Q. 1-83

translated by
Vernon J. Bourke


  1. Prologue
  2. How every agent acts for an end
  3. That every agent acts for a good
  4. That evil in things is not intended
  5. Arguments which seem to prove that evil is not apart from intention
  6. Answers to these arguments
  7. That evil is not an essence
  8. Arguments which seem to prove that evil is a nature or some real thing
  9. Answers to these arguments
  10. That good is the cause of evil
  11. That evil is based on the good
  12. That evil does not wholly destroy good
  13. That evil has a cause of some sort
  14. That evil is an accidental cause
  15. That there is no highest evil
  16. That the end of everything is a good
  17. That all things are ordered to one end Who is God
  18. How God is the end of all things
  19. That all things tend to become like God
  20. How things imitate divine goodness
  21. That things naturally tend to become like God inasmuch as He is a cause
  22. How things are ordered to their ends in various ways
  23. That the motion of the heavens comes from an intellectual principle
  24. How even beings devoid of knowledge seek the good
  25. That to understand God is the end of every intellectual substance
  26. Whether felicity consists in a will act
  27. That human felicity does not consist in pleasures of the flesh
  28. That felicity does not consist in honors
  29. That man’s felicity does not consist in glory
  30. That man’s felicity does not consist in riches
  31. That felicity does not consist in worldly power
  32. That felicity does not consist in goods of the body
  33. That human felicity does not lie in the senses 119
  34. That man’s ultimate felicity does not lie in acts of the moral virtues
  35. That ultimate felicity does not lie in the act of prudence
  36. That felicity does not consist in the operation of art
  37. That the ultimate felicity of man consists in the contemplation of God
  38. That human felicity does not consist in the knowledge of God which is generally possessed by most men
  39. That human felicity does not consist in the knowledge of God gained through demonstration
  40. Human felicity does not consist in the knowledge of God which is through faith
  41. Whether in this life man is able to understand separate substances through the study and investigation of the speculative sciences
  42. That we cannot in this life understand separate substances in the way that Alexander claimed
  43. That we cannot in this life understand separate substances in the way that Averroes claimed
  44. That man’s ultimate felicity does not consist in the kind of knowledge of separate substances that the foregoing opinions assume
  1. That in this life we cannot understand separate substances
  2. That the soul does not understand itself through itself in this life
  3. That in this life we cannot see God through His essence
  4. That man’s ultimate felicity does not come in this life
  5. That separate substances do not see God in His essence by knowing Him through their essence
  6. That the natural desire of separate substances does not come to rest in the natural knowledge which they have of God
  7. How God may be seen in His essence
  8. That no created substance can, by its own natural power, attain the vision of God in His essence
  9. That the created intellect needs an influx of divine light in order to see God through His essence
  10. Arguments by which it seems to be proved that God cannot be seen in His essence, and the answers to them
  11. That the created intellect does not comprehend the divine substance
  12. That no created intellect while seeing God sees all that can be seen in Him
  13. That every intellect, whatever its level, can be a participant in the divine vision
  14. That one being is able to see God more perfectly than another
  15. How those who see the divine substance may see all things
  16. That those who see God see all things in Him at once
  17. That through the vision of God one becomes a partaker of eternal life
  18. That those who see God will see Him perpetually
  19. How man’s every desire is fulfilled in that ultimate felicity
  20. That God governs things by His providence
  21. That God preserves things in being
  22. That nothing gives being except in so far as it
  23. That God is the cause of operation for all things that operate
  24. That God is everywhere
  25. The opinion of those who take away proper actions from natural things
  26. How the same effect is from God and from a natural agent
  27. That divine providence does not entirely exclude evil from things
  28. That divine providence does not exclude contingency from things
  29. That divine providence does not exclude freedom of choice
  30. That divine providence does not exclude fortune and chance
  31. That God’s providence applies to contingent singulars
  32. That God’s providence applies immediately to all singulars
  33. That the execution of divine providence is accomplished by means of secondary causes
  34. That other creatures are ruled by God by means of intellectual creatures
  35. That lower intellectual substances are ruled by higher ones
  36. On the ordering of the angels among themselves
  37. On the ordering of men among themselves and to other things
  38. That lower bodies are ruled by God through celestial bodies
  39. Epilogue to the preceding chapters

Caput 1 Chapter 1
Deus magnus dominus et rex magnus super omnes deos. Quoniam non repellet dominus plebem suam. Quia in manu eius sunt omnes fines terrae, et altitudines montium ipsius sunt. Quoniam ipsius est mare et ipse fecit illud, et siccam manus eius formaverunt. Psalm. XCIV. “The Lord is a great God and a great King above all gods” (Ps 94:3). “For the Lord will not cast off His people” (Ps. 93:14)”For in His hand are all the ends of the earth, and the heights of the mountains are His. For the sea is His and He made it, and His hands formed dry land” (Ps. 94:4-5)
Unum esse primum entium, totius esse perfectionem plenam possidens, quod Deum dicimus, in superioribus est ostensum, qui ex sui perfectionis abundantia omnibus existentibus esse largitur, ut non solum primum entium, sed et principium omnium esse comprobetur. Esse autem aliis tribuit non necessitate naturae, sed secundum suae arbitrium voluntatis, ut ex superioribus est manifestum. Unde consequens est ut factorum suorum sit dominus: nam super ea quae nostrae voluntati subduntur, dominamur. Hoc autem dominium super res a se productas perfectum habet, utpote qui ad eas producendas nec exterioris agentis adminiculo indiget, nec materiae fundamento: cum sit totius esse universalis effector. [1] That there is one First Being, possessing the full perfection of the whole of being, and that we call Him God, has been shown in the preceding Books. From the abundance of His perfection, He endows all existing things with being, so that He is fully established not only as the First Being but also as the original source of all existing things. Moreover, He has granted being to other things, not by a necessity of His nature but according to the choice of His will, as has been made clear in our earlier explanations. From this it follows that He is the Lord of the things that He has made, for we are masters of the things that are subject to our will. In fact, He holds perfect dominion over things produced by Himself, since to produce them He is in need neither of the assistance of an external agent nor of the underlying presence of matter, for He is the universal maker of the whole of being.
Eorum autem quae per voluntatem producuntur agentis, unumquodque ab agente in finem aliquem ordinatur: bonum enim et finis est obiectum proprium voluntatis, unde necesse est ut quae ex voluntate procedunt, ad finem aliquem ordinentur. Finem autem ultimum unaquaeque res per suam consequitur actionem, quam oportet in finem dirigi ab eo qui principia rebus dedit per quae agunt. [2] Now, each of the things produced through the will of an agent is directed to an end by the agent. For the proper object of the will is the good and the end. As a result, things which proceed from will must be directed to some end. Moreover, each thing achieves its ultimate end through its own action which must be directed to the end by Him Who gives things the principles through which they act.
Necesse est igitur ut Deus, qui est in se universaliter perfectus et omnibus entibus ex sua potestate esse largitur, omnium entium rector existat, a nullo utique directus: nec est aliquid quod ab eius regimine excusetur, sicut nec est aliquid quod ab ipso esse non sortiatur. Est igitur, sicut perfectus in essendo et causando, ita etiam et in regendo perfectus. [3] So, it must be that God, Who is in all ways perfect in Himself, and Who endows all things with being from His own power, exists as the Ruler of all beings, and is ruled by none other. Nor is there anything that escapes His rule, just as there is nothing that does not receive its being from Him. As He is perfect in being and causing, so also is He perfect in ruling.
Huius vero regiminis effectus in diversis apparet diversimode, secundum differentiam naturarum. Quaedam namque sic a Deo producta sunt ut, intellectum habentia, eius similitudinem gerant et imaginem repraesentent: unde et ipsa non solum sunt directa, sed et seipsa dirigentia secundum proprias actiones in debitum finem. Quae si in sua directione divino subdantur regimini, ad ultimum finem consequendum ex divino regimine admittuntur: repelluntur autem si secus in sua directione processerint. [4] Of course, the result of this rule is manifested differently in different beings, depending on the diversity of their natures. For some beings so exist as God’s products that, possessing understanding, they bear His likeness and reflect His image. Consequently, they are not only ruled but are also rulers of themselves, inasmuch as their own actions are directed to a fitting end. If these beings submit to the divine rule in their own ruling, then by virtue of the divine rule they are admitted to the achievement of their ultimate end; but, if they proceed otherwise in their own ruling, they are rejected.
Alia vero, intellectu carentia, seipsa in suum finem non dirigunt, sed ab alio diriguntur. Quorum quaedam, incorruptibilia existentia, sicut in esse naturali pati non possunt defectum, ita in propriis actionibus ab ordine in finem eis praestitutum nequaquam exorbitant, sed indeficienter regimini primi regentis subduntur: sicut sunt corpora caelestia, quorum motus semper uniformiter procedunt. [5] Still other beings, devoid of understanding, do not direct themselves to their end, but are directed by another being. Some of these are incorruptible and, as they can suffer no defect in their natural being, so in their own actions they never fail to follow the order to the end which is prearranged for them. They are unfailingly subject to the rule of the First Ruler. Such are the celestial bodies whose motions occur in ever the same way.
Alia vero, corruptibilia existentia, naturalis esse pati possunt defectum, qui tamen per alterius profectum suppletur: nam, uno corrupto, aliud generatur. Et similiter in actionibus propriis a naturali ordine deficiunt, qui tamen defectus per aliquod bonum inde proveniens compensatur. Ex quo apparet quod nec illa quae ab ordine primi regiminis exorbitare videntur, potestatem primi regentis evadunt: nam et haec corruptibilia corpora, sicut ab ipso Deo condita sunt, ita potestati eius perfecte subduntur. [6] Other beings, however, are corruptible. They can suffer a defect in their natural being, yet such a defect works to the advantage of another being. For, when one thing is corrupted, another comes into being. Likewise, in their proper actions they may fall short of the natural order, yet such a failure is balanced by the good which comes from it. Thus, it is evident that not even those things which appear to depart from the order of the primary rule do actually escape the power of the First Ruler. Even these corruptible bodies are perfectly subject to His power, just as they are created by God Himself.
Hoc igitur, divino repletus spiritu, Psalmista considerans, ut nobis divinum regimen demonstraret, primo describit nobis primi regentis perfectionem: naturae quidem, in hoc quod dicit Deus, potestatis, in hoc quod dicit magnus dominus, quasi nullo indigens ad suae potestatis effectum producendum; auctoritatis, in hoc quod dicit rex magnus super omnes deos, quia, etsi sint multi regentes, omnes tamen eius regimini subduntur. [7] Contemplating this fact, the Psalmist, being filled with the Holy Spirit, first describes for us the perfection of the First Ruler, in order to point out the divine rule to us: as a perfection of nature, by the use of the term “God”; as a perfection of power, by the use of the words, “great Lord” (suggesting that He has need of no other being for His power to produce His effect); and as a perfection of authority, by the use of the phrase, “a great King above all gods” (for even if there be many rulers, they are all nonetheless subject to His rule).
Secundo autem nobis describit regiminis modum. Et quidem quantum ad intellectualia, quae, eius regimen sequentia, ab ipso consequuntur ultimum finem, qui est ipse: et ideo dicit, quia non repellet dominus plebem suam. Quantum vero ad corruptibilia, quae, etiam si exorbitent interdum a propriis actionibus, a potestate tamen primi regentis non excluduntur, dicit, quia in manu eius sunt omnes fines terrae. Quantum vero ad caelestia corpora, quae omnem altitudinem terrae excedunt, idest corruptibilium corporum, et semper rectum ordinem divini regiminis servant, dicit, et altitudines montium ipsius sunt. [8] In the second place, he describes for us the manner of this rule. First, as regards those intellectual beings who are led by Him to their ultimate end, which is Himself, he uses this expression: “For the Lord will not cast off His people.” Next, in regard to corruptible beings which are not removed from the power of the First Ruler, even if they go astray sometimes in their own actions, he says: “For in His hands are all the ends of the earth.” Then, in regard to celestial bodies which exist above all the highest parts of the earth (that is, of corruptible bodies) and which always observe the right order of the divine rule, he says: “and the heights of the mountains are His.”
Tertio vero ipsius universalis regiminis rationem assignat: quia necesse est ut ea quae a Deo sunt condita, ab ipso etiam regantur. Et hoc est quod dicit, quoniam ipsius est mare et cetera. [9] In the third place, he indicates the reason for this universal rule: the things created by God must also be ruled by Him. Thus it is that he says: “For the sea is His,” and so on.
Quia ergo in primo libro de perfectione divinae naturae prosecuti sumus; in secundo autem de perfectione potestatis ipsius, secundum quod est rerum omnium productor et dominus: restat in hoc tertio libro prosequi de perfecta auctoritate sive dignitate ipsius, secundum quod est rerum omnium finis et rector. Erit ergo hoc ordine procedendum: ut primo agatur de ipso secundum quod est rerum omnium finis. Secundo, de regimine universali ipsius, secundum quod omnem creaturam gubernat. Tertio, de speciali regimine, prout gubernat creaturas intellectum habentes. [10] Therefore, since we have treated of the perfection of the divine nature in Book One, and of the perfection of His power inasmuch as He is the Maker and Lord of all things in Book Two, there remains to be treated in this third Book His perfect authority or dignity, inasmuch as He is the End and Ruler of all things. So, this will be our order of procedure: first, we shall treat of Himself, according as He is the end of all things; second, of His universal rule, according as He governs every creature [64-110]; third, of His particular rule, according as He governs creatures possessed of understanding [111-163.

Caput 2
Quod omne agens agit propter finem
Chapter 2
Ostendendum est igitur primo, quod omne agens in agendo intendit aliquem finem. [1] The first thing that we must show, then, is that in acting every agent intends an end.
In his enim quae manifeste propter finem agunt, hoc dicimus esse finem in quod tendit impetus agentis: hoc enim adipiscens dicitur adipisci finem, deficiens autem ab hoc dicitur deficere a fine intento; sicut patet in medico agente ad sanitatem, et homine currente ad certum terminum. Nec differt, quantum ad hoc, utrum quod tendit in finem sit cognoscens, vel non: sicut enim signum est finis sagittantis, ita est finis motus sagittae. Omnis autem agentis impetus ad aliquid certum tendit: non enim ex quacumque virtute quaevis actio procedit, sed a calore quidem calefactio, a frigore autem infrigidatio; unde et actiones secundum diversitatem activorum specie differunt. Actio vero quandoque quidem terminatur ad aliquod factum, sicut aedificatio ad domum, sanatio ad sanitatem: quandoque autem non, sicut intelligere et sentire. Et si quidem actio terminatur ad aliquod factum, impetus agentis tendit per actionem in illud factum: si autem non terminatur ad aliquod factum, impetus agentis tendit in ipsam actionem. Oportet igitur quod omne agens in agendo intendat finem: quandoque quidem actionem ipsam; quandoque aliquid per actionem factum. [2] In the case of things which obviously act for an end we call that toward which the inclination of the agent tend the end. For, if it attain this, it is said to attain its end; but if it fail in regard to this, it fails in regard to the end in tended, as is evident in the case of the physician working for the sake of health, and of the man who is running toward a set objective. As far as this point is concerned, it makes n difference whether the being tending to an end is a knowing being or not. For, just as the target is the end for the archer, so is it the end for the motion of the arrow. Now every inclination of an agent tends toward something definite. A given action does not stem from merely any power but heating comes from heat, cooling from cold. Thus it is that, actions are specifically distinguished by virtue of diversity of active powers. In fact, an action may sometime terminate in something which is made, as building does in a house, and as healing does in health. Sometimes, however, it does not, as in the cases of understanding an sensing. Now, if an action does in fact terminate in some thing that is made, the inclination of the agent tend through the action toward the thing that is produced. But if it does not terminate in a product, then the inclination of the agent tends toward the action itself. So, it must be that every agent in acting intends an end, sometimes the action itself, sometimes a thing produced by the action.
Adhuc. In omnibus agentibus propter finem, hoc esse ultimum finem dicimus, ultra quod agens non quaerit aliquid: sicut actio medici est usque ad sanitatem, ea vero consecuta, non conatur ad aliquid ulterius. Sed in actione cuiuslibet agentis est invenire aliquid ultra quod agens non quaerit aliquid: alias enim actiones in infinitum tenderent; quod quidem est impossibile, quia, cum infinita non sit pertransire, agens agere non inciperet; nihil enim movetur ad id ad quod impossibile est pervenire. Omne igitur agens agit propter finem. [3] Again, with reference to all things that act for an end, we say that the ultimate end is that beyond which the agent seeks nothing else; thus, the action of a physician goes as far as health, but when it is attained there is no desire for anything further. Now, in the action of all agents, one may find something beyond which the agent seeks nothing further. Otherwise, actions would tend to infinity, which is impossible. Since “it is impossible to proceed to infinity,” the agent could not begin to act, because nothing is moved toward what cannot be reached. Therefore, every agent acts for an end.
Amplius. Si actiones agentis procedant in infinitum, oportet quod vel ex istis actionibus sequatur aliquod factum, vel non. Si quidem sequatur aliquod factum, esse illius facti sequetur post infinitas actiones. Quod autem praeexigit infinita, impossibile est esse: cum non sit infinita pertransire. Quod autem impossibile est esse, impossibile est fieri: et quod impossibile est fieri, impossibile est facere. Impossibile est igitur quod agens incipiat facere aliquod factum ad quod praeexiguntur actiones infinitae. [4] Besides, if the actions of an agent are supposed to proceed to infinity, then there must be as a consequence to these actions either something that is produced, or nothing. Supposing that there is something that results, then the existence of this thing would come about after an infinite number of actions. But that which presupposes an infinite number of things cannot come into existence, since it is impossible to proceed to infinity. Now, that which is impossible in regard to being is impossible in regard to coming into being. And it is impossible to produce that which cannot come into being. Therefore, it is impossible for an agent to begin to produce something that presupposes an infinite number of actions.
Si autem ex illis actionibus non sequitur aliquod factum, oportet ordinem huiusmodi actionum esse vel secundum ordinem virtutum activarum, sicut si homo sentit ut imaginetur, imaginatur autem ut intelligat, intelligit autem ut velit: vel secundum ordinem obiectorum, sicut considero corpus ut considerem animam, quam considero ut considerem substantiam separatam, quam considero ut considerem Deum. Non autem est possibile procedere in infinitum neque in virtutibus activis, sicut neque in formis rerum, ut probatur in II Metaph., forma enim est agendi principium: neque in obiectis, sicut neque in entibus, cum sit unum primum ens, ut supra probatum est. Non est igitur possibile quod actiones in infinitum procedant. Oportet igitur esse aliquid quo habito conatus agentis quiescat. Omne igitur agens agit propter finem. Supposing, on the other hand, that nothing follows as a product of these actions, then the order of such actions must either depend on the ordering of the active powers (as in the case of a man who senses so that he may imagine, imagines so that he may understand, and then understands so that he may will); or it depends on the ordering of objects (thus, I think of body so that I may be able to think of soul, which latter I think so that I may be able to think of immaterial substance, which in turn I think so that I may be able to think about God). Indeed, it is impossible to proceed to infinity, either through a series of active powers (for instance, through the forms of things, as is proved in Metaphysics [Ia, 2: 994a 1–b6], for the form is the principle of action) or through a series of objects (for there is not an infinite number of beings, because there is one First Being, as we demonstrated earlier [I:42]). So, it is not possible for actions to proceed to infinity. There must, then, be something which satisfies the agent’s desire when it is attained. Therefore, every agent acts for an end.
Item. In his quae agunt propter finem, omnia intermedia inter primum agens et ultimum finem sunt fines respectu priorum et principia activa respectu sequentium. Si igitur conatus agentis non est ad aliquid determinatum, sed actiones, sicut dictum est, procedunt in infinitum, oportet principia activa in infinitum procedere. Quod est impossibile, ut supra ostensum est. Necesse est igitur quod conatus agentis sit ad aliquid determinatum. [5] Moreover, for things which act for an end, all things intermediate between the first agent and the ultimate end are as ends in regard to things prior, and as active principles with regard to things consequent. So, if the agent’s desire is not directed to some definite thing, but, rather, the actions are multiplied to infinity, as was said, then the active principles must be multiplied to infinity. This is impossible, as we showed above. Therefore, the agent’s desire must be directed to some definite thing.
Adhuc. Omne agens vel agit per naturam, vel per intellectum. De agentibus autem per intellectum non est dubium quin agant propter finem: agunt enim praeconcipientes in intellectu id quod per actionem consequuntur, et ex tali praeconceptione agunt; hoc enim est agere per intellectum. Sicut autem in intellectu praeconcipiente existit tota similitudo effectus ad quem per actiones intelligentis pervenitur, ita in agente naturali praeexistit similitudo naturalis effectus, ex qua actio ad hunc effectum determinatur: nam ignis generat ignem, et oliva olivam. Sicut igitur agens per intellectum tendit in finem determinatum per suam actionem, ita agens per naturam. Omne igitur agens agit propter finem. [6] Furthermore, for every agent the principle of its action is either its nature or its intellect. Now, there is no question that intellectual agents act for the sake of an end, because they think ahead of time in their intellects of the things which they achieve through action; and their action stems from such preconception. This is what it means for intellect to be the principle of action. just as the entire likeness of the result achieved by the actions of an intelligent agent exists in the intellect that preconceives it, so, too, does the likeness of a natural resultant pre-exist in the natural agent; and as a consequence of this, the action is determined to a definite result. For fire gives rise to fire, and an olive to an olive. Therefore, the agent that acts with nature as its principle is just as much directed to a definite end, in its action, as is the agent that acts through intellect as its principle. Therefore, every agent acts for an end.
Amplius. Peccatum non invenitur nisi in his quae sunt propter finem: nec enim imputatur alicui ad peccatum si deficiat ab eo ad quod non est; medico enim imputatur ad peccatum si deficiat a sanando, non autem aedificatori aut grammatico. Sed peccatum invenimus in his quae fiunt secundum artem, sicut cum grammaticus non recte loquitur; et in his quae sunt secundum naturam, sicut patet in partubus monstruosis. Ergo tam agens secundum naturam, quam agens secundum artem et a proposito, agit propter finem. [7] Again, there is no fault to be found, except in the case of things that are for the sake of an end. A fault is never attributed to an agent, if the failure is related to something that is not the agent’s end. Thus, the fault of failing to heal is imputed to the physician, but not to the builder or the grammarian. We do find fault with things done according to art, for instance, when the grammarian does not speak correctly, and also in things done according to nature, as is evident in the case of the birth of monsters. Therefore, it is just as true of the agent that acts in accord with nature as of the agent who acts in accord with art and as a result of previous planning that action is for the sake of an end.
Item. Si agens non tenderet ad aliquem effectum determinatum, omnes effectus essent ei indifferentes. Quod autem indifferenter se habet ad multa, non magis unum eorum operatur quam aliud: unde a contingente ad utrumque non sequitur aliquis effectus nisi per aliquid determinetur ad unum. Impossibile igitur esset quod ageret. Omne igitur agens tendit ad aliquem determinatum effectum, quod dicitur finis eius. [8] Besides, if an agent did not incline toward some definite effect, all results would be a matter of indifference for him. Now, he who looks upon a manifold number of things with indifference no more succeeds in doing one of them than another. Hence, from an agent contingently indifferent to alternatives no effect follows, unless he be determined to one effect by something. So, it would be impossible for him to act. Therefore, every agent tends toward some determinate effect, and this is called his end.
Sunt autem aliquae actiones quae non videntur esse propter finem, sicut actiones ludicrae et contemplatoriae, et actiones quae absque attentione fiunt, sicut confricatio barbae et huiusmodi: ex quibus aliquis opinari potest quod sit aliquod agens non propter finem. Sed sciendum quod actiones contemplativae non sunt propter alium finem, sed ipsae sunt finis. Actiones autem ludicrae interdum sunt finis, cum quis solum ludit propter delectationem quae in ludo est: quandoque autem sunt propter finem, ut cum ludimus ut postmodum melius studeamus. Actiones autem quae fiunt sine attentione, non sunt ab intellectu, sed ab aliqua subita imaginatione vel naturali principio: sicut inordinatio humoris pruritum excitantis est causa confricationis barbae, quae fit sine attentione intellectus. Et haec ad aliquem finem tendunt, licet praeter ordinem intellectus. [9] Of course, there are some actions that do not seem to be for an end. Examples are playful and contemplative actions, and those that are done without attention, like rubbing one’s beard and the like. These examples could make a person think that there are some cases of acting without an end. However, we must understand that contemplative actions are not for another end, but are themselves ends. On the other hand, acts of play are sometimes ends, as in the case of a man who plays solely for the pleasure attaching to play; at other times they are for an end, for instance, when we play so that we can study better afterward. Actions that are done without attention do not stem from the intellect but from some sudden act of imagination or from a natural source. Thus, a disorder of the.humors produces an itch and is the cause of rubbing the beard, and this is done without intellectual attention. So, these actions do tend to some end, though quite apart from the order of the intellect.
Per hoc autem excluditur antiquorum naturalium error; qui ponebant omnia fieri ex necessitate materiae, causam finalem a rebus penitus subtrahentes. [10] Through this consideration the error of the ancient natural philosophers is refuted; they claimed that all things come about as a result of material necessity, for they completely excluded final cause from things.

Caput 3
Quod omne agens agit propter bonum
Chapter 3
Ex hoc autem ulterius ostendendum est quod omne agens agit propter bonum. [1] Next after this we must show that every agent acts for a good.
Inde enim manifestum est omne agens agere propter finem, quia quodlibet agens tendit ad aliquod determinatum. Id autem ad quod agens determinate tendit, oportet esse conveniens ei: non enim tenderet in ipsum nisi propter aliquam convenientiam ad ipsum. Quod autem est conveniens alicui, est ei bonum. Ergo omne agens agit propter bonum. [2] That every agent acts for an end has been made clear from the fact that every agent tends toward something definite. Now, that toward which an agent tends in a definite way must be appropriate to it, because the agent would not be inclined to it except by virtue of some agreement with it. But, what is appropriate to something is good for it. So, every agent acts for a good.
Praeterea. Finis est in quo quiescit appetitus agentis vel moventis, et eius quod movetur. Hoc autem est de ratione boni, ut terminet appetitum: nam bonum est quod omnia appetunt. Omnis ergo actio et motus est propter bonum. [3] Again, the end is that in which the appetitive inclination of an agent or mover, and of the thing moved, finds its rest. Now, the essential meaning of the good is that it provides a terminus for appetite, since “the good is that which all desire.” Therefore, every action and motion are for the sake of a good.
Adhuc. Omnis actio et motus ad esse aliquo modo ordinari videtur: vel ut conservetur secundum speciem vel individuum; vel ut de novo acquiratur. Hoc autem ipsum quod est esse, bonum est. Et ideo omnia appetunt esse. Omnis igitur actio et motus est propter bonum. [4] Besides, every action and movement are seen to be ordered in some way toward being, either that it may be preserved in the species or in the individual, or that it may be newly acquired. Now, the very fact of being is a good, and so all things desire to be. Therefore, every action and movement are for the sake of a good.
Amplius. Omnis actio et motus est propter aliquam perfectionem. Si enim ipsa actio sit finis, manifestum est quod est perfectio secunda agentis. Si autem actio sit transmutatio exterioris materiae, manifestum est quod movens intendit aliquam perfectionem inducere in re mota; in quam etiam tendit mobile, si sit motus naturalis. Hoc autem dicimus esse bonum quod est esse perfectum. Omnis igitur actio et motus est propter bonum. [5] Moreover, every action and movement are for the sake of some perfection. Even if the action itself be the end, it is clear that it is a secondary perfection of the agent. But, if the action be a changing of external matter, it is obvious that the mover intends to bring about some perfection in the thing that is moved. Even the thing that is moved also tends toward this, if it be a case of natural movement. Now, we call what is perfect a good. So, every action and movement are for the sake of a good.
Item. Omne agens agit secundum quod est actu. Agendo autem tendit in sibi simile. Igitur tendit in actum aliquem. Actus autem omnis habet rationem boni: nam malum non invenitur nisi in potentia deficiente ab actu. Omnis igitur actio est propter bonum. [6] Furthermore, every agent acts in so far as it is in act, and in acting it tends to produce something like itself. So, it tends toward some act. But every act has something of good in its essential character, for there is no evil thing that is not in a condition of potency falling short of its act. Therefore, every action is for the sake of a good.
Adhuc. Agens per intellectum agit propter finem sicut determinans sibi finem: agens autem per naturam, licet agat propter finem, ut probatum est, non tamen determinat sibi finem, cum non cognoscat rationem finis, sed movetur in finem determinatum sibi ab alio. Agens autem per intellectum non determinat sibi finem nisi sub ratione boni: intelligibile enim non movet nisi sub ratione boni, quod est obiectum voluntatis. Ergo et agens per naturam non movetur neque agit propter aliquem finem nisi secundum quod est bonum: cum agenti per naturam determinetur finis ab aliquo appetitu. Omne igitur agens propter bonum agit. [7] Again, an intelligent agent acts for the sake of an end, in the sense that it determines the end for itself. On the other hand, an agent that acts from a natural impulse, though acting for an end, as we showed in the preceding chapter, does not determine the end for itself, since it does not know the meaning of an end, but, rather, is moved toward an end determined for it by another being. Now, the intelligent agent does not determine the end for itself, unless it do so by considering the rational character of the good, for an object of the intellect is only motivating by virtue of the rational meaning of the good, which is the object of the will. Therefore, even the natural agent is neither moved, nor does it move, for the sake of an end, except in so far as the end is a good; for the end is determined for the natural agent by some appetite. Therefore, every agent acts for the sake of a good.
Item. Eiusdem rationis est fugere malum et appetere bonum: sicut eiusdem rationis est moveri a deorsum et moveri sursum. Omnia autem inveniuntur malum fugere: nam agentia per intellectum hac ratione aliquid fugiunt, quia apprehendunt illud ut malum; omnia autem agentia naturalia, quantum habent de virtute, tantum resistunt corruptioni, quae est malum uniuscuiusque. Omnia igitur agunt propter bonum. [8] Besides, there is the same general reason for avoiding evil that there is for seeking the good, just as there is the same general reason for moving downward and for moving upward. But all things are known to flee from evil; in fact, intelligent agents avoid a thing for this reason: they recognize it as an evil thing. Now, all natural agents resist corruption, which is an evil for each individual, to the full extent of their power. Therefore, all things act for the sake of a good.
Adhuc. Quod provenit ex alicuius agentis actione praeter intentionem ipsius, dicitur a casu vel fortuna accidere. Videmus autem in operibus naturae accidere vel semper vel frequentius quod melius est: sicut in plantis folia sic esse disposita ut protegant fructus; et partes animalium sic disponi ut animal salvari possit. Si igitur hoc evenit praeter intentionem naturalis agentis, hoc erit a casu vel fortuna. Sed hoc est impossibile: nam ea quae accidunt semper vel frequenter, non sunt casualia neque fortuita, sed quae accidunt in paucioribus. Naturale igitur agens intendit ad id quod melius est. Et multo manifestius quod agit per intellectum. Omne igitur agens intendit bonum in agendo. [9] Moreover, that which results from the action of an agent, but apart from the intention of the agent, is said to happen by chance or by luck. But we observe that what happens in the workings of nature is either always, or mostly, for the better. Thus, in the plant world leaves are arranged so as to protect the fruit, and among animals the bodily organs are disposed in such a way that the animal can be protected. So, if this came about apart from the intention of the natural agent, it would be by chance or by luck. But this is impossible, for things which occur always, or for the most part, are neither chance nor fortuitous events, but only those which occur in few instances. Therefore, the natural agent tends toward what is better, and it is much more evident that the intelligent agent does so. Hence, every agent intends the good when it acts.
Item. Omne quod movetur ducitur ad terminum motus a movente et agente. Oportet igitur movens et motum ad idem tendere. Quod autem movetur, cum sit in potentia, tendit ad actum, et ita ad perfectum et bonum: per motum enim exit de potentia in actum. Ergo et movens et agens semper in movendo et agendo intendit bonum. [10] Furthermore, everything that is moved is brought to the terminus of the movement by the mover and agent. So, the mover and the object moved must tend toward the same thing. Now, the object moved, since it is in potency, tends toward act, and so toward the perfect and the good, for it goes from potency to act through movement. Therefore, both the mover and the agent always intend the good in their movement and action.
Hinc est quod philosophi definientes bonum dixerunt: bonum est quod omnia appetunt. Et Dionysius, IV cap., de divinis nominibus, dicit quod omnia bonum et optimum concupiscunt. [11] This is the reason why the philosophers, in defining the good, have said: “the good is what all desire. And Dionysius states that “all crave the good and the best [ De div. nom. IV, 4].”

Caput 4
Quod malum est praeter intentionem in rebus
Chapter 4
Ex hoc autem apparet quod malum in rebus incidit praeter intentionem agentium. [1] From this it is clear that evil occurs in things apart from the intention of the agents.
Quod enim ex actione consequitur diversum ab eo quod erat intentum ab agente, manifestum est praeter intentionem accidere. Malum autem diversum est a bono, quod intendit omne agens. Est igitur malum praeter intentionem eveniens. [2] For that which follows from an action, as a different result from that intended by the agent, clearly happens apart from intention. Now, evil is different from the good which every agent intends. Therefore, evil is a result apart from intention.
Item. Defectus in effectu et actione consequitur aliquem defectum in principiis actionis: sicut ex aliqua corruptione seminis sequitur partus monstruosus, et ex curvitate cruris sequitur claudicatio. Agens autem agit secundum quod habet de virtute activa, non secundum id quod defectum virtutis patitur. Secundum autem quod agit, sic intendit finem. Intendit igitur finem correspondentem virtuti. Quod igitur sequitur respondens defectui virtutis, erit praeter intentionem agentis. Hoc autem est malum. Accidit igitur malum praeter intentionem. [3] Again, a defect in an effect and in an action results from some defect in the principles of the action; for instance, the birth of a monstrosity results from some corruption of the semen, and lameness results from a bending of the leg bone. Now, an agent acts in keeping with the active power that it has, not in accord with the defect of power to which it is subject. According as it acts, so does it intend the end. Therefore, it intends an end corresponding to its power. So, that which results as an effect of the defect of power will be apart from the intention of the agent. Now, this is evil. Hence, evil occurs apart from intention.
Adhuc. Ad idem tendit motus mobilis et motio moventis. Mobile autem tendit per se ad bonum: ad malum autem per accidens et praeter intentionem. Quod quidem maxime in generatione et corruptione apparet. Materia enim, cum est sub una forma, est in potentia ad formam aliam et privationem formae iam habitae: sicut, cum est sub forma aeris, est in potentia ad formam ignis et privationem formae aeris. Et ad utrumque transmutatio materiae terminatur simul: ad formam quidem ignis secundum quod generatur ignis, ad privationem autem formae aeris secundum quod corrumpitur aer. Non autem intentio et appetitus materiae est ad privationem, sed ad formam: non enim tendit ad impossibile; est autem impossibile materiam tantum sub privatione esse, esse vero eam sub forma est possibile. Igitur quod terminetur ad privationem est praeter intentionem; terminatur autem ad eam inquantum pervenit ad formam quam intendit, quam privatio alterius formae de necessitate consequitur. Transmutatio igitur materiae in generatione et corruptione per se ordinatur ad formam, privatio vero consequitur praeter intentionem. Et similiter oportet esse in omnibus motibus. Et ideo in quolibet motu est generatio et corruptio secundum quid: sicut, cum aliquid alteratur de albo in nigrum, corrumpitur album et fit nigrum. Bonum autem est secundum quod materia est perfecta per formam, et potentia per actum proprium: malum autem secundum quod est privata actu debito. Omne igitur quod movetur intendit in suo motu pervenire ad bonum, pervenit autem ad malum praeter intentionem. Igitur, cum omne agens et movens intendat ad bonum, malum provenit praeter intentionem agentis. [4] Besides, the movement of a mobile thing and the motion of its mover tend toward the same objective. Of itself, the mobile thing tends toward the good, but it may tend toward evil accidentally and apart from intention. This is best seen in generation and corruption. When it is under one form, matter is in potency to another form and to the privation of the form it already has. Thus, when it is under the form of air, it is in potency to the form of fire and to the privation of the form of air. Change in the matter terminates in both at the same time; in the form of fire, in so far as fire is generated; in the privation of the form of air, inasmuch as air is corrupted. Now, the intention and appetite of matter are not toward privation but toward form, for it does not tend toward the impossible. Now, it is impossible for matter to exist under privation alone, but for it to exist under a form is possible. Therefore, that which terminates in a privation is apart from intention. It terminates in a privation inasmuch as it attains the form which it intends, and the privation of another form is a necessary result of this attainment. So, the changing of matter in generation and corruption is essentially ordered to the form, but the privation is a consequence apart from the intention. The same should be true for all cases of change. Therefore, in every change there is a generation and a corruption, in some sense; for instance, when a thing changes from white to black, the white is corrupted and the black comes into being. Now, it is a good thing for matter to be perfected through form, and for potency to be perfected through its proper act, but it is a bad thing for it to be deprived of its due act. So, everything that is moved tends in its movement to reach a good, but it reaches an evil apart from such a tendency. Therefore, since every agent and mover tends to the good, evil arises apart from the intention of the agent.
Amplius. In agentibus per intellectum et aestimationem quamcumque, intentio sequitur apprehensionem: in illud enim tendit intentio quod apprehenditur ut finis. Si igitur perveniatur ad aliquid quod non habet speciem apprehensam, erit praeter intentionem: sicut, si aliquis intendat comedere mel, et comedat fel credens illud esse mel, hoc erit praeter intentionem. Sed omne agens per intellectum tendit ad aliquid secundum quod accipit illud sub ratione boni, sicut ex superioribus patet. Si ergo illud non sit bonum, sed malum, hoc erit praeter intentionem. Agens igitur per intellectum non operatur malum nisi praeter intentionem. Cum igitur tendere ad bonum sit commune agenti per intellectum et per naturam, malum non consequitur ex intentione alicuius agentis nisi praeter intentionem. [5] Moreover, in the case of beings that act as a result of understanding or of some sort of sense judgment, intention is a consequence of apprehension, for the intention tends to what is apprehended as an end. If it actually attains something which does not possess the specific nature of what was apprehended, then this will be apart from the intention. For example, if someone intends to eat honey, but he cats poison, in the belief that it is honey, then this will be apart from the intention. But every intelligent agent tends toward something in so far as he considers the object under the rational character of a good, as was evident in the preceding chapter. So, if this object is not good but bad, this will be apart from his intention. Therefore, an intelligent agent does not produce an evil result, unless it be apart from his intention. Since to tend to the good is common to the intelligent agent and to the agent that acts by natural instinct, evil does not result from the intention of any agent, except apart from the intention.
Hinc est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod malum est praeter intentionem et voluntatem. Hence, Dionysius says, in the fourth chapter of On the Divine names: “Evil is apart from intention and will.”

Caput 5
Rationes quibus videtur probari quod malum non sit praeter intentionem
(et solutio ipsarum)
Chapter 5
Sunt autem quaedam quae huic sententiae adversarii videntur. [1] Now, there are certain points which seem to run counter to this view.
Quod enim accidit praeter intentionem agentis, dicitur esse fortuitum et casuale et in paucioribus accidens. Malum autem fieri non dicitur fortuitum et casuale, neque ut in paucioribus accidens, sed semper vel in pluribus. In naturalibus enim semper generationi corruptio adiungitur. In agentibus etiam per voluntatem in pluribus peccatum accidit: cum difficile sit secundum virtutem agere, sicut attingere centrum in circulo, ut dicit Aristoteles, in II Ethicorum. Non igitur videtur malum esse proveniens praeter intentionem. [2] That which happens apart from the intention of the agent is called fortuitous, a matter of chance, something which rarely happens. But the occurrence of evil is not called fortuitous, a matter of chance, nor does it happen rarely, but always or in most cases. For corruption always accompanies generation in the things of nature. Even in the case of volitional agents sin occurs in most cases, since “it is as difficult to act in accord with virtue as to find the center of a circle,” as Aristotle says in the Nicomachean Ethics [II, 9: 1109a 24]. So, evil does not seem to happen apart from intention.
Item. Aristoteles in III Eth., expresse dicit quod malitia est voluntarium. Et hoc probat per hoc quod aliquis voluntarie operatur iniusta, irrationabile autem est operantem voluntarie iniusta non velle iniustum esse, et voluntarie stuprantem non velle incontinentem esse; et per hoc quod legislatores puniunt malos quasi voluntarie operantes mala. Non videtur igitur malum praeter voluntatem vel intentionem esse. [3] Again, in Ethics III [5: 1113b 16] Aristotle expressly states that “wickedness is voluntary.” He proves this by the fact that a person voluntarily performs unjust acts: “now it is unreasonable for the agent of voluntarily unjust actions not to will to be unjust, and for the self-indulgent man not to wish to be incontinent” [1114a 11]; and he proves it also by the fact that legislators punish evil men as doers of evil in a voluntary way [1113b 22]. So, it does not seem that evil occurs apart from the will or the intention.
Praeterea. Omnis motus naturalis habet finem intentum a natura. Corruptio autem est mutatio naturalis, sicut et generatio. Finis igitur eius, qui est privatio habens rationem mali, est intentus a natura: sicut etiam forma et bonum, quae sunt generationis finis. [4] Besides, every natural change has an end intended by nature. Now, corruption is a natural change, just as generation is. Therefore, its end, which is a privation having the rational character of evil, is intended by nature: just as are form and the good, which are the ends of generation.

Caput 6 Chapter 6
Ut autem positarum rationum solutio manifestior fiat, considerandum est quod malum considerari potest vel in substantia aliqua, vel in actione ipsius. Malum quidem in substantia aliqua est ex eo quod deficit ei aliquid quod natum est et debet habere: si enim homo non habet alas, non est ei malum, quia non est natus eas habere; si etiam homo capillos flavos non habet, non est malum, quia etsi natus sit habere, non tamen est debitum ut habeat; est tamen malum si non habeat manus, quas natus est et debet habere, si sit perfectus, quod tamen non est malum avi. Omnis autem privatio, si proprie et stricte accipiatur, est eius quod quis natus est habere et debet habere. In privatione igitur sic accepta semper est ratio mali. [1] So that the solution of these alleged arguments maybe made more evident we should notice that evil may be considered either in a substance or in its action. Now, evil is in a substance because something which it was originally to have, and which it ought to have, is lacking in it. Thus, if a man has no wings, that is not an evil for him, because he was not born to have them; even if a man does not have blond hair, that is not an evil, for, though he may have such hair, it is not something that is necessarily due him. But it is an evil if he has no hands, for these he is born to, and should, have—if he is to be perfect. Yet this defect is not an evil for a bird. Every privation, if taken properly and strictly, is of that which one is born to have, and should have. So, in this strict meaning of privation, there is always the rational character of evil.
Materia autem, cum sit potentia ad omnes formas, omnes quidem nata est habere, nulla tamen est ei debita: cum sine quavis una earum possit esse perfecta in actu. Quaelibet tamen earum est debita alicui eorum quae ex materia constituuntur: nam non potest esse aqua nisi habeat formam aquae, nec potest esse ignis nisi habeat formam ignis. Privatio igitur formae huiusmodi, comparata ad materiam, non est malum materiae: sed comparata ad id cuius est forma, est malum eius, sicut privatio formae ignis est malum ignis. [2] Now, since it is in potency toward all forms, matter is indeed originated to have all of them; however, a certain one of them is not necessarily due it, since without this certain one it can be actually perfect. Of course, to each thing composed of matter some sort of form is due, for water cannot exist unless it have the form of water, nor can fire be unless it possess the form of fire. So, the privation of such forms in relation to matter is not an evil for the matter, but in relation to the thing whose form it is, it is an evil for it; just as the privation of the form of fire is an evil for fire.
Et quia tam privationes quam habitus et formae non dicuntur esse nisi secundum quod sunt in subiecto, si quidem privatio sit malum per comparationem ad subiectum in quo est, erit malum simpliciter: sin autem, erit malum alicuius, et non simpliciter. Hominem igitur privari manu, est malum simpliciter: materia autem privari forma aeris, non est malum simpliciter, sed est malum aeris. And since privations, just as much as habits and forms, are not said to exist, except in the sense that they are in a subject, then if a privation be an evil in relation to the subject in which it is, this will be evil in the unqualified sense. But, otherwise, it will be an evil relative to something, and not in the unqualified sense. Thus, for a man to be deprived of a hand is an unqualified evil, but for matter to be deprived of the form of air is not an unqualified evil, though it is an evil for the air.
Privatio autem ordinis aut commensurationis debitae in actione, est malum actionis. Et quia cuilibet actioni est debitus aliquis ordo et aliqua commensuratio, necesse est ut talis privatio in actione simpliciter malum existat. [3] Now, a privation of order, or due harmony, in action is an evil for action. And because there is some due order and harmony for every action, such privation in an action must stand as evil in the unqualified sense.
His igitur visis, sciendum est quod non omne quod est praeter intentionem, oportet esse fortuitum vel casuale, ut prima ratio proponebat. Si enim quod est praeter intentionem, sit consequens ad id quod est intentum vel semper vel frequenter, non eveniet fortuito vel casualiter: sicut in eo qui intendit dulcedine vini frui, si ex potatione vini sequatur ebrietas, non erit fortuitum nec casuale; esset autem casuale si sequeretur ut in paucioribus. [4] Having observed these points, we should understand that not everything that is apart from intention is necessarily fortuitous or a matter of chance, as the first argument claimed. For, if that which is apart from intention be either an invariable or a frequent consequence of what is intended, then it does not occur fortuitously or by chance. Take, for example, a man who directs his intention to the enjoyment of the sweetness of wine: if intoxication is the result of drinking the wine, this is neither fortuitous nor a matter of chance. Of course, it would be a matter of chance if this result followed in but few cases.
Malum ergo corruptionis naturalis, etsi sequatur praeter intentionem generantis, consequitur tamen semper: nam semper formae unius est adiuncta privatio alterius. Unde corruptio non evenit casualiter neque ut in paucioribus: licet privatio quandoque non sit malum simpliciter, sed alicuius, ut dictum est. Si autem sit talis privatio quae privet id quod est debitum generato, erit casuale et simpliciter malum, sicut cum nascuntur partus monstruosi: hoc enim non consequitur de necessitate ad id quod est intentum, sed est ei repugnans; cum agens intendat perfectionem generati. [5] So the evil of natural corruption, though a result which is apart from the intention of the agent of generation, is nevertheless an invariable consequence, for the acquisition of one form is always accompanied by the privation of another form. Hence, corruption does not occur by chance, nor as something that happens in few cases; even though privation at times is not an unqualified evil, but is only so in relation to some definite thing, as has been said. However, if it be the kind of privation which takes away what is due to the thing generated, this will be by chance and unqualifiedly evil, as in the case of the birth of monsters. For, such a thing is not the necessary result of what is intended; rather, it is repugnant to what is intended, since the agent intends a perfect product of generation.
Malum autem actionis accidit in naturalibus agentibus ex defectu virtutis activae. Unde si agens habet virtutem defectivam, hoc malum consequitur praeter intentionem, sed non erit casuale, quia de necessitate est consequens ad talem agentem: si tamen tale agens vel semper vel frequenter patitur hunc virtutis defectum. Erit autem casuale si hic defectus raro talem comitatur agentem. [6] Now, evil in relation to action occurs in the case of natural agents as a result of the defect of an active power. Hence, if the agent has a defective power, the evil is a result apart from the intention, but it will not be a chance result because it follows necessarily from this kind of agent, provided this kind of agent is subject to this defect of power, either always or frequently. However, it will be a matter of chance if this defect is rarely associated with this kind of agent.
In agentibus autem voluntariis intentio est ad bonum aliquod particulare, si debet sequi actio: nam universalia non movent, sed particularia, in quibus est actus. Si igitur illud bonum quod intenditur, habeat coniunctam privationem boni secundum rationem vel semper vel frequenter, sequitur malum morale non casualiter, sed vel semper vel frequenter: sicut patet in eo qui vult uti femina propter delectationem, cui delectationi adiuncta est inordinatio adulterii; unde malum adulterii non sequitur casualiter. Esset autem casuale malum si ad id quod intendit, sequeretur aliquod peccatum ut in paucioribus: sicut cum quis, proiiciens ad avem, interficit hominem. [7] In the case of voluntary agents, the intention is directed to some particular good, if action is to result, for universals cause no movement, but particular things do, since actions go on in their area. Therefore, if a particular good that is intended has attached to it, either always or frequently, a privation of good according to reason, then the result is a moral evil; and not by chance, but either invariably or for the most part. This is clearly the case with a man who wills to enjoy a woman for the sake of pleasure, to which pleasure there is attached the disorder of adultery. Hence, the evil of adultery is not something which results by chance. However, it would be an instance of chance evil if some wrong resulted in a few cases from the object intended: for example, in the case of a person who kills a man while shooting at a bird.
Quod autem huiusmodi bona aliquis intendat ut in pluribus quibus privationes boni secundum rationem consequuntur, ex hoc provenit quod plures vivunt secundum sensum, eo quod sensibilia sunt nobis manifesta, et magis efficaciter moventia in particularibus, in quibus est operatio: ad plura autem talium bonorum sequitur privatio boni secundum rationem. [8] That a person may frequently direct his intention to goods of this kind, to which privations of good according to reason are consequent, results from the fact that most men live on the sense level, because sensory objects are better known to us, and they are more effective motives in the domain of particular things where action goes on. Now, the privation of good according to reason is the consequence of most goods of this kind.
Ex quo patet quod, licet malum praeter intentionem sit, est tamen voluntarium, ut secunda ratio proponit, licet non per se, sed per accidens. Intentio enim est ultimi finis, quem quis propter se vult: voluntas autem est eius etiam quod quis vult propter aliud, etiam si simpliciter non vellet; sicut qui proiicit merces in mari causa salutis, non intendit proiectionem mercium, sed salutem, proiectionem autem vult non simpliciter, sed causa salutis. Similiter propter aliquod bonum sensibile consequendum aliquis vult facere inordinatam actionem, non intendens inordinationem, neque volens eam simpliciter, sed propter hoc. Et ideo hoc modo malitia et peccatum dicuntur esse voluntaria, sicut proiectio mercium in mari. [9] From this it is evident that, though evil be apart from intention, it is nonetheless voluntary, as the second argument suggests, though not essentially but accidentally so. For intention is directed to an ultimate end which a person wills for its own sake, but the will may also be directed to that which a person wills for the sake of something else, even if he would not will it simply for itself. In the example of the man who throws his merchandise into the sea in order to save himself [cf. Ethics III, 1: 1110a 8-29], he does not intend the throwing away of the merchandise but his own safety; yet he wills the throwing not for itself but for the sake of safety. Likewise, a person wills to do a disorderly action for the sake of some sensory good to be attained; he does not intend the disorder, nor does he will it simply for itself, but for the sake of this result. And so, evil consequences and sins are called voluntary in this way, just as is the casting of merchandise into the sea.
Eodem autem modo patet solutio ad tertiam obiectionem. Nunquam enim invenitur mutatio corruptionis sine mutatione generationis: et per consequens nec finis corruptionis sine fine generationis. Natura ergo non intendit finem corruptionis seorsum a fine generationis, sed simul utrumque. Non enim est de intentione naturae absoluta quod non sit aqua, sed quod sit aer, quo existente non est aqua. Hoc ergo quod est esse aerem, intendit natura secundum se: quod vero est non esse aquam, non intendit nisi inquantum est coniunctum ei quod est esse aerem. Sic igitur privationes a natura non sunt secundum se intentae, sed secundum accidens: formae vero secundum se. [10] The answer to the third difficulty is similarly evident. Indeed, the change of corruption is never found without the change of generation; neither, as a consequence, is the end of corruption found without the end of generation. So, nature does not intend the end of corruption as separated from the end of generation, but both at once. It is not the unqualified intention of nature that water should not exist, but that there should be air, and while a thing is so existing it is not water. So, nature directly intends that this existing thing be air; it does not intend that this thing should not exist as water, except as a concomitant of the fact that it is to be air. Thus, privations are not intended by nature in themselves, but only accidentally; forms, however, are intended in themselves.
Patet ergo ex praemissis quod illud quod est simpliciter malum, omnino est praeter intentionem in operibus naturae, sicut partus monstruosi: quod vero non est simpliciter, sed alicui malum, non est intentum a natura secundum se, sed secundum accidens. [11] It is clear, then, from the foregoing that what is evil in an unqualified sense is completely apart from intention in the workings of nature, as in the birth of monsters; on the other hand, that which is not evil in the unqualified sense, but evil in relation to some definite thing, is not directly intended by nature but only accidentally.

Caput 7
Quod malum non est aliqua essentia
Chapter 7
Ex his autem apparet quod nulla essentia est secundum se mala. [1] From these considerations it becomes evident that no essence is evil in itself.
Malum enim, ut dictum est, nihil est aliud quam privatio eius quod quis natus est et debet habere: sic enim apud omnes est usus huius nominis malum. Privatio autem non est aliqua essentia, sed est negatio in substantia. Malum igitur non est aliqua essentia in rebus. [2] In fact, evil is simply a privation of something which a subject is entitled by its origin to possess and which it ought to have, as we have said. Such is the meaning of the word “evil” among all men. Now, privation is not an essence; it is, rather, a negation in a substance. Therefore, evil is not an essence in things.
Adhuc. Unumquodque secundum suam essentiam habet esse. Inquantum autem habet esse, habet aliquid boni: nam, si bonum est quod omnia appetunt, oportet ipsum esse bonum dicere, cum omnia esse appetant. Secundum hoc igitur unumquodque bonum est quod essentiam habet. Bonum autem et malum opponuntur. Nihil igitur est malum secundum quod essentiam habet. Nulla igitur essentia mala est. [3] Again, each thing has actual being in accord with its essence. To the extent that it possesses being, it has something good; for, if good is that which all desire, then being itself must be called a good, because all desire to be. As a consequence, then, each thing is good because it possesses actual being. Now, good and evil are contraries. So, nothing is evil by virtue of the fact that it has essence. Therefore, no essence is evil.
Amplius. Omnis res vel est agens, vel est facta. Malum autem non potest esse agens: quia quicquid agit, agit inquantum est actu existens et perfectum. Et similiter non potest esse factum: nam cuiuslibet generationis terminus est forma et bonum. Nulla igitur res secundum suam essentiam est mala. [4] Besides, everything is either an agent or a thing that is made. Now, evil cannot be an agent, because whatever acts does so inasmuch as it is actually existent and perfect. Similarly, it cannot be a thing that is made, for the termination of every process of generation is a form, and a good thing. Therefore, nothing is evil by virtue of its essence.
Item. Nihil tendit ad suum contrarium: unumquodque enim appetit quod est sibi simile et conveniens. Omne autem ens agendo intendit bonum, ut ostensum est. Nullum igitur ens, inquantum huiusmodi, est malum. [5] Moreover, nothing tends toward its contrary, for each thing inclines to what is like and suitable to itself. Now, every being intends a good, when it is acting, as has been proved. Therefore, no being, as being, is evil.
Adhuc. Omnis essentia est alicui rei naturalis. Si enim est in genere substantiae, est ipsa natura rei. Si vero sit in genere accidentis, oportet quod ex principiis alicuius substantiae causetur, et sic illi substantiae erit naturalis: licet forte alteri substantiae non sit naturalis, sicut caliditas est naturalis igni, licet sit innaturalis aquae. Quod autem est secundum se malum, non potest esse alicui naturale. De ratione enim mali est privatio eius quod est alicui natum inesse et debitum ei. Malum igitur, cum sit eius quod est naturale privatio, non potest esse alicui naturale. Unde et quicquid naturaliter inest alicui, est ei bonum, et malum si ei desit. Nulla igitur essentia est secundum se mala. [6] Furthermore, every essence belongs to some definite thing in nature. Indeed, if it falls in the genus of substance, it is the very nature of the thing. However, if it is in the genus of accident, it must be caused by the principles of some substance, and thus it will be natural to this substance, though perhaps it may not be natural to another substance. For example, heat is natural to fire, though it may not be natural to water. Now, what is evil in itself can not be natural to anything. For it is of the very definition of evil that it be a privation of that which is to be in a subject by virtue of its natural origin, and which should be in it. So, evil cannot be natural to any subject, since it is a privation of what is natural. Consequently, whatever is present naturally in something is a good for it, and it is evil if the thing lacks it. Therefore, no essence is evil in itself.
Amplius. Quicquid habet essentiam aliquam, aut ipsummet est forma, aut habet formam aliquam: per formam enim collocatur unumquodque in genere vel specie. Forma autem, inquantum huiusmodi, habet rationem bonitatis: cum sit principium actionis; et finis quem intendit omne faciens; et actus quo unumquodque habens formam perfectum est. Quicquid igitur habet essentiam aliquam, inquantum huiusmodi, est bonum. Malum igitur non habet essentiam aliquam. [7] Again, whatever possesses an essence is either a form itself, or has a form. In fact, every being is placed in a genus or species through a form. Now, a form, as such, has the essential character of goodness, because a form is a principle of action; so, too, does the end to which every agent looks; and so also does the action whereby each thing having a form is perfected. Hence, everything that has an essence is, by virtue of that fact, a good thing. Therefore, evil has no essence.
Item. Ens per actum et potentiam dividitur. Actus autem, inquantum huiusmodi, bonum est: quia secundum quod aliquid est actu, secundum hoc est perfectum. Potentia etiam bonum aliquid est: tendit enim potentia ad actum, ut in quolibet motu apparet; et est etiam actui proportionata, non ei contraria; et est in eodem genere cum actu; et privatio non competit ei nisi per accidens. Omne igitur quod est, quocumque modo sit, inquantum est ens, bonum est. Malum igitur non habet aliquam essentiam. [8] Besides, being is divided by act and potency. Now, act, as such, is good, for something is perfect to the extent that it is in act. Potency, too, is a good thing, for potency tends toward act, as appears in every instance of change. Moreover, potency is also proportionate to act and not contrary to it. It belongs in the same genus with act; privation does not belong to it, except accidentally. So, everything that exists, whatever the mode of its existence, is a good thing to the extent that it is a being. Therefore, evil does not possess any essence.
Amplius. Probatum est in secundo huius, quod omne esse, quocumque modo sit, est a Deo. Deum autem esse perfectam bonitatem, in primo ostendimus. Cum igitur boni effectus malum esse non possit, impossibile est aliquod ens, inquantum est ens, esse malum. [9] Moreover, we have proved in Book Two of this work [15] that every act of being, whatever its type may be, comes from God. And we have shown in Book One [28, 41] that God is perfect goodness. Now, since evil could not be the product of a good thing, it is impossible for any being, as a being, to be evil.
Hinc est quod Gen. 1-31 dicitur: vidit Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona; et Eccle. 3-11: cuncta fecit bona in tempore suo; et I Tim. 4-4: omnis creatura Dei bona. [10] This is why Genesis (1:31) states: “God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good”; and Ecclesiastes (3:11): “He hath made all things good in their time”; and also I Timothy (4:4): “Every creature of God is good.”
Et Dionysius, cap. IV de Div. Nom., dicit quod malum non est existens, scilicet per se, nec aliquid in existentibus, quasi accidens, sicut albedo vel nigredo. [11] And Dionysius, in chapter four of On the Divine Names says that “evil is not an existing thing,” that is, in itself; “nor is it something among things that have existence,” but it is a sort of accident, something like whiteness or blackness.
Per hoc autem excluditur error Manichaeorum, ponentium aliquas res secundum suas naturas esse malas. [12] Through this consideration, the error of the Manicheans is refuted, for they claimed that some things are evil in their very natures.

Caput 8
Rationes quibus videtur probari quod malum sit natura vel res aliqua (et solutio ipsarum)
Chapter 8
Videtur autem quibusdam rationibus praedictae sententiae posse obviari. [1] Now, it appears that the preceding view may be opposed by certain arguments.
Ex propria enim differentia specifica unumquodque speciem sortitur. Malum autem est differentia specifica in aliquibus generibus, scilicet in habitibus et actibus moralibus: sicut enim virtus secundum suam speciem est bonus habitus, ita contrarium vitium est malus habitus secundum suam speciem; et similiter de actibus virtutum et vitiorum. Malum igitur est dans speciem aliquibus rebus. Est igitur aliqua essentia, et aliquibus rebus naturalis. [2] Each thing is specified by its own specific difference. But evil is a specific difference in some genera; for instance, among habits and acts in the moral order. just as virtue is specifically a good habit, so is the contrary vice specifically a bad habit. The same may be said of virtuous and vicious acts. Therefore, evil is that which gives specificity to some things, and thus it is an essence and is natural to certain things.
Praeterea. Utrumque contrariorum est natura quaedam: si enim nihil poneret, alterum contrariorum esset privatio vel negatio pura. Sed bonum et malum dicuntur esse contraria. Malum igitur est natura aliqua. [3] Again, of two contraries, each is a definite nature, for, if one contrary were supposed to be nothing, then it would be either a privation or a pure negation. But good and evil are said to be contraries. Therefore, evil is a nature of some sort.
Item. Bonum et malum dicuntur esse genera contrariorum ab Aristotele, in praedicamentis. Cuiuslibet autem generis est essentia et natura aliqua: nam non entis non sunt species neque differentiae, et ita quod non est, non potest esse genus. Malum igitur est aliqua essentia et natura. [4] Besides, good and evil are spoken of by Aristotle in the Categories [8: 14a 24] as “genera of contraries.” Now, there is an essence and a definite nature for each kind of genus. There are no species or differences for non-being; so, that which does not exist cannot be a genus. Therefore, evil is a definite essence and nature.
Adhuc. Omne quod agit, est res aliqua. Malum autem agit inquantum malum: repugnat enim bono et corrumpit ipsum. Malum igitur, inquantum malum, est res aliqua. [5] Moreover, everything that acts is a real thing. Now, evil does act precisely as evil, for it attacks the good and corrupts it. So, evil precisely as evil is a real thing.
Amplius. In quibuscumque invenitur magis et minus, oportet quod sint res aliquae habentes ordinem: negationes enim et privationes non suscipiunt magis et minus. Invenitur autem inter mala unum altero peius. Oportet igitur, ut videtur, quod malum sit res aliqua. [6] Furthermore, wherever the distinction of more or less is found, there must be certain things arranged in hierarchic order, since neither negations nor privations admit of more or less. But among evils, one may be worse than another. It would seem, then, that evil must be a real thing.
Praeterea. Res et ens convertuntur. Est autem malum in mundo. Ergo est res aliqua et natura. [7] Again, thing and being are convertible. There is evil in the world. Therefore, it is a real thing and a nature.

Caput 9
Chapter 9
Has autem rationes non difficile est solvere. Malum enim et bonum in moralibus specificae differentiae ponuntur, ut prima ratio proponebat, quia moralia a voluntate dependent: secundum hoc enim aliquid ad genus moris pertinet, quod est voluntarium. Voluntatis autem obiectum est finis et bonum. Unde a fine speciem moralia sortiuntur: sicut et naturales actiones a forma principii activi, ut calefactio a calore. Quia igitur bonum et malum dicuntur secundum universalem ordinem ad finem, vel privationem ordinis, oportet quod in moralibus primae differentiae sint bonum et malum. Unius autem generis oportet esse unam mensuram primam. Moralium autem mensura est ratio. Oportet igitur quod a fine rationis dicantur aliqua in moralibus bona vel mala. Quod igitur in moralibus sortitur speciem a fine qui est secundum rationem, dicitur secundum speciem suam bonum: quod vero sortitur speciem a fine contrario fini rationis, dicitur secundum speciem suam malum. Finis autem ille, etsi tollat finem rationis, est tamen aliquod bonum: sicut delectabile secundum sensum, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Unde et in aliquibus animalibus sunt bona; et homini etiam cum sunt secundum rationem moderata; et contingit quod est malum uni, esse bonum alteri. Et ideo nec malum, secundum quod est differentia specifica in genere moralium, importat aliquid quod sit secundum essentiam suam malum: sed aliquid quod secundum se est bonum, malum autem homini, inquantum privat ordinem rationis, quod est hominis bonum. [1] It is not difficult to answer these arguments. Evil and good are assigned as specific differences in moral matters, as the first argument asserted, because moral matters depend on the will. For this reason, anything that is voluntary belongs in the class of moral matters. Now, the object of the will is the end and the good. Hence, moral matters get their species from the end, just as natural actions are specified by the form of the active principle; for instance, the act of heating is specified by heat. Hence, because good and evil are so termed by virtue of a universal order, or privation of order, to the end, it is necessary in moral matters for the primary distinction to be between good and evil. Now, there must be but one primary standard in any one genus. The standard in moral matters is reason. Therefore, it must be from a rational end that things in the moral area are termed good or evil. So, in moral matters, that which is specified by an end that is in accord with reason is called good specifically; and that which is specified by an end contrary to the rational end is termed evil specifically. Yet that contrary end, even though it runs counter to the rational end, is nevertheless some sort of good: for instance, something that delights on the sense level, or anything like that. Thus, these are goods for certain animals, and even for man, when they are moderated by reason. It also happens that what is evil for one being is good for another. So, evil, as a specific difference in the genus of moral matters, does not imply something that is evil in its own essence, but something that is good in itself, though evil for man, inasmuch as it takes away the order of reason which is the good for man.
Ex quo etiam patet quod malum et bonum sunt contraria secundum quod in genere moralium accipiuntur: non autem simpliciter accepta, sicut secunda ratio proponebat, sed malum privatio est boni, inquantum est malum. [2] From this it is also clear that evil and good are contraries according to the way they are understood in the area of moral matters, but they are not when taken without qualification, as the second argument suggested. Rather, in so far as it is evil, evil is the privation of good.
Eodem etiam modo potest accipi dictum quod malum et bonum, prout sunt in moralibus, sunt genera contrariorum, ex quo tertia ratio procedebat. Omnium enim contrariorum moralium vel utrumque est malum, sicut prodigalitas et illiberalitas; vel unum bonum et alterum malum, sicut liberalitas et illiberalitas. Est igitur malum morale et genus et differentia, non secundum quod est privatio boni rationis, ex quo dicitur malum; sed ex natura actionis vel habitus ordinati ad aliquem finem qui repugnat debito fini rationis; sicut homo caecus est hominis individuum non inquantum est caecus, sed inquantum est hic homo; et irrationale est differentia animalis non propter privationem rationis, sed ratione talis naturae ad quam sequitur remotio rationis. [3] In the same way, too, one may understand the statement that evil and good, as found in the moral area, are “genera of contraries”—from which phrase the third argument begins. Indeed, in all moral contraries, either both contraries are evil, as in the case of prodigality and illiberality, or one is good and the other evil, as in the case of liberality and illiberality. Therefore, moral evil is both a genus and a difference, not by the fact that it is a privation of the rational good whence it is termed evil, but by the nature of the action or habit ordered to some end that is opposed to the proper rational end. Thus, a blind man is an individual man, not inasmuch as he is blind but in so far as he is this man. So, also, irrational is an animal difference, not because of the privation of reason but by virtue of a certain kind of nature, to which the absence of reason follows as a consequence.
Potest etiam dici quod Aristoteles dicit malum et bonum esse genera, non secundum propriam opinionem, cum inter prima decem genera, in quorum quolibet invenitur aliqua contrarietas, ea non connumeret; sed secundum opinionem Pythagorae, qui posuit bonum et malum esse prima genera et prima principia, et in utroque eorum posuit esse decem prima contraria: sub bono quidem finitum, par, unum, dextrum, masculinum, quiescens, rectum, lucem, quadratum, et ultimo bonum; sub malo autem, infinitum, impar, plurale, sinistrum, femininum, motum, curvum, tenebras, altera parte longius, et ultimo malum. Sic autem et in pluribus librorum logicorum locis utitur exemplis, secundum sententiam aliorum philosophorum, quasi probabilibus secundum illud tempus. One can also say that Aristotle calls good and evil genera, not according to his own opinion (for he does not number them among the primary ten genera in which every kind of contrariety is found) but according to the opinion of Pythagoras, who supposed that good and evil are the first genera and first principles, and who placed ten prime contraries under each of them: under the good were, “limit, even, one, right, male, rest, straight, light, square, and finally good”; and under evil were, “the unlimited, odd, multitude, left, female, motion, curved, darkness, oblong, and finally evil [cf. Met. I, 5: 986a 24-27].Thus, here and in several places in the treatises on logic, he uses examples in accord with the views of other philosophers, as if they were more acceptable in his time.
Habet tamen et hoc dictum aliquam veritatem: nam impossibile est quod probabiliter dicitur, secundum totum esse falsum. Omnium enim contrariorum unum est perfectum, et alterum diminutum, quasi privationem quandam habens admixtam: sicut album et calidum sunt perfecta, frigidum vero et nigrum sunt imperfecta, quasi cum privatione significata. Quia igitur omnis diminutio et privatio ad rationem mali pertinet; omnis autem perfectio et complementum ad rationem boni: semper in contrariis alterum sub bono videtur comprehendi, alterum ad rationem mali accedere. Et secundum hoc bonum et malum genera contrariorum omnium esse videntur. In fact, this statement has some truth, since it is impossible for a probable statement to be entirely false. In the case of all contraries, one is perfect and the other is a diminished perfection, having, as it were, some privation mixed with it. For instance, white and hot are perfect conditions, but cold and black are imperfect, connoting something of privation. Therefore, since every diminution and privation pertains to the formal character of evil, and every perfection and fulfillment to the formal character of good, it appears to be always so between contraries, that one is included under the good and the other approaches the notion of evil. From this point of view, good and evil seem to be genera of all contraries.
Per hoc etiam patet qualiter malum repugnat bono, ex quo quarta ratio procedebat. Secundum enim quod formae et fini, quae habent rationem boni, et sunt agendi vera principia, est adiuncta privatio contrariae formae et finis contrarii, actio quae sequitur ex tali forma et tali fine, attribuitur privationi et malo: per accidens quidem, nam privatio, secundum quod huiusmodi, non est alicuius actionis principium. Propter quod bene in IV cap. de Div. Nom., dicit Dyonisius, quod malum non pugnat contra bonum nisi virtute boni, secundum se vero est impotens et infirmum, quasi nullius actionis principium. Malum tamen corrumpere dicitur bonum non solum agendo virtute boni, sicut expositum est: sed formaliter secundum se, sicut dicitur caecitas corrumpere visum quia est ipsa visus corruptio; per quem modum dicitur albedo parietem colorare quia est ipse parietis color. [4] In this way it also becomes apparent how evil is opposed to the good, which is the starting point of the fourth argument. According as there is added a privation of a contrary form, and a contrary end, to a form and an end (which have the rational character of good and are true principles of action) the action that results from such a form and end is attributed to the privation and the evil. Yet, this attribution is accidental, for privation, as such, is not the principle of any action. Hence, Dionysius says, quite properly, in the fourth chapter of On the Divine Names, that “evil does not fight against good, except through the power of the good; in itself, indeed, it is powerless and weak,” the principle of no action, as it were. However, we say that evil corrupts the good, not only when it acts in virtue of the good, as has been explained, but also formally of itself. Thus, blindness is said to corrupt sight, for it is itself the corruption of sight; similarly, whiteness is said to color a wall, when it is the actual color of the wall.
Dicitur autem aliquid altero magis et minus malum, per recessum a bono. Sic enim quae privationem important, intenduntur et remittuntur, sicut inaequale et dissimile: dicitur enim inaequalius quod est ab aequalitate magis distans; et similiter dissimilius magis a similitudine recedens. Unde et magis malum dicitur quod est magis privatum bono, quasi magis a bono distans. Privationes autem intenduntur non quasi aliquam essentiam habentes, sicut qualitates et formae, ut quinta ratio procedebat, sed per augmentum causae privantis: sicut aer tenebrosior est quanto plura fuerint interposita obstacula lucis, sic enim longius a lucis participatione distat. [5] We do indeed say that something is more or less evil than another thing, in reference to the good that it lacks. Thus, things which imply a privation admit of increase or decrease in degree, as do the unequal and the dissimilar. For we say that something is more unequal when it is more removed from equality and, likewise, that something is more dissimilar when it is farther away from similitude. Consequently, a thing that is more deprived of goodness is said to be more evil, as it were, more distant from the good. However, privations do not increase as do things that have an essence, such as qualities and forms, as the fifth argument assumes, but through increase of the depriving cause. Thus, just as the air is darker when more obstacles have been placed before the light, so does a thing become farther removed from participation in the light.
Dicitur etiam malum esse in mundo, non quasi essentiam aliquam habeat, vel res quaedam existat, ut sexta ratio procedebat: sed ea ratione qua dicitur quod res aliqua mala est ipso malo; sicut caecitas et quaelibet privatio esse dicitur quia animal caecitate est caecum. Ens enim dupliciter dicitur, ut philosophus in metaphysica docet. Uno modo, secundum quod significat essentiam rei, et dividitur per decem praedicamenta: et sic nulla privatio potest dici ens. Alio modo, secundum quod significat veritatem compositionis: et sic malum et privatio dicitur ens, inquantum privatione dicitur aliquid esse privatum. [6] We also say that evil is in the world, not as possessing some essence, nor as a definitely existing thing, as the sixth argument suggested, but for the same reason that we may call something evil by virtue of its evil. For instance, blindness, or any other sort of privation, is said to exist because an animal is blinded by its blindness. Indeed, there are two ways of talking about being, as the Philosopher teaches in his Metaphysics [IV, 7: 1017a 8]. In one way, being means the essence of a thing, and thus it falls into the ten categories; so taken, no privation can be called a being. In another way, being means the truth in a judgment; in this meaning, privation is called a being, inasmuch as something is said to be deprived by virtue of a privation.

Caput 10
Quod causa mali est bonum
Chapter 10
Ex praemissis autem concludi potest quod malum non causatur nisi a bono. [1] The foregoing arguments enable us to conclude that evil is caused only by the good.
Si enim alicuius mali est causa malum; malum autem non agit nisi virtute boni, ut probatum est: oportet ipsum bonum esse causam primariam mali. [2] For, if an evil thing were the cause of a certain evil, then the evil thing would not act, except by virtue of the good, as has been proved. So, this good must be the primary cause of the evil.
Adhuc. Quod non est, nullius est causa. Omnem igitur causam oportet esse ens aliquod. Malum autem non est ens aliquod, ut probatum est. Malum igitur non potest esse alicuius causa. Oportet igitur si ab aliquo causetur malum, quod illud sit bonum. [3] Again, what does not exist is not the cause of anything. So, every cause must be a definite thing. But evil is not a definite being, as has been proved. Therefore, evil cannot be the cause of anything. if, then, evil be caused by anything, this cause must be the good.
Item. Quicquid est proprie et per se alicuius causa, tendit in proprium effectum. Si igitur malum esset per se alicuius causa, tenderet in proprium effectum, scilicet malum. Hoc autem est falsum: nam ostensum est quod omne agens intendit bonum. Malum igitur per se non est causa alicuius, sed solum per accidens. Omnis autem causa per accidens reducitur ad causam per se. Solum autem bonum potest esse per se causa, sed malum non potest esse per se causa. Malum igitur causatum est a bono. [4] Besides, whatever is properly and of itself the cause of something tends toward a proper effect. So, if evil were of itself the cause of anything, it would tend toward an effect proper to it; namely, evil. But this is false, for it has been shown that every agent tends toward the good. Therefore, evil is not the cause of anything through evil itself, but only accidentally. Now, every accidental cause reduces to a cause that works through itself. And only the good can be a cause through itself, for evil cannot be a cause through itself. Therefore, evil is caused by the good.
Praeterea. Omnis causa vel est materia, vel forma, vel agens, vel finis. Malum autem non potest esse neque materia neque forma: ostensum est enim supra quod tam ens actu, quam ens in potentia, est bonum. Similiter non potest esse agens: cum unumquodque agat secundum quod est actu et formam habet. Neque etiam potest esse finis: cum sit praeter intentionem, ut probatum est. Malum igitur non potest esse alicuius causa. Si igitur aliquid sit causa mali, oportet quod sit a bono causatum. [5] Moreover, every cause is either matter, or form, or agent, or end. Now, evil cannot be either matter or form, for it has been shown that both being in act and being in potency are good. Similarly, evil cannot be the agent, since anything that acts does so according as it is in act and has form. Nor, indeed, can it be an end, for it is apart from intention, as we have proved. So. evil cannot be the cause of anything. Therefore, if anything is the cause of evil, it must be caused by the good.
Cum autem malum et bonum sint opposita; unum autem oppositorum non potest esse causa alterius nisi per accidens, sicut frigidum calefacit, ut dicitur in VIII physicorum: sequitur quod bonum non possit esse causa activa mali nisi per accidens. [6] In fact, since evil and good are contraries, one of these contraries cannot be the cause of the other unless it be accidentally; as the cold heats, as is said in Physics VIII [1: 251a 33]. Consequently, the good could not be the active cause of evil, except accidentally.
Hoc autem accidens in naturalibus potest esse et ex parte agentis; et ex parte effectus. Ex parte quidem agentis, sicut cum agens patitur defectum virtutis, ex quo sequitur quod actio sit defectiva et effectus deficiens: ut, cum virtus membri digerentis est debilis, sequitur imperfecta decoctio et humor indigestus, quae sunt quaedam mala naturae. Accidit autem agenti, inquantum est agens, quod virtutis defectum patiatur: non enim agit secundum quod deficit ei virtus, sed secundum quod habet aliquid de virtute; si enim penitus virtute careret, omnino non ageret. Sic igitur malum causatur per accidens ex parte agentis, inquantum agens est deficientis virtutis. Propter quod dicitur quod malum non habet causam efficientem, sed deficientem: quia malum non sequitur ex causa agente nisi inquantum est deficientis virtutis, et secundum hoc non est efficiens. In idem autem redit si defectus actionis et effectus proveniat ex defectu instrumenti, vel cuiuscumque alterius quod requiritur ad actionem agentis, sicut cum virtus motiva producit claudicationem propter tibiae curvitatem: utroque enim agens agit, et virtute et instrumento. [7] Now, in the order of nature, this accidental aspect can be found either on the side of the agent or of the effect. It will be on the side of the agent when the agent suffers a defect in its power, the consequence of which is a defective action and a defective effect. Thus, when the power of an organ of digestion is weak, imperfect digestive functioning and undigested humor result; these are evils of nature. Now, it is accidental to the agent, as agent, for it to suffer a defect in its power; for it is not an agent by virtue of the fact that its power is deficient, but because it possesses some power. If it were completely lacking in power, it would not act at all. Thus, evil is caused accidentally on the part of the agent in so far as the agent is defective in its power. This is why we say that “evil has no efficient, but only a deficient, cause,” for evil does not result from an agent cause, unless because it is deficient in power, and to that extent it is not efficient.—And it reduces to the same thing if the defect in the action and in the effect arise from a defect of the instrument or of anything else required for the agent’s action; for example, when the motor capacity produces lameness because of a curvature of the tibia. For the agent acts both by means of its power and of its instrument.
Ex parte vero effectus, malum ex bono causatur per accidens, tum ex parte materiae effectus; tum ex parte formae ipsius. Si enim materia sit indisposita ad recipiendam impressionem agentis, necesse est defectum sequi in effectu: sicut cum monstruosi partus sequuntur propter materiae indigestionem. Nec hoc imputatur ad aliquem defectum agentis, si materiam indispositam non transmutat ad actum perfectum: unicuique enim agenti naturali est virtus determinata secundum modum suae naturae, quam si non excedat, non propter hoc erit deficiens in virtute, sed tunc solum quando deficit a mensura virtutis sibi debitae per naturam. [8] On the side of the effect, evil is accidentally caused by the good, either by virtue of the matter of the effect, or by virtue of its form. For, if the matter is not well disposed to the reception of the agent’s action on it, there must result a defect in the product. Thus, the births of monsters are the result of lack of assimilation on the part of the matter. Nor may this be attributed to some defect in the agent, if it fail to convert poorly disposed matter into perfect act. There is a determinate power for each natural agent, in accord with its type of nature, and failure to go beyond this power will not be a deficiency in power; such deficiency is found only when it falls short of the measure of power naturally due it.
Ex parte autem formae effectus, per accidens malum incidit inquantum formae alicui de necessitate adiungitur privatio alterius formae, unde simul cum generatione unius rei, necesse est alterius rei sequi corruptionem. Sed hoc malum non est malum effectus intenti ab agente, sicut in praecedentibus patet, sed alterius rei. [9] From the point of view of the form of the effect, evil occurs accidentally because the privation of another form is the necessary concomitant of the presence of a given form. Thus, simultaneously with the generation of one thing there necessarily results the corruption of another thing. But this evil is not an evil of the product intended by the agent, but of another thing, as was apparent in the preceding discussion.
Sic igitur in naturalibus patet quod malum per accidens tantum causatur a bono. Eodem autem modo et in artificialibus accidit. Ars enim in sua operatione imitatur naturam, et similiter peccatum in utraque invenitur. [10] Thus it is clear that, in the natural order, evil is only accidentally caused by the good. Now, it works in the same way in the realm of artifacts. “For art in its working imitates nature,” and bad results occur in both in the same way.
In moralibus autem videtur aliter se habere. Non enim ex defectu virtutis sequi videtur morale vitium: cum infirmitas virtutis morale vitium vel totaliter tollat, vel saltem diminuat; infirmitas enim non meretur poenam, quae culpae debetur, sed magis misericordiam et ignoscentiam; voluntarium enim oportet esse moris vitium, non necessarium. Si tamen diligenter consideretur, invenitur quantum ad aliquid simile, quantum vero ad aliquid dissimile. Dissimile quidem quantum ad hoc, quod vitium morale in sola actione consideratur, non autem in aliquo effectu producto: nam virtutes morales non sunt factivae, sed activae. Artes autem factivae sunt: et ideo dictum est quod in eis similiter peccatum accidit sicut in natura. Malum igitur morale non consideratur ex materia vel forma effectus, sed solum consequitur ex agente. [11] However, in the moral order, the situation seems to be different. It does not appear that moral vice results from a defect of power, since weakness either completely removes moral fault, or at least diminishes it. Indeed, weakness does not merit moral punishment that is proper to guilt, but, rather, mercy and forgiveness. A moral fault must be voluntary, not necessitated. Yet, if we consider the matter carefully, we shall find the two orders similar from one point of view, and dissimilar from another. There is dissimilarity on this point: moral fault is noticed in action only, and not in any effect that is produced; for the moral virtues are not concerned with making but with doing. The arts are concerned with making, and so it has been said that in their sphere a bad result happens just as it does in nature Therefore, moral evil is not considered in relation to the matter or form of the effect, but only as a resultant from the agent.
In actionibus autem moralibus inveniuntur per ordinem quatuor activa principia. Quorum unum est virtus executiva, scilicet vis motiva, qua moventur membra ad exequendum imperium voluntatis. Unde haec vis a voluntate movetur, quae est aliud principium. Voluntas vero movetur ex iudicio virtutis apprehensivae, quae iudicat hoc esse bonum vel malum, quae sunt voluntatis obiecta, unum ad prosequendum movens, aliud ad fugiendum. Ipsa autem vis apprehensiva movetur a re apprehensa. Primum igitur activum principium in actionibus moralibus est res apprehensa; secundum vis apprehensiva; tertium voluntas; quartum vis motiva, quae exequitur imperium rationis. [12] Now, in moral actions we find four principles arranged in a definite order. One of these is the executive power, the moving force, whereby the parts of the body are moved to carry out the command of the will. Then this power is moved by the will, which is a second principle. Next, the will is moved by the judgment of the apprehensive power which judges that this object is good or bad, for the objects of the will are such that one moves toward attainment, another moves toward avoidance. This apprehensive power is moved, in turn, by the thing apprehended. So, the first active principle in moral actions is the thing that is cognitively apprehended, the second is the apprehensive power, the third is the will, and the fourth is the motive power which carries out the command of reason.
Actus autem virtutis exequentis iam praesupponit bonum vel malum morale. Non enim ad mores huiusmodi actus exteriores pertinent nisi secundum quod sunt voluntarii. Unde, si voluntatis sit actus bonus, et actus exterior bonus dicetur: malus autem, si ille sit malus. Nihil autem ad malitiam moralem pertineret si actus exterior deficiens esset defectu ad voluntatem non pertinente: claudicatio enim non est vitium moris, sed naturae. Huiusmodi igitur virtutis exequentis defectus moris vitium vel totaliter excusat, vel minuit. Actus vero quo res movet apprehensivam virtutem, immunis est a vitio moris: movet enim secundum ordinem naturalem visibile visum, et quodlibet obiectum potentiam passivam. Ipse etiam actus apprehensivae virtutis, in se consideratus, morali vitio caret: cum eius defectus vitium morale vel excuset vel minuat, sicut et defectus exequentis virtutis; pariter enim infirmitas et ignorantia excusant peccatum vel minuunt. Relinquitur igitur quod morale vitium in solo actu voluntatis primo et principaliter inveniatur: et rationabiliter etiam ex hoc actus moralis dicatur, quia voluntarius est. In actu igitur voluntatis quaerenda est radix et origo peccati moralis. [13] Now, the act of the power that carries out the action already presupposes the distinction of moral good or evil. For external acts of this kind do not belong in the moral area, unless they are voluntary. Hence, if the act of the will be good, then the external act is also deemed good, but if it be bad, the external act is bad. It would have nothing to do with moral evil if the external act were defective by virtue of a defect having no reference to the will. Lameness, for instance, is not a fault in the moral order, but in the natural order. Therefore, a defect of this type in the executive power either completely excludes moral fault, or diminishes it. So, too, the act whereby a thing moves the apprehensive power is free from moral fault, for the visible thing moves the power of sight in the natural order, and so, also, does any object move a passive potency. Then, too, this act of the apprehensive power, considered in itself, is without moral fault, for a defect in it either removes or diminishes moral fault, as is the case in a defect of the executive power. Likewise, weakness and ignorance excuse wrongdoing, or diminish it. The conclusion follows, then, that moral fault is found primarily and principally in the act of the will only, and so it is quite reasonable to say, as a result, that an act is moral because it is voluntary. Therefore the root and source of moral wrongdoing is to be sought in the act of the will.
Videtur autem hanc inquisitionem consequi difficultas. Cum enim actus deficiens proveniat propter defectum activi principii, oportet praeintelligere defectum in voluntate ante peccatum morale. Qui quidem defectus si sit naturalis, semper inhaeret voluntati: semper igitur voluntas in agendo moraliter peccabit; quod actus virtutum falsum esse ostendunt. Si autem defectus sit voluntarius, iam est peccatum morale, cuius causa iterum inquirenda restabit: et sic ratio in infinitum deducet. Oportet ergo dicere quod defectus in voluntate praeexistens non sit naturalis, ne sequatur voluntatem in quolibet actu peccare; neque etiam casualis et fortuitus, non enim esset in nobis morale peccatum, casualia enim sunt impraemeditata et extra rationem. Est igitur voluntarius. Non tamen peccatum morale: ne cogamur in infinitum procedere. Quod quidem qualiter esse possit, considerandum est. [14] However, a difficulty seems to result from this investigation. Since a defective act stems from a defect in the active principle, we must understand that there is a defect in the will preceding the moral fault. Of course, if this defect be natural, then it is always attached to the will, and so the will would always commit a morally bad action when it acts. But virtuous acts show that this conclusion is false. On the other hand, if the defect be voluntary, it is already a morally bad act, and we will have to look in turn for its cause. Thus, our rational investigation will never come to an end. Therefore, we must say that the defect pre-existing in the will is not natural, to avoid the conclusion that the will sins in everyone of its acts. Nor can we attribute the defect to chance or accident, for then there would be no moral fault in us, since chance events are not premeditated and are beyond the control of reason. So, the defect is voluntary. Yet, it is not a moral fault; otherwise, we should go on to infinity. How this is possible we must now explain.
Cuiuslibet siquidem activi principii perfectio virtutis ex superiori activo dependet: agens enim secundum agit per virtutem primi agentis. Cum igitur secundum agens manet sub ordine primi agentis, indeficienter agit: deficit autem in agendo si contingat ipsum ab ordine primi agentis deflecti; sicut patet in instrumento cum deficit a motu agentis. Dictum est autem quod in ordine actionum moralium duo principia voluntatem praecedunt: scilicet vis apprehensiva; et obiectum apprehensum, quod est finis. Cum autem unicuique mobili respondeat proprium motivum, non quaelibet vis apprehensiva est debitum motivum cuiuslibet appetitus, sed huius haec, et illius alia. Sicut igitur appetitus sensitivi proprium motivum est vis apprehensiva sensualis, ita voluntatis proprium motivum est ratio ipsa. [15] As a matter of fact, the perfection of the power of every active principle depends on a higher active principle, since a secondary agent acts through the power of a primary agent. While, therefore, a secondary agent remains in a position of subordination to the first agent, it acts without any defect, but it becomes defective in its action if it happens to turn away from its subordination to the primary agent, as is illustrated in the case of an instrument, when it falls short of the motion of the agent. Now, it has been said that two principles precede the will in the order of moral actions: namely, the apprehensive power, and the object apprehended, which is the end. Since to each movable there corresponds a proper motive power, not merely any apprehensive power is the suitable motive power for any and every appetite; rather, one pertains to this appetite and another to a second appetite. Thus, just as the proper motive power for the sensory appetite is the sensory apprehensive power, so the reason itself is the proper motivator for the will.
Rursus, cum ratio multa bona et multos fines apprehendere possit; cuiuslibet autem sit proprius finis: et voluntatis erit finis et primum motivum, non bonum quodlibet, sed bonum quoddam determinatum. Cum igitur voluntas tendit in actum mota ex apprehensione rationis repraesentantis sibi proprium bonum, sequitur debita actio. Cum autem voluntas in actionem prorumpit ad apprehensionem apprehensivae sensualis; vel ipsius rationis aliquod aliud bonum repraesentantis a proprio bono diversum; sequitur in actione voluntatis peccatum morale. [16] Again, since reason is able to apprehend many goods and a multiplicity of ends, and since for each thing there is a proper end, there will be, then, for the will an end and a first motivating object which is not merely any good, but some determinate good. Hence, when the will inclines to act as moved by the apprehension of reason, presenting a proper good to it, the result is a fitting action. But when the will breaks forth into action, at the apprehension of sense cognition, or of reason itself presenting some other good at variance with its proper good, the result in the action of the will is a moral fault.
Praecedit igitur in voluntate peccatum actionis defectus ordinis ad rationem; et ad proprium finem. Ad rationem quidem, sicut cum, ad subitam apprehensionem sensus, voluntas in bonum delectabile secundum sensum tendit. Ad finem vero debitum, sicut cum ratio in aliquod bonum ratiocinando devenit quod non est, vel nunc vel hoc modo, bonum, et tamen voluntas in illud tendit quasi in proprium bonum. Hic autem ordinis defectus voluntarius est: nam in potestate ipsius voluntatis est velle et non velle. Itemque est in potestate ipsius quod ratio actu consideret, vel a consideratione desistat; aut quod hoc vel illud consideret. Nec tamen iste defectus est malum morale: si enim ratio nihil consideret, vel consideret bonum quodcumque, nondum est peccatum, quousque voluntas in finem indebitum tendat. Quod iam est voluntatis actus. [17] Hence, a defect of ordering to reason and to a proper end precedes a fault of action in the will: in regard to reason, in the case of the will inclining, on the occasion of a sudden sense apprehension, toward a good that is on the level of sensory pleasure; and in regard to a proper end, in the case when reason encounters in its deliberation some good which is not, at this time or under these conditions, really good, and yet the will inclines toward it, as if it were a proper good. Now, this defect in ordering is voluntary, for to will and not to will lie within the power of the will itself. And it is also within its power for reason to make an actual consideration, or to abstain from such a consideration, or further to consider this or that alternative. Yet, such a defect of ordering is not a moral evil, for, if reason considers nothing, or considers any good whatever, that is still not a sin until the will inclines to an unsuitable end. At this point, the act of will occurs.
Sic igitur tam in naturalibus quam in moralibus patet quod malum a bono non causatur nisi per accidens. [18] Thus, it is,car, both in the natural order and in the moral order, that evil is only caused by good accidentally.

Caput 11
Quod malum fundatur in bono
Chapter 11
Ex praemissis etiam ostendi potest quod omne malum est in aliquo bono fundatum. [1] It can also be shown from the preceding considerations that every evil is based on some good.
Malum enim non potest esse per se existens: cum non sit essentiam habens, ut supra ostensum est. Oportet igitur quod malum sit in aliquo subiecto. Omne autem subiectum, cum sit substantia quaedam, bonum quoddam est, ut ex praemissis patet. Omne igitur malum in bono aliquo est. [2] Indeed, evil cannot exist by itself, since it has no essence, as we have demonstrated. Therefore, evil must be in some subject. Now, every subject, because it is some sort of substance, is a good of some kind, as is clear from the foregoing. So, every evil is in a good thing.
Adhuc. Malum privatio quaedam est, ut ex praemissis patet. Privatio autem et forma privata in eodem subiecto sunt. Subiectum autem formae est ens in potentia ad formam, quod bonum est: nam in eodem genere sunt potentia et actus. Privatio igitur, quae malum est, est in bono aliquo sicut in subiecto. [3] Again, evil is a certain privation, as is evident from the foregoing. Now, privation and the form that is deprived are in the same subject. But the subject of form is being in potency to form, and such being is good, because potency and act belong in the same genus. Therefore, the privation which is evil is present in a good thing, as in a subject.
Amplius. Ex hoc dicitur aliquid malum, quia nocet. Non autem nisi quia nocet bono: nocere enim malo bonum est, cum corruptio mali sit bona. Non autem noceret, formaliter loquendo, bono, nisi esset in bono: sic enim caecitas homini nocet inquantum in ipso est. Oportet igitur quod malum sit in bono. [4] Besides, something is called evil due to the fact that it causes injury. But this is only so because it injures the good, for to injure the evil is a good thing, since the corruption of evil is good. Now, formally speaking, it would not injure the good unless it were in the good; thus, blindness injures a man to the extent that it is in him. So, evil must be in the good.
Item. Malum non causatur nisi a bono, et per accidens tantum. Omne autem quod est per accidens, reducitur ad id quod est per se. Oportet igitur semper cum malo causato, quod est effectus boni per accidens, esse bonum aliquod quod est effectus boni per se, ita quod sit fundamentum eius: nam quod est per accidens, fundatur supra id quod est per se. [5] Moreover, evil is not caused, except by the good, and then only accidentally. But everything that occurs accidentally is reducible to that which is by itself. So, with a caused evil which is the accidental effect of the good, there must always be some good which is the direct effect of the good as such, and thus this good effect is the foundation of the evil. For what exists accidentally is based on that which exists by itself.
Sed cum bonum et malum sint opposita; unum autem oppositorum non possit esse alterius subiectum, sed expellat ipsum: videbitur alicui primo aspectu esse inconveniens si bonum subiectum mali esse dicatur. [6] However, since good and evil are contraries, one of these contraries cannot be the subject for the other; rather, it excludes the other. It will seem to someone, at first glance, that it is improper to say that good is the subject of evil.
Non est autem inconveniens, si veritas perquiratur. Nam bonum communiter dicitur sicut et ens: cum omne ens, inquantum huiusmodi, sit bonum, ut probatum est. Non est autem inconveniens ut non ens sit in ente sicut in subiecto: privatio enim quaelibet est non ens, et tamen subiectum eius est substantia, quae est ens aliquod. Non tamen non ens est in ente sibi opposito sicut in subiecto. Caecitas enim non est non ens universale, sed non ens hoc, quo scilicet tollitur visus: non est igitur in visu sicut in subiecto, sed in animali. Similiter autem malum non est sicut in subiecto in bono sibi opposito, sed hoc per malum tollitur: sed in aliquo alio bono; sicut malum moris est in bono naturae; malum autem naturae, quod est privatio formae, est in materia, quae est bonum sicut ens in potentia. [7] Yet it is not improper, provided the truth be investigated to its limit. Good is spoken of in just as general a way as being, since every being, as such, is good, as we have proved. Now, it is not improper for non-being to be present in being, as in a subject. Indeed, any instance of privation is a non-being, yet its subject is a substance which is a being. However, non-being is not present in a being contrary to it, as in a subject. For blindness is not universal non-being, but, rather, this particular non-being whereby sight is taken away. So, it is not present in the power of sight as its subject, but, rather, in the animal. Likewise, evil is not present in a good contrary to it, as in its subject; rather, this contrary good is taken away by the evil. For instance, moral evil is present in a natural good, while a natural evil, which is a privation of form, is present in matter which is a good, in the sense of a being in potency.

Caput 12
Quod malum non totaliter consumit bonum
Chapter 12
Patet autem ex praedictis quod, quantumcumque multiplicetur malum, nunquam potest totum bonum consumere. [1] It is evident from the foregoing explanation that, no matter how much evil be multiplied, it can never destroy the good wholly.
Semper enim oportet quod remaneat mali subiectum, si malum remanet. Subiectum autem mali est bonum. Manet igitur semper bonum. [2] In fact, there must always continue to be a subject for evil, if evil is to endure. Of course, the subject of evil is the good, and so the good will always endure.
Sed cum contingat malum in infinitum intendi; semper autem per intensionem mali minuatur bonum: videtur in infinitum per malum diminui bonum. Bonum autem quod per malum diminui potest, oportet esse finitum: nam infinitum bonum non est capax mali, ut in primo libro ostensum est. Videtur igitur quod quandoque totum tollatur bonum per malum: nam si ex finito aliquid infinities tollatur, oportet illud quandoque per ablationem consumi. [3] Yet, because it is possible for evil to increase without limit, and because good is always decreased as evil increases, it appears that the good may be infinitely decreased by evil. Now, the good that can be decreased by evil must be finite, for the infinite good does not admit of evil, as we showed in Book One [39]. So, it seems that eventually the good would be wholly destroyed by evil, for, if something be subtracted an infinite number of times from a finite thing, the latter must be destroyed eventually by the subtraction.
Non autem potest dici, ut dicunt quidam, quod sequens ablatio, secundum eandem proportionem facta qua et prior, in infinitum procedens, bonum non possit consumere, sicut in continui divisione contingit: nam si ex bicubitali linea dimidium subtraxeris, itemque ex residuo dimidium, et sic in infinitum procedas, semper aliquid adhuc dividendum remanebit. Sed tamen in hoc divisionis processu semper posterius subtractum oportet esse minus secundum quantitatem: dimidium enim totius, quod prius subtrahebatur, maius est secundum quantitatem absolutam quam dimidium dimidii, licet eadem proportio maneat. Hoc autem in diminutione qua bonum per malum diminuitur, nequaquam potest accidere. Nam quanto bonum magis per malum fuerit diminutum, erit infirmius: et sic per secundum malum magis diminui poterit. Rursusque malum sequens contingit esse aequale, vel maius priore: unde non semper secundo subtrahetur a bono per malum minor boni quantitas, proportione servata eadem. [4] Now, it cannot be answered, as some people say, that if the subsequent subtraction be made in the same proportion as the preceding one, going on to infinity, it is not possible to destroy the good, as happens in the division of a continuum. For, if you subtract half of a line two cubits long, and then half of the remainder, and if you go on in this way to infinity, something will always remain to be divided. But, in this process of division, that which is subtracted later must always be quantitatively diminished. In fact, the half of the whole is quantitatively greater than half of the half, though the same proportion continues. This, however, cannot in any sense happen in the decreasing of good by evil, for the more the good would be decreased by evil the weaker would it become, and so, more open to diminution by subsequent evil. On the contrary, the later evil could be equal to, or greater than, the earlier evil; hence a proportionately smaller quantity of good would not always be subtracted by evil from the good in subsequent cases.
Est igitur aliter dicendum. Ex praemissis enim manifestum est quod malum totaliter bonum cui oppositum est tollit, sicut caecitas visum: oportet autem quod remaneat bonum quod est mali subiectum. Quod quidem, inquantum subiectum est, habet rationem boni, secundum quod est potentia ad actum boni quod privatur per malum. Quanto igitur minus fuerit in potentia ad illud bonum, tanto minus erit bonum. Subiectum autem fit minus potentia ad formam, non quidem per solam subtractionem alicuius partis subiecti; neque per hoc quod aliqua pars potentiae subtrahatur; sed per hoc quod potentia impeditur per contrarium actum ne in actum formae exire possit, sicut subiectum tanto est minus potentia frigidum, quanto in eo magis calor augetur. Diminuitur igitur bonum per malum magis apponendo contrarium quam de bono aliquid subtrahendo: quod etiam convenit his quae sunt dicta de malo. Diximus enim quod malum incidit praeter intentionem agentis, quod semper intendit aliquod bonum, ad quod sequitur exclusio alterius boni, quod est ei oppositum. Quanto igitur illud bonum intentum ad quod praeter intentionem agentis sequitur malum, magis multiplicatur, tanto potentia ad bonum contrarium diminuitur magis: et sic magis per malum dicitur diminui bonum. [5] So, another sort of answer must be given. It is evident from what has been said that evil does take away completely the good which is its contrary, as blindness does with sight. Yet there must remain the good which is the subject of evil. This, in fact, inasmuch as it is a subject, has the essential character of goodness, in the sense that it is in potency to the act of goodness which is lacking due to the evil. So, the less it is in potency to this good, the less will it be a good. Now, a subject becomes less potential to a form, not simply by the subtraction of any of its parts, nor by the fact that any part of the potency is subtracted, but by the fact that the potency is impeded by a contrary act from being able to proceed to he actuality of the form. For example, a subject is less potential in regard to cold to the extent that heat is increased in it. Therefore, the good is diminished by evil more as a result of the addition of its contrary than by the subtraction of some of its goodness. This is also in agreement with the things that have been said about evil. Indeed, we said that evil occurs apart from the intention of the agent, and that he always intends a definite good, and that it consequently implies the exclusion of another good which is contrary to it. So, the more this intended good (which apart from the agent’s intention results in evil) is multiplied, the more is the potency to the contrary good diminished. And this is rather the way in which the good is said to be diminished by evil.
Haec autem diminutio boni per malum non potest in naturalibus in infinitum procedere. Nam formae naturales et virtutes omnes terminatae sunt, et perveniunt ad aliquem terminum ultra quem porrigi non possunt. Non potest igitur neque forma aliqua contraria, neque virtus contrarii agentis in infinitum augeri, ut ex hoc sequatur in infinitum diminutio boni per malum. [6] Now, in the natural order, this diminution of the good by evil cannot proceed to infinity. All natural forms and powers are limited, and they reach some limit beyond which they cannot extend. So, it is not possible for any contrary form, or any power of a contrary agent, to be increased to infinity, in such a way that the result would be an infinite diminution of good by evil.
In moralibus autem potest ista diminutio in infinitum procedere. Nam intellectus et voluntas in suis actibus terminos non habent. Potest enim intellectus intelligendo in infinitum procedere: unde mathematicae numerorum species et figurarum infinitae dicuntur. Et similiter voluntas in volendo in infinitum procedit: qui enim vult furtum committere, potest iterum velle illud committere, et sic in infinitum. Quanto autem voluntas magis in fines indebitos tendit, tanto difficilius redit ad proprium et debitum finem: quod patet in his in quibus per peccandi consuetudinem iam est habitus vitiorum inductus. In infinitum igitur per malum moris bonum naturalis aptitudinis diminui potest. Nunquam tamen totaliter tolletur, sed semper naturam remanentem comitatur. [7] However, in the moral order, this diminution can proceed to infinity. For the intellect and the will have no limits to their acts. The intellect is able to go on to infinity in its act of understanding; this is why the mathematical species of numbers and figures are called infinite. Likewise, the will proceeds to infinity in its act of willing: a man who wills to commit a theft can will again to commit it, and so on to infinity. Indeed, the more the will tends toward unworthy ends, the greater is its difficulty in returning to a proper and worthy end. This is evident in he case of people in whom vicious habits have developed already, as a result of their growing accustomed to sinning. Therefore, the good of natural aptitude can be infinitely decreased by moral evil. Yet, it will never be wholly destroyed; rather, it will always accompany the nature that endures.

Caput 13
Quod malum habet aliquo modo causam
Chapter 13
Ex praedictis autem ostendi potest quod, etsi malum non habeat causam per se, cuiuslibet tamen mali oportet esse causam per accidens. [1] From what has been said above it can be shown that, though evil has no direct cause of itself, still there must be an accidental cause for every evil.
Quicquid enim est in aliquo ut in subiecto, oportet quod habeat aliquam causam: causatur enim vel ex subiecti principiis, vel ex aliqua extrinseca causa. Malum autem est in bono sicut in subiecto, ut ostensum est. Oportet igitur quod malum habeat causam. [2] Whatever exists in another thing as in its subject must have some cause, for it is caused either by the principles of the subject or by some extrinsic cause. Now, evil is in the good as in a subject, as has been indicated, and so it is necessary for evil to have a cause.
Item. Quod est in potentia ad utrumque oppositorum, non constituitur in actu alicuius eorum nisi per aliquam causam: nulla enim potentia facit se esse in actu. Malum autem est privatio eius quod quis natus est et debet habere: ex hoc enim unumquodque dicitur malum esse. Est igitur malum in subiecto quod est in potentia ad ipsum et ad suum oppositum. Oportet igitur quod malum habeat aliquam causam. [3] Again, that which is in potency to either of two contraries is not advanced to actuality under one of them unless through some cause, for no potency makes itself be in act. Now, evil is a privation of something that is natural to a man, and which he ought to have. This is why anything whatever is called evil. So, evil is present in a subject that is in potency to evil and to its contrary. Therefore, it is necessary for evil to have some cause.
Adhuc. Quicquid inest alicui praeter suam naturam, advenit ei ex aliqua alia causa: omnia enim in his quae sunt sibi naturalia permanent nisi aliquid aliud impediat; unde lapis non fertur sursum nisi ab aliquo proiiciente, nec aqua calefit nisi ab aliquo calefaciente. Malum autem semper inest praeter naturam eius cui inest: cum sit privatio eius quod natum est aliquid et debet habere. Igitur oportet quod malum semper habeat aliquam causam, vel per se vel per accidens. [4] Besides, whatever is present in something and is not due to it from its nature comes to it from some other cause, for all things present in existing beings as natural components remain there unless something else prevents them. Thus, a stone is not moved upward unless by something else that impels it, nor is water heated unless by some heating agent. Now, evil is always present as something foreign to the nature of that in which it is, since it is a privation of what a thing has from its natural origin, and ought to have. Therefore evil must always have some cause, either directly of itself, or accidentally.
Amplius. Omne malum consequitur ad aliquod bonum: sicut corruptio sequitur ad aliquam generationem. Sed omne bonum habet aliquam causam, praeter primum bonum, in quo non est aliquod malum, ut in primo libro ostensum est. Omne igitur malum habet aliquam causam, ad quam sequitur per accidens. [5] Moreover, every evil is the consequence of a good, as corruption is the result of an act of generation. But every good has a cause, other than the first good in which there is no evil, as has been shown in Book One [39]. Therefore, every evil has a cause, in regard to which it is an accidental result.

Caput 14
Quod malum est causa per accidens
Chapter 14
Ex eisdem etiam patet quod malum, etsi non sit causa per se, est tamen causa per accidens. [1] It is plain, from the same consideration, that evil, though not a direct cause of anything by itself, is, however, an accidental cause.
Si enim aliquid est causa alicuius per se, id quod accidit ei, est causa illius per accidens: sicut album quod accidit aedificatori, est causa domus per accidens. Omne autem malum est in aliquo bono. Bonum autem omne est alicuius aliquo modo causa: materia enim est quodammodo causa formae, et quodammodo e converso; et similiter est de agente et fine. Unde non sequitur processus in infinitum in causis, si quodlibet est alicuius causa, propter circulum inventum in causis et causatis secundum species diversas causarum. Malum igitur est per accidens causa. [2] For, if a thing is the direct cause of something, then that which is an accidental concomitant of this direct cause is the accidental cause of the resultant. Take, for instance, the fact that a builder happens to be white, then whiteness is the accidental cause of the house. Now, every evil is present in something good. And every good thing is the cause of something in some way, for matter is in one way the cause of form; in another way the converse is so. The same is true of the agent and the end. Hence, the result is not a process to infinity in causes if each thing is the cause of another thing, for there is a circle involved in causes and effects, depending on the different types of cause. So, evil is an accidental cause.
Adhuc. Malum est privatio quaedam, ut ex praedictis patet. Privatio autem est principium per accidens in rebus mobilibus, sicut materia et forma per se. Malum igitur est alicuius causa per accidens. [3] Again, evil is a privation, as we have seen before. Now, privation is an accidental principle in beings subject to motion, just as matter and form are essential principles. Therefore, evil is the accidental cause of something else.
Praeterea. Ex defectu causae sequitur defectus in effectu. Defectus autem in causa est aliquod malum. Non tamen potest esse causa per se: quia res non est causa per hoc quod est deficiens, sed per hoc quod est ens; si enim tota deficeret, nullius esset causa. Malum igitur est alicuius causa non per se, sed per accidens. [4] Besides, from a defect in a cause there follows a defect in the effect. Now a defect in a cause is an evil. Yet, it cannot be a direct cause in itself, for a thing is not a cause by the fact that it is defective but rather by the fact that it is a being. Indeed, if it were entirely defective, it would not cause anything. So, evil is the cause of something, not as a direct cause by itself, but accidentally.
Item. Secundum omnes species causarum discurrendo, invenitur malum esse per accidens causa. In specie quidem causae efficientis quia propter causae agentis deficientem virtutem sequitur defectus in effectu et actione. In specie vero causae materialis, quia ex materiae indispositione causatur in effectu defectus. In specie vero causae formalis, quia uni formae semper adiungitur alterius formae privatio. In specie vero causae finalis, quia indebito fini adiungitur malum, inquantum per ipsum finis debitus impeditur. [5] Moreover, evil is found to be an accidental cause in a discursive examination of all types of cause. This is so, in the kind of cause which is efficient, since a defect in the effect and in action results from a deficiency of power in the acting cause. Then, in the type of cause that is material, a defect in the effect is caused by the unsuitable character of the matter. Again, in the kind of cause which is formal, there is the fact that a privation of another form is always the adjunct of the presence of a given form. And, in the type of cause that is final, evil is connected with an improper end, inasmuch as the proper end is hindered by it.
Patet igitur quod malum est causa per accidens, et non potest esse causa per se. [6] Therefore, it is clear that evil is an accidental cause and cannot be a direct cause by itself.

Caput 15
Quod non est summum malum
Chapter 15
Ex hoc autem patet quod non potest esse aliquod summum malum, quod sit omnium malorum principium. [1] As a consequence, it is evident that there cannot be any highest evil which would be the first source of all evils.
Summum enim malum oportet esse absque consortio omnis boni: sicut et summum bonum est quod est omnino separatum a malo. Non potest autem esse aliquod malum omnino separatum a bono: cum ostensum sit quod malum fundatur in bono. Ergo nihil est summe malum. [2] The highest evil ought to be quite dissociated from any good; just as the highest good is that which is completely separate from evil. Now, no evil can exist in complete separation from the good, for we have shown that evil is based upon the good. Therefore, the highest evil is nothing.
Adhuc. Si aliquid est summe malum, oportet quod per essentiam suam sit malum: sicut et summe bonum est quod per suam essentiam bonum est. Hoc autem est impossibile: cum malum non habeat aliquam essentiam, ut supra probatum est. Impossibile est igitur ponere summum malum, quod sit malorum principium. [3] Again, if the highest evil be anything, it must be evil in its own essence, just as the highest good is what is good in its own essence. Now, this is impossible, because evil has no essence, as we proved above. So, it is impossible to posit a highest evil which would be the source of evils.
Item. Illud quod est primum principium, non est ab aliquo causatum. Omne autem malum causatur a bono, ut ostensum est. Non est igitur malum primum principium. [4] Besides, that which is a first principle is not caused by anything. But every evil is caused by a good, as we have shown. Therefore, evil is not a first principle.
Amplius. Malum non agit nisi virtute boni, ut ex praemissis patet. Primum autem principium agit virtute propria. Malum igitur non potest esse primum principium. [5] Moreover, evil acts only through the power of the good, as is clear from what has been established previously. But a first principle acts through its own power. Therefore, evil cannot be a first principle.
Praeterea. Cum id quod est per accidens, sit posterius eo quod est per se, impossibile est quod sit primum id quod est per accidens. Malum autem non evenit nisi per accidens et praeter intentionem, ut probatum est. Impossibile est igitur quod malum sit primum principium. [6] Furthermore, since “that which is accidental is posterior to that which is per se,” it is impossible for that which is first to be accidental. Now, evil arises only accidentally, and apart from intention, as has been demonstrated. So, it is impossible for evil to be a first principle.
Adhuc. Omne malum habet causam per accidens, ut probatum est. Primum autem principium non habet causam neque per se neque per accidens. Malum igitur non potest esse primum principium in aliquo genere. [7] Again, every evil has an accidental cause, as we have proved. Now, a first principle has no cause, whether direct or accidental. Therefore, evil cannot be a first principle in any genus.
Item. Causa per se prior est ea quae per accidens. Sed malum non est causa nisi per accidens, ut ostensum est. Malum igitur non potest esse primum principium. [8] Besides, a per sc cause is prior to one which is accidental. But evil is not a cause, except in the accidental sense, as we have shown.” So, evil cannot be a first principle.
Per hoc autem excluditur error Manichaeorum, ponentium aliquod summum malum, quod est principium primum omnium malorum. [9] By means of this conclusion, the error of the Manicheans is refuted, for they claimed that there is a highest evil which is the first principle of all evils.

Caput 16
Quod finis cuiuslibet rei est bonum
Chapter 16
Si autem omne agens agit propter bonum, ut supra probatum est, sequitur ulterius quod cuiuslibet entis bonum sit finis. Omne enim ens ordinatur in finem per suam actionem: oportet enim quod vel ipsa actio sit finis; vel actionis finis est etiam finis agentis. Quod est eius bonum. [1] If every agent acts for the sake of a good, as was proved above, it follows further that the end of every being is a good. For every being is ordered to its end through its action. It must be, then, that the action itself is the end, or that the end of the action is also the end of the agent. And this is its good.
Amplius. Finis rei cuiuslibet est in quod terminatur appetitus eius. Appetitus autem cuiuslibet rei terminatur ad bonum: sic enim philosophi diffiniunt bonum, quod omnia appetunt. Cuiuslibet igitur rei finis est aliquod bonum. [2] Again, the end of anything is that in which its appetite terminates. Now, the appetite of anything terminates in a good; this is how the philosophers define the good: “that which all things desire.” Therefore, the end for everything is a good.
Item. Illud ad quod aliquid tendit cum extra ipsum fuerit, et in quo quiescit cum ipsum habuerit, est finis eius. Unumquodque autem, si perfectione propria careat, in ipsam movetur, quantum in se est: si vero eam habeat, in ipsa quiescit. Finis igitur uniuscuiusque rei est eius perfectio. Perfectio autem cuiuslibet est bonum ipsius. Unumquodque igitur ordinatur in bonum sicut in finem. [3] Besides, that toward which a thing tends, while it is beyond the thing, and in which it rests, when it is possessed, is the end for the thing. Now, if anything lacks a proper perfection, it is moved toward it, in so far as lies within its capacity, but if it possess it the thing rests in it. Therefore, the end of each thing is its perfection. Now, the perfection of anything is its good. So, each thing is ordered to a good as an end.
Praeterea. Eodem modo ordinantur in finem ea quae cognoscunt finem, et ea quae finem non cognoscunt: licet quae cognoscunt finem, per se moveantur in finem; quae autem non cognoscunt, tendunt in finem quasi ab alio directa, sicut patet de sagittante et sagitta. Sed ea quae cognoscunt finem, semper ordinantur in bonum sicut in finem: nam voluntas, quae est appetitus finis praecogniti, non tendit in aliquid nisi sub ratione boni, quod est eius obiectum. Ergo et ea quae finem non cognoscunt, ordinantur in bonum sicut in finem. Finis igitur omnium est bonum. [4] Moreover, things that know their end are ordered to the end in the same way as things which do not know it, though the ones that do know their end are moved toward it through themselves, while those that do not know it incline to their end, as directed by another being. The example of the archer and the arrow shows this clearly. However, things that know their end are always ordered to the good as an end, for the will, which is the appetite for a foreknown end, inclines toward something only if it has the rational character of a good, which is its object. So, also, the things which do not know their end are ordered to a good as an end. Therefore, the end of all things is a good.

Caput 17
Quod omnia ordinantur in unum finem, qui est Deus
Chapter 17
Ex hoc autem apparet quod omnia ordinantur in unum bonum sicut in ultimum finem. [1] It is, consequently, apparent that all things are ordered to one good, as to their ultimate end.
Si enim nihil tendit in aliquid sicut in finem nisi inquantum ipsum est bonum, ergo oportet quod bonum inquantum bonum sit finis. Quod igitur est summum bonum, est maxime omnium finis. Sed summum bonum est unum tantum, quod est Deus: ut in primo libro probatum est. Omnia igitur ordinantur sicut in finem in unum bonum quod est Deus. [2] If, in fact, nothing tends toward a thing as an end, unless this thing is a good, it is therefore necessary that the good, as good, be the end. Therefore, that which is the highest good is, from the highest point of view, the end of all things. But there is only one highest good, and this is God, as has been demonstrated in Book One [42]. So, all things are ordered to one good, as their end, and this is God.
Item. Quod est maximum in unoquoque genere, est causa omnium illorum quae sunt illius generis; sicut ignis, qui est calidissimus, est causa caliditatis in aliis corporibus. Summum igitur bonum, quod est Deus, est causa bonitatis in omnibus bonis. Ergo et est causa cuiuslibet finis quod sit finis: cum quicquid est finis, sit huiusmodi inquantum est bonum. Propter quod autem est unumquodque, et illud magis. Deus igitur maxime est omnium rerum finis. [3] Again, that which is supreme in any genus is the cause of all the members that belong in that genus; thus, fire, which is the hottest of corporeal things, is the cause of the heat of other things. Therefore, the highest good which is God is the cause of the goodness in all good things. So, also, is He the cause of every end that is an end, since whatever is an end is such because it is a good. Now, “the cause of an attribute’s inherence in a subject always itself inheres in the subject more firmly than does the attribute.” Therefore, God is obviously the end of all things.
Adhuc. In quolibet genere causarum causa prima est magis causa quam causa secunda: nam causa secunda non est causa nisi per causam primam. Illud igitur quod est causa prima in ordine causarum finalium, oportet quod sit magis causa finalis cuiuslibet quam causa finalis proxima. Sed Deus est prima causa in ordine causarum finalium: cum sit summum in ordine bonorum. Est igitur magis finis uniuscuiusque rei quam aliquis finis proximus. [4] Besides, in any kind of causes, the first cause is more a cause than is the secondary cause, for a secondary cause is only a cause through the primary cause. Therefore, that which is the first cause in the order of final causes must be more the final cause of anything than is its proximate final cause. But God is the first cause in the order of final causes, since He is the highest in the order of goods. Therefore, He is more the end of everything than is any proximate end.
Amplius. In omnibus finibus ordinatis oportet quod ultimus finis sit finis omnium praecedentium finium: sicut, si potio conficitur ut detur aegroto, datur autem ut purgetur, purgatur autem ut extenuetur, extenuatur autem ut sanetur; oportet quod sanitas sit finis et extenuationis et purgationis et aliorum praecedentium. Sed omnia inveniuntur in diversis gradibus bonitatis ordinata sub uno summo bono, quod est causa omnis bonitatis: ac per hoc, cum bonum habeat rationem finis, omnia ordinantur sub Deo sicut fines praecedentes sub fine ultimo. Oportet igitur quod omnium finis sit Deus. [5] Moreover, in every ordered series of ends the ultimate end must be the end of all preceding ends. For instance, if a potion is mixed to be given a sick man, and it is given in order to purge him, and he is purged in order to make him thinner, and he is thinned down so that he may become healthy.—then health must be the end of the thinning process, and of the purging, and of the other actions which precede it. But all things are found, in their various degrees of goodness, to be subordinated to one highest good which is the cause of all goodness. Consequently, since the good has the essential character of an end, all things are subordinated to God, as preceding ends under an ultimate end. Therefore, God must be the end of all things.
Praeterea. Bonum particulare ordinatur in bonum commune sicut in finem: esse enim partis est propter esse totius; unde et bonum gentis est divinius quam bonum unius hominis. Bonum autem summum, quod est Deus, est bonum commune, cum ex eo universorum bonum dependeat: bonum autem quo quaelibet res bona est, est bonum particulare ipsius et aliorum quae ab ipso dependent. Omnes igitur res ordinantur sicut in finem in unum bonum, quod est Deus. [6] Furthermore, a particular good is ordered to the common good as to an end; indeed, the being of a part depends on the being of the whole. So, also, the good of a nation is more godlike than the good of one man. Now, the highest good which is God is the common good, since the good of all things taken together depends on Him; and the good whereby each thing is good is its own particular good, and also is the good of the other things that depend on this thing. Therefore, all things are ordered to one good as their end, and that is God.
Item. Ad ordinem agentium sequitur ordo in finibus: nam sicut supremum agens movet omnia secunda agentia, ita ad finem supremi agentis oportet quod ordinentur omnes fines secundorum agentium: quidquid enim agit supremum agens, agit propter finem suum. Agit autem supremum actiones omnium inferiorum agentium, movendo omnes ad suas actiones, et per consequens ad suos fines. Unde sequitur quod omnes fines secundorum agentium ordinentur a primo agente in finem suum proprium. Agens autem primum rerum omnium est Deus, ut in secundo probatum est. Voluntatis autem ipsius nihil aliud finis est quam sua bonitas, quae est ipsemet, ut in primo probatum est. Omnia igitur quaecumque sunt facta vel ab ipso immediate, vel mediantibus causis secundis, in Deum ordinantur sicut in finem. Omnia autem entia sunt huiusmodi: nam, sicut in secundo probatur, nihil esse potest quod ab ipso non habeat esse. Omnia igitur ordinantur in Deum sicut in finem. [7] Again, order among ends is a consequence of order among agents, for, just as the supreme agent moves all secondary agents, so must all the ends of secondary agents be ordered to the end of the supreme agent, since whatever the supreme agent does, He does for the sake of His end. Now, the supreme agent does the actions of all inferior agents by moving them all to their actions and, consequently, to their ends. Hence, it follows that all the ends of secondary agents are ordered by the first agent to His own proper end. Of course, the first agent of all things is God, as we proved in Book Two [15]. There is no other end for His will than His goodness, which is Himself, as we proved in Book One [74]. Therefore, all things, whether made by Him. immediately, or by means of secondary causes, are ordered to God as to their end. Now, all things are of this kind, for, as we proved in Book Two [15], there can be nothing that does not take its being from Him. So, all things are ordered to God as an end.
Adhuc. Finis ultimus cuiuslibet facientis, inquantum est faciens, est ipsemet: utimur enim factis a nobis propter nos; et si aliquid aliquando propter aliud homo faciat, hoc refertur in bonum suum vel utile vel delectabile vel honestum. Deus autem est causa factiva rerum omnium, quorundam quidem immediate, quorundam autem mediantibus aliis causis, ut ex praemissis est manifestum. Est igitur ipsemet finis rerum omnium. [8] Besides, the ultimate end of any maker, as a maker, is himself; we use things made by us for our own sakes, and, if sometimes a man makes a thing for some other purpose, this has reference to his own good, either as useful, delectable, or as a good for its own sake. Now, God is the productive cause of all things, of some immediately, of others by means of other causes, as is shown in the foregoing. Therefore, He Himself is the end of all things.
Praeterea. Finis inter alias causas primatum obtinet, et ab ipso omnes aliae causae habent quod sint causae in actu: agens enim non agit nisi propter finem, ut ostensum est. Ex agente autem materia in actum formae reducitur: unde materia fit actu huius rei materia, et similiter forma huius rei forma, per actionem agentis, et per consequens per finem. Finis etiam posterior est causa quod praecedens finis intendatur ut finis: non enim movetur aliquid in finem proximum nisi propter finem postremum. Est igitur finis ultimus prima omnium causa. Esse autem primam omnium causam necesse est primo enti convenire, quod Deus est, ut supra ostensum est. Deus igitur est ultimus omnium finis. [9] Moreover, the end holds first place over other types of cause, and to it all other causes owe the fact that they are causes in act: for the agent acts only for the sake of the end, as was pointed out.” Matter is brought to formal act by the agent, and thus matter actually becomes the matter of this particular thing, as form becomes the form of this thing: through the action of the agent, and consequently through the end. So, too, the posterior end is the cause of the preceding end being intended as an end, for a thing is not moved toward a proximate end unless for the sake of a last end. Therefore, the ultimate end is the first cause of all. Now, to be the first cause of all must be appropriate to the first being, that is, to God, as was shown above. So, God is the ultimate end of all things.
Hinc est quod dicitur Proverb. 16-4: universa propter semetipsum operatus est Deus. Et Apoc. ult.: ego sum alpha et omega, primus et novissimus. [10] Thus it is said in Proverbs (16:4): “God made all things for Himself”; and in the Apocalypse (22:13): “I am Alpha and Omega, the First and the Last.”

Caput 18
Quomodo Deus sit finis rerum
Chapter 18
Restat igitur inquirendum quomodo Deus sit omnium finis. Quod quidem ex praemissis fiet manifestum. [1] We must further investigate how God is the end of all. This will be made clear from the foregoing.
Sic enim est ultimus finis omnium rerum quod tamen est prius omnibus in essendo. Finis autem aliquis invenitur qui, etiam si primatum obtineat in causando secundum quod est in intentione, est tamen in essendo posterius. Quod quidem contingit in quolibet fine quem agens sua actione constituit: sicut medicus constituit sanitatem per suam actionem in infirmo, quae tamen est finis eius. Aliquis autem finis invenitur qui, sicut est praecedens in causando, ita etiam in essendo praecedit: sicut dicitur finis id quod aliquid sua actione vel motu acquirere intendit, ut locum sursum ignis per suum motum, et civitatem rex per pugnam. Deus igitur sic est finis rerum sicut aliquid ab unaquaque re suo modo obtinendum. [2] The ultimate end of all is such that He is, nonetheless, prior to all things in existing being. Now, there is a sort of end which, though it holds first place causally in the order of intention, is posterior in existing. This is the situation with an end which the agent sets up by his own action, as a physician sets up health in a sick man by his own action; this is, of course, the physician’s end. And then there is an end which takes precedence in existing being, just as it precedes in the causal order. For instance, we call that an end which one intends to obtain by his action or motion, as fire inclines upward by its motion, and a king intends to establish a city by fighting. Therefore, God is not the end of things in the sense of being something set up as an ideal, but as a pre-existing being Who is to be attained.
Adhuc. Deus est simul ultimus rerum finis, et primum agens, ut ostensum est. Finis autem per actionem agentis constitutus, non potest esse primum agens, sed est magis effectus agentis. Non potest igitur Deus sic esse finis rerum quasi aliquid constitutum, sed solum quasi aliquid praeexistens obtinendum. [3] Again, God is at once the ultimate end of things and the first agent, as we have shown. But the end that is produced by the action of the agent cannot be the first agent; it is, rather, the effect of the agent. Therefore, God cannot be the end of things in this way, as something produced, but only as something pre-existing that is to be attained.
Amplius. Si aliquid agat propter rem aliquam iam existentem, et per eius actionem aliquid constituatur, oportet quod rei propter quam agit aliquid acquiratur ex actione agentis: sicut si milites pugnant propter ducem, cui acquiritur victoria, quam milites suis actionibus causant. Deo autem non potest aliquid acquiri ex actione cuiuslibet rei: est enim sua bonitas omnino perfecta, ut in primo libro ostensum est. Relinquitur igitur quod Deus sit finis rerum, non sicut aliquid constitutum aut effectum a rebus, neque ita quod aliquid ei a rebus acquiratur, sed hoc solo modo, quia ipse rebus acquiritur. [4] Besides, if something act for the sake of an already existing thing, and should then set up something by its action, then this something must be added by the action of the agent to the thing for the sake of which the action is done: thus, if soldiers fight for the sake of their leader, victory will come to the leader, and this is what the soldiers cause by their actions. Now, something cannot be added to God by the action of a thing, for His goodness is completely perfect, as we showed in Book One [37ff]. The conclusion stands, then, that God is the end of things, not in the sense of something set up, or produced, by things, nor in the sense that something is added to Him by things, but in this sense only, that He is attained by things.
Item. Oportet quod eo modo effectus tendat in finem quo agens propter finem agit. Deus autem qui est primum agens omnium rerum, non sic agit quasi sua actione aliquid acquirat, sed quasi sua actione aliquid largiatur: quia non est in potentia ut aliquid acquirere possit, sed solum in actu perfecto, ex quo potest elargiri. Res igitur non ordinantur in Deum sicut in finem cui aliquid acquiratur, sed ut ab ipso ipsummet suo modo consequantur, cum ipsemet sit finis. [5] Moreover, the effect must tend toward the end in the same way that the agent works for the end. Now, God, Who is the first agent of all things, does not act in such a way that something is attained by His action, but in such a way that something is enriched by His action. For He is not in potency to the possibility of obtaining something; rather, He is in perfect act simply, and as a result He is a source of enrichment. So, things are not ordered to God as to an end for which something may be obtained, but rather so that they may attain Himself from Himself, according to their measure, since He is their end.

Caput 19
Quod omnia intendunt assimilari Deo
Chapter 19
Ex hoc autem quod acquirunt divinam bonitatem, res creatae similes Deo constituuntur. Si igitur res omnes in Deum sicut in ultimum finem tendunt ut ipsius bonitatem consequantur, sequitur quod ultimus rerum finis sit Deo assimilari. [1] Created things are made like unto God by the fact that they attain to divine goodness. If then, all things tend toward God as an ultimate end, so that they may attain His goodness, it follows that the ultimate end of things is to become like God.
Amplius. Agens dicitur esse finis effectus inquantum effectus tendit in similitudinem agentis: unde forma generantis est finis generationis. Sed Deus ita est finis rerum quod est etiam primum agens earum. Omnia igitur intendunt, sicut ultimum finem, Deo assimilari. [2] Again, the agent is said to be the end of the effect because the effect tends to become like the agent; hence, “the form of the generator is the end of the generating action.” But God is the end of things in such a way that He is also their first agent. Therefore, all things tend to become like God as to their ultimate end.
Item. In rebus evidenter apparet quod esse appetunt naturaliter: unde et si qua corrumpi possunt, naturaliter corrumpentibus resistunt, et tendunt illuc ubi conserventur, sicut ignis sursum et terra deorsum. Secundum hoc autem esse habent omnia quod Deo assimilantur, qui est ipsum esse subsistens: cum omnia sint solum quasi esse participantia. Omnia igitur appetunt quasi ultimum finem Deo assimilari. [3] Besides, it is quite evident that things “naturally desire to be,” and if they can be corrupted by anything they naturally resist corrupting agents and tend toward a place where they may be preserved, as fire inclines upward and earth downward. Now, all things get their being from the fact that they are made like unto God, Who is subsisting being itself, for all things exist merely as participants in existing being. Therefore, all things desire as their ultimate end to be made like unto God.
Praeterea. Res omnes creatae sunt quaedam imagines primi agentis, scilicet Dei: agens enim agit sibi simile. Perfectio autem imaginis est ut repraesentet suum exemplar per similitudinem ad ipsum: ad hoc enim imago constituitur. Sunt igitur res omnes propter divinam similitudinem consequendam sicut propter ultimum finem. [4] Moreover, all created things are, in a sense, images of the first agent, that is, of God, “for the agent makes a product to his own likeness. Now, the function of a perfect image is to represent its prototype by likeness to it; this is why an image is made. Therefore, all things exist in order to attain to the divine likeness, as to their ultimate end.
Adhuc. Omnis res per suum motum vel actionem tendit in aliquod bonum sicut in finem, ut supra ostensum est. In tantum autem aliquid de bono participat, in quantum assimilatur primae bonitati, quae Deus est. Omnia igitur per motus suos et actiones tendunt in divinam similitudinem sicut in finem ultimum. [5] Furthermore, everything tends through its motion or action toward a good, as its end, which we showed above. Now, a thing participates in the good precisely to the same extent that it becomes like the first goodness, which is God. So, all things tend through their movements and actions toward the divine likeness, as toward their ultimate end.

Caput 20
Quomodo res imitentur divinam bonitatem
Chapter 20
Patet ergo ex his quae dicta sunt quod assimilari ad Deum est ultimus omnium finis. Id autem quod proprie habet rationem finis, est bonum. Tendunt igitur res in hoc quod assimilentur Deo proprie inquantum est bonus. [1] From what has been said, then, it is clear that to become like God is the ultimate end of all. Now, that which possesses the formal character of an end, in the proper sense, is the good. Therefore, things tend toward this objective, of becoming like God, inasmuch as He is good.
Bonitatem autem creaturae non assequuntur eo modo sicut in Deo est, licet divinam bonitatem unaquaeque res imitetur secundum suum modum. Divina enim bonitas simplex est, quasi tota in uno consistens. Ipsum enim divinum esse omnem plenitudinem perfectionis obtinet, ut in primo libro probatum est. Unde, cum unumquodque in tantum sit bonum in quantum est perfectum, ipsum divinum esse est eius perfecta bonitas: idem enim est Deo esse, vivere, sapientem esse, beatum esse, et quicquid aliud ad perfectionem et bonitatem pertinere videtur, quasi tota divina bonitas sit ipsum divinum esse. Rursumque ipsum divinum esse est ipsius Dei existentis substantia. In aliis autem rebus hoc accidere non potest. Ostensum est enim in secundo quod nulla substantia creata est ipsum suum esse. Unde, si secundum quod res quaelibet est, bona est; non est autem earum aliqua suum esse: nulla earum est sua bonitas, sed earum quaelibet bonitatis participatione bona est, sicut et ipsius esse participatione est ens. [2] Creatures do not attain goodness in the same measure that it is in God, though each thing imitates divine goodness according to its measure. For, divine goodness is simple, entirely gathered together, as it were, into one being. Indeed, this divine existing being includes the entire fullness of perfection, as we proved in Book One [28]. As a result, since anything is perfect to the extent that it is good, this divine being is His perfect goodness. In fact, for God it is the same thing to be, to live, to be wise, to be blessed, and to be whatever else seems to belong to perfection and goodness; the whole divine goodness is, as it were, His divine existing being. Again, this divine being is the substance of the existing God. Now, this cannot obtain in the case of other things. We have pointed out in Book Two [15] that no created substance is its own act of being. Hence, if anything is good by virtue of the fact that it exists, none of them is its own act of being; none of them is its own goodness. Rather, each of them is good by participation in goodness, just as it is being by participation in existing being itself.
Rursus. Non omnes creaturae in uno gradu bonitatis constituuntur. Nam quorundam substantia forma et actus est: scilicet cui secundum id quod est, competit esse actu et bonum esse. Quorundam vero substantia ex materia et forma composita est: cui competit actu esse et bonum esse, sed secundum aliquid sui, scilicet secundum formam. Divina igitur substantia sua bonitas est; substantia vero simplex bonitatem participat secundum id quod est; substantia autem composita secundum aliquid sui. [3] Again, not all creatures are established on one level of goodness. For some of them, substance is their form and their act: this is so for the creature to whom, because of what it is essentially, it is appropriate to be, and to be good. For others, indeed, substance is composed of matter and form: to such a being it is appropriate to be, and to be good—but by virtue of some part of it, that is to say, by virtue of its form. Therefore, divine substance is its own goodness, but a simple substance participates goodness by virtue of what it is essentially, while composite substance does so by virtue of something that belongs to it as a part.
In hoc autem tertio gradu substantiarum iterum diversitas invenitur quantum ad ipsum esse. Nam quorundam ex materia et forma compositorum totam materiae potentiam forma adimplet, ita quod non remanet in materia potentia ad aliam formam: et per consequens nec in aliqua alia materia potentia ad hanc formam. Et huiusmodi sunt corpora caelestia, quae ex tota materia sua constant. Quorundam vero forma non replet totam materiae potentiam: unde adhuc in materia remanet potentia ad aliam formam; et in alia materiae parte remanet potentia ad hanc formam; sicut patet in elementis et elementatis. Quia vero privatio est negatio in substantia eius quod substantiae potest inesse, manifestum est quod cum hac forma quae non implet totam materiae potentiam, adiungitur privatio formae: quae quidem adiungi non potest substantiae cuius forma implet totam materiae potentiam; neque illi quae est forma per suam essentiam; et multo minus illi cuius essentia est ipsum suum esse. Cum autem manifestum sit quod motus non potest esse ubi non est potentia ad aliud, quia motus est actus existentis in potentia; itemque manifestum sit quod malum est ipsa privatio boni: planum est quod in hoc ultimo substantiarum ordine est bonum mutabile et permixtionem mali oppositi habens; quod in superioribus substantiarum ordinibus accidere non potest. Possidet igitur haec substantia ultimo modo dicta, sicut ultimum gradum in esse, ita ultimum gradum in bonitate. [4] In this third grade of substance, in turn, there is found a diversity in regard to being itself. For some of them that are composed of matter and form, the form fulfills the entire potentiality of the matter, so that there remains in their matter no potentiality for another form. And consequently, there is no potentiality in other matter for the form of this type of substance. Beings of this type are celestial bodies, which actuate their entire matter when they exist. For other substances, the form does not exhaust the entire potentiality of their matter; consequently, there still remains a potentiality for another form, and in some other portion of matter there remains a potentiality for this sort of form, as is the case in the elements and in things composed of the elements. In fact, since privation is the negation in a substance of something which can be present in that substance, it is clear that the privation of a form is found combined with the type of form that does not exhaust the entire potentiality of matter. Indeed, privation cannot be associated with a substance whose form exhausts the entire potentiality of its matter; nor with one which is a form in its essence; still less with one whose essence is its very act of being. Now, since it is obvious that change cannot take place where there is no potentiality to something else, for motion is the “act of that which exists potentially,” and since it is also clear that evil is the very privation of the good, it is plain that, in this lowest order of substances, the good is mutable and mixed with its contrary evil. This cannot occur in the higher orders of substances. Therefore, this substance which we have said is on the lowest level holds the lowest rank in goodness, just as it has the lowest grade in being.
Inter partes etiam huius substantiae ex materia et forma compositae, bonitatis ordo invenitur. Cum enim materia sit ens in potentia secundum se considerata, forma vero sit actus eius; substantia vero composita sit actu existens per formam: forma quidem erit secundum se bona, substantia vero composita prout actu habet formam; materia vero secundum quod est in potentia ad formam. Et licet unumquodque sit bonum inquantum est ens, non tamen oportet quod materia, quae est ens solum in potentia, sit bona solum in potentia. Ens enim absolute dicitur, bonum autem etiam in ordine consistit: non enim solum aliquid bonum dicitur quia est finis, vel quia est obtinens finem; sed, etiam si nondum ad finem pervenerit, dummodo sit ordinatum in finem, ex hoc ipso dicitur bonum. Materia ergo non potest simpliciter dici ens ex hoc quod est potentia ens, in quo importatur ordo ad esse: potest autem ex hoc simpliciter dici bona, propter ordinem ipsum. In quo apparet quod bonum quodammodo amplioris est ambitus quam ens: propter quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod bonum se extendit ad existentia et non existentia. Nam et ipsa non existentia, scilicet materia secundum quod intelligitur privationi subiecta, appetit bonum, scilicet esse. Ex quo patet quod etiam sit bona: nihil enim appetit bonum nisi bonum. [5] Still, among the parts of this sort of substance composed of matter and form, an order of goodness is found. In fact, since matter, considered in itself, is potential being and form is its act, and since composite substance is actually existent through form, the form will be good in itself; while the composite substance is so in so far as it actually possesses form; and the matter is good inasmuch as it is in potentiality to form. Besides, though anything is good in so far as it is a being, it is not, however, necessary for matter which is merely potential being to be good only in potency. For being is a term used absolutely, while good also includes a relation. In fact, a thing is not called good simply because it is an end, or because it has achieved the end; provided it be ordered to the end, it may be called good because of this relation. So, matter cannot be called a being without qualification, because it is potential being, in which a relation to existing being is implied, but it can be called good, without qualification, precisely because of this relation. It is apparent in this conclusion that good is, in a way, of wider scope than being. For this reason, Dionysius says, in the fourth chapter of On the Divine Names: “the good extends to existent beings and also to non-existent ones.” For, this non-existent thing—namely matter understood as subject to privation—desires a good, that is, to be. It is, consequently, evident that it is also good, for nothing except a good thing desires the good.
Est et alio modo creaturae bonitas a bonitate divina deficiens. Nam, sicut dictum est, Deus in ipso suo esse summam perfectionem obtinet bonitatis. Res autem creata suam perfectionem non possidet in uno, sed in multis: quod enim est in supremo unitum, multiplex in infimis invenitur. Unde Deus secundum idem dicitur esse virtuosus, sapiens et operans, creatura vero secundum diversa: tantoque perfecta bonitas alicuius creaturae maiorem multiplicitatem requirit, quanto magis a prima bonitate distans invenitur. Si vero perfectam bonitatem non potest attingere, imperfectam retinebit in paucis. Et inde est quod, licet primum et summum bonum sit omnino simplex; substantiaeque ei in bonitate propinquae, sint pariter et quantum ad simplicitatem vicinae: infimae tamen substantiae inveniuntur simpliciores quibusdam superioribus eis, sicut elementa animalibus et hominibus, quia non possunt pertingere ad perfectionem cognitionis et intellectus, quam consequuntur animalia et homines. [6] There is still another way in which the goodness of a creature is defective in comparison with divine goodness. For, as we said, God in His very act of being holds the highest perfection of goodness. On the other hand, a created thing does not possess its perfection in unity, but in many items, for what is unified in the highest instance is found to be manifold in the lowest things. Consequently, God is said to be virtuous, wise, and operative with reference to the same thing, but creatures are so described with reference to a diversity of things. And so, the more multiplicity the perfect goodness of any creature requires, the more removed is it from the first goodness. If it cannot attain perfect goodness, it will keep imperfect goodness in a few items. Hence it is that, though the first and highest good is altogether simple, and the substances that are nearer to it in goodness are likewise close to it in regard to simplicity, we find some among the lowest substances to be simpler than some of their superiors, as is the case with elements in relation to animals and men; yet these lower simple beings cannot achieve the perfection of knowledge and understanding which animals and men do attain.
Manifestum est ergo ex dictis quod, licet Deus secundum suum simplex esse perfectam et totam suam bonitatem habeat, creaturae tamen ad perfectionem suae bonitatis non pertingunt per solum suum esse, sed per plura. Unde, licet quaelibet earum sit bona inquantum est, non tamen potest simpliciter bona dici si aliis careat quae ad ipsius bonitatem requiruntur: sicut homo qui, virtute spoliatus, vitiis est subiectus, dicitur quidem bonus secundum quid, scilicet inquantum est ens et inquantum est homo, non tamen bonus simpliciter, sed magis malus. Non igitur cuilibet creaturarum idem est esse et bonum esse simpliciter: licet quaelibet earum bona sit inquantum est. Deo vero simpliciter idem est esse et esse bonum. [7] So, it is evident from what has been said that, though God has His own perfect and complete goodness, in accord with His simple existing being, creatures do not attain the perfection of their goodness through their being alone, but through many things. Hence, although any one of them is good in so far as it exists, it cannot be called good, without qualification, if it lack any other things required for its goodness. Thus, a man who is destitute of virtue and host to vices is indeed called good, relatively speaking; that is, to the extent that be is a being, and a man. However, in the absolute sense, he is not good, but evil. So, it is not the same thing for any creature to be and to be good without qualification, although each of them is good in so far as it exists. In God, however, to be and to be good are simply the same thing.
Si autem res quaelibet tendit in divinae bonitatis similitudinem sicut in finem; divinae autem bonitati assimilatur aliquid quantum ad omnia quae ad propriam pertinent bonitatem; bonitas autem rei non solum in esse suo consistit, sed in omnibus aliis quae ad suam perfectionem requiruntur, ut ostensum est: manifestum est quod res ordinantur in Deum sicut in finem non solum secundum esse substantiale, sed etiam secundum ea quae ei accidunt pertinentia ad perfectionem; et etiam secundum propriam operationem, quae etiam pertinet ad perfectionem rei. [8] So, if each thing tends toward a likeness of divine goodness as its end, and if each thing becomes like the divine goodness in respect of all the things that belong to its proper goodness, then the goodness of the thing consists not only in its mere being, but in all the things needed for its perfection, as we have shown. It is obvious, then, that things are ordered to God as an end, not merely according to their substantial act of being, but also according to those items which are added as pertinent to perfection, and even according to the proper operation which also belongs to the thing’s perfection.

Caput 21
Quod res intendunt naturaliter assimilari Deo in hoc quod est causa
Chapter 21
Ex his autem apparet quod res intendunt divinam similitudinem etiam in hoc quod sunt causae aliorum. [1] As a result, it is evident that things also tend toward the divine likeness by the fact that they are the cause of other things.
Tendit enim in divinam similitudinem res creata per suam operationem. Per suam autem operationem una res fit causa alterius. Ergo in hoc etiam res intendunt divinam similitudinem, ut sint aliis causae. [2] In fact, a created thing tends toward the divine likeness through its operation. Now, through its operation, one thing becomes the cause of another. Therefore, in this way, also, do things tend toward the divine likeness, in that they are the causes of other things.
Adhuc. Res tendunt in divinam similitudinem inquantum est bonus, ut supra dictum est. Ex bonitate autem Dei est quod aliis esse largitur: unumquodque enim agit inquantum est actu perfectum. Desiderant igitur generaliter res in hoc Deo assimilari, ut sint aliorum causae. [3] Again, things tend toward the divine likeness inasmuch as He is good, as we said above. Now, it is as a result of the goodness of God that He confers being on all things, for a being acts by virtue of the fact that it is actually perfect. So, things generally desire to become like God in this respect, by being the causes of other things.
Amplius. Ordo ad bonum boni rationem habet, ut ex dictis est manifestum. Unumquodque autem per hoc quod est causa alterius, ordinatur ad bonum: bonum enim solum causatur per se, malum autem per accidens tantum, ut ostensum est. Esse igitur aliorum causa est bonum. Secundum autem quodlibet bonum ad quod aliquid tendit, intendit divinam similitudinem: cum quodlibet bonum creatum sit ex participatione divinae bonitatis. Intendunt igitur res divinam similitudinem in hoc quod sunt aliorum causae. [4] Besides, an orderly relation toward the good has the formal character of a good thing, as is clear from what we have said. Now, by the fact that it is the cause of another, a thing is ordered toward the good, for only the good is directly caused in itself; evil is merely caused accidentally, as we have shown. Therefore, to be the cause of other things is good. Now, a thing tends toward the divine likeness according to each good to which it inclines, since any created thing is good through participation in divine goodness. And so, things tend toward the divine likeness by the fact that they are causes of others.
Item. Eiusdem rationis est quod effectus tendat in similitudinem agentis, et quod agens assimilet sibi effectum: tendit enim effectus in finem in quem dirigitur ab agente. Agens autem intendit sibi assimilare patiens non solum quantum ad esse ipsius, sed etiam quantum ad causalitatem: sicut enim ab agente conferuntur effectui naturali principia per quae subsistat, ita principia per quae aliorum sit causa; sicut enim animal, dum generatur, accipit a generante virtutem nutritivam, ita etiam virtutem generativam. Effectus igitur tendit in similitudinem agentis non solum quantum ad speciem ipsius, sed etiam quantum ad hoc quod sit aliorum causa. Sic autem tendunt res in similitudinem Dei sicut effectus in similitudinem agentis, ut ostensum est. Intendunt igitur res naturaliter assimilari Deo in hoc quod sunt causae aliorum. [5] Moreover, it is for the same reason that the effect tends to the likeness of the agent, and that the agent makes the effect like to itself, for the effect tends toward the end to which it is directed by the agent. The agent tends to make the patient like the agent, not only in regard to its act of being, but also in regard to causality. For instance, just as the principles by which a natural agent subsists are conferred by the agent, so are the principles by which the effect is the cause of others. Thus, an animal receives from the generating agent, at the time of its generation, the nutritive power and also the generative power. So, the effect does tend to be like the agent, not only in its species, but also in this characteristic of being the cause of others. Now, things tend to the likeness of God in the same way that effects tend to the likeness of the agent, as we have shown. Therefore, things naturally tend to become like God by the fact that they are the causes of others.
Praeterea. Tunc maxime perfectum est unumquodque quando potest alterum sibi simile facere: illud enim perfecte lucet quod alia illuminare potest. Unumquodque autem tendens in suam perfectionem, tendit in divinam similitudinem. Per hoc igitur unumquodque tendit in divinam similitudinem, quod intendit aliorum causa esse. [6] Furthermore, everything is at its peak perfection when it is able to make another thing like itself; thus, a thing is a perfect source of light when it can enlighten other things. Now, everything tending to its own perfection tends toward the divine likeness. So, a thing tends to the divine likeness by tending to be the cause of other things.
Quia vero causa, inquantum huiusmodi, superior est causato, manifestum est quod tendere in divinam similitudinem per hunc modum ut sit aliorum causa, est superiorum in entibus. [7] And since a cause, as such, is superior to the thing caused, it is evident that to tend toward the divine likeness in the manner of something that causes others is appropriate to higher types of beings.
Item. Prius est unumquodque in se perfectum quam possit alterum causare, ut iam dictum est. Haec igitur perfectio ultimo accidit rei, ut aliorum causa existat. Cum igitur per multa tendat res creata in divinam similitudinem, hoc ultimum ei restat, ut divinam similitudinem quaerat per hoc quod sit aliorum causa. Unde Dionysius dicit, III cap. caelestis hierarchiae, quod omnium divinius est Dei cooperatorem fieri: secundum quod apostolus dicit, I Corinth. 3-9: Dei adiutores sumus. [8] Again, a thing must first be perfect in itself before it can cause another thing, as we have said already. So, this final perfection comes to a thing in order that it may exist as the cause of others. Therefore, since a created thing tends to the divine likeness in many ways, this one whereby it seeks the divine likeness by being the cause of others takes the ultimate place. Hence Dionysius says, in the third chapter of On the Celestial Hierarchy, that “of all things, it is more divine to become a co-worker with God”; in accord with the statement of the Apostle: “we are God’s coadjutors” (1 Cor, 3:9)

Caput 22
Quomodo diversimode res ordinantur in suos fines
Chapter 22
Ex praemissis autem manifestum esse potest quod ultimum per quod res unaquaeque ordinatur ad finem, est eius operatio: diversimode tamen, secundum diversitatem operationis. [1] It can be shown from the foregoing that the last thing through which any real being is ordered to its end is its operation. Yet this is done in various ways, depending on the diversity of operations.
Nam quaedam operatio est rei ut aliud moventis, sicut calefacere et secare. Quaedam vero est operatio rei ut ab alio motae, sicut calefieri et secari. Quaedam vero operatio est perfectio operantis actu existentis in aliud transmutandum non tendens: quorum primo differunt a passione et motu; secundo vero, ab actione transmutativa exterioris materiae. Huiusmodi autem operatio est sicut intelligere, sentire et velle. Unde manifestum est quod ea quae moventur vel operantur tantum, sine hoc quod moveant vel faciant, tendunt in divinam similitudinem quantum ad hoc quod sint in seipsis perfecta; quae vero faciunt et movent, inquantum huiusmodi, tendunt in divinam similitudinem in hoc quod sint aliorum causae; quae vero per hoc quod moventur movent, intendunt divinam similitudinem quantum ad utrumque. [2] One kind of operation pertains to a thing as the mover of another, as in the actions of heating or sawing. Another is the operation of a thing that is moved by another, as in the case of being heated or being sawed. Still another operation is the perfection of an actually existing agent which does not tend to produce a change in another thing. And these last differ, first of all, from passion and motion, and secondly from action transitively productive of change in exterior matter. Examples of operations in this third sense are understanding, sensing, and willing. Hence, it is clear that the things which are moved, or passively worked on only, without actively moving or doing anything, tend to the divine likeness by being perfected within themselves; while the things that actively make and move, by virtue of their character, tend toward the divine likeness by being the causes of others. Finally, the things that move as a result of being moved tend toward the divine likeness in both ways.
Corpora autem inferiora, secundum quod moventur motibus naturalibus, considerantur ut mota tantum, non autem ut moventia, nisi per accidens: accidit enim lapidi quod, descendens, aliquod obvians impellat. Et similiter est in alteratione et aliis motibus. Unde finis motus eorum est ut consequantur divinam similitudinem quantum ad hoc quod sint in seipsis perfecta, utpote habentia propriam formam et proprium ubi. [3] Lower bodies, inasmuch as they are moved in their natural motions, are considered as moved things only, and not as movers, except in the accidental sense, for it may happen that a falling stone will put in motion a thing that gets in its way. And the same applies to alteration and the other kinds of change. Hence, the end of their motion is to achieve the divine likeness by being perfected in themselves; for instance, by possessing their proper form and being in their proper place.
Corpora vero caelestia movent mota. Unde finis motus eorum est consequi divinam similitudinem quantum ad utrumque. Quantum quidem ad propriam perfectionem, inquantum corpus caeleste sit in aliquo ubi in actu in quo prius erat in potentia. Nec propter hoc minus suam perfectionem consequitur, quamvis ad ubi in quo prius erat actu, remaneat in potentia. Similiter enim et materia prima in suam perfectionem tendit per hoc quod acquirit in actu formam quam prius habebat in potentia, licet et aliam habere desinat quam prius actu habebat: sic enim successive materia omnes formas suscipit ad quas est in potentia, ut tota eius potentia reducatur in actum successive, quod simul fieri non poterat. Unde, cum corpus caeleste sit in potentia ad ubi sicut materia prima ad formam, perfectionem suam consequitur per hoc quod eius potentia tota ad ubi reducitur in actum successive, quod simul non poterat fieri. [4] On the other hand, celestial bodies move because they are moved. Hence, the end of their motion is to attain the divine likeness in both ways. In regard to the way which involves its own perfection, the celestial body comes to be in a certain place actually, to which place it was previously in potency. Nor does it achieve its perfection any less because it now stands in potency to the place in which it was previously. For, in the same way, prime matter tends toward its perfection by actually acquiring a form to which it was previously in. potency, even though it then ceases to have the other form which it actually possessed before, for this is the way that matter may receive in succession all the forms to which it is potential, so that its entire potentiality may be successively reduced to act, which could not be done all at once. Hence, since a celestial body is in potency to place in the same way that prime matter is to form, it achieves its perfection through the fact that its entire potency to place is successively reduced to act, which could not be done all at once.
Inquantum vero movendo movent, est finis motus eorum consequi divinam similitudinem in hoc quod sint causae aliorum. Sunt autem aliorum causae per hoc quod causant generationem et corruptionem et alios motus in istis inferioribus. Motus igitur corporum caelestium, inquantum movent, ordinantur ad generationem et corruptionem quae est in istis inferioribus. Non est autem inconveniens quod corpora caelestia moveant ad generationem horum inferiorum, quamvis haec inferiora corpora sint caelestibus corporibus indigniora, cum tamen finem oporteat esse potiorem eo quod est ad finem. [5] In regard to the way which involves movers that actively move, the end of their motion is to attain the divine likeness by being the causes of others. Now, they are the causes of others by the fact that they cause generation and corruption and other changes in these lower things. So, the motions of the celestial bodies, as actively moving, are ordered to the generation and corruption which take Place in these lower bodies.—Nor is it unfitting that celestial bodies should move for the sake of the generation and corruption of these lower things, even though lower bodies are of less value than celestial bodies, while, of course, the end should be more important than what is for the sake of the end.
Generans enim agit ad formam generati: cum tamen generatum non sit dignius generante, sed in agentibus univocis sit eiusdem speciei cum ipso. Intendit enim generans formam generati, quae est generationis finis, non quasi ultimum finem: sed similitudinem esse divini in perpetuatione speciei, et in diffusione bonitatis suae, per hoc quod aliis formam speciei suae tradit, et aliorum sit causa. Similiter autem corpora caelestia, licet sint digniora inferioribus corporibus, tamen intendunt generationem eorum, et formas generatorum in actum educere per suos motus, non quasi ultimum finem: sed per hoc ad divinam similitudinem intendentes quasi ad ultimum finem, in hoc quod causae aliorum existant. Indeed, the generating agent acts for the sake of the form of the product of generation, yet this product is not more valuable than the agent; rather, in the case of univocal agents it is of the same species as the agent. In fact, the generating agent intends as its ultimate end, not the form of the product generated, which is the end of the process of generation, but the likeness of divine being in the perpetuation of the species and in the diffusion of its goodness, through the act of handing on its specific form to others, and of being the cause of others. Similarly, then, celestial bodies, although they are of greater value than lower bodies, tend toward the generation of these latter, and through their motions to the actual eduction of the forms of the products of generation, not as an ultimate end but as thereby intending the divine likeness as an ultimate end, inasmuch as they exist as the causes of other things.
Considerandum autem quod unumquodque, inquantum participat similitudinem divinae bonitatis, quae est obiectum voluntatis eius, intantum participat de similitudine divinae voluntatis, per quam res producuntur in esse et conservantur. Superiora autem divinae bonitatis similitudinem participant simplicius et universalius: inferiora vero particularius et magis divisim. Unde et inter corpora caelestia et inferiora non attenditur similitudo secundum aequiparantiam, sicut in his quae sunt unius speciei: sed sicut universalis agentis ad particularem effectum. Sicut igitur agentis particularis in istis inferioribus intentio contrahitur ad bonum huius speciei vel illius, ita intentio corporis caelestis fertur ad bonum commune substantiae corporalis, quae per generationem conservatur et multiplicatur et augetur. [6] Now, we should keep in mind that a thing participates in the likeness of the divine will, through which things are brought into being and preserved, to the extent that it participates in the likeness of divine goodness which is the object of His will. Higher things participate more simply and more universally in the likeness of divine goodness, while lower things do so more particularly and more in detail. Hence, between celestial and lower bodies the likeness is not observed according to complete equivalence, as it is in the case of things of one kind. Rather, it is like the similarity of a universal agent to a particular effect. Therefore, just as in the order of lower bodies the intention of a particular agent is focused on the good of this species or that, so is the intention of a celestial body directed to the common good of corporeal substance which is preserved, and multiplied, and increased through generation.
Cum vero, ut dictum est, quaelibet res mota, inquantum movetur, tendat in divinam similitudinem ut sit in se perfecta; perfectum autem sit unumquodque inquantum fit actu: oportet quod intentio cuiuslibet in potentia existentis sit ut per motum tendat in actum. Quanto igitur aliquis actus est posterior et magis perfectus, tanto principalius in ipsum appetitus materiae fertur. Unde oportet quod in ultimum et perfectissimum actum quem materia consequi potest, tendat appetitus materiae quo appetit formam, sicut in ultimum finem generationis. In actibus autem formarum gradus quidam inveniuntur. Nam materia prima est in potentia primo ad formam elementi. Sub forma vero elementi existens est in potentia ad formam mixti: propter quod elementa sunt materia mixti. Sub forma autem mixti considerata, est in potentia ad animam vegetabilem: nam talis corporis anima actus est. Itemque anima vegetabilis est potentia ad sensitivam; sensitiva vero ad intellectivam. Quod processus generationis ostendit: primo enim in generatione est fetus vivens vita plantae, postmodum vero vita animalis, demum vero vita hominis. Post hanc autem formam non invenitur in generabilibus et corruptibilibus posterior forma et dignior. Ultimus igitur finis generationis totius est anima humana, et in hanc tendit materia sicut in ultimam formam. Sunt ergo elementa propter corpora mixta; haec vero propter viventia; in quibus plantae sunt propter animalia; animalia vero propter hominem. Homo igitur est finis totius generationis. [7] As we said, since any moved thing, inasmuch as it is moved, tends to the divine likeness so that it may be perfected in itself, and since a thing is perfect in so far as it is actualized, the intention of everything existing in potency must be to tend through motion toward actuality. And so, the more posterior and more perfect an act is, the more fundamentally is the inclination of matter directed toward it. Hence. in regard to the last and most perfect act that matter can attain, the inclination of matter whereby it desires form must be inclined as toward the ultimate end of generation. Now, among the acts pertaining to forms, certain gradations are found. Thus, prime matter is in potency, first of all, to the form of an element. When it is existing under the form of an element it is in potency to the form of a mixed body; that is why the elements are matter for the mixed body. Considered under the form of a mixed body, it is in potency to a vegetative soul, for this sort of soul is the act of a body. In turn, the vegetative soul is in potency to a sensitive soul, and a sensitive one to an intellectual one. This the process of generation shows: at the start of generation there is the embryo living with plant life, later with animal life, and finally with human life. After this last type of form, no later and more noble form is found in the order of generable and corruptible things. Therefore, the ultimate end of the whole process of generation is the human soul, and matter tends toward it as toward an ultimate form. So, elements exist for the sake of mixed bodies; these latter exist for the sake of living bodies, among which plants exist for animals, and animals for men. Therefore, man is the end of the whole order of generation.
Quia vero per eadem res generatur et conservatur in esse, secundum ordinem praemissum in generationibus rerum est etiam ordo in conservationibus earundem. Unde videmus quod corpora mixta sustentantur per elementorum congruas qualitates: plantae vero ex mixtis corporibus nutriuntur; animalia ex plantis nutrimentum habent; et quaedam etiam perfectiora et virtuosiora ex quibusdam imperfectioribus et infirmioribus. Homo vero utitur omnium rerum generibus ad sui utilitatem. Quibusdam quidem ad esum, quibusdam vero ad vestitum: unde et a natura nudus est institutus, utpote potens ex aliis sibi vestitum praeparare; sicut etiam nullum sibi congruum nutrimentum natura praeparavit nisi lac, ut ex diversis rebus sibi cibum conquireret. Quibusdam vero ad vehiculum: nam in motus celeritate, et in fortitudine ad sustinendos labores, multis animalibus infirmior invenitur, quasi aliis animalibus ad auxilium sibi praeparatis. Et super hoc omnibus sensibilibus utitur ad intellectualis cognitionis perfectionem. Unde et de homine in Psalmo dicitur, ad Deum directo sermone: omnia subiecisti sub pedibus eius. Et Aristoteles dicit, in I politicorum, quod homo habet naturale dominium super omnia animalia. [8] And since a thing is generated and preserved in being by the same reality, there is also an order in the preservation of things, which parallels the foregoing order of generation. Thus we see that mixed bodies are sustained by the appropriate qualities of the elements; Plants, in turn, are nourished by mixed bodies; animals get their nourishment from plants: so, those that are more perfect and more powerful from those that are more imperfect and weaker. In fact, man uses all kinds of things for his own advantage: some for food, others for clothing. That is why he was created nude by nature, since he is able to make clothes for, himself from other things; just as nature also provided him with no appropriate nourishment, except milk, because he can obtain food for himself from a variety of things. Other things he uses for transportation, since we find man the inferior of many animals in quickness of movement, and in the strength to do work; other animals being provided, as it were, for his assistance. And, in addition to this, man uses all sense objects for the perfection of intellectual knowledge. Hence it is said of man in the Psalms (8:8) in a statement directed to God: “You have subjected all things under his feet,” And Aristotle says, in the Politics I [5: 1254b 9], that man has natural dominion over all animals.
Si igitur motio ipsius caeli ordinatur ad generationem; generatio autem tota ordinatur ad hominem sicut in ultimum finem huius generis: manifestum est quod finis motionis caeli ordinatur ad hominem sicut in ultimum finem in genere generabilium et mobilium. [9] So, if the motion of the heavens is ordered to generation, and if the whole of generation is ordered to man as a last end within this genus, it is clear that the end of celestial motion is ordered to man, as to an ultimate end in the genus of generable and mobile beings.
Hinc est quod Deuteron. 4-19, dicitur quod Deus corpora caelestia fecit in ministerium cunctis gentibus. Hence the statement in Deuteronomy (4:19) that God made celestial bodies “for the service of all peoples”.

Caput 23
Quod motus caeli est a principio intellectivo
Chapter 23
Ex praemissis etiam ostendi potest primum motivum motus caeli esse aliquid intellectivum. [1] From the preceding we can also show that the prime motive principle of the heavens is something intellectual.
Nihil enim secundum propriam speciem agens intendit formam altiorem sua forma; intendit enim omne agens sibi simile. Corpus autem caeleste, secundum quod agit per motum suum, intendit ultimam formam, quae est intellectus humanus, quae quidem est altior omni corporali forma, ut ex praemissis patet. Corpus igitur caeli non agit ad generationem secundum propriam speciem, sicut agens principale, sed secundum speciem alicuius superioris agentis intellectualis, ad quod se habet corpus caeleste sicut instrumentum ad agens principale. Agit autem caelum ad generationem secundum quod movetur. Movetur igitur corpus caeleste ab aliqua intellectuali substantia. [2] Nothing that acts in function of its own species intends a form higher than its own form, for every agent tends toward its like. Now, a celestial body, acting under its own motion, tends toward the ultimate form, which is the human intellect; and which is, in fact, higher than any bodily form, as is clear from the foregoing. Therefore, a celestial body does not act for a generation according to its own species as a principal agent, but according to the species of a higher intellectual agent, to which the celestial body is related as an instrument to a principal agent. Now, the heavens act for the purpose of generation in accord with the way in which they are moved. So, a celestial body is moved by some intellectual substance.
Adhuc. Omne quod movetur, necesse est ab alio moveri, ut superius probatum est. Corpus igitur caeli ab alio movetur. Aut ergo illud aliud est omnino separatum ab eo: aut est ei unitum, ita quod compositum ex caelo et movente dicatur movere seipsum, inquantum una pars eius est movens et alia mota. Si autem sic est; omne autem movens seipsum est vivum et animatum: sequitur quod caelum sit animatum. Non autem alia anima quam intellectuali: non enim nutritiva, cum in eo non sit generatio et corruptio; neque sensitiva, cum non habeat organorum diversitatem. Sequitur ergo quod moveatur ab anima intellectiva. Si autem movetur a motore extrinseco, aut illud erit corporeum, aut incorporeum. Et si quidem corporeum, non movet nisi motum: nullum enim corpus movet nisi motum, ut ex superioribus patet. Oportebit ergo et illud ab alio moveri. Cum autem non sit procedere in infinitum in corporibus, oportebit devenire ad primum movens incorporeum. Quod autem est penitus a corpore separatum, oportet esse intellectuale, ut ex superioribus patet. Motus igitur caeli, quod est primum corporeum, est ab intellectuali substantia. [3] Again, everything that is moved must be moved by another being, as we proved earlier. Therefore, a celestial body is moved by something else. So, this other thing is either completely separated from it, or is united with it in the sense that the composite of the celestial body and the mover may be said to move itself, in so far as one of its parts is the mover and another part is the thing moved. Now, if it works this way, since everything that moves itself is alive and animated, it would follow that the heavens are animated, and by no other soul than an intellectual one: not by a nutritive soul, for generation and corruption are not within its power; nor by a sensitive soul, for a celestial body has no diversity of organs. The conclusion is, then, that it is moved by an intellective soul.—On the other hand, if it is moved by an extrinsic mover, this latter will be either corporeal or incorporeal. Now, if it is corporeal, it will not move unless it is moved, for no body moves unless it is moved, as was evident previously. Therefore, it will also have to be moved by another. And since there should be no process to infinity in the order of bodies, we will have to come to an incorporeal first mover. Now, that which is utterly separate from body must be intellectual, as is evident from earlier considerations. Therefore, the motion of the heavens, that is of the first body, comes from an intellectual substance.
Item. Corpora gravia et levia moventur a generante et removente prohibens, ut probatur in VIII physicorum: non enim potest esse quod forma in eis sit movens et materia mota, nihil enim movetur nisi corpus. Sicut autem elementorum corpora sunt simplicia, et non est in eis compositio nisi materiae et formae, ita et corpora caelestia sunt simplicia. Si igitur moventur sicut gravia et levia, oportet quod moveantur a generante per se, et a removente prohibens per accidens. Hoc autem est impossibile: nam illa corpora ingenerabilia sunt, utpote non habentia contrarietatem; et motus eorum impediri non possunt. Oportet igitur quod moveantur illa corpora a moventibus per apprehensionem. Non autem sensitivam, ut ostensum est. Ergo intellectivam. [4] Besides, heavy and light bodies are moved by their generating agent, and by that which takes away any impediment to motion, as was proved in Physics VIII [4: 256a 1]. For it cannot be that the form in them is the mover, and the matter the thing moved, since nothing is moved unless it be a body. Now, just as the elemental bodies are simple and there is no composition in them, except of matter and form, so also are the celestial bodies simple. And so, if they are moved in the same way as heavy and light bodies, they must be moved directly by their generating agent, and accidentally by the agent which removes an impediment to motion. But this is impossible, for these bodies are not capable of generation: for they are not endowed with contrariety, and their motions cannot, be impeded. So, these bodies must be moved by movers that function through knowing; not through sensitive knowledge, as we showed, but through intellectual knowledge.
Amplius. Si principium motus caeli est sola natura, absque apprehensione aliqua, oportet quod principium motus caeli sit forma caelestis corporis, sicut et in elementis: licet enim formae simplices non sint moventes, sunt tamen principia motuum, ad eas enim consequuntur motus naturales, sicut et omnes aliae naturales proprietates. Non autem potest esse quod motus caelestis sequatur formam caelestis corporis sicut principium activum. Sic enim forma est principium motus localis, inquantum alicui corpori, secundum suam formam, debetur aliquis locus, in quem movetur ex vi suae formae tendentis in locum illum, quam quia dat generans, dicitur esse motor: sicut igni secundum suam formam competit esse sursum. Corpori autem caelesti, secundum suam formam, non magis congruit unum ubi quam aliud. Non igitur motus caelestis principium est sola natura. Oportet igitur quod principium motus eius sit aliquid per apprehensionem movens. [5] Moreover, if the principle of celestial motion is simply a nature lacking any type of apprehension, then the principle of celestial motion must be the form of a celestial body, just as is the case in the elements. For, although simple forms are not movers, they are nonetheless the principles of motions, since natural motions are resultant from them, as are all other natural properties. Now, it is impossible for celestial motion to result from the form of a celestial body, as from an active principle. A form is the principle of local motion in the same way that a certain place is proper to a body by virtue of its form; it is moved to this place by the force of its form tending to it, and, since the generating agent gives the form, it is said to be the mover. For instance, it is appropriate to fire, by virtue of its form, to be in a higher place. But one place is no more appropriate than another for a celestial body, according to its form. Therefore, the principle of celestial motion is not simply the nature of the body. So, the principle of its motion must be something that moves as a result of apprehension.
Adhuc. Natura semper ad unum tendit: unde quae sunt a natura, semper sunt eodem modo, nisi impediantur; quod est in paucioribus. Quod igitur ex sui ratione habet difformitatem, impossibile est quod sit finis in quem tendit natura. Motus autem secundum rationem suam est huiusmodi: quod enim movetur, inquantum huiusmodi, dissimiliter se habet et nunc et prius. Impossibile est igitur quod natura intendat motum propter seipsum. Intendit igitur quietem per motum, quae se habet ad motum sicut unum ad multa: quiescit enim quod similiter se habet nunc et prius. Si igitur motus caeli sit a natura tantum, esset ordinatus in aliquam quietem. Cuius contrarium apparet: cum sit continuus. Non est igitur motus caeli a natura sicut a principio activo, sed magis a substantia intelligente. [6] Furthermore, nature always tends toward one objective; hence, things which result from nature always occur in the same way, unless they are interfered with, and this happens to few of them. Indeed, that which has a deformity within its very definition cannot be an end to which a nature tends. Now, motion, by definition, is of this type, for whatever is moved, by virtue of that fact, is in a different condition before and after.” So, it is impossible for a nature to tend toward motion for the sake of motion. Therefore, it tends through motion toward rest, and the latter is related to motion as one to many. Indeed, a thing at rest is one which is in the same condition before and after. If then, the motion of the heavens were simply from a nature, it would be ordered to some condition of rest. But the contrary of this is apparent, for celestial motion is continuous. Therefore, the motion of the heavens does not arise from a nature, as its active principle, but rather from an intelligent substance.
Item. Omni motui qui est a natura sicut a principio activo, oportet quod, si accessus ad aliquid est naturalis, quod recessus ab eodem sit innaturalis et contra naturam: sicut grave accedit deorsum naturaliter, recedit autem inde contra naturam. Si igitur motus caeli esset naturalis, cum tendat ad occidentem naturaliter, contra naturam ab occidente recedens in orientem rediret. Hoc autem est impossibile: in motu enim caelesti nihil est violentum et contra naturam. Impossibile est igitur quod principium activum motus caelestis sit natura. Est igitur principium activum eius aliqua vis apprehensiva, et per intellectum, ut ex praedictis patet. Movetur igitur corpus caeleste a substantia intellectuali. [7] Again, for every motion that is from a nature, as an active principle, if its approach to something be natural, then its removal from that objective must be unnatural and against nature. Thus, a heavy thing naturally moves downward, but for it to move in the opposite direction is against nature. Therefore, if the motion of the heavens were natural, since it tends westward naturally, it would return to the east in the manner of a thing that recedes from the west by a motion against nature. Now, this is impossible. In celestial motion there is nothing violent and against nature. So, it is impossible for the active principle of celestial motion to be a nature. Therefore, its active principle is some apprehensive power, and through understanding, as is clear from what was said earlier. So, a celestial body is moved by an intellectual substance.
Non tamen est negandum motum caelestem esse naturalem. Dicitur enim esse motus aliquis naturalis, non solum propter activum principium, sed etiam propter passivum: sicut patet in generatione simplicium corporum. Quae quidem non potest dici naturalis ratione principii activi: movetur enim id naturaliter a principio activo cuius principium activum est intra, natura enim est principium motus in eo in quo est; principium autem activum in generatione simplicis corporis est extra. Non est igitur naturalis ratione principii activi, sed solum ratione principii passivi, quod est materia, cui inest naturalis appetitus ad formam naturalem. Sic ergo motus caelestis corporis, quantum ad activum principium, non est naturalis, sed magis voluntarius et intellectualis: quantum vero ad principium passivum est naturalis, nam corpus caeleste habet naturalem aptitudinem ad talem motum. [8] Yet we must not deny that celestial motion is natural. In fact, a motion is called natural, not simply because of its active principle, but also because of its passive one. This is exemplified in the generation of simple bodies. Indeed, this generation cannot be called natural by reason of the active principle, for that is moved naturally by an active principle, which has its active principle within it; “a nature is a principle of motion in that to which it belongs.” But the active principle in the generation of a simple body is outside. So, it is not natural by reason of the active principle, but only by reason of the passive principle, which is the matter in which the natural appetite for a natural form is present. And so, the motion of a celestial body, as far as its active principle is concerned, is not natural, but voluntary and intellectual; however, in relation to its passive principle, the motion is natural, for a celestial body has a natural aptitude for such motion.
Hoc autem manifeste apparet si habitudo consideretur caelestis corporis ad suum ubi. Patitur enim et movetur unumquodque secundum quod est in potentia, agit vero et movet secundum quod est actu. Corpus autem caeleste, secundum suam substantiam consideratum, invenitur ut in potentia indifferenter se habens ad quodlibet ubi, sicut materia prima ad quamlibet formam, sicut praedictum est. Aliter autem est de corpore gravi et levi, quod, in sua natura consideratum, non est indifferens ad omnem locum, sed ex ratione suae formae determinatur sibi locus. Natura igitur corporis gravis et levis est principium activum motus eius: natura vero corporis caelestis est motus ipsius passivum principium. Unde non debet alicui videri quod violenter moveatur, sicut corpora gravia et levia, quae a nobis moventur per intellectum. Corporibus enim gravibus et levibus inest naturalis aptitudo ad contrarium motum ei quo moventur a nobis, et ideo a nobis moventur per violentiam: licet motus corporis animalis, quo movetur ab anima, non sit ei violentus inquantum est animatum, etsi sit ei violentus inquantum est grave quoddam. Corpora autem caelestia non habent aptitudinem ad motum contrarium, sed ad illum quo moventur a substantia intelligente. Unde simul est voluntarius, quantum ad principium activum; et naturalis, quantum ad principium passivum. [9] This becomes clearly evident when we consider the relation of a celestial body to its location. A thing is acted on passively, and is moved, in so far as it is in potency; while it acts and moves, in so far as it is in act. Now, a celestial body, considered in its substance, is found to be indifferently related to every place, just as prime matter is to every form, as we said before. Of course, it is a different situation in the case of a heavy or light body which, considered in its nature, is not indifferent to every place, but is determined by virtue of its form to a place of its own. So, the nature of a heavy or light body is the active principle of its motion, while the nature of a celestial body is the passive principle of its motion. Hence, no one should get the impression that the latter is moved violently, as is the case with heavy and light bodies that are moved by us through understanding. For there is present in heavy and light bodies a natural aptitude for motion contrary to that in which they are moved by us, and so they are moved by us through violence. However, the motion of an animated body, in which it is moved by a soul, is not violent for it as an animal, though it is violent for it as a heavy object. Celestial bodies have no aptitude for contrary motion, but only for that whereby they are moved by an intelligent substance. Consequently, it is at once voluntary, in relation to the active principle, and natural, in relation to the passive principle.
Quod autem motus caeli est voluntarius secundum activum principium, non repugnat unitati et conformitati caelestis motus, ex hoc quod voluntas ad multa se habet, et non est determinata ad unum. Quia sicut natura determinatur ad unum per suam virtutem, ita voluntas determinatur ad unum per suam sapientiam, qua voluntas dirigitur infallibiliter ad unum finem. [10] That the motion of the heavens is voluntary according to its active principle is not repugnant to the unity and uniformity of celestial motion because of the fact that the will is open to a plurality of actions and is not determined to one of them. In fact, just as a nature is determined to one objective by its power, so is the will determined to one objective by its wisdom, whereby the will is infallibly directed to one end.
Patet etiam ex praemissis quod in motu caelesti non est contra naturam neque accessus ad aliquod ubi, neque recessus ab eo. Hoc enim accidit in motu gravium et levium propter duo: primo quidem, quia intentio naturae est determinata in gravibus et levibus ad unum locum, unde, sicut naturaliter tendit in ipsum, ita contra naturam recedit ab eo. Secundo, quia duo motus quorum unus accedit ad terminum, et alter recedit, sunt contrarii. Si autem accipiatur in motu gravium et levium non ultimus locus, sed medius, sicut ad ipsum acceditur naturaliter, ita ab ipso naturaliter receditur: quia totum stat sub una intentione naturae; et non sunt motus contrarii, sed unus et continuus. Ita autem est in motu caelestium corporum: quia naturae intentio non est ad aliquod ubi determinatum, ut iam dictum est; motus etiam quo recedit corpus circulariter motum ab aliquo signo, non est contrarius motui quo illuc accedit, sed est unus motus et continuus. Unde quodlibet ubi in motu caeli est sicut medium, et non sicut extremum in motu recto. [11] It is also evident from the foregoing that in celestial motion neither the approach to a certain place, nor the regression from that place, is against nature. Such a thing does occur in the motion of heavy and light bodies for two reasons. First, because the natural tendency in heavy and light things is determined to one place; hence, just as such a body naturally tends to this place, so does it go against nature in receding from it. Second, because two motions, one approaching a term and the other receding from it, are contrary. But, if we take into consideration in this motion of heavy and light bodies, not the final place but an intermediate one, then just as an approach may naturally be made to it, so also may a recession be naturally made from it. For the whole motion comes under one natural tendency, and these motions are not contrary but one and continuous.—So, too, is the situation in the motion of celestial bodies, for the tendency of their nature is not toward some determinate place, as has been said already. Also, the motion whereby a body moves in a circle, away from a point of reference, is not contrary to the motion whereby it approaches the point, but it is one continuous motion. Hence, each place in the motion of the heavens is like a middle point, and not like a terminal point in straight-line motion.
Non differt autem, quantum ad praesentem intentionem, utrum corpus caeleste moveatur a substantia intellectuali coniuncta, quae sit anima eius, vel a substantia separata; et utrum unumquodque corporum caelestium moveatur a Deo immediate, vel nullum, sed mediantibus substantiis intellectualibus creatis; aut primum tantum immediate a Deo, alia vero mediantibus substantiis creatis; dummodo habeatur quod motus caelestis est a substantia intellectuali. [12] Nor does it make any difference, as far as our present purpose is concerned, whether a heavenly body is moved by a conjoined intellectual substance which is its soul, or by a separate substance; nor whether each celestial body is moved immediately by God, or whether none is so moved, because all are moved through intermediary, created, intellectual substances; nor whether the first body alone is immediately moved by God, and the others through the mediation of created substances—provided it is granted that celestial motion comes from intellectual substance.

Caput 24
Quomodo appetunt bonum etiam quae cognitione carent
Chapter 24
Si autem corpus caeleste a substantia intellectuali movetur, ut ostensum est; motus autem corporis caelestis ordinatur ad generationem in inferioribus: necesse est quod generationes et motus istorum inferiorum procedant ex intentione substantiae intelligentis. In idem enim fertur intentio principalis agentis, et instrumenti. Caelum autem est causa inferiorum motuum secundum suum motum, quo movetur a substantia intellectuali. Sequitur ergo quod sit sicut instrumentum intellectualis substantiae. Sunt igitur formae et motus inferiorum corporum a substantia intellectuali causatae et intentae sicut a principali agente, a corpore vero caelesti sicut ab instrumento. [1] Now, if a celestial body is moved by intellectual substance, as we have shown, and if the motion of a celestial body is ordered to generation in the realm of things here below, it must be that the processes of generation and the motions of these lower things start from the intention of an intelligent substance. For the intention of the principal agent and that of the instrument are directed toward the same thing. Now, the heavens is the cause of the movements of inferior bodies, by virtue of its own motion in which it is moved by an intellectual substance. It follows, then, that the heavenly body is like an instrument for intellectual substance. Therefore, the forms and movements of lower bodies are caused by intellectual substance which intends them as a principal agent, while the celestial body is like an instrument.
Oportet autem quod species eorum quae causantur et intenduntur ab intellectuali agente, praeexistant in intellectu ipsius: sicut formae artificiatorum praeexistunt in intellectu artificis, et ex eis deriventur in effectus. Omnes igitur formae quae sunt in istis inferioribus, et omnes motus, derivantur a formis intellectualibus quae sunt in intellectu alicuius substantiae, vel aliquarum. Et propter hoc dicit Boetius, in libro de Trin., quod formae quae sunt in materia, venerunt a formis quae sunt sine materia. Et quantum ad hoc verificatur dictum Platonis, quod formae separatae sunt principia formarum quae sunt in materia: licet Plato posuerit eas per se subsistentes, et causantes immediate formas sensibilium; nos vero ponamus eas in intellectu existentes, et causantes formas inferiores per motum caeli. [2] It must be, then, that the species of things caused and intended by the intellectual agent exist beforehand in his intellect, as the forms of artifacts pre-exist in the intellect of the artist and are projected from there into their products. So, all the forms that are in these lower substances, and all their motions, are derived from the intellectual forms which are in the intellect of some substance, or substances. Consequently, Boethius says in his book, The Trinity, that “forms which are in matter have come from forms which are without matter.” And on this point, Plato’s statement is verified, that forms separated from matter are the principles of forms that are in it. Although Plato claimed that they subsist in themselves and immediately cause the forms of sensible things, we assert that they exist in an intellect and cause lower forms through the motion of the heavens.
Quia vero omne quod movetur ab aliquo per se, non secundum accidens, dirigitur ab eo in finem sui motus; corpus autem caeleste movetur a substantia intellectuali; corpus autem caeleste causat per sui motum omnes motus in istis inferioribus: necessarium est quod corpus caeleste dirigatur in finem sui motus per substantiam intellectualem, et per consequens omnia inferiora corpora in proprios fines. [3] Since everything that is moved directly and not merely accidentally by another being is directed by that being to the end of its motion, and since the celestial body is moved by an intellectual substance, and, moreover, the celestial body causes, through its own motion, all the motions in these lower things, the celestial body must be directed to the end of its motion by an intellectual substance, and so must all lower bodies be directed to their own ends.
Sic igitur non est difficile videre qualiter naturalia corpora cognitione carentia moveantur et agant propter finem. Tendunt enim in finem sicut directa in finem a substantia intelligente, per modum quo sagitta tendit ad signum directa a sagittante. Sicut enim sagitta consequitur inclinationem ad finem determinatum ex impulsione sagittantis, ita corpora naturalia consequuntur inclinationem in fines naturales ex moventibus naturalibus, ex quibus sortiuntur suas formas et virtutes et motus. [4] So, then, it is not difficult to see how natural bodies, devoid of knowledge, are moved and perform actions for an end. They tend to the end as things directed to that end by an intellectual substance, in the way that an arrow tends toward the target when it has been aimed by the archer. just as the arrow attains its inclination to a definite end from the archer’s act of shooting it, so do natural bodies attain their inclination to natural ends, from natural movers; from which movers they also receive their forms, powers, and motions.
Unde etiam patet quod quodlibet opus naturae est opus substantiae intelligentis: nam effectus principalius attribuitur primo moventi dirigenti in finem, quam instrumentis ab eo directis. Et propter hoc operationes naturae inveniuntur ordinate procedere ad finem, sicut operationes sapientis. [5] Consequently, it is also evident that every working of nature is the work of an intelligent substance, because an effect is more fundamentally attributed to the prime mover, which aims at the end, than to the instruments which have been directed by it. And because of this we find that the workings of nature proceed toward their end in an orderly way, as do the actions of a wise man.
Planum igitur fit quod ea etiam quae cognitione carent, possunt operari propter finem; et appetere bonum naturali appetitu; et appetere divinam similitudinem; et propriam perfectionem. Non est autem differentia sive hoc sive illud dicatur. Nam per hoc quod tendunt in suam perfectionem, tendunt ad bonum: cum unumquodque in tantum bonum sit in quantum est perfectum. Secundum vero quod tendit ad hoc quod sit bonum, tendit in divinam similitudinem: Deo enim assimilatur aliquid inquantum bonum est. Bonum autem hoc vel illud particulare habet quod sit appetibile inquantum est similitudo primae bonitatis. Propter hoc igitur tendit in proprium bonum, quia tendit in divinam similitudinem, et non e converso. Unde patet quod omnia appetunt divinam similitudinem quasi ultimum finem. [6] Hence, it becomes obvious that even things which lack knowledge can be made to work for an end, and to seek the good by a natural appetite, and to seek the divine likeness and their own perfection. And there is no difference between saying one of these things or the other. For, by the fact that they tend to their own perfection they tend to the good, since a thing is good to the extent that it is perfect. Moreover, by virtue of tending to be good it tends to the divine likeness, for a thing is made like unto God in so far as it is good. And this or that particular good thing becomes an object of desire according as it is a likeness of prime goodness. So, too, for this reason it tends to its own good, because it tends to the divine likeness, and not conversely. Hence, it is clear that all things desire the divine likeness as an ultimate end.
Bonum autem suum cuiuslibet rei potest accipi multipliciter. Uno quidem modo, secundum quod est eius proprium ratione individui. Et sic appetit animal suum bonum cum appetit cibum, quo in esse conservatur. Alio modo, secundum quod est eius ratione speciei. Et sic appetit proprium bonum animal inquantum appetit generationem prolis et eius nutritionem, vel quicquid aliud operetur ad conservationem vel defensionem individuorum suae speciei. Tertio vero modo, ratione generis. Et sic appetit proprium bonum in causando agens aequivocum: sicut caelum. Quarto autem modo, ratione similitudinis analogiae principiatorum ad suum principium. Et sic Deus, qui est extra genus, propter suum bonum omnibus rebus dat esse. [7] Now, the good that is proper to a thing may be received in many ways. One way depends on what is appropriate to the essential character of the individual. It is thus that an animal seeks his good, when he desires the food whereby he may be kept in existence. A second way depends on what is appropriate to the species. It is in this way that an animal desires his proper good, inasmuch as he desires the procreation of offspring and the nourishment of the same, or the performance of any other work that is for the preservation or protection of individuals belonging to his species. A third way depends on the essential character of his genus. It is in this way that an equivocal agent seeks its proper good by an act of causation, as in the case of the heavens. And a fourth way depends on the analogical likeness of things produced, in relation to their source. And it is in this way that God, Who is beyond genus, gives existing being to all, because of His own goodness.
Ex quo patet quod quanto aliquid est perfectioris virtutis, et eminentius in gradu bonitatis, tanto appetitum boni communiorem habet, et magis in distantibus a se bonum quaerit et operatur. Nam imperfecta ad solum bonum proprii individui tendunt; perfecta vero ad bonum speciei; perfectiora vero ad bonum generis; Deus autem, qui est perfectissimus in bonitate, ad bonum totius entis. Unde non immerito dicitur a quibusdam quod bonum, inquantum huiusmodi, est diffusivum: quia quanto aliquid invenitur melius, tanto ad remotiora bonitatem suam diffundit. Et quia in quolibet genere quod est perfectissimum est exemplar et mensura omnium quae sunt illius generis, oportet quod Deus, qui est in bonitate perfectissimus et suam bonitatem communissime diffundens, in sua diffusione sit exemplar omnium bonitatem diffundentium. Inquantum autem unumquodque bonitatem diffundit in alia, fit aliorum causa. Hinc etiam patet quod unumquodque tendens ad hoc quod sit aliorum causa, tendit in divinam similitudinem, et nihilominus tendit in suum bonum. [8] It is evident, next, that the more perfect something is in its power, and the higher it is in the scale of goodness, the more does it have an appetite for a broader common good, and the more does it seek and become involved in the doing of good for beings far removed from itself. Indeed, imperfect beings tend only to the good proper to the individual, while perfect beings tend to the good of their species. But more perfect beings tend to the good of the genus, while God, Who is most perfect in goodness, tends toward the good of being as a whole. Hence it is said by some people, and not inappropriately, that “the good, as such, is diffusive,” because the better a thing is, the more does it diffuse its goodness to remote beings. And since, “in every genus, that which is most perfect is the archetype and measure of all things belonging in the genus,” God, Who is most perfect in goodness and Who diffuses His goodness in the broadest way, must be in His diffusion the archetype for all diffusers of goodness. Now, inasmuch as a thing diffuses goodness to other beings, it comes to be their cause. As a result, it is also clear that a thing which tends to become the cause of others tends toward the divine likeness, and nonetheless it tends toward its own good.
Non est ergo inconveniens si motus corporum caelestium, et actiones motorum eorum, dicantur esse aliqualiter propter haec corpora quae generantur et corrumpuntur, quae sunt eis indigniora. Non enim sunt propter haec sicut propter ultimum finem: sed, intendentes horum generationem, intendunt suum bonum, et divinam similitudinem tanquam ultimum finem. [9] Therefore, it is not unfitting to say that the motions of the heavenly bodies and the actions of their movers are in some sense for the sake of these generable and corruptible bodies which are less worthy than they. They are not for the sake of these bodies, in the sense of an ultimate end; rather, by intending the generation of these bodies they intend their own good and the divine likeness as an ultimate end.

Caput 25
Quod intelligere Deum est finis omnis intellectualis substantiae
Chapter 25
Cum autem omnes creaturae, etiam intellectu carentes, ordinentur in Deum sicut in finem ultimum; ad hunc autem finem pertingunt omnia inquantum de similitudine eius aliquid participant: intellectuales creaturae aliquo specialiori modo ad ipsum pertingunt, scilicet per propriam operationem intelligendo ipsum. Unde oportet quod hoc sit finis intellectualis creaturae, scilicet intelligere Deum. [1] Since all creatures, even those devoid of understanding, are ordered to God as to an ultimate end, all achieve this end to the extent that they participate somewhat in His likeness. Intellectual creatures attain it in a more special way, that is, through their proper operation of understanding Him. Hence, this must be the end of the intellectual creature, namely, to understand God.
Ultimus enim finis cuiuslibet rei est Deus, ut ostensum est. Intendit igitur unumquodque sicut ultimo fini Deo coniungi quanto magis sibi possibile est. Vicinius autem coniungitur aliquid Deo per hoc quod ad ipsam substantiam eius aliquo modo pertingit, quod fit dum aliquid quis cognoscit de divina substantia, quam dum consequitur eius aliquam similitudinem. Substantia igitur intellectualis tendit in divinam cognitionem sicut in ultimum finem. [2] The ultimate end of each thing is God, as we have shown. So, each thing intends, as its ultimate end, to be united with God as closely as is possible for it. Now, a thing is more closely united with God by the fact that it attains to His very substance in some manner, and this is accomplished when one knows something of the divine substance, rather than when one acquires some likeness of Him. Therefore, an intellectual substance tends to divine knowledge as an ultimate end.
Item. Propria operatio cuiuslibet rei est finis eius: est enim secunda perfectio ipsius; unde quod ad propriam operationem bene se habet, dicitur virtuosum et bonum. Intelligere autem est propria operatio substantiae intellectualis. Ipsa igitur est finis eius. Quod igitur est perfectissimum in hac operatione, hoc est ultimus finis: et praecipue in operationibus quae non ordinantur ad aliqua operata, sicut est intelligere et sentire. Cum autem huiusmodi operationes ex obiectis speciem recipiant, per quae etiam cognoscuntur, oportet quod tanto sit perfectior aliqua istarum operationum, quanto eius obiectum est perfectius. Et sic intelligere perfectissimum intelligibile, quod Deus est, est perfectissimum in genere huius operationis quae est intelligere. Cognoscere igitur Deum intelligendo est ultimus finis cuiuslibet intellectualis substantiae. [3] Again, the proper operation of a thing is an end for it, for this is its secondary perfection. That is why whatever is fittingly related to its proper operation is said to be virtuous and good. But the act of understanding is the proper operation of an intellectual substance. Therefore, this act is its end. Ana that which is most perfect in this operation is the ultimate end, particularly in the case of operations that are not ordered to any products, such as the acts of understanding and sensing. Now, since operations of this type are specified by their objects, through which they are known also, any one of these operations must be more perfect when its object is more perfect. And so, to understand the most perfect intelligible object, which is God, is the most perfect thing in the genus of this operation of understanding. Therefore, to know God by an act of understanding is the ultimate end of every intellectual substance.
Potest autem aliquis dicere intellectualis quidem substantiae ultimum finem consistere in intelligendo optimum intelligibile: non tamen illud quod est optimum intelligibile huius vel illius intellectualis substantiae, est optimum intelligibile simpliciter, sed quanto aliqua intellectualis substantia est altior, tanto suum intelligibile optimum est altius. Et ideo forte suprema intellectualis substantia creata habet pro intelligibili optimo illud quod est optimum simpliciter, unde eius felicitas erit in intelligendo Deum: cuiuslibet vero inferioris substantiae intellectualis felicitas erit intelligere aliquod inferius intelligibile, quod est tamen altissimum eorum quae ab ipsa intelliguntur. Et praecipue intellectus humani videtur quod non sit intelligere optimum intelligibile simpliciter, propter eius debilitatem: habet enim se ad cognoscendum illud quod est maximum intelligibile sicut oculus noctuae ad solem. [4] Of course, someone could say that the ultimate end of an intellectual substance consists, in fact, in understanding the best intelligible object—not that the best object of understanding for this or that particular intellectual substance is absolutely the best intelligible object, but that, the higher an intellectual substance is, the higher will its best object of understanding be. And so, perhaps the highest created intellectual substance may have what is absolutely best as its best intelligible object, and, consequently, its felicity will consist in understanding God, but the felicity of any lower intellectual substance will lie in the understanding of some lower intelligible object, which is, however, the highest thing understood by it. Particularly would it seem true of the human intellect that its function is not to understand absolutely the best intelligible object, because of its weakness; indeed, it stands in relation to the knowing of the greatest intelligible object, “as the owl’s eye is to the sunlight.”
Sed manifeste apparet quod finis cuiuslibet substantiae intellectualis, etiam infimae, est intelligere Deum. Ostensum est enim supra quod omnium entium ultimus finis in quem tendunt, est Deus. Intellectus autem humanus, etsi sit infimus in ordine intellectualium substantiarum, est tamen superior omnibus intellectu carentibus. Cum ergo nobilioris substantiae non sit ignobilior finis, erit etiam intellectus humani finis ipse Deus. Unumquodque autem intelligens consequitur suum finem ultimum per hoc quod ipsum intelligit, ut ostensum est. Intelligendo igitur pertingit intellectus humanus ad Deum sicut ad finem. [5] But it seems obvious that the end of any intellectual substance, even the lowest, is to understand God. It has been shown above that the ultimate end of all things, to which they tend, is God. Though it is the lowest in the order of intellectual substances, the human intellect is, nevertheless, superior to all things that lack understanding. And so, since there should not be a less noble end for a more noble substance, the end for the human intellect will be God Himself. And an intelligent being attains his ultimate end by understanding Him, as was indicated. Therefore, the human intellect reaches God as its end, through an act of understanding.
Adhuc. Sicut res intellectu carentes tendunt in Deum sicut in finem per viam assimilationis, ita substantiae intellectuales per viam cognitionis, ut ex praedictis patet. Res autem intellectu carentes, etsi tendant in similitudinem proximorum agentium, non tamen ibi quiescit naturae intentio, sed habet pro fine assimilationem ad summum bonum, ut ex dictis patet, etsi imperfectissime ad hanc similitudinem possint pertingere. Intellectus igitur quantumcumque modicum possit de divina cognitione percipere, illud erit sibi pro ultimo fine, magis quam perfecta cognitio inferiorum intelligibilium. [6] Again, just as things devoid of understanding tend toward God as an end, by way of assimilation, so intellectual substances do so by way of cognition, as is evident from the foregoing. Now, although things devoid of understanding tend to the likeness of their proximate agents, their natural tendency does not, however, rest there, for this tendency has as its end assimilation to the highest good, as is apparent from what we have said, even though these things can only attain this likeness in a very imperfect way. Therefore, however small the amount of divine knowledge that the intellect may be able to grasp, that will be for the intellect, in regard to its ultimate end, much more than the perfect knowledge of lower objects of understanding.
Amplius. Unumquodque maxime desiderat suum finem ultimum. Intellectus autem humanus magis desiderat, et amat, et delectatur in cognitione divinorum, quamvis modicum quidem de illis percipere possit, quam in perfecta cognitione quam habet de rebus infimis. Est igitur ultimus finis hominis intelligere quoquo modo Deum. [7] Besides, a thing has the greatest desire for its ultimate end. Now, the human intellect has a greater desire, and love, and pleasure, in knowing divine matters than it has in the perfect knowledge of the lowest things, even though it can grasp but little concerning divine things. So, the ultimate end of man is to understand God, in some fashion.
Adhuc. Unumquodque tendit in divinam similitudinem sicut in proprium finem. Illud igitur per quod unumquodque maxime Deo assimilatur, est ultimus finis eius. Deo autem assimilatur maxime creatura intellectualis per hoc quod intellectualis est: hanc enim similitudinem habet prae ceteris creaturis, et haec includit omnes alias. In genere autem huius similitudinis magis assimilatur Deo secundum quod intelligit actu, quam secundum quod intelligit in habitu vel potentia: quia Deus semper actu intelligens est, ut in primo probatum est. Et in hoc quod intelligit actu, maxime assimilatur Deo secundum quod intelligit ipsum Deum: nam ipse Deus intelligendo se intelligit omnia alia, ut in primo probatum est. Intelligere igitur Deum est ultimus finis omnis intellectualis substantiae. [8] Moreover, a thing inclines toward the divine likeness as to its own end. So, that whereby a thing chiefly becomes like God is its ultimate end. Now, an intellectual creature chiefly becomes like God by the fact that it is intellectual, for it has this sort of likeness over and above what other creatures have, and this likeness includes all others. In the genus of this sort of likeness a being becomes more like God by actually understanding than by habitually or potentially understanding, because God is always actually understanding, as we proved in Book One [56]. And, in this actual understanding, it becomes most like God by understanding God Himself, for God understands all things in the act of understanding Himself, as we proved in Book One [49]. Therefore, to understand God is the ultimate end of every intellectual substance.
Item. Quod est tantum propter aliud diligibile, est propter illud quod est tantum propter se diligibile: non enim est abire in infinitum in appetitu naturae, quia desiderium naturae frustraretur, cum non sit possibile pertransire infinita. Omnes autem scientiae et artes et potentiae practicae sunt tantum propter aliud diligibiles: nam in eis finis non est scire, sed operari. Scientiae autem speculativae sunt propter seipsas diligibiles: nam finis earum est ipsum scire. Nec invenitur aliqua actio in rebus humanis quae non ordinetur ad alium finem, nisi consideratio speculativa. Nam etiam ipsae actiones ludicrae, quae videntur absque fine fieri, habent aliquem finem debitum, scilicet ut per eas quodammodo mente relevati, magis simus postmodum potentes ad studiosas operationes: alias esset semper ludendum, si ludus propter se quaereretur, quod est inconveniens. Ordinantur igitur artes practicae ad speculativas, et similiter omnis humana operatio ad speculationem intellectus, sicut ad finem. In omnibus autem scientiis et artibus ordinatis ad illam videtur pertinere ultimus finis quae est praeceptiva et architectonica aliarum: sicut ars gubernatoria, ad quam pertinet finis navis, qui est usus ipsius, est architectonica et praeceptiva respectu navisfactivae. Hoc autem modo se habet philosophia prima ad alias scientias speculativas, nam ab ipsa omnes aliae dependent, utpote ab ipsa accipientes sua principia, et directionem contra negantes principia: ipsaque prima philosophia tota ordinatur ad Dei cognitionem sicut ad ultimum finem, unde et scientia divina nominatur. Est ergo cognitio divina finis ultimus omnis humanae cognitionis et operationis. [9] Furthermore, that which is capable of being loved only for the sake of some other object exists for the sake of that other thing which is lovable simply on its own account. In fact, there is no point in going on without end in the working of natural appetite, since natural desire would then be futile, because it is impossible to get to the end of an endless series. Now, all practical sciences, arts, and powers are objects of love only because they are means to something else, for their purpose is not knowledge but operation. But the speculative sciences are lovable for their own sake, since their end is knowledge itself. Nor do we find any action in human affairs, except speculative thought, that is not directed to some other end. Even sports activities, which appear to be carried on without any purpose, have a proper end, namely, so that after our minds have been somewhat relaxed through them we may be then better able to do serious jobs. Otherwise, if sport were an end in itself, the proper thing to do would be to play all the time, but that is not appropriate. So, the practical arts are ordered to the speculative ones, and likewise every human operation to intellectual speculation, as an end. Now, among all the sciences and arts which are thus subordinated, the ultimate end seems to belong to the one that is preceptive and architectonic in relation to the others. For instance, the art of navigation, to which the end, that is the use, of a ship pertains, is architectonic and preceptive in relation to the art of shipbuilding. In fact, this is the way that first philosophy is related to the other speculative sciences, for all the others depend on it, in the sense that they take their principles from it, and also the position to be assumed against those who deny the principles. And this first philosophy is wholly ordered to the knowing of God, as its ultimate end; that is why it is also called divine science. So, divine knowledge is the ultimate end of every act of human knowledge and every operation.
Adhuc. In omnibus agentibus et moventibus ordinatis oportet quod finis primi agentis et motoris sit ultimus finis omnium: sicut finis ducis exercitus est finis omnium sub eo militantium. Inter omnes autem hominis partes, intellectus invenitur superior motor: nam intellectus movet appetitum, proponendo ei suum obiectum; appetitus autem intellectivus, qui est voluntas, movet appetitus sensitivos, qui sunt irascibilis et concupiscibilis, unde et concupiscentiae non obedimus nisi voluntatis imperium adsit; appetitus autem sensitivus, adveniente consensu voluntatis, movet iam corpus. Finis igitur intellectus est finis omnium actionum humanarum. Finis autem et bonum intellectus est verum: et per consequens ultimus finis primum verum. Est igitur ultimus finis totius hominis, et omnium operationum et desideriorum eius, cognoscere primum verum, quod est Deus. [10] Again, in all agents and movers that are arranged in an order, the end of the first agent and mover must be the ultimate end of all. Thus, the end of the commander of an army is the end of all who serve as soldiers under him. Now, of all the parts of man, the intellect is found to be the superior mover, for the intellect moves the appetite, by presenting it with its object; then the intellectual appetite. that is the will, moves the sensory appetites, irascible and concupiscible, and that is why we do not obey concupiscence unless there be a command from the will; and finally, the sense appetite, with the advent of consent from the will, now moves the body. Therefore, the end of the intellect is the end of all human actions. “But the end and good of the intellect are the true;” consequently, the first truth is the ultimate end. So, the ultimate end of the whole man, and of all his operations and desires, is to know the first truth, which is God.
Amplius. Naturaliter inest omnibus hominibus desiderium cognoscendi causas eorum quae videntur: unde propter admirationem eorum quae videbantur, quorum causae latebant, homines primo philosophari coeperunt, invenientes autem causam quiescebant. Nec sistit inquisitio quousque perveniatur ad primam causam: et tunc perfecte nos scire arbitramur quando primam causam cognoscimus. Desiderat igitur homo naturaliter cognoscere primam causam quasi ultimum finem. Prima autem omnium causa Deus est. Est igitur ultimus finis hominis cognoscere Deum. [11] Besides, there is naturally present in all men the desire to know the causes of whatever things are observed. Hence, because of wondering about things that were seen but whose causes were hidden, men first began to think philosophically; when they found the cause, they were satisfied. But the search did not stop until it reached the first cause, for “then do we think that we know perfectly, when we know the first cause.” Therefore, man naturally desires, as his ultimate end, to know the first cause. But the first cause of all things is God. Therefore, the ultimate end of man is to know God.
Praeterea. Cuiuslibet effectus cogniti naturaliter homo scire causam desiderat. Intellectus autem humanus cognoscit ens universale. Desiderat igitur naturaliter cognoscere causam eius, quae solum Deus est, ut in secundo probatum est. Non est autem aliquis assecutus finem ultimum quousque naturale desiderium quiescat. Non sufficit igitur ad felicitatem humanam, quae est ultimus finis, qualiscumque intelligibilis cognitio, nisi divina cognitio adsit, quae terminat naturale desiderium sicut ultimus finis. Est igitur ultimus finis hominis ipsa Dei cognitio. [12] Moreover, for each effect that he knows, man naturally desires to know the cause. Now, the human intellect knows universal being. So, he naturally desires to know its cause, which is God alone, as we proved in Book Two [15]. Now, a person has not attained his ultimate end until natural desire comes to rest. Therefore, for human happiness which is the ultimate end it is not enough to have merely any kind of intelligible knowledge; there must be divine knowledge, as an ultimate end, to terminate the natural desire. So, the ultimate end of man is the knowledge of God.
Amplius. Corpus, quod naturali appetitu tendit in suum ubi, tanto vehementius et velocius movetur, quanto magis appropinquat fini: unde probat Aristoteles in I de caelo, quod motus naturalis rectus non potest esse ad infinitum, quia non magis moveretur postea quam prius. Quod igitur vehementius in aliquid tendit post quam prius, non movetur ad infinitum, sed ad aliquid determinatum tendit. Hoc autem invenimus in desiderio sciendi: quanto enim aliquis plura scit, tanto maiori desiderio affectat scire. Tendit igitur desiderium naturale hominis in sciendo ad aliquem determinatum finem. Hoc autem non potest esse aliud quam nobilissimum scibile, quod Deus est. Est igitur cognitio divina finis ultimus hominis. [13] Furthermore, a body tending toward its proper place by natural appetite is moved more forcibly and swiftly as it approaches its end. Thus, Aristotle proves, in On the Heavens I [8: 27a 18], that natural motion in a straight line cannot go on to infinity, for then it would be no more moved later than earlier. So, a thing that tends more forcibly later than earlier, toward an objective, is not moved toward an indefinite objective, but tends toward some determinate thing. Now, we find this situation in the desire to know. The more a person knows, the more is be moved by the desire to know. Hence, man’s natural desire tends, in the process of knowing, toward some definite end. Now, this can be none other than the most noble object of knowledge, which is God. Therefore, divine knowledge is the ultimate end of man.
Ultimus autem finis hominis, et cuiuslibet intellectualis substantiae, felicitas sive beatitudo nominatur: hoc enim est quod omnis substantia intellectualis desiderat tanquam ultimum finem, et propter se tantum. Est igitur beatitudo et felicitas ultima cuiuslibet substantiae intellectualis cognoscere Deum. [14] Now, the ultimate end of man, and of every intellectual substance, is called felicity or happiness, because this is what every intellectual substance desires as an ultimate end, and for its own sake alone. Therefore, the ultimate happiness and felicity of every intellectual substance is to, know God.
Hinc est quod dicitur Matth. 5-8: beati mundo corde, quoniam ipsi Deum videbunt. Et Ioan. 17-3: haec est vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te, Deum verum. [15] And so, it is said in Matthew (5:8): “Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God”; and in John (17:3): “This is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the only true God.”
Huic etiam sententiae Aristoteles in ultimo Ethicorum, concordat, ubi ultimam hominis felicitatem dicit esse speculativam, quantum ad speculationem optimi speculabilis. [16] With this view, the judgment of Aristotle is also in agreement, in the last Book of his Ethics [X, 7: 1177a 18], where he says that the ultimate felicity of man is “speculative, in accord with the contemplation of the best object of speculation.”

Caput 26
Utrum felicitas consistat in actu voluntatis
Chapter 26
Quia vero intellectualis substantia sua operatione pertingit ad Deum non solum intelligendo, sed etiam per actum voluntatis, desiderando et amando ipsum et in ipso delectationem habendo, potest alicui videri quod ultimus finis, et ultima hominis felicitas, non sit in cognoscendo Deum, sed magis in amando, vel aliquo alio actu voluntatis se habendo ad ipsum: [1] Now, since an intellectual substance, through its own operation, attains to God, not only by understanding, but also through an act of will, by desiring and loving Him and by taking delight in Him, it may appear to someone that the ultimate end and the ultimate felicity of man do not lie in knowing, but in loving God, or in some other act of will relating to Him.
Praecipue cum obiectum voluntatis sit bonum, quod habet rationem finis; verum autem, quod est obiectum intellectus, non habet rationem finis nisi inquantum et ipsum est bonum. Unde non videtur homo consequi ultimum finem per actum intellectus, sed magis per actum voluntatis. [2] Especially so, since the object of the will is the good, and the good has the rational character of an end, while the true which is the object of the intellect does not have the rational character of an end, except inasmuch as it is also a good. Consequently, it does not seem that Man attains his ultimate end through an act of understanding, but rather, through an act of will.
Praeterea. Ultima perfectio operationis est delectatio, quae perficit operationem sicut pulchritudo iuventutem, ut in X Eth. philosophus dicit. Si igitur perfecta operatio est ultimus finis, videtur quod ultimus finis magis sit secundum operationem voluntatis quam intellectus. [3] Again, the ultimate perfection of operation is delight “which perfects activity as beauty perfects youth,” as the Philosopher says in Ethics X [4: 1174b 31]. So, if perfect operation is the ultimate end, it appears that the ultimate end is more in accord with an operation of the will than of the intellect.
Adhuc. Delectatio videtur ita propter se desiderari quod nunquam propter aliud: stultum enim est quaerere ab aliquo quare velit delectari. Haec autem est conditio ultimi finis: ut scilicet propter se quaeratur. Est igitur ultimus finis magis in operatione voluntatis quam intellectus, ut videtur. [4] Besides, delight seems to be so much an object of desire for its own sake that it is never desired for the sake of something else; indeed, it is foolish to ask a person why he wishes to be delighted. Now, this is characteristic of the ultimate end: it is sought for its own sake. Therefore, the ultimate end lies in an operation of the will rather than of the intellect, it would seem.
Item. In appetitu ultimi finis maxime omnes concordant: cum sit naturalis. Plures autem quaerunt delectationem quam cognitionem. Magis igitur videtur esse finis delectatio quam cognitio. [5] Moreover, all men agree to the fullest extent in their appetite for the ultimate end, for it is natural. Now, more men seek delight than knowledge. So, it would seem that the end is delight rather than knowledge.
Amplius. Voluntas videtur esse altior potentia quam intellectus: nam voluntas movet intellectum ad suum actum; intellectus enim actu considerat quae habitu tenet, cum aliquis voluerit. Actio igitur voluntatis videtur nobilior quam actio intellectus. Magis igitur videtur ultimus finis, quae est beatitudo, consistere in actu voluntatis quam in actu intellectus. [6] Furthermore, the will seems to be a higher power than the intellect, for the will moves the intellect to its act; indeed, the intellect actually considers, whenever it wills to, what it retains habitually. Therefore, the action of the will seems to be nobler than the action of the intellect. And so, it seems that the ultimate end, which is happiness, consists rather in an act of will than in an act of intellect.
Hoc autem esse impossibile manifeste ostenditur. [7] However, it can be shown that this view is quite impossible.
Cum enim beatitudo sit proprium bonum intellectualis naturae, oportet quod secundum id intellectuali naturae conveniat quod est sibi proprium. Appetitus autem non est proprium intellectualis naturae, sed omnibus rebus inest: licet sit diversimode in diversis. Quae tamen diversitas procedit ex hoc quod res diversimode se habent ad cognitionem. Quae enim omnino cognitione carent, habent appetitum naturalem tantum. Quae vero habent cognitionem sensitivam, et appetitum sensibilem habent, sub quo irascibilis et concupiscibilis continetur. Quae vero habent cognitionem intellectivam, et appetitum cognitioni proportionalem habent, scilicet voluntatem. Voluntas igitur, secundum quod est appetitus, non est proprium intellectualis naturae: sed solum secundum quod ab intellectu dependet. Intellectus autem secundum se proprius est intellectuali naturae. Beatitudo igitur vel felicitas in actu intellectus consistit substantialiter et principaliter, magis quam in actu voluntatis. [8] Since happiness is the proper good of an intellectual nature, happiness must pertain to an intellectual nature by reason of what is proper to that nature. Now, appetite is not peculiar to intellectual nature; instead, it is present in all things, though it is in different things in different ways. And this diversity arises from the fact that things are differently related to knowledge. ~For things lacking knowledge entirely have natural appetite only. And things endowed with sensory knowledge have, in addition, sense appetite, under which irascible and concupiscible powers are included. But things possessed of intellectual knowledge also have an appetite proportionate to this knowledge, that is, will. So, the will is not peculiar to intellectual nature by virtue of being an appetite, but only in so far as it depends on intellect. However, the intellect, in itself, is peculiar to an intellectual nature. Therefore, happiness, or felicity, consists substantially and principally in an act of the intellect rather than in an act of the will.
Adhuc. In omnibus potentiis quae moventur a suis obiectis, obiecta sunt naturaliter priora actibus illarum potentiarum: sicut motor naturaliter prior est quam moveri ipsius mobilis. Talis autem potentia est voluntas: appetibile enim movet appetitum. Obiectum igitur voluntatis est prius naturaliter quam actus eius. Primum igitur eius obiectum praecedit omnem actum ipsius. Non potest ergo actus voluntatis primum volitum esse. Hoc autem est ultimus finis, qui est beatitudo. Impossibile est igitur quod beatitudo sive felicitas sit ipse actus voluntatis. [9] Again, in the case of all powers that are moved by their objects the objects are naturally prior to the acts of these powers, just as a mover is naturally prior to the moving of its passive object. Now, the will is such a power, for the object of appetition moves the appetite. So, the will’s object is naturally prior to its act. Hence, its first object precedes every one of its acts. Therefore, no act of the will can be the first thing that is willed. But that is what the ultimate end is, in the sense of happiness. So, it is impossible for happiness, or felicity, to be the very act of the will.
Praeterea. In omnibus potentiis quae possunt converti in suos actus, prius oportet quod actus illius potentiae feratur in obiectum aliud, et postmodum feratur in suum actum. Si enim intellectus intelligit se intelligere, prius oportet poni quod intelligat rem aliquam, et consequenter quod intelligat se intelligere: nam ipsum intelligere quod intellectus intelligit, alicuius obiecti est; unde oportet quod vel procedatur in infinitum, vel, si est devenire ad primum intellectum, hoc non erit ipsum intelligere, sed aliqua res intelligibilis. Similiter oportet quod primum volitum non sit ipsum velle, sed aliquid aliud bonum. Primum autem volitum intellectualis naturae est ipsa beatitudo sive felicitas: nam propter hanc volumus quaecumque volumus. Impossibile est igitur felicitatem essentialiter in actu voluntatis consistere. [10] Besides, for all the powers capable of reflection on their own acts, the act of such a power must first be brought to bear on some other object, and then directed to its own act. If the intellect is to understand itself in the act of understanding, it must first be taken that it understands something, and then, as a result, that it understands that it is understanding. For, this act of understanding which the intellect understands pertains to some object. Hence, it is necessary either to proceed through an endless series, or, if we are to come to a first object of understanding, it will not be the act of understanding but rather some intelligible thing. Likewise, the first willed object must not be the will’s act but some other good thing. But, for an intellectual nature, the first thing that is willed is happiness itself, or felicity, since it is for the sake of this happiness that we will whatever we will. Therefore, it is impossible for felicity to consist essentially in an act of the will.
Amplius. Unumquodque secundum ea quae constituunt substantiam eius, habet naturae suae veritatem: differt enim verus homo a picto per ea quae substantiam hominis constituunt. Vera autem beatitudo non differt a falsa secundum actum voluntatis: nam eodem modo se habet voluntas in desiderando vel amando vel delectando, quicquid sit illud quod sibi proponitur ut summum bonum, sive vere sive falso; utrum autem vere sit summum bonum quod ut tale proponitur vel falso, hoc differt ex parte intellectus. Beatitudo igitur, sive felicitas, in intellectu essentialiter magis quam in actu voluntatis consistit. [11] Moreover, each thing possesses its true nature by virtue of the components which make up its substance. Thus, a real man differs from a painting of a man by virtue of the things that constitute the substance of man. Now, in their relation to the will act, true happiness does not differ from false happiness. In fact, the will, when it desires, loves or enjoys, is related in just the same way to its object, whatever it may be that is presented to it as a highest good, whether truly or falsely. Of course, whether the object so presented is truly the highest good, or is false, this distinction is made on the part of the intellect. Therefore, happiness, or felicity, essentially consists in understanding rather than in an act of the will.
Item. Si aliquis actus voluntatis esset ipsa felicitas, hic actus esset aut desiderare, aut amare, aut delectari. Impossibile est autem quod desiderare sit ultimus finis. Est enim desiderium secundum quod voluntas tendit in id quod nondum habet: hoc autem contrariatur rationi ultimi finis. Amare etiam non potest esse ultimus finis. Amatur enim bonum non solum quando habetur, sed etiam quando non habetur, ex amore enim est quod non habitum desiderio quaeratur: et si amor iam habiti perfectior sit, hoc causatur ex hoc quod bonum amatum habetur. Aliud igitur est habere bonum quod est finis, quam amare, quod ante habere est imperfectum, post habere vero perfectum. Similiter autem nec delectatio est ultimus finis. Ipsum enim habere bonum causa est delectationis: vel dum bonum nunc habitum sentimus; vel dum prius habitum memoramur; vel dum in futuro habendum speramus. Non est igitur delectatio ultimus finis. Nullus ergo actus voluntatis potest esse substantialiter ipsa felicitas. [12] Furthermore, if any act of the will were this felicity, this act would be either one of desire, of love, or of delight. Now, it is impossible for the act of desiring to be the ultimate end. For it is by desire that the will tends toward what it does not yet possess, but this is contrary to the essential character of the ultimate end.—So, two, the act of loving cannot be the ultimate end. For a good is loved not only when possessed but also when not possessed. Indeed, it is as a result of love that what is not possessed is sought with desire, and if the love of something already possessed is more perfect, this results from the fact that the good which was loved is possessed. So, it is a different thing to possess a good which is the end, and to love it; for love, before possession, is imperfect, but after possession, perfect. —Similarly, delight is not the ultimate end. For the very possession of the good is the cause of delight: we either experience it while the good is presently possessed, or we remember it when it was formerly possessed, or we hope for it when it is to be possessed in the future. So, delight is not the ultimate end. Therefore, none of the acts of will can be this felicity substantially.
Adhuc. Si delectatio esset ultimus finis, ipsa secundum seipsam esset appetenda. Hoc autem est falsum. Refert enim quae delectatio appetatur ex eo ad quod consequitur delectatio: nam delectatio quae consequitur bonas et appetendas operationes, bona est et appetenda; quae autem malas, mala et fugienda. Habet igitur quod sit bona et appetenda ex alio. Non est igitur ipsa ultimus finis, qui est felicitas. [13] Again, if delight were the ultimate end, it would be desired for its own sake. But this is false. The value of desiring a certain delight arises from the thing which delight accompanies. For the delight that accompanies good and desirable operations is good and desirable, but that which accompanies evil deeds is evil and repulsive. So, it owes the fact that it is good and desirable to something else. Therefore, delight is not the ultimate end, in the sense of felicity.
Adhuc. Rectus ordo rerum convenit cum ordine naturae: nam res naturales ordinantur in suum finem absque errore. In naturalibus autem est delectatio propter operationem, et non e converso. Videmus enim quod natura illis operationibus animalium delectationem apposuit quae sunt manifeste ad fines necessarios ordinatae, sicut in usu ciborum, qui ordinatur ad conservationem individui, et in usu venereorum, qui ordinatur ad conservationem speciei: nisi enim adesset delectatio, animalia a praedictis usibus necessariis abstinerent. Impossibile ergo est quod delectatio sit ultimus finis. [14] Besides, the right order of things is in agreement with the order of nature, for natural things are ordered to their end without error. In the order of natural things, delight is for the sake of operation, and not conversely. In fact, we see that nature has associated pleasure with those operations of animals that are clearly ordered to necessary ends; such as to the eating of food, for this is ordered to the preservation of the individual; and to the use of sexual capacities, for this is ordered to the preservation of the species. Indeed, unless pleasure were associated with them, animals would refrain from these necessary activities that we have mentioned. Therefore, it is impossible for pleasure to be the ultimate end.
Item. Delectatio nihil aliud esse videtur quam quietatio voluntatis in aliquo bono convenienti, sicut desiderium est inclinatio voluntatis in aliquod bonum consequendum. Sicut autem homo per voluntatem inclinatur in finem et quietatur in illo, ita corpora naturalia habent inclinationes naturales in fines proprios, quae quidem quietantur fine iam adepto. Ridiculum autem est dicere quod finis motus corporis gravis non sit esse in loco proprio, sed quietatio inclinationis qua in hoc tendebat. Si enim hoc principaliter natura intenderet ut inclinatio quietaretur, non daret eam; dat autem eam ut per hoc tendat in locum proprium; quo consecuto, quasi fine, sequitur inclinationis quietatio. Et sic quietatio talis non est finis, sed concomitans finem. Nec igitur delectatio est finis ultimus, sed concomitans ipsum. Multo igitur magis nec aliquis voluntatis actus est felicitas. [15] Moreover, pleasure seems to be simply the repose of the will in some appropriate good, as desire is the inclination of the will toward the attainment of some good. Now, just as a man is inclined through his will to the end and reposes in it, so do physical bodies in nature possess natural inclinations to proper ends, and these inclinations come to rest when the end has already been reached. However, it is ridiculous to say that the end of a heavy body’s motion is not to be in its proper place, but that the end is the resting of the inclination whereby it tends there. If nature bad intended this at the beginning, that the inclination would come to rest, it would not have given such an inclination; instead, it gives it so that, by this means, the thing may tend to a proper place. When this has been reached, as an end, the repose of the inclination follows. And so, such repose is not the end, but rather a concomitant of the end. Nor, indeed, is pleasure the ultimate end; it is its concomitant. And so, by an even greater reason, no other act of the will is felicity.
Adhuc. Si alicuius rei sit aliqua res exterior finis, illa eius operatio dicetur etiam finis ultimus per quam primo consequitur rem illam: sicut his quibus pecunia est finis, dicitur etiam possidere pecuniam finis, non autem amare, neque concupiscere. Finis autem ultimus substantiae intellectualis est Deus. Illa igitur operatio hominis est substantialiter eius beatitudo vel felicitas, per quam primo attingit ad Deum. Hoc autem est intelligere: nam velle non possumus quod non intelligimus. Est igitur ultima felicitas hominis in cognoscendo Deum per intellectum substantialiter, non in actu voluntatis. [16] If one thing has another thing as its external end, then the operation whereby the first thing primarily attains the second will be called the ultimate end of the first thing. Thus, for those to whom money is an end, we say that to possess the money is their end, but not the loving of it, not the craving of it. Now, the ultimate end of an intellectual substance is God. So, that operation of man is substantially his happiness, or his felicity, whereby be primarily attains to God. This is the act of understanding, for we cannot will what we do not understand. Therefore, the ultimate felicity of man lies substantially in knowing God through his intellect, and not in an act of the will.
Iam igitur per ea quae dicta sunt, patet solutio in contrarium obiectorum. [17] At this point, then, the answer to the arguments against our view is clear from what we have said.
Non enim, si felicitas per hoc quod habet rationem summi boni, est obiectum voluntatis, propter hoc necesse est quod sit substantialiter ipse actus voluntatis: ut prima ratio procedebat. Immo ex hoc ipso quod est primum obiectum, sequitur quod non sit actus eius, ut ex dictis apparet. For, if felicity is an object of the will because it has the rational character of a highest good, that does not make it substantially an act of the will, as the first argument implied. On the contrary, from the fact that it is a first object, the conclusion is that felicity is not its act, as is apparent in what we have said.
Neque etiam oportet quod omne id quo res quocumque modo perficitur, sit finis illius rei: sicut secunda ratio procedebat. Est enim aliquid perfectio alicuius dupliciter: uno modo, ut habentis iam speciem; alio modo, ut ad speciem habendam. Sicut perfectio domus secundum quod iam habet speciem, est id ad quod species domus ordinatur, scilicet habitatio: non enim domus fieret nisi propter hoc; unde et in definitione domus oportet hoc poni, si debeat definitio esse perfecta. Perfectio vero ad speciem domus, est tam id quod ordinatur ad speciem constituendam, sicut principia substantialia ipsius; quam id quod ordinatur ad speciei conservationem, sicut apodiacula, quae fiunt ad sustentationem domus; quam etiam illa quae faciunt ad hoc quod usus domus sit convenientior, sicut pulchritudo domus. Illud igitur quod est perfectio rei secundum quod iam habet speciem, est finis ipsius: ut habitatio est finis domus. Et similiter propria operatio cuiuslibet rei, quae est quasi usus eius, est finis ipsius. Quae autem sunt perfectiones rei ad speciem, non sunt finis rei: immo res est finis ipsarum; materia enim et forma sunt propter speciem. Licet enim forma sit finis generationis, non tamen est finis iam generati et speciem habentis: immo ad hoc quaeritur forma ut species sit completa. Similiter conservantia rem in sua specie, ut sanitas et vis nutritiva, licet perficiant animal, non tamen sunt finis animalis, sed magis e converso. Ea etiam quibus aptatur res ad proprias operationes speciei perficiendas, et ad debitum finem congruentius consequendum, non sunt finis rei, sed magis e converso: sicut pulchritudo hominis, et robur corporis, et alia huiusmodi, de quibus dicit philosophus, in I Ethicorum, quod organice deserviunt felicitati. [18] Nor, indeed, is it necessary that everything whereby a thing is in any way perfected be the end of that thing, as the second argument claimed. In fact, something may be the perfection of a thing in two ways: in one way, of a thing that already possesses its species; and in a second way, in order that the thing may acquire its species. For instance, the perfection of a house which already has its species is that to which the species of the house is ordered, namely, habitation. For a house is made for this purpose only, and so this must be included in the definition of a house if the definition is to be perfect. But the perfection for the sake of the species of the house is both that which is directed to the setting up of the species, such as its substantial principles, and also that which is ordered to the preservation of its species, such as the foundations made to hold up the house, and even those things that make the use of the house more agreeable, such as the beauty of the house. And then, that which is the perfection of the thing, in so far as it already possesses its species, is its end: as habitation is the end of the house. Likewise, the proper operation of anything, which is its use as it were, is its end. Now, the things that are perfections leading up to the species are not the end for the thing; on the contrary, the thing is their end, matter and form are for the sake of the species. Though form is the end of the generative act, it is not the end of the thing that is already generated and possessed of its species. Rather, the form is required so that the species may be complete. Similarly, factors which preserve a thing in its species, such as health and the nutritive power, though perfectants of the animal, are not the end of the animal; rather, the opposite is true. Also, items by which a thing is improved for the perfection of its proper operations, and for the more appropriate attainment of its proper end, are not the end for the thing; rather, the opposite is so. For instance, beauty is for the man, and strength is for the body, and so for other similar things which the Philosopher talks about in Ethics I [8-9: 1099b 2–1099b 28], saying that “they contribute to felicity instrumentally.”
Delectatio autem est perfectio operationis, non ita quod ad ipsam ordinetur operatio secundum suam speciem, sed ordinatur ad alios fines, sicut comestio ordinatur secundum suam speciem ad conservationem individui: sed est similis perfectioni quae ordinatur ad speciem rei; nam propter delectationem attentius et decentius operationi insistimus in qua delectamur. Unde in X Ethicorum philosophus dicit quod delectatio perficit operationem sicut decor iuventutem, qui quidem est propter eum cui inest iuventus, et non e converso. Pleasure, however, is a perfection of operation, not in such a way that operation is ordered to it as to its species; rather, pleasure is ordered to other ends, as eating is ordered specifically to the preservation of the individual. But pleasure is like the perfection that is conducive to the species of the thing, since because of pleasure we apply ourselves more carefully and suitably to the operation in which we take pleasure. Hence the Philosopher says in Ethics X [4: 1174b 31] that “pleasure perfects operation as beauty perfects youth.” For, of course, beauty is for the sake of him in whom youth is found, and not the converse.
Neque autem quod delectationem non propter aliud volunt homines sed propter seipsam, est sufficiens signum quod delectatio sit ultimus finis: sicut tertia ratio concludebat. Nam delectatio, etsi non sit ultimus finis, est tamen ultimum finem concomitans: cum ex adeptione finis delectatio consurgat. [19] Nor is the fact that men desire pleasure for its own sake, and not for the sake of something else, enough to indicate that pleasure is the ultimate end, as the third argument concluded. For, although pleasure is not the ultimate end, it is, of course, a concomitant of this end, since pleasure arises out of the attainment of the end.
Non autem plures quaerunt delectationem quae est in cognoscendo, quam cognitionem. Sed plures sunt qui quaerunt delectationes sensibiles quam cognitionem intellectus et delectationem ipsam consequentem: quia ea quae exterius sunt, magis nota pluribus existunt, eo quod a sensibilibus incipit humana cognitio. [20] Nor do more persons seek the pleasure that is associated with knowing rather than the knowledge. Rather, there are more people who seek sensual pleasures than intellectual knowledge and its accompanying pleasure, because things that are external stand out as better known, since human knowledge starts from sensible objects.
Quod autem quinta ratio proponit, voluntatem esse altiorem intellectu, quasi eius motivam, falsum esse manifestum est. Nam primo et per se intellectus movet voluntatem: voluntas enim, inquantum huiusmodi, movetur a suo obiecto, quod est bonum apprehensum. Voluntas autem movet intellectum quasi per accidens, inquantum scilicet intelligere ipsum apprehenditur ut bonum, et sic desideratur a voluntate, ex quo sequitur quod intellectus actu intelligit. Et in hoc ipso intellectus voluntatem praecedit: nunquam enim voluntas desideraret intelligere nisi prius intellectus ipsum intelligere apprehenderet ut bonum. Et iterum, voluntas movet intellectum ad operandum in actu per modum quo agens movere dicitur; intellectus autem voluntatem per modum quo finis movet, nam bonum intellectum est finis voluntatis; agens autem est posterior in movendo quam finis, nam agens non movet nisi propter finem. Unde apparet intellectum simpliciter esse altiorem voluntate: voluntatem vero intellectu per accidens et secundum quid. [21] Now, what the fifth argument suggests, that the will is higher than the intellect, in the sense of moving it, is clearly false. For, primarily Ad directly, the intellect moves the will; indeed, the will, as such, is moved by its object which is the known good. But the will moves the intellect rather accidentally, that is, in so far as the act of understanding is itself apprehended as good, and so is desired by the will, with the result that the intellect actually understands. Even in this act, the intellect precedes the will, for the will would never desire the act of understanding unless, first of all, the intellect were to apprehend the act of understanding as a good.—And again, the will moves the intellect actually to perform its operation, in the way that an agent is said to move; while the intellect moves the will in the way that an end moves something, since the good that is understood is the end for the will. Now, the agent comes later, in the process of moving, than does the end, since the agent does not move except for the sake of the end. Hence, it is evident that the intellect is, without qualification, higher than the will. On the other hand, the will is higher than the intellect, accidentally and in a qualified sense.

Caput 27
Quod felicitas humana non consistit in delectationibus carnalibus
Chapter 27
Ex praemissis autem apparet quod impossibile est felicitatem humanam consistere in delectationibus corporalibus, quarum praecipuae sunt in cibis et venereis. [1] Now, it is clear from what we have said that it is impossible for human felicity to consist in bodily pleasures, the chief of which are those of food and sex.
Ostensum est enim quod secundum naturae ordinem delectatio est propter operationem, et non e converso. Si igitur operationes non fuerint ultimus finis, delectationes consequentes eas neque sunt ultimus finis, neque concomitantes ultimum finem. Constat autem quod operationes quas consequuntur praedictae delectationes, non sunt ultimus finis: ordinantur enim ad aliquos fines manifestos; sicut comestio ad conservationem corporis, coitus autem ad generationem prolis. Delectationes igitur praemissae non sunt ultimus finis, neque ultimum finem concomitantes. Non est igitur in his ponenda felicitas. [2] In fact, we have shown that in the order of nature pleasure depends on operation, and not the converse. So, if operations are not the ultimate end, the pleasures that result from them are not the ultimate end, either; nor are they concomitant with the ultimate end. It stands to reason that the operations which accompany the above-mentioned pleasures are not the ultimate end, for they are ordered to certain ends that are quite obvious: eating, for instance, to the preservation of the body, and sexual intercourse to the generation of offspring. Therefore, the aforementioned Pleasures are not the ultimate end, nor are they concomitants of the ultimate end. So, felicity is not to be located in these pleasures.
Adhuc. Voluntas est superior quam appetitus sensitivus: movet enim ipsum, sicut superius dictum est. In actu autem voluntatis non consistit felicitas, sicut iam supra ostensum est. Multo igitur minus in delectationibus praedictis, quae sunt in appetitu sensitivo. [3] Again, the will is higher than sense appetite, for it moves itself, as we said above. Now, we have already shown that felicity does not lie in an act of the will. Still less will it consist in the aforementioned pleasures which are located in the sense appetite.
Amplius. Felicitas est quoddam bonum hominis proprium: non enim bruta possunt dici felicia, nisi abusive. Delectationes autem praemissae sunt communes hominibus et brutis. Non est igitur in eis ponenda felicitas. [4] Besides, felicity is a certain kind of good, appropriate to man. Indeed, brute animals cannot be deemed happy, unless we stretch the meaning of the term. But these pleasures that we are talking about are common to men and brutes. So, felicity should not be attributed to them.
Item. Ultimus finis est nobilissimum eorum quae ad rem pertinent: habet enim rationem optimi. Hae autem delectationes non conveniunt homini secundum id quod est nobilissimum in ipso, quod est intellectus, sed secundum sensum. Non est igitur in talibus delectationibus ponenda felicitas. [5] Moreover, the ultimate end is the noblest appurtenance of a thing; in fact, the term means the best. But these pleasures are not agreeable to man by virtue of what is noblest in him, namely, his understanding, but by virtue of his sense capacity. So, felicity should not be located in pleasures of this kind.
Praeterea. Summa perfectio hominis esse non potest in hoc quod coniungitur rebus se inferioribus, sed per hoc quod coniungitur alicui rei altiori: finis enim est melior eo quod est ad finem. Delectationes autem praemissae consistunt in hoc quod homo secundum sensum coniungitur aliquibus se inferioribus, scilicet sensibilibus quibusdam. Non est igitur in talibus delectationibus felicitas ponenda. [6] Furthermore, the highest perfection of man cannot lie in a union with things inferior to himself, but, rather, in a union with some reality of a higher character, for the end is better than that which is for the sake of the end. Now, the aforementioned pleasures consist in this fact: that man is, through his senses, united with some things that are his inferiors, that is, with certain. sensible objects. So, felicity is not to be located in pleasures of this sort.
Amplius. Quod non est bonum nisi secundum quod est moderatum, non est secundum se bonum, sed accipit bonitatem a moderante. Usus autem praedictarum delectationum non est bonus homini nisi sit moderatus: aliter enim hae delectationes se invicem impedirent. Non sunt igitur hae delectationes secundum se bonum hominis. Quod autem est summum bonum, est per se bonum: quia quod per se bonum est, melius est eo quod per aliud. Non sunt igitur tales delectationes summum hominis bonum, quod est felicitas. [7] Again, something which is not good unless it be moderated is not good of itself; rather, it receives goodness from the source of the moderation. Now, the enjoyment of the aforementioned pleasures is not good for man unless it be moderated; otherwise, these pleasures will interfere with each other. So, these pleasures are not of themselves the good for man. But that which is the highest good is good of itself, because what is good of itself is better than what depends on something else. Therefore, such pleasures are not the highest good for man, that is, felicity.
Item. In omnibus quae per se dicuntur, sequitur magis ad magis, si simpliciter sequatur ad simpliciter: sicut, si calidum calefacit, magis calidum magis calefacit, et maxime calidum maxime calefaciet. Si igitur delectationes praemissae essent secundum se bonae, oporteret quod maxime uti eis esset optimum. Hoc autem patet esse falsum: nam nimius usus earum reputatur in vitium, et est etiam corporis noxius, et similium delectationum impeditivus. Non sunt igitur per se bonum hominis. In eis igitur non consistit humana felicitas. [8] Besides, in the case of all things that are predicated per se, an absolute variation is directly accompanied by a similar variation in the degree of intensification. Thus, if a hot thing heats, then a hotter thing heats more, and the hottest thing will heat the most. So, if the aforementioned pleasures were goods of themselves, the maximum enjoyment of them should be the best. But this is clearly false, for excessive enjoyment of them is considered vicious, and is also, harmful to the body, and it prevents the enjoyment of similar pleasures. Therefore, they are not of themselves the good for man. So, human felicity does not consist in them.
Praeterea. Actus virtutum sunt laudabiles ex hoc quod ad felicitatem ordinantur. Si igitur in delectationibus praemissis consisteret humana felicitas, actus virtutis magis esset laudabilis in accedendo ad has delectationes quam in abstinendo ab eis. Hoc autem patet esse falsum: nam actus temperantiae maxime laudatur in abstinendo a delectationibus; unde ab hoc denominatur. Non est igitur in delectationibus praemissis hominis felicitas. [9] Moreover, virtuous acts are praiseworthy because they are ordered to felicity. So, if human felicity consisted in the aforementioned pleasures, a virtuous act would be more praiseworthy when it involved the enjoyment of these pleasures than when it required abstention from them. However, it is clear that this is false, for the act of temperance is given most praise when it involves abstaining from pleasures; as a result, it gets its name from this fact. Therefore, man’s felicity does not lie in the aforesaid pleasures.
Amplius. Finis ultimus cuiuslibet rei Deus est, ut ex praemissis patet. Illud igitur oportet ultimum finem hominis poni, per quod maxime appropinquat ad Deum. Per praedictas autem delectationes homo impeditur a maxima appropinquatione ad Deum, quae fit per contemplationem, quam maxime praedictae delectationes impediunt, utpote ad sensibilia maxime hominem immergentes, et per consequens ab intelligibilibus retrahentes. Non est igitur in delectationibus corporalibus felicitas humana ponenda. [10] Furthermore, the ultimate end of everything is God, as is clear from what has been indicated earlier. So, we should consider the ultimate end of man to be that whereby be most closely approaches God. But, through the aforesaid pleasures, man is kept away from a close approach to God, for this approach is effected through contemplation, and the aforementioned pleasures are the chief impediment to contemplation, since they plunge man very deep into sensible things, consequently distracting him from intelligible objects. Therefore, human felicity must not be located in bodily pleasures.
Per hoc autem excluditur error Epicureorum in his voluptatibus felicitatem hominis ponentium: ex quorum persona dicit Salomon, Eccle. 5-17: hoc itaque visum est mihi bonum, ut comedat quis et bibat et fruatur laetitia ex labore suo et haec est pars illius. Et Sap. 2-9: ubique relinquamus signa laetitiae: quoniam haec est pars nostra, et haec est sors nostra. [11] Through this conclusion we are refuting the error of the Epicureans, who placed man’s felicity in these enjoyments. Acting as their spokesman, Solomon says in Ecclesiastes (5:17): “This therefore seemed good to me, that a man should eat and drink and enjoy the fruit of his labor, and this is his portion”; and again in Wisdom (2:9): “let us everywhere leave tokens of joy, for this is our portion, and this our lot.”
Excluditur etiam error Cerinthianorum qui in ultima felicitate, post resurrectionem, mille annos in regno Christi secundum carnales ventris voluptates fabulantur futuros: unde et Chiliastae (quasi millenarii), sunt appellati. [12] Also refuted is the error of the Cerinthians, for they told a fabulous story about ultimate felicity, that after the resurrection there would be, in the reign of Christ, a thousand years of carnal pleasures of the belly. Hence, they were also called Chiliasts; that is, Millenarians.
Excluduntur etiam Iudaeorum et Saracenorum fabulae, quae retributiones iustorum in praedictis voluptatibus ponunt: felicitas enim est virtutis praemium. [13] Refuted, too, are the fables of the Jews and the Saracens, who identified the rewards for just men with these pleasures, for felicity is the reward for virtue.

Caput 28
Quod felicitas non consistit in honoribus
Chapter 28
Ex praedictis etiam patet quod nec in honoribus est summum bonum hominis, quod est felicitas. [1] It is also clear from the foregoing that the highest good for man, that is felicity, does not lie in honors.
Finis enim ultimus hominis, et sua felicitas, est eius perfectissima operatio, ut ex superioribus patet. Honor autem hominis non consistit in sua operatione, sed alterius ad ipsum, qui ei reverentiam exhibet. Non est igitur felicitas hominis in honoribus ponenda. [2] Indeed, the ultimate end of man, and his felicity, is his most perfect operation, as is evident in what has preceded. Now, a man’s honor is not identified with his operation, but with something done by another person who shows respect for him. Therefore, the felicity of man should not be identified with honors.
Adhuc. Quod est propter alterum bonum et desiderabile, non est ultimus finis. Tale autem est honor: non enim aliquis recte honoratur nisi propter aliquod aliud bonum in eo existens. Et propter hoc homines honorari quaerunt, quasi boni alicuius quod in eis est testimonium habere volentes: unde et magis gaudent homines a magnis et sapientibus honorari. Non est igitur in honoribus felicitas hominis ponenda. [3] Again, that which is good and desirable on account of something else is not the ultimate end. But honor is of this sort. A person is not rightly honored unless it be because of some other good that is present in him. And this is why men seek to be honored, desiring, as it were, to have a witness to some good feature present in them. Hence, men take greater joy in being honored by important and wise people. So, man’s felicity is not to be identified with honors.
Amplius. Ad felicitatem per virtutem pervenitur. Operationes autem virtutum sunt voluntariae: aliter enim non essent laudabiles. Oportet igitur felicitatem esse aliquod bonum ad quod homo sua voluntate perveniat. Hoc autem quod honorem assequatur, non est in potestate hominis, sed magis in potestate honorantis. Non est igitur in honoribus felicitas humana ponenda. [4] Besides, the attainment of felicity is accomplished through virtue. Now, virtuous operations are voluntary; otherwise, they would not merit praise. So, felicity ought to be some good which man may attain by his own will. But the gaining of honor is not within the power of any man; rather, it is in the power of the one who gives the honor. Therefore, human felicity is not to be identified with honors.
Item. Esse dignum honore non potest nisi bonis inesse. Honorari autem possunt etiam mali. Melius est igitur fieri honore dignum quam honorari. Non est igitur honor summum hominis bonum. [5] Moreover, to be worthy of honor can only be an attribute of good men. But it is possible for even evil men to be honored. So, it is better to become worthy of honor than to be honored. Therefore, honor is not the highest good for man.
Praeterea. Summum bonum est perfectum bonum. Perfectum autem bonum non compatitur aliquod malum. Cui autem non inest aliquod malum, impossibile est esse malum. Impossibile est igitur esse malum cui adest summum bonum. Potest autem aliquis malus honorem consequi. Non est igitur honor summum hominis bonum. [6] Furthermore, the highest good is the perfect good. But the perfect good is completely exclusive of evil. Now, that in which there can be no evil cannot itself be evil. Therefore, that which is in possession of the highest good cannot be evil. But it is possible for a bad man to attain honor. So, honor is not the highest good for man.

Caput 29
Quod felicitas hominis non consistit in gloria
Chapter 29
Ex quo etiam apparet quod nec in gloria, quae est in celebritate famae, consistit summum hominis bonum. [1] From this it is also apparent that the highest good for man does not consist in glory, which means a widely recognized reputation.
Est enim gloria, secundum Tullium frequens de aliquo fama cum laude: et secundum Ambrosium, clara cum laude notitia. Ad hoc autem homines volunt innotescere cum laude et claritate quadam, ut ab eis quibus innotescunt honorentur. Est igitur gloria propter honorem quaesita. Si igitur honor non est summum bonum, multo minus gloria. [2] Now, according to Tully, glory is “widespread repute accompanied by praise of a person.” And according to Ambrose, it is “an illustrious reputation accompanied by praise.” Now, men desire to become known in connection with some sort of praise and renown, for the purpose of being honored by those who know them. So, glory is sought for the sake of honor. Hence, if honor is not the highest good, much less is glory.
Adhuc. Laudabilia bona sunt secundum quae aliquis ostenditur ordinatus ad finem. Qui autem ordinatur ad finem, nondum est ultimum finem assecutus. Laus igitur non attribuitur ei qui iam est ultimum finem assecutus: sed magis honor, ut philosophus dicit, in I Ethicorum. Non potest igitur gloria esse summum bonum: cum principaliter in laude consistat. [3] Again, praiseworthy goods are those whereby a person is shown to be well ordered to his end. Now, he who is well ordered to his end has not yet achieved the ultimate end. So, praise is not given to him who has already attained the ultimate end, but honor, as the Philosopher says in Ethics I [12: 1101b 24]. Therefore, glory cannot be the highest good, because it consists principally in praise.
Amplius. Cognoscere nobilius est quam cognosci: non enim cognoscunt nisi quae sunt nobiliora in rebus; cognoscuntur autem infima. Non potest igitur summum hominis bonum esse gloria, quae consistit in hoc quod aliquis cognoscatur. [4] Besides, to know is more noble than to be known; only the more noble things know, but the lowest things are known. So, the highest good for man cannot be glory, for it consists in the fact that a person is well known.
Item. Cognosci aliquis non desiderat nisi in bonis: in malis autem quaerit latere. Cognosci igitur bonum est et desiderabile propter bona quae in aliquo cognoscuntur. Illa igitur sunt meliora. Non est igitur gloria, quae in hoc consistit quod aliquis cognoscatur, summum hominis bonum. [5] Moreover, a person desires to be known only for good things; where bad things are concerned, he seeks concealment. So, to be known is a good and desirable thing, because of the good things that are known about a person. And so, these good things are better than being widely known. Therefore, glory is not the highest good, for it consists in a person being widely known.
Praeterea. Summum bonum oportet esse perfectum: cum quietet appetitum: cognitio autem famae, in qua gloria humana consistit, est imperfecta: est enim plurimum incertitudinis et erroris habens. Non potest igitur talis gloria esse summum bonum. [6] Furthermore, the highest good should be perfect, for it should satisfy the appetite. Now, the knowledge associated with fame, in which human glory consists, is imperfect, for it is possessed of the greatest uncertainty and error. Therefore, such glory cannot be the highest good.
Item. Id quod est summum hominis bonum, oportet esse stabilissimum in rebus humanis: naturaliter enim desideratur diuturna boni constantia. Gloria autem, quae in fama consistit, est instabilissima: nihil enim est mutabilius opinione et laude humana. Non est igitur talis gloria summum hominis bonum. [7] Again, the highest good for man should be what is most enduring among human affairs, for an endless duration of the good is naturally desired. Now, glory, in the sense of fame, is the least permanent of things; in fact, nothing is more variable than opinion and human praise. Therefore, such glory is not the highest good for man.

Caput 30
Quod felicitas hominis non consistit in divitiis
Chapter 30
Ex hoc autem apparet quod nec divitiae sunt summum hominis bonum. [1] From this, moreover, it is also clear that riches are not the highest good for man.
Non enim appetuntur divitiae nisi propter aliud: per se enim nihil boni inferunt, sed solum cum utimur eis, vel ad corporis sustentationem, vel ad aliquid huiusmodi. Quod autem est summum bonum, est propter se desideratum, et non propter aliud. Non sunt igitur divitiae summum hominis bonum. [2] Indeed, riches are only desired for the sake of something else; they provide no good of themselves but only when we use them, either for the maintenance of the body or some such use. Now, that which is the highest good is desired for its own sake and not for the sake of something else. Therefore, riches are not the highest good for man.
Adhuc. Eorum possessio vel conservatio non potest esse summum hominis bonum quae maxime conferunt homini in hoc quod emittuntur. Divitiae autem in hoc maxime conferunt quod expenduntur: hoc enim earum usus est. Non potest igitur divitiarum possessio esse summum hominis bonum. [3] Again, man’s highest good cannot lie in the possession or keeping of things that chiefly benefit man through being spent. Now, riches are chiefly valuable because they can be expended, for this is their use. So, the possession of riches cannot be the highest good for man.
Amplius. Actus virtutis laudabilis est secundum quod ad felicitatem accedit. Magis autem est laudabilis actus liberalitatis et magnificentiae, quae sunt circa pecunias, ex hoc quod pecuniae emittuntur, quam ex hoc quod conservantur: unde et ab hoc nomina harum virtutum sumuntur. Non consistit igitur hominis felicitas in possessione divitiarum. [4] Besides, an act of virtue is praiseworthy in so far as it comes closer to felicity. Now, acts of liberality and magnificence, which have to do with money, are more praiseworthy in a situation in which money is spent than in one in which it is saved. So, it is from this fact that the names of these virtues are derived. Therefore, the felicity of man does not consist in the possession of riches.
Item. Illud in cuius consecutione summum hominis bonum est, oportet esse homine melius. Divitiis autem homo est melior: cum sint res quaedam ad usum hominis ordinatae. Non est igitur in divitiis summum hominis bonum. [5] Moreover, that object in whose attainment man’s highest good lies must be better than man. But man is better than riches, for they are but things subordinated to man’s use. Therefore, the highest good for man does not lie in riches.
Praeterea. Summum hominis bonum fortunae non subiacet: nam fortuita absque studio rationis eveniunt; oportet autem quod per rationem homo proprium finem consequatur. In consecutione autem divitiarum maximum locum habet fortuna. Non est igitur in divitiis humana felicitas constituta. [6] Furthermore, man’s highest good is not subject to fortune, for things subject to fortune come about independently of rational effort. But it must be through reason that man will achieve his proper end. Of course, fortune occupies an important place in the attainment of riches, Therefore, human felicity is not founded on riches.
Amplius. Hoc evidens fit per hoc quod divitiae involuntarie amittuntur; et quod malis advenire possunt, quos necesse est summo bono carere; et quod instabiles sunt; et alia huiusmodi, quae ex superioribus rationibus colligi possunt. [7] Again, this becomes evident in the fact that riches are lost in an involuntary manner, and also that they may accrue to evil men who must fail to achieve the highest good, and also that riches are unstable—and for other reasons of this kind which may be gathered from the preceding arguments.

Caput 31
Quod felicitas non consistit in potentia mundana
Chapter 31
Similiter autem nec mundana potentia summum hominis bonum esse potest: cum etiam in ea obtinenda plurimum fortuna possit; et instabilis sit; et non subiaceat hominis voluntati; et plerumque malis adveniat; quae summo bono repugnant, ut ex praemissis patet. [1] Similarly, neither can worldly power be man’s highest good, since in its attainment, also, fortune can play a most important part. It is also unstable; nor is it subject to man’s will; oftentimes it comes to bad men—and these characteristics are incompatible with the highest good, as was evident in the foregoing arguments.
Item. Homo maxime dicitur bonus secundum quod ad summum bonum attingit. Secundum autem quod habet potentiam, non dicitur neque bonus neque malus: non enim est bonus omnis qui potest bona facere; neque malus est aliquis ex hoc quod potest mala facere. Summum igitur bonum non consistit in hoc quod est esse potentem. [2] Again, man is deemed good chiefly in terms of his attainment of the highest good. Now, he is not called good, or bad, simply because he has power, for not everyone who can do good things is a good man, nor is a person bad because he is able to do evil things. Therefore, the highest good does not consist in the fact of being powerful.
Adhuc. Omnis potentia ad alterum est. Summum autem bonum non est ad alterum. Non est igitur potentia summum hominis bonum. [3] Besides, all power is relative to some other thing. But the highest good is not relative to something else. Therefore, power is not man’s highest good.
Amplius. Illud quo quis potest et bene et male uti, non potest esse summum hominis bonum: melius enim est quo nullus male uti potest. Potentia autem aliquis bene et male uti potest: nam potestates rationales ad opposita sunt. Non est igitur potestas humana summum hominis bonum. [4] Moreover, a thing that one can use both for good and for evil cannot be man’s highest good, for that is better which no one can use in a bad way. Now, one can use power well or badly, “for rational powers are capable of contrary effects.” Therefore, man’s highest good does not consist in human power.
Praeterea. Si aliqua potestas est summum bonum, oportet illam esse perfectissimam. Potestas autem humana est imperfectissima: radicatur enim in hominum voluntatibus et opinionibus, in quibus est maxima inconstantia. Et quanto maior reputatur potestas, tanto a pluribus dependet: quod etiam ad eius debilitatem pertinet; cum quod a multis dependet, destrui multipliciter possit. Non est igitur in potestate mundana summum hominis bonum. [5] Furthermore, if any sort of power is the highest good, it ought to be the most perfect. But human power is most imperfect, since it is rooted in the wills and the opinions of men, in which there is the greatest inconstancy. And the more important the power is considered to be, the more does it depend on large numbers of people, which fact also contributes to its frailty, since what depends on many can be destroyed in many ways. Therefore, man’s highest good does not lie in worldly power.
Felicitas igitur hominis in nullo exteriori bono consistit: cum omnia exteriora bona, quae dicuntur bona fortunae, sub praedictis contineantur. [6] Man’s felicity, then, consists in no exterior good, since all exterior goods, the ones that are called “goods of fortune,” are contained under the preceding headings.

Caput 32
Quod felicitas non consistit in bonis corporis
Chapter 32
Quod autem nec in corporis bonis, cuiusmodi sunt sanitas, pulchritudo et robur, sit hominis summum bonum, per similia manifeste apparet. Haec enim etiam bonis et malis communia sunt; et instabilia sunt; et voluntati non subiacent. [1] Moreover, that man’s highest good does not lie in goods of the body, such as health, beauty, and strength, is clearly evident from similar considerations. For these things are possessed in common by both good and bad men; they are also unstable; moreover, they are not subject to the will.
Praeterea. Anima est melior corpore, quod non vivit, nec praedicta bona habet, nisi per animam. Bonum igitur animae, sicut intelligere et alia huiusmodi, est melius quam bonum corporis. Non est igitur corporis bonum summum hominis bonum. [2] Again, the soul is better than the body, which is not alive, and which does not possess the aforementioned goods except by means of the soul. So, a good of the soul, like understanding and that sort of thing, is better than a good of the body. Therefore, the good of the body is not man’s highest good.
Adhuc. Haec bona sunt homini et aliis animalibus communia. Felicitas autem est proprium hominis bonum. Non est igitur in praemissis bonis hominis felicitas. [3] Besides, these goods are common to men and other animals. But felicity is the proper good of man. Therefore, man’s felicity does not lie in the aforesaid goods.
Amplius. Multa animalia, quantum ad bona corporis, sunt homine potiora: quaedam enim sunt velociora homine, quaedam robustiora, et sic de aliis. Si igitur in his esset summum hominis bonum, non esset homo optimum animalium: quod patet esse falsum. Non est igitur felicitas humana in bonis corporis consistens. [4] Moreover, many animals are better endowed than men, as far as the goods of the body go; for some are faster than man, some are stronger, and so on. If, then, man’s highest good lay in these things, man would not be the most excellent of animals; which is obviously false. Therefore, human felicity does not consist in goods of the body.

Caput 33
Quod felicitas humana non consistit in sensu
Chapter 33
Per eadem etiam apparet quod neque summum hominis bonum est in bonis sensitivae partis. Nam haec etiam bona sunt homini et aliis animalibus communia. [1] In the same way, it is also apparent that man’s highest good does not lie in the goods of his sensitive part. For these goods, too, are common to men and other animals.
Item. Intellectus est melior sensu. Bonum igitur intellectus est melius quam bonum sensus. Non igitur summum hominis bonum in sensu consistit. [2] Again, intellect is better than sense. So, the good of the intellect is better than the good of the senses. Therefore, man’s highest good does not lie in sense.
Adhuc. Maximae delectationes secundum sensum sunt in cibis et venereis, in quibus oporteret esse summum bonum, si in sensu esset. Non est autem in his. Non est igitur in sensu summum hominis bonum. [3] Besides, the greatest pleasures in the sense order have to do with food and sexual activities; and so, the highest good ought to lie in these areas, if it were in sense. But it is not found in these things. Therefore, man’s highest good does not lie in the senses.
Amplius. Sensus diliguntur propter utilitatem, et propter cognitionem. Tota autem utilitas sensuum ad corporis bona refertur. Cognitio autem sensus ad intellectivam ordinatur: unde animalia intellectu carentia non delectantur in sentiendo nisi per comparationem ad utilitatem ad corpus pertinentem, secundum quod per sensus cognitionem consequuntur cibos vel venerea. Non est igitur in parte sensitiva summum hominis bonum, quod est felicitas. [4] Moreover, the senses are treasured because of their usefulness, and also because of their knowledge. Now, the entire utility of the senses has reference to the goods of the body. But sense cognition is subordinated to intellectual cognition; thus, animals devoid of understanding take no pleasure in sensing, except in regard to some benefit pertaining to the body, according as they obtain food or sexual satisfaction through sense knowledge. Therefore, man’s highest good, his felicity, does not lie in his sensitive part.

Caput 34
Quod ultima hominis felicitas non consistit in actibus virtutum moralium
Chapter 34
Apparet autem quod nec in operationibus moralibus consistit ultima felicitas hominis. [1] It is clear, too, that the ultimate felicity of man does not consist in moral actions.
Felicitas enim humana non est ad ulteriorem finem ordinabilis, si sit ultima. Omnes autem operationes morales sunt ordinabiles ad aliquid aliud. Quod patet ex his quae inter eas sunt praecipuae. Operationes enim fortitudinis quae sunt in rebus bellicis, ordinantur ad victoriam et ad pacem: stultum enim esset propter se tantum bellare. Similiter operationes iustitiae ordinantur ad pacem inter homines servandam, per hoc quod unusquisque quiete quod suum est possidet. Et similiter patet in omnibus aliis. Non est igitur in operationibus moralibus ultima hominis felicitas. [2] In fact, human felicity is incapable of being ordered to a further end, if it is ultimate. But all moral operations can be ordered to something else. This is evident from the most important instances of these actions. The operations of fortitude, which are concerned with warlike activities, are ordered to victory and to peace. Indeed, it would be foolish to make war merely for its own sake. Likewise, the operations of justice are ordered to the preservation of peace among men, by means of each man having his own possessions undisturbed. And the same thing is evident for all the other virtues. Therefore, man’s ultimate felicity does not lie in moral operations.
Adhuc. Virtutes morales ad hoc sunt ut per eas conservetur medium in passionibus intrinsecis et exterioribus rebus. Non est autem possibile quod modificatio passionum vel rerum exteriorum sit ultimus finis humanae vitae: cum ipsae passiones et exteriores res sint ad aliud ordinabiles. Non est igitur possibile quod in actibus virtutum moralium sit ultima hominis felicitas. [3] Again, the moral virtues have this purpose: through them the mean is preserved in the internal passions and in regard to external things. Now, it is not possible for such a measuring of passions, or of external things, to be the ultimate end of human life, since these passions and exterior things are capable of being ordered to something else. Therefore, it is not possible for man’s ultimate felicity to lie in acts of the moral virtues.
Amplius. Cum homo sit homo ex eo quod est rationem habens, oportet quod proprium eius bonum, quod est felicitas, sit secundum id quod est proprium rationi. Magis autem est proprium rationis quod ipsa in se habet, quam quod in alio facit. Cum igitur bonum moralis virtutis sit quoddam a ratione in rebus aliis a se institutum, non poterit esse optimum hominis, quod est felicitas: sed magis bonum quod est in ipsa ratione situm. [4] Besides, since man is man by virtue of his possession of reason, his proper good which is felicity should be in accord with what is appropriate to reason. Now, that is more appropriate to reason which reason has within itself than which it produces in another thing. So, since the good of moral virtue is something produced by reason in things other than itself, it could not be that which is best for man; namely, felicity. Rather would felicity seem to be a good situated in reason itself.
Item. Ostensum est supra quod finis omnium rerum ultimus est assimilari ad Deum. Illud igitur secundum quod homo maxime assimilatur Deo, erit eius felicitas. Hoc autem non est secundum actus morales: cum tales actus Deo attribui non possint nisi metaphorice; non enim Deo convenit habere passiones, vel aliqua huiusmodi, circa quae sunt actus morales. Non est igitur ultima felicitas hominis, quae est ultimus eius finis, consistens in actibus moralibus. [5] Moreover, it was shown above that the ultimate end of all things is to become like unto God. So, that whereby man is made most like God will be his felicity. Now, this is not a function of moral acts, since such acts cannot be attributed to God, except metaphorically. Indeed, it does not befit God to have passions, or the like, with which moral acts are concerned. Therefore, man’s ultimate felicity, that is, his ultimate end, does not consist in moral actions.
Praeterea. Felicitas est proprium hominis bonum. Illud igitur quod est maxime proprium hominis inter omnia bona humana respectu aliorum animalium, est in quo quaerenda est eius ultima felicitas. Huiusmodi autem non est virtutum moralium actus: nam aliqua animalia aliquid participant vel liberalitatis vel fortitudinis; intellectualis autem actionis nullum animal aliquid participat. Non est igitur ultima hominis felicitas in actibus moralibus. [6] Furthermore, felicity is the proper good for man. So, that which is most proper among all human goods, for man in contrast to the other animals, is the good in which his ultimate felicity is to be sought. Now, an act of moral virtue is not of this sort, for some animals share somewhat, either in liberality or in fortitude, but an animal does not participate at all in intellectual action. Therefore, man’s ultimate felicity does not lie in moral acts.

Caput 35
Quod ultima felicitas non sit in actu prudentiae
Chapter 35
Ex hoc etiam apparet quod neque in actu prudentiae est ultima hominis felicitas. [1] From this it is also apparent that man’s ultimate felicity does not lie in an act of prudence.
Actus enim prudentiae est solum circa ea quae sunt moralium virtutum. Non est autem in actibus moralium virtutum ultima hominis felicitas. Neque igitur in actu prudentiae. [2] For the act of prudence is only concerned with things that pertain to the moral virtues. Now, man’s ultimate felicity does not lie in acts of the moral virtues, nor, then, in the act of prudence.
Adhuc. Ultima felicitas hominis est in optima hominis operatione. Optima autem hominis operatio, secundum id quod est proprium hominis, est in comparatione ad perfectissima obiecta. Operatio autem prudentiae non est circa obiecta perfectissima intellectus vel rationis: non enim est circa necessaria, sed circa contingentia operabilia. Non est igitur in eius operatione ultima hominis felicitas. [3] Again, man’s ultimate felicity consists in the best operation of man. Now, the best operation of man, according to what is proper to man, lies in a relationship to the most perfect object. But the operation of prudence is not concerned with the most perfect object of understanding or reason; indeed, it does not deal with necessary objects, but with contingent problems of action. Therefore, man’s ultimate felicity does not lie in this operation.
Amplius. Quod ordinatur ad alterum sicut ad finem, non est ultima hominis felicitas. Operatio autem prudentiae ordinatur ad alterum sicut ad finem: tum quia omnis practica cognitio, sub qua continetur prudentia, ordinatur ad operationem; tum etiam quia prudentia facit hominem bene se habere in his quae sunt ad finem eligenda, sicut patet per Aristotelem, in VI Ethicorum. Non est igitur in operatione prudentiae ultima hominis felicitas. [4] Besides, that which is ordered to another thing as an end is not the ultimate felicity for man. But the operation,of prudence is ordered to something else as an end: both because all practical knowledge, in which category prudence is included, is ordered to action, and because prudence makes a man well disposed in regard to things that are to be chosen for the sake of the end, as is clear from Aristotle, in Ethics VI [13: 1145a 6]. Therefore, man’s ultimate felicity does not lie in the operation of prudence.
Item. Animalia irrationabilia non participant aliquid felicitatis: sicut probat Aristoteles in I Ethicor. Participant autem quaedam eorum aliquid prudentiae: ut patet per eundem in I metaphysicae. Igitur felicitas non consistit in operatione prudentiae. [5] Moreover, irrational animals do not participate in felicity, as Aristotle proves in Ethics I [9: 1099b 33]. However, some of them do participate somewhat in prudence, as appears in the same writer, in Metaphysics I [1: 980a 30]. Therefore, felicity does not consist in the operation of prudence.

Caput 36
Quod felicitas non consistit in operatione artis
Chapter 36
Patet etiam quod neque in operatione artis. [1] It is also clear that it does not lie in the operation of art.
Quia etiam artis cognitio practica est. Et ita ad finem ordinatur, et ipsa non est ultimus finis. [2] For the knowledge that pertains to art is also practical knowledge. And so, it is ordered to an end, and is not itself the ultimate end.
Praeterea. Operationum artis fines sunt artificiata. Quae non possunt esse ultimus finis humanae vitae: cum magis nos sumus fines omnium artificialium; omnia enim propter hominis usum fiunt. Non potest igitur in operatione artis esse ultima felicitas. [3] Again, the ends of art operations are artifacts. These cannot be the ultimate end of human life, for we ourselves are, rather, the ends for all artificial things. Indeed, they are all made for man’s use. Therefore, ultimate felicity cannot lie in the operation of art.

Caput 37
Quod ultima felicitas hominis consistit in contemplatione Dei
Chapter 37
Si igitur ultima felicitas hominis non consistit in exterioribus, quae dicuntur bona fortunae; neque in bonis corporis; neque in bonis animae quantum ad sensitivam partem; neque quantum ad intellectivam secundum actum moralium virtutum; neque secundum intellectuales quae ad actionem pertinent, scilicet artem et prudentiam: relinquitur quod ultima hominis felicitas sit in contemplatione veritatis. [1] So, if the ultimate felicity of man does not consist in external things which are called the goods of fortune, nor in the goods of the body, nor in the goods of the soul according to its sensitive part, nor as regards the intellective part according to the activity of the moral virtues, nor according to the intellectual virtues that are concerned with action, that is, art and prudence—we are left with the conclusion that the ultimate felicity of man lies in the contemplation of truth.
Haec enim sola operatio hominis est sibi propria; et in ea nullo modo aliquod aliorum animalium communicat. [2] Indeed, this is the only operation of man which is proper to him, and in it he shares nothing in common with the other animals.
Haec etiam ad nihil aliud ordinatur sicut ad finem: cum contemplatio veritatis propter seipsam quaeratur. [3] So, too, this is ordered to nothing else as an end, for the contemplation of truth is sought for its own sake.
Per hanc etiam operationem homo suis superioribus coniungitur per similitudinem: quia haec tantum de operationibus humanis in Deo et in substantiis separatis est. [4] Also, through this operation man is united by way of likeness with beings superior to him, since this alone of human operations is found also in God and in separate substances.
Hac etiam operatione ad illa superiora contingit, cognoscendo ipsa quocumque modo. [5] Indeed, in this operation he gets in touch with these higher beings by knowing them in some way.
Ad hanc etiam operationem sibi homo magis est sufficiens: utpote ad eam in parum auxilio exteriorum rerum egens. [6] Also, for this operation man is rather sufficient unto himself, in the sense that for it he needs little help from external things.
Ad hanc etiam omnes aliae humanae operationes ordinari videntur sicut ad finem. Ad perfectionem enim contemplationis requiritur incolumitas corporis, ad quam ordinantur artificialia omnia quae sunt necessaria ad vitam. Requiritur etiam quies a perturbationibus passionum, ad quam pervenitur per virtutes morales et per prudentiam; et quies ab exterioribus perturbationibus, ad quam ordinatur totum regimen vitae civilis. Ut sic, si recte considerentur, omnia humana officia servire videantur contemplantibus veritatem. [7] In fact, all other human operations seem to be ordered to this one, as to an end. For, there is needed for the perfection of contemplation a soundness of body, to which all the products of art that are necessary for life are directed. Also required are freedom from the disturbances of the passions—this is achieved through the moral virtues and prudence—and freedom from external disorders, to which the whole program of government in civil life is directed. And so, if they are rightly considered, all human functions may be seen to subserve the contemplation of truth.
Non est autem possibile quod ultima hominis felicitas consistat in contemplatione quae est secundum intellectum principiorum, quae est imperfectissima, sicut maxime universalis, rerum cognitionem in potentia continens; et est principium, non finis humani studii, a natura nobis proveniens, non secundum studium veritatis. Neque etiam secundum scientias quae sunt de rebus infimis: cum oporteat felicitatem esse in operatione intellectus per comparationem ad nobilissima intelligibilia. Relinquitur igitur quod in contemplatione sapientiae ultima hominis felicitas consistat, secundum divinorum considerationem. [8] However, it is not possible for man’s ultimate felicity to consist in the contemplation which depends on the understanding of principles, for that is very imperfect, being most universal, including the potential cognition of things. Also, it is the beginning, not the end, of human enquiry, coming to us from nature and not because of our search for truth. Nor, indeed, does it lie in the area of the sciences which deal with lower things, because felicity should lie in the working of the intellect in relation to the noblest objects of understanding. So, the conclusion remains that man’s ultimate felicity consists in the contemplation of wisdom, based on the considering of divine matters.
Ex quo etiam patet inductionis via quod supra rationibus est probatum, quod ultima felicitas hominis non consistit nisi in contemplatione Dei. [9] From this, that is also clear by way of induction, which was proved above by rational arguments, namely, that man’s ultimate felicity consists only in the contemplation of God.

Caput 38
Quod felicitas humana non consistit in cognitione Dei quae communiter habetur a pluribus
Chapter 38
Inquirendum autem relinquitur in quali Dei cognitione ultima felicitas substantiae intellectualis consistit. Est enim quaedam communis et confusa Dei cognitio, quae quasi omnibus hominibus adest: sive hoc sit per hoc quod Deum esse sit per se notum, sicut alia demonstrationis principia, sicut quibusdam videtur, ut in primo libro dictum est; sive, quod magis verum videtur, quia naturali ratione statim homo in aliqualem Dei cognitionem pervenire potest. Videntes enim homines res naturales secundum ordinem certum currere; cum ordinatio absque ordinatore non sit, percipiunt, ut in pluribus, aliquem esse ordinatorem rerum quas videmus. Quis autem, vel qualis, vel si unus tantum est ordinator naturae, nondum statim ex hac communi consideratione habetur: sicut, cum videmus hominem moveri et alia opera agere, percipimus ei inesse quandam causam harum operationum quae aliis rebus non inest, et hanc causam animam nominamus; nondum tamen scientes quid sit anima, si est corpus, vel qualiter operationes praedictas efficiat. [1] It remains to investigate the kind of knowledge in which the ultimate felicity of an intellectual substance consists. For there is a common and confused knowledge of God which is found in practically all men; this is due either to the fact that it is self-evident that God exists, just as other principles of demonstration are—a view held by some people, as we said in Book One [25]—or, what seems indeed to be true, that man can immediately reach some sort of knowledge of God by natural reason. For, when men see that things in nature run according to a definite order, and that ordering does not occur without an orderer, they perceive in most cases that there is some orderer of the things that we sec. But who or what kind of being, or whether there is but one orderer of nature, is not yet grasped immediately in this general consideration, just as, when we see that a man is moved and performs other works, we perceive that there is present in him some cause of these operations which is not present in other things, and we call this cause the soul; yet we do not know at that point what the soul is, whether it is a body, or how it produces these operations which have been mentioned.
Non est autem possibile hanc cognitionem Dei ad felicitatem sufficere. [2] Of course, it is not possible for this knowledge of God to suffice for felicity.
Felicis enim operationem oportet esse absque defectu. Haec autem cognitio est multorum errorum admixtionem suscipiens. Quidam enim rerum mundanarum non alium ordinatorem esse crediderunt quam corpora caelestia: unde corpora caelestia deos esse dixerunt. Quidam vero ulterius ipsa elementa et quae ex eis generantur: quasi aestimantes motus et operationes naturales quas habent, non ab alio ordinatore eis inesse, sed ab eis alia ordinari. Quidam vero, humanos actus non alicuius ordinationi subesse credentes nisi humanae, homines qui alios ordinant, deos esse dixerunt. Ista igitur Dei cognitio non sufficit ad felicitatem. [3] In fact, the operation of the man enjoying felicity must be without defect. But this knowledge admits of a mixture of many errors. Some people have believed that there is no other orderer of worldly things than the celestial bodies, and so they said that the celestial bodies are gods. Other people pushed it farther, to the very elements and the things generated from them, thinking that motion and the natural functions which these elements have are not present in them as the effect of some other orderer, but that other things are ordered by them. Still other people, believing that human acts are not subject to any ordering, other than human, have said that men who order others are gods. And so, this knowledge of God is not enough for felicity.
Amplius. Felicitas est finis humanorum actuum. Ad praedictam autem cognitionem non ordinantur humani actus sicut ad finem: immo quasi statim a principio omnibus adest. Non igitur in hac Dei cognitione felicitas consistit. [4] Again, felicity is the end of human acts. But human acts are not ordered to the aforementioned knowledge, as to an end. Rather, it is found in all men, almost at once, from their beginning. So, felicity does not consist in this knowledge of God.
Item. Nullus propter hoc vituperabilis apparet quia felicitate careat: quinimmo carentes ea et in ipsam tendentes laudantur. Ex hoc autem quod praedicta Dei cognitione aliquis caret, maxime vituperabilis apparet: designatur enim per hoc maxime hominis stoliditas, quod tam manifesta Dei signa non percipit; sicut stolidus reputaretur qui, hominem videns, eum habere animam non comprehenderet. Unde et in Psalmo dicitur: dixit insipiens in corde suo: non est Deus. Non est igitur haec Dei cognitio quae ad felicitatem sufficiat. [5] Besides, no man seems to be blameworthy because of the fact that he lacks felicity; in point of fact, those who lack it, but are tending toward it, are given praise. But the fact that a person lacks the aforesaid knowledge of God makes him appear very blameworthy. Indeed, a man’s dullness is chiefly indicated by this: he fails to perceive such evident signs of God, just as a person is judged to be dull who, while observing a man, does not grasp the fact that he has a soul. That is why it is said in the Psalms (13:1, 52:1): “The fool hath said in his heart: There is no God.” So, this is not the knowledge of God which suffices for felicity.
Amplius. Cognitio quae habetur de re tantum in communi, non secundum aliquid sibi proprium, est imperfectissima, sicut cognitio quae haberetur de homine ex hoc quod movetur: est enim huiusmodi cognitio per quam res cognoscitur in potentia tantum; propria enim in communibus potentia continentur. Felicitas autem est operatio perfecta; et summum hominis bonum oportet esse secundum id quod est actu, et non secundum quod est potentia tantum; nam potentia per actum perfecta habet boni rationem. Non est igitur praemissa Dei cognitio ad felicitatem nostram sufficiens. [6] Moreover, the knowledge that one has of a thing, only in a general way and not according to something proper to it, is very imperfect, just like the knowledge one might have of a man when one knows simply that he is moved. For this is the kind of knowledge whereby a thing is known only in potency, since proper attributes are potentially included within common ones. But felicity is a perfect operation, and man’s highest good ought to be based on what is actual and not simply on what is potential, for potency perfected by act has the essential character of the good. Therefore, the aforementioned knowledge is not enough for our felicity.

Caput 39
Quod felicitas humana non consistit in cognitione Dei quae habetur per demonstrationem
Chapter 39
Rursus, est quaedam alia Dei cognitio, altior quam praemissa, quae de Deo per demonstrationem habetur, per quam magis ad propriam ipsius cognitionem acceditur: cum per demonstrationem removeantur ab eo multa, per quorum remotionem ab aliis discretus intelligitur. Ostendit enim demonstratio Deum esse immobilem, aeternum, incorporeum, omnino simplicem, unum, et alia huiusmodi, quae in libro primo de Deo ostendimus. [1] On the other hand, there is another sort of knowledge of God, higher than the foregoing, and we may acquire it through demonstration. A closer approach to a proper knowledge of Him is effected through this kind, for many things are set apart from Him, through demonstration, whose removal enable Him to be understood in distinction from other beings. In fact, demonstration shows that God is immutable, eternal, incorporeal, altogether simple, one, and other such things which we have shown about God in Book One[15-38].
Ad propriam autem alicuius rei cognitionem pervenitur non solum per affirmationes, sed etiam per negationes: sicut enim proprium hominis est esse animal rationale, ita proprium eius est non esse inanimatum neque irrationale. Sed hoc interest inter utrumque cognitionis propriae modum, quod, per affirmationes propria cognitione de re habita, scitur quid est res, et quomodo ab aliis separatur: per negationes autem habita propria cognitione de re, scitur quod est ab aliis discreta, tamen quid sit remanet ignotum. Talis autem est propria cognitio quae de Deo habetur per demonstrationes. Non est autem nec ista ad ultimam hominis felicitatem sufficiens. Now, we reach a proper knowledge of a thing not only through affirmations but also through negations; for instance, it is proper to a man to be a rational animal, and so it is proper to him not to be inanimate or irrational. But there is this difference between these two modes of proper knowledge: through affirmations, when we have a proper knowledge of a thing, we know what the thing is, and bow it is separated from others; but through negations, when we have a proper knowledge of a thing, we know that it is distinct from other things, yet what it is remains unknown. Now, such is the proper knowledge that we have of God through demonstrations. Of course, this is not sufficient for the ultimate felicity of man.
Ea enim quae sunt alicuius speciei, perveniunt ad finem illius speciei ut in pluribus: ea enim quae sunt a natura, sunt semper vel in pluribus, deficiunt autem in paucioribus propter aliquam corruptionem. Felicitas autem est finis humanae speciei: cum omnes homines ipsam naturaliter desiderent. Felicitas igitur est quoddam commune bonum possibile provenire omnibus hominibus, nisi accidat aliquibus impedimentum quo sint orbati. Ad praedictam autem cognitionem de Deo habendam per viam demonstrationis pauci perveniunt, propter impedimenta huius cognitionis, quae in principio libri tetigimus. Non est igitur talis Dei cognitio essentialiter ipsa humana felicitas. [2] For, the things which pertain to a species extend to the end of that species, in most cases; in fact, things which are of natural origin are so always, or in most cases, though they may fail in a few instances because of some corruption. Now, felicity is the end of the human species, since all men naturally desire it. So, felicity is a definite common good, capable of accruing to all men, unless an impediment occurs by which some may be deprived of it. Now, few men attain the knowledge of God that we have just mentioned, acquired by way of demonstration, because of the obstacles to this knowledge which we touched on in the beginning of this work. Therefore, such knowledge of God is not essentially identical with human felicity.
Adhuc. Esse in actu est finis existentis in potentia, ut ex praemissis patet. Felicitas igitur, quae est ultimus finis, est actus cui non adiungitur potentia ad ulteriorem actum. Talis autem cognitio per viam demonstrationis de Deo habita remanet adhuc in potentia ad aliquod ulterius de Deo cognoscendum, vel eadem nobiliori modo: posteriores enim conati sunt aliquid ad divinam cognitionem pertinens adiungere his quae a prioribus invenerunt tradita. Non est igitur talis cognitio ultima humana felicitas. [3] Then, again, to be actual is the end of what is potential, as is clear from the foregoing. So, felicity which is the ultimate end is an act to which no potency for further actuality is attached. But this sort of knowledge of God, acquired by way of demonstration, still remains in potency to something further to be learned about God, or to the same knowledge possessed in a higher way, for later men have endeavored to add something pertinent to divine knowledge to the things which they found in the heritage of their predecessors. Therefore, such knowledge is not identical with ultimate felicity.
Amplius. Felicitas omnem miseriam excludit: nemo enim simul miser et felix esse potest. Deceptio autem et error magna pars miseriae est: hoc est enim quod omnes naturaliter fugiunt. Praedictae autem cognitioni quae de Deo habetur, multiplex error adiungi potest: quod patet in multis qui aliqua vera de Deo per viam demonstrationis cognoverunt, qui, suas aestimationes sequentes, dum demonstratio eis deesset, in errores multiplices inciderunt. Si autem aliqui fuerunt qui sic de divinis veritatem invenerunt demonstrationis via quod eorum aestimationi nulla falsitas adiungeretur, patet eos fuisse paucissimos: quod non congruit felicitati, quae est communis finis. Non igitur est in hac cognitione de Deo ultima hominis felicitas. [4] Moreover, felicity excludes all unhappiness, for no man can be at once unhappy and happy. Now, deception and error constitute a great part of unhappiness; in fact, that is what all men naturally avoid. But manifold error can accompany the aforesaid knowledge that is acquired about God, and this is evident in many men who learned some truths about God by way of demonstration, and who, following their own opinions in cases where demonstration fails them, have fallen into many errors. In fact, if there have been any men who have discovered the truth about divine things in such a way, by means of demonstration, that no falsity attached to their judgment, it is clear that there have been few such. This is not appropriate to felicity, which is a common end. So, man’s ultimate felicity does not lie in this knowledge of God.
Praeterea. Felicitas in operatione perfecta consistit. Ad perfectionem autem cognitionis requiritur certitudo: unde scire aliter non dicimur nisi cognoscamus quod impossibile est aliter se habere, ut patet in I posteriorum. Cognitio autem praedicta multum incertitudinis habet, quod demonstrat diversitas sententiarum de divinis eorum qui haec per viam demonstrationis invenire conati sunt. Non est igitur in tali cognitione ultima felicitas. [5] Besides, felicity consists in a perfect operation. Now, certainty is required for perfect knowledge; for this reason we are not said to know unless we learn something that cannot be otherwise, as is evident in the Posterior Analytics [I, 2: 72a17]. Now, the knowledge we have been talking about includes much uncertainty; the diversity of the sciences of divine matters among those who have tried to find out these things by way of demonstration shows this. Therefore, ultimate felicity is not found in such knowledge.
Item. Voluntas cum consecuta fuerit ultimum finem, quietatur eius desiderium. Ultimus autem finis omnis cognitionis humanae est felicitas. Illa igitur cognitio Dei essentialiter est ipsa felicitas, qua habita non restabit alicuius scibilis desideranda cognitio. Talis autem non est cognitio quam philosophi per demonstrationes de Deo habere potuerunt: quia adhuc, illa cognitione habita, alia desideramus scire, quae per hanc cognitionem nondum sciuntur. Non est igitur in tali cognitione Dei felicitas. [6] Moreover, the will rests its desire when it has attained the ultimate end. But the ultimate cud of all human knowledge is felicity. So, that knowledge of God which, when acquired, leaves no knowledge of a knowable object to be desired is essentially this felicity. But this is not the kind of knowledge about God that the philosophers were able to get through demonstrations, because, even when we acquire this knowledge, we still desire to know other things that are not known through this knowledge. Therefore, felicity is not found in such knowledge of God.
Adhuc. Finis cuiuslibet existentis in potentia est ut ducatur in actum: ad hoc enim tendit per motum, quo movetur in finem. Tendit autem unumquodque ens in potentia ad hoc quod sit actu secundum quod est possibile. Aliquid enim est existens in potentia cuius tota potentia potest reduci in actum: unde huius finis est ut totaliter in actum reducatur; sicut grave, extra medium existens, est in potentia ad proprium ubi. Aliquid vero cuius potentia tota non potest simul in actum reduci, sicut patet de materia prima: unde per suum motum appetit successive in actum diversarum formarum exire, quae sibi, propter earum diversitatem, simul inesse non possunt. Intellectus autem noster est in potentia ad omnia intelligibilia, ut in secundo dictum est. Duo autem intelligibilia possunt simul in intellectu possibili existere secundum actum primum, qui est scientia: licet forte non secundum actum secundum, qui est consideratio. Ex quo patet quod tota potentia intellectus possibilis potest reduci simul in actum. Hoc igitur requiritur ad eius ultimum finem, qui est felicitas. Hoc autem non facit praedicta cognitio quae de Deo per demonstrationem haberi potest: quia, ea habita, adhuc multa ignoramus. Non est igitur talis cognitio Dei sufficiens ad ultimam felicitatem. [7] Furthermore, the end of every being which is in potency is to be brought into act, for it tends toward this through the motion by which it is moved to its end. Of course, every being in potency tends to become actual, in so far as that is possible. Now, there is one kind of being in potency whose entire potency can be reduced to act; hence, its end is to be completely reduced to act. Thus, a heavy body in some unusual position is in potency to its proper place. But there is another kind of thing whose entire potency cannot be reduced to act at the same time. This is the case with prime matter, and that is why, through its change, it seeks to be actuated successively under different forms which cannot be simultaneously present in it, because of their diversity. Now, our intellect is in potency to all intelligible objects, as was explained in Book Two [47]. But two intelligible objects can exist simultaneously in the possible intellect, by way of the first act which is science, though perhaps not by way of the second act which is consideration. It is evident from this that the entire potency of the possible intellect can be reduced to act at one time. So, this is required for its ultimate end which is felicity. But the aforesaid knowledge of God which can be acquired through demonstration does not do this, since, even when we possess it, We still remain ignorant of many things. Therefore, such knowledge of God is not sufficient for ultimate felicity.

Caput 40
Quod felicitas humana non consistit in cognitione Dei quae est per fidem
Chapter 40
Est autem et alia Dei cognitio, quantum ad aliquid superior cognitione praedicta, qua scilicet Deus ab hominibus per fidem cognoscitur. Quae quidem quantum ad hoc cognitionem quae de Deo per demonstrationem habetur, excedit, quia quaedam de Deo per fidem cognoscimus ad quae, propter sui eminentiam, ratio demonstrans pervenire non potest, sicut in principio huius operis dictum est. Non est autem possibile neque in hac Dei cognitione ultimam hominis felicitatem consistere. [1] Now, there is still another knowledge of God, in one sense superior to the aforementioned knowledge, and by this God is known to men through faith. In comparison with the knowledge that we have of God through demonstration, this knowledge through faith surpasses it, for we know some things about God through faith which, because of their sublimity, demonstrative reason cannot attain, as we said at the beginning of this work. Yet, it is not possible for man’s ultimate felicity to consist in even this knowledge of God.
Felicitas enim est perfecta intellectus operatio, sicut ex dictis patet. In cognitione autem fidei invenitur operatio intellectus imperfectissima quantum ad id quod est ex parte intellectus, quamvis maxima perfectio inveniatur ex parte obiecti: non enim intellectus capit illud cui assentit credendo. Non est igitur neque in hac Dei cognitione ultima hominis felicitas. [2] Felicity, indeed, is a perfect operation of the intellect as is clear from what we have said. But, in the knowledge of faith, there is found a most imperfect operation of the intellect, having regard to what is on the side of the intellect, though the greatest perfection is discovered on the side of the object. For the intellect does not grasp the object to which it gives assent in the act of believing. Therefore, neither does man’s ultimate felicity lie in this kind of knowledge of God.
Item. Ostensum est supra quod ultima felicitas non consistit principaliter in actu voluntatis. In cognitione autem fidei principalitatem habet voluntas: intellectus enim assentit per fidem his quae sibi proponuntur, quia vult, non autem ex ipsa veritatis evidentia necessario tractus. Non est igitur in hac cognitione ultima hominis felicitas. [3] Again, we showed above, that ultimate felicity does not consist primarily in an act of the will. But in the knowledge of faith the will takes priority; indeed, the intellect assents through faith to things resented to it, because of an act of will and not because it is necessarily moved by the very evidence of the truth. So, man’s ultimate felicity does not lie in this knowledge.
Adhuc. Qui credit, assensum praebet his quae sibi ab alio proponuntur, quae ipse non videt: unde fides magis habet cognitionem auditui similem quam visioni. Non autem crederet aliquis non visis ab alio propositis nisi aestimaret eum perfectiorem cognitionem habere de propositis quam ipse habeat qui non videt. Aut igitur aestimatio credentis est falsa: aut oportet quod proponens habeat perfectiorem cognitionem propositorum. Quod et si ipse solum cognoscit ea quasi ab alio audiens, non potest hoc in infinitum procedere: esset enim vanus et absque certitudine fidei assensus; non enim inveniretur aliquod primum ex se certum, quod certitudinem fidei credentium afferret. Non est autem possibile fidei cognitionem esse falsam neque vanam, ut ex dictis patet in principio libri: et tamen, si esset falsa et vana, in tali cognitione felicitas non posset consistere. [4] Besides, one who believes gives assent to things that are proposed to him by another person, and which he himself does not see. Hence, faith has a knowledge that is more like hearing than vision. Now, a man would not believe in things that are unseen but proposed to him by another man unless he thought that this other man had more perfect knowledge of these proposed things than he himself who does not see them. So, either the believer’s judgment is false or else the proposer must have more perfect knowledge of the things proposed. And if the proposer only knows these things by hearing them from another man, this cannot go on indefinitely, for the assent of faith would be foolish and without certitude; indeed, we would discover no first thing certain in itself which would bring certainty to the faith of the believer. Now, it is not possible for the knowledge of faith to be false and empty, as is evident from what we have said in the opening Book [I, 7]. Yet, if it were false and empty, felicity could not consist in such knowledge.
Est igitur aliqua hominis cognitio de Deo altior cognitione fidei: sive ipse homo proponens fidem immediate videat veritatem, sicut Christo credimus; sive a vidente immediate accipiat, sicut credimus apostolis et prophetis. Cum igitur in summa Dei cognitione felicitas hominis consistat, impossibile est quod consistat in fidei cognitione. So, there is for man some knowledge of God which is higher than the knowledge of faith: either the man who proposes the faith sees the truth immediately, as is the case when we believe in Christ; or he takes it immediately from one who does see, as when we believe the Apostles and Prophets. So, since man’s felicity consists in the highest knowledge of God, it is impossible for it to consist in the knowledge of faith.
Amplius. Per felicitatem, cum sit ultimus finis, naturale desiderium quietatur. Cognitio autem fidei non quietat desiderium, sed magis ipsum accendit: quia unusquisque desiderat videre quod credit. Non est igitur in cognitione fidei ultima hominis felicitas. [5] Moreover, through felicity, because it is the ultimate end, natural desire comes to rest. Now, the knowledge of faith does not bring rest to desire but rather sets it aflame, since every man desires to see what he believes. So, man’s ultimate felicity does not lie in the knowledge of faith.
Praeterea. Cognitio de Deo dicta est finis inquantum ultimo fini rerum, scilicet Deo, coniungit. Per cognitionem autem fidei non fit res credita intellectui praesens perfecte: quia fides de absentibus est, non de praesentibus. Unde et apostolus dicit 2 Cor. 5, quod quandiu per fidem ambulamus, peregrinamur a domino. Fit tamen per fidem Deus praesens affectui, cum voluntarie credens Deo assentiat: secundum quod dicitur Ephes. 3-17, habitare Christum per fidem in cordibus nostris. Non est ergo possibile quod in cognitione fidei ultima felicitas humana consistat. [6] Furthermore, the knowledge of God has been called the end because it is joined to the ultimate end of things, that is, to God. But an item of belief is not made perfectly present to the intellect by the knowledge of faith, since faith is of things absent, not of things present. For this reason the Apostle says, in 2 Corinthians (5:6-7), that “while we are in the body we walk by faith and we are absent from the Lord.” Yet God is brought into the presence of love through faith, since the believer assents to God voluntarily, according to what is said in Ephesians (3:17): “that Christ may dwell by faith in our hearts.” Therefore, it is not possible for ultimate human felicity to consist in the knowledge of faith.

Caput 41
Utrum in hac vita homo possit intelligere substantias separatas per studium et inquisitionem scientiarum speculativarum
Chapter 41
Habet autem et adhuc aliam cognitionem de Deo intellectualis substantia. Dictum est enim in secundo libro quod intellectualis substantia separata, cognoscendo essentiam suam, cognoscit et quod est supra se, et quod est sub se secundum modum suae substantiae. Quod praecipue necesse est si illud quod est supra ipsam, sit causa eius: cum oporteat in effectibus similitudinem inveniri causae. Unde, cum Deus sit causa omnium substantiarum intellectualium creatarum, ut ex superioribus patet, necesse est quod intellectuales substantiae separatae, cognoscendo suam essentiam, cognoscant per modum visionis cuiusdam ipsum Deum: res enim illa per intellectum visionis modo cognoscitur, cuius similitudo in intellectu existit, sicut et similitudo rei corporaliter visae est in sensu videntis. Quicumque ergo intellectus apprehendit substantiam separatam cognoscendo de ea quid est, videt Deum altiori modo quam aliqua praedictarum cognitionum cognoscatur. [1] An intellectual substance has still another kind of knowledge of God. Indeed, it has been stated in Book Two [96ff] that a separate substance, in knowing its own essence, knows both what is above and what is below itself, in a manner proper to its substance. This is especially necessary if what is above it is its cause, since the likeness of the cause must be found in the effects. And so, since God is the cause of all created intellectual substances, as is evident from the foregoing, then separate intellectual substances, in knowing their own essence, must know God Himself by way of a vision of some kind. For a thing whose likeness exists in the intellect is known through the intellect by way of vision, just as the likeness of a thing which is seen corporeally is present in the sense of the viewer. So, whatever intellect understands a separate substance, by knowing what it is, sees God in a higher way than He is known by any of the previously treated types of knowledge.
Quia ergo quidam posuerunt ultimam felicitatem hominis esse in hac vita per hoc quod cognoscunt substantias separatas, considerandum est utrum homo in hac vita possit substantias separatas cognoscere. Hoc autem quaestionem habet. Intellectus enim noster, secundum statum praesentem, nihil intelligit sine phantasmate, quod ita se habet ad intellectum possibilem, quo intelligimus, sicut se habent colores ad visum, ut patet ex his quae in secundo tractata sunt. Si igitur per cognitionem intellectivam quae est ex phantasmatibus, possit pervenire aliquis nostrum ad intelligendas substantias separatas, possibile erit quod aliquis in hac vita intelligat ipsas substantias separatas; et per consequens, videndo ipsas substantias separatas, participabit modum illius cognitionis quo substantia separata, intelligens se, intelligit Deum. Si autem per cognitionem quae est ex phantasmatibus, nullo modo possit pervenire ad intelligendas substantias separatas, non erit possibile quod homo in statu huius vitae praedictum modum divinae cognitionis assequatur. [2] Hence, since some men have claimed that man’s ultimate end is in this life, because they know separate substances, we must consider whether man can know separate substances in this life. Now, on this point there is some dispute. For, our intellect in our present state understands nothing without a phantasm, and the phantasm is related to the possible intellect, whereby we understand, as colors are related to vision, as is evident from what we have treated in Book Two. Therefore, if any of us could achieve the understanding of separate substances through the intellectual knowledge which is from phantasms, then it would be possible for a person in this life to understand separate substances themselves. Consequently, by seeing these separate substances one will participate in that mode of knowledge whereby the separate substance, while understanding itself, understands God. But, if one cannot in any way attain to the understanding of separate substances through the knowledge which depends on phantasms, then it will not be possible for man in the present state of life to achieve the aforesaid mode of divine knowledge.
Quod autem ex cognitione quae est per phantasmata, ad intelligendum substantias pervenire possimus, aliqui diversimode posuerunt. Avempace namque posuit quod per studium speculativarum scientiarum possumus, ex his intellectis quae per phantasmata cognoscimus, pervenire ad intelligendas substantias separatas. Possumus enim actione intellectus extrahere quidditatem rei cuiuslibet habentis quidditatem quae non est sua quidditas. Est enim intellectus natus cognoscere quamlibet quidditatem inquantum est quidditas: cum intellectus proprium obiectum sit quod quid est. Si autem illud quod primo per intellectum possibilem intelligitur, est aliquid habens quidditatem, possumus per intellectum possibilem abstrahere quidditatem illius primo intellecti; et si illa quidditas habeat quidditatem, possibile erit iterum abstrahere quidditatem illius quidditatis; et cum non sit procedere in infinitum, oportet quod stetur alicubi. Potest igitur intellectus noster pervenire via resolutionis ad cognoscendam quidditatem non habentem aliquam quidditatem. Talis autem est quidditas substantiae separatae. Potest igitur intellectus noster, per cognitionem horum sensibilium quae ex phantasmatibus accipitur, pervenire ad intelligendas substantias separatas. [3] Now, various people have claimed in different ways that we could reach an understanding of separate substances from the knowledge which is accomplished through phantasms. For instance, Avempace claimed that, through the study of the speculative sciences, we can, on the basis of things understood through phantasms, reach an understanding of separate substances. For we can by the action of the intellect abstract the quiddity of anything that has a quiddity, and which is not identical with its quiddity. Indeed, the intellect is naturally equipped to know any quiddity, in so far as it is quiddity, since the proper object of the intellect is what a thing is. But, if what is primarily understood by the possible intellect is something having a quiddity, we can abstract through the possible intellect the quiddity of that which is primarily understood. Moreover, if that quiddity also has a quiddity, it will in turn be possible to abstract the quiddity of this quiddity. And since an infinite process is impossible, it must stop somewhere. Therefore, our intellect is able to reach, by way of resolution, the knowledge of a quiddity which has no further quiddity. Now, this is the sort of quiddity proper to a separate substance. So, our intellect can, through the knowledge of those sensible things that is received from phantasms, reach an understanding of separate substances.
Procedit autem ad idem ostendendum per aliam similem viam. Ponit enim quod intellectum unius rei, ut puta equi, apud me et apud te multiplicatur solum per multiplicationem specierum spiritualium, quae sunt diversae in me et in te. Oportet igitur quod intellectum quod non sustentatur in aliqua huiusmodi specie, sit idem apud te et apud me. Sed quidditas intellecti quam intellectus noster natus est abstrahere, ut probatum est, non habet aliquam speciem spiritualem et individualem: cum quidditas intellecti non sit quidditas individui, neque spiritualis neque corporalis, cum intellectum, inquantum est huiusmodi, sit universale. Intellectus igitur noster natus est intelligere quidditatem cuius intellectus est unus apud omnes. Talis autem est quidditas substantiae separatae. Est igitur intellectus noster natus cognoscere substantiam separatam. [4] He proceeds, moreover, to show the same thing in another, similar way. For he maintains that the understanding of one thing, say a horse, is plurally present in me and in you, simply by means of a multiplication of spiritual species which are diversified in me and in you. So, then, it is necessary that an object of understanding, which is not based on any species of this kind, be identical in me and in you. But the quiddity of an object of understanding, which quiddity our intellect is naturally capable of abstracting, has no spiritual but individual species, as we have proved, because the quiddity of a thing that is understood is not the quiddity of an individual, either spiritual or corporeal, for a thing that is understood, as such, is universal. So, our intellect is by nature capable of understanding a quiddity for which the understanding is one among all men. Now, such is the quiddity of a separate substance. Hence, our understanding is naturally equipped to know separate substance.
Si autem diligenter consideretur, viae istae frivolae invenientur. Cum enim intellectum, inquantum huiusmodi, sit universale, oportet quod quidditas intellecti sit quidditas alicuius universalis, scilicet generis vel speciei. Quidditas autem generis vel speciei horum sensibilium, cuius cognitionem intellectivam per phantasmata accipimus, comprehendit in se materiam et formam. Est igitur omnino dissimilis quidditati substantiae separatae, quae est simplex et immaterialis. Non est igitur possibile quod per hoc quod intelligitur quidditas rei sensibilis per phantasmata, intelligatur quidditas substantiae separatae. [5] However, if a careful consideration be made, these ways of arguing will be discovered to be frivolous. Since a thing that is understood, as such, is universal, the quiddity of the thing understood must be the quiddity of something universal; namely, of a genus or a species. Now, the quiddity of a genus or species pertaining to these sensible things, whose intellectual knowledge we get through phantasms, includes matter and form within itself. So, it is entirely unlike the quiddity of a separate substance, which latter is simple and immaterial. Therefore, it is not possible for the quiddity of a separate substance to be understood, simply because the quiddity of a sensible thing is understood through phantasms.
Praeterea. Non est eiusdem rationis forma quae secundum esse non potest separari ab aliquo subiecto, cum illa quae separatur secundum esse a tali subiecto, licet utraque secundum considerationem accipiatur absque tali subiecto. Non enim est eadem ratio magnitudinis, et substantiae separatae, nisi ponamus magnitudines separatas medias inter species et sensibilia, sicut aliqui Platonici posuerunt. Quidditas autem generis vel speciei rerum sensibilium non potest separari secundum esse ab hac individuali materia: nisi forte, secundum Platonicos, ponamus rerum species separatas, quod est ab Aristotele improbatum. Est igitur omnino dissimilis quidditas praedicta substantiis separatis, quae nullo modo sunt in materia. Non igitur per hoc quod hae quidditates intelliguntur, substantiae separatae intelligi possunt. [6] Besides, the form which in actual being cannot be separated from a subject is not of the same rational character as the form which is separated in its being from such a subject, even though both of them can be taken, in an act of consideration, without such a subject. Thus, there is not the same essential character for magnitude and for a separate substance, unless we claim that magnitudes are separate things midway between specific forms and sensible things, as some of the Platonists maintained. Of course, the quiddity of a genus or species of sensible things cannot be separate in actual being from a given material individual, unless, perhaps, we maintain with the Platonists separate forms of things, but this has been disproved by Aristotle. Therefore, the quiddity of the aforementioned separate substances, which in no way exist in matter, is utterly different. Therefore, separate substances cannot be understood simply by virtue of the fact that these quiddities are understood.
Adhuc. Si quidditas substantiae separatae detur esse eiusdem rationis cum quidditate generis vel speciei istorum sensibilium, non poterit dici quod sit eiusdem rationis secundum speciem nisi dicamus quod species horum sensibilium sint ipsae substantiae separatae, sicut Platonici posuerunt. Remanet igitur quod non erunt eiusdem rationis nisi quantum ad rationem quidditatis inquantum est quidditas. Haec autem est ratio communis, generis scilicet et substantiae. Non igitur per has quidditates de substantiis separatis aliquid intelligi poterit nisi remotum genus ipsarum. Cognito autem genere, non propter hoc cognoscitur species nisi in potentia. Non poterit igitur intelligi substantia separata per intellectum quidditatum horum sensibilium. [7] Again, if it is granted that the quiddity of a separate substance is of the same rational character as the quiddity of a genus or species of these sensible things, that does not warrant saying that it is of the same rational character specifically, unless we say that the species of sensible things are themselves separate substances, as the Platonists claimed. The conclusion stands, then, that they will not be of the same rational character, except according to the rational character of quiddity as quiddity. Now, this is a meaning of rational chasracter which is common to genus and to substance. Therefore, nothing except their remote genus could be understood concerning separate substances through these sensible quiddities. Now, the fact that the genus is known does not mean that hte species is known, except in potency. So, separate substances could not be understood through an understanding of the quiddities of these sensible things.
Amplius. Maior est distantia substantiae separatae a sensibilibus quam unius sensibilis ab alio. Sed intelligere quidditatem unius sensibilis non sufficit ad intelligendam quidditatem alterius sensibilis: caecus enim natus, per hoc quod intelligit quidditatem soni, nullo modo potest pervenire ad intelligendam quidditatem coloris. Multo igitur minus per hoc quod intelligat aliquis quidditatem sensibilis substantiae, poterit intelligere quidditatem substantiae separatae. [8] Moreover, there is a greater difference between separate substances and sensible things than between one sensible thing and another. But to understand the quiddity of one sensible thing is not enough to enable one to understand the quiddity of another sensible thing. For instance, a man who is born blind is not at all enabled to achieve understanding of the quiddity of color simply because he understands the quiddity of sound. Much less, then, is one enabled to understand the quiddity of a separate substance by the fact that he understands the quiddity of a sensible substance.
Item. Si etiam ponamus quod substantiae separatae orbes moveant, ex quorum motibus causantur formae sensibilium, hic modus cognitionis substantiae separatae ex sensibilibus non sufficit ad sciendam quidditatem ipsarum. Nam per effectum scitur causa vel ratione similitudinis quae est inter effectum et causam: vel inquantum effectus demonstrat virtutem causae. Ratione autem similitudinis, ex effectu non poterit sciri de causa quid est, nisi sit agens unius speciei: sic autem non se habent substantiae separatae ad sensibilia. Ratione autem virtutis, hoc etiam non potest esse nisi quando effectus adaequat virtutem causae: tunc enim per effectum tota virtus causae cognoscitur; virtus autem rei demonstrat substantiam ipsius. Hoc autem in proposito dici non potest: nam virtutes substantiarum separatarum excedunt effectus sensibiles omnes quos intellectu comprehendimus, sicut virtus universalis effectum particularem. Non est igitur possibile quod per sensibilium intellectum devenire possumus ad intelligendum substantias separatas. [9] Furtherfore, even if we claim that separate substances move the spheres, and that from their motions the forms of these sensible things are produced, this way of knowing separate substance, from sensible things, does not suffice for a knowing of their quiddity. For a cause is known through an effect, either by reason of a likeness which exists between the effect and the cause or in so far as the effect shows the power of the cause. Now, it would not be possible to know from the effect, by reason of likeness, what the cause is unless the agent is of one species with the effect. But that is not the way separate substances are related to sensible things. On the other hand, on the basis of power, this cannot be done except when the effect is equal to the power of the cause. For, in that case, the whole power of the cause is known through the effect, and the power of a thing demonstrates its substance. But this cannot be asserted in the present case, for the powers of separate substances exceed all the sensible effects which we may grasp intellectuallly, as a universal power surpases a particular effect. Therefore, it is not possible for us to be enabled, through an understanding of sensible things, to come to an understanding of separate substance.
Adhuc. Omnia intelligibilia in quorum cognitionem devenimus per inquisitionem et studium, ad aliquam scientiarum speculativarum pertinent. Si igitur per hoc quod intelligimus naturas et quidditates istorum sensibilium, pervenimus ad intelligendas substantias separatas, oportet quod intelligere substantias separatas contingat per aliquam scientiarum speculativarum. Hoc autem non videmus: non est enim aliqua speculativa scientia quae doceat de aliqua substantiarum separatarum quid est, sed solum quia sunt. Non est igitur possibile quod per hoc quod intelligimus naturas sensibilium, perveniamus ad intelligendas substantias separatas. [10] Again, all intelligible objects whose knowledge we reach through investigation and study belong to some one of the speculative sciences. So, if we attain the understanding of separate substances as a result of our understanding of the natures and quiddities of these sensible things, then it must be that the understanding of separate substances depends on one of the speculative sciences. Yet we do not observe this; there is no speculative science whihc teaches what any of the separate substances is, but only that they are. So, it is not possible for us to reach an understanding of separate substances simply because we understand sensible natures.
Si autem dicatur quod est possibile esse aliquam talem speculativam scientiam quamvis adhuc non sit inventa, hoc nihil est: quia non est possibile per aliqua principia nobis nota ad intelligendas substantias praedictas devenire. Omnia enim propria principia cuiuscumque scientiae dependent ex principiis primis indemonstrabilibus per se notis, quorum cognitionem a sensibilibus accipimus, ut patet in fine posteriorum. Sensibilia autem non sufficienter ducunt in cognitionem rerum immaterialium, ut per superiores rationes est probatum. Non est ergo possibile aliquam scientiam esse per quam ad intelligendas substantias separatas perveniri possit. [11] On the other hand, if it be suggested that such a speculative science is possible, even though it has not yet been discovered, this is no argument, because it is not possible to arrive at an understanding of the aforesaid substances through any principles known to us. Indeed, all the proper principles of any science depend on first indemonstrable principles, which are self-evident, and we get our knowledge of these from the senses, as is shown at the end of the Posterior Analytics. However sensible things are not adequate guides to the knowledge of immaterial things, as we have proved by the arguments above. Therefore, it is not possible for there to be any science whereby one might achieve understanding of separate substances.

Caput 42
Quod non possumus in hac vita intelligere substantias separatas sicut ponit Alexander
Chapter 42
Quia vero Alexander posuit quod intellectus possibilis est generabilis et corruptibilis, utpote quaedam praeparatio naturae humanae consequens commixtionem elementorum, ut in secundo habitum est; non est autem possibile ut talis virtus supra materialia elevetur: posuit quod intellectus possibilis noster nunquam potest pervenire ad intelligendas substantias separatas; posuit tamen quod nos, secundum statum praesentis vitae, possumus substantias separatas intelligere. [1] Because Alexander [of Aphrodisias] claimed that the possible intellect is capable of being generated and corrupted, in the sense that it is “a perfection of human nature resulting from a mixture of the elements,” as we saw in Book Two, and since it is not possible for such a power to transcend material conditions, he maintained that our possible intellect can never reach an understanding of separate substances. Yet he asserted that, in our present state of life, we are able to understand separate substances.
Quod quidem ostendere nitebatur hoc modo. Unumquodque quando pervenerit ad complementum in sua generatione, et ad ultimam perfectionem suae substantiae, complebitur operatio sua propria, sive actio sive passio: sicut enim operatio substantiam sequitur, ita operationis perfectio perfectionem substantiae; unde animal, cum fuerit ex toto perfectum, poterit per se ambulare. Intellectus autem habitualis, qui nihil est aliud quam species intelligibiles factae per intellectum agentem existentes in intellectu possibili, operatio est duplex: una ut faciat intellecta in potentia esse intellecta in actu, quam habet ex parte intellectus agentis; secunda est intelligere intellecta in actu; haec enim duo homo potest facere per habitum intellectualem. Quando igitur complebitur generatio intellectus in habitu, complebitur in ipso utraque praemissarum operationum. Semper autem accedit ad complementum suae generationis, dum novas species intellectas acquirit. Et sic necesse est quod quandoque sua generatio compleatur, nisi sit impedimentum: quia nulla generatio est ad infinitum tendens. Complebitur igitur quandoque utraque operationum intellectus in habitu, per hoc quod omnia intellecta in potentia faciet in actu, quod est complementum primae operationis; et per hoc quod intelliget omnia intelligibilia, et separata et non separata. [2] In fact, he tried to show this in the following way. Whenever anything has reached maturity in its process of generation and has come to the full perfection of its substance, the operation proper to it will be at its peak, whether as action or as passion. For, as operation is consequent upon substance, so also is the perfection of operation a result of the perfection of substance. Hence, an animal, when it has become wholly perfect, is able to walk by itself. Now, the habitual understanding which is simply “intelligible species made to exist in the possible intellect by the agent intellect” has a twofold operation: one, to make potentially understood things to be actually understood, and it owes this to the role of the agent intellect; and the second is actually to understand the objects of understanding. These two things, then, man can do through an intellectual habit. So, whenever the generating of the habitual understanding has reached completion, both of these stated operations will be at their peak in it. Now, it always approaches the peak perfection of its generation when it acquires new kinds of objects of understanding. And thus, its process of generation must be completed at some time, unless there be an impediment, because no process of generation tends to an indefinite termination. So, it will reach completion whenever both operations are habitually present in the intellect, by virtue of the fact that it makes all the potential objects of understanding actual, which is the completion of the first operation, and because of the fact that it understands all intelligible objects, both separate and not separate.
Cum autem intellectus possibilis non possit intelligere substantias separatas, secundum eius opinionem, ut iam dictum est; intendit quod intelligemus per intellectum in habitu substantias separatas, inquantum intellectus agens, qui ab ipso ponitur substantia separata, fiet forma intellectus in habitu et nobis ipsis; ita quod per eum intelligemus sicut nunc intelligimus per intellectum possibilem; et, cum de virtute intellectus agentis sit facere omnia intellecta in actu quae sunt intelligibilia potentia, et intelligere substantias separatas, in statu illo intelligemus substantias separatas, et omnia intelligibilia non separata. [3] Now, since according to his opinion the possible intellect cannot understand separate substances, as has already been said, he thought that we will understand separate substances through the habitual understanding, in so far as the agent intellect, which he supposes to be a separate substance, becomes the form of the habitual understanding, and a form for us ourselves. Thus, we will understand through it, as we now understand through the possible intellect; and since it is the function of the power of the agent intellect to make all things which are potentially intelligible to be actually understood, and to understand the separate substances, we will understand separate substances in this life, and also all non-separate intelligible things.
Et secundum hoc, per hanc cognitionem quae est ex phantasmatibus, pervenimus in cognitionem substantiae separatae; non quasi et ipsa phantasmata et intellecta per ea sint medium aliquod ad cognoscendas substantias separatas, prout accidit in scientiis speculativis, sicut posuit opinio superior; sed inquantum species intelligibiles sunt quaedam dispositiones in nobis ad talem formam quae est intellectus agens. Et hoc est primum in quo differunt hae duae opiniones. [4] So, according to this theory, we reach the knowledge of separate substances through this knowledge which comes from the phantasms, not in the sense that these phantasms and the things understood through them are means for the knowing of separate substances (as is the case with the speculative sciences, according to the position advanced in the preceding chapter), but, rather, in so far as the intelligible species are certain dispositions within us to the kind of form that the agent intellect is. And this is the first point on which these two opinions differ.
Unde, quando intellectus in habitu fuerit perfectus per huiusmodi species intelligibiles in nobis factas ab intellectu agente, fiet ipse intellectus agens nobis forma, ut dictum est. Et nominat ipsum intellectum adeptum, de quo dicunt Aristotelem dicere quod sit ab extrinseco. Et sic, licet in scientiis speculativis non sit perfectio ultima humana, sicut superior ponebat opinio; per eas tamen homo disponitur ad ultimam perfectionem consequendam. Et hoc est secundum in quo differt secunda opinio a prima. [5] Hence, when the habitual understanding will be perfected through the production in us by the agent intellect of these intelligible species, the agent intellect will itself become a form for us, as we have said. And he calls this the “acquired understanding,” which, according to their statement, Aristotle says comes from outside. And so, though the ultimate human perfection is not in the speculative sciences, as the preceding opinion claimed, man is disposed through these sciences to the attainment of the ultimate perfection. And this is the second point on which the first and second opinions differ.
Tertio autem differt per hoc quod, secundum primam opinionem, intelligere intellectum agentem est causa quod continuetur nobiscum. Secundum vero hanc secundam opinionem, est e converso: nam propter hoc quod nobiscum continuatur ut forma, intelligimus ipsum et alias substantias separatas. [6] However, they differ on a third point, because, according to the first opinion, our actual understanding of the agent intellect is the cause of its being united with us. Whereas, according to the second opinion, the converse is the case, for, since it is united with us as a form, we understand it and the other separate substances.
Haec autem irrationabiliter dicuntur. Intellectus enim in habitu, sicut intellectus possibilis, ponitur ab Alexandro esse generabilis et corruptibilis. Aeternum autem non potest fieri forma generabilis et corruptibilis, secundum eum: propter hoc enim ponit intellectum possibilem, qui unitur nobis ut forma, esse generabilem et corruptibilem, intellectum vero agentem, qui est incorruptibilis, esse substantiam separatam. Cum igitur intellectus agens, secundum Alexandrum, ponatur esse quaedam substantia separata aeterna, impossibile erit quod intellectus agens fiat forma intellectus in habitu. [7] Now, these statements are unreasonable. Indeed, the habitual understanding, as also the possible understanding, is supposed by Alexander to be generable and corruptible. Now, the eternal cannot become the form of the generable and corruptible, according to him. For this reason, he claims that the possible intellect, which is united to us as a form, is generable and corruptible, while the agent intellect which is incorruptible is a separate substance. Hence, since the agent intellect, according to Alexander, is supposed to be an eternal separate substance, it will be impossible for the agent intellect to become the form of the habitual intellect.
Praeterea. Forma intellectus, inquantum est intellectus, est intelligibile, sicut forma sensus est sensibile: non enim recipit aliquid intellectus, per se loquendo, nisi intelligibiliter sicut nec sensus nisi sensibiliter. Si igitur non potest intellectus agens esse intelligibile per intellectum in habitu, impossibile erit quod sit forma eius. [8] Moreover, the form of the intellect, as intellect, is the intelligible object, just as the form of the sense is the sensible object; indeed, the intellect receives nothing, strictly speaking, except in an intellectual way, just as the sense power only receives sensitively. So, if the agent intellect cannot be an intelligible object through the habitual intellect, then it will be impossible for it to be its form.
Item. Intelligere aliquo tripliciter dicimur. Uno modo, sicut intelligimus intellectu, qui est virtus a qua egreditur talis operatio: unde et ipse intellectus intelligere dicitur, et ipsum intelligere intellectus fit intelligere nostrum. Alio modo, sicut specie intelligibili: qua quidem dicimur intelligere, non quasi ipsa intelligat, sed quia vis intellectiva per eam perficitur in actu, sicut vis visiva per speciem coloris. Tertio modo, sicut medio per cuius cognitionem devenimus in cognitionem alterius. [9] Besides, we are said to understand something in three ways. First, as we understand by means of the intellect which is the power from which such an operation proceeds; hence, both the intellect itself is said to understand, and also the intellect’s act of understanding becomes our act of understanding. Second, we understand by means of an intelligible species; of course, we are not said to understand by it, in the sense that it understands, but because the intellective power is actually perfected by it, as the visual power is by the species of color. Third, we understand as by an intermediary through the knowing of which we come to the knowledge of something else.
Si igitur homo quandoque per intellectum agentem intelligat substantias separatas, oportet aliquo modorum dictorum hoc dici. Non autem dicitur hoc modo tertio: quia non concedit Alexander quod intelligat intellectum agentem vel intellectus possibilis, vel intellectus in habitu. Nec etiam secundo modo: quia intelligere per speciem intelligibilem attribuitur virtuti intellectivae cuius illa species intelligibilis est forma; non autem concedit Alexander quod intellectus possibilis, vel intellectus in habitu, intelligat substantias separatas; unde non potest esse quod sic intelligamus substantias separatas per intellectum agentem sicut intelligimus aliqua per speciem intelligibilem. Si autem sicut per virtutem intellectivam, oportet quod ipsum intelligere intellectus agentis sit intelligere hominis. Hoc autem esse non potest nisi ex substantia intellectus agentis et substantia hominis fiat unum secundum esse: impossibile enim est, si sint duae substantiae secundum esse diversae, quod operatio unius sit operatio alterius. Erit igitur intellectus agens unum secundum esse cum homine. Non autem secundum esse accidentale: quia iam non esset intellectus agens substantia, sed accidens; sic enim ex colore et corpore fit unum secundum esse accidentale. Relinquitur igitur quod intellectus agens sit cum homine unum secundum esse substantiale. Erit igitur vel anima humana, vel pars eius, et non aliqua substantia separata, sicut Alexander ponit. Non igitur secundum opinionem Alexandri potest poni quod homo intelligat substantias separatas. [10] So, if at some point man understands separate substances through the agent intellect, this must be explained by one of these ways that have been mentioned. Now, it is not explained by the third way, for Alexander did not admit that either the possible or the habitual intellect understands the agent intellect. Nor, indeed, is it in the second way, for to understand through an intelligible species is the attribute of the intellective power for which this intelligible species is the form. Now, Alexander did not grant that the possible intellect or the habitual intellect understands separate substances; hence, it is not possible for us to understand separate substances through the agent intellect in the same way that we understand other things through an intelligible species. But, if it is as through an intellective power, then the agent intellect’s act of understanding must be man’s act of understanding. Now, this cannot be so unless one actual being is made from the substance of the agent intellect and the substance of man; indeed, it is impossible if they are two substances with different acts of being, for the operation of the one to be the operation of the other. Therefore, the agent intellect will be one existing being with man, not one accidentally, for then the agent intellect would be not a substance but an accident, as is the case when a thing that is one being accidentally is made from color and a body. The conclusion remains, then, that the agent intellect is united with man in substantial being. It will be, then, either the human soul or a part of it, and not some separate substance as Alexander claimed. Therefore, it cannot be maintained, on the basis of Alexander’s opinion, that man understands separate substances.
Amplius. Si intellectus agens quandoque fiet forma istius hominis, ita quod per ipsum intelligere possit, eadem ratione poterit fieri forma alterius hominis per ipsum similiter intelligentis. Sequetur ergo quod duo homines simul per intellectum agentem intelligent sicut per formam suam. Hoc autem est ita quod ipsum intelligere intellectus agentis sit intelligere intelligentis per ipsum, ut iam dictum est. Erit ergo idem intelligere duorum intelligentium. Quod est impossibile. [11] Furthermore, if the agent intellect at any time becomes the form of one man, so that he is enabled to understand through it, by the same token it could become the form of another man similarly understanding through it. It will Mow, then, that two men will understand at the same time through the agent intellect as through their own form. This is so because the agent intellect’s own act of understanding is the act of understanding of ‘the man who understands through it, as was said already. Therefore, there will be the same act of understanding for two intelligent beings; and this is impossible.
Ratio etiam sua frivola omnino est. Primo quidem quia, quando perficitur generatio alicuius generis, oportet quod perficiatur sua operatio, sed tamen secundum modum sui generis, non autem secundum modum generis altioris: cum enim perficitur generatio aeris, habet generationem et motum completum sursum, non tamen ut moveatur ad locum ignis. Similiter autem, cum completur generatio intellectus in habitu, complebitur eius operatio, quae est intelligere, secundum suum modum: non autem secundum modum quo intelligunt substantiae separatae, ut scilicet intelligat substantias separatas. Unde ex generatione intellectus in habitu non potest concludi quod homo quandoque intelligat substantias separatas. [12] As a matter of fact, his theory is entirely frivolous. First of all because, whenever the process of generation is perfected in any member of a genus its operation must be perfected, but, of course, according to the manner of its own genus and not according to the mode of a higher genus. For instance, when the generation of air is perfected it has a development and complete movement upward, but not such that it is moved to the place proper to fire. Similarly, when the development of the habitual intellect is completed its operation of understanding will be completed according to its own mode, but not according to the mode whereby separate substances understand, so that it may understand separate substances. Hence, from the generation of the habitual intellect one cannot conclude that man will understand separate substance at some time.
Secundo, quia eiusdem virtutis est complementum operationis cuius est operatio ipsa. Si igitur intelligere substantias separatas sit complementum operationis intellectus in habitu, sequitur quod intellectus in habitu intelligat quandoque substantias separatas. Quod Alexander non ponit: sequeretur enim quod intelligere substantias separatas contingeret per scientias speculativas, quae sub intellectu in habitu comprehenduntur. [13] Secondly, it is frivolous because the perfection of an operation belongs to the same power to which the operation itself belongs. So, if to understand separate substances be a perfection of the operation of the habitual intellect, it follows that the habitual intellect understands separate substances at some point in time. Now, Alexander does not claim this, for it would follow that to understand separate substances would depend on the speculative sciences which are included under the notion of habitual understanding.
Tertio, quia eorum quae generari incipiunt, completur generatio ut in pluribus: cum omnes generationes rerum sint a causis determinatis, quae consequuntur effectus suos vel semper vel in maiori parte. Si igitur ad completionem generationis sequitur etiam complementum actionis, oportet etiam quod operatio completa consequatur ea quae generantur vel semper, vel in maiori parte. Intelligere autem substantias separatas non consequuntur qui ad generationem intellectus in habitu student, neque in pluribus neque semper: quinimmo nullus professus est se ad hanc perfectionem pervenisse. Non est igitur complementum operationis intellectus in habitu intelligere substantias separatas. [14] Thirdly, it is frivolous because the generation of things that begin to be generated is nearly always brought to completion, since all processes of generating things are due to determinate causes which achieve their effects, either always, or in the majority of cases. If, then, the perfection of action also follows upon the completion of generation, it must also be the case that perfect operation accompanies the generated things, either always, or in the majority of cases. Now, the actual understanding of separate substances is not achieved by those who apply themselves to the development of habitual understanding, either in most cases or always; on the contrary, no man has openly declared that be had achieved this perfection. Therefore, the perfection of the operation of habitual understanding does not consist in the actual understanding of separate substances.

Caput 43
Quod non possumus in hac vita intelligere substantias separatas sicut ponit Averroes
Chapter 43
Quia vero maxima difficultas est in opinione Alexandri ex hoc quod ponit intellectum possibilem in habitu totaliter corruptibilem, Averroes faciliorem viam se existimavit adinvenisse ad ostendendum quod quandoque intelligamus substantias separatas, ex hoc quod ponit intellectum possibilem incorruptibilem, et a nobis secundum esse separatum, sicut et intellectum agentem. [1] Because there is very great difficulty in Alexander’s opinion, as a result of his supposition that the possible intellect in a condition of habituation is entirely corruptible, Averroes thought that be found an easier way to show that we sometimes understand separate substances. In fact, he asserted that the possible intellect is incorruptible and separate in being from us, as is also the agent intellect.
Ostendit enim primo, quod necesse est ponere quod intellectus agens se habeat ad principia naturaliter cognita a nobis vel sicut agens ad instrumentum, vel sicut forma ad materiam. Intellectus enim in habitu, quo intelligimus, non solum habet hanc actionem quae est intelligere, sed etiam hanc quae est facere intellecta in actu: utrumque enim experimur in nostra potestate existere. Hoc autem quod est facere intellecta in actu magis proprie notificat intellectum in habitu quam intelligere: quia prius est facere intellecta in actu quam intelligere. Sunt autem quaedam in nobis facta intellecta in actu naturaliter, non ex studio aut ex nostra voluntate, sicut prima intelligibilia. Haec autem facere intellecta actu non contingit per intellectum in habitu, per quem fiunt intellecta in actu ea quae scimus ex studio: sed magis sunt initium intellectus in habitu; unde et habitus horum intelligibilium ab Aristotele, in VI Ethicorum, intellectus dicitur. Fiunt autem intellecta in actu per solum intellectum agentem. Per haec autem fiunt intellecta in actu alia, quae ex studio scimus. Facere igitur haec consequentia intellecta in actu est actio et intellectus in habitu, quantum ad prima principia; et ipsius intellectus agentis. Una autem actio non est duorum nisi unum eorum comparetur ad alterum sicut agens ad instrumentum, vel sicut forma ad materiam. Oportet igitur quod intellectus agens comparetur ad prima principia intellectus in habitu vel sicut agens ad instrumentum, vel sicut forma ad materiam. [2] He showed, first of all, that it was necessary to hold that the agent intellect is related to principles naturally known to us, either as agent is to instrument, or as form to matter. For the habitual intellect, by which we understand, has not only this action of understanding, but also another, which is to make things actually understood; indeed, we know by experience that both actions stand within our power. Now, the action of making things actual objects of understanding is more properly indicative of the meaning of habitual intellect than is the act of understanding, for to make things actually intelligible precedes the act of understanding them. But there are some things within us which are rendered actually understood in a natural way, not as a result of our effort or of the action of our will: such are the first intelligible things. In fact, to make these actually understood does not depend on the habitual intellect, through which things that we know from study are made to be actually understood; rather, these first intelligibles are the starting point of the habitual intellect. And that is why the habit of these intelligibles is also called understanding by Aristotle, in Ethics VI [6: 1141a 7]. Now, they are made to be actually understood by the agent intellect alone. And by means of them other things are made to be actually understood: these are the things that we know from study. So, to make these subsequent things actually understood is the work both of the habitual intellect, as regards first principles, and of the agent intellect. Now, one action is not attributed to two things unless one of them is related to the other as agent to instrument or as form to matter. So, the agent intellect is necessarily related to the first principles of the habitual intellect either as agent to instrument or as form to matter.
Quod quidem qualiter possit esse sic ostendit. Intellectus possibilis, cum sit, secundum eius positionem, quaedam substantia separata, intelligit intellectum agentem et alias substantias separatas, et etiam prima intellecta speculativa. Est igitur subiectum utrorumque. Quaecumque autem conveniunt in uno subiecto, alterum eorum est sicut forma alterius: sicut, cum color et lux sint in diaphano sicut in subiecto, oportet quod alterum, scilicet lux, sit quasi forma alterius, scilicet coloris. Hoc autem necesse est quando habent ordinem ad invicem: non in his quae per accidens coniunguntur in eodem subiecto, sicut albedo et musica. Sunt autem intellecta speculativa et intellectus agens ordinem ad invicem habentia: cum intellecta speculativa sint facta intellecta in actu per intellectum agentem. Habet se igitur intellectus agens ad intellecta speculativa quasi forma ad materiam. [3] In fact, he indicates how this is possible in the following way. Since the possible intellect, according to his theory, is a separate substance, it understands the agent intellect and the other separate substances, and also the first objects of speculative understanding. So, it is the subject for both types of objects. Now, whenever two things are united in one subject, one of them is like the form of the other. Thus, when color and light are present in a diaphanous body as their subject, one of them, namely, light, must be like the form of the other, namely, color. Now, this is necessary when they have an ordered relationship to each other, but not in the case of things accidentally associated in the same subject, like whiteness and musical ability. But speculatively understood things and the agent intellect do have an ordered relationship to each other, since the objects of speculative understanding are rendered actually understood by means of the agent intellect. So, the agent intellect is related to the objects of speculative understanding as form is to matter.
Oportet igitur quod, cum intellecta speculativa sint nobis copulata per phantasmata, quae sunt quoddam subiectum ipsorum, quod etiam intellectus agens continuetur nobiscum, inquantum est forma intellectorum speculativorum. Quando igitur intellecta speculativa sunt in nobis solum in potentia, intellectus agens continuatur nobiscum solum in potentia. Quando autem aliqua intellecta speculativa sunt in nobis in actu et aliqua in potentia, continuatur nobis partim actu et partim in potentia: et tunc dicimur moveri ad continuationem praedictam: quia quanto plura intellecta in actu fuerint in nobis facta, perfectius intellectus agens continuatur nobis. Hic autem profectus et motus ad continuationem fit per studium in scientiis speculativis, per quas vera intellecta acquirimus, et falsae opiniones excluduntur, quae sunt extra ordinem huius motus, sicut monstruosa extra ordinem naturalis operationis. Unde et ad hunc profectum iuvant se homines, sicut iuvant se invicem in scientiis speculativis. Therefore, when the objects of speculative understanding are united with us through the phantasms, which are in a sense their subject, the agent intellect must also be connected with us, because it is the form of the objects of speculative understanding. Thus, when the objects of speculative understanding are only potentially present in us, the agent intellect is only potentially connected with us. But, when some objects of speculative understanding are actually in us, and some are potentially present, its connection with us is partly actual and partly potential. Then it is that we are said to be in motion toward the aforementioned connection, for, as more things are made to be actually understood within us, the agent intellect becomes more perfectly connected with us. This progress and movement toward the connection is accomplished through study in the speculative sciences, through which we acquire true objects of understanding, and also false opinions that are outside the orderly process of this movement are excluded, just as monstrosities are outside the order of natural operation. Hence, men may help each other in making this progress, as they are of mutual assistance in the speculative sciences.
Quando ergo omnia intellecta in potentia fuerint in nobis facta in actu, tunc intellectus agens perfecte copulabitur nobis ut forma, et intelligemus per ipsum perfecte, sicut nunc perfecte intelligimus per intellectum in habitu. Unde, cum ad intellectum agentem pertineat intelligere substantias separatas, intelligemus tunc substantias separatas, sicut nunc intelligimus intellecta speculativa. Et haec erit ultima hominis felicitas, in qua homo erit sicut quidam Deus. And so, when all potential objects of understanding have been made actual within us, the agent intellect is perfectly united with us as a form, and then we will understand perfectly through it, just as we now understand perfectly through the habitual intellect. Hence, since it is the function of the agent intellect to understand separate substances, we will then understand separate substances, as we now understand the objects of speculative understanding. And this will be the ultimate felicity of man, in which man will be “like some sort of God.”
Huius autem positionis destructio ex praemissis sufficienter apparet: procedit enim ex suppositione multorum quae in superioribus sunt improbata. [4] Now, the refutation of this theory is sufficiently evident from the things that we have said earlier: in fact, it proceeds from the supposition of many points which are disproved in the foregoing sections.
Primo quidem, supra ostensum est quod intellectus possibilis non est aliqua substantia separata a nobis secundum esse. Unde non oportebit quod sit subiectum substantiarum separatarum: praecipue cum Aristoteles dicat quod intellectus possibilis est in quo est omnia fieri; unde videtur quod sit subiectum solum illorum quae sunt facta intellecta. [5] First of all, we showed above that the possible intellect is not some substance separated from us in its being. Hence, it will not be necessary for it to be the subject of separate substances, especially since Aristotle says that the intellect is possible, “in that it is able to become all things.” From this we see that it is the subject only of those things that are made actually understood.
Item. De intellectu agente etiam supra ostensum est quod non est aliqua substantia separata, sed pars animae: cui Aristoteles attribuit hanc operationem, scilicet facere intellecta in actu, quae est in nostra potestate. Unde non oportebit quod intelligere per intellectum agentem sit nobis causa quod possimus intelligere substantias separatas: alias semper intelligeremus eas. [6] Again, we have shown above, concerning the agent intellect, that it is not a separate substance, but a part of the soul, to which Aristotle assigns this operation: “to make things actually understood” [ De anima III, 5: 430a 14], and this lies within our power. Hence, it will not be necessary for the act of understanding —through the agent intellect to be the cause, for us, of our,capacity to understand separate substances; otherwise, we would always understand them.
Adhuc. Si intellectus agens est substantia separata, non copulatur nobiscum nisi per species factas intellectas in actu, secundum eius positionem, sicut nec intellectus possibilis: licet intellectus possibilis se habeat ad illas species sicut materia ad formam, intellectus autem agens e converso sicut forma ad materiam. Species autem factae intellectae in actu copulantur nobiscum, secundum eius positionem, propter phantasmata, quae ita se habent ad intellectum possibilem sicut colores ad visum, ad intellectum vero agentem sicut colores ad lucem, ut ex verbis Aristotelis in III de anima patet. Non autem lapidi, in quo est color, potest attribui neque actio visus ut videat, neque actio solis ut illuminet. Ergo, secundum positionem praedictam, homini non poterit attribui neque actio intellectus possibilis ut intelligat; neque actio intellectus agentis ut intelligat substantias separatas, vel ut faciat intellecta in actu. [7] Furthermore, if the agent intellect is a separate substance, it cannot be joined to us except through species that have been made actually understood, according to this theory; and neither can the possible intellect, even though the possible intellect is related to these species as matter to form, while, conversely, the agent intellect is as form to matter. Now, species that have been made actually understood are joined with us, according to his theory, by means of the phantasms which are related to the possible intellect as colors to the visual power, but to the agent intellect as colors to light: as we see from the words of Aristotle in Book in of On the Soul [III, 5: 430a 15]. But to the stone in which color is present, neither the action of the power of sight as it sees nor the action of the sun as it enlightens can be attributed. Therefore, according to the aforesaid theory, it would be impossible to attribute to man either the action of the possible intellect as it understands or the action of the agent intellect as it understands separate substances or as it makes things actually understood.
Amplius. Secundum positionem praemissam, intellectus agens non ponitur continuari nobiscum ut forma nisi per hoc quod est forma speculativorum intellectorum, quorum etiam ponitur forma per hoc quod eadem actio est intellectus agentis et illorum intellectorum, scilicet facere intellecta actu. Non igitur poterit esse forma nobis nisi secundum quod communicant in actione eius intellecta speculativa. Haec autem non communicant in operatione eius quae est intelligere substantias separatas, cum sint species rerum sensibilium: nisi redeamus ad opinionem Avempace, quod quidditates substantiarum separatarum possint cognosci per ea quae intelligimus de istis sensibilibus. Nullo igitur modo per viam praedictam poterimus intelligere substantias separatas. [8] Besides, according to this theory, the agent intellect is not asserted to be connected with us as a form except by the fact that it is the form of objects of speculative understanding; and it is claimed to be the form of these objects because the same action belongs to the agent intellect and to these objects of understanding, which action is to make things actually understood. So, it could not be a form for us, unless by virtue of the fact that the objects of speculative understanding share in its action. Now, these objects do not share in its operation which consists in understanding separate substances, for they are the species of sensible things, unless we go back to the opinion of Avempace that the quiddities of separate substances can be known through the things that we understand about sensible objects. Therefore, it would not be at all possible for us to understand separate substances in the aforesaid way.
Praeterea. Intellectus agens secundum alium ordinem comparatur ad intellecta speculativa, quorum est factivus; et ad substantias separatas, quarum non est factivus, sed cognoscitivus tantum, secundum eius positionem. Non igitur oportet, si copuletur nobis per hoc quod est factivus intellectorum speculativorum, quod copuletur nobis secundum quod est cognoscitivus substantiarum separatarum: sed in tali processu est deceptio manifeste secundum accidens. [9] Moreover, the agent intellect is related to the objects of speculative understanding, which it makes to be so, in a different way from its relation to separate substances, which it does not make, but only knows, according to this theory. So, there is no necessity for it to be joined to us in its function as knower of separate substances, even if it is joined to us in its function as maker of the objects of speculative understanding. Rather, there is clearly a fallacy of accident in reasoning such as his.
Adhuc. Si per intellectum agentem cognoscimus substantias separatas, hoc non est inquantum intellectus agens est forma huius vel illius intellecti speculativi, sed inquantum fit forma nobis: sic enim per ipsum possumus intelligere. Fit autem forma nobis etiam per prima intellecta speculativa, secundum quod ipse dicit. Ergo statim a principio homo potest per intellectum agentem intelligere substantias separatas. [10] Again, if we know separate substances through the agent intellect, this is not accomplished because the agent intellect is the form of this or that object of speculative understanding, but because it becomes a form for us, for in this way we are enabled to understand through it. Now, it becomes a form for us even through the first objects of speculative understanding, according to his own statement. Therefore, immediately at the start, man can know separate substances through the agent intellect.
Si autem dicatur quod non fit nobis perfecte forma per quaedam intellecta speculativa intellectus agens, ut per ipsum possimus intelligere substantias separatas: hoc non est nisi quia illa intellecta speculativa non adaequant perfectionem intellectus agentis in intelligendo substantias separatas. Sed nec omnia intellecta speculativa simul accepta adaequant illam perfectionem intellectus agentis secundum quod intelligit substantias separatas: cum omnia haec non sint intelligibilia nisi inquantum sunt facta intellecta; illa vero sunt intelligibilia secundum suam naturam. Non igitur per hoc quod omnia speculativa intelligibilia sciemus, oportebit quod ita perfecte intellectus agens fiat nobis forma quod per ipsum intelligamus substantias separatas. Vel, si hoc non requiritur, oportebit dicere quod, intelligendo quodlibet intelligibile, intelligamus substantias separatas. [11] Of course, it might be answered that the agent intellect does not become a form for us, in a perfect way, by virtue of certain objects of speculative understanding, so that we might understand separate substances through it and the only reason for this is that these objects of speculative understanding are not sufficient for the perfecting of the agent intellect in the act of understanding separate substances. But not even all the objects of speculative understanding taken together are sufficient for that perfection of the agent intellect by which it understands separate substances. For all these objects are intelligible only in so far as they have been made to be understood, while those separate substances are intelligible by their own nature. So, not even the fact that we will know all the objects of speculative understanding will make it necessary for the agent intellect to become a form for us, in such a perfect way that we may understand separate substances through it. Or, if this is not required, then we will have to say that, in understanding any intelligible object, we understand separate substances.

Caput 44
Quod ultima felicitas hominis non consistit in cognitione substantiarum separatarum qualem praedictae opiniones fingunt
Chapter 44
Non est autem possibile neque felicitatem humanam in tali cognitione substantiarum separatarum ponere sicut praedicti philosophi posuerunt. [1] Of course, it is not possible to identify human felicity with such knowledge of separate substances, as the aforementioned philosophers have maintained.
Vanum enim est quod est ad finem quem non potest consequi. Cum igitur finis hominis sit felicitas, in quam tendit naturale ipsius desiderium, non potest poni felicitas hominis in eo ad quod homo pervenire non potest: alioquin sequeretur quod homo esset in vanum, et naturale eius desiderium esset inane, quod est impossibile. Quod autem intelligere substantias separatas homini sit impossibile secundum praedictas positiones, ex dictis est manifestum. Non est igitur in tali cognitione substantiarum separatarum felicitas hominis constituta. [2] Indeed, a thing is futile which exists for an end which it cannot attain. So, since the end of man is felicity, to which his natural desire tends, it is not possible for the felicity of man to be placed in something that man cannot achieve. Otherwise, it would follow that man is a futile being, and his natural desire would be incapable of fulfillment, which is impossible. Now, it is clear from what has been said that man cannot understand separate substances on the basis of the foregoing opinions. So, man’s felicity is not located in such knowledge of separate substances.
Praeterea. Ad hoc quod intellectus agens uniatur nobis ut forma ita quod per ipsum intelligamus substantias separatas, requiritur quod generatio intellectus in habitu sit completa, secundum Alexandrum; vel quod omnia intellecta speculativa sint facta in nobis in actu, secundum Averroem; quae duo in idem redeunt, nam secundum hoc intellectus in habitu generatur in nobis, secundum quod intellecta speculativa fiunt in nobis in actu. Omnes autem species rerum sensibilium sunt intellectae in potentia. Ad hoc igitur quod intellectus agens copuletur alicui, oportet quod intelligat in actu per intellectum speculativum omnes naturas rerum sensibilium, et omnes virtutes, operationes et motus eorum. Quod non est possibile aliquem hominem scire per principia scientiarum speculativarum, per quas movemur ad continuationem intellectus agentis, ut ipsi dicunt: cum ex his quae nostris sensibus subsunt, ex quibus sumuntur principia scientiarum speculativarum, non possit perveniri ad omnia praedicta cognoscenda. Est igitur impossibile quod aliquis homo ad illam continuationem perveniat per modum ab eis assignatum. Non est igitur possibile quod in tali continuatione sit hominis felicitas. [3] Again, in order that the agent intellect be united to us as a form, so that we may understand separate substances through it, it is required that the generation of the habitual intellect be complete, according to Alexander; or that all objects of speculative understanding be made actual within us, according to Averroes. And these two views reduce to the same thing, for in this explanation the habitual intellect is generated in us, in so far as the objects of speculative understanding are made actual within us. Now, all species from sensible things are potential objects of understanding. So, in order that the agent intellect be joined with any person, he must actually understand all the natures of sensible things, and all their powers, operations, and motions, through speculative understanding. This is not possible for any man to know through the principles of the speculative sciences, by which principles we are moved to a connection with the agent intellect, as they say. For, one could not attain all these objects of knowledge from the things that come under the scope of our senses, and from which the principles of the speculative sciences are drawn. So, it is impossible for a man to achieve this connection, in the manner suggested by them. Therefore, it is not possible for man’s felicity to consist in such a connection.
Adhuc. Dato quod talis continuatio hominis ad intellectum agentem sit possibilis qualem ipsi describunt, planum est quod talis perfectio paucissimis hominum advenit; in tantum quod nec ipsi, nec aliqui, quantumcumque in scientiis speculativis studiosi et periti, ausi sunt talem perfectionem de se profiteri. Quinimmo omnes plurima a se asserunt ignorata: sicut Aristoteles quadraturam circuli, et rationes ordinis caelestium corporum, in quibus, ut ipsemet dicit in II de caelo, non nisi topicas rationes reddere potest; et quid sit in eis necessarium et eorum motoribus, aliis reservat in XI metaphysicae. Felicitas autem est quoddam commune bonum, ad quod plures pervenire possunt, nisi sint orbati, ut Aristoteles dicit in I Ethicorum. Et hoc etiam verum est de omni fine naturali alicuius speciei, quod ipsum consequuntur ea quae sunt illius speciei ut in pluribus. Non est ergo possibile quod ultima hominis felicitas in continuatione praedicta consistat. [4] Besides, even granting that such a connection of man with the agent intellect were possible as they describe it, it is plain that such perfection comes to very few men; so much so that not even these men, nor any other men, however diligent and expert in speculative sciences, have dared to claim such perfection for themselves. On the contrary, they all state that many things are unknown to them, Thus, Aristotle speaks of the squaring of the circle, and he can give only probable arguments for his principles for the ordering of celestial bodies, as he admits himself, in Book II of On the Heavens [5: 288a 2], and what is necessary in regard to these bodies and their movers he keeps for others to explain, in Metaphysics XI [8: 1073b 2]. Now, felicity is a definite common good, which many people can attain, “unless they are defective,” as Aristotle puts it, in Ethics I [9: 1099b 19]. And this is also true of every natural end in any species, that the members of this species do attain it, in most cases. Therefore, it is not possible for man’s ultimate felicity to consist in the aforesaid connection.
Patet autem quod nec Aristoteles, cuius sententiam sequi conantur praedicti philosophi, in tali continuatione ultimam felicitatem hominis opinatus est esse. Probat enim in I Ethicorum quod felicitas hominis est operatio ipsius secundum virtutem perfectam: unde necesse fuit quod de virtutibus determinaret, quas divisit in virtutes morales et intellectuales. Ostendit autem in X quod ultima felicitas hominis est in speculatione. Unde patet quod non est in actu alicuius virtutis moralis; nec prudentiae nec artis, quae tamen sunt intellectuales. Relinquitur ergo quod sit operatio secundum sapientiam, quae est praecipua inter tres residuas intellectuales, quae sunt sapientia, scientia et intellectus, ut ostendit in VI Ethicorum: unde et in X Ethicorum sapientem iudicat esse felicem. Sapientia autem, secundum ipsum, est una de scientiis speculativis, caput aliarum, ut dicit in VI Ethicorum: et in principio metaphysicae scientiam quam in illo libro tradere intendit, sapientiam nominat. Patet ergo quod opinio Aristotelis fuit quod ultima felicitas quam homo in vita ista acquirere potest, sit cognitio de rebus divinis qualis per scientias speculativas haberi potest. Ille autem posterior modus cognoscendi res divinas, non per viam scientiarum speculativarum, sed quodam generationis ordine naturali, est confictus ab expositoribus quibusdam. [5] However, it is clear that Aristotle, whose view the aforementioned philosophers try to follow, did not think that man’s ultimate felicity is to be found in such a connection. For he proves, in Ethics I [13: 1102a 5], that man’s felicity is his operation according to perfect virtue. Hence, he had to develop his teaching on the virtues, which he divided into the moral and the intellectual virtues. Now, he shows in Book X [7: 1177a 18], that the ultimate felicity of man lies in speculation. Hence, it clearly does not lie in the act of any moral virtue, nor of prudence or art, though these are intellectual virtues. It remains, then, that it is an operation in accord with wisdom, the chief of the three remaining intellectual virtues, which are wisdom, science, and understanding, as he points out in Ethics VI [6: 1141a 3]. Hence, in Ethics X [8: 1179a 32], he gives his judgment that the wise man is happy. Now, wisdom, for him, is one of the speculative knowledges, “the head of the others,” as he says in Ethics VI [6]. And at the beginning of the Metaphysics [I, 1: 981b 26], he calls the science which he intends to treat in this work, wisdom. Therefore, it is clear that Aristotle’s opinion was that the ultimate felicity which man can acquire in this life is the kind of knowledge of divine things which can be gained through the speculative sciences. But that later way of knowing divine things, not by means of the speculative sciences but by a process of generation in the natural order, was made up by some of his commentators.

Caput 45
Quod non possumus in hac vita intelligere substantias separatas
Chapter 45
Quia ergo secundum modos praedictos substantiae separatae non possunt cognosci a nobis in vita ista, inquirendum restat utrum aliquo modo in vita ista substantias ipsas separatas intelligere possimus. [1] Hence, since separate substances cannot be known by us in this life in the preceding ways, the question remains whether we may understand these separate substances in any way during this life.
Quod autem hoc sit possibile nititur ostendere Themistius per locum a minori. Substantiae enim separatae sunt magis intelligibiles quam materialia: haec enim sunt intelligibilia inquantum sunt facta intellecta in actu per intellectum agentem; illa vero sunt secundum seipsa intelligibilia. Si ergo intellectus noster comprehendit haec materialia, multo magis natus est intelligere illas substantias separatas. [2] Themistius tries to show that it is possible, by an argument from a less important case. Separate substances are indeed more intelligible than material ones; the latter are intelligible, in so far as they are made to be actually understood by the agent intellect, but the former are intelligible in themselves. Therefore, if our intellect comprehends these material substances, it is naturally much more capable of understanding separate substances.
Haec autem ratio, secundum diversas opiniones de intellectu possibili, diversimode iudicanda est. Si enim intellectus possibilis non sit virtus a materia dependens; et sit iterum secundum esse a corpore separatus, ut Averroes ponit, sequetur quod nullum necessarium ordinem ad res materiales habeat; unde quae sunt magis intelligibilia in seipsis, erunt sibi magis intelligibilia. Sed tunc sequi videtur quod, cum nos a principio per intellectum possibilem intelligamus, quod a principio intelligamus, substantias separatas: quod patet esse falsum. [3] Now, this argument must be judged in different ways, depending on the various opinions concerning the possible intellect. For, if the possible intellect is not a power which depends on matter, and again if it is separate in being from body, as Averroes supposes, then it follows that it has no necessary relation to material things. Consequently, things that are more intelligible in themselves will be more intelligible to it. But then it seems to follow that, since we understand from the start by means of the possible intellect, we therefore understand separate substances from the start: which is clearly false.
Sed hoc inconveniens evitare Averroes nititur, secundum ea quae de eius opinione praedicta sunt: quae patet esse falsa ex praemissis. [4] But Averroes tried to avoid this difficulty by the explanation which has been mentioned above, in connection with his opinion. And this is plainly false, on the basis of what we have established.
Si autem intellectus possibilis non est a corpore separatus secundum esse, ex hoc ipso quod est tali corpori unitus secundum esse, habet quendam necessarium ordinem ad materialia, ut nisi per illa ad aliorum cognitionem pervenire non possit. Unde non sequitur, si substantiae separatae sint in seipsis magis intelligibiles, quod propter hoc sint magis intelligibiles intellectui nostro. Et hoc demonstrant verba Aristotelis in II metaphysicae. Dicit enim ibidem quod difficultas intelligendi res illas accidit ex nobis, non ex illis: nam intellectus noster se habet ad manifestissima rerum sicut se habet oculus vespertilionis ad lucem solis. Unde, cum per materialia intellecta non possint intelligi substantiae separatae, ut supra ostensum est, sequetur quod intellectus possibilis noster nullo modo possit intelligere substantias separatas. [5] However, if the possible intellect is not separated in being from body, then by virtue of such a union in being with body it has a necessary relation to material things, so that it could not reach a knowledge of other things except by means of these material things. Hence, it does not follow that, if separate substances are more intelligible in themselves, they are for this reason more intelligible to our intellect. And the words of Aristotle in Metaphysics II [1: 993b 9] prove this. For he says there that “the difficulty of understanding these things comes from us not from them, for our intellect is to the most evident things, as the eye of the owl is to the light of the sun.” Hence, since separate substances cannot be understood through material things that are understood, as was shown above, it follows that our possible intellect can in no way understand separate substances.
Hoc etiam apparet ex ordine intellectus possibilis ad agentem. Potentia enim passiva ad illa solum est in potentia in quae potest proprium eius activum: omni enim potentiae passivae respondet potentia activa in natura; alias potentia passiva esset frustra, cum non possit reduci in actum nisi per activam; unde videmus quod visus non est susceptivus nisi colorum, qui illuminantur per lucem. Intellectus autem possibilis, cum sit virtus quodammodo passiva, habet proprium agens sibi respondens, scilicet intellectum agentem, qui ita se habet ad intellectum possibilem sicut se habet lux ad visum. Non est igitur intellectus possibilis in potentia nisi ad illa intelligibilia quae sunt facta per intellectum agentem. Unde et Aristoteles, in III de anima, describens utrumque intellectum, dicit quod intellectus possibilis est quo est omnia fieri, agens vero quo est omnia facere; ut ad eadem utriusque potentia referri intelligatur, huius activa, illius passiva. Cum ergo substantiae separatae non sint factae intellectae in actu per intellectum agentem, sed solum materialia, ad haec sola se extendit possibilis intellectus. Non igitur per ipsum possumus intelligere substantias separatas. [6] This is also evident from the relation of the possible intellect to the agent intellect. A passive potency is only a potency in regard to those things that are within the power of its proper active principle; for, to every passive potency in nature there corresponds an active potency; otherwise, the passive potency would be useless, for it could not be reduced to act except through an active potency. Hence we see that the visual power is only receptive of colors which are illuminated by light. Now, the possible intellect, since it is a passive power in some sense, has its proper corresponding agent, namely, the agent intellect which is related to the possible intellect as light is to sight. So, the possible intellect is only in potency to those intelligible objects which are made by the agent intellect. Hence, Aristotle, describing both intellects in Book III of On the Soul [5: 430a 14], says that the possible intellect is “the capacity to become all things,” while the agent intellect is “the capacity to make all things”; so, each potency is understood to be referred to the same thing, but one is active and the other passive, Thus, since separate substances are not made to be actually intelligible by the agent intellect, but only material substances are, the possible intellect only includes the latter within its scope. Therefore, we cannot understand separate substances through it.
Propter quod et Aristoteles congruo exemplo usus est: nam oculus vespertilionis nunquam potest videre lucem solis. Quamvis Averroes hoc exemplum depravare nitatur, dicens quod simile non est de intellectu nostro ad substantias separatas, et oculo vespertilionis ad lucem solis, quantum ad impossibilitatem, sed solum quantum ad difficultatem. Quod tali ratione probat ibidem. Quia si illa quae sunt intellecta secundum se, scilicet substantiae separatae, essent nobis impossibiles ad intelligendum, frustra essent: sicut si esset aliquod visibile quod nullo visu videri posset. [7] For this point Aristotle made use of an appropriate example, for the eye of an owl can never see the light of the sun; though Averroes tries to ruin this example by saying that the similarity between our intellect in relation to separate substances and the eye of the owl in relation to the light of the sun does not extend to impossibility, but only to difficulty. He gives a proof for this, in the same place, using the following argument: If those things which are understood in themselves, namely, separate substances, were not possible for us to understand, they would be for no purpose, just as if there were a visible object which could not be seen by any visual power.
Quae quidem ratio quam frivola sit, apparet. Etsi enim a nobis nunquam illae substantiae intelligerentur, tamen intelliguntur a seipsis. Unde nec frustra intelligibiles essent: sicut nec sol frustra visibilis est, ut Aristotelis exemplum prosequamur, quia non potest ipsum videre vespertilio; cum possit ipsum videre homo et alia animalia. [8] How frivolous this argument is, is quite apparent. For, though these substances might never be understood by us, they are nonetheless understood by themselves. Hence, they are not intelligible in a purposeless way, as the sun (to pursue Aristotle’s example) is visible, yet not in a purposeless way, simply because the owl cannot see it. For man and other animals can see it.
Sic ergo intellectus possibilis, si ponitur corpori unitus secundum esse, non potest intelligere substantias separatas. Interest tamen qualiter de substantia ipsius sentiatur. Si enim ponatur esse quaedam virtus materialis generabilis et corruptibilis, ut quidam posuerunt, sequitur quod ex sua substantia determinatur ad intelligendum materialia. Unde necesse est quod nullo modo intelligere possit substantias separatas: quia impossibile erit ipsum esse separatum. [9] And thus, the possible intellect, if it be granted that it is united with the body in being, cannot understand separate substances. However, it makes a difference how one thinks about its substance. For, if it is supposed to be a material power, capable of generation and corruption, as some have claimed, then it follows that it is limited by its own substance to the understanding of material things. Consequently, that it could in no way understand separate substances is quite necessary, since it could not be separate in its own being.
Si autem intellectus possibilis, quamvis sit corpori unitus, est tamen incorruptibilis et a materia non dependens secundum suum esse, sicut supra ostendimus; sequitur quod obligatio ad intelligendas res materiales accidat ei ex unione ad corpus. Unde, cum anima a corpore tali fuerit separata, intellectus possibilis intelligere poterit ea quae sunt secundum se intelligibilia, scilicet substantias separatas, per lumen intellectus agentis, quae est similitudo in anima intellectualis luminis quod est in substantiis separatis. On the other hand, if the possible intellect, though united with a body, is, however, incorruptible and not dependent on matter in its actual being, as we showed above,” it follows that the limitation to the understanding of material things accrues to it as a result of its union with the body. Consequently, when the soul will have been separated from this body, the possible intellect will be able to understand things that are intelligible in themselves, through the light of the agent intellect, which is the likeness in the intellectual soul of the light which is present in separate substances.
Et haec est sententia nostrae fidei de intelligendo substantias separatas a nobis post mortem, et non in hac vita. [10] And this is the view of our faith, concerning the understanding of separate substances by us after death, and not in this life.

Caput 46
Quod anima in hac vita non intelligit seipsam per seipsam
Chapter 46
Videtur autem difficultas quaedam contra praedicta afferri ex quibusdam Augustini verbis, quae diligenter pertractanda sunt. Dicit enim in IX de Trinitate libro: mens, sicut corporearum rerum notitias per sensus corporis colligit, sic incorporearum rerum per semetipsam. Ergo et seipsam per seipsam novit: quoniam est incorporea. Ex his enim verbis videtur quod mens nostra se per seipsam intelligat, et intelligendo se, intelligat substantias separatas: quod est contra praeostensa. Inquirere ergo oportet quomodo anima nostra per seipsam intelligat se. [1] Now, it seems that some objection may be offered against what we have said, on the basis of a text of Augustine which requires careful interpretation. In fact, he says in Book IX of The Trinity: “Just as the mind gathers knowledge of bodily things through the bodily senses, so does it obtain knowledge of incorporeal things through itself. And so, it knows itself through itself, since it is incorporeal.” Indeed, it does appear from these words that our mind understands itself, through itself, and by understanding itself it understands separate substances. And this is in opposition to what was shown above. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate how our soul understands itself through itself.
Impossibile est autem dici quod per seipsam intelligat de se quid est. Per hoc enim fit potentia cognoscitiva actu cognoscens, quod est in ea id quo cognoscitur. Et si quidem sit in ea in potentia, cognoscit in potentia; si autem in actu, cognoscit actu; si autem medio modo, cognoscit habitu. Ipsa autem anima semper sibi adest actu, et nunquam in potentia vel in habitu tantum. Si igitur per seipsam anima seipsam cognoscit quid est, semper actu intelliget de se quid est. Quod patet esse falsum. [2] Now, it cannot be said that it understands what it is, through itself. For, a cognitive potency becomes an actual knower by the fact that there is present in it that whereby the knowing is accomplished. Of course, if it be present in a potential way in the potency, one knows potentially; but if it be there actually, one knows actually; and if it be there in an intermediate fashion, one knows habitually. But the soul is always actually present to itself, never merely potentially or habitually. So, if the soul knows itself through itself, in the sense of what it is, it will always actually understand what it is. And this is plainly false.
Adhuc. Si anima per seipsam cognoscit de se quid est; omnis autem homo animam habet: omnis igitur homo cognoscit de anima quid est. Quod patet esse falsum. [3] Again, if the soul understands what it is, through itself, and if every man has a soul, then every man knows what soul is. And this is plainly false.
Amplius. Cognitio quae fit per aliquid naturaliter nobis inditum, est naturalis: sicut principia indemonstrabilia, quae cognoscuntur per lumen intellectus agentis. Si igitur nos de anima scimus quid est per ipsam animam, hoc erit naturaliter notum. In his autem quae sunt naturaliter nota, nullus potest errare: in cognitione enim principiorum indemonstrabilium nullus errat. Nullus igitur erraret circa animam quid est, si hoc anima per seipsam cognosceret. Quod patet esse falsum: cum multi opinati sint animam esse hoc vel illud corpus, et aliqui numerum, vel harmoniam. Non igitur anima per seipsam cognoscit de se quid est. [4] Moreover, the knowledge which comes about through something naturally implanted in us is natural, as is the case with indemonstrable principles which are known through the light of the agent intellect. If, then, we know concerning the soul what it is, through the soul itself, then this will be something naturally known. Now, in the case of things that are naturally known no one can err; for instance, in the knowing of indemonstrable principles no one makes an error. So, no one would be in error concerning what the soul is, if the soul knew this through itself. And this is clearly false, for many men have held the opinion that the soul is this or that body, and some have thought it a number or a harmony. Therefore, the soul does not, through itself, know concerning itself what it is.
Amplius. In quolibet ordine, quod est per se est prius eo quod est per aliud, et principium eius. Quod ergo est per se notum, est prius notum omnibus quae per aliud cognoscuntur, et principium cognoscendi ea: sicut primae propositiones conclusionibus. Si igitur anima per seipsam de se cognoscit quid est, hoc erit per se notum, et per consequens primo notum et principium cognoscendi alia. Hoc autem patet esse falsum: nam quid est anima non supponitur in scientia quasi notum, sed proponitur ex aliis quaerendum. Non igitur anima de seipsa cognoscit quid est per seipsam. [5] Besides, in any order, “that which exists through itself is prior to, and is the principle of, that which is through another.” So, that which is known through itself is known before all things that are known through another, and it is the principle of the knowing of them. Thus, the first propositions are prior to the conclusions. If, then, the soul knows through itself what it is in itself, this will be something known through itself, and, consequently, a first known thing and a principle for the knowing of other things. Now, this is clearly false. For, what the soul is no science takes as something known; rather, it is a topic proposed for investigation, starting from other items of knowledge. Therefore, the soul does not know concerning itself what it is, through itself.
Patet autem quod nec ipse Augustinus hoc voluit. Dicit enim in X libro de Trin. quod anima, cum sui notitiam quaerit, non velut absentem se quaerit cernere, sed praesentem se curat discernere: non ut cognoscat se, quasi non norit; sed ut dignoscat ab eo quod alterum novit. Ex quo dat intelligere quod anima per se cognoscit seipsam quasi praesentem, non quasi ab aliis distinctam. Unde et in hoc dicit aliquos errasse, quod animam non distinxerunt ab illis quae sunt ab ipsa diversa. Per hoc autem quod scitur de re quid est, scitur res prout est ab aliis distincta: unde et definitio, quae significat quid est res, distinguit definitum ab omnibus aliis. Non igitur voluit Augustinus quod anima de se cognoscat quid est per seipsam. [6] Now, it appears that even Augustine himself did not intend that it does. For he says in Book X of The Trinity that “the soul, when seeking knowledge of itself, does not endeavor to see itself as something absent, but takes care to observe itself as present; not to learn about itself as if it were ignorant, but to distinguish itself from what it knows as another thing.” Thus, he makes us understand that the soul, through itself, does know itself as present, but not as distinct from other things. Consequently, he says that some people have erred on this point because they have not distinguished the soul from those things which are different from it. Now, because a thing is known from the point of view of what it is, that thing is also known in distinction from others; consequently, the definition which signifies what a thing is distinguishes the thing defined from all else. Therefore, Augustine did not wish to say that, through itself, the soul knows concerning itself what it is.
Sed nec Aristoteles hoc voluit. Dicit enim in III de anima, quod intellectus possibilis intelligit se sicut alia. Intelligit enim se per speciem intelligibilem, qua fit actu in genere intelligibilium. In se enim consideratus, est solum in potentia ad esse intelligibile: nihil autem cognoscitur secundum quod est in potentia, sed secundum quod est actu. Unde substantiae separatae, quarum substantiae sunt ut aliquid actu ens in genere intelligibilium, de se intelligunt quid sunt per suas substantias: intellectus vero possibilis noster per speciem intelligibilem, per quam fit actu intelligens. Unde et Aristoteles, in III de anima, ex ipso intelligere demonstrat naturam intellectus possibilis, scilicet quod sit immixtus et incorruptibilis, ut ex praemissis patet. [7] But neither did Aristotle intend this. Indeed, he says in Book III of On the Soul [4: 430a 2] that “the possible intellect understands itself as it does other things.” For it understands itself through an intelligible species, by which it is made actual in the genus of intelligible objects. Considered in itself, it is merely in potency in regard to intelligible being; nothing is known according to what it is potentially, but only as it is actually. Hence, separate substances, whose substances are like something actually existing in the genus of intelligible objects, do understand, concerning themselves, what they are, through their own substances; while our possible intellect does so, through an intelligible species, by which it is made an actual agent which understands. Hence, also, Aristotle, in Book III of On the Soul [4: 429a 2], demonstrates from the very act of understanding what is the nature of the possible intellect, namely, that it is “unmixed and incorruptible,” as is clear from what we have said earlier.
Sic igitur, secundum intentionem Augustini, mens nostra per seipsam novit seipsam inquantum de se cognoscit quod est. Ex hoc enim ipso quod percipit se agere, percipit se esse; agit autem per seipsam, unde per seipsam de se cognoscit quod est. [8] And so, according to Augustine’s meaning, our mind knows itself through itself, in so far as it knows concerning itself, that it is. Indeed, from the fact that it perceives that it acts it perceives that it is. Of course, it acts through itself, and so, through itself, it knows concerning itself that it is.
Sic ergo et de substantiis separatis anima, cognoscendo seipsam, cognoscit quia sunt: non autem quid sunt, quod est earum substantias intelligere. Cum enim de substantiis separatis hoc quod sint intellectuales quaedam substantiae cognoscamus, vel per demonstrationem vel per fidem, neutro modo hanc cognitionem accipere possemus nisi hoc ipsum quod est esse intellectuale, anima nostra ex seipsa cognosceret. Unde et scientia de intellectu animae oportet uti ut principio ad omnia quae de substantiis separatis cognoscimus. [9] So, also, in regard to separate substances, the soul by knowing itself knows that they are, but not what they are, for to do the latter is to understand their substances. Indeed, when we know this about separate substances, either through demonstration or through faith, that there are certain intellectual substances, we would not be able to get this knowledge on either basis unless our soul knew on its own part this point: what it is to be intellectual. Consequently, the knowledge concerning the soul’s understanding must be used as a starting point for all that we learn about separate substances.
Non autem oportet quod, si per scientias speculativas possumus pervenire ad sciendum de anima quid est, quod possimus ad sciendum quod quid est de substantiis separatis per huiusmodi scientias pervenire: nam intelligere nostrum, per quod pervenimus ad sciendum de anima nostra quid est, multum est remotum ab intelligentia substantiae separatae. Potest tamen per hoc quod scitur de anima nostra quid est, perveniri ad sciendum aliquod genus remotum substantiarum separatarum: quod non est earum substantias intelligere. [10] Nor is it a necessary conclusion that, if we succeed in knowing what the soul is through the speculative sciences, we must then be able to reach a knowledge of what separate substances are, through these same sciences. As a matter of fact, our act of understanding, whereby we attain to the knowledge of what our soul is, is very remote from the intelligence of a separate substance. Nevertheless, it is possible through knowing what our soul is to reach a knowledge of a remote genus for separate substances, but this does not mean an understanding of these substances.
Sicut autem de anima scimus quia est per seipsam, inquantum eius actus percipimus; quid autem sit, inquirimus ex actibus et obiectis per principia scientiarum speculativarum: ita etiam de his quae sunt in anima nostra, scilicet potentiis et habitibus, scimus quidem quia sunt, inquantum actus percipimus; quid vero sint, ex ipsorum actuum qualitate invenimus. [11] just as we know, through itself, that the soul is, in so far as we perceive its act, and we seek to discover what it is, from a knowledge of its acts and objects, by means of the principles of the speculative sciences, so also do we ‘know concerning the things that are within our soul, such as powers and habits, that they indeed are, by virtue of our perception of their acts; but we discover what they are, from the qualitative character of their acts.

Caput 47
Quod non possumus in hac vita videre Deum per essentiam
Chapter 47
Si autem alias substantias separatas in hac vita intelligere non possumus, propter connaturalitatem intellectus nostri ad phantasmata, multo minus in hac vita divinam essentiam videre possumus, quae transcendit omnes substantias separatas. [1] Now, if we are not able to understand other separate substances in this life, because of the natural affinity of our intellect for phantasms, still less are we able in this life to see the divine essence which transcends all separate substances.
Huius autem signum hinc etiam accipi potest, quia quanto magis mens nostra ad contemplanda spiritualia elevatur, tanto magis abstrahitur a sensibilibus. Ultimus autem terminus quo contemplatio pertingere potest, est divina substantia. Unde oportet mentem quae divinam substantiam videt, totaliter a corporalibus sensibus esse absolutam, vel per mortem vel per aliquem raptum. Hinc est quod dicitur ex persona Dei, Exodi 33-20: non videbit me homo et vivet. [2] An indication of this may also be taken from the fact that the higher our mind is elevated to the contemplation of spiritual beings, the more is it withdrawn from sensible things. Now, the final limit to which contemplation can reach is the divine substance. Hence, the mind which sees the divine substance must be completely cut off from the bodily senses, either by death or by ecstasy. Thus, it is said by one who speaks for God: “Man shall not see me and live” (Exod. 33:20).
Quod autem in sacra Scriptura aliqui Deum vidisse dicuntur, oportet intelligi hoc fuisse vel per aliquam imaginariam visionem; seu etiam corporalem, prout scilicet per aliquas corporeas species, vel exterius apparentes vel interius formatas in imaginatione, divinae virtutis praesentia demonstrabatur; vel etiam secundum quod aliqui per spirituales effectus aliquam cognitionem de Deo intelligibilem perceperunt. [3] But that some men are spoken of in Sacred Scripture as having seen God must be understood either in reference to an imaginary vision, or even a corporeal one: according as the presence of divine power was manifested through some corporeal species, whether appearing externally, or formed internally in the imagination; or even according as some men have perceived some intelligible knowledge of God through His spiritual effects.
Difficultatem autem afferunt quaedam verba Augustini, ex quibus videtur quod in hac vita possimus intelligere ipsum Deum. Dicit enim in IX libro de Trin., quod in aeterna veritate, ex qua omnia temporalia facta sunt, formam secundum quam sumus, et secundum quam vel in nobis vel in corporibus vera et recta ratione aliquid operamur, visu mentis aspicimus, atque inde conceptam rerum veracem notitiam apud nos habemus. In XII etiam confessionum dicit: si ambo videmus verum esse quod dicis, et ambo videmus verum esse quod dico, ubi quaeso, id videmus? Nec ego utique in te, nec tu in me. Sed ambo in ipsa quae supra mentes nostras est, incommutabili veritate. In libro etiam de vera religione dicit quod secundum veritatem divinam de omnibus iudicamus. In libro autem Soliloquiorum dicit quod prius est veritas cognoscenda, per quam possunt alia cognosci. Quod de veritate divina intelligere videtur. Videtur ergo ex verbis eius quod ipsum Deum, qui sua veritas est, videamus, et per ipsum alia cognoscamus. [4] However, certain words of Augustine do present a difficulty; for it appears from them that we can understand God Himself in this life. He says in Book IX of The Trinity that “we see with the vision of the mind, in the eternal truth, from which all temporal things have been made, the form in accord with which we exist, and in accord with which we perform any action by true and right reason, either within ourselves or in bodies, and as a result of this we have with us a conception and a true knowledge of things.” He also says in Book VII of the Confessions: “Suppose both of us see that what you say is true, and both of us see that what I say is true: where, I ask, do we see it? Certainly, I do not see it in you, nor you in me, but both in that immutable truth which is above our minds. Again, he says in the book On the True Religion that “we judge all things according to the divine truth.” And he says in the Soliloquies that “truth must be known first, and through it other things can be known.” And this seems to mean the divine truth. It appears, then, from his words, that we see God Himself, Who is His own truth, and thus we know other things through Him.
Ad idem etiam pertinere videntur verba eiusdem quae ponit in XII de Trin., sic dicens: rationis est iudicare de istis corporalibus secundum rationes incorporales et sempiternas, quae, nisi supra mentem humanam essent, incommutabiles profecto non essent. Rationes autem incommutabiles et sempiternae alibi quam in Deo esse non possunt: cum solus Deus, secundum fidei doctrinam, sit sempiternus. Videtur igitur sequi quod Deum in ista vita videre possimus, et per hoc quod eum et in eo rationes rerum videmus, de aliis iudicemus. [5] The same writer’s words seem to tend toward the same view, words which he puts in Book XII of The Trinity, saying the following: “It pertains to reason to judge concerning these bodily things in accord with the incorporeal and sempiternal reasons which, unless they were above the human mind, certainly would not be immutable.” Now, the immutable and sempiternal reasons cannot exist in any other location than in God, since only God, according to the teaching of our faith, is sempiternal. Therefore, it seems to follow that we are able to see God in this life, and because we see the reasons of things in Him we may judge concerning other things.
Non est autem credendum quod Augustinus hoc in verbis praemissis senserit, quod in hac vita Deum per suam essentiam intelligere possimus. Qualiter igitur illam incommutabilem veritatem, vel istas rationes aeternas, in hac vita videamus, et secundum eam de aliis iudicemus, inquirendum est. [6] However, we must not believe that Augustine held this view, in the texts which have been quoted: that we are able in this life to understand God through His essence. So, we have to make a study of how we may see this immutable truth, or these eternal reasons, in this life, and thus judge other things in accord with this vision.
Veritatem quidem in anima esse, ipse Augustinus in libro Soliloquiorum confitetur: unde ex aeternitate veritatis immortalitatem animae probat. Non solum autem sic veritas est in anima sicut Deus per essentiam in rebus omnibus dicitur; neque sicut in rebus omnibus est per suam similitudinem, prout unaquaeque res in tantum dicitur vera inquantum ad Dei similitudinem accedit: non enim in hoc anima rebus aliis praeferretur. Est ergo speciali modo in anima inquantum veritatem cognoscit. Sicut igitur animae et res aliae verae quidem dicuntur in suis naturis, secundum quod similitudinem illius summae naturae habent, quae est ipsa veritas, cum sit suum intellectum esse: ita id quod per animam cognitum est, verum est inquantum illius divinae veritatis quam Deus cognoscit, similitudo quaedam existit in ipso. Unde et Glossa super illud Psalmi, diminutae sunt veritates a filiis hominum, dicit quod, sicut ab una facie resultant multae in speculo, ita ab una prima veritate resultant multae veritates in mentibus hominum. [7] As a matter of fact, Augustine himself admits that truth is in the soul, in the Soliloquies, and as a result he proves the immortality of the soul from the eternity of truth. But truth is not in the soul simply in the way that God is said to be in all things by His essence, nor as He is in all things by His likeness, in the sense that each thing is called true to the extent that it approaches the likeness of God; for it is not on this basis that the soul is set above other things. Therefore, it is present in a special way in the soul, inasmuch as it knows truth. So, just as souls and other things are indeed said to be true in their own natures, because they have a likeness to the highest nature, which is Truth Itself, since it is its own actual being as understood—so also, what is known by the soul is true in so far as some likeness exists in it of that divine truth which God knows. Hence the Gloss on Psalm 11:2: “Truths are decayed from among the children of men,” says that: “as from one face there may result many reflections in a mirror, so from one first truth there may result many truths in the minds of men.
Quamvis autem diversa a diversis cognoscuntur et creduntur vera, tamen quaedam sunt vera in quibus omnes homines concordant, sicut sunt prima principia intellectus tam speculativi quam practici: secundum quod universaliter in mentibus omnium divinae veritatis quasi quaedam imago resultat. Inquantum ergo quaelibet mens quicquid per certitudinem cognoscit, in his principiis intuetur, secundum quae de omnibus iudicatur, facta resolutione in ipsa, dicitur omnia in divina veritate vel in rationibus aeternis videre, et secundum eas de omnibus iudicare. Et hunc sensum confirmant Augustini verba in libro Soliloquiorum, qui dicit quod scientiarum spectamina videntur in divina veritate sicut haec visibilia in lumine solis, quae constat non videri in ipso corpore solis, sed per lumen, quod est similitudo solaris claritatis in aere et similibus corporibus relicta. Now, although different things are known and believed to be true by different people, certain things are true on which all men agree, such as the first principles of understanding, both speculative and practical, according as an image of divine truth is reflected universally in the minds of all men. So, in so far as any mind knows anything whatever with certitude, the object is intuited in these principles, by means of which judgment is made concerning all things, by resolving them back into these principles; and so the mind is said to see all things in the divine truth, or in the eternal reasons, and is said to judge all things in accord with them. And this interpretation the words of Augustine confirm, in the Soliloquies, for he says that the principles of the sciences are seen in the divine truth as these visible objects are seen in the light of the sun. Yet it is obvious that they are not seen in the actual body of the sun, but through its light, which is a likeness in the air of solar brilliance, transmitted to suitable bodies.
Ex his ergo verbis Augustini non habetur quod Deus videatur secundum suam substantiam in hac vita, sed solum sicut in speculo. Quod et apostolus de cognitione huius vitae confitetur, dicens, I Cor. 13-12: videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate. [8] Therefore, we should not gather from these words of Augustine that God can be seen in His substance in this life, but only as in a mirror. And this is what the Apostle professes concerning the knowledge of this life, for he says: “We see now through a glass in a dark manner” (1 Cor. 13:l2).
Quamvis autem hoc speculum quod est mens humana, de propinquiori Dei similitudinem repraesentet quam inferiores creaturae, tamen cognitio Dei quae ex mente humana accipi potest, non excedit illud genus cognitionis quod ex sensibilibus sumitur: cum et ipsa anima de seipsa cognoscat quid est per hoc quod naturas intelligit sensibilium, ut dictum est. Unde nec per hanc viam cognosci Deus altiori modo potest quam sicut causa cognoscitur per effectum. [9] Although this mirror, which is the human mind, reflects the likeness of God in a closer way than lower creatures do, the knowledge of God which can be taken in by the human mind does not go beyond the type of knowledge that is derived from sensible things, since even the soul itself knows what it is itself as a result of understanding the natures of sensible things, as we have said. Hence, throughout this life God can be known in no higher way than that whereby a cause is known through its effect.

Caput 48
Quod ultima hominis felicitas non sit in hac vita
Chapter 48
Si ergo humana felicitas ultima non consistit in cognitione Dei qua communiter ab omnibus vel pluribus cognoscitur secundum quandam aestimationem confusam, neque iterum in cognitione Dei qua cognoscitur per viam demonstrationis in scientiis speculativis, neque in cognitione Dei qua cognoscitur per fidem, ut in superioribus est ostensum; non est autem possibile in hac vita ad altiorem Dei cognitionem pervenire ut per essentiam cognoscatur, vel saltem ita quod aliae substantiae separatae intelligantur, ut ex his posset Deus quasi de propinquiori cognosci, ut ostensum est; oportet autem in aliqua Dei cognitione felicitatem ultimam poni, ut supra probatum est: impossibile est quod in hac vita sit ultima hominis felicitas. [1] If, then, ultimate human felicity does not consist in the knowledge of God, whereby He is known in general by all, or most, men, by a sort of confused appraisal, and again, if it does not consist in the knowledge of God which is known by way of demonstration in the speculative sciences, nor in the cognition of God whereby He is known through faith, as has been shown in the foregoing; and if it is not possible in this life to reach a higher knowledge of God so as to know Him through His essence, or even in such a way that, when the other separate substances are known, God might be known through the knowledge of them, as if from a closer vantage point, as we showed; and if it is necessary to identify ultimate felicity with some sort of knowledge of God, as we proved above; then it is not possible for man’s ultimate felicity to come in this life.
Item. Ultimus finis hominis terminat eius appetitum naturalem, ita quod, eo habito, nihil aliud quaeritur: si enim adhuc movetur ad aliud, nondum habet finem in quo quiescat. Hoc autem in hac vita non est possibile accidere. Quanto enim plus aliquis intelligit, tanto magis in eo desiderium intelligendi augetur, quod est hominibus naturale: nisi forte aliquis sit qui omnia intelligat. Quod in hac vita nulli unquam accidit qui esset solum homo, nec est possibile accidere: cum in hac vita substantias separatas, quae sunt maxime intelligibilia, cognoscere non possimus, ut ostensum est. Non est igitur possibile ultimam hominis felicitatem in hac vita esse. [2] Again, the ultimate end of man brings to a termination man’s natural appetite, in the sense that, once the end is acquired, nothing else will be sought. For, if he is still moved onward to something else, he does not yet have the end in which he may rest. Now, this termination cannot occur in this life. For, the more a person understands, the more is the desire to understand increased in him, and this is natural to man, unless, perchance, there be someone who understands all things. But in this life this does not happen to anyone who is a mere man, nor could it happen, since we are not able to know in this life the separate substances, and they are most intelligible, as has been shown. Therefore, it is not possible for man’s ultimate felicity to be in this life.
Adhuc. Omne quod movetur in finem, desiderat naturaliter stabiliri et quiescere in illo: unde a loco quo corpus naturaliter movetur, non recedit nisi per motum violentum, qui contrariatur appetitui. Felicitas autem est ultimus finis, quem homo naturaliter desiderat. Est igitur hominis desiderium naturale ad hoc quod in felicitate stabiliatur. Nisi igitur cum felicitate pariter immobilem stabilitatem consequatur, nondum est felix, eius desiderio naturali nondum quiescente. Cum igitur aliquis felicitatem consequitur, pariter stabilitatem et quietem consequetur: unde et omnium haec est de felicitate conceptio, quod de sui ratione stabilitatem requirat; propter quod philosophus dicit, in I Eth., quod non aestimamus felicem esse chamaleontem quendam. In vita autem ista non est aliqua certa stabilitas: cuilibet enim, quantumcumque felix dicatur, possibile est infirmitates et infortunia accidere, quibus impeditur ab operatione, quaecumque sit illa, in qua ponitur felicitas. Non est igitur possibile in hac vita esse ultimam hominis felicitatem. [3] Besides, everything that is moved toward an end naturally desires to be stationed at, and at rest in, that end; consequently, a body does not move away from the place to which it is moved naturally, unless by virtue of a violent movement which runs counter to its appetite. Now, felicity is the ultimate end which man naturally desires. So, there is a natural desire of man to be established in felicity. Therefore, unless along with felicity such an unmoving stability be attained, he is not yet happy, for his natural desire is not yet at rest. And so, when a person attains felicity he likewise attains stability and rest, and that is why this is the notion of all men concerning felicity, that it requires stability as part of its essential character. For this reason, the Philosopher says, in Ethics I [10: 1100b 5], that “we do not regard the happy man as a sort of chameleon.” Now, in this life there is no certain stability, for to any man, no matter how happy he is reputed to be, illnesses and misfortunes may possibly come, and by them he may be hindered in that operation, whatever it may be, with which felicity is identified. Therefore, it is not possible for man’s ultimate felicity to be in this life.
Amplius. Inconveniens videtur et irrationabile quod tempus generationis alicuius rei sit magnum, tempus autem durationis ipsius sit parvum: sequeretur enim quod natura in maiori tempore suo fine privaretur; unde videmus quod animalia quae parvo tempore vivunt, parvum etiam tempus ad hoc quod perficiantur habent. Si autem felicitas consistat in perfecta operatione secundum virtutem perfectam, vel intellectualem vel moralem, impossibile est eam advenire homini nisi post tempus diuturnum. Et hoc maxime in speculativis apparet, in quibus ultima felicitas hominis ponitur, ut ex dictis patet: nam vix in ultima aetate homo ad perfectum in speculatione scientiarum pervenire potest. Tunc autem, ut plurimum, modicum restat humanae vitae. Non est igitur possibile in hac vita ultimam hominis felicitatem esse. [4] Moreover, it appears inappropriate and irrational for the time of generation of a thing to be long, while the time of its maturity is short. For it would follow that a nature would be without its end, most of the time. Consequently, we see that animals which live but a short time also take but a short time to come to perfect maturity. Now, if felicity consists in perfect operation, in accord with perfect virtue, whether intellectual or moral, it is impossible for it to come to man until a long time has elapsed, And this is especially evident in speculative pursuits, in which man’s ultimate felicity is placed, as is clear from what we have said. For man is barely able to reach perfection in scientific speculation in the last stage of his life. But then, in most cases, only a little part of human life remains. So, it is not possible for man’s ultimate felicity to be in this life.
Praeterea. Felicitatem perfectum quoddam bonum omnes confitentur: alias appetitum non quietaret. Perfectum autem bonum est quod omnino caret admixtione mali: sicut perfecte album est quod est omnino impermixtum nigro. Non est autem possibile quod homo in statu istius vitae omnino sit immunis a malis: non solum corporalibus, quae sunt fames, sitis, aestus et frigus, et alia huiusmodi; sed etiam a malis animae. Nullus enim invenitur qui non aliquando inordinatis passionibus inquietetur; qui non aliquando praetereat medium, in quo virtus consistit, vel in plus vel in minus; qui non etiam in aliquibus decipiatur; vel saltem ignoret quae scire desiderat; aut etiam debili opinione concipiat ea de quibus certitudinem habere vellet. Non est igitur aliquis in hac vita felix. [5] Furthermore, all men admit that felicity is a perfect good; otherwise, it could not satisfy desire. Now, a perfect good is one which lacks any admixture of evil, just as a perfectly white thing is completely unmixed with black. Of course, it is not possible for man in the present state of life to be entirely free from evils, not only from corporeal ones, such as hunger, thirst, heat and cold, and other things of this kind, but also from evils of the soul. For we can find no one who is not disturbed at times by unruly passions, who does not at times overstep the mean in which virtue lies, either by excess or defect, who also is not mistaken in certain matters, or who at least is ignorant of things which he desires to know, or who also conceives with uncertain opinion things about which he would like to be certain. Therefore, no person is happy in this life.
Adhuc. Homo naturaliter refugit mortem, et tristatur de ipsa: non solum ut nunc, cum eam sentit, eam refugiens, sed etiam cum eam recogitat. Hoc autem quod non moriatur, homo non potest assequi in hac vita. Non est igitur possibile quod homo in hac vita sit felix. [6] Again, man naturally shrinks from death, and is sorrowful at its prospect, not only at the instant when he feels its threat and tries to avoid it, but even when he thinks back upon it. But freedom from death is something man cannot achieve in this life. Therefore, it is not possible for man in this life to be happy.
Amplius. Felicitas ultima non consistit in habitu, sed in operatione: habitus enim propter actus sunt. Sed impossibile est in hac vita continue agere quamcumque actionem. Impossibile est igitur in hac vita hominem totaliter esse felicem. [7] Besides, ultimate felicity does not consist in an habitual state, but in an operation, since habits are for the sake of acts. But it is impossible to perform any action continuously in this life. Therefore, it is impossible for man in this life to be entirely happy.
Item. Quanto aliquid est magis desideratum et dilectum, tanto eius amissio maiorem dolorem vel tristitiam affert. Felicitas autem maxime desideratur et amatur. Maxime igitur eius amissio tristitiam habet. Sed si sit in hac vita ultima felicitas, certum est quod amitteretur, saltem per mortem. Et non est certum utrum duratura sit usque ad mortem: cum cuilibet homini possibile sit in hac vita accidere morbos quibus totaliter ab operatione virtutis impeditur, sicut phrenesim et alios huiusmodi, quibus impeditur rationis usus. Semper igitur talis felicitas habebit tristitiam naturaliter annexam. Non erit igitur perfecta felicitas. [8] Furthermore, the more a thing is desired and loved, the more does its loss bring sorrow and sadness. Now, felicity is what is most desired and loved. Therefore, its loss holds the greatest prospect of sorrow. But, if ultimate felicity were possible in this life, it is certain that it would be lost, at least by death. And it is not certain whether it would last until death, since for any man in this life there is the possibility of sickness, by which he may be completely impeded from the work of virtue: such things as mental illness and the like, by which the use of reason is halted. So, such felicity always will have sorrow naturally associated with it. Therefore, it will not be perfect felicity.
Potest autem aliquis dicere quod, cum felicitas sit bonum intellectualis naturae, perfecta et vera felicitas est illorum in quibus natura intellectualis perfecta invenitur, idest in substantiis separatis: in hominibus autem invenitur imperfecta, per modum participationis cuiusdam. Ad veritatem enim intelligendam plene, non nisi per quendam inquisitionis motum pertingere possunt; et ad ea quae sunt secundum naturam maxime intelligibilia, omnino deficiunt, sicut ex dictis patet. Unde nec felicitas, secundum suam perfectam rationem, potest hominibus adesse: sed aliquid ipsius participant, etiam in hac vita. Et haec videtur fuisse sententia Aristotelis de felicitate. Unde in I Ethicorum, ubi inquirit utrum infortunia tollant felicitatem, ostenso quod felicitas sit in operibus virtutis, quae maxime permanentes in hac vita esse videntur, concludit illos quibus talis perfectio in hac vita adest, esse beatos ut homines, quasi non simpliciter ad felicitatem pertingentes, sed modo humano. [9] However, someone may say that, since felicity is a good of intellectual nature, perfect and true felicity belongs to those beings in whom a perfect intellectual nature is found, that is, to separate substances, but that in man there is found an imperfect happiness, in the manner of some sort of participation. For, in regard to the full understanding of truth, men can attain it only through enquiry, and they are utterly deficient in regard to objects which are most intelligible in their nature, as is clear from what we have said. And so, felicity in its perfect character cannot be present in men, but they may participate somewhat in it, even in this life. And this seems to have been Aristotle’s view on felicity. Hence, in Ethics I, where he asks whether misfortunes take away happiness, having shown that felicity consists in the works of virtue which seem to be most enduring in this life, he concludes that those men for whom such perfection in this life is possible are happy as men, as if they bad not attained felicity absolutely, but merely in human fashion.
Quod autem praedicta responsio rationes praemissas non evacuet ostendendum est. [10] Now, we have to show that the foregoing reply does not invalidate the arguments which we have given above.
Homo enim etsi naturae ordine substantiis separatis sit inferior, creaturis tamen irrationabilibus superior est. Perfectiori igitur modo suum finem ultimum consequitur quam illa. Illa vero sic perfecte suum finem ultimum consequuntur quod nihil aliud quaerunt: grave enim, cum fuerit in suo ubi, quiescit; animalia etiam cum fruuntur delectabilibus secundum sensum, eorum naturale desiderium quietatur. Oportet igitur multo fortius quod, cum homo pervenerit ad suum finem ultimum, naturale eius desiderium quietetur. Sed hoc non potest fieri in vita ista. Ergo homo non consequitur felicitatem, prout est finis proprius eius, in hac vita, ut ostensum est. Oportet ergo quod consequatur post hanc vitam. Indeed, though man is by nature inferior to separate substances, he is nonetheless superior to irrational creatures. So, he attains his ultimate end in a more perfect way than they do. They achieve their ultimate end with such perfection because they seek nothing else, for the heavy thing comes to rest when it has occupied its own place; and even in the case of animals, when they enjoy sensual pleasures their natural desire is at rest. So, it is much more necessary for man’s natural desire to come to rest when he has reached his ultimate end. But this cannot come about in this life. Therefore, man does not attain felicity, understood as his proper end, during this life, as we have shown. Therefore, he must attain it after this life.
Adhuc. Impossibile est naturale desiderium esse inane: natura enim nihil facit frustra. Esset autem inane desiderium naturae si nunquam posset impleri. Est igitur implebile desiderium naturale hominis. Non autem in hac vita, ut ostensum est. Oportet igitur quod impleatur post hanc vitam. Est igitur felicitas ultima hominis post hanc vitam. [11] Again, it is impossible for natural desire to be unfulfilled, since “nature does nothing in vain.”“ Now, natural desire would be in vain if it could never be fulfilled. Therefore, man’s natural desire is capable of fulfillment, but not in this life, as we have shown. So, it must be fulfilled after this life. Therefore, man’s ultimate felicity comes after this life.
Amplius. Quandiu aliquid movetur ad perfectionem, nondum est in ultimo fine. Sed omnes homines in cognoscendo veritatem semper se habent ut moti et tendentes ad perfectionem: quia illi qui sequuntur, superinveniunt aliqua illis quae a prioribus sunt inventa, sicut etiam dicitur in II metaphysicae. Non igitur homines in cognitione veritatis sic se habent quasi in ultimo fine existentes. Cum igitur in speculatione, per quam quaeritur cognitio veritatis, maxime videatur ultima felicitas hominis in hac vita consistere, sicut etiam ipse Aristoteles probat in X Eth., impossibile est dicere quod homo in hac vita ultimum suum finem consequatur. [12] Besides, as long as anything is in motion toward perfection, it is not yet at the ultimate end. But all men, while learning the truth, are always disposed as beings in motion, and as tending toward perfection, because men who come later make other discoveries, over and above those found out by earlier men, as is also stated in Metaphysics II [1: 993a 31]. So, men in the process of learning the truth are not situated as if they were at the ultimate end. Thus, since man’s ultimate felicity in this life seems mainly to consist in speculation, whereby the knowledge of the truth is sought, as Aristotle himself proves in Ethics X [7: 1177a 18], it is impossible to say that man achieves his ultimate end in this life.
Praeterea. Omne quod est in potentia, intendit exire in actum. Quandiu igitur non est ex toto factum in actu, non est in suo fine ultimo. Intellectus autem noster est in potentia ad omnes formas rerum cognoscendas: reducitur autem in actum cum aliquam earum cognoscit. Ergo non erit ex toto in actu, nec in ultimo suo fine, nisi quando omnia, saltem ista materialia, cognoscit. Sed hoc non potest homo assequi per scientias speculativas, quibus in hac vita veritatem cognoscimus. Non est igitur possibile quod ultima felicitas hominis sit in hac vita. [13] Moreover, everything that is in potency tends to proceed into act. So, as long as it is not made wholly actual, it is not at its ultimate end. Now, our intellect is in potency in regard to all the forms of things to be known, and it is reduced to act when it knows any one of them. So, it will not be wholly in act, nor at its ultimate end, until it knows all things, at least all these material things. But man cannot achieve this through the speculative sciences, through which he knows truth in this life. Therefore, it is not possible for man’s ultimate felicity to be in this life.
Propter has autem et huiusmodi rationes, Alexander et Averroes posuerunt ultimam hominis felicitatem non esse in cognitione humana, quae est per scientias speculativas, sed per continuationem cum substantia separata, quam esse credebant possibilem homini in hac vita. Quia vero Aristoteles vidit quod non est alia cognitio hominis in hac vita quam per scientias speculativas, posuit hominem non consequi felicitatem perfectam, sed suo modo. [14] For these and like reasons, Alexander and Averroes claimed that man’s ultimate felicity does not consist in the human knowledge which comes through the speculative sciences, but through a connection with a separate substance, which they believed to be possible for man in this life. But, since Aristotle saw that there is no other knowledge for man in this life than through the speculative sciences, he maintained that man does not achieve perfect felicity, but only a limited kind.
In quo satis apparet quantam angustiam patiebantur hinc inde eorum praeclara ingenia. A quibus angustiis liberabimur si ponamus, secundum probationes praemissas, hominem ad veram felicitatem post hanc vitam pervenire posse, anima hominis immortali existente in quo statu anima intelliget per modum quo intelligunt substantiae separatae, sicut in secundo huius operis ostensum est. [15] On this point there is abundant evidence of how even the brilliant minds of these men suffered from the narrowness of their viewpoint. From which narrow attitudes we shall be freed if we grant in accord with the foregoing proofs that man can reach true felicity after this life, when man’s soul is existing immortally; in which state the soul will understand in the way that separate substances understand, as we showed in Book Two [81] of this work.
Erit igitur ultima felicitas hominis in cognitione Dei quam habet humana mens post hanc vitam, per modum quo ipsum cognoscunt substantiae separatae. Propter quod, Matth. 5-12, dominus mercedem nobis in caelis promittit; et Matth. 22-30, dicit quod sancti erunt sicut Angeli, qui vident semper Deum in caelis, ut dicitur Matth. 18-10. [16] And so, man’s ultimate felicity will lie in the knowledge of God that the human mind has after this life, according to the way in which separate substances know Him. For which reason our Lord promises us “a reward in heaven” and says that the saints “shall be as the angels... who always see God in heaven,” as it is said (Matt 5:12; 22:30; 18:10).

Caput 49
Quod substantiae separatae non vident Deum per essentiam ex hoc quod cognoscunt eum per suam essentiam
Chapter 49
Oportet autem inquirere utrum haec ipsa cognitio qua substantiae separatae, et animae post mortem, cognoscunt Deum per suas essentias, sufficiat ad ipsarum ultimam felicitatem. [1] Moreover, we must inquire whether this knowledge whereby the separate substances and the soul after death know God, through their own essences, suffices for their ultimate felicity.
Ad cuius veritatis indaginem, primo ostendendum est quod per talem modum cognitionis non cognoscitur divina essentia. [2] The first thing to be done, in investigating the truth of this question, is to show that the divine essence is not known through such a type of knowledge.
Contingit enim ex effectu cognoscere causam multipliciter. Uno modo, secundum quod effectus sumitur ut medium ad cognoscendum de causa quod sit, et quod talis sit: sicut accidit in scientiis, quae causam demonstrant per effectum. Alio modo, ita quod in ipso effectu videatur causa, inquantum similitudo causae resultat in effectu: sicut homo videtur in speculo propter suam similitudinem. Et differt hic modus a primo. Nam in primo sunt duae cognitiones, effectus et causae, quarum una est alterius causa: nam cognitio effectus est causa quod cognoscatur eius causa. In modo autem secundo una est visio utriusque: simul enim dum videtur effectus, videtur et causa in ipso. Tertio modo, ita quod ipsa similitudo causae in effectu sit forma qua cognoscit causam suus effectus: sicut si arca haberet intellectum, et per formam suam cognosceret artem a qua talis forma, velut eius similitudo, processit. Nullo autem istorum modorum per effectum potest cognosci de causa quid est, nisi sit effectus causae adaequatus, in quo tota virtus causae exprimatur. [3] In fact, it is possible to know a cause from its effect, in many ways. One way is to take the effect as a means of finding out, concerning the cause, that it exists and that it is of a certain kind. This occurs in the sciences which demonstrate the cause through the effect. Another way is to see the cause in the effect itself, according as the likeness of the cause is reflected in the effect; thus a man may be seen in a mirror, by virtue of his likeness. And this way is different from the first. In fact, in the first way there are two cognitions, one of the effect and one of the cause, and one is the cause of the other; for the knowledge of the effect is the cause of the knowing of its cause. But in the second way there is one vision of both, since at the same time that the effect is seen the cause is also seen in it. A third way is such that the very likeness of the cause, in its effect, is the form by which the effect knows its own cause. For instance, suppose a box had an intellect, and so knew through its form the skilled mind from which such a form proceeded as a likeness of that mind. Now, it is not possible in any of these ways to know from the effect what the cause is, unless the effect be adequate to the cause, one in which the entire virtuality of the cause is expressed.
Substantiae autem separatae cognoscunt Deum per suas substantias sicut causa cognoscitur per effectum: non autem primo modo, quia sic eorum cognitio esset discursiva, sed secundo modo, inquantum una videt Deum in alia; et modo tertio, inquantum quaelibet earum videt Deum in seipsa. Nulla autem earum est effectus adaequans virtutem Dei, ut in secundo libro ostensum est. Non est igitur possibile quod per hunc modum cognitionis ipsam divinam essentiam videant. [4] Now, separate substances know God through their substances, as a cause is known through its effect; not, of course, in the first way, for then their knowledge would be discursive; but in the second way, according as one substance sees God in another; and also in the third way, according as any one of them sees God within itself. Now, none of them is an effect adequately representing the power of God, as we showed in Book Two [22ff]. So, it is impossible for them to see the divine essence itself by this kind of knowledge.
Amplius. Similitudo intelligibilis per quam intelligitur aliquid secundum suam substantiam, oportet quod sit eiusdem speciei, vel magis species eius; sicut forma domus quae est in mente artificis, est eiusdem speciei cum forma domus quae est in materia, vel potius species eius; non enim per speciem hominis intelligitur de asino vel equo quid est. Sed ipsa natura substantiae separatae non est idem specie cum natura divina, quinimmo nec genere, ut in primo libro ostensum est. Non est igitur possibile quod substantia separata intelligat divinam substantiam per propriam naturam. [5] Besides, the intelligible likeness through which a thing is understood in its substance must be of the same species or, rather, of an identical species; as the form of the house which exists in the mind of the artisan is of the same species as the form of the house which exists in matter, or, rather, the species are identical; for one is not going to understand what a donkey or a horse is through the species of a man. But the nature of a separate substance is not the same in species as the divine nature, not even the same in genus, as we showed in Book One [25]. Therefore, it is not possible for a separate substance, through its own nature, to understand the divine substance.
Item. Omne creatum ad aliquod genus vel speciem terminatur. Divina autem essentia est infinita, comprehendens in se omnem perfectionem totius esse, ut in primo libro ostensum est. Impossibile est igitur quod per aliquid creatum divina substantia videatur. [6] Furthermore, every created thing is limited to some genus or species. But the divine essence is unlimited, comprehending within itself every perfection in the whole of existing being, as we showed in Book One [28, 43]. Therefore, it is impossible for the divine substance to be seen through any created being.
Praeterea. Omnis intelligibilis species per quam intelligitur quidditas vel essentia alicuius rei, comprehendit in repraesentando rem illam: unde et orationes significantes quod quid est terminos et definitiones vocamus. Impossibile est autem quod aliqua similitudo creata taliter Deum repraesentet: cum quaelibet similitudo creata sit alicuius generis determinati, non autem Deus, ut in primo ostensum est. Non est igitur possibile quod per aliquam similitudinem creatam divina substantia intelligatur. [7] Moreover, every intelligible species whereby the quiddity or essence of any thing is understood comprehends that thing while representing it; consequently, we call words signifying what such a thing is terms and definitions. But it is impossible for a created likeness to represent God in this way, since every created likeness belongs to a definite genus, while God does not, as we explained in Book One [25]. Therefore, it is not possible for the divine substance to be understood through a created likeness.
Amplius. Divina substantia est suum esse ut in primo ostensum est. Ipsum autem esse substantiae separatae est aliud quam sua substantia, ut in secundo probatum est. Essentia igitur substantiae separatae non est sufficiens medium quo Deus per essentiam videri possit. [8] Furthermore, divine substance is its own existing being, as we showed in Book One [22]. But the being of separate substance is other than its substance, as we proved in Book Two [52]. Therefore, the essence of a separate substance is not an adequate medium whereby God could be seen essentially.
Cognoscit tamen substantia separata per suam substantiam de Deo quia est; et quod est omnium causa; et eminentem omnibus; et remotum ab omnibus, non solum quae sunt, sed etiam quae mente creata concipi possunt. Ad quam etiam cognitionem de Deo nos utcumque pertingere possumus: per effectus enim de Deo cognoscimus quia est et quod causa aliorum est, aliis supereminens, et ab omnibus remotus. Et hoc est ultimum et perfectissimum nostrae cognitionis in hac vita, ut Dionysius dicit, in libro de mystica theologia, cum Deo quasi ignoto coniungimur: quod quidem contingit dum de eo quid non sit cognoscimus, quid vero sit penitus manet ignotum. Unde et ad huius sublimissimae cognitionis ignorantiam demonstrandam, de Moyse dicitur, Exodi 20-21, quod accessit ad caliginem in qua est Deus. [9] However a separate substance does know through its own substance that God is, and that He is the cause of all things, that He is eminent above all and set apart from all, not only from things which exist, but also from things which can be conceived by the created mind. Even we are able to reach this knowledge of God, in some sense; for we know through His effects, that God is, and that He is the cause of other beings, that He is supereminent over other things and set apart from all. And this is the ultimate and most perfect limit of our knowledge in this life, as Dionysius says in Mystical Theology. “We are united with God as the Unknown.” Indeed, this is the situation, for, while we know of God what He is not, what He is remains quite unknown. Hence, to manifest his ignorance of this sublime knowledge, it is said of Moses that “he went to the dark cloud wherein God was” (Exod. 20:21).
Quia vero natura inferior in sui summo non nisi ad infimum superioris naturae attingit oportet quod haec ipsa cognitio sit eminentior in substantiis separatis quam in nobis. Quod per singula patet. Nam quanto propinquior et expressior alicuius causae effectus cognoscitur, tanto evidentius apparet de causa eius quod sit. Substantiae autem separatae, quae per seipsas Deum cognoscunt, sunt propinquiores effectus, et expressius Dei similitudinem gerentes, quam effectus per quos nos Deum cognoscimus. Certius ergo sciunt substantiae separatae et clarius quam nos, quod Deus est. [10] Now, since a lower nature only touches with its highest part the lowest part of the next higher nature, this knowledge must be more eminent in separate substances than in us. This becomes evident in a detailed consideration. For, the more closely and definitely we know the effect of a cause, the more evident does it become that its cause exists. Now, separate substances, which know God through themselves, are nearer effects and more definite bearers of the likeness of God than the effects through which we know God. Therefore, the separate substances know more certainly and clearly than we that God is.
Rursus: cum per negationes ad propriam cognitionem rei quoquo modo deveniatur, ut supra dictum est, quanto plura et magis propinqua quis ab aliquo remota esse cognoverit, tanto magis ad propriam ipsius cognitionem accedit: sicut magis accedit ad propriam hominis cognitionem qui scit eum non esse neque inanimatum neque insensibilem, quam qui scit solum eum non esse inanimatum, licet neuter sciat de homine quid sit. Substantiae autem separatae plura cognoscunt quam nos, et quae sunt Deo magis propinqua: et per consequens suo intellectu plura et magis propinqua a Deo removent quam nos. Magis igitur accedunt ad propriam ipsius cognitionem quam nos: licet nec ipsae, per hoc quod seipsas intelligunt, divinam substantiam videant. Again, since it is possible to come in some way to the proper knowledge of a thing by means of negations, as we said above, the more a person can know that a large number of closely related things are set apart from an object, the more does one approach toward a proper knowledge of it. For instance, one approaches closer to a proper knowledge of man when he knows that he is neither an inanimate, nor an insensitive, being than when one merely knows that he is not inanimate; even though neither of them makes it known what man is. Now, separate substances know more things than we do, and things that are closer to God; consequently, in their understanding, they set apart from God more things, and more intimately related things, than we do. So, they approach more closely to a proper knowledge of Him than we do, although even these substances do not see the divine substance by means of their understanding of themselves.
Item: tanto aliquis alicuius altitudinem magis novit, quanto altioribus scit eum esse praelatum: sicut, etsi rusticus sciat regem esse summum in regno, quia tamen non cognoscit nisi quaedam infima regni officia, cum quibus aliquid habet negotii, non ita cognoscit regis eminentiam sicut aliquis qui omnium principum regni dignitates novit, quibus scit regem esse praelatum; quamvis neuter altitudinem regiae dignitatis comprehendat. Nos autem nescimus nisi quaedam infima entium. Licet ergo sciamus Deum omnibus entibus eminere, non tamen ita cognoscimus eminentiam divinam sicut substantiae separatae, quibus altissimi rerum ordines noti sunt, et eis omnibus superiorem Deum esse cognoscunt. Also, the more one knows how a man is placed in authority over people in higher positions, the more does one know the high position of this man. Thus, though a rustic may know that the king occupies the highest office in the kingdom, since he is acquainted only with some of the lowest official positions in the kingdom with which he may have some business, he does not know the eminence of the king in the way that another man does who is acquainted with all the leading dignitaries of the kingdom and knows that the king holds authority over them; even though neither type of lower office comprehends the exalted position appropriate to the dignity of the king. Of course, we are in ignorance, except in regard to the lowest types of beings. So, although we may know that God is higher than all beings, we do not know the divine eminence as separate substances do, for the highest orders of beings are known to them, and they know that God is superior to all of them.
Ulterius: manifestum est quod causalitas alicuius causae, et virtus eius, tanto magis cognoscitur, quanto plures et maiores eius effectus innotescunt. Ex quo manifestum fit quod substantiae separatae causalitatem Dei et eius virtutem magis cognoscunt quam nos, licet nos omnium entium eum esse causam sciamus. Finally, it is obvious that the more the large number, and great importance, of the effects of a cause become known, the more does the causality of the cause, and its power, become known. As a result, it becomes manifest that separate substances know the causality of God, and His power, better than we do; even though we know that He is the cause of all beings.

Caput 50
Quod in naturali cognitione quam habent substantiae separatae de Deo non quiescit earum naturale desiderium
Chapter 50
Non potest autem esse quod in tali Dei cognitione quiescat naturale desiderium substantiae separatae. [1] However, it is impossible for the natural desire in separate substances to come to rest in such a knowledge of God.
Omne enim quod est imperfectum in aliqua specie, desiderat consequi perfectionem speciei illius: qui enim habet opinionem de re aliqua, quae est imperfecta illius rei notitia, ex hoc ipso incitatur ad desiderandum illius rei scientiam. Praedicta autem cognitio quam substantiae separatae habent de Deo, non cognoscentes ipsius substantiam, est imperfecta cognitionis species: non enim arbitramur nos aliquid cognoscere si substantiam eius non cognoscamus; unde et praecipuum in cognitione alicuius rei est scire de ea quid est. Ex hac igitur cognitione quam habent substantiae separatae de Deo, non quiescit naturale desiderium, sed incitatur magis ad divinam substantiam videndam. [2] For everything that is an imperfect member of any species desires to attain the perfection of its species. For instance, a man who has an opinion regarding something, that is, an imperfect knowledge of the thing, is thereby aroused to desire knowledge of the thing. Now, the aforementioned knowledge which the separate substances have of God, without knowing His substance, is an imperfect species of knowledge. In fact, we do not think that we know a thing if we do not know its substance. Hence, it is most important, in knowing a thing, to know what it is. Therefore, natural desire does not come to rest as a result of this knowledge which separate substances have of God; rather, it further arouses the desire to see the divine substance.
Item. Ex cognitione effectuum incitatur desiderium ad cognoscendum causam: unde homines philosophari incoeperunt causas rerum inquirentes. Non quiescit igitur sciendi desiderium, naturaliter omnibus substantiis intellectualibus inditum, nisi, cognitis substantiis effectuum, etiam substantiam causae cognoscant. Per hoc igitur quod substantiae separatae cognoscunt omnium rerum quarum substantias vident, esse Deum causam, non quiescit desiderium naturale in ipsis, nisi etiam ipsius Dei substantiam videant. [3] Again, as a result of knowing the effects, the desire to know their cause is aroused; thus, men began to philosophize when they investigated the causes of things.” Therefore, the desire to know, which is naturally implanted in all intellectual substances, does not rest until, after they have come to know the substances of the effects, they also know the substance of the cause. The fact, then, that separate substances know that God is the cause of all things whose substances they see, does not mean that natural desire comes to rest in them, unless they also see the substance of God Himself.
Adhuc. Sicut se habet quaestio propter quid ad quaestionem quia, ita se habet quaestio quid est ad quaestionem an est: nam quaestio propter quid quaerit medium ad demonstrandum quia est aliquid, puta quod luna eclipsatur; et similiter quaestio quid est quaerit medium ad demonstrandum an est, secundum doctrinam traditam in II posteriorum. Videmus autem quod videntes quia est aliquid, naturaliter scire desiderant propter quid. Ergo et cognoscentes an est aliquid, naturaliter scire desiderant quid est ipsum, quod est intelligere eius substantiam. Non igitur quietatur naturale sciendi desiderium in cognitione Dei qua scitur de ipso solum quia est. [4] Besides, the problem of why something is so is related to the problem of whether it is so, in the same way that an inquiry as to what something is stands in regard to an inquiry as to whether it exists. For the question why looks for a means to demonstrate that something is so, for instance, that there is an eclipse of the moon; likewise, the question what is it seeks a means to demonstrate that something exists, according to the traditional teaching in Posterior Analytics II [1: 89b 22]. Now, we observe that those who see that something is so naturally desire to know why. So, too, those acquainted with the fact that something exists naturally desire to know what this thing is, and this is to understand its substance. Therefore, the natural desire to know does not rest in that knowledge of God whereby we know merely that He is.
Amplius. Nihil finitum desiderium intellectus quietare potest. Quod exinde ostenditur quod intellectus, quolibet finito dato, aliquid ultra molitur: unde qualibet linea finita data, aliquam maiorem molitur apprehendere, et similiter in numeris; et haec est ratio infinitae additionis in numeris et lineis mathematicis. Altitudo autem et virtus cuiuslibet substantiae creatae finita est. Non igitur intellectus substantiae separatae quiescit per hoc quod cognoscit substantias creatas quantumcumque eminentes, sed adhuc naturali desiderio tendit ad intelligendum substantiam quae est altitudinis infinitae, ut in primo libro ostensum est de substantia divina. [5] Furthermore, nothing finite can fully satisfy intellectual desire. This is shown from the fact that, whenever a finite object is presented, the intellect extends its interest to something more, so that, given any finite line, it strives to apprehend a longer one; and the same thing takes place in regard to numbers. This is the reason for infinite series in numbers and in mathematical lines. Now, the eminence and power of any created substance are finite. Therefore, the intellect of a separate substance does not come to rest simply because it knows created substances, however lofty they may be, but it still tends by natural desire toward the understanding of substance which is of infinite eminence, as we showed concerning divine substance in Book One [43].
Praeterea. Sicut naturale desiderium inest omnibus intellectualibus naturis ad sciendum, ita inest eis naturale desiderium ignorantiam seu nescientiam pellendi. Substantiae autem separatae, sicut iam dictum est, cognoscunt, praedicto cognitionis modo, substantiam Dei esse supra se et supra omne id quod ab eis intelligitur: et per consequens sciunt divinam substantiam sibi esse ignotam. Tendit igitur naturale ipsorum desiderium ad intelligendum divinam substantiam. [6] Moreover, just as the natural desire to know is present in all intellectual natures, so is there present in them the natural desire to put off ignorance and lack of knowledge. Now, the separate substances know, as we have said, by the aforesaid mode of knowledge, that the substance of God is above them and above everything understood by them; consequently, they know that the divine substance is unknown to them. Therefore, their natural desire tends toward the understanding of divine substance.
Item. Quanto aliquid est fini propinquius, tanto maiori desiderio tendit ad finem: unde videmus quod motus naturalis corporum in fine intenditur. Intellectus autem substantiarum separatarum propinquiores sunt divinae cognitioni quam noster intellectus. Intensius igitur desiderant Dei cognitionem quam nos. Nos autem, quantumcumque sciamus Deum esse, et alia quae supra dicta sunt, non quiescimus desiderio, sed adhuc desideramus eum per essentiam suam cognoscere. Multo igitur magis substantiae separatae hoc naturaliter desiderant. Non igitur in cognitione Dei praedicta earum desiderium quietatur. [7] Besides, the nearer a thing comes to its end, the greater is the desire by which it tends to the end; thus, we observe that the natural motion of bodies is increased toward the end. Now, the intellects of separate substances are nearer to the knowledge of God than our intellects are. So, they desire the knowledge of God more intensely than we do. But, no matter how fully we know that God exists, and the other things mentioned above, we do not cease our desire, but still desire to know Him through His essence. Much more, then, do the separate substances desire this naturally. Therefore, their desire does not come to rest in the aforesaid knowledge of God.,
Ex quibus concluditur quod ultima felicitas substantiae separatae non est in illa cognitione Dei qua eum cognoscunt per suas substantias: cum adhuc earum desiderium ducat eas usque ad Dei substantiam. [8] The conclusion from these considerations is that the ultimate felicity of separate substances does not lie in the knowledge of God, in which they know Him through their substances, for their desire still leads them on toward God’s substance.
In quo etiam satis apparet quod in nullo alio quaerenda est ultima felicitas quam in operatione intellectus: cum nullum desiderium tam in sublime ferat sicut desiderium intelligendae veritatis. Omnia namque nostra desideria vel delectationis, vel cuiuscumque alterius quod ab homine desideratur, in aliis rebus quiescere possunt: desiderium autem praedictum non quiescit nisi ad summum rerum cardinem et factorem Deum pervenerit. Propter quod convenienter sapientia dicit, Eccli. 24-7: ego in altissimis habitavi, et thronus meus in columna nubis. Et Proverb. 9-3 dicitur quod sapientia per ancillas suas vocat ad arcem. Erubescant igitur qui felicitatem hominis, tam altissime sitam, in infimis rebus quaerunt. [9] Also, quite apparent in this conclusion is the fact that ultimate felicity is to be sought in nothing other than an operation of the intellect, since no desire carries on to such sublime heights as the desire to understand the truth. Indeed, all our desires for pleasure, or other things of this sort that are craved by men, can be satisfied with other things, but the aforementioned desire does not rest until it reaches God, the highest point of reference for, and the maker of, things. This is why Wisdom appropriately states: “I dwelt in the highest places, and my throne is in a pillar of a cloud” (Sirach 24:7). And Proverbs (9:3) says that Wisdom “by her maids invites to the tower.” Let those men be ashamed, then, who seek man’s felicity in the most inferior things, when it is so highly situated.

Caput 51
Quomodo Deus per essentiam videatur
Chapter 51
Cum autem impossibile sit naturale desiderium esse inane, quod quidem esset si non esset possibile pervenire ad divinam substantiam intelligendam, quod naturaliter omnes mentes desiderant; necesse est dicere quod possibile sit substantiam Dei videri per intellectum, et a substantiis intellectualibus separatis, et ab animabus nostris. [1] Since it is impossible for a natural desire to be incapable of fulfillment, and since it would be so, if it were not possible to reach an understanding of divine substance such as all minds naturally desire, we must say that it is possible for the substance of God to be seen intellectually, both by separate intellectual substances and by our souls.
Modus autem huius visionis satis iam ex dictis qualis esse debeat, apparet. Ostensum enim est supra quod divina substantia non potest videri per intellectum aliqua specie creata. Unde oportet, si Dei essentia videatur, quod per ipsammet essentiam divinam intellectus ipsam videat: ut sit in tali visione divina essentia et quod videtur, et quo videtur. [2] It is already sufficiently apparent from what we have said what should be the mode of this vision. For we showed above that the divine substance cannot be seen intellectually by means of any created species. Consequently, if the divine essence is seen, it must be done as His intellect sees the divine essence itself through itself, and in such a vision the divine essence must be both what is seen and that whereby it is seen.
Cum autem intellectus substantiam aliquam intelligere non possit nisi fiat actu secundum aliquam speciem informantem ipsum quae sit similitudo rei intellectae, impossibile videri potest alicui quod per essentiam divinam intellectus creatus possit videre ipsam Dei substantiam quasi per quandam speciem intelligibilem: cum divina essentia sit quiddam per seipsum subsistens; et in primo ostensum sit quod Deus nullius potest esse forma. [3] Now, since the created intellect cannot understand any substance unless it becomes actual by means of some species, which is the likeness of the thing understood, informing it, a person might consider it impossible for a created intellect to be able to see, by means of the divine essence serving as a sort of intelligible species, the very substance of God. For the divine essence is a certain being subsisting through itself, and we showed in Book One [26] that God cannot be a form for any other being.
Ad huius igitur intelligentiam veritatis, considerandum est quod substantia quae est per seipsam subsistens, est vel forma tantum, vel compositum ex materia et forma. Illud igitur quod ex materia et forma compositum est, non potest alterius esse forma: quia forma in eo est iam contracta ad illam materiam, ut alterius rei forma esse non possit. Illud autem quod sic est subsistens ut tamen solum sit forma, potest alterius esse forma, dummodo esse suum sit tale quod ab aliquo alio participari possit, sicut in secundo ostendimus de anima humana. Si vero esse suum ab altero participari non posset, nullius rei forma esse posset: sic enim per suum esse determinatur in seipso, sicut quae sunt materialia per materiam. [4] In order to understand the truth of this matter, we must consider that self-subsistent substance is either a form only, or a composite of matter and form. And a thing composed of matter and form cannot be the form of another being, because the form in it is already limited to this matter in such a way that it could not be the form of another thing. But a being which subsists in such a way that it is a form only can be the form of another, provided its being is such that it could be participated by that other thing, as we showed concerning the human soul, in Book Two [68]. However, if its being could not be participated by another, it could not be the form of any other thing, for then it would be determined within itself by its own being, just as material things are by their own matter.
Hoc autem, sicut in esse substantiali vel naturali invenitur, sic et in esse intelligibili considerandum est. Cum enim intellectus perfectio sit verum, illud intelligibile erit ut forma tantum in genere intelligibilium quod est veritas ipsa. Quod convenit soli Deo nam cum verum sequatur ad esse, illud tantum sua veritas est quod est suum esse, quod est proprium soli Deo, ut in secundo ostensum est. Alia igitur intelligibilia subsistentia sunt non ut pura forma in genere intelligibilium, sed ut formam in subiecto aliquo habentes: est enim unumquodque eorum verum, non veritas; sicut et est ens, non autem ipsum esse. Now, this should be observed as obtaining in the same way in the order of intelligible being as it does in substantial or physical being. For, since the perfection of the intellect is what is true, in the order of intelligible objects, that object which is a purely formal intelligible will be truth itself. And this characteristic applies only to God, for, since the true is consequent on being, that alone is its own truth which is its own being. But this is proper to God only, as we showed in Book Two [15]. So, other intelligible subsistents do not exist as pure forms in the order of intelligible beings, but as possessors of a form in some subject. In fact, each of them is a true thing but not truth, just as each is a being but not the very act of being.
Manifestum est igitur quod essentia divina potest comparari ad intellectum creatum ut species intelligibilis qua intelligit: quod non contingit de essentia alicuius alterius substantiae separatae. Nec tamen potest esse forma alterius rei secundum esse naturale: sequeretur enim quod, simul cum alio iuncta, constitueret unam naturam; quod esse non potest, cum essentia divina in se perfecta sit in sui natura. Species autem intelligibilis, unita intellectui, non constituit aliquam naturam, sed perficit ipsum ad intelligendum: quod perfectioni divinae essentiae non repugnat. So, it is manifest that the divine essence may be related to the created intellect as an intelligible species by which it understands, but this does not apply to the essence of any other separate substance. Yet, it cannot be the form of another thing in its natural being, for the result of this would be that, once joined to another thing, it would make up one nature. This could not be, since the divine essence is in itself perfect in its own nature. But an intelligible species,(united with an intellect, does not make up a nature; rather, it perfects the intellect for the act of understanding, and this is not incompatible with the perfection of the divine essence.
Haec igitur visio immediata Dei repromittitur nobis in Scriptura, I Cor. 13-12: videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate: tunc autem facie ad faciem. Quod corporali modo nefas est intelligere, ut in ipsa divinitate corporalem faciem imaginemur: cum ostensum sit Deum incorporeum esse; neque etiam sit possibile ut nostra corporali facie Deum videamus, cum visus corporalis, qui in facie nostra residet, non nisi rerum corporalium esse possit. Sic igitur facie ad faciem Deum videbimus, quia immediate eum videbimus, sicut hominem quem facie ad faciem videmus. [5] This immediate vision of God is promised us in Scripture: “We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face” (1 Cor. 13:12). It is wrong to understand this in a corporeal way, picturing in our imagination a bodily face of the Divinity, since we have shown that God is incorporeal. Nor is it even possible for us to see God with our bodily face, for the power of corporeal vision, which is associated with our face, can only apply to corporeal things. Thus, then, shall we see God face to face, in the sense that we shall see Him without a medium, as is true when we see a man face to face.
Secundum autem hanc visionem maxime Deo assimilamur, et eius beatitudinis participes sumus: nam ipse Deus per suam essentiam suam substantiam intelligit, et haec est eius felicitas. Unde dicitur I Ioan. 3-2: cum autem apparuerit, similes ei erimus et videbimus eum sicuti est. Et Luc. 22, dominus dicit: ego dispono vobis sicut disposuit mihi pater meus mensam, ut edatis et bibatis super mensam meam in regno meo. Quod quidem non de corporali cibo vel potu intelligi potest, sed de eo qui in mensa sapientiae sumitur, de quo a sapientia dicitur, Proverb. 9-5: comedite panes meos, et bibite vinum quod miscui vobis. Super mensam ergo Dei manducant et bibunt qui eadem felicitate fruuntur qua Deus felix est, videntes eum illo modo quo ipse videt seipsum. [6] In this vision, of course, we become most like unto God, and we are partakers in His happiness. For God Himself understands His own substance through His own essence; and this is His felicity. Hence it is said: “When He shall appear, we shall be like to Him, because we shall see Him as He is” (1 John 3:2). And the Lord says “I dispose to you, as My Father has disposed to me... my table, that you may eat and drink at my table, in my kingdom” (Luke 22:29-30). Of course, this can be understood not in reference to corporeal food or drink, but to Him who is received at the table of Wisdom, of whom Wisdom speaks: “Eat My bread and drink the wine which I have mingled for you” (Proverbs 9:5). And so, may they who enjoy the same felicity whereby God is happy eat and drink at God’s table, seeing Him in the way that lie sees Himself.

Caput 52
Quod nulla creata substantia potest sua naturali virtute pervenire ad videndum Deum per essentiam
Chapter 52
Non est autem possibile quod ad illum visionis divinae modum aliqua creata substantia ex virtute propria possit attingere. [1] However, it is not possible for any created substance, by its own power, to be able to attain this manner of divine vision.
Quod enim est superioris naturae proprium, non potest consequi natura inferior nisi per actionem superioris naturae cuius est proprium: sicut aqua non potest esse calida nisi per actionem ignis. Videre autem Deum per ipsam essentiam divinam est proprium naturae divinae: operari enim per propriam formam est proprium cuiuslibet operantis. Nulla igitur intellectualis substantia potest videre Deum per ipsam divinam essentiam nisi Deo hoc faciente. [2] Indeed, a lower nature cannot acquire that which is proper to a higher nature except through the action of the higher nature to which the property belongs. For instance, water cannot be hot except through the action of fire. Now, to see God through His divine essence is proper to the divine nature, for it is the special prerogative of any agent to perform its operation through its own form. So, no intellectual substance can see God through His divine essence unless God is the agent of this operation.
Amplius. Forma alicuius propria non fit alterius nisi eo agente: agens enim facit sibi simile inquantum formam suam alteri communicat. Videre autem substantiam Dei impossibile est nisi ipsa divina essentia sit forma intellectus qua intelligit, ut probatum est. Impossibile est igitur quod aliqua substantia creata ad illam visionem perveniat nisi per actionem divinam. [3] Again, the form proper to any being does not come to be in another being unless the first being is the agent of this event, for an agent makes something like itself by communicating its form to another thing. Now, it is impossible to see the substance of God unless the divine essence itself is the form whereby the intellect understands, as we have proved. Therefore, it is not possible for a created substance to attain this vision, except through divine action.
Adhuc. Si aliqua duo debeant ad invicem copulari quorum unum sit formale et aliud materiale, oportet quod copulatio eorum compleatur per actionem quae est ex parte eius quod est formale, non autem per actionem eius quod est materiale: forma enim est principium agendi, materia vero principium patiendi. Ad hoc autem quod intellectus creatus videat Dei substantiam, oportet quod ipsa divina essentia copuletur intellectui ut forma intelligibilis, sicut probatum est. Non est igitur possibile ad hanc visionem perveniri ab aliquo intellectu creato nisi per actionem divinam. [4] Besides, if any two factors are to be mutually united, so that one of them is formal and the other material, their union must be completed through action coming from the side of the formal factor, and not through the action of the one that is material. In fact, form is the principle of action, while matter is the principle of passion. For the created intellect to see God’s substance, then, the divine essence itself must be joined as an intelligible form to the intellect, as we have proved. Therefore, it is not possible for the attainment of this vision to be accomplished by a created intellect except through divine action.
Item. Quod est per se, causa est eius quod est per aliud. Intellectus autem divinus per seipsum divinam substantiam videt: nam intellectus divinus est ipsa divina essentia, qua Dei substantia videtur, ut in primo probatum est. Intellectus autem creatus videt divinam substantiam per essentiam Dei, quasi per aliud a se. Haec igitur visio non potest advenire intellectui creato nisi per actionem Dei. [5] Furthermore, “that which is of itself is the cause of that which is through another being.” But the divine intellect sees the divine substance through itself, for the divine intellect is the divine essence itself whereby the substance of God is seen, as was proved in Book One [45]. However, the created intellect sees the divine substance through the essence of God, as through something other than itself. Therefore, this vision cannot come to the created intellect except through God’s action.
Praeterea. Quidquid excedit limites alicuius naturae, non potest sibi advenire nisi per actionem alterius: sicut aqua non tendit sursum nisi ab aliquo alio mota. Videre autem Dei substantiam transcendit limites omnis naturae creatae: nam cuilibet naturae intellectuali creatae proprium est ut intelligat secundum modum suae substantiae; substantia autem divina non potest sic intelligi, ut supra ostensum est. Impossibile est ergo perveniri ab aliquo intellectu creato ad visionem divinae substantiae nisi per actionem Dei, qui omnem creaturam transcendit. [6] Moreover, whatever exceeds the limitations of a nature cannot accrue to it except through the action of another being. For instance, water does not tend upward unless it is moved by something else. Now, seeing God’s substance transcends the limitations of every created nature; indeed, it is proper for each created intellectual nature to understand according to the manner of its own substance. But divine substance cannot be understood in this way, as we showed above. Therefore, the attainment by a created intellect to the vision of divine substance is not possible except through the action of God, Who transcends all creatures.
Hinc est quod Rom. 6-23 dicitur: gratia Dei vita aeterna. In ipsa enim divina visione ostendimus esse hominis beatitudinem, quae vita aeterna dicitur: ad quam sola Dei gratia dicimur pervenire, quia talis visio omnem creaturae facultatem excedit, nec est possibile ad eam pervenire nisi divino munere; quae autem sic adveniunt creaturae, Dei gratiae deputantur. Et Ioan. 14-21 dominus dicit: ego manifestabo ei meipsum. [7] Thus, it is said: “The grace of God is life everlasting” (Rom. 6:23). In fact, we have shown that man’s happiness, which is called life everlasting, consists in this divine vision, and we are said to attain it by God’s grace alone, because such a vision exceeds all the capacity of a creature and it is not possible to reach it without divine assistance. Now, when such things happen to a creature, they are attributed to God’s grace. And the Lord says: “I will manifest Myself to him” (John 14:21).

Caput 53
Quod intellectus creatus indiget aliqua influentia divini luminis ad hoc quod Deum per essentiam videat
Chapter 53
Oportet autem quod ad tam nobilem visionem intellectus creatus per aliquam divinae bonitatis influentiam elevetur. [1] For such a noble vision, the created intellect must be elevated by means of an influx of divine goodness.
Impossibile est enim quod id quod est forma alicuius rei propria, fiat alterius rei forma, nisi res illa participet aliquam similitudinem illius cuius est propria forma: sicut lux non fit actus alicuius corporis nisi aliquid participet de diaphano. Essentia autem divina est propria forma intelligibilis intellectus divini, et ei proportionata: nam haec tria in Deo unum sunt, intellectus, quo intelligitur, et quod intelligitur. Impossibile est igitur quod ipsa essentia fiat intelligibilis forma alicuius intellectus creati, nisi per hoc quod aliquam divinam similitudinem intellectus creatus participat. Haec igitur divinae similitudinis participatio necessaria est ad hoc quod Dei substantia videatur. [2] Indeed, it is not possible for what is the proper form of one thing to become the form of another unless the latter thing participates some likeness of the thing to which the form belongs. For instance, light can only become the act of a body if the body participates somewhat in the diaphanous. But the divine essence is the proper intelligible form for the divine intellect and is proportioned to it; in fact, these three are one in God: the intellect, that whereby understanding is accomplished, and the object which is understood. So, it is impossible for this essence to become the intelligible form of a created intellect unless by virtue of the fact that the created intellect participates in the divine likeness. Therefore, this participation in the divine likeness is necessary so that the substance of God may be seen.
Adhuc. Nihil est susceptivum formae sublimioris nisi per aliquam dispositionem ad illius capacitatem elevetur: proprius enim actus in propria potentia fit. Essentia autem divina est forma altior omni intellectu creato. Ad hoc igitur quod essentia divina fiat intelligibilis species alicuius intellectus creati, quod requiritur ad hoc quod divina substantia videatur, necesse est quod intellectus creatus aliqua dispositione sublimiori ad hoc elevetur. [3] Again, nothing is receptive of a more sublime form unless it be elevated by means of a disposition to the capacity for this form, for a proper act is produced in a proper potency. Now, the divine essence is a higher form than any created intellect. So, in order that the divine essence may become the intelligible species for a created intellect, which is needed in order that the divine substance may be seen, it is necessary for the created intellect to be elevated for this purpose by a more sublime disposition.
Amplius. Si aliqua duo prius fuerint non unita et postmodum uniantur, oportet quod hoc fiat per mutationem utriusque, vel alterius tantum. Si autem ponatur quod intellectus aliquis creatus de novo incipiat Dei substantiam videre, oportet, secundum praemissa, quod divina essentia copuletur ei de novo ut intelligibilis species. Impossibile est autem quod divina essentia moveatur, sicut supra ostensum est. Oportet igitur quod talis unio incipiat esse per mutationem intellectus creati. Quae quidem mutatio aliter esse non potest nisi per hoc quod intellectus creatus aliquam dispositionem de novo acquirat. [4] Besides, suppose that two things are not united at first, and then later they are united; this must be done by changing both of them, or at least one. Now, suppose that a created intellect starts for the first time to see God’s substance; then, necessarily, according to the preceding arguments, the divine essence must be united with it for the first time as an intelligible species. Of course, it is not possible for the divine essence to be changed, as we showed above. So, this union must start to exist by means of a change in the created intellect. In fact, this change can only come about by means of the created intellect acquiring some new disposition.
Idem autem sequitur si detur quod a principio suae creationis tali visione aliquis creatus intellectus potiatur. Nam si talis visio facultatem naturae creatae excedit, ut probatum est, potest intelligi quivis intellectus creatus in specie suae naturae consistere absque hoc quod Dei substantiam videat. Unde, sive a principio sive postmodum Deum videre incipiat, oportet eius naturae aliquid superaddi. Indeed, the same conclusion follows if it be granted that a created intellect is endowed with such a vision from the start of its creation. For, if this vision exceeds the capacity of a created nature, as we have proved, then any created intellect may be understood to enjoy complete existence in the species proper to its nature, without seeing the substance of God. Hence, whether it begins to see God at the start of its existence, or later, something must be added to its nature.
Item. Nihil potest ad altiorem operationem elevari nisi per hoc quod eius virtus fortificatur. Contingit autem dupliciter alicuius virtutem fortificari. Uno modo, per simplicem intensionem ipsius virtutis: sicut virtus activa calidi augetur per intensionem caloris, ut possit efficere vehementiorem actionem in eadem specie. Alio modo, per novae formae appositionem: sicut diaphani virtus augetur ad hoc quod possit illuminare, per hoc quod fit lucidum actu per formam lucis receptam in ipso de novo. Et hoc quidem virtutis augmentum requiritur ad alterius speciei operationem consequendam. Virtus autem intellectus creati naturalis non sufficit ad divinam substantiam videndam, ut ex dictis patet. Oportet ergo quod augeatur ei virtus, ad hoc quod ad talem visionem perveniat. Non sufficit autem augmentum per intensionem naturalis virtutis: quia talis visio non est eiusdem rationis cum visione naturali intellectus creati; quod ex distantia visorum patet. Oportet igitur quod fiat augmentum virtutis intellectivae per alicuius novae dispositionis adeptionem. [5] Furthermore, nothing can be elevated to a higher operation unless because its power is strengthened. But there are two possible ways in which a thing’s power may be strengthened. One way is by a simple intensification of the power itself; thus, the active power of a hot thing is increased by an intensification of the heat, so that it is able to perform a stronger action of the same species. A second way is by the imposition of a new form; thus, the power of a diaphanous object is increased so that it can shine with light, by virtue of its becoming actually luminous, through the form of light received for the first time within it. And in fact, this latter kind of increase of power is needed for the acquisition of an operation of another species. Now, the power of a created intellect is not sufficient to see the divine substance, as is clear from what we have said. So, its power must be increased in order that it may attain such a vision. But the increase through the intensification of a natural power does not suffice, since this vision is not of the same essential type as the vision proper to a natural created intellect. This is evident from the difference between the objects of these visions. Therefore, an increase of the intellectual power by means of the acquisition of a new disposition must be accomplished.
Quia vero in cognitionem intelligibilium ex sensibilibus pervenimus, etiam sensibilis cognitionis nomina ad intelligibilem cognitionem transumimus: et praecipue quae pertinent ad visum, qui inter ceteros sensus nobilior est et spiritualior, ac per hoc intellectui affinior; et inde est quod ipsa intellectualis cognitio visio nominatur. Et quia corporalis visio non completur nisi per lucem, ea quibus intellectualis visio perficitur, lucis nomen assumunt: unde et Aristoteles, in III de anima, intellectum agentem luci assimilat, ex eo quod intellectus agens facit intelligibilia in actu, sicut lux facit quodammodo visibilia actu. Illa igitur dispositio qua intellectus creatus ad intellectualem divinae substantiae visionem extollitur, congrue lux gloriae dicitur: non propter hoc quod faciat intelligibile in actu, sicut lux intellectus agentis; sed per hoc quod facit intellectum potentem actu intelligere. [6] However, since we reach the knowledge of intelligible things from sensible things, we also take over the names proper to sense knowledge for intellectual knowledge, especially the ones which apply to sight, which, compared to the other senses, is more noble and more spiritual, and so more closely related to the intellect. Thus it is that this intellectual knowledge is called vision. And since corporeal vision is not accomplished without light, those things whereby intellectual vision is perfected take on the name fight. Hence, even Aristotle, in Book III of On the Soul [5: 430a 15], likens the agent intellect to light, because of the fact that the agent intellect makes things actually intelligible, just as light in a way makes things actually visible. Therefore, this disposition whereby the created intellect is raised to the intellectual vision of divine substance is fittingly called the light of glory; not because it makes some object actually intelligible, as does the light of the agent intellect, but because it makes the intellect actually powerful enough to understand.
Hoc autem est lumen de quo in Psalmo dicitur: in lumine tuo videbimus lumen, scilicet divinae substantiae. Et Apoc. 22 dicitur: civitas, scilicet beatorum, non eget sole neque luna: nam claritas Dei illuminavit illam. Et Isaiae 60 dicitur: non erit tibi amplius sol ad lucendum per diem, nec splendor lunae illuminabit te: sed erit tibi dominus in lucem sempiternam, et Deus tuus in gloriam tuam. Inde est etiam, quia Deo idem esse est quod intelligere, et est omnibus causa intelligendi, quod dicitur esse lux, Ioan. 1-9: erat lux vera, quae illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum; et I Ioan. 1-5: Deus lux est; et in Psalmo: amictus lumine sicut vestimento. Et propter hoc etiam tam Deus quam Angeli in sacra Scriptura in figuris igneis describuntur, propter ignis claritatem. [7] Now, this is the light of which it is said in the Psalms (35:10): “In Thy light we shall see the light,” that is, of the divine substance. And it is said in the Apocalypse (22:5; see also 21:23): “The city,” that is, of the Blessed, “has no need of the sun, nor of the moon... for the glory of God bath enlightened it.” And it is said in Isaiah (60:19): “You shall no more have the sun for your light by day, neither shall the brightness of the moon enlighten you; but the Lord shall be an everlasting light for you, and your God for your glory.”—It is also so, because in God to be and to understand is the same thing; and because He is for all the cause of understanding, He is said to be the light (John 1:9): “That was the true light which enlightened every man that comes into this world” (John 1:9); and: “God is light” (1 John 1:5); and in the Psalms (103:7): “You... are clothed with light as with a garment.”And for this reason also, both God and the angels are described in Sacred Scripture in figures of fire (Exod. 24:17; Acts 2:3; Ps 103:4), because of the brilliance of fire.

Caput 54
Rationes quibus videtur probari quod Deus non possit videri per essentiam, et solutiones earum
Chapter 54
Nullum enim lumen adveniens visui potest visum elevare ad videndum ea quae naturalem facultatem visus corporalis excedunt: non enim potest visus videre nisi colorata. Divina autem substantia excedit omnem intellectus creati capacitatem, etiam magis quam intellectus excedat capacitatem sensus. Nullo igitur lumine superveniente intellectus creatus elevari poterit ad divinam substantiam videndam. [1] Now, someone will object against the preceding statements. No light that is added to the power of vision can elevate this power to a vision of things which exceed the capacity of bodily sight, for the power of sight is able to see colored objects only. But divine substance exceeds all the capacity of a created intellect, even more than understanding exceeds the capacity of sense. Therefore, the created intellect could not be elevated by any adventitious light so as to see the divine substance.
Praeterea. Lumen illud quod in intellectu creato recipitur, creatum aliquid est. Et ipsum ergo in infinitum a Deo distat. Non potest igitur per huiusmodi lumen intellectus creatus ad divinae substantiae visionem elevari. [2] Again, the light which is received in a created intellect is something created. And so, it is infinitely removed from God. Therefore, the created intellect cannot be elevated to the vision of the divine substance by this kind of light.
Item. Si hoc quidem potest facere lumen praedictum propter hoc quod est divinae substantiae similitudo, cum omnis intellectualis substantia, ex hoc ipso quod intellectualis est, divinam similitudinem gerat ipsa natura cuiuslibet intellectualis substantiae ad visionem divinam sufficiet. [3] Besides, if the aforesaid light can in fact do this because it is a likeness of the divine substance, then since every intellectual substance, by the fact of being intellectual, bears the divine likeness, the very nature of any intellectual substance whatever is adequate to the divine vision.
Adhuc. Si lumen illud creatum est; nihil autem prohibet quod est creatum alicui rei creatae connaturale esse; poterit aliquis intellectus creatus esse qui suo connaturali lumine divinam substantiam videbit. Cuius contrarium ostensum est. [4] Furthermore, if this light is created, then nothing prevents it from being created connatural with some creature; hence, there could be a created intellect which, by its own connatural light, would see the divine substance. The contrary of this has been proved.
Amplius. Infinitum inquantum huiusmodi, ignotum est. Ostensum est autem in primo Deum esse infinitum. Non igitur potest divina substantia per lumen praedictum videri. [5] Moreover, “the infinite as such is unknown.” Now, we have shown in Book One [43] that God is infinite. Therefore, the divine substance cannot be seen by means of the aforesaid light.
Adhuc. Oportet esse proportionem intelligentis ad rem intellectam. Non est autem aliqua proportio intellectus creati, etiam lumine praedicto perfecti, ad substantiam divinam: cum adhuc remaneat distantia infinita. Non potest igitur intellectus creatus ad divinam substantiam videndam per lumen aliquod elevari. [6] Again, there must be a proportion between the understander and the thing understood. But there is no proportion between the created intellect, even when perfected by this light, and the divine substance, because their distance apart still remains infinite. Therefore, the created intellect cannot be elevated to the vision of the divine substance by any light.
Ex his autem et similibus rationibus aliqui moti sunt ad ponendum quod divina substantia nunquam ab aliquo intellectu creato videtur. Quae quidem positio et veram creaturae rationalis beatitudinem tollit, quae non potest esse nisi in visione divinae substantiae, ut ostensum est; et auctoritati sacrae Scripturae contradicit, ut ex superioribus patet. Unde tanquam falsa et haeretica abiicienda est. [7] For these and similar reasons some men have been moved to assert that the divine substance is never seen by any created intellect. Of course, this position both takes away true happiness from the rational creature, for it can consist in nothing other than a vision of divine substance, as we have shown; and it also contradicts the text of Sacred Scripture, as is evident from the preceding texts. Consequently, it is to be spurned as false and heretical.
Rationes autem praedictas non difficile est solvere. Divina enim substantia non sic est extra facultatem creati intellectus quasi aliquid omnino extraneum ab ipso, sicut est sonus a visu, vel substantia immaterialis a sensu, nam divina substantia est primum intelligibile, et totius intellectualis cognitionis principium: sed est extra facultatem intellectus creati sicut excedens virtutem eius, sicut excellentia sensibilium sunt extra facultatem sensus. Unde et philosophus in II Metaphys., dicit quod intellectus noster se habet ad rerum manifestissima sicut oculus noctuae ad lucem solis. Indiget igitur confortari intellectus creatus aliquo divino lumine ad hoc quod divinam essentiam videre possit. Per quod prima ratio solvitur. [8] Indeed, it is not difficult to answer these arguments. The divine substance is not beyond the capacity of the created intellect in such a way that it is altogether foreign to it, as sound is from the object of vision, or as immaterial substance is from sense power; in fact, the divine substance is the first intelligible object and the principle of all intellectual cognition. But it is beyond the capacity of the created intellect, in the sense that it exceeds its power; just as sensible objects of extreme character are beyond the capacity of sense power. Hence, the Philosopher says that “our intellect is to the most evident things, as the eye of the owl is to the light of the sun.” So, a created intellect needs to be strengthened by a divine light in order that it may be able to see the divine essence. By this, the first argument is answered.
Huiusmodi autem lumen intellectum creatum ad Dei visionem exaltat, non propter eius indistantiam a divina substantia, sed propter virtutem quam a Deo sortitur ad talem effectum: licet secundum suum esse a Deo in infinitum distet, ut secunda ratio proponebat. Non enim hoc lumen intellectum creatum Deo coniungit secundum esse, sed secundum intelligere solum. [9] Moreover, this sort of light raises the created intellect to the vision of God, not on the basis of a diminution of its distance from the divine substance, but by virtue of a power which it receives from God in relation to such an effect; even though it remains far away from God in its being, as the second argument suggested. In fact, this light does not unite the created intellect with God in the act of being but only in the act of understanding.
Quia vero ipsius Dei proprium est ut suam substantiam perfecte cognoscat, lumen praedictum Dei similitudo est quantum ad hoc quod ad Dei substantiam videndam perducit. Hoc autem modo nulla intellectualis substantia similitudo Dei esse potest. Cum enim nullius substantiae creatae simplicitas sit aequalis divinae, impossibile est quod totam suam perfectionem creata substantia habeat in eodem: hoc enim est proprium Dei, ut in primo ostensum est, qui secundum idem est ens, intelligens et beatus. Aliud igitur oportet esse in substantia intellectuali creata lumen quo divina visione beatificatur; et aliud quodcumque lumen quo in specie suae naturae completur, et proportionaliter suae substantiae intelligit. Ex quo patet solutio tertiae rationis. [10] Since, however, it is proper to God Himself to know His own substance perfectly, the aforesaid light is a likeness of God, inasmuch as it conduces to the seeing of God’s substance. But no intellectual substance can be a likeness of God in this sense. For, since the divine simplicity is not equaled by any created substance, it is not possible for a created substance to have its entire perfection in the same identity; indeed, this is proper to God, as we showed in Book One [28], for He is being, understanding and blessed, identically. So, in a created intellectual substance, the light whereby it is beatified in the divine vision is one thing, while the light whereby it is in any sense perfected within its natural species, and whereby it understands in a manner proportioned to its substance, is quite a different thing. From this the answer to the third argument is evident.
Quarta vero solvitur per hoc quod visio divinae substantiae omnem naturalem virtutem excedit, ut ostensum est. Unde et lumen quo intellectus creatus perficitur ad divinae substantiae visionem, oportet esse supernaturale. [11] Now, the fourth is answered by the fact that the vision of the divine substance exceeds every natural power, as we have shown. Hence, the light whereby the created intellect is perfected for the vision of the divine substance must be supernatural.
Neque autem divinae substantiae visionem impedire potest quod Deus dicitur esse infinitus, ut quinta ratio proponebat. Non enim dicitur infinitus privative, sicut quantitas. Huiusmodi enim infinitum rationabiliter est ignotum: quia est quasi materia carens forma, quae est cognitionis principium. Sed dicitur infinitus negative, quasi forma per se subsistens non limitata per materiam recipientem. Unde quod sic infinitum est, maxime cognoscibile est secundum se. [12] Nor does the fact that God is called infinite hinder the vision of the divine substance, as the fifth argument suggested. For, He is not called infinite in the privative sense, as quantity is. This latter kind of infinity is rationally unknown, because it is like matter devoid of form, which is the principle of knowledge. Rather, He is called infinite in the negative sense, like a self-subsistent form, not limited by matter receiving it. Hence, a being which is infinite in this sense is most knowable in itself.
Proportio autem intellectus creati est quidem ad Deum intelligendum, non secundum commensurationem aliquam proportione existente, sed secundum quod proportio significat quamcumque habitudinem unius ad alterum, ut materiae ad formam, vel causae ad effectum. Sic autem nihil prohibet esse proportionem creaturae ad Deum secundum habitudinem intelligentis ad intellectum, sicut et secundum habitudinem effectus ad causam. Unde patet solutio sextae obiectionis. [13] Now, the proportion of the created intellect to the understanding of God is not, in fact, based on a commensuration in an existing proportion, but on the fact that proportion means any relation of one thing to another, as of matter to form, or of cause to effect. In this sense, then, nothing prevents there being a proportion of creature to God on the basis of a relation of one who understands to the thing understood, just as on the basis of the relation of effect to cause. Hence the answer to the sixth objection is clear.

Caput 55
Quod intellectus creatus non comprehendit divinam substantiam
Chapter 55
Quia vero cuiuslibet actionis modus sequitur efficaciam activi principii, magis enim calefacit cuius calor virtuosior est; oportet quod etiam modus cognitionis sequatur efficaciam principii cognoscendi. [1] However, since the type of action appropriate to any agent depends on the efficacy of its active principle, and thus a thing whose heat is stronger performs the act of heating more intensely, then it must be that the manner of knowing depends on the efficacy of the principle of the act of knowing.
Lumen autem praedictum est quoddam divinae cognitionis principium: cum per ipsum elevetur intellectus creatus ad divinam substantiam videndam. Oportet ergo quod modus divinae visionis commensuretur virtuti praedicti luminis. Lumen autem praedictum multo deficit in virtute a claritate divini intellectus. Impossibile est ergo quod per huiusmodi lumen ita perfecte divina substantia videatur sicut eam videt intellectus divinus. Intellectus autem divinus substantiam illam videt ita perfecte sicut perfecte visibilis est: veritas enim divinae substantiae, et claritas intellectus divini, sunt aequalia; immo magis sunt unum. Impossibile est igitur quod intellectus creatus per lumen praedictum videat divinam substantiam ita perfecte sicut perfecte est visibilis. Omne autem quod comprehenditur ab aliquo cognoscente, cognoscitur ab eo ita perfecte sicut cognoscibile est: qui enim novit quod triangulus habet tres angulos aequales duobus rectis, quasi opinabile quoddam probabili ratione, quia sic a sapientibus dicitur, nondum hoc comprehendit; sed solum ille qui hoc novit quasi quoddam scibile, per medium quod est causa. Impossibile est igitur quod intellectus creatus divinam substantiam comprehendat. [2] Now, the aforementioned light is a certain principle of divine knowledge, because the created intellect is elevated by it to the seeing of the divine substance. Therefore, the mode of the divine vision must be commensurate with the power of this light. Of course, the aforementioned light, in its power, falls far short of the clarity of the divine intellect. So, it is impossible for the divine substance to be seen as perfectly by means of this kind of light, as it is seen by the divine intellect itself. Indeed, the divine intellect sees its substance as perfectly as its perfect capacity to be seen permits. In fact, the truth of the divine substance and the clarity of the divine intellect are equal, or, better, they are but one. So, it is impossible for a created intellect, by means of the aforesaid light, to see the divine substance as perfectly as its perfect capacity to be seen permits. Now, everything that is comprehended by a knower is known by him in as perfect a way as the knowable object permits. For instance, a person who knows that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, but merely as a matter of opinion on the basis of probable reasoning, since it is said to be so by wise men, does not yet comprehend it; but only the man who knows this as a definite knowable object, by means of whatever is its cause. It is impossible, then, for the created intellect to comprehend the divine substance.
Adhuc. Virtus finita non potest adaequare in sua operatione obiectum infinitum. Substantia autem divina est quoddam infinitum per comparationem ad omnem intellectum creatum: cum omnis intellectus creatus sub certa specie terminetur. Impossibile est ergo quod visio alicuius intellectus creati adaequet in videndo divinam substantiam, scilicet ita perfecte ipsam videndo sicut visibilis est. Nullus igitur intellectus creatus ipsam comprehendit. [3] Again, a finite power in its operation cannot be on a par with an infinite object. But the divine substance is something infinite in relation to every created intellect, since every created intellect is limited under a definite species. So, it is impossible for any created intellect’s vision to be equal to the seeing of the divine substance; that is to say, to seeing it as perfectly as its capacity to be seen permits. Therefore, no created intellect may comprehend it.
Amplius. Omne agens in tantum perfecte agit in quantum perfecte participat formam quae est operationis principium. Forma autem intelligibilis qua divina substantia videtur, est ipsa divina essentia: quae etsi fiat forma intelligibilis intellectus creati, non tamen intellectus creatus capit ipsam secundum totum posse eius. Non igitur ita perfecte ipsam videt sicut ipsa visibilis est. Non ergo comprehenditur ab intellectu creato. [4] Besides, every agent acts perfectly to the extent that it participates in the form which is the principle of its operation. Now, the intelligible form, by which the divine substance is seen, is the divine essence itself, and, though it becomes the intelligible form of the created intellect, the created intellect does not grasp it according to its entire capacity. So, it does not see it as perfectly as its capacity to be seen permits. Therefore, it is not comprehended by the created intellect.
Item. Nullum comprehensum excedit terminos comprehendentis. Si igitur intellectus creatus divinam substantiam comprehenderet, divina substantia non excederet limites intellectus creati: quod est impossibile. Impossibile est igitur quod intellectus creatus divinam substantiam comprehendat. [5] Furthermore, no object of comprehension exceeds the limitations of the one who comprehends. Thus, if the created intellect were to comprehend the divine substance, the divine substance would not exceed the limits of the created intellect. But this is impossible. Therefore, it is not possible for a created intellect to comprehend the divine substance.
Non autem sic dicitur quod divina substantia ab intellectu creato videtur, non tamen comprehenditur, quasi aliquid eius videatur et aliquid non videatur: cum divina substantia sit simplex omnino. Sed quia non ita perfecte ab intellectu creato videtur sicut visibilis est: per quem modum dicitur opinans conclusionem demonstrativam cognoscere sed non comprehendere, quia non perfecte ipsam cognoscit, scilicet per modum scientiae, licet nulla pars eius sit quam non cognoscat. [6] Now, this statement that the divine substance is seen by the created intellect, yet not comprehended, does not mean that part of it is seen and part not seen, because the divine substance is entirely simple. Rather, it means that it is not seen as perfectly by the created intellect as its visibility would permit. In the same way, a man who has an opinion regarding a demonstrative conclusion is said to know it but not to comprehend it, since he does not know it perfectly, that is, in a scientific way, though there is no part of it that he does not know.

Caput 56
Quod nullus intellectus creatus, videndo Deum, videt omnia quae in eo videri possunt
Chapter 56
Ex hoc autem apparet quod intellectus creatus, etsi divinam substantiam videat, non tamen omnia cognoscit quae per divinam substantiam cognosci possunt. [1] It is evident from this that, though the created intellect may see the divine substance, it does not know all that can be known through the divine substance.
Tunc enim solum necesse est quod, cognito aliquo principio, omnes eius effectus cognoscantur per ipsum, quando principium comprehenditur intellectu: sic enim principium aliquod secundum suam totam virtutem cognoscitur, quando omnes effectus eius cognoscuntur ex ipso. Per divinam autem essentiam alia cognoscuntur sicut cognoscitur effectus ex causa. Cum igitur intellectus creatus non possit divinam substantiam cognoscere sic quod ipsam comprehendat, non est necesse quod videndo ipsam, omnia videat quae per ipsam cognosci possunt. [2] For it is only in the case of the principle being comprehended by the intellect that, once the principle is known, all its effects are of necessity known through it. Indeed, in that case, when all its effects are known from itself, a principle is known in its entire capacity. Now, other things are known through the divine essence, as the effect is known from its cause. But, since the created intellect cannot know the divine substance in such a way that it comprehends it, the intellect does not have to see all things that can be known through this substance, when it sees it.
Item. Quanto aliquis intellectus est altior, tanto plura cognoscit, vel secundum rerum multitudinem, vel saltem secundum earundem rerum plures rationes. Intellectus autem divinus excedit omnem intellectum creatum. Plura igitur cognoscit quam aliquis intellectus creatus. Non autem cognoscit aliquid nisi per hoc quod suam essentiam videt, ut in primo ostensum est. Plura igitur sunt cognoscibilia per essentiam divinam quam aliquis intellectus creatus per ipsam videre possit. [3] Again, the higher the nature of an intellect, the more does it know: either in the sense of a multitude of things, or even in the sense of a greater number of reasons for the same things. But the divine intellect surpasses every created intellect. So, it knows more than any created intellect does, and it does not know anything without seeing its essence, as we showed in Book One [49]. Therefore, more things are knowable through the divine essence than any created intellect can see, through the aforesaid essence.
Adhuc. Quantitas virtutis attenditur secundum ea in quae potest. Idem igitur est cognoscere omnia in quae potest aliqua virtus, et ipsam virtutem comprehendere. Divinam autem virtutem, cum sit infinita, non potest aliquis creatus intellectus comprehendere, sicut nec essentiam eius, ut probatum est. Neque igitur intellectus creatus potest cognoscere omnia in quae divina virtus potest. Omnia autem in quae divina virtus potest, sunt per essentiam divinam cognoscibilia: omnia enim cognoscit Deus, et non nisi per essentiam suam. Non igitur intellectus creatus, videns divinam substantiam, videt omnia quae in Dei substantia videri possunt. [4] Besides, the quantity of a power depends on the things that it can do. So, it is the same to know all the things that a power can do and to comprehend the power itself. But, since the divine power is infinite, no created intellect can comprehend it, just as its essence cannot be comprehended, as we have proved. Nor can the created intellect know all that the divine power can do. But all things that the divine power can do are knowable through the divine essence, for God knows all and in no other way than through His essence. Therefore, the created intellect, seeing the divine substance, does not see all that can be seen in God’s substance.
Amplius. Nulla virtus cognoscitiva cognoscit rem aliquam nisi secundum rationem proprii obiecti: non enim visu cognoscimus aliquid nisi inquantum est coloratum. Proprium autem obiectum intellectus est quod quid est, idest substantia rei, ut dicitur in III de anima. Igitur quicquid intellectus de aliqua re cognoscit, cognoscit per cognitionem substantiae illius rei: unde in qualibet demonstratione per quam innotescunt nobis propria accidentia, principium accipimus quod quid est, ut dicitur in I posteriorum. Si autem substantiam alicuius rei intellectus cognoscat per accidentia, sicut dicitur in I de anima, quod accidentia magnam partem conferunt ad cognoscendum quod quid est; hoc est per accidens, inquantum cognitio intellectus oritur a sensu, et sic per sensibilium accidentium cognitionem oportet ad substantiae intellectum pervenire; propter quod hoc non habet locum in mathematicis, sed in naturalibus tantum. Quicquid igitur est in re quod non potest cognosci per cognitionem substantiae eius, oportet esse intellectui ignotum. [5] Moreover, no cognoscitive power knows a thing except under the rational character of its proper object. For instance, we do not know anything by sight except according as it is colored. Now, the proper object of the intellect is that which is, that is, the substance of a thing, as is stated in Book III of On the Soul [4: 429b 10]. Therefore, whatever the intellect knows about any thing, it knows through knowing the substance of the thing. Consequently, in any demonstration through which the proper accidents become known to us, we take as our principle that which is, as is stated in Posterior Analytics I [4: 73a 37]. Now, if the intellect knows the substance of a thing through its accidents, in accordance with what is said in Book I of On the Soul [1: 402b 21], that “the accidents contribute a good deal to the knowing of that which is,” this is accidental, inasmuch as the intellect must attain to substance through the knowledge of sensible accidents. For this reason, this procedure has no place in mathematics, but only in the area of physical things. Therefore, whatever is in a thing and cannot be known through a knowledge of its substance must be unknown to the intellect.
Quid autem velit aliquis volens, non potest cognosci per cognitionem substantiae ipsius: nam voluntas non tendit in sua volita omnino naturaliter; propter quod voluntas et natura duo principia activa ponuntur. Non potest igitur aliquis intellectus cognoscere quid volens velit, nisi forte per aliquos effectus, sicut, cum videmus aliquem voluntarie operantem, scimus quid voluerit; aut per causam, sicut Deus voluntates nostras sicut et alios suos effectus, cognoscit per hoc quod est nobis causa volendi; aut per hoc quod aliquis alteri suam voluntatem insinuat, ut cum aliquis loquendo suum affectum exprimit. Cum igitur multa ex simplici Dei voluntate dependeant, ut partim ex superioribus patet, et adhuc erit amplius manifestum; intellectus creatus, etsi Dei substantiam videat, non tamen omnia cognoscit quae Deus per suam substantiam videt. However, what a volitional agent wills cannot be known through a knowledge of his substance, for the will does not incline to its object in a purely natural way; this is why the will and nature are said to be two active principles. So, an intellect cannot know what a volitional agent wills except, perhaps, through certain effects. For instance, when we see someone acting voluntarily we may know what he wishes: either through their cause, as God knows our will acts, just as He does His other effects, because He is for us a cause of our willing; or by means of one person indicating his wish to another, as when a man expresses his feeling in speech. And so, since many things are dependent on the simple will of God, as is partly clear from earlier considerations, and will later be more evident, though the created intellect may see God’s, substance, it does not know all that God sees through His substance.
Potest autem aliquis contra praedicta obiicere quod Dei substantia maius est aliquid quam omnia quae ipse facere, vel intelligere, vel velle potest, praeter seipsum: unde, si intellectus creatus Dei substantiam videre potest, multo magis possibile est quod omnia cognoscat quae Deus, praeter seipsum, vel intelligit, vel vult, vel facere potest. [6] Of course, someone can object against the foregoing that God’s substance is something greater than all the things which He can make, or understand, or will, apart from Himself; hence, if the created intellect can see God’s substance, it is much more possible for it to know all things which God understands, or wills, or makes, except for Himself.
Sed, si diligenter consideretur non est eiusdem rationis aliquid cognosci in seipso, et in sua causa: quaedam enim in seipsis de facili cognoscibilia sunt quae tamen in suis causis non de facili cognoscuntur. Verum est igitur quod maius est intelligere divinam substantiam quam quicquid est aliud praeter ipsam, quod in seipso cognosci potest. Perfectioris tamen cognitionis est cognoscere divinam substantiam et in ea eius effectus videre, quam cognoscere divinam substantiam sine hoc quod effectus videantur in ipsa. Et hoc quidem quod divina substantia videatur, absque comprehensione ipsius fieri potest. Quod autem omnia quae per ipsam intelligi possunt, cognoscantur, hoc absque ipsius comprehensione non potest accidere, ut ex praedictis patet. [7] But, if it is carefully considered, the fact that something is known in itself does not have the same meaning as that it is known in its cause. For some things easily known in themselves are not, however, easily known in their causes. So, it is true that it is a greater thing to understand the divine substance than anything whatever other than that substance which might be known in itself. However, to know the divine substance and to see its effects in it is a more perfect knowledge than to know the divine substance without seeing the effects in it. And this seeing of the divine substance can be done without comprehension of it. But for all things which can be understood through it to be known is something which cannot happen without comprehending this substance, as is evident from what we have said.

Caput 57
Quod omnis intellectus, cuiuscumque gradus, particeps esse potest divinae visionis
Chapter 57
Cum autem ad visionem divinae substantiae intellectus creatus quodam supernaturali lumine sublimetur, ut patet ex dictis, non est aliquis intellectus creatus ita secundum suam naturam infimus, qui non ad hanc visionem possit elevari. [1] Since the created intellect is exalted to the vision of the divine substance by a certain supernatural light, as is evident from what has been said, there is no created intellect so low in its nature that it cannot be elevated to this vision.
Ostensum enim est quod lumen illud non potest esse alicui creaturae connaturale, sed omnem creatam naturam excedit secundum virtutem. Quod autem fit virtute supernaturali, non impeditur propter naturae diversitatem, cum divina virtus sit infinita: unde in sanatione infirmi quae fit miraculose, non differt utrum aliquis multum vel parum infirmetur. Diversus ergo gradus naturae intellectualis non impedit quin infimum in tali natura ad illam visionem perduci possit praedicto lumine. [2] It has been shown, in fact, that this light cannot be connatural with any creature, but, that it surpasses every created nature in its power. But what is done by supernatural power is not hindered by a diversity of nature, since divine power is infinite. And so, in the case of the healing of an afflicted person, accomplished miraculously, it makes no difference whether the person is much or little afflicted. Therefore, the varying level of the intellectual nature does not hinder the lowest member of such a nature from being able to be brought to this vision by the aforementioned light.
Adhuc. Distantia intellectus secundum ordinem naturae supremi ad Deum est infinita in perfectione et bonitate. Eius autem distantia ad intellectum infimum est finita: finiti enim ad finitum non potest esse infinita distantia. Distantia igitur quae est inter infimum intellectum creatum et supremum, est quasi nihil in comparatione ad illam distantiam quae est inter supremum intellectum creatum et Deum. Quod autem est quasi nihil, non potest variationem sensibilem facere: sicut distantia quae est inter centrum terrae et visum, est quasi nihil in comparatione ad distantiam quae est inter visum nostrum et octavam sphaeram, ad quam tota terra comparata obtinet locum puncti; et propter hoc nulla sensibilis variatio fit per hoc quod astrologi in suis demonstrationibus utuntur visu nostro quasi centro terrae. Nihil ergo differt quicumque intellectus sit qui ad Dei visionem per lumen praedictum elevetur, utrum summus, vel infimus, vel medius. [3] Again, the gap between the intellect, at its highest natural level, and God is infinite in perfection and goodness. But the distance from the highest to the lowest intellect is finite, for there cannot be an infinite distance between one finite being and another. So, the distance which lies between the lowest created intellect and the highest one is like nothing in comparison to the gap which lies between the highest created intellect and God. Now, that which is practically nothing cannot make a noticeable difference; thus, the distance between the center of the earth and our level of vision is like nothing in comparison with the distance that lies between our eye level and the eighth sphere, in regard to which sphere the whole earth takes the place of a point; this is why no noticeable variation results from the fact that astronomers in their demonstrations use our eye level of sight as the center of the earth. Therefore, it makes no difference what level of intellect it is that is elevated to the vision of God by the aforementioned light: it may be the highest, the lowest, or one in the middle.
Item. Supra probatum est quod omnis intellectus naturaliter desiderat divinae substantiae visionem. Naturale autem desiderium non potest esse inane. Quilibet igitur intellectus creatus potest pervenire ad divinae substantiae visionem, non impediente inferioritate naturae. [4] Besides, it was proved above that every intellect naturally desires the vision of the divine substance, but natural desire cannot be incapable of fulfillment. Therefore, any created intellect whatever can attain to the vision of the divine substance, and the inferiority of its nature is no impediment.
Hinc est quod Matth. 22-30, dominus hominibus repromittit gloriam Angelorum: erunt, inquit, de hominibus loquens, sicut Angeli Dei in caelo. Et Apoc. 20, eadem mensura hominis et Angeli esse perhibetur. Propter quod et fere ubique in sacra Scriptura Angeli in forma hominum describuntur: vel in toto, sicut patet de Angelis qui apparuerunt Abrahae in similitudine virorum, Gen. 18-2; vel in parte, sicut patet de animalibus, Ezech. 1-8, de quibus dicitur quod manus hominis erant sub pennis eorum. [5] Hence it is that the Lord promises men the glory of the angels: “They shall be,” He says, speaking of men, “like the angels of God in heaven” (Matt. 22:30). And also it is said that there is “the same measure for man and for angel” (Apoc. 21:3-7). For this reason, too, almost everywhere in Sacred Scripture angels are described in the shape of men: either wholly, as is evident of the angels who appeared to Abraham in the likeness of men (Gen. 18:2); or partially, as is the case of the animals of whom it is said that “they had the hands of a man under their wings” (Ez. 1:8).
Per hoc autem excluditur error quorundam qui dicebant quod anima humana, quantumcumque elevetur, non potest ad aequalitatem superiorum intellectuum pervenire. [6] By this conclusion we refute the error of those who have said that the human soul, no matter how much it be elevated, cannot attain equality with the higher intellects.

Caput 58
Quod unus alio perfectius Deum videre potest
Chapter 58
Quia vero modus operationis consequitur formam quae est operationis principium; visionis autem qua intellectus creatus divinam substantiam videt, principium quoddam est lumen praedictum, ut ex dictis patet: necesse est quod secundum modum huius luminis sit modus divinae visionis. Possibile est autem huius luminis diversos esse participationis gradus, ita quod unus eo perfectius illustretur quam alius. Possibile igitur est quod unus Deum videntium eum perfectius alio videat, quamvis uterque videat eius substantiam. [1] Since the mode of operation results from the form which is the principle of operation, and since the principle of the vision in which the created intellect sees the divine substance is the aforementioned light, as is clear from what we have said, the mode of the divine vision must be in accord with the mode of this light. Now, it is possible for there to be different degrees of participation in this light, and so one intellect may be more perfectly illuminated than another. Therefore, it is possible that one of those who see God may see Him more perfectly than another, even though both see His substance.
Adhuc. In quocumque genere est aliquod summum, quod excedit alia, est etiam invenire magis et minus, secundum maiorem propinquitatem vel distantiam ab ipso: sicut aliqua sunt magis et minus calida secundum quod magis vel minus appropinquant ad ignem, qui est summe calidus. Deus autem suam substantiam perfectissime videt, utpote qui solus eam comprehendit, ut supra ostensum est. Igitur et eum videntium unus alio magis vel minus substantiam eius videt, secundum quod magis vel minus ei appropinquat. [2] Again, whenever there is a highest member which surpasses others in a genus, we also find that there are degrees of more and less, depending on the greater proximity to, or distance from, this highest member. For instance, certain things are more or less hot depending on whether they are more or less near to fire, which is the highest type of hot thing. But God sees His own substance most perfectly, being the only One Who comprehends it, as we showed above. And so, of those who see Him, one may see His substance more or less than another, depending on whether one is more or less near to Him.
Amplius. Lumen gloriae ex hoc ad divinam visionem elevat, quod est quaedam similitudo intellectus divini, sicut iam dictum est. Contingit autem aliquid magis vel minus assimilari Deo. Possibile est igitur aliquem perfectius vel minus perfecte divinam substantiam videre. [3] Besides, the light of glory elevates to the divine vision due to the fact that it is a certain likeness of the divine intellect, as we have already stated. Now, it is possible for a thing to become more or less like God. Therefore, it is possible for one to see the divine substance more or less perfectly.
Item. Cum finis proportionaliter respondeat his quae sunt ad finem, oportet quod sicut aliqua diversimode praeparantur ad finem, ita diversimode participent finem. Visio autem divinae substantiae est ultimus finis cuiuslibet intellectualis substantiae, ut ex dictis patet. Intellectuales autem substantiae non omnes aequaliter praeparantur ad finem: quaedam enim sunt maioris virtutis, et quaedam minoris; virtus autem est via ad felicitatem. Oportet igitur quod in visione divina sit diversitas, quod quidam perfectius, quidam minus perfecte divinam substantiam videant. [4] Furthermore, because the end is related in a proportional way to the things which are directed to the end, these things must participate in the end differently, depending on the different ways in which they are disposed toward the end. But the vision of the divine substance is the ultimate end of every intellectual substance, as is clear from what we have said. Now, not all intellectual substances are disposed with equal perfection to the end; some, in fact, are more virtuous and others less, and virtue is the road to felicity. So, there must be diversity within the divine vision: some seeing the divine substance more perfectly; others, less perfectly.
Hinc est quod, ad hanc felicitatis differentiam designandam, dominus dicit, Io. 14-2: in domo patris mei mansiones multae sunt. [5] Thus it is that, in order to indicate the variation in this felicity, the Lord says: “In My Father’s house there are many mansions” (John 14:2).
Per hoc autem excluditur error quorundam qui dicunt omnia praemia esse aequalia. [6] On this basis, then, the error of those who say that all rewards are equal is refuted.
Sicut autem ex modo visionis apparet diversus gradus gloriae in beatis, ita ex eo quod videtur apparet gloria eadem: nam cuiuslibet felicitas ex hoc est quod Dei substantiam videt, ut probatum est. Idem ergo est quod omnes beatos facit: non tamen ab eo omnes aequaliter beatitudinem capiunt. [7] Moreover, just as the different degrees of glory among the blessed are evident from the mode of this vision, so from the side of the object that is seen the glory appears to be the same, for the felicity of each person is due to his seeing God’s substance, as we proved. Therefore, it is the same being that makes all blessed; yet they do not all grasp happiness therefrom in equal degree.
Unde praedictis non obviat quod dominus, Matth. 20-10 omnibus laborantibus in vinea, licet non aequaliter laboraverint, idem tamen praemium redditum docet, scilicet denarium: quia idem est quod omnibus datur in praemium ad videndum et fruendum, scilicet Deus. [8] Hence, there is no contradiction between the foregoing and what our Lord teaches (Matt. 20:10), that to all who labor in the vineyard, though they may not do equal work, there is paid nevertheless the same reward, namely, a penny, because it is the same reward that is given to all, to be seen and enjoyed, namely, God.
In quo etiam considerandum est quod quodammodo contrarius est ordo corporalium et spiritualium motuum. Omnium enim corporalium motuum est idem numero primum subiectum, fines vero diversi. Spiritualium vero motuum, scilicet intellectualium apprehensionum et voluntatum, sunt quidem diversa subiecta prima, finis vero numero idem. [9] On this point we must also take into consideration the fact that the order of corporeal movements is somewhat contrary to that of spiritual movements. For there is numerically the same first subject for all corporeal motions, but the ends are different. While there are, on the other hand, different first subjects for spiritual movements, that is to say, for acts of intellectual apprehension and of willing, their end is, however, numerically the same.

Caput 59
Quomodo videntes divinam substantiam omnia videant
Chapter 59
Quia vero visio divinae substantiae est ultimus finis cuiuslibet intellectualis substantiae, ut patet ex dictis; omnis autem res cum pervenerit ad ultimum finem, quiescit appetitus eius naturalis: oportet quod appetitus naturalis substantiae intellectualis divinam substantiam videntis omnino quiescat. Est autem appetitus naturalis intellectus ut cognoscat omnium rerum genera et species et virtutes, et totum ordinem universi: quod demonstrat humanum studium circa singula praedictorum. Quilibet igitur divinam substantiam videntium cognoscet omnia supradicta. [1] Since the vision of the divine substance is the ultimate end of every intellectual substance, as is evident from what we have said, and since the natural appetite of everything comes to rest when the thing reaches its ultimate end, the natural appetite of an intellectual substance must come to rest completely when it sees the divine substance. Now, the natural appetite of the intellect is to know the genera and species and powers of all things, and the whole order of the universe; human investigation of each of the aforementioned items indicates this. Therefore, each one who sees the divine substance knows all the things mentioned above.
Amplius. In hoc intellectus et sensus differt, ut patet in III de anima, quod sensus ab excellentibus sensibilibus corrumpitur vel debilitatur, ut postmodum minora sensibilia percipere non possit: intellectus autem, quia non corrumpitur nec impeditur a suo obiecto, sed solum perficitur, postquam intellexit maius intelligibile, non minus poterit alia intelligibilia intelligere, sed magis. Summum autem in genere intelligibilium est divina substantia. Intellectus igitur qui per lumen divinum elevatur ad videndam Dei substantiam, multo magis eodem lumine perficitur ad omnia alia intelligenda quae sunt in rerum natura. [2] Again, the intellect and the senses differ on this point as is clear from Book III of On the Soul [4: 429a 14], the power to sense is destroyed, or weakened, by the more striking sense objects, so that later it is unable to perceive weaker objects; but the intellect, not being corrupted or hindered by its object but only perfected, after understanding a greater object of the intellect, is not less able to understand other intelligibles but more able. Now, the highest object in the genus of intelligible objects is the divine substance. So, the intellect which is elevated by divine light in order to see God’s substance is much more perfected by this same light, so that it may understand all other objects which exist in the nature of things.
Adhuc. Esse intelligibile non est minoris ambitus quam esse naturale, sed forte maioris: intellectus enim natus est omnia quae sunt in rerum natura intelligere, et quaedam intelligit quae non habent esse naturale, sicut negationes et privationes. Quaecumque igitur requiruntur ad perfectionem esse naturalis, requiruntur ad perfectionem esse intelligibilis, vel etiam plura. Perfectio autem esse intelligibilis est cum intellectus ad suum ultimum finem pervenerit: sicut perfectio esse naturalis in ipsa rerum institutione consistit. Omnia igitur quae Deus ad perfectionem universi produxit, intellectui se videnti manifestat. [3] Besides, intelligible being is not of lesser scope than natural being, but perhaps it is more extensive; indeed, intellect is from its origin capable of understanding all things existing in reality, and it also understands things that have no natural being, such as negations and privations. So, whatever things are needed for the perfection of natural being are also needed for the perfection of intelligible being, and even more. But the perfection of intelligible being is present when the intellect reaches its ultimate end, just as the perfection of natural being consists in the very establishment of things in actual being. Therefore, God shows the intellect that is seeing Him all the things which He has produced for the perfection of the universe.
Item. Quamvis videntium Deum unus alio perfectius eum videat, ut ostensum est, quilibet tamen ita perfecte eum videt quod impletur tota capacitas naturalis: quinimmo ipsa visio omnem capacitatem naturalem excedit, ut ostensum est. Oportet igitur quod quilibet videns divinam substantiam in ipsa substantia divina cognoscat omnia ad quae se extendit sua capacitas naturalis. Capacitas autem naturalis cuiuslibet intellectus se extendit ad cognoscenda omnia genera et species et ordinem rerum. Haec igitur quilibet Deum videntium in divina substantia cognoscet. [4] Moreover, although one of the intellects seeing God may see Him more perfectly than another, as we have shown, each one sees Him so perfectly that its whole natural capacity is fulfilled. Or, rather, this vision exceeds all natural capacity, as we have shown. So, each one seeing the divine substance knows in this divine substance all the things to which its natural capacity extends. But the natural capacity of every intellect extends to the knowing of all genera and species and orders of things. Therefore, each one who sees God will know these things in the divine substance.
Hinc est quod dominus Moysi petenti divinae substantiae visionem respondet, Exod. 33-19: ego ostendam tibi omne bonum. Et Gregorius dicit: quid est quod nesciant qui scientem omnia sciunt? [5] Hence it is that the Lord replies to Moses, when he asks for the vision of the divine substance: “I will show thee all good” (Exod, 33:19). And Gregory says: “What do they not know, who know Him Who knows all things?”
Si autem praemissa diligenter considerentur, patet quod quodam modo videntes divinam substantiam omnia vident, quodam vero modo non. Si enim per omnia illa intelligantur quae ad universi perfectionem pertinent, manifestum est ex dictis quod videntes divinam substantiam omnia vident, ut rationes modo inductae ostendunt. Cum enim intellectus sit quodammodo omnia, quaecumque ad perfectionem naturae pertinent, omnia etiam pertinent ad perfectionem esse intelligibilis: propter quod, secundum Augustinum, super Gen. ad Litt., quaecumque facta sunt per Dei verbum ut in propria natura subsisterent, fiebant etiam in intelligentia angelica ut ab Angelis intelligerentur. De perfectione autem naturalis esse sunt naturae specierum, et earum proprietates et virtutes: ad naturas enim specierum intentio naturae fertur; individua enim sunt propter speciem. Pertinet igitur ad perfectionem intellectualis substantiae ut omnium specierum naturas et virtutes et propria accidentia cognoscat. Hoc igitur in finali beatitudine consequetur per divinae essentiae visionem. Per cognitionem autem naturalium specierum, et individua sub speciebus huiusmodi existentia cognoscuntur ab intellectu Deum vidente, ut ex his quae dicta sunt supra de cognitione Dei et Angelorum, potest esse manifestum. [6] Moreover, if the foregoing statements are carefully considered, it becomes clear that, in a way, those who see the divine substance do see all things; whereas, in another way, they do not. Indeed, if the word all means whatever things pertain to the perfection of the universe, it is obvious from what has been said that those who see the divine substance do see all things, as the arguments that have just been advanced show. For, since the intellect is in some way all things, whatever things belong to the perfection of nature belong also in their entirety to the perfection of intelligible being. For this reason, according to Augustine’s Literal Commentary on Genesis, whatever things have been made by the Word of God to subsist in their proper nature have also come to be in the angelic understanding, so that they might be understood by the angels. Now, within the perfection of natural being belong the nature of species and their properties and powers, for the inclination of nature is drawn to the natures of species, since individuals are for the sake of the species. So, it is pertinent to the perfection of intellectual substance to know the natures of all species and their powers and proper accidents. Therefore, this will be obtained in the final beatitude through the vision of the divine essence. Moreover, through the cognition of natural species the individuals existing under these species are known by the intellect that sees God, as can be made evident from what has been said above on the knowledge appropriate to God and the angels.
Si vero per omnia intelligantur omnia quae Deus, suam essentiam videndo, cognoscit, nullus intellectus creatus omnia in Dei substantia videt, ut superius est ostensum. [7] However, if the term all means all the things that God knows in seeing His own essence, then no created intellect sees all things in God’s substance, as we have showed above.
Hoc autem considerari potest quantum ad plura. Primo, quantum ad ea quae Deus facere potest, sed nec fecit nec facturus est unquam. Omnia enim huiusmodi cognosci non possunt nisi eius virtus comprehenderetur: quod non est possibile alicui intellectui creato, ut supra ostensum est. Hinc est quod Iob 11 dicitur: forsitan vestigia Dei comprehendes, et omnipotentem usque ad perfectum reperies? Excelsior caelo est, et quid facies? Profundior Inferno, et unde cognosces? Longior terra mensura eius, et latior mari. Non enim haec dicuntur quasi dimensionibus quantitatis Deus sit magnus: sed quia eius virtus non limitatur ad omnia quae magna esse videntur, quin possit etiam maiora facere. [8] But this can be considered under several points. First, in regard to those things which God can make but has not made, nor will ever make. Indeed, all things of this kind cannot be known unless His power is comprehended, and this is not possible for any intellectual creature, as we showed above. Hence, the statement in Job 11 [7ff]: “Do you think you can understand the steps of God, and find out the Almighty perfectly? He is higher than heaven, and what will you do? He is deeper than hell, and how will you know? His measure is longer than the earth, and broader than the sea.” Indeed, these things are not said as though God were great in quantitative dimensions, but because His power is not limited to all things which are seen to be great, for, on the contrary, He can make even greater things.
Secundo, quantum ad rationes rerum factarum: quas omnes cognoscere non potest intellectus nisi divinam bonitatem comprehendat. Ratio enim cuiuslibet rei factae sumitur ex fine quem faciens intendit. Finis autem omnium a Deo factorum divina bonitas est. Ratio igitur rerum factarum est ut divina bonitas diffundatur in rebus. Sic igitur aliquis omnes rationes rerum creatarum cognosceret, si cognosceret omnia bona quae in rebus creatis, secundum ordinem divinae sapientiae, provenire possunt. Quod esset divinam bonitatem et sapientiam comprehendere: quod nullus intellectus creatus potest. Hinc est quod dicitur Eccle. 8-17: intellexi quod omnium operum Dei non possit homo invenire rationem. [9] Secondly, let us consider it in regard to the reasons for the things that have been made: the intellect cannot know all of these unless it comprehend the divine goodness. For, the reason for everything that has been made is derived from the end which its maker intended. But the end of all things made by God is divine goodness. Therefore, the reason for the things that have been made is so that the divine goodness might be diffused among things. And so, one would know all the reasons for things created if he knew all the goods which could come about in created things in accord with the order of divine wisdom. This would be to comprehend divine goodness And wisdom, something no created intellect can do. Hence it is said: “I understand that man can find no reason of all those works of God” (Eccle. 8:17).
Tertio, quantum ad ea quae ex sola Dei voluntate dependent: sicut praedestinatio, electio et iustificatio, et alia huiusmodi quae ad sanctificationem pertinent creaturae. Hinc est quod dicitur I Cor. 2-11: quae sunt hominis nemo novit nisi spiritus hominis, qui in ipso est. Ita et quae sunt Dei nemo novit nisi spiritus Dei. [10] Thirdly, we may consider the point in regard to those things which depend on the will of God alone: for instance, predestination, election, justification, and other similar things which pertain to the sanctification of the creature. On this matter, it is said: “No man knows the things of a man, but the spirit of man that is in him. So the things also that are of God, no man knows, but the Spirit of God” (1 Cor. 2:11).

Caput 60
Quod videntes Deum omnia simul vident in ipso
Chapter 60
Cum autem ostensum sit quod intellectus creatus, divinam substantiam videns, in ipsa Dei substantia omnes species rerum intelligat; quaecumque autem una specie videntur, oportet simul et una visione videri, cum visio principio visionis respondeat: necesse est ut intellectus qui divinam substantiam videt, non successive, sed simul omnia contempletur. [1] Now that we have shown that the created intellect, seeing the divine substance, understands all the species of things in God’s very substance, and that whatever things are seen by one species must be seen at once and by one vision, since a vision corresponds to the principle of the vision, it necessarily follows that the intellect which sees the divine substance contemplates all things at once and not in succession.
Item. Summa et perfecta felicitas intellectualis naturae in Dei visione consistit, ut supra ostensum est. Felicitas autem non est secundum habitum, sed secundum actum: cum sit ultima perfectio et ultimus finis. Ea igitur quae videntur per visionem divinae substantiae, qua beati sumus, omnia secundum actum videntur. Non ergo unum prius et aliud posterius. [2] Again, the highest and perfect felicity of intellectual nature consists in the vision of God, as we showed above. But felicity is not a matter of habit but of act, since it is the ultimate perfection and the ultimate end. So, of the things that are seen through the vision of the divine substance, whereby we are made blessed, all are seen actually. Therefore, one is not first and then another later.
Adhuc. Unaquaeque res, cum pervenerit ad suum ultimum finem, quiescit: cum omnis motus sit ad acquirendum finem. Ultimus autem finis intellectus est visio divinae substantiae, ut supra ostensum est. Intellectus igitur divinam substantiam videns non movetur de uno intelligibili in aliud. Omnia igitur quae per hanc visionem cognoscit, simul actu considerat. [3] Besides, when each thing reaches its ultimate end it rests, for all motion is in order to attain an end. Now, the ultimate end of the intellect is the vision of the divine substance as we showed above. So, the intellect seeing the divine substance is not moved from one intelligible object to another. Therefore, it considers actually at once all the things that it knows through this vision.
Amplius. In divina substantia intellectus omnes rerum species cognoscit, ut ex dictis patet. Quorundam autem generum sunt species infinitae: sicut numerorum, figurarum et proportionum. Intellectus igitur in divina substantia videt infinita. Non autem omnia ea videre posset nisi simul videret: quia infinita non est transire. Oportet igitur quod omnia quae intellectus in divina substantia videt, simul videat. [4] Moreover, the intellect knows all the species of things in the divine substance, as is clear from what has been said. Now in some genera there are infinite species, for example, of numbers, figures, and proportions. So, the intellect sees an infinity of things in the divine substance. But it could not see all of these unless it saw them at once, for it is impossible to pass through an infinity of things. Therefore, all that the intellect sees in the divine substance must be seen at once.
Hinc est quod dicit Augustinus, in XV de Trin.: non erunt tunc volubiles nostrae cogitationes, ab aliis in alia euntes et redeuntes: sed omnem scientiam nostram uno simul conspectu videbimus. [5] Hence, what Augustine says, in Book XV of The Trinity: “Our thoughts will not then be fleeting, going to and fro from some things to others, but we shall see all our knowledge in one single glance.”

Caput 61
Quod per visionem Dei aliquis fit particeps vitae aeternae
Chapter 61.
Ex hoc autem apparet quod per visionem praedictam intellectus creatus vitae aeternae fit particeps. [1] From this consideration it is apparent that the created intellect becomes a partaker in the eternal life through this vision.
In hoc enim aeternitas a tempore differt, quod tempus in quadam successione habet esse, aeternitatis vero esse est totum simul. Iam autem ostensum est quod in praedicta visione non est aliqua successio, sed omnia quae per illam videntur, simul et uno intuitu videntur. Illa ergo visio in quadam aeternitatis participatione perficitur. Est autem illa visio quaedam vita: actio enim intellectus est vita quaedam. Fit ergo per illam visionem intellectus creatus vitae aeternae particeps. [2] For, eternity differs from time in this way: time has its being in a sort of succession, whereas the being of eternity is entirely simultaneous. But we have shown that there is no succession in the aforesaid vision; instead, all things that are seen through it are seen at once, and in one view. So, this vision is perfected in a sort of participation in eternity. Moreover, this vision is a kind of life, for the action of the intellect is a kind of life. Therefore, the created intellect becomes a partaker in eternal life through this vision.
Item. Per obiecta actus specificantur. Obiectum autem visionis praedictae est divina substantia secundum seipsam, non secundum aliquam eius similitudinem creatam, ut supra ostensum est. Esse autem divinae substantiae in aeternitate est, vel magis est ipsa aeternitas. Ergo et visio praedicta in participatione aeternitatis est. [3] Again, acts are specified by their objects. But the object of the aforementioned vision is the divine substance in itself, and not in a created likeness of it, as we showed above. Now, the being of the divine substance is in eternity, or, rather, is eternity itself. Therefore, this vision also consists in a participation in eternity.
Adhuc. Si aliqua actio sit in tempore, hoc erit vel propter principium actionis, quod est in tempore, sicut actiones rerum naturalium sunt temporales: vel propter operationis terminum, sicut substantiarum spiritualium, quae sunt supra tempus, quas exercent in res tempori subditas. Visio autem praedicta non est in tempore ex parte eius quod videtur: cum hoc sit substantia aeterna. Neque ex parte eius quo videtur: quod etiam est substantia aeterna. Neque etiam ex parte videntis, quod est intellectus, cuius esse non subiacet tempori: cum sit incorruptibile, ut supra probatum est. Est igitur visio illa secundum aeternitatis participationem, utpote omnino transcendens tempus. [4] Besides, if a given action is done in time, this will be either because the principle of the action is in time—in this sense the actions of temporal things are temporal; or because of the terminus of the operation, as in the case of spiritual substances which are above time but perform their actions on things subject to time. Now, the aforementioned vision is not in time by virtue of what is seen, for this is the eternal substance; nor by virtue of that whereby the seeing is accomplished, for this also is the eternal substance; nor even by virtue of the agent who sees, that is the intellect, whose being does not come under time, since it is incorruptible, as we proved above. Therefore, this vision consists in a participation in eternity, as completely transcending time.
Amplius. Anima intellectiva est creata in confinio aeternitatis et temporis, ut in libro de causis dicitur, et ex praemissis potest esse manifestum: quia est ultima in ordine intellectuum, et tamen eius substantia est elevata supra materiam corporalem, non dependens ab ipsa. Sed actio eius secundum quam coniungitur inferioribus, quae sunt in tempore, est temporalis. Ergo actio eius secundum quam coniungitur superioribus, quae sunt supra tempus, aeternitatem participat. Talis autem est maxime visio qua divinam substantiam videt. Ergo per huiusmodi visionem fit in participatione aeternitatis: et, eadem ratione, quicumque alius intellectus creatus Deum videt. [5] Furthermore, the intellective soul is created “on the border line between eternity and time,” as is stated in the Book on Causes, and as can be shown from our earlier statements. In fact, it is the lowest in the order of intellects, yet its substance is raised above corporeal matter, not depending on it. But its action, as joined to lower things which exist in time, is temporal. Therefore, its action, as joined to higher things which exist above time, participates in eternity. Especially so is the vision by which it sees the divine substance. And so, by this kind of vision it comes into the participation of eternity; and for the same reason, so does any other created intellect that sees God.
Hinc est quod dominus dicit, Io. 17-3: haec est vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te, verum Deum unum. [6] Hence, the Lord says: “This is eternal life, that they may know you, the only true God” (John 17:3).

Caput 62
Quod videntes Deum in perpetuum eum videbunt
Chapter 62
Ex hoc autem apparet quod illi qui ultimam felicitatem consequuntur ex visione divina, nunquam ab illa decident. [1] Now, it is clear from this that those who obtain ultimate felicity as a result of the divine vision never depart from it.
Omne enim quod quandoque est et quandoque non est, tempore mensuratur: ut patet in IV physicorum. Visio autem praedicta, quae intellectuales creaturas beatas facit, non est in tempore, sed in aeternitate. Impossibile est ergo quod ex quo illius particeps aliquis fit, ipsam amittat. [2] For, “everything which at one time exists, and at another does not, is measured by time,” as is clear in Physics IV [12: 221b 28]. But the aforementioned vision, which makes intellectual creatures happy, is not in time but in eternity. So, it is impossible for a person to lose it, once he has become a partaker in it.
Adhuc. Creatura intellectualis non pervenit ad ultimum finem nisi quando eius naturale desiderium quietatur. Sicut autem naturaliter desiderat felicitatem, ita naturaliter desiderat felicitatis perpetuitatem: cum enim in sua substantia sit perpetua, illud quod propter se desiderat et non propter aliud, desiderat ut semper habendum. Non igitur esset felicitas ultimus finis nisi perpetuo permaneret. [3] Again, the intellectual creature does not reach his ultimate end until his natural desire comes to rest. But, just as one naturally desires felicity, so also does he naturally desire everlasting felicity; for, since he is everlasting in his substance, he desires to possess forever that object which is desired for its own sake and not because of something else. Therefore, his felicity would not be the ultimate end unless it endured perpetually.
Amplius. Omne illud quod cum amore possidetur, si sciatur quod quandoque amittatur, tristitiam infert. Visio autem praedicta, quae beatos facit, cum sit maxime delectabilis et maxime desiderata, maxime a possidentibus eam amatur. Impossibile ergo esset eos non tristari si scirent se quandoque eam amissuros. Si autem non esset perpetua, hoc scirent: iam enim ostensum est quod, videndo divinam substantiam, etiam alia cognoscunt quae naturaliter sunt; unde multo magis cognoscunt qualis illa visio sit, utrum perpetua vel quandoque desitura. Non ergo talis visio adesset eis sine tristitia. Et ita non esset vera felicitas, quae ab omni malo immunem reddere debet, ut supra ostensum est. [4] Besides, everything that is possessed with love may cause sorrow, provided it be recognized that such a thing may be lost. But the aforesaid vision which makes men happy is especially loved by its possessors, since it is the most lovable and desirable of objects. Therefore, it would not be possible for them to avoid sorrow if they knew that they would lose it at some time. Now, if it were not perpetual, they would know this, for we have shown already, that, while seeing the divine substance, they also know other things that are naturally so. Hence, they certainly know what kind of vision it is, whether perpetual or to stop at some future time. So, this vision would not be theirs without sorrow. And thus it will not be true felicity which should be made free from all evil, as we showed above.
Item. Quod movetur naturaliter ad aliquid sicut ad finem sui motus, non removetur ab eo nisi per violentiam, sicut grave cum proiicitur sursum. Constat autem ex praedictis quod omnis substantia intellectualis naturali desiderio tendit ad illam visionem. Non ergo ab illa deficiet nisi per violentiam. Nihil autem tollitur per violentiam alicuius nisi virtus auferentis sit maior virtute causantis. Visionis autem divinae causa est Deus, ut supra probatum est. Ergo, cum nulla virtus divinam virtutem excedat, impossibile est quod illa visio per violentiam tollatur. In perpetuum ergo durabit. [5] Moreover, that which is naturally moved toward something, as to the end of its motion, may not be removed from it without violence, as in the case of a weight when it is thrown upward. But from what we have said, it is obvious that every intellectual substance tends by natural desire toward that vision. So, it cannot fail to continue that vision, unless because of violence. But nothing is taken away from a thing by violence unless the power removing it is greater than the power which causes it. Now, the cause of the divine vision is God, as we proved above. Therefore, since no power surpasses the divine power, it is impossible for this vision to be taken away by violence. Hence, it will endure forever.
Adhuc. Si aliquis videre desinat quod prius videbat, aut hoc erit quia deficit ei facultas videndi, sicut cum aliquis moritur vel caecatur, vel aliqualiter aliter impeditur; aut erit quia non vult amplius videre, sicut cum quis avertit visum a re quam prius videbat; vel quia obiectum subtrahitur. Et hoc communiter verum est, sive de visione sensus, sive de intellectuali visione loquamur. Substantiae autem intellectuali videnti Deum non potest deesse facultas Deum videndi: neque per hoc quod esse desinat, cum sit perpetua, ut supra ostensum est; neque per defectum luminis quo Deum videt, cum lumen illud incorruptibiliter recipiatur, secundum conditionem et recipientis et dantis. Neque potest deesse ei voluntas tali visione fruendi, ex quo percipit in illa visione esse suam ultimam felicitatem: sicut non potest velle non esse felix. Nec etiam videre desinet per subtractionem obiecti: quia obiectum illud, quod est Deus, semper eodem modo se habet; nec elongatur a nobis nisi inquantum nos elongamur ab ipso. Impossibile est igitur quod visio illa Dei, quae beatos facit, unquam deficiat. [6] Furthermore, if a person ceases to see what he formerly saw, this cessation will be either because the power of sight fails him, as when one dies or goes blind, or because he is impeded in some other way, or it will be because he does not wish to see any longer, as when a man turns away his glance from a thing that he formerly saw, or because the object is taken away. And this is true in general whether we are talking about sensory or intellectual vision. Now, in regard to the intellectual substance that sees God there cannot be a failure of the ability to see God: either because it might cease to exist, for it exists in perpetuity, as we showed above, or because of a failure of the light whereby it sees God, since the light is received incorruptibly both in regard to the condition of the receiver and of the giver. Nor can it lack the will to enjoy such a vision, because it perceives that its ultimate felicity lies in this vision, just as it cannot fail to will to be happy. Nor, indeed, may it cease to see because of a removal of the object, for the object, which is God, is always existing in the same way; nor is He far removed from us, unless by virtue of our removal from Him. So, it is impossible for the vision of God, which makes men happy, ever to fail.
Praeterea. Impossibile est quod aliquis a bono quo fruitur velit discedere nisi propter aliquod malum quod in fruitione illius boni aestimat, saltem propter hoc quod aestimatur impeditivum maioris boni: sicut enim nihil desiderat appetitus nisi sub ratione boni, ita nihil fugit nisi sub ratione mali. Sed in fruitione illius visionis non potest esse aliquod malum: cum sit optimum ad quod creatura intellectualis pervenire potest. Neque etiam potest esse quod ab eo qui illa fruitur visione, aestimetur in ea esse aliquod malum, vel aliquid eo melius: cum visio illius summae veritatis omnem falsam aestimationem excludat. Impossibile est igitur quod substantia intellectualis quae Deum videt, unquam illa visione carere velit. [7] Again, it is impossible for a person to will to abandon a good which he is enjoying, unless because of some evil which he perceives in the enjoyment of that good; even if it be simply that it is thought to stand in the way of a greater good. For, just as the appetite desires nothing except under the rational character of a good, so does it shun nothing except under the character of an evil But there can be no evil in the enjoyment of this vision, because it is the best to which the intellectual creature can attain. Nor, in fact, can it be that he who is enjoying this vision might think that there is some evil in it, or that there is something better than it. For the vision of the highest Truth excludes all falsity. Therefore, it is impossible for the intellectual substance that sees God ever to will to be without that vision.
Item. Fastidium alicuius quo prius aliquis delectabiliter fruebatur, accidit propter hoc quod res illa aliquam immutationem facit in re, corrumpendo vel debilitando virtutem ipsius. Et propter hoc vires sensibiles, quibus accidit fatigatio in suis actionibus propter immutationem corporalium organorum a sensibilibus; a quibus etiam, si fuerint excellentia, corrumpuntur; fastidiunt post aliquod tempus frui eo quod prius delectabiliter sentiebant. Et propter hoc etiam in intelligendo fastidium patimur post longam vel vehementem meditationem, quia fatigantur potentiae utentes corporalibus organis, sine quibus consideratio intellectus nunc compleri non potest. Divina autem substantia non corrumpit, sed maxime perficit intellectum. Neque ad eius visionem concurrit aliquis actus qui per organa corporalia exerceatur. Impossibile est igitur quod illius visionis aliquem fastidiat qui prius ea delectabiliter fruebatur. [8] Besides, dislike of an object which one formerly enjoyed with delight occurs because this thing produces some kind of real change, destroying or weakening one’s power. And this is why the sense powers, subject to fatigue in their actions because of the changing of the bodily organs by sense objects, are corrupted, even by the best of such objects. Indeed, after a period of enjoyment, they grow to dislike what they formerly perceived with delight. And for this reason we even suffer boredom in the use of our intellect, after a long or strenuous meditation, because our powers that make use of the bodily organs become tired, and intellectual thinking cannot be accomplished without these. But the divine substance does not corrupt; rather, it greatly perfects the intellect. Nor does any act exercised through bodily organs accompany this vision. Therefore, it is impossible for anyone who at one time took joy in the delight of this vision to grow weary of it.
Amplius. Nihil quod cum admiratione consideratur, potest esse fastidiosum: quia quandiu admiratione est, adhuc desiderium movet. Divina autem substantia a quolibet intellectu creato semper cum admiratione videtur: cum nullus intellectus creatus eam comprehendat. Impossibile est igitur quod substantia intellectualis illam visionem fastidiat. Et ita non potest esse quod per propriam voluntatem ab illa visione desistat. [9] Furthermore, nothing that is contemplated with wonder can be tiresome, since as long as the thing remains in wonder it continues to stimulate desire. But the divine substance is always viewed with wonder by any created intellect, since no created intellect comprehends it. So, it is impossible for an intellectual substance to become tired of this vision. And thus, it cannot, of its own will, desist from this vision.
Adhuc. Si aliqua duo fuerunt prius unita et postmodum separantur, oportet quod hoc accidat per mutationem alicuius eorum: relatio enim, sicut non incipit esse de novo absque mutatione alterius relatorum, ita nec absque alterius mutatione de novo esse desistit. Intellectus autem creatus videt Deum per hoc quod ei quodammodo unitur, ut ex dictis patet. Si ergo visio illa desinat, unione huiusmodi desinente, oportet quod hoc fiat per mutationem divinae substantiae, vel intellectus ipsam videntis. Quorum utrumque est impossibile: nam divina substantia immutabilis est, ut in primo libro ostensum est; substantia etiam intellectualis elevatur supra omnem mutationem cum Dei substantiam videt. Impossibile est igitur quod aliquis decidat ab illa felicitate qua Dei substantiam videt. [10] Moreover, if any two things were formerly united and later come to be separated, this must be due to a change in one of them. For, just as a relation does not come into being for the first time without a change in one of the things related, so also it does not cease to be without a new change in one of them. Now, the created intellect sees God by virtue of being united to Him in some way, as is clear from what we have said. So, if this vision were to cease, bringing this union to an end, it would have to be done by a change in the divine substance, or in the intellect of the one who sees it. Both of these changes are impossible: for the divine substance is immutable, as we showed in Book One [13], and, also, the intellectual substance is raised above all change when it sees God’s substance. Therefore, it is impossible for anyone to depart from the felicity in which he sees God’s substance.
Item. Quanto aliquid est Deo propinquius, qui est omnino immobilis, tanto est minus mutabile, et magis perseverans: unde quaedam corpora, propter hoc quod longe distant a Deo, non possunt in perpetuum durare, sicut dicitur in II de generatione. Sed nulla creatura potest Deo vicinius appropinquare quam quae eius substantiam videt. Creatura igitur intellectualis quae Dei substantiam videt, summam immutabilitatem consequetur. Non igitur possibile est quod unquam ab illa visione deficiat. [11] Besides, the nearer a thing is to God, Who is entirely immutable, the less mutable is it and the more lasting. Consequently, certain bodies, because “they are far removed from God,” as is stated in On Generation II [10: 336b 30], cannot endure forever. But no creature can come closer to God than the one who sees His substance. So, the intellectual creature that sees God’s substance attains the highest immutability. Therefore, it is not possible for it ever to lapse from this vision.
Hinc est quod in Psalm. dicitur: beati qui habitant in domo tua, domine: in saecula saeculorum laudabunt te. Et alibi: non commovebitur in aeternum qui habitat in Ierusalem. Et Isaiae 33-20 oculi tui videbunt Ierusalem civitatem opulentam, tabernaculum quod nequaquam transferri poterit, nec auferentur clavi eius in sempiternum, et omnes funiculi eius non rumpentur: quia solummodo ibi magnificus dominus Deus noster. Et Apoc. 3-12: qui vicerit, faciam illum columnam in templo Dei mei, et foras non egredietur amplius. [12] Hence it is said in the Psalm (83:5): "Blessed are they who dwell in Your house, O Lord: they shall praise You for ever and ever." And in another text: "He shall not be moved for ever that dwells in Jerusalem" (Ps. 124: 1) And again: "Your eyes shall see Jerusalem, a rich habitation, a tabernacle that cannot be removed; neither shall the nails thereof be taken away for ever; neither shall any of the cords thereof be broken, because only there our Lord is magnificent" (Is. 33:20-21). And again: "He who overcomes, I will make him a pillar in the temple of My God: and he shall go out no more" (Rev. 3:12)
Per haec autem excluditur error Platonicorum, qui dicebant separatas animas, postquam felicitatem ultimam adeptae fuissent, iterum ad corpora incipere velle redire; et, finita felicitate illius vitae, iterum miseriis huius vitae involvi. Et etiam error Origenis, qui dixit animas et Angelos, post beatitudinem, iterum posse ad miseriam devenire. [13] By these considerations, then, the error of the Platonists is refuted, for they said that separated souls, after having attained ultimate felicity, would begin to desire to return to their bodies, and having brought to an end the felicity of that life they would again become enmeshed in the troubles of this life; and also the error of Origen, who said that souls and angels, after beatitude, could again return to unhappiness.

Caput 63
Qualiter in illa ultima felicitate omne desiderium hominis completur
Chapter 63


Ex praemissis autem evidenter apparet quod in illa felicitate quae provenit ex visione divina, omne desiderium humanum impletur, secundum illud Psalmi, qui replet in bonis desiderium tuum; et omne humanum studium ibi suam consummationem accipit. Quod quidem patet discurrenti per singula. [1] From the foregoing it is quite apparent that, in the felicity that comes from the divine vision, every human desire is fulfilled, according to the text of the Psalm (10-2:5): "Who satisfies your desire with good things." And every human effort attains its completion in it. This, in fact, becomes clear to anyone who thinks over particular instances.
Est enim quoddam desiderium hominis inquantum intellectualis est, de cognitione veritatis: quod quidem desiderium homines prosequuntur per studium contemplativae vitae. Et hoc quidem manifeste in illa visione consummabitur, quando, per visionem primae veritatis, omnia quae intellectus naturaliter scire desiderat, ei innotescent, ut ex supra dictis apparet. [2] For there is in man, in so far as he is intellectual, one type of desire, concerned with the knowledge of truth; indeed, men seek to fulfill this desire by the effort of the contemplative life. And this will clearly be fulfilled in that vision, when, through the vision of the First Truth, all that the intellect naturally desires to know becomes known to it, as is evident from what was said above.
Est etiam quoddam hominis desiderium secundum quod habet rationem, qua inferiora disponere potest: quod prosequuntur homines per studium activae et civilis vitae. Quod quidem desiderium principaliter ad hoc est, ut tota hominis vita secundum rationem disponatur, quod est vivere secundum virtutem: cuiuslibet enim virtuosi finis in operando est propriae virtutis bonum, sicut fortis ut fortiter agat. Hoc autem desiderium tunc omnino complebitur: quia ratio in summo vigore erit, divino lumine illustrata, ne a recto deficere possit. [3] There is also a certain desire in man, based on his possession of reason, whereby he is enabled to manage lower things; this, men seek to fulfill by the work of the active and civic life. Indeed, this desire is chiefly for this end, that the entire life of man may be arranged in accord with reason, for this is to live in accord with virtue. For the end of the activity of every virtuous man is the good appropriate to his virtue, just as, for the brave man, it is to act bravely. Now, this desire will then be completely fulfilled, since reason will be at its peak strength, having been enlightened by the divine light, so that it cannot swerve away from what is right.
Consequuntur etiam civilem vitam quaedam bona quibus homo indiget ad civiles operationes. Sicut honoris sublimitas: quam homines inordinate appetentes, superbi et ambitiosi fiunt. Ad summam autem honoris altitudinem per illam visionem homines sublimantur, inquantum Deo quodam modo uniuntur, ut supra ostensum est. Et propter hoc, sicut ipse Deus rex saeculorum est, ita et beati ei coniuncti reges dicuntur, Apoc. 20-6: regnabunt cum Christo. [4] Going along, then, with the civic life are certain goods which man needs for civic activities. For instance, there is a high position of honor, which makes men proud and ambitious, if they desire it inordinately. But men are raised through this vision to the highest peak of honor, because they are in a sense united with God, as we pointed out above. For this reason, just as God Himself is the "King of ages" (1 Tim. 1:17), so are the blessed united with Him called kings: "They shall reign with Christ" (Apoc. 20:6).
Consequitur etiam civilem vitam aliud appetibile, quod est famae celebritas: per cuius inordinatum appetitum homines inanis gloriae cupidi dicuntur. Beati autem per illam visionem redduntur celebres, non secundum hominum, qui et decipi et decipere possunt, opinionem sed secundum verissimam cognitionem et Dei et omnium beatorum. Et ideo illa beatitudo in sacra Scriptura frequentissime gloria nominatur: sicut in Psalmo dicitur: exultabunt sancti in gloria. [5] Another object of desire associated with civic life is popular renown; by an inordinate desire for this men are deemed lovers of vainglory. Now, the blessed are made men of renown by this vision, not according to the opinion of men, who can deceive and be deceived, but in accord with the truest knowledge, both of God and of all the blessed. Therefore, this blessedness is frequently termed glory in Sacred Scripture; for instance, it is said in the Psalm (149:5): "The saints shall rejoice in glory."
Est etiam et aliud in civili vita appetibile, scilicet divitiae: per cuius inordinatum appetitum et amorem homines illiberales et iniusti fiunt. In illa autem beatitudine est bonorum omnium sufficientia: inquantum beati perfruuntur illo qui comprehendit omnium bonorum perfectionem. Propter quod dicitur Sap. 7-11: venerunt mihi omnia bona pariter cum illa. Unde et in Psalmo dicitur: gloria et divitiae in domo eius. [6] There is, indeed, another object of desire in civic life; namely, wealth. By the inordinate desire and love of this, men become illiberal and unjust. But in this beatitude there is a plenitude of all goods, inasmuch as the blessed come to enjoy Him Who contains the perfection of all good things. For this reason it is said in Wisdom (7:11): “All good things came to me together with her.” Hence it is also said in the Psalm (111:3): “Glory and wealth shall be in His house.”
Est etiam tertium hominis desiderium, quod est sibi et aliis animalibus commune, ut delectationibus perfruatur: quod homines maxime prosequuntur secundum vitam voluptuosam; et per eius immoderantiam homines intemperati et incontinentes fiunt. In illa vero felicitate est delectatio perfectissima: tanto quidem perfectior ea quae secundum sensus est, qua etiam bruta animalia perfrui possunt, quanto intellectus est altior sensu; quanto etiam illud bonum in quo delectabimur, maius est omni sensibili bono, et magis intimum, et magis continue delectans; quanto etiam illa delectatio est magis pura ab omni permixtione contristantis, aut sollicitudinis alicuius molestantis; de qua dicitur in Psalmo: inebriabuntur ab ubertate domus tuae, et torrente voluptatis tuae potabis eos. [7] There is even a third desire of man, which is common to him and the other animals, to enjoy pleasures. Men chiefly seek after this in the voluptuous life, and they become intemperate and incontinent through immoderation in regard to it. However, the most perfect delight is found in this felicity: as much more perfect than the delight of the sense, which even brute animals can enjoy, as the intellect is superior to sense power; and also as that good in which we shall take delight is greater than any sensible good, and more intimate, and more continually delightful; and also as that delight is freer from all admixture of sorrow, or concern about trouble. Of this it is said in the Psalm (35:9): “They shall be inebriated with the plenty of your house, and you shall make them drink of the torrent of your pleasure.”
Est etiam et naturale desiderium, omnibus rebus commune, per quod conservationem sui desiderant, secundum quod possibile est: per cuius immoderantiam homines timidi redduntur, et nimis a laboribus sibi parcentes. Quod quidem desiderium tunc omnino complebitur, quando beati perfectam sempiternitatem consequentur, ab omni nocumento securi: secundum illud Isaiae 49-10 et Apoc. 21: non esurient neque sitient amplius, neque cadet super illos sol neque ullus aestus. [8] There is, moreover, a natural desire common to all things by which they desire their own preservation, to the extent that this is possible: men are made fearful and excessively chary of work that is bard for them by immoderation in this desire. But this desire will then be completely satisfied when the blessed attain perfect sempiternity and are safe from all harm; according to the text of Isaiah (49:10) and Apocalypse 21 [see 7:16]: “They shall no more hunger or thirst, neither shall the sun fall on them, nor any heat.”
Sic igitur patet quod per visionem divinam consequuntur intellectuales substantiae veram felicitatem, in qua omnino desideria quietantur, et in qua est plena sufficientia omnium bonorum, quae, secundum Aristotelem, ad felicitatem requiritur. Unde et Boetius dicit quod beatitudo est status omnium bonorum congregatione perfectus. [9] And so, it is evident that through the divine vision intellectual substances obtain true felicity, in which their desires are completely brought to rest and in which is the full sufficiency of all the goods which, according to Aristotle,” are required for happiness. Hence, Boethius also says that “happiness is a state of life made perfect by the accumulation of all goods” [ De consolatione philosophiae III, 2].
Huius autem ultimae et perfectae felicitatis in hac vita nihil est adeo simile sicut vita contemplantium veritatem, secundum quod est possibile in hac vita. Et ideo philosophi, qui de illa felicitate ultima plenam notitiam habere non potuerunt, in contemplatione quae est possibilis in hac vita, ultimam felicitatem hominis posuerunt. Propter hoc etiam, inter alias vitas, in Scriptura divina magis contemplativa commendatur, dicente domino, Lucae 10-42: Maria optimam partem elegit, scilicet contemplationem veritatis, quae non auferetur ab ea. Incipit enim contemplatio veritatis in hac vita, sed in futura consummatur: activa vero et civilis vita huius vitae terminos non transcendit. [10] Now, there is nothing in this life so like this ultimate and perfect felicity as the life of those who contemplate truth, to the extent that it is possible in this life. And so, the philosophers who were not able to get full knowledge of this ultimate happiness identified man’s ultimate happiness with the contemplation which is possible in this life. On this account, too, of all other lives the contemplative is more approved in divine Scripture, when our Lord says: “Mary has chosen the better part,” namely, the contemplation of truth, “which shall not be taken from her” (Luke 10:42). In fact, the contemplation of truth begins in this life, but reaches its climax in the future; whereas the active and civic life does not go beyond the limits of this life.

Caput 64
Quod Deus sua providentia gubernat res
Chapter 64
Ex his autem quae praemissa sunt, sufficienter habetur quod Deus est rerum omnium finis. Ex quo haberi potest ulterius quod ipse sua providentia gubernet vel regat universa. [1] From the points that have been set forth we have adequately established that God is the end of all things. The next possible conclusion from this is that He governs, or rules, the whole of things by His providence.
Quandocumque enim aliqua ordinantur ad aliquem finem, omnia dispositioni illius subiacent ad quem principaliter pertinet ille finis, sicut in exercitu apparet: omnes enim partes exercitus, et eorum opera, ordinantur ad bonum ducis, quod est victoria, sicut in ultimum finem; et propter hoc ad ducem pertinet totum exercitum gubernare. Similiter ars quae est de fine, imperat et dat leges arti quae est de his quae sunt ad finem: ut civilis militari, et militaris equestri, et ars gubernatoria navifactivae. Cum igitur omnia ordinentur ad bonitatem divinam sicut in finem, ut ostensum est, oportet quod Deus, ad quem principaliter illa bonitas pertinet, sicut substantialiter habita et intellecta et amata, sit gubernator omnium rerum. [2] Whenever certain things are ordered to a definite end they all come under the control of the one to whom the end primarily belongs. This is evident in an army: all divisions of an army and their functions are ordered to the commander’s good as an ultimate end, and this is victory. And for this reason it is the function of t he commander to govern the whole army. Likewise, an art which is concerned with the end commands and makes the laws for an art I concerned with means to the end. Thus, the art of civil government commands that of the military; the military commands the equestrian; and the art of navigation commands that of shipbuilding. So, since all things are ordered to divine goodness as an end, as we showed, it follows that God, to Whom this goodness primarily belongs, as something substantially possessed and known and loved, must be the governor of all things.
Adhuc. Quicumque facit aliquid propter finem, utitur illo ad finem. Ostensum autem est supra quod omnia quae habent esse quocumque modo, sunt effectus Dei; et quod Deus omnia facit propter finem qui est ipse. Ipse igitur utitur omnibus dirigendo ea in finem. Hoc autem est gubernare. Est igitur Deus per suam providentiam omnium gubernator. [3] Again, whoever makes a thing for the sake of an end may use the thing for that end. Now, we showed above that all things possessing being in any way whatever are God’s products, and also that God makes all things for an end which is Himself. Therefore, He uses all things by directing them to their end. Now, this is to govern. So, God is the governor of all things through His providence.
Amplius. Ostensum est quod Deus est primum movens non motum. Primum autem movens non minus movet quam secunda moventia, sed magis: quia sine eo non movent alia. Omnia autem quae moventur, moventur propter finem, ut supra ostensum est. Movet igitur Deus omnia ad fines suos. Et per intellectum: ostensum enim est supra quod non agit per necessitatem naturae, sed per intellectum et voluntatem. Nihil est autem aliud regere et gubernare per providentiam quam movere per intellectum aliqua ad finem. Deus igitur per suam providentiam gubernat et regit omnia quae moventur in finem: sive moveantur corporaliter; sive spiritualiter, sicut desiderans dicitur moveri a desiderato. [4] Besides, we have shown that God is the first unmoved mover. The first mover does not move fewer things, but more, than the secondary movers, for the latter do not move other things without the first. Now, all things that are moved are so moved because of the end, as we showed above. So, God moves all things to their ends, and He does so through His understanding, for we have shown above that He does not act through a necessity of His nature, but through understanding and will. Now, to rule or govern by providence is simply to move things toward an end through understanding. Therefore, God by His providence governs and rules all things that are moved toward their end, whether they be moved corporeally, or spiritually as one who desires is moved by an object of desire.
Item. Probatum est quod corpora naturalia moventur et operantur propter finem, licet finem non cognoscant, ex hoc quod semper vel frequentius accidit in eis quod melius est; et non aliter fierent si fierent per artem. Impossibile est autem quod aliqua non cognoscentia finem operentur propter finem et ordinate perveniant in ipsum nisi sint mota ab aliquo habente cognitionem finis: sicut sagitta dirigitur ad signum a sagittante. Oportet ergo quod tota operatio naturae ab aliqua cognitione ordinetur. Et hoc quidem vel mediate vel immediate oportet reducere in Deum: oportet enim quod omnis inferior ars et cognitio a superiori principia accipiat, sicut etiam in scientiis speculativis et operativis apparet. Deus igitur sua providentia mundum gubernat. [5] Moreover, that natural bodies are moved and made to operate for an end, even though they do not know their end, was proved by the fact that what happens to them is always, or often, for the best; and, if their workings resulted from art, they would not be done differently. But it is impossible for things that do not know their end to work for that end, and to reach that end in an orderly way, unless they are moved by someone possessing knowledge of the end, as in the case of the arrow directed to the target by the archer. So, the whole working of nature must be ordered by some sort of knowledge. And this, in fact, must lead back to God, either mediately or immediately, since every lower art and type of knowledge must get its principles from a higher one, as we also see in the speculative and operative sciences. Therefore, God governs the world by His providence.
Adhuc. Ea quae sunt secundum suam naturam distincta, in unum ordinem non conveniunt nisi ab uno ordinante colligantur in unum. In universitate autem rerum sunt res distinctas et contrarias naturas habentes, quae tamen omnes in unum ordinem conveniunt, dum quaedam operationes quorundam excipiunt, quaedam etiam a quibusdam iuvantur vel imperantur. Oportet igitur quod sit universorum unus ordinator et gubernator. [6] Furthermore, things that are different in their natures do not come together into one order unless they are gathered into a unit by one ordering agent. But in the whole of reality things are distinct and possessed of contrary natures; yet all come together in one order, and while some things make use of the actions of others, some are also helped or commanded by others. Therefore, there must be one orderer and governor of the whole of things.
Amplius. Eorum quae circa caelestium corporum motus apparent, ratio assignari non potest ex necessitate naturae: cum quaedam eorum habeant plures motus quibusdam, et omnino difformes. Oportet igitur quod illorum motuum ordinatio sit ab aliqua providentia. Et per consequens omnium inferiorum motuum et operationum, qui per illos motus disponuntur. [7] Moreover, it is not possible to give an explanation, based on natural necessity, for the apparent motions of celestial bodies, since some of them have more motions than others, and altogether incompatible ones. So, there must be an ordering of their motions by some providence, and, consequently, of the motions and workings of all lower things that are controlled by their motions.
Item. Quanto aliquid propinquius est causae, tanto plus participat de effectu ipsius. Unde, si aliquid tanto participatur perfectius ab aliquibus quanto alicui rei magis appropinquant, signum est quod illa res sit causa illius quod diversimode participatur: sicut, si aliqua magis sunt calida secundum quod magis appropinquant igni, signum est quod ignis sit causa caloris. Inveniuntur autem tanto aliqua perfectius ordinata esse, quanto magis sunt Deo propinqua: nam in corporibus inferioribus, quae sunt maxime a Deo distantia naturae dissimilitudine, invenitur esse defectus aliquando ab eo quod est secundum cursum naturae, sicut patet in monstruosis et aliis casualibus; quod nunquam accidit in corporibus caelestibus, quae tamen sunt aliquo modo mutabilia; quod non accidit in substantiis intellectualibus separatis. Manifestum est ergo quod Deus est causa totius ordinis rerum. Est igitur ipse per suam providentiam gubernator totius universitatis rerum. [8] Besides, the nearer a thing is to its cause, the more does it participate in its influence. Hence, if some perfection is more perfectly participated by a group of things the more they approach a certain object, then this is an indication that this object is the cause of the perfection which is participated in various degrees. For instance, if certain things become hotter as they come nearer to fire, this is an indication that fire is the cause of heat. Now, things are found to be more perfectly ordered the nearer they are to God. For, in the lower types of bodies, which are very far away from God in the dissimilarity of their natures, there is sometimes found to be a falling away from the regular course of nature, as in the case of monstrosities and other chance events; but this never happens in the case of the celestial bodies, though they are somewhat mutable, and it does not occur among separate intellectual substances. Therefore, it is plain that God is the cause of the whole order of things. So, He is the governor of the whole universe of reality through His providence.
Adhuc. Sicut supra probatum est, Deus res omnes in esse produxit, non ex necessitate naturae, sed per intellectum et voluntatem. Intellectus autem et voluntatis ipsius non potest esse alius finis ultimus nisi bonitas eius, ut scilicet eam rebus communicaret, sicut ex praemissis apparet. Res autem participant divinam bonitatem per modum similitudinis, inquantum ipsae sunt bonae. Id autem quod est maxime bonum in rebus causatis, est bonum ordinis universi, quod est maxime perfectum, ut philosophus dicit: cui etiam consonat Scriptura divina, Gen. 1, cum dicitur, vidit Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona, cum de singulis operibus dixisset simpliciter quod erant bona. Bonum igitur ordinis rerum causatarum a Deo est id quod est praecipue volitum et causatum a Deo. Nihil autem aliud est gubernare aliqua quam eis ordinem imponere. Ipse igitur Deus omnia suo intellectu et voluntate gubernat. [9] Furthermore, as we proved above, God brings all things into being, not from the necessity of His nature, but by understanding and will. Now, there can be no other ultimate end for His understanding and will than His goodness, that is, to communicate it to things, as is clear from what has been established. But things participate in the divine goodness to the extent that they are good, by way of likeness. Now, that which is the greatest good in caused things is the good of the order of the universe; for it is most perfect, as the Philosopher says.” With this, divine Scripture is also in agreement, for it is said in Genesis (1:31): “God saw all the things He had made, and they were very good,” while He simply said of the individual works, that “they were good.” So, the good of the order of things caused by God is what is chiefly willed and caused by God. Now, to govern things is nothing but to impose order on them. Therefore, God Himself governs all things by His understanding and will.
Amplius. Unumquodque intendens aliquem finem, magis curat de eo quod est propinquius fini ultimo: quia hoc etiam est finis aliorum. Ultimus autem finis divinae voluntatis est bonitas ipsius, cui propinquissimum in rebus creatis est bonum ordinis totius universi: cum ad ipsum ordinetur, sicut ad finem, omne particulare bonum huius vel illius rei, sicut minus perfectum ordinatur ad id quod est perfectius; unde et quaelibet pars invenitur esse propter suum totum. Id igitur quod maxime curat Deus in rebus creatis, est ordo universi. Est igitur gubernator ipsius. [10] Moreover, any agent intending an end is more concerned about what is nearer to the ultimate end, because this nearer thing is also an end for other things. Now, the ultimate end of the divine will is His goodness, and the nearest thing to this latter, among created things, is the good of the order of the whole universe, since every particular good of this or that thing is ordered to it as to an end (just as the less perfect is ordered to what is more perfect); and so, each part is found to be for the sake of its whole. Thus, among created things, what God cares for most is the order of the universe. Therefore, He is its governor.
Item. Quaelibet res creata consequitur suam ultimam perfectionem per operationem propriam: nam oportet quod ultimus finis et perfectio rei sit vel ipsa operatio, vel operationis terminus aut effectus, forma vero secundum quam res est, est perfectio prima, ut patet in II de anima. Ordo autem rerum causatarum secundum distinctionem naturarum et gradum ipsarum, procedit ex divina sapientia, sicut in secundo est ostensum. Ergo et ordo operationum, per quas res causatae magis appropinquant ad ultimum finem. Ordinare autem actiones aliquarum rerum ad finem, est gubernare ipsa. Deus igitur per suae sapientiae providentiam rebus gubernationem et regimen praestat. [11] Again, every created thing attains its ultimate perfection through its proper operation, for the ultimate end and the perfection of a thing must be either its operation or the term or product of its operation. Of course, the form, by virtue of which the thing exists, is its first perfection, as is evident from Book II of On the Soul [1: 412a 28]. But the order of caused things, according to the distinction of their natures and levels, proceeds from divine Wisdom, as we showed in Book Two. So also does the order of their operations, whereby caused things draw nearer to their ultimate end. Now, to order the actions of certain things toward their end is to govern them. Therefore, God provides governance and regulation for things by the providence of His wisdom.
Hinc est quod sacra Scriptura Deum dominum et regem profitetur, secundum illud Psalmi, dominus ipse est Deus, et item, rex omnis terrae Deus: regis enim et domini est suo imperio regere et gubernare subiectos. Unde et rerum cursum sacra Scriptura divino praecepto adscribit, Iob 9-7, qui praecipit soli et non oritur, et stellas claudit quasi sub signaculo; et in Psalmo, praeceptum posuit et non praeteribit. [12] Hence it is that Sacred Scripture proclaims God as Lord and King, according to the text of the Psalm (99:2): “The Lord, He is God”; and again: “God is the King of all the earth” (Ps. 46:8); for it is the function of the king and lord to rule and govern those subject to their command. And so, Sacred Scripture attributes the course of things to divine decree: “Who commands the sun, and it rises not, and shuts up the stars, as it were under a seal” (Job 9:7); and also in the Psalm (10:6): “He has made a decree and it shall not pass away.”
Per hoc autem excluditur error antiquorum naturalium, qui dicebant omnia ex necessitate materiae provenire: ex quo sequebatur omnia casu accidere, et non ex aliquo providentiae ordine. [13] Now, by this conclusion the error of the ancient philosophers of nature is refuted, for they said that all things come about as a result of material necessity, the consequence of which would be that all things happen by chance and not from the order of providence.

Caput 65
Quod Deus conservat res in esse
Chapter 65
Ex eo autem quod Deus res sua providentia regit, sequitur quod in esse conservet. [1] Now, from the fact that God rules things by His providence it follows that He preserves them in being.
Ad gubernationem enim aliquorum pertinet omne illud per quod suum finem consequuntur: secundum hoc enim aliqua regi vel gubernari dicuntur, quod ordinantur in finem. In finem autem ultimum quem Deus intendit, scilicet bonitatem divinam, ordinantur res non solum per hoc quod operantur, sed etiam per hoc quod sunt: quia inquantum sunt, divinae bonitatis similitudinem gerunt, quod est finis rerum, ut supra ostensum est. Ad divinam igitur providentiam pertinet quod res conserventur in esse. [2] Indeed, everything whereby things attain their end pertains to the governance of these things. For things are said to be ruled or governed by virtue of their being ordered to their end. Now, things are ordered to the ultimate end which God intends, that is, divine goodness, not only by the fact that they perform their operations, but also by the fact that they exist, since, to the extent that they exist, they bear the likeness of divine goodness which is the end for things, as we showed above. Therefore, it pertains to divine providence that things are preserved in being.
Item. Oportet quod idem sit causa rei, et conservationis ipsius: nam conservatio rei non est nisi continuatio esse ipsius. Ostensum est autem supra quod Deus per suum intellectum et voluntatem est causa essendi omnibus rebus. Igitur per suum intellectum et voluntatem conservat res omnes in esse. [3] Again, the same principle must be the cause of a thing and of its preservation, for the preservation of a thing is nothing but the continuation of its being. Now, we showed above that God, through His understanding, and will, is the cause of being for all things. Therefore, He preserves all things in being through His intellect and will.
Item. Nullum particulare agens univocum potest esse simpliciter causa speciei: sicut hic homo non potest esse causa speciei humanae; esset enim causa omnis hominis, et per consequens sui ipsius, quod est impossibile. Est autem causa hic homo huius hominis, per se loquendo. Hic autem homo est per hoc quod natura humana est in hac materia, quae est individuationis principium. Hic igitur homo non est causa hominis nisi inquantum est causa quod forma humana fiat in hac materia. Hoc autem est esse principium generationis huius hominis. Patet ergo quod nec hic homo, nec aliquod aliud agens univocum in natura, est causa nisi generationis huius vel illius rei. Oportet autem ipsius speciei humanae esse aliquam per se causam agentem: quod ipsius compositio ostendit, et ordinatio partium, quae eodem modo se habet in omnibus, nisi per accidens impediatur. Et eadem ratio est de omnibus aliis speciebus rerum naturalium. [4] Besides, no particular univocal agent can be the unqualified cause of its species; for instance, this individual man cannot be the cause of the human species, for he would then be the cause of every man, and, consequently, of himself—which is impossible. But this individual man is the cause, properly speaking, of that individual man. Now, this man exists because human nature is present in this matter, which is the principle of individuation. So, this man is not the cause of a man, except in the sense that he is the cause of a human form coming to be in this matter. This is to be the principle of the generation of an individual man. So, it is apparent that neither this man, nor any other univocal agent in nature, is the cause of anything except the generation of this or that individual thing. Now, there must be some proper agent cause of the human species itself; its composition shows this, and also the ordering of its parts, which is uniform in all cases unless it be accidentally impeded. And the same reasoning applies to all the other species of natural things.
Haec autem causa est Deus, vel mediate vel immediate: ostensum enim est quod ipse est prima omnium rerum causa. Oportet ergo quod ipse hoc modo se habeat ad species rerum sicut se habet hic generans in natura ad generationem, cuius est per se causa. Generatio autem cessat, cessante operatione generantis. Ergo et omnes species rerum cessarent, cessante operatione divina. Igitur ipse per suam operationem conservat res in esse. Now, this cause is God, either mediately or immediately. For we have shown that He is the first cause of all things. So, He must stand in regard to the species of things as the individual generating agent in nature does to generation, of which he is the direct cause. But generation ceases as soon as the operation of the generative agent ceases. Therefore, all the species of things would also cease as soon as the divine operation ceased. So, He preserves things in being through His operation.
Adhuc. Licet alicui existenti accidat motus, tamen motus est praeter esse rei. Nullum autem corporeum est causa alicuius rei nisi inquantum movetur: quia nullum corpus agit nisi per motum, ut Aristoteles probat. Nullum igitur corpus est causa esse alicuius rei inquantum est esse, sed est causa eius quod est moveri ad esse, quod est fieri rei. Esse autem cuiuslibet rei est esse participatum: cum non sit res aliqua praeter Deum suum esse, ut supra probatum est. Et sic oportet quod ipse Deus, qui est suum esse, sit primo et per se causa omnis esse. Sic igitur se habet ad esse rerum operatio divina, sicut motio corporis moventis ad fieri et moveri rerum factarum vel motarum. Impossibile autem est quod fieri et moveri alicuius rei maneat, cessante motione moventis. Impossibile ergo est quod esse alicuius rei remaneat nisi per operationem divinam. [5] Moreover, though motion may occur for any existing thing, motion is apart from the being of the thing. Now, nothing. corporeal, unless it be moved, is the cause of anything, for no body acts unless by motion, as Aristotle proves. Therefore, no body is the cause of the being of anything, in so far as it is being, but it is the cause of its being moved toward being, that is, of the thing’s becoming. Now, the being of any thing is participated being, since no thing is its own act of being, except God, as we proved above. And thus, God Himself, Who is His own act of being, must be primarily and essentially the cause of every being. So, divine operation is related to the being of things as the motion of a corporeal mover is to the becoming and passive movement of the things that are made or moved. Now, it is impossible for the becoming and passive movement of a thing to continue if the motion of the mover cease. Therefore, it is impossible for the being of a thing to continue except through divine operation.
Amplius. Sicut opus artis praesupponit opus naturae, ita opus naturae praesupponit opus Dei creantis: nam materia artificialium est a natura, naturalium vero per creationem a Deo. Artificialia autem conservantur in esse virtute naturalium: sicut domus per soliditatem lapidum. Omnia igitur naturalia non conservantur in esse nisi virtute Dei. [6] Furthermore, just as art work presupposes a work of nature, so does a work of nature presuppose the work of God the creator. In fact, the material for art products comes from nature, while that of natural products comes through creation by God. Moreover, art objects are preserved in being by the power of natural things; a home, for instance, by the solidity of its stories. Therefore, all natural things are preserved in being by nothing other than the power of God.
Item. Impressio agentis non remanet in effectu, cessante actione agentis, nisi vertatur in naturam effectus. Formae enim generatorum, et proprietates ipsorum, usque in finem manent in eis post generationem, quia efficiuntur eis naturales. Et similiter habitus sunt difficile mobiles, quia vertuntur in naturam: dispositiones autem et passiones, sive corporales sive animales, manent aliquantum post actionem agentis, sed non semper, quia insunt ut in via ad naturam. Quod autem pertinet ad naturam superioris generis, nullo modo manet post actionem agentis: sicut lumen non manet in diaphano, recedente illuminante. Esse autem non est natura vel essentia alicuius rei creatae, sed solius Dei, ut in primo ostensum est. Nulla igitur res remanere potest in esse, cessante operatione divina. [7] Again, the impression of an agent does not continue in the product, if the agent’s action ceases, unless the impression be converted into the nature of the product. Indeed, the forms of things generated, and their properties, remain in them after generation until the end, since they become natural to them. And likewise, habits are difficult to change because they are turned into a nature. But dispositions and passions, whether of the body or soul, endure for a little while after the action of the agent, but not forever, since they are present in a state transitional to nature. Now, whatever belongs to the nature of a higher type of being does not last at all after the action of the agent; light, for instance, does not continue in a diaphanous body when the source of light has gone away. Now, to be is not the nature or essence of any created thing, but only of God, as we showed in Book One [22]. Therefore, no thing can remain in being if divine operation cease.
Adhuc. Circa rerum originem duplex est positio: una fidei, quod res de novo fuerint a Deo productae in esse; et positio quorundam philosophorum, quod res a Deo ab aeterno effluxerint. Secundum autem utramque positionem oportet dicere quod res conserventur in esse a Deo. Nam si res a Deo productae sunt in esse postquam non fuerant, oportet quod esse rerum divinam voluntatem consequatur, et similiter non esse: quia permisit res non esse quando voluit, et fecit res esse cum voluit. Tandiu igitur sunt quandiu eas esse vult. Sua igitur voluntas conservatrix est rerum. [8] Furthermore, there are two positions regarding the origin of things: one, from faith, holding that things have been brought into being by God, at the beginning; and the position of certain philosophers, that things have emanated from God eternally. Now, in either position one has to say that things are preserved in being by God. For, if things are brought into being by God, after they were not existing, then the being of things, and similarly their non-being, must result from the divine will; for He has permitted things not to be, when He so willed; and He made things to be, when He so willed. Hence, they exist just as long as He wills them to be. Therefore, His will is the preserver of things.
Si autem res ab aeterno a Deo effluxerunt, non est dare tempus aut instans in quo primo a Deo effluxerint. Aut igitur nunquam a Deo productae sunt: aut semper a Deo esse earum procedit quandiu sunt. Sua igitur operatione res in esse conservat. But, if things have eternally emanated from God, we cannot give a time or instant at which they first flowed forth from God. So, either they never were produced by God, or their being is always flowing forth from God as long as they exist. Therefore, He preserves things in being by His operation.
Hinc est quod dicitur Hebr. 1-3: portans omnia verbo virtutis suae. Et Augustinus dicit, IV super Gen. ad Litt.: creatoris potentia, et omnipotentis atque omnitenentis virtus, causa est subsistendi omnis creaturae. Quae virtus ab eis quae creata sunt regendis si aliquando cessaret, simul et eorum cessaret species, omnisque natura concideret. Neque enim sicut structuram aedium cum fabricaverit quis, abscedit atque, illo cessante atque abscedente, stat opus eius, ita mundus vel in ictu oculi stare poterit, si ei regimen Deus subtraxerit. [9] Hence it is said: “Upholding all things by the word of His Power” (Heb. 1:3). And Augustine says: “The power of the Creator, and the strength of the Omnipotent and All-sustaining is the cause of the subsistence of every creature. And, if this power were ever to cease its ruling of the things which have been created, their species would at once come to an end, and all nature would collapse. For the situation is not like that of a man who has built a house and has then gone away, and, while he is not working and is absent, his work stands. For, if God were to withdraw His rule from it, the world could not stand, even for the flick of an eye.”
Per hoc autem excluditur quorundam loquentium in lege Maurorum positio, qui, ad hoc quod sustinere possent mundum Dei conservatione indigere, posuerunt omnes formas esse accidentia, et quod nullum accidens durat per duo instantia, ut sic semper rerum formatio esset in fieri: quasi res non indigeret causa agente nisi dum est in fieri. Unde et aliqui eorum ponere dicuntur quod corpora indivisibilia, ex quibus omnes substantias dicunt esse compositas, quae sola, secundum eos, firmitatem habent, possunt ad horam aliquam remanere, si Deus suam gubernationem rebus subtraheret. Quorum etiam quidam dicunt quod res esse non desineret nisi Deus in ipsa accidens desitionis causaret. Quae omnia patet esse absurda. [10] Now, by this conclusion the position of the exponents of the Law of the Moors is refuted, for, in order to be able to maintain that the world needs God’s preservation, they took the view that all forms are accidents, and that no accident endures through two instants. So that, in this view, the informing of things would be in continuous process, as if a thing would not need an agent cause except while in the process of becoming. Hence, also, some of these people are said to claim that indivisible bodies (out of which, they say, all substances are composed and which alone, according to them, possess stability) could last for about an hour if God were to withdraw His governance from things. Also, some of them say that a thing could not even cease to be unless God caused in it the accident of “cessation.”— Now, all these views are clearly absurd.

Caput 66
Quod nihil dat esse nisi inquantum agit in virtute divina
Chapter 66
Ex hoc autem manifestum est quod omnia inferiora agentia non dant esse nisi inquantum agunt in virtute divina. [1] From this it is manifest that no lower agents give being except in so far as they act by divine power.
Nihil enim dat esse nisi inquantum est ens actu. Deus autem conservat res in esse per suam providentiam, ut ostensum est. Ex virtute igitur divina est quod aliquid det esse. [2] Indeed, a thing does not give being except in so far as it is an actual being. But God preserves things in being by His providence, as we showed. Therefore, it is as a result of divine power that a thing gives being.
Amplius. Quando aliqua agentia diversa sub uno agente ordinantur, necesse est quod effectus qui ab eis communiter fit, sit eorum secundum quod uniuntur in participando motum et virtutem illius agentis: non enim plura faciunt unum nisi inquantum unum sunt; sicut patet quod omnes qui sunt in exercitu operantur ad victoriam causandam, quam causant secundum quod sunt sub ordinatione ducis, cuius proprius effectus victoria est. Ostensum est autem in primo quod primum agens est Deus. Cum igitur esse sit communis effectus omnium agentium, nam omne agens facit esse actu; oportet quod hunc effectum producunt inquantum ordinantur sub primo agente, et agunt in virtute ipsius. [3] Again, when several different agents are subordinated to one agent, the effect that is produced by their common action must be attributed to them as they are united in their participation in the motion and power of this agent. For several agents do not produce one result unless they are as one. It is clear, for example, that all the men in an army work to bring about victory, and they do this by virtue of being subordinated to the leader, whose proper product is victory. Now, we showed in Book One [13] that the first agent is God. So, since being is the common product of all agents, because every agent produces actual being, they must produce this effect because they are subordinated to the first agent and act through His power.
Adhuc. In omnibus causis agentibus ordinatis illud quod est ultimum in generatione et primum in intentione, est proprius effectus primi agentis: sicut forma domus, quae est proprius effectus aedificatoris, posterius provenit quam praeparatio caementi et lapidis et lignorum, quae fiunt per artifices inferiores, qui subsunt aedificatori. In omni autem actione esse in actu est principaliter intentum, et ultimum in generatione: nam, eo habito, quiescit agentis actio et motus patientis. Est igitur esse proprius effectus primi agentis, scilicet Dei: et omnia quae dant esse, hoc habent inquantum agunt in virtute Dei. [4] Besides, in the case of all agent causes that are ordered, that which is last in the process of generation and first in intention is the proper product of the primary agent. For instance, the form of a house, which is the proper product of the builder, appears later than the preparation of the cement, stones, and timbers, which are made by the lower workmen who come under the builder. Now, in every action, actual being is primarily intended, but is last in the process of generation. In fact, as soon as it is achieved, the agent’s action and the patient’s motion come to rest. Therefore, being is the proper product of the primary agent, that is, of God; and all things that give being do so because they act by God’s power.
Amplius. Ultimum in bonitate et perfectione inter ea in quae potest agens secundum, est illud in quod potest ex virtute agentis primi: nam complementum virtutis agentis secundi est ex agente primo. Quod autem est in omnibus effectibus perfectissimum, est esse: quaelibet enim natura vel forma perficitur per hoc quod est actu; et comparatur ad esse in actu sicut potentia ad actum. Ipsum igitur esse est quod agentia secunda agunt in virtute agentis primi. [5] Moreover, the ultimate in goodness and perfection among the things to which the power of a secondary agent extends is that which it can do by the power of the primary agent, for the perfection of the power of the secondary agent is due to the primary agent. Now, that which is most perfect of all effects is the act of being, for every nature or form is perfected by the fact that it is actual, and it is related to actual being as potency is to act. Therefore, the act of being is what secondary agents produce through the power of the primary agent.
Item. Secundum ordinem causarum est ordo effectuum. Primum autem in omnibus effectibus est esse: nam omnia alia sunt quaedam determinationes ipsius. Igitur esse est proprius effectus primi agentis, et omnia alia agunt ipsum inquantum agunt in virtute primi agentis. Secunda autem agentia, quae sunt quasi particulantes et determinantes actionem primi agentis, agunt sicut proprios effectus alias perfectiones, quae determinant esse. [6] Besides, the order of the effects follows the order of the causes. But the first among all effects is the act of being, since all other things are certain determinations of it. Therefore, being is the proper effect of the primary agent, and all other things produce being because they act through the power of the primary agent. Now, secondary agents, which are like particularizers and determinants of the primary agent’s action, produce as their proper effects other perfections which determine being.
Praeterea. Quod est per essentiam tale, est propria causa eius quod est per participationem tale: sicut ignis est causa omnium ignitorum. Deus autem solus est ens per essentiam suam, omnia autem alia sunt entia per participationem: nam in solo Deo esse est sua essentia. Esse igitur cuiuslibet existentis est proprius effectus eius, ita quod omne quod producit aliquid in esse, hoc facit inquantum agit in virtute Dei. [7] Furthermore, that which is of a certain kind through its essence is the proper cause of what is of such a kind by participation. Thus, fire is the cause of all things that are afire. Now, God alone is actual being through His own essence, while other beings are actual beings through participation, since in God alone is actual being identical with His essence. Therefore, the being of every existing thing is His proper effect. And so, everything that brings something into actual being does so because it acts through God’s power.
Hinc est quod dicitur Sap. 1-14: creavit Deus ut essent omnia. Et in pluribus Scripturae locis dicitur quod Deus omnia facit. In libro etiam de causis dicitur quod nec intelligentia dat esse nisi inquantum est divina, idest, inquantum agit in virtute divina. [8] Hence it is said: “God created, that all things might be” (Wis. 1:14). And in several texts of Scripture it is stated that God makes all things. Moreover, it is said in the Book on Causes that not even an intelligence gives being “unless in so far as it is divine,” that is; in so far as it acts through divine power.

Caput 67
Quod Deus est causa operandi omnibus operantibus
Chapter 67
Ex hoc autem apparet quod Deus causa est omnibus operantibus ut operentur. Omne enim operans est aliquo modo causa essendi, vel secundum esse substantiale, vel accidentale. Nihil autem est causa essendi nisi inquantum agit in virtute Dei, ut ostensum est. Omne igitur operans operatur per virtutem Dei. [1] It is evident, next, that God is the cause enabling all operating agents to operate. In fact, every operating agent is a cause of being in some way, either of substantial or of accidental being. Now, nothing is a cause of being unless by virtue of its acting through the power of God, as we showed. Therefore, every operating agent acts through God’s power.
Adhuc. Omnis operatio quae consequitur aliquam virtutem, attribuitur sicut causae illi rei quae dedit illam virtutem: sicut motus gravium et levium naturalis consequitur formam ipsorum, secundum quam sunt gravia et levia, et ideo causa motus ipsorum dicitur esse generans, qui dedit formam. Omnis autem virtus cuiuscumque agentis est a Deo, sicut a primo principio omnis perfectionis. Ergo, cum omnis operatio consequatur aliquam virtutem, oportet quod cuiuslibet operationis causa sit Deus. [2] Again, every operation that results from a certain power is attributed causally to the thing which has given the power. For instance, the natural motion of heavy and light things results from their form, depending on whether they are heavy or light, and so the cause of their motion is said to be the generating agent that has given them the form. Now, every power in any agent is from God, as from a first principle of all perfection. Therefore, since every operation results from a power, the cause of every operation must be God.
Amplius. Manifestum est quod omnis actio quae non potest permanere cessante impressione alicuius agentis, est ab illo agente: sicut manifestatio colorum non posset esse cessante actione solis qua aerem illuminat, unde non est dubium quin sol sit causa manifestationis colorum. Et similiter patet de motu violento, qui cessat cessante violentia impellentis. Sicut autem Deus non solum dedit esse rebus cum primo esse incoeperunt, sed quandiu sunt, esse in eis causat, res in esse conservans, ut ostensum est; ita non solum cum primo res conditae sunt, eis virtutes operativas dedit, sed semper eas in rebus causat. Unde, cessante influentia divina, omnis operatio cessaret. Omnis igitur rei operatio in ipsum reducitur sicut in causam. [3] Besides, it is obvious that every action which cannot continue after the influence of a certain agent has ceased results from that agent. For instance, the manifestation of colors could not continue if the sun’s action of illuminating the air were to cease, so there is no doubt that the sun is the cause of the manifestation of colors. And the same thing appears in connection with violent motion, for it stops with the cessation of violence on the part of the impelling agent. But just as God has not only given being to things when they first began to exist, and also causes being in them as long as they exist, conserving things in being, as we have shown, so also has He not merely granted operative powers to them when they were originally created, but He always causes these powers in things. Hence, if this divine influence were to cease, every operation would cease. Therefore, every operation of a thing is traced back to Him as to its cause.
Item. Quicquid applicat virtutem activam ad agendum, dicitur esse causa illius actionis: artifex enim applicans virtutem rei naturalis ad aliquam actionem, dicitur esse causa illius actionis, sicut coquus decoctionis, quae est per ignem. Sed omnis applicatio virtutis ad operationem est principaliter et primo a Deo. Applicantur enim virtutes operativae ad proprias operationes per aliquem motum vel corporis, vel animae. Primum autem principium utriusque motus est Deus. Est enim primum movens omnino immobile, ut supra ostensum est. Similiter etiam omnis motus voluntatis quo applicantur aliquae virtutes ad operandum, reducitur in Deum sicut in primum appetibile et in primum volentem. Omnis igitur operatio debet attribui Deo sicut primo et principali agenti. [4] Moreover, whatever agent applies active power to the doing of something, it is said to be the cause of that action. Thus, an artisan who applies the power of a natural thing to some action is said to be the cause of the action; for instance, a cook of the cooking which is done by means of fire. But every application of power to operation is originally and primarily made by God. For operative powers are applied to their proper operations by some movement of body or of soul. Now, the first principle of both types of movement is God. Indeed, He is the first mover and is altogether incapable of being moved, as we shown above. Similarly, also, every movement of a will whereby Powers are applied to operation is reduced to God, as a first object of appetite and a first agent of willing. Therefore; every operation should be attributed to God, as to a first and principal agent.
Adhuc. In omnibus causis agentibus ordinatis semper oportet quod causae sequentes agant in virtute causae primae: sicut in rebus naturalibus corpora inferiora agunt in virtute corporum caelestium; et in rebus voluntariis omnes artifices inferiores operantur secundum imperium supremi architectoris. In ordine autem causarum agentium Deus est prima causa, ut in primo ostensum est. Ergo omnes causae inferiores agentes agunt in virtute ipsius. Causa autem actionis magis est illud cuius virtute agitur quam etiam illud quod agit: sicut principale agens magis quam instrumentum. Deus igitur principalius est causa cuiuslibet actionis quam etiam secundae causae agentes. [5] Furthermore, in all agent causes arranged in an orderly way the subsequent causes must act through the power of the first cause. For instance, in the natural order of things, lower bodies act through the power of the celestial bodies; and, again, in the order of voluntary things, all lower artisans work in accord with the direction of the top craftsman. Now, in the order of agent causes, God the first cause, as we showed in Book One [64]. And so, all lower agent causes act through His power. But the cause of an action is the one by whose power the action is done rather than the one who acts: the principal agent, for instance, rather than the instrument. Therefore, God is more especially the cause of every action than are the secondary agent causes.
Item. Omne operans per suam operationem ordinatur ad finem ultimum: oportet enim quod vel operatio ipsa sit finis; vel operatum, quod est operationis effectus. Ordinare autem res in finem est ipsius Dei, sicut supra ostensum est. Oportet igitur dicere quod omne agens virtute divina agat. Ipse est igitur qui est causa actionis omnium rerum. [6] Again, every agent is ordered through his operation to an ultimate end, for either the operation itself is the end, or the thing that is made, that is, the product of the operation. Now, to order things to their end is the prerogative of God Himself, as we showed above. So, we have to say that every agent acts by the divine power. Therefore, He is the One Who is the cause of action for all things.
Hinc est quod dicitur Isaiae 26-12, omnia opera nostra operatus es in nobis, domine; et Ioan. 15-5, sine me nihil potestis facere, et Philip. 2-13, Deus est qui operatur in nobis velle et perficere pro bona voluntate. Et hac ratione frequenter in Scripturis naturae effectus operationi divinae attribuuntur, quia ipse est qui operatur in omni operante per naturam vel per voluntatem: sicut illud Iob 10-10 nonne sicut lac mulsisti me, et sicut caseum me coagulasti? Pelle et carnibus vestisti me, ossibus et nervis compegisti me; et in Psalmo, intonuit de caelo dominus, et altissimus dedit vocem suam, grando et carbones ignis. [7] Hence it is said: “Lord, Thou hast wrought all our works in us” (Is. 26:12); and: “Without Me, you can do nothing” (John 15:5); and: “It is God Who works in us both to will and to accomplish according to His good will” (Phil. 2: 13). And for this reason, the products of nature are often attributed, in Scripture, to divine working, because it is He Who works in every agent operating naturally or voluntarily, as the text has it: “Have you not milked me as milk, and curdled me like cheese? You have clothed me with skin; You have put me together with bones and sinews” (Job 10:10-11); and in the Psalm (17:14): “The Lord thundered from heaven, and the Highest gave His voice: hail and coals of fire.”

Caput 68
Quod Deus est ubique
Chapter 68
Ex hoc autem apparet quod necesse est Deum esse ubique et in omnibus rebus. [1] As a consequence, it is clear that God must be everywhere and in all things.
Movens enim et motum oportet esse simul, ut probat philosophus in VII physicorum. Deus autem omnia movet ad suas operationes, ut ostensum est. Est igitur in omnibus rebus. [2] For, the mover and the thing moved must be simultaneous, as the Philosopher proves. But God moves all things to their operations, as we have shown. Therefore, He is in all things.
Item. Omne quod est in loco, vel in re quacumque, aliquo modo contingit ipsam: res enim corporea est in aliquo sicut in loco secundum contactum quantitatis dimensivae; res autem incorporea in aliquo esse dicitur secundum contactum virtutis, cum careat dimensiva quantitate. Sic igitur se habet res incorporea ad hoc quod sit in aliquo per virtutem suam, sicut se habet res corporea ad hoc quod sit in aliquo per quantitatem dimensivam. Si autem esset aliquod corpus habens quantitatem dimensivam infinitam, oporteret illud esse ubique. Ergo, si sit aliqua res incorporea habens virtutem infinitam, oportet quod sit ubique. Ostensum est autem in primo Deum esse infinitae virtutis. Est igitur ubique. [3] Again, everything that is in a place, or in something, is in some way in contact with it. For instance, a bodily thing is in place in something according to the contact of dimensive quantity; while an incorporeal thing is said to be in something according to the contact of power, since it lacks dimensive quantity. And so, an incorporeal thing is related to its presence in something by its power, in the same way that a corporeal thing is related to its presence in something by dimensive quantity. Now, if there were any body possessed of infinite dimensive quantity, it would have to be everywhere. So, if there be an incorporeal being possessed of infinite power, it must be everywhere. But we showed in Book One [43] that God is of infinite power. Therefore, He is everywhere.
Adhuc. Sicut se habet causa particularis ad particularem effectum, ita se habet causa universalis ad universalem effectum. Oportet autem causam particularem proprio effectui particulari adesse simul: sicut ignis per suam essentiam calefacit, et anima per suam essentiam vitam corpori confert. Cum igitur Deus sit causa universalis totius esse, ut in secundo ostensum est, oportet quod in quocumque est invenire esse, ei adsit divina praesentia. [4] Besides, as a Particular cause is to a particular effect, so is a universal cause to a universal effect. Now, a particular cause must be simultaneous with its proper particular effect. Thus, fire heats through its essence, and the soul confers life on the body through its essence. Therefore, since God is the universal cause of the whole of being, as we showed in Book Two [15], it must be that wherever being is found, the divine presence is also there.
Amplius. Quodcumque agens est praesens tantum uni suorum effectuum, eius actio non potest derivari ad alia nisi illo mediante, eo quod agens et patiens oportet esse simul: sicut vis motiva non movet alia membra nisi mediante corde. Si igitur Deus esset praesens uni tantum suorum effectuum, utpote primo mobili, quod ab eo immediate movetur, sequeretur quod eius actio non posset ad alia derivari nisi illo mediante. Hoc autem est inconveniens. Si enim alicuius agentis actio non potest derivari ad alia nisi mediante aliquo primo, oportet quod illud proportionaliter respondeat agenti secundum totam eius virtutem, aliter enim non posset agens tota sua virtute uti: sicut videmus quod omnes motus quos potest causare virtus motiva, expleri possunt per cor. Non est autem aliqua creatura per quam posset expleri quicquid divina virtus facere potest: cum divina virtus excedat in infinitum quamlibet rem creatam, ut apparet ex his quae in primo ostensa sunt. Inconveniens est igitur dicere quod divina actio non se extendat ad alia nisi mediante uno primo. Non est igitur praesens in uno tantum suorum effectuum, sed in omnibus. Eadem enim ratione opinabitur si quis dicat eum esse in aliquibus, et non in omnibus: quia quotcumque effectus divini accipiantur, non sufficienter explere poterunt divinae virtutis executionem. [5] Moreover, whenever an agent is present only to one of its effects, its action cannot be transferred to another, unless by using the first effect as an intermediary, because the agent and the patient must be simultaneous. For instance, the organic motive power does not have a member of the body except through the heart as an intermediary. So, if God were present to but one of His effects—for instance, to the first moved sphere which would be moved immediately by Him—it would follow that His action could not be transferred to another thing except through the mediation of this sphere. Now, this is not appropriate. Indeed, if the action of any agent cannot be transferred to other things except through the mediation of a first effect, then this effect must correspond proportionally with the agent according to its entire power; otherwise, the agent could not use his entire power. We see an instance of this in the fact that all the motions that the motive power can cause can be carried out through the heart. But there is no creature that can serve as a medium for the carrying out of whatever the divine power can do, for divine power infinitely surpasses every created thing, as is evident from the things shown in Book One [43]. Therefore, it is not appropriate to say that divine action does not extend to other effects except through the mediation of a first one. So, He is not merely present in one of His effects, but in all of them. The same reasoning will be used if a person says that He is present in some and not in others, because, no matter how many divine effects are taken, they could not be sufficient to carry out the execution of the divine power.
Praeterea. Necesse est ut causa agens sit simul cum suo effectu proximo et immediato. In qualibet autem re est aliquis effectus proximus et immediatus ipsius Dei. Ostensum est enim in secundo quod solus Deus creare potest. In qualibet autem re est aliquid quod per creationem causatur: in rebus quidem corporalibus prima materia; in rebus autem incorporeis simplices earum essentiae; ut apparet ex his quae in secundo sunt determinata. Oportet igitur simul Deum adesse in omnibus rebus: praesertim cum ea quae de non esse ad esse produxit, continuo et semper in esse conservet, ut ostensum est. [6] Furthermore, an agent cause must be simultaneous with its proximate and immediate effect. But there is in everything a proximate and immediate effect of God Himself. For we showed in Book Two [21] that God alone can create. Now, there is in everything something caused by creation: prime matter in the case of corporeal things, in incorporeal things their simple essences, as is evident from the things that we determined in Book Two [15ff]. Therefore, God must be simultaneously present in all things, particularly since He continually and always preserves in being those things which He has brought into being from nonbeing, as has been shown.
Hinc est quod dicitur Ier. 24, caelum et terram ego impleo; et in Psalmo, si ascendero in caelum, tu illic es; et si descendero ad Infernum, ades. [7] Hence it is said: “I fill heaven and earth” (Jer. 23:24); and in the Psalm (138:8): “If I ascend into heaven, You art there; if I descend into hell, You art present.”
Per hoc autem excluditur error quorundam dicentium Deum in aliqua parte mundi determinata esse, puta in primo caelo et in parte orientis, unde est principium motus caeli. Quorum tamen dictum sustineri posset si sane accipiatur: ut scilicet non intelligamus Deum aliqua determinata mundi parte esse conclusum; sed quia omnium corporearum motionum principium, secundum naturae ordinem, ab aliqua determinata incipit parte, Deo movente. Propter quod et in sacra Scriptura Deus dicitur specialiter esse in caelo: secundum illud Isaiae ult., caelum mihi sedes est; et in Psalmo, caelum caeli domino, et cetera. Sed ex hoc quod, praeter naturae ordinem, etiam in infimis corporibus Deus aliquid operatur quod virtute caelestis corporis causari non potest, manifeste ostenditur Deum non solum caelesti corpori, sed etiam infimis rebus immediate adesse. [8] Through this conclusion, moreover, the error is set aside of those who say that God is in some definite part of the world (for instance, in the first heaven and in the eastern section) and that He is consequently the principle of heavenly motion.—Of course, this statement of theirs could be supported, if soundly interpreted: not, for instance, that we may understand God as being confined to some determinate part of the world, but that the source of all corporeal motions, according to the order of nature, takes its start from a determinate part, being moved by God. Because of this He is spoken of in Sacred Scripture also as being in the heavens in a particular way; in the text of Isaiah toward the end (66:1): “Heaven is My throne,” and in the Psalm (113: 16): “The heaven of heaven is the Lord’s,” and so on.—But from the fact that, apart from the order of nature, God performs some operation in even the lowest of bodies which cannot be, caused by the power of a celestial body it is clearly shown that God is immediately present, not only in the celestial body, but also in the lowest things.
Non est autem aestimandum Deum sic esse ubique quod per locorum spatia dividatur, quasi una pars eius sit hic et alia alibi, sed totus ubique est. Deus enim, cum sit omnino simplex, partibus caret. [9] But we must not think that God is everywhere in such a way that He is divided in various areas of place, as if one part of Him were here and another part there. Rather, His entire being is everywhere. For God, as a completely simple being, has no parts.
Neque sic simplex est quemadmodum punctus, qui est terminus continui, et propter hoc determinatum situm in continuo habet: unde non potest unus punctus nisi in uno loco indivisibili esse. Deus autem indivisibilis est quasi omnino extra genus continui existens. Unde non determinatur ad locum, vel magnum vel parvum, ex necessitate suae essentiae, quasi oporteat eum esse in aliquo loco: cum ipse fuerit ab aeterno ante omnem locum. Sed immensitate suae virtutis attingit omnia quae sunt in loco: cum sit universalis causa essendi, ut dictum est. Sic igitur ipse totus est ubicumque est: quia per simplicem suam virtutem universa attingit. [10] Nor is His simplicity something like that of a point, which is the terminus of a continuous line and thus has a definite position on this line, with the consequence that one point is impossible unless it A at one, indivisible place. In fact, God is indivisible, in the sense of existing entirely outside the genus of continuous things. And so, He is not determined in regard to place, either large or small, by any necessity of His essence requiring Him to be in a certain place, for Ile has been from eternity prior to all place. But by the immensity of His power He touches upon all things that are in place, for He is the universal cause of being, as we said. Thus, He is present in His entirety wherever He is, since He touches upon all things by His simple power.
Non est tamen aestimandum quod sic sit in rebus quasi in rebus mixtus: ostensum est enim in primo quod neque materia neque forma est alicuius. Sed est in omnibus per modum causae agentis. [11] Yet, we must not think that He is present in things, in the sense of being combined with them as one of their parts. For it was shown in Book One [17, 27] that He is neither the matter nor the form of anything. Instead, He is in all things in the fashion of an agent cause.

Caput 69
De opinione eorum qui rebus naturalibus proprias subtrahunt actiones
Chapter 69
Ex hoc autem quidam occasionem errandi sumpserunt, putantes quod nulla creatura habet aliquam actionem in productione effectuum naturalium: ita scilicet quod ignis non calefacit, sed Deus causat calorem praesente igne; et similiter dicunt in omnibus aliis effectibus naturalibus. [1] From this conclusion some men have taken the opportunity to fall into error, thinking that no creature has an active role in the production of natural effects. So, for instance, fire does not give heat, but God causes heat in the presence of fire, and they said like things about all other natural effects.
Hunc autem errorem rationibus confirmare conati sunt, ostendentes nullam formam, neque substantialem neque accidentalem, nisi per viam creationis produci in esse. Non enim possunt formae et accidentia fieri ex materia: cum non habeant materiam partem sui. Unde, si fiunt, oportet quod fiant ex nihilo, quod est creari. Et quia creatio solius Dei actus est, ut in secundo ostensum est, sequi videtur quod solus Deus tam formas substantiales quam accidentales in natura producat. [2] Now, they tried to support this error by arguments pointing out that no form, substantial or accidental, can be brought into being except by way of creation. Indeed, forms and accidents cannot come into being from matter, since they do not have matter as one of their parts. Hence, if they are made, they must be made from nothing, and this is to be created. And because creation is an act of God alone, as we showed in Book Two [21], it would seem to follow that God alone produces both substantial and accidental forms in nature.
Huic autem positioni partim etiam quorundam philosophorum opinio concordavit. Quia enim omne quod per se non est, ab eo quod est per se derivatum invenitur, videtur quod formae rerum quae non sunt per se existentes sed in materia, proveniant ex formis quae per se sine materia sint: quasi formae in materia existentes sint quaedam participationes illarum formarum quae sine materia sunt. Et propter hoc Plato posuit species rerum sensibilium esse quasdam formas separatas, quae sunt causae essendi his sensibilibus, secundum quod eas participant. [3] Of course, the opinion of some philosophers is partly in agreement with this position. In fact, since everything that does not exist through itself is found to be derived from that which does exist through itself, it appears that the forms of things, which are not existing through themselves but in matter, come from forms which are existent through themselves without matter. It is as if forms existing in matter were certain participations in those forms which exist without matter. And because of this, Plato claimed that the species of sensible things are certain forms separate from matter, which are the causes of being for these sensible things, according as these things participate in them.
Avicenna, vero posuit omnes formas substantiales ab intelligentia agente effluere. Accidentales autem formas esse ponebat materiae dispositiones, quae ex actione inferiorum agentium materiam disponentium proveniebant: in quo a priore stultitia declinabat. [4] On the other hand, Avicenna maintained that all substantial forms flow forth from the agent Intelligence. But he claimed that accidental forms are dispositions of matter which have arisen from the action of lower agents disposing matter. In this way he avoided the foolish aspects of the preceding erroneous view.
Huius autem signum esse videbatur quod nulla virtus activa invenitur esse in istis corporibus nisi accidentalis forma, sicut qualitates activae et passivae, quae non videntur esse ad hoc sufficientes quod formas substantiales causare possint. [5] Now, an indication of this seemed to lie in the fact that no active power is found to exist in these bodies, except accidental form; for instance, the active and passive qualities, which do not appear to be adequate in their power to cause substantial forms.
Inveniuntur etiam quaedam in istis inferioribus quae non generantur ex sibi similibus, sicut animalia ex putrefactione generata. Unde videtur quod horum formae ex altioribus principiis proveniant. Et pari ratione aliae formae, quarum quaedam sunt multo nobiliores. [6] Moreover, certain things are found, among things here below, which are not generated as like from like; for instance, animals generated as a result of putrefaction. Hence, it seems that the forms of these beings come from higher principles; by the same reasoning, so do other forms, some of which are much more noble.
Quidam vero ad hoc argumentum assumunt ex naturalium corporum imbecillitate ad agendum. Nam omnis corporis forma est adiuncta quantitati. Quantitas autem impedit actionem et motum: cuius signum ponunt quia quantum additur in quantitate alicui corpori, tanto fit ponderosius, et tardatur motus eius. Unde ex hoc concludunt quod nullum corpus sit activum, sed passivum tantum. [7] In fact, some people derive an argument for this from the weakness of natural bodies in regard to acting. For every bodily form is combined with quantity, but quantity hinders action and motion. As an indication of this, they assert that the more that is added to the quantity of a body, the heavier it becomes and the more its motion is slowed down. So, from this they conclude that no body is active but only passive.
Hoc etiam ostendere nituntur per hoc quod omne patiens est subiectum agenti; et omne agens praeter primum, quod creat, requirit subiectum inferius se. Nulla autem substantia est inferior corporali. Unde videtur quod nullum corpus sit activum. [8] They also try to show this by the fact that every patient is a subject for an agent, and every agent, apart from the first which creates, needs a subject lower than itself. But no substance is lower than corporeal substance. Hence, it appears that no body is active.
Addunt etiam ad hoc quod corporalis substantia est in ultima distantia a primo agente: unde non videtur eis quod virtus activa perveniat usque ab substantiam corporalem; sed, sicut Deus est agens tantum, ita substantia corporalis, cum sit infima in genere rerum, sit passiva tantum. [9] They also add, in regard to this point, that corporeal substance is at the greatest distance from the first agent; hence, it does not seem to them that active power could reach the whole way to corporeal substance. Instead, just as God is an agent only, so is corporeal substance passive only, for it is the lowest in the genus of things.
Propter has igitur rationes ponit Avicebron, in libro fontis vitae, quod nullum corpus est activum; sed virtus substantiae spiritualis, pertransiens per corpora, agit actiones quae per corpora fieri videntur. [10] So, because of these arguments, Avicebron maintained in the book, The Source of Life, that no body is active, but that the power of spiritual substance, passing through bodies, does the actions which seem to be done by bodies.
Quidam etiam loquentes in lege Maurorum dicuntur ad hoc rationem inducere quod etiam accidentia non sint ex actione corporum, quia accidens non transit a subiecto in subiectum. Unde reputant impossibile quod calor transeat a corpore calido in aliud corpus ab ipso calefactum: sed dicunt omnia huiusmodi accidentia creari a Deo. [11] Moreover, certain exponents of the Law of the Moors are reported to adduce in support of this argument the point that even accidents do not come from the action of bodies, because an accident does not pass from subject to subject. Hence, they regard it as impossible for heat to pass over from a hot body into another body heated by it. They say, rather, that all accidents like this are created by God.
Ad praemissas autem positiones multa inconvenientia sequuntur. Si enim nulla inferior causa, et maxime corporalis, aliquid operatur, sed Deus operatur in omnibus solus; Deus autem non variatur per hoc quod operatur in rebus diversis: non sequetur diversus effectus ex diversitate rerum in quibus Deus operatur. Hoc autem ad sensum apparet falsum: non enim ex appositione calidi sequitur infrigidatio, sed calefactio tantum; neque ex semine hominis sequitur generatio nisi hominis. Non ergo causalitas effectuum inferiorum est ita attribuenda divinae virtuti quod subtrahatur causalitas inferiorum agentium. [12] Now, many inappropriate conclusions follow from the foregoing theories. For, if no lower cause, and especially no bodily one, performs any operation, but, instead, God operates alone in all things, and if God is not changed by the fact that He operates in different things, then different effects would not follow from the diversity of things in which God operates. Now, this appears false to the senses, for cooling does not result from putting something near a hot object, but only heating; nor does the generation of anything except a man result from the semen of man. Therefore, the causality of the lower type of effects is not to be attributed to divine power in such a way as to take away the causality of lower agents.
Item. Contra rationem sapientiae est ut sit aliquid frustra in operibus sapientis. Si autem res creatae nullo modo operarentur ad effectus producendos, sed solus Deus operaretur omnia immediate, frustra essent adhibitae ab ipso aliae res ad producendos effectus. Repugnat igitur praedicta positio divinae sapientiae. [13] Again, it is contrary to the rational character of wisdom for there to be anything useless in the activities of the possessor of wisdom. But, if created things could in no way operate to produce their effects, and if God alone worked all operations immediately, these other things would be employed in a useless way by Him, for the production of these effects. Therefore, the preceding position is incompatible with divine wisdom.
Adhuc. Quod dat alicui aliquod principale, dat eidem omnia quae consequuntur ad illud: sicut causa quae dat corpori elementari gravitatem, dat ei motum deorsum. Facere autem aliquid actu consequitur ad hoc quod est esse actu, ut patet in Deo: ipse enim est actus purus, et est etiam prima causa essendi omnibus, ut supra ostensum est. Si igitur communicavit aliis similitudinem suam quantum ad esse, inquantum res in esse produxit, consequens est quod communicaverit eis similitudinem suam quantum ad agere, ut etiam res creatae habeant proprias actiones. [14] Besides, the giver of some principal part to a thing gives the thing all the items that result from that part. For instance, the cause that gives weight to an elemental body also gives it downward motion. But the ability to make an actual thing results from being actually existent, as is evident in the case of God, for He is pure act and is also the first cause of being for all things, as we showed above. Therefore, if He has communicated His likeness, as far as actual being is concerned, to other things, by virtue of the fact that He has brought things into being, it follows that He has communicated to them His likeness, as far as acting is concerned, so that created things may also have their own actions.
Amplius. Perfectio effectus demonstrat perfectionem causae: maior enim virtus perfectiorem effectum inducit. Deus autem est perfectissimum agens. Oportet igitur quod res ab ipso creatae perfectionem ab ipso consequantur. Detrahere ergo perfectioni creaturarum est detrahere perfectioni divinae virtutis. Sed si nulla creatura habet aliquam actionem ad aliquem effectum producendum, multum detrahitur perfectioni creaturae: ex abundantia enim perfectionis est quod perfectionem quam aliquid habet, possit alteri communicare. Detrahit igitur haec positio divinae virtuti. [15] Furthermore, the perfection of the effect demonstrates the perfection of the cause, for a greater power brings about a more perfect effect. But God is the most perfect agent. Therefore, things created by Him obtain perfection from Him. So, to detract from the perfection of creatures is to detract from the perfection of divine power. But, if no creature has any active role in the production of any effect, much is detracted from the perfection of the creature. Indeed, it is part of the fullness of perfection to be able to communicate to another being the perfection which one possesses. Therefore, this position detracts from the divine power.
Item. Sicut est boni bonum facere, ita est summi boni aliquid optime facere. Deus autem est summum bonum, ut in primo ostensum est. Igitur eius est optime facere omnia. Melius autem est quod bonum alicui collatum sit multorum commune, quam quod sit proprium: quia bonum commune semper invenitur esse divinius quam bonum unius tantum. Sed bonum unius fit multis commune si ab uno in alia derivatur, quod non potest esse nisi inquantum diffundit ipsum in alia per propriam actionem: si vero potestatem non habet illud in alia transfundendi, manet sibi ipsi proprium. Sic igitur Deus rebus creatis suam bonitatem communicavit ut una res, quod accepit, possit in aliam transfundere. Detrahere ergo actiones proprias rebus, est divinae bonitati derogare. [16] Moreover, as it is the function of the good to make what is good, so it is the prerogative of the highest good to make what is best. But God is the highest good, as we showed in Book One. So, it is His function to make all things best. Now, it is better for a good that is conferred on a thing to be common to many than for it to be exclusive, for “the common good is always found to be more divine than the good of one alone.” But the good of one being becomes common to many if it can pass from one to the other; this cannot occur unless it can diffuse this good to others through its own action. On the other hand, if it lacks the power to transfer this good to others, it continues to keep it exclusively. Therefore, God so communicates His goodness to created beings that one thing which receives it can transfer it to another. Therefore, to take away their proper actions from things is to disparage the divine goodness.
Adhuc. Subtrahere ordinem rebus creatis est eis subtrahere id quod optimum habent: nam singula in seipsis sunt bona, simul autem omnia sunt optima, propter ordinem universi; semper enim totum est melius partibus et finis ipsarum. Si autem rebus subtrahantur actiones, subtrahitur ordo rerum ad invicem: rerum enim quae sunt diversae secundum suas naturas, non est colligatio in ordinis unitatem nisi per hoc quod quaedam agunt et quaedam patiuntur. Inconveniens igitur est dicere quod res non habeant proprias actiones. [17] Again, to take away order from created things is to deprive them of their best possession, for individual things are good in themselves, but all things together are best because of the order of the whole. Indeed, the whole is always better than its parts, and is their end. Now, if actions be taken away from things, the mutual order among things is removed, for, in regard to things that are different in their natures, there can be no gathering together into a unity of order unless by the fact that some of them act and others undergo action. Therefore, it is inappropriate to say that things do not have their own actions.
Amplius. Si effectus non producuntur ex actione rerum creatarum, sed solum ex actione Dei, impossibile est quod per effectus manifestetur virtus alicuius causae creatae: non enim effectus ostendit virtutem causae nisi ratione actionis quae, a virtute procedens, ad effectum terminatur. Natura autem causae non cognoscitur per effectum nisi inquantum per ipsum cognoscitur virtus eius, quae naturam consequitur. Si igitur res creatae non habeant actiones ad producendos effectus, sequetur quod nunquam natura alicuius rei creatae poterit cognosci per effectum. Et sic subtrahitur nobis omnis cognitio scientiae naturalis, in qua praecipue demonstrationes per effectum sumuntur. [18] Besides, if effects are not produced by the action of created things, but only by the action of God, it is impossible for the power of any created cause to be manifested through its effects. Of course, an effect does not show the power of a cause unless by virtue of the action which proceeding from the power terminates in the effect. Now, the nature of a cause is not known through the effect unless its power is known through this effect, for the power results from the nature. So, if created things have no actions productive of effects, it follows that no nature of anything would ever be known through the effect. And thus, all the knowledge of natural science is taken away from us, for the demonstrations in it are chiefly derived from the effect.
Item. Apparet per inductionem in omnibus quod simile agat suum simile. Id autem quod generatur in rebus inferioribus non est forma tantum, sed compositum ex materia et forma: nam omnis generatio ex aliquo est, scilicet ex materia, et ad aliquid, scilicet formam. Oportet ergo quod generans non sit forma tantum, sed compositum ex materia et forma. Non igitur species rerum separatae, ut Platonici posuerunt; neque intelligentia agens, ut posuit Avicenna, est causa formarum quae sunt in materiis, sed magis hoc compositum ex materia et forma. [19] Furthermore, it is inductively evident in all cases that like produces like. But what is generated in lower things is not merely the form, but the thing composed of matter and form, since every process of generation is from something, namely from matter, and to something, namely form. Therefore, the generating agent cannot be merely a form, but is, rather, the composite of matter and form. Therefore, it is not the separate species of things, as the Platonists claimed, nor the agent Intelligence, as Avicenna held, that is, the cause of the forms which exist in matter; rather, it is the individual composed of matter and form.
Item. Si agere sequitur ad esse in actu, inconveniens est quod actus perfectior actione destituatur. Perfectior autem actus est forma substantialis quam accidentalis. Si igitur formae accidentales quae sunt in rebus corporalibus habent proprias actiones, multo magis forma substantialis habet aliquam propriam actionem. Non est autem eius propria actio disponere materiam: quia hoc fit per alterationem, ad quam sufficiunt formae accidentales. Igitur forma substantialis generantis est principium actionis ut forma substantialis introducatur in generatum. [20] Moreover, if to act is the result of a being which is in act, it is inappropriate for a more perfect act to be deprived of action. But the substantial form is a more perfect act than accidental form. So, if accidental forms in corporeal things have their proper actions, by all the greater reason the substantial form has its proper action. But to dispose matter is not a proper action for it, since this is done by alteration, for which accidental forms are sufficient. Therefore, the substantial form of the generating agent is the source of the action, as a substantial form is put into the product of generation.
Rationes autem quas inducunt facile est solvere. Cum enim ad hoc aliquid fiat ut sit, sicut forma non dicitur ens quasi ipsa habeat esse, sed quia per eam compositum est; ita nec forma proprie fit, sed incipit esse per hoc quod compositum sit reductum de potentia in actum, qui est forma. [21] Now, it is easy to break down the arguments which they bring forward. In fact, since a thing is made so that it will exist, and since a form is not called a being in the sense that it possesses being but because the composite exists by means of it, so also the form is not made, in the proper sense, but it begins to be by the fact that the composite is reduced from potency to act, which is the form.
Neque etiam oportet ut omne quod habet aliquam formam quasi participatam, recipiat eam immediate ab eo quod est essentialiter forma: sed immediate quidem ab alio quod habet similem formam, simili modo scilicet participatam, quod tamen agat in virtute illius formae separatae, si qua sit talis. Sic enim agens similem sibi effectum producit. [22] Nor, indeed, is it necessary that everything which has a form by participation should receive it immediately from that which is form essentially; rather, it may receive it immediately from another being that has a similar form, participated in the same way, and, of course, this being may act by the power of the separate form, if there be any such. So, it is in this way that an agent produces an effect like itself.
Similiter etiam non oportet quod, quia omnis actio inferiorum corporum fit per qualitates activas et passivas, quae sunt accidentia, quod non producatur ex actione eorum nisi accidens. Quia illae formae accidentales, sicut causantur a forma substantiali, quae simul cum materia est causa omnium propriorum accidentium, ita agunt virtute formae substantialis. Quod autem agit in virtute alterius, producit effectum similem non sibi tantum, sed magis ei in cuius virtute agit: sicut ex actione instrumenti fit in artificiato similitudo formae artis. Ex quo sequitur quod ex actione formarum accidentalium producuntur formae substantiales, inquantum agunt instrumentaliter in virtute substantialium formarum. [23] Likewise, it is not necessary, because every action of lower bodies is done by active and passive qualities which are accidents, that only an accident be produced by their actions. For, just as they are caused by the substantial form which, together with matter, is the cause of all the proper accidents, these accidental forms also act by the power of the substantial form. Now, that which acts by the power of another produces an effect similar not only to itself but more especially to that by whose power it acts. For instance, from the action of an instrument there is produced in the artifact a likeness of the form in the mind of the artist. Consequently, it follows that substantial forms are produced from the action of accidental forms, as they act instrumentally through the power of the substantial forms.
In animalibus autem quae ex putrefactione generantur, causatur forma substantialis ex agente corporali, scilicet corpore caelesti, quod est primum alterans, unde oportet quod omnia moventia ad formam in istis inferioribus, agant in virtute illius. Et propter hoc, ad producendas aliquas formas imperfectas sufficit virtus caelestis, absque agente univoco. Ad producendas autem formas perfectiores, sicut sunt animae animalium perfectorum, requiritur etiam cum agente caelesti agens univocum: talia enim animalia non generantur nisi ex semine. Et propter hoc dicit Aristoteles, in II Phys., quod homo generat hominem et sol. [24] In the case of animals generated from putrefaction, the substantial form is caused by a corporeal agent, namely, the celestial body which is the first agent of alteration; and so all things that produce a change of form in these lower bodies do so by its power. And for this reason the celestial power is enough, without a univocal agent, to produce some imperfect forms. But to produce perfect forms, like the souls of perfect animals, there is also required a univocal agent together with the celestial agent. In fact, such animals are not generated except from semen. And that is why Aristotle says that “man and the sun generate man” [ Physics II, 2: 194b 14].
Non est autem verum quod quantitas impediat actionem formae, nisi per accidens: inquantum scilicet omnis quantitas continua est in materia; forma autem in materia existens, cum sit minoris actualitatis, est per consequens minoris virtutis in agendo. Unde corpus quod habet minus de materia et plus de forma, scilicet ignis, est magis activum. Supposito autem modo actionis quam forma in materia existens habere potest, quantitas coauget magis quam minuat actionem. Nam quanto corpus calidum fuerit maius, supposita aeque intensa caliditate, tanto magis calefacit; et supposita gravitate aeque intensa, quanto maius fuerit corpus grave, tanto velocius movebitur motu naturali; et inde est quod tardius movetur motu innaturali. Quod ergo corpora gravia sunt tardioris motus innaturalis cum fuerint maioris quantitatis, non ostendit quod quantitas impediat actionem, sed magis quod coaugeat ipsam. [25] Moreover, it is not true that quantity impedes the action of a form, except accidentally; that is to say, in so far as all continuous quantity is in matter, and form existing in matter, having lesser actuality, is consequently less powerful in acting. Hence, a body that has less matter and more form, for instance, fire, is more active. But, if we consider a kind of action which a form existing in matter may have, then quantity helps to increase rather than to diminish the action. For instance, the larger a hot body is, granting equal intensity of heat, the more is it able to give off heat; and granting equal degree of weight, the bigger a heavy body is, the more rapidly will it be moved by natural motion; that is why it is moved more slowly by unnatural motion. Therefore, the fact that heavy bodies have slower unnatural motion when they have larger quantity does not show that quantity impedes action, but that it helps to increase it.
Non oportet etiam quod corpus omne careat actione propter hoc quod in ordine rerum substantia corporalis est infima secundum suum genus. Quia etiam inter corpora unum est superius altero, et formalius et magis activum: sicut ignis respectu inferiorum corporum. Nec tamen etiam infimum corpus excluditur ab agendo. Manifestum est enim quod corpus non potest agere se toto, cum sit compositum ex materia, quae est ens in potentia, et ex forma, quae est actus: agit enim unumquodque secundum quod est actu. Et propter hoc omne corpus agit secundum suam formam: ad quam comparatur aliud corpus, scilicet patiens, secundum suam materiam ut subiectum, inquantum materia eius est in potentia ad formam agentis. Si autem e converso ad formam corporis patientis sit in potentia materia corporis agentis, erunt agentia et patientia ad invicem: sicut accidit in duobus corporibus elementaribus. Sin autem, erit unum tantum agens, et alterum tantum patiens respectu illius: sicut est comparatio corporis caelestis ad corpus elementare. Sic igitur corpus agens agit in subiectum non ratione totius corporis, sed formae per quam agit. [26] Nor, indeed, is it necessary for every body to lack action because bodily substance is generically the lowest in the order of things. For, even among bodies, one is higher than another, and more formal, and more active: as fire is in regard to lower bodies. Nor, in fact, is even the lowest body prevented from. acting. For it is clear that a body cannot act in its entirety, since it is composed of matter which is potential being, and of form which is act. Indeed, each thing acts according as it is in act. And because of this, every body acts in accord with its form; and related to it is another body, namely, the patient, which is a subject by virtue of its matter, because its matter is in potency to the form of the agent. But, conversely, if the matter of the agent’s body be in potency to the form of the patient’s body, they will be mutually related as agent to patient. This happens, for instance, between two elemental bodies. But, on the other hand, one may be only an agent and the other only a patient in relation to the first, as is the relation between a celestial body and an elemental body. And so, a body that is an agent acts on a subject, not by virtue of its entire body, but of the form through which it acts.
Non est etiam verum quod corpora sint in ultima remotione a Deo. Cum enim Deus sit actus purus, secundum hoc aliqua magis vel minus ab eo distant, quod sunt plus vel minus in actu vel in potentia. Illud igitur in entibus est extreme distans a Deo quod est potentia tantum, scilicet materia prima. Unde eius est pati tantum et non agere. Corpora vero, cum sint composita ex materia et forma, accedunt ad divinam similitudinem inquantum habent formam, quam Aristoteles, in I Phys., nominat divinum quiddam. Et propter hoc, secundum quod habent formam, agunt: secundum vero quod habent materiam, patiuntur. [27] Nor is it even true that bodies are at the greatest distance from God. For, since God is pure act, things are more or less distant from Him on this basis: that they are more or less in act or in potency. So, among beings that is most distant from God which is merely potential; namely, prime matter. Hence, its function is solely to undergo, and not to perform, action. But bodies, as composed of matter and form, approach the divine likeness because they possess form, which Aristotle calls a divine thing [ Physics I, 9: 192a 16]. And because of this, they act in so far as they possess form, but they undergo action in so far as they possess matter.
Ridiculum autem est dicere quod ideo corpus non agat quia accidens non transit de subiecto in subiectum. Non enim hoc modo dicitur corpus calidum calefacere quod idem numero calor qui est in calefaciente corpore, transeat ad corpus calefactum: sed quia virtute caloris qui est in corpore calefaciente, alius calor numero fit actu in corpore calefacto, qui prius erat in eo in potentia. Agens enim naturale non est traducens propriam formam in alterum subiectum: sed reducens subiectum quod patitur, de potentia in actum. [28] Again, it is laughable to say that a body does not act because an accident does not pass from subject to subject. For a hot body is not said to give off heat in this sense, that numerically the same heat which is in the heating body passes over into the heated body. Rather, by the power of the heat which is in the heating body, a numerically different heat is made actual in the heated body, a heat which was previously in it in potency. For a natural agent does not hand over its own form to another subject, but it reduces the passive subject from potency to act.
Non igitur auferimus proprias actiones rebus creatis, quamvis omnes effectus rerum creatarum Deo attribuamus quasi in omnibus operanti. [29] Therefore, we do not take away their proper actions from created things, though we attribute all the effects of created things to God, as an agent working in all things.

Caput 70
Quomodo idem effectus sit a Deo et a natura agente
Chapter 70
Quibusdam autem difficile videtur ad intelligendum quod effectus naturales et Deo attribuantur et naturali agenti. [1] Now, it seems difficult for some people to understand how natural effects are attributed to God and to a natural agent.
Nam una actio a duobus agentibus non videtur progredi posse. Si igitur actio per quam effectus naturalis producitur, procedit a corpore naturali, non procedit a Deo. [2] For it does not seem possible for one action to proceed from two agents. So, if the action whereby a natural effect is produced proceeds from a natural body, it does not proceed from God.
Item. Quod potest fieri sufficienter per unum, superfluum est si per multa fiat: videmus enim quod natura non facit per duo instrumenta quod potest facere per unum. Cum igitur virtus divina sufficiens sit ad producendos effectus naturales, superfluum est adhibere ad eosdem effectus producendos etiam naturales virtutes: vel, si virtus naturalis sufficienter proprium effectum producit, superfluum est quod divina ad eundem effectum agat. [3] Again, when a thing can be done adequately by one agent, it is superfluous for it to be done by many; in fact, we see that nature does not do with two instruments what it can do with one. So, since the divine power is sufficient to produce natural effects, it is superfluous to use natural powers, too, for the production of the same effects. Or, if the natural power adequately produces the proper effect, it is superfluous for the divine power to act for the same effect.
Praeterea. Si Deus totum effectum naturalem producit, nihil relinquitur de effectu naturali agenti ad producendum. Non videtur igitur esse possibile quod eosdem effectus Deus producere dicatur quos res naturales producunt. [4] Besides, if God produces the entire natural effect, then nothing is left of the effect for the natural agent to produce. So, it does not seem to be possible to say that God produces the same effects that natural agents produce.
Haec autem difficultatem non afferunt si praemissa considerentur. In quolibet enim agente est duo considerare, scilicet rem ipsam quae agit, et virtutem qua agit: sicut ignis calefacit per calorem. Virtus autem inferioris agentis dependet a virtute superioris agentis, inquantum superius agens dat virtutem ipsam inferiori agenti per quam agit; vel conservat eam; aut etiam applicat eam ad agendum, sicut artifex applicat instrumentum ad proprium effectum; cui tamen non dat formam per quam agit instrumentum, nec conservat, sed dat ei solum motum. Oportet ergo quod actio inferioris agentis non solum sit ab eo per virtutem propriam, sed per virtutem omnium superiorum agentium: agit enim in virtute omnium. Et sicut agens infimum invenitur immediatum activum, ita virtus primi agentis invenitur immediata ad producendum effectum: nam virtus infimi agentis non habet quod producat hunc effectum ex se, sed ex virtute proximi superioris; et virtus illius hoc habet ex virtute superioris; et sic virtus supremi agentis invenitur ex se productiva effectus, quasi causa immediata; sicut patet in principiis demonstrationum, quorum primum est immediatum. Sicut igitur non est inconveniens quod una actio producatur ex aliquo agente et eius virtute, ita non est inconveniens quod producatur idem effectus ab inferiori agente et Deo: ab utroque immediate, licet alio et alio modo. [5] However, these points present no difficulty, provided the things previously established be considered. In every agent, in fact, there are two things to consider: namely, the thing itself that acts, and the power by which it acts. Fire, for instance, heats by means of heat. But the power of a lower agent depends on the power of the superior agent, according as the superior agent gives this power to the lower agent whereby it may act; or preserves it; or even applies it to the action, as the artisan applies an instrument to its proper effect, though he neither gives the form whereby the instrument works, nor preserves it, but simply gives it motion. So, it is necessary for the action of a lower agent to result not only from the agent by its own power, but also from the power of all higher agents; it acts, thus, through the power of all. And just as the lowest agent is found immediately active, so also is the power of the primary agent found immediate in the production of the effect. For the power of the lower agent is not adequate to produce this effect of itself, but from the power of the next higher agent; and the power of the next one gets this ability from the power of the next higher one; and thus the power of the highest agent is discovered to be of itself productive of the effect, as an immediate cause. This is evident in the case of the principles of demonstration, the first of which is immediate. So, just as it is not unfitting for one action to be produced by an agent and its power, so it is not inappropriate for the same effect to be produced by a lower agent and God: by both immediately, though in different ways.
Patet etiam quod, etsi res naturalis producat proprium effectum, non est superfluum quod Deus illum producat: quia res naturalis non producit ipsum nisi virtute divina. [6] It is also evident that, though a natural thing produces its proper effect, it is not superfluous for God to produce it, since the natural thing does not produce it except by divine power.
Neque est superfluum, si Deus per seipsum potest omnes effectus naturales producere, quod per quasdam alias causas producantur. Non enim hoc est ex insufficientia divinae virtutis, sed ex immensitate bonitatis ipsius, per quam suam similitudinem rebus communicare voluit non solum quantum ad hoc quod essent, sed etiam quantum ad hoc quod aliorum causae essent: his enim duobus modis creaturae communiter omnes divinam similitudinem consequuntur, ut supra ostensum est. Per hoc etiam decor ordinis in rebus creatis apparet. [7] Nor is it superfluous, even if God can by Himself produce all natural effects, for them to be produced by certain other causes. For this is not a result of the inadequacy of divine power, but of the immensity of His goodness, whereby He has willed to communicate His likeness to things, not only so that they might exist, but also that they might be causes for other things. Indeed, all creatures generally attain the divine likeness in these two ways, as we showed above. By this, in fact, the beauty of order in created things is evident.
Patet etiam quod non sic idem effectus causae naturali et divinae virtuti attribuitur quasi partim a Deo, et partim a naturali agente fiat, sed totus ab utroque secundum alium modum: sicut idem effectus totus attribuitur instrumento, et principali agenti etiam totus. [8] It is also apparent that the same effect is not attributed to a natural cause and to divine power in such a way that it is partly done by God, and partly by the natural agent; rather, it is wholly done by both, according to a different way, just as the same effect is wholly attributed to the instrument and also wholly to the principal agent.

Caput 71
Quod divina providentia non excludit totaliter malum a rebus
Chapter 71
Ex his autem apparet quod divina providentia, qua res gubernat, non impedit quin corruptio et defectus et malum in rebus inveniatur. [1] Now, from these conclusions it becomes evident that divine providence, whereby He governs things, does not prevent corruption, deficiency, and evil from being found in things.
Divina enim gubernatio, qua Deus operatur in rebus, non excludit operationem causarum secundarum, sicut iam ostensum est. Contingit autem provenire defectum in effectu propter defectum causae secundae agentis, absque eo quod sit defectus in primo agente: sicut cum in effectu artificis habentis perfecte artem, contingit aliquis defectus propter instrumenti defectum; et sicut hominem cuius vis motiva est fortis, contingit claudicare, non propter defectum virtutis motivae, sed propter tibiae curvitatem. Contingit igitur in his quae aguntur et gubernantur a Deo, aliquem defectum et aliquod malum inveniri, propter defectum agentium secundorum, licet in ipso Deo nullus sit defectus. [2] Indeed, divine governance, whereby God works in things, does not exclude the working of secondary causes, as we have already shown. Now, it is possible for a defect to happen in an effect, because of a defect in the secondary agent cause, without there being a defect in the primary agent. For example, in the case of the product of a perfectly skilled artisan, some defect may occur because of a defect in his instrument. And again, in the case of a man whose motive power is strong, he may limp as a result of no defect in his bodily power to move, but because of a twist in his leg bone. So, it is possible, in the case of things made and governed by God, for some defect and evil to be found, because of a defect of the secondary agents, even though there be no defect in God Himself.
Amplius. Perfecta bonitas in rebus creatis non inveniretur nisi esset ordo bonitatis in eis, ut scilicet quaedam sint aliis meliora: non enim implerentur omnes gradus possibiles bonitatis; neque etiam aliqua creatura Deo similaretur quantum ad hoc quod alteri emineret. Tolleretur etiam summus decor a rebus, si ab eis ordo distinctorum et disparium tolleretur. Et quod est amplius, tolleretur multitudo a rebus, inaequalitate bonitatis sublata: cum per differentias quibus res ad invicem differunt, unum altero melius existat; sicut animatum inanimato, et rationale irrationali. Et sic, si aequalitas omnimoda esset in rebus, non esset nisi unum bonum creatum: quod manifeste perfectioni derogat creaturae. Gradus autem bonitatis superior est ut aliquid sit bonum quod non possit a bonitate deficere: inferior autem eo est quod potest a bonitate deficere. Utrumque igitur gradum bonitatis perfectio universi requirit. Ad providentiam autem gubernantis pertinet perfectionem in rebus gubernatis servare, non autem eam minuere. Igitur non pertinet ad divinam providentiam ut omnino excludat a rebus potentiam deficiendi a bono. Hanc autem potentiam sequitur malum: quia quod potest deficere, quandoque deficit. Et ipse defectus boni malum est, ut supra ostensum est. Non est igitur ad divinam providentiam pertinens ut omnino malum a rebus prohibeat. [3] Moreover, perfect goodness would not be found in created things unless. there were an order of goodness in them, in the sense that some of them are better than others. Otherwise, all possible grades of goodness would not be realized, nor would any creature be like God by virtue of holding a higher place than another. The highest beauty would be taken away from things, too, if the order of distinct and unequal things were removed. And what is more, multiplicity would be taken away from things if inequality of goodness were removed, since through the differences by which things are distinguished from each other one thing stands out as better than another; for instance, the animate in relation to the inanimate, and the rational in regard to the irrational. And so, if complete equality were present in things, there would be but one created good, which clearly disparages the perfection of the creature. Now, it is a higher grade of goodness for a thing to be good because it cannot fall from goodness; lower than that is the thing which can fall from goodness. So, the perfection of the universe requires both grades of goodness. But it pertains to the providence of the governor to preserve perfection in the things governed, and not to decrease it. Therefore, it does not pertain to divine goodness, entirely to exclude from things the power of falling from the good. But evil is the consequence of this power, because what is able to fall does fall at times. And this defection of the good is evil, as we showed above. Therefore, it does not pertain to divine providence to prohibit evil entirely from things.
Adhuc. Optimum in gubernatione qualibet est ut rebus gubernatis secundum modum suum provideatur: in hoc enim regiminis iustitia consistit. Sicut igitur esset contra rationem humani regiminis si impedirentur a gubernatore civitatis homines agere secundum sua officia - nisi forte quandoque ad horam, propter aliquam necessitatem,- ita esset contra rationem divini regiminis si non sineret res creatas agere secundum modum propriae naturae. Ex hoc autem quod creaturae sic agunt, sequitur corruptio et malum in rebus: cum, propter contrarietatem et repugnantiam quae est in rebus, una res sit alterius corruptiva. Non est igitur ad divinam providentiam pertinens malum omnino a rebus gubernatis excludere. [4] Again, the best thing in any government is to provide for the things governed according to their own mode, for the justice of a regime consists in this. Therefore, as it would be contrary to the rational character of a human regime for men to be prevented by the governor from acting in accord with their own duties—except, perhaps, on occasion, due to the need of the moment—so, too, would it be contrary to the rational character of the divine regime to refuse permission for created things to act according to the mode of their nature. Now, as a result of this fact, that creatures do act in this way, corruption and evil result in things, because, due to the contrariety and incompatibility present in things, one may be a source of corruption for another. Therefore, it does not pertain to divine providence to exclude evil entirely from the things that are governed.
Item. Impossibile est quod agens operetur aliquod malum nisi propter hoc quod intendit aliquod bonum, sicut ex superioribus apparet. Prohibere autem cuiuscumque boni intentionem universaliter a rebus creatis, non pertinet ad providentiam eius qui est omnis boni causa: sic enim multa bona subtraherentur ab universitate rerum; sicut, si subtraheretur igni intentio generandi sibi simile, ad quam sequitur hoc malum quod est corruptio rerum combustibilium, tolleretur hoc bonum quod est generatio ignis, et conservatio ipsius secundum suam speciem. Non est igitur divinae providentiae malum totaliter a rebus excludere. [5] Besides, it is impossible for an agent to do something evil, unless by virtue of the fact that the agent intends something good, as is evident from the foregoing. But to prohibit universally the intending of the good for the individual on the part of created things is not the function of the providence of Him Who is the cause of every good thing. For, in that way, many goods would be taken away from the whole of things. For example, if the inclination to generate its like were taken away from fire (from which inclination there results this particular evil which is the burning up of combustible things), there would also be taken away this particular good which is the generation of fire and the preservation of the same according to its species. Therefore, it is not the function of divine providence totally to exclude evil from things.
Adhuc. Multa bona sunt in rebus quae, nisi mala essent, locum non haberent: sicut non esset patientia iustorum si non esset malignitas persequentium; nec esset locus iustitiae vindicanti si delicta non essent; in rebus etiam naturalibus non esset unius generatio nisi esset alterius corruptio. Si ergo malum totaliter ab universitate rerum per divinam providentiam excluderetur, oporteret etiam bonorum multitudinem diminui. Quod esse non debet: quia virtuosius est bonum in bonitate quam in malitia malum, sicut ex superioribus patet. Igitur non debet per divinam providentiam totaliter malum excludi a rebus. [6] Furthermore, many goods are present in things which would not occur unless there were evils. For instance, there would not be the patience of the just if there were not the malice of their persecutors; there would not be a place for the justice of vindication if there were no offenses; and in the order of nature, there would not be the generation of one thing unless there were the corruption of another. So, if evil were totally excluded from the whole of things by divine providence, a multitude of good things would have to be, sacrificed. And this is as it should be, for the good is stronger in its goodness than evil is in its malice, as is clear from earlier sections. Therefore, evil should not be totally excluded from things by divine providence.
Amplius. Bonum totius praeminet bono partis. Ad providum igitur gubernatorem pertinet negligere aliquem defectum bonitatis in parte, ut fiat augmentum bonitatis in toto: sicut artifex abscondit fundamenta sub terra ut tota domus habeat firmitatem. Sed si malum a quibusdam partibus universi subtraheretur, multum deperiret perfectionis universi, cuius pulchritudo ex ordinata malorum et bonorum adunatione consurgit, dum mala ex bonis deficientibus proveniunt, et tamen ex eis quaedam bona consequuntur, ex providentia gubernantis: sicut et silentii interpositio facit cantilenam esse suavem. Non igitur per divinam providentiam debuit malum a rebus excludi. [7] Moreover, the good of the whole takes precedence over the good of a part. it is proper for a governor with foresight to neglect some lack of goodness in a part, so that there may be an increase of goodness in the whole. Thus, an artisan bides the foundations beneath earth, so that the whole house may have stability. But, if evil were removed from some parts of the universe, much perfection would perish from the ‘universe, whose beauty arises from an ordered unification of evil and good things. In fact, while evil things originate from good things that are defective, still, certain good things also result from them, as a consequence of the providence of the governor. Thus, even a silent pause makes a hymn appealing. Therefore, evil should not have been excluded from things by divine providence.
Adhuc. Res aliae, et praecipue inferiores, ad bonum hominis ordinantur sicut ad finem. Si autem nulla mala essent in rebus, multum de bono hominis diminueretur, et quantum ad cognitionem, et quantum ad boni desiderium vel amorem. Nam bonum ex comparatione mali magis cognoscitur; et dum aliqua mala perpetimur, ardentius bona optamus; sicut quantum bonum sit sanitas, infirmi maxime cognoscunt; qui etiam ad eam magis exardent quam sani. Non igitur pertinet ad divinam providentiam mala a rebus totaliter excludere. [8] Again, other things, particularly lower ones, are ordered to man’s good as an end. Now, if no evils were present in things, much of man’s good would be diminished, both in regard to knowledge and in regard to the desire or love of the good. In fact, the good is better known from its comparison with evil, and while we continue to suffer certain evils our desire for goods grows more ardent. For instance, how great a good health is, is best known by the sick; and they also crave it more than do the healthy. Therefore, it is not the function of divine providence totally to exclude evils from things.
Propter quod dicitur, Isaiae 45-7: faciens pacem et creans malum. Et Amos 3-6: non est malum in civitate quod Deus non faciat. [9] For this reason, it is said: “I make peace and create evil” (Is. 45:7); and again: “There is no evil in a city which God will not do” (Amos 3:6).
Per haec autem excluditur quorundam error qui, propter hoc quod mala in mundo evenire videbant, dicebant Deum non esse: sicut Boetius, in I de Cons., introducit quendam philosophum quaerentem: si Deus est, unde malum? Esset autem e contrario arguendum: si malum est, Deus est. Non enim esset malum sublato ordine boni, cuius privatio est malum. Hic autem ordo non esset, si Deus non esset. [10] Now, with these considerations we dispose of the error of those who, because they noticed that evils occur in the world, said that there is no God. Thus, Boethius introduces a certain philosopher who asks: “If God exists, whence comes evil?” [ De consolatione philosophiae I, 4]. But it could be argued to the contrary: “If evil exists, God exists.” For, there would be no evil if the order of good were taken away, since its privation is evil. But this order would not exist if there were no God.
Tollitur etiam et erroris occasio per praemissa illis qui divinam providentiam usque ad haec corruptibilia extendi negabant, propter hoc quod in eis multa mala evenire conspiciebant; sola autem incorruptibilia divinae providentiae subdi dicebant, in quibus nullus defectus, nec malum aliquod invenitur. [11] Moreover, by the foregoing arguments, even the occasion of error is removed from those who denied that divine providence is extended to these corruptible things, because they saw that many evils occur in them; they said, moreover, that only incorruptible things are subject to divine providence, things in which no defect or evil part is found.
Per haec etiam tollitur errandi occasio Manichaeis, qui duo prima principia agentia posuerunt, bonum et malum, quasi malum sub providentia boni Dei locum habere non posset. [12] By these considerations, the occasion of erring is also taken away from the Manicheans who maintained two first agent principles, good and evil, as though evil could have no place under the providence of a good God.
Solvitur etiam et quorundam dubitatio: utrum scilicet actiones malae sint a Deo? Nam cum ostensum sit omne agens actionem suam producere inquantum agit virtute divina, et ex hoc, Deum esse omnium et effectuum et actionum causam; itemque ostensum sit quod malum et defectus in his quae providentia divina reguntur, accidat ex conditione secundarum causarum, in quibus potest esse defectus: manifestum est quod actiones malae, secundum quod deficientes sunt, non sunt a Deo, sed a causis proximis deficientibus; quantum autem ad id quod de actione et entitate habent, oportet quod sint a Deo; sicut claudicatio est a virtute motiva quantum ad id quod habet de motu, quantum vero ad id quod habet de defectu, est ex curvitate cruris. [13] So, too, the difficulty of some people is solved; namely, whether evil actions are from God. Indeed, since it has been shown that every agent produces its action by acting through the divine power, and, consequently that God is the cause both of all effects and all actions, and since it was also shown that evil and defects occur in things ruled by divine providence as a result of the establishment of secondary causes in which there can be deficiency, it is evident that bad actions, according as they are defective, are not from God but from defective proximate causes; but, in so far as they possess something of action and entity, they must be from God. Thus limping arises from the motive power, in so far as it possesses something of motion, but in regard to what it has by way of defect it is due to the crookedness of the leg.

Caput 72
Quod divina providentia non excludit contingentiam a rebus
Chapter 72
Sicut autem divina providentia non excludit universaliter malum a rebus, ita etiam non excludit contingentiam, nec necessitatem rebus imponit. [1] just as divine providence does not wholly exclude evil from things, so also it does not exclude contingency, or impose necessity on things.
Iam enim ostensum est quod operatio providentiae qua Deus operatur in rebus, non excludit causas secundas, sed per eas impletur, inquantum agunt virtute Dei. Ex causis autem proximis aliqui effectus dicuntur necessarii vel contingentes, non autem ex causis remotis: nam fructificatio plantae est effectus contingens propter causam proximam, quae est vis germinativa, quae potest impediri et deficere; quamvis causa remota, scilicet sol, sit causa ex necessitate agens. Cum igitur inter causas proximas multae sint quae deficere possunt, non omnes effectus qui providentiae subduntur, erunt necessarii, sed plurimi sunt contingentes. [2] It has already been shown that the operation of providence, whereby God works in things, does not exclude secondary causes, but, rather, is fulfilled by them, in so far as they act by God’s power. Now certain effects are called necessary or contingent in regard to proximate causes, but not in regard to remote causes. Indeed, the fact that a plant bears fruit is a fact contingent on a proximate cause, which is the germinative power which can be impeded and can fail, even though the remote cause, the sun, be a cause acting from necessity. So, since there are many things among proximate causes that may be defective, not all effects subject to providence will be necessary, but a good many are contingent.
Adhuc. Ad divinam providentiam pertinet ut gradus entium qui possibiles sunt, adimpleantur, ut ex supra dictis patet. Ens autem dividitur per contingens et necessarium: et est per se divisio entis. Si igitur divina providentia excluderet omnem contingentiam, non omnes gradus entium conservarentur. [3] Again, it pertains to divine providence that the grades of being which are possible be fulfilled, as is evident from what was said above. But being is divided into the contingent and the necessary, and this is an essential division of being. So, if divine providence excluded all contingency, not all grades of beings would be preserved.
Amplius. Quanto aliqua sunt propinquiora Deo, tanto magis de similitudine ipsius participant: et quanto magis distant, tanto magis a similitudine ipsius deficiunt. Illa autem quae sunt Deo propinquissima, sunt omnino immobilia: scilicet substantiae separatae, quae maxime ad Dei similitudinem accedunt, qui est omnino immobilis. Quae autem sunt his proxima, et moventur immediate ab his quae semper eodem modo se habent, quandam immobilitatis speciem retinent, in hoc quod semper eodem modo moventur, sicut corpora caelestia. Consequitur ergo quod ea quae consequuntur ad ista, et ab eis sunt mota, longius ab immobilitate Dei distant, ut scilicet non semper eodem modo moveantur. Et in hoc ordinis pulchritudo apparet. Omne autem necessarium, inquantum huiusmodi, semper eodem modo se habet. Repugnaret igitur divinae providentiae, ad quam pertinet ordinem in rebus statuere et conservare, si omnia ex necessitate evenirent. [4] Besides, the nearer certain things are to God, the more they participate in His likeness; and the farther they are away, the more defective are they in regard to His likeness. Now, those that are nearest to God are quite immobile; namely, the separate substances which most closely approach the likeness of God, Who is completely immutable. But the ones which are next to these, and which are moved immediately by those which always exist in the same way, retain a certain type of immobility by the fact that they are always moved in the same way, which is true of the celestial bodies. It follows, then, that those things which come after them and are moved by them are far distant from the immutability of God, so that they are not always moved in the same way. And beauty is evident in this order. Now, every necessary thing, as such, always exists in the same wav. It would be incompatible, then, with divine providence. to which the establishment and preservation of order in things belongs, if all things came about as a result of necessity.
Praeterea. Quod necessarium est esse, semper est. Nullum autem corruptibile semper est. Si igitur divina providentia hoc requirit quod omnia sint necessaria, sequitur quod nihil sit in rebus corruptibile: et per consequens nec generabile. Subtraheretur ergo a rebus tota pars generabilium et corruptibilium. Quod perfectioni derogat universi. [5] Furthermore, that which is necessary is always. Now, no corruptible thing always exists. So, if divine providence required this, that all things be necessary, it would follow that nothing corruptible exists among things, and, consequently, nothing generable. Thus, the whole area of generable and corruptible things would be removed from reality. This detracts from the perfection of the universe.
Adhuc. In omni motu est quaedam generatio et corruptio: nam in eo quod movetur, aliquid incipit et aliquid desinit esse. Si igitur omnis generatio et corruptio subtraheretur, subtracta contingentia rerum, ut ostensum est, consequens est quod etiam motus subtraheretur a rebus, et omnia mobilia. [6] Moreover, in every motion there is some generation and corruption, for, in a thing that is moved, something begins and something ceases to be. So, if all generation and corruption were removed as a result of taking away the contingency of things, as we showed, the consequence would be that even motion would be taken away from things, and so would all movable things.
Item. Debilitatio virtutis alicuius substantiae, et eius impedimentum ex aliquo contrario agente, est ex aliqua eius immutatione. Si ergo divina providentia non impedit motum a rebus, neque etiam impedietur debilitatio virtutis ipsarum, aut impedimentum ex resistentia alterius. Ex virtutis autem debilitate, et eius impedimento, contingit quod res naturalis non semper eodem modo operatur, sed quandoque deficit ab eo quod competit sibi secundum suam naturam, ut sic naturales effectus non ex necessitate proveniant. Non igitur pertinet ad providentiam divinam quod rebus provisis necessitatem imponat. [7] Besides, the weakening of the power of any substance, and the hindering of it by a contrary agent, are due to some change in it. So, if divine providence does not prevent motion from going on in things, neither will the weakening of their power be prevented, nor the blocking of their power by the resistance of another thing. Now, the result of the weakness in power, and the impeding of it, is that a thing in nature does not always work uniformly, but sometimes fails in regard to what is appropriate for it naturally; and so, natural effects do not occur by necessity. Therefore, it is not the function of divine providence to impose necessity on things ruled by it.
Amplius. In his quae providentia debite reguntur, non debet esse aliquid frustra. Cum igitur manifestum sit causas aliquas esse contingentes, ex eo quod impediri possunt ut non producant suos effectus, patet quod contra rationem providentiae esset quod omnia ex necessitate contingerent. Non igitur divina providentia necessitatem rebus imponit, contingentiam a rebus universaliter excludens. [8] Furthermore, among things that are properly regulated by providence there should be none incapable of fulfillment. So, if it be manifest that some causes are contingent, because they can be prevented from producing their effects, it would evidently be against the character of providence for all things to happen out of necessity. Therefore, divine providence does not impose necessity on things by entirely excluding contingency from things.

Caput 73
Quod divina providentia non excludit arbitrii libertatem
Chapter 73
Ex quo etiam patet quod providentia voluntatis libertati non repugnat. [1] From this it is also evident that providence is not incompatible with freedom of will.
Cuiuslibet enim providentis gubernatio ad perfectionem rerum gubernatarum ordinatur vel adipiscendam, vel augendam, vel conservandam. Quod igitur perfectionis est, magis conservandum est per providentiam quam quod est imperfectionis et defectus. In rebus autem inanimatis causarum contingentia ex imperfectione et defectu est: secundum enim suam naturam sunt determinata ad unum effectum, quem semper consequuntur nisi sit impedimentum vel ex debilitate virtutis, vel ex aliquo exteriori agente, vel ex materiae indispositione; et propter hoc causae naturales agentes non sunt ad utrumque, sed ut frequentius eodem modo suum effectum producunt, deficiunt autem raro. Quod autem voluntas sit causa contingens, ex ipsius perfectione provenit: quia non habet virtutem limitatam ad unum, sed habet in potestate producere hunc effectum vel illum; propter quod est contingens ad utrumlibet. Magis igitur pertinet ad providentiam divinam conservare libertatem voluntatis quam contingentiam in naturalibus causis. [2] Indeed, the governance of every provident ruler is ordered either to the attainment, or the increase, or the preservation of the perfection of the things governed. Therefore, whatever pertains to perfection is to be preserved by providence rather than what pertains to imperfection and deficiency. Now, among inanimate things the contingency of causes is due to imperfection and deficiency, for by their nature they are determined to one result which they always achieve, unless there be some impediment arising either from a weakness of their power, or on the part of an external agent, or because of the unsuitability of the matter. And for this reason, natural agent causes are not capable of varied results; rather, in most cases, they produce their effect in the same way, failing to do so but rarely. Now, the fact that the will is a contingent cause arises from its perfection, for it does not have power limited to one outcome but rather has the ability to produce this effect or that; for which reason it is contingent in regard to either one or the other. Therefore, it is more pertinent to divine providence to preserve liberty of will than contingency in natural causes.
Amplius. Ad providentiam divinam pertinet ut rebus utatur secundum modum earum. Modus autem agendi cuiuslibet rei consequitur formam eius, quae est principium actionis. Forma autem per quam agit voluntarie agens, non est determinata: agit enim voluntas per formam apprehensam ab intellectu, nam bonum apprehensum movet voluntatem ut eius obiectum; intellectus autem non habet unam formam effectus determinatam, sed de ratione sua est ut multitudinem formarum comprehendat. Et propter hoc voluntas multiformes effectus producere potest. Non igitur ad rationem providentiae pertinet quod excludat voluntatis libertatem. [3] Moreover, it is proper to divine Providence to use things according to their own mode. Now, the mode of acting peculiar to each thing results from its form, which is the source of action. Now, the form whereby an agent acts voluntarily is not determined, for the will acts through a form apprehended by the intellect, since the apprehended good moves the will as its object. Now, the intellect does not have one form determined to an effect; rather, it is characteristic of it to comprehend a multitude of forms. And because of this the will can produce effects according to many forms. Therefore, it does not pertain to the character of providence to exclude liberty of will.
Item. Per gubernationem cuiuscumque providentis res gubernatae deducuntur ad finem convenientem: unde et de providentia divina Gregorius Nyssenus dicit quod est voluntas Dei per quam omnia quae sunt, convenientem deductionem accipiunt. Finis autem ultimus cuiuslibet creaturae est ut consequatur divinam similitudinem, sicut supra ostensum est. Esset igitur providentiae repugnans si alicui rei subtraheretur illud per quod assequitur similitudinem divinam. Agens autem voluntarium assequitur divinam similitudinem in hoc quod libere agit: ostensum est enim in primo liberum arbitrium in Deo esse. Non igitur per providentiam subtrahitur voluntatis libertas. [4] Besides, by the governance of every provident agent the things governed are led to a suitable end; hence, Gregory of Nyssa says of divine providence that it is the “will of God through which all things that exist receive a suitable end.” But the ultimate end of every creature is to attain the divine likeness, as we showed above. Therefore, it would be incompatible with providence for that whereby a thing attains the divine likeness to be taken away from it. Now, the voluntary agent attains the divine likeness because it acts freely, for we showed in Book One [88] that there is free choice in God. Therefore, freedom of will is not taken away by divine providence.
Adhuc. Providentia est multiplicativa bonorum in rebus gubernatis. Illud ergo per quod multa bona subtraherentur a rebus, non pertinet ad providentiam. Si autem libertas voluntatis tolleretur, multa bona subtraherentur. Tolleretur enim laus virtutis humanae, quae nulla est si homo libere non agit. Tolleretur etiam iustitia praemiantis et punientis, si non libere homo ageret bonum vel malum. Cessaret etiam circumspectio in consiliis, quae de his quae ex necessitate aguntur, frustra tractantur. Esset igitur contra providentiae rationem si subtraheretur voluntatis libertas. [5] Again, providence tends to multiply goods among the things that are governed. So, that whereby many goods are removed from things does not pertain to providence. But, if freedom of will were taken away, many goods would be removed. Taken away, indeed, would be the praise of human virtue which is nothing, if man does not act freely. Taken away, also, would be justice which rewards and punishes, if man could not freely do good or evil. Even the careful consideration of circumstances in processes of deliberation would cease, for it is useless to dwell upon things that are done of necessity. Therefore, it would be against the very character of providence if liberty of will were removed.
Hinc est quod dicitur Eccli. 15-14 Deus ab initio constituit hominem, et reliquit eum in manu consilii sui. Et iterum: 18 ante hominem vita et mors, bonum et malum: quod placuerit ei, dabitur illi. [6] Hence it is said: “God made man from the beginning and left him in the hand of his own counsel”; and again: “Before man is life and death, good and evil, that which he shall choose shall be given him” (Sirach 15:14, 18).
Per haec autem excluditur opinio Stoicorum, qui secundum ordinem quendam causarum intransgressibilem, quem Graeci ymarmenen vocabant, omnia ex necessitate dicebant provenire. [7] Now, by these considerations the opinion of the Stoics is set aside, for they said that all things come about by necessity, according to an irrevocable order of causes, which the Greeks called ειμαρμενη.

Caput 74
Quod divina providentia non excludit fortunam et casum
Chapter 74
Ex praemissis etiam apparet quod divina providentia non subtrahit a rebus fortunam et casum. [1] It is also apparent from the foregoing that divine providence does not take away fortune and chance from things.
In his enim quae in minori parte accidunt, dicitur esse fortuna et casus. Si autem non provenirent aliqua ut in minori parte, omnia ex necessitate acciderent: nam ea quae sunt contingentia ut in pluribus, in hoc solo a necessariis differunt, quod possunt in minori parte deficere. Esset autem contra rationem providentiae divinae si omnia ex necessitate contingerent, ut ostensum est. Igitur et contra rationem providentiae divinae esset si nihil foret fortuitum et casuale in rebus. [2] For it is in the case of things that happen rarely that fortune and chance are said to be present. Now, if some things did not occur in rare instances, all things would happen by necessity. Indeed, things that are contingent in most cases differ from necessary things only in this: they can fail to happen, in a few cases. But it would be contrary to the essential character of divine providence if all things occurred by necessity, as we showed. Therefore, it would also be contrary to the character of divine providence if nothing were to be fortuitous and a matter of chance in things.
Amplius. Contra rationem providentiae esset si res providentiae subiectae non agerent propter finem: cum providentiae sit omnia ordinare in finem. Esset etiam contra perfectionem universi si nulla res corruptibilis esset, nec aliqua virtus deficere potens, ut ex supra dictis patet. Ex hoc autem quod aliquod agens propter finem deficit ab eo quod intendit, sequitur aliqua casu contingere. Esset igitur contra rationem providentiae, et perfectionis rerum, si non essent aliqua casualia. [3] Again, it would be contrary to the very meaning of providence if things subject to providence did not act for an end, since it is the function of providence to order all things to their end. Moreover, it would be against the perfection of the universe if no corruptible thing existed, and no power could fail, as is evident from what was said above. Now, due to the fact that an agent fails in regard to an end that is intended, it follows that some things occur by chance. So, it would be contrary to the meaning of providence, and to the perfection of things, if there were no chance events.
Adhuc. Multitudo et diversitas causarum ex ordine divinae providentiae et dispositionis procedit. Supposita autem causarum diversitate, oportet unam alteri quandoque concurrere per quam impediatur, vel iuvetur, ad suum effectum producendum. Ex concursu autem duarum vel plurium causarum contingit aliquid casualiter evenire, dum finis non intentus ex concursu alicuius causae provenit: sicut inventio debitoris ab eo qui ibat ad forum causa emendi aliquid, provenit ex hoc quod debitor etiam ad forum ivit. Non est igitur divinae providentiae contrarium quod sint aliqua fortuita et casualia in rebus. [4] Besides, the large number and variety of causes stem from the order of divine providence and control. But, granted this variety of causes, one of them must at times run into another cause and be impeded, or assisted, by it in the production of its effect. Now, from the concurrence of two or more causes it is possible for some chance event to occur, and thus an unintended end comes about due to this causal concurrence. For example, the discovery of a debtor, by a man who has gone to market to sell something, happens because the debtor also went to market. Therefore, it is not contrary to divine providence that there are some fortuitous and chance events among things.
Item. Quod non est, non potest esse alicuius causa. Unde oportet quod unumquodque, sicut se habet ad esse, ita se habeat ad hoc quod sit causa. Oportet igitur quod secundum diversitatem ordinis in entibus sit etiam diversitas ordinis in causis. Ad perfectionem autem rerum requiritur quod non solum sint in rebus entia per se, sed etiam entia per accidens: res enim quae non habent in sua substantia ultimam perfectionem, oportet quod perfectionem aliquam consequantur per accidentia; et tanto per plura, quanto magis distant a simplicitate Dei. Ex hoc autem quod aliquod subiectum habet multa accidentia, sequitur quod sit aliquod ens per accidens: nam subiectum et accidens, et etiam duo accidentia unius subiecti, sunt unum et ens per accidens; sicut homo albus, et musicum album. Oportet igitur ad perfectionem rerum quod sint etiam causae quaedam per accidens. Ea autem quae ex causis aliquibus procedunt per accidens, dicuntur accidere a casu vel fortuna. Non est igitur contra rationem providentiae, quae perfectionem rerum conservat, ut aliqua fiant a casu vel fortuna. [5] Moreover, what does not exist cannot be the cause of anything. Hence, each thing must stand in the same relation to the fact that it is a cause, as it does to the fact that it is a being. So, depending on the diversity of order in beings, there must also be a diversity of order among causes. Now, it is necessary for the perfection of things that there be among things not only substantial beings but also accidental beings. Indeed, things that do not possess ultimate perfection in their substance must obtain such perfection through accidents, and the more of these there are, the farther are they from the simplicity of God. From the fact, then, that a certain subject has many accidents it follows that it is a being accidentally, because a subject and an accident, and even two accidents of one substance, are a unit and a being accidentally; as in the example of a white man, and of a musical, white being. So, it is necessary to the perfection of things that there should also be some accidental causes. Now, things which result accidentally from any causes are said to happen by chance or fortune. Therefore, it is not contrary to the rational character of providence, which preserves the perfection of things, for certain things to come about as a result of chance or fortune.
Praeterea. Ad ordinem divinae providentiae pertinet ut sit ordo et gradus in causis. Quanto autem aliqua causa est superior, tanto est maioris virtutis: unde eius causalitas ad plura se extendit. Nullius autem causae naturalis intentio se extendit ultra virtutem eius: esset enim frustra. Oportet ergo quod intentio causae particularis non se extendat ad omnia quae contingere possunt. Ex hoc autem contingit aliquid casualiter vel fortuito, quod eveniunt aliqua praeter intentionem agentium. Ordo igitur divinae providentiae exigit quod sit casus et fortuna in rebus. [6] Furthermore, that there be order and a gradation of causes is important to the order of divine providence. But the higher a cause is, the greater is its power; and so, its causality applies to a greater number of things. Now, the natural intention of a cause cannot extend beyond its power, for that would be useless. So, the particular intention of a cause cannot extend to all things that can happen. Now, it is due to the fact that some things happen apart from the intention of their agents that there is a possibility of chance or fortuitous occurrence. Therefore, the order of divine providence requires that there be chance and fortune in reality.
Hinc est quod dicitur Eccle. 9-11: vidi nec velocium esse cursum etc., sed tempus casumque in omnibus, scilicet inferioribus. [7] Hence it is said: “I saw that the race is not to the swift... but time and chance in all” (Sirach 9:11), that is, among things here below.

Caput 75
Quod providentia Dei sit singularium contingentium
Chapter 75
Ex his autem quae ostensa sunt, manifestum fit quod divina providentia pervenit usque ad singularia generabilium et corruptibilium. [1] It is obvious from what we have shown that divine providence reaches out to singulars that are generable and corruptible.
Non enim videtur horum non esse providentia nisi propter eorum contingentiam, et quia multa in eis casualiter et fortuito eveniunt: in hoc enim solum differunt ab incorruptibilibus et universalibus corruptibilium, quorum dicunt providentiam esse. Providentiae autem non repugnat contingentia, et casus et fortuna, neque voluntarium, ut ostensum est. Nihil igitur prohibet et horum providentiam esse, sicut incorruptibilium et universalium. [2] Except for the fact of their contingency, and the fact that many of them come about by chance and fortune, it does not seem that providence is inapplicable to them. For it is only on this basis that they differ from incorruptible things, and the universal natures of corruptible things, to which providence does apply, as people say. But contingency is not incompatible with providence, nor are chance or fortune or voluntary action, as we have shown. Therefore, nothing prohibits providence from also applying to these things, just as it does to incorruptible and universal things.
Adhuc. Si Deus horum singularium providentiam non habet, aut hoc est quia non cognoscit ea; aut quia non potest; aut quia non vult eorum curam habere. Non autem potest dici quod Deus singularia non cognoscat: ostensum enim est supra quod Deus eorum notitiam habet. Neque etiam potest dici quod Deus eorum curam habere non possit: cum eius potentia sit infinita, ut supra probatum est. Nec etiam haec singularia gubernationis non capacia sunt: cum videamus ea gubernari rationis industria, sicut patet in hominibus; et per naturalem instinctum, sicut patet in apibus et multis animalibus brutis, quae quodam naturali instinctu gubernantur. Neque etiam potest dici quod Deus non velit ea gubernare: cum voluntas ipsius sit universaliter omnis boni; bonum autem eorum quae gubernantur, in ordine gubernationis maxime consistit. Non igitur potest dici quod Deus horum singularium curam non habeat. [3] Again, if God does not exercise providence over these singulars, this is either because He does not know them, or because He is not able to do so, or because He does not wish to take care of them. Now, it cannot be said that God does not know singulars; we showed above that God does possess knowledge of them. Nor can it be said that God is unable to take care of them, for His power is infinite, as we proved above. Nor, indeed, are these singulars incapable of being governed, since we see them governed by the use of reason in the case of men, and by means of natural instinct in the case of bees and many brute animals that are governed by some sort of natural instinct. Nor, in fact, can it be said that God does not wish to govern them, since His will is universally concerned with every good thing, and the good of things that are governed lies chiefly in the order of governance. Therefore, it cannot be said that God takes no care of these singulars.
Amplius. Omnes causae secundae, in hoc quod causae existunt, divinam similitudinem consequuntur, ut ex supra dictis patet. Invenitur autem hoc communiter in causis producentibus aliquid, quod curam habent eorum quae producunt: sicut animalia naturaliter nutriunt foetus suos. Deus igitur curam habet eorum quorum causa existit. Est autem causa etiam istorum particularium, ut ex supra dictis patet. Habet igitur eorum curam. [4] Besides, all secondary causes, by the fact of being causes, attain the divine likeness, as is evident from what we said above. Now, we find one thing in common among causes that produce something: they take care of their products. Thus, animals naturally nourish their young. So, God takes care of the things of which He is the cause. Now, He is the cause even of these particular things, as is obvious from our previous statements.” So, He does take care of them.
Item. Ostensum est supra quod Deus in rebus creatis non ex necessitate naturae agit, sed per voluntatem et intellectum. Ea autem quae aguntur per intellectum et voluntatem, curae providentis subduntur, quae in hoc consistere videtur quod per intellectum aliqua dispensentur. Divinae ergo providentiae subduntur ea quae ab ipso aguntur. Ostensum est autem supra quod Deus operatur in omnibus causis secundis, et omnes earum effectus reducuntur in Deum sicut in causam: et sic oportet quod ea quae in istis singularibus aguntur, sint ipsius opera. Igitur haec singularia, et motus et operationes ipsorum, divinae providentiae subiacent. [5] Moreover, we showed above that God does not act in regard to created things by a necessity of His nature, but through His will and intellect. Now, things done by intellect and will are subject to the care of a provident agent, for that is what such care seems to consist in: the fact that certain things are managed through understanding. And so, the things that result from His action are subject to divine providence. But we showed before that God works through all secondary causes, and that all their products may be traced back to God as their cause; so it must be that the things that are done among singulars are His works. Therefore, these singulars, and also their motions and operations, come under the scope of divine providence.
Praeterea. Stulta est providentia alicuius qui non curat ea sine quibus ea quae curat esse non possunt. Constat autem quod, si omnia deficerent particularia, quod universalia eorum remanere non possent. Si igitur Deus universalia tantum curat, singularia vero ista omnino derelinquit, stulta et imperfecta erit eius providentia. [6] Furthermore, foolish is the providence of a person who does not take care of the things needed by the things for which he does care. But it is obvious that, if all particular things vanished, their universals could not endure. So, if God be only concerned with universals, and if He be entirely negligent of these singulars, then His providence will be foolish and imperfect.
Si autem dicat aliquis quod horum singularium Deus curam habet usque ad hoc quod conserventur in esse, non autem quantum ad alia: hoc omnino esse non potest. Nam omnia alia quae circa singularia accidunt, ad eorum conservationem vel corruptionem ordinantur. Si ergo Deus habet curam singularium quantum ad eorum conservationem, habet curam omnium circa ea contingentium. [7] However, suppose someone says that God takes care of these singulars to the extent of preserving them in being, but not in regard to anything else; this is utterly impossible. In fact, all other events that occur in connection with singulars are related to their preservation or corruption. So, if God takes care of singulars as far as their preservation is concerned, He takes care of every contingent event connected with them.
Potest autem aliquis dicere quod sola cura universalium sufficit ad particularium conservationem in esse. Provisa sunt enim cuilibet speciei ea per quae quodlibet individuum speciei illius potest conservari in esse: sicut data sunt animalibus organa ad cibum sumendum et digerendum, et cornua ad protegendum se. Utilitates autem horum non deficiunt nisi in minori parte: cum ea quae sunt a natura, producant effectus suos vel semper, vel frequenter. Et sic non possunt omnia individua deficere, etsi aliquod deficiat. [8] Of course, a person could say that the mere care of the universals is enough for the preservation of particulars in being, for in each species there are provided the means whereby any individual of the species may be preserved in being. For example, organs for the taking in and digestion of food have been given to animals, and also horns with which to protect themselves. Moreover, good uses of these cannot fail to be made, except in rare instances, because things that are from nature produce their effects in all cases, or frequently. Thus, it is not possible for all individuals to fall, even though a particular one may do so.
Sed secundum hanc rationem, omnia quae circa individua contingunt, providentiae subiacebunt, sicut et conservatio eorum in esse: quia circa singularia alicuius speciei nihil potest accidere quod non reducatur aliquo modo ad principia illius speciei. Sic igitur singularia non magis subiacent divinae providentiae quantum ad conservationem in esse, quam quantum ad alia. [9] But according to this argument all events that occur in connection with individuals will be subject to providence, in the same way that their preservation in being is, because nothing can happen in connection with the singular members of any species that cannot be reduced in some way to the sources of that species. And so, singulars come no more under the scope of divine providence in regard to their preservation in being than they do in regard to their other aspects.
Praeterea. In comparatione rerum ad finem talis ordo apparet quod accidentia sunt propter substantias, ut per ea perficiantur; in substantiis vero materia est propter formam; per hanc enim participat divinam bonitatem, propter quam omnia facta sunt, ut supra ostensum est. Ex quo patet quod singularia sunt propter naturam universalem. Cuius signum est quod in his in quibus potest natura universalis conservari per unum individuum, non sunt multa individua unius speciei: sicut patet in sole et luna. Cum autem providentia sit ordinativa aliquorum in finem, oportet quod ad providentiam pertineant et fines, et ea quae sunt ad finem. Subiacent igitur providentiae non solum universalia, sed etiam singularia. [10] Furthermore, in the relation of things to their end, an order appears, such that accidents exist for the sake of substances, in order that substances may be perfected by them; on the other hand, within substances matter is for the sake of form, for it participates in divine goodness through form, and that is why all things were made, as we showed above. Consequently, it is clear that singulars exist for the sake of the universal nature. The sign of this is the fact that, in the case of beings whose universal nature can be preserved by one individual, there are not plural individuals of one species, as is instanced by the sun and the moon. But, since providence has the function of ordering things to their end, both the ends and the things that are related to an end must be a matter of concern to providence. Therefore, not only universals, but also singulars, come under the scope of providence.
Adhuc. Haec est differentia inter cognitionem speculativam et practicam, quod cognitio speculativa, et ea quae ad ipsam pertinent, perficiuntur in universali; ea vero quae pertinent ad cognitionem practicam, perficiuntur in particulari: nam finis speculativae est veritas, quae primo et per se in immaterialibus consistit et in universalibus; finis vero practicae est operatio, quae est circa singularia. Unde medicus non curat hominem in universali, sed hunc hominem: et ad hoc est tota scientia medicinae ordinata. Constat autem quod providentia ad practicam cognitionem pertinet: cum sit ordinativa rerum in finem. Esset igitur imperfectissima Dei providentia si in universalibus consisteret, et usque ad singularia non perveniret. [11] Again, this is the difference between speculative and practical knowledge: speculative knowledge and the functions that pertain to it reach their perfection in the universal, while the things that belong to practical knowledge reach their perfection in the particular. In fact, the end of speculative cognition is truth, which consists primarily and essentially in immaterial and universal things; but the end of practical cognition is operation, which is concerned with singulars. So, the physician does not heal man as a universal, but, rather, this individual man, and the whole science of medicine is ordered to this result. Now, it is obvious that providence belongs to the area of practical knowledge, for its function is to order things to their end. Therefore, God’s providence would be most imperfect if it were to confine itself to universals and not extend as far as singulars.
Item. Cognitio speculativa magis perficitur in universali quam in particulari: quia magis sciuntur universalia quam particularia; et propter hoc universalissimorum principiorum cognitio omnibus est communis. Ille vero perfectior est in scientia speculativa qui non solum universalem, sed propriam cognitionem de rebus habet: nam qui cognoscit in universali tantum, cognoscit rem solum in potentia. Propter quod discipulus de universali cognitione principiorum reducitur in propriam cognitionem conclusionum per magistrum, qui utramque cognitionem habet: sicut aliquid reducitur de potentia in actum per ens actu. Multo igitur magis in scientia practica perfectior est qui non solum in universali, sed etiam in particulari res disponit ad actum. Divina igitur providentia, quae est perfectissima, usque ad singularia se extendit. [12] Besides, speculative knowledge is perfected in the universal rather than in the particular, because universals are better known than particulars. Because of this, the knowledge of the most universal principles is common. However, that man who has not only universal, but also a proper, knowledge of things is more perfect in speculative science, for, the man who knows only universally merely knows a thing potentially. This is why a student is led from a universal knowledge of principles to a proper knowledge of conclusions, by his teacher who possesses knowledge of both —just as a thing is brought from potency to act by an actual being. So, in practical science, he is much more perfect who directs things to act, not only universally, but also in the particular case. Therefore, divine providence, being most perfect, extends to singulars.
Amplius. Cum Deus sit causa entis inquantum est ens, ut supra ostensum est, oportet quod ipse sit provisor entis inquantum est ens: providet enim rebus inquantum est causa earum. Quicquid ergo quocumque modo est, sub eius providentia cadit. Singularia autem sunt entia, et magis quam universalia: quia universalia non subsistunt per se, sed sunt solum in singularibus. Est igitur divina providentia etiam singularium. [13] Moreover, since God is the cause of actual being because He is being, as was shown above, He must be the agent of providence for being, because He is being. Indeed, He does provide for things, because He is their cause. So, whatever a thing is, and whatever its mode of existing, it falls under His providence. Now, singulars are beings, and more so than universals, for universals do not subsist of themselves, but are only in singulars. Therefore, divine providence also applies to singulars.
Item. Res creatae providentiae divinae subduntur prout ab ipso in finem ultimum ordinantur, qui est bonitas sua. Participatio ergo divinae bonitatis a rebus creatis est per providentiam divinam. Bonitatem autem divinam participant etiam singularia contingentia. Oportet ergo quod etiam ad ea divina providentia se extendat. [14] Furthermore, created things are subject to divine providence inasmuch as they are ordered by it to their ultimate end, which is divine goodness. Therefore, the participation of divine goodness by created things is accomplished by divine providence. But even contingent singulars participate in divine goodness. So, divine providence must extend even to them.
Hinc est quod dicitur Matth. 6: duo passeres asse veneunt, et unus ex eis non cadit in terra sine patre meo. Et Sap. 8-1: attingit a fine usque ad finem fortiter: idest, a primis creaturis usque ad infimas earum. Ezechiel etiam 9-9 arguitur opinio quorundam qui dicebant, dereliquit dominus terram, dominus non videt; et Iob 22-14, circa cardines caeli perambulat, nec nostra considerat. [15] Hence it is said: “Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing: and not one of them shall fall on the ground without My Father” (Matt. 10:29; see 6:26). And again: “She reaches from end to end mightily” (Wis. 8:1), that is, from the noblest creatures down to the lowest of them. So, also, we oppose the view of those who said: “The Lord has forsaken the earth, and the Lord does not see” (Ez. 9:9); and again: “He walks about the poles of heaven, and He does not consider our things” (Job 22:14).
Per haec autem excluditur opinio quorundam qui dixerunt quod divina providentia non se extendit usque ad haec singularia. Quam quidem opinionem quidam Aristoteli imponunt, licet ex verbis eius haberi non possit. [16] By this conclusion we set aside the opinion of those who said that divine providence does not extend as far as these singular things. In fact, some attribute this opinion to Aristotle, even though it cannot be gathered from his own words.

Caput 76
Quod providentia Dei sit omnium singularium immediate
Chapter 76
Quidam autem concesserunt providentiam divinam usque ad haec singularia procedere, sed quibusdam mediantibus causis. Posuit enim Plato, ut Gregorius Nyssenus dicit, triplicem providentiam. Quarum prima est summi Dei, qui primo et principaliter providet propriis, idest omnibus spiritualibus et intellectualibus; consequenter vero toti mundo quantum ad genera et species, et universales causas, quae sunt corpora caelestia. Secunda vero est qua providetur singularibus animalium et plantarum, et aliorum generabilium et corruptibilium, quantum ad eorum generationem et corruptionem et alias mutationes. Quam quidem providentiam Plato attribuit diis qui caelum circumeunt. Aristoteles vero horum causalitatem attribuit obliquo circulo. Tertiam vero providentiam ponit rerum quae ad humanam vitam pertinent. Quam quidem attribuit quibusdam Daemonibus circa terram existentibus, qui sunt, secundum ipsum, humanarum actionum custodes. Sed tamen, secundum Platonem, secunda et tertia providentia a prima dependet: nam Deus summus secundos et tertios statuit provisores. [1] Now, some have conceded that divine providence extends to singulars, but through certain intermediary causes. Indeed, Plato asserted a threefold providence, according to Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De natura hominis, 44]. The first of these is that of the highest God, Who primarily and above all provides for His own things, that is, for all things spiritual and intellectual, but subsequently for the whole world, as far as genera and species go, and the universal causes which are the celestial bodies. Then the second type of providence is that by which provision is made for individual animals and plants, and for other generable and corruptible individuals, in respect to their generation and corruption, and other changes. Now, Plato attributes this kind of providence to the “gods that circulate about the heavens.” Aristotle, on the other hand, attributes their causality to the “oblique circle. Finally, he assigns a third kind of providence to things that pertain to human life. So, he attributes this function to certain “daemons living in the region of the earth” who are caretakers for human actions, according to him. But still, according to Plato, the second and third types of providence depend on the first, for the highest God has established the ones on the second and third levels as provident agents.
Haec autem positio Catholicae fidei consonat quantum ad hoc quod omnium providentiam reducit in Deum sicut in primum auctorem. Videtur autem sententiae fidei repugnare quantum ad hoc, quod non omnia particularia divinae providentiae immediate dicit esse subiecta. Quod ex praemissis ostendi potest. [2] Now, this theory is in agreement with the Catholic faith, in so far as it traces the providence of all things back to God as its first author. But it seems incompatible with the view of the faith, in regard to this: it says that not all particulars are immediately subject to divine providence. Now, we can show from the foregoing that they are.
Habet enim Deus immediatam singularium cognitionem, non quasi ea in suis causis cognoscens tantum, sed etiam in seipsis, sicut in primo huius operis ostensum est. Inconveniens autem videtur quod, singularia cognoscens, eorum ordinem non velit, in quo bonum praecipuum eorum constat: cum voluntas sua sit totius bonitatis principium. Oportet ergo quod, sicut immediate singularia cognoscit, ita immediate eorum ordinem statuat. [3] In point of fact, God has immediate knowledge of singulars, not merely in the sense that He knows them in their causes, but even in themselves, as we showed in Book One [65ff]of this work. But it would appear inappropriate for Him to know singulars and yet not to will their order, in which their chief good consists, for His will is the source of goodness in its entirety. Therefore, just as He knows singulars immediately, He must also establish order for them immediately.
Amplius. Ordo qui per providentiam in rebus gubernatis statuitur, ex ordine illo provenit quem provisor in sua mente disponit: sicut et forma artis quae fit in materia, ab ea procedit quae est in mente artificis. Oportet autem, ubi sunt multi provisores unus sub alio, quod ordinem conceptum superior inferiori tradat: sicut ars inferior accipit principia a superiori. Si igitur secundi et tertii provisores ponuntur esse sub primo provisore, qui est Deus summus, oportet quod ordinem statuendum in rebus a summo Deo accipiant. Non est autem possibile quod iste ordo sit in eis perfectior quam in summo Deo: quinimmo omnes perfectiones per modum descensus ab eo in alia proveniunt, ut ex superioribus patet. Oportet autem quod ordo rerum sit in secundis provisoribus non solum in universali, sed etiam quantum ad singularia: alias non possent sua providentia in singularibus ordinem statuere. Multo igitur magis ordo singularium est in divinae providentiae dispositione. [4] Again, the order that is established by providence among things that are governed arises from the order which the provident agent decides on within his own mind. For example, the artistic form that is produced in matter proceeds from the form that is in the mind of the artist. Now, where there are many overseers, arranged one under the next, the order that is conceived by the higher one must be handed down to the lower one; just as a lower type of an receives its principles from a higher one. If, then, the second and third provident agents are claimed to be under the first provident agent, Who is the highest God, they must receive the order that is to be established in things from the highest God. Now, it is not possible for this order to be more perfect in them than in the highest God; on the contrary, all perfections come to other things from Him by way of descent, as appears from things said earlier. The order of things must, then, be present in the secondary agents of providence, not merely universally, but also in respect to singulars; otherwise, they could not establish, order in singulars by their providence. Therefore, the ordering of singulars is much more under the control of divine providence.
Adhuc. In his quae humana providentia reguntur, invenitur quod aliquis superior provisor circa quaedam magna et universalia per seipsum excogitat qualiter sint ordinanda, minimorum vero ordinem ipse non excogitat, sed aliis inferioribus excogitandum relinquit. Et hoc quidem contingit propter eius defectum: inquantum vel singularium minimorum conditiones ignorat; vel non sufficit ad omnium ordinem excogitandum, propter laborem et temporis prolixitatem quae requireretur. Huiusmodi autem defectus longe sunt a Deo: nam ipse omnia singularia cognoscit; nec in intelligendo laborat, aut tempus requirit, cum intelligendo seipsum, omnia alia cognoscat, sicut supra ostensum est. Ipse igitur omnium et singularium ordinem excogitat. Eius igitur providentia est omnium singularium immediate. [5] Besides, in the case of things regulated by human providence we find that a certain higher overseer thinks out the way in which some of the big and universal matters are to be ordered, but he does not himself think out the ordering of the smallest details; rather, he leaves these to be planned by agents on a lower level. But, as a matter of fact, this is so because of his own deficiency, either because he does not know the circumstances for the individual details, or because he is not able to think out the order for all, by virtue of the effort and length of time that might be needed. Now, deficiencies of this kind are far removed from God, because He knows all singular things, and He does not make an effort to understand, or require any time for it; since, by understanding Himself He knows all other things, as we showed above. Therefore, He plans even the order for all singular things. So, His providence applies to all singulars immediately.
Item. In rebus humanis inferiores provisores per suam industriam ordinem excogitant in his quorum gubernatio eis a praesidente committitur. Quam quidem industriam a praesidente homine non habent, nec usum ipsius: si vero a superiore eam haberent, iam ordinatio per superiorem fieret, ipsi autem essent illius ordinationis non provisores, sed executores. Constat autem per supra dicta quod omnis sapientia et intellectus a summo Deo in omnibus intelligentibus causatur; nec intellectus aliquis potest aliquid intelligere nisi virtute divina, sicut nec aliquod agens operatur nisi inquantum agit in virtute ipsius. Est igitur ipse Deus immediate sua providentia omnia dispensans: quicumque vero sub ipso provisores dicuntur, sunt providentiae ipsius executores. [6] Moreover, in human affairs the lower overseers, through their own efforts, plan the order for those things whose direction has been given them by the chief executive. Of course, they do not get this ability from the man who is in charge, or even its use. Indeed, if they did get it from him, the ordering would already be accomplished by the higher executive, and they would not be the agents responsible for this ordering, but simply the ones who carry it out. Now, it is obvious from things said above that all wisdom and understanding are caused in intelligent beings by the highest God, and that no intellect can understand anything unless by divine power; just as no agent can perform any operation unless be act by this divine power. Therefore, God Himself is the disposer of all things immediately by His providence, and whatever beings are called agents of providence under Him are executors of His providence.
Praeterea. Superior providentia dat regulas providentiae inferiori: sicut politicus dat regulas et leges duci exercitus, qui dat leges et regulas centurionibus et tribunis. Si igitur sub prima providentia Dei summi sunt aliae providentiae, oportet quod Deus illis secundis vel tertiis provisoribus det regulas sui regiminis. Aut ergo dat eis regulas et leges universales, aut particulares. Si autem dat eis universales regulas regiminis, cum universales regulae non possint semper ad particularia applicari, maxime in rebus mobilibus, quae non semper eodem modo se habent; oporteret quod illi provisores secundi vel tertii quandoque praeter regulas sibi datas ordinarent de rebus suae provisioni subiectis. Haberent ergo iudicium super regulas acceptas: quando secundum eas oporteret agere, et quando eas praetermittere oporteret. Quod esse non potest: quia hoc iudicium ad superiorem pertinet; nam eius est interpretari leges et dispensare in eis, cuius est eas condere. Hoc igitur iudicium de regulis universalibus datis, oportet quod fiat per supremum provisorem. Quod quidem esse non posset si se ordinationi horum singularium immediate non immisceret. Oportet igitur, secundum hoc, quod sit horum immediatus provisor. Si vero secundi et tertii provisores a summo provisore particulares regulas et leges accipiunt, manifeste apparet quod horum singularium ordinatio fit immediate per divinam providentiam. [7] Furthermore, a higher providence gives regulations to a lower providence, just as a statesman gives regulations and laws to the leader of an army, who gives laws and regulations to the heads of larger or smaller military units. If, then, there be other providences under the first providence of the supreme God, God must give these secondary or tertiary overseers the regulations for their commands. So, He gives them either universal regulations and laws or particular ones. But, if He gives them universal regulations for their commands, since universal regulations cannot be applied in all cases, to particulars, especially in the case of variable things that do not always remain the same, these secondary or tertiary overseers would have to give orders at times that are contrary to the regulations given them for the things subject to their control. So, they would be able to pass judgment on the regulations that they have received, as to when action should accord with these regulations and when one should overlook them. Now, this could not be, for such judgment belongs to a superior. Indeed, it is the prerogative of the one who establishes the laws to interpret them and issue dispensations from them. So, this judgment over universally given regulations must be carried out by the supreme overseer. Of course, He could not do this if He refused to involve Himself immediately in the ordering of these singular things. So, according to this, He must be the immediate overseer of these things. On the other hand, if the secondary and tertiary overseers receive particular regulations and laws from the highest overseer, then it is quite obvious that the ordering of these singulars is done immediately by divine providence.
Amplius. Semper provisor superior habet iudicium de his quae ab inferioribus provisoribus ordinantur: utrum sint bene ordinata necne. Si igitur secundi provisores vel tertii sunt sub Deo primo provisore, oportet quod Deus iudicium habeat de his quae ab his ordinantur. Quod quidem esse non potest, si horum singularium ordinem non consideret. Habet igitur ipse per seipsum curam de his singularibus. [8] Again, the superior overseer always holds the power of judgment over the orders issued by inferior overseers, as to whether the orders are properly given or not. If, then, the secondary or tertiary overseers are under God as the first overseer, God must hold the power of judgment over the things ordered by them. In fact, He could not do this if He did not consider the order of these singulars. Therefore He Himself takes care by Himself of these singulars.
Adhuc. Si Deus per seipsum immediate haec inferiora singularia non curat, hoc non est nisi vel quia ea despicit; vel ne eis eius dignitas inquinetur, ut quidam dicunt. Hoc autem irrationabile est. Nam dignius est provide aliquorum ordinationem excogitare, quam in eis operari. Si igitur Deus in omnibus operatur, sicut supra ostensum est, nec in hoc aliquid eius dignitati derogatur, quinimmo pertinet ad eius universalem et summam virtutem; nullo modo despiciendum est ei, vel eius dignitatem commaculat, si circa haec singularia immediate providentiam habeat. [9] Besides, if God does not immediately by Himself take care of these inferior singular things, this can only be either because He despises them or because His dignity might be lowered by them, as some people say. But this is unreasonable. It is indeed a matter of greater dignity to oversee the planning of the order for certain things than for it to be produced in them. So, if God works in all things, as we showed above, and if His dignity is not diminished thereby, and if this belongs rather to His universal and supreme power, it is in no sense something to be despised by Him, or something that might besmirch His dignity, if He exercises His providence immediately over these singulars.
Item. Omnis sapiens qui provide sua virtute utitur, in agendo moderatur suae virtutis usum, ordinans ad quid et quantum perveniat: alias virtus in agendo sapientiam non sequeretur. Constat autem ex praemissis quod divina virtus in operando usque ad infima rerum pervenit. Igitur divina sapientia est ordinativa qui, et quot, et qualiter ex eius virtute progrediantur effectus, etiam in infimis rebus. Est igitur ipse immediate sua providentia omnium rerum ordinem excogitans. [10] Moreover, every wise being who uses his power providently sets limits on the use of his power, when he acts, by ordering the objective and the extent to which it goes; otherwise, his power would not keep pace with his wisdom in such action. But it is obvious from the foregoing that the divine power, in operating, reaches to the lowest things. So, the divine wisdom is in control of ordering what, bow many, and what kind of effects proceed from His power, even down to the lowest things. Therefore, He is Himself planning the order for all things immediately by His providence.
Hinc est quod dicitur Rom. 13-1: quae a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt. Et Iudith. 9-4: tu fecisti priora, et illa post illa cogitasti, et hoc factum est quod ipse voluisti. [11] Hence it is said: “The things that are from God are well ordered” (Rom. 13:1). And again: “You have done the things of old, and have devised one thing after another; and what You have willed has been done” (Judith 9:4).

Caput 77
Quod executio divinae providentiae fit mediantibus causis secundis
Chapter 77
Attendendum est autem quod ad providentiam duo requiruntur: ordinatio, et ordinis executio. Quorum primum fit per virtutem cognoscitivam: unde qui perfectioris cognitionis sunt, ordinatores aliorum dicuntur, sapientis enim est ordinare. Secundum vero fit per virtutem operativam. E contrario autem se habet in his duobus: nam tanto perfectior est ordinatio, quanto magis descendit ad minima; minimorum autem executio condecet inferiorem virtutem, effectui proportionatam. In Deo autem quantum ad utrumque summa perfectio invenitur: est enim in eo perfectissima sapientia ad ordinandum, virtus perfectissima ad operandum. Oportet ergo quod ipse omnium ordines per sapientiam suam disponat, etiam minimorum: exequatur vero minima per alias inferiores virtutes, per quas ipse operetur, sicut virtus universalis et altior per inferiorem et particularem virtutem. Conveniens est igitur quod sint inferiores agentes divinae providentiae executores. [1] We should attend to the fact that two things are required for providence: the ordering and the execution of the order. The first of these is accomplished by the cognitive power; as a consequence, those who have more perfect knowledge are called orderers of the others. “For it is the function of the wise man to order.” But the second is done by the operative power. Now, the situations in these two functions are contrary to each other. For, the more perfect an ordering is, the more does it descend to small details; but the execution of small details is appropriate to a lower power, proportionate to such an effect. Now, in God the highest perfection in regard to both functions is found; in fact, there is in Him the most perfect wisdom for ordering and the most perfect power for operating. So, He Himself through His wisdom must arrange the orders for all things, even the least; on the other hand, He may execute the small details by means of other lower powers, through which He Himself works, as does a universal and higher power through a lower and particular power. It is appropriate, then, that there be inferior agents as executors of divine providence.
Item. Ostensum est supra quod divina operatio non excludit operationes causarum secundarum. Ea vero quae ex operationibus causarum secundarum proveniunt, divinae providentiae subiacent: cum Deus omnia singularia ordinet per seipsum, ut ostensum est. Sunt igitur secundae causae divinae providentiae executrices. [2] Again, we showed above that divine operation does not exclude the operations of secondary causes. But the resultants of the operations of secondary causes are within the scope of divine providence, since God orders all singulars by Himself, as we showed. Therefore, secondary causes are the executors of divine providence.
Adhuc. Quanto virtus alicuius agentis est fortior, tanto in magis remota suam operationem extendit: sicut ignis, quanto est maior, magis remota calefacit. Hoc autem non contingit in agente quod non agit per medium: quia quidlibet in quod agit, est sibi proximum. Cum igitur virtus divinae providentiae sit maxima, per aliqua media ad ultima suam operationem perducere debet. [3] Besides, the stronger the power of an agent is, the farther does its operation extend to more remote effects. For instance, the bigger a fire is, the farther away are the things it heats. But this does not occur in the case of an agent that acts without a medium, for whatever it acts on is adjacent to it. Therefore, since the power of divine providence is the greatest, it must extend its operation to its most distant effects through some intermediaries.
Amplius. Ad dignitatem regentis pertinet ut habeat multos ministros, et diversos sui regiminis executores: quia tanto altius et maius ostendetur suum dominium, quanto plures in diversis gradibus ei subduntur. Nulla autem dignitas alicuius regentis est comparabilis dignitati divini regiminis. Conveniens igitur est quod per diversos gradus agentium fiat divinae providentiae executio. [4] Moreover, it belongs to the dignity of a ruler to have many ministers and a variety of executors of his rule, for, the more subjects he has, on different levels, the higher and greater is his dominion shown to be. But no ruler’s dignity is comparable to the dignity of the divine rule. So, it is appropriate that the execution of divine providence be carried out by diverse levels of agents.
Praeterea. Convenientia ordinis perfectionem providentiae demonstrat: cum ordo sit proprius providentiae effectus. Ad convenientiam autem ordinis pertinet ut nihil inordinatum relinquatur. Perfectio igitur divinae providentiae requirit ut excessum aliquarum rerum supra alias ad ordinem convenientem reducat. Hoc autem fit cum ex abundantia aliquorum magis habentium, provenit aliquod bonum minus habentibus. Cum igitur perfectio universi requirat quod quaedam aliis abundantius divinam bonitatem participent, ut supra ostensum est, exigit divinae providentiae perfectio ut per ea quae plenius divinam bonitatem participant, executio divini regiminis compleatur. [5] Furthermore, the propriety of its order manifests the perfection of providence, since order is the proper effect of providence. Now, it is pertinent to the propriety of order that nothing be left in disorder. So, the perfection of divine providence requires that the excess of certain things over others lit reduced to a suitable order. Now, this is done when one makes available some good for those that have less, from the abundance of those that have more. So, since the perfection of the universe requires that certain things participate in divine goodness more abundantly than others, as we showed above, the perfection of divine providence demands that the execution of the divine rule be accomplished by those that participate more fully in divine goodness.
Adhuc. Nobilior est ordo causarum quam effectuum: sicut et causa potior est effectu. Magis igitur in eo perfectio providentiae demonstratur. Si autem non essent aliquae causae mediae exequentes divinam providentiam non esset in rebus ordo causarum, sed effectuum tantum. Exigit igitur divinae providentiae perfectio quod sint causae mediae executrices ipsius. [6] Besides, the order of causes is more noble than the order of effects, just as a cause is better than an effect. So, the perfection of providence is better manifested by the first order. But, if there were no intermediary causes carrying out divine providence, there would not be an order of causes in reality but only an order of effects, Therefore, the perfection of divine providence demands that there be intermediary causes as executors of it.
Hinc est quod in Psalmo dicitur: benedicite domino omnes virtutes eius, ministri eius, qui facitis voluntatem eius; et alibi: ignis, grando, nix, spiritus procellarum, quae faciunt verbum eius. [7] Hence it is said in the Psalm (102:21): “Bless the Lord, all His hosts; you ministers of His who do His will”; and elsewhere: “Fire, hail, snow, stormy winds, which fulfill His word” (Ps. 148:8).

Caput 78
Quod mediantibus creaturis intellectualibus aliae creaturae reguntur a Deo
Chapter 78
Quia vero ad providentiam divinam pertinet ut ordo servetur in rebus; congruus autem ordo est ut a supremis ad infima proportionaliter descendatur: oportet quod divina providentia secundum quandam proportionem usque ad res ultimas perveniat. Haec autem proportio est ut, sicut supremae creaturae sunt sub Deo et gubernantur ab ipso, ita inferiores creaturae sint sub superioribus et regantur ab ipsis. Inter omnes autem creaturas sunt supremae intellectuales, sicut ex superioribus patet. Exigit igitur divinae providentiae ratio ut ceterae creaturae per creaturas rationales regantur. [1] Since it is the function of divine providence to maintain order in things, and since a suitable order is such that there is a proportional descent from the highest things to the lowest it must be that divine providence reaches the farthest things by some sort of proportion. Now, the proportion is like this: as the highest creatures are under God and are governed by Him, so the lower creatures are under the higher ones and are ruled by them. But of all creatures the highest are the intellectual ones, as is evident from what we said earlier. Therefore, the rational plan of divine providence demands that the other creatures be ruled by rational creatures.
Amplius. Quaecumque creatura exequitur divinae providentiae ordinem, hoc habet inquantum participat aliquid de virtute primi providentis: sicut et instrumentum non movet nisi inquantum per motum participat aliquid de virtute principalis agentis. Quae igitur amplius de virtute divinae providentiae participant, sunt executiva divinae providentiae in illa quae minus participant. Creaturae autem intellectuales plus aliis de ipsa participant: nam, cum ad providentiam requiratur et dispositio ordinis, quae fit per cognoscitivam virtutem, et executio, quae fit per operativam, creaturae rationales utramque virtutem participant, reliquae vero creaturae virtutem operativam tantum. Per creaturas igitur rationales omnes aliae creaturae sub divina providentia reguntur. [2] Again, whatever type of creature carries out the order of divine providence, it is able to do so because it participates in something of the power of the first providential being; just as an instrument does not move unless, through being moved, it participates somewhat in the power of the principal agent. So, the beings that participate more fully in the power of the divine providence are executive agents of divine providence in regard to those that participate less. But intellectual creatures participate more than others in it, because an ability to establish order which is done by cognitive power, and an ability to execute it which is clone by operative power, are both required for providence, and rational creatures share in both types of power, while the rest of creatures have operative powers only. Therefore, all other creatures are ruled by means of rational creatures under divine providence.
Adhuc. Cuicumque datur a Deo aliqua virtus, datur ei in ordine ad effectum ipsius virtutis: sic enim optime omnia disponuntur, dum unumquodque ordinatur ad omnia bona quae ex ipso nata sunt provenire. Virtus autem intellectiva de se est ordinativa et regitiva: unde videmus quod, quando coniunguntur in eodem, virtus operativa sequitur regimen intellectivae virtutis; sicut in homine videmus quod ad imperium voluntatis moventur membra. Idem etiam apparet si in diversis existant: nam illi homines qui excedunt in virtute operativa, oportet quod dirigantur ab illis qui in virtute intellectiva excedunt. Exigit igitur divinae providentiae ratio quod creaturae aliae per intellectuales creaturas regantur. [3] Besides, to whomever any power is given by God, the recipient is given the power together with an ordination toward the effect of that power. For in that way all things are arranged for the best, inasmuch as each thing is ordered to all the goods that can naturally come from it. Now, the intellectual power by itself is capable of ordering and ruling; hence, we see that the operative power follows the direction of the intellective power, when they are combined in the same subject. In man, for instance, we observe that the bodily members are moved at the command of the will. The same is evident even if they are in different subjects; for instance, those men who excel in operative power must be directed by those who excel in intellectual power. Therefore, the rational plan of divine providence demands that other creatures be ruled by intellectual creatures.
Item. Virtutes particulares natae sunt moveri a virtutibus universalibus: ut patet tam in arte quam in natura. Constat autem quod virtus intellectiva est universalior omni alia virtute operativa: nam virtus intellectiva continet formas universales, omnis autem virtus operativa tantum est ex aliqua forma propria operantis. Oportet igitur quod per virtutes intellectuales moveantur et regantur omnes aliae creaturae. [4] Moreover, particular powers are naturally adapted to be moved by universal powers; this is evident quite as much in the artistic as in the natural sphere. Now, it is obvious that intellectual power is more universal than any operative power, for the intellectual power contains universal forms, while each power is operative only because of some form proper to the agent. Therefore, all other creatures must be moved and regulated by means of intellectual powers.
Praeterea. In omnibus potentiis ordinatis una est directiva alterius, quae magis rationem cognoscit: unde videmus in artibus quod ars illa ad quam pertinet finis, ex quo sumitur ratio totius artificii, dirigit illam, et imperat ei, quae artificium operatur, sicut ars gubernatoria navifactivae; et illa quae formam inducit, imperat ei quae materiam disponit. Instrumenta vero, quae non cognoscunt aliquam rationem, reguntur tantum. Cum igitur solae intellectuales creaturae rationes ordinis creaturarum cognoscere possint, earum erit regere et gubernare omnes alias creaturas. [5] Furthermore, in all powers arranged in an order, one is directive in relation to the next, and it knows the rational plan best. Thus, we see in the case of the arts that one art, which is concerned with the end from which the plan for the entire artistic production is derived, directs and commands another art which makes the product, as the ‘art of navigation does in regard to shipbuilding. So, the one that introduces the form commands the one that prepares the matter. Instruments, on the other hand, which do not know the plan at all, are simply ruled. Since only intellectual creatures can know the rational plans for the ordering of creatures, it will therefore be their function to rule and govern all other creatures.
Adhuc. Quod est per se, est causa eius quod est per aliud. Solae autem creaturae intellectuales operantur per seipsas, utpote suarum operationum per liberum voluntatis arbitrium dominae existentes: aliae vero creaturae ex necessitate naturae operantur, tanquam ab alio motae. Creaturae igitur intellectuales per suam operationem sunt motivae et regitivae aliarum creaturarum. [6] Again, that which is of itself is the cause of that which is through another. But only intellectual creatures operate by themselves, in the sense that they are masters of their operations through free choice of their will. On the other hand, other creatures are involved in operation resulting from the necessity of nature, since they are moved by something else. Therefore, intellectual creatures by their operation are motivating and regulative of other creatures.

Caput 79
Quod substantiae intellectivae inferiores reguntur per superiores
Chapter 79
Cum autem inter creaturas intellectuales quaedam sint aliis altiores, ut ex superioribus patet, oportet quod etiam inferiores intellectualium naturarum per superiores gubernentur. [1] Since certain intellectual creatures are higher than others, as is clear from the foregoing, the lower ones of an intellectual nature must be governed by the higher ones.
Adhuc. Virtutes magis universales sunt motivae virtutum particularium, sicut dictum est. Superiores autem inter intellectuales naturas habent formas magis universales, ut supra ostensum est. Sunt igitur ipsae regitivae inferiorum intellectualium naturarum. [2] Again, more universal powers are able to move particular powers, as we said. But the higher intellectual natures have more universal forms, as was shown above. Therefore, they are capable of ruling the lower intellectual natures.
Item. Potentia intellectiva quae est propinquior principio, semper invenitur regitiva intellectualis virtutis quae magis a principio distat. Quod quidem apparet tam in scientiis speculativis quam in activis: scientia enim speculativa quae accipit ab alia principia ex quibus demonstrat, dicitur esse illi subalternata; et scientia activa quae est propinquior fini, qui est principium in operativis, est architectonica respectu magis distantis. Cum ergo inter intellectuales substantias quaedam sint primo principio, scilicet Deo, propinquiores, ut in secundo ostensum est, ipsae erunt aliarum regitivae. [3] Besides, an intellectual potency that is nearer to the principle is always capable of ruling an intellectual power that is more removed from the principle. This is evident in both speculative and active sciences; for a speculative science which derives its principles of demonstration from another science is said to be subalternated to that other; and an active science which is nearer the end, which is the principle in matters of operation, is architectonic in regard to a more distant one. Therefore, since some intellectual substances are nearer the first principle, namely God, as was shown in Book Two [95], they will be capable of ruling others.
Adhuc. Superiores intellectuales substantiae perfectius divinae sapientiae influentiam in seipsis recipiunt: cum unumquodque recipiat aliquid secundum modum suum. Per sapientiam autem divinam omnia gubernantur. Et sic oportet quod ea quae magis divinam sapientiam participant, sint gubernativa eorum quae minus participant. Substantiae igitur intellectuales inferiores gubernantur per superiores. [4] Moreover, superior intellectual substances receive the influence of divine wisdom into themselves more perfectly, because each being receives something according to the being’s own mode. Now, all things are governed by divine wisdom. And so, things that participate more in divine wisdom must be capable of governing those that participate less. Therefore, the lower intellectual substances are governed by the higher ones.
Dicuntur ergo superiores spiritus et Angeli, inquantum inferiores spiritus dirigunt quasi eis annuntiando, nam Angeli quasi nuntii dicuntur; et ministri, inquantum per suam operationem exequuntur, etiam in corporalibus, divinae providentiae ordinem, nam minister est quasi instrumentum animatum, secundum philosophum. Et hoc est quod dicitur in Psalmo. Qui facit Angelos suos spiritus, et ministros suos flammam ignis. [5] Thus, the higher spirits are also called angels, because they direct the lower spirits, as it were, by bringing messages to them; in fact, angels are spoken of as messengers. And they are also called ministers, because they carry out by their operation the order of divine providence even in the area of bodily things. Indeed, a minister is “like a living instrument,” according to the Philosopher [ Politics I, 4: 1253b 29]. So this is what is said in the Psalm (103:4): “You make your angels spirits, and your ministers a burning fire.”

Caput 80
De ordinatione Angelorum ad invicem
Chapter 80
Cum autem corporalia per spiritualia regantur, ut ostensum est, corporalium autem est quidam ordo: oportet quod superiora corpora per superiores intellectuales substantias regantur, inferiora vero per inferiores. Quia etiam quanto aliqua substantia est superior, tanto virtus eius est universalior; virtus vero intellectualis substantiae est universalior virtute corporis: superiores quidem inter intellectuales substantias habent virtutes non explicabiles per aliquam virtutem corpoream, et ideo non sunt corporibus unitae; inferiores vero habent virtutes particulatas explicabiles per aliqua corporea instrumenta, et ideo oportet quod corporibus uniantur. [1] Since bodily things are ruled by spiritual things, as we showed, and since there is an order of bodily things, the higher bodies must be ruled by the higher intellectual substances, while the lower bodies are ruled by the lower ones. Moreover, since the higher a substance is the more universal is its power, but the power of an intellectual substance is more universal than the power of a body, the higher intellectual substances, then, have powers incapable of functioning through bodily power, and so they are not united with bodies. But the lower ones have particular powers that are capable of functioning through certain bodily organs, and so they must be united with bodies.
Sicut autem superiores inter substantias intellectuales sunt universalioris virtutis, ita etiam perfectius divinam dispositionem ab ipso recipiunt, in hoc quod usque ad singula ordinis rationem cognoscunt per hoc quod a Deo accipiunt. Haec autem divinae ordinationis manifestatio divinitus facta usque ad ultimas intellectualium substantiarum pertingit: sicut dicitur Iob 25-3: nunquid est numerus militum eius, et super quem non splendet lumen eius? Sed inferiores intellectus non in ea perfectione ipsam recipiunt quod per eam singula quae ad ordinem providentiae spectant, ab ipsis exequenda, cognoscere possint, sed solum in quadam communitate: quantoque sunt inferiores, tanto per primam illuminationem divinitus acceptam minus in speciali divini ordinis cognitionem accipiunt; in tantum quod intellectus humanus, qui est infimus secundum naturalem cognitionem, solum quorundam universalissimorum notitiam habet. [2] Now, as the higher intellectual substances are more universal in their power, they are also more perfectly receptive of divine control from Him, in the sense that they know the plan of this order down to its singular details because they receive it from God. However, this manifesting of the divine ordering stretches down by divine action to the last of the intellectual substances; as it is stated: “Is there any numbering of His soldiers? And upon whom shall not His light arise?” (Job 25:3). But the lower understandings do not receive it with such perfection that they are able to know through it the individual details which pertain to the order of providence, and which they are to execute. Rather, they know them in a general sort of way. The lower they are, the fewer details of the divine order do they receive through the first illumination which they get from the divine source. So much so, that the human understanding, which is the lowest according to natural knowledge, gets a knowledge of certain most universal items only.
Sic igitur substantiae intellectuales superiores perfectionem cognitionis praedicti ordinis immediate consequuntur a Deo, quam quidem perfectionem oportet quod aliae inferiores per eas consequantur: sicut supra diximus quod universalis discipuli cognitio per cognitionem magistri, qui in speciali cognoscit, perducitur ad perfectum. [3] And thus, the higher intellectual substances obtain immediately from God a perfect knowledge of the aforementioned order; and then, other lower substances must obtain this perfect knowledge through them, just as we said above that the student’s universal knowledge is brought to perfection by the knowledge of the teacher who knows in detail.
Hinc est quod Dionysius de supremis intellectualibus substantiis, quas primae hierarchiae, idest sacri principatus nominat, 7 cap. Cael. Hier., dicit quod non per alias substantias sanctificatae, sed ab ipsa divinitate, in ipsam immediate extenduntur et ad immaterialem et invisibilem pulchritudinem, quantum fas est, in contemplationem adducuntur et ad divinorum operum scibiles rationes; et per has dicit suppositas caelestium essentiarum dispositiones erudiri. Sic ergo altiores intellectus in altiori principio cognitionis perfectionem suscipiunt. Hence, Dionysius, speaking of the highest intellectual substances whom he calls the first hierarchy, that is, the sacred sovereignty, says: “they are not sanctified by other substances but they are immediately ranged about Himself by the Godhead and are conducted to the immaterial and invisible beauty, in so far as it is permitted, and to the knowable reasons for the divine workings.” And thus, through them, he says, “those placed below in the ranks of the celestial essences are instructed.” In this way, then, the higher understandings receive a perfect knowledge from a higher source of knowledge.
In qualibet autem dispositione providentiae ipsa ordinatio effectuum ex forma agentis derivatur: oportet enim effectus a causa secundum aliquam similitudinem procedere. Quod autem agens suae formae similitudinem effectibus communicet, est propter aliquem finem. Primum ergo principium in dispositione providentiae est finis; secundum, forma agentis; tertium, ipsa dispositio ordinis effectuum. Supremum igitur in ordine intellectus est quod in fine ordinis ratio attendatur; secundum autem, quod in forma; tertium vero, quod ipsa ordinis dispositio in seipsa, non in aliquo altiori principio cognoscatur. Unde et ars quae considerat finem, est architectonica respectu eius quae considerat formam, sicut gubernatoria respectu navis factivae; ea vero quae considerat formam, respectu eius quae considerat solum ordines motuum qui ordinantur ad formam, sicut navis factiva respectu manu artificum. [4] Moreover, in every arrangement of providence this ordering of effects is derived from the form of the agent, because the effect must proceed from the cause by virtue of a certain likeness. Now, the fact that an agent communicates a likeness of his form to his effects is due to some end. So, the first principle in providential arrangement is the end; the second is the form of the agent; and the third is the arrangement of the order of the effects. Therefore, the highest function in the order of understanding is for the rational nature of the order to be considered in relation to the end; and the second most important thing is to observe it in relation to the form; while the third thing is to know the arrangement of this order in itself, and not in a higher source. Thus, the art which considers the end is architectonic in relation to the one which considers the form, as the art of navigating a ship is to the art of making one; but the art which considers the form is architectonic in relation to the art which merely considers the orders of the motions that are ordered in terms of the form, as the art of shipbuilding orders the skill of the workmen.
Sic ergo inter illos intellectus qui immediate in ipso Deo perfectam cognitionem ordinis providentiae divinae percipiunt, est quidam ordo, quia supremi et primi ordinis providentiae rationem percipiunt in ipso ultimo fine, qui est divina bonitas; quidam tamen eorum aliis clarius. Et isti dicuntur Seraphim, quasi ardentes vel incendentes, quia per incendium designari solet intensio amoris vel desiderii, quae sunt de fine. Unde Dionysius dicit, 7 cap. Cael. Hier., quod ex hoc eorum nomine designatur mobilitas eorum circa divina, fervens et flexibilis, et reductio inferiorum in Deum, sicut in finem. [5] So, there is a definite order in those understandings which grasp immediately in God Himself a perfect knowledge of the order of divine providence. For the highest and first intellects perceive the plan of the providential order in the ultimate end itself, which is the divine goodness, and some of them do so more clearly than others. These are called Seraphim, meaning the “ardent” or “burning” ones, because the intensity of love or desire, which are functions concerned with the end, is customarily symbolized by fire. Thus Dionysius says that, as a result of this name of theirs, there is a suggestion of “their mobility in relation to the divine, a fervent and flexible mobility, and of their leading of lower things to God,” as to their end.
Secundi autem rationem ordinis providentiae in ipsa forma divina perfecte cognoscunt. Et hi dicuntur Cherubim, quod interpretatur scientiae plenitudo: scientia enim per formam scibilis perficitur. Unde dicit Dionysius quod talis nominatio significat, quod sunt contemplativi in prima operatrice virtute divinae pulchritudinis. [6] The second type of understandings know the plan of providence perfectly in the divine form itself. These are called Cherubim, which means “fullness of knowledge.” Indeed, knowledge is made perfect through the form of the knowable object. Hence, Dionysius says that this way of naming them suggests that they are “capable of contemplating the first operative power of divine beauty.
Tertii vero ipsam dispositionem divinorum iudiciorum in seipsa considerant. Et hi dicuntur throni: nam per thronum potestas iudiciaria designatur, secundum illud: sedes super thronum et iudicas iustitiam. Unde dicit Dionysius quod per hanc nominationem designatur quod sunt deiferi, et ad omnes divinas susceptiones familiariter aperti. [7] Then, the third type of understandings consider the very arrangement of the divine judgments in themselves. These are called Thrones; for, by thrones the judiciary power is symbolized, according to this text: “You sit on the throne and judge justice” (Ps. 9:5). And so Dionysius says that this designation suggests that they are “bearers of God, immediately available for all divine undertakings.
Non autem sic praemissa intelligenda sunt quasi aliud sit divina bonitas, aliud divina essentia, et aliud eius scientia rerum dispositionem continens: sed quia secundum haec alia et alia est eius consideratio. [8] Now, the preceding statements are not to be understood in the sense that there is a difference between divine goodness, divine essence, and divine knowledge as it contains the arrangement of things; rather, there is a different way of considering each one.
Inter ipsos etiam inferiores spiritus, qui divini ordinis per eos exequendi perfectam cognitionem per superiores spiritus consequuntur, oportet ordinem esse. Nam quae inter ea sunt altiora, virtutis etiam sunt universalioris in cognoscendo: unde cognitionem ordinis providentiae in principiis et causis magis universalibus adipiscuntur; inferiores vero in causis magis particularibus; altioris enim intellectus esset homo qui ordinem omnium naturalium considerare posset in corporibus caelestibus, quam qui indiget ad perfectam cognitionem ad inferiora corpora prospicere. Illi igitur qui in causis universalibus, quae sunt mediae inter Deum, qui est universalissima causa, et causas particulares, possunt ordinem providentiae perfecte cognoscere, medii sunt inter illos qui in ipso Deo rationem praedicti ordinis considerare sufficiunt, et eos qui in causis particularibus necesse habent considerare. Et hi a Dionysio ponuntur in media hierarchia, quae, sicut a suprema dirigitur, ita dirigit infimam: ut dicit in 8 cap. Cael. Hier. [9] So, also, among the lower spirits who attain, through the higher spirits, a perfect knowledge of the divine order which they are to carry out there must be some order. In fact, the superior ones among them have a more universal power of knowing; hence, they obtain knowledge of the order of providence through principles and causes that are more universal, whereas the lower ones acquire it in more particular causes. For instance, the man who could consider the order of all natural things in the celestial bodies would be possessed of higher understanding than the man who is obliged, for the sake of perfect knowledge, to direct his gaze upon the lower bodies. So, those who can perfectly know the order of providence in the universal causes, which are intermediaries between God, Who is the most universal cause, and particular causes are intermediate between the ones who are able to consider the plan of this order in God Himself and the ones who must consider it in particular causes. These are placed by Dionysius in the middle hierarchy, for, just as it is directed by the highest, so also does it direct the lowest one, as he says in On the Celestial Hierarchy VIII.
Inter has etiam intellectuales substantias oportet quod ordo quidam existat. Nam ipsa universalis providentiae dispositio distribuitur quidem, primo, in multos executores. Quod quidem fit per ordinem dominationum: dominorum enim est praecipere quid alii exequantur. Unde Dionysius dicit, 8 cap. Cael. Hier., quod nomen dominationis designat aliquam anagogen superpositam omni servituti, et omni subiectione superiorem. [10] Moreover, there must be a definite order among these intellectual substances. In fact, the very arrangement in general, according to providence, is assigned first to many executors. This is accomplished through the order of Dominations, for it is the function of those who hold dominion to prescribe what the others execute. Hence, Dionysius says that the word Domination suggests “a certain freedom from control, placed above all servitude and superior to all subjection.”
Secundo autem, ab operante et exequente distribuitur et multiplicatur ad varios effectus. Quod quidem fit per ordinem virtutum, quarum nomen, ut Dionysius ibidem dicit, significat quandam fortem virilitatem in omnes deiformes operationes, non relinquentem suimet imbecillitate aliquem deiformem motum. In quo patet quod principium universalis operationis ad hunc ordinem pertinet. Unde videtur quod ad hunc ordinem pertineat motus caelestium corporum, ex quibus, sicut ex quibusdam universalibus causis, consequuntur particulares effectus in natura: et ideo virtutes caelorum nominantur Luc. 21-26, ubi dicitur: virtutes caelorum movebuntur. Ad eos etiam spiritus pertinere videtur executio divinorum operum quae praeter naturae ordinem fiunt, nam ista sunt sublimissima in divinis ministeriis: propter quod Gregorius dicit quod virtutes dicuntur illi spiritus per quos signa frequentius fiunt. Et si quid aliud universale et primum est in ministeriis divinis exequendis, conveniens est ad hunc ordinem pertinere. [11] Then, secondly, there is a distribution and multiplication in the form of diverse effects on the part of the agent and executor. In fact, this is done by the order of Virtues, whose name, as Dionysius says in the same place, suggests “a strong forcefulness in regard to all Godlike operations, one which does not abandon its Godlike movement because of any weakening in itself.” It is evident from this that the source of universal operation belongs to this order. Hence it appears that pertinent to this order is the motion of the celestial bodies, from which bodies as universal causes, the particular effects in nature follow. So, they are called “the powers of the heavens” where it is said: “the powers of the heavens shall be moved” (Luke 21:26). Also pertinent to these spirits is the execution of divine works which are done outside the order of nature, for these are most sublime among the divine ministrations. For which reason, Gregory says, “those spirits are called Virtues through which miracles are frequently wrought” [ In Evangelium, homil. 34]. And if there be anything else that is universal and primary in the carrying out of divine ministrations, it is proper to assign it to this order.
Tertio vero, universalis providentiae ordo, iam in effectibus institutus, inconfusus custoditur, dum cohibentur ea quae possent hunc ordinem perturbare. Quod quidem pertinet ad ordinem potestatum. Unde Dionysius ibidem dicit quod nomen potestatum importat quandam bene ordinatam et inconfusam circa divinas susceptiones ordinationem. Et ideo Gregorius dicit quod ad hunc ordinem pertinet contrarias potestates arcere. [12] And, thirdly, the universal order of providence, already established in the effects, is guarded from all confusion, provided those things which might disturb this order are kept in check. Now, this pertains to the order of Powers. Hence, Dionysius says, in the same place, that the word Powers means “a well-ordered and unconfused ordering in regard to divine undertakings.” And Gregory says that pertinent to this order “is to check contrary powers.”
Infimi autem inter superiores intellectuales substantias sunt qui ordinem divinae providentiae ut in particularibus causis cognoscibilem divinitus accipiunt: et hi immediate rebus humanis praeponuntur. Unde de eis Dionysius dicit quod ista tertia dispositio spirituum humanis hierarchiis per consequentiam praecipit. Per res autem humanas intelligendae sunt omnes inferiores naturae et causae particulares, quae ad hominem ordinantur et in usum hominis cedunt, sicut patet ex praemissis. [13] Now, the lowest of the superior intellectual substances are those who receive the order of divine providence from a divine source, as it is knowable in particular causes. These are put immediately in charge of human affairs. Hence, Dionysius says of them: “this third order of spirits commands, in turn, the human hierarchies.” By human affairs we must understand all lower natures and particular causes which are related to man and which fall to the use of man, as is clear from the foregoing.
Inter hos etiam quidam ordo existit. Nam in rebus humanis est aliquod bonum commune, quod quidem est bonum civitatis vel gentis, quod videtur ad principatuum ordinem pertinere. Unde Dionysius eodem capitulo dicit quod nomen principatuum designat quiddam ductivum cum ordine sacro. Propter quod et Dan. 10, fit mentio de Michaele principe Iudaeorum, et principe Persarum, et Graecorum. Et sic dispositio regnorum, et mutatio dominationis a gente in gentem, ad ministerium huius ordinis pertinere oportet. Instructio etiam eorum qui inter homines existunt principes, de his quae ad administrationem sui regiminis pertinent, ad hunc ordinem spectare videtur. [14] Of course, there is a certain order among these. For in human affairs there is a common good which is, in fact, the good of a state or a people, and this seems to belong to the order of Principalities. Hence, Dionysius says, in the same chapter, that the name Principality suggests “a certain leadership along with sacred order.” For this reason, mention is made of “Michael the Prince of the Jews,” and of “a Prince of the Persians and a Prince of the Greeks” (Dan. 10:13, 20). And so, the arrangement of kingdoms and the changing of domination from one people to another ought to belong to the ministry of this order. Also, the instruction of those who occupy the position of leaders among men concerning matters pertinent to the administration of their rule seems to be the concern of this order.
Est etiam aliquod humanum bonum quod non in communitate consistit, sed ad unum aliquem pertinet secundum seipsum, non tamen uni soli utile, sed multis: sicut quae sunt ab omnibus et singulis credenda et observanda, sicut ea quae sunt fidei, et cultus divinus, et alia huiusmodi. Et hoc ad Archangelos pertinet, de quibus Gregorius dicit quod summa nuntiant: sicut Gabrielem Archangelum nominamus, qui virgini verbi incarnationem nuntiavit ab omnibus credendam. [15] There is also a type of human good which does not lie in the community, but pertains to one. person as such; whose profit is not confined to one but is available to many. Examples are the things to be believed and practiced by all and sundry, such as items of faith, of divine worship, and the like. This pertains to the Archangels, of whom Gregory says: “they announce the most important things.” For instance, we call Gabriel an Archangel, because he announced the Incarnation of the Word to the Virgin, for the belief of all.
Quoddam vero humanum bonum est ad unumquemque singulariter pertinens. Et huiusmodi ad ordinem pertinent Angelorum, de quibus Gregorius dicit quod infima nuntiant: unde et hominum custodes esse dicuntur, secundum illud Psalmi: Angelis suis Deus mandavit de te, ut custodiant te in omnibus viis tuis. Unde et Dionysius dicit quod Archangeli medii sunt inter principatus et Angelos, habentes aliquid commune cum utrisque: cum principatibus quidem, inquantum inferioribus Angelis ducatum praestant, nec immerito, quia quae sunt propria in humanis, secundum ea quae sunt communia dispensari oportet; cum Angelis vero, quia annuntiant Angelis, et per Angelos nobis, quorum est manifestare hominibus, quae ad eos pertinent secundum uniuscuiusque analogiam. Propter quod et commune nomen ultimus ordo quasi speciale sibi assumit: quia scilicet officium habet nobis immediate nuntiandi. Et propter hoc Archangeli nomen compositum habent ex utroque: dicuntur enim Archangeli quasi principes Angeli. [16] Still another human good is pertinent to each person individually. This type of good belongs to the Angels; of whom Gregory says: “they announce less important things.” So, they are said to be “guardians of men,” according to the Psalm (90:11): “He gave His angels charge over you, to keep you in all thy ways.” Hence, Dionysius says that the Archangels are intermediate between the Principalities and the Angels, having something in common with both: with the Principalities, “in so far as they have charge of leading the lower angels,” and this is as it should be, for in human affairs private goods should be allotted on the basis of the things that are common; and in common with the Angels, because “they make announcements to the Angels and through the Angels to us,” and the function of the Angels is to make known to men “the things that pertain to them, in accord with what is proper to each man.” For this reason, too, the last order takes the common name for its own special one; that is to say, because it has the duty of making announcements immediately to us. That is also why the name Archangel is composed of both names, for Archangels are called, as it were, Principal Angels.
Assignat autem et Gregorius aliter caelestium spirituum ordinationem: nam principatus inter medios spiritus connumerat, post dominationes immediate; virtutes vero inter infimos, ante Archangelos. Sed, diligenter inspicientibus, utraque ordinatio in modico differt. Nam secundum Gregorium, principatus dicuntur, non qui gentibus praeponuntur, sed qui etiam ipsis bonis spiritibus principantur, quasi primi existentes in ministeriorum divinorum executione: dicit enim quod principari est inter alios priorem existere. Hoc autem, secundum assignationem ante dictam, diximus ad virtutum ordinem pertinere. Virtutes autem, secundum Gregorium, sunt quae ad quasdam particulares operationes ordinantur, cum in aliquo speciali casu, praeter communem ordinem, oportet aliqua miraculose fieri. Secundum quam rationem satis convenienter cum infimis ordinantur. [17] However, Gregory assigns a different ordering to the celestial spirits; for he numbers the Principalities among the intermediate spirits, immediately after the Dominations, while he puts the Virtues among the lowest, before the Archangels. But to people who consider the matter carefully the two ways of ordering them differ but slightly. In fact, according to Gregory, Principalities are called, not those put in charge of peoples, but “who are given leadership even over good spirits,” as if they held first position in the execution of the divine ministrations. He says, indeed, that “to be put in the position of leader is to stand out as first among the rest.” Now, we said that this characteristic, in the previously given arrangement, belongs to the order of Virtues. But, according to Gregory, the Virtues are those related to certain particular operations, when in some special case outside the general order something has to be done miraculously. On the basis of this meaning, they are quite appropriately put in the same order with the lowest ones.
Utraque autem ordinatio ex verbis apostoli auctoritatem habere potest. Dicit enim Ephes. 1-20 constituens illum, scilicet Christum, ad dexteram suam in caelestibus, supra omnem principatum et potestatem et virtutem et dominationem. In quo patet quod, ascendendo, supra principatus potestates posuit, et supra has virtutes, supra quas dominationes collocavit. Quem ordinem Dionysius observavit. Ad Colossenses autem, loquens de Christo, dicit: sive throni, sive dominationes, sive principatus, sive potestates, omnia per ipsum et in ipso creata sunt. In quo patet quod, a thronis incipiens, descendendo, sub eis dominationes, sub quibus principatus, et sub his potestates posuit. Quem ordinem Gregorius observavit. [18] Moreover, both ways of ordering them can find support in the words of the Apostle. For he says: “Sitting Him,” that is, Christ, “on His right hand in heavenly places, above all principality, and power, and virtue, and dominion” (Eph. 3:20-21). It is clear that in the ascending order of this list he placed Powers above Principalities, and the Virtues above these, and the Dominations over these. Now, this is the order that Dionysius kept. However, to the Colossians, in speaking of Christ, he says: “whether thrones, or dominations, or principalities, or powers, all things were created by Him and in Him” (Col. 1:16). In this text it appears that, starting with Thrones and going downward, he placed under them the Dominations, under them the Principalities, and under these the Powers. Now, this is the order that Gregory retained.
De Seraphim autem fit mentio Isaiae 6; de Cherubim, Ezech. 1; de Archangelis, in canonica Iudae, cum Michael Archangelus cum Diabolo disputans etc.; de Angelis autem in Psalmis, ut dictum est. [19] Mention is made of the Seraphim in Isaiah (6:2, 6); of the Cherubim in Ezekiel 1 (3ff); of the ‘Archangels in the canonical Epistle of Jude (9): “When Michael the archangel, disputing with the devil, etc.”; and of the Angels in the Psalms, as we have said.
Est autem in omnibus ordinatis virtutibus hoc commune, quod in vi superioris virtutis omnes inferiores agunt. Unde id quod diximus ad Seraphim ordinem pertinere, omnes inferiores ex virtute ipsius exequuntur. Et similiter etiam est in aliis ordinibus considerandum. [20] There is also this common feature in all ordered powers, that all lower ones act by virtue of the higher power. Hence, what we explained as pertaining to the order of Seraphim all the lower orders carry out through the power of the Seraphim. And the same conclusion should be applied to the other orders, too.

Caput 81
De ordinatione hominum ad invicem et ad alia
Chapter 81
Inter alias vero intellectuales substantias humanae animae infimum gradum habent: quia, sicut supra dictum est, in prima sui institutione cognitionem ordinis providentiae divinae in sola quadam universali cognitione suscipiunt; ad perfectam vero ordinis secundum singula cognitionem, oportet quod ex ipsis rebus, in quibus ordo divinae providentiae iam particulariter institutus est, perducatur. Unde oportuit quod haberet organa corporea, per quae a rebus corporalibus cognitionem hauriret. Ex quibus tamen, propter debilitatem intellectualis luminis, perfectam notitiam eorum quae ad hominem spectant, adipisci non valent nisi per superiores spiritus adiuventur, hoc exigente divina dispositione, ut inferiores per superiores spiritus perfectionem acquirant, ut supra ostensum est. Quia tamen aliquid homo de lumine intellectuali participat, ei secundum providentiae divinae ordinem subduntur animalia bruta, quae intellectu nullo modo participant. Unde dicitur Gen. 1-26: faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram, scilicet secundum quod intellectum habet, et praesit piscibus maris, et volatilibus caeli, et bestiis terrae. [1] As a matter of fact, human souls bold the lowest rank in relation to the other intellectual substances, because, as we said above,” at the start of their existence they receive a knowledge of divine providence, wherein they know it only in a general sort of way. But the soul must be brought to a perfect knowledge of this order, in regard to individual details, by starting from the things themselves in which the order of divine providence has already been established in detail. So, the soul had to have bodily organs by which it might draw knowledge from corporeal things. Yet, even with such equipment, because of the feebleness of its intellectual light, man’s soul is not able to acquire a perfect knowledge of the things that are important to man unless it be helped by higher spirits, for the divine disposition requires this, that lower spirits acquire perfection through the higher ones, as we showed above. Nevertheless, since man does participate somewhat in intellectual light, brute animals are subject to him by the order of divine providence, for they participate in no way in understanding. Hence it is said: “Let us make man to our own image and likeness,” namely, according as he has understanding, “and let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea, and the fowls of the air, and the beasts of the earth” (Gen. 1:26).
Animalia vero bruta, etsi intellectu careant, quia tamen cognitionem aliquam habent, plantis, et aliis quae cognitione carent, secundum divinae providentiae ordinem praeferuntur. Unde dicitur Gen. 1-29 ecce, dedi vobis omnem herbam afferentem semen super terram, et universa ligna quae habent in semetipsis sementem generis sui, ut sint vobis in escam, et cunctis animantibus terrae. [2] Even brute animals, though devoid of understanding, have some knowledge; and so, in accord with the order of divine providence, they are set above plants and other things that lack knowledge. Hence it is said: “Behold I give you every herb bearing seed upon the earth, and all trees that have in themselves seed of their own kind, to be your meat, and to all the beasts of the earth” (Gen. 1:29-30).
Inter ea vero quae penitus cognitione carent, unum subiacet alteri secundum quod est unum altero potentius in agendo. Non enim participant aliquid de dispositione providentiae, sed solum de executione. [3] Moreover, among things utterly devoid of knowledge one thing comes under another, depending on whether the one is more powerful in acting than the other. Indeed, they do not participate in anything of the disposition of providence, but only in its execution.
Quia vero homo habet et intellectum et sensum et corporalem virtutem, haec in ipso ad invicem ordinantur, secundum divinae providentiae dispositionem, ad similitudinem ordinis qui in universo invenitur, nam virtus corporea subditur sensitivae et intellectivae virtuti, velut exequens earum imperium; ipsa sensitiva potentia intellectivae subditur, et eius imperio continetur. [4] Now, since man possesses intellect, sense, and bodily power, these are interrelated within him by a mutual order, according to the disposition of divine providence, in a likeness to the order which is found in the universe. In fact, corporeal power is subject to sense and intellectual power, as carrying out their command, and the sensitive power is subject to the intellectual and is included under its command.
Ex eadem autem ratione, et inter ipsos homines ordo invenitur. Nam illi qui intellectu praeminent, naturaliter dominantur; illi vero qui sunt intellectu deficientes, corpore vero robusti, a natura videntur instituti ad serviendum; sicut Aristoteles dicit in sua politica. Cui etiam concordat sententia Salomonis, qui dicit, Proverb. 11-29: qui stultus est, serviet sapienti. Et Exod. 18 dicitur: provide de omni plebe viros sapientes et timentes Deum, qui iudicent populum omni tempore. [5] On the same basis, there is also found an order among men themselves. Indeed, those who excel in understanding naturally gain control, whereas those who have defective understanding, but a strong body, seem to be naturally fitted for service, as Aristotle says in his Politics [I, 5: 1254b 25]. The view of Solomon is also in accord with this, for he says: “The fool shall serve the wise” (Prov. 11:29); and again: “Provide out of all the people wise men such as fear God... who may judge the people at all times” (Exod. 18:21-22).
Sicut autem in operibus unius hominis ex hoc inordinatio provenit quod intellectus sensualem virtutem sequitur; sensualis vero virtus propter corporis indispositionem trahitur ad corporis motum, ut in claudicantibus apparet: ita et in regimine humano inordinatio provenit ex eo quod non propter intellectus praeminentiam aliquis praeest, sed vel robore corporali dominium sibi usurpat, vel propter sensualem affectionem aliquis ad regendum praeficitur. Quam quidem inordinationem nec Salomon tacet, qui dicit, Eccle. 10-5 est et malum quod vidi sub sole, quasi per errorem egrediens a facie principis, positum stultum in dignitate sublimi. Huiusmodi autem inordinatio divinam providentiam non excludit: provenit enim, permissione divina, ex defectu inferiorum agentium; sicut et de aliis malis dictum est. Neque per huiusmodi inordinationem totaliter naturalis ordo pervertitur: nam stultorum dominium infirmum est, nisi sapientum consilio roboretur. Unde dicitur Proverb. 20-18: cogitationes consiliis roborabuntur et gubernaculis tractanda sunt bella; et 24-5 vir sapiens fortis est et vir doctus validus et robustus: quia cum dispositione initur bellum, et erit salus ubi multa consilia. Et quia consilians regit eum qui consilium accipit, et quodammodo ei dominatur, dicitur Proverb. 17-2, quod servus sapiens dominabitur filiis stultis. [6] Now, just as in the activities of one man disorder arises from the fact that understanding follows the lead of sensual power, while the sensual power is dragged down to the movement of the body by virtue of some disorder of the body, as is evident in the case of men who limp, so also does disorder arise in a human government, as a result of a man getting control, not because of the eminence of his understanding, but either because he usurps dominion for himself by bodily strength or because someone is set up as a ruler on the basis of sensual affection. Nor is Solomon silent on this kind of disorder, for he says: “There is an evil that I have seen under the sun, as it were by an error proceeding from the face of the prince: a fool set in high dignity” (Eccles. 10:5-6). But disorder of this kind does not exclude divine providence; it comes about, indeed, with divine permission, as a result of the deficiency of lower agents, just as we explained in connection with other evils. Nor is the natural order entirely perverted by such disorder, for the dominion of fools is weak unless strengthened by the counsel of the wise. Hence it is said in Proverbs (20:16): “Designs are strengthened by counsels, and wars are to be arranged by governments”; and again: “a wise man is strong, and a knowing man stout and valiant: because war is managed by due ordering, and there shall be safety when there are many counsels” (Prov. 24:5-6). And since he who gives counsel rules the man who takes counsel, and in a sense governs him, it is said in Proverbs (17:2): “a wise servant shall rule over foolish sons.”
Patet ergo quod divina providentia ordinem omnibus rebus imponit: ut sic verum sit quod dicit apostolus, Rom. 13-1: quae a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt. [7] So, it is evident that divine providence imposes order on all things; thus, what the Apostle says is certainly true: “the things which are of God are well ordered” (Rom. 13:1).

Caput 82
Quod inferiora corpora reguntur a Deo per corpora caelestia
Chapter 82
Sicut autem in substantiis intellectualibus est superius et inferius, ita etiam in substantiis corporalibus. Substantiae autem intellectuales reguntur a superioribus, ut dispositio divinae providentiae proportionaliter descendat usque ad infima, sicut iam dictum est. Ergo, pari ratione, inferiora corpora per superiora disponuntur. [1] Now, just as there is a difference between higher and lower intellectual substances, so also is there such a difference between corporeal substances. But intellectual substances are ruled by the higher ones, since the disposition of divine providence descends proportionally to the lowest, as we have said already. Therefore, on a like basis, the lower bodies are ordered through the higher ones.
Amplius. Quanto aliquod corpus est superius loco, tanto invenitur esse formalius et propter hoc etiam rationabiliter est locus inferioris, nam formae est continere, sicut et loci; aqua enim est formalior terra, aer aqua, ignis aere. Sed corpora caelestia sunt omnibus loco superiora. Ipsa igitur sunt magis formalia omnibus aliis. Ergo magis activa. Agunt ergo in inferiora corpora. Et sic per ea inferiora disponuntur. [2] Again, the higher a body is in place, the more formal is it found to be. And even the place of a lower body reasonably follows this rule, since it is the function of form to limit, just as it is of place. In fact, water is more formal than earth, air than water, fire than air. But the celestial bodies are superior in place to all bodies. So, they are more formal than all the others, and, therefore, more active. So, they act on the lower bodies; thus, the lower ones are disposed by them.
Item. Quod est in sua natura perfectum absque contrarietate, est universalioris virtutis quam illud quod in sua natura non perficitur nisi cum contrarietate: contrarietas enim est ex differentiis determinantibus et contrahentibus genus; unde in acceptione intellectus, quia est universalis, species contrariorum non sunt contrariae, cum sint simul. Corpora autem caelestia sunt in suis naturis absque omni contrarietate perfecta: non enim sunt levia neque gravia, neque calida neque frigida. Corpora vero inferiora non perficiuntur in suis naturis nisi cum aliqua contrarietate. Et hoc etiam motus eorum demonstrant: nam motui circulari corporum caelestium non est aliquid contrarium, unde nec in eis violentia esse potest; motui autem inferiorum corporum contrarii sunt, scilicet motus deorsum motui sursum. Corpora ergo caelestia sunt universalioris virtutis quam corpora inferiora. Universales autem virtutes sunt motivae particularium, sicut ex dictis patet. Corpora igitur caelestia movent et disponunt corpora inferiora. [3] Besides, that which is in its nature perfected without contrariety is more universal than that which is not perfected in its nature without contrariety. Indeed, contrariety arises from the various things that determine and contract a genus; hence, in the realm of understanding, because it is universal the species of contraries are not contraries, for they may co-exist. But celestial bodies are perfected without any contrariety in their natures, for they are neither light nor heavy, neither hot nor cold. However, lower bodies are not perfected in their natures without some contrariety. Their motions also demonstrate this, for there is nothing contrary to the circular motion of the celestial bodies, and, consequently, there can be no violence in regard to them; but there are contraries to the motion of lower bodies, namely, downward motion as opposed to upward motion. So, celestial bodies are possessed of more universal power than lower bodies. But universal powers move particular ones, as is evident from what we have said. Therefore, celestial bodies move and dispose lower bodies.
Adhuc. Ostensum est supra quod per substantias intellectuales alia omnia reguntur. Corpora autem caelestia sunt similiora substantiis intellectualibus quam alia corpora, inquantum sunt incorruptibilia. Sunt etiam eis propinquiora, inquantum ab eis immediate moventur, ut supra ostensum est. Per ipsa igitur reguntur inferiora corpora. [4] Moreover, it was shown above that all things are ruled through intellectual substances. But celestial bodies are more like intellectual substances than are other bodies because the former are incorruptible. They are also nearer to them, inasmuch as they are moved immediately by them, as we showed above. Therefore, the lower bodies are ruled by them.
Praeterea. Oportet primum principium motus esse aliquid immobile. Quae ergo magis accedunt ad immobilitatem, debent esse aliorum motiva. Corpora autem caelestia magis accedunt ad immobilitatem primi principii quam inferiora: quia non moventur nisi una specie motus, scilicet motu locali; alia vero corpora moventur omnibus speciebus motus. Corpora igitur caelestia sunt motiva et regitiva inferiorum corporum. [5] Furthermore, the first source of motion must be something immutable. So, the things that are nearest to immutability should be movers of the rest. But celestial bodies approach more closely to the immutability of the first source than do lower bodies, for they are not moved except by one kind of motion, namely, local motion; while other bodies are moved by all the species of motion. Therefore, the celestial bodies move and govern the lower bodies.
Amplius. Primum in quolibet genere est causa eorum quae sunt post. Inter omnes autem alios motus, primus est motus caeli. Primo quidem, quia motus localis est primus inter omnes motus. Et tempore: quia solus potest esse perpetuus, ut probatur in VIII Phys. Et naturaliter: quia sine eo non potest esse aliquis aliorum; non enim augmentatur aliquid nisi praeexistente alteratione, per quam quod prius erat dissimile, convertatur et fiat simile; neque alteratio potest esse nisi praeexistente loci mutatione, quia ad hoc quod fiat alteratio, oportet quod alterans magis sit propinquum alterato nunc quam prius. Est etiam perfectione prior: quia motus localis non variat rem secundum aliquid ei inhaerens, sed solum secundum aliquid extrinsecum; et propter hoc est rei iam perfectae. [6] Again, the first in any genus is the cause of members which are posterior. Now, in regard to all other motions, the first is the motion of the heavens; first of all, of course, because local motion is first among all motions, This is so in regard to time, for it alone can be perpetual, as is proved in the Physics VIII [7: 260b 29]. It is also so in regard to nature, for without it there cannot be any other kind of motion, In fact, a thing is not increased unless there be a preceding alteration by which what was formerly unlike is changed and becomes like; nor can alteration be accomplished unless there be a preceding local change, since for alteration to be achieved the agent of alteration must now be brought closer to the thing altered than it was before. It is also prior in perfection, because local motion does not change the thing in regard to any inherent factor but only according to something extrinsic; for this reason it belongs to an already perfected thing.
Secundo, quia etiam inter motus locales est motus circularis prior. Et tempore: quia solus ipse potest esse perpetuus, ut probatur in VIII Phys. Et naturaliter: quia est magis simplex et unus, cum non distinguatur in principium, medium et finem, sed totus sit quasi medium. Et etiam perfectione: quia reflectitur ad principium. Secondly, even among local motions the circular is prior. And again, in regard to time: because it alone can be perpetual, as is proved in the Physics [VIII, 8: 261b 27]. And in regard to nature: for it is more simple and unified, since it is not divided into beginning, middle, and end; rather, the whole motion is like a middle. And even in perfection: because it is brought back to its origin.
Tertio, quia solus motus caeli invenitur semper regularis et uniformis: in motibus enim naturalibus gravium et levium fit additio velocitatis in fine, in violentis autem additio tarditatis. Oportet ergo quod motus caeli sit causa omnium aliorum motuum. Thirdly, because only the motion of the heavens is found always to be regular and uniform, for in the case of the natural motions of heavy and light things there is an increase in velocity toward the end; in the case of violent motion, there is an increase in retardation. So, the motion of the heavens must be the cause of all other motions.
Adhuc. Sicut se habet immobile simpliciter ad motum simpliciter, ita se habet immobile secundum hunc motum ad motum talem. Id autem quod est immobile simpliciter, est principium omnis motus, ut supra probatum est. Quod ergo est immobile secundum alterationem, est principium omnis alterationis. Corpora autem caelestia sola inter corporalia sunt inalterabilia: quod demonstrat dispositio eorum, quae semper eadem invenitur. Est ergo corpus caeleste causa omnis alterationis in his quae alterantur. Alteratio autem in his inferioribus est principium omnis motus: nam per alterationem pervenitur ad augmentum et generationem; generans autem est motor per se in motu locali gravium et levium. Oportet ergo quod caelum sit causa omnis motus in istis inferioribus corporibus. [7] Besides, as the absolutely immobile is to unqualified motion, so is the immobile, that is qualified by a given motion, related to that motion. Now, that which is absolutely immobile is the source of all motion, as we proved above. So, what is immobile in regard to alteration is the source of all alteration. Now, the celestial bodies, alone among bodily things, are inalterable; their condition shows this, for it is always the same. So, the celestial body is the cause of all alteration in things that are changed by alteration. Now, in these lower bodies alteration is the source of all motion, for through alteration a thing achieves increase and generation, whereas the agent of generation is a self-mover in the local motion of heavy and light things. Therefore, the heavens must be the cause of all motion in these lower bodies.
Sic ergo patet quod corpora inferiora a Deo per corpora caelestia reguntur. [8] Thus, it is evident that lower bodies are ruled by God through the celestial bodies.

Caput 83
Epilogus praedictorum
Chapter 83
Ex omnibus autem quae ostensa sunt colligere possumus quod, quantum ad ordinis excogitationem rebus imponendum, Deus omnia per seipsum disponit. Unde super illud Iob 33, quem posuit alium super orbem quem fabricatus est? Dicit Gregorius: mundum quippe per seipsum regit qui per seipsum condidit. Et Boetius, in III de Consol.: Deus per se solum cuncta disponit. [1] Now, from all the things that have been pointed out we may gather that, as far as the planning of the order to be imposed on things is concerned, God disposes everything by Himself. And so, in his commentary on the text of Job 34:13 (“What other did He appoint over the earth?”) Gregory says: “Indeed, He Who created the world by Himself rules it by Himself” [ Moralia XXIV, 20]. And Boethius says, in Consolation of Philosophy III: “God disposes all things of Himself alone.”
Sed quantum ad executionem, inferiora per superiora dispensat. Corporalia quidem per spiritualia. Unde Gregorius dicit, in IV Dialog.: in hoc mundo visibili nihil nisi per invisibilem creaturam disponi potest. Inferiores vero spiritus per superiores. Unde dicit Dionysius, IV cap. Cael. Hier., quod caelestes essentiae intellectuales primo in seipsas divinam edunt illuminationem, et in nos deferunt quae supra nos sunt manifestationes. Inferiora etiam corpora per superiora. Unde dicit Dionysius, IV cap., de Div. Nom., quod sol generationem visibilium corporum confert, et ad vitam ipsam movet, et nutrit et auget et perficit, et mundat et renovat. [2] But, in regard to the execution, He orders the lower things through the higher ones, and the bodily things through the spiritual ones. Hence, Gregory says, in his fourth Dialogue: “in this visible world nothing can be ordered except through an invisible creature.” And the lower spirits are ordered through the higher ones. Hence, Dionysius says that “the heavenly intellectual essences first give divine illumination to themselves, and then bring us manifestations which are above us.” Also, the lower bodies are ordered by the higher ones. Hence, Dionysius says that “the sun brings generation to visible bodies, and stimulates them to life itself, and nourishes, increases and perfects, cleanses and renews.”
De his autem omnibus simul dicit Augustinus, in III de Trin.: quemadmodum corpora crassiora et inferiora per subtiliora et potentiora quodam ordine reguntur, ita omnia corpora per spiritum vitae rationalem; et spiritus rationalis peccator per spiritum rationalem iustum. [3] Moreover, Augustine speaks on all these points together, in the Book III of The Trinity: “As the grosser and lower bodies are ruled in a certain order by means of the subtler and more powerful ones, so are all bodies by means of the rational spirit of life, and also the sinful rational spirit of the sinner by the righteous rational spirit.”