The Human Wisdom of
St. Thomas
A Breviary of Philosophy

from

the works of

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

Arranged by
JOSEF PIEPER
Translated by DROSTAN MacLAREN, O.P.

LONDON

SHE ED & WARD,
1948

LTD.

CONTENTS
PREFACE ...........................................................................................

ix

I.

The order of the parts of the universe to each
other exists in virtue of the order of the whole
universe to God.........................................................

t

The creature is vanity in so far as it comes from
nothingness, but not in so far as it is an image
of God......................................................................................

6

There can be good without evil; but there cannot
be evil without good..........................................................

9

II.

in.
IV.

Intellectual natures have a greater affinity to the
whole than other beings..................................................... 19
V.
Our intellect in understanding is extended to
infinity...................................................................................... 24

VI.
Morality presupposes nature............................................ 36

VII.
Reason is man’s nature. Hence whatever is con­
trary to reason is contrary to human nature............... 42

VIII.
The desire of the last end is not among those things
over which we have mastery.............................................. 4θ

IX.

The happiness of the active life lies in the action
of prudence by which man rules himself and others. 49
vii

CONTENTS
X.

Moral virtue does not exclude the passions...............

sg

XI.
Through virtue man is ordered to the utmost limit
of his capacity...................................................................... 58

XII.
Pleasure perfects operation just as beauty perfects
youth ..................................................................................... 60

XIII.
Grace and virtue imitate the order of nature which
is instituted by the divine wisdom........... ................... 6g
XIV.

The theologian considers human actions in so far
as through them man is ordered to beatitude........... 75
XV.
Each being naturally loves God more than itself. . 78
XVI.

Things are more in God than God is in things......... 87
XVII.

This is the final human knowledge of God: to know
that we do not know God.................................................. 99
KEY TO THE ABBREVIATIONS IN THE INDEX
OF REFERENCES.............................................................. 105
INDEX OF REFERENCES............................................................ 105

PREFACE
These remarks are not intended to relieve the reader
of the necessity of using his mind to get at the meaning
of the texts brought together in this Breviary. On the
contrary, it seems desirable thaï the reader should
encounter these passages from the works of Thomas
Aquinas all on his own and, so to speak, left alone
without the aid of an introduction or commentary. It
is to be hoped that such an encounter will of itself
introduce the reader to the form and design of the
whole work of the “Universal Doctor” of Christendom.
The Editor does not wish this book to be read
straight through from beginning to end at one sitting,
but rather that one or more of these texts, or even a
whole section, should be absorbed thoughtfully again
and again; in this way the reader will kindle his own
thinking, and by gradually making the thought of St.
Thomas his own, he will gain some degree of familiarity
with the philosophical attitude with which each and
every one of these words has been uttered.
I therefore deliberately refrain from even the briefest
interpretation of my own of the basic thought of St.
Thomas Aquinas contained in this synthesis.
In spite of this, I must not omit to point out that
this book, which is intended to be a Breviary of
“Philosophy,” contains nothing which is Theology in
the strict sense of the term. (That can be left over for
ix

PREFACE

a second, similar, self-contained collection of texts.)
Nevertheless, it must be remembered that this philosophy has sprung from the soil of a great theology
in which alone was it able to flourish. Also it can scarcely
remain hidden from anyone who follows the thought
attentively that the reflections here gathered together
lead to the gateway of Theology and Faith. The last
word of our Breviary is that concerning the owl and
the eagle; blessed beyond all human power is a heart
which like an eagle, flying upwards over the mists of
human frailty, gazes with deeply penetrating eye into
the light of unchangeable truth.
“Order and Mystery”: this title needs a word of
explanation. It has become almost a commonplace
that ordo represents a basic category of mediaeval
thought, and especially of the’ system of Thomas
Aquinas.
Ordo: represents the clear and intelligible building
up of reality, as well as the doctrine which reflects that
reality; it represents the satisfaction enjoyed by our
minds in surveying and penetrating the pattern of
life; it represents ways of life which can be trodden
and followed by our thought. And in fact nobody who
has absorbed into himself even a little of the “Summa
Theologica” will be able completely to resist the cold,
logical enchantment which the reason in its search for
enlightenment encounters in an explanation of the
universe constructed with such architectural power.
Nevertheless, anyone who does not see this world,
apparently explained with the utmost clarity of reason,
x

PREFACE

surrounded on all its borders by pathless mystery does
not do justice to Thomas Aquinas.
In the opinion of Thomas, not only does mystery put
a limit to the penetrability of reality, but ordo itself is
interwoven and crossed by mystery. And it is not only
mystery in the theological sense, likewise flowing
through every part of the whole world, which opposes
itself to the grasp of our ordering thought and our
attempts at rational mastery. No, the boundary be­
tween order and mystery passes through this world
itself; the effort of human thought, says Thomas, has
not been able to track down the essence of a single
gnat.
One aim of our Breviary is to demonstrate this
double aspect of the work of St. Thomas: the order
and the mystery.
Anticipating a probable objection by critics, I myself
wish to say quite frankly that the choice of the texts
has been determined entirely by the personal feelings
of the chooser; so a personal remark may also be allowed
here. During this work I had in mind especially my
own circle of friends, and I included only such texts
as I should like to bring to their notice. This I did in
order that the real character of St. Thomas might be
made visible to them in this way. Yet after all, the
objective point of view may balance the subjective to
a certain extent.
This Thomist Breviary has, I suppose, scarcely been
harmed by the fact that the work of selection and trans­
lation has been done during my years of service in the
xi

PREFACE

army, and had to progress in a not very academic atmos­
phere. In such changing conditions of life, what lias
already become familiar is encountered afresh, as U
for the first time, and with previously unknown potemtialities of understanding. In this way not a few tract'
ates, which I thought I knew very well, at this second
meeting have entirely surprised me. It is now my hope
that the character of Thomas Aquinas as revealed in
this Breviary, may dawn on the reader also, whether
already acquainted with it or not, with that morning
power of radiation which is usual at a first meeting.
JOSEF PIEPER

The least insight that one can obtain
into sublime things is more desirable
than the most certain knowledge of
lower things (I, 1,53d i).

I
The order of the parts of
the universe to each other
exists in virtue of the order
of the whole universe to
God. (i)
(2) Everything eternal is necessary.

(3) Just as God himself is One, so he also produces
unity; not only because each being is one in
itself, but also because all things in a certain
sense are one perfect unity.

(4) The more unity a thing has, the more perfect is
its goodness and power.
(5) The higher a nature is, the more closely related
to it is what emanates from it.

(6) Everything imperfect strives after perfection.
(7) The source of every imperfect thing lies neces­
sarily in one perfect being.

(8) The beginning of everything is directed towards
its perfection. This is clear in those things
1

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

which are done by nature, as well as id those
things which are made by art. Thus every
beginning of perfection is ordered to the com­
plete perfection, which is realized in the last
end.
(9) The higher the rank a thing holds in the uni­
verse, the more it ought to participate in that
order in which the goodness of the universe
consists.
(10) The more perfect a thing is in power and the
greater degree of goodness it possesses, the more
universal is its striving after goodness and the
more it seeks out and accomplishes good in that
which is distant from it.

(11) The sign of perfection in lower beings is that
they are able to produce things like themselves.
(12) What comes from God is well ordered. Now
the order of things consists in this, that they
are led to God each one by the others.

(13) The complete perfection of the universe de­
mands that there should be created natures
which return to God, not only according to the
likeness of their being, but also through their
actions. This can only be through the acts of
the reason and the will, because God himself
2

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

has no other way of acting towards himself.
Hence, for the final perfection of the universe,
it was necessary that there should be intellectual
beings.
(14) Although a thing which adheres firmly to God
is better, yet a thing which can either adhere to
God or not is also good. Hence that world in
which both these kinds of beings are found is
better than one in which there is only one kind.

(15) Although a being subject to decay would be
of higher degree if it were incorruptible, yet a
world composed of both permanent and transi­
tory beings is better than one in which there
are only incorruptible beings.

(16) Although spiritual substance is better than cor­
poreal substance, nevertheless a world in which
there were only spiritual beings would not be
better but rather less perfect.
(17) All movement is derived from something un­
moved.
(18) Everything changeable is reduced to a first un­
moved being; hence each particular knowledge
is also derived from some completely certain
knowledge, which is not subject to error.
b

3

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

(ig) The order of divine providence demands that
there should be coincidence and chance in
things.

(20) The perfection of the whole of corporeal nature
depends in a certain sense on the perfection of
man.
(21) The lowest member of a higher class of beings
is always found in contact with the highest
member of a lower class. Thus the lowest type
of animal life scarcely exceeds the life of plants;
for example, oysters which have no movement
have only the sense of touch and stick to the
earth just like plants. Hence the blessed Denis
says, The Divine Wisdom joins the last of the
higher kind with the first of the lower kind.
In the genus of corporeal things we can there­
fore take something supreme, namely the human
body, which is united in harmonious equili­
brium. It touches the lowest member of a higher
class, namely the human soul which, from its
mode of understanding, can be perceived to hold
the lowest position in the class of intellectual
beings. Hence it comes to pass that the intel­
lectual soul is said to be like the horizon or
boundary line between corporeal and incor­
poreal substance, since it is itself an incorporeal
substance and yet is the form of the body.
4

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST THOMAS

(22) Intellect is the first author and mover of the
universe. . . . Hence the last end of the universe
must necessarily be the good of the intellect.
This, however, is truth. Hence truth must be
the last end of the whole universe.

5

II
The creature is vanity in
so far as it comes from
nothingness, but not in so
far as it is an image of
God. (23)

(24) Even though created beings pass away, they
will never sink back into nothingness.
(25) The creature is darkness in so far as it comes
out of nothing. But inasmuch as it has its
origin from God, it participates in his image
and this leads to likeness to him.
(26) God cannot be the cause of a tendency to notbeing. Rather the creature has this of itself, in
so far as it has developed out of nothing.
(27) The further a being is distant from that which
is Being of itself, namely God, the nearer it is
to nothingness. But the nearer a being stands to
God, the further away it is from nothingness.
(28) The movement proper to the nature of a
creature is not a tendency towards nothingness:
this movement has a fixed direction towards
6

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS
good and the tendency towards nothingness is
only a defect in it.
(29) Since free will comes from nothingness, it is its
peculiar property not to be naturally confirmed
in good.
(30) The property of being pliant to evil belongs
to the will in virtue of its origin from nothing­
ness and not because it comes from God.
(31) The intellectual creature cannot naturally be
relieved of the possibilities of sinning; since it
has arisen out of nothingness, it can be capable
of defect.

(32) It is clearly not a convincing argument to say
that what is derived from nothing tends of itself
to nothingness and thus the potency to notbeing resides in all created things. For beings
created by God can only be said to tend towards
nothing in the same way as they have also taken
their origin from nothing. This, however, hap­
pens only through the power of the agent.
Hence the potency to not-being does not dwell
in creatures, but God has the power either to
give them being or to allow the inflow of being
into them to dry up.
(33) Even that which is stable in things would sink
7

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

back into nothingness, since it arises from
nothing, were it not held up by the hand of the
governor of all things.
(34) The potency to not-being of spiritual creatures
dwells more in God, who can withdraw the
influx of his power, than in the nature of those
creatures themselves.
»
(35) If God were to reduce a being to nothingness,
he would not do it by an action, but because he
would cease to act.

8

Ill

There can be good without evil; but there cannot
be evil without good. (36)

(37) Every creature participates in goodness in the
same degree as it participates in being.
(38) Everything that is, and in whatever way it is, is
good in so far as it exists.

(39) Being itself is like goodness. Good and Being
are convertible ideas.
(40) Good and true and being are one and the same
thing in reality, but in the mind they are dis­
tinguished from each other.
(41) Good and the inclination to good follow from
the very nature of a being; hence, so long as
the nature remains, the inclination to good
cannot be removed, not even from the damned.
(42) No essence is in itself evil. Evil has no essence.
(43) Evil consists entirely in not-being.
9

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

(44) Nothing can be called evil in so far as it has
being, but only in so far as it is deprived of
part of its being.

(45) Evil actions are good and come from God in so
far as it is a question of the being they possess.

(46) All that belongs to being and action in a sinful
act comes from God as first cause. But the
deformity in it goes back to free will as its cause,
just as the progress made by one who limps is
reduced to the power of movement as its first
cause, while all the obliquity in such a gait
arises from the crookedness of his limbs.

(47) There is nothing unseemly in the thought that
God acts with adulterers in their natural action,
for the nature of adulterers is not evil, only
their will. What is worked by the power of
théir seed springs not from their will but from
their nature. Hence it is not unfitting that God
should co-operate in that action and give it its
final perfection.
(48) In the demons one is aware of both their nature,
which is from God, and the deformity of their
sin, which is not from God. Thus it is not
absolutely true to say that God is in the demons:
we must add—only in so far as they are real
beings. But it is absolutely true to say that God
10

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

is in things, if we mean things whose nature is
not deformed.

(49) Since the demons are intellectual substances,
they can in no way have a natural urge to any
evil whatsoever. Hence they cannot naturally
be evil.
(50) Evil itself is not a positive thing, but that in
which evil adheres is something positive, in so
far as evil takes away only a part of the good.
In the same way, blindness is not anything
positive, but he who happens to be blind is
something positive.
(51) Just as perfection is comprehended under the
word good, so the word evil means nothing but
the loss of perfection.
(52) Evil arises through some particular thing being
lacking, but good arises only from a whole and
integral cause.
(53) A single and solitary defect is sufficient to make
something bad. But for a thing to be absolutely
good a single, particular goodness is not suffi­
cient; for this the entire fulness of goodness is
demanded.
(54) Every being is perfect in so far as it has real
11

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

existence but imperfect in so far as it is only
potential, and thus deprived of real existence.

(55) Good is what all things desire, as was first said
so well by the Philosopher. . . . But all things
in their own way desire real, actual being. This
is evident from the fact that all things by their
very nature fight against corruption. Hence
real, actual being makes up the idea of the good.
(56) The good fulfills not only the idea of being
perfect but also that of causing perfection.
(57) Although everything is good in so far as it has
being, yet being is not itself the essence of a
created thing. Hence it does not follow that a
creature is good in virtue of its own essence.
(58) Everything naturally desires unity just as it
also desires goodness.
(59) There is no desire which is not directed towards
a good.

(60) Nobody can strive after evil for its own sake.

(61) Sin does not occur in the will without some
ignorance in the intellect. For we will nothing
unless it is good, either real or apparent.
12

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

(62) It is impossible that any evil should be striven
after precisely as evil, either by the natural
appetite, or the sensitive, or the intellectual,
which is the will.

(63) We do not strive towards evil by tending
towards anything but by turning away from
something. Just as a thing is called good by
reason of its participation in goodness, so a
thing is called evil by reason of its turning away
from good.
(64) Evil in things lies outside any purpose: it occurs
without the intention of the agent.

(65) Even if that which is aimed at in sin is some­
thing evil in reality and opposed to the rational
nature, nevertheless it is apprehended as a good
and according to nature.
(66) Evil is never loved except under the aspect of
good; that is to say, in so far as it is truly a good
in some particular respect, but is conceived as
absolutely good. '
(67) To will evil is neither freedom nor a part of
freedom.

(68) Pain at the loss of something good shows the
goodness of the nature.
is

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

(69) Hatred would never overcome love, except for
the sake of a still greater love.
(70) The rational, intellectual nature is related to
good and evil in a way which distinguishes it
above all other beings. For every other creature
is naturally ordered to some particular, partial
good. On the other hand, only the intellectual
nature apprehends the universal idea of good
itself through its intellectual knowledge, and is
moved by the desire of the will to the good in its
universality. Hence, among rational creatures,
evil is divided in a particular way, namely, into
fault and punishment.
(71) In the sphere of free-will every evil is either
punishment or fault. Fault comes nearer than
punishment to the idea of evil.

(72) Punishment is opposed to the good of the one
who is punished and deprived of some good.
Fault stands in opposition to the good of the
order towards God, and thus it is directly op­
posed to the divine goodness.
(73) Judgment must not be passed on things accord­
ing to the opinion of the wicked, but according
to that of the good, just as in matters of taste,
judgment must not be according to the opinion
of the sick, but according to that of the healthy.
14

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

Hence punishment is not to be regarded as the
greater evil, because the wicked are more afraid
of it; but fault must rather be held as the greater
evil, because the good are more afraid of it.
(74) To the order of the universe there also belongs
the order of justice, which demands that punish­
ment should be inflicted on everyone who sins.
In this respect, God is the author of the evil
which is punishment, but not of the evil which
is fault.

(75) It is thus determined in the order of divine
justice: that one is subject in punishment to the
power of him by whose suggestion one has con­
sented to sin.
(76) Evil must be avoided in every way; hence it is
in no way permitted to do evil so that from it
some good may arise. But good need not be
done in every way; hence some good must
sometimes be omitted in order that great evils
may be avoided.

(77) Just as good is naturally prior to evil, which
signifies a lack of good, so the affections of the
soul, whose object is good, are naturally prior
to those affections whose object is evil, and
which therefore arise from the former. Hence
»5

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS
hatred and sadness have their cause m some
love, desire or pleasure.

(78) Good is the cause of evil in so far as it can have
a cause at all. For it must be realised that evil
cannot have a cause, proper to itself.
(79) Evil is not caused except by good.

(80) Every evil is based on some good. . . . Moral evil
is based on the good rooted in human nature;
evil which springs from the nature and is the
privation of being, is based on matter which is
good, like being which only exists potentially.
(81) Everything evil is rooted in some good, and
everything false in some truth.
(82) Evil produces no effect except in virtue of some
good.
(83) Evil does not fight against good except in virtue
of good. For in itself it is powerless and weak,
and is the source of no activity.
(84) However much evil is multiplied, it is never
able completely to swallow up good.

(85) Stronger than the evil in wickedness is the good
in goodness.

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

(86) Good can be realised in purer form than evil.
For there is some good in which no evil is mixed,
but there is nothing so very evil that no good
is mixed in it.
(87) Though evil always lessens good, yet it is never
able completely to destroy it. Just as in this
way some good always remains, so there cannot
be anything completely and wholly evil.
(88) There can be no supreme evil in the same way
as there is a supreme good, which is essentially
good.
(89) In the world nothing is found which is wholly
and completely evil.

(90) In every sinful action there remains something
good.

(91 ) Nothing is so very evil that it cannot have some
appearance of good; and by reason of such good­
ness it is able to move the desire.

(92) It is impossible for the good of our nature to be
destroyed completely by sin.
(93) It is not impossible that an evil should be
ordered to good by some good; but it is impos­
sible that anything should be ordered to evil
by some good.
17

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

(94) If evil were completely excluded from reality,
it would mean that much good would also be
taken away. Divine providence does not imply
the complete removal of evil from reality, but
rather the ordering to some good of the evil
which arises.
(95) Many good things would disappear if God did
not allow some evil to exist.

(96) If God had taken away from the world every­
thing which man has made an occasion of sin,
the universe would remain imperfect.
(97) If evil were taken away from some parts of the
universe, then much of its perfection would
disappear, for its beauty arises from the orderly
union of good and evil, while evil springs from
the waning away of good. Nevertheless, by the
foresight of the governor of the universe, good
follows from evil just as the song receives its
sweetness from the interval of silence.

18

IV

Intellectual natures have
a greater affinity to the
whole than other beings.
(98)

(99) In the universe only the intellectual nature is
sought on its own account, all others on account
of it.

(100) The highest step in the whole process of genera­
tion of creatures is the human soul, towards
which matter tends as its ultimate form. . . .
Man is therefore the end of all generation.

(101) It follows that spiritual things are called great
according to their fullness of being. For Augus­
tine says that, among those things which have
no size, to be greater is the same as to be better.
(102) Intellectual natures have a greater affinity to
the whole than other beings; for every intel­
lectual being is in a certain manner all things,
in so far as it is able to comprehend all being
by the power of its understanding. Every other
nature possesses only an imperfect participation
in being.
19

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

(103) The desire of man is to know something whole

and perfect.

(104) The soul is given to man in the place of all the
forms, so that in a certain sense man might be
all things.
(105) The natural perfection of each single being
which is in the state of potentiality consists in
the fact that it can be made actual. But the
intellect is in the state of potentiality with
regard to things which can be known. Before it
is made actual it is imperfect; but it is made
perfect when it is carried over into the act, so
that it arrives at the knowledge of things. Hence
some philosophers, directing their attention to
the natural perfection of man, have said that
the final happiness of man consists in this—
that in his soul is reflected the order of the
whole universe. . . . Man’s beatitude consists in
the knowledge of God but not in the knowledge
of created things. Hence one is not more blessed
because of the knowledge of creatures, but only
because of the knowledge of God. Nevertheless,
this very knowledge of created things belongs
to the natural perfection of the soul.

(106) It is said that the soul is in a certain sense all
things, because it is created to know all things.
In this way it is possible for the perfection of
20

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

the whole universe to have its existence in one
single being. Hence, according to philosophers,
the ultimate perfection to which the soul can
attain is that in it is reflected the whole order
of the universe and its causes. This also, they
say, is the last end of man, which in our opinion
will be attained in the vision of God. What, is
there that they will not see, who will see him
who sees all things? (Gregory the Great) .

(107) Only the intellectual creature is able to compre­
hend the direction by which it is directed to its
own acts.
(108) It is clear that man is not only a soul but a
compound of soul and body. But Plato was able
to assert that man is a soul which makes use of
the body, because he attributed sense percep­
tion to the soul as proper to it.

(109) In so far as the soul is the form of the body, it
has not got an existence apart from the exist­
ence of the body; it is rather united to the body
through this existence.
(110) Union with the body belongs to the essence of
the soul.
(111) Since the soul is only a part of human nature,
21

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

it does not possess its natural perfection except
in union with the body.

(112) Hence our body is transitory because it is not
itself perfectly subject to the soul; for were it
completely subject to the soul, immortality
would overflow to it from the immortality of
the soul.

(113) It is clear that the better a body is prepared,
the better will be the soul allotted to it. . . .
Since among men there are some who possess
a better-disposed body, to them also will be
allotted a soul endowed with a greater power
of understanding.
(114) Since the body with which the intellectual soul
is united must be prepared in the best way, it
is necessary for the sensitive nature to possess
the finest possible organ of the sense of touch.
Hence it is said that among all sensitive beings
we have the most reliable sense of touch, and
also that it is on account of the delicacy of this
sense that one man is more fitted than another
for the work of the intellect (Aristotle) .

(115) All the other senses are based on the sense of
touch. . . . Among all beings which have sense
perception, man has the most delicate sense of
touch. . . . And among men, those who possess
22

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

the more refined sense of touch have the best
intelligence.
(116) Since man possesses intellect and sense percep­
tion and bodily strength., so, according to the
plan of divine providence, these are all har­
monized in him, in the likeness of that order
which is found in the universe.
(117) The human soul possesses such an abundance
of various powers because it dwells on the
borders of spiritual and material being; in it
therefore the powers of both kinds of being
meet together.
(118) Natural things learn nothing and forget noth­
ing. . . . We do not forget nor do we learn
natural things.
(119) In man there is not only memory but also retro­
spection.

(120) A devil knows the nature of human thought
better than man does.

(121) In us there is not only the pleasure which we
share with the beasts, but also the pleasure
which we share with the angels.

23

V

Our intellect in under­
standing is extended to
infinity. (122)

(123) Desire of the knowledge of truth is peculiar to
human nature.
(124) In its active nature the intellect is therefore
naturally capable of knowing everything that
exists.

(125) Wonder is the desire for knowledge.
(126) Our intellect in knowing anything is extended
to infinity. This ordering of the intellect to
infinity would be vain and senseless if there
were no infinite object of knowledge.
(127) An ever-so-imperfect knowledge of most sub­
lime things still implies high perfection for the
soul. Hence, although the human reason is
unable perfectly to comprehend what lies be­
yond its limits, nevertheless it acquires much
perfection for itself if it, at least in some way.
perceives it by faith.

(128) The greatest kindness one can render to any
man consists in leading him from error to truth.
24

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

(129) The distinction between intelligent beings and
those which have no knowledge lies in the fact
that the latter have nothing but their own form,
while intelligent beings have the forms of other
things also, since the image of the thing known
is in the knower. Hence it is clear that the
nature of non-intelligent beings is narrower and
more restricted, while that of intelligent beings
has greater breadth and power of comprehen­
sion. Hence the Philosopher says that the soul
is in a certain manner all things.

O30) The most perfect types of beings, such as intel­
lectual beings, make the most complete return
to their own essences. In knowing something
outside themselves, they step outside themselves
in a certain sense; in so far as they know that
they know, they already begin to return to
themselves, for the act of knowledge is midway
between the knower and the thing known. But
that return is completely achieved when they
know their own essences. Hence every being
which knows its own essence is said to make
the most perfect return to its essence.
(*3i) To return to its own essence is nothing other
than having independent being resting in itself.
(132) The proper object of the human intellect when
united with the body is natures actually existing
in corporeal matter.
25

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS
O33) Our natural knowledge can extend as far as it
can be led by the hand through material things.

(*34) Since the senses are the first source of our
knowledge, it follows that all things upon which
we pass judgment are necessarily related to the
senses in some way.

0 35) Although the soul is more like God than other
creatures are, yet it cannot arrive at knowledge
of its own nature, so as to distinguish it from
other natures, except by way of creatures which
can be known by the senses, and from which
our knowledge takes its origin.
(136) Although by Revelation we are elevated to the
knowledge of things which would otherwise
remain unknown to us, yet we are never raised
so far as to know them in any way other than
through things which can be known by the
senses.
(J37) The senses are not deceived concerning their
proper object.

Û38) Truth is in both the reason and the sense­
faculties, but not in the same way. It is in the
reason as the result of the act of knowledge,
and at the same time as known by the reason. .. .
26

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

It is known by the reason because the reason
is reflected on its own act, knowing not only its
act but also its relation to reality. ... In the
sense-faculties, however, truth is only the result
of their act. . . . But it is not in the sense­
faculties as known by the senses. Though the
sense-faculties make true judgments on things,
yet they do not know the truth by which they
make true judgments. For though the senses
know that they perceive things, yet they do not
know their own nature, and consequently the
nature of their act, its relation to reality and its
truth remain unknown by the senses.

(139) No sense organ is aware of itself or of its opera­
tion. The eye neither sees itself, nor does it see
that it sees. But the intellect is aware of itself
and of its act of knowing.
(140) To judge one’s own judgment: this can only
be done by the reason, which reflects on its own
act and knows the relation between that upon
which it judges and that by which it judges.
Hence the root of all freedom lies in the reason.

(141) The object of the natural appetite is in every
case this thing in so far as it is this thing. The
object of the sensitive appetite is always this
thing in so far as it is agreeable and brings
pleasure; for example, water not in so far as it
27

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

is water, but precisely as pleasing to the taste.
But the proper object of the will is the good
itself, taken as such. In the same way sense
perception is distinguished from intellectual
knowledge: the apprehension of this coloured
thing is proper to the senses, but the intellect
knows the very nature of colour itself.

(142) The truth of the human intellect receives its
direction and measurement from the essences of
things. For the truth or falsity of an opinion
depends on whether a thing is or is not.
(142a) The most perfect kind of order is found in
things; from them is derived the order of our
knowledge.

(143) The human intellect is measured by things so
that man’s thought is not true on its own ac­
count but is called true in virtue of its con­
formity with things. . . . The divine intellect,
on the other hand, is the measure of things,
since things are true to the extent in which they
represent the divine intellect.

(144) Created things are midway between God’s
knowledge and our knowledge, for we receive
our knowledge from things which are caused by
God’s knowledge. Hence just as things which
can be known are prior to our knowledge and
28

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

are its measure, so is God’s knowledge the
measure of created things and prior to them.

(145) The word has naturally more conformity with
the reality it expresses than with the person
who speaks, even though it dwells in the speaker
as in its subject.
(146) Nobody perceives himself to know except from
the fact that he knows some object, because
knowledge of some object is prior to knowledge
of oneself as knowing. Hence the soul expressly
attains to the perception of itself only through
that which it knows or perceives. . . . Our mind
is unable to know itself in such a way that it
immediately apprehends itself, but it arrives at
knowledge of itself by the fact that it perceives
other things.
(147) It is necessary to say that the human soul knows
all things in the eternal ideas as all our knowl­
edge arises from participation in them. The
intellectual light dwelling in us is nothing else
than a kind of participated image of the un­
created light in which the eternal ideas are con­
tained.

(14θ) Just as in that part of the soul adapted to active
operation, the first intuitive awareness of prin­
ciples never errs, so insight into the first prin29

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

ciples of knowledge never errs in that part of the
soul which is disposed to speculative reasoning.
(149) A twofold relationship is found between the
soul and reality. One is when the real thing is
itself in the soul in the manner of the soul and
not in its own mode: the other is when the soul
is related to the real thing existing in its own
mode of being. Thus a thing is the object of the
soul in a double way. One way is in so far as
the thing is disposed or adapted to be in the
soul, not according to its own mode of being,
but in the manner of the soul; that is to say, in
a spiritual way. This is the idea of intelligibility
in so far as it is knowable. In the other way, a
real thing is the object of the soul inasmuch as
the soul is inclined to it and ordered to it accord­
ing to the mode of real being existing in itself.
This is the idea of desirability in so far as it is
desirable.

J5o) Knowledge takes place in the degree in which
the thing known is in the knower, but love takes
place inasmuch as the lover is united with the
real object of his love. Higher things exist in
a nobler way in themselves than in lower things
but, on the other hand, lower things exist in a
nobler way in higher things than in themselves.
Hence knowledge of lower things is more valu­
able than love of them, but love of higher
30

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

things, and above all love of God, is more
valuable than knowledge.
(151) Love of God is better than knowledge of him;
on the other hand, knowledge of corporeal
things is better than love of them. Nevertheless,
considered in itself, the intellect is nobler than
the will.

(152) Knowledge is perfected by the thing known
becoming one with the knower in its image.
Love, however, causes the very thing itself
which is loved to become one with the lover
in a certain sense. Hence love has more unitive
power than knowledge.
(153) Union belongs to love in so far as the loving
desire is related in affection to the thing loved
as to itself or something belonging to itself.
(154) Intellectual activity is made perfect in that intel­
ligible things are in the intellect according to
its own proper mode of being. Hence the intel­
lect is not injured but is made perfect by things.
The action of the will, on the other hand, con­
sists in movement towards the thing itself, so
that in love the soul is fused together with the
thing loved. Hence the soul receives some
blemish when it clings to things in an inordi­
nate way.
31

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

(155) There is the following distinction between the
intellect and the will. Knowledge is caused by
the fact that the thing known is in a certain
way in the knower. The will, however, does
not act in the same way, but contrariwise,
according as the will is related to the actual
thing desired, in so far as the one who wills seeks
something in which he finds satisfaction. For
this reason good and evil, which are concerned
with the will, are in things; but truth and error,
which are concerned with the intellect, are in
the mind which knows.

(156) Love is said to transform the lover into the
loved because by love the lover is moved towards
the thing loved. But knowledge creates likeness
in so far as an image of the thing known arises
in the knower.
(157) Truth and goodness include one another. The
truth is something good; otherwise it would not
be worth desiring; and the good is true; other­
wise it would not be intelligible.
(158) Since goodness and truth are convertible in
reality, it follows that the good is known by the
mind as true just as truth is desired by the will
as good.

(159) Truth is the good of the intellect; for this
32

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS
reason every intellect is called good because it
knows truth.

(160) The will would never desire knowledge unless
the intellect first of all comprehended knowl­
edge itself as something good.
(161) The good, considered as true, is related to the
reason before it is related to the will as some­
thing worth desiring.

(162) The intellect is in itself prior to the will, be­
cause the object of the will is a good which is
known, yet the will is prior in action and in
movement.
(163) Every act of the will arises from an act of the
intellect. Nevertheless, one particular act of
the will is prior to a particular act of the intel­
lect, for the will tends towards the final act of
the intellect, which is beatitude.
^64) The will is not a supreme rule but is a rule
receiving its direction from elsewhere, because
it is directed by the reason and intellect, not
only in us but also in God. In us intellect and
will are really distinct, and hence the will and
the rectitude of the will are also not the same,
but in God intellect and will are the same in
38

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS
reality, and hence the rectitude of his will is
also identical with his will itself.
(165) In a certain sense the will always obeys itself;
namely, so that man in some way always wills

that which he wishes to will. In one sense,
however, it does not always obey itself; namely,
when one wills imperfectly and ineffectively
what he wished to will perfectly and effectively.

(166) The perfection of goodness is more widespread
than that of truth. . . . All beings strive after
the good, but not all know the truth.
(167) It would seem that God cannot be loved
directly in this life, for one cannot love what
one does not know, as Augustine says. But we
do not know God directly in this life: we see
him through a glass darkly (1 Cor. 13.12).
Hence we do not love him directly.—To this we
must reply: Although one cannot love what one
does not know, yet the order of knowledge need
not necessarily be the same as that of love.
Love is the term or end of knowledge; hence
it can begin at once where knowledge ceases,
namely, in the thing itself which is known
through another thing.
(168) The intellect knows not only for itself, but also
for all the powers of the soul. The will wills not
34

i HE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS
only for itself, but also for all the powers of
the soul.

(169) Man wills good by natural necessity.
(170) The proper object of love is the good. . . . The
good is the proper cause of love.

(171) Everything that acts, whatever it may be, per­
forms every action from some kind of love.

(172) Just as natural movement and rest spring from
the form of a thing, so every affection of the soul
has its origin in love.
(173) Love is the first movement of the will and every
faculty of desire.
(174) In us love receives its order from virtue.
(175) The first act of the will does not exist in virtue
of the command of the reason, but in virtue of
a natural instinct or some higher cause.

D

35

VI

Morality presupposes na
ture. (176)

(177) Natural love resides not only in the powers of
the vegetative soul but also in all the powers of
the soul and in every part of the body, and
universally in all things.
(178) The first source to which every act of the will
is reduced is that which is willed naturally by
man.

(179) Just as natural knowledge is always true, so is
natural love always good, since it is nothing
other than a natural urge implanted by the
author of nature. Hence, to say that a natural
inclination is wrong is to offer an insult to the
creator of nature.

(180) In the same way as the will is founded on
nature, everything that is desired has its origin
and foundation in something which is naturally
desired.
(181) The right order of things is in harmony with
the order of nature, for natural things are
ordered to their end without any error.

3θ

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

(182) Reason imitates nature.
(183) The principles of reason are those which are
conformed to nature.
(184) It is certain that what the reason is naturally
endowed with is true in the highest degree; so
much so that it is not even possible to think it
can be false.
(185) Since the will is naturally good, its natural act
is always good. As man wills his own happiness
naturally, the natural act of the will is under­
stood to be life and beatitude. If we are refer­
ring to moral good, then the will considered
in itself is neither good nor bad, but is in
potency to good and evil.
(186) In the sphere of intellectual knowledge and
voluntary action, what is natural comes first,
and from it all else is derived. From the knowl­
edge of naturally known first principles is de­
rived the knowledge of that which follows from
them, and from the fact that one wills the end
naturally perceived is derived the choice of the
means leading to the end.

<187) Action conformable to art and reason must be
uniform with that which is according to nature
and instituted by the divine reason.
37

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

(188) A natural desire cannot possibly be vain and
senseless.
(189) Nature is presupposed by all the virtues, those
bestowed gratuitously by God as well as those
which are acquired.
(190) To become like nature by consenting to the
reason is the property of those virtues dwelling
in the appetite.
(191) Just as the order of right reason takes its origin
from man, so the order of nature is from God
himself.

(192) Natural inclinations dwell in things by the
action of God, who moves all things. Hence it is
impossible that the natural tendency of any
kind of being should be directed to something
which is evil in itself. But the natural urge to
carnal intercourse resides in all perfect animals.
It is therefore impossible that carnal intercourse
should be evil in itself.
(1 93) Even in the state of innocence there would have
been generation of offspring for the multiplica­
tion of the human race; otherwise man’s sin
would have been necessary in order that so great
a good should arise from it.
38

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

(194) Perhaps you may say: If the Word has assumed
a living body, why then did the Evangelist make
no mention of the spiritual soul but only of
the flesh, when he says, The Word was made
flesh? To this I answer: the Evangelist did this
firstly in order to manifest the reality of the In­
carnation against the Manichees, who said the
Word did not take on real flesh . . . since it is
not fitting that the word of the good God should
take on flesh, which they themselves called a
creature of the devil.

(195) Since that which is according to nature is or­
dered by the divine reason, which ought to be
imitated by human reason, hence sin and evil
is whatever is done by human judgment con­
trary to the order which is commonly found
in natural things.
(196) Everything that opposes a natural inclination
is sinful because it is contrary to the law of
nature.

(197) Sin is opposed to the natural inclination.
(198) Since sin is contrary to nature ... to seek the
satisfaction of a natural desire is not sinful if
nothing inordinate is added to it.
(199) The virtues perfect us so that we follow our
natural inclinations in a fitting manner.
.89

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

(200) The natural inclination is the beginning of
virtue.
(201) Although the virtues in their perfect state do
not have their origin in nature, yet they cause
an inclination to that which is according to
nature, that is to say, that which is according
to the order of reason.
(202) The submission of the lower powers of the soul
to reason comes from nature, but they are not
actually and continually subject by their nature.

(203) The natural inclination to the good of virtue is
indeed a beginning of virtue, but it is not per­
fect virtue. The more perfect such an inclina­
tion, the more dangerous can it be, if it is not
united to right reason . . . just as when a racing
horse is blind, the more impetuously it dashes
forward, the more violently does it collide with
some object and the more grievously is it in-

(204) There can be a natural inclination to the acts of
a single virtue but not to the acts of all the
virtues, because the natural readiness by which
a man is inclined to one virtue at the same time
causes an inclination to the contrary of another
virtue. He who happens to have a natural pre­
disposition to fortitude, which is manifested in
40

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

the prosecution of a difficult end, is less disposed
to meekness, which consists in mastering the
passions of the irascible powers.

(205) Every sin is based on a natural desire. Since
man naturally desires likeness to God, in so far
as all naturally desired goodness is an image of
the divine goodness, hence Augustine says, when
speaking to God: The soul commits adultery—
in sinning—when it turns aside from Thee and
seeks outside Thee those things which it can
find pure and clear only when it returns to
Thee.

4«

VII
Reason is man’s nature.
Hence whatever is con­
trary to reason is contrary
to human nature. (206)

(207) What is ordered according to reason is accord­
ing to human nature.

(208) The good of man, precisely as man, consists in
this: that the reason should be perfect in the
knowledge of truth, and that the subordinate
affections should be regulated in accordance
with the rule of reason. For man’s human
nature belongs to him from the fact that he has
the power of reason.

(209) The rule of the human will is twofold. One is
immediate and homogeneous, namely, the hu­
man reason. The other is the supreme rule,
namely, the eternal law, which is, so to speak,
God’s reason.
(210) The human will can only be protected from
sin when the reason is preserved from ignorance
and error.
42

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

(211) Moral virtue perfects the appetitive faculty of
man by directing it towards the good of the
reason.
(212) Human nature in the strict sense consists in
being according to the reason. Hence a man is
said to contain himself when he acts in accord­
ance with reason.

(213) The more necessary something is, the more it
needs the preservation of the order of reason
in it.
(214) Moral virtue is nothing other than a participa­
tion of the appetite in right reason.

(215) The perfection of virtue is achieved not by
nature but by the reason.
(216) The reason which knows evil is not opposed to
good but rather shares in the idea of good.
(217) The root cause of human good is the reason.
(218) Human good is the end of the moral virtues;
but the good of the human soul is to be in
accordance with reason.

(219) The reason is the primary source of all human
activity. Those sources of human action which
48

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

are also found elsewhere, in some way obey the
reason.

(220) Every movement of the appetite conformed to
true knowledge is good in itself; but every
movement conformed to false knowledge is in
itself bad and sinful.
(221) The spiritual beauty of the soul consists in the
fact that the conduct and action of man is in
accordance with and fitted to the spiritual
clearness of the reason.
(222) Considered in itself the will which departs
from the reason is always bad, no matter whether
it is right or wrong.
(223) Although a man is not superior to himself, yet
the one, by whose command he has knowledge,
is superior to him; thus man is bound by his
own conscience.

(224) When the reason proposes something to us as
God’s command, then, even if it is in error, to
despise the command of the reason is the same
as despising God’s command.
(225) Conscience is said to be the law of our minds
because it is the verdict of the reason, deduced
from the law of nature.
44

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

(226) Man himself does not create the law; but
through his knowledge, by which he perceives
the law created by someone else, he is bound to
obey the law.
(227) To compare the obligation of conscience with
the obligation due to the command of a superior
is the same as comparing the obligation of a
divine command with the obligation of a su­
perior’s command. Since a divine command
binds even against the order of a superior and
in a higher way, the obligation of conscience is
thus higher than the obligation of a superior’s
command, and the conscience will bind even
if it conflicts with the command of a superior.

45

VIII

The desire of the last end
is not among those things
over which we have mas­
tery. (228)
(229) Wherever there is intellectual knowledge, there
is also free will.

(230) He who acts against his will has no freedom of
action, but he can truly have free will.
(231) The nature of free will is not the ability to
choose evil; but the choice of evil is a conse­
quence of free will, in so far as the latter resides
in a created nature which is capable of defect.

(232) We are masters of our actions inasmuch as we
are able to choose this or that. Choice, however,
is not concerned with the end, but only with
the means leading to the end. Hence desire of
the last end is not among those things over
which we have mastery.
(233) The will necessarily desires its last end so that
it is unable not to desire it; but it does not
necessarily desire any of the means leading to
the end.
46

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

(234) Anything towards which we strive naturally is
not subject to free will.
(235) Every appetitive nature must necessarily desire
peace, since it always strives to arrive peacefully
and without hindrance at that towards which
its desire goes out.

(236) Whoever strives towards good, by this very
fact also desires beauty. ... It is the same desire
that is directed towards goodness, beauty and
peace.

(237) The end is last in execution but first in the in­
tention of the reason.
(238) Man necessarily desires everything on account
of the last end.

(239) Man is not called simply good when he is good
in some part only, but when he is good in his
entirety; but the latter comes about through
the goodness of the will.
(240) A good man is not one who has a good intellect
but one who has a good will.

(241) A good will makes a man absolutely good.
(242) The man who has a good will is called simply
a good man.
47

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

(243) Rightness of intention alone does not make the
will completely good.
(244) From the fact that one wills the end, the reason
determines on the means leading to the end.

(245) Whenever a colour is seen, light is perceived
at the same time; but one can see light without
perceiving colour.* In the same way, whenever
the means to an end are willed, the end is willed
at the same time; but the converse does not
hold good.
• The theory of light which St. Thomas inherited from Aristotle is
now known to be quite erroneous. What he means by the words, “one
can see light without perceiving colour,” is that though the “diaphanous"
—i.e., air, ether, or atmosphere—is not visible in itself as colours are,
yet it may be said to be seen in the same sense as we say we see darkness.

48

IX
The happiness of the ac­
tive life lies in the action
of prudence by which man
rules himself and others.
(246)

(247) Three things are necessary for the salvation of
man: to know what he ought to believe, to know
what he ought to desire, and to know what he
ought to do.

(248) The will is directed to the end, but choice to
that which leads to the end.
(249) A man does not take counsel with himself over
the end, but only over the means leading to the
end.
(250) To order is the task of the wise man.
(251) The name of wise man simply in itself is re­
served only for him whose consideration is
directed to the end of the universe, which is
also the source of all things.
(252) Even though knowledge of universals is first
49

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

in certainty, yet it does not have first place in
the sphere of operation; that belongs rather ro
knowledge of particulars, since action is con
cerned with particular things.

(253) It is not the task of prudence to concern itself
with the most sublime things, which are con­
sidered by wisdom. Prudence rules the things
which are ordered to wisdom, namely the means
by which men ought to arrive at wisdom. In
this way prudence is the servant of wisdom.

(254) Prudence considers the ways by which we ar­
rive at beatitude: but wisdom considers the very
object of beatitude.
(255) Man already possesses some share in true beati­
tude according to the measure in which he
studies wisdom.
(256) By wisdom itself one is led to the everlasting
kingdom (Wisd. 6.21) .

(257) Moral virtue presupposes knowledge.
(258) Since practical knowledge belongs to prudence,
it is more natural to man than pure speculative
knowledge.

(259) Human virtue is perfection in a human way.
50

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

Man is not able to comprehend the truth of
things with certainty in a simple intuition,
especially those things which are related to
action and contingent.
(260) The happiness of the contemplative life lies
in nothing else but the perfect consideration
of the highest truth; but the happiness of the
active life lies in the act of prudence, through
which man rules himself and others.

(261) The more contemplation excels the active life,
the more service seems to be done for God by
one who has to put up with a loss of his be­
loved contemplation in order to serve the
salvation of his neighbour for God’s sake.

(262) A precious pearl is more valuable than bread;
but in the case of hunger bread would be
preferred to it.
(263) He who is dying of hunger must be fed rather
than taught, since for one in need it is better
to inherit wealth than to be a philosopher
(Aristotle), although the latter in itself is cer­
tainly of higher value.
(264) To be called from the contemplative to the
active life is not a loss but a gain.

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

( 0(5-) A.I1 the virtues of the appetitive part of man,
which are called the moral virtues, in so tar as
they arc virtues are caused by prudence.
(266) When things are lower than the one who knows
them, then to know them is superior to willing
what is directed towards them, because then
things are in a higher way in the intellect than
in themselves—since everything that is in some­
thing else is in it in the manner of that thing

in which it is. But when things are higher than
the one who knows them, then the will ascends
higher than the mind is able to reach. Thus it
comes about that in the sphere of moral action,
which is lower than man himself, an intellectual
virtue gives their form to the moral virtues—as
prudence to the other moral virtues. In the
sphere of the theological virtues, however, which
are directed towards God, charity, which is a
virtue of the will, gives its form to faith, which
is an intellectual virtue.

(267) To prudence belongs the execution of all pre­
cepts about the acts of justice contained in the
law.
(268) The act of the (sensitive) desire is imperfect
unless reason is perfected by prudence, no
matter what disposition to good may dwell in
the appetitive faculty. Without prudence, there5«

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

fore, there cannot be discipline, or moderation,
or any moral virtue.

(269) Prudence is wisdom in human affairs., but not
wisdom absolutely in itself . Prudence is directed
to human good, but man is not the highest good
in the sphere of existing beings.

(270) All moral virtue must be prudent.
(271) AU sins are opposed to prudence, just as all
virtues are ruled by prudence.

(272) Prudence helps all the other virtues and acts
in them all.
(273) In general, man can receive counsel from an­
other regarding that which is to be done; but,
in the very act itself, the preservation of his
judgment in undisturbed rectitude against the
influence of the passions arises only from the
unerring rule of prudence, without which there
can be no virtue.
(274) In matters of prudence nobody is self-sufficient
in all things.
(275) Those who need to be guided by the advice of
another, if they are in a state of grace, at least
know how to advise themselves by the fact that
58

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

they seek the advice of someone else and are
able Lo distinguish good and bad counsel.
(276) In human activity a special kind of prudence

is found wherever there is a special kind of
domination and ordering.
A man cannot be sufficiently prudent in the
domain of a single virtue unless he is prudent
in all things.

0?8) When man acts against any virtue he acts
against prudence, without which there cannot
be any moral virtue.
(279) Prudence is frustrated chiefly by intemperance.
. . . Hence the vices opposed to prudence arise
mostly from impurity.

54

X

Moral virtue does not ex­
clude the passions. (280)
(281) The passions are in themselves neither good
nor bad, since in man good and evil are deter­
mined according to the reason. Hence the
passions, considered in themselves, can be good
as well as evil, according as they can correspond
with the reason or be contrary to it.

(282) What is good is determined for every being
according to the condition of its nature. Hence
good human action is accompanied by passion
and the service of the body.

(283) Since human nature is made up of body and
soul, of an intellectual and a sensitive part,
human good demands that man should sur­
render himself in his totality to virtue; that is
to say, both in his intellectual and sensitive
part, and with his body. Hence, for human
virtue it is necessary that the desire for just
vengeance should reside not only in the rational
part of the soul but also in the sensitive part
and in the body, and that the body should be
moved to serve virtue.
55

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

(284) Hence it is true that to act from passion lessens
both praise and blame, but to act with passion
can increase both.
(285) It is not contrary to the idea of virtue that the
deliberation of the reason should be suspended
in the carrying out of that which has already
been considered by the reason.

(286) He who is angry or afraid is not praised or
blamed, but only he who, while in this state,
behaves either properly or not.

(287) There are four basic passions of the soul—
Sadness, Joy, Hope and Fear.
(288) Like nature, passion also drives itself violently
to one determined thing.
(289) Of all the passions, sadness causes the most
injury to the soul.

(290) Every virtue by which a passion is ordered
also gives order to the body.

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

appetite, is useful from the fact that when angry
a man does more readily what reason com­
mands.* Otherwise the sensitive appetite in
man would be in vain, whereas it remains true
that nature makes nothing in vain.
(293) Since hatred wills evil to another precisely as
evil, it is not satisfied with any degree of
evil, since what is desired for its own sake is
desired without any limit, as the Philosopher
says. . . . Anger, however, wills evil only under
the aspect of just vengeance; hence when the
evil inflicted exceeds the measure of justice in
the opinion of the one who is angry, then he
becomes merciful.

(294) Despair, like hope, presupposes desire. Neither
hope nor despair is directed towards anything
which does not move our desire.

(295) Fear is never without hope in a happy result,
which cannot exist in any way in the damned,
in whom there can therefore be no fear.
(296) All fear arises from the love of something.

(291) Anger, it is true, in some way upsets the reason,
even if it follows a rational judgment, but it
helps the promptitude of action.

(297) Fear makes men more deliberative than hope.

(292) Anger, like all other movements of the sensitive

• Though anger coming after a rational judgment upsets the reason,
nevertheless it is useful because it gives greater promptitude in carrying
out the commands of the reason. Coming before a judgment, however,
anger is bad, as it makes a true judgment almost impossible.

5θ

57

XI

Through virtue man is
ordered to the utmost
limit of his capacity. (298)
(299) Sin consists in the loss of order in the soul, just
as sickness consists in disorder of the body.

(300) Inordinate love of self is the cause of all sin.
(301) All sin arises from some ignorance.
(302) Inordinate fear is included in every sin; the
miser fears the loss of money, the intemperate
man the loss of pleasure.
(303) Spiritual sins contain a greater malice than
those of the flesh.
(304) He who sins turns aside from that in which
the idea of the last end is truly found; but, as
a matter of fact, he does not cease to intend the
last end, which, however, he seeks wrongly in
other things.
(305) The good for everything is what is fitting to it
according to its form; evil is that which does
not correspond to the order of its form.
58

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

(306) Sin is nothing other than falling away from the
good which is fitting to one’s nature.
(307) Virtue is called the limit of potentiality . . . be­
cause it causes an inclination to the highest act
which a faculty can perform.
(308) The nature of virtue demands that it should
look up to the last end.

59

XII

Pleasure perfects opera­
tion just as beauty per­
fects youth. (309)

(310) All things desire pleasure in the same way as
they desire goodness; but they strive towards
pleasure on account of good and not e converso.
It does not thereby follow that pleasure is the
greatest good or that it is good in itself; but
every pleasure does spring from some good, and
some pleasure springs from that which is the
highest good and good in itself.

(311) The fact that children and animals seek pleasure
does not show that they are altogether wicked:
in them the natural impulse acts from God,
who moves them to act according to that im­
pulse.
(312) Pleasure is a kind of perfection of operation,
as the Philosopher has made clear; it perfects
operation just as beauty perfects youth.
(313) The desire strives towards good in the same
way as it strives towards the enjoyment of good,
which is pleasure. Thus as the desire is moved
60

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

to action through striving towards good, so also
through striving towards pleasure.

(314) The more perfect action causes more perfect
pleasure.
(315)

In so far as it is loved, everything becomes a
source of pleasure.

(316) All pleasure is uniform in that it means the
resting in some good, and in this respect it can
be a rule and measure of action. He whose will
comes to rest in an actual good is himself good,
while he whose will comes to rest in evil is
himself evil.

(317) Good is aspired to and pleasure is desired for
the same reason: this reason is nothing other
than the satisfaction of the appetite in good.

(318) The idea of joy is distinguished from that of
pleasure. Pleasure arises from a real union with
some good thing. Joy, however, does not re­
quire this; the mere satisfaction of the will is
sufficient for the idea of joy.
(319) Pleasure is not good in the highest degree from
the fact that it is pleasure, but because it is
perfect rest in a sublime good.
61

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

(320) Pleasure which springs from contemplation is
opposed by no sadness; nor is sadness joined
to it—except in an accidental way.
(321) There is a double goodness common to pleasure
and sadness; true judgment on good and evil as
well as the due order of thé will which accepts
good and rejects evil. Thus it is clear that in
pain and sadness there is some good the lessen­
ing of which can make them less good them
selves. But in every pleasure there is not
something evil through whose removal the
pleasure itself can become better. Hence it is
in fact possible that some pleasure can be the
highest good of man . . . but sadness cannot be
the greatest human evil.

XI π

Grace and virtue imitate
the order of nature which
is instituted by the divine
wisdom. (322)
(32S) The act of the intellect is accomplished by the
thing known being in the knower; thus the
excellence of the intellectual act is determined
according to the degree of the intellect. The
act of the will, and of every appetitive faculty,
is perfected in the inclination of the one who
desires to the actual thing desired, as to its end;
hence the dignity of the act of the appetite is
determined in accordance with the actual thing
which is the object of this act. A thing inferior
to the soul is in the soul in a nobler way than
in itself, for every thing is in another in the
manner of that in which it is. A thing higher
than the soul, however, is in a noble]' way in
itself, than in the soul. Hence, with regard to
what is inferior to us, knowledge is nobler than
love, for which reason the Philosopher places
the intellectual virtues higher than the moral
virtues. But with regard to what is above us,
especially God, love is higher than knowledge.
Hence charity excels faith.
63

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

(324) The discipline and moderation of the miser,
which restrain the desire for intemperance be­
cause it may cost money, are not true virtue.
. . . There can be no true virtue without charity.

(325) Although charity is necessary for salvation, it is
not necessary to know that one has charity;
rather it is generally more useful not to know.
(326) As it is good to love a friend in so far as he is a
friend, so it is bad to love an enemy in so far
as he is an enemy; but it is good to love an
enemy is so far as he is a creature of God. To
love a friend as a friend, and an enemy as an
enemy, would be a contradiction; but it is no
contradiction to love both friend and enemy
in so far as both are creatures of God.
(327) To love an enemy is higher than to love only a
friend, since it shows greater love of God. But
if we consider both acts in themselves, it is
better to love a friend than an enemy, and it is
better to love God than a friend. The difficulty
involved in loving an enemy does not determine
the nature of merit, except inasmuch as it
manifests the perfection of love which over­
comes this difficulty. Hence, if love were so
perfect that it would completely overcome the
difficulty, it would be still more meritorious.
64

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

(328) In the idea of merit and virtue the good is
more valuable than the effort. Hence, not all
that is difficult is also meritorious: but it must
be difficult in such a way that it is at the same
time good in a higher way.
(329) The nature of virtue lies in good more than
in difficulty.

(330) The divine law so orders men to each other
that each one preserves his order. This means
that men have peace with each other, for peace
between men, as Augustine says, is nothing
other than the harmony of order.
(331) The idea of peace includes the idea of concord
and adds something further. Wherever there is
peace, there is also concord; but wherever con­
cord rules, there is not always peace, if peace is
understood at all in its proper sense. . . . Con­
cord implies one common intention among
many people; but peace, in addition to this
common purpose, also implies a unity of desire
in each individual. Peace is opposed by a two­
fold dissension; the dissension of men with
themselves and the dissension between one
another. Only the second kind of dissension
opposes concord.
(33ta) To be at peace befits love; but to make peace
is the work of ordering wisdom.
65

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

(332) A father naturally loves his son more than
brothers love each other, although the son docs
not love his father as much as he is loved by
him.
(333) The love with which one loves oneself includes
the love of wife and child more than the love
of father.
(334) The common good is the noblest among human
goods; but the divine goodness surpasses human
good.
(335) Man cannot possibly be good unless he stands
in the right relation to the common good.
(336) The higher virtues are in a closer relation to
the common >good. But justice and fortitude
are more closely related than temperance to
the common good.

(337) The good of the whole is higher than the
particular good of an individual, if both are
understood as springing from the same source.
But the good of a single grace is higher than
the natural good of the whole universe.
(S3®) Just as the right use of power in ruling over
many people is a good in the highest degree,
66

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. ΊΉΟΜΑ8

so is its misuse in the highest degree evil. Thus
power can be turned into good or evil.

(339) God’s power is his goodness; hence he can only
use his power in a good way. But this is not so
in the case of man. Hence it is not sufficient for
beatitude that man should become like to God
in power, unless he becomes like to him in
goodness also.

(34°) Every law is ordered to the common salvation
of mankind, and it is in virtue of this quality
that it possesses the nature and binding force
of law. In so far as it fails in this, it has no power
of obligation.

(341) Among the virtues only justice includes the
idea of duty; hence moral virtue is determinable
by law in the degree in which it is related to
justice.

(342) The task of the human lawgiver is to rule
external actions only. To God alone, who is the
divine lawgiver, belongs the ruling of the
interior movements of the will.
(343) Human law sets up no precepts except about
justice; if it prescribes the acts of other virtues,
it does so only in so far as these assume the
nature of justice.

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

(344) Justice without mercy cannot be perfect virtue.
(345) Justice without mercy is cruelty, mercy with­
out justice is the mother of laxity.

(346) Mercy does not cancel out justice; it is rather,
in a manner of speaking, the plenitude of
justice.
(347) The old and the wise, who think that evil can
also happen to themselves, likewise the feeble
and the fearful are more merciful. Those, on
the contrary, who think themselves to be happy,
and so strong that no evil can happen to them,
are not so easily merciful. Thus weakness is
always a foundation of mercy.*
(348) Among all the moral virtues the activity of
right reason appears more particularly in jus­
tice. The wrong use of the reason is therefore
most apparent in sins against justice.

(349) The good of the reason lies in truth as its proper
object and in justice as its proper effect.
(350) The praise of fortitude in a certain sense de­
pends on justice. Hence Ambrose says, Fortitude
without justice is the matter from which evil
arises.
* This applies only to man. God’s mercy always arises from his love.

68

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

(351) To suffer death is not to be praised for us own.
sake but only because of its order to some good.

(352) Those who do brave deeds for the sake of
worldly glory are not truly brave.
(353) T can happen that a man may fear death less
than he ought.

(354) Fortitude appears to excel among the virtues.
Virtue is concerned with things difficult and
good. But fortitude is concerned with difficulty;
hence it is the greatest of the virtues. To this
we must reply: the idea of virtue consists in
good rather than difficulty. The greatness of a
virtue is therefore to be measured according to
the idea of good rather than that of difficulty.
(355) The boldest people are those who arc rightly
related to divine things.
(356) The acts of fortitude in battle are ordered to
victory and peace; for it would be foolish to
wage war only for its own sake.

(357) Fortitude has two acts—to attack and to hold
one’s ground.
(358) The most special act of fortitude, more peculiar
to it than attacking, is to sustain, that is to say
to stand immovable in the face of danger.
69

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

(359) Endurance truly implies a suffering attitude
of the body, but it also implies an act of the
soul which with all its strength perseveres in
good; it follows from this that the soul does
not yield to bodily passion already attacking it.
(360) Endurance is more difficult than attacking, and
this for three reasons. Firstly, endurance seems
to mean that one stands fast against a stronger
assailant, while one who attacks goes forward
with superior strength; but it is more difficult
to fight against a stronger than a weaker op­
ponent. Secondly, endurance perceives danger
already present, while for the one who attacks
it is still in the future; but it is more difficult to
be unmoved by the present than by the future.
Thirdly, endurance implies duration in time,
while one can attack with a sudden impulse;
but it is more difficult to remain unmoved for
a long time than to fly at some difficult object
with a sudden movement.

(361) A brave man is also patient.
(362) Patience is included in fortitude, for the essen­
tial quality of patience is also possessed by the
brave, namely not being upset by threatening
evil. Fortitude, however, adds something fur­
ther, namely to attack the threatening evil when
necessary.
70

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

(363) A man is called patient not because he shuns
evil but because he endures a present evil in an
honourable fashion; that is to say, he is not made
unduly sad by it.
(364) Among the virtues temperance in particular
lays claim to a special beauty, and ugliness is
most apparent in sins of intemperance.
(365) There is something shameful about all sin, but
especially about the sin of intemperance.
(366) Intemperance is most opposed to the purity and
beauty of man.
(367) Right reason makes one exercise abstinence in
a fitting way, namely, with cheerfulness of mind,
and for a fitting end, namely, for the glory of
God and not for the glorification of oneself.
(368) All worldly things can be reduced to three:
honour, wealth and happiness.

(369) Abstinence from things which bring pleasure is
fitting for those who have undertaken the life
of contemplation and the passing on of spiritual
good to others in a kind of spiritual generation,
but it is not fitting to those whose task it is to do
bodily work and serve physical generation.
71

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

(370) If a man deliberately abstains from wine to
such an extent that he does serious harm to his
nature, he will not be free from blame.
(371) Recreation is necessary to lead a human life.

(372) The result of impurity is a harmful duplicity
of mind.
(373) The virtue of chastity prepares man best for
contemplation.
(374) He who gives way to anger is less worthy of
blame than he who yields to desire, for the latter
is less deprived of reason.
(375) Sons imitate their fathers more in sins of anger
than in sins of desire.

(376) Meekness above all makes men masters of them­
selves.
(377) Pride extinguishes all the virtues and destroys
all the powers of the soul, since its rule extends
to them all.
(37®) The skilful doctor puts up with his patient
being afflicted by a lesser illness in order that
he may recover from a serious disorder; in the
same way the gravity of sins of pride is shown
72

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

by the fact that God allows man to fall into
other sins in order to heal him from pride.
(379) Many people take pride even in their humility.

(380) In a certain sense humility is man’s readiness
to approach spiritual and divine things.
(381) Humility makes man capable of knowing God.
(382) Humility prepares the way for wisdom.
(383) Two things can be considered in man; what is
of God and what is of man. ... In view of this
every man must submit what is of man in him­
self to what is of God in his neighbour. . . . But
humility does not demand that a man should
submit what is of God in himself to that which
seems to be of God in another. ... In the same
way humility does not demand that a man
should submit what is of himself to that which
is of man in another.

(384) Pusillanimity can also spring from pride.
(385) To act deceitfully is a sign of pusillanimity:
but a proud man is open and frank in all things.
(386) The ambitious are easily made jealous. In like
73

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

manner the faint-hearted are jealous, as they
consider everything to be important, and what­
ever good falls to someone else, they believe to
be an unfair advantage.

74

XIV

The theologian considers
human actions in so far as
through them man is or­
dered to beatitude. (387)
(388) The last end of human life is beatitude.

(389) A man is called a wayfarer because he is striving
towards beatitude; but he is called a “comprehensor” when he has already reached beatitude.

(390) Striving towards beatitude is the same as striv­
ing towards the satisfaction of the will.
(391) Happiness is a good proper to human beings.
Animals can only be called happy by a misuse of
language.
(392) Even though money is merely useful, yet it has
a certain resemblance to happiness because it
possesses the character of universality, since all
things obey money (Eccles. 10.19).*
(393) In perfect beatitude the whole man is made
• For the miser, one who makes money the last end of human life, all
things may be said to obey money. St. Thomas is here referring to the
sin of avarice.

75

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

perfect, which means that perfection overflows
from the higher to the lower part of his nature.
In the imperfect beatitude of the present life,
on the other hand, we proceed contrariwise
from the perfection of the lower part to that of
the higher part.
(394) What is most desired and willed by the in­
tellectual nature is the supreme perfection of
that nature; which perfection is its own beati
tude.

(395) The rational creature naturally desires beati­
tude. Hence it cannot wish not to be happy.
(396) Perfect beatitude belongs naturally to God
alone, as in him being and beatitude are iden­
tical. For the creature, however, beatitude is
not a natural possession but is its last end.
(397) God is beatitude by his essence. . . . Men, how­
ever, only participate in beatitude; as Boethuis
says, they are called “gods” by reason of some
participation.
(398) Virtuous action is to be praised because it is
directed towards beatitude.

(399) Virtues perfect man in actions by which he is
led to beatitude.
76

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST- THOMAS

(400) Whatever is willed is in every case directed
towards beatitude, which itself is not desired on
account of something else and in which the
movement of the desire comes to rest.
(401) The last end and beatitude of man is his most
perfect operation.

XV

Each being naturally loves
God more than itself. (402)

(403) Each single being is perfect in the measure in
which it reaches up to its own origin.
(404) In tending towards its own perfection, every­
thing tends towards God, for the perfections
of all things are images of the divine being.
(405) The highest perfection of human life consists
in the mind of man being open to God.

(406) Since the soul is created directly by God, it will
not be completely happy unless it sees God
directly.
(407) Every rational being knows God implicitly in
every act of knowledge. For, just as nothing has
the nature of desirability except through its
likeness to the first goodness, so nothing is
knowable except through its likeness to the
first truth.

(408) The natural desire for knowledge cannot be
satisfied in us until we know the first cause, and
78

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

that not in any kind of way but in its essence.
God, however, is the first cause. Hence the last
end of the creature endowed with a spiritual
intellect is to see God in his essence.
(409) The final happiness and beatitude of any in­
tellectual being is to know God.

(410) Purity makes the eye fit for clear vision; so also
the vision of God is promised to the pure of
heart.
(411) The creature is darkness compared with the
excellence of the divine light. Hence created
knowledge, which is derived from the power of
created being, is called evening knowledge.
(412) Created things in themselves do not lead away
from God but towards him; for the invisible
things of God are clearly seen, being understood
by the things that are made (Rom. 1.20) . But
the fact that they lead us away from God arises
from the fault of those who use them foolishly.
Hence it is said: creatures are made into a snare
to the feet of the unwise (Wisd. 14.11). But
even in the fact that creatures lead us away
from God in this way, there is evidence that
they have their being from God, for they would
not be able to lead the unwise away from God
79

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS
except by enticing them by the good which they
possess from God.

(413) It is quite clearly a false opinion to say that,
with regard to the truth of faith, it is completely
indifferent what one thinks about created
things, provided one has the right opinion
about God; an error about creatures reacts in
a false knowledge of God.
(4!4) The end and ultimate perfection of the human
soul is to transcend the whole order of created
things through knowledge and love, and to ad­
vance to the first cause, which is God.

(4J5) The end which the intellectual creature reaches
by its own activity is the complete actualisation
of the intellect in relation to all intelligible
things lying within its capacity; in this the in­
tellect becomes most like to God.
(415a) Although the human intellect can know only
a little about divine things, yet in that knowl­
edge it finds its desire, love and happiness more
completely than in the most perfect knowledge
it can have of lower things.

(416) All beings naturally strive towards God—not
explicitly but implicitly.
80

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

(417) Although the soul is led to God through the
intellect more than through the love of the will,
yet the movement of love reaches him more
perfectly than the intellect does.

(418) Man approaches nearer to God through love
than through his reason, because in love man
does not act himself, but is in a manner of
speaking drawn nearer by God himself.
(419) Nothing lies midway between our intellect and
God, either by way of efficient causality—since
our minds are directly created and sanctified by
God—or by way of some object causing beati­
tude—since the soul is beatified by enjoying God
himself.

(420) Love, which is an act of the appetitive faculty,
even in this life tends primarily to God and
from him passes on to other things; according
to this, charity loves God directly but other
things through the mediation of God. In knowl­
edge, however, the converse is true, since we
know God through other things, either as cause
through effects or by way of eminence or
negation.
(421) It can well happen that one who is not in
charity loves one created thing more than God,
another equally with God and another less than
81

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

God. But it is impossible for one to love a
creature equally with God and at the saine
time love nothing more than God, because the
last end of the human will must necessarily be
one single thing.
(442) Since everything is worth loving in so far as is
is good, God is infinitely worth loving since his
goodness is infinite. But no creature can love
infinitely, since no finite power can be infinitely
in act. Hence God alone can love himself in
the most perfect way, since his power of loving
is as great as his goodness.
(423) The reason why we are called wayfarers is be­
cause we are striving towards God, who is our
last end and beatitude. In this life we advance
by coming nearer to God, not with bodily
steps but through the affection of the heart.
This approach, however, is made by charity
because by it the mind is united with God.
(424) Man is united with God through his will.
(425) The love of God has the power of uniting
things: it reduces human affections from many
to one. . . . Love of self, on the other hand,
divides up human affections and diversifies
them.

(426) Since every creature according to its nature
82

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

naturally belongs to God, it follows that both
angel and man naturally love God more than
themselves, and before themselves. Everything
in its own way naturally loves God more than
itself.
(427) Hope leads to love in so far as the hope of
getting some good from God leads to the love
of God for his own sake.

(428) All things, in so far as they have being, are like
to God, who is being in the first and highest
manner.
(429) It is evident that all things naturally strive
after being, according to which they become
like to God, who is being itself, while all other
things only participate in being. Hence the
last end towards which all things strive is
likeness to God.
(430) All things, in so far as they have being, aim
at likeness to God, who is being itself.
(431) Being is itself a likeness of the divine goodness.
Hence, in so far as a thing longs for being, it
desires likeness to God, and longs for God
himself implicitly.
(432) The last end is the first principle of being, in
which all perfection is preserved, and towards
G
83

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

whose likeness all things strive according to
their perfection, some in relation to being only,
others in relation to living being, and others in
relation to living being, intelligence and beati­
tude.
(433) Everything which strives after its own perfec­
tion tends towards likeness to God.
(434) He who wills something under some aspect of
good, has a will conformed to the divine will.
(435) All creatures participate in the divine goodness,
with the result that they pour forth to others the
goodness which they themselves possess. For it
belongs to the nature of goodness to communi­
cate itself to others.
(436) An inclination to good through action is im­
planted in every creature which comes from
the hand of God. But the creature becomes
more like to God by the realisation of each single
good.

(437) Since God’s essence and operation are identical,
the highest assimilation of man to God is realised
in some action. Hence beatitude, by which man
is made like to God in the most complete way
and which is the end of human life, consists
in an action.
84

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOM

(438) When man omits to do what is in his power and
only waits for God’s help, he appears to tempt
God.

(439) Since the creature endeavours to be like to
God through many things, the last thing re­
maining to it is to seek the likeness to God,
who is the cause of other things.
(440) Although there is some likeness to God in all
creatures, only in the intellectual creature is
this likeness by way of image ... in other
creatures it is by way of vestige or footprint.

(440a) Our likeness to God is prior to our likeness to
our neighbour, which is based on the former.
(441) Creatures do not reflect their exemplar in a
perfect manner. Hence they can reflect it in
many ways, and there are many images. But
there is only one perfect way of representation,
and so there can only be one Son, who is the
perfect image of the Father.

(442) There is only one perfect uncreated image.
The first exemplar, the divine essence, cannot
be represented perfectly by a single creature
but must be represented by many created
things.
85

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

(443) One result of the vision of God is the immut­
ability of the intellect and the will. The intellect
is fixed, because when the first cause in which
all else can be known is reached, the quest of
the spirit comes to an end. The m • liability of
the will also ceases, because nothing· further
remains to be desired when the last end, which
contains in itself the plenitude of goodness,
is reached.
(444) The nearer a thing is to God, who is completely
immovable, the less changeable and more en­
during it is.

(445) The emanation of creatures from God would
be imperfect unless they returned to him in
equal measure.
(446) Wood burning in a fire participates in the
nature of fire; thus in a certain sense man is
also made a participator in the divine nature.
(447) Since the enjoyment of God, deservedly, due
to his excellence, surpasses the power of all
creatures, it follows that this complete and
perfect joy does not enter into man but rather
man enters into it. Enter into the joy of thy
Lord (Matt. 25.21) .
*

86

XVI
Things are more in God
than God is in things.
(448)

(449) God himself is his own being, which can be
said of no other being.

(450) Since the proper name of God is He who is, a
nature identical with his being is proper to him
alone.

(451) Since God’s being cannot be as if contained
in a receptacle, but is pure being, it is not
limited in any determined mode of perfection of
being but contains in itself the whole of being.
(452) All things in the whole world are moved to
act by something else, except the first agent,
whose action is such that he is in no way moved
to act by anything else. In him nature and will
are identical.
(453) Time has a before and after, aeon in itself has
no before and after, though they can be joined
87

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

to it, but. eternity has no before and after, nor
does it tolerate such things.*
(454) The higher a being is, the simpler it is. Hence
the beings which possess the highest degree of
nobility must also possess the highest degree of
simplicity.
(455)

is the first exemplar of all things.

(456) Even though all things, in so far as they exist,
reflect the divine essence, yet they do not all do
so in one and the same way, but in different
ways and in different degrees. Thus the divine
essence is the proper exemplar and idea of a
particular creature in so far as it can be reflected
by this determined creature in this determined
way.
(457) Irom the one first truth there result many
truths in the human mind, just as the one
human face produces many images in a broken
mirror.

(458) God, and what is in God, are not directed to
any end but are the end.
• Aevum, aeviternity, or aeon is used by St. Thomas and the Scholastics
to mean the measure of the duration of spiritual substances such as
angels. It comes midway between time and eternity, and may be conceived
as the measure of the duration of a thing which is unchangeable in
itself, but whose operations involve change.

88

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

(459) God, who acts first of all beings, does not gain
anything for himself by his action, but com­
municates and gives out something to others.
Hence things are not ordered to God as end
in order to add something to him, but so that
they may reach the end, each in its own way,
through him who is himself the end.

(460) God loves those who love him, but not as if
their love were the reason why he loves them;
rather it is the contrary.
(461) The divine love causes the good which it loves
in some thing; but it is not always so with human
love.
(462) Since God is outside the whole created order
and every creature is ordered to him, but the
contrary is not true, so it is clear that there is
a real relation of creatures to God. There is,
however, no real relation of God to creatures,
but only a rational one, in so far as creatures
are referred to him.
(463) We can in truth open our hearts to God, but
not without God’s help.

(464) The word perfection, if taken in its literal sense,
cannot be applied to God, for nothing is made
89

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

perfect (per-fectum)
(factum) .

except what is created

(465) We know and judge all things in the light of the
first truth, for the light of our intellect, which
is either natural or a gift of grace, is nothing
other than an imprint of the first truth.
(466) Just as a doctor is said to cause health though
he only acts exteriorly, while nature alone is
active from within, so man is said to teach truth
though he only announces it exteriorly while
God teaches interiorly.

(467) When man teaches he only exercises an external
activity like a doctor when he heals; but just as
the interior nature is the principal cause of
healing, so also the interior light of the mind is
the principal cause of knowledge. These, how­
ever, both come from God.

(468) We acquire our interior knowledge by the fact
that things impress their likeness on our souls.
But in God’s knowledge the contrary is true;
from his mind forms flow out to all creatures.
Hence, just as knowledge in us is a sealing of
our souls through things, so, on the other hand,
forms are nothing other than a sealing of things
through God’s knowledge.
(469) Human rational knowledge is in a certain sense
9°

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

caused by things; hence it follows that in­
telligible things are the measure of human
knowledge. That reality is of this nature is a
true judgment of the reason, but the contrary
is not true. God’s mind is by its knowledge the
cause of things. Hence his knowledge must
necessarily be the measure of things, just as
the rules of art measure the works of art, each
of which is perfect in the degree in which it
obeys these rules.

(47°) Even if the human intellect did not exist, things
would still be called true by reason of their
order to the divine intellect. If, however, both
intellects were thought to be no more, which is
impossible, the idea of truth could not exist
in any way.

(471) The knowledge of God is compared to created
things as art to works of art. Hence, just as art
not only knows but also creates what is artis­
tically correct, while it only knows but does not
create what deviates from the rules of art, so
God’s knowledge both knows and creates all
good things, while it only knows sin and evil,
which are deviations from his eternal law, but
does not cause them.
(472) God’s purpose is not frustrated in those who sin
or in those who attain salvation.
91

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

i
I
i
i
■

'

'
j
!
j
J

J
J
j:!
I
*

(473) There remains one reason for the angels’ joy,
both when men repent and when they sin,
namely that the order ofdivine providence is
fulfdled.
(474) Just as a pottery vase could expect to be put to
good use by the potter, so man must hope to
expect right guidance from God.

(475) It is a feature of mercy that it is poured forth
to others and, what is more, that it should
comfort the poverty of others. But this belongs
in the highest degree to the superior. Hence,
mercy belongs properly to God, and it is said
that his omnipotence is here most clearly shown.
(476) God’s omnipotence is most manifest in clemency and mercy, for the supreme power of God
is most clearly evident in the fact that he forgives sins freely. He who is bound by the law
of a higher authority is not free to leave sins
unpunished.

(477) Divine justice always presupposes divine mercy
upon which it is based. Nothing is due to the
creature except with regard to something real
already existing in it beforehand; and if this
latter is due to the creature, again it is with
regard to something prior. Since we cannot pro­
ceed to infinity, we must necessarily arrive at
92

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

something which depends only on the goodness
of the divine will, which is man's last aim and
end.

(478) Nothing is due to anyone except in virtue of
something which has been given to him gra­
tuitously by God.
(479) Things are said to have been created in the
beginning of time, not as if the beginning of
time were the measure of creation, but because
heaven and earth have been created together
with time.
(480) God has created all men for beatitude.

(481) Just as the primary purpose of human law is
to cause friendship between men, so the pur­
pose of the divine law is to establish friendship
between men and God.
(482) The eternal law is compared to the order of the
human reason as art to a work of art.
(483) God by his power does touch created things in
moving them, but he himself is not touched, for
the natural power of no creature is able to
penetrate to God.

(484) Irrational

creatures neither
93

participate

in

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

human reason nor do they obey it, yet they
participate in the divine reason by obeying it.

(485) Wherever God is, there he is totally. T hrough
his undivided power he is in contact with
everything.
(486) Even natural love, which dwells in all things,
arises from some knowledge; this knowledge,
however, does not belong to things themselves
but to the founder of creation.
(487) It is true that God, who is the first cause, does
not enter into the essences of created things;
yet created being can only be understood as
having arisen from the divine being.

(488) It is clear that all inferior beings, though they
are active, do not give being to other things
except in so far as the power of God acts in
them.
(489) God must be in all things in the most intimate
way. . . . The fact that he acts directly in all
things is a sign of thé almighty power of God.
(490) Everything which acts must be said to act
through the power of God. It is God himself
who is the cause of the activity of all things.
94

I

I

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF Sil· THOMAS

(491) Though created things produce their own
proper effects, yet it is not superfluous (hat God
should also produce the same effects, because
the creature produces nothing except through
the power of God. Nor is it superfluous that
the effects which God can produce by himself
should also be produced by other causes. This
comes not from any insufficiency in the divine
power, but from the immensity of God’s good­
ness, through which he has wished to com­
municate his likeness to things—not only by
giving them existence but also in making them
the causes of other things. In this double way
the image of God is common to all creatures.
Here also is manifested the beauty of the order
in creation.
(492) All creatures are nothing other than an ob­
jective expression and representation of what
is contained in the concept of the divine Word.
(493) Knowledge and will mean that the thing known
is in the knower and the thing willed is in
the wilier. Thus, according to knowledge and
will, things are more in God than God is in
things.

(494) We know that everything done by God dwells
in him as known, so it follows that all created
things are in him as in the divine life. . . . Also
95

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

the natures of inanimate things are alive in
God’s mind, in which they have divine existence.
(495) Since God is the universal cause of all being, it
is thus necessary that wherever being is found,
God is also there present.

(496) God is the cause of all action in so far as he
grants the power of acting, which he preserves
and brings into act, and in so far as it is through
his power that every other power is active.
When we realise that God is his own power and
that he dwells in every being, not as part of its
essence but as holding it in being, it follows
that God himself must act directly in every
agent; this, however, does not exclude the action
of the will and of nature.
(497)

The natural necessity indwelling in things
which are determined to a single end is the
action of God directing them to their end, just
as the necessity by which an arrow is determined
to fly to a certain target is an action of the
archer and not of the arrow. But there is a
difference; what creatures receive from God
is their nature, but what man impresses on
natural things, in addition to their nature, is
the compulsion of force. Hence, just as the
necessary compulsion in the flight of the arrow
shows the aim of the archer, so the natural
96

Γ

;

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

j

necessity in creatures manifests the direction of
divine providence.

f
:
!
ί

(498) God moves all things in their own manner.
Hence some things participate in the divine
movement in a necessary way,but the rational
creature is moved freely.
(499)

£

Î

is not contrary to the idea of nature that
natural things should be moved by God as
first mover, since nature is a kind of instrument
used by God. In the same way there is nothing
contradictory in the idea of voluntary action
arising from God, in so far as the will is moved
by God.

(500) God’s providence cares for all things in their
own manner . . . Voluntary action, and mastery
over that action, are peculiar to man and to
spiritual creatures. To this compulsion is op­
posed. Hence God does not compel man to act
rightly.

<

J
!
*

(501) God’s action as first cause is perfect, but natural
action is also needed as second cause. God could
do what nature does without the help of nature,
but it is his will to act through the medium
of nature so that order may be preserved in
things.

97

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

(502) God does not justify us without any action on
our part.
(503) Divine providence does not destroy the nature
of things but preserves it.

(504) The gifts of grace are joined to nature in such
a way that they do not destroy but perfect it.
Hence the light of faith, which flows into us
through grace, does not extinguish the light
of natural knowledge which is our natural
inheritance.
(505) Grace does not destroy nature but presupposes
and perfects it.

9«

XVII

This is the final human
knowledge of God: to
know that we do not know
God. (506)
(507) Although uncreated truth exceeds all created
truth, yet there is nothing to prevent created
truth from being better known to us. Things
which are less known in themselves are known
better by us.

(508) God is one in reality but multiple according to
our minds; we know him in as many ways as
created things represent him.

(509) The necessity of calling God by many names is
evident. Since we cannot know God naturally
except from his effects, so it is necessary to
designate his perfection by different names, just
as different perfections are found in created
things. If, however, we were able to compre­
hend his essence in itself and give him a name
proper to his essence, then we would express
him in a single name. This is promised to those
who will see God in his essence. In that day

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

there shall be one Lord, and his name shall be
one. (Zach. 14.9).

(510) Created things are not sufficient to represent
the creator. Hence we cannot possibly arrive at
perfect knowledge of the creator from creatures;
in addition, because of the weakness of our
intellect we cannot even know all that created
things manifest of God.
(511) God can in no way be said to be like creatures;
but creatures can truly be called like to God
in a certain sense.
(512) No human affections in the strict sense can
actually be in God also, with the exception of
joy and love.

(513) Even though a creature may be very like God,
yet it never arrives at the stage when something
is due to it in the way that things are due to
God.
(514) From his effects we know that God exists, that
he is the cause of other things, and that he
excels everything else which he leaves far below
him; that is the final perfection of our knowl­
edge in this life.

(515) The truths of faith, which can only be known
100

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. I'HOMAS

completely by those who sec the essence of God.
can be known by the human reason only in
similitudes, which arc not sufficiently dear m
give comprehensive knowledge of that truth
as if by a demonstration or as if understood in
itself. Nevertheless, it is useful for die human
mind to exercise itself m such enquiries, inade­
quate as they are, provided there is no presump­
tuous claim to complete understanding and
demonstration. A little knowledge of the most
sublime things, even though it is poor and in­
sufficient, is a source of the highest joy.

(516) The human mind proceeds to the knowledge of
God in three ways, although it does not arrive
at knowledge of what he is but only that he is.
Firstly: in so far as his creative action is known
more perfectly. Secondly: in so far as he is the
cause of higher effects, for since these bear his
likeness in a higher way, they show forth his
excellence more distinctly. Thirdly: in so far
as he is known more and more as being far
above all those things we see in his effects.

(51*7) The human intellect, which naturally acquires
its knowledge from material things, is not able
of itself to arrive at the point of seeing the
divine substance in itself, since the latter is
elevated incomparably above all material things
and even above all other beings.
101

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

(518) Our intellect speaks of divine things, not ac­
cording to their own mode of existence—for it
cannot know them so—but according to the
mode of existence found in created things.
(519) To know God in a created likeness is not to
know the essence of God.
(520) Whatever is comprehended by a finite being is
itself finite.
(521) The investigation of divine things in such a way
as if one were able to comprehend them com­
pletely is presumptuous and is forbidden.

(522) It is impossible to predicate anything of God
and of other beings in the same sense.
(523) The reason cannot track down the will of God
except with regard to what he must will with
absolute necessity; but his will in relation to
creatures is not of such a kind.
(524) God is not called incomprehensible because
there is something in him which cannot be seen,
but because he is not seen as perfectly as he
can be seen.

(525) God is honoured by silence, not because we
may say or know nothing about him, but be­
102

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS

cause we know that we are unable to compre­
hend him.
(526) Neither Christian nor pagan knows the nature
of God as he is in himself.
(527) In this life we cannot know perfectly what God
is, but we can know what he is not, and in this
consists the perfection of our knowledge as way­
farers in this world. Likewise, in this life we
cannot love God perfectly so that we are per­
manently turned towards him in act, but only
imperfectly so that our minds are never turned
towards what is contrary to him.
(528) The divine substance in its immensity exceeds
every form which can be grasped by our minds.
Hence we cannot comprehend it by knowing
what it is, but only have a slight knowledge of
it in knowing what it is not.

(529) We only know God truly when we believe that
he is above all that men can think about God.

(530) It is said that at the end of our knowledge God
is ultimately known as unknown, because then
the mind knows God most perfectly when it
knows that his essence is above all that can be
known in this life of wayfaring.
103

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS
(531) Even though the eye of the owl does not see
the sun, nevertheless the eye of the eagle gazes
at it.

104

Key to the Abbreviations in the Index of References
In the following index of references, the references to
the Summa Theologica are represented only by num­
bers. For example, II-II, 123, 2 means the II Part of the
II part, question 123, article 2 .The same holds good
for the commentary on the Books of the Sentences of
Peter Lombard. For example, 3, d. 33, 2, 5, means the
3rd. Book, dist. 33, question 2, article 5. The other
works are abbreviated as follows:
C.G. — Summa contra Gentiles.
Comp, theol. — Compendium theologiae.
Ver. = Questiones disputatae de veritate.
Pot. = Questiones disputatae de potentia Dei.
Mal. — Questiones disputatae de malo.
Car. = Questiones disputatae de caritate.
Corr. frat. = Questiones disputatae de corr. fraterna.
De spe = Questiones disputatae de spe.
Virt. comm. = Questiones disputatae de virtutibus in communi.
Virt. card. — Questiones disputatae de virtutibus cardinalibus.
Spir. creat.- = Questiones disputatae de spiritualibus creaturis.
An. = Questiones disputatae de anima.
Quoi. = Questiones quodlibetales.
Perf. vit. spir. — De perfectione vitae spiritualis.
Nat. verb. = De natura verbi intellectus.
Un. int. = De unitate intellectus contra Averoistas.
Comm, in An. = Commentary on Aristotle's De anima.
In Met. = Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle.
In Joh. = Commentary on the Gospel of St. John.
In Matth. = Commentary on the Gospel of St. Matthew.
In Trin. = Commentary on Boethius on the Trinity.
In div. nom. — Commentary on Pseudo-Dionysius on the Divine Names.
Praec. car. =. De duobus praeceptis caritatis.

Index of References
(3) Pot. 3, 16 ad 1.
(4) C.G. 1, 102.

(1) Pot. 7, 9.
(2) C.G. 1, 83.

105

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)
(22)
(23)
(24)
(25)
(26)
(27)
(28)
(29)
(30)
(31)
(32)
(33)
(34)
(35)
(36)
(37)
(58)
(39)
(40)
(41)
(42)
(43)
(44)
(45)
(46)
(47)
(48)
(49)
(50)

(51)
(52)
(53)
(54)
(55)
(56)
(57)
(58)
(59)
(60)
(61)
(62)
(63)
(64)
(65)
(66)
(67)
(68)
(69)
(70)
(71)
(72)
(73)
(74)
(75)
(76)
(77)
(78)
(79)
(80)
(81)
(82)
(83)
(84)
(85)
(86)
(87)
(88)
(89)
(90)
(91)
(92)
(93)
(94)
(95)
(96)

C.G. 4, 11.
I II, 16, 4.
C.G. 1, 28.
I-II, 1, 6.
C.G. 3, 90.
C.G. 3, 24.
C.G. 2, 6.
I-II, ill, 1.
C.G. 2, 46.
Ver. 24, 1 ad 16.
Ver. 5, 3 ad 3.
C.G. 3, 136.
I, 84, 1 ad 3.
Ver. 16, 2.
C.G. 3, 74.
Comp, theol. I, 148.
C.G. 2, 68.
C.G. 1, 1.
Car. 1 ad 11.
I, 65, 1 ad 1.
Ver. 18, 2 ad 5.
I, 104, 3 ad 1.
C.G. 2, 30.
Pot. 5, 1 ad 16.
Ver. 24, 8 ad 14.
Ver. 22, 6 ad 3.
2, d. 23, 1.
C.G. 2, 80.
I, 103, 1 ad 2.
I, 104, 1 ad 1.
I» 1O4> 3 ad 3.
I, 109, 1 ad 1.
Ver. 20, 4.
C.G. 3, 7.
Ver. 21, 3.
I-II, 29, 5.
Ver. 16, 3 ad 5.
C.G. 3, 7.
?ot· 3· »6 ad 3.
I. 5» 3 ad 2.
Ver. 8, 4 ad 5.
Pot. 3, 6 ad 20.
C.G. 2, 89.
I, 8, 1 ad 4.
I» 63- 4·
Mai. 1, i.

106

Comp, theol. I, 114.
I-II, 19, 7 ad 3.
I-II, 20, 2.
C.G. i, 28.
C.G. i, 37.
Ver. 21, 3 ad 2.
I» 6> 3 ad 2I-II, 36, 3·
I-II, 8, 1.
I-II, 78, i ad 2.
C.G. 4, 92.
I, 19, 9.
Pot. 3, 6 ad 14.
C.G. 3, 4.
I-II, 6, 4 ad 3.
I-II, 27, i ad i.
Ver. 22, 6.
I-II, 35, i ad 3.
I-II, 29, 3 ad 2.
Mai. 1, 4.
I, 48, 5; I, 48, 6.
I-II, 79, 1 ad 4.
Mai. 1, 5 ad 10,
I, 49» s·
I» θ8- S·
Corr. frat. 1 ad 4.
Mai. 10, 1 ad 5.
Mai. 1, 3.
C.G. 3, 10.
C.G. 3, 11.
I, 17, 4 ad .2.
Mai. 12, 1 ad 10.
C.G. 3, 9.
C.G. 3, 12; cf. I, 48^4.
C.G. 3, 71.
Ver. 16, 2 (sed contra)
I. 49» 3·
Comp, theol. I, 117I, 103, 7 ad 1.
Ver. 24, 10 ad 11.
Ver. 22, 6 ad 6.
Mai. 2, 12.
Ver. 5, 4 ad 6.
Comp, theol. I, 142.
I, 48, 2 ad 3.
I, 92, i ad 3.

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS
(97) C.G. 3, 7i.
(98) C.G. 3, 112.
(99) C.G. 3, 112.
(100) C.G. 3, 22.
(101) C.G. 1, 43.
(102) C.G. 3, 112.
(103) I-II, 32, 2.
(104) Comm, in An. 3, 8, lect. 13.
(105) Ver. 2O> 3; Ver. 20, 3 ad 5.
(106) Ver. 2, 2.
(107) C.G. 3, 113.
(108) I, 75, 4.
(109) I, 76, 7 ad 3.
(110) Un. int.
(111) Spir. creat. 2 ad 5.
(112) Ver. 13, 3 ad 2.
("S) L 85» 7(114) An. 8.
(115) I. 76« 5·
(116) C.G. 3, 81.
(ïi7) E 77« 2·
(118) Virt. comm. 9.
(119) An. 13.
(120) Mai. 16, 8 ad 7.
(121) I-II, 31, 4 ad 3.
(122) C.G. 1, 43.
(123) Mai. 9, 1.
(124) C.G. 3, 59.
(125) I-II, 32, 8.
(126) C.G. 1, 43.
(127) C.G. 1, 5.
(128) In div. nom. 4, 4.
(129) I, 14, i.
(130) Ver. 1, g.
(»3») Ver. 2, 2 ad 2.
(132) I, 84, 7.
(133) I» 12« 12.
(134) Ver. 12, 3 ad 2.
(135) Ver. 18, 2 ad 7.
(136) In Trin. 6, 3.
(’37) I. 85« 6«
(138) Ver. 1, 9.
(139) C.G. 2, 66.
(140) Ver. 24, 2.
(141) Ver. 25, 1.
(142) De spe 1 ad 7.

joy

(142a) Π-ΙΙ, 26, s ad 2.
(143) III, 93, 1 ad 3.
ί‘44) Ï- !4> 8 ad 3.
(i45) Nat. verb.
■ 146) Ver. 10, 8.
(’47) I, 84, 5.
(148) Ver, 16, i (sed contra).
(149) Ver. 22, 10.
(150) I, 108, 6 ad 3.
(151) I, 82, 3.
(152) I-II, 28, 1 ad g.
(153) I-II, 26, 2 ad 2.
<154) I II, 86, i ad 2.
(155) C.G. 1, 77: cf. I, 16, 1; Ver.
26, 3.
(156) Mai. 6, i ad 13.
(157) I, 79, 11 ad 2.
(158) I, 59, 2 ad 3.
fi59) C.G. 1, 71.
(160) C.G. 3, 26.
(161) I-II, 19, 3 ad 1.
(162) Car. 3, ad 12.
(163) I-II, 4, 4 ad 2.
(164) Ver. 23, 6.
(165) Ver. 24, 10 ad 15.
(166) Ver. 21, 3.
(167) II-II, 27, 4, obj. 1 ad 1.
(168) I-II, 5 âd 2.
(169) Ver. 25, 1.
(170) I-II, 27, 1.
(171) III, 28, 6.
(172) De spe 3.
(173) I, 20, i.
(174) I-II, 55, ) ad 4.
(175) I-II, 17, 5 ad 3.
(176) Corr. frat. 1, ad 5.
(177) I-II, 26, i ad 3.
(178) Car. 1.
(179) I, 60, 1 ad 3.
(180) Ver. 22, 5.
(181) C.G. 3, 26.
(182) I, 60, 5.
(183) II-II, 154« ’«·
(184) C.G. 1, 7.
(185) Mai. 2, 3 ad 2.
(186) I-II, 17, 9 ad 2.

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS
(187)
(188)
(189)
(190)
(191)
(192)
(193)
(194)
(195)
(196)
(197)
(198)
(199)
(200)
(201)
(202)
(203)
(204)
(205)
(206)
(207)
(208)
(209)
(210)
(211)
(212)
(213)
(214)

n-II, 50, 4.
C.G. a, 7g.
Ver. 16, 2 ad 5.
I II, 58, 1 ad 3.
II-II, 154, 12, ad 1.
C.G. 3, 126.
1> 98> 1.
In Joh. 1, 7.
II-II, 130, 1.
II-II, 133, 1; II-II, 142, 1.
E 63> 9Quoi. 3, 22.
II-II, 108, 2.
I II, 58, 4 ad 8I-II, 71, 2 ad 1.
Virt. comm. 8, ad 17.
I-II, 58, 4 ad 3.
Virt. comm. 8 ad 10.
Mai. 8, 2.
Mai. 14, 2 ad 8.
II-II, 145, 3.
Virt. comm. 9.
I-II, 71, 6.
C.G. 4, 70.
1-11,59,4.
II-II, 155, 1 ad «.
II-II, 153, 3.
Virt. comm. 12 ad 16; II-II,

157» «·

(215) Virt. comm. 8.
(216) C.G. 1, 71.
(217) Ι-Π, 66, 1; Virt. comm. 4
ad 3.
(218) II-II, 47, 6.
(219) I-II, 58, 2.
(220) II-II, 20, 1.
(221) II-II, 145· «·
(222) I-II, 19, 5·
(223) Ver. 17, 3 ad 3.
(224) I-II, 19. 5 ad 2.
(225) Ver. 17, 1 ad 1.
(226) Ver. 17, 3 ad 1.
(227) Ver. 17, 5.
(228) I, 82, i ad 3.
(229) I, 59, 8·
(230) Mai. 6, 1 ad 22.

108

(231)
(232)
(233)
(234)
(235)
(236)
(237)
(238)
(239)
(240)
(241)
(242)
(243)
(244)
(245)
(246)
(247)
(248)
(249)
(250)
(251)
(252)
(253)
(254)
(255)
(256)
(257)
(258)
(259)
(260)
(261)
(262)
(263)
(264)
(265)
(266)
(267)
(268)
(269)
(270)
(271)

(272)
(273)
(274)
(275)

Ver. 24, 3 ad 2.
I, 82, 1 ad 3.
Ver- 22, 6.
I, 83, 2.
II-II, 29, 2.
Ver. 22, i ad 12.
I-II, 18, 7 ad 2.
I-II, 1, 6.
Virt. comm. 7 ad 2.
I, 5« 4 ad 3.
Virt. comm. 9 ad 16.
Mai. 1, 5.
I-II, 19, 8 ad 2.
I-II, 90, 1 ad 3.
I-II, 8, 3 ad 2.
Virt. comm. 5 ad 8.
Praec. car. (princ).
C.G. 1, 88.
I-II, 14, 2.
C.G. 1, 1.
C.G. 1, i.
I-II, 77, 2 ad 1.
I-II, 66, 5 ad 1.
I-II, 66, 5 ad 2.
C.G. 1, 2.
C.G. 1, 2.
I-II, 56, 2 ad 2.
Ver. 18, 7 ad 7.
II-II, 51, 1 ad 2.
Virt. comm. 5 ad 8.
Perf. vit. spir. 23.
Quoi, i, 14.
II-II, 32, 3.
II-II, 182, 1 ad 3.
Virt. comm. 6.
Car. 3 ad 13.
II-II, 56, 2 ad 3.
Ver. 14, 6.
II-II, 47, 2 ad i.
Virt. comm. 12 ad 23.
II-II, 119, 3 ad 3; II-II, 55>
2 ad 3.
II-II, 47, 5 ad 2.
Virt. comm. 6 ad 2.
II-II, 49, 3 ad 3.
II-II, 47, 14 ad 2.

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS
(276) II-II, 50, 1.
(277) Virt. card. 2 ad 4.
(278) I-II, 73, 1 ad 2.
(279) II-II, j53, g ad 1.
(280) I-II, 59, 2 (sed contra) .
(281) I-II, 59, 1.
(282) I-II, 59, 5 ad 3.
(283) Mai. 12, 1.
(284) Ver. 26, 7 ad 1.
(285) II-II, 158, 1 ad 2.
(286) II-II, 125, 1 ad 1.
(287) Ver. 26, 5.
(288) C.G. i, 89.
(289) I-II, 37, 4.
(290) Virt. comm. 12 ad 9.
(291) Mai. 12, 1 ad 4.
(292) II-II, 158, 8 ad 2.
(*93) MI, 46, 6 ad 1.
(*94) Ι-Π, 40, 4 ad 3.
(*95) I-II, 67, 4 ad 2.
(296) I-II, 43, 1 (sed contra) .
(297) I-II, 44, 2 ad 3.
(298) Virt. comm. 11 ad 15.
(299) Mai. 7, 1.
(300) I-II, 77, 4.
(301) C.G. 4, 70.
(302) II-II, 125, 2.
(303) I-II, 73, 5.
(8°4) I-H, x, 7 ad 1.
(305) Ι-Π, 18, 5.
(306) I-II, 109, 2 ad 2.
(307) Virt. comm. 9 ad 15; Virt.
card. 3.
(308) II-II, 123, 4.
(309) C.G. 1, 90.
(310) I-II, 2, 6 ad 3.
(311) I-II, 34, i ad 2.
(312) C.G. x, 90.
(313) Mai. 10, 3.
(8’4) I-II, 3*, θ ad 3.
(3’5) Ι-H, 3*, 6.
(316) I-II, 34, 4 ad 2.
(317) I"H, *, 6 ad 1; I-II, 34, 2 ad
3·
(318) C.G. i, 90.
(8’9) I-H, 84. 8 ad 8·

109

(320) III, 35, 5.
(321) I-II, 3g. 4 ad 1.
(322) II-II, 31, 3.
(323) ll-II, 23, 6 ad ;.
(324) II-II, 23, 7.
(325) Ver. 10, 10 ad 7.
(326) Car. 8 ad 11, ad 12.
(327) Car. 8 ad 17.
(328) II-II, 27, 8 ad 3.
(329) II-II, 123, i2 ad 2.
(330) C.G. 3, 28.
<331) II-II, 29, 1; II-II, 29, 1 ad 3
(331a) II-II, 45, 6 ad x.
(332) I, 96· 3 ad 2·
(333) Car- 9 ad 18.
(334) H-II, 124, 5 ad 3.
(335) IH, 9*. 1 ad 3.
(336) II-II, 141, 8.
(337) I-II, 113, 9 ad 2.
(338) I-II, 2, 4 ad 2.
(339) I-11» *. 4 ad i.
(340) I-II, 96, 6.
(341) FII, 99» 5 ad x.
(342) I-H, 1O°. 9·
1'343) I’11, ’«ο, *·
(344) I-H, 65, 4.
(345) In Matth. 5, i.
(346) I, 21, 3 ad 2.
(347) H-II, 30, 2.
/348) II-II, 55, 8.
(349) H-II, 124, I.
(350) II-II, 123, 12 ad 3.
(351) II-II, 124, 3.
(352) II-II, 131, 1 ad 3.
(353) H-Η, 126, j.
(354) II-II, 123, 12 ad 2.
(355) I-H. 45, 3(356) C.G. 3, 34.
(337) II-II, 128, x.
(358) II-II, 123, 6.
(359) II-II, 123, 6 ad 2.
(361)) II-II, 123, 6 ad 1.
(361) I-II, 66, 4 ad 2.
(362) Virt. card. 1, 1 ad 14·
(363) II-II, 136, 4 ad 2.
(364) II-II, 143.

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS
(365)
(366)
(367)
(368)
(369)
(370)
(371)
(372)
(373)
(374)
(375)
(376)
(377)
(378)
(379)
(380)
(381)
(382)
(383)
(384)
(385)
(386)
(387)
(388)
(389)
(390)
(391)
(392)
(393)
(394)
(395)
(396)
(397)
(398)
(399)
(400)
(401)
(402)
(403)
(404)
(405)
(406)
(407)
(408)
(409)

II-II, 15». 4 ad 2.
II-II, 142. 4·
IIII, 146, 1 ad 4.
ΙΊΙ, 108, 3 ad 4.
II-II, 142, i ad 2.
II-II, 150, 1 ad 1.
II-II, 150, 1 ad 1.
II-II, 53. 6 ad 2·
II-II, 180, 2 ad 3·
Ver. 25, 2.
Ver. 25’ ® ad 4’> Mai. l2> 4·
II-II, 157, 4.
Mai. 8, 2 ad i.
II-II, 162, 6 ad 3; Ver. 25, 7
ad 5.
II-II, 162, 5 ad 3.
II-II, 161, 5 ad 4·
In Matth. 11.
Mai. 8. 3 ad 8.
II-II, 161, 3.
Π-ΙΙ, 133, 1 ad 3·
II-II, 55- « ad 2.
II-II, 36, 1 ad 2.
MI, 7» 2·
I-II, 69, 1.
III, 15, ioI-II, 5. 8.
C.G. 3, 27.
Mai. 13, 3 ad 2.
I'll, 3, 3 ad 3C.G. 1, 100.
C.G. 4, 92.
I, 62, 4Ι-H. 3- 1 ad 1.
C.G. 3, 27; I-II, i3> 3 ad 1.
Ι-H. 8s* *·
C.G. 1, 101.
C.G. 3, 28.
I, 60, 5 ad i.
I, 12, 1.
I, 6, 1 ad 2.
C.G. 3, 13°·
Quoi. 10, 17.
Ver. 22, 2 ad 1.
Comp, theol. I, 104·
C.G. 3, 25.

(410)
(411)
(412)
(413)
(414)
(415)
(415a)
(416)
(417)
(418)
(419)
(420)
(421)
(422)
(423)
(424)
(425)
(426)
(427)
(428)
(429)
(430)
(431)
(432)
(433)
(434)
(435)
(436)
(437)
(438)
(439)
(440)
(440a)
(441)
(442)
(443)
(444)
(445)
(446)
(447)
(448)
(449)
(450)
(45‘)
(452)
(453)

no

I-II, 69, 4.
I, 64, 1 ad 3.
I, 65, i ad 3.
C.G. 2, 3C.G. 2, 87.
Comp, theol. I. jog.
C.G. 3, 25.
Ver. 22, 2.
Ver. 22, 11 ad 10.
I-II, 26, 3 ad 4.
Ver. 27, i ad 10.
II-II, 27, 4·
Mai. 7, 1 ad 20.
Perf. vit. spir. 3.
II-II, 24, 4·
Ι-H. 87, 6Ι-Π, 73. 1 ad 3.
I, 60, 5; I, Go, 5 ad :
De spe 3.
C.G. Ί, 80.
C.G. 3, 19.
II-II, 34, 1 ad 3.
Ver. 22, 2 ad 2.
Ι-Π, 2, 5 ad 3.
CG· 3- 21 ·
ΙΊΙ. *9’ 10 ad 1 I. lo6> 4Ver. 20, 4.
I’11. 55· 2 ad 3·
H-H. 53. 4 ad 1.
C-G· 3. 21 ■
I, 93, 6.
II-II, 26, 2 ad 2.
Pot. 3, 16 ad 12.
I, 47, 1 ad 2.
Comp, theol. I, 14g.
CG 3> 62·
Ver- 2O- 4·
I-II, 62, 1 ad 1.
11-11,28,3.
I, 8, 3 ad 3.
Spir. creat. 1.
C.G. 2, 52; I, 13, 11
Pt>t· *. 2I, 60, 1 ad 2.
I. 1O> 5·

THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS
(454) C.G. 1, 18.
(455) I- 44. 3·
(456) Quoi. 4, 1.
(457) Quoi. 10, 7.
(458) Pot. i, 2 ad 1.
(459) C.G. 3, 18.
(460) Ver. 27, 2 ad 1.
(461) C.G. 3, 150.
(462) I, 13, 7.
(463) Ver. 24, 15 ad 2.
(464) Ver. 2, 3 ad 13.
(465)
88, 3 ad 1·
(466) Ver. ii, 1 ad 7.
(467) I, 117, 1 ad 1.
(468) Ver. 2, 1 ad 6.
(469) C.G. 1, 61.
(470) Ver. 1, 2.
(471) Quoi. 5, 2.
(472) I, 63, 7 ad 2.
(473) E 113- 7 ad 3.
(474) Comp, theol. 2, 4.
(475) Π-ΙΙ, 30, 4.
(476) I. 25, 3 ad 3.
(477) I. 21, 4.
(478) L 25, 3 ad 3.
(479) I, 4θ> 3 ad i.
(480) Ver. 23, 2.
(481) I-II, 99, 2.
(482) I-II, 71, 2 ad 4.
(483) I, 105. 2 ad 1.
(484) I-II, 93, 5 ad 2.
(485) C.G. 3, 68.
(486) I-II, 27, 2 ad 3.
(487) Pot. 3, 5 ad 1.
(488) C.G. 3, 66.
(489) I, 8, 1; I, 8, i ad 3.
(49°) C.G. 3, 67.
(491) C.G. 3, 70.
(492) C.G. 4, 42.
(493) I. 8, 3 ad 3.

I, 18, 4; J, 18, 4 ad 2.
C.G. 3, 68.
Pot. 3, 7.
I, 103, 1 ad 3.
Quoi, i, 7 ad 2.
(499) I-II, 6, 1 ad 3.
Î500; (LG. 3, 148.
(501) Pot. 3, 7 ad 16.
(502) III, 111, 2 a<l 2.
1503) I-11, to, 4.
<f>oi) In Trin. 2, 3.
(505) Ver. i.], 10 ad 9: I, i, 8 ad 2
I, 2, 2 ad 1.
(506) Pot. 7, 5 ad 14.
(507) Ver. 10, 12 ad 6.
(508) I, 13, 4 ad 3.
(,5091 C.G. 1, 31.
(510) Ver. 5, 2 ad 11.
(511) Ver. 2, îi ad 1.
<512) C.G. 1, 91.
Q13) Ver. 2, n.
,■514) C.G. 3, 49.
(r} 15) C.G. 1, 8.
(516) In Trin. 1, 2.
(517) C.G. 4, 1.
(5’8) I. 39> 2·
(519) I, 12, 4 ad 1.
(520) I-II, 4, 3 ad 1.
(521) In Trin. 2, 1 ad 2.
(522) C.G. 1, 32.
(523) I, 46, 2.
(524) I, 12, 7 ad 2.
(525) In Trin. 2, 1 ad 6.
(526) I, 13, 10 ad 5.
(527) Car. 10, ad 2 (contra).
(528) C.G. i, 14; I. 3 (prooem­
ium) .
(529) C.G. 1, 5: Ver. 8, 1 ad 8.
(530) In Trin. 1, 2 ad 1.
(531) In Job. prologus.
(491)
(495)
( }()(·)
(497)

11I