translated by
Anton C. Pegis


  1. The office of the wise man
  2. The author’s intention in the present work
  3. On the way in which divine truth is to be made known
  4. That the truth about God to which the natural reason reaches is fittingly proposed to men for belief
  5. That the truths the human reason is not able to investigate are fittingly proposed to men for belief
  6. That to give assent to the truths of faith is not foolishness even though they are above reason
  7. That the truth of reason is not opposed to the truth of the Christian faith
  8. How the human reason is related to the truth of faith
  9. The order and manner of procedure in the present work
  10. The opinion of those who say that the existence of God, being self-evident, cannot be demonstrated
  11. A refutation of the above-mentioned opinion and a solution of the arguments
  12. The opinion of those who say that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated but is held by faith alone
  13. Arguments in proof of the existence of God
  14. That to know God we must use the way of remotion
  15. That God is eternal
  16. That there is no passive potency in God
  17. That there is no matter in God
  18. That there is no composition in God
  19. That in God there is nothing violent or unnatural
  20. That God is not a body
  21. That God is His essence
  22. That in God being and essence are the same
  23. That no accident is found in God
  24. That the divine being cannot be determined by the addition of some substantial difference
  25. That God is not in some genus
  26. That God is not the formal being of all things
  27. That God is not the form of any body
  28. The divine perfection
  29. The likeness of creatures to God
  30. The names that can be predicated of God
  31. That the divine perfection and the plurality of divine names are not opposed to the divine simplicity
  32. That nothing is predicated univocally of God and other things
  33. That not all names are said of God and creatures in a purely equivocal way
  34. That names said of God and creatures are said analogically
  35. That many names said of God are not synonyms
  36. How our intellect forms a proposition about God
  37. That God is good
  38. That God is goodness itself
  39. That there cannot be evil in God
  40. That God is the good of every good
  41. That God is the highest good
  42. That God is one
  43. That God is infinite
  44. That God is intelligent
  45. That God’s act of understanding is His essence
  46. That God understands through nothing other than through His essence
  47. That God understands Himself perfectly
  48. That primarily and essentially God knows only Himself
  49. That God understands things other than Himself
  1. That God has a proper knowledge of all things
  2. Arguments inquiring how a multitude of intellectual objects is in the divine intellect
  3. Continued
  4. The solution of the above difficulty
  5. How the divine essence, being one and simple, is the proper likeness of all intelligible objects
  6. That God understands all things together
  7. That God’s knowledge is not habitual
  8. That God’s knowledge is not discursive
  9. That God does not understand by composing and dividing
  10. That the truth of enunciables; is not excluded from God
  11. That God is truth
  12. That God is the purest truth
  13. That the divine truth is the first and highest truth
  14. The arguments of those who wish to take away the knowledge of singulars from God
  15. The order of what is to be said on the divine knowledge
  16. That God knows singulars
  17. That God knows the things that are not
  18. That God knows future contingent singulars;
  19. That God knows the motions of the will
  20. That God knows infinite things
  21. That God knows lowly things
  22. That God knows evils
  23. That God has will
  24. That the will of God is His essence
  25. That the principal object of the divine will is the divine essence
  26. That in willing Himself God also wills other things
  27. That God wills Himself and other things by one act of will
  28. That the multitude of the objects of the will is not opposed to the divine simplicity
  29. That the divine will extends to singular goods
  30. That God wills even the things that are not yet
  31. That His own being and His own goodness God wills necessarily
  32. That God does not will other things in a necessary way
  33. Arguments leading to awkward consequences if God does not necessarily will things other than Himself
  34. That God wills something other than Himself with the necessity of supposition
  35. That the will of God is not of what is in itself impossible
  36. That the divine will does not remove contingency from things, nor does it impose absolute necessity on them
  37. That a reason can be assigned to the divine Will
  38. That nothing can be the cause of the divine Will
  39. That in God there is free choice
  40. That in God there are not the passions of the appetites
  41. That in God there are delight and joy, but they are not opposed to the divine perfection
  42. That in God there is love
  43. How virtues may be held to be in God
  44. That in God there are the moral virtues that deal with actions
  45. That in God there are contemplative virtues
  46. That God cannot will evil
  47. That God hates nothing, and the hatred of no thing befits Him
  48. That God is living
  49. That God is His life
  50. That the life of God is everlasting
  51. That God is blessed
  52. That God is His blessedness
  53. That the perfect and unique blessedness of God excels every other blessedness

Caput 1 Chapter 1
Quod sit officium sapientis THE OFFICE OF THE WISE MAN
Veritatem meditabitur guttur meum, et labia mea detestabuntur impium. Prov. 8-7. “My mouth shall meditate truth, and my lips shall hate impiety” (Prov. 8:7).
Multitudinis usus, quem in rebus nominandis sequendum philosophus censet, communiter obtinuit ut sapientes dicantur qui res directe ordinant et eas bene gubernant. Unde inter alia quae homines de sapiente concipiunt, a philosopho ponitur quod sapientis est ordinare. Omnium autem ordinatorum ad finem, gubernationis et ordinis regulam ex fine sumi necesse est: tunc enim unaquaeque res optime disponitur cum ad suum finem convenienter ordinatur; finis enim est bonum uniuscuiusque. Unde videmus in artibus unam alterius esse gubernativam et quasi principem, ad quam pertinet eius finis: sicut medicinalis ars pigmentariae principatur et eam ordinat, propter hoc quod sanitas, circa quam medicinalis versatur, finis est omnium pigmentorum, quae arte pigmentaria conficiuntur. Et simile apparet in arte gubernatoria respectu navifactivae; et in militari respectu equestris et omnis bellici apparatus. Quae quidem artes aliis principantes architectonicae nominantur, quasi principales artes: unde et earum artifices, qui architectores vocantur, nomen sibi vindicant sapientum.
Quia vero praedicti artifices, singularium quarundam rerum fines pertractantes, ad finem universalem omnium non pertingunt, dicuntur quidem sapientes huius vel illius rei, secundum quem modum dicitur 1 Cor. 3-10, ut sapiens architectus, fundamentum posui; nomen autem simpliciter sapientis illi soli reservatur cuius consideratio circa finem universi versatur, qui item est universitatis principium; unde secundum philosophum, sapientis est causas altissimas considerare.
[1] The usage of the multitude, which according to the Philosopher is to be followed in giving names to things, has commonly held that they are to be called wise who order things rightly and govern them well. Hence, among other things that men have conceived about the wise man, the Philosopher includes the notion that “it belongs to the wise man to order.” Now, the rule of government and order for all things directed to an end must be taken from the end. For, since the end of each thing is its good, a thing is then best disposed when it is fittingly ordered to its end. And so we see among the arts that one functions as the governor and the ruler of another because it controls its end. Thus, the art of medicine rules and orders the art of the chemist because health, with which medicine is concerned, is the end of all the medications prepared by the art of the chemist. A similar situation obtains in the art of ship navigation in relation to shipbuilding, and in the military art with respect to the equestrian art and the equipment of war. The arts that rule other arts are called architectonic, as being the ruling arts. That is why the artisans devoted to these arts, who are called master artisans, appropriate to themselves the name of wise men.
But, since these artisans are concerned, in each case, with the ends of certain particular things, they do not reach to the universal end of all things. They are therefore said to be wise with respect to this or that thing; in which sense it is said that “as a wise architect, I have laid the foundation” (1 Cor. 3:10). The name of the absolutely wise man, however, is reserved for him whose consideration is directed to the end of the universe, which is also the origin of the universe. That is why, according to the Philosopher, it belongs to the wise man to consider the highest causes.
Finis autem ultimus uniuscuiusque rei est qui intenditur a primo auctore vel motore ipsius. Primus autem auctor et motor universi est intellectus, ut infra ostendetur. Oportet igitur ultimum finem universi esse bonum intellectus. Hoc autem est veritas. Oportet igitur veritatem esse ultimum finem totius universi; et circa eius considerationem principaliter sapientiam insistere. Et ideo ad veritatis manifestationem divina sapientia carne induta se venisse in mundum testatur, dicens, Ioan. 18-37: ego in hoc natus sum, et ad hoc veni in mundum, ut testimonium perhibeam veritati.
Sed et primam philosophiam philosophus determinat esse scientiam veritatis; non cuiuslibet, sed eius veritatis quae est origo omnis veritatis, scilicet quae pertinet ad primum principium essendi omnibus; unde et sua veritas est omnis veritatis principium; sic enim est dispositio rerum in veritate sicut in esse.
[2] Now, the end of each thing is that which is intended by its first author or mover. But the first author and mover of the universe is an intellect, as will be later shown. The ultimate end of the universe must, therefore, be the good of an intellect. This good is truth. Truth must consequently be the ultimate end of the whole universe, and the consideration of the wise man aims principally at truth. So it is that, according to His own statement, divine Wisdom testifies that He has assumed flesh and come into the world in order to make the truth known: “For this was I born, and for this came I into the world, that I should give testimony to the truth” (John 18:37).
The Philosopher himself establishes that first philosophy is the science of truth, not of any truth, but of that truth which is the origin of all truth, namely, which belongs to the first principle whereby all things are. The truth belonging to such a principle is, clearly, the source of all truth; for things have the same disposition in truth as in being.
Eiusdem autem est unum contrariorum prosequi et aliud refutare sicut medicina, quae sanitatem operatur, aegritudinem excludit. Unde sicut sapientis est veritatem praecipue de primo principio meditari et aliis disserere, ita eius est falsitatem contrariam impugnare. [3] It belongs to one and the same science, however, both to pursue one of two contraries and to oppose the other. Medicine, for example, seeks to effect health and to eliminate illness. Hence, just as it belongs to the wise man to meditate especially on the truth belonging to the first principle and to teach it to others, so it belongs to him to refute the opposing falsehood.
Convenienter ergo ex ore sapientiae duplex sapientis officium in verbis propositis demonstratur: scilicet veritatem divinam, quae antonomastice est veritas, meditatam eloqui, quod tangit cum dicit, veritatem meditabitur guttur meum; et errorem contra veritatem impugnare, quod tangit cum dicit, et labia mea detestabuntur impium, per quod falsitas contra divinam veritatem designatur, quae religioni contraria est, quae etiam pietas nominatur, unde et falsitas contraria ei impietatis sibi nomen assumit. [4] Appropriately, therefore, is the twofold office of the wise man shown from the mouth of Wisdom in our opening words: to meditate and speak forth of the divine truth, which is truth in person (Wisdom touches on this in the words my mouth shall meditate truth), and to refute the opposing error (which Wisdom touches on in the words and my lips shall hate impiety). By impiety is here meant falsehood against the divine truth. This falsehood is contrary to religion, which is likewise named piety. Hence, the falsehood contrary to it is called impiety.

Caput 2 Chapter 2
Quae sit in hoc opere auctoris intentio THE AUTHOR’S INTENTION IN THE PRESENT WORK
Inter omnia vero hominum studia sapientiae studium est perfectius, sublimius, utilius et iucundius. [1] Among all human pursuits, the pursuit of wisdom is more perfect, more noble, more useful, and more full of joy.
Perfectius quidem, quia inquantum homo sapientiae studium dat, intantum verae beatitudinis iam aliquam partem habet unde sapiens dicit, beatus vir qui in sapientia morabitur, Eccli. 14-22. It is more perfect because, in so far as a man gives himself to the pursuit of wisdom, so far does he even now have some share in true beatitude. And so a wise man has said: “Blessed is the man that shall continue in wisdom” (Sirach 14:22).
Sublimius autem est quia per ipsum homo praecipue ad divinam similitudinem accedit, quae omnia in sapientia fecit: unde, quia similitudo causa est dilectionis, sapientiae studium praecipue Deo per amicitiam coniungit; propter quod Sap. 7-14 dicitur quod sapientia infinitus thesaurus est hominibus, quo qui usi sunt, facti sunt participes amicitiae Dei. It is more noble because through this pursuit man especially approaches to a likeness to God Who “made all things in wisdom” (Ps. 103:24). And since likeness is the cause of love, the pursuit of wisdom especially joins man to God in friendship. That is why it is said of wisdom that “she is an infinite treasure to men! which they that use become the friends of God” (Wis. 7:14).
Utilius autem est quia per ipsam sapientiam ad immortalitatis regnum pervenitur: concupiscentia enim sapientiae deducet ad regnum perpetuum, Sap. 6-21. It is more useful because through wisdom we arrive at the kingdom of immortality. For “the desire of wisdom leads to the everlasting kingdom” (Wis. 6:21).
Iucundius autem est quia non habet amaritudinem conversatio illius nec taedium convictus illius, sed laetitiam et gaudium, Sap. 8-16. It is more full of joy because “her conversation has no bitterness, nor her company any tediousness, but joy and gladness” (Wis. 7:16).
Assumpta igitur ex divina pietate fiducia sapientis officium prosequendi, quamvis proprias vires excedat, propositum nostrae intentionis est veritatem quam fides Catholica profitetur, pro nostro modulo manifestare, errores eliminando contrarios: ut enim verbis Hilarii utar, ego hoc vel praecipuum vitae meae officium debere me Deo conscius sum, ut eum omnis sermo meus et sensus loquatur. [2] And so, in the name of the divine Mercy, I have the confidence to embark upon the work of a wise man, even though this may surpass my powers, and I have set myself the task of making known, as far as my limited powers will allow, the truth that the Catholic faith professes, and of setting aside the errors that are opposed to it. To use the words of Hilary: “I am aware that I owe this to God as the chief duty of my life, that my every word and sense may speak of Him” [ De Trinitate I, 37].
Contra singulorum autem errores difficile est procedere, propter duo. Primo, quia non ita sunt nobis nota singulorum errantium dicta sacrilega ut ex his quae dicunt possimus rationes assumere ad eorum errores destruendos. Hoc enim modo usi sunt antiqui doctores in destructionem errorum gentilium quorum positiones scire poterant quia et ipsi gentiles fuerant, vel saltem inter gentiles conversati et in eorum doctrinis eruditi.
Secundo, quia quidam eorum, ut Mahumetistae et Pagani, non conveniunt nobiscum in auctoritate alicuius Scripturae, per quam possint convinci, sicut contra Iudaeos disputare possumus per vetus testamentum, contra haereticos per novum. Hi vero neutrum recipiunt. Unde necesse est ad naturalem rationem recurrere, cui omnes assentire coguntur. Quae tamen in rebus divinis deficiens est.
[3] To proceed against individual errors, however, is a difficult business, and this for two reasons. In the first place, it is difficult because the sacrilegious remarks of individual men who have erred are not so well known to us so that we may use what they say as the basis of proceeding to a refutation of their errors. This is, indeed, the method that the ancient Doctors of the Church used in the refutation of the errors of the Gentiles. For they could know the positions taken by the Gentiles since they themselves had been Gentiles, or at least had lived among the Gentiles and had been instructed in their teaching.
In the second place, it is difficult because some of them, such as the Mohammedans and the pagans, do not agree with us in accepting the authority of any Scripture, by which they may be convinced of their error. Thus, against the Jews we are able to argue by means of the Old Testament, while against heretics we are able to argue by means of the New Testament. But the Muslims and the pagans accept neither the one nor the other. We must, therefore, have recourse to the natural reason, to which all men are forced to give their assent. However, it is true, in divine matters the natural reason has its failings.
Simul autem veritatem aliquam investigantes ostendemus qui errores per eam excludantur: et quomodo demonstrativa veritas, fidei Christianae religionis concordet. [4] Now, while we are investigating some given truth, we shall also show what errors are set aside by it; and we shall likewise show how the truth that we come to know by demonstration is in accord with the Christian religion.

Caput 3 Chapter 3
Quis modus sit possibilis divinae veritatis manifestandae ON THE WAY IN WHICH DIVINE TRUTH IS TO BE MADE KNOWN
Quia vero non omnis veritatis manifestandae modus est idem; disciplinati autem hominis est tantum de unoquoque fidem capere tentare, quantum natura rei permittit, ut a philosopho, optime dictum Boetius introducit, necesse est prius ostendere quis modus sit possibilis ad veritatem propositam manifestandam. [1] The way of making truth known is not always the same, and, as the Philosopher has very well said, “it belongs to an educated man to seek such certitude in each thing as the nature of that thing allows.” The remark is also introduced by Boethius [ De Trinitate II]. But, since such is the case, we must first show what way is open to us in order that we may make known the truth which is our object.
Est autem in his quae de Deo confitemur duplex veritatis modus. Quaedam namque vera sunt de Deo quae omnem facultatem humanae rationis excedunt, ut Deum esse trinum et unum. Quaedam vero sunt ad quae etiam ratio naturalis pertingere potest, sicut est Deum esse, Deum esse unum, et alia huiusmodi; quae etiam philosophi demonstrative de Deo probaverunt, ducti naturalis lumine rationis. [2] There is a twofold mode of truth in what we profess about God. Some truths about God exceed all the ability of the human reason. Such is the truth that God is triune. But there are some truths which the natural reason also is able to reach. Such are that God exists, that He is one, and the like. In fact, such truths about God have been proved demonstratively by the philosophers, guided by the light of the natural reason.
Quod autem sint aliqua intelligibilium divinorum quae humanae rationis penitus excedant ingenium, evidentissime apparet.
Cum enim principium totius scientiae quam de aliqua re ratio percipit, sit intellectus substantiae ipsius, eo quod, secundum doctrinam philosophi demonstrationis principium est quod quid est; oportet quod secundum modum quo substantia rei intelligitur, sit modus eorum quae de re illa cognoscuntur. Unde si intellectus humanus, alicuius rei substantiam comprehendit, puta lapidis vel trianguli, nullum intelligibilium illius rei facultatem humanae rationis excedet. Quod quidem nobis circa Deum non accidit. Nam ad substantiam ipsius capiendam intellectus humanus naturali virtute pertingere non potest: cum intellectus nostri, secundum modum praesentis vitae, cognitio a sensu incipiat; et ideo ea quae in sensu non cadunt, non possunt humano intellectu capi, nisi quatenus ex sensibilibus earum cognitio colligitur. Sensibilia autem ad hoc ducere intellectum nostrum non possunt ut in eis divina substantia videatur quid sit: cum sint effectus causae virtutem non aequantes. Ducitur tamen ex sensibilibus intellectus noster in divinam cognitionem ut cognoscat de Deo quia est, et alia huiusmodi quae oportet attribui primo principio. Sunt igitur quaedam intelligibilium divinorum quae humanae rationi sunt pervia; quaedam vero quae omnino vim humanae rationis excedunt.
[3] That there are certain truths about God that totally surpass man’s ability appears with the greatest evidence.
Since, indeed, the principle of all knowledge that the reason perceives about some thing is the understanding of the very substance of that being (for according to Aristotle “what a thing is” is the principle of demonstration) [ Posterior Analytics II, 3], it is necessary that the way in which we understand the substance of a thing determines the way in which we know what belongs to it. Hence, if the human intellect comprehends the substance of some thing, for example, that of a stone or of a triangle, no intelligible characteristic belonging to that thing surpasses the grasp of the human reason. But this does not happen to us in the case of God. For the human intellect is not able to reach a comprehension of the divine substance through its natural power. For, according to its manner of knowing in the present life, the intellect depends on the sense for the origin of knowledge; and so those things that do not fall under the senses cannot be grasped by the human intellect except in so far as the knowledge of them is gathered from sensible things. Now, sensible things cannot lead the human intellect to the point of seeing in them the nature of the divine substance; for sensible things are effects that fall short of the power of their cause. Yet, beginning with sensible things, our intellect is led to the point of knowing about God that He exists, and other such characteristics that must be attributed to the First Principle. There are, consequently, some intelligible truths about God that are open to the human reason; but there are others that absolutely surpass its power.
Adhuc ex intellectuum gradibus idem facile est videre. Duorum enim quorum unus alio rem aliquam intellectu subtilius intuetur, ille cuius intellectus est elevatior, multa intelligit quae alius omnino capere non potest: sicut patet in rustico, qui nullo modo philosophiae subtiles considerationes capere potest. Intellectus autem Angeli plus excedit intellectum humanum quam intellectus optimi philosophi intellectum rudissimi idiotae: quia haec distantia inter speciei humanae limites continetur, quos angelicus intellectus excedit. Cognoscit quidem Angelus Deum ex nobiliori effectu quam homo: quanto ipsa substantia Angeli, per quam in Dei cognitionem ducitur naturali cognitione, est dignior rebus sensibilibus et etiam ipsa anima, per quam intellectus humanus in Dei cognitionem ascendit. Multoque amplius intellectus divinus excedit angelicum quam angelicus humanum. Ipse enim intellectus divinus sua capacitate substantiam suam adaequat, et ideo perfecte de se intelligit quid est, et omnia cognoscit quae de ipso intelligibilia sunt: non autem naturali cognitione Angelus de Deo cognoscit quid est, quia et ipsa substantia Angeli, per quam in Dei cognitionem ducitur, est effectus causae virtutem non adaequans. Unde non omnia quae in seipso Deus intelligit, Angelus naturali cognitione capere potest: nec ad omnia quae Angelus sua naturali virtute intelligit, humana ratio sufficit capienda. Sicut igitur maximae amentiae esset idiota qui ea quae a philosopho proponuntur falsa esse assereret propter hoc quod ea capere non potest, ita, et multo amplius, nimiae stultitiae est homo si ea quae divinitus Angelorum ministerio revelantur falsa esse suspicatur ex hoc quod ratione investigari non possunt. [4] We may easily see the same point from the gradation of intellects. Consider the case of two persons of whom one has a more penetrating grasp of a thing by his intellect than, does the other. He who has the superior intellect understands many things that the other cannot grasp at all. Such is the case with a very simple person who cannot at all grasp the subtle speculations of philosophy. But the intellect of an angel surpasses the human intellect much more than the intellect of the greatest philosopher surpasses the intellect of the most uncultivated simple person; for the distance between the best philosopher and a simple person is contained within the limits of the human species, which the angelic intellect surpasses. For the angel knows God on the basis of a more noble effect than does man; and this by as much as the substance of an angel, through which the angel in his natural knowledge is led to the knowledge of God, is nobler than sensible things and even than the soul itself, through which the human intellect mounts to the knowledge of God. The divine intellect surpasses the angelic intellect much more than the angelic surpasses the human. For the divine intellect is in its capacity equal to its substance, and therefore it understands fully what it is, including all its intelligible attributes. But by his natural knowledge the angel does not know what God is, since the substance itself of the angel, through which he is led to the knowledge of God, is an effect that is not equal to the power of its cause. Hence, the angel is not able, by means of his natural knowledge, to grasp all the things that God understands in Himself; nor is the human reason sufficient to grasp all the things that the angel understands through his own natural power. Just as, therefore, it would he the height of folly for a simple person to assert that what a philosopher proposes is false on the ground that he himself cannot understand it, so (and even more so) it is the acme of stupidity for a man to suspect as false what is divinely revealed through the ministry of the angels simply because it cannot be investigated by reason.
Adhuc idem manifeste apparet ex defectu quem in rebus cognoscendis quotidie experimur. Rerum enim sensibilium plurimas proprietates ignoramus, earumque proprietatum quas sensu apprehendimus rationes perfecte in pluribus invenire non possumus. Multo igitur amplius illius excellentissimae substantiae omnia intelligibilia humana ratio investigare non sufficit. [5] The same thing, moreover, appears quite clearly from the defect that we experience every day in our knowledge of things. We do not know a great many of the properties of sensible things, and in most cases we are not able to discover fully the natures of those properties that we apprehend by the sense. Much more is it the case, therefore, that the human reason is not equal to the task of investigating all the intelligible characteristics of that most excellent substance.
Huic etiam consonat dictum philosophi, qui in II Metaphys. asserit quod intellectus noster se habet ad prima entium, quae sunt manifestissima in natura, sicut oculus vespertilionis ad solem. [6] The remark of Aristotle likewise agrees with this conclusion. He says that “our intellect is related to the prime beings, which are most evident in their nature, as the eye of an owl is related to the sun” [ Metaphysics Ia, 1]
Huic etiam veritati sacra Scriptura testimonium perhibet. Dicitur enim Iob 11-7: forsitan vestigia Dei comprehendes, et omnipotentem usque ad perfectum reperies? Et 36-26: ecce, Deus magnus, vincens scientiam nostram. Et 1 Cor. 13-9: ex parte cognoscimus. [7] Sacred Scripture also gives testimony to this truth. We read in Job: “Do you think you can comprehend the depths of God, and find the limit of the Almighty?” (11:7). And again: “Behold, God is great, exceeding our knowledge” (Job 36:26). And St. Paul: “We know in part” (1 Cor. 13:9).
Non igitur omne quod de Deo dicitur, quamvis ratione investigari non possit, statim quasi falsum abiiciendum est, ut Manichaei et plures infidelium putaverunt. [8] We should not, therefore, immediately reject as false, following the opinion of the Manicheans and many unbelievers, everything that is said about God even though it cannot be investigated by reason.

Caput 4 Chapter 4
Quod veritas divinorum ad quam naturalis ratio pertingit
convenienter hominibus credenda proponitur
Duplici igitur veritate divinorum intelligibilium existente, una ad quam rationis inquisitio pertingere potest, altera quae omne ingenium humanae rationis excedit, utraque convenienter divinitus homini credenda proponitur.
Hoc autem de illa primo ostendendum est quae inquisitioni rationis pervia esse potest: ne forte alicui videatur, ex quo ratione haberi potest, frustra id supernaturali inspiratione credendum traditum esse.
[1] Since, therefore, there exists a twofold truth concerning the divine being, one to which the inquiry of the reason can reach, the other which surpasses the whole ability of the human reason, it is fitting that both of these truths be proposed to man divinely for belief.
This point must first be shown concerning the truth that is open to the inquiry of the reason; otherwise, it might perhaps seem to someone that, since such a truth can be known by the reason, it was uselessly given to men through a supernatural inspiration as an object of belief.
Sequerentur autem tria inconvenientia si huiusmodi veritas solummodo rationi inquirenda relinqueretur. [2] Yet, if this truth were left solely as a matter of inquiry for the human reason, three awkward consequences would follow.
Unum est quod paucis hominibus Dei cognitio inesset. A fructu enim studiosae inquisitionis, qui est inventio veritatis, plurimi impediuntur tribus de causis. Quidam siquidem propter complexionis indispositionem, ex qua multi naturaliter sunt indispositi ad sciendum: unde nullo studio ad hoc pertingere possent ut summum gradum humanae cognitionis attingerent, qui in cognoscendo Deum consistit. Quidam vero impediuntur necessitate rei familiaris. Oportet enim esse inter homines aliquos qui temporalibus administrandis insistant, qui tantum tempus in otio contemplativae inquisitionis non possent expendere ut ad summum fastigium humanae inquisitionis pertingerent, scilicet Dei cognitionem. Quidam autem impediuntur pigritia. Ad cognitionem enim eorum quae de Deo ratio investigare potest, multa praecognoscere oportet: cum fere totius philosophiae consideratio ad Dei cognitionem ordinetur; propter quod metaphysica, quae circa divina versatur, inter philosophiae partes ultima remanet addiscenda. Sic ergo non nisi cum magno labore studii ad praedictae veritatis inquisitionem perveniri potest. Quem quidem laborem pauci subire volunt pro amore scientiae, cuius tamen mentibus hominum naturalem Deus inseruit appetitum. [3] The first is that few men would possess the knowledge of God. For there are three reasons why most men are cut off from the fruit of diligent inquiry which is the discovery of truth. Some do not have the physical disposition for such work. As a result, there are many who are naturally not fitted to pursue knowledge; and so, however much they tried, they would be unable to reach the highest level of human knowledge which consists in knowing God. Others are cut off from pursuing this truth by the necessities imposed upon them by their daily lives. For some men must devote themselves to taking care of temporal matters. Such men would not be able to give so much time to the leisure of contemplative inquiry as to reach the highest peak at which human investigation can arrive, namely, the knowledge of God. Finally, there are some who are cut off by indolence. In order to know the things that the reason can investigate concerning God, a knowledge of many things must already be possessed. For almost all of philosophy is directed towards the knowledge of God, and that is why metaphysics, which deals with divine things, is the last part of philosophy to be learned. This means that we are able to arrive at the inquiry concerning the aforementioned truth only on the basis of a great deal of labor spent in study. Now, those who wish to undergo such a labor for the mere love of knowledge are few, even though God has inserted into the minds of men a natural appetite for knowledge.
Secundum inconveniens est quod illi qui ad praedictae veritatis inventionem pervenirent, vix post longum tempus pertingerent. Tum propter huius veritatis profunditatem, ad quam capiendam per viam rationis non nisi post longum exercitium intellectus humanus idoneus invenitur. Tum etiam propter multa quae praeexiguntur, ut dictum est. Tum etiam propter hoc quod tempore iuventutis, dum diversis motibus passionum anima fluctuat, non est apta ad tam altae veritatis cognitionem, sed in quiescendo fit prudens et sciens, ut dicitur in VII Physic. Remaneret igitur humanum genus, si sola rationis via ad Deum cognoscendum pateret, in maximis ignorantiae tenebris: cum Dei cognitio, quae homines maxime perfectos et bonos facit, non nisi quibusdam paucis, et his etiam post temporis longitudinem proveniret. [4] The second awkward effect is that those who would come to discover the abovementioned truth would barely reach it after a great deal of time. The reasons are several. There is the profundity of this truth, which the human intellect is made capable of grasping by natural inquiry only after a long training. Then, there are many things that must be presupposed, as we have said. There is also the fact that, in youth, when the soul is swayed by the various movements of the passions, it is not in a suitable state for the knowledge of such lofty truth. On the contrary, “one becomes wise and knowing in repose,” as it is said in the Physics [VII, 3]. The result is this. If the only way open to us for the knowledge of God were solely that of the reason, the human race would remain in the blackest shadows of ignorance. For then the knowledge of God, which especially renders men perfect and good, would come to be possessed only by a few, and these few would require a great deal of time in order to reach it.
Tertium inconveniens est quod investigationi rationis humanae plerumque falsitas admiscetur, propter debilitatem intellectus nostri in iudicando, et phantasmatum permixtionem. Et ideo apud multos in dubitatione remanerent ea quae sunt etiam verissime demonstrata, dum vim demonstrationis ignorant; et praecipue cum videant a diversis qui sapientes dicuntur, diversa doceri. Inter multa etiam vera quae demonstrantur, immiscetur aliquando aliquid falsum, quod non demonstratur, sed aliqua probabili vel sophistica ratione asseritur, quae interdum demonstratio reputatur. Et ideo oportuit per viam fidei fixam certitudinem et puram veritatem de rebus divinis hominibus exhiberi. [5] The third awkward effect is this. The investigation of the human reason for the most part has falsity present within it, and this is due partly to the weakness of our intellect in judgment, and partly to the admixture of images. The result is that many, remaining ignorant of the power of demonstration, would hold in doubt those things that have been most truly demonstrated. This would be particularly the case since they see that, among those who are reputed to be wise men, each one teaches his own brand of doctrine. Furthermore, with the many truths that are demonstrated, there sometimes is mingled something that is false, which is not demonstrated but rather asserted on the basis of some probable or sophistical argument, which yet has the credit of being a demonstration. That is why it was necessary that the unshakeable certitude and pure truth concerning divine things should be presented to men by way of faith.
Salubriter ergo divina providit clementia ut ea etiam quae ratio investigare potest, fide tenenda praeciperet: ut sic omnes de facili possent divinae cognitionis participes esse et absque dubitatione et errore. [6] Beneficially, therefore, did the divine Mercy provide that it should instruct us to hold by faith even those truths that the human reason is able to investigate. In this way, all men would easily be able to have a share in the knowledge of God, and this without uncertainty and error.
Hinc est quod Ephes. 4-17 dicitur: iam non ambuletis sicut et gentes ambulant in vanitate sensus sui, tenebris obscuratum habentes intellectum. Et Isaiae 54-13: ponam universos filios tuos doctos a domino. [7] Hence it is written: “Henceforward walk not as the Gentiles walk in the vanity of their mind, having their understanding darkened” (Eph. 4:17-18). And again: “All your children shall be taught of the Lord” (Is. 54:13).

Caput 5 Chapter 5
Quod ea quae ratione investigari non possunt convenienter fide tenenda hominibus proponuntur THAT THE TRUTHS THE HUMAN REASON IS NOT ABLE TO INVESTIGATE ARE FITTINGLY PROPOSED TO MEN FOR BELIEF
Videtur autem quibusdam fortasse non debere homini ad credendum proponi illa quae ratio investigare non sufficit cum divina sapientia unicuique secundum modum suae naturae provideat. Et ideo demonstrandum est quod necessarium sit homini divinitus credenda proponi etiam illa quae rationem excedunt. [1] Now, perhaps some will think that men should not be asked to believe what the reason is not adequate to investigate, since the divine Wisdom provides in the case of each thing according to the mode of its nature. We must therefore prove that it is necessary for man to receive from God as objects of belief even those truths that are above the human reason.
Nullus enim desiderio et studio in aliquid tendit nisi sit ei praecognitum. Quia ergo ad altius bonum quam experiri in praesenti vita possit humana fragilitas, homines per divinam providentiam ordinantur, ut in sequentibus investigabitur, oportuit mentem evocari in aliquid altius quam ratio nostra in praesenti possit pertingere, ut sic disceret aliquid desiderare, et studio tendere in aliquid quod totum statum praesentis vitae excedit. Et hoc praecipue Christianae religioni competit, quae singulariter bona spiritualia et aeterna promittit: unde et in ea plurima humanum sensum excedentia proponuntur. Lex autem vetus, quae temporalia promissa habebat, pauca proposuit quae humanae rationis inquisitionem excederent. Secundum etiam hunc modum philosophis cura fuit, ad hoc ut homines a sensibilium delectationibus ad honestatem perducerent, ostendere esse alia bona his sensibilibus potiora, quorum gustu multo suavius qui vacant activis vel contemplativis virtutibus delectantur. [2] No one tends with desire and zeal towards something that is not already known to him. But, as we shall examine later on in this work, men are ordained by the divine Providence towards a higher good than human fragility can experience in the present life. That is why it was necessary for the human mind to be called to something higher than the human reason here and now can reach, so that it would thus learn to desire something and with zeal tend towards something that surpasses the whole state of the present life. This belongs especially to the Christian religion, which in a unique way promises spiritual and eternal goods. And so there are many things proposed to men in it that transcend human sense. The Old Law, on the other hand, whose promises were of a temporal character, contained very few proposals that transcended the inquiry of the human reason. Following this same direction, the philosophers themselves, in order that they might lead men from the pleasure of sensible things to virtue, were concerned to show that there were in existence other goods of a higher nature than these things of sense, and that those who gave themselves to the active or contemplative virtues would find much sweeter enjoyment in the taste of these higher goods.
Est etiam necessarium huiusmodi veritatem ad credendum hominibus proponi ad Dei cognitionem veriorem habendam. Tunc enim solum Deum vere cognoscimus quando ipsum esse credimus supra omne id quod de Deo cogitari ab homine possibile est: eo quod naturalem hominis cognitionem divina substantia excedit, ut supra ostensum est. Per hoc ergo quod homini de Deo aliqua proponuntur quae rationem excedunt, firmatur in homine opinio quod Deus sit aliquid supra id quod cogitare potest. [3] It is also necessary that such truth be proposed to men for belief so that they may have a truer knowledge of God. For then only do we know God truly when we believe Him to be above everything that it is possible for man to think about Him; for, as we have shown, the divine substance surpasses the natural knowledge of which man is capable. Hence, by the fact that some things about God are proposed to man that surpass his reason, there is strengthened in man the view that God is something above what he can think.
Alia etiam utilitas inde provenit, scilicet praesumptionis repressio, quae est mater erroris. Sunt enim quidam tantum de suo ingenio praesumentes ut totam rerum naturam se reputent suo intellectu posse metiri, aestimantes scilicet totum esse verum quod eis videtur et falsum quod eis non videtur. Ut ergo ab hac praesumptione humanus animus liberatus ad modestam inquisitionem veritatis perveniat, necessarium fuit homini proponi quaedam divinitus quae omnino intellectum eius excederent. [4] Another benefit that comes from the revelation to men of truths that exceed the reason is the curbing of presumption, which is the mother of error. For there are some who have such a presumptuous opinion of their own ability that they deem themselves able to measure the nature of everything; I mean to say that, in their estimation, everything is true that seems to them so, and everything is false that does not. So that the human mind, therefore, might be freed from this presumption and come to a humble inquiry after truth, it was necessary that some things should be proposed to man by God that would completely surpass his intellect.
Apparet etiam alia utilitas ex dictis philosophi in X Ethicor. Cum enim Simonides quidam homini praetermittendam divinam cognitionem persuaderet et humanis rebus ingenium applicandum, oportere inquiens humana sapere hominem et mortalia mortalem; contra eum philosophus dicit quod homo debet se ad immortalia et divina trahere quantum potest. Unde in XI de Animal. dicit, quod, quamvis parum sit quod de substantiis superioribus percipimus, tamen illud modicum est magis amatum et desideratum omni cognitione quam de substantiis inferioribus habemus. Dicit etiam in II Cael. et Mund. quod cum de corporibus caelestibus quaestiones possint solvi parva et topica solutione, contingit auditori ut vehemens sit gaudium eius. Ex quibus omnibus apparet quod de rebus nobilissimis quantumcumque imperfecta cognitio maximam perfectionem animae confert.
Et ideo, quamvis ea quae supra rationem sunt ratio humana plene capere non possit, tamen multum sibi perfectionis acquiritur si saltem ea qualitercumque teneat fide.
[5] A still further benefit may also be seen in what Aristotle says in the Ethics [X, 7]. There was a certain Simonides who exhorted people to put aside the knowledge of divine things and to apply their talents to human occupations. He said that “he who is a man should know human things, and he who is mortal, things that are mortal.” Against Simonides Aristotle says that “man should draw himself towards what is immortal and divine as much as he can.” And so he says in the De animalibus [I, 5] that, although what we know of the higher substances is very little, yet that little is loved and desired more than all the knowledge that we have about less noble substances. He also says in the De caelo et mundo [II, 12] that when questions about the heavenly bodies can be given even a modest and merely plausible solution, he who hears this experiences intense joy. From all these considerations it is clear that even the most imperfect knowledge about the most noble realities brings the greatest perfection to the soul.
Therefore, although the human reason cannot grasp fully the truths that are above it, yet, if it somehow holds these truths at least by faith, it acquires great perfection for itself.
Et ideo dicitur Eccli. 3-25: plurima supra sensum hominis ostensa sunt tibi. Et 1 Cor. 2-11 quae sunt Dei nemo novit nisi spiritus Dei; nobis autem revelavit Deus per spiritum suum. [6] Therefore it is written: “For many things are shown to you above the understanding of men” (Sirach 3:75). Again: “So the things that are of God no man knows but the Spirit of God. But to us God has revealed them by His Spirit” (1 Cor. 2:11, 10).

Caput 6 Chapter 6.
Quod assentire his quae sunt fidei non est levitatis quamvis supra rationem sint THAT TO GIVE ASSENT TO THE TRUTHS OF FAITH IS NOT FOOLISHNESS EVEN THOUGH THEY ARE ABOVE REASON
Huiusmodi autem veritati, cui ratio humana experimentum non praebet, fidem adhibentes non leviter credunt, quasi indoctas fabulas secuti, ut 2 Petr. 1-16, dicitur.
Haec enim divinae sapientiae secreta ipsa divina sapientia, quae omnia plenissime novit, dignata est hominibus revelare: quae sui praesentiam et doctrinae et inspirationis veritatem, convenientibus argumentis ostendit, dum ad confirmandum ea quae naturalem cognitionem excedunt, opera visibiliter ostendit quae totius naturae superant facultatem; videlicet in mirabili curatione languorum, mortuorum suscitatione, caelestium corporum mirabili immutatione; et, quod est mirabilius, humanarum mentium inspiratione, ut idiotae et simplices, dono spiritus sancti repleti, summam sapientiam et facundiam in instanti consequerentur.
Quibus inspectis, praedictae probationis efficacia, non armorum violentia, non voluptatum promissione, et, quod est mirabilissimum, inter persecutorum tyrannidem, innumerabilis turba non solum simplicium, sed sapientissimorum hominum, ad fidem Christianam convolavit, in qua omnem humanum intellectum excedentia praedicantur, voluptates carnis cohibentur et omnia quae in mundo sunt contemni docentur; quibus animos mortalium assentire et maximum miraculorum est, et manifestum divinae inspirationis opus, ut, contemptis visibilibus, sola invisibilia cupiantur.
Hoc autem non subito neque a casu, sed ex divina dispositione factum esse, manifestum est ex hoc quod hoc se facturum Deus multis ante prophetarum praedixit oraculis, quorum libri penes nos in veneratione habentur, utpote nostrae fidei testimonium adhibentes.
[1] Those who place their faith in this truth, however, “for which the human reason offers no experimental evidence,” do not believe foolishly, as though “following artificial fables” (2 Peter 2:16).
For these “secrets of divine Wisdom” (Job 11:6) the divine Wisdom itself, which knows all things to the full, has deigned to reveal to men. It reveals its own presence, as well as the truth of its teaching and inspiration, by fitting arguments; and in order to confirm those truths that exceed natural knowledge, it gives visible manifestation to works that surpass the ability of all nature. Thus, there are the wonderful cures of illnesses, there is the raising of the dead, and the wonderful immutation in the heavenly bodies; and what is more wonderful, there is the inspiration given to human minds, so that simple and untutored persons, filled with the gift of the Holy Spirit, come to possess instantaneously the highest wisdom and the readiest eloquence.
When these arguments were examined, through the efficacy of the abovementioned proof, and not the violent assault of arms or the promise of pleasure, and (what is most wonderful of all) in the midst of the tyranny of the persecutors, an innumerable throng of people, both simple and most learned, flocked to the Christian faith. In this faith there are truths preached that surpass every human intellect; the pleasures of the flesh are curbed; it is taught that the things of the world should be spurned. Now, for the minds of mortal men to assent to these things is the greatest of miracles, just as it is a manifest work of divine inspiration that, spurning visible things, men should seek only what is invisible.
Now, that this has happened neither without preparation nor by chance, but as a result of the disposition of God, is clear from the fact that through many pronouncements of the ancient prophets God had foretold that He would do this. The books of these prophets are held in veneration among us Christians, since they give witness to our faith.
Huius quidem confirmationis modus tangitur Hebr. 2-3 quae, scilicet humana salus, cum initium accepisset enarrari per dominum, ab eis qui audierunt in nos confirmata est, contestante Deo signis et portentis et variis spiritus sancti distributionibus. [2] The manner of this confirmation is touched on by St. Paul: “Which,” that is, human salvation, “having begun to be declared by the Lord, was confirmed to us by them that hear Him: God also bearing them witness of signs, and wonders, and divers miracles, and distributions of the Holy Spirit” (Heb. 7:3-4).
Haec autem tam mirabilis mundi conversio ad fidem Christianam indicium certissimum est praeteritorum signorum: ut ea ulterius iterari necesse non sit, cum in suo effectu appareant evidenter. Esset enim omnibus signis mirabilius si ad credendum tam ardua, et ad operandum tam difficilia, et ad sperandum tam alta, mundus absque mirabilibus signis inductus fuisset a simplicibus et ignobilibus hominibus. Quamvis non cesset Deus etiam nostris temporibus, ad confirmationem fidei, per sanctos suos miracula operari. [3] This wonderful conversion of the world to the Christian faith is the clearest witness of the signs given in the past; so that it is not necessary that they should be further repeated, since they appear most clearly in their effect. For it would be truly more wonderful than all signs if the world had been led by simple and humble men to believe such lofty truths, to accomplish such difficult actions, and to have such high hopes. Yet it is also a fact that, even in our own time, God does not cease to work miracles through His saints for the confirmation of the faith.
Hi vero qui sectas errorum introduxerunt processerunt via contraria: ut patet in Mahumeto qui carnalium voluptatum promissis, ad quorum desiderium carnalis concupiscentia instigat, populus illexit. Praecepta etiam tradidit promissis conformia, voluptati carnali habenas relaxans, in quibus in promptu est a carnalibus hominibus obediri. Documenta etiam veritatis non attulit nisi quae de facili a quolibet mediocriter sapiente naturali ingenio cognosci possint: quin potius vera quae docuit multis fabulis et falsissimis doctrinis immiscuit. Signa etiam non adhibuit supernaturaliter facta, quibus solis divinae inspirationi conveniens testimonium adhibetur, dum operatio visibilis quae non potest esse nisi divina, ostendit doctorem veritatis invisibiliter inspiratum: sed dixit se in armorum potentia missum, quae signa etiam latronibus et tyrannis non desunt. Ei etiam non aliqui sapientes, in rebus divinis et humanis exercitati, a principio crediderunt: sed homines bestiales in desertis morantes, omnis doctrinae divinae prorsus ignari, per quorum multitudinem alios armorum violentia in suam legem coegit. Nulla etiam divina oracula praecedentium prophetarum ei testimonium perhibent: quin potius quasi omnia veteris et novi testamenti documenta fabulosa narratione depravat, ut patet eius legem inspicienti. Unde astuto consilio libros veteris et novi testamenti suis sequacibus non reliquit legendos, ne per eos falsitatis argueretur. Et sic patet quod eius dictis fidem adhibentes leviter credunt. [4] On the other hand, those who founded sects committed to erroneous doctrines proceeded in a way that is opposite to this, The point is clear in the case of Muhammad. He seduced the people by promises of carnal pleasure to which the concupiscence of the flesh goads us. His teaching also contained precepts that were in conformity with his promises, and he gave free rein to carnal pleasure. In all this, as is not unexpected, he was obeyed by carnal men. As for proofs of the truth of his doctrine, he brought forward only such as could be grasped by the natural ability of anyone with a very modest wisdom. Indeed, the truths that he taught he mingled with many fables and with doctrines of the greatest falsity. He did not bring forth any signs produced in a supernatural way, which alone fittingly gives witness to divine inspiration; for a visible action that can be only divine reveals an invisibly inspired teacher of truth. On the contrary, Muhammad said that he was sent in the power of his arms—which are signs not lacking even to robbers and tyrants. What is more, no wise men, men trained in things divine and human, believed in him from the beginning, Those who believed in him were brutal men and desert wanderers, utterly ignorant of all divine teaching, through whose numbers Muhammad forced others to become his followers by the violence of his arms. Nor do divine pronouncements on the part of preceding prophets offer him any witness. On the contrary, he perverts almost all the testimonies of the Old and New Testaments by making them into fabrications of his own, as can be seen by anyone who examines his law. It was, therefore, a shrewd decision on his part to forbid his followers to read the Old and New Testaments, lest these books convict him of falsity. It is thus clear that those who place any faith in his words believe foolishly.

Caput 7 Chapter 7
Quod veritati fidei Christianae non contrariatur veritas rationis THAT THE TRUTH OF REASON IS NOT OPPOSED TO THE TRUTH OF THE CHRISTIAN FAITH
Quamvis autem praedicta veritas fidei Christianae humanae rationis capacitatem excedat, haec tamen quae ratio naturaliter indita habet, huic veritati contraria esse non possunt.
Ea enim quae naturaliter rationi sunt insita, verissima esse constat: in tantum ut nec esse falsa sit possibile cogitare. Nec id quod fide tenetur, cum tam evidenter divinitus confirmatum sit, fas est credere esse falsum. Quia igitur solum falsum vero contrarium est, ut ex eorum definitionibus inspectis manifeste apparet, impossibile est illis principiis quae ratio naturaliter cognoscit, praedictam veritatem fidei contrariam esse.
[1] Now, although the truth of the Christian faith which we have discussed surpasses the capacity of the reason, nevertheless that truth that the human reason is naturally endowed to know cannot be opposed to the truth of the Christian faith.
For that with which the human reason is naturally endowed is clearly most true; so much so, that it is impossible for us to think of such truths as false. Nor is it permissible to believe as false that which we hold by faith, since this is confirmed in a way that is so clearly divine. Since, therefore, only the false is opposed to the true, as is clearly evident from an examination of their definitions, it is impossible that the truth of faith should be opposed to those principles that the human reason knows naturally.
Item. Illud idem quod inducitur in animam discipuli a docente, doctoris scientia continet: nisi doceat ficte, quod de Deo nefas est dicere. Principiorum autem naturaliter notorum cognitio nobis divinitus est indita: cum ipse Deus sit nostrae auctor naturae. Haec ergo principia etiam divina sapientia continet. Quicquid igitur principiis huiusmodi contrarium est, divinae sapientiae contrariatur. Non igitur a Deo esse potest. Ea igitur quae ex revelatione divina per fidem tenentur, non possunt naturali cognitioni esse contraria. [2] Furthermore, that which is introduced into the soul of the student by the teacher is contained in the knowledge of the teacher—unless his teaching is fictitious, which it is improper to say of God. Now, the knowledge of the principles that are known to us naturally has been implanted in us by God; for God is the Author of our nature. These principles, therefore, are also contained by the divine Wisdom. Hence, whatever is opposed to them is opposed to the divine Wisdom, and, therefore, cannot come from God. That which we hold by faith as divinely revealed, therefore, cannot be contrary to our natural knowledge.
Adhuc. Contrariis rationibus intellectus noster ligatur, ut ad veri cognitionem procedere nequeat. Si igitur contrariae cognitiones nobis a Deo immitterentur, ex hoc a veritatis cognitione noster intellectus impediretur. Quod a Deo esse non potest. [3] Again. In the presence of contrary arguments our intellect is chained, so that it cannot proceed to the knowledge of the truth. If, therefore, contrary knowledges were implanted in us by God, our intellect would be hindered from knowing truth by this very fact. Now, such an effect cannot come from God.
Amplius. Ea quae sunt naturalia mutari non possunt, natura manente. Contrariae autem opiniones simul eidem inesse non possunt. Non igitur contra cognitionem naturalem aliqua opinio vel fides homini a Deo immittitur. [4] And again. What is natural cannot change as long as nature does not. Now, it is impossible that contrary opinions should exist in the same knowing subject at the same time. No opinion or belief, therefore, is implanted in man by God which is contrary to man’s natural knowledge.
Et ideo apostolus dicit, Rom. 10-8: prope est verbum in corde tuo et in ore tuo: hoc est verbum fidei, quod praedicamus. Sed quia superat rationem, a nonnullis reputatur quasi contrarium. Quod esse non potest. [5] Therefore, the Apostle says: “The word is nigh thee, even in thy mouth and in thy heart. This is the word of faith, which we preach” (Rom. 10:8). But because it overcomes reason, there are some who think that it is opposed to it: which is impossible.
Huic etiam auctoritas Augustini concordat, qui in II super Gen. ad Litt. dicit sic: illud quod veritas patefaciet, libris sanctis sive testamenti veteris sive novi nullo modo potest esse adversum. [6] The authority of St. Augustine also agrees with this. He writes as follows: “That which truth will reveal cannot in any way be opposed to the sacred books of the Old and the New Testament” [ De genesi ad litteram II, 18].
Ex quo evidenter colligitur, quaecumque argumenta contra fidei documenta ponantur, haec ex principiis primis naturae inditis per se notis non recte procedere. Unde nec demonstrationis vim habent, sed vel sunt rationes probabiles vel sophisticae. Et sic ad ea solvenda locus relinquitur. [7] From this we evidently gather the following conclusion: whatever arguments are brought forward against the doctrines of faith are conclusions incorrectly derived from the first and self-evident principles imbedded in nature. Such conclusions do not have the force of demonstration; they are arguments that are either probable or sophistical. And so, there exists the possibility to answer them.

Caput 8 Chapter 8
Qualiter se habeat humana ratio ad veritatem fidei HOW THE HUMAN REASON IS RELATED TO THE TRUTH OF FAITH
Considerandum etiam videtur quod res quidem sensibiles, ex quibus humana ratio cognitionis principium sumit, aliquale vestigium in se divinae imitationis retinent, ita tamen imperfectum quod ad declarandam ipsius Dei substantiam omnino insufficiens invenitur. Habent enim effectus suarum causarum suo modo similitudinem, cum agens agat sibi simile: non tamen effectus ad perfectam agentis similitudinem semper pertingit. Humana igitur ratio ad cognoscendum fidei veritatem, quae solum videntibus divinam substantiam potest esse notissima, ita se habet quod ad eam potest aliquas verisimilitudines colligere, quae tamen non sufficiunt ad hoc quod praedicta veritas quasi demonstrative vel per se intellecta comprehendatur.
Utile tamen est ut in huiusmodi rationibus, quantumcumque debilibus, se mens humana exerceat, dummodo desit comprehendendi vel demonstrandi praesumptio: quia de rebus altissimis etiam parva et debili consideratione aliquid posse inspicere iucundissimum est, ut ex dictis apparet.
[1] There is also a further consideration. Sensible things, from which the human reason takes the origin of its knowledge, retain within themselves some sort of trace of a likeness to God. This is so imperfect, however, that it is absolutely inadequate to manifest the substance of God. For effects bear within themselves, in their own way, the likeness of their causes, since an agent produces its like; yet an effect does not always reach to the full likeness of its cause. Now, the human reason is related to the knowledge of the truth of faith (a truth which can be most evident only to those who see the divine substance) in such a way that it can gather certain likenesses of it, which are yet not sufficient so that the truth of faith may be comprehended as being understood demonstratively or through itself.
Yet it is useful for the human reason to exercise itself in such arguments, however weak they may be, provided only that there be present no presumption to comprehend or to demonstrate. For to be able to see something of the loftiest realities, however thin and weak the sight may be, is, as our previous remarks indicate, a cause of the greatest joy.
Cui quidem sententiae auctoritas Hilarii concordat, qui sic dicit in libro de Trin., loquens de huiusmodi veritate: haec credendo incipe, procurre, persiste: etsi non perventurum sciam, gratulabor tamen profecturum. Qui enim pie infinita prosequitur, etsi non contingat aliquando, semper tamen proficiet prodeundo. Sed ne te inferas in illud secretum, et arcano interminabilis nativitatis non te immergas, summam intelligentiae comprehendere praesumens: sed intellige incomprehensibilia esse. [2] The testimony of Hilary agrees with this. Speaking of this same truth, he writes as follows in his De Trinitate [II, 10, ii]: “Enter these truths by believing, press forward, persevere. And though I may know that you will not arrive at an end, yet I will congratulate you in your progress. For, though he who pursues the infinite with reverence will never finally reach the end, yet he will always progress by pressing onward. But do not intrude yourself into the divine secret, do not, presuming to comprehend the sum total of intelligence, plunge yourself into the mystery of the unending nativity; rather, understand that these things are incomprehensible.”

Caput 9 Chapter 9
De ordine et modo procedendi in hoc opere THE ORDER AND MANNER OF PROCEDURE IN THE PRESENT WORK
Ex praemissis igitur evidenter apparet sapientis intentionem circa duplicem veritatem divinorum debere versari, et circa errores contrarios destruendos: ad quarum unam investigatio rationis pertingere potest, alia vero omnem rationis excedit industriam. Dico autem duplicem veritatem divinorum, non ex parte ipsius Dei, qui est una et simplex veritas; sed ex parte cognitionis nostrae, quae ad divina cognoscenda diversimode se habet. [1] It is clearly apparent, from what has been said, that the intention of the wise man ought to be directed toward the twofold truth of divine things, and toward the destruction of the errors that are contrary to this truth. One kind of divine truth the investigation of the reason is competent to reach, whereas the other surpasses every effort of the reason. I am speaking of a “twofold truth of divine things,” not on the part of God Himself, Who is truth one and simple, but from the point of view of our knowledge, which is variously related to the knowledge of divine things.
Ad primae igitur veritatis manifestationem per rationes demonstrativas, quibus adversarius convinci possit, procedendum est. Sed quia tales rationes ad secundam veritatem haberi non possunt, non debet esse ad hoc intentio ut adversarius rationibus convincatur: sed ut eius rationes, quas contra veritatem habet, solvantur; cum veritati fidei ratio naturalis contraria esse non possit, ut ostensum est.
Singularis vero modus convincendi adversarium contra huiusmodi veritatem est ex auctoritate Scripturae divinitus confirmata miraculis: quae enim supra rationem humanam sunt, non credimus nisi Deo revelante.
Sunt tamen ad huiusmodi veritatem manifestandam rationes aliquae verisimiles inducendae, ad fidelium quidem exercitium et solatium, non autem ad adversarios convincendos: quia ipsa rationum insufficientia eos magis in suo errore confirmaret, dum aestimarent nos propter tam debiles rationes veritati fidei consentire.
[2] Now, to make the first kind of divine truth known, we must proceed through demonstrative arguments, by which our adversary may become convinced. However, since such arguments are not available for the second kind of divine truth, our intention should not be to convince our adversary by arguments: it should be to answer his arguments against the truth; for, as we have shown, the natural reason cannot be contrary to the truth of faith.
The sole way to overcome an adversary of divine truth is from the authority of Scripture—an authority divinely confirmed by miracles. For that which is above the human reason we believe only because God has revealed it.
Nevertheless, there are certain likely arguments that should be brought forth in order to make divine truth known. This should be done for the training and consolation of the faithful, and not with any idea of refuting those who are adversaries. For the very inadequacy of the arguments would rather strengthen them in their error, since they would imagine that our acceptance of the truth of faith was based on such weak arguments.
Modo ergo proposito procedere intendentes, primum nitemur ad manifestationem illius veritatis quam fides profitetur et ratio investigat, inducentes rationes demonstrativas et probabiles, quarum quasdam ex libris philosophorum et sanctorum collegimus per quas veritas confirmetur et adversarius convincatur.
Deinde, ut a manifestioribus ad minus manifesta fiat processus, ad illius veritatis manifestationem procedemus quae rationem excedit, solventes rationes adversariorum et rationibus probabilibus et auctoritatibus, quantum Deus dederit, veritatem fidei declarantes.
[3] This, then, is the manner of procedure we intend to follow. We shall first seek to make known that truth which faith professes and reason investigates. This we shall do by bringing forward both demonstrative and probable arguments, some of which were drawn from the books of the philosophers and of the saints, through which truth is strengthened and its adversary overcome [Books I-III].
Then, in order to follow a development from the more manifest to the less manifest, we shall proceed to make known that truth which surpasses reason, answering the objections of its adversaries and setting forth the truth of faith by probable arguments and by authorities, to the best of our ability [Book IV].
Intendentibus igitur nobis per viam rationis prosequi ea quae de Deo ratio humana investigare potest, primo, occurrit consideratio de his quae Deo secundum seipsum conveniunt; secundo, vero, de processu creaturarum ab ipso; tertio, autem, de ordine creaturarum in ipsum sicut in finem. [4] We are aiming, then, to set out following the way of the reason and to inquire into what the human reason can investigate about God. In this aim the first consideration that confronts us is of that which belongs to God in Himself [Book I]. The second consideration concerns the coming forth of creatures from God [Book II]. The third concerns the ordering of creatures to God as to their end [Book III].
Inter ea vero quae de Deo secundum seipsum consideranda sunt, praemittendum est, quasi totius operis necessarium fundamentum, consideratio qua demonstratur Deum esse. Quo non habito, omnis consideratio de rebus divinis tollitur. [5] Now, among the inquiries that we must undertake concerning God in Himself, we must set down in the beginning that whereby His Existence is demonstrated, as the necessary foundation of the whole work. For, if we do not demonstrate that God exists, all consideration of divine things is necessarily suppressed.

Caput 10 Chapter 10
De opinione dicentium quod Deum esse demonstrari non potest cum sit per se notum THE OPINION OF THOSE WHO SAY THAT THE EXISTENCE OF GOD, BEING SELF-EVIDENT, CANNOT BE DEMONSTRATED
Haec autem consideratio qua quis nititur ad demonstrandum Deum esse, superflua fortasse quibusdam videbitur, qui asserunt quod Deum esse per se notum est, ita quod eius contrarium cogitari non possit, et sic Deum esse demonstrari non potest. Quod quidem videtur ex his. [1] There are some persons to whom the inquiry seeking to demonstrate that God exists may perhaps appear superfluous. These are the persons who assert that the existence of God is self-evident, in such wise that its contrary cannot be entertained in the mind. It thus appears that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated, as may be seen from the following arguments.
Illa enim per se esse nota dicuntur quae statim notis terminis cognoscuntur: sicut, cognito quid est totum et quid est pars, statim cognoscitur quod omne totum est maius sua parte. Huiusmodi autem est hoc quod dicimus Deum esse. Nam nomine Dei intelligimus aliquid quo maius cogitari non potest. Hoc autem in intellectu formatur ab eo qui audit et intelligit nomen Dei: ut sic saltem in intellectu iam Deum esse oporteat. Nec potest in intellectu solum esse: nam quod in intellectu et re est, maius est eo quod in solo intellectu est; Deo autem nihil esse maius ipsa nominis ratio demonstrat. Unde restat quod Deum esse per se notum est, quasi ex ipsa significatione nominis manifestum. [2] Those propositions are said to be self-evident that are known immediately upon the knowledge of their terms. Thus, as soon as you know the nature of a whole and the nature of a part, you know immediately that every whole is greater than its part. The proposition God exists is of this sort. For by the name God we understand something than which a greater cannot be thought. This notion is formed in the intellect by one who hears and understands the name God. As a result, God must exist already at least in the intellect. But He cannot exist solely in the intellect, since that which exists both in the intellect and in reality is greater than that which exists in the intellect alone. Now, as the very definition of the name points out, nothing can be greater than God. Consequently, the proposition that God exists is self-evident, as being evident from the very meaning of the name God.
Item. Cogitari quidem potest quod aliquid sit quod non possit cogitari non esse. Quod maius est evidenter eo quod potest cogitari non esse. Sic ergo Deo aliquid maius cogitari posset, si ipse posset cogitari non esse. Quod est contra rationem nominis. Relinquitur quod Deum esse per se notum est. [3] Again, it is Possible to think that something exists whose non-existence cannot be thought. Clearly, such a being is greater than the being whose non-existence can be thought. Consequently, if God Himself could be thought not to be, then something greater than God could be thought. This, however, is contrary to the definition of the name God. Hence, the proposition that God exists is self-evident.
Adhuc. Propositiones illas oportet esse notissimas in quibus idem de seipso praedicatur, ut, homo est homo; vel quarum praedicata in definitionibus subiectorum includuntur, ut, homo est animal. In Deo autem hoc prae aliis invenitur, ut infra ostendetur, quod suum esse est sua essentia, ac si idem sit quod respondetur ad quaestionem quid est, et ad quaestionem an est. Sic ergo cum dicitur, Deus est, praedicatum vel est idem subiecto, vel saltem in definitione subiecti includitur. Et ita Deum esse per se notum erit. [4] Furthermore, those propositions ought to be the most evident in which the same thing is predicated of itself, for example, man is man, or whose predicates are included in the definition of their subjects, for example, Man is an animal. Now, in God, as will be shown in a later chapter, it is pre-eminently the case that His being is His essence, so that to the question what is He? and to the question is He? the answer is one and the same. Thus, in the proposition God exists, the predicate is consequently either identical with the subject or at least included in the definition of the subject. Hence, that God exists is self-evident.
Amplius. Quae naturaliter sunt nota, per se cognoscuntur: non enim ad ea cognoscenda inquisitionis studio pervenitur. At Deum esse naturaliter notum est: cum in Deum naturaliter desiderium hominis tendat sicut in ultimum finem, ut infra patebit. Est igitur per se notum Deum esse. [5] What is naturally known is known through itself, for we do not come to such propositions through an effort of inquiry. But the proposition that God exists is naturally known since, as will be shown later on, the desire of man naturally tends towards God as towards the ultimate end. The proposition that God exists is, therefore, self-evident.
Item. Illud per se notum oportet esse quo omnia alia cognoscuntur. Deus autem huiusmodi est. Sicut enim lux solis principium est omnis visibilis perceptionis, ita divina lux omnis intelligibilis cognitionis principium est: cum sit in quo primum maxime lumen intelligibile invenitur. Oportet igitur quod Deum esse per se notum sit. [6] There is also the consideration that that through which all the rest are known ought itself to be self-evident. Now, God is of this sort. For just as the light of the sun is the principle of all visible perception, so the divine light is the principle of all intelligible knowledge; since the divine light is that in which intelligible illumination is found first and in its highest degree. That God exists, therefore, must be self-evident.
Ex his igitur et similibus aliqui opinantur Deum esse sic per se notum existere ut contrarium mente cogitari non possit. [7] These, then, and others like them are the arguments by which some think that the proposition God exists is so self-evident that its contrary cannot be entertained by the mind.

Caput 11 Chapter 11
Reprobatio praemissae opinionis et solutio rationum praemissarum A REFUTATION OF THE ABOVEMENTIONED OPINION AND A SOLUTION OF THE ARGUMENTS
Praedicta autem opinio provenit. Partim quidem ex consuetudine qua ex principio assueti sunt nomen Dei audire et invocare. Consuetudo autem, et praecipue quae est a puero, vim naturae obtinet: ex quo contingit ut ea quibus a pueritia animus imbuitur, ita firmiter teneat ac si essent naturaliter et per se nota. [1] In part, the above opinion arises from the custom by which from their earliest days people are brought up to hear and to call upon the name of God. Custom, and especially custom in a child comes to have the force of nature. As a result, what the mind is steeped in from childhood it clings to very firmly, as something known naturally and self-evidently.
Partim vero contingit ex eo quod non distinguitur quod est notum per se simpliciter, et quod est quoad nos per se notum. Nam simpliciter quidem Deum esse per se notum est: cum hoc ipsum quod Deus est, sit suum esse. Sed quia hoc ipsum quod Deus est mente concipere non possumus, remanet ignotum quoad nos. Sicut omne totum sua parte maius esse, per se notum est simpliciter: ei autem qui rationem totius mente non conciperet, oporteret esse ignotum. Et sic fit ut ad ea quae sunt notissima rerum, noster intellectus se habeat ut oculus noctuae ad solem, ut II Metaphys. dicitur. [2] In part, however, the above opinion comes about because of a failure to distinguish between that which is self-evident in an absolute sense and that which is self-evident in relation to us. For assuredly that God exists is, absolutely speaking, self-evident, since what God is is His own being. Yet, because we are not able to conceive in our minds that which God is, that God exists remains unknown in relation to us. So, too, that every whole is greater than its part is, absolutely speaking, self-evident; but it would perforce be unknown to one who could not conceive the nature of a whole. Hence it comes about, as it is said in Metaphysics II [Ia, 1], that “our intellect is related to the most knowable things in reality as the eye of an owl is related to the sun.”’
Nec oportet ut statim, cognita huius nominis Deus significatione, Deum esse sit notum, ut prima ratio intendebat. Primo quidem, quia non omnibus notum est, etiam concedentibus Deum esse, quod Deus sit id quo maius cogitari non possit: cum multi antiquorum mundum istum dixerint Deum esse. Nec etiam ex interpretationibus huius nominis Deus, quas Damascenus ponit, aliquid huiusmodi intelligi datur. Deinde quia, dato quod ab omnibus per hoc nomen Deus intelligatur aliquid quo maius cogitari non possit, non necesse erit aliquid esse quo maius cogitari non potest in rerum natura. Eodem enim modo necesse est poni rem, et nominis rationem. Ex hoc autem quod mente concipitur quod profertur hoc nomine Deus, non sequitur Deum esse nisi in intellectu. Unde nec oportebit id quo maius cogitari non potest esse nisi in intellectu. Et ex hoc non sequitur quod sit aliquid in rerum natura quo maius cogitari non possit. Et sic nihil inconveniens accidit ponentibus Deum non esse: non enim inconveniens est quolibet dato vel in re vel in intellectu aliquid maius cogitari posse, nisi ei qui concedit esse aliquid quo maius cogitari non possit in rerum natura. [3] And, contrary to the Point made by the first argument, it does not follow immediately that, as soon as we know the meaning of the name God, the existence of God is known. It does not follow first because it is not known to all, even including those who admit that God exists, that God is that than which a greater cannot be thought. After all, many ancients said that this world itself was God. Furthermore, no such inference can be drawn from the interpretations of the name God to be found in Damascene [ De fide orthodoxa I, 9]. What is more, granted that everyone should understand by the name God something than which a greater cannot be thought, it will still not be necessary that there exist in reality something than which a greater cannot be thought. For a thing and the definition of a name are posited in the same way. Now, from the fact that that which is indicated by the name God is conceived by the mind, it does not follow that God exists save only in the intellect. Hence, that than which a greater cannot be thought will likewise not have to exist save only in the intellect. From this it does not follow that there exists in reality something than which a greater cannot be thought. No difficulty, consequently, befalls anyone who posits that God does not exist. For that something greater can be thought than anything given in reality or in the intellect is a difficulty only to him who admits that there is something than which a greater cannot be thought in reality.
Nec etiam oportet, ut secunda ratio proponebat, Deo posse aliquid maius cogitari si potest cogitari non esse. Nam quod possit cogitari non esse, non ex imperfectione sui esse est vel incertitudine, cum suum esse sit secundum se manifestissimum: sed ex debilitate nostri intellectus, qui eum intueri non potest per seipsum, sed ex effectibus eius, et sic ad cognoscendum ipsum esse ratiocinando perducitur. [4] Nor, again, is it necessary, as the second argument advanced, that something greater than God can be thought if God can be thought not to be. For that He can be thought not to be does not arise either from the imperfection or the uncertainty of His own being, since this is in itself most manifest. It arises, rather, from the weakness of our intellect, which cannot behold God Himself except through His effects and which is thus led to know His existence through reasoning.
Ex quo etiam tertia ratio solvitur. Nam sicut nobis per se notum est quod totum sua parte sit maius, sic videntibus ipsam divinam essentiam per se notissimum est Deum esse, ex hoc quod sua essentia est suum esse. Sed quia eius essentiam videre non possumus, ad eius esse cognoscendum non per seipsum, sed per eius effectus pervenimus. [5] This enables us to solve the third argument as well. For just as it is evident to us that a whole is greater than a part of itself, so to those seeing the divine essence in itself it is supremely self-evident that God exists because His essence is His being. But, because we are not able to see His essence, we arrive at the knowledge of His being, not through God Himself, but through His effects.
Ad quartam etiam patet solutio. Sic enim homo naturaliter Deum cognoscit sicut naturaliter ipsum desiderat. Desiderat autem ipsum homo naturaliter inquantum desiderat naturaliter beatitudinem, quae est quaedam similitudo divinae bonitatis. Sic igitur non oportet quod Deus ipse in se consideratus sit naturaliter notus homini, sed similitudo ipsius. Unde oportet quod per eius similitudines in effectibus repertas in cognitionem ipsius homo ratiocinando perveniat. [6] The answer to the fourth argument is likewise clear. For man naturally knows God in the same way as he naturally desires God. Now, man naturally desires God in so far as he naturally desires beatitude, which is a certain likeness of the divine goodness. On this basis, it is not necessary that God considered in Himself be naturally known to man, but only a likeness of God. It remains, therefore, that man is to reach the knowledge of God through reasoning by way of the likenesses of God found in His effects.
Ad quintam etiam de facili patet solutio. Nam Deus est quidem quo omnia cognoscuntur, non ita quod alia non cognoscantur nisi eo cognito, sicut in principiis per se notis accidit: sed quia per eius influentiam omnis causatur in nobis cognitio. [7] So, too, with the fifth argument, an easy solution is available. For God is indeed that by which all things are known, not in the sense that they are not known unless He is known (as obtains among self-evident principles), but because all our knowledge is caused in us through His influence.

Caput 12 Chapter 12
De opinione dicentium quod Deum esse demonstrari non potest sed sola fide tenetur THE OPINION OF THOSE WHO SAY THAT THE EXISTENCE OF GOD CANNOT BE DEMONSTRATED BUT IS HELD BY FAITH ALONE
Est autem quaedam aliorum opinio praedictae positioni contraria, per quam etiam inutilis redderetur conatus probare intendentium Deum esse. Dicunt enim quod Deum esse non potest per rationem inveniri, sed per solam viam fidei et revelationis est acceptum. [1] There are others who hold a certain opinion, contrary to the position mentioned above, through which the efforts of those seeking to prove the existence of God would likewise be rendered futile. For they say that we cannot arrive at the existence of God through the reason; it is received by way of faith and revelation alone.
Ad hoc autem dicendum moti sunt quidam propter debilitatem rationum quas aliqui inducebant ad probandum Deum esse. [2] What led some persons to hold this view was the weakness of the arguments which had been brought forth by others to prove that God exists.
Posset tamen hic error fulcimentum aliquod falso sibi assumere ex quorundam philosophorum dictis, qui ostendunt in Deo idem esse essentiam et esse, scilicet id quod respondetur ad quid est, et ad quaestionem an est. Via autem rationis perveniri non potest ut sciatur de Deo quid est. Unde nec ratione videtur posse demonstrari an Deus sit. [3] Nevertheless, the present error might erroneously find support in its behalf in the words of some philosophers who show that in God essence and being are identical, that is, that that which answers to the question what is it? is identical with that which answers to the question is it? Now, following the way of the reason we cannot arrive at a knowledge of what God is. Hence, it seems likewise impossible to demonstrate by the reason that God exists.
Item. Si principium ad demonstrandum an est, secundum artem philosophi, oportet accipere quid significet nomen; ratio vero significata per nomen est definitio, secundum philosophum, in IV Metaph.; nulla remanebit via ad demonstrandum Deum esse, remota divinae essentiae vel quidditatis cognitione. [4] Furthermore, according to the logic of the Philosopher, as a principle to demonstrate whether a thing is we must take the signification of the name of that thing [ Posterior Analytics II, 9]; and, again according to the Philosopher [ Metaphysics IV, 7], the meaning signified by a name is its definition. If this be so, if we set aside a knowledge of the divine essence or quiddity, no means will be available whereby to demonstrate that God exists.
Item. Si demonstrationis principia a sensu cognitionis originem sumunt, ut in posterioribus ostenditur, ea quae omnem sensum et sensibilia excedunt, videntur indemonstrabilia esse. Huiusmodi autem est Deum esse. Est igitur indemonstrabile. [5] Again, if, as is shown in the Posterior Analytics [I, 18], the knowledge of the principles of demonstration takes its origin from sense, whatever transcends all sense and sensibles seems to be indemonstrable. That God exists appears to be a proposition of this sort and is therefore indemonstrable.
Huius autem sententiae falsitas nobis ostenditur, tum ex demonstrationis arte, quae ex effectibus causas concludere docet. Tum ex ipso scientiarum ordine. Nam, si non sit aliqua scibilis substantia supra substantiam sensibilem, non erit aliqua scientia supra naturalem, ut dicitur in IV Metaph. Tum ex philosophorum studio, qui Deum esse demonstrare conati sunt. Tum etiam apostolica veritate asserente, Rom. 1-20: invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur. [6] The falsity of this opinion is shown to us, first, from the art of demonstration which teaches us to arrive at causes from their effects. Then, it is shown to us from the order of the sciences. For, as it is said in the Metaphysics [IV, 3], if there is no knowable substance higher than sensible substance, there will be no science higher than physics. It is shown, thirdly, from the pursuit of the philosophers, who have striven to demonstrate that God exists. Finally, it is shown to us by the truth in the words of the Apostle Paul: “For the invisible things of God... are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made” (Rom. 1:20).
Nec hoc debet movere, quod in Deo idem est essentia et esse, ut prima ratio proponebat. Nam hoc intelligitur de esse quo Deus in seipso subsistit, quod nobis quale sit ignotum est, sicut eius essentia. Non autem intelligitur de esse quod significat compositionem intellectus. Sic enim esse Deum sub demonstratione cadit, dum ex rationibus demonstrativis mens nostra inducitur huiusmodi propositionem de Deo formare qua exprimat Deum esse. [7] Nor, contrary to the first argument, is there any problem in the fact that in God essence and being are identical. For this is understood of the being by which God subsists in Himself. But we do not know of what sort this being is, just as we do not know the divine essence. The reference is not to the being that signifies the composition of intellect. For thus the existence of God does fall under demonstration; this happens when our mind is led from demonstrative arguments to form such a proposition of God whereby it expresses that He exists.
In rationibus autem quibus demonstratur Deum esse, non oportet assumi pro medio divinam essentiam sive quidditatem, ut secunda ratio proponebat: sed loco quidditatis accipitur pro medio effectus, sicut accidit in demonstrationibus quia; et ex huiusmodi effectu sumitur ratio huius nominis Deus. Nam omnia divina nomina imponuntur vel ex remotione effectuum divinorum ab ipso, vel ex aliqua habitudine Dei ad suos effectus. [8] Now, in arguments proving the existence of God, it is not necessary to assume the divine essence or quiddity as the middle term of the demonstration. This was the second view proposed above. In place of the quiddity, an effect is taken as the middle term, as in demonstrations quia. It is from such effects that the meaning of the name God is taken. For all divine names are imposed either by removing the effects of God from Him or by relating God in some way to His effects.
Patet etiam ex hoc quod, etsi Deus sensibilia omnia et sensum excedat, eius tamen effectus, ex quibus demonstratio sumitur ad probandum Deum esse, sensibiles sunt. Et sic nostrae cognitionis origo in sensu est etiam de his quae sensum excedunt. [9] It is thereby likewise evident that, although God transcends all sensible things and the sense itself, His effects, on which the demonstration proving His existence is based, are nevertheless sensible things. And thus, the origin of our knowledge in the sense applies also to those things that transcend the sense.

Caput 13 Chapter 13
Rationes ad probandum Deum esse ARGUMENTS IN PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
Ostenso igitur quod non est vanum niti ad demonstrandum Deum esse, procedamus ad ponendum rationes quibus tam philosophi quam doctores Catholici Deum esse probaverunt. [1] We have now shown that the effort to demonstrate the existence of God is not a vain one. We shall therefore proceed to set forth the arguments by which both philosophers and Catholic teachers have proved that God exists.
Primo autem ponemus rationes quibus Aristoteles procedit ad probandum Deum esse. Qui hoc probare intendit ex parte motus duabus viis. [2] We shall first set forth the arguments by which Aristotle proceeds to prove that God exists. The aim of Aristotle is to do this in two ways, beginning with motion.
Quarum prima talis est: omne quod movetur, ab alio movetur. Patet autem sensu aliquid moveri, utputa solem. Ergo alio movente movetur. Aut ergo illud movens movetur, aut non. Si non movetur, ergo habemus propositum, quod necesse est ponere aliquod movens immobile. Et hoc dicimus Deum. Si autem movetur, ergo ab alio movente movetur. Aut ergo est procedere in infinitum: aut est devenire ad aliquod movens immobile. Sed non est procedere in infinitum. Ergo necesse est ponere aliquod primum movens immobile. [3] Of these ways the first is as follows. Everything that is moved is moved by another. That some things are in motion—for example, the sun—is evident from sense. Therefore, it is moved by something else that moves it. This mover is itself either moved or not moved. If it is not, we have reached our conclusion—namely, that we must posit some unmoved mover. This we call God. If it is moved, it is moved by another mover. We must, consequently, either proceed to infinity, or we must arrive at some unmoved mover. Now, it is not possible to proceed to infinity. Hence, we must posit some prime unmoved mover.
In hac autem probatione sunt duae propositiones probandae: scilicet, quod omne motum movetur ab alio; et quod in moventibus et motis non sit procedere in infinitum. [4] In this proof, there are two propositions that need to be proved, namely, that everything that is moved is moved by another, and that in movers and things moved one cannot proceed to infinity.
Quorum primum probat philosophus tribus modis. Primo, sic. Si aliquid movet seipsum, oportet quod in se habeat principium motus sui: alias, manifeste ab alio moveretur. Oportet etiam quod sit primo motum: scilicet quod moveatur ratione sui ipsius, et non ratione suae partis, sicut movetur animal per motum pedis; sic enim totum non moveretur a se, sed sua pars, et una pars ab alia. Oportet etiam ipsum esse divisibile, et habere partes: cum omne quod movetur sit divisibile, ut probatur in VI Physic. [5] The first of these propositions Aristotle proves in three ways. The first way is as follows. If something moves itself, it must have within itself the principle of its own motion; otherwise, it is clearly moved by another. Furthermore, it must be primarily moved. This means that it must be moved by reason of itself, and not by reason of a part of itself, as happens when an animal is moved by the motion of its foot. For, in this sense, a whole would not be moved by itself, but a part, and one part would be moved by another. It is also necessary that a self-moving being be divisible and have parts, since, as it is proved in the Physics [VI, 4], whatever is moved is divisible.
His suppositis sic arguit. Hoc quod a seipso ponitur moveri, est primo motum. Ergo ad quietem unius partis eius, sequitur quies totius. Si enim, quiescente una parte, alia pars eius moveretur, tunc ipsum totum non esset primo motum, sed pars eius quae movetur alia quiescente. Nihil autem quod quiescit quiescente alio, movetur a seipso: cuius enim quies ad quietem sequitur alterius, oportet quod motus ad motum alterius sequatur; et sic non movetur a seipso. Ergo hoc quod ponebatur a seipso moveri, non movetur a seipso. Necesse est ergo omne quod movetur, ab alio moveri. [6] On the basis of these suppositions Aristotle argues as follows. That which is held to be moved by itself is primarily moved. Hence, when one of its parts is at rest, the whole is then at rest. For if, while one part was at rest, another part in it were moved, then the whole itself would not be primarily moved; it would be that part in it which is moved while another part is at rest. But nothing that is at rest because something else is at rest is moved by itself; for that being whose rest follows upon the rest of another must have its motion follow upon the motion of another. It is thus not moved by itself. Therefore, that which was posited as being moved by itself is not moved by itself. Consequently, everything that is moved must be moved by another.
Nec obviat huic rationi quod forte aliquis posset dicere quod eius quod ponitur movere seipsum, pars non potest quiescere; et iterum quod partis non est quiescere vel moveri nisi per accidens; ut Avicenna calumniatur. Quia vis rationis in hoc consistit, quod, si aliquid seipsum moveat primo et per se, non ratione partium, oportet quod suum moveri non dependeat ab aliquo; moveri autem ipsius divisibilis, sicut et eius esse, dependet a partibus; et sic non potest seipsum movere primo et per se. Non requiritur ergo ad veritatem conclusionis inductae quod supponatur partem moventis seipsum quiescere quasi quoddam verum absolute: sed oportet hanc conditionalem esse veram, quod, si quiesceret pars, quod quiesceret totum. Quae quidem potest esse vera etiam si antecedens sit impossibile: sicut ista conditionalis est vera, si homo est asinus, est irrationalis. [7] Nor is it an objection to this argument if one might say that, when something is held to move itself, a part of it cannot be at rest; or, again, if one might say that a part is not subject to rest or motion except accidentally, which is the unfounded argument of Avicenna. For, indeed, the force of Aristotle’s argument lies in this: if something moves itself primarily and through itself, rather than through its parts, that it is moved cannot depend on another. But the moving of the divisible itself, like its being, depends on its parts; it cannot therefore move itself primarily and through itself. Hence, for the truth of the inferred conclusion it is not necessary to assume as an absolute truth that a part of a being moving itself is at rest. What must rather be true is this conditional proposition: if the part were at rest, the whole would be at rest. Now, this proposition would be true even though its antecedent be impossible. In the same way, the following conditional proposition is true: if man is an ass, he is irrational.
Secundo, probat per inductionem, sic. Omne quod movetur per accidens, non movetur a seipso. Movetur enim ad motum alterius. Similiter neque quod movetur per violentiam: ut manifestum est. Neque quae moventur per naturam ut ex se mota, sicut animalia, quae constat ab anima moveri. Nec iterum quae moventur per naturam ut gravia et levia. Quia haec moventur a generante et removente prohibens. Omne autem quod movetur, vel movetur per se, vel per accidens. Et si per se, vel per violentiam, vel per naturam. Et hoc, vel motum ex se, ut animal; vel non motum ex se, ut grave et leve. Ergo omne quod movetur, ab alio movetur. [8] In the second way, Aristotle proves the proposition by induction [ Physics VIII, 4]. Whatever is moved by accident is not moved by itself, since it is moved upon the motion of another. So, too, as is evident, what is moved by violence is not moved by itself. Nor are those beings moved by themselves that are moved by their nature as being moved from within; such is the case with animals, which evidently are moved by the soul. Nor, again, is this true of those beings, such as heavy and light bodies, which are moved through nature. For such beings are moved by the generating cause and the cause removing impediments. Now, whatever is moved is moved through itself or by accident. If it is moved through itself, then it is moved either violently or by nature; if by nature, then either through itself, as the animal, or not through itself, as heavy and light bodies. Therefore, everything that is moved is moved by another.
Tertio, probat sic. Nihil idem est simul actu et potentia respectu eiusdem. Sed omne quod movetur, inquantum huiusmodi, est in potentia: quia motus est actus existentis in potentia secundum quod huiusmodi. Omne autem quod movet est in actu, inquantum huiusmodi: quia nihil agit nisi secundum quod est in actu. Ergo nihil est respectu eiusdem motus movens et motum. Et sic nihil movet seipsum. [9] In the third way, Aristotle proves the proposition as follows [VIII, 5]. The same thing cannot be at once in act and in potency with respect to the same thing. But everything that is moved is, as such, in potency. For motion is the act of something that is in potency inasmuch as it is in potency. That which moves, however, is as such in act, for nothing acts except according as it is in act. Therefore, with respect to the same motion, nothing is both mover and moved. Thus, nothing moves itself.
Sciendum autem quod Plato qui posuit omne movens moveri, communius accepit nomen motus quam Aristoteles. Aristoteles enim proprie accepit motum secundum quod est actus existentis in potentia secundum quod huiusmodi: qualiter non est nisi divisibilium et corporum, ut probatur in VI Physic. Secundum Platonem autem movens seipsum non est corpus: accipiebat enim motum pro qualibet operatione, ita quod intelligere et opinari sit quoddam moveri; quem etiam modum loquendi Aristoteles tangit in III de anima. Secundum hoc ergo dicebat primum movens seipsum movere quod intelligit se et vult vel amat se. Quod in aliquo non repugnat rationibus Aristotelis: nihil enim differt devenire ad aliquod primum quod moveat se, secundum Platonem; et devenire ad primum quod omnino sit immobile, secundum Aristotelem. [10] It is to be noted, however, that Plato, who held that every mover is moved [ Phaedrus ], understood the name motion in a wider sense than did Aristotle. For Aristotle understood motion strictly, according as it is the act of what exists in potency inasmuch as it is such. So understood, motion belongs only to divisible bodies, as it is proved in the Physics [VI, 4]. According to Plato, however, that which moves itself is not a body. Plato understood by motion any given operation, so that to understand and to judge are a kind of motion. Aristotle likewise touches upon this manner of speaking in the De anima [III, 7]. Plato accordingly said that the first mover moves himself because he knows himself and wills or loves himself. In a way, this is not opposed to the reasons of Aristotle. There is no difference between reaching a first being that moves himself, as understood by Plato, and reaching a first being that is absolutely unmoved, as understood by Aristotle.
Aliam autem propositionem, scilicet quod in moventibus et motis non sit procedere in infinitum, probat tribus rationibus. [11] The second proposition, namely, that there is no procession to infinity among movers and things moved, Aristotle proves in three ways.
Quarum prima talis est. Si in motoribus et motis proceditur in infinitum, oportet omnia huiusmodi infinita corpora esse: quia omne quod movetur est divisibile et corpus, ut probatur in VI Physic. Omne autem corpus quod movet motum, simul dum movet movetur. Ergo omnia ista infinita simul moventur dum unum eorum movetur. Sed unum eorum, cum sit finitum, movetur tempore finito. Ergo omnia illa infinita moventur tempore finito. Hoc autem est impossibile. Ergo impossibile est quod in motoribus et motis procedatur in infinitum. [12] The first is as follows [VII, 1]. If among movers and things moved we proceed to infinity, all these infinite beings must be bodies. For whatever is moved is divisible and a body, as is proved in the Physics [VI, 4]. But every body that moves some thing moved is itself moved while moving it. Therefore, all these infinites are moved together while one of them is moved. But one of them, being finite, is moved in a finite time. Therefore, all those infinites are moved in a finite time. This, however, is impossible. It is, therefore, impossible that among movers and things moved one can proceed to infinity.
Quod autem sit impossibile quod infinita praedicta moveantur tempore finito, sic probat. Movens et motum oportet simul esse: ut probat inducendo in singulis speciebus motus. Sed corpora non possunt simul esse nisi per continuitatem vel contiguationem. Cum ergo omnia praedicta moventia et mota sint corpora, ut probatum est, oportet quod sint quasi unum mobile per continuationem vel contiguationem. Et sic unum infinitum movetur tempore finito. Quod est impossibile, ut probatur in VI physicorum. [13] Furthermore, that it is impossible for the abovementioned infinites to be moved in a finite time Aristotle proves as follows. The mover and the thing moved must exist simultaneously. This Aristotle proves by induction in the various species of motion. But bodies cannot be simultaneous except through continuity or contiguity. Now, since, as has been proved, all the aforementioned movers and. things moved are bodies, they must constitute by continuity or contiguity a sort of single mobile. In this way, one infinite is moved in a finite time. This is impossible, as is proved in the Physics [VII, 1].
Secunda ratio ad idem probandum talis est. In moventibus et motis ordinatis, quorum scilicet unum per ordinem ab alio movetur, hoc necesse est inveniri, quod, remoto primo movente vel cessante a motione, nullum aliorum movebit neque movebitur: quia primum est causa movendi omnibus aliis. Sed si sint moventia et mota per ordinem in infinitum, non erit aliquod primum movens, sed omnia erunt quasi media moventia. Ergo nullum aliorum poterit moveri. Et sic nihil movebitur in mundo. [14] The second argument proving the same conclusion is the following. In an ordered series of movers and things moved (this is a series in which one is moved by another according to an order), it is necessarily the fact that, when the first mover is removed or ceases to move, no other mover will move or be moved. For the first mover is the cause of motion for all the others. But, if there are movers and things moved following an order to infinity, there will be no first mover, but all would be as intermediate movers. Therefore, none of the others will be able to be moved, and thus nothing in the world will be moved.
Tertia probatio in idem redit, nisi quod est ordine transmutato, incipiendo scilicet a superiori. Et est talis. Id quod movet instrumentaliter, non potest movere nisi sit aliquid quod principaliter moveat. Sed si in infinitum procedatur in moventibus et motis, omnia erunt quasi instrumentaliter moventia, quia ponentur sicut moventia mota, nihil autem erit sicut principale movens. Ergo nihil movebitur. [15] The third proof comes to the same conclusion, except that, by beginning with the superior, it has a reversed order. It is as follows. That which moves as an instrumental cause cannot move unless there be a principal moving cause. But, if we proceed to infinity among movers and things moved, all movers will be as instrumental causes, because they will be moved movers and there will be nothing as a principal mover. Therefore, nothing will be moved.
Et sic patet probatio utriusque propositionis quae supponebatur in prima demonstrationis via, qua probat Aristoteles esse primum motorem immobilem. [16] Such, then, is the proof of both propositions assumed by Aristotle in the first demonstrative way by which he proved that a first unmoved mover exists.
Secunda via talis est. Si omne movens movetur, aut haec propositio est vera per se, aut per accidens. Si per accidens, ergo non est necessaria: quod enim est per accidens verum, non est necessarium. Contingens est ergo nullum movens moveri. Sed si movens non movetur, non movet: ut adversarius dicit. Ergo contingens est nihil moveri: nam, si nihil movet, nihil movetur. Hoc autem habet Aristoteles pro impossibili, quod scilicet aliquando nullus motus sit. Ergo primum non fuit contingens: quia ex falso contingenti non sequitur falsum impossibile. Et sic haec propositio, omne movens ab alio movetur, non fuit per accidens vera. [17] The second way is this. If every mover is moved, this proposition is true either by itself or by accident. If by accident, then it is not necessary, since what is true by accident is not necessary. It is something possible, therefore, that no mover is moved. But if a mover is not moved, it does not move: as the adversary says. It is therefore possible that nothing is moved. For, if nothing moves, nothing is moved. This, however, Aristotle considers to be impossible—namely, that at any time there be no motion. Therefore, the first proposition was not possible, since from a false possible, a false impossible does not follow. Hence, this proposition, every mover is moved by another, was not true by accident.
Item, si aliqua duo sunt coniuncta per accidens in aliquo; et unum illorum invenitur sine altero, probabile est quod alterum absque illo inveniri possit: sicut, si album et musicum inveniuntur in Socrate, et in Platone invenitur musicum absque albo, probabile est quod in aliquo alio possit inveniri album absque musico. Si igitur movens et motum coniunguntur in aliquo per accidens, motum autem invenitur in aliquo absque eo quod moveat, probabile est quod movens inveniatur absque eo quod moveatur. Nec contra hoc potest ferri instantia de duobus quorum unum ab altero dependet: quia haec non coniunguntur per se, sed per accidens. [18] Again, if two things are accidentally joined in some being, and one of them is found without the other, it is probable that the other can be found without it. For example, if white and musical are found in Socrates, and in Plato we find musical but not white, it is probable that in some other being we can find the white without the musical. Therefore, if mover and thing moved are accidentally joined in some being, and the thing moved be found without the mover in some being, it is probable that the mover is found without that which is moved. Nor can the example of two things, of which one depends on the other, be brought as an objection against this. For the union we are speaking of is not essential, but accidental.
Si autem praedicta propositio est vera per se, similiter sequitur impossibile vel inconveniens. Quia vel oportet quod movens moveatur eadem specie motus qua movet, vel alia. Si eadem, ergo oportebit quod alterans alteretur, et ulterius quod sanans sanetur, et quod docens doceatur, et secundum eandem scientiam. Hoc autem est impossibile: nam docentem necesse est habere scientiam, addiscentem vero necesse est non habere; et sic idem habebitur ab eodem et non habebitur, quod est impossibile. Si autem secundum aliam speciem motus movetur, ita scilicet quod alterans moveatur secundum locum, et movens secundum locum augeatur, et sic de aliis; cum sint finita genera et species motus, sequetur quod non sit abire in infinitum. Et sic erit aliquod primum movens quod non movetur ab alio. Nisi forte aliquis dicat quod fiat reflexio hoc modo quod, completis omnibus generibus et speciebus motus, iterum oporteat redire ad primam: ut, si movens secundum locum alteretur et alterans augeatur, iterum augens moveatur secundum locum. Sed ex hoc sequetur idem quod prius: scilicet quod id quod movet secundum aliquam speciem motus, secundum eandem moveatur, licet non immediate sed mediate. [19] But, if the proposition that every mover is moved is true by itself, something impossible or awkward likewise follows. For the mover must be moved either by the same kind of motion as that by which he moves, or by another. If the same, a cause of alteration must itself be altered, and further, a healing cause must itself be healed, and a teacher must himself be taught and this with respect to the same knowledge. Now, this is impossible. A teacher must have science, whereas he who is a learner of necessity does not have it. So that, if the proposition were true, the same thing would be possessed and not possessed by the same being—which is impossible. If, however, the mover is moved by another species of motion, so that (namely) the altering cause is moved according to place, and the cause moving according to place is increased, and so forth, since the genera and species of motion are finite in number, it will follow that we cannot proceed to infinity. There will thus be a first mover, which is not moved by another. Will someone say that there will be a recurrence, so that when all the genera and species of motion have been completed the series will be repeated and return to the first motion? This would involve saying, for example, that a mover according to place would be altered, the altering cause would be increased, and the increasing cause would be moved according to place. Yet this whole view would arrive at the same conclusion as before: whatever moves according to a certain species of motion is itself moved according to the same species of motion, though mediately and not immediately.
Ergo relinquitur quod oportet ponere aliquod primum quod non movetur ab alio exteriori. [20] It remains, therefore, that we must posit some first mover that is not moved by any exterior moving cause.
Quia vero, hoc habito quod sit primum movens quod non movetur ab alio exteriori, non sequitur quod sit penitus immobile, ideo ulterius procedit Aristoteles, dicendo quod hoc potest esse dupliciter. Uno modo, ita quod illud primum sit penitus immobile. Quo posito, habetur propositum: scilicet, quod sit aliquod primum movens immobile. Alio modo, quod illud primum moveatur a seipso. Et hoc videtur probabile: quia quod est per se, semper est prius eo quod est per aliud; unde et in motis primum motum rationabile est per seipsum moveri, non ab alio. [21] Granted this conclusion—namely, that there is a first mover that is not moved by an exterior moving cause—it yet does not follow that this mover is absolutely unmoved. That is why Aristotle goes on to say that the condition of the first mover may be twofold [VIII, 5]. The first mover can be absolutely unmoved. If so, we have the conclusion we are seeking: there is a first unmoved mover. On the other hand, the first mover can be self-moved. This may be argued, because that which is through itself is prior to what is through another. Hence, among things moved as well, it seems reasonable that the first moved is moved through itself and not by another.
Sed, hoc dato, iterum idem sequitur. Non enim potest dici quod movens seipsum totum moveatur a toto: quia sic sequerentur praedicta inconvenientia, scilicet quod aliquis simul doceret et doceretur, et similiter in aliis motibus; et iterum quod aliquid simul esset in potentia et actu, nam movens, inquantum huiusmodi, est actu, motum vero in potentia. Relinquitur igitur quod una pars eius est movens tantum et altera mota. Et sic habetur idem quod prius: scilicet quod aliquid sit movens immobile. [22] But, on this basis, the same conclusion again follows. For it cannot be said that, when a mover moves himself, the whole is moved by the whole. Otherwise, the same difficulties would follow as before: one person would both teach and be taught, and the same would be true among other motions. It would also follow that a being would be both in potency and in act; for a mover is, as such, in act, whereas the thing moved is in potency. Consequently, one part of the self-moved mover is solely moving, and the other part solely moved. We thus reach the same conclusion as before: there exists an unmoved mover.
Non autem potest dici quod utraque pars moveatur, ita quod una ab altera; neque quod una pars moveat seipsam et moveat alteram; neque quod totum moveat partem; neque quod pars moveat totum: quia sequerentur praemissa inconvenientia, scilicet quod aliquid simul moveret et moveretur secundum eandem speciem motus; et quod simul esset in potentia et actu; et ulterius quod totum non esset primo movens se, sed ratione partis. Relinquitur ergo quod moventis seipsum oportet unam partem esse immobilem et moventem aliam partem. [23] Nor can it be held that both parts of the self-moved mover are moved, so that one is moved by the other, or that one moves both itself and the other, or that the whole moves a part, or that a part moves the whole. All this would involve the return of the aforementioned difficulties: something would both move and be moved according to the same species of motion; something would be at once in potency and in act; and, furthermore, the whole would not be primarily moving itself, it would move through the motion of a part. The conclusion thus stands: one part of a self-moved mover must be unmoved and moving the other part.
Sed quia in moventibus se quae sunt apud nos, scilicet in animalibus, pars movens, scilicet anima, etsi sit immobilis per se, movetur tamen per accidens; ulterius ostendit quod primi moventis seipsum pars movens non movetur neque per se neque per accidens.
Moventia enim se quae sunt apud nos, scilicet animalia, cum sint corruptibilia, pars movens in eis movetur per accidens. Necesse est autem moventia se corruptibilia reduci ad aliquod primum movens se quod sit sempiternum. Ergo necesse est aliquem motorem esse alicuius moventis seipsum qui neque per se neque per accidens moveatur.
[24] But there is another point to consider. Among self-moved beings known to us, namely, animals, although the moving part, which is to say the soul, is unmoved through itself, it is yet moved by accident. That is why Aristotle further shows that the moving part of the first self-moving being is not moved either through itself or by accident [VIII, 6].
For, since self-moving beings known to us, namely, animals, are corruptible, the moving part in them is moved by accident. But corruptible self-moving beings must be reduced to some first self-moving being that is everlasting. Therefore, some self-moving being must have a mover that is moved neither through itself nor by accident.
Quod autem necesse sit, secundum suam positionem, aliquod movens se esse sempiternum, patet. Si enim motus est sempiternus, ut ipse supponit, oportet quod generatio moventium seipsa quae sunt generabilia et corruptibilia, sit perpetua. Sed huius perpetuitatis non potest esse causa aliquod ipsorum moventium se: quia non semper est. Nec simul omnia: tum quia infinita essent; tum quia non simul sunt. Relinquitur igitur quod oportet esse aliquod movens seipsum perpetuum, quod causat perpetuitatem generationis in istis inferioribus moventibus se. Et sic motor eius non movetur neque per se neque per accidens. [25] It is further evident that, according to the position of Aristotle, some self-moved being must be everlasting. For if, as Aristotle supposes, motion is everlasting, the generation of self-moving beings (this means beings that are generable and corruptible) must be endless. But the cause of this endlessness cannot be one of the self-moving beings, since it does not always exist. Nor can the cause be all the self-moving beings together, both because they would be infinite and because they would not be simultaneous. There must therefore be some endlessly self-moving being, causing the endlessness of generation among these sublunary self-movers. Thus, the mover of the self-moving being is not moved, either through itself or by accident.
Item, in moventibus se videmus quod aliqua incipiunt de novo moveri propter aliquem motum quo non movetur a seipso animal, sicut cibo digesto aut aere alterato: quo quidem motu ipse motor movens seipsum movetur per accidens. Ex quo potest accipi quod nullum movens seipsum movetur semper cuius motor movetur per se vel per accidens. Sed primum movens seipsum movetur semper: alias non posset motus esse sempiternus, cum omnis alius motus a motu primi moventis seipsum causetur. Relinquitur igitur quod primum movens seipsum movetur a motore qui non movetur neque per se neque per accidens. [26] Again, we see that among beings that move themselves some initiate a new motion as a result of some motion. This new motion is other than the motion by which an animal moves itself, for example, digested food or altered air. By such a motion the self-moving mover is moved by accident. From this we may infer that no self-moved being is moved everlastingly whose mover is moved either by itself or by accident. But the first self-mover is everlastingly in motion; otherwise, motion could not be everlasting, since every other motion is caused by the motion of the self-moving first mover. Ile first self-moving being, therefore, is moved by a mover who is himself moved neither through himself nor by accident.
Nec est contra hanc rationem quod motores inferiorum orbium movent motum sempiternum, et tamen dicuntur moveri per accidens. Quia dicuntur moveri per accidens non ratione sui ipsorum, sed ratione suorum mobilium, quae sequuntur motum superioris orbis. [27] Nor is it against this argument that the movers of the lower spheres produce an everlasting motion and yet are said to be moved by accident. For they are said to be moved by accident, not on their own account, but on account of their movable subjects, which follow the motion of the higher sphere.
Sed quia Deus non est pars alicuius moventis seipsum, ulterius Aristoteles, in sua metaphysica, investigat ex hoc motore qui est pars moventis seipsum, alium motorem separatum omnino, qui est Deus. Cum enim omne movens seipsum moveatur per appetitum, oportet quod motor qui est pars moventis seipsum, moveat propter appetitum alicuius appetibilis. Quod est eo superius in movendo: nam appetens est quodammodo movens motum; appetibile autem est movens omnino non motum. Oportet igitur esse primum motorem separatum omnino immobilem, qui Deus est. [28] Now, God is not part of any self-moving mover. In his Metaphysics [XII, 7], therefore, Aristotle goes on from the mover who is a part of the self-moved mover to seek another mover—God—who is absolutely separate. For, since everything moving itself is moved through appetite, the mover who is part of the self-moving being moves because of the appetite of some appetible object. This object is higher, in the order of motion, than the mover desiring it; for the one desiring is in a manner a moved mover, whereas an appetible object is an absolutely unmoved mover. There must, therefore, be an absolutely unmoved separate first mover. This is God.
Praedictos autem processus duo videntur infirmare. Quorum primum est, quod procedunt ex suppositione aeternitatis motus: quod apud Catholicos supponitur esse falsum. [29] Two considerations seem to invalidate these arguments. The first consideration is that, as arguments, they presuppose the eternity of motion, which Catholics consider to be false.
Et ad hoc dicendum quod via efficacissima ad probandum Deum esse est ex suppositione aeternitatis mundi, qua posita, minus videtur esse manifestum quod Deus sit. Nam si mundus et motus de novo incoepit, planum est quod oportet poni aliquam causam quae de novo producat mundum et motum: quia omne quod de novo fit, ab aliquo innovatore oportet sumere originem; cum nihil educat se de potentia in actum vel de non esse in esse. [30] To this consideration the reply is as follows. The most efficacious way to prove that God exists is on the supposition that the world is eternal. Granted this supposition, that God exists is less manifest. For, if the world and motion have a first beginning, some cause must clearly be posited to account for this origin of the world and of motion. That which comes to be anew must take its origin from some innovating cause; since nothing brings itself from potency to act, or from non-being to being.
Secundum est, quod supponitur in praedictis demonstrationibus primum motum, scilicet corpus caeleste, esse motum ex se. Ex quo sequitur ipsum esse animatum. Quod a multis non conceditur. [31] The second consideration is that the demonstrations given above presuppose that the first moved being, namely, a heavenly body, is self-moved. This means that it is animated, which many do not admit.
Et ad hoc dicendum est quod, si primum movens non ponitur motum ex se, oportet quod moveatur immediate a penitus immobili. Unde etiam Aristoteles sub disiunctione hanc conclusionem inducit: quod scilicet oporteat vel statim devenire ad primum movens immobile separatum, vel ad movens seipsum, ex quo iterum devenitur ad movens primum immobile separatum. [32] The reply to this consideration is that, if the prime mover is not held to be self-moved, then it must be moved immediately by something absolutely unmoved. Hence, even Aristotle himself proposed this conclusion as a disjunction: it is necessary either to arrive immediately at an unmoved separate first mover, or to arrive at a self-moved mover from whom, in turn, an unmoved separate first mover is reached.
Procedit autem philosophus alia via in II Metaphys., ad ostendendum non posse procedi in infinitum in causis efficientibus, sed esse devenire ad unam causam primam: et hanc dicimus Deum. Et haec via talis est. In omnibus causis efficientibus ordinatis primum est causa medii, et medium est causa ultimi: sive sit unum, sive plura media. Remota autem causa, removetur id cuius est causa. Ergo, remoto primo, medium causa esse non poterit. Sed si procedatur in causis efficientibus in infinitum, nulla causarum erit prima. Ergo omnes aliae tollentur, quae sunt mediae. Hoc autem est manifeste falsum. Ergo oportet ponere primam causam efficientem esse. Quae Deus est. [33] In Metaphysics II [Ia, 2] Aristotle also uses another argument to show that there is no infinite regress in efficient causes and that we must reach one first cause—God. This way is as follows. In all ordered efficient causes, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, whether one or many, and this is the cause of the last cause. But, when you suppress a cause, you suppress its effect. Therefore, if you suppress the first cause, the intermediate cause cannot be a cause. Now, if there were an infinite regress among efficient causes, no cause would be first. Therefore, all the other causes, which are intermediate, will be suppressed. But this is manifestly false. We must, therefore, posit that there exists a first efficient cause. This is God.
Potest etiam alia ratio colligi ex verbis Aristotelis. In II enim Metaphys. ostendit quod ea quae sunt maxime vera, sunt et maxime entia. In IV autem Metaphys. ostendit esse aliquid maxime verum, ex hoc quod videmus duorum falsorum unum altero esse magis falsum, unde oportet ut alterum sit etiam altero verius; hoc autem est secundum approximationem ad id quod est simpliciter et maxime verum. Ex quibus concludi potest ulterius esse aliquid quod est maxime ens. Et hoc dicimus Deum. [34] Another argument may also be gathered from the words of Aristotle. In Metaphysics II [Ia, 1] he shows that what is most true is also most a being. But in Metaphysics IV [4] he shows the existence of something supremely true from the observed fact that of two false things one is more false than the other, which means that one is more true than the other. This comparison is based on the nearness to that which is absolutely and supremely true. From these Aristotelian texts we may further infer that there is something that is supremely being. This we call God.
Ad hoc etiam inducitur a Damasceno alia ratio sumpta ex rerum gubernatione: quam etiam innuit Commentator in II physicorum. Et est talis. Impossibile est aliqua contraria et dissonantia in unum ordinem concordare semper vel pluries nisi alicuius gubernatione, ex qua omnibus et singulis tribuitur ut ad certum finem tendant. Sed in mundo videmus res diversarum naturarum in unum ordinem concordare, non ut raro et a casu, sed ut semper vel in maiori parte. Oportet ergo esse aliquem cuius providentia mundus gubernetur. Et hunc dicimus Deum. [35] Damascene proposes another argument for the same conclusion taken from the government of the world [ De fide orthodoxa I, 3]. Averroes likewise hints at it [In II Physicorum ]. The argument runs thus. Contrary and discordant things cannot, always or for the most part, be parts of one order except under someone’s government, which enables all and each to tend to a definite end. But in the world we find that things of diverse natures come together under one order, and this not rarely or by chance, but always or for the most part. There must therefore be some being by whose providence the world is governed. This we call God.

Caput 14 Chapter 14
Quod ad cognitionem Dei oportet uti via remotionis THAT TO KNOW GOD WE MUST USE THE WAY OF REMOTION
Ostenso igitur quod est aliquod primum ens, quod Deum dicimus, oportet eius conditiones investigare. [1] We have shown that there exists a first being, whom we call God. We must, accordingly, now investigate the properties of this being.
Est autem via remotionis utendum praecipue in consideratione divinae substantiae. Nam divina substantia omnem formam quam intellectus noster attingit, sua immensitate excedit: et sic ipsam apprehendere non possumus cognoscendo quid est. Sed aliqualem eius habemus notitiam cognoscendo quid non est. Tantoque eius notitiae magis appropinquamus, quanto plura per intellectum nostrum ab eo poterimus removere. Tanto enim unumquodque perfectius cognoscimus, quanto differentias eius ad alia plenius intuemur: habet enim res unaquaeque in seipsa esse proprium ab omnibus aliis rebus distinctum. Unde et in rebus quarum definitiones cognoscimus, primo eas in genere collocamus, per quod scimus in communi quid est; et postmodum differentias addimus, quibus a rebus aliis distinguatur; et sic perficitur substantiae rei completa notitia. [2] Now, in considering the divine substance, we should especially make use of the method of remotion. For, by its immensity, the divine substance surpasses every form that our intellect reaches. Thus we are unable to apprehend it by knowing what it is. Yet we are able to have some knowledge of it by knowing what it is not. Furthermore, we approach nearer to a knowledge of God according as through our intellect we are able to remove more and more things from Him. For we know each thing more perfectly the more fully we see its differences from other things; for each thing has within itself its own being, distinct from all other things. So, too, in the case of the things whose definitions we know. We locate them in a genus, through which we know in a general way what they are. Then we add differences to each thing, by which it may be distinguished from other things. In this way, a complete knowledge of a substance is built up.
Sed quia in consideratione substantiae divinae non possumus accipere quid, quasi genus; nec distinctionem eius ab aliis rebus per affirmativas differentias accipere possumus, oportet eam accipere per differentias negativas. Sicut autem in affirmativis differentiis una aliam contrahit, et magis ad completam designationem rei appropinquat secundum quod a pluribus differre facit; ita una differentia negativa per aliam contrahitur, quae a pluribus differre facit. Sicut, si dicamus Deum non esse accidens, per hoc ab omnibus accidentibus distinguitur; deinde si addamus ipsum non esse corpus, distinguemus ipsum etiam ab aliquibus substantiis; et sic per ordinem ab omni eo quod est praeter ipsum, per negationes huiusmodi distinguetur; et tunc de substantia eius erit propria consideratio cum cognoscetur ut ab omnibus distinctus. Non tamen erit perfecta: quia non cognoscetur quid in se sit. [3] However, in the consideration of the divine substance we cannot take a what as a genus; nor can we derive the distinction of God from things by differences affirmed of God. For this reason, we must derive the distinction of God from other beings by means of negative differences. And just as among affirmative differences one contracts the other, so one negative difference is contracted by another that makes it to differ from many beings. For example, if we say that God is not an accident, we thereby distinguish Him from all accidents. Then, if we add that He is not a body, we shall further distinguish Him from certain substances. And thus, proceeding in order, by such negations God will be distinguished from all that He is not. Finally, there will then be a proper consideration of God’s substance when He will be known as distinct from all things. Yet, this knowledge will not be perfect, since it will not tell us what God is in Himself.
Ad procedendum igitur circa Dei cognitionem per viam remotionis, accipiamus principium id quod ex superioribus iam manifestum est, scilicet quod Deus sit omnino immobilis. Quod etiam auctoritas sacrae Scripturae confirmat. Dicitur enim Malach. 3-6: ego Deus, et non mutor; Iac. 1-17: apud quem non est transmutatio; et Num. 23-19: non est Deus quasi homo, ut mutetur. [4] As a principle of procedure in knowing God by way of remotion, therefore, let us adopt the proposition which, from what we have said, is now manifest, namely, that God is absolutely unmoved. The authority of Sacred Scripture also confirms this. For it is written: “I am the Lord and I change not” (Mal. 3:6);...“with whom there is no change” (James 2:17). Again: “God is not man... that He should be changed (Num. 23:19).

Caput 15 Chapter 15
Quod Deus sit aeternus THAT GOD IS ETERNAL
Ex hoc autem apparet ulterius Deum esse aeternum. [1] From what we have said it is further apparent that God is eternal.
Nam omne quod incipit esse vel desinit, per motum vel mutationem hoc patitur. Ostensum autem est Deum esse omnino immutabilem. Est igitur aeternus, carens principio et fine. [2] Everything that begins to be or ceases to be does so through motion or change. Since, however, we have shown that God is absolutely immutable, He is eternal, lacking all beginning or end.
Item. Illa sola tempore mensurantur quae moventur: eo quod tempus est numerus motus, ut patet in IV physicorum. Deus autem est omnino absque motu, ut iam probatum est. Tempore igitur non mensuratur. Igitur in ipso non est prius et posterius accipere. Non ergo habet esse post non esse, nec non esse post esse potest habere, nec aliqua successio in esse ipsius inveniri potest: quia haec sine tempore intelligi non possunt. Est igitur carens principio et fine, totum esse suum simul habens. In quo ratio aeternitatis consistit. [3] Again. Those beings alone are measured by time that are moved. For time, as is made clear in Physics IV [11], is “the number of motion.” But God, as has been proved, is absolutely without motion, and is consequently not measured by time. There is, therefore, no before and after in Him; He does not have being after non-being, nor non-being after being, nor can any succession be found in His being. For none of these characteristics can be understood without time. God, therefore, is without beginning and end, having His whole being at once. In this consists the nature of eternity.
Adhuc. Si aliquando non fuit et postmodum fuit, ab aliquo eductus est de non esse in esse. Non a seipso: quia quod non est non potest aliquid agere. Si autem ab alio, illud est prius eo. Ostensum autem est Deum esse primam causam. Non igitur esse incoepit. Unde nec esse desinet: quia quod semper fuit, habet virtutem semper essendi. Est igitur aeternus. [4] What is more, if it were true that there was a time when He existed after not existing, then He must have been brought by someone from non-being to being. Not by Himself, since what does not exist cannot act. If by another, then this other is prior to God. But we have shown that God is the first cause. Hence, He did not begin to be, nor consequently will He cease to be, for that which has been everlastingly has the power to be everlastingly. God is, therefore, eternal.
Amplius. Videmus in mundo quaedam quae sunt possibilia esse et non esse, scilicet generabilia et corruptibilia. Omne autem quod est possibile esse, causam habet: quia, cum de se aequaliter se habeat ad duo, scilicet esse et non esse, oportet, si ei approprietur esse, quod hoc sit ex aliqua causa. Sed in causis non est procedere in infinitum, ut supra probatum est per rationem Aristotelis. Ergo oportet ponere aliquid quod sit necesse-esse. Omne autem necessarium vel habet causam suae necessitatis aliunde; vel non, sed est per seipsum necessarium. Non est autem procedere in infinitum in necessariis quae habent causam suae necessitatis aliunde. Ergo oportet ponere aliquod primum necessarium, quod est per seipsum necessarium. Et hoc Deus est: cum sit causa prima, ut ostensum est. Est igitur Deus aeternus: cum omne necessarium per se sit aeternum. [5] We find in the world, furthermore, certain beings, those namely that are subject to generation and corruption, which can be and not-be. But what can be has a cause because, since it is equally related to two contraries, namely, being and non-being, it must be owing to some cause that being accrues to it. Now, as we have proved by the reasoning of Aristotle, one cannot proceed to infinity among causes. We must therefore posit something that is a necessary being. Every necessary being, however, either has the cause of its necessity in an outside source or, if it does not, it is necessary through itself. But one cannot proceed to infinity among necessary beings the cause of whose necessity lies in an outside source. We must therefore posit a first necessary being, which is necessary through itself. This is God, since, as we have shown, He is the first cause. God, therefore, is eternal, since whatever is necessary through itself is eternal.
Ostendit etiam Aristoteles ex sempiternitate temporis sempiternitatem motus. Ex quo iterum ostendit sempiternitatem substantiae moventis. Prima autem substantia movens Deus est. Est igitur sempiternus. Negata autem sempiternitate temporis et motus, adhuc manet ratio ad sempiternitatem substantiae. Nam, si motus incoepit, oportet quod ab aliquo movente incoeperit. Qui si incoepit, aliquo agente incoepit. Et sic vel in infinitum ibitur; vel devenietur ad aliquid quod non incoepit. [6] From the everlastingness of time, likewise, Aristotle shows the everlastingness of motion [ Physics VIII, 1], from which he further shows the everlastingness of the moving substance [VIII, 6]. Now, the first moving substance is God. God is therefore everlasting. If we deny the everlastingness of time and motion, we are still able to prove the everlastingness of the moving substance. For, if motion had a beginning, it must have done so through some moving cause. If this moving cause began, it did so through the action of some cause. Hence, either one will proceed to infinity, or he will arrive at a moving cause that had no beginning.
Huic autem veritati divina auctoritas testimonium perhibet. Unde Psalmus: tu autem, domine, in aeternum permanes. Et idem: tu autem idem ipse es, et anni tui non deficient. [7] To this truth divine authority offers witness. The Psalmist says: “But You, Lord, endure forever”; and he goes on to say: “But You art always the selfsame: and Your years shall not fail” (Ps. 101:13, 28).

Caput 16 Chapter 16
Quod in Deo non est potentia passiva THAT THERE IS NO PASSIVE POTENCY IN GOD
Si autem Deus aeternus est, necesse est ipsum non esse in potentia. [1] If God is eternal, of necessity there is no potency in Him.
Omne enim id in cuius substantia admiscetur potentia, secundum id quod habet de potentia potest non esse: quia quod potest esse, potest non esse. Deus autem secundum se non potest non esse: cum sit sempiternus. In Deo igitur non est potentia ad esse. [2] The being whose substance has an admixture of potency is liable not to be by as much as it has potency; for that which can be, can not-be. But, God, being everlasting, in His substance cannot not-be. In God, therefore, there is no potency to being.
Adhuc. Quamvis id quod quandoque est in potentia quandoque actu, prius sit tempore in potentia quam in actu, tamen simpliciter actus est prior potentia: quia potentia non educit se in actum, sed oportet quod educatur in actum per aliquid quod sit in actu. Omne igitur quod est aliquo modo in potentia, habet aliquid prius se. Deus autem est primum ens et prima causa, ut ex supra dictis patet. Non igitur habet in se aliquid potentiae admixtum. [3] Though a being that is sometime in potency and sometime in act is in time in potency before being in act, absolutely speaking act is prior to potency. For potency does not raise itself to act; it must be raised to act by something that is in act. Hence, whatever is in some way in potency has something prior to it. But, as is evident from what was said above, God is the first being and the first cause. Hence, He has no admixture of potency in Himself.
Item. Illud quod est per se necesse esse, nullo modo est possibile esse: quia quod est per se necesse esse, non habet causam; omne autem quod est possibile esse, habet causam, ut supra ostensum est. Deum autem est per se necesse esse. Nullo igitur modo est possibile esse. Nihil ergo potentiae in sua substantia invenitur. [4] Moreover, that which is a necessary being through itself is in no way a possible being, since that which is through itself a necessary being has no cause, whereas, as we have shown above, whatever is a possible being has a cause. But God is through Himself a necessary being. He is, therefore, in no way a possible being, and so no potency is found in His substance.
Item. Unumquodque agit secundum quod est actu. Quod igitur non est totus actus, non toto se agit, sed aliquo sui. Quod autem non toto se agit, non est primum agens: agit enim alicuius participatione, non per essentiam suam. Primum igitur agens, quod Deus est, nullam habet potentiam admixtam, sed est actus purus. [5] Again, each thing acts in so far as it is in act. Therefore, what is not wholly act acts, not with the whole of itself, but with part of itself. But what does not act with the whole of itself is not the first agent, since it does not act through its essence but through participation in something. The first agent, therefore, namely, God, has no admixture of potency but is pure act.
Adhuc. Unumquodque, sicut natum est agere inquantum est actu, ita natum est pati inquantum est potentia: nam motus est actus potentia existentis. Sed Deus est omnino impassibilis ac immutabilis, ut patet ex dictis. Nihil ergo habet de potentia, scilicet passiva. [6] Further, just as each thing naturally acts in so far as it is in act, so it is naturally receptive in so far as it is in potency; for motion is the act of that which exists in potency. But God is absolutely impassible and immutable, as is clear from what we have said. He has, therefore, no part of potency—that is, passive potency.
Item. Videmus aliquid esse in mundo quod exit de potentia in actum. Non autem educit se de potentia in actum: quia quod est potentia, nondum est; unde nec agere potest. Ergo oportet esse aliquid aliud prius, qui educatur de potentia in actum. Et iterum, si hoc est exiens de potentia in actum, oportet ante hoc aliquid aliud poni, quo reducatur in actum. Hoc autem in infinitum procedere non potest. Ergo oportet devenire ad aliquid quod est tantum actu et nullo modo in potentia. Et hoc dicimus Deum. [7] Then, too, we see something in the world that emerges from potency to act. Now, it does not educe itself from potency to act, since that which is in potency, being still in potency, can therefore not act. Some prior being is therefore needed by which it may be brought forth from potency to act. This cannot go on to infinity. We must, therefore, arrive at some being that is only in act and in no wise in potency. This being we call God.

Caput 17 Chapter 17
Quod in Deo non est materia THAT THERE IS NO MATTER IN GOD
Apparet etiam ex hoc Deum non esse materiam. [1] From this it is likewise evident that God is not matter.
Quia materia id quod est, in potentia est. [2] Whatever matter is, it is in potency.
Item. Materia non est agendi principium: unde efficiens et materia in idem non incidunt, secundum philosophum. Deo autem convenit esse primam causam effectivam rerum, ut supra dictum est. Ipse igitur materia non est. [3] Matter, furthermore, is not a principle of acting. That is why, according to Aristotle, the efficient cause and matter do not coincide [ Physics II, 7]. But, as we have said, it belongs to God to be the first efficient cause of things. Therefore, He is not matter.
Amplius. Sequitur res naturales casu existere his qui omnia in materiam reducebant sicut in causam primam: contra quos agitur in II physicorum. Si igitur Deus, qui est prima causa, sit causa materialis rerum, sequitur omnia a casu existere. [4] Moreover, for those who reduced all things to matter as to the first cause it follows that natural things exist by chance. Aristotle argues against these thinkers in Physics II [8]. Hence, if God, Who is the first cause, is the material cause of things, it follows that all things exist by chance.
Item. Materia non fit causa alicuius in actu nisi secundum quod alteratur et mutatur. Si igitur Deus est immobilis, ut probatum est, nullo modo potest esse rerum causa per modum materiae. [5] Again, matter does not become the cause of something actual except by being altered and changed. But if, as we have proved, God is absolutely immobile, He cannot in any way be the cause of things according to the mode of matter.
Hanc autem veritatem fides Catholica confitetur, qua Deum non de sua substantia, sed de nihilo asserit cuncta creasse. [6] Now, the Catholic faith professes this truth, namely, it asserts that God has created all things, not out of His own substance, but out of nothing.
In hoc autem insania David de Dinando confunditur, qui ausus est dicere Deum esse idem quod prima materia, ex hoc quod, si non esset idem, oporteret differre ea aliquibus differentiis, et sic non essent simplicia; nam in eo quod per differentiam ab alio differt, ipsa differentia compositionem facit.
Hoc autem processit ex ignorantia qua nescivit quid inter differentiam et diversitatem intersit. Differens enim, ut in X Metaph. determinatur, dicitur ad aliquid, nam omne differens aliquo est differens: diversum autem aliquid absolute dicitur, ex hoc quod non est idem. Differentia igitur in his quaerenda est quae in aliquo conveniunt: oportet enim aliquid in eis assignari secundum quod differant; sicut duae species conveniunt in genere, unde oportet quod differentiis distinguantur. In his autem quae in nullo conveniunt, non est quaerendum quo differant, sed seipsis diversa sunt. Sic enim et oppositae differentiae ab invicem distinguuntur: non enim participant genus quasi partem suae essentiae: et ideo non est quaerendum quibus differant, seipsis enim diversa sunt. Sic etiam Deus et materia prima distinguuntur, quorum unus est actus purus, aliud potentia pura, in nullo convenientiam habentes.
[7] On this point, however, the madness of David of Dinant stands confounded. He dared to assert that God is the same as prime matter on the ground that, if He were not, He would have to differ from it by some differences, and thus they would not be simple. For in the being that differs from another by a difference, the difference itself produces a composition.
David’s position was the result of ignorance. He did not know how to distinguish between difference and diversity. The different, as is determined in Metaphysics X [3], is said relationally, for every different is different by something. Something is called diverse, however, absolutely, from the fact that it is not the same. Difference, therefore, must be sought among those things that agree in something, for we must point to something in them according to which they differ: for example, two species agree in genus and must therefore be distinguished by differences. But in things that agree in nothing we need not seek the whereby they differ; they are diverse by themselves. In the same way, opposite differences are distinguished from one another. For they do not share in the genus as a part of their essence, and therefore, since they are by themselves diverse, there is no need to seek that by which they differ. In this way, too, God and prime matter are distinguished: one is pure act, the other is pure potency, and they agree in nothing.

Caput 18 Chapter 18
Quod in Deo nulla est compositio THAT THERE IS NO COMPOSITION IN GOD
Ex praemissis autem concludi potest quod in Deo nulla sit compositio. [1] From what we have set down we can conclude that there is no composition in God.
Nam in omni composito oportet esse actum et potentiam. Non enim plura possunt simpliciter unum fieri nisi aliquid sit ibi actus, et aliud potentia. Quae enim actu sunt, non uniuntur nisi quasi colligata vel congregata, quae non sunt unum simpliciter. In quibus etiam ipsae partes congregatae sunt sicut potentia respectu unionis: sunt enim unitae in actu postquam fuerint in potentia unibiles. In Deo autem nulla est potentia. Non est igitur in eo aliqua compositio. [2] In every composite there must be act and potency. For several things cannot become absolutely one unless among them something is act and something potency. Now, beings in act are not united except by being, so to speak, bound or joined together, which means that they are not absolutely one. Their parts, likewise, are brought together as being in potency with respect to the union, since they are united in act after being potentially unitable. But in God there is no potency. Therefore, there is no composition in Him.
Item. Omne compositum posterius est suis componentibus. Primum ergo ens, quod Deus est, ex nullis compositum est. [3] Every composite, moreover, is subsequent to its components. The first being, therefore, which is God, has no components.
Adhuc. Omne compositum est potentia dissolubile, quantum est ex ratione compositionis: licet in quibusdam sit aliquid aliud dissolutioni repugnans. Quod autem est dissolubile, est in potentia ad non esse. Quod Deo non competit: cum sit per se necesse-esse. Non est igitur in eo aliqua compositio. [4] Every composite, furthermore, is potentially dissoluble. This arises from the nature of composition, although in some composites there is another element that resists dissolution. Now, what is dissoluble can not-be. This does not befit God, since He is through Himself the necessary being. There is, therefore, no composition in God.
Amplius. Omnis compositio indiget aliquo componente: si enim compositio est, ex pluribus est; quae autem secundum se sunt plura, in unum non convenirent nisi ab aliquo componente unirentur. Si igitur compositus esset Deus, haberet componentem: non enim ipse seipsum componere posset, quia nihil est causa sui ipsius; esset enim prius seipso, quod est impossibile. Componens autem est causa efficiens compositi. Ergo Deus haberet causam efficientem. Et sic non esset causa prima, quod supra habitum est. [5] Every composition, likewise, needs some composer. For, if there is composition, it is made up of a plurality, and a plurality cannot be fitted into a unity except by some composer. If, then, God were composite, He would have a composer. He could not compose Himself, since nothing is its own cause, because it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now, the composer is the efficient cause of the composite. Thus, God would have an efficient cause. Thus, too, He would not be the first cause—which was proved above.
Item. In quolibet genere tanto aliquid est nobilius quanto simplicius: sicut in genere calidi ignis, qui non habet aliquam frigidi permixtionem. Quod igitur est in fine nobilitatis omnium entium, oportet esse in fine simplicitatis. Hoc autem quod est in fine nobilitatis omnium entium, dicimus Deum, cum sit prima causa: causa enim est nobilior effectu. Nulla igitur compositio ei accidere potest. [6] Again, in every genus the simpler a being, the more noble it is: e.g., in the genus of the hot, Ere, which has no admixture of cold. That, therefore, which is at the peak of nobility among all beings must be at the peak of simplicity. But the being that is at the peak of nobility among all beings we call God, since He is the first cause. For a cause is nobler than an effect. God can, therefore, have no composition.
Praeterea. In omni composito bonum non est huius vel illius partis, sed totius,- et dico bonum secundum illam bonitatem quae est propria totius et perfectio eius: nam partes sunt imperfectae respectu totius: sicut partes hominis non sunt homo, partes etiam numeri senarii non habent perfectionem senarii, et similiter partes lineae non perveniunt ad perfectionem mensurae quae in tota linea invenitur. Si ergo Deus est compositus, perfectio et bonitas eius propria invenitur in toto, non autem in aliqua eius partium. Et sic non erit in eo pure illud bonum quod est proprium ei. Non est ergo ipse primum et summum bonum. [7] Furthermore, in every composite the good belongs, not to this or that part, but to the whole—and I say good according to the goodness that is proper to the whole and its perfection. For parts are imperfect in comparison with the whole, as the parts of man are not a man, the parts of the number six do not have the perfection of six, and similarly the parts of a line do not reach the perfection of the measure found in the whole line. If, then, God is composite, His proper perfection and goodness is found in the whole, not in any part of the whole. Thus, there will not be in God purely that good which is proper to Him. God, then, is not the first and highest good.
Item. Ante omnem multitudinem oportet invenire unitatem. In omni autem composito est multitudo. Igitur oportet id quod est ante omnia, scilicet Deum, omni compositione carere. [8] Again, prior to all multitude we must find unity. But there is multitude in every composite. Therefore, that which is before all things, namely, God, must be free of all composition.

Caput 19 Chapter 19
Quod in Deo nihil est violentum neque praeter naturam THAT IN GOD THERE IS NOTHING VIOLENT OR UNNATURAL
Ex hoc autem philosophus concludit quod in Deo nihil potest esse violentum neque extra naturam. [1] From this Aristotle concludes that in God there can be nothing violent or unnatural.
Omne enim illud in quo aliquid violentum et praeter naturam invenitur, aliquid sibi additum habet: nam quod est de substantia rei non potest esse violentum neque praeter naturam. Nullum autem simplex habet in se aliquid additum: ex hoc enim compositio relinqueretur. Cum igitur Deus sit simplex, ut ostensum est, nihil in eo potest esse violentum neque praeter naturam. [2] Everything in which there is found something violent and outside nature has something added to itself, for what belongs to the substance of a thing can be neither violent nor outside nature. Now, nothing simple has anything added to itself, since this would render it composite. Since, then, God is simple, as we have shown, nothing in Him can be violent or outside nature.
Amplius. Necessitas coactionis est necessitas ex alio. In Deo autem non est necessitas ex alio, sed est per seipsum necessarium, et causa necessitatis aliis. Igitur nihil in eo est coactum. [3] Furthermore, the necessity of coaction is a necessity from another. But in God there is no necessity from another; He is necessary through Himself and the cause of necessity for other things. Therefore, nothing in God is due to coaction.
Adhuc. Ubicumque est aliquid violentum, ibi potest esse aliquid praeter id quod rei per se convenit: nam violentum contrariatur ei quod est secundum naturam. Sed in Deo non est possibile esse aliquid praeter id quod secundum se ei convenit: cum secundum se sit necesse-esse, ut ostensum est. Non potest igitur in eo esse aliquid violentum. [4] Again, wherever there is something violent, there can be something beyond what befits a thing through itself; for the violent is opposed to what is according to nature. But in God there cannot be anything beyond what befits Him according to Himself; for God, as we have shown, is of Himself the necessary being. There can, therefore, be nothing violent in God.
Item. Omne in quo est aliquid violentum vel innaturale, natum est ab alio moveri: nam violentum est cuius principium est extra nil conferente vim passo. Deus autem est omnino immobilis, ut ostensum est. Igitur non potest in eo esse aliquid violentum vel innaturale. [5] Then, too, everything in which there can be something violent or unnatural is by nature able to be moved by another. For the violent is “that whose source is from the outside, the receiver being completely passive.” Now, as we have shown, God is absolutely immobile. There can, therefore, be nothing violent or unnatural in Him.

Caput 20 Chapter 20
Quod Deus non est corpus THAT GOD IS NOT A BODY
Ex praemissis etiam ostenditur quod Deus non est corpus. [1] From the preceding remarks it is also shown that God is not a body.
Omne enim corpus, cum sit continuum, compositum est et partes habens. Deus autem non est compositus, ut ostensum est. Igitur corpus non est. [2] Every body, being a continuum, is composite and has parts. But, as we have shown, God is not composite, and is, therefore, not a body.
Praeterea. Omne quantum est aliquo modo in potentia: nam continuum est potentia divisibile in infinitum; numerus autem in infinitum est augmentabilis. Omne autem corpus est quantum. Ergo omne corpus est in potentia. Deus autem non est in potentia, sed actus purus, ut ostensum est. Ergo Deus non est corpus. [3] Again, everything possessed of quantity is in a certain manner in potency. For a continuum is potentially divisible to infinity, while numbers can be increased to infinity. But every body has quantity and is therefore in potency. But God is not in potency, being pure act, as has been shown. Therefore, God is not a body.
Adhuc. Si Deus est corpus, oportet quod sit aliquod corpus naturale: nam corpus mathematicum non est per se existens, ut philosophus probat, eo quod dimensiones accidentia sunt. Non autem est corpus naturale: cum sit immobilis, ut ostensum est; omne autem corpus naturale mobile est. Deus igitur non est corpus. [4] Furthermore, if God is a body, He must be some natural body, since, as the Philosopher proves, a mathematical body is not something self-existing, since dimensions are accidents. But God is not a natural body, being immobile, as we have shown, whereas every natural body is movable. God is, therefore, not a body.
Amplius. Omne corpus finitum est: quod tam de corpore circulari quam de recto probatur in I caeli et mundi. Quodlibet autem corpus finitum intellectu et imaginatione transcendere possumus. Si igitur Deus est corpus, intellectus et imaginatio nostra aliquid maius Deo cogitare possunt. Et sic Deus non est maior intellectu nostro. Quod est inconveniens. Non est igitur corpus. [5] Again, every body is finite, as is proved in De caelo I [I, 5] of a circular body and a rectilinear body. Now, we can transcend any given finite body by means of the intellect and the imagination. If, then, God is a body, our intellect and imagination can think of something greater than God. God is thus not greater than our intellect—which is awkward. God is, therefore, not a body.
Adhuc. Cognitio intellectiva certior est quam sensitiva. Invenitur autem aliquid subiectum sensui in rerum natura. Igitur et intellectui. Sed secundum ordinem obiectorum est ordo potentiarum, sicut et distinctio. Ergo super omnia sensibilia est aliquid intelligibile in rerum natura existens. Omne autem corpus in rebus existens est sensibile. Igitur super omnia corpora est aliquid accipere nobilius. Si igitur Deus est corpus, non erit primum et maximum ens. [6] Intellectual knowledge, moreover, is more certain than sensitive knowledge. In nature we find an object for the sense and therefore for the intellect as well. But the order and distinction of powers is according to the order of objects. Therefore, above all sensible things there is something intelligible among things. Now, every body having actual existence is sensible. Therefore, we can find something nobler above all bodies. Hence, if God is a body, He will not be the first and greatest being.
Praeterea. Quolibet corpore non vivente res vivens est nobilior. Quolibet autem corpore vivente sua vita est nobilior: cum per hoc habeat supra alia corpora nobilitatem. Id igitur quo nihil est nobilius, corpus non est. Hoc autem est Deus. Igitur non est corpus. [7] A living thing, likewise, is nobler than any non-living body, and the life of a living body is nobler than it, since it is this life that gives to the living body its nobility above other bodies. Therefore, that than which nothing is nobler is not a body. Ibis is God. God is, therefore, not a body.
Item. Inveniuntur rationes philosophorum ad idem ostendendum procedentes ex aeternitate motus, in hunc modum. In omni motu sempiterno oportet quod primum movens non moveatur neque per se neque per accidens, sicut ex supra dictis patet. Corpus autem caeli movetur circulariter motu sempiterno. Ergo primus motor eius non movetur neque per se neque per accidens. Nullum autem corpus movet localiter nisi moveatur: eo quod oportet movens et motum esse simul; et sic corpus movens moveri oportet, ad hoc quod sit simul cum corpore moto. Nulla etiam virtus in corpore movet nisi per accidens moveatur: quia, moto corpore, movetur per accidens virtus corporis. Ergo primus motor caeli non est corpus neque virtus in corpore. Hoc autem ad quod ultimo reducitur motus caeli sicut ad primum movens immobile, est Deus. Deus igitur non est corpus. [8] Then, too, there are the arguments of the philosophers to the same effect, based on the eternity of motion. They are as follows. In every everlasting motion, the first mover cannot be moved either through Himself or by accident, as is clear from the above. Now, the body of the heavens is moved in a circle with an everlasting motion. Therefore, its first mover is not moved either through Himself or by accident. Now, no body moves locally unless it be moved, since the mover and the moved must be together. The moving body must thus be moved in order to be together with the moved body. But no power in a body moves unless it itself be moved by accident, since, when a body is moved, its power is by accident moved. The first mover of the heavens, therefore, is neither a body nor a power in a body. Now, that to which the motion of the heavens is ultimately reduced as to its first unmoved mover is God. God is, therefore, not a body.
Adhuc. Nulla potentia infinita est potentia in magnitudine. Potentia primi motoris est potentia infinita. Ergo non est in aliqua magnitudine. Et sic Deus, qui est primus motor, neque est corpus neque est virtus in corpore. [9] Again, no infinite power is a power in a magnitude. But the power of the prime mover is an infinite power. Therefore, it is not in any magnitude. Therefore, God, Who is the prime mover, is neither a body nor a power in a body.
Prima sic probatur. Si potentia magnitudinis alicuius est infinita, aut ergo erit magnitudinis finitae; aut infinitae. Magnitudo infinita nulla est, ut probatur in III Physic. et in I caeli et mundi. Magnitudinis autem finitae non est possibile esse potentiam infinitam. Et sic in nulla magnitudine potest esse potentia infinita.
Quod autem in magnitudine finita non possit esse potentia infinita, sic probatur. Aequalem effectum quem facit potentia minor in tempore maiori, facit potentia maior in tempore minori: qualiscumque sit ille effectus, sive sit secundum alterationem, sive secundum motum localem, sive secundum quemcumque alium motum. Sed potentia infinita est maior omni potentia finita. Ergo oportet quod in minori perficiat effectum, velocius movendo, quam potentia quaecumque finita. Nec potest esse quod in minori quod sit tempus. Relinquitur igitur quod hoc erit in indivisibili temporis. Et sic movere et moveri et motus erunt in instanti. Cuius contrarium demonstratum est in VI physicorum.
Quod autem non possit potentia infinita magnitudinis finitae movere in tempore, sic iterum probatur. Sit potentia infinita quae est a. Accipiatur pars eius quae est ab. Pars igitur ista movebit in tempore maiori. Oportebit tamen esse aliquam proportionem huius temporis ad tempus in quo movet tota potentia: cum utrumque tempus sit finitum. Sint igitur haec duo tempora in decupla proportione se ad invicem habentia: non enim quantum ad hanc rationem differt istam vel aliam proportionem dicere. Si autem addatur ad potentiam praedictam finitam, diminui oportebit de tempore secundum proportionem additionis ad potentiam: cum maior potentia in minori tempore moveat. Si ergo addatur decuplum, illa potentia movebit in tempore quod erit decima pars temporis in quo movebat prima pars accepta infinitae potentiae, scilicet ab. Et tamen haec potentia quae est decuplum eius, est potentia finita: cum habeat proportionem determinatam ad potentiam finitam. Relinquitur igitur quod in aequali tempore movet potentia finita et infinita. Quod est impossibile. Non igitur potentia infinita magnitudinis finitae potest movere in tempore aliquo.
[10] The first proposition is proved thus. If the power of some magnitude is infinite, it will be the power either of a finite magnitude or an infinite one. But there is no infinite magnitude, as is proved in Physics III [5] and De caelo I [5]. But a finite magnitude cannot have an infinite power. Therefore, an infinite power cannot reside in any magnitude.
That an infinite power cannot reside in a finite magnitude is proved thus. A greater power produces an equal effect in a shorter time than a lesser power does in a longer time. This is true whether that effect be according to alteration, local motion, or any other motion whatever. But an infinite power is greater than every finite power. Therefore, by moving more swiftly, it should produce its effect in a shorter time than any finite power. Nor can it be in something lesser that still is in time, Therefore, this will be in an indivisible point of time. And thus to move, to be moved, and motion will take place in an instant—of which the contrary has been proved in Physics VI [3].
That an infinite power in a finite magnitude cannot move in time is likewise proved as follows. Let there be an infinite power A. Let us assume a part of that power to be AB. This part will, therefore, move in a greater time. Yet there must be some proportion of this time to the time in which the whole power moves, since both times are finite. Let these two times be related to one another in the proportion of one to ten, since for the present argument this proportion will do as well as any other. Now, if we add to the aforementioned finite power, we must diminish its time according to the proportion of the addition to the power; for a greater power moves in a lesser time. If the decuple be added, that power will move in a time that will be a tenth part of the time in which the first assumed part of the infinite power, namely, AB, moved. And yet this power, which is its decuple, is a finite power, since it has a determinate proportion to the finite power. Therefore, the finite and the infinite power will move in the same time—which is impossible. Therefore, the infinite power of a finite magnitude cannot move in time.
Quod autem potentia primi motoris sit infinita, sic probatur. Nulla potentia finita potest movere tempore infinito. Sed potentia primi motoris movet in tempore infinito: quia motus primus est sempiternus. Ergo potentia primi motoris est infinita. Prima sic probatur. Si aliqua potentia finita alicuius corporis movet tempore infinito, pars illius corporis, habens partem potentiae, movebit in tempore minori: quia quanto aliquid est maioris potentiae, tanto in maiori tempore motum continuare poterit; et sic pars praedicta movebit tempore finito, maior autem pars in maiori tempore movere poterit. Et sic semper, secundum quod addetur ad potentiam motoris, addetur ad tempus secundum eandem proportionem. Sed additio aliquoties facta perveniet ad quantitatem totius, vel etiam excedet. Ergo et additio ex parte temporis perveniet ad quantitatem temporis in quo movet totum. Tempus autem in quo totum movebat, dicebatur esse infinitum. Ergo tempus finitum metietur tempus infinitum. Quod est impossibile. [11] That the power of the first mover is infinite is proved thus. No finite power can move in an infinite time. But the power of the first mover moves in an infinite time because the first motion is endless. Therefore, the power of the prime mover is infinite. Ile first proposition is proved thus. If the finite power of some body moves in an infinite time, a part of that body, having a part of the power, will move in a shorter time; for the greater the power of a mover, the more it will be able to keep up its motion in a longer time. Thus, the aforementioned part will move in a finite time, and a greater part will be able to move in a longer time. Thus, as we add to the power of the mover, we shall always add to the time according to the same proportion. But after a certain addition has been made, the addition win reach the quantity of the whole or even exceed it. So, too, an addition of time will reach the quantity of time in which it moves the whole. But the time in which it moved the whole was said to be infinite. Therefore, a finite time will measure an infinite time—which is impossible.
Sed contra hunc processum plures sunt obiectiones. [12] But against this reasoning there are several objections.
Quarum una est, quia potest poni quod illud corpus quod movet primum motum, non est divisibile: sicut patet de corpore caelesti. Praedicta autem probatio procedit ex divisione eius. [13] One objection is this. It can be assumed that the body that moves the first moved is not divisible, as is the case with a heavenly body. But the preceding proof is based on the division of the first body.
Sed ad hoc dicendum quod conditionalis potest esse vera cuius antecedens est impossibile. Et si quid est quod destruat veritatem talis conditionalis, est impossibile: sicut, si aliquis destrueret veritatem huius conditionalis, si homo volat, habet alas, esset impossibile. Et secundum modum hunc intelligendus est processus probationis praedictae. Quia haec conditionalis est vera, si corpus caeleste dividitur, pars eius erit minoris potentiae quam totum. Huius autem conditionalis veritas tollitur si ponatur primum movens esse corpus, propter impossibilia quae sequuntur. Unde patet hoc esse impossibile. Et similiter potest responderi si fiat obiectio de augmento potentiarum finitarum. Quia non est accipere in rerum natura potentias secundum omnem proportionem quam habet tempus ad tempus quodcumque. Est tamen conditionalis vera, qua in praedicta probatione indigetur. [14] The reply to this objection is as follows. There can be a true conditional proposition whose antecedent is impossible. If there is something that destroys the truth of this conditional proposition, it is then impossible. For example, if someone destroys the truth of the conditional proposition, If man flies, he has wings, it would be impossible. It is in this manner that the above proof is to be understood. For the following conditional proposition is true: If a heavenly body is divided, a part of it will have less power than the whole. Now, the truth of this conditional proposition is taken away if it be posited that the first mover is a body; and the reason is the impossibilities that follow from it. Therefore, to posit this is impossible. A similar reply can be given if objection is made concerning the increase of finite powers. We cannot assume powers in nature according to all proportions of time to any given time. Nevertheless, the proposition required in the above proof is a true conditional proposition.
Secunda obiectio est quia, etsi corpus dividitur, aliqua virtus potest esse alicuius corporis quae non dividitur diviso corpore: sicut anima rationalis non dividitur diviso corpore. [15] The second objection is this. Although a body is divided, it is possible to find in a given body a power that is not divided when the body is divided. For example, the rational soul is not divided if the body is divided.
Et ad hoc est dicendum quod per processum praedictum non probatur quod non sit Deus coniunctus corpori sicut anima rationalis corpori humano: sed quod non est virtus in corpore sicut virtus materialis, quae dividitur ad divisionem corporis. Unde etiam dicitur de intellectu humano quod non est corpus neque virtus in corpore. Quod autem Deus, non sit unitus corpori sicut anima, alterius rationis est. [16] The reply is as follows. The above argument does not prove that God is not joined to a body as the rational soul is joined to the human body; it proves that He is not a power in a body in the manner of a material power, which is divided upon the division of the body. So, too, it is said of the human intellect that it is not a body or a power in a body. However, that God is not joined to a body as the soul is, this is another issue.
Tertia obiectio est quia, si cuiuslibet corporis est potentia finita, ut in praedicto processu ostenditur; per potentiam autem finitam non potest aliquid durare tempore infinito: sequetur quod nullum corpus possit durare tempore infinito. Et sic corpus caeleste de necessitate corrumpetur. [17] The third objection is this. If some given body has a finite power, as the above argument shows, and if through a finite power nothing can endure through an infinite time, it will follow that no body can endure through an infinite time. Thus, a heavenly body will of necessity be corrupted.
Ad hoc autem a quibusdam respondetur quod corpus caeleste secundum potentiam suam potest deficere, sed perpetuitatem durationis acquirit ab alio quod est potentiae infinitae. Et huic solutioni videtur attestari Plato, qui de corporibus caelestibus Deum loquentem inducit in hunc modum: natura vestra estis dissolubilia, voluntate autem mea indissolubilia: quia voluntas mea maior est nexu vestro. [18] To this objection some reply that, as far as its own power is concerned, a heavenly body can fail, but it acquires an eternal duration from another being of an infinite power. Plato [ Timaeus ] seems to speak for this solution when he introduces God addressing the heavenly bodies as follows: “By your natures you are dissoluble, but through my will you are indissoluble; for my will is greater than your bond.”
Hanc autem solutionem improbat Commentator, in XI Metaph. Nam impossibile est, secundum eum, quod id quod est de se possibile non esse, acquirat perpetuitatem essendi ab alio. Sequeretur enim quod corruptibile mutetur in incorruptibilitatem. Quod est impossibile secundum ipsum. Et ideo ipse in hunc modum respondet: quod in corpore caelesti omnis potentia quae est, finita est: non tamen oportet quod habeat omnem potentiam; est enim in corpore caelesti, secundum Aristotelem, in VIII Metaph., potentia ad ubi, sed non ad esse. Et sic non oportet quod insit ei potentia ad non esse. [19] The Commentator attacks this position in Metaphysics XI. According to him, it is impossible that what can of itself not-be should acquire a perpetuity of being from another. This would mean that something corruptible becomes incorruptible, which according to him is impossible. Hence, Averroes answers the objection as follows. All the potency that is in a heavenly body is finite, but there is no reason why a heavenly body should have every potency. For, according to Aristotle in Metaphysics VIII, there is in a heavenly body potency with respect to place, but not with respect to being. Hence, a heavenly body need not have a potency to non-being.
Sciendum tamen quod haec responsio Commentatoris non est sufficiens. Quia, etsi detur quod in corpore caelesti non sit potentia quasi passiva ad esse, quae est potentia materiae, est tamen in eo potentia quasi activa, quae est virtus essendi: cum expresse Aristoteles dicat, in I caeli et mundi, quod caelum habet virtutem ut sit semper. [20] This reply of the Commentator, however, is not sufficient. Even if we should grant that in a heavenly body there is no sort of a passive potency to being, which is the potency of matter, yet there is in it a potency of an active kind, which is the power of being. For Aristotle expressly says in De caelo I [I, 3] that the heavens have the power to be forever.”
Et ideo melius dicendum est quod, cum potentia dicatur ad actum, oportet iudicare de potentia secundum modum actus. Motus autem de sui ratione quantitatem habet et extensionem: unde duratio eius infinita requirit quod potentia movens sit infinita. Esse autem non habet aliquam extensionem quantitatis: praecipue in re cuius esse est invariabile, sicut caelum. Et ideo non oportet quod virtus essendi sit infinita in corpore finito, licet in infinitum duret: quia non differt quod per illam virtutem aliquid duret in uno instanti vel tempore infinito, cum esse illud invariabile non attingatur a tempore nisi per accidens. [21] Hence, it is better to reply as follows. Since potency is said relatively to act, we must judge of potency according to the mode of the act. Now, according to its nature, motion has quantity and extension, and hence its infinite duration requires that the potency moving it be infinite. But being does not have any quantitative extension, especially in the case of a thing, such as the heavens, whose being is without change. Hence, the power of being need not be infinite in a finite body, even though it will endure to infinity. For it is one and the same whether through that power something will endure for an instant or for an infinite time, since its changeless being is not touched by time except by accident.
Quarta obiectio est de hoc quod non videtur esse necessarium quod id quod movet tempore infinito, habeat potentiam infinitam, in illis moventibus quae movendo non alterantur. Quia talis motus nihil consumit de potentia eorum: unde non minore tempore movere possunt postquam aliquo tempore moverunt quam ante; sicut solis virtus finita est, et, quia in agendo eius virtus activa non minuitur, infinito tempore potest agere in haec inferiora, secundum naturam. [22] The fourth objection is this. In those beings that in moving are not themselves altered, it does not seem necessary that what moves in an infinite time should have an infinite power. For such a motion consumes nothing of their power, so that after they have moved for a time they are able to move for no less a time than before. Thus, the power of the sun is finite, and because its active power is not lessened by acting, it is able, according to its nature, to act on the sublunary world during an infinite time.
Et ad hoc dicendum est quod corpus non movet nisi motum, ut probatum est. Et ideo, si contingat corpus aliquod non moveri, sequetur ipsum non movere. In omni autem quod movetur est potentia ad opposita: quia termini motus sunt oppositi. Et ideo, quantum est de se, omne corpus quod movetur possibile est non moveri. Et quod possibile est non moveri, non habet de se ut perpetuo tempore moveatur. Et sic nec quod in perpetuo tempore moveat. [23] To this the reply is, as we have proved, that a body does not move unless it be moved. If, then, it should happen that a certain body is not moved, that body will consequently not move. But in everything that is moved there is a potency towards opposites, since the termini of motion are opposites. Therefore, of itself, every body that is moved can also not-be-moved. But what can not-be-moved is not of itself able to be moved through endless time, and hence neither to move through endless time.
Procedit ergo praedicta demonstratio de potentia finita corporis finiti, quae non potest de se movere tempore infinito. Sed corpus quod de se possibile est moveri et non moveri, movere et non movere, acquirere potest perpetuitatem motus ab aliquo. Quod oportet esse incorporeum. Et ideo oportet primum movens esse incorporeum. Et sic nihil prohibet secundum naturam corpus finitum, quod acquirit ab alio perpetuitatem in moveri, habere etiam perpetuitatem in movere: nam et ipsum primum corpus caeleste, secundum naturam, potest perpetuo motu inferiora corpora caelestia revolvere, secundum quod sphaera movet sphaeram.
Nec est inconveniens secundum Commentatorem quod illud quod de se est in potentia moveri et non moveri, acquirat ab alio perpetuitatem motus, sicut ponebatur esse impossibile de perpetuitate essendi. Nam motus est quidam defluxus a movente in mobile: et ideo potest aliquod mobile acquirere ab alio perpetuitatem motus, quam non habet de se. Esse autem est aliquid fixum et quietum in ente: et ideo quod de se est in potentia ad non esse, non potest, ut ipse dicit, secundum viam naturae acquirere ab alio perpetuitatem essendi.
[24] The above demonstration, consequently, holds of the finite power of a finite body, which power of itself cannot move in an infinite time. But a body that of itself can be moved and not-moved, move and not-move, can acquire perpetuity of motion from another. This must be incorporeal. The first mover must, therefore, be incorporeal. Thus, according to its nature, nothing prevents a finite body, which acquires from another a perpetuity in being moved, from likewise having a perpetuity in moving. For the first heavenly body itself, according to its nature, can revolve the lower heavenly bodies with a perpetual motion, according as sphere moves sphere.
Nor, according to the Commentator, is it impossible (as it was impossible in the me of perpetuity of being) that what of itself can be moved and not-moved should acquire perpetuity of motion from another. For motion is a certain flow out of the mover to the thing moved, and hence something moved can acquire from another a perpetuity of motion that it does not have of itself. To be, on the other hand, is something fixed and at rest in being, and, therefore, that which of itself is in potency to non-being cannot, as Averroes himself says [ In XII Metaphysicorum ], following the course of nature acquire from another a perpetuity of being.
Quinta obiectio est quod per praedictum processum non videtur maior ratio quare non sit potentia infinita in magnitudine quam extra magnitudinem: nam utrobique sequetur quod moveat non in tempore. [25] The fifth objection is that, following the above reasoning, there does not seem to be a greater reason why an infinite power is not in a magnitude rather than outside a magnitude. For in either case it will follow that it moves in null time.
Et ad hoc dicendum quod finitum et infinitum in magnitudine et tempore et motu inveniuntur secundum unam rationem, sicut probatur in III et in VI Physic.: et ideo infinitum in uno eorum aufert proportionem finitam in aliis. In his autem quae carent magnitudine, non est finitum et infinitum nisi aequivoce. Unde praedictus modus demonstrandi in talibus potentiis locum non habet. [26] To this the reply is that, in magnitude, time, and motion, finite and infinite are found according to one and the same notion, as is proved in Physics III [4] and VI [2, 7]. Therefore, the infinite in one of them removes a finite proportion in the others. But in beings without magnitude there is no finite or infinite except equivocally. Hence, the aforementioned method of demonstration is not applicable among such potencies.
Aliter autem respondetur et melius, quod caelum habet duos motores: unum proximum, qui est finitae virtutis, et ab hoc habet quod motus eius sit finitae velocitatis; et alium remotum, qui est infinitae virtutis, a quo habet quod motus eius possit esse infinitae durationis. Et sic patet quod potentia infinita quae non est in magnitudine, potest movere corpus non immediate in tempore. Sed potentia quae est in magnitudine oportet quod moveat immediate: cum nullum corpus moveat nisi motum. Unde, si moveret, sequeretur quod moveret in non tempore. [27] There is, however, another and better answer. The heavens have two movers, a proximate one with a finite power, which is responsible for the fact that they have a finite velocity, and a remote mover with an infinite power, which is responsible for the fact that their motion can be of an infinite duration. And thus it is evident that an infinite power that is not in a magnitude can move a body in time, but not immediately. But a power that is in a magnitude must move immediately, since no body moves except by being moved. Hence, if it did move, it would follow that it would move in null time.
Potest adhuc melius dici quod potentia quae non est in magnitudine est intellectus, et movet per voluntatem. Unde movet secundum exigentiam mobilis, et non secundum proportionem suae virtutis. Potentia autem quae est in magnitudine non potest movere nisi per necessitatem naturae: quia probatum est quod intellectus non est virtus corporea. Et sic movet de necessitate secundum proportionem suae quantitatis. Unde sequitur, si movet, quod moveat in instanti. [28] An even better reply is this. A power that is not in a magnitude is an intellect, and moves by will. For we have proved that the intellect is not a corporeal power. Therefore, it moves according to the needs of the movable body and not the proportion of its power; whereas a power that is in a magnitude can move only through the necessity of nature. Thus, of necessity, it moves according to the proportion of its quantity. Hence, if it moves, it moves in an instant.
Secundum hoc ergo, remotis praedictis obiectionibus, procedit demonstratio Aristotelis. [29] Thus, with the removal of the preceding objections, we see that the argumentation of Aristotle stands.
Amplius. Nullus motus qui est a movente corporeo potest esse continuus et regularis: eo quod movens corporale in motu locali movet attrahendo vel expellendo; id autem quod attrahitur vel expellitur non in eadem dispositione se habet ad moventem a principio motus usque ad finem, cum quandoque sit propinquius, quandoque remotius; et sic nullum corpus potest movere motum continuum et regularem. Motus autem primus est continuus et regularis, ut probatur in VIII Physic. Igitur movens primum motum non est corpus. [30] No motion, furthermore, which is from a corporeal mover can be continuous and regular, because in local motion a corporeal mover moves by pulling and pushing. Now, what is pulled or pushed is not uniformly disposed towards its mover from the beginning to the end of the motion, since at times it will be nearer and at other times farther away. Thus, no body can move with a continuous and regular motion. But the first motion is continuous and regular, as is proved in Physics VIII [7]. Therefore, the mover of the first motion is not a body.
Item. Nullus motus qui est ad finem qui exit de potentia in actum, potest esse perpetuus: quia, cum perventum fuerit ad actum, motus quiescit. Si ergo motus primus est perpetuus, oportet quod sit ad finem qui sit semper et omnibus modis in actu. Tale autem non est aliquod corpus neque aliqua virtus in corpore: cum omnia huiusmodi sint mobilia per se vel per accidens. Igitur finis primi motus non est corpus neque virtus in corpore. Finis autem primi motus est primum movens, quod movet sicut desideratum. Hoc autem est Deus. Deus igitur neque est corpus neque virtus in corpore. [31] Again, no motion to an end that passes from potency to act can be endless, since when it reaches act the motion comes to rest. If, then, the first motion is endless, it must aim at an end that is always and in all ways in act. But such an end is not a body or a power in a body, since all such things are movable either through themselves or by accident. Therefore, the end of the first motion is neither a body nor a power in a body. But the end of the first motion is the first mover, which moves as something desired. This, however, is God. God, therefore, is neither a body nor a power in a body.
Quamvis autem falsum sit, secundum fidem nostram, quod motus caeli sit perpetuus, ut infra patebit; tamen verum est quod motus ille non deficiet neque propter impotentiam motoris, neque propter corruptionem substantiae mobilis, cum non videatur motus caeli per diuturnitatem temporis lentescere. Unde demonstrationes praedictae suam efficaciam non perdunt. [32] However, although according to our faith it is false that the motion of the heavens is perpetual, as will be made evident later on, yet it is true that it will not fail either through a failure of power in the mover or through the corruption of the substance in the moved; for there is no evidence that the passing of time has slowed down the motion of the heavens. Hence, the above demonstrations do not lose their force.
Huic autem veritati demonstratae concordat divina auctoritas. Dicitur enim Ioan. 4-24: spiritus est Deus, et eos qui eum adorant, in spiritu et veritate adorare oportet. Dicitur etiam 1 Tim. 1-17: regi saeculorum immortali, invisibili, soli Deo. Et Rom. 1-20: invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur: quae enim non visu sed intellectu conspiciuntur, incorporea sunt. [33] With this demonstrated truth divine authority stands in agreement. For it is said in John (4:24): “God is a spirit, and they that adore Him must adore Him in spirit and in truth.” It is likewise said: “To the King of ages. immortal, invisible, the only God” (1 Tim. 1:17). Again: “The invisible things of God... are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made” (Rom. 1:20); for what is seen, not by sight, but by the intellect, is incorporeal.
Per hoc autem destruitur error primorum philosophorum naturalium, qui non ponebant nisi causas materiales, ut ignem vel aquam vel aliquid huiusmodi; et sic prima rerum principia corpora dicebant, et eadem vocabant deos.
Inter quos etiam quidam fuerunt ponentes causas moventes amicitiam et litem. Qui etiam propter praedictas rationes confutantur. Nam, cum lis et amicitia sint in corporibus secundum eos, sequetur prima principia moventia esse virtutes in corpore.
Ipsi etiam ponebant Deum esse compositum ex quatuor elementis et amicitia. Per quod datur intelligi quod posuerunt Deum esse corpus caeleste.
Inter antiquos autem solus Anaxagoras ad veritatem accessit, ponens intellectum moventem omnia.
[34] Thereby is destroyed the error of the early natural philosophers, who posited only material causes, such as fire or water or the like, and who thus said that the first principles of things were bodies and called them gods.
Among them there were some who further posited friendship and strife as moving causes. (They, too, were refuted through the above arguments.) For since, according to them, strife and friendship are in bodies, it will follow that the first moving principles are bodily powers.
They also held that God is composed of the four elements and friendship, which would give us to understand that for them God was a heavenly body.
Among the early thinkers, Anaxagoras alone approached the truth by positing that an intellect moved all things.
Hac etiam veritate redarguuntur gentiles ponentes ipsa elementa mundi et virtutes in eis existentes deos esse, ut solem, lunam, terram, aquam et huiusmodi, occasionem habentes ex praedictis philosophorum erroribus. [35] By this truth, too, are refuted the Gentiles, who, taking their beginning in the errors of the philosophers we have listed, posited that the elements of the world and the powers in them are gods; for example, the sun, the moon, the earth, water, and the like.
Praedictis etiam rationibus excluduntur deliramenta Iudaeorum simplicium, Tertulliani, Vadianorum sive Anthropomorphitarum haereticorum qui Deum corporalibus lineamentis figurabant: necnon et Manichaeorum, qui quandam infinitam lucis substantiam per infinitum spatium distentam Deum aestimabant. [36] By the same arguments, moreover, are set aside the wild fantasies of the simple Jews, Tertullian, the Vodiani or Anthropomorphite heretics, who endowed God with a bodily figure; and also of the Manicheans, who thought that God was a certain infinite substance of light, stretched out through an infinite space.
Quorum omnium errorum fuit occasio quod de divinis cogitantes ad imaginationem deducebantur, per quam non potest accipi nisi corporis similitudo. Et ideo eam in incorporeis meditandis derelinquere oportet. [37] The occasion of all these errors was that, in thinking of divine things, men were made the victims of their imagination, through which it is not possible to receive anything except the likeness of a body. This is why, in meditating on what is incorporeal, we must stop following the imagination.

Caput 21 Chapter 21
Quod Deus est sua essentia THAT GOD IS HIS ESSENCE
Ex praemissis autem haberi potest quod Deus est sua essentia, quidditas seu natura. [1] From what has been laid down we can infer that God is His essence, quiddity, or nature.
In omni enim eo quod non est sua essentia sive quidditas, oportet aliquam esse compositionem. Cum enim in unoquoque sit sua essentia, si nihil in aliquo esset praeter eius essentiam, totum quod res est esset eius essentia: et sic ipsum esset sua essentia. Si igitur aliquid non esset sua essentia, oportet aliquid in eo esse praeter eius essentiam. Et sic oportet in eo esse compositionem. Unde etiam essentia in compositis significatur per modum partis, ut humanitas in homine. Ostensum est autem in Deo nullam esse compositionem. Deus igitur est sua essentia. [2] There must be some composition in every being that is not its essence or quiddity. Since, indeed, each thing possesses its own essence, if there were nothing in a thing outside its essence all that the thing is would be its essence; which would mean that the thing is its essence. But, if some thing were not its essence, there should be something in it outside its essence. Thus, there must be composition in it. Hence it is that the essence in composite things is signified as a part, for example, humanity in man. Now, it has been shown that there is no composition in God. God is, therefore, His essence.
Adhuc. Solum illud videtur esse praeter essentiam vel quidditatem rei quod non intrat definitionem ipsius: definitio enim significat quid est res. Sola autem accidentia rei sunt quae in definitione non cadunt. Sola igitur accidentia sunt in re aliqua praeter essentiam eius. In Deo autem non sunt aliqua accidentia, ut ostendetur. Nihil igitur est in eo praeter essentiam eius. Est igitur ipse sua essentia. [3] Moreover, only that which does not enter the definition of a thing seems to be outside its essence or quiddity; for the definition signifies what a thing is. But it is only the accidents of a thing that do not fall in the definition; and therefore only the accidents in any thing are outside its essence. But, as will be shown, in God there are no accidents. There is, therefore, nothing in God outside His essence; and hence He is His essence.
Amplius. Formae quae de rebus subsistentibus non praedicantur, sive in universali sive in singulari acceptis, sunt formae quae non per se singulariter subsistunt in seipsis individuatae. Non enim dicitur quod Socrates aut homo aut animal sit albedo, quia albedo non est per se singulariter subsistens, sed individuatur per subiectum subsistens. Similiter etiam formae naturales non subsistunt per se singulariter, sed individuantur in propriis materiis: unde non dicimus quod hic ignis, aut ignis, sit sua forma. Ipsae etiam essentiae vel quidditates generum vel specierum individuantur per materiam signatam huius vel illius individui, licet etiam quidditas generis vel speciei formam includat et materiam in communi: unde non dicitur quod Socrates, vel homo, sit humanitas. Sed divina essentia est per se singulariter existens et in seipsa individuata: cum non sit in aliqua materia, ut ostensum est. Divina igitur essentia praedicatur de Deo, ut dicatur: Deus est sua essentia. [4] Furthermore, forms that are not predicated of subsisting things, whether these be considered universally or each is taken singly, are forms that do not subsist through themselves as singulars individuated in themselves. We do not say that Socrates, or man, or animal is whiteness, because whiteness does not subsist as a singular through itself but is individuated through its subsisting subjects. In the same way, also, natural forms do not subsist as singulars through themselves but are individuated in their proper matters. That is why we do not say that this fire, or fire, is its own form. The very essences or quiddities of genera and species are individuated through the designated matter of this or that individual, even though the quiddity of the genus or the species should include common form and matter. That is why we do not say that Socrates or man is humanity. But the divine essence exists through itself as a singular existent and individuated through itself; for, as we have shown, it is not in any matter. The divine essence is predicated of God, therefore, so that we may say: God is His essence.
Praeterea. Essentia rei vel est res ipsa vel se habet ad ipsam aliquo modo ut causa: cum res per suam essentiam speciem sortiatur. Sed nullo modo potest esse aliquid causa Dei: cum sit primum ens, ut ostensum est. Deus igitur est sua essentia. [5] Again, the essence of a thing is either the thing itself or is related to the thing in some way as its cause; for a thing derives its species through its essence. But nothing can in any way be the cause of God, since, as we have shown, He is the first being. God is, therefore, His essence.
Item. Quod non est sua essentia, se habet secundum aliquid sui ad ipsam ut potentia ad actum. Unde et per modum formae significatur essentia, ut puta, humanitas. Sed in Deo nulla est potentialitas, ut supra ostensum est. Oportet igitur quod ipse sit sua essentia. [6] Then, too, what is not its essence is related to its essence, according to some part of itself, as potency to act. That is why the essence is signified in the manner of a form, for example, humanity. But, as was shown above, there is no potentiality in God. He must, therefore, be His essence.

Caput 22 Chapter 22
Quod in Deo idem est esse et essentia THAT IN GOD BEING AND ESSENCE ARE THE SAME
Ex his autem quae supra ostensa sunt, ulterius probari potest quod in Deo non est aliud essentia vel quidditas quam suum esse. [1] From what was proved above, however, we can further prove that His essence or quiddity is not something other than His being.
Ostensum est enim supra aliquid esse quod per se necesse est esse, quod Deus est. Hoc igitur esse quod necesse est, si est alicui quidditati quae non est quod ipsum est, aut est dissonum illi quidditati seu repugnans, sicut per se existere quidditati albedinis: aut ei consonum sive affine, sicut albedini esse in alio. Si primo modo, illi quidditati non conveniet esse quod est per se necesse: sicut nec albedini per se existere. Si autem secundo modo, oportet quod vel esse huiusmodi dependeat ab essentia; vel utrumque ab alia causa; vel essentia ab esse. Prima duo sunt contra rationem eius quod est per se necesse-esse: quia, si ab alio dependet, iam non est necesse esse. Ex tertio vero sequitur quod illa quidditas accidentaliter adveniat ad rem quae per se necesse est esse: quia omne quod sequitur ad esse rei, est ei accidentale. Et sic non erit eius quidditas. Deus igitur non habet essentiam quae non sit suum esse. [2] For it was shown above that there is some being that must be through itself, and this is God. If, then, this being that must be belongs to an essence that is not that which it is, either it is incompatible with that essence or repugnant to it, as to exist through itself is repugnant to the quiddity of whiteness, or it is compatible with it or appropriate to it, as to be in another is to whiteness. If the first alternative be the case, the being that is through itself necessary will not befit that quiddity, just as it does not befit whiteness to exist through itself. If the second alternative be the case, either such being must depend on the essence, or both must depend on another cause, or the essence must depend on the being. The first two alternatives are contrary to the nature of that which is through itself a necessary being; for if it depends on another, it is no longer a necessary being. From the third alternative it follows that that quiddity is added accidentally to the thing that is through itself a necessary being; for what follows upon a thing’s being is accidental to it and hence not its quiddity. God, therefore, does not have an essence that is not His being.
Sed contra hoc potest dici quod illud esse non absolute dependet ab essentia illa, ut omnino non sit nisi illa esset: sed dependet quantum ad coniunctionem qua ei coniungitur. Et sic illud esse per se necesse est, sed ipsum coniungi non per se necesse est. [3] But against this conclusion it can be objected that that being does not absolutely depend on that essence, so as not to be unless the essence existed; it depends, rather, on the essence with reference to the union by which it is joined to it. Thus, that being is through itself necessary, but its union with the essence is not.
Haec autem responsio praedicta inconvenientia non evadit. Quia si illud esse potest intelligi sine illa essentia, sequetur quod illa essentia accidentaliter se habet ad illud esse. Sed id quod est per se necesse-esse est illud esse. Ergo illa essentia se habet accidentaliter ad id quod est per se necesse esse. Non ergo est quidditas eius. Hoc autem quod est per per se necesse-esse, est Deus. Non igitur illa est essentia Dei, sed aliqua essentia Deo posterior. Si autem non potest intelligi illud esse sine illa essentia, tunc illud esse absolute dependet ab eo a quo dependet coniunctio sua ad essentiam illam. Et sic redit idem quod prius. [4] However, this reply does not escape the aforementioned difficulties. For, if that being can be understood without that essence, it will follow that the essence is related to that being in an accidental way. But that being is that which is through itself a necessary being. Therefore, that essence is related in an accidental way to that which is through itself a necessary being. It is, therefore, not its essence. But that which is through itself a necessary being is God. That essence, then, is not the essence of God, but some essence below God. On the other hand, if that being cannot be understood without that essence, it depends absolutely on that on which its union to that essence depends. We then reach the same impasse as before.
Item. Unumquodque est per suum esse. Quod igitur non est suum esse, non est per se necesse-esse. Deus autem est per se necesse-esse. Ergo Deus est suum esse. 15] Another argument. Each thing is through its own being. Hence, that which is not its own being is not through itself a necessary being. But God is through Himself a necessary being. He is, therefore, His own being.
Amplius. Si esse Dei non est sua essentia, non autem pars eius esse potest, cum essentia divina sit simplex, ut ostensum est, oportet quod huiusmodi esse sit aliquid praeter essentiam eius. Omne autem quod convenit alicui quod non est de essentia eius, convenit ei per aliquam causam: ea enim quae per se non sunt unum, si coniungantur, oportet per aliquam causam uniri. Esse igitur convenit illi quidditati per aliquam causam. Aut igitur per aliquid quod est de essentia illius rei, sive per essentiam ipsam, aut per aliquid aliud. Si primo modo, essentia autem est secundum illud esse, sequitur quod aliquid sit sibi ipsi causa essendi. Hoc autem est impossibile: quia prius secundum intellectum est causam esse quam effectum; si ergo aliquid sibi ipsi esset causa essendi, intelligeretur esse antequam haberet esse, quod est impossibile:- nisi intelligatur quod aliquid sit sibi causa essendi secundum esse accidentale, quod esse est secundum quid. Hoc enim non est impossibile: invenitur enim aliquod ens accidentale causatum ex principiis sui subiecti, ante quod esse intelligitur esse substantiale subiecti. Nunc autem non loquimur de esse accidentali, sed de substantiali. Si autem illi conveniat per aliquam aliam causam; omne autem quod acquirit esse ab alia causa, est causatum, et non est causa prima; Deus autem est prima causa non habens causam, ut supra demonstratum est: igitur ista quidditas quae acquirit esse aliunde, non est quidditas Dei. Necesse est igitur quod Dei esse quidditas sua sit. [6] Again, if God’s being is not His essence, and cannot be part of that essence, since, as we have shown, the divine essence is simple, such a being must be something outside the divine essence. But whatever belongs to a thing and is yet not of its essence belongs to it through some cause; for, if things that are not through themselves one are joined, they must be joined through some cause. Being, therefore, belongs to that quiddity through some cause. This is either through something that is part of the essence of that thing, or the essence itself, or through something else. If we adopt the first alternative, and it is a fact that the essence is through that being, it follows that something is the cause of its own being. This is impossible, because, in their notions, the existence of the cause is prior to that of the effect. If, then, something were its own cause of being, it would be understood to be before it had being—which is impossible, unless we understand that something is the cause of its own being in an accidental order, which is being in an accidental way. This is not impossible. It is possible that there be an accidental being that is caused by the principles of its subject before the substantial being of its subject is understood as given. Here, however, we are speaking of substantial being, not accidental being. On the other hand, if the being belongs to the essence through some other cause, then this follows: given that what acquires its being from another cause is something caused, and is not the first cause, whereas God, as was demonstrated above, is the first cause and has no cause, the quiddity that acquires its being from another is not the quiddity of God. God's being must, therefore, be His quiddity.
Amplius. Esse actum quendam nominat: non enim dicitur esse aliquid ex hoc quod est in potentia, sed ex eo quod est in actu. Omne autem cui convenit actus aliquis diversum ab eo existens, se habet ad ipsum ut potentia ad actum: actus enim et potentia ad se invicem dicuntur. Si ergo divina essentia est aliud quam suum esse, sequitur quod essentia et esse se habeant sicut potentia et actus. Ostensum est autem in Deo nihil esse de potentia, sed ipsum esse purum actum. Non igitur Dei essentia est aliud quam suum esse. [7] Being, furthermore, is the name of an act, for a thing is not said to be because it is in potency but because it is in act. Everything, however, that has an act diverse from it is related to that act as potency to act; for potency and act are said relatively to one another. If, then, the divine essence is something other than its being, the essence and the being are thereby related as potency and act. But we have shown that in God there is no potency, but that He is pure act. God's essence, therefore, is not something other than His being.
Item. Omne illud quod non potest esse nisi concurrentibus pluribus, est compositum. Sed nulla res in qua est aliud essentia et aliud esse, potest esse nisi concurrentibus pluribus, scilicet essentia et esse. Ergo omnis res in qua est aliud essentia et aliud esse, est composita. Deus autem non est compositus, ut ostensum est. Ipsum igitur esse Dei est sua essentia. [8] Moreover, if something can exist only when several elements come together, it is composite. But no thing in which the essence is other than the being can exist unless several elements come together, namely, the essence and the being. Hence, every thing in which the essence is other than the being is composite. But, as we have shown, God is not composite. Therefore, God's being is His essence.
Amplius. Omnis res est per hoc quod habet esse. Nulla igitur res cuius essentia non est suum esse, est per essentiam suam, sed participatione alicuius, scilicet ipsius esse. Quod autem est per participationem alicuius, non potest esse primum ens: quia id quod aliquid participat ad hoc quod sit, est eo prius. Deus autem est primum ens, quo nihil est prius. Dei igitur essentia est suum esse. [9] Every thing, furthermore, exists because it has being. A thing whose essence is not its being, consequently, is not through its essence but by participation in something, namely, being itself. But that which is through participation in something cannot be the first being, because prior to it is the being in which it participates in order to be. But God is the first being, with nothing prior to Him. His essence is, therefore, His being.
Hanc autem sublimem veritatem Moyses a domino est edoctus, qui cum quaereret a domino, Exod. 3 dicens: si dixerint ad me filii Israel, quod nomen eius? Quid dicam eis? Dominus respondit: ego sum qui sum. Sic dices filiis Israel: qui est misit me ad vos, ostendens suum proprium nomen esse qui est. Quodlibet autem nomen est institutum ad significandum naturam seu essentiam alicuius rei. Unde relinquitur quod ipsum divinum esse est sua essentia vel natura. [10] This sublime truth Moses was taught by our Lord. When Moses asked our Lord: “If the children of Israel say to me: what is His name? What shall I say to them?” The Lord replied: “I AM WHO AM.... You shall say to the children of Israel: HE WHO IS has sent me to you” (Exod. 3:13, 14). By this our Lord showed that His own proper name is HE WHO IS. Now, names have been devised to signify the natures or essences of things. It remains, then, that the divine being is God's essence or nature.
Hanc etiam veritatem Catholici doctores professi sunt. Ait namque Hilarius, in libro de Trin.: esse non est accidens Deo, sed subsistens veritas, et manens causa, et naturalis generis proprietas. Boetius etiam dicit, in libro de Trin., quod divina substantia est ipsum esse et ab ea est esse. [11] Catholic teachers have likewise professed this truth. For Hilary writes in his book De Trinitate [II]: “Being is not an accident in God but subsisting truth, the abiding cause and the natural property His nature.” Boethius also says in his own work De Trinitate [II]: “The divine substance is being itself, and from it comes being.”

Caput 23 Chapter 23
Quod in Deo non est accidens THAT NO ACCIDENT IS FOUND IN GOD
Ex hac etiam veritate de necessitate sequitur quod Deo supra eius essentiam nihil supervenire possit, neque aliquid ei accidentaliter inesse. [1] It follows necessarily from this truth that nothing can come to God beyond His essence, nor can there be anything in Him in an accidental way.
Ipsum enim esse non potest participare aliquid quod non sit de essentia sua: quamvis id quod est possit aliquid aliud participare. Nihil enim est formalius aut simplicius quam esse. Et sic ipsum esse nihil participare potest. Divina autem substantia est ipsum esse. Ergo nihil habet quod non sit de sua substantia. Nullum ergo accidens ei inesse potest. [2] For being cannot participate in anything that is not of its essence, although that which is can participate in something. The reason is that nothing is more formal or more simple than being, which thus participates in nothing. But the divine substance is being itself, and therefore has nothing that is not of its substance. Hence, no accident can reside in it.
Amplius. Omne quod inest alicui accidentaliter, habet causam quare insit: cum sit praeter essentiam eius cui inest. Si igitur aliquid accidentaliter sit in Deo, oportet quod hoc sit per aliquam causam. Aut ergo causa accidentis est ipsa divina substantia, aut aliquid aliud. Si aliquid aliud, oportet quod illud agat in divinam substantiam: nihil enim inducit aliquam formam, vel substantialem vel accidentalem, in aliquo recipiente, nisi aliquo modo agendo in ipsum; eo quod agere nihil aliud est quam facere aliquid actu, quod quidem est per formam. Ergo Deus patietur et movebitur ab alio agente. Quod est contra praedeterminata. Si autem ipsa divina substantia est causa accidentis quod sibi inest; impossibile est autem quod sit causa illius secundum quod est recipiens ipsum, quia sic idem secundum idem faceret seipsum in actu; ergo oportet, si in Deo est aliquod accidens, quod secundum aliud et aliud recipiat et causet accidens illud, sicut corporalia recipiunt propria accidentia per naturam materiae et causant per formam. Sic igitur Deus erit compositus. Cuius contrarium superius probatum est. [3] Furthermore, what is present in a thing accidentally has a cause of its presence, since it is outside the essence of the thing in which it is found. If, then, something is found in God accidentally, this must be through some cause. Now, the cause of the accident is either the divine essence itself or something else. If something else, it must act on the divine essence, since nothing will cause the introduction of some form, substantial or accidental, in some receiving subject except by acting on it in some way. For to act is nothing other than to make something actual, which takes place through a form. Thus, God will suffer and receive the action of some cause—which is contrary to what we already established. On the other hand, let us suppose that the divine substance is the cause of the accident inhering in it. Now it is impossible that it be, as receiving it, the cause of the accident, for then one and the same thing would make itself to be actual in the same respect. Therefore, if there is an accident in God, it will be according to different respects that He receives and causes that accident, just as bodily things receive their accidents through the nature of their matter and cause them through their form. Thus, God will be composite. But, we have proved the contrary of this proposition above.
Item. Omne subiectum accidentis comparatur ad ipsum ut potentia ad actum: eo quod accidens quaedam forma est faciens esse actu secundum esse accidentale. Sed in Deo nulla est potentialitas, ut supra ostensum est. In eo igitur nullum accidens esse potest. [4] Every subject of an accident, moreover, is related to it as potency to act, since the accident is a certain form making the subject to be actual according to an accidental being. But, as we have shown above, there is no potentiality in God. There can, therefore, be no accident in Him.
Adhuc. Cuicumque inest aliquid accidentaliter, est aliquo modo secundum suam naturam mutabile: accidens enim de se natum est inesse et non inesse. Si igitur Deus habet aliquid accidentaliter sibi conveniens, sequetur quod ipse sit mutabilis. Cuius contrarium supra demonstratum est. [5] Then, too, when a being has an accident inhering in it, it is in some way mutable according to its nature, since an accident can inhere or not-inhere. If, then, God has something belonging to Him in an accidental way, He will consequently be mutable. But the contrary of this was demonstrated above.
Amplius. Cuicumque inest aliquod accidens, non est quidquid habet in se: quia accidens non est de essentia subiecti. Sed Deus est quidquid in se habet. In Deo igitur nullum est accidens. Media sic probatur. Unumquodque nobilius invenitur in causa quam in effectu. Deus autem est omnium causa. Ergo quidquid est in eo, nobilissimo modo in eo invenitur. Perfectissime autem convenit aliquid alicui quod est ipsummet: hoc enim perfectius est unum quam cum aliquid alteri substantialiter unitur ut forma materiae; quae etiam unio perfectior est quam cum aliquid accidentaliter inest. Relinquitur ergo quod Deus sit quidquid habet. [6] Again, that which has an accident inhering in it is not whatever it has in itself, since an accident is not part of the essence of the subject. But God is what He has in Himself. There is, therefore, no accident in God. The minor proposition is proved thus. Everything is found in a more noble way in the cause than in an effect. But God is the cause of all things. Hence, whatever is in Him is there in the most noble way. Now, what a thing itself is, this belongs to it in a most perfect way. For this is some thing more perfectly one than when something is joined to something else substantially as form to matter; just as substantial union is more perfect than when something inheres in something else as an accident. God, then, is whatever He has.
Item. Substantia non dependet ab accidente: quamvis accidens dependeat a substantia. Quod autem non dependet ab aliquo, potest aliquando inveniri sine illo. Ergo potest aliqua substantia inveniri sine accidente. Hoc autem praecipue videtur simplicissimae substantiae convenire, qualis est substantia divina. Divinae igitur substantiae omnino accidens non inest. [7] It is also a fact that a substance does not depend on an accident, although an accident depends on a substance. But what does not depend on something can sometimes be found without it. Some substance, then, can be found without an accident. This seems especially to fit the substance that is most simple, such as the divine substance is. The divine substance, therefore, has no accidents whatever.
In hanc autem sententiam etiam Catholici tractatores conveniunt. Unde Augustinus, in libro de Trin., dicit quod in Deo nullum est accidens. [8] In dealing with this problem, Catholics likewise give assent to this opinion. Whence Augustine says in his De Trinitate [V, 4] that “there is no accident in God.”
Ex hac autem veritate ostensa, error quorundam in lege Sarracenorum loquentium confutatur, qui ponunt quasdam intentiones divinae essentiae superadditas. [9] The proof of this truth serves as a refutation of the error of some Saracen theologians “who posit certain intentions superadded to the divine essence.

Caput 24 Chapter 24
Quod divinum esse non potest designari per additionem alicuius differentiae substantialis THAT THE DIVINE BEING CANNOT BE DETERMINED BY THE ADDITION OF SOME SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE
Ostendi etiam ex praedictis potest quod supra ipsum divinum esse non potest aliquid superaddi quod designet ipsum designatione essentiali, sicut designatur genus per differentias. [1] We can likewise show from what we have said that nothing can be added to the divine being to determine it with an essential determination, as a genus is determined by its differences.
Impossibile est enim aliquid esse in actu nisi omnibus existentibus quibus esse substantiale designatur: non enim potest esse animal in actu quin sit animal rationale vel irrationale. Unde etiam Platonici, ponentes ideas, non posuerunt ideas per se existentes generum, quae designantur ad esse speciei per differentias essentiales; sed posuerunt ideas per se existentes solarum specierum, quae ad sui designationem non indigent essentialibus differentiis. Si igitur divinum esse per aliquid aliud superadditum designetur designatione essentiali, ipsum esse non erit in actu nisi illo superaddito existente. Sed ipsum esse divinum est sua substantia, ut ostensum est. Ergo substantia divina non potest esse in actu nisi aliquo superveniente. Ex quo potest concludi quod non sit per se necesse-esse. Cuius contrarium supra ostensum est. [2] Nothing can be in act unless everything that determines its substantial act of being exists. Thus, there cannot be an actual animal unless it be a rational or an irrational animal. Hence, the Platonists themselves, in positing the Ideas, did not posit self-existing Ideas of genera, which are determined to the being of their species through essential differences; rather, they posited self-existing Ideas solely of species, which for their determination need no essential differences. If, then, the divine being is determined essentially through something else superadded to it, it will be in act only if what is superadded is present. But the divine being, as we have shown, is the divine substance itself. Therefore the divine substance cannot be in act without the presence of something added; from which it can be concluded that it is not through itself a necessary being. But, we have proved the contrary of this proposition above.
Item. Omne illud quod indiget aliquo superaddito ad hoc quod possit esse, est in potentia respectu illius. Sed divina substantia non est aliquo modo in potentia, ut supra ostensum est. Sed sua substantia est suum esse. Igitur esse suum non potest designari aliqua designatione substantiali per aliquid sibi superadditum. [3] Moreover, what needs an addition in order to be is in potency in relation to this addition. But, as we have shown, the divine substance is not in any way in potency; rather, the divine substance is its being. The divine being, therefore, cannot be determined in its substance through something superadded to it.
Amplius. Omne illud per quod res consequitur esse in actu et est intrinsecum rei, vel est tota essentia rei, vel pars essentiae. Quod autem designat aliquid designatione essentiali, facit rem esse actu et est intrinsecum rei designatae: alias per id designari non posset substantialiter. Ergo oportet quod sit vel ipsa essentia rei, vel pars essentiae. Sed si aliquid superadditur ad esse divinum, hoc non potest esse tota essentia Dei: quia iam ostensum est quod esse Dei non est aliud ab essentia eius. Relinquitur ergo quod sit pars essentiae divinae. Et sic Deus erit compositus ex partibus essentialiter. Cuius contrarium supra ostensum est. [4] Again, that through which a thing derives being in act and is intrinsic to it is either the whole essence of that thing or a part of the essence. But that which determines something in an essential way makes that thing to be in act and is intrinsic to the determined thing; otherwise, the thing could not be determined substantially by it. It must therefore be either the essence itself or a part of the essence. But, if something is added to the divine being, this cannot be the whole essence of God, since it has already been shown that God’s being is not other than His essence. It must, then, be a part of the essence, which means that God will be composed of essential parts. But, we have proved the contrary of this above.
Item. Quod additur alicui ad designationem alicuius designatione essentiali, non constituit eius rationem, sed solum esse in actu: rationale enim additum animali acquirit animali esse in actu, non autem constituit rationem animalis inquantum est animal; nam differentia non intrat definitionem generis. Sed si in Deo addatur aliquid per quod designetur designatione essentiali, oportet quod illud constituat ei cui additur rationem propriae eius quidditatis seu naturae: nam quod sic additur, acquirit rei esse in actu; hoc autem, scilicet esse in actu, est ipsa divina essentia, ut supra ostensum est. Relinquitur ergo quod supra divinum esse nihil possit addi quod designet ipsum designatione essentiali, sicut differentia designat genus. [5] Furthermore, what is added to a thing to give it a certain essential determination does not constitute its nature but only its being in act. For rational added to animal gains for animal being in act, but it does not constitute the nature of animal as animal, since the difference does not enter the definition of the genus. But, if something is added in God by which He is determined in His essence, that addition must constitute for the being to which it is added the nature of its own quiddity or essence, since what is thus added gains for a thing its being in act. But in God this “being in act” is the divine essence itself, as we have shown above. It remains, then, that to the divine being nothing can be added that determines it in an essential way, as the difference determines the genus.

Caput 25 Chapter 25
Quod Deus non est in aliquo genere THAT GOD IS NOT IN SOME GENUS
Ex hoc autem de necessitate concluditur quod Deus non sit in aliquo genere. [1] From this we infer necessarily that God is not in some genus.
Nam omne quod est in aliquo genere, habet aliquid in se per quod natura generis designatur ad speciem: nihil enim est in genere quod non sit in aliqua eius specie. Hoc autem in Deo est impossibile, ut ostensum est. Impossibile est igitur Deum esse in aliquo genere. [2] Every thing in a genus has something within it by which the nature of the genus is determined to its species; for nothing is in a genus that is not in some species of that genus. But, as we have shown, this determination cannot take place in God. God cannot, then, be in some genus.
Amplius. Si Deus sit in genere, aut est in genere accidentis, aut in genere substantiae. In genere accidentis non est: accidens enim non potest esse primum ens et prima causa. In genere etiam substantiae esse non potest: quia substantia quae est genus, non est ipsum esse; alias omnis substantia esset esse suum, et sic non esset causata ab alio, quod esse non potest, ut patet ex dictis. Deus autem est ipsum esse. Igitur non est in aliquo genere. [3] If, moreover, God is in a genus, either He is in the genus of accident or in that of substance. He is not in the genus of accident, since the first being and the first cause cannot be an accident. Neither can God be in the genus of substance, since the substance that is a genus is not being itself; otherwise, every substance would be its being and would thus not be caused by another—which is impossible, as is evident from what we have said. Therefore, God is not in some genus.
Item. Quicquid est in genere secundum esse differt ab aliis quae in eodem genere sunt. Alias genus de pluribus non praedicaretur. Oportet autem omnia quae sunt in eodem genere, in quidditate generis convenire quia de omnibus genus in quod quid est praedicatur. Esse igitur cuiuslibet in genere existentis est praeter generis quidditatem. Hoc autem in Deo impossibile est. Deus igitur in genere non est. [4] Again, whatever is in a genus differs in being from the other things in that genus; otherwise, the genus would not be predicated of many things. But all the things that are in the same genus must agree in the quiddity of the genus, since the genus is predicated of all things in it in terms of what they are. In other words, the being of each thing found in a genus is outside the quiddity of the genus. This is impossible in God. God, therefore, is not in a genus.
Amplius. Unumquodque collocatur in genere per rationem suae quidditatis: genus enim praedicatur in quid est. Sed quidditas Dei est ipsum suum esse. Secundum quod non collocatur aliquid in genere: quia sic ens esset genus, quod significat ipsum esse. Relinquitur igitur quod Deus non sit in genere. [5] Then, too, each thing is placed in a genus through the nature of its quiddity, for the genus is a predicate expressing what a thing is. But the quiddity of God is His very being. Accordingly, God is not located in a genus, because then being, which signifies the act of being, would be a genus. Therefore, God is not in a genus.
Quod autem ens non possit esse genus, probatur per philosophum in hunc modum. Si ens esset genus, oporteret differentiam aliquam inveniri per quam traheretur ad speciem. Nulla autem differentia participat genus, ita scilicet quod genus sit in ratione differentiae, quia sic genus poneretur bis in definitione speciei: sed oportet differentiam esse praeter id quod intelligitur in ratione generis. Nihil autem potest esse quod sit praeter id quod intelligitur per ens, si ens sit de intellectu eorum de quibus praedicatur. Et sic per nullam differentiam contrahi potest. Relinquitur igitur quod ens non sit genus. Unde ex hoc de necessitate concluditur quod Deus non sit in genere. [6] Now, that being cannot be a genus is proved by the Philosopher in the following way [ Metaphysics III, 3]. If being were a genus we should have to find a difference through which to contract it to a species. But no difference shares in the genus in such a way that the genus is included in the notion of the difference, for thus the genus would be included twice in the definition of the species. Rather, the difference is outside what is understood in the nature of the genus. But there can be nothing that is outside that which is understood by being, if being is included in the concept of the things of which it is predicated. Thus, being cannot be contracted by any difference. Being is, therefore, not a genus. From this we conclude necessarily that God is not in a genus.
Ex quo etiam patet quod Deus definiri non potest: quia omnis definitio est ex genere et differentiis. [7] From this it is likewise evident that God cannot be defined, for every definition is constituted from the genus and the differences.
Patet etiam quod non potest demonstratio de ipso fieri, nisi per effectum: quia principium demonstrationis est definitio eius de quo fit demonstratio. [8] It is also clear that no demonstration is possible about God, except through an effect; for the principle of demonstration is the definition of that of which the demonstration is made.
Potest autem alicui videri quod, quamvis nomen substantiae Deo proprie convenire non possit, quia Deus non substat accidentibus; res tamen significata per nomen ei conveniat, et ita sit in genere substantiae. Nam substantia est ens per se: quod Deo constat convenire, ex quo probatum est ipsum non esse accidens. [9] Now it can seem to someone that, although the name substance cannot properly apply to God because God does not substand accidents, yet the thing signified by the name is appropriate and thus God is in the genus of substance. For a substance is a being through itself. Now, this is appropriate to God, since we have proved that He is not an accident.
Sed ad hoc dicendum est ex dictis quod in definitione substantiae non est ens per se. Ex hoc enim quod dicitur ens non posset esse genus: quia iam probatum est quod ens non habet rationem generis. Similiter nec ex hoc quod dicitur per se. Quia hoc non videtur importare nisi negationem tantum: dicitur enim ens per se ex hoc quod non est in alio; quod est negatio pura. Quae nec potest rationem generis constituere: quia sic genus non diceret quid est res, sed quid non est. Oportet igitur quod ratio substantiae intelligatur hoc modo, quod substantia sit res cui conveniat esse non in subiecto; nomen autem rei a quidditate imponitur, sicut nomen entis ab esse; et sic in ratione substantiae intelligitur quod habeat quidditatem cui conveniat esse non in alio. Hoc autem Deo non convenit: nam non habet quidditatem nisi suum esse. Unde relinquitur quod nullo modo est in genere substantiae. Et sic nec in aliquo genere: cum ostensum sit ipsum non esse in genere accidentis. [10] To this contention we must reply, in accord with what we have said, that being through itself is not included in the definition of substance. For, if something is called being, it cannot be a genus, since we have already proved that being does not have the nature of a genus. Neither can what is through itself be a genus, since the expression seems to indicate nothing more than a negation. Something is said to be a being through itself because it is not in another. This is a pure negation, which likewise cannot constitute the nature of a genus; for a genus would then say, not what a thing is, but what it is not. The nature of substance, therefore, must be understood as follows. A substance is a thing to which it belongs to be not in a subject. The name thing takes its origin from the quiddity, just as the name being comes from to be. In this way, the definition of substance is understood as that which has a quiddity to which it belongs to be not in another. Now, this is not appropriate to God, for He has no quiddity save His being. In no way, then, is God in the genus of substance. Thus, He is in no genus, since we have shown that He is not in the genus of accident.

Caput 26 Chapter 26
Quod Deus non est esse formale omnium THAT GOD IS NOT THE FORMAL BEING OF ALL THINGS
Ex his autem confutatur quorundam error qui dixerunt Deum nihil aliud esse quam esse formale uniuscuiusque rei. [1] We are now able to refute the error of certain persons who said that God is nothing other than the formal being of each thing.
Nam esse hoc dividitur per esse substantiae et esse accidentis. Divinum autem esse neque est esse substantiae neque esse accidentis, ut probatum est. Impossibile est igitur Deum esse illud esse quo formaliter unaquaeque res est. [2] This being is divided into the being of substance and the being of accident. Now, we have proved that the divine being is neither the being of substance nor that of accident. God, therefore, cannot be that being by which each thing formally is.
Item. Res ad invicem non distinguuntur secundum quod habent esse: quia in hoc omnia conveniunt. Si ergo res differunt ad invicem, oportet quod vel ipsum esse specificetur per aliquas differentias additas, ita quod rebus diversis sit diversum esse secundum speciem: vel quod res differant per hoc quod ipsum esse diversis naturis secundum speciem convenit. Sed primum horum est impossibile: quia enti non potest fieri aliqua additio secundum modum quo differentia additur generi, ut dictum est. Relinquitur ergo quod res propter hoc differant quod habent diversas naturas, quibus acquiritur esse diversimode. Esse autem divinum non advenit alii naturae, sed est ipsa natura, ut ostensum est. Si igitur esse divinum esset formale esse omnium, oporteret omnia simpliciter esse unum. [3] Furthermore, things are not distinguished from one another in having being, for in this they agree. If, then, things differ from one another, either their being must be specified through certain added differences, so that diverse things have a diverse being according to their species, or things must differ in that the being itself is appropriate to natures that are diverse in species. The first of these alternatives is impossible, since, as we have said, no addition can be made to a being in the manner in which a difference is added to a genus. It remains, then, that things differ because they have diverse natures, to which being accrues in a diverse way. Now, the divine being does not accrue to a nature that is other than it; it is the nature itself, as we have said. If, therefore, the divine being were the formal being of all things, all things would have to be absolutely one.
Amplius. Principium naturaliter prius est eo cuius est principium. Esse autem in quibusdam rebus habet aliquid quasi principium: forma enim dicitur esse principium essendi; et similiter agens, quod facit aliqua esse actu. Si igitur esse divinum sit esse uniuscuiusque rei, sequetur quod Deus, qui est suum esse, habeat aliquam causam; et sic non sit necesse-esse per se. Cuius contrarium supra ostensum est. [4] Then, too, a principle is naturally prior to that whose principle it is. Now, in certain things being has something that is as its principle. For the form is said to be a principle of being, and so is the agent, that makes things to be in act. If, therefore, the divine being is the being of each thing, it will follow that God, Who is His own being, has some cause. Thus, He is not through Himself a necessary being. But, we have proved the contrary of this conclusion above.
Adhuc. Quod est commune multis, non est aliquid praeter multa nisi sola ratione: sicut animal non est aliud praeter Socratem et Platonem et alia animalia nisi intellectu, qui apprehendit formam animalis expoliatam ab omnibus individuantibus et specificantibus; homo enim est quod vere est animal; alias sequeretur quod in Socrate et Platone essent plura animalia, scilicet ipsum animal commune, et homo communis, et ipse Plato. Multo igitur minus et ipsum esse commune est aliquid praeter omnes res existentes nisi in intellectu solum. Si igitur Deus sit esse commune, Deus non erit aliqua res nisi quae sit in intellectu tantum. Ostensum autem est supra Deum esse aliquid non solum in intellectu, sed in rerum natura. Non est igitur Deus ipsum esse commune omnium. [5] Moreover, that which is common to many is not outside the many except by the reason alone. Thus, animal is not something outside Socrates and Plato and the other animals except in the intellect that apprehends the form of animal stripped of all its individuating and specifying characteristics. For man is that which truly is animal; otherwise, it would follow that in Socrates and Plato there are several animals, namely, common animal itself, common man, and Plato himself. Much less, then, is common being itself something outside all existing things, save only for being in the intellect. Hence, if God is common being, the only thing that will exist is that which exists solely in the intellect. But we showed above that God is something not only in the intellect but also in reality. Therefore, God is not the common being of all things.
Item. Generatio per se loquendo est via in esse, et corruptio via in non esse: non enim generationis terminus est forma et corruptionis privatio, nisi quia forma facit esse et privatio non esse; dato enim quod aliqua forma non faceret esse, non diceretur generari quod talem formam acciperet. Si igitur Deus sit omnium rerum esse formale, sequetur quod sit terminus generationis. Quod est falsum: cum ipse sit aeternus, ut supra ostensum est. [6] Again, strictly speaking, generation is the way to being and corruption the way to non-being. For form is not the terminus of generation, and privation is not the terminus of corruption, except because a form causes being and privation non-being. If a form did not cause being, a thing which received such a form would not be said to be generated. Hence, if God is the formal being of all things, He will consequently be the terminus of generation. This is false, since, as we have shown above, God is eternal.
Praeterea. Sequetur quod esse cuiuslibet rei fuerit ab aeterno. Non igitur potest esse generatio vel corruptio. Si enim sit, oportet quod esse praeexistens alicui rei de novo acquiratur. Aut ergo alicui prius existenti: aut nullo modo prius existenti. Si primo modo, cum unum sit esse omnium existentium secundum positionem praedictam, sequetur quod res quae generari dicitur, non accipiat novum esse, sed novum modum essendi: quod non facit generationem, sed alterationem. Si autem nullo modo prius existebat, sequetur quod fiat ex nihilo: quod est contra rationem generationis. Igitur haec positio omnino generationem et corruptionem destruit. Et ideo patet eam esse impossibilem. [7] It will also follow that the being of each thing has existed from eternity. Generation or corruption is therefore impossible. If it does exist, pre-existing being must accrue to something anew. It will therefore accrue either to something pre-existing or to something in no way pre-existing. In the first instance, since according to the above position the being of all existing things is one, it will follow that a thing that is said to be generated acquires, not a new being, but a new mode of being. The result is alteration, not generation. But, if the generated thing in no way pre-existed, it will follow that it is produced from nothing—which is contrary to the nature of generation. This position, therefore, entirely ruins generation and corruption and, as a consequence, is evidently impossible.
Hunc etiam errorem sacra doctrina repellit, dum confitetur Deum excelsum et elevatum, ut dicitur Isaiae 6-1; et eum super omnia esse, ut Rom. 9-5 habetur. Si enim esse omnium, tunc est aliquid omnium, non autem super omnia. [8] Sacred Teaching as well casts aside this error in confessing that God is “high and elevated,” according to Isaiah (6:1), and that He is “over all,” according to Romans (9:5). For, if He is the being of all things, He is part of all things, but not over them.
Hi etiam errantes eadem sententia procelluntur qua et idolatrae, qui incommunicabile nomen, scilicet Dei, lignis et lapidibus imposuerunt, ut habetur Sap. 14-21. Si enim Deus est esse omnium, non magis dicetur vere lapis est ens, quam lapis est Deus. [9] So, too, those who committed this error are condemned by the same judgment as are the idolaters who “gave the incommunicable name,” that is, of God, “to wood and stones,” as it is written (Wis. 14:21). If, indeed, God is the being of all things, there will be no more reason to say truly that a stone is a being than to say that a stone is God.
Huic autem errori quatuor sunt quae videntur praestitisse fomentum.
Primum est quarundam auctoritatum intellectus perversus. Invenitur enim a Dionysio dictum, IV cap. Cael. Hier.: esse omnium est superessentialis divinitas. Ex quo intelligere voluerunt ipsum esse formale omnium rerum Deum esse, non considerantes hunc intellectum ipsis verbis consonum esse non posse. Nam si divinitas est omnium esse formale, non erit super omnia, sed inter omnia, immo aliquid omnium. Cum ergo divinitatem super omnia dixit, ostendit secundum suam naturam ab omnibus distinctum et super omnia collocatum. Ex hoc vero quod dixit quod divinitas est esse omnium, ostendit quod a Deo in omnibus quaedam divini esse similitudo reperitur. Hunc etiam eorum perversum intellectum alibi apertius excludens, dixit in II cap. de Div. Nom., quod ipsius Dei neque tactus neque aliqua commixtio est ad res alias, sicut est puncti ad lineam vel figurae sigilli ad ceram.
[10] Four factors seem to have contributed to the rise of this error.
The first is the warped interpretation of certain authoritative texts. There is in Dionysius this remark [ De caelesti hierarchia IV, 1]: “The being of all things is the super-essential divinity.” From this remark they wished to infer that God is the formal being of all things, without considering that this interpretation could not square with the words themselves. For, if the divinity is the formal being of all things, it will not be over all but among all, indeed a part of all. Now, since Dionysius said that the divinity was above all things, he showed that according to its nature it was distinct from all things and raised above all things. And when he said that the divinity is the being of all things, he showed that there was in all things a certain likeness of the divine being, coming from God. Elsewhere Dionysius has rather openly set aside this warped interpretation. He has said: “God neither touches nor is in any way mingled with other things, as a point touches a line or the figure of a seal touches wax” [ De divinis nominibus II, 5].
Secundum quod eos in hunc errorem promovit, est rationis defectus. Quia enim id quod commune est per additionem specificatur vel individuatur, aestimaverunt divinum esse, cui nulla fit additio, non esse aliquod esse proprium, sed esse commune omnium; non considerantes quod id quod commune est vel universale sine additione esse non potest, sed sine additione consideratur: non enim animal potest esse absque rationali differentia, quamvis absque his differentiis cogitetur. Licet etiam cogitetur universale absque additione, non tamen absque receptibilitate additionis: nam si animali nulla differentia addi posset, genus non esset; et similiter est de omnibus aliis nominibus. Divinum autem esse est absque additione non solum in cogitatione, sed etiam in rerum natura: nec solum absque additione, sed etiam absque receptibilitate additionis. Unde ex hoc ipso quod additionem, non recipit nec recipere potest, magis concludi potest quod Deus non sit esse commune, sed proprium: etiam ex hoc ipso suum esse ab omnibus aliis distinguitur quod nihil ei addi potest. Unde Commentator in libro de causis dicit quod causa prima ex ipsa puritate suae bonitatis ab aliis distinguitur et quodammodo individuatur. [11] The second cause leading them to this error is a failure of reason. For, since that which is common is specified or individuated through addition, they thought that the divine being, which receives no addition, was not some proper being but the common being of all things. They ignored the fact that what is common or universal cannot exist without addition, but is considered without addition. For animal cannot be without the difference rational or the difference irrational, although it is considered without these differences. What is more, although a universal may be considered without addition, it is not without the receptibility of addition; for, if no difference could be added to animal, it would not be a genus. The same is true of all other names. But the divine being is without addition not only in thought but also in reality; and not only without addition but also without the receptibility of addition. From the fact, then, that it neither receives nor can receive addition we can rather conclude that God is not common being but proper being; for His being is distinguished from all the rest by the fact that nothing can be added to it. Hence the Commentator says in the Book of Causes that, out of the purity of its goodness, the first cause is distinguished from the rest and in a manner individuated.
Tertium quod eos in hunc errorem induxit, est divinae simplicitatis consideratio. Quia enim Deus in fine simplicitatis est, aestimaverunt illud quod in ultimo resolutionis invenitur eorum quae fiunt in nobis, Deum esse, quasi simplicissimum: non enim est in infinitum procedere in compositione eorum quae sunt in nobis. In hoc etiam eorum defecit ratio, dum non attenderunt id quod in nobis simplicissimum invenitur, non tam rem completam, quam rei aliquid esse. Deo autem simplicitas attribuitur sicut rei alicui perfectae subsistenti. [12] The third factor that led them into this error concerns the divine simplicity. God is at the peak of simplicity. They therefore thought that the last point of resolution in our way of seeing things is God, as being absolutely simple. For it is not possible to proceed to infinity in composition among the things we know. Their reason also failed because they did not observe that what is most simple in our understanding of things is not so much a complete thing as a part of a thing. But, simplicity is predicated of God as of some perfect subsisting thing.
Quartum etiam quod eos ad hoc inducere potuit, est modus loquendi quo dicimus Deum in omnibus rebus esse: non intelligentes quod non sic est in rebus quasi aliquid rei, sed sicut rei causa quae nullo modo suo effectui deest. Non enim similiter dicimus esse formam in corpore, et nautam in navi. [13] A fourth factor that could have led them to their error is the mode of expression we use when we say that God is in all things. By this we do not mean that God is in things as a part of a thing, but as the cause of a thing that is never lacking to its effect. For we do not say that a form is in matter as a sailor is in a ship.

Caput 27 Chapter 27
Quod Deus non sit forma alicuius corporis THAT GOD IS NOT THE FORM OF ANY BODY
Ostenso igitur quod Deus non sit esse omnium, similiter ostendi potest quod Deus non sit alicuius rei forma. [1] Having shown that God is not the being of all things, we can likewise show that He is not the form of any thing.
Nam divinum esse non potest esse alicuius quidditatis quae non sit ipsum esse, ut ostensum est. Quod autem est ipsum esse divinum, non est aliud quam Deus. Impossibile est igitur Deum esse alicuius alterius formam. [2] As we have shown, the divine being cannot belong to any quiddity that is not being itself. Now, only God is the divine being itself. It is impossible, therefore, for God to be the form of some other being.
Amplius. Forma corporis non est ipsum esse, sed essendi principium. Deus autem est ipsum esse. Non ergo est Deus forma corporis. [3] Furthermore, the form of a body is not the being itself, but a principle of being. But God is being itself. He is, therefore, not the form of a body.
Item. Ex unione formae et materiae resultat aliquid compositum, quod est totum respectu materiae et formae. Partes autem sunt in potentia respectu totius. In Deo autem nulla est potentialitas. Impossibile est igitur Deum esse formam unitam alicui rei. [4] Again, the union of form and matter results in a composite, which is a whole with respect to the matter and the form. But the parts are in potency in relation to the whole. In God, however, there is no potentiality. Therefore, God cannot be a form united to some thing.
Adhuc. Quod per se habet esse, nobilius est eo quod habet esse in alio. Omnis autem forma alicuius corporis habet esse in alio. Cum igitur Deus sit ens nobilissimum, quasi prima essendi causa, non potest esse alicuius forma. [5] Moreover, that which has being through itself is nobler than that which has being in another. But every form of a body has being in another. Since, then, God, as the first cause of being, is the noblest being, He cannot be the form of any being.
Praeterea. Hoc idem potest ostendi ex aeternitate motus, sic. Si Deus est forma alicuius mobilis, cum ipse sit primum movens, compositum erit movens seipsum. Sed movens seipsum potest moveri et non moveri. Utrumque igitur in ipso est. Quod autem est huiusmodi, non habet motus indeficientiam ex seipso. Oportet igitur supra movens seipsum ponere aliud primum movens, quod largiatur ei perpetuitatem motus. Et sic Deus, qui est primum movens, non est forma corporis moventis seipsum. [6] The same conclusion can also be reached in the following way from the eternity of motion. If God is the form of some movable body, since He is the first mover, the composite will be self-moving. But something self-moving can be moved and not-moved. Both possibilities are found in it. But such a being does not of itself have an indefectibility of motion. Above the self-moving being, therefore, we must posit another first mover, which gives to the self-moving being the endlessness of its motion. Thus, God, Who is the first mover, is not the form of a self-moving body.
Est autem hic processus utilis ponentibus aeternitatem motus. Quo non posito, eadem conclusio haberi potest ex regularitate motus caeli. Sicut enim movens seipsum potest quiescere et moveri, ita potest velocius et tardius moveri. Necessitas igitur uniformitatis motus caeli dependet ex aliquo principio superiori omnino immobili, quod non est pars corporis moventis seipsum quasi aliqua forma eius. [7] This argumentation is suitable for those who posit the eternity of motion. Those who do not posit it can reach the same conclusion from the regularity of the motion of the heavens. For just as a self-mover can be at rest and in motion, so it can be moved more swiftly and less so. The necessity in the uniformity of the motion of the heavens, therefore, depends on some higher and absolutely immobile principle, which is not a part of a self-moving body as the form of that body.
Huic autem veritati Scripturae concordat auctoritas. Dicitur enim in Psalmo: elevata est magnificentia tua super caelos, Deus. Et Iob 8: excelsior caelo est et quid facies? Longior terra mensura eius est et profundior mari. [8] The authority of Scripture is in agreement with this truth. For it is said in a Psalm (8:2): “Your magnificence is elevated above the heavens”; and in Job (11:8, 9): “He is higher than heaven, and what will you do?... His measure is longer than the earth and deeper than the sea.”
Sic igitur gentilium error evacuatur, qui dicebant Deum esse animam caeli vel etiam animam totius mundi, et ex hoc errore, idolatriam defendebant, dicentes totum mundum esse Deum, non ratione corporis, sed ratione animae, sicut homo dicitur sapiens non ratione corporis sed animae: quo supposito, sequi opinabantur quod mundo et partibus eius non indebite divinus cultus exhibeatur. Commentator etiam dicit, in XI Metaphys., quod hic locus fuit lapsus sapientum gentis Zabiorum, idest idolatrarum quia scilicet posuerunt Deum esse formam caeli. [9] Thus, then, is removed the error of the Gentiles, who said that God is the soul of the heavens, or even the soul of the whole world. Thereby they defended the error of idolatry, by saying that the whole world was God not by reason of the body but by reason of the soul; just as man is said to be wise not by reason of the body but by reason of the soul. On the basis of this error the Gentiles thought it to follow that, not unfittingly, divine worship should be shown to the world and its parts. The Commentator also says that this point was the place where the Zabii stumbled and fell from wisdom—because, namely, they posited that God is the form of the heavens [ In XII Metaphysicorum ].

Caput 28 Chapter 28
De perfectione divina ON THE DIVINE PERFECTION
Licet autem ea quae sunt et vivunt, perfectiora sint quam ea quae tantum sunt, Deus tamen qui non est aliud quam suum esse, est universaliter ens perfectum. Et dico universaliter perfectum, cui non deest alicuius generis nobilitas. [1] Although the things that exist and live are more perfect than the things that merely exist, nevertheless, God, Who is not other than His being, is a universally perfect being. And I call universally perfect that to which the excellence of no genus is lacking.
Omnis enim nobilitas cuiuscumque rei est sibi secundum suum esse: nulla enim nobilitas esset homini ex sua sapientia nisi per eam sapiens esset, et sic de aliis. Sic ergo secundum modum quo res habet esse, est suus modus in nobilitate: nam res secundum quod suum esse contrahitur ad aliquem specialem modum nobilitatis maiorem vel minorem, dicitur esse secundum hoc nobilior vel minus nobilis. Igitur si aliquid est cui competit tota virtus essendi, ei nulla nobilitatum deesse potest quae alicui rei conveniat. Sed rei quae est suum esse, competit esse secundum totam essendi potestatem: sicut, si esset aliqua albedo separata, nihil ei de virtute albedinis deesse posset; nam alicui albo aliquid de virtute albedinis deest ex defectu recipientis albedinem, quae eam secundum modum suum recipit, et fortasse non secundum totum posse albedinis. Deus igitur, qui est suum esse, ut supra probatum est, habet esse secundum totam virtutem ipsius esse. Non potest ergo carere aliqua nobilitate quae alicui rei conveniat. [2] Every excellence in any given thing belongs to it according to its being. For man would have no excellence as a result of his wisdom unless through it he were wise. So, too, with the other excellences. Hence, the mode of a thing’s excellence is according to the mode of its being. For a thing is said to be more or less excellent according as its being is limited to a certain greater or lesser mode of excellence. Therefore, if there is something to which the whole power of being belongs, it can lack no excellence that is proper to some thing. But for a thing that is its own being it is proper to be according to the whole power of being. For example, if there were a separately existing whiteness, it could not lack any of the power of whiteness. For a given white thing lacks something of the power of whiteness through a defect in the receiver of the whiteness, which receives it according to its mode and perhaps not according to the whole power of whiteness. God, therefore, Who is His being, as we have proved above, has being according to the whole power of being itself. Hence, He cannot lack any excellence that belongs to any given thing.
Sicut autem omnis nobilitas et perfectio inest rei secundum quod est, ita omnis defectus inest ei secundum quod aliqualiter non est. Deus autem, sicut habet esse totaliter, ita ab eo totaliter absistit non esse: quia per modum per quem habet aliquid esse, deficit a non esse. A Deo ergo omnis defectus absistit. Est igitur universaliter perfectus. [3] But just as every excellence and perfection is found in a thing according as that thing is, so every defect is found in it according as in some way it is not. Now, just as God bas being wholly, so non-being is wholly absent from Him. For as a thing has being, in that way is it removed from non-being. Hence, all defect is absent from God. He is, therefore, universally perfect.
Illa vero quae tantum sunt, non sunt imperfecta propter imperfectionem ipsius esse absoluti: non enim ipsa habent esse secundum suum totum posse, sed participant esse per quendam particularem modum et imperfectissimum. [4] Those things that merely exist are not imperfect because of an imperfection in absolute being. For they do not possess being according to its whole power; rather, they participate in it through a certain particular and most imperfect mode.
Item. Omne imperfectum ab aliquo perfecto necesse est ut praecedatur: semen enim est ab animali vel a planta. Igitur primum ens oportet esse perfectissimum. Ostensum est autem Deum esse primum ens. Est igitur perfectissimus. [5] Furthermore, everything that is imperfect must be preceded by something perfect. Thus, the seed is from the animal or the plant. The first being must, therefore, be most perfect. But we have shown that God is the first being. He is, therefore, most perfect.
Amplius. Unumquodque perfectum est inquantum est actu; imperfectum autem secundum quod est potentia cum privatione actus. Id igitur quod nullo modo est potentia sed est actus purus, oportet perfectissimum esse. Tale autem Deus est. Est igitur perfectissimus. [6] Again, each thing is perfect according as it is in act, and imperfect according as it is in potency and lacking act. Hence, that which is in no way in potency, but is pure act, must be most perfect. Such, however, is God. God is, therefore, most perfect.
Amplius. Nihil agit nisi secundum quod est in actu. Actio igitur consequitur modum actus in agente. Impossibile est igitur effectum qui per actionem educitur, esse in nobiliori actu quam sit actus agentis: possibile est tamen actum effectus imperfectiorem esse quam sit actus causae agentis, eo quod actio potest debilitari ex parte eius in quod terminatur. In genere autem causae efficientis fit reductio ad unam primam quae Deus dicitur, ut ex dictis patet, a quo sunt omnes res, ut in sequentibus ostendetur. Oportet igitur quicquid actu est in quacumque re alia, inveniri in Deo multo eminentius quam sit in re illa, non autem e converso. Est igitur Deus perfectissimus. [7] Nothing, moreover, acts except as it is in act. Hence, action follows the mode of act in the agent. It is therefore impossible that an effect brought forth by an action be of a more excellent act than is the act of the agent. On the other hand, it is possible that the act of the effect be less perfect than the act of the efficient cause, since an action can become weakened through the effect in which it terminates. Now, in the genus of the efficient cause there is a reduction to one cause, called God, as is evident from what we have said; and from this cause, as we shall show later on, all things come. Hence, it is necessary that whatever is found in act in any thing whatever must be found in God in a more eminent way than in that thing itself. But the converse is not true. God, therefore, is most perfect.
Item. In unoquoque genere est aliquid perfectissimum in genere illo, ad quod omnia quae sunt illius generis mensurantur: quia ex eo unumquodque ostenditur magis vel minus perfectum esse, quod ad mensuram sui generis magis vel minus appropinquat; sicut album dicitur esse mensura in omnibus coloribus, et virtuosus inter omnes homines. Id autem quod est mensura omnium entium non potest esse aliud quam Deus, qui est suum esse. Ipsi igitur nulla deest perfectionum quae aliquibus rebus conveniat: alias non esset omnium communis mensura. [8] In every genus, furthermore, there is something that is most perfect for that genus, acting as a measure for all other things in the genus. For each thing is shown to be more or less perfect according as it approaches more or less to the measure of its genus. Thus, white is said to be the measure among all colors, and the virtuous man among all men. Now, the measure of all beings cannot be other than God, Who is His own being. No perfection, consequently, that is appropriate to this or that thing is lacking to Him; otherwise, He would not be the common measure of all things.
Hinc est quod, cum quaereret Moyses divinam videre faciem seu gloriam, responsum est ei a domino, ego ostendam tibi omne bonum, ut habetur Exod. 33-19, per hoc dans intelligere in se omnis bonitatis plenitudinem esse. Dionysius etiam, in V cap. de Div. Nom. dicit: Deus non quodam modo est existens, sed simpliciter et incircumscriptive totum esse in seipso accepit et praeaccepit. [9] This is why, when Moses asked to see the divine countenance or glory, he received this reply from the Lord: “I will show you all good,” as it is written in Exodus (33:18, 19); by which the Lord gave Moses to understand that the fullness of all goodness was in Him. Dionysius likewise says: “God does not exist in a certain way; He possesses, and this before all others, all being within Himself absolutely and limitlessly” [ De div. nom. V, 4].
Sciendum tamen est quod perfectio Deo convenienter attribui non potest si nominis significatio quantum ad sui originem attendatur: quod enim factum non est, nec perfectum posse dici videtur. Sed quia omne quod fit, de potentia in actum deductum est et de non esse in esse quando factum est, tunc recte perfectum esse dicitur, quasi totaliter factum, quando potentia totaliter est ad actum reducta, ut nihil de non esse retineat, sed habeat esse completum. Per quandam igitur nominis extensionem perfectum dicitur non solum quod fiendo pervenit ad actum completum, sed id etiam quod est in actu completo absque omni factione. Et sic Deum perfectum esse dicimus, secundum illud Matth. 5-48: estote perfecti sicut et pater vester caelestis perfectus est. [10] We must note, however, that perfection cannot be attributed to God appropriately if we consider the signification of the name according to its origin; for it does not seem that what is not made [ factum ] can be called perfect [ perfectum ]. But everything that comes to be is brought forth from potency to act and from non-being to being when it has been made. That is why it is rightly said to be perfect, as being completely made, at that moment when the potency is wholly reduced to act, so that it retains no non-being but has a completed being. By a certain extension of the name, consequently, perfect is said not only of that which by way of becoming reaches a completed act, but also of that which, without any making whatever, is in complete act. It is thus that, following the words of Matthew (5:48), we say that God is perfect: “Be perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect.”

Caput 29 Chapter 29
De similitudine creaturarum ON THE LIKENESS OF CREATURES TO GOD
Ex hoc autem quomodo in rebus possit similitudo ad Deum inveniri vel non possit, considerari potest. [1] In the light of what we have said, we are able to consider how a likeness to God is and is not possible in things.
Effectus enim a suis causis deficientes non conveniunt cum eis in nomine et ratione, necesse est tamen aliquam inter ea similitudinem inveniri: de natura enim actionis est ut agens sibi simile agat cum unumquodque agat secundum quod actu est. Unde forma effectus in causa excedente invenitur quidem aliqualiter, sed secundum alium modum et aliam rationem, ratione cuius causa aequivoca dicitur. Sol enim in corporibus inferioribus calorem causat agendo secundum quod actu est; unde oportet quod calor a sole generatus aliqualem similitudinem obtineat ad virtutem activam solis, per quam calor in istis inferioribus causatur, ratione cuius sol calidus dicitur, quamvis non una ratione. Et sic sol omnibus illis similis aliqualiter dicitur in quibus suos effectus efficaciter inducit: a quibus tamen rursus omnibus dissimilis est, inquantum huiusmodi effectus non eodem modo possident calorem et huiusmodi quo in sole invenitur. Ita etiam et Deus omnes perfectiones rebus tribuit, ac per hoc cum omnibus similitudinem habet et dissimilitudinem simul. [2] Effects that fall short of their causes do not agree with them in name and nature. Yet, some likeness must be found between them, since it belongs to the nature of action that an agent produce its like, since each thing acts according as it is in act. The form of an effect, therefore, is certainly found in some measure in a transcending cause, but according to another mode and another way. For this reason the cause is called an equivocal cause. Thus, the sun causes heat among these sublunary bodies by acting according as it is in act. Hence, the heat generated by the sun must bear some likeness to the active power of the sun, through which beat is caused in this sublunary world; and because of this beat the sun is said to be hot, even though not in one and the same way. And so the sun is said to be somewhat like those things in which it produces its effects as an efficient cause. Yet the sun is also unlike all these things in so far as such effects do not possess heat and the like in the same way as they are found in the sun. So, too, God gave things all their perfections and thereby is both like and unlike all of them.
Et inde est quod sacra Scriptura aliquando similitudinem inter eum et creaturam commemorat, ut cum dicitur Gen. 1-26: faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram; aliquando similitudo negatur, secundum illud Isaiae 40-18: cui ergo similem fecistis Deum, aut quam imaginem ponetis ei? Et in Psalmo: Deus, quis similis erit tibi? [3] Hence it is that Sacred Scripture recalls the likeness between God and creatures, as when it is said in Genesis (1:26): “Let us make man to our image and likeness.” At times the likeness is denied, as in the text of Isaiah (40:18): “To whom then have you likened God, and what image will you make for Him?” or in the Psalm (82:1) [Vulgate]: “O God, who is like You?”
Huic autem rationi Dionysius concordat, qui in IX cap. de Div. Nom. dicit: eadem similia sunt Deo et dissimilia: similia quidem, secundum imitationem eius qui non est perfecte imitabilis, qualem in eis contingit esse; dissimilia autem, secundum quod causata habent minus suis causis. [4] Dionysius is in agreement with this argument when he says: “The same things are both like and unlike God. They are like according as they imitate as much as they can Him Who is not perfectly imitable, they are unlike according as effects are lesser than their causes” [ De div. nom. IX, 7].
Secundum tamen hanc similitudinem convenientius dicitur Deo creatura similis quam e converso. Simile enim alicui dicitur quod eius possidet qualitatem vel formam. Quia igitur id quod in Deo perfecte est, in rebus aliis per quandam deficientem participationem invenitur, illud secundum quod similitudo attenditur, Dei quidem simpliciter est, non autem creaturae. Et sic creatura habet quod Dei est: unde et Deo recte similis dicitur. Non autem sic potest dici Deum habere quod creaturae est. Unde nec convenienter dicitur Deum creaturae similem esse: sicut nec hominem dicimus suae imagini esse similem, cui tamen sua imago recte similis enuntiatur. [5] In the light of this likeness, nevertheless, it is more fitting to say that a creature is like God rather than the converse. For that is called like something which possesses a quality or form of that thing. Since, then, that which is found in God perfectly is found in other things according to a certain diminished participation, the basis on which the likeness is observed belongs to God absolutely, but not to the creature. Thus, the creature has what belongs to God and, consequently, is rightly said to be like God. But we cannot in the same way say that God has what belongs to the creature. Neither, then, can we appropriately say that God is like a creature, just as we do not say that man is like his image, although the image is rightly said to be like him.
Multo etiam minus proprie dicitur quod Deus creaturae similetur. Nam assimilatio motum ad similitudinem dicit et sic competit et quod ab alio accipit unde simile sit. Creatura autem accipit a Deo unde ei sit similis: non autem e converso. Non igitur Deus creaturae assimilatur, sed magis e converso. [6] All the less proper, moreover, is the expression that God is likened to a creature. For likening expresses a motion towards likeness and thus belongs to the being that receives from another that which makes it like. But a creature receives from God that which makes it like Him. The converse, however, does not hold. God, then, is not likened to a creature; rather, the converse is true.

Caput 30 Chapter 30
Quae nomina de Deo possint praedicari THE NAMES THAT CAN BE PREDICATED OF GOD
Ex his etiam considerari potest quid de Deo dici vel non dici possit, quidve de eo tantum dicatur, quid etiam de eo simul et aliis rebus. [1] From what we have said we can further consider what it is possible to say or not to say of God, what is said of Him alone, and also what is said of Him and other things together.
Quia enim omnem perfectionem creaturae est in Deo invenire sed per alium modum eminentiorem, quaecumque nomina absolute perfectionem absque defectu designant, de Deo praedicantur et de aliis rebus: sicut est bonitas, sapientia, esse, et alia huiusmodi. Quodcumque vero nomen huiusmodi perfectiones exprimit cum modo proprio creaturis, de Deo dici non potest nisi per similitudinem et metaphoram, per quam quae sunt unius rei alteri solent adaptari, sicut aliquis homo dicitur lapis propter duritiam intellectus. Huiusmodi autem sunt omnia nomina imposita ad designandum speciem rei creatae, sicut homo et lapis: nam cuilibet speciei debetur proprius modus perfectionis et esse. Similiter etiam quaecumque nomina proprietates rerum designant quae ex propriis principiis specierum causatur. Unde de Deo dici non possunt nisi metaphorice. Quae vero huiusmodi perfectiones exprimunt cum supereminentiae modo quo Deo conveniunt, de solo Deo dicuntur: sicut summum bonum, primum ens, et alia huiusmodi. [2] Since it is possible to find in God every perfection of creatures, but in another and more eminent way, whatever names unqualifiedly designate a perfection without defect are predicated of God and of other things: for example, goodness, wisdom, being, and the like. But when any name expresses such perfections along with a mode that is proper to a creature, it can be said of God only according to likeness and metaphor. According to metaphor, what belongs to one thing is transferred to another, as when we say that a man is a stone because of the hardness of his intellect. Such names are used to designate the species of a created thing, for example, man and stone, for to each species belongs its own mode of perfection and being. The same is true of whatever names designate the properties of things, which are caused by the proper principles of their species. Hence, they can be said of God only metaphorically. But the names that express such perfections along with the mode of supereminence with which they belong to God are said of God alone. Such names are the highest good, the first being, and the like.
Dico autem aliqua praedictorum nominum perfectionem absque defectu importare, quantum ad illud ad quod significandum nomen fuit impositum: quantum enim ad modum significandi, omne nomen cum defectu est. Nam nomine res exprimimus eo modo quo intellectu concipimus. Intellectus autem noster, ex sensibus cognoscendi initium sumens, illum modum non transcendit qui in rebus sensibilibus invenitur, in quibus aliud est forma et habens formam, propter formae et materiae compositionem. Forma vero in his rebus invenitur quidem simplex, sed imperfecta, utpote non subsistens: habens autem formam invenitur quidem subsistens, sed non simplex, immo concretionem habens. Unde intellectus noster, quidquid significat ut subsistens, significat in concretione: quod vero ut simplex, significat non ut quod est, sed ut quo est. Et sic in omni nomine a nobis dicto, quantum ad modum significandi, imperfectio invenitur, quae Deo non competit, quamvis res significata aliquo eminenti modo Deo conveniat: ut patet in nomine bonitatis et boni; nam bonitas significat ut non subsistens, bonum autem ut concretum. Et quantum ad hoc nullum nomen Deo convenienter aptatur, sed solum quantum ad id ad quod significandum nomen imponitur. Possunt igitur, ut Dionysius docet, huiusmodi nomina et affirmari de Deo et negari: affirmari quidem, propter nominis rationem; negari vero, propter significandi modum. [3] I have said that some of the aforementioned names signify a perfection without defect. This is true with reference to that which the name was imposed to signify; for as to the mode of signification, every name is defective. For by means of a name we express things in the way in which the intellect conceives them. For our intellect, taking the origin of its knowledge from the senses, does not transcend the mode which is found in sensible things, in which the form and the subject of the form are not identical owing to the composition of form and matter. Now, a simple form is indeed found among such things, but one that is imperfect because it is not subsisting; on the other hand, though a subsisting subject of a form is found among sensible things, it is not simple but rather concreted. Whatever our intellect signifies as subsisting, therefore, it signifies in concretion; but what it signifies as simple, it signifies, not as that which is, but as that by which something is. As a result, with reference to the mode of signification there is in every name that we use an imperfection, which does not befit God, even though the thing signified in some eminent way does befit God. This is clear in the name goodness and good. For goodness has signification as something not subsisting, while good has signification as something concreted. And so with reference to the mode of signification no name is fittingly applied to God; this is done only with reference to that which the name has been imposed to signify. Such names, therefore, as Dionysius teaches [ De divinis nominibus I, 5, De caelesti hierarchia II, 3], can be both affirmed and denied of God. They can be affirmed because of the meaning of the name; they can be denied because of the mode of signification.
Modus autem supereminentiae quo in Deo dictae perfectiones inveniuntur, per nomina a nobis imposita significari non potest nisi vel per negationem, sicut cum dicimus Deum aeternum vel infinitum; vel etiam per relationem ipsius ad alia, ut cum dicitur prima causa, vel summum bonum. Non enim de Deo capere possumus quid est, sed quid non est, et qualiter alia se habeant ad ipsum, ut ex supra dictis patet. [4] Now, the mode of supereminence in which the abovementioned perfections are found in God can be signified by names used by us only through negation, as when we say that God is eternal or infinite, or also through a relation of God to other things, as when He is called the first cause or the highest good. For we cannot grasp what God is, but only what He is not and how other things are related to Him, as is clear from what we said above.

Caput 31 Chapter 31
Quod divina perfectio et pluralitas nominum divinorum divinae simplicitati non repugnant THAT THE DIVINE PERFECTION AND THE PLURALITY OF DIVINE NAMES ARE NOT OPPOSED TO THE DIVINE SIMPLICITY
Ex praedictis etiam videri potest quod divina perfectio et plura nomina dicta de Deo ipsius simplicitati non repugnant. [1] From what has been said it can likewise be seen that the divine perfection and the plurality of names said of God are not opposed to His simplicity.
Sic enim omnes perfectiones in rebus aliis inventas Deo attribui diximus sicut effectus in suis causis aequivocis inveniuntur. Qui quidem effectus in suis causis sunt virtute, ut calor in sole. Virtus autem huiusmodi nisi aliqualiter esset de genere caloris, sol per eam agens non sibi simile generaret. Ex hac igitur virtute sol calidus dicitur, non solum quia calorem facit, sed quia virtus per quam hoc facit, est aliquid conforme calori. Per eandem autem virtutem per quam sol facit calorem, facit et multos alios effectus in inferioribus corporibus, utpote siccitatem. Et sic calor et siccitas, quae in igne sunt qualitates diversae, soli attribuuntur per unam virtutem. Ita et omnium perfectiones, quae rebus aliis secundum diversas formas conveniunt, Deo secundum unam eius virtutem attribui est necesse. Quae item virtus non est aliud a sua essentia: cum ei nihil accidere possit, ut probatum est. Sic igitur sapiens Deus dicitur non solum secundum hoc quod sapientiam efficit, sed quia, secundum quod sapientes sumus, virtutem eius, qua sapientes nos facit, aliquatenus imitamur. Non autem dicitur lapis, quamvis lapides fecerit, quia in nomine lapidis intelligitur modus determinatus essendi, secundum quem lapis a Deo distinguitur. Imitatur autem lapis Deum ut causam secundum esse, secundum bonitatem, et alia huiusmodi, sicut et aliae creaturae. [2] We have said that all the perfections found in other things are attributed to God in the same way as effects are found in their equivocal causes. These effects are in their causes virtually, as heat is in the sun. For, unless the power of the sun belonged to some extent to the genus of heat, the sun acting through this power would not generate anything like itself. The sun, then, is said to be hot through this power not only because it produces heat, but also because the power through which it does this has some likeness to heat. But through the same power through which it produces heat, the sun produces also many other effects among sublunary bodies-for example, dryness. And thus heat and dryness, which in fire are diverse qualities, belong to the sun through one and the same power. So, too, the perfections of all things, which belong to the rest of things through diverse forms, must be attributed to God through one and the same power in Him. This power is nothing other than His essence, since, as we have proved, there can be no accident in God. Thus, therefore, God is called wise not only in so far as He produces wisdom, but also because, in so far as we are wise, we imitate to some extent the power by which He makes us wise. On the other hand, God is not called a stone, even though He has made stones, because in the name stone there is understood a determinate mode of being according to which a stone is distinguished from God. But the stone imitates God as its cause in being and goodness, and other such characteristics, as do also the rest of creatures.
Huius autem simile inveniri potest in potentiis cognoscitivis et in virtutibus operativis humanis. Intellectus enim unica virtute cognoscit omnia quae pars sensitiva diversis potentiis apprehendit, et etiam alia multa. Intellectus etiam, quanto fuerit altior, tanto aliquo uno plura cognoscere potest, ad quae cognoscenda intellectus inferior non pertingit nisi per multa. Potestas etiam regia ad omnia illa extenditur ad quae diversae sub ipso potestates ordinem habent. Sic igitur et Deus per unum simplex suum esse omnimodam perfectionem possidet, quam res aliae, immo multo minorem, per quaedam diversa consequuntur. [3] A similar situation obtains among the knowing and operative powers of man. For by its single power the intellect knows all the things that the sensitive part of the soul grasps through a diversity of powers-and many other things as well. So, too, the higher an intellect is, the more it can know more things through one likeness, while a lesser intellect manages to know many things only through many likenesses. So, too, a ruling power extends to all those things to which diverse powers under it are ordered. In this way, therefore, through His one simple being God possesses every kind of perfection that all other things come to possess, but in a much more diminished way, through diverse principles.
Ex quo patet necessitas plura nomina Deo dandi. Quia enim eum non possumus cognoscere naturaliter nisi ex effectibus deveniendo in ipsum, oportet quod nomina quibus perfectionem ipsius significamus, diversa sint, sicut et perfectiones in rebus inveniuntur diversae. Si autem ipsam essentiam prout est possemus intelligere et ei nomen proprium adaptare, uno nomine tantum eam exprimeremus. Quod promittitur his qui eum per essentiam videbunt, Zach. ult.: in die illa erit dominus unus et nomen eius unum. [4] From this we see the necessity of giving to God many names. For, since we cannot know Him naturally except by arriving at Him from His effects, the names by which we signify His perfection must be diverse, just as the perfections belonging to things are found to be diverse. Were we able to understand the divine essence itself as it is and give to it the name that belongs to it, we would express it by only one name. This is promised to those who will see God through His essence: “In that day there shall be one Lord, and His name shall be one” (Zach. 14:9).

Caput 32 Chapter 32
Quod nihil de Deo et rebus aliis univoce praedicatur THAT NOTHING IS PREDICATED UNIVOCALLY OF GOD AND OTHER THINGS
Ex his autem patet quod nihil de Deo et rebus aliis potest univoce praedicari. [1] It is thereby evident that nothing can be predicated univocally of God and other things.
Nam effectus qui non recipit formam secundum speciem similem ei per quam agens agit, nomen ab illa forma sumptum secundum univocam praedicationem recipere non potest: non enim univoce dicitur calidus ignis a sole generatus, et sol. Rerum quarum Deus est causa, formae ad speciem divinae virtutis non perveniunt: cum divisim et particulariter recipiant quod in Deo simpliciter et universaliter invenitur. Patet igitur quod de Deo et rebus aliis nihil univoce dici potest. [2] An effect that does not receive a form specifically the same as that through which the agent acts cannot receive according to a univocal predication the name arising from that form. Thus, the heat generated by the sun and the sun itself are not called univocally hot. Now, the forms of the things God has made do not measure up to a specific likeness of the divine power; for the things that God has made receive in a divided and particular way that which in Him is found in a simple and universal way. It is evident, then, that nothing can be said univocally of God and other things.
Amplius. Si aliquis effectus ad speciem causae pertingat, praedicationem nominis univoce non consequetur nisi secundum eundem essendi modum eandem specie formam suscipiat: non enim univoce dicitur domus quae est in arte, et in materia, propter hoc quod forma domus habet esse dissimile utrobique. Res autem aliae, etiam si omnino similem formam consequerentur, non tamen consequuntur secundum eundem modum essendi: nam nihil est in Deo quod non sit ipsum esse divinum, ut ex dictis patet, quod in aliis rebus non accidit. Impossibile est igitur aliquid univoce de Deo et rebus aliis praedicari. [3] If, furthermore, an effect should measure up to the species of its cause, it will not receive the univocal predication of the name unless it receives the same specific form according to the same mode of being. For the house that is in the art of the maker is not univocally the same house that is in matter, for the form of the house does not have the same being in the two locations. Now, even though the rest of things were to receive a form that is absolutely the same as it is in God, yet they do not receive it according to the same mode of being. For, as is clear from what we have said, there is nothing in God that is not the divine being itself, which is not the case with other things. Nothing, therefore, can be predicated of God and other things univocally.
Adhuc. Omne quod de pluribus univoce praedicatur, vel est genus, vel species, vel differentia, vel accidens aut proprium. De Deo autem nihil praedicatur ut genus nec ut differentia, ut supra ostensum est; et sic nec ut definitio, nec etiam ut species, quae ex genere et differentia constituitur. Nec aliquid ei accidere potest, ut supra demonstratum est: et ita nihil de eo praedicatur neque ut accidens neque ut proprium; nam proprium de genere accidentium est. Relinquitur igitur nihil de Deo et rebus aliis univoce praedicari. [4] Moreover, whatever is predicated of many things univocally is either a genus, a species, a difference, an accident, or a property. But, as we have shown, nothing is predicated of God as a genus or a difference; and thus neither is anything predicated as a definition, nor likewise as a species, which is constituted of genus and difference. Nor, as we have shown, can there be any accident in God, and therefore nothing is predicated of Him either as an accident or a property, since property belongs to the genus of accidents. It remains, then, that nothing is predicated univocally of God and other things.
Item. Quod univoce de pluribus praedicatur, utroque illorum ad minus secundum intellectum simplicius est. Deo autem neque secundum rem neque secundum intellectum potest esse aliquid simplicius. Nihil igitur univoce de Deo et rebus aliis praedicatur. [5] Again, what is predicated of many things univocally is simpler than both of them, at least in concept. Now, there can be nothing simpler than God either in reality or in concept. Nothing, therefore, is predicated univocally of God and other things.
Amplius. Omne quod de pluribus praedicatur univoce, secundum participationem cuilibet eorum convenit de quo praedicatur: nam species participare dicitur genus, et individuum speciem. De Deo autem nihil dicitur per participationem: nam omne quod participatur determinatur ad modum participati, et sic partialiter habetur et non secundum omnem perfectionis modum. Oportet igitur nihil de Deo et rebus aliis univoce praedicari. [6] Everything, likewise, that is predicated univocally of many things belongs through participation to each of the things of which it is predicated; for the species is said to participate in the genus and the individual in the species. But nothing is said of God by participation, since whatever is participated is determined to the mode of that which is participated and is thus possessed in a partial way and not according to every mode of perfection. Nothing, therefore, can be predicated univocally of God and other things.
Adhuc. Quod praedicatur de aliquibus secundum prius et posterius, certum est univoce non praedicari: nam prius in definitione posterioris includitur: sicut substantia in definitione accidentis secundum quod est ens. Si igitur diceretur univoce ens de substantia et accidente, oporteret quod substantia etiam poneretur in definitione entis secundum quod de substantia praedicatur. Quod patet esse impossibile. Nihil autem de Deo et rebus aliis praedicatur eodem ordine, sed secundum prius et posterius: cum de Deo omnia praedicentur essentialiter, dicitur enim ens quasi ipsa essentia, et bonus quasi ipsa bonitas; de aliis autem praedicationes fiunt per participationem, sicut Socrates dicitur homo non quia sit ipsa humanitas, sed humanitatem habens. Impossibile est igitur aliquid de Deo et rebus aliis univoce dici. [7] Then, too, what is predicated of some things according to priority and posteriority is certainly not predicated univocally. For the prior is included in the definition of the posterior, as substance is included in the definition of accident according as an accident is a being. If, then, being were said univocally of substance and accident, substance would have to be included in the definition of being in so far as being is predicated of substance. But this is clearly impossible. Now nothing is predicated of God and creatures as though they were in the same order, but, rather, according to priority and posteriority. For all things are predicated of God essentially. For God is called being as being entity itself, and He is called good as being goodness itself. But in other beings predications are made by participation, as Socrates is said to be a man, not because he is humanity itself, but because he possesses humanity. It is impossible, therefore, that anything be predicated univocally of God and other things.

Caput 33 Chapter 33
Quod non omnia nomina dicuntur de Deo et creaturis pure aequivoce THAT NOT ALL NAMES ARE SAID OF GOD AND CREATURES IN A PURELY EQUIVOCAL WAY
Ex praemissis etiam patet quod non quicquid de Deo et rebus aliis praedicatur, secundum puram aequivocationem dicitur, sicut ea quae sunt a casu aequivoca. [1] From what we have said it likewise appears that not everything predicated of God and other things is said in a purely equivocal way, in the manner of equivocals by chance.
Nam in his quae sunt a casu aequivoca, nullus ordo aut respectus attenditur unius ad alterum, sed omnino per accidens est quod unum nomen diversis rebus attribuitur: non enim nomen impositum uni significat ipsum habere ordinem ad aliud. Sic autem non est de nominibus quae de Deo dicuntur et creaturis. Consideratur enim in huiusmodi nominum communitate ordo causae et causati, ut ex dictis patet. Non igitur secundum puram aequivocationem aliquid de Deo et rebus aliis praedicatur. [2] For in equivocals by chance there is no order or reference of one to another, but it is entirely accidental that one name is applied to diverse things: the application of the name to one of them does not signify that it has an order to the other. But this is not the situation with names said of God and creatures, since we note in the community of such names the order of cause and effect, as is clear from what we have said. It is not, therefore, in the manner of pure equivocation that something is predicated of God and other things.
Amplius. Ubi est pura aequivocatio, nulla similitudo in rebus attenditur, sed solum unitas nominis. Rerum autem ad Deum est aliquis modus similitudinis, ut ex supra dictis patet. Relinquitur igitur quod non dicuntur de Deo secundum puram aequivocationem. [3] Furthermore, where there is pure equivocation, there is no likeness in things themselves; there is only the unity of a name. But, as is clear from what we have said, there is a certain mode of likeness of things to God. It remains, then, that names are not said of God in a purely equivocal way.
Item. Quando unum de pluribus secundum puram aequivocationem praedicatur, ex uno eorum non possumus duci in cognitionem alterius: nam cognitio rerum non dependet ex vocibus, sed ex nominum ratione. Ex his autem quae in rebus aliis inveniuntur in divinorum cognitionem pervenimus, ut ex dictis patet. Non igitur secundum puram aequivocationem dicuntur huiusmodi de Deo et aliis rebus. [4] Moreover, when one name is predicated of several things in a purely equivocal way, we cannot from one of them be led to the knowledge of another; for the knowledge of things does not depend on words, but on the meaning of names. Now, from what we find in other things, we do arrive at a knowledge of divine things, as is evident from what we have said. Such names, then, are not said of God and other things in a purely equivocal way.
Adhuc. Aequivocatio nominis processum argumentationis impedit. Si igitur nihil diceretur de Deo et creaturis nisi pure aequivoce, nulla argumentatio fieri posset procedendo de creaturis ad Deum. Cuius contrarium patet ex omnibus loquentibus de divinis. [5] Again, equivocation in a name impedes the process of reasoning. If, then, nothing was said of God and creatures except in a purely equivocal way, no reasoning proceeding from creatures to God could take place. But, the contrary is evident from all those who have spoken about God.
Amplius. Frustra aliquod nomen de aliquo praedicatur nisi per illud nomen aliquid de eo intelligamus. Sed si nomina dicuntur de Deo et creaturis omnino aequivoce, nihil per illa nomina de Deo intelligimus: cum significationes illorum nominum notae sint nobis solum secundum quod de creaturis dicuntur. Frustra igitur diceretur aut probaretur de Deo quod Deus est ens, bonus, vel si quid aliud huiusmodi est. [6] It is also a fact that a name is predicated of some being uselessly unless through that name we understand something of the being. But, if names are said of God and creatures in a purely equivocal way, we understand nothing of God through those names; for the meanings of those names are known to us solely to the extent that they are said of creatures. In vain, therefore, would it be said or proved of God that He is a being, good, or the like.
Si autem dicatur quod per huiusmodi nomina solum de Deo cognoscimus quid non est, ut scilicet ea ratione dicatur vivens quia non est de genere rerum inanimatarum et sic de aliis; ad minus oportebit quod vivum de Deo et creaturis dictum conveniat in negatione inanimati. Et sic non erit pure aequivocum. [7] Should it be replied that through such names we know only what God is not, namely, that God is called living because He does not belong to the genus of lifeless things, and so with the other names, it will at least have to be the case that living said of God and creatures agrees in the denial of the lifeless. Thus, it will not be said in a purely equivocal way.

Caput 34 Chapter 34
Quod ea quae dicuntur de Deo et creaturis dicuntur analogice THAT NAMES SAID OF GOD AND CREATURES ARE SAID ANALOGICALLY
Sic igitur ex dictis relinquitur quod ea quae de Deo et rebus aliis dicuntur, praedicantur neque univoce neque aequivoce, sed analogice: hoc est, secundum ordinem vel respectum ad aliquid unum. [1] From what we have said, therefore, it remains that the names said of God and creatures are predicated neither univocally nor equivocally but analogically, that is, according to an order or reference to something one.
Quod quidem dupliciter contingit: uno modo, secundum quod multa habent respectum ad aliquid unum: sicut secundum respectum ad unam sanitatem animal dicitur sanum ut eius subiectum, medicina ut eius effectivum, cibus ut conservativum, urina ut signum. [2] This can take place in two ways. In one way, according as many things have reference to something one. Thus, with reference to one health we say that an animal is healthy as the subject of health, medicine is healthy as its cause, food as its preserver, urine as its sign.
Alio modo, secundum quod duorum attenditur ordo vel respectus, non ad aliquid alterum, sed ad unum ipsorum: sicut ens de substantia et accidente dicitur secundum quod accidens ad substantiam respectum habet, non quod substantia et accidens ad aliquid tertium referantur. [3] In another way, the analogy can obtain according as the order or reference of two things is not to something else but to one of them. Thus, being is said of substance and accident according as an accident has reference to a substance, and not according as substance and accident are referred to a third thing.
Huiusmodi igitur nomina de Deo et rebus aliis non dicuntur analogice secundum primum modum, oporteret enim aliquid Deo ponere prius: sed modo secundo. [4] Now, the names said of God and things are not said analogically according to the first mode of analogy, since we should then have to posit something prior to God, but according to the second mode.
In huiusmodi autem analogica praedicatione ordo attenditur idem secundum nomen et secundum rem quandoque, quandoque vero non idem. Nam ordo nominis sequitur ordinem cognitionis: quia est signum intelligibilis conceptionis. Quando igitur id quod est prius secundum rem, invenitur etiam cognitione prius, idem invenitur prius et secundum nominis rationem et secundum rei naturam: sicut substantia est prior accidente et natura, inquantum substantia est causa accidentis; et cognitione, inquantum substantia in definitione accidentis ponitur. Et ideo ens dicitur prius de substantia quam de accidente et secundum rei naturam et secundum nominis rationem. Quando vero id quod est prius secundum naturam, est posterius secundum cognitionem, tunc in analogicis non est idem ordo secundum rem et secundum nominis rationem: sicut virtus sanandi quae est in sanativis, prior est naturaliter sanitate quae est in animali, sicut causa effectu; sed quia hanc virtutem per effectum cognoscimus, ideo etiam ex effectu nominamus. Et inde est quod sanativum est prius ordine rei, sed animal dicitur per prius sanum secundum nominis rationem. [5] In this second mode of analogical predication the order according to the name and according to reality is sometimes found to be the same and sometimes not. For the order of the name follows the order of knowledge, because it is the sign of an intelligible conception. When, therefore, that which is prior in reality is found likewise to be prior in knowledge, the same thing is found to be prior both according to the meaning of the name and according to the nature of the thing. Thus, substance is prior to accident both in nature, in so far as substance is the cause of accident, and in knowledge, in so far as substance is included in the definition of accident. Hence, being is said of substance by priority over accident both according to the nature of the thing and according to the meaning of the name. But when that which is prior in nature is subsequent in our knowledge, then there is not the same order in analogicals according to reality and according to the meaning of the name. Thus, the power to heal, which is found in all health-giving things, is by nature prior to the health that is in the animal, as a cause is prior to an effect; but because we know this healing power through an effect, we likewise name it from its effect. Hence it is that the health-giving is prior in reality, but animal is by priority called healthy according to the meaning of the name.
Sic igitur, quia ex rebus aliis in Dei cognitionem pervenimus, res nominum de Deo et rebus aliis dictorum per prius est in Deo secundum suum modum, sed ratio nominis per posterius. Unde et nominari dicitur a suis causatis. [6] Thus, therefore, because we come to a knowledge of God from other things, the reality in the names said of God and other things belongs by priority in God according to His mode of being, but the meaning of the name belongs to God by posteriority. And so He is said to be named from His effects.

Caput 35 Chapter 35
Quod plura nomina dicta de Deo non sunt synonyma THAT MANY NAMES SAID OF GOD ARE NOT SYNONYMS
Ostenditur etiam ex dictis quod, quamvis nomina de Deo dicta eandem rem significent, non tamen sunt synonyma: quia non significant rationem eandem. [1] It is likewise shown from what has been said that, although names said of God signify the same reality, they are yet not synonyms because they do not signify the same notion.
Nam sicut diversae res uni simplici rei quae Deus est similantur per formas diversas, ita intellectus noster per diversas conceptiones ei aliqualiter similatur, inquantum per diversas perfectiones creaturarum in ipsum cognoscendum perducitur. Et ideo de uno, intellectus noster multa concipiens non est falsus neque vanus: quia illud simplex esse divinum huiusmodi est ut ei secundum formas multiplices aliqua similari possint, ut supra ostensum est. Secundum autem diversas conceptiones diversa nomina intellectus adinvenit quae Deo attribuit. Et ita, cum non secundum eandem rationem attribuantur, constat ea non esse synonyma, quamvis rem omnino unam significent: non enim est eadem nominis significatio, cum nomen per prius conceptionem intellectus quam rem intellectam significet. [2] For just as diverse things are likened through their diverse forms to the one simple reality that God is, so our intellect through its diverse conceptions is to some extent likened to God in so far as it is led through the diverse perfections of creatures to know Him. Therefore, in forming many conceptions of one thing, our intellect is neither false nor futile, because the simple being of God, as we have shown, is such that things can be likened to it according to the multiplicity of their forms. But in accord with its diverse conceptions our intellect devises diverse names that it attributes to God. Hence, since these names are not attributed to God according to the same notion, it is evident that they are not synonyms, even though they signify a reality that is absolutely one. For the signification of the name is not the same, since a name signifies the conception of the intellect before it signifies the thing itself understood by the intellect.

Caput 36 Chapter 36
Qualiter intellectus noster de Deo propositionem formet HOW OUR INTELLECT FORMS A PROPOSITION ABOUT GOD
Ex hoc etiam ulterius patet quod intellectus noster de Deo simplici non in vanum enuntiationes format componendo et dividendo, quamvis Deus omnino sit simplex. [1] From this it is further evident that, although God is absolutely simple, it is not futile for our intellect to form enunciations concerning God in His simplicity by means of composition and division.
Quamvis namque intellectus noster in Dei cognitionem per diversas conceptiones deveniat, ut dictum est, intelligit tamen id quod omnibus eis respondet omnino unum esse: non enim intellectus modum quo intelligit rebus attribuit intellectis; sicut nec lapidi immaterialitatem, quamvis eum immaterialiter cognoscat. Et ideo rei unitatem proponit per compositionem verbalem, quae est identitatis nota, cum dicit, Deus est bonus vel bonitas: ita quod si qua diversitas in compositione est, ad intellectum referatur, unitas vero ad rem intellectam. Et ex hac ratione quandoque intellectus noster enuntiationem de Deo format cum aliqua diversitatis nota, praepositionem interponendo, ut cum dicitur, bonitas est in Deo: quia et hic designatur aliqua diversitas, quae competit intellectui, et aliqua unitas, quam oportet ad rem referre. [2] For although, as we have said, our intellect arrives at the knowledge of God through diverse conceptions, it yet understands that what corresponds to all of them is absolutely one. For the intellect does not attribute its mode of understanding to the things that it understands; for example, it does not attribute immateriality to a stone even though it knows the stone immaterially. It therefore sets forth the unity of a thing by a composition of words, which is a mark of identity, when it says, God is good or goodness. The result is that if there is some diversity in the composition, it is referred to the intellect, whereas the unity is referred to the thing understood by the intellect. On the same basis, our intellect sometimes forms an enunciation about God with a certain mark of diversity in it, through the use of a preposition, as when we say, there is goodness in God. Here, too, there is indicated a certain diversity, which belongs to the intellect, and a certain unity, which must be referred to the reality.

p align=center> Chapter 37
Ex perfectione autem divina, quam ostendimus, bonitas ipsius concludi potest. [1] From the divine perfection, which we have shown, we can conclude to the goodness of God.
Id enim quo unumquodque bonum dicitur, est propria virtus eius: nam virtus est uniuscuiusque quae bonum facit habentem et opus eius bonum reddit. Virtus autem est perfectio quaedam: tunc enim unumquodque perfectum dicimus quando attingit propriam virtutem, ut patet in VII physicorum. Ex hoc igitur unumquodque bonum est quod perfectum est. Et inde est quod unumquodque suam perfectionem appetit sicut proprium bonum. Ostensum est autem Deum esse perfectum. Est igitur bonus. [2] For that by which each thing is called good is the virtue that belongs to it; for “the virtue of each thing is what makes its possessor and his work good.” Now, virtue “is a certain perfection, for each thing is then called perfect when it reaches the virtue belonging to it,” as may be seen in Physics VII [3]. Hence, each thing is good from the fact that it is perfect. That is why each thing seeks its perfection as the good belonging to it. But we have shown that God is perfect. Therefore, He is good.
Item. Ostensum est supra esse aliquod primum movens immobile, quod Deus est. Movet autem sicut movens omnino immobile. Quod movet sicut desideratum. Deus igitur, cum sit primum movens immobile, est primum desideratum. Desideratur autem dupliciter aliquid: aut quia est bonum; aut quia apparet bonum. Quorum primum est quod est bonum: nam apparens bonum non movet per seipsum, sed secundum quod habet aliquam speciem boni; bonum vero movet per seipsum. Primum igitur desideratum, quod Deus est, est vere bonum. [3] Again, it was shown above that there is a certain first unmoved mover, namely, God’s This mover moves as a completely unmoved mover, which is as something desired. Therefore, since God is the first unmoved mover, He is the first desired. But something is desired in two ways, namely, either because it is good or because it appears to be good. The first desired is what is good, since the apparent good does not move through itself but according as it has a certain appearance of the good, whereas the good moves through itself. The first desired, therefore, God, is truly good.
Adhuc. Bonum est quod omnia appetunt: ut philosophus optime dictum introducit, I Ethicorum. Omnia autem appetunt esse actu secundum suum modum: quod patet ex hoc quod unumquodque secundum naturam suam repugnat corruptioni. Esse igitur actu boni rationem constituit: unde et per privationem actus a potentia consequitur malum, quod est bono oppositum, ut per philosophum patet, in IX metaphysicae. Deus autem est ens actu non in potentia, ut supra ostensum est. Est igitur vere bonus. [4] Furthermore, “the good is that which all things desire.” The Philosopher introduces this remark as a “felicitous saying” in Ethics I [1]. But all things, each according to its mode, desire to be in act; this is clear from the fact that each thing according to its nature resists corruption. To be in act, therefore, constitutes the nature of the good. Hence it is that evil, which is opposed to the good, follows when potency is deprived of act, as is clear from the Philosopher in Metaphysics IX [9]. But, as we have shown, God is being in act without potency. Therefore, He is truly good.
Amplius. Communicatio esse et bonitatis ex bonitate procedit. Quod quidem patet et ex ipsa natura boni, et ex eius ratione. Naturaliter enim bonum uniuscuiusque est actus et perfectio eius. Unumquodque autem ex hoc agit quod actu est. Agendo autem esse et bonitatem in alia diffundit. Unde et signum perfectionis est alicuius quod simile possit producere: ut patet per philosophum in IV Meteororum. Ratio vero boni est ex hoc quod est appetibile. Quod est finis. Qui etiam movet agentem ad agendum. Propter quod dicitur bonum esse diffusivum sui et esse. Haec autem diffusio Deo competit: ostensum enim est supra quod aliis est causa essendi, sicut per se ens necesse. Est igitur vere bonus. [5] Moreover, the communication of being and goodness arises from goodness. This is evident from the very nature and definition of the good. By nature, the good of each thing is its act and perfection. Now, each thing acts in so far as it is in act, and in acting it diffuses being and goodness to other things. Hence, it is a sign of a being’s perfection that it “can produce its like,” as may be seen from the Philosopher in Meteorologica IV [3]. Now, the nature of the good comes from its being something appetible. This is the end, which also moves the agent to act. That is why it is said that the good is diffusive of itself and of being. But this diffusion befits God because, as we have shown above, being through Himself the necessary being, God is the cause of being for other things. God is, therefore, truly good.
Hinc est quod in Psalmo dicitur: quam bonus Israel Deus his qui recto sunt corde. Et Thren. 3-25 dicitur: bonus est dominus sperantibus in se, animae quaerenti illum. [6] That is why it is written in a Psalm (72:1): “How good is God to Israel, to those who are of a right heart!” And again: “The Lord is good to those who hope in Him, to the soul that seeks Him” (Lam. 3:25).

Caput 38 Chapter 38
Quod Deus est ipsa bonitas THAT GOD IS GOODNESS ITSELF
Ex his autem haberi potest quod Deus sit sua bonitas. [1] From this we can conclude that God is His goodness.
Esse enim actu in unoquoque est bonum ipsius. Sed Deus non solum est ens actu, sed est ipsum suum esse, ut supra ostensum est. Est igitur ipsa bonitas, non tantum bonus. [2] To be in act is for each being its good. But God is not only a being in act; He is His very act of being, as we have shown. God is, therefore, goodness itself, and not only good.
Praeterea. Perfectio uniuscuiusque est bonitas eius, ut ostensum est. Perfectio autem divini esse non attenditur secundum aliquid additum supra ipsum, sed quia ipsum secundum seipsum perfectum est, ut supra ostensum est. Bonitas igitur Dei non est aliquid additum suae substantiae, sed sua substantia est sua bonitas. [3] Again, as we have shown, the perfection of each thing is its goodness. But the perfection of the divine being is not affirmed on the basis of something added to it, but because the divine being, as was shown above, is perfect in itself. The goodness of God, therefore, is not something added to His substance; His substance is His goodness.
Item. Unumquodque bonum quod non est sua bonitas, participative dicitur bonum. Quod autem per participationem dicitur, aliquid ante se praesupponit, a quo rationem suscipit bonitatis. Hoc autem in infinitum non est possibile abire: quia in causis finalibus non proceditur in infinitum, infinitum enim repugnat fini; bonum autem rationem finis habet. Oportet igitur devenire ad aliquod bonum primum, quod non participative sit bonum per ordinem ad aliquid aliud, sed sit per essentiam suam bonum. Hoc autem Deus est. Est igitur Deus sua bonitas. [4] Moreover, each good thing that is not its goodness is called good by participation. But that which is named by participation has something prior to it from which it receives the character of goodness. This cannot proceed to infinity, since among final causes there is no regress to infinity, since the infinite is opposed to the end [ finis ]. But the good has the nature of an end. We must, therefore, reach some first good, that is not by participation good through an order toward some other good, but is good through its own essence. This is God. God is, therefore, His own goodness.
Item. Id quod est participare aliquid potest, ipsum autem esse nihil: quod enim participat potentia est, esse autem actus est. Sed Deus est ipsum esse, ut probatum est. Non est igitur bonus participative, sed essentialiter. [5] Again, that which is can participate in something, but the act of being can participate in nothing. For that which participates is in potency, and being is an act. But God is being itself, as we have proved. He is not, therefore, by participation good; He is good essentially.
Amplius. Omne simplex suum esse et id quod est unum habet: nam, si sit aliud et aliud, iam simplicitas tolletur. Deus autem est omnino simplex, ut ostensum est. Igitur ipsum esse bonum non est aliud quam ipse. Est igitur sua bonitas. [6] Furthermore, in a simple being, being and that which is are the same. For, if one is not the other, the simplicity is then removed. But, as we have shown, God is absolutely simple. Therefore, for God to be good is identical with God. He is, therefore, His goodness.
Per eadem etiam patet quod nullum aliud bonum est sua bonitas. Propter quod dicitur Matth. 19-17: nemo bonus nisi solus Deus. [7] It is thereby likewise evident that no other good is its goodness. Hence it is said in Matthew (19:17): “One is good, God.”

Caput 39 Chapter 39
Quod in Deo non potest esse malum THAT THERE CANNOT BE EVIL IN GOD
Ex hoc autem manifeste apparet quod in Deo non potest esse malum. [1] From this it is quite evident that there cannot be evil in God.
Esse enim et bonitas, et omnia quae per essentiam dicuntur, nihil praeter se habent admixtum: licet id quod est vel bonum possit aliquid praeter esse et bonitatem habere. Nihil enim prohibet quod est uni perfectioni suppositum, etiam alii supponi, sicut quod est corpus potest esse album et dulce: unaquaeque autem natura suae rationis termino concluditur, ut nihil extraneum intra se capere possit. Deus autem est bonitas, non solum bonus, ut ostensum est. Non potest igitur in eo esse aliquid non bonitas. Et ita malum in eo omnino esse non potest. [2] For being and goodness, and all names that are predicated essentially, have nothing extraneous mixed with them, although that which is or good can have something besides being and goodness. For nothing prevents the subject of one perfection from being the subject of another, just as that which is a body can be white and sweet. Now, each nature is enclosed within the limits of its notion, so that it cannot include anything extraneous within itself. But, as we have proved, God is goodness, and not simply good. There cannot, therefore, be any non-goodness in Him. Thus, there cannot possibly be evil in God.
Amplius. Id quod est oppositum essentiae alicuius rei, sibi omnino convenire non potest dum manet: sicut homini non potest convenire irrationalitas vel insensibilitas nisi homo esse desistat. Sed divina essentia est ipsa bonitas, ut ostensum est. Ergo malum, quod est bono oppositum, in eo locum habere non potest nisi esse desisteret. Quod est impossibile: cum sit aeternus, ut supra ostensum est. [3] Moreover, what is opposed to the essence of a given thing cannot befit that thing so long as its essence remains. Thus, irrationality or insensibility cannot befit man unless he ceases to be a man. But the divine essence is goodness itself, as we have shown. Therefore, evil, which is the opposite of good, could have no place in God—unless He ceased to be God, which is impossible, since He is eternal, as we have shown.
Adhuc. Cum Deus sit suum esse, nihil participative de ipso dici potest, ut patet ex ratione supra inducta. Si igitur malum de ipso dicatur; non dicetur participative, sed essentialiter. Sic autem malum de nullo dici potest ut sit essentia alicuius: ei enim esse deficeret, quod bonum est, ut ostensum est; in malitia autem non potest esse aliquid extraneum admixtum, sicut nec in bonitate. Malum igitur de Deo dici non potest. [4] Furthermore, since God is His own being, nothing can be said of Him by participation, as is evident from the above argument. If, then, evil is said of God, it will not be said by participation, but essentially. But evil cannot be so said of anything as to be its essence, for it would lose its being, which is a good, as we have shown. In evil, however, there can be nothing extraneous mixed with it, as neither in goodness. Evil, therefore, cannot be said of God.
Item. Malum bono oppositum est. Ratio autem boni in perfectione consistit. Ergo ratio mali in imperfectione. Defectus autem vel imperfectio in Deo, qui est universaliter perfectus, esse non potest, ut supra ostensum est. In Deo igitur malum esse non potest. [5] Again, evil is the opposite of good. But the nature of the good consists in perfection, which means that the nature of evil consists in imperfection. Now, in God, Who is universally perfect, as we have shown above, there cannot be defect or imperfection. Therefore, evil cannot be in God.
Praeterea. Perfectum est aliquid secundum quod est actu. Ergo imperfectum erit secundum quod est deficiens ab actu. Ergo malum vel privatio est, vel privationem includit. Privationis autem subiectum est potentia. Haec autem in Deo esse non potest. Igitur nec malum. [6] Then, too, a thing is perfect according as it is in act. A thing will therefore be imperfect according as it falls short of act. Hence, evil is either a privation or includes privation. But the subject of privation is potency, which cannot be in God. Neither, therefore, can evil.
Praeterea. Si bonum est quod ab omnibus appetitur, igitur malum unaquaeque natura refugit inquantum huiusmodi. Quod autem inest alicui contra motum naturalis appetitus, est violentum et praeter naturam. Malum igitur in unoquoque est violentum et praeter naturam secundum quod est ei malum: etsi possit ei esse naturale secundum aliquid eius in rebus compositis. Deus autem compositus non est, nec aliquid esse potest in eo violentum vel praeter naturam, ut ostensum est. Malum igitur in Deo esse non potest. [7] If, moreover, the good is “that which is sought by all,” it follows that every nature flees evil as such. Now, what is in a thing contrary to the motion of its natural appetite is violent and unnatural. Evil in each thing, consequently, is violent and unnatural, so far as it is an evil for that thing; although, among composite things, evil may he natural to a thing according to something within it. But God is not composite, nor, as we have shown, can there be anything violent or unnatural in Him. Evil, therefore, cannot be in God.
Hoc etiam sacra Scriptura confirmat. Dicitur enim prima canonica Ioannis: Deus lux est, et tenebrae in eo non sunt ullae. Et in Iob 34-10: absit a Deo impietas, et ab omnipotente iniquitas. [8] Scripture likewise confirms this. For it is said in the canonic Epistle of John (I, 1:5): “God is light and in Him there is no darkness”; and in Job (34:10) it is written: “Far from God be wickedness; and iniquity from the Almighty.”

Caput 40 Chapter 40
Quod Deus est omnis boni bonum THAT GOD IS THE GOOD OF EVERY GOOD
Ostenditur etiam ex praedictis quod Deus sit omnis boni bonum. [1] From the foregoing it is also shown that God is “the good of every good.”’
Bonitas enim uniuscuiusque est perfectio ipsius, ut dictum est. Deus autem, cum sit simpliciter perfectus, sua perfectione omnes rerum perfectiones comprehendit, ut ostensum est. Sua igitur bonitas omnes bonitates comprehendit. Et ita est omnis boni bonum. [2] For the goodness of each thing is its perfection, as we have said. But, since God is absolutely perfect, in His perfection He comprehends the perfections of all things, as has been shown. His goodness, therefore, comprehends every goodness. Thus, He is the good of every good.
Item. Quod per participationem dicitur aliquale, non dicitur tale nisi inquantum habet quandam similitudinem eius quod per essentiam dicitur: sicut ferrum dicitur ignitum inquantum quandam similitudinem ignis participat. Sed Deus est bonus per essentiam, omnia vero alia per participationem, ut ostensum est. Igitur nihil dicetur bonum nisi inquantum habet aliquam similitudinem divinae bonitatis. Est igitur ipse bonum omnis boni. [3] Moreover, that which is said to be of a certain sort by participation is said to be such only so far as it has a certain likeness to that which is said to be such by essence. Thus iron is said to be on fire in so far as it participates in a certain likeness of fire. But God is good through His essence, whereas all other things are good by participation, as has been shown. Nothing, then, will be called good except in so far as it has a certain likeness of the divine goodness. Hence, God is the good of every good.
Adhuc. Cum unumquodque appetibile sit propter finem; boni autem ratio consistat in hoc quod est appetibile: oportet quod unumquodque dicatur bonum vel quia est finis, vel quia ordinatur ad finem. Finis igitur ultimus est a quo omnia rationem boni accipiunt. Hoc autem Deus est, ut infra probabitur. Est igitur Deus omnis boni bonum. [4] Since, furthermore, each thing is appetible because of the end, and since the nature of the good consists in its being appetible, each thing must be called good either because it is the end or because it is ordered to the end. It is the last end, then, from which all things receive the nature of good. As will be proved later on, this is God. God is, therefore, the good of every good.
Hinc est quod dominus, suam visionem Moysi promittens, dicit, Exodi 33-19: ego ostendam tibi omne bonum. Et Sap. 8, dicitur de divina sapientia: venerunt mihi omnia bona pariter cum illa. [5] Hence it is that God, promising to Moses a vision of Himself, says: “I will show you all good” (Exod. 33:19). And in Wisdom (7:11), it is said of the divine wisdom: “All good things come to me together with her.”

Caput 41 Chapter 41
Quod Deus sit summum bonum THAT GOD IS THE HIGHEST GOOD
Ex hoc autem ostenditur quod Deus sit summum bonum. [1] From this conclusion we prove that God is the highest good.
Nam bonum universale praeminet cuilibet bono particulari, sicut bonum gentis est melius quam bonum unius: bonitas enim totius et perfectio praeminet bonitati et perfectioni partis. Sed divina bonitas comparatur ad omnia alia sicut universale bonum ad particulare: cum sit omnis boni bonum, ut ostensum est. Est igitur ipse summum bonum. [2] For the universal good stands higher than any particular good, just as “the good of the people is better than the good of an individual,” since the goodness and perfection of the whole stand higher than the goodness and perfection of the part. But the divine goodness is compared to all others as the universal good to a particular good, being, as we have shown, the good of every good. God is, therefore, the highest good.
Praeterea. Id quod per essentiam dicitur, verius dicitur quam id quod est per participationem dictum. Sed Deus est bonus per suam essentiam, alia vero per participationem, ut ostensum est. Est igitur ipse summum bonum. [3] Furthermore, what is said essentially is said more truly than what is said by participation. But God is good essentially, while other things are good by participation, as we have shown. God is, therefore, the highest good.
Item. Quod est maximum in unoquoque genere est causa aliorum quae sunt in illo genere: causa enim potior est effectu. Ex Deo autem omnia habent rationem boni, ut ostensum est. Est igitur ipse summum bonum. [4] Again, “what is greatest in any genus is the cause of the rest in that genus,” for a cause ranks higher than an effect. But, as we have shown, it is from God that all things have the nature of good. God is, therefore, the highest good.
Amplius. Sicut albius est quod est nigro impermixtius, ita melius est quod est malo impermixtius. Sed Deus est maxime malo impermixtus: quia in eo nec actu nec potentia malum esse potest, et hoc ei ex sua natura competit, ut ostensum est. Est igitur ipse summum bonum. [5] Moreover, just as what is not mixed with black is more white, so what is not mixed with evil is more good. But Cod is most unmixed with evil, because evil can be in God neither in act nor in potency; and this belongs to God according to His nature, as we have shown. God is, therefore, the highest good.
[23860] Contra Gentiles, lib. 1 cap. 41 n. 6 Hinc est quod dicitur 1 Reg. 2-2: non est sanctus ut est dominus. [6] Hence what is written in 1 Samuel (2:2): “There is none holy as the Lord is.”

Caput 42 Chapter 42
Quod Deus est unus THAT GOD IS ONE
Ex hoc autem ostenditur quod Deus sit summum bonum. [1] From what has been shown it is evident that God is one.
Non enim possibile est esse duo summe bona. Quod enim per superabundantiam dicitur, in uno tantum invenitur. Deus autem est summum bonum, ut ostensum est. Deus igitur est unus. [2] For it is not possible that there be two highest goods, since that which is said by superabundance is found in only one being. But God, as we have shown, is the highest good. God is, therefore, one.
Praeterea. Ostensum est Deum esse omnino perfectum, cui nulla perfectio desit. Si igitur sunt plures dii, oportet esse plura huiusmodi perfecta. Hoc autem est impossibile: nam si nulli eorum deest aliqua perfectio, nec aliqua imperfectio admiscetur, quod requiritur ad hoc quod aliquid sit simpliciter perfectum, non erit in quo ad invicem distinguantur. Impossibile est igitur plures deos ponere. [3] Again, it has been shown that God is absolutely perfect, lacking no perfection. If, then, there are many gods, there must be many such perfect beings. But this is impossible. For, if none of these perfect beings lacks some perfection, and does not have any admixture of imperfection, which is demanded for an absolutely perfect being, nothing will be given in which to distinguish the perfect beings from one another. It is impossible, therefore, that there be many gods.
Item. Quod sufficienter fit uno posito, melius est per unum fieri quam per multa. Sed rerum ordo est sicut melius potest esse: non enim potentia agentis primi deest potentiae quae est in rebus ad perfectionem. Sufficienter autem omnia complentur reducendo in unum primum principium. Non est igitur ponere plura principia. [4] Again, that which is accomplished adequately through one supposition is better done through one than through many. But the order of things is the best it can be, since the power of the first cause does not fail the potency in things for perfection. Now, all things are sufficiently fulfilled by a reduction to one first principle. There is, therefore, no need to posit many principles.
Amplius. Impossibile est unum motum continuum et regularem a pluribus motoribus esse. Nam, si simul movent, nullus eorum est perfectus motor, sed omnes se habent loco unius perfecti motoris: quod non competit in primo motore, perfectum enim est prius imperfecto. Si autem non simul moveant, quilibet eorum est quandoque movens et quandoque non. Ex quo sequitur quod motus non sit continuus neque regularis. Motus enim continuus et unus est ab uno motore. Motor etiam qui non semper movet, irregulariter invenitur movere: sicut patet in motoribus inferioribus, in quibus motus violentus in principio intenditur et in fine remittitur, motus autem naturalis e converso. Sed primus motus est unus et continuus, ut a philosophis probatum est. Ergo oportet eius motorem primum esse unum. [5] Moreover, it is impossible that there be one continuous and regular motion from many movers. For, if they move together, none of them is a perfect mover, but all together rather take the place of one perfect mover. This is not befitting in the first mover, for the perfect is prior to the imperfect. If, however, they do not move together, each of them at times moves and at times does not. It follows from this that motion is neither continuous nor regular. For a motion that is continuous and one is from one mover. Furthermore, a mover that is not always moving is found to move irregularly, as is evident among lesser movers among whom a violent motion is stronger in the beginning and weaker at the end, whereas a natural motion proceeds conversely. But, as the philosophers have proved, the first motion is one and continuous. Therefore, its first mover must be one.
Adhuc. Substantia corporalis ordinatur ad spiritualem sicut ad suum bonum: nam est in ista bonitas plenior, cui corporalis substantia intendit assimilari, cum omne quod est desideret optimum quantum possibile est. Sed omnes motus corporalis creaturae inveniuntur reduci ad unum primum, praeter quem non est alius primus qui nullo modo reducatur in ipsum. Ergo praeter substantiam spiritualem quae est finis primi motus, non est aliqua quae non reducatur in ipsam. Hoc autem nomine Dei intelligimus. Non est igitur nisi unus Deus. [6] Furthermore, a corporeal substance is ordered to a spiritual substance as to its good. For there is in the spiritual substance a fuller goodness to which the corporeal substance seeks to liken itself, since whatever exists desires the best so far as this is possible. But all the motions of the corporeal creature are seen to be reduced to one first motion, beyond which there is no other first motion that is not in some way reduced to it. Therefore, outside the spiritual substance that is the end of the first motion, there is none that is not reduced to it. But this is what we understand by the name of God. Hence, there is only one God.
Amplius. Omnium diversorum ordinatorum ad invicem, ordo eorum ad invicem est propter ordinem eorum ad aliquid unum: sicut ordo partium exercitus ad invicem est propter ordinem totius exercitus ad ducem. Nam quod aliqua diversa in habitudine aliqua uniuntur, non potest esse ex propriis naturis secundum quod sunt diversa: quia ex hoc magis disiungerentur. Nec potest esse ex diversis ordinantibus: quia non posset esse quod unum ordinem intenderent ex seipsis secundum quod sunt diversi. Et sic vel ordo multorum ad invicem est per accidens: vel oportet reducere ad aliquod unum primum ordinans, qui ad finem quem intendit omnia alia ordinat. Omnes autem partes huius mundi inveniuntur ordinatae ad invicem, secundum quod quaedam a quibusdam iuvantur sicut corpora inferiora moventur per superiora, et haec per substantias incorporeas, ut ex supra dictis patet. Nec hoc est per accidens: cum sit semper vel in maiori parte. Igitur totus hic mundus non habet nisi unum ordinatorem et gubernatorem. Sed praeter hunc mundum non est alius. Non est igitur nisi unus omnium rerum gubernator, quem Deum dicimus. [7] Among all the things that are ordered to one another, furthermore, their order to one another is for the sake of their order to something one; just as the order of the parts of an army among themselves is for the sake of the order of the whole army to its general. For that some diverse things should be united by some relationship cannot come about from their own natures as diverse things, since on this basis they would rather be distinguished from one another. Nor can this unity come from diverse ordering causes, because they could not possibly intend one order in so far as among themselves they are diverse. Thus, either the order of many to one another is accidental, or we must reduce it to some one first ordering cause that orders all other things to the end it intends. Now, we find that all the parts of this world are ordered to one another according as some things help some other things. Thus, lower bodies are moved by higher bodies, and these by incorporeal substances, as appears from what was said above. Nor is this something accidental, since it takes place always or for the most part. Therefore, this whole world has only one ordering cause and governor. But there is no other world beyond this one. Hence, there is only one governor for all things, whom we call God.
Adhuc. Si sunt duo quorum utrumque est necesse-esse, oportet quod conveniant in intentione necessitatis essendi. Oportet igitur quod distinguantur per aliquid quod additur uni tantum, vel utrique. Et sic oportet vel alterum vel utrumque esse compositum. Nullum autem compositum est necesse-esse, per seipsum, sicut supra ostensum est. Impossibile est igitur esse plura quorum utrumque sit necesse-esse. Et sic nec plures deos. [8] Then, too, if there are two beings of which both are necessary beings, they must agree in the notion of the necessity of being. Hence, they must be distinguished by something added either to one of them only, or to both. This means that one or both of them must be composite. Now, as we have shown, no composite being is through itself a necessary being. It is impossible therefore that there be many beings of which each is a necessary being. Hence, neither can there be many gods.
Amplius. Illud in quo differunt, ex quo ponuntur convenire in necessitate essendi, aut requiritur ad complementum necessitatis essendi aliquo modo, aut non. Si non requiritur, ergo est aliquid accidentale: quia omne quod advenit rei nihil faciens ad esse ipsius, est accidens. Ergo hoc accidens habet causam. Aut ergo essentiam eius quod est necesse-esse, aut aliquid aliud. Si essentiam eius, cum ipsa necessitas essendi sit essentia eius, ut ex supra dictis patet, necessitas essendi erit causa illius accidentis. Sed necessitas essendi invenitur in utroque. Ergo utrumque habebit illud accidens. Et sic non distinguentur secundum illud. Si autem causa illius accidentis sit aliquid aliud, nisi ergo illud aliud esset, hoc accidens non esset. Et nisi hoc accidens esset, distinctio praedicta non esset. Ergo, nisi esset illud aliud, ista duo quae ponuntur necesse-esse, non essent duo sed unum. Ergo esse proprium utriusque est dependens ab altero. Et sic neutrum est necesse-esse per seipsum. [9] Furthermore, given two gods that are posited as agreeing in the necessity of being, either that in which they differ is in some way required for the completion of their necessity of being, or it is not. If it is not, then it is something accidental, because that which accrues to a thing without contributing to its being is an accident. Hence, this accident has a cause, which is, consequently, either the essence of the necessary being or something else. If its essence, then, since the necessity itself of being is its essence, as is evident from what was said above, the necessity of being will be the cause of that accident. But the necessity of being is found in both gods. Therefore, both will have that accident, and thus will not be distinguished with reference to it. If, however, the cause of the accident is something else, it follows that, unless that something else existed, this accident would not exist; and unless this accident existed, the aforesaid distinction would not exist. Therefore, unless that something else existed, these two supposed necessary beings would not be two but one. Therefore, the proper being of each depends on the other, and thus neither of them is through itself a necessary being.
Si autem illud in quo distinguuntur sit necessarium ad necessitatem essendi complendam, aut hoc erit quia illud includitur in ratione necessitatis essendi, sicut animatum includitur in definitione animalis: aut hoc erit quia necessitas essendi specificatur per illud, sicut animal completur per rationale. Si primo modo, oportet quod, ubicumque sit necessitas essendi, sit illud quod in eius ratione includitur: sicut cuicumque convenit animal, convenit animatum. Et sic, cum ambobus praedictis attribuatur necessitas essendi, secundum illud distingui non poterunt. Si autem secundo modo, hoc iterum esse non potest. Nam differentia specificans genus non complet generis rationem, sed per eam acquiritur generi esse in actu: ratio enim animalis completa est ante additionem rationalis, sed non potest esse animal actu nisi sit rationale vel irrationale. Sic ergo aliquid complet necessitatem essendi quantum ad esse in actu et non quantum ad intentionem necessitatis essendi. Quod est impossibile, propter duo. Primo, quia eius quod est necesse-esse, sua quidditas est suum esse, ut supra probatum est. Secundo, quia sic necesse-esse acquireret esse per aliquid aliud: quod est impossibile. [10] If, however, that in which they are distinguished is required to complete the necessity of their being, either this will be because it is included in the nature of this necessity of being, as animate is included in the definition of animal, or this will be because their necessity of being is specified by it, as animal is completed by rational. If the first is the case, wherever the necessity of being is found there must be present that which is included in its nature, just as animate belongs to whatever being to which animal belongs. And thus, since the necessity of being is attributed to both the aforementioned beings, they will not thereby be distinguished. If the second is the case, this too is impossible. A difference specifying a genus does not complete the nature of the genus, but rather through it the genus comes to be in act. For the nature of animal is complete before the addition of rational. Rather, the fact is that there cannot be an animal in act that is not rational or irrational. Thus, therefore, something completes the necessity of being as to being in act, and not as to the notion of the necessity of being. This is impossible on two counts. First, because the quiddity of a necessary being is its being, as was proved above. Second, because, were it true, the necessary being would acquire being through something else, which is impossible.
Non est igitur possibile ponere plura quorum quodlibet sit necesse-esse per seipsum. [11] It is, therefore, not possible to posit many beings of which each is through itself a necessary being.
Adhuc. Si sunt duo dii, aut hoc nomen Deus de utroque praedicatur univoce, aut aequivoce. Si aequivoce, hoc est praeter intentionem praesentem: nam nihil prohibet rem quamlibet quolibet nomine aequivoce nominari, si usus loquentium admittat. Si autem dicatur univoce, oportet quod de utroque praedicetur secundum unam rationem. Et sic oportet quod in utroque sit una natura secundum rationem. Aut igitur haec natura est in utroque secundum unum esse, aut secundum aliud et aliud. Si secundum unum, ergo non erunt duo sed unum tantum: duorum enim non est unum esse si substantialiter distinguantur. Si autem est aliud et aliud esse in utroque, ergo neutri erit sua quidditas suum esse. Sed hoc oportet in Deo ponere, ut probatum est. Ergo neutrum illorum duorum est hoc quod intelligimus nomine Dei. Sic igitur impossibile est ponere duos deos. [12] What is more, if there are two gods, either the name God is predicated of both univocally, or equivocally. If equivocally, this is outside our present purpose. Nothing prevents any given thing from being equivocally named by any given name, provided we admit the usage of those who express the name. But if it be used univocally, it must be predicated of both according to one notion, which means that, in notion, there must be in both one nature. Either, therefore, this nature is in both according to one being, or according to a being that is other in each case. If according to one, there will not be two gods, but only one, since there cannot be one being for two things that are substantially distinguished. If each has its own being, therefore in neither being will the quiddity be its being. Yet this must be posited in God, as we have proved. Therefore, neither of these two beings is what we understand by the name God. It is, therefore, impossible to posit two gods.
Amplius. Nihil eorum quae conveniunt huic signato inquantum est hoc signatum, possibile est alii convenire: quia singularitas alicuius rei non est alteri praeter ipsum singulare. Sed ei quod est necesse-esse sua necessitas essendi convenit inquantum est hoc signatum. Ergo impossibile est quod alicui alteri conveniat. Et sic impossibile est quod sint plura quorum quodlibet sit necesse-esse. Et per consequens impossibile est esse plures deos. [13] Again, nothing that belongs to this designated thing as such can belong to another, for the singularity of some thing belongs to none other than to that singular thing. But its necessity of being belongs to the necessary being so far as it is this designated being. Therefore, it cannot belong to another, and therefore there cannot be several beings of which each is a necessary being. It is, consequently, impossible that there be several gods.
Probatio mediae: si enim illud quod est necesse-esse non est hoc signatum inquantum est necesse-esse, oportet quod designatio sui esse non sit necessaria secundum se, sed ex alio dependeat. Unumquodque autem secundum quod est actu est distinctum ab omnibus aliis: quod est esse hoc signatum. Ergo quod est necesse-esse dependet ab alio quantum ad hoc quod est esse in actu. Quod est contra rationem eius quod est necesse-esse. Oportet igitur quod id quod est necesse-esse sit necesse-esse secundum hoc quod est hoc signatum. [14] The proof of the minor. If the necessary being is not this designated being as a necessary being, the designation of its being is not necessary through itself but depends on another. But so far as each thing is in act it is distinct from all other things; this is to be this designated thing. Therefore, the necessary being depends on another to be in act; which is against the nature of the necessary being. Therefore, the necessary being must be necessary according as it is this designated being.
Adhuc. Natura significata hoc nomine Deus aut est per seipsam individuata in hoc Deo, aut per aliquid aliud. Si per aliud oportet quod sit ibi compositio. Si per seipsam, ergo impossibile est quod alteri conveniat: illud enim quod est individuationis principium, non potest esse pluribus commune. Impossibile igitur est esse plures deos. [15] Furthermore, either the nature signified by the name God is individuated through itself in this God, or it is individuated through something else. If through something else, composition must result. If through itself, then it cannot possibly belong to another, since the principle of individuation cannot be common to several, It is impossible, therefore, that there be several gods.
Amplius. Si sunt plures dii, oportet quod natura deitatis non sit una numero in utroque. Oportet igitur esse aliquid distinguens naturam divinam in hoc et in illo. Sed hoc est impossibile: quia natura divina non recipit additionem neque differentiarum essentialium neque accidentium, ut supra ostensum est; nec etiam natura divina est forma alicuius materiae, ut possit dividi ad materiae divisionem. Impossibile est igitur esse plures deos. [16] If, again, there are several gods, the nature of the godhead cannot be numerically one in two of them. There must, therefore, be something distinguishing the divine nature in this and in that god. But this is impossible, because, as we have shown above, the divine nature receives the addition neither of essential differences nor of accidents. Nor yet is the divine nature the form of any matter, to be capable of being divided according to the division of matter. It is impossible, therefore, that there be two gods.
Item. Esse proprium uniuscuiusque rei est tantum unum. Sed ipse Deus est esse suum, ut supra ostensum est. Impossibile est igitur esse nisi unum Deum. [17] Then, too, the proper being of each thing is only one. But God is His being, as we have shown. There can, therefore, be only one God.
Adhuc. Secundum hunc modum res habet esse quo possidet unitatem: unde unumquodque suae divisioni pro posse repugnat, ne per hoc in non esse tendat. Sed divina natura est potissime habens esse. Est igitur in ea maxima unitas. Nullo igitur modo in plura distinguitur. [18] Moreover, a thing has being in the manner it possesses unity. Hence, each thing struggles as much as it can against any division of itself, lest thereby it tend to nonbeing. But the divine nature has being most powerfully. There is therefore, in it the greatest unity, and hence no plurality is in any way distinguished within it.
Amplius. In unoquoque genere videmus multitudinem ab aliqua unitate procedere: et ideo in quolibet genere invenitur unum primum, quod est mensura omnium quae in illo genere inveniuntur. Quorumcumque igitur invenitur in aliquo uno convenientia, oportet quod ab aliquo uno principio dependeant. Sed omnia in esse conveniunt. Oportet igitur esse unum tantum quod est rerum omnium principium. Quod Deus est. [19] Furthermore, we notice in each genus that multitude proceeds from some unity. This is why in every genus there is found a prime member that is the measure of all the things found in that genus. In whatever things, therefore, we find that there is an agreement in one respect, it is necessary that this depend upon one source. But all things agree in being. There must, therefore, be only one being that is the source of all things. This is God.
Item. In quolibet principatu ille qui praesidet unitatem desiderat: unde inter principatus est potissima monarchia, sive regnum. Multorum etiam membrorum unum est caput: ac per hoc evidenti signo apparet ei cui convenit principatus, unitatem deberi. Unde et Deum, qui est omnium causa, oportet unum simpliciter confiteri. [20] Again, in every rulership he who rules desires unity. That is why among the forms of rulership the main one is monarchy or kingship. So, too, for many members there is one head, whereby we see by an evident sign that he to whom rulership belongs should have unity. Hence, we must admit that God, Who is the cause of all things, is absolutely one.
Hanc autem confessionem divinae unitatis etiam ex sacris eloquiis accipere possumus. Nam Deut. 6-4 dicitur: audi, Israel, dominus Deus tuus Deus unus est; et Exod. 20-3: non erunt tibi dii alii praeter me; et Ephes. 4-5: unus dominus, una fides, et cetera. [21] This confession of the divine unity we can likewise gather from holy Scripture. For it is said in Deuteronomy (6:4): “Hear, O Israel: the Lord our God is one God”; and in Exodus (20:3): “You shall not have strange gods before Me”; and in Ephesians (4:5): “One Lord, one faith, one baptism.”
Hac autem veritate repelluntur gentiles deorum multitudinem confitentes. Quamvis plures eorum unum Deum summum esse dicerent, a quo omnes alios quos deos nominabant causatos esse asserebant, omnibus substantiis sempiternis divinitatis nomen adscribentes, et praecipue ratione sapientiae et felicitatis et rerum gubernationis. Quae quidem consuetudo loquendi etiam in sacra Scriptura invenitur, dum sancti Angeli, aut etiam homines vel iudices, dii nominantur; sicut illud Psalmi: non est similis tibi in diis, domine; et alibi, ego dixi, dii estis; et multa huiusmodi per varia Scripturae loca inveniuntur. [22] Now by this truth are refuted those Gentiles who accepted a multitude of gods. However, many of them said that there was one highest God, by whom all the others whom they named gods were according to them caused. For they attributed the name of divinity to all everlasting substances, and this especially because of their wisdom and felicity and the rulership of things. This manner of speaking is found also in Sacred Scripture, in which the holy angels, or even men, or judges, are called gods. Thus, this verse of the Psalms (85:8): “There is none among the gods like You, O Lord”; and elsewhere: “I have said: You are gods” (Ps. 81:6). Many such expressions are found in different places in Scripture.
Unde magis huic veritati videntur contrarii Manichaei, duo prima ponentes principia, quorum alterum alterius causa non sit. [23] Hence, it is mainly the Manicheans who seem opposed to this truth, in that they posit two first principles of which one is not the cause of the other.
Hanc etiam veritatem Ariani suis erroribus impugnaverunt, dum confitentur patrem et filium non unum, sed plures deos esse: cum tamen filium verum Deum auctoritate Scripturae credere cogantur. [24] The Arians likewise attacked this truth by their errors, in confessing that the Father and the Son are not one but several gods; although the authority of Scripture forces e to believe that the Son is true God.

Caput 43 Chapter 43
Quod Deus est infinitus THAT GOD IS INFINITE
Cum autem infinitum quantitatem sequatur, ut philosophi tradunt, non potest infinitas Deo attribui ratione multitudinis: cum ostensum sit solum unum Deum esse, nullamque in eo compositionem vel partium vel accidentium inveniri. Secundum etiam quantitatem continuam infinitus dici non potest: cum ostensum sit eum incorporeum esse. Relinquitur igitur investigare an secundum spiritualem magnitudinem esse infinitum ei conveniat. [1] Since, as the philosophers teach, “the infinite accompanies quantity,” infinity cannot be attributed to God on the ground of multitude. For we have shown that there is only one God and that no composition of parts or accidents is found in Him. Nor, again, according to continuous quantity can God be called infinite, since we have shown that He is incorporeal. It remains, then, to investigate whether according to spiritual magnitude it befits God to be infinite.
Quae quidem spiritualis magnitudo quantum ad duo attenditur: scilicet quantum ad potentiam; et quantum ad propriae naturae bonitatem sive completionem. Dicitur enim aliquid magis vel minus album secundum modum quo in eo sua albedo completur. Pensatur etiam magnitudo virtutis ex magnitudine actionis vel factorum. Harum autem magnitudinem una aliam consequitur: nam ex hoc ipso quo aliquid actu est, activum est; secundum igitur modum quo in actu suo completur, est modus magnitudinis suae virtutis. Et sic relinquitur res spirituales magnas dici secundum modum suae completionis: nam et Augustinus dicit quod in his quae non mole magna sunt, idem est esse maius quod melius. [2] We speak of spiritual magnitude with reference to two points: namely, power and the goodness or completeness of one’s own nature. For something is said to be more or less white according to the mode in which its whiteness is completed. The magnitude of its power likewise is measured from the magnitude of its action or its works. Of these magnitudes one follows the other. For, from the fact that something is in act it is active, and hence the mode of the magnitude of its power is according to the mode in which it is completed in its act. Thus, it remains that spiritual beings are called great according to the mode of their completion. Augustine himself says that “in beings that are great but not in bulk, to be greater is the same as to be better.”
Ostendendum est igitur secundum huius magnitudinis modum Deum infinitum esse. Non autem sic ut infinitum privative accipiatur, sicut in quantitate dimensiva vel numerali: nam huiusmodi quantitas nata est finem habere; unde secundum subtractionem eius quod sunt nata habere, infinita dicuntur; et propter hoc in eis infinitum imperfectionem designat. Sed in Deo infinitum negative tantum intelligitur: quia nullus est perfectionis suae terminus sive finis, sed est summe perfectum. Et sic Deo infinitum attribui debet. [3] We must therefore show that God is infinite according to the mode of this sort of magnitude. The infinite here will not be taken in the sense of privation, as in the case of dimensive or numerical quantity. For this quantity is of a nature to have a limit, so that such things are called infinites according as there is removed from them the limits they have by nature; which means that in their case the infinite designates an imperfection. But in God the infinite is understood only in a negative way, because there is no terminus or limit to His perfection: He is supremely perfect. It is thus that the infinite ought to be attributed to God.
Omne namque quod secundum suam naturam finitum est, ad generis alicuius rationem determinatur. Deus autem non est in aliquo genere, sed eius perfectio omnium generum perfectiones continet, ut supra ostensum est. Est igitur infinitus. [4] For everything that according to its nature is finite is determined to the nature of some genus. God, however, is not in any genus; His perfection, as was shown above, rather contains the perfections of all the genera. God is, therefore, infinite.
Amplius. Omnis actus alteri inhaerens terminationem recipit ex eo in quo est: quia quod est in altero, est in eo per modum recipientis. Actus igitur in nullo existens nullo terminatur: puta, si albedo esset per se existens, perfectio albedinis in ea non terminaretur, quominus haberet quicquid de perfectione albedinis haberi potest. Deus autem est actus nullo modo in alio existens: quia nec est forma in materia, ut probatum est; nec esse suum inhaeret alicui formae vel naturae, cum ipse sit suum esse, ut supra ostensum est. Relinquitur igitur ipsum esse infinitum. [5) Again, every act inhering in another is terminated by that in which it inheres, since what is in another is in it according to the mode of the receiver. Hence, an act that exists in nothing is terminated by nothing. Thus, if whiteness were self-existing, the perfection of whiteness in it would not be terminated so as not to have whatever can be had of the perfection of whiteness. But God is act in no way existing in another, for neither is He a form in matter, as we have proved, nor does His being inhere in some form or nature, since He is His own being, as was proved above. It remains, then, that God is infinite.
Adhuc. In rebus invenitur aliquid quod est potentia tantum, ut materia prima; aliquid quod est actus tantum, ut Deus, sicut supra ostensum est; aliquid quod est actu et potentia, sicut res ceterae. Sed potentia, cum dicatur ad actum, non potest actum excedere, sicut nec in unoquoque, ita nec simpliciter. Cum igitur materia prima sit infinita in sua potentialitate, relinquitur quod Deus, qui est actus purus, sit infinitus in sua actualitate. [6] Furthermore, in reality we find something that is potency alone, namely, prime matter, something that is act alone, namely, God, as was shown above, and something that is act and potency, namely, the rest of things. But, since potency is said relatively to act, it cannot exceed act either in a particular case or absolutely. Hence, since prime matter is infinite in its potentiality, it remains that God, Who is pure act, is infinite in His actuality.
Item. Tanto actus aliquis perfectior est, quanto minus habet potentiae permixtum. Unde omnis actus cui permiscetur potentia, habet terminum suae perfectionis: cui autem non permiscetur aliqua potentia, est absque termino perfectionis. Deus autem est actus purus absque omni potentia, ut supra ostensum est. Est igitur infinitus. [7] Moreover, an act is all the more perfect by as much as it has less of potency mixed with it. Hence, every act with which potency is mixed is terminated in its perfection. But, as was shown above, God is pure act without any potency. He is, therefore, infinite.
Amplius. Ipsum esse absolute consideratum infinitum est: nam ab infinitis et infinitis modis participari possibile est. Si igitur alicuius esse sit finitum, oportet quod limitetur esse illud per aliquid aliud quod sit aliqualiter causa illius esse. Sed esse divini non potest esse aliqua causa: quia ipse est necesse per seipsum. Igitur esse suum est infinitum, et ipse infinitus. [8] Again, considered absolutely, being is infinite, since there are infinite and infinite modes in which it can be participated. If, then, the being of some thing is finite, that being must be limited by something other that is somehow its cause. But there can be no cause of the divine being, for God is a necessary being through Himself. Therefore, His being is infinite, and so is He.
Adhuc. Omne quod habet aliquam perfectionem, tanto est perfectius quanto illam perfectionem plenius participat. Sed non potest esse aliquis modus, nec etiam cogitari, quo plenius habeatur aliqua perfectio quam ab eo quod per suam essentiam est perfectum et cuius essentia est sua bonitas. Hoc autem Deus est. Nullo igitur modo potest cogitari aliquid melius vel perfectius Deo. Est igitur infinitus in bonitate. [9] Then, too, what has a certain perfection is the more perfect as it participates in that perfection more fully. But there cannot be a mode of perfection, nor is one thinkable, by which a given perfection is possessed more fully than it is possessed by the being that is perfect through its essence and whose being is its goodness. In no way, therefore, is it possible to think of anything better or more perfect than God. Hence, God is infinite in goodness.
Amplius. Intellectus noster ad infinitum in intelligendo extenditur: cuius signum est quod, qualibet quantitate finita data, intellectus noster maiorem excogitare potest. Frustra autem esset haec ordinatio intellectus ad infinitum nisi esset aliqua res intelligibilis infinita. Oportet igitur esse aliquam rem intelligibilem infinitam, quam oportet esse maximam rerum. Et hanc dicimus Deum. Deus igitur est infinitus. [10] Our intellect, furthermore, extends to the infinite in understanding; and a sign of this is that, given any finite quantity, our intellect can think of a greater one. But this ordination of the intellect would be in vain unless an infinite intelligible reality existed. There must, therefore, be some infinite intelligible reality, which must be the greatest of beings. This we call God. God is, therefore, infinite.
Item. Effectus non potest extendi ultra suam causam. Intellectus autem noster non potest esse nisi a Deo, qui est prima omnium causa. Non igitur potest aliquid cogitare intellectus noster maius Deo. Si igitur omni finito potest aliquid maius cogitare, relinquitur Deum finitum non esse. [11] Again, an effect cannot transcend its cause. But our intellect can be only from God, Who is the first cause of all things. Our intellect, therefore, cannot think of anything greater than God. If, then, it can think of something greater than every finite thing, it remains that God is not finite.
Amplius. Virtus infinita non potest esse in essentia finita: quia unumquodque agit per suam formam, quae vel est essentia eius vel pars essentiae; virtus autem principium actionis nominat. Sed Deus non habet virtutem activam finitam: movet enim in tempore infinito, quod non potest esse nisi a virtute infinita, ut supra ostensum est. Relinquitur igitur Dei essentiam esse infinitam. [12] There is also the argument that an infinite power cannot reside in a finite essence. For each thing acts through its form, which is either its essence or a part of the essence, whereas power is the name of a principle of action. But God does not have a finite active power. For He moves in an infinite time, which can be done only by an infinite power, as we have proved above. It remains, then, that God’s essence is infinite.
Haec autem ratio est secundum ponentes aeternitatem mundi. Qua non posita, adhuc magis confirmatur opinio de infinitate divinae virtutis. Nam unumquodque agens tanto est virtuosius in agendo quanto potentiam magis remotam ab actu in actum reducit: sicut maiori virtute opus est ad calefaciendum aquam quam aerem. Sed id quod omnino non est, infinite distat ab actu, nec est aliquo modo in potentia. Igitur, si mundus factus est postquam omnino prius non erat, oportet factoris virtutem esse infinitam. [13] This argument, however, is according to those who posit the eternity of the world. If we do not posit it, there is all the greater confirmation for the view that the power of God is infinite. For each agent is the more powerful in acting according as it reduces to act a potency more removed from act; just as a greater power is needed to heat water than air. But that which in no way exists is infinitely distant from act, nor is it in any way in potency. If, then, the world was made after previously not being at all, the power of its maker must be infinite.
Haec autem ratio, etiam secundum eos qui ponunt aeternitatem mundi, valet ad probandum infinitatem divinae virtutis. Confitentur enim Deum esse causam mundanae substantiae, quamvis eam sempiternam arbitrentur, dicentes hoc modo Deum aeternum sempiterni mundi causam existere sicut pes ab aeterno fuisset causa vestigii si ab aeterno fuisset impressus in pulvere. Hac autem positione facta, secundum rationem praedictam nihilominus sequitur Dei virtutem esse infinitam. Nam sive ex tempore, secundum nos, sive ab aeterno, secundum eos, produxerit, nihil esse potest in re quod ipse non produxerit: cum sit universale essendi principium. Et sic, nulla praesupposita materia vel potentia, produxit. Oportet autem proportionem virtutis activae accipere secundum proportionem potentiae passivae: nam, quanto potentia passiva maior praeexistit vel praeintelligitur, tanto maiori virtute activa in actum completur. Relinquitur igitur, cum virtus finita producat aliquem effectum praesupposita potentia materiae, quod Dei virtus, quae nullam potentiam praesupponit, non sit finita, sed infinita: et ita essentia infinita. [14] This argument holds in proving the infinity of the divine power even according to those who posit the eternity of the world. For they acknowledge that God is the cause of the substance of the world, though they consider this substance to be everlasting. They say that God is the cause of an everlasting world in the same way as a foot would have been the cause of an imprint if it had been pressed on sand from all eternity. If we adopt this position, according to our previous argumentation it still follows that the power of God is infinite. For, whether God produced things in time, as we hold, or from all eternity, according to them, nothing can be in reality that God did not produce; for God is the universal source of being. Thus, God produced the world without the supposition of any pre-existent matter or potency. Now, we must gather the proportion of an active power according to the proportion of a passive potency, for the greater the potency that preexists or is presupposed, by so much the greater active power will it be brought to actual fulfillment. It remains, therefore, that, since a finite power produces a given effect by presupposing the potency of matter, the power of God, which presupposes no potency, is infinite, not finite. Thus, so is His essence infinite.
Amplius. Unaquaeque res tanto est diuturnior quanto eius esse causa est efficacior. Illud igitur cuius diuturnitas est infinita, oportet quod habeat esse per causam efficaciae infinitae. Sed diuturnitas Dei est infinita: ostensum est enim supra ipsum esse aeternum. Cum igitur non habeat, aliam causam sui esse praeter seipsum, oportet ipsum esse infinitum. [15] Each thing, moreover, is more enduring according as its cause is more efficacious. Hence, that being whose duration is infinite must have been from a cause of infinite efficaciousness. But the duration of God is infinite, for we have shown above that He is eternal. Since, then, He has no other cause of His being than Himself, He must be infinite.
Huic autem veritati sacrae Scripturae auctoritas testimonium perhibet. Ait namque Psalmista: magnus dominus et laudabilis nimis, et magnitudinis eius non est finis. [16] The authority of Sacred Scripture is witness to this truth. For the psalmist says: “Great is the Lord, and greatly to be praised: and of His greatness there is no end” (Ps. 144:3).
Huic etiam veritati attestantur antiquissimorum philosophorum dicta, qui omnes infinitum posuerunt primum rerum principium, quasi ab ipsa veritate coacti. Propriam enim vocem ignorabant, aestimantes, infinitatem primi principii ad modum quantitatis discretae, secundum Democritum, qui posuit atomos infinitos rerum principia, et secundum Anaxagoram, qui posuit infinitas partes consimiles principia rerum; vel ad modum quantitatis continuae, secundum illos qui posuerunt aliquod elementum, vel confusum aliquod infinitum corpus, esse primum omnium principium. Sed cum ostensum sit per sequentium philosophorum studium quod non est aliquod corpus infinitum; et huic coniungatur quod oportet esse primum principium aliquo modo infinitum: concluditur quod neque est corpus neque virtus in corpore infinitum quod est primum principium. [17] The sayings of the most ancient philosophers are likewise a witness to this truth. They all posited an infinite first principle of things, as though compelled by truth itself.” Yet they did not recognize their own voice. They judged the infinity of the first principle in terms of discrete quantity, following Democritus, who posited infinite atoms as the principles of things, and also Anaxagoras, who posited infinite similar parts as the principles of things. Or they judged infinity in terms of continuous quantity, following those who posited that the first principle of all things was some element or a confused infinite body. But, since it was shown by the effort of later philosophers that there is no infinite body, given that there must be a first principle that is in some way infinite, we conclude that the infinite which is the first principle is neither a body nor a power in a body.

Caput 44 Chapter 44
Quod Deus est intelligens THAT GOD IS INTELLIGENT
Ex praemissis autem ostendi potest quod Deus sit intelligens. [1] From what has been said we can show that God is intelligent.
Ostensum enim est supra quod in moventibus et motis non est possibile in infinitum procedere, sed oportet mobilia omnia reducere, ut probabile est, in unum primum movens seipsum. Movens autem seipsum se movet per appetitum et apprehensionem: sola enim huiusmodi inveniuntur seipsa movere, utpote in quibus est moveri et non moveri. Pars igitur movens in primo movente seipsum oportet et quod sit appetens et apprehendens. In motu autem qui est per appetitum et apprehensionem, appetens et apprehendens est movens motum: appetibile autem et apprehensum est movens non motum. Cum igitur id quod est omnium primum movens, quod Deum dicimus, sit movens omnino non motum, oportet quod comparetur ad motorem qui est pars moventis seipsum sicut appetibile ad appetentem. Non autem sicut appetibile sensuali appetitu: nam appetitus sensibilis non est boni simpliciter, sed huius particulati boni, cum et apprehensio sensus non sit nisi particularis; id autem quod est bonum et appetibile simpliciter, est prius eo quod est bonum et appetibile ut hic et nunc. Oportet igitur primum movens esse appetibile ut intellectum. Et ita oportet movens quod appetit ipsum, esse intelligens. Multo igitur magis et ipsum primum appetibile erit intelligens: quia appetens ipsum fit intelligens actu per hoc quod ei tamquam intelligibili unitur. Oportet igitur Deum esse intelligentem facta suppositione quod primum motum moveat seipsum, ut philosophi voluerunt. [2] We have shown above that among movers and things moved we cannot proceed to infinity, but must reduce all movable things, as is demonstrable, to one first self-moving being. The self-moving being moves itself only by appetite and knowledge, for only such beings are found to move themselves, because to be moved and not moved lies in their power. The moving part in the first self-moving being must he appetitive and apprehending. Now, in a motion that takes place through appetite and apprehension, he who has the appetite and the apprehension is a moved mover, while the appetible and apprehended is the unmoved mover. Since, therefore, the first mover of all things, whom we call God, is an absolutely unmoved mover, He must be related to the mover that is a part of the self-moving being as the appetible is to the one who has the appetite. Not, however, as something appetible by sensible appetite, since sensible appetite is not of that which is good absolutely but of this particular good, since the apprehension of the sense is likewise particular; whereas that which is good and appetible absolutely is prior to that which is good and appetible here and now. The first mover, then, must be appetible as an object of intellect, and thus the mover that desires it must be intelligent. All the more, therefore, will the first appetible be intelligent, since the one desiring it is intelligent in act by being joined to it as an intelligible. Therefore, making the supposition that the first mover moves himself, as the philosophers intended, we must say that God is intelligent.
Adhuc. Idem necesse est sequi si fiat reductio mobilium non in aliquod primum movens seipsum, sed in movens omnino immobile. Nam primum movens est universale principium motus. Oportet igitur, cum omne movens moveat per aliquam formam quam intendit in movendo, quod forma per quam movet primum movens, sit universalis forma et universale bonum. Forma autem per modum universalem non invenitur nisi in intellectu. Oportet igitur primum movens, quod Deus est, esse intelligens. [3] Moreover, the same conclusion must follow if the reduction of movable beings is, not to a first self-moving being, but to an absolutely unmoved mover. For the first mover is the universal source of motion. Therefore, since every mover moves through a form at which it aims in moving, the form through which the first mover moves must be a universal form and a universal good. But a form does not have a universal mode except in the intellect. Consequently, the first mover, God, must be intelligent.
Amplius. In nullo ordine moventium invenitur quod movens per intellectum sit instrumentum eius quod movet absque intellectu, sed magis e converso. Omnia autem moventia quae sunt in mundo, comparantur ad primum movens, quod Deus est, sicut instrumenta ad agens principale. Cum igitur in mundo inveniantur multa moventia per intellectum, impossibile est quod primum movens moveat absque intellectu. Necesse est igitur Deum esse intelligentem. [4] In no order of movers, furthermore, is it the case that an intellectual mover is the instrument of a mover without an intellect. Rather, the converse is true. But all movers in the world are to the first mover, God, as instruments are related to a principal agent. Since, then, there are in the world many movers endowed with intelligence, it is impossible that the first mover move without an intellect. Therefore, God must be intelligent.
Item. Ex hoc aliqua res est intelligens quod est sine materia: cuius signum est quod formae fiunt intellectae in actu per abstractionem a materia. Unde et intellectus est universalium et non singularium: quia materia est individuationis principium. Formae autem intellectae in actu fiunt unum cum intellectu actu intelligente. Unde, si ex hoc sunt formae intellectae in actu quod sunt sine materia, oportet rem aliquam ex hoc esse intelligentem quod est sine materia. Ostensum est autem supra Deum esse omnino immaterialem. Est igitur intelligens. [5] Again, a thing is intelligent because it is without matter. A sign of this is the fact that forms are made understood in act by abstraction from matter. And hence the intellect deals with universals and not singulars, for matter is the principle of individuation. But forms that are understood in act become one with the intellect that understands them in act. Therefore, if forms are understood in act because they are without matter, a thing must be intelligent because it is without matter. But we have shown that God is absolutely immaterial. God is, therefore, intelligent.
Adhuc. Deo nulla perfectio deest quae in aliquo genere entium inveniatur, ut supra ostensum est: nec ex hoc aliqua compositio in eo consequitur, ut etiam ex superioribus patet. Inter perfectiones autem rerum potissima est quod aliquid sit intellectivum: nam per hoc ipsum est quodammodo omnia, habens in se omnium perfectionem. Deus igitur est intelligens. [6] Then, too, as was shown above, no perfection found in any genus of things is lacking to God. Nor on this account does any composition follow in Him. But among the perfections; of things the greatest is that something be intelligent, for thereby it is in a manner all things, having within itself the perfections of all things. God is, therefore, intelligent.
Item. Omne quod tendit determinate in aliquem finem, aut ipsum praestituit sibi finem, aut praestituitur ei finis ab alio: alias non magis in hunc quam in illum finem tenderet. Naturalia autem tendunt in fines determinatos: non enim a casu naturales utilitates consequuntur: sic enim non essent semper aut in pluribus, sed raro; horum enim est casus. Cum ergo ipsa non praestituant sibi finem, quia rationem finis non cognoscunt; oportet quod eis praestituatur finis ab alio, qui sit naturae institutor. Hic autem est qui praebet omnibus esse, et est per seipsum necesse-esse, quem Deum dicimus, ut ex supra dictis patet. Non autem posset naturae finem praestituere nisi intelligeret. Deus igitur est intelligens. [7] Again, that which tends determinately to some end either has set itself that end or the end has been set for it by another. Otherwise, it would tend no more to this end than to that. Now, natural things tend to determinate ends. They do not fulfill their natural needs by chance, since they would not do so always or for the most part, but rarely, which is the domain of chance. Since, then, things do not set for themselves an end, because they have no notion of what an end is, the end must be set for them by another, who is the author of nature. He it is who gives being to all things and is through Himself the necessary being. We call Him God, as is clear from what we have said. But God could not set an end for nature unless He had understanding. God is, therefore, intelligent.
Amplius. Omne quod est imperfectum, derivatur ab aliquo perfecto: nam perfecta naturaliter sunt priora imperfectis, sicut actus potentia. Sed formae in rebus particularibus existentes sunt imperfectae: quia partialiter, et non secundum communitatem suae rationis. Oportet igitur quod deriventur ab aliquibus formis perfectis et non particulatis. Tales autem formae esse non possunt nisi intellectae: cum non inveniatur aliqua forma in sua universalitate nisi in intellectu. Et per consequens oportet eas esse intelligentes, si sint subsistentes: sic enim solum possunt esse operantes. Deum igitur, qui est actus primus subsistens, a quo omnia alia derivantur, oportet esse intelligentem. [8] Furthermore, everything imperfect derives from something perfect; for the perfect is naturally prior to the imperfect, as is act to potency. But the forms found in particular things are imperfect because they are there in a particular way and not according to the community of their natures. They must therefore be derived from some forms that are perfect and not particular. But such forms cannot exist unless by being understood, since no form is found in its universality except in the intellect. Consequently, these forms must be intelligent, if they be subsistent; for only thus do they have operation. God, then, Who is the first subsistent act, from whom all other things are derived, must be intelligent.
Hanc autem veritatem etiam fides Catholica confitetur. Dicitur enim Iob 9-4 de Deo: sapiens corde est et fortis robore. Et 12-16: apud ipsum est fortitudo et sapientia. In Psalmo: mirabilis facta est scientia tua ex me. Et Rom. 11-33: o altitudo divitiarum sapientiae et scientiae Dei. [9] This truth the Catholic faith likewise confesses. For it is said of God in Job (9:4): “He is wise of heart, and mighty in strength”; and later on (12:16): “With Him is strength and wisdom.” So, too, in the Psalms (138:6): “Your knowledge has become wonderful to me”; and Romans (21:33): “O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God.”
Huius autem fidei veritas in tantum apud homines invaluit ut ab intelligendo nomen Dei imponerent: nam Theos, quod secundum Graecos Deum significat, dicitur a theasthe, quod est considerare vel videre. [10] The truth of this faith was so strong among men that they named God from the act of understanding. For theos [θεος], which among the Greeks signifies God, comes from theaste [θεασθαι], which means to consider or to see.

Caput 45 Chapter 45
Quod intelligere Dei est sua essentia THAT GOD’S ACT OF UNDERSTANDING IS HIS ESSENCE
Ex hoc autem quod Deus est intelligens, sequitur quod suum intelligere sit sua essentia. [1] From the fact that God is intelligent it follows that His act of understanding is His essence.
Intelligere enim est actus intelligentis in ipso existens, non in aliud extrinsecum transiens, sicut calefactio transit in calefactum: non enim aliquid patitur intelligibile ex hoc quod intelligitur, sed intelligens perficitur. Quicquid autem est in Deo, est divina essentia. Intelligere ergo Dei est divina essentia, et divinum esse, et ipse Deus: nam Deus est sua essentia et suum esse. [2] To understand is the act of one understanding, residing in him, not proceeding to something outside as heating proceeds to the heated thing. For, by being understood, the intelligible suffers nothing; rather, the one understanding is perfected. Now, whatever is in God is the divine essence. God’s act of understanding, therefore, is His essence, it is the divine being, God Himself. For God is His essence and His being.
Praeterea. Intelligere comparatur ad intellectum sicut esse ad essentiam. Sed esse divinum est eius essentia, ut supra probatum est. Ergo et intelligere divinum eius intellectus. Intellectus autem divinus est Dei essentia: alias esset accidens Deo. Oportet igitur quod intelligere divinum sit eius essentia. [3] Furthermore, the act of understanding is to the intellect as being [ esse ] is to essence [ essentia ]. But, as we have proved, God’s being is His essence. Therefore, God’s understanding is His intellect. But the divine intellect is God’s essence; otherwise, it would be an accident in God. Therefore, the divine understanding is His essence.
Amplius. Actus secundus est perfectior quam actus primus: sicut consideratio quam scientia. Scientia autem vel intellectus Dei est ipsa eius essentia, si est intelligens, ut ostensum est: cum nulla perfectio conveniat ei participative, sed per essentiam, ut ex superioribus patet. Si igitur sua consideratio non sit sua essentia, aliquid erit sua essentia nobilius et perfectius. Et sic non erit in fine perfectionis et bonitatis. Unde non erit primum. [4] Again, second act is more perfect than first act, as consideration is more perfect than knowledge. But the knowledge or intellect of God is His essence, if, as we have proved, He is intelligent; for, as is clear from the above, no perfection belongs to Him by participation but rather by essence. If, therefore, His consideration is not His essence, something will be nobler and more perfect than His essence. Thus, God will not be at the summit of perfection and goodness and hence will not be first.
Adhuc. Intelligere est actus intelligentis. Si igitur Deus intelligens non sit suum intelligere, oportet quod comparetur ad ipsum sicut potentia ad actum. Et ita in Deo erit potentia et actus. Quod est impossibile, ut supra probatum est. [5] Moreover, to understand is the act of the one understanding. If, therefore, God in understanding is not His understanding, God must be related to it as potency to act. Thus, there will be potency and act in God, which is impossible, as we proved above.
Item. Omnis substantia est propter suam operationem. Si igitur operatio Dei sit aliud quam divina substantia, erit finis eius aliquid aliud a se. Et sic Deus non erit sua bonitas: cum bonum cuiuslibet sit finis eius. [6] Then, too, every substance exists for the sake of its operation. If, then, the operation of God is other than the divine substance, the end of God will be something other than God. Thus, God will not be His goodness, since the good of each thing is its end.
Si autem divinum intelligere est eius esse, necesse est quod intelligere eius sit simplex, aeternum et invariabile, et actu tantum existens, et omnia quae de divino esse probata sunt. Non est igitur Deus in potentia intelligens, aut de novo aliquid intelligere incipiens, vel quamcumque mutationem aut compositionem in intelligendo habens. [7] If, however, God’s understanding is His being, His understanding must be simple, eternal and unchangeable, existing only in act, and including all the perfections that have been proved of the divine being. Hence, God is not potentially understanding, nor does He begin to understand something anew, nor still does He have any change or composition in understanding.

Caput 46 Chapter 46
Quod Deus per nihil aliud intelligit quam per suam essentiam THAT GOD UNDERSTANDS THROUGH NOTHING OTHER THAN THROUGH HIS ESSENCE
Ex his autem quae supra ostensa sunt, evidenter apparet quod intellectus divinus nulla alia specie intelligibili intelligat quam sua essentia. [1] From what has been shown above it appears with evidence that the divine intellect understands through no other intelligible species than through His essence.
Species enim intelligibilis principium formale est intellectualis operationis: sicut forma cuiuslibet agentis principium est propriae operationis. Divina autem operatio intellectualis est eius essentia, ut ostensum est. Esset igitur aliquid aliud divinae essentiae principium et causa si alia intelligibili specie quam sua essentia intellectus divinus intelligeret. Quod supra ostensis repugnat. [2] The intelligible species is the formal principle of intellectual operation, just as the form of any agent is the principle of its own operation. Now, as we have shown, the divine intellectual operation is God’s essence. If, then, the divine intellect understood by an intelligible species other than the divine essence, something other would be added to the divine essence as principle and cause. This is opposed to what was shown above.
Adhuc. Per speciem intelligibilem fit intellectus intelligens actu: sicut per speciem sensibilem sensus actu sentiens. Comparatur igitur species intelligibilis ad intellectum sicut actus ad potentiam. Si igitur intellectus divinus aliqua alia specie intelligibili intelligeret quam seipso, esset in potentia respectu alicuius. Quod esse non potest, ut supra ostensum est. [3] Furthermore, the intellect becomes understanding in act through an intelligible species, just as the sense becomes sensing in act through a sensible species. The intelligible species is to the intellect, therefore, as act to potency. If, then, the divine intellect understood through some intelligible species other than itself, it would be in potency with respect to something. This is impossible, as we proved above.
Amplius. Species intelligibilis in intellectu praeter essentiam eius existens esse accidentale habet: ratione cuius scientia nostra inter accidentia computatur. In Deo autem non potest aliquod esse accidens, ut supra ostensum est. Igitur non est in intellectu eius aliqua species praeter ipsam divinam essentiam. [4] Moreover, an intelligible species in the intellect that is other than the intellect’s essence has an accidental being, which is why our knowledge is numbered among the accidents. But in God, as we have shown, there can be no accident. Therefore, there is not in the divine intellect any species other than the divine essence itself.
Adhuc. Species intelligibilis similitudo est alicuius intellecti. Si igitur in intellectu divino sit aliqua intelligibilis species praeter essentiam ipsius, similitudo alicuius intellecti erit. Aut igitur divinae essentiae: aut alterius rei. Ipsius quidem divinae essentiae non potest esse: quia sic divina essentia non esset intelligibilis per seipsam, sed illa species faceret eam intelligibilem. Nec etiam potest esse in intellectu divino species alia praeter essentiam ipsius quae sit alterius rei similitudo. Illa enim similitudo imprimeretur ei ab aliquo. Non autem a seipso: quia sic idem esset agens et patiens; essetque aliquod agens quod non suam sed alterius similitudinem induceret patienti, et sic non omne agens sibi simile ageret. Nec ab alio: esset enim aliquod agens prius eo. Ergo impossibile est quod in ipso sit aliqua species intelligibilis praeter ipsius essentiam. [5] Again, the intelligible species is the likeness of something understood. If, then, there is in the divine intellect an intelligible species other than the divine essence, it will be the likeness of something understood. It will thus be the likeness either of the divine essence or of some other thing. It cannot be the likeness of the divine essence, because then the divine essence would not be intelligible through itself, but that species would make it intelligible. Nor can there be in the divine intellect a species other than the divine intellect that is the likeness of some other being. For that likeness would then be impressed on the divine intellect by some being. Not by itself, since then the same being would be agent and receiver, and also because there would be an agent that impressed, not its own likeness, but that of another on the receiver, and thus it would not be true that every agent produced its like. Nor by another, for there would then be an agent prior to God. It is, therefore, impossible that there be in God an intelligible species other than His essence.
Praeterea. Intelligere Dei est eius esse, ut ostensum est. Si igitur intelligeret per aliquam speciem quae non sit sua essentia, esset per aliquod aliud a sua essentia. Quod est impossibile. Non igitur intelligit per aliquam speciem quae non sit sua essentia. [6] Furthermore, God’s understanding, as we have shown, is His essence. If, therefore, God understood through a species that was not His essence, it would be through something other than His essence. This is impossible. Therefore, God does not understand through a species that is not His essence.

Caput 47 Chapter 47
Quod Deus intelligit perfecte seipsum THAT GOD UNDERSTANDS HIMSELF PERFECTLY
Ex hoc autem ulterius patet quod ipse seipsum perfecte intelligit. [1] From this it further appears that God understands Himself perfectly.
Cum enim per speciem intelligibilem intellectus in rem intellectam feratur, ex duobus perfectio intellectualis operationis dependet. Unum est ut species intelligibilis perfecte rei intellectae conformetur. Aliud est ut perfecte intellectui coniungatur: quod quidem tanto fit amplius quanto intellectus in intelligendo maiorem efficaciam habet. Ipsa autem divina essentia quae est species intelligibilis qua intellectus divinus intelligit, est ipsi Deo penitus idem; estque intellectui ipsius idem omnino. Seipsum igitur Deus perfectissime cognoscit. [2] Since through the intelligible species the intellect is directed to the thing understood, the perfection of intellectual operation depends on two things. One is that the intelligible species be perfectly conformed to the thing understood. The second is that it be perfectly joined to the intellect, which is realized more fully according as the intellect has greater power in understanding. Now, the divine essence, which is the intelligible species by which the divine intellect understands, is absolutely identical with God and it is also absolutely identical with His intellect. Therefore, God understands Himself most perfectly.
Adhuc. Res materialis intelligibilis efficitur per hoc quod a materia et materialibus conditionibus separatur. Quod ergo est per sui naturam ab omni materia et materialibus conditionibus separatum, hoc est intelligibile secundum suam naturam. Sed omne intelligibile intelligitur secundum quod est unum actu cum intelligente. Ipse autem Deus intelligens est, ut probatum est. Igitur, cum sit immaterialis omnino, et sibi ipsi maxime sit unum, maxime seipsum intelligit. [3] Furthermore, a material thing is made intelligible by being separated from matter and the conditions of matter. Therefore, that which is through its nature separate from all matter and material conditions is intelligible in its nature. Now every intelligible is understood by being one in act with the one understanding. But, as we have proved, God is intelligent. Therefore, since He is absolutely immaterial, and most one with Himself, He understands Himself perfectly.
Item. Ex hoc aliquid actu intelligitur quod intellectus in actu et intellectum in actu unum sunt. Divinus autem intellectus est semper intellectus in actu: nihil enim est in potentia et imperfectum in Deo. Essentia autem Dei secundum seipsam perfecte intelligibilis est, ut ex dictis patet. Cum igitur intellectus divinus et essentia divina sint unum, ex dictis, manifestum est quod Deus perfecte seipsum intelligat: Deus enim est et suus intellectus et sua essentia. [4] Again, a thing is Understood in act because the intellect in act and the understood in act are one. But the divine intellect is always an intellect in act, since there is no potency or imperfection in God. On the other hand, the divine essence is through itself perfectly intelligible, as is clear from what we have said. Since, therefore, the divine intellect and the divine essence are one, it is evident from what we have said that God understands Himself perfectly. For God is His intellect and His essence.
Adhuc. Omne quod est in aliquo per modum intelligibilem, intelligitur ab eo. Essentia autem divina est in Deo per modum intelligibilem: nam esse naturale Dei et esse intelligibile unum et idem est, cum esse suum sit suum intelligere. Deus igitur intelligit essentiam suam. Ergo seipsum: cum ipse sit sua essentia. [5] Moreover, what is in something in an intelligible way is understood by it. The divine essence is in God in an intelligible way, for the natural being of God and His intelligible being are one and the same, since His being is His understanding. God, therefore, understands His essence, and hence Himself, since He is His essence.
Amplius. Actus intellectus, sicut et aliarum animae potentiarum, secundum obiecta distinguuntur. Tanto igitur erit perfectior intellectus operatio quanto erit perfectius intelligibile. Sed perfectissimum intelligibile est essentia divina: cum sit perfectissimus actus et prima veritas. Operatio autem intellectus divini est etiam nobilissima: cum sit ipsum esse divinum, ut ostensum est. Deus igitur seipsum intelligit. [6] The acts of the intellect, furthermore, like those of the other powers of the soul, are distinguished according to their objects. The operation of the intellect will be more perfect as the intelligible object is more perfect. But the most perfect intelligible object is the divine essence, since it is the most perfect and the first truth. The operation of the divine intellect is likewise the most noble, since, as we have shown, it is the divine being. Therefore, God understands Himself.
Adhuc. Rerum omnium perfectiones in Deo maxime inveniuntur. Inter alias autem perfectiones in rebus creatis inventas maxima est intelligere Deum: cum natura intellectualis aliis praemineat, cuius perfectio est intelligere; nobilissimum autem intelligibile Deus est. Deus igitur maxime seipsum intelligit. [7] Again, the perfections of all things are found supremely in God. Now, among other perfections found in created things the greatest is to understand God. For the intellectual nature, whose perfection is understanding, excels all the others; and the most noble intelligible object is God. God, therefore, knows Himself supremely.
Hoc autem auctoritate divina confirmatur. Ait namque apostolus, I Cor. 2-10, quod spiritus Dei scrutatur etiam profunda Dei. [8] This is confirmed by divine authority. For the Apostle says: “The spirit searches all things, yea, the deep things of God” (1 Cor. 2:10).

Caput 48 Chapter 48
Quod Deus primo et per se solum seipsum cognoscit THAT PRIMARILY AND ESSENTIALLY GOD KNOWS ONLY HIMSELF
Ex praemissis autem apparet quod Deus primo et per se solum seipsum cognoscit. [1] Now, it appears from what we have said that primarily. and essentially God knows only Himself.
Illa enim solum res est primo et per se ab intellectu cognita cuius specie intelligit: operatio enim formae quae est operationis principium proportionatur. Sed id quod Deus intelligit nihil est aliud quam sua essentia, ut probatum est. Igitur intellectum ab ipso primo et per se nihil est aliud quam ipsemet. [2] That thing alone is primarily and essentially known by the intellect by whose species the intellect understands; for an operation is proportioned to the form that is the principle of the operation. But, as we have proved, that by which God understands is nothing other than His essence. Therefore, the primary and essential object of His intellect is nothing other than Himself.
Adhuc. Impossibile est simul multa primo et per se intelligere: una enim operatio non potest simul multis terminari. Deus autem seipsum quandoque intelligit, ut probatum est. Si igitur intelligat aliquid aliud quasi primo et per se intellectum, oportet quod intellectus eius mutetur de consideratione sui in considerationem illius. Illud autem est eo ignobilius. Sic igitur intellectus divinus mutatur in peius. Quod est impossibile. [3] It is, furthermore, impossible to understand a multitude primarily and essentially, since one operation cannot be terminated by many. But, as we have proved, God at some time understands Himself. If, therefore, He understands something other than Himself as the primary and essential object of His understanding, His intellect must change from a consideration of Himself to the consideration of this something else. This something else is less noble than God. The divine intellect is thus changed for the worse, which is impossible.
Amplius. Operationes intellectus distinguuntur penes obiecta. Si igitur Deus intelligit se et aliud a se quasi principale obiectum, habebit plures operationes intellectuales. Ergo vel sua essentia erit in plura divisa: vel aliquam operationem intellectualem habebit quae non est sua substantia. Quorum utrumque impossibile esse monstratum est. Restat igitur nihil a Deo esse cognitum quasi primo et per se intellectum, nisi suam essentiam. [4] Moreover, the operations of the intellect are distinguished according to their objects. If, then, God understands Himself and something other than Himself as the principal object, He will have several intellectual operations. Therefore, either His essence will be divided into several parts, or He will have an intellectual operation that is not His substance. Both of these positions have been proved to be impossible. It remains, then, that nothing other than the divine essence is known by God as the primary and essential object of His intellect.
Item. Intellectus, secundum quod est differens a suo intellecto, est in potentia respectu illius. Si igitur aliquid aliud sit intellectum a Deo primo et per se, sequetur quod ipse sit in potentia respectu alicuius alterius. Quod est impossibile, ut ex dictis patet. [5] Again, in so far as the intellect is different from its object, it is in potency to it. If, then, something other than Himself is God's primary and essential object, it will follow that He is in potency to something else. This is impossible, as is clear from what we have said.
Praeterea. Intellectum est perfectio intelligentis: secundum enim hoc intellectus perfectus est quod actu intelligit; quod quidem est per hoc quod est unum cum eo quod intelligitur. Si igitur aliquid aliud a Deo sit primo intellectum ab ipso, erit aliquid aliud perfectio ipsius, et eo nobilius. Quod est impossibile. [6] The thing understood, likewise, is the perfection of the one understanding. For the intellect is perfect according as it understands in act, and this obtains through the fact that the intellect is one with what is understood. If, then, something other than Himself is primarily understood by God, something else will be His perfection, and more noble than He. This is impossible.
Amplius. Ex multis intellectis intelligentis scientia integratur. Si igitur sunt multa scita a Deo quasi principaliter cognita et per se, sequitur quod scientia Dei sit ex multis composita. Et sic vel erit divina essentia composita: vel scientia erit accidens Deo. Quorum utrumque impossibile esse ex dictis manifestum est. Relinquitur igitur quod id quod est primo et per se intellectum a Deo, nihil est aliud quam sua substantia. [7] Furthermore, the knowledge of the one understanding is comprised of many things understood. If, then, God knows many things as the principal and essential objects of His knowledge, it will follow that the knowledge of God is composed of many things. Thus, either the divine essence will be composite, or knowledge will be an accident in God. From what we have said, it is clear that both of these suppositions are impossible. It remains, therefore, that what is primarily and essentially understood by God is nothing other than His substance.
Adhuc. Operatio intellectualis speciem et nobilitatem habet secundum id quod est per se et primo intellectum: cum hoc sit eius obiectum. Si igitur Deus aliud a se intelligeret quasi per se et primo intellectum, eius operatio intellectualis speciem et nobilitatem haberet secundum id quod est aliud ab ipso. Hoc autem est impossibile: cum sua operatio sit eius essentia, ut ostensum est. Sic igitur impossibile est quod intellectum a Deo primo et per se sit aliud ab ipso. [8] Again, intellectual operation derives its specification and nobility from that which is essentially and primarily understood by it. If, then, God understood something other than Himself as His essential and primary object, His intellectual operation would have its specification and nobility according to something other than God. This, however, is impossible, since, as we have shown, God’s operation is His essence. Thus, it is impossible that what is understood primarily and essentially by God be other than He.

Caput 49 Chapter 49
Ex hoc autem quod seipsum cognoscit primo et per se, quod alia a se in seipso cognoscat ponere oportet. [1] From the fact that God understands Himself primarily and essentially we must posit that He knows in Himself things other than Himself.
Effectus enim cognitio sufficienter habetur per cognitionem suae causae: unde et scire dicimur unumquodque cum causam cognoscimus. Ipse autem Deus est per suam essentiam causa essendi aliis. Cum igitur suam essentiam plenissime cognoscat, oportet ponere quod etiam alia cognoscat. [2] An effect is adequately known when its cause is known. So “we are said to know each thing when we know the cause.” But God Himself is through His essence the cause of being for other things. Since He has a most full knowledge of His essence, we must posit that God also knows other things.
Adhuc. Omnis effectus in sua causa aliqualiter praeexistit similitudo: cum omne agens agat sibi simile. Omne autem quod est in aliquo, est in eo per modum eius in quo est. Si igitur Deus aliquarum rerum est causa, cum ipse sit secundum suam naturam intellectualis, similitudo causati sui in eo erit intelligibiliter. Quod autem est in aliquo per modum intelligibilem, ab eo intelligitur. Deus igitur res alias a se in seipso intelligit. [3] Moreover, the likeness of every effect somehow preexists in its cause; for every agent produces its like. But whatever is in something is in it according to the mode of that in which it is. If, then, God is the cause of certain things, since according to His nature He is intellectual, the likeness of what He causes will exist in Him in an intelligible way. But what is in something in an intelligible way is understood by it. God, therefore, understands within Himself things other than Himself.
Amplius. Quicumque cognoscit perfecte rem aliquam, cognoscit omnia quae de re illa vere possunt dici et quae ei conveniunt secundum suam naturam. Deo autem secundum suam naturam convenit quod sit aliorum causa. Cum igitur perfecte seipsum cognoscat, cognoscit se esse causam. Quod esse non potest nisi cognoscat aliqualiter causatum. Quod est aliud ab ipso: nihil enim sui ipsius causa est. Ergo Deus cognoscit alia a se. [4] Again, whoever knows perfectly a given thing knows whatever can be truly said of it and whatever befits it according to its nature. But it befits God according to His nature to be the cause of other things. Since, then, God knows Himself perfectly, He knows Himself to be a cause. This cannot be unless He somehow knows what He causes. This is other than He, since nothing is the cause of itself. Therefore, God knows things other than Himself.
Colligentes igitur has duas conclusiones, apparet Deum cognoscere seipsum quasi primo et per se notum, alia vero sicut in essentia sua visa. [5] If we put together these two conclusions, it appears that God knows Himself as primarily and essentially known, whereas He knows other things as seen in His essence.
Quam quidem veritatem expresse Dionysius tradit, in VII cap. de Div. Nom., dicens: non secundum visionem singulis se immittit, sed secundum unam causae continentiam scit omnia. Et infra: divina sapientia seipsam cognoscens scit alia. [6] This truth is expressly taught by Dionysius. He says: “In seeing them, God does not insert Himself in singulars, but He knows them as contained within a single cause” [ De dev. nom. VII, 2]. And later on: “the divine wisdom, knowing itself, knows other things.”
Cui etiam sententiae attestari videtur Scripturae sacrae auctoritas. Nam in Psalmo de Deo dicitur: prospexit de excelso sancto suo, quasi de seipso excelso alia videns. [7] To this judgment, too, the authority of Sacred Scripture bears witness. For it is said of God in the Psalms (101:20): “He looked forth from His high sanctuary”; as though to say that God sees other things from His own height.

Caput 50 Chapter 50
Quod Deus habet propriam cognitionem de omnibus rebus THAT GOD HAS A PROPER KNOWLEDGE OF ALL THINGS
Quia vero quidam dixerunt quod Deus de aliis rebus non habet cognitionem nisi universalem, utpote cognoscens ea inquantum sunt entia, ex hoc quod naturam essendi cognoscit per cognitionem sui ipsius; restat ostendendum quod Deus cognoscit omnes alias res prout ab invicem sunt distinctae et a Deo. Quod est cognoscere res secundum proprias rationes earum. [1] Some have said that God has only a universal knowledge of other things. He knows them, that is, in so far as they are beings because He knows the nature of being through a knowledge of Himself. For this reason, it remains for us to show that God knows all other things as they are distinct from one another and from Himself. This is to know things according to their proper natures.
Ad huius autem ostensionem, Deum esse causam omnis entis supponatur: quod et ex supra dictis aliquatenus patet, et infra plenius ostendetur. Sic igitur nihil in aliqua re esse potest quod non sit ab eo causatum vel mediate vel immediate. Cognita autem causa, cognoscitur eius effectus. Quicquid igitur est in quacumque re potest cognosci cognito Deo et omnibus causis mediis quae sunt inter Deum et res. Sed Deus seipsum cognoscit et omnes causas medias quae sunt inter ipsum et rem quamlibet. Quod enim seipsum perfecte cognoscat, iam ostensum est. Seipso autem cognito, cognoscit quod ab ipso immediate est. Quo cognito, cognoscit iterum quod ab illo immediate est: et sic de omnibus causis mediis usque ad ultimum effectum. Ergo Deus cognoscit quicquid est in re. Hoc autem est habere propriam et completam cognitionem de re, cognoscere scilicet omnia quae in re sunt, communia et propria. Deus ergo propriam de rebus cognitionem habet, secundum quod sunt ab invicem distinctae. [2] In order to show this point, let us suppose that God is the cause of every being, as is somewhat evident from what we said above and will be more fully shown later on. Thus, there is consequently nothing in any thing that is not caused by God, mediately or immediately. Now, when the cause is known, the effect is known. Whatever is in each and every thing can be known if we know God and all the causes that are between God and things. But God knows Himself and all the intervening causes between Himself and any given thing. Now, we have already shown that God knows Himself perfectly. By knowing Himself, God knows whatever proceeds from Him immediately. When this is known, God once more knows what proceeds from it immediately; and so on for all intermediate causes down to the last effect. Therefore, God knows whatever is found in reality. But this is to have a proper and complete knowledge of a thing, namely, to know all that there is in that thing, both what is common and what is proper. Therefore, God has a proper knowledge of things, in so far as they are distinct from one another.
Adhuc. Omne quod agit per intellectum, habet cognitionem de re quam agit secundum propriam facti rationem: quia cognitio facientis determinat formam facto. Deus autem causa est rerum per intellectum: cum suum esse sit suum intelligere, unumquodque autem agit inquantum est actu. Cognoscit igitur causatum suum proprie, secundum quod est distinctum ab aliis. [3] Furthermore, whatever acts through an intellect knows what it does according to the proper nature of its work; for the knowledge of the maker determines the form for the thing made. Now, God causes things through His intellect, since His being is His understanding and each thing acts in so far as it is in act. God, therefore, has a proper knowledge of what He causes, so far as it is distinct from the others.
Amplius. Rerum distinctio non potest esse a casu: habet enim ordinem certum. Oportet ergo ex alicuius causae intentione distinctionem in rebus esse. Non autem ex intentione alicuius causae per necessitatem naturae agentis: quia natura determinatur ad unum, et sic nullius rei per naturae necessitatem agentis intentio potest esse ad multa inquantum distincta sunt. Restat ergo quod distinctio in rebus provenit ex intentione alicuius causae cognoscentis. Videtur autem intellectus proprium esse rerum distinctionem considerare: unde et Anaxagoras distinctionis principium intellectum dixit. Universalis autem rerum distinctio non potest esse ex intentione alicuius causarum secundarum: quia omnes huiusmodi causae sunt de universitate causatorum distinctorum. Est igitur hoc primae causae, quae per seipsam ab omnibus aliis distinguitur, intendere distinctionem omnium rerum. Deus igitur cognoscit res ut distinctas. [4] Moreover, the distinction of things cannot be from chance, because it has a fixed order. The distinction in things must therefore be from the intention of some cause. It cannot be from the intention of a cause acting through a necessity of nature, for nature is determined to one course of action, and thus the intention of no thing acting through the necessity of nature can terminate in many effects in so far as these are distinct. It remains, then, that distinction in things comes from the intention of a knowing cause. But it seems to be proper to the intellect to consider the distinction of things; and so Anaxagoras called the intellect the source of distinction. Now, the universal distinction of things cannot be from the intention of some secondary cause, because all such causes belong to the world of distinct effects. It belongs to the first cause, that is through itself distinguished from all other things, to aim at the distinction of all things. God, therefore, knows things as distinct.
Item. Quicquid Deus cognoscit, perfectissime cognoscit: est enim in eo omnis perfectio sicut in simpliciter perfecto, ut supra ostensum est. Quod autem cognoscitur in communi tantum, non perfecte cognoscitur: ignorantur enim ea quae sunt praecipua illius rei, scilicet ultimae perfectiones, quibus perficitur proprium esse eius; unde tali cognitione magis cognoscitur res in potentia quam in actu. Si igitur Deus cognoscendo essentiam suam cognoscit omnia in universali, oportet quod etiam propriam habeat cognitionem de rebus. [5] Again, whatever God knows He knows most perfectly. For, as was shown above, there is all perfection in God as in the absolutely perfect being. Now, what is known only in a general way is not perfectly known, since one does not yet know what is most important in that thing, namely, the ultimate perfections, by which its proper being is completed; so that by such a knowledge a thing is known potentially rather than actually. Since, then, by knowing His own essence God knows things in a universal way, He must also have a proper knowledge of things.
Adhuc. Quicumque cognoscit naturam aliquam, cognoscit per se accidentia illius naturae. Per se autem accidentia entis, inquantum est ens, sunt unum et multa, ut probatur in IV Metaph. Deus igitur, si cognoscendo essentiam suam cognoscit in universali naturam entis, sequitur quod cognoscat multitudinem. Multitudo autem sine distinctione intelligi non potest. Intelligit igitur res prout sunt ab invicem distinctae. [6] Then, too, whoever knows a certain nature knows the essential accidents of that nature. The essential accidents of being as being are one and many, as is proved in Metaphysics IV [3]. If, then, by knowing His essence, God knows the nature of being in a universal way, it follows that He knows multitude. But multitude cannot be understood without distinction. Therefore, God knows things as they are distinct from one another.
Amplius. Quicumque cognoscit perfecte aliquam naturam universalem, cognoscit modum quo natura illa haberi potest: sicut qui cognoscit albedinem, scit quod recipit magis et minus. Sed ex diverso modo essendi constituuntur diversi gradus entium. Si igitur Deus cognoscendo se cognoscit naturam universalem entis; non autem imperfecte, quia ab eo omnis imperfectio longe est, ut supra probatum est: oportet quod cognoscat omnes gradus entium. Et sic de rebus aliis a se habebit propriam cognitionem. [7] Whoever, furthermore, perfectly knows a universal nature knows the mode in which that nature can be possessed. In the same way, he who knows whiteness knows that which receives it more and less. But the grades of beings are established from the diverse mode of being. If, then, by knowing Himself, God knows the universal nature of being, and this not imperfectly, since, as we have shown, every imperfection is remote from Him, God must know all grades of beings. Thus, God will have a proper knowledge of things other than Himself.
Praeterea. Quicumque cognoscit perfecte aliquid, cognoscit omnia quae sunt in illo. Sed Deus cognoscit seipsum perfecte. Ergo cognoscit omnia quae sunt in ipso secundum potentiam activam. Sed omnia secundum proprias formas sunt in ipso secundum potentiam activam: cum ipse sit omnis entis principium. Ipse igitur habet cognitionem propriam de omnibus rebus. [8] Furthermore, he who knows something perfectly knows all that is in it. But God knows Himself perfectly. Therefore, He knows all that is in Him according to His active power. But all things, in their proper forms, are in Him according to His active power, since God is the principle of every being. Therefore, God has a proper knowledge of all things.
Adhuc. Quicumque scit naturam aliquam, scit an illa natura sit communicabilis: non enim animalis naturam sciret perfecte qui nesciret eam pluribus communicabilem esse. Divina autem natura communicabilis est per similitudinem. Scit ergo Deus quot modis eius essentiae aliquid simile esse potest. Sed ex hoc sunt diversitates formarum quod divinam essentiam res diversimode imitantur: unde philosophus formam naturalem divinum quoddam nominat. Deus igitur de rebus habet cognitionem secundum proprias formas. [9] Again, he who knows a certain nature knows whether that nature is communicable. He who did not know that the nature of animal is communicable to many would not know it perfectly. Now, the divine nature is communicable by likeness. God, therefore, knows in how many modes there can be something like His essence. But the diversities of forms arise from the fact that things imitate the divine essence diversely; and so the Philosopher has called a natural form “something divine.” Therefore, God has a knowledge of things in terms of their proper forms.
Praeterea. Apud homines et alios cognoscentes habetur cognitio de rebus prout in sua multitudine sunt ab invicem distinctae. Si igitur Deus res in sua distinctione non cognoscit, sequitur eum insipientissimum esse: sicut et illis qui ponebant Deum non cognoscere litem, quam omnes cognoscunt; quod pro inconvenienti habet philosophus, in I de anima et in III metaphysicae. [10] Moreover, men and other knowing beings know things as distinct from one another in their multitude. If, then, God does not know things in their distinction, it follows that He is the most foolish being of all, as He must have been for those who held that God did not know strife, a thing known to all-an opinion that the Philosopher considers to be untenable in De anima I [5]and Metaphysics III [4].
Hoc etiam auctoritate Scripturae canonicae edocemur. Dicitur namque Gen. 1-31: vidit Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona. Et Heb. 4-13: non est ulla creatura invisibilis in conspectu eius: omnia nuda et aperta sunt oculis eius. [11] We likewise receive this teaching from the canonic Scriptures. For it is said in Genesis (1:31): “And God saw all things that He had made, and they were very good.” And in Hebrews (4:13): “Neither is there any creature invisible in His sight: but all things are naked and open to His eyes.”

Caput 51 Chapters 51-52
Rationes ad inquirendum qualiter multitudo intellectorum sit in intellectu divino ARGUMENTS INQUIRING HOW A MULTITUDE OF INTELLECTUAL OBJECTS IS IN THE DIVINE INTELLECT
Sed ne multitudo intellectorum in intellectum divinum compositionem inducat, investigandus est modus quo ista intellecta sint multa. [1] Lest the multitude of intellectual objects, however, introduce a composition into the divine intellect, we must investigate the mode in which these intellectual objects are many.
Non autem haec multitudo sic intelligi potest quasi multa intellecta habeant esse distinctum in Deo. Ista enim intellecta aut essent idem quod essentia divina: et sic in essentia Dei poneretur aliqua multitudo, quod supra multipliciter est remotum. Aut essent superaddita essentiae divinae: et sic esset in Deo aliquod accidens, quod supra impossibile esse ostendimus. [2.] Now, this multitude cannot be taken to mean that many intellectual objects have a distinct being in God. For either these objects would be the same as the divine essence, and thus a certain multitude would be posited in the essence of God, which we set aside above in many ways; or they would be added to the divine essence, and thus there would be some accident in God, which we have shown above to be impossible.
Nec iterum potest poni huiusmodi formas intelligibilia per se existere: quod Plato, praedicta inconvenientia vitans, videtur posuisse, introducendo ideas. Nam formae rerum naturalium sine materia existere non possunt: cum nec sine materia intelligantur. [3] Nor, again, can such intelligible forms be posited as existing in themselves. This is what Plato, avoiding the above difficulties, seems to have posited by introducing the Ideas. For the forms of natural things cannot exist without matter, since neither are they understood without matter.
Quod etiam si poneretur, nec hoc sufficeret ad ponendum Deum intelligere multitudinem. Nam cum formae praedictae sint extra Dei essentiam, si sine his Deus multitudinem rerum intelligere non posset, quod ad perfectionem sui intellectus requiritur, sequeretur quod sua perfectio in intelligendo ab alio dependeret: et per consequens in essendo, cum suum esse sit suum intelligere. Cuius contrarium supra ostensum est. [4] And, even if this position were held, it would not enable us to posit that God has understanding of a multitude. For, since the aforementioned forms are outside God’s essence, if God could not understand the multitude of things without them, as the perfection of His intellect requires, it would follow that His perfection in understanding depended on something else, and consequently so would His perfection in being, since His being is His understanding. The contrary of this was shown above.
Item. Cum omne quod est praeter essentiam suam sit causatum ab eo, ut infra ostendetur, necesse est, si formae praedictae extra Deum sunt, ab eo causatas esse. Ipse autem est causa rerum per intellectum, ut infra ostendetur. Ergo Deum intelligere huiusmodi intelligibilia praeexigitur ordine naturae ad hoc quod huiusmodi intelligibilia sint. Non igitur per hoc Deus intelligit multitudinem quod intelligibilia multa per se existunt extra eum. [5] Furthermore, since whatever is outside His essence must be caused by Him, as will be shown later on it is necessary that, if the aforementioned forms are to be found outside God, they must be caused by Him. But God is the cause of things through His intellect, as will be shown later on. Therefore, so that these intelligibles may have existence, it is required according to the order of nature that God first understand them. Hence, God does not have knowledge of multitude by the fact that many intelligibles are found outside Him.
Adhuc. Intelligibile in actu est intellectus in actu: sicut et sensibile in actu est sensus in actu. Secundum vero quod intelligibile ab intellectu distinguitur, est utrumque in potentia, sicut et in sensu patet: nam neque visus est videns actu, neque visibile videtur actu, nisi cum visus informatur visibilis specie, ut sic ex visu et visibili unum fiat. Si igitur intelligibilia Dei sunt extra intellectum ipsius, sequetur quod intellectus suus sit in potentia, et similiter intelligibilia ipsius. Et sic indigebit aliquo reducente in actu. Quod est impossibile: nam hoc esset eo prius. [6] Furthermore, the intelligible in act is the intellect in act, just as the sensible in act is the sense in act. According as the intelligible is distinguished from the intellect, both are in potency, as likewise appears in the case of the sense. For neither the sight is seeing in act, nor is the visible object seen in act, except when the sight is informed by the species of the visible object, so that thereby from the sight and the object something one results. If, then, the intelligible objects of God are outside His intellect, it will follow that His intellect is in potency, as are also its intelligible objects. Thus, some cause reducing them to act would be needed, which is impossible, since there is nothing prior to God.
Praeterea. Intellectum oportet esse in intelligente. Non igitur sufficit ponere formas rerum per se existentes extra intellectum divinum ad hoc quod Deus multitudinem rerum intelligat, sed oportet quod sint in ipso intellectu divino. [7] Then, too, the understood must be in him who understands. Therefore, to posit the forms of things as existing in themselves outside the divine intellect does not suffice for God to understand a multitude of things; these intelligibles must be in the divine intellect itself.
Ex eisdem etiam rationibus apparet quod non potest poni quod multitudo intelligibilium praedictorum sit in aliquo alio intellectu praeter divinum, vel animae vel Angeli sive intelligentiae.
Nam sic intellectus divinus, quantum ad aliquam suam operationem, dependeret ab aliquo posteriori intellectu. Quod etiam est impossibile.
[8] [Chapter 52] From the same arguments it likewise appears that the multitude of the aforementioned intelligibles cannot reside in any intellect other than the divine intellect—for example, that of a soul or an angel or intelligence.
If this were true, the divine intellect would depend on a lower intellect for some operation. But this is impossible.
Sicut etiam res in se subsistentes a Deo sunt, ita et quae rebus insunt. Unde et ad esse praedictorum intelligibilium in aliquo posteriorum intellectuum praeexigitur intelligere divinum, per quod Deus est causa. [9] Then, too, just as self-subsisting things are from God, so is whatever inheres in them. Hence, the divine understanding, by which God is a cause, is a prerequisite for the being of the aforementioned intelligibles in some lower intellect.
Sequetur etiam intellectum divinum esse in potentia: cum sua intelligibilia non sint ei coniuncta. [10] It likewise follows that the divine intellect is in potency, since its intelligible objects are not joined to it.
Sicut etiam unicuique est proprium esse, ita et propria operatio. Non igitur esse potest ut per hoc quod aliquis intellectus ad operandum disponitur, alius operationem intellectualem exequatur, sed ipsemet intellectus apud quem dispositio invenitur: sicut unumquodque est per essentiam suam, non per essentiam alterius. Per hoc igitur quod intelligibilia multa sunt apud aliquem secundorum intellectuum, non poterit esse quod intellectus primus multitudinem cognoscat. [11] Furthermore, just as each thing has its own being, so it has its own operation. It cannot happen, then, that because some intellect is disposed for operation another intellect will perform an intellectual operation; rather, the very same intellect in which the disposition is present will do this, just as each thing is through its own essence, not through the essence of another. Therefore, by the fact that there are many intelligible objects in some secondary intellect it could not come about that the first intellect knows a multitude.

Caput 53 Chapter 53
Solutio praemissae dubitationis THE SOLUTION OF THE ABOVE DIFFICULTY
Praemissa autem dubitatio faciliter solvi potest, si diligenter inspiciatur qualiter res intellectae in intellectu existant. [1] We can solve the above difficulty with ease if we examine diligently how the things that are understood by the intellect exist within the intellect.
Et ut ab intellectu nostro ad divini intellectus cognitionem, prout est possibile, procedamus, considerandum est quod res exterior intellecta a nobis in intellectu nostro non existit secundum propriam naturam, sed oportet quod species eius sit in intellectu nostro, per quam fit intellectus in actu. Existens autem in actu per huiusmodi speciem sicut per propriam formam, intelligit rem ipsam. Non autem ita quod ipsum intelligere sit actio transiens in intellectum, sicut calefactio transit in calefactum, sed manet in intelligente: sed habet relationem ad rem quae intelligitur, ex eo quod species praedicta, quae est principium intellectualis operationis ut forma, est similitudo illius. [2] So far as it is possible, let us proceed from our intellect to the knowledge that the divine intellect has. Let us consider the fact that an external thing understood by us does not exist in our intellect according to its own nature; rather, it is necessary that its species be in our intellect, and through this species the intellect comes to be in act. Once in act through this species as through its own form, the intellect knows the thing itself. This is not to be understood in the sense that the act itself of understanding is an action proceeding to the thing understood, as heating proceeds to the heated thing. Understanding remains in the one understanding, but it is related to the thing understood because the abovementioned species, which is a principle of intellectual operation as a form, is the likeness of the thing understood.
Ulterius autem considerandum est quod intellectus, per speciem rei formatus, intelligendo format in seipso quandam intentionem rei intellectae, quae est ratio ipsius, quam significat definitio. Et hoc quidem necessarium est: eo quod intellectus intelligit indifferenter rem absentem et praesentem, in quo cum intellectu imaginatio convenit; sed intellectus hoc amplius habet, quod etiam intelligit rem ut separatam a conditionibus materialibus, sine quibus in rerum natura non existit; et hoc non posset esse nisi intellectus sibi intentionem praedictam formaret. [3] We must further consider that the intellect, having been informed by the species of the thing, by an act of understanding forms within itself a certain intention of the thing understood, that is to say, its notion, which the definition signifies. This is a necessary point, because the intellect understands a present and an absent thing indifferently. In this the imagination agrees with the intellect. But the intellect has this characteristic in addition, namely, that it understands a thing as separated from material conditions, without which a thing does not exist in reality. But this could not take place unless the intellect formed the abovementioned intention for itself.
Haec autem intentio intellecta, cum sit quasi terminus intelligibilis operationis, est aliud a specie intelligibili quae facit intellectum in actu, quam oportet considerari ut intelligibilis operationis principium: licet utrumque sit rei intellectae similitudo. Per hoc enim quod species intelligibilis quae est forma intellectus et intelligendi principium, est similitudo rei exterioris, sequitur quod intellectus intentionem formet illi rei similem: quia quale est unumquodque, talia operatur. Et ex hoc quod intentio intellecta est similis alicui rei, sequitur quod intellectus, formando huiusmodi intentionem, rem illam intelligat. [4] Now, since this understood intention is, as it were, a terminus of intelligible operation, it is distinct from the intelligible species that actualizes the intellect, and that we must consider the principle of intellectual operation, though both are a likeness of the thing understood. For, by the fact that the intelligible species, which is the form of the intellect and the principle of understanding, is the likeness of the external thing, it follows that the intellect forms an intention like that thing, since such as a thing is, such are its works. And because the understood intention is like some thing, it follows that the intellect, by forming such an intention) knows that thing.
Intellectus autem divinus nulla alia specie intelligit quam essentia sua, ut supra ostensum est. Sed tamen essentia sua est similitudo omnium rerum. Per hoc ergo sequitur quod conceptio intellectus divini, prout seipsum intelligit, quae est verbum ipsius, non solum sit similitudo ipsius Dei intellecti, sed etiam omnium quorum est divina essentia similitudo. Sic ergo per unam speciem intelligibilem, quae est divina essentia, et per unam intentionem intellectam, quae est verbum divinum, multa possunt a Deo intelligi. [5] Now, the divine intellect understands by no species other than the divine essence, as was shown above. Nevertheless, the divine essence is the likeness of all things. Thereby it follows that the conception of the divine intellect as understanding itself, which is its Word, is the likeness not only of God Himself understood, but also of all those things of which the divine essence is the likeness. In this way, therefore, through one intelligible species, which is the divine essence, and through one understood intention, which is the divine Word, God can understand many things.

Caput 54 Chapter 54
Qualiter divina essentia una et simplex sit propria similitudo omnium intelligibilium HOW THE DIVINE ESSENCE, BEING ONE AND SIMPLE, IS THE PROPER LIKENESS OF ALL INTELLIGIBLE OBJECTS
Sed rursus difficile vel impossibile alicui videri potest quod unum et idem simplex, ut divina essentia, sit propria ratio sive similitudo diversorum.
Nam, cum diversarum rerum sit distinctio ratione propriarum formarum, quod alicui secundum propriam formam simile fuerit, alteri necesse est ut dissimile inveniatur. Secundum vero quod diversa aliquid commune habent, nihil prohibet ea similitudinem unam habere, sicut homo et asinus inquantum sunt animalia. Ex quo sequetur quod Deus de rebus propriam cognitionem non habeat, sed communem: nam secundum modum quo similitudo cogniti est in cognoscente, sequitur cognitionis operatio, sicut et calefactio secundum modum caloris; similitudo enim cogniti in cognoscente est sicut forma qua agitur. Oportet igitur, si Deus de pluribus propriam cognitionem habet, quod ipse sit propria ratio singulorum. Quod qualiter sit investigandum est.
[1] But, again, it can seem to someone difficult or impossible that one and the same simple being, the divine essence for example, is the proper model or likeness of diverse things.
For, since among diverse things there is a distinction by reason of their proper forms, whatever is like something according to its proper form must turn out to be unlike something else. To be sure, according as diverse things have something in common, nothing prevents them from having one likeness, as do man and a donkey so far as they are animals. But from this it will follow that God does not have a proper knowledge of things, but a common one; for the operation that knowledge is follows the mode in which the likeness of the known is in the knower. So, too, heating is according to the mode of the heat. For the likeness of the known in the knower is as the form by which the operation takes place. Therefore, if God has a proper knowledge of many things, He must be the proper model of singulars. How this may be we must investigate.
Ut enim philosophus dicit, in VIII Metaph., formae et definitiones rerum, quae eas significant, sunt similes numeris. Nam in numeris, una unitate addita vel subtracta, species numeri variatur: ut patet in binario et ternario. Similiter autem est et in definitionibus: nam una differentia addita vel subtracta variat speciem; substantia enim sensibilis absque rationali, et rationali addito, specie differt. [2] As the Philosopher says in Metaphysics VIII [3], the forms of things and the definitions that signify them are like numbers. Among numbers, the addition or subtraction of unity changes the species of a number, as appears in the numbers two and three. It is the same among definitions: the addition or subtraction of one difference changes the species. For sensible substance, with the difference rational taken away and added, differs in species.
In his autem quae in se multa continent, non sic se habet intellectus ut natura. Nam ea quae ad esse alicuius rei requiruntur illius rei natura divisa esse non patitur: non enim remanebit animalis natura si a corpore anima subtrahatur. Intellectus vero ea quae sunt in esse coniuncta, interdum disiunctim accipere potest, quando unum eorum in alterius rationem non cadit. Et per hoc in ternario potest considerare binarium tantum; et in animali rationali id quod est sensibile tantum. Unde intellectus id quod plura complectitur potest accipere ut propriam rationem plurimorum, apprehendendo aliqua illorum absque aliis. Potest enim accipere denarium ut propriam rationem novenarii, una unitate subtracta; et similiter ut propriam rationem singulorum numerorum infra inclusorum. Similiter etiam in homine accipere potest proprium exemplar animalis irrationalis inquantum huiusmodi, et singularum specierum eius, nisi aliquas differentias adderent positivas.
Propter hoc quidam philosophus, Clemens nomine, dixit quod nobiliora in entibus, sunt minus nobilium exemplaria.
[3] Now, with reference to things that contain a multitude, the intellect and nature are differently disposed. For what is required for the being of something the nature of that thing does not permit to be removed. For the nature of an animal will not survive if the soul is taken away from the body. But what is joined in reality the intellect can at times receive separately, when one of the elements is not included in the notion of the other. Thus, in the number three the intellect can consider the number two only, and in the rational animal it can consider that which is sensible only. Hence, that which contains several elements the intellect can take as the proper notion of the several elements by apprehending one of them without the others. It can, for example, take the number ten as the proper notion of nine by subtracting unity, and similarly as the proper notion of each of the numbers included under it. So, too, it can take in man the proper exemplar of irrational animal as such, and of each of its species, except that they would add some positive differences.
On this account a certain philosopher, Clement by name, said that the nobler beings in reality are the exemplars of the less noble [cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, De div. nom. V, 9].
Divina autem essentia in se nobilitates omnium entium comprehendit, non quidem per modum compositionis, sed per modum perfectionis, ut supra ostensum est. Forma autem omnis, tam propria quam communis, secundum id quod aliquid ponit, est perfectio quaedam: non autem imperfectionem includit nisi secundum quod deficit a vero esse. Intellectus igitur divinus id quod est proprium unicuique in essentia sua comprehendere potest, intelligendo in quo eius essentiam imitetur, et in quo ab eius perfectione deficit unumquodque: utpote, intelligendo essentiam suam ut imitabilem per modum vitae et non cognitionis, accipit propriam formam plantae; si vero ut imitabilem per modum cognitionis et non intellectus, propriam formam animalis; et sic de aliis. Sic igitur patet quod essentia divina, inquantum est absolute perfecta, potest accipi ut propria ratio singulorum. Unde per eam Deus propriam cognitionem de omnibus habere potest. [4] But the divine essence comprehends within itself the nobilities of all beings, not indeed compositely, but, as we have shown above, according to the mode of perfection. Now, every form, both proper and common, considered as positing something, is a certain perfection; it includes imperfection only to the extent that it falls short of true being. The intellect of God, therefore, can comprehend in His essence that which is proper to each thing by understanding wherein the divine essence is being imitated and wherein each thing falls short of its perfection. Thus, by understanding His essence as imitable in the mode of life and not of knowledge, God has the proper form of a plant; and if He knows His essence as imitable in the mode of knowledge and not of intellect, God has the proper form of animal, and so forth. Thus, it is clear that, being absolutely perfect, the divine essence can be taken as the proper exemplar of singulars. Through it, therefore, God can have a proper knowledge of all things.
Quia vero propria ratio unius distinguitur a propria ratione alterius; distinctio autem est pluralitatis principium: oportet in intellectu divino distinctionem quandam et pluralitatem rationum intellectarum considerare, secundum quod id quod est in intellectu divino est propria ratio diversorum. Unde, cum hoc sit secundum quod Deus intelligit proprium respectum assimilationis quam habet unaquaeque creatura ad ipsum, relinquitur quod rationes rerum in intellectu divino non sint plures vel distinctae nisi secundum quod Deus cognoscit res pluribus et diversis modis esse assimilabiles sibi.
Et secundum hoc Augustinus dicit quod Deus alia ratione facit hominem et alia equum; et rationes rerum pluraliter in mente divina esse dicit.
In quo etiam aliqualiter salvatur Platonis opinio ponentis ideas, secundum quas formarentur omnia quae in rebus materialibus existunt.
[5] Since, however, the proper exemplar of one thing is distinguished from the proper exemplar of another thing, and distinction is the source of plurality, we must observe in the divine intellect a certain distinction and plurality of understood exemplars, according as that which is in the divine intellect is the proper exemplar of diverse things. Hence, since this obtains according as God understands the proper relation of resemblance that each creature has to Him, it remains that the exemplars of things in the divine intellect are many or distinct only according as God knows that things can be made to resemble Him by many and diverse modes.
In accord with this, Augustine says that God made man and a horse by distinct exemplars. He also says that the exemplars of things are a plurality in the divine mind.
This conclusion likewise saves to some extent the opinion of Plato and his doctrine of Ideas, according to which would be formed everything that is found among material things.

Caput 55 Chapter 55
Ex his autem ulterius apparet quod Deus omnia simul intelligit. [1] From this it is further apparent that God understands all things together.
Intellectus enim noster simul multa actu intelligere non potest, quia, cum intellectus in actu sit intellectum in actu, si plura simul actu intelligeret, sequeretur quod intellectus simul esset plura secundum unum genus, quod est impossibile. Dico autem secundum unum genus: quia nihil prohibet idem subiectum informari diversis formis diversorum generum, sicut idem corpus est figuratum et coloratum. Species autem intelligibiles, quibus intellectus formatur ad hoc quod sit ipsa intellecta in actu, omnes sunt unius generis: habent enim unam rationem essendi secundum esse intelligibile, licet res quarum sunt species in una essendi non conveniant ratione; unde nec contrariae sunt per contrarietatem rerum quae sunt extra animam. Et inde est quod, quando aliqua multa accipiuntur quocumque modo unita, simul intelliguntur: simul enim intelligit totum continuum, non partem post partem; et similiter simul intelligit propositionem, non prius subiectum et postea praedicatum; quia secundum unam totius speciem omnes partes cognoscit. [2] Our intellect cannot understand in act many things together. The reason is that, since “the intellect in act is its object in act,” if the intellect did understand many things together, it would follow that the intellect would be at one and the same time many things according to one genus—which is impossible. I say “according to one genus” because nothing prevents the same subject from being informed by diverse forms of diverse genera, just as the same body is figured and colored. Now, the intelligible species, by which the intellect is formed so as to be the objects that are understood in act, all belong to one genus; for they have one manner of being in the order of intelligible being, even though the things whose species they are do not have one manner of being. Hence, the species are not contrary through the contrariety of the things that are outside the soul. It is in this way that, when certain things that are many are considered as in any way united, they are understood together. For the intellect understands a continuous whole all at once, not part after part. So, too, it understands a proposition all at once, not first the subject and then the predicate, since it knows all the parts according to one species of the whole.
Ex his igitur accipere possumus quod quaecumque plura una specie cognoscuntur, simul possunt intelligi. Omnia autem quae Deus cognoscit, una specie cognoscit, quae est sua essentia. Omnia igitur simul intelligere potest. [3] From these remarks we can infer that, whenever several things are known through one species, they can be known together. But all that God knows He knows through one species, which is His essence. Therefore, God can understand all things together.
Item. Vis cognoscitiva non cognoscit aliquid actu nisi adsit intentio: unde et phantasmata in organo conservata interdum non actu imaginamur, quia intentio non fertur ad ea; appetitus enim alias potentias in actum movet in agentibus per voluntatem. Multa igitur ad quae simul intentio non fertur, non simul intuemur. Quae autem oportet sub una intentione cadere, oportet simul esse intellecta: qui enim comparationem duorum considerat, intentionem ad utrumque dirigit et simul intuetur utrumque. [4] Again, a knowing power does not know anything in act unless the intention be present. Thus, the phantasms preserved in the organ are not always actually imagined because the intention is not directed to them. For among voluntary agents the appetite moves the other powers to act. We do not understand together, therefore, many things to which the intention is not directed at the same time. But things that must fall under one intention must be understood together; for he who is considering a comparison between two things directs his intention to both and sees both together.
Omnia autem quae sunt in divina scientia sub una intentione necesse est cadere. Intendit enim Deus suam essentiam perfecte videre. Quod est videre ipsam secundum totam virtutem suam, sub qua omnia concluduntur. Deus igitur, videndo essentiam suam, simul omnia intuetur. [5] Now, all the things that are in the divine knowledge must fall under one intention. For God intends to see His essence perfectly, which is to see it according to its whole power, under which are contained all things. Therefore God, by seeing His essence, sees all things together.
Amplius. Intellectus successive multa considerantis impossibile est esse unam tantum operationem: cum enim operationes secundum obiecta differant, oportebit diversam esse operationem intellectus qua considerabitur primum, et qua considerabitur secundum. Intellectus autem divini est una operatio, quae est sua essentia, ut probatum est supra. Non igitur successive, sed simul omnia sua cognita considerat. [6] Furthermore, the intellect of one considering successively many things cannot have only one operation. For since operations differ according to their objects, the operation by which the first is considered must be different from the operation by which the second is considered. But the divine intellect has only one operation, namely, the divine essence, as we have proved. Therefore, God considers all that He knows, not successively, but together.
Adhuc. Successio sine tempore intelligi non potest, nec tempus sine motu: cum tempus sit numerus motus secundum prius et posterius. In Deo autem impossibile est esse motum aliquem, ut ex supra dictis haberi potest. Nulla igitur est in consideratione divina successio. Et sic omnia quae cognoscit simul considerat. [7] Moreover, succession cannot be understood without time nor time without motion, since time is “the number of motion according to before and after.” But there can be no motion in God, as may be inferred from what we have said. There is, therefore, no succession in the divine consideration. Thus, all that He knows God considers together.
Item. Intelligere Dei est ipsum suum esse, ut ex supra dictis patet. In esse autem divino non est prius et posterius, sed est totum simul, ut supra ostensum est. Igitur nec consideratio Dei habet prius et posterius, sed omnia simul intelligit. [8] Then, too, God’s understanding is His being, as is clear from what we have said. But there is no before and after in the divine being; everything is together, as was shown above. Neither, therefore, does the consideration of God contain a before and after, but, rather, understands all things together.
Praeterea. Omnis intellectus intelligens unum post aliud est quandoque potentia intelligens et quandoque actu: dum enim intelligit primum in actu, intelligit secundum in potentia. Intellectus autem divinus nunquam est in potentia sed semper actu intelligens. Non igitur intelligit res successive, sed omnia simul intelligit. [9] Every intellect, furthermore, that understands one thing after the other is at one time potentially understanding and at another time actually understanding. For while it understands the first thing actually it understands the second thing potentially. But the divine intellect is never potentially, but always actually, understanding. Therefore, it does not understand things successively but rather understands them together.
Huic autem veritati testimonium sacra Scriptura affert: dicitur enim Iac. 1-17, quod apud Deum non est transmutatio nec vicissitudinis obumbratio. [10] Sacred Scripture bears witness to this truth. For it is written: “With God there is no change nor shadow of alteration” (James 1:17).

Caput 56 Chapter 56
Quod cognitio Dei non est habitualis THAT GOD’S KNOWLEDGE IS NOT HABITUAL
Ex hoc autem apparet quod in Deo non est habitualis cognitio. [1] From this it appears that there is no habitual knowledge in God.
In quibuscumque enim est habitualis cognitio, non omnia simul cognoscuntur, sed dum quaedam cognoscuntur actu, alia cognoscuntur habitu. Deus autem omnia simul actu intelligit, ut probatum est. Non est igitur in eo habitualis cognitio. [2] Where there is habitual knowledge, not all things are known together; some are known actually, and some habitually. But, as we have proved, God has actual understanding of all things together. There is, therefore, no habitual knowledge in Him.
Praeterea. Habens habitum et non considerans est quodammodo in potentia, aliter tamen quam ante intelligere. Ostensum est autem quod intellectus divinus nullo modo est in potentia. Nullo igitur modo est in ipso habitualis cognitio. [3] Furthermore, he who has a habit and is not using it is in a manner in potency, though otherwise than prior to understanding. But we have shown that the divine intellect is in no way in potency. In no way, therefore, is there habitual knowledge in it.
Adhuc. Omnis intellectus habitualiter aliquid cognoscentis est aliud eius essentia quam sua operatio intellectualis, quae est ipsa consideratio: intellectui enim habitualiter cognoscenti deest sua operatio; non autem eius essentia deesse ei potest. In Deo autem sua essentia est sua operatio, ut supra ostensum est. Non est igitur in eius intellectu habitualis cognitio. [4] Moreover, if an intellect knows something habitually, its essence is other than its intellectual operation, which is the consideration itself. For an intellect that knows habitually is lacking its operation, but its essence cannot be lacking to it. In God, however, as we have proved, His essence is His operation. There is, therefore, no habitual knowledge in His intellect.
Item. Intellectus habitualiter tantum cognoscens non est in sua ultima perfectione: unde nec felicitas, quae est optimum, ponitur secundum habitum, sed secundum actum. Si igitur Deus est habitualiter cognoscens per suam substantiam, secundum suam substantiam consideratus non erit universaliter perfectus. Cuius contrarium ostensum est supra. [5] Again, an intellect that knows only habitually is not at its highest perfection. That is why happiness, which is something best, is posited in terms of act, not in terms of habit. If, therefore, God is habitually knowing through His substance, considered in His substance He will not be universally perfect. We have shown the contrary of this conclusion.
Amplius. Ostensum est quod ipse est intelligens per essentiam suam, non autem per aliquas species intelligibiles essentiae superadditas. Omnis autem intellectus in habitu per aliquas species intelligit: nam habitus vel est habilitatio quaedam intellectus ad recipiendum species intelligibiles quibus actu fiat intelligens; vel est ordinata aggregatio ipsarum specierum existentium in intellectu non secundum completum actum, sed medio modo inter potentiam et actum. Non est igitur in ipso habitualis scientia. [6] It has also been shown that God understands through His essence, but not through any intelligible species added to His essence. Now, every habitual intellect understands through some species. For either a habit confers on the intellect a certain ability to receive the intelligible species by which it becomes understanding in act, or else it is the ordered aggregate of the species themselves existing in the intellect, not according to a complete act, but in a way intermediate between potency and act. There is therefore no habitual knowledge in God.
Praeterea. Habitus quaedam qualitas est. Deo autem non potest nec qualitas nec aliquod accidens accidere, ut supra probatum est. Non igitur Deo competit habitualis cognitio. [7] Then, again, a habit is a certain quality. But no quality or accident can be added to God, as we have proved. Habitual knowledge, therefore, does not befit God.
Quia vero dispositio qua quis est habitu tantum considerans aut volens vel agens assimilatur dispositioni dormientis, hinc est quod David, ut habitualem dispositionem a Deo removeret, dicit: ecce, non dormitavit neque dormiet qui custodit Israel. Hinc etiam est quod Eccli. 23-28 dicitur: oculi domini multo sunt lucidiores super solem: nam sol semper est in actu lucendi. [8] But because the disposition by which one is only habitually considering or willing or doing is likened to the disposition of one sleeping, hence it is that, in order to remove any habitual disposition from God, David says: “Behold He neither slumbers nor sleeps, who keeps Israel” (Ps. 120:4). Hence, also, what is said in Sirach (23:28): “The eyes of the Lord are far brighter than the sun”; for the sun is always shining.

Caput 57 Chapter 57
Quod cognitio Dei non est discursiva THAT GOD’S KNOWLEDGE IS NOT DISCURSIVE
Ex hoc autem ulterius habetur quod divina consideratio non est ratiocinativa vel discursiva. [1] We thereby further know that the divine consideration is not ratiocinative or discursive.
Tunc enim ratiocinativa est nostra consideratio quando ab uno considerato in aliud transimus, sicut syllogizando a principiis in conclusiones. Non enim ex hoc aliquis ratiocinatur vel discurrit quod inspicit qualiter conclusio ex praemissis sequatur, simul utrumque considerans: hoc enim contingit non argumentando, sed argumenta iudicando; sicut nec cognitio materialis est ex hoc quod materialia diiudicat. Ostensum est autem quod Deus non considerat unum post aliud quasi successive, sed simul omnia. Non ergo eius cognitio est ratiocinativa vel discursiva: quamvis omnem discursum et ratiocinationem cognoscat. [2] Our consideration is ratiocinative when we proceed from the consideration of one thing to another, as when in syllogistic reasoning we proceed from principles to conclusions. For, when someone examines how a conclusion follows from premises and considers both together, he is not on this account reasoning or discoursing, since this takes place, not by arguing, but by judging the arguments. So, too, knowledge is not material because it judges material things. Now, it has been shown that God does not consider one thing after the other as it were in succession, but all together. His knowledge, therefore, is not ratiocinative or discursive, although He knows all discourse and ratiocination.
Item. Omnis ratiocinans alia consideratione intuetur principia et conclusionem: non enim oporteret, consideratis principiis, ad conclusionem procedere, si ex hoc ipso quod principia considerantur conclusiones etiam considerarentur. Deus autem cognoscit omnia operatione una, quae est sua essentia, ut supra probatum est. Non est igitur sua cognitio ratiocinativa. [3] Everyone reasoning sees the principle by one consideration and the conclusions by another. There would be no need to proceed to conclusions after the consideration of the principles if by considering the principles we also considered the conclusions. But God knows all things by one operation, His essence, as we proved above. His knowledge is, therefore, not ratiocinative.
Praeterea. Omnis ratiocinativa cognitio habet aliquid de potentia et aliquid de actu: nam conclusiones in principiis sunt in potentia. In divino autem intellectu potentia locum non habet, ut supra ostensum est. Non est igitur eius intellectus discursivus. [4] Again, all ratiocinative knowledge contains some potency and some act, for conclusions are in principles potentially. But in the divine intellect potency has no place, as was proved above. God’s intellect, therefore, is not discursive.
Amplius. In omni scientia discursiva oportet aliquid esse causatum: nam principia sunt quodammodo causa efficiens conclusionis; unde et demonstratio dicitur syllogismus faciens scire. In divina autem scientia nihil potest esse causatum: cum sit ipse Deus, ut ex superioribus patet. Dei igitur scientia non potest esse discursiva. [5] Moreover, in all discursive knowledge there must be something caused, since principles are in a manner the efficient cause of the conclusion. Hence, demonstration is said to be “a syllogism making one to know.” But in the divine knowledge there can be nothing caused, since it is God Himself, as is clear from what has preceded. God’s knowledge, therefore, cannot be discursive.
Adhuc. Ea quae naturaliter cognoscuntur, absque ratiocinatione nobis sunt nota: sicut patet de primis principiis. Sed in Deo non potest esse cognitio nisi naturalis, immo nisi essentialis: sua enim scientia est sua essentia, ut supra probatum est. Dei igitur cognitio non est ratiocinativa. [6] What is naturally known, furthermore, is known to us without ratiocination. But in God there can be only natural knowledge, indeed, only essential knowledge; for, as was proved above, His knowledge is His essence. God’s knowledge, therefore, is not ratiocinative.
Praeterea. Omnem motum necesse est reduci in primum movens quod est movens tantum et non motum. Illud igitur a quo est prima origo motus, oportet omnino esse movens non motum. Hoc autem est intellectus divinus, ut supra ostensum est. Oportet igitur intellectum divinum omnino esse moventem non motum. Ratiocinatio autem est quidam motus intellectus transeuntis ab uno in aliud. Non est igitur divinus intellectus ratiocinativus. [7] Again, every motion must be reduced to a first mover that is only mover and not moved. That from which the first motion originates, therefore, must be an absolutely unmoved mover. This, as was proved above, is the divine intellect. The divine intellect must, therefore, be an absolutely unmoved mover. But ratiocination is a certain motion of the intellect proceeding from one thing to another. Hence, the divine intellect is not ratiocinative.
Item. Quod est supremum in nobis est inferius eo quod in Deo est: nam inferius non attingit superius nisi in sui summo. Supremum autem in nostra cognitione est, non ratio, sed intellectus, qui est rationis origo. Dei igitur cognitio non est ratiocinativa, sed intellectualis tantum. [8] Then, too, what is highest in us is lower than what is in God, for the lower reaches the higher only in its own highest part. But what is highest in our knowledge is, not reason, but intellect, which is the origin of reason. God’s knowledge, then, is not ratiocinative but solely intellectual.
Amplius. A Deo omnis defectus removendus est: eo quod ipse est simpliciter perfectus, ut supra ostensum est. Sed ex imperfectione intellectualis naturae provenit ratiocinativa cognitio. Nam quod per aliud cognoscitur minus est notum eo quod per se cognoscitur; nec ad id quod per aliud est notum natura cognoscentis sufficit sine eo per quod fit notum. In cognitione autem ratiocinativa fit aliquid notum per aliud: quod autem intellectualiter cognoscitur per se est notum, et ad ipsum cognoscendum natura cognoscentis sufficit absque exteriori medio. Unde manifestum est quod defectivus quidam intellectus est ratio. Divina igitur scientia non est ratiocinativa. [9] Moreover, since God is absolutely perfect, as we proved above, every defect must be removed from Him. But ratiocinative knowledge arises from an imperfection in intellectual nature. For that which is known through another is less known than what is known through itself; nor is the nature of the knower sufficient for knowing that which is known through another without that through which it is made known. But in ratiocinative knowledge something is made known through another, whereas that which is known intellectually is known through itself, and the nature of the knower is able to know it without an external means. Hence, it is manifest that reason is a certain defective intellect. Therefore, the divine knowledge is not ratiocinative.
Adhuc. Absque rationis discursu comprehenduntur ea quorum species sunt in cognoscente: non enim visus discurrit ad lapidem cognoscendum cuius similitudo in visu est. Divina autem essentia est omnium similitudo, ut supra probatum est. Non igitur procedit ad aliquid cognoscendum per rationis discursum. [10] Furthermore, those things whose species are in the knower are comprehended without discursive reasoning. For the sight does not proceed discursively to know the stone whose likeness it possesses. But the divine essence, as was shown above, is the likeness of all things. Hence, it does not proceed to know something through discursive reasoning.
Patet etiam solutio eorum quae discursum in divinam scientiam inducere videntur. Tum ex hoc quod per essentiam suam alia novit. Quod quidem ostensum est non fieri discursive: cum eius essentia se habeat ad alia non sicut principium ad conclusiones, sed sicut species ad res cognitas. Tum ex hoc quod inconveniens forte aliquibus videretur si Deus syllogizare non posset. Habet enim syllogizandi scientiam tanquam iudicans, et non sicut syllogizando discurrens. [11] The solution of those difficulties that seem to introduce discursiveness into the divine knowledge is likewise at hand. First, because God knows other things through His essence. For it was shown that this does not take place discursively, since God’s essence is related to other things, not as a principle to conclusions, but as a species to things known. Secondly, because some might think it unbefitting if God were not able to syllogize. For God possesses the knowledge of syllogizing as one judging, and not as one proceeding by syllogizing.
Huic autem veritati, rationibus probatae, etiam sacra Scriptura testimonium perhibet. Dicitur enim Hebr. 4-13: omnia nuda et aperta sunt oculis eius. Quae enim ratiocinando scimus non sunt secundum se nobis nuda et aperta, sed ratione aperiuntur et nudantur. [12] To this truth, which has been rationally proved, Sacred Scripture likewise gives witness. For it is written: “And things are naked and open to His sight” (Heb. 4:13). For what we know by reasoning is not through itself naked and revealed to us, but is opened and laid bare by reason.

Caput 58 Chapter 58
Quod Deus non intelligit componendo et dividendo THAT GOD DOES NOT UNDERSTAND BY COMPOSING AND DIVIDING
Per eadem etiam ostendi potest quod intellectus divinus non intelligit per modum intellectus componentis et dividentis. [1] Through the same means we can also show that the divine intellect does not understand in the manner of a composing and dividing intellect.
Cognoscit enim omnia cognoscendo essentiam suam. Essentiam autem suam non cognoscit componendo et dividendo: cognoscit enim seipsum sicut est: in ipso autem nulla est compositio. Non igitur intelligit per modum intellectus componentis et dividentis. [2] For the divine intellect knows all things by knowing its own essence. Now it does not know its own essence by composing and dividing, since it knows itself as it is and there is no composition in it. It does not, therefore, know in the manner of a composing and dividing intellect.
Adhuc. Ea quae intellectu componuntur et dividuntur nata sunt seorsum ab eo considerari: compositione enim et divisione opus non esset si in hoc ipso quod de aliquo apprehenderetur quid est, haberetur quid ei inesset vel non inesset. Si igitur Deus intelligeret per modum intellectus componentis et dividentis, sequeretur quod non uno intuitu omnia consideraret, sed seorsum unumquodque. Cuius contrarium supra est ostensum. [3] Moreover, what is composed and divided by the intellect is of a nature to be considered separately by it. For there would be no need of composition and division if by apprehending the essence of a thing we grasped what belonged in it and what did not. If, then, God understood in the manner of a composing and dividing intellect, it would follow that He did not consider all things by one intuition but each thing separately. We have shown the contrary of this above.
Amplius. In Deo non potest esse prius et posterius. Compositio autem et divisio posterior est consideratione eius quod quid est, quae est eius principium. In operatione igitur divini intellectus compositio et divisio esse non potest. [4] Furthermore, there can be no before and after in God. But composition and division come after the consideration of the essence, which is their principle. Hence, composition and division cannot be found in the operation of the divine intellect.
Item. Proprium obiectum intellectus est quod quid est: unde circa hoc non decipitur intellectus nisi per accidens, circa compositionem autem et divisionem decipitur; sicut et sensus qui est propriorum semper est verus, in aliis autem fallitur. In intellectu autem divino non est aliquid per accidens, sed solum quod per se est. In divino igitur intellectu non est compositio et divisio sed solum simplex rei acceptio. [5] Again, the proper object of the intellect is what a thing is. Hence, in relation to what a thing is the intellect suffers no deception except by accident, whereas as concerns composition and division it is deceived. So, too, a sense dealing with its proper sensibles is always true, but in other cases it is deceived. But in the divine intellect there is nothing accidental, but only that which is substantial. In the divine intellect, therefore, there is no composition and division, but only the simple apprehension of a thing.
Amplius. Propositionis per intellectum componentem et dividentem formatae compositio in ipso intellectu existit, non in re quae est extra animam. Si igitur intellectus divinus de rebus iudicet per modum intellectus componentis et dividentis, erit intellectus ipse compositus. Quod est impossibile, ut ex supra dictis patet. [6] Furthermore, in the case of a proposition formed by a composing and dividing intellect, the composition itself exists in the intellect, not in the thing that is outside the soul. If the divine intellect should judge of things in the manner of a composing and dividing intellect, the intellect itself will be composite. This is impossible, as is clear from what has been said.
Item. Intellectus componens et dividens diversis compositionibus diversa diiudicat: compositio enim intellectus compositionis terminos non excedit; unde compositione qua intellectus diiudicat hominem esse animal, non diiudicat triangulum esse figuram. Compositio autem vel divisio operatio quaedam intellectus est. Si igitur Deus res considerat componendo et dividendo, sequetur quod suum intelligere non sit unum tantum sed multiplex. Et sic etiam sua essentia non erit una tantum: cum sua operatio intellectualis sit sua essentia, ut supra ostensum est. [7] Again, the composing and dividing intellect judges diverse things by diverse compositions, for the composition of the intellect does not exceed the terms of the composition. Hence, the intellect does not judge the triangle to be a figure by the same composition by which it judges man to be an animal. Now, composition or division is a certain operation of the intellect. If, then, God considers things by means of composing and dividing, it will follow that His understanding is not solely one but many. And thus His essence, as well, will not be solely one, since His intellectual operation is His essence, as was proved above.
Non autem propter hoc oportet nos dicere quod enuntiabilia ignorat. Nam essentia sua, cum sit una et simplex, exemplar est omnium multiplicium et compositorum. Et sic per ipsam Deus omnem multitudinem et compositionem tam naturae quam rationis cognoscit. [8] But it is not on this account necessary for us to say that God does not know enunciables. For His essence, being one and simple, is the exemplar of all manifold and composite things. And thus God knows through His essence all multitude and composition both of nature and of reason.
His autem sacrae Scripturae auctoritas consonat. Dicitur enim Isaiae 55-8 non enim cogitationes meae cogitationes vestrae. Et tamen in Psalmo dicitur: dominus scit cogitationes hominum, quas constat per compositionem et divisionem intellectus procedere. [9] With these conclusions the authority of Sacred Scripture is in harmony. For it is said in Isaiah (55:8): “For My thoughts are not your thoughts.” Yet it is said in a Psalm (93:11): “The Lord knows the thoughts of men,” which thoughts evidently proceed through composition and division in the intellect.
Dionysius etiam dicit, VII cap. de Div. Nom.: igitur divina sapientia, seipsam cognoscens, cognoscit omnia, et materialia immaterialiter et indivisibiliter divisibilia et multa unitive. [10] Dionysius likewise says: “Therefore, in knowing itself, the divine wisdom knows all things-the material immaterially, the divisible indivisibly, and the many unitedly” [ De div. nom. VII, 2].

Caput 59 Chapter 59
Quod a Deo non excluditur veritas enuntiabilium THAT THE TRUTH OF ENUNCIABLES IS NOT EXCLUDED FROM GOD
Ex hoc autem apparet quod, licet divini intellectus cognitio non se habeat ad modum intellectus componentis et dividentis, non tamen excluditur ab eo veritas, quae, secundum philosophum, solum circa compositionem et divisionem intellectus est. [1] From this it may be seen that, although the knowledge of the divine intellect is not of the sort belonging to an intellect that composes and divides, truth, which according to the Philosopher is found only in the composition and division of the intellect [ Metaph. V, 4; De anima III, 6], is yet not excluded from it.
Cum enim veritas intellectus sit adaequatio intellectus et rei, secundum quod intellectus dicit esse quod est vel non esse quod non est, ad illud in intellectu veritas pertinet quod intellectus dicit, non ad operationem qua illud dicit. Non enim ad veritatem intellectus exigitur ut ipsum intelligere rei aequetur, cum res interdum sit materialis, intelligere vero immateriale: sed illud quod intellectus intelligendo dicit et cognoscit, oportet esse rei aequatum, ut scilicet ita sit in re sicut intellectus dicit. Deus autem sua simplici intelligentia, in qua non est compositio et divisio, cognoscit non solum rerum quidditates, sed etiam enuntiationes, ut ostensum est. Et sic illud quod intellectus divinus intelligendo dicit est compositio et divisio. Non ergo excluditur veritas ab intellectu divino ratione suae simplicitatis. [2] For, since the truth of the intellect is “the adequation of intellect and thing,” inasmuch as the intellect says that what is is and what is not is not, truth belongs to that in the intellect which the intellect says, not to the operation by which it says it. For the intellect to be true it is not required that its act of understanding be adequated to the thing known, since the thing is sometimes material whereas the act of understanding is immaterial. Rather, what the intellect in understanding says and knows must be adequated to the thing, so that, namely, the thing be such as the intellect says it to be. Now, by His simple understanding, in which there is no composition and division, God knows not only the quiddities of things but also enunciations, as has been shown. Hence, that which the divine intellect says in understanding is composition and division. Therefore, truth is not excluded from the divine intellect by reason of its simplicity.
Amplius. Cum aliquod incomplexum vel dicitur vel intelligitur, ipsum quidem incomplexum, quantum est de se, non est rei aequatum nec rei inaequale: cum aequalitas et inaequalitas secundum comparationem dicantur; incomplexum autem, quantum est de se, non continet aliquam comparationem vel applicationem ad rem. Unde de se nec verum nec falsum dici potest: sed tantum complexum, in quo designatur comparatio incomplexi ad rem per notam compositionis aut divisionis. Intellectus tamen incomplexus, intelligendo quod quid est, apprehendit quidditatem rei in quadam comparatione ad rem: quia apprehendit eam ut huius rei quidditatem. Unde, licet ipsum incomplexum, vel etiam definitio, non sit secundum se verum vel falsum, tamen intellectus apprehendens quod quid est dicitur quidem per se semper esse verus, ut patet in III de anima; etsi per accidens possit esse falsus, inquantum vel definitio includit aliquam complexionem, vel partium definitionis ad invicem, vel totius definitionis ad definitum. Unde definitio dicetur, secundum quod intelligitur ut huius vel illius rei definitio, secundum quod ab intellectu accipitur, vel simpliciter falsa, si partes definitionis non cohaereant invicem, ut si dicatur animal insensibile; vel falsa secundum hanc rem, prout definitio circuli accipitur ut trianguli. Dato igitur, per impossibile, quod intellectus divinus solum incomplexa cognosceret, adhuc esset verus, cognoscendo suam quidditatem ut suam. [1] When the incomplex is said or understood, the incomplex, of itself, is neither equated to a thing nor unequal to it. For equality and inequality are by relation, whereas the incomplex, of itself, does not imply any relation or application to a thing. Hence, of itself, it can be said to be neither true nor false; but the complex can, in which the relation of the incomplex to a thing is designated by a sign of composition or division. Nevertheless, the incomplex intellect in understanding what a thing is apprehends the quiddity of a thing in a certain relation to the thing, because it apprehends it as the quiddity of that thing. Hence although the incomplex itself, or even a definition, is not in itself true or false, nevertheless the intellect that apprehends what a thing is is always said to be through itself true, as appears in De anima III [6], although it can be by accident false, in so far as a definition includes some composition either of the parts of a definition with one another or of the whole definition with the thing defined. Hence, according as the definition is understood to be the definition of this or that thing, as it is received by the intellect, it will be called absolutely false if the parts of the definition do not belong together, as if we should say insensible animal; or it will be called false with reference to a given thing, as when the definition of a circle is taken as that of a triangle. Given, therefore, by an impossible supposition, that the divine intellect knew only incomplexes, it would still be true in knowing its own quiddity as its own.
Adhuc. Divina simplicitas perfectionem non excludit: quia in suo esse simplici habet quicquid perfectionis in aliis rebus per quandam aggregationem perfectionum seu formarum invenitur, ut supra ostensum est. Intellectus autem noster, apprehendendo incomplexa, nondum pertingit ad ultimam suam perfectionem, quia adhuc est in potentia respectu compositionis vel divisionis: sicut et in naturalibus simplicia sunt in potentia respectu commixtorum, et partes respectu totius. Deus igitur secundum suam simplicem intelligentiam illam perfectionem cognitionis habet quam intellectus noster habet per utramque cognitionem, et complexorum et incomplexorum. Sed veritas consequitur intellectum nostrum in sui perfecta cognitione, quando iam usque ad compositionem pervenit. Ergo et in ipsa simplici Dei intelligentia est veritas. [4] Again, the divine simplicity does not exclude perfection, because it possesses in its simple being whatever of perfection is found in other things through a certain aggregation of perfections or forms, as was shown above. But in apprehending incomplexes, our intellect does not yet reach its ultimate perfection, because it is still in potency to composition or division. So, too, among natural things, the simple are in potency with reference to the mixed, and the parts with reference to the whole. According to His simple understanding, therefore, God has that perfection of knowledge that our intellect has through both knowledges, that of complexes and that of incomplexes. But our intellect reaches truth in its perfect knowledge, that is to say, when it already has arrived at composition. Therefore, in the simple understanding of God as well there is truth.
Item. Cum Deus omnis boni bonum sit, utpote omnes bonitates in se habens, ut supra ostensum est, bonitas intellectus ei deesse non potest. Sed verum est bonum intellectus: ut patet per philosophum, in VI Ethicorum. Ergo veritas in Deo est. [5] Again, since God is the good of every good, as having every goodness in Himself, as has been shown above, the goodness of the intellect cannot be lacking to Him. But the true is the good of the intellect, as appears from the Philosopher [ Ethics VI, 2]. Therefore, truth is in God.
Et hoc est quod dicitur in Psalmo: est autem Deus verax. [6] And this is what is said in a Psalm: “But God is true” (Rom. 3:4).

Caput 60 Chapter 60
Quod Deus est veritas THAT GOD IS TRUTH
Ex praemissis autem apparet quod ipse Deus est veritas. [1] From the foregoing it is evident that God Himself is truth.
Veritas enim quaedam perfectio est intelligentiae, sive intellectualis operationis, ut dictum est. Intelligere autem Dei est sua substantia. Ipsum etiam intelligere, cum sit divinum esse, ut ostensum est, non supervenienti aliqua perfectione perfectum est, sed est per seipsum perfectum: sicut et de divino esse supra ostensum est. Relinquitur igitur quod divina substantia sit ipsa veritas. [2] Truth is a certain perfection of understanding or of intellectual operation, as has been said. But the understanding of God is His substance. Furthermore, since this understanding is, as we have shown, the divine being, it is not perfected through any superadded perfection; it is perfect through itself, in the same manner as we have shown of the divine being. It remains, therefore, that the divine substance is truth itself.
Item. Veritas est quaedam bonitas intellectus, secundum philosophum. Deus autem est sua bonitas, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo est etiam sua veritas. [3] Again, according to the Philosopher, truth is a certain goodness of the intellect. But God is His own goodness, as we have shown above. Therefore, He is likewise His own truth.
Praeterea. De Deo nihil participative dici potest: cum sit suum esse, quod nihil participat. Sed veritas est in Deo, ut supra ostensum est. Si igitur non dicatur participative, oportet quod dicatur essentialiter. Deus ergo est sua veritas. [4] Furthermore, nothing can be said of God by participation, since He is His own being, which participates in nothing. But, as was shown above, there is truth in God. If, then, it is not said by participation, it must be said essentially. Therefore, God is His truth.
Amplius. Licet verum proprie non sit in rebus sed in mente, secundum philosophum, res tamen interdum vera dicitur, secundum quod proprie actum propriae naturae consequitur. Unde Avicenna dicit, in sua metaphysica, quod veritas rei est proprietas esse uniuscuiusque rei quod stabilitum est ei, inquantum talis res nata est de se facere veram aestimationem, et inquantum propriam sui rationem quae est in mente divina, imitatur. Sed Deus est sua essentia. Ergo, sive de veritate intellectus loquamur sive de veritate rei, Deus est sua veritas. [5] Moreover, although, according to the Philosopher, the true is properly not in things but in the mind, a thing is at times said to be true when it reaches in a proper way the act of its own nature. Hence, Avicenna says in his Metaphysics that “the truth of a thing is the property of the being established in each thing” [VIII, 6]. This is so in so far as each thing is of a nature to give a true account of itself and in so far as it imitates the model of itself which is in the divine mind. But God is His essence. Therefore, whether we speak of the truth of the intellect or of the truth of a thing, God is His truth.
Hoc autem confirmatur auctoritate domini de se dicentis, Ioan. 14-6: ego sum via, veritas et vita. [6] This is confirmed by the authority of our Lord, Who says of Himself: “I am the way, and the truth, and the life” (John 14:6).

Caput 61 Chapter 61
Quod Deus est purissima veritas THAT GOD IS THE PUREST TRUTH
[1] It is clear from this demonstration that in God there is pure truth, with which no falsity or deception can be mingled.
Hoc autem ostenso, manifestum est quod in Deo est pura veritas, cui nulla falsitas vel deceptio admisceri potest.
Veritas enim falsitatem non compatitur: sicut nec albedo nigredinem. Deus autem non solum est verus, sed est ipsa veritas. Ergo in eo falsitas esse non potest.
[2] For truth is not compatible with falsity, as neither is whiteness with blackness. But God is not only true, He is truth itself. Therefore, there can be no falsity in Him.
[not in translation] For truth excludes falsity, just as whitness excludes blackness. But God is not only true, but truth itself. Therefore there can be no falsity in him.
Amplius. Intellectus non decipitur in cognoscendo quod quid est: sicut nec sensus in proprio sensibili. Omnis autem cognitio divini intellectus se habet ad modum intellectus cognoscentis quod quid est, ut ostensum est. Impossibile est igitur in divina cognitione errorem sive deceptionem aut falsitatem esse. [3] Moreover, the intellect is not deceived in knowing what a thing is, just as the sense is not deceived in its proper sensible. But, as we have shown, all the knowledge of the divine intellect is in the manner of an intellect knowing what a thing is. It is impossible, therefore, that there be error or deception or falsity in the divine knowledge.
Praeterea. Intellectus in primis principiis non errat, sed in conclusionibus interdum, ad quas ex principiis primis ratiocinando procedit. Intellectus autem divinus non est ratiocinativus aut discursivus, ut supra ostensum est. Non igitur potest esse in ipso falsitas aut deceptio. [4] Furthermore, the intellect does not err in the case of first principles; it errs at times in the case of conclusions at which it arrives by reasoning from first principles. But the divine intellect, as we have shown above, is not ratiocinative or discursive. Therefore, there cannot be falsity or deception in it.
Item. Quanto aliqua vis cognoscitiva est altior, tanto eius proprium obiectum est universalius, plura sub se continens: unde illud quod visus cognoscit per accidens, sensus communis aut imaginatio apprehendit ut sub proprio obiecto contentum. Sed vis divini intellectus est in fine sublimitatis in cognoscendo. Ergo omnia cognoscibilia comparantur ad ipsum sicut cognoscibilia proprie et per se et non secundum accidens. In talibus autem virtus cognoscitiva non errat. In nullo igitur cognoscibili possibile est divinum intellectum errare. [5] Again, the higher a knowing power, so much the more universal is its proper object, containing several objects under it. Thus, that which sight knows by accident the common sense or the imagination apprehends as contained under its proper object. But the power of the divine intellect is at the very peak of elevation in knowing. Hence, all knowable objects are related to it as knowable properly,and essentially and not by accident. In such cases, however, the knowing power does not err. Therefore, the divine intellect cannot err in the case of any knowable object.
Amplius. Virtus intellectualis est quaedam perfectio intellectus in cognoscendo. Secundum autem virtutem intellectualem non contingit intellectum falsum dicere, sed semper verum: verum enim dicere est bonus actus intellectus, virtutis autem est actum bonum reddere. Sed divinus intellectus perfectior est per suam naturam quam intellectus humanus per habitum virtutis: est enim in fine perfectionis. Relinquitur igitur quod in intellectu divino non potest esse falsitas. [6] Moreover, intellectual virtue is a certain perfection of the intellect in knowing. But according to intellectual virtue no intellect expresses what is false, but always what is true; for to speak the true is the good of the act of the intellect, and it belongs to virtue “to make an act good.” But the divine intellect, being at the peak of perfection, is more perfect through its nature than the human intellect is through the habit of virtue. It remains, therefore, that there cannot be falsity in the divine intellect.
Adhuc. Scientia intellectus humani a rebus quodammodo causatur: unde provenit quod scibilia sunt mensura scientiae humanae; ex hoc enim verum est quod intellectu diiudicatur, quia res ita se habet, et non e converso. Intellectus autem divinus per suam scientiam est causa rerum. Unde oportet quod scientia eius sit mensura rerum: sicut ars est mensura artificiatorum, quorum unumquodque in tantum perfectum est inquantum arti concordat. Talis igitur est comparatio intellectus divini ad res qualis rerum ad intellectum humanum. Falsitas autem causata ex inaequalitate intellectus humani et rei non est in rebus, sed in intellectu. Si igitur non esset omnimoda adaequatio intellectus divini ad res, falsitas esset in rebus, non in intellectu divino. Nec tamen in rebus est falsitas: quia quantum unumquodque habet de esse, tantum habet de veritate. Nulla igitur inaequalitas est inter intellectum divinum et res; nec aliqua falsitas in intellectu divino esse potest. [7] Furthermore, the knowledge of the human intellect is in a manner caused by things. Hence it is that knowable things are the measure of human knowledge; for something that is judged to be so by the intellect is true because it is so in reality, and not conversely. But the divine intellect through its knowledge is the cause of things. Hence, its knowledge is the measure of things, in the same way as an art is the measure of artifacts, each one of which is perfect in so far as it agrees with the art. The divine intellect, therefore, is related to things as things are related to the human intellect. But the falsity that is caused by the lack of equality between the human intellect and a thing is not in reality but in the intellect. If, therefore, there were no adequation whatever of the divine intellect to things, the falsity would be found in things and not in the divine intellect. Nevertheless, there is no falsity in things, because, so far as each thing has being, to that extent does it have truth. There is, therefore, no inequality between the divine intellect and things, nor can there be any falsity in the divine intellect.
Item. Sicut verum est bonum intellectus, ita falsum est malum ipsius: naturaliter enim appetimus verum cognoscere et refugimus falso decipi. Malum autem in Deo esse non potest, ut probatum est. Non potest igitur in eo esse falsitas. [8] Again, as the true is the good of the intellect, so the false is its evil. For we naturally seek to know the truth and flee from being deceived by the false. But, as we have proved, there can be no evil in God. Hence, there can be no falsity in Him.
Hinc est quod dicitur Rom. 3-4: est autem Deus verax; et Num. 23-19: non est Deus ut homo, ut mentiatur; et I Ioan. 1-5: Deus lux est et tenebrae in eo non sunt ullae. [9] Hence it is written: “But God is true” (Rom. 3:4); and in Numbers (23:19): “God is not a man, that He should lie”; and in John (I, 1:5): “God is light, and in Him there is no darkness.”

Caput 62 Chapter 62
Quod divina veritas est prima et summa veritas THAT THE DIVINE TRUTH IS THE FIRST AND HIGHEST TRUTH
Ex his autem quae ostensa sunt manifeste habetur quod divina veritas sit prima et summa veritas. [1] From what we have shown it clearly results that the divine truth is the first and highest truth.
Sicut enim est dispositio rerum in esse, ita et in veritate, ut patet per philosophum, in II Metaph.: et hoc ideo quia verum et ens se invicem consequuntur; est enim verum cum dicitur esse quod est vel non esse quod non est. Sed divinum esse est primum et perfectissimum. Ergo et sua veritas est prima et summa. [2] As is clear from the Philosopher, things are disposed in truth as they are disposed in being. The reason for this is that the true and being follow one another; for the true then exists when that which is is said to be and that which is not is said not to be. But the divine being is first and most perfect. Therefore, its truth is the first and highest truth.
Item. Quod per essentiam alicui convenit, perfectissime ei convenit. Sed veritas Deo attribuitur essentialiter, ut ostensum est. Sua igitur veritas est summa et prima veritas. [3] Again, what belongs to a thing essentially belongs to it most perfectly. But, as we have shown, truth is said of God essentially. Therefore, His truth is the highest and first truth.
Praeterea. Veritas in nostro intellectu ex hoc est quod adaequatur rei intellectae. Aequalitatis autem causa est unitas, ut patet in V metaphysicae. Cum igitur in intellectu divino sit omnino idem intellectus et quod intelligitur, sua veritas erit prima et summa veritas. [4] Furthermore, there is truth in our intellect because it is adequated to the thing that the intellect understands. But, as can be seen in Metaphysics V [15], unity is the cause of equality. Since, then, in the divine intellect the intellect and that which it understands are absolutely one, its truth is the first and highest truth.
Amplius. Illud quod est mensura in unoquoque genere, est perfectissimum illius generis: unde omnes colores mensurantur albo. Sed divina veritas est mensura omnis veritatis. Veritas enim nostri intellectus mensuratur a re quae est extra animam, ex hoc enim intellectus noster verus dicitur quod consonat rei: veritas autem rei mensuratur ad intellectum divinum, qui est causa rerum, ut infra probabitur; sicut veritas artificiatorum ab arte artificis; tunc enim vera est arca quando consonat arti. Cum etiam Deus sit primus intellectus et primum intelligibile, oportet quod veritas intellectus cuiuslibet eius veritate mensuretur: si unumquodque mensuratur primo sui generis, ut philosophus tradit, in X metaphysicae. Divina igitur veritas est prima, summa et perfectissima veritas. [5] Moreover, that which is the measure in any given genus is most perfect in that genus. That is why all colors are measured by white. But the divine truth is the measure of all truth. For the truth of our intellect is measured by the thing outside the soul, since our intellect is said to be true because it is in agreement with the thing that it knows. On the other hand, the truth of a thing is measured by the divine intellect, which is the cause of things, as will later on be proved. In the same way, the truth of artifacts comes from the art of the artisan, for a chest is then true when it agrees with its art. And since God is the first intellect and the first intelligible, the truth of any given intellect must be measured by the truth of His intellect—if, as the Philosopher teaches, each thing is measured by that which is first in its genus. The divine truth, therefore, is the first, highest, and most perfect truth.

Caput 63 Chapter 63
Rationes volentium subtrahere Deo cognitionem singularium THE ARGUMENTS OF THOSE WHO WISH TO TAKE AWAY THE KNOWLEDGE OF SINGULARS FROM GOD
Sunt autem quidam qui perfectioni divinae cognitionis singularium notitiam subtrahere nituntur. Ad quod quidem confirmandum septem viis procedunt. [1] Now, there are certain persons who are trying to take away the knowledge of singulars from the perfection of the divine knowledge. They use seven ways to confirm their position.
Prima est ex ipsa singularitatis conditione. Cum enim singularitatis principium sit materia signata, non videtur per aliquam virtutem immaterialem singularia posse cognosci, si omnis cognitio per quandam assimilationem fiat. Unde et in nobis illae solae potentiae singularia apprehendunt quae materialibus organis utuntur, ut imaginatio et sensus et huiusmodi; intellectus autem noster, quia immaterialis est, singularia non cognoscit. Multo igitur minus intellectus divinus singularium est cognoscitivus, qui maxime a materia recedit. Et sic nullo modo videtur quod Deus singularia cognoscere possit. [2] The first way is based on the very condition of singularity. For the principle of singularity is designated matter, and hence it seems that singulars cannot be known by any immaterial power, given that all knowledge takes place through a certain assimilation. So, too, in our own case only those powers apprehend singulars that make use of material organs, for example, the imagination, the senses, and the like. But because it is immaterial, our intellect does not know singulars. Much less, therefore, does the divine intellect know singulars, being the most removed from matter. Thus, in no way does it seem that God can know singulars.
Secunda est quod singularia non semper sunt. Aut igitur semper scientur a Deo: aut quandoque scientur et quandoque non scientur. Primum esse non potest: quia de eo quod non est non potest esse scientia, quae solum verorum est; ea autem quae non sunt, vera esse non possunt. Secundum etiam esse non potest: quia divini intellectus cognitio est omnino invariabilis, ut ostensum est. [3] The second way is based on the fact that singulars do not always exist. Therefore, either they will be known by God always, or they will be known at some time and not at another. The first alternative is impossible, since of that which does not exist there can be no knowledge; knowledge deals only with what is true, and what does not exist cannot be true. Nor is the second alternative possible, since, as we have shown, the knowledge of the divine intellect is absolutely unchangeable.
Tertia, ex eo quod non omnia singularia de necessitate proveniunt, sed quaedam contingenter. Unde de eis certa cognitio esse non potest nisi quando sunt. Certa enim cognitio est quae falli non potest: cognitio autem omnis quae est de contingenti, cum futurum est, falli potest; potest enim evenire oppositum eius quod cognitione tenetur; si enim non posset oppositum evenire, iam necessarium esset. Unde et de contingentibus futuris non potest esse in nobis scientia, sed coniecturalis aestimatio quaedam. Supponere autem oportet omnem Dei cognitionem esse certissimam et infallibilem, ut supra ostensum est. Impassibile est etiam quod Deus aliquid de novo cognoscere incipiat, propter eius immutabilitatem, ut dictum est. Ex his igitur videtur sequi quod singularia contingentia non cognoscat. [4] The third way is based on the fact that not all singulars come to be of necessity but some happen contingently. Hence, there can be a certain knowledge of them only when they exist. Now, that knowledge is certain which cannot be deceived. But all knowledge of the contingent can be deceived when the contingent is future, since the opposite of what is held by knowledge can happen; for, if it could not happen, it would then be necessary. Hence it is that we cannot have any knowledge of future contingents, but only a certain conjectural estimation. Now, we must suppose that all God’s knowledge is, as we have shown, most certain and infallible. And because of His immutability, as we have said, it is impossible for God to begin to know something anew. From all this it seems to follow that God does not know contingent singulars.
Quarta est ex hoc quod quorundam singularium causa est voluntas. Effectus autem, antequam sit, non potest nisi in sua causa cognosci: sic enim solum esse potest antequam in se esse incipiat. Motus autem voluntatis a nullo possunt per certitudinem cognosci nisi a volente, in cuius potestate sunt. Impossibile igitur videtur quod Deus de huiusmodi singularibus quae causam ex voluntate sumunt, notitiam aeternam habeat. [5] The fourth way is based on the fact that the will is the cause of some singulars. Before it exists, an effect can be known only in its cause, since, before it begins to be, this is the only way for an effect to exist. But the motions of the will can be known with certitude only by the one willing, in whose power they lie. It seems impossible, therefore, that God should have an eternal knowledge of such singulars as are caused by the will.
Quinta est ex singularium infinitate. Infinitum enim, inquantum huiusmodi, est ignotum: nam omne quod cognoscitur sub cognoscentis comprehensione quodammodo mensuratur; cum mensuratio nihil aliud sit quam quaedam certificatio rei mensuratae. Unde omnis ars infinita repudiat. Singularia autem sunt infinita, ad minus in potentia. Impossibile igitur videtur quod Deus singularia cognoscat. [6] The fifth way is based on the infinity of singulars. The infinite as such is unknown. Everything that is known is in a manner measured by the comprehension of the knower, since this “measure” is nothing other than a certain certification of the measured thing. That is why every art repudiates the infinite. But singulars are infinite, at least potentially. It seems impossible, then, that God knows singulars.
Sexta est ex ipsa vilitate singularium. Cum enim nobilitas scientiae ex nobilitate scibilis quodammodo pensetur, vilitas etiam scibilis in vilitatem scientiae redundare videtur. Divinus autem intellectus nobilissimus est. Non igitur eius nobilitas patitur quod Deus quaedam vilissima inter singularia cognoscat. [7] The sixth way is based on the very lowliness of singulars. Since the dignity of a science is in a way determined from the dignity of its object, the lowliness of the knowable object likewise seems to redound to the lowliness of the science. But the divine intellect is most noble. Its nobility, therefore, forbids that it should know certain of the lowliest among singulars.
Septima est ex malitia quae in quibusdam singularibus invenitur. Cum enim cognitum sit aliquo modo in cognoscente; malum autem in Deo esse non possit, ut supra ostensum est: videtur sequi quod Deus malum et privationem omnino non cognoscat, sed solum intellectus qui est in potentia; privatio enim non nisi in potentia esse potest. Et ex hoc sequitur quod non habeat Deus de singularium notitiam, in quibus malum et privatio invenitur. [8] The seventh way is based on the evil found in some singulars. For, since that which is known is found in the knower in a certain way, and there can be no evil in God, as was shown above, it seems to follow that God has absolutely no knowledge of evil and privation. This is known only by an intellect that is in potency, for privation can exist only in potency. From this it follows that God has no knowledge of the singulars in which there is evil and privation.

Caput 64 Chapter 64
Ordo dicendorum circa divinam cognitionem THE ORDER OF WHAT IS TO BE SAID ON THE DIVINE KNOWLEDGE
Ad huius autem erroris exclusionem; ut etiam divinae scientiae perfectio ostendatur; oportet diligenter veritatem inquirere circa singula praedictorum, ut ea quae sunt veritati contraria repellantur. Primo, ergo, ostendemus quod divinus intellectus singularia cognoscit. Secundo, quod cognoscit ea quae non sunt in actu. Tertio, quod cognoscit contingentia futura infallibili cognitione. Quarto, quod cognoscit motus voluntatis. Quinto, quod cognoscit infinita. Sexto, quod cognoscit quaelibet vilia et minima in entibus. Septimo, quod cognoscit mala et privationes quaslibet vel defectus. [1] To remove this error, and likewise to show the perfection of the divine knowledge, we must diligently look into the truth of each of the above ways, so that what is opposed to the truth may be refuted. We shall first show, then, that the divine intellect knows singulars. Second, we shall show that it knows what does not exist in act. Third, that it knows future contingents with an infallible knowledge. Fourth, that it knows the motions of the will. Fifth, that it knows infinite things. Sixth, that it knows every lowly and least thing among beings. Seventh, that it knows evils and all privations and defects.

Caput 65 Chapter 65
Quod Deus singularia cognoscat THAT GOD KNOWS SINGULARS
Primo igitur ostendemus quod singularium cognitio Deo non potest deesse. [1] We shall therefore first show that the knowledge of singulars cannot be lacking to God.
Ostensum enim est supra quod Deus cognoscit alia inquantum est causa eis. Effectus autem Dei sunt res singulares. Hoc enim modo Deus causat res, inquantum facit eas esse in actu: universalia autem non sunt res subsistentes, sed habent esse solum in singularibus, ut probatur in VII metaphysicae. Deus igitur cognoscit res alias a se non solum in universali, sed etiam in singulari. [2] It was shown above that God knows other things in so far as He is their cause. Now, singular things are God's effects. God causes things in so far as He makes them to be in act. Universals, on the other hand, are not subsisting things, but rather have being only in singulars, as is proved in Metaphysics VII [13]. God, therefore, knows things other than Himself, not only universally, but also in the singular.
Item. Cognitis principiis ex quibus constituitur essentia rei, necesse est rem illam cognosci: sicut, cognita anima rationali et corpore tali, cognoscitur homo. Singularis autem essentia constituitur ex materia designata et forma individuata: sicut Socratis essentia ex hoc corpore et hac anima, ut essentia hominis universalis ex anima et corpore, ut patet in VII metaphysicae. Unde, sicut haec cadunt in definitione hominis universalis, ita illa caderent in definitione Socratis si posset definiri. Cuicumque igitur adest cognitio materiae, et eorum per quae materia designatur, et formae in materia individuatae, ei non potest deesse cognitio singularis. Sed Dei cognitio usque ad materiam et accidentia individuantia et formas pertingit. Cum enim suum intelligere sit sua essentia, oportet quod intelligat omnia quae sunt quocumque modo in eius essentia; in qua quidem virtute sunt, sicut in prima origine, omnia quae esse quocumque modo habent, cum sit primum et universale essendi principium; a quibus materia et accidens non sunt aliena, cum materia sit ens in potentia et accidens sit ens in alio. Deo igitur cognitio singularium non deest. [3] Again, by knowing the principles of which the essence of a thing is composed, we necessarily know that thing itself. Thus, by knowing a rational soul and a certain sort of body, we know man. Now, the singular essence is composed of designated matter and individuated form. Thus, the essence of Socrates is composed of this body and this soul, just as the universal essence of man is composed of soul and body, as may be seen in Metaphysics VII [10]. Hence, just as the latter principles fall within the definition of universal man, so the former principles would fall in the definition of Socrates if he could be defined. Hence, whoever has a knowledge of matter and of what designates matter, and also of form individuated in matter, must have a knowledge of the singular. But the knowledge of Cod extends to matter and to individuating accidents and forms. For, since His understanding is His essence, He must understand all things that in any way are in His essence. Now, within His essence, as within the first source, there are virtually present all things that in any way have being, since He is the first and universal principle of being. Matter and accidents are not absent from among these things, since matter is a being in potency and an accident is a being in another. Therefore, the knowledge of singulars is not lacking to God.
Amplius. Natura generis perfecte non potest cognosci nisi eius differentiae primae et passiones propriae cognoscantur: non enim perfecte sciretur natura numeri si par et impar ignorarentur. Sed universale et singulare sunt differentiae, vel per se passiones entis. Si igitur Deus, cognoscendo essentiam suam, perfecte cognoscit naturam communem entis, oportet quod perfecte cognoscat universale et singulare. Sicut autem non perfecte cognosceret universale si cognosceret intentionem universalitatis et non cognosceret rem universalem, ut hominem aut animal; ita non perfecte cognosceret singulare si cognosceret rationem singularitatis et non cognosceret hoc vel illud singulare. Oportet igitur quod Deus res singulares cognoscat. [4] Moreover, the nature of a genus cannot be known perfectly unless its first differences and proper attributes are known. The nature of number would not be known perfectly if the even and the odd were not known. But universal and singular are differences or essential attributes of being. If, then, in knowing His essence God knows perfectly the common nature of being, He must know the universal and the singular perfectly. But, just as He would not know the universal perfectly if He knew the intention of universality and did not know the universal reality, for example, man or animal, so He would not know the singular perfectly if He knew the nature of singularity and did not know this or that singular. Therefore, God must know singular things.
Adhuc. Sicut Deus est ipsum suum esse, ita est suum cognoscere, ut ostensum est. Sed ex hoc quod est suum esse oportet quod in ipso inveniantur omnes perfectiones essendi sicut in prima essendi origine, ut supra habitum est. Ergo oportet quod in eius cognitione inveniatur omnis cognitionis perfectio sicut in primo cognitionis fonte. Hoc autem non esset si ei singularium notitia deesset: cum in hoc aliquorum cognoscentium perfectio consistat. Impossibile est igitur eum singularium notitiam non habere. [5] Furthermore, just as God is His being, so, as we have shown, He is His knowing. Now, since He is His being, all the perfections of being must be found in Him as in the first origin of being, as was shown above. Therefore, there must be found in His knowledge, as in the first source of knowledge, the perfection of all knowledge. But this would not be so if the knowledge of singulars were lacking to Him; for the perfection of some knowers consists in this knowledge. Therefore, it is impossible for God not to have a knowledge of singulars.
Praeterea. In omnibus virtutibus ordinatis hoc communiter invenitur quod virtus superior ad plura se extendit et tamen est unica, virtus vero inferior se extendit ad pauciora, et multiplicatur tamen respectu illorum: sicut patet in imaginatione et sensu; nam una vis imaginationis se extendit ad omnia quae quinque vires sensuum cognoscunt et ad plura. Sed vis cognoscitiva in Deo est superior quam in homine. Quicquid ergo homo diversis viribus cognoscit, intellectu scilicet, imaginatione et sensu, hoc Deus uno suo simplici intellectu considerat. Est igitur singularium cognoscitivus, quae nos sensu et imaginatione apprehendimus. [6] Furthermore, among all ordered powers it is commonly found that the higher power, though one, extends to several things, whereas a lower power extends to fewer things and is nevertheless multiplied by its relation to them. This happens in the case of the imagination and the sense. The one power of the imagination extends to all the things that the five powers of the senses know, and to more besides. But the knowing power in God is higher than it is in man. Therefore, whatever man knows by means of diverse powers, namely, the intellect, the imagination, and the sense, this God considers by His one simple intellect. God, therefore, knows the singulars that we apprehend by the sense and the imagination.
Amplius. Divinus intellectus ex rebus cognitionem non sumit, sicut noster, sed magis per suam cognitionem est causa rerum, ut infra ostendetur: et sic eius cognitio quam de rebus aliis habet, est ad modum practicae cognitionis. Practica autem cognitio non est perfecta nisi ad singularia perveniatur: nam practicae cognitionis finis est operatio, quae in singularibus est. Divina igitur cognitio quam de aliis rebus habet, se usque ad singularia extendit. [7] Moreover, the divine intellect does not gather its knowledge from things, as ours does; rather, as will be shown later on, it is through its knowledge the cause of things. The knowledge that the divine intellect has of other things is after the manner of practical knowledge. Now, practical knowledge is not perfect unless it reaches to singulars. For the end of practical knowledge is operation, which belongs to the domain of singulars. Therefore, the knowledge that God has of other things extends to singulars.
Adhuc. Primum mobile movetur a motore movente per intellectum et appetitum, ut supra ostensum est. Non autem posset motor aliquis per intellectum causare motum nisi cognosceret mobile inquantum natum est moveri secundum locum. Hoc autem est inquantum est hic et nunc: et per consequens inquantum est singulare. Intellectus igitur qui est motor primi mobilis, cognoscit primum mobile inquantum est singulare. Qui quidem motor vel ponitur Deus, et sic habetur propositum: vel aliquid quod est infra Deum. Cuius intellectus si potest cognoscere singulare sua virtute, quod noster intellectus non potest, multo magis hoc poterit intellectus Dei. [8] Furthermore, as was shown above, the first movable is moved by a mover moving through intellect and appetite. Now, a mover could not cause motion through his intellect unless he moved the movable in so far as it is of a nature to be moved in place. But this is true of the movable in so far as it is here and now, and consequently in so far as it is singular. Therefore, the intellect that is the mover of the first movable knows the first movable in so far as it is singular. Now, this mover is either held to be God, in which case we have made our point, or it is held to be some being below God. But, if the intellect of such a being can by its power know the singular, which our intellect cannot, all the more will the intellect of God be able to do this.
Item. Agens honorabilius est patiente et acto, sicut actus potentia. Forma igitur quae est inferioris gradus non potest agendo perducere suam similitudinem in gradum altiorem; sed forma superior poterit perducere agendo suam similitudinem in gradum inferiorem; sicut ex virtutibus incorruptibilibus stellarum producuntur formae corruptibiles in istis inferioribus, virtus autem corruptibilis non potest producere formam incorruptibilem. Cognitio autem omnis fit per assimilationem cognoscentis et cogniti: in hoc tamen differt, quod assimilatio in cognitione humana fit per actionem rerum sensibilium in vires cognoscitivas humanas, in cognitione autem Dei est e converso per actionem formae intellectus divini in res cognitas. Forma igitur rei sensibilis, cum sit per suam materialitatem individuata, suae singularitatis similitudinem perducere non potest in hoc quod sit omnino immaterialis, sed solum usque ad vires quae organis materialibus utuntur; ad intellectum autem perducitur per virtutem intellectus agentis, inquantum omnino a conditionibus materiae exuitur; et sic similitudo singularitatis formae sensibilis non potest pervenire usque ad intellectum humanum. Similitudo autem formae intellectus divini, cum pertingat usque ad rerum minima, ad quae pertingit sua causalitas, pervenit usque ad singularitatem formae sensibilis et materialis. Intellectus igitur divinus potest cognoscere singularia, non autem humanus. [9] Again, the agent is more noble than the patient or thing acted upon, as act is more noble than potency. Hence, a form of a lower grade cannot by acting extend its likeness to a higher grade; rather, the higher form by acting can extend its likeness to a lower grade. Thus, from the incorruptible powers of the stars there are produced corruptible forms among sublunary things; but a corruptible power cannot produce an incorruptible form. Now, all knowledge takes place through the assimilation of the knower and the known. There is this difference, however, that the assimilation in human knowledge takes place through the action of sensible things on man’s knowing powers, whereas in the case of God’s knowledge the assimilation takes place contrariwise through the action of the forms of the divine intellect on the things known. Hence, since the form of the sensible thing is individuated through its materiality, it cannot extend the likeness of its singularity so that it be absolutely immaterial. It can extend its likeness to the level of the powers that use material organs; it reaches the intellect only through the power of the agent intellect in so far as it is completely divested of the conditions of matter. Thus, the likeness of the singularity of a sensible form cannot reach up to the human intellect. But the likeness of a form in the divine intellect, by reaching to the least of things to which its causality reaches, extends to the singularity of the sensible and material form. The divine intellect, therefore, can know singulars, but not the human intellect.
Praeterea. Sequeretur inconveniens quod philosophus contra Empedoclem inducit, scilicet Deum esse insipientissimum, si singularia non cognoscit, quae etiam homines cognoscunt. [10] Then, too, if God does not know singulars which even men know, there would follow the difficulty that the Philosopher raises against Empedocles, namely, that God is the most foolish of beings [ De anima I, 5; Metaph. III, 4].
Haec autem probata veritas etiam Scripturae sacrae auctoritate firmatur. Dicitur enim Hebr. 4-13: non est ulla creatura invisibilis in conspectu eius. Error etiam contrarius excluditur Eccli. 16-16: non dicas: a Deo abscondar, et ex summo quis mei memorabitur? [11] This truth that we have proved is likewise strengthened by the authority of Sacred Scripture. For it is said in Hebrews (4:13): “Neither is there any creature invisible in His sight.” The contrary error likewise is removed by Sirach (16:16): “Do not say: I shall be hidden from God, and who shall remember me from on high?”
Patet etiam ex dictis qualiter obiectio in contrarium facta non recte concludit. Nam id quo intellectus divinus intelligit, etsi immateriale sit, est tamen et materiae et formae similitudo, sicut primum principium productivum utriusque. [12] It is also clear from what has been said how the objection to the contrary does not conclude properly. For, although that by which the divine intellect understands is immaterial, it is nevertheless the likeness of both form and matter, being the first productive principle of both.

Caput 66 Chapter 66
Quod Deus cognoscit ea quae non sunt THAT GOD KNOWS THE THINGS THAT ARE NOT
Deinde ostendendum est quod Deo non deest notitia eorum etiam quae non sunt. [1] We must next show that the knowledge even of the things that are not is not lacking to God.
Ut enim ex supra dictis patet, eadem est comparatio scientiae divinae ad res scitas quae scibilium ad scientiam nostram. Est autem haec comparatio scibilis ad nostram scientiam, quod scibile potest esse absque eo quod eius scientia a nobis habeatur, ut ponit exemplum philosophus, in praedicamentis, de circuli quadratura; non autem e converso. Talis ergo erit comparatio divinae scientiae ad res alias quod etiam non existentium esse potest. [2] As is clear from what we have said above, the relation of the divine knowledge to the things known is the same as the relation of the things that we know to our knowledge. Now, the relation of a thing known to our knowledge is this, namely, that the known thing can exist without our having a knowledge of it, as Aristotle illustrates of the squaring of a circle; but the converse is not true. The relation of the divine knowledge to other things, therefore, win be such that it can be even of non-existing things.
Item. Cognitio divini intellectus comparatur ad res alias sicut cognitio artificis ad artificiata: cum per suam scientiam sit causa rerum. Artifex autem suae artis cognitione etiam ea quae nondum sunt artificiata cognoscit: formae enim artis ex eius scientia effluunt in exteriorem materiam ad artificiatorum constitutionem; unde nihil prohibet in scientia artificis esse formas quae nondum exterius prodierunt. Sic igitur nihil prohibet Deum eorum quae non sunt notitiam habere. [3] Again, the knowledge of the divine intellect is to other things as the knowledge of an artisan to artifacts, since through His knowledge God is the cause of things. Now, the artisan knows through his art even those things that have not yet been fashioned, since the forms of his art flow from his knowledge to external matter for the constitution of the artifacts. Hence, nothing forbids that there be in the knowledge of an artisan forms that have not yet come out of it. Thus, nothing forbids God to have knowledge of the things that are not.
Praeterea. Deus cognoscit alia a se per suam essentiam inquantum est similitudo eorum quae ab eo procedunt, ut ex dictis patet. Sed, cum essentia Dei sit infinitae perfectionis, ut supra ostensum est; quaelibet autem alia res habeat esse et perfectionem terminatam: impossibile est quod universitas rerum aliarum adaequet essentiae divinae perfectionem. Extendit igitur se vis suae repraesentationis ad multo plura quam ad ea qua sunt. Si igitur Deus totaliter virtutem et perfectionem essentiae suae cognoscit, extendit se eius cognitio non solum ad ea quae sunt, sed etiam ad ea qua non sunt. [4] Furthermore, through His essence God knows things other than Himself in so far as His essence is the likeness of the things that proceed from Him. This is clear from what we have said. But since, as was shown above, the essence of God is of an infinite perfection, whereas every other thing has a limited being and perfection, it is impossible that the universe of things other than God equal the perfection of the divine essence. Hence, its power of representation extends to many more things than to those that are. Therefore, if God knows completely the power and perfection of His essence, His knowledge extends not only to the things that are but also to the things that are not.
Amplius. Intellectus noster, secundum illam operationem qua cognoscit quod quid est, notitiam habere potest etiam eorum quae non sunt actu: potest enim leonis vel equi essentiam comprehendere omnibus huiusmodi animalibus interemptis. Intellectus autem divinus cognoscit ad modum cognoscentis quod quid est non solum definitiones, sed etiam enuntiabilia, ut ex supra dictis patet. Potest igitur etiam eorum quae non sunt notitiam habere. [5] Moreover, by that operation through which it knows what a thing is our intellect can know even those things that do not actually exist. It can comprehend the essence of a lion or a horse even though all such animals were to be destroyed. But the divine intellect knows, in the manner of one knowing what a thing is, not only definitions but also enunciables, as is clear from what we have said. Therefore, it can know even the things that are not.
Adhuc. Effectus aliquis in sua causa praenosci potest etiam antequam sit: sicut praenoscit astrologus eclipsim futuram ex consideratione ordinis caelestium motuum. Sed cognitio Dei est de rebus omnibus per causam: se enim cognoscendo, qui est omnium causa, alia quasi suos effectus cognoscit, ut supra ostensum est. Nihil igitur prohibet quin etiam quae nondum sunt cognoscat. [6] Furthermore, an effect can be pre-known in its cause even before it exists. Thus, an astronomer pre-knows a future eclipse from a consideration of the order of the heavenly motions. But God knows all things through a cause; for, by knowing Himself, Who is the cause of other things, He knows other things as His effects, as was shown above. Nothing, therefore, prevents God from knowing even the things that are not.
Amplius. Intelligere Dei successionem non habet, sicut nec eius esse. Est igitur totum simul semper manens: quod de ratione aeternitatis est. Temporis autem duratio successione prioris et posterioris extenditur. Proportio igitur aeternitatis ad totam temporis durationem est sicut proportio indivisibilis ad continuum: non quidem eius indivisibilis quod terminus continui est, quod non adest cuilibet parti continui,- huius enim similitudinem habet instans temporis - sed eius indivisibilis quod extra continuum est, cuilibet tamen parti continui, sive puncto in continuo signato, coexistit: nam, cum tempus motum non excedat, aeternitas, quae omnino extra motum est, nihil temporis est.
Rursum, cum aeterni esse nunquam deficiat, cuilibet tempori vel instanti temporis praesentialiter adest aeternitas. Cuius exemplum utcumque in circulo est videre: punctum enim in circumferentia signatum, etsi indivisibile sit, non tamen cuilibet puncto alii secundum situm coexistit simul, ordo enim situs continuitatem circumferentiae facit; centrum vero, quod est extra circumferentiam, ad quodlibet punctum in circumferentia signatum directe oppositionem habet. Quicquid igitur in quacumque parte temporis est, coexistit aeterno quasi praesens eidem: etsi respectu alterius partis temporis sit praeteritum vel futurum. Aeterno autem non potest aliquid praesentialiter coexistere nisi toti: quia successionis durationem non habet. Quicquid igitur per totum decursum temporis agitur, divinus intellectus in tota sua aeternitate intuetur quasi praesens. Nec tamen quod quadam parte temporis agitur, semper fuit existens. Relinquitur igitur quod eorum quae secundum decursum temporis nondum sunt, Deus notitiam habet.
[7] Moreover, God’s understanding has no succession, as neither does His being. He is therefore an ever-abiding simultaneous whole-which belongs to the nature of eternity. On the other hand, the duration of time is stretched out through the succession of the before and after. Hence, the proportion of eternity to the total duration of time is as the proportion of the indivisible to something continuous; not, indeed, of that indivisible that is the terminus of a continuum, which is not present to every part of a continuum (the instant of time bears a likeness to such an indivisible), but of that indivisible which is outside a continuum and which nevertheless co-exists with any given part of a continuum or with a determinate point in the continuum. For, since time lies within motion, eternity, which is completely outside motion, in no way belongs to time.
Furthermore, since the being of what is eternal does not pass away, eternity is present in its presentiality to any time or instant of time. We may see an example of sorts in the case of a circle. Let us consider a determined point on the circumference of a circle. Although it is indivisible, it does not co-exist simultaneously with any other point as to position, since it is the order of position that produces the continuity of the circumference. On the other hand, the center of the circle, which is no part of the circumference, is directly opposed to any given determinate point on the circumference. Hence, whatever is found in any part of time coexists with what is eternal as being present to it, although with respect to some other time it be past or future. Something can be present to what is eternal only by being present to the whole of it, since the eternal does not have the duration of succession. The divine intellect, therefore, sees in the whole of its eternity, as being present to it, whatever takes place through the whole course of time. And yet what takes place in a certain part of time was not always existent. It remains, therefore, that God has a knowledge of those things that according to the march of time do not yet exist.
Per has igitur rationes apparet quod Deus non entium notitiam habet. Non tamen omnia non entia eandem habent habitudinem ad eius scientiam.
Ea enim quae non sunt nec erunt nec fuerunt, a Deo sciuntur quasi eius virtuti possibilia. Unde non cognoscit ea ut existentia aliqualiter in seipsis, sed ut existentia solum in potentia divina. Quae quidem a quibusdam dicuntur a Deo cognosci secundum notitiam simplicis intelligentiae.
Ea vero quae sunt praesentia, praeterita vel futura nobis, cognoscit Deus secundum quod sunt in sua potentia, et in propriis causis, et in seipsis. Et horum cognitio dicitur notitia visionis: non enim Deus rerum quae apud nos nondum sunt, videt solum esse quod habent in suis causis, sed etiam illud quod habent in seipsis, inquantum eius aeternitas est praesens sua indivisibilitate omni tempori.
[8] Through these arguments it appears that God has a knowledge of non-being. But not all non-beings have the same relation to His knowledge.
For those things that are not, nor will be, nor ever were, are known by God as possible to His power. Hence, God does not know them as in some way existing in themselves, but as existing only in the divine power. These are said by some to be known by God according to a knowledge of simple understanding.
The things that are present, past, or future to us God knows in His power, in their proper causes, and in themselves. The knowledge of such things is said to be a knowledge of vision. For of the things that for us are not yet God sees not only the being that they have in their causes but also the being that they have in themselves, in so far as His eternity is present in its indivisibility to all time.
Et tamen esse quodcumque rei Deus cognoscit per essentiam suam. Nam sua essentia est repraesentabilis per multa quae non sunt nec erunt nec fuerunt. Ipsa etiam est similitudo virtutis cuiuslibet causae, secundum quam praeexistunt effectus in causis. Esse etiam cuiuslibet rei quod habet in seipsa, est ab ea exemplariter deductum. [9] Nevertheless, whatever being a thing has God knows through His essence. For His essence can be represented by many things that are not, nor will be, nor ever were. His essence is likewise the likeness of the power of every cause, through which effects pre-exist in their causes. And the being that each thing has in itself comes from the divine essence as from its exemplary source.
Sic igitur non entia cognoscit Deus inquantum aliquo modo habent esse: vel in potentia Dei, vel in causis suis, vel in seipsis. Quod rationi scientiae non obsistit. [10] Thus, therefore, God knows non-beings in so far as in some way they have being, namely, in His power, or in their causes, or in themselves. This is not incompatible with the nature of knowledge.
His autem quae praemissa sunt etiam Scripturae sacrae auctoritas testimonium perhibet. Dicitur enim Eccli. 23-29: domino Deo nostro, antequam crearentur, nota sunt omnia: sic et post perfectum cognoscit omnia. Et Ier. 1-5: priusquam te formarem in utero novi te. [11] The authority of Sacred Scripture likewise offers witness to what has preceded. For it is said in Sirach (23:29): “For all things were known to the Lord God before they were created: so also after they were perfected He beholds all things.” And in Jeremias (1:5): “Before I formed you in the bowels of your mother I knew you.”
Patet autem ex praemissis quod non cogimur dicere, sicut quidam dixerunt, Deum universaliter singularia cognoscere, quia cognoscit ea in causis universalibus tantum, sicut qui cognosceret eclipsim hanc, non prout haec, sed prout provenit ex oppositione: cum ostensum sit quod divina cognitio se extendit ad singularia prout sunt in seipsis. [12] It is also clear from what has preceded that we are not forced to say, as some said, that God knows singulars universally because He knows them only in universal causes, just as one would know a particular eclipse not in itself but as it arises from the position of the stars. For we have shown that the divine knowledge extends to singulars in so far as they are in themselves.

Caput 67 Chapter 67
Quod Deus cognoscit singularia contingentia futura THAT GOD KNOWS FUTURE CONTINGENT SINGULARS
Ex his autem iam aliqualiter patere potest quod contingentium singularium ab aeterno Deus infallibilem scientiam habuit, nec tamen contingentia esse desistunt. [1] From this we can begin to understand somewhat that God had from eternity an infallible knowledge of contingent singulars, and yet they do not cease to be contingent.
Contingens enim certitudini cognitionis non repugnat nisi secundum quod futurum est, non autem secundum quod praesens est. Contingens enim, cum futurum est, potest non esse: et sic cognitio aestimantis ipsum futurum esse falli potest; falletur enim si non erit quod futurum esse aestimavit. Ex quo autem praesens est, pro illo tempore non potest non esse: potest autem in futurum non esse, sed hoc non iam pertinet ad contingens prout praesens est, sed prout futurum est. Unde nihil certitudini sensus deperit cum quis videt currere hominem, quamvis hoc dictum sit contingens. Omnis igitur cognitio quae supra contingens fertur prout praesens est, certa esse potest. Divini autem intellectus intuitus ab aeterno fertur in unumquodque eorum quae temporis cursu peraguntur prout praesens est, ut supra ostensum est. Relinquitur igitur quod de contingentibus nihil prohibet Deum ab aeterno scientiam infallibilem habere. [2] The contingent is opposed to the certitude of knowledge only so far as it is future, not so far as it is present. For when the contingent is future, it can not-be. Thus, the knowledge of one conjecturing that it will be can be mistaken: it will be mistaken if what he conjectures as future will not take place. But in so far as the contingent is present, in that time it cannot not-be. It can not-be in the future, but this affects the contingent not so far as it is present but so far as it is future. Thus, nothing is lost to the certitude of sense when someone sees a man running, even though this judgment is contingent. All knowledge, therefore, that bears on something contingent as present can be certain. But the vision of the divine intellect from all eternity is directed to each of the things that take place in the course of time, in so far as it is present, as shown above. It remains, therefore, that nothing prevents God from having from all eternity an infallible knowledge of contingents.
Item. Contingens a necessario differt secundum quod unumquodque in sua causa est: contingens enim sic in sua causa est ut non esse ex ea possit et esse; necessarium vero non potest ex sua causa nisi esse. Secundum id vero quod utrumque eorum in se est, non differt quantum ad esse, supra quod fundatur verum: quia in contingenti, secundum id quod in se est, non est esse et non esse, sed solum esse, licet in futurum contingens possit non esse. Divinus autem intellectus ab aeterno cognoscit res non solum secundum esse quod habent in causis suis, sed etiam secundum esse quod habent in seipsis. Nihil igitur prohibet ipsum habere aeternam cognitionem de contingentibus et infallibilem. [3] Again, the contingent differs from the necessary according to the way each of them is found in its cause. The contingent is in its cause in such a way that it can both not-be and be from it; but the necessary can only be from its cause. But according to the way both of them are in themselves, they do not differ as to being, upon which the true is founded. For, according as it is in itself, the contingent cannot be and not-be, it can only be, even though in the future it can not-be. Now, the divine intellect from all eternity knows things not only according to the being that they have in their causes, but also according to the being that they have in themselves. Therefore, nothing prevents the divine intellect from having an eternal and infallible knowledge of contingents.
Amplius. Sicut ex causa necessaria certitudinaliter sequitur effectus, ita ex causa contingenti completa si non impediatur. Sed, cum Deus cognoscat omnia, ut ex supra dictis patet, scit non solum causas contingentium, sed etiam ea quibus possunt impediri. Scit igitur per certitudinem an contingentia sint vel non sint. [4] Moreover, just as from a necessary cause an effect follows with certitude, so it follows from a complete contingent cause if it be not impeded. But since, as appears from what was said above, God knows all things, He knows not only the causes of contingent things but also those things by which these causes may be impeded. Therefore, He knows with certitude whether contingent things are or are not.
Adhuc. Effectum excedere suae causae perfectionem non contingit, interdum tamen ab ea deficit. Unde, cum in nobis ex rebus cognitio causetur, contingit interdum quod necessaria non per modum necessitatis cognoscimus, sed probabilitatis. Sicut autem apud nos res sunt causa cognitionis, ita divina cognitio est causa rerum cognitarum. Nihil igitur prohibet ea in se contingentia esse de quibus Deus necessariam scientiam habet. [5] Furthermore, an effect cannot exceed the perfection of its cause, though sometime it falls short of it. Hence, since our knowledge comes to us from things, it happens at times that we know what is necessary not according to the mode of necessity but according to that of probability. Now, just as in us things are the cause of knowledge, so the divine knowledge is the cause of the things known. Therefore, nothing prevents those things from being contingent in themselves of which God has a necessary knowledge.
Praeterea. Effectus non potest esse necessarius cuius causa est contingens: contingeret enim effectum esse remota causa. Effectus autem ultimi causa est et proxima et remota. Si igitur proxima fuerit contingens, eius effectum contingentem oportet esse, etiam si causa remota necessaria sit: sicut plantae non necessario fructificant, quamvis motus solis sit necessarius, propter causas intermedias contingentes. Scientia autem Dei, etsi sit causa rerum scitarum per ipsam, est tamen causa remota. Eius igitur necessitati scitorum contingentia non repugnat: cum contingat causas intermedias contingentes esse. [6] Again, an effect whose cause is contingent cannot be a necessary one; otherwise, the effect could be even though the cause were removed. Now, of the most remote effect there is both a proximate and a remote cause. If, then, the proximate cause were contingent, its effect would have to be contingent even though the remote cause is necessary. Thus, plants do not bear fruit of necessity, even though the motion of the sun is necessary, because the intermediate causes are contingent. But the knowledge of God, though it is the cause of the things known through it, is yet a remote cause. Therefore, the contingency of the things known is not in conflict with this necessity, since it may be that the intermediate causes are contingent.
Item. Scientia Dei vera non esset et perfecta si non hoc modo res evenirent sicut Deus eas evenire cognoscit. Deus autem, cum sit cognitor totius esse, cuius est principium, cognoscit unumquemque effectum non solum in se, sed etiam in ordine ad quaslibet suas causas. Ordo autem contingentium ad suas causas proximas est ut contingenter ex eis proveniant. Cognoscit igitur Deus aliqua evenire et contingenter evenire. Sic igitur divinae scientiae certitudo et veritas rerum contingentiam non tollit. [7] The knowledge of God, furthermore, would not be true and perfect if things did not happen in the way in which God knows them to happen. Now, since God knows all being, and is its source, He knows every effect not only in itself but also in its order to each of its causes. But the order of contingent things to their proximate causes is that they come forth from these causes in a contingent way. Hence, God knows that some things are taking place, and this contingently. Thus, therefore, the certitude and truth of the divine knowledge does not remove the contingency of things.
Patet igitur ex dictis quomodo obiectio cognitionem contingentium in Deo impugnans sit repellenda. Non enim posteriorum variatio prioribus variabilitatem inducit: cum contingat ex causis necessariis primis effectus ultimos contingentes procedere. Res autem a Deo scitae non sunt priores eius scientia, sicut apud nos est, sed sunt ea posteriores. Non igitur sequitur, si id quod est a Deo scitum variari potest, quod eius scientia possit falli vel qualitercumque variari. Secundum consequens igitur decipiemur si, quia nostra cognitio rerum variabilium variabilis est, propter hoc in omni cognitione hoc necessario accidere putetur. [8] From what has been said, it is therefore clear bow the objection impugning a knowledge of contingents in God is to be repulsed. For change in that which comes later does not induce change in that which has preceded; for it is possible that from prime necessary causes there proceed ultimate contingent effects. Now, the things that are known by God are not prior to His knowledge, as is the case with us, but, rather, subsequent to it. It does not therefore follow that, if something known by God can change, His knowledge of it can be deceived or in any way changed. We shall be deceived in the consequent therefore, if, because our knowledge of changeable things is itself changeable, we suppose on this account that such is necessarily the case in all knowledge.
Rursus, cum dicitur, Deus scit, vel scivit, hoc futurum, medium quoddam accipitur inter divinam scientiam et rem scitam, scilicet tempus in quo est locutio, respectu cuius illud quod a Deo scitum dicitur est futurum. Non autem est futurum respectu divinae scientiae, quae, in momento aeternitatis existens, ad omnia praesentialiter se habet. Respectu cuius, si tempus locutionis de medio subtrahatur, non est dicere hoc esse cognitum quasi non existens, ut locum habeat quaestio qua quaeritur an possit non esse: sed sic cognitum dicetur a Deo ut iam in sua existentia visum. Quo posito, non remanet praedictae quaestioni locus: quia quod iam est, non potest, quantum ad illud instans, non esse. Deceptio igitur accidit ex hoc quod tempus in quo loquimur, coexistit aeternitati, vel etiam tempus praeteritum - quod designatur cum dicimus, Deus scivit -: unde habitudo temporis praeteriti vel praesentis ad futurum aeternitati attribuitur, quae omnino ei non competit. Et ex hoc accidit secundum accidens falli. [9] Again, when it is said that God knows or knew this future thing, a certain intermediate point between the divine knowledge and the thing known is assumed. This is the time when the above words are spoken, in relation to which time that which is known by God is said to be future. But this is not future with reference to the divine knowledge, which, abiding in the moment of eternity, is related to all things as present to them. If with respect to the divine knowledge we remove from its intermediate position the time when the words are spoken, we cannot say that this is known by God as non-existent, so as to leave room for the question whether it can not-be; rather, it will be said to be known by God in such a way that it is seen by Him already in its own existence. On this basis there is no room for the preceding question. For that which already is cannot, with respect to that moment of time, not be. We are therefore deceived by the fact that the time in which we are speaking is present to eternity, as is likewise past time (designated by the words God knew). Hence, the relation of past or present time to the future is attributed to eternity, to which such a relation does not belong. It is thus that we commit the fallacy of accident.
Praeterea, si unumquodque a Deo cognoscitur sicut praesentialiter visum, sic necessarium erit esse quod Deus cognoscit, sicut necessarium est Socratem sedere ex hoc quod sedere videtur. Hoc autem non necessarium est absolute, vel, ut a quibusdam dicitur, necessitate consequentis: sed sub conditione, vel necessitate consequentiae. Haec enim conditionalis est necessaria: si videtur sedere, sedet. Unde et, si conditionalis in categoricam transferatur, ut dicatur, quod videtur sedere, necesse est sedere, patet eam de dicto intellectam, et compositam, esse veram; de re vero intellectam, et divisam, esse falsam. Et sic in his, et in omnibus similibus quae Dei scientiam circa contingentia oppugnantes argumentantur, secundum compositionem et divisionem falluntur. [10] There is more. If each thing is known by God as seen by Him in the present, what is known by God will then have to be. Thus, it is necessary that Socrates be seated from the fact that he is seen seated. But this is not absolutely necessary or, as some say, with the necessity of the consequent; it is necessary conditionally, or with the necessity of the consequence. For this is a necessary conditional proposition: if he is seen sitting, he is sitting. Hence, although the conditional proposition may be changed to a categorical one, to read what is seen sitting must necessarily be sitting, it is clear that the proposition is true if understood of what is said, and compositely; but it is false if understood of what is meant, and dividedly. Thus, in these and all similar arguments used by those who oppose God’s knowledge of contingents, the fallacy of composition and division takes place.
Quod autem Deus futura contingentia sciat, etiam auctoritate Scripturae sacrae ostenditur. Dicitur enim Sap. 8-8, de divina sapientia: signa et monstra scit antequam fiant, et eventus temporum et saeculorum. Et Eccli. 39-24 non est quicquam absconditum ab oculis eius: a saeculo usque in saeculum respicit. Et Isaiae 48-5: praedixi tibi ex tunc: antequam venirent, indicavi tibi. [11] That God knows future contingents is also shown by the authority of Sacred Scripture. For it is said of the divine wisdom: “She knows signs and wonders before they be done, and the events of times and ages” (Wis. 8:8). And in Sirach (39:24-25) it is said: “There is nothing hidden from His eyes. He sees from eternity to eternity.” And in Isaiah (48:5): “I foretold you of old, before they came to pass I told you.”

Caput 68 Chapter 68
Quod Deus cognoscit motus voluntatis THAT GOD KNOWS THE MOTIONS OF THE WILL
Deinde oportet ostendere quod Deus cogitationes mentium et voluntates cordium cognoscat. [1] We must now show that God knows the thoughts of the mind and the motions of the will.
Omne enim quod quocumque modo est cognoscitur a Deo, inquantum suam essentiam cognoscit, ut supra ostensum est. Ens autem quoddam est in anima, quoddam in rebus extra animam. Cognoscit igitur Deus omnes huiusmodi entis differentias, et quae sub eis continentur. Ens autem in anima est quod est in voluntate vel cogitatione. Relinquitur igitur quod Deus ea quae sunt in cogitatione et voluntate cognoscat. [2] As was shown above, whatever in any way exists is known by God in so far as He knows His own essence. There is a certain being in the soul and a certain being in things outside the soul. God, therefore, knows all these differences of being and what is contained under them. But the being that is in the soul is that which is in the will or in thought. It remains, therefore, that God knows that which is in thought and in the will.
Amplius. Sic Deus cognoscendo suam essentiam alia cognoscit, sicut per cognitionem causae cognoscuntur effectus. Omnia igitur Deus cognoscit, suam essentiam cognoscendo, ad quae sua causalitas extenditur. Extenditur autem ad operationes intellectus et voluntatis: nam, cum res quaelibet operetur per suam formam, a qua est aliquod esse rei, oportet fontale principium totius esse, a quo est etiam omnis forma, omnis operationis principium esse; cum effectus causarum secundarum in causas primas principalius reducantur. Cognoscit igitur Deus et cogitationes et affectiones mentis. [3] Moreover, in knowing His essence, God knows other things in the same way as an effect is known through a knowledge of the cause. By knowing His essence, therefore, God knows all things to which His causality extends. But it extends to the operations of the intellect and the will. For, since each thing acts through its form, from which the thing has a certain being, so the fount and source of all being, from which is also every form, must be the source of all operation; for the effects of second causes are grounded more principally in first causes. Therefore, God knows the thoughts and affections of the mind.
Item. Sicut esse suum est primum et per hoc omnis esse causa, ita suum intelligere est primum, et per hoc omnis intellectualis operationis intellectualis causa. Sicut igitur Deus cognoscendo suum esse cognoscit esse cuiuslibet rei, ita cognoscendo suum intelligere et velle cognoscit omnem cogitationem et voluntatem. [4] Again, just as God’s being is prime and for this reason the cause of all being, so His understanding is prime and on this account the cause of all intellectual operation. Hence, just as God, by knowing His being knows the being of each thing, so by knowing His understanding and willing He knows every thought and will.
Adhuc. Deus non solum cognoscit res secundum quod in seipsis sunt, sed etiam secundum quod sunt in causis suis, ut ex supra dictis patet: cognoscit enim ordinem causae ad suum effectum. Sed artificialia sunt in artificibus per intellectum et voluntatem artificum, sicut res naturales sunt in suis causis per virtutes causarum: sicut enim res naturales assimilant sibi suos effectus per suas virtutes activas, ita artifex per intellectum inducit formam artificiati, per quam assimilatur suae arti. Et similis ratio est de omnibus quae a proposito aguntur. Scit igitur Deus et cogitationes et voluntates. [5] Moreover, as is clear from what was said above, God knows things not only so far as they are in themselves, but also so far as they are in their causes; for He knows the order of a cause to its effect. But artifacts are in artisans through their intellect and will, just as natural things are in their causes through the powers of these causes. For just as natural things through their active powers assimilate their effects to themselves, so an artisan through his intellect induces into the artifact the form through which it is assimilated to his art. The situation is the same for all things that proceed intentionally from an agent. Therefore, God knows the thoughts and affections of the mind.
Item. Deus non minus cognoscit substantias intelligibiles quam ipse, vel nos, substantias sensibiles: cum substantiae intellectuales sint magis cognoscibiles, puta magis in actu existentes. Informationes autem et inclinationes substantiarum sensibilium cognoscuntur et a Deo et a nobis. Cum igitur cogitatio animae sit per informationem quandam ipsius; affectio autem sit quaedam inclinatio ipsius ad aliquid, nam et ipsam inclinationem rei naturalis appetitum naturalem dicimus; relinquitur quod Deus cogitationes et affectiones cordium cognoscat. [6] Again, God knows intelligible substances no less than He knows or we know sensible substances; for intellectual substances are more knowable, since they are in act. Now, both God and we know how sensible substances are informed and inclined. Since, then, the soul’s thinking is a certain information of the soul itself and its affection is a certain inclination of the soul towards something (so, too, we likewise call the inclination of a natural thing a natural appetite), it remains that God knows the thoughts and affections of the mind.
Hoc autem testimonio Scripturae sacrae confirmatur. Dicitur enim in Psalmo: scrutans corda et renes Deus; Prov. 15-11: Infernus et perditio coram domino: quanto magis corda filiorum hominum. Ioan. 2-25: ipse sciebat quid esset in homine. [7] This is confirmed by the testimony of Sacred Scripture. For it is said in a Psalm (7:10): “The searcher of hearts and reins is God.” And in the Proverbs (15:11): “Hell and destruction are before the Lord: how much more the hearts of the children of men?” And John (2:25): “He knew what was in man.”
Dominium autem quod habet voluntas supra suos actus, per quod in eius est potestate velle vel non velle, excludit determinationem virtutis ad unum, et violentiam causae exterius agentis: non autem excludit influentiam superioris causae, a qua est ei esse et operari. Et sic remanet causalitas in causa prima, quae Deus est, respectu motuum voluntatis: ut sic Deus, seipsum cognoscendo, huiusmodi cognoscere possit. [8] As for the dominion that the will has over its acts, through which it lies in the power of the will to will or not to will, this excludes the determination of the power to one effect and any violence from a cause acting from the outside; but it does not exclude the influence of a higher cause from which come its being and operation. Thus, the causality in the first cause, which is God, is not removed with respect to the motions of the will. Hence, God, by knowing Himself, can know such motions.

Caput 69 Chapter 69
Quod Deus cognoscit infinita THAT GOD KNOWS INFINITE THINGS
Post haec ostendendum est quod Deus infinita cognoscit. [1] After this we must show that God knows infinite things.
Cognoscendo enim se esse causam rerum alia a se cognoscit, ut ex superioribus patet. Ipse autem est causa infinitorum, si infinita sunt entia: est enim omnium eorum quae sunt causa. Est igitur infinitorum cognoscitivus. [2] By knowing Himself to be the cause of things God knows things other than Himself, as is clear from the above. But God is the cause of infinite things, if there are infinite things, since He is the cause of all things that are. Therefore, God knows infinite things.
Item. Deus suam virtutem perfecte cognoscit, ut ex supra dictis patet. Virtus autem non potest cognosci perfecte nisi cognoscantur omnia in quae potest: cum secundum ea quantitas virtutis quodammodo attendatur. Sua autem virtus, cum sit infinita, ut ostensum est supra, ad infinita se extendit. Est igitur Deus infinitorum cognitor. [3] Again, as is clear from what we have said, God knows His own power perfectly. But a power cannot be known perfectly unless all that it can do is known, since this is how the magnitude of a power is in a manner gauged. But since, as was shown above, His power is infinite, it extends to infinite things. Therefore, God knows infinite things.
Amplius. Si Dei cognitio ad omnia se extendit quae quocumque modo sunt, ut ostensum est, oportet quod non solum cognoscat ens actu, sed etiam ens potentia. Sed in rebus naturalibus est infinitum in potentia, etsi non actu, ut philosophus probat in III physicorum. Cognoscit igitur Deus infinita: sicut unitas, quae est principium numeri, infinitas species numerorum cognosceret si cognosceret quicquid est in se in potentia; est enim unitas potentia omnis numerus. [4] Moreover, if the knowledge of God extends to all things that in any way are, as was shown, He must know not only that which is actual but also that which is potential. But among natural things there is the infinite in potency, though not in act, as the Philosopher proves in Physics III [6]. God, therefore, knows infinite things. So, too, unity, which is the source of number, would know the infinite species of number if it knew whatever was in it potentially; for unity is potentially every number.
Adhuc. Deus essentia sua sicut quodam medio exemplari alia cognoscit. Sed cum sit perfectionis infinitae, ut supra ostensum est, ab ipso exemplari possunt infinita habentia perfectiones finitas: quia nec aliquod unum eorum, nec quotlibet plura exemplata perfectionem exemplaris adaequare possunt; et sic semper remanet novus modus quo aliquod exemplatum ipsam imitari possit. Nihil igitur prohibet ipsum per essentiam suam infinita cognoscere. [5] Furthermore, God knows other things by His essence as through a certain exemplary means. But, since His essence is of an infinite perfection, as was shown above, an infinite number of things having finite perfections can be derived from it. For no one thing or any number of things copied from the divine essence can equal the perfection of their cause. There thus always remains a new way in which some copy is able, to imitate the divine essence. Hence, nothing prevents God from knowing infinite things through His essence.
Praeterea. Esse Dei est suum intelligere. Sicut igitur suum esse est infinitum, ut ostensum est, ita suum intelligere est infinitum. Sicut autem se habet finitum ad finitum, ita infinitum ad infinitum. Si igitur secundum intelligere nostrum, quod finitum est, finita capere possumus, et Deus secundum suum intelligere infinita capere potest. [6] Besides, God’s being is His understanding. Hence, just as His being is infinite, as we have shown, so His understanding is infinite. But as the finite is to the finite, so the infinite is to the infinite. If, then, we are able to grasp finite things according to our understanding, which is finite, so God according to His understanding can grasp infinite things.
Amplius. Intellectus cognoscens maximum intelligibile non minus cognoscit minora, sed magis, ut patet per philosophum, in III de anima: quod ex hoc provenit quia intellectus non corrumpitur ex excellenti intelligibili, sicut sensus, sed magis perficitur. Sed si accipiantur infinita entia; sive sint eiusdem speciei, ut infiniti homines, sive infinitarum specierum; etiam si aliqua vel omnia essent infinita secundum quantitatem, si hoc esset possibile; universum eorum esset minoris infinitatis quam Deus: nam quodlibet eorum et omnia simul haberent esse receptum et limitatum ad aliquam speciem vel genus, et sic secundum aliquid esset finitum; unde deficeret ab infinitate Dei, qui est infinitus simpliciter, ut supra ostensum est. Cum igitur Deus perfecte seipsum cognoscat, nihil prohibet eum etiam illam summam infinitorum cognoscere. [7] Moreover, the intellect that knows the greatest intelligible, all the more, rather than less, knows lesser intelligibles, as is clear from the Philosopher in De anima III [4]. This arises because the intellect is not corrupted by an excelling intelligible, as is the sense, but is rather perfected by it. Now, let us take infinite things, whether of the same species (for example, an infinite number of men) or of infinite species, and let us even assume that some or all of them were infinite in quantity, were this possible the universe of these things would be of a lesser infinity than is God. For each of them, and all of them together, would have a being that is received and limited to a given species or genus and would thus be finite in some respect. Hence, it would fall short of the infinity of God, Who is absolutely infinite, as was shown above. Therefore, since God knows Himself perfectly, nothing prevents Him from also knowing that sum of infinite things.
Adhuc. Quanto aliquis intellectus est efficacior et limpidior in cognoscendo, tanto ex uno potest plura cognoscere: sicut et omnis virtus, quanto est fortior, tanto est magis unita. Intellectus autem divinus secundum efficaciam sive perfectionem est infinitus, ut ex superioribus patet. Potest ergo per unum, quod est sua essentia, infinita cognoscere. [8] Again, the more an intellect is more efficacious and penetrating in knowing, the more it can know many things through one means. So, too, every power is more united the more strong it is. But the divine intellect, as is clear from the above, is infinite in power or in perfection. Therefore, it can know infinite things through one means, namely, the divine essence.
Praeterea. Intellectus divinus est perfectus simpliciter: sicut et eius essentia. Nulla igitur perfectio intelligibilis ei deest. Sed id ad quod est in potentia intellectus noster est eius perfectio intelligibilis. Est autem in potentia ad omnes species intelligibiles. Species autem huiusmodi sunt infinitae: nam et numerorum species infinitae sunt et figurarum. Relinquitur igitur quod Deus omnia huiusmodi infinita cognoscat. [9] Moreover, the divine intellect, like the divine essence, is absolutely perfect. Hence, no intelligible perfection is lacking to it. But that to which our own intellect is in potency is its intelligible perfection. Now, our intellect is in potency to all intelligible species. But such species are infinite, since the species of both numbers and figures are infinite. It remains, then, that God knows all such infinites.
Item. Cum intellectus noster sit cognoscitivus infinitorum in potentia, potest enim in infinitum species numerorum multiplicare; si intellectus divinus non cognosceret infinita etiam actu, sequeretur quod vel plurium esset cognoscitivus intellectus humanus quam divinus; vel quod intellectus divinus non cognosceret omnia actu quorum est cognoscitivus in potentia. Quorum utrumque est impossibile, ut ex supra dictis patet. [10] Again, since our intellect can know infinite things in potency, being able to multiply the species of numbers infinitely, if the divine intellect did not know infinite things also in act, it would follow either that the human intellect knew more than did the divine intellect, or that the divine intellect did not know in act all the things that it knew in potency. Both alternatives are impossible, as appears from what was said above.
Adhuc. Infinitum cognitioni repugnat inquantum repugnat numerationi: nam partes infiniti numerari secundum se impossibile est, quasi contradictionem implicans. Cognoscere autem aliquid per numerationem suarum partium est intellectus successive cognoscentis partem post partem, non autem intellectus simul diversas partes comprehendentis. Cum igitur intellectus absque successione cognoscat omnia simul, non magis impeditur cognoscere infinita quam finita. [11] Again, the infinite cannot be known in so far as it cannot be numbered, for it is in itself impossible to number the parts of the infinite, as implying a contradiction. But to know something by the numbering of its parts belongs to an intellect that knows one part after the other; it does not belong to an intellect that comprehends the diverse parts together. Therefore, since the divine intellect knows all things together without succession, it is no more prevented from knowing infinite things than from knowing finite things.
Amplius. Omnis quantitas in quadam multiplicatione partium consistit: et propter hoc numerus est prima quantitatum. Ubi ergo pluralitas nullam differentiam operatur, ibi nec aliquid quod quantitatem consequitur aliquam differentiam facit. In cognitione autem Dei plura hoc modo cognoscuntur ut unum: cum non per diversas species, sed per unam speciem, quae est Dei essentia, cognoscantur. Unde et simul multa cognoscuntur a Deo. Et ita in Dei cognitione nullam differentiam pluralitas facit. Ergo nec infinitum, quod quantitatem consequitur. Nihil ergo differt ad intellectum divinum infinitorum et finitorum cognitio. Et sic, cum cognoscat finita, nihil prohibet eum cognoscere etiam infinita. [12] Moreover, all quantity consists in a certain multiplication of parts, and this is why number is the first of quantities. Where, therefore, plurality does not bring about any difference, there neither does anything that follows quantity bring about any difference. Now, in the case of God’s knowledge, many things are known as one, since they are known not through diverse species but through one species, namely, the divine essence. Hence, many things are also known together by God, so that in this way plurality introduces no difference in the divine knowledge. Neither, therefore, does the infinite that accompanies quantity. Hence, to know infinite and finite objects makes no difference to the divine intellect. Thus, since God knows finite things, nothing prevents Him from also knowing infinite things.
Huic autem consonat quod in Psalmo dicitur: et sapientiae eius non est numerus. [13] What is said in a Psalm (146:5) agrees with this: “And of His wisdom there is no number.”
Patet autem ex praedictis quare intellectus noster infinitum non cognoscit, sicut intellectus divinus. Differt enim intellectus noster ab intellectu divino quantum ad quatuor, quae hanc differentiam faciunt. Primum est, quod intellectus noster simpliciter finitus est: divinus autem infinitus. Secundum est, quia intellectus noster diversa per diversas species cognoscit. Unde non potest in infinita secundum unam cognitionem, sicut intellectus divinus. Tertium est ex hoc proveniens, quod intellectus noster, quia per diversas species diversa cognoscit, non potest simul multa cognoscere; et ita infinita cognoscere non posset nisi successive ea numerando. Quod non est in intellectu divino, qui simul multa intuetur, quasi per unam speciem visa. Quartum est, quia intellectus divinus est eorum quae sunt et quae non sunt, ut ostensum est. [14] Now, from what has been said it is evident why our intellect does not know the infinite, as does the divine intellect. For our intellect is distinguished from the divine intellect on four points which bring about this difference. The first point is that our intellect is absolutely finite whereas the divine intellect is infinite. The second point is that our intellect knows diverse things through diverse species. This means that it does not extend to infinite things through one act of knowledge as does the divine intellect. The third point follows from the second. Since our intellect knows diverse things through diverse species it cannot know many things at one and the same time. Hence, it can know infinite things only successively by numbering them. This is not the case with the divine intellect which sees many things together as grasped through one species. The fourth point is that the divine intellect knows both the things that are and the things that are not, as has been shown.
Patet etiam quomodo verbum philosophi, qui dicit quod infinitum, secundum quod infinitum, est ignotum, praesenti sententiae non obviat. Quia, cum infiniti ratio quantitati competat, ut ipse dicit, infinitum ut infinitum cognosceretur si per mensurationem suarum partium notum esset: haec est enim propria cognitio quantitatis. Sic autem Deus non cognoscit. Unde, ut ita dicatur, non cognoscit infinitum secundum quod est infinitum, sed secundum quod ad suam scientiam se habet ac si esset finitum, ut ostensum est. [15] It is likewise evident how the statement of Aristotle, who says that the infinite as infinite is unknown, is not opposed to the present conclusion. For, since the nature of the infinite belongs to quantity, as he himself says, the infinite as infinite would be known if it were known through the measurement of its parts, for this is the proper knowledge of quantity. But God does not know in this way. God, therefore, so to speak, does not know the infinite in so far as it is infinite, but, as we have shown, in so far as it is related to His knowledge as though it were something finite.
Sciendum tamen quod Deus infinita non cognoscit scientia visionis, ut verbis aliorum utamur, quia infinita nec sunt actu, nec fuerunt nec erunt; cum generatio ex neutra parte sit infinita, secundum fidem Catholicam. Scit tamen infinita scientia simplicis intelligentiae. Scit enim Deus infinita quae nec sunt nec erunt nec fuerunt, quae tamen sunt in potentia creaturae. Et scit etiam infinita quae sunt in sua potentia quae nec sunt nec erunt nec fuerunt. [16] It must be observed, however, that God does not know infinite things with the knowledge of vision, to make use of an expression employed by others. For there neither are nor have been nor will be infinite things in act, since, according to the Catholic faith, generation is not infinite at either end. But God knows the infinite with the knowledge of simple understanding. For He knows the infinite things which neither are nor will be nor have been, which yet lie in the potency of the creation. God likewise knows the infinite things that are in His power, which neither are nor will be nor have been.
Unde, quantum ad quaestionem de cognitione singularium pertinet, responderi posset per interemptionem maioris: non enim singularia sunt infinita. Si tamen essent, nihil minus Deus ea cognosceret. [17] Hence, as concerns the question of the knowledge of singulars, we may reply by denying the major. There are not infinite singulars. However, if there were, God would still know them.

Caput 70 Chapter 70
Quod Deus vilia cognoscit THAT GOD KNOWS LOWLY THINGS
Hoc autem habito, ostendendum est quod Deus cognoscit vilia; et quod hoc nobilitati eius scientiae non repugnat. [1] Having achieved this conclusion, we must show that God knows lowly things, and that this is not opposed to the nobility of His knowledge.
Quando enim aliqua virtus activa est fortior, tanto in remotiora suam actionem extendit: ut etiam in sensibilium actionibus apparet. Vis autem divini intellectus in cognoscendo res similatur virtuti activae: intellectus enim divinus non recipiendo a rebus cognoscit, sed magis per hoc quod eis influit. Cum igitur sit infinitae virtutis in intelligendo, ut ex praedictis patet, oportet quod eius cognitio usque ad remotissima extendatur. Sed gradus nobilitatis et vilitatis in omnibus entibus attenditur secundum propinquitatem et distantiam a Deo, qui est in fine nobilitatis. Ergo quantumcumque vilissima in entibus Deus, propter maximam virtutem sui intellectus, cognoscit. [2] The stronger a given active power is, the more does its action extend to more remote effects. This is also evident in the actions of sensible things. Now, the power of the divine intellect in knowing things is like an active power. For God knows things not by receiving anything from them, but, rather, by exercising His causality on them. Hence, since God is of an infinite power in understanding, as is clear from what has preceded, His knowledge must extend even to the most remote things. But the gradation of nobility and lowliness among all things is measured according to their nearness to and distance from God, Who is at the peak of nobility. Therefore, because of the perfect power of His intellect, God knows the lowliest possible among beings.
Praeterea. Omne quod est, in eo quod est vel quale quid est, actu est, et similitudo primi actus est, et ex hoc nobilitatem habet. Quod etiam potentia est, ex ordine ad actum, nobilitatis est particeps: sic enim esse dicitur. Relinquitur igitur quod unumquodque, in se consideratum, nobile est: sed vile dicitur respectu nobilioris. A Deo autem distant nobilissimae aliarum rerum non minus quam ultimae rerum creatarum distent a supremis. Si igitur haec distantia impediret divinam cognitionem, multo magis impediret illa. Et sic sequeretur quod nihil Deus cognosceret aliud a se. Quod supra improbatum est. Si igitur aliquid aliud a se cognoscit, quantumcumque nobilissimum, pari ratione cognoscit quodlibet, quantumcumque dicatur vilissimum. [3] Furthermore, everything that is, in that it is or in what it is, is in act and the likeness of the first act, and on this account has nobility. Whatever is in potency likewise participates in nobility from its order to act; for it is thus that it is said to be. It remains, then, that, considered in itself, each thing is noble, but is called lowly with respect to something more noble. Now, the most noble of creatures are no less distant from God than the lowest of creatures are distant from the highest. Hence, if this distance prevented God from knowing them, all the more would the previous distance. It would thus follow that God did not know anything other than Himself. This was disproved above. If, then, God knows something other than Himself, however supreme in nobility it may be, by the same reason He knows anything whatever, however exceedingly lowly it may be called.
Amplius. Bonum ordinis universi nobilius est qualibet parte universi: cum partes singulae ordinentur ad bonum ordinis qui est in toto sicut ad finem, ut per philosophum patet, in XI metaphysicae. Si igitur Deus cognoscit aliquam aliam naturam nobilem, maxime cognoscet ordinem universi. Hic autem cognosci non potest nisi cognoscantur et nobiliora et viliora, in quorum distantiis et habitudinibus ordo universi consistit. Relinquitur igitur quod Deus cognoscit non solum nobilia, sed etiam ea quae vilia reputantur. [4] Moreover, the good of the order of the universe is more noble than any part of the universe, since the individual parts are ordered, as to an end, to the good of the order that is in the whole. Ibis is evident from the Philosopher in Metaphysics XI [10]. Hence, if God knows some other noble nature, He especially knows the order of the universe. But this order cannot be known without a knowledge both of the things that are more noble and of the things that are more lowly, in whose distances and relations the order of the universe consists. It remains, therefore, that God knows not only noble things but also the things that are deemed lowly.
Adhuc. Vilitas cognitorum in cognoscentem non redundat per se: hoc est enim de ratione cognitionis, ut cognoscens contineat species cogniti secundum modum suum. Per accidens autem potest redundare in cognoscentem vilitas cognitorum: vel eo quod, dum vilia considerat, a nobilioribus abstrahitur cogitandis: vel eo quod ex consideratione vilium in aliquas indebitas affectiones inclinatur. Quod quidem in Deo esse non potest, ut ex dictis patet. Non igitur derogat divinae nobilitati vilium rerum cognitio, sed magis pertinet ad divinam perfectionem, secundum quod omnia in seipso praehabet, ut supra ostensum est. [5] Again, the lowliness of the things known does not of itself redound to the knower. For it belongs to the nature of knowledge that the knower should contain the species of the thing known according to his own manner. Accidentally, however, the lowliness of the things known can redound to the knower. This may be either because, while he is considering lowly things, his mind is turned away from thinking of more noble things; or it may be because, as a result of considering lowly things, he is inclined towards certain unbefitting affections. This, however, is not possible in God, as is clear from what has been said. The knowledge of lowly things, therefore, does not detract from the divine nobility, but rather belongs to the divine perfection according as it pre-contains all things in itself, as was shown above.
Adhuc. Virtus aliqua non iudicatur parva quae in parva potest, sed quae ad parva determinatur: nam virtus quae in magna potest, etiam potest in parva. Cognitio ergo quae simul potest in nobilia et vilia, non est iudicanda vilis, sed illa quae in vilia tantum potest, sicut in nobis accidit: nam alia consideratione consideramus divina et humana, et alia scientia est utriusque; unde, comparatione nobilioris, inferior vilior reputatur. In Deo autem non est sic: nam eadem scientia et consideratione seipsum et omnia alia considerat. Non igitur eius scientiae aliqua vilitas ascribitur ex hoc quod quaecumque vilia cognoscit. [6] Furthermore, a power is not judged to be small because it can do small things but because it is limited to small things; for a power that can do great things can likewise do small ones. Hence, a knowledge that extends at the same time to both noble and lowly things is not to be judged as being lowly; rather, that knowledge is to be judged lowly which extends only to lowly things, as happens in our own case. For we examine divine and human things by different considerations, and the knowledge of the one is not the knowledge of the other, so that by comparison with the more noble knowledge the lower knowledge is deemed to be lowlier. But it is not thus in God. By one and the same knowledge and consideration He considers both Himself and all other things. No lowliness, therefore, is ascribed to His knowledge from the fact that He knows any lowly things whatever.
Huic autem consonat quod dicitur Sap. 7 de divina sapientia, quod attingit ubique propter suam munditiam, et nihil inquinatum incurrit in illam. [7] What is said of the divine wisdom is in harmony with this conclusion. Wisdom “reaches everywhere by reason of her purity... and therefore no defiled thing cometh into her” (Wis. 7:24-25).
Patet autem ex praedictis quod ratio quae in oppositum obiiciebatur, ostensae veritati non repugnat. Nobilitas enim scientiae attenditur secundum ea ad quae principaliter scientia ordinatur, et non ad omnia quaecumque in scientia cadunt: sub nobilissima enim scientiarum, apud nos, cadunt non solum suprema in entibus, sed etiam infima; nam philosophia prima considerationem suam extendit a primo ente usque ad ens in potentia, quod est ultimum in entibus. Sic autem sub divina scientia comprehenduntur infima entium quasi cum principali cognitio simul nota: divina enim essentia est principale a Deo cognitum, in quo omnia cognoscuntur, ut supra ostensum est. [8] Now, from what has been said it is evident that the argument advanced on the opposite side is not opposed to the truth we have shown. For the nobility of knowledge is measured in terms of those things to which knowledge is principally directed, and not in terms of all the things that fall within knowledge. For in the most noble among the knowledges that we have there are included not only the highest beings but also the lowest. For first philosophy extends its consideration from the first being to being in potency, which is the lowest being. Thus, under divine science are included the lowest of beings as being known along with its principal object. For the divine essence is the principal object known by God and in this object, as was shown above, all others are known.
Patet etiam quod haec veritas non repugnat dictis philosophi in XI metaphysicae. Nam ibi intendit ostendere quod divinus intellectus non cognoscit aliud a se quod sit sui intellectus perfectio quasi principale cognitum. Et secundum hunc modum dicit quod vilia melius ignorantur quam cognoscuntur: quando scilicet est alia cognitio vilium et nobilium, et vilium consideratio considerationem nobilium impedit. [9] It is also evident that this truth is not opposed to what the Philosopher says in Metaphysics XI [9]. Aristotle there intends to show that the divine intellect does not know anything other than itself that is its perfection in the sense of being its principal known object. In this sense he says that it is better not to know lowly things than to know them. This is the case, namely, when the knowledge of the lowly is different from the knowledge of the noble and the consideration of lowly things impedes the consideration of noble things.

Caput 71 Chapter 71
Quod Deus cognoscit mala THAT GOD KNOWS EVILS
Nunc restat ostendere quod Deus cognoscat etiam mala. [1] It now remains to show that God likewise knows evils.
Bono enim cognito, malum oppositum cognoscitur. Sed Deus cognoscit omnia particularia bona, quibus mala opponuntur. Cognoscit igitur Deus mala. [2] When a good is known, the opposite evil is known. But God knows all particular goods, to which evils are opposed. Therefore, God knows evils.
Praeterea. Contrariorum rationes in anima non sunt contrariae: alias non simul essent in anima, nec simul cognoscerentur. Ratio ergo qua cognoscitur malum, non repugnat bono, sed magis ad rationem boni pertinet. Si igitur in Deo, propter suam absolutam perfectionem, inveniuntur omnes rationes bonitatis, ut supra probatum est, relinquitur quod in ipso sit ratio qua malum cognoscitur. Et sic est etiam malorum cognoscitivus. [3] Furthermore, the notions of contraries are themselves not contraries in the soul; otherwise, they would not be in the soul together nor would they be known together. The notion, therefore, by which evil is known is not opposed to the good but belongs, rather, to the notion of the good. Hence, if all the notions of goodness are found in God because of His absolute perfection, as was proved above, it follows that there is in Him the notion by which evil is known. And thus God also knows evils.
Item. Verum est bonum intellectus: ex hoc enim aliquis intellectus dicitur bonus quod verum cognoscit. Verum autem non solum est bonum esse bonum, sed etiam malum esse malum: sicut enim verum est esse quod est, ita verum est non esse quod non est. Bonum igitur intellectus etiam in cognitione mali consistit. Sed, cum divinus intellectus sit perfectus in bonitate, non potest sibi deesse aliqua intellectualium perfectionum. Adest igitur sibi malorum cognitio. [4] Again, the true is the good of the intellect. For an intellect is said to be good because it knows the true. But it is true not only that the good is good but also that evil is evil; for just as it is true that that which is is, so it is true that that which is not is not. The good of the intellect, therefore, also consists in the knowledge of evil. But, since the divine intellect is perfect in goodness, no intellectual perfection can be lacking to it. Therefore, it has a knowledge of evils.
Amplius. Deus cognoscit rerum distinctionem, ut supra ostensum est. Sed in ratione distinctionis est negatio: distincta enim sunt quorum unum non est aliud. Unde et prima, quae seipsis distinguuntur, mutuo sui negationem includunt: ratione cuius negativae propositiones in eis sunt immediatae, ut, nulla quantitas est substantia. Cognoscit igitur Deus negationem. Privatio autem negatio quaedam est in subiecto determinato, ut in IV Metaphys. ostenditur. Cognoscit igitur privationem. Et per consequens malum, quod nihil est aliud quam privatio debitae perfectionis. [5] Moreover, as was shown above, God knows the distinction of things. But negation is found within the notion of distinction; for those things are distinct of which one is not the other. Hence, the first notions, which are distinguished by themselves, mutually include a negation of one another. That is why the negative propositions among them are immediate: for example, no quantity is a substance. God, therefore, knows negation. But privation is a certain negation in a determinate subject, as is shown in Metaphysics IV [2]. God, therefore, knows privation. Consequently, He knows evil, which is nothing other than the privation of a due perfection.
Praeterea. Si Deus cognoscit omnes species rerum, ut supra probatum est, et etiam a quibusdam philosophis conceditur et probatur, oportet quod cognoscat contraria: tum quia quorundam generum species sunt contrariae; tum quia differentiae generum sunt contrariae, ut patet in X metaphysicae. Sed in contrariis includitur oppositio formae et privationis, ut ibidem habetur. Ergo oportet quod Deus cognoscat privationem. Et per consequens malum. [6] Furthermore, if God knows all the species of things, as was proved above, and is likewise conceded and proved by certain philosophers, He must know contraries. This is so because the species of certain genera are contraries and also because the differences of genera are contraries, as is proved in Metaphysics X [8]. But between contraries there is included the opposition of form and privation, as is said in the same reference. Therefore, God must know privation and consequently evil.
Adhuc. Deus cognoscit non solum formam, sed etiam materiam, ut supra ostensum est. Materia autem, cum sit ens in potentia, cognosci perfecte non potest nisi cognoscatur ad quae eius potentia se extendat: sicut et in omnibus aliis potentiis accidit. Extendit autem se potentia materiae et ad formam et privationem: quod enim potest esse, potest etiam non esse. Ergo Deus cognoscit privationem. Et sic cognoscit per consequens malum. [7] Again, as was shown above, God knows not only form but also matter. But, since matter is a being in potency, it cannot be known perfectly unless those things to which its potency extends are known. This is the case with all other potencies. Now, the potency of matter extends both to form and to privation, since that which can be can also not-be. Therefore, God knows privation, and consequently He knows evil.
Item. Si Deus cognoscit aliquid aliud a se, maxime cognoscet quod est optimum. Hoc autem est ordo universi, ad quem sicut ad finem omnia particularia bona ordinantur. In ordine autem universi sunt quaedam quae sunt ad removendum nocumenta quae possent ex quibusdam aliis provenire: ut patet in his quae dantur animalibus ad defensionem. Ergo huiusmodi nocumenta Deus cognoscit. Cognoscit igitur mala. [8] Again, if God knows something other than Himself, He especially knows that which is the best. Ibis is the order of the universe to which, as to the end, all particular goods are ordered. But in the order of the universe certain things exist to ward off dangers that may come about from certain other things. This is clear from what is given to animals for their own protection. Therefore, God knows such dangers. Hence, He knows evils.
Praeterea. In nobis malorum cognitio nunquam vituperatur secundum id quod per se scientiae est, idest secundum iudicium quod habetur de malis: sed per accidens, secundum quod per malorum considerationem interdum aliquis ad mala inclinatur. Hoc autem non est in Deo: quia immutabilis est, ut supra ostensum est. Nihil igitur prohibet quin Deus mala cognoscat. [9] Furthermore, in our own case the knowledge of evil is not considered blameworthy according to that which essentially belongs to knowledge, namely, the judgment that we have of evil things. But it is considered blameworthy by accident, in so far as through the consideration of evil one is sometimes inclined to evil things. This is not the case in God, because, as was shown above, He is immutable. Nothing, therefore, prevents God from knowing evils.
Huic autem consonat quod dicitur Sap. 8, quod Dei sapientiam non vincit malitia. Prov. 15-11 dicitur: Infernus et perditio coram domino. Et in Psalmo: delicta mea a te non sunt abscondita. Et Iob 11-11 dicitur: ipse novit hominum vanitatem: et videns iniquitatem, nonne considerat? [10] What is said in Wisdom (7:30) harmonizes with this conclusion: “No evil can overcome” the “wisdom” of God. And in Proverbs (15:11) it is said: “Hell and destruction are before the Lord.” And in the Psalm (68:6): “My offenses are not hidden from you.” And in Job (11:11) it is said: “For He knows the vanity of men, and when He sees iniquity, does He not consider it?”
Sciendum autem quod circa cognitionem mali et privationis aliter se habet intellectus divinus, atque aliter intellectus noster. Nam cum intellectus noster singulas res per singulas species proprias cognoscat et diversas, id quod est in actu cognoscit per speciem intelligibilem, per quam fit intellectus in actu. Unde et potentiam cognoscere potest, inquantum in potentia ad talem speciem quandoque se habet: ut sicut actum cognoscit per actum, ita etiam potentiam per potentiam cognoscat. Et quia potentia est de ratione privationis, nam privatio est negatio, cuius subiectum est ens in potentia; sequitur quod intellectui nostro competat aliquo modo cognoscere privationem, inquantum est natus esse in potentia. Licet etiam dici possit quod ex ipsa cognitione actus sequitur cognitio potentiae et privationis. [11] We must observe, however, that on the knowledge of evil and privation the divine intellect and our own are differently disposed. For, since our intellect knows singular things through singular species that are proper and diverse, that which it is in act it knows through an intelligible species through which it is made an intellect in act. Hence, it can also know potency in so far as it is sometimes in potency to such a species; so that just as it knows act through act, so likewise it knows potency through potency. And because potency belongs to the nature of privation, since privation is a negation whose subject is a being in potency, it follows that it is suitable to our intellect in a certain manner to know privation in so far as it is of a nature to be in potency. Nevertheless, it can also be said that the knowledge of potency and privation follows from the knowledge of act.
Intellectus autem divinus, qui nullo modo est in potentia, non cognoscit modo praedicto privationem nec aliquid aliud. Nam si cognosceret aliquid per speciem quae non est ipse, sequeretur de necessitate quod proportio eius ad illam speciem esset sicut proportio potentiae ad actum. Unde oportet quod ipse intelligat solum per speciem quae est sua essentia. Et per consequens quod intelligat se tantum sicut primum intellectum. Intelligendo tamen se, cognoscit alia, sicut supra ostensum est. Non solum autem actus, sed potentias et privationes. [12] The divine intellect, on the other hand, which is in no way in potency, does not know privation or anything else in the above given way. For, if it knew something through a species that is not itself, it would necessarily follow that its proportion to that species would be as the proportion of potency to act. God must therefore understand solely through the species that is His own essence. It follows, consequently, that He understands only Himself as the first object of His intellect. But in understanding Himself He understands other things, as was proved above. And He knows not only acts, but also potencies and, privations.
Et hic est sensus verborum quae philosophus ponit in III de anima, dicens: aut quomodo malum cognoscit, aut nigrum? Contraria enim quodammodo cognoscit. Oportet autem potentia esse cognoscens, et esse in ipso. Si vero alicui non inest contrarium - scilicet in potentia -, seipsum cognoscit, et actu est, et separabile. Nec oportet sequi expositionem Averrois, qui vult quod ex hoc sequatur quod intellectus qui est tantum in actu, nullo modo cognoscat privationem. Sed sensus est quod non cognoscat privationem per hoc quod est in potentia ad aliquid aliud, sed per hoc quod cognoscit seipsum et est semper in actu. [13] This is the meaning of the words that the Philosopher sets down in De anima III [6], when he says: “How does it apprehend evil or something black? For in a manner it knows contraries. But the knower must be potentially what it knows and this must be in it. But, if no contrary is present to a certain knower”—that is, in potency—“this knower knows itself and is in act and separable.”“ Nor must we adopt the interpretation of Averroes, who takes the position that it follows from this text that the intellect that is solely in act in no way knows privation. Rather, the sense is that it does not know privation by the fact of being in potency to something else; it knows privation because it knows itself and is always in act.
Rursus sciendum quod, si Deus hoc modo seipsum cognosceret quod, cognoscendo se, non cognosceret alia entia, quae sunt particularia bona, nullo modo cognosceret privationem aut malum. Quia bono quod est ipse non est aliqua privatio opposita: cum privatio et suum oppositum sint nata esse circa idem, et sic ei quod est actus purus nulla privatio opponitur. Et per consequens nec malum. Unde, posito quod Deus se solum cognoscat, cognoscendo bono quod est ipse non cognoscet malum. Sed quia, cognoscendo se, cognoscit entia in quibus natae sunt esse privationes, necesse est ut cognoscat privationes oppositas, et mala opposita particularibus bonis. [14] Moreover, we must observe that, if God knew Himself in such a way that, by knowing Himself, He did not know other beings, which are particular goods, then in no way would He know privation and evil. For to the good that He is there is no contrary privation, since privation and its opposite bear on the same thing, and thus to that which is pure act no privation is opposed. And, consequently, neither is evil. Hence, granted that God knows only Himself, by knowing the good that He is He will not know evil. But because, in knowing Himself, He knows the beings that are by nature subject to privations, He must know the privations and the evils that are opposed to particular goods.
Sciendum etiam quod, sicut Deus absque discursu intellectus cognoscendo se cognoscit alia, ut supra ostensum est; ita etiam non oportet quod eius cognitio sit discursiva si per bona cognoscit mala. Nam bonum est quasi ratio cognitionis mali. Unde cognoscuntur mala per bona sicut res per suas definitiones: non sicut conclusiones per principia. [15] We must likewise observe, as was shown above, that just as God in knowing Himself knows other things without any discursiveness of the intellect, so likewise it is not necessary that His knowledge be discursive if He knows the evil through the good. For the good is as the principle of the knowledge of what is evil. Hence, evils are known through goods as things are known through their definitions, not as conclusions are known through their principles.
Nec etiam ad imperfectionem cognitionis divinae cedit si mala per privationem bonorum cognoscat. Quia malum non dicit esse nisi inquantum est privatio boni. Unde secundum hunc solum modum est cognoscibile: nam unumquodque, quantum habet de esse, tantum habet de cognoscibilitate. [16] Nor, again, does it mean that there is imperfection in the divine knowledge if God knows evils through the privation of goods. For the position says that evil exists only in so far as it is the privation of good. Hence, in this way alone is it knowable, for each thing is knowable to the extent that it has being.

Caput 72 Chapter 72
Quod Deus est volens THAT GOD HAS WILL
Expeditis his quae ad divini intellectus cognitionem pertinent, nunc restat considerare de Dei voluntate. [1] Having dealt with what concerns the knowledge of the divine intellect, it remains for us to deal with God’s will.
Ex hoc enim quod Deus est intelligens, sequitur quod sit volens. Cum enim bonum intellectum sit obiectum proprium voluntatis, oportet quod bonum intellectum, inquantum huiusmodi, sit volitum. Intellectum autem dicitur ad intelligentem. Necesse est igitur quod intelligens bonum, inquantum huiusmodi, sit volens. Deus autem intelligit bonum: cum enim sit perfecte intelligens, ut ex supra dictis patet, intelligit ens simul cum ratione boni. Est igitur volens. [2] From the fact that God is endowed with intellect it follows that He is endowed with will. For, since the understood good is the proper object of the will, the understood good is, as such, willed. Now that which is understood is by reference to one who understands. Hence, he who grasps the good by his intellect is, as such, endowed with will. But God grasps the good by His intellect, For, since the activity of His intellect is perfect, as appears from what has been said, He understands being together with the qualification of the good. He is, therefore, endowed with will.
Adhuc. Cuicumque inest aliqua forma, habet per illam formam habitudinem ad ea quae sunt in rerum natura: sicut lignum album per suam albedinem est aliquibus simile et quibusdam dissimile. In intelligente autem et sentiente est forma rei intellectae et sensatae: cum omnis cognitio sit per aliquam similitudinem. Oportet igitur esse habitudinem intelligentis et sentientis ad ea quae sunt intellecta et sensata secundum quod sunt in rerum natura. Non autem hoc est per hoc quod intelligunt et sentiunt: nam per hoc magis attenditur habitudo rerum ad intelligentem et sentientem; quia intelligere et sentire est secundum quod res sunt in intellectu et sensu, secundum modum utriusque. Habet autem habitudinem sentiens et intelligens ad rem quae est extra animam per voluntatem et appetitum. Unde omnia sentientia et intelligentia appetunt et volunt: voluntas tamen proprie in intellectu est. Cum igitur Deus sit intelligens, oportet quod sit volens. [3] Again, whoever possesses some form is related through that form to things in reality. For example, white wood is through its whiteness like some things and unlike other things. But in one understanding and sensing there is the form of the understood and sensed thing, since all knowledge is through some likeness. There must, therefore, be a relation of the one understanding and sensing to understood and sensed things according as these are in reality. But this is not because of the fact that these beings understand and sense, since thereby we rather find a relation of things to the one understanding and sensing; for to understand and to sense exist according as things are in the intellect and the sense, following the mode of each. He who senses and understands has a relation to the thing outside the soul through his will and appetite. Hence, all sensing and understanding beings have appetite and will. Properly speaking, however, the will is in the intellect. Since, then, God is intelligent, He must be endowed with will.
Amplius. Illud quod consequitur omne ens, convenit enti inquantum est ens. Quod autem est huiusmodi, oportet quod in eo maxime inveniatur quod est primum ens. Cuilibet autem enti competit appetere suam perfectionem et conservationem sui esse: unicuique tamen secundum suum modum, intellectualibus quidem per voluntatem, animalibus per sensibilem appetitum, carentibus vero sensu per appetitum naturalem. Aliter tamen quae habent, et quae non habent: nam ea quae non habent, appetitiva virtute sui generis desiderio tendunt ad acquirendum quod ei deest; quae autem habent, quietantur in ipso. Hoc igitur primo enti, quod Deus est, deesse non potest. Cum igitur ipse sit intelligens, inest sibi voluntas, qua placet sibi suum esse et sua bonitas. [4] Moreover, that which accompanies every being belongs to being inasmuch as it is in being. This accompaniment must be found in a supreme way in that which is the first being. Now, it belongs to every being to seek its perfection and the conservation of its being, and this in the case of each being according to its mode: for intellectual beings through will, for animals through sensible appetite, and to those lacking sense through natural appetite. To seek perfection belongs differently to those that have it and those that have it not. For those that have it not tend by desire, through the appetitive power proper to them, to acquire what is lacking to their desire, whereas those that have it rest in it. Hence, this cannot be lacking to the first being, which is God. Since, then, God is intelligent, there is in Him a will by which His being and His goodness are pleasing to Him.
Item. Intelligere, quanto perfectius est, tanto delectabilius est intelligenti. Sed Deus intelligit, et suum intelligere est perfectissimum, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo intelligere est ei delectabilissimum. Delectatio autem intelligibilis est per voluntatem: sicut delectatio sensibilis est per concupiscentiae appetitum. Est igitur in Deo voluntas. [5] Again, the more perfect understanding is, the more delightful it is to the one understanding, But God understands and His understanding is most perfect, as was shown above. Therefore, His understanding is most full of delight. But intelligible delight is through the will, as sensible delight is through the appetite of concupiscence. There is, therefore, will in God.
Praeterea. Forma per intellectum considerata non movet nec aliquid causat nisi mediante voluntate, cuius obiectum est finis et bonum, a quo movetur aliquis ad agendum. Unde intellectus speculativus non movet; neque imaginatio pura absque aestimatione. Sed forma intellectus divini est causa motus et esse in aliis: agit enim res per intellectum, ut infra ostendetur. Oportet igitur quod ipse sit volens. [6] Furthermore, a form considered by the intellect does not move or cause anything except through the will, whose object is the end and the good, by which someone is moved to act. Hence, the speculative intellect does not move, nor does the imagination alone without an act of the estimative power. But the form of the divine intellect is the cause of motion and being in other things, since God produces things by His intellect, as will be shown later on. Therefore, God must be endowed with will.
Item. In virtutibus motivis, in habentibus intellectum, prima invenitur voluntas: nam voluntas omnem potentiam applicat ad suum actum; intelligimus enim quia volumus, et imaginamur quia volumus, et sic de aliis. Et hoc habet quia obiectum eius est finis:- quamvis intellectus, non secundum modum causae efficientis et moventis, sed secundum modum causae finalis, moveat voluntatem, proponendo sibi suum obiectum, quod est finis. Primo igitur moventi convenit maxime habere voluntatem. [7] Again, among moving powers in beings possessing an intellect, the first is found to be the will. For the will sets every power to its act: we understand because we will, we imagine because we will, and so with the rest. The will has this role because its object is the end; although it is also a fact that the intellect, though not in the manner of an efficient and moving cause, but in that of a final cause, moves the will by proposing to it its object, namely, the end. It therefore belongs supremely to the first mover to have a will.
Praeterea. Liberum est quod sui causa est: et sic liberum habet rationem eius quod est per se. Voluntas autem primo habet libertatem in agendo: inquantum enim voluntarie agit quis, dicitur libere agere quamcumque actionem. Primo igitur agenti maxime competit per voluntatem agere, cui maxime convenit per se agere. [8] Furthermore, “that is free which is for its own sake,” and thus the free has the nature of that which is through itself. Now, first and primarily, will has liberty in acting, for according as someone acts voluntarily he is said to perform any given action freely. To act through will, therefore, supremely befits the first agent, whom it supremely befits to act through himself.
Amplius. Finis et agens ad finem semper unius ordinis inveniuntur in rebus: unde et finis proximus, qui est proportionatus agenti, incidit in idem specie cum agente, tam in naturalibus quam in artificialibus; nam forma artis per quam artifex agit, est species formae quae est in materia, quae est finis artificis; et forma ignis generantis qua agit, est eiusdem speciei cum forma ignis geniti, quae est finis generationis. Deo autem nihil coordinatur quasi eiusdem ordinis nisi ipse: alias essent plura prima, cuius contrarium supra ostensum est. Ipse est igitur primum agens propter finem qui est ipsemet. Ipse igitur non solum est finis appetibilis, sed appetens, ut ita dicam, se finem, et appetitu intellectuali, cum sit intelligens: qui est voluntas. Est igitur in Deo voluntas. [9] Moreover, the end and the agent to the end are always found to be of one order in reality; and hence the proximate end that is proportioned to an agent falls into the same species as the agent both among natural things and artificial things. For the form of the art through which the artisan works is the species of the form that is in matter, which is the end of the artisan; and the form by which the generating fire acts is of the same species as the form of the generated fire, which is the end of generation. But nothing is co-ordered with God, as within the same order, except Himself; otherwise, there would be several first beings—whose contrary was proved above. He is therefore the first agent because of the end that He is Himself. He is therefore not only the appetible end, but also the seeker of Himself as the end, so to speak. And this He is with an intellectual appetite, since He is intelligent. This is will. There is, therefore, will in God.
Hanc autem Dei voluntatem Scripturae sacrae testimonia confitentur. Dicitur enim in Psalmo: omnia quaecumque voluit, dominus fecit. Et Rom. 9-19: voluntati eius quis resistit? [10] The testimony of Sacred Scripture is witness to the divine will. For it is said in a Psalm (134:6): “Whatever the Lord pleased He has done.” And Romans (9:19): “Who resists His will?”

Caput 73 Chapter 73
Quod voluntas Dei est eius essentia THAT THE WILL OF GOD IS HIS ESSENCE
Ex hoc autem apparet quod sua voluntas non est aliud quam sua essentia. [1] From this it appears that God’s will is not other than His essence.
Deo enim convenit esse volentem inquantum est intelligens, ut ostensum est. Est autem intelligens per essentiam suam, ut supra probatum est. Ergo et volens. Est igitur voluntas Dei ipsa eius essentia. [2] It belongs to God to be endowed with will in so far as He is intelligent, as has been shown. But God has understanding by His essence, as was proved above. So, therefore, does He have will. God’s will, therefore, is His very essence.
Adhuc. Sicut intelligere est perfectio intelligentis, ita et velle volentis: utrumque enim est actio in agente manens, non autem transiens in aliquid passum, sicut calefactio. Sed intelligere Dei est eius esse, ut supra probatum est: eo quod, cum esse divinum secundum se sit perfectissimum, nullam supervenientem perfectionem admittit, ut supra ostensum est. Est igitur et divinum velle esse ipsius. Ergo et voluntas Dei est eius essentia. [3] Again, as to understand is the perfection of the one understanding, so to will is the perfection of the one willing; for both are actions remaining in the agent and not going out (as does heat) to some receiving subject. But the understanding of God is His being, as was proved above. For, since the divine being is in itself most perfect, it admits of no superadded perfection, as was proved above. The divine willing also is, therefore, His being; and hence the will of God is His essence.
Amplius. Cum omne agens agat inquantum actu est, oportet quod Deus, qui est actus purus, per suam essentiam agat. Velle autem est quaedam Dei operatio. Oportet igitur quod Deus per essentiam suam sit volens. Sua igitur voluntas est sua essentia. [4] Moreover, since every agent acts in so far as it is in act, God, Who is pure act, must act through His essence. Willing, however, is a certain operation of God. Therefore, God must be endowed with will through His essence. Therefore, His will is His essence.
Item. Si voluntas esset aliquid additum divinae substantiae, cum divina substantia sit quid completum in esse, sequeretur quod voluntas adveniret ei quasi accidens subiecto; sequeretur quod divina substantia compararetur ad ipsam quasi potentia ad actum; et quod esset compositio in Deo. Quae omnia supra improbata sunt. Non est igitur possibile quod divina voluntas sit aliquid additum divinae essentiae. [5] Furthermore, if will were something added to the divine substance, since the divine substance is something complete in being it would follow that will would be added to it as an accident to a subject, that the divine substance would be related to it as potency to act, and that there would be composition in God. All this was refuted above. Hence, it is not possible that the divine will be something added to the divine substance.

Caput 74 Chapter 74
Quod principale volitum Dei est divina essentia THAT THE PRINCIPAL OBJECT OF THE DIVINE WILL IS THE DIVINE ESSENCE
Ex hoc autem ulterius apparet quod principale divinae voluntatis volitum est eius essentia. [1] From this it further appears that the principal object of the divine will is the divine essence.
Bonum enim intellectum est obiectum voluntatis, ut dictum est. Id autem quod a Deo principaliter intelligitur est divina essentia, ut supra probatum est. Divina igitur essentia est id de quo principaliter est divina voluntas. [2] The understood good is the object of the will, as has been said. But that which is principally understood by God is the divine essence, as was proved above. The divine essence, therefore, is principally the object of the divine will.
Item. Appetibile comparatur ad appetitum sicut movens ad motum, ut supra dictum est. Et similiter se habet volitum ad voluntatem: cum voluntas sit de genere appetitivarum potentiarum. Si igitur voluntatis divinae sit aliud principale volitum quam ipsa Dei essentia, sequetur quod aliquid aliud sit superius divina voluntate, quod ipsam movet. Cuius contrarium ex praedictis patet. [3] Again, the appetible is to appetite as the mover to the moved, as was said above. Similar, too, is the relation of the object of the will to the will, since the will belongs to the class of appetitive powers. If, then, the principal object of the divine will be other than the divine essence, it will follow that there is something higher than the divine will moving it. The contrary of this is apparent from what has been said.
Praeterea. Principale volitum est unicuique volenti causa volendi: cum enim dicimus, volo ambulare ut saner, causam nos reddere arbitramur; et si quaeratur, quare vis sanari, procedetur in assignatione causarum quousque perveniatur ad finem ultimum, qui est principale volitum, quod est causa volendi per seipsum. Si igitur Deus aliquid aliud principaliter velit quam seipsum, sequetur quod aliquid aliud sit ei causa volendi. Sed suum velle est suum esse, ut ostensum est. Ergo aliquid aliud erit ei causa essendi. Quod est contra rationem primi entis. [4] Moreover, the principal object willed is for each one willing the cause of his willing. For when we say, I will to walk in order to become healed, we are of the impression that we are assigning a cause. If, then, it be asked, why do you want to become healed? causes will be assigned one after the other until we arrive at the ultimate end. This is the principal object of the will, which is through itself the cause of willing. If, then, God should principally will something other than Himself, it will follow that something other is the cause of His willing. But His willing is His being, as has been shown.” Hence, something other will be the cause of His being—which is contrary to the nature of the first being.
Adhuc. Unicuique volenti principale volitum est suus ultimus finis: nam finis est per se volitus, et per quem alia fiunt volita. Ultimus autem finis est ipse Deus: quia ipse est summum bonum, ut ostensum est. Ipse igitur est principale volitum suae voluntatis. [5] Furthermore, for each being endowed with a will the principal object willed is the ultimate end. For the end is willed through itself, and through it other things become objects of will. But the ultimate end is God Himself, since He is the highest good, as has been shown. Therefore, God is the principal object of His will.
Amplius. Unaquaeque virtus ad suum obiectum principale secundum aequalitatem proportionatur: nam virtus rei secundum obiecta mensuratur, ut patet per philosophum, in I caeli et mundi. Voluntas igitur ex aequo proportionatur suo principali obiecto: et similiter intellectus, et etiam sensus. Divinae autem voluntati nihil ex aequo proportionatur nisi eius essentia. Ergo principale obiectum divinae voluntatis est essentia divina. [6] Moreover, every power is proportioned with equality to its principal object, for the power of a thing is measured according to its objects, as may be seen through the Philosopher in De caelo et mundo [11], But the will is proportioned with equality to its principal object, and similarly the intellect and likewise the sense. Now, nothing is proportioned with equality to the divine will save only God’s essence. Therefore, the principal object of the divine will is the divine essence.
Cum autem essentia divina sit Dei intelligere et omnia alia quae in ipso esse dicuntur, manifestum est ulterius quod eodem modo principaliter vult se intelligere, se velle, se esse unum, et quicquid aliud est huiusmodi. [7] But since the divine essence is God’s understanding and all else that is said to be in Him, it is further manifest that in the same way He principally wills Himself to understand, to will, to be one, and other such attributes.

Caput 75 Chapter 75
Quod Deus, volendo se, vult etiam alia THAT IN WILLING HIMSELF GOD ALSO WILLS OTHER THINGS
Hinc autem ostendi potest quod, volendo se, vult etiam alia. [1] Thereby it can be shown, however, that in willing Himself God also wills other things.
Cuius enim est velle finem principaliter, eius est velle ea quae sunt ad finem ratione finis. Est autem ipse Deus ultimus rerum finis, ut ex praedictis aliquatenus patet. Ex hoc igitur quod vult se esse, etiam alia vult, quae in ipsum sicut in finem ordinantur. [2] For to whom it belongs to win the end principally, to him it belongs to will the things that are ordered to the end for the sake of the end. Now, God Himself is the ultimate end of things, as appears somewhat from what has been said. Hence, because He wills Himself to be, He likewise wills other things, which are ordered to Him as to the end.
Item. Unusquisque eius quod est propter ipsum ab ipso volitum et amatum, perfectionem desiderat: quae enim propter se amamus, volumus esse optima, et semper meliorari et multiplicari, quantum possibile est. Ipse autem Deus essentiam suam propter seipsam vult et amat. Non autem secundum se augmentabilis et multiplicabilis est, ut ex supra dictis est manifestum: sed solum multiplicabilis est secundum suam similitudinem, quae a multis participatur. Vult igitur Deus rerum multitudinem ex hoc quod suam essentiam et perfectionem vult et amat. [3] Again, everyone desires the perfection of that which is willed and loved by him for its own sake. For the things that we love for their own sake we want to be most perfect, and always to become better and be multiplied as much as possible. But God wills and loves His essence for its own sake. Now, the divine essence cannot be increased or multiplied in itself, as is manifest from what has been said; it can be multiplied solely according to its likeness, which is participated by many. God, therefore, wills the multitude of things in willing and loving His own essence and perfection.
Amplius. Quicumque amat aliquid secundum se et propter ipsum, amat per consequens omnia in quibus illud invenitur: ut qui amat dulcedinem propter ipsam, oportet quod omnia dulcia amet. Sed Deus suum esse secundum se et propter ipsum vult et amat, ut supra ostensum est. Omne autem aliud esse est quaedam sui esse secundum similitudinem participatio, ut ex praedictis aliquatenus patet. Relinquitur igitur quod Deus, ex hoc ipso quod vult et amat se, vult et amat alia. [4] Moreover, whoever loves something in itself and for its own sake consequently loves all the things in which it is found: for example, he who loves sweetness for itself must love all sweet things. But God wills and loves His own being in itself and for its own sake, as shown above. Every other being, however, is by way of likeness a certain participation of His being, as appears somewhat from what has been said. It remains, then, that God, in that He wills and loves Himself, wills and loves other things.
Adhuc. Deus, volendo se, vult omnia quae in ipso sunt. Omnia autem quodammodo praeexistunt in ipso per proprias rationes, ut supra ostensum est. Deus igitur, volendo se, etiam alia vult. [5] Furthermore, in willing Himself God wills all that is in Him. But all things in a certain manner pre-exist in Him through their proper models, as was shown above. God, therefore, in willing Himself likewise wills other things.
Item. Quanto aliquid est perfectioris virtutis, tanto sua causalitas ad plura se extendit et in magis remotum, ut supra dictum est. Causalitas autem finis in hoc consistit quod propter ipsum alia desiderantur. Quanto igitur finis est perfectior et magis volitus, tanto voluntas volentis finem ad plura extenditur ratione finis illius. Divina autem essentia est perfectissima in ratione bonitatis et finis. Igitur diffundet suam causalitatem maxime ad multa, ut propter ipsam multa sint volita; et praecipue a Deo, qui eam secundum totam suam virtutem perfecte vult. [6] Then, again, the more perfect the power of a being, by so much does its causality extend to more, and more remote, things, as was said above. But the causality of the end consists in this, that other things are desired for its sake. The more perfect an end, therefore, and the more willed, by so much does the will of one willing the end extend to more things for the sake of that end. But the divine essence is most perfect as goodness and as end. It will, therefore, supremely diffuse its causality to many, so that many things may be willed for its sake; and especially so by God, Who wills the divine essence perfectly according to its power.
Praeterea. Voluntas consequitur intellectum. Sed Deus intellectu suo intelligit se principaliter et in se intelligit alia. Igitur similiter principaliter vult se, et, volendo se, vult omnia alia. [7] Moreover, will accompanies intellect. But by His intellect God principally understands Himself, and He understands other things in Himself. In the same way, therefore, He principally wills Himself, and wills all other things in willing Himself.
Hoc autem auctoritate sacrae Scripturae confirmatur. Dicitur enim Sap. 11-25: diligis enim omnia quae sunt, et nihil eorum odisti quae fecisti. [8] This is confirmed by the authority of Sacred Scripture. For it is said in Wisdom (11:25): “For You love all things that are, and hate none of the things which You have made.”

Caput 76 Chapter 76
Quod Deus uno actu voluntatis se et alia velit THAT GOD WILLS HIMSELF AND OTHER THINGS BY ONE ACT OF WILL
Hoc autem habito, sequitur quod Deus uno actu voluntatis se et alia velit. [1] From this result it follows that God wills Himself and other things by one act of will.
Omnis enim virtus una operatione, vel uno actu, fertur in obiectum et in rationem formalem obiecti: sicut eadem visione videmus lumen et colorem, qui fit visibilis actu per lumen. Cum autem aliquid volumus propter finem tantum, illud quod propter finem desideratur accipit rationem voliti ex fine: et sic finis comparatur ad ipsum sicut ratio formalis ad obiectum, ut lumen ad colorem. Cum igitur Deus omnia alia velit propter se sicut propter finem, ut ostensum est, uno actu voluntatis vult se et alia. [2.] Every power is directed to its object and to the formal notion of the object by one operation or one act. For example, by the same sight we see light and color, which becomes visible in act through light. Now, when we will something solely for the sake of the end, that which is desired for the sake of the end derives the nature of something willed from the end; and thus the end is to it as the formal notion of the object is to the object, for example, as light is to color. Since, then, God wills other things for His own sake as for the sake of the end, as has been shown, He wills Himself and other things by one act of will.
Amplius. Quod perfecte cognoscitur et desideratur, secundum totam suam virtutem cognoscitur et desideratur. Finis autem virtus est non solum secundum quod in se desideratur, sed etiam secundum quod alia fiunt appetibilia propter ipsum. Qui igitur perfecte desiderat finem, utroque modo ipsum desiderat. Sed non est ponere aliquem actum Dei volentis quo velit se et non velit se perfecte: cum in eo nihil sit imperfectum. Quolibet igitur actu quo Deus vult se, vult se absolute et alia propter se. Alia vero a se non vult nisi inquantum vult se, ut probatum est. Relinquitur igitur quod se et alia non alio et alio actu voluntatis vult, sed uno et eodem. [3] Moreover, what is perfectly known and desired is known and desired according to its whole power. But the power of the end is measured not only according as it is desired in itself, but also according as other things become desirable for its sake. Hence, whoever desires an end perfectly desires it in both ways. But there is no act of will in God by which He wills Himself and does not do so perfectly, since there is nothing imperfect in Him. Therefore, by whatever act God wills Himself, He wills Himself absolutely and other things for His sake. But He does not will things other than Himself except in so far as He wills Himself, as has been proved. It remains, then, that God does not will Himself and other things by different acts of will, but by one and the same act.
Adhuc. Sicut ex supra dictis patet, in actu cognitivae virtutis discursus attenditur secundum quod semotim cognoscimus principia, et ex eis in conclusiones venimus: si enim in ipsis principiis intueremur conclusiones ipsa principia cognoscendo, non esset discursus, sicut nec quando aliquid videmus in speculo. Sicut autem principia se habent ad conclusiones in speculativis, ita fines ad ea quae sunt ad finem in operativis et appetitivis: nam sicut conclusiones cognoscimus per principia, ita ex fine procedit appetitus et operatio eorum quae sunt ad finem. Si igitur aliquis semotim velit finem et ea quae sunt ad finem, erit quidam discursus in eius voluntate. Hunc autem in Deo esse est impossibile: cum sit extra omnem motum. Relinquitur igitur quod simul, et eodem actu voluntatis, Deus vult se et alia. [4] Furthermore, as appears from what has been said, discursiveness is found in the act of a cognitive power according as we know principles by themselves and from them we arrive at conclusions. For, if we saw conclusions in principles by knowing the principles themselves, there would be no discursiveness, as likewise there is not when we see something in a mirror. But as principles are to conclusions in speculative matters, so ends are to the things ordered to them in operative and appetitive matters; for, just as conclusions are known through principles, so the appetite and doing of the things ordered to the end proceed from the end. If, then, someone wills separately the end and the things ordered to the end, there will be a certain discursiveness in His will. But this cannot be in God, since He is outside all motion. It remains, then, that God wills Himself and other things together and in the same act of will.
Item. Cum Deus semper velit se, si alio actu vult se et alio alia, sequetur quod est impossibile: nam unius simplicis potentiae non sunt simul duae operationes. [5] Again, since God wills Himself always, if He wills Himself and other things by different acts it will follow that there are at once two acts of will in Him. This is impossible, since one simple power does not have at once two operations.
Praeterea. In omni actu voluntatis volitum comparatur ad volentem ut movens ad motum. Si igitur sit aliqua actio voluntatis divinae qua vult alia a se, diversa a voluntate qua vult se, in illo erit aliquid aliud movens divinam voluntatem. Quod est impossibile. [6] Furthermore, in every act of the will the object willed is to the one willing as a mover to the moved. If, then, there be some action of the divine will, by which God wills things other than Himself, which is diverse from the action by which He wills Himself, there will be in Him some other mover of the divine will. This is impossible.
Amplius. Velle Dei est suum esse, ut probatum est. Sed in Deo non est nisi unum esse. Ergo non est ibi nisi unum velle. [7] Moreover, God’s willing is His being, as has been proved. But in God there is only one being. Therefore, there is in Him only one willing.
Item. Velle competit Deo secundum quod est intelligens. Sicut igitur uno actu intelligit se et alia, inquantum essentia sua est exemplar omnium; ita uno actu vult se et alia, inquantum sua bonitas est ratio omnis bonitatis. [8] Again, willing belongs to God according as He is intelligent. Therefore, just as by one act He understands Himself and other things, in so far as His essence is the exemplar of all things, so by one act He wills Himself and other things, in so far as His goodness is the likeness of all goodness.

Caput 77 Chapter 77
Quod volitorum multitudo divinae simplicitati non repugnat THAT THE MULTITUDE OF THE OBJECTS OF THE WILL IS NOT OPPOSED TO THE DIVINE SIMPLICITY
Ex hoc autem sequitur quod volitorum multitudo non repugnat unitati et simplicitati divinae substantiae. [1] From this it follows that the multitude of the objects of the will is not opposed to the unity and simplicity of the divine substance.
Nam actus secundum obiecta distinguuntur. Si igitur volita plura quae Deus vult inducerent in ipso aliquam multitudinem, sequeretur quod non esset in eo una tantum operatio voluntatis. Quod est contra praeostensa. [2] For acts are distinguished according to their objects. If, then, the many objects that God wills caused a multitude in Him, it would follow that there was not in Him solely one operation of the will. This is against what has been proved above.
Item. Ostensum est quod Deus alia vult inquantum vult bonitatem suam. Hoc igitur modo comparantur aliqua ad voluntatem quo comprehenduntur a bonitate eius. Sed omnia in bonitate eius unum sunt: sunt enim alia in ipso secundum modum eius, scilicet materialia immaterialiter et multa unite, ut ex supra dictis patet. Relinquitur igitur quod multitudo volitorum non multiplicat divinam substantiam. [3] Again, it has been shown that God wills other things in so far as He wills His own goodness. Hence, other things are to His will in the manner in which they are comprehended by His goodness. But all things in His goodness are one, since other things are in Him according to His way, namely, “the material immaterially and the many unitedly,” as appears from what has been said. It remains, then, that the multitude of the objects of the will does not multiply the divine substance.
Praeterea. Divinus intellectus et voluntas sunt aequalis simplicitatis: quia utrumque est divina substantia, ut probatum est. Multitudo autem intellectorum non inducit multitudinem in essentia divina, neque compositionem in intellectu eius. Ergo neque multitudo volitorum inducit aut diversitatem in essentia divina, aut compositionem in eius voluntate. [4] Moreover, the divine intellect and will are of an equal simplicity, for both are the divine substance, as has been proved. But the multitude of intellectual objects does not cause a multitude in the divine essence, nor a composition in the divine intellect. Neither, therefore, does a multitude of the objects of the will cause either a diversity in the divine essence or a composition in the divine will.
Amplius. Hoc inter cognitionem et appetitum interest, quod cognitio fit secundum quod cognitum est aliquo modo in cognoscente; appetitus autem non, sed e converso secundum quod appetitus refertur ad rem appetibilem, quam appetens quaerit vel in qua quiescit. Et propter hoc bonum et malum, quae respiciunt appetitum, sunt in rebus; verum autem et falsum, quae respiciunt cognitionem, sunt in mente; ut philosophus dicit, in VI metaphysicae. Quod autem aliquid ad multa se habeat, non repugnat simplicitati eius: cum et unitas sit multorum numerorum principium. Multitudo ergo volitorum a Deo non repugnat eius simplicitati. [5] Furthermore, there is this difference between knowledge and appetite, that knowledge takes place according as the known is in some way in the knower, whereas appetite does not take place in this way, but rather conversely, according as the appetite is related to the appetible thing, which the one pursuing seeks or in which be rests. And on this account good and evil, which have reference to appetite, are in things, whereas the true and the false, which have reference to knowledge, are in the mind, as the Philosopher says in Metaphysics VI [4]. Now, that something be related to many is not opposed to its simplicity, since unity itself is the principle of numerical multitude. Hence, the multitude of the objects willed by God is not opposed to His simplicity.

Caput 78 Chapter 78
Quod divina voluntas ad singula bonorum se extendit THAT THE DIVINE WILL EXTENDS TO SINGULAR GOODS
Ex quo etiam apparet quod non oportet nos dicere, ad conservandam simplicitatem divinam, quod velit alia bona in quadam universalitate, inquantum vult se esse principium bonorum quae possunt ab ipso fluere, non autem velit ea in particulari. [1] From this it is likewise apparent that, for the purpose of conserving the divine simplicity, we should not say that God wills other goods in a certain general way, in so far as He wills Himself to be the principle of the goods that can come forth from Him, but that He does not will them in the particular.
Nam velle est secundum comparationem volentis ad rem volitam. Non autem prohibet divina simplicitas quin possit comparari ad multa etiam particularia: dicitur enim Deus optimum vel primum etiam respectu singularium. Ergo sua simplicitas non prohibet quin etiam in speciali vel particulari alia a se velit. [2] For to will implies a relationship of the one willing to the thing willed. But the divine simplicity does not forbid -its being related even to many particulars; for God is said to be something best and first in relation to singulars. Therefore, His simplicity does not forbid Him from willing things other than Himself in the concrete or the particular.
Item. Voluntas Dei ad alia comparatur inquantum bonitatem participant ex ordine ad bonitatem divinam, quae est ratio volendi Deo. Sed non solum universitas bonorum, sed et singulum eorum a bonitate divina bonitatem sortitur, sicut et esse. Voluntas igitur Dei ad singula bonorum se extendit. [3] Again, the will of God is related to other things in so far as they participate in goodness in virtue of their order to the divine goodness, which is for God the reason of His willing. But not only the totality of goods, but even each one of them derives its goodness from the divine goodness, as well as its being. Therefore, the will of God extends to singular goods.
Amplius. Secundum philosophum, in XI Metaph., duplex bonum ordinis invenitur in universo: unum quidem secundum quod totum universum ordinatur ad id quod est extra universum, sicut exercitus ordinatur ad ducem; aliud secundum quod partes universi ordinantur ad invicem, sicut et partes exercitus. Secundus autem ordo est propter primum. Deus autem, ex hoc quod vult se ut finis est, vult alia quae ordinantur in ipsum ut in finem, sicut probatum est. Vult igitur bonum ordinis totius universi in ipsum, et bonum ordinis universi secundum partes suas ad invicem. Bonum autem ordinis consurgit ex singulis bonis. Vult igitur etiam singula bona. [4] Moreover, according to the Philosopher, in Metaphysics XI [10], a twofold good of order is found in the universe: one according to which the whole universe is ordered to what is outside the universe, as the army is ordered to its general; the other according as the parts of the universe are ordered to one another, as are the parts of the army. Now, the second order is for the sake of the first. But God, from the fact of willing Himself as the end, wills other things that are ordered to Him as to the end, as has been proved. He therefore wills the good of the order that the whole universe has to Him, as well as the good of the order that the universe has in the mutual relations of its parts. But the good of an order arises from singular goods. Therefore, God also wills singular goods.
Praeterea. Si Deus non vult singula bona ex quibus constat universum, sequitur quod in universo sit casu ordinis bonum: non est enim possibile quod aliqua pars universi omnia particularia bona componat in ordinem universi, sed sola universalis causa totius universi, quae Deus est, qui per suam voluntatem agit, ut infra ostendetur. Quod autem ordo universi sit casualis, est impossibile: quia sequeretur quod multo magis alia posteriora essent casu. Relinquitur igitur quod Deus etiam singula bonorum vult. [5] Furthermore, if God does not will the singular goods of which the universe is composed, it follows that in the universe the good that order is is by chance. For it is not possible that some part of the universe should bring together all the particular goods into the order of the universe; only the universal cause of the whole universe, God, Who acts through His will, as will later be shown, can do this. Now, that the order of the universe be by chance is impossible, since it would follow that the consequences of the order would all the more be by chance. It remains, then, that God wills even singulars among goods.
Adhuc. Bonum intellectum, inquantum huiusmodi, est volitum. Sed Deus intelligit etiam particularia bona, ut supra probatum est. Vult igitur etiam particularia bona. [6] Again, the understood good, as such, is what is willed. But God understands even particular goods, as was proved above. He therefore wills even particular goods.
Hoc autem auctoritate Scripturae confirmatur, quae, Genesis 1, ad singula opera complacentiam divinae voluntatis ostendit, dicens: vidit Deus lucem quod esset bona, et similiter de aliis operibus, et postea de omnibus simul: vidit Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona. [7] This is confirmed by the authority of Scripture, which, in the first chapter of Genesis (1:4, 31), shows the pleasure of the divine will with each single work, in the words: “God saw the light that it was good,” and similarly of His other works, and then of all the works together: “And God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good.”

Caput 79 Chapter 79
Quod Deus vult etiam ea quae nondum sunt THAT GOD WILLS EVEN THE THINGS THAT ARE NOT YET
Si autem velle est per comparatione volentis ad volitum, forte alicui potest videri quod Deus non velit nisi ea quae sunt: nam relativa oportet simul esse, et, uno interempto, interimitur alterum, ut philosophus docet. Si igitur velle est per comparationem volentis ad volitum, nullus potest velle nisi ea quae sunt. [1] If willing implies a relationship of the one willing to the thing willed, it can possibly seem to someone that God cannot will save only the things that are. For relatives ought to be together, and when one is destroyed so is the other, as the Philosopher teaches. If, then, willing implies the relationship of the one willing to the thing willed, no one can will save the things that are.
Praeterea. Voluntas dicitur ad volita, sicut et causa et creator. Non autem potest dici etiam Deus creator, vel dominus, vel pater, nisi eorum quae sunt. Ergo nec potest dici velle nisi ea quae sunt. [2] Furthermore, will is said in relation to the things that are willed, and similarly with cause and creator. But not even God can be called Creator, or Lord, or Father, save of the things that are. Therefore, neither can He be said to will save the things that are.
Ex hoc autem posset ulterius concludi, si divinum velle est invariabile, sicut et suum esse, et non vult nisi ea quae actu sunt, quod nihil velit quod non semper sit. [3] From this it could be further concluded that, if the divine willing is unchangeable as is the divine being, and God does not will save the things that are in act, He wills nothing that does not always exist.
Dicunt autem ad haec quidam quod ea quae non sunt in seipsis, sunt in Deo et in eius intellectu. Unde nihil prohibet etiam ea quae non sunt in seipsis, Deum velle secundum quod in eo sunt. [4] To these difficulties some answer that the things that are not in themselves are in God and in His intellect. Hence, nothing prevents God from willing the things that do not exist in themselves in so far as they are in Him.
Hoc autem non videtur sufficienter dictum. Nam secundum hoc dicitur quilibet volens aliquid velle, quod voluntas sua refertur ad volitum. Si igitur divina voluntas non refertur ad volitum quod non est nisi secundum quod est in ipso vel in eius intellectu, sequetur quod Deus non velit illud aliter nisi quia vult illud esse in se vel in eius intellectu. Hoc autem non intendunt loquentes sed quod Deus huiusmodi quae nondum sunt velit esse etiam in seipsis. [5] But this does not seem to be a sufficient reply. For someone with a will is said to will something in so far as his will is related to the thing willed. If, then, the divine will is not related to the thing willed save only in so far as it exists in Him or in His intellect, it will follow that God does not will that thing except because He wills it to be in His being or in His intellect. But this is not the intention of those who bold the position; they intend that God wills such not-yet-existents to be even in themselves.
Rursum, si voluntas comparatur ad rem volitam per suum obiectum, quod est bonum intellectum; intellectus autem non solum intelligit bonum esse in se, sed etiam in propria natura: et voluntas comparabitur ad volitum non solum secundum quod est in cognoscente, sed etiam secundum quod est in seipso. [6] Again, if the will is related to the thing willed through its object, the understood good, and the intellect understands not only that the good exists in it but that it exists in its own nature, the will likewise is related to the thing willed not only as it is in the knower, but likewise as it is in itself.
Dicamus igitur quod, cum bonum apprehensum moveat voluntatem, oportet quod ipsum velle sequatur conditionem apprehensionis: sicut et motus aliorum mobilium sequuntur conditiones moventis quod est causa motus. Relatio autem apprehendentis ad apprehensum est consequens ad apprehensionem ipsam: per hoc enim refertur apprehendens ad apprehensum quod apprehendit ipsum. Non autem solum apprehendens apprehendit rem secundum quod est in ipso, sed secundum quod est in propria natura: quia non solum cognoscimus rem intelligi a nobis, quod est eam esse in intellectu, sed eam esse vel fuisse vel futuram esse in propria natura. Licet igitur tunc res illa non sit nisi in cognoscente, relatio tamen consequens apprehensionem est ad eam non prout est in cognoscente, sed prout est secundum propriam naturam, quam apprehendit apprehendens. [7] Let us therefore reply that, since the apprehended good moves the will, the act of will itself must follow the condition of apprehension; just as the motions of the other movers follow the conditions of the mover that is the cause of motion. But the relation of the apprehension to the thing apprehended follows upon the apprehension itself, because one who apprehends is related to the apprehended thing in that he apprehends it. Now, he who apprehends does not apprehend a thing solely as it is in him, but as it is in its own nature; for not only do we know that a thing is understood by us because it is in the intellect, but we know also that it exists or has existed or will exist in its own nature. Therefore, although at that moment the thing does not exist save only in the intellect, the relation following upon the apprehension is to the thing, not as it exists in the knower, but as it is in its own nature, which the one apprehending apprehends.
Voluntatis igitur divinae relatio est ad rem non existentem secundum quod est in propria natura secundum aliquod tempus, et non solum secundum quod est in Deo cognoscente. Vult igitur Deus rem quae non est nunc, esse secundum aliquod tempus: et non solum vult secundum quod ipse eam intelligit. [8] The relation of the divine will, therefore, is to the non-existing thing according as it exists in its proper nature at a certain time, and not only according as it is in God knowing it. The thing that does not now exist God wills to be at a certain time; He does not will solely the fact that He understands it.
Nec est simile de relatione volentis ad volitum, et creantis ad creatum, et facientis ad factum, aut domini ad subiectam creaturam. Nam velle est actio in volente manens: unde non cogit intelligi aliquid extra existens. Sed facere et creare et gubernare significant actionem terminatam ad exteriorem effectum, sine cuius existentia huiusmodi actio non potest intelligi. [9] The relations of the one willing to the thing willed, of creator to created, and of maker to thing made, or of Lord to His subject creature, are not similar. For willing is an action remaining in the one willing, and hence does not require that something existing outside the will be understood. But to make, to create, and to govern signify an action terminating in an exterior effect, without whose existence such an action cannot be understood.

Caput 80 Chapter 80
Quod Deus de necessitate vult suum esse et suam bonitatem THAT HIS OWN BEING AND HIS OWN GOODNESS GOD WILLS NECESSARILY
Ex his autem quae supra ostensa sunt, sequitur quod Deus de necessitate velit suum esse et suam bonitatem, nec possit contrarium velle. [1] From what was shown above it follows that God wills His own being and His own goodness in a necessary way, and cannot will the contrary.
Ostensum est enim supra quod Deus vult suum esse et suam bonitatem ut principale obiectum, quod est sibi ratio volendi alia. In omni igitur volito vult suum esse et suam bonitatem: sicut visus in omni colore videt lumen. Impossibile est autem Deum non velle aliquid actu: esset enim volens in potentia tantum; quod est impossibile, cum suum velle sit suum esse. Necesse est igitur quod velit suum esse et suam bonitatem. [2] For it was shown above that God wills His own being and His own goodness as His principal object, which is for Him the reason for willing other things. In everything willed, therefore, God wills His own being and His own goodness, just as the sight in every color sees light. But it is impossible for God not to will something in act, for He would be willing only in potency, which is impossible, since His willing is His being. It is therefore necessary that God will His own being and His own goodness.
Item. Quilibet volens de necessitate vult suum ultimum finem: sicut homo de necessitate vult suam beatitudinem, nec potest velle miseriam. Sed Deus vult se esse sicut ultimum finem, ut ex praedictis patet. Necessario igitur vult se esse, nec potest velle se non esse. [3] Again, every being endowed with will necessarily wills his own ultimate end: for example, man necessarily wills his own beatitude and cannot will misery. But God wills Himself to be as the ultimate end, as appears from what has been said. Therefore, He necessarily wills Himself to be, nor can He will Himself not to be.
Amplius. In appetitivis et in operativis finis hoc modo se habet sicut principium indemonstrabile in speculativis: sicut enim ex principiis concluduntur in speculativis conclusiones, ita in activis et appetitivis ratio omnium agendorum et appetendorum ex fine sumitur. Sed in speculativis intellectus de necessitate assentit primis principiis indemonstrabilibus, quorum contrariis nullo modo potest assentire. Ergo voluntas necessario inhaeret fini ultimo, ut non possit contrarium velle. Et sic, si divinae voluntati non est alius finis quam ipse, de necessitate vult se esse. [4] Moreover, in appetitive and operative matters the end functions as an indemonstrable principle does in speculative matters. For just as in speculative matters the conclusions are reached from principles, so in active and appetitive matters the principle of all the things to be done and sought is taken from the end. But in speculative matters the intellect necessarily assents to the first and indemonstrable principles, and can in no way assent to their contraries. Therefore, the will necessarily inheres to the ultimate end, so as to be unable to will the contrary. Thus, if the divine will has no end other than itself, it necessarily wills itself to be.
Adhuc. Omnia, inquantum sunt, assimilantur Deo, qui est primo et maxime ens. Omnia autem, inquantum sunt, suo modo naturaliter diligunt suum esse. Multo igitur magis Deus suum esse diligit naturaliter. Natura autem eius est per se necesse-esse, ut supra probatum est. Deus igitur ex necessitate vult se esse. [5] Again, all things in so far as they are, are likened to God Who is primarily and supremely being. But all things, in so far as they are, in their own way naturally love their own being. All the more, then, does God naturally love His own being. But His nature is a being necessary through itself, as was shown above. Therefore, God of necessity wills Himself to be.
Praeterea. Omnis perfectio et bonitas quae in creaturis est, Deo convenit essentialiter, ut supra probatum est. Diligere autem Deum est summa perfectio rationalis creaturae: cum per hoc quodammodo Deo uniatur. Ergo in Deo essentialiter est. Ergo ex necessitate diligit se. Et sic vult se esse. [6] Furthermore, every perfection and goodness found in creatures is proper to God in an essential way, as was proved above. But to love God is the highest perfection of the rational creature, since thereby it is somehow united to God. Therefore, this love is found in God in an essential way. Therefore, of necessity God loves Himself. And thus He wills Himself to be.

Caput 81 Chapter 81
Quod Deus non de necessitate vult alia a se THAT GOD DOES NOT WILL OTHER THINGS IN A NECESSARY WAY
Si autem divina voluntas est divinae bonitatis et divini esse ex necessitate, posset alicui videri quod etiam aliorum ex necessitate esset: cum omnia alia velit volendo suam bonitatem, ut supra probatum est. Sed tamen recte considerantibus apparet quod non est aliorum ex necessitate. [1] But, if the divine will of necessity wills the divine goodness and the divine being, it might seem to someone that it wills of necessity other things as well, since God wills all other things in willing His own goodness, as was proved above. Nevertheless, if we consider the matter correctly, it appears that He does not will other things necessarily.
Est enim aliorum ut ordinatorum ad finem suae bonitatis. Voluntas autem non ex necessitate fertur in ea quae sunt ad finem, si finis sine his esse possit: non enim habet necesse medicus, ex suppositione voluntatis quam habet de sanando, illa medicamenta adhibere infirmo sine quibus nihilominus potest infirmum sanare. Cum igitur divina bonitas sine aliis esse possit, quinimmo nec per alia ei aliquid accrescat; nulla inest ei necessitas ut alia velit ex hoc quod vult suam bonitatem. [2] For God wills other things as ordered to the end of His goodness. But the will is not directed to what is for the sake of the end if the end can be without it. For, on the basis of his intention to heal, a doctor does not necessarily have to give to a sick person the medicine without which the sick person can nevertheless be healed. Since, then, the divine goodness can be without other things, and, indeed, is in no way increased by other things, it is under no necessity to will other things from the fact of willing its own goodness.
Adhuc. Cum bonum intellectum sit proprium obiectum voluntatis, cuiuslibet per intellectum concepti potest esse voluntas ubi salvatur ratio boni. Unde, quamvis esse cuiuslibet, inquantum huiusmodi, bonum sit, non esse autem malum; ipsum tamen non esse alicuius potest cadere sub voluntate ratione alicuius boni adiuncti quod salvatur, licet non ex necessitate: est enim bonum aliquid esse, etiam alio non existente. Solum igitur illud bonum voluntas, secundum sui rationem, non potest velle non esse, quo non existente tollitur totaliter ratio boni. Tale autem nullum est praeter Deum. Potest igitur voluntas, secundum sui rationem, velle non esse quamcumque rem praeter Deum. Sed in Deo est voluntas secundum totam suam facultatem: omnia enim in ipso sunt universaliter perfecta. Potest igitur Deus velle non esse quamcumque rem aliam praeter se. Non igitur de necessitate vult esse alia a se. [3] Furthermore, since the understood good is the object of the will, the will can will anything conceived by the intellect in which the nature of the good is present. Hence, although the being of any given thing is as such a good and its non-being an evil, the non-being of something can fall under the will (though not by necessity) because of some adjoined good that is preserved; since it is a good that something be, even though something else does not exist. Therefore, according to its own nature, the will cannot not will that good whose non-existence causes the nature of the good entirely to be lost. But there is no such good apart from God. According to its nature, therefore, the will can will the non-existence of anything whatever apart from God. But in God will is present according to its whole range, since all things in Him are universally perfect. God, therefore, can will the non-existence of anything whatever apart from Himself. Hence, it is not of necessity that things other than Himself exist.
Amplius. Deus, volendo bonitatem suam, vult esse alia a se prout bonitatem eius participant. Cum autem divina bonitas sit infinita, est infinitis modis participabilis, et aliis modis quam ab his creaturis quae nunc sunt participetur. Si igitur, ex hoc quod vult bonitatem suam, vellet de necessitate ea quae ipsam participant, sequeretur quod vellet esse infinitas creaturas, infinitis modis participantes suam bonitatem. Quod patet esse falsum: quia, si vellet, essent; cum sua voluntas sit principium essendi rebus, ut infra ostendetur. Non igitur ex necessitate vult etiam ea quae nunc sunt. [4] Moreover, God, in willing His own goodness, wills things other than Himself to be in so far as they participate in His goodness. But, since the divine goodness is infinite, it can be participated in infinite ways, and in ways other than it is participated in by the creatures that now exist. if, then, as a result of willing His own goodness, God necessarily willed the things that participate in it, it would follow that He would will the existence of an infinity of creatures participating in His goodness in an infinity of ways. This is patently false, because, if He willed them, they would be, since His will is the principle of being for things, as will be shown later on. Therefore, God does not necessarily will even the things that now exist.
Item. Sapientis voluntas, ex hoc quod est de causa, est de effectu qui ex causa de necessitate sequitur: stultum enim esset velle solem existere super terram, et non esse diei claritatem. Sed effectum qui non ex necessitate sequitur ex causa, non est necesse aliquem velle ex hoc quod vult causam. A Deo autem procedunt alia non ex necessitate, ut infra ostendetur. Non igitur necesse est quod Deus alia velit ex hoc quod vult se. [5] Again, the will of a wise man, by the fact of dealing with a cause, deals also with the effect that necessarily follows from the cause. For it would be foolish to wish the sun to be overhead and yet that it should not be daylight. But, as to an effect that does not follow of necessity from a cause, it is not necessary that someone will it because he wills the cause. Now, other things proceed from God Without necessity, as will be shown later on. It is not necessary, therefore, that God will other things from the fact of willing Himself.
Amplius. Res procedunt a Deo sicut artificiata ab artifice, ut infra ostendetur. Sed artifex, quamvis velit se habere artem, non tamen ex necessitate vult artificiata producere. Ergo nec Deus ex necessitate vult alia a se esse. [6] Moreover, things proceed from God as artifacts from an artisan, as will be shown later on. But, although the artisan wishes to have the art, he does not necessarily wish to produce the artifacts. Neither, therefore, does God necessarily will that there be things other than Himself.
Est ergo considerandum quare Deus alia a se ex necessitate sciat, non autem ex necessitate velit: cum tamen, ex hoc quod intelligit et vult se, intelligat et velit alia. Huius autem ratio est: quod enim intelligens intelligat aliquid, est ex hoc quod intelligens se habet quodam modo; prout ex hoc aliquid actu intelligitur quod est eius similitudo in intelligente. Sed quod volens aliquid velit, ex hoc est quod volitum aliquo modo se habet: volumus enim aliquid vel quia finis est, vel quia ad finem ordinatur. Esse autem omnia in Deo, ut in eo intelligi possent, ex necessitate requirit divina perfectio: non autem divina bonitas ex necessitate requirit alia esse, quae in ipsam ordinantur ut in finem. Et ob hoc necesse est Deum alia scire, non autem velle. Unde nec omnia vult quae ad bonitatem ipsius ordinem habere possent: omnia autem scit quae ad essentiam eius, per quam intelligit, qualemcumque ordinem habent. [7] We must therefore consider why it is that God necessarily knows things other than Himself, but does not necessarily will them, even though from the fact that He understands and wills Himself He understands and wills other things. The reason is as follows. That he who understands should understand something arises from the fact that he is disposed in a certain way, since something is understood in act in so far as its likeness is in the one understanding. But that he who wills should will something arises from the fact that what is willed is disposed in a certain way. For we will something either because it is the end or because it is ordered to the end. Now, that all things be in God, so that they can be understood in Him, is necessarily required by the divine perfection; but the divine goodness does not necessarily require that other things exist, which are ordered to it as to the end. That is why it is necessary that God know other things, but not necessary that He will them. Hence, neither does God will all the things that can have an order to His goodness; but He knows all things that have any order whatever to His essence, by which He understands.

Caput 82 Chapter 82.
Videntur tamen sequi inconvenientia si Deus ea quae vult non ex necessitate velit. [1] Awkward consequences seem to follow if God does not will necessarily the things that He wills.
Si enim Dei voluntas respectu aliquorum volitorum non determinetur quantum ad illa, videtur se ad utrumlibet habere. Omnis autem virtus quae est ad utrumlibet est quodammodo in potentia: nam ad utrumlibet species est possibilis contingentis. Erit igitur Dei voluntas in potentia. Non igitur erit Dei substantia, in qua nulla est potentia, ut supra ostensum est. [2] For, if with respect to certain objects the will of God is not determined to them, it would seem to be disposed to opposites. But every power that is disposed to opposites is in a manner in potency, since “to opposites” is a species of the contingent possible. Therefore, there is potency in the will of God, which will consequently not be the substance of God, in which there is no potency, as was shown above.
Adhuc. Si ens in potentia, inquantum huiusmodi, natum est moveri, quia quod potest esse potest non esse; sequitur ulterius divinam voluntatem esse variabilem. [3] If being in potency, as such, is of a nature to be moved, because what can be can not-be, it follows that the divine will is changeable.
Praeterea. Si naturale est Deo aliquid circa causata sua velle, necessarium est. Innaturale autem nihil in ipso esse potest: non enim in ipso potest esse aliquid per accidens neque violentum, ut supra ostensum est. [4] Furthermore, if it is natural to God to will something about His effects, it is necessary. Now there can be nothing unnatural in God, since there cannot be anything accidental or violent in Him, as was proved above.
Item. Si quod est ad utrumlibet indifferenter se habens non magis in unum quam in aliud tendit nisi ab alio determinetur, oportet quod Deus vel nihil eorum velit ad quae ad utrumlibet se habet, cuius contrarium supra ostensum est; vel quod ab alio determinetur ad unum. Et sic erit aliquid eo prius, quod ipsum determinet ad unum. [5] Again, if what is open to opposites, being indifferently disposed, tends no more to one thing than to another unless it be determined by another, it is necessary either that God will none of the things towards which He is disposed to opposites, of which the contrary was proved above, or that God be determined to one effect by another. Thus, there will be something prior to Him, determining Him to one effect.
Horum autem nullum necesse est sequi. Ad utrumlibet enim esse alicui virtuti potest convenire dupliciter: uno modo, ex parte sui; alio modo, ex parte eius ad quod dicitur.
Ex parte quidem sui, quando nondum consecuta est suam perfectionem, per quam ad unum determinetur. Unde hoc in imperfectionem virtutis redundat, et ostenditur esse potentialitas in ipsa: sicut patet in intellectu dubitantis, qui nondum assecutus est principia ex quibus ad alterum determinetur.
Ex parte autem eius ad quod dicitur, invenitur aliqua virtus ad utrumlibet esse quando perfecta operatio virtutis a neutro dependet, sed tamen utrumque esse potest: sicut ars, quae diversis instrumentis uti potest ad idem opus aequaliter perficiendum. Hoc autem ad imperfectionem virtutis non pertinet, sed magis ad eius eminentiam: inquantum utrumlibet oppositorum excedit, et ob hoc determinatur ad neutrum, se ad utrumlibet habens. Sic autem est in divina voluntate respectu aliorum a se: nam finis eius a nullo aliorum dependet, cum tamen ipsa fini suo perfectissime sit unita. Non igitur oportet potentialitatem aliquam in divina voluntate poni.
[6] But of these conclusions none necessarily follows. For to be open to opposites belongs to a certain power in a twofold way: in one way, from the side of itself; in another way, from the side of its object.
From the side of itself, when it has not yet achieved its perfection, through which it is determined to one effect. This openness redounds to the imperfection of a power, and potentiality is shown to be in it; as appears in the case of an intellect in doubt, which has yet not acquired the principles from which to be determined to one alternative.
From the side of its object, a certain power is found open to opposites when the perfect operation of the power depends on neither alternative, though both can be. An example is an art which can use diverse instruments to perform the same work equally well. This openness does not pertain to the imperfection of a power, but rather to its eminence, in so far as it dominates both alternatives, and thereby is determined to neither, being open to both. This is bow the divine will is disposed in relation to things other than itself. For its end depends on none of the other things, though it itself is most perfectly united to its end. Hence, it is not required that any potentiality be posited in the divine will.
Similiter autem nec mutabilitatem. Si enim in divina voluntate nulla est potentialitas, non sic absque necessitate alterum oppositorum praeaccipit circa sua causata quasi consideretur in potentia ad utrumque, ut primo sit volens potentia utrumque et postmodum volens actu, sed semper est volens actu quicquid vult, non solum circa se sed etiam circa causata: sed quia volitum non habet necessarium ordinem ad divinam bonitatem, quae est proprium obiectum divinae voluntatis; per modum quo non necessaria, sed possibilia enuntiabilia dicimus quando non est necessarius ordo praedicati ad subiectum. Unde cum dicitur, Deus vult hoc causatum, manifestum est esse enuntiabile non necessarium, sed possibile, illo modo quo non dicitur aliquid possibile secundum aliquam potentiam, sed quod non necesse est esse nec impossibile est esse, ut philosophus tradit in V Metaph.: sicut triangulum habere duo latera aequalia est enuntiabile possibile, non tamen secundum aliquam potentiam, cum in mathematicis non sit potentia neque motus. Exclusio igitur necessitatis praedictae immutabilitatem divinae voluntatis non tollit.
Quam Scriptura sacra profitetur, I Reg. 15-29: triumphator in Israel poenitudine non flectetur.
[7] Mutability, similarly, is not required- For, if there is no potentiality in the divine will, God does not thus prefer one of the opposites among His effects as if He should be thought as being in potency to both, so that He first wills both in potency and afterward He wills in act; rather, He wills in act whatever He wills, not only in relation to Himself but also in relation to His effects. The reason rather is because the object willed does not have a necessary order to the divine goodness, which is the proper object of the divine will; just as we call enunciables, not necessary, but possible when there is not a necessary order of the predicate to the subject. Hence, when it is said, God wills this effect, it is manifest that it is not a necessary enunciable but a possible one, not in the sense in which something is said to be possible according to some power, but in the sense in which the possible is that whose existence is neither necessary nor impossible, as the Philosopher teaches in Metaphysics V [12]. For example, for a triangle to have two equal sides is a possible enunciable, but not according to some power, since in mathematics there is neither power nor motion. The exclusion of the aforesaid necessity, therefore, does not take away the immutability of the divine will.
This Sacred Scripture professes: “But the triumpher in Israel will not spare, and will not be moved to repentance” (1 Samuel 15:29).
Quamvis autem divina voluntas ad sua causata non determinetur, non tamen oportet dicere quod nihil eorum velit, aut quod ad volendum ab aliquo exteriori determinetur. Cum enim bonum apprehensum voluntatem sicut proprium obiectum determinet; intellectus autem divinus non sit extraneus ab eius voluntate, cum utrumque sit sua essentia; si voluntas Dei ad aliquid volendum per sui intellectus cognitionem determinetur, non erit determinatio voluntatis divinae per aliquid extraneum facta. Intellectus enim divinus apprehendit non solum divinum esse, quod est bonitas eius, sed etiam alia bona, ut supra ostensum est. Quae quidem apprehendit ut similitudines quasdam divinae bonitatis et essentiae, non ut eius principia. Et sic voluntas divina in illa tendit ut suae bonitati convenientia, non ut ad suam bonitatem necessaria.- Sic autem et in nostra voluntate accidit: quod, cum ad aliquid inclinatur quasi necessarium simpliciter ad finem, quadam necessitate movetur in illud; cum autem tendit in aliquid solum propter convenientiam quandam, non necessario in illud tendit. Unde nec divina voluntas tendit in sua causata necessario. [8] However, although the divine will is not determined to its effects, we yet cannot say that it wills none of them, or that in order to will one of them it is determined by an exterior agent. For, since the apprehended good determines the will as its proper object, and the divine intellect is not outside God’s will, because both are His essence, if God’s will is determined to will something through the knowledge of His intellect, this determination of the divine will will not be due to something extraneous. For the divine intellect apprehends not only the divine being, which is God’s goodness, but also other goods, as was shown above. These goods it apprehends as certain likenesses of the divine goodness and essence, not as its principles. And thus, the divine will tends to them as befitting its goodness, not as necessary to it. The same thing happens in the case of our own will. When it is inclined to something as absolutely necessary to the end, it is moved to it with a certain necessity; but when it tends to something only because of a certain befittingness, it tends to it without necessity. Hence, neither does the divine will tend to its effects in a necessary way.
Non etiam oportet propter praemissa innaturale aliquid in Deo ponere. Voluntas namque sua uno et eodem actu vult se et alia: sed habitudo eius ad se est necessaria et naturalis; habitudo autem eius ad alia est secundum convenientiam quandam, non quidem necessaria et naturalis, neque violenta aut innaturalis, sed voluntaria; quod enim voluntarium est, neque naturale neque violentum necesse est esse. [9] Nor, furthermore, is it necessary because of the foregoing to posit something unnatural in God. For His will wills itself and other things by one and the same act. But its relation to itself is necessary and natural, whereas its relation to other things is according to a certain befittingness, not indeed necessary and natural, nor violent and unnatural, but voluntary; for the voluntary need be neither natural nor violent.

Caput 83 Chapter 83
Quod Deus vult aliquid aliud a se necessitate suppositionis THAT GOD WILLS SOMETHING OTHER THAN HIMSELF WITH THE NECESSITY OF SUPPOSITION
Ex his autem haberi potest quod, licet Deus circa causata nihil necessario velit absolute, vult tamen aliquid necessario ex suppositione. [1] From this we may infer that, although among His effects God wills nothing with absolute necessity, yet He does will something with the necessity of supposition.
Ostensum enim est divinam voluntatem immutabilem esse. In quolibet autem immutabili, si semel est aliquid, non potest postmodum non esse: hoc enim moveri dicimus quod aliter se habet nunc et prius. Si igitur divina voluntas est immutabilis, posito quod aliquid velit, necesse est ex suppositione eum hoc velle. [2] For it has been shown that the divine will is immutable. Now, if something is found in any immutable being, it cannot afterwards not be; for we say that a thing has moved if it is otherwise disposed now than it was previously. If, then, the divine will is immutable, assuming that it wills something, God must by supposition will this thing.
Item. Omne aeternum est necessarium. Deum autem velle aliquid causatum esse est aeternum: sicut enim esse suum, ita et velle aeternitate mensuratur. Est ergo necessarium. Sed non absolute consideratum: quia voluntas Dei non habet necessariam habitudinem ad hoc volitum. Ergo est necessarium ex suppositione. [3] Again, everything eternal is necessary. Now, that God should will some effect to be is eternal, for, like His being, so, too, His willing is measured by eternity, and is therefore necessary. But it is not necessary considered absolutely, because the will of God does not have a necessary relation to this willed object. Therefore, it is necessary by supposition.
Praeterea. Quicquid Deus potuit, potest: virtus enim eius non minuitur, sicut nec eius essentia. Sed non potest nunc non velle quod ponitur voluisse: quia non potest mutari sua voluntas. Ergo nunquam potuit non velle quicquid voluit. Est ergo necessarium ex suppositione eum voluisse quicquid voluit, sicut et velle: neutrum autem necessarium absolute, sed possibile modo praedicto. [4] Furthermore, whatever God could He can, for His power is not decreased, as neither is His essence. But He cannot now not will what He is posited as having willed, because His will cannot be changed. Therefore, at no time could He not will what He has willed. It is therefore necessary by supposition that He willed whatever He willed, and also that He wills it; neither, however, is absolutely necessary, but, rather, possible in the aforementioned way.
Amplius. Quicumque vult aliquid, necessario vult ea quae necessario requiruntur ad illud, nisi sit ex parte eius defectus, vel propter ignorantiam, vel quia a recta electione eius quod est ad finem intentum abducatur per aliquam passionem. Quae de Deo dici non possunt. Si igitur Deus, volendo se, vult aliquid aliud a se, necessarium est eum velle omne illud quod ad volitum ab eo ex necessitate requiritur: sicut necessarium est Deum velle animam rationalem esse, supposito quod velit hominem esse. [5] Moreover, whoever wills something, necessarily wills whatever it necessarily required for it, unless there be a defect in him either because of ignorance or because he is led astray through passion from the right choice of that which leads to the intended end. This cannot be said of God. If God, then, in willing Himself wills something other than Himself, it is necessary that He will for this object whatever is necessarily required by it. Thus, it is necessary that God will the rational soul to exist supposing that He wills man to exist.

Caput 84 Chapter 84
Quod voluntas Dei non est impossibilium secundum se THAT THE WILL OF GOD IS NOT OF WHAT IS IN ITSELF IMPOSSIBLE
Ex hoc apparet quod voluntas Dei non potest esse eorum quae sunt secundum se impossibilia. [1] From this it appears that the will of God cannot be of the things that are impossible in themselves.
Huiusmodi enim sunt quae in seipsis repugnantiam habent: ut hominem esse asinum, in quo includitur rationale esse irrationale. Quod autem repugnat alicui, excludit aliquid eorum quae ad ipsum requiruntur: sicut esse asinum excludit hominis rationem. Si igitur necessario vult ea quae requiruntur ad hoc quod supponitur velle, impossibile est eum velle ea quae eis repugnant. Et sic impossibile est eum velle ea quae sunt impossibilia simpliciter. For these have a contradiction in themselves, for example, that man is an ass, in which the rational and the irrational are included. For what is incompatible with something excludes some of the things that are necessary to it, as to be an ass excludes man’s reason. If, then, God necessarily wills the things that are required for what He wills by supposition, it is impossible for Him to will what is incompatible with these things. Thus, it is impossible for God to will the absolutely impossible.
Item. Sicut supra ostensum est, Deus, volendo suum esse, quod est sua bonitas, vult omnia alia inquantum habent eius similitudinem. Secundum hoc autem quod aliquid repugnat rationi entis inquantum huiusmodi, non potest in eo salvari similitudo primi esse, scilicet divini, quod est fons essendi. Non potest igitur Deus velle aliquid quod repugnat rationi entis inquantum huiusmodi. Sicut autem rationi hominis inquantum est homo repugnat esse irrationale, ita rationi entis inquantum huiusmodi repugnat quod aliquid sit simul ens et non ens. Non potest igitur Deus velle quod affirmatio et negatio sint simul verae. Hoc autem includitur in omni per se impossibili, quod ad seipsum repugnantiam habet inquantum contradictionem implicat. Voluntas igitur Dei non potest esse per se impossibilium. [3] Again, as was shown above, in willing His own being, which is His own goodness, God wills all other things in so far as they bear His likeness. But in so far as a thing is opposed to the nature of being as such, there cannot be preserved in it the likeness of the first being, namely, the divine being, which is the source of being. Hence, God cannot will something that is opposed to the nature of being as such. But just as it is opposed to the nature of man as man to be irrational, so it is opposed to the nature of being as such that something be at once being and nonbeing. God, therefore, cannot will that affirmation and negation be true together. But this is included in everything that is of itself impossible, which has an opposition with itself as implying a contradiction. The will of God, therefore, cannot be of that which is of itself impossible.
Amplius. Voluntas non est nisi alicuius boni intellecti. Illud igitur quod non cadit in intellectum, non potest cadere in voluntatem. Sed ea quae sunt secundum se impossibilia non cadunt in intellectum, cum sibi ipsis repugnent: nisi forte per errorem non intelligentis rerum proprietatem, quod de Deo dici non potest. In divinam igitur voluntatem non possunt cadere quae secundum se sunt impossibilia. [4] Moreover, the will is only of the understood good. Hence, whatever cannot be the object of the intellect is not an object of the will. But that which is of itself impossible is not an object of the intellect, since it is self-contradictory, except, of course, through the fault of one who does not understand what belongs to things—which cannot be said of God. Therefore, that which is of itself impossible cannot be the object of the will.
Adhuc. Secundum quod unumquodque se habet ad esse, ita se habet ad bonitatem. Sed impossibilia sunt quae non possunt esse. Ergo non possunt esse bona. Ergo nec volita a Deo, qui non vult nisi ea quae sunt vel possunt esse bona. [5] Furthermore, as a thing is disposed toward being, so it is disposed toward goodness. But the impossible is that which cannot be. Therefore, it cannot be good, and hence cannot be willed by God, Who does not will save only the things that are or can be good.

Caput 85 Chapter 85
Quod divina voluntas non tollit contingentiam a rebus, neque eis necessitatem absolutam imponit THAT THE DIVINE WILL DOES NOT REMOVE CONTINGENCY FROM THINGS, NOR DOES IT IMPOSE ABSOLUTE NECESSITY ON THEM
Ex praedictis autem haberi potest quod divina voluntas contingentiam non tollit, nec necessitatem absolutam rebus imponit. [1] From what has been said it results that the divine will does not remove contingency from things, nor does it impose absolute necessity on things.
Vult enim Deus omnia quae requiruntur ad rem quam vult, ut dictum est. Sed aliquibus rebus secundum modum suae naturae competit quod sint contingentes, non necessariae. Igitur vult aliquas res esse contingentes. Efficacia autem divinae voluntatis exigit ut non solum sit quod Deus vult esse, sed etiam ut hoc modo sit sicut Deus vult illud esse: nam et in agentibus naturalibus, cum virtus agens est fortis, assimilat sibi suum effectum non solum quantum ad speciem, sed etiam quantum ad accidentia, quae sunt quidam modi ipsius rei. Igitur efficacia divinae voluntatis contingentiam non tollit. [2] God wills whatever is required for a thing that He wills, as has been said. But it befits certain things, according to the mode of their nature, that they be contingent and not necessary. Therefore, God wills that some things be contingent. Now, the efficacy of the divine will requires not only that something be that God wills to be, but also that it be as He wills it to be. For, among natural agents as well, when the acting power is strong it assimilates its effect to itself not only as to species but also as to the accidents, which are certain modes of that thing. Therefore, the efficacy of the divine will does not remove contingency.
Amplius. Deus principalius vult bonum universitatis suorum effectuum quam aliquod bonum particulare: quanto in illo completior invenitur suae bonitatis similitudo. Completio autem universi exigit ut sint aliqua contingentia: alias non omnes gradus entium in universo continerentur. Vult igitur Deus aliqua esse contingentia. [3] Moreover, God wills the good of the universe of His effects more principally than He does any particular good, according as a fuller likeness of His goodness is found in it. But the completeness of the universe requires that there be some contingent things; otherwise, not all grades of beings would be contained in the universe. Therefore, God wills that there be some contingent things.
Adhuc. Bonum universi in quodam ordine consideratur, ut patet in XI metaphysicae. Requirit autem ordo universi aliquas causas esse variabiles: cum corpora sint de perfectione universi, quae non movent nisi mota. A causa autem variabili effectus contingentes sequuntur: non enim potest esse effectus firmioris esse quam sua causa. Unde videmus, quamvis causa remota sit necessaria, si tamen causa proxima sit contingens, effectum contingentem esse: sicut patet in his quae circa inferiora corpora accidunt; quae quidem contingentia sunt propter proximarum causarum contingentiam, quamvis causae remotae, quae sunt motus caelestes, sint ex necessitate. Vult igitur Deus aliqua contingenter evenire. [4] Furthermore, the good of the universe is seen in a certain order, as appears in Metaphysics XI [10]. But the order of the universe requires that there be some changeable causes, since bodies are part of the perfection of the universe, and they do not move unless they be moved. Now, contingent effects follow from a changeable cause, for an effect cannot have a more stable being than its cause. Hence we see that, even though the remote cause is necessary, provided the proximate cause is contingent, the effect is contingent, as may be seen in the things that happen among sublunary bodies, which are contingent because of the contingency of the proximate causes even though the remote causes, which are the heavenly motions, are necessary. God, therefore, wills something to come to pass contingently.
Praeterea. Necessitas ex suppositione in causa non potest concludere necessitatem absolutam in effectu. Deus autem vult aliquid in creatura non necessitate absoluta, sed solum necessitate quae est ex suppositione, ut supra ostensum est. Ex voluntate igitur divina non potest concludi in rebus creatis necessitas absoluta. Haec autem sola excludit contingentiam: nam etiam contingentia ad utrumlibet redduntur ex suppositione necessaria; sicut Socratem moveri, si currit, est necessarium. Divina igitur voluntas non excludit a rebus volitis contingentiam. [5] The necessity of supposition in the cause, moreover, does not require an absolute necessity in the effect. But God wills something in the creature, not by absolute necessity, but only by a necessity of supposition, as was shown above. From the divine will, therefore, an absolute necessity in created things cannot be inferred. But only this excludes contingency, for even the contingents open to opposites are made necessary by supposition: for example, that Socrates be moved, if he runs, is necessary. Therefore, the divine will does not exclude contingency from the things it wills.
Non igitur sequitur, si Deus vult aliquid, quod illud de necessitate eveniat: sed quod haec conditionalis sit vera et necessaria, si Deus aliquid vult, illud erit. Consequens tamen non oportet esse necessarium. [6] Hence, it does not follow, if God wills something, that it will of necessity take place. But this conditional is true and necessary: If God wills something, it will be. But the consequent does not have to be necessary.

Caput 86 Chapter 86
Quod divinae voluntatis potest ratio assignari THAT A REASON CAN BE ASSIGNED TO THE DIVINE WILL
Colligere autem ex praedictis possumus quod divinae voluntatis ratio assignari potest. [1] From what has been said we can infer that a reason can be assigned to the divine will.
Finis enim est ratio volendi ea quae sunt ad finem. Deus autem vult bonitatem suam tanquam finem, omnia autem alia vult tanquam ea quae sunt ad finem. Sua igitur bonitas est ratio quare vult alia quae sunt diversa ab ipso. [2] The end is the reason for willing the things that are for the sake of the end. But God wills His own goodness as the end, and other things He wills as things that are for the sake of the end. His goodness, therefore, is the reason why He wills the other things which are different from Himself.
Rursus. Bonum particulare ordinatur ad bonum totius sicut ad finem, ut imperfectum ad perfectum. Sic autem cadunt aliqua sub divina voluntate secundum quod se habent in ordine boni. Relinquitur igitur quod bonum universi sit ratio quare Deus vult unumquodque particulare bonum in universo. [3] Again, a particular good is ordered to the good of the whole as to its end, as the imperfect to the perfect. Now, some things fall under the divine will according to their disposition in the order of the good. It remains, then, that the good of the universe is the reason why God wills each particular good in the universe.
Item. Sicut supra ostensum est, supposito quod Deus aliquid velit, sequitur ex necessitate quod velit ea quae ad illud requiruntur. Quod autem alii necessitatem imponit, est ratio quare illud sit. Ratio igitur quare Deus vult ea quae requiruntur ad unumquodque, est ut sit illud ad quod requiritur. [4] Again, as was shown above, on the supposition that God wills something, it follows necessarily that He wills the things required for it. But that which imposes necessity on another is the reason why that other exists. Therefore, the reason why God wills the things that are required for each thing is that that thing be for which they are required.
Sic igitur procedere possumus in assignando divinae voluntatis rationem: Deus vult hominem habere rationem ad hoc quod homo sit; vult autem hominem esse ad hoc quod completio universi sit; vult autem bonum universi esse quia decet bonitatem ipsius. [5] Thus, therefore, can we proceed in assigning the reason of the divine will. God wills man to have a reason in order that man be; He wills man to be so that the universe may be complete; and He wills that the good of the universe be because it befits His goodness.
Non tamen praedicta triplex ratio secundum eandem habitudinem procedit. Nam bonitas divina neque dependet a perfectione universi, neque ex ea aliquid sibi accrescit. Perfectio autem universi, licet ex aliquibus particularibus bonis ex necessitate dependeat, quae sunt essentiales partes universi, ex quibusdam tamen non dependet ex necessitate, sed tamen ex eis aliqua bonitas vel decor accrescit universo: sicut ex his quae sunt solum ad munimentum vel decorem aliarum partium universi. Particulare autem bonum dependet ex necessitate ex his quae ad ipsum absolute requiruntur: licet et hoc etiam habeat quaedam quae sunt propter melius ipsius. Aliquando igitur ratio divinae voluntatis continet solum decentiam; aliquando utilitatem; aliquando autem necessitatem quae est ex suppositione; necessitatem vero absolutam, solum cum vult seipsum. [6] However, this threefold reason does not proceed according to the same relationship. For the divine goodness neither depends on the perfection of the universe nor is anything added to it from this perfection. For, although the perfection of the universe necessarily depends on certain particular goods that are its essential parts, yet on some of them it does not depend of necessity, but nevertheless a certain goodness or adornment accrues to the universe from them, as from those things that exist only for the support or adornment of the other parts of the universe. A particular good depends necessarily on the things that are absolutely required for it, even though this too has certain things that are for its embellishment. Hence, at times the reason of the divine will contains only a befittingness; at other times, usefulness; at still other times, a necessity of supposition; but a necessity that is absolute only when it wills itself.

Caput 87 Chapter 87
Quod divinae voluntatis nihil potest esse causa THAT NOTHING CAN BE THE CAUSE OF THE DIVINE WILL
Quamvis autem aliqua ratio divinae voluntatis assignari possit, non tamen sequitur quod voluntatis eius sit aliquid causa. [1] Now, although a certain reason of the divine will can be assigned, it does not follow that anything is the cause of the divine will.
Voluntati enim causa volendi est finis. Finis autem divinae voluntatis est sua bonitas. Ipsa igitur est Deo causa volendi, quae est etiam ipsum suum velle. [2] For to the will the cause of its willing is the end. But the end of the divine will is its goodness. Hence, it is the cause of God’s willing, just as it is also His act of will.
Aliorum autem a Deo volitorum nullum est Deo causa volendi. Sed unum eorum est alteri causa ut ordinem habeat ad divinam bonitatem. Et sic intelligitur Deus propter unum eorum aliud velle. [3] As to the other objects willed by God, none is the cause of willing for God. But one of them is the cause for the other to have an order to the divine goodness. And thus God is understood to will one of them for the sake of another.
Patet tamen quod non oportet discursum aliquem ponere in Dei voluntate. Nam ubi est unus actus, non consideratur discursus: ut supra circa intellectum ostensum est. Deus autem uno actu vult et suam bonitatem et omnia alia: cum sua actio sit sua essentia. [4] It is nevertheless manifest that no discursiveness is to be posited in the divine will. For where there is one act that is no discursiveness, as was shown above in connection with the intellect. But by means of one act God wills His goodness and all other things, since His action is His essence.
Per praedicta autem excluditur error quorundam dicentium omnia procedere a Deo secundum simplicem voluntatem: ut de nullo oporteat rationem reddere nisi quia Deus vult. [5] Through the foregoing is set aside the error of certain persons who said that all things proceed from God according to His simple will, which means that we are not to give an explanation of anything except that God wills it.
Quod etiam Scripturae divinae contrariatur, quae Deum perhibet secundum ordinem sapientiae suae omnia fecisse: secundum illud Psalmi: omnia in sapientia fecisti. Et Eccli. 1-10 dicitur quod Deus effudit sapientiam suam super omnia opera sua. [6] This view is likewise opposed to Sacred Scripture, which proclaims that God made all things according to the order of His wisdom, as is said in the Psalm (103:24): “You made all things in wisdom.” And in Sirach (1:10) it is said that God “poured” His wisdom “out upon all His works.”

Caput 88 Chapter 88
Quod in Deo est liberum arbitrium THAT IN GOD THERE IS FREE CHOICE
Ex praedictis autem ostendi potest quod in Deo liberum arbitrium invenitur. [1] From what has been said it can be shown that free choice is found in God.
Nam liberum arbitrium dicitur respectu eorum quae non necessitate quis vult, sed propria sponte: unde in nobis est liberum arbitrium respectu eius quod volumus currere vel ambulare. Deus autem alia a se non ex necessitate vult, ut supra ostensum est. Deo igitur liberum arbitrium habere competit. [2] Free choice is said in relation to the things that one wills, not of necessity, but of his own accord. Thus, there is in us free choice in relation to our willing to run or to walk. But God wills things other than Himself without necessity, as was shown above. Therefore, to have free choice befits God.
Adhuc. Voluntas divina in his ad quae secundum suam naturam non determinatur, inclinatur quodammodo per suum intellectum, ut supra ostensum est. Sed ex hoc homo dicitur prae ceteris animalibus liberum arbitrium habere quod ad volendum iudicio rationis inclinatur, non impetu naturae sicut bruta. Ergo in Deo est liberum arbitrium. [3] Again, towards the things to which it is not determined by nature the divine will is in a manner inclined through its intellect, as was shown above. But on this account is man said to have free choice as opposed to the other animals because he is inclined to willing by the judgment of the reason and not by the impulse of nature, as are the brutes. Therefore, in God there is free choice.
Item. Secundum philosophum, in III Ethic., voluntas est finis, electio autem eorum quae ad finem sunt. Cum igitur Deus seipsum tanquam finem velit, alia vero sicut quae ad finem sunt, sequitur quod respectu sui habeat voluntatem tantum, respectu autem aliorum electionem. Electio autem semper per liberum arbitrium fit. Deo igitur liberum arbitrium competit. [4] Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in Ethics III [5], “will is of the end, but election is of that which is for the sake of the end.” Since, then, God wills Himself as the end, and other things as what is for the sake of the end, it follows that with reference to Himself God has only will, but with reference to other things He has election. But election is made by choice. Therefore, free choice befits God.
Praeterea. Homo per hoc quod habet liberum arbitrium, dicitur suorum actuum dominus. Hoc autem maxime competit primo agenti, cuius actus ab alio non dependet. Ipse igitur Deus liberum arbitrium habet. [5] Moreover, because he has free choice, man is said to be master of his acts. But this supremely befits the first agent, whose act does not depend on another. Therefore, God has free choice.
Hoc etiam ex ipsa nominis ratione haberi potest. Nam liberum est quod sui causa est, secundum philosophum, in principio metaphysicae. Hoc autem nulli magis competit quam primae causae, quae Deus est. [6] This can likewise be gathered from the very meaning of the name. For “that is free which is for its own sake,” according to the Philosopher in the beginning of the Metaphysics [I, 2]. But this befits no being more than the first cause, God.

Caput 89 Chapter 89
Quod in Deo non sunt passiones affectuum THAT IN GOD THERE ARE NOT THE PASSIONS OF THE APPETITES
Ex praemissis autem sciri potest quod passiones affectuum in Deo non sunt. [1] From what has preceded we can know that the passions of the appetites are not in God.
Secundum enim intellectivam affectionem non est aliqua passio, sed solum secundum sensitivam, ut probatur in VII physicorum. Nulla autem talis affectio in Deo esse potest: cum desit sibi sensitiva cognitio, ut per supra dicta est manifestum. Relinquitur igitur quod in Deo non sit affectiva passio. [2] Now, according to intellective appetite there is no passion, but only according to sensitive appetite, as is proved in Physics VII [3]. But no such appetite can be in God, since He does not have sensitive knowledge, as is manifest from what has been said above. Therefore, there is no passion of the appetite in God.
Praeterea. Omnis affectiva passio secundum aliquam transmutationem corporalem fit: puta secundum constrictionem vel dilatationem cordis, aut secundum aliquid huiusmodi. Quorum nullum in Deo possibile est accidere: eo quod non sit corpus nec virtus in corpore, ut supra ostensum est. Non est igitur in ipso affectiva passio. [3] Moreover, every passion of the appetite takes place through some bodily change, for example, the contraction or distension of the heart, or something of the sort. Now, none of this can take place in God, since He is not a body or a power in a body, as was shown above. There is, therefore, no passion of the appetite in Him.
Item. In omni affectiva passione patiens aliqualiter trahitur extra suam communem, aequalem vel connaturalem dispositionem: cuius signum est quod huiusmodi passiones, si intendantur, animalibus inferunt mortem. Sed non est possibile Deum extra suam naturalem conditionem aliqualiter trahi: cum sit omnino immutabilis, ut supra ostensum est. Patet igitur quod in Deo huiusmodi passiones esse non possunt. [4] Again, in every passion of the appetite the patient is somehow drawn out of his usual, calm, or connatural disposition. A sign of this is that such passions, if intensified, bring death to animals. But it is not possible for God to be somehow drawn outside His natural condition, since He is absolutely immutable, as has been shown. It appears, then, that such passions cannot be found in God.
Amplius. Omnis affectio quae est secundum passionem, determinate in unum fertur, secundum modum et mensuram passionis: passio enim impetum habet ad aliquid unum, sicut et natura; et propter hoc ratione oportet eam reprimi et regulari. Divina autem voluntas non determinatur secundum se ad unum in his quae creata sunt, nisi ex ordine suae sapientiae, ut supra ostensum est. Non est igitur in ipso passio secundum affectionem aliquam. [5] Moreover, every affection arising from a passion is directed determinately to one thing according to the manner and measure of the passion. For passion has an impulse to something one, as does nature, and on this account it must be curbed and regulated by reason. But the divine will is not determined in itself to something one among creatures, except out of the order of its wisdom, as was shown above. Therefore, there is no passion of the appetite in God.
Adhuc. Omnis passio est alicuius potentia existentis. Deus autem est omnino liber a potentia: cum sit purus actus. Est igitur agens tantum, et nullo modo aliqua passio in ipso locum habet. [6] Furthermore, every passion belongs to something existing in potency. But God is completely free from potency, since He is pure act. God, therefore, is solely agent, and in no way does any passion have a place in Him.
Sic igitur omnis passio ratione generis a Deo removetur. [7] Thus, therefore, by reason of its genus, passion is excluded in God.
Quaedam autem passiones removentur a Deo non solum ratione sui generis, sed etiam ratione speciei. Omnis enim passio ex obiecto speciem recipit. Cuius igitur obiectum omnino est Deo incompetens, talis passio a Deo removetur etiam secundum rationem propriae speciei. [8] Some passions, however, are excluded from God not only by reason of their genus, but also by reason of their species. For every passion is specified by its object. That passion, therefore, whose subject is absolutely unbefitting to God is removed from God even according to the nature of its proper species.
Talis autem est tristitia vel dolor: nam eius obiectum est malum iam inhaerens, sicut gaudii obiectum est bonum praesens et habitum. Tristitia igitur et dolor ex ipsa sui ratione in Deo esse non possunt. [9] Such a passion, however, is sorrow or pain, for its subject is the already present evil, just as the object of joy is the good present and possessed. Sorrow and pain, therefore, of their very nature cannot be found in God.
Adhuc. Ratio obiecti alicuius passionis non solum sumitur ex bono et malo, sed etiam ex hoc quod aliqualiter quis se habet ad alterum horum: sic enim spes et gaudium differunt. Si igitur modus ipse se habendi ad obiectum qui in ratione passionis includitur, Deo non competit, nec ipsa passio Deo convenire potest, etiam ex ratione propriae speciei. Spes autem, quamvis habeat obiectum bonum, non tamen bonum iam obtentum, sed obtinendum. Quod quidem Deo non potest competere, ratione suae perfectionis, quae tanta est quod ei additio fieri non potest. Spes igitur in Deo esse non potest, etiam ratione suae speciei. Et similiter nec desiderium alicuius non habiti. [10] Furthermore, the notion of the object of a given passion is derived not only from good and evil, but also from the fact that one is disposed in a certain way towards one of them. For it is thus that hope and joy differ. If, then, the mode itself in which one is disposed toward the object that is included in the notion of passion is not befitting to God, neither can the passion itself befit Him, even through the nature of its proper species. Now, although hope has as its object something good, yet it is not a good already possessed, but one to be possessed. This cannot befit God, because of His perfection, which is so great that nothing can be added to it. Hope, therefore, cannot be found in God, even by reason of its species. And likewise, neither can the. desire of something not possessed.
Amplius. Sicut divina perfectio impedit potentiam additionis alicuius boni obtinendi a Deo, ita etiam, et multo amplius, excludit potentiam ad malum. Timor autem respicit malum quod potest imminere, sicut spes bonum obtinendum. Duplici igitur ratione suae speciei timor a Deo excluditur: et quia non est nisi existentis in potentia; et quia habet obiectum malum quod potest inesse. [11] Moreover, just as the divine perfection excludes from God the potency of the addition of some good to be obtained, so likewise, and all the more, does it exclude the potency to evil. Fear has reference to the evil that can threaten, as hope has reference to a good to be obtained. By a twofold reason of its species, therefore, is fear excluded from God: both because it belongs only to one existing in potency and because it has for its object a threatening evil.
Item. Poenitentia mutationem affectus importat. Igitur et ratio poenitentiae Deo repugnat, non solum quia species tristitiae est, sed etiam quia mutationem voluntatis importat. [12] Again, repentance implies a change of affection. Therefore, the nature of repentance likewise is repugnant to God, not only because it is a species of sadness, but also because it implies a change of will.
Praeterea. Absque errore cognitivae virtutis esse non potest ut illud quod est bonum apprehendatur ut malum. Nec est nisi in particularibus bonis ut alterius malum possit bonum existere alteri, in quibus corruptio unius est generatio alterius: universali autem bono ex nullo particulari bono aliquid deperit, sed per unumquodque repraesentatur. Deus autem est universale bonum, cuius similitudinem participando omnia dicuntur bona. Nullius igitur malum sibi potest esse bonum. Nec potest esse ut id quod est simpliciter bonum et non est sibi malum, apprehendat ut malum: quia sua scientia est absque errore, ut supra ostensum est. Invidiam igitur in Deo impossibile est esse, etiam secundum suae speciei rationem: non solum quia invidia species tristitiae est, sed etiam quia tristatur de bono alterius, et sic accipit bonum alterius tanquam malum sibi. [13] Furthermore, without an error of the cognitive power it is impossible that what is good be apprehended as evil. Nor is it possible that the evil of one be the good of another, except among particular goods in which “the corruption of one is the generation of another.” But the universal good does not lose anything because of the existence of some particular good, but is rather mirrored by each one. God, however, is the universal good, and by participating in His likeness all things are called good. The evil of no thing, therefore, can be His good. Nor is it possible that what is absolutely good, and is not evil to itself, He should apprehend as something evil; for His knowledge is without error, as has been shown. Envy, therefore, cannot be found in God, even according to the nature of its species, not only because it is a species of sadness, but also because it is saddened by the good of another and thus takes his good as its own evil.
Adhuc. Eiusdem rationis est tristari de bono et appetere malum: nam primum est ex hoc quod bonum aestimatur malum; secundum vero est ex hoc quod malum aestimatur bonum. Ira autem est appetitus mali alterius ad vindictam. Ira igitur a Deo longe est secundum rationem suae speciei: non solum quia effectus tristitiae est; sed etiam quia est appetitus vindictae propter tristitiam ex iniuria illata conceptam. [14] Moreover, to be saddened over a good and to seek evil are of the same nature, for the first arises because the good is judged to be evil, while the second arises because evil is judged to be good. Anger is the appetite of another’s evil for the sake of revenge. Anger, therefore, is far from God according to the nature of its species, not only because it is an effect of sadness, but likewise because it is an appetite for revenge arising from sadness due to an injury received.
Rursus, quaecumque aliae passiones harum species sunt vel ab eis causantur, pari ratione a Deo excluduntur. [15] Again, whatever other passions are species of these or are caused by them, are for the same reason removed from God.

Caput 90 Chapter 90
Quod in Deo sit delectatio et gaudium non tamen repugnat divinae perfectioni THAT IN GOD THERE ARE DELIGHT AND JOY, BUT THEY ARE NOT OPPOSED TO THE DIVINE PERFECTION
Sunt autem quaedam passiones quae, licet Deo non conveniant secundum quod passiones, nihil tamen ex ratione suae speciei important repugnans divinae perfectioni. [1] There are certain passions which, though they do not befit God as passions, do not signify anything by the nature of their species that is repugnant to the divine perfection.
Harum autem est gaudium et delectatio. Est enim gaudium praesentis boni. Neque igitur ratione obiecti, quod est bonum, neque ratione modi se habendi ad obiectum, quod est actu habitum, gaudium secundum suae speciei rationem divinae perfectioni repugnat. [2] Among these passions are joy and delight. Delight is of a present good. Neither, therefore, by reason of its object, which is a good, nor by reason of its disposition towards its object, which is possessed in act, is joy, according to the nature of its species, repugnant to the divine perfection.
Ex hoc autem manifestum est quod gaudium vel delectatio proprie in Deo sit. Sicut enim bonum et malum apprehensum sunt obiectum appetitus sensibilis, ita et appetitus intellectivi. Utriusque enim est prosequi bonum et fugere malum, vel secundum veritatem vel secundum aestimationem: nisi quod obiectum intellectivi appetitus est communius quam sensitivi, quia intellectivus appetitus respicit bonum vel malum simpliciter, appetitus autem sensitivus bonum vel malum secundum sensum; sicut etiam et intellectus obiectum est communius quam sensus. Sed operationes appetitus speciem ex obiectis sortiuntur. Inveniuntur igitur in appetitu intellectivo, qui est voluntas, similes operationes secundum rationem speciei operationibus appetitus sensitivi, in hoc differentes quod in appetitu sensitivo sunt passiones, propter coniunctionem eius ad organum corporale, in intellectivo autem sunt operationes simplices: sicut enim per passionem timoris, quae est in appetitu sensitivo, refugit quis malum futurum, ita sine passione intellectivus appetitus idem operatur. Cum igitur gaudium et delectatio Deo non repugnent secundum suam speciem, sed solum inquantum passiones sunt; in voluntate autem sunt secundum suam speciem, non autem ut passiones: relinquitur quod etiam divinae voluntati non desint. [3] From this it is manifest that joy or delight is properly in God. For just as the apprehended good and evil are the object of sensible appetite, so, too, are they of intellective appetite. It belongs to both to seek good and avoid evil, whether truly or by estimation. There is the difference that the object of intellective appetite is more common than that of the sensitive appetite, because intellective appetite has reference to good and evil absolutely, whereas sensitive appetite has reference to good or evil according to the sense. So, too, the object of the intellect is more common than that of the sense. But the operations of appetite derive their species from their objects. Hence, there are found in intellective appetite, which is the will, operations that in the nature of their species are similar to the operations of the sensitive appetite, differing in that in the sensitive appetite there are passions because of its union to a bodily organ, whereas in the intellective appetite there are simple operations; for just as through the passion of fear, which resides in the sensitive appetite, someone flees a future evil, so without passion the intellective appetite does the same thing. Since, then, joy and delight are not repugnant to God according to their species, but only in so far as they are passions, and since they are found in the will according to their species but not as passions, it remains that they are not lacking even to the divine will.
Item. Gaudium et delectatio est quaedam quietatio voluntatis in suo volito. Deus autem in seipso, qui est suum principale volitum, maxime quietatur, utpote in se omnem sufficientiam habens. Ipse igitur per suam voluntatem in se maxime gaudet et delectatur. [4] Again, joy and delight are a certain resting of the will in its object. But God, Who is His own principal object willed, is supremely at rest in Himself, as containing all abundance in Himself. God, therefore, through His will supremely rejoices in Himself.
Praeterea. Delectatio est quaedam operationis perfectio, ut patet per philosophum, X Ethic.: perficit enim operationem sicut pulchritudo iuventutem. Sed Deus perfectissimam operationem habet in intelligendo, ut ex praedictis patet. Si igitur nostrum intelligere, propter suam perfectionem, est delectabile, divinum intelligere erit sibi delectabilissimum. [5] Furthermore, delight is a certain perfection of operation, as appears from the Philosopher in Ethics X [4]; “for it perfects operation, as does beauty youth.” But God has the most perfect operation in understanding, as appears from what has been said. If, then, our understanding is delightful because of its perfection, the divine understanding will be most full of delight.
Amplius. Unumquodque naturaliter in suo simili gaudet, quasi in convenienti: nisi per accidens, inquantum est impeditivum propriae utilitatis, sicut figuli ad invicem corrixantur, pro eo quod unus impedit lucrum alterius. Omne autem bonum est divinae bonitatis similitudo, ut ex supra dictis patet: nec ex aliquo bono sibi aliquid deperit. Relinquitur igitur quod Deus de omni bono gaudet. [6] Moreover, each thing takes joy in its like as in something agreeable, except by accident in so far as it may interfere with one’s own advantage: for example, “potters quarrel among themselves” because one interferes with the profit of the other. Now, every good is a likeness of the divine good, as was said above, nor does God lose any good because of some good. It remains, then, that God takes joy in every good.
Est igitur in eo proprie gaudium et delectatio. Differunt autem gaudium et delectatio ratione. Nam delectatio provenit ex bono realiter coniuncto: gaudium autem hoc non requirit, sed sola quietatio voluntatis in volito sufficit ad gaudii rationem. Unde delectatio est solum de coniuncto bono, si proprie sumatur: gaudium autem de exteriori. Ex quo patet quod Deus proprie in seipso delectatur, gaudet autem et in se et in aliis. [7] joy and delight, then, are properly in God. Now, joy and delight differ in notion. For delight arises from a really conjoined good, whereas joy does not require this, but the resting of the will in the object willed suffices for the nature of joy. Hence, delight is only of the conjoined good if it be taken properly, whereas joy is of a non-conjoined good. From this it is apparent that God properly delights in Himself, but He takes joy both in Himself and in other things.

Caput 91 Chapter 91
Quod in Deo sit amor THAT IN GOD THERE IS LOVE
Similiter autem oportet et amorem in Deo esse secundum actum voluntatis eius. [1] In the same way, there must be love in God according to the act of His will.
Hoc enim est proprie de ratione amoris, quod amans bonum amati velit. Deus autem vult bonum suum et aliorum, ut ex dictis patet. Secundum hoc igitur Deus et se et alia amat. [2] For this belongs properly to the nature of love, that the lover will the good of the one he loves. Now, God wills His own good and that of others, as appears from what has been said. This means, therefore, that God loves Himself and other things.
Adhuc. Ad veritatem amoris requiritur quod bonum alicuius vult prout est eius: cuius enim bonum aliquis vult solum prout in alterius bonum cedit, per accidens amatur; sicut qui vult vinum conservari ut illud bibat, aut hominem ut sibi sit utilis aut delectabilis, per accidens amat vinum aut hominem, per se autem seipsum. Sed Deus vult bonum uniuscuiusque secundum quod est eius: vult enim unumquodque esse secundum quod in se bonum est; licet etiam unum ordinet in utilitatem alterius. Deus igitur vere amat et se et alia. [3] Again, for true love it is required that we will someone’s good as his good. For if we will someone’s good only in so far as it leads to the good of another, we love this someone by accident, just as he who wishes to store wine in order to drink it or loves a man so that this man may be useful or enjoyable to him, loves the wine or the man by accident, but essentially he loves himself. But God wills the good of each thing according as it is the good of each thing; for He wills each thing to be according as it is in itself good (although He likewise orders one thing to another’s use). God, then, truly loves Himself and other things.
Amplius. Cum unumquodque naturaliter velit aut appetat suo modo proprium bonum, si hoc habet amoris ratio quod amans velit aut appetat bonum amati, consequens est quod amans ad amatum se habeat sicut ad id quod est cum eo aliquo modo unum. Ex quo videtur propria ratio amoris consistere in hoc quod affectus unius tendat in alterum sicut in unum cum ipso aliquo modo: propter quod dicitur a Dionysio quod amor est unitiva virtus. Quanto ergo id unde amans est unum cum amato est maius, tanto est amor intensior: magis enim amamus quos nobis unit generationis origo, aut conversationis usus, aut aliquid huiusmodi, quam eos quos solum nobis unit humanae naturae societas. Et rursus, quanto id ex quo est unio est magis intimum amanti, tanto amor fit firmior: unde interdum amor qui est ex aliqua passione, fit intensior amore qui est ex naturali origine vel ex aliquo habitu, sed facilius transit. Id autem unde omnia Deo uniuntur, scilicet eius bonitas, quam omnia imitantur, est maximum et intimum Deo: cum ipse sit sua bonitas. Est igitur in Deo amor non solum verus, sed etiam perfectissimus et firmissimus. [4] Moreover, since each thing in its own way wills and seeks its proper good, if it is the nature of love that the lover will and seek the good of the one he loves, it follows that the lover is to the loved as to that which in some way is one with him. From this the proper nature of love is seen to consist in this, that the affection of the one tends to the other as to someone who is somehow one with him. On this account it is said by Dionysius that love is a “unitive power” [ De div. nom. IV, 13]. Therefore, the more that through which the lover is one with the one he loves is greater, the more is the love intense. For we love those whom the origin of birth joins to us, or the way of life, or something of the sort, more than those whom the community of human nature alone joins to us. Again, the more the source of the union is intimate to the lover, by so much the stronger becomes the love. Hence, at times, the love arising from some passion becomes more intense than the love that is of natural origin or from some habit; but it passes more easily. But the source whence all things are joined to God, namely, His goodness, which all things imitate, is what is supreme and most intimate in God, since it is His goodness. There is, therefore, in God not only a true love, but also a most perfect and a most enduring love.
Item. Amor ex parte obiecti non importat aliquid repugnans Deo: cum sit boni. Nec ex modo se habendi ad obiectum: nam amor est alicuius rei non minus cum habetur, sed magis, quia bonum aliquod fit nobis affinius cum habetur; unde et motus ad finem in rebus naturalibus ex propinquitate finis intenditur (quandoque autem contrarium per accidens accidit, utpote quando in amato experimur aliquid quod repugnat amori: tunc enim minus amatur quando habetur). Non igitur amor repugnat divinae perfectioni secundum rationem suae speciei. Est igitur in Deo. [5] Again, from the side of its object love does not signify anything repugnant to God, since its object is the good; neither does it from the mode of its disposition towards its object. For we love some thing, not less, but more when we have it, because a good is closer to us when we have it. So, too, a motion to an end among natural things becomes intensified from the nearness of the end. (The contrary sometimes happens by accident, namely, when in the one we love we experience something repugnant to love; then the object loved is loved less when it is gained.) Hence, love is not repugnant to the divine perfection according to the nature of its species. Therefore, it is found in God.
Praeterea. Amoris est ad unionem movere, ut Dionysius dicit. Cum enim, propter similitudinem vel convenientiam amantis et amati, affectus amantis sit quodammodo unitus amato, tendit appetitus in perfectionem unionis, ut scilicet unio quae iam inchoata est in affectu, compleatur in actu: unde et amicorum proprium est mutua praesentia et convictu et collocutionibus gaudere. Deus autem movet omnia alia ad unionem: inquantum enim dat eis esse et alias perfectiones, unit ea sibi per modum quo possibile est. Deus igitur et se et alia amat. [6] Moreover, it belongs to love to move towards union, as Dionysius says. For since, because of a likeness or congeniality between the lover and the one he loves, the affection of the lover is in a manner united to the one loved, his appetite tends to the perfection of the union, so that, namely, the union that has already begun in affection may be completed in act. Hence, it is also the privilege of friends to take joy in one another’s presence, in living together, and in conversation. But God moves all things to union, for in so far as He gives them being and other perfections, He joins them to Himself in the manner in which this is possible. God, therefore, loves Himself and other things.
Adhuc. Omnis affectionis principium est amor. Gaudium enim et desiderium non est nisi amati boni; timor et tristitia non est nisi de malo quod contrariatur bono amato; ex his autem omnes aliae affectiones oriuntur. Sed in Deo est gaudium et delectatio, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo in Deo est amor. [7] Again, the principle of every affection is love. For joy and desire are only of a good that is loved, and fear and sadness are only of an evil that is opposed to the good that is loved; and from these all the other affections take their origin. But in God there is joy and delight, as was shown above. Therefore, in God there is love.
Posset autem alicui videri quod Deus non magis hoc quam illud amet. Si enim intensio et remissio naturae mutabilis proprie est, Deo competere non potest, a quo omnis mutabilitas procul est. [8] Now, it might seem to someone that God does not love this thing more than that. For, if increase or decrease in intensity properly belongs to a changeable nature, it cannot befit God, from whom all mutability is absent.
Rursus. Nullum aliorum quae de Deo per modum operationis dicuntur, secundum magis et minus de ipso dicitur: neque enim magis aliquid alio cognoscit, neque magis de hoc quam de illo gaudet. [9] Again, none of the other things that are said of God in terms of operation are said of Him according to more and less; for neither does He know one thing more than another, nor does He take more joy over this thing than over that.
Sciendum itaque quod, cum aliae operationes animae sint circa unum solum obiectum, solus amor ad duo obiecta ferri videtur. Per hoc enim quod intelligimus vel gaudemus, ad aliquod obiectum aliqualiter nos habere oportet: amor vero aliquid alicui vult, hoc enim amare dicimur cui aliquod bonum volumus, secundum modum praedictum. Unde et ea quae concupiscimus, simpliciter quidem et proprie desiderare dicimur, non autem amare, sed potius nos ipsos, quibus ea concupiscimus: et ex hoc ipsa per accidens et improprie dicuntur amari. Aliae igitur operationes secundum solum actionis vigorem secundum magis et minus dicuntur. Quod in Deo accidere non potest. Nam vigor actionis secundum virtutem qua agitur mensuratur: omnis autem divina actio unius et eiusdem virtutis est. Amor autem secundum magis et minus dupliciter dici potest. Uno quidem modo, ex bono quod alicui volumus: secundum quod illum magis diligere dicimur cui volumus maius bonum. Alio modo ex vigore actionis: secundum quod dicimur illum magis diligere cui, etsi non maius bonum, aequale tamen bonum ferventius et efficacius volumus. [10] We must therefore observe that, although the other operations of the soul deal with only one object, love alone seems to be directed to two objects. For by the fact that we understand and rejoice, we must be somehow related to some object. Love, however, wills something for someone, for we are said to love the thing to which we wish some good, as explained above. Hence, the things that we want, absolutely and properly we are said to desire, but not to love; rather, we love ourselves for whom we want those things: whence it is by accident and improperly that such things are said to be loved. Now, then, the other operations are susceptible of more and less only according to the vigor of the action. This cannot take place in God. For the vigor of an action is measured according to the power by which it is done, and every divine action belongs to one and the same power. On the other hand, love is said according to more and less in a twofold way. In one way, from the good that we will to someone, and according to this we are said to love him more to whom we will the greater good. In a second way, from the vigor of the action, and in this way we are said to love him more to whom we will with greater fervor and efficacity, though not a greater good, yet an equal good.
Primo quidem igitur modo, nihil prohibet dici quod Deus aliquid alio magis diligat, secundum quod ei maius vult bonum. Secundo autem modo dici non potest: eadem ratione quae de aliis dicta est. [11] In the first way, nothing prevents us from saying that God loves one thing more than another, according as He wills it a greater good. In the second way, this cannot be said, for the same reason that was given in the case of the other operations.
Patet igitur ex praedictis quod de nostris affectionibus nulla est quae in Deo proprie possit esse nisi gaudium et amor:- quamvis haec etiam in eo non secundum passionem, sicut in nobis, sint. [12] It is therefore apparent from what has been said that, from among our affections, there is none that can properly exist in God save only joy and love; although even these are not in God as passions, as they are in us.
Quod autem in Deo sit gaudium vel delectatio, auctoritate Scripturae confirmatur. Dicitur enim in Psalmo: delectationes in dextera tua usque in finem. Prov. 9: delectabar per singulos dies ludens coram eo, dicit divina sapientia, quae Deus est, ut ostensum est. Luc. 15-10: gaudium est in caelo super uno peccatore poenitentiam agente. Philosophus etiam dicit, in VII Ethic., quod Deus semper gaudet una et simplici delectatione. [13] That there are joy and delight in God is confirmed by the authority of Sacred Scripture. For it is said in a Psalm (15:11): “At Your right hand there are delights even to the ends.” In the Proverbs (8:30), divine Wisdom, which is God, as we have shown, says: “I... was delighted every day playing before Him at all times.” And Luke (15:10): “There is joy in heaven before the angels of God upon one sinner doing penance.” The Philosopher likewise says in Ethics VII [14] that “God ever rejoices with one simple delight.”
Amorem etiam Dei Scriptura commemorat, Deut. 33-3: dilexit populos; Ierem. 31-3: in caritate perpetua dilexi te; Ioan. 16-27: ipse enim pater amat vos. Philosophi etiam quidam posuerunt rerum principium Dei amorem. Cui consonat Dionysii verbum, IV cap. de Div. Nom.; dicentis quod divinus amor non permisit ipsum sine germine esse. [14] Sacred Scripture likewise records the love of God: “He hath loved the people” (Deut. 33:3); “I have loved you with an everlasting love” (Jer. 31:3); “For the Father Himself loves you” (John 16:27). Certain philosophers likewise made God’s love to be the principle of things. With this view the words of Dionysius agree when he says that “the divine love did not allow Him to be without offspring” [ De div. nom. IV, 11].
Sciendum tamen etiam alias affectiones, quae secundum speciem suam divinae perfectioni repugnant, in sacra Scriptura de Deo dici, non quidem proprie, ut probatum est, sed metaphorice, propter similitudinem vel effectuum, vel alicuius affectionis praecedentis. [15] It must be noted, however, that the other affections, which in their species are repugnant to the divine perfection, are also said of God in Sacred Scripture, not indeed properly, as has been proved, but metaphorically, because of a likeness either in effects or in some preceding affection.
Dico autem effectuum, quia interdum voluntas ex sapientiae ordine in illum effectum tendit in quem aliquis ex passione defectiva inclinatur: iudex enim ex iustitia punit, sicut et iratus ex ira. Dicitur igitur aliquando Deus iratus, inquantum ex ordine suae sapientiae aliquem vult punire: secundum illud Psalmi: cum exarserit in brevi ira eius. Misericors vero dicitur inquantum ex sua benevolentia miserias hominum tollit: sicut et nos propter misericordiae passionem facimus idem. Unde in Psalmo: miserator et misericors dominus, patiens et multum misericors. Poenitens etiam interdum dicitur, inquantum secundum aeternum et immutabilem providentiae suae ordinem facit quae prius destruxerat, vel destruit quae prius fecit: sicut et poenitentia moti facere inveniuntur. Unde Gen. 6-7: poenitet me fecisse hominem. Quod autem hoc proprie intelligi non possit, patet per hoc quod habetur I Reg. 15-29: triumphator in Israel non parcet, nec poenitudine flectetur. [16] I say of effects because the will at times, following the order of wisdom, tends to that effect to which someone is inclined because of a defective passion; for a judge punishes from justice, as the angry man punishes from anger. Hence, God is at times called angry in so far as, following the order of His wisdom, He wills to punish someone, according to a Psalm (2:13): “When His wrath shall be kindled in a short time.” On the other hand, God is called merciful in so far as out of His loving-kindness He takes away the miseries of men, just as we do the same thing through the passion of mercy. Hence the Psalm (102:8): “The Lord is compassionate and merciful: longsuffering and plenteous in mercy.” Sometimes, too, God is said to repent in so far as according to the eternal and immutable order of His providence He makes what He previously had destroyed, or destroys what He had previously had made—as those who are moved by repentance are found doing. Hence Genesis (6:7): “I repent that I have made man.” That this cannot be taken at the letter appears from what is said in 1 Samuel (15:29): “But the triumpher in Israel will not spare, and will not be moved to repentance.”
Dico autem propter similitudinem affectionis praecedentis. Nam amor et gaudium, quae in Deo proprie sunt, principia sunt omnium affectionum: amor quidem per modum principii moventis: gaudium vero per modum finis; unde etiam irati punientes gaudent, quasi finem assecuti. Dicitur igitur Deus tristari, inquantum accidunt aliqua contraria his quae ipse amat et approbat: sicut et in nobis est tristitia de his quae nobis nolentibus acciderunt. Et hoc patet Isaiae 59-15 vidit Deus, et malum apparuit in oculis eius, quia non est iudicium. Et vidit quia non est vir, et aporiatus est, quia non est qui occurrat. [17] And I say in [the likeness of] some preceding affection since love and joy, which are properly in God, are the principles of the other affections, love in the manner of a moving principle and joy in the manner of an end. Hence, those likewise who punish in anger rejoice as having gained their end. God, then, is said to be saddened in so far as certain things take place that are contrary to what He loves and approves; just as we experience sadness over things that have taken place against our will. This is apparent in Isaiah (59:15-16): God “saw, and it appeared evil in His eyes, because there is no judgment. And He saw that there is not a man, and He stood astonished, because there is none to oppose Himself.”
Ex praedictis autem excluditur error quorundam Iudaeorum attribuentium Deo iram, tristitiam, poenitentiam, et omnes huiusmodi passiones, secundum proprietatem, non distinguentes quid in Scripturis sacris proprie et metaphorice dicatur. [18] Now, what we have said sets aside the error of certain Jews who attributed anger, sadness, repentance, and all such passions in their proper sense to God, failing to distinguish what in Sacred Scripture is said properly and what metaphorically.

Caput 92 Chapter 92
Quomodo in Deo ponantur esse virtutes HOW VIRTUES MAY BE HELD TO BE IN GOD
Consequens est autem dictis ostendere quomodo virtutes in Deo ponere oportet. Oportet enim, sicut esse eius est universaliter perfectum, omnium entium perfectiones in se quodammodo comprehendens, ita et bonitatem eius omnium bonitates in se quodammodo comprehendere. Virtus autem est bonitas quaedam virtuosi: nam secundum eam dicitur bonus, et opus eius bonum. Oportet ergo bonitatem divinam omnes virtutes suo modo continere. [1] Following what has been said, it remains to show how virtues may be posited in God. For just as God’s being is universally perfect, containing in itself the perfections of all beings, so His goodness must in a manner contain the goodness in each and every thing. Now, virtue is a certain goodness in the virtuous, for “according to it is one called good, and his work good.” Therefore, the divine goodness must contain in its way all the virtues.
Unde nulla earum secundum habitum in Deo dicitur, sicut in nobis. Deo enim non convenit bonum esse per aliquid aliud ei superadditum, sed per essentiam suam: cum sit omnino simplex. Nec etiam per aliquid suae essentiae additum agit: cum sua actio sit suum esse, ut ostensum est. Non est igitur virtus eius aliquis habitus, sed sua essentia. [2] As a consequence, none of them is posited as a habit in God, as happens in our case. For it does not befit God to be good through something else superadded to Him, but through His essence, since He is absolutely simple. Nor, likewise, does He act through something added to His essence, since His action is His being, as has been shown. Hence, His virtue is not some habit, but His essence.
Item. Habitus imperfectus actus est, quasi medius inter potentiam et actum: unde et habentes habitum dormientibus comparantur. In Deo autem est actus perfectissimus. Actus igitur in eo non est sicut habitus, ut scientia: sed sicut considerare, quod est actus ultimus et perfectus. [3] Again, a habit is an imperfect act, as being intermediate between potency and act; hence, those possessing a habit are compared to those who are asleep. But in God there is most perfect act. Act, therefore, is not in Him as a habit, for example, science, but as the act of considering, which is an ultimate and perfect act.
Adhuc. Habitus potentiae alicuius perfectivus est. In Deo autem nihil est secundum potentiam, sed solum secundum actum. In eo igitur habitus esse non potest. [4] Further, habit is perfective of a power. But in God there is nothing in potency, but only in act. A habit, therefore, cannot be found in Him.
Praeterea. Habitus de genere accidentis est. Quod in Deo omnino non est, ut supra ostensum est. Igitur nec virtus aliqua in Deo secundum habitum dicitur, sed solum secundum essentiam. [5] Moreover, a habit is in the genus of accident, which in no way is found in God, as was shown above. Neither, therefore, is any virtue said of God as a habit, but only according to His essence.
Cum autem virtutes humanae sint quibus humana vita dirigitur; humana autem vita est duplex, contemplativa et activa: quae quidem ad activam vitam virtutes pertinent, prout hanc vitam perficiunt, Deo competere non possunt. [6] Now, since human virtues are those by which human life is directed, and human life is twofold, contemplative and active, the virtues belonging to the active life, so far as they perfect this life, cannot befit God.
Vita enim activa hominis in usu corporalium bonorum consistit: unde et virtutes vitam activam dirigunt quibus his bonis recte utimur. Huiusmodi autem Deo convenire non possunt. Igitur nec huiusmodi virtutes prout hanc vitam dirigunt. [7] For man’s active life consists in the use of bodily goods, and hence the active life is directed by the virtues by which we make a right use of these goods. Such goods, however, cannot befit God, nor, therefore, can such virtues so far as they direct this life.
Adhuc. Huiusmodi virtutes mores hominum secundum politicam conversationem perficiunt: unde illis qui politica conversatione non utuntur, convenire non multum videntur. Multo igitur minus Deo convenire possunt, cuius conversatio et vita longe est a modo humanae vitae. [8] Furthermore, such virtues perfect the ways of men in the domain of political life. Hence, for those who do not take part in such a life the active virtues do not seem very suitable. Much less, therefore, can they suit God, whose conduct and life is far removed from the manner of human life.
Harum etiam virtutum quae circa activam vitam sunt, quaedam circa passiones nos dirigunt. Quas in Deo ponere non possumus. Virtutes enim quae circa passiones sunt, ex ipsis passionibus speciem sortiuntur sicut ex propriis obiectis: unde et temperantia a fortitudine differt inquantum haec circa concupiscentias est, illa vero circa timores et audacias. In Deo autem passiones non sunt, ut ostensum est. Igitur nec huiusmodi virtutes in Deo esse possunt. [9] Of the virtues that deal with the active life some, likewise, direct the passions. These we cannot posit in God. For the virtues that deal with the passions take their species from the passions as from their proper objects; and so temperance differs from fortitude so far as it deals with desires, whereas the latter with fear and daring. But in God there are no passions, as has been shown, and therefore neither can such virtues be found in Him.
Item. Huiusmodi virtutes non in parte intellectiva animae sunt, sed in parte sensitiva, in qua sola passiones esse possunt, ut probatur in VII physicorum. In Deo autem non est sensitiva pars, sed solus intellectus. Relinquitur igitur quod in Deo huiusmodi virtutes esse non possint, etiam secundum proprias rationes. [10] Again, such virtues are not found in the intellective part of the soul but in the sensitive part, in which alone passions can be found, as is proved in Physics VII [3]. In God, however, there is no sensitive part, but only intellect. It remains, then, that such virtues cannot be in God even according to their proper natures.
Passionum autem circa quas virtutes sunt, quaedam sunt secundum inclinationem appetitus in aliquod corporale bonum quod est delectabile secundum sensum, sicut sunt cibi et potus et venerea; circa quorum concupiscentias est sobrietas, castitas, et universaliter temperantia et continentia. Unde, quia corporales delectationes omnino a Deo remotae sunt, virtutes praedictae nec proprie Deo conveniunt, cum circa passiones sint; nec etiam metaphorice de Deo dicuntur in Scripturis, quia nec est accipere similitudinem ipsarum in Deo secundum similitudinem alicuius effectus. [11] Of the passions, with which the virtues deal, some exist according to the inclination of the appetite to some corporeal good that is delightful to the sense, for example, food, drink, and sex. For the desires of these passions there are sobriety and chastity, and, in general, temperance and continence. Hence, because bodily delights are absolutely foreign to God, the aforesaid virtues neither befit God properly, since they deal with passions, nor are they said of God even metaphorically in Scripture, because there is no available likeness of them in God in terms of a likeness of some effect.
Quaedam vero passiones sunt secundum inclinationem appetitus in aliquod spirituale bonum, sicut est honor, dominium, victoria, vindicta, et alia huiusmodi: circa quorum spes, audacias et omnino appetitus sunt fortitudo, magnanimitas, mansuetudo, et aliae huiusmodi virtutes. Quae quidem in Deo proprie esse non possunt, eo quod circa passiones sunt: dicuntur tamen in Scriptura metaphorice de Deo, propter similitudinem effectus; ut est illud I Reg. 2-2: non est fortis sicut Deus noster; et Mich. 6: quaerite mansuetum, quaerite bonum. [12] Some passions, however, follow the inclination of the appetite to some spiritual good, such as honor, power, victory, revenge, and the like; and concerned with their hopes, their darings, and in general their desires there are fortitude, magnanimity, gentleness, and other like virtues. These, properly speaking, cannot be found in God, since they deal with passions, but in Scripture they are said metaphorically of God, because of a likeness in effects. For example, what is said in 1 Samuel (2:2): “There is no one as strong as our God”; and Micah [rather, Zephaniah 2:31: “Seek the just, seek the meek.”

Caput 93 Chapter 93
Quod in Deo sunt virtutes morales quae sunt circa actiones THAT IN GOD THERE ARE THE MORAL VIRTUES THAT DEAL WITH ACTIONS
Sunt autem virtutes aliquae vitam activam hominis dirigentes quae non circa passiones, sed circa actiones sunt: ut veritas, iustitia, liberalitas, magnificentia, prudentia et ars. [1] Now, there are some virtues directing the active life of man that do not deal with passions, but with actions: for example, truth, justice, liberality, magnificence, prudence, and art.
Cum autem virtus ex obiecto vel materia speciem sortiatur; actiones autem quae sunt harum virtutum materiae vel obiecta, divinae perfectioni non repugnant: nec huiusmodi virtutes, secundum propriam speciem, habent aliquid propter quod a divina perfectione excludantur. [2] Since, however, virtue derives its species from its object or its matter, and since the actions that are the matter or the objects of such virtues are not repugnant to the divine perfection, neither do these virtues, according to their proper species, have anything on whose account they are excluded from the divine perfection.
Item. Huiusmodi virtutes perfectiones quaedam voluntatis et intellectus sunt, quae sunt principia operationum absque passione. In Deo autem est voluntas et intellectus nulla carens perfectione. Igitur haec Deo deesse non possunt. [3] Again, these virtues are certain perfections of the intellect and the will, which are principles of operation without passion. But in God there are intellect and will, lacking no perfection. Therefore, these virtues cannot be absent from God.
Amplius. Eorum omnium quae a Deo in esse procedunt, ratio propria in divino intellectu est, ut supra ostensum est. Ratio autem rei fiendae in mente facientis ars est: unde philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod ars est recta ratio factibilium. Est igitur proprie ars in Deo. Et ideo dicitur Sap. 7-21: omnium artifex docuit me sapientiam. [4] Moreover, of the things that come into being from God the proper model is in the divine intellect, as was shown above. Now, the model in the mind of the maker of the thing to be made is art. Hence, the Philosopher says in Ethics VI [4] that “art is the true model of things to be made.” Art, then, is properly in God. And therefore it is said in Wisdom (7:21): “the artisan of all things has taught me wisdom.”
Item. Divina voluntas, in his quae sunt alia ab ipso, determinatur ad unum per cognitionem suam, ut supra ostensum est. Cognitio autem ordinans voluntatem ad agendum prudentia est: quia secundum philosophum, in VI Ethic., prudentia est recta ratio agibilium. Est igitur in Deo prudentia. Et hoc est quod dicitur Iob 26: apud ipsum est prudentia et fortitudo. [5] Again, the divine will, with reference to things other than God, is determined to one effect by His knowledge, as was shown above. But the knowledge directing the will to act is prudence; for, according to the Philosopher in Ethics VI [5], “prudence is the true notion of the things to be done.” There is, therefore, prudence in God. And this is what is said in Job (12:13): “With Him is prudence and strength.”
Adhuc. Ostensum est supra quod ex hoc quod Deus vult aliquid, vult illa quae requiruntur ad ipsum. Quod autem ad perfectionem alicuius requiritur, est debitum unicuique. Est igitur in Deo iustitia, cuius est unicuique quod suum est distribuere. Unde in Psalmo dicitur: iustus dominus et iustitias dilexit. [6] Furthermore, it was shown above that because God wills something He also wills those things that are necessary to it. But that which is necessary to the perfection of each thing is due to it. Therefore, there is justice in God, to which it belongs to give to each one what belongs to him. Hence it is said in a Psalm (30:8): “The Lord is just and loves justice.”
Amplius. Sicut supra ostensum est, finis ultimus propter quem Deus vult omnia, nullo modo dependet ab his quae sunt ad finem, nec quantum ad esse nec quantum ad perfectionem aliquam. Unde non vult alicui suam bonitatem communicare ad hoc ut sibi exinde aliquid accrescat, sed quia ipsum communicare est sibi conveniens sicut fonti bonitatis. Dare autem non propter aliquod commodum ex datione expectatum, sed propter ipsam bonitatem et convenientiam dationis, est actus liberalitatis, ut patet per philosophum, in IV Ethicorum. Deus igitur est maxime liberalis: et, ut Avicenna dicit, ipse solus liberalis proprie dici potest; nam omne aliud agens praeter ipsum ex sua actione aliquod bonum acquirit, quod est finis intentus. Hanc autem eius liberalitatem Scriptura ostendit, dicens in Psalmo: aperiente te manum tuam, omnia implebuntur bonitate; et Iac. 1-5: qui dat omnibus affluenter et non improperat. [7] Moreover, as was shown above, the ultimate end for which God wills all things in no way depends on the things that exist for the sake of the end, and this either as to being or as to some perfection. Hence, He does not will to give to someone His goodness so that thereby something may accrue to Himself, but because for Him to make such a gift befits Him as the fount of goodness. But to give something not for the sake of some benefit expected from the giving, but because of the goodness and befittingness of the giving, is an act of liberality, as appears from the Philosopher in Ethics IV [1]. God, therefore, is supremely liberal; and, as Avicenna says, He alone can truly be called liberal, for every agent other than God acquires some good from his action, which is the intended end.” Scripture sets forth this liberality of God, saying in a Psalm (103:28): “When You open Your hand, they shall all be filled with good”; and in James (1:5): “Who gives to all men abundantly without reproaching.”
Item. Omnia quae a Deo esse accipiunt, necesse est ut ipsius similitudinem gerant inquantum sunt, et bona sunt, et proprias rationes in divino intellectu habent, ut supra ostensum est. Hoc autem ad virtutem veritatis pertinet, ut per philosophum in IV Ethic. patet, ut in suis factis et dictis aliquis talem se exhibeat qualis est. Est igitur in Deo veritatis virtus. Unde Rom. 3-4: est autem Deus verax; et in Psalmo: omnes viae tuae veritas. [8] Again, all things that receive being from God must bear His likeness in so far as they are, are good, and have their proper models in the divine intellect, as was shown above. But it belongs to the virtue of truth, as appears from the Philosopher in Ethics IV [7], for someone in his deeds and words to show himself such as he is. Therefore, there is in God the virtue of truth. Hence, Romans (3:4): “But God is true”; and the Psalm (118:151): “All Your ways are truth.”
Si quae autem virtutes sunt quae ad aliquas actiones ordinentur quae sunt subiectorum ad superiora, talia Deo convenire non possunt: sicut obedientia, latria, vel aliquid huiusmodi quod superiori debetur. [9] But, if there are any virtues that deal with notions belonging to subordinates in relation to their superiors, such cannot befit God: for example, obedience, worship, or something of the sort that is due a superior.
Si etiam aliquarum ex praedictis virtutibus sint aliqui actus imperfecti, secundum illos Deo attribui dictae virtutes non possunt. Sicut prudentia quantum ad actum bene consiliandi Deo non competit. Cum enim consilium sit quaedam quaestio, ut dicitur in VI Ethic.; divina autem cognitio non sit inquisitiva, ut supra ostensum est: non potest sibi consiliari esse conveniens. Unde Iob 26-3: cui dedisti consilium? Forsitan ei qui non habet intelligentiam? Et Isaiae 40-14: cum quo iniit consilium, et instruxit eum? Secundum autem actum illum qui est de consiliatis iudicare et approbata eligere, nihil prohibet prudentiam de Deo dici. Dicitur tamen interdum consilium de Deo. Vel propter similitudinem occultationis: nam consilia occulte aguntur; unde quod est in divina sapientia occultum, per similitudinem consilium dicitur, ut patet Isaiae 25-1, secundum aliam litteram: consilium tuum antiquum verum fiat. Vel inquantum consulentibus satisfacit: est enim etiam sine discursu intelligentis instruere inquirentes. [10] If, furthermore, some of the aforementioned virtues have certain imperfect acts, the virtues in question cannot be attributed to God according to those acts. Thus, prudence, according to the act of taking good counsel, does not befit God. For, since counsel is “a certain inquiry,” as is said in Ethics VI [9], and the divine knowledge is not inquiring, as was shown above, to take counsel cannot befit God. Hence Job (26:3): “How you have counseled him who has no wisdom!”; and Isaiah (40:14): “Whom has He consulted: and who has instructed Him?” But as to the act that consists in judging the matter of counsel and choosing what has been approved, nothing prevents prudence from being said of God. Nevertheless, counsel is at times said of God. This is either because of the likeness in privacy, since counsels take place in private, so that what is hidden in the divine wisdom is called by likeness counsel, as appears in Isaiah in the other version: “May Your ancient counsel be verified” (25:1 Septuagint); or in so far as He gives satisfaction to those who seek His counsel, since one who has understanding can, even without any discursiveness, instruct the inquiring.
Similiter etiam iustitia quantum ad commutationis actum Deo competere non potest: cum ipse a nullo aliquid accipiat. Unde Rom. 11-35: quis prior dedit illi, et retribuetur ei? Et Iob 41-1: quis ante mihi dedit, ut reddam ei? Per similitudinem tamen aliqua Deo dare dicimur, inquantum nostra data Deus acceptat. Non igitur sibi competit commutativa iustitia, sed solum distributiva. Unde Dionysius dicit, VIII cap. de Div. Nom. quod iustitia laudatur Deus sicut omnibus secundum dignitatem distribuens: secundum illud Matth. 25-15: dedit unicuique secundum propriam virtutem. [11] In the same way, justice, as concerns the act of commutative justice, cannot befit God, since He does not receive anything from anyone. Hence Romans (11:35): “Who hath first given to Him and recompense shall be made him?” And Job (41:2): “Who hath given me before that I should repay him?” Through a likeness, however, we are said to give some things to God in so far as God looks with favor upon our gifts. Commutative justice, therefore, does not befit God, but only distributive. Hence, Dionysius says that “God is praised for His justice as giving to all according to their worth” [ De div. nom. VIII, 3]. And in the words of Matthew (25:15): “He gave... to every one according to his proper ability.”
Scire autem oportet quod actiones circa quas sunt praedictae virtutes, secundum suas rationes ex rebus humanis non dependent: non enim de agendis iudicare, aliquid dare vel distribuere, solius hominis est, sed cuiuslibet intellectum habentis. Secundum tamen quod ad res humanas contrahuntur, ex his quodammodo speciem sumunt: sicut curvum in naso facit speciem simi. Virtutes igitur praedictae, secundum quod ordinant humanam vitam activam, ad has actiones ordinantur prout ad res humanas contrahuntur, ab eis speciem sumentes. Secundum quem modum Deo convenire non possunt. Secundum vero quod actiones praedictae in sua communitate accipiuntur, possunt etiam rebus divinis aptari. Sicut enim homo rerum humanarum, ut pecuniae vel honoris, distributor est, ita et Deus omnium bonitatum universi. Sunt igitur praedictae virtutes in Deo universalioris extensionis quam in homine; nam sicut iustitia hominis se habet ad civitatem vel domum, ita iustitia Dei se habet ad totum universum. Unde et divinae virtutes nostrarum exemplares dicuntur: nam quae sunt contracta et particulata, similitudines quaedam absolutorum entium sunt, sicut lumen candelae se habet ad lumen solis. Aliae vero virtutes, quae Deo proprie non conveniunt, non habent exemplar in divina natura; sed solum in divina sapientia, quae omnium entium proprias rationes complectitur; sicut est de aliis corporalibus rebus. [12] We must observe, however, that the actions with which the above virtues deal, do not according to their natures depend on man; for to judge of the things that are to be done, or to give or distribute something, does not belong to man alone but to any being possessing an intellect. Yet, in so far as these are narrowed to the human sphere, in a manner they receive their species from them, as the curvature in a nose produces the species of the snub. The aforementioned virtues, therefore, according as they order man’s active life, are ordered to these actions in so far as they are narrowed to human affairs and take their species from them. In this manner they cannot befit God. But in so far as the aforementioned actions are taken in their generality, they can be attributed even to divine things. For just as man is a distributor of human goods, such as money and honor, so too God is the distributor of all the goods of the universe. The aforementioned virtues, therefore, are of a more universal extension in God than in man; for as the justice of man is to the community or the household, so the justice of God is to the whole universe. Hence, the divine virtues are said to be the exemplar virtues of ours; for the things that are contracted and particularized are the likenesses of certain absolute beings, just as the light of a candle is to the light of the sun. As for the other virtues, which do not properly befit God, they do not have an exemplar in the divine nature, but only in the divine wisdom, which contains the proper likenesses of all beings: this is the case with other corporeal beings.

Caput 94 Chapter 94
Quod in Deo sunt virtutes contemplativae THAT IN GOD THERE ARE CONTEMPLATIVE VIRTUES
De contemplativis autem virtutibus dubium esse non potest quin Deo maxime conveniant. [1] Concerning the contemplative virtues there can be no doubt that they supremely befit God.
Si enim sapientia in cognitione altissimarum causarum consistit, secundum philosophum, in principio metaphysicae; ipse autem Deus praecipue seipsum cognoscit, nec aliquid cognoscit nisi cognoscendo seipsum, ut probatum est, qui est omnium prima causa: manifestum est quod sibi potissime sapientia debet adscribi. Unde Iob 9-4: sapiens corde est: et Eccli. 1-1: omnis sapientia a domino Deo est, et cum illo fuit semper. Philosophus etiam dicit, in principio metaphysicae, quod est divina possessio, non humana. [2] For if wisdom consists in the knowledge of the highest causes, according to the Philosopher in the beginning of the Metaphysics [I, 2], and if God especially knows Himself, and does not know anything, as has been proved, except by knowing Himself Who is the first cause of all things, it is manifest that wisdom must most especially be attributed to Him. Hence Job (9:4): “He is wise in heart”; and Sirach (1:1): “All wisdom is from the Lord God, and hath been always with Him.” The Philosopher also says in the beginning of the Metaphysics [I, 2] that wisdom is a divine possession, not a human one.
Item. Si scientia est rei cognitio per propriam causam; ipse autem omnium causarum et effectuum ordinem cognoscit, et per hoc singulorum proprias causas novit, ut supra ostensum est: manifestum est quod in ipso proprie scientia est:- non tamen quae sit per ratiocinationem causata, sicut scientia nostra ex demonstratione causatur. Unde I Reg. 2-3: Deus scientiarum dominus est. [3] Again, if science is the knowledge of a thing through its cause, and if God knows the order of all causes and effects, and thereby knows the proper causes of singulars, as was shown above, it is manifest that in a proper sense there is science in Him. Nevertheless, this is not the science caused by ratiocination, as our science is caused by demonstration. Hence 1 Samuel (2:3): “For the Lord is the God of all knowledge.”
Adhuc. Si immaterialis cognitio aliquarum rerum absque discursu intellectus est; Deus autem huiusmodi cognitionem de omnibus habet, ut supra ostensum est: est igitur in ipso intellectus. Unde Iob 12-13: ipse habet consilium et intelligentiam. [4] Furthermore, if the immaterial knowledge of some things without discursiveness is intellect, and God has such knowledge of all things, as was shown above, there is therefore intellect in God. Hence Job (12:13): “He hath counsel and understanding.”
Hae etiam virtutes in Deo sunt exemplares nostrarum, sicut perfectum imperfecti. [5] These virtues, likewise, are in God the exemplars of ours, as the perfect of the imperfect.

Caput 95 Chapter 95
Quod Deus non potest velle malum THAT GOD CANNOT WILL EVIL
Ex his autem quae dicta sunt, ostendi potest quod Deus non potest velle malum. [1] From what has been said it can be shown that God cannot will evil.
Virtus enim rei est secundum quam aliquis bene operatur. Omnis autem operatio Dei est operatio virtutis: cum sua virtus sit sua essentia, ut supra ostensum est. Non potest igitur malum velle. [2] For the virtue of a being is that by which he operates well. Now every operation of God is an operation of virtue, since His virtue is His essence, as was shown above. Therefore, God cannot will evil.
Item. Voluntas nunquam ad malum fertur nisi aliquo errore in ratione existente, ad minus in particulari eligibili. Cum enim voluntatis obiectum sit bonum apprehensum, non potest voluntas ferri in malum nisi aliquo modo proponatur sibi ut bonum: et hoc sine errore esse non potest. In divina autem cognitione non potest esse error, ut supra ostensum est. Non igitur voluntas eius potest ad malum tendere. [3] Again, the will never aims at evil without some error existing in the reason, at least with respect to a particular object of choice. For, since the object of the will is the apprehended good, the will cannot aim at evil unless in some way it is proposed to it as a good; and this cannot take place without error. But in the divine knowledge there cannot be error, as was shown above. God’s will cannot, therefore, tend towards evil.
Amplius. Deus est summum bonum, ut supra probatum est. Summum autem bonum non patitur aliquod consortium mali: sicut nec summe calidum permixtionem frigidi. Divina igitur voluntas non potest flecti ad malum. [4] Moreover, God is the highest good, as has been shown. But the highest good cannot bear any mingling with evil, as neither can the highest hot thing bear any mingling with the cold. The divine will, therefore, cannot be turned to evil.
Praeterea. Cum bonum habeat rationem finis, malum non potest incidere in voluntate nisi per aversionem a fine. Voluntas autem divina a fine averti non potest: cum nihil possit velle nisi volendo seipsum, ut ostensum est. Non potest igitur velle malum. [5] Furthermore, since the good has the nature of an end, evil cannot enter the will except by turning away from the end. But the divine will cannot be turned from the end, since it can will nothing except by willing itself. Therefore, it cannot will evil.
Et sic patet quod liberum arbitrium in ipso naturaliter stabilitum est in bono. [6] And thus it appears that free choice in God naturally stands abiding in the good.
Hoc autem est quod dicitur Deut. 32-4: Deus fidelis et absque iniquitate; et Hab. 1-13: mundi sunt oculi tui, domine, et respicere ad iniquitatem non potes. [7] This is what is said in Deuteronomy (32:4): “God is faithful and without any iniquity”; and Habakkuk (1:13): “Your eyes are too pure to behold evil, and You cannot look on iniquity.”
Per hoc autem confutatur error Iudaeorum, qui in Talmut dicunt Deum quandoque peccare et a peccato purgari; et Luciferianorum, qui dicunt Deum in Luciferi deiectione peccasse. [8] By this is refuted the error of the Jews, who say in the Talmud that at times God sins and is cleansed from sin; and of the Luciferians, who say that God sinned in ejecting Lucifer.

Caput 96 Chapter 96
Quod Deus nihil odit, nec odium alicuius rei ei convenire potest THAT GOD HATES NOTHING, AND THE HATRED OF NO THING BEFITS HIM
Ex hoc autem apparet quod odium alicuius rei Deo convenire non potest. [1] From this it appears that the hatred of something does not befit God.
Sicut enim amor se habet ad bonum, ita odium se habet ad malum: nam his quos amamus, bonum volumus; his vero quos odimus, malum. Si igitur voluntas Dei ad malum inclinari non potest, ut ostensum est, impossibile est quod ipse rem aliquam odio habeat. [2] For as love is to the good, so hatred is to evil; for to those we love we will good, and to those we hate, evil. If, then, the will of God cannot be inclined to evil, as has been shown, it is impossible that He should hate anything.
Item. Voluntas Dei in alia a se fertur, ut supra ostensum est, inquantum, volendo et amando suum esse et suam bonitatem vult eam diffundi, secundum quod possibile est, per similitudinis communicationem. Hoc igitur est quod Deus in rebus aliis a se vult, ut in eis sit suae bonitatis similitudo. Hoc autem est bonum uniuscuiusque rei, ut similitudinem divinam participet: nam quaelibet bonitas alia non est nisi quaedam similitudo primae bonitatis. Igitur Deus unicuique rei vult bonum. Nihil igitur odit. [3] Again, the will of God is directed to things other than Himself, as has been shown, in so far as, by willing and loving His own being and His own goodness, God wills it to be diffused as much as possible through the communication of likeness. This, then, is what God wills in other things, that there be in them the likeness of His goodness. But this is the good of each thing, namely, to participate in the likeness of God; for every other goodness is nothing other than a certain likeness of the first goodness. Therefore, God wills good to each thing. Hence, He hates nothing.
Adhuc. A primo ente omnia alia originem essendi sumunt. Si igitur aliquid eorum quae sunt odio habet, vult illud non esse: quia hoc est unicuique bonum. Vult igitur actionem suam non esse qua illud in esse producitur vel mediate vel immediate: ostensum est enim supra quod, si Deus aliquid vult, oportet quod illa velit quae ad illud requiruntur. Hoc autem est impossibile. Quod quidem patet, si res per voluntatem ipsius in esse procedant: quia tunc oportet actionem qua res producuntur esse voluntariam. Similiter si naturaliter sit rerum causa: quia, sicut placet sibi sua natura, sic placet sibi omne illud quod sua natura requirit. Nullam igitur rem Deus odit. [4] Furthermore, from the first being all the others take the origin of their being. If, then, God hates anything among the things that are, He wills it not to be, since to be is each thing’s good. He wills, therefore, the non-existence of His own action by which that thing is brought into being either mediately or immediately. For it was shown above that, if God wills something, He must will the things that are necessary for it. Now, this is impossible. This is apparent if things come into being through His will, for then the action by which things are produced must be voluntary. The same is the case if God is by nature the cause of things, for, just as His nature is pleasing to Him, so whatever His nature requires is pleasing to Him. God, therefore, does not hate anything.
Praeterea. Illud quod invenitur in omnibus causis activis naturaliter, praecipue in primo agente necesse est inveniri. Omnia autem agentia suo modo suos effectus amant, secundum quod huiusmodi: sicut parentes filios, poetae poemata, artifices sua opera. Multo igitur magis Deus nullam rem odit: cum ipse sit omnium causa. [5] Moreover, that which is found in all naturally active causes must be especially found in the first cause. But all agents in their own way love their effects as such: thus, parents love their children, poets their poetry, and artists their works. All the more, then, does God not hate anything, since He is the cause of all things.
Hoc autem est quod dicitur Sap. 11-25: diligis omnia quae sunt, et nihil odisti eorum quae fecisti. [6] This is what is said in Wisdom (11:25): “For You love all the things that are, and hate none of the things which You hast made.”
Dicitur autem similitudinarie Deus aliqua odire. Et hoc dupliciter. Primo modo, ex hoc quod Deus, amando res, volens eorum bonum esse, vult contrarium malum non esse. Unde malorum odium habere dicitur, nam quae non esse volumus, dicimur odio habere: secundum illud Zach. 8-17: unusquisque malum contra amicum suum ne cogitetis in cordibus vestris, et iuramentum mendax non diligatis: omnia enim haec sunt quae odi, dicit dominus. Haec autem non sunt effectus ut res subsistentes, quarum proprie est odium vel amor. [7] However, God is said by similitude to hate some things, and this in a twofold way. In the first way, because God, in loving things and by willing the existence of their good, wills the non-existence of the contrary evil. Hence, He is said to have a hatred of evils, for we are said to hate what we will not to exist. In the words of Zechariah (8:17): “And let none of you imagine evil in your hearts against his friend and love not a false oath. For all these are the things that I hate, says the Lord.” These, however, are not effects in the manner of subsisting things, to which properly love and hate refer.
Alius autem modus est ex hoc quod Deus vult aliquod maius bonum quod esse non potest sine privatione minoris boni. Et sic dicitur odire: cum magis hoc sit amare. Sic enim, inquantum vult bonum iustitiae vel ordinis universi, quod esse non potest sine punitione vel corruptione aliquorum, dicitur illa odire quorum punitionem vult vel corruptionem: secundum illud Mal. 1-3: Esau odio habui; et illud Psalmi: odisti omnes qui operantur iniquitatem; perdes omnes qui loquuntur mendacium: virum sanguinum et dolosum abominatur dominus. [8] The second way arises from the fact that God wills some greater good that cannot be without the loss of some lesser good. And thus He is said to hate, although this is rather to love. For thus, inasmuch as He wills the good of justice or of the order of the universe, which cannot exist without the punishment or corruption of some things, God is said to hate the things whose punishment or corruption He wills. In the words of Malachi (1:3): “I have hated Esau”; and the Psalms (5:7): “You hate all workers of iniquity: You destroy all who speak a lie. The bloody and the deceitful man the Lord will abhor.”

Caput 97 Chapter 97
Quod Deus est vivens THAT GOD IS LIVING
Ex his autem quae iam ostensa sunt, de necessitate habetur quod Deus est vivens. [1] From what has already been proved it necessarily follows that God is living.
Ostensum est enim Deum esse intelligentem et volentem. Intelligere autem et velle non nisi viventis est. Est igitur Deus vivens. [2] For it has been shown that God is understanding and willing, and the acts of understanding and willing belong only to a living being. Therefore, God is living.
Adhuc. Vivere secundum hoc aliquibus attributum est quod visa sunt per se, non ab alio moveri. Et propter hoc illa quae videntur per se moveri, quorum motores vulgus non percipit, per similitudinem dicimus vivere: sicut aquam vivam fontis fluentis, non autem cisternae vel stagni stantis; et argentum vivum, quod motum quendam habere videtur. Proprie enim illa sola per se moventur quae movent seipsa, composita ex motore et moto, sicut animata. Unde haec sola proprie vivere dicimus: alia vero omnia ab aliquo exteriori moventur, vel generante, vel removente prohibens, vel impellente. Et quia operationes sensibiles cum motu sunt, ulterius omne illud quod agit se ad proprias operationes, quamvis non sint cum motu, dicitur vivere: unde intelligere, appetere et sentire actiones vitae sunt. Sed Deus maxime non ab alio, sed a seipso operatur: cum sit prima causa agens. Maxime igitur ei competit vivere. [3] Again, to live is attributed to some beings because they are seen to move themselves, but not to be moved by another. And on this account the things that seem to be moved by themselves, whose movers people in general do not perceive, we call by similitude living: for example, the living water of a flowing spring, but not the water of a cistern or a stagnant pool; or quicksilver, which appears to have a certain movement. For, in a proper sense, those things move through themselves that move themselves, being composed of a mover and something moved, for example, animate things. These alone we properly say are living, while all other things are moved by some exterior agent, be it a generating cause, or one removing an obstacle, or an impelling cause. And because all sensible operations involve motion, everything that moves itself to its own operations is further said to live, though this be not with motion; and so understanding, appetition, and sensing are actions of life. But it is supremely true of God that He does not act from another, but through Himself, since He is the first agent. Therefore, to live belongs to Him in a supreme way.
Item. Divinum esse omnem perfectionem essendi comprehendit, ut supra ostensum est. Vivere autem est quoddam esse perfectum: unde viventia in ordine entium non viventibus praeferuntur. Divinum igitur esse est vivere. Ipse igitur est vivens. [4] Again, the divine being comprehends every perfection of being, as has been shown. But to live is a certain perfection, which is why living things in the order of being are higher than non-living things. Hence, the divine being is living. Therefore, God is living.
Hoc etiam auctoritate divinae Scripturae confirmatur. Dicitur enim Deut. 32-40, ex ore domini: dicam, vivo ego in aeternum; et in Psalmo: cor meum et caro mea exultaverunt in Deum vivum. [5] This is likewise confirmed by the authority of the divine Scripture. For it is said in Deuteronomy (32:40) in the person of the Lord: “I will say: I live forever”; and in a Psalm (83:3): “My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God.”

Caput 98 Chapter 98
Quod Deus est sua vita THAT GOD IS HIS LIFE
Ex hoc autem ulterius patet quod Deus sit sua vita. [1] From this it further appears that God is His life.
Vita enim viventis est ipsum vivere in quadam abstractione significatum: sicut cursus non est secundum rem aliud quam currere. Vivere autem viventium est ipsum esse eorum, ut patet per philosophum, in II de anima: cum enim ex hoc animal dicatur vivens quod animam habet, secundum quam habet esse, utpote secundum propriam formam, oportet quod vivere nihil sit aliud quam tale esse ex tali forma proveniens. Deus autem est suum esse, ut supra probatum est. Est igitur suum vivere et sua vita. [2] For the life of the living being is the very act of living signified in an abstract manner, as running is in reality nothing other than to run. Now, “to live is for the living their very being,” as appears from the Philosopher in De anima II [4]. For, since an animal is said to be living because it has a soul, through which it has being as through its proper form, it follows that to live is nothing other than such a being arising from such a form. But God is His own being, as was proved above. Therefore, He is His own act of living and His own life.
Item. Ipsum intelligere est quoddam vivere, ut patet per philosophum, in II de anima: nam vivere est actus viventis. Deus autem est suum intelligere, sicut supra ostensum est. Est igitur suum vivere et sua vita. [3] Again, understanding is a certain way of living, as appears from the Philosopher in De anima II [2]; for to live is the act of a living being. But God is His own understanding, as was shown above, and therefore He is His own act of living and His own life.
Amplius. Si Deus non esset sua vita, cum sit vivens, ut ostensum est, sequeretur quod esset vivens per participationem vitae. Omne autem quod est per participationem, reducitur ad id quod est per seipsum. Deus igitur reduceretur in aliquod prius, per quod viveret. Quod est impossibile, ut ex dictis patet. [4] Moreover, if God were not His life, since He is living, as has been shown, it would follow that He would be living through the participation of life. But everything that is through participation is reduced to that which is through itself. Therefore, God would be reduced to something prior, through which He would be living. This is impossible, as is apparent from what has been said.
Adhuc. Si sit vivens Deus, ut ostensum est, oportet in ipso esse vitam. Si igitur non sit ipse sua vita, erit aliquid in ipso quod non est ipse. Et sic erit compositus. Quod supra improbatum est. Est igitur Deus sua vita. [5] Furthermore, if God is living, as has been shown, there must be life in Him. If, then, He is not His own life, there will be something in Him that is not He.. Thus, He will be composite, which has been disproved.” Therefore, God is His life.
Et hoc est quod dicitur Ioan. 14-6: ego sum vita. [6] This is what is said in John (14:6): “I am... the life.”

Caput 99 Chapter 99
Quod vita Dei est sempiterna THAT THE LIFE OF GOD IS EVERLASTING
Ex hoc autem apparet quod vita eius sit sempiterna. [1] From this it appears that God’s life is everlasting.
Nihil enim desinit vivere nisi per separationem vitae. Nihil autem a seipso separari potest: omnis enim separatio fit per divisionem alicuius ab alio. Impossibile est igitur quod Deus deficiat vivere: cum ipse sit sua vita, ut ostensum est. [2] Nothing ceases to live except through separation from life. But nothing can be separated from God, since every separation takes place through the division of something from something. It is therefore impossible that God cease to live, since He is His life, as has been shown.
Item. Omne illud quod quandoque est et quandoque non est, est per aliquam causam: nihil enim seipsum de non esse in esse adducit, quia quod nondum est, non agit. Divina autem vita non habet aliquam causam: sicut nec divinum esse. Non igitur quandoque est vivens et quandoque non vivens, sed semper vivit. Est igitur vita eius sempiterna. [3] Again, everything that at times is and at times is not is through some cause, for nothing leads itself from nonbeing to being, since that which does not yet exist does not act. But the divine life has no cause, as neither does the divine being. Hence, God is not at times living and at times not-living, but He always lives. Therefore, His life is everlasting.
Adhuc. In qualibet operatione operans manet, licet interdum operatio transeat secundum successionem: unde et in motu mobile manet idem subiecto in toto motu, licet non secundum rationem. Ubi igitur actio est ipsum agens, oportet quod nihil ibi per successionem transeat, sed totum simul maneat. Intelligere autem et vivere Dei ipse est Deus, ut ostensum est. Igitur eius vita non habet successionem, sed est tota simul. Est igitur sempiterna. [4] Furthermore, in every operation the agent abides, even though at times the operation passes through succession. Hence, in motion likewise, the movable remains the same in subject during the whole motion, although not in situation. Where, therefore, the action is the agent itself, of necessity nothing there passes through succession, but the whole remains all together. But the understanding and living of God are God Himself, as has been shown. Therefore, His life has no succession, but is life all together. Therefore, it is everlasting.
Amplius. Deus omnino immobilis est, ut supra ostensum est. Quod autem incipit aut desinit vivere, vel in vivendo successionem patitur, mutabile est: nam vita alicuius incipit per generationem, desinit autem per corruptionem, successio autem propter motum aliquem est. Deus igitur neque incoepit vivere, neque desinet vivere, neque in vivendo successionem patitur. Est igitur eius vita sempiterna. [5] Moreover, God is absolutely immobile, as was shown above. But what begins to live and ceases to live, or in living suffers succession, is mutable. For one’s life begins through generation, it ceases through corruption, and as to succession, it exists because of some motion. But God neither began to live, nor will He cease to live, not in living does He suffer any succession. Therefore, His life is everlasting.
Hinc est quod dicitur Deut. 32-40, ex ore domini: vivo ego in aeternum; I Ioan. ult.: hic est verus Deus et vita aeterna. [6] Hence what is said in Deuteronomy (32:40) in the person of the Lord: “I live forever”; and in 1 John (5:20): “This is true God and life eternal.”

Caput 100 Chapter 101
Quod Deus est beatus THAT GOD IS BLESSED
Restat autem ex praemissis ostendere Deum esse beatum. [1] It remains from the foregoing to show that God is blessed.
Cuiuslibet enim intellectualis naturae proprium bonum est beatitudo. Cum igitur Deus sit intelligens, suum proprium bonum erit beatitudo. Non autem comparatur ad proprium bonum sicut quod in bonum nondum habitum tendit, hoc enim est naturae mobilis et in potentia existentis: sed sicut quod iam obtinet proprium bonum. Igitur beatitudinem non solum desiderat, sicut nos, sed ea fruitur. Est igitur beatus. [2] The proper good of every intellectual nature is blessedness. Since, then, God is intelligent, His proper good will be blessedness. But He is not related to His proper good as is something that tends to a good not yet possessed, since this belongs to a nature that is movable and existing in potency; He is related rather as that which already possesses its proper good. Therefore, He not only desires blessedness, as we do, but enjoys it. Therefore, He is blessed.
Amplius. Illud est maxime desideratum vel volitum ab intellectuali natura quod est perfectissimum in ipsa: et hoc est eius beatitudo. Perfectissimum autem in unoquoque est operatio perfectissima eius: nam potentia et habitus per operationem perficiuntur; unde et philosophus dicit felicitatem esse operationem perfectam.
Perfectio autem operationis dependet ex quatuor. Primo, ex suo genere: ut scilicet sit manens in ipso operante. Dico autem operationem in ipso manentem per quam non fit aliud praeter ipsam operationem: sicut videre et audire. Huiusmodi enim sunt perfectiones eorum quorum sunt operationes, et possunt esse ultimum: quia non ordinantur ad aliquod factum quod sit finis. Operatio vero vel actio ex qua sequitur aliquid actum praeter ipsam, est perfectio operati, non operantis, et comparatur ad ipsum sicut ad finem. Et ideo talis operatio intellectualis naturae non est beatitudo sive felicitas. Secundo, ex principio operationis: ut sit altissimae potentiae. Unde secundum operationem sensus non est in nobis felicitas, sed secundum operationem intellectus et per habitum perfecti. Tertio, ex operationis obiecto. Et propter hoc in nobis ultima felicitas est in intelligendo altissimum intelligibile. Quarto, ex forma operationis: ut scilicet perfecte, faciliter, firmiter et delectabiliter operetur. Talis autem est Dei operatio: cum sit intelligens; et suus intellectus altissima virtutum sit, nec indiget habitu perficiente, quia in seipso perfectus est, ut supra ostensum est; ipse autem seipsum intelligit, qui est summum intelligibilium; perfecte, absque omni difficultate, et delectabiliter. Est igitur beatus.
[3] Moreover, that is supremely desired or willed by an intellectual nature which is most perfect in it; and this is its blessedness. But the most perfect thing in each being is its most perfect operation. For potency and habit are perfected by operation, and so the Philosopher says that "felicity is perfect operation" [Ethics X, 7].
But the perfection of operation depends on four things. First, on its genus, namely, that it be abiding in its operating cause. By an operation that abides in its cause I mean one through which nothing takes place but the operation itself: for example, to see and to hear. For these are the perfections of the beings whose operations they are, and can be ultimate because they are not ordered to something made as to their end. On the other hand, the operation or the action from which there follows some result beyond the action itself is the perfection of the thing produced, and not of the operating cause, and is related to it as to an end. Hence, such an operation of an intellectual nature is not blessedness or felicity. Second, it depends on the principle of operation, namely, that it be the operation of the highest power. Hence, there is not felicity in us according to the operation of sense, butt according to the operation of the intellect, and one perfected by a habit. Third, it depends on the object of operation. On this account, the highest felicity in us consists in understanding the highest intelligible. Fourth, it depends on the form of the operation, namely, that it be easily, firmly, and with delight. Such, however, is the operation of God, since He is intelligent, and His the highest power, nor does He need any perfecting habit, because He is perfect in Himself, as was shown above. Furthermore, He understands Himself, being the highest intelligible, and this perfectly, without any difficulty, and with delight. God is, therefore, blessed.
Adhuc. Per beatitudinem desiderium omne quietatur: quia, ea habita, non restat aliud desiderandum; cum sit ultimus finis. Oportet igitur eum esse beatum qui perfectus est quantum ad omnia quae desiderare potest: unde Boetius dicit quod beatitudo est status omnium bonorum congregatione perfectus. Sed talis est divina perfectio quod omnem perfectionem in quadam simplicitate comprehendit, ut supra ostensum est. Ipse igitur est vere beatus. [4] Furthermore, through blessedness every desire is given rest, because, when blessedness is possessed, nothing else remains to be desired, since it is the ultimate end. He must, therefore, be blessed who is perfect in relation to all the things that He can desire. Hence, Boethius says that blessedness is "a state made perfect by the accumulation of all goods" [ De consolatione philosophiae III, 2]. But such is the divine perfection, because it comprehends all perfection in a certain simplicity, as was shown above. Therefore, God is truly blessed.
Item. Quandiu alicui deest aliquid quo indigeat, nondum beatus est: quia eius desiderium nondum est quietatum. Quicumque igitur sibi sufficiens est, nullo indigens, ille beatus est. Ostensum est autem supra quod Deus non indiget aliis: cum a nullo exteriori sua perfectio dependeat; nec alia vult propter se sicut propter finem quasi eis indigeat, sed solum quia hoc est conveniens suae bonitati. Est igitur ipse beatus. [5] Again, as long as someone is missing something that he needs, he is not yet blessed, for his desire is not yet at rest. Whoever, therefore, is self-sufficient, needing nothing, he is blessed. But it has been shown above that God does not need other things, since His perfection depends on nothing outside Himself, nor does God will other things for His own sake as though He needed them, but solely because this befits His goodness. Therefore, He is blessed.
Praeterea. Ostensum est supra quod Deus non potest velle aliquod impossibile. Impossibile est autem ei aliquid advenire quod nondum habeat: cum ipse nullo modo sit in potentia, ut ostensum est. Igitur nihil potest velle se habere quod non habeat. Quicquid igitur vult, habet. Nec aliquid male vult, ut supra ostensum est. Est igitur beatus: secundum quod a quibusdam beatus esse perhibetur qui habet quicquid vult et nihil male vult. [6] Furthermore, it was shown above that God cannot will something impossible. But it is impossible that God should receive what He does not already have, since He is in no way in potency, as has been shown. Therefore, He cannot will to have anything that He does not have. Hence, whatever He wills, He has. Nor does He will anything evil, as was shown above. He is therefore blessed, in the manner in which some proclaim the blessed man to be “be who has whatever He wills and who wills nothing evil.”
Eius etiam beatitudinem sacra Scriptura protestatur, I Tim. ult.: quem ostendet suis temporibus beatus et potens. [7] Sacred Scripture, furthermore, proclaims the blessedness of God: “Which in His times He shall show Who is the Blessed and only Mighty” (1 Tim. 6:15).

Caput 101 Chapter 101
Quod Deus sit sua beatitudo THAT GOD IS HIS BLESSEDNESS
Ex his autem apparet quod Deus sit sua beatitudo. [1] From this it is apparent that God is His blessedness.
Beatitudo enim eius est intellectualis operatio ipsius, ut ostensum est. Supra autem ostendimus quod ipsum Dei intelligere sit sua substantia. Ipse igitur est sua beatitudo. [2] For His blessedness is a certain intellectual operation, as has been shown. But it was shown above that His understanding is His substance. Therefore, He is His blessedness.
Item. Beatitudo, cum sit ultimus finis, est id quod quilibet natus habere, vel habens, principaliter vult. Ostensum est autem supra quod Deus principaliter vult suam essentiam. Sua igitur essentia est eius beatitudo. [3] Again, blessedness, since it is the ultimate end, is that which he who can have it, or has it, principally wills. But it was shown above that God principally wills His essence. Therefore, His essence is His blessedness.
Adhuc. Unusquisque in beatitudinem suam ordinat quicquid vult: ipsa enim est quae propter aliud non desideratur, et ad quam terminatur motus desiderii unum propter aliud desiderantis, ne sit infinitus. Cum igitur Deus omnia alia velit propter suam bonitatem, quae est sua essentia, oportet quod ipse, sicut est sua essentia et sua bonitas, ita sit sua beatitudo. [4] Furthermore, everyone relates to his blessedness whatever he wills. For it is what is not desired for the sake of something else, and that in which terminates the motion of the desire of someone desiring one thing for the sake of another—so that the motion may not be infinite. Since, then, God wills all other things for the sake of His goodness, which is His essence, it is necessary that, just as He is His essence and His goodness, He be His blessedness.
Praeterea. Duo summa bona esse est impossibile: si enim aliquid uni deesset quod alterum haberet, neutrum summum et perfectum esset. Deus autem ostensus est supra summum bonum esse. Beatitudo etiam summum bonum ostendetur esse ex hoc quod est ultimus finis. Ergo beatitudo et Deus sunt idem. Est igitur Deus sua beatitudo. [5] Moreover, that there be two highest goods is impossible. For, if one lacked something that the other had, neither would be highest and perfect. But God was shown above to be the highest good. Blessedness will also be shown to be the highest good because it is the ultimate end. Therefore, blessedness and God are identical. Therefore, God is His blessedness.

Caput 102 Chapter 102
Quod beatitudo divina perfecta et singularis est excedens omnem aliam beatitudinem THAT THE PERFECT AND UNIQUE BLESSEDNESS OF GOD EXCELS EVERY OTHER BLESSEDNESS
Ulterius autem ex praemissis considerari potest beatitudinis divinae excellentia. [1] From what has preceded we may further examine the excellence of the divine blessedness.
Quanto enim aliquid propinquius est beatitudini, tanto perfectius beatum est. Unde, etsi aliquis propter spem beatitudinis obtinendae beatus dicatur, nullo modo sua beatitudo comparatur eius beatitudini qui eam iam actu consecutus est. Propinquissimum autem est beatitudini quod est ipsa beatitudo. Quod de Deo ostensum est. Ipse igitur est singulariter perfecte beatus. [2] The nearer something is to blessedness, the more blessed it is. Hence, although a man may be called blessed because he hopes to obtain blessedness, in no way does his blessedness compare with the blessedness of the one who already possesses it in act. But the thing nearest to blessedness is blessedness itself. This has been shown of God. Therefore, God is in a unique way perfectly blessed.
Item. Cum delectatio ex amore causetur, ut ostensum est, ubi est maior amor, et maior delectatio in consecutione amati. Sed unumquodque, ceteris paribus, plus se amat quam aliud: cuius signum est quod, quanto aliquid est alicui propinquius, magis naturaliter amatur. Plus igitur delectatur Deus in sua beatitudine, quae est ipsemet, quam alii beati in beatitudine quae non est quod ipsi sunt. Magis igitur desiderium quiescit, et perfectior est beatitudo. [3] Again, since delight is caused by love, as has been shown, the possession of what is Joved. But, other things being equal, each thing loves itself more than another, and a sign of this is that the nearer a thing is to something else the more it is naturally loved. God, therefore, delights more in His blessedness, which He Himself is, than do other blessed ones in the blessedness which is not they themselves. The desire has therefore all the more repose, and the blessedness is all the more perfect.
Praeterea. Quod per essentiam est, potius est eo quod per participationem dicitur sicut natura ignis perfectius invenitur in ipso igne quam in rebus ignitis. Deus autem per essentiam suam beatus est. Quod nulli alii competere potest: nihil enim aliud praeter ipsum potest esse summum bonum, ut ex praedictis patere potest; et sic oportet ut quicumque alius ab ipso beatus est, participatione beatus dicatur. Divina igitur beatitudo omnem aliam beatitudinem excedit. [4] Furthermore, that which is through its essence is more excellent than what is said by participation: for example, the nature of fire is found more perfectly in fire itself than in things that are on fire. But God is blessed through His essence, and this befits no other being, since no being other than He can be the highest good, as can be seen from what has been said. And thus, whoever other than God is blessed, must be called blessed by participation. The divine blessedness, therefore, excels every other blessedness.
Amplius. Beatitudo in perfecta operatione intellectus consistit, ut ostensum est. Nulla autem alia intellectualis operatio eius operationi comparari potest. Quod patet non solum ex hoc quod est operatio subsistens: sed quia una operatione Deus seipsum ita perfecte intelligit sicut est, et omnia alia, quae sunt et quae non sunt, bona et mala. In aliis autem intelligentibus intelligere ipsum non est subsistens, sed actus subsistentis. Nec ipsum Deum, qui est summum intelligibile, aliquis ita perfecte potest intelligere sicut perfecte est: cum nullius esse perfectum sit sicut esse divinum, nec alicuius operatio possit esse perfectior quam sua substantia. Nec est aliquis alius intellectus qui omnia etiam quae Deus facere potest, cognoscat: quia sic divinam potentiam comprehenderet. Illa etiam quae intellectus alius cognoscit, non omnia una et eadem operatione cognoscit. Incomparabiliter igitur Deus supra omnia beatus est. [5] Moreover, blessedness consists in the perfect operation of the intellect, as has been shown. But no other intellectual operation can compare with God’s operation. This is evident not only because it is a subsistent operation but also because by one operation God knows Himself as perfectly as He is perfect, as well as all other things, those that are and those that are not, the good and the evil. But in all other beings with an intellect, the operation of the intellect is not itself subsistent, but the act of something subsistent. Nor, again, is God Himself, Who is the highest intelligible, understood by anyone as perfectly as He is perfect, since the being of no thing is as perfect as the divine being, nor can the operation of any being be more perfect than its substance. Nor, still, is there another intellect that knows also all the things that God can make, for then it would comprehend the divine power. And even as to the things that another intellect knows, it does not know them all by one and the same operation. God, therefore, is blessed above all things beyond compare.
Item. Quanto aliquid magis est unitum, tanto eius virtus et bonitas perfectior est. Operatio autem successiva secundum diversas partes temporis dividitur. Nullo igitur modo eius perfectio potest comparari perfectioni operationis quae est absque successione tota simul: et praecipue si non in momento transeat, sed in aeternum maneat. Divinum autem intelligere est absque successione totum simul aeternaliter existens: nostrum autem intelligere successionem habet, inquantum adiungitur ei per accidens continuum et tempus. Divina igitur beatitudo in infinitum excedit humanam: sicut duratio aeternitatis excedit nunc temporis fluens. [6] Again, the more something is united, by so much the more are its power and goodness more perfect. But a successive operation is divided according to the diverse parts of time. Its perfection, therefore, can in no way be compared to the perfection of an operation that is all at once without succession, and this especially if it does not pass away in a moment but abides for eternity. Now, in God, to understand exists eternally all at once and without succession, whereas in us to understand implies succession because continuity and time are by accident joined to it. Hence, the divine blessedness infinitely excels human blessedness, as the duration of eternity excels the flowing now of time.
Adhuc. Fatigatio, et occupationes variae quibus necesse est contemplationem nostram in hac vita interpolari, in qua consistit praecipue humana felicitas, si qua est praesentis vitae; errores, dubitationes, et casus varii quibus subiacet praesens vita; ostendunt omnino incomparabilem esse humanam felicitatem, praecipue huius vitae, divinae beatitudini. [7] Furthermore, weariness and the various cares with which perforce our contemplation in this life is mingled (in this contemplation human felicity especially consists, if by chance there is such in the present life), and the errors, doubts and hazards to which the present life is exposed show that human felicity, especially that of the present life, cannot at all compare with the divine blessedness.
Amplius. Perfectio divinae beatitudinis considerari potest ex hoc quod omnes beatitudines complectitur secundum perfectissimum modum. De contemplativa quidem felicitate, habet perfectissimam sui et aliorum perpetuam considerationem. De activa vero, non vitae unius hominis, aut domus aut civitatis aut regni, sed totius universi gubernationem. [8] Moreover, the perfection of the divine blessedness can be observed from the fact that it includes within itself every blessedness in a most perfect way. For contemplative felicity God has the most perfect and everlasting consideration of Himself and other things. For active felicity He has the government, not of the life of one man, or of a household, a city, or a kingdom, but of the whole universe.
Falsa etiam felicitas et terrena non habet nisi quandam umbram illius perfectissimae felicitatis. Consistit enim in quinque, secundum Boetium: scilicet in voluptate, divitiis, potestate, dignitate et fama. Habet autem Deus excellentissimam delectationem de se, et universale gaudium de omnibus bonis, absque contrarii admixtione. Pro divitiis vero habet omnimodam sufficientiam in seipso omnium bonorum, ut supra ostensum est. Pro potestate habet infinitam virtutem. Pro dignitate habet omnium entium primatum et regimen. Pro fama habet admirationem omnis intellectus ipsum utcumque cognoscentis. [9] As for false and earthly felicity, it contains no more than a shadow of that most perfect felicity. For it consists in five things, according to Boethius [ De consolatione philosophiae III, 2]; namely, in pleasure, riches, power, honor, and fame. But God enjoys a most excelling delight in Himself, as well as a universal joy in all things, without the admixture of any contrary. For wealth, He has the all-abundant sufficiency of all good things within Himself, as was shown above. For power, He has His infinite strength. For honor, He has the primacy and rule over all beings. For fame, He has the admiration of every intellect that knows Him however little.
Ipsi igitur qui singulariter beatus est, honor sit et gloria in saecula saeculorum. Amen. To Him, then, Who is singularly blessed, be, honor and glory unto the ages of ages. Amen.