The Irish
Ecclesiastical Record
JI

Baiunal unfor (Bpmupal Pandion

VOLUME LXI
JANUARY

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JUNE 1943

FIFTH SERIES

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1943

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828
THE IRISH ECCLESIASTICAL RECORD
Has he nothing to tell us of the effects of the Eucharist ? These
could not have been divulged in any words which would have found
understanding and acceptance among the pagans to whom he
addressed his Apology or the Jews represented by Tryphon. St.
Justin was to teach what were the effects of the Eucharist by action
THE THOMIST PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING
and endurance. It was in the strength imparted by this food that
the little band of Christians stood up so fearlessly against the {
By FRANCIS McPOLIN, M.A., PmD.
contempt and threats of the prefect Rusticus. By virtue of this
food they looked forward with confidence to the Resurrection.
‘TYERFECT schools,’ says our late Holy Father in the Encyclical
Thus reads the ancient Martyrium 1 : —
>
y
Divini Illius Magistri, i are the result not so much of
The prefect says to Justin, ‘ Hearken, you who arc called learned, and think I
good methods as of good teachers.’ Yet it cannot be
that you know true doctrines : ii' you arc scourged and beheaded, do yon believe I
denied that one of the most virile movements in modern education
you will ascend into heaven ? ’ Justin said, ‘ I hope that, if I endure these things.
is that which expressly and very deliberately aims at liberating the
I shall have Jlis gifts. For 1 know that to ail vlio have thus lived, there abides '
pupil from all dependence on his teacher by enabling him to educate
the divine favour until the. consummation of the whole world. Rusticus the
prefect said, 1 Do you think, then, that you will ascend into heaven to receive i himself. In the Newr Education developed in Europe and America
some recompense ? ’ Justin said, ‘I do not think U but IT know
i....... and
„„j am
... fully
4..n., ' during the past forty years the whole idea of positive teaching, in the
•nlenee, saying, 1 Let those
confident of it.’ . . . Rusticus the pr
traditional sense, is regarded as obsolete and untenable. The advo­
and to obcv ihe Kmperor’s command,
who have refused to sacrifice to the. r,
cates of the new pedagogy claim that learning is after all a work
be scourged, and led away to suffer the punishment of beheading, accordingio
so strictly personal to the pupil that any ‘ interference ’ by a teacher
the law's.’ The holy martyr's, praising God and going forth to the accustomed
place were beheaded, and perfected their testimony in the confession of the Saviour,
can only upset the process and produce a spurious result. Auto­
And some of the faithful, having secretly removed their bodies, laid them in a
education has become the watch-word of the new movement, and
fit place, the grace of Our Lord Jesus Christ having wrought with them. To 1 in late years various systems have been devised and perfected with
Him be glory for ever and ever. Amen.
the intention of enabling the pupil to educate himself on his own
lines, at his own rate, and by his own efforts.
John Morson, O.Cist.
One such system will be taken up for exposition and critical
iP.G. 6, 1569-1572.
study in a subsequent article. As a preliminary to that study the
present article will outline the main points in the philosophy of
teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas, giving special attention to such
matters of topical interest as—the nature of the learning process ;
the possibility of auto-education ; the teacher’s function in relation
to self-active learning.’ The sources relied upon are the Summa
Theologica, Summa Contra Gentiles, and the Quaestiones Disputatae,
particularly De Magistro (Qq. De Veritate, Q. XI, De Magistro, in
quatuor articulos divisa).1.
In the first article of De Magistro, St. Thomas, as though
anticipating the whole modern controversy regarding the possibility
of teaching, raises and answers with characteristic thoroughness the
basic philosophic question : Whether man can teach another and be
called a teacher, or God alone ? 2 The argument that ‘ interference ’
by a teacher only upsets the learning process St. Thomas at once
rejects as being ‘ without reason.’ It excludes immediate causes,
1
since it attributes all the effects appearing in things to the first
i causes solely. This, St. Thomas points out, detracts from the
universal order which is woven together by the order and connexion
of causes : while the first cause, from the abundance of its own
1 Reference symbols :—S.T.-Summa Theologica ; S .C .G. = Summa Contra Gentiles;

Qq.—Quaestiones Disputatae;
Magistro.
* Utrum homo alium docere potest et dici Magister vel Deus solus, D.M., art. 1.

.

330
THE IRISH ECCLESIASTIC?AL RECORD
:
THE THOMIST PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING
331
goodness, confers upon other things not only that they may be,
He is likewise the first cause of nature’s operations. Therefore
but also that they may be causes.1
God is the first cause of health and of knowledge. Nevertheless
At the outset, St. Thomas adopts the Aristotelian distinction
man is said to cure and to teach as an. immediate cause.
between existence in potentia and existence in actu.
Natural
Good teaching, according to the philosophy of St. Thomas, is
forms pre-exist in matter in potentia and are brought into existence
based on the concrete, and the reason is that man is composed of
in actu by the operation of an extrinsic proximate agent.2 So also
body and soul, one in being and one in action. The soul was made
certain potentialities of knowledge pre-exist in the learner and it
for knowledge and the body was made for the soul, not the soul
is the actualization of these potentialities which constitutes the act
for the body. The greater good of the soul demands its union with
of learning.
the body, and it is for that reason that it cannot grasp things
Proceeding on these lines St. Thomas further distinguishes two
without having recourse to sensible; images; for sensible things
kinds of potentiality. A thing exists in potentia activa completa
impart by their impression a proper knowledge of themselves, and
when the intrinsic principle is sufficiently able to bring it to perfect
in their regard human souls are like the uneducated who have need
actuality, as is shown in healing ; for through the efficacy of nature
for concrete examples for their instruction.1
in the sick person he is brought to health. But a thing exists in
In the present state of life, says St. Thomas, in which the soul
potentia passiva when the intrinsic principle is not sufficient to
is united to a passible body, it is impossible for our intellect to
educe it to actuality, as when fire is made from air ; for this cannot
understand anything actually, except by turning to the phantasms
be done through any power existing in the air.
(sense representations of experience).2 In such terms did St.
Corresponding to these two kinds of potentiality there are two
Thomas, writing in the thirteenth century, set forth the true philo­
kinds of extrinsic agent. When anything exists in potentia activa
sophic basis of the Intuitive Method, which method, curiously
completa, the extrinsic agent acts only by helping the intrinsic
enough, is commonly regarded as Pcstalozzi’s own outstanding
agent,3 just as a doctor in healing is a minister to nature, which does . contribution to educational practice.3
the principal work. But when something exists in potentia passiva,
The Thomist theory of knowledge is a clear and logical outcome
then the extrinsic agent is that which does the principal work,
of Thomist teaching regarding the nature of the human soul and
just as fire makes air fire in act what was fire in potentiality. From
the nature of the union that exists between the soul and the body.
this it follows that since a person could, if left to himself, acquire
That teaching is as follows :—
knowledge, the intrinsic agent is that which does the principal
From the operation of the human soul its being can be known. Inasmuch
work in the act of learning, and hence we say that knowledge
as it has an operation transcending material things, its existence is elevated
pre-exists in the learner in potentia activa completa.
above the body, not depending on it; but inasmuch as its nature is to acquire
Knowledge can be acquired in a twofold manner, the one when
immaterial knowledge from material things, it is clear that the soul cannot be
the natural reason of itself comes to a knowledge of the unknown,
the complement of its own species without union with the body. For a thing
is not complete in species unless it has that which is required for the proper
which is called inventio ; the other when someone extrinsically gives
operation of that species. If, then, the human soul, inasmuch as it is united
aid to the natural reason, which is called disciplina. Inventio
to the body as a form, has being, elevated above the body, not depending on
and disciplina are closely allied ; for in those things which are done
it, it is clear that it is constituted on the confines of things corporeal and
both by nature and by art, art copies the action of nature,4 just
incorporeal.4
as nature in one suffering from cold induces health by warming him,
The soul acquires immaterial knowledge from material things
so does the doctor. In the same way the teacher leads the learner by
through psycho-physical action. The physiological apparatus of
means of symbols through the same discursive process that he
himself goes through by natural reason, and thus the learner comes
J ‘ Ad hoc ergo quod perfectam et propriam cognitionem do rebus habere possent,
ac naturaliter sunt institutae, ut corporibus uniantur, et sic ab ipsis robus sensibilibus
to a cognition of the unknown through the aid of what is proposed
propriam
de eis cognitionem accipiant, sicut homines rudes ad scientiam induci non
to him. Hence teaching and healing have this in common that
posaunt nisi per sensibilia exempla.’—(S.T., 1 ; Q. Ixxxix art. 1.)
just as the doctor causes health in a sick person natura operante,
8 ‘ Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est intellectum nostrum secundum
praesentis vitae statura quo passibili corpori conjungitur, aliquid intelligere in actu,
so the teacher causes knowledge in another per operatione rationis
qisi
convertendo
se ad phantasmata.’—S.T. 1. q. Ixxxiv, art. vii.
naturalis illius. But since God is the author of nature’s powers,
’ Cf. Chavannes, a native of Lausanne and contemporary of Pestalozzi : ‘ Le mot
1 ‘ Prima causa ex eminentia bonitatis suae aliis rebus confert non solum quod
sint sed etiam quod causae sint.’ Loc. cit.
2 ‘ Formae enim naturales praeexistunt quidem in materia, non in actu, ut alii
dicebant, sed in potentia solum, de qua in actum reducuntur per agens extrineecum
proximum.—D.M., art. 1.
2 4 Non agit nisi adjuvando agens intrinsecum et ministrando ei.'—D.M., art. 1.
* ‘Eodem modo operatur ars, et per eadem media, quibus et natura.’—D.M., art. 1.

intuition est derive d’un mot latin, qui signifie “ Voir,” considérer de près et jusqu’au
fond. Dans le langage philosophique, on l’emploie aujourd’hui pour designer la vue
du sens intérieur ou de Fame. L’impression reçue par le sens extérieurs, et principale­
ment par celui de la vue, se communique assitot a Fame qui acquiret par là le sentiment
ou là conscience de l’objet. Cette representation de l’objet saisie par Fame est
appelée intuition.’—Exposé de la Methode Elémentaire de H. Pestalozzi (Paris, 180-),
Introduction.
* Qq , De Anima, q. 1 art. 1.

ISO

p'332
THE IRISH ECCLESIASTICAL RECORD
knowledge is the nervous system. Afferent nerves terminating in the
brain centres reach out to various parts of the body where thev
are connected with end-organs specially adapted to thé reception of
physical stimuli. These stimuli give rise to certain impulses, which
a^e ^ilSmittcd to the brain. But once a nervous impulse enters
the brain we lose trace of it. It is carried over to the intellect by
a method which we do not understand, but which must be intimately
bound up with the mystery of the union of soul and body’.
In treating of the genesis of knowledge St. Thomas recalls the
Aristotelian distinction between the active and the passive intellect
. . ; the intellectus agens and the intellectus possibilis. The intellectus
agens is that faculty3’ which abstracts intelligible forms from sense
representations of experience, or ‘ phantasms ’ as they are called.
An external object, as it presents itself to the senses, is singular and
contingent, but hidden beneath the surface of qualities which give
the object its individuality and contingency is the unalterable nature
or essence which is universal and necessary. The intellectus agens
by virtue of its illuminative power, separates what is necessary and
universal—the species intelligibilis- -from what is contingent and
particular, thus rendering actually intelligible what before wTas only
potentially intelligible. The actually" intelligible element now acts
upon the intellectus possibilis, as colour acts upon the eye, producing
the species intelligibilis impressa. The action of the intellectus agens
on the phantasms is thus seen to precede the reception by the
intellectus possibilis. Wherefore the pre-eminence of the action is
ascribed not to the phantasms, but to the intellectus agens, We
should, St. Thomas points out, have a perfect example of this if the
eTe, besides being a diaphanous body and receptive of colours, ha
sufficient light to make colours actually visible ; even as
animals are said to throw sufficient light on objects by the light oî
their eyes.1
In all intellectual education the pre-eminence of ac^01? ί
attributed to the intellectus agens. The mere reception of sym;
m the sense faculty is only a phase of that complex activity by w.ic
he intellect produces knowledge in itself: From the seaS1,
symbols, which are received in the sense faculty, the intellect &
the essence which it uses in producing knowledge in itself.2 With
such intellectual action on the part of the scholar no teach
however vivid or impressive, can be effective. As colours are no
nhnr/ m aetuality except under the influence of light, so a so
phantasms are not intelligible in act except through the operation
ot the active intellect.3
t
the .™Mand bodilT vision, St. Thomas points out, are no
’ b>r bodily vision is not a logical power, so tha
*
lib. y cap
intentiones intollicilriî
quae in potentia sensitiva rcipiuntur,
«■rt. 1 ad 4.)
es’ ‘Tdbus utitur ad scientiam in seipso faciend
iutelligibjiia actu

YisibiIes ætu nisi per lumen, ita phantasmata non
per intellectum agentem.’ Qq. de Anima, q. 1
15‘

I

THE THOMIST PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING

333

certain of its objects it arrives at others ; but all its objects are
visible to it as quickly as it is turned towards them. Hence the
i one looking does not need to be excited by another to see, except
inasmuch as his gaze may be directed by someone to something
ι visible, as with the pointing of the finger.1 But the intellective
i power, since it is discursive, does infer some things from others.
' Hence it has not precisely an equal relation to all intelligible objects
to be considered. Some things it sees immediately ; others it cannot
see except through the office of reason. To knowing things of this
kind the intellect is not only in accidental potentiality, but even in
;ι essential potentiality ; for it needs a mover which will lead it into
actuality through teaching. The teacher, then, excites the intellect
to knowing those things he is teaching as an essential mover, leading
j it from potentiality to actuality ; but he who shows something to
j; the bodily sight excites it as an accidental mover.2
The teacher is an essential mover, but he is not, and cannot, be
; the efficient cause of any learning. He is, and must remain, an
extrinsic agent. Too often the art of teaching is conceived as the
transmission ,of knowledge to a passive recipient. Such was the
root error of Herbartianism ; and Herbartian pedagogy led to over
teaching, with all its deadening consequences for the pupil. No
Herbartian ‘ presentations,’ however skilfully presented, could
transfer knowledge, much less create an ‘ apperceiving mass.
Such methods of instruction only blunt the faculties and foster
, ,
I passivity of mind.
Self-activity, on the other hand, constitutes the central method
principle of the
Thomist philosophy of teaching. ‘ He who teaches,,
------Thomas, ‘ is not said to transfer knowledge to the pupd.
i -ys
y St.. Ihomas,
! What errors
errors m
in modem pedagogy could have been avoided had
Thomism formed a part of the inheritance of the modern educator .
And what an amount of modern pedagogical literature need not have
t been written ! When Pestalozzi said : ‘ Let the child not only be
• acted upon, but let him be an agent in intellectual education, he
Was, all unwittingly, emphasing a Thomist maxim. I he same,
indeed, might well be said about many of Professor John ewey s
teachings in regard to such matters as the nature of re ec ive
thinking, the essential basis of experience needed for the educative
process and the nature of the process itself as self-devel
But the philosophy of St. Thomas places the art o ea
g
a far higher level than anything contemplated in the materialj^
monism of Dewey and his school. Learning, as S .
+T.ari<jPenf]ina
involves psycho-physical action. By an operation ^scen g
material things the intellect takes the intelligible ο
meaning) from sensible objects. Meaning is not tangible to letter,
because matter and meaning belong to different sp
I

art· 1
12um·
,
■
illa ouae docet, sicut motor
.. doctor ergo excitat intellectum ad sciendum
aKqUam visui corporali,
««entialis educens de potentia in actum ; sed ostendens rem al q
excitat eum sicut per accidens . . .’ Loc. cit.

334
THE IRISH ECCLESIASTICAL RECORD
hence thought, the human urge after the meaning of things, is a
spiritual function. Meaning is simply the seal of man’s reason.
It can be put into sounds and the sounds become language ; it can
be put into lines and curves and they become writing. Language
and writing are, therefore, meaning incarnate in matter. In these
composites of matter and meaning (symbols) the meaningful element
is more real than the material. In writing, the paper and the ink
are for the meaning ; in language the sound is for the meaning, not
vice versa. Hence :—
The words of the teacher, heard or seen in writing, have the same relation
to causing knowledge in the intellect as anything outside the mind has, because
from both, the intellect takes the intelligible content (meaning) ; yet the words
of the teacher have a closer relation to causing knowledge than have the mere
perceivable things outside the mind, inasmuch as words are symbols or
intelligible content.1

In the last analysis all teaching depends upon symbols. Even
if some things seem to be taught by themselves (for example, it
when somebody asks what it is to walk, someone walks), yet this
is not sufficient to teach one, unless some symbol be; added ; ana
the reason is that in the same thing there are many elements, so
that it would not be known how far the demonstration held in
regard to any aspect of that object, whether in regard to the
substance of the object or in regard to- some accident of it.3
It is clear, therefore, that as far as intellectual education is
concerned no sensory material, no apparatus, can rival in efficacy
the spoken word of the teacher. No matter what may be sai
to the contrary, telling will always form an important elemen
teaching. Mere telling, however, is not enough ; the teacher mus s
to it that the pupils assimilate what is proposed to them ^hroug
the medium of language. But how is he to do that, if he is o y
an extrinsic agent ? Obviously the simplest way is by cons
interrogation. No external stimulus can more effectively cause
pupil’s intellective light to be focused on a specific point than a w
shaped, well-put question. Moreover, the mere expectation
searching questions keeps the pupil’s intellectus agens alert, r J
to seize the intelligible content of the teacher’s words. Nor is
all ; for the effort which the pupil makes to reproduce ideas in
orderly way and to clothe them in suitable language in answe
a question tends to fix those ideas firmly in his mind.
Such in general are the method principles underlying g
disputatio, the typical stimulus method employed by St.. 1
himself and his contemporaries in the medieval university,
disputations, we are told by De Wulf,3 consisted of two acts ’
there was a passage at arms between one or many objectors (opP
and a person replying (respondens) different from the one c .
with the final defence. When the discussion had gone on sumc
long, we are told, the master entered upon the scene, and m an
1 n

art· 1 84 Hum.
art. 1.

» History of Medieval Philosophy, vol. 1, P·

: THE THOMIST PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING
335
paft of the discussion or on another day he took up again in a
methodic way each question propounded, ‘grouped the opinions and
arguments, summed up the objections and replies, dealt with certain
difficulties which the person replying had intentionally left in
suspense, and finally presented a definitive solution or determinatio
introduced by the words resp&ndeo dicendum or a similar formula.
It can easily be seen that the introduction of the disputatio as
a regular feature of class-room procedure in the medieval university
had the double effect of minimizing, while at the same time magnify­
ing, the teacher’s role in the educative process. On the one hand
it tended to make the students more alert and active in acquiring
knowledge, and in a corresponding degree lightened the teacher’s
task. Oh the other hand the fact that the teacher had to deal
with unforeseen difficulties and to make even erroneous arguments
i contribute towards the illumination of a subject in the final
i Eminatio, called for thorough and detailed knowledge and made
every disputation an intellectual exercise for him as well as for
the students.
Scholarship is the first requisite for success in teaching. Merely
to have knowledge in potentia is not enough for the teacher ; he must
have explicitly and perfectly that knowledge which he is to cause
m another ; else he cannot be called a perfect agent. For there are
two kinds of agents in nature, as Aristotle shows.1 One kind of
^ent is that which had in itself everything which in the effect is
fansed by it, either in the same way, as in the case of univocal
0Γ *n a suPerior way, as in f^e case of equivocal agents.
® there are certain agents in which there pre-exists only a part
01 the results which are brought about, just as movement or some
mechcine in which the heat is found, either actually or
causes healing ; but the heat is not the healing entirely,
only partially. In the first kind of agent the action is perfect,
*®eseeond it is not. Instruction, says St. Thomas, implies perfect
«tian of knowledge in the teacher or master. Hence, he w’ho is
i Lacher must have explicitly and perfectly the knowledge which
ËWs in another, as in one learning through instruction.2
. Jjere is, therefore, an important difference between the function
hJJ'eacker in causing knowledge and that of a doctor in causing
tafJ*’ Both act as extrinsic proximate agents ministering o
which does the principal work. But whereas the doctor need
health himself in aciu, he can nevertheless cause it i
rbv J masmuch as he has health ζ in cognitione artis ; and that is
Xa
ean heal himself. But it is not enough
^knowledge ‘in cognitione artis’; he must have rt
cannot teach himself any more than ie
finite
l^dge w actu and at the same time not have it
he a perfect agent of his own knowledge, ther
j &18 heyond the power of man.
t

vii. 22 2Ά
.
j- »rt. 2. Utrumahquis possit sui ipsius Magister du*.

it. ·

THE IRISH ECCLESIASTK AL RECORD
THE THOMIST PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING
337
In the natural order knowledge can be acquired either per rôviçj at the right time; why interfere in any way? why not leave children
doctrinam or per inventionem according as one dudied under a teacher ; rMfyfo the discipline of nature? why not remain quite passive and let them
or independently. The second method is the more perfect on the gtl knowledge as best they can ? why not be consistent throughout ? 1
part of the one receiving the knowledge, because he is thereby ’ For a way out of the difficulty Spencer had recourse to the
distinguished as a more gifted student ; but on the part of that naturalistic principle that the helplessness of children is the one
which causes the knowledge, the more perfect mode is per doctrinam, and only reason for trying to educate them. He argued thus :—
because the teacher who has the knowledge as a whole explicitly |
It is a general law of life that the more complex the organism to be produced,
can lead to knowledge more quickly and easily than anyone can
the longer the period during which it is dependent on a parent organism for
lead himself.1
food and protection. . . . Now, this law applies to the mind as to°the body.
Man gains a knowledge of the unknown by means of his intel­ For mental pabulum also every higher creature, and especially man, is at first
lective light and the first concepts intuitively known, which are dependent on adult aid. . . . Thus, in providing from day to day the right kind
compared to the light of the active intellect as tools to a builder. of facts, prepared in the right manner, and giving them in due abundance at
With regard to both God is the cause of man’s knowledge in the appropriate intervals, there is as much scope for active ministration to a
most excellent way possible, because He endows the mind itself II child’s mind as to its body.2
with the intellective light and impresses on it the knowledge of
The determinism inherent in that debased concept of education
first principles which are as certain germs of knowledge, ‘just as is at once apparent. Less apparent but no less real are its moral
He impresses on other natural things germinal capacities of all the dangers. In the words of Pius XI,
effects
to be produced.’2 Therefore
God is
said to teach
interiorly.
.
ir
i
i
i
,
avety
Every torm
form ot
of pedagogic naturalism which, m
in any way excludes or weakens
Man cannot teach interiorly, because he cannot increase the
Christian formation in the teaching ofyouth is false . .
if the
intellective light in another.
But he can teach as an extrinsic I —
mtentioh
to banish
banish from
from education
education despotism
despotism and
and violence,
violence, which,
which, by
by the
...^.1 isis to
agent, for although germinal capacities arc not educed to actuality way»·
way, just punishment is not, this would be correct, but in no way new. It
through a created power, yet
that w hich is in them originally would mean only what has been taught and reduced to practice by the Church
traditional
Christianeducation.
education. . . . . . . But,
But,alas
alas! I itit isis clear
clear from
from the
the obvious
obvious
and virtually can be educed to actuality by the action of a i '„intraditional
[Christian
336

ereated nnwe-r 3
TT
* .1
·

i.·

x

'

r i

Ji

i mearun
LuAuuug£oi
u. the words
rrvxuo and
auu from
nom experience, that
mai what
wnai is intended
mxenaea by
oy not a few
rew
; is» the withdrawal of education from every sort of dependence on the divine
h.„
., . Such men are miserably deluded in their claim to emancipate, as they
, law.
the child, while in reality they are making him the slave of his own blind
)
°f 1118
his disorderly affections, which, as a logical consequence of their
i j'
system, come
001116 to tie
be justified as legitimate demands of a so-called autonomous

Here then is an evolutionary concept °£
of human development
free from that determinism which, St. Thomas says, takes away
from the universal order. Both the learning and the teaching
processes are here
uVlv considered
vAzn^uv^d from
from the
the evolutionary
evolutionary or
or developdevelopmental point of view. Learning is an evolutionary passing from j Ba *
potency to act. Teaching is the art of evoking that transition, j
θ? Spencer’s educational theory St. Thomas would emphatically
Learning and teaching alike depend for their efficacy upon the first ί
puts things in the wrong order, since in every movement the
cause which has endowed man with the potentialities of knowledge 1 Eminus ad quern is more important than the terminus a quo (the
and of virtue. God is therefore the first cause of man’s learning, I
1S more important than the beginning).4 The first requisite
then1 for a sound theory of education is a dependable ideal. But
inasmuch as He is the author of man’s potentialities ; but, ex j j-h®
eminentia bonitatis suae, He has left the unfolding of those potenti- I & ® philosophy that determines ideals. Therefore education
alities to human initiative. Man was made educable in order that pertains to philosophy more than to natural science. Moreover,
man might teach and be taught. Education is therefore the i philosophy is necessary to determine accurately the nature of man,
fulfilment of a double duty : of charity to the young and of a social ’ the subject of education. For the manner of studying man ought to
duty to the adult.
‘
Λ
' humanity
'
..........................
conform
to
’s place in the hierarchy of things. Hence
Materialistic evolutionism, on the other hand, leaves no scope St. Thomas says : ‘ Having treated of the spiritual and of the
for education in the traditional sense of the term. CT
Tl Herbert corporal creature, we proceed to treat of man, who is composed of
Of this
Spencer, the philosopher of Darwinism, was fully conscious when a spiritual and of a corporal substance.’ 5
he wrote :—
’
!1
In striking contrast to modern systems Thomist education
considers man whole and entire, body and soul, such as right reason
If it is . true that the mind like the body has a predetermined course of
evohition—-if it unfolds spontaneously—if its successive desires for this or j and revelation show him to be. It is therefore more truly scientific
that kind of information arise when these are severally required for its
nutrition if there thus exists in itself a prompter to the right species of |I
1 DM., art. 2.
3 DM., art. 3. Vtrum homo ab angelo doceri possit.

3 D.M., art. 1 ad 5.

* Education : Intellectual, Moral and Physical (Everyman), p. 54.
1 Op. cit., p. 55.
’ Divini Illius Magistri.
«S.T., 11-11, Q. 37, art. 2 and 2un>.
» Ibid., 1, q. Ixxv. : Prologue.
VOL.

ιλι—24

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THE IRISH ECCLESIASTICAL RECORD
than any system founded upon naturalism. Thomist education
views human nature from above, beginning even with God and the
angels. It believes that man’s true nature is exhibited in his highest
functions, and that it is more clearly manifested in the genius than
in the idiot, in the saint than in the criminal. Thomism is synthetic.
It does not despise any branch of learning. Especially does it
welcome the contributions of those sciences devoted to the study
of man ex parte corporis. But it recognizes that above all the
sciences is ‘ wisdom ’ which ‘ judges all things and sets them
in order.’1
Francis McPolin.
1 S.T. 11-1,

art. 2.

'if:
Mr

NOTES AND QUERIES
[Queries in Theology, Canon Law, or Liturgy sent in for solution in this section
Λ the ‘I. E. Record
tf the sender, even t
given to queries whicl
should such vérificatif

OCCULT
Rev. Dear Sir,—Will
;
Petrus is a co
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whole time and e
long distances by
efforts innumcrabl
I
the Company for
receives only a n
a living wage. O
an increase of salai
he can get no otht
■work, partly beca
because he had ho
work he had done
him generously. (
some time ago he
whereby he can aj
payment of premia
Recently, too, he h
the Company relue
for the injustice ai
Yet Petrus is c
about his actions ai
taken to suppiemen
similarly to supplei
of a minimum livin.
The questions were
Our correspondent c
employee of the Insun
oftentimes are only part
a supplementary or, at n
this case shows clearly t
devoting all his energies
this may be a purely vol
terested in insurance worJ
fee rewarded suitably for
has employed Petrus on
the rest of his working t:
occupation. The point ii
Petrus is a whole-time
claims and utilizes the e
day cannot be obliged to j