­ rioribus, et alibi latius explicui ex actibus fidei, et aliis actibus supematuralibus, relinqui in nobis species, quibus earum actuum recordemur, quae species non sint simpliciter et rigorose supernaturales, sed solum praesuppositive et secundum quid, id est, tales quae non possunt fieri, nisi posito tali actu supernatural!.” 48 Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae de Virtutibus, Art. 10, ad 19. “ Di­ cendum, quod actus virtutis infusae non causant aliquem habitum, sed per eos augetur praeexistens : quia nec ex actibus virtutis acquisitae aliquis habitus generatur; alias multiplicarentur habitus in infinitum." 50 The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues just as medicaments used by a healthy man do not cause health but rather confirm the habit of health already existing in the subject. *® After listing these arguments from St. Thomas along with the arguments of Suarez, Mazzella goes on to explain the source of facility in the infused virtues. He agrees with Suarez that this facility is to be attributed partially to the grace of God. but he says that it is especially to be attributed to the disposition of the subject whereby the impediments to virtue are removed. He explains this statement by saying that the constant exercise of the infused virtues serves to moderate the passions, remove difficulties, and so expel prejudice and ignorance that the subject is prompt tp the practice of the infused virtues. Mazzella agrees with De Lugo in saying that this facility would be supernatural secundum quid inasmuch as it presupposes the existence of supernatural acts.48 *50 Not many current authors have written on this topic. How­ ever, in a recent theological publication entitled Virtues and Vices the author, Father Pierse, agrees with the opinion of Suarez and Mazzella. In treating the subject of facility in the infused virtues, Father Pierse has the following to say : Repeated acts coming from the infused virtues or capacities will remove the vicious turn in the organism and cause a favourable disposition of parts which will give even a facility for action. The supernatural acts will do what purely natural acts could do in giving an acquired virtue, in the sense of creating a bent or facility for some good action. This also explains how a per­ son, who has long practiced Christian virtue, falls for a 48 Aquinas, St, Summa Theologica, I-IIae, Quaest. LI, art. 4, Resp. ad tertium. “Dicendum, quod actus qui producuntur ex habitu infuso non causant aliquem habitum; sed confirmant habitum praeexistentem, sicut medicinalia adhibita homini sano per naturam non causant aliquam sanitatem, sed sanitatem prius habitam corroborant.” 50 Cf. op. cit., n. 81. “ Tales ergo sunt species relicta ab actibus supernaturalibus, et memoria, qua illorum recordamur: nempe supematurales solum praesuppositive quatenus ad sui existentiam praesupponunt necessario aliquid supematurale, sed tamen debitae naturae intellectuali ex suppositione, quod sint in nobis actus supematurales.” Facility in the Infused Moral Virtues 51 short time, returns to grace, will speedily acquire the old facility in the exercise of certain virtues. The favourable bent in the power of the organism continues subconsciously through a short lapse.51 As to whether this facility is natural or supernatural, this same author adds the following : The facility of the infused virtues is only supernatural quoad modum, in the manner of production; it is like sight given miraculously to the blind ; it could come from nature but it did not. . . . From this treatment there follows the important conclusion that the acts of virtue of a just man are not in part natural and in part super­ natural, but entirely supernatural in substance.52 r Thus, Father Pierse agrees substantially with the foregoing opinion in asserting that the facility attached to the infused virtues is supernatural in origin, and not from an acquired natural habit. We can summarize the teaching of this third opinion in the following manner. The proponents of this opinion admit that there can be a facility of action joined to the infused virtues, but they deny that it comes from an acquired habit either natural or supernatural. They explain this facility by saying that it comes per se from the grace of God, per accidens from the repeti­ tion of acts of the infused virtues whereby obstacles are removed and a certain supernatural bent or facility is established in the faculty. Finally, they assert that this facility is not strictly and rigorously supernatural, but only supernatural secundum quid in­ asmuch as the supernatural character is not so much to be at­ tributed to the facility in itself as to the acts from which it proceeds. Article IV. The Opinion of Molina. Ripalda, Billot, and Merkelbach Regarding Facility in the Infused Virtues Fourth Opinion. There are other theologians who teach that there is an entirely natural explanation for the facility in the in51 Pierse, G., Virtues and Vices (Browne and Nolan, 1935), Chap. V, Part II, p. 39. 52 Ibid., p. 40. 52 The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues fused virtues. According to their opinion, there is a natural acquired habit generated by repeated acts of the infused virtues, and this natural habit is responsible for the facility which is experienced in the practice of the infused virtues. As far as can be determined, the author of this opinion is the Jesuit theologian, Louis Molina. Before the time of Molina, Scotus had opened the way for this teaching by affirming that supernatural acts were quoad substantiam natural, thereby admitting the possibility of acquired natural habits from supernatural acts.53 However, Scotus did not develop this latter point, and it is more or less inferred from his general teaching.5* We have already indicated Molina’s doctrine at the beginning of this chapter. However, we shall explain his ideas here more in detail. In speaking of the infused theological virtues, Molina 5556 states that these virtues are produced in the soul by God alone, and cannot be attained by any natural acts. However, he goes on to say that the supernatural acts of infused faith, hope and charity virtually (eminenter) include natural acts of these same virtues, since in their production there concur all those causes which would produce natural acts.58 Therefore, in the course of time, super­ natural acts of the infused virtues will give rise to natural ac­ quired habits of virtue. What does he mean by saying that “ in the production of a supernatural act, all those causes concur which would produce a natural act ” ? 57 Apparently, he means by this that the mechanics are the same in the production of both super­ set Scotus, J. Duns, Opus Oxoniense (Editio Nova, juxta editionem Waddingi, Paris, Apud Ludovicum Vives, 1894), Liber V, Disp. 26. 34 Suarez, for instance, attributes this opinion to Scotus. Cfr. Suarez, op. cit., Vol. IX, Liber VI, Chap. XIV, n. 4. “ Nam licet Scotus et Gabriel expresse non dicant illos habitus acquiri per actus virtutum infusarum, satis id indicant, praesertim cum in fundamento illo quod tales actus (supernaturales) sint in substantia naturales conveniant.” 53 Molina, L., Concordia Liberi Arbitrii, Quaest. XIV, Art. XIII, Dis­ putatio XXXVIII. 56Ibid. “Quia tamen actus illi (supernaturales) eminenter continent naturales actus fidei, spei, et caritatis, eo quod ad ipsorum productionem con­ currant causae omnes, quae producerent actus illos naturales.” 37 Ibid. “ Eo quod ad ipsorum productionem (actus supernaturales) con­ currant causae omnes, quae producerent actus illos naturales.” Facility in the Infused Moral Virtues 53 natural and natural acts, that we go through the same motions and use the same faculties of intellect and will as much in the one act as in the other, the only difference being that the faculty which before was operative through purely natural powers is not endowed with power of the supernatural order. Following upon this is his conclusion that a natural act is virtually contained in a supernatural act, and that in time, supernatural acts of the infused virtues will produce natural acquired habits of virtue. A variation of this same opinion was taught by Vasquez,88 although it is difficult to determine from his writings whether he actually held this opinion or simply mentioned it as a possibility. According to his teaching, Vasquez maintains that, through the repetition of acts supernatural quoad substantiam, there are ac­ quired habits natural quoad substantiam, which natural habits cooperate in the production of supernatural acts. For while such natural habits would not concur to the substance of the super­ natural act in the sense of supplying the posse, nevertheless, they would contribute to the substance of the act in a certain way by supplying a facility of action.58 5960 Ripalda 80 likewise affirms that supernatural acts of the infused virtues produce natural acquired habits. No one can doubt, says Ripalda, that the repetition of supernatural acts of the infused virtues produces a facility of action. But facility of action can come only from an acquired habit, as is evident from the very nature of facility. Hence, since facility is present in acts of the infused virtues, it must be attributed to an acquired habit. Fur­ thermore, since this acquired habit cannot be supernatural, because only God can produce supernatural habits in us, it must be nat­ ural.61 To Ripalda, this seems to be the only possible solution to the problem, for the fact is obvious that the infused virtues 58 Cf. Vasquez, P. Gabriel, Commentariorum ac Disputationum in Primam Secundae Sancti Thomae (Lugduni, Sumptibus Jacob Cardon, 1681). Tom. I, Disp. 77, Chap. 10, η. 48. “ Dicendum esset dari habitum ad facile ope­ randum actus infusos, distinctum ab habitu infuso, et alterius naturae ac­ quisitum per actus infusas ad facilius utendum ipso habitu infuso.” s» Cf. Ibid., n. 47-48. 60 De Ente Supematurali, Tom. II, Liber III, Disp. LIII. Cf. Ibid., η. 1. 54 The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues confer a facility of action, and the only satisfactory explanation for this facility is an acquired natural habit. In this connection, Ripalda takes occasion to refute the opinion of Medina, Suarez and other theologians who teach that this facility is a result of the moderation of the passions, the overcoming of difficulties, and the removal of impediments. How can they affirm this, demands Ripalda, without at the same time affirming that these things are possible only by the formation of an acquired habit?62 In support of his contention, Ripalda invokes the authority of St. Thomas, quoting from the treatise De Veritate, where the. following statement is made : It is to be said that from these repeated acts there is not generated any habit distinct from the habit by which these acts are elicited ; but either a habit of the same kind is increased, just as from acts of infused charity there is generated another habit of charity, or a pre­ existing habit is increased, as in one who already has an acquired habit of temperance, by new acts this habit is increased.63 In this passage, says Ripalda, St. Thomas affirms that supernatural acts of infused charity generate another habit of charity, namely, an acquired habit of charity. But such an acquired habit could t only be natural, since St. Thomas teaches elsewhere that super! natural habits can come only from God by infusion.64 There­ fore, we have it on the authority of St. Thomas that supernatural acts of the infused virtues produce an acquired natural habit.65 1, pd 1 JI i* 62 Cf. Ibid., n. 3. “ Nam si eo casu major facilitas, et habilitas potentiae potest reduci in remotionem impedientium, nimirum quia prioribus actibus moderatae sunt passionibus, et superatae difficultates retardantes animum ab agendo eos actus, ut arbitratur Medina, sane eodem modo potest reduci facilitas potentiae ad actus naturales acquisita in remotionem impedientium, quin argumentum sit statuendi habitus acquisitos naturales.” 63 Aquinas, De Veritate, Quaest 17, art. 1, ad quartum. "Dicendum, quod ex his actibus (repetitis) non generatur habitus alterius modi ab illo habitu ex quo actus eliciuntur, sed vel aliquis habitus ejusdem rationis, sicut ex actibus infusae charitatis generatur aliquis habitus dilectionis; vel praeexistens augmentatur, sicut in eo qui habet habitum temperantiae acquisitum ex actibus, ipse habitus augmentatur.” e* Cf. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I-IIae, Quaest. LI, art. 4. 63 Cf. Ripalda, op. cit., n. 3, in finem. * Facility in the Infused Moral Virtues 55 So far, we have listed Molina, Vasquez and Ripalda in favor of this fourth opinion. However, one of the most recent and perhaps most vigorous proponents of this system is Cardinal Billot.®6 According to Billot, the assertion that repeated acts of the infused virtues produce acquired natural habits, is a fact proven by constant and universal experience. The Saints, for instance, always progressed and advanced in the practice of the infused virtues as a result of frequent and strenuous exercise of their acts. Furthermore, we know that certain Saints had a special facility in the practice of those virtues in which they most assiduously exercised themselves. However, there is no suf­ ficient explanation for this fact unless it is admitted that by the repetition of acts of the infused virtues, there is produced an acquired natural habit whereby the passions are moderated, ' and the faculty is more and more disciplined to the practice of the infused virtues.07 Billot attacks the assertion of Suarez and Mazzella that the facility of the infused virtues comes per sc from the grace of God and per accidens from the moderation of the passions and the removal of obstacles. Such an explanat'on, says Billot, is obviously unsatisfactory. First of all, since this facility is some­ thing intrinsic, inhering in the faculty, it cannot be sufficiently explained by any extrinsic means such as grace.0” Therefore, , the explanation that this facility comes per se from the grace of God is unsound and unsatisfactory. Secondly, according to Billot, - the acts of the infused virtues cannot moderate the passions and destroy the tendency to the opposite vice without at the same time producing a positive inclination to acts of virtue. Thereee Billot, L., De Virtutibus Infusis (Rome, In Universitate Gregoriana, 1921), Generale Prolegomenon (I-IIae, Qq. 49-61), Section 3. 67 Ibid., “Videmus praeterea (quod maxime notandum est), eos (sanctos) semper habuisse specialem exercitii facilitatem in ea speciali virtute in qua speciali quoque modo sese exercebant. Atqui hujus facti, quod vim obtinet legis cujusdam uniformis et numquam deficientis, nulla est sufficiens ex­ plicatio, nisi dicatur generari per frequentationem actuum virtutis infusae habitus acquisitus, quo naturalis potentia eidem infusae virtuti melius subiicitur, et semper magis magisque disciplinatur ad prompte operandum secundam ipsam.” 68 Cf. Ibid. 56 The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues fore, to say that repeated acts of the infused virtues effect the moderation of the passions and the removal of impediments to virtue, is the same as to say that repeated acts of the infused virtues generate a positive acquired habit which inclines the potency to acts of the infused virtues. Here, Billot attacks Suarez and Mazzella on the score of inconsistency. For they affirm that repeated acts of the infused virtues moderate the passions and remove the obstacles to virtue, but at the same time they deny that there is acquired any habit of facility. Accord­ ing to Billot, such a position is extremely inconsistent. He illustrates his point by an example of a seal on wax. The seal, in making its imprint on wax, does not only destroy the previous figure of the wax, but at the same time it positively produces its own image. In this example, you could not affirm that the seal had destroyed the previous figure of the wax without at the same time affirming that the seal had also imparted its own image. So also in the infused virtues, concludes Billot, the adversaries cannot affirm that the passions are moderated and difficulties are overcome without at the same time admitting that a habit is acquired which disposes to acts of virtue.69 Billot goes on to show the absurdities which would follow from the opposite opinion. If it is true, as the adversaries affirm, that no acquired habit is produced by repeated acts of the infused virtues, then it would be to the detriment of man constantly to perform works of the infused virtues, since he would never be able to acquire that promptitude and delectability which follow from the acquired habit of virtue and its concomitant facility. 89 Ibid. * Quo semel posito jam nunc considera quod vis efficiens actuum virtutis nusquam se extendit ad destructionem inclinationis vitiosae con­ trariae, nisi per hoc ipsum quod inducit positivam proclivitatem ad id quod est consentaneum virtuti; . . . Unde materialiter loquendo, idem est si dicas quod repetitio actuum virtutis infusae destruit impedimenta ad virtutis exer­ citium, aut quod generat habitum conferentem positivam inclinationem propensivam in illud. Primum enim facere nequit nisi mediante secundo, et valde inconsequenter loqui videntur adversarii, dum primum adstruunt et alterum negant” To Ibid. “ Sequeretur enim fore in detrimentum hominis si semper se­ cundum infusas virtutes opera virtutuum exerceret Probatur consequentia, Facility in the Infused Moral Virtues 57 This is the joy and pleasure of virtue which St. Paul has refer­ ence to in his Epistle to the Hebrews: Now all discipline seems for the present to be a matter not for joy but for grief ; but afterwards it yields the most peaceful fruit of justice to those who have been exercised by it.71 Again, St. Paul emphasizes the same truth when he tells Timothy: “ Train thyself in godliness.”72 According to the context of this passage, St. Paul is speaking of bodily training, and he urges Timothy to acquire that same training in virtue which is ac­ quired in the body by constant corporal exercise. Once more, St. Paul speaks of the facility and enjoyment to be found in the practice of virtue in his Epistle to the Hebrews, where he says: But solid food is for the more mature, for those who by practice have their faculties trained to discern good and evil.73 How, inquires Billot, can these texts be reconciled with the opinion that there is no positive propensity, no habit acquired in the prac­ tice of the infused virtues?74 As we have seen in the previous article, the main objection of Suarez and Mazzella to the production of an acquired habit from repeated acts of the infused virtues is based on the fact that the formal objects of natural and supernatural acts are diverse. They argue that it would be repugnant for acts to produce a habit which would not tend to the same formal and material objects as the acts from which it proceeds. Billot answers this objection by admonishing his adversaries that they should not obscure those things which are clear by adding obscurities, rather they should try to clarify those things which are obscure by means of illumination. What is more clear, exclaims Billot, than quia numquam acquirere posset ad quod per se pendet ab assuetudine; promptitudinem dico et delectabilitatem in operando bonum . . /’ ™ Hebrews, 12:11-12. 72 / Tim., 4:7. T3 Hebrews, 5:14. 7* Billot, op. cit., Section 3. 58 The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues the fact that repeated acts of the infused virtues cause an acquired habit of facility? On the other hand, what is more obscure than the assertion of the adversaries that the formal object of the supernatural act is diverse in species from the formal object of the natural act? If they cannot reconcile the evident fact of facility with their opinion regarding the formal objects of acts, why do they not accept the proven fact of facility and abandon their teaching in regard to formal objects? In this way, says Billot, they would not adduce obscurity to something which is already clear. However, the real answer to the difficulty of Suarez and Mazzella in regard to formal objects, is to be found in a distinction between the substance of the supernatural act and its supernatural mode of operation. Billot goes on to explain that the substance of the supernatural act entails all those functions which are common to any act either natural or supernatural, and considered in this way, the substance of a supernatural act, in itself, is indif­ ferent to a natural or a supernatural determination. The super­ natural mode of operation, however, is that formality which ordinates the act to its entitative supernatural perfection. This distinction between the substance and the mode of a supernatural act is riot found indiscriminately in all supernatural acts, but -only in those acts whose objects are able to be attained both by the natural faculty in se and by the natural faculty elevated to the supernatural order by the infused virtues.73 Since we are dealing with such acts in the present case, namely acts of the moral virtues which can be either natural or supernatural, we can lawfully make use of this distinction. This being established. Billot goes on to say that the supernatural act quoad substantiam has the same reason of tendency to its object as a natural act elicited solely from the powers of nature. Here, we have a solu­ tion to the present problem. If through the repetition of super­ natural acts of the infused virtues, the faculty is exercised along75 75 Ibid., n. Ill, De Ratione Distinctionis Supematuralium, section 1. " Ita­ que haec distinctio inter substantiam et modum non in omnibus actibus supernaturalibus indiscrimïnatim reperitur, sed in illis duntaxat quorum objecta duplici ratione attingi possunt, videlicet tam per potentiam elevatam quam per non elevatam.” Facility in the Infused Moral Virtues 59 exactly the same line as it would be exercised by natural acts, it follows that the natural faculty will be stamped by a propensity inclining it to similar acts of virtue. This propensity is nothing more than the facility which Hows from an acquired natural habit.76 It is in this way that Billot is in perfect agreement with the two assertions of Molina, (1 ) that “ in the production of a super­ natural act, all ' those causes concur which produce a natural act,” 77 (2) that a natural act is virtually contained in every super­ natural act of virtue.7879 In order to understand more clearly exactly how the natural act is virtually contained m the super­ natural act, Billot gives this further explanation.,u An act can be virtually contained in another act in two ways. First, in the sense in which the perfections of creatures are said to be virtually contained in God, namely, that they are not contained in God according to the same univocal sense as they are in creatures, but according to a certain analogical and transcendent mode. It is not according to this first sense that the natural act is virtually contained in the supernatural act, for here the acts generate a habit having the same formal tendency toward the object, thereby retaining the univocal predication. Secondly', an act can be virtually contained in another act according to the manner in which the perfections of animality are said to be contained in man, because in man, elevated to his superior condition, there is still retained univocally7 his formal nature of “ animal rationale.” It is in this way that the natural act is virtually contained in the supernatural act, and tends toward the same object, even though the supernatural act is ontologically elevated to a higher order, 76 Ibid., η. II, section 3. “ Atqui hinc sumetur optima explicatio praesentis doctrinae, quia si per repetitos actus supernaturales potentia naturalis exer­ cetur in eadem omnino linea ac exerceretur per naturales, necesse sane est ut juxta principia certissima superius declarata cap. I, eadem quoque prepensiva inclinatione sigilletur ad facile et prompte exsequenda opera virtutum.” 77 Molina, Concordia Liberi Arbitrii, Quaest. XIV, Art. ΧΠΙ, Disputatio XXXVIII. " Eo quod ad ipsorum productionem (actus supernaturales) con­ currant causae omnes, quae producerent actus illos naturales." 78 Cf. Ibid. 79 Billot, op. cit., η. II, section 3, footnote 1. 60 The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues and elicited from the power of a new nature, sanctifying grace. This explains how natural acquired habits can be generated by supernatural acts of the infused virtues, for the natural act is virtually contained in the supernatural act of virtue. Further­ more, these acquired natural habits produced from supernatural acts follow all of the rules for acquired habits produced by natural acts, especially as regards their increase, diminution, and corrup­ tion. Thus, they will be increased by an increase of the infused acts and diminished by a lessening of these acts. Again, these natural acquired habits will not be destroyed by one contrary act. Hence, even though the infused virtues are lost by mortal sin, the acquired habits produced by the acts of these virtues will remain in the soul conferring their facility toward natural acts and also to supernatural acts, supposing the help of actual grace.80 Is this opinion contrary to the doctrine of St. Thomas? Billot does not seem to think so. But what of the quotations from St. Thomas used by Mazzella 8182in proof of the opposite assertion? Billot examines and explains these quotations. The first citation from St. Thomas used by Mazzella is as follows : It is to be said that acts of the infused virtues do not cause any habit, but through these acts pre-existing habits are increased, just as neither from the acts of the acquired virtues is any other habit generated, other­ wise habits would be multiplied in infinitum.62 Billot places this text in its context and shows that St. Thomas is here discussing w’hether or not acts of the infused virtues produce habits of the same order and species. Therefore, we can interpret the response of St. Thomas in the following man­ ner: Just as from acts of the acquired virtues there is not gen­ erated any other acquired habit, so also neither from acts of the infused virtues are generated other infused virtues of the same 80 Cf. Ibid., η. II, section 3. 81 Mazzella, De Virtutibus Infusis, Disp. I, Art. V, n. 78. 82 Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae de Virtutibus, Art. 10, ad 19. “ Di­ cendum, quod actus virtutis infusae non causant aliquem habitum, sed per eos augetur praeexistens: quia nec ex actibus virtutis acquisitae aliquis generatur alias multiplicarentur habitus in infinitum.” Facility in the Infused Moral Virtues 61 species and order. Judging from the context, says Billot, this seems to be the more obvious sense of the response, and hence this text cannot be used against the assertion that repeated acts of the infused virtues generate an acquired habit.83 The other text cited by Mazzella is similar to the one already given: Acts which are produced by an infused habit do not cause another habit but confirm a pre-existing habit, just as medicaments used by a healthy man do not cause health, but merely confirm the habit of health already existing in the subject.84 Once more, Billot insists that this text must be considered in its context, and this being done, Billot makes a twofold observa­ tion. First, St. Thomas speaks here not only of habits infused per se, but of habits infused per accidens, as well, namely, those habits which can be acquired by our own natural acts but which de facto are miraculously infused into the soul by God for some special reason above the order of nature. Second, the difficulty which St. Thomas sought to answer in this third question from which the quotation is taken, is the impossibility of there being two habits of the same species, distinct only in number, existing in the same subject. Keeping these facts in mind, says Billot, it is easier to determine the sense of the question. In his response, St. Thomas asserts that it does not follow from the infusion of the virtues that there are two forms of the same species existing in the same subject simultaneously. If by the infused virtue here is understood a virtue infused per accidens, it is true that by the acts of these virtues no other habits would be formed, for the virtues infused per accidens are of the same species as the acquired habits and differ from them only by reason of their miraculous origin in the soul. Thus by the exercise of 83 Op. cit., η. II, section 3, Opponitur primo auctoritas S. Thomae. 84 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I-IIae, Quaest. LI, art. 4, Resp. ad Ter­ tium. “ Dicendum, quod actus qui producuntur ex habitu infuso non causant aliquem habitum : sed confirmant habitum praeexistentem, sicut medicinalia adhibita homini sano per naturam non causant aliquam santitatem, sed sanitatem prius habitam corroborant." 62 The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues these habits no other acquired habits would be produced, but a pre-existing habit would be confirmed. On the other hand, if by the infused habit here is meant a habit infused per se, it is true that these habits do not produce other habits of the same species as themselves, namely, infused habits. However, St. Thomas does not exclude the formation of an acquired habit from an infused habit, for although it would have a similar tendency to its object, nevertheless, it would not be of the same species, for the one habit is infused and the other is acquired. After showing that these passages from St. Thomas do not disprove his doctrine, Billot, in turn, cites a text from St. Thomas which seems to give positive confirmation to his teaching. This passage is as follows : It is to be said that in the beginning the infused virtue does not always remove the inclination of the passions as does the acquired virtue, and for this reason, the infused virtue does not proceed pleasantly in the be­ ginning.85 Why, inquires Billot, does St. Thomas affirm that the infused virtues do not afford pleasure in the beginning, unless he takes it for granted that delectation does follow later on as a result of repeated acts of the infused virtues ? And how can this pleasure ΟΓ exercise of facility follow from repeated acts, unless it comes as a result of an acquired habit whereby the faculty is favorably disposed toward promptly and readily placing acts of the infused virtues?86 In support of the conclusions of Cardinal Billot, we have cor­ roborative statements from Merkelbach to the effect that a natural act is virtually contained in every supernatural act of virtue, and that an acquired natural habit is generated by repeated acts of the infused virtues.87 Thus, Merkelbach agrees with Billot 85 Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae de Virtutibus, Art. 10, ad 15. “ Di­ cendum, quod quia a principio virtus infusa non semper ita tollit sensum passionum sicut virtus acquisita, propter hoc a principio non ita delectabiliter operatur.” 88 Cf. op. cit., π. II, section 3. Opponitur primo auctoritas S. Thomae. 87 Cf. Merkelbach, B. H., Summa Theologiae Moralis (Paris, Desdée De Brouwer et Soc. 1938). Vol. I. De Habitibus et Virtutibus in Genere, Tertia Facility in the Infused Moral Virtues 63 in maintaining that the facility of the infused virtues is a result of an acquired natural habit, and like Billot, Merkelbach appeals to the authority of St. Thomas as a proof of this assertion.88* Article V. The Opinion of John of St. Thomas, Gonet, Billuart and Schiffini Regarding Facility in the Infused Virtues Fifth Opinion. Another theory explaining the facility of the infused moral virtues has been advocated by John of St. Thomas and Gonet.88 His theory is very similar to the ideas expressed by Molina, Ripalda, and Billot, but the two opinions are not strictly identical. According to the teaching of John of St. Thomas, it cannot be denied that acquired habits are generated by repeated acts of the infused virtues. Thus, a person who constantly exercises and repeats acts of the infused virtues, will, after a time, acquire a natural habit which will facilitate the practice of the infused virtues.80 This acquired habit which Pars, Quaest. Secunda, n. 621, n. 2. "Actus supematurales dum tendunt ad finem seu bonum et objectum supernaturale, simul tendunt sub aliquo respectu ad finem naturalem et bonum naturale rationi conveniens, tum quia exercentur simul facultates naturales, tum quia actus et bonum supernaturalia eminenter continent et includunt actum naturalem et bonitatem naturalem; sic autem possunt producere habitus naturales ejusdem specisi ac illud objectum ut est naturale et conforme rationi, et per hoc vincere et removere obstacula huic actui et objecto opposita, eodem modo ac de virtute acquisita dictum est." 88 Ibid., n. 621, n. 2 in finem. 88 John of St. Thomas, Cursus Theologicus (Paris, Ludovicus Vives, 1885), Tom. VI, Quaest. LXII, Art. VII, Disputatio XVI, n. 38-39. John of St. Thomas seems to be the first to mention this opinion. Gonet later adopted this teaching in his writings. Cfr. Gonet, ClyPeus Theologiae Thomisticae, Vol. IV, Disp. IV, art. 4, n. 25. 80Ibid., n. 38. “Licet enim dubitari non possit, quod circa materiam vir­ tutum infusarum etiam theologicarum potest generari habitus aliquis ac­ quisitus, qui diverso motivo, et sub diversa ratione formali versetur circa illam materiam, et ad illum habitum generandum facilitari possit animus ex frequentatione actuum infusorum, quatenus si illa materia est magis frequentata, et sic facilius poterit etiam tractari ex alio simili motivo, sicut circa materiam, quam saepius demonstrando tractamus, possumus etiam probabilius rationibus adjuvare, et facilius acquiri poterit talis habitus pro­ babilis.” 64 The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues is formed is not to be attributed formally to the repetition of acts of the infused virtues, but as it were dispositively, inasmuch as the habit is begotten from repetition with respect to the same matter, under a natural motive.1,1 This acquired natural habit which results dispositively from repeated acts of the infused virtues is responsible for the facility which is experienced in the practice of the infused virtues. Billuart91 92 is a faithful adherent to the opinion of John of St. Thomas. In explaining the facility of the infused moral virtues, Billuart uses exactly the same terminology as his predecessor, affirming that supernatural acts generate an acquired natural habit not formally, but dispositively, since he who repeats acts of the infused virtues is gradually disposed to place acts of these same virtues from a natural acquired habit.93 In more recent times, the Jesuit theologian, Schiffini, can also be listed as favoring this opinion.9* Schiffini states that repeated supernatural acts of the infused virtues generate an acquired habit not directly, but morally or meritoriously.95* He explains this by saying “ that by the sustained and fervent exercise of acts of the infused virtues, the habit is so established in the 91 Ibid., n. 39. “Et sic intelligi potest D. Thomas cum in illo loco ex quaestione XVII de veritate dicit: 'Per actus virtutum infusarum gigni habitum,’ id est, non formaliter per illos actus, sed quasi dispositive, qua­ tenus ex frequentatione circa talem materiam originari potest, et facilitari, quod etiam sub alio motivo possit circa eamdem operari.” 92 Cf. Billuart, F. C. R., Summa Sancti Thomae (Editio Nova, Paris, Letouzey et Ané), Vol. II, Tractatus de Passionibus et Virtutibus, Dis­ sertatio II, Article 3. 93 Ibid., Art 3, resp ad abj. 3. “ Potest tamen dici quod (actus supematurales) generent habitum alterum inferioris ordinis non quidem formaliter sed dispositive, quia hoc ipso quo quis iterat actus virtutum infusarum, dis­ ponitur et facilitatur ut circa eamdem materiam operetur ex motivo natu­ rali, sicque transeundo de uno motivo in aliud, generatur virtus acquisita circa eamdem materiam.” 94 Cf. Schiffini, Sancto, De Virtutibus Infusis (Friburgi Brisgoviae, Herder, Typography Editoris Pontificii, 1904), Disputatio I, Section VI. 95 Ibid., η. 39, Objectio II. “ Siquidem vero, ut ostensum est, ad tale aug­ mentum (facilitatis) actus non cooperantur nisi moraliter, in modum im­ petrationis vel meritii, consimili ratione intrinseca illa facilitas, sive pronitas potentiae ad actum.” Facility in the Infused Moral Virtues 65 soul that it is, as it were, converted into nature.”*98 He goes on to say that the constant exercise of the infused virtues “ leaves many of its vestiges in the faculty, for example, in the memory, and these vestiges, in turn, facilitate the exercise of virtue.” 97 In this way, the constant exercise of supernatural acts can be said to concur actively and physically to the beginnings of an acquired habit.98 Neither John of St. Thomas, nor his followers, Billuart and Schiffini, discuss the question of whether or not a natural act is virtually contained in the supernatural act of virtue. Hence it is impossible to determine their exact stand on that point. However, it is quite obvious that their teaching coincides rather closely with that conclusion, and for this reason their system can be associated with the foregoing opinion of Molina, Ripalda, Billot, and Merkelbach. On the other hand, since the mode of acquiring the natural habit seems to be distinct in each system, the two opinions cannot be strictly identified. Article VI. Conclusion and Critical Estimate of Various Opinions Regarding Facility in the Infused Virtues the We have listed five opinions of theologians in explanation of the facility which is found in the practice of the infused virtues. These five opinions are as follows : (1) Facility follows as a result of the interior increase and intensification of the infused virtues. (2) Repeated supernatural acts quoad substantiam produce a supernatural acquired habit, and this supernatural acquired habit is the source of facility in the infused virtues. (Hurtado.) (3) Repeated supernatural acts of the infused virtues give rise to no acquired habits, either natural or supernatural. The 98Ibid., n. 39. “Quando longo et ferventi piorum actum exercitio, virtutes infusae ita in anima obfirmatur, ut quasi in naturam converti videantur.” 37 Ibid,, “ Nam imprimis tale exercitium relinquit in potentia complura sui quasi vestigia, exempli gratia, memoriam sui, species bene ordinatus; quae quidem vestigia multam facilitant hoc ipsum exercitium." 98Ibid., “Jam vero hac maxime ratione, frequentatio actuum active et physice concurrit ad genesim habitum acquisitorum.” 66 The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues facility of the infused virtues is to be attributed per se to the grace of God, and per accidens to the repetition of acts of the infused virtues whereby the passions are moderated and impedi­ ments removed. (Medina, Sylvius, Suarez, and C. Mazzella.) (4) Repeated supernatural acts of the infused virtues generate an acquired natural habit, since a natural act is virtually con­ tained in every supernatural act of virtue. This acquired natural habit is the source of facility in the infused virtues. (Molina, Ripalda, Billot and Merkelbach.) (5) Repeated supernatural acts of the infused virtues gen­ erate a natural acquired habit, not directly but dispositively, in as much as repeated acts of the infused virtues dispose the potency toward acquiring a natural habit of the same virtues. (John of St. Thomas, Billuart, Schiffini.) There remains the task of evaluating and giving a critical estimate of these different opinions. As we have already seen, the first and second opinions are commonly rejected by theologians as contrary to both reason and experience. The first opinion, namely, that facility is a result of the increase and intensifica­ tion of the infused virtues, is obviously false, for we know that all the infused virtues increase simultaneously in the same pro­ portion and yet an increase in the facility of one of the infused virtues does not effect an increase in the facility of the other infused virtues. The second opinion, which places the source of facility in an acquired supernatural habit, is likewise false, for theologians commonly teach that supernatural habits cannot be acquired but are infused by God. Hence, both of these opinions are to be rejected as unsatisfactory. As we have already seen in the previous article, the fourth and fifth opinions, though not identical, are remarkably similar in content. This similarity is so striking that we feel these two opinions can be grouped together, and the same critical estimate applied to both, making exceptions for their accidental differ­ ences. Both opinions maintain that by repeated supernatural acts of the infused virtues, an acquired natural habit is generated; both opinions agree that the facility of the infused virtues is to be attributed to this acquired habit. They differ only accidentally, inasmuch as the fourth opinion attributes the origin of the Facility in the Infused Moral Virtues acquired habit to the fact that a natural act is virtually contained in every supernatural act of virtue, while the fifth opinion at­ tributes the origin of the acquired habit to the close interrelation of natural and supernatural acts. Since the fourth and fifth theories can be bracketed together, the field is narrowed down to two opinions of theologians. The third opinion, on the one hand, maintains that no acquired habit results from repeated acts of the infused virtues, and the facility of the infused virtues must be attributed per se to the grace of God, and per accidens to the repetition of supernatural acts, whereby the passions are moderated and impediments are re­ moved. The fourth and fifth opinions, on the other hand, main­ tain that an acquired habit is formed from repeated supernatural acts of the infused virtues, and the facility of the infused virtues is to be ascribed to this acquired natural habit. We have already given the principal arguments for both of these systems, so that here, we shall simply give a brief résumé of their teachings, attempting to determine which is the more correct. Suarez, the chief proponent of the view that no acquired habit is formed from repeated acts of the infused virtues, lists three arguments defending his own opinion and attacking the position of his adversaries. We shall submit these arguments here, along with a refutation by Cardinal Billot, and after this, we shall give our own critical estimate of the two theories. The first argument of Suarez insists that there is no basis for the assertion that supernatural acts of the infused virtues virtually contain natural acts of virtue. It is one thing for an act to be more perfect than another; it is another thing to assert that because it is more perfect, it virtually contains the inferior act.88 In the present case, while the first assertion is true, the second assertion is false ; neither does it follow from the first state­ ment, nor can it be proven. This objection, we believe, has been sufficiently answered by 89 Suarez, Opera Omnia, Vol. IX, Book VI, Chap. 14, n. 14. “ Sine funda­ mento enim dicitur actum fidei infusae eminenter continere actum fidei ac­ quisitae. Aliud est enim esse eminentiorem. id est, perfectioris speciei et naturae, aliud eminenter continere illum, et licet primum sit verum, secundum falsum est, nec ex promo sequitur, neque aliunde ostendi potest.” 68 The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues Billot in the previous article where we treated his theory ex­ plaining the manner in which a supernatural act virtually contains a natural act of virtue. It is to be recalled that he distinguished between the substance of the supernatural act and its supernatural mode, and demonstrated how the natural act is virtually contained in the supernatural act just as the perfections of animality are virtually contained in the notion of man. In each case, there is retained the univocal predication. The second objection of Suarez is based on the absurdities which follow from the position of his adversaries. If you grant their assertion that supernatural acts of the infused virtues gen­ erate an acquired habit, then you would be logically forced to the admission that supernatural habits could elicit natural acts, which is obviously false.100 Billot answers that no such absurdity follows from his system. Furthermore, he denies that a strict parity can be instituted between the mode in which acts are caused by a habit, and the mode in which a habit is caused by repeated acts.101* For an act is caused by a habit inasmuch as it proceeds from the faculty formally determined by the habit to a special mode of operation. Whence it is conceded that from a supernatural habit there can­ not be produced any natural act. For either the act flows from the habit or it does not. If the act flows from a supernatural habit, then the act must necessarily be supernatural. If the act does not flow from the habit, then the act is not caused by the habit but by the faculty not using the habit. This, continues Billot, is entirely different from the manner in which a habit is produced by repeated acts.11'2 For a habit is caused by repeated acts insofar as the operative faculty receives 100 Ibid., n. 14. “Alias dicere quis posset etiam habitum infusum fidei posse elicere actum fidei naturalis, quia eminenter continet illum. Cur enim haec continentia eminentalis magis tribuetur actui quam habitui ? Consequens autem est falsum, alias fides divina eliceret actum de se fallibilem, quid repugnat perfectioni ejus.” 101 Billot, L., De Virtutibus Infusia, Generale Prolegomenon (I-IIae, Qq. 49-61), η. II, section 3, Obj. Tertio. "Respondeo negando antecedens quoad paritatem quam adstruit inter modum quo actus causatur ab habitu, et quo habitus causatur ab actu repetito.” m2 Ibid., section 3, Obj. Tertio. Facility in the Infused Moral Virtues 69 the act and its impression. The general principle is that the passive agent receives the impression of the active element accord­ ing to its own nature, neither more nor less. Quidquid recipitur, secundum modum recipientis recipitur. Billot illustrates his meaning by an example. It is the nature of wax to receive the impression of a seal, and this it does, regardless of whether or not the instrument used to imprint the seal was gold, silver, copper, or lead. By its very nature, the wax receives the imprint of the seal, but it does not record whether or not this seal was made by a gold, silver, copper or leaden instrument, for this the wax is unable to do according to its nature. So also in the present case, supernatural acts do not leave the impression of their supernaturality upon the faculty, for it is not the nature of the faculty to receive any supernatural disposition, unless according to its obediential potency which can be reduced to act by God alone. However, it is according to the nature of the faculty to receive impressions according to its nature, and since supernatural acts impress the faculty in the same way as natural acts, they dispose and facilitate the natural faculty toward repeating similar acts, and in this way supernatural acts generate an acquired natural habit in the faculty.103 The third objection of Suarez is based on the fact that the adversaries confuse the orders of nature and grace in asserting that supernatural acts generate a natural acquired habit. And even if such a natural habit was formed, says Suarez, it would not be able to contribute anything to the supernatural object of the acts, for the acquired habit is natural and the acts are super­ natural.104 Billot responds to this objection with a distinction. He con­ cedes that u natural habit can contribute nothing to a super­ 103 Ibid., section 3, Obj. Tertio. “ Verumtamen, quia iidem illi actus super­ na turales eumdem habent modum tendendi in objectum, quem habuissent remota supernaturalitate, ideo eodem quoque modo sigillant facultatem ac quilibet naturales actus, relinquendo in ea propensionem ad actus similes tendentiae, ac per hoc, eodem modo generant habitum entitative naturalem.” 104 Ibid., n. 15. “ Nulla est ergo talis continentia eminentalis neque oportet confundere ordines actuum et habituum gratiae et naturae; condistinguuntur enim inter se tanquam species particulares diversorum ordinum, non tanquam cause universalis, et effectus particularis et aequivocus.” 70 The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues natural object per se and ratione sui; he denies that such a habit contributes nothing to the supernatural object when it is elevated to the supernatural order by the infused virtues?05 He explains his distinction by saying that the proximate principle of a meri­ torious act is not only the infused virtue, but also the natural faculty insofar as it is informed by the infused virtue. In the be­ ginning of the supernatural act, says Billot, the infused virtue elevates the faculty simpliciter, for the faculty is not yet accus­ tomed to the practice of virtue. But after repeated supernatural acts of the infused virtues^ the faculty becomes disciplined and prompt to the practice of virtue by reason of its naturally acquired habit of facility, so that now, not only the faculty, but the faculty along with its acquired facility is elevated to the supernatural order. In this way, the natural acquired habit does add some­ thing to supernatural acts, namely, a mode of facility. In answer to the other objection, that his system confuses the orders of nature and grace, Billot states that certain theologians seem inclined to divorce entirely the orders of nature and grace, fearing the error of Pelagianism, whereas, in reality, there are no grounds for such a fear. As if, says Billot, nature is not the necessary fundament of grace! As if a good habit of nature confers nothing to the operations of grace! St. Thomas affirms that certain persons are disposed “ by a proper disposition of the body to chastity, meekness, and to other virtues of this kind.” loe If such natural dispositions of the body are helpful to us in the arduous way of the supernatural virtues, will not the inclinations acquired by the exercise of these virtues be of similar assistance to us ?*106 107 As to which opinion is more correct, the opinion of Suarez or w Ibid., sectio 3, Obj. Secundo. “Nihil naturale juvat ad finem vitae aeternae, per se et ratione sui, concedo. Etiam ut elevatum per donum gratiae, nego.” 106Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I-IIae, Quaest LI, Art. 1, c. “Sunt quidam enim dispositi ex propria corporis complexione ad castitatem, vel mansuetudinem, vel ad alia hujusmodi.” 107 Op. cit., section 3, Obj. Secundo, in finem. “ Si ergo in ardua via vir­ tutum supematuralium tantum juvat, accedente gratia, indoles naturalis et ipsa corporis complexio, non juvaret acquisita per ipsissimarum virtutum exercitium inclinatio?” Facility in the Infused Moral Virtues 71 the opinion of Billot, we are inclined to agree with the con­ clusions of Cardinal Billot and his associates in maintaining that repeated acts of the infused virtues generate an acquired natural habit which is responsible for the facility of the infused virtues. The fact is quite obvious, as theologians admit, that a certain facility does follow from repeated acts of the infused virtues. ' This facility can be accounted for either in a natural or a super­ natural manner, and from the general principles of theology, we cannot have recourse to the supernatural when there is a satis­ factory natural explanation at hand for some particular fact. To our way of thinking, there is such a natural explanation to be had for the facility experienced in the practice of the infused virtues, namely, that by the repetition of these acts there is formed a natural acquired habit. Certainly, this opinion does not detract in any way from the importance of grace, neither does it entirely exclude grace from the development of this facility. It simply states that this facility is more properly attributed to nature than to grace. Catholic theology teaches that the principles of nature and grace are not opposed, that “ grace does not violate but perfects nature.” This being true, then why should an acquired habit not be developed from repeated acts of the in­ fused virtues? On the other hand, if such were not the case, we would be inclined to believe that grace did violate nature in not permitting the connatural acquisition of facility in the prac­ tice of the infused virtues. Moreover, we are inclined to agree with the opinion that a natural act is virtually contained in every supernatural act of virtue, since this seems to us a reasonable solution of the difficulty. The proponents of this view, notably Cardinal Billot, present a strong case for this opinion, and the arguments of the opposition do not seem to weaken their case to any appreciable extent. For these reasons, we believe the opinion of Billot and his associates to be the more satisfactory and the more consistent explanation of facility in the infused virtues. On the contrary, the conclusions of the opposite opinion seem to be inconsistent and unsatisfactory. In their theory, facility is attributed, at one time, to the grace of God ; at another time, to the moderation of the passions and the removal of difficulties. In - ztributing facility to the grace of God, we believe that they 72 The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues adduce a supernatural cause for a fact which already has a suf­ ficient natural explanation. In attributing facility to the modera­ tion of the passions and the removal of difficulties, we are inclined to believe that they implicitly admit our conclusion, namely, that these things can only come about as a result of an acquired natural habit. The conclusions to be drawn from this present treatment seem obvious, namely, that it is possible to acquire facility in the in­ fused moral virtues, supposing of course that we make use of the means provided by nature and grace. The infused moral virtues per se make supernatural acts possible, they do not make these acts easy. Ease and readiness in the performance of such acts will come only in direct proportion to the efforts which we expend in cooperating with the means provided by nature and grace. This truth is well stated in the following words : The infused virtue does not make a man virtuous but gives him the possibility of practicing virtue in the super­ natural order; he has merely a new operative principle of supernatural activity in his soul. He must cooperate with divine grace and act in accordance with such in­ fused principles or virtues in order to acquire solid virtue. The infused virtues are like the “ talents ”708 which the nobleman of the parable gave his servants, saying, “ Trade till I come.” *109 The servant who kept his “ talent ” idle is called a “ wicked servant,” and is punished for his inactivity. Operative principles of a supernatural order were infused in our souls that they might be put to work and produce supernatural acts.110 25:14 ff.; Luke, 19:12 ff. 109 Luke, 19:13. 110 Parente, P., The Ascetical Life (B. Herder, St, Louis, 1944), pp. 125-126. CHAPTER III HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE QUESTION OF FACILITY IN THE VIRTUES Article I. Facility as a Quality of Virtue According to Pagan Philosophers (460-322 b. c.) the Prior to the great philosophical systems of the Greeks, we find very little mention of virtue. The Greek philosophers, however, arrived at a theory’ of natural virtue which is practically identical with our own. Socrates (460-399 b. c.) seems to have been the first to form a system of ethics and give an analysis of the virtues. Since Socrates himself committed none of his doctrines to writing, we are indebted to his disciple, Plato, for our knowledge of his teachings. It is in the Dialogues, especially the Dialogues zuith Meno and Euthydemus, that Plato discusses the Socratic theory of virtue. The ultimate object of human existence, according to Socrates, is happiness, and the means to happiness is virtue.1 Virtue, in turn, is wisdom, and there is no virtue apart from wisdom.2 Therefore, it follows necessarily that any individual who is wise and intelligent will be virtuous. Also if wisdom is the only virtue, then ignorance, the lack of knowledge, is the only vice. We might mention two more corollaries from the doctrine of Socrates, namely, since wisdom is virtue, true hap­ piness cannot be found in the pleasures of this world. Again, if 1 Plato, Dialogue with Euthydemus (L.C.L., IV, p. 415. Trans, by VV. M. Lamb, 1924) : ** We are all eager to be happy, and we are found to become so by not only using things but using them aright” 2 Plato, Dialogue zoith Meno (L.C.L., IV, p. 331), Trans, by W. M. Lamb, 1924) : “ Then if virtue is something that is in the soul, and must needs be profitable, it ought to be wisdom, seeing that all the properties of the soul are in themselves neither profitable nor harmful, but are made either one or the other by the addition of wisdom or folly; and hence, by this argu­ ment, virtue being profitable must be a sort of wisdom.” 73 74 The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues wisdom is the only virtue, then the virtues are not really distinct from one another, for they are all identified with wisdom. In general, we can say that these notions of Socrates are very imperfect, and in some instances, obviously fallacious. To say, for instance, that only wisdom is virtue, and that intellectual train­ ing alone suffices for virtuous living is a fallacy that many of our modern educators have only too well imitated. Experience has proven that discipline of the will must accompany intellectual training in order to effect true virtue, for knowledge, of itself, cannot constitute moral goodness. This would be the equivalent of saying that a man becomes a good swimmer by learning the speculative principles of moving in the water, or that an in­ dividual becomes a good aviator by reading a handbook of flying instructions. However, regardless of what may be said against the Socratic theory of virtue, one thing must be said in its favor, namely, it was a beginning, it was a basis and a starting point from which other philosophers and scholars went on to build the system of natural virtue as we know it today. Plato (427-347 b. c.), the illustrious disciple of Socrates, added much to the teaching of his master on the subject of virtue. Plato declares that the Summum Bonum consists in the perfect imita­ tion of God, the highest good, an imitation which cannot be fully realized in this life.34 Plato departs from the teaching of Socrates that wisdom is the only virtue, and makes place for other virtues such as justice, temperance, and fortitude. In fact, it is in the Republic of Plato that we find the first enumeration of the car­ dinal virtues. * Although Plato states that man should aim at 3 Plato, Laws, Bk. IV (L.C.L. IX, pp. 295-296, Trans, by R. G. Bury, 1926) : “ What conduct, then, is dear to God and in his steps ?... In our eyes God will be the ‘ measure of all things ’ in the highest degree—a degree much higher than is any man they talk of. He then, that is to become dear to such a one must needs become, so far as he possibly can, of a like char acter; and according to the present argument, he amongst us who is tem­ perate is dear to God, since he is like him, while he that is not temperate is unlike and at enmity, as is also he who is unjust, and so likewise with the rest, by parity of reason.” 4 Plato, Republic, Bk. IV (L.C.L. I, p. 347, Trans, by Paul Shorey, 1930) : “ I think our city, if it has been rightly founded, is good in the full sense of the word . . . Clearly, then, it will be wise, brave, sober and just” Development of the Question of Facility in the Virtues 75 being virtuous, he gives no satisfactory explanation of how this is to be accomplished except to suggest that it is the function of the State to train its citizens in virtue.J Plato’s notion of virtue, although an improvement on the So­ cratic theory, is none the less very imperfect, hor one thing, Plato does not consider the virtues as habits. Γη fact, it is difficult to determine from his writings whether or not he realized that the virtues were habits. There is only one isolated passage in his writings where he seems to infer this truth. In this same passage, Plato indicates that we can acquire facility in the virtues by the repetition of their acts. Thus, in the Fourth Book of the Republic, he says : Healthful things surely engender health and diseaseful disease. Then does not doing just acts engender justice, and unjust injustice?G This text is one of the first statements of the important principle that repeated acts lead to good habits. However, Plato did not evolve the possibilities of this theory. It remained for his re­ nowned disciple, Aristotle, to develop this teaching into one of the most important single factors in philosophy and education. As Professor Jowett remarks in the Introduction to his transla­ tion of the Republic: We may observe how nearly Plato approaches the famous Aristotelian thesis that “ good actions produce good habits.” The words “ as healthy practices produce health, so just practices produce justice ” have a sound very like the Nicomachean Ethics. But we note also that an in­ cidental remark in Plato has become a far reaching prin5 Ibid., Bk. IV (L.C.L. I, p. 331, Trans, by Paul Shorey, 1930) : " The State, if it once starts well, proceeds as it were in a cycle of growth. I mean that a sound nurture and education if kept up creates good natures in the state, and sound natures in turn receiving an education of this sort develop into better men than their predecessors both for other purposes and for the production of offspring as among animals also.” e Ibid., Bk. IV (L.C.L., p. 419, Trans, by Paul Shorey, 1930) : τά μέν ύγιεικά εμποιεί, τά δέ νωσώδα νοσόν. Ναί, οΰκουν καί τό μεν δίκαια πράττειν δικαιοσύνην εμποιεί, τό δ’ άδικα αδικίαν. 76 The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues ciple in Aristotle, and an inseparable part of the great ethical system.7 It is therefore in the works of Aristotle that we find the complete and nearly perfect statement of natural virtue. Unlike Plato, who began with ideas as the basis of observation, Aristotle (384-322 B. c.) chose rather to take the facts of ex­ perience as his starting point ; thus, he analyzed more accurately, and sought to trace truths to their highest and ultimate causes. Aristotle agreed with his predecessors in affirming that the supreme good of man is happiness. But he disagreed with them on the means of attaining happiness. According to his way of thinking, happiness is that form of good which is peculiar to man, the good which is proper to a rational being. Since reason is man’s greatest prerogative, it should be the aim of man’s existence to live in conformity with reason, to live a life of virtue.8 Virtue, in turn, is not a feeling, but rather a fixed quality or habit of the mind 9 and since virtue pertains both to the intellect and the will, there are both intellectual and moral virtues.10 Furthermore, both the intellectual and moral virtues follow a middle path between excess and defect, in the same way that an expert in any art avoids extremes and seeks and adopts the mean. Regarding this point, Aristotle says: TJowett, B., The Works of Plato, Translated into English with Analysis and Introductions (Tudor Publishing Company, New York), Analysis, p. 90. ’Aristotle, Eth. Nie., I, vii, 14 (L.C.L., p. 33, Trans, by H. Rackharn 1926) : “If we declare that the function of man is a certain form of life, and define that form of life as the exercise of the soul’s faculties and ac­ tivities in association with the rational principle ... if then all this be so, the Good of man proves to be the active exercise of his soul’s faculties in con­ formity with the excellence of virtue, or if there be several human excel­ lences of virtues, in conformity with the best and the most perfect among them.” • Ibid., II, VI, 15 (L.C.L., p. 95, Trans, by H. Rackham, 1926) : “Virtue then is a settled disposition of the mind as regards the choice of actions and feelings.” 10 Ibid., I, xiii, 20 (L.C.L., p. 67, Trans, by H. Rackham, 1926) : “ Now virtue is also differentiated in correspondence with the division of the soul (intellectual and appetitive). Some forms of virtue are called intellectual virtues, others moral virtues.” Development of the Question of Facility in the Virtues 77 If then, as we say, good craftsmen look to the mean as they work, and if virtue, like nature, is more perfect and better than any form of art, it follows that virtue aims at hitting the mean.11 Whence does virtue arise? The intellectual virtues, according to Aristotle, are a result of observation and instruction, while the moral virtues are acquired as a result of practice.1213 * Virtues, therefore, cannot be called endowments of nature, for nature gives only the capacity to receive them and this capacity must be brought to maturity by habit. Aristotle explains his meaning in the following words : Moreover, the faculties given us by nature are bestowed on us first in a potential form ; we develop their exercise afterwards. This is clearly so with our senses: we did not acquire the faculty of sight or hearing by repeatedly seeing or listening, but the other way about—because we had the senses we began to use them, we did not get them by using them. The virtues on the other hand we acquire by first having actually practised them, just as we do the arts. We learn an art or craft by doing the things that we shall have to do when we have learned it : for instance, men become builders by building houses, harpers by playing on a harp. Similarly we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts.15 11 Ibid ~ II, VII, VI, 9 (L.C.L, p. 93, Trans, by H. Rackham, 1926) : si δή ol άγαδοί τεχνίται, ώς λέγομεν, προς τούτο βλέποντες εργάζονται, ή δ’ αρετή πάσης τέχνης ακριβέστερα καί άμείνων έστιν. ώ σπερ καί ή φύσις τού μέσου αν εϊη σταχιστική. 12 Ibid., II, I, 1 (L.C.L., ρ. 71, Trans, by Η. Rackham, 1926): "Virtue being, as we have seen, of two kinds, intellectual anil moral, intellectual virtue is for the most part both produced and increased by instruction, and therefore requires experience and time, whereas moral or ethical virtue is the product of habit” 13 Ibid., II, I, 4 (L.C.L., p. 71-73, Trans, by H. Rackham, 1926) : έτι, οσα μέν φύσει ήμίν παραγίνεται, τάς δυνάμεις τούτων πρότερσν κομ.ζόμεθα, ύστερον δέ τάς ένεργείας άποδίδομεν (δπερ έπί τών αίσίΐήσεων δήλον. ού γάρ έκ τού πολλάκις ιδεΐν ή πολλάκις ακοΰσαι τάς α'οΰήο'εις ελάύομεν, άλλ’ ανάπαλιν έχοντες έχρήσαμεδ-α ον χρησάμενοι έ'σχομενΐ· τάς δ’ άρετάς λαμόάνομεν ένεργήσαντες πρότερον ώσπερ καί έπΐ τών άλλων τεχνών α γάρ δεϊ μαθόντας ποιεΐν, ταΰτα ποιοΰντες μ,ανϋάναμεν, olov οίκοδομούντες οικοδόμοι· γίνονται καί κιύαρίξσντες κιδαρισται. οντω δέ καί 78 The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues Here, we find definitely stated the important principle that “ the repetition of acts leads to a habit.” And according to Aristotle, virtues and vices have their origin in repeated acts. Just as we become proficient in the arts by practice, so also, it is the repeti­ tion of acts good or bad that makes us virtuous or vicious. Following this, Aristotle draws the following conclusion : It is therefore not of small moment whether we are trained from childhood in one set of habits or another; on the contrary it is of very great, or rather of supreme importance.14 This is the underlying principle of Aristotle’s ethics throughout that man determines himself to be what he is by his habits. If a man wishes to be good and virtuous, he must exercise himself to the utmost, for “ a virtuous life involves serious purpose, and does not consist in amusement.” 15 Although Aristotle makes no specific mention of facility in the practice of virtue, it is obvious from his writings that such facility results from the constant repetition of virtuous acts. This is especially evidenced by his words : Men become builders by building houses, harpers by playing on a harp. Similarly we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts.16 This Aristotelian principle that “ good actions produce good habits'” was later adopted as the basis of Christian Ethics, and τά μέν δίκαια πράττοντες δίκαιοι γινόμενα, τά δέ σώφρονα σώφρονες. τα δ’ ανδρεία ανδρείοι. Ibid., II, I, 8 (L.C.L., ρ. 75, Trans, by Η. Rackham, 1926) : ού μικρόν ουν διαφέρει το ούτως η οδτως εύβύς έκ νέων έδίζεσίΐαι, ά'/.λ παμπολοΰ μάλλον δέ τά παν. is Ibid., X, VI, 6 (L.C.L., ρ. 611, Trans, by Η. Rackham, 1926) : δοκεϊ δ’ ό ευδαίμων βίος κατ’ αρετήν είναι· αυτός δέ μετά σπουδής, όλλ’ ούκ έν παιδία. 16 Ibid., II, I, 4 (L.C.L., ρ. 73, Trans, by Η. Rackham, 1926) : οίκοδβμοΰντες οικοδόμοι γίνονται καί κιδαρίζοντες κιδαρισταί ουτω δε καί τά μεν δίκαια πράττοντες δίκαιοι γινόμενα, τά δέ σώφρονα σώφρονες, τά δ’ άνδρεΐα ανδρείοι. Development of the Question of Facility in the Virtues ; 79 • is Still retained in theology in connection with the acquisition of ■ : ■ the natural virtues. Indeed, it would be difficult to evaluate the debt that Catholic thought owes to Aristotelian philosophy. Article Π. Facility as a Quality of XTktue According to Early Christian Writers. (Time of Christ—300 a. d.) the ;· f i *· , « i With the coming of Christ, and the statement of His divine teachings, the supernatural aspect of virtue was emphasized. It was dearly taught that the function of virtue is to conduct man to a supernatural end, the beatific vision of God.17 Hence, virtue it­ self must become supernatural. This process did not imply the _ destruction of natural virtue, but rather, its perfection. Just as grace perfects nature but does not destroy it, so also, supernatural virtue perfected natural virtue without destroying it. Hence, we find no texts in the teaching of Our Lord where natural virtue is condemned as something evil. Christ did not condemn natural virtue as bad, He simply proclaimed supernatural virtue to be immeasurably better and more perfect. Again, we find no statements of Our Lord to the effect that human effort and exertion no longer have place in His system. Our actions are elevated to a supernatural plane, true; but still they must be exercised through natural means, and Christ did not exclude the use of natural means in the acquisition of virtue. He told His Apostles : “ Watch and pray that you may not enter into temptation.” 18 Prayer is certainly a supernatural means, but the “ watching ” implies that we are to use our senses and our natural faculties to the end of avoiding the occasions of sin. The natural virtues are still retained, but they must become super­ naturalized, to natural goodness must be added supernatural goodness : You therefore, are to be perfect, even as your heavenly Father is perfect.19 Christ enjoined the practice of virtue on His followers when He said : Î 17 Cf. 7 Corinthians, 13 :12. 18 Matt., 26:41. 5:46-48. 80 The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues If anyone wishes to come after Me, let him deny him­ self, and take up his cross and follow Me.20 How close is this description of the Christian life to the life of natural virtue which Aristotle described as " a life of serious purpose, not a life of amusement.” 21 All of the effort and energy used to acquire natural virtue is still prescribed in the Christian life, but it is now of a higher order and tending to a sublime End beyond the vision and range of natural man. Even our Divine Saviour, enriched as He was with the most sublime super­ natural perfections, also possessed in His human soul the natural virtues in an eminent degree.22 Accordingly, those who profess to be His followers must cultivate the natural as well as the supernatural virtues. The idea of virtue as outlined in the writings of St. Paul clearly shows that it is obtained not only by grace and infusion, but by effort and exertion as well : But I chastise my body and bring it into subjection, lest after preaching to others I myself should be rejected.23 And in the First Epistle to Timothy, St. Paul compares the virtues with bodily training as he tells Timothy : " Train thyself in godli­ ness.” 24 These texts and similar passages in the writings of St. Paul seem to confirm our previously stated thesis that the supernatural virtues do not entirely supplant the natural virtues. The question might arise, how do natural virtues remain in the supernatural system? The answer is that the natural virtues remain as physical determinations of the faculties to a certain Matt., 16:24. 21 Aristotle, op. cit., X (L.C.L., p. 611, Trans, by H. Rackham, 1926) : οΓτο; δέ μετά σπουδής, άλλ’ ούκ έν παιδι'α. 22 St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, III, Quaest. VII, Art. II, c. “ Unde cum gratia Christi fuerit perfectissima, consequens est, quod ex ipsa proces­ serint virtutes ad perficiendum singulas potentias animae quantum ad omnes animae actus ; et ita Christus habuit omnes virtutes.” Cfr. Satolli, Summa Theologica (Rome, A. Befani, 1888), Vol. 5, De Incarnatione, Pars Prima, Quaest. VII, n. 4. 23 7 Corinthians, 9:27. I Timothy, 4:8. γύμναζε δέ σεαυτόν πρός ευσέβειαν. Development of the Question of Facility in the Virtues 81 course of action, in other words, they remain as habits in the soul. However, as regards intrinsically ordinating our actions toward their supernatural ultimate End, there is no need for them, for this can be effected by supernatural virtue alone. Nevertheless, the natural virtues are important inasmuch as they complement the supernatural virtues, and are responsible for the ease and facility with which we practice these virtues. Eor although acquired habits have nothing positive to do with the power of attaining to a supernatural end, they have a great deal to do with the ease of attaining to it. In the early documents of the Church, the Didaché,25 the Letter of Barnabas,26 Pope Clement's letter to the Corinthians,27 the letters of Ignatius28 and Polycarp,29 and the Shepherd of Hermas,30 there is very little mention of moral virtue. The theo­ logical virtues were, for the most part, stressed by these early Christian writers. This is especially true of St. Polycarp’s letter to the Philippians.31 In general, the character of these works is doctrinal and hortatory. There are occasional references and ex­ hortations to good works, but no specific treatment of the moral virtues. Even the Greek Apologists, who were the real founders of a progressive theology, did not treat the philosophical nature of the virtues. There are some mentions of virtue in their works, notably in Theophilus of Antioch,32 Clement of Alexandria,3334 and Origen,3* 25 Cf. The Didaché {The Teaching of the Twelve Apostles), (Ed. by F. X. Funk, Doctrina Duodecim Apostolorum, Tubingen, 1887). 28 Cf. The {Spurious) Letter of Barnabas (Ed. by F. X. Funk, Die Apostolischen Vater, Tubingen, 1906, 2 auflage, p. 29). 2T Cf. Pope Clement, Letter to the Corinthians (Ed. by F. X. Funk. Ibid., p. 33). 28 Cf. St. Ignatius, Letters (Ed. by F. X. Funk, Ibid., PP- 80-108). 29 Cf. St. Polycarp, Letter to the Philippians (Ed. by F. X. Funk, Ibid., pp. 109 fl.). 39 Cf. The Sheperd of Hermas (Ed. by F. X. Funk, Ibid., pp. 144 ff.). « Cf. St. Poiycarp, Letter to the Philippians (Ed. by F. X. Funk, Ibid., p. 110). 82 Cf. Theophilus of Antioch, Ad Atolycum (PG 6). 33 Cf. Clement of Alexandria, Pedagogus (PG 8:250 ff·)· 34 Cf. Origen, Libellus De Oratione {PG 11:415 ff.)· 82 The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues but for the most part, their considerations of virtue are of a general nature and only incidental to their apologetic writings. Perhaps the best treatment of virtue, in these early apologetical writings, is to be found in the Pedagogus of Clement of Alex­ andria. In this work, Christ is represented as the Divine Teacher, instructing His pupils, all Christians, in the way of virtue and sanctity.35 Among the Latin Apologists of this same period, Tertullian36 has some excellent writings on the subject of Christian virtue, but mostly from an apologetic point of view. The same thing is true of his disciple, St. Cyprian.37 Cyprian proves that each Christian is, under grace, capable of making progress in virtue and likening himself to the image of Our Lord.38 However, he does not treat the virtues as habits, nor does he give any detailed analysis of them. Article HI. The Progressive Patristic Period (300-500 a. d.) The characteristic of this period is the introduction of natural virtue into the Patristic writings, also the insistence on the part of human energy and effort in the acquisition of the virtues. Among the Greek Fathers, we find the following statement in the works of Macarius of Egypt : He who forces and compels himself to the practice of prayer, as I have said ; cannot likewise develop in himself humility, charity, meekness, and the order of the other virtues, unless he forces himself to it by violence.3940 In the works of the three Cappadocians, St. Basil,40 St. Gregory 35 Cf. Clement of Alexandria, Pedagogus (PG 8:2S0 ff.). 36 Cf. Tertullian, Apologeticum (PL 1-2). 37 St. Cyprian, Liber De Bono Patientiae (PL 4:622 ff.). 38 St. Cyprian, De Zelo et Livore (PL 4:648): “Imaginem autem coelestem portare non possumus, nisi in eo quod esse jam coepimus, Christi similitudinam praebeamus.” 39 Macarius, Liber de Libertate Mentis (PG 34:951) “Qui ad orationem duntaxat vi se adhibita cogit, uti prius exposui ; praeterea vero ad humilita­ tem, ad charitatem, ad mansuetudinem, aliarumque virtutum ordinem in se accersendum non elaborat, nec se in id violentia adigit.” 40 St Basil, De Humilitate (PG 31.3:526 ff.), etiam Homilia Quod Mundanis Adhaerendum Non Sit (PG 31,3:539 ff.). Development of the Question of Facility in the Fir tues 83 of Nazianus,41 and St. Gregory of Nyssa,42 we also find mention of the personal initiative which must be put forth in the attainment of - virtue. This is especially verified in the writings of St. Gregory of Nyssa.43 St. John Chrysostom likewise emphasizes the im­ portance of using to the fullest one's own energy, one’s natural gifts of mind and body toward the attainment of Christian virtue.44 This emphasis on human effort in the acquisition of virtue is even more clearly stressed by the Latin bathers. Lactantius 45 testifies to the fact that “ virtue cannot be attained without the greatest difficulty and labor on our part.” Regarding facility in the practice of virtue, Lactantius says: Virtue consists in the knowledge of God, and evetything seems difficult so long as you are unacquainted with Him ; when you know Him, everything becomes easy.4647 St. Ambrose, in his treatise De Abraham Libri Duo ' * vividly describes the difficulties and hardships of the Christian life. St. Jerome gives the following testimony to the importance of hard work and natural effort which attends the prosecution of virtue. In one of his letters to Paulina, he says : I am anxious that in you there should be nothing mediocre : everything supreme, everything perfect, is 41 Cf. St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oratio II, Apologetica (PG 35 :4O7) etiam Oratio IP, Contra Julianum (PG 35:531 ff.). 42 Cf. St. Gregory Nyssa, De Professione Christiana (PG 46:238 ff.). 43 St. Gregory Nyssa, De Perfecta Christiana Forma (PG 46:263). “Quo­ circa, nisi prius caro mortificatur membris, quae sunt super terram, quibus obsequimur appetitui, per hostiam viventem sacrificetur, beneplacens et per­ fecti Dei voluntas sine impedimento non potest in vita credentium observari.” 44 Cf. St. John Chrysostom, Homilia XX In Actum Apostolorum, Chap. IX, v. 10 (P.G. 60, 14:158). 45 Lactantius, De Pero Cultu, Chap. VII (PL 5:659). “Quoniam ad bonum, quod summum atque sublime est, nisi cum summa difficultate ac labore non potest proveniri.” 46 Lactantius, Divinarum Institutionum, VI, 23. (CSEL 19:571:7 f.) “ Nam quia virtus in Dei agnitione consistit, omnia gravia sunt, dum ignores, ubi cognoveris, facilia” (Ed. by Brant and Laubann). (Cfr. PL 6:721.) 47 Cf. St. Ambrose, De Abraham Libri Duo, Lib. 1 (PL 6:659 ff.). 84 The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues what I desire. Gird your loins. without great effort.48 Nothing is achieved In the writings of St. Augustine, we find the most complete of all the early treatises on virtue. Augustine defines virtue as “ a good quality of the mind by which we live rightly, and which cannot be put to an evil use, which God produces in us without our co­ operation.” 49 As it stands, this definition includes only the infused virtues, and it is true that these virtues were emphasized by St. Augustine. However, elsewhere in his writings, he includes the acquired as well as the infused virtues under a broader definition of virtue, “ conduct in accordance with right reason.” 50 According to Augustine, the supreme good of man consists in the eternal contemplation of God, and here on earth it is man’s duty so to act that he may attain the happiness which is reserved for him beyond the grave. The path of duty is clearly marked out by the divine law.51 The destiny of the human soul and the law of God, therefore, are the determinants of moral good. In order to fulfill the law of God, man must practice virtue. Virtue does not imply apathy; the emotions are not to be destroyed or eradicated, but to be kept under control and restrained within the limits prescribed by the law' of God. The law of God is the law of love.82 Man should love God above all things ; he should love himself with a rational love seeking what is best for himself in the 48 St Jerome, Epistola ad Paulinam, n. 58 (PL 22:586) : " Nihil in te mediocre esse contentus sum; totum summum, totum perfectum desidero, Accingere, quaeso te, accingere, Nihil sine magno labore vita dedit mortalibus.” 49 St Augustine, De Libero Arbitrio, Lib. 2, Chap. 19 (PL 32:1268). “ Virtus est bona qualitas mentis, qua recte vivitur et nemo male utitur et quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur.” Cfr. Contra Julianum, Chap. 3, n. 15-20 (PL 44:743-748), etiam Super Psal. 118, cone. 26, ante med. (PL 37:1577). 50 St Augustine, De Civitate Dei, XIV, 9. (CSEL 40,2:21) : "Hi motus, hi adfectus de amore boni et de sancta caritate venientes, si vitia vocanda sunt, sinamus, ut ea, quae vere vitia sunt, virtutes vocentur. Sed cum rectam rationem sequantur istae adfectiones, quando ubi oportet adhibentur, quis eas tunc morbos seu vitiosas passiones audeat dicere?” (Cfr. PL 41:416). 51 Cf. St. Augustine, De Libero Arbitrio, Lib. I, Chap. 6 (PL 32:1228). 52 Ct. St. Augustine, In Epistolam Joannis ad Parthos (PL 35:2031): “ Deus Dilectio est” Development of the Question of Facility in the Virtues 85 light of his eternal destiny; he should also love his fellow men and desire what is best for them. Charity, which is love, is the foundation of all the virtues?3 Even from this sketchy outline of his doctrine, it is possible to glean some idea of the vastness of Augustine’s thought. His writings reveal a thorough knowledge of the virtues, and it is little wonder that his ideas exerted such a powerful influence on succeeding theological thought. In con­ cluding this study of the Latin Fathers, we might mention the works of St. Leo the Great.54 His sermons, especially, contain excellent material on the virtues and are filled with frequent ex­ hortations to practice natural privations and mortifications as a means to virtue. In summary of the writings of the Early Fathers, we can say that, with the exception of Lactantius, there are no explicit statements regarding facility in the practice of the virtues. How­ ever, inasmuch as they emphasize the importance of personal effort and initiative in the performance of good works, the Fathers seem to indicate implicitly that some measure of facility in virtue can be obtained in this way. Article IV. The Late Patristic and Early Mediaeval Period (500-1100 a. d.) The early Medieval Period is often regarded as unproductive of theologians and theological thought of any importance. While it is true that this period suffers by comparison with the ages which immediately precede and follow it, there is no basis for the assertion that it is entirely unfruitful of any contribution to theological development. The causes which made this period less productive of scholarship, were to a large extent negative ; the absence of civil peace, the failure of many to see the union be­ tween revelation and philosophy, the fewness of new heresies demanding a clearer explanation of doctrine. However, even in this period, there were exceptional minds which originated new 53 Cf. St. Augustine, In Epistolam Joannis ad Parthos (PL 35:2033), “ Dilige et quod vis fac : sive taceas, dilectione taceas : sive clames, dilectione clames : sive emendas, dilectione emendas : sive parcas, dilectione parcas : radix sit intus dilectionis, non potest de ista radice nisi bonum existere.” 54 Cf. St. Leo the Great, Homiliae (PL 54:142 ff.). 86 The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues theological thought. The most important contribution of this period is the first systematic treatment of virtue and vice. The first work worthy of mention in the Mediaeval Period is the Theologia Mystica of Dionysius the Pseudo-Aereopagite,53 which was written at the close of the fifth century. The author of this work is unknown. He is referred to as Pseudo-Aereopagite, because for some time, this work was erroneously attributed to Dionysius the Aereopagite. The Theologia Mystica contains many references to virtue, including an accurate analysis of the the­ ological and moral virtues. However, it does not concern itself much with the nature of the virtues or give anything approaching a scientific treatment of the virtues. Perhaps the most important Eastern writer of the Medieval Period from the standpoint of our subject is St. John Climacus (ca. 525-605). His work, Scala Paradisi, from which the Saint receives his epithet of Climacus,56 is one of the first complete treatises on the virtues. The author gives prominent place to the virtues, and traces the progress of a Christian from his first advance in virtue to the summit of perfection. The initial step toward a virtuous life, according to Climacus, is the renunciation of the world. After this, we must set ourselves to the task of mortifying our body with great labor and care, denying ourselves all those things which before were occasions of sin in our lives. The practice of virtue is difficult in the beginning but with constant exertion and effort, it is made easy. For after the initial hard­ ships of virtue, there comes to us a certain ease and joy in the performance of good works. Regarding this point, Climacus says : When we first abandon the profane life we enter with enormous bitterness and struggle of soul into the arduous path of virtue. But after we have gone a little way, we complete the rest of the journey almost without trouble. For when our mortal feeling of the body is absorbed and subdued by the alacrity of the soul, we exercise virtue with eagerness, yearning and joy, as if we were afire with a heavenly flame.57 35 Cf. Dionysius, Theologia Mystica {PG 3:1017-18). 36 St. John Climacus, Scala Paradisi (PG 88:631 ff.). 57 Ibid., I, 9 (PG 88:639) : “In abdicatae profanae vitae exordio ingenti Development of the Question of Facility in the Virtues 87 It is difficult to determine from this passage whether Climacus attributes facility to the grace of God or to the constant repetition of virtuous acts. It is obvious, however, from other passages in his writings that he attaches considerable importance to acquired habits of virtue. Thus, commenting on the words of a certain Abbot, Isaias, Climacus says : Sometimes he speaks of violence, as when he says, “ A monk is an assiduous violence to nature.” He wishes to say that when a way of acting is fixed and implanted in nature, as is commonly said, and then is changed, it is a violence to convert these inveterate habits and to transfer to another way of life, whence Christ has said, “ The kingdom of heaven bears violence.”* 58 Despite the emphasis that he places on acquired habits and per­ sonal effort, Climacus avoids the tendency of certain Eastern writers to over-emphasize and exaggerate ascetic methods. Ac­ cording to the doctrine of Climacus, virtue is always to be found “ in a middle path between excess and defect.” 5960He concludes his work by showing the effects of virtue. “ Heaven has for its ornament, the stars ; virtue has for its ornament, tranquillity and peace.” e0 This work of Climacus deserves to be called the first scientific cum animi acerbitate et labore arduam virtutis viam ingredimur. Sed aliquantulum progressi, sine molestia fere, quod reliquum est itineris con­ ficimus. Quando mortalis noster corporis sensus per animi alacritatem ab­ sorptus et subactus est, virtutem cum studio, desiderio et gaudio, tanquam coelesti flamma succensi, exercemus.” 58Ibid., I, 16 (PG 88:647) : “Passim nominat violentiam ut quando dicit: Monachus est assidua naturae violentia. Vult ergo dicere, quod consuetu­ dine per habitum infixa, et in naturam, ut vulgo dicitur, mutata et versa, violentia sit inveteratos mores mutare, et in aliam vivendi rationem trans­ ferre : unde Christus dicit : Regnum coelorum vim patitur." seIbid., II, 20 (PG 88:654) : “Abjicere bona facile est: comparare autem difficile; duas enim sattellites vitium habet, quibus graviter virtutem hinc et inde oppugnat : Hinc per excessum urgens, inde per defectum ; virtus autem in medio consistens adversus alterutrum (vicissim adversus utrumque), hos­ tium semper cogitur depugnare.” 60Ibid., XXIX, 445 (PG 88:1147): "Firmamentum quidem pro ornatu habet stellas : animi vero tranquillitas virtutes." 88 The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues treatise on the virtues. The treatment of the virtues in his writ­ ings is both clear and concise, and it is interesting to note that in certain passages of his writings there is a certain similarity to Aristotelian thought. The main theme of Climacus seems to be that “ we should work as if everything depended on our own efforts, and pray as if everything depended on God.” For it is not enough to love God, we must give expression to that love in the labors and mortifications which accompany the acquisition of virtue.61 In summary, the Scala Paradisi of St. John Climacus is the most satisfactory expression of the earlier writers on the subject of virtue. It is the forerunner of the more specific and specialized treatises of the Scholastic theologians. The other Eastern writers of this period, with the possible exception of St. John Damascene, do not approach the clarity or thoroughness of John Climacus. In his brief but comprehensive work, De Virtute et Vitio, St. John Damascene (ca. 676-754) states that since man is composed of two elements, body and soul, it follows that his virtues and vices will correspond to this two­ fold division.6263In precise and orderly style, the author goes on to enumerate the virtues, stating whether they belong more properly to the body or to the soul. His classification of the virtues is quite comprehensive, including the theological and moral virtues, with the latter virtues being listed at some length. Perhaps the most striking feature of Damascene’s work is his order and division. As was the case with John Climacus, one detects a certain similarity to Aristotelian method in John Damascene. Among the lesser known authors who wrote on the subject of virtue were Sophronius and St. Maximus. In his homilies,62 Sophronius treats the subject of virtue and vice but not at any length. The work of St. Maximus, Liber Asceticus, is a treatise on mystical theology which describes the dialogue between an elderly monk and a young postulant whom he is instructing in the 61 Ibid., V, 137 {PG 88:790) : “ Charitas ergo Deum expellit negligentiam.” 62 Cf. St John Damascene, De Virtute et Vitio, 509, V {PG 95:86) : " Animadvertendum est, hominem, cum ex duabus constat, anima scilicet et corpore, duplices quoque sensus habere, eorumque duplices esse facultates . . . Hinc earum virtutes et vitia duplicia." 63 Cf. Sophronius, Homilia {PG 87, 3:3147). Development of the Question of Facility in the Firtues 89 way of virtue. The author’s doctrine can be summed up in the statement that there are three requisites for a virtuous life, love, mortification, and prayer.64 The entire treatise is a development of these three means of perfection. The topic of virtue was also discussed by the Latin Fathers of the Medieval Period. Nicetas65 and Caesarius of Arles66 al­ though they do not give a detailed treatment of the virtues, do mention this subject throughout their writings. Boethius (480526), who is principally noted for his translation and explanation of Aristotle’s treatises on logic, gives scant mention to the virtues in his famous work, De Consolatione Philosophiae. He does describe the work of virtue and states the Aristotelian idea that the virtues constitute a middle path between excess and defect, but this is the entire extent of his treatment.67 He concludes his work with an exhortation to detest vice and practice virtue.68 There are many treatises on the virtues to be found among the works of the Great Pope and Doctor of the Church, St. Gregory the Great, especially in his moral writings. In keeping with his passion for allegorizing Sacred Scripture, Gregory describes virtue by many figures of speech. For example, in his work Regula Pastoralis, Gregory' compares the acquisition of virtue to a ship ascending the current of a river.69 Just as the ship must either make its way against the current, or in turn, be forced backward by it, so also, the soul must either advance against the current of the passions or else be swept away by them. Among the more scientific treatises on the virtues are the wrorks 64 Cf. St. Maximus, Liber Asceticus, 19, D (PG 90:926) : “ Fieri non potest ut animus perfecto Deo vacet, nisi tres istas virtutes paraverit ; nempe dilectionem, abstinentiam (seu jejunium) et orationem.” 65 Cf. Nicetas, De Ratione Fidei (PL 52:847-853). 86 Cf. Caesar of Aries, Regula ad Monachos (PL 67:1097). 87 Cf. Boethius, De Consolatione Philosophae, IV, VII (PL 63:825): "Firmis medium viribus occupatae.” 68 Cf. Ibid., V, VI (PL 63-862) ; “ Aversamini igitur vitia, colite virtutes, ad rectas spes animum sublevate, humiles preces in excelsa porrigite.” 68 Cf. St. Gregory the Great, Regula Pastoralis, XXXIV (PL 77:118): " In hoc quippe mundo humana anima quasi mare navis est contra icturo fluminis condescends : uno in loco nequaquam permittitur, quia adima relabitur, nisi ad summa conetur.” 90 The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues of St. Isidore of Seville (560-636) and Alcuin (735-804). St. Isidore’s considerations of virtue, found in his work Libri Sen­ tentiarum, are brief and to the point. The author concerns him­ self principally with the origin of virtue, and under this heading he seems to indicate the Aristotelian doctrine that the virtues are caused by repeated acts.70 According to St. Isidore, the attainment of facility in the practice of virtue does not follow immediately upon entrance into the virtuous life. Rather, it is a gradual process which begins and develops slowly with the repetition of virtuous acts. We begin the practice of virtue in small things, and little by little we are led to those virtues of a higher and more important order. To illustrate this point, St. Isidore uses the following analogy. The hardened sinner did not begin his evil career by committing great crimes, instead he began with small faults, and these small failings in turn, being unchecked, gradually and imperceptibly led to great sins. If we substitute virtue for vice in the foregoing description, says St. Isidore, we have an accurate account of the development of facility in the virtues.71 In the Libri Sententiarum, both the theological and moral virtues are discussed, and a clear picture is presented of the opposition between virtue and vice.72 In conclusion, the work of St. Isidore of Seville is one of the most advanced presentations of virtue among the Latin Fathers. It is excelled only by the treatise of Alcuin. The scientific treatises on virtue, begun in the East by John Climacus and John Damascene, find their counterpart and perhaps even their perfection in the writings of Alcuin. In the works of this author, we discover a tract on the virtues which is verysimilar both in content and method to the modern treatments of 70 St. Isidore of Seville, Sententiarum, Lib. II, XXXIII {PL 83:635): “ Sic vitio vitium gignitur, sicut virtus virtute concipitur.” 77 Cf. Ibid., Lib. Π, XXXVI {PL 83:637) : "Quemadmodum ad virtutem tendentes culmen, non a summis inchoant, sed a modicis, ut sensim ad alttora pertingant, ita et qui dilabuntur ad vitia, non statim a magnis criminibus incipiunt, sed a modicis assuescunt, et sic in maximo proruunt. Sicut paulatim homo a minimis vitiis in maximis proruit, ita a modicis virtutibus gradatim ad ea quae sunt excelsa contendit.” ™Cf. Ibid., Lib. Ill, XXXVI, XXXVII (PL 83:637-638). Development of the Question of Facility in the Virtues j ’ I f t : 91' moral theology. Alcuin defines virtue as a habit,73 enumerates and defines both the theological and the moral virtues.74 Besides the cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, temperance and fortitude, Alcuin lists many other moral virtues which How from the cardinal virtues as from a source. His treatise is lengthy and detailed, and complete in almost every respect. However, he does not mention facility, and does not express the idea that the virtues confer facility only in so far as this truth is contained in his statement that virtue is a habit. With the exception of St. Bernard of Clairvaux, the western writers who succeeded Alcuin are all relatively unimportant to our topic. Among these writers, we can list Paschasius Radbertus, Hincmar of Rheims, John Scotus Erigena, and Pope Leo IX. Paschasius Radbertus 75 is the author of an admirable and scholarly work on the theological virtues. Hincmar of Rheims and Pope Leo IX 77 have contributed popular, rather than scientific essays on the virtues. This is especially true of the work, De Conflictu, written by Leo IX. Written in the form of dialogue, this work represents virtue and vice conversing with one another, and in this way there is illustrated the contrast between the virtuous and vicious way of life.78 The works of both Pope Leo and Hincmar are definitely inferior to the writings of Alcuin. John Scotus Erigena (ca. 810-875) can be singled out for his original work in adapting philosophical to theological thought, However, he went to excess in borrowing his ideas from the NeoPlatonist school of philosophy, and some of their teachings led him into doctrinal errors which were later condemned by a decree of the Third Council of Valence in the year 855.79 His principal error was centered around the idea of a u world system,” the 73 Cf. Alcuin, Liber De Virtutibus et Vitiis, XXXV {PL 101:637): “ Virtus est animi habitus, natura decus, vitae ratio, morum pietas, cultus divinitatis, honor hominis, aeternae beatitudinis meritum.” 7* Cf. /bid., XXXV (PL 101:637). Cfr. (PL 101:615, 616). 75 Cf. Paschasius Radbertus, De Fide, Spe et Caritate (PL 120:1387 ff.). 76 Cf. Hincmar, De Cavendiis Vitiis et Virtutibus Exercendis (PL 125 : 857-930). 77 Cf. Leo IX, De Conflictu Vitiorum et Vitium (PL 143:559-578). 78 Cf. /bid. (PL 143:559 fi.). 78 Cf. Cone. Valentinum (DBU 320 ff.). 92 The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues procession of all creatures from God and the return of all crea­ tures to God.80 This theory led Erigena into several excesses, for instance, even the condemned souls will ultimately reach a natural paradise. His considerations of the virtues are linked up with his “ world system ” idea, hence they are not important enough for specific analysis. The writers toward the dose of this Period include Lan franc, St. Peter Damian, and St. Bernard of Clairvaux. In the work of Lanfranc, De Celanda Confessione,81 there is only passing mention given to the topic of virtue. St. Peter Damian wrote many tracts on the individual virtues which are dispersed throughout his writings.82 Of these writers, the most important to our subject is St. Bernard (1090-1153) since he offers striking testimony to the importance of acquired habits and to the facility which is afforded in the performance of virtuous actions. In his work, De Con­ sideratione, speaking of the force of habit, St. Bernard says: What is there that habit does not turn about ? What is not hardened by constant practice? What does not give place to use? What bitterness is so loathed that cus­ tom will not change into sweetness? Hear what the just man laments concerning this fact, “ The things which before my soul would not touch, now through anguish are my meats” (Job IV, 7). What at first you think un­ bearable, you will become accustomed to in time, and you will not judge it to be very grave ; later it will even feel light, later still you will not feel it at all; yet later and it will become pleasant.83 80 Cf. De Pita et Praeceptis J. Scoti {PL 122:49-50) : “ Ait igitur Bruckerus, omnem Scoti philosophiam huc redire: Omnia quaecumque sunt, non radicaliter modo et virtualiter, sed et essentialiter in Deo contineri, atque adeo omnia ex Deo ab aeterno progressa esse et fluxisse, inque varias classes inferiorum et superiorum, deteriorum meliorumque entium distincta tandem in fontem originemque suam (id est Deum) reditura *esse. ’ 81 Cf. Lanfranc, De Celanda Confessione {PL 150:625-632). 82 Cf. St. Peter Damian, Opuscula Varia {PL 145:19 ff.). 83 St. Bernard, De Consideratione, Lib. I, c. 2, n. 2 {PL 182:729-730): “ Quid non invertat consuetudo ? Quid non assiduitate duretur ? Quid non usui cedat? Quantis quod prae amaritudine prius exhorrebant, usu ipso male in dulce conversum est? Audi justum quid lamentetur super hujuscemodi: Quae prius tangere nolebat anima mea, nunc prae angustia cibi mei sunt. (Job VI, 7.) Primum tibi importabile videbitur aliquid; processu temporis, Development of the Question of Facility in the Virtues 93 This is a very clear and apt description of the facility which accompanies the constant and persevering practice of virtue. As we shall see later on, these words of St. Bernard were used by the Scholastic theologians in proof of their doctrine that it is possible to achieve facility in the practice of virtue. Article V. The Early Scholastic Period (1150-1350) This period is rightly called “ the golden age of theological literature,” for it was during this time that theological thought and expression reached its maturity. The scholars of this age neither despised nor neglected the works of their predecessors, but going beyond the limits which circumstances set to their specula­ tion, the Scholastics carried their inquiry into new fields of the­ ological thought and development. There were many circum­ stances favoring theological progress at this particular time, the period was completely peaceful, and Christian ideals dominated everywhere. The time had come for Christian thought to put forth its best efforts. An additional factor which gave great impetus to the Scholastic development was the introduction of the works of Aristotle. Prior to the thirteenth century, the Christian scholars of the West were for long ignorant of Aristotle’s original works, with the exception of the Organon (treatises on logic) which had been translated into Latin by Boethius.84 in the East, on the other hand, several commentaries on Aristotle’s writings had been published,85 but it is doubtful whether or not Christian philosophers and theologians were familiar with them. St. John Damascene seems to be one of the first Christian scholars to incorporate Aristotelian philosophy in his writings,86' and it is interesting to note that he had applied Aristotelian methods to Catholic theology over a century before si assuescas, judicabis non ideo grave : paulo post et leve senties ; paulo post nec senties ; paulo post etiam delectabit” 8