' l * » k THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Vol. LXXIV THE PHILOSOPHY OF MODERN REVOLUTION by Reverend James Joseph Maguire, C.S.P., MA. A DISSERTATION I Submitted to the Faculty oj the School of Philosophy of the Catholic University of America in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy ■ ■ I * I Λ. THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA PRESS WASHINGTON, D. C. . , 1 943 · i Î h ', J·; imprimi tfottft: Henry I. Stark, C.S.P. Superior General, Milfil ©bstat: Fulton J. Sheen, Censor Deputatus. imprimatur: iji Michael J. Curley, D.D., Archbishop of Baltimore and Washington. July 24, 1943. COPYRIGHT, 1943 THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA PRESS ooum Printed by The Padlist Pm» New York, N. Y· TO MY MOTHER TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE vii PREFACE ....................................................................................... PART I EXPOSITION CHAPTER I THE NATURE OF MODERN REVOLUTION................... 1 Revolution in Anarchism .................................................... 4 Revolution in Classical Marxism ................................... 10 Revolution in Leninist Marxism..................................... 12 Revolution in French Revolutionary Syndicalism. . . 14 Revolution in Fascism ......................................................... 17 Revolution in Nazism .......................................................... 20 Conclusions 23 .................................................. CHAPTER II IRRATIONALITY AS MANIFESTED IN THE CONCEPT OF NECESSARY PROGRESS ................................ Introduction — Revolutionary Irrationality eral in Gen­ ....................................................................................... The Concept of Necessary Progress.................................. v 26 26 30 Contents vi CHAPTER III IRRATIONALITY AS MANIFESTED IN THE CONCEPT OF A LATENT CREATIVE POWER ................... 44 CHAPTER IV IRRATIONALITY AS MANIFESTED IN THE CONCEPT OF THE CREATIVE VALUE OF ACTION........ 55 Conclusions About Revolutionary Irrationality......... 73 CHAPTER V IMMANENTISM .......................................................................... 76 Militant Atheism.................................................................... 77 Religion ............................................ 82 New Pseudo-Religions ........................................................... 88 Reinterpretation of Conclusions—The Relation Between Irrationality, Immanentism and the Revolutionary Ideal......... 99 PART II EVALUATION CHAPTER VI THE SPIRIT OF REVOLUTION............................................ 107 .<■ ' ί,'ί' Contents vii CHAPTER VII DOCTRINELESS DYNAMISM........ ....................................... Π9 CHAPTER VIII THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF HUMAN REA­ SON .......................................................................................... 127 CHAPTER IX HUMAN FREEDOM AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT.... 134 CHAPTER X THE SUPRA-TEMPORAL DESTINY OF MAN................. 146 CHAPTER XI THE PHILOSOPHIC ROOTS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY DOCTRINES ................................................................. 157 CONCLUSION ............................................................................. 168 BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................... 171 ALPHABETICAL INDEX ........................................................ 185 PREFACE The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the philosophy of revolution as it is embodied in the more significant modern revolu­ tionary movements, and to evaluate this philosophy in the light of Thomistic principles. In this day and age it is hardly necessary to present a lengthy apologia for a study of revolution. Though it savors of the bromidic, it is none the less true that ours is an age of revolution; or at any rate, it is true that we of today are acutely “revolution-conscious.” This is obvious from the very flood of dire predictions, of critical self­ appraisals and of theories of collapse that deluge our book marts. Though it be granted that a good deal of this is sheer hysteria, it must still be admitted that much of the fear is justified, and much of the criticism is valid. The very march of political events itself forces us to the realization that we are living through a period of crisis and transition. The present war is one such symptom, but even before its outbreak it was apparent that the seeds of unrest were germinat­ ing in our culture. It is over twenty-five years since Bolshevism came to power in Russia; and since then its disruptive influence has come to be felt in every corner of the civilized world. In that quar­ ter of a century we have witnessed also the emergence of Fascism and Nazism. We have been disquieted not merely by the realization of their military menace, but also by the realization that similar forces might well come into being elsewhere. In this connection the universal spectacle of economic disorder and depression has hardly been reassuring. Obviously no thinking man can evade the responsibility of exam­ ining the character of these Behemoths which have arisen out of the social deep. But how is such an analysis to be conducted? One way is by an examination of the political and economic panaceas proffered by modern revolutionary movements and by a parallel appraisal of our own social structure and ideals. Need we observe that this type of analysis has been widely undertaken? We are in the possession of a huge literature on all the various phases of such an analysis; some of it, at least, is of abiding and definitive value. ix X Foreword That such an analysis is both invaluable and indispensable is not to be denied. But what is debatable is whether or not such an ap­ proach leads to an adequate understanding of the true character and essential temper of these movements. Such an understanding demands a clear conception, not merely of the formally expressed propositions of the current economic and political platforms of the various revolutionary movements, but also a clear conception of the possibilities of development latent in the inner dynamic of each movement. In the lack of such a true understanding there is a real danger. Fastening upon surface divergencies in political and eco­ nomic panaceas, one may be led to commit oneself to positions whose tragic falsity is revealed only by the march of events. Such was the plight of our contemporary leftist intelligentsia; they were redeemed from it only by the occurrence of the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939. It is impossible today to escape the query suggested by the fol­ lowing statement of Souvarine. The old vocabulary is ill-adapted to express new historical phenomena. The new terms, Bolshevism and Fascism, in them­ selves empty of political meaning, were necessary to describe hitherto unknown social movements and their empirical ideology. In the final analysis, these movements show so many similarities, and are open to so many mutual plagiarisms, they borrow and exchange so many things from one another, that the same word “totalitarian,” another addition to the modern vocabulary, be­ comes them both perfectly. Mussolini began by imitating Lenin; Hitler continued by imitating Mussolini and Stalin; the latter in turn copies his two rivals, especially in their worst features. At long intervals the three dictators, with Stalin as leader, follow one another in the way in which they educate and discipline their subjects by bringing them into line, throwing them into prison and putting them to death. It is hardly possible that so many analogies between Bolshevism and Fascism in word and deed, in means and methods, in institutions and types of men, do not re­ flect some historical relationship, unless one admits the possi­ bility of a complete divorce between the essence and the form.1 To this suggestion Rauschning returns a negative answer. 1 Boris Souvarine, “Stalin, A Critical Survey of Bolshevism,” N. Y., Alli­ ance Book Corp., 1939, p. 673. Foreword xi It might be tempting to demonstrate a close relationship be­ tween Fascism, Bolshevism and National Socialism, to describe each of them as special type of the dynamic movement, the doc­ trineless movement, and to find distinctions between them only in the degrees and shades of their revolutionary impulse, or in the historical occasion of their initial phase. . . . This assertion is justified insofar as Stalinism is nothing more than the jettison­ ing of the Communist doctrine of the Russian Revolution and its development into something else." Borkenau answers in the affirmative. We have now finished our description of the totalitarian revo­ lution. We have attempted to demonstrate how in different ways, it is fundamentally always the same. We have tried to trace its roots in the structure of our modern industrial society. We have attempted to prove that a totalitarian regime is essentially an inevitable outcome of the laws which govern the development of our modern society. The totalitarian revolution is in fact, as we j have said, the Socialist revolution which Marx has foretold; 1 though the agent of this revolution has not been the proletariat. . . . Ideals are always disappointing after they have been ful­ filled. Yet it is futile to deny that what has come into being, is in fact, in the main outline what Marx predicted.234 It will of course, be obvious that we intend to lend no unquali­ fied approval to any of these statements, but they do give some indi­ cation of the nature of the problem undertaken in this study. We shall attempt to analyze what we have called the inner dynamic or essential temper of these movements. In doing this we shall not take as our point of departure the similarity in the ultimate polit­ ical fruits of these three creeds, nor shall we restrict ourselves to the three movements already mentioned. Indeed we could not do so, if for no other reason than that Russian Communism traces its origin to Marx, Mussolini appeals to Sorel and to the Syndicalism Sorel professed, and this in turn stems from nineteenth century Anarchism? 2 Hermann Rauschning, “The Revolution of Nihilism,” N. ¥., Alliance Book Corp., 1939, p. 57. 3 F. Borkenau, “The Totalitarian Enemy,” London, Faber & Faber (pref­ ace dated 1939), p. 239. 4 Cf. Ch. I, passim. xii Foreword In fact the characteristic features of the modern revolution are al­ ready apparent in nineteenth century movements. (This is a point which shall be discussed in greater detail in the body of the disser­ tation.) In analyzing these movements we shall take as our starting point, the character of the appeal they make, and the nature of the hope held forth as an inducement. It is as revolutionary movements that we propose to study them. Our aim is no mere comparison of the various political and economic panaceas. Our methodology is in many ways analogous to that of Mannheim’s “sociology of knowl­ edge.” Like Mannheim, we are attempting “to comprehend the theoΐ ries and their mutations in close relation to the collective groups and typical total situations out of which they arose, and whose expo' nents they Are.” 5* We shall therefore, examine the ideologies which serve to rally these movements, we shall inquire into the nature and scope of the complaints they express and we shall scrutinize their various concepts of the factors and forces involved in the process of social transformation. That each movement is in some sense the product of a particular historical situation and that each has adopted its own type of philo­ sophical formulation is beyond cavail. Yet in speaking, as we have, of a philosophy of modem revolution, it will be obvious that, with Mannheim, we hope to discover for this “specific social situation” (i. e., modern revolution) “certain modes of thinking and possibili­ ties of orientation.” 8 The possibility of achieving such a result can, of course, be demonstrated only by the actual investigation. Nevertheless we may say (anticipating our conclusions) that in the ideologies of the various movements, we do find embodied certain philosophic principles, certain basic specifications which are inde­ pendent of the changing forms of the ideologies, in the sense that they reappear dressed out in very varying philosophic guises and 5 Karl Mannheim, “Ideology and Utopia” (An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge), N. V., Harcourt, Brace, 1940 (2nd imp.), p. 156. e Ibid., p. 157. However, it must be kept in mind that while Mannheim’s aim is to construct “a psychology which would be socially and historical!}' relevant” (K. Mannheim, “Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction,” N. ¥., Harcourt, Brace, 1940, p. 15), ours is to ascertain the philosophic prin­ ciples embodied in such modes of thinking. Foreword xiii terminologies. It is in the body of such basic principles that we find the essential philosophy of modern revolution. In the second section we shall attempt to evaluate and criticize this revolutionary philosophy in the light of the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. This latter section is however, more than a mere critique, in the negative sense of the word. In that criticism we shall attempt to indicate some of the fundamental inter-relationships of the various movements and to draw out the practical implications of the revolutionary principles. All of this is possible only when we are able to view the revolutionary philosophy from the vantage point of an adequate metaphysic and an adequate concept of the nature and destiny of man. To Monsignor Fulton J. Sheen, under whose direction this disser­ tation was written, the author owes a great debt of gratitude, not only for constant aid and encouragement, but for many personal kind­ nesses as well. He is indebted also to the Rev. Dr. Ignatius Smith, O.P., and to the Rev. Dr. Charles Hart for their reading of the manu­ script and for helpful criticisms. He is deeply grateful to the Paulist Community for the opportunity to engage in graduate study and he wishes to thank all the members of the community of St. Paul’s Col­ lege, Brookland, D. C., who have been so generous with their aid and so unflagging in their interest. He is especially appreciative of the invaluable assistance rendered by his brother, Gerard E. Maguire, C.S.P. i ϊ. _____ JL· Part I Exposition CHAPTER I. THE NATURE OF MODERN REVOLUTION There are few words in our modern lexicon that are used more frequently, and defined less precisely than the word “revolution.” Modern developments have not simplified the task of definition, but in no case however, was it an easy one. Such phrases as e. g. “Indus­ trial Revolution” or “revolution in science” have, of course, been generally regarded as more or less extended uses of the term. Yet the difficulty remains even after such usages have been prescinded from. Typical of what might be called the classical concept of revo­ lution, is its description as “the intervention of force in place of law.” 1 As such it connoted the idea of barricades and street-fighting. In line with this notion it might seem satisfactory to define revolution as the violent or extra-legal transfer of political power. Yet two objec­ tions can be raised against such a definition. The fact is that neither the violence nor the change of governing personnel is indispensable to the notion of revolution. If there has been a radical change in the form of government, or even in the ex­ tent of the State’s power, we also speak of a revolution, even though the change was effected through seemingly legal channels. Revolution may be defined as a radical or organic change in the constitution of government, accomplished either peacefully or violently. Or it may be defined to be the successful resistance to established authority, by which a new form of authority is established and instituted.1 2 We need only think of Hitler’s accession to power, which in the last analysis was achieved through more or less parliamentary methods. 1 “La révolution, c’est l’intervention de la force en dehors de la loi.” Ch. Remusat, article, “Révolution” dans le “Dictionnaire des Sciences Politiques,” from M. Ralea, “L’Idée de Révolution dans les Doctrines Socialistes,” Paris, Rivière, 1923, p. 6. 2 Joseph Clark, “The History and Theory of Revolutions,” reprint from the Princeton Review for April, 1862, p. 5. 1 U I i ‘ 2 The Philosophy of Modern Revolution The second, and more serious objection is that such a definition fails to express the complete scope of the modern revolution. Today we are no longer able to think of revolution in terms of ‘ purely politi­ cal” transfer of power. Although a fundamental change in the political organization of a nation has been accepted for many generations as a satisfactory definition, it is quite obvious that in our day it has come to mean more than that. Since the Bolshevists have come to power in Russia we have been forced to think of revolution as a fundamental change not only in the political but also in the economic organization of society.3 Thus a recasting of the social order is, at least in modern times, a far more important characteristic of revolutions, than a change of the political constitution or the use of violence in the attain­ ment of the end. This aspect of revolution distinguishes it also from the coup d’etat, rebellion and insurrection with which it is sometimes confused.4 Today the “social revolution” is generally accepted as the revolution par excellence. The distinction between the “purely political” and the “social” revolution is not, however a recent one. It was already formulated in the first decades of the nineteenth century. The political revolution only effects a transfer of power from the hands of one group to those of another through violent means; the social revolution attacks the very structure of society.5 Proudhon utilized this distinction to differentiate the desired Anar­ chist social revolution from the periodic governmental changes that France underwent in the first part of the nineteenth century. We can perhaps, best delineate the modern concept of revolution by citing Burnham’s description of the three chief constituents of the social revolution. 3 Robert Hunter, “Revolution, Why? How? When?”, Harper and Brothers, N. Y1940, p. 8. 4 A. Meusel, article, “Revolution and Counter-Revolution,” in the Ency­ clopedia of Social Sciences, Vol. 13, p. 367. 5 “La révolution politique ne fait qu’operer un transfert de pouvoir des mains d’un groupe dans celles d’un autre par des moyens violents; la révolu­ tion social s’attaque a la structure même de la société." Ralea, op. cil., p. 16. The Nature of Modern Revolution 3 1. There takes place a drastic change in the most important social (economic and political) institutions. The system of prop­ erty relations, the forms under which economic production is carried on, the legal structure, the type of political organization and regime are all so sharply altered that we feel compelled to call them different in kind not merely modified in degree . . . 2. Along with the changes in social institutions there go more or less parallel changes in cultural institutions and in the domi­ nant beliefs which men hold about man’s place in the world and the universe . . . 3. Finally we observe a change in the group of men which holds the top positions, which controls the greater part of power and prestige in society ... 6 It will be obvious that this is not intended as a general or uni­ versally valid description of revolution. Nevertheless we do believe that it does represent what the man of today regards as a revolution. When we of today think of revolution, we think of it in terms of Communism, Fascism, or Nazism; and this is what revolution means according to these three movements. This is the phenomenon which we have called modern revolution. . We shall analyze it by studying the more significant of the “revolu­ tionary” movements in which it is embodied. In this category we must include not only Communism, Fascism and Nazism, but also certain nineteenth century movements. Though the modern revolu­ tion first became an accomplished fact in the twentieth century, it is obvious that the concept of modern revolution was already formulated by Marx and the early Anarchists. We shall then, consider Anarch­ ism, its three chief exponents, Proudhon, Bakunin and Kropotkin; the classical Marxism of Marx and Engels and Leninist Marxism, French Revolutionary Syndicalism, particularly as expressed by Sorel, and Italian Fascism and Nazism. That the revolution envisioned by these movements is social as well as political is obvious even to the casual observer. Whatever may have been the circumstances under which each developed, or whatever may have been the hidden motives of individual leaders, the movements themselves have been presented to the world as crusades «.James Burnham, “The Managerial Revolution,” N. Y., John Day Co., 1941, pp. 5-6. 4 The Philosophy oj Modern Revolution for more or less thorough-going revisions of the whole structure of society. Yet even this fact, which has been so widely recognized, does not, in itself, give us an adequate and complete picture of the essential temper of these movments. Any attempt to define the modern revo­ lutionary movement solely in terms of its political and economic panaceas is superficial. The attitude of each of those movements must rather be characterized as a wholesale dissatisfaction with the existing order. While the revolutionary attitude finds its primary expression in a criticism of the economic system and the political order, its roots are deeper and its ideal is more inclusive. It is with the whole man and not merely with the conditions of his material existence that the modern revolutionary is concerned. The zeal with which he pursues his economic and political aims takes its ardor from the conviction that under the existing conditions, man is, some­ how degraded and dehumanized. While any attempt to encompass the ideal of the modern revolutionary in a single phrase is difficult and dangerous, as a working description, we may say that the modern revolutionary is concerned not merely with the factors of material existence but also, and in fact primarily, with man’s moral condition. What is envisioned is a transformation, not merely of man’s environ\ ment, but of man himself. Revolution in Anarchism In Anarchism one senses at once a strong note of moral indigna­ tion. The Anarchist hatred of the State stems from the conviction that man has been corrupted and debased by government and au­ thority. Property, he regards as another form of slavery. The Anarchist feels that government and property bring out the worst in man, that life under these conditions makes man selfish, rapacious, unjust and cruel. All forms of compulsion must be accordingly abol­ ished in order that the spirit of antagonism may die, and that out of the free, creative activity of the people themselves a new “spirit of voluntary cooperation” 7 may be born. t1 ,< I / 7 Cf. the Manifesto adopted at the Geneva International Congress in 1882. (Reproduced in full in E. V. Zenker, “Anarchism,” G. P. Putnam’s Sons, όί The Nature of Modern Revolution This concern with the moral conditions of society is the constant preoccupation of Proudhon, "the father of modern Anarchism.” 8 It is in terms of an ethical advance that he pictures the goal of the revolution. What does society want today? That its tendency toward sin and poverty should become a movement toward comfort and virtue.9 N. Y., 1897, pp. 288-290). Actually the word “Anarchism” is loosely used to apply to a great variety of movements and currents. Edmundo GonzalezBlanco lists ten such applications (“Los Sistemas Sociales Contemporaneos,” Ancha, Barcelona, 1930, pp. 43-112). It is, in fact, amorphous even con­ sidered simply as a purely political revolutionary theory. “There is no one body of theory that may be specifically labeled “Anarchism” and it is scarcely possible to discuss the subject except in relation to the work of its more im­ portant exponents. Of these the Frenchman, Proudhon, and the two Russians, Bakunin and Kropotkin, are easily the most important. Proudhon formulated the idea and gave it a name; Bakunin advanced the idea and organized the Anarchists; and Kropotkin reduced the idea to writing and developed the first unified or systematic theory of Anarchism.” R. E. Westmeyer, “Modern Economic and Social Systems,” Farrar-Rinehart, N. Y., 1940, p. 294. 8 Though Proudhon is invariably associated with Anarchism, his own ideas are not always clear and consistent, nor is it easy to classify him among the various types of social reformers. (Cf. Westmeyer, op. cit., p. 295) It must be kept in mind that in this study we are primarily concerned with Anarchism, and that we are dealing with Proudhon only insofar as he manifests typically Anarchist doctrine. It must also be kept in mind that we are primarily inter­ ested in his philosophy and not in the details of his social or economic panaceas. Fortunately for our purposes Proudhon has developed his concept of the Anarchist philosophy of revolution in his work, “The General Idea of the Revolution in the Nineteenth Century” (transi. J. B. Robinson, London, Freedom Press, 1923). The most comprehensive analysis of Proudhon’s views is “The Political Theories of P. J. Proudhon,” by S. Y. Lu. (Columbia U. Ph.D. thesis, M. R. Gray, 1922). Cf. also, J. Duprat, “Proudhon, Socioloque et Moraliste,” Alcan, Paris, 1929. Cornu has shown that though Proudhon “Considere que le destruction de celui-ci (the bourgeois state) est la condition préalable et necessaire de toute transformation sociale” he was nevertheless, the defender of the middle class. “C’est cette position intermédiare qui explique et sa doctrine et son action” (A. Cornu, “Utopisme et Marxisme” in “A la Luminiere du Marxisme,” Tome II, p. 138. Editions Sociales Internationales, Paris, 1937). » P. J. Proudhon, “General Idea of the Revolution in the Nineteenth Cen­ tury,” trans, by John Beverly Robinson, London, Freedom Press, 1923, p. 79. ‘Φ The Philosophy oj Modern Revolution 6 In listing the aims of the revolution, he has no hesitation about trans­ cending the categories of economics. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. The indefinite perfectibility of the individual and the race. The honorableness of work. The equality of fortunes. The identity of interests. The end of antagonisms. The universality of comfort. The sovereignty of reason. The absolute liberty of the man and of the citizen."’ The triumph of the revolution is to be the establishment of "jus­ tice.11 In defining his notion of "justice,” Proudhon grows lyrical to the point of obscurantism. It is the essential law of human rela­ tionships, but it is more than a law. It is a power of the soul and an attitude of mind. He even ventures to apply to "justice,” Spino­ za’s definition of substance.10 12*18 11 **« ' » j* 4 Justice is a power of our soul which makes us affirm what is just, independent of all interests; makes us desire above all other things the public security ; and which attaches us to the city more strongly than to our family or to what relates exclusively to our own egoism. By its law of equilibrium and its formula of reci­ procity, it could establish order and create unity, in a word, bring all variable and contradictory phenomena to a general and con­ stant law.ia 10 Ibid., pp. 243-244. 11 “Ce que donne vie à la Révolution est un élément positif, expression de la conscience universelle, que la Révolution a pbur objet de determiner et de construire, pour le salut et la gloire de l’humanité: c’est la Justice.” P. J. Proudhon, “De La Justice dans le Révolution et dans l’Eglise,” Paris, 1858, Vol. I, p. 19. Cf. J. Chabrier, “L’Idée de la Révolution d’après Proudhon,” Paris, 1935, pp. 13-17. ™