METAPHYSICS
BOOK III

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 1: 995a 24-995b 4
[995α] [24] ἀνάγκη πρὸς τὴν ἐπιζητουμένην ἐπιστήμην ἐπελθεῖν ἡμᾶς [25] πρῶτον περὶ ὧν ἀπορῆσαι δεῖ πρῶτον: ταῦτα δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὅσα τε περὶ αὐτῶν ἄλλως ὑπειλήφασί τινες, κἂν εἴ τι χωρὶς τούτων τυγχάνει παρεωραμένον.	176. With a view to the science under investigation we must attack first those subjects which must first be investigated. These are all the subjects about which some men have entertained different opinions, and any other besides these which has been omitted.
ἔστι δὲ τοῖς εὐπορῆσαι βουλομένοις προὔργου τὸ διαπορῆσαι καλῶς: ἡ γὰρ ὕστερον εὐπορία λύσις τῶν πρότερον ἀπορουμένων ἐστί, λύειν δ᾽ οὐκ [30] ἔστιν ἀγνοοῦντας τὸν δεσμόν, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ τῆς διανοίας ἀπορία δηλοῖ τοῦτο περὶ τοῦ πράγματος: ᾗ γὰρ ἀπορεῖ, ταύτῃ παραπλήσιον πέπονθε τοῖς δεδεμένοις: ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἀμφοτέρως προελθεῖν εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν. διὸ δεῖ τὰς δυσχερείας τεθεωρηκέναι πάσας πρότερον,	177. Now for those who wish to investigate the truth it is worth the while to ponder these difficulties well. For the subsequent study of truth is nothing else than the solution of earlier problems. For it is impossible to untie a knot without knowing it. But a perplexity on the part of the mind makes this evident in regard to the matter at hand; for insofar as the mind is perplexed, to that extent it experiences something similar to men who are bound; for in both cases it is impossible to move forward. For this reason, then, it is first necessary to consider all the difficulties and the reasons for them.
τούτων τε χάριν καὶ διὰ τὸ τοὺς [35] ζητοῦντας ἄνευ τοῦ διαπορῆσαι πρῶτον ὁμοίους εἶναι τοῖς ποῖ δεῖ βαδίζειν ἀγνοοῦσι,	178. [This is also necessary] for another reason, namely, that those who make investigations without first recognizing the problem are like those who do not know where they ought to go.
καὶ πρὸς τούτοις οὐδ᾽ εἴ ποτε τὸ ζητούμενον εὕρηκεν ἢ μὴ γιγνώσκειν: [995β] [1] τὸ γὰρ τέλος τούτῳ μὲν οὐ δῆλον τῷ δὲ προηπορηκότι δῆλον.	179. Again, one would not even know when he finds the thing which he is seeking [and when not]; for the goal is not evident to such a man, but it is evident to one who previously discussed the difficulties.
ἔτι δὲ βέλτιον ἀνάγκη ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ κρῖναι τὸν ὥσπερ ἀντιδίκων καὶ τῶν ἀμφισβητούντων λόγων ἀκηκοότα πάντων.	180. Furthermore, one who has heard all the arguments of the litigants, as it were, and of those who argue the question, is necessarily in a better position to pass judgment.

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 1: 995b 4-995b 27
ἔστι δ᾽ ἀπορία πρώτη [5] μὲν περὶ ὧν ἐν τοῖς πεφροιμιασμένοις διηπορήσαμεν, πότερον μιᾶς ἢ πολλῶν ἐπιστημῶν θεωρῆσαι τὰς αἰτίας:	181. The first problem concerns the things about which we raised questions in our introductory statements, i.e., whether it belongs to one science or to many to speculate about the causes.
καὶ πότερον τὰς τῆς οὐσίας ἀρχὰς τὰς πρώτας ἐστὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἰδεῖν μόνον ἢ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐξ ὧν δεικνύουσι πάντες, οἷον πότερον ἐνδέχεται ταὐτὸ καὶ ἓν ἅμα φάναι καὶ ἀποφάναι [10] ἢ οὔ, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων: εἴ τ᾽ ἐστι περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, πότερον μία περὶ πάσας ἢ πλείονές εἰσι, κἂν εἰ πλείονες πότερον ἅπασαι συγγενεῖς ἢ τὰς μὲν σοφίας τὰς δὲ ἄλλο τι λεκτέον αὐτῶν.	182. And there is also the problem whether it belongs to this science to know only the principles of substance, or also the principles on which all sciences base their demonstrations, e.g., whether it is possible to affirm and deny one and the same thing at the same time or not; and other such principles. And if this science deals with substance, there is the question whether one science deals with all substances, or many sciences. And if many, whether all are cognate, or whether some should be called wisdom and others something else.
καὶ τοῦτο δ᾽ αὐτὸ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐστὶ ζητῆσαι, πότερον τὰς αἰσθητὰς οὐσίας εἶναι [15] μόνον φατέον ἢ καὶ παρὰ ταύτας ἄλλας, καὶ πότερον μοναχῶς ἢ πλείονα γένη τῶν οὐσιῶν, οἷον οἱ ποιοῦντες τά τε εἴδη καὶ τὰ μαθηματικὰ μεταξὺ τούτων τε καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν. περί τε τούτων οὖν,	183. It is also necessary to inquire whether sensible substances alone must be said to exist, or whether there are other substances in addition to these; and whether they are unique, or whether there are many classes of substances, as was claimed by those who created the Forms and made the objects of mathematics an intermediate class between these Forms and sensible substances. As we have said, then, it is necessary to examine these questions.
καθάπερ φαμέν, ἐπισκεπτέον, καὶ πότερον περὶ τὰς οὐσίας ἡ θεωρία μόνον ἐστὶν ἢ καὶ περὶ [20] τὰ συμβεβηκότα καθ᾽ αὑτὰ ταῖς οὐσίαις, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις περὶ ταὐτοῦ καὶ ἑτέρου καὶ ὁμοίου καὶ ἀνομοίου καὶ ἐναντιότητος, καὶ περὶ προτέρου καὶ ὑστέρου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων τῶν τοιούτων περὶ ὅσων οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ πειρῶνται σκοπεῖν ἐκ τῶν ἐνδόξων μόνων ποιούμενοι τὴν σκέψιν, τίνος [25] ἐστὶ θεωρῆσαι περὶ πάντων: ἔτι δὲ τούτοις αὐτοῖς ὅσα καθ᾽ αὑτὰ συμβέβηκεν, καὶ μὴ μόνον τί ἐστι τούτων ἕκαστον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἆρα ἓν ἑνὶ ἐναντίον:	184. There is also the problem whether this speculation has to do with substances alone or also with the proper accidents of substances. And we must inquire about sameness and difference, likeness and unlikeness, contrariety, priority and posteriority, and all other such things which the dialecticians attempt to treat (basing their investigations only on probabilities); for to them too it belongs to theorize about all these things. Furthermore, we must investigate all those essential accidents of these same things; and not only what each one of them is, but also whether there is one contrary for each one.

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 1: 995b 27-996a 17
καὶ πότερον αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα τὰ γένη ἐστὶν ἢ εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται ἐνυπάρχοντα ἕκαστον: καὶ εἰ τὰ γένη, πότερον ὅσα ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀτόμοις λέγεται [30] τελευταῖα ἢ τὰ πρῶτα, οἷον πότερον ζῷον ἢ ἄνθρωπος ἀρχή τε καὶ μᾶλλον ἔστι παρὰ τὸ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον.	185. And we must inquire whether it is genera that constitute the principles and elements of things, or the parts into which each existing thing is divided. And if it is genera, whether it is those that are predicated of individuals first or last. And we must also inquire whether animal or man is a principle, and exists more truly than the singular.
μάλιστα δὲ ζητητέον καὶ πραγματευτέον πότερον ἔστι τι παρὰ τὴν ὕλην αἴτιον καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ἢ οὔ, καὶ τοῦτο χωριστὸν ἢ οὔ, καὶ πότερον ἓν ἢ πλείω τὸν ἀριθμόν, καὶ πότερον ἔστι τι παρὰ τὸ [35] σύνολον (λέγω δὲ τὸ σύνολον, ὅταν κατηγορηθῇ τι τῆς ὕλης) ἢ οὐθέν, ἢ τῶν μὲν τῶν δ᾽ οὔ, καὶ ποῖα τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων.	186. But most of all it is necessary to investigate and treat the question whether besides matter there is any cause in the proper sense or not; and whether it is separable or not; and whether it is numerically one or many. And we must ask whether there is anything besides the synolon (and by synolon I mean matter when something is predicated of it), or nothing; or whether this is true of some things but not of others, [and what these things are].
[996α] [1] ἔτι αἱ ἀρχαὶ πότερον ἀριθμῷ ἢ εἴδει ὡρισμέναι, καὶ αἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις καὶ αἱ ἐν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ; καὶ πότερον τῶν φθαρτῶν καὶ ἀφθάρτων αἱ αὐταὶ ἢ ἕτεραι, καὶ πότερον ἄφθαρτοι πᾶσαι ἢ τῶν φθαρτῶν φθαρταί; ἔτι δὲ τὸ πάντων [5] χαλεπώτατον καὶ πλείστην ἀπορίαν ἔχον, πότερον τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ ὄν, καθάπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ Πλάτων ἔλεγεν, οὐχ ἕτερόν τί ἐστιν ἀλλ᾽ οὐσία τῶν ὄντων; ἢ οὔ, ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερόν τι τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς φησὶ φιλίαν ἄλλος δέ τις πῦρ ὁ δὲ ὕδωρ ἢ ἀέρα: καὶ πότερον αἱ ἀρχαὶ [10] καθόλου εἰσὶν ἢ ὡς τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα τῶν πραγμάτων,	187. Further, we must inquire whether the principles of things are limited in number or in kind, both those in the intelligible structures of things and those in the underlying subject; and whether the principles of corruptible and of incorruptible things are the same or different; and whether they are all incorruptible, or whether those of corruptible things are corruptible. And the most difficult question of all, and the most disputed one, is whether unity and being are not something different from the substances of existing things, as the Pythagoreans and Plato say, or whether this is not the case, but the underlying subject is something different,” as Empedocles holds of love, another thinker of fire, another of water, and another of air. And we must inquire whether the principles of things are universals or singular things.
καὶ δυνάμει ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ: ἔτι πότερον ἄλλως ἢ κατὰ κίνησιν: καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα ἀπορίαν ἂν παράσχοι πολλήν.	188. Again, we must inquire whether they exist potentially or actually. And also whether they are principles of things in some other way or in reference to motion; for these questions present great difficulty.
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις πότερον οἱ ἀριθμοὶ καὶ τὰ μήκη καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ αἱ στιγμαὶ οὐσίαι τινές εἰσιν ἢ οὔ, κἂν εἰ οὐσίαι πότερον [15] κεχωρισμέναι τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἢ ἐνυπάρχουσαι ἐν τούτοις; περὶ γὰρ τούτων ἁπάντων οὐ μόνον χαλεπὸν τὸ εὐπορῆσαι τῆς ἀληθείας ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ τὸ διαπορῆσαι τῷ λόγῳ ῥᾴδιον καλῶς.	189. And in addition to these questions we must inquire whether numbers or lengths and points are somehow substances or not. And if they are substances, whether they are separate from sensible things or are found in them. Concerning all these matters it is not only difficult to discover what is true, but it is not even easy to state the problems well.

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 2: 996a 18-996b 26
πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ ὧν πρῶτον εἴπομεν, πότερον μιᾶς ἢ πλειόνων ἐστὶν ἐπιστημῶν θεωρῆσαι πάντα τὰ γένη τῶν [20] αἰτίων.	190. Therefore let us discuss first the problem about which we first spoke (181): whether it is the office of one science or of many to study all the classes of causes.
μιᾶς μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμης πῶς ἂν εἴη μὴ ἐναντίας οὔσας τὰς ἀρχὰς γνωρίζειν;	191. For how will it be the office of one science to come to principles since they are not contrary?
ἔτι δὲ πολλοῖς τῶν ὄντων οὐχ ὑπάρχουσι πᾶσαι: τίνα γὰρ τρόπον οἷόν τε κινήσεως ἀρχὴν εἶναι τοῖς ἀκινήτοις ἢ τὴν τἀγαθοῦ φύσιν, εἴπερ ἅπαν ὃ ἂν ᾖ ἀγαθὸν καθ᾽ αὑτὸ καὶ διὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν τέλος ἐστὶν [25] καὶ οὕτως αἴτιον ὅτι ἐκείνου ἕνεκα καὶ γίγνεται καὶ ἔστι τἆλλα, τὸ δὲ τέλος καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα πράξεώς τινός ἐστι τέλος, αἱ δὲ πράξεις πᾶσαι μετὰ κινήσεως; ὥστ᾽ ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις οὐκ ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο ταύτην εἶναι τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐδ᾽ εἶναί τι αὐτοαγαθόν. διὸ καὶ ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν οὐθὲν δείκνυται διὰ [30] ταύτης τῆς αἰτίας, οὐδ᾽ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις οὐδεμία διότι βέλτιον ἢ χεῖρον, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ τὸ παράπαν μέμνηται οὐθεὶς οὐθενὸς τῶν τοιούτων, ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα τῶν σοφιστῶν τινὲς οἷον Ἀρίστιππος προεπηλάκιζεν αὐτάς: ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις, καὶ ταῖς βαναύσοις, οἷον ἐν τεκτονικῇ καὶ σκυτικῇ, διότι [35] βέλτιον ἢ χεῖρον λέγεσθαι πάντα, τὰς δὲ μαθηματικὰς οὐθένα ποιεῖσθαι λόγον περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν.	192. Furthermore, in the case of many existing things not all the principles are present. For how can a principle of motion be present in all immobile things, or how can the nature of the good be found there? For everything which is a good in itself and by reason of its own nature is an end and thus a cause, because it is for its sake that other things come to be and exist. Further, the end and that for the sake of which something comes to be is the terminus of some action. But all actions involve motion. Therefore it would be impossible for this principle to be present in immobile things, nor could there be an autoagathon, i.e., a good in itself. Hence in mathematics too nothing is proved by means of this cause, nor is there any demonstration on the grounds that a thing is better or worse. Nor does anyone make any mention at all of anything of this kind. And for this reason some of the Sophists, for example, Aristippus, disregarded these. For in the other arts, even in the servile ones, such as building and cobbling, all things are to be explained on the grounds that they are better or worse; but the mathematical sciences give no account of things which are good or evil.
[996β] [1] - ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ γε πλείους ἐπιστῆμαι τῶν αἰτίων εἰσὶ καὶ ἑτέρα ἑτέρας ἀρχῆς, τίνα τούτων φατέον εἶναι τὴν ζητουμένην, ἢ τίνα μάλιστα τοῦ πράγματος τοῦ ζητουμένου ἐπιστήμονα τῶν ἐχόντων [5] αὐτάς;	193. But on the other hand, if there are many sciences of the causes, and different sciences for different principles, which of these must be said to be the one that is being sought, or which one of those who have them is best informed about the subject under investigation?
ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τῷ αὐτῷ πάντας τοὺς τρόπους τοὺς τῶν αἰτίων ὑπάρχειν, οἷον οἰκίας ὅθεν μὲν ἡ κίνησις ἡ τέχνη καὶ ὁ οἰκοδόμος, οὗ δ᾽ ἕνεκα τὸ ἔργον, ὕλη δὲ γῆ καὶ λίθοι, τὸ δ᾽ εἶδος ὁ λόγος.	194. For it is possible for the same thing to have all the classes of causes; for example, in the case of a house the source of motion is the art and the builder, the reason for which is its function, the matter is earth and stones, and the form is the plan.
ἐκ μὲν οὖν τῶν πάλαι διωρισμένων τίνα χρὴ καλεῖν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν σοφίαν ἔχει λόγον ἑκάστην [10] προσαγορεύειν: ᾗ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχικωτάτη καὶ ἡγεμονικωτάτη καὶ ᾗ ὥσπερ δούλας οὐδ᾽ ἀντειπεῖν τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιστήμας δίκαιον, ἡ τοῦ τέλους καὶ τἀγαθοῦ τοιαύτη (τούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα τἆλλα),	195. Therefore, from the things which were established a little while ago (14-26: C 36- 51) as to which of the sciences one should call wisdom, there is reason for calling every one of them such. For inasmuch as wisdom takes precedence and is a more authoritative science, and one which the others, like slaves, have no right to contradict, then the science which deals with the end and the good is such a science, because other things are for the sake of this.
ᾗ δὲ τῶν πρώτων αἰτίων καὶ τοῦ μάλιστα ἐπιστητοῦ διωρίσθη εἶναι, ἡ τῆς οὐσίας ἂν εἴη τοιαύτη: πολλαχῶς γὰρ [15] ἐπισταμένων τὸ αὐτὸ μᾶλλον μὲν εἰδέναι φαμὲν τὸν τῷ εἶναι γνωρίζοντα τί τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ τῷ μὴ εἶναι, αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων ἕτερον ἑτέρου μᾶλλον, καὶ μάλιστα τὸν τί ἐστιν ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τὸν πόσον ἢ ποῖον ἢ τί ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν πέφυκεν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ εἰδέναι ἕκαστον καὶ ὧν ἀποδείξεις [20] εἰσί, τότ᾽ οἰόμεθα ὑπάρχειν ὅταν εἰδῶμεν τί ἐστιν (οἷον τί ἐστι τὸ τετραγωνίζειν, ὅτι μέσης εὕρεσις: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων),	196. But insofar as wisdom has been defined (24: C 49) as the science of first causes and of what is most knowable, such a science will be about substance. For while a subject may be known in many ways, we say that he who knows what a thing is in its being knows it better than he who knows it in its nonbeing. And in the former case one knows better than another, especially he who knows what a thing is, and not how great it is or of what sort it is or anything that it is naturally disposed to do or to undergo. Further, in the case of other things too we think that we know every single thing, and those of which there are demonstrations, when we know what each is, for example, what squaring is, because it is finding the middle term. The same thing is true in other cases.
περὶ δὲ τὰς γενέσεις καὶ τὰς πράξεις καὶ περὶ πᾶσαν μεταβολὴν ὅταν εἰδῶμεν τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς κινήσεως: τοῦτο δ᾽ ἕτερον καὶ ἀντικείμενον τῷ τέλει, ὥστ᾽ ἄλλης ἂν [25] δόξειεν ἐπιστήμης εἶναι τὸ θεωρῆσαι τῶν αἰτίων τούτων ἕκαστον.	197. But with regard to processes of generation and actions and every change, we think that we know these perfectly when we know the principle of motion. But this differs from and is opposite to the end of motion. And for this reason it seems to be the province of a different science to speculate about each one of these causes.

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 2: 996b 26-997a 15
ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀποδεικτικῶν ἀρχῶν, πότερον μιᾶς ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμης ἢ πλειόνων, ἀμφισβητήσιμόν ἐστιν (λέγω [28] δὲ ἀποδεικτικὰς τὰς κοινὰς δόξας ἐξ ὧν ἅπαντες δεικνύουσιν) οἷον ὅτι πᾶν ἀναγκαῖον ἢ φάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι, καὶ [30] ἀδύνατον ἅμα εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὅσαι ἄλλαι τοιαῦται προτάσεις, πότερον μία τούτων ἐπιστήμη καὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἢ ἑτέρα, κἂν εἰ μὴ μία, ποτέραν χρὴ προσαγορεύειν τὴν ζητουμένην νῦν.	198. But with respect to the principles of demonstration there is also the problem whether they are studied by one science or by many. By principles of demonstration I mean the common axioms from which fall] demonstrations proceed, e.g., “everything must either be affirmed or denied,” and “it is impossible both to be and not to be at the same time,” and all other such propositions. Is there one science which deals with these principles and with substance or are there different sciences? And, if not one, which of the two must be called the one that is now being sought?
μιᾶς μὲν οὖν οὐκ εὔλογον εἶναι: τί γὰρ μᾶλλον γεωμετρίας ἢ ὁποιασοῦν περὶ τούτων ἐστὶν ἴδιον τὸ ἐπαΐειν; [35] εἴπερ οὖν ὁμοίως μὲν ὁποιασοῦν ἐστίν, ἁπασῶν δὲ μὴ ἐνδέχεται, [997α] [1] ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὕτως οὐδὲ τῆς γνωριζούσης τὰς οὐσίας ἴδιόν ἐστι τὸ γιγνώσκειν περὶ αὐτῶν.	199. Now it would be unreasonable that these things should be studied by one science; for why should the study of these be proper to geometry rather than to any other science? In a similar way, then, if this study pertains to any science but cannot pertain to all, an understanding of these principles is no more proper to the science which studies substance than it is to any other science.
ἅμα δὲ καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἔσται αὐτῶν ἐπιστήμη; τί μὲν γὰρ ἕκαστον τούτων τυγχάνει ὂν καὶ νῦν γνωρίζομεν (χρῶνται γοῦν ὡς γιγνωσκομένοις [5] αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄλλαι τέχναι): εἰ δὲ ἀποδεικτικὴ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐστί, δεήσει τι γένος εἶναι ὑποκείμενον καὶ τὰ μὲν πάθη τὰ δ᾽ ἀξιώματ᾽ αὐτῶν (περὶ πάντων γὰρ ἀδύνατον ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι), ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἔκ τινων εἶναι καὶ περί τι καὶ τινῶν τὴν ἀπόδειξιν: ὥστε συμβαίνει πάντων εἶναι γένος ἕν [10] τι τῶν δεικνυμένων, πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ ἀποδεικτικαὶ χρῶνται τοῖς ἀξιώμασιν.	200. But at the same time how will there be a science of these principles? For we already know what each one of them is; and therefore the other arts use them as something known. However, if there is demonstration of them, there will have to be some subject-genus, and some of the principles will have to be properties and others axioms. For there cannot be demonstration of all things, since demonstration must proceed from something, and be about something, and [be demonstration] of certain things. It follows, then, that there is a single genus of demonstrable things; for all demonstrative sciences use axioms.
ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ ἑτέρα ἡ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ ἡ περὶ τούτων, ποτέρα κυριωτέρα καὶ προτέρα πέφυκεν αὐτῶν; καθόλου γὰρ μάλιστα καὶ πάντων ἀρχαὶ τὰ ἀξιώματά ἐστιν, εἴ τ᾽ ἐστὶ μὴ τοῦ φιλοσόφου, τίνος ἔσται περὶ αὐτῶν ἄλλου τὸ [15] θεωρῆσαι τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ ψεῦδος;	201. But on the other hand, if the science which considers substance differs from the one which considers axioms, which of these sciences is the more important and prior one? For axioms are most universal and are the principles of all things. And if it does not belong to the philosopher to establish the truth and falsity [of these principles], to what other person will it belong?

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 2: 997a 15-997a 34
ὅλως τε τῶν οὐσιῶν πότερον μία πασῶν ἐστὶν ἢ πλείους ἐπιστῆμαι;	202. And there is the problem whether there is one science which deals with all substances, or many sciences.
εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ μία, ποίας οὐσίας θετέον τὴν ἐπιστήμην ταύτην;	203. If there is not one science, then with what substances must this science deal?
τὸ δὲ μίαν πασῶν οὐκ εὔλογον: καὶ γὰρ ἂν ἀποδεικτικὴ μία περὶ πάντων εἴη τῶν συμβεβηκότων, εἴπερ πᾶσα ἀποδεικτικὴ περί [20] τι ὑποκείμενον θεωρεῖ τὰ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ συμβεβηκότα ἐκ τῶν κοινῶν δοξῶν. περὶ οὖν τὸ αὐτὸ γένος τὰ συμβεβηκότα καθ᾽ αὑτὰ τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστὶ θεωρῆσαι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν δοξῶν. περί τε γὰρ ὃ μιᾶς καὶ ἐξ ὧν μιᾶς, εἴτε τῆς αὐτῆς εἴτε ἄλλης, ὥστε καὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα, εἴθ᾽ αὗται θεωροῦσιν εἴτ᾽ [25] ἐκ τούτων μία.	204. But it is unreasonable that there should be one science of all substances; for then one science would demonstrate all essential accidents, i.e., if it is true that every demonstrative science speculates about the essential accidents of some subject by proceeding from common opinions. Hence it is the office of the same science to study the essential accidents of the same subject-genus by proceeding from the same opinions. For it belongs to one science to consider that something is so, and it belongs to one science to consider the principles from which demonstrations proceed, whether to the same science or to a different one. Hence it belongs to one science to consider accidents, whether they are studied by these sciences or by one derived from them.
ἔτι δὲ πότερον περὶ τὰς οὐσίας μόνον ἡ θεωρία ἐστὶν ἢ καὶ περὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα ταύταις; λέγω δ᾽ οἷον, εἰ τὸ στερεὸν οὐσία τίς ἐστι καὶ γραμμαὶ καὶ ἐπίπεδα, πότερον τῆς αὐτῆς ταῦτα γνωρίζειν ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμης καὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα περὶ ἕκαστον γένος περὶ ὧν αἱ μαθηματικαὶ [30] δεικνύουσιν, ἢ ἄλλης.	205. Further, there is the problem whether this science is concerned only with substances or also with accidents. I mean, for example, that if a solid is a kind of substance, and also lines and surfaces, the question arises whether it is the function of the same science to know these and also the accidents of each class of things about which the mathematical sciences make demonstrations, or whether it is the concern of a different science.
εἰ μὲν γὰρ τῆς αὐτῆς, ἀποδεικτική τις ἂν εἴη καὶ ἡ τῆς οὐσίας, οὐ δοκεῖ δὲ τοῦ τί ἐστιν ἀπόδειξις εἶναι:	206. For if it is the concern of the same science, a particular one will undertake these demonstrations and this will be the one which deals with substance. However, there does not seem to be any demonstration of the quiddity.
εἰ δ᾽ ἑτέρας, τίς ἔσται ἡ θεωροῦσα περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν τὰ συμβεβηκότα; τοῦτο γὰρ ἀποδοῦναι παγχάλεπον.	207. But if it is the concern of a different science, which science will it be that studies the accidents of substances? For to solve this is very difficult.

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapters 2 & 3: 997a 34-998a 21
ἔτι δὲ πότερον τὰς αἰσθητὰς οὐσίας μόνας εἶναι [35] φατέον ἢ καὶ παρὰ ταύτας ἄλλας, καὶ πότερον μοναχῶς ἢ πλείω γένη τετύχηκεν ὄντα τῶν οὐσιῶν, [997β] [1] οἷον οἱ λέγοντες τά τε εἴδη καὶ τὰ μεταξύ, περὶ ἃ τὰς μαθηματικὰς εἶναί φασιν ἐπιστήμας;	208. Furthermore, there is the problem whether sensible substances alone must be said to exist, or others besides these. And whether there is one genus or many genera of substances, as is held by those who speak of the Forms and the intermediate entities with which they say the mathematical sciences deal.
ὡς μὲν οὖν λέγομεν τὰ εἴδη αἴτιά τε καὶ οὐσίας εἶναι καθ᾽ ἑαυτὰς εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις περὶ [5] αὐτῶν:	209. Now the way in which we say that the Forms are both causes and substances in themselves has been treated in our first discussions concerning all of these things (69).
πολλαχῇ δὲ ἐχόντων δυσκολίαν, οὐθενὸς ἧττον ἄτοπον τὸ φάναι μὲν εἶναί τινας φύσεις παρὰ τὰς ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ, ταύτας δὲ τὰς αὐτὰς φάναι τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς πλὴν ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἀΐδια τὰ δὲ φθαρτά. αὐτὸ γὰρ ἄνθρωπόν φασιν εἶναι καὶ ἵππον καὶ ὑγίειαν, ἄλλο δ᾽ οὐδέν, παραπλήσιον [10] ποιοῦντες τοῖς θεοὺς μὲν εἶναι φάσκουσιν ἀνθρωποειδεῖς δέ: οὔτε γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐποίουν ἢ ἀνθρώπους ἀϊδίους, οὔθ᾽ οὗτοι τὰ εἴδη ἄλλ᾽ ἢ αἰσθητὰ ἀΐδια.	210. But while they involve difficulty in many respects, it is no less absurd to say that there are certain other natures besides those which exist in the heavens, and that these are the same as sensible things, except that the former are eternal whereas the latter are corruptible. For they [i.e., the Platonists] say nothing more or less than that there is a man-in-himself and horse-in- itself and health-in-itself, which differ in no respect [from their sensible counterparts]; in which they act like those who say that there are gods and that they are of human form. For just as the latter made nothing else than eternal men, in a similar way the former make the Forms nothing else than eternal sensible things.
ἔτι δὲ εἴ τις παρὰ τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ τὰ μεταξὺ θήσεται, πολλὰς ἀπορίας ἕξει: δῆλον γὰρ ὡς ὁμοίως γραμμαί τε παρά τ᾽ αὐτὰς καὶ [15] τὰς αἰσθητὰς ἔσονται καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἄλλων γενῶν: ὥστ᾽ ἐπείπερ ἡ ἀστρολογία μία τούτων ἐστίν, ἔσται τις καὶ οὐρανὸς παρὰ τὸν αἰσθητὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ ἥλιός τε καὶ σελήνη καὶ τἆλλα ὁμοίως τὰ κατὰ τὸν οὐρανόν. καίτοι πῶς δεῖ πιστεῦσαι τούτοις; οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀκίνητον εὔλογον εἶναι, κινούμενον δὲ [20] καὶ παντελῶς ἀδύνατον: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ὧν ἡ ὀπτικὴ πραγματεύεται καὶ ἡ ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἁρμονική: καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα ἀδύνατον εἶναι παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ διὰ τὰς αὐτὰς αἰτίας: εἰ γὰρ ἔστιν αἰσθητὰ μεταξὺ καὶ αἰσθήσεις, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ζῷα ἔσονται μεταξὺ αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν φθαρτῶν.	211. Furthermore, if anyone holds that there are intermediate entities in addition to the Forms and sensible substances, he will face many problems. For evidently there will be, in like manner, lines in addition to ordinary sensible lines, and the same will be true of other classes of things. Therefore, since astronomy is one of these [mathematical sciences], there will be a heaven in addition to the one we perceive, and a sun and moon, and the same will be true of the other celestial bodies. And how are we to accept these things? For it is unreasonable that a heaven should be immobile, but that it should be mobile is altogether impossible. The same thing is true of the things with which the science of perspective is concerned, and of harmonics in mathematics, because for the same reasons it is also impossible that these should exist apart from sensible things. For if there are intermediate sensible objects and senses, evidently there will be intermediate animals between animals-in-themselves and those which are corruptible.
[25] ἀπορήσειε δ᾽ ἄν τις καὶ περὶ ποῖα τῶν ὄντων δεῖ ζητεῖν ταύτας τὰς ἐπιστήμας. εἰ γὰρ τούτῳ διοίσει τῆς γεωδαισίας ἡ γεωμετρία μόνον, ὅτι ἡ μὲν τούτων ἐστὶν ὧν αἰσθανόμεθα ἡ δ᾽ οὐκ αἰσθητῶν, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ παρ᾽ ἰατρικὴν ἔσται τις ἐπιστήμη καὶ παρ᾽ ἑκάστην τῶν ἄλλων μεταξὺ αὐτῆς τε ἰατρικῆς [30] καὶ τῆσδε τῆς ἰατρικῆς: καίτοι πῶς τοῦτο δυνατόν; καὶ γὰρ ἂν ὑγιείν᾽ ἄττα εἴη παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ὑγιεινόν.	212. Again, one might also raise the question as to what things these sciences must investigate. For if geometry, which is the art of measuring the earth, differs from geodesy, which is the art of dividing the earth, only in this respect that the latter deals with things which are perceptible by the senses, whereas the former deals with those which are imperceptible, evidently there will be, in addition to the science of medicine, another science midway between the science of medicine itself and this particular science of medicine; and this will be true of the other sciences. But how is this possible? For then there will be certain healthy things besides those which are sensible and besides health-in-itself.
ἅμα δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀληθές, ὡς ἡ γεωδαισία τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐστὶ μεγεθῶν καὶ φθαρτῶν: ἐφθείρετο γὰρ ἂν φθειρομένων.	213. Similarly, neither does it seem that geodesy is concerned with continuous quantities which are sensible and corruptible. For in this case it would be destroyed when they are destroyed.
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἂν εἴη μεγεθῶν [35] οὐδὲ περὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἡ ἀστρολογία τόνδε. [998α] [1] οὔτε γὰρ αἱ αἰσθηταὶ γραμμαὶ τοιαῦταί εἰσιν οἵας λέγει ὁ γεωμέτρης (οὐθὲν γὰρ εὐθὺ τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὕτως οὐδὲ στρογγύλον: ἅπτεται γὰρ τοῦ κανόνος οὐ κατὰ στιγμὴν ὁ κύκλος ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγεν ἐλέγχων τοὺς γεωμέτρας), οὔθ᾽ αἱ κινήσεις καὶ [5] ἕλικες τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ὅμοιαι περὶ ὧν ἡ ἀστρολογία ποιεῖται τοὺς λόγους, οὔτε τὰ σημεῖα τοῖς ἄστροις τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει φύσιν.	214. Nor again will astronomy deal with sensible continuous quantities, or with this heaven. For the lines we perceive by the senses are not such as those of which geometry speaks, since none of the things perceived by the senses are straight or round in this way. For the circle does not touch the rule at a point, but in the way in which Protagoras spoke in arguing against the geometricians. Neither are the motions or revolutions of the heavens similar to the things of which geometry speaks, nor do points have the same nature as the stars.
εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἵ φασιν εἶναι μὲν τὰ μεταξὺ ταῦτα λεγόμενα τῶν τε εἰδῶν καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, οὐ μὴν χωρίς γε τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τούτοις: οἷς τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἀδύνατα πάντα [10] μὲν πλείονος λόγου διελθεῖν, ἱκανὸν δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα θεωρῆσαι.	215. However, there are also some who say that these intermediate entities, which are below the Forms and above sensible things, do not exist outside of sensible things but in them. But to enumerate all the impossible consequences which follow from this theory would require too long a discussion. It will be sufficient to propose the following consideration.
οὔτε γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτων εὔλογον ἔχειν οὕτω μόνον, ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὰ εἴδη ἐνδέχοιτ᾽ ἂν ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς εἶναι (τοῦ γὰρ αὐτοῦ λόγου ἀμφότερα ταῦτά ἐστιν),	216. It is unreasonable that this should be so only in the case of such things, but evidently it is also possible for the Forms to exist in sensible things, because both of these views depend on the same argument.
ἔτι δὲ δύο στερεὰ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τόπῳ,	217. Furthermore, it would be necessary for two solids to occupy the same place.
καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἀκίνητα [15] ἐν κινουμένοις γε ὄντα τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς.	218. And [the objects of mathematics] would not be immobile since they exist in sensible things, which are moved.
ὅλως δὲ τίνος ἕνεκ᾽ ἄν τις θείη εἶναι μὲν αὐτά, εἶναι δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς; ταὐτὰ γὰρ συμβήσεται ἄτοπα τοῖς προειρημένοις: ἔσται γὰρ οὐρανός τις παρὰ τὸν οὐρανόν, πλήν γ᾽ οὐ χωρὶς ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τόπῳ: ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀδυνατώτερον. [20]	219. Moreover, on the whole, to what end would anyone hold that they exist but exist in sensible things? For the same absurdities as those described will apply to these suppositions. For there will be a heaven in addition to the one which we perceive, although it will not be separate but in the same place; but this is quite impossible.
Chapter 3
περί τε τούτων οὖν ἀπορία πολλὴ πῶς δεῖ θέμενον τυχεῖν τῆς ἀληθείας,	In these matters, then, it is difficult to see how it is possible to have any positive truth.

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 3: 998a 20-999a 23
καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν πότερον δεῖ τὰ γένη στοιχεῖα καὶ ἀρχὰς ὑπολαμβάνειν ἢ μᾶλλον ἐξ ὧν ἐνυπαρχόντων ἐστὶν ἕκαστον πρώτων,	220. Concerning the principles of things there is the problem whether genera must be regarded as the elements and principles of things, or rather the first things of which each thing is composed inasmuch as they are intrinsic.
οἷον φωνῆς στοιχεῖα καὶ ἀρχαὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι ταῦτ᾽ ἐξ ὧν σύγκεινται αἱ φωναὶ [25] πρώτων, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τὸ κοινὸν ἡ φωνή: καὶ τῶν διαγραμμάτων ταῦτα στοιχεῖα λέγομεν ὧν αἱ ἀποδείξεις ἐνυπάρχουσιν ἐν ταῖς τῶν ἄλλων ἀποδείξεσιν ἢ πάντων ἢ τῶν πλείστων,	221. just as the elements and principles of a word seem to be those things of which all words are first composed, but not word in common. And just as we say that the elements of diagrams are those things whose demonstrations are found in the demonstrations of others, either of all or of most of them.
ἔτι δὲ τῶν σωμάτων καὶ οἱ πλείω λέγοντες εἶναι στοιχεῖα καὶ οἱ ἕν, ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται καὶ ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκεν ἀρχὰς λέγουσιν [30] εἶναι, οἷον Ἐμπεδοκλῆς πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ τὰ μετὰ τούτων στοιχεῖά φησιν εἶναι ἐξ ὧν ἐστὶ τὰ ὄντα ἐνυπαρχόντων, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὡς γένη λέγει ταῦτα τῶν ὄντων.	222. Furthermore, those who say that the elements of bodies are many, and those who say that they are one, call the things of which bodies are composed and constituted their principles, as Empedocles says that fire and water and those things which are included with these are the elements from which existing things derive their being; but he does not speak of them as the genera of existing things.
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἴ τις ἐθέλει τὴν φύσιν ἀθρεῖν, [998β] [1] οἷον κλίνην ἐξ ὧν μορίων συνέστηκε καὶ πῶς συγκειμένων, τότε γνωρίζει τὴν φύσιν αὐτῆς. ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων τῶν λόγων οὐκ ἂν εἴησαν αἱ ἀρχαὶ τὰ γένη τῶν ὄντων:	223. And again if anyone wished to speculate about the nature of other things, in finding out in regard to each (a bed, for example) of what parts it is made and how it is put together, he will come to know its nature. And according to these arguments genera are not the principles of existing things.
εἰ δ᾽ ἕκαστον μὲν [5] γνωρίζομεν διὰ τῶν ὁρισμῶν, ἀρχαὶ δὲ τὰ γένη τῶν ὁρισμῶν εἰσίν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τῶν ὁριστῶν ἀρχὰς εἶναι τὰ γένη.	224. But if we know each thing through definitions, and genera are the principles of definitions, genera must be the principles of the things defined.
κἂν [7] εἰ ἔστι τὴν τῶν ὄντων λαβεῖν ἐπιστήμην τὸ τῶν εἰδῶν λαβεῖν καθ᾽ ἃ λέγονται τὰ ὄντα, τῶν γε εἰδῶν ἀρχαὶ τὰ γένη εἰσίν.	225. And if in order to acquire scientific knowledge of existing things it is necessary to acquire scientific knowledge of their species, according to which they are said to be beings, then genera are the principles of species.
φαίνονται δέ τινες καὶ τῶν λεγόντων στοιχεῖα τῶν ὄντων τὸ [10] ἓν ἢ τὸ ὂν ἢ τὸ μέγα καὶ μικρὸν ὡς γένεσιν αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι.	226. Moreover, some of those who say that the elements of existing things are the one or being or the great and small, seem to use these as genera.
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀμφοτέρως γε οἷόν τε λέγειν τὰς ἀρχάς. ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος τῆς οὐσίας εἷς: ἕτερος δ᾽ ἔσται ὁ διὰ τῶν γενῶν ὁρισμὸς καὶ ὁ λέγων ἐξ ὧν ἔστιν ἐνυπαρχόντων.	227. But it is not possible to speak of principles in both ways; for the meaning of substance is one. Therefore a definition by means of genera will differ from one which gives the intrinsic constituents.
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις εἰ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα ἀρχαὶ τὰ γένη εἰσί, [15] πότερον δεῖ νομίζειν τὰ πρῶτα τῶν γενῶν ἀρχὰς ἢ τὰ ἔσχατα κατηγορούμενα ἐπὶ τῶν ἀτόμων; καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ἔχει ἀμφισβήτησιν.	228. Again, if genera are the principles of things in the fullest sense, there is the question whether the first genera must be thought to be principles, or those which are lowest and are predicated of individual things. For this also raises a problem.
εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀεὶ τὰ καθόλου μᾶλλον ἀρχαί, φανερὸν ὅτι τὰ ἀνωτάτω τῶν γενῶν: ταῦτα γὰρ λέγεται κατὰ πάντων. τοσαῦται οὖν ἔσονται ἀρχαὶ τῶν ὄντων ὅσαπερ [20] τὰ πρῶτα γένη, ὥστ᾽ ἔσται τό τε ὂν καὶ τὸ ἓν ἀρχαὶ καὶ οὐσίαι: ταῦτα γὰρ κατὰ πάντων μάλιστα λέγεται τῶν ὄντων. οὐχ οἷόν τε δὲ τῶν ὄντων ἓν εἶναι γένος οὔτε τὸ ἓν οὔτε τὸ ὄν: ἀνάγκη μὲν γὰρ τὰς διαφορὰς ἑκάστου γένους καὶ εἶναι καὶ μίαν εἶναι ἑκάστην, ἀδύνατον δὲ κατηγορεῖσθαι ἢ τὰ εἴδη τοῦ [25] γένους ἐπὶ τῶν οἰκείων διαφορῶν ἢ τὸ γένος ἄνευ τῶν αὐτοῦ εἰδῶν, ὥστ᾽ εἴπερ τὸ ἓν γένος ἢ τὸ ὄν, οὐδεμία διαφορὰ οὔτε ὂν οὔτε ἓν ἔσται. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ μὴ γένη, οὐδ᾽ ἀρχαὶ ἔσονται, εἴπερ ἀρχαὶ τὰ γένη.	229. For if universals are the principles of things to a greater degree, evidently these must be the highest genera, because it is most properly these which are predicated of all existing things. Therefore there will be as many principles of existing things as there are first genera. Hence being and unity will be principles and substances, for it is these especially which are predicated of all existing things. It is impossible, however, that unity or being should be a single genus of existing things; for it is necessary both that the differences of each genus exist and that each be one. But it is impossible either that species be predicated of the differences of their own genera, or that a genus be so predicated independently of its species. If, then, unity or being is a genus, no difference will be one and a being. But if unity and being are not genera, neither will they be principles, supposing that genera are principles.
ἔτι καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ συλλαμβανόμενα μετὰ τῶν διαφορῶν ἔσται γένη μέχρι τῶν ἀτόμων [30] (νῦν δὲ τὰ μὲν δοκεῖ τὰ δ᾽ οὐ δοκεῖ): πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἔτι μᾶλλον αἱ διαφοραὶ ἀρχαὶ ἢ τὰ γένη: εἰ δὲ καὶ αὗται ἀρχαί, ἄπειροι ὡς εἰπεῖν ἀρχαὶ γίγνονται, ἄλλως τε κἄν τις τὸ πρῶτον γένος ἀρχὴν τιθῇ.	230. Further, those things which are intermediate and are taken along with differences will be genera down to individuals. But some seem to be such, whereas others do not. Again, differences are principles to a greater degree than genera; and if they are principles, principles will be infinite in number, so to speak. And [this will appear] in another way also if one holds that the first genus is a principle.
[999α] [1] ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ εἰ μᾶλλόν γε ἀρχοειδὲς τὸ ἕν ἐστιν, ἓν δὲ τὸ ἀδιαίρετον, ἀδιαίρετον δὲ ἅπαν ἢ κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν ἢ κατ᾽ εἶδος, πρότερον δὲ τὸ κατ᾽ εἶδος, τὰ δὲ γένη διαιρετὰ εἰς εἴδη, μᾶλλον ἂν ἓν τὸ [5] ἔσχατον εἴη κατηγορούμενον: οὐ γάρ ἐστι γένος ἅνθρωπος τῶν τινῶν ἀνθρώπων.	231. But, on the other hand, if unity is a specific principle to a greater degree, and unity is indivisible, and everything indivisible is such either in quantity or in species, and what is indivisible in species is prior, and genera are divisible into species, then it will be rather the lowest predicate which is one. For man is not the genus of particular men.
ἔτι ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερόν ἐστιν, οὐχ οἷόν τε τὸ ἐπὶ τούτων εἶναί τι παρὰ ταῦτα (οἷον εἰ πρώτη τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἡ δυάς, οὐκ ἔσται τις ἀριθμὸς παρὰ τὰ εἴδη τῶν ἀριθμῶν: ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ σχῆμα παρὰ τὰ εἴδη [10] τῶν σχημάτων: εἰ δὲ μὴ τούτων, σχολῇ τῶν γε ἄλλων ἔσται τὰ γένη παρὰ τὰ εἴδη: τούτων γὰρ δοκεῖ μάλιστα εἶναι γένη): ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀτόμοις οὐκ ἔστι τὸ μὲν πρότερον τὸ δ᾽ ὕστερον.	232. Further, in the case of those things to which prior and subsequent apply, it is not possible in their case that there should be something which exists apart from them. For example, if the number two is the first of numbers, there will not be any number apart from the species of numbers; nor, likewise, any figure apart from the species of figures. But if the genera of these things do not [exist apart from the species], then in the case of other things the teaching will be that there are genera apart from the species; for of these things there seem especially to be genera. But among individual things one is not prior and another subsequent.
ἔτι ὅπου τὸ μὲν βέλτιον τὸ δὲ χεῖρον, ἀεὶ τὸ βέλτιον πρότερον: ὥστ᾽ οὐδὲ τούτων ἂν εἴη γένος. ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων [15] μᾶλλον φαίνεται τὰ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀτόμων κατηγορούμενα ἀρχαὶ εἶναι τῶν γενῶν:	233. Further, where one thing is better and another worse, that which is better is always prior; so that there will be no genus of these things. From these considerations, then, it seems that it is the terms predicated of individuals, rather than genera, which are principles.
πάλιν δὲ πῶς αὖ δεῖ ταύτας ἀρχὰς ὑπολαβεῖν οὐ ῥᾴδιον εἰπεῖν. τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὴν δεῖ καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν εἶναι παρὰ τὰ πράγματα ὧν ἀρχή, καὶ δύνασθαι εἶναι χωριζομένην αὐτῶν: τοιοῦτον δέ τι παρὰ τὸ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον [20] εἶναι διὰ τί ἄν τις ὑπολάβοι, πλὴν ὅτι καθόλου κατηγορεῖται καὶ κατὰ πάντων; ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ διὰ τοῦτο, τὰ μᾶλλον καθόλου μᾶλλον θετέον ἀρχάς: ὥστε ἀρχαὶ τὰ πρῶτ᾽ ἂν εἴησαν γένη.	234. But again it is not easy to state how one must conceive these to be the principles of things. For a principle or cause must be distinct from the things of which it is the principle or cause, and must be able to exist apart from them. But why should one think that anything such as this exists apart from singular things, except that it is predicated universally and of all things? But if this is the reason, then the more universal things are, the more they must be held to be principles. Hence the first genera will be principles of things.

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 4: 999a 24-999b 20
ἔστι δ᾽ ἐχομένη τε τούτων ἀπορία καὶ πασῶν χαλεπωτάτη [25] καὶ ἀναγκαιοτάτη θεωρῆσαι, περὶ ἧς ὁ λόγος ἐφέστηκε νῦν.	235. But there is a problem connected with these things, which is the most difficult of all and the most necessary to consider, with which our analysis is now concerned.
εἴτε γὰρ μὴ ἔστι τι παρὰ τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα, τὰ δὲ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα ἄπειρα, τῶν δ᾽ ἀπείρων πῶς ἐνδέχεται λαβεῖν ἐπιστήμην; ᾗ γὰρ ἕν τι καὶ ταὐτόν, καὶ ᾗ καθόλου τι ὑπάρχει, ταύτῃ πάντα γνωρίζομεν.	236. For if there is nothing apart from singular things, and singular things are infinite in number, how is it possible to acquire scientific knowledge of them? For insofar as there is something that is one and the same, and insofar as there is something universal [which relates to singular things], to that extent we acquire knowledge of them.
ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τοῦτο [30] ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι καὶ δεῖ τι εἶναι παρὰ τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα, ἀναγκαῖον ἂν εἴη τὰ γένη εἶναι παρὰ τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα, ἤτοι τὰ ἔσχατα ἢ τὰ πρῶτα: τοῦτο δ᾽ ὅτι ἀδύνατον ἄρτι διηπορήσαμεν.	237. But if this is necessary, and there must be something apart from singular things, it will be necessary that genera exist apart from singular things, and they will be either the last or the first. But the impossibility of this has already appeared from our discussion.
ἔτι εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα ἔστι τι παρὰ τὸ σύνολον ὅταν κατηγορηθῇ τι τῆς ὕλης, πότερον, εἰ ἔστι, παρὰ πάντα δεῖ εἶναί τι, ἢ παρὰ μὲν ἔνια εἶναι παρὰ δ᾽ ἔνια μὴ εἶναι, ἢ παρ᾽ οὐδέν;	238. Further, if there is something apart from the concrete whole (which is most disputable), as when something is predicated of matter, if there is such a thing, the problem arises whether it must exist apart from all concrete wholes, or apart from some and not from others, or apart from none.
[999β] [1] εἰ μὲν οὖν μηδέν ἐστι παρὰ τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα, οὐθὲν ἂν εἴη νοητὸν ἀλλὰ πάντα αἰσθητὰ καὶ ἐπιστήμη οὐδενός, εἰ μή τις εἶναι λέγει τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐπιστήμην.	239. If, then, there is nothing apart from singular things, nothing will be intelligible, but all things will be sensible, and there will be no science of anything, unless one might say that sensory perception is science.
ἔτι δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἀΐδιον οὐθὲν οὐδ᾽ ἀκίνητον (τὰ γὰρ αἰσθητὰ [5] πάντα φθείρεται καὶ ἐν κινήσει ἐστίν):	240. Further, neither will anything be eternal or immobile; for all sensible things perish and are subject to motion.
μὴν εἴ γε ἀΐδιον μηθέν ἐστιν, οὐδὲ γένεσιν εἶναι δυνατόν. ἀνάγκη γὰρ εἶναί τι τὸ γιγνόμενον καὶ ἐξ οὗ γίγνεται καὶ τούτων τὸ ἔσχατον ἀγένητον, εἴπερ ἵσταταί τε καὶ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος γενέσθαι ἀδύνατον:	241. But if there is nothing eternal, neither can there be generation; for there must be something which has come to be and something from which it comes to be; and the last of these must be ungenerated, since the process of generation must have a limit, and since it is impossible for anything to come to be from non-being.
ἔτι δὲ γενέσεως οὔσης καὶ κινήσεως ἀνάγκη καὶ πέρας εἶναι (οὔτε [10] γὰρ ἄπειρός ἐστιν οὐδεμία κίνησις ἀλλὰ πάσης ἔστι τέλος, γίγνεσθαί τε οὐχ οἷόν τε τὸ ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι:	242. Further, since generation and motion exist, there must be a terminus; for no motion is infinite but every motion has a terminus. And that which is incapable of coming to be cannot be generated. But that which has come to be must exist as soon as it has come to be.
τὸ δὲ γεγονὸς ἀνάγκη εἶναι ὅτε πρῶτον γέγονεν): ἔτι δ᾽ εἴπερ ἡ ὕλη ἔστι διὰ τὸ ἀγένητος εἶναι, πολὺ ἔτι μᾶλλον εὔλογον εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν, ὅ ποτε ἐκείνη γίγνεται: εἰ γὰρ μήτε τοῦτο ἔσται [15] μήτε ἐκείνη, οὐθὲν ἔσται τὸ παράπαν, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον, ἀνάγκη τι εἶναι παρὰ τὸ σύνολον, τὴν μορφὴν καὶ τὸ εἶδος.	243. Further, if matter exists because it is ungenerated, it is much more reasonable that substance should exist, since that is what it (matter) eventually comes to be. For if neither the one nor the other exists, nothing at all will exist. But if this is impossible, there must be something besides the synolon, and this is the form or specifying principle.
εἰ δ᾽ αὖ τις τοῦτο θήσει, ἀπορία ἐπὶ τίνων τε θήσει τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τίνων οὔ. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ πάντων οὐχ οἷόν τε, φανερόν: οὐ γὰρ ἂν θείημεν εἶναί τινα οἰκίαν παρὰ τὰς τινὰς [20] οἰκίας.	244. But again if anyone holds this to betrue, the problem arises in what cases one may hold this and in what not. For evidently this isnot thought to be so in all cases. For we do not hold that there is a house apart from particular houses.

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 4: 999b 20-1000a
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις πότερον ἡ οὐσία μία πάντων ἔσται, οἷον τῶν ἀνθρώπων;	245. Again, there is the problem whether all things, for example, all men, have a single substance.
ἀλλ᾽ ἄτοπον: ἓν γὰρ πάντα ὧν ἡ οὐσία μία. ἀλλὰ πολλὰ καὶ διάφορα; ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο ἄλογον.	246. But this is absurd; for not all things whose substance is one are themselves one, but are many and different. But this too is untenable.
ἅμα δὲ καὶ πῶς γίγνεται ἡ ὕλη τούτων ἕκαστον καὶ ἔστι τὸ σύνολον ἄμφω ταῦτα;	247. And at the same time there is the problem how matter becomes each of the many things and a concrete whole.
ἔτι δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν [25] καὶ τόδε ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις. εἰ μὲν γὰρ εἴδει εἰσὶν ἕν, οὐθὲν ἔσται ἀριθμῷ ἕν, οὐδ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ ὄν: καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι πῶς ἔσται, εἰ μή τι ἔσται ἓν ἐπὶ πάντων;	248. And again one might also raise this problem about principles. For if they are specifically one, there will be nothing that is numerically one. Nor again will unity itself and being be one. And how will there be science unless there is some unity in all things?
ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ ἀριθμῷ ἓν καὶ μία ἑκάστη τῶν ἀρχῶν, καὶ μὴ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἄλλαι ἄλλων (οἷον τῆσδε τῆς συλλαβῆς [30] τῷ εἴδει τῆς αὐτῆς οὔσης καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ εἴδει αἱ αὐταί: καὶ γὰρ αὗται ὑπάρχουσιν ἀριθμῷ ἕτεραι), εἰ δὲ μὴ οὕτως ἀλλ᾽ αἱ τῶν ὄντων ἀρχαὶ ἀριθμῷ ἕν εἰσιν, οὐκ ἔσται παρὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα οὐθὲν ἕτερον: τὸ γὰρ ἀριθμῷ ἓν ἢ τὸ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον λέγειν διαφέρει οὐθέν: οὕτω γὰρ λέγομεν τὸ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον, τὸ ἀριθμῷ ἕν, καθόλου δὲ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτων. [1000α] [1] ὥσπερ οὖν εἰ τὰ τῆς φωνῆς ἀριθμῷ ἦν στοιχεῖα ὡρισμένα, ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἂν τοσαῦτα εἶναι τὰ πάντα γράμματα ὅσαπερ τὰ στοιχεῖα, μὴ ὄντων γε δύο τῶν αὐτῶν μηδὲ πλειόνων.	249. But, on the other hand, if they are numerically one, each of the principles will also be one, and not as in the case of sensible things, different for different things; for example, if the syllable "ba" is taken as a species, its principles in every case are specifically the same, for they are numerically different. However, if this is not so, but the things which are the principles of beings are numerically one, there will be nothing else besides the elements. For it makes no difference whether we say “numerically one” or “singular,” because it is in this way that we say each thing is numerically one. But the universal is what exists in these. For example, if the elements of a word were limited in number, there would have to be as many letters as there are elements. Indeed, no two of them would be the same, nor would more than two.

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 4: 1000a 5-1001a 3
οὐθενὸς δ᾽ ἐλάττων ἀπορία παραλέλειπται καὶ τοῖς νῦν καὶ τοῖς πρότερον, πότερον αἱ αὐταὶ τῶν φθαρτῶν καὶ τῶν ἀφθάρτων ἀρχαί εἰσιν ἢ ἕτεραι.	250. Again, there is a problem which has been neglected no less by the moderns than by their predecessors: whether the principles of corruptible and incorruptible things are the same or different.
εἰ μὲν γὰρ αἱ αὐταί, πῶς τὰ μὲν φθαρτὰ τὰ δὲ ἄφθαρτα, καὶ διὰ τίν᾽ αἰτίαν;	251. For if they are the same, how is it that some things are incorruptible and others corruptible? And what is the cause?
οἱ μὲν οὖν περὶ Ἡσίοδον καὶ πάντες ὅσοι θεολόγοι [10] μόνον ἐφρόντισαν τοῦ πιθανοῦ τοῦ πρὸς αὑτούς, ἡμῶν δ᾽ ὠλιγώρησαν (θεοὺς γὰρ ποιοῦντες τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ ἐκ θεῶν γεγονέναι, τὰ μὴ γευσάμενα τοῦ νέκταρος καὶ τῆς ἀμβροσίας θνητὰ γενέσθαι φασίν,	252. The followers of Hesiod and all those who were called theologians paid attention only to what was plausible to themselves and have neglected us. For,’ making the principles of things to be gods or generated from the gods, they say that whatever has not tasted nectar and ambrosia became mortal.
δῆλον ὡς ταῦτα τὰ ὀνόματα γνώριμα λέγοντες αὑτοῖς: καίτοι περὶ αὐτῆς τῆς προσφορᾶς [15] τῶν αἰτίων τούτων ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς εἰρήκασιν: εἰ μὲν γὰρ χάριν ἡδονῆς αὐτῶν θιγγάνουσιν, οὐθὲν αἴτια τοῦ εἶναι τὸ νέκταρ καὶ ἡ ἀμβροσία, εἰ δὲ τοῦ εἶναι, πῶς ἂν εἶεν ἀΐδιοι δεόμενοι τροφῆς):	253. And it is clear that they are using these terms in a way known to themselves, but what they have said about the application of these causes is beyond our understanding. For if it is for the sake of pleasure that the gods partake of these things, nectar and ambrosia are not the cause of their being. But if they partake of them to preserve their being, how will the gods be eternal in requiring food?
ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῶν μυθικῶς σοφιζομένων οὐκ ἄξιον μετὰ σπουδῆς σκοπεῖν:	254. But with regard to those who have philosophized by using fables, it is not worth our while to pay any serious attention to them.
παρὰ δὲ τῶν δι᾽ [20] ἀποδείξεως λεγόντων δεῖ πυνθάνεσθαι διερωτῶντας τί δή [21] ποτ᾽ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν ὄντα τὰ μὲν ἀΐδια τὴν φύσιν ἐστὶ τὰ δὲ φθείρεται τῶν ὄντων. ἐπεὶ δὲ οὔτε αἰτίαν λέγουσιν οὔτε εὔλογον οὕτως ἔχειν, δῆλον ὡς οὐχ αἱ αὐταὶ ἀρχαὶ οὐδὲ αἰτίαι αὐτῶν ἂν εἶεν.	255. However, from those who make assertions by means of demonstration it is necessary to find out, by questioning them, why some of the things which are derived from the same principles are eternal in nature and others are corrupted. But since these philosophers mention no cause, and it is unreasonable that things should be as they say, it is clear that the principles and causes of these things will not be the same.
καὶ γὰρ ὅνπερ οἰηθείη λέγειν [25] ἄν τις μάλιστα ὁμολογουμένως αὑτῷ, Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, καὶ οὗτος ταὐτὸν πέπονθεν: τίθησι μὲν γὰρ ἀρχήν τινα αἰτίαν τῆς φθορᾶς τὸ νεῖκος,	256. For the explanation which one will consider to say something most to the point is that of Empedocles, who has been subject to the same error. For he posits a certain principle, hate, which is the cause of corruption.
δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν οὐθὲν ἧττον καὶ τοῦτο γεννᾶν ἔξω τοῦ ἑνός: ἅπαντα γὰρ ἐκ τούτου τἆλλά ἐστι πλὴν ὁ θεός. λέγει γοῦν ἐξ ὧν πάνθ᾽ ὅσα τ᾽ ἦν ὅσα τ᾽ [30] ἔσθ᾽ ὅσα τ᾽ ἔσται ὀπίσσω, δένδρεά τ᾽ ἐβλάστησε καὶ ἀνέρες ἠδὲ γυναῖκες, θῆρές τ᾽ οἰωνοί τε καὶ ὑδατοθρέμμονες ἰχθῦς, καί τε θεοὶ δολιχαίωνες. καὶ χωρὶς δὲ τούτων δῆλον: [1000β] [1] εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἦν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν, ἓν ἂν ἦν ἅπαντα, ὡς φησίν: ὅταν γὰρ συνέλθῃ, "τότε δ᾽ ἔσχατον ἵστατο νεῖκος."	257. Yet even hate would seem to generate everything except the one. For all things except God are derived from this. Hence he says: “From which have blossomed forth all that was and is [and will be]: trees, and men and women, and beasts and flying things, and water-nourished fish, and the long-lived gods.” And apart from these things it is evident that, if hate did not exist in the world, all things would be one, as he says: “For when they have come together, then hate will stand last of all.”
διὸ καὶ συμβαίνει αὐτῷ τὸν εὐδαιμονέστατον θεὸν ἧττον φρόνιμον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων: οὐ γὰρ γνωρίζει [5] ἅπαντα: τὸ γὰρ νεῖκος οὐκ ἔχει, ἡ δὲ γνῶσις τοῦ ὁμοίου τῷ ὁμοίῳ. γαίῃ μὲν γάρ, (φησί,) γαῖαν ὀπώπαμεν, ὕδατι δ᾽ ὕδωρ, αἰθέρι δ᾽ αἰθέρα δῖον, ἀτὰρ πυρὶ πῦρ ἀΐδηλον, στοργὴν δὲ στοργῇ, νεῖκος δέ τε νείκεϊ λυγρῷ.	258. For this reason too it turns out that God, who is most happy, is less wise than other beings. For he does not know all the elements, because hate he does not have, and knowledge is of like by like. “For one knows earth by earth, water by water, affection by affection, and hate by mournful hate.”
ἀλλ᾽ ὅθεν δὴ ὁ λόγος, τοῦτό γε φανερόν, ὅτι [10] συμβαίνει αὐτῷ τὸ νεῖκος μηθὲν μᾶλλον φθορᾶς ἢ τοῦ εἶναι αἴτιον:	259. But it is also clear (and this is where our discussion began) that hate no more turns out to be the cause of corruption than of being.
ὁμοίως δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἡ φιλότης τοῦ εἶναι, συνάγουσα γὰρ εἰς τὸ ἓν φθείρει τὰ ἄλλα.	260. Nor, similarly, is love the cause of existence; for in blending things together into a unity it corrupts other things.
καὶ ἅμα δὲ αὐτῆς τῆς μεταβολῆς αἴτιον οὐθὲν λέγει ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ὅτι οὕτως πέφυκεν:	261. Moreover, he does not speak of the cause of change itself, except to say that it was naturally disposed to be so.
ἀλλ᾽ ὅτε δὴ μέγα νεῖκος ἐνὶ μελέεσσιν ἐθρέφθη, εἰς τιμάς [15] τ᾽ ἀνόρουσε τελειομένοιο χρόνοιο ὅς σφιν ἀμοιβαῖος πλατέος παρ᾽ ἐλήλαται ὅρκου: ὡς ἀναγκαῖον μὲν ὂν μεταβάλλειν: αἰτίαν δὲ τῆς ἀνάγκης οὐδεμίαν δηλοῖ.	262. [He says]: “But thus mighty hate was nourished among the members and rose to a position of honor when the time was fulfilled, which being changeable dissolved the bond.” Hence change is a necessity, but he gives no reason for its necessity.
ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως τοσοῦτόν γε μόνος λέγει ὁμολογουμένως: οὐ γὰρ τὰ μὲν φθαρτὰ τὰ δὲ ἄφθαρτα ποιεῖ τῶν ὄντων ἀλλὰ πάντα [20] φθαρτὰ πλὴν τῶν στοιχείων. ἡ δὲ νῦν λεγομένη ἀπορία ἐστὶ διὰ τί τὰ μὲν τὰ δ᾽ οὔ, εἴπερ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐστίν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἂν εἴησαν αἱ αὐταὶ ἀρχαί, τοσαῦτα εἰρήσθω:	263. Yet he alone speaks expressly to this extent. For he does not make some beings corruptible and others incorruptible, but makes all things corruptible except the elements. But the problem that has been stated is why some things are corruptible and others are not, supposing that they come from the same principles. To this extent, then, it has been said that the principles of things will not be the same.
εἰ μὲν γὰρ φθαρταί, δῆλον ὡς [25] ἀναγκαῖον καὶ ταύτας ἔκ τινων εἶναι (πάντα γὰρ φθείρεται εἰς ταῦτ᾽ ἐξ ὧν ἔστιν), ὥστε συμβαίνει τῶν ἀρχῶν ἑτέρας ἀρχὰς εἶναι προτέρας, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἀδύνατον, καὶ εἰ ἵσταται καὶ εἰ βαδίζει εἰς ἄπειρον: ἔτι δὲ πῶς ἔσται τὰ φθαρτά, εἰ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἀναιρεθήσονται; εἰ δὲ ἄφθαρτοι, διὰ [30] τί ἐκ μὲν τούτων ἀφθάρτων οὐσῶν φθαρτὰ ἔσται, ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἑτέρων ἄφθαρτα; τοῦτο γὰρ οὐκ εὔλογον, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἀδύνατον ἢ πολλοῦ λόγου δεῖται.	264. But if the principles are different, one problem is whether they will be incorruptible or corruptible. For supposing that they are corruptible, it is evident that they must also come from certain things, because all things that are corrupted are dissolved into those elements from which they come. Hence it follows that there are other principles prior to these principles. But this is also unreasonable, whether the process stops or goes on to infinity. Further, how will corruptible things exist if their principles are destroyed? But if they are incorruptible, why will corruptible things come from incorruptible principles, and incorruptible things from others? For this is unreasonable, and is either impossible or requires a great deal of reasoning.
ἔτι δὲ οὐδ᾽ ἐγκεχείρηκεν οὐδεὶς ἑτέρας, ἀλλὰ τὰς αὐτὰς ἁπάντων λέγουσιν ἀρχάς. [1001α] [1] ἀλλὰ τὸ πρῶτον ἀπορηθὲν ἀποτρώγουσιν ὥσπερ τοῦτο μικρόν τι λαμβάνοντες.	265. Further, no one has attempted to say that these things have different principles, but [all thinkers] say that all things have the same principles. But they admit the first problem, considering it a trifling matter.

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 4: 1001a 4-1001b 25
πάντων δὲ καὶ θεωρῆσαι χαλεπώτατον καὶ πρὸς τὸ [5] γνῶναι τἀληθὲς ἀναγκαιότατον πότερόν ποτε τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ἓν οὐσίαι τῶν ὄντων εἰσί, καὶ ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν οὐχ ἕτερόν τι ὂν τὸ μὲν ἓν τὸ δὲ ὄν ἐστιν, ἢ δεῖ ζητεῖν τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ἓν ὡς ὑποκειμένης ἄλλης φύσεως. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐκείνως οἱ δ᾽ οὕτως οἴονται τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν.	266. But the most difficult problem which has to be considered, and the one which is most necessary for a knowledge of the truth, is whether unity and being are the substance of existing things, and whether each of them is nothing else than unity and being. Or whether it is necessary to investigate what being and unity themselves are, as though there were some other nature which underlies them.
Πλάτων [10] μὲν γὰρ καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι οὐχ ἕτερόν τι τὸ ὂν οὐδὲ τὸ ἓν ἀλλὰ τοῦτο αὐτῶν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι, ὡς οὔσης τῆς οὐσίας αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἑνὶ εἶναι καὶ ὄντι: οἱ δὲ περὶ φύσεως, οἷον Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ὡς εἰς γνωριμώτερον ἀνάγων λέγει ὅ τι τὸ ἕν ἐστιν: δόξειε γὰρ ἂν λέγειν τοῦτο τὴν φιλίαν εἶναι (αἰτία [15] γοῦν ἐστὶν αὕτη τοῦ ἓν εἶναι πᾶσιν), ἕτεροι δὲ πῦρ, οἱ δ᾽ ἀέρα φασὶν εἶναι τὸ ἓν τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ὄν, ἐξ οὗ τὰ ὄντα εἶναί τε καὶ γεγονέναι. ὣς δ᾽ αὔτως καὶ οἱ πλείω τὰ στοιχεῖα τιθέμενοι: ἀνάγκη γὰρ καὶ τούτοις τοσαῦτα λέγειν τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ ὂν ὅσας περ ἀρχὰς εἶναί φασιν.	267. For some think that reality is of the former sort, and some of the latter. For Plato and the Pythagoreans thought that being and unity were nothing else [than themselves], and that this is their nature, their substance being simply unity and being. But among the other philosophers [there are different opinions] about the nature of unity. Empedocles, for example, as though reducing it to something better known, says that unity is being; for he would seem to say that this is love, since this is the cause why unity belongs to all things. Others say that this unity and being of which existing things consist and have been made is fire, and others say it is air. And those who hold that there are many elements say the same thing; for they must also speak of unity and being in as many ways as they say there are principles.
συμβαίνει [20] δέ, εἰ μέν τις μὴ θήσεται εἶναί τινα οὐσίαν τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ ὄν, μηδὲ τῶν ἄλλων εἶναι τῶν καθόλου μηθέν (ταῦτα γάρ ἐστι καθόλου μάλιστα πάντων, εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι τι ἓν αὐτὸ μηδ᾽ αὐτὸ ὄν, σχολῇ τῶν γε ἄλλων τι ἂν εἴη παρὰ τὰ λεγόμενα καθ᾽ ἕκαστα), ἔτι δὲ μὴ ὄντος τοῦ ἑνὸς οὐσίας, [25] δῆλον ὅτι οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἀριθμὸς εἴη ὡς κεχωρισμένη τις φύσις τῶν ὄντων (ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀριθμὸς μονάδες, ἡ δὲ μονὰς ὅπερ ἕν τί ἐστιν): εἰ δ᾽ ἔστι τι αὐτὸ ἓν καὶ ὄν, ἀναγκαῖον οὐσίαν αὐτῶν εἶναι τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ ὄν: οὐ γὰρ ἕτερόν τι καθόλου κατηγορεῖται ἀλλὰ ταῦτα αὐτά.	268. But if anyone holds that unity and being are not substances, it will follow that no other universals are such; for these are the most universal of all. But if there is no one-in-itself or being-in-itself, there will hardly be any other things that exist apart from what are called singular things. Further, if unity is not a substance, evidently number will not exist as another reality separate from existing things; for number is units, and a unit is truly something one. But if there is a one-in-itself and being-in-itself, the substance of these must be unity itself and being itself. For nothing else is predicated universally of all things but these two.
ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ γ᾽ ἔσται [30] τι αὐτὸ ὂν καὶ αὐτὸ ἕν, πολλὴ ἀπορία πῶς ἔσται τι παρὰ ταῦτα ἕτερον, λέγω δὲ πῶς ἔσται πλείω ἑνὸς τὰ ὄντα. τὸ γὰρ ἕτερον τοῦ ὄντος οὐκ ἔστιν, ὥστε κατὰ τὸν Παρμενίδου συμβαίνειν ἀνάγκη λόγον ἓν ἅπαντα εἶναι τὰ ὄντα καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ὄν.	269. But, on the other hand, if there is to be a one-in-itself and being-in-itself, there is great difficulty in seeing how there will be anything else besides these. I mean, how will there be more beings than one? For that which differs from being does not exist, Hence according to Parmenides’ argument it must follow that all beings are one, and that this is being.
[1001β] [1] ἀμφοτέρως δὲ δύσκολον: ἄν τε γὰρ μὴ ᾖ τὸ ἓν οὐσία ἄν τε ᾖ τὸ αὐτὸ ἕν, ἀδύνατον τὸν ἀριθμὸν οὐσίαν εἶναι. ἐὰν μὲν οὖν μὴ ᾖ, εἴρηται πρότερον δι᾽ ὅ: ἐὰν δὲ ᾖ, ἡ αὐτὴ ἀπορία καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος. ἐκ τίνος γὰρ [5] παρὰ τὸ ἓν ἔσται αὐτὸ ἄλλο ἕν; ἀνάγκη γὰρ μὴ ἓν εἶναι: ἅπαντα δὲ τὰ ὄντα ἢ ἓν ἢ πολλὰ ὧν ἓν ἕκαστον.	270. But there is a difficulty in either case; for whether unity itself is not a substance, or whether there is a unity itself, it is impossible for number to be a substance. Now it has already been stated why this follows if unity is not a substance; but if it is, the same difficulty will arise with regard to being. For from something outside of being something else will be one; for it must be not one. But all beings are either one or many, each of which is a one.
ἔτι εἰ ἀδιαίρετον αὐτὸ τὸ ἕν, κατὰ μὲν τὸ Ζήνωνος ἀξίωμα οὐθὲν ἂν εἴη (ὃ γὰρ μήτε προστιθέμενον μήτε ἀφαιρούμενον ποιεῖ μεῖζον μηδὲ ἔλαττον, οὔ φησιν εἶναι τοῦτο τῶν ὄντων, [10] ὡς δηλονότι ὄντος μεγέθους τοῦ ὄντος: καὶ εἰ μέγεθος, σωματικόν: τοῦτο γὰρ πάντῃ ὄν: τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πὼς μὲν προστιθέμενα ποιήσει μεῖζον, πὼς δ᾽ οὐθέν, οἷον ἐπίπεδον καὶ γραμμή, στιγμὴ δὲ καὶ μονὰς οὐδαμῶς):	271. Further, if unity itself is indivisible, according to Zeno’s axiom it will be nothing. For that which when added does not make a thing greater or when subtracted does not make it smaller, this, he says, does not belong to the realm of existing things, as though it were evident that whatever has being is a continuous quantity.’ And if it is a continuous quantity, it is corporeal; for this in every respect is a being. But other quantities, for example, a surface and a line, when added in one way will make a thing greater, but in another way they will not; and a point and a unit will do so in no way.
ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ οὗτος θεωρεῖ φορτικῶς, καὶ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ἀδιαίρετόν τι [15] ὥστε [καὶ οὕτως] καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνόν τιν᾽ ἀπολογίαν ἔχειν (μεῖζον μὲν γὰρ οὐ ποιήσει πλεῖον δὲ προστιθέμενον τὸ τοιοῦτον):	272. But this philosopher speculates clumsily, and it is possible for a thing to be indivisible in such a way that some answer may be made against him; for when something of this kind is added it will not make a thing greater but more.
ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ ἐξ ἑνὸς τοιούτου ἢ πλειόνων τοιούτων ἔσται μέγεθος;	273. Yet how will continuous quantity come from such a unity or from many of them? For this would be like saying that a line is made up of points.
ὅμοιον γὰρ καὶ τὴν γραμμὴν ἐκ στιγμῶν εἶναι φάσκειν. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ εἴ τις οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνει ὥστε [20] γενέσθαι, καθάπερ λέγουσί τινες, ἐκ τοῦ ἑνὸς αὐτοῦ καὶ ἄλλου μὴ ἑνός τινος τὸν ἀριθμόν, οὐθὲν ἧττον ζητητέον διὰ τί καὶ πῶς ὁτὲ μὲν ἀριθμὸς ὁτὲ δὲ μέγεθος ἔσται τὸ γενόμενον, εἴπερ τὸ μὴ ἓν ἡ ἀνισότης καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις ἦν. οὔτε γὰρ ὅπως ἐξ ἑνὸς καὶ ταύτης οὔτε ὅπως ἐξ ἀριθμοῦ [25] τινὸς καὶ ταύτης γένοιτ᾽ ἂν τὰ μεγέθη, δῆλον.	274. But even if someone were to think that the situation is such that number has come, as some say, from unity itself and from something else that is not one, none the less it would be necessary to inquire why and how the thing which has come to be would sometimes be a number and sometimes a continuous quantity, if that not-one were inequality and the same nature in either case. For it is not clear how continuous quantities would be produced from unity and this principle, or from some number and this principle.

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 5: 1001b 26-1002b 11
τούτων δ᾽ ἐχομένη ἀπορία πότερον οἱ ἀριθμοὶ καὶ τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰ ἐπίπεδα καὶ αἱ στιγμαὶ οὐσίαι τινές εἰσιν ἢ οὔ.	275. And connected with these is the question whether numbers and bodies and surfaces and points are substances, or not.
εἰ μὲν γὰρ μή εἰσιν, διαφεύγει τί τὸ ὂν καὶ τίνες αἱ οὐσίαι τῶν ὄντων: τὰ μὲν γὰρ πάθη καὶ αἱ κινήσεις [30] καὶ τὰ πρός τι καὶ αἱ διαθέσεις καὶ οἱ λόγοι οὐθενὸς δοκοῦσιν οὐσίαν σημαίνειν (λέγονται γὰρ πάντα καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένου τινός, καὶ οὐθὲν τόδε τι): ἃ δὲ μάλιστ᾽ ἂν δόξειε σημαίνειν οὐσίαν, ὕδωρ καὶ γῆ καὶ πῦρ καὶ ἀήρ, ἐξ ὧν τὰ σύνθετα σώματα συνέστηκε, [1002α] [1] τούτων θερμότητες μὲν καὶ ψυχρότητες καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάθη, οὐκ οὐσίαι, τὸ δὲ σῶμα τὸ ταῦτα πεπονθὸς μόνον ὑπομένει ὡς ὄν τι καὶ οὐσία τις οὖσα.	276. For if they are not, we are in a quandary as to what being is, and what the substances of things are. For affections and motions and relations and dispositions and their complex conceptions do not seem to signify substance; because all are predicated of some subject, and no one of them is a particular thing. And those things which seem to signify substance most of all, as fire, water, earth [and air], of which composite bodies are constituted, their heat and cold and similar affections, are not substances. And it is only the body which undergoes these that remains as a being and is a substance.
ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε σῶμα ἧττον οὐσία τῆς ἐπιφανείας, [5] καὶ αὕτη τῆς γραμμῆς, καὶ αὕτη τῆς μονάδος καὶ τῆς στιγμῆς: τούτοις γὰρ ὥρισται τὸ σῶμα, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄνευ σώματος ἐνδέχεσθαι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ δὲ σῶμα ἄνευ τούτων ἀδύνατον.	277. Yet a body is a substance to a lesser degree than a surface, and this than a line, and this in turn than a unit and a point; for a body is defined by means of these, and these seem to be capable of existing without a body, but that a body should exist without these is impossible.
διόπερ οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ οἱ πρότερον τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ ὂν ᾤοντο τὸ σῶμα εἶναι τὰ δὲ ἄλλα [10] τούτου πάθη, ὥστε καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς τῶν σωμάτων τῶν ὄντων εἶναι ἀρχάς: οἱ δ᾽ ὕστεροι καὶ σοφώτεροι τούτων εἶναι δόξαντες ἀριθμούς. καθάπερ οὖν εἴπομεν, εἰ μὴ ἔστιν οὐσία ταῦτα, ὅλως οὐδὲν ἐστὶν οὐσία οὐδὲ ὂν οὐθέν: οὐ γὰρ δὴ τά γε συμβεβηκότα τούτοις ἄξιον ὄντα καλεῖν.	278. For this reason many of the natural philosophers, including the first, thought that substance and being are bodies, and that other things are attributes of this kind of thing; and hence too that the principles of bodies are the principles of beings. But the later philosophers, who were wiser than these, thought that the principles-of things are numbers. Therefore, as we have said, if these are not substance, there is no substance or being at all; for the accidents of these things are not worthy to be called beings.
[15] —ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τοῦτο μὲν ὁμολογεῖται, ὅτι μᾶλλον οὐσία τὰ μήκη τῶν σωμάτων καὶ αἱ στιγμαί, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ ὁρῶμεν ποίων ἂν εἶεν σωμάτων (ἐν γὰρ τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἀδύνατον εἶναι), οὐκ ἂν εἴη οὐσία οὐδεμία.	279. But if it is admitted that lengths and points are substances to a greater degree than bodies, and we do not see to what sort of bodies these belong (because it is impossible for them to exist in sensible bodies), there will then be no substance at all.
ἔτι δὲ φαίνεται ταῦτα πάντα διαιρέσεις ὄντα τοῦ σώματος, τὸ μὲν εἰς πλάτος [20] τὸ δ᾽ εἰς βάθος τὸ δ᾽ εἰς μῆκος.	280. Further, all of these seem to be dimensions of bodies, one according to width, another according to depth, and another according to length.
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὁμοίως ἔνεστιν ἐν τῷ στερεῷ ὁποιονοῦν σχῆμα: ὥστ᾽ εἰ μηδ᾽ ἐν τῷ λίθῳ Ἑρμῆς, οὐδὲ τὸ ἥμισυ τοῦ κύβου ἐν τῷ κύβῳ οὕτως ὡς ἀφωρισμένον: οὐκ ἄρα οὐδ᾽ ἐπιφάνεια (εἰ γὰρ ὁποιαοῦν, κἂν αὕτη ἂν ἦν ἡ ἀφορίζουσα τὸ ἥμισυ), ὁ δ᾽ [25] αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ γραμμῆς καὶ στιγμῆς καὶ μονάδος, ὥστ᾽ εἰ μάλιστα μὲν οὐσία τὸ σῶμα, τούτου δὲ μᾶλλον ταῦτα, μὴ ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα μηδὲ οὐσίαι τινές, διαφεύγει τί τὸ ὂν καὶ τίς ἡ οὐσία τῶν ὄντων.	281. And, similarly, any figure whatever already exists in a solid. Hence if neither Mercury is in the stone, nor one half of a cube in a cube as something segregated, neither will surface exist in a solid; for if this were true of anything whatever, it would also be true of that which divides a thing in half. And the same argument would apply in the case of a line, a point and a unit. If, then, a body is substance in the highest degree, and these things are such to a greater degree than it is, and these do not exist and are not substances, it escapes our understanding as to what being itself is and what the substance of beings is.
πρὸς γὰρ τοῖς εἰρημένοις καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν φθορὰν συμβαίνει ἄλογα. [30] δοκεῖ μὲν γὰρ ἡ οὐσία, ἐὰν μὴ οὖσα πρότερον νῦν ᾖ ἢ πρότερον οὖσα ὕστερον μὴ ᾖ, μετὰ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι ταῦτα πάσχειν: τὰς δὲ στιγμὰς καὶ τὰς γραμμὰς καὶ τὰς ἐπιφανείας οὐκ ἐνδέχεται οὔτε γίγνεσθαι οὔτε φθείρεσθαι, ὁτὲ μὲν οὔσας ὁτὲ δὲ οὐκ οὔσας. ὅταν γὰρ ἅπτηται ἢ διαιρῆται τὰ σώματα, [1002β] [1] ἅμα ὁτὲ μὲν μία ἁπτομένων ὁτὲ δὲ δύο διαιρουμένων γίγνονται: ὥστ᾽ οὔτε συγκειμένων ἔστιν ἀλλ᾽ ἔφθαρται, διῃρημένων τε εἰσὶν αἱ πρότερον οὐκ οὖσαι (οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἥ γ᾽ ἀδιαίρετος στιγμὴ διῃρέθη εἰς δύο), εἴ τε γίγνονται καὶ [5] φθείρονται, ἐκ τίνος γίγνονται;	282. For along with what has been said there happen to be certain unreasonable views about generation and corruption. For if substance, not existing before, exists now, or existing before, does not exist afterwards, it seems to suffer these changes through generation and corruption. But it is impossible for points and lines and surfaces either to come to be or to be destroyed, even though they sometimes exist and sometimes do not. For when bodies are joined or divided, at one time, when they are joined, they [i.e., the two surfaces] simultaneously become one, and at another time, when they are divided, two surfaces are produced; because it [i.e., one of the two surfaces in question] is not in the bodies which have been joined but has perished. And when bodies are divided surfaces exist which did not exist before. For the indivisible point is not divided into two, and if things are generated and corrupted, they are generated from something.
παραπλησίως δ᾽ ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὸ νῦν τὸ ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ: οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῦτο ἐνδέχεται γίγνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως ἕτερον ἀεὶ δοκεῖ εἶναι, οὐκ οὐσία τις οὖσα. ὁμοίως δὲ δῆλον ὅτι ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰς στιγμὰς καὶ τὰς γραμμὰς καὶ τὰ ἐπίπεδα: ὁ γὰρ [10] αὐτὸς λόγος: ἅπαντα γὰρ ὁμοίως ἢ πέρατα ἢ διαιρέσεις εἰσίν.	283. And it is similar with regard to the now in time, for this cannot be generated and corrupted. Yet it seems always to exist, although it is not a substance. It is also clear that this is true of points, lines and surfaces, because the argument is the same; for they are all similarly either limits or divisions.

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 6: 1002b 12-1002b 32
ὅλως δ᾽ ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις διὰ τί καὶ δεῖ ζητεῖν ἄλλ᾽ ἄττα παρά τε τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ τὰ μεταξύ, οἷον ἃ τίθεμεν εἴδη.	284. But in general one will wonder why, in addition to sensible things and those which are intermediate, it is necessary to look for certain other things which we posit as the specific essences (or Forms) of sensible things.
εἰ γὰρ διὰ τοῦτο, ὅτι τὰ μὲν μαθηματικὰ [15] τῶν δεῦρο ἄλλῳ μέν τινι διαφέρει, τῷ δὲ πόλλ᾽ ἄττα ὁμοειδῆ εἶναι οὐθὲν διαφέρει, ὥστ᾽ οὐκ ἔσονται αὐτῶν αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἀριθμῷ ἀφωρισμέναι (ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τῶν ἐνταῦθα γραμμάτων ἀριθμῷ μὲν πάντων οὐκ εἰσὶν αἱ ἀρχαὶ ὡρισμέναι, εἴδει δέ, ἐὰν μὴ λαμβάνῃ τις τησδὶ τῆς συλλαβῆς [20] ἢ τησδὶ τῆς φωνῆς: τούτων δ᾽ ἔσονται καὶ ἀριθμῷ ὡρισμέναι—ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μεταξύ: ἄπειρα γὰρ κἀκεῖ τὰ ὁμοειδῆ), ὥστ᾽ εἰ μὴ ἔστι παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ τὰ μαθηματικὰ ἕτερ᾽ ἄττα οἷα λέγουσι τὰ εἴδη τινές, οὐκ ἔσται μία ἀριθμῷ ἀλλ᾽ εἴδει οὐσία, οὐδ᾽ αἱ ἀρχαὶ τῶν [25] ὄντων ἀριθμῷ ἔσονται ποσαί τινες ἀλλὰ εἴδει: εἰ οὖν τοῦτο ἀναγκαῖον, καὶ τὰ εἴδη ἀναγκαῖον διὰ τοῦτο εἶναι τιθέναι. καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὴ καλῶς διαρθροῦσιν οἱ λέγοντες, ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι γε τοῦθ᾽ ὃ βούλονται, καὶ ἀνάγκη ταῦτα λέγειν αὐτοῖς, ὅτι τῶν εἰδῶν οὐσία τις ἕκαστόν ἐστι καὶ οὐθὲν κατὰ συμβεβηκός.	285. For if it is because the objects of mathematics differ in one respect from the things which are at hand, they do not differ in being many things that are specifically the same. Hence the principles of sensible things will not be limited in number but only in species; unless one were to consider the principles of this particular syllable or word, for these are limited in number. And this is likewise true of the intermediate entities; for in their case too there are an infinite number of things that are specifically the same. Hence, if in addition to sensible substances and the objects of mathematics there are not certain other things, such as some call the Forms, there will be no substance which is one both numerically and specifically. Nor will the principles of beings be limited in number, but only in species. Therefore, if this is necessary, it will also be necessary on this account that there should be Forms. And even if those who speak of the Forms do not express themselves clearly, although this is what they wanted to say, they must affirm that each of the Forms is a substance, and that nothing accidental pertains to them.
ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ γε θήσομεν τά τε εἴδη εἶναι καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀλλὰ μὴ εἴδει, εἰρήκαμεν ἃ συμβαίνειν ἀναγκαῖον ἀδύνατα.	286. But if we hold that the Forms exist, and that principles are one numerically but not specifically, we have stated the untenable conclusions that follow from this view.

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 6: 1002b 32-1003b 17
σύνεγγυς δὲ τούτων ἐστὶ τὸ διαπορῆσαι πότερον δυνάμει ἔστι τὰ στοιχεῖα ἤ τιν᾽ ἕτερον τρόπον.	287. And connected with these problems there is the question whether the elements of things exist potentially or in some other way.
εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλως πως, πρότερόν τι ἔσται τῶν ἀρχῶν ἄλλο (πρότερον [1003α] [1] γὰρ ἡ δύναμις ἐκείνης τῆς αἰτίας, τὸ δὲ δυνατὸν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἐκείνως πᾶν ἔχειν):	288. If they exist in some other way, then there will be something else prior to [first] principles. For potentiality is prior to that cause, but the potential need not exist in that way.
εἰ δ᾽ ἔστι δυνάμει τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἐνδέχεται μηθὲν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων: δυνατὸν γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τὸ μήπω ὄν: γίγνεται μὲν γὰρ τὸ [5] μὴ ὄν, οὐθὲν δὲ γίγνεται τῶν εἶναι ἀδυνάτων. ταύτας τε οὖν τὰς ἀπορίας ἀναγκαῖον ἀπορῆσαι περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν,	289. But if the elements exist potentially, it is possible for nothing to exist; for even that which does not yet exist is capable of existing, because that which does not exist may come to be. But nothing that is incapable of existing may come to be. It is necessary, then, to investigate these problems.
καὶ πότερον καθόλου εἰσὶν ἢ ὡς λέγομεν τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα.	290. And there is also the problem whether [first] principles are universals or singular things, as we maintain.
εἰ μὲν γὰρ καθόλου, οὐκ ἔσονται οὐσίαι (οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν κοινῶν τόδε τι σημαίνει ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε, ἡ δ᾽ οὐσία τόδε τι:	291. For if they are universals, they will not be substances, because a common term signifies not a particular thing but what sort of thing; and a substance is a particular thing.
δ᾽ [10] ἔσται τόδε τι καὶ ἓν θέσθαι τὸ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενον, πολλὰ ἔσται ζῷα ὁ Σωκράτης, αὐτός τε καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ ζῷον, εἴπερ σημαίνει ἕκαστον τόδε τι καὶ ἕν): εἰ μὲν οὖν καθόλου αἱ ἀρχαί, ταῦτα συμβαίνει:	292. But if it is a particular thing, and is held to be the common whatness which is predicated of things, Socrates himself will be many animals: [himself] and man and animal; i.e., if each of these signifies a particular thing and a one. If, then, the first principles of things are universals, these consequences will follow.
εἰ δὲ μὴ καθόλου ἀλλ᾽ ὡς τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα, οὐκ ἔσονται ἐπιστηταί (καθόλου [15] γὰρ ἡ ἐπιστήμη πάντων), ὥστ᾽ ἔσονται ἀρχαὶ ἕτεραι πρότεραι τῶν ἀρχῶν αἱ καθόλου κατηγορούμεναι, ἄνπερ μέλλῃ ἔσεσθαι αὐτῶν ἐπιστήμη.	293. However, if they are not universals but have the nature of singular things, they will not be knowable; for all scientific knowledge is universal. Hence, if there is to be any scientific knowledge of [first] principles, there will have to be different principles which are predicated universally and are prior to [first] principles.