THEOLOGICAL

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VOLUME VIII
1947

--------------------------Jtr»------------- !---- s---- γττ—

Published by the ’Theological. F'a'çultiet

of the Society of Jesus in the United States

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THEOLOGICAL STUDIES

is ens, the objectum commune intellectus. Again, on the level of judg­
ment the agent object is the objective evidence provided by sense
and/or empirical consciousness, ordered conceptually and logically
in a reductio ad principia, and moving to the critical act of under­
standing. Corresponding to this agent object, there is the other ter­
minal object, the inner word of judgment, the veri-ui. in and through
which is known the final object, the eus retie.
Here, as is apparent, metaphysics and psychology go hand in hand,
and the metaphysical analysis is but the more general form of the
psychological analysis. Souls arc distinguished by their potencies,
potencies by their acts, acts by their objects. Ί he final object of
intellect is the real; the real is known through an immanent object pro­
duced by intellect, the true; the true supposes a more elementary
immanent object also produced by the intellect, the definition. This
production is not merely utterance, dicere, but the utterance of intelli­
gence in act, or rationally conscious disregard of the irrelevant, of
critical evaluation of all that is relevant, of intclligere. This intelligere
can be what it is only if there are objects to move it as well as the objects
that it produces: the intelligere that expresses itself in judgment is
moved by the relevant evidence; the intelligere that expresses itself
in definition is moved by illuminated phantasm. But evidence as
relevant and phantasm as illuminated are not mere sensible data;
hence besides the sensitive potencies and the possible intellect there is
needed an agent intellect. Finally, as the contrast between the labor
of study and the ease of subsequent mastery manifests, there are
forms or habits to be developed in the possible intellect—understanding
for the grasp of principles, science for the grasp of implications,
wisdom for right judgment on the validity both of principles and of
conclusions; they come to us through acts of understanding; they
stand to acts of understanding as first act to second ; and like the second
acts, they are produced by agent objects which themselves are in­
struments of agent intellect.
(To be continued'■)
k

‘‘

V

THE INHABITATION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT
A SOLUTION ACCORDING TO DE LA TAILLE

MALACHI J. DONNELLY, S.J.
St. Mary’s College

N the following essay we shall suggest a tentative metaphysical

I solution for the non-exclusively proprium theory of the inhabitation
of the Blessed Trinity in the just soul. This theory asserts that
the soul is united directly and, in a real sense, immediately with each
divine Person according to His proper hypostatic character and in
His distinction from the other divine Persons. Unlike the more
common appropriation theory, the non-exclusively proprium explana­
tion demands that each of the divine Persons be present to, and united
with, the soul by a manner of presence and union that will in some way
be different from the proper manner and presence of the other two
divine Persons.
REGULATIVE NORMS

In Mystici Corporis Pope Pius XII maintains that “well-directed
I and earnest study of this doctrine [that of the Mystical Body and of
the inhabitation] and the clash of diverse opinions and their dis­
cussion, provided love of truth and due submission to the Church be
the arbiter, will soon open rich and bright vistas, whose light will
help to progress in kindred sacred sciences.”1 But, while indeed
encouraging free discussion, the Holy Father points out two conditions
which must be strictly safeguarded: (1) “Every kind of mystic union
by which the faithful would in any way pass beyond the sphere of
creatures and rashly enter the Divine, even to the extent of one single
attribute of the eternal Godhead being predicated of them as their
own” must be avoided; (2) “. . .all these activities are common
to the most Blessed Trinity, in so far as they have God as supreme
efficient cause” (“. . . quatenus eadem Deum ut supremam efficientem
causam respiciant” [italics inserted]).2
While observing these negative norms of the Holy Father, the the­
ologian should endeavor, in his metaphysics of the inhabitation, to
lAAS XXXV (1943), 231 (The English translation is that of The America Press,
n. 94).
* Loc. cii.
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INHABITATION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

447

preserve intact the richness and, as far as that is possible, the literal
seriously, one cannot but admit that he attributes a special role to
meaning of divine revelation as found in Holy Scripture and tradition.
the Holy Spirit.4 Theologians generally, however, interpret this
If, at any time, because of an apparent impossibility of reconciling
special emphasis on the Holy Spirit according to pure appropriation.6
the words of revelation with “firmly established theological prin­
Unlike Mahé and A. Erbss,6 these theologians fail to recognize that,
ciples,'’’ it seems that these words are to be interpreted in a non-literal ■'
between pure appropriation and the exclusively proprium theory of
sense, then surely the theologian should examine whether such an
Petavius, there is a possible middle course in the non-exclusively
irreconcilability be real or only apparent, and, secondly, he should
proprium theory. It is to the credit of Scheeben that he drew the
seriously consider whether the conclusions he draws from such the­
attention of theologians to this possible middle course.
ological principles be indeed genuinely legitimate.
Advocates of the more common appropriation theory maintain
As Galtier well remarks,3 if a philosophic principle, arrived at by
that the manner of presence and union is identically and under every
the natural light of reason, docs not square with supernatural rev­
respect the same for all three divine Persons. This is a necessary
elation, or does so only with difhculty, then it surely is not to be
consequence, so these theologians believe, of the fact that the influence
expected that divine revelation should be bent and twisted to fit
of each Person in sanctification is in every way the same as that of
within the cadre· of a particular philosophic system, if any change
the other two Persons. When, therefore, the work of sanctification
or compromise is to be made, it must be on the side of philosophy; the
is attributed to the Holy Spirit, this is only by pure appropriation.
system of philosophy must be adapted to revelation, or at least it ‘
Since the effecting of sanctification—a work of love—has greater
must be acknowledged that a philosophy based on purely natural
resemblance to the hypostatic character of the Holy Spirit than to
experience and reasoning does not contain all reality within its domain.
that of Father and Son, it is quite proper to appropriate sanctification
For the supernatural is most real; and, surely, it is quite beyond the
to the Holy Spirit. Nevertheless, so we are told by these theologians,
reach of mere philosophy.
the role of the Holy Spirit in our sanctification is under every respect
The explanation of the non-exclusively proprium theory of the in­
identical with the part played by the Father and the Son.
habitation, as presented in the following pages, is not to be considered
The main reasons offered in support of appropriation are the follow­
as more than a tentative solution. Nevertheless, this writer believes
’ ing. Arguing from the words of the Council of Florence: “omniaque
that such a theory better safeguards the absolute inseparability of
[in divinis] sunt unum, ubi non obviat relationis oppositio,” the­
created and uncreated grace, and, at the same time, guarantees the
ologians rightly conclude that “omnia opera ad extra sunt communia
strictly transcendental character of the supernatural in created grace.
toti Trinitati.” This principle is unquestionable; in fact, its definition
If, according to this explanation, a solution to the ordinary objections
was prepared at Vatican.7 From this corollary of Florence the pro­
against this theory is suggested, then, it is hoped, some theologians
,
ponents of appropriation deduce the following argument. Since, they
say, sanctification and the inhabitation are clearly an opus ad extra,
may be tempted to reconsider the personal role of the divine Persons
in our sanctification.
they are in every respect quite common to all three divine Persons.
ARGUMENTS FOR PURE APPROPRIATION

Every theologian must admit that both Scripture and the Fathers
use language that seemingly, at least, ascribes a special personal role
to the Holy Spirit in our sanctification. With regard to St. Cyril
of Alexandria, in particular, J. Mahé maintains that, if one takes Cyril
’ L’HabÙalion en nous des trois personnes (Paris, 1928), 218, n. 3.

4“La sanctification d’après saint Cyrille d’Alexandrie,” Rev. d'hist, ecclés., X (1909),
477.
5 Cf. Galtier, op. cit., passim.
6 Mahé, loc. cit.; Eross, “Die personliche Verbindung mit der Dreifaltigkeit,” Scholastik,
XI (1936), 392 f.
7 Cf. Collectio Lacensis, VII, S. 514b., 540a., et alibi; for instance, we read: “Si quis
creationem aut quamvis aliam operationem ad extra uni personae divinae ita propriam
esse dixerit, ut non sit omnibus communis, una et indivisa; anathema sit” (ibid., 1636d.,
can. 4).

4.

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INHABITATION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

449

Hence, there is not the faintest nuance of difference in the manner
created grace exercises some kind of formal causality in our sanctifica­
of the indwelling or union of the divine Persons. Every kind of per­
tion.
sonal union is flatly rejected. Although it is admitted that the Persons
Nevertheless, the problem is not precisely whether or not uncreated
are indeed present according to their mutual distinctions and hyposta­
( grace really exercises quasi-formal causality in sanctification. Rather,
tic characters, the theologians generally deny that this demands any
the question with which we are concerned is whether the saying,
difference in the mode of presence for each Person. Hypostatic
“omnia opera ad extra sunt communia toti Trinitati,” is true even
character and mode of presence are two distinct things, not to be con­
when there is involved, not efficient, but quasi-formal causality on
fused. Plurality of the one does not demand plurality of the other.3
the part of the indwelling divine Persons. In other words, does this
In support of the above argument, Galtier, among others, proposes
dictum demand that, even in the case of such quasi-formal causality,
the following. Since, he tells us, the divine relations as such get all
< the influence and mode of presence of each divine Person be identically
their reality and perfection from the one common divine essence and
the same as that of the other Persons?
since the divine Persons as such are distinguished from one another
Unless this mode of presence, or (as we prefer) this passive presence
by these same divine relations, consequently, the divine Persons have
of the Persons in the soul, is in some -way different for each divine
all their reality from the one and common divine essence. Because
Person, then all possibility of any kind of proprium union and inof the poverty of the divine Persons (“la pauvreté de leur être par­
t dwelling at once disappears.
ticulier”), no one Person, as such, can confer upon the soul any reality
With regard to the objection based on the so-called pauvreté of the
which is not equally, and in identically the same way, communicated
divine Persons, it is sufficient for our purpose merely to indicate that
to the soul by the other two Persons. And, since the new presence
one may envisage the divine Persons in two different ways. One
follows upon the new effect and since this effect is in every way identi­
can consider them reduplicative, namely, according to their precise
cally the same for, and common to, all three divine Persons, the mode i
relative aspect, that is, according to the formal ratio of their distinc­
of presence will also be one and common in every way to all three
tion, the proprietas distinguens. Or, on the other hand, one may
Persons.9
regard the divine Persons as taken specificative, that is as a subsistens
Finally, many theologians claim that St. Thomas holds pure appro­
divinum distinctum. If only the elementum distinguens is taken into
priation in his teaching on the inhabitation of the Holy Spirit. With­
consideration and not also the subsistens distinctum—that is, if the
out investigating further the teaching of the Angelic Doctor, it is
relations (and divine Persons) are envisaged only in abstracto and not
nonetheless interesting to note that the passages cited by B. Froget,
also in concreto as they actually exist—-then, of course, one may speak
for instance, deal only with efficient causality. And the same holds
of the “pauvreté de leur être particulier.” But, as R. P. Juan B.
true for the conciliar arguments proposed by the same theologian.10
* Manyâ has pointed out in a masterful essay,12 such a procedure would
Such argumentation is, unfortunately for its proponent, quite beside
1
12 “ Metafîsica de la relaciôn ‘In Divinis,’ ” Revista espaiiola de teologîa, V (1945),
the point. For, as all will admit, if there be only question of efficient
277 f. He writes thus; “ El esse ad, pues, si pudiese scr obtenido perfectamenle aislado,
causality in sanctification, there could be no possibility of any kind
no expresaria perfecciôn alguna en ningûn sujeto, ni en su principio ni en su término,
porque prescindirîa de todo sujeto, de todo principio y de todo término. En realidad séria
of proprium theory whatsoever. However, according to P. Galtier,11
un absurdo y, por tanto, la nada.” And, again, “Y nôtese que cuando no se trata de. la
that opinion is today becoming more common which holds that un8 Cf. Galtier, op. cit., p. 122 f.
’ Ibid., p. 32 ff.
10 De l’habitation du. Saint Esprit dans les âmes justes (4e éd. ; Paris, 1900), 452 ff., 469 ff.
11 De SS. Trinitate in se el in nobis (Paris, 1933), n. 413.

relaciôn en abstracto, sino de la relatio in divinis, esse «Zjjo indispensable en cl concepto de
relaciôn se présenta concreto y determinado; Dios, la divina substanda. Por tanto, el
puro esse aa in divinis, el concepto formal de la divina relaciôn que prescindiera adecuadamente de la essencia divina, expresaria un absurdo, expresaria la nada, no expresaria
perfecciôn alguna” (Zoc. cit.).

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be a vivisection of the divine Persons. In fact, if one consider merely
the esse ad in a divine relation, or, for that matter, in any relation,
one would be guilty of indulgence in metaphysical illusions, in pure
imagining. For an esse ad, or a pure saltus, considered as adequately
J
distinct from the thing related, is a pure nothingness and utterly
inconceivable.

A
!

THE ΝΟΝ-EXCLUSIVELY PROPRIUM THEORY

We do not intend to prove that this theory is true. As already
indicated, even the proponents of pure appropriation readily admit
that Scripture and the Fathers speak of a personal indwelling of the )
divine Persons in the just soul, and this with special emphasis on the
*
role of the Holy Spirit.13 Galtier, however, holds that no form of
the proprium theory can be reconciled with solidly’ established the­
ological principles (“avec les conclusions les plus avérées de la thé­ »
ologie trinitaire”).14
On the other hand, there are not a few theologians who maintain ;
that an explanation of the inhabitation according to pure appropriation
would logically lead to a denial of a radical difference between the
ordinary substantial presence of God in all creatures and the special
inhabitation of God in the just soul. In the natural order, creatures
by remote analogy participate in the perfections of the God of creation ‘
and conservation; as a result, they are related to Deus units. Con­
trariwise, in the supernatural order, the grace-filled soul shares in the
inner trinitarian life of God; consequently, such a soul is related to
Deus trinus. And, since all the newness of this presence and relation
is on the side of the creature alone, it is indeed difficult to see how ’·
such an utterly new kind of presence and relation can exist without
some kind of difference being postulated in the mode of presence by
which each divine Person is present to and in the just soul.
J. Beumer maintains that, although in the popular literature on
the subject much is said that is indeed very inspiring and beautiful
1
concerning this immediate presence of the divine Persons, on the other
hand, the technical terminology of the theologians greatly weakens
11 Cf. Galtier, L'Habitalion, p. 3 fl.

« Ibid., p. vii, and pp. 36 fi.

INHABITATION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

451

all this through the insistence on an explanation according to pure
appropriation.15
Since most of those theologians who reject the proprium theory
in all its forms do so on metaphysical grounds, we shall propose a
tentative metaphysical explanation of the non-exdusively proprium
theory of the inhabitation. This explanation, so we believe, d >us
not violate any solidly established principles of trinitarian meta­
physics. And, nevertheless, this explanation will require some kind
of difference in the manner of presence according to which each distinct
divine Person is present to, and united with, the just soul.1,! further­
more, such a solution will demand three distinct relations to the Blessed
Trinity, a relation to, and union with, each divine Person.
SOLUTION THROUGH THE PRINCIPLES OF DE LA TAILLE

St. Peter tells us that through grace we are made true sharers of
the divine nature itself (2 Pet. 1:4). And the fact of the indwelling
of the three divine Persons in the soul is clearly stated in Scripture
and tradition. From grace and the inhabitation of the divine Persons
there arises a most intimate union between God and the just soul.1.
Any metaphysical solution of the inhabitation and the grace-state
must, therefore, show, if possible, how the three divine Persons com­
municate in a finite and participated manner their nature to the just
soul, and this through created grace. At the same time, such a solu­
tion must also explain the union resultant upon the presence of the
indwelling Persons.18
14“Die Einwohnung der drei gottlichen Personen in tier Seele des begnadeten Menschen,” Théologie und Glaube, XXX (1938), 504; ci., P. Giichter, “ Unsere Einheit mit
Christus nach dem hl. Irenaeus,” ZKT, LVIII (1934), 527 ff.
16 Let it be clear from the beginning that the u diiierence” in the manner of presence for
each divine Person will be, according to the theory which we shall suggest, not an absolute
difference, but one that is strictly relative.
17 It is interesting to note that H. du Manoir de Juaye maintains that there is no dis­
tinction allowable between the operation of the divine Persons and tn.rir union with the
just soul (Dogme et spiritualité chez saint Cyrille d'Alexandrie (Paris, 1944’, 241). This at­
titude is explainable, perhaps, by the author’s acknowledged indebtedness to Guider
(ibid.,p. 237, n. 2).
18 With regard to the relationship between, and the relative priority of, created and un­
created grace, the following essays will be found enlightening: J. Martinez Gômez, Relaciôn entre la inhabitaciôn del Espiritu Santo y los dones creados de la justificacion,

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INHABITATION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

The various theories concerning all this are well known : the “sicut f
cognitum in cognoscente et amatum in amante/' as one aspect of St.
Thomas’ own teaching;*
1920
the so-called '‘friendship theory” of Suarez/
the conception of grace as a bond of union between the soul and God.
according to Lessius;21 the dynamic theory of Vasqucz;22 the experi­ •
mental knowledge view of John of St. Thomas;23* and, finally, the
twofold formal causality doctrine of Cornelius à Lapide.21 But in j
all these various explanations we find the same difficulties: how can
a created, physical accident make us truly sharers of the divine nature,
and how can uncreated grace, which surely docs not inform the soul,
truly sanctify? Or, again, how can one sa)' that the three divine
Persons dwell within the soul without there being the slightest differ­
ence in the manner of their presence?
'
These are some of the difficulties that confront one who would seek
a solution of the inhabitation. And—let us at once admit it—the
i;
solution of these difficulties is far from easy.
Nevertheless, in the words of the Vatican Council and of Pope
Pius XII, we may perhaps, by comparing this marvel of the indwelling
of the Blessed Trinity with that other august mystery7 of our faith,
the Incarnation of the Son of God, discover new light that may aid
in arriving at a solution of the problem.2526For, in the Incarnation,
Estudios Ecclesiasticos, XIV (1935), 20-50; K. Rahner, “Zur scholastischen Begrifflichkeit
der ungeschaffenen Gnade,” ZKT, LXIII (1939), 137-56; P. Dumont, “Le caractère
divin de la grâce d’après la théologie scholastique,” Revue des sciences religieuses, XIV
(1934), 62-95.
19 Sum. Theol., I, q. 43, a. 3; In I Sent., d. 14, q. 2, a. 2; cf. Comp. Theol., 44 et 45.
20 De Trinitate, XII, c. V; De Gratia, VII, c. 11.
21 De Summo Bono, II, disp. 1; De Perfectionibus Moribusque Divinis, XII, c. 11 and
Appendix.
22 Comment, ac Disp. in Primam Partem Sancti Thomae, I, q. 8, a. 3, disp. 30, c. 3.
23 Cursus Theologicus, IV, d. 17; cf. Gardeil, A., La structure de l'âme et l'expérience
mystique (Paris, 1927); id., in Revue Thomiste, XXVIII (1923), 3-42, 129-41, 238-60, in
which Gardeil’s doctrine first appeared, later to be incorporated into Vol. 11 of the work
cited above; E. Delaye also follows John of St. Thomas, “La vie tie la grâce,” Nouvelle
revue théologique, LUI (1926), 561-78; “L’Onction du Saint Esprit,” ibid., 641-56; and
“Le Christ mystique,” ibid., 721-33.
21 Commentaria in Scripturam Sacram, especially, In Osee, 1.10; In II Epist. S. Petri,
1:4; and In Epist. Divi Pardi, Rom. 8:15.
26 Cf. Mystici Corporis, AAS, XXXV (1943), 232; Cone. Vaticanum, Sess. Ill, cap. 4
(DB, 1796).
1

453

we have the most perfect union between a creature and God. In
onePerson we have one being who is both God and Man. Two perfect
and complete natures in the Person of the Word; there are not two
subjects or Persons, not one who is God and another who is man;
there is just one Person who is Man while remaining true God. There
is in Jesus Christ the highest possible communication of the divinity
tpa creature; yet the human nature truly retains its creaturely quality.
Hence, the human nature in the God-man, Jesus Christ, is a perfect
human nature; yet it is not the human nature of a mere man. It is
God’s humanity; united in substantial union with the Word of God,
it exists by sharing in His very own being. The humanity of Christ
is impregnated, filled to the full with the very'· being of God, precisely
as this being is proper to the Word.
For De la Taille, this union between the humanity and the Person
of the Word is effected by the actuation of the obediential potency
in the human nature.26 This is not a case of actuation through infor­
mation, but of actuation by an act, a divine act, which actuates, but
does not inform. In order to elevate the humanity to a level where
it bears some proportion for union with the Word, a change of some
kind must take place in the humanity; for, according to St. Thomas,27
nothing can receive a higher form, unless it be raised to this capacity
by some disposition. When two terms unite, change must take place
in one or other of these terms. In the hypostatic union this elevation
of the subjective obediential potency to the level for union with the
Word is called by De la Taille created actuation by uncreated act.
This will not be a disposition that is antecedent to the union;
rather, will it be the grace of union in all its reality, newness, con­
sidered in its very foundation. In the language of De la Taille, this
will be an amelioration, disposition infuse, perfectionnement, adaptation,
etc, by which the humanity, through the actuation of the obediential
potency, is raised to the necessary level of the hypostatic union. At
the same time, it is the union taken passively; for it is but the reception

s* For the teaching of De la Taille on this subject, cf. “Actuation créée par acte incréé,”
Rech, de sc. rei., XVIII (1928), 253-68; “Entretien amical d’Eudoxe et de Palamede,”
Ra>. apol., XLVIII (1929), 5-26, 129-45; also, our own article, “The Theory of R. P.
Maurice de la Taille, S.J., on the Hypostatic Union,” Theological Studies, II (1941),
510-26.
«C. Gentes, IV, 53.

y

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THEOLOGICAL STUDIES

of the actuation into the potency: it is union with the act which
actuates, but does not inform.
'
And it must be noted that this created actuation is not a mode of
union, a sort of trait d’union, which the humanity would touch on one
side and the Person of the Word on the other. This is in accord with
the saying of St. Thomas: “. . . sed quod natura habeat esse in sup­
posito suo non fit mediante aliquo habitu.”28 And in another place ,
St. Thomas stresses the immediacy of the union between the humanity
and the Person of the Word:
. . . . in unione humanae naturae ad divinam nihil potest cadere medium formaliter unionem causans, cui per prius humana natura conjungatur quam divinae
personae: sicut enim inter materiam et formam nihil cadit medium in esse quod
per prius sit in materia quam forma substantialis; alias esse accidentale esset
prius substantiali, quod est impossibile; ita inter naturam et suppositum non
potest aliquid dicto mode medium cadere, cura utraque conjunctio sit ad esse
substantiale (italics inserted).29

uh '
Hl

ii W

The intermediary to be rejected, as De la Taille insists on many
occasions, is any kind of mode which would in any way affect the
humanity antecedently to the union with the Person of the Word.
This does not mean that a modification is not admitted which would
be consequent upon, or better concomitant with, the very union
itself. Such a modification of the humanity would, in reality, be
nothing else than the hypostatic union itself taken qua union in the
passive sense. For the modification of the humanity, considered as
a formal substantial perfecting of this humanity, is that by which the
human nature is elevated to the proper level for union with the Word;
as an actuation of the humanity, this modification is introduced into it
by the Word and refers the human nature to the Word with whom it
is united in substantial union.
Now we come to the precise point which is indeed fundamental
to the solution which we are suggesting. For De la Taille, that which
in the last analysis endows a divine gift with a strictly supernatural
quality is not the causal relation (efficient causality) to God. Rather
it is, in a manner that is either immediate or remote, a relation of
union between created passive potency—nature or faculty—and the
uncreated act.
28 Sum. Theol., Ill, q. 2, a. 10.

" In III Sent., d. 2, q. 2, sol. 1.

INHABITATION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

455

This passive potency will not be an ordinary subjective potency,
one connatural to the creature; rather, will it be, in the strictest sense
of the word, obediential, consisting in the non-repugnance of the
assumption of a human nature to personal union with a divine Person.
But in order that the humanity may be rendered apt for such a union,
a divinely infused disposition is necessary. In the hypostatic union
this will be of the substantial order, while in the beatific vision and in
justifying grace the infused disposition will be in the accidental order.
Such a disposition must not, as we have already indicated, be thought
to exist in the humanity prior to union with the Word. No, this modi­
fication of the human nature is introduced therein by the Word and
is indissolubly dependent upon the divine act for its very existence.
Consequently, in that the infused disposition is in very truth the union
itself (taken passively) with the Word and again, since such a union
is in the strictest sense wholly supernatural, it is clear that the infused
disposition is entirely and absolutely supernatural. Most truly,
then, is it called the grace of union, a grace that is indeed supernatural
in the highest possible degree.
The theological reasoning that led De la Taille to his thesis on the
supernatural seems to be partly, at least, the following. If one holds
that the supernatural is absolutely transcendent to creatures, whether
they be human or angelic, then it seems that only a presence of God
by union or by quasi-formal causality will fulfil the requirement of
the absolutely supernatural. Were God to be present only through
an effect of efficient causality, it would be very difficult to show that
such a presence is radically different from His natural presence in
creatures. If His presence is due only to an effect of His efficiency,
then such a presence would not go beyond the relation of creature to
Creator, of effect to cause. On the other hand, through a presence
effected by the union of the uncreated divine Act with a created
potency, there springs up a relation of the creature to God that is
completely novae speciei, different from every natural relation of men
and angels to God. For in such a case there will be true participation
by the creature in the inner life of the Godhead. Of course, efficiency
is necessary, but the ratio of the efficient cause does not as such enter
formally into such a union qua union.
In the hypostatic union, for example, this created actuation, in so

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THEOLOGICAL STUDIES

Far as it results from divine efficiency, has a relation to the entire
Trinity, as to unum princzpwim indistinctum of the actuation’s very 1
existence.30 Yet, since this created actuation is also the reception
of the actuation into the potency, and is therefore union with the act
which is not received but nevertheless actuates, this created actuation
has a relation to the Person of the Word; and under the ratio of a formal
communication of divine being as proper to the Word, the actuation *
produces in the humanity a relationship terminating at the Word
alone.
The relation of the humanity to the Second Person involves a mu­
tation on the human side of the union, because all the newness of the
union comes from the created clement. Now, as St. Thomas teaches,31
every mutation consists of actio and passio. Since in the hypostatic
union only the human element of the union can change, the whole
reality of the mutation will consist in the passio. This will be the
foundation of the relation of the human nature to the Word.
The human nature assumed by the Word is like a garment worn
by a man. The garment is changed, conformed to the figure of the
man; nevertheless, the man himself undergoes no change. Analo­
gously, the human nature is changed, conformed substantially (not
accidentally, as in the case of the garment—and, as we shall see, in
the case of sanctifying grace) to the Person of the Word. This mutatio,
passio, and, as St. Thomas adds, this tractio of the human nature to
the divine Person is something real in the human nature. It is created
actuation by uncreated act.
To repeat, we have an instance of an act (the Person of the Word
alone) which actuates, yet does not inform, because of the imperfection
involved in information (act-dependence and act-limitation). The
actuation alone is received by way of information. The point to be
stressed in all this is that the Word, precisely as distinct from Father
and Holy Spirit, does communicate something intrinsically to the
humanity, namely, a created participation in the divine being as this
being is properly possessed by the Word. The Word alone gives
the humanity its actuation, considering, of course, this actuation
MSum. Theol., I, q. 36, a. 4, ad 7“; cf. ibid., q. 8, a. 1.
ZiSum. Theol., Ill, q. 2, a. 7.

INHABITATION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

457

under its formal aspect, as flowing from the Word into the humanity
by qùasi-formal causality. Otherwise, there would be no true ratio
sufficiens for the humanity’s being referred to, and united with, the
Person of the Word alone.
Furthermore, since an essentially intrinsic note, such as existence,
is not received at all unless it be received intrinsically, it follows
that, unless the Word alone gives or communicates His own divine
being to His humanity, and that intrinsically, He does not communi­
cate being at all.32 Seemingly, then, one must hold that the Second
Person, in His distinction from Father and Holy Spirit, does communi­
cate a reality intrinsically to the humanity which He assumes. Since
this communication cannot be the result of merely efficient causality,
it must be the result of some kind of. formal causality, namely, quasiformal causality, or created actuation by uncreated act. And pre­
cisely because this communication of divine being, this muta lio,
passio, and tractio of the humanity to the Person of the Word comes
from the Word alone, for this reason it is that the humanity is referred,
drawn to the Word alone and with the Word alone is so intimately
united in a true substantial union.
A SUPPOSITION

Let us suppose that we have a case of three human natures which
are hypostatically united with the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit
respectively.33 Each of these human natures will have within it a
created actuation, a passio, mutatio, by which it is elevated to a level
proportionate to the union. This will be a passive communication
of divine being precisely as this divine being is proper to the divine
Person with whom the particular humanity is hypostatically united.
At the same time, this created actuation will be the union between
the humanity and the divine Person; that is to say, it will be the union
taken passively in its very foundation, which gives rise to the relation
to a particular divine Person. Here we have the crucial point of the
problem we are discussing: is this created actuation, this mutatio,
this passio, and passive communication of divine being exactly and
32 Cf. John of St. Thomas’ commentary, lit Sum. Theol., Ill, disp. 18, n. 20.
33 Sum Theol., Ill, q. 3, a. 5; q. 2, aa. 7, 8, and a. 6, ad 2m.

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under every respect the same for each of the three humanities which
is assumed unto a personal hypostatic union with a particular and .
distinct divine Person?
We hold that these created actuations must in some way be distinct
and differ from one another. For, if these passive communications
or receptions of divine being are the same in each of the assumed
humanities (and that under every possible aspect), how may one
explain how/why humanity A will be united with and referred to the
Father alone? And again, how explain the same with regard to
humanity B and C, namely, that they will be united with and referred
respectively to the Word and Holy Spirit alone? If the created actu­
ation in each humanity is, under every respect, the same, then there
is utterly lacking a truly sufficient reason for each humanity’s being i
united with, and referred to, the Person with whom alone it is united.
We hold the following to be the reason why each humanity is
referred to and united with a different and distinct Person, and to
and with Him alone: namely, the created actuation in each humanity
is not only the result of efficient causality on the part of the entire
Blessed Trinity acting as the one indistinct Principle of the created
effect; but this actuation, or passive communication of divine being, '
is also lota quanta the result of a formal communication of divine
being as this being is proper to the Word (or as the case may be, to
Father and to Holy Spirit) and proper to Him (or to Them) alone.
In other words, each divine Person communicates the same divine
being, but in a relatively different manner, in accordance with His
own personal and hypostatic character and relative difference from
the other two divine Persons. Under this precise aspect, the com­
munication of divine being is not merely an opus ad extra (a work of
purely efficient causality and hence absolutely and under every respect
common to all three divine Persons, sine ulla Personarum distinctione) ;
but, in the very communication of divine being by quasi-formal
causality, or by this created actuation by uncreated act, this com­
munication is also a tractio, a drawing of the creature into the inner
circuit of proper divine trinitarian life. Hence, with E. Mersch,34
one may perhaps say that, under this precise aspect, the uniting of
M Cf. “ Filii in Filio,“Noun. rev. thiol., LXV (1938), 826 f.

INHABITATION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

459

the creature with the divine Person (or Persons) is not strictly an
opus ad extra, but rather ad intra.
Were the created actuation in each of the three assumed humanities
exactly and under every respect identical, seemingly, then, the only
sufficient reason why in a particular humanity the created actuation
would refer this same humanity to a particular and distinct divine
Person with whom it is united, and to Him alone, would be the divine
will. Such a theory (i.e., which would maintain that each created
actuation is in every respect identical for the three assumed humani­
ties) would logically result in a pure extrinsécisme. Were the three
actuations in every respect identical, none of the humanities (which
are referred to and united with a particular divine Person) would
receive anything within themselves which would be a created, sub­
stantial participation of the divine being proper to the Person to whom
alone (precisely in virtue of the supposed hypostatic union) the
particular humanities are related and with whom alone they are
hypostatically united. Therefore, the only reason why any particular
humanity would be united with a definite Person would be some purely
extrinsic reason.
The reasoning leading us to hold that the three actuations would
be in some way different is the following: (1) According to our suppo­
sition, each humanity would be united with a particular divine Person;
(2) the union would be substantial, consisting in a sharing by the
humanity in the being of the divine Person with whom it is united;
(3) hence, to be united with a particular divine Person, in His dis­
tinction from the other Persons, the humanity must receive from Him
a passive communication of divine being as this being is proper to this
particular Person (and which is, therefore, in some way different from
the passive communication of divine being which the other two humani­
ties receive from the two divine Persons with whom they are united).
For union means, surely, an intercommunication of that being which
is proper to the subjects united.
Each communication of divine being is to be considered as qualified,
determined, and colored (if one may thus speak) by the proper hypo­
static character of the particular and distinct divine Person who
actively communicates this divine being. In brief, we hold that the

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reality (a created, finite, and passive communication of divine being) .
which each of the three humanities receives would be, from the absolute .
point of view, exactly the same for each humanity. Nevertheless,
from the relative side and when this communication of divine being
is considered as an essentially unitive substantial modification of the
humanity, there is a real difference in each of the three communications
of divine being. For the one simple reality communicated is, in each
supposed hypostatic union, conferred upon each humanity in a rela- 1
tively different manner determined by the relative distinction and
hypostatic character of each divine Person. Because of its particular
and special origin, each actuation, or passive communication of divine
being, is essentially a unitive entity. However, it is not essentially
unitive, in the sense that it unites the humanity receiving this sub­
stantial modification with any divine Person without distinction.
Nevertheless, the actuation must be said to be unitive in that it is
essentially destined to effect a substantial union between the humanity
and that particular divine Person from which the communication
flows by quasi-formal causality. And because the communication of
divine being is in each case determined by the particular hypostatic
character of the divine Person who confers it upon His humanity,
this clearly provides a foundation for a relation that terminates at one
divine Person and at Him alone.
ANOTHER SUPPOSITION

Let us now imagine that all three divine Persons are hypostatically
united with the very one and same human nature.35 The question
arises: is the passive communication of divine being which each divine
Person confers upon the common humanity in every way identical
with that communicated by the other two divine Persons? And
again, why is it that this particular humanity would be referred to,
and united with, all three divine Persons, whereas in the hypostatic
union there is only one divine Person, the Second Person of the Blessed
Trinity, who enters into union with His sacred humanity?
In this supposed case of three divine Persons united hypostatically
with a single humanity we suggest the following. The created actu­
ation is one physical, simple, undivided, utterly supernatural entity
35 Sum. Theol, III, q. 3, q. 6.

INHABITATION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

461

in the substantial order. It is not an ens quod, but an ens quo, sub­
stantially modifying the humanity and immediately uniting it with
the three divine Persons. It is the union itself (taken passively).
It is communicated by all three Persons by quasi-formal causality,
or by actuating, yet without informing, the humanity. Nevertheless,
although this substantial actuation of the one and same humanity
comes from all three divine Persons, each Person communicates
a substantial participation in divine being precisely as He possesses
it, namely, in a manner which is relatively, yet most really, different
(in accordance with the difference of each Person’s personal and proper
hypostatic character) from the manner in which the other two divine
Persons communicate this substantial actuation, or created and finite
passive participation in trinitarian being.
Hence, this substantial created actuation of the one humanity
would be the formal result of a formal communication of divine being
from three distinct Persons conferring this one divine being in three
relatively distinct and different manners according to the proper
hypostatic character of each divine Person. Accordingly, as a result,
there would spring up from this one created actuation, as from a single
reality, three distinct relations to three distinct Persons. This created
reality in the assumed humanity is both one and threefold : it is abso­
lutely one, considered as a substantial mutation of the humanity;
it is relatively threefold, if considered as a passio (and an essentially
unitive substantial modification) brought into being· in a threefold
I relatively different manner through each Person’s impressing upon,
i.e., communicating to, the humanity the divine being as each divine
Person possesses this being in a proper manner determined by His
hypostatic character.
By the three distinct relations which spring forth, as it were, or
well up, from this one created actuation, the humanity is referred
1 to the three distinct divine Persons, with each of whom the humanity
is substantially united in hypostatic union. And all this, because the
created actuation is in its entirety the formal result of the formal com­
munication of divine being by each divine Person according to His
relative distinction from the other two Persons.
,
To repeat: the reality communicated to the humanity, i.e., the
substantial created actuation, is one and simple as a substantial

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463

hypostatic union, then we have an instance where an opus ad extra
modification of the humanity. Yet, at the same time, this created
actuation is stamped with a threefold relativity. For it has been ’ is not referred indeterminately to the entire Trinity. True it is that,
under the aspect of a new created entity, the grace of union is to be
communicated in its entirety by each divine Person in a relatively
referred to the entire Trinity as to its one efficient cause. But, if
different manner determined by each Person’s relative distinction
one considers this same grace of union as a passive reception of the
and proper hypostatic character. Hence, from the one created
divine being into the humanity, and precisely as this same divine
actuation, as from a miniature divine essence (to use faltering human
language), there springs forth a miniature trinity, so to speak, of three ( being is properly possessed by the Word in a personal manner according
to His particular hypostatic character, then, under this formal aspect,
distinct relations to three distinct divine Persons. And the human
the grace of union is an optes ad extra which is not referable indeter­
nature assumed belongs to all three distinct Persons, so that one could
minately to the entire Trinity. For, under this aspect, the humanity
say in all truth: this Man is the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.
is to be referred to the Word alone, since, thus considered, the grace
There is no pantheism involved here, no removal of the creature
of Union is the very union itself (taken passively) of the humanity
from its creaturcly sphere. For the created actuation is just that,
with the Person of the Word and with Him alone.
namely, created and finite. This created actuation is received into
More and more today theologians are realizing that created grace
a created, finite humanity; and, as such, it is limited to the created
results from the inhabitation, and not vice versa. St. Thomas himself
sphere in which revolves the being of every creature. Nevertheless,
says: “.. . . ipsae personae divinae quadam sui sigillatione in animabus
as Scheeben has indicated often,36 this created actuation, this mutatio
nostris relinquunt quaedam dona . . . .”37 Namely, the conferring
and passio, this passive communication of divine being, and this
of created grace takes place by the impression on the soul of the divine
passive union has its roots, not in the creature, but in God Himself,
seal of the Persons of the Blessed Trinity. Thus created grace be­
and not in Deus unus, but in Deus trinus qua trinus.
comes, so to speak, the concave impression of the convex divine seal.
APPLICATION TO THE INHABITATION
Hence, the just soul, in the words of St. Thomas, possesses God
Most theologians, as we have seen, hold that the mode of the inhab­
“per quemdam modum passionis.”38
itation is perfectly and in every way identical for each divine Person.
Going back over one of our suppositions, we may say again that,
The new presence and the hypostatic characters of the divine Persons,
if three divine Persons, instead of the Second Person alone, were to
so we are told, must be kept rigorously apart as two things quite
assume a humanity unto Themselves, this same humanity would be
distinct from one another. And, above all, the firmly established
united with, and referred to, all three distinct Persons. The foundation
principle, “omnia opera ad extra sunt communia toti Trinitati,”
of the union would be one, simple, and undivided created actuation,
and the pauvreté of the divine Persons demand that the inhabitation
one communication of divine being in the substantial order. And
be explained according to the laws of pure appropriation.
this would be a communication of divine being precisely as this being
In the first place, it seems tenable that the dictum, “omnia opera
is proper to each divine Person. Hence, each Person would communi­
ad extra, etc.,” is valid only with regard to works of efficient causality.
cate the divine being in a manner that would be determined by His
For only in divine efficiency can one show that the inner trinitarian
own proper hypostatic character and difference from the other two
relations do not enter. But, if in the effect the creature enter into
Persons. As a result, from this substantial actuation of the humanity
relation with a divine Person as such, as is surely the case in the
and grace of substantial union, there would well up and spring forth
three distinct relations, one to each distinct divine Person. Such
36 Cf. Die Herrlichkeiten der goUlichen Gnade, II, c. 9, pp. 196, 200 f., 206 f.; Nalur und
f
would be the case, because the actuation is received lota quanta and
Gnade, p. 205 ff.; Die Mysierien des Christentums, n. 28, p. 149 ff.; Dogmalik, III, n. 841;
Der Kaiholik, LXIII (1883, I), 151 f.

w In I Sent., d. 14, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2“.

38 Ibid., d. 18, q. 1, a. 5, ad ullimum.

*

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“per quemdam modum passionis substantialis” from each divine divine Person will communicate “quadam sui sigillatione” an acci­
Person who, through an exercise of quasi-fonnal causality, would ’ dental share of the divine being and nature to the human soul.
communicate the divine being to the humanity assumed. And. Through its obediential potency the soul is laid open to the divine
since wherever there is passio there also is found a relation springing threefold act which will actuate the soul without informing it. And
up to the one causing this passio, we have here, consequently, three thus, via the potency, there will flow into the soul “per quemdam
distinct relations, one to each divine Person who is suo modo the self- modum passionis,” a stream of that divine being which, though utterly
sufficient and complete quasi-formal cause of this substantially deified , one and undivided, is nonetheless distinguished, so to speak, by the
threefold, relative channels through which it courses lovingly, a surging
humanity.
In the inhabitation of the Blessed Trinity and in the union with the flood of divine life, the life of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, pulsating,
as it were, in infinite urge for gracious self-communication.
divine Persons through created grace we have a condition which,
Therefore, since each Person communicates tola quanta this finite
though quite different from, is nevertheless analogous to, the supposed
case of a single humanity’s being assumed to substantial union with , sharing in trinitarian life, there will be in the soul a passive communicaall three divine Persons. In the first place, as all will agree, in the ' tion of this life, a created actuation, a passio corresponding to the
active communication of the particular divine Person. This passio
inhabitation through grace there is much more than a merely externa!
will relate the soul to and unite it with a particular divine Person,
juxtaposition of the divine Persons and the human soul. The union
not because this definite Person communicates to the soul an absolute
is not a merely moral union, i.e., one based only on external relation­
reality which is not conferred upon the soul equally by the other two
ships or upon a special activity of God in the soul. No, here there
is a real entering of the divine Persons into, and a real ontological < divine Persons. But this passio will truly unite the soul with, and
refer it to, a distinct Person because each Person communicates the
union of these same Persons with, the grace-filled soul. This presence
one reality in a relatively different manner. This relatively different
of the divine Persons in the just soul is entirely new in kind, novae
manner of communicating the very same created participation in
speciei, from the ordinary substantial presence of God in all creatures.
Yet the divine Persons cannot be within the soul by way of information; ■ trinitarian life suffices for saying that the soul is united with, and related
to,, the divine Persons in their mutual distinctions.
nevertheless, in the soul They definitely are. And, if They are in the
Under this aspect, created grace, as an accidental communication
soul, the soul surely receives Them intrinsically within its very bosom.
But this can only be creato modo, according to the finite capacity of · of divine life and being (communicated by each divine Person modo
relative diverso), appears as a current, or flame, or light-flood of divine
the soul. In other words, the soul will receive the divine Persons,
being, flowing from the one Godhead, but distinguished relatively
in that They actuate the soul without informing it. The soul receives
by its passage through the three divine and distinct Persons. The
the Blessed Trinity as the divine threefold act which actuates the soul
reality communicated by each Person is, absolutely speaking, the
without informing it. Keeping well in mind, therefore, what we
same: the one, indivisible, finite, accidental, created communication
have said in the above paragraphs about created actuation, we offer
the following suggestions, which perhaps may cast additional light upon ' of their common divine trinitarian life. Nevertheless, each Person
communicates this one reality wholly and entirely, and that as a Person
the problem of the “how” in the inhabitation of the divine Persons
distinct from the other two divine Persons.
in the just soul.
Created grace, therefore, may be considered as the passive recep­
In the grace-state, since we have to do with an already existing
tion,
in an accidental, finite, and created manner, of proper trinitarian
human person, there will be only an accidental communication of
divine trinitarian life, a communication of the divine nature and being , life. Its roots are not in the human soul, but rather in the divine
nature itself, yet in this divine nature as properly possessed by the
as it is properly possessed by each of the three divine Persons. Each

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THEOLOGICAL STUDIES

three distinct Persons, each of whom communicates the divine life in
a relatively different manner determined by His proper hypostatic *
character. And just as the three divine Persons have the same divine
life and nature through identity with their very Persons, so analo­
gously and finito et creato modo the human soul will have by accidental
and finite participation the same divine life, and this divine life pre­
cisely as it is communicated in a relative different and proper manner ,
by each distinct Person.
Moreover, just as the three divine Persons can be three only because
each Person is this one Being, and just as the relations by which these
three divine Persons are distinguished well up and spring forth, so
to speak, with natural necessity from the una quaedam summa res
which is both One and Three, so, analogously, from the one and indi­
visible, created and finite communication of divine life to the soul
will there arise three relations, one to each divine Person who, by
quasi-formal causality, communicates the divine life to the soul.
Created grace thus takes on the aspect of a finite, miniature, and
(if such language be not too venturesome) facsimile-imitated trinity. »
Father and Son will breathe forth the Holy Spirit into the soul. And
the same Holy Spirit, “per quemdam modum passionis,” which results
from “quadam sigillatione sui” in the just soul, will be received therein
finito modo, as the created nature of the soul demands. But, it is s
not the Holy Spirit alone that the soul receives. The Father Himself
will give to the soul His only begotten Son and a true share in the
divine life and being precisely as possessed by His Son, a real share
in that filiation of His only Son, of that filiation upon which our own
adoptive filiation is modelled. Finally, the Father Himself, as prin­
ciple and source of all intra- and extra-trinitarian life and being,
will come to the soul and give Himself to it, in St. Thomas’ words,
as the “ultimum principium ad quod recurrimus.”39
Hence created grace will be the passive reception of the divine
Persons within the soul. Moreover, it will be the union itself (taken
passively) with the same divine Persons. And finally, it will be the
inhabitation itself (in the passive, created, and finite sense) of these
very same Persons within the just soul. For the only way in which
these divine Persons can be received within the soul is in a created
39 Ibid., d. 14, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2“; d. 15, q. 3, a. 1, sol.

INHABITATION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

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manner, according to the finite capacity of the soul itself. Truly,
in this light, created grace will be a rich sharing in God’s own nature,
not in the nature precisely of the God of creation and conservation,
oi Deus unus, but rather in the intimate trinitarian life of the triune
God, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, whom Jesus Christ has revealed
to men.
CONCLUSION

In this theory there is no question of an exclusively proper union
with the Holy Spirit. At the most, there is merely question of the
order of the Persons in the indwelling. As Scheeben so boldly yet
reverently explains, the union between the soul and the divine Persons
is like unto a matrimonium ratum et consummatum between two human
persons. In the supernatural union with the divine Persons, there
will be an insertion of the semen spirituale divinum into the human
soul. The Holy Spirit stands forth as the “first” to enter into the
temple; but He only enters therein because Father and Son breathe
Him forth into the soul as their semen spirituale divinum. They,
too, are united immediately with the human soul, though the union
be in and through the Holy Spirit. Just as the Holy Spirit is immedi­
ately “united” with the divine essence (through identity with His
Person), even though the Holy Spirit receives the divine essence
through His procession from Father and Son, so, in analogous fashion
the soul is immediately united with Father and Son, even though
this union takes place through and in the Holy Spirit whom Father
and Son breathe forth into the soul.
Summing up, therefore, we say that grace is one, simple, created,
accidental absolute reality, if taken as a mere modification of the human
soul. However, taken as a bond of union (and, in very fact, as the
union itself, considered passively), created grace is essentially relative
in a threefold way. For, under this aspect, it is but the passive com­
munication in a threefold relatively different manner of divine trini­
tarian life as properly possessed by each Person. From this one
reality of grace (which each Person communicates in its fulness)
there spring up three relations terminating at each divine Person with
whom the soul is intimately and immediately united, though it be
true that the order of the union observes the inverted order of the

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divine processions. All this, to be sure, is in the accidental order.
Viewed thus, created grace will be the passive union of the soul with
the divine Persons. And again, created grace will be the inhabitation
of the three divine Persons, taking inhabitation in the passive sense,
as tirât which is received (by way of information) into the soul. This
can only be the created actuation itself, hence, created grace.
In this rough sketch of the “how” of the non-exclusively proprium
theory of the inhabitation we believe that a better understanding of
the relation of created and uncreated grace may perhaps be found.
Furthermore, in our opinion, this explanation better safeguards the
absolutely supernatural character of created grace, rooting it in­
extricably in the ver}7 nature of God Himself. Also, in the light of
this explanation, certain assertions of St. Thomas become, we believe,
more intelligible.
We shall indicate but a few statements of St. Thomas which concern
this subject. Among several which might be cited, there is one state­
ment which, seemingly, is contrary to our explanation. St. Thomas
says clearly that it is una fruitione that we enjoy the divine Persons;40
for, surely, Their divine life is but one life, Their goodness but one
bonitas divina. It should be carefully noted that, in our explanation,
although the soul does indeed have distinct relations to each divine
Person, nevertheless the reality which each Person communicates
to the soul is but one sole reality, one bonitas divina participata. How­
ever, we hold that each Person bestows this one divine goodness in
a relatively different manner (conditioned by His hypostatic difference
and relative distinction). The reality conferred is one created grace,
hence una fruitio, although communicated to the soul in a threefold
relatively different manner by each Person.
St. Thomas’ contention, that created grace takes its origin from,
and is modelled after, the divine relations themselves,41 is, we believe,
more easily understood in the light of our explanation. The same
holds true with regard to his affirming that the missions of the Son
and Holy Spirit are distinct both according to their eternal processions
and according to the effect in the creature, and this secundum rem.i2
Again, his numerous references to the Holy Spirit’s being the nexus
40 Ibid., d. 1, q. 2, a. 2, sol.

« Ibid., d. 15, q. 4, a. 1, sol.

42 Ibid., a. 2, sol.

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conjoining the soul and God become more intelligible when viewed
in the light of the solution we have proposed.43
At the risk of straying from the proper subject of this paper, we
should like to draw attention to an important passage concerning
the role of the Holy Spirit. In commenting on the words of Our Lord
at the Last Supper, “ut sint unum in nobis, sicut et nos unum sumus”
(John 17:22), St. Thomas teaches the following.44 The Father and
Son, we are told,45 can be considered insofar as they are one in essence,
or insofar as they are distinct Persons. Under the first consideration,
the unity of Father and Son will be founded in their community of
essence. As distinct Persons, however, they will be united through
a unity of love and harmony (“per consonantiam amoris”) had through
the Holy Spirit.
There is not here (in the passage from St. John), St. Thomas holds,
question of essential unity only, because we are not united to God
in that way (“quia illo modo Deo non unimur”), but there is rather
question of unity of love, which is the Holy Spirit. In other words,
our union with God through created grace is not with the divine
Persons precisely as They are one in essence, but rather as They are
one in the love and harmony of the Holy Spirit. Only according to
the unity of essence does the distinction of Persons disappear; for the
divine essence is the one and only common element which the divine
Persons have. But, in that They are one through unity of love and
harmony in the Holy Spirit, They are united among Themselves as
distinct Persons. And, St. Thomas teaches, that is the way in which
. we are united with Them, namely, as distinct Persons. We believe
that insistence on some kind of distinction (namely, a relative dis­
tinction, as explained above) in the union (taken passively), insofar
as this union is a reality in the soul, renders more understandable a
union with distinct Persons.
Finally, in our explanation, we also can speak of appropriation

ts

it

43 Cf. Ibid., d. 10, q. 1, a. 3, sol.: “. . . ex ipsa processione Spiritus Sanctus habet quod
procedat ut persona, sed ex modo processionis habet quod sit vinculum, vel unio amantis
et amati”; and again, d. 31, q. 3, a. 1, sol.: “Ita etiam nexus convenit Spiritui Sancto ex
modo suae processionis, in quantum est amor Patris et Filii, quo uniuntur; et etiam est
connectons nos Deo, in quantum est donum.”
44 Ibid., d. 32, q. 1, a. 3.
45 Ibid., d. 10, q. 1, a. 3, sol.

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THEOLOGICAL STUDIES

regarding the role of the Holy Spirit. However, this use of appropria­
tion will be quite different from that employed when, for example, ’
we appropriate the act of creation to the Father. For in creation
there is involved no distinction of Persons whatsoever. On the con­
trary, this is, we believe, not true in the process of sanctification.
Furthermore, we too can say that the inhabitation is common to all
three divine Persons, since all three Persons dwell within the soul ,
and since each Person is the true quasi-formal cause of the entire
reality of created grace. And, since the conferring of Themselves
upon the soul is indeed a work of love, this may be “appropriated”
to the Spirit of divine love. Nevertheless, this kind of appropriation
will always involve and presuppose a true proprium.
Our explanation, as suggested in the above paragraphs, is purely
tentative and has been proposed in the hope that it may perhaps
provoke further thought upon this most engaging subject of the in­
habitation. Perhaps, in the future, it may be possible to consider
in detail St. Thomas’ own teaching on the relation between created
and uncreated grace, and at the same time discuss more fully the ,
objections raised against the non-exclusively proprium theory of the
inhabitation of the Most Blessed Trinity in the souls of just men.

CURRENT THEOLOGY
ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOGMA AND
THE SUPERNATURAL
The quantity and quality of theological literature which has poured from
the pens of European, and especially French, theologians during the war and
post-war years have been almost incredible. This mass of writing is witness
to a profound realization that the present world-wide sickness of men’s
hearts and minds is the inevitable result of an interior spiritual torpor,
deriving from a cultivated and all-pervasive ignorance of God and religion.
It is likewise witness to a vital awareness that the multiple obstacles to the
true happiness of men cannot be shattered by physical prowess, economic
resources, social planning, or any other purely human means, but only by a
complete change of heart, initiated by the loving impulsions of grace and
directed by a living theology serving the needs of our peculiar age.
Because of the lofty and apostolic motives of these writers and their
recognized theological stature, and because the problems they are con­
fronting are similar to ours, it is almost essential that American Catholic
leaders, and especially theologians, follow closely the major trends and
controversies of European theological thought. The times, however, are
too serious, the need of an immediate alleviation of the misery of spiritual
desolation and barrenness too overwhelming, for biased criticism, whether
based on false loyalties to theological schools, inadequate knowledge, or
superficial judgments.1 On the other hand, critical evaluation on the part
of professional theologians is absolutely necessary for any true progress.
The present article, though for the most part a summary, will make some
critical comments, with the sole intention that the momentousness of the
problems discussed and the serious consequences of varying solutions may
be brought into focus as a basis for further discussion by American theo­
logians.
I.
In an article entitled, “Present Orientations of Religious Thought,”2
Père J. Daniélou, S.J., after stressing the eagerness of modern minds for a
1 The present writer confesses candidly that he may justly be charged with similar
defects in his review of Matthias Scheeben, The Mysteries of Christianity, Theological
Studies, VIII (1947), 136-40. He wishes to reject any overt statement or impli­
cation that the Surnaturel of P. Henri de Lubac is in any way to be connected with
modem false philosophies or that it is disparaging to Saint Thomas.
* J. Daniélou, S. J., “Les orientations présentes de la pensée religieuse,” Études, CCXLIX
(1946), 5-21.
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