METAPHYSICS, BOOK XII

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 1: 1069a 18-1069a 30
[1069α] [18] περὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἡ θεωρία: τῶν γὰρ οὐσιῶν αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ τὰ αἴτια ζητοῦνται.	1023. The study here is concerned with substance; for it is the principles and causes of substances which are being investigated.
καὶ γὰρ εἰ ὡς ὅλον τι τὸ πᾶν, [20] ἡ οὐσία πρῶτον μέρος: καὶ εἰ τῷ ἐφεξῆς, κἂν οὕτως πρῶτον ἡ οὐσία, εἶτα τὸ ποιόν, εἶτα τὸ ποσόν.	1024. For if the totality of things is a kind of whole, substance is its first part; and if things constitute a whole by reason of succession, substance is also first, and then quality or quantity.
ἅμα δὲ οὐδ᾽ ὄντα ὡς εἰπεῖν ἁπλῶς ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ ποιότητες καὶ κινήσεις, ἢ καὶ τὸ οὐ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ οὐκ εὐθύ: λέγομεν γοῦν εἶναι καὶ ταῦτα, οἷον ἔστιν οὐ λευκόν.	1025. And in like manner the latter are not to be regarded as beings in an unqualified sense, but as qualities and motions of being. Otherwise the not-straight and not-white would be beings; for we say that they are, for example, “the not-white is.”
ἔτι οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων χωριστόν.	1026. Again, none of the other genera can exist separately.
[25] μαρτυροῦσι δὲ καὶ οἱ ἀρχαῖοι ἔργῳ: τῆς γὰρ οὐσίας ἐζήτουν ἀρχὰς καὶ στοιχεῖα καὶ αἴτια. οἱ μὲν οὖν νῦν τὰ καθόλου οὐσίας μᾶλλον τιθέασιν (τὰ γὰρ γένη καθόλου, ἅ φασιν ἀρχὰς καὶ οὐσίας εἶναι μᾶλλον διὰ τὸ λογικῶς ζητεῖν): οἱ δὲ πάλαι τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα, οἷον πῦρ καὶ γῆν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τὸ [30] κοινόν, σῶμα.	1027. The ancient philosophers testify to this in practice, for it was of substance that they sought the principles, elements and causes. Present-day thinkers [Platonists] however, maintain that universals are substances; for genera are universals, and they say that these are principles and substances to a greater degree because they investigate the matter dialectically. But the ancient philosophers regarded particular things as substances, for example, fire and earth, and not a common body.

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapters 1 & 2: 1069a 30-1069b 32
οὐσίαι δὲ τρεῖς, μία μὲν αἰσθητή—ἧς ἡ μὲν ἀΐδιος ἡ δὲ φθαρτή, ἣν πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν, οἷον τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ ζῷα [ἡ δ᾽ ἀΐδιος]—ἧς ἀνάγκη τὰ στοιχεῖα λαβεῖν, εἴτε ἓν εἴτε πολλά: ἄλλη δὲ ἀκίνητος, καὶ ταύτην φασί τινες εἶναι χωριστήν, οἱ μὲν εἰς δύο διαιροῦντες, [35] οἱ δὲ εἰς μίαν φύσιν τιθέντες τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ μαθηματικά, οἱ δὲ τὰ μαθηματικὰ μόνον τούτων. ἐκεῖναι μὲν δὴ φυσικῆς (μετὰ κινήσεως γάρ), [1069β] [1] αὕτη δὲ ἑτέρας, εἰ μηδεμία αὐτοῖς ἀρχὴ κοινή.	1028. Now there are three classes of substances. One is sensible, and of this class one kind is eternal and another perishable. The latter, such as plants and animals, all men recognize. But it is the eternal whose elements we must grasp, whether they are one or many. Another class is the immovable, which certain thinkers claim to have separate existence, some dividing it into two kinds, others maintaining that the separate Forms and the objects of mathematics are of one nature, and still others a holding that only the objects of mathematics belong to this class. The first two classes of substance belong to the philosophy of nature since they involve motion; but the last belongs to a different science if there is no principle common to these three.
Chapter 2
ἡ δ᾽ αἰσθητὴ οὐσία μεταβλητή. εἰ δ᾽ ἡ μεταβολὴ ἐκ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἢ τῶν μεταξύ, ἀντικειμένων δὲ μὴ [5] πάντων (οὐ λευκὸν γὰρ ἡ φωνή) ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου, ἀνάγκη ὑπεῖναί τι τὸ μεταβάλλον εἰς τὴν ἐναντίωσιν: οὐ γὰρ τὰ ἐναντία μεταβάλλει. ἔτι τὸ μὲν ὑπομένει, τὸ δ᾽ ἐναντίον οὐχ ὑπομένει: ἔστιν ἄρα τι τρίτον παρὰ τὰ ἐναντία, ἡ ὕλη.	1029. Sensible substance is capable of being changed. And if change proceeds from opposites or from intermediates, yet not from all opposites (for the spoken word is not white) but only from a contrary, then there must be some underlying subject which can be changed from one contrary to another; for contraries themselves are not changed (730). Further, this subject remains, whereas a contrary does not remain. Therefore there is some third thing besides the contraries, and this is matter.
εἰ δὴ αἱ μεταβολαὶ τέτταρες, ἢ κατὰ τὸ τί [10] ἢ κατὰ τὸ ποῖον ἢ πόσον ἢ ποῦ, καὶ γένεσις μὲν ἡ ἁπλῆ καὶ φθορὰ ἡ κατὰ <�τὸ> τόδε, αὔξησις δὲ καὶ φθίσις ἡ κατὰ τὸ ποσόν, ἀλλοίωσις δὲ ἡ κατὰ τὸ πάθος, φορὰ δὲ ἡ κατὰ τόπον, εἰς ἐναντιώσεις ἂν εἶεν τὰς καθ᾽ ἕκαστον αἱ μεταβολαί. ἀνάγκη δὴ μεταβάλλειν τὴν ὕλην δυναμένην [15] ἄμφω:	1030. If, then, there are four kinds of change: either in substance or in quality or in quantity or in place, and if change in substance is generation and destruction without qualification, and change in quantity is increase and decrease, and change in attribute is alteration, and change in place is local motion, then the changes occurring in each case must be changes to contrary states. Therefore it must be the matter which is capable of being changed to both states.
ἐπεὶ δὲ διττὸν τὸ ὄν, μεταβάλλει πᾶν ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος εἰς τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὄν (οἷον ἐκ λευκοῦ δυνάμει εἰς τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ λευκόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπ᾽ αὐξήσεως καὶ φθίσεως), ὥστε οὐ μόνον κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐνδέχεται γίγνεσθαι ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ ὄντος γίγνεται πάντα, δυνάμει [20] μέντοι ὄντος, ἐκ μὴ ὄντος δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ.	1031. And since being is twofold, every change is from potential being to actual being, for example, from potentially white to actually white. The same is true of increase and decrease. Hence not only can a thing come to be accidentally from nonbeing, but all things come to be from being, i.e., from potential being, not from actual being.
καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἔστι τὸ Ἀναξαγόρου ἕν: βέλτιον γὰρ ἢ "ὁμοῦ πάντα"—καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέους τὸ μῖγμα καὶ Ἀναξιμάνδρου, καὶ ὡς Δημόκριτός φησιν—"ἦν ὁμοῦ πάντα δυνάμει, ἐνεργείᾳ δ᾽ οὔ": ὥστε τῆς ὕλης ἂν εἶεν ἡμμένοι:	1032. And this is the “One” of Anaxagoras; for it is better to maintain this view than to claim that “all things were together.” And this is the “Mixture” of Empedocles and Anaximander, and it recalls the statement of Democritus that all things were together potentially but not at all actually. Hence all these thinkers were touching upon matter.
πάντα δ᾽ ὕλην ἔχει ὅσα μεταβάλλει, [25] ἀλλ᾽ ἑτέραν: καὶ τῶν ἀϊδίων ὅσα μὴ γενητὰ κινητὰ δὲ φορᾷ, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ γενητὴν ἀλλὰ ποθὲν ποί.	1033. Now all things which undergo change have matter, but different things have different matters; and of eternal things, those which are incapable of being generated but can be moved by local motion have matter. Yet they do not have that kind of matter which is subject to generation, but only such as is subject to motion from one place to another (697).
ἀπορήσειε δ᾽ ἄν τις ἐκ ποίου μὴ ὄντος ἡ γένεσις: τριχῶς γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὄν. εἰ δή τι ἔστι δυνάμει, ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως οὐ τοῦ τυχόντος ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερον ἐξ ἑτέρου: οὐδ᾽ ἱκανὸν ὅτι ὁμοῦ πάντα [30] χρήματα: διαφέρει γὰρ τῇ ὕλῃ, ἐπεὶ διὰ τί ἄπειρα ἐγένετο ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ἕν; ὁ γὰρ νοῦς εἷς, ὥστ᾽ εἰ καὶ ἡ ὕλη μία, ἐκεῖνο ἐγένετο ἐνεργείᾳ οὗ ἡ ὕλη ἦν δυνάμει.	1034. And one might raise the question from what kind of non-being generation could come about; for non-being is spoken of in three senses. If, then, one kind of non-being is potentiality, still it is not from anything at all that a thing comes to be, but different things come from different things. Nor is it enough to say that “all things were together,” since they differ in their matter, for otherwise why would an infinite number of things be generated and not just one thing? For mind is one, so that if matter were also one, only that could come to be actually whose matter was in potentiality.

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapters 2 & 3: 1069b 32-1070a 30
τρία δὴ τὰ αἴτια καὶ τρεῖς αἱ ἀρχαί, δύο μὲν ἡ ἐναντίωσις, ἧς τὸ μὲν λόγος καὶ εἶδος τὸ δὲ στέρησις, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἡ ὕλη. [35]	1035. The causes or principles of things, then, are three. Two of these are the pair of contraries, of which one is the formal determinant or specifying principle, and the other the privation, and the third, matter.
Chapter 3
μετὰ ταῦτα ὅτι οὐ γίγνεται οὔτε ἡ ὕλη οὔτε τὸ εἶδος, λέγω δὲ τὰ ἔσχατα. πᾶν γὰρ μεταβάλλει τὶ καὶ ὑπό τινος καὶ εἴς τι: [1070α] [1] ὑφ᾽ οὗ μέν, τοῦ πρώτου κινοῦντος: ὃ δέ, ἡ ὕλη: εἰς ὃ δέ, τὸ εἶδος. εἰς ἄπειρον οὖν εἶσιν, εἰ μὴ μόνον ὁ χαλκὸς γίγνεται στρογγύλος ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ στρογγύλον ἢ ὁ χαλκός: ἀνάγκη δὴ στῆναι.	1036. It should be noted next that neither matter nor form comes to be, and I mean the last matter and form. For everything which changes something else changes it from something to something. That by which it is changed is the first [i.e., immediate] mover; that which is changed is the matter; and that to which it is changed is the form. Hence there will be an infinite regress if not only the bronze becomes round but also roundness itself or bronze comes to be. Therefore there must be some stopping point.
μετὰ ταῦτα ὅτι ἑκάστη [5] ἐκ συνωνύμου γίγνεται οὐσία (τὰ γὰρ φύσει οὐσίαι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα). ἢ γὰρ τέχνῃ ἢ φύσει γίγνεται ἢ τύχῃ ἢ τῷ αὐτομάτῳ. ἡ μὲν οὖν τέχνη ἀρχὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ, ἡ δὲ φύσις ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ (ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ), αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ αἰτίαι στερήσεις τούτων.	1037. Again, it should be noted that every substance comes to be from something having the same name; for both things which are by nature as well as other things are substances. For things come to be either by art or by nature or by luck or spontaneously. Art is a principle in another, but nature is a principle in the subject itself; for man begets man. The remaining causes are the privations of these.
οὐσίαι δὲ τρεῖς, ἡ μὲν ὕλη [10] τόδε τι οὖσα τῷ φαίνεσθαι (ὅσα γὰρ ἁφῇ καὶ μὴ συμφύσει, ὕλη καὶ ὑποκείμενον), ἡ δὲ φύσις τόδε τι καὶ ἕξις τις εἰς ἥν: ἔτι τρίτη ἡ ἐκ τούτων ἡ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα, οἷον Σωκράτης ἢ Καλλίας.	1038. There are three kinds of substance. First, there is matter, which is a particular thing in appearance; for whatever things are one by contact and not by natural union are matter and subject. Second, there is the nature [i.e., the form], which is a determinate thing inasmuch as it is a kind of positive state; and third, there is the singular thing which is composed of these, such as Socrates or Callias.
ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τινῶν τὸ τόδε τι οὐκ ἔστι παρὰ τὴν συνθετὴν οὐσίαν, οἷον οἰκίας τὸ εἶδος, εἰ [15] μὴ ἡ τέχνη (οὐδ᾽ ἔστι γένεσις καὶ φθορὰ τούτων, ἀλλ᾽ ἄλλον τρόπον εἰσὶ καὶ οὐκ εἰσὶν οἰκία τε ἡ ἄνευ ὕλης καὶ ὑγίεια καὶ πᾶν τὸ κατὰ τέχνην), ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ, ἐπὶ τῶν φύσει: διὸ δὴ οὐ κακῶς Πλάτων ἔφη ὅτι εἴδη ἔστιν ὁπόσα φύσει, εἴπερ ἔστιν εἴδη ἄλλα τούτων <�οἷον πῦρ σὰρξ κεφαλή: [20] ἅπαντα γὰρ ὕλη ἐστί, καὶ τῆς μάλιστ᾽ οὐσίας ἡ τελευταία>.	1039. Now in some cases the “this” [i.e., the form] does not exist apart from the composite substance; for example, the form of a house, unless it is the art. Nor is there generation and destruction of these forms, but it is in a different sense that house apart from matter, and health, and everything which comes to be by art, do and do not exist. But if the “this” does exist apart from matter, it is only in the case of those things which are by nature. Hence Plato was not wrong in saying that the Forms are things which exist by nature, i.e., if there are separate Forms different from these other things, such as fire, flesh and head. For all of these are matter, and they are the ultimate matter of substance in the fullest sense.
τὰ μὲν οὖν κινοῦντα αἴτια ὡς προγεγενημένα ὄντα, τὰ δ᾽ ὡς ὁ λόγος ἅμα. ὅτε γὰρ ὑγιαίνει ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τότε καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια ἔστιν, καὶ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς χαλκῆς σφαίρας ἅμα καὶ ἡ χαλκῆ σφαῖρα (εἰ δὲ καὶ ὕστερόν τι ὑπομένει, σκεπτέον: [25] ἐπ᾽ ἐνίων γὰρ οὐδὲν κωλύει, οἷον εἰ ἡ ψυχὴ τοιοῦτον, μὴ πᾶσα ἀλλ᾽ ὁ νοῦς: πᾶσαν γὰρ ἀδύνατον ἴσως).	1040. Hence efficient causes are causes as things which are prior to their effects; but those things which are causes in the sense of the formal determinant are simultaneous with their effects. For it is when a man becomes healthy that health also exists; and the shape of the bronze sphere comes to be at the same time as the bronze sphere. But whether any form continues to exist afterwards is a question that requires investigation. For nothing prevents this from being so in certain cases, for example, if the soul is of this sort, not every soul but the intellectual; for perhaps it is impossible that every soul should continue to exist.
φανερὸν δὴ ὅτι οὐδὲν δεῖ διά γε ταῦτ᾽ εἶναι τὰς ἰδέας: ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ, ὁ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον τὸν τινά: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν: ἡ γὰρ ἰατρικὴ τέχνη ὁ λόγος τῆς ὑγιείας [30] ἐστίν.	1041. It is evident, then, that it is not necessary on these grounds that the Ideas should exist; for man begets man, and the singular man begets a singular man. The same thing also holds true in the case of the arts; for the art of medicine is the formal determinant of health.

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapters 4 & 5: 1070a 31-1071b 2
τὰ δ᾽ αἴτια καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἄλλα ἄλλων ἔστιν ὥς, ἔστι δ᾽ ὡς, ἂν καθόλου λέγῃ τις καὶ κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν, ταὐτὰ πάντων.	1042. In one sense the causes and principles of different things are different; but in another sense they are not, for, if one speaks universally and proportionally, they are the same for all.
ἀπορήσειε γὰρ ἄν τις πότερον ἕτεραι ἢ αἱ αὐταὶ ἀρχαὶ καὶ στοιχεῖα τῶν οὐσιῶν καὶ τῶν πρός τι, καὶ καθ᾽ [35] ἑκάστην δὴ τῶν κατηγοριῶν ὁμοίως. ἀλλ᾽ ἄτοπον εἰ ταὐτὰ πάντων: ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ ἔσται τὰ πρός τι καὶ αἱ οὐσίαι.	1043. And one might raise the question whether the principles and elements of substances and of relations are the same or different; and the same question may be asked of each of the other categories.
[1070β] [1] τί οὖν τοῦτ᾽ ἔσται; παρὰ γὰρ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τἆλλα τὰ κατηγορούμενα οὐδέν ἐστι κοινόν, πρότερον δὲ τὸ στοιχεῖον ἢ ὧν στοιχεῖον: ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ᾽ ἡ οὐσία στοιχεῖον τῶν πρός τι, οὐδὲ τούτων οὐδὲν τῆς οὐσίας.	1044. But it would be absurd if the principles and elements of all things were the same; for then substance and relations would be derived from the same principles. How then will this be [common]? For there is nothing common existing apart from substance and the other categories; and an element is prior to the things of which it is the element. But substance is not an element of relations, nor is any of these an element of substance.
ἔτι πῶς ἐνδέχεται πάντων [5] εἶναι ταὐτὰ στοιχεῖα; οὐδὲν γὰρ οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι τῶν στοιχείων τῷ ἐκ στοιχείων συγκειμένῳ τὸ αὐτό, οἷον τῷ ΒΑ τὸ Β ἢ Α (οὐδὲ δὴ τῶν νοητῶν στοιχεῖόν ἐστιν, οἷον τὸ ὂν ἢ τὸ ἕν: ὑπάρχει γὰρ ταῦτα ἑκάστῳ καὶ τῶν συνθέτων). οὐδὲν ἄρ᾽ ἔσται αὐτῶν οὔτ᾽ οὐσία οὔτε πρός τι: ἀλλ᾽ ἀναγκαῖον. οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα [10] πάντων ταὐτὰ στοιχεῖα.	1045. Further, how is it possible for the elements of all things to be the same? For none of the elements can be the same as a composite of elements; for example, neither b nor a is the same as ba; nor can any of the intelligibles, such as being and unity, be an element; for these belong to each composite thing. Hence none of them can be either a substance or a relation. But it must be one or the other. Therefore the elements of all things are not the same.
ἢ ὥσπερ λέγομεν, ἔστι μὲν ὥς, ἔστι δ᾽ ὡς οὔ, οἷον ἴσως τῶν αἰσθητῶν σωμάτων ὡς μὲν εἶδος τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ἄλλον τρόπον τὸ ψυχρὸν ἡ στέρησις, ὕλη δὲ τὸ δυνάμει ταῦτα πρῶτον καθ᾽ αὑτό, οὐσίαι δὲ ταῦτά τε καὶ τὰ ἐκ τούτων, ὧν ἀρχαὶ ταῦτα, ἢ εἴ τι ἐκ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ [15] γίγνεται ἕν, οἷον σὰρξ ἢ ὀστοῦν: ἕτερον γὰρ ἀνάγκη ἐκείνων εἶναι τὸ γενόμενον. τούτων μὲν οὖν ταὐτὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ ἀρχαί (ἄλλων δ᾽ ἄλλα), πάντων δὲ οὕτω μὲν εἰπεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν, τῷ ἀνάλογον δέ, ὥσπερ εἴ τις εἴποι ὅτι ἀρχαὶ εἰσὶ τρεῖς, τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἡ στέρησις καὶ ἡ ὕλη. ἀλλ᾽ ἕκαστον τούτων ἕτερον περὶ [20] ἕκαστον γένος ἐστίν, οἷον ἐν χρώματι λευκὸν μέλαν ἐπιφάνεια: φῶς σκότος ἀήρ, ἐκ δὲ τούτων ἡμέρα καὶ νύξ.	1046. Or, as we say, there is a sense in which they are the same and a sense in which they are not; for example, perhaps the elements of sensible bodies are the hot as form, the cold as privation, and that which primarily and of its own nature is potentially both of these as matter. And not only these are substances, but so also are the things of which they are the principles. And so also is any unity which comes to be from the hot and the cold, as flesh and bone; for the thing produced from these must differ from them. The elements and principles of these things, then, are the same, although the elements of different things are different. However, it cannot be said that the elements of all things are the same in this sense, but only proportionally, just as if one were to say that there are three principles, form, privation and matter. But each of these is different in each class of things; for example, in the case of colors there is white, black and surface; and there is darkness, light and air, from which day and night are derived.
ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐ μόνον τὰ ἐνυπάρχοντα αἴτια, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς οἷον τὸ κινοῦν, δῆλον ὅτι ἕτερον ἀρχὴ καὶ στοιχεῖον, [24] αἴτια δ᾽ ἄμφω, καὶ εἰς ταῦτα διαιρεῖται ἡ ἀρχή, τὸ δ᾽ [25] ὡς κινοῦν ἢ ἱστὰν ἀρχή τις καὶ οὐσία, ὥστε στοιχεῖα μὲν κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν τρία, αἰτίαι δὲ καὶ ἀρχαὶ τέτταρες: ἄλλο δ᾽ ἐν ἄλλῳ, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον ὡς κινοῦν ἄλλο ἄλλῳ. ὑγίεια, νόσος, σῶμα: τὸ κινοῦν ἰατρική. εἶδος, ἀταξία τοιαδί, πλίνθοι: τὸ κινοῦν οἰκοδομική [καὶ εἰς ταῦτα διαιρεῖται [30] ἡ ἀρχή].	1047. And since not only the things which are intrinsic to a being are its causes, but also certain external things, as the moving cause, it is evident that principle and element differ, although both are causes. And principle is divided into these two kinds; and whatever causes motion or makes it cease is a kind of principle. Hence analogically there are three elements and four causes or principles; but they differ in different things, and the first cause of motion is different in different things: for example, health, sickness and body, and the moving cause is the art of medicine. form, a certain kind of disorder, and bricks, and the moving cause is the art of building. Principle is also divided into these.
ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ κινοῦν ἐν μὲν τοῖς φυσικοῖς ἀνθρώπῳ ἄνθρωπος, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀπὸ διανοίας τὸ εἶδος ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον, τρόπον τινὰ τρία αἴτια ἂν εἴη, ὡδὶ δὲ τέτταρα. ὑγίεια γάρ πως ἡ ἰατρική, καὶ οἰκίας εἶδος ἡ οἰκοδομική, καὶ ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ:	1048. And since in the case of physical things the moving cause of man is man, while in the case of objects of thought the moving cause is the form or its contrary, in one sense there will be three causes and in another sense four. For in a sense the art of medicine is health, and the art of building is the form of a house, and man begets man.
ἔτι παρὰ ταῦτα τὸ ὡς [35] πρῶτον πάντων κινοῦν πάντα.	1049. And besides these there is that which as the first of all things imparts motion to all things.
Chapter 5
ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν χωριστὰ τὰ δ᾽ οὐ χωριστά, οὐσίαι ἐκεῖνα. [1071α] [1] καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάντων αἴτια ταὐτά, ὅτι τῶν οὐσιῶν ἄνευ οὐκ ἔστι τὰ πάθη καὶ αἱ κινήσεις.	1050. Since some things are separable and some are not, it is the former which are substances. And for this reason these (substances) are the causes of all things, because without substances there can be no affections and motions.
ἔπειτα ἔσται ταῦτα ψυχὴ ἴσως καὶ σῶμα, ἢ νοῦς καὶ ὄρεξις καὶ σῶμα.	1051. Next, all of these causes are perhaps soul and body, or intellect, appetite and body.
ἔτι δ᾽ ἄλλον τρόπον τῷ ἀνάλογον ἀρχαὶ αἱ αὐταί, οἷον ἐνέργεια [5] καὶ δύναμις: ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῦτα ἄλλα τε ἄλλοις καὶ ἄλλως. ἐν ἐνίοις μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ὁτὲ μὲν ἐνεργείᾳ ἔστιν ὁτὲ δὲ δυνάμει, οἷον οἶνος ἢ σὰρξ ἢ ἄνθρωπος (πίπτει δὲ καὶ ταῦτα εἰς τὰ εἰρημένα αἴτια: ἐνεργείᾳ μὲν γὰρ τὸ εἶδος, ἐὰν ᾖ χωριστόν, καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν στέρησις δέ, οἷον [10] σκότος ἢ κάμνον, δυνάμει δὲ ἡ ὕλη: τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ δυνάμενον γίγνεσθαι ἄμφω): ἄλλως δ᾽ ἐνεργείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει διαφέρει ὧν μὴ ἔστιν ἡ αὐτὴ ὕλη, ὧν <�ἐνίων> οὐκ ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερον, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπου αἴτιον τά τε στοιχεῖα, πῦρ καὶ γῆ ὡς ὕλη καὶ τὸ ἴδιον εἶδος, καὶ ἔτι τι [15] ἄλλο ἔξω οἷον ὁ πατήρ, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα ὁ ἥλιος καὶ ὁ λοξὸς κύκλος, οὔτε ὕλη ὄντα οὔτ᾽ εἶδος οὔτε στέρησις οὔτε ὁμοειδὲς ἀλλὰ κινοῦντα.	11052. Again, there is another sense in which the principles of things are proportionally the same, i.e., as actuality and potentiality; but these are different for different things and apply to them in different ways. For in some cases the same thing is at one time actual and at another time potential, as wine, flesh or man. Now these principles fall into the classes of causes mentioned; for a form is an actuality if it can exist apart, and so also is the thing composed of matter and form, and so also is a privation, such as darkness and suffering; but matter is in potentiality, for it is what is capable of becoming both. But it is in another way that the distinction of actuality and potentiality applies to those things of which the matter is not the same, and the form is not the same but different. For example, the cause of man is his elements—fire and earth as matter, and his proper form—and if there is anything external, such as his father; and besides these there is the sun and the oblique circle, which are neither matter nor species nor privation nor form, but are moving causes.
ἔτι δὲ ὁρᾶν δεῖ ὅτι τὰ μὲν καθόλου ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, τὰ δ᾽ οὔ. πάντων δὴ πρῶται ἀρχαὶ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ πρῶτον τοδὶ καὶ ἄλλο ὃ δυνάμει. ἐκεῖνα μὲν [20] οὖν τὰ καθόλου οὐκ ἔστιν: ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστον: ἄνθρωπος μὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώπου καθόλου, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδείς, ἀλλὰ Πηλεὺς Ἀχιλλέως σοῦ δὲ ὁ πατήρ, καὶ τοδὶ τὸ Β τουδὶ τοῦ ΒΑ, ὅλως δὲ τὸ Β τοῦ ἁπλῶς ΒΑ. ἔπειτα, εἰ δὴ τὰ τῶν οὐσιῶν, ἄλλα δὲ ἄλλων [25] αἴτια καὶ στοιχεῖα, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη, τῶν μὴ ἐν ταὐτῷ γένει, χρωμάτων ψόφων οὐσιῶν ποσότητος, πλὴν τῷ ἀνάλογον: καὶ τῶν ἐν ταὐτῷ εἴδει ἕτερα, οὐκ εἴδει ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἄλλο, ἥ τε σὴ ὕλη καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ κινῆσαν καὶ ἡ ἐμή, τῷ καθόλου δὲ λόγῳ ταὐτά.	1053. Further, we must note that some of these causes can be expressed universally and some. not. The first principles of all things are those first “this, one actually, one potentially. Therefore these principles are not universals, for the principle of a singular thing is a singular thing. For while man taken universally is a principle of man, there is no universal man, but Peleus is the cause of Achilles, and your father is the cause of you; and b and a taken either absolutely or particularly are the causes of the syllable ba. Further, there are different causes and elements of different things, as has been stated (1046), and the causes of things which do not belong to the same genus, as colors, sounds, substances and quantity, are different, except in a proportional way. And the causes of things which belong to the same species are different, not specifically, but in the sense that the causes of singular things are different; that is, your matter and form and moving cause are different from mine, although they are the same in their universal intelligibility.
τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν [30] τίνες ἀρχαὶ ἢ στοιχεῖα τῶν οὐσιῶν καὶ πρός τι καὶ ποιῶν, πότερον αἱ αὐταὶ ἢ ἕτεραι, δῆλον ὅτι πολλαχῶς γε λεγομένων ἔστιν ἑκάστου, διαιρεθέντων δὲ οὐ ταὐτὰ ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερα, πλὴν ὡδὶ καὶ πάντων, ὡδὶ μὲν ταὐτὰ ἢ τὸ ἀνάλογον, ὅτι ὕλη, εἶδος, στέρησις, τὸ κινοῦν, καὶ ὡδὶ τὰ τῶν οὐσιῶν [35] αἴτια ὡς αἴτια πάντων, ὅτι ἀναιρεῖται ἀναιρουμένων: ἔτι τὸ πρῶτον ἐντελεχείᾳ: ὡδὶ δὲ ἕτερα πρῶτα ὅσα τὰ ἐναντία ἃ μήτε ὡς γένη λέγεται μήτε πολλαχῶς λέγεται: καὶ ἔτι αἱ ὗλαι. [1071β] [1] τίνες μὲν οὖν αἱ ἀρχαὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν καὶ πόσαι, καὶ πῶς αἱ αὐταὶ καὶ πῶς ἕτεραι, εἴρηται.	1054. And to ask whether the principles and elements of substances and of relations and of qualities are the same or different, is clearly to raise questions about terms that are used in many senses. But the principles of different things are not the same but different, except that in a sense they are the same for all. They are the same for all proportionally because each thing has matter, form, privation and a moving cause. And the causes of substances may be regarded as the causes of all things because when they are destroyed all things are destroyed, And again that which is first in complete reality is the cause of all things. However, in a sense the primary [i.e., proximate] causes of things are different, i.e., all the contraries which are not predicated either as genera or as terms having many meanings. And again the matter of different things is different. We have stated what the principles of sensible things are, then, and how many there are, and how they are the same and how different.

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 6: 1071b 3-1071b 22
ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἦσαν τρεῖς οὐσίαι, δύο μὲν αἱ φυσικαὶ μία δ᾽ ἡ ἀκίνητος, περὶ ταύτης λεκτέον ὅτι ἀνάγκη εἶναι ἀΐδιόν [5] τινα οὐσίαν ἀκίνητον. αἵ τε γὰρ οὐσίαι πρῶται τῶν ὄντων, καὶ εἰ πᾶσαι φθαρταί, πάντα φθαρτά: ἀλλ᾽ ἀδύνατον κίνησιν ἢ γενέσθαι ἢ φθαρῆναι (ἀεὶ γὰρ ἦν), οὐδὲ χρόνον. οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον εἶναι μὴ ὄντος χρόνου: καὶ ἡ κίνησις ἄρα οὕτω συνεχὴς ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ χρόνος: [10] ἢ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ κινήσεώς τι πάθος. κίνησις δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστι συνεχὴς ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἡ κατὰ τόπον, καὶ ταύτης ἡ κύκλῳ.	1055. Since there are three classes of substance (1028), two of which are physical and one immovable, concerning the latter it is necessary to affirm that an eternal immovable substance must exist. For substances are the primary kind of beings, and if all of them are perishable, all things are perishable. But it is impossible either that motion should have come to be or that it should perish, for it always existed; and the same is true of time, for there cannot be a before and an after if there is no time. Motion is continuous, then, in the sense that time is; for time is either the same as motion or a property of it. Now the only continuous motion is that which pertains to place, and of this only that which is circular.
ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ ἔστι κινητικὸν ἢ ποιητικόν, μὴ ἐνεργοῦν δέ τι, οὐκ ἔσται κίνησις: ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸ δύναμιν ἔχον μὴ ἐνεργεῖν. οὐθὲν ἄρα ὄφελος οὐδ᾽ ἐὰν οὐσίας ποιήσωμεν ἀϊδίους, [15] ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ εἴδη, εἰ μή τις δυναμένη ἐνέσται ἀρχὴ μεταβάλλειν: οὐ τοίνυν οὐδ᾽ αὕτη ἱκανή, οὐδ᾽ ἄλλη οὐσία παρὰ τὰ εἴδη: εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐνεργήσει, οὐκ ἔσται κίνησις.	1056. But even if there is something which is capable of imparting or producing motion, but is not actually doing so, motion will still not exist; for that which has a potentiality may possibly not exercise it. Hence nothing is to be gained if we invent certain eternal substances, as do those who posit the separate Forms, unless there is some principle among them which is capable of causing change (83). This is not sufficient, then, nor is another substance besides the separate Forms sufficient; for if it does not act, there will be no eternal motion.
ἔτι οὐδ᾽ εἰ ἐνεργήσει, ἡ δ᾽ οὐσία αὐτῆς δύναμις: οὐ γὰρ ἔσται κίνησις ἀΐδιος: ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸ δυνάμει ὂν μὴ εἶναι. δεῖ [20] ἄρα εἶναι ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην ἧς ἡ οὐσία ἐνέργεια.	1057. And even if it does act this will still not be sufficient, if its essence is a potentiality; for there will be no eternal motion, since what is potential may possibly not be. Hence there must be a principle of the kind whose substance is an actuality.
ἔτι τοίνυν ταύτας δεῖ τὰς οὐσίας εἶναι ἄνευ ὕλης: ἀϊδίους γὰρ δεῖ, εἴπερ γε καὶ ἄλλο τι ἀΐδιον.	1058. Further, such substances must also be immaterial; for they must be eternal if anything else is. Hence they are actualities.

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapters 6 & 7: 1071b 22-1072a 26
ἐνέργεια ἄρα. καίτοι ἀπορία: δοκεῖ γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἐνεργοῦν πᾶν δύνασθαι τὸ δὲ δυνάμενον οὐ πᾶν ἐνεργεῖν, ὥστε πρότερον εἶναι τὴν δύναμιν.	1059. There is a difficulty, however; for it seems that, while everything which is acting is able to act, not everything which is able to act is acting; so potentiality is prior.
[25] ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τοῦτο, οὐθὲν ἔσται τῶν ὄντων: ἐνδέχεται γὰρ δύνασθαι μὲν εἶναι μήπω δ᾽ εἶναι. καίτοι εἰ ὡς λέγουσιν οἱ θεολόγοι οἱ ἐκ νυκτὸς γεννῶντες, ἢ ὡς οἱ φυσικοὶ ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματά φασι, τὸ αὐτὸ ἀδύνατον. πῶς γὰρ κινηθήσεται, εἰ μὴ ἔσται ἐνεργείᾳ τι αἴτιον; οὐ γὰρ ἥ γε [30] ὕλη κινήσει αὐτὴ ἑαυτήν, ἀλλὰ τεκτονική, οὐδὲ τὰ ἐπιμήνια οὐδ᾽ ἡ γῆ, ἀλλὰ τὰ σπέρματα καὶ ἡ γονή.	1060. But if this is so, no beings will exist; for everything may be capable of being, but still not be. And if we take what the theologians say, who generate everything from Night, or what the— philosophers of nature say, who affirm that “all things were together,” they express the same impossible view. For how will things be moved, if there is no actual cause? Matter will not move itself, but technical knowledge will move it; nor will menstrual blood or earth move themselves, but semen or seed will move them.
διὸ ἔνιοι ποιοῦσιν ἀεὶ ἐνέργειαν, οἷον Λεύκιππος καὶ Πλάτων: ἀεὶ γὰρ εἶναί φασι κίνησιν. ἀλλὰ διὰ τί καὶ τίνα οὐ λέγουσιν, οὐδ᾽, <�εἰ> ὡδὶ <�ἢ> ὡδί, τὴν αἰτίαν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ὡς [35] ἔτυχε κινεῖται, ἀλλὰ δεῖ τι ἀεὶ ὑπάρχειν, ἕσπερ νῦν φύσει μὲν ὡδί, βίᾳ δὲ ἢ ὑπὸ νοῦ ἢ ἄλλου ὡδί. (εἶτα ποία πρώτη; διαφέρει γὰρ ἀμήχανον ὅσον). ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ Πλάτωνί γε οἷόν τε λέγειν ἣν οἴεται ἐνίοτε ἀρχὴν εἶναι, [1072α] [1] τὸ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινοῦν: ὕστερον γὰρ καὶ ἅμα τῷ οὐρανῷ ἡ ψυχή, ὡς φησίν.	1061. This is the reason why some men, such as Leucippus and Plato, posit something which is always actual; for they say that motion always exists. But they do not say why it exists, or what it is, or how this is so, or what its cause is. For nothing is moved by chance, but there must always be something existing which moves it. Now things are moved in one way by nature, and in another by force or by mind or by some other agent. What kind of motion, then, is prior? For this makes the greatest difference. Plato cannot explain what it is that he sometimes thinks is the source of motion, i.e., what moves itself; for according to him the soul is later than motion and simultaneous with the heavens.
τὸ μὲν δὴ δύναμιν οἴεσθαι ἐνεργείας πρότερον ἔστι μὲν ὡς καλῶς ἔστι δ᾽ ὡς οὔ (εἴρηται δὲ πῶς):	1062. Now to think that potentiality is prior to actuality is in one sense right and in another not; and we have explained how this is so (1059).
ὅτι δ᾽ [5] ἐνέργεια πρότερον, μαρτυρεῖ Ἀναξαγόρας (ὁ γὰρ νοῦς ἐνέργεια) καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς φιλίαν καὶ τὸ νεῖκος, καὶ οἱ ἀεὶ λέγοντες κίνησιν εἶναι, ὥσπερ Λεύκιππος:	1063. That actuality is prior is affirmed by Anaxagoras (for mind is an actuality), and by Empedocles in his theory of love and strife (50), and by those who say that motion always existed, as Plato and Leucippus.
ὥστ᾽ οὐκ ἦν ἄπειρον χρόνον χάος ἢ νύξ, ἀλλὰ ταὐτὰ ἀεὶ ἢ περιόδῳ ἢ ἄλλως, εἴπερ πρότερον ἐνέργεια δυνάμεως.	1064. Hence Chaos or Night did not exist for an infinite time, but the same things have always existed, either in a cycle or in some other way, granted that actuality is prior to potentiality.
εἰ δὴ τὸ αὐτὸ [10] ἀεὶ περιόδῳ, δεῖ τι ἀεὶ μένειν ὡσαύτως ἐνεργοῦν. εἰ δὲ μέλλει γένεσις καὶ φθορὰ εἶναι, ἄλλο δεῖ εἶναι ἀεὶ ἐνεργοῦν ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως. ἀνάγκη ἄρα ὡδὶ μὲν καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ἐνεργεῖν ὡδὶ δὲ κατ᾽ ἄλλο: ἤτοι ἄρα καθ᾽ ἕτερον ἢ κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον. ἀνάγκη δὴ κατὰ τοῦτο: πάλιν γὰρ ἐκεῖνο [15] αὐτῷ τε αἴτιον κἀκείνῳ. οὐκοῦν βέλτιον τὸ πρῶτον: καὶ γὰρ αἴτιον ἦν ἐκεῖνο τοῦ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως: τοῦ δ᾽ ἄλλως ἕτερον, τοῦ δ᾽ ἀεὶ ἄλλως ἄμφω δηλονότι. οὐκοῦν οὕτως καὶ ἔχουσιν αἱ κινήσεις. τί οὖν ἄλλας δεῖ ζητεῖν ἀρχάς;	1065. Therefore, if something is always moved in the same cycle, there must be something which always continues to act in the same way. But if there is to be generation and destruction, there must be something else “ which acts in different ways. Hence this must act in one way of itself, and in another way in virtue of something else, i.e., either in virtue of some third agent or of the first. Now it must be in virtue of the first; for this is the cause both of the second and of the third. The first is preferable, then; for it was the cause of that whose being is always to be the same, and something else was the cause of that whose being is to be different; and obviously both of these account for eternal diversity. Therefore, if motion always exhibits these characteristics, why is it necessary to look for other principles?
Chapter 7
ἐπεὶ δ᾽ οὕτω τ᾽ ἐνδέχεται, καὶ εἰ μὴ οὕτως, ἐκ νυκτὸς [20] ἔσται καὶ ὁμοῦ πάντων καὶ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, λύοιτ᾽ ἂν ταῦτα, καὶ ἔστι τι ἀεὶ κινούμενον κίνησιν ἄπαυστον, αὕτη δ᾽ ἡ κύκλῳ (καὶ τοῦτο οὐ λόγῳ μόνον ἀλλ᾽ ἔργῳ δῆλον), ὥστ᾽ ἀΐδιος ἂν εἴη ὁ πρῶτος οὐρανός.	And since this is a possible account of the matter, and if this is not so all things will come from Night (1060) or “all things were together” (1060) or something comes from non-being (1034), these difficulties are solved. And there is something which is always being moved with an unceasing motion, and this is circular motion. This is evident not only in theory but in fact; and for this reason the first heaven will be eternal.
ἔστι τοίνυν τι καὶ ὃ κινεῖ. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ κινούμενον καὶ κινοῦν [καὶ] μέσον, τοίνυν [25] ἔστι τι ὃ οὐ κινούμενον κινεῖ, ἀΐδιον καὶ οὐσία καὶ ἐνέργεια οὖσα.	1066. Therefore there is also something which causes it to move. And since that which is moved and causes motion is intermediate, there must be something which causes motion and is unmoved, which is eternal and both a substance and an actuality.

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 7: 1072a 26-1072b 14
κινεῖ δὲ ὧδε τὸ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ τὸ νοητόν: κινεῖ οὐ κινούμενα. τούτων τὰ πρῶτα τὰ αὐτά. ἐπιθυμητὸν μὲν γὰρ τὸ φαινόμενον καλόν, βουλητὸν δὲ πρῶτον τὸ ὂν καλόν: ὀρεγόμεθα δὲ διότι δοκεῖ μᾶλλον ἢ δοκεῖ διότι ὀρεγόμεθα: [30] ἀρχὴ γὰρ ἡ νόησις. νοῦς δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ κινεῖται,	1067. Now the first mover causes motion as something intelligible and something appetible; for these alone cause motion without being moved. And what is first in the class of the appetible and in that of the intelligible is the same; for it is the apparent good which is the object of concupiscible appetite, and the real good which is the primary object of will. For we desire a thing because it seems good rather than consider it good because we desire it; for understanding is the principle of desire. And the intellect is moved by an intelligible object.
νοητὴ δὲ ἡ ἑτέρα συστοιχία καθ᾽ αὑτήν: καὶ ταύτης ἡ οὐσία πρώτη, καὶ ταύτης ἡ ἁπλῆ καὶ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν (ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ ἁπλοῦν οὐ τὸ αὐτό: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἓν μέτρον σημαίνει, τὸ δὲ ἁπλοῦν πὼς ἔχον αὐτό).	1068. And one of the two columns of opposites (60) is the intelligible in itself; and in this class primary substance is first, and in substance that which is simple and exists actually. However, one and simple are not the same; for one signifies a measure (432; 825), and simple signifies a state.
ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ [35] τὸ δι᾽ αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ συστοιχίᾳ: καὶ ἔστιν ἄριστον ἀεὶ ἢ ἀνάλογον τὸ πρῶτον. [1072β] [1] ὅτι δ᾽ ἔστι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις, ἡ διαίρεσις δηλοῖ: ἔστι γὰρ τινὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα <�καὶ> τινός, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἔστι τὸ δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστι. κινεῖ δὴ ὡς ἐρώμενον, κινούμενα δὲ τἆλλα κινεῖ.	1069. But that which is good and that which is desirable in itself are in the same column of opposites; and that which is first in each class is always best, or analogous to the best. That the final cause belongs to the class of immovable things is shown by a process of division; for the final cause of a thing is either that which exists or that which does not.
εἰ μὲν οὖν τι κινεῖται, ἐνδέχεται καὶ [5] ἄλλως ἔχειν, ὥστ᾽ εἰ [ἡ] φορὰ πρώτη ἡ ἐνέργειά ἐστιν, ᾗ κινεῖται ταύτῃ γε ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν, κατὰ τόπον, καὶ εἰ μὴ κατ᾽ οὐσίαν: ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔστι τι κινοῦν αὐτὸ ἀκίνητον ὄν, ἐνεργείᾳ ὄν, τοῦτο οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν οὐδαμῶς. φορὰ γὰρ ἡ πρώτη τῶν μεταβολῶν, ταύτης δὲ ἡ κύκλῳ: ταύτην [10] δὲ τοῦτο κινεῖ. ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄρα ἐστὶν ὄν: καὶ ᾗ ἀνάγκῃ, καλῶς, καὶ οὕτως ἀρχή. τὸ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον τοσαυταχῶς, τὸ μὲν βίᾳ ὅτι παρὰ τὴν ὁρμήν, τὸ δὲ οὗ οὐκ ἄνευ τὸ εὖ, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἀλλ᾽ ἁπλῶς. ἐκ τοιαύτης ἄρα ἀρχῆς ἤρτηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις.	1070. And it causes motion as something loved, whereas by that which is [first] moved other things are moved. Therefore, if a thing is moved, it is possible for it to be other than it. is. Hence, local motion, which is the primary kind of motion, is also the actuality of that which is [first] moved; and in this respect the thing first moved can differ in place though not in substance. But since there is something which moves yet is itself immovable and exists actually, this can in no way be other than it is. For the primary kind of change is local motion, and of local motion the first is circular motion; and this is the motion which the first mover causes. Hence the first mover necessarily exists; and insofar as it is necessary it is good, and thus is a principle. For necessary has all of these meanings: that which seems to be done by force; that without which something does not fare well; and that which cannot be other than it is, but is absolutely necessary (416-22). It is on such a principle, then, that the heavens and the natural world depend.

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 7: 1072b 14-1073a 13
διαγωγὴ δ᾽ [15] ἐστὶν οἵα ἡ ἀρίστη μικρὸν χρόνον ἡμῖν (οὕτω γὰρ ἀεὶ ἐκεῖνο: ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ ἀδύνατον),	1071. And its course of life is like the best which we enjoy for a short time; for it is always in that state, though this is impossible for us.
ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡδονὴ ἡ ἐνέργεια τούτου (καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐγρήγορσις αἴσθησις νόησις ἥδιστον, ἐλπίδες δὲ καὶ μνῆμαι διὰ ταῦτα). ἡ δὲ νόησις ἡ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν τοῦ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ἀρίστου, καὶ ἡ μάλιστα τοῦ μάλιστα.	1072. For its operation is also pleasure. This is why being awake, sensing and understanding are most pleasant, and hopes and memories are pleasant because of them. Now understanding in itself has to do with what is best in itself, and the highest type of understanding has to do with what is best in the highest degree.
αὑτὸν [20] δὲ νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς κατὰ μετάληψιν τοῦ νοητοῦ: νοητὸς γὰρ γίγνεται θιγγάνων καὶ νοῶν, ὥστε ταὐτὸν νοῦς καὶ νοητόν. τὸ γὰρ δεκτικὸν τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ τῆς οὐσίας νοῦς, ἐνεργεῖ δὲ ἔχων, ὥστ᾽ ἐκείνου μᾶλλον τοῦτο ὃ δοκεῖ ὁ νοῦς θεῖον ἔχειν, καὶ ἡ θεωρία τὸ ἥδιστον καὶ ἄριστον. εἰ οὖν οὕτως εὖ ἔχει, [25] ὡς ἡμεῖς ποτέ, ὁ θεὸς ἀεί, θαυμαστόν: εἰ δὲ μᾶλλον, ἔτι θαυμασιώτερον. ἔχει δὲ ὧδε.	1073. And an intellect understands itself insofar as it takes on its intelligible object; for it becomes intelligible by attaining and understanding its object, so that an intellect and its intelligible object are the same. For that which is receptive of something intelligible and of substance is an intellect; and it is actual when it possesses this. Hence it is the latter rather than the former state which seems to constitute the divine state of intellect; and its act of understanding is the most pleasant and best. Therefore, if God is in that pleasurable state in which we sometimes are, this is wondrous; and if He is in that state in a higher degree, this is even more wondrous; and He is in that state.
καὶ ζωὴ δέ γε ὑπάρχει: ἡ γὰρ νοῦ ἐνέργεια ζωή, ἐκεῖνος δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια: ἐνέργεια δὲ ἡ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν ἐκείνου ζωὴ ἀρίστη καὶ ἀΐδιος. φαμὲν δὴ τὸν θεὸν εἶναι ζῷον ἀΐδιον ἄριστον, ὥστε ζωὴ καὶ αἰὼν συνεχὴς [30] καὶ ἀΐδιος ὑπάρχει τῷ θεῷ: τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ θεός.	1074. Life, then, also belongs to Him; for intellectual activity is life, and God is that activity; and the essential activity of God is the life which is best and eternal. And we say that God is an animal, eternal and most excellent. Hence life and continuous and eternal duration belong to God; for this is what God is.
ὅσοι δὲ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ Σπεύσιππος τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ ἄριστον μὴ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἶναι, διὰ τὸ καὶ τῶν φυτῶν καὶ τῶν ζῴων τὰς ἀρχὰς αἴτια μὲν εἶναι τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ τέλειον ἐν τοῖς ἐκ τούτων, οὐκ ὀρθῶς οἴονται. [35] τὸ γὰρ σπέρμα ἐξ ἑτέρων ἐστὶ προτέρων τελείων, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον οὐ σπέρμα ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ τὸ τέλειον: [1073α] [1] οἷον πρότερον ἄνθρωπον ἂν φαίη τις εἶναι τοῦ σπέρματος, οὐ τὸν ἐκ τούτου γενόμενον ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερον ἐξ οὗ τὸ σπέρμα. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔστιν οὐσία τις ἀΐδιος καὶ ἀκίνητος καὶ κεχωρισμένη τῶν αἰσθητῶν, [5] φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων:	1075. And all those, such as the Pythagoreans and Speusippus, who think (1109:C 2644) that the greatest good and excellence are not found in the [first] principle (because they are of the opinion that, while the principles of plants and animals are causes, it is in the things that come from these that goodness and perfection are found) are in error. For seed comes from other things which are prior and perfect, and it is not seed that is first but the perfect being. For example, one might say that the man is prior to the seed, not the man who comes from the. seed, but another man from whom the seed comes (780). Therefore it is evident from what has been said that there is a substance which is eternal and immovable and separate from sensible things.
δέδεικται δὲ καὶ ὅτι μέγεθος οὐδὲν ἔχειν ἐνδέχεται ταύτην τὴν οὐσίαν ἀλλ᾽ ἀμερὴς καὶ ἀδιαίρετός ἐστιν (κινεῖ γὰρ τὸν ἄπειρον χρόνον, οὐδὲν δ᾽ ἔχει δύναμιν ἄπειρον πεπερασμένον: ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶν μέγεθος ἢ ἄπειρον ἢ πεπερασμένον, πεπερασμένον μὲν διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ [10] ἂν ἔχοι μέγεθος, ἄπειρον δ᾽ ὅτι ὅλως οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν ἄπειρον μέγεθος):	1076. And it has been shown that this substance can have no magnitude, but is without parts and indivisible; for it causes motion for an infinite time, and nothing finite has an infinite power. And since every magnitude is either finite or infinite, this substance cannot have finite magnitude; and it cannot have infinite magnitude, because there is no infinite magnitude at all.
ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ὅτι ἀπαθὲς καὶ ἀναλλοίωτον: πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ ἄλλαι κινήσεις ὕστεραι τῆς κατὰ τόπον. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν δῆλα διότι τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον.	1077. It has also been shown (1066) that it lacks potentiality and is unalterable; for all the other kinds of motion are subsequent to local motion. It is clear, then, that these things are of this sort.

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 8: 1073a 14-1073b 17
πότερον δὲ μίαν θετέον τὴν τοιαύτην οὐσίαν ἢ πλείους, [15] καὶ πόσας, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν, ἀλλὰ μεμνῆσθαι καὶ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων ἀποφάσεις, ὅτι περὶ πλήθους οὐθὲν εἰρήκασιν ὅ τι καὶ σαφὲς εἰπεῖν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τὰς ἰδέας ὑπόληψις οὐδεμίαν ἔχει σκέψιν ἰδίαν (ἀριθμοὺς γὰρ λέγουσι τὰς ἰδέας οἱ λέγοντες ἰδέας, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ὁτὲ μὲν ὡς [20] περὶ ἀπείρων λέγουσιν ὁτὲ δὲ ὡς μέχρι τῆς δεκάδος ὡρισμένων: δι᾽ ἣν δ᾽ αἰτίαν τοσοῦτον τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἀριθμῶν, οὐδὲν λέγεται μετὰ σπουδῆς ἀποδεικτικῆς):	1078. We must not neglect the question whether it is necessary to posit one such substance or more than one, and if the latter, how many; and we must also recall the lack of statements on this point by other philosophers, because they have said nothing about the number of these substances which can be clearly stated. The theory of Ideas makes no proper study of this problem; for the proponents of the Ideas say that the Ideas are numbers, and they speak of numbers sometimes as unlimited and sometimes as limited to the number ten. But as to the reason why there should be so many numbers, nothing is said apodictically.
ἡμῖν δ᾽ ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων καὶ διωρισμένων λεκτέον. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ὄντων ἀκίνητον καὶ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ καὶ κατὰ [25] συμβεβηκός, κινοῦν δὲ τὴν πρώτην ἀΐδιον καὶ μίαν κίνησιν: ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ κινούμενον ἀνάγκη ὑπό τινος κινεῖσθαι, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον εἶναι καθ᾽ αὑτό, καὶ τὴν ἀΐδιον κίνησιν ὑπὸ ἀϊδίου κινεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν μίαν ὑφ᾽ ἑνός,	1079. However, we must discuss this question by beginning with what has already been laid down and established. For the first principle and primary being is both essentially and accidentally immovable, but it causes the primary motion, which is eternal and unique. And since that which is moved must be moved by something else, the first mover must be essentially immovable, and eternal motion must be caused by an eternal mover, and a single motion by a single thing.
ὁρῶμεν δὲ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς τὴν ἁπλῆν φοράν, ἣν κινεῖν φαμὲν [30] τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν καὶ ἀκίνητον, ἄλλας φορὰς οὔσας τὰς τῶν πλανήτων ἀϊδίους (ἀΐδιον γὰρ καὶ ἄστατον τὸ κύκλῳ σῶμα: δέδεικται δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς περὶ τούτων), ἀνάγκη καὶ τούτων ἑκάστην τῶν φορῶν ὑπ᾽ ἀκινήτου τε κινεῖσθαι καθ᾽ αὑτὴν καὶ ἀϊδίου οὐσίας. ἥ τε γὰρ τῶν ἄστρων φύσις ἀΐδιος [35] οὐσία τις οὖσα, καὶ τὸ κινοῦν ἀΐδιον καὶ πρότερον τοῦ κινουμένου, καὶ τὸ πρότερον οὐσίας οὐσίαν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι. φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι τοσαύτας τε οὐσίας ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τήν τε φύσιν ἀϊδίους καὶ ἀκινήτους καθ᾽ αὑτάς, καὶ ἄνευ μεγέθους διὰ τὴν εἰρημένην αἰτίαν πρότερον. [1073β] [1] —ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν οὐσίαι, καὶ τούτων τις πρώτη καὶ δευτέρα κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν τάξιν ταῖς φοραῖς τῶν ἄστρων, φανερόν:	1080. Now we see that, besides the simple local motion which we say the first immovable substance causes, there are other local motions—those of the planets—which are eternal (for a body which is moved in a circle is eternal and never stands still, as has been proved in our treatises on nature). Each of these motions, then, must also be caused by a substance which is essentially immovable and eternal. For the nature of the stars is eternal, being a kind of substance; and that which causes motion is eternal and prior to that which is moved; and that which is prior to a substance must be a substance. Hence it is evident that there must be as many substances as there are motions of the stars, and that these substances are eternal in nature, essentially immovable, and without magnitude, for the reason given above (1076). It is evident, then, that these movers are substances, and that one of these is first and another second according to the same order as the motions of the stars.
τὸ δὲ πλῆθος ἤδη τῶν φορῶν ἐκ τῆς οἰκειοτάτης φιλοσοφίᾳ τῶν μαθηματικῶν [5] ἐπιστημῶν δεῖ σκοπεῖν, ἐκ τῆς ἀστρολογίας: αὕτη γὰρ περὶ οὐσίας αἰσθητῆς μὲν ἀϊδίου δὲ ποιεῖται τὴν θεωρίαν, αἱ δ᾽ ἄλλαι περὶ οὐδεμιᾶς οὐσίας, οἷον ἥ τε περὶ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς καὶ τὴν γεωμετρίαν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν πλείους τῶν φερομένων αἱ φοραί, φανερὸν τοῖς καὶ μετρίως ἡμμένοις (πλείους γὰρ ἕκαστον [10] φέρεται μιᾶς τῶν πλανωμένων ἄστρων): πόσαι δ᾽ αὗται τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι, νῦν μὲν ἡμεῖς ἃ λέγουσι τῶν μαθηματικῶν τινὲς ἐννοίας χάριν λέγομεν, ὅπως ᾖ τι τῇ διανοίᾳ πλῆθος ὡρισμένον ὑπολαβεῖν: τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν τὰ μὲν ζητοῦντας αὐτοὺς δεῖ τὰ δὲ πυνθανομένους παρὰ τῶν ζητούντων, [15] ἄν τι φαίνηται παρὰ τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα τοῖς ταῦτα πραγματευομένοις, φιλεῖν μὲν ἀμφοτέρους, πείθεσθαι δὲ τοῖς ἀκριβεστέροις.	1081. But it is now necessary to discover the number of these motions from that branch of the mathematical sciences which is most akin to philosophy, namely, astronomy. For this science studies the kind of substance which is sensible but eternal, whereas the other mathematical sciences, such as the science of numbers and geometry, are not concerned with any kind of substance. That there are many motions belonging to the bodies which are moved is evident even to those who have given little consideration to the matter; for each of the wandering stars has more than one motion. As to the number of these motions, in order that we may have some definite number in mind for the purpose of understanding this point, let us now state what some of the mathematicians say; but for the rest, this we must investigate partly for ourselves and partly accept the opinion of other investigators. And if anyone in treating this subject should be found to form a different opinion from the one stated here, we must respect both views but accept the more certain.

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 8: 1073b 17-1074b 14
Εὔδοξος μὲν οὖν ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης ἑκατέρου τὴν φορὰν ἐν τρισὶν ἐτίθετ᾽ εἶναι σφαίραις, ὧν τὴν μὲν πρώτην τὴν τῶν ἀπλανῶν ἄστρων εἶναι, τὴν δὲ δευτέραν κατὰ τὸν [20] διὰ μέσων τῶν ζῳδίων, τὴν δὲ τρίτην κατὰ τὸν λελοξωμένον ἐν τῷ πλάτει τῶν ζῳδίων (ἐν μείζονι δὲ πλάτει λελοξῶσθαι καθ᾽ ὃν ἡ σελήνη φέρεται ἢ καθ᾽ ὃν ὁ ἥλιος), τῶν δὲ πλανωμένων ἄστρων ἐν τέτταρσιν ἑκάστου σφαίραις, καὶ τούτων δὲ τὴν μὲν πρώτην καὶ δευτέραν τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι [25] ἐκείναις (τήν τε γὰρ τῶν ἀπλανῶν τὴν ἁπάσας φέρουσαν εἶναι, καὶ τὴν ὑπὸ ταύτῃ τεταγμένην καὶ κατὰ τὸν διὰ μέσων τῶν ζῳδίων τὴν φορὰν ἔχουσαν κοινὴν ἁπασῶν εἶναι), τῆς δὲ τρίτης ἁπάντων τοὺς πόλους ἐν τῷ διὰ μέσων τῶν ζῳδίων εἶναι, τῆς δὲ τετάρτης τὴν φορὰν κατὰ τὸν λελοξωμένον [30] πρὸς τὸν μέσον ταύτης: εἶναι δὲ τῆς τρίτης σφαίρας τοὺς πόλους τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἰδίους, τοὺς δὲ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης καὶ τοῦ Ἑρμοῦ τοὺς αὐτούς:	1082. Now Eudoxus claimed that the motion both of the sun and of the moon involves for each three spheres. The first of these is the sphere of the stars whose positions remain unchanged; the second, the one which passes through the middle of the zodiac; and the third, the one which moves obliquely in the latitude of the animals in the zodiac. But the circle in which the moon is moved is inclined at a greater angle than that in which the sun is moved. He also claimed that the motion of the wandering stars involves four spheres for each. The first and second of these are the same as those mentioned above. The sphere of the fixed stars is the one which imparts motion to all of the spheres, and the sphere which is situated below this and moves through the middle of the zodiac is common to all of the planets. The third sphere for each of the planets has its poles in the circle which passes through the middle signs of the zodiac; and the motion of the fourth sphere is in a circle which is inclined at a greater angle to the middle of this sphere; and while the poles of the third sphere are peculiar to each of the other planets, those of Venus and of Mercury are the same.
Κάλλιππος δὲ τὴν μὲν θέσιν τῶν σφαιρῶν τὴν αὐτὴν ἐτίθετο Εὐδόξῳ [τοῦτ᾽ ἔστι τῶν ἀποστημάτων τὴν τάξιν], τὸ δὲ πλῆθος τῷ μὲν τοῦ Διὸς καὶ [35] τῷ τοῦ Κρόνου τὸ αὐτὸ ἐκείνῳ ἀπεδίδου, τῷ δ᾽ ἡλίῳ καὶ τῇ σελήνῃ δύο ᾤετο ἔτι προσθετέας εἶναι σφαίρας, τὰ φαινόμενα [37] εἰ μέλλει τις ἀποδώσειν, τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς τῶν πλανήτων ἑκάστῳ μίαν. ἀναγκαῖον δέ, εἰ μέλλουσι συντεθεῖσαι πᾶσαι τὰ φαινόμενα ἀποδώσειν, [1074α] [1] καθ᾽ ἕκαστον τῶν πλανωμένων ἑτέρας σφαίρας μιᾷ ἐλάττονας εἶναι τὰς ἀνελιττούσας καὶ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἀποκαθιστάσας τῇ θέσει τὴν πρώτην σφαῖραν ἀεὶ τοῦ ὑποκάτω τεταγμένου ἄστρου: οὕτω γὰρ μόνως [5] ἐνδέχεται τὴν τῶν πλανήτων φορὰν ἅπαντα ποιεῖσθαι. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐν αἷς μὲν αὐτὰ φέρεται σφαίραις αἱ μὲν ὀκτὼ αἱ δὲ πέντε καὶ εἴκοσίν εἰσιν, τούτων δὲ μόνας οὐ δεῖ ἀνελιχθῆναι ἐν αἷς τὸ κατωτάτω τεταγμένον φέρεται, αἱ μὲν τὰς τῶν πρώτων δύο ἀνελίττουσαι ἓξ ἔσονται, αἱ δὲ τὰς [10] τῶν ὕστερον τεττάρων ἑκκαίδεκα: ὁ δὴ ἁπασῶν ἀριθμὸς τῶν τε φερουσῶν καὶ τῶν ἀνελιττουσῶν ταύτας πεντήκοντά τε καὶ πέντε. εἰ δὲ τῇ σελήνῃ τε καὶ τῷ ἡλίῳ μὴ προστιθείη τις ἃς εἴπομεν κινήσεις, αἱ πᾶσαι σφαῖραι ἔσονται ἑπτά τε καὶ τεσσαράκοντα. τὸ μὲν οὖν πλῆθος τῶν σφαιρῶν ἔστω [15] τοσοῦτον,	1083. And Callippus assumed the position of the spheres to be the same as Eudoxus did, i.e., as regards the arrangement of their distances, and he gave the same number of spheres to Jupiter and to Saturn as Eudoxus did. But he thought that two spheres should be added both to the sun and to the moon if appearances are to be saved. And to each of the other planets he added one sphere. However, if all spheres taken together are to account for appearances, there must be additional spheres for each of the other planets, one less in number than those mentioned above, which revolve the planets and always restore to the same place the first sphere of the star which is next in order below. For only in this way can all the spheres account for the motion of the planets. Therefore, since, as regards the spheres in which the planets themselves are carried along, some are eight in number and others twenty-five in number, and of these only those in which the lowest planet is carried along do not need to be revolved, then the spheres which revolve the first two planets will be six in number, and those which revolve the last four will be sixteen in number. The total number of spheres, then, both those which carry the planets along and those which revolve them, will be fifty-five. And if one has not added to the moon and to the sun the motions which we have mentioned (1083), the total number of spheres will be forty-seven. Let the number of the spheres, then, be so many.
ὥστε καὶ τὰς οὐσίας καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς ἀκινήτους [καὶ τὰς αἰσθητὰς] τοσαύτας εὔλογον ὑπολαβεῖν (τὸ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον ἀφείσθω τοῖς ἰσχυροτέροις λέγειν):	1084. Hence it is reasonable to suppose that there are as many substances and immovable principles and perceptible principles. Therefore the statement of necessity is to be left to more powerful thinkers.
εἰ δὲ μηδεμίαν οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι φορὰν μὴ συντείνουσαν πρὸς ἄστρου φοράν, ἔτι δὲ πᾶσαν φύσιν καὶ πᾶσαν οὐσίαν ἀπαθῆ καὶ καθ᾽ [20] αὑτὴν τοῦ ἀρίστου τετυχηκυῖαν τέλος εἶναι δεῖ νομίζειν, οὐδεμία ἂν εἴη παρὰ ταύτας ἑτέρα φύσις, ἀλλὰ τοῦτον ἀνάγκη τὸν ἀριθμὸν εἶναι τῶν οὐσιῶν. εἴτε γὰρ εἰσὶν ἕτεραι, κινοῖεν ἂν ὡς τέλος οὖσαι φορᾶς:	1085. However, if there can be no celestial motion which is not related to the motion of a star, and further if every nature and substance which is unchangeable and has in itself reached the highest good must be thought to be an end, there will be no other nature besides these; but this must be the number of substances. For if there were others, they would cause motion as being ends of local motion.
ἀλλὰ εἶναί γε ἄλλας φορὰς ἀδύνατον παρὰ τὰς εἰρημένας. τοῦτο δὲ εὔλογον ἐκ τῶν [25] φερομένων ὑπολαβεῖν. εἰ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ φέρον τοῦ φερομένου χάριν πέφυκε καὶ φορὰ πᾶσα φερομένου τινός ἐστιν, οὐδεμία φορὰ αὑτῆς ἂν ἕνεκα εἴη οὐδ᾽ ἄλλης φορᾶς, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἄστρων ἕνεκα. εἰ γὰρ ἔσται φορὰ φορᾶς ἕνεκα, καὶ ἐκείνην ἑτέρου δεήσει χάριν εἶναι: ὥστ᾽ ἐπειδὴ οὐχ οἷόν τε εἰς ἄπειρον, [30] τέλος ἔσται πάσης φορᾶς τῶν φερομένων τι θείων σωμάτων κατὰ τὸν οὐρανόν. ὅτι δὲ εἷς οὐρανός, φανερόν.	1086. But there cannot be other motions besides those mentioned. And it is reasonable to suppose this from the bodies that are moved. For if everything which moves exists by nature for the sake of that which is moved, and all motion is the motion of something moved, no motion will exist for itself or for the sake of another motion, but all motions will exist for the sake of the stars. For if one motion should exist for the sake of another, the latter must also exist for the sake of another. Hence, since an infinite regress is impossible, the end of every motion must be one of the divine bodies which move about in the heavens.
εἰ γὰρ πλείους οὐρανοὶ ὥσπερ ἄνθρωποι, ἔσται εἴδει μία ἡ περὶ ἕκαστον ἀρχή, ἀριθμῷ δέ γε πολλαί. ἀλλ᾽ ὅσα ἀριθμῷ πολλά, ὕλην ἔχει (εἷς γὰρ λόγος καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς πολλῶν, [35] οἷον ἀνθρώπου, Σωκράτης δὲ εἷς): τὸ δὲ τί ἦν εἶναι οὐκ ἔχει ὕλην τὸ πρῶτον: ἐντελέχεια γάρ. ἓν ἄρα καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἀριθμῷ τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον ὄν: καὶ τὸ κινούμενον ἄρα ἀεὶ καὶ συνεχῶς: εἷς ἄρα οὐρανὸς μόνος.	1087. And it is evident that there is only one heaven. For if there were many heavens, as there are many men, the principle of each would be one in species but many in number. But all things which are many in number have matter; for many individuals have one and the same intelligible structure, for example, man, whereas Socrates is one; but the primary quiddity 4 has no matter, for it is complete reality. Therefore the first mover, which is immovable, is one both in its intelligible structure and in number; and therefore what is moved eternally and continuously is only one. Hence there is only one heaven.
[1074β] [1] παραδέδοται δὲ παρὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων καὶ παμπαλαίων ἐν μύθου σχήματι καταλελειμμένα τοῖς ὕστερον ὅτι θεοί τέ εἰσιν οὗτοι καὶ περιέχει τὸ θεῖον τὴν ὅλην φύσιν. τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ μυθικῶς ἤδη προσῆκται πρὸς τὴν πειθὼ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ [5] πρὸς τὴν εἰς τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὸ συμφέρον χρῆσιν: ἀνθρωποειδεῖς τε γὰρ τούτους καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ὁμοίους τισὶ λέγουσι, καὶ τούτοις ἕτερα ἀκόλουθα καὶ παραπλήσια τοῖς εἰρημένοις, ὧν εἴ τις χωρίσας αὐτὸ λάβοι μόνον τὸ πρῶτον, ὅτι θεοὺς ᾤοντο τὰς πρώτας οὐσίας εἶναι, θείως ἂν εἰρῆσθαι [10] νομίσειεν, καὶ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς πολλάκις εὑρημένης εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἑκάστης καὶ τέχνης καὶ φιλοσοφίας καὶ πάλιν φθειρομένων καὶ ταύτας τὰς δόξας ἐκείνων οἷον λείψανα περισεσῶσθαι μέχρι τοῦ νῦν. ἡ μὲν οὖν πάτριος δόξα καὶ ἡ παρὰ τῶν πρώτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἡμῖν φανερὰ μόνον. [15]	1088. Now traditions have been handed down from our predecessors and the ancient thinkers, and left to posterity in the form of a myth, that these heavenly bodies are gods, and that the divine encompasses the whole of nature. But the rest of the traditions have been added later in the form of a myth for the persuasion of the multitude, the general welfare, and the passing of laws (172). For they say that the gods have human form and are similar to some of the other animals; and they add other statements which follow upon these and are similar to the ones mentioned. Now if anyone will separate these statements and accept only the first, that they thought the first substances to be gods, this will be considered to he a divine statement. And though every art and every philosophy has often been discovered and again lost, the opinions of these early thinkers have been preserved as relics to the present day. Therefore the opinions of our forefathers and those which have come down to us from the first thinkers are evident only to this extent.

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 9: 1074b 15-1075a 10
τὰ δὲ περὶ τὸν νοῦν ἔχει τινὰς ἀπορίας: δοκεῖ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τῶν φαινομένων θειότατον, πῶς δ᾽ ἔχων τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη, ἔχει τινὰς δυσκολίας.	1089. The things which pertain to intellect (or mind) involve certain difficulties; for of the things apparent to us it seems to be the most divine; but how it is so gives rise to certain difficulties.
εἴτε γὰρ μηδὲν νοεῖ, τί ἂν εἴη τὸ σεμνόν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔχει ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ὁ καθεύδων: εἴτε νοεῖ, τούτου δ᾽ ἄλλο κύριον, οὐ γάρ ἐστι τοῦτο ὅ ἐστιν αὐτοῦ ἡ [20] οὐσία νόησις, ἀλλὰ δύναμις, οὐκ ἂν ἡ ἀρίστη οὐσία εἴη: διὰ γὰρ τοῦ νοεῖν τὸ τίμιον αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει.	1090. For if it is not actually understanding, but is in a sense like one asleep, what dignity will it have? Or if it is understanding, but its chief good is different from itself, then, since its essence is not an act of understanding but a potentiality, it will not be the best substance; for it is by reason of its act of understanding that dignity belongs to it.
ἔτι δὲ εἴτε νοῦς ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ εἴτε νόησίς ἐστι, τί νοεῖ; ἢ γὰρ αὐτὸς αὑτὸν ἢ ἕτερόν τι: καὶ εἰ ἕτερόν τι, ἢ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ ἢ ἄλλο.	1091. Furthermore, whether its substance is its power to understand or its act of understanding, what does it understand? For it understands either itself or something else; and if something else, either the same thing always or something different.
πότερον οὖν διαφέρει τι ἢ οὐδὲν τὸ νοεῖν τὸ καλὸν ἢ τὸ τυχόν; [25] ἢ καὶ ἄτοπον τὸ διανοεῖσθαι περὶ ἐνίων;	1092. Does it make any difference or not, then, whether it understands what is good or what is contingent? Or is it absurd that it should ponder about certain things?
δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι τὸ θειότατον καὶ τιμιώτατον νοεῖ, καὶ οὐ μεταβάλλει: εἰς χεῖρον γὰρ ἡ μεταβολή, καὶ κίνησίς τις ἤδη τὸ τοιοῦτον.	1093. Hence it is evident that it understands what is most divine and honorable, and that it does not change; for a change would be for the worse, and this would already be motion.
πρῶτον μὲν οὖν εἰ μὴ νόησίς ἐστιν ἀλλὰ δύναμις, εὔλογον ἐπίπονον εἶναι τὸ συνεχὲς αὐτῷ τῆς νοήσεως:	1094. Therefore, if the first mover is not its act of understanding but a potency, it is reasonable to assume, first, that the continuity of its act of understanding is laborious to it (797).
ἔπειτα δῆλον [30] ὅτι ἄλλο τι ἂν εἴη τὸ τιμιώτερον ἢ ὁ νοῦς, τὸ νοούμενον. καὶ γὰρ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ ἡ νόησις ὑπάρξει καὶ τὸ χείριστον νοοῦντι, ὥστ᾽ εἰ φευκτὸν τοῦτο (καὶ γὰρ μὴ ὁρᾶν ἔνια κρεῖττον ἢ ὁρᾶν), οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ ἄριστον ἡ νόησις. αὑτὸν ἄρα νοεῖ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κράτιστον,	1095. Second, that there is evidently something else more honorable than intellect, namely, what it understands. For both the power to understand and understanding itself belong even to one who understands the basest thing. This must accordingly be avoided; for there are some things which it is better not to see than to see. But this will not be so if the act of understanding is the best of things. Therefore, if there is a most powerful intellect, it must understand itself.
καὶ ἔστιν ἡ νόησις νοήσεως νόησις. [35] φαίνεται δ᾽ ἀεὶ ἄλλου ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις καὶ ἡ δόξα καὶ ἡ διάνοια, αὑτῆς δ᾽ ἐν παρέργῳ.	1096. And its act of understanding is an understanding of understanding. But science, perception, opinion and thought always seem to be about something else and only indirectly about themselves.
ἔτι εἰ ἄλλο τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ νοεῖσθαι, κατὰ πότερον αὐτῷ τὸ εὖ ὑπάρχει; οὐδὲ γὰρ ταὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι νοήσει καὶ νοουμένῳ.	1097. Again, if understanding is something different from being understood, from which of these does the intellect derive its goodness? For the essence of understanding and that of being understood are not the same.
ἢ ἐπ᾽ ἐνίων ἡ ἐπιστήμη τὸ πρᾶγμα, [1075α] [1] ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ποιητικῶν ἄνευ ὕλης ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν θεωρητικῶν ὁ λόγος τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ ἡ νόησις; οὐχ ἑτέρου οὖν ὄντος τοῦ νοουμένου καὶ τοῦ νοῦ, ὅσα μὴ ὕλην ἔχει, τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται, καὶ ἡ [5] νόησις τῷ νοουμένῳ μία.	1098. But in certain cases is not understanding identical with the thing understood? For in the productive sciences the object is the substance or quiddity without matter; and in the theoretical sciences the intelligible structure is both the object and the understanding of it. Therefore, since the object of understanding does not differ from the act of understanding in the case of things which have no matter, they will be the same; and the act of understanding will be identical with the thing understood.
ἔτι δὴ λείπεται ἀπορία, εἰ σύνθετον τὸ νοούμενον: μεταβάλλοι γὰρ ἂν ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι τοῦ ὅλου.	1099. Yet the difficulty still remains whether the thing that it understands is composite; for if it is, the intellect will be changed in passing from one part of the whole to another.
ἢ ἀδιαίρετον πᾶν τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὕλην—ὥσπερ ὁ ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς	1100. Now whatever does not have matter is indivisible, for example, the human mind.
ἢ ὅ γε τῶν συνθέτων ἔχει ἔν τινι χρόνῳ (οὐ γὰρ ἔχει τὸ εὖ ἐν τῳδὶ ἢ ἐν τῳδί, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ὅλῳ τινὶ τὸ ἄριστον, ὂν ἄλλο τι)— [10] οὕτως δ᾽ ἔχει αὐτὴ αὑτῆς ἡ νόησις τὸν ἅπαντα αἰῶνα;	1101. And the act of understanding composite things involves time. For it does not possess its goodness at this or at that moment but attains the greatest good over a whole period of time, and this is something different from itself. And an intellect which understands itself is in this state through all eternity.

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 10: 1075a 11-1076a 4
ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ καὶ ποτέρως ἔχει ἡ τοῦ ὅλου φύσις τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον, πότερον κεχωρισμένον τι καὶ αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτό, ἢ τὴν τάξιν.	1102. We must also inquire how the nature of the whole [universe] contains the good and the highest good, whether as something separate and self-subsisting or as the order of its parts.
ἢ ἀμφοτέρως ὥσπερ στράτευμα; καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ τάξει τὸ εὖ καὶ ὁ στρατηγός, καὶ μᾶλλον [15] οὗτος: οὐ γὰρ οὗτος διὰ τὴν τάξιν ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνη διὰ τοῦτόν ἐστιν.	1103. Or is it in both ways, as an army does? For the good of an army consists both in its order and in its commander, but mainly in the latter; for he does not exist for the sake of the order, but the order exists for him.
πάντα δὲ συντέτακταί πως, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὁμοίως, καὶ πλωτὰ καὶ πτηνὰ καὶ φυτά: καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει ὥστε μὴ εἶναι θατέρῳ πρὸς θάτερον μηδέν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι τι. πρὸς μὲν γὰρ ἓν ἅπαντα συντέτακται, ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ ἐν οἰκίᾳ τοῖς ἐλευθέροις [20] ἥκιστα ἔξεστιν ὅ τι ἔτυχε ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἢ τὰ πλεῖστα τέτακται, τοῖς δὲ ἀνδραπόδοις καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις μικρὸν τὸ εἰς τὸ κοινόν, τὸ δὲ πολὺ ὅ τι ἔτυχεν: τοιαύτη γὰρ ἑκάστου ἀρχὴ αὐτῶν ἡ φύσις ἐστίν. λέγω δ᾽ οἷον εἴς γε τὸ διακριθῆναι ἀνάγκη ἅπασιν ἐλθεῖν, καὶ ἄλλα οὕτως ἔστιν ὧν κοινωνεῖ [25] ἅπαντα εἰς τὸ ὅλον.	1104. And all things, both plants and animals (those that swim and those that fly), are ordered together in some way, but not alike; and things are not such that there is no relation between one thing and another, but there is a connection. For all things are ordered together to one end, but in the same way as in a household, where the children are not permitted to do just as they please, but all or most of the things done are arranged in an orderly way, while the slaves and livestock do little for the common good but act for the most part at random. For the nature of each of these constitutes such a principle. I mean that by it all must be able to be distinguished. And there are other activities which all have in common for the sake of the whole.
ὅσα δὲ ἀδύνατα συμβαίνει ἢ ἄτοπα τοῖς ἄλλως λέγουσι, καὶ ποῖα οἱ χαριεστέρως λέγοντες, καὶ ἐπὶ ποίων ἐλάχισται ἀπορίαι, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν.	1105. And we must not fail to consider all the impossible and incongruous conclusions that confront those who explain things differently, and what sort of views are expressed by the more popular thinkers, among whom the fewest difficulties appear.
πάντες γὰρ ἐξ ἐναντίων ποιοῦσι πάντα. οὔτε δὲ τὸ πάντα οὔτε τὸ ἐξ ἐναντίων ὀρθῶς, οὔτ᾽ ἐν ὅσοις τὰ ἐναντία ὑπάρχει, πῶς [30] ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων ἔσται, οὐ λέγουσιν:	1106. For all these thinkers derive all things from contraries. But neither “all things” (1055) nor “from contraries” (1029) is correct; nor do they explain how the things in which contraries are present come from contraries.
ἀπαθῆ γὰρ τὰ ἐναντία ὑπ᾽ ἀλλήλων. ἡμῖν δὲ λύεται τοῦτο εὐλόγως τῷ τρίτον τι εἶναι. οἱ δὲ τὸ ἕτερον τῶν ἐναντίων ὕλην ποιοῦσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ τὸ ἄνισον τῷ ἴσῳ ἢ τῷ ἑνὶ τὰ πολλά. λύεται δὲ καὶ τοῦτο τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον: ἡ γὰρ ὕλη ἡ μία οὐδενὶ ἐναντίον.	1107. For contraries cannot be acted upon by one another. But this difficulty is solved by us in a reasonable way on the ground that there is a third element. Some thinkers make one of the contraries matter, as those who make the unequal the matter of the equal, or the many the matter of the one. But this is also met in the same way; for matter, as one, is contrary to nothing.
ἔτι [35] ἅπαντα τοῦ φαύλου μεθέξει ἔξω τοῦ ἑνός: τὸ γὰρ κακὸν αὐτὸ θάτερον τῶν στοιχείων.	1108. Further, [according to them] all things except the one will exist by participating in evil; for evil itself is one of the two elements (78).
οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι οὐδ᾽ ἀρχὰς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν: καίτοι ἐν ἅπασι μάλιστα τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀρχή.	1109. For other thinkers consider neither good nor evil as principles, even though the good is in the fullest sense a principle of things.
[38] οἱ δὲ τοῦτο μὲν ὀρθῶς ὅτι ἀρχήν, ἀλλὰ πῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀρχὴ οὐ λέγουσιν, πότερον ὡς τέλος ἢ ὡς κινῆσαν ἢ ὡς εἶδος.	1110. The former are right in holding that the good is a principle, but they do not say how it is a principle: whether as an end or as a mover or as a form.
[1075β] [1] ἀτόπως δὲ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς: τὴν γὰρ φιλίαν ποιεῖ τὸ ἀγαθόν, αὕτη δ᾽ ἀρχὴ καὶ ὡς κινοῦσα (συνάγει γάρ) καὶ ὡς ὕλη: μόριον γὰρ τοῦ μίγματος. εἰ δὴ καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ συμβέβηκεν [5] καὶ ὡς ὕλῃ ἀρχῇ εἶναι καὶ ὡς κινοῦντι, ἀλλὰ τό γ᾽ εἶναι οὐ ταὐτό. κατὰ πότερον οὖν φιλία; ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄφθαρτον εἶναι τὸ νεῖκος: τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶν αὐτῷ ἡ τοῦ κακοῦ φύσις.	1111. And Empedocles’ doctrine (50) is also unreasonable; for he identifies the good with friendship, although the latter is a principle both as a mover (for it combines things), and as matter (for it is a part of the mixture 4). Therefore, even if it happens that the same thing is a principle both as matter and as a mover, still their being is not the same. In what respect, then, is friendship a principle? And it is also unreasonable that strife should be indestructible; for the essence of evil, for him, is precisely this strife.
Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ ὡς κινοῦν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀρχήν: ὁ γὰρ νοῦς κινεῖ. ἀλλὰ κινεῖ ἕνεκά τινος, ὥστε ἕτερον, πλὴν ὡς ἡμεῖς λέγομεν: [10] ἡ γὰρ ἰατρική ἐστί πως ἡ ὑγίεια. ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον μὴ ποιῆσαι τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ νῷ. πάντες δ᾽ οἱ τἀναντία λέγοντες οὐ χρῶνται τοῖς ἐναντίοις, ἐὰν μὴ ῥυθμίσῃ τις.	1112. Again, Anaxagoras makes the good a principle as a mover; for his “Intellect” causes motion. But it causes motion for the sake of some goal, and therefore there must be something other than intellect (84), unless it is as we say; for the art of medicine is in a sense health (606). It is also unreasonable not to provide something that is contrary to the good (78) or to intellect.
καὶ διὰ τί τὰ μὲν φθαρτὰ τὰ δ᾽ ἄφθαρτα, οὐδεὶς λέγει: πάντα γὰρ τὰ ὄντα ποιοῦσιν ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀρχῶν. ἔτι οἱ [15] μὲν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ποιοῦσι τὰ ὄντα: οἱ δ᾽ ἵνα μὴ τοῦτο ἀναγκασθῶσιν, ἓν πάντα ποιοῦσιν.	1113. But all who speak of contraries fail to make use of them as such, except that some make use of imagery. And none of them explain why some things are destructible and others are not; for they derive all things from the same principles (250-263). Again, some derive beings from non-being, while others (63) lest they be driven to this, make all things one.
ἔτι διὰ τί ἀεὶ ἔσται γένεσις καὶ τί αἴτιον γενέσεως, οὐδεὶς λέγει.	1114. Further, no one explains why there is always generation, and what its cause is.
καὶ τοῖς δύο ἀρχὰς ποιοῦσιν ἄλλην ἀνάγκη ἀρχὴν κυριωτέραν εἶναι, καὶ τοῖς τὰ εἴδη ἔτι ἄλλη ἀρχὴ κυριωτέρα: διὰ τί γὰρ μετέσχεν ἢ [20] μετέχει;	1115. And those who posit two principles of things must assume a first principle which is superior. This also holds for those who posit separate Forms, because there is another principle which is more important; for why has matter participated in the Forms or why does it participate in them?
καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις ἀνάγκη τῇ σοφίᾳ καὶ τῇ τιμιωτάτῃ ἐπιστήμῃ εἶναί τι ἐναντίον, ἡμῖν δ᾽ οὔ. οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐναντίον τῷ πρώτῳ οὐδέν: πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἐναντία ὕλην ἔχει, καὶ δυνάμει ταῦτα ἔστιν: ἡ δὲ ἐναντία ἄγνοια εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον, τῷ δὲ πρώτῳ ἐναντίον οὐδέν.	1116. And for other thinkers there must be something contrary to wisdom or the noblest science; but this is not so in our case. For there is nothing contrary to what is primary, since all contraries involve matter, and things having matter are in potentiality; and ignorance is contrary to the particular knowledge which is the contrary into which it can pass. But there is nothing contrary to what is primary.
εἴ τε μὴ ἔσται παρὰ τὰ [25] αἰσθητὰ ἄλλα, οὐκ ἔσται ἀρχὴ καὶ τάξις καὶ γένεσις καὶ τὰ οὐράνια, ἀλλ᾽ ἀεὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀρχή, ὥσπερ τοῖς θεολόγοις καὶ τοῖς φυσικοῖς πᾶσιν.	1117. Further, if nothing exists except sensible things, there will be no principle, no order, no generation, no heavenly bodies; but every principle will have a principle, as is maintained by all the theologians and natural philosophers.
εἰ δ᾽ ἔσται τὰ εἴδη: ἢ <�οἱ> ἀριθμοί, οὐδενὸς αἴτια: εἰ δὲ μή, οὔτι κινήσεώς γε.	1118. Now if there are separate Forms and numbers, they will not be causes of anything; but if they are, they will certainly not be causes of motion.
ἔτι πῶς ἔσται ἐξ ἀμεγεθῶν μέγεθος καὶ συνεχές; ὁ γὰρ ἀριθμὸς οὐ ποιήσει [30] συνεχές, οὔτε ὡς κινοῦν οὔτε ὡς εἶδος.	1119. Again, how will extension or continuous quantity be composed of parts which are unextended? For number cannot either as a mover or as a form produce a continuum.
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδέν γ᾽ ἔσται τῶν ἐναντίων ὅπερ καὶ ποιητικὸν καὶ κινητικόν; ἐνδέχοιτο γὰρ ἂν μὴ εἶναι. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὕστερόν γε τὸ ποιεῖν δυνάμεως. οὐκ ἄρα ἀΐδια τὰ ὄντα. ἀλλ᾽ ἔστιν: ἀναιρετέον ἄρα τούτων τι. τοῦτο δ᾽ εἴρηται πῶς.	1120. Further, no one of the contraries will be a productive principle and a mover, because it would be possible for it not to be. And in any case its activity would be subsequent to its potentiality. No beings, then, would be eternal. But some are. Therefore one of these premises must be rejected. How this may be done has been explained (1057).
ἔτι τίνι οἱ ἀριθμοὶ ἓν ἢ ἡ [35] ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ ὅλως τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα, οὐδὲν λέγει οὐδείς: οὐδ᾽ ἐνδέχεται εἰπεῖν, ἐὰν μὴ ὡς ἡμεῖς εἴπῃ, ὡς τὸ κινοῦν ποιεῖ.	1121. Again, as to the way in which numbers, or soul and body, or forms and things in general are one, no one states anything; nor is it possible to do so unless he says, as we do, that a mover makes them one (733-41).
οἱ δὲ λέγοντες τὸν ἀριθμὸν πρῶτον τὸν μαθηματικὸν καὶ οὕτως ἀεὶ ἄλλην ἐχομένην οὐσίαν καὶ ἀρχὰς ἑκάστης ἄλλας, [1076α] [1] ἐπεισοδιώδη τὴν τοῦ παντὸς οὐσίαν ποιοῦσιν (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἡ ἑτέρα τῇ ἑτέρᾳ συμβάλλεται οὖσα ἢ μὴ οὖσα) καὶ ἀρχὰς πολλάς: τὰ δὲ ὄντα οὐ βούλεται πολιτεύεσθαι κακῶς. "οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη: εἷς κοίρανος ἔστω."	1122. And those who say that mathematical number is the primary reality and that there is always one substance after another and give different principles for each, make the substance of the universe itself a group of substances unrelated to each other (for one substance confers nothing upon another, either by being or not being), and give us many principles. But beings do not want to be badly disposed.—“Many rulers are not good; therefore let there be one ruler.”