Chapter 1 I. HE SHOWS THAT WE MUST CONSIDER PLEASURE. A. He proposes his intention. — 1953-1954 μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα περὶ ἡδονῆς ἴσως ἕπεται διελθεῖν. After these matters we ought perhaps next to discuss pleasure. B. Three reasons why we must treat pleasure. 1. FIRST. — 1955 μάλιστα γὰρ δοκεῖ συνῳκειῶσθαι τῷ γένει ἡμῶν, διὸ παιδεύουσι τοὺς νέους οἰακίζοντες ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ· For it seems to be adapted especially to humankind. This is why masters of households teach children by means of pleasure and pain. 2. SECOND. — 1956-1957 δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἤθους ἀρετὴν μέγιστον εἶναι τὸ χαίρειν οἷς δεῖ καὶ μισεῖν ἃ δεῖ. διατείνει γὰρ ταῦτα διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου, ῥοπὴν ἔχοντα καὶ δύναμιν πρὸς ἀρετήν τε καὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡδέα προαιροῦνται, τὰ δὲ λυπηρὰ φεύγουσιν· ὑπὲρ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων ἥκιστ' ἂν δόξειε παρετέον εἶναι, Likewise, it seems that a man’s rejoicing in the things he ought and hating the things he ought has great importance for moral virtue; they extend throughout the whole of life, having influence and power for virtue and a happy life, since men choose pleasure and shun pain—motives that should not, it seems, determine our choice. 3. THIRD. a. He enumerates the diffcrent opinions. — 1958-1959 ἄλλως τε καὶ πολλὴν ἐχόντων ἀμφισβήτησιν. οἳ μὲν γὰρ τἀγαθὸν ἡδονὴν λέγουσιν, οἳ δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας κομιδῇ φαῦλον, οἳ μὲν ἴσως πεπεισμένοι οὕτω καὶ ἔχειν, οἳ δὲ οἰόμενοι βέλτιον εἶναι πρὸς τὸν βίον ἡμῶν ἀποφαίνειν τὴν ἡδονὴν τῶν φαύλων, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐστίν· ῥέπειν γὰρ τοὺς πολλοὺς πρὸς αὐτὴν καὶ δουλεύειν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, διὸ δεῖν εἰς τοὐναντίον ἄγειν· ἐλθεῖν γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον. Moreover, they (pleasure and pain) particularly admit of much uncertainty. Some people say that pleasure is a good, while others, on the contrary, maintain it is something very evil—some of them because they are convinced, and others because they think it better for human living to declare pleasure an evil, though it is not—for most men are disposed to it and are in fact slaves of pleasure. Therefore they are to be induced to the opposite, since in this way they will attain the mean. b. He rejects a statement contained in the opinions. — 1960-1963 μή ποτε δὲ οὐ καλῶς τοῦτο λέγεται. οἱ γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεσι λόγοι ἧττόν εἰσι πιστοὶ τῶν ἔργων· ὅταν οὖν διαφωνῶσι τοῖς κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, καταφρονούμενοι καὶ τἀληθὲς προσαναιροῦσιν· ὁ γὰρ ψέγων τὴν ἡδονήν, ὀφθείς ποτ' ἐφιέμενος, ἀποκλίνειν δοκεῖ πρὸς αὐτὴν ὡς τοιαύτην οὖσαν ἅπασαν· τὸ διορίζειν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τῶν πολλῶν. ἐοίκασιν οὖν οἱ ἀληθεῖς τῶν λόγων οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι χρησιμώτατοι εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον· συνῳδοὶ γὰρ ὄντες τοῖς ἔργοις πιστεύονται, διὸ προτρέπονται τοὺς συνιέντας ζῆν κατ' αὐτούς. But perhaps this is not a wise attitude, for in questions concerning the passions and actions, arguments are less convincing than facts. Therefore, when arguments are at variance with facts they are spurned and their truth destroyed. If a man who censures b pleasure is seen in his own way to desire it, his inclination to it seems to indicate that all pleasure is desirable. For the majority of people do not draw nice distinctions. Consequently, true arguments are most useful not only for science but also for living, for when they are in accord with the facts they are accepted, and so move those who understand their truth to live by them. τῶν μὲν οὖν τοιούτων ἅλις· τὰ δ' εἰρημένα περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐπέλθωμεν. These matters have been discussed sufficiently. Let us pass on to the treatment of pleasure.
COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Post haec autem de delectatione et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de virtutibus moralibus et intellectualibus, et etiam de continentia et amicitia quae quamdam affinitatem cum virtute habent, in hoc decimo libro intendit determinare de fine virtutis. Et primo quidem de fine virtutis qui est hominis in seipso. Secundo autem de fine virtutis in respectu ad bonum commune, quod est bonum totius civitatis, ibi, utrum igitur si et de his et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo determinat de delectatione, quae a quibusdam esse ponitur finis virtutis; secundo determinat de felicitate, quae secundum omnes est finis virtutis, ibi: dictis autem his quae circa virtutes et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo prooemialiter ostendit quod determinandum est de delectatione. Secundo prosequitur suum propositum, ibi, Eudoxus igitur delectationem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit quod intendit. 1953.After the Philosopher has finished the consideration of the moral and intellectual virtues-and of continence and friendship which have a relation to virtue-in the tenth book he intends to consider the end of virtue. First, concerning the end of virtue that perfects man in himself; then [Lect. 14], at “Have we sufficiently etc.” (B. 1179 a 33), concerning the end of virtue in relation to the common good, the good of the whole state. He discusses the first point from two aspects. First he defines pleasure which is designated by some as the end of virtue. Next [Lect. 9], at “After the discussion etc.” (B. 1176 a 30), he defines happiness, which in the opinion of everyone is the end of virtue. He treats the first point in a twofold manner. First [I] by way of introduction he shows we must consider pleasure. Second [Lect. 2; II], after the introduction, at “Eudoxus thought etc.” (B. 1172 b 9), he pursues his proposition. He considers the first point under two headings. First [I, A] he proposes his intention. Et dicit quod post praedicta consequens est, ut pertranseunter, idest breviter, de delectatione tractetur. Tractaverat quidem supra in septimo de delectatione, inquantum est materia continentiae, unde potissime sua consideratio versabatur circa delectationes sensibiles et corporales. Nunc autem intendit determinare de delectatione secundum quod adiungitur felicitati. Et ideo praecipue determinat de delectatione intelligibili et spirituali. 1954. He remarks that after the previous treatise (245-1952), it is logical for pleasure to be treated in passing, i.e., briefly. To be sure he had already treated pleasure in the seventh book (1354-1367), inasmuch as it is the object of continence. Hence there his study dwelt chiefly on sensible and bodily pleasures. But here he intends to consider pleasure as an adjunct to happiness. Therefore, he gives special attention to intellectual and spiritual pleasure. Secundo ibi: maxime enim etc., probat quod de delectatione sit agendum, tribus rationibus. Quarum prima sumitur ex affinitate delectationis ad nos. Videtur enim delectatio maxime connaturaliter appropriari humano generi et inde oiakizontes id est gubernatores domorum, maxime erudiunt pueros per delectationem et tristitiam; volentes enim eos provocare ad bonum et declinare a malo, bene agentes eos student delectare, puta aliquibus munusculis, male autem agentes contristant, puta verberibus. Et quia moralis philosophia de rebus humanis considerat, pertinet ad moralem de delectatione considerare. 1955. Then [II, B], at “For it seems,” he proves by three reasons why we must treat pleasure. The first [B, 1] is taken from the relation of pleasure to us. For pleasure seems in a marked degree to be naturally adapted to humankind. For this reason orakizontes, i.e., rulers of households, teach children especially by means of pleasure and pain. People who wish to induce children to good or restrain them from evil try to please the well-behaved, e.g., with small presents, and to punish those who misbehave, e.g., by whipping. Since moral philosophy considers human affairs, it is the business of moral science to treat pleasure. Secundam rationem ponit ibi: videtur autem et cetera. Quae sumitur per comparationem ad virtutem. Et dicit quod maxime videtur ad moralem virtutem pertinere quod homo gaudeat in quibus oportet et odiat ea quae oportet et contristetur in eis. Praecipue enim consistit virtus moralis in ordinatione appetitus, quae cognoscitur per ordinationem delectationis et tristitiae, quae consequuntur omnes appetitivos motus, ut supra in II dictum est. Et hoc est quod subdit: quod haec, scilicet delectatio et tristitia, protenduntur ad omnia quae sunt humanae vitae, et habent magnam potestatem ad hoc quod homo sit virtuosus et feliciter vivens, quod non potest esse si inordinate delectetur, vel tristetur. 1956. At “Likewise, it seeme’ he presents the second reason [B, 2], which istaken from a comparison with virtue. He says that it seems to be a particular concern of moral virtue that a mat enjoy the things he ought and hate the things he ought and grieve over them. For moral virtue consists principally in the regulation of the appetite; and this is judged by the regulation of pleasure and pain which all the movements of the appetitive part follow, as has been pointed out in the second book (296). And he adds: they, viz., pleasure and pain extend to all phases of human life, exerting great influence on man to be virtuous and live happily. This cannot happen unless his pleasures and pain are properly ordered. Homines enim frequenter eligunt delectabilia etiam mala, et fugiunt tristia etiam bona. Nequaquam autem videtur quod homo qui vult esse virtuosus et felix debeat eligere delectationem et fugam tristitiae pro talibus, scilicet pro hoc quod incurrat aliquas malas operationes vel quod careat operibus virtutis. Et e converso potest dici quod non est eligendum facere mala, aut vitare bona pro talibus, idest pro delectabilibus accipiendis et tristibus fugiendis. Et sic patet quod ad moralem philosophum pertinet considerare de delectatione, sicut et de virtute morali et de felicitate. 1957. Men frequently choose even harmful pleasures and avoid even salutary afflictions. But it seems that the man who wishes to be virtuous and happy ought not to choose pleasure and reject pain as such, that is, commit evil deeds or omit virtuous actions on this account. And, conversely, it can be said that he must not choose to do evil or avoid good for the sake of these, i.e., to obtain pleasure and shun pain. Obviously then it is the function of moral philosophy to treat pleasure, just as it treats moral virtue and happiness. Tertiam rationem ponit ibi, aliterque et cetera. Quae quidem sumitur ex dubitatione existente circa delectationem. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo enumerat diversas opiniones circa delectationem, ex quibus dubitatio probatur; secundo reprobat quiddam quod in opinionibus dictum est, ibi, ne forte autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod alia ratione determinandum est de delectatione et tristitia, quia habent multam dubitationem. Quod patet ex diversitate loquentium de eis. 1958. He offers a third reason [B, 3] at “Moreover, they.” It is taken from the uncertainty prevalent concerning pleasure. He discusses this point from two aspects. First [3, a] he enumerates the different opinions about pleasure, from which the uncertainty arises. Then [3, b], at “But perhaps this etc.,” he rejects a statement contained in the opinions. He says first that we must treat pleasure and pain for another reason: because they admit of much uncertainty. This is obvious from the different views of thinkers who discuss these subjects. Quidam enim dicunt, delectationem esse quiddam bonum, quidam vero e contrario dicunt, delectationem esse aliquid valde pravum. Et hoc diversimode. Nam quidam hoc dicunt, quia persuasum est eis, quod ita se habeat et ita credunt se verum dicere, alii vero, licet non credant hoc verum esse quod delectatio sit aliquid pravum, tamen existimant melius esse ad vitam nostram enunciare, quod delectatio sit quiddam pravum, quamvis non sit, ad retrahendum homines a delectatione ad quam multi inclinantur et inserviunt delectationibus, et ideo oportet homines in contrarium ducere, ut scilicet abhorreant delectationes, enunciando eas esse malas; sic enim pervenietur ad medium, ut scilicet homo moderate delectationibus utatur. 1959. Some say pleasure is a kind of good. Others, on the contrary, maintain that it is something very badand this in different ways. For some hold the opinion because they are convinced that it is so and believe they are speaking the truth. But others, though they may not believe that pleasure is an evil, nevertheless judge it better for human living to declare that pleasure is an evil-although it is not-to withdraw men from pleasure to which the majority are inclined (for people are in fact slaves to pleasure). For this reason men must be induced to the opposite, i.e., to have an aversion to pleasures by declaring them evil. In this way we attain the mean, that is, men use pleasures with moderation. Deinde cum dicit: ne forte autem etc., reprobat id quod ultimo dictum est. Non enim videtur esse bene dictum, quod homines falso enuncient delectationes esse malas, ad hoc, quod homines retrahantur ab eis: quia circa actiones et passiones humanas minus creditur sermonibus, quam operibus. Si enim aliquis operetur quod dicit esse malum, plus provocat exemplo quam deterreat verbo. 1960. Then [3, b], at “But perhaps this,” he rejects the last statement. It hardly seems correct for people to say what they do not believe—that pleasures are evil just to withdraw us from them, because in questions of human actions and passions we give less credence to words than to actions. For if a man does what he says is evil, he incites by his example more than he restrains by his word. Et huius ratio est, quia unusquisque videtur eligere id quod sibi videtur esse bonum in particulari, circa quod sunt passiones et operationes humanae. Quando ergo sermones alicuius dissonant ab operibus sensibiliter in ipso apparentibus, tales sermones contemnuntur. Et per consequens interimitur verum quod per eos dicitur. Et ita acciderit in proposito. 1961. The reason for this is that everyone seems to choose what appears to him good in a particular case, the object of human actions and passions. When, therefore, a man’s arguments are at variance with his clearly manifest actions, such arguments are spurned; and consequently the truth enunciated by them is destroyed. Thus it will happen in our proposition. Si enim aliquis vituperans omnem delectationem aliquando videretur ad aliquam delectationem inclinari daret intelligere, quod omnis delectatio esset eligenda. Multitudo enim vulgaris non potest determinare distinguendo hoc esse bonum et illud malum, sed indistincte accipit esse bonum, quod in uno bonum apparet. Sic igitur sermones veri non solum videntur esse utiles ad scientiam, sed etiam ad bonam vitam. Creditur enim eis inquantum concordant cum operibus. Et ideo tales sermones provocant eos, qui intelligunt veritatem ipsorum ut secundum eos vivant. 1962. If someone censuring all pleasure is seen to give way to a pleasure lie might give the impression that all pleasure ought to be chosen. The common people cannot determine by distinguishing this as good and that as evil, but without discrimination they accept as good what appears good in one instance. In this way, then, sound arguments seem to be useful not only for science but also for good living, for they are convincing to the extent they are in accord with actions. For this reason such arguments move those who understand their truth to live by them. Ultimo autem epilogando concludit, quod de talibus sufficienter dictum est. Oportet autem procedere ad ea quae dicta sunt ab aliis de delectatione. 1963. Finally, he concludes in an epilogue that these matters have been discussed sufficiently. Now we must pass on to the observations made by others about pleasure.
Opinions on Pleasure as a Good
Chapter 2 II. HE CONTINUES WITH THE OPINIONS OF OTHERS. A. The opinion of those who set pleasure in the category of good. 1. THE ARGUMENTS EUDOXUS USED TO PROVE THAT PLEASURE IS IN THE CATEGORY OF GOOD. a. On the part of pleasure itself. i. The opinion and argument of Eudoxus. — 1964-1965 εὔδοξος μὲν οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν τἀγαθὸν ᾤετ' εἶναι διὰ τὸ πάνθ' ὁρᾶν ἐφιέμενα αὐτῆς, καὶ ἔλλογα καὶ ἄλογα, ἐν πᾶσι δ' εἶναι τὸ αἱρετὸν τὸ ἐπιεικές, καὶ τὸ μάλιστα κράτιστον· τὸ δὴ πάντ' ἐπὶ ταὐτὸ φέρεσθαι μηνύειν ὡς πᾶσι τοῦτο ἄριστον ὄν ἕκαστον γὰρ τὸ αὑτῷ ἀγαθὸν εὑρίσκειν, ὥσπερ καὶ τροφήν, τὸ δὲ πᾶσιν ἀγαθόν, καὶ οὗ πάντ' ἐφίεται, τἀγαθὸν εἶναι. Eudoxus thought that pleasure is an absolute good because he saw all creatures, both rational and irrational, seeking it. But in every case what is desirable is good, and what is most desirable is the greatest good. Hence the fact that all things are drawn to the same object shows that it is a most excellent good for all, since everything finds its own good just as it finds its own food. Now what is good for all and what all desire is an absolute good. ii. Why the opinion and argument were accepted. — 1966 ἐπιστεύοντο δ' οἱ λόγοι διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἤθους ἀρετὴν μᾶλλον ἢ δι' αὑτούς· διαφερόντως γὰρ ἐδόκει σώφρων εἶναι· οὐ δὴ ὡς φίλος τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐδόκει ταῦτα λέγειν, ἀλλ' οὕτως ἔχειν κατ' ἀλήθειαν. But his arguments were accepted because of his excellent character rather than for their merit. For he appeared to be a man moderate in the different pleasures; and consequently did not seem to defend his opinion as a lover of pleasure but because it was really true. b. On the part of the contrary. — 1967 οὐχ ἧττον δ' ᾤετ' εἶναι φανερὸν ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου· τὴν γὰρ λύπην καθ' αὑτὸ πᾶσι φευκτὸν εἶναι, ὁμοίως δὴ τοὐναντίον αἱρετόν· He also thought that his view was otherwise substantiated by pleasure’s contrary. Since pain in itself is an object to be avoided by all, so its opposite is likewise an object to be chosen. 2. THE ARGUMENTS EUDOXUS USED TO PROVE THAT (PLEASURE) IS THE GREATEST GOOD. a. First. — 1968 μάλιστα δ' εἶναι αἱρετὸν ὃ μὴ δι' ἕτερον μηδ' ἑτέρου χάριν αἱρούμεθα· τοιοῦτο δ' ὁμολογουμένως εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν· οὐδένα γὰρ ἐπερωτᾶν τίνος ἕνεκα ἥδεται, ὡς καθ' αὑτὴν οὖσαν αἱρετὴν τὴν ἡδονήν. Moreover, that is most worthy of choice which we choose not because or for the sake of another. Now, it is admitted that pleasure is such an object. For no one asks to what end a man is pleased, so that pleasure in itself is desirable. b. Second. i. The argument. — 1969 προστιθεμένην τε ὁτῳοῦν τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἱρετώτερον ποιεῖν, οἷον τῷ δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ σωφρονεῖν, αὔξεσθαι δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὑτῷ. Further, pleasure added to any good makes it more desirable. Thus the addition of pleasure to just or temperate action enhances its goodness. ii. The flaw in this argument. — 1970 ἔοικε δὴ οὗτός γε ὁ λόγος τῶν ἀγαθῶν αὐτὴν ἀποφαίνειν, καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἑτέρου· πᾶν γὰρ μεθ' ἑτέρου ἀγαθοῦ αἱρετώτερον ἢ μονούμενον. But this argument seems to prove only that pleasure is a good and not a greater good than any other. For every good joined to another is more desirable than by itself. B. The contrary opinion. 1. HOW THEY MEET THE PRECEDING ARGUMENTS. a. How they used in the opposite way the argument... advanced. i. How Plato used this argument. — 1971-1972 τοιούτῳ δὴ λόγῳ καὶ Πλάτων ἀναιρεῖ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδονὴ τἀγαθόν· αἱρετώτερον γὰρ εἶναι τὸν ἡδὺν βίον μετὰ φρονήσεως ἢ χωρίς, εἰ δὲ τὸ μικτὸν κρεῖττον, οὐκ εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν τἀγαθόν· οὐδενὸς γὰρ προστεθέντος αὐτῷ τἀγαθὸν αἱρετώτερον γίνεσθαι. It is by an argument of this kind that Plato attempts to nullify the previous view, by showing that pleasure is not an absolute good. He argued that the life of pleasure is more desirable with prudence than without it. But if the combination is better, pleasure is not an absolute good; for a good of this type does not become more desirable by any addition. ii. He rejects Plato’s process of reasoning. — 1973 δῆλον δ' ὡς οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν τἀγαθὸν ἂν εἴη, ὃ μετά τινος τῶν καθ' αὑτὸ ἀγαθῶν αἱρετώτερον γίνεται. τί οὖν ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον, οὗ καὶ ἡμεῖς κοινωνοῦμεν; τοιοῦτον γὰρ ἐπιζητεῖται. Obviously nothing else either will be an absolute good if it is made more desirable by the addition of any of the things that are good in themselves. What then is there bf this nature that we can share? This is what we are looking for. b. How they met the other arguments. i. On the part of pleasure itself. — 1974-1977 οἱ δ' ἐνιστάμενοι ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθὸν οὗ πάντ' ἐφίεται, μὴ οὐθὲν λέγουσιν. ἃ γὰρ πᾶσι δοκεῖ, ταῦτ' εἶναί φαμεν· ὁ δ' ἀναιρῶν ταύτην τὴν πίστιν οὐ πάνυ πιστότερα ἐρεῖ. εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὰ ἀνόητα ὀρέγεται αὐτῶν, ἦν ἄν τι λεγόμενον, εἰ δὲ καὶ τὰ φρόνιμα, πῶς λέγοιεν ἄν τι; ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φαύλοις ἔστι τι φυσικὸν ἀγαθὸν κρεῖττον ἢ καθ' αὑτά, ὃ ἐφίεται τοῦ οἰκείου ἀγαθοῦ. Those who deny that what all beings desire is good are talking nonsense. For that which all men believe to be true, we say is really so; and the man who rejects this belief expresses beliefs hardly more acceptable. If only creatures without understanding desire pleasures, some weight might be conceded in the contention; but if intelligent beings do so too, it does not seem to make sense. Perhaps even in evil men there is some natural good better than themselves which seeks their own proper good. ii. On the part of the contrary. — 1978-1979 οὐκ ἔοικε δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου καλῶς λέγεσθαι. οὐ γάρ φασιν, εἰ ἡ λύπη κακόν ἐστι, τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι· ἀντικεῖσθαι γὰρ καὶ κακὸν κακῷ καὶ ἄμφω τῷ μηδετέρῳλέγοντες ταῦτα οὐ κακῶς, οὐ μὴν ἐπί γε τῶν εἰρημένων ἀληθεύοντες. ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντοιν τῶν κακῶν καὶ φευκτὰ ἔδει ἄμφω εἶναι, τῶν μηδετέρων δὲ μηδέτερον ἢ ὁμοίως· νῦν δὲ φαίνονται τὴν μὲν φεύγοντες ὡς κακόν, τὴν δ' αἱρούμενοι ὡς ἀγαθόν· οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἀντίκειται. Nor does the argument seem to be correct about the contrary. They say that if pain is evil it does not follow that pleasure is good, for evil is also opposed to evil. And both good and evil are opposed to what is neither the one nor the other. In this they were correct but their statement does not apply to the present question. For, if both were evil, both ought to be avoided; but if neither was evil, neither should be an object of aversion, or both should be equally so. However, as it is, man seems to avoid the one as evil and to seek the other as good. In this way then they are in opposition.
COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Eudoxus igitur delectationem et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit quod determinandum est de delectatione, hic incipit de ea tractare. Et primo prosequitur opiniones aliorum. Secundo determinat veritatem, ibi: quid autem est vel quale quid et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo prosequitur opinionem ponentium delectationem in genere bonorum. Secundo prosequitur opinionem contrariam ibi, tali utique (...) ratione et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit rationes ex quibus probabat Eudoxus delectationem esse in genere bonorum. Secundo ponit rationes, ex quibus probabat eam esse maximum bonum, ibi, maxime autem eligibile et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit, quomodo Eudoxus probabat delectationem esse de genere bonorum ex parte ipsius delectationis. Secundo quomodo hoc probabat ex parte contrarii, ibi, non minus autem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo ponit opinionem et rationem Eudoxi. Secundo ostendit, quare eius opinioni et rationi credebatur, ibi, credebantur autem et cetera. 1964. After the Philosopher has shown that we must treat pleasure, he now begins to treat it. First [II] he continues with the opinions of others. Then [Lect. 5], at “The nature and quality etc.” (B. 1174 a 13), he defines the truth. He discusses the first point under two headings. First [II, A] he proceeds with the opinion of those who set pleasure in the category of good; next [II, B], at “It is by an argument etc.,” with the contrary opinion. He considers his first point from two aspects. First [A, 1] he presents the arguments Eudoxus used to prove that pleasure is in the category of good. Second [A, 2], at “Moreover, that is etc.,” he offers the arguments Eudoxus used to prove that it is the greatest good. He handles the first point in a twofold manner. First [1, a] he shows how Eudoxus proved that pleasure is in the genus of good on the part of pleasure itself; then [1, b], at “He also thought etc.,” how Eudoxus proved this on the part of the contrary. He treats the first point in two ways. First [a, i] he proposes the opinion and argument of Eudoxus. Next [a, ii], at “But his arguments etc.,” he shows why the opinion and argument were accepted. Dicit ergo primo, quod Eudoxus existimabat delectationem esse de genere bonorum, quia videbat quod omnia desiderant ipsam, tam rationalia scilicet homines, quam irrationalia, scilicet bruta animalia. Illud autem quod est apud omnes eligibile, videtur esse epiiches, idest bonum, et maxime potens in bonitate, ex quo potest trahere ad se omnem appetitum. Et sic quod omnia ferantur ad idem, scilicet ad delectationem, denunciat, quod delectatio non solum est bonum, sed etiam quiddam optimum; manifestum est enim, quod unumquodque quaerit invenire id quod est sibi bonum, sicut cibus est bonum omnibus animalibus, a quibus communiter appetitur. Sic ergo patet delectationem, quam omnia appetunt, esse aliquid bonum. 1965. He says first that Eudoxus was of the opinion that pleasure comes under the category of good because he saw that all creatures, both rational and irrational, i.e., men and brutes, seek pleasure. But what all choose seems to be proper and good and has great influence in goodness because it can attract every appetite to itself. And so, the fact that all are moved toward the same object, viz., pleasure, indicates that pleasure, is not only a good but a most excellent good. For it is obvious that everything seeks to find what is good. Thus food is good to all animals who commonly desire it. Therefore it is evident that pleasure sought by all is a good. Deinde cum dicit credebantur autem sermones etc., ostendit quare Eudoxo maxime credebatur. Et dicit, quod sermones Eudoxi magis credebantur propter moralem virtutem dicentis, quam etiam propter eorum efficaciam. Ipse enim erat temperatus circa delectationes differenter, quasi excellentius aliis. Et ideo cum laudabat delectationem, non videbatur hoc dicere quasi amicus delectationis, sed quia sic se habet secundum rei veritatem. 1966. Then [a, ii], at “But his arguments” he shows why Eudoxus was especially given credence. He observes that Eudoxus’ arguments were accepted because of the moral virtue of the speaker rather than their cogency. He was indeed a man moderate in the different pleasures, being more exemplary than others. For this reason, when he praised pleasure, he did not seem to be speaking as a lover of pleasure but because it was really true. Deinde cum dicit: non minus autem etc., ponit rationem Eudoxi, quae sumebatur ex parte contrarii. Et dicit, quod Eudoxus existimabat esse manifestum delectationem esse de genere bonorum non minus ex contrario, scilicet ex parte ipsius delectationis. Manifeste enim apparet, quod tristitia secundum se est omnibus fugienda. Unde contrarium, scilicet delectatio, videtur esse omnibus eligendum. 1967. Next [i, b], at “He also thought,” he presents Eudoxus’ argument that was taken on the part of the contrary. He remarks that Eudoxus thought it no less clear from the contrary (i.e., on the part of pain rather than on the part of pleasure itself) that pleasure belongs to the category of good. For it is obvious that pain in itself ought to be avoided by everyone. Hence the contrary, pleasure, apparently ought to be ch95en by everyone. Deinde cum dicit: maxime autem etc., inducit duas rationes Eudoxi, ad ostendendum, quod delectatio sit maximum bonum. Quarum prima est. Illud autem videtur esse maxime eligibile, et per consequens maxime bonum, quod non eligitur propter alterum quod ei accidat, neque gratia alicuius sicut finis. Hoc autem manifeste confitentur omnes circa delectationem. Nullus enim quaerit ab alio, cuius gratia velit delectari; quasi delectatio sit secundum seipsam eligibilis. Ergo delectatio est maxime bonum. 1968. At “Moreover, that is” [A, 2] he presents two arguments of Eudoxus to show that pleasure is the greatest good. The first is this [2, a]. That seems most worthy of choice, and consequently the greatest good, which is chosen not because of another incidental to it, or for the sake of something as an end. But all men plainly acknowledge this about pleasure. For no one asks another why he desires pleasure, which would indicate that pleasure is desirable in itself. Therefore pleasure is good in the highest degree. Secundam rationem ponit ibi: appositamque et cetera. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ponit ipsam rationem. Hoc enim apparet circa delectationem, quod apposita cuicumque bono facit ipsum eligibilius. Sicut si apponatur ei quod est iuste agere, vel temperatum esse, auget horum bonitatem. Melior enim est, qui delectatur in operatione iustitiae seu temperantiae. Et ex hoc volebat concludere, quod delectatio esset optimum, quasi omnibus bonitatem augens. 1969. He offers the second argument [2, b] at “Further, pleasure,” explaining it in a twofold manner. First [b, i] he presents the argument itself. It is evident that pleasure added to any good makes it more desirable. Thus the addition of pleasure to just action and temperate conduct increases their goodness, for a man is better who takes pleasure in a work of justice or temperance. From this he (Eudoxus) wished to conclude that pleasure was best, as enhancing the goodness in all actions. Secundo ibi: videtur autem etc., ostendit defectum huius rationis. Et dicit, quod praedicta ratio videtur concludere, quod delectatio sit de genere bonorum, non autem quod sit magis bonum aliquo alio. De quocumque enim bono hoc etiam verificatur, quod alteri bono coniunctum, est melius quam si sit solitarium per seipsum. 1970. Next [b, ii], at “But this argument,” he shows the flaw in this argument. He remarks that the reason just given proves that pleasure comes under the category of good, but not that it is a greater good than any other. For it is also true of any good that, when joined to another, it constitutes a greater good than it was by itself. Deinde cum dicit: tali utique ratione etc., prosequitur opinionem ponentium, delectationem non esse bonum. Et primo ostendit, quomodo obviant praemissis rationibus. Secundo ponit rationes eorum, quas in contrarium adducunt, ibi, non tamen si non qualitatum et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit, quomodo ratione superius inducta, ad ostendendum delectationem esse optimum, utebantur ad contrarium. Secundo ostendit, quomodo obviabant aliis rationibus, ibi, instantes autem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo manifestat, quomodo Plato praemissa ratione ad oppositum utebatur; secundo solvit processum Platonis, ibi, manifestum autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod per rationem immediate praemissam Plato, qui erat contrariae opinionis, interimere conabatur, quod dictum est, ostendendo, quod delectatio non est per se bonum. Manifestum est enim, quod delectatio est eligibilior si adiungatur prudentiae. Quia igitur delectatio commixta alteri melior est, concludebat, quod delectatio non sit per se bonum. Illud enim, quod est per se bonum, non fit eligibilius per appositionem alterius. 1971. Then [II, B], at “It is by an argument,” he pursues the opinion of those who maintain that pleasure is not a good. First [B, 1] he explains how they meet the preceding arguments. Second [Lect. 3; B, 2], at “However, it does not follow etc.” (B. 1173 a 14), he gives the arguments they allege to the contrary. He discusses the first point from two aspects. First [B, 1, a] he shows how they used in the opposite way the argument previously advanced to show that pleasure is the highest good. Next [B, i, b], at “Those who deny etc.,” he shows how they met the other arguments. He treats the first point in a twofold manner. First [B, i, a, i] he explains how Plato used this argument to prove the opposite. Then [B, 1, a, ii], at “Obviously nothing else etc.,” he rejects Plato’s process of reasoning. He observes first that, by the reason just given, Plato, who held the contrary opinion, attempted to nullify what has been asserted (1965-1970), by showing that pleasure is not a good in itself nor in the absolute sense. It is evident that pleasure is more worthy of choice when accompanied by prudence. Since then pleasure combined with something else is better, he concluded that pleasure is not a good in itself. That which is a good in itself does not become more desirable by an addition of something else. Circa quod sciendum est, quod Plato per se bonum nominabat id quod est ipsa essentia bonitatis, sicut per se hominem ipsam essentiam hominis. Ipsi autem essentiae bonitatis nihil potest apponi, quod sit bonum alio modo, quam participando essentiam bonitatis. Et ita quicquid bonitatis est in eo quod additur est derivatum ab ipsa essentia bonitatis. Et sic per se bonum non fit melius aliquo addito. 1972. On this point we must understand that Plato named as a good in itself that which is the essence of goodness; for example, man in himself (per se) is the essence of man. But to this essence of goodness nothing can be added that is good in a way other than by participating in the essence of goodness. So, whatever goodness is an addition is derived from the very essence of goodness. Thus the good in itself does not become better by any addition. Deinde cum dicit manifestum autem etc., improbat Aristoteles processum Platonis. Manifestum est enim quod secundum hanc rationem nihil aliud in rebus humanis erit per se bonum, cum quodlibet humanum bonum fiat eligibilius additum alicui per se bono. Non enim potest inveniri aliquid in communicationem humanae vitae veniens quod sit tale, ut scilicet non fiat melius per appositionem alterius. Tale autem aliquid quaerimus, quod scilicet in communicationem humanae vitae veniat. Qui enim dicunt delectationem esse bonum, intendunt eam esse quoddam humanum bonum, non autem ipsum divinum bonum, quod est ipsa essentia bonitatis. 1973. At “Obviously nothing else” [B, 1, a, ii] Aristotle rejects Plato’s process of reasoning. According to this argument obviously nothing in human affairs will be good in itself, since every human good added to any good in itself is rendered more desirable. For nothing can be found associated with human life that is of such a nature that it does not become better by the addition of another good. But we are seeking something of this kind associated with human life. People who hold that pleasure is a good mean a human good and not the divine good itself, which is the essence of goodness. Deinde cum dicit: instantes autem etc., ostendit quomodo Platonici obviabant rationibus Eudoxi probantibus delectationem esse bonum. Et primo quomodo obviabant rationi quae sumebatur ex parte ipsius delectationis; secundo quomodo obviabant rationi quae sumebatur ex parte contrarii, ibi, videtur autem et cetera. Obviabant autem primae rationi interimendo istam: bonum est quod omnia appetunt. Sed Aristoteles hoc improbat dicens, quod illi qui instant rationi Eudoxi dicentes quod non est necessarium esse bonum id quod omnia appetunt, nihil dicere videntur. 1974. Next [ B, 1, b ], at “Those who deny,” he shows how the Platonists met Eudoxus’ arguments proving that pleasure is a good. First [B, 1, b, i], how they met the argument taken on the part of pleasure itself; then [B, 1, b, ii], at “Nor does the argument etc.,” the argument taken on the part of the contrary. They answered the first argument by denying this: that which all desire is good. But Aristotle rejects this, observing that those who oppose the argument of Eudoxus by maintaining that what all desire is not necessarily good seem to talk nonsense. Illud enim quod videtur omnibus dicimus ita se habere; et hoc habetur quasi principium. Quia non est possibile quod naturale iudicium in omnibus fallat; cum autem appetitus non sit nisi eius quod videtur bonum, id quod ab omnibus appetitur omnibus videtur bonum. Et sic delectatio quae ab omnibus appetitur est bona. 1975. That which all believe to be true, we say, is really so. And we hold this as a principle, because it is impossible for natural judgment to fail in all cases. But, since the appetite tends only to that which seems good, what is desired by all seems good to all. So, pleasure that all desire is good. Ille autem qui hoc quod ab omnibus creditur interimit, non dicit totaliter credibiliora. Posset enim sustineri illud quod dicitur, si sola ea quae sine intellectu agunt, sicut bruta animalia et homines pravi appeterent delectationes; quia sensus non iudicat bonum nisi ut nunc: et sic non oporteret delectationem esse bonum simpliciter, sed solum quod sit bonum ut nunc. Sed cum etiam habentes sapientiam appetant aliquam delectationem, omnino non videntur aliquid verum dicere. 1976. The man who rejects what is accepted by everyone expresses views that are hardly more acceptable. That position might be defended if only those creatures who are without understanding, like dumb animals and evil men, desired pleasures. The reason is that the senses judge good only in its immediacy; and in this way it would not be necessary that pleasure be a good simply but only that it be a good here and now. But since even intelligent creatures desire some pleasure, it does not seem to make any sense. Et tamen, si omnia quae agunt sine intellectu appeterent delectationem, adhuc esset probabile quod delectatio esset quoddam bonum: quia etiam in pravis hominibus est quoddam naturale bonum quod inclinat in appetitum convenientis boni; et hoc naturale bonum est melius quam pravi homines, inquantum huiusmodi. Sicut enim virtus est perfectio naturae, et propter hoc virtus moralis est melior quam virtus naturalis, ut in sexto dictum est; ita cum malitia sit corruptio naturae, bonum naturale est melius, sicut integrum corrupto. Manifestum est autem quod secundum id quod ad malitiam pertinet pravi homines diversificantur. Sunt enim malitiae sibiinvicem contrariae. Et ideo id secundum quod omnes pravi conveniunt, scilicet delectationem appetere, videtur magis ad naturam quam ad malitiam pertinere. 1977. However, if even all creatures which act without understanding desired pleasure, it might still be probable that pleasure was a good, because even in wicked men there is some natural good that tends to the desire of a suitable good; and this natural good is better than evil men as such. As virtue is a perfection of nature-and for this reason moral virtue is better than natural virtue (we noted this in the sixth book, 1275-1280)—so, since vice is a corruption of nature, the natural good is better: the integral thing is better than the corrupt. But it is clear that evil men are diversified by their connection with vice, for vices are contrary to one another. Therefore, the object on which evil men agree, viz., the desire of pleasure, seems to belong rather to nature than vice. Deinde cum dicit: non videtur autem etc., ostendit quomodo obviabant rationi quae sumebatur ex parte tristitiae. Dicebant enim quod non sequitur, si tristitia est malum, quod propter hoc delectatio sit bonum. Quia invenitur quod malum opponitur non solum bono sed etiam malo: sicut audacia non solum fortitudini, sed etiam timiditati; et ambo scilicet bonum et malum, opponuntur ei quod neque est bonum neque malum, sicut extrema opponuntur medio. Est autem aliquid tale secundum suam speciem consideratum, sicut levare festucam de terra vel aliquid huiusmodi. 1978. Then [B, 1, b, ii], at “Nor does the argument,” he shows how they answered the argument taken on the part of pain. They held that, even if pain is an evil, it does not follow that pleasure is good; since we know that evil is opposed not only to good but also to evil, for example, rashness is opposed not only to fortitude but also cowardice. And both good and evil are opposed to that which is neither good nor evil, as the extremes are opposed to the mean; for there is such an act considered according to its species, for instance, to pick up a straw from the ground, or the like. Sed hunc processum Aristoteles improbans dicit, quod non dicunt male quantum ad istam oppositionem mali ad malum: sed tamen non dicunt verum in proposito. Non enim tristitia opponitur delectationi sicut malum malo. Si enim ambo essent mala, oporteret quod ambo essent fugienda, sicut enim bonum inquantum huiusmodi, est appetibile; ita malum inquantum huiusmodi, est fugiendum. Si autem neutrum eorum esset malum, neutrum esset fugiendum vel similiter se haberet circa utrumque. Sed nunc omnes videntur fugere tristitiam tamquam malum, et appetere delectationem tamquam bonum. Sic ergo opponuntur adinvicem sicut bonum et malum. 1979. However, Aristotle in refutation of this process of reasoning remarks that they are correct in reference to this opposition of evil to evil, but their statement does not apply to the present question. For pain is not opposed to pleasure, as evil to evil. If both were evil, both would have to be avoided; just as good as such is to be sought, so evil as such is to be avoided. But if neither of them was evil, neither should be an object of aversion, or they should be viewed in the same light. However, as it is, all men seem to avoid pain as evil and seek pleasure as good. Thus then they are opposed to each other as good and evil.
Pleasure Is Not a Good According to Plato
Chapter 3 (B)2. HE PRESENTS (PLATONISTS’) ARGUMENTS AGAINST EUDOXUS’ POSITION. a. He proposes the arguments. i. First. — 1980-1981 οὐ μὴν οὐδ' εἰ μὴ τῶν ποιοτήτων ἐστὶν ἡ ἡδονή, διὰ τοῦτ' οὐδὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οὐδὲ γὰρ αἱ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐνέργειαι ποιότητές εἰσιν, οὐδ' ἡ εὐδαιμονία. However it does not follow that if pleasure is not a quality, therefore it is not a good; for neither virtuous activities nor happiness are qualities either. ii. Second. x. THE REASON OF THE PLATONISTS. — 1982 λέγουσι δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ὡρίσθαι, τὴν δ' ἡδονὴν ἀόριστον εἶναι, ὅτι δέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ [τὸ] ἧττον. But they maintain that good is determinate, and that pleasure is indeterminate, because it admits of more and less. y. HE REJECTS SUCH AN ARGUMENT. — 1983-1988 εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐκ τοῦ ἥδεσθαι τοῦτο κρίνουσι, καὶ περὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς, καθ' ἃς ἐναργῶς φασὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον τοὺς ποιοὺς ὑπάρχειν καὶ πράττειν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετάς, ἔσται ταὐτά· δίκαιοι γάρ εἰσι μᾶλλον καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, ἔστι δὲ καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ σωφρονεῖν μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον. εἰ δὲ ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, μή ποτ' οὐ λέγουσι τὸ αἴτιον, ἂν ὦσιν αἳ μὲν ἀμιγεῖς αἳ δὲ μικταί. καὶ τί κωλύει, καθάπερ ὑγίεια ὡρισμένη οὖσα δέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ [τὸ] ἧττον, οὕτω καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν; οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ συμμετρία ἐν πᾶσίν ἐστιν, οὐδ' ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μία τις ἀεί, ἀλλ' ἀνιεμένη διαμένει ἕως τινός, καὶ διαφέρει τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον. τοιοῦτον δὴ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι. Now if they judge in this way about partaking of pleasure, then the same applies to justice and other virtues according to which some are clearly said to be more or less virtuous. For people are in fact just and brave in a greater or less degree, and can act more or less justly and temperately. However if their judgment is based on the nature of the pleasures themselves, perhaps they are not stating the real cause since some pleasures are pure (or unmixed) and others mixed. Why may not pleasure be like health which is determinate and still admits of degrees? Health is not constituted by the same proportion of humors in all men, nor by one proportion always in the same person; but, even when diminished, it remains up to a certain point, and so differs in degree. iii. Third. x. HE PROPOSES THE ARGUMENT. — 1989 τέλειόν τε τἀγαθὸν τιθέντες, τὰς δὲ κινήσεις καὶ τὰς γενέσεις ἀτελεῖς, τὴν ἡδονὴν κίνησιν καὶ γένεσιν ἀποφαίνειν πειρῶνται. Again, they postulate that the good in itself (per se) is perfect, while movements and processes of generation are imperfect; and then they try to show that pleasure is a motion or process. y. HE REJECTS THIS ARGUMENT. aa. First... that pleasure is a motion. — 1990-1992 οὐ καλῶς δ' ἐοίκασι λέγειν οὐδ' εἶναι κίνησιν. πάσῃ γὰρ οἰκεῖον εἶναι δοκεῖ τάχος καὶ βραδυτής, καὶ εἰ μὴ καθ' αὑτήν, οἷον τῇ τοῦ κόσμου, πρὸς ἄλλο· τῇ δ' ἡδονῇ τούτων οὐδέτερον ὑπάρχει. ἡσθῆναι μὲν γὰρ ἔστι ταχέως ὥσπερ ὀργισθῆναι, ἥδεσθαι δ' οὔ, οὐδὲ πρὸς ἕτερον, βαδίζειν δὲ καὶ αὔξεσθαι καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα. μεταβάλλειν μὲν οὖν εἰς τὴν ἡδονὴν ταχέως καὶ βραδέως ἔστιν, ἐνεργεῖν δὲ κατ' αὐτὴν οὐκ ἔστι ταχέως, λέγω δ' ἥδεσθαι. But they do not seem to be correct. In fact pleasure is not a motion, for swiftness and slowness are proper to all movement, if not absolutely like the motion of the earth, then relative to another moving body. But neither of these is true of pleasure. A man can become pleased quickly just as he can get angry quickly; but he cannot be pleased quickly, not even in relation b to somebody else, as he can walk, grow, and so on quickly. Therefore someone can change into a pleasurable state quickly or slowly, but he cannot function or be pleased in that state quickly. bb. Next... that pleasure is a process of generation. a’. First. — 1993-1994 γένεσίς τε πῶς ἂν εἴη; δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ τυχόντος τὸ τυχὸν γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐξ οὗ γίνεται, εἰς τοῦτο διαλύεσθαι· καὶ οὗ γένεσις ἡ ἡδονή, τούτου ἡ λύπη φθορά. καὶ λέγουσι δὲ τὴν μὲν λύπην ἔνδειαν τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι, τὴν δ' ἡδονὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν. ταῦτα δὲ σωματικά ἐστι τὰ πάθη. εἰ δή ἐστι τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἀναπλήρωσις ἡ ἡδονή, ἐν ᾧ ἡ ἀναπλήρωσις, τοῦτ' ἂν καὶ ἥδοιτο· τὸ σῶμα ἄρα· οὐ δοκεῖ δέ· οὐδ' ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀναπλήρωσις ἡδονή, ἀλλὰ γινομένης μὲν ἀναπληρώσεως ἥδοιτ' ἄν τις, καὶ τεμνόμενος λυποῖτο. And how can it be a process of generation? It does not seem that any chance thing can be generated from any other chance thing, but everything is dissolved into that from which it came; and pain would be the destruction of that which pleasure generates. Further, they affirm that pain is a deficiency of the natural state and pleasure a replenishment. But these experiences are bodily passions. If then pleasure is a replenishment of the natural state, the part replenished will feel the pleasure. Consequently the body can feel pleasure. However, this does not seem to be the case. Therefore, pleasure is not replenishment; but after replenishment takes place, a man will feel pleasure just as after a surgical operation he will feel pain. b’. The origin of this opinion. — 1995-1996 ἡ δόξα δ' αὕτη δοκεῖ γεγενῆσθαι ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὴν τροφὴν λυπῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν· ἐνδεεῖς γὰρ γενομένους καὶ προλυπηθέντας ἥδεσθαι τῇ ἀναπληρώσει. τοῦτο δ' οὐ περὶ πάσας συμβαίνει τὰς ἡδονάς· ἄλυποι γάρ εἰσιν αἵ τε μαθηματικαὶ καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις αἱ διὰ τῆς ὀσφρήσεως, καὶ ἀκροάματα δὲ καὶ ὁράματα πολλὰ καὶ μνῆμαι καὶ ἐλπίδες. τίνος οὖν αὗται γενέσεις ἔσονται; οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἔνδεια γεγένηται, οὗ γένοιτ' ἂν ἀναπλήρωσις. This opinion seems to arise from pains and pleasures associated with food. Certainly people who are distressed beforehand by lack of food receive pleasure by replenishment. However, this is not the case with all pleasures. For pleasures of (mathematical) knowledge are not preceded by pain, nor are the pleasures of sense-for example, smell-and sounds and sights; and the same is true of memories and hopes. If these are the result of generation, by what are they generated? No lack of anything has occurred to be replenished.
COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Non tamen si non qualitatum et cetera. Postquam philosophus removit obviationes Platonicorum ad rationes Eudoxi hic ponit rationes eorum contra ipsam positionem Eudoxi. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo proponit rationes ad ostendendum quod delectatio non sit de genere bonorum. Secundo ponit rationes ad ostendendum quod delectatio non sit per se et universaliter bonum, ibi, manifestare autem videtur et cetera. Et quia primae rationes falsum concludunt, ideo Aristoteles simul ponendo eas, destruit eas. Ponit ergo circa primum quatuor rationes. Quarum prima talis est. Bonum videtur ad genus qualitatis pertinere: quaerenti enim quale est hoc, respondemus, quoniam bonum. Delectatio autem non est qualitas; ergo non est bonum. 1980. After the Philosopher has dismissed the Platonists’ opposition to the arguments of Eudoxus, he now [B, 2] presents their arguments against Eudoxus’ position. He treats this point in a twofold manner. First [2, a] he proposes the arguments designed to show that pleasure does not belong to the category of good. Then [Lect. 4; 2, b], at “The distinction between etc.” (B. 1173 b 33), he offers the arguments to show that pleasure i t an absolute and universal good. Sit the first set of arguments conclude falsely, therefore Aristotle presents and disproves them at the same time. He gives four arguments on the first point. The first [a, i] is this. Good seems to come under the genus of quality; for, to a person asking what the quality of a thing is we answer that it is good. But pleasure is not a quality. Therefore it is not a good. Sed hoc Aristoteles removet dicens: quod non sequitur, si delectatio non sit de genere qualitatum, quod propter hoc non sit de genere bonorum, quia etiam operationes virtutis et ipsa felicitas, quae manifeste sunt de genere bonorum, (non sunt qualitates). Bonum enim dicitur non solum in qualitate, sed etiam in omnibus generibus, sicut in primo dictum est. 1981. But Aristotle rejects this, observing that even if pleasure does not come under the genus of quality, it does not follow that pleasure is not a good. For good is predicated not only of quality but also of every genus, as was indicated in the first book (81). Secundam rationem ponit ibi: dicunt autem et cetera. Et primo ponit ipsam rationem Platonicorum: dicebant enim quod esse bonum est determinatum, ut patet ex his quae supra in nono dicta sunt. Delectatio autem, ut dicunt, est indeterminata. Quod probabant per hoc quod recipit magis et minus. Et sic concludebant quod delectatio non esset de genere bonorum. 1982. He presents the second argument [a, ii] at “But they maintain.” First [ii, x] he offers the reason of the Platonists themselves. They hold that good is determinate, as is evident from the discussion in the ninth book (1887)Now pleasure is indeterminate according to them-a statement they proved from the fact that it admits of degrees. Thus they concluded that pleasure did not come under the genus of good. Secundo ibi, siquidem igitur etc., destruit huiusmodi processum. Circa quod considerandum est, quod dupliciter aliquid recipit magis et minus. Uno modo in concreto. Alio modo in abstracto. Semper enim dicitur aliquid magis et minus per accessum ad aliquid unum vel per recessum ab eo; quando igitur id quod inest subiecto est unum et simplex, ipsum quidem in se non recipit magis et minus. Unde non dicitur magis et minus in abstracto. Sed potest dici magis et minus in concreto, ex eo quod subiectum magis et minus participat huiusmodi formam. Sicut patet in luce, quae est una et simplex forma. Unde non dicitur ipsa lux secundum magis et minus. Sed corpus dicitur magis vel minus lucidum, eo quod perfectius vel minus perfecte participat lucem. 1983. Next [ii, y], at “Now if they etc.,” he rejects such an argument. On this point we must remember that a thing admits of degrees in two ways: one, in the concrete; the other, in the abstract. Something is called more and and less by reason of nearness to an object or remoteness from it. When, therefore, a thing that exists in a subject has oneness and simplicity, it does not admit of more and less in itself. Hence it is not said to admit of degrees in the abstract. But it can be predicated according to more and less in the concrete because the subject partakes more and less of such a form, as is evident in the case of light which is an undivided and simple form. Consequently, light itself is not predicated according to more and less. However, a body is termed more or less luminous from this that it partakes of light more or less perfectly. Quando autem est aliqua forma quae in sui ratione importat quamdam proportionem multorum ordinatorum ad unum, talis forma etiam secundum propriam rationem recipit magis et minus. Sicut patet de sanitate et pulchritudine; quorum utrumque importat proportionem convenientem naturae eius quod dicitur pulchrum vel sanum. Et quia huiusmodi proportio potest esse vel magis vel minus conveniens, inde est quod ipsa pulchritudo vel sanitas in se considerata dicitur secundum magis et minus. Et ex hoc patet quod unitas secundum quam aliquid est determinatum est causa quod aliquid non recipiat magis et minus. Quia ergo delectatio recipit magis et minus, videbatur non esse aliquid determinatum et per consequens non esse de genere bonorum. 1984. On the other hand, when there exists a form that in its nature indicates a proportion between many individuals referred to one principle, that form admits of degrees even according to its own nature. This is evident of health and beauty: each implies a proportion appropriate to the nature of an object designated as beautiful or healthy. And since a proportion of this kind can be more or less appropriate, consequently beauty and health considered in themselves are predicated according to more and less. It is obvious from this that unity, by which something is determinate, is the reason why a thing may not admit of degrees. Since then pleasure does admit of degrees, it seemed not to be something determinate and consequently not to belong to the genus of good. Aristotiles igitur huic obviando dicit quod, si Platonici iudicant delectationem esse aliquid indeterminatum ex eo quod recipit magis et minus in concreto, videlicet per hoc quod contingit aliquem delectari magis et minus, erit idem dicere circa iustitiam et alias virtutes, secundum quas aliqui dicuntur esse aliquales magis et minus. Sunt enim aliqui magis et minus iusti et fortes. Et idem etiam accidit circa actiones. Contingit enim quod aliquis agat iuste et temperate magis et minus. Et secundum hoc, vel virtutes non erunt de genere bonorum, vel praedicta ratio non removet delectationem esse de genere bonorum. 1985. Therefore, Aristotle in opposing this observes that, if the Platonists hold that pleasure is something indeterminate because it admits of degrees in the concrete—by reason of the fact that someone can be pleased more and less—they will have to admit the same about justice and other virtues according to which people are designated such more and less. Certainly some men are just and brave in a greater or less degree. The same is true concerning actions, for someone can act more and less justly and temperately. Thus, either virtues will not belong to the genus of good, or the reason offered does not remove pleasure from the genus of good. Si vero dicant delectationem recipere magis et minus ex parte ipsarum delectationum: considerandum est ne forte eorum ratio non referatur ad omnes delectationes, sed assignent causam quod quaedam delectationes sunt simplices et immixtae, puta delectatio quae sequitur contemplationem veri, quaedam autem delectationes sunt mixtae, puta quae sequuntur contemperantiam aliquorum sensibilium, sicut quae sequuntur harmoniam sonorum, aut commixtionem saporum, seu colorum. Manifestum est enim, quod delectatio simplex secundum se non recipiet magis et minus, sed sola mixta; inquantum scilicet contemperantia sensibilium quae delectationem causat potest esse magis vel minus conveniens naturae eius qui delectatur. 1986. However, if they maintain that pleasure admits of degrees on the part of the pleasures themselves, we must consider that perhaps their argument may not apply to all pleasures; but they are indicating the reason why some pleasures are pure and unmixed, for example, the pleasure following the contemplation of truth, and other pleasures are mixed like those following a pleasing combination of some kinds of sensibles, for instance, pleasures resulting from musical harmony or the blending of tastes or colors. Obviously, pure pleasure of itself does not admit of degrees but only mixed pleasure, inasmuch as a pleasing combination of sensibles causing pleasure can be more or less agreeable to the nature of the person enjoying it. Sed tamen neque etiam delectationes quae secundum se recipiunt magis et minus ratione suae mixtionis, oportet non esse determinatas, neque bonas. Nihil enim prohibet quin delectatio recipiens magis et minus sit determinata, sicut et sanitas. Huiusmodi enim determinata dici possunt, inquantum aliqualiter attingunt id ad quod ordinantur, licet possent propinquius attingere. Sicut commixtio humorum habet rationem sanitatis ex eo quod attingit convenientiam humanae naturae; et ex hoc dicitur determinata, quasi proprium terminum attingens. 1987. Nevertheless, neither is it necessary that pleasures, which in themselves admit of degrees by reason of their admixture, are not determinate or good. Nothing prevents pleasure, which allows of more or less, from being determinate-as health is in fact. Qualities of this kind may be called determinate inasmuch as they reach in some way that to which they are ordered although they might come closer. Thus a’ mixture of humors contains the reason for health from the fact that it attains a harmony in human nature; and by reason of this it is called determinate attaining its proper end, so to speak. Sed complexio quae nullo modo ad hoc attingit, non est determinata, sed est procul a ratione sanitatis. Ideo autem sanitas secundum se recipit magis et minus, quia non est eadem commensuratio humorum in omnibus hominibus, neque etiam in uno et eodem est semper eadem. Sed etiam si remittatur, permanet ratio sanitatis usque ad aliquem terminum. Et sic differt sanitas secundum magis et minus. Et eadem ratio est de delectatione mixta. 1988. But a temperament that in no way attains this is not determinate but is far from the notion of health. For that reason health of itself admits of more and less because the same proportion of humors is not found in all men, nor is it always the same in one and the same person. But, even when diminished, health remains up to a certain point. Hence health differs according to degrees; and the same is true of pleasure. Tertiam rationem ponit ibi, perfectumque et cetera. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ponit ipsam rationem. Ponebant enim Platonici, id quod est per se bonum esse quiddam perfectum; omnes autem motiones et generationes sunt imperfectae. Est enim motus actus imperfecti, ut dicitur in tertio physicorum. Unde nullam motionem seu generationem ponunt esse de genere bonorum. Nituntur autem affirmare quod delectatio sit motio vel generatio. Unde concludunt quod delectatio non est per se bonum. 1989. At “Again, they postulate” he offers the third argument [a, iii] and discusses it in a twofold manner. First [iii, x] he proposes the argument. The Platonists held that what is good in itself (per se) is something perfect. But motion and processes of generation are imperfect, for motion is an act of an imperfect thing, as stated in the third book of the Physics (Ch. 2, 201 b 27-202 a 2; St. Th. Lect. 3, 296). Consequently they maintain that no motion or process of generation belongs to the genus of good. And they try to establish that pleasure is a motion or a process of generation. Hence they conclude that pleasure is not a good in itself (per se). Secundo ibi: non bene autem etc., excludit hanc rationem dupliciter. Primo quidem quantum ad hoc, quod dicunt delectationem esse motionem. Et dicit quod non bene videntur dicere dum dicunt, delectationem esse motionem. Omnis enim motio videtur esse velox aut tarda. Velocitas autem et tarditas non conveniunt motioni absolute secundum seipsam, sed per respectum ad aliud. Sicut motio mundi, idest motus diurnus, quo revolvitur totum caelum, dicitur velox per respectum ad alios motus. 1990. Then [iii, y], at “But they do not seem,” he rejects this argument under two aspects. First [y, aa], as to their assertion that pleasure is a mo. tion. He states that they are apparently not correct when they maintain that pleasure is a motion, for every motion seems to be swift or slow. But swiftness and slowness are not proper to motion considered absolutely and in itself but in relation to something else. For example, the motion of the earth, i.e., the daily motion, in which the whole heavens revolve, is called swift in comparison with other motions. Et huius ratio est, quia sicut in IV physicorum habetur, velox est quod in pauco tempore multum movetur: tardum autem quod in multo parum, multum autem et paucum dicuntur ad aliquid, ut habetur in praedicamentis. Sed delectationi non competit neque velocitas neque tarditas. Contingit quidem quod aliquis pervenit velociter ad delectationem, sicut aliquis velociter provocatur ad iram. Sed quod aliquis delectetur velociter vel tarde, non dicitur, neque etiam per respectum ad alterum, sicut velociter dicitur aliquis aut tarde ire, aut augeri, et omnia huiusmodi. Sic igitur patet quod contingit (quod) velociter et tarde aliquis transponatur in delectationem, idest quod perveniat ad ipsam. 1991. The reason for this—as is pointed out in the sixth book of the Physics (Ch. 2, 232 a 25-232 b 20; St. Th. Lect. 3, 766-773)—is that a thing is called “swift” which moves a great distance in a short time and “slow” a little distance in a long time. Now “great” and “little” are predicated relatively, as indicated in the Categories (Ch. 6, 5 b 15-30). But neither swiftness nor slowness are attributable to pleasure. To be sure a man can become pleased quickly, just as he can become angry quickly. But we do not say that a man can be pleased quickly or slowly, not even in comparison with someone else, as we do say that a man can walk quickly or slowly, can grow quickly or slowly, and so on. So then obviously someone can be changed into a state of pleasure, i.e., can arrive at it quickly or slowly. Et hoc ideo, quia per aliquem motum potest perveniri ad delectationem. Sed non contingit velociter operari secundum delectationem, ut scilicet aliquis velociter delectetur. Quia ipsum delectari magis est in factum esse quam in fieri. 1992. This is so because we can attain pleasure by a kind of motion. But we cannot function quickly in the state of pleasure so that we are quickly pleased. The reason is that the act of being pleased consists in something done (in facto) rather than in something taking place (in fieri). Secundo ibi: et generatio etc., excludit rationem Platonicorum quantum ad hoc, quod ponebant delectationem esse generationem. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit, quod delectatio non sit generatio. Secundo ostendit originem huius opinionis, ibi, opinio autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod delectatio non videtur esse generatio. Non enim videtur quidlibet ex quolibet generari. Sed unumquodque, ex quo generatur, in hoc dissolvitur. Et oportet, si delectatio est generatio, quod eiusdem tristitia sit corruptio, cuius delectatio est generatio. Et hoc quidem Platonici asserunt. Dicunt enim quod tristitia est defectus eius quod est secundum naturam, videmus enim quod ex separatione eius quod naturaliter unitur sequitur dolor. Et similiter dicunt, quod delectatio sit repletio: quia cum apponitur aliquid alicui, quod ei convenit secundum naturam, sequitur delectatio. 1993. Next [y, bb], at “And how can it be,” he rejects the Platonists’ argument to uphold their opinion that pleasure is a process of generation. He discusses this point in a twofold manner. First [bb, a’] he shows that pleasure is not a process of generation. Then [bb, b’], at “This opinion seems etc.,” he shows the origin of this opinion. He remarks first that pleasure does not appear to be a process of generation, for it does not seem that any chance thing is generated from any other chance thing. But everything is dissolved into that from which it is generated. If pleasure is a generation, pain must be the destruction of the same thing which pleasure generates. This is affirmed by the Platonists who hold that pain is a deficiency in what is according to nature, for we see that pain follows a person’s privation of those things to which he is naturally united. Likewise they maintain that pleasure is a replenishment because pleasure follows when something naturally belonging to a man is added to him. Sed hoc ipse improbat, quia separatio et repletio sunt corporales passiones. Si ergo delectatio est repletio eius quod est secundum naturam, sequetur illud delectari in quo est repletio. Sequetur ergo quod corpus delectetur. Sed hoc non videtur esse verum; quia delectatio est passio animae. Patet ergo, quod delectatio non est ipsa repletio seu generatio, sed quiddam ad hoc consequens, facta enim repletione aliquis delectatur sicut facta incisione aliquis dolet et tristatur. 1994. But Aristotle rejects this argument because privation and replenishment are bodily passions. If then pleasure is a replenishment of what is according to nature, the part replenished will feel pleasure. Consequently the body can feel pleasure. But this does not seem to be the case because pleasure is a passion of the soul. Therefore it is clear that pleasure is not a replenishment or a process of generation but a consequence of it. A man feels pleasure after replenishment just as he feels pain and distress after a surgical operation. Deinde cum dicit: opinio autem etc., ostendit originem huius opinionis. Et dicit, quod haec opinio quae ponit delectationem esse repletionem, et tristitiam subtractionem, videtur provenisse ex tristitiis et delectationibus, quae sunt circa cibum. Illi enim qui prius fuerunt tristati propter indigentiam cibi, postea delectantur in ipsa repletione. Sed hoc non accidit circa omnes delectationes; inveniuntur enim quaedam delectationes in quibus non est repletio alicuius defectus. Delectationes enim quae sunt in considerationibus mathematicis, non habent tristitiam oppositam, quam ponunt in defectu consistere. Et ita huiusmodi delectationes non sunt ad repletionem defectus. Et idem apparet in delectationibus quae sunt secundum sensus, puta per olfactum, auditum, et visum praesentium sensibilium. 1995. Then [bb, b], at “This opinion seems,” he shows its origin. He observes that the view that sees pleasure as a replenishment and pain as a privation seems to arise from pains and pleasures concerned with food. People who beforehand are distressed by the lack of food, afterwards are pleased by replenishment. But this does not occur in connection with all pleasures where replenishment of a deficiency does not take place. For pleasures resulting from mathematical studies do not have an opposite pain, which they say consists in a deficiency. Thus pleasures of this sort do not exist for a replenishment of a need. It is evidently the same with some pleasures of sense such as smell, sound and the sight of physical objects. Sunt etiam multae species memoriae delectabiles; nec causa potest assignari, cuius generationes sunt huiusmodi delectationes; quia non inveniuntur aliqui defectus praecedentes quorum fiat repletio per huiusmodi delectationes. Dictum est autem supra, quod cuius generatio est delectatio, eius corruptio est tristitia. Unde, si aliqua delectatio invenitur absque defectu tristitiae, sequitur quod non omnis delectatio sit repletio. 1996. Besides, many delightful hopes and memories exist; and no cause can be assigned whose generations are pleasures of this sort, because there are no preceding defects which are replenished by means of these pleasures. But it was pointed out (1993) that if pleasure is the generation of a thing, pain is its destruction. Therefore, if any pleasure is found without the defect of pain, it follows that a pain is not the correlative of every pleasure.
A Fourth Argument that Pleasure Is Not a Good
Chapter 3 (a) iv. He refutes a fourth (argument). x. FIRST (REPUTATION) — 1997-1998 πρὸς δὲ τοὺς προφέροντας τὰς ἐπονειδίστους τῶν ἡδονῶν λέγοι τις ἂν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι ταῦθ' ἡδέα οὐ γὰρ εἰ τοῖς κακῶς διακειμένοις ἡδέα ἐστίν, οἰητέον αὐτὰ καὶ ἡδέα εἶναι πλὴν τούτοις, καθάπερ οὐδὲ τὰ τοῖς κάμνουσιν ὑγιεινὰ ἢ γλυκέα ἢ πικρά, οὐδ' αὖ λευκὰ τὰ φαινόμενα τοῖς ὀφθαλμιῶσιν· In answer to those who bring forward very disgraceful pleasures it can be said that these are not pleasant; for even if they are pleasing to the ill-disposed, we must not assume that they are really pleasant—except to such people—any more than what is wholesome or sweet or bitter to the sick is so in fact, or any more than objects which seem white to persons with diseased eyes are actually white. y. SECOND. — 1999 ἢ οὕτω λέγοι τις ἄν, ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἡδοναὶ αἱρεταί εἰσιν, οὐ μὴν ἀπό γε τούτων, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ πλουτεῖν, προδόντι δ' οὔ, καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, οὐ μὴν ὁτιοῦν φαγόντι· Or we may concede that pleasures are desirable but not from these sources. Thus wealth is desirable but not as the price of betrayal, so too is health but not as a result of eating things indifferently. z. THIRD. — 2000 ἢ τῷ εἴδει διαφέρουσιν αἱ ἡδοναί· ἕτεραι γὰρ αἱ ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν τῶν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσχρῶν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡσθῆναι τὴν τοῦ δικαίου μὴ ὄντα δίκαιον οὐδὲ τὴν τοῦ μουσικοῦ μὴ ὄντα μουσικόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. Again, we may say that pleasures differ in kind: some are derived from honorable sources and others from base sources. Now it is impossible to enjoy the pleasure proper to the just man without being just, to enjoy the pleasure proper to a musician without being musical. And this applies to other pleasures. b. Pleasure is not a good in itself for three reasons. i. First. — 2001 ἐμφανίζειν δὲ δοκεῖ καὶ ὁ φίλος ἕτερος ὢν τοῦ κόλακος οὐκ οὖσαν ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἡδονὴν ἢ διαφόρους εἴδει· ὃ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τἀγαθὸν ὁμιλεῖν δοκεῖ, ὃ δὲ πρὸς ἡδονήν, καὶ τῷ μὲν ὀνειδίζεται, τὸν δ' ἐπαινοῦσιν ὡς πρὸς ἕτερα ὁμιλοῦντα. The distinction between a friend and a flatterer seems to show that pleasure is not a good or that pleasures differ in kind. For a friend is thought to intend good in his association but the flatterer, pleasure; the latter is blamed with reproach but the former praised, for no other reason than the ends they pursue. ii. Second. — 2002 οὐδείς τ' ἂν ἕλοιτο ζῆν παιδίου διάνοιαν ἔχων διὰ βίου, ἡδόμενος ἐφ' οἷς τὰ παιδία ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα, οὐδὲ χαίρειν ποιῶν τι τῶν αἰσχίστων, μηδέποτε μέλλων λυπηθῆναι. And certainly no one would choose to retain the mind of a child throughout life in order to have the pleasures that children are thought especially to enjoy. Nor would anyone choose to find pleasure in doing an extremely shameful act even though he might never have to suffer pain as a result. iii. Third. — 2003-2004 περὶ πολλά τε σπουδὴν ποιησαίμεθ' ἂν καὶ εἰ μηδεμίαν ἐπιφέροι ἡδονήν, οἷον ὁρᾶν, μνημονεύειν, εἰδέναι, τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχειν. εἰ δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἕπονται τούτοις ἡδοναί, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· ἑλοίμεθα γὰρ ἂν ταῦτα καὶ εἰ μὴ γίνοιτ' ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἡδονή. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὔτε τἀγαθὸν ἡ ἡδονὴ οὔτε πᾶσα αἱρετή, δῆλον ἔοικεν εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι εἰσί τινες αἱρεταὶ καθ' αὑτὰς διαφέρουσαι τῷ εἴδει ἢ ἀφ' ὧν. τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ἱκανῶς εἰρήσθω. Likewise, there are many things we should be eager about even though they do not produce pleasure, for example, sight, memory, knowledge, possession of virtues. It makes no difference whether pleasures necessarily follow these activities, for we would choose them if no pleasure resulted. It is obvious, therefore, that pleasure is not a good in itself (per se), that not every pleasure is desirable, and that some pleasures are desirable in themselves, being different from the others in kind or in their sources. We have now treated sufficiently the opinions about pleasure and pain.
COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Ad proferentes autem et cetera. Postquam philosophus exclusit tres rationes Platonicorum concludentium delectationem non esse de genere bonorum, hic excludit quartam, quae sumitur ex turpitudine quarumdam delectationum. Platonici enim proferebant in medium quasdam opprobriosas delectationes, puta adulteriorum et ebrietatum, ut ex his ostenderent delectationes non esse de genere bonorum. Sed ad hoc Aristoteles tripliciter obviat. 1997. After the Philosopher has disproved the three arguments of the Platonists concluding that pleasure does not belong to the category of good, he now [a, iv] refutes a fourth argument that they draw from the vileness of some pleasures. The Platonists adduce certain disgraceful pleasures, like adultery and drunkenness, to show that pleasures do not come under the category of good. But Aristotle answers this argument in a threefold manner. Non enim sequitur, si aliqua sunt delectabilia male dispositis, quod propter hoc sint delectabilia simpliciter; nisi quod sunt delectabilia his, id est male dispositis, sicut etiam neque sunt simpliciter sana illa quae sunt sana infirmis neque etiam sunt simpliciter dulcia vel amara, quae videntur huiusmodi habentibus gustum infectum; neque etiam sunt simpliciter alba, quae videntur talia his qui patiuntur obtalmiam. Et haec quidem solutio procedit secundum quod delectabile dicitur simpliciter homini id quod est ei delectabile secundum rationem. Quod non contingit de huiusmodi turpibus, quamvis sint delectabilia secundum sensum. 1998. First [iv, x], as someone might observe, disgraceful pleasures are not pleasant in the absolute sense. If some pleasures are delightful to the ill-disposed, it does not follow that they are pleasing in themselves but only to persons prone to vice. just as the things that seem healthful to the sick are not in themselves healthful, so the things that seem sweet or bitter to people with perverted taste are not in themselves sweet or bitter; nor are objects that seem white to persons with diseased eyes really white. This solution proceeds on the assumption that unqualified pleasure for man is what is pleasant according to reason—a circumstance not possible with physical pleasures of this kind, although they are pleasing to the senses. Secundam obviationem ponit ibi, vel sic utique et cetera. Potest enim dici, quod omnes delectationes sint eligibiles, non tamen omnibus, sicut etiam ditari bonum est; non tamen est bonum quod ditetur ille qui est proditor patriae; quia sic potest magis nocere. Similiter etiam esse sanum bonum est, non tamen est bonum ei qui comedit aliquid nocivum. Sicut serpens comestus, quandoque curat leprosum, licet perimat sanum. Et similiter delectationes bestiales, bestiis quidem sunt appetibiles, non autem hominibus. 1999. He presents the second refutation [iv, y] at “Or we may concede.” It can be admitted that all pleasures are desirable but not in relation to all persons. For example, it is good to be enriched, but it is not good for a traitor to his country to be enriched because in this way he can do more harm. Likewise health is good but not for one who has eaten something harmful. Thus eating a snake sometimes cures a leper although it may destroy health. Similarly bestial pleasures are certainly desirable for animals but not for men. Tertiam obviationem ponit ibi, vel specie et cetera. Et dicit, quod delectationes specie differunt. Aliae enim sunt secundum speciem delectationes quae causantur a bonis operibus, ab illis quae causantur a turpibus. Differunt enim passiones secundum obiecta. Et ita ille qui non est iustus, non potest delectari delectatione quae est propria iusti, sicut nec ille qui non est musicus potest delectari delectatione musici. Et idem est de aliis delectationibus. 2000. At “Again, we may say” [iv, z] he offers the third refutation, observing that pleasures differ in kind. Pleasures resulting from virtuous actions differ in kind from those resulting from shameful actions, for passions differ according to their objects. The unjust man cannot enjoy the pleasure proper to the just man, just as an unmusical person cannot enjoy a musician’s delight. And the same applies to other pleasures. Deinde cum dicit manifestare autem etc., probat quod delectatio non sit per se et universaliter bonum. Et hoc tribus rationibus. Circa quarum primam dicit, quod hoc, quod delectatio non sit bonum, vel quod sint diversae species delectationis, quarum quaedam sint bonae et quaedam malae, manifestat differentia quae est inter amicum et adulatorem. Amicus enim colloquitur amico propter bonum, adulator autem propter delectationem. Unde adulator vituperatur, amicus autem laudatur: et sic patet, quod propter diversa colloquuntur. Est ergo aliud delectatio, et aliud bonum. 2001. Then [2, b], at “The distinction between,” he proves that pleasure is not a good in itself (per se) and in a universal sense, for three reasons. Concerning the first reason [b, i] he remarks: the difference between a friend and a flatterer shows that pleasure is not a good or that there are different kinds of pleasure some honorable and others base. A friend converses with a friend to some go purpose, but the flatterer to please. Hence a flatterer is blamed with reproach but a friend is praised, and so it is clear that they converse out of different motives. Therefore pleasure is one thing and good another. Secundam rationem ponit ibi: nullusque utique et cetera. Et dicit, quod nullus eligeret per totam vitam suam habere mentem pueri, ita quod semper delectaretur in quibus pueri delectantur, qui tamen aestimantur maxime delectari. Neque etiam aliquis eligeret gaudere faciendo turpissima per totam vitam suam, etiam si nunquam deberet tristari. Quod dicit contra Epicuros, qui ponebant quod turpes delectationes non sunt vitandae, nisi propter hoc quod inducunt in maiores tristitias. Et sic patet, quod delectatio non est per se bonum, quia quolibet modo esset eligenda. 2002. He presents the second reason [b, ii] at “And certainly no one.” No man, he says, would choose to retain a childish mind all his life so that he might always have the so-called pleasures of childhood. Nor would anyone choose to take pleasure in doing cxtremely shameful actions throughout his life even if he might never have to suffer pain. This statement is made against the Epicureans who maintain that shameful pleasures are to be shunned only because they bring about greater suffering. Thus it is clear that pleasure is not a good in itself (per se), because it would have to be chosen under every circumstance. Tertiam rationem ponit ibi, et circa multa et cetera. Manifestum est enim, multa esse ad quae homo studeret, etiam si nulla delectatio ex his sequeretur: sicut videre, recordari, scire, virtutem habere. Nihil autem differt ad propositum si ex his sequuntur delectationes, quia etiam praedicta eligerentur nulla delectatione ab his consequente. Id autem quod est per se bonum tale est sine quo nihil est eligibile ut patet de felicitate. Sic ergo delectatio non est per se bonum. 2003. He states the third reason [b, iii] at “Likewise, there are.” Obviously there are many things a man should be eager about even though no pleasure results from them, for example, sight, memory, knowledge, the possession of virtue. It makes no difference in the case whether pleasures follow from these activities, because he would choose them even if they brought about no pleasure. But that which is good in itself (per se) is of such a nature that without it nothing is desirable, as is evident concerning happiness. Therefore pleasure is not a good in itself (per se). Ultimo autem epilogando concludit, quod manifestum videtur esse ex praemissis, quod delectatio non sit per se bonum, et quod non omnis delectatio sit eligibilis. Et quod quaedam delectationes sunt eligibiles, quae vel secundum seipsas differunt specie a malis delectationibus, vel secundum ea a quibus causantur. Et sic sufficienter tractatum est de his, quae ab aliis dicuntur de delectatione et tristitia. 2004. Finally, he summarizes in conclusion that it seems obvious from the premises that pleasure is not a good in itself (per se), and that not every pleasure is desirable; and that some pleasures are desirable even in themselves, being different from evil pleasures either in their kind or in their sources. We have now discussed sufficiently the opinions of others on pleasure and pain.
Pleasure Is Neither a Motion Nor a Process of Change
Chapter 4 I. HE SHOWS THAT PLEASURE DOES NOT COME UNDER THE CATEGORY OF MOTION. A. He proposes his intention. — 2005 τί δ' ἐστὶν ἢ ποῖόν τι, καταφανέστερον γένοιτ' ἂν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἀναλαβοῦσιν. The nature and quality of pleasure will become clearer if we take up the question again from the beginning. B. He carries out his proposition. 1. A PRINCIPLE NECESSARY FOR AN EXPLANATION. — 2006-2007 δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡ μὲν ὅρασις καθ' ὁντινοῦν χρόνον τελεία εἶναι· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐνδεὴς οὐδενὸς ὃ εἰς ὕστερον γινόμενον τελειώσει αὐτῆς τὸ εἶδος· τοιούτῳ δ' ἔοικε καὶ ἡ ἡδονή. ὅλον γάρ τι ἐστί, καὶ κατ' οὐδένα χρόνον λάβοι τις ἂν ἡδονὴν ἧς ἐπὶ πλείω χρόνον γινομένης τελειωθήσεται τὸ εἶδος. Now, seeing seems perfect at any moment whatsoever, for it does not require anything coming later to complete its form. But pleasure appears to be a thing of this nature: it is a whole, and at no time can anyone find a pleasure whose form will be completed if it lasts longer. 2. HE PROVES THE PROPOSITION (BY TWO ARGUMENTS). a. First. i. He... states a conclusion. — 2008-2009 διόπερ οὐδὲ κίνησίς ἐστιν. Therefore, pleasure is not a form of motion. ii. The major of the previous argument. x. CONCERNING THE PROCESS OF GENERATION. — 2010-2012 ἐν χρόνῳ γὰρ πᾶσα κίνησις καὶ τέλους τινός, οἷον ἡ οἰκοδομική, καὶ τελεία ὅταν ποιήσῃ οὗ ἐφίεται. ἢ ἐν ἅπαντι δὴ τῷ χρόνῳ ἢ τούτῳ. ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέρεσι καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ πᾶσαι ἀτελεῖς, καὶ ἕτεραι τῷ εἴδει τῆς ὅλης καὶ ἀλλήλων. ἡ γὰρ τῶν λίθων σύνθεσις ἑτέρα τῆς τοῦ κίονος ῥαβδώσεως, καὶ αὗται τῆς τοῦ ναοῦ ποιήσεως· καὶ ἡ μὲν τοῦ ναοῦ τελεία οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἐνδεὴς πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον, ἡ δὲ τῆς κρηπῖδος καὶ τοῦ τριγλύφου ἀτελής· μέρους γὰρ ἑκατέρα. τῷ εἴδει οὖν διαφέρουσι, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ὁτῳοῦν χρόνῳ λαβεῖν κίνησιν τελείαν τῷ εἴδει, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, ἐν τῷ ἅπαντι. For every motion involves duration and is a means to an end, e.g., the process of building that is perfect when it effect ts what it aims at—a thing achieved either over the whole time or at the final moment. All the movements are imperfect during the portions of that time and are different in kind from the completed process and from one another. Thus in building a temple the fitting of the stones is different from the fluting of a column, and both are different from the construction of the whole edifice. And while the building of the temple is a perfect process requiring nothing more to achieve the end, laying the foundation and constructing the triglyph are imperfect processes (each produces only a part). Therefore they differ in kind, and it is not possible to find motion specifically perfect at any one moment but, if at all, only in the whole space of time. y. CONCERNING LOCOMOTION. — 2013-2017 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ βαδίσεως καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν. εἰ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ φορὰ κίνησις πόθεν ποῖ, καὶ ταύτης διαφοραὶ κατ' εἴδη, πτῆσις βάδισις ἅλσις καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. οὐ μόνον δ' οὕτως, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ βαδίσει· τὸ γὰρ πόθεν ποῖ οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ σταδίῳ καὶ ἐν τῷ μέρει, καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ μέρει καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ, οὐδὲ τὸ διεξιέναι τὴν γραμμὴν τήνδε κἀκείνην· οὐ μόνον γὰρ γραμμὴν διαπορεύεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τόπῳ οὖσαν, ἐν ἑτέρῳ δ' αὕτη ἐκείνης. δι' ἀκριβείας μὲν οὖν περὶ κινήσεως ἐν ἄλλοις εἴρηται, ἔοικε δ' οὐκ ἐν ἅπαντι χρόνῳ τελεία εἶναι, ἀλλ' αἱ πολλαὶ ἀτελεῖς καὶ διαφέρουσαι τῷ εἴδει, εἴπερ τὸ πόθεν ποῖ εἰδοποιόν. τῆς ἡδονῆς δ' ἐν ὁτῳοῦν χρόνῳ τέλειον τὸ εἶδος. δῆλον οὖν ὡς ἕτεραί τ' ἂν εἶεν ἀλλήλων, καὶ τῶν ὅλων τι καὶ τελείων ἡ ἡδονή. The same is true of walking and other movements. For, if locomotion is motion from one point in space to another, it also has differences in kind-flying, walking, leaping, and so on. And not only this, but there are differences in walking itself; for the starting and finishing points of the whole racecourse are not the same as those of a part of the course, nor are those of one part the same as those of another; nor is the motion of traversing this line and that line the same, since a runner not only travels along a line but along a line existing in place and this line is in a different place b from that. We have adequately discussed motion in another work, and it seems that motion is not complete at any moment but there are many incomplete motions differing in kind, since the starting and finishing points specify the motion. On the other hand pleasure is specifically complete at any and every moment. It is obvious then that motions are different from one another and that pleasure belongs to the things which are whole and complete. b. Second (argument). — 2018-2019 δόξειε δ' ἂν τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι κινεῖσθαι μὴ ἐν χρόνῳ, ἥδεσθαι δέ· τὸ γὰρ ἐν τῷ νῦν ὅλον τι. Likewise, this is thought to be the case because motion necessarily occupies a space of time, but pleasure does not because that which occurs in a moment is a whole. 3. HE CONCLUDES WHAT HE PRINCIPALLY INTENDED. — 2020-2021 ἐκ τούτων δὲ δῆλον καὶ ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λέγουσι κίνησιν ἢ γένεσιν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν. οὐ γὰρ πάντων ταῦτα λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τῶν μεριστῶν καὶ μὴ ὅλων· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁράσεώς ἐστι γένεσις οὐδὲ στιγμῆς οὐδὲ μονάδος, οὐδὲ τούτων οὐθὲν κίνησις οὐδὲ γένεσις· οὐδὲ δὴ ἡδονῆς· ὅλον γάρ τι. From these considerations it is obviously a mistake to speak of pleasure as motion or a process of generation. For these attributes cannot be predicated of all things but only of such as are divisible and not wholes. Thus there is no process of generation in the act of seeing, in a point or in unity, nor is there any motion in them. Consequently there is no motion or process in pleasure either, for it is a whole.
COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Quid autem est vel quale quid et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de delectatione secundum aliorum opinionem, hic determinat de ea secundum veritatem. Et primo ostendit delectationem non esse in genere motus, seu generationis sicut a Platonicis ponebatur. Secundo determinat naturam et proprietatem ipsius, ibi, sensus autem omnis et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo dicit de quo est intentio, et modum agendi. Et dicit, quod manifestius fiet per sequentia, quid sit delectatio, secundum genus suum, vel quale quid sit, idest utrum sit bona vel mala, si a principio resumamus considerationem de ipsa. 2005. After the Philosopher has outlined other opinions about pleasures, he now gives the real definition. First [I] he shows that pleasure does not come under the category of motion or process of generation, as the Platonists held. Then [Lect. 6; II], at “Again, every sense etc.” (B. 1174 b 14), he defines its nature and characteristic quality. He treats the first point from two aspects. First [I, A] he proposes his intention and method of procedure, remarking that the natureof pleasure (according to its genus) and its quality (whether it is good or bad) will be made clearer from the following discussion if we take up this question again from the beginning. Secundo ibi, videtur enim etc., exequitur propositum. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo praemittit quoddam principium necessarium ad propositum ostendendum. Secundo ostendit propositum, ibi, propter quod neque motus et cetera. Tertio concludit principale intentum, ibi, ex his autem manifestum et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod operatio sensus visus, quae dicitur visio est perfecta, secundum quodcumque tempus. Non enim indiget aliquo posterius advenienti, quod perficiat eius speciem. Et hoc ideo, quia visio completur in primo instanti temporis; si autem requireretur tempus ad eius complementum, non quodcumque tempus ad hoc sufficeret; sed oporteret esse tempus determinatum, sicut accidit in ceteris quae fiunt in tempore, quorum generatio certam temporis mensuram requirit. Sed visio statim in momento perficitur. Et idem est de delectatione. 2006. Next [I, B], at “Now, seeing seems,” he carries out his proposition. He does this in a threefold manner. First [B, 1] he introduces a principle necessary for an explanation of the proposition. Then [B, 2], at “Therefore, etc.,” he proves the proposition. Third [B, 3], at “From these considerations etc.,” he concludes what he principally intended. He says first that the operation of the sense of sight called seeing is complete at any moment whatsoever. It does not require anything coming later to perfect its form. This is so because seeing is completed in the first instant of time. Now if time were needed for its completion, no time whatsoever would suffice but a certain duration would be necessary, as is the case with other activities occurring in time whose generation requires a particular measure of time. But seeing is perfected in a moment. The same is true of pleasure. Delectatio enim est quoddam totum, idest completum in primo instanti quo incipit esse, ita quod non potest accipi aliquod tempus in quo sit delectatio quod requirat amplius tempus ad speciem delectationis perficiendam, sicut contingit in his quorum generatio est in tempore; potest enim accipi aliquod tempus generationis humanae quod requirat amplius tempus ad speciem humanam perficiendam. 2007. Pleasure is a whole, i.e., something completed in the first instant of its inception. Thus a space of time cannot be assigned in which pleasure may take place, in the sense that more time is needed to complete its form, as in those activities whose generation requires an interval of time. The moment of human generation can be indicated because more time is necessary to perfect the human form. Deinde cum dicit propter quod neque motus etc., ostendit propositum duabus rationibus. Quarum prima talis est. Omnis motus seu generatio perficitur in determinato tempore, in cuius parte nondum est motus perfectus. Hoc autem non accidit circa delectationem. Ergo delectatio non est motus, neque generatio. 2008. At “Therefore” [B, 2] he proves the proposition by two arguments. The first [2, a]: every movement or process of generation is perfected after a lapse of time and the motion is not yet completed in a part of that time. This is not true of pleasure. Therefore pleasure is neither a movement nor a process of generation. Circa hanc autem rationem primo ponit conclusionem; concludens ex praemisso principio, in quo virtualiter tota ratio continetur, quod delectatio non est motus. 2009. In connection with this argument he first [a, i] states a conclusion deducing from the preceding principle—in which virtually the whole reason is contained—that pleasure is not a motion. Secundo autem ibi: in tempore enim etc., ponit maiorem praemissae rationis; videlicet quod omnis motus est in tempore, et omnis motus est alicuius finis, idest habens aliquem finem, ad quem ordinatur, ad quem determinato tempore pervenit. Et hoc manifestat primo quidem circa generationem. Ars enim aedificativa perficit suam operationem, quando perficit id quod intendit, scilicet domum; quod quidem facit in toto aliquo determinato tempore, in cuius partibus omnes generationes sunt imperfectae, et differunt specie a tota generatione completa, et etiam adinvicem. Cuius ratio est, quia generatio speciem recipit secundum formam, quae est finis generationis. 2010. Next [a, ii], at “For every motion,” he presents the major of the previous argument: every motion involves duration; and every motion is a means to an end, i.e., has an end to which it is ordered and which it attains with the lapse of time. He shows this first [ii, x] concerning the process of generation, For the art of building perfects its operation when it completes what it intends, namely, a house. It does this in some whole interval of time; and all the processes are imperfect during the portions of that time and are different in kind—and even among themselves—from the complete process. The reason for this is that generation receives its species from the form which is the end of the process. Manifestum est autem quod aliud est forma totius et aliud sunt formae singularium partium. Unde et generationes differunt specie abinvicem. Si enim aliquod templum aedificetur in aliquo determinato tempore, in aliqua parte illius temporis componuntur lapides ad parietis constructionem. In alia vero parte temporis virgantur columnae, idest in modum virgarum sculpuntur. Sed in toto tempore construitur ipsum templum. Et haec tria differunt specie: scilicet lapidum compositio, columnarum virgatio, et templi aedificatio. 2011. But the form of the whole operation is one thing and the forms of the individual parts are another. Hence the processes also differ from one another in kind. For if a temple is constructed in a certain period of time, one portion of time is occupied in fitting the stones for the building of the wall, another portion in fluting (virgantur) the columns, i.e., sculpturing them in the manner of rods (virgarum). But during the whole time the temple itself is constructed. And these three operations differ in kind: the fitting of the stones, the fluting of the columns, and the construction of the temple. Est tamen circa hoc considerandum, quod sicut forma totius templi est perfecta, formae autem partium sunt imperfectae, ita etiam ipsa constructio templi est generatio perfecta, nullo enim exteriori indiget ad propositum aedificatoris explendum; sed generatio fundamenti est imperfecta, et similiter generatio trisculpti, idest columnarum sculptarum in tres ordines dispositarum supra fundamentum. Quia utrumque horum est generatio partis, quae habet rationem imperfecti. Sic ergo patet, quod praedictae generationes totius et partium differunt specie; et quod non est accipere, quod species motus perficiatur in quocumque tempore, sed perficitur in toto tempore. 2012. On this point we should note that, as the form of the whole temple is perfect but the forms of the parts are imperfect, so also the building of the temple itself is a perfect process—it requires nothing else to complete the plan of the builder—but laying the foundation is an imperfect process, as is also constructing the triglyph or the sculptured columns arranged in three rows above the foundation. And both of these are the making of a part having the nature of what is imperfect. It is evident then that the preceding constructions of the whole and of the parts differ specifically; and that we are not to understand that motion is specifically perfect at any part of the time but is completed in the whole period of time. Secundo ibi: similiter autem etc., manifestat idem in motu locali. Et dicit quod id quod dictum est de generatione, similiter videtur esse verum in ambulatione, et in omnibus aliis motibus. Manifestum est enim quod latio, id est motus localis, est motus unde et quo, idest a termino et ad terminum. Et sic oportet, quod specie diversificetur secundum diversitatem terminorum. Sunt autem diversae species motus localis in animalibus volatus qui convenit avibus, ambulatio quae convenit gressibilibus, saltatio quae convenit locustis, et alia huiusmodi quae differunt secundum diversas species principiorum moventium: non enim sunt eiusdem speciei animae diversorum animalium. 2013. Then [ii, y], at “The same is true,” he shows the same thing concerning locomotion. He observes that what is said about the process of generation seems also to be true about walking and all other movements, for it is obvious that all locomotion or local movement is motion from one point in space to another, i.e., from one term to another. Thus motion must be differentiated in kind according to a difference of terms. There are different kinds of locomotion among the animals: flying (suitable to birds), walking (suitable to gressorial creatures), leaping (suitable to grasshoppers) and other movements of this kind. These differ according to the different kinds of moving principles, for the souls of different animals do not belong to the same classification. Nec solum praedicto modo diversificantur species localium motuum; sed etiam in una dictarum specierum, puta ambulatione, diversae species inveniuntur. Si enim accipiatur motus quo quis perambulat stadium, et motus quo quis ambulat aliquam partem eius, non est utrobique idem unde et quo, idest terminus a quo et terminus ad quem. Et simile est de motibus, quibus aliquis perambulat hanc et illam partem stadii, quia non sunt idem termini, non enim est idem secundum speciem pertransire hanc lineam et illam, quamvis omnes lineae in quantum huiusmodi sint eiusdem speciei. 2014. The kinds of locomotion differ not only in the foregoing manner but also in one of these species, for instance, walking which is of different kinds. For traveling the whole racecourse and traveling a part of it do not have the same starting point and finishing line, i.e., the same terms a quo and ad quem. And the case is similar to traveling this or that part of the course because the boundaries are not the same. The motion of traversing this line and that line is not the same specifically, although all lines as such belong to the same species. Tamen secundum quod in certo situ seu loco constituuntur, accipiuntur ut specie differentes secundum diversitatem locorum, quae attenditur secundum diversum ordinem ad primum continens. Ille autem qui pertransit lineam, non solum pertransit lineam, sed lineam in loco existentem; quia in alio loco est una linea ab alia. Et ita manifestum est, quod secundum diversitatem terminorum, differt specie totus motus localis a singulis partibus; ita tamen, quod totus motus habet perfectam speciem, partes autem habent speciem imperfectam. 2015. As motions are constituted in a determined position or location, they are understood as differing specifically according to the difference of places, which is taken according to a different disposition in regard to the first encompassing spice. Now a runner not only travels along a line but along a line existing in place because this line is in a different place from that. Clearly then the whole locomotion differs specifically from each of its parts according to the difference of boundaries, in such a way however that the whole motion is perfect specifically but the parts imperfectly so. Et quia ad manifestationem praedictorum requireretur plene cognoscere naturam motus, subiungit, quod in aliis, idest in libro physicorum, dictum est de motu per certitudinem, idest sufficienter et complete. Sed hoc sufficit hic de motu dixisse, quod motus non est perfectus in omni tempore; sed multi sunt motus imperfecti et differentes specie in diversis partibus temporis, ex eo, quod unde et quo, idest termini motus, specificant motum. 2016. Because complete knowledge of the nature of motion might be required for a clarification of these points, he adds that a precise, i.e., adequate and complete, account of motion has been given in another work, the Physics (Bk. III, Ch. 1-3, 200 b 12-202 b 29; St. Th. Lect. 1-5, 275-325). But it is enough to say here that motion is not perfect at every moment, but there are many imperfect motions differing in the different parts of time from the fact that the starting points and the finishing lines, i.e., the terms of the motion, specify the motion. Sic igitur manifestata propositione maiori, subiungit minorem, scilicet quod species delectationis est perfecta in quocumque tempore, et hoc manifestum est ex supra dictis. Unde concludit manifestum esse, quod delectatio et generatio sive mutatio, sunt alterae adinvicem; et quod delectatio est aliquid de numero totorum et perfectorum, quia scilicet in qualibet parte temporis delectatio habet complementum suae speciei. 217. Having thus explained the major of the proposition he then adds the minor, that the form of pleasure is complete at any and every momentthis has been shown from previous discussions (2007). He concludes then that pleasure and generation or change obviously differ from one another, and that pleasure is numbered among things that are whole and complete because pleasure has the completion of its form in every part. Secundam rationem ponit ibi: videbitur autem et cetera. Quae talis est: non contingit moveri in non tempore, ut in sexto physicorum probatum est. Delectari autem contingit in non tempore. Sic enim dictum est, quod delectari est aliquid totum, quia contingit etiam delectari in nunc, hoc enim dicitur hic esse totum quod statim in ipso nunc habet suum complementum; ergo delectatio non est motus. 2018. He proposes the second argument [2, b] at “Likewise, this is thought.” It is that motion is impossible except in a space of time, as proved in the sixth book of the Physics (Ch. 3, 234 a 24-234 b 9; St. Th. Lect. 5, 794-795), but pleasure is possible without an interval of time. It has been pointed out that a feeling of pleasure is a whole for the reason that this feeling occurs in a moment and is completed immediately. Therefore pleasure is not a motion. Et est considerandum, quod differentia ex qua procedit haec ratio, est causa differentiae ex qua prima ratio procedebat. Ideo enim species delectationis est perfecta in quocumque tempore, non autem species motus, quia delectatio est in instanti, motus autem omnis in tempore. Et hoc designat ipse modus loquendi philosophi cum dicit videbitur autem utique hoc, et ex non contingere et cetera. 2019. We should note that the difference from which this argument proceeds is the cause of the difference from which the first argument proceeded. Therefore the form of pleasure is complete at every moment but not so motion, because pleasure is instantaneous while all motion occupies an interval of time. And the Philosopher’s way of speaking shows this when he says “Likewise, this is thought to be the case etc.” Deinde cum dicit: ex his autem manifestum etc., concludit ex praemissis principale intentum. Et dicit manifestum esse ex praemissis, quod non bene dicunt, dicentes delectationem esse motum vel generationem. Ratio enim motus et generationis non potest cuique attribui, sed solum divisibilibus, quae non sunt tota, idest quae non statim habent suum complementum. 2020. Then [ B, 3], at “From these considerations,” he concludes from the premises what he principally intended. He remarks it is clear from the premises (2006-2019) that philosophers are mistaken in speaking of pleasure as a motion or process of generation. The concept of motion and generation cannot be predicated of everything but only of divisible things that are not whole and are not completed immediately. Neque enim potest dici quod generatio sit visionis, ita scilicet quod visio successive compleatur. Sic etiam non potest dici de puncto et unitate. Haec enim non generantur, sed consequuntur generationem quorumdam. Similiter non potest his attribui motus. Unde nec delectationi, quae etiam est quoddam totum, idest in indivisibili perfectionem habens. 2021. Neither is it possible to speak of seeing as a process of generation in such a way that seeing attains completion successively. Nor can we speak of a point or unity in a similar fashion. For these are not generated but accompany certain things. Likewise motion cannot be attributed to them, and consequently not to pleasure, which is also a whole, i.e., has its perfection in being indivisible.
The Nature and Properties of Pleasure
Chapter 4 II. HE NOW EXPLAINS THE NATURE AND PROPERTIES OF PLEASURE. A. What pleasure is. 1. PLEASURE IS A PERFECTION OF ACTIVITY. a. What is the perfect activity. i. He explains his proposition. — 2022-2023 αἰσθήσεως δὲ πάσης πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἐνεργούσης, τελείως δὲ τῆς εὖ διακειμένης πρὸς τὸ κάλλιστον τῶν ὑπὸ τὴν αἴσθησιν. τοιοῦτον γὰρ μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ ἡ τελεία ἐνέργεια· Again, every sense functions in relation to its object, and functions perfectly when it is in good condition and directed to the finest object falling under it. This seems to be the best description of perfect activity. ii. He mentions a doubt. — 2024 αὐτὴν δὲ λέγειν ἐνεργεῖν, ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἐστί, μηθὲν διαφερέτω, καθ' ἑκάστην δὴ βελτίστη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια τοῦ ἄριστα διακειμένου πρὸς τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ὑπ' αὐτήν. It does not seem to make any difference whether the sense itself acts or man in whom the sense resides; in either case the most perfect activity proceeds from the best-conditioned agent in relation to the most excellent of the objects falling within its competence. b. Pleasure is the perfection of activity. — 2025-2026 αὕτη δ' ἂν τελειοτάτη εἴη καὶ ἡδίστη. κατὰ πᾶσαν γὰρ αἴσθησίν ἐστιν ἡδονή, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ διάνοιαν καὶ θεωρίαν, ἡδίστη δ' ἡ τελειοτάτη, τελειοτάτη δ' ἡ τοῦ εὖ ἔχοντος πρὸς τὸ σπουδαιότατον τῶν ὑπ' αὐτήν· τελειοῖ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἡδονή. And this activity is most perfect and most pleasant, for there is a pleasure corresponding to each sense, and also to thought and contemplation. Now, that activity is most pleasant that is most perfect, and the most perfect activity belongs to the best-conditioned faculty in relation to the most excellent object falling within its competence. c. How pleasure can perfect activity. — 2027 οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἥ τε ἡδονὴ τελειοῖ καὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν τε καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις, σπουδαῖα ὄντα, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ ὁ ἰατρὸς ὁμοίως αἰτία ἐστὶ τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν. However, pleasure does not perfect the activity in the same way as the sensible object and the sense-both of which are good-perfect it, just as health and a doctor are not in the same way the cause of being healthy. 2. HE CLARIFIES WHAT HE HAS SAID. a. First. — 2028 καθ' ἑκάστην δ' αἴσθησιν ὅτι γίνεται ἡδονή, δῆλον φαμὲν γὰρ ὁράματα καὶ ἀκούσματα εἶναι ἡδέα· That there is a pleasure corresponding to each sense is obvious, for we speak of sights and sounds as pleasant. b. Second. — 2029 δῆλον δὲ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα, ἐπειδὰν ἥ τε αἴσθησις ᾖ κρατίστη καὶ πρὸς τοιοῦτον ἐνεργῇ· τοιούτων δ' ὄντων τοῦ τε αἰσθητοῦ καὶ τοῦ αἰσθανομένου, ἀεὶ ἔσται ἡδονὴ ὑπάρχοντός γε τοῦ τε ποιήσοντος καὶ τοῦ πεισομένου. It is also obvious that pleasure is greatest when the sense is keenest and active in relation to its corresponding object. So long, then, as the sensible object and the perceiving subject remain in this condition, the pleasure will continue since the agent and the recipient are both at hand. c. Finally. — 2030-2031 τελειοῖ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἡδονὴ οὐχ ὡς ἡ ἕξις ἐνυπάρχουσα, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπιγινόμενόν τι τέλος, οἷον τοῖς ἀκμαίοις ἡ ὥρα. But pleasure perfects activity not as an inherent habit but as a kind of supervenient end like the bloom of health perfects youth. B. The properties of pleasure. 1. THE DURATION OF PLEASURE. a. How long pleasure should last. — 2032 ἕως ἂν οὖν τό τε νοητὸν ἢ αἰσθητὸν ᾖ οἷον δεῖ καὶ τὸ κρῖνον ἢ θεωροῦν, ἔσται ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἡ ἡδονή· ὁμοίων γὰρ ὄντων καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐχόντων τοῦ τε παθητικοῦ καὶ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ ταὐτὸ πέφυκε γίνεσθαι. So long then as the sensible or intelligible object and the discerning or contemplative subject are as they should be, there will be pleasure in the activity. For while the active and passive elements are unchanged in themselves and in their relation to one another the same result is produced. b. Why pleasure cannot be continuous. — 2033 πῶς οὖν οὐδεὶς συνεχῶς ἥδεται; ἢ κάμνει; πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια ἀδυνατεῖ συνεχῶς ἐνεργεῖν. οὐ γίνεται οὖν οὐδ' ἡδονή· ἕπεται γὰρ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ. How is it then that no one can feel pleasure continuously? Is it from fatigue? Certainly no creature with a body is capable of uninterrupted activity. Therefore pleasure also is not continuous, for it accompanies activity. c. Why new things are more pleasing. — 2034-2035 ἔνια δὲ τέρπει καινὰ ὄντα, ὕστερον δὲ οὐχ ὁμοίως διὰ ταὐτό· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον παρακέκληται ἡ διάνοια καὶ διατεταμένως περὶ αὐτὰ ἐνεργεῖ, ὥσπερ κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν οἱ ἐμβλέποντες, μετέπειτα δ' οὐ τοιαύτη ἡ ἐνέργεια ἀλλὰ παρημελημένη· διὸ καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀμαυροῦται. Some things give us pleasure when new but later do not, because at first the mind is stimulated and is intensely active about them. This is so in the case of sight when we look at something intently; later however our reaction is not of this nature but becomes relaxed. For this reason pleasure too slackens. 2. DESIRABILITY (OF PLEASURE). a. He explains his proposition. — 2036 ὀρέγεσθαι δὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς οἰηθείη τις ἂν ἅπαντας, ὅτι καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἅπαντες ἐφίενται· ἡ δὲ ζωὴ ἐνέργειά τις ἐστί, καὶ ἕκαστος περὶ ταῦτα καὶ τούτοις ἐνεργεῖ ἃ καὶ μάλιστ' ἀγαπᾷ, οἷον ὁ μὲν μουσικὸς τῇ ἀκοῇ περὶ τὰ μέλη, ὁ δὲ φιλομαθὴς τῇ διανοίᾳ περὶ τὰ θεωρήματα, οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἕκαστος· ἡ δ' ἡδονὴ τελειοῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας, καὶ τὸ ζῆν δή, οὗ ὀρέγονται. εὐλόγως οὖν καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐφίενται· τελειοῖ γὰρ ἑκάστῳ τὸ ζῆν, αἱρετὸν ὄν. It might be thought that all men seek pleasure because they desire life. Now life is a form of activity, and everyone is concerned with the things he loves most and devotes himself to their activities. For example, a musician pays close attention to good music, a student of philosophy is intent on intellectual problems, and so on. Since then pleasure perfects these activities, it also perfects life, which all desire. Consequently it is reasonable that men seek pleasure, for it perfects life which is desirable to everyone. b. He raises a doubt. — 2037-2038 πότερον δὲ διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὸ ζῆν αἱρούμεθα ἢ διὰ τὸ ζῆν τὴν ἡδονήν, ἀφείσθω ἐν τῷ παρόντι. συνεζεῦχθαι μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα φαίνεται καὶ χωρισμὸν οὐ δέχεσθαι· ἄνευ τε γὰρ ἐνεργείας οὐ γίνεται ἡδονή, πᾶσάν τε ἐνέργειαν τελειοῖ ἡ ἡδονή. The question whether we choose life for the sake of pleasure or pleasure for the sake of life can be dismissed for the present. Indeed they seem to be united and not to admit of separation, since there is no pleasure without activity.
COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Sensus autem omnis et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit quod delectatio non est in genere motus sicut quidam posuerunt, hic ostendit naturam et proprietates delectationis. Et primo ostendit quid sit delectatio. Secundo agit de differentia delectationum adinvicem, ibi, unde videntur et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quid sit delectatio. Secundo ex hoc determinat quasdam delectationis proprietates, ibi, usquequo autem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quod delectatio est quaedam operationis perfectio; secundo manifestat quaedam quae dixerat, ibi: secundum unumquemque autem et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo ostendit quae sit perfecta operatio. Secundo ostendit quod perfectio operis sit delectatio, ibi, haec autem utique et cetera. Tertio ostendit qualiter delectatio operationem perficiat, ibi, perficit autem operationem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit propositum. 2022. After the Philosopher has shown that pleasure is not in the category of motion, as some thinkers maintained, he now [II] explains the nature and properties of pleasure. First he shows what pleasure is. Then [Lect. 7], at “Consequently pleasures etc.” (B. 1175 a 22), he treats the variations among pleasures. The first point is discussed in a twofold fashion. First [II, A] he shows what pleasure is. Next [II, B], at “So long then etc.,” from this he defines the properties of pleasure. He considers the first point under two headings. First [A, 1] he shows that pleasure is a perfection of activity. Second [A, 2], at “That there is a pleasure etc.,” he clarifies what he has said. He handles the first point in a threefold manner. First [A, 1, a] he explains what is the perfect activity. Then [A, 1, b], at “And this activity etc.,” he shows that pleasure is the perfection of activity. Third [A, 1. c], at “However, pleasure etc.,” he shows how pleasure can perfect activity. He discusses the first point from two aspects. First [a, i] he explains his proposition. Et dicit, quod cuiuslibet sensus operatio est alicuius operantis in respectu ad sensibile, quod est sensus obiectum; sic igitur in operatione sensus duo considerantur: scilicet ipse sensus qui est operationis principium, et sensibile quod est operationis obiectum. Ad hoc igitur quod operatio sensus sit perfecta, requiritur optima dispositio ex parte utriusque, scilicet sensus et obiecti. Et ideo subdit, quod tunc perfecte sensus operatur quando est operatio sensus bene dispositi ad aliquid pulcerrimum, idest convenientissimum eorum quae sensui subiacent. Hoc enim maxime videtur esse perfecta operatio, quod scilicet a sensu progreditur in comparatione ad tale obiectum. 2023. He observes that the activity of each sense is the functioning of an agent in respect to a sensible thing that is the sense’s object. Hence in the activity of sense two elements are considered: the sense itself that is the active principle, and the sensible thing that is the object of the activity. Consequently, the best condition on the part of both sense and object is required for the perfect activity of sense. For this reason he adds that sense functions perfectly when the activity of sense is well-conditioned in relation to the finest or fittest of the objects falling under the sense. This activity seems to be especially perfect which proceeds from sense in relation to an object of this kind. Secundo ibi: ipsum autem etc., facit mentionem de quadam dubitatione. Quia enim dixerat sensum esse operantem, et in primo de anima dictum est, quod anima non operatur, sed homo per animam; ideo subiungit quod nihil differt ad propositum, utrum ipse sensus operetur vel homo sive animal in quo est sensus. Quia quicquid horum dicatur, manifestum est quod circa unumquodque optima operatio est operantis optime dispositi per respectum ad id quod est potissimum inter ea quae subiacent virtuti talis operantis. Ex his enim duobus videtur maxime dependere operationis perfectio; scilicet ex principio activo et obiecto. 2024. Ncxt [a, ii], at “it does not seem,” he mentions a doubt. Since he has just said that sense is active (2023) and—in the first book of the De Anima (Ch. 4, 408 b 11-18; St. Th. Lect. 10, 151-162)—that the soul does not act but man acts by means of the soul, consequently he adds that it makes no difference to our purpose whether it is the sense itself that acts or man (or animal) in whom the sense resides. The reason is: no matter which is affirmed, obviously it is true concerning each that the most perfect activity proceeds from the best-conditioned agent with respect to the most excellent object failing within the competence of such an agent. For the perfection of the activity seems to depend especially on these two: the active principle and the object. Deinde cum dicit: haec autem etc., ostendit quod delectatio sit operationis perfectio. Videmus enim quod eadem operatio, quam diximus esse perfectissimam, est etiam delectabilissima. Ubicumque enim invenitur in aliquo cognoscente operatio perfecta, ibi etiam invenitur operatio delectabilis. Est enim delectatio non solum secundum tactum et gustum, sed et secundum omnem sensum. Nec solum secundum sensum, sed etiam secundum speculationem intellectus, inquantum scilicet speculatur aliquid verorum per certitudinem. 2025. Then [A, i, b], at “And this activity,” he shows that pleasure is a perfection of activity. We shall see that the same activity which we said is most perfect is also most pleasant; wherever a perfect activity is found in any percipient, there also a pleasant activity is found, for a pleasure corresponds not only to touch and taste but also to every sense—not only to sense but also to contemplation inasmuch as the intellect contemplates some truth with certitude. Et inter huiusmodi operationes sensus et intellectus illa est delectabilissima quae est perfectissima. Perfectissima autem operatio est quae est sensus vel intellectus bene dispositi in comparatione ad optimum eorum quae subiacent sensui vel intellectui. Si igitur operatio perfecta est delectabilis, perfectissima autem delectabilissima, consequens est quod operatio inquantum est perfecta, sit delectabilis. Delectatio ergo est operationis perfectio. 2026. Among these activities of sense and intellect, that is most pleasant which is most perfect. But the most perfect is that belonging to sense or intellect well-conditioned in relation to the best of the objects that fall under sense or intellect. If then perfect activity is pleasant, and most perfect activity most pleasant, it follows that activity is pleasant to the extent that it is perfect. Therefore pleasure is the perfection of activity. Deinde cum dicit: perficit autem etc., ostendit qualiter delectatio perficiat operationem. Et dicit, quod non eodem modo delectatio perficit operationem, puta sensus, sicut perficit eam obiectum quod est sensibile et principium activum quod est sensus, quae omnia sunt quaedam bona et bonitatem operationi tribuentia. Sicut etiam eius quod est sanari non eodem modo est causa sanitas et medicus; sed sanitas quidem per modum formae, medicus autem per modum agentis. Similiter autem operationem perficit per modum quidem formae delectatio, quae est ipsa perfectio eius, per modum autem agentis perficit ipsam sensus bene dispositus sicut movens motum. Sensibile autem conveniens, sicut movens non motum. Et eadem ratio est circa intellectum. 2027. At “However, pleasure” [A, 1, c] he shows how pleasure can perfect activity. He observes that pleasure does not perfect activity (of sense, for example) in the same way as the object (which is the sensible) and the active principle (which is the sense)—all of which are good elements contributing excellence to the activity—perfect it. Thus health and a doctor are not in the same manner the cause of being healthy, but health is a cause by way of form and a doctor by way of agent. Likewise pleasure, the perfection of activity, perfects activity by way of form; a wellconditioned sense, a mover that is moved, by way of agent; but a suitable sensible object perfects activity, as a mover that is unmoved. The same reasoning is also valid concerning the intellect. Deinde cum dicit secundum unumquemque autem etc., manifestat quaedam quae dixerat. Et primo dicit, manifestum esse quod secundum unumquemque sensum est delectatio, ut supra dictum est, per hoc quod dicimus et experimur visiones esse delectabiles, puta pulchrarum formarum et etiam auditiones, puta suavium melodiarum. 2028. Next [A, 2.], at “That there is,” he clarifies what he has said. First [A, 2, a] it is clear, he states, that there is a pleasure corresponding to each sense-as was just pointed out (2025).from the fact that we say and perceive that there are pleasant sights like beautiful forms and sounds like melodious songs. Secundo ibi, manifestum autem etc., manifestat aliud praemissorum dicens, manifestum esse per experimentum quod visio et auditio et quaelibet operatio sensus maxime est delectabilis quando et sensus est potentissimus, idest optime vigens in sua virtute, et quando operatur respectu talis obiecti, scilicet maxime convenientis. Et quamdiu in tali dispositione manet et ipsum sensibile et animal habens sensum, tamdiu manet delectatio, sicut et in aliis apparet quod quandiu permanet eadem dispositio facientis et patientis, necesse est quod permaneat idem effectus. 2029. Second [A, 2, b], at “It is also,” he clarifies another premise by remarking that it is clear from experience that seeing, hearing, and every activity of sense are exceedingly pleasant when the sense is keenest or strongest and acts in relation to its corresponding best object. So long as the sensible object itself and the animal possessing the sense remain in this condition, the pleasure remains, as is apparent also in other activities. And so long as the condition of the agent and recipient are the same, the effect is necessarily the same. Tertio ibi: perficit autem etc., manifestat quod supra dictum est de modo quo delectatio perficit operationem. Dictum est enim, quod delectatio perficit operationem non effective, sed formaliter; est autem duplex formalis perfectio. Una quidem intrinseca, quae constituit essentiam rei. Alia autem quae supervenit rei in sua specie constitutae. 2030. Finally [A, 2, c], at “But pleasure perfects,” he clarifies a previous statement (2027) about the manner in which pleasure perfects activity. For it was stated that pleasure perfects activity not efficiently but formally. Now, formal perfection is twofold. One is intrinsic constituting a thing’s essence, but the other is added to a thing already constituted in its species. Dicit ergo quod delectatio perficit operationem non sicut habitus qui inest, id est non sicut forma intrans essentiam rei, sed (ut) quidam finis, id est quaedam perfectio superveniens, sicut pulchritudo supervenit iuvenibus non quasi existens de essentia iuventutis, sed quasi consequens bonam dispositionem causarum iuventutis. Et similiter delectatio consequitur bonam dispositionem causarum operationis. 2031. He says first that pleasure perfects activity not as a habit that is inherent, i.e., not as a form intrinsic to the essence of the thing, but as a kind of end or supervenient perfection, like the bloom of health comes to young people not as being of the essence of youth but as following from a favorable condition of the causes of youth. Likewise pleasure follows from a favorable condition of the causes of activity. Deinde cum dicit: usquequo autem etc., determinat rationes quarumdam proprietatum delectationis ex his quae praedeterminata sunt de eius quidditate. Et primo agit de duratione delectationis. Secundo de eius appetibilitate, ibi, appetere autem et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo ostendit quamdiu debeat durare delectatio. Et dicit, quod tamdiu erit delectatio in operatione, quamdiu ex una parte obiectum quod est sensibile, vel intelligibile est in debita dispositione, et ex alia parte ipsum operans quod est discernens per sensum vel speculans per intellectum. Et huius ratio est quod, quandiu in activo et passivo manet eadem dispositio et eadem habitudo ad invicem, tandiu manet idem effectus; unde si bona dispositio potentiae cognoscitivae et obiecti est causa delectationis, ea durante necesse est delectationem durare. 2032. Then [II, B], at “So long then,” he defines the reasons for certain properties of pleasure from what has been defined about its nature. First [B, 1] he considers1the duration of pleasure; next [B, 2], at “It miaht be thought etc.,” its desirability. He discussed the first point from three aspects. First [B, 1, a] he shows how long pleasure should last. He observes that there will be pleasure in activity so long as, on the one hand, the object (sensible or intelligible) and, on the other, the agent itself (which perceives by sense or contemplates by intellect) are well-conditioned. The reason for this is that as long as the condition of the active and passive elements remains the same and the relation between them remains the same, so long will the effect remain the same. Hence if the good condition of the knowing faculty and of the object is the cause of pleasure, as long as this lasts pleasure necessarily lasts. Secundo ibi: qualiter igitur etc., assignat rationem quare delectatio non possit esse continua. Et dicit, quod ideo nullus continue delectatur, quia laborat in operatione quam consequitur delectatio. Et sic operatio efficitur non delectabilis. Hoc autem ideo est, quia omnia quae habent corpora passibilia non possunt continue operari propter hoc, quod eorum corpora immutantur a sua dispositione per motum qui coniungitur operationi; cuilibet autem operationi rei habentis corpus, ipsum corpus aliqualiter deservit; vel immediate, sicut operationi sensitivae quae per organum corporeum producitur; vel mediate, sicut operationi intellectivae quae utitur operationibus virtutum sensitivarum quae fiunt per organa corporea. Sic igitur ex quo non potest esse continua operatio, neque etiam delectatio potest esse continua. Delectatio enim sequitur operationem, ut dictum est. 2033. Next [B, 1, b], at “How is it then,” he assigns the reason why pleasure cannot be continuous. No one, he says, continuously feels pleasure since he grows weary from activity that pleasure accompanies, and in this way activity is not pleasant. This is so because all creatures with bodies capable of suffering are unable to be continuously active, for their bodies are changed in their condition by motion connected with activity. The body itself is subservient in some manner to every activity of the being whose body it is: either immediately to sensitive activity, which is produced by a bodily organ, or mediately to intellectual activity, which uses the activities of the sensitive powers generated by bodily organs. Therefore activity cannot be continuous on the part of its productive principle; and so pleasure also cannot be continuous, for it accompanies activity (155, 1486, 1496). Tertio ibi: quaedam autem delectant etc., assignat rationem quare nova magis delectant. Et dicit quod quaedam quando sunt nova delectant, postea autem non aequaliter delectant. Et huius ratio est, quia a principio mens inclinatur studiose circa huiusmodi propter desiderium et admirationem, et ita intense, idest vehementer circa huiusmodi operatur. 2034. Third [B, 1, c], at “Some things,” he gives the reason why new things are more pleasing. He remarks that things when new are more delightful but later are not equally so. The reason for this is that at first the mind is eagerly inclined toward such things on account of desire and curiosity and so is intensely or vehemently active about them. Et ex hoc sequitur delectatio vehemens: sicut patet de illis qui studiose aspiciunt aliquid quod prius non viderunt, propter admirationem. Postea autem quando consueti sunt videre, non fit talis operatio, ut scilicet ita attente videant vel quidlibet aliud operentur sicut prius; sed negligenter operantur; et ideo etiam delectatio obscuratur, idest minus sentitur. 2035. Vehement pleasure accompanies this, as is evident in people who, from curiosity, look hard at something they have not seen previously. Later though, when they become accustomed to the sight, their reaction is not of such a nature that they look so intently or do anything else as before. But they act in a relaxed manner and for this reason the pleasure also fades, i.e., is felt less keenly. Deinde cum dicit: appetere autem etc., assignat rationem quare delectatio ab omnibus appetatur. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo manifestat propositum. Et dicit quod ideo potest aliquis rationabiliter existimare quod omnes appetant delectationem, quia omnes naturaliter appetunt vivere. Vita autem secundum suam ultimam perfectionem in quadam operatione consistit, ut in nono ostensum est. Et inde est quod unusquisque circa illa maxime operatur et his operationibus insistit quae maxime diligit. Sicut musicus maxime insistit ad audiendum melodias; et ille qui est amator sapientiae maxime insistit ad hoc, quod mente theoremata, idest considerationes, speculetur. Unde, cum delectatio perficiat operationem, ut supra dictum est, consequens est, quod perficiat ipsum vivere, quod omnes appetunt. Et ita rationabile est, quod omnes appetant delectationem, ex eo quod perficit vivere, quod est omnibus eligibile. 2036. The [B, 2], at “It might be thought,” he presents the reason why pleasure is desired by everyone. He treats this point in a twofold manner. First [B, 2, a] he explains his proposition, observing that a man can judge with reason that all men naturally seek pleasure because they all naturally desire life. But life according to its ultimate perfection consists in a form of activity, as pointed out in the ninth book (1846). Therefore everyone is especially active about those things which he loves most of all and devotes himself to their activities. Thus a musician listens most attentively to good music; a lover of wisdom applies himself especially to the contemplation of intellectual problems or studies. Since then pleasure perfects activityas was indicated (2036).consequently it perfects life itself which all desire. Thus it is reasonable that everyone should seek pleasure from the fact that it perfects life which is desirable to everybody. Secundo ibi: utrum autem etc., movet quamdam dubitationem ex dictis. Dictum est enim quod omnes appetant delectationem, et similiter omnes appetunt vivere quod in operatione perficitur. Appetibilia autem habent ordinem adinvicem, sicut et scibilia. Potest ergo esse dubitatio utrum homines appetant vitam propter delectationem, vel e converso delectationem propter vitam. 2037. Next [B, 2, b], at “The question whether,” he raises a doubt by reason of the discussion. We have stated that all desire pleasure and likewise all desire life which is perfected in activity. But objects of desire, as well as objects of knowledge, have an order among themselves. Therefore a doubt can arise whether men seek life for the sake of pleasure or, conversely, pleasure for the sake of life. Et dicit quod haec dubitatio dimittenda est ad praesens: quia ista duo ita coniunguntur adinvicem, quod nullo modo separantur. Non enim fit delectatio sine operatione, neque rursus potest esse perfecta operatio sine delectatione, ut supra dictum est. Videtur tamen principalius esse operatio quam delectatio. Nam delectatio est quies appetitus in re delectante, qua quis per operationem potitur. Non autem aliquis appetit quietem in aliquo, nisi in quantum aestimat sibi conveniens. Et ideo ipsa operatio, quae delectat sicut quiddam conveniens, videtur per prius appetibilis, quam delectatio. 2038. He says that the doubt must two questions are so joined that they do not admit,of any separation. For there is no pleasure without activity, and on the other hand there can be no perfect activity without pleasure, as has been noted (2025, 2026). However activity, rather than pleasure, seems to be principal. For pleasure is a repose of the appetite in a pleasing object which a person enjoys by means of activity. But a person desires repose in a thing only inasmuch as he judges it agreeable to him. Consequently the activity itself that gives pleasure as a pleasing object seems to be desirable be dismissed at present because these prior to pleasure.
Pleasures Differ in Kind
Chapter 5 I. HE EXPLAINS THE DIFFERENCE OF PLEASURES TAKEN ON THE PART OF THE ACTIVITIES. A. How pleasures may differ in kind according to... activities. 1. HE SHOWS (THIS) BY REASON. a. First. — 2039-2041 ὅθεν δοκοῦσι καὶ τῷ εἴδει διαφέρειν. τὰ γὰρ ἕτερα τῷ εἴδει ὑφ' ἑτέρων οἰόμεθα τελειοῦσθαι οὕτω γὰρ φαίνεται καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τέχνης, οἷον ζῷα καὶ δένδρα καὶ γραφὴ καὶ ἄγαλμα καὶ οἰκία καὶ σκεῦος· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς διαφερούσας τῷ εἴδει ὑπὸ διαφερόντων εἴδει τελειοῦσθαι. Consequently pleasures seem to differ in kind. For we judge that different kinds of things are perfected by different perfections. This is thought to be true both of natural organisms and of productions of art, for instance, animals, trees, paintings, statues, a house, and a receptacle. Likewise, activities differing in kind are perfected by things differing in kind. Moreover, activities of intellect differ from those of the senses; and the latter differ from one another, and so then do the pleasures that perfect them. 2. HE MANIFESTS THE SAME PROPOSITION BY INDICATIONS. a. First. — 2042-2043 διαφέρουσι δ' αἱ τῆς διανοίας τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ αὐταὶ ἀλλήλων κατ' εἶδος· καὶ αἱ τελειοῦσαι δὴ ἡδοναί. φανείη δ' ἂν τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τοῦ συνῳκειῶσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἑκάστην τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἣν τελειοῖ. συναύξει γὰρ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ οἰκεία ἡδονή. μᾶλλον γὰρ ἕκαστα κρίνουσι καὶ ἐξακριβοῦσιν οἱ μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἐνεργοῦντες, οἷον γεωμετρικοὶ γίνονται οἱ χαίροντες τῷ γεωμετρεῖν, καὶ κατανοοῦσιν ἕκαστα μᾶλλον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ φιλόμουσοι καὶ φιλοικοδόμοι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστοι ἐπιδιδόασιν εἰς τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον χαίροντες αὐτῷ· συναύξουσι δὲ αἱ ἡδοναί, τὰ δὲ συναύξοντα οἰκεῖα· τοῖς ἑτέροις δὲ τῷ εἴδει καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἕτερα τῷ εἴδει. This will also be evident from the fact that each pleasure is akin to the activity it perfects, for an activity is stimulated by a pleasure proper to it. People who work pleasurably judge each thing better and investigate them more accurately. For example, those who find pleasure in the study of geometry become geometricians and grasp each problem more clearly. Similarly, those who love music, architecture, and other arts make progress in their own field when they enjoy their work. But pleasure intensifies activity and what intensifies a thing is proper to it. Therefore properties of things differing in kind must themselves differ in kind. b. Another indication. i. He shows the difference among pleasures (from the hindrance of other activities). — 2044-2047 ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦτ' ἂν φανείη ἐκ τοῦ τὰς ἀφ' ἑτέρων ἡδονὰς ἐμποδίους ταῖς ἐνεργείαις εἶναι. οἱ γὰρ φίλαυλοι ἀδυνατοῦσι τοῖς λόγοις προσέχειν, ἐὰν κατακούσωσιν αὐλοῦντος, μᾶλλον χαίροντες αὐλητικῇ τῆς παρούσης ἐνεργείας· ἡ κατὰ τὴν αὐλητικὴν οὖν ἡδονὴ τὴν περὶ τὸν λόγον ἐνέργειαν φθείρει. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων συμβαίνει, ὅταν ἅμα περὶ δύο ἐνεργῇ· ἡ γὰρ ἡδίων τὴν ἑτέραν ἐκκρούει, κἂν πολὺ διαφέρῃ κατὰ τὴν ἡδονήν, μᾶλλον, ὥστε μηδ' ἐνεργεῖν κατὰ τὴν ἑτέραν. διὸ χαίροντες ὁτῳοῦν σφόδρα οὐ πάνυ δρῶμεν ἕτερον, καὶ ἄλλα ποιοῦμεν ἄλλοις ἠρέμα ἀρεσκόμενοι, οἷον καὶ ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις οἱ τραγηματίζοντες, ὅταν φαῦλοι οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι ὦσι, τότε μάλιστ' αὐτὸ δρῶσιν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ μὲν οἰκεία ἡδονὴ ἐξακριβοῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας καὶ χρονιωτέρας καὶ βελτίους ποιεῖ, αἱ δ' ἀλλότριαι λυμαίνονται, δῆλον ὡς πολὺ διεστᾶσιν. A still clearer indication of this is given by the fact that activities are hindered by pleasures arising from other activities. For people who love the flute are incapable of paying attention to a discussion when they hear someone playing the flute because they enjoy the music more than their present activity. Therefore, the pleasure connected with flute-playing destroys that activity which is concerned with discussion. A similar thing happens in other cases where a person tries to do two things at the same time; the more pleasant activity drives out the other, and if it is much more pleasant it does so more effectively so that the other ceases altogether. For this reason when we take intense pleasure in something we can scarcely do anything else; and when we take relaxed pleasure in some things we can be engaged in others. For example, people who eat sweets at stage-plays do so especially when the actors are poor. Since then pleasure proper to activities strengthens, prolongs and improves them, and since other pleasures injure these activities, it is clear that pleasures differ greatly. ii. He compares alien pleasures with pains belonging to the activities. — 2048-2049 σχεδὸν γὰρ αἱ ἀλλότριαι ἡδοναὶ ποιοῦσιν ὅπερ αἱ οἰκεῖαι λῦπαι· φθείρουσι γὰρ τὰς ἐνεργείας αἱ οἰκεῖαι λῦπαι, οἷον εἴ τῳ τὸ γράφειν ἀηδὲς καὶ ἐπίλυπον ἢ τὸ λογίζεσθαι· ὃ μὲν γὰρ οὐ γράφει, ὃ δ' οὐ λογίζεται, λυπηρᾶς οὔσης τῆς ἐνεργείας. συμβαίνει δὴ περὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας τοὐναντίον ἀπὸ τῶν οἰκείων ἡδονῶν τε καὶ λυπῶν· οἰκεῖαι δ' εἰσὶν αἱ ἐπὶ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ καθ' αὑτὴν γινόμεναι. αἱ δ' ἀλλότριαι ἡδοναὶ εἴρηται ὅτι παραπλήσιόν τι τῇ λύπῃ ποιοῦσιν· φθείρουσι γάρ, πλὴν οὐχ ὁμοίως. Indeed alien pleasures produce nearly the same effect as proper pains, for activities are destroyed by their proper pains. For instance, if writing or doing sums proves to be an unpleasant and painful task, a person neither writes nor does sums because the activity is painful. Activities then are affected in a different manner by their proper pleasures and pains-these arise from the nature of the activities. But alien pleasures are said to have an effect resembling pain, for they both destroy activity although not to the same degree.
COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Unde videntur et specie differre et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit naturam delectationis et proprietates ipsius, hic determinat de differentia delectationum ad invicem. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo determinat de differentia delectationum quae sumitur ex parte operationum. Secundo de differentia delectationum quae sumitur ex parte subiecti, ibi, videtur autem esse et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit, quomodo delectationes differant specie secundum differentiam operationum. Secundo, quomodo differant in bonitate et malitia, ibi, differentibus autem operationibus et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit per rationem, quod delectationes differunt specie secundum differentiam operationum. Secundo manifestat idem per signa, ibi, apparebit autem utique et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod cum delectatio sit operationis perfectio, consequens est, quod sicut operationes differunt specie, ita etiam et delectationes differre videantur; ita enim existimamus communiter, quasi per se notum, quod ea quae sunt diversa secundum speciem, perficiuntur perfectionibus specie differentibus. Quod quidem manifestum est circa perfectiones essentiales, quae constituunt speciem. Idem autem necesse est esse et circa alias consequentes perfectiones, dummodo sint propriae, quia consequuntur ex essentialibus principiis speciei. Et hoc videmus accidere, tam circa naturalia quam circa artificialia. 2039. After the Philosopher has explained the nature and properties of pleasure, he now explains the difference among pleasures. He discusses this point from two aspects. First [I] he explains the difference of pleasures taken on the part of the activities; then [Lect. 8; II] at-“It is thought etc.” (B. 1176 a 3), the difference taken on the part of the subject. He treats the first point in a twofold manner. First [I, A] he shows how pleasures may differ in kind according to the difference among activities; next [Lect. 8; I, B], at “Since activities differ etc.” (B. 1175 b 25), how they differ in goodness and badness. He handles the first point in two ways. First [A, 1] he shows by reason that pleasures differ in kind on the basis of differing activities; then [A, 2], at “This will also etc.,” he manifests the same proposition by indications. He observes first: since pleasure is the perfection of activity, it follows that just as activities differ in kind so pleasures too seem to differ. Thus we commonly judge as intrinsically evident (per se notum) that those things that differ in kind are perfected by specifically different perfections. Certainly this is obvious concerning essential perfections which constitute a species. And it is necessarily the same with other consequent perfections, provided they are proper, because they follow the essential principles of the species. We see this happen in the case both of natural and artistic objects. Circa naturalia quidem: quia alia est perfectio animalium, quae scilicet consistit in perspicacitate sensus, et alia arborum, quae consistit in earum fecunditate. Circa artificialia vero, quia alia est perfectio picturarum, ut scilicet sint delectabilibus coloribus distinctae, et alia est perfectio imaginum, ut scilicet bene repraesentent ea quorum sunt imagines. Similiter etiam alia est perfectio domus, ut scilicet sit firmum receptaculum, et alia vasis, ut scilicet sit bonae capacitatis. Unde oportet quod operationes specie differentes perficiantur a delectationibus specie differentibus. 2040. In natural objects surely, because the perfection of animals, which consists in keenness of sense, is one thing; and the perfection of trees, which consists in their fruitfulness, is another. And in artistic objects, because the perfection of paintings—that they be characterized by pleasing colors—is one thing, and the perfection of statues—that they aptly represent the individuals, whose images they are—is another. Likewise the perfection of a house—that it be a solid dwelling—is one thing, and the perfection of a receptacle—that it have a large capacityis another. Consequently activities differing specifically must be perfected by specifically different pleasures. Manifestum est autem, quod operationes mentis, idest intellectus, differunt specie ab operationibus sensus. Et similiter operationes sensuum ab invicem, diversificantur enim et secundum obiecta, et secundum potentias quae sunt operationum principia. Unde relinquitur, quod delectationes, quae perficiunt operationes, differant specie. 2041. It is clear that activities of mind or intellect differ in kind from activities of the senses; similarly the activities of the senses differ from one another. The reason is that they are differentiated according to objects and according to the faculties which are principles of activities. Consequently pleasures that perfect activities differ specifically. Deinde cum dicit: apparebit autem etc., manifestat idem per signa. Et primo per hoc, quod operatio per propriam delectationem confortatur; secundo per hoc quod per extraneam delectationem impeditur, ibi: adhuc autem magis et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod hoc, scilicet differentia delectationum secundum operationes, apparet ex eo quod quaelibet delectatio quadam affinitate appropriatur operationi quam perficit, quia unaquaeque operatio per propriam delectationem augetur, sicut quidlibet natum est augeri per id quod est sibi simile et conforme. 2042. Then [A, 2], at “This will also,” he manifests the same proposition by indications. First [2, a] by the fact that activity is stimulated by its own pleasure.’ He observes first that this difference among pleasures corresponding to activities is evident from the fact that each pleasure is ascribed by a kind of affinity to the activity it perfects, because each activity is intensified by its own pleasure, as everything is naturally intensified by what is similar and agreeable. Videmus enim quod illi qui delectabiliter operantur quodcumque opus rationis magis possint singula diiudicare et per certitudinem exquirere ea circa quae delectabiliter negotiantur; sicut geometrae, qui delectantur in considerationibus geometriae, magis possunt intelligere singula huiusmodi considerationis, quia mens magis detinetur in eo in quo delectatur. Et eadem ratio est de omnibus aliis, sicut de his qui amant musicalia et delectantur in eis, et de his qui delectantur in arte aedificativa, et de omnibus aliis, quod per hoc quod gaudent in tali opere, magnum augmentum faciunt ad proprium opus. Et sic patet, quod delectationes augent operationes. Manifestum est autem, quod ea quae augent sunt propria his quae augentur. Unde oportet, quod diversa diversis augeantur. Si igitur operationes, quae augentur per delectationes, specie differunt, ut ostensum est, consequens est quod et ipsae delectationes augentes specie differant. 2043. We notice that people who do any intellectual work with pleasure can judge each point better and investigate accurately the questions which pleasantly engage their attention. For example, geometricians who take pleasure in the study of geometry can grasp more clearly each problem of this science because their mind is detained longer by that which is pleasant. And the same reason holds for all others (similarly occupied), for instance, those who love music and delight in it, those who love architecture, and so on-that because they find pleasure in such work they make great progress in their art. Evidently then pleasures intensify activities. But it is clear that what intensifies an action is proper to it. Consequently things that are different are intensified by different things. Therefore if activities, which are intensified by’ pleasure, differ in kind—as we have shown (2039-2040—the intensifying pleasures themselves should be specifically different. Deinde cum dicit: adhuc autem magis etc., inducit aliud signum, quod sumitur ex impedimento quod affertur operationibus per extraneas delectationes. Et primo ex hoc ostendit differentiam delectationum. Secundo comparat extraneas delectationes propriis tristitiis, ibi, fere enim alienae et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod id quod dictum est de differentia delectationum secundum operationes, magis apparet ex eo quod operationes impediuntur per delectationes ab aliis operationibus factas. Ideo autem magis per hoc manifestatur propositum, quia hoc, quod delectationes augent operationes, posset attribui communi rationi delectationis, non autem propriae huius delectationis, secundum quam differunt delectationes adinvicem. 2044. At “A still clearer” [2, b] he presents another indication taken from the hindrance to the activities derived from other activities. First [b, i] from this he shows the difference among pleasures. Next [b, ii], at “Indeed alien pleasures etc.,” he compares alien pleasures with pains belonging to the activities. He says first that the remarks (2042-2043) about the difference among pleasures corresponding to the activities are more apparent from the fact that the activities are hindered by the pleasures arising from other occupations. From this then our contention is more evidently sustained because the fact that pleasures intensify activities might, be ascribed to the general nature of pleasure but not to the particular nature of this pleasure according to which pleasures differ from one another. Sed manifeste apparet, quod delectationes specie differunt, dum invenitur, quod propria delectatio auget operationem et extranea impedit. Videmus enim quod illi qui sunt amatores sonitus fistularum, non possunt attendere sermonibus qui eis dicuntur quando audiunt aliquem fistulantem, ex eo quod magis gaudent in opere fistulativae artis quam in praesenti operatione, scilicet in auditione sermonum sibi dictorum. Et sic patet, quod delectatio, quae fit secundum operationem fistulativae artis corrumpit operationem secundum sermonem. Et ita videmus accidere in aliis, cum occurrit alicui, quod simul circa aliqua duo operetur. 2045. But it is very clear that pleasures differ in kind. when we discover that activity is promoted by its own pleasure but impeded by extraneous pleasure. For we see that flute-favorers simply cannot hear people talking to them when listening to flute-playing because they take more pleasure in the music of the flute than in their present activity, i.e., hearing talk intended for them. Evidently then pleasure arising from flute-playing impedes the mind’s reflective activities. The same thing apparently happens in other situations when someone is doing two things at once. Manifestum est enim quod delectabilior operatio excludit aliam, intantum, quod si sit magna differentia in excessu delectationis, homo totaliter omittit operari secundum operationem minus sibi delectabilem. Et inde est, quod quando vehementer delectamur in aliquo quocumque, nihil aliud possumus operari. Sed quando aliqua placent nobis quiete, idest remisse vel parum, possumus etiam quaedam alia facere; sicut patet de his qui in theatris, id est in spectaculis ludorum, quia parum ibi delectantur in his quae vident, possunt intendere comestioni leguminum, quae non est multum delectabilis. Et hoc maxime faciunt homines quando inspiciunt aliquos non bene pugnantes in agone, ita quod inspectio talis pugnae non sit eis delectabilis. 2046. For it is obvious that the more pleasant activity drives out the other, to the extent that if there is a great difference in the amount of pleasure, a person entirely neglects the activity less pleasurable to him. Consequently when we take vehement pleasure in something we are incapable of doing anything else. But when something pleases us quietly, i.e., mildly or hardly at all, we can be doing other things too, as is evident of people at a show. Those who find little amusement in what they see there can be busy eating sweets-a diversion only moderately pleasant. People do this especially when watching athletes fighting poorly in public games, so that viewing such a contest is not pleasing to them. Quia ergo propria delectatio confirmat operationes ex quibus consequitur, ut scilicet homo vehementius eis intendat, et facit eas diuturniores, ut scilicet homo magis in eis perseveret, et facit eas meliores, idest perfectius finem attingentes; et cum hoc delectationes alienae, idest quae consequuntur quasdam alias operationes, officiunt, idest nocent, manifeste consequitur, quod delectationes multum differunt adinvicem; quia quod una delectatio iuvat, alia impedit. 2047. A proper pleasure then (a) strengthens the activities from which it proceeds, so that a person exerts himself more vigorously in them; (b) it prolongs the activities, so that a person stays longer at them; (c) it improves the activities so they attain their end more perfectly. Likewise other pleasures—those accompanying other activities—obstruct or harm all this; hence these facts clearly demonstrate that pleasures differ much from one another, for what one pleasure helps, another hinders. Deinde cum dicit fere enim etc., comparat alienas delectationes tristitiis propriis, ut ex hoc magis appareat delectationum differentia. Et dicit, quod fere eumdem effectum habet circa aliquam operationem delectatio aliena, scilicet quae causatur ex aliqua alia operatione, et tristitia propria secundum quam scilicet aliquis tristatur de ipsa operatione. Manifestum est enim, quod tristitia quae est de aliqua operatione corrumpit ipsam. Sicut si alicui scribere vel ratiocinari sit non delectabile, vel magis triste, neque scribet neque ratiocinabitur propter tristitiam sibi provenientem ex tali operatione. 2048. Next [b, ii], at “Indeed alien pleasures,” he compares extraneous pleasures with pains proper (to the activities) so that the difference among pleasures may in this way be more obvious. He observes that extraneous pleasure (which is caused by some other activity) and proper pain (according to which a person suffers from the activity itself) produce nearly the same effect on an activity. For, evidently, pain arising from an activity destroys it. For instance, if it is unpleasant or rather trying for someone to write or tally figures he will neither write nor tally, owing to the painful nature of such activity. Sic igitur circa operationes contrarium effectum habent delectationes propriae et tristitiae propriae, quae scilicet ex ipsis operationibus causantur, alienae autem sunt quae causantur ex aliis operationibus. Et dictum est, quod extraneae delectationes faciunt aliquid propinquum tristitiae propriae. Ex utraque enim parte corrumpitur operatio, non tamen similiter; sed magis per tristitiam propriam quae directe et secundum se delectationi contrariatur. Aliena vero delectatio contrariatur secundum aliud, scilicet secundum operationem. 2049. In this way then activities are affected in a different manner by proper pleasures and pains, as it were being caused by these very activities; but extraneous pleasures are caused by other activities. We have just noted (2045-2046) that extraneous pleasures have an effect resembling proper pain. For in either case activity is destroyed (“although not in the same manner”) but more so by proper pain which is directly and by reason of itself opposed to pleasure. On the other hand the contrariety of extraneous pleasure arises from another source, viz., activity.
The Morality of Pleasures
Chapter 5 B. Pleasures differ in goodness and evil according to the difference of activities. 1. IN MORAL GOODNESS. a. He states his proposition. — 2050 διαφερουσῶν δὲ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ἐπιεικείᾳ καὶ φαυλότητι, καὶ τῶν μὲν αἱρετῶν οὐσῶν τῶν δὲ φευκτῶν τῶν δ' οὐδετέρων, ὁμοίως ἔχουσι καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί· καθ' ἑκάστην γὰρ ἐνέργειαν οἰκεία ἡδονὴ ἔστιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν τῇ σπουδαίᾳ οἰκεία ἐπιεικής, ἡ δὲ τῇ φαύλῃ μοχθηρά· Since activities differ in goodness and badness, and some are to be chosen, others to be avoided, and still others are indifferent, the same is true also of their pleasures; for a proper pleasure corresponds to each activity. Thus the pleasure proper to a virtuous activity is good and that proper to a vicious activity is bad. b. He proves his proposition. — 2051-2055 καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἐπαινεταί, τῶν δ' αἰσχρῶν ψεκταί. οἰκειότεραι δὲ ταῖς ἐνεργείαις αἱ ἐν αὐταῖς ἡδοναὶ τῶν ὀρέξεων· αἳ μὲν γὰρ διωρισμέναι εἰσὶ καὶ τοῖς χρόνοις καὶ τῇ φύσει, αἳ δὲ σύνεγγυς ταῖς ἐνεργείαις, καὶ ἀδιόριστοι οὕτως ὥστ' ἔχειν ἀμφισβήτησιν εἰ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἡ ἐνέργεια τῇ ἡδονῇ. οὐ μὴν ἔοικέ γε ἡ ἡδονὴ διάνοια εἶναι οὐδ' αἴσθησις ἄτοπον γάρ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ χωρίζεσθαι φαίνεταί τισι ταὐτόν. ὥσπερ οὖν αἱ ἐνέργειαι ἕτεραι, καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί. Just as desires for honorable things are praiseworthy, those for base things are blameworthy. But pleasures accompanying activities are more proper to them than the desires. For the latter are separated in time and distinct in nature from activities, while the former are intimately connected with them and so closely linked as to raise a doubt whether activity is identical with pleasure. However, we are not to understand that pleasure is thought or sensation—this would be unreasonable—although some people have identified them because they are connected. Therefore, just as activities are different, so too are their pleasures. 2. IN PHYSICAL GOODNESS. — 2056 διαφέρει δὲ ἡ ὄψις ἁφῆς καθαρειότητι, καὶ ἀκοὴ καὶ ὄσφρησις γεύσεως· ὁμοίως δὴ διαφέρουσι καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί, καὶ τούτων αἱ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, καὶ ἑκάτεραι ἀλλήλων. Now sight differs in purity from touch, and hearing and smell from taste; similarly pleasures of intellect diffcr from those of the senses, and each class iias differences within itself. II. HE SHOWS WHAT THE DIFFERENCE OF PLEASURE IS RELATIVE TO THE SUBJECT. A. In regard to animals. — 2057-2058 δοκεῖ δ' εἶναι ἑκάστῳ ζώῳ καὶ ἡδονὴ οἰκεία, ὥσπερ καὶ ἔργον· ἡ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. καὶ ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ δὲ θεωροῦντι τοῦτ' ἂν φανείη· ἑτέρα γὰρ ἵππου ἡδονὴ καὶ κυνὸς καὶ ἀνθρώπου, καθάπερ Ἡράκλειτός φησιν ὄνους σύρματ' ἂν ἑλέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ χρυσόν· ἥδιον γὰρ χρυσοῦ τροφὴ ὄνοις. αἱ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἑτέρων τῷ εἴδει διαφέρουσιν εἴδει, τὰς δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀδιαφόρους εὔλογον εἶναι. It is thought that each creature has its own pleasure just as it has its own activity, for pleasure corresponds to activity. This will be apparent to a person who considers each thing. Certainly a horse, a dog, a man have different pleasures. As Heraclitus says: an ass prefers grass to gold, since food is more pleasant than gold to asses. Therefore creatures differing in species have different kinds of pleasures. On the other hand it is reasonable to hold that things of the same species have similar pleasures. B. In regard to men. 1. MEN HAVE DIFFERENT PLEASURES. — 2059-2061 διαλλάττουσι δ' οὐ σμικρὸν ἐπί γε τῶν ἀνθρώπων· τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ τοὺς μὲν τέρπει τοὺς δὲ λυπεῖ, καὶ τοῖς μὲν λυπηρὰ καὶ μισητά ἐστι τοῖς δὲ ἡδέα καὶ φιλητά. καὶ ἐπὶ γλυκέων δὲ τοῦτο συμβαίνει· οὐ γὰρ τὰ αὐτὰ δοκεῖ τῷ πυρέττοντι καὶ τῷ ὑγιαίνοντι, οὐδὲ θερμὸν εἶναι τῷ ἀσθενεῖ καὶ τῷ εὐεκτικῷ. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐφ' ἑτέρων συμβαίνει. However, pleasures differ considerably among men. For the same things delight some men but sadden others, and things distressing and odious to some are pleasant and attractive to others. This happens in the case of things sweet to the taste, since the same objects do not seem sweet to a sick man and to one in good condition; nor does the same temperature feel warm to an invalid and to a healthy man. The same holds good in other cases too. 2. THE PRINCIPAL PLEASURE IS FOUND IN THE VIRTUOUS MAN. — 2062-2063 δοκεῖ δ' ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς τοιούτοις εἶναι τὸ φαινόμενον τῷ σπουδαίῳ. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο καλῶς λέγεται, καθάπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἔστιν ἑκάστου μέτρον ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἁγαθός, ᾗ τοιοῦτος, καὶ ἡδοναὶ εἶεν ἂν αἱ τούτῳ φαινόμεναι καὶ ἡδέα οἷς οὗτος χαίρει. τὰ δὲ τούτῳ δυσχερῆ εἴ τῳ φαίνεται ἡδέα, οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν· πολλαὶ γὰρ φθοραὶ καὶ λῦμαι ἀνθρώπων γίνονται· ἡδέα δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τούτοις καὶ οὕτω διακειμένοις. τὰς μὲν οὖν ὁμολογουμένως αἰσχρὰς δῆλον ὡς οὐ φατέον ἡδονὰς εἶναι, πλὴν τοῖς διεφθαρμένοις· In all cases, that seems to be really so which appears to the good man. If this is correct, as it seems to be, and if the measure of everything is virtue and the good man as such, then the things that appear to him to be pleasures are really pleasures and the things that he enjoys are really pleasant. Wherefore it is not surprising that things painful to him are evidently pleasant to someone. For men are subject to much perversion and deterioration. But these things are not pleasant (in themselves) but only to these people an] others similarly inclined. It is obvious then that pleasures admittedly disreputable are pleasures only to men of perverted taste. 3. WHICH IS THE PRINCIPAL PLEASURE. — 2064 τῶν δ' ἐπιεικῶν εἶναι δοκουσῶν ποίαν ἢ τίνα φατέον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι; ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν δῆλον; ταύταις γὰρ ἕπονται αἱ ἡδοναί. εἴτ' οὖν μία ἐστὶν εἴτε πλείους αἱ τοῦ τελείου καὶ μακαρίου ἀνδρός, αἱ ταύτας τελειοῦσαι ἡδοναὶ κυρίως λέγοιντ' ἂν ἀνθρώπου ἡδοναὶ εἶναι, αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ δευτέρως καὶ πολλοστῶς, ὥσπερ αἱ ἐνέργειαι. But of the pleasures that seem to be virtuous we must discuss which kind and which particular pleasure are peculiarly human. This will be clear from the activities, for the pleasures result from the activities. Therefore, whether the perfect and happy man has one or many activities, it will be the pleasures perfecting these that will be called human in the principal sense. The other pleasures will be so only in various secondary ways, as are the activities.
COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Differentibus autem operationibus et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit quod delectationes secundum differentiam operationum differunt specie, hic ostendit quod secundum earum operationum differentiam differunt in bonitate et malitia. Et primo quantum ad bonitatem moralem. Secundo quantum ad bonitatem naturalem quae attenditur secundum puritatem et impuritatem, ibi: differt autem visus et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit quod intendit. Secundo probat propositum, ibi, etenim concupiscentiae et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod cum operationes differant secundum epiikiam et pravitatem, idest secundum virtutem et malitiam, ita scilicet quod quaedam operationes sunt eligibiles sicut operationes virtuosae, quaedam autem fugiendae sicut operationes vitiosae, quaedam autem secundum suam speciem neutro modo se habent sed possunt ad utrumque trahi, ita etiam se habet et circa delectationes. Quia cum unicuique operationi sit aliqua delectatio propria, ut supra dictum est, delectatio quae est propria virtuosae operationi est virtuosa et illa quae est propria pravae operationi est mala. 2050. After the Philosopher has shown that pleasures differ in kind according to the difference of activities, he now [B] shows that pleasures differ in goodness and evil according to the difference of activities. First [B, 1] in moral goodness; then [B, 2], at “Now sight differs etc.,” in physical goodness, which is judged according to purity and impurity. He discusses his first point in a twofold manner. First [1, a] he states his proposition. Next [1I, b], at “Just as desires etc.,” he proves his proposition. He says first that, since activities differ according to goodness and badness, i.e., virtue and vice—in such a way that some activities (the virtuous) are to be chosen, others (the vicious) are to be shunned, and still others are in neither class by their nature but can become either—so also do pleasures. The reason is that each activity is accompanied by a proper pleasure, as was stated previously (2039). Hence the pleasure proper to a virtuous activity is good, and the pleasure proper to a vicious activity is bad. Deinde cum dicit: et enim concupiscentiae etc., probat propositum ratione sumpta ex parte concupiscentiarum. Videmus enim quod concupiscentiae quibus aliqua bona, idest honesta, concupiscuntur, sunt laudabiles: puta si aliquis concupiscat iuste aut fortiter agere. Concupiscentiae autem rerum turpium sunt vituperabiles; puta si aliquis concupiscat furari aut moechari. Manifestum est autem, quod magis sunt propinquae et propriae operationibus delectationes quibus in ipsis operationibus delectamur, quam concupiscentiae quibus eas concupiscimus. 2051. Next [1, b], at “Just as desires,” he proves his proposition by a reason taken on the part of desires. We see that the desires by which we want good or honorable objects are praiseworthy, for example, if a person wants to act justly or bravely. But desires for base objects are blameworthy, for example, if a person desires to steal or fornicate. Obviously the pleasures by which we enjoy these activities are closer and more proper to the activities than are the desires by which we want them. Concupiscentiae enim distinguuntur ab operationibus tempore. Ante enim concupiscimus aliquid operari quam illud operemur. Distinguuntur etiam secundum naturam; quia operatio est actus perfecti, concupiscentia autem imperfecti et nondum habentis. Sed delectationes sunt propinquae operationibus, quia utrumque est alicuius perfecti. Sunt etiam et indiscretae secundum tempus; quia si nondum aliquis operatur, in tali operatione non delectatur; eo quod delectatio est rei praesentis, sicut concupiscentia rei futurae: et in tantum delectatio propinqua est operationi, quod videtur esse dubitabile, utrum operatio sit idem delectationi. 2052. Desires are separated from activities by time, for we desire to do an act before we do it. They are also distinct by nature because activity:s an act of a perfect thing but desire is an act of something imperfect and not yet achieved. But pleasures are closely connected with activities because both belong to something perfect. They are also closely linked by time for, if a person has not yet performed an action he is not enjoying this action because pleasure concerns a present thing, as desire a future one. Pleasure is closely linked to activity to such a degree that it seems to be a matter of doubt whether activity is identical with pleasure. Nec tamen dicendum est quod sit ita. Non enim potest esse delectatio nisi in operatione sensus vel intellectus. Ea enim quae cognitione carent delectari non possunt. 2053. However, we must not say that this is so. Pleasure indeed can be felt only in the activity of the senses or intellect, for creatures lacking perception cannot experience pleasure. Nec tamen est idem quod operatio intellectus, neque idem quod operatio sensus. Nam delectatio magis ad appetitivam partem pertinet. Est autem inconveniens si delectatio aliquibus videatur esse idem operationi, propter hoc quod ab operatione tempore non separatur. 2054. Nevertheless, pleasure is identical neither with the activity of the intellect nor with the activity of the senses. Pleasure pertains rather to the appetitive part. But it is unreasonable that some should think that pleasure is identical with activity because it is not separated from it. Sic igitur patet quod, sicut operationes sunt alterae secundum virtutem et malitiam, ita etiam et delectationes. Ex quo patet, inconvenienter enuntiasse quosdam universaliter de delectationibus quod sint bonae vel malae. 2055. Thus it is evident that, as activities differ according to virtue and vice, so too do pleasures. From this it is clear that some thinkers have inconsistently proclaimed that pleasures are (not) good and bad. Deinde cum dicit: differt autem visus etc., ostendit differentiam delectationum secundum puritatem et impuritatem. Manifestum est enim, quod operationes sensuum secundum puritatem differunt. Purior est enim operatio visus quam tactus; et similiter operatio auditus et olfactus quam operatio gustus. Dicitur autem aliqua operatio purior quae est immaterialior. Et secundum hoc, inter omnes sensitivas operationes purissima est operatio visus, quia est immaterialior, veluti minus habens admixtum de dispositionibus materiae; et ex parte obiecti quod fit sensibile in actu per lumen, quod derivatur a corpore caelesti; et ex parte medii quod sola spirituali transmutatione immutatur. Et propter easdem causas operatio tactus est maxime materialis; quia eius obiecta sunt conditiones materiae passibilis (et) medium eius non est extrinsecum, sed coniunctum. Et eadem differentia puritatis attenditur inter delectationes sensuum adinvicem. Sunt etiam operationes et delectationes intellectus puriores operationibus et delectationibus sensitivis, utpote magis immateriales. 2056. At “Now sight differs” [B, 2] he shows the difference between pleasures based on purity and impurity. Obviously activities of the senses differ according to purity, for the activity of sight is purer than that of touch; similarly, the activity of smell than that of taste. But activity that is more material is called purer. According to this the purest of all sensitive activities is sight because more immaterial, having as it does less admixture of material conditions—both on the part of the object which becomes actually (in actu) visible by light derived from the sun and on the part of the medium which is altered only by a spiritual change. For the same reasons the activity of touch is most material because the qualities of passible matter are its objects and its medium is not separate but contiguous. And the same difference in purity is observed between sensible pleasures among themselves. Likewise activities and pleasures of intellect, as being more immaterial, are purer than those of the senses. Deinde cum dicit: videtur autem esse unicuique etc., ostendit quae sit differentia delectationum ex parte obiecti. Et primo quantum ad animalia diversarum specierum. Secundo quantum ad homines qui sunt unius speciei, ibi: differunt autem non parum et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod cum delectatio consequatur operationem, videtur quod unicuique rei sit propria delectatio, sicut et propria operatio. Quod autem sit propria operatio uniuscuiusque rei, apparet ex hoc quod operationes sequuntur formas rerum secundum quas res specie differunt. Quod autem singulorum sit propria delectatio, apparet, si quis velit in unoquoque considerare. 2057. Then [II], at “It is thought,” he shows what the difference of pleasures is relative to the subject. First [II, A] in regard to animals of different species. Next [II, B], at “However, pleasures etc.,” in regard to men. He says first: since pleasure accompanies activity, it seems that each thing has its own pleasure just as it has its own activity. That each thing has its own activity is apparent from the fact that activities follow the forms of things according to which the things differ in kind. That each thing has its own pleasure is apparent if anyone wishes to consider things individually. Manifestum est enim, quod alia est delectatio equi et alia canis et alia hominis, sicut Heraclitus dicit quod asinus magis eligit fenum quam aurum. Quia delectabilius est sibi nutrimentum quod exhibetur ei per fenum, quam aurum. Sic igitur patet quod eorum quae differunt specie sunt delectationes specie differentes. Sed eorum quae non differunt specie, rationabile est quod sit indifferens delectatio consequens naturam speciei. 2058. For it is clear that a horse finds pleasure in one thing, a dog in another, and man in a third; as Herachtus says, an ass prefers grass to gold, since the nourishment afforded him by the grass is more pleasant to him than the gold. Thus it is obvious that things differing in kind have pleasures specifically different. On the other hand it is reasonable that the things that do not differ in kind have a similar pleasure following the nature of the species. Deinde cum dicit: differunt autem etc., ostendit differentiam delectationum in hominibus. Et primo ostendit quod hominum sint diversae delectationes. Secundo ostendit quod in virtuoso sit verior delectatio, ibi, videtur autem in omnibus etc.; tertio ostendit quae sit potior delectatio inter delectationes virtuosi, ibi, earum autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod quamvis rationabile videatur, quod indifferentium specie sit indifferens delectatio; et ita sit in aliis animalibus; tamen in hominibus, qui omnes sunt eiusdem speciei, multum differunt delectationes, sicut et operationes. 2059. At “However, pleasure” [II, B] he explains the difference among pleasures in men. First [II, B, 1] he shows that men have different pleasures. Then [II, B, 2], at “In all; cases etc.,” he shows that the principal pleasure is found in the virtuous man. Finally [II, B, 3], at “But of the pleasures etc.,” he shows which is the principal pleasure among the pleasures of a virtuous man. He says first: although it seems reasonable that creatures alike in kind should have a common sort of pleasure—this is so in the case of other animals—nevertheless men, who are all of the same species, do have very different pleasures just as they have different activities. Cuius ratio est, quia operationes et delectationes aliorum animalium consequuntur naturalem inclinationem, quae est eadem in omnibus animalibus eiusdem speciei. Sed operationes et delectationes hominum proveniunt a ratione quae non determinatur ad unum. Et inde est quod eadem quosdam homines delectant, et quosdam contristant. Et quibusdam sunt tristia et odibilia, quibusdam autem et delectabilia et amicabilia. 2060. The reason is that activities and pleasures of other animals follow their natural tendency, which is the same in all animals belonging to the same species. But activities and pleasures of men spring from reason that is not determined to one behavioral pattern. Consequently certain things delight some men and sadden others; and things distressing and odious to some are pleasant and attractive to others. Quae quidem se consequuntur, quia unusquisque delectatur in eo quod amat; et accidit hoc, quia quidam sunt melius vel peius dispositi secundum rationem. Et idem accidit circa gustum dulcium; quia non videntur eadem dulcia febricitanti qui habet gustum infectum, et sano qui habet gustum bene dispositum; (et idem accidit circa tactum:) quia non videtur idem esse calidum ei qui habet debilem tactum, et ei qui bene se habet. Et ita etiam est in aliis. 2061. Situations of this kind occur because everyone takes pleasure in what he loves. And this happens because some are well or badly disposed according to reason. This is the case in regard to the taste of sweet things since the same objects do not seem sweet to a sick man who has a diseased taste and to a well man who has a healthy taste; the same object does not seem hot to a person with a defective sense of touch and to a person whose touch is normal. This is true also of the other senses. Deinde cum dicit: videtur autem in omnibus etc., ostendit, quod delectatio virtuosorum sit potior inter delectationes humanas. Et dicit, quod in omnibus talibus quae pertinent ad passiones et operationes humanas, illud videtur esse verum, quod apparet studioso qui habet rectum iudicium circa talia, sicut sanus circa dulcia. Et si hoc bene dicitur, sicut videtur, ita quod virtus sit mensura secundum quam iudicetur de omnibus rebus humanis, et bonus inquantum est virtuosus, sequitur quod illae sint verae delectationes, quae videntur virtuoso et illa vere sint delectabilia quibus virtuosus gaudet. 2062. Then [II, B, 2], at “In all cases,” he shows that the pleasure of virtuous persons is the principal human pleasure. He observes: in all cases of this kind connected with human passions and activities, that seems to be really so which appearse to the good man who has correct judgment about such things, for example, the healthy man about what is sweet. And if this is correct—and it seems to be—that virtue is the measure by which we should judge all human affairs and that a man is good inasmuch as he is virtuous, it follows that real pleasures are those which appear so to the virtuous man, and that genuinely delightful things are those which the virtuous man enjoys. Si autem aliqua de quibus tristatur virtuosus appareant aliis delectabilia, non est admirandum. Hoc enim accidit propter multas corruptiones, et multiplicia hominum nocumenta, ex quibus pervertitur ratio et appetitus. Et sic illa quae repudiat virtuosus non sunt simpliciter delectabilia, sed solum male dispositis. Sic ergo manifestum est, quod illae delectationes quas omnes confitentur esse turpes, non dicendae sunt delectationes nisi hominibus corruptis. 2063. But it is not surprising that some things which are painful to the virtuous man are delightful to other men. For this happens on account of the many corruptions and various deteriorations of man which pervert his reason and appetite. Thus the things that the virtuous person repudiates are not pleasurable in themselves but only to the evilly inclined. Therefore it is obvious that pleasures which all admit to be disreputable must be declared pleasures only to depraved men. Deinde cum dicit: earum autem etc., ostendit quod aliqua est potior inter delectationes virtuosi. Et dicit, quod considerandum est inter delectationes virtuosas qualis vel quae sit praecipua delectatio hominis. Et hoc dicit esse manifestum ex operationibus ad quas consequuntur delectationes; quia sive sit una operatio, sive plures, quae sunt propriae hominis perfecti et beati, manifestum est, quod delectationes consequentes has operationes sunt principaliter delectationes hominis. Reliquae vero secundario et multipliciter sub principalibus delectationibus, sicut et circa operationes accidit. 2064. Finally [II, B, 3], at “But of the pleasures,” he shows that there is one principal pleasure among those of the good man. Aristotle notes that of the virtuous pleasures we must consider which kind ai4d which particular one constitute the Ichief pleasure of man. This, he says, will be clear from the activities that the pleasures follow. The reason is that, whether the perfect and happy man has one or many proper activities, obviously the pleasures accompanying these activities are the chief pleasures of man. The others are contained under the chief pleasures in various secondary ways, as happens in the case of activities.
The Nature of Happiness
Chapter 6 I. HE CONNECTS THIS WITH HIS EARLIER TREATMENT. — 2065 εἰρημένων δὲ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς τε καὶ φιλίας καὶ ἡδονάς, λοιπὸν περὶ εὐδαιμονίας τύπῳ διελθεῖν, ἐπειδὴ τέλος αὐτὴν τίθεμεν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων. ἀναλαβοῦσι δὴ τὰ προειρημένα συντομώτερος ἂν εἴη ὁ λόγος. After the discussion of the various kinds of virtue, friendship, and pleasure, it remains for us to treat happiness in a general way, inasmuch as we consider this to be the end of human activity. But our discussion will be more concise if we reassert what has been stated already. II. HE CARRIES OUT HIS PROPOSAL. A. He explains the genus of happiness. — 2066-2067 εἴπομεν δὴ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἕξις· καὶ γὰρ τῷ καθεύδοντι διὰ βίου ὑπάρχοι ἄν, φυτῶν ζῶντι βίον, καὶ τῷ δυστυχοῦντι τὰ μέγιστα. εἰ δὴ ταῦτα μὴ ἀρέσκει, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον εἰς ἐνέργειάν τινα θετέον, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρότερον εἴρηται, We have said that happiness is definitely not a habit. If it were it might be enjoyed by a person passing his whole life in sleep, living the life of a vegetable, or by someone suffering the greatest misfortune. If then this inconsistency is unacceptable, we must place happiness in the class of activity, as was indicated previously. B. He shows the nature of virtuous activity. 1. HAPPINESS IS CONTAIN UNDER THE ACTIVITIES DESIRABLE IN THEMSELVES. a. A division of activities. — 2068 τῶν δ' ἐνεργειῶν αἳ μέν εἰσιν ἀναγκαῖαι καὶ δι' ἕτερα αἱρεταὶ αἳ δὲ καθ' αὑτάς, But some activities are necessary and desirable for the sake of something else while others are desirable in themselves. b. Happiness falls under... activities... desirable in themselves. — 2069 δῆλον ὅτι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τῶν καθ' αὑτὰς αἱρετῶν τινὰ θετέον καὶ οὐ τῶν δι' ἄλλο· οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἐνδεὴς ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἀλλ' αὐτάρκης. Now it is clear that we must place happiness among the things desirable in themselves and not among those desirable for the sake of something else. For happiness lacks nothing and is selfsufficient. But those activities are desirable in themselves that are sought for no other reason than the activity itself. 2. HE DIVIDES THESE ACTIONS INTO VIRTUOUS AND AGREEABLE. — 2070 καθ' αὑτὰς δ' εἰσὶν αἱρεταὶ ἀφ' ὧν μηδὲν ἐπιζητεῖται παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. τοιαῦται δ' εἶναι δοκοῦσιν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις· τὰ γὰρ καλὰ καὶ σπουδαῖα πράττειν τῶν δι' αὑτὰ αἱρετῶν. καὶ τῶν παιδιῶν δὲ αἱ ἡδεῖαι· οὐ γὰρ δι' ἕτερα αὐτὰς αἱροῦνται· βλάπτονται γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῶν μᾶλλον ἢ ὠφελοῦνται, ἀμελοῦντες τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τῆς κτήσεως. Such actions are thought to be in conformity with virtue, for to do virtuous and honorable deeds is a thing desirable in itself. But agreeable amusements also seem to be desirable in themselves; they are not chosen for the sake of other things, since they are rather harmful than helpful, causing men to neglect their bodies and property. 3. HE SHOWS UNDER WHICH CLASSIFICATION HAPPINESS FALLS. a. Why some may think that happiness consists in amusement. — 2071-2072 καταφεύγουσι δ' ἐπὶ τὰς τοιαύτας διαγωγὰς τῶν εὐδαιμονιζομένων οἱ πολλοί, διὸ παρὰ τοῖς τυράννοις εὐδοκιμοῦσιν οἱ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις διαγωγαῖς εὐτράπελοι· ὧν γὰρ ἐφίενται, ἐν τούτοις παρέχουσι σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἡδεῖς, δέονται δὲ τοιούτων. δοκεῖ μὲν οὖν εὐδαιμονικὰ ταῦτα εἶναι διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἐν δυναστείαις ἐν τούτοις ἀποσχολάζειν, Many apparently happy persons have recourse to such pastimes. This is why the ready-witted in conversation are favorites with tyrants; they show themselves agreeable in furnishing the desired amusement for which the tyrants want them. So these pleasures are thought to constitute happiness because people in high places spend their time in them. b. He rejects the reason offered for this. — 2073-2075 οὐδὲν δ' ἴσως σημεῖον οἱ τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ δυναστεύειν ἡ ἀρετὴ οὐδ' ὁ νοῦς, ἀφ' ὧν αἱ σπουδαῖαι ἐνέργειαι· οὐδ' εἰ ἄγευστοι οὗτοι ὄντες ἡδονῆς εἰλικρινοῦς καὶ ἐλευθερίου ἐπὶ τὰς σωματικὰς καταφεύγουσιν, διὰ τοῦτο ταύτας οἰητέον αἱρετωτέρας εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ οἱ παῖδες τὰ παρ' αὑτοῖς τιμώμενα κράτιστα οἴονται εἶναι. εὔλογον δή, ὥσπερ παισὶ καὶ ἀνδράσιν ἕτερα φαίνεται τίμια, οὕτω καὶ φαύλοις καὶ ἐπιεικέσιν. καθάπερ οὖν πολλάκις εἴρηται, καὶ τίμια καὶ ἡδέα ἐστὶ τὰ τῷ σπουδαίῳ τοιαῦτα ὄντα· ἑκάστῳ δ' ἡ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἕξιν αἱρετωτάτη ἐνέργεια, καὶ τῷ σπουδαίῳ δὴ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετήν. οὐκ ἐν παιδιᾷ ἄρα ἡ εὐδαιμονία· But perhaps such persons prove nothing; for virtue and intelligence, the principles of good actions, do not depend on the possession of power. Nor should bodily pleasures be thought more desirable, if these persons without a taste for pure and liberal pleasure resort to physical pleasures. Children too think that objects highly prized by them are best. It is reasonable then that just as different things are valuable to a child and to a man, so also are they to good and bad men. Therefore, as we have often mentioned, those actions are worthy and pleasant that appear so to a good man. Now that activity is most desirable to everyone that is in accordance with his proper habit. But the activity most desirable to a good man is in accord with virtue. Consequently, his happiness does not consist in amusement. c. He resolves the truth (by two arguments). i. First. — 2076-2077 καὶ γὰρ ἄτοπον τὸ τέλος εἶναι παιδιάν, καὶ πραγματεύεσθαι καὶ κακοπαθεῖν τὸν βίον ἅπαντα τοῦ παίζειν χάριν. ἅπαντα γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν ἑτέρου ἕνεκα αἱρούμεθα πλὴν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας· τέλος γὰρ αὕτη. σπουδάζειν δὲ καὶ πονεῖν παιδιᾶς χάριν ἠλίθιον φαίνεται καὶ λίαν παιδικόν. παίζειν δ' ὅπως σπουδάζῃ, κατ' Ἀνάχαρσιν, ὀρθῶς ἔχειν δοκεῖ· ἀναπαύσει γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ παιδιά, ἀδυνατοῦντες δὲ συνεχῶς πονεῖν ἀναπαύσεως δέονται. οὐ δὴ τέλος ἡ ἀνάπαυσις· γίνεται γὰρ ἕνεκα τῆς ἐνεργείας. Surely it would be strange that amusement should be our end-that we should transact business and undergo hardships all through life in order to amuse ourselves. For we choose nearly all things for the sake of something else, except happiness which is an end itself. Now it seems foolish and utterly childish to exert oneself and to labor for the sake of amusement. On the contrary, to play in order to work better is the correct rule according to Anacharsis. This is because amusement is a kind of relaxation that men need, since they are incapable of working continuously. Certainly relaxation is not an end, for it is taken as a means to further activity. ii. Second argument. — 2078-2079 δοκεῖ δ' ὁ εὐδαίμων βίος κατ' ἀρετὴν εἶναι· οὗτος δὲ μετὰ σπουδῆς, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν παιδιᾷ. βελτίω τε λέγομεν τὰ σπουδαῖα τῶν γελοίων καὶ μετὰ παιδιᾶς, καὶ τοῦ βελτίονος ἀεὶ καὶ μορίου καὶ ἀνθρώπου σπουδαιοτέραν τὴν ἐνέργειαν· ἡ δὲ τοῦ βελτίονος κρείττων καὶ εὐδαιμονικωτέρα ἤδη. ἀπολαύσειέ τ' ἂν τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν ὁ τυχὼν καὶ ἀνδράποδον οὐχ ἧττον τοῦ ἀρίστου· εὐδαιμονίας δ' οὐδεὶς ἀνδραπόδῳ μεταδίδωσιν, εἰ μὴ καὶ βίου. οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις διαγωγαῖς ἡ εὐδαιμονία, ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργείαις, καθάπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται. Moreover, a life lived in conformity with virtue is thought to be a happy one; it is accompanied by joy “ but not by the joy of amusement. Now we say that those things that are done in earnest are better than ludicrous things and things connected with amusement, and we say that the activity of the better part or the better man is more serious. But an activity that belongs to a superior faculty is itself superior and more productive of happiness. Surely anyone can enjoy the pleasures of the body, the bestial man no less than the best of men. However, we do not ascribe happiness to the bestial man, if we do not assign him a life properly human. Therefore happiness does not consist in pursuits of this sort but in virtuous activities, as has been stated already.
COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Dictis autem his quae circa virtutes et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de delectatione, hic determinat de felicitate. Et primo continuat se ad praecedentia. Secundo exequitur propositum, ibi, diximus autem et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo narrat ea quae supra tractata sunt; dictum est enim supra de virtutibus, de II libro usque ad VIII, de amicitiis, in VIII et IX, de delectatione, in prima parte huius decimi. Secundo dicit de quo restat dicendum; quia de felicitate, de qua oportet pertransire, id est breviter dicere typo, idest figuraliter, sicut et de ceteris moralibus supra dictum est. Ideo autem de felicitate dicendum est, quia communiter omnes ponunt eam finem omnium humanorum. Finem autem oportet esse non ignotum, ad hoc quod absque errore operationes dirigantur ad finem. Tertio determinat modum tractandi de felicitate. Et dicit quod oportet resumere ea quae supra in primo dicta sunt de ipsa, sic enim erit brevior sermo si non a principio de ipsa tractetur. 2065. After the Philosopher has considered pleasure, he now takes up the consideration of happiness. First [I] he connects this with his earlier treatment. Then [II], at “We have said etc.,” he carries out his proposal. He makes a threefold division of the first point. First he enumerates the subjects already treated: virtues were discussed from the second book to the eighth (245-1537), friendship in the eighth and ninth books (1538-1952), and pleasure in the first part of the tenth book (1953-2064). Next he mentions what remains to be discussed, viz., happiness, which we must touch upon and briefly treat in a general way of in outline, just as we have previously treated other moral questions (43-230). Moreover, we must discuss happiness because everyone in general considers it the end of all human activities. Now, in order that activities be directed to an end without error it is necessary for the end to be known. Finally, he indicates the method of treating happiness, observing that we must reassert what was said about it initially (43-230). In this way our discussion will be more concise if we treat it from the beginning. Deinde cum dicit: diximus autem etc., exequitur propositum. Et primo manifestat genus felicitatis, ostendens quod non est habitus, sed operatio. Secundo ostendit, quod est operatio secundum virtutem, ibi, operationum autem et cetera. Tertio investigat cuius virtutis sit operatio, ibi, si autem felicitas et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod supra in primo dictum est, quod felicitas non est habitus. Sequerentur enim duo inconvenientia: quorum unum est, quod cum habitus remaneant in dormiente, sequeretur, si felicitas esset habitus, quod inesset etiam dormienti per totam vitam suam, vel per maximam partem eius. Et hoc est inconveniens; quia dormiens non habet perfecte operationes vitae, nisi eas quae pertinent ad animam vegetabilem, quae invenitur in plantis, quibus felicitas attribui non potest; manifestum est enim quod sensus et motus exteriores cessant in dormiente. Interiores autem phantasiae sunt inordinatae et imperfectae. Et similiter, si qua sit operatio intellectus in dormiente, est imperfecta. Solae autem operationes nutritivae partis perfectae sunt. 2066. Then [II], at “We have said” he carries out his intention. First [II, A] he explains the genus of happiness, showing that it is not a habit, but an activity. Next [II, B], at “But some activities etc.,” he shows the nature of virtuous activity. Finally [Lect. 10], at “If happiness etc.” (B. 1177 a 12), he investigates to what virtue the activity belongs. He says first—as was indicated in the first book (118-130, 152-153)—that happiness is not a habit. For two incongruities might follow: the first is that, since habits remain in a person asleep, it might follow—if happiness were a habit—that a sleeper might be happy throughout his whole life or a greater part of it. But this is unreasonable because one who is asleep does not perfectly exercise vital activities except those belonging to the vegetative soul found in plants to which happiness cannot be attributed. It is certain that sensation and external movements cease when a man is asleep; and internal images are distorted and imperfect. Likewise, intellectual activity in a sleeping person is imperfect, if indeed there is any. On the other hand, only activities of the nutritive part are perfect (in the sleeping person). Aliud autem inconveniens est, quia in infortunatis manent habitus virtutum; operationes autem virtutum impediuntur in eis propter infortunia. Si igitur felicitas sit habitus, sequeretur quod infortunati essent vere felices. Hoc autem Stoici pro inconvenienti non habent, ponentes exteriora bona nullo modo esse hominis bona et ideo per infortunia nihil posse homini de sua felicitate diminui. Hoc tamen est contra opinionem communem, quae infortunium repugnare felicitati existimat. Secundum ergo illos, quibus ista inconvenientia non placent, dicendum est quod felicitas non sit habitus, sed magis sit inter operationes ponenda, sicut in primo dictum est. 2067. A second incongruity is that virtuous habits remain in persons suffering misfortune, but their virtuous activities are hindered by reason of the misfortune. If then happiness is a habit, it might follow that the unfortunate were really happy. The Stoics, though, did not think this to be an inconsistency since they held that external goods are in no way human goods; and for this reason man’s happiness cannot be diminished by misfortunes. However, this is contrary to the common opinion that judges misfortune to be inconsistent with happiness. Therefore, according to those who reject these illogical consequences it must be said that happiness is not a habit but is to be placed among activities, as has been stated in the first book (118-130, 152-153). Deinde cum dicit operationum autem etc., ostendit, quod felicitas sit operatio secundum virtutem. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit felicitatem contineri sub operationibus, quae sunt secundum se eligibiles. Secundo dividit huiusmodi operationes in operationes virtutis et operationes ludi, ibi, tales autem esse videntur etc.; tertio ostendit sub quibus harum felicitas contineatur, ibi, refugiunt autem et ad tales et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit quamdam operationum divisionem. Et dicit quod operationum quaedam sunt necessariae ad aliud, et eligibiles propter quaedam alia, utpote non appetibiles nisi propter finem, quaedam vero sunt eligibiles secundum seipsas; quia, et si nihil aliud ab eis proveniret, tamen in seipsis habent unde appetantur. 2o68. At “But some activities” [II, B] he shows that happiness is a virtuous activity. He discusses this point from three aspects. First [ B, 1] he shows that happiness is contained under the activities desirable in themselves (secundum se). Then [B, 2], at “Such actions etc.,” he divides these actions into virtuous and agreeable. Finally [B, 3], at “Many apparently happy etc.,” he shows under which classification happiness falls. He treats the first point in a twofold manner. First [1, a] he proposes a division of activities. He notes that some activities are necessary for something else and to be chosen for the sake of other things, being desirable only for this end; other activities are worthy of choice in themselves (secundum seipsas) because, even if no further benefit might come from them they have a characteristic of desirability in themselves. Secundo ibi, manifestum etc., ostendit quod felicitas contineatur sub illis operationibus quae sunt eligibiles secundum se ipsas, non autem sub illis quae sunt eligibiles propter aliud. De ratione enim felicitatis est, quod sit per se sufficiens et non indigeat aliquo alio, ut patet ex his quae dicta sunt in primo. Illae autem operationes dicuntur secundum se eligibiles, ex quibus nihil aliud quaeritur praeter ipsam operationem, quasi nullo alio indigentes ad hoc quod sint eligibiles, illae vero quae sunt eligibiles propter aliud indigent alio ad hoc quod sint eligibiles. Et sic patet quod felicitas est operatio secundum se eligibilis. 2069. Second [1, b], at “Now it is clear,” he shows that happiness falls under those activities that are desirable in themselves and not under those which are desirable for the sake of something else. For it is of the nature of happiness to be self-sufficient and in need of nothing further, as is evident from what was said in the first book (118). But those activities are designated as desirable in themselves, from which nothing further than the activity itself is sought, inasmuch as they lack nothing to make them worthy of choice. Thus it is clear that happiness is an activity desirable in itself. Deinde cum dicit: tales autem etc., subdividit operationes secundum se eligibiles. Et dicit, quod primo quidem tales esse videntur operationes quae sunt secundum virtutem: quia hoc est per se eligibile homini, quod eligat ea quae sunt per se bona et honesta. Unde et honestum a quibusdam dicitur, quod sua vi nos trahit et sua dignitate nos allicit. Secundo videntur esse per se eligibiles etiam operationes delectabiles quae sunt in ludo. Non enim videtur quod homines tales operationes propter aliquam utilitatem eligant, cum magis per tales operationes homines laedantur quam iuventur. Videntur enim homines propter ludos negligere et corpora, quae laboribus et periculis exponunt, et possessiones, propter expensas quae in ludis fiunt. 2070. Then [B, 2], at “Such actions,” he subdivides activities desirable in themselves. He says first that these seem to be virtuous actions because it is absolutely (per se) desirable to man that he choose those thing that are of themselves (per se) good and honorable. Consequently some people call an object honorable because it draws us by its virtue and attracts us by its excellence. Second, even agreeable amusements seem to be desirable of themselves. For it does not seem that men choose these pastimes for any utility, since people are more often harmed than helped by such activities. In fact, because of amusements men seem to neglect both their bodies, which are exposed to pains and dangers, and their possessions by reason of the expenses they incur. Deinde cum dicit: refugiunt autem etc., ostendit sub quibus harum contineatur felicitas. Et primo ostendit, quare videatur quibusdam felicitas esse in operatione ludi; secundo excludit rationem ad hoc inductam, ibi: nullum autem forte signum etc.; tertio determinat veritatem, ibi, etenim inconveniens et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod multi eorum, qui apud homines reputantur felices, confugiunt ad tales conversationes, volentes scilicet in ludis conversari. Et inde est, quod tyranni approbant in conversatione ludi eutrapelos, qui scilicet sciunt convenienter ludere. 2071. Next [B, 3], at “Many apparently happy,” he shows under which classification happiness falls. First [3, a] he explains why some may think that happiness consists in amusement. Then [3, b], at “But perhaps etc.,” he rejects the reason offered for this. Finally [3, c], at “Surely it would etc.,” he resolves the truth. He says first that many who are looked upon as happy have recourse to pastimes of this kind, inasmuch as they want to be amused. Consequently, tyrants highly approve persons of ready wit in conversation for the sharpness of their jests. Vocat autem huiusmodi potentes tyrannos, quia non videntur communi utilitati intendere, sed propriae delectationi, qui in ludis conversantur. Ideo autem tyranni approbant eutrapelos, quia tales lusores exhibent se tyrannis delectabiles in his quae ipsi tyranni appetunt; scilicet in delectationibus ludi, ad quas indigent talibus hominibus. Sic igitur videtur quod felicitas in talibus consistat propter hoc quod huiusmodi vacant illi qui sunt in potentatibus constituti, quos homines reputant felices. 2072. He calls people in power tyrants because those who are occupied with amusements do not seem to strive for the common interest but for their own gratification. Moreover, tyrants make favorites of the ready-wittcd because they show themselves pleasing to tyrants in the very things that are desired, i.e., in pleasant amusements for which the tyrants want such men. Thus then happiness is said to consist in pleasures of this nature because persons in power—whom men consider happy—spend their time in them. Deinde cum dicit: nullum autem etc., excludit praedictam rationem. Et dicit, quod ex huiusmodi potentibus non potest accipi sufficiens signum, quod felicitas in ludo consistat. In his enim non invenitur excellentia prae aliis hominibus, nisi secundum potentiam mundanam, ex qua non sequitur quod operationes eorum sint virtuosae, quia virtus moralis et intellectualis, quae sunt principia bonarum operationum, non consistit in hoc quod aliquis sit potens. Et ideo non oportet, quod operationes ludi, quibus potentes vacant, sint optimae. 2073. Then [3, b], at “But perhaps,” he rejects the preceding reason. He remarks that rulers of this sort cannot be accepted as sufficient evidence that happiness consists in amusement. For these persons are superior to other men only in worldly power, but from this it does not follow that their actions are virtuous, since moral and intellectual virtues, the principles of good deeds, do not depend on a man being powerful. Consequently it is not necessary that amusements, to which princes devote their leisure, be the most excellent activities. Et similiter etiam quantum ad appetitum, qui per virtutem rectificatur, non oportet quod potentes bene se habeant et ideo, si potentes interiori gustu non percipiunt delectationem virtutis activae vel speculativae, quae est sincera, idest absque corruptione eius qui delectatur, et liberalis, quia est secundum rationem, secundum quam homo est liber in operando; et propter hoc confugiunt ad corporales delectationes, inter quas comprehenduntur delectationes ludicrae: non propter hoc est existimandum, quod huiusmodi delectationes sive operationes sint aliis eligibiliores. Quia videmus quod etiam pueri, quia carent intellectu et virtute, reputant quaedam puerilia in quibus conversantur esse pretiosa et optima, quae tamen non sunt magni ponderis, nec a viris perfectis aliquid reputantur. Rationabile est igitur, quod sicut pueris et viris perfectis alia et alia videntur pretiosa esse, ita etiam pravis et virtuosis. 2074. Likewise it does not necessarily follow that a prince is well-behaved in relation to the appetite that is directed by virtue. And so, if the powerful do not interiorly perceive in active and contemplative virtue the pleasure which is pure (i.e., without the corruption of the one enjoying it), and liberal (i.e., in keeping with reason by which man is free in his actions), and therefore resort to bodily pleasures among which amusements are numbered; for this reason we must not judge that these pleasures or activities are more desirable than others. We see that boys too, lacking understanding and virtue, consider childish pleasures they pursue as precious and best, although these have no great significance and are little valued by grown men. It is reasonable then that just as different things seem valuable to boys and mature men so also are they valued by wicked and virtuous persons. Ostensum est autem supra multoties, quod illa sunt vere pretiosa et delectabilia, quae talia iudicantur a virtuoso, qui est regula humanorum actuum. Sicut autem unicuique videtur esse maxime eligibilis operatio, quae convenit sibi secundum proprium habitum, ita etiam virtuoso est maxime eligibilis et pretiosa operatio quae est secundum virtutem. Et ideo in tali operatione est ponenda felicitas, non autem in operatione ludi. 2075. We have often indicated before (494, 1905) that those actions are really excellent and pleasant that are judged such by a good man who is the norm of human acts. But, as an activity that is agreeable to anyone as it arises from a proper habit seems to him to be most desirable, so a virtuous activity is most desirable and excellent to a good man. Consequently happiness must be placed in this activity and ftot in amusement. Deinde cum dicit: et enim inconveniens etc., determinat veritatem; probans, quod in operatione ludi non sit felicitas, duabus rationibus. Quarum prima sumitur ex hoc, quod felicitas est finis, quia scilicet, si felicitas consisteret in ludo, sequeretur hoc inconveniens, quod finis totius humanae vitae esset ludus, ita scilicet quod homo negotiaretur et omnia alia laboriosa et mala pateretur solum ut luderet; et hoc ideo sequeretur, quia fere omnia alia eligimus alterius gratia, praeter felicitatem, quae est ultimus finis; hoc autem quod homo studeat speculationi, et laboret in actione propter ludum, videtur esse stultum et valde puerile. 2076. At “Surely it would” [3, c] he resolves the truth, proving by two arguments that happiness does not consist in amusement. The first argument [c, i] is taken from the fact that happiness is the end. If it should consist in amusement, this inconsistency would follow, that the purpose of man’s whole life would be amusement so that he would engage in trade and undergo all other labors solely to amuse himself. This would follow because we choose nearly all other things, except happiness which is the ultimate end, for the sake of something else. But it seems foolish and thoroughly childish for a man to pursue contemplation and tiresome action for the sake of amusement. Sed e converso, recte se videtur habere secundum sententiam Anacharsis, quod aliquis ludat ad horam ad hoc quod postea diligentius studeat. Quia in ludo est quaedam relaxatio et requies animae, homines autem, cum non possint continue laborare, indigent requie; unde patet quod requies sive ludus non est finis, quia requies quaeritur propter operationem, ut scilicet homo postea vehementius operetur. Et sic patet, quod felicitas non consistit in ludo. 2077. On the contrary, according to the opinion of Anacharsis it seems proper for a person to amuse himself for a time so that later he may work harder. The reason is that relaxation and rest are found in amusement. But, since men cannot work continuously, they need rest. Hence it is clear that amusement or rest is not an end because this rest is for the sake of activity in order that afterwards men may work more earnestly. Obviously then happiness does not consist in amusement. Secundam rationem ponit ibi, videtur autem et cetera. Ideo enim ponunt aliqui felicitatem in ludo, propter delectationem quae in ludo est. Habet autem felicitas delectationem quamdam, quia est operatio secundum virtutem, quae cum gaudio existit. Non tamen cum gaudio ludi. Quia cum felicitas sit summum bonum hominis, oportet quod in optimis consistat. Meliora autem dicimus virtuosa, quae serie aguntur, quam ridiculosa, quae fiunt ludo. Et hoc sic patet quia operatio quae est melioris particulae animae, et quae est propria hominis, est magis virtuosa. Patet autem, quod operatio, quae est melioris partis, est melior, et per consequens felicior. 2078. He presents the second argument [c, ii] at “Moreover, a life.” Some people place happiness in amusement because of the pleasure found in it. Now happiness does have some pleasure because it is an activity of virtue which is accompanied by joy, but not by the joy of amusement. The reason is that, since happiness is the highest good of man, it must consist in what is best. But we hold virtuous things, that are seriously done, to be better than amusing things that are playfully done. This is evident from the fact that activity which belongs to the better part of the soul and is proper to man is more virtuous. But obviously an activity belonging to a better part is better and consequently more productive of happiness. Potest autem contingere, quod corporalibus delectationibus potest potiri quicumque homo, etiam bestialis, non minus quam optimus quicumque vir. Felicitatem autem nullus attribuit homini bestiali, neque etiam parti animae brutali, sicut non attribuitur ei vita quae est propria hominis. Et sic patet, quod in talibus conversationibus, scilicet in delectationibus corporalibus, inter quas computantur delectationes ludi, non consistit felicitas, sed solum in operationibus quae sunt secundum virtutem, sicut et prius dictum est. 2079. Anyone can enjoy the pleasures of the body, even a bestial man no less than the noblest of men. But no one ascribes happiness to a bestial man, or to the animal part of the soul, just as we do not assign to him life which is properly human. Clearly then happiness does not consist in pursuits of this kind, i.e., in physical pleasures-among which amusements are counted-but only in virtuous activities, as has been stated already (2075, 2078).
Happiness, an Activity According to the Highest Virtue
Chapter 7 I. (HE SHOWS THIS) IN GENERAL. — 2080-2085 εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργεια, εὔλογον κατὰ τὴν κρατίστην· αὕτη δ' ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀρίστου. εἴτε δὴ νοῦς τοῦτο εἴτε ἄλλο τι, ὃ δὴ κατὰ φύσιν δοκεῖ ἄρχειν καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ ἔννοιαν ἔχειν περὶ καλῶν καὶ θείων, εἴτε θεῖον ὂν καὶ αὐτὸ εἴτε τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ θειότατον, ἡ τούτου ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν εἴη ἂν ἡ τελεία εὐδαιμονία. If happiness is an activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable that it should be in accordance with the highest virtue; and this will be the virtue of the best part in us. Whether this part be the intellect or something else that seems to rule and control us by nature and to understand noble and divine things, whether it be itself divine or the most divine element in us, the activity of this part in accordance with its proper virtue will constitute perfect happiness. II. (HE SHOWS THIS) IN PARTICULAR. A. Perfect happiness consists in... contemplative virtue. 1. PERFECT HAPPINESS CONSISTS IN THE ACTIVITY OF CONTEMPLATION. a. Happiness consists in contemplative activity. i. He states his intention. — 2086 ὅτι δ' ἐστὶ θεωρητική, εἴρηται. ὁμολογούμενον δὲ τοῦτ' ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι καὶ τοῖς πρότερον καὶ τῷ ἀληθεῖ. Now we have already said that this activity is contemplative—a conclusion in harmony both with our previous discussion and with the truth. ii. He proves his statement by six arguments. u. FIRST. — 2087 κρατίστη τε γὰρ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ τῶν γνωστῶν, περὶ ἃ ὁ νοῦς· For contemplation is the highest operation, since the intellect is the best element in us and the objects of the intellect are the best of the things that can be known. v. SECOND. — 2088-2089 ἔτι δὲ συνεχεστάτη· θεωρεῖν [τε] γὰρ δυνάμεθα συνεχῶς μᾶλλον ἢ πράττειν ὁτιοῦν. It is also most continuous: we can contemplate truth more continuously than we can carry on any other activity. w. THIRD. — 2090-2092 οἰόμεθά τε δεῖν ἡδονὴν παραμεμῖχθαι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἡδίστη δὲ τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργειῶν ἡ κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν ὁμολογουμένως ἐστίν· δοκεῖ γοῦν ἡ φιλοσοφία θαυμαστὰς ἡδονὰς ἔχειν καθαρειότητι καὶ τῷ βεβαίῳ, εὔλογον δὲ τοῖς εἰδόσι τῶν ζητούντων ἡδίω τὴν διαγωγὴν εἶναι. Again, we think that pleasure is necessarily mingled with happiness. But the most delightful of all activities in accordance with virtue is admittedly activity in accordance with wisdom. For philosophy or the pursuit of wisdom offers pleasures marvelous both in purity and permanence; and it is reasonable that those who have attained the truth will spend their life more pleasantly than those who are occupied in pursuing the truth. x. FOURTH. — 2093-2096 ἥ τε λεγομένη αὐτάρκεια περὶ τὴν θεωρητικὴν μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη· τῶν μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ζῆν ἀναγκαίων καὶ σοφὸς καὶ δίκαιος καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ δέονται, τοῖς δὲ τοιούτοις ἱκανῶς κεχορηγημένων ὁ μὲν δίκαιος δεῖται πρὸς οὓς δικαιοπραγήσει καὶ μεθ' ὧν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ σώφρων καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστος, ὁ δὲ σοφὸς καὶ καθ' αὑτὸν ὢν δύναται θεωρεῖν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν σοφώτερος ᾖ, μᾶλλον· βέλτιον δ' ἴσως συνεργοὺς ἔχων, ἀλλ' ὅμως αὐταρκέστατος. Then too the quality of self-sufficiency will be found especially in contemplation. For the philosopher indeed needs the necessaries of life no less than the just man and other virtuous men do. However, when the necessities have been provided, the just man still needs people toward whom and with whose aid he may act justly. The same is true of the temperate man and the brave man and so on. But the philosopher can contemplate by himself, and the more so the wiser he is. While it is perhaps better for him to have fellow workers nevertheless he is the most self-sufficient. y. FIFTH. — 2097 δόξαι τ' ἂν αὐτὴ μόνη δι' αὑτὴν ἀγαπᾶσθαι· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῆς γίνεται παρὰ τὸ θεωρῆσαι, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν πρακτικῶν ἢ πλεῖον ἢ ἔλαττον περιποιούμεθα παρὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν. Moreover, this activity would seem to be loved for its own sake, for nothing is produced by it apart from the act of contemplation. On the other hand, from practical activities we acquire a greater or less benefit apart from the action itself.
COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Si autem felicitas est et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit quod felicitas est operatio secundum virtutem, hic incipit ostendere cuius virtutis sit operatio. Et primo ostendit hoc in generali. Secundo in speciali, ibi, quoniam autem est speculativa et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod cum felicitas sit operatio secundum virtutem, sicut et hic et in primo ostensum est, rationabiliter sequitur, quod sit operatio secundum virtutem optimam. Ostensum est enim in primo, quod felicitas est optimum inter omnia humana bona, cum sit omnium finis. Et quia melioris potentiae melior est operatio, ut supra dictum est; consequens est quod operatio optima hominis sit operatio eius, quod est in homine optimum. Et hoc quidem secundum rei veritatem est intellectus. 2080. Now that the Philosopher has shown that happiness is an activity in accordance with virtue he begins here to show which virtue this activity follows. First [I] in general; then [II], at “Now we have etc.,” in particular. He states first: since happiness is an activity in keeping with virtue—as explained also in the first book (119, 124, 128, 131, 151, 160 and elsewhere).we reasonably deduce that happiness is an activity in accordance with the highest virtue. For it was shown in the first book (65, 67, 128, 169, 171) that happiness is the best of all human goods as the goal of them all. Likewise, since the better activity flows from the better faculty—as was just stated (2078) logically the best activity of man will be the activity of the part that is best in him. Ile truth of the matter is: the best part of man is his intellect. Sed quia circa hoc diversimode sunt aliqui opinati, nec est nunc locus talia discutiendi, sub dubio ad praesens relinquit, utrum optimum hominis sit intellectus, vel aliquid aliud. Ponit tamen signa quaedam, ex quibus potest cognosci, quod intellectus sit optimum eorum, quae sunt in homine. 2081. But, as some have thought differently on this point and there is no place here to discuss such matters, for the present he leaves the question in doubt: is the intellect or something else best in man? However, he does offer some evidence from which we can conclude that the intellect is the best of us. Et primo quidem, per comparationem ad ea quae infra intellectum sunt, quibus intellectus propter sui excellentiam principatur et dominatur. Principatur quidem respectu irascibilis et concupiscibilis, quibus ratio sive intellectus praesidet quasi politico principatu, quia in aliquo resistere possunt rationi. Dominatur autem corporeis membris, quae ad nutum obediunt imperio rationis absque contradictione. Et ideo ratio vel intellectus praesidet corpori, quasi servo, despotico principatu ut dicitur primo politicae. 2082. First, from a comparison with inferior things that the intellect rules and controls by reason of its superiority. Certainly the intellect or reason rules the irascible and concupiscible appetites in presiding over them by a quasi-political power, though they can of course resist reason to some extent. On the other hand the reason controls the physical members which obey its command blindly without contradiction. Therefore the reason or intellect governs the body as a slave by a despotic power, as pointed out in the first book of the Politics (Ch. 5, 1254 b 4; StTh. Lect. 3, 64). Secundo vero, ponit signa excellentiae intellectus per comparationem ad superiora, scilicet ad res divinas, ad quas dupliciter comparatur. Uno modo secundum habitudinem, quasi ad obiecta. Solus enim intellectus habet intelligentiam de rebus essentialiter bonis, quae sunt res divinae. Alio modo comparatur intellectus humanus ad res divinas, secundum connaturalitatem ad ipsas, diversimode quidem secundum diversorum sententias. 2083. Second, he offers some indications of the intellect’s superiority by comparison with higher or divine things to which the intellect is compared in a twofold manner. First, by a special relation to these objects: only the intellect understands things that are essentially noble or divine. In the other way the human intellect is compared to divine things by a natural affinity for them—in a different fashion corresponding to the knowledge of different objects. Quidam enim posuerunt intellectum humanum esse aliquid sempiternum et separatum. Et secundum hoc ipse intellectus esset quiddam divinum. Dicimus enim res divinas esse, quae sunt sempiternae et separatae. Alii vero intellectum partem animae posuerunt, sicut Aristoteles. Et secundum hoc intellectus non est simpliciter quiddam divinum, sed est divinissimum inter omnia quae in nobis, propter maiorem convenientiam quam habet cum substantiis separatis, secundum quod eius operatio est sine organo corporeo. 2084, Some philosophers held that the intellect is something imperishable and separate; and in their system the intellect would be a divine thing, for we call those beings divine that are imperishable and separate. Others, like Aristotle, considered the intellect a part of the soul; and in this view the intellect is not something divine by itself (simpliciter) but the most divine of all the things in us. This is so because of its greater agreement with the separated substances, inasmuch as its activity exists without a bodily organ. Quocumque autem modo se habeat, necesse est secundum praedicta, quod perfecta felicitas sit operatio huius optimi secundum virtutem propriam sibi. Non enim potest esse perfecta operatio, quod requiritur ad felicitatem, nisi potentiae perfectae per habitum qui est virtus ipsius secundum quam reddit operationem bonam. 2085. But whatever way the intellect may be constituted, in keeping with what has been said, happiness is necessarily an activity of this best element in accordance with the virtue proper to it. For the perfect activity required for happiness can come only from a power perfected by a habit that is the power’s virtue making the activity good. Deinde cum dicit: quoniam autem est speculativa etc., ostendit in speciali cuius virtutis operatio sit perfecta felicitas. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit, quod in operatione speculativae virtutis consistit perfecta felicitas. Secundo comparat felicitatem perfectam ad res exteriores, ibi, opus erit autem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit, quod perfecta felicitas consistit in operatione speculationis. Secundo praefert hanc felicitatem felicitati quae consistit in actione, ibi, secundo autem qui secundum aliam virtutem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit, quod felicitas consistit in operatione speculativa. Secundo ostendit qualiter se habeat ad hominem, ibi: talis autem utique erit et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit quod intendit. Et dicit, quod ex supra dictis in sexto manifestum est, quod speculativa operatio est intellectus secundum propriam virtutem eius, scilicet secundum sapientiam principaliter, quae comprehendit intellectum et scientiam. Et quod in tali operatione consistat, felicitas, videtur esse consonum eis, quae in primo dicta sunt de felicitate, et etiam ipsi veritati. 2086. Then [II], at “Now we have,” he shows in particular the activity of what virtue constitutes happiness. He makes two points here. First [II, A] he shows that perfect happiness consists in the activity of contemplative virtue. Next [Lect. 13], at “But, being man etc.” (B. 1178 b 33), he connects perfect happiness with external things. He discusses the first point from two aspects. First [A, 1] he shows that perfect happiness consists in the activity of contemplation. Second [Lect. 12; A, 2], at “But life etc.” (B. 1178 a 9), he prefers this happiness to that which consists in action. He treats the first point in a twofold manner. First [1, a] he shows that happiness consists in contemplative activity. Then [Lect. 11; 1, b], at “Such a life etc.” (B. 1177 b 26), he shows how happiness is related to man. He handles the first point in two ways. First [a, i] he states his intention. From previous discussion in the sixth book (1190) contemplative activity obviously belongs to the intellect in accordance with its proper virtue, i.e., principally in accord with wisdom, which includes understanding and science. And that happiness consists in such activity seems in harmony with our discussions on happiness in the first book (118-130) and with truth itself. Secundo ibi: optima et enim etc., probat propositum sex rationibus. Prima ergo ratio talis est. Dictum est prius, quod felicitas est optima operatio. Optima autem inter operationes humanas est speculatio veritatis. Et hoc patet ex duobus, ex quibus pensatur dignitas operationis. Uno modo ex parte potentiae, quae est operationis principium. Et sic patet hanc operationem esse optimam, sicut et intellectus est optimum eorum quae in nobis sunt, ut prius ostensum est. Alio modo ex parte obiecti, quod dat speciem operationi. Et secundum hoc etiam haec operatio est optima; quia inter omnia cognoscibilia optima sunt intelligibilia, et praecipue divina. Et sic in eorum speculatione consistit perfecta humana felicitas. 2087. Next [a, ii], at “For contemplation,” he proves his statement by six arguments. The first [ii, u]: happiness is the highest activity, as was pointed out before (2080). But the highest of human activities is contemplation of truth; and this is evident from the two reasons by which we judge the excellence of activity. First, on the part of the faculty that is the principle of the activity. Thus this activity is obviously the highest, as the intellect is also the best element in us (explained before in 2080-2085). Second, on the part of the object determining the species of the activity. Here too this activity is the highest because, among the objects that can be known, the supra-sensible—especially the divine—are the highest. And so it is in the contemplation of these objects that the perfect happiness of man consists. Secundam rationem ponit ibi: adhuc autem continuissima et cetera. Ostensum enim est in I quod felicitas est maxime continua et permanens. Inter omnes autem operationes humanas continuissima est speculatio veritatis. Manifestum est enim, quod magis continue potest homo perseverare in speculatione veritatis, quam in quacumque alia operatione. 2088. He offers the second argument [ii, v] at “It is also.” As shown in the first book (129), happiness is especially continuous and lasting. But the most continuous of all human activities is the contemplation of truth. For it is clear that man can persevere in the contemplation of truth more continuously than in any other activity. Cuius ratio est, quia necesse est discontinuari operationem nostram propter laborem quem non possumus continue ferre. Labor autem et fatigatio accidit in operationibus nostris propter passibilitatem corporis, quod alteratur et removetur a naturali dispositione sua; unde, cum intellectus in sua operatione minimum utatur corpore, sequitur quod minimum eius operationi adveniat labor et fatigatio. Quae nulla esset si intellectus in speculando non indigeret phantasmatibus existentibus in organis corporeis. Et sic patet quod maxime invenitur felicitas in speculatione veritatis propter eius continuitatem. 2089. The reason fat this is that interruption of our activity is necessary, for we are incapable of laboring without a break. Now distress and weariness come about in our labors from the passibility of the body, which is changed and removed from its natural condition. Since the intellect in operating uses the body very little, it follows that its activity is only slightly affected by toil and fatigue. And there would be none of this if the intellect did not need the phantasms existing in the organs of the body. Thus it is clear that happiness is found most of all in the contemplation of truth because of its freedom from labor. Tertiam rationem ponit ibi, existimamusque et cetera. Et dicit, quod sicut in primo dictum est, communiter existimamus quod felicitati delectatio adiungatur. Inter omnes autem operationes virtutis delectabilissima est contemplatio sapientiae, sicut est manifestum et concessum ab omnibus. Habet enim philosophia in sapientiae contemplatione delectationes admirabiles, et quantum ad puritatem, et quantum ad firmitatem. Puritas quidem talium delectationum attenditur ex hoc, quod sunt circa res immateriales. Firmitas autem earum attenditur secundum hoc, quod sunt circa res immutabiles. 2090. He presents the third argument [ii, w], at “Again, we think,” by observing that we commonly suppose that pleasure is associated with happiness—as was indicated in the first book (129). But the most delightful of all virtuous activities is the contemplation of wisdom—an evident fact conceded by everyone. For, in the contemplation of wisdom philosophy offers pleasures marvelous both in purity and permanence. The purity of these pleasures is perceived in this: they deal with immaterial objects; their permanence, in that their objects are unchangeable. Qui enim delectatur circa res materiales, incurrit quamdam impuritatem affectus ex hoc quod circa inferiora occupatur. Qui autem circa res mutabiles delectatur, non potest firmam delectationem habere, quia mutata re aut corrupta quae delectationem afferebat, delectatio cessat, et quandoque in tristitiam vertitur. Dicit autem delectationes philosophiae esse admirabiles propter inconsuetudinem talium delectationum apud multitudinem hominum, qui in rebus materialibus delectantur. 2091. A person taking pleasure in material objects incurs some impurity of affection from being engrossed with inferior things; and a person taking pleasure in changeable objects cannot have lasting enjoyment since, when the object affording pleasure is changed or destroyed, the pleasure itself ceases and sometimes becomes painful. Now he calls the pleasures of philosophy marvelous because of the infrequency of such pleasures among men who find enjoyment in material things. Speculatio veritatis est duplex: una quidem quae consistit in inquisitione veritatis; alia vero quae consistit in contemplatione veritatis iam inventae et cognitae. Et hoc perfectius est, cum sit terminus et finis inquisitionis. Unde et maior est delectatio in consideratione veritatis iam cognitae, quam in inquisitione eius. Et ideo dicit quod delectabilius conversantur illi, qui iam sciunt veritatem, habentes intellectum perfectum per intellectualem virtutem, quam illi qui adhuc inquirunt eam. Unde perfecta felicitas non consistit in quacumque speculatione intellectus, sed in ea quae est secundum propriam virtutem ipsius. 2092. Contemplation of truth is twofold: one consists in the investigation of truth, the other in the reflection on the truth already discovered and known. The second is more perfect since it is the term and end of investigation. Consequently greater pleasure is found in the consideration of truth already known than in its investigation. For this reason he declares that people who already know the truth and have their reason perfected by its intellectual virtue spend their life more delightfully. Hence perfect happiness does not consist in contemplation indiscriminately but in that which corresponds to its proper virtue. Quartam rationem ponit ibi, et quae dicitur et cetera. Ostensum est enim in primo, quod per se sufficientia, quae Graece dicitur autarchia, requiritur ad felicitatem. Huiusmodi autem per se sufficientia maxime invenitur circa speculativam operationem, ad quam homo non indiget nisi his quae sunt necessaria omnibus ad communem vitam: indiget enim necessariis vitae tam sapiens, scilicet speculativus, quam etiam iustus, et reliqui habentes virtutes morales, quae perficiunt vitam activam. 2093. He gives the fourth argument [ii, x] at “Then too the quality.” We have shown in the first book (107-114) that self-sufficiency, in Greek autarchia, is necessary for happiness. But this self-sufficiency is found most of all in contemplation for which man needs only what is commonly required for social living. For the necessaries of life are indeed needed both by the wise or contemplative man and by the just man and others possessing the moral virtues that perfect the active life. Si autem alicui dentur sufficienter necessaria vitae, adhuc pluribus indiget virtuosus, secundum virtutem moralem. Indiget enim iustus ad suam operationem aliis. Et primo quidem illis ad quos debet iuste agere, quia iustitia ad alterum est, ut dictum est in quinto. Secundo autem indiget aliquibus, cum quibus operetur iustitiam, ad quod indiget homo frequenter multorum auxilio. Et eadem ratio est de temperato et forti, et de aliis virtuosis moraliter. 2094. When the necessaries of life are sufficiently provided, the man who is good according to moral virtue needs still more. The just man needs other men for his activity; first, those toward whom he should act justly, since justice refers to another person-as was pointed out in the fifth book (909, 934). Second, he needs others as helpers to do justice, for in this a man frequently requires the assistance of many people. The same argument holds for the temperate or the brave man and for other persons good according to moral virtue. Sed non est ita de sapiente speculativo, qui potest speculari veritatem, etiam si solus secundum seipsum existat. Quia contemplatio veritatis est operatio penitus intrinseca ad exterius non procedens. Et tanto aliquis magis poterit solus existens speculari veritatem, quanto fuerit magis perfectus in sapientia. Quia talis plura cognoscit, et minus indiget ab aliis instrui vel iuvari. 2095. But this is not the case with the contemplative philosopher who can contemplate truth even if he lives by himself. The reason is that contemplation of the truth is an entirely internal activity not proceeding externally. And the more a person can contemplate the truth when living by himself the more perfect he will be in wisdom.,This is so because such a man knows much and has little need of help and instruction from others. Nec hoc dicitur quia contemplantem non iuvet societas; quia ut in octavo dictum est, duo simul convenientes et intelligere et agere magis possunt. Et ideo subdit, melius esse sapienti, quod habeat cooperatores circa considerationem veritatis, quia interdum unus videt quod alteri, licet sapientiori, non occurrit. Et quamvis sapiens ab aliis iuvetur, tamen inter omnes ipse per se magis sibi sufficit ad propriam operationem. Et sic patet, quod maxime in operatione sapientiae invenitur felicitas. 2096. This does not mean that companionship is not a help to contemplation, since two together are more effective in intellectual and practical activity, as was pointed out in the eighth book (1540). For this reason he adds that it is better for the philosopher to have fellow workers in the study of truth because sometimes one sees what does not occur to another, who is perhaps wiser. And although the philosopher is helped by others, nevertheless of himself he is more adequate than anyone for his own activity. So it is evident that happiness is found in the activity of wisdom most of all. Quintam rationem ponit ibi, videbitur autem utique et cetera. Ostensum est enim in primo, quod felicitas est ita per se appetibilis, quod nullo modo appetitur propter aliud. Hoc autem apparet in sola speculatione sapientiae, quod propter seipsam diligatur et non propter aliud. Nihil enim homini accrescit ex contemplatione veritatis praeter ipsam veritatis speculationem. Sed ex exterioribus operabilibus semper homo acquirit aliquid praeter ipsam operationem, aut plus aut minus; puta honorem et gratiam apud alios, quae non acquirit sapiens ex sua contemplatione, nisi per accidens, inquantum scilicet veritatem contemplatam aliis enunciat, quod iam pertinet ad exteriorem actionem. Sic ergo patet quod felicitas maxime consistit in operatione contemplationis. 2097. He states the fifth reason [ii, y] at “Moreover, this activity.” Now happiness is so desirable in itself (per se) that it is never sought for the sake of anything else, as explained in the first book (iii). But this is evident only in the contemplation of wisdom which is loved for itself and not for something else. In fact the contemplation of truth adds nothing to a man apart from itself, but external activity secures for him a greater or less benefit beyond the action, for example, honor or favor with others; this is not acquired by the philosopher from his contemplation except incidentally, inasmuch as he communicates to others the truth contemplated—something that is now a part of external activity. Therefore it is obvious that happiness consists in contemplation most of all.
Happiness and Leisure
Chapter 7 (II) Z. SIXTH (REASON). — 2098-2104 δοκεῖ τε ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν τῇ σχολῇ εἶναι· ἀσχολούμεθα γὰρ ἵνα σχολάζωμεν, καὶ πολεμοῦμεν ἵν' εἰρήνην ἄγωμεν. τῶν μὲν οὖν πρακτικῶν ἀρετῶν ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς ἢ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἡ ἐνέργεια, αἱ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις δοκοῦσιν ἄσχολοι εἶναι, αἱ μὲν πολεμικαὶ καὶ παντελῶς οὐδεὶς γὰρ αἱρεῖται τὸ πολεμεῖν τοῦ πολεμεῖν ἕνεκα, οὐδὲ παρασκευάζει πόλεμον· δόξαι γὰρ ἂν παντελῶς μιαιφόνος τις εἶναι, εἰ τοὺς φίλους πολεμίους ποιοῖτο, ἵνα μάχαι καὶ φόνοι γίνοιντο· ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ ἄσχολος, καὶ παρ' αὐτὸ τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι περιποιουμένη δυναστείας καὶ τιμὰς ἢ τήν γε εὐδαιμονίαν αὑτῷ καὶ τοῖς πολίταις, ἑτέραν οὖσαν τῆς πολιτικῆς, ἣν καὶ ζητοῦμεν δῆλον ὡς ἑτέραν οὖσαν. εἰ δὴ τῶν μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πράξεων αἱ πολιτικαὶ καὶ πολεμικαὶ κάλλει καὶ μεγέθει προέχουσιν, αὗται δ' ἄσχολοι καὶ τέλους τινὸς ἐφίενται καὶ οὐ δι' αὑτὰς αἱρεταί εἰσιν, ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργεια σπουδῇ τε διαφέρειν δοκεῖ θεωρητικὴ οὖσα, καὶ παρ' αὑτὴν οὐδενὸς ἐφίεσθαι τέλους, καὶ ἔχειν τὴν ἡδονὴν οἰκείαν αὕτη δὲ συναύξει τὴν ἐνέργειαν, καὶ τὸ αὔταρκες δὴ καὶ σχολαστικὸν καὶ ἄτρυτον ὡς ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τῷ μακαρίῳ ἀπονέμεται, τὰ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ἐνέργειαν φαίνεται ὄντα· ἡ τελεία δὴ εὐδαιμονία αὕτη ἂν εἴη ἀνθρώπου, λαβοῦσα μῆκος βίου τέλειον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀτελές ἐστι τῶν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας. And happiness is thought to depend on leisure, for we are busy in order to have leisure, and we wage war in order to attain peace. Now the exercise of the practical virtues is evident in political and military affairs, but actions concerned with these seem to be without leisure. This is completely the case with warlike activity, for no one chooses to wage war or provoke it merely for the sake of fighting. Indeed a man would be considered a murderous character if he turned his friends into enemies for the sake of causing battles and slaughter. But the activity of the statesman is also without leisure, and aims at—apart from participation in politics—positions of power and honor or even the happiness of himself and fellow citizens as something distinct from political activity (and we are investigating it as something distinct). Even if, among the activities of the moral virtues, political and military actions stand out prominent both in nobility and in greatness, they are without leisure, aim at some other end, and are not desirable for their own sakes. On the other hand the activity of the intellect, being contemplative, is thought to be different by reason of serious application, both in desiring no end beyond itself and in possessing a proper pleasure that increases its activity. So contemplation seems to have self-sufficiency, leisureliness, freedom from labor (as far as humanly possible), and all other activities usually assigned to the happy man. Therefore, man’s perfect happiness will consist in this activity of the intellect, if a long span of life be added (as nothing belonging to happiness should be incomplete). b. He shows how this contemplative life is associated with man. i. He explains his proposition. — 2105-2106 ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη βίος κρείττων ἢ κατ' ἄνθρωπον· οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν οὕτω βιώσεται, ἀλλ' ᾗ θεῖόν τι ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει· ὅσον δὲ διαφέρει τοῦτο τοῦ συνθέτου, τοσοῦτον καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν. εἰ δὴ θεῖον ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοῦτον βίος θεῖος πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον. Such a life is higher than the human level; and it is not lived by man according to the human mode but according to something divine in him. And so far as this differs from the composite, to that extent its activity differs from the activity flowing from the other kind of virtue. Therefore, if the intellect is divine in comparison with man, so is its life divine in comparison with human life. ii. He rejects an error. — 2107-2110 οὐ χρὴ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς παραινοῦντας ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν ἄνθρωπον ὄντα οὐδὲ θνητὰ τὸν θνητόν, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὑτῷ· εἰ γὰρ καὶ τῷ ὄγκῳ μικρόν ἐστι, δυνάμει καὶ τιμιότητι πολὺ μᾶλλον πάντων ὑπερέχει. δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ εἶναι ἕκαστος τοῦτο, εἴπερ τὸ κύριον καὶ ἄμεινον. ἄτοπον οὖν γίνοιτ' ἄν, εἰ μὴ τὸν αὑτοῦ βίον αἱροῖτο ἀλλά τινος ἄλλου. τὸ λεχθέν τε πρότερον ἁρμόσει καὶ νῦν· τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἑκάστῳ τῇ φύσει κράτιστον καὶ ἥδιστόν ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ· καὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δὴ ὁ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν βίος, εἴπερ τοῦτο μάλιστα ἄνθρωπος. οὗτος ἄρα καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατος. Nor ought we to follow the philosophers who advise man to study human things, and mortals to study mortality, but we ought to strive to attain immortality so far as possible and to exert all our power to live according to the best thing in us. For, though this is a small part of us, it far surpasses all else in power and value; it may seem, even, to be the true self of each, being the principal and better part. Consequently it would be strange if a person were to choose to live not his own life but the life of some other. Moreover, our previous statement is applicable here: what is proper to the nature of each thing is best and most pleasant for it. So then the life of the intellect is best and most pleasant for man since the intellect more than anything else is man. This life, therefore, will be the happiest.
COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Videturque felicitas et cetera. Positis quinque rationibus ex quibus ostendebatur, quod felicitas consistit in speculatione veritatis secundum convenientiam ad ea quae supradicta sunt, hic addit sextam quae procedit ex quadam conditione felicitatis, quam supra non posuerat. Felicitas enim consistit in quadam vacatione. Vacare enim dicitur aliquis quando non restat ei aliquid agendum: quod contingit cum aliquis iam ad finem pervenerit. Et ideo subdit, quod non vacamus ut vacemus, idest laboramus operando, quod est non vacare, ut perveniamus ad quiescendum in fine, quod est vacare. Et hoc ostendit per exemplum bellantium, qui ad hoc bella gerunt quod ad pacem adoptatam perveniant. 2098. After Aristotle has presented five reasons to show that happiness consists in the contemplation of truth, he now adds a sixth reason [ii, z], not previously mentioned, arising from a feature of happiness. Now happiness involves a kind of leisure. For a person is said to have leisure when he has nothing further to do-a condition in which he finds himself on arriving at some goal. For this reason the Philosopher adds that we are busy in order to have leisure, that is, we are active in working—this is being busy—in order to rest at the end, and this is having leisure. And he finds an example of this in soldiers who wage war to obtain a desirable peace. Est tamen considerandum, quod supra philosophus dicit, quod requies sit gratia operationis. Sed ibi locutus fuit de requie, qua intermittitur operatio ante consequutionem finis propter impossibilitatem continue operandi, quae quidem requies ordinatur ad operationem sicut ad finem. Vacatio autem est requies in fine ad quem ordinatur operatio, et sic felicitati, quae est ultimus finis, maxime competit vacatio. Quae quidem non invenitur in operationibus virtutum practicarum, quarum praecipue sunt illae quae consistunt in rebus politicis, utpote ordinantes bonum commune, quod est divinissimum; vel in rebus bellicis, quibus ipsum bonum commune defenditur contra hostes, et tamen his operibus non competit vacatio. 2099. We should note, as the Philosopher stated before (2077), that rest should be taken for the sake of activity. But there he was speaking of rest which, before attaining the end, suspends activity because of the impossibility of uninterrupted labor—this rest being ordered to activity as an end. On the other hand leisure is rest in the end to which activity is ordered. Thus understood, leisure is a special property of happiness, the ultimqte end; it is not found in the activities of the practical virtues. Prominent among these are the virtues dealing with political affairs involving the direction of the common or most divine good and with warfare involving the defense of the common good against enerdies; nevertheless in such activities leisure has no part. Et primo quidem, circa bellicas operationes hoc est penitus manifestum, quia nullus eligit bella gerere aut praeparare bella solum gratia bellandi, quod esset vacationem habere in rebus bellicis. Quia si in bellis gerendis finem suum constitueret, sequeretur quod esset violentus et occisor, in tantum, quod etiam de amicis faceret impugnatores ad hoc, quod posset pugnare et occidere. 2100. In the first place this is entirely clear in military operations since no one chooses to wage war or to provoke it solely for the sake of fighting, which would be to have leisure for warfare. The reason is that if someone were to make his end the waging of war he would be a murderous character turning his friends into enemies so that he could fight and kill. Secundo etiam hoc manifestum est in actionibus politicis, quod non est in eis vacatio; sed praeter ipsam conversationem civilem vult homo acquirere aliquid aliud, puta potentatus et honores; vel, quia in his non est ultimus finis ut in primo ostensum est, magis est decens, quod per civilem conversationem aliquis velit acquirere felicitatem sibi ipsi et civibus, ita quod huiusmodi felicitas, quam intendit aliquis acquirere per politicam vitam, sit altera ab ipsa politica vita; sic enim per vitam politicam, quaerimus eam quasi alteram existentem ab ipsa. Haec est enim felicitas speculativa, ad quam tota vita politica videtur ordinata; dum per pacem, quae per ordinationem vitae politicae statuitur et conservatur, datur hominibus facultas contemplandi veritatem. 2101. Second, it is obvious that there is no place for leisure in political activities. But a man wants something besides mere participation in politics, like positions of power and honor; and-since these objectives do not constitute the ultimate end, as was pointed out in the first book (60-72)it is rather fitting that by means of politics a person should wish to obtain happiness for himself and everyone else; happiness of this kind sought in political life is distinct from political life itself, and in fact we do seek it as something distinct. This is contemplative happiness to which the whole of political life seems directed; as long as the arrangement of political life establishes and preserves peace giving men the opportunity of contemplating truth. Si igitur inter omnes actiones virtutum moralium excellunt politicae et bellicae, tam pulchritudine, quia sunt maxime honorabiles, quam etiam magnitudine, quia sunt circa maximum bonum, quod est bonum commune; cum huiusmodi operationes non habeant in seipsis vacationem, sed agantur propter appetitum alterius finis et non sint eligibiles propter seipsas, non erit in operationibus virtutum moralium perfecta felicitas. 2102. Among the activities of the moral virtues political and military actions stand out preeminent both in nobility (they are most honorable) and in greatness (they concern the greatest good, i.e., the common good), and these actions do not themselves possess leisure but are directed to a further end and are not desirable for their own sakes. Hence perfect happiness will not be found in the activities of the moral virtues. Sed operatio intellectus, quae est speculativa, videtur a praemissis operationibus differre secundum rationem studii; quia scilicet homo vacat huiusmodi operationi propter seipsam, ita quod nullum alium finem praeter ipsam appetit. Habet etiam huiusmodi operatio propriam delectationem ex ipsa procedentem, quae auget eam. Sic igitur patet, quod secundum huiusmodi operationem speculativam intellectus manifeste apparent omnia existere in homine quaecumque solent attribui beato, scilicet quod sit per se sufficiens, et quod vacet, et quod non laboret. Et hoc dico quantum possibile est homini mortalem vitam agenti, in qua vita huiusmodi non possunt perfecte existere. 2103. But the activity of the intellect, which is contemplative, seems to differ from the preceding activities by reason of serious application, since man applies himself to it for its own sake so that he seeks no further end. This activity also contains a proper pleasure proceeding from itself and augmenting it. So then such contemplative activity of the intellect clearly provides for man the attributes customarily assigned to the happy person: self-sufficiency, leisureliness, and freedom from labor. And I say this insofar as it is possible for man living a mortal life in which such things cannot exist perfectly. Sic igitur in contemplatione intellectus consistit perfecta felicitas hominis dummodo adsit diuturnitas vitae. Quae quidem requiritur ad bene esse felicitatis, secundum quod oportet nihil eorum, quae pertinent ad felicitatem, esse imperfectum. 2104. Therefore man’s perfect happiness consists in contemplation of the intellect, if a long span of life be added. This indeed is necessary for the well-being of happiness, as nothing belonging to happiness should be incomplete. Deinde cum dicit: talis autem utique etc., ostendit qualiter huiusmodi vita contemplativa se habeat ad hominem. Et primo ostendit propositum. Secundo excludit errorem, ibi, oportet autem non secundum suadentes et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod talis vita, quae vacat contemplationi veritatis, est melior quam vita quae est secundum hominem. Cum enim homo sit compositus ex anima et corpore, habens sensitivam naturam et intellectivam, vita homini commensurata videtur consistere in hoc, quod homo secundum rationem ordinet affectiones et operationes sensitivas et corporales. Sed vacare soli operationi intellectus videtur esse proprium supernarum substantiarum in quibus invenitur sola natura intellectiva, quam (homo) participat secundum intellectum. 2105. Then [1, b], at “Such a life,” he shows how this contemplative life is associated with man. First [b, i] he explains his proposition. Second [b, ii], at “Nor ought we etc.,” he rejects an error. He says first that the kind of life that has leisure for the contemplation of truth is higher than the human level. Since man is composed of soul and body with a sensitive and intellectual nature, life commensurate to him is thought to consist in this, that he directs by reason his sensitive and bodily affections and activities. But to engage solely in intellectual activity seems proper to the superior substances possessing only an intellectual nature that they participate by their intellect. Et ideo manifestans quod dictum est, subdit quod homo sic vivens, scilicet vacando contemplationi, non vivit secundum quod homo, qui est compositus ex diversis, sed secundum quod aliquid divinum in ipso existit, prout scilicet secundum intellectum divinam similitudinem participat. Et ideo quantum intellectus in sua puritate consideratus differt a composito ex anima et corpore, tantum distat operatio speculativa ab operatione quae fit secundum virtutem moralem, quae proprie est circa humana. Sicut ergo intellectus per comparationem ad hominem est quiddam divinum, ita et vita speculativa, quae est secundum intellectum, comparatur ad vitam moralem, sicut divina ad humanam. 2106. For this reason in explaining his statement he adds that man living in this manner, i.e., occupied in contemplation, does not live as man, composed of diverse elements, but as something divine is present in him, partaking in a likeness to the divine intellect. And on that account, as the intellect considered in its purity differs from a composite of soul and body so the contemplative activity differs from the activity following moral virtue, which is properly concerned with human affairs. Therefore, just as the intellect compared to man is something divine, so the contemplative life, which is based upon the intellect, is compared to the life of moral virtue as divine to human life. Deinde cum dicit: oportet autem etc., excludit quorumdam errorem, qui suadebant, quod homo debeat intendere ad sapiendum humana et mortalis ad sapiendum mortalia. Et fuit hoc dictum Simonidis poetae, ut patet in principio metaphysicae. Quod quidem philosophus dicit esse falsum, quia homo debet tendere ad immortalitatem quantum potest, et secundum totum posse suum facere ad hoc quod vivat secundum intellectum, qui est optimum eorum quae sunt in homine, qui quidem est immortalis et divinus. Quamvis enim hoc optimum sit parvum mole, quia est incorporeum et simplicissimum, et per consequens caret magnitudine molis, tamen quantitate virtutis et pretiositatis multum excedit omnia quae in homine sunt. 2107. Next [b, i], at “Nor ought we,” he rejects the error of some philosophers who advised man that he must strive to know the things of man, and mortals the things of mortals. This was the advice of the poet Simonides, as appears in the beginning of the Metaphysics (Ch. 2, 982 b 30-983 a 4; St. Th., 3, 61-63). But the Philosopher calls it false, since we must strive to attain immortality so far as possible, and exert all our power to live according to reason—the best of all the elements in man who is truly divine and immortal. For, though this best element is a small part, being incorporeal and most simple, and consequently lacking greatness, nevertheless it surpasses everything human in the extent of its power and value. Virtute quidem sive potentia excedit in suis operationibus, quibus superioribus coniungitur, et inferioribus principatur, et sic quodammodo omnia complectitur; pretiositate autem quantum ad dignitatem suae naturae, quia intellectus est immaterialis et simplex, incorruptibilis et impassibilis. Unumquodque autem, idest totus homo videtur esse hoc, scilicet intellectus, si ita est, immo quia ita est, quod intellectus est principalius et melius, quod sit in homine. 2108. It excels in power by its activities, which are akin to superior beings and have authority over inferior beings, and so in a way it embraces all things. Likewise, it excels in value as regards the excellence of its nature, since the intellect is immaterial and simple, incorruptible and incapable of suffering. Now each human being, i.e., the whole man, seems to be the intellect if it is true—nay rather because it is true—that the intellect is the principal and better part of man. Dictum est enim supra in nono quod unumquodque potissime videtur esse id quod est principalius in eo, quia omnia alia sunt quasi instrumenta illius. Et sic dum homo vivit secundum operationem intellectus, vivit secundum vitam maxime sibi propriam. Esset autem inconveniens si aliquis eligeret vivere non secundum vitam propriam suiipsius, sed secundum vitam alicuius alterius. Unde inconvenienter dicunt qui suadent, quod homo non debeat vacare speculationi intellectus. Et cum hoc dictum sit prius in nono, quod id quod est secundum intellectum est proprium homini, congruit etiam et nunc in proposito. Illud enim quod est optimum secundum naturam in unoquoque est maxime proprium sibi: quod autem est optimum et proprium, consequens est quod sit delectabilissimum, quia unusquisque delectatur in bono sibi convenienti; sic igitur patet quod, si homo maxime est intellectus tamquam principalissimum in ipso, quod vita, quae est secundum intellectum, est delectabilissima homini, et maxime sibi propria. 2109. We have stated in the ninth book (1868, 1872) that each thing is thought to be especially that which constitutes its chief part, since all other parts are its tools, so to speak. And so when man lives in accordance with the activity of the intellect, he lives in accordance with the life most proper to him; for it would be strange if a person were to choose to live not his own life but the life of some other. Hence they give unwise counsel who say that man should not engage in intellectual contemplation. And the statement made in the ninth book (1807, 1847, 1869-1872) that what accords with reason is proper to man is applicable also to our present purpose. For that which is best in each thing’s nature is most proper to it. But what is best and proper consequently is most delightful because everyone delights in a good that is pleasing to him. So then, if man is especially his intellect, since this is the principal element in him, evidently life according to the intellect is most delightful and proper to him in the highest degree. Nec hoc est contra id quod supra dictum est, quod non est secundum hominem, sed supra hominem: non est enim secundum hominem quantum ad naturam compositam, est autem propriissime secundum hominem quantum ad id quod est principalissimum in homine: quod quidem perfectissime invenitur in substantiis superioribus, in homine autem imperfecte et quasi participative. Et tamen istud parvum est maius omnibus aliis quae in homine sunt. Sic ergo patet, quod iste qui vacat speculationi veritatis est maxime felix, quantum homo in hac vita felix esse potest. 2110. Nor is it contrary to our previous assertion (2106) that this is not on the human level but above man. Indeed it is not on the human level considering man’s composite nature, but it is most properly human considering what is principal in man-a thing found most perfectly in superior substances but imperfectly and by participation, as it were, in man. Nevertheless this small part is greater than all the other parts in man, Thus it is clear that the person who gives himself to the contemplation of truth is the happiest a man can be in this life.
Happiness and the Moral Virtues
Chapter 8 (A)2. The Philosopher... introduces a kind of a secondary happiness. a. He proposes his intention. — 2111 δευτέρως δ' ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν· αἱ γὰρ κατὰ ταύτην ἐνέργειαι ἀνθρωπικαί. But life in accordance with the other kind of virtue is happy only in a secondary degree. b. He proves his proposition by four reasons. i. First. — 2112-2116 δίκαια γὰρ καὶ ἀνδρεῖα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλους πράττομεν ἐν συναλλάγμασι καὶ χρείαις καὶ πράξεσι παντοίαις ἔν τε τοῖς πάθεσι διατηροῦντες τὸ πρέπον ἑκάστῳ· ταῦτα δ' εἶναι φαίνεται πάντα ἀνθρωπικά. ἔνια δὲ καὶ συμβαίνειν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος δοκεῖ, καὶ πολλὰ συνῳκειῶσθαι τοῖς πάθεσιν ἡ τοῦ ἤθους ἀρετή. συνέζευκται δὲ καὶ ἡ φρόνησις τῇ τοῦ ἤθους ἀρετῇ, καὶ αὕτη τῇ φρονήσει, εἴπερ αἱ μὲν τῆς φρονήσεως ἀρχαὶ κατὰ τὰς ἠθικάς εἰσιν ἀρετάς, τὸ δ' ὀρθὸν τῶν ἠθικῶν κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. συνηρτημέναι δ' αὗται καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι περὶ τὸ σύνθετον ἂν εἶεν· αἱ δὲ τοῦ συνθέτου ἀρεταὶ ἀνθρωπικαί· καὶ ὁ βίος δὴ ὁ κατὰ ταύτας καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία. ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ κεχωρισμένη· τοσοῦτον γὰρ περὶ αὐτῆς εἰρήσθω· διακριβῶσαι γὰρ μεῖζον τοῦ προκειμένου ἐστίν. Its activities are merely human, for we perform works of justice, fortitude, and the other virtues when we observe what is due to everyone in our mutual dealings, our services and various kinds of actions and passions. And all these are human experiences. Besides, some of these matters seem to pertain to the body, and moral virtue is thought to be ascribed especially to the passions. Prudence too is connected with moral virtue, and moral virtue with prudence since the principles of prudence are taken from the moral virtues and the rectitude of the moral virtues from prudence. And both, being connected with the passions, will belong to the nature of the composite. Now the virtues of the composite are human, and so then are life and happiness following these virtues. The intellect, however, is something separate. We have then sufficiently treated this point, and a fuller explanation would be more than our purpose requires. ii. Second. — 2117-2120 δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς χορηγίας ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢ ἐπ' ἔλαττον δεῖσθαι τῆς ἠθικῆς. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαίων ἀμφοῖν χρεία καὶ ἐξ ἴσου ἔστω, εἰ καὶ μᾶλλον διαπονεῖ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ὁ πολιτικός, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· μικρὸν γὰρ ἄν τι διαφέροι· πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας πολὺ διοίσει. τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἐλευθερίῳ δεήσει χρημάτων πρὸς τὸ πράττειν τὰ ἐλευθέρια, καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ δὴ εἰς τὰς ἀνταποδόσεις αἱ γὰρ βουλήσεις ἄδηλοι, προσποιοῦνται δὲ καὶ οἱ μὴ δίκαιοι βούλεσθαι δικαιοπραγεῖν, τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ δυνάμεως, εἴπερ ἐπιτελεῖ τι τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ τῷ σώφρονι ἐξουσίας· πῶς γὰρ δῆλος ἔσται ἢ οὗτος ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τις; ἀμφισβητεῖταί τε πότερον κυριώτερον τῆς ἀρετῆς ἡ προαίρεσις ἢ αἱ πράξεις, ὡς ἐν ἀμφοῖν οὔσης· τὸ δὴ τέλειον δῆλον ὡς ἐν ἀμφοῖν ἂν εἴη· πρὸς δὲ τὰς πράξεις πολλῶν δεῖται, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν μείζους ὦσι καὶ καλλίους, πλειόνων. τῷ δὲ θεωροῦντι οὐδενὸς τῶν τοιούτων πρός γε τὴν ἐνέργειαν χρεία, ἀλλ' ὡς εἰπεῖν καὶ ἐμπόδιά ἐστι πρός γε τὴν θεωρίαν· ᾗ δ' ἄνθρωπός ἐστι καὶ πλείοσι συζῇ, αἱρεῖται τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν πράττειν· δεήσεται οὖν τῶν τοιούτων πρὸς τὸ ἀνθρωπεύεσθαι. But contemplative happiness seems to need little dispensing of external goods or less than the happiness based on moral virtue. Both indeed need the necessities of life and in an equal degree, even if the statesman is more troubled than the philosopher about the requirements of the body and the like. On this point they differ little but in their activities there is a wide difference. For the generous man needs the means to practice liberality and the just man to make a return of services (since mere wishes are not evident and even the unjust pretend that they want to act justly). Likewise the brave man will need strength if he performs any act in accordance with his virtue; and the temperate man will need opportunity. Otherwise, how can he or any other virtuous person be recognized? Further, it may be asked whether choice or action is more important in virtue, which appears to involve both; surely it is evident that perfection consists in both. Now for action many things are required and the more so the greater and nobler the deeds are; but for the activity of the contemplative man nothing of the kind is needed. In fact it can be said that external goods are obstacles to contemplation. But the contemplative person, insofar as he is man and lives with others, chooses to perform virtuous acts. Hence he will need external goods to live a human life. iii. Third. — 2121-2123 ἡ δὲ τελεία εὐδαιμονία ὅτι θεωρητική τις ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἂν φανείη. τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ μάλιστα ὑπειλήφαμεν μακαρίους καὶ εὐδαίμονας εἶναι· πράξεις δὲ ποίας ἀπονεῖμαι χρεὼν αὐτοῖς; πότερα τὰς δικαίας; ἢ γελοῖοι φανοῦνται συναλλάττοντες καὶ παρακαταθήκας ἀποδιδόντες καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα; ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀνδρείους... ὑπομένοντας τὰ φοβερὰ καὶ κινδυνεύοντας ὅτι καλόν; ἢ τὰς ἐλευθερίους; τίνι δὲ δώσουσιν; ἄτοπον δ' εἰ καὶ ἔσται αὐτοῖς νόμισμα ἤ τι τοιοῦτον. αἱ δὲ σώφρονες τί ἂν εἶεν; ἢ φορτικὸς ὁ ἔπαινος, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχουσι φαύλας ἐπιθυμίας; διεξιοῦσι δὲ πάντα φαίνοιτ' ἂν τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις μικρὰ καὶ ἀνάξια θεῶν. ἀλλὰ μὴν ζῆν γε πάντες ὑπειλήφασιν αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἄρα· οὐ γὰρ δὴ καθεύδειν ὥσπερ τὸν Ἐνδυμίωνα. τῷ δὴ ζῶντι τοῦ πράττειν ἀφαιρουμένου, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ ποιεῖν, τί λείπεται πλὴν θεωρία; ὥστε ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνέργεια, μακαριότητι διαφέρουσα, θεωρητικὴ ἂν εἴη· καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων δὴ ἡ ταύτῃ συγγενεστάτη εὐδαιμονικωτάτη. That perfect happiness is a form of contemplative activity will be clear from what follows. Now we suppose that the gods are supremely happy and blessed. But what kind of actions should we attribute to them? just actions? The gods will appear rather ridiculous making contracts, returning deposits and so on. Brave actionsin undergoing terrors and running risks because it is good to do so? Or.liberal actions? But to whom will they give? Besides it will be strange for them to have money and the like. If they are called temperate, the praise will be distasteful since they do not have lustful desires. In fact, a thorough review shows all the circumstances of these actions trifling and unworthy of the gods. However, we commonly think of them as living and active, for we must not suppose that they are asleep like Endymion. If then we take away from a living being action, and production besides, what is left except contemplation? Therefore the activity of God, which is transcendent in happiness, is contemplative; and that most akin to it among human activities is the greatest source of happiness, iv. Fourth. — 2124-2125 σημεῖον δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν τὰ λοιπὰ ζῷα εὐδαιμονίας, τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ἐστερημένα τελείως. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ θεοῖς ἅπας ὁ βίος μακάριος, τοῖς δ' ἀνθρώποις, ἐφ' ὅσον ὁμοίωμά τι τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ὑπάρχει· τῶν δ' ἄλλων ζώων οὐδὲν εὐδαιμονεῖ, ἐπειδὴ οὐδαμῇ κοινωνεῖ θεωρίας. ἐφ' ὅσον δὴ διατείνει ἡ θεωρία, καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ οἷς μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει τὸ θεωρεῖν, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν, οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν θεωρίαν· αὕτη γὰρ καθ' αὑτὴν τιμία. ὥστ' εἴη ἂν ἡ εὐδαιμονία θεωρία τις. This is further indicated by the fact that the other animals do not partake of happiness, for they are completely deprived of this activity. The life of the gods is completely happy; the same is true of man’s life insofar as it contains a likeness of contemplative activity. But none of the other animals possess happiness because they do not share in contemplation. So then contemplation and happiness are coextensive; and the more deeply people contemplate, the happier they are, not by accident but by reason of contemplation which is itself admirable. Consequently happiness consists principally in some form of contemplation.
COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Secundo autem qui secundum aliam virtutem et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit quod perfecta felicitas est et principalis secundum speculationem intellectus, hic inducit quamdam aliam secundariam felicitatem, quae consistit in operatione moralium virtutum. Et primo proponit quod intendit; dicens, quod cum ille qui vacat speculationi veritatis sit felicissimus, secundario est felix ille qui vivit secundum aliam virtutem, scilicet secundum prudentiam, quae dirigit omnes morales virtutes. Sicut enim felicitas speculativa attribuitur sapientiae, quae comprehendit in se alios habitus speculativos tamquam principalior existens, ita etiam felicitas activa, quae est secundum operationes moralium virtutum, attribuitur prudentiae, quae est perfectiva omnium moralium virtutum, ut in sexto ostensum est. 2111. After he has shown that perfect happiness consists principally and primarily in intellectual contemplation, the Philosopher next introduces a kind of secondary happiness [A, 2] arising from the activity of the moral virtues. First [2, a] he proposes his intention: although a man who engages in the contemplation of truth is happiest, another is happy in a secondary degree as lie lives by the standard of a different virtue, prudence, which directs all the moral virtues. For, just as happiness of contemplative living is attributed to wisdom which, as the preeminent virtue, contains in itself other speculative habits, so too the happiness of active living, which is gauged by the activities of the moral virtues, is attributed to prudence perfecting all the moral virtues, as was pointed out in the sixth book (1275-1284). Secundo ibi, secundum ipsam enim etc., ostendit propositum quatuor rationibus. Quarum prima est, quia operationes quae sunt secundum alias virtutes activas sunt operationes humanae. Sunt enim circa res humanas. Primo quidem circa res exteriores, quae in usum hominis veniunt. Opera enim iustitiae et fortitudinis et aliarum virtutum, quae adinvicem agimus existunt in commutationibus, prout secundum iustitiam homines invicem sua bona commutant. Existunt etiam in necessitatibus, prout scilicet unus homo alteri subvenit in sua necessitate. Existunt etiam in quibuscumque actionibus et passionibus humanis, circa quas secundum virtutes morales conservatur id quod convenit unicuique. Omnia autem praedicta videntur esse quaedam humana. 2112. Then [2, b], at “Its activities,” he proves his proposition by four reasons. First [b, i]: because activities conforming to the other active virtues are human activities, since they concern human affairs. In the first place they deal with commonplace external matters in the life of man. For the works of justice, fortitude, and the other virtues, which we do for one another, are manifest in our dealings, as when men mutually exchange their goods in conformity with justice; in our services, as when one man succors another in need; and in all kinds of -actions and passions where the moral virtues observe what is due to everyone. And all these are human experiences. Secundo autem, quaedam ad virtutes pertinentia videntur pertinere ad corpus et ad animae passiones, quibus virtus moralis, secundum quamdam affinitatem, appropriatur. Multae enim moralium virtutum sunt circa passiones, sicut ex praedictis patet. Sic igitur virtus moralis est circa humana bona in quantum est circa bona exteriora, et circa bona corporis et circa animae passiones. 2113. Second, some matters, of the virtues seem to pertain to the body and the passions of the soul to which moral virtue is ascribed by a kind of affinity. For many moral virtues deal with the passions, as is apparent from previous discussions (367). So then moral virtue concerns human affairs inasmuch as it deals with external goods, bodily goods, and the passions of the soul. Morali autem virtuti coniungitur prudentia intellectualis virtus existens, secundum quamdam affinitatem, et e converso, quia principia prudentiae accipiuntur secundum virtutes morales, quarum fines sunt principia prudentiae. Rectitudo autem moralium virtutum accipitur secundum prudentiam, quae facit rectam electionem eorum quae sunt ad finem, ut patet ex his quae in sexto dicta sunt. Ea autem, scilicet virtus moralis et prudentia, simul copulantur cum passionibus, quia scilicet secundum utramque modificantur passiones. Passiones autem sunt communes totius compositi ex anima et corpore, cum pertineant ad partem sensitivam. 2114. Prudence, considered as an intellectual virtue, is connected with moral virtue by a kind of affinity; the reverse of this is likewise true, because the principles of prudence are taken from the moral virtues whose ends are the principles of prudence. Moreover, the rectitude of the moral virtues is taken from prudence because prudence makes the right choice of means, as evident from the sixth book (1268-1269). Likewise, moral virtue and prudence are joined at the same time with the passions because the passions are regulated by both. And since the passions belong to the composite they are common to the whole composite of soul and body. Unde patet, quod tam virtus moralis quam prudentia sunt circa compositum. Virtutes autem compositi proprie loquendo sunt humanae, inquantum homo est compositus ex anima et corpore, unde et vita quae secundum has, id est secundum prudentiam et virtutem moralem, est humana, quae dicitur vita activa. Et per consequens felicitas, quae in hac vita consistit, est humana. Sed vita et felicitas speculativa, quae est propria intellectus, est separata et divina. 2115. It is obvious then that both moral virtue and prudence are concerned with the composite. Now virtues of the composite, properly speaking, are human inasmuch as man is composed of soul and body. Hence life in accordance with these, namely, prudence and moral virtue, is also human (and is called the active life). Consequently happiness consisting in this kind of life is human. But contemplative life and contemplative happiness, which are proper to the intellect, are separate and divine. Et tantum dicere ad praesens de ipsa sufficiat. Quod autem magis per certitudinem explicetur, est aliquid maius quam pertineat ad propositum. Agitur enim de hoc in tertio de anima, ubi ostenditur, quod intellectus est separatus. Sic igitur patet, quod felicitas speculativa est potior quam activa, quanto aliquid separatum et divinum est potius quam id quod est compositum et humanum. 2116. It should suffice for the present to say this much on the matter, for a fuller explanation would be more than what belongs to our purpose. The question is treated in the third book De Anima (Ch. 5, 43- a 22; St. Th. Lect. 10, 742-743), where it is shown that the intellect is separate. Therefore it is evident that happiness of contemplative living is more excellent than happiness of active living according as something separate and divine is more excellent than that which is composite and human. Secundam rationem ponit ibi: videbitur autem utique et cetera. Et dicit, quod speculativa vita et felicitas videtur parum, vel saltem minus quam moralis, indigere quod homini largiantur exteriora bona. Verum est enim quod ambobus, idest tam speculativo quam morali, opus est habere necessaria vitae, puta cibum et potum et alia huiusmodi; quamvis circa corpus magis laboret activus quam speculativus, quia exteriores actiones per corpus aguntur; tamen quantum ad hoc non est magna differentia, quin aequaliter necessariis uterque indigeat. Sed quantum ad operationes utriusque, magna est quantum ad hoc differentia, quia virtuosus multis indiget ad suas operationes, sicut patet quod liberali opus est pecuniis ad agendum liberaliter, et similiter iustus indiget pecuniis ad hoc quod reddat illa quae debet. 2117. He continues with the second reason [b, ii] at “But contemplative”: life and happiness based on contemplative virtue have little need—or less than those based on moral virtue—for external goods to be dispensed to man. For it is true that both the contemplative and active forms must have the necessaries of life, like food, drink, and so on; although the statesman is more concerned about the body than the philosopher, since external activities are performed by the body. Nevertheless on this point there is little difference, rather each equally needs the necessities. But in the matter of activities the difference between them is considerable because the virtuous man requires much for his activities, as the generous man obviously needs the means to practice liberality, and likewise the just man needs money to pay what he owes. Et si quis dicat, quod actus liberalitatis est etiam velle dare, et actus iustitiae velle reddere, quod potest esse etiam sine pecuniis; considerandum est, quod voluntates hominum non sunt manifestae sine operationibus exterioribus. Multi enim qui non sunt iusti simulant se velle iuste agere. Sed ad hoc, quod sit manifestum de aliquo an sit fortis, indiget aliquo exteriori, si debet aliquod opus exterius fortitudinis perficere. Et similiter, temperatus indiget potestate utendi delectabilibus ad hoc quod manifestetur temperantia. Aliter enim, nisi adsit facultas operandi, non poterit esse manifestus neque iste virtuosus, scilicet temperatus vel fortis, neque aliquis alius. 2118. And if it be argued that even the will to give is an act of liberality and the will to repay is an act of justice—these are possible without money—we should bear in mind that man’s will is hidden without external activities. In fact, many unjust persons pretend they want to act justly. But in order to show whether a man is brave some external act is necessary; and so he ought to perform some work of fortitude externally. Likewise, the temperate man must have the opportunity of enjoying pleasures in order to manifest temperance. Otherwise, if there is no occasion for action, neither the virtuous person (the temperate or brave) nor any other can be recognized. Et ideo potest quaeri, quid sit principalius in virtute morali: utrum electio interior vel actiones exteriores, cum utrumque ad virtutem exigatur. Et quamvis electio sit principalior in virtute morali, ut supra dictum est, tamen manifestum est quod ad omnimodam perfectionem virtutis moralis requiritur non solum electio, sed etiam operatio exterior. Ad actiones autem exteriores opus est homini quod habeat multa, et tanto plura quanto actiones debent esse maiores et meliores. 2119. For this reason it can be asked, which is more important in moral virtue, internal choice or external acts, since both are requirements of virtue? And although choice is more important in moral virtue, as indicated previously (322, 1129), nevertheless not only choice but also external activity is required for the complete perfection of moral virtue. But for external actions a man needs many things, and the more so the greater and nobler the deeds are. Sed ille qui vacat speculationi, nullo talium indiget ad suam operationem. Quinimmo potest dici, quod exteriora bona impediunt hominem a speculatione, propter sollicitudinem quae ex eis ingeritur homini, distrahens animum hominis ne totaliter possit speculationi vacare. Sed si homo speculativus indigeat exterioribus rebus, hoc erit inquantum est homo indigens necessariis, et inquantum convivit pluribus hominibus, quos interdum oportet iuvare; et inquantum homo contemplativus eligit vivere secundum virtutem moralem. Et sic indigebit talibus ad hoc quod humaniter conversetur. Sic igitur patet, quod felicitas speculativa est potior quam activa, quae est secundum virtutem moralem. 2120. On the other hand the person engaged in contemplation needs none of these things for the exercise of his activity. Rather it can be said that external goods hinder a man from conterLplation on account of the anxiety they impose on him, distracting his mind so he cannot give himself completely to contemplation. But if the contemplative person requires external goods, this will be because a man needs the necessities of life, or because he lives with many persons he must help at times; and to this extent he chooses to live in accordance with moral virtue. Therefore he will need these things to live a human life. Thus it is evident that contemplative happiness is more excellent than active happiness, which follows moral virtue. Tertiam rationem ponit ibi, perfecta autem felicitas et cetera. Et dicit, quod hoc, quod felicitas perfecta consistat in quadam speculativa operatione, ex hoc apparet, quod diis, idest substantiis separatis, maxime videtur competere quod sint felices et beati. Nec tamen possumus eis attribuere actiones moralium virtutum. Si quis enim attribueret eis iustitiae operationes, apparerent deridendi, utpote commutationes facientes, vel etiam sua bona apud alios deponentes, vel quaecumque alia opera iustitiae facientes. Et similiter non potest eis attribui fortitudo, ut scilicet sustineant terribilia et pericula propter bonum commune. Similiter etiam non competit eis liberalitas prout est virtus humana. 2121. In presenting the third reason [b, iii], at “That perfect happiness,” he says that perfect happiness evidently should consist in contemplative activity because the gods (i.e., separated substances) seem supremely happy and blessed. Yet we cannot ascribe to them the acts of the moral virtues. If the activities of justice were attributed to them they would appear ridiculous in the role of making contracts, depositing their goods with others, and so on. Nor can bravery be attributed to them in the sense that they undergo terrors and run risks for the sake of the common good; nor does liberality, as a human virtue, befit them. Non enim erit assignare cui mortalium dent huiusmodi bona quae dant homines liberaliter, quia inconveniens est quod aliquis dicat eos uti ad dandum denarium vel aliquid huiusmodi. Si autem aliquis attribuat eis temperantiam, huiusmodi laus magis erit onerosa Deo quam grata. Non enim est laudabile Deo, quod non habeat pravas concupiscentias, quia non est natus eas habere. Sic igitur pertranseundo, omnes actiones moralium virtutum, apparet, quod sunt parva, et indigna diis, idest substantiis superioribus. 2122. They should not be described as giving to any mortal the kind of gifts that men freely bestow, because it is unseemly to say that they make presents of money or the like. And if anyone complimented them for temperance, such praise would be more distasteful than pleasing to God. For it is not laudable for God to be without lustful desires since his nature does not have them. So then, in running through all the moral virtues it is apparent that their acts are trifling and unworthy of the gods, i.e., the superior substances. Sed tamen omnes opinantur quod vivant et per consequens quod operentur. Non enim convenit eis quod nihil operentur, sicut dormientes, sicut dicitur de quodam philosopho qui diu vixit dormiens. Si igitur a vita divina auferamus agere moralium virtutum et prudentiae, et adhuc multo magis auferamus a divina vita facere, quod est proprium artis, nulla alia operatio relinquitur Deo praeter speculationem. Et sic patet quod operatio Dei, quae excellit in beatitudine, est speculativa et per speculationem sapientiae suae omnia fecit. Ex quo patet quod inter operationes humanas illa quae est simillima divinae speculationi est felicissima. 2123. On the other hand, though, they are thought to live and consequently to be active. We cannot suppose they do nothing but sleep like a philosopher who is said to have slept all his life. If therefore we take away from the life of the gods the action of the moral virtues and prudence, and then further take away productionwhich is the property of art-there remains in God no other activity excelling in happiness except contemplation; and he exercises all his activity in the contemplation of wisdom. From this it is clear that of all human activities the one most akin to divine contemplation is the greatest source of happiness. Quartam rationem ponit ibi: signum autem et cetera. Et dicit, quod signum huius, quod perfecta felicitas consistat in contemplatione sapientiae, est quod animalia irrationabilia, quae carent felicitate, omnino sunt privata tali operatione; quia non habent intellectum, quo nos speculamur veritatem. Aliquo autem modo participant operatione virtutum moralium, sicut leo actu fortitudinis et liberalitatis et ciconia actu pietatis ad parentes. Et hoc rationabiliter. 2124. He then proceeds with the fourth reason at “This is further” [b, iv]: an indication that perfect happiness consists in the contemplation of wisdom is that irrational animals which do not partake of happiness are completely deprived of this activity. The reason is that they are without intellect by which we contemplate truth. To some extent though they share in the activities of the moral virtues: the lion, for instance, in the act of fortitude and liberality, the stork in the act of filial piety. And this they do in a reasonable way. Diis enim, idest substantiis separatis, quia habent solam intellectualem vitam, tota eorum vita est beata, homines autem in tantum sunt beati, inquantum existit in eis quaedam similitudo talis operationis, scilicet speculativae. Sed nullum aliorum animalium est felix, quia in nullo communicant speculatione. Et sic patet, quod quantum se extendit speculatio, tantum se extendit felicitas. Et quibus magis competit speculari, magis competit esse felices, non secundum accidens, sed secundum speculationem, quae est secundum se honorabilis. Unde sequitur, quod felicitas principaliter sit quaedam speculatio. 2125. The life of the gods (i.e., the intellectual substances) is completely happy because they have only intellectual life; and the life of men is happy insofar as some likeness of this contemplative activity is found in them. But none of the animals possess happiness because they do not share at all in contemplation. Consequently it is evident that the more extensive contemplation is, the more extensive happiness is; and people who can contemplate more deeply are happier, not from something incidental but from the contemplation, which is in itself admirable. It follows then that happiness consists principally in some form of contemplation.
Happiness and External Goods
Chapter 8 I. HE EXPLAINS HOW THE HAPPY MAN IS DISPOSED TOWARDS INFERIOR CREATURES. A. To what extent the happy man needs external... goods. 1. (HE) NEEDS EXTERNAL GOODS. — 2126-2127 δεήσει δὲ καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς εὐημερίας ἀνθρώπῳ ὄντι· οὐ γὰρ αὐτάρκης ἡ φύσις πρὸς τὸ θεωρεῖν, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ τὸ σῶμα ὑγιαίνειν καὶ τροφὴν καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν θεραπείαν ὑπάρχειν. But, being man, the happy person will also need external prosperity, for human nature is not of itself (per se) sufficient for the activity of contemplation; the body too must have health and food and other requirements. 2. HE DOES NOT NEED MANY AND GREAT POSSESSIONS. — 2128-2129 οὐ μὴν οἰητέον γε πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων δεήσεσθαι τὸν εὐδαιμονήσοντα, εἰ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἄνευ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μακάριον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τὸ αὔταρκες οὐδ' ἡ πρᾶξις, δυνατὸν δὲ καὶ μὴ ἄρχοντα γῆς καὶ θαλάττης πράττειν τὰ καλά· καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ μετρίων δύναιτ' ἄν τις πράττειν κατὰ τὴν ἀρετήν τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ἐναργῶς· οἱ γὰρ ἰδιῶται τῶν δυναστῶν οὐχ ἧττον δοκοῦσι τὰ ἐπιεικῆ πράττειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον· ἱκανὸν δὲ τοσαῦθ' ὑπάρχειν· ἔσται γὰρ ὁ βίος εὐδαίμων τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐνεργοῦντος. Yet, even if man’s happiness is not possible without external goods, we must not think that it will require many and great possessions. For self-sufficiency does not depend on a superabundance—neither does judgment nor action—and it is possible to do good deeds without ruling land and sea; one can act virtuously with moderate means. (Experience clearly demonstrates this, for private citizens seem to be not less but more active in good works than the powerful.) It is sufficient then that this much is available, for the life of the man who acts virtuously will be happy. B. He confirms this by the authority of the philosophers. 1. THEIR OBSERVATIONS. a. The opinion of Solon. — 2130 — καὶ Σόλων δὲ τοὺς εὐδαίμονας ἴσως ἀπεφαίνετο καλῶς, εἰπὼν μετρίως τοῖς ἐκτὸς κεχορηγημένους, πεπραγότας δὲ τὰ κάλλισθ', ὡς ᾤετο, καὶ βεβιωκότας σωφρόνως· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ μέτρια κεκτημένους πράττειν ἃ δεῖ. Solon probably gave a good description of a happy man as one who has a moderate share of external goods, has done (in Solon’s opinion) the most virtuous actions, and has lived temperately. For a man can with only moderate means do what he ought. b. The opinion of Anaxagoras. — 2131 ἔοικε δὲ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας οὐ πλούσιον οὐδὲ δυνάστην ὑπολαβεῖν τὸν εὐδαίμονα, εἰπὼν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσειεν εἴ τις ἄτοπος φανείη τοῖς πολλοῖς· οὗτοι γὰρ κρίνουσι τοῖς ἐκτός, τούτων αἰσθανόμενοι μόνον. Anaxagoras also seems to think that a happy man need be neither rich nor powerful; and he is not surprised that this may seem strange to the majority, since they judge by externals, the only things they know. 2. THEY ARE CREDIBLE. — 2132 συμφωνεῖν δὴ τοῖς λόγοις ἐοίκασιν αἱ τῶν σοφῶν δόξαι. πίστιν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχει τινά, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς ἐν τοῖς πρακτικοῖς ἐκ τῶν ἔργων καὶ τοῦ βίου κρίνεται· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τὸ κύριον. σκοπεῖν δὴ τὰ προειρημένα χρὴ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὸν βίον φέροντας, καὶ συνᾳδόντων μὲν τοῖς ἔργοις ἀποδεκτέον, διαφωνούντων δὲ λόγους ὑποληπτέον. So the views of the philosophers seem to harmonize with our arguments, and consequently have some credibility. However, in practical matters the truth is tested by a man’s conduct and way of living, for these are the dominant factors. we must therefore examine the preceding opinions by judging them from the facts and from the actual life (of the philosopher). If they agree with the facts we should accept them; if they disagree we should consider them mere theories. II. (HE EXPLAINS HOW THE HAPPY MAN IS DISPOSED) TOWARD GOD. — 2133-2136 ὁ δὲ κατὰ νοῦν ἐνεργῶν καὶ τοῦτον θεραπεύων καὶ διακείμενος ἄριστα καὶ θεοφιλέστατος ἔοικεν. εἰ γάρ τις ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὑπὸ θεῶν γίνεται, ὥσπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ εἴη ἂν εὔλογον χαίρειν τε αὐτοὺς τῷ ἀρίστῳ καὶ συγγενεστάτῳ τοῦτο δ' ἂν εἴη ὁ νοῦς καὶ τοὺς ἀγαπῶντας μάλιστα τοῦτο καὶ τιμῶντας ἀντευποιεῖν ὡς τῶν φίλων αὐτοῖς ἐπιμελουμένους καὶ ὀρθῶς τε καὶ καλῶς πράττοντας. ὅτι δὲ πάντα ταῦτα τῷ σοφῷ μάλισθ' ὑπάρχει, οὐκ ἄδηλον. θεοφιλέστατος ἄρα. τὸν αὐτὸν δ' εἰκὸς καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατον· ὥστε κἂν οὕτως εἴη ὁ σοφὸς μάλιστ' εὐδαίμων. But the man who is active intellectually and cultivates his mind seems to be most worthily disposed and most beloved of the gods. Now if the gods have any care of human affairs-it is generally believed they have-it would be reasonable for them both to delight in that which is best in us and most akin to them (this of course is the intellect) and to confer favors on those who love and honor this most-as if the gods themselves are solicitous for their friends who act rightly and honorably. But that all these attributes belong especially to the philosopher is obvious. He is therefore most beloved by the gods, and he will, in all probability, be also most happy. if this be so then the philosopher will be the happiest of men.
COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Opus erit autem et exteriori et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit quae sit perfecta felicitas, hic ostendit quomodo se habeat ad exteriora. Et primo ostendit, quomodo se habeat felix ad bona inferiora. Secundo quomodo se habeat ad Deum, ibi, secundum intellectum autem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quantum indigeat felix exterioribus et terrenis bonis. Secundo confirmat per auctoritatem sapientium, ibi, et Solon autem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit, quod felix indiget exterioribus bonis; secundo ostendit quod non indiget multis et magnis, ibi: non tamen existimandum et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod felix cum sit homo, opus habet exteriori prosperitate. Humana enim natura non est per se sufficiens ad speculandum propter conditionem corporis, quod ad sui sustentationem indiget exterioribus rebus. Substantia autem intellectualis incorporea per se sufficiens est ad speculandum. 2126. Now that the Philosopher has shown what perfect happiness is, he here shows its relations to external things. First [I] he explains how the happy man is disposed toward inferior creatures; then [II], at “But the man etc.,” towards God. He discusses the first point in a twofold manner. First [I, A] he shows to what extent the happy man needs external and earthly goods. Next [I, B], at “Solon probably etc.,” he confirms this by the authority of the philosophers. He treats the first point from two aspects. First [A, 1] Aristotle proves that the happy person needs external goods; second [A, 2], at “Yet, even if etc.,” that he does not need many and. great possessions. The Philosopher remarks first that the happy man has need of external prosperity, since human nature is not self-sufficient for the activity of contemplation, due to the condition of the body which requires external goods for its sustenance. On the other hand an intellectual and incorporeal substance is of itself (per se) sufficient for contemplative activity. Homini autem, ad hoc quod speculetur, opus est primo habere corpus sanum; quia per infirmitatem corporis debilitantur vires sensitivae quibus homo utitur in speculando. Distrahitur etiam intentio mentis ab attentione speculationis; indiget etiam homo cibo ad nutritionem corporis, et reliquo famulatu, ut scilicet sibi ministrentur omnia alia, quae sunt sibi necessaria ad vitam humanam. 2127, But man must first of all have a healthy body in order to contemplate, because the sensitive powers he uses in contemplation are weakened by sickness; the mind is also diverted from attention to contemplation. Likewise man must have food and bodily nourishment and other help so that everything necessary for human living be furnished him. Deinde cum dicit: non tamen existimandum etc., ostendit, quod homo non indiget multis exterioribus rebus ad felicitatem. Et dicit, quod etsi non contingat aliquem esse beatum beatitudine huius vitae absque exterioribus rebus necessariis ad vitam humanam, non tamen est existimandum quod ad hoc quod aliquis fiat felix, indigeat multis et magnis divitiis. Quod enim aliquis sit sibi per se sufficiens, quod requiritur ad felicitatem, non consistit in superabundantia divitiarum. Paucis enim indiget natura. Superabundantia autem facit minus per se sufficientes. Indiget enim homo multorum auxilio seu ministerio ad custodiendas seu gubernandas superabundantes divitias. Similiter etiam rectitudo iudicii tam rationis speculativae quam practicae, et exterior actio virtuosa potest esse absque divitiarum superabundantia. 2128. Then [A, 2], at “Yet, even if,” he shows that a man does not need many external things for happiness. Aristotle notes that even if it is not possibic for a person to enjoy the happiness of this life without the external goods necessary for human living, nevertheless we must not think he needs great wealth. For the self-sufficiency required for happiness does not consist in a superabundance of riches; nature, in fact, needs only a few things. Moreover, superabundance makes people less self-sufficient, since a man must have the help or service of many servants to guard and manage excessive possessions. Besides, rectitude of judgment, by both speculative and practical reason, and external virtuous action are possible without an abundance of riches. Et quia hoc manifestum erat quantum ad iudicium rationis, manifestat hoc consequenter quantum ad actionem virtutis, quae pluribus indigere videtur, ut supra dictum est. Et dicit, quod possibile est, quod illi qui non sunt principes terrae et maris, quasi in divitiis non superabundantes, bene operari. Si enim aliquis moderate habeat de bonis exterioribus, poterit operari secundum virtutem. Quod manifesto apparet experimento: homines enim ydiotae, id est popularem et privatam vitam agentes, videntur agere virtuosa non minus quam potentes, sed etiam magis, quia potentes impediuntur a multis virtuosis actibus tum propter nimias occupationes et sollicitudines, tum etiam propter superbiam quam etiam superabundantia divitiarum gignit. Sufficit autem ad felicitatem quod homo tantum habeat de exterioribus bonis, quod possit virtuosa operari: quia si aliquis operetur secundum virtutem, erit vita eius felix, cum felicitas in operatione virtutis consistat, sicut prius dictum est. 2129. Because this statement regarding the judgment of reason is evident, he therefore explains it in relation to virtuous action which seems to need many things-we noted this before (2112-2116). It is possible, he says, for people to do good deeds without ruling land and sea, without—so to speak—abundant wealth. A moderate portion of riches is sufficient for good deeds. Experience shows this clearly, for private citizens apparently perform not less but rather more noble deeds than potentates do. Indeed potentates are hindered from many virtuous actions both by too many occupations and cares and by pride and excessive riches. On the other hand, a moderate amount of wealth enabling a man to perform good works is sufficient for happiness; for if someone should act virtuously, his life would be happy, since happiness consists in virtuous activity—as was indicated previously (119, 124, 128, 190, 1267, 2085 et passim). Deinde cum dicit: et Solon autem etc., confirmat quod dictum est per dicta sapientum. Et primo proponit eorum dicta. Secundo ostendit in proposito eis esse credendum, ibi, consonare itaque et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo introducit dictum Solonis, qui illos enunciavit esse felices, qui moderate sunt ditati quantum ad exteriora bona. Huiusmodi enim maxime inveniuntur agere virtuosa et vivere temperate: quia aliqui moderatas divitias possidentes possunt agere quae oportet: a quo impediuntur tam illi qui superabundant in divitiis propter nimiam sollicitudinem, vel propter elationem, quam etiam illi qui in talibus deficiunt, quos oportet nimis sollicitari circa victum quaerendum. Deficit etiam eis in pluribus opportunitas bene operandi. 2130. Next [I, B], at “Solon probably,” he confirms his opinion by the sayings of the philosophers. First [ B, 1] he proposes their observations; then [B, 2], at “So the views etc.,” he shows they are credible in this matter. He makes two references on the first point. First [1, a] he introduces the opinion of Solon that happy men are well supplied with external goods. For such men especially act virtuously and live temperately, because people with moderate possessions can do what they ought; those with great resources are prevented from this by too much anxiety or by pride, while those without resources must be excessively solicitous about getting food. Besides, these persons lack the opportunity for virtuous activity in most cases. Secundo ibi: videtur autem etc., inducit ad idem sententiam Anaxagorae, cui videbatur, quod aliquis neque dives neque potens potuit esse felix. Nec mirabitur, si hoc videatur inconveniens multis. Quia multitudo hominum iudicat secundum exteriora bona quae sola cognoscit, ignorant autem bona rationis, quae sunt vera hominis bona, secundum quae aliquis est felix. 2131.Second [1, b], at “Anaxagoras also” he reduces to the same position the opinion of Anaxagoras: “a happy man need be neither rich nor powerful.” Nor will he be surprised if this may seem strange to many, since the majority judge by externals, the only things they know. For they are ignorant of intellectual goods, which are the real human goods according to which a man is happy. Deinde cum dicit consonare itaque etc., ostendit quod dictis sapientum in hac materia est acquiescendum; concludens ex praedictis, quod opiniones sapientum consonant rationibus, unde videntur habere quandam fidem. Sed in operabilibus magis iudicatur verum circa dictum alicuius ex operibus et modo vivendi ipsius, quam etiam ex ratione; quia dominans, id est id quod est principale circa operabilia, consistit in his, scilicet in operibus et modo vivendi. Non enim circa talia principaliter quaeritur cognitio sed opus, ut in secundo habitum est. Et ideo ea quae dicta sunt, oportet considerare per comparationem ad opera et vitam sapientum. Et ea quibus opera sapientum consonant, sunt acceptanda; puta quod non requirantur ad felicitatem superabundantes divitiae, quas sapientes non quaerunt; si vero dissonent opera, suspicandum est quod sint soli sermones veritatem non habentes. Sicut patet de sententia Stoicorum, qui dicebant exteriora nullum bonum hominis esse; cuius contrarium in operationibus eorum apparet. Appetunt enim ea et quaerunt tamquam bona. 2132. At “So the views” [B, 2] he shows that we should accept the observations of the philosophers in this matter, concluding from the premises that their views harmonize with his arguments. Hence they have some credibility. However, in practical matters the truth, of a man’s assertion is tested more by deeds and his way of living than even by argument, because the dominant or principal factor in practical affairs consists in them, i.e., deeds and way of life. For in questions of this kind our principal aim is not knowledge but conduct, as stated in the second book (255-256). This is why we ought to consider what has been said by comparison with the actions and life of the philosophers. Statements in keeping w!th the conduct of the philosophers should be accepted. For instance, abundant riches are not needed for happiness, and the philosophers do not seek them. But if their actions are not in accord we should suspect that their words lack truth. This is evident concerning the opinion held by the Stoics who maintained that external goods are not human goods; yet, their actions show the contrary, for they desire and seek these as goods. Deinde cum dicit: secundum intellectum autem etc., ostendit quomodo felix se habeat ad superiora, scilicet ad Deum: et dicit, quod felix felicitate speculativa, quia operatur secundum intellectum contemplando veritatem, et curam suam apponit ad bonum intellectus, videtur esse optime dispositus, inquantum excellit in eo quod est optimum hominis, et etiam amantissimus Deo. Supposito enim, sicut rei veritas habet, quod Deus habeat curam et providentiam de rebus humanis, rationabile est, quod delectetur circa homines de eo quod est optimum in eis, et quod est cognatissimum, idest simillimum Deo. Quod quidem est intellectus, ut ex praemissis patet. Et per consequens rationabile est, quod Deus maxime benefaciat his qui amant intellectum, et honorant ipsum bonum intellectus omnibus praeferentes, quasi ipsi dii curent de his qui sunt eis amici; rationabile etiam est quod beneficia conferant his qui recte et bene operantur. 2133. Then [II], at “But the man,” he shows how the happy man is disposed toward superior beings, i.e., towards God: a man happy in contemplative happiness seems to be most worthily disposed—inasmuch as he excels in that which is best in us—and also most pleasing to God, since he exercises his intellect in contemplating the trutli, and cultivates intellectual pursuits. For, supposing—as is really the case—that God exercises solicitude and providence over human affairs, it is reasonable for him to delight in that which is best in men and most akin or similar to himself. This part is the intellect, as is clear from the premises (2109). Consequently it is reasonable that God should confer his greatest favors on those who love and honor their intellect preferring its good to all other goods—as if the gods themselves are solicitous for men who act rightly and honorably. Manifestum est autem, quod omnia praedicta conveniunt sapienti. Sapiens enim diligit et honorat intellectum, qui maxime amatur a Deo inter res humanas. Sapiens etiam et recte et bene operatur. Relinquitur ergo, quod ipse sit Deo amantissimus. Ille autem est felicissimus, qui maxime amatur a Deo qui est fons omnium bonorum. Relinquitur igitur quod, etiam secundum hoc quod felicitas hominis dicitur esse per hoc quod amatur a Deo, sapiens est maxime felix. 2134. Now all these attributes clearly belong to the philosopher: he loves and honors his intellect, the most pleasing to God of all human things; he also acts honorably and rightly. It remains then that he is dearest to God. But that man is happiest who is loved most by God, the source of all good. Likewise, since man’s happiness is said to consist in the fact that he is loved by God, we conclude that the philosopher is happy in the highest degree. Ex quo patet, quod ultimam felicitatem humanam ponit Aristoteles in operatione sapientiae, de qua supra in sexto determinavit, non autem in continuatione ad intelligentiam agentem, ut quidam fingunt. 2135. Arguing in this vein, Aristotle evidently places the ultimate hapnoneve of man in the activity of wisdom—a question decided in the sixth book (1267).and not in an unbroken series of actions of the active (agens) intelligence, as some imagine. Attendendum etiam, quod in hac vita non ponit perfectam felicitatem, sed talem qualis potest competere humanae et mortali vitae. Unde, et supra in primo dixit, beatos autem ut homines. 2136. Likewise, we must keep in mind that he does not specify perfect happiness, but such as can be ascribed to human and mortal life. Hence, in the first book (202) he states: “Those we call happy are men etc.”
The Need of Virtue
Chapter 9 I. THE NECESSITY OF LEGISLATION. A. A question. — 2137 ἆρ' οὖν εἰ περί τε τούτων καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ φιλίας καὶ ἡδονῆς, ἱκανῶς εἴρηται τοῖς τύποις, τέλος ἔχειν οἰητέον τὴν προαίρεσιν; Have we sufficiently discussed in a general way what should be investigated in these matters about virtues, friendship, and pleasure in order to bring our project to a conclusion? B. He settles the question. 1. HE SHOWS IT IS NECESSARY THAT A MAN BECOME GOOD. — 2138 ἢ καθάπερ λέγεται, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς τέλος τὸ θεωρῆσαι ἕκαστα καὶ γνῶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ πράττειν αὐτά· οὐδὲ δὴ περὶ ἀρετῆς ἱκανὸν τὸ εἰδέναι, ἀλλ' ἔχειν καὶ χρῆσθαι πειρατέον, ἢ εἴ πως ἄλλως ἀγαθοὶ γινόμεθα; Indeed, as they say, the end of science in practicable matters is not to investigate and to know individual things but rather to do them. Therefore it is not sufficient to have knowledge of virtue; we must try to possess and practice virtue, or try any other actual way of becoming virtuous. 2. HE SHOWS THAT HABITUATION TO VIRTUOUS LIVING IS REQUIRED. a. Persuasive words alone are not enough. — 2139-2142 εἰ μὲν οὖν ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι αὐτάρκεις πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐπιεικεῖς, πολλοὺς ἂν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους δικαίως ἔφερον κατὰ τὸν Θέογνιν, καὶ ἔδει ἂν τούτους πορίσασθαι· νῦν δὲ φαίνονται προτρέψασθαι μὲν καὶ παρορμῆσαι τῶν νέων τοὺς ἐλευθερίους ἰσχύειν, ἦθός τ' εὐγενὲς καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόκαλον ποιῆσαι ἂν κατοκώχιμον ἐκ τῆς ἀρετῆς, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς ἀδυνατεῖν πρὸς καλοκαγαθίαν προτρέψασθαι· οὐ γὰρ πεφύκασιν αἰδοῖ πειθαρχεῖν ἀλλὰ φόβῳ, οὐδ' ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν φαύλων διὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς τιμωρίας· πάθει γὰρ ζῶντες τὰς οἰκείας ἡδονὰς διώκουσι καὶ δι' ὧν αὗται ἔσονται, φεύγουσι δὲ τὰς ἀντικειμένας λύπας, τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἡδέος οὐδ' ἔννοιαν ἔχουσιν, ἄγευστοι ὄντες. τοὺς δὴ τοιούτους τίς ἂν λόγος μεταρρυθμίσαι; οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἢ οὐ ῥᾴδιον τὰ ἐκ παλαιοῦ τοῖς ἤθεσι κατειλημμένα λόγῳ μεταστῆσαι· Were persuasive words sufficient of themselves to make men virtuous, many great rewards would be due according to Theognis; and it would be necessary to give them to those who persuade. At present it seems that persuasive discourse can challenge and move youths of excellent character and can fill the lover of the good with virtue. But it cannot arouse the ma jority to virtue, for most people are not subject by nature to shame but to fear; nor do they refrain from evil because of disgrace but because of punishment. In fact, since they live by passion, they follow their own pleasures, by which the passions themselves are nourished, and avoid the contrary pains. They do not know what is truly good and pleasant, nor can they taste its delight. What words would reform people of this sort? It is impossible or at least difficult to change by argument what is held by inveterate habit. b. Habituation is needed. — 2143-2147 ἀγαπητὸν δ' ἴσως ἐστὶν εἰ πάντων ὑπαρχόντων δι' ὧν ἐπιεικεῖς δοκοῦμεν γίνεσθαι, μεταλάβοιμεν τῆς ἀρετῆς. γίνεσθαι δ' ἀγαθοὺς οἴονται οἳ μὲν φύσει οἳ δ' ἔθει οἳ δὲ διδαχῇ. τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς φύσεως δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ διά τινας θείας αἰτίας τοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐτυχέσιν ὑπάρχει· ὁ δὲ λόγος καὶ ἡ διδαχὴ μή ποτ' οὐκ ἐν ἅπασιν ἰσχύει, ἀλλὰ δεῖ προδιειργάσθαι τοῖς ἔθεσι τὴν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ ψυχὴν πρὸς τὸ καλῶς χαίρειν καὶ μισεῖν, ὥσπερ γῆν τὴν θρέψουσαν τὸ σπέρμα. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀκούσειε λόγου ἀποτρέποντος οὐδ' αὖ συνείη ὁ κατὰ πάθος ζῶν· τὸν δ' οὕτως ἔχοντα πῶς οἷόν τε μεταπεῖσαι; ὅλως τ' οὐ δοκεῖ λόγῳ ὑπείκειν τὸ πάθος ἀλλὰ βίᾳ. δεῖ δὴ τὸ ἦθος προϋπάρχειν πως οἰκεῖον τῆς ἀρετῆς, στέργον τὸ καλὸν καὶ δυσχεραῖνον τὸ αἰσχρόν. It is perhaps a thing worthy to be esteemed if we attain virtue after having everything that seems to make men just. Some philosophers think that men are virtuous by nature; others, that they become virtuous by practice; still others, that they become virtuous by instruction. Certainly what pertains to nature is not in our power but comes from some divine cause to a man who is very fortunate. However, discourse and instruction are not effective with everyone but the soul of the hearer must be prepared by good habits to rejoice in the good and hate the evil, just as the soil must be well tilled to nourish the seed. Indeed the man who lives according to passion will not listen to a discourse on virtue nor will he understand it. How is it possible to persuade such a man? In general, passion does not yield to argument but to violence. Obviously there must preexist a natural disposition in some way akin to virtue by which a man loves what is good and hates what is evil. 3. HE SHOWS... LEGISLATION IS REQUIRED. a. All men become virtuous by means of law. i. He discloses his proposition. x. ABOUT THE YOUNG. — 2148-2149 ἐκ νέου δ' ἀγωγῆς ὀρθῆς τυχεῖν πρὸς ἀρετὴν χαλεπὸν μὴ ὑπὸ τοιούτοις τραφέντα νόμοις· τὸ γὰρ σωφρόνως καὶ καρτερικῶς ζῆν οὐχ ἡδὺ τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἄλλως τε καὶ νέοις. διὸ νόμοις δεῖ τετάχθαι τὴν τροφὴν καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα· οὐκ ἔσται γὰρ λυπηρὰ συνήθη γενόμενα. But it is difficult properly to direct anyone to virtue from his youth unless he is reared under good laws; to live a temperate and hard life is unattractive to most people but particularly the young. For this reason the rearing of children and their activities ought to be regulated by law. Thus good things will not be distasteful after they have become habitual. y. ABOUT OTHERS. — 2150 οὐχ ἱκανὸν δ' ἴσως νέους ὄντας τροφῆς καὶ ἐπιμελείας τυχεῖν ὀρθῆς, ἀλλ' ἐπιεδὴ καὶ ἀνδρωθέντας δεῖ ἐπιτηδεύειν αὐτὰ καὶ ἐθίζεσθαι, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα δεοίμεθ' ἂν νόμων, καὶ ὅλως δὴ περὶ πάντα τὸν βίον· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ ἀνάγκῃ μᾶλλον ἢ λόγῳ πειθαρχοῦσι καὶ ζημίαις ἢ τῷ καλῷ. It is not enough that the young receive proper rearing and care, but on arriving at manhood they must learn these very things by experience and become accustomed to them. For this we need laws even throughout the whole of man’s life, for most men are more attentive to coercion than argument, to what is hurtful than to what is good. ii. He presents evidence for (his proposition). — 2151-2152 διόπερ οἴονταί τινες τοὺς νομοθετοῦντας δεῖν μὲν παρακαλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ προτρέπεσθαι τοῦ καλοῦ χάριν, ὡς ἐπακουσομένων τῶν ἐπιεικῶς τοῖς ἔθεσι προηγμένων, ἀπειθοῦσι δὲ καὶ ἀφυεστέροις οὖσι κολάσεις τε καὶ τιμωρίας ἐπιτιθέναι, τοὺς δ' ἀνιάτους ὅλως ἐξορίζειν· τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῶντα τῷ λόγῳ πειθαρχήσειν, τὸν δὲ φαῦλον ἡδονῆς ὀρεγόμενον λύπῃ κολάζεσθαι ὥσπερ ὑποζύγιον. διὸ καί φασι δεῖν τοιαύτας γίνεσθαι τὰς λύπας αἳ μάλιστ' ἐναντιοῦνται ταῖς ἀγαπωμέναις ἡδοναῖς. For this reason some think [Plato, Laws 722] that legislators ought to stimulate men to virtue and exhort them on moral grounds: the obedient who are just should be aroused by means of preexisting habits, the insubordinate and the degenerate should be visited with pains and punishments but the absolutely incurable should be completely banished [Plato, Protagoras 325]. The reason is that the just man living a good life obeys exhortation but the evil man seeking pleasure is punished like a beast of burden. Hence, they say, those pains should be inflicted that are especially opposed to the pleasures men love. b. (Men cannot be made virtuous) without law (for two reasons). i. First. — 2153 εἰ δ' οὖν, καθάπερ εἴρηται, τὸν ἐσόμενον ἀγαθὸν τραφῆναι καλῶς δεῖ καὶ ἐθισθῆναι, εἶθ' οὕτως ἐν ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἐπιεικέσι ζῆν καὶ μήτ' ἄκοντα μήθ' ἑκόντα πράττειν τὰ φαῦλα, ταῦτα δὲ γίνοιτ' ἂν βιουμένοις κατά τινα νοῦν καὶ τάξιν ὀρθήν, ἔχουσαν ἰσχύν· ἡ μὲν οὖν πατρικὴ πρόσταξις οὐκ ἔχει τὸ ἰσχυρὸν οὐδὲ [δὴ] τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, οὐδὲ δὴ ὅλως ἡ ἑνὸς ἀνδρός, μὴ βασιλέως ὄντος ἤ τινος τοιούτου· ὁ δὲ νόμος ἀναγκαστικὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, λόγος ὢν ἀπό τινος φρονήσεως καὶ νοῦ. As we have stated, the man who is going to be virtuous must have careful rearing and good habits; then he should live according to a moral code and refrain from evil either by his own will or by coercion. This is possible only to men whose lives are directed by intelligence and right order having coercive force. Certainly this power is not contained in the precept of a father nor does it belong to anyone who is not a ruler or a person in authority. But the law includes coercive force, whereas instruction proceeds from prudence and reason. ii. The second reason. — 2154 καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀνθρώπων ἐχθαίρουσι τοὺς ἐναντιουμένους ταῖς ὁρμαῖς, κἂν ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ δρῶσιν· ὁ δὲ νόμος οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπαχθὴς τάττων τὸ ἐπιεικές. Some men hate people who oppose their inclinations, even when the opposition is just. But the law in commanding what is just is not irksome.
COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Utrum igitur, si et de his et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de fine virtutis, considerato in ipso homine virtuoso, qui est delectatio vel felicitas, hic determinat alium finem qui accipitur per comparationem ad bonum commune, ostendens, quod praeter praedictam doctrinam moralium, necesse est esse aliam legis positivam, quae intendit ad bonum commune. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit necessariam esse legispositionem; secundo necessarium esse, quod aliquis fiat legis positivus, ibi, in sola autem Lacedaemoniorum etc.; tertio ostendit quomodo possit fieri legis positivus, ibi, igitur post hoc intendendum et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo movet quaestionem, utrum scilicet, si sufficienter dictum est in tipis, id est quantum tipice et figuraliter dici debuit, de his scilicet quae pertinent ad felicitatem, et de virtutibus, et de amicitia et delectatione, existimandum sit quod electio nostra habeat finem et complementum, qua scilicet eligimus tractare de bono humano, vel adhuc est aliquid superaddendum. 2137. After the Philosopher has determined virtue’s end, which in the virtuous man is pleasure or happiness, now he determines the other end, which is understood in comparison with the common good. He shows that, besides this moral science, it is necessary to have another science, the legislative, whose object is the common good. On this point he does three things. First [I] he shows the necessity of legislation. Next [Lect. 15, II], at “Only in Sparta etc.” (B.1180 a 25), he shows the necessity of a man’s becoming a legislator. Last [Lect. 16, III], at “Then we must etc.” (B.1180 b 28), he shows how a man can become a legislator. He treats the first point from two aspects. First [I, A] It asks a question about the adequacy of the general discussion—inasmuch as the matter should be discussed generally and schematically—on the subjects for investigation: happiness, virtues, friendship, and pleasure. Is the choice we made treating the good of man really finished and perfected, or is there some more to be added? Secundo ibi: vel quemadmodum dicitur etc., determinat veritatem; ostendens, quod adhuc aliquid aliud requiritur. Et primo ostendit, quod requiritur aliquem fieri bonum. Secundo ostendit, quod ad hoc quod aliquis fiat bonus, requiritur consuetudo vitae bonae, ibi, siquidem igitur essent sermones etc.; tertio ostendit quod ad hanc consuetudinem habendam requiritur legis positio, ibi, ex iuvene autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod finis scientiae quae est circa operabilia, non est cognoscere et speculari singula, sicut in scientiis speculativis, sed magis facere ipsa. Et quia secundum virtutem sumus boni et operatores bonorum, non sufficit ad scientiam, quae intendit bonum humanum, quod aliquis cognoscat virtutem. Sed tentandum est, quod aliquis habeat eam, scilicet secundum habitum, et utatur ea scilicet secundum actum: vel si aliquis aestimet, quod per alium modum possit homo fieri bonus, quam per virtutem, tentandum est illud habere. 2138. Next [I, B ], at “Indeed, as they say,” he settles the question, showing that something more is required. First [B, 1] he shows it is necessary that a man become good. Then [B, 2], at “Were persuasive words etc.,” he shows that habituation to virtuous living is required for a man to become good. Last [B, 3], at “But it is difficult etc.,” he shows that to have this habituation legislation is required. He says first that the end of the science concerned with practicable matters is not to know and investigate individual things, as in the speculative sciences, but rather to do them. And since we become virtuous and doers of good works in accordance with virtue, it is not sufficient for the science whose object is man’s good that someone have a knowledge of virtue. But he must try to possess it as a habit and practice it. Or if it is thought that a man can become good in another way than by virtue, then he must try to possess that. Deinde cum dicit: si quidem igitur etc., ostendit, quod ad hoc quod aliquis fiat bonus, requiritur consuetudo. Et primo ostendit, quod ad hoc non sufficit solus sermo persuasivus. Secundo ostendit, quod necessaria est consuetudo, ibi, amabile autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod si sermones persuasivi per se sufficerent ad faciendum homines studiosos, multae et magnae mercedes deberentur alicui secundum thegnin, id est secundum artem persuadendi ad bonum, et esset omnino necessarium, quod magnae mercedes retribuerentur persuasoribus. Sed non ita est universaliter. 2139. Then [B, 2], at “Were persuasive words,” he shows that habituation is required in order that a man become good. First [2, a] he shows that persuasive words alone are not enough; second [2, b], at “It is perhaps etc.,” that habituation is needed. He says first that if persuasive words sufficed to make men virtuous, many great rewards would be due to a man for his skill, i.e., because of the art of persuading to the good; and it would be absolutely necessary to give great rewards to those who persuade. But this is not generally true. Videmus enim quod sermones persuasivi, possunt provocare et movere ad bonum iuvenes liberales, qui scilicet non sunt subiecti vitiis et passionibus, et qui habent nobiles mores, inquantum sunt apti ad operationes virtutis, et qui vere amant bonum possunt fieri cathacotini, id est repleti virtute et honore. Tales enim qui sunt bene dispositi ad virtutem, ex bonis persuasionibus provocantur ad perfectionem virtutis. 2140. We see that persuasive words can challenge, and move to good, generous youths who are not slaves of vice and passion and who have excellent natural dispositions inasmuch as they are inclined to virtuous operations. And those who truly love the good can become catocochimon, i.e., full of virtue and honor, for such as are well-disposed to virtue by good advice are incited to the perfection of virtue. Sed multi hominum non possunt per sermones provocari ad bonitatem, quia non oboediunt verecundiae, quae timet turpitudinem, sed magis coercentur timore poenarum. Non enim recedunt a pravis operibus propter eorum turpitudinem, sed propter poenas quas timent: quia enim vivunt secundum passiones, et non secundum rationem, (proprias delectationes persequuntur,) per quas passiones propriae magis in eis crescunt, et fugiunt tristitias contrarias quaesitis delectationibus, quae per poenas eis inferuntur, non autem intelligunt id quod est vere bonum et delectabile, neque etiam dulcedinem eius gustu percipere possunt. Tales autem homines nullo sermone transmutari possunt. 2141. But many men cannot be induced to virtue because they are not subject to shame which fears disgrace, but rather are coerced by the dread of punishment. They do not refrain from evil because of disgracefulness but because of the punishments feared. In fact they live according to their passions and not according to reason; thus their own desires increase and they avoid pains opposed to the pleasures soughtpains inflicted on them by punishments. They do not know what is really good and pleasant, nor can they taste its delight. But people like these cannot be changed by any argument. Ad hoc enim quod aliquis sermone transmutetur, requiritur quod proponatur homini aliquid quod accipiat, ille autem cui non sapit bonum honestum, sed inclinatur ad passiones, non acceptat quicquid proponatur sermone inducente ad virtutem. Unde non est possibile, vel saltem non est facile, quod aliquis per sermonem possit hominem transmutare ab his quae per antiquam consuetudinem comprehendit. Sicut etiam in speculativis, non posset reduci ad veritatem ille qui firmiter adhaereret contrariis principiorum, quibus in operabilibus proportionantur fines, ut supra dictum est. 2042. Something acceptable must be proposed to change a man by argument. Now, one who does not relish an honorable good but is inclined toward passion does not accept any reasoning that leads to virtue. Hence it is impossible, or at least difficult, for anyone to be able to change a man by argument from what he holds by inveterate usage. So also in speculative matters it is not possible to lead back to truth a man who firmly cleaves to the opposite of those principles to which goals are equivalent in practical matters, as indicated previously (223, 474, 1431) Deinde cum dicit: amabile autem etc., ostendit, quod requiritur consuetudo ad hoc quod aliquis fiat bonus. Et dicit, quod non debemus esse contenti solis sermonibus ad acquirendum virtutem. Sed multum debet esse carum nobis, si etiam habitis omnibus per quae homines videntur fieri virtuosi, consequamur virtutem. Circa quae triplex est opinio. Quidam enim dicunt, quod homines fiunt boni per naturam: puta ex naturali complexione cum impressione caelestium corporum; quidam vero dicunt, quod homines fiunt boni per exercitium: alii vero dicunt, quod homines fiunt boni per doctrinam. Haec quidem tria aliqualiter vera sunt. 2143. Next [2, b ], at “It is perhaps,” he shows that habituation is required for a man to become virtuous. To acquire virtue, Aristotle says, we ought not to be satisfied with mere words. But we ought to consider it a thing of great value if—even after possessing everything that seems to make men virtuous—we attain virtue. There are three views on these matters. Some philosophers maintain that men are virtuous by nature, i.e., by natural temperament together with the influence of the heavenly bodies. Others hold that men become virtuous by practice. Still others say that men become virtuous by instruction. All three opinions are true in some degree. Nam et naturalis dispositio proficit ad virtutem; secundum quod in sexto dictum est, quod quidam mox a nativitate videntur fortes vel temperati, secundum quamdam naturalem inclinationem. Sed huiusmodi naturalis virtus est imperfecta, ut ibidem dictum est. Et ad eius perfectionem exigitur, quod superveniat perfectio intellectus seu rationis. Et propter hoc exigitur doctrina, quae sufficeret si in solo intellectu seu ratione virtus consisteret secundum opinionem Socratis, qui ponebat virtutem esse scientiam. Sed quia requiritur ad virtutem rectitudo appetitus, necessaria est (quod) tertio consuetudo per quam appetitus inclinetur ad bonum. 2144. Certainly the natural temperament is a help to virtue; this agrees with what was said in the sixth book (1276-1280) that some people seem brave or temperate right from birth through a natural inclination. But natural virtue of this kind is imperfect, as we pointed out then; and its completion requires that the perfection of the intellect or reason supervene. For this reason there is need of instruction that would be enough if virtue were located in the intellect or reason alone—the opinion of Socrates who maintained that virtue is knowledge. However, because rectitude of the appetitive faculty is needed there must be habituation inclining this faculty to good. Sed illud, quod ad naturam pertinet, manifestum est, quod non existit in potestate nostra, sed provenit hominibus ex aliqua divina causa; puta ex impressione caelestium corporum quantum ad corporis humani dispositionem, et ab ipso Deo, qui solus est supra intellectum quantum ad hoc quod mens hominis moveatur ad bonum. Et ex hoc homines vere sunt bene fortunati, quod per divinam causam inclinantur ad bonum, ut patet in capitulo de bona fortuna. 2145. But what pertains to nature manifestly is not in our power but comes to men from some divine cause: from the influence of the heavenly bodies in regard to man’s physical condition, and from God Himself—who alone governs the intellect—in regard to the movement of man’s mind to good. In this men are really very fortunate to be inclined to good by a divine cause, as is evident in the chapter De Bona Fortuna [a compilation from a chapter of the Eudemian Ethics (1246 b 37-1248 b ii) and a chapter of the Magna Moralia (1206 b 30-1207 b 19)]. Dictum est autem supra, quod sermo et doctrina non habet efficaciam in omnibus, sed oportet quod, ad hoc quod efficaciam habeat in aliquo, quod auditoris anima ex multis bonis consuetudinibus sit praeparata ad gaudendum de bonis et ad odiendum mala; sicut etiam oportet terram esse bene cultam ad hoc quod nutriat semen; sic enim se habet sermo auditus in anima, sicut semen in terra. Ille enim qui vivit secundum passiones, non libenter audiet sermonem monentis, neque etiam intelliget, ita scilicet quod iudicet illud esse bonum ad quod inducitur. Unde non potest ab aliquo persuaderi. 2146. It was explained previously (2139-2142) that discourse and instruction are not effective with everyone. But, that they be effective the soul of the hearer must be prepared by many good customs to rejoice in the good and hate the evil, just as the soil must be well tilled to nourish the seed abundantly. As seed is conditioned in the earth, so admonition in the soul of the hearer. Indeed the man who lives by passion will not eagerly hear words of advice, nor even understand, so that he can judge the advice to be good. Therefore he cannot be persuaded by anyone. Et ut universaliter loquamur, passio quae per consuetudinem firmata in homine dominatur, non cedit soli sermoni, sed oportet adhibere violentiam, ut scilicet homo compellatur ad bonum. Et sic patet, quod ad hoc, quod sermo monentis in aliquo efficaciam habeat, oportet praeexistere consuetudinem, per quam homo acquirat morem proprium virtutis, ut scilicet diligat bonum honestum, et abominetur turpe. 2147. Generally speaking, passion that—when firmly rooted by habituation—masters man does not yield to argument but must be attacked by violence to compel men to good. So, evidently, for exhortation to have an effect on anyone there must necessarily preexist habituation by which man may acquire the proper disposition to virtue so that he can love the honorable good and hate what is dishonorable. Deinde cum dicit: ex iuvene autem etc., ostendit, quod ad bonam consuetudinem requiritur legis positio. Et primo ostendit, quod per legem omnes fiunt boni. Secundo ostendit, quod hoc sine lege congrue fieri non potest, ibi, si igitur, quemadmodum dictum est et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit propositum. Secundo inducit ad hoc quoddam signum, ibi: propter quod existimant et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit propositum quantum ad iuvenes. Secundo quantum ad alios, ibi: non sufficiens autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod difficile est quod aliquis ab ipsa iuventute manuducatur ad virtutem secundum bonas consuetudines, nisi nutriatur sub bonis legibus, per quas quaedam necessitas inducitur homini ad bonum. 2148. Then [B, 3], at “But it is difficult,”.he shows that legislation is required for virtuous habituation. First [3, a] he shows that all men become virtuous by means of law. Next [3, b], at “As we have stated etc.,” he shows that this cannot be done properly without law. He discusses the first point in a twofold manner. First [a i] discloses his proposition. Second [a, ii], at “For this reason etc.,” he presents evidence for it. On the first point he does two things. First [i, x] he explains his proposition about the young; then [i, y], at “It is not enough etc.,” about others. He says first that it is difficult for anyone to be guided from his youth to virtue according to good customs unless he is reared under excellent laws by which a kind of necessity impels a man to good. Quod enim aliquis vivat temperate, abstinendo scilicet a delectabilibus, et perseveranter, ut scilicet non recedat a bono propter labores et tristitias, non est delectabile multis hominibus, et specialiter iuvenibus, qui sunt proni ad delectationes, ut in septimo dictum est. Et ideo oportet, quod nutritiones puerorum et adinventiones eorum, id est viae operandi quas homines adinveniunt, sint ordinatae per bonas leges ex quibus quodam modo iuvenes compellantur consuescere bona, quae quando iam in consuetudinem venerint, non erunt tristia, sed magis delectabilia. 2149. To live a temperate and a hard life by refraining from pleasures and by not abandoning the good on account of labors and pain is unattractive to many, especially to young men who are prone to pleasures, as we have indicated in the seventh book (1531). For this reason the rearing of children and their activities must be regulated by good laws; thus they will be forced, as it were, to become accustomed to good things which will not be distasteful but pleasant after the habit has been formed. Deinde cum dicit: non sufficiens autem etc., ostendit quod etiam alii indigent legislatione. Et dicit, quod non sufficit, quod homines solum dum sunt iuvenes bene nutriantur secundum leges et bona cura de eis habeatur, sed etiam plus quando aliquis factus est vir, oportet, quod adinveniat vias honestas ad operandum, et quod in talibus consuescat. Et ad hoc indigemus legibus; et non solum a principio, quando scilicet aliquis incipit fieri vir, sed etiam universaliter per totam vitam hominis. Multi enim sunt, qui magis obediunt necessitati, idest coactioni, quam sermoni. Et magis obediunt iacturae, idest damno, quod incurrunt pro poenis, quam bono honesto. 2150. At “It is not enough” [i, y] he shows that others too need legislation. He says that it is not enough for young men to be reared under good laws and to be well taken care of, but, even more, adults must discover honorable ways to act and become accustomed to them. For this reason we need laws not only in the beginning when someone is growing to manhood but generally throughout man’s entire life. Many indeed there are who obey by necessity or force instead of persuasion; they pay more attention to deprivation, i.e., the hurt they receive from punishment than to what is honorable. Deinde cum dicit propter quod existimant etc., inducit quoddam signum ad propositum. Et dicit, quod quia ad bonam vitam hominis requiritur necessitas inducta per legem, inde est, quod quidam legis positores existimant, quod oportet homines advocare ad virtutem, ita scilicet ut virtuosi, qui propria sponte obediunt rebus honestis, per praecedentes consuetudines provocentur per bonum, puta ostendendo eis honestatem eius quod proponitur. Sed his qui sunt inobedientes et mores degeneres habent, apponunt poenas corporales, puta flagella et diversas punitiones, vituperando eos et in propriis rebus damnificando. Illos autem, qui sunt totaliter insanabiles, exterminant, sicut cum suspendunt latronem. 2151. Next [a, ii], at “For this reason,” he presents some evidence for his proposition. He says that, since the restraint induced by law is required for the virtuous life of man, some legislators think that man must be summoned to virtue in this way: the virtuous—who of their own free will comply with what is honorable—should be aroused to good by means of pre-existing customs, by showing the goodness of what is proposed. But the insubordinate and the degenerate are allotted physical punishments like beatings and other chastisements, censure and loss of their possessions. However, the absolutely incurable are exterminated—the bandit, for instance, is hanged. Et hoc ideo, quia virtuosus qui suam vitam ordinat ad bonum, soli sermoni oboedit quo ei bonum proponitur, sed homo pravus qui appetit delectationem debet puniri per tristitiam seu dolorem, quemadmodum subiugale, idest sicut asinus ducitur flagellis. Et inde est, quod sicut dicunt, oportet tales tristitias adhibere quae maxime contrariantur amatis delectationibus; puta si aliquis inebriavit se, quod detur ei aqua ad bibendum. 2152. It is this way because the virtuous man, who adjusts his life to the good, heeds the mere counsel by which good is proposed to him. But the evil man who seeks pleasure ought to be punished by pain or sorrow like a beast of burden—the ass is driven by lashes. Hence, they say, those pains should be inflicted that are directly contrary to cherished pleasures, for example, a drunkard should be forced to drink only water. Deinde cum dicit: si igitur, quemadmodum dictum est etc., ostendit, quod lex est necessaria ad hoc quod homo fiat bonus. Et hoc duabus rationibus. Quarum prima est, quia oportet eum, qui est futurus bonus, bene nutriri et consuescere, et quod postea vivat secundum adinventiones rectarum viarum, ita quod abstineat a pravis, sive propria voluntate sive etiam contra suam voluntatem coactus. Quod quidem non contingit nisi vita hominis dirigatur per aliquem intellectum, qui habeat, et rectum ordinem ad hoc quod ducat ad bonum, et habeat fortitudinem, idest vim coactivam ad hoc quod compellat nolentes; quam quidem vim coactivam non habet praeceptum paternum, neque cuiuscumque alterius hominis persuadentis, qui non sit rex, vel in aliquo alio principatu constitutus. Sed lex habet coactivam potentiam, in quantum est promulgata a rege vel principe. Et est sermo procedens ab aliqua prudentia et intellectu dirigente ad bonum. Unde patet, quod lex necessaria est ad faciendum homines bonos. 2153. Then [3, b], at As we have stated,” he shows that law is necessary to make men good, for two reasons. The first is [b, i] that the man who is going to become virtuous must have careful rearing and good customs; and afterwards he should live by a moral code so that he refrains from evil either by his own will or even by coercion contrary to his will. This is possible only when a mans life is directed by some intellect that has both the right order conducive to good and the firmness, i.e., the coercive power, to compel the unwilling. Certainly the coercive power is not contained in the precept of a father, nor does it belong to any other counselor who is not a ruler or a person in authority. But the law includes coercive power inasmuch as it is promulgated by the ruler or prince; likewise it is an instruction issuing from prudence and reason which gives guidance towards the good. Therefore, law is obviously necessary to make men virtuous. Secundam rationem ponit ibi: et hominum quidem et cetera. Et dicit, quod homines qui volunt contrariari motibus alicuius habentur odio ab eo cui contrariantur, etiam si recte hoc faciant, aestimantur enim quod faciant hoc ex aliquo malo zelo. Sed lex quae praecepit honesta, non est onerosa, id est gravis vel odiosa, quia communiter proponitur. Unde relinquitur, quod lex est necessaria ad faciendum homines bonos. 2154. He gives the second reason [b, ii] at “Some men,” saying that people willing to oppose the inclinations of others are hated by their opponent, even when the opposition is just; they are considered to act from a malicious zeal. But the law commanding good deeds is not irksome, i.e., burdensome, or odious because it is proposed in a general way. Therefore the conclusion stands that law is necessary to make men virtuous.
Man Must Be Capable of Legislating
Chapter 9 II. A MAN SHOULD BE A MAKER OF LAWS. A. (Aristotle) indicates his intention. — 2155-2156 ἐν μόνῃ δὲ τῇ Λακεδαιμονίων πόλει ἢ μετ' ὀλίγων ὁ νομοθέτης ἐπιμέλειαν δοκεῖ πεποιῆσθαι τροφῆς τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων· ἐν δὲ ταῖς πλείσταις τῶν πόλεων ἐξημέληται περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ ζῇ ἕκαστος ὡς βούλεται, κυκλωπικῶς θεμιστεύων παίδων ἠδ' ἀλόχου. κράτιστον μὲν οὖν τὸ γίνεσθαι κοινὴν ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ ὀρθὴν [καὶ δρᾶν αὐτὸ δύνασθαι]· κοινῇ δ' ἐξαμελουμένων ἑκάστῳ δόξειεν ἂν προσήκειν τοῖς σφετέροις τέκνοις καὶ φίλοις εἰς ἀρετὴν συμβάλλεσθαι,... ἢ προαιρεῖσθαί γε. μᾶλλον δ' ἂν τοῦτο δύνασθαι δόξειεν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων νομοθετικὸς γενόμενος. Only in Sparta and a few other states does the lawmaker seem to have considered the questions of education and modes of conduct. For matters of this kind are neglected in most states and each man lives as he pleases dealing with wives and children as the Cyclopes do [Homer, Odyssey, ix. 114]. Therefore it seems best that there be strict public supervision and that we should be able to carry it out. Since men neglect this as a common duty, it seems fitting that each man should do something to help his children and friends become virtuous; or at least select the means for it. Apparently this can best be done, judging by the preceding statements, if a man becomes a legislator. B. He proves his proposal (by two arguments). 1. FIRST. — 2157-2159 αἱ μὲν γὰρ κοιναὶ ἐπιμέλειαι δῆλον ὅτι διὰ νόμων γίνονται, ἐπιεικεῖς δ' αἱ διὰ τῶν σπουδαίων· γεγραμμένων δ' ἢ ἀγράφων, οὐδὲν ἂν δόξειε διαφέρειν, οὐδὲ δι' ὧν εἷς ἢ πολλοὶ παιδευθήσονται, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐπὶ μουσικῆς ἢ γυμναστικῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐνισχύει τὰ νόμιμα καὶ τὰ ἤθη, οὕτω καὶ ἐν οἰκίαις οἱ πατρικοὶ λόγοι καὶ τὰ ἔθη, καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν καὶ τὰς εὐεργεσίας· προϋπάρχουσι γὰρ στέργοντες καὶ εὐπειθεῖς τῇ φύσει. Public supervision is obviously done in accordance with law; and good b supervision is achieved by good laws. It makes no difference whether the laws are written or not, nor whether they instruct one or many, any more than it does in music, gymnastics, or other skills. In fact public laws and customs have the same place in states as paternal precepts and customs have in families. In the latter case supervision is even more effective by reason of relationship and benefits conferred, for children first love their parents and readily obey them out of natural affection. 2. SECOND. — 2160-2163 ἔτι δὲ καὶ διαφέρουσιν αἱ καθ' ἕκαστον παιδεῖαι τῶν κοινῶν, ὥσπερ ἐπ' ἰατρικῆς· καθόλου μὲν γὰρ τῷ πυρέττοντι συμφέρει ἡσυχία καὶ ἀσιτία, τινὶ δ' ἴσως οὔ, ὅ τε πυκτικὸς ἴσως οὐ πᾶσι τὴν αὐτὴν μάχην περιτίθησιν. ἐξακριβοῦσθαι δὴ δόξειεν ἂν μᾶλλον τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον ἰδίας τῆς ἐπιμελείας γινομένης· μᾶλλον γὰρ τοῦ προσφόρου τυγχάνει ἕκαστος. ἀλλ' ἐπιμεληθείη μὲν ἂν ἄριστα καθ' ἓν καὶ ἰατρὸς καὶ γυμναστὴς καὶ πᾶς ἄλλος ὁ καθόλου εἰδώς, τί πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς τοιοισδί τοῦ κοινοῦ γὰρ αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι λέγονταί τε καὶ εἰσίν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἑνός τινος οὐδὲν ἴσως κωλύει καλῶς ἐπιμεληθῆναι καὶ ἀνεπιστήμονα ὄντα, τεθεαμένον δ' ἀκριβῶς τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ δι' ἐμπειρίαν, καθάπερ καὶ ἰατροὶ ἔνιοι δοκοῦσιν ἑαυτῶν ἄριστοι εἶναι, ἑτέρῳ οὐδὲν ἂν δυνάμενοι ἐπαρκέσαι. οὐδὲν δ' ἧττον ἴσως τῷ γε βουλομένῳ τεχνικῷ γενέσθαι καὶ θεωρητικῷ ἐπὶ τὸ καθόλου βαδιστέον εἶναι δόξειεν ἄν, κἀκεῖνο γνωριστέον ὡς ἐνδέχεται· εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι περὶ τοῦθ' αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι. τάχα δὲ καὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ δι' ἐπιμελείας βελτίους ποιεῖν, εἴτε πολλοὺς εἴτ' ὀλίγους, νομοθετικῷ πειρατέον γενέσθαι, εἰ διὰ νόμων ἀγαθοὶ γενοίμεθ' ἄν. ὅντινα γὰρ οὖν καὶ τὸν προτεθέντα διαθεῖναι καλῶς οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ τυχόντος, ἀλλ' εἴπερ τινός, τοῦ εἰδότος, ὥσπερ ἐπ' ἰατρικῆς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ὧν ἔστιν ἐπιμέλειά τις καὶ φρόνησις. Furthermore, instruction for general use varies according to each case: in the art of medicine, for instance, fast and rest are usually beneficial to people running a fever but perhaps not for a particular patient. So in athletic contests, an athlete presumably does not use the same plan of battle against every opponent. Thus it would seem that individual attention produces better results in particular cases, for everyone is more likely to get what is suitable. But a thing will be done with the greatest care if a doctor or a trainer or any other working artist knows in a universal way what is common to all men or to a particular class. This is so because the sciences are said to be and actually are concerned with universals. But the unscientific individual may also be successful; for nothing hinders a person from producing a cure even without universal knowledge provided that from experience he can diagnose the symptoms in each case. Thus people seem to be skillful in doctoring themselves but are unable to help others. Nevertheless, if a man wishes to become an artist or a theoretician he must have recourse to the universal and know it in some measure; for the sciences deal with the universal, as we have indicated previously. Likewise the man who wants to make people—either a few or many—better by his supervision must try to become a legislator, if it is true that we are made virtuous by means of laws. The reason is that the ability to dispose any individual adequately is not possessed by everyone but, if anyone can do it, it is the man who knows scientifically. This is evident in the medical art and in other fields where prudence and supervision are employed.
COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS In sola autem Lacedaemoniorum et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit quod legis positio necessaria est ad hoc quod homines fiant boni, hic ostendit quod necessarium sit hominem esse legis positivum. Et primo proponit quod intendit. Secundo probat propositum, ibi, communes quidem enim et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod quamvis, sicut praedictum est, necessaria sit legumpositio ad nutritiones et operationes hominum, tamen in sola civitate Lacedaemoniorum cum paucis aliis legislator videtur habuisse curam, ut legibus ordinaret nutritiones puerorum, et vias inventas ad operandum. Sed in pluribus civitatibus talia sunt neglecta, in quibus unusquisque vivit sicut vult disponens de filiis et uxore secundum suam voluntatem ad modum Cyclopum, idest quarumdam gentium barbararum, quae legibus non utuntur. Optimum igitur est, quod habeatur recta cura de nutritionibus puerorum, et virtuosis actionibus civium, secundum publicam auctoritatem; et quod homo instruatur, ut possit hoc idonee operari. 2155. After the Philosopher has shown that legislation is necessary to make men virtuous [II], he now shows that a man should be a maker of laws. First [II, A] he indicates his intention. Then [II, B], at “Public supervision etc.,” he proves his proposal. He says first that, as was just pointed out (2148- 2154), legislation is needed for education and the activities of men; nevertheless, only in Sparta and a few other states does the legislator seem to have paid attention to the legal regulation of children’s education and to the established modes of conduct. But matters of this kind are neglected in most states where each man lives as he pleases dealing with his children and wife as he wishes, like the Cyclopes—certain barbarous tribes who are not accustomed to laws. Therefore it is best that there be strict supervision by public authority over the ed cation of children and the virtuous activities of the citizens and that man be so instructed to be able to do this properly. Sed cum homines negligant hoc in communi, quia scilicet non exhibent ad hoc publicam curam, videtur esse conveniens unicuique privatae personae ut conferat suis filiis et amicis aliquid ad hoc quod sint virtuosi, vel si non potest conferre, quod saltem eligat ea per quae hoc possit fieri. Quod quidem maxime videtur posse fieri, secundum praedicta, si aliquis fiat legis positivus, idest si acquirat idoneitatem, qua possit condere rectas leges. Et sic esse legis positivum principaliter competit publicae personae, secundario tamen competit etiam privatae. 2156. But men commonly neglect this duty because it is plain they show no public concern for it. Hence it seems fitting that each private person do something to ‘help his children and friends to become virtuous; or if he cannot, at least he should select the means to make this possible. Apparently it can best be done, according to the preceding statements, if a man becomes a legislator, i.e., if he acquires the skill to be able to make good laws. So, to be a legislator pertains principally to a public person, secondarily however also to a private person. Deinde cum dicit: communes quidem enim etc., probat propositum per duas rationes. Dicit ergo primo manifestum esse, quod communes curae, scilicet quae fiunt per publicas personas, quarum est leges condere, fiunt per leges. Sic enim videntur de aliquibus curare in quantum super his leges statuunt. Bonae autem curae sunt quae fiunt per bonas leges. 2157. Next [II, B], at “Public supervision,” he proves his proposal by two arguments. He says first [B, 1] that general supervision, as it is exercised by public officials whose function is to frame laws, obviously is done in accordance with law; thus the supervision is exercised over some people inasmuch as laws are made for them. But good supervision is properly achieved by means of good laws. Nec differt ad propositum, utrum hoc fiat per leges scriptas vel non scriptas vel per leges quibus unus instruatur aut plures. Sicut etiam patet in musica et exercitativa et in aliis eruditionibus; quod non differt quantum ad praesens tempus utrum documentum proferatur cum scripto vel sine scripto. Nam Scriptura adhibetur ad conservationem memoriae in futurum. Similiter etiam, non differt utrum in talibus documentum proponatur uni tantum aut pluribus; et ita videtur eiusdem rationis esse, quod aliquis paterfamilias instruat filium suum, vel paucos domesticos sermone admonitorio sine Scriptura et quod aliquis princeps ferat legem scriptam ad ordinandam totam multitudinem civitatis. Sicut enim se habent leges publicae, et mores per eos introducti in civitatibus, sic se habent in domibus paterni sermones et mores per eos introducti. 2158. It makes no difference for our proposal whether this is done by means of written or unwritten laws, or by laws instructing one or many. As is evident also in music, gymnastics, and other skills, it does not matter in the present connection whether instruction is imparted in writing or not; for writing is used to keep information for the future. Neither does it matter whether instruction in such subjects is offered to one or many. Therefore it seems to come to the same thing that a father of a family should instruct his son or a few domestics by a verbal or written admonition, and that a prince should make a law in writing to govern all the people of the state. In fact public laws and customs introduced by rulers hold the same place in states as do paternal precepts and customs introduced by parents in families. Haec autem sola differentia est: quod paternus sermo non habet plenarie vim coactivam sicut sermo regius, ut supra dictum est. Consequenter autem ostendit, quod quantum ad aliquid hoc magis competit privatae personae quam publicae, ex cognatione et beneficiis, scilicet propter quae filii diligunt parentes, et de facili obediunt naturali amicitiae, quae est filiorum ad patrem. Sic igitur, licet sermo regius magis possit per viam timoris, tamen sermo paternus magis potest per viam amoris, quae quidem via est efficacior in his qui non sunt totaliter male dispositi. 2159. This is the only difference: a father’s precept does not have full coercive power like the royal decree, as was noted previously (2153). Consequently he shows that to some extent this (supervision) is more suitable to a private than a public person by reason of relationship and benefits because of which children love their parents and are readily obedient out of natural affection. So then, although the royal decree is more powerful by way of fear, nevertheless the paternal precept is more powerful by way of love—a way that is more efficacious with people not totally depraved. Secundam rationem ponit ibi adhuc autem et cetera. Et dicit, quod disciplina, quae est utilis in communi, habet aliquam differentiam circa aliquod particulare; sicut patet in arte medicinali; quia in universali, febricitantibus utilis est abstinentia et quies, ut natura non gravetur per abundantiam cibi, et calor non excitetur per motum. Sed forte alicui homini febricitanti hoc non expedit, quia abstinentia nimis debilitaret virtutem et forte aliquis febricitans indiget motu ad hoc quod resolvantur grossi humores. Et idem etiam patet in agonistis, quia pugil non utitur eodem modo pugnandi contra unumquemque. Et secundum hoc certius videbitur procedi in operatione uniuscuiusque artis activae, si adhibeatur propria cura circa unumquodque. Sic enim unusquisque magis potietur eo quod sibi convenit. 2160. At “Furthermore, instruction” he gives the second argument. He says that instruction that is generally useful varies for particular cases. Thus it is evident in the art of medicine that fast and rest are usually beneficial to people running a fever so nature will not be burdened with an abundance of food, and heat will not be generated by activity. But perhaps this is not advisable for a particular fever-stricken patient because fast might weaken him too much; and perhaps the patient might need activity to dissolve the gross humors. The same thing is obvious in athletic contests because the athlete does not use the identical plan of battle against every opponent. In this way the operation of each practical art will seem more certain if special attention is paid to each individual; thus everyone will better acquire what is suitable to him. Sed tamen optime adhibebitur cura ad aliquid faciendum, si medicus, et exercitativus et quilibet alius artifex operativus cognoscat universale, puta quid communiter omnibus conferat, puta omnibus hominibus, vel quid conferat omnibus talibus, puta cholericis. Et hoc ideo quia scientiae, et dicuntur esse et sunt de communibus: optime ergo curare poterit qui ex scientia universali procedit ad curandum de aliquo particulari. Non tamen solum hoc modo potest medicus curare, sed etiam quantum ad curationem alicuius particularis hominis nihil prohibet, quod bene curet eum, etiam si nesciat communia, dum tamen propter experientiam consideret diligenter accidentia cuiuscumque particularis hominis: sicut et quidam videntur esse optimi medici sui ipsorum, propter hoc, quod sunt experti accidentia propria, non tamen sufficiunt ad adiuvandum alios. 2161. However, a thing will be done with the greatest care, if a doctor or a trainer or any other artisan (artifex) knows in a universal way what is common to all men or what will benefit all men of a particular class, for example, the irascible. This is so because science is said to be, and actually is, concerned with universals. Therefore he who proceeds from universal knowledge can best care for an individual case. Nevertheless this is not the only way a healer can produce a cure; nothing hinders him from curing a particular patient without universal knowledge provided that from experience he can properly diagnose the symptoms of each patient. Thus some people seem to be skillful in doctoring themselves because they know their own symptoms from experience, but they are not qualified to help others. Quamvis autem aliquis sine scientia universali possit bene operari circa aliquod particulare, nihilominus tamen ille qui vult fieri artifex debet tendere ad cognitionem universalis, ut aliquo modo illud cognoscat; sicut hoc etiam necessarium est ei qui vult esse speculativus, puta geometra vel naturalis. Dictum est enim quod scientiae sunt circa haec, scilicet circa universalia. Et ita etiam se habet in his qui curam adhibent ut faciant bonos. 2162. Although a man can operate well in a particular situation without universal knowledge, nevertheless if he wishes to become an artist he must strive for generalized knowledge that he may know the universal in some measure. This is likewise necessary for one who wishes to be a speculative scientist like the geometrician or the physicist. It was indicated before (1213, 1352) that the sciences deal with this matter, namely, universals. This is the case too with men who exercise supervision to make people virtuous. Possibile enim est, quod sine arte et scientia, qua cognoscatur universale, aliquis possit hunc vel illum hominem facere bonum, propter experientiam quam habet de ipso. Tamen si aliquis velit per suam curam aliquos facere meliores, sive multos sive paucos, debet tentare ut perveniat ad scientiam universalem eorum, per quae quis fit bonus, idest ut fiat legispositivus, id est ut sciat artem qua leges bene ponantur, cum per leges boni fiamus, ut supra habitum est. Quia quod aliquis possit bene disponere quamcumque bonam habitudinem hominis inducendo ipsam, et oppositam removendo ipsam, puta sanitatem et aegritudinem, virtutem et malitiam, non est cuiuscumque, sed solum alicuius scientis communia; sicut patet in arte medicinali, et in omnibus aliis rebus quibus adhibetur cura et prudentia humana. In omnibus enim oportet, quod aliquis non solum cognoscat singularia, sed etiam quod habeat scientiam communium; quia forte occurrent aliqua, quae comprehenduntur sub scientia communi, non autem sub cognitione singularium accidentium. 2163. It is possible that someone, without art and science by which the universal is known, can make this or that man virtuous because of the experience he has had with himself. However, if someone wants to make people—either a few or many—better by his supervision he ought to try to acquire a universal knowledge of the things that make a man virtuous; in other words, he ought to try to become a legislator so that he knows the art by which good laws are framed since we are made virtuous by means of laws, as was pointed out previously (2153-2154). The reason is that the ability to prepare properly any good disposition in man by introducing it and by removing its opposite, for example, health and sickness, virtue and vice, does not belong to everyone but only to the man who knows scientifically. This is evident in the medical art and in all other fields where supervision and human prudence are employed. In all these a man must not only know particulars but have a knowledge of universals because some things may happen which are included under universal knowledge but not under the knowledge of individual cases.
How to Learn the Science of Lawmaking
Chapter 9 III. HE NOW ASKS HOW ONE BECOMES A LAWMAKER. A. He states his intention. B. He carries (it) out. — 2164 ἆρ' οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπισκεπτέον πόθεν ἢ πῶς νομοθετικὸς γένοιτ' ἄν τις; Then we must inquire, after these discussions, from whom and how the science of lawmaking may be learned. 1. MEANS FAMILIAR TO PREVIOUS PHILOSOPHERS WERE NOT SUFFICIENT TO TEACH ANYONE THE SCIENCE OF LAWMAKING. a. The way someone should learn lawmaking. — 2165 ἢ καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, παρὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν; μόριον γὰρ ἐδόκει τῆς πολιτικῆς εἶναι. Is it not, as in the other areas of knowledge, from those versed in political science? (Legislation) seems to be a part of political science. b. That this does not follow in practice. i. He proposes their diversity (among those who busy themselves about legislation). — 2166-2167 ἢ οὐχ ὅμοιον φαίνεται ἐπὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἐπιστημῶν τε καὶ δυνάμεων; ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις οἱ αὐτοὶ φαίνονται τάς τε δυνάμεις παραδιδόντες καὶ ἐνεργοῦντες ἀπ' αὐτῶν, οἷον ἰατροὶ γραφεῖς· τὰ δὲ πολιτικὰ ἐπαγγέλλονται μὲν διδάσκειν οἱ σοφισταί, πράττει δ' αὐτῶν οὐδείς, ἀλλ' οἱ πολιτευόμενοι, Or are we to say that political science is different from the other sciences and arts? Certainly in the other practical sciences persons, like doctors and painters, who teach technique seem to be the very ones who put it into practice. However, in political science the Sophists profess to teach the art and none of them puts it into operation, that being left to those who are engaged in politics. ii. He shows the deficiencies: x. OF THE POLITICIANS. aa. He states... the deficiency. — 2168 οἳ δόξαιεν ἂν δυνάμει τινὶ τοῦτο πράττειν καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ διανοίᾳ· These seem to perform their public activities more from a kind of habit and experience than from intellectual discernment. bb. He verifies his statement. — 2169-2170 οὔτε γὰρ γράφοντες οὔτε λέγοντες περὶ τῶν τοιούτων φαίνονται καίτοι κάλλιον ἦν ἴσως ἢ λόγους δικανικούς τε καὶ δημηγορικούς, οὐδ' αὖ πολιτικοὺς πεποιηκότες τοὺς σφετέρους υἱεῖς ἤ τινας ἄλλους τῶν φίλων. εὔλογον δ' ἦν, εἴπερ ἐδύναντο· οὔτε γὰρ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἄμεινον οὐδὲν κατέλιπον ἄν, οὔθ' αὑτοῖς ὑπάρξαι προέλοιντ' ἂν μᾶλλον τῆς τοιαύτης δυνάμεως, οὐδὲ δὴ τοῖς φιλτάτοις. Apparently they do not produce anything either in speeches or in writing about matters of this kind; although it might be more to their credit than the composition of speeches on judicial procedure and the art of persuasion. Furthermore they do not make their own sons or any of their friends statesmen. Nevertheless, they would reasonably have done so, if they could. Surely they could leave nothing better to their countries; nor could they choose anything more acceptable to themselves—nor for that matter to their best friends—than the ability to make others statesmen. cc. He refutes an error. — 2171 οὐ μὴν μικρόν γε ἔοικεν ἡ ἐμπειρία συμβάλλεσθαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐγίνοντ' ἂν διὰ τῆς πολιτικῆς συνηθείας πολιτικοί· διὸ τοῖς ἐφιεμένοις περὶ πολιτικῆς εἰδέναι προσδεῖν ἔοικεν ἐμπειρίας. Nevertheless experience does seem to contribute not a little, for merely living in a political environment would not have made statesmen of them. And thus we may conclude that those who would wish a knowledge of politics must have (in addition) practice. y. (THE DEFICIENCY) OF THE SOPHISTS. aa. He states his proposition. — 2172 τῶν δὲ σοφιστῶν οἱ ἐπαγγελλόμενοι λίαν φαίνονται πόρρω εἶναι τοῦ διδάξαι. ὅλως γὰρ οὐδὲ ποῖόν τι ἐστὶν ἢ περὶ ποῖα ἴσασιν· But the Sophists who profess to teach political science seem to be a long way from teaching it. Indeed they appear to misunderstand completely what kind of science it is and what its subject matter is. bb. He verifies his proposition. — 2173-2177 οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ ῥητορικῇ οὐδὲ χείρω ἐτίθεσαν, οὐδ' ἂν ᾤοντο ῥᾴδιον εἶναι τὸ νομοθετῆσαι συναγαγόντι τοὺς εὐδοκιμοῦντας τῶν νόμων· ἐκλέξασθαι γὰρ εἶναι τοὺς ἀρίστους, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὴν ἐκλογὴν οὖσαν συνέσεως καὶ τὸ κρῖναι ὀρθῶς μέγιστον, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μουσικήν. οἱ γὰρ ἔμπειροι περὶ ἕκαστα κρίνουσιν ὀρθῶς τὰ ἔργα, καὶ δι' ὧν ἢ πῶς ἐπιτελεῖται συνιᾶσιν, καὶ ποῖα ποίοις συνᾴδει· τοῖς δ' ἀπείροις ἀγαπητὸν τὸ μὴ διαλανθάνειν εἰ εὖ ἢ κακῶς πεποίηται τὸ ἔργον, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ γραφικῆς. οἱ δὲ νόμοι τῆς πολιτικῆς ἔργοις ἐοίκασιν· πῶς οὖν ἐκ τούτων νομοθετικὸς γένοιτ' ἄν τις, ἢ τοὺς ἀρίστους κρίναι; οὐ γὰρ φαίνονται οὐδ' ἰατρικοὶ ἐκ τῶν συγγραμμάτων γίνεσθαι. καίτοι πειρῶνταί γε λέγειν οὐ μόνον τὰ θεραπεύματα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς ἰαθεῖεν ἂν καὶ ὡς δεῖ θεραπεύειν ἑκάστους, διελόμενοι τὰς ἕξεις· ταῦτα δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἐμπείροις ὠφέλιμα εἶναι δοκεῖ, τοῖς δ' ἀνεπιστήμοσιν ἀχρεῖα. Otherwise they would not make political science identical with rhetoric and even lower; nor would they think it easy to make laws simply by collecting approved statutes and then choosing the best of them—as though a choice did not demand the actual employment of intellect, and as though right judgment were not the greatest thing, as is evident in music. In fact people who have experience with particulars make correct judgments about performances and understand by what means and in what way the works are accomplished and what harmonizes with what. But the inexperienced understandably are ignorant whether a work is done well or badly, on the basis of what is in books. Now laws are, as it were, the effects of the art of politics. Therefore, how can a man learn law-making from compilations of laws, or judge what laws are best? Surely men do not seem to become doctors from books although the authors try to describe not only the cures but the means of curing, what remedies must be prescribed for each individual condition. Nevertheless, these things seem to be useful to the experienced but not to the inexperienced. cc. We must reject (an) error. — 2178 ἴσως οὖν καὶ τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν αἱ συναγωγαὶ τοῖς μὲν δυναμένοις θεωρῆσαι καὶ κρῖναι τί καλῶς ἢ τοὐναντίον καὶ ποῖα ποίοις ἁρμόττει εὔχρηστ' ἂν εἴη· τοῖς δ' ἄνευ ἕξεως τὰ τοιαῦτα διεξιοῦσι τὸ μὲν κρίνειν καλῶς οὐκ ἂν ὑπάρχοι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα αὐτόματον, εὐσυνετώτεροι δ' εἰς ταῦτα τάχ' ἂν γένοιντο. Perhaps then collections of laws and constitutions will be useful to those who are able to consider and judge which works or laws may be good or bad and which are suitable to the circumstances. But those who review things of this kind without ability cannot properly judge except by chance; although perhaps they will become more capable of understanding them. 2. HE CONCLUDES THAT... (TEACHING THE SCIENCE OF LAWMAKING) HAS TO BE DISCUSSED BY ITSELF. a. This is incumbent upon him. — 2179 παραλιπόντων οὖν τῶν προτέρων ἀνερεύνητον τὸ περὶ τῆς νομοθεσίας, αὐτοὺς ἐπισκέψασθαι μᾶλλον βέλτιον ἴσως, καὶ ὅλως δὴ περὶ πολιτείας, ὅπως εἰς δύναμιν ἡ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια φιλοσοφία τελειωθῇ. Since our predecessors have left the subject of legislation uninvestigated, perhaps it will be much better for us to attempt to treat this and the forms of government in general. In this way we can complete philosophy with regard to political science as it deals with human affairs. b. In what order he is going to carry this out. — 2180 πρῶτον μὲν οὖν εἴ τι κατὰ μέρος εἴρηται καλῶς ὑπὸ τῶν προγενεστέρων πειραθῶμεν ἐπελθεῖν, εἶτα ἐκ τῶν συνηγμένων πολιτειῶν θεωρῆσαι τὰ ποῖα σώζει καὶ φθείρει τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὰ ποῖα ἑκάστας τῶν πολιτειῶν, καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας αἳ μὲν καλῶς αἳ δὲ τοὐναντίον πολιτεύονται. θεωρηθέντων γὰρ τούτων τάχ' ἂν μᾶλλον συνίδοιμεν καὶ ποία πολιτεία ἀρίστη, καὶ πῶς ἑκάστη ταχθεῖσα, καὶ τίσι νόμοις καὶ ἔθεσι χρωμένη. λέγωμεν οὖν ἀρξάμενοι. Therefore, first we will attempt in passing to secure whatever fragments of good are to be found in the statements of our predecessors. Next, on the basis of the constitutions we have collected, we will study the things that preserve states and the things that corrupt states; we will consider what influences corrupt particular forms of government, and why some states are governed well and others badly. After these discussions we will begin to inquire what is the ideal state, how it ought to be organized and what laws and customs it should follow. This then will serve as a beginning.
COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Igitur post hoc intendendum et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit quod necessarium est homini quod fiat legis positivus, hic inquirit qualiter aliquis legis positivus fieri possit. Et primo dicit de quo est intentio; concludens ex praemissis quod cum ostensum sit, expedire homini quod fiat legis positivus, oportet post praedicta intendere unde aliquis fiat legispositivus, utrum scilicet ex consuetudine vel ex doctrina; et qualiter per hunc vel per istum modum. 2164. After the Philosopher has shown that a man should be a lawmaker [III], he now asks how one becomes a lawmaker. First [III, A] he states his intention. He concludes from the premises that, since it was shown (2157-2163) to be expedient for man to become a legislator, he m:ust inquire after these discussions whence a man may learn the science of lawmaking: by experience or education, and how this may be achieved. Secundo ibi: vel quemadmodum etc., exequitur propositum. Et primo ostendit, quod ea quibus priores utebantur, non sufficiebant ad hoc quod aliquis fieret legis positivus. Secundo concludit hoc sibi tractandum esse, ibi, relinquentibus igitur et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit qualiter oporteret aliquem fieri legispositivum; secundo ostendit hoc non observari, ibi, vel non simile videtur et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod videtur esse conveniens, quod inde et taliter aliquis fiat legis positivus, sicut accidit in aliis operativis scientiis quae sunt praeter politicam. Nec est inconveniens, si dum intendo de legis positiva, loquor de politica: quia, ut in sexto dictum est, legis positiva est quaedam pars politicae prudentiae. Est enim legis positiva quaedam architectonica politica. 2165. Second [III, B], at “Is it not etc.,” he carries out his intention. First [ B, 1 ] he shows that the means familiar to previous philosophers were not sufficient to teach anyone the science of lawmaking. Next [B, 2], at “Since our predecessors etc.,” he concludes that this has to be discussed by itself. He treats the first point from two aspects. First [1, a] he shows the way someone should learn lawmaking. Then [1, b], at “Or are we to say etc.,” he shows that this does not follow in practice. He says first that it seems reasonable that the origin and manner of becoming a legislator take place as in other practical sciences which are for the sake of political science. Nor is it out of place for me to treat political science While inquiring about legislation. The reason, as stated in the sixth book (1197-1198), is that legislation is a part of political prudence, for legislation is a kind of architectonic political science. Deinde cum dicit: vel non simile etc., ostendit hoc non observari, quod videtur conveniens propter diversitatem eorum, qui se intromittunt de legis positiva. Et primo proponit eorum diversitatem. Secundo ostendit eorum insufficientiam, ibi: qui videbuntur utique et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod quamvis rationabile videretur quod similiter esset in hoc sicut in aliis, tamen non videtur simile observari circa politicam et circa alias artes operativas, quae dicuntur scientiae quantum ad id quod habent cognitionis, potentiae vero inquantum sunt operationis principia. In aliis enim artibus operativis idem videntur esse qui tradunt huiusmodi artes scilicet docendo eas, et qui operantur secundum ipsas: sicut medici, et medicinam docent et secundum medicinam operantur. Et eadem ratio est de scriptoribus, et quibuscumque aliis secundum artem operantibus. 2166. Then [1, b], at “Or are we to say,” he shows this—that it seems reasonable—does not follow in practice because of the difference among those who busy themselves about legislation. First [b, i] he proposes their diversity. Next [b, ii], at “These seem etc., he shows their deficiencies. He says first that, although there would reasonably appear to be a resemblance between this and other sciences, nevertheless something different seems to be observed in political science and the other practical arts—others are called sciences inasmuch as they have principles of knowledge, and aptitudes inasmuch as they are principles of operation. Indeed in the other practical arts, the people who impart these arts by teaching them seem to be the very ones who practice them: doctors, for example, teach medicine and practice their art. The same situation prevails for painters and any others who operate by art. Sed circa politicam, aliter esse videtur. Quidam enim, scilicet sophistae, profitentur se docere legis positivam, cum tamen nullus eorum secundum eam agat. Sed quidam alii videntur ea uti, illi scilicet qui civiliter conversantur. 2167. However, it seems to be otherwise in political science. Some, the Sophists, profess to teach legislation, but none of them puts it into practice. But others, viz., the politicians seem to practice it. Deinde cum dicit: qui videbuntur utique etc., ostendit insufficientiam utrorumque. Et primo civiliter conversantium. Secundo sophistarum, ibi, sophistarum autem et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit quod intendit de defectu civiliter conversantium: quia scilicet opera civilia, quae exercent, magis videntur facere ex quadam potentia, idest ex quodam habitu per consuetudinem acquisito, et ex quadam experientia, quam ex mente, idest intellectu vel scientia. 2168. Next [b, ii], at “These seem,” he shows the deficiencies of both: first [ii, x] of the politicians, and then [ii, y] at “But the Sophists etc.” of the Sophists. On the first point he does three things. First [x, aa] he states what he has in mind about the deficiency of the politicians. Their public activities seem to be performed more from an aptitude or a kind of habit acquired by custom, and from experience than from intellectual discernment, i.e., reason or science. Secundo ibi: neque enim scribentes etc., probat propositum per duo signa. Quorum primum est, quod illi qui agunt secundum scientiam possunt tradere scripto vel verbo rationes eorum quae agunt, illi autem qui civiliter conversantur non videntur neque scripto neque verbo aliquid tradere circa politicam, quamvis hoc esset multo melius scribere, quam sermones iudicativos, secundum quos scilicet aliqui instruuntur per quasdam leges positas qualiter debeant iudicare, et concionativos, per quos scilicet aliqui instruuntur concionari secundum rhetoricam. 2169. Second [x, bb], at “Apparently they etc.,” he verifies his statement by two indications. The first is that those who work scientifically can give the reason, written or oral, for the things they do. But politicians do not seem to produce any work on political science either in speeches or writing. Certainly writing of this kind would be much better than the discourses on judicial procedure—by which people are taught how they ought to judge according to certain fixed canons-and on eloquence by which they are taught to speak publicly according to the rules of rhetoric. Secundum signum est, quia illi qui operantur secundum scientiam possunt facere alios operatores instruendo eos. Huiusmodi autem homines, qui politice conversantur, non faciunt politicos, neque filios suos neque aliquos amicorum suorum. Et tamen rationabile est quod facerent si possent. Nihil enim melius possent praestare suis civitatibus, quod relinqueretur post eos, quam si facerent aliquos esse bonos politicos. Similiter etiam nihil esset magis eligibile quantum ad ipsos, quam habere potentiam faciendi alios esse politicos; neque etiam amicissimis suis possent aliquid utilius conferre. 2170. The second indication is that men who work scientifically can form other scientific workers by teaching. But men of the kind who practice politics do not make their sons or any of their friends statesmen. Nevertheless it is reasonable that they would so if they could. Surely they could confer on their countries no greater benefit, which would remain after them, than to be the means of making other good statesmen. Likewise there would be nothing more acceptable to themselves than the ability to make other men statesmen-they could do nothing more useful even for their best friends. Tertio ibi: non tamen parvum etc., excludit errorem. Posset enim aliquis ex praemissis existimare, quod experientia conversationis civilis esset inutilis. Sed ipse dicit, quod quamvis non sufficiat, non tamen parvum aliquid confert ad hoc quod homo fiat politicus. Alioquin non fierent aliqui magis politici per consuetudinem politicae vitae, et his qui desiderant scire aliquid de politica, videtur esse necessaria experientia vitae politicae. 2171. Third [x, cc], at “Nevertheless experience,” he refutes an error. Someone might judge from the premises that experience in practicing politics would not be useful. But Aristotle says that, although it is not enough, nevertheless it contributes not a little toward making a man a statesman. Otherwise, some would not become better statesmen by the practice of political life. And experience in political life seems necessary for those who desire to, know something about the art of political science. Deinde cum dicit sophistarum autem etc., ostendit defectum quem patiuntur sophistae. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo proponit quod intendit. Et dicit, quod sophistae, qui promittunt se docere politicam videntur valde longe esse ab hoc quod doceant. Videntur enim totaliter ignorare, et qualis scientia sit politica, et circa qualia consistat. 2172. At “But the Sophists” [ii, y] he shows the deficiency that the Sophists suffer. On this point he does three things. First [y, aa] he states his proposition, saying that the Sophists who profess to teach political science seem to be a long way from teaching it. Indeed they appear to misunderstand completely what kind of knowledge of political science is as well as its subject matter. Secundo ibi: non enim utique etc., ostendit propositum per signa. Et primo quantum ad hoc quod dixerat eos nescire quale quid est. Si enim hoc scirent, non ponerent quod politica esset eadem cum rhetorica vel potius peior quam rhetorica: rhetorica enim potest persuadere tam circa laudes et vituperia alicuius personae quam in consiliis quam etiam in iudiciis, secundum triplex genus causae; demonstrativum, deliberativum et iudiciale. Sed secundum istos, politica persuasiva est solum in iudiciis. Reputant enim illos esse bonos politicos, qui sciunt inducere leges ad aliquod iudicium. 2173. Next [y, bb], at “Otherwise they,” he verifies his proposition by indications, first in regard to his statement that they do not know its characteristic nature. If they understood this they would not identify it with rhetoric; for rhetoric can give persuasive arguments in praise or censure of a person both in assemblies and in the courts—and this on a threefold basis: demonstrative, deliberative, and judicial. But according to them political science only teaches a man to form judgments. They think men are good statesmen who know how to make laws for forming a judgment. Secundum signum ponit quantum ad hoc quod dixerat, eos nescire circa qualia sit politica. Si enim hoc scirent, non existimarent, quod facile esset ponere leges, secundum legis positivam quae est principalis pars politicae, per hoc scilicet quod ad ponendum leges sufficit, quod aliquis congreget diversas leges approbatas, et eligat optimas earum, et illas instituat. 2174. He gives the second indication for his statement that they do not know the subject matter of political science. If they knew this they would not think it easy to frame laws-in accordance with legislation which is the principal part of political science—for they declare that it suffices for lawmaking to collect different approved statutes, choose the best, and institute them. In quo quidem quantum ad duo peccant. Uno modo quantum ad hoc quod ponunt, quod congregare leges et eligere optimas earum sit sufficiens ad hoc quod fiat legispositivus, cum per legispositivam aliquis non solum debeat iudicare de inventis legibus, sed etiam novas adinvenire ad similitudinem aliarum artium operativarum. Medicus enim non solum habet iudicium de remediis adinventis ad sanandum, sed etiam nova remedia adinvenire potest. Alio modo quem tangit primo praetermisso. Quia hoc non est facile, quod aliquis eligat optimas leges, sicut electione non pertinente ad solum intellectum, et iudicio recto existente quodam maximo, sicut patet etiam in musica. 2175. They err in two ways on this point. In one way by maintaining that to become a legislator it is enough to collect laws and choose the best among them. The reason is that for legislation a man must not only judge about the laws in use but also devise new laws, in imitation of the other practical arts; for a doctor not only judges about the known remedies for effecting a cure but can discover new ones. They err in another way—which he touches upon after disposing of the first error. It not easy for a man to choose the best laws because choice does not depend on the intellect alone, and right judgment is an important matter, as is evident in music. Illi enim qui sunt experti circa singula, habent rectum iudicium de operibus, et intelligunt per quas vias et qualiter huiusmodi opera perfici possunt, et qualia opera qualibus personis vel negotiis concordent. Sed rationabile est quod inexpertos lateat, utrum bene vel male fiat opus secundum quod inveniunt traditum in Scriptura. Latet enim eos applicatio eius quod in Scriptura inveniunt, ad opus. Leges autem instituendae assimilantur operibus politicis. Instituuntur enim quasi regulae politicorum operum. Unde illi, qui nesciunt qualia sunt opera convenientia, non possunt scire quales sunt leges convenientes. 2176. People who have experience with particulars make correct judgment about results and understand by what means and in what manner these results can be produced, and what kinds are suited to what persons or things. But the inexperienced are understandably ignorant whether a work is done well or badly on the basis of what they read in books, for they do not know how to put into practice what is in the books. Now laws to be framed are, as it were, the results of the art of politics; they are framed as rules for activities of the state. Consequently, men who do not know what kind of results are suitable do not know what kind of laws are suitable. Sic igitur ex legibus congregatis non potest aliquis fieri legispositivus vel iudicare quales leges sint optimae, nisi habeat experientiam. Sicut etiam non videtur homines posse fieri bene medicantes per sola scripta remedia; quamvis illi qui tradunt in scriptis illa remedia, conentur ponere non solum curas, sed etiam modos sanandi et qualiter oporteat distribuere remedia ad singulas habitudines hominum. Sed tamen omnia haec videntur esse utilia solis expertis. Illis autem qui nesciunt singularia, propter inexperientiam videntur esse inutilia. 2177. Therefore it is impossible from a collection of laws for a man to learn the science of lawmaking or to judge what kind of laws are best unless he has experience. Likewise it seems impossible for men to become good doctors only from remedies given in books, even though the authors of these remedies try to determine not only the cures but also the means of curing, how remedies must be prescribed according to the individual conditions of men. Nevertheless all these things seem useful only to people with experience and not to those who are ignorant of particulars because of inexperience. Tertio ibi: forte igitur etc., concludit ex praemissis exclusionem cuiusdam erroris quo aliquis posset opinari quod congregatio legum scriptarum esset omnino inutile. Et dicit, quod sicut dictum est se habere circa remedia medicinalia conscripta, ita etiam se habet in proposito; scilicet quod congregare leges et politias, idest ordinationes civitatum diversarum, utile est illis, qui propter consuetudinem possunt considerare et iudicare, quae opera vel leges bene vel male se habeant et qualia qualibus congruant. Sed illi qui non habent habitum per consuetudinem acquisitum, et volunt tales conscriptiones pertransire, non possunt de talibus bene iudicare nisi casualiter; fiunt tamen magis dispositi ad intelligendum talia, per hoc, quod transcurrunt leges et politias conscriptas. 2178. Last [y, cc], at “Perhaps then,” he infers from the foregoing remarks that we must reject the error that a collection of written laws is absolutely useless. He says-we have already indicated this-that the same applies to remedies in textbooks as to our problem; to collect laws and constitutions, i.e., ordinances of different states, is useful for those who can consider and judge from practice which works or laws may be good or bad, and what kinds are suitable in the circumstances. But those who have not the habit acquired by practice and want to review written documents of this kind cannot properly judge them except by chance. However, they do become more capable of understanding such things by the fact that they have actually read through the written laws and constitutions. Deinde cum dicit relinquentibus igitur etc., promittit se docturum qualiter aliquis fiat legispositivus. Et primo ostendit hoc sibi imminere. Et dicit, quod ex quo priores, idest sapientes, qui ante ipsum fuerunt, reliquerunt non bene perscrutatum illud, quod pertinet ad legis positionem: melius est quod nos ipsi intendamus ad tractandum de legis positione, et universaliter de tota politia, cuius pars est legis positiva, ut sic perficiamus philosophicam doctrinam ad potentiam, id est scientiam operativam, quae est circa humana, quam secundum hoc ultimo tradidisse videtur. 2179. At “Since our predecessors” [B, 2] he points out that he is about to discuss how a man may learn lawmaking. First [2, a] Aristotle shows that this is incumbent upon him. He says that previous persons, viz., philosophers who preceded him, left a poorly organized treatise on legislation. Hence it is well for us to attempt to treat legislation and, in general, the whole question of government, of which lawmaking is a part. In this way we can extend philosophic teaching to political science, the practical knowledge concerned with human affairs—a subject that seems to have been taught last according to this view. Secundo ibi: primum quidem igitur etc., ostendit quo ordine hoc executurus sit. Et dicit, quod primo tentabit pertranseunter tangere si quid in parte bene dictum est circa politicam a progenitoribus, idest a prioribus sapientibus. Quod faciet in secundo politicae. Deinde ex diversis politiis considerabit quales politiae salvant civitates, scilicet politiae rectae, quae sunt regnum, aristocratia et politia, et quales corrumpunt, scilicet perversae politiae, quae sunt tyrannis, oligarchia et democratia. Et iterum considerandum est qualia conservent vel corrumpunt singulas politias et propter quas causas quaedam civitates bene agunt civiliter, quaedam autem male. Et hoc determinabit a tertio libro politicae usque ad septimum: ubi post praedicta considerata incipit conspicere, qualis sit optima politia, et qualiter debeat esse ordinata, et quibus legibus et consuetudinibus utatur. Sed ante omnia haec ponit quaedam principia politicae in libro I, a quibus dicit se incepturum. Quod quidem est continuatio ad librum politicae et terminatio sententiae totius libri Ethicorum. 2180. Then [2, b], at “Therefore, first” he shows in what order he is going to carry this out. He says that he will first attempt in passing to touch upon what in part was well treated in political science by our predecessors, i.e., by earlier philosophers. This he will do in the second book of the Politics. After that he will consider which of the various forms of government preserve the states (the good forms are the kingdom, aristocracy, and the citizens’ government) and which forms corrupt the states (the bad forms are tyranny of one ruler, oligarchy, and democracy). Besides, we must consider what things preserve or corrupt particular forms of government, and the reasons why some states are governed well and others badly. This he will determine in the Politics from the third to the seventh book. Then after the previous discussions he begins to inquire what is the ideal state, how it ought to be organized, and what laws and customs it should follow. But before all these things he sets down in the first book certain principles from which he says we must begin. This will serve as a connecting link with the work on the Politics and as a conclusion to the whole work of the Ethics.