THE SUBJECT OF METAPHYSICS, DEMONSTRATIVELY
LESSON 1: The Proper Subject Matter of This Science: Being as Being, and Substance and Accidents LESSON 2 This Science Considers Being and Unity. The Parts of Philosophy Based on the Divisions of Being and Unity LESSON 3 The Same Science Considers Unity and Plurality and All Opposites. The Method of Treating These LESSON 4 First Philosophy Considers All Contraries. Its Distinction from Logic LESSON 5 Answers to Questions Raised in Book III about Principles of Demonstration LESSON 6 First Philosophy Must Examine the First Principle of Demonstration. The Nature of This Principle. The Errors about It LESSON 7 Contradictories Cannot Be True at the Same Time LESSON 8 Other Arguments Against the Foregoing Position LESSON 9 Three Further Arguments Against Those Who Deny the First Principle LESSON 10 The Procedure Against Those Who Say that Contradictories Are True at the Same Time LESSON 11 The Reason Why Some Considered Appearances to Be True LESSON 12 Two Reasons Why Some Identify Truth with Appearances LESSON 13 Change in Sensible Things Not Opposed to Their Truth LESSON 14 Seven Arguments against the View that Truth Consists in Appearances LESSON 15 Refutation of the View that Contradictories Can Be Shown to Be True at the Same Time. Contraries Cannot Belong to the Same Subject at the Same Time LESSON 16 No Intermediate between Contradictories. How Heraclitus and Anaxagoras Influenced This Position LESSON 17 Rejection of the opinions that Everything Is True and False, and that Everything Is at Rest and in Motion
LESSON 1 The Proper Subject Matter of This Science: Being as Being, and Substance and Accidents
ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapters 1 & 2: 1003a-1003b 22 [1003α]  ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη τις ἣ θεωρεῖ τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὂν καὶ τὰ τούτῳ ὑπάρχοντα καθ᾽ αὑτό. 294. There is a certain science which studies being as being and the attributes which necessarily belong to being. αὕτη δ᾽ ἐστὶν οὐδεμιᾷ τῶν ἐν μέρει λεγομένων ἡ αὐτή: οὐδεμία γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπισκοπεῖ καθόλου περὶ τοῦ ὄντος ᾗ ὄν, ἀλλὰ μέρος αὐτοῦ τι ἀποτεμόμεναι  περὶ τούτου θεωροῦσι τὸ συμβεβηκός, οἷον αἱ μαθηματικαὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν. 295. This science is not the same as any of the so-called particular sciences; for none of the other sciences attempt to study being as being in general, but cutting off some part of it they study the accidents of this part. This, for example, is what the mathematical sciences do. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς ἀκροτάτας αἰτίας ζητοῦμεν, δῆλον ὡς φύσεώς τινος αὐτὰς ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καθ᾽ αὑτήν. εἰ οὖν καὶ οἱ τὰ στοιχεῖα τῶν ὄντων ζητοῦντες ταύτας τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐζήτουν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ  στοιχεῖα τοῦ ὄντος εἶναι μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἀλλ᾽ ᾗ ὄν: διὸ καὶ ἡμῖν τοῦ ὄντος ᾗ ὂν τὰς πρώτας αἰτίας ληπτέον. 296. Now since we are seeking the principles and ultimate causes of things, it is evident that these must be of themselves the causes of some nature. Hence, if those who sought the elements of beings sought these principles, they must be the elements of beings not in any accidental way but inasmuch as they are beings. Therefore the first causes of being as being must also be understood by us. Chapter 2 τὸ δὲ ὂν λέγεται μὲν πολλαχῶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἓν καὶ μίαν τινὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐχ ὁμωνύμως ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ  ὑγιεινὸν ἅπαν πρὸς ὑγίειαν, τὸ μὲν τῷ φυλάττειν τὸ δὲ τῷ ποιεῖν τὸ δὲ τῷ σημεῖον εἶναι τῆς ὑγιείας τὸ δ᾽ ὅτι δεκτικὸν αὐτῆς, [1003β]  καὶ τὸ ἰατρικὸν πρὸς ἰατρικήν (τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῷ ἔχειν ἰατρικὴν λέγεται ἰατρικὸν τὸ δὲ τῷ εὐφυὲς εἶναι πρὸς αὐτὴν τὸ δὲ τῷ ἔργον εἶναι τῆς ἰατρικῆς), ὁμοιοτρόπως δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ληψόμεθα λεγόμενα τούτοις,  οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ ὂν λέγεται πολλαχῶς μὲν ἀλλ᾽ ἅπαν πρὸς μίαν ἀρχήν: τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὅτι οὐσίαι, ὄντα λέγεται, τὰ δ᾽ ὅτι πάθη οὐσίας, τὰ δ᾽ ὅτι ὁδὸς εἰς οὐσίαν ἢ φθοραὶ ἢ στερήσεις ἢ ποιότητες ἢ ποιητικὰ ἢ γεννητικὰ οὐσίας ἢ τῶν πρὸς τὴν οὐσίαν λεγομένων, ἢ τούτων τινὸς  ἀποφάσεις ἢ οὐσίας: διὸ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν εἶναι μὴ ὄν φαμεν. 297. The term being is used in many senses, but with reference to one thing and to some one nature and not equivocally. Thus everything healthy is related to health, one thing because it preserves health, another because it causes it, another because it is a sign of it (as urine) and still another because it is receptive of it. The term medical is related in a similar way to the art of medicine; for one thing is called medical because it possesses the art of medicine, another because it is receptive of it, and still another because it is the act of those who have the art of medicine. We can take other words which are used in a way similar to these. And similarly there are many senses in which the term being is used, but each is referred to a first principle. For some things are called beings because they are substances; others because they are affections of substances; others because they are a process toward substance, or corruptions or privations or qualities of substance, or because they are productive or generative principles of substance, or of things which are related to substance, or the negation of some of these or of substance. For this reason too we say that non-being is non-being. καθάπερ οὖν καὶ τῶν ὑγιεινῶν ἁπάντων μία ἐπιστήμη ἔστιν, ὁμοίως τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. οὐ γὰρ μόνον τῶν καθ᾽ ἓν λεγομένων ἐπιστήμης ἐστὶ θεωρῆσαι μιᾶς ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν πρὸς μίαν λεγομένων φύσιν: καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τρόπον τινὰ  λέγονται καθ᾽ ἕν. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι καὶ τὰ ὄντα μιᾶς θεωρῆσαι ᾗ ὄντα. 298. Therefore, just as there is one science of all healthy things, so too the same thing is true in other cases. For it is the office of one and the same science to study not only those things which are referred to one thing but also those which are referred to one nature. For those too in a sense are referred to one thing. πανταχοῦ δὲ κυρίως τοῦ πρώτου ἡ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ ἐξ οὗ τὰ ἄλλα ἤρτηται, καὶ δι᾽ ὃ λέγονται. 299. It is evident, then, that it is the function of one science to study beings as beings. εἰ οὖν τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία, τῶν οὐσιῶν ἂν δέοι τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ἔχειν τὸν φιλόσοφον. 299a. But in every respect a science is concerned with what is primary, and that on which other things depend, and form which they derive their name. Hence, if this is substance, it must be of substances that the philosopher possesses the principles and causes. ἅπαντος δὲ γένους καὶ αἴσθησις μία ἑνὸς  καὶ ἐπιστήμη, οἷον γραμματικὴ μία οὖσα πάσας θεωρεῖ τὰς φωνάς: διὸ καὶ τοῦ ὄντος ᾗ ὂν ὅσα εἴδη θεωρῆσαι μιᾶς ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμης τῷ γένει, τά τε εἴδη τῶν εἰδῶν. 300. Now of every single class of things there is one sense and one science; for example, grammar, which is one science, studies all words. And for this reason too it belongs to a general science to study all species of being as being and the species of these species. COMMENTARY It is being and its properties In praecedenti libro philosophus disputative processit de illis, quae debent in hac scientia considerari: hic incipit procedere demonstrative determinando veritatem quaestionum prius motarum et disputatarum. 529. In the preceding book the Philosopher proceeded to treat dialectically the things which ought to be considered in this science. Here he begins to proceed demonstratively by establishing the true answer to those questions which have been raised and argued dialectically. Fuit autem in praecedenti libro disputatum tam de his quae pertinent ad modum huius scientiae, scilicet ad quae se extendit huius scientiae consideratio, quam etiam de his quae sub consideratione huius scientiae cadunt. Et quia prius oportet cognoscere modum scientiae quam procedere in scientia ad ea consideranda de quibus est scientia, ut in secundo libro dictum est: ideo dividitur haec pars in duas. Primo dicit de quibus est consideratio huius scientiae. Secundo dicit de rebus quae sub consideratione huius scientiae cadunt, in quinto libro, ibi, principium dicitur aliud quidem et cetera. In the preceding book he treated dialectically both the things which pertain to the method of this science, namely, those to which the consideration of this science extends, as well as those which fall under the consideration of this science. And because it is first necessary to know the method of a science before proceeding to consider the things with which it deals, as was explained in Book II (335), this part is therefore divided into two members. First, he speaks of the things which this science considers; and second (749), of those which fall under its consideration. He does this in Book V (“In one sense the term principle”). Prima in duas. Primo subiectum stabilit huius scientiae. Secundo procedit ad solvendum quaestiones motas in libro praecedenti de consideratione huius scientiae, ibi, ens autem multis. The first part is divided into two members. First, he establishes what the subject matter of this science is. Second (534), he proceeds to answer the questions raised in the preceding book about the things which this science considers (“The term being”). Circa primum tria facit. Primo supponit aliquam esse scientiam cuius subiectum sit ens. Secundo ostendit quod ista non est aliqua particularium scientiarum, ibi, haec autem et cetera. Tertio ostendit quod haec est scientia quae prae manibus habetur, ibi, quoniam autem principia et cetera. In regard to the first he does three things. First, he submits that there is a science whose subject is being. Second (532), he shows that it is not one of the particular sciences (“But this science”); and third (533), he shows that it is the science with which we are now dealing (“Now since”). Quia vero scientia non solum debet speculari subiectum, sed etiam subiecto per se accidentia: ideo dicit primo, quod est quaedam scientia, quae speculatur ens secundum quod ens, sicut subiectum, et speculatur ea quae insunt enti per se, idest entis per se accidentia. Now because a science should investigate not only its subject but also the proper accidents of its subject, he therefore says, first, that there is a science which studies being as being, as its subject, and studies also “the attributes which necessarily belong to being,” i.e., its proper accidents. Dicit autem secundum quod est ens, quia scientiae aliae, quae sunt de entibus particularibus, considerant quidem de ente, cum omnia subiecta scientiarum sint entia, non tamen considerant ens secundum quod ens, sed secundum quod est huiusmodi ens, scilicet vel numerus, vel linea, vel ignis, aut aliquid huiusmodi. 530. He says “as being” because the other sciences, which deal with particular beings, do indeed consider being (for all the subjects of the sciences are beings), yet they do not consider being as being, but as some particular kind of being, for example, number or line or fire or the like. Dicit etiam et quae huic insunt per se et non simpliciter quae huic insunt, ad significandum quod ad scientiam non pertinet considerare de his quae per accidens insunt subiecto suo, sed solum de his quae per se insunt. Geometra enim non considerat de triangulo utrum sit cupreus vel ligneus, sed solum considerat ipsum absolute secundum quod habet tres angulos aequales et cetera. Sic igitur huiusmodi scientia, cuius est ens subiectum, non oportet quod consideret de omnibus quae insunt enti per accidens, quia sic consideraret accidentia quaesita in omnibus scientiis, cum omnia accidentia insint alicui enti, non tamen secundum quod est ens. Quae enim sunt per se accidentia inferioris, per accidens se habent ad superius, sicut per se accidentia hominis non sunt per se accidentia animalis. 531. He also says “and the attributes which necessarily belong to being,” and not just those which belong to being, in order to show that it is not the business of this science to consider those attributes which belong accidentally to its subject, but only those which belong necessarily to it. For geometry does not consider whether a triangle is of bronze or of wood, but only considers it in an absolute sense according as it has three angles equal to two right angles. Hence a science of this kind, whose subject is being, must not consider all the attributes which belong accidentally to being, because then it would consider the accidents investigated by all sciences; for all accidents belong to some being, but not inasmuch as it is being. For those accidents which are the proper accidents of an inferior thing are related in an accidental way to a superior thing; for example, the proper accidents of man are not the proper accidents of animal. Necessitas autem huius scientiae quae speculatur ens et per se accidentia entis, ex hoc apparet, quia huiusmodi non debent ignota remanere, cum ex eis aliorum dependeat cognitio; sicut ex cognitione communium dependet cognitio rerum propriarum. Now the necessity of this science, which considers being and its proper accidents, is evident from this, that such things should not remain unknown since the knowledge of other things depends on them, just as the knowledge of proper objects depends on that of common objects. 532. This science (295). Deinde cum dicit haec autem hic ostendit, quod ista scientia non sit aliqua particularium scientiarum, tali ratione. Nulla scientia particularis considerat ens universale inquantum huiusmodi, sed solum aliquam partem entis divisam ab aliis; circa quam speculatur per se accidens, sicut scientiae mathematicae aliquod ens speculantur, scilicet ens quantum. Scientia autem communis considerat universale ens secundum quod ens: ergo non est eadem alicui scientiarum particularium. Then he shows that this science is not one of the particular sciences, and he uses the following argument. No particular science considers universal being as such, but only some part of it separated. from the others; and about this part it studies the proper accidents. For example, the mathematical sciences study one kind of being, quantitative being. But the common science considers universal being as being, and therefore it is not the same as any of the particular sciences. 533. Now since (296). Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem hic ostendit, quod ista scientia, quae prae manibus habetur, habet ens pro subiecto, tali ratione. Omne principium est per se principium et causa alicuius naturae: sed nos quaerimus prima rerum principia et altissimas causas, sicut in primo dictum est: ergo sunt per se causa alicuius naturae. Sed non nisi entis. Quod ex hoc patet, quia omnes philosophi elementa quaerentes secundum quod sunt entia, quaerebant huiusmodi principia, scilicet prima et altissima; ergo in hac scientia nos quaerimus principia entis inquantum est ens: ergo ens est subiectum huius scientiae, quia quaelibet scientia est quaerens causas proprias sui subiecti. Here he shows that the science with which we are dealing has being as its subject, and he uses the following argument. Every principle is of itself the principle and cause of some nature. But we are seeking the first principles and ultimate causes of things, as was explained in Book I (57), and therefore these are of themselves the causes of some nature. But this nature can only be the nature of being. This is clear from the fact that all philosophers, in seeking the elements of things inasmuch as they are beings, sought principles of this kind, namely, the first and ultimate ones. Therefore in this science we are seeking the principles of being as being. Hence being is the subject of this science, for any science seeks the proper causes of its subject. It applies analogically to the different categories. Deinde cum dicit ens autem hic procedit ad solvendum quaestiones in praecedenti libro motas de consideratione huius scientiae: et dividitur in tres partes. Primo solvit quaestionem, qua quaerebant, utrum huius scientiae esset consideratio de substantiis et accidentibus simul, et utrum de omnibus substantiis. Secundo solvit quaestionem qua quaerebatur utrum huius scientiae esset considerare de omnibus istis, quae sunt unum et multa, idem et diversum, oppositum, contrarium et huiusmodi, ibi, si igitur ens et unum et cetera. Tertio solvit quaestionem, qua quaerebatur utrum huius scientiae esset considerare demonstrationis principia, ibi, dicendum est autem utrum unius et cetera. 534. The term “being” (297).
Then he proceeds to answer the questions raised in the preceding book about the things which this science considers, and this is divided into three parts. First, he answers the question whether this science considers substances and accidents together, and whether it considers all substances. Second (548), he answers the question whether it belongs to this science to consider all of the following: one and many, same and different, opposites, contraries, and so forth (“Now although”). Third (588), he answers the question whether it belongs to this science to consider the principles of demonstration (“Moreover, it is necessary”).
Circa primum tria facit. Primo ostendit quod huius scientiae est considerare tam de substantiis quam de accidentibus. Secundo quod principaliter de substantiis ibi, ubique vero proprie et cetera. Tertio quod de omnibus substantiis, ibi, omnis autem generis. In regard to the first he does three things. First, he shows that it is the office of this science to consider both substances and accidents. Second (546), he shows that this science is chiefly concerned with substances (“But in every respect”). Third (547), he shows that it pertains to this science to consider all substances (“Now of every”). Circa primum, utitur tali ratione. Quaecumque communiter unius recipiunt praedicationem, licet non univoce, sed analogice de his praedicetur, pertinent ad unius scientiae considerationem: sed ens hoc modo praedicatur de omnibus entibus: ergo omnia entia pertinent ad considerationem unius scientiae, quae considerat ens inquantum est ens, scilicet tam substantias quam accidentia. In regard to the first part he uses this kind of argument: those things which have one term predicated of them in common, not univocally but analogously, belong to the consideration of one science. But the term being is thus predicated of all beings. Therefore all beings, i.e., both substances and accidents, belong to the consideration of one science which considers being as being. In hac autem ratione primo ponit minorem. Secundo maiorem, ibi, quemadmodum ergo salubrium omnium. Tertio conclusionem, ibi, manifestum igitur et cetera. 535. Now in this argument he gives, first (535), the minor premise; second (544), the major premise (“Therefore, just as”); and third (545), the conclusion (“It is evident, then”). Dicit ergo primo, quod ens sive quod est, dicitur multipliciter. Sed sciendum quod aliquid praedicatur de diversis multipliciter: quandoque quidem secundum rationem omnino eamdem, et tunc dicitur de eis univoce praedicari, sicut animal de equo et bove. Quandoque vero secundum rationes omnino diversas; et tunc dicitur de eis aequivoce praedicari, sicut canis de sidere et animali. Quandoque vero secundum rationes quae partim sunt diversae et partim non diversae: diversae quidem secundum quod diversas habitudines important, unae autem secundum quod ad unum aliquid et idem istae diversae habitudines referuntur; et illud dicitur analogice praedicari, idest proportionaliter, prout unumquodque secundum suam habitudinem ad illud unum refertur. He accordingly says, first, that the term being, or what is, has several meanings. But it must be noted that a term is predicated of different things in various senses. Sometimes it is predicated of them according to a meaning which is entirely the same, and then it is said to be predicated of them univocally, as animal is predicated of a horse and of an ox. Sometimes it is predicated of them according to meanings which are entirely different, and then it is said to be predicated of them equivocally, as dog is predicated of a star and of an animal. And sometimes it is predicated of them according to meanings which are partly different and partly not (different inasmuch as they imply different relationships, and the same inasmuch as these different relationships are referred to one and the same thing), and then it is said “to be predicated analogously,” i.e., proportionally, according as each one by its own relationship is referred to that one same thing. Item sciendum quod illud unum ad quod diversae habitudines referuntur in analogicis, est unum numero, et non solum unum ratione, sicut est unum illud quod per nomen univocum designatur. Et ideo dicit quod ens etsi dicatur multipliciter, non tamen dicitur aequivoce, sed per respectum ad unum; non quidem ad unum quod sit solum ratione unum, sed quod est unum sicut una quaedam natura. Et hoc patet in exemplis infra positis. 536. It must also be noted that the one thing to which the different relationships are referred in the case of analogical things is numerically one and not just one in meaning, which is the kind of oneness designated by a univocal term. Hence he says that, although the term being has several senses, still it is not predicated equivocally but in reference to one thing; not to one thing which is one merely in meaning, but to one which is one as a single definite nature. This is evident in the examples given in the text. Ponit enim primo unum exemplum, quando multa comparantur ad unum sicut ad finem, sicut patet de hoc nomine sanativum vel salubre. Sanativum enim non dicitur univoce de diaeta, medicina, urina et animali. Nam ratio sani secundum quod dicitur de diaeta, consistit in conservando sanitatem. Secundum vero quod dicitur de medicina, in faciendo sanitatem. Prout vero dicitur de urina, est signum sanitatis. Secundum vero quod dicitur de animali, ratio eius est, quoniam est receptivum vel susceptivum sanitatis. Sic igitur omne sanativum vel sanum dicitur ad sanitatem unam et eamdem. Eadem enim est sanitas quam animal suscipit, urina significat, medicina facit, et diaeta conservat. 537. First, he gives the example of many things being related to one thing as an end. This is clear in the case of the term healthy or healthful. For the term healthy is not predicated univocally of food, medicine, urine and an animal; because the concept healthy as applied to food means something that preserves health; and as applied to medicine it means something that causes health; and as applied to urine it means something that is a sign of health; and as applied to an animal it means something that is the recipient or subject of health. Hence every use of the term healthy refers to one and the same health; for it is the same health which the animal receives, which urine is a sign of, which medicine causes, and which food preserves. Secundo ponit exemplum quando multa comparantur ad unum sicut ad principium efficiens. Aliquid enim dicitur medicativum, ut qui habet artem medicinae, sicut medicus peritus. Aliquid vero quia est bene aptum ad habendum artem medicinae, sicut homines qui sunt dispositi ut de facili artem medicinae acquirant. Ex quo contingit quod ingenio proprio quaedam medicinalia operantur. Aliquid vero dicitur medicativum vel medicinale, quia eo opus est ad medicinam, sicut instrumenta quibus medici utuntur, medicinalia dici possunt, et etiam medicinae quibus medici utuntur ad sanandum. Et similiter accipi possunt alia quae multipliciter dicuntur, sicut et ista. 538. Second, he gives the example of many things being related to one thing as an efficient principle. For one thing is called medical because it possesses the art of medicine, as the skilled physician. Another is called medical because it is naturally disposed to have the art of medicine, as men who are so disposed that they may acquire the art of medicine easily (and according to this some men can engage in medical activities as a result of a peculiar natural constitution). And another is called medical or medicinal because it is necessary for healing, as the instruments which physicians use can be called medical. The same thing is also true of the things called medicines, which physicians use in restoring health. Other terms which resemble these in having many senses can be taken in a similar way. Et sicut est de praedictis, ita etiam et ens multipliciter dicitur. Sed tamen omne ens dicitur per respectum ad unum primum. Sed hoc primum non est finis vel efficiens sicut in praemissis exemplis, sed subiectum. 539. And just as the above-mentioned terms have many senses, so also does the term being. Yet every being is called such in relation to one first thing, and this first thing is not an end or an efficient cause, as is the case in the foregoing examples, but a subject. Alia enim dicuntur entia vel esse, quia per se habent esse sicut substantiae, quae principaliter et prius entia dicuntur. Alia vero quia sunt passiones sive proprietates substantiae, sicut per se accidentia uniuscuiusque substantiae. Quaedam autem dicuntur entia, quia sunt via ad substantiam, sicut generationes et motus. Alia autem entia dicuntur, quia sunt corruptiones substantiae. Corruptio enim est via ad non esse, sicut generatio via ad substantiam. Et quia corruptio terminatur ad privationem, sicut generatio ad formam, convenienter ipsae etiam privationes formarum substantialium esse dicuntur. Et iterum qualitates vel accidentia quaedam dicuntur entia, quia sunt activa vel generativa substantiae, vel eorum quae secundum aliquam habitudinem praedictarum ad substantiam dicuntur, vel secundum quamcumque aliam. For some things are called beings, or are said to be, because they have being of themselves, as substances, which are called beings in the primary and proper sense. Others are called beings because they are affections or properties of substances, as the proper accidents of any substance. Others are called beings because they are processes toward substance, as generation and motion. And others are called beings because they are corruptions of substances; for corruption is the process toward non-being just as generation is the process toward substance. And since corruption terminates in privation just as generation terminates in form, the very privations of substantial forms are fittingly called beings. Again, certain qualities or certain accidents are called beings because they are productive or generative principles of substances or of those things which are related to substance according to one of the foregoing relationships or any other relationship. Item negationes eorum quae ad substantiam habitudinem habent, vel etiam ipsius substantiae esse dicuntur. Unde dicimus quod non ens est non ens. Quod non diceretur nisi negationi aliquo modo esse competeret. And similarly the negations of those things which are related to substances, or even substance itself, are also called beings. Hence we say that non-being is non-being. But this would not be possible unless a negation possessed being in some way. Sciendum tamen quod praedicti modi essendi ad quatuor possunt reduci. 540. But it must be noted that the above-mentioned modes of being can be reduced to four. Nam unum eorum quod est debilissimum, est tantum in ratione, scilicet negatio et privatio, quam dicimus in ratione esse, quia ratio de eis negociatur quasi de quibusdam entibus, dum de eis affirmat vel negat aliquid. Secundum quid autem differant negatio et privatio, infra dicetur. (1) For one of them, which is the most imperfect, i.e., negation and privation, exists only in the mind. We say that these exist in the mind because the mind busies itself with them as kinds of being while it affirms or denies something about them. In what respect negation and privation differ will be treated below (564). Aliud autem huic proximum in debilitate est, secundum quod generatio et corruptio et motus entia dicuntur. Habent enim aliquid admixtum de privatione et negatione. Nam motus est actus imperfectus, ut dicitur tertio physicorum. 541. (2) There is another mode of being inasmuch as generation and corruption are called beings, and this mode by reason of its imperfection comes close to the one given above. For generation and corruption have some admixture of privation and negation, because motion is an imperfect kind of actuality, as is stated in the Physics, Book III. Tertium autem dicitur quod nihil habet de non ente admixtum, habet tamen esse debile, quia non per se, sed in alio, sicut sunt qualitates, quantitates et substantiae proprietates. 542. (3) The third mode of being admits of no admixture of non-being, yet it is still an imperfect kind of being, because it does not exist of itself but in something else, for example, qualities and quantities and the properties of substances. Quartum autem genus est quod est perfectissimum, quod scilicet habet esse in natura absque admixtione privationis, et habet esse firmum et solidum, quasi per se existens, sicut sunt substantiae. Et ad hoc sicut ad primum et principale omnia alia referuntur. Nam qualitates et quantitates dicuntur esse, inquantum insunt substantiae; motus et generationes, inquantum tendunt ad substantiam vel ad aliquid praedictorum; privationes autem et negationes, inquantum removent aliquid trium praedictorum. 543. (4) The fourth mode of being is the one which is most perfect, namely, what has being in reality without any admixture of privation, and has firm and solid being inasmuch as it exists of itself. This is the mode of being which substances have. Now all the others are reduced to this as the primary and principal mode of being; for qualities and quantities are said to be inasmuch as they exist in substances; and motions and generations are said to be inasmuch as they are processes tending toward substance or toward some of the foregoing; and negations and privations are said to be inasmuch as they remove some part of the preceding three. 544. Therefore, just as (298). Deinde cum dicit quemadmodum ergo hic ponit maiorem primae rationis; dicens, quod est unius scientiae speculari non solum illa quae dicuntur secundum unum, idest secundum unam rationem omnino, sed etiam eorum quae dicuntur per respectum ad unam naturam secundum habitudines diversas. Et huius ratio est propter unitatem eius ad quod ista dicuntur; sicut patet quod de omnibus sanativis considerat una scientia, scilicet medicinalis, et similiter de aliis quae eodem modo dicuntur. Here he gives the major premise of the first argument. He says that it is the office of one science to study not only those things which are referred “to one thing,” i.e., to one common notion, but also those which are referred to one nature according to different relationships. And the reason for this is that the thing to which they are referred is one; just as it is clear that one science, medicine, considers all health-giving things. The same thing holds true of other things which are spoken of in the same way. 545. It is evident (299). Deinde cum dicit manifestum igitur hic ponit conclusionem intentam quae per se est manifesta. Then he draws his intended conclusion. This is evident of itself. 546. But in every (299a). Ubique vero hic ponit quod haec scientia principaliter considerat de substantiis, etsi de omnibus entibus consideret, tali ratione. Omnis scientia quae est de pluribus quae dicuntur ad unum primum, est proprie et principaliter illius primi, ex quo alia dependent secundum esse, et propter quod dicuntur secundum nomen; et hoc ubique est verum. Sed substantia est hoc primum inter omnia entia. Ergo philosophus qui considerat omnia entia, primo et principaliter debet habere in sua consideratione principia et causas substantiarum; ergo per consequens eius consideratio primo et principaliter de substantiis est. Then he shows that this science, even though it considers all beings, is chiefly concerned with substances. He uses the following argument. Every science which deals with many things that are referred to one primary thing is properly and principally concerned with that primary thing on which other things depend for their being and from which they derive their name; and this is true in every case. But substance is the primary kind of being. Hence the philosopher who considers all beings ought to consider primarily and chiefly the principles and causes of substances. Therefore his consideration extends primarily and chiefly to substances. 547. Now of every (300). Deinde cum dicit omnis autem hic ostendit quod primi philosophi est considerare de omnibus substantiis, tali ratione. Omnium eorum qui sunt unius generis, est unus sensus et una scientia, sicut visus est de omnibus coloribus, et grammatica considerat omnes voces. Si igitur omnia entia sint unius generis aliquo modo, oportet quod omnes species eius pertineant ad considerationem unius scientiae quae est generalis: et species entium diversae pertineant ad species illius scientiae diversas. Hoc autem dicit, quia non oportet quod una scientia consideret de omnibus speciebus unius generis secundum proprias rationes singularum specierum, sed secundum quod conveniunt in genere. Secundum autem proprias rationes pertinent ad scientias speciales, sicut est in proposito. Nam omnes substantiae, inquantum sunt entia vel substantiae, pertinent ad considerationem huius scientiae: inquantum autem sunt talis vel talis substantia, ut leo vel bos, pertinent ad scientias speciales. Then he shows by the following argument that it is the business of the first philosopher to consider all substances. There is one sense and one science of all things belonging to one class; for example, sight is concerned with all colors, and grammar with all words. Therefore, if all beings somehow belong to one class, all species of being must belong to the consideration of one science which is a general science, and different species of being must belong to the different species of that science. He says this because it is not necessary for one science to consider all the species of one genus according to the special notes of every single species, but only inasmuch as they agree generically. But according to their specific notes the different species of one genus belong to the special sciences, as happens in the present case. For inasmuch as all substances are beings or substances, they belong to the consideration of this science; but inasmuch as they are a particular kind of substance, as a lion or an ox, they belong to the special sciences.
LESSON 2 This Science Considers Being and Unity. The Parts of Philosophy Based on the Divisions of Being and Unity
ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 2: 1003b 22-1004a 9 εἰ δὴ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ἓν ταὐτὸν καὶ μία φύσις τῷ ἀκολουθεῖν ἀλλήλοις ὥσπερ ἀρχὴ καὶ αἴτιον, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὡς ἑνὶ λόγῳ δηλούμενα  (διαφέρει δὲ οὐθὲν οὐδ᾽ ἂν ὁμοίως ὑπολάβωμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸ ἔργου μᾶλλον): 301. Now although being and unity are the same and are a single nature in the sense that they are associated like principle and cause, they are not the same in the sense that they are expressed by a single concept. Yet it makes no difference even if we consider them to be the same; in fact this will rather support our undertaking. ταὐτὸ γὰρ εἷς ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἄνθρωπος,  καὶ ὢν ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἄνθρωπος, καὶ οὐχ ἕτερόν τι δηλοῖ κατὰ τὴν λέξιν ἐπαναδιπλούμενον τὸ εἷς ἄνθρωπος καὶ εἷς ὢν ἄνθρωπος (δῆλον δ᾽ ὅτι οὐ χωρίζεται οὔτ᾽ ἐπὶ γενέσεως οὔτ᾽  ἐπὶ φθορᾶς), ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἑνός, ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἡ πρόσθεσις ἐν τούτοις ταὐτὸ δηλοῖ, καὶ οὐδὲν ἕτερον τὸ ἓν παρὰ τὸ ὄν, 302. For one man and human being and man are the same thing; and nothing different is expressed by repeating the terms when we say, “This is a human being, a man, and one man.” And it is evident that they are not separated either in generation or in corruption. The same holds true of what is one. Hence it is evident that any addition to these expresses the same thing, and that unity is nothing else than being. ἔτι δ᾽ ἡ ἑκάστου οὐσία ἕν ἐστιν οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὅπερ ὄν τι: 303. Further, the substance of each thing is one in no accidental way; and similarly it is something that is. ὥσθ᾽ ὅσα περ τοῦ ἑνὸς εἴδη, τοσαῦτα καὶ τοῦ ὄντος: περὶ ὧν τὸ τί ἐστι τῆς  αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης τῷ γένει θεωρῆσαι, λέγω δ᾽ οἷον περὶ ταὐτοῦ καὶ ὁμοίου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων. σχεδὸν δὲ πάντα ἀνάγεται τἀναντία εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν ταύτην: [1004α]  τεθεωρήσθω δ᾽ ἡμῖν ταῦτα ἐν τῇ ἐκλογῇ τῶν ἐναντίων. 304. Hence there are as many species of being as there are of unity, of which it is the office of the same general science to treat. I mean, for example, sameness and likeness and other such attributes. And almost all contraries may be referred to this starting point. But these have been studied by us in our selection, i.e., in our explanation or treatment, of contraries. καὶ τοσαῦτα μέρη φιλοσοφίας ἔστιν ὅσαι περ αἱ οὐσίαι: ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον εἶναί τινα πρώτην καὶ ἐχομένην αὐτῶν. ὑπάρχει  γὰρ εὐθὺς γένη ἔχον τὸ ὂν [καὶ τὸ ἕν]: διὸ καὶ αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι ἀκολουθήσουσι τούτοις. ἔστι γὰρ ὁ φιλόσοφος ὥσπερ ὁ μαθηματικὸς λεγόμενος: καὶ γὰρ αὕτη ἔχει μέρη, καὶ πρώτη τις καὶ δευτέρα ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἄλλαι ἐφεξῆς ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν. 305. And there are just as many parts of philosophy as there are substances, so that there must be a first philosophy and one which is next in order to it. For being and unity are things which straightway have genera; and for this reason the sciences will correspond to these. For the term philosopher is used like the term mathematician; for mathematics too has parts, and there is a first and a second science and then others “ following these among the mathematical sciences. COMMENTARY Metaphysics also treats of “being-one”. Hic procedit ad ostendendum quod ad considerationem unius scientiae pertinent considerare huiusmodi communia, scilicet unum et multa, idem et diversum: et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit hoc de singulis per proprias rationes. Secundo de omnibus simul per quasdam rationes communes, ibi, et philosophi est de omnibus posse speculari. 548. Here he proceeds to show that the study of common attributes such as one and many and same and different belongs to the consideration of one and the same science; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he shows that this is true of each attribute taken separately by arguing from proper or specific principles. Second (570), he shows that this is true of all attributes taken together by arguing from common principles. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quod de omnibus hic considerare debet philosophus. Secundo docet modum considerandi, ibi, quare quoniam unum multipliciter et cetera. In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows that the philosopher ought to investigate all these attributes. Second (568), he tells us how to investigate them. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quod ad hanc scientiam pertineat considerare de uno et de speciebus unius. Secundo quod ad eamdem scientiam pertineat considerare de omnibus oppositis, ibi, quoniam autem unius est opposita considerare. In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows that it is the office of this science to consider unity and its species. Second (564), he shows that it is the office of one and the same science to consider all opposites. Circa primum duo facit. Primo enim ostendit quod huius scientiae est considerare de uno. Secundo quod eius sit considerare de speciebus unius, ibi, quare quotcumque unius. In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows that it is the office of this science to consider unity. Second (561), he shows that it also, belongs to it to examine the species of unity. Dicit ergo primo, quod ens et unum sunt idem et una natura. Hoc ideo dicit, quia quaedam sunt idem numero quae non sunt una natura, sed diversae, sicut Socrates, et hoc album, et hoc musicum. Unum autem et ens non diversas naturas, sed unam significant. Hoc autem contingit dupliciter. Quaedam enim sunt unum quae consequuntur se adinvicem convertibiliter sicut principium et causa. Quaedam vero non solum convertuntur ut sint idem subiecto, sed etiam sunt unum secundum rationem, sicut vestis et indumentum. He therefore says, first, that being and unity are the same and are a single nature. He says this because some things are numerically the same which are not a single nature but different natures, for example, Socrates, this white thing, and this musician. Now the terms one and being do not signify different natures but a single nature. But things can be one in two ways: (1) for some things are one which are associated as interchangeable things, like principle and cause; and (2) some are interchangeable not only in the sense that they are one and the same numerically [or in subject] but also in the sense that they are one and the same conceptually, like garment and clothing. Unum autem et ens significant unam naturam secundum diversas rationes. Unde sic se habent sicut principium et causa, sed non sicut tunica et vestis, quae sunt nomina penitus synonyma. Nihil tamen differt ad propositum, si similiter accipiamus ea dici, sicut illa quae sunt unum et subiecto et ratione. Sed hoc erit magis prae opere, idest magis utile ad hoc quod intendit. Intendit enim probare quod unum et ens cadunt sub eadem consideratione, et quod habent species sibi correspondentes. Quod manifestius probaretur si unum et ens essent idem re et ratione, quam si sint idem re et non ratione. 549. Now the terms one and being signify one nature according to different concepts, and therefore they are like the terms principle and cause, and not like the terms tunic and garment, which are wholly synonymous. —Yet it makes no difference to his thesis if we consider them to be used in the same sense, as those things which are one both numerically and conceptually. In fact this will “rather support our undertaking,” i.e., it will serve his purpose better; for he intends to prove that unity and being belong to the same study, and that the species of the one correspond to those of the other. The proof of this would be clearer if unity and being were the same both numerically and conceptually rather than just numerically and not conceptually. Quod autem sint idem re, probat duabus rationibus, quarum primam ponit ibi, idem enim, quae talis est. Quaecumque duo addita uni nullam diversitatem afferunt, sunt penitus idem: sed unum et ens addita homini vel cuicumque alii nullam diversitatem afferunt: ergo sunt penitus idem. Minor patet: idem enim est dictum homo, et unus homo. Et similiter est idem dictum, ens homo, vel quod est homo: et non demonstratur aliquid alterum cum secundum dictionem replicamus dicendo, est ens homo, et homo, et unus homo. Quod quidem probat sic. 550. He proves that they are the same numerically by using two arguments. He gives the first where he says, “For one man,” and it runs as follows. Any two things which when added to some third thing cause no difference are wholly the same. But when one and being are added to man or to anything at all, they cause no difference. Therefore they are wholly the same. The truth of the minor premise is evident; for it is the same thing to say “man” and “one man.” And similarly it is the same thing to say “human being” and “the thing that is man;” and nothing different is expressed when in speaking we repeat the terms, saying, “This is a human being, a man, and one man.” He proves this as follows. Idem enim est generari et corrumpi hominem, et id quod est homo. Quod ex hoc patet, quia generatio est via ad esse, et corruptio mutatio ab esse ad non esse. Unde nunquam generatur homo, quin generetur ens homo: nec unquam corrumpitur homo, quin corrumpatur ens homo. Quae autem simul generantur et corrumpuntur sunt unum. 551. It is the same thing for man and the thing that is man to be generated and corrupted. This is evident from the fact that generation is a process toward being, and corruption a change from being to non-being. Hence a man is never generated without a human being being generated, nor is a man ever corrupted without a human being being corrupted; and those things which are generated and corrupted together are themselves one and the same. Et sicut dictum est quod ens et homo non separantur in generatione et corruptione, similiter apparet de uno. Nam cum generatur homo, generatur unus homo: et cum corrumpitur, similiter corrumpitur. Unde manifestum est quod appositio in istis ostendit idem; et per hoc quod additur vel unum vel ens, non intelligitur addi aliqua natura supra hominem. Ex quo manifeste apparet, quod unum non est aliud praeter ens: quia quaecumque uni et eidem sunt eadem, sibiinvicem sunt eadem. 552. And just as it has been said that being and man are not separated either in generation or in corruption, so too this is evident of what is one; for when a man is generated, one man is generated, and when a man is corrupted, one man is also corrupted. It is clear, then, that the apposition of these [i.e., of one or being to man] expresses the same thing, and that just because the term one or being is added to man it is not to be understood that some nature is added to man. And from this it is clearly apparent that unity does not differ from being, because any two things which are identical with some third thing are identical with each other. Patet autem ex praedicta ratione, non solum quod sunt unum re, sed quod differunt ratione. Nam si non differrent ratione, essent penitus synonyma; et sic nugatio esset cum dicitur, ens homo et unus homo. Sciendum est enim quod hoc nomen homo, imponitur a quidditate, sive a natura hominis; et hoc nomen res imponitur a quidditate tantum; hoc vero nomen ens, imponitur ab actu essendi: et hoc nomen unum, ab ordine vel indivisione. Est enim unum ens indivisum. Idem autem est quod habet essentiam et quidditatem per illam essentiam, et quod est in se indivisum. Unde ista tria, res, ens, unum, significant omnino idem, sed secundum diversas rationes. 553. It is also evident from the foregoing argument that unity and being are the same numerically but differ conceptually; for if this were not the case they would be wholly synonymous, and then it would be nonsense to say, “a human being,” and “one man.” For it must be borne in mind that the term man is derived from the quiddity or the nature of man, and the term thing from the quiddity only; but the term being is derived from the act of being, and the term one from order or lack of division; for what is one is an undivided being. Now what has an essence, and a quiddity by reason of that essence, and what is undivided in itself, are the same. Hence these three—thing, being, and one—signify absolutely the same thing but according to different concepts. 554. Further, the substance (303). Deinde cum dicit amplius autem hic ponit secundam rationem ad idem; quae talis est. Quaecumque duo praedicantur de substantia alicuius rei per se et non per accidens, illa sunt idem secundum rem: sed ita se habent unum et ens, quod praedicantur per se et non secundum accidens de substantia cuiuslibet rei. Substantia enim cuiuslibet rei est unum per se et non secundum accidens. Ens ergo et unum significant idem secundum rem. Then he gives the second argument, which has to do with sameness or identity of subject. This argument is as follows. Any two attributes which are predicated essentially and not accidentally of the substance of each thing are the same in subject, or numerically. But unity and being are such that they are predicated essentially and not accidentally of the substance of each thing; for the substance of a thing is one in itself and not accidentally. Therefore the terms being and one signify the same thing in subject. Quod autem ens et unum praedicentur de substantia cuiuslibet rei per se et non secundum accidens, sic potest probari. Si enim praedicarentur de substantia cuiuslibet rei per aliquod ens ei additum, de illo iterum necesse est praedicari ens, quia unumquodque est unum et ens. Aut ergo iterum de hoc praedicatur per se, aut per aliquid aliud additum. Si per aliquid aliud, iterum esset quaestio de illo addito, et sic erit procedere usque ad infinitum. Hoc autem est impossibile: ergo necesse est stare in primo, scilicet quod substantia rei sit una et ens per seipsam, et non per aliquid additum. 555. That the terms being and one are predicated essentially and not accidentally of the substance of each thing can be proved as follows. If being and one were predicated of the substance of each thing by reason of something added to it [i.e., accidentally], being would have to be predicated also of the thing added, because anything at all is one and a being. But then there would be the question whether being is predicated of this thing (the one added) either essentially or by reason of some other thing that is added to it in turn. And if the latter were the case, then the same question would arise once again regarding the last thing added, and so on to infinity. But this is impossible. Hence the first position must be held, namely, that a thing’s substance is one and a being of itself and not by reason of something added to it. Sciendum est autem quod circa hoc Avicenna aliud sensit. Dixit enim quod unum et ens non significant substantiam rei, sed significant aliquid additum. Et de ente quidem hoc dicebat, quia in qualibet re quae habet esse ab alio, aliud est esse rei, et substantia sive essentia eius: hoc autem nomen ens, significat ipsum esse. Significat igitur (ut videtur) aliquid additum essentiae. 556. But it must be noted that Avicenna felt differently about this; for he said that the terms being and one do not signify a thing’s substance but something added to it. He said this of being because, in the case of anything that derives its existence from something else, the existence of such a thing must differ from its substance or essence. But the term being signifies existence itself. Hence it seems that being, or existence is something added to a thing’s essence. De uno autem hoc dicebat, quia aestimabat quod illud unum quod convertitur cum ente, sit idem quod illud unum quod est principium numeri. Unum autem quod est principium numeri necesse est significare quamdam naturam additam substantiae: alioquin cum numerus ex unitatibus constituatur, non esset numerus species quantitatis, quae est accidens substantiae superadditum. Dicebat autem quod hoc unum convertitur cum ente, non quia significat ipsam rei substantiam vel entis, sed quia significat accidens quod inhaeret omni enti, sicut risibile quod convertitur cum homine. 557. He spoke in the same way of one, because he thought that the one which is interchangeable with being and the one which is the principle of number are the same. And the one which is the principle of number must signify a reality added to the substance, otherwise number, since it is composed of ones, would not be a species of quantity, which is an accident added to substance. He said that this kind of one is interchangeable with being, not in the sense that it signifies the very substance of a thing or being, but in the sense that it signifies an accident belonging to every being, just as the ability to laugh belongs to every man. Sed in primo quidem non videtur dixisse recte. Esse enim rei quamvis sit aliud ab eius essentia, non tamen est intelligendum quod sit aliquod superadditum ad modum accidentis, sed quasi constituitur per principia essentiae. Et ideo hoc nomen ens quod imponitur ab ipso esse, significat idem cum nomine quod imponitur ab ipsa essentia. 558. But in regard to the first point he does not seem to be right; for even though a thing’s existence is (+) other than its essence, it should not be understood to be something added to its essence after the manner of an (~) accident, but (+) something established, as it were, by the principles of the essence. Hence the term being, which is applied to a thing by reason of its very existence, designates the same thing as the term which is applied to it by reason of its essence. [Existence is later clarified as the act of essence.] De uno autem non videtur esse verum, quod sit idem quod convertitur cum ente, et quod est principium numeri. Nihil enim quod est in determinato genere videtur consequi omnia entia. Unde unum quod determinatur ad speciale genus entis, scilicet ad genus quantitatis discretae, non videtur posse cum ente universali converti. Si enim unum est proprium et per se accidens entis, oportet quod ex principiis causetur entis in quantum ens, sicut quodlibet accidens proprium ex principiis sui subiecti. Ex principiis autem communibus entis inquantum est ens, non intelligitur causari aliquod particulariter ens sufficienter. Unde non potest esse quod ens aliquod determinati generis et speciei sit accidens omnis entis. 559. Nor does it seem to be true that the one or unity which is interchangeable with being and that which is the principle of number are the same; for nothing that pertains to some special class of being seems to be characteristic of all beings. Hence the unity which is limited to a special class of being—discrete quantity—does not seem to be interchangeable with universal being. For, if unity is a proper and essential accident of being, it must be caused by the principles of being as being, just as any proper accident is caused by the principles of its subject. But it is not reasonable that something having a particular mode of being should be adequately accounted for by the common principles of being as being. It cannot be true, then, that something which belongs to a definite genus and species is an accident of every being. Unum igitur quod est principium numeri, aliud est ab eo quod cum ente convertitur. Unum enim quod cum ente convertitur, ipsum ens designat, superaddens indivisionis rationem, quae, cum sit negatio vel privatio, non ponit aliquam naturam enti additam. Et sic in nullo differt ab ente secundum rem, sed solum ratione. Nam negatio vel privatio non est ens naturae, sed rationis, sicut dictum est. 560. Therefore the kind of unity which is the principle of number differs from that which is interchangeable with being; for the unity which is interchangeable with being signifies being itself, adding to it the notion of undividedness, which, since it is a negation or a privation, does not posit any reality added to being. Thus unity differs from being in no way numerically but only conceptually; for a negation or a privation is not a real being but a being of reason, as has been stated (540). Unum vero quod est principium numeri addit supra substantiam, rationem mensurae, quae est propria passio quantitatis, et primo invenitur in unitate. Et dicitur per privationem vel negationem divisionis, quae est secundum quantitatem continuam. Nam numerus ex divisione continui causatur. Et ideo numerus ad scientiam mathematicam pertinet, cuius subiectum extra materiam esse non potest, quamvis sine materia sensibili consideretur. Hoc autem non esset, si unum quod est principium numeri, secundum esse a materia separaretur in rebus immaterialibus existens, quasi cum ente conversum. However, the kind of unity which is the principle of number adds to substance the note of a measure, which is a special property of quantity and is found first in the unit. And it is described as the privation or negation of division which pertains to continuous quantity; for number is produced by dividing the continuous. Hence number belongs to mathematical science, whose subject cannot exist apart from sensible matter but can be considered apart from sensible matter. But this would not be so if the kind of unity which is the principle of number were separate from matter in being and existed among the immaterial substances, as is true of the kind of unity which is interchangeable with being. 561. Hence there are (304). Quare quotcumque hic concludit quod philosophi est considerare de partibus unius, sicut de partibus entis. Et primo hoc ostendit. Secundo etiam ostendit, quod secundum diversas partes entis et unius, sunt diversae partes philosophiae, ibi, et tot partes. Then he concludes that it is the business of the philosopher to consider the parts of unity, just as it is to consider the parts of being. First, he proves this; and second (563), he shows that there are different parts of philosophy corresponding to the different parts of being and unity. Dicit ergo primo, quod ex quo unum et ens idem significant, et eiusdem sunt species eaedem, oportet quod tot sint species entis, quot sunt species unius, et sibiinvicem respondentes. Sicut enim partes entis sunt substantia, quantitas et qualitas etc., ita et partes unius sunt idem, aequale et simile. Idem enim unum in substantia est. Aequale, unum in quantitate. Simile, unum in qualitate. Et secundum alias partes entis possent sumi aliae partes unius, si essent nomina posita. Et sicut ad unam scientiam, scilicet ad philosophiam, pertinet consideratio de omnibus partibus entis, ita et de omnibus partibus unius, scilicet eodem et simili et huiusmodi. Et ad hoc principium, scilicet unum, reducuntur omnia contraria fere. He says, first, that since being and unity signify the same thing, and the species of things that are the same are themselves the same, there must be as many species of being as there are of unity, and they must correspond to each other. For just as the parts of being are substance, quantity, quality, and so on, in a similar way the parts of unity are sameness, equality and likeness. For things are the same when they are one in substance, equal when they are one in quantity, and like when they are one in quality. And the other parts of unity could be taken from the other parts of being, if they were given names. And just as it is the office of one science, philosophy, to consider all parts of being, in a similar way it is the office of this same science to consider all parts of unity, i.e., sameness, likeness and so forth. And to this “starting point,” i.e., unity, “almost” all contraries may be referred. Et hoc addit, quia in quibusdam non est ita manifestum. Et tamen hoc esse necesse est; quia cum in omnibus contrariis alterum habeat privationem inclusam, oportet fieri reductionem ad privativa prima, inter quae praecipue est unum. 562. He adds this qualification because in some cases this point is not so evident. Yet it must be true; for since one member of every pair of contraries involves privation, they must be referred back to certain primary privatives, among which unity is the most basic. Et iterum multitudo, quae ex uno causatur, causa est diversitatis differentiae et contrarietatis, ut infra dicetur. Et haec dicit esse considerata in ecloga, idest in electione contrariorum, idest in tractatu, quae est pars electa ad tractandum de contrariis, scilicet in decimo huius. And plurality, which stems from unity, is the cause of otherness, difference and contrariety, as will be stated below. He says that this has been treated “in our selection,” or extract, “of contraries,” i.e., a treatise which is the part selected to deal with contraries, namely, Book X (2000-21) of this work. 563. And there are (305). Et tot partes hic ostendit partes philosophiae distingui secundum partes entis et unius; et dicit, quod tot sunt partes philosophiae, quot sunt partes substantiae, de qua dicitur principaliter ens et unum et de qua principalis est huius scientiae consideratio et intentio. Here he shows that the parts of philosophy are distinguished in reference to the parts of being and unity. He says that there are as many parts of philosophy as there are parts of substance, of which being and unity chiefly are predicated, and of which it is the principal intention or aim of this science to treat. Et, quia partes substantiae sunt ordinatae adinvicem, nam substantia immaterialis est prior substantia sensibili naturaliter; ideo necesse est inter partes philosophiae esse quamdam primam. Illa tamen, quae est de substantia sensibili, est prima ordine doctrinae, quia a notioribus nobis oportet incipere disciplinam: et de hac determinatur in septimo et octavo huius. Illa vero, quae est de substantia immateriali est prior dignitate et intentione huius scientiae, de qua traditur in duodecimo huius. And because the parts of substance are related to each other in a certain order, for immaterial substance is naturally prior to sensible substance, then among the parts of philosophy there must be a first part. (1) Now that part which is concerned with sensible substance is first in the order of instruction, because any branch of learning must start with things which are better known to us. He treats of this part in Books VII (1300) and VIII of this work. (2) But that part which has to do with immaterial substance is prior both in dignity and in the aim of this science. This part is treated in Book XII (2488) of this work. Et tamen quaecumque sunt prima, necesse est quod sint continua aliis partibus, quia omnes partes habent pro genere unum et ens. Unde in consideratione unius et entis diversae partes huius scientiae uniuntur, quamvis sint de diversis partibus substantiae; ut sic sit una scientia inquantum partes praedictae sunt consequentes hoc, id est unum et ens, sicut communia substantiae. Et in hoc philosophus est similis mathematico. Nam mathematica habet diversas partes, et quamdam principaliter sicut arithmeticam, et quamdam secundario sicut geometriam, et alia consequenter se habent his, sicut perspectiva, astrologia et musica. Yet whatever parts are first must be continuous with the others, because all parts have unity and being as their genus. Hence all parts of this science are united in the study of being and unity, although they are about different parts of substance. Thus it is one science inasmuch as the foregoing parts are things which correspond to “these,”i.e., to unity and being, as common attributes of substance. In this respect the philosopher resembles the mathematician; for mathematical science has different parts, one of which is primary, as arithmetic, another secondary, as geometry, and others following these in order, as optics, astronomy and music.
LESSON 3 The Same Science Considers Unity and Plurality and All Opposites. The Method of Treating These
ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 2: 1004a 9-1004a 34 ἐπεὶ δὲ μιᾶς τἀντικείμενα  θεωρῆσαι, τῷ δὲ ἑνὶ ἀντίκειται πλῆθος—ἀπόφασιν δὲ καὶ στέρησιν μιᾶς ἐστὶ θεωρῆσαι διὰ τὸ ἀμφοτέρως θεωρεῖσθαι τὸ ἓν οὗ ἡ ἀπόφασις ἢ ἡ στέρησις (ἢ <�γὰρ> ἁπλῶς λέγομεν ὅτι οὐχ ὑπάρχει ἐκεῖνο, ἤ τινι γένει: ἔνθα μὲν οὖν τῷ ἑνὶ ἡ διαφορὰ πρόσεστι παρὰ τὸ ἐν τῇ ἀποφάσει, ἀπουσία γὰρ  ἡ ἀπόφασις ἐκείνου ἐστίν, ἐν δὲ τῇ στερήσει καὶ ὑποκειμένη τις φύσις γίγνεται καθ᾽ ἧς λέγεται ἡ στέρησις) 306. Now since it is the office of a single science to study opposites, and plurality is the opposite of unity, it is also the office of a single science to study negation and privation, because in both cases we are studying the unity of which there is negation or privation. And this (negation or privation) is what is stated either absolutely because an attribute is not present in a thing or (not absolutely) because it is not present in some determinate class. Therefore this difference is present in unity over and above what is implied in negation; for negation is the absence of the thing in question. But in the case of privation there is an underlying subject of which the privation is predicated. [τῷ δ᾽ ἑνὶ πλῆθος ἀντίκειται]—ὥστε καὶ τἀντικείμενα τοῖς εἰρημένοις, τό τε ἕτερον καὶ ἀνόμοιον καὶ ἄνισον καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα λέγεται ἢ κατὰ ταῦτα ἢ κατὰ πλῆθος καὶ τὸ ἕν,  τῆς εἰρημένης γνωρίζειν ἐπιστήμης: ὧν ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ ἐναντιότης: διαφορὰ γάρ τις ἡ ἐναντιότης, ἡ δὲ διαφορὰ ἑτερότης. 307. But plurality is the opposite of unity. Hence the opposites of the abovementioned concepts, otherness, unlikeness, and inequality, and any others which are referred to plurality or unity, must come within the scope of the science mentioned above. And contrariety is one of these; for contrariety is a kind of difference, and difference is a kind of otherness. ὥστ᾽ ἐπειδὴ πολλαχῶς τὸ ἓν λέγεται, καὶ ταῦτα πολλαχῶς μὲν λεχθήσεται, ὅμως δὲ μιᾶς ἅπαντά ἐστι γνωρίζειν: οὐ γὰρ εἰ πολλαχῶς, ἑτέρας, ἀλλ᾽ εἰ μήτε καθ᾽ ἓν μήτε  πρὸς ἓν οἱ λόγοι ἀναφέρονται. ἐπεὶ δὲ πάντα πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον ἀναφέρεται, οἷον ὅσα ἓν λέγεται πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον ἕν, ὡσαύτως φατέον καὶ περὶ ταὐτοῦ καὶ ἑτέρου καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων ἔχειν: ὥστε διελόμενον ποσαχῶς λέγεται ἕκαστον, οὕτως ἀποδοτέον πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον ἐν ἑκάστῃ κατηγορίᾳ πῶς πρὸς ἐκεῖνο  λέγεται: τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῷ ἔχειν ἐκεῖνο τὰ δὲ τῷ ποιεῖν τὰ δὲ κατ᾽ ἄλλους λεχθήσεται τοιούτους τρόπους. 308. Hence, since the term one is used in many senses, the terms designating the foregoing opposites will also be used in many senses. Yet it is the business of one science to know them all. For even if some term is used in many senses, it does not therefore follow that it belongs to another science. Hence if terms are not used with one meaning, and their concepts are not referred to one thing, then it is the office of a different science to study them. But since all things are referred to some primary thing, as all things which are one are referred to a primary one, the same thing must hold true of sameness, otherness, and the contraries. It is necessary, then to distinguish all the senses in which each term is used and then refer them back to the primary thing signified in each of the predicates in question to see how each is related to it. For one thing is given a particular predicate because it possesses it, another because it produces it, and others in other ways. φανερὸν οὖν [ὅπερ ἐν ταῖς ἀπορίαις ἐλέχθη] ὅτι μιᾶς περὶ τούτων καὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἐστὶ λόγον ἔχειν (τοῦτο δ᾽ ἦν ἓν τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀπορήμασιν), 309. Hence it is evident, as has been stated in our problems, that it is the office of a single science to give an account of these predicates as well as of substance; and this was one of the problems (181:C 346; 202:C 393). COMMENTARY It also considers “one-many”, “negation-privation” etc. Hic ostendit, quod considerare de oppositis pertinet ad scientiam istam: et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit, quod eius est considerare de negatione et privatione. Secundo de contrariis, ibi, sed uni et cetera. 564. Here he shows that it is the office of this science to consider opposites; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he shows that it is the office of this science to consider privation and negation; and second (567), to consider contraries (“But plurality”). Dicit ergo, quod, cum ad unam scientiam pertineat considerare opposita, sicut ad medicinam considerare sanum et aegrum, et ad grammaticam congruum et incongruum: uni autem opponitur multitudo: necesse est, quod illius scientiae sit speculari negationem et privationem, cuius est speculari unum et multitudinem. Propter quod utriusque est considerare unum; scilicet ex utroque dependet unius consideratio, de cuius ratione est negatio et privatio. Nam sicut dictum est, unum est ens non divisum: divisio autem ad multitudinem pertinet, quae uni opponitur. Unde cuius est considerare unum, eius est considerare negationem vel privationem. He accordingly says (306) that, since it pertains to one science to consider opposites (for example, it belongs to medicine to consider health and sickness, and to grammar to consider agreement and disagreement), and since plurality is the opposite of unity, the study of privation and negation must belong to that science which deals with unity and plurality. For the consideration “of both” involves unity; that is, the study of unity, whose concept entails negation and privation, depends on both of these. For, as has been said above (553), what is one is an undivided being, and division relates to plurality, which is the opposite of unity. Hence the study of negation and privation belongs to that science whose business it is to consider unity. Negatio autem est duplex: quaedam simplex per quam absolute dicitur quod hoc non inest illi. Alia est negatio in genere, per quam aliquid non absolute negatur, sed infra metas alicuius generis; sicut caecum dicitur non simpliciter, quod non habet visum, sed infra genus animalis quod natum est habere visum. 565. Now there are two kinds of negation: (1) simple negation, by which one thing is said absolutely not to be present in something else, and (2) negation in a genus, by which something is denied of something else, not absolutely, but within the limits of some determinate genus. For example, not everything that does not have sight is said absolutely to be blind, but something within the genus of an animal which is naturally fitted to have sight. Et haec adest differentia huic quod dico unum praeter quod est in negatione, idest per quam distat a negatione: quia negatio dicit tantum absentiam alicuius, scilicet quod removet, sine hoc quod determinet subiectum. Unde absoluta negatio potest verificari tam de non ente, quod est natum habere affirmationem, quam de ente, quod est natum habere et non habet. Non videns enim potest dici tam Chimaera quam lapis quam etiam homo. Sed in privatione est quaedam natura vel substantia determinata, de qua dicitur privatio: non enim omne non videns potest dici caecum, sed solum quod est natum habere visum. Et sic, cum negatio, quae in ratione unius includitur, sit negatio in subiecto (alias non ens, unum dici posset): patet, quod unum differt a negatione simpliciter, et magis trahit se ad naturam privationis, ut infra decimo huius habetur. And this difference is present in unity over and above “what is implied in negation”; i.e., it is something by which it differs from negation, because negation expresses only the absence of something, namely, what it removes, without stating a determinate subject. (1) Hence simple negation can be verified both of a non-being, which is not naturally fitted to have something affirmed of it, and of a being which is naturally fitted to have something affirmed of it and does not. For unseeing can be predicated both of a chimera and of a stone and of a man. (2) But in the case of privation there is a determinate nature or substance of which the privation is predicated; for not everything that does not have sight can be said to be blind, but only that which is naturally fitted to have sight. Thus since the negation which is included in the concept of unity is a negation in a subject (otherwise a non-being could be called one), it is evident that unity differs from simple negation and rather resembles the nature of privation, as is stated below in Book X (2069) of this work. Sciendum est autem quod quamvis unum importet privationem implicitam, non tamen est dicendum quod importet privationem multitudinis: quia cum privatio sit posterior naturaliter eo cuius est privatio, sequeretur quod unum esset posterius naturaliter multitudine. Item quod multitudo poneretur in definitione unius. Nam privatio definiri non potest nisi per suum oppositum, ut quid est caecitas? Privatio visus. Unde cum in definitione multitudinis ponatur unum (nam multitudo est aggregatio unitatum), sequitur quod sit circulus in definitionibus. Et ideo dicendum quod unum importat privationem divisionis, non quidem divisionis quae est secundum quantitatem, nam ista divisio determinatur ad unum particulare genus entis, et non posset cadere in definitione unius. Sed unum quod cum ente convertitur importat privationem divisionis formalis quae fit per opposita, cuius prima radix est oppositio affirmationis et negationis. Nam illa dividuntur adinvicem, quae ita se habent, quod hoc non est illud. Primo igitur intelligitur ipsum ens, et ex consequenti non ens, et per consequens divisio, et per consequens unum quod divisionem privat, et per consequens multitudo, in cuius ratione cadit divisio, sicut in ratione unius indivisio; quamvis aliqua divisa modo praedicto rationem multitudinis habere non possint nisi prius cuilibet divisorum ratio unius attribuatur. 566. But it must be noted that, although unity includes an implied privation, it must not be said to include (~) the privation of plurality; for, since a privation is subsequent in nature to the thing of which it is the privation, it would follow that unity would be subsequent in nature to plurality. And it would also follow that plurality would be given in the definition of unity; for a privation can be defined only by its opposite. For example, if someone were to ask what blindness is, we would answer that it is the privation of sight. Hence, since unity is given in the definition of plurality (for plurality is an aggregate of units), it would follow that there would be circularity in definitions. (+) Hence it must be said that unity includes the privation of division, although not (~) the kind of division that belongs to quantity; for this kind of division is limited to one particular class of being and cannot be included in the definition of unity. (+) But the unity which is interchangeable with being implies the privation of formal division, which comes about through opposites, and whose primary root is the opposition between affirmation and negation. For those things are divided from each other which are of such a kind that one is not the other. Therefore being itself is understood first, and then non-being, and then division, and then the kind of unity which is the privation of division, and then plurality, whose concept includes the notion of division just as the concept of unity includes the notion of undividedness. However, some of the things that have been distinguished in the foregoing way can be said to include the notion of plurality only if the notion of unity is first attributed to each of the things distinguished. 567. But plurality (307). Sed uni pluralitas hic ostendit quod philosophi est considerare contraria. Uni enim multitudo opponitur, ut dictum est. Opposita autem est unius scientiae considerare. Cum igitur ista scientia consideret unum et idem, aequale et simile, necesse est quod consideret opposita his, scilicet multum, alterum sive diversum, dissimile, et inaequale, et quaecumque alia reducuntur ad illa, sive etiam ad unum et pluralitatem. Et inter ista una est contrarietas. Nam contrarietas est quaedam differentia, eorum scilicet quae maxime differunt in eodem genere: differentia vero est quaedam alteritas sive diversitas, ut decimo huius habetur: igitur contrarietas pertinet ad considerationem huius scientiae. Here he shows that it is the business of the philosopher to consider contraries, or opposites; for plurality is the opposite of unity, as has been said (564), and it is the office of one science to consider opposites. Hence, since this science considers unity, sameness, likeness and equality, it must also consider their opposites, plurality, otherness or diversity, unlikeness and inequality, and all other attributes which are reduced to these or even to unity and plurality. And contrariety is one of these; for contrariety is a kind of difference, namely, of things differing in the same genus. But difference is a kind of otherness or diversity, as is said in Book X (2017). Therefore contrariety belongs to the consideration of this science. 568. Hence, since (308). Quare quoniam hic tradit modum, quo philosophus de his debet determinare: et dicit, quod cum omnia praedicta deriventur ab uno, et unum multipliciter dicatur, etiam omnia ista necesse est multipliciter dici: scilicet idem et diversum et alia huiusmodi. Sed tamen quamvis multipliciter dicantur omnia, tamen quae significantur per quodlibet horum nominum est cognoscere unius scientiae, scilicet philosophiae. Non enim sequitur, quod si aliquid dicitur multipliciter, quod propter hoc sit alterius scientiae vel diversae. Diversa enim significata si neque dicuntur secundum unum, idest secundum unam rationem, scilicet univoce, nec ratione diversa referuntur ad unum, sicut est in analogicis: tunc sequitur, quod sit alterius, idest diversae scientiae de his considerare, vel ad minus unius per accidens. Sicut caeleste sidus, quod est canis, considerat astrologus, naturalis autem canem marinum et terrestrem. Haec autem omnia referuntur ad unum principium. Sicut enim quae significantur per hoc nomen unum, licet sint diversa, reducuntur tamen in unum primum significatum; similiter est dicendum de his nominibus, idem, diversum, contrarium, et huiusmodi. Then he deals with the method by which the philosopher ought to establish these things. He says that, since all of the above-mentioned opposites are derived from unity, and the term one is used in many senses, all of the terms designating these must also be used in many senses, i.e., same, other, and so on. Yet even though all of these are used in many senses, it is still the work of one science, philosophy, to know the things signified by each of these terms. For if some term is used in many senses, it does not therefore follow that it belongs to another or different science. For if the different things signified are not referred to “with one meaning,” or according to one concept, i.e., univocally, or are not referred to one thing in different ways, as in the case of analogous things, then it follows that it is the office of another, i.e., of a different, science, to consider them; or at least it is the office of one science accidentally, just as astronomy considers a star in the heavens, i.e., the dog star, and natural science considers a dog-fish and a dog. But all of these are referred to one starting point. For things signified by the term one, even though diverse, are referred back to a primary thing signified as one; and we must also speak in the same way of the terms same, other, contrary, and others of this kind. Et ideo circa unumquodque istorum philosophus duo debet facere: videlicet primo dividere quot modis dicitur unumquodque. Et haec divisio consequenter assignatur in unoquoque praedicato idest in unoquoque istorum nominum de pluribus praedicatorum, ad quod primum dicatur; sicut quid est primum significatum huius nominis idem vel diversum et quomodo ad illud omnia alia referantur; aliquid quidem inquantum habet illud, aliquid autem inquantum facit illud, vel secundum alios huiusmodi modos. Regarding each of these terms, then, the philosopher should do two things. (1) First, he should distinguish the many senses in which each may be used; and (2) second, he should determine regarding “each of the predicates,” i.e., each of the names predicated of many things, to what primary thing it is referred. For example, he should state what the first thing signified by the term same or other is, and how all the rest are referred to it; one inasmuch as it possesses it, another inasmuch as it produces it, or in other ways of this kind. 569. Hence it is evident (309). Deinde cum dicit palam ergo inducit conclusionem ex omnibus praecedentibus; scilicet quod huius scientiae est ratiocinari de his communibus et de substantia: et hoc fuit unum quaesitum inter quaestiones in tertio disputatas. He draws his conclusion from what has been said, namely, that it belongs to this science to reason about those common predicates and about substance; and this was one of the problems investigated in the questions treated dialectically in Book III (393).
LESSON 4 First Philosophy Considers All Contraries. Its Distinction from Logic
ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 2: 1004a 34-1005a 18 καὶ ἔστι τοῦ φιλοσόφου περὶ πάντων δύνασθαι θεωρεῖν. [1004β]  εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦ φιλοσόφου, τίς ἔσται ὁ ἐπισκεψόμενος εἰ ταὐτὸ Σωκράτης καὶ Σωκράτης καθήμενος, ἢ εἰ ἓν ἑνὶ ἐναντίον, ἢ τί ἐστι τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ ποσαχῶς λέγεται; ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων.  ἐπεὶ οὖν τοῦ ἑνὸς ᾗ ἓν καὶ τοῦ ὄντος ᾗ ὂν ταῦτα καθ᾽ αὑτά ἐστι πάθη, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ᾗ ἀριθμοὶ ἢ γραμμαὶ ἢ πῦρ, δῆλον ὡς ἐκείνης τῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ τί ἐστι γνωρίσαι καὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότ᾽ αὐτοῖς. καὶ οὐ ταύτῃ ἁμαρτάνουσιν οἱ περὶ αὐτῶν σκοπούμενοι ὡς οὐ φιλοσοφοῦντες, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι πρότερον ἡ οὐσία,  περὶ ἧς οὐθὲν ἐπαΐουσιν, ἐπεὶ ὥσπερ ἔστι καὶ ἀριθμοῦ ᾗ ἀριθμὸς ἴδια πάθη, οἷον περιττότης ἀρτιότης, συμμετρία ἰσότης, ὑπεροχὴ ἔλλειψις, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ καθ᾽ αὑτοὺς καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς (ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ στερεῷ καὶ ἀκινήτῳ καὶ κινουμένῳ ἀβαρεῖ τε καὶ βάρος  ἔχοντι ἔστιν ἕτερα ἴδια), οὕτω καὶ τῷ ὄντι ᾗ ὂν ἔστι τινὰ ἴδια, καὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ περὶ ὧν τοῦ φιλοσόφου ἐπισκέψασθαι τὸ ἀληθές. 310. And it is also evident that it is the function of the philosopher to be able to study all things. For if it is not the function of the philosopher, who is it that will investigate whether Socrates and Socrates sitting are the same person, or whether one thing has one contrary, or what a contrary is, or how many meanings it has? And the same applies to other questions of this kind. Therefore, since these same things are the essential properties of unity as unity and of being as being, but not as numbers or lines or fire, evidently it is the office of this science to know both the quiddities of these and their accidents. Therefore those who have been studying these things do not err by being unphilosophical, but because substance, to which they pay no attention, is first. Now there are properties of number as number, for example, oddness and evenness, commensurability and equality, excess and defect, and these belong to numbers either in themselves or in relation to one another. And similarly there are properties of the solid, and of what is changeable and what is unchangeable, and of what is heavy and what is light. And in a similar fashion there are properties of being as being; and these are the ones about which the philosopher has to investigate the truth. σημεῖον δέ: οἱ γὰρ διαλεκτικοὶ καὶ σοφισταὶ τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν ὑποδύονται σχῆμα τῷ φιλοσόφῳ: ἡ γὰρ σοφιστικὴ φαινομένη μόνον σοφία ἐστί, καὶ οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ  διαλέγονται περὶ ἁπάντων, κοινὸν δὲ πᾶσι τὸ ὄν ἐστιν, διαλέγονται δὲ περὶ τούτων δῆλον ὅτι διὰ τὸ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ταῦτα εἶναι οἰκεῖα. περὶ μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος στρέφεται ἡ σοφιστικὴ καὶ ἡ διαλεκτικὴ τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ, 311. An indication of this is the following. Dialecticians and sophists assume the same guise as the philosopher, for sophistry is apparent wisdom, and dialecticians dispute about all things, and being is common to all things. But evidently they dispute about these matters because they are common to philosophy. For sophistry and dialectics are concerned with the same class of things as philosophy. ἀλλὰ διαφέρει τῆς μὲν τῷ τρόπῳ τῆς δυνάμεως, τῆς δὲ τοῦ βίου  τῇ προαιρέσει: ἔστι δὲ ἡ διαλεκτικὴ πειραστικὴ περὶ ὧν ἡ φιλοσοφία γνωριστική, ἡ δὲ σοφιστικὴ φαινομένη, οὖσα δ᾽ οὔ. 312. But philosophy differs from the latter in the manner of its power, and from the former in the choice, i.e., selection, of a way of life. For dialectics is in search of knowledge of what the philosopher actually knows, and sophistry has the semblance of wisdom but is not really such. ἔτι τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ ἑτέρα συστοιχία στέρησις, καὶ πάντα ἀνάγεται εἰς τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν, καὶ εἰς ἓν καὶ πλῆθος, οἷον στάσις τοῦ ἑνὸς κίνησις δὲ τοῦ πλήθους: 313. Further, one corresponding member of each pair of contraries is privative, and all contraries are referred to being and to non-being and to unity and to plurality; for example, rest pertains to unity and motion to plurality. δ᾽ ὄντα καὶ τὴν  οὐσίαν ὁμολογοῦσιν ἐξ ἐναντίων σχεδὸν ἅπαντες συγκεῖσθαι: πάντες γοῦν τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐναντίας λέγουσιν: οἱ μὲν γὰρ περιττὸν καὶ ἄρτιον, οἱ δὲ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν, οἱ δὲ πέρας καὶ ἄπειρον, οἱ δὲ φιλίαν καὶ νεῖκος. 314. And almost all men admit that substance and beings are composed of contraries; for all say that principles are contraries. For some speak of the odd and even, others of the hot and cold, others of the limited and unlimited, and others of love and hate. πάντα δὲ καὶ τἆλλα ἀναγόμενα φαίνεται εἰς τὸ ἓν καὶ πλῆθος (εἰλήφθω γὰρ ἡ ἀναγωγὴ ἡμῖν), [1005α]  αἱ δ᾽ ἀρχαὶ καὶ παντελῶς αἱ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων ὡς εἰς γένη ταῦτα πίπτουσιν. 315. And all the other contraries seem to be reducible to unity and plurality. Therefore let us take that reduction for granted. And all the principles which have to do with other things fall under unity and being as their genera. φανερὸν οὖν καὶ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι μιᾶς ἐπιστήμης τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὂν θεωρῆσαι. πάντα γὰρ ἢ ἐναντία ἢ ἐξ ἐναντίων, ἀρχαὶ δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων τὸ ἓν  καὶ πλῆθος. ταῦτα δὲ μιᾶς ἐπιστήμης, εἴτε καθ᾽ ἓν λέγεται εἴτε μή, ὥσπερ ἴσως ἔχει καὶ τἀληθές. ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως εἰ καὶ πολλαχῶς λέγεται τὸ ἕν, πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον τἆλλα λεχθήσεται καὶ τὰ ἐναντία ὁμοίως, [καὶ διὰ τοῦτο] καὶ εἰ μὴ ἔστι τὸ ὂν ἢ τὸ ἓν καθόλου καὶ ταὐτὸ ἐπὶ πάντων ἢ  χωριστόν, ὥσπερ ἴσως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν πρὸς ἓν τὰ δὲ τῷ ἐφεξῆς. 316. It is clear from these discussions, then, that it is the office of one science to study being as being. For all beings are either contraries or composed of contraries, and the principles of contraries are unity and plurality. And these belong to one science, whether they are used in one sense or not. And perhaps the truth is that they are not. Yet even if the term one is used in many senses, all will be referred to one primary sense; and the same is true of contraries. Hence, even if unity or being is not a universal and the same in all things or is something separate (as presumably it is not), still in some cases the thing will be referred to unity and in others it will be referred to what follows on unity. διὰ τοῦτο οὐ τοῦ γεωμέτρου θεωρῆσαι τί τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ τέλειον ἢ ἓν ἢ ὂν ἢ ταὐτὸν ἢ ἕτερον, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως. 317. And for this reason it is not the province of geometry to examine what a contrary is, or what the perfect is, or what unity is, or what sameness or otherness is, but to assume them. ὅτι μὲν οὖν μιᾶς ἐπιστήμης τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὂν θεωρῆσαι καὶ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα αὐτῷ ᾗ ὄν, δῆλον, καὶ ὅτι  οὐ μόνον τῶν οὐσιῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἡ αὐτὴ θεωρητική, τῶν τε εἰρημένων καὶ περὶ προτέρου καὶ ὑστέρου, καὶ γένους καὶ εἴδους, καὶ ὅλου καὶ μέρους καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων. 318. It is evident, then, that it is the office of one science to study both being as being and the attributes which belong to being as being. And it is evident too that the same science studies not only substances but also their accidents, both those mentioned above, and prior and subsequent, genus and species, whole and part, and others such as these. COMMENTARY General reasons for that (difference between metaphysics and dialectics or sophistry). Hic ostendit per rationes communes, quod de omnibus praedictis philosophus debet considerare. Et primo ostendit propositum. Secundo conclusionem inducit intentam, ibi, quod quidem igitur et cetera. 570. Here he uses arguments based on common principles to prove what the philosopher ought to consider regarding all of the foregoing attributes. First, he proves his thesis; and second (587), he introduces his intended conclusion (“It is evident”). Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit propositum. Secundo ex dictis infert quoddam corollarium, ibi, et propter hoc et cetera. In regard to the first part he does two things. First, he proves his thesis; and second (586), he draws a corollary from what has been said (“And for this reason”). Ostendit autem primum tribus rationibus. Secunda ibi, signum autem et cetera. Tertia ibi, amplius autem et cetera. He gives three arguments to prove his thesis. The second (572) begins where he says, “An indication of this”; and the third (578), at “Further, one corresponding.” Prima ratio, talis est. Omnes dubitationes, quae possunt moveri, sunt in aliqua scientia solvendae: sed de praedictis communibus moventur quaedam quaestiones, sicut de eodem et de diverso movetur illa quaestio utrum sit idem Socrates, et Socrates sedens: et de contrariis movetur ista quaestio, utrum unum sit contrarium uni, et quot modis dicitur: ergo oportet, quod in aliqua scientia ista solvantur, quae consideret de eodem et contrario et aliis praedictis. The first argument is as follows. All questions that can be raised must be answered by some science. But questions are raised about the common attributes mentioned above, for example, that raised about sameness and otherness: whether Socrates and Socrates sitting are the same; and that raised about contraries: whether one thing has one contrary, and how many meanings the term contrary has. Hence these questions must be answered by some science which considers sameness and contrariety and the other attributes mentioned above. Et quod hoc pertineat ad philosophum et ad nullum alium, sic probat. Eius est considerare primas passiones entis, cuius est considerare ens secundum quod est ens. Sed praedicta omnia sunt per se accidentia entis et unius secundum quod huiusmodi. Sicut enim numerus, inquantum huiusmodi, habet proprias passiones, ut superfluum, aequale, commensuratum et huiusmodi, quorum quaedam insunt alicui numero absolute, ut par et impar, quaedam uni per comparationem ad alterum, ut aequale: et etiam substantia habet proprias passiones ut firmum, idest corpus, et alia huiusmodi. Similiter et ens inquantum ens, habet quaedam propria, quae sunt communia praedicta. Ergo consideratio eorum pertinet ad philosophum. Et ideo tradentes philosophiam non peccaverunt de his tractando tamquam non philosophantes, idest tamquam ista non pertineant ad considerationem philosophiae; sed quia de his tractantes de substantia nihil audiunt, quasi substantiae omnino obliviscantur, cum tamen ipsa sit primum inter illa, de quibus philosophus debet considerare. 571. That this is the job of the philosopher and of no one else he proves thus: that science whose office is to consider being as being is the one which must consider the first properties of being. But all of the above-mentioned attributes are proper accidents of unity and being as such. For number as number has properties, such as excess, equality, commensurability, and so on, some of which belong to a number taken absolutely, as even and odd, and some to one number in relation to another, as equality. And even substance has proper attributes, “as the resistant,” or body, and others of this kind. And in a similar way being as being has certain properties, which are the common attributes mentioned above; and therefore the study of them belongs to the philosopher. Hence those dealing with philosophy have not erred in their treatment of these things “by being unphilosophical,” i.e., by considering them in a way that does not pertain to the investigations of philosophy, but because in treating them they pay no attention to substance, as though they were completely unmindful of it despite the fact that it is the first thing which the philosopher ought to consider. 572. An indication (311). Deinde cum dicit signum autem hic ponit secundam rationem ad idem ostendendum, quae est per signum, quae talis est. Dialectici et sophistae induunt figuram eamdem philosopho, quasi similitudinem cum eo habentes: sed dialectici et sophistae disputant de praedictis: ergo et philosophi est ea considerare. Ad manifestationem autem primae ostendit quomodo dialectica et sophistica cum philosophia habeant similitudinem, et in quo differunt ab ea. Then he gives a second argument to prove the same point. This argument employs an example and runs thus: dialecticians and sophists assume the same guise as the philosopher inasmuch as they resemble him in some respect. But the dialectician and sophist dispute about the above-mentioned attributes. Therefore the philosopher should also consider them. In support of his first premise he shows how dialectics and sophistry resemble philosophy and how they differ from it. Conveniunt autem in hoc, quod dialectici est considerare de omnibus. Hoc autem esse non posset, nisi consideraret omnia secundum quod in aliquo uno conveniunt: quia unius scientiae unum subiectum est, et unius artis una est materia, circa quam operatur. Cum igitur omnes res non conveniant nisi in ente, manifestum est quod dialecticae materia est ens, et ea quae sunt entis, de quibus etiam philosophus considerat. Similiter etiam sophistica habet quamdam similitudinem philosophiae. Nam sophistica est visa sive apparens sapientia, non existens. Quod autem habet apparentiam alicuius rei, oportet quod aliquam similitudinem cum illa habeat. Et ideo oportet quod eadem consideret philosophus, dialecticus et sophista. 573. Dialectics resembles philosophy in that it is also the office of the dialectician to consider all things. But this could not be the case unless he considered all things insofar as they agree in some one respect; because each science has one subject, and each art has one matter on which it operates. Therefore, since all things agree only in being, evidently the subject matter of dialectics is being and those attributes which belong to being; and this is what the philosopher also investigates. And sophistry likewise resembles philosophy; for sophistry has “the semblance of wisdom,” or is apparent wisdom, without being wisdom. Now anything that takes on the appearance of something else must resemble it in some way. Therefore the philosopher, the dialectician and the sophist must consider the same thing. Differunt autem abinvicem. Philosophus quidem a dialectico secundum potestatem. Nam maioris virtutis est consideratio philosophi quam consideratio dialectici. Philosophus enim de praedictis communibus procedit demonstrative. Et ideo eius est habere scientiam de praedictis, et est cognoscitivus eorum per certitudinem. Nam certa cognitio sive scientia est effectus demonstrationis. Dialecticus autem circa omnia praedicta procedit ex probabilibus; unde non facit scientiam, sed quamdam opinionem. Et hoc ideo est, quia ens est duplex: ens scilicet rationis et ens naturae. Ens autem rationis dicitur proprie de illis intentionibus, quas ratio adinvenit in rebus consideratis; sicut intentio generis, speciei et similium, quae quidem non inveniuntur in rerum natura, sed considerationem rationis consequuntur. Et huiusmodi, scilicet ens rationis, est proprie subiectum logicae. Huiusmodi autem intentiones intelligibiles, entibus naturae aequiparantur, eo quod omnia entia naturae sub consideratione rationis cadunt. Et ideo subiectum logicae ad omnia se extendit, de quibus ens naturae praedicatur. Unde concludit, quod subiectum logicae aequiparatur subiecto philosophiae, quod est ens naturae. 574. Yet they differ from each other. The philosopher differs from the dialectician in power, because the consideration of the philosopher is more efficacious than that of the dialectician. For the philosopher proceeds demonstratively in dealing with the common attributes mentioned above, and thus it is proper to him to have scientific knowledge of these attributes. And he actually knows them with certitude, for certain or scientific knowledge is the effect of demonstration. The dialectician, however, proceeds to treat all of the above-mentioned common attributes from probable premises, and thus he does not acquire scientific knowledge of them but a kind of opinion. The reason for this difference is that there are two kinds of beings: beings of reason and real beings. The expression being of reason is applied properly to those notions which reason derives from the objects it considers, for example, the notions of genus, species and the like, which are not found in reality but are a natural result of the consideration of reason. And this kind of being, i.e., being of reason, constitutes the proper subject of logic. But intellectual conceptions of this kind are equal in extension to real beings, because all real beings fall under the consideration of reason. Hence the subject of logic extends to all things to which the expression real being is applied. His conclusion is, then, that the subject of logic is equal in extension to the subject of philosophy, which is real being. Philosophus igitur ex principiis ipsius procedit ad probandum ea quae sunt consideranda circa huiusmodi communia accidentia entis. Dialecticus autem procedit ad ea consideranda ex intentionibus rationis, quae sunt extranea a natura rerum. Et ideo dicitur, quod dialectica est tentativa, quia tentare proprium est ex principiis extraneis procedere. Now the philosopher proceeds from the principles of this kind of being to prove the things that have to be considered about the common accidents of this kind of being. But the dialectician proceeds to consider them from the conceptions of reason, which are extrinsic to reality. Hence it is said that dialectics is in search of knowledge, because in searching it is proper to proceed from extrinsic principles. A sophista vero differt philosophus prohaeresi, idest electione vel voluptate, idest desiderio vitae. Ad aliud enim ordinat vitam suam et actiones philosophus et sophista. Philosophus quidem ad sciendum veritatem; sophista vero ad hoc quod videatur scire quamvis nesciat. 575. But the philosopher differs from the sophist “in the choice,” i.e., in the selection or willing, or in the desire, of a way of life. For the philosopher and sophist direct their life and actions to different things. The philosopher directs his to knowing the truth, whereas the sophist directs his so as to appear to know what he does not. Licet autem dicatur, quod philosophia est scientia, non autem dialectica et sophistica, non tamen per hoc removetur quin dialectica et sophistica sint scientiae. Dialectica enim potest considerari secundum quod est docens, et secundum quod est utens. Secundum quidem quod est docens, habet considerationem de istis intentionibus, instituens modum, quo per eas procedi possit ad conclusiones in singulis scientiis probabiliter ostendendas; et hoc demonstrative facit, et secundum hoc est scientia. Utens vero est secundum quod modo adinvento utitur ad concludendum aliquid probabiliter in singulis scientiis; et sic recedit a modo scientiae. 576. Now although it is said that philosophy is scientific knowledge, and that dialectics and sophistry are not, this still does not do away with the possibility of dialectics and sophistry being sciences. For dialectics can be considered both from the viewpoint of theory and from that of practice. (1) From the viewpoint of theory it studies these conceptions and establishes the method by which one proceeds from them to demonstrate with probability the conclusions of the particular sciences; and it does this demonstratively, and to this extent it is a science. (2) But from the viewpoint of practice it makes use of the above method so as to reach certain probable conclusions in the particular sciences; and in this respect it falls short of the scientific method. Et similiter dicendum est de sophistica; quia prout est docens tradit per necessarias et demonstrativas rationes modum arguendi apparenter. Secundum vero quod est utens, deficit a processu verae argumentationis. The same must be said of sophistry, because from the viewpoint of theory it treats by means of necessary and demonstrative arguments the method of arguing to apparent truth. From the viewpoint of practice, however, it falls short of the process of true argumentation. Sed in parte logicae quae dicitur demonstrativa, solum doctrina pertinet ad logicam, usus vero ad philosophiam et ad alias particulares scientias quae sunt de rebus naturae. Et hoc ideo, quia usus demonstrativae consistit in utendo principiis rerum, de quibus fit demonstratio, quae ad scientias reales pertinet, non utendo intentionibus logicis. 577. But that part of logic which is said to be demonstrative is concerned only with theory, and the practical application of it belongs to philosophy and to the other particular sciences, which are concerned with real beings. This is because the practical aspect of the demonstrative part of logic consists in using the principles of things, from which proceeds demonstration (which properly belongs to the sciences that deal with real beings), and not in using the conceptions of logic. Et sic apparet, quod quaedam partes logicae habent ipsam scientiam et doctrinam et usum, sicut dialectica tentativa et sophistica; quaedam autem doctrinam et non usum, sicut demonstrativa. Thus it appears that some parts of logic are at the same time scientific, theoretical, and practical, as exploratory dialectics and sophistry; and one is concerned with theory and not practice, namely, demonstrative logic. 578. Further, one corresponding (313). Amplius contrariorum hic ponit tertiam rationem, quae talis est. Quaecumque reducuntur in unum et ens, debent considerari a philosopho, cuius est considerare unum et ens: sed omnia contraria reducuntur ad unum et ens: ergo omnia contraria sunt de consideratione philosophi, cuius est considerare unum et ens. Then he gives the third argument in support of his thesis. It runs as follows: everything that is reducible to unity and being should be considered by the philosopher, whose function is to study unity and being. But all contraries are reducible to unity and being. Therefore all contraries belong to the consideration of the philosopher, whose function is to study unity and being. Quod autem omnia contraria reducantur ad unum et ens, ostendit quidem primo quantum ad ens hoc modo. Inter duo contraria, quae a philosophis principia ponuntur, ut in primo habitum est, semper unum quidem est alteri correlativum, et ei coordinatum est, ut privatio. Quod ex hoc patet: quia semper alterum contrariorum est imperfectum respectu alterius, et sic quamdam perfectionis privationem alterius importat. Privatio autem est quaedam negatio, ut dictum est supra; et sic est non ens. Et sic patet quod omnia contraria reducuntur in ens et non ens. 579. Then he proves that all contraries are reducible to unity and being. He does this, first, with regard to being; and he proceeds thus: of any two contraries which the philosophers posited as the principles of things, as is said in Book I (62:C 132), one contrary is always the correlative of the other and is related to it as its privation. This is clear from the fact that one of two contraries is always something imperfect when compared with the other, and thus implies some privation of the perfection of the other. But a privation is a kind of negation, as was stated above (306:C 564), and thus is a non-being. Hence it is clear that all contraries are reducible to being and non-being. Similiter etiam ostendit quod reducuntur in unum et multitudinem, per quoddam exemplum. Status enim sive quies reducitur in unitatem. Illud enim quiescere dicitur, quod uno modo se habet nunc et prius, ut in sexto physicorum traditur. Motus autem ad multitudinem pertinet; quia quod movetur, diversimode se habet nunc et prius; quod multitudinem importat. 580. He also shows by an example that all contraries are reducible to unity and plurality. For rest or repose is reducible to unity, since that is said to be at rest which is in the same condition now as it was before, as is stated in Book VI of the Physics. And motion is reducible to plurality, because whatever is in motion is in a different condition now than it was before, and this implies plurality. 581. And almost all (314). Deinde ibi entia vero ostendit alio modo, quod contraria reducuntur ad ens: quia principia et principiata sunt unius considerationis. Principia autem entium, inquantum huiusmodi, confitentur philosophi esse contraria. Omnes enim dicunt entia et substantias entium ex contrariis componi, ut in primo physicorum dictum est, et primo huius. Et quamvis in hoc conveniant quod entium principia sint contraria, differunt tamen quantum ad contraria quae ponunt. Quidam enim ponunt par et impar, sicut Pythagorici. Et alii calorem et frigus, sicut Parmenides. Quidam finem sive terminum et infinitum, idest finitum et infinitum, sicut idem Pythagoras. Nam pari et impari, finitum et infinitum attribuebant, ut in primo habitum est. Alii concordiam et discordiam, sicut Empedocles. Patet ergo quod contraria reducuntur in considerationem entis. Then he uses another argument to show that contraries are reducible to being. Both the principles of things and the things composed of them belong to the same study. But the philosophers admit that contraries are the principles of being as being; for all say that beings and the substances of beings are composed of contraries, as was stated in Book I of the Physics and in the first book of this work (62:C 132). Yet while they agree on this point, that the principles of beings are contraries, still they differ as to the contraries which they give. For some give the even and odd, as the Pythagoreans; others the hot and cold, as Parmenides; others “the end” or terminus “and the unlimited,” i.e., the finite and infinite, as did the same Pythagoreans (for they attributed limitedness and unlimitedness to the even and the odd, as is stated in Book I (59:C 124); and still others gave friendship and strife, as Empedocles. Hence it is clear that contraries are reducible to the study of being. 582. And all the other (315). Deinde ulterius ibi omnia vero dicit, quod sicut praedicta contraria reducuntur ad ens, ita habent reduci ad unum et multitudinem. Quod apparet. Nam imparitas aliquid unitatis habet propter indivisionem: paritas autem ad naturam multitudinis pertinet propter suam divisionem. Sic autem finis sive terminus ad unitatem pertinet, quae est terminus omnis resolutionis: infinitum autem pertinet ad multitudinem, quae in infinitum augetur. Concordia etiam unitatis est manifeste. Discordia vero multitudinis. Calor autem ad unitatem pertinet, inquantum habet unire homogenea. Frigus autem ad multitudinem, inquantum habet ea separare. Nec solum ista contraria reducuntur sic in unum et multitudinem, sed etiam alia. Sed ista reductio sive introductio ad unum et multitudinem accipiatur sive sumatur, idest supponatur nunc a nobis, quia longum esset per singula contraria hoc discutere. He says that the above-mentioned contraries are reducible not only to being but also to unity and plurality. This is evident. For oddness by reason of its indivisibility is affiliated with unity, and evenness by reason of its divisibility has a natural connection with plurality. Thus end or limit pertains to unity, which is the terminus of every process of resolution, and lack of limit pertains to plurality, which may be increased to infinity. Again, friendship also clearly pertains to unity, and strife to plurality. And heat pertains to unity inasmuch as it can unite homogeneous things, whereas cold pertains to plurality inasmuch as it can separate them. Further, not only these contraries are reducible in this way to unity and plurality, but so also are the others. Yet this “reduction,” or introduction, to unity and plurality let us now accept or “take for granted,” i.e., let us now assume it, because to examine each set of contraries would be a lengthy undertaking. Deinde ostendit consequenter quod omnia contraria reducuntur ad unum et ens. Constat enim quod omnia tam principia quam quae sunt de aliis, idest principiata, inducunt in unum et ens tamquam in genera; non quod sint vere genera; sed ratione suae communitatis quamdam similitudinem generum habent. Si igitur contraria omnia sunt principia vel ex principiis, oportet quod ad unum et ens reducantur. Sic igitur patet, quod dupliciter ostendit contraria reduci ad ens. Primo per naturam privationis. Secundo per hoc quod contraria sunt principia. Quod vero reducantur ad unum, ostendit per exemplum et per quamdam reductionem. Finaliter autem ostendit quod reducantur ad unum et ens inquantum sunt genera. 583. Next he shows that all contraries are reducible to unity and being. For it is certain that all principles, inasmuch as they have to do “with other things” i.e., the things composed of them, fall under unity and being as their genera, not in the sense that they truly are genera, but in the sense that they bear some likeness to genera by reason of what they have in common. Hence, if all contraries are principles or things composed of principles, they must be reducible to unity and being. Thus it is clear that he shows that contraries are reducible to being for two reasons: first, because of the nature of privation, and second, by reason of the fact that contraries are principles. He shows that they are reducible to unity by giving an example and by using a process of reduction. Last, he shows that they are reducible to unity and being inasmuch as they have the character of genera. 584. It is clear (316). Palam igitur hic ostendit conversim, scilicet quod ista scientia considerat ens, quia considerat praedicta, tali ratione. Omnia entia reducuntur ad contraria; quia vel sunt contraria, vel sunt ex contrariis: contraria vero reducuntur ad unum et multitudinem, quia unum et multitudo sunt principia contrariorum: unum autem et multitudo sunt unius scientiae, scilicet philosophiae: ergo et eius est considerare ens secundum quod est ens. Sciendum est tamen, quod praedicta omnia in unius scientiae considerationem cadunt, sive dicantur secundum unum, idest univoce, sive non, sicut fortasse verum est. Sed tamen quamvis unum dicatur multipliciter, omnia tamen alia, idest omnes significationes, reducuntur ad unam primam significationem. Et similiter est etiam de contrariis, quae dicuntur multipliciter, sed omnes significationes ad unam primam reducuntur. Et propter hoc, si etiam unum et ens non est unum universale quasi genus existens, sicut supra ponebatur, sive dicamus quod universale sit unum in omnibus secundum opinionem nostram, sive quod sit aliquid separatum a rebus secundum opinionem Platonis, sicut fortassis non est verum: tamen dicuntur secundum prius et posterius: sicut et aliae significationes referuntur ad unum primum, et aliae se habent consequenter respectu illius primi. Utitur tamen adverbio dubitandi, quasi nunc supponens quae inferius probabuntur. Here he proves in a converse way that this science considers being because it considers the things mentioned above. His argument is this: all beings are reducible to contraries because they are either contraries or composed of contraries. And contraries are reducible to unity and plurality because unity and plurality are the principles of contraries. But unity and plurality belong to one science, philosophy. Therefore it is the office of this science to consider being as being. Yet it must be noted that all the contraries mentioned above fall under the consideration of one science whether they are used “in one sense,” i.e., univocally, or not, as perhaps is the case. However, even if the term one is used in many senses, all the others, i.e., all the other senses, are reducible to one primary sense. Hence, even if unity or being is not one universal, like a genus, as was stated above (whether a universal is said to be a one-in-all, as we maintain, or something separate from things, as Plato thought, and as is presumably not the case), still each is used in a primary and a secondary sense. And the same holds true in the case of other terms, for some senses are referred to one primary sense, and others are secondary with respect to that primary sense. An adverb designating uncertainty is used inasmuch as we are now assuming things that will be proved below. Sciendum tamen est quod hoc, quod dixit, omnia entia contraria esse vel ex contrariis, non posuit secundum suam opinionem, sed accepit quasi opinionem philosophorum antiquorum: entia enim immobilia nec sunt contraria, nec ex contrariis. Unde nec Plato circa sensibiles substantias immobiles posuit contrarietatem. Fecit enim unitatem ex parte formae, contrarietatem ex parte materiae. Antiqui vero philosophi solummodo substantias sensibiles posuerunt, in quibus necesse est contrarietatem esse secundum quod mobiles sunt. 585. But nevertheless it must be borne in mind that the statement which he made, that all beings are either contraries or composed of contraries, he did not give as his own opinion but as one which he took from the ancient philosophers; for unchangeable beings are not contraries or composed of contraries. And this is why Plato did not posit any contrariety in the unchangeable sensible substances; for he attributed unity to form and contrariety to matter. But the ancient philosophers claimed that only sensible substances exist and that these must contain contrariety inasmuch as they are changeable. 586. And for this reason (317) Deinde cum dicit et propter inducit quoddam corollarium ex praedictis; dicens, quod geometriae non est speculari de praedictis, quae sunt accidentia entis inquantum est ens, scilicet quid est contrarium, aut quid est perfectum, et huiusmodi. Sed si consideret, hoc erit ex conditione, idest ex suppositione, quasi supponens ab aliquo priori philosopho, a quo sumit quantum est necessarium ad suam materiam. Et hoc quod dicitur de geometria, similiter est intelligendum in qualibet alia particulari scientia. Then he draws a corollary from what has been said. He says that it is not the province of geometry to investigate the foregoing things, which are accidents of being as being, i.e., to investigate what a contrary is, or what the perfect is, and so on. But if a geometer were to consider them, he would “assume them,” i.e., presuppose their truth, inasmuch as he would take them over from some prior philosopher from whom he accepts them insofar as they are necessary for his own subject matter. What is said about geometry must be understood to apply also in the case of any other particular science. 587. It is evident (318). Deinde cum dicit quod quidem colligit quae sunt supra ostensa; dicens, manifestum esse, quod ad unam scientiam pertinet considerare ens secundum quod est ens, et ea quae per se illi insunt. Et per hoc patet, quod illa scientia non solum est considerativa substantiarum, sed etiam accidentium, cum de utrisque ens praedicetur. Et est considerativa eorum quae dicta sunt, scilicet eiusdem et diversi, similis et dissimilis, aequalis et inaequalis, negationis et privationis, et contrariorum; quae supra diximus esse per se entis accidentia. Et non solum est considerativa istorum, de quibus ostensum est singillatim propriis rationibus, quae cadunt in consideratione huius scientiae; sed etiam considerat de priori et posteriori, genere et specie, toto et parte, et aliis huiusmodi, pari ratione, quia haec etiam sunt accidentia entis inquantum est ens. He now summarizes the points established above. He says that obviously the consideration of being as being and the attributes which belong to it of itself pertain to one science. Thus it is clear that that science considers not only substances but also accidents since being is predicated of both. And it considers the things which have been discussed, namely, sameness and otherness, likeness and unlikeness, equality and inequality, privation and negation, and contraries-which we said above are the proper accidents of being. And it considers not only those things which fall under the consideration of this science, about which demonstration was made individually by means of arguments based on proper principles, but it in like manner also considers prior and subsequent, genus and species, whole and part, and other things of this kind, because these too are accidents of being as being.
LESSON 5 Answers to Questions Raised in Book III about Principles of Demonstration
ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 3: 1005a 19-1005b 8 λεκτέον δὲ πότερον μιᾶς ἢ ἑτέρας ἐπιστήμης περί τε  τῶν ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασι καλουμένων ἀξιωμάτων καὶ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας. 319. Moreover, it is necessary to state whether it is the office of one science or of different sciences to inquire about those principles which are called axioms in mathematics, and about substance. φανερὸν δὴ ὅτι μιᾶς τε καὶ τῆς τοῦ φιλοσόφου καὶ ἡ περὶ τούτων ἐστὶ σκέψις: 320. Now it is evident that it is the office of one science—that of the philosopher—to investigate these. ἅπασι γὰρ ὑπάρχει τοῖς οὖσιν ἀλλ᾽ οὐ γένει τινὶ χωρὶς ἰδίᾳ τῶν ἄλλων. καὶ χρῶνται μὲν πάντες, ὅτι τοῦ ὄντος ἐστὶν ᾗ ὄν, ἕκαστον δὲ τὸ γένος  ὄν: ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον δὲ χρῶνται ἐφ᾽ ὅσον αὐτοῖς ἱκανόν, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἔστιν ὅσον ἐπέχει τὸ γένος περὶ οὗ φέρουσι τὰς ἀποδείξεις: ὥστ᾽ ἐπεὶ δῆλον ὅτι ᾗ ὄντα ὑπάρχει πᾶσι (τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὸ κοινόν), τοῦ περὶ τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὂν γνωρίζοντος καὶ περὶ τούτων ἐστὶν ἡ θεωρία. 321. For these principles apply to all beings and not to some class distinct from the others. And all men employ them, because they pertain to being as being; for each class is being. But they employ them just so far as to satisfy their needs, i.e., so far as the class contains the things about which they form demonstrations. Hence, since it is evident that these principles pertain to all things inasmuch as they are beings (for this is what they have in common), the investigation of them belongs to him who considers being as being. διόπερ οὐθεὶς τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐπισκοπούντων  ἐγχειρεῖ λέγειν τι περὶ αὐτῶν, εἰ ἀληθῆ ἢ μή, οὔτε γεωμέτρης οὔτ᾽ ἀριθμητικός, 322. Hence no one who is making a special inquiry attempts to say anything about their truth or falsity, neither the geometer nor the arithmetician. ἀλλὰ τῶν φυσικῶν ἔνιοι, εἰκότως τοῦτο δρῶντες: μόνοι γὰρ ᾤοντο περί τε τῆς ὅλης φύσεως σκοπεῖν καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἔστιν ἔτι τοῦ φυσικοῦ τις ἀνωτέρω (ἓν γάρ τι γένος τοῦ ὄντος ἡ φύσις),  τοῦ καθόλου καὶ τοῦ περὶ τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν θεωρητικοῦ καὶ ἡ περὶ τούτων ἂν εἴη σκέψις: [1005β]  ἔστι δὲ σοφία τις καὶ ἡ φυσική, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πρώτη. 323. However, some of the philosophers of nature have done this, and with reason; for they thought that they alone were inquiring about the whole of nature and about being. But since there is one kind of thinker who is superior to the philosopher of nature (for nature is only one class of being), the investigation of these principles will belong to him who studies the universal and deals with first substance. The philosophy of nature is a kind of wisdom, but it is not the first. ὅσα δ᾽ ἐγχειροῦσι τῶν λεγόντων τινὲς περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας ὃν τρόπον δεῖ ἀποδέχεσθαι, δι᾽ ἀπαιδευσίαν  τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν τοῦτο δρῶσιν: δεῖ γὰρ περὶ τούτων  ἥκειν προεπισταμένους ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀκούοντας ζητεῖν. 324. And whatever certain ones of 1 those who speak about the truth attempt to say concerning the way in which it must be accepted, they do this through ignorance of analytics. For they must know these principles in order to attain scientific knowledge and not be seeking them when they are learning a science. ὅτι μὲν οὖν τοῦ φιλοσόφου, καὶ τοῦ περὶ πάσης τῆς οὐσίας θεωροῦντος ᾗ πέφυκεν, καὶ περὶ τῶν συλλογιστικῶν ἀρχῶν ἐστὶν ἐπισκέψασθαι, δῆλον: 325. It is evident, then, that it is also the business of the philosopher, i.e., of him who investigates all substance insofar as its nature permits, to investigate all syllogistic principles. COMMENTARY This science considers the first principles of demonstration. Hic solvit aliam quaestionem in tertio motam; scilicet utrum ad istam scientiam pertineat considerare prima principia demonstrationis. Et dividitur in duo. Primo ostendit, quod eius est considerare universaliter de omnibus his principiis. Secundo specialiter de primo eorum ibi, congruit autem et cetera. 588. Here he answers another question raised in Book III (387): whether it belongs to this science to consider the first principles of demonstration. This is divided into two parts. In the first he shows that it belongs to this science to make a general study of all these principles; and in the second (596) he shows that it also belongs to it to make a special study of the first of these principles (“And it is fitting”). Circa primum tria facit. Primo movet quaestionem, quae est, utrum unius scientiae sit considerare de substantia et de principiis quae in scientiis mathematicis vocantur dignitates, aut est alterius et alterius scientiae considerare. Appropriat autem ista principia magis mathematicis scientiis, quia certiores demonstrationes habent, et manifestius istis principiis per se notis utuntur, omnes suas demonstrationes ad haec principia resolventes. In regard to the first he does three things. First, he raises the question whether it belongs to one or to different sciences to consider substance and the principles which are called axioms in the mathematical sciences. He assigns these principles more to the mathematical sciences because such sciences have more certain demonstrations and use these self-evident principles in a more manifest way inasmuch as they refer all of their demonstrations to them. 589. Now it is evident (320). Palam autem secundo solvit: quae quidem solutio est, quia una scientia intendit de utrisque praedictis: et haec est philosophia, quae prae manibus habetur. Second, he answers this question by saying that a single science investigates both of the foregoing things, and that this is the philosophy with which we are now concerned. 590. For these principles (321). Omnibus enim tertio probat solutionem propositam: et circa hoc duo facit. Primo probat propositum. Secundo conclusionem principalem inducit, ibi, quoniam igitur et cetera. Probat autem solutionem propositam dupliciter. Third, he proves his proposed answer, and in regard to this he does two things. First, he proves it. Second (595), he introduces his main conclusion (“It is evident”). Primo per rationem. Secundo per signum, ibi, unde nullus et cetera. Now he proves his proposed answer in two ways. He does this, first, by an argument; and second (592), by an example (“Hence no one”). Ratio talis est. Quaecumque insunt omnibus entibus, et non solum alicui generi entium separatim ab aliis, haec pertinent ad considerationem philosophi: sed praedicta principia sunt huiusmodi: ergo pertinent ad considerationem philosophi. Minorem sic probat. Illa, quibus utuntur omnes scientiae, sunt entis inquantum huiusmodi: sed prima principia sunt huiusmodi: ergo pertinent ad ens inquantum est ens. The argument is as follows: whatever principles pertain to all beings, and not just to one class of beings distinct from the others, belong to the consideration of the philosopher. But the above-mentioned principles are of this kind. Therefore they belong to the consideration of the philosopher. He proves the minor premise as follows. Those principles which all sciences use pertain to being as being. But first principles are principles of this kind. Therefore they pertain to being as being. Rationem autem, quare omnes scientiae eis utuntur, sic assignat; quia unumquodque genus subiectum alicuius scientiae recipit praedicationem entis. Utuntur autem principiis praedictis scientiae particulares non secundum suam communitatem, prout se extendunt ad omnia entia, sed quantum sufficit eis: et hoc secundum continentiam generis, quod in scientia subiicitur, de quo ipsa scientia demonstrationes affert. Sicut ipsa philosophia naturalis utitur eis secundum quod se extendunt ad entia mobilia, et non ulterius. 591. The reason which he gives for saying that all sciences use these principles is that the subject genus of each science has being predicated of it. Now the particular sciences do not use the foregoing principles insofar as they are common principles, i.e., as extending to all beings, but insofar as they have need of them; that is, insofar as they extend to the things contained in the class of beings which constitutes the subject of a particular science about which it makes demonstrations. For example, the philosophy of nature uses them insofar as they extend to changeable beings and no further. 592. Hence no one (322). Deinde cum dicit unde nullus probat quod dixerat, per signum. Et primo inducit probationem. Secundo excludit quorumdam errorem, ibi, sed quoniam est adhuc. Then he proves what he had said by using an example. First, he introduces the proof; and second (593), he rejects a false notion held by some men (“However, some”). Dicit ergo primo, quod nullus intendens primo tradere scientiam alicuius particularis entis, conatus est aliquid dicere de primis principiis utrum sint vera aut non: nec geometra, aut arithmeticus, qui tamen istis principiis plurimum utuntur, ut supra dictum est. Unde patet quod consideratio dictorum principiorum ad hanc scientiam pertinet. He accordingly says, first, that no one whose chief intention is to hand down scientific knowledge of some particular being has attempted to say anything about the truth or falsity of first principles. Neither the geometer nor the arithmetician does this even though they make the greatest use of these principles, as was said above (588). Hence it is evident that the investigation of these principles belongs to this science. 593. However, some (323). Deinde cum dicit nisi physicorum excludit errorem quorumdam: et circa hoc duo facit. Primo excludit errorem eorum, qui de praedictis se intromittebant, cum ad eos non pertineret. Secundo eorum, qui de eis alio modo volebant tractare quam de eis sit tractandum, ibi, quicumque autem utuntur et cetera. Here he rejects the false notion held by some men, and in regard to this he does two things. First, he rejects the false notion of those who occupied themselves with these principles even though they did not concern them. Second, (594), he rejects the false notion of those who wanted to deal with these principles in a different way than they should be dealt with. Dicit ergo primo, quod quamvis nulla scientiarum particularium de praedictis principiis se intromittere debeat, quidam tamen naturalium de his se intromiserunt; et hoc non sine ratione. Antiqui enim non opinabantur aliquam substantiam esse praeter substantiam corpoream mobilem, de qua physicus tractat. Et ideo creditum est, quod soli determinent de tota natura, et per consequens de ente; et ita etiam de primis principiis quae sunt simul consideranda cum ente. Hoc autem falsum est; quia adhuc est quaedam scientia superior naturali: ipsa enim natura, idest res naturalis habens in se principium motus, in se ipsa est unum aliquod genus entis universalis. He accordingly says, first, that even though none of the particular sciences ought to deal with the above-mentioned principles, nevertheless some of the natural philosophers have dealt with them; and they did so not without reason. For the ancients did not think that there was any substance besides the changeable corporeal substance with which the philosophy of nature is concerned. Hence they believed that they alone established the truth about the whole of nature and therefore about being, and thus about first principles, which must be considered along with being. But this is false, because there is still a science which is superior to the science of nature. For nature itself, i.e., natural being, which has its own principle of motion, constitutes in itself one class of universal being. Non enim omne ens est huiusmodi: cum probatum sit in octavo physicorum, esse aliquod ens immobile. Hoc autem ens immobile superius est et nobilius ente mobili, de quo considerat naturalis. Et quia ad illam scientiam pertinet consideratio entis communis, ad quam pertinet consideratio entis primi, ideo ad aliam scientiam quam ad naturalem pertinet consideratio entis communis; et eius etiam erit considerare huiusmodi principia communia. Physica enim est quaedam pars philosophiae: sed non prima, quae considerat ens commune, et ea quae sunt entis inquantum huiusmodi. But not every being is of this kind, because it has been proved in the Physics, Book VIII, that an unchangeable being exists. Now this unchangeable being is superior to and nobler than changeable being, with which the philosophy of nature is concerned. And since the consideration of common being belongs to that science which studies the primary kind of being, then the consideration of common being belongs to a different science than the philosophy of nature. And the consideration of common principles of this kind will also belong to this science. For the philosophy of nature is a part of philosophy but not the first part, which considers common being and those attributes which belong to being as being. 594. And whatever (324). Deinde cum dicit quicumque vero excludit alium errorem circa modum tractandi huiusmodi principia. Quidam enim tractabant de istis principiis volentes ea demonstrare: et quaecumque isti dixerunt de veritate praedictorum principiorum, quomodo oporteat ea recipere per vim demonstrationis, vel quomodo oporteat contingere veritatem in omnibus istis ita se habere, hoc fecerunt propter ignorantiam, vel propter imperitiam analyticorum, idest illius partis logicae, in qua ars demonstrandi traditur: quia oportet scientes de his pervenire, idest omnis scientia per demonstrationem acquisita ex his principiis causatur. Then he rejects the other false notion, which concerns the way in which such principles should be treated. For some men investigated these principles with the aim of demonstrating them. And whatever they said about the truth of these principles, i.e., how they must be accepted as true by force of demonstration, or how the truth found in all these principles must be reached, they did through ignorance of, or lack of skill in, “analytics,” which is that part of logic in which the art of demonstration is treated. For “they must know these principles in order to attain scientific knowledge”; i.e., every science acquired by demonstration depends on these principles. Sed non oportet audientes, idest discipulos instruendos in aliqua scientia, quaerere de his sicut de aliquibus demonstrandis. Vel secundum aliam literam oportet de his pervenire scientes, idest oportet, quod qui acquirunt scientiam per demonstrationem perveniant ad cognoscendum huiusmodi principia communia, et non quod quaerant ea sibi demonstrari. But “those who are learning,” i.e., the pupils who are being instructed in some science, must not seek these principles as something to be demonstrated. Or, according to another text, “those who have scientific knowledge must attain science from these principles”; i.e., those who attain knowledge by demonstration must come to know common principles of this kind and not ask that they be demonstrated to them. 595. It is evident (325). Deinde cum dicit quoniam igitur concludit conclusionem principaliter intentam: scilicet quod philosophi erit considerare de omni substantia inquantum huiusmodi, et de primis syllogismorum principiis. Ad huius autem evidentiam sciendum, quod propositiones per se notae sunt, quae statim notis terminis cognoscuntur, ut dicitur primo posteriorum. Hoc autem contingit in illis propositionibus, in quibus praedicatum ponitur in definitione subiecti, vel praedicatum est idem subiecto. Sed contingit aliquam propositionem quantum in se est esse per se notam, non tamen esse per se notam omnibus, qui ignorant definitionem praedicati et subiecti. Unde Boetius dicit in libro de hebdomadibus, quod quaedam sunt per se nota sapientibus quae non sunt per se nota omnibus. Illa autem sunt per se nota omnibus, quorum termini in conceptionem omnium cadunt. Huiusmodi autem sunt communia, eo quod nostra cognitio a communibus ad propria pervenit, ut dicitur in primo physicorum. Et ideo istae propositiones sunt prima demonstrationum principia, quae componuntur ex terminis communibus, sicut totum et pars, ut, omne totum est maius sua parte; et sicut aequale et inaequale, ut, quae uni et eidem sunt aequalia, sibi sunt aequalia. Et eadem ratio est de similibus. Et quia huiusmodi communes termini pertinent ad considerationem philosophi, ideo haec principia de consideratione philosophi sunt. Determinat autem ea philosophus non demonstrando, sed rationes terminorum tradendo, ut quid totum et quid pars et sic de aliis. Hoc autem cognito, veritas praedictorum principiorum manifesta relinquitur. He draws the conclusion primarily intended, namely, that it will be the function of the philosopher to consider every substance as such and also the first syllogistic principles. In order to make this clear it must be noted that self-evident propositions are those which are known as soon as their terms are known, as is stated in Book I of the Posterior Analytics. This occurs in the case of those propositions in which the predicate is given in the definition of the subject, or is the same as the subject. But it happens that one kind of proposition, even though it is self-evident in itself, is still not self-evident to all, i.e., to those who are ignorant of the definition of both the subject and the predicate. Hence Boethius says in De Hebdomadibus that there are some propositions which are self-evident to the learned but not to all. Now those are self-evident to all whose terms are comprehended by all. And common principles are of this kind, because our knowledge proceeds from common principles to proper ones, as is said in Book I of the Physics. Hence those propositions which are composed of such common terms as whole and part (for example, every whole is greater than one of its parts) and of such terms as equal and unequal (for example, things equal to one and the same thing are equal to each other), constitute the first principles of demonstration. And the same is true of similar terms. Now since common terms of this kind belong to the consideration of the philosopher, then it follows that these principles also fall within his scope. But the philosopher does not establish the truth of these principles (~) by way of demonstration, but (+) by considering the meaning of their terms. For example, he considers what a whole is and what a part is; and the same applies to the rest. And when the meaning of these terms becomes known, it follows that the truth of the above-mentioned principles becomes evident.
LESSON 6 First Philosophy Must Examine the First Principle of Demonstration. The Nature of This Principle. The Errors about It
ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapters 3 & 4: 1005b 8-1006a 18 προσήκει δὲ τὸν μάλιστα γνωρίζοντα περὶ ἕκαστον γένος ἔχειν λέγειν τὰς βεβαιοτάτας ἀρχὰς  τοῦ πράγματος, ὥστε καὶ τὸν περὶ τῶν ὄντων ᾗ ὄντα τὰς πάντων βεβαιοτάτας. ἔστι δ᾽ οὗτος ὁ φιλόσοφος. 326. And it is fitting that the person who is best informed about each class of things should be able to state the firmest principles of his subject. Hence he who understands beings as beings should be able to state the firmest principles of all things. This person is the philosopher. βεβαιοτάτη δ᾽ ἀρχὴ πασῶν περὶ ἣν διαψευσθῆναι ἀδύνατον: γνωριμωτάτην τε γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην (περὶ γὰρ ἃ μὴ γνωρίζουσιν ἀπατῶνται πάντες) καὶ ἀνυπόθετον.  ἣν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν τὸν ὁτιοῦν ξυνιέντα τῶν ὄντων, τοῦτο οὐχ ὑπόθεσις: ὃ δὲ γνωρίζειν ἀναγκαῖον τῷ ὁτιοῦν γνωρίζοντι, καὶ ἥκειν ἔχοντα ἀναγκαῖον. ὅτι μὲν οὖν βεβαιοτάτη ἡ τοιαύτη πασῶν ἀρχή, δῆλον: 327. And the firmest of all principles is that about which it is impossible to make a mistake; for such a principle must be both the best known (for all men make mistakes about things which they do not know) and not hypothetical. For the principle which everyone must have who understands anything about beings is not hypothetical; and that which everyone must know who knows anything must be had by him when he comes to his subject. It is evident, then, that such a principle is the firmest of all. τίς δ᾽ ἔστιν αὕτη, μετὰ ταῦτα λέγωμεν. τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἅμα ὑπάρχειν τε καὶ μὴ  ὑπάρχειν ἀδύνατον τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτό (καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προσδιορισαίμεθ᾽ ἄν, ἔστω προσδιωρισμένα πρὸς τὰς λογικὰς δυσχερείας): αὕτη δὴ πασῶν ἐστὶ βεβαιοτάτη τῶν ἀρχῶν: ἔχει γὰρ τὸν εἰρημένον διορισμόν. ἀδύνατον γὰρ ὁντινοῦν ταὐτὸν ὑπολαμβάνειν εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καθάπερ  τινὲς οἴονται λέγειν Ἡράκλειτον. οὐκ ἔστι γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον, ἅ τις λέγει, ταῦτα καὶ ὑπολαμβάνειν: εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἅμα ὑπάρχειν τῷ αὐτῷ τἀναντία (προσδιωρίσθω δ᾽ ἡμῖν καὶ ταύτῃ τῇ προτάσει τὰ εἰωθότα), ἐναντία δ᾽ ἐστὶ δόξα δόξῃ ἡ τῆς ἀντιφάσεως, φανερὸν ὅτι ἀδύνατον ἅμα  ὑπολαμβάνειν τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι τὸ αὐτό: ἅμα γὰρ ἂν ἔχοι τὰς ἐναντίας δόξας ὁ διεψευσμένος περὶ τούτου. διὸ πάντες οἱ ἀποδεικνύντες εἰς ταύτην ἀνάγουσιν ἐσχάτην δόξαν: φύσει γὰρ ἀρχὴ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀξιωμάτων αὕτη πάντων.  328. And let us next state what this principle is. It is that the same attribute cannot both belong and not belong to the same subject at the same time and in the same respect; and let us stipulate any other qualifications that have to be laid down to meet dialectical difficulties. Now this is the firmest of all principles, since it answers to the definition given; for it is impossible for anyone to think that the same thing both is and is not, although some are of the opinion that Heraclitus speaks in this way; for what a man says he does not necessarily accept. But if it is impossible for contraries to belong simultaneously to the same subject (and let us then suppose that the same things are established here as in the usual proposition), and if one opinion which expresses the contradictory of another is contrary to it, evidently the same man at the same time cannot think that the same thing can both be and not be; for one who is mistaken on this point will have contrary opinions at the same time. And it is for this reason that all who make demonstrations reduce their argument to this ultimate position. For this is by nature the starting point of all the other axioms. Chapter 4 εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἵ, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, αὐτοί τε ἐνδέχεσθαί φασι τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, [1006α]  καὶ ὑπολαμβάνειν οὕτως. χρῶνται δὲ τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ πολλοὶ καὶ τῶν περὶ φύσεως. ἡμεῖς δὲ νῦν εἰλήφαμεν ὡς ἀδυνάτου ὄντος ἅμα εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ διὰ τούτου ἐδείξαμεν ὅτι βεβαιοτάτη  αὕτη τῶν ἀρχῶν πασῶν. 329. Now as we have said (328), there are some who claimed that the same thing can both be and not be, and that this can be believed. And many of those who treat of nature adopt this theory. But now we take it to be impossible for a thing both to be and not be at the same time, and by means of this we shall show that this is the firmest of all principles. ἀξιοῦσι δὴ καὶ τοῦτο ἀποδεικνύναι τινὲς δι᾽ ἀπαιδευσίαν: ἔστι γὰρ ἀπαιδευσία τὸ μὴ γιγνώσκειν τίνων δεῖ ζητεῖν ἀπόδειξιν καὶ τίνων οὐ δεῖ: ὅλως μὲν γὰρ ἁπάντων ἀδύνατον ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι (εἰς ἄπειρον γὰρ ἂν βαδίζοι, ὥστε μηδ᾽ οὕτως εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν),  εἰ δέ τινων μὴ δεῖ ζητεῖν ἀπόδειξιν, τίνα ἀξιοῦσιν εἶναι μᾶλλον τοιαύτην ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιεν εἰπεῖν. 330. But some deem it fitting that even this principle should be demonstrated, and they do this through want of education. For not to know of what things one should seek demonstration and of what things one should not shows want of education. For it is altogether impossible that there should be demonstration of all things, because there would then be an infinite regress so that there would still be no demonstration. But if there are some things of which it is not necessary to seek demonstration, these people cannot say what principle they think to be more indemonstrable. ἔστι δ᾽ ἀποδεῖξαι ἐλεγκτικῶς καὶ περὶ τούτου ὅτι ἀδύνατον, ἂν μόνον τι λέγῃ ὁ ἀμφισβητῶν: ἂν δὲ μηθέν, γελοῖον τὸ ζητεῖν λόγον πρὸς τὸν μηθενὸς ἔχοντα λόγον, ᾗ μὴ ἔχει: ὅμοιος  γὰρ φυτῷ ὁ τοιοῦτος ᾗ τοιοῦτος ἤδη. τὸ δ᾽ ἐλεγκτικῶς ἀποδεῖξαι λέγω διαφέρειν καὶ τὸ ἀποδεῖξαι, ὅτι ἀποδεικνύων μὲν ἂν δόξειεν αἰτεῖσθαι τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ, ἄλλου δὲ τοῦ τοιούτου αἰτίου ὄντος ἔλεγχος ἂν εἴη καὶ οὐκ ἀπόδειξις. 331. But even in this case it is possible to show by refutation that this view is impossible, if only our opponent will say something. But if he says nothing, it is ridiculous to look for a reason against one who has no reason, on the very point on which he is without reason; for such a man is really like a plant. Now I say that demonstration by refutation is different from demonstration [in the strict sense], because he who would demonstrate this principle in the strict sense would seem to beg the question. But when someone argues for the sake of convincing another there will be refutation, not demonstration. COMMENTARY This science considers particularly the very first principle, that of contradiction. Hic ostendit principaliter, quod ad primum philosophum pertinet considerare de primo demonstrationis principio: et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit, quod eius est de ipso considerare. Secundo de ipso tractare incipit, ibi, principium vero et cetera. 596. He shows here that it is the first philosopher who is chiefly concerned with the first principle of demonstration; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he shows that it is the business of the first philosopher to consider this principle; and second (611), he begins to examine this principle. Circa primum tria facit. Primo ostendit, quod huius scientiae est considerare de primo demonstrationis principio. Secundo ostendit quid sit illud, ibi, et firmissimum et cetera. Tertio excludit quosdam errores circa idem principium, ibi, sunt autem quidam et cetera. In regard to the first he does three things. First, he shows that it is the office of this science to consider the first principle of demonstration. Second (597), he indicates what this principle is. Third (606), he rejects certain errors regarding this same principle. Utitur autem ad primum tali ratione. In unoquoque genere ille est maxime cognoscitivus, qui certissima cognoscit principia; quia certitudo cognitionis ex certitudine principiorum dependet. Sed primus philosophus est maxime cognoscitivus et certissimus in sua cognitione: haec enim erat una de conditionibus sapientis, ut in prooemio huius libri patuit, scilicet quod esset certissimus cognitor causarum; ergo philosophus debet considerare certissima et firmissima principia circa entia, de quibus ipse considerat sicut de genere sibi proprie subiecto. In regard to the first point he uses the following argument. In every class of things that man is best informed who knows the most certain principles, because the certitude of knowing depends on the certitude of principles. But the first philosopher is best informed and most certain in his knowledge; for this was one of the conditions of wisdom, as was made clear in the prologue of this work (35), namely, that he who knows the causes of things has the most certain knowledge. Hence the philosopher ought to consider the most certain and firmest principles of beings, which he considers as the subject-genus proper to himself. 597. And the firmest (327). Deinde cum dicit et firmissimum hic ostendit quid sit firmissimum sive certissimum principium: et circa hoc duo facit. Primo dicit quae sunt conditiones certissimi principii. Deinde adaptat eas uni principio, ibi, quid vero sit et cetera. Then he shows what the firmest or most certain principle is; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he states the conditions for the most certain principle; and then (600) he shows how they fit a single principle (“And let us”). Ponit ergo primo, tres conditiones firmissimi principii. Prima est, quod circa hoc non possit aliquis mentiri, sive errare. Et hoc patet, quia cum homines non decipiuntur nisi circa ea quae ignorant: ideo circa quod non potest aliquis decipi, oportet esse notissimum. He accordingly gives, first, the three conditions for the firmest principle. (1) The first is that no one can make a mistake or be in error regarding it. And this is evident because, since men make mistakes only about those things which they do not know, then that principle about which no one can be mistaken must be the one which is best known. Secunda conditio est ut sit non conditionale, idest non propter suppositionem habitum, sicut illa, quae ex quodam condicto ponuntur. Unde alia translatio habet. Et non subiiciantur, idest non subiiciantur ea, quae sunt certissima principia. Et hoc ideo, quia illud, quod necessarium est habere intelligentem quaecumque entium hoc non est conditionale, idest non est suppositum, sed oportet per se esse notum. Et hoc ideo, quia ex quo ipsum est necessarium ad intelligendum quodcumque, oportet quod quilibet qui alia est cognoscens, ipsum cognoscat. 598. (2) The second condition is that it must “not be hypothetical,” i.e., it must not be held as a supposition, as those things which are maintained through some kind of common agreement. Hence another translation reads “And they should not hold a subordinate place,” i.e., those principles which are most certain should not be made dependent on anything else. And this is true, because whatever is necessary for understanding anything at all about being “is not hypothetical,” i.e., it is not a supposition but must be self-evident. And this is true because whatever is necessary for understanding anything at all must be known by anyone who knows other things. Tertia conditio est, ut non acquiratur per demonstrationem, vel alio simili modo; sed adveniat quasi per naturam habenti ipsum, quasi ut naturaliter cognoscatur, et non per acquisitionem. Ex ipso enim lumine naturali intellectus agentis prima principia fiunt cognita, nec acquiruntur per ratiocinationes, sed solum per hoc quod eorum termini innotescunt. Quod quidem fit per hoc, quod a sensibilibus accipitur memoria et a memoria experimentorum et ab experimento illorum terminorum cognitio, quibus cognitis cognoscuntur huiusmodi propositiones communes, quae sunt artium et scientiarum principia. 599. (3) The third condition is that it is not acquired (~) by demonstration or by any similar method, but (+) it comes in a sense by nature to the one having it inasmuch as it is naturally known and not acquired. For first principles become known through the natural light of the agent intellect, and they are not acquired by any process of reasoning but by having their terms become known. This comes about by reason of the fact that memory is derived from sensible things, experience from memory, and knowledge of those terms from experience. And when they are known, common propositions of this kind, which are the principles of the arts and sciences, become known. Manifestum est ergo quod certissimum principium sive firmissimum, tale debet esse, ut circa id non possit errari, et quod non sit suppositum et quod adveniat naturaliter. Hence it is evident that the most certain or firmest principle should be such that there can be no error regarding it; that it is not hypothetical; and that it comes naturally to the one having it. 600. And let us next (328). Deinde cum dicit quid vero ostendit cui principio praedicta determinatio conveniat: et dicit, quod huic principio convenit tamquam firmissimo, quod est impossibile eidem simul inesse et non inesse idem: sed addendum est, et secundum idem: et etiam alia sunt determinanda circa hoc principium, quaecumque determinari contingit ad logicas difficultates, sine quibus videtur contradictio cum non sit. Then he indicates the principle to which the above definition applies. He says that it applies to this principle, as the one which is firmest: it is impossible for the same attribute both to belong and not belong to the same subject at the same time. And it is necessary to add “ in the same respect ”; and any other qualifications that have to be given regarding this principle “to meet dialectical difficulties” must be laid down, since without these qualifications there would seem to be a contradiction when there is none. Quod autem praedicta huic principio conveniant, sic ostendit. Impossibile enim est quemcumque suscipere, sive opinari, quod idem sit simul et non sit: quamvis quidam arbitrentur Heraclitum hoc opinatum fuisse. Verum est autem, quod Heraclitus hoc dixit, non tamen hoc potuit opinari. Non enim necessarium est, quod quicquid aliquis dicit, haec mente suscipiat vel opinetur. 601. That this principle must meet the conditions given above he shows as follows: (1) It is impossible for anyone to think, or hold as an opinion, that the same thing both is and is not at the same time, although some believe that Heraclitus was of this opinion. But while it is true that Heraclitus spoke in this way, he could not think that this is true; for it is not necessary that everything that a person says he should mentally an opinion. Si autem aliquis diceret, quod contingeret aliquem opinari idem simul esse et non esse, sequitur hoc inconveniens, quod contingit contraria eidem simul inesse. Et haec determinentur nobis, idest ostendantur quadam propositione consueta et in logicis determinata. Ostensum est enim in fine perihermenias, quod opiniones sunt contrariae, non quae sunt contrariorum, sed quae sunt contradictionis per se loquendo. Hae enim non sunt contrariae opiniones primo et per se, ut si unus opinetur, quod Socrates est albus, et alius opinetur quod Socrates est niger. Sed, quod unus opinetur quod Socrates est albus, et alius opinetur quod Socrates non est albus. 602. But if one were to say that it is possible for someone to think that the same thing both is and is not at the same time, this absurd consequence follows: contraries could belong to the same subject at the same time. And “let us suppose that the same things are established,” or shown, here as in the usual proposition established in our logical treatises. For it was shown at the end of the Peri hermineas I that contrary opinions are not those which have to do with contraries but those which have to do with contradictories, properly speaking. For when one person thinks that Socrates is white and another thinks that he is black, these are not contrary opinions in the primary and proper sense; but contrary opinions are had when one person thinks that Socrates is white and another thinks that he is not white. Si igitur quis opinetur simul duo contradictoria esse vera, opinando simul idem esse et non esse, habebit simul contrarias opiniones: et ita contraria simul inerunt eidem, quod est impossibile. Non igitur contingit aliquem circa haec interius mentiri et quod opinetur simul idem esse et non esse. Et propter hoc omnes demonstrationes reducunt suas propositiones in hanc propositionem, sicut in ultimam opinionem omnibus communem: ipsa enim est naturaliter principium et dignitas omnium dignitatum. 603. Therefore, if someone were to think that two contradictories are true at the same time by thinking that the same thing both is and is not at the same time, he will have contrary opinions at the same time; and thus contraries will belong to the same thing at the same time. But this is impossible. It is impossible, then, for anyone to be mistaken in his own mind about these things and to think that the same thing both is and is not at the same time. And it is for this reason that all demonstrations reduce their propositions to this proposition as the ultimate opinion common to all; for this proposition is by nature the starting point and axiom of all axioms. Et sic patent aliae duae conditiones; quia inquantum in hanc reducunt demonstrantes omnia, sicut in ultimum resolvendo, patet quod non habetur ex suppositione. Inquantum vero est naturaliter principium, sic patet quod advenit habenti, et non habetur per acquisitionem. 604. (2 & 3) The other two conditions are therefore evident, because, insofar as those making demonstrations reduce all their arguments to this principle as the ultimate one by referring them to it, evidently this principle is not based on an assumption. Indeed, insofar as it is by nature a starting point, it clearly comes unsought to the one having it and is not acquired by his own efforts. Ad huius autem evidentiam sciendum est, quod, cum duplex sit operatio intellectus: una, qua cognoscit quod quid est, quae vocatur indivisibilium intelligentia: alia, qua componit et dividit: in utroque est aliquod primum: in prima quidem operatione est aliquod primum, quod cadit in conceptione intellectus, scilicet hoc quod dico ens; nec aliquid hac operatione potest mente concipi, nisi intelligatur ens. 605. Now for the purpose of making this evident it must be noted that, since the intellect has two operations, one by which it knows quiddities, which is called the understanding of indivisibles, and another by which it combines and separates, there is something first in both operations. In the first operation the first thing that the intellect conceives is being, and in this operation nothing else can be conceived unless being is understood. Et quia hoc principium, impossibile est esse et non esse simul, dependet ex intellectu entis, sicut hoc principium, omne totum est maius sua parte, ex intellectu totius et partis: ideo hoc etiam principium est naturaliter primum in secunda operatione intellectus, scilicet componentis et dividentis. Nec aliquis potest secundum hanc operationem intellectus aliquid intelligere, nisi hoc principio intellecto. Sicut enim totum et partes non intelliguntur nisi intellecto ente, ita nec hoc principium omne totum est maius sua parte, nisi intellecto praedicto principio firmissimo. And because this principle—it is impossible for a thing both to be and not be at the same time—depends on the understanding of being (just as the principle, every whole is greater than one of its parts, depends on the understanding of whole and part), then this principle is by nature also the first in the second operation of the intellect, i.e., in the act of combining and separating. And no one can understand anything by this intellectual operation unless this principle is understood. For just as a whole and its parts are understood only by understanding being, in a similar way the principle that every whole is greater than one of its parts is understood only if the firmest principle is understood. 606. Now as we have said (329). Deinde cum dicit sunt autem ostendit quomodo circa praedictum principium ab aliquibus est erratum: et circa hoc duo facit. Primo tangit errorem illorum, qui contradicebant praedicto principio. Secundo eorum, qui ipsum demonstrare volebant, ibi, dignantur autem et cetera. Then he shows how some men erred regarding this principle; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he touches on the error of those who rejected the foregoing principle; and second (607) he deals with those who wished to demonstrate it (“But some”). Dicit ergo, quod quidam, sicut dictum est de Heraclito, dicebant quod contingit idem simul esse et non esse, et quod contingit hoc existimare. Et hac positione utuntur multi naturales, ut infra patebit: sed nos nunc accipimus supponendo praedictum principium esse verum, scilicet quod impossibile sit idem esse et non esse, sed ex sui veritate ostendimus quod est certissimum. Ex hoc enim quod impossibile est esse et non esse, sequitur quod impossibile sit contraria simul inesse eidem, ut infra dicetur. Et ex hoc quod contraria non possunt simul inesse, sequitur quod homo non possit habere contrarias opiniones, et per consequens quod non possit opinari contradictoria esse vera, ut ostensum est. He accordingly says that some men as was stated above about Heraclitus (601), said that the same thing can both be and not be at the same time, and that it is possible to hold this opinion; and many of the philosophers of nature adopt this position, as will be made clear below (665). For our part, however, we now take as evident that the principle in question is true, i.e., the principle that the same thing cannot both be and not be; but from its truth we show that it is most certain. For from the fact that a thing cannot both be and not be it follows that contraries cannot belong to the same subject, as will be said below (663). And from the fact that contraries cannot belong to a subject at the same time it follows that a man cannot have contrary opinions and, consequently, that he cannot think that contradictories are true, as has been shown (603). 607. But some (330). Deinde cum dicit dignantur autem tangit errorem quorumdam, qui praedictum principium demonstrare volebant: et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit quod non possit demonstrari simpliciter. Secundo quod aliquo modo potest demonstrari, ibi, est autem demonstrare et cetera. Then he mentions the error of certain men who wished to demonstrate the above-mentioned principle; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he shows that it cannot be demonstrated in the strict sense; and second (608), that it can be demonstrated in a way (“But even”). Dicit ergo primo, quod quidam dignum ducunt, sive volunt demonstrare praedictum principium. Et hoc propter apaedeusiam, idest ineruditionem sive indisciplinationem. Est enim ineruditio, quod homo nesciat quorum oportet quaerere demonstrationem, et quorum non: non enim possunt omnia demonstrari. Si enim omnia demonstrarentur, cum idem per seipsum non demonstretur, sed per aliud, oporteret esse circulum in demonstrationibus. Quod esse non potest: quia sic idem esset notius et minus notum, ut patet in primo posteriorum. Vel oporteret procedere in infinitum. Sed, si in infinitum procederetur, non esset demonstratio; quia quaelibet demonstrationis conclusio redditur certa per reductionem eius in primum demonstrationis principium: quod non esset si in infinitum demonstratio sursum procederet. Patet igitur, quod non sunt omnia demonstrabilia. Et si aliqua sunt non demonstrabilia, non possunt dicere quod aliquod principium sit magis indemonstrabile quam praedictum. Thus he says, first, that certain men deem it fitting, i.e., they wish, to demonstrate this principle; and they do this “through want of education,” i.e., through lack of learning or instruction. For there is want of education when a man does not know what to seek demonstration for and what not to; for not all things can be demonstrated. For if all things were demonstrable, then, since a thing is not demonstrated through itself but through something else, demonstrations would either be circular (although this cannot be true, because then the same thing would be both better known and less well known, as is clear in Book I of the Posterior Analytics), or they would have to proceed to infinity. But if there were an infinite regress in demonstrations, demonstration would be impossible, because the conclusion of any demonstration is made certain by reducing it to the first principle of demonstration. But this would not be the case if demonstration proceeded to infinity in an upward direction. It is clear, then, that not all things are demonstrable. And if some things are not demonstrable, these men cannot say that any principle is more indemonstrable than the above-mentioned one. 608. But even in this case (331). Est autem hic ostendit, quod aliquo modo potest praedictum principium demonstrari; dicens, quod contingit praedictum principium demonstrari argumentative. In Graeco habetur elenchice, quod melius transfertur redarguitive. Nam elenchus est syllogismus ad contradicendum. Unde inducitur ad redarguendum aliquam falsam positionem. Et propter hoc isto modo ostendi potest, quod impossibile sit idem esse et non esse. Here he shows that the above-mentioned principle can be demonstrated in a certain respect. He says that it may be demonstrated by disproof. In Greek the word is ἐλεγκτικῶς, which is better translated as by refutation, for an ἔλεγκος is a syllogism that establishes the contradictory of a proposition, and so is introduced to refute some false position. And on these grounds it can be shown that it is impossible for the same thing both to be and not be. Sed solum si ille qui ex aliqua dubitatione negat illud principium, dicit aliquid idest aliquid nomine significat. Si vero nihil dicit, derisibile est quaerere aliquam rationem ad illum qui nulla utitur ratione loquendo. Talis enim in hac disputatione, qui nihil significat, similis erit plantae. Animalia enim bruta etiam significant aliquid per talia signa. But this kind of argument can be employed only if the one who denies that principle because of difficulties “says something,” i.e., if he signifies something by a word. But if he says nothing, it is ridiculous to look for a reason against one who does not make use of reason in speaking; for in this dispute anyone who signifies nothing will be like a plant, for even brute animals signify something by such signs. Differt enim demonstrare simpliciter principium praedictum, et demonstrare argumentative sive elenchice. Quia si aliquis vellet demonstrare simpliciter praedictum principium, videretur petere principium, quia non posset aliquid sumere ad eius demonstrationem, nisi aliqua quae ex veritate huius principii dependerent, ut ex praedictis patet. Sed quando demonstratio non erit talis, scilicet simpliciter, tunc est argumentatio sive elenchus et non demonstratio. 609. For it is one thing to give a strict demonstration of this principle, and another to demonstrate it argumentatively or by refutation. For if anyone wished to give a strict demonstration of this principle, he would seem to be begging the question, because any principle that he could take for the purpose of demonstrating this one would be one of those that depend on the truth of this principle, as is clear from what has been said above (330:C 607). But when the demonstration is not of this kind, i.e., demonstration in the strict sense, there will then be disproof or refutation at most. Alia litera sic habet et melius, alterius autem cum huius causa sit, argumentatio erit, et non demonstratio, idest cum huiusmodi processus a minus notis ad hoc magis notum principium fiat causa alterius hominis qui hoc negat, tunc poterit esse argumentatio sive elenchus, et non demonstratio, scilicet syllogismus contradicens ei poterit esse, cum id quod est minus notum simpliciter est concessum ab adversario, ex quo poterit procedi ad praedictum principium ostendendum quantum ad ipsum, licet non simpliciter. 610. Another text states this better by saying, “But when one argues for the sake of convincing another, there will then be refutation but not demonstration”; i.e., when a process of this kind from a less well known to a better known principle is employed for the sake of convincing another man who denies this, there will then be disproof or refutation but not demonstration; i.e., it will be possible to have a syllogism which contradicts his view, since what is less known absolutely is admitted by the opponent, and thus it will be possible to proceed to demonstrate the above-mentioned principle so far as the man is concerned but not in the strict sense.
LESSON 7 Contradictories Cannot Be True at the Same Time
ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 4: 1006a 18-1007b 18 ἀρχὴ δὲ πρὸς ἅπαντα τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐ τὸ ἀξιοῦν ἢ εἶναί τι λέγειν  ἢ μὴ εἶναι (τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ τάχ᾽ ἄν τις ὑπολάβοι τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς αἰτεῖν), ἀλλὰ σημαίνειν γέ τι καὶ αὑτῷ καὶ ἄλλῳ: τοῦτο γὰρ ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ λέγοι τι. εἰ γὰρ μή, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τῷ τοιούτῳ λόγος, οὔτ᾽ αὐτῷ πρὸς αὑτὸν οὔτε πρὸς ἄλλον. ἂν δέ τις τοῦτο διδῷ, ἔσται ἀπόδειξις: ἤδη γάρ τι  ἔσται ὡρισμένον. ἀλλ᾽ αἴτιος οὐχ ὁ ἀποδεικνὺς ἀλλ᾽ ὁ ὑπομένων: ἀναιρῶν γὰρ λόγον ὑπομένει λόγον. ἔτι δὲ ὁ τοῦτο συγχωρήσας συγκεχώρηκέ τι ἀληθὲς εἶναι χωρὶς ἀποδείξεως [ὥστε οὐκ ἂν πᾶν οὕτως καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχοι]. 332. The starting point of all such discussions is not the desire that someone shall state that something either is or is not, for this might perhaps be thought to be begging the question, but that he shall state something significant both for himself and for someone else; for this he must do if he is to say anything. For if he does not, no discussion will be possible for such a person either with himself or with another. But if anyone will grant this, demonstration will be possible; for there will already be something definite. But this will not have the effect of demonstrating but of upholding, for he who destroys reason upholds reason. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δῆλον ὡς τοῦτό γ᾽ αὐτὸ ἀληθές, ὅτι σημαίνει τὸ  ὄνομα τὸ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι τοδί, ὥστ᾽ οὐκ ἂν πᾶν οὕτως καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχοι: 333. First of all, then, it is evident that this at least is true, that the term to be or not to be signifies something, so that not everything will be so and not so. ἔτι εἰ τὸ ἄνθρωπος σημαίνει ἕν, ἔστω τοῦτο τὸ ζῷον δίπουν. 334. Again, if the term man signifies one thing, let this be a two-footed animal. λέγω δὲ τὸ ἓν σημαίνειν τοῦτο: εἰ τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος, ἂν ᾖ τι ἄνθρωπος, τοῦτ᾽ ἔσται τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι (διαφέρει δ᾽ οὐθὲν οὐδ᾽ εἰ πλείω τις φαίη σημαίνειν μόνον δὲ ὡρισμένα, [1006β]  τεθείη γὰρ ἂν ἐφ᾽ ἑκάστῳ λόγῳ ἕτερον ὄνομα: λέγω δ᾽ οἷον, εἰ μὴ φαίη τὸ ἄνθρωπος ἓν σημαίνειν, πολλὰ δέ, ὧν ἑνὸς μὲν εἷς λόγος τὸ ζῷον δίπουν, εἶεν δὲ καὶ ἕτεροι πλείους, ὡρισμένοι δὲ τὸν ἀριθμόν:  τεθείη γὰρ ἂν ἴδιον ὄνομα καθ᾽ ἕκαστον τὸν λόγον: εἰ δὲ μή [τεθείη], ἀλλ᾽ ἄπειρα σημαίνειν φαίη, φανερὸν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν εἴη λόγος: τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἓν σημαίνειν οὐθὲν σημαίνειν ἐστίν, μὴ σημαινόντων δὲ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀνῄρηται τὸ διαλέγεσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ πρὸς αὑτόν:  οὐθὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται νοεῖν μὴ νοοῦντα ἕν, εἰ δ᾽ ἐνδέχεται, τεθείη ἂν ὄνομα τούτῳ τῷ πράγματι ἕν). ἔστω δή, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη κατ᾽ ἀρχάς, σημαῖνόν τι τὸ ὄνομα καὶ σημαῖνον ἕν: 335. Now by signifying one thing I mean this: granted that man is a two-footed animal, then if something is a man, this will be what being a man is. And it makes no difference even if someone were to say that this term signifies many things, provided that there are a definite number; for a different term might be assigned to each concept. I mean, for example, that if one were to say that the term man signifies not one thing but many, one of which would have a single concept, namely, two-footed animal, there might still be many others, if only there are a limited number; for a particular term might be assigned to each concept. However, if this were not the case, but one were to say that a term signifies an infinite number of things, evidently reasoning would be impossible; for not to signify one thing is to signify nothing. And if words signify nothing, there will be no discourse with another or even with ourselves. For it is impossible to understand anything unless one understands one thing; but if this does happen, a term may be assigned to this thing. Let it be assumed, then, as we said at the beginning (332), that a term signifies something, and that it signifies one thing. οὐ δὴ ἐνδέχεται τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι σημαίνειν ὅπερ ἀνθρώπῳ μὴ εἶναι, εἰ τὸ ἄνθρωπος σημαίνει μὴ μόνον καθ᾽ ἑνὸς  ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕν (οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο ἀξιοῦμεν τὸ ἓν σημαίνειν, τὸ καθ᾽ ἑνός, ἐπεὶ οὕτω γε κἂν τὸ μουσικὸν καὶ τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ ἄνθρωπος ἓν ἐσήμαινεν, ὥστε ἓν ἅπαντα ἔσται: συνώνυμα γάρ). καὶ οὐκ ἔσται εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἀλλ᾽ ἢ καθ᾽ ὁμωνυμίαν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ὃν ἡμεῖς ἄνθρωπον  καλοῦμεν, ἄλλοι μὴ ἄνθρωπον καλοῖεν: τὸ δ᾽ ἀπορούμενον οὐ τοῦτό ἐστιν, εἰ ἐνδέχεται τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἄνθρωπον τὸ ὄνομα, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα. 336. It is impossible, then, that being a man should mean not being a man, if the term man not only signifies something about one subject but also signifies one thing. For we do not think it fitting to identify signifying one thing with signifying something about one subject, since the terms musical, white and man would then signify one thing. And therefore all things would be one, because all would be synonymous. And it will be impossible to be and not to be the same thing, except in an equivocal sense, as occurs if one whom we call man others call not-man. But the problem is not whether the same thing can at the same time be and not be a man in name, but whether it can in fact. δὲ μὴ σημαίνει ἕτερον τὸ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ μὴ ἄνθρωπος, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦ εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ, ὥστ᾽ ἔσται τὸ ἀνθρώπω  ι εἶναι μὴ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι: ἓν γὰρ ἔσται. τοῦτο γὰρ σημαίνει τὸ εἶναι ἕν, τὸ ὡς λώπιον καὶ ἱμάτιον, εἰ ὁ λόγος εἷς: εἰ δὲ ἔσται ἕν, ἓν σημανεῖ τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἀνθρώπῳ. ἀλλ᾽ ἐδέδεικτο ὅτι ἕτερον σημαίνει. 337. Now if man and not-man do not signify something different, it is evident that not being a man will not differ from being a man. Thus being a man will be identical with not being a man, for they will be one thing. For being one means this: being related as clothing and garment are, if they are taken in the same sense. And if being a man and not being a man are to be one, they must signify one thing. But it has been shown that they signify different things. ἀνάγκη τοίνυν, εἴ τί ἐστιν ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἄνθρωπος, ζῷον εἶναι δίπουν  (τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν ὃ ἐσήμαινε τὸ ἄνθρωπος): εἰ δ᾽ ἀνάγκη τοῦτο, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μὴ εἶναι <�τότε> τὸ αὐτὸ ζῷον δίπουν (τοῦτο γὰρ σημαίνει τὸ ἀνάγκη εἶναι, τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶναι μὴ εἶναι [ἄνθρωπον]): οὐκ ἄρα ἐνδέχεται ἅμα ἀληθὲς εἶναι εἰπεῖν τὸ αὐτὸ ἄνθρωπον εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἄνθρωπον. ὁ δ᾽ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι ἄνθρωπον: 338. Therefore, if it is true to say that something is a man, it must be a two-footed animal, for this is what the term man signifies. But if this is necessary, it is impossible for this very thing not to be a two-footed animal; for this is what to-be-necessary means, namely, unable not to be. Hence it cannot be true to say that the same thing is and is not a man at the same time. The same argument also applies to not being a man. [1007α]  τὸ γὰρ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι ἕτερον σημαίνει, εἴπερ καὶ τὸ λευκὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἄνθρωπον εἶναι ἕτερον: πολὺ γὰρ ἀντίκειται ἐκεῖνο μᾶλλον, ὥστε σημαίνειν ἕτερον. εἰ δὲ καὶ  τὸ λευκὸν φήσει τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἓν σημαίνειν, πάλιν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐροῦμεν ὅπερ καὶ πρότερον ἐλέχθη, ὅτι ἓν πάντα ἔσται καὶ οὐ μόνον τὰ ἀντικείμενα. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο, συμβαίνει τὸ λεχθέν, 339. For being a man and not being a man signify different things, since being white and being a man are different; for there is much greater opposition in the former case, so that they signify different things. And if one were to say also that white signifies the same thing as man and is one in concept, we shall say the same thing as was said before (335), namely, that all things are one, and not merely opposites. But if this is impossible, then what has been said will follow. ἂν ἀποκρίνηται τὸ ἐρωτώμενον. ἐὰν δὲ προστιθῇ ἐρωτῶντος ἁπλῶς καὶ τὰς ἀποφάσεις, οὐκ ἀποκρίνεται  τὸ ἐρωτώμενον. οὐθὲν γὰρ κωλύει εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἄνθρωπον καὶ λευκὸν καὶ ἄλλα μυρία τὸ πλῆθος: ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως ἐρομένου εἰ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ἄνθρωπον τοῦτο εἶναι ἢ οὔ, ἀποκριτέον τὸ ἓν σημαῖνον καὶ οὐ προσθετέον ὅτι καὶ λευκὸν καὶ μέγα. καὶ γὰρ ἀδύνατον ἄπειρά γ᾽ ὄντα τὰ  συμβεβηκότα διελθεῖν: ἢ οὖν ἅπαντα διελθέτω ἢ μηθέν. ὁμοίως τοίνυν εἰ καὶ μυριάκις ἐστὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἄνθρωπος καὶ  οὐκ ἄνθρωπος, οὐ προσαποκριτέον τῷ ἐρομένῳ εἰ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἅμα καὶ οὐκ ἄνθρωπος, εἰ μὴ καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα συμβέβηκε προσαποκριτέον, ὅσα ἐστὶν ἢ μὴ ἔστιν: ἐὰν  δὲ τοῦτο ποιῇ, οὐ διαλέγεται. 340. That is to say, it will follow if our opponent answers the question. And if in giving a simple answer to the question he also adds the negations, he is not answering the question. For there is nothing to prevent the same thing from being man and white and a thousand other things numerically. Still if one asks whether it is or is not true to say that this is a man, his opponent should reply by stating something that means one thing and not add that it is also white or black or large. Indeed, it is impossible to enumerate the accidents of being, which are infinite in number; so therefore let him enumerate either all or none. Similarly, even if the same thing is a thousand times a man and a not-man, he must not, in answering the question whether this is a man, add that it is also at the same time a not-man, unless he also gives all the other corresponding accidents, whatever are so or are not so. And if he does not do this, there will be no debate with him. ὅλως δ᾽ ἀναιροῦσιν οἱ τοῦτο λέγοντες οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. πάντα γὰρ ἀνάγκη συμβεβηκέναι φάσκειν αὐτοῖς, καὶ τὸ ὅπερ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι ἢ ζῴῳ εἶναι μὴ εἶναι. εἰ γὰρ ἔσται τι ὅπερ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι, τοῦτο οὐκ ἔσται μὴ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ  (καίτοι αὗται ἀποφάσεις τούτου): ἓν γὰρ ἦν ὃ ἐσήμαινε, καὶ ἦν τοῦτό τινος οὐσία. τὸ δ᾽ οὐσίαν σημαίνειν ἐστὶν ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο τι τὸ εἶναι αὐτῷ. εἰ δ᾽ ἔσται αὐτῷ τὸ ὅπερ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι ἢ ὅπερ μὴ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι ἢ ὅπερ μὴ εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ, ἄλλο ἔσται, ὥστ᾽ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτοῖς  λέγειν ὅτι οὐθενὸς ἔσται τοιοῦτος λόγος, ἀλλὰ πάντα κατὰ συμβεβηκός: τούτῳ γὰρ διώρισται οὐσία καὶ τὸ συμβεβηκός: τὸ γὰρ λευκὸν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ συμβέβηκεν ὅτι ἔστι μὲν λευκὸς ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὅπερ λευκόν. 341. And those who say this do away completely with substance or essence, for they must say that all attributes are accidents, and that there is no such thing as being a man or being an animal. For if there is to be such a thing as being a man, this will not be being a not-man or not being a man; in fact these are the negations of it. For there was one thing which the term signified, and this was the substance of something. And to signify the substance of a thing is to signify that its being is not something else. And if being essentially a man is being essentially a not-man, then the being of man will be something else. Hence they are compelled to say that nothing will have such a concept as this, but that all attributes are accidental. For this distinguishes substance from accident; for white is an accident of man, because while some man is white he is not the essence of whiteness. εἰ δὲ πάντα κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς λέγεται, οὐθὲν ἔσται πρῶτον τὸ καθ᾽ οὗ, εἰ ἀεὶ  τὸ συμβεβηκὸς καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένου τινὸς σημαίνει τὴν κατηγορίαν. [1007β]  ἀνάγκη ἄρα εἰς ἄπειρον ἰέναι. ἀλλ᾽ ἀδύνατον: οὐδὲ γὰρ πλείω συμπλέκεται δυοῖν: τὸ γὰρ συμβεβηκὸς οὐ συμβεβηκότι συμβεβηκός, εἰ μὴ ὅτι ἄμφω συμβέβηκε ταὐτῷ, λέγω δ᾽ οἷον τὸ λευκὸν μουσικὸν καὶ τοῦτο λευκὸν  ὅτι ἄμφω τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ συμβέβηκεν. ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὁ Σωκράτης μουσικὸς οὕτως, ὅτι ἄμφω συμβέβηκεν ἑτέρῳ τινί. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν τὰ μὲν οὕτως τὰ δ᾽ ἐκείνως λέγεται συμβεβηκότα, ὅσα οὕτως λέγεται ὡς τὸ λευκὸν τῷ Σωκράτει, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄπειρα εἶναι ἐπὶ τὸ ἄνω, οἷον τῷ Σωκράτει τῷ λευκῷ  ἕτερόν τι συμβεβηκός: οὐ γὰρ γίγνεταί τι ἓν ἐξ ἁπάντων. οὐδὲ δὴ τῷ λευκῷ ἕτερόν τι ἔσται συμβεβηκός, οἷον τὸ μουσικόν: οὐθέν τε γὰρ μᾶλλον τοῦτο ἐκείνῳ ἢ ἐκεῖνο τούτῳ συμβέβηκεν, καὶ ἅμα διώρισται ὅτι τὰ μὲν οὕτω συμβέβηκε τὰ δ᾽ ὡς τὸ μουσικὸν Σωκράτει: ὅσα δ᾽ οὕτως, οὐ  συμβεβηκότι συμβέβηκε συμβεβηκός, ἀλλ᾽ ὅσα ἐκείνως, ὥστ᾽ οὐ πάντα κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς λεχθήσεται. ἔσται ἄρα τι καὶ ὣς οὐσίαν σημαῖνον. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, δέδεικται ὅτι ἀδύνατον ἅμα κατηγορεῖσθαι τὰς ἀντιφάσεις. 342. Moreover, if all attributes are accidental predicates, there will be no first universal. And if the accidental always implies a predication about some subject, the process must go on to infinity. But this is impossible; for not more than two terms are combined in accidental predication. For an accident is an accident of an accident only because both are accidents of the same subject. I mean, for example, that white is an accident of musical and musical of white’ only because both are accidental to man; but Socrates is not musical in the sense that both are accidental to something else. Therefore, since some accidents are predicated in the latter and some in the former sense, all those that are predicated as white is predicated of Socrates cannot form an infinite series in an upward direction so that there should be another accident of white Socrates; for no one thing results from all of these. Nor again will white have another accident, such as musical; for this is no more an accident of that than that of this. And at the same time it has been established that some things are accidents in this sense and some in the sense that musical is an accident of Socrates. And whatever attributes are predicated accidentally in the latter sense are not accidents of accidents but only those predicated in the former sense. Not all attributes, then, are said to be accidents; and thus there must be some term which also signifies substance. And if this is so, then we have proved that contradictories cannot be predicated at the same time of the same subject. COMMENTARY Hic incipit elenchice disputare contra negantes praedictum principium: et dividitur in duas partes. Primo disputat contra eos, qui dicunt contradictoria simul esse vera. Secundo contra illos qui dicunt quod contingit ea simul esse falsa, verum nec iterum et cetera. 611. Here he begins to argue dialectically against those who deny the foregoing principle, and this is divided into two parts. In the first (332:C 611) he argues against those who say that contradictories are true at the same time; and in the second (383:C 720), against those who say that they are false at the same time (“Neither can there be”). Circa primum duo facit. Primo disputat contra praedictos errantes in communi. Secundo ostendit quomodo in speciali sit disputandum contra diversos, ibi, est autem non idem modus. In regard to the first he does two things. First, he argues in a general way against those who make the aforesaid errors. Second (353:C 663), he shows how we must argue specifically against different positions (“But the same method”). Circa primum duo facit. Primo disputat rationem negantium praedictum principium. Secundo ostendit quod opinio Protagorae in idem redit cum praedicta positione, ibi, est autem ab eadem et cetera. In regard to the first he does two things. First, he argues dialectically against the reasoning of those who deny the foregoing principle. Second (352:C 661), he shows that Protagoras’ opinion is fundamentally the same as the one just mentioned (“The doctrine of Protagoras”). Circa primum ponit septem rationes. Secunda ibi, omnino vero destruunt. Tertia ibi, amplius si contradictiones. Quarta ibi, amplius autem circa omnia et cetera. Quinta ibi, amplius igitur quomodo. Sexta ibi, unde et maxime manifestum est. Septima ibi, amplius quia si maxime. In regard to the first point he gives seven arguments. He gives the second (341:C 624) at the words “And those who”; the third (343:C 636) at “Furthermore, if all”; the fourth (347:C 642) at “Again, either this”; the fifth (348:C 652) at “Again, how”; the sixth (349:C 654) at “It is most evident”; and the seventh (351:C 65.9) at “Further, even if all.” Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit ex quo principio oporteat procedere contra negantes primum principium. Secundo ex illo principio procedit, ibi, primum quidem igitur manifestum et cetera. In regard to the first he does two things. First, he indicates the starting point from which one must proceed to argue against those who deny the first principle. Second (333:C 612), he proceeds to argue from that starting point (“First of all, then”). Dicit ergo primo, quod ad omnia talia inopinabilia non oportet accipere pro principio, quod aliquid velit supponere hoc determinate esse vel non esse, idest non oportet accipere pro principio aliquam propositionem, qua asseratur aliquid de re vel negetur ab ea: hoc enim esset quaerere principium ut prius dictum est. Sed oportet accipere pro principio, quod nomen significet aliquid, et ipsi qui profert, inquantum se loquentem intelligit, et alii qui eum audit. Si autem hoc non concedit, tunc talis non habebit propositum nec secum, nec cum alio; unde superfluum erit cum eo disputare; sed cum hoc dederit, iam statim erit demonstratio contra eum: statim enim invenitur aliquid definitum et determinatum quod per nomen significatur distinctum a suo contradictorio, ut infra patebit. Sed tamen hoc non erit demonstrans praedictum principium simpliciter, sed tantum erit ratio sustinens contra negantes. Ille enim qui destruit rationem, idest sermonem suum, dicendo quod nomen nihil significat, oportet quod sustineat, quia hoc ipsum quod negat, proferre non potest nisi loquendo et aliquid significando. He therefore says, first (332), that with respect to all such unreasonable positions there is no need for us to take as a starting point that someone `wishes to suppose that this thing definitely is “or is not”; i.e., it is not necessary to take as a starting point some proposition in which some attribute is either affirmed or denied of a subject (for this would be a begging of the question, as was said above [331:C 609]), but it is necessary to take as a starting point that a term signifies something both to the one who utters it, inasmuch as he himself understands what he is saying, and to someone else who hears him. But if such a person does not admit this, he will not say anything meaningful either for himself or for someone else, and it will then be idle to dispute with him. But when he has admitted this, a demonstration will at once be possible against him; for there is straightway found to be something definite and determinate which is signified by the term distinct from its contradictory, as will become clear below. Yet this will not strictly be a demonstration of the foregoing principle but only an argument upholding this principle against those who deny it. For he who “destroys reason,” i.e., his own intelligible expression, by saying that a term signifies nothing, must uphold its significance, because he can only express what he denies by speaking and by signifying something. 612. First of all, then (333). Deinde cum dicit primum quidem procedit ex dicta suppositione ad propositum ostendendum. Et primo singulariter in uno. Secundo generaliter in omnibus, ibi, amplius si homo et cetera. He proceeds from the assumption he had made to prove what he intends. First, he deals with one particular case; and second (334:C 612), he treats all cases in a general way (“Again, if the term”). Dicit ergo primo, quod si nomen aliquid significat, primo hoc erit manifestum quod haec propositio erit vera, et eius contradictoria quam negat est falsa. Et sic ad minus hoc habemus, quia non omnis affirmatio est vera cum sua negatione. He accordingly says, first (333), that if a term signifies something, it will be evident first of all that this proposition will be true, and that its contradictory, which he denies, will be false; and thus this at least will be true, that not every affirmation is true together with its negation. 613. Now by signifying (535). Deinde cum dicit dico autem ostendit universaliter de omnibus, scilicet quod contradictoria non sint simul vera. Et circa hoc quatuor facit. Primo ponit quaedam quae sunt necessaria ad propositum concludendum. Secundo concludit propositum, ibi, necesse itaque. Tertio probat quoddam quod supposuerat, ibi, nam esse hominem et cetera. Quarto excludit quamdam cavillationem, ibi, si autem respondeatur. Then he shows that this applies universally to all cases, namely, that contradictories are not true at the same time. In regard to this he does four things. First, he makes certain assumptions which are necessary for drawing his intended conclusion. Second (338:C 620), he draws his conclusion (“Therefore, if it is true”). Third (339:C 622), he proves one assumption which he had made (“For being a man”). Fourth (340:C 623), he rejects a quibble (“That is to say”). Circa primum tria facit. Primo ostendit quod nomen unum significat. Secundo ex hoc ostendit ulterius quod hoc nomen homo, significet id quod est hominem esse, non autem id quod est non esse, ibi, nec sic contingit et cetera. Tertio ostendit quod homo significat unum ibi, si autem non significat et cetera. In regard to the first he does three things. First, he shows that a term signifies one thing; and second (336:C 616), he shows from this that the term man signifies what being a man is, but not what it is not (“It is impossible, then”). Third (337:C 61g), he shows that the term man signifies one thing (“Now if man”). Dicit ergo primo, quod si homo significat aliquid unum, sit hoc unum, animal bipes. Hoc enim unum dicitur nomen significare, quod est definitio rei significatae per nomen; ut si est hominis esse animal bipes, idest si hoc est quod quid est homo, hoc erit significatum per hoc nomen homo. He accordingly says, first (335), that if the term man signifies one thing, let this be two-footed animal. For a term is said to signify this one thing which is the definition of the thing signified by the term, so that if “two-footed animal” is the being of man, i.e., if this is what the essence of man is, this will be what is signified by the term man. Si autem dicat nomen plura significat, aut significabit finita, aut infinita. Si autem finita, nihil differt, secundum aliam translationem, ab eo quod ponitur significare unum, quia significat multas rationes diversarum rerum finitas, et singulis eorum possunt adaptari diversa nomina. Ut si homo significet multa, et unius eorum sit ratio animal bipes, ponetur unum nomen secundum hanc rationem, quod est homo: et si sunt plures aliae rationes, ponentur alia plura nomina, dummodo rationes illae sint finitae. Et sic redibit primum quod nomen significet unum. 614. But if one were to say that a term signifies many things, it will signify either a finite or an infinite number of them. But if it signifies a finite number, it will differ in no way, according to another translation, from the term which is assumed to signify one thing; for it signifies many finite concepts of different things, and different terms can be fitted to each single concept. For example, if the term man were to signify many concepts, and the concept two-footed animal is one of them, one term is assigned to the concept man. And if there are many other concepts, many other terms may be assigned so long as those concepts are finite in number. Thus he will be forced back to the first position, that a term signifies one thing. Si autem nomen non significat finitas rationes, sed infinitas, manifestum est quod nulla erit ratio sive disputatio. Quod sic patet. Quod enim non significat unum, nihil significat. Et hoc sic probatur. Nomina significant intellectus. Si igitur nihil intelligitur, nihil significatur. Sed si non intelligitur unum, nihil intelligitur; quia oportet quod qui intelligit ab aliis distinguat. Ergo si non significat unum, non significat. Sed si nomina non significant, tolletur disputatio, et quae est secundum veritatem et quae est ad hominem. Ergo patet quod si nomina infinita significent, non erit ratio sive disputatio. Sed si contingit intelligere unum, imponatur ei nomen, et sic teneatur quod nomen significet aliquid. 615. But if a term does not signify a finite but an infinite number of concepts, evidently neither reasoning nor debate will be possible. This becomes clear as follows: any term that does not signify one thing signifies nothing. This is proved thus: terms signify something understood, and therefore if nothing is understood, nothing is signified. But if one thing is not understood, nothing is understood, because anyone who understands anything must distinguish it from other things. If a term does not signify one thing, then, it signifies nothing at all; and if terms signify nothing, discourse will be impossible, both the kind which establishes truth and the kind which refutes an assertion. Hence it is clear that, if terms signify an infinite number of things, neither reasoning nor dispute will be possible. But if it is possible to understand one thing, a term may be given to it. So let it be held then that a term signifies something. 616. It is impossible (336). Deinde cum dicit nec sic contingit ostendit secundum; scilicet quod hoc nomen homo non significet id quod est homini non esse: nomen enim significans unum, non solum significat unum subiecto, quod ideo dicitur unum quia de uno, sed id quod est unum simpliciter, scilicet secundum rationem. Si enim hoc vellemus dicere, quod nomen significat unum quia significat ea quae verificantur de uno, sic sequeretur quod musicum et album et homo unum significarent, quoniam omnia verificantur de uno. Et ex hoc sequeretur, quod omnia essent unum: quia si album dicitur de homine, et propter hoc est unum cum eo, cum dicatur etiam de lapide, erit unum cum lapide. Et quae uni et eidem sunt eadem, sibiinvicem sunt eadem. Unde sequeretur quod homo et lapis sit unum, et unius rationis. Et sic sequeretur quod omnia nomina sint univoca, idest unius rationis, vel synonyma secundum aliam literam, idest omnino idem significantia re et ratione. He proves the second point, namely, that the term man does not signify not being a man; for a term that signifies one thing signifies not only what is one in subject (and is therefore said to be one because it is predicated of one subject) but what is one absolutely, i.e., in concept. For if we wanted to say that a term signifies one thing because it signifies the attributes which are verified of one thing, it would then follow that the terms musical, white and man all signify one thing, since all are verified of one thing. And from this it would follow that all things are one; for if white is predicated of man and is therefore identical with him, then when it is also predicated of a stone it will be identical with a stone; and since those things which are identical with one and the same thing are identical with each other, it would follow that a man and a stone are one thing and have one concept. Thus the result would be that all terms are univocal, i.e., one in concept, or synonymous, as another text says, i.e., meaning absolutely the same thing in subject and in concept. Quamvis autem esse et non esse verificentur de eodem secundum negantes principium primum, tamen oportet quod alius sit hoc quod esse hominem et hoc quod est non esse; sicut aliud est ratione album et musicum, quamvis de eodem verificentur. Ergo patet quod esse et non esse non erunt idem ratione et re, quasi uno nomine significatum univoce. 617. Now although being and nonbeing are verified of the same subject according to those who deny the first principle, still being a man and not being a man must differ in concept, just as white and musical differ in concept even though they are verified of the same subject. Hence it is evident that being and non-being cannot be the same in concept and in subject in the sense that they are signified by one univocal term. Sciendum est autem quod esse hominem vel esse homini sive hominis, hic accipitur pro quod quid est hominis. Ex hoc ergo concluditur quod hoc quod dico homo, non significat hoc quod dico hominem non esse, sicut propriam rationem. Sed quia dixerat supra quod idem nomen potest plura significare secundum diversas rationes, ideo subiungit nisi secundum aequivocationem, ad determinandum quod homo univoce non significet esse hominem, et non esse hominem; sed aequivoce potest utrumque significare; ut si id quod vocamus hominem in una lingua, vocent alii non hominem in alia lingua. Non enim est nostra disputatio si idem secundum nomen contingat esse et non esse, sed si idem secundum rem. 618. Now it must be noted that the expression being a man or to be a man or having the being of a man is taken here for the quiddity of man, and therefore it is concluded from this that the term man does not signify not being a man as its proper concept. But because he had said above (335:C 614) that the same term can signify many things according to different concepts, he therefore adds “except in an equivocal sense” in order to make clear that the term man does not signify in a univocal sense both being a man and not being a man, but it can signify both in an equivocal sense; i.e., in the sense that what we call man in one language others might call not-man in another language. For we are not debating whether the same thing can both be and not be man in name, but whether it can in fact. 619. Now if man (337). Deinde cum dicit si autem probat tertium, scilicet quod homo et non homo non significat idem, tali ratione. Homo significat hoc quod est esse hominem, et quod quid est homo: non homo autem significat non esse hominem, et quod quid est non homo. Si ergo homo et non homo non significant aliquid diversum, tunc id quod est esse homini non erit diversum ab hoc quod est non esse homini, vel non esse hominem. Et ita unum eorum praedicabitur de altero. Et erunt etiam secundum rationem unum. Cum enim dicimus aliqua unum significare, intelligimus quod significent rationem unam, sicut vestis et indumentum. Si igitur esse hominem et non esse hominem sunt hoc modo unum, scilicet secundum rationem, unum et idem erit illud quod significabit illud quod est esse hominem, et id quod est non esse hominem. Sed datum est vel demonstratum, quia diversum nomen est quod significat utrumque. Ostensum est enim quod hoc nomen homo significat hominem, et non significat non esse hominem: ergo patet quod esse hominem et non esse hominem, non sunt unum secundum rationem. Et sic patet propositum quod homo et non homo diversa significant. Then he proves the third point: that the terms man and not-man do not signify the same thing, and he uses the following argument. The term man signifies being a man or what man is, and the term not-man signifies not being a man or what man is not. If, then, man and not man do not signify something different, being a man will not differ from not being a man, or being a non-man, and therefore one of these will be predicated of the other. And they will also have one concept; for when we say that some terms signify one thing, we mean that they signify one concept, as the terms clothing and garment do. Hence, if being a man and not being a man are one in this way, i.e., in concept, there will then be one concept which will signify both being a man and not being a man. But it has been granted or demonstrated that the term which signifies each is different; for it has been shown that the term man signifies man and does not signify not-man. Thus it is clear that being a man and not being a man do not have a single concept, and therefore the thesis that man and not-man signify different things becomes evident. 620. Therefore, if it is true (338). Deinde cum dicit necesse itaque ostendit principale propositum ex prioribus suppositis, tali ratione. Necesse est quod homo sit animal bipes: quod patet ex praehabitis. Haec enim est ratio quam hoc nomen significat. Sed quod necesse est esse, non contingit non esse: hoc enim significat necessarium, scilicet non possibile non esse, vel non contingens non esse, vel impossibile non esse: ergo impossibile est sive non contingens vel non possibile hominem non esse animal bipes. Sic ergo patet quod non contingit utrumque verum esse affirmationem et negationem; scilicet quod si animal bipes, et quod non sit animal bipes. Et eadem ratio ex significationibus nominum sumpta potest accipi de non homine, quia necesse est non hominem esse non animal bipes, cum hoc significet nomen: ergo impossibile est esse animal bipes. Here he proves his main thesis from the assumptions made earlier, and he uses the following argument. A man must be a two-footed animal, as is true from the foregoing, for this is the concept which the term man signifies. But what is necessary cannot not be; for this is what the term necessary means, namely, unable not to be, or incapable of not being, or impossible not to be. Hence it is not possible, or incapable, or impossible for man not to be a two-footed animal, and therefore it is evident that the affirmation and the negation cannot both be true; i.e., it cannot be true that man is both a two-footed animal and not a two-footed animal. The same reasoning based on the meanings of terms can be understood to apply to what is not-man, because what is not-man must be not a two-footed animal, since this is what the term signifies. Therefore it is impossible that a not-man should be a two-footed animal. Ea autem, quae supra monstrata sunt, valent ad propositum: quia si consideretur quod homo et non homo idem significarent, vel quod hoc nomen homo significaret esse hominem et non esse hominem, posset adversarius negare istam: necesse est hominem esse animal bipes. Posset enim dicere, quod non magis necessarium est dicere hominem esse animal bipes, quam non esse animal bipes, si haec nomina homo et non homo idem significarent, vel si hoc nomen homo utrumque significet, scilicet id quod est esse hominem, et id quod est non esse hominem. 621. Now the things demonstrated above are useful to his thesis, because if someone were to think that the terms man and not-man might signify the same thing, or that the term man might signify both being a man and not being a man, his opponent could deny the proposition that man must be a two-footed animal. For he could say that it is no more necessary to say that man must be a two-footed animal than to say that he is not a two-footed animal, granted that the terms man and not-man signify the same thing, or granted that the term man signifies both of these-being a man and not being a man. 622. For being a man (339) Deinde cum dicit nam hominem hic probat quoddam quod supposuerat. Ad probandum autem quod hoc nomen, homo, non significat id quod est non esse hominem, assumpsit quod id quod est esse hominem, et id quod est non esse hominem, sint diversa, quamvis verificentur de eodem. Et hoc intendit hic probare tali ratione. Magis opponuntur esse hominem et non esse hominem quam homo et album: sed homo et album sunt diversa secundum rationem, licet sint idem subiecto; ergo et esse hominem et non esse hominem sunt diversa secundum rationem. Minorem sic probat. Si enim omnia quae dicuntur de eodem sunt unum secundum rationem quasi significata uno nomine, sequitur quod omnia sunt unum, sicut supra dictum est et expositum. Si ergo hoc non contingit, continget illud quod dictum est, scilicet quod esse hominem et non esse hominem sunt diversa. Et per consequens sequitur ultima conclusio supradicta, scilicet quod homo sit animal bipes, et quod impossibile est ipsum esse non animal bipes. Then he proves one of the assumptions which he had made; for in order to prove that the term man does not signify not being a man, he assumed that being a man and not being a man are different, even though they might be verified of the same subject. His aim here is to prove this by the following argument. There is greater opposition between being a man and not being a man than between man and white; but man and white have different concepts, although they may be the same in subject. Therefore being a man and not being a man also have different concepts. He proves the minor thus: if all attributes which are predicated of the same subject have the same concept and are signified by one term, it follows that all are one, as has been stated and explained (336:C 616). Now if this is impossible, the position we have maintained follows, namely, that being a man and not being a man are different. And for this reason the final conclusion given above will follow, namely, that man is a two-footed animal, and that it is impossible for him to be what is not a two-footed animal. 623. That is to say (340). Deinde cum dicit si respondeatur excludit quamdam cavillationem per quam praedictus processus posset impediri. Posset enim adversarius interrogatus, an necesse sit hominem esse animal bipes, non respondere affirmationem vel negationem, sed dicere, necesse est hominem esse animal bipes, et non esse animal bipes. Hoc autem excludit hic philosophus dicens praedictam conclusionem sequi, dummodo velit respondere ad interrogatum simpliciter. Si autem interroganti simpliciter de affirmatione, velit addere negationem in sua responsione, ut dictum est, non ad interrogatum responderet. Quod sic probat. Contingit enim unam et eamdem rem esse hominem et album et mille alia huiusmodi. Hic tamen si quaeratur, utrum homo sit albus, respondendum est tantum id quod uno nomine significatur. Nec sunt addenda alia omnia. Verbi gratia: si quaeratur, utrum hoc sit homo, respondendum est, quod est homo. Et non est addendum quod est homo et albus et magnus et similia; quia oportet omnia quae accidunt alicui simul respondere, aut nullum. Omnia autem simul non possunt, cum sint infinita: infinita enim eidem accidunt ad minus secundum relationes ad infinita antecedentia et consequentia, et infinita non est pertransire. In respondendo ergo, nullum eorum quae accidunt quaesito est respondendum, sed solum quod quaeritur. Licet ergo supponatur millies quod sit idem homo et non homo; cum tamen quaeritur de homine, non est respondendum de non homine, nisi respondeantur omnia quae possunt homini accidere. Si enim hoc fieret, non esset disputandum, quia nunquam compleretur disputatio, cum impossibile sit infinita pertransire. He rejects one quibble by which the foregoing process of reasoning could be obstructed. For when an opponent has been asked whether man must be a two-footed animal, he need not reply either affirmatively or negatively but could say that man must be both a two-footed animal and not a two-footed animal. But the philosopher rejects this here, saying that the foregoing conclusion follows so long as an opponent wishes to give a simple answer to the question. But if in giving a simple answer to the question on the side of the affirmative he also wishes to include in his answer the negative aspect, he will not be answering the question. He proves this as follows. One and the same thing can be both a man and white and a thousand other things of this kind. Yet if it is asked here whether a man is white, we must give in our answer only what is signified by one word, and not add all the other attributes. For example, if one asks whether this is a man, we must answer that it is a man, and not add that it is both a man and white and large and the like; for we must give either all of the accidents of a thing at once or not. But not all accidents can be given at once since they are infinite in number; for there are an infinite number of accidents belonging to one and the same thing by reason of its relationship to an infinite number of antecedents and consequents, and what is infinite in number cannot be traversed. In answering the question, then, we must not give any of the attributes which are accidental to the thing about which the question is raised but only the attribute which is asked for. Hence, even if it is supposed a thousand times that man and not-man are the same, still, when the question is asked about man, the answer must not include anything about not-man, unless all those things which are accidental to man are given. And if this were done, no dispute would be possible, because it would never reach completion, since an infinite number of things cannot be traversed. 624. And those who (341). Deinde cum dicit omnino vero ponit secundam rationem, quae sumitur ex ratione praedicati substantialis et accidentalis: quae talis est. Si affirmatio et negatio verificantur de eodem, sequitur quod nihil praedicabitur in quid sive substantialiter, sed solum per accidens. Et sic in praedicatis per accidens erit procedere in infinitum. Sed hoc est impossibile: ergo primum. Then he gives the second argument, and it is based on the notion of substantial and accidental predicates. This is his argument: if an affirmation and a negation are verified of the same subject, it follows that no term will be predicated quidditatively, or substantially, but only accidentally; and therefore there will have to be an infinite regress in accidental predicates. But the consequent is impossible, and thus the antecedent must be impossible. Circa hanc rationem duo facit. Primo ponit conditionalem. Secundo probat destructionem consequentis, ibi, si vero omnia secundum accidens et cetera. 625. In this argument he does two things. First, he gives a conditional proposition. Second (342:C 629), he gives a proof that destroys the consequent (“Moreover, if all”). Circa primum sic procedit: dicens quod illi qui hoc dicunt, scilicet affirmationem et negationem simul esse vera, omnino destruunt substantiam, idest substantiale praedicatum, et quod quid erat esse, idest quod praedicatur in eo quod quid: necesse est enim eis dicere quod omnia accidunt, idest per accidens praedicantur, et quod non sit hominem esse aut animal esse, et quod non sit quod significet quid est homo, aut quid est animal. Regarding the first part he proceeds as follows. He says that those who state that an affirmation and a negation may lie true at the same time completely do away with “substance,” i.e., with a substantial predicate, “or essence,” i.e., with an essential predicate; for they must say “that all attributes are accidents,” or accidental predicates, and that there is no such thing as being a man or being an animal, and that what the quiddity of man or the quiddity of animal signifies does not exist. Quod sic probat. Si aliquid est quod est hominem esse, idest quod quid est homo substantialiter, scilicet de homine praedicatum; illud non erit non esse hominem, nec erit esse non hominem. Huius enim quod est esse hominem sunt praedictae duae negationes; scilicet non esse hominem, vel esse non hominem. Patet ergo quod affirmatio et negatio non verificantur de eodem; quia scilicet de eo quod est esse hominem non verificatur non esse hominem, vel esse non hominem. 626. He proves this as follows: if there is something which is being a man, i.e., which is the substantial essence of man, which is predicated of man, it will not be not being a man or being a not-man; for these two, i.e., not being a man and being a not-man, are the negations of being a man. It is clear, then, that an affirmation and a negation are not verified of the same subject, for not being a man or being a not-man is not verified of being a man. Conditionalem autem positam, quod si aliquid sit quod quid est homo, quod illud non sit non esse hominem, vel esse non hominem, sic probat. Propositum est enim supra et probatum quod hoc quod significat nomen est unum. Et iterum est positum quod illud quod significat nomen, est substantia rei, scilicet quod quid est res. Unde patet quod aliquid significat substantiam rei, et idem quod est significatum non est aliquid aliud. Si igitur illud quod est esse hominem, sive quod quid est homo, fuerit vel non esse hominem, vel esse non hominem, constat quidem quod erit alterum a se. Unde oportet dicere, quod non sit definitio significans quod quid est esse rei; sed sequetur ex hoc quod omnia praedicentur secundum accidens. 627. And the assumption made, namely, that if there is such a thing as being a man, this will not be not being a man or being a not-man, he proves in the following way. It was posited and proved above that the thing which a term signifies is one. And it was also posited that the thing which a term signifies is the substance of something, namely, a thing’s quiddity. Hence it is clear that some term signifies a thing’s substance, and that the thing which was signified is not something else. Therefore, if the essence or quiddity of man should be either not being a man or being a not-man, it is quite clear that it would differ from itself. It would be necessary to say, then, that there is no definition signifying a thing’s essence. But from this it would follow that all predicates are accidental ones. In hoc enim distinguitur substantia ab accidente, idest praedicatum substantiale ab accidentali, quia unumquodque est vere id quod praedicatur substantialiter de eo; et ita non potest dici illud quod praedicatur substantialiter esse non unum, quia quaelibet res non est nisi una. Sed homo dicitur albus, quia albedo vel album accidit ei. Non autem ita quod sit id quod vere est album vel albedo. Ergo non oportet quod id quod praedicatur per accidens sit unum tantum. Sed multa possunt per accidens praedicari. Substantiale vero praedicatum est unum tantum. Et sic patet, quod ita est esse hominem quod non est non esse hominem. Si autem utrumque fuerit, iam substantiale praedicatum non erit unum tantum, et sic non erit substantiale sed accidentale. 628. For substance is distinguished from accident, i.e., a substantial predicate is distinguished from an accidental one, in that each thing is truly what is predicated substantially of it. Thus it cannot be said that a substantial predicate is not one thing, for each thing exists only if It is one. But man is said to be white because whiteness or white is one of his accidents, although not in such a way that he is the very essence of white or whiteness. It is not necessary, then, that an accidental predicate should be one only, but there can be many accidental predicates. A substantial predicate, however, is one only; and thus it is clear that what being a man is is not what not being a man is. But if a substantial predicate is both, it will no longer be one only, and thus will not be substantial but accidental. 629. Moreover, if all (342). Deinde cum dicit si vero destruit consequens; ostendens hoc esse impossibile quod aliquid non praedicetur substantialiter, sed omnia accidentaliter; quia si omnia per accidens praedicentur, non erit aliquid praedicatum universale. (Dicitur autem hic praedicatum universale sicut in posterioribus, secundum quod praedicatur de aliquo per se et secundum quod ipsum est). Hoc autem est impossibile: quia si semper aliquid praedicatur de altero per accidens, oportet quod accidentalis praedicatio procedat in infinitum, quod est impossibile hac ratione. He destroys the consequent. He shows that it is impossible that all predicates should be accidental and none substantial because, if all were accidental, there would be no universal predicate. (And universal predicate here means the same thing as it does in the Posterior Analytics, i.e., an attribute which is predicated of something in virtue of itself and in reference to what it itself is). But this is impossible; for if one attribute is always predicated of another accidentally, there will be an infinite regress in accidental predication; but this is impossible for this reason. Praedicatio enim accidentalis non complectitur nisi duos modos. Unus modus est secundum quod accidens de accidente praedicatur per accidens, et hoc ideo, quia ambo accidunt eidem subiecto, sicut album praedicatur de musico, quia ambo accidunt homini. Alius modus est quo accidens praedicatur de subiecto, sicut Socrates dicitur musicus, non quia ambo accidunt alicui alteri subiecto, sed quia unum eorum accidit alteri. Cum igitur sint duo modi praedicationis per accidens, in neutro contingit esse praedicationem in infinitum. 630. For there are only two ways in which accidental predication occurs. One way is had when one accident is predicated accidentally of another; and this happens because both are accidents of the same subject, for example, when white is predicated of musical because both are accidents of man. The other way is had when an accident is predicated of a subject (as when Socrates is said to be musical), not because both are accidents of some other subject, but because one of them is an accident of the other. Hence, even though there are two ways in which accidents may be predicated, in neither way can there be an infinite regress in predication. Constat enim quod illo modo, quo accidens praedicatur de accidente, non contingit abire in infinitum, quia oportet devenire ad subiectum. Iam enim dictum est, quod haec est ratio praedicationis huius, quia ambo praedicantur de uno subiecto; et sic descendendo a praedicato ad subiectum contingit invenire pro termino ipsum subiectum. 631. For it is clear that there cannot be an infinite regress in that way in which one accident is predicated of another, because one must reach some subject. For it has been stated already that the essential note of this kind of predication is that both accidents are predicated of one subject. And thus by descending from a predicate to a subject, the subject itself can be found to be the terminus. Sed illo modo praedicandi per accidens quo accidens praedicatur de subiecto, ut cum dicitur Socrates est albus, non contingit abire in infinitum in superius ascendendo a subiecto ad praedicatum, ita ut dicamus quod Socrati accidit album et quod Socrati albo accidit aliquod aliud. Hoc enim non posset esse nisi duobus modis. Uno modo quia ex albo et Socrate fieret unum. Et sic sicut Socrates est unum subiectum albedinis, ita Socrates albus esset subiectum alterius accidentis. Hoc autem non potest esse, quia non fit aliquid unum ex omnibus quibuscumque praedicatis. Ex subiecto enim et accidente non fit unum simpliciter, sicut fit unum ex genere et differentia. Unde non potest dici quod Socrates albus, sit unum subiectum. 632. And there cannot be an infinite regress in an upward direction in the way of predicating in which an accident is predicated of a subject, as when Socrates is said to be white, by ascending from a subject to a predicate so as to say that white is an accident of Socrates and that some other attribute is an accident of white Socrates. For this could occur only in two ways. One way would be that one thing would come from white and Socrates; and thus just as Socrates is one subject of whiteness, in a similar way white Socrates would be one subject of another accident. But this cannot be so, because one thing does not come from all of these predicates. For what is one in an absolute sense does not come from a substance and an accident in the way that one thing comes from a genus and a difference. Hence it cannot be said that white Socrates is one subject. Alius modus esset quod sicut Socrates est subiectum albi, ita ipsi albo insit aliquid aliud accidens, ut musicum. Sed hoc etiam non potest esse, propter duo. Primo, quia non erit aliqua ratio, quare musicum dicatur magis accidere albo quam e converso. Unde non erit ordo inter album et musicum, sed e converso respicient se adinvicem. Secundo, quia simul cum hoc definitum est vel determinatum, quod iste est alius modus praedicandi per accidens in quo accidens praedicatur de accidente, ab illo modo quo accidens praedicatur de subiecto, et musicum de Socrate. In isto autem modo de quo nunc loquitur, non dicitur praedicatio accidentalis, quia accidens praedicetur de accidente; sed illo modo quo prius locuti sumus. 633. The other way would be that, just as Socrates is the subject of whiteness, in a similar way some other accident, such as musical, would have whiteness as its subject. But neither can this be so, and for two reasons. First, there can be no special reason why musical should be said to be an accident of white rather than the reverse; neither white nor musical will be prior to the other, but they will rather be of equal rank. Second, in conjunction with this it has been established or determined at the same time that this way of predicating in which an accident is predicated of an accident differs from that in which an accident is predicated of a subject, as when musical is predicated of Socrates. But in the way of which he is now speaking accidental predication does not mean that an accident is predicated of an accident; but it is to be so taken in the way we first described. Sic igitur manifestum est, quod in accidentali praedicatione non est abire in infinitum: quare patet quod non omnia praedicantur secundum accidens. Et ulterius quod aliquid erit significans substantiam. Et ulterius quod contradictio non verificatur de eodem. 634. It is evident, then, that an infinite regress in accidental predication is impossible, and therefore that not all predications are accidental. And it is also evident that there will be some term which signifies substance; and again, that contradictories are not true of the same subject. Sciendum autem est circa praedictam rationem, quod licet accidens non sit subiectum alterius, et sic non sit ordo accidentis ad accidens quantum ad rationem subiiciendi, est tamen ordo quantum ad rationem causae et causati. Nam unum accidens est causa alterius, sicut calidum et humidum dulcis et sicut superficies coloris. Subiectum enim per hoc quod subiicitur uni accidenti, est susceptivum alterius. 635. Now with regard to the argument given it must be noted that, even though one accident is not the subject of another, and thus one accident is not related to the other as its subject, still one is related to the other as cause and thing caused. For one accident is the cause of another. Heat and moistness, for example, are the cause of sweetness, and surface is the cause of color. For by reason of the fact that a subject is receptive of one accident it is receptive of another.
LESSON 8 Other Arguments Against the Foregoing Position
ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 4: 1007b 18-1008b 2 ἔτι εἰ ἀληθεῖς αἱ ἀντιφάσεις ἅμα κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πᾶσαι, δῆλον ὡς  ἅπαντα ἔσται ἕν. ἔσται γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ τριήρης καὶ τοῖχος καὶ ἄνθρωπος, εἰ κατὰ παντός τι ἢ καταφῆσαι ἢ ἀποφῆσαι ἐνδέχεται, καθάπερ ἀνάγκη τοῖς τὸν Πρωταγόρου λέγουσι λόγον. 343. Furthermore, if all contradictories are true of the same subject at the same time, it is evident that all things will be one. For the same thing will be a trireme, a wall and a man, if it is possible either to affirm or to deny anything of everything. εἰ γάρ τῳ δοκεῖ μὴ εἶναι τριήρης ὁ ἄνθρωπος, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἔστι τριήρης: ὥστε καὶ ἔστιν, εἴπερ  ἡ ἀντίφασις ἀληθής. καὶ γίγνεται δὴ τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου, ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα: ὥστε μηθὲν ἀληθῶς ὑπάρχειν. τὸ ἀόριστον οὖν ἐοίκασι λέγειν, καὶ οἰόμενοι τὸ ὂν λέγειν περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος λέγουσιν: τὸ γὰρ δυνάμει ὂν καὶ μὴ ἐντελεχείᾳ τὸ ἀόριστόν ἐστιν. 344. And this is what must follow for those who agree with Protagoras’ view. For if it appears to anyone that a man is not a trireme, it is evident that he is not a trireme; so that he also is a trireme if contradictories are true. And thus there arises the view of Anaxagoras that all things exist together at the same time, so that nothing is truly one. Hence they seem to be speaking about the indeterminate; and while they think they are speaking about being, they are speaking about non-being; for the indeterminate is what exists potentially and is not complete. ἀλλὰ μὴν λεκτέον γ᾽ αὐτοῖς κατὰ  παντὸς <�παντὸς> τὴν κατάφασιν ἢ τὴν ἀπόφασιν: ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ ἑκάστῳ ἡ μὲν αὐτοῦ ἀπόφασις ὑπάρξει, ἡ δ᾽ ἑτέρου ὃ μὴ ὑπάρχει αὐτῷ οὐχ ὑπάρξει: λέγω δ᾽ οἷον εἰ ὀληθὲς εἰπεῖν τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὅτι οὐκ ἄνθρωπος, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἢ τριήρης ἢ οὐ τριήρης. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἡ κατάφασις, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν ἀπόφασιν:  εἰ δὲ μὴ ὑπάρχει ἡ κατάφασις, ἥ γε ἀπόφασις ὑπάρξει μᾶλλον ἢ ἡ αὐτοῦ. [1008α]  εἰ οὖν κἀκείνη ὑπάρχει, ὑπάρξει καὶ ἡ τῆς τριήρους: εἰ δ᾽ αὕτη, καὶ ἡ κατάφασις. ταῦτά τε οὖν συμβαίνει τοῖς λέγουσι τὸν λόγον τοῦτον, 345. But the affirmation and the negation of every predicate of every subject must be admitted by them; for it would be absurd if each subject should have its own negation predicated of it while the negation of something else which cannot be predicated of it should not be predicated of it. I mean that, if it is true to say that a man is not a man, evidently it is also true to say that he is not a trireme. Therefore, if the affirmation is predicable of him, so also must the negation be. But if the affirmation is not predicable of him, the negation of the other term will be predicable of him to a greater degree than his own negation. If, then, the latter negation is predicable of him, the negation of trireme will also be predicable of him; and if this is predicable of him, the affirmation will be too. This is what follows, then, for those who hold this view. καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἢ φάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι. εἰ γὰρ ἀληθὲς ὅτι ἄνθρωπος καὶ  οὐκ ἄνθρωπος, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ οὔτ᾽ ἄνθρωπος οὔτ᾽ οὐκ ἄνθρωπος ἔσται: τοῖν γὰρ δυοῖν δύο ἀποφάσεις, εἰ δὲ μία ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἐκείνη, καὶ αὕτη μία ἂν εἴη ἀντικειμένη. 346. And it also follows for them that it is not necessary either to affirm or to deny. For if it is true that the same thing is both a man and a not-man, evidently it will be neither a man nor a not-man; for of the two affirmations there are two negations. And if the former is taken as a single proposition composed of the two, the latter also will be a single proposition opposed to the former. ἔτι ἤτοι περὶ ἅπαντα οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἔστι καὶ λευκὸν καὶ οὐ λευκὸν καὶ ὂν καὶ οὐκ ὄν, καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας φάσεις καὶ  ἀποφάσεις ὁμοιοτρόπως, ἢ οὒ ἀλλὰ περὶ μέν τινας, περί τινας δ᾽ οὔ. καὶ εἰ μὲν μὴ περὶ πάσας, αὗται ἂν εἶεν ὁμολογούμεναι: εἰ δὲ περὶ πάσας, πάλιν ἤτοι καθ᾽ ὅσων τὸ φῆσαι καὶ ἀποφῆσαι καὶ καθ᾽ ὅσων ἀποφῆσαι καὶ φῆσαι, ἢ κατὰ μὲν ὧν φῆσαι καὶ ἀποφῆσαι, καθ᾽ ὅσων δὲ ἀποφῆσαι  οὐ πάντων φῆσαι. καὶ εἰ μὲν οὕτως, εἴη ἄν τι παγίως οὐκ ὄν, καὶ αὕτη βεβαία δόξα, καὶ εἰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι βέβαιόν τι καὶ γνώριμον, γνωριμωτέρα ἂν εἴη ἡ φάσις ἡ ἀντικειμένη: εἰ δὲ ὁμοίως καὶ ὅσα ἀποφῆσαι φάναι, ἀνάγκη ἤτοι ἀληθὲς διαιροῦντα λέγειν, οἷον ὅτι  λευκὸν καὶ πάλιν ὅτι οὐ λευκόν, ἢ οὔ. καὶ εἰ μὲν μὴ ἀληθὲς διαιροῦντα λέγειν, οὐ λέγει τε ταῦτα καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐθέν (τὰ δὲ μὴ ὄντα πῶς ἂν φθέγξαιτο ἢ βαδίσειεν;), καὶ πάντα δ᾽ ἂν εἴη ἕν, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται, καὶ ταὐτὸν ἔσται καὶ ἄνθρωπος καὶ θεὸς καὶ τριήρης  καὶ αἱ ἀντιφάσεις αὐτῶν (εἰ γὰρ ὁμοίως καθ᾽ ἑκάστου, οὐδὲν διοίσει ἕτερον ἑτέρου: εἰ γὰρ διοίσει, τοῦτ᾽ ἔσται ἀληθὲς καὶ ἴδιον): ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ διαιροῦντα ἐνδέχεται ἀληθεύειν, συμβαίνει τὸ λεχθέν, πρὸς δὲ τούτῳ ὅτι πάντες ἂν ἀληθεύοιεν καὶ πάντες ἂν ψεύδοιντο, καὶ αὐτὸς αὑτὸν ὁμολογεῖ  ψεύδεσθαι. ἅμα δὲ φανερὸν ὅτι περὶ οὐθενός ἐστι πρὸς τοῦτον ἡ σκέψις: οὐθὲν γὰρ λέγει. οὔτε γὰρ οὕτως οὔτ᾽ οὐχ οὕτως λέγει, ἀλλ᾽ οὕτως τε καὶ οὐχ οὕτως: καὶ πάλιν γε ταῦτα ἀπόφησιν ἄμφω, ὅτι οὔθ᾽ οὕτως οὔτε οὐχ οὕτως: εἰ γὰρ μή, ἤδη ἄν τι εἴη ὡρισμένον. ἔτι εἰ ὅταν ἡ φάσις  ἀληθὴς ᾖ, ἡ ἀπόφασις ψευδής, κἂν αὕτη ἀληθὴς ᾖ, ἡ κατάφασις ψευδής, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα φάναι καὶ ἀποφάναι ἀληθῶς. [1008β]  ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως φαῖεν ἂν τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς κείμενον. 347. Again, either this is true of all things, and a thing is both white and not-white, and both being and not-being, and the same applies to other affirmations and negations; or it is not true of all but is true of some and not of others. And if not of all, the exceptions will be admitted. But if it is true of all, then either the negation will be true of everything of which the affirmation is, and the affirmation will be true of everything of which the negation is, or the negation will be true of everything of which the affirmation is, but the affirmation will not always be true of everything of which the negation is. And if the latter is true, there will be something that certainly is not, and this will be an unshakeable opinion. And if that it is not is something certain and knowable, more known indeed will be the opposite affirmation than the negation. But if in denying something it is equally possible to affirm what is denied, it is necessary to state what is true about these things, either separately (for example, to say that a thing is white and that it is not-white), or not. And if it is not true to affirm them separately, then an opponent will not be saying what he professes to say, and nothing will exist. But how could non-existent things speak or walk, as he does? Again, [according to this view] all things will be one, as has been said before (336:C 616), and man and God and a trireme and their contradictories will be the same. Similarly, if this is true of each thing, one thing will differ in no respect from another; for if it differs, this difference will be something true and proper to it. And similarly if it is possible for each to be true separately, the results described will follow. And to this we may add that all will speak the truth and all speak falsely; and that each man will admit of himself that he is in error. And at the same time it is evident that up to this point the discussion is about nothing at all, because our opponent says nothing. For he does not say that a thing is so or is not so, but that it is both so and not so; and again he denies both of these and says that it is neither so nor not so. For if this were not the case there would already be some definite statement. Further, if when the affirmation is true the negation is false, and if when the negation is true the affirmation is false, it will be impossible both to affirm and to deny the same thing truly at the same time. But perhaps someone will say that this was the contention from the very beginning. COMMENTARY Ponit tertiam rationem, quae sumitur ex uno et diverso: et est ratio talis. Si affirmatio et negatio verificantur simul de eodem, omnia sunt unum. Hoc autem est falsum; ergo et primum. Circa hanc rationem tria facit. 636. Then he gives a third argument, which involves oneness and difference. The argument runs thus: if an affirmation and a negation are true of the same subject at the same time, all things will be one. But the consequent is false. Hence the antecedent must be false. In regard to this argument he does three things. Primo ponit conditionalem et exemplificat, quia scilicet sequeretur si contradictiones simul verificantur de eodem, quod idem essent triremis, idest navis habens tres ordines remorum, et murus et homo. First (343:C 636), he lays down a conditional proposition and gives an example, namely, that if contradictories are true of the same subject at the same time, it will follow that the same thing will be a trireme (i.e., a ship with three banks of oars), a wall and a man. 637. And this is what (344). Secundo cum dicit quemadmodum est ostendit quod idem inconveniens sequitur ad duas alias positiones. Primo ad opinionem Protagorae, qui dicebat quod quicquid alicui videtur, hoc totum est verum; quia si alicui videtur quod homo non sit triremis, non erit triremis; et si alteri videtur quod sit triremis, erit triremis; et sic erunt contradictoria vera. Then he shows that the same impossible conclusion follows with regard to two other positions. He does this, first, with regard to the opinion of Protagoras, who said that whatever seems so to anyone is wholly true for him; for if it seems to someone that a man is not a trireme, then he will not be a trireme; and if it seems to someone else that a man is a trireme, he will be a trireme; and thus contradictories will be true. Secundo ad opinionem Anaxagorae, qui dicebat omnes res simul esse, quasi nihil sit vere unum ab aliis determinatum, sed omnia sint unum in quadam confusione. Dicebat enim, quod quodlibet sit in quolibet, sicut in primo physicorum ostensum est. Quod ideo accidebat Anaxagorae, quia ipse videtur loqui de ente indeterminato, idest quod non est determinatum in actu. Et cum putaret loqui de ente perfecto, loquebatur de ente in potentia, sicut infra patebit. Quod autem est in potentia et non endelechia, idest in actu, est indefinitum. Potentia enim non finitur nisi per actum. 638. Second, he does this with regard to the opinion of Anaxagoras, who said that all things exist together, so that nothing which is truly one is distinguished from other things, but all are one in a kind of mixture. For he said that everything is found in everything else, as has been shown in Book I of the Physics. This is the position which Anaxagoras adopted because he seems to be speaking about indeterminate being, i.e., what has not been made actually determinate. And while he thought he was speaking about complete being, he was speaking about potential being, as will become clear below (355:C 667). But the indeterminate is what exists potentially and is not “complete,” i.e., actual; for potency is made determinate only by actuality. 639. But the affirmation (345). Tertio cum dicit sed dicenda probat conditionalem primo propositam esse veram. Et primo quantum ad hoc quod omnia affirmative dicta unum essent. Secundo quantum ad hoc quod affirmationes a suis negationibus non distinguerentur in veritate et falsitate, ibi, et quia non est necesse et cetera. Third, he proves that the first conditional proposition is true. He does this, first, on the grounds that all things would have to be affirmed to be one; and second (346:C 640), on the grounds that affirmations would not be distinguished from their negations from the viewpoint of truth and falsity (“And it also follows”). Dicit ergo primo, quod illud primum est ab eis supponendum ex quo ponunt affirmationem et negationem simul verificari de eodem, quod de quolibet est affirmatio et negatio vera. Constat enim quod de unoquoque magis videtur praedicari negatio alterius rei, quam negatio propria. Inconveniens enim esset si alicui inesset sua negatio et non inesset negatio alterius rei, per quam significatur quod illa res non inest ei: sicut si verum est dicere quod homo non est homo, multo magis est verum dicere quod homo non est triremis. Patet ergo, quod de quocumque necessarium est praedicari negationem, quod praedicatur de eo affirmatio. Et ita per consequens praedicabitur negatio, cum affirmatio et negatio sint simul vera; aut si non praedicabitur affirmatio, praedicabitur negatio alterius magis quam negatio propria. Sicut si triremis non praedicatur de homine, praedicabitur de eo non triremis, multo magis quam non homo. Sed ipsa negatio propria praedicatur, quia homo non est homo: ergo et negatio triremis praedicabitur de eo, ut dicatur quod homo non est triremis. Sed si praedicatur affirmatio, praedicabitur negatio, cum simul verificentur: ergo necesse est quod homo sit triremis et eadem ratione quodlibet aliud. Et sic omnia erunt unum. Hoc igitur contingit dicentibus hanc positionem, scilicet quod contradictio verificetur de eodem. He accordingly says, first (345), that the first conditional proposition must be admitted by them inasmuch as they hold than an affirmation and a negation are true of the same subject at the same time because an affirmation and a negation are true of anything at all. For it is clear that the negation of some other thing seems to be predicable of each thing to a greater degree than its own negation. For it would be absurd if some subject should have its own negation predicated of it and not the negation of something else by which it is signified that this other thing is not predicable of it. For example, if it is true to say that a man is not a man, it is much truer to say that a man is not a trireme. Hence it is clear that anything of which a negation must be predicated must also have an affirmation predicated of it. Therefore a negation will be predicated of it since an affirmation and a negation are true at the same time; or if an affirmation is not predicated of it, the negation of the other term will be predicated of it to a greater degree than its own negation. For example, if the term trireme is not predicable of man, non-trireme will be predicated of him inasmuch as it may be said that a man is not a trireme. But if the affirmation is predicable, so also must the negation be, since they are verified of the same thing. A man, then, must be a trireme, and he must also be anything else on the same grounds. Hence all things must be one. Therefore this is what follows for those who maintain the position that contradictories are true of the same subject. 640. And it also follows (346). Deinde cum dicit et quia non deducit aliud inconveniens, quod scilicet non distinguatur negatio ab affirmatione in falsitate, sed utraque sit falsa. Dicit ergo quod non solum praedicta inconvenientia sequuntur ad praedictam positionem, sed etiam sequitur quod non sit necessarium affirmare et negare, idest quod non sit necessarium affirmationem vel negationem esse veram, sed contingit utramque esse falsam. Et sic non erit distantia inter verum et falsum. Quod sic probat. He now draws the other impossible conclusion which follows from this view, namely, that a negation will not be distinguished from an affirmation as regards falsity, but each will be false. Thus he says that not only the foregoing impossible conclusions follow from the above-mentioned position, but also the conclusion that it is not necessary “either to affirm or to deny,” i.e., it is not necessary that either the affirmation or the negation of a thing should be true, but each may be false; and so there will be no difference between being true and being false. He’ proves this as follows. Si verum sit quod aliquid sit homo et non homo, verum est quod id non erit homo, nec erit non homo. Et hoc patet. Horum enim duorum quae sunt homo et non homo, sunt duae negationes, scilicet non homo et non non homo. Si autem ex primis duabus fiat una propositio, ut dicamus, Socrates non est homo nec non homo, sequitur quod nec affirmatio nec negatio sit vera, sed utraque falsa. 641. If it is true that something is both a man and a not-man, it is also true that it is neither a man nor a not-man. This is evident. For of these two terms, man and not-man, there are two negations, not man and not not-man. And if one proposition were formed from the first two, for example, if one were to say that Socrates is neither a man nor a not-man, it would follow that neither the affirmation nor the negation is true but that both are false. 642. Again, either this (347). Deinde cum dicit amplius autem ponit quartam rationem quae sumitur ex certitudine cognitionis; et est talis. Si affirmatio et negatio simul verificantur, aut ita est in omnibus, aut ita est in quibusdam, et in quibusdam non: si autem non est verum in omnibus, illae, in quibus non est verum, erunt confessae, idest simpliciter et absolute concedendae, vel erunt certae, idest certitudinaliter verae secundum aliam translationem; idest in eis ita erit vera negatio, quod affirmatio erit falsa, vel e converso. Then he gives a fourth argument, and this is based on certitude in knowing. It runs thus. If an affirmation and a negation are true at the same time, either this is true of all things, or it is true of some and not of others. But if it is not true of all, then those of which it is true will be “admitted”; i.e., they will be conceded simply and absolutely, or according to another translation “they will be certain,” i.e., true with certainty; that is, in their case the negation will be true because the affirmation is false, or the reverse. Si autem hoc est verum in omnibus, quod contradictio verificetur de eodem, hoc contingit dupliciter. Uno modo quod de quibuscumque sunt verae affirmationes, sunt verae negationes, et e converso. Alio modo quod de quibuscumque verificantur affirmationes, verificentur negationes, sed non e converso. 643. But if it is true in all cases that contradictories are verified of the same subject, this might happen in two ways. In one way anything of which affirmations are true, negations are true, and the reverse. In another way anything of which affirmations are true, negations are true, but not the reverse. Et si hoc secundum sit verum, sequitur hoc inconveniens, quod aliquid firmiter vel certitudinaliter est non ens; et ita erit firma opinio, quae scilicet est de negativa; et hoc ideo, quia negativa semper est vera, eo quod quandocumque est affirmativa vera, est etiam negativa vera. Non autem affirmativa semper erit vera, quia positum est, quod non de quocumque est vera negativa, sit vera affirmativa; et ita negativa erit firmior et certior quam affirmativa: quod videtur esse falsum: quia dato quod non esse sit certum et notum, tamen semper erit certior affirmatio quam negatio ei opposita, quia veritas negativae semper dependet ex veritate alicuius affirmativae. Unde nulla conclusio negativa infertur, nisi in praemissis sit aliqua affirmativa. Conclusio vero affirmativa ex negativa non probatur. 644. And if the second is true, this impossible conclusion will follow: there will be something that firmly or certainly is not; and so there will be an unshakeable opinion regarding a negative proposition. And this will be the case because a negation is always true since whenever an affirmation is true its negation is also true. But an affirmation will not always be true, because it was posited that an affirmation is not true of anything at all of which a negation is true; and thus a negation will be more certain and knowable than an affirmation. But this seems to be false because, even though non-being is certain and knowable, an affirmation will always be more certain than its opposite negation; for the truth of a negation always depends on that of some affirmation. Hence a negative conclusion can be drawn only if there is some kind of affirmation in the premises. But an affirmative conclusion can never be drawn from negative premises. Si autem dicatur primo modo, scilicet quod de quibuscumque est affirmare, ita de eis est negare; similiter de quibuscumque est negare, de eis est affirmare, ut scilicet affirmatio et negatio convertantur: hoc contingit dupliciter: quia si semper negatio et affirmatio sunt simul verae, aut erit divisim dicere de utraque quod sit vera, verbi gratia, quod sit divisim dicere quod haec est vera, homo est albus, iterum haec est vera, homo non est albus: aut non est divisum utramque dicere veram sed solum coniunctim, ut si dicamus quod haec copulativa sit vera, homo est albus et homo non est albus. 645. Now if one were to speak in the first way and say that of anything of which an affirmation is true the negation is also true, and similarly that of anything of which the negation is true the affirmation is also true, inasmuch as affirmation and negation are interchangeable, this might happen in two ways. For if an affirmation and a negation are both true at the same time, either it will be possible to state what is true of each separately, for example, to say that each of these propositions is true separately—“Man is white” and “Man is not white”; or it will not be possible to state that each is true separately but only both together. For example, if we were to say that this copulative proposition is true —“Man is white and man is not white.” Et siquidem dicamus hoc secundo modo, ut scilicet non sit utraque vera divisim sed solum coniunctim, tunc sequuntur duo inconvenientia: quorum primum est, quod non dicet ea, idest quod non asseret nec affirmationem nec negationem, et quod ambae erunt nihil, idest quod ambae sunt falsae: vel secundum aliam translationem et non erit nihil, idest sequitur quod nihil sit verum, nec affirmatio nec negatio. Et si nihil est verum, nihil poterit dici nec intelligi. Quomodo enim aliquis pronuntiabit vel intelliget non entia? Quasi dicat, nullo modo. 646. And if we were to speak in the second way and say that neither one is true separately but only both together, two impossible conclusions would then follow. The first is that “an opponent will not be saying what he professes to say,” i.e., he will assert neither the affirmation nor the negation of something, and “neither will exist,” i.e., both will be false; or according to another text, “nothing will exist,” i.e., it will follow that nothing is true, neither the affirmation nor the negation. And if nothing is true it will be impossible to understand or to express anything. For how can anyone understand or express non-being? Implied is the reply: in no way. Secundum inconveniens est, quia sequitur quod omnia sint unum, quod in priori ratione est dictum. Sequitur enim quod sit idem homo et Deus et triremis, et etiam contradictiones eorum, scilicet non homo et non Deus et non triremis. Et sic patet, quod si affirmatio et negatio simul dicuntur de unoquoque, tunc nihil differt unum ab alio. Si enim unum ab alio differret, oporteret quod aliquid diceretur de uno, quod non diceretur de alio. Et sic sequeretur quod aliquid esset verum determinate et proprium huic rei, quod non conveniret alteri. Et sic non de quolibet verificaretur affirmatio vel negatio. Constat autem quod ea quae nullo modo differunt, sunt unum; et ita sequetur omnia unum esse. 647. The second impossible conclusion would be that all things are one, as has been stated in a previous argument (345:C 639). For it would follow that a man and God and a trireme, and also their contradictories, a not-man, not-God and not-trireme, are the same. Thus it is clear that, if an affirmation and a negation are true of any subject at the same time, one thing will not differ from another. For if one were to differ from another, something would have to be predicated of the one which is not predicated of the other; and so it would follow that something is definitely and properly true of this thing which does not fit the other. Therefore an affirmation and a negation will not be true of anything whatever. But it is clear that things which differ in no way are one. Thus it would follow that all things are one. Si autem dicatur primo modo, scilicet quod non solum coniunctim est dicere affirmationem et negationem, sed etiam divisim, sequuntur quatuor inconvenientia: quorum unum est, quod haec positio significat ipsum dictum, idest demonstrat hoc esse verum quod immediate est dictum. Unde alia litera habet accidit quod dictum est, scilicet quod omnia sunt unum; quia sic etiam similiter affirmatio et negatio de unoquoque dicetur, et non erit differentia unius ad aliud. 648. But if one were to speak in the first way and say that it is possible for an affirmation and a negation to be true, not only together but also separately, four impossible conclusions will follow. The first is that this position “indicates that this statement is true”; i.e., it proves that the statement just made is true. Hence another text reads, “the results described will follow,” i.e., all things will be one, because it will then be possible both to affirm and to deny each thing, and one will not differ from the other. Secundum est quod omnes verum dicerent, quia quilibet vel dicit affirmationem vel negationem, et utraque est vera; et omnes mentientur, quia contradictorium eius quod quisque dicit, erit verum. Et idem etiam homo seipsum dicere falsum confitetur; quia cum dicit negationem esse veram, dicit se falsum dixisse cum dixit affirmationem. 649. A second impossible conclusion is that all will speak the truth, because anyone at all must make either an affirmation or a negation, and each will be true. And each man will also admit of himself that he is wrong when he says that the affirmation is true; for, since he says that the negation is true, he admits that he was in error when he made the affirmation. Tertium est quia manifestum est quod adhuc non poterit esse perscrutatio vel disputatio. Non enim potest disputari cum aliquo qui nihil concedit. Ille enim nihil dicit, quia nec dicit absolute quod est ita, nec dicit quod non est ita; sed dicit quod est ita et non est ita. Et iterum ambo ea negat dicens quod nec est ita nec non ita, sicut ex praecedenti ratione apparet. Si enim non omnia ista neget, sequitur quod ipse noverit aliquid determinate verum; quod est contra positum. Vel secundum quod alia translatio habet, et planius, iam utique erit determinatum. 650. A third impossible conclusion is that up to this point there obviously could not be any investigation or dispute. For it is impossible to carry on a dispute with someone who admits nothing, because such a person really says nothing since he does not say absolutely that something is so or is not so; but he says that it is both so and not so. And again he denies both of these, for he says that it is neither so nor not so, as is evident from the preceding argument. For if he does not deny all of these he will know that something is definitely true, and this is contrary to his original position. Or according to another translation which expresses this more clearly, “there would already be some definite statement.” Quartum sequitur per definitionem veri et falsi. Verum enim est cum dicitur esse quod est vel non esse quod non est. Falsum autem est cum dicitur non esse quod est, aut esse quod non est. Ex quo patet per definitionem veri et falsi, quod quando affirmatio est vera, tunc negatio est falsa: tunc enim dicit non esse, quod est: et si negatio est vera, tunc affirmatio est falsa: tunc enim dicitur esse de eo quod non est. Non ergo contingit vere idem affirmare et negare. Sed forte adversarius ad hoc ultimum poterit dicere, quod hic est petitio principii. Qui enim ponit contradictionem simul esse veram, non recipit hanc definitionem falsi, scilicet quod falsum est dicere quod non est esse, vel quod est non esse. 651. A fourth impossible conclusion will follow because of the definition of the true and the false. For truth exists when one says that what is, is, or that what is not, is not. But falsity exists when one says that what is, is not, or that what is not, is. Hence from the definition of the true and the false it is clear that, when an affirmation is true, its negation is false; for one then says that what is, is not. And when a negation is true, its affirmation is false; for what is not is then said to be. Therefore it is impossible both to affirm and to deny the same thing truly. But perhaps an opponent could say that this last argument is begging the question; for he who claims that contradictories are true at the same time does not accept this definition of the false: the false is to say that what is not, is, or that what is, is not.
LESSON 9 Three Further Arguments Against Those Who Deny the First Principle
ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapters 4 & 5: 1008b 2-1009a 16 ἔτι ἆρα ὁ μὲν ἢ ἔχειν πως ὑπολαμβάνων ἢ μὴ ἔχειν διέψευσται, ὁ δὲ ἄμφω ἀληθεύει; εἰ γὰρ ἀληθεύει, τί ἂν εἴη τὸ λεγόμενον ὅτι τοιαύτη τῶν ὄντων ἡ  φύσις; εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀληθεύει, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀληθεύει ἢ ὁ ἐκείνως ὑπολαμβάνων, ἤδη πως ἔχοι ἂν τὰ ὄντα, καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἀληθὲς ἂν εἴη, καὶ οὐχ ἅμα καὶ οὐκ ἀληθές. εἰ δὲ ὁμοίως ἅπαντες καὶ ψεύδονται καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγουσιν, οὔτε φθέγξασθαι οὔτ᾽ εἰπεῖν τῷ τοιούτῳ ἔσται: ἅμα γὰρ ταῦτά τε καὶ  οὐ ταῦτα λέγει. εἰ δὲ μηθὲν ὑπολαμβάνει ἀλλ᾽ ὁμοίως οἴεται καὶ οὐκ οἴεται, τί ἂν διαφερόντως ἔχοι τῶν γε φυτῶν; 348. Again, how is that man wrong who judges that a thing is so or is not so, and is he right who judges both? For if the second is right, what will his statement mean except that such is the nature of beings? And if he is not right, he is more right than the one who holds the first view, and beings will already be of a certain nature, and this will be true and not at the same time not true. But if all men are equally right and wrong, anyone who holds this view can neither mean nor state anything; for he will both affirm and not affirm these things at the same time. And if he makes no judgment but equally thinks and does not think, in what respect will he differ from plants? ὅθεν καὶ μάλιστα φανερόν ἐστιν ὅτι οὐδεὶς οὕτω διάκειται οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων οὔτε τῶν λεγόντων τὸν λόγον τοῦτον. διὰ τί γὰρ βαδίζει Μέγαράδε ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ἡσυχάζει, οἰόμενος  βαδίζειν δεῖν; οὐδ᾽ εὐθέως ἕωθεν πορεύεται εἰς φρέαρ ἢ εἰς φάραγγα, ἐὰν τύχῃ, ἀλλὰ φαίνεται εὐλαβούμενος, ὡς οὐχ ὁμοίως οἰόμενος μὴ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὸ ἐμπεσεῖν καὶ ἀγαθόν; δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι τὸ μὲν βέλτιον ὑπολαμβάνει τὸ δ᾽ οὐ βέλτιον. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄνθρωπον τὸ δ᾽ οὐκ ἄνθρωπον  καὶ τὸ μὲν γλυκὺ τὸ δ᾽ οὐ γλυκὺ ἀνάγκη ὑπολαμβάνειν. οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ἴσου ἅπαντα ζητεῖ καὶ ὑπολαμβάνει, ὅταν οἰηθεὶς βέλτιον εἶναι τὸ πιεῖν ὕδωρ καὶ ἰδεῖν ἄνθρωπον εἶτα ζητῇ αὐτά: καίτοι ἔδει γε, εἰ ταὐτὸν ἦν ὁμοίως καὶ ἄνθρωπος καὶ οὐκ ἄνθρωπος. ἀλλ᾽ ὅπερ ἐλέχθη, οὐθεὶς ὃς οὐ  φαίνεται τὰ μὲν εὐλαβούμενος τὰ δ᾽ οὔ: ὥστε, ὡς ἔοικε, πάντες ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἔχειν ἁπλῶς, εἰ μὴ περὶ ἅπαντα, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὸ ἄμεινον καὶ χεῖρον. 349. It is most evident, then, that no one, either among those who profess this theory or any others, is really of this mind. For why does a man walk home 1 and not remain where he is when he thinks he is going there? He does not at dawn walk directly into a well or into a brook if he happens on such; but he seems to be afraid of doing so because he does not think that to fall in is equally good and not good. Therefore he judges that the one is better and the other not. And if this is so in the case of what is good and what is not good, it must also be so in the case of other things. Thus he must judge that one thing is a man and another not a man, and that one thing is sweet and another not sweet. For when he thinks that it is better to drink water and to see a man and then seeks these things, he does not make the same judgment about all of them, though this would be necessary if the same thing were equally a man and not a man. But according to what has been said there is no one who does not seem to fear some things and not others. Hence, as it appears, all men make an unqualified judgment, and if not about all things, still about what is better or worse. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι  ἀλλὰ δοξάζοντες, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐπιμελητέον ἂν εἴη τῆς ἀληθείας, ὥσπερ καὶ νοσώδει ὄντι ἢ ὑγιεινῷ τῆς ὑγιείας:  καὶ γὰρ ὁ δοξάζων πρὸς τὸν ἐπιστάμενον οὐχ ὑγιεινῶς διάκειται πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν. 350. And if they do not have science but opinion, they ought to care all the more about the truth, just as one who is ill ought to care more about health than one who is well. For one who has opinion in contrast to one who has science is not healthily disposed towards the truth. ἔτι εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα πάντα οὕτως ἔχει καὶ οὐχ οὕτως, ἀλλὰ τό γε μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ἔνεστιν ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν ὄντων: οὐ γὰρ ἂν ὁμοίως φήσαιμεν εἶναι τὰ δύο ἄρτια καὶ τὰ τρία, οὐδ᾽ ὁμοίως διέψευσται ὁ τὰ  τέτταρα πέντε οἰόμενος καὶ ὁ χίλια. εἰ οὖν μὴ ὁμοίως, δῆλον ὅτι ἅτερος ἧττον, ὥστε μᾶλλον ἀληθεύει. εἰ οὖν τὸ μᾶλλον ἐγγύτερον, [1009α]  εἴη γε ἄν τι ἀληθὲς οὗ ἐγγύτερον τὸ μᾶλλον ἀληθές. κἂν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἤδη γέ τι ἔστι βεβαιότερον καὶ ἀληθινώτερον, καὶ τοῦ λόγου ἀπηλλαγμένοι ἂν εἴημεν τοῦ ἀκράτου καὶ κωλύοντός τι τῇ διανοίᾳ  ὁρίσαι. 351. Further, even if all things are so and not so as much as you like, still difference of degree belongs to the nature of beings. For we should not say that two and three are equally even; and he who thinks that four is five is not equally as wrong as he who thinks that it is a thousand. Therefore, if they are not equally wrong, obviously one is less wrong and so more right. Hence, if what is truer is nearer to what is true, there must be some truth to which the truer is nearer. And even if there is not, still there is already something truer and more certain, and we shall be freed from that intemperate theory which prevents us from determining anything in our mind. Chapter 5 ἔστι δ᾽ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς δόξης καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρου λόγος, καὶ ἀνάγκη ὁμοίως αὐτοὺς ἄμφω ἢ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι: εἴτε γὰρ τὰ δοκοῦντα πάντα ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα, ἀνάγκη εἶναι πάντα ἅμα ἀληθῆ καὶ ψευδῆ (πολλοὶ γὰρ  τἀναντία ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἀλλήλοις, καὶ τοὺς μὴ ταὐτὰ δοξάζοντας ἑαυτοῖς διεψεῦσθαι νομίζουσιν: ὥστ᾽ ἀνάγκη τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναί τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι), καὶ εἰ τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν, ἀνάγκη τὰ δοκοῦντα εἶναι πάντ᾽ ἀληθῆ (τὰ ἀντικείμενα γὰρ δοξάζουσιν ἀλλήλοις οἱ διεψευσμένοι καὶ ἀληθεύοντες: εἰ οὖν ἔχει τὰ  ὄντα οὕτως, ἀληθεύσουσι πάντες). ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς εἰσὶ διανοίας ἀμφότεροι οἱ λόγοι, δῆλον: 352. The doctrine of Protagoras proceeds from the same opinion, and both of these views must be alike either true or not true. For if all things which seem or appear are true, everything must be at once true and false. For many men have opinions which are contrary to one another, and they think that those who do not have the same opinions as themselves are wrong. Consequently the same thing must both be and not be. And if this is so, it is necessary to think that all opinions are true; for those who are wrong and those who are right entertain opposite opinions. If, then beings are such, all men will speak the truth. Hence it is evident that both contraries proceed from the same way of thinking. COMMENTARY Hic ponit quintam rationem, quae sumitur ex veritatis ratione, quae talis est. Dictum est quod affirmatio et negatio simul vera ponuntur: ergo ille, qui suscipit sive opinatur sic se habere, idest affirmationem tantum aut non sic se habere, scilicet ille, qui opinatur negationem esse veram tantum, mentitus est: qui vero opinatur ambo simul, dicit verum. Cum igitur verum sit quando ita est in re sicut est in opinione, vel sicut significatur voce, sequitur quod ipsum quod dicit erit aliquid determinatum in rebus, scilicet quia entium natura talis erit qualis dicitur, ut non patiatur affirmationem et negationem simul. Vel secundum aliam literam quia talis est entium natura: quasi dicat, ex quo hoc quod dicitur est determinate verum, sequitur quod res habeat naturam talem. Si autem dicatur quod ille qui existimat simul affirmationem et negationem, non opinatur verum, sed magis ille qui existimat illo modo, quod vel tantum affirmatio vel tantum negatio sit vera, adhuc manifestum est quod entia se habebunt in aliquo modo determinate. Unde alia translatio habet planius quodammodo et hoc erit verum determinate, et non erit simul non verum ex quo sola affirmatio vel negatio est vera. 652. Here he gives a fifth argument, which is based on the notion of truth, and it runs as follows. It has been stated that both the affirmation and the negation of something are held to be true at the same time. Therefore he who judges or thinks that “a thing is so,” i.e., that the affirmation alone is true, “or is not so,” i.e., that the negation alone is true, is wrong; and he who judges that both are true at the same time is right. Hence, since truth exists when something is such in reality as it is in thought, or as it is expressed in words, it follows that what a man expresses will be something definite in reality; i.e., the nature of beings will be such as it is described to be; so that it will not be at once the subject both of an affirmation and of a negation. Or according to another text, “beings will already be of a certain nature,” as if to say that since the statement is definitely true, it follows that a thing has such a nature. However, if one were to say that it is not he who judges that an affirmation and a negation are true at the same time that has a true opinion, but rather he who thinks that either the affirmation alone is true or the negation alone is true, it is evident that beings will already exist in some determinate way. Hence another translation says more clearly, “and in a sense this will be definitely true and not at the same time not true,” because either the affirmation alone is true or the negation alone is true. Sed si omnes praedicti, scilicet et illi qui dicunt utramque partem contradictionis, et illi qui dicunt alteram mentiuntur, et omnes etiam verum dicunt; cum tali qui hoc ponit, non est disputandum nec aliquid dicendum ut disputetur cum eo; vel secundum aliam literam, talis homo non asserit aliquid nec affirmat. Sicut enim alia translatio dicit, nec asserere nec dicere aliquid huiusmodi est, quia similiter unumquodque et dicit et negat. Et si ipse sicut similiter affirmat et negat exterius, ita et similiter interius opinatur et non opinatur, et nihil suscipit quasi determinate verum, in nullo videtur differre a plantis; quia etiam bruta animalia habent determinatas conceptiones. Alius textus habet ab aptis natis: et est sensus, quia talis, qui nihil suscipit, nihil differt in hoc quod actu cogitat ab illis, qui apti nati sunt cogitare, et nondum cogitat actu; qui enim apti nati sunt cogitare de aliqua quaestione, neutram partem asserunt, et similiter nec isti. 653. But if all of those just mentioned, i.e., both those who affirm both parts of a contradiction and those who affirm one of the two, “are wrong,” and all are also right, it will be impossible to carry on a dispute with anyone who maintains this, or even to say anything that might provoke a dispute with him. Or according to another text, “such a man will not affirm or assert anything.” For, as another translation says, “he cannot assert or affirm anything of this kind,” because he equally affirms and denies anything at all. And if this man takes nothing to be definitely true, and similarly thinks and does not think, just as he similarly affirms and denies something in speech, he seems to differ in no way from plants; because even brute animals have certain definite conceptions. Another text reads, “from those disposed by nature,” and this means that such a one who admits nothing does not differ in what he is actually thinking from those who are naturally disposed to think but are not yet actually thinking. For those who are naturally disposed to think about any question do not affirm either part of it, and similarly neither do the others. 654. It is most evident (349). Deinde cum dicit unde et maxime ponit sextam rationem, quae sumitur ab electione et fuga: et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ponit rationem. Secundo excludit quamdam cavillosam responsionem, ibi, si autem non scientes et cetera. Then he gives a sixth argument, which is based on desire and aversion. In regard to this he does two things. First, he gives the argument. Second (350:C 658), he rejects an answer which is a quibble (“And if they”). Dicit ergo primo, quod manifestum est quod nullus homo sic disponitur ut credat affirmationem et negationem simul verificari; nec illi qui hanc positionem ponunt, nec etiam alii. Si enim idem esset ire domum et non ire, quare aliquis iret domum et non quiesceret, si putaret quod hoc ipsum quiescere, esset ire domum? Patet ergo, ex quo aliquis vadit et non quiescit, quod aliud putat esse ire et non ire. He accordingly says, first (349), that it is evident that no man is of such a mind as to think that both an affirmation and a negation can be verified of the same subject at the same time. Neither those who maintain this position nor any of the others can think in this way. For if to go home were the same as not to go home, why would someone go home rather than remain where he is, if he were of the opinion that to remain where he is is the same as to go home? Therefore, from the fact that someone goes home and does not remain where he is it is clear that he thinks that to go and not to go are different. Et similiter si aliquis incedit per aliquam viam, quae forte directe vadit ad puteum vel ad torrentem, non recte incedit per viam illam, sed videtur timere casum in puteum aut in torrentem. Et hoc ideo, quia incidere in torrentem vel puteum non putat esse similiter bonum et non bonum, sed absolute putat esse non bonum. Si autem putaret esse bonum sicut et non bonum, non magis vitaret quam eligeret. Cum ergo vitet et non eligat, palam est quod ipse suscipit sive opinatur quod unum sit melius, scilicet non incidere in puteum, quod novit esse melius. 655. Similarly, if someone walks along a path which happens to lead directly to a well or a brook, he does not proceed straight along that path but seems to fear that he will fall into the well or brook. This happens because he judges that to fall into a well or a brook is not equally good and not good, but he judges absolutely that it is not good. However, if he were to judge that it is both good and not good, he would not avoid the above act any more than he would desire it. Therefore, since he avoids doing this and does not desire it, obviously he judges or thinks that the one course is better, namely, not to fall into the well, because he knows that it is better. Et si hoc est in non bono et bono, similiter necesse est esse in aliis, ut videlicet opinetur quod hoc sit homo, et illud non homo: et hoc sit dulce et illud non dulce. Quod ex hoc patet, quia non omnia aequaliter quaerit et opinatur, cum ipse putet melius aquam bibere dulcem quam non dulcem, et melius videre hominem quam non hominem. Et ex ista diversa opinione sequitur quod determinate quaerit unum et non aliud. Oporteret siquidem quod similiter utraque quaereret, scilicet dulce et non dulce, hominem et non hominem, si existimaret quod essent eadem contradictoria. Sed, sicut dictum est, nullus est qui non videatur hoc timere et illa non timere. Et sic per hoc ipsum quod homo afficitur diversimode ad diversa, dum quaedam timet et quaedam desiderat, oportet quod non existimet idem esse quodlibet et non esse. 656. And if this is true of what is good and what is not good, the same thing must apply in other cases, so that clearly one judges that one thing is a man and another not a man, and that one thing is sweet and another not sweet. This is evident from the fact that he does not seek all things to the same degree or make the same judgment about them, since he judges that it is better to drink water which is sweet than to drink that which is not sweet; and that it is better to see a man than to see something which is not a man. And from this difference in opinion it follows that he definitely desires the one and not the other; for he would have to desire both equally, i.e., both the sweet and the not-sweet, and both man and not-man, if he thought that contradictories were the same. But, as has been said before (349:C 655), there is no one who does not seem to avoid the one and not the other. So by the very fact that a man is differently disposed to various things inasmuch as he avoids some and desires others, he must not think that the same thing both is and is not. Sic ergo patet quod omnes opinantur se habere veritatem vel in affirmativa tantum, vel in negativa, et non utraque simul. Et si non in omnibus, saltem in bonis et malis, vel in melioribus et in deterioribus. Ex hac enim differentia provenit quod quaedam quaeruntur et quaedam timentur. 657. It is evident, then that all men think that truth consists in affirmation alone or in negation alone and not in both at the same time. And if they do not think that this applies in all cases, they at least are of the opinion that it applies in the case of things which are good or evil or of those which are better or worse; for this difference accounts for the fact that some things are desired and others are avoided. 658. And if they (350). Deinde cum dicit si autem non excludit quamdam cavillationem. Posset enim aliquis dicere quod homines quaedam desiderant tamquam bona, et alia fugiunt tamquam non bona, non quasi scientes veritatem, sed quasi opinantes, quod non idem sit bonum et non bonum, licet idem sit secundum rei veritatem. Sed si hoc est verum, quod homines non sunt scientes, sed opinantes, multo magis debent curare ut addiscant veritatem. Quod sic patet; quia infirmus magis curat de sanitate quam sanus. Ille autem, qui opinatur non verum, non disponitur salubriter ad veritatem in comparatione ad scientem: habet enim se ad scientem sicut infirmus ad sanitatem. Defectus enim scientiae est opinio falsa, sicut aegritudo sanitatis. Et sic patet, quod homines debent curare de veritate invenienda: quod non esset, si nihil esset verum determinate, sed simul aliquid verum et non verum. Then he rejects a quibble. For some one could say that men desire some things inasmuch as they are good and avoid others inasmuch as they are not good, not because they know the truth but because they are of the opinion that the same thing is not both good and not good, although this amounts to the same thing in reality. But if it is true that men do not have science but opinion, they ought to care all the more about learning the truth. This is made clear as follows: one who is ill cares more about health than one who is well. But one who has an untrue opinion, in comparison with one who has scientific knowledge, is not healthily disposed towards the truth, because he is in the same state with regard to scientific knowledge as a sick man is with regard to health; for a false opinion is a lack of scientific knowledge just as illness is a lack of health. Thus it is evident that men ought to care about discovering the truth. However, this would not be the case if nothing were definitely true, but only if something were both true and not true at the same time. 659. Further, even if all (351). Deinde cum dicit amplius quia ponit septimam rationem, quae sumitur ex diversis gradibus falsitatis. Dicit ergo, quod etsi maxime verum sit quod omnia sic se habeant et non sic, idest quod affirmatio et negatio sint simul vera, et omnia sint simul vera et falsa, sed tamen in natura entium oportet quod aliquid sit magis et minus verum. Constat enim quod non similiter se habet ad veritatem, quod duo sunt paria, et tria sunt paria: nec similiter se habet ad mendacium dicere quod quatuor sunt pente idest quinque, et quod sint mille. Si enim sunt falsa similiter, manifestum est quod alterum est minus falsum, scilicet dicere quatuor esse quinque, quam dicere quatuor esse mille. Quod autem est minus falsum, est verum magis vel propinquius vero, sicut et minus nigrum, quod est albo propinquius. Patet ergo quod alter eorum magis dicit verum, idest magis appropinquat veritati, scilicet ille qui dicit quatuor esse quinque. Sed non esset aliquid affinius vero vel propinquius, nisi esset aliquid simpliciter verum, cui propinquius vel affinius esset magis verum et minus falsum. Relinquitur ergo quod aliquid oportet ponere esse absolute verum, et non omnia vera et falsa; quia sequitur ex hoc quod contradictio sit simul vera. Et si per praedictam rationem non sequitur quod aliquid sit absolute verum, tamen iam habetur quod aliquid est verius et firmius sive certius alio. Et sic non eodem modo se habet ad veritatem et certitudinem affirmatio et negatio. Et ita per hanc rationem et per alias praecedentes erimus liberati vel remoti a ratione, idest opinione non mixta, idest non temperata (unde alius textus habet, distemperata): tunc enim opinio est bene contemperata, quando praedicatum non repugnat subiecto: cum autem opinio implicat opposita, tunc non bene contemperatur. Talis autem est praedicta positio, quae dicit contradictionem verificari. Then he gives a seventh argument, which is based on the different degrees of falsity. He says that even if it should be most true that everything is so and not so, i.e., that an affirmation and its negation are true at the same time, still it is necessary that different degrees of truth should exist in reality. For obviously it is not equally true to say that two is even and that three is even; nor is it equally false to say that four is five, and that it is a thousand. For if both are equally false, it is evident that one is less false, i.e., it is less false to say that four is five than to say that it is a thousand. But what is less false is truer, or nearer to the truth, just as that is also less black which is nearer to white. Therefore it is clear that one of them speaks more truly, i.e., he comes nearer to the truth; and this is the one who says that four is five. But nothing would be closer or nearer to the truth unless there were something which is absolutely true in relation to which the nearer or closer would be truer and less false. It follows, then, that it is necessary to posit something which is unqualifiedly true, and that not all things are both true and false, because otherwise it would follow from this that contradictories are true at the same time. And even if it does not follow from the foregoing argument that there is something which is unqualifiedly true, still it has been stated already that one thing is truer and firmer or more certain than another (351:C 659); and thus affirmation and negation are not related in the same way to truth and certitude. Hence as a result of this argument and the others given above we shall be freed or liberated from this theory, i.e., from this non-mixed opinion, or one that is not tempered (and for this reason another text has “intemperate”); for an opinion is well tempered when the predicate is not repugnant to the subject. But when an opinion involves opposite notions, it is not well tempered; and the position mentioned above, which says that contradictories can be true, is an opinion of this kind. Item prohibet ne mente aliquid possimus definire vel determinare. Prima enim ratio distinctionis consideratur in affirmatione et negatione. Unde qui affirmationem et negationem unum esse dicit, omnem determinationem sive distinctionem excludit. 660. Further, this position prevents us from being able to define or settle anything in our mind. For the first notion of difference is considered in affirmation and negation. Hence he who says that an affirmation and a negation are one does away with all definiteness or difference. 661. The doctrine of Protagoras (352). Deinde cum dicit est autem ostendit quod opinio Protagorae reducitur in eamdem sententiam cum praedicta positione. Dicebat enim Protagoras, quod omnia, quae videntur alicui esse vera, omnia sunt vera. Et siquidem haec positio est vera, necesse est primam positionem esse veram, scilicet quod affirmatio et negatio sint simul vera. Et per consequens, quod omnia sint simul vera et falsa, sicut ex hac positione sequitur, ut supra ostensum est. Quod sic ostendit. Multi enim homines opinantur sibiinvicem contraria: et putant quod illi, qui non eadem opinantur quod ipsi, mentiantur, et e converso. Si ergo quidquid alicui videtur hoc est verum, sequitur quod utrique mentiantur, et verum dicant, quod idem sit et non sit. Et sic ad opinionem Protagorae sequitur quod contradictio simul verificetur. Here he shows that the opinion of Protagoras is reduced to the same position as the one mentioned above. For Protagoras said that everything which seems to be true to anyone is true. And if this position is true, the first one must also be true, namely, that an affirmation and its negation are true at the same time. Hence all things must be true and false at the same time inasmuch as this follows from this position, as has been shown above (351:C 659). He proves this as follows. Many men have opinions which are contrary to one another, and they think that those who do not have the same opinions as themselves are wrong, and vice versa. If, then, whatever seems so to anyone is true, it follows that both are wrong and both are right, because the same thing is and is not. Hence according to the opinion of Protagoras it follows that both parts of a contradiction are true at the same time. Similiter etiam si hoc est verum quod contradictio simul verificetur, necessarium est opinionem Protagorae esse veram, scilicet quod omnia quae videntur aliquibus esse vera, sint vera. Constat enim quod aliqui habent diversas opiniones; quorum quidam sunt mentientes, et quidam sunt verum dicentes, quia opinantur sibiinvicem opposita. Si ergo omnia opposita sunt simul vera, quod sequitur si contradictoria simul verificentur, necessario sequitur quod omnes dicant verum, et quod videtur alicui sit verum; et sic patet quod eiusdem sententiae vel intellectus vel rationis est utraque positio, quia ad unam sequitur alia de necessitate. 662. Similarly, if it is true that both parts of a contradiction are true at the same time, the opinion of Protagoras must be true, namely, that all things which seem true to anybody are true. For it is clear that people have different opinions, and some of these are false and others are true because they have opinions which are opposed to each other. If, then, all opposites are true at the same time (and this follows if contradictories are true at the same time), the result must be that all are right, and that what seems so to anyone is true. Thus it is clear that each position contains the same opinion, theory, or way of thinking, because one necessarily follows from the other.
LESSON 10 The Procedure Against Those Who Say that Contradictories Are True at the Same Time
ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 5: 1009a 16-1009a 38 ἔστι δ᾽ οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος πρὸς ἅπαντας τῆς ἐντεύξεως: οἱ μὲν γὰρ πειθοῦς δέονται οἱ δὲ βίας. ὅσοι μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ ἀπορῆσαι ὑπέλαβον οὕτως, τούτων εὐΐατος ἡ ἄγνοια (οὐ γὰρ πρὸς τὸν  λόγον ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν ἡ ἀπάντησις αὐτῶν): ὅσοι δὲ λόγου χάριν λέγουσι, τούτων δ᾽ ἔλεγχος ἴασις τοῦ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ λόγου καὶ τοῦ ἐν τοῖς ὀνόμασιν. 353. But the same method of discussion is not applicable in all of these cases, because some men need persuasion and others force. For the ignorance of those who have formed their opinions as a result of difficulties is easily cured, because refutation is directed not against their words but against their thought. But the cure for all of those who argue for the sake of argument consists in refuting what they express in speech and in words. ἐλήλυθε δὲ τοῖς διαποροῦσιν αὕτη ἡ δόξα ἐκ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἡ μὲν τοῦ ἅμα τὰς ἀντιφάσεις καὶ τἀναντία ὑπάρχειν ὁρῶσιν ἐκ ταὐτοῦ  γιγνόμενα τἀναντία: εἰ οὖν μὴ ἐνδέχεται γίγνεσθαι τὸ μὴ ὄν, προϋπῆρχεν ὁμοίως τὸ πρᾶγμα ἄμφω ὄν, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας μεμῖχθαι πᾶν ἐν παντί φησι καὶ Δημόκριτος: καὶ γὰρ οὗτος τὸ κενὸν καὶ τὸ πλῆρες ὁμοίως καθ᾽ ὁτιοῦν ὑπάρχειν μέρος, καίτοι τὸ μὲν ὂν τούτων εἶναι τὸ δὲ  μὴ ὄν. 354. Those who have experienced difficulties have formed this opinion because of things observed in the sensible world, i.e., the opinion that contradictories and contraries can both be true at the same time, inasmuch as they see that contraries are generated from the same thing. Therefore, if it is impossible for nonbeing to come into being, the thing must have existed before as both contraries equally. This is Anaxagoras’ view, for he says that everything is mixed in everything else. And Democritus is of the same opinion, for he holds that the void and the full are equally present in any part, and yet one of these is non-being and the other being. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τοὺς ἐκ τούτων ὑπολαμβάνοντας ἐροῦμεν ὅτι τρόπον μέν τινα ὀρθῶς λέγουσι τρόπον δέ τινα ἀγνοοῦσιν: τὸ γὰρ ὂν λέγεται διχῶς, ὥστ᾽ ἔστιν ὃν τρόπον ἐνδέχεται γίγνεσθαί τι ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, ἔστι δ᾽ ὃν οὔ, καὶ ἅμα τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι καὶ ὂν καὶ μὴ ὄν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ κατὰ ταὐτὸ [ὄν]: δυνάμει  μὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ἅμα ταὐτὸ εἶναι τὰ ἐναντία, ἐντελεχείᾳ δ᾽ οὔ. 355. Concerning those who base their opinions on these grounds, then, we say that in one sense they speak the truth, and that in another they do not know what they are saying. For being has two meanings, so that in one sense a thing can come to be from non-being and in another sense it cannot. Hence the same thing can both be and not be at the same time, but not in the same respect; for while the same thing can be potentially two contraries at the same time, it cannot in complete actuality. ἔτι δ᾽ ἀξιώσομεν αὐτοὺς ὑπολαμβάνειν καὶ ἄλλην τινὰ οὐσίαν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων ᾗ οὔτε κίνησις ὑπάρχει οὔτε φθορὰ οὔτε γένεσις τὸ παράπαν. 356. Further, we shall expect them to believe that among beings there is also another kind of substance to which neither motion nor generation nor corruption belongs in any way. COMMENTARY Postquam determinavit philosophus et posuit rationes contra negantes primum principium, hic ostendit quomodo diversimode est procedendum, quo ad diversos, qui ex diversis viis in praedictum errorem devenerunt: et dividitur in duas partes. Primo ostendit quod diversimode est procedendum contra diversos. Secundo incipit procedere alio modo quam supra, ibi, venit autem dubitantibus. 663. Having raised arguments against those who deny the first principle, and having settled the issue, here the Philosopher indicates how one must proceed differently against various men who adopted different versions of the above-mentioned error. This is divided into two parts. In the first (353:C 663) he shows that one must proceed differently against different men. In the second (354:C 665) he begins to proceed in a different way than he did above (“Those who”). Dicit ergo primo, quod non est idem modus homiliae, idest popularis allocutionis, vel bonae constructionis, secundum aliam translationem, idest ordinatae dispositionis vel intercessionis, sicut in Graeco habetur, idest persuasionis, ad omnes praedictas positiones, scilicet de veritate contradictionis et veritate eorum quae apparent. Dupliciter enim aliqui incidunt in praedictas positiones. Quidam enim ex dubitatione. Cum enim eis occurrunt aliquae sophisticae rationes, ex quibus videantur sequi praedictae positiones, et eas nesciunt solvere, concedunt conclusionem. Unde eorum ignorantia est facile curabilis. Non enim obviandum est eis vel occurrendum ad rationes quas ponunt, sed ad mentem, ut scilicet solvatur dubitatio de mentibus, per quam in huiusmodi opiniones inciderunt. Et tunc ab istis positionibus recedunt. He accordingly says, first (353), that the same method “of discussion,” i.e., of popular address (or “of good grammatical construction,” according to another translation, or of well ordered argument “or intercession,” as is said in the Greek, i.e., of persuasion) is not applicable to all of the foregoing positions; that is, to the position that contradictories can be true, and to the position that truth consists in appearances. For some thinkers adopt the foregoing positions for two reasons. Some do so because of some difficulty; for since certain sophistical arguments occur to them, from which the foregoing positions seem to follow, and they do not know how to solve them, they accept the conclusion. Hence their ignorance is easily cured. For one must not oppose them or attack the arguments which they give, but must appeal to their thought, clearing up the mental difficulties which have led them to form such opinions; and then they will give up these positions. Alii vero praedictas positiones prosequuntur non propter aliquam dubitationem eos ad huiusmodi inducentem, sed solum causa orationis, idest ex quaedam protervia, volentes huiusmodi rationes impossibiles sustinere propter seipsas, quia contraria earum demonstrari non possunt. Et horum medela est argumentatio vel arguitio quae est in voce orationis et in nominibus, idest per hoc quod ipsa vox orationis aliquid significat. Significatio autem orationis a significatione nominum dependet. Et sic oportet ad hoc principium redire, quod nomina aliquid significant; sicut supra philosophus usus est. 664. Others adopt the foregoing positions, not because of any difficulty which leads them to such positions, but only because they want to argue “for the sake of argument,” i.e., because of a certain insolence, inasmuch as they want to maintain impossible theories of this kind for their own sake since the contrary of these cannot be demonstrated. The cure for these men is the refutation or rejection “of what they express in speech and in words,” i.e., on the grounds that the word in a statement has some meaning. Now the meaning of a statement depends on the meaning of the words, so that it is necessary to return to the principle that words signify something. This is the principle which the Philosopher used above (332:C 611). 665. Those who (354). Deinde cum dicit venit autem quia superius obviavit super hoc ex significatione nominum, hic incipit obviare dubitantibus solvendo eorum dubitationes. Since the Philosopher met the difficulties above on this point by considering the meaning of words, he begins here to meet those who are in difficulties by solving their problems. Et primo quantum ad illos, qui ponebant contradictoria esse simul vera. Secundo quantum ad illos qui ponebant omnia apparentia esse vera, ibi, similiter autem. First (354), he deals with those who held that contradictories are true at the same time; and second (357:C 669), he deals with those who held that everything which appears so is true (“And similarly”). Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit dubitationem quae movet quosdam ad concedendum contradictoria esse simul vera. Secundo solvit, ibi, igitur ex his. In regard to the first he does two things. First, he sets forth the difficulty which led some men to admit that contradictories are true at the same time. Second (355:C 667), he clears up this difficulty (“Concerning those”). Dicit ergo, quod opinio de hoc quod contradictio simul verificetur, quibusdam venit per modum dubitationis ex sensibilibus, in quibus apparet generatio et corruptio et motus. Videbatur enim quod ex aliquo uno fiebant contraria, sicut ex aqua fit et aer qui est calidus, et terra quae est frigida. Sed omne quod fit, fit ex prius existente. Quod enim non est, non contingit fieri, cum ex nihilo nihil fiat. Oportet ergo quod res fuerit simul in se habens contradictionem; quia si ex uno et eodem fit calidum et frigidum, fit per consequens calidum et non calidum. He says, then, that the opinion on this point, that the parts of a contradiction may be true at the same time, was formed by some men as a result of a difficulty which arose with regard to sensible things, in which generation and corruption and motion are apparent. For it seemed that contraries were generated from the same thing; for example, air, which is warm, and earth, which is cold, both come from water. But everything which is generated comes from something that existed before; for non-being cannot come into being, since nothing comes from nothing. A thing therefore had to have in itself contradictories simultaneously, because if both the hot and the cold are generated from one and the same thing, then it turns out to be hot and not-hot itself. Propter hanc autem rationem Anaxagoras dixit quod omnia in omnibus miscentur. Ex hoc enim quod videbat quodlibet ex quolibet fieri, putabat quod nihil posset fieri ex alio nisi ante fuisset ibi. Et huic rationi videtur acquievisse Democritus. Posuit enim vacuum et plenum in qualibet parte corporis coniungi. Quae quidem se habent sicut ens et non ens. Nam plenum se habet sicut ens, vacuum vero sicut non ens. 666. It was because of such reasoning that Anaxagoras claimed that everything is mixed in everything else. For from the fact that anything at A seemed to come from anything else he thought that one thing could come from another only if it already existed in it. Democritus also seems to have agreed with this theory, for he claimed that the void and the full are combined in any part of a body. And these are like being and non-being, because the full has the character of being and the void the character of non-being. 667. Concerning those (355). Deinde cum dicit igitur ex solvit praedictam dubitationem dupliciter. Primo sic, dicens quod sicut dictum est, illis qui ex dubitatione opinantur praedicta inconvenientia, obviandum est ad mentem. Igitur ad suscipientes, idest opinantes contradictoria simul verificari, ex his, idest praedicta ratione dicimus, quod quodammodo recte dicunt, et quodammodo ignorant quid dicunt, inconvenienter loquentes. Ens enim dupliciter dicitur; ens actu, et ens in potentia. Cum igitur dicunt quod ens non fit ex non ente, quodammodo verum dicunt, et quodammodo non. Nam ens fit ex non ente actu, ente vero in potentia. Unde etiam aliquo modo idem potest esse simul ens et non ens, et aliquo modo non potest. Contingit enim quod idem sit contraria in potentia, non tamen perfecte, idest in actu. Si enim tepidum est in potentia calidum et frigidum, neutrum tamen in actu. Here he solves the foregoing difficulty in two ways. First, he says that the opinion of those who have adopted the foregoing absurd views because of some difficulty must be met by appealing to their thought, as has been stated (353:C 663). Therefore “concerning those who base their opinions,” i.e., those who think that contradictories are true at the same time, “on these grounds,” i.e., on the reasoning mentioned above, we say that in one sense they speak the truth and in another they do not know what they are saying since their statements are absurd. For being has two meanings: actual being and potential being; and therefore when they say that being does not come from non-being, in one sense they are right and in another they are not. For being does not come from actual being but from potential being. Hence in one sense the same thing can be at the same time both being and non-being, and in another sense it cannot; for the same thing can be contraries potentially, but it cannot be both “in complete actuality,” i.e., actually. For if something warm is potentially both hot and cold, it still cannot be actually both. 668. Further, we shall (356). Deinde cum dicit amplius autem secundam solutionem ponit ibi, dicens, quod dignum dicimus, quod ipsi suscipiant vel opinentur aliquam substantiam esse cui nec insit motus, nec generatio, nec corruptio, quod probatum est octavo physicorum. Tali autem substantiae non poterit concludi ex ratione praedicta, quod insint contraria, quia ex ea non fit aliquid. Et haec solutio videtur procedere secundum Platonicos, qui propter mutabilitatem sensibilium coacti sunt ponere ideas immobiles, scilicet de quibus dentur definitiones, et fiant demonstrationes, et certa scientia habeatur; quasi de his sensibilibus propter eorum mutabilitatem et admixtionem contrarietatis in eis certa scientia esse non possit. Sed prima solutio sufficientior est. Then he gives the second solution. He says that we deem it fitting that they should accept or think that there is some kind of substance to which neither motion nor generation nor corruption belongs, as is proved in Book VIII of the Physics. Now one could not conclude to the existence of this kind of substance by reason of what has been said above, namely, that contraries belong to it, because nothing is generated from them. This solution seems to be like the one reached by the Platonists, who, because of the changeable character of sensible things, were compelled to posit unchangeable separate Forms (i.e., those of which definitions are given, and demonstrations made, and certain knowledge is had) on the grounds that there could be no certain knowledge of sensible things because of their changeableness and the mixture of contrariety which they contain. But the first solution is a better one.
LESSON 11 The Reason Why Some Considered Appearances to Be True
ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 5: 1009a 38-1009b 12 [1009β]  —ὅμοιως δὲ καὶ ἡ περὶ τὰ φαινόμενα ἀλήθεια ἐνίοις ἐκ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐλήλυθεν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθὲς οὐ πλήθει κρίνεσθαι οἴονται προσήκειν οὐδὲ ὀλιγότητι, τὸ δ᾽ αὐτὸ τοῖς μὲν γλυκὺ γευομένοις δοκεῖν εἶναι τοῖς δὲ πικρόν, ὥστ᾽ εἰ πάντες ἔκαμνον  ἢ πάντες παρεφρόνουν, δύο δ᾽ ἢ τρεῖς ὑγίαινον ἢ νοῦν εἶχον, δοκεῖν ἂν τούτους κάμνειν καὶ παραφρονεῖν τοὺς δ᾽ ἄλλους οὔ: ἔτι δὲ καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων τἀναντία [περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν] φαίνεσθαι καὶ ἡμῖν, καὶ αὐτῷ δὲ ἑκάστῳ πρὸς αὑτὸν οὐ ταὐτὰ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἀεὶ δοκεῖν. ποῖα οὖν τούτων ἀληθῆ  ἢ ψευδῆ, ἄδηλον: οὐθὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον τάδε ἢ τάδε ἀληθῆ, ἀλλ᾽ ὁμοίως. διὸ Δημόκριτός γέ φησιν ἤτοι οὐθὲν εἶναι ἀληθὲς ἢ ἡμῖν γ᾽ ἄδηλον. 357. And similarly the theory that truth consists in appearances comes to some thinkers from sensible things. For they think that the truth should not be judged by the large or small number who uphold some view; and they point out that the same thing appears to be sweet to some when they taste it and bitter to others. Hence, if all men were ill or all were mad, and only two or three were healthy or in possession of their wits, the latter would appear ill or mad and not the former. Further, they say that the impressions made upon many of the other animals are contrary to those made upon us, and that to the senses of each person things do not always appear to be the same. Therefore it is not always evident which of these views is true or which is false, but both appear equally so. And it is for this reason that Democritus says that either nothing is true or it is not evident to us. COMMENTARY Postquam philosophus solvit dubitationem, ex qua inducebantur antiqui ad ponendum contradictoria simul esse vera, hic removet illa, ex quibus aliqui inducebantur ad ponendum omne, quod apparet, esse verum. 669. Having solved the difficulty which led the ancient philosophers to maintain that contradictories are true at the same time, the Philosopher now dispels the difficulty which led some thinkers to maintain that every appearance is true. Dividitur autem pars ista in duas. Primo ponit dubitationes, ex quibus aliqui movebantur ad praedictam positionem ponendam. Secundo removet dubitationes praedictas, ibi, nos autem et ad hanc orationem. This part is divided into two. First (351:C 669), he gives the difficulties which led some thinkers to hold the position mentioned above. Second (363:C 685), he dispels these difficulties (“But in reply”). Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit rationem eorum, ex qua movebantur ad ponendum omne, quod apparet, esse verum. Secundo assignat causam praedictae rationis, ibi, omnino vero propter existimare. In regard to the first he does two things. First, he gives the reason which led these men to maintain that every appearance is true. Second (358:C 672), he explains why they reasoned in this way (“In general”). Dicit ergo primo, quod sicut opinio, quae ponebat contradictoria simul esse vera, veniebat ex quibusdam sensibilibus, in quibus contingit contradictoria fieri ex aliquo uno, similiter et veritas quae est circa apparentia, idest opinio de veritate apparentium, venit ex quibusdam sensibilibus, illis scilicet qui non protervientes, sed dubitantes in hanc positionem incidunt. Et hoc quia de eisdem sensibilibus inveniuntur contrariae opiniones diversorum. Et hoc tripliciter. Primo, quia quibusdam gustantibus videtur dulce, quod aliis videtur amarum esse. Et sic homines de omnibus sensibilibus contrariam opinionem habent. Secundo, quia multa animalia contraria iudicant de sensibilibus nobis. Illud enim quod videtur sapidum bovi vel asino, mali saporis ab homine iudicatur. Tertio, quia idem homo in diversis temporibus diversimode iudicat de sensibilibus. Quod enim nunc videtur sibi dulce et sapidum, alio tempore sibi videtur amarum et insipidum. He therefore says, first (357), that, just as the opinion which maintained that contradictories are true at the same time came from certain sensible things in which it happens that contradictories come from the same thing, so too “the theory that truth consists in appearances,” or the opinion about the truth of appearances, is derived from certain sensible things; that is, by those who are not perverse but are drawn into this position because of difficulties. This occurs because they find that different men hold contrary opinions about the same sensible things; and they give three reasons in support of their position. First, they point out that the same thing appears to taste sweet to some atid bitter to others, so that men have contrary opinions about all sensible things. Second, they note that many animals make judgments about sensible things which are contrary to ours; for what seems tasty to the ox or to the ass is judged by man to be unpalatable. Third, they say that the same man at different times makes different judgments about sensible things; for what now appears to be sweet and palatable to him at another time seems bitter or tasteless. Nec potest assignari ratio certa per quam fiat manifestum, quae opinionum istarum sit vera, aut quae sit falsa; quia non magis una earum videtur vera uni, quam alteri altera. Ergo oportet quod aequaliter sint verae, vel aequaliter falsae. Et ideo dixit Democritus, quod aut nihil est determinate verum in rebus; aut si quid est verum, non est nobis manifestum. Cognitionem enim rerum accipimus per sensus. Iudicium autem sensus non est certum, cum non semper eodem modo iudicet. Unde nulla certitudo videtur nobis esse de veritate, ut possimus dicere, quod haec opinio determinate est vera et contraria determinate est falsa. 670. And no certain reason can be given that clearly indicates which of these opinions is true or which is false, because one of these seems no truer to one person than the other does to another person. Therefore they must be equally true or equally false. Hence Democritus said that either nothing is definitely true or, if anything is true, it is not evident to us; for even though we acquire our knowledge of things through the senses, their judgment is not certain since they do not always judge in the same way. Hence we do not seem to have any certainty regarding the truth so that we can say that this opinion is definitely true and its contrary definitely false. Sed quia posset aliquis dicere, contra hanc opinionem, quod aliqua regula potest sumi per quam discernitur inter contrarias opiniones quae earum sit vera, ut videlicet dicamus quod illud est verum iudicium de sensibilibus quod dant sani, non quod dant aegrotantes; et de veritate hoc est verum iudicium, quod dant sapientes et intelligentes, non autem quod dant insipientes vel stulti: ideo in principio removet istam responsionem per hoc, quod iudicium certum de veritate non convenienter potest sumi ex multitudine et paucitate, ut scilicet dicatur esse verum quod multis videtur, falsum autem quod videtur paucis; cum quandoque illud quod est pluribus opinabile, non sit simpliciter verum. Sanitas autem et aegritudo, sive sapientia et stultitia, non videntur differre nisi secundum multitudinem et paucitatem. Si enim omnes vel plures essent tales quales sunt illi qui nunc reputantur desipientes vel stulti, illi reputarentur sapientes. Et qui nunc reputantur sapientes, reputarentur stulti. Et similiter est de sanitate et aegritudine. Non ergo credendum est magis iudicio sani et sapientis de falsitate et veritate, quam iudicio infirmi et insipientis. 671. But someone could say, in opposing this position, that some rule can be adopted whereby a person can discern among contrary opinions the one that is true. That is, we might say that the judgment which healthy people make about sensible things is right, and the one which sick people make is not; and that the judgment which wise and intelligent people make in matters of truth is right, and the one which foolish or ignorant people make is not. He rejects this reply at the very start on the grounds that no certain judgment about the truth of any theory can be fittingly based on the number, large or small, of persons who hold it, according to which that would be said to be true which seems so to many, and that to be false which seems so to a few; for sometimes what many believe is not simply true. Now health and sickness or wisdom and foolishness do not seem to differ only by reason of the greater or smaller number of people involved. For if all or most persons were like those who are now thought to be ignorant or foolish, they would be considered wise, and those who are now thought to be wise would be considered foolish. The same applies in the case of health and sickness. Hence the judgment regarding truth and falsity of one who is healthy and wise is no more credible than the judgment of one who is ill and foolish.
LESSON 12 Two Reasons Why Some Identify Truth with Appearances
ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 5: 1009b 12-1010a 15 ὅλως δὲ διὰ τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν φρόνησιν μὲν τὴν αἴσθησιν, ταύτην δ᾽ εἶναι ἀλλοίωσιν, τὸ φαινόμενον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀληθὲς εἶναί  φασιν: 358. And in general it is because these philosophers think that discretion is sensory perception, and that this in turn is alteration, that they say that what appears to the senses is necessarily true. ἐκ τούτων γὰρ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ Δημόκριτος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἕκαστος τοιαύταις δόξαις γεγένηνται ἔνοχοι. καὶ γὰρ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς μεταβάλλοντας τὴν ἕξιν μεταβάλλειν φησὶ τὴν φρόνησιν:
- πρὸς παρεὸν γὰρ μῆτις ἐναύξεται ἀνθρώποισιν.
καὶ ἐν ἑτέροις δὲ λέγει  ὅτι
- ὅσσον <�δ᾽> ἀλλοῖοι μετέφυν, τόσον ἄρ σφισιν αἰεὶ
- καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ἀλλοῖα παρίστατο.
καὶ Παρμενίδης δὲ ἀποφαίνεται τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον:
- ὡς γὰρ ἑκάστοτ᾽ ἔχει κρᾶσιν μελέων πολυκάμπτων,
- τὼς νόος ἀνθρώποισι παρίσταται: τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ
- ἔστιν ὅπερ φρονέει, μελέων φύσις ἀνθρώποισιν
-  καὶ πᾶσιν καὶ παντί: τὸ γὰρ πλέον ἐστὶ νόημα.
Ἀναξαγόρου δὲ καὶ ἀπόφθεγμα μνημονεύεται πρὸς τῶν ἑταίρων τινάς, ὅτι τοιαῦτ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἔσται τὰ ὄντα οἷα ἂν ὑπολάβωσιν. φασὶ δὲ καὶ τὸν Ὅμηρον ταύτην ἔχοντα φαίνεσθαι τὴν δόξαν, ὅτι ἐποίησε τὸν Ἕκτορα, ὡς ἐξέστη ὑπὸ  τῆς πληγῆς, κεῖσθαι ἀλλοφρονέοντα, ὡς φρονοῦντας μὲν καὶ τοὺς παραφρονοῦντας ἀλλ᾽ οὐ ταὐτά.
359. For it is for these reasons that both Empedocles and Democritus and, we may probably say, every one of the other philosophers became involved in such opinions. For Empedocles also says that when men change their condition they change their knowledge, “for understanding varies in men in relation to what is seen,” according to him. And elsewhere he says, “Insofar as they are changed into a different nature, to that extent it is proper for them always to think other thoughts.” And Parmenides also speaks in the same way: “For just as each has his mixture of many-jointed limbs, so intellect is present in men; for it is the same thing, the nature of the limbs, which exercises discretion in men—in all and in each; for that which is more is intellect.” Anaxagoras is also recorded as saying to some of his companions that things were such to them as they thought them to be. And men also say that Homer maintained this view, because he made Hector, after he was stunned by the blow, think other thoughts; implying that people of sound and unsound mind both think but not the same thoughts. It is evident, then, that if both of these states of mind are forms of knowledge, beings must also be so and not so at the same time. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι, εἰ ἀμφότεραι φρονήσεις, καὶ τὰ ὄντα ἅμα οὕτω τε καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει. ᾗ καὶ χαλεπώτατον τὸ συμβαῖνόν ἐστιν: εἰ γὰρ οἱ μάλιστα τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἀληθὲς ἑωρακότες—οὗτοι  δ᾽ εἰσὶν οἱ μάλιστα ζητοῦντες αὐτὸ καὶ φιλοῦντες—οὗτοι τοιαύτας ἔχουσι τὰς δόξας καὶ ταῦτα ἀποφαίνονται περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας, πῶς οὐκ ἄξιον ἀθυμῆσαι τοὺς φιλοσοφεῖν ἐγχειροῦντας; τὸ γὰρ τὰ πετόμενα διώκειν τὸ ζητεῖν ἂν εἴη τὴν ἀλήθειαν. 360. Hence their conclusion happens to be the most serious one. For if those who have seen most clearly the truth which it is possible for us to have (and these are those who seek and love it most), maintain such opinions and express such views about the truth, how is it unfitting that those who are trying to philosophize should abandon the attempt? For to seek the truth will be like chasing birds. [1010α]  —αἴτιον δὲ τῆς δόξης τούτοις ὅτι περὶ τῶν ὄντων μὲν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐσκόπουν, τὰ δ᾽ ὄντα ὑπέλαβον εἶναι τὰ αἰσθητὰ μόνον: ἐν δὲ τούτοις πολλὴ ἡ τοῦ ἀορίστου φύσις ἐνυπάρχει καὶ ἡ τοῦ ὄντος οὕτως ὥσπερ εἴπομεν:  διὸ εἰκότως μὲν λέγουσιν, οὐκ ἀληθῆ δὲ λέγουσιν (οὕτω γὰρ ἁρμόττει μᾶλλον εἰπεῖν ἢ ὥσπερ Ἐπίχαρμος εἰς Ξενοφάνην). 361. Now the reason these men held this opinion is that, while they investigated the truth about beings, they thought that sensible things alone exist; and in these much of the nature of the indeterminate, i.e., the kind of being which we have described (355), is present. Hence, while they speak in a plausible way, they do not say what is true; for it is more plausible to speak as they do than as Epicharmus did to Xenophanes. ἔτι δὲ πᾶσαν ὁρῶντες ταύτην κινουμένην τὴν φύσιν, κατὰ δὲ τοῦ μεταβάλλοντος οὐθὲν ἀληθευόμενον, περί γε τὸ πάντῃ πάντως μεταβάλλον οὐκ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἀληθεύειν.  ἐκ γὰρ ταύτης τῆς ὑπολήψεως ἐξήνθησεν ἡ ἀκροτάτη δόξα τῶν εἰρημένων, ἡ τῶν φασκόντων ἡρακλειτίζειν καὶ οἵαν Κρατύλος εἶχεν, ὃς τὸ τελευταῖον οὐθὲν ᾤετο δεῖν λέγειν ἀλλὰ τὸν δάκτυλον ἐκίνει μόνον, καὶ Ἡρακλείτῳ ἐπετίμα εἰπόντι ὅτι δὶς τῷ αὐτῷ ποταμῷ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμβῆναι: αὐτὸς  γὰρ ᾤετο οὐδ᾽ ἅπαξ. 362. Again, since they saw that the whole of the natural world is in motion, and that we can say nothing true about what is undergoing change, they came to the conclusion that it is impossible to say anything true about what is always changing altogether. For it was from this view that the most extreme of the opinions mentioned above blossomed forth; that is, the opinion held by those who are said to Heraclitize, and such as Cratylus expressed, who finally thought that he should say nothing but only moved his finger, and criticized Heraclitus for saying that it is impossible to step into the same river twice; for he himself thought that this could not be done even once. COMMENTARY Ostendit causam praedictae positionis. Et primo ex parte sensus. Secundo ex parte sensibilium, ibi, huius autem opinionis causa et cetera. 672. He gives the reason why these philosophers adopted the foregoing position. First (358:C 672), he shows how sensory perception provided one reason for adopting this position; and second (361:C 681), how sensible objects provided another (“Now the reason”). Circa primum tria facit. Primo ponit causam praedictae positionis ex parte sensus. Secundo recitat diversorum opiniones, quae in hanc causam concordaverunt, ibi, ex his Empedocles et cetera. Tertio invehit contra eos, ibi, quare gravissimum. In regard to the first part he does three things. First, he explains how sensory perception provided one reason for adopting this position. Second (359:C 674), he recounts the opinions of different men which have this reason as their common basis (“For it is”). Third (36o:C 680), he attacks these opinions (“Hence their conclusion”). Dicit ergo primo, quod antiqui hoc opinabantur, quod prudentia sive sapientia vel scientia non esset nisi sensus. Non enim ponebant differentiam inter sensum et intellectum. Cognitio autem sensus fit per quamdam alterationem sensus ad sensibilia: et ita quod sensus aliquid sentiat, provenit ex impressione rei sensibilis in sensum. Et sic semper cognitio sensus respondet naturae rei sensibilis, ut videtur. Oportet igitur, secundum eos, quod illud, quod videtur secundum sensum, sit de necessitate verum. Cum autem coniunxerimus quod omnis cognitio est sensitiva, sequitur quod omne quod alicui apparet quocumque modo, sit verum. He accordingly says, first (158), that the ancients were of the opinion that discretion, i.e., wisdom or science, is merely sensory perception; for they did not make any distinction between sense and intellect. Now sensory perception comes about through a certain alteration of a sense with reference to sensible objects. And so the fact that a sense perceives something results from the impression which a sensible thing makes on the sense. Thus a sensory perception always corresponds to the nature of the sensible object as it appears. Hence, according to these thinkers, whatever appears to the senses is necessarily true; and since we must add that all knowing is sensory, it follows that whatever appears in any way at all to anyone is true., Haec autem ratio non solum deficit in hoc, quod ponit sensum et intellectum idem, sed et in hoc quod ponit iudicium sensus nunquam falli de sensibilibus. Fallitur enim de sensibilibus communibus et per accidens, licet non de sensibilibus propriis, nisi forte ex indispositione organi. Nec oportet, quamvis sensus alteretur a sensibilibus, quod iudicium sensus sit verum ex conditionibus rei sensibilis. Non enim oportet quod actio agentis recipiatur in patiente secundum modum agentis, sed secundum modum patientis et recipientis. Et inde est quod sensus non est quandoque dispositus ad recipiendum formam sensibilis secundum quod est in ipso sensibili; quare aliter aliquando iudicat quam rei veritas se habeat. 673. But this argument fails, not only because it holds that sense and intellect are the same, but also because it maintains that the judgment which a sense makes about sensible objects is never false. For while a sense may make a mistake about common and accidental sensible objects, it does not do this with regard to its proper sensible object, except perhaps when the sensory organ is indisposed. And even though a sense is altered by its sensible object, the judgment of a sense does not have to conform to the conditions of the sensible object; for it is not necessary that the action of an agent be received in the patient according to the mode of being of the agent but only according to that of the patient or subject. This is why a sense sometimes is not disposed to receive the form of a sensible object according to the mode of being which the form has in the sensible object, and it therefore sometimes judges a thing to be otherwise than it really is. 674. For it is (359). Deinde cum dicit ex his enim recitat diversorum opiniones assentientium causis praedictis. Omnia autem dicta eorum, quae inducit, tendunt ad duo. Quorum primum est, quod intellectus sit idem cum sensu. Aliud est, quod omne quod videtur sit verum. Dicit ergo, quod ex praedictis rationibus Empedocles et Democritus et singuli aliorum sunt facti rei talibus opinionibus, ut est dicere verisimile, idest sicut verisimiliter coniecturare possumus ex eorum dictis. He presents the opinions which different men held for the reasons stated above. Now all of the statements of these men which he adduces imply two things: first, that intellect is the same as sense, and, second, that every appearance is true. Thus he says that it is for the reasons mentioned above that Empedocles and Democritus and each of the other philosophers became involved in such opinions about reality “we may probably say,” i.e., we can conjecture on the basis of their statements. Dicit enim Empedocles quod illi, qui permutant habitum, idest dispositionem corporis, permutant etiam prudentiam; quasi intellectus cuius est prudentia, sequatur habitudinem corporis, sicut et sensus. Nam prudentia crescit in hominibus ad apparens, idest per hoc quod aliquid de novo incipit apparere homini, profectus scientiae fit in homine: sed hoc fit per hoc quod dispositio corporis variatur. Alia translatio habet melius: ad praesens enim voluntas vel consilium augetur hominibus, quasi dicat: secundum dispositiones diversas praesentes, nova consilia, sive novae voluntates, sive novae prudentiae hominibus augentur; quasi consilium sive voluntas non sequatur aliquam vim intellectivam in homine, quae sit praeter sensum, sed solam dispositionem corporis quae variatur secundum praesentiam diversarum rerum. In aliis autem libris suis dicit Empedocles quod quantum ad alterationem transformat, idest secundum quantitatem qua homo transformatur in alteram dispositionem corporis, tanta eis est semper cura inquit, id est quod tot curae sive sollicitudines seu prudentiae hominibus adveniunt. Quod quidem est difficile. Alia translatio melius sic habet. Quia quantumcumque mutati fiant, intantum secundum ipsas semper sapere alia statutum est sive stultum. Vel ipsis affuit secundum aliam literam: quasi dicat, quod quantumcumque homo mutatur in dispositione corporis, intantum semper alia sapientia, quasi alium intellectum et aliam sapientiam habens. 675. For Empedocles said that those who change “their condition,” i.e., some bodily disposition, also change their understanding; implying that the intellect, to which knowledge belongs, depends on a condition of the body, just as a sense does. For understanding increases in men “in relation to what is seen”; that is, an increase in knowledge takes place in a man by reason of the fact that something new begins to appear to him, and this comes about as a result of some change in a bodily disposition. Another translation states this more clearly, saying, “For purpose or decision develops in man in relation to what is at hand”; as if to say, according to the different dispositions which are actually present in men, new decisions or new purposes or new judgments develop in them. And the implication is that decision or purpose does not, depend on any intellective power in man over and above the senses but only on a disposition of the body, which is changed with the presence of different things. But in other works ‘ of his Empedocles says that, to the extent that alteration occurs, that is, to the extent that men are changed to another bodily disposition, to that extent, he says, there is always thoughtfulness in them; that is, thought, concern, or planning arises in them proportionately. This translation is a difficult one to understand, but another states this notion more clearly, saying, “to the extent that men have been changed, to that extent they are always determined to think other thoughts or even foolish ones.” Or according to another text, “It is proper for them [always to think other thoughts],” as if to say that, insofar as a man is changed in some bodily disposition, to that extent his basic outlook is different-implying that he has a different understanding and a different outlook. Deinde ponit opinionem Parmenidis ad idem; dicens, quod Parmenides de rerum veritate enuntiat eodem modo sicut Empedocles. Dicit enim quod sicut unusquisque habet dispositionem membrorum valde circumflexorum, vel multae flexionis, secundum aliam literam, ita intellectus hominibus: quasi dicat, quod in membris hominis est multa varietas et circumvolutio ad hoc quod talis membrorum dispositio adaptetur ad operationem intellectus, qui sequitur membrorum complexionem, secundum eum. Ipse enim dicit quod idem est quod curavit, idest quod curam habet sive prudentiam de membris ex natura membrorum: et quod est in omnibus, idest in singulis partibus universi, et quod est in omni, idest in toto universo. Sed tamen aliter nominatur in toto universo, et in singulis partibus universi et etiam in homine. Et hoc in toto universo, dicitur Deus. In singulis autem partibus universi, dicitur natura. In homine autem, dicitur intellectus. Et sic hoc habet plus in homine quam in aliis partibus universi, quia in homine illa virtus intelligit propter complexionem determinatam membrorum, non autem in aliis rebus. In quo etiam datur intelligi quod intellectus sequitur complexionem corporis, et per consequens non differt a sensu. Alia translatio planius habet sic. Idem enim quod quidam sapit membrorum, non est in hominibus et omnibus et omnium. Plus enim est intellectus. 676. Then he gives Parmenides’ opinion in this matter. He says that Parmenides speaks about the truth of things in the same way that Empedocles does, for Parmenides says ‘ that, just as each man has an arrangement of jointed members, or “of many-jointed limbs,” according to another text, so intellect is present in men; implying that there is a great deal of variety and circumvolution in the members of man in order that such an arrangement of members may be adjusted for the operation of the intellect, which depends on the way in which the members are combined, according to him. For he says that it is the same thing “which cares for,” i.e., which has the care or supervision of the members because of the nature of the members, and which is “in each,” i.e., in the individual parts of the universe, and “in all,” i.e., in the whole universe. Yet insofar as it is present in the whole universe and in its individual parts and in men, it is designated by different names. In the whole universe it is called God, in the individual parts it is called nature, and in men it is called thought. Thus it is present to a greater degree in man than it is in the other parts of the universe; for in man this power thinks as a result of the determinate way in which his members are combined, but this does not apply in the case of other things. In this statement he also wants it understood that thought is a result of the way in which the body is composed, and thus does not differ from sensory perception. Another translation states this more clearly, saying, “For it is the same thing, the nature of the limbs, which exercises discretion in men-in all and in each; for that which is more is intellect.” Deinde ponit opinionem Anaxagorae qui pronuntiavit ad quosdam suos socios vel amicos reducendo eis ad memoriam, quia talia sunt eis entia, qualia suscipiunt sive opinantur. Et hoc est secundum quod in illis dictis philosophorum tangitur, scilicet quod veritas sequatur opinionem. 677. Then he gives the opinion of Anaxagoras, who expressed it to some of his companions and friends and had them commit it to memory, namely, that things are such to them as they take or believe them to be. This is the second point which is touched on in these statements of the philosophers, namely, that truth depends on opinion. Deinde ponit opinionem Homeri, de quo dicunt, quod videbatur eamdem opinionem habere. Fecit enim in sua recitatione Hectorem iacere quasi in extasi a plaga sibi illata aliud cunctantem, idest aliud cogitantem quam prius, vel aliena sapientem, secundum aliam translationem, scilicet ab his quae prius sapuerat, quasi cunctantem quidem et non cunctantem, idest in illo strato, in quo iacebat percussus, esset sapiens et non sapiens: sed non quantum ad eadem; quia quantum ad illa, quae tunc sibi videbantur sapiens erat; quantum autem ad illa quae prius sapuerat et iam sapere desierat, non erat sapiens. Alia translatio sic habet: sapientes quidem et desipientes: quasi dicat, fuit de Hectore qui sapiebat aliena post plagam, ita contingit et de aliis quod sunt simul sapientes et desipientes, non secundum eadem sed secundum diversa. 678. Then he gives the view of Homer, who seemed to be of the same opinion according to what people said of him. For in his story he made Hector lie, as it were, in a trance from the blow which he had been dealt, “lingering in another place,” i.e., to think other thoughts than he had thought before, or, according to another text, to be of a different opinion from the one which he had before; as if in lingering and not lingering, i.e., in the state in which he lay after being struck down, he would both think and not think, although not about the same thing. For he knew those things which then appeared to him, but not those which he had known before, and had then ceased to know. Another translation expresses the idea thus: “Implying that people of sound and unsound mind both think but not the same thoughts”; as if to say that, just as this is true of Hector, who had strange opinions after the blow, so too it is possible for others to have sound and foolish opinions at the same, although not about the same things but about different ones. Ex omnibus autem praedictis philosophorum opinionibus concludit conclusionem intentam, scilicet quod si utraeque sint prudentiae, scilicet secundum quas homo existimat contraria mutatus de una dispositione in aliam; quod omne id quod existimatur sit verum. Non enim esset prudentia existimare falsum. Unde sequitur quod entia similiter se habeant sic et non sic. 679. Now from all of the foregoing views of the philosophers he draws his intended conclusion that, if both of these states of mind constitute knowledge, i.e., those states in which a man thinks contrary things when he is changed from one state to another, it follows that whatever anyone thinks is true; for knowing would not consist in thinking what is false. Hence it follows that beings are equally so and not so. 680. Hence, their conclusion (360). Deinde cum dicit quare et invehit contra praedictos philosophos, dicens, quod gravissimum accidens est quod eis accidit. Nam si illi, qui maxime viderunt verum inquantum contingit ab homine posse videri, scilicet praedicti philosophi, qui etiam sunt maxime quaerentes et amantes verum, tales opiniones et tales sententias proferunt de veritate, quomodo non est dignum praedictos philosophos dolere de hoc, quod eorum studium frustratur, si veritas inveniri non potest? Alia litera habet quomodo non est dignum relinquere vel respuere philosophari conantes? Idest quod homo non adhaereat his, qui volunt philosophari, sed eos contemnat. Nam si nullum verum potest ab homine de veritate sciri, quaerere veritatem est quaerere illud, quod non potest homo habere, sicut ille qui prosequitur vel fugat volatilia. Quanto enim magis prosequitur, tanto magis ab eo elongantur. Here he attacks the above-mentioned philosophers. He says that the conclusion which they drew is the most serious one. For if those who have seen the truth most clearly, insofar as it is possible for man to see it (namely, the foregoing philosophers, who are also the ones that love and seek it most of all) offer such opinions and views about the truth, how is it unfitting that these philosophers should grieve about the ineffectualness of their study if truth cannot be found? Another text reads, “How is it unfitting that those who are trying to philosophize should give up or abandon the attempt?” i.e., that a man should not cling to those who want to philosophize but despise them. For, if a man can know nothing about the truth, to seek the truth is to seek something which he cannot attain. In fact he resembles someone who chases or hunts birds; for the more he pursues them the farther they get away from him. 681. Now the reason (361). Deinde cum dicit huius autem assignat causam praemissae opinionis ex parte sensibilium; scilicet quae causa praedictae opinionis etiam ex parte sensibilium ponebatur. Nam, cum sensibile sit prius sensu naturaliter, oportet quod dispositio sensuum sequatur sensibilium dispositionem. Assignat autem ex parte sensibilium duplicem causam; quarum secunda ponitur, ibi, amplius autem omnium et cetera. He indicates how sensible things influenced this opinion, i.e., how they provided a basis for the above-mentioned position. For, since sensible things are naturally prior to the senses, the dispositions of the senses must depend on those of sensible things. He gives two ways in which sensible things provided a basis for this position. The second (362) is treated at the words, “Again, since they.” Dicit ergo primo, quod causa opinionis praedictorum philosophorum fuit, quia cum ipsi intenderent cognoscere veritatem de entibus, et videretur eis quod sola sensibilia entia essent, totius veritatis doctrinam diiudicaverunt ex natura sensibilium rerum. In rebus autem sensibilibus multum est de natura infiniti sive indeterminati, quia in eis est materia, quae quantum est de se non determinatur ad unum, sed est in potentia ad multas formas: et est in eis natura entis similiter ut diximus, videlicet quod esse rerum sensibilium non est determinatum, sed ad diversa se habens. Unde non est mirum si non determinatam cognitionem ingerit sensibus, sed huic sic, et alteri aliter. He accordingly says, first, that the reason why the foregoing philosophers adopted this position is this: since they aimed to know the truth about beings, and it seemed to them that sensible things alone exist, they therefore based their doctrine about truth in general on the nature of sensible things. Now in sensible things much of the nature of the infinite or indeterminate is present, because they contain matter, which is not in itself limited to one form but is in potency to many; and in these the nature of being is also found just as we have pointed out: the being of sensible things is not determinate but is open to various determinations. It is not to be wondered at, then, if he does not assign a definite knowledge to the senses, but one kind of knowledge to one sense, and another kind to another sense. Et propter hoc praedicti philosophi decenter sive verisimiliter loquuntur ratione praedicta. Non tamen verum dicunt in hoc quod ponunt nihil determinatum esse in rebus sensibilibus. Nam licet materia quantum est de se indeterminate se habeat ad multas formas, tamen per formam determinatur ad unum modum essendi. Unde cum res cognoscantur per suam formam magis quam per materiam, non est dicendum quod non possit haberi de rebus aliqua determinata cognitio. Et tamen quia verisimilitudinem aliquam habet eorum opinio, magis congruit dicere sicut ipsi dicebant, quam sicut dicit Epicharmus ad Xenophanem, qui forte dicebat omnia immobilia et necessaria esse, et per certitudinem sciri. 682. And for this reason the abovementioned philosophers use the foregoing argument plausibly or fittingly, though they are not right in claiming that there is nothing definite in sensible things; for even though matter in itself is indeterminately disposed for many forms, nevertheless by a form it is, determined to one mode of being. Hence, since things are known by their form rather than by their matter, it is wrong to say that we can have no definite knowledge of them. Yet, since the opinion of these philosophers has some plausibility, it is more fitting to speak as they do than as Epicharmus did to Xenophanes, who seems to have said that all things are immovable, necessary and known with certainty. 683. Again, since they (362). Deinde cum dicit amplius autem ponit secundam causam ex parte sensibilium sumptam; dicens quod philosophi viderunt omnem hanc naturam, scilicet sensibilem, in motu esse. Viderunt etiam de permutante, idest de eo quod movetur, quod nihil verum dicitur inquantum mutatur. Quod enim mutatur de albedine in nigredinem, non est album nec nigrum inquantum mutatur. Et ideo si natura rerum sensibilium semper permutatur, et omnino, idest quantum ad omnia, ita quod nihil in ea est fixum, non est aliquid determinate verum dicere de ipsa. Et ita sequitur quod veritas opinionis vel propositionis non sequatur modum determinatum essendi in rebus, sed potius id quod apparet cognoscendi; ut hoc sit esse verum unumquodque quod est alicui apparere. He gives the second way in which sensible things provided a basis for this opinion. He says that the philosophers saw that the whole of the natural world, i.e., the sensible world, is in motion, and they also saw that no attribute can be predicated of anything that is being changed insofar as it is being changed; for whatever is being changed insofar as it is being changed is neither white nor black. Hence, if the nature of sensible things is being changed always and “altogether,” i.e., in all respects, so that there is nothing fixed in reality, it is impossible to make any statement about them that is definitely true. Thus it follows that the truth of an opinion or proposition does not depend on some determinate mode of being in reality but rather on what appears to the knower; so that it is what appears to each individual that is true for him. Et quod ista fuerit eorum ratio, ex hoc patet. Nam ex hac susceptione sive opinione pullulavit opinio dictorum philosophorum summa vel extrema, idest quae invenit quid summum vel extremum huius sententiae, quae dicebat heraclizare, idest sequi opinionem Heracliti, vel sequentium Heraclitum secundum aliam literam, idest qui dicebant se opinionem Heracliti sequi qui posuit omnia moveri, et per hoc nihil esse verum determinate. Et hanc opinionem habuit Cratylus, qui ad ultimum ad hanc dementiam devenit, quod opinatus est quod non oportebat aliquid verbo dicere, sed ad exprimendum quod volebat, movebat solum digitum. Et hoc ideo, quia credebat quod veritas rei quam volebat enuntiare, primo transibat, quam oratio finiretur. Breviori autem spatio digitum movebat. Iste autem Cratylus reprehendit vel increpavit Heraclitum. Heraclitus enim dixit quod non potest homo bis intrare in eodem flumine, quia antequam intret secundo, aqua quae erat fluminis iam defluxerat. Ipse autem existimavit, quod nec semel potest homo intrare in eumdem fluvium, quia ante etiam quam semel intret, aqua fluminis defluit et supervenit alia. Et ita non solum etiam non potest homo bis loqui de re aliqua antequam dispositio mutetur, sed etiam nec semel. 684. That such was their argument becomes clear as follows. For from this assumption or opinion there sprouted “the most serious or extreme” opinion of the philosophers of whom we have spoken, i.e., the opinion which is found to be the most serious or extreme in this class. And this is the one which he called “Heraclitizing,” i.e., following the opinion of Heraclitus, or the opinion of those who were disciples of Heraclitus, according to another text, or of those who professed to follow the opinion of Heraclitus, who claimed that all things are in motion and consequently that nothing is definitely true. This opinion also was maintained by Cratylus, who finally arrived at such a pitch of madness that he thought that he should not express anything in words, but in order to express what he wanted he would only move his finger. He did this because he believed that the truth of the thing which he wanted to express would pass away before he had finished speaking. But he could move his finger in a shorter space of time. This same Cratylus also reprimanded or rebuked Heraclitus. For Heraclitus said that a man cannot step into the same river twice, because before he steps in a second time the water of the river already has flowed by. But Cratylus thought that a man cannot step into the same river even once, because even before he steps in once the water then in the river flows by and other water replaces it. Thus a man is incapable not only of speaking twice about anything before his disposition is changed but even of speaking once.
LESSON 13 Change in Sensible Things Not Opposed to Their Truth
ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 5: 1010a 15-1010b 1 ἡμεῖς δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἐροῦμεν ὅτι τὸ μὲν μεταβάλλον ὅτε μεταβάλλει ἔχει τινὰ αὐτοῖς λόγον μὴ οἴεσθαι εἶναι, 363. But in reply to this theory we shall also say that there is some reason why these men should think that what is changing, when it is changing, does not exist. καίτοι ἔστι γε ἀμφισβητήσιμον: τό τε γὰρ ἀποβάλλον ἔχει τι τοῦ ἀποβαλλομένου, καὶ τοῦ γιγνομένου ἤδη ἀνάγκη τι εἶναι, ὅλως  τε εἰ φθείρεται, ὑπάρξει τι ὄν, καὶ εἰ γίγνεται, ἐξ οὗ γίγνεται καὶ ὑφ᾽ οὗ γεννᾶται ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο μὴ ἰέναι εἰς ἄπειρον. 364. Yet there is a problem here; for what is casting off some quality retains something of what is being cast off, and something of what is coming to be must already exist. And in general if a thing is ceasing to be, there must be something which is; and if a thing is coming to be, there must be something from which it comes to be and something by which it comes to be; and this process cannot proceed to infinity. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα παρέντες ἐκεῖνα λέγωμεν, ὅτι οὐ ταὐτό ἐστι τὸ μεταβάλλειν κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν καὶ κατὰ τὸ ποιόν: κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὸ ποσὸν ἔστω μὴ μένον,  ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ἅπαντα γιγνώσκομεν. 365. But setting aside these considerations, let us say that change in quantity and change in quality are not the same. Let it be granted, then, that a thing does not remain the same in quantity; but it is by reason of its form that we know each thing. ἔτι δ᾽ ἄξιον ἐπιτιμῆσαι τοῖς οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ὅτι καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐπὶ τῶν ἐλαττόνων τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἰδόντες οὕτως ἔχοντα περὶ ὅλου τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ὁμοίως ἀπεφήναντο: ὁ γὰρ περὶ ἡμᾶς τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ τόπος ἐν φθορᾷ καὶ γενέσει διατελεῖ  μόνος ὤν, ἀλλ᾽ οὗτος οὐθὲν ὡς εἰπεῖν μόριον τοῦ παντός ἐστιν, ὥστε δικαιότερον ἂν δι᾽ ἐκεῖνα τούτων ἀπεψηφίσαντο ἢ διὰ ταῦτα ἐκείνων κατεψηφίσαντο. 366. Again, those who hold this view deserve to be criticized, because what they saw in the case of a very small number of sensible things they asserted to be true also of the whole universe. For it is only that region of the sensible world about us which is always in process of generation and corruption. But this is, so to speak, not even a part of the whole, so that it would have been juster for them to have esteemed the changing because of the whole than to misjudge as they did the whole because of its changing part. ἔτι δὲ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ πρὸς τούτους ταὐτὰ τοῖς πάλαι λεχθεῖσιν ἐροῦμεν: ὅτι  γὰρ ἔστιν ἀκίνητός τις φύσις δεικτέον αὐτοῖς καὶ πειστέον  αὐτούς. 367. Further, it is evident that in answering these men we shall say the same things as we said before (356); for we must show them and make them understand that there is a kind of nature which is immobile. καίτοι γε συμβαίνει τοῖς ἅμα φάσκουσιν εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἠρεμεῖν μᾶλλον φάναι πάντα ἢ κινεῖσθαι: οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν εἰς ὅ τι μεταβαλεῖ: ἅπαντα γὰρ ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν. 368. And those who say that the same thing both is and is not at the same time can also say that all things are at rest rather than in motion. For according to this view there is nothing into which anything may be changed, since everything is already present in everything. COMMENTARY Disputat contra praedicta. Et primo quantum ad hoc quod ponebant de mutabilitate rerum sensibilium. Secundo quantum ad hoc quod dicebatur de apparentia sensuum, ibi, de veritate vero quod non est. 685. He argues against the foregoing opinions. First (363:C 685), he argues against the views that were held about the changeable character of sensible things; and second (369:C 692), against the statements that were made regarding sensory appearances (“Now concerning the truth”). Circa primum, ponit sex rationes; quarum prima talis est. Qui existimat non esse de eo quod non est, veram opinionem habet, et veram orationem profert si hoc enuntiat: sed quod mutatur, dum mutatur non est, nec illud ad quod mutatur, nec illud ex quo mutatur: ergo aliquid vere potest dici de eo quod mutatur. Sic ergo possumus dicere contra praedictam rationem vel orationem, idest opinionem dicentem quod de eo quod mutatur nihil potest verum dici, quia permutans, idest quod mutatur, quando permutat, idest quando permutatur, habet quamdam orationem vel rationem veram in eis, idest secundum praedictorum opinionem non existimari, idest quod non existimetur aliquid ei inesse. In regard to the first part (363) he gives six arguments. The first of these is as follows: he who thinks that what is not does not exist, has a true opinion and makes a true statement if he expresses this. But what is being changed, while it is being changed, is neither that to which it is being changed nor that from which it is being changed; and thus some true statement can be made about a thing that is undergoing change. Hence, in opposing the foregoing theory or “account” (i.e., the opinion that no true statement can be made about anything which is changing), we can say that there is some ground or valid reason “in their case,” i.e., according to the opinion of the foregoing philosophers, for thinking “that what is changing,” or what is being changed, “when it is changing,” i.e., while it is undergoing change, does not exist; that is, there is some reason for thinking that it has no being. 686. Yet there is (364). Deinde cum dicit est etiam secundam rationem ponit, quae talis est. Omne quod permutatur, habet iam aliquid de termino ad quem permutatur; quia quod mutatur, dum mutatur, partim est in termino ad quem, et partim in termino a quo, ut probatur in sexto physicorum; vel secundum aliam literam abiiciens habet aliquid eius quod abiicitur. Et ex hoc datur intelligi quod in eo quod movetur, sit aliquid de termino a quo: quia quamdiu aliquid movetur, tamdiu terminus a quo abiicitur; non autem abiiceretur nisi aliquid eius inesset subiecto mobili. Et eius quod fit, necesse est iam aliquid esse: quia omne quod fit fiebat, ut probatur sexto physicorum. Patet etiam, quod si aliquid corrumpitur, quod adhuc aliquid sit; quia si omnino non esset, iam esset omnino in corruptum esse, et non in corrumpi. Similiter autem si aliquid generatur, oportet quod sit materia ex qua generatur, et agens a quo generatur. Hoc autem non est possibile procedere in infinitum; quia ut probatur in secundo, nec in causis materialibus, nec in agentibus, in infinitum proceditur. Sic igitur est magna dubitatio contra eos qui dicunt, quod de eo quod movetur nihil potest vere dici: tum quia in eo quod movetur et generatur est aliquid de termino ad quem: tum quia in omni generatione et motu oportet ponere aliquid ingenitum et immobile ex parte materiae et agentis. Then he gives the second argument, and it runs thus: everything which is being changed already has some part of the terminus to which it is being changed, because what is being changed, while it is being changed, is partly in the terminus to which it is being changed, and partly in the terminus from which it is being changed, as is proved in Book VI of the Physics (or, according to another text, “that which is casting off some quality retains something of what is being cast off”). And by this statement we are given to understand that anything which is being moved retains some part of the terminus from which it is being moved, because so long as a thing is being moved it is casting off the terminus from which it is being moved; and it is possible only to cast off some quality which belongs to a mobile subject. And something of what is coming to be must already exist, because everything which is coming to be was coming to be, as is proved in Book VI of the Physics. And it is also evident that, if something is ceasing to be, there must be something which is; for if it did not exist in any way at all, it already would have ceased to be and would not be ceasing to be. Similarly, if something is coming to be, there must be a matter from which it is coming to be and an agent by which it is coming to be. But this cannot go on to infinity, because, as is proved in Book II (153:C 301), there cannot be an infinite regress either in the case of material causes or in that of efficient causes. Hence a major problem faces those who say that no true statement can be made about anything which is being moved or generated, both because each thing which is being moved or generated has some part of the terminus to which it is being moved, and because in every process of generation or motion there must be held to be something unproduced and unchangeable both on the part of the matter and on that of the agent. 687. But setting aside (365). Deinde cum dicit sed haec tertiam rationem ponit. Et haec ratio contradicit eis quantum ad causam, ex qua opinionem sumpserunt, quia omnia sensibilia semper moventur. Moti enim sunt ad hoc dicendum ex his quae augentur. Viderunt enim quod aliquid per unum annum crescit secundum modicam quantitatem; et crediderunt quod motus augmenti esset continuus, ita quod quantitas, secundum quam attenditur augmentum divideretur proportionaliter secundum partes temporis, ita quod in qualibet parte fieret augmentum alicuius quantitatis, cuius proportio esset ad totam quantitatem, sicut proportio partis temporis ad totum tempus. Unde, cum iste motus sit insensibilis, existimaverunt similiter quod ea quae videntur quiescere, moventur, sed motu insensibili. Then he gives the third argument, and this rejects the very ground on which these thinkers base their opinion that all sensible things are always in motion. For they were led to make this statement because of things which increase as a result of growth. For they saw that a thing increases in quantity to a very small degree during one year, and they thought that the motion of growth was continuous, so that quantity, in which increase is observed, might be divided in proportion to the parts of time. Thus an increase in some part of quantity would take place in some part of time, and this part of quantity would be related to a whole quantity as some part of a period of time to the whole of that period. And since this kind of motion is imperceptible, they also thought that things which appear to be at rest are being moved, although by an imperceptible motion. Dicit ergo contra illos, quod praetermissis illis, quae dicta sunt, patet quod non est idem motus secundum quantitatem, et secundum qualitatem vel formam. Et quamvis concedatur eis quod motus secundum quantitatem sit continuus in rebus, et quod omnia hoc motu semper insensibiliter moveantur, tamen secundum qualitatem vel formam non oportet quod propter hoc semper omnia moveantur. Et ita poterit haberi cognitio de rebus determinata; quia res magis cognoscuntur per suam speciem quam per suam quantitatem. 688. In opposing these thinkers, then, he says that, even apart from the considerations which have been made, it is clear that change in quantity and in quality or form are not the same. And although they admit that change in quantity is continuous in reality, and that all things are always being moved imperceptibly by this motion, it is not therefore necessary for this reason that all things should be being moved in quality or form. Hence it will be possible to have a definite knowledge of things, because things are known by their form rather than by their quantity. 689. Again, those who (366). Deinde cum dicit amplius autem quartam rationem ponit, dicens, quod dignum est renuere sive increpare sic existimantes, idest opinantes, scilicet quod omnia sensibilia sunt semper in motu, propter hoc quod paucorum sensibilium numerum inveniunt sic se habentem, cum tamen plura sensibilia immobilia sint, nisi quantum ad motum localem. Constat enim quod sola sensibilia quae sunt hic circa nos in sphaera activorum et passivorum, sunt in generatione et corruptione. Huiusmodi autem locus est quasi nihil respectu universi. Nam tota terra non habet sensibilem quantitatem respectu supremae sphaerae. Ideo se habet ad eam sicut centrum, sicut astrologi probant per hoc quod semper sex signa zodiaci super terram apparent. Quod non esset, si terra aliquam partem caeli sensu notabilem a nobis occultaret. Stultum enim fuit de tota natura sensibili iudicare propter illa pauciora; immo tolerabilius fuisset quod tota natura sensibilis fuisset diiudicata secundum modum caelestium corporum, quae multum excedunt alia in quantitate. Then he gives the fourth argument. He says that “those who think in this way,’,’ i.e., those who entertain the opinion that all sensible things are always being moved because they find a small number of sensible things of which this is true, deserve to be criticized; for there are many sensible things which are capable. of being moved only from the viewpoint of local motion. For it is obvious that it is only the sensible things around us here in the sphere of active and passive things which are in process of generation and corruption. But this sphere or place amounts to nothing, so to speak, in comparison with the whole universe; for the entire earth has no sensible quantity in comparison with the outermost sphere. Hence this place is related to the universe as its central point, as the astronomers prove on the grounds that the six signs of the zodiac always appear above the earth. But this would not be the case if the earth were to hide from us some part of the heavens which are perceived by the senses. For it would be foolish to make a judgment about the whole sensible world in the light of these few things. Indeed, it would have been more acceptable if the whole sensible world had been judged according to the motion of the celestial bodies, which far surpass the others in quantity. 690. Further, it is evident (367). Deinde cum dicit amplius autem quintam rationem ponit, dicens, quod contra haec dicenda sunt ea quae supra sunt dicta in hoc eodem libro; scilicet quod sit quaedam natura immobilis, scilicet natura primi motoris, ut probatum est in octavo physicorum. Et hoc est dicendum contra eos, et ipsi debent hoc credere, sicut alibi probatum est. Et ideo non est verum, quod omnia sint semper in motu, et quod nihil vere de aliquo possit dici. He gives the fifth argument. He says that we must also use the same arguments against these men as were used above in this same book; that is, we must show them that there is a kind of nature which is immobile, namely, that of the primary mover, as is proved in Book VIII of the Physics. And this argument must be used against them, and they ought to accept it, as has been proved elsewhere (356:C 668). It is not true, then, that all things are always in motion, and that it is impossible to make any true statement about anything. 691. And those who say (368). Deinde cum dicit et etiam sextam rationem ponit, dicens, quod illa positio, qua ponunt omnia moveri, repugnat primae eorum positioni, qua ponuntur contradictoria simul verificari de eodem: quia si aliquid simul est et non est, magis sequitur quod omnia quiescant quam quod omnia moveantur. Nihil enim permutatur ad hoc quod iam inest ei; sicut quod iam est album non mutatur ad albedinem. Si autem idem contingit simul esse et non esse, omnia insunt omnibus, ut supra probatum est, quia omnia sunt unum. Et ita non erit in quod possit aliquid permutari. He gives the sixth argument. He says that their position that all things are being moved is opposed to their first position, that contradictories are true of the same subject at the same time, because if something is and is not at the same time, it follows that all things are at rest rather than in motion. For nothing is being changed in terms of any attribute which already belongs to it; for example, what is already white is not being changed as regards whiteness. But if it is possible for the same thing both to be and not be at the same time, all attributes will be present in all things, as has been proved above (345:C 639), because all will be one. Hence there will not be anything to which a thing can be changed.
LESSON 14 Seven Arguments against the View that Truth Consists in Appearances
ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 5: 1010b 1-1011a 2 [1010β]  —περὶ δὲ τῆς ἀληθείας, ὡς οὐ πᾶν τὸ φαινόμενον ἀληθές, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι οὐδ᾽ <�εἰ> ἡ αἴσθησις <�μὴ> ψευδὴς τοῦ γε ἰδίου ἐστίν, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ φαντασία οὐ ταὐτὸν τῇ αἰσθήσει. 369. Now concerning the truth that not everything which appears is true, the following points must be taken into consideration: first, that a sense is not false with regard to its proper object, but imagination is not the same as a sense. εἶτ᾽ ἄξιον θαυμάσαι εἰ τοῦτ᾽ ἀποροῦσι, πότερον τηλικαῦτά ἐστι  τὰ μεγέθη καὶ τὰ χρώματα τοιαῦτα οἷα τοῖς ἄπωθεν φαίνεται ἢ οἷα τοῖς ἐγγύθεν, καὶ πότερον οἷα τοῖς ὑγιαίνουσιν ἢ οἷα τοῖς κάμνουσιν, καὶ βαρύτερα πότερον ἃ τοῖς ἀσθενοῦσιν ἢ ἃ τοῖς ἰσχύουσιν, καὶ ἀληθῆ πότερον ἃ τοῖς καθεύδουσιν ἢ ἃ τοῖς ἐγρηγορόσιν. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ οὐκ οἴονταί  γε, φανερόν: οὐθεὶς γοῦν, ἐὰν ὑπολάβῃ νύκτωρ Ἀθήνῃσιν εἶναι ὢν ἐν Λιβύῃ, πορεύεται εἰς τὸ ᾠδεῖον. 370. Second, that it is surprising if some should raise the question whether continuous quantities are as great and colors really such as they appear to those who are at a distance or as they appear to those who are close at hand, and whether things are such as they appear to those who are healthy or to those who are ailing, and whether heavy things are such as they appear to those who are weak or to those who are strong, and whether those things are true which appear to those who are asleep or to those who are awake. For it is clear that they do not think so. Therefore no one who is in Lybia, having dreamed that he was in Athens, would go to the Odeon. ἔτι δὲ περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος, ὥσπερ καὶ Πλάτων λέγει, οὐ δήπου ὁμοίως κυρία ἡ τοῦ ἰατροῦ δόξα καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἀγνοοῦντος, οἷον περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἔσεσθαι ὑγιοῦς ἢ μὴ μέλλοντος. 371. Again, concerning future things, as Plato says, the opinion of a physician and that of a person who is ignorant of the art of medicine are not of equal value as to whether someone will get well or not. ἔτι δὲ ἐπ᾽ αὐτῶν  τῶν αἰσθήσεων οὐχ ὁμοίως κυρία ἡ τοῦ ἀλλοτρίου καὶ ἰδίου ἢ τοῦ πλησίον καὶ τοῦ αὑτῆς, ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν χρώματος ὄψις, οὐ γεῦσις, περὶ δὲ χυμοῦ γεῦσις, οὐκ ὄψις: 372. Again, in the case of the senses the perception of a foreign object and that of a proper object, or that of a kindred object and that of the object of the sense concerned, are not of equal value. In the case of colors it is sight and not taste which passes judgment; and in the case of flavors it is taste and not sight which does this. ὧν ἑκάστη ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ οὐδέποτε φησιν ἅμα οὕτω καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχειν. ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ ἐν ἑτέρῳ  χρόνῳ περί γε τὸ πάθος ἠμφισβήτησεν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὸ ᾧ συμβέβηκε τὸ πάθος. λέγω δ᾽ οἷον ὁ μὲν αὐτὸς οἶνος δόξειεν ἂν ἢ μεταβαλὼν ἢ τοῦ σώματος μεταβαλόντος ὁτὲ μὲν εἶναι γλυκὺς ὁτὲ δὲ οὐ γλυκύς: ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τό γε γλυκύ, οἷόν ἐστιν ὅταν ᾖ, οὐδεπώποτε μετέβαλεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀεὶ ἀληθεύει  περὶ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἔστιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ ἐσόμενον γλυκὺ τοιοῦτον. 373. And no one of these senses ever affirms at the same time about the same subject that it is simultaneously both so and not so. Nor at another time does it experience any difficulty about a modification, but only about the object of which the modification is an accident. I mean, for example, that the same wine, either as a result of a change in itself or in the body, might seem at one time sweet and at another not, But sweetness, such as it is when it exists, has never changed; but one is always right about it, and sweetness itself is necessarily such as it is. καίτοι τοῦτο ἀναιροῦσιν οὗτοι οἱ λόγοι ἅπαντες, ὥσπερ καὶ οὐσίαν μὴ εἶναι μηθενός, οὕτω μηδ᾽ ἐξ ἀνάγκης μηθέν: τὸ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν, ὥστ᾽ εἴ τι ἔστιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, οὐχ ἕξει οὕτω τε καὶ  οὐχ οὕτως. 374. Yet all these theories destroy this, for just as things will have no substance, neither will they have any necessity; for that is necessary which cannot be in one way and in another. Hence, if anything is necessary, it will not be both so and not so. ὅλως τ᾽ εἴπερ ἔστι τὸ αἰσθητὸν μόνον, οὐθὲν ἂν εἴη μὴ ὄντων τῶν ἐμψύχων: αἴσθησις γὰρ οὐκ ἂν εἴη. τὸ μὲν οὖν μήτε τὰ αἰσθητὰ εἶναι μήτε τὰ αἰσθήματα ἴσως ἀληθές (τοῦ γὰρ αἰσθανομένου πάθος τοῦτό ἐστι), τὸ δὲ τὰ ὑποκείμενα μὴ εἶναι, ἃ ποιεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν, καὶ ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως,  ἀδύνατον. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἥ γ᾽ αἴσθησις αὐτὴ ἑαυτῆς ἐστίν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι τι καὶ ἕτερον παρὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, ὃ ἀνάγκη πρότερον εἶναι τῆς αἰσθήσεως: [1011α]  τὸ γὰρ κινοῦν τοῦ κινουμένου φύσει πρότερόν ἐστι, κἂν εἰ λέγεται πρὸς ἄλληλα ταῦτα, οὐθὲν ἧττον. 375. And in general if only the sensible actually exists, there would be nothing if living things did not exist; for there would be no senses. Therefore the position that neither sensible objects nor sensory perceptions would exist is perhaps true, for these are modifications of the one sensing. But that the underlying subjects which cause perception should not exist apart from perception is impossible; for a perception is not the perception of itself, but there is some other thing besides the perception which must be prior to the perception. For that which causes motion is naturally prior to that which is moved, and this is no less true if they are correlative terms. COMMENTARY Hic incipit procedere contra ipsam rationem de veritate apparentium: et circa hoc duo facit. Primo improbat hanc opinionem. Secundo inducit conclusionem intentam, ibi, igitur quia cunctorum. 692. Here he begins to argue dialectically against the opinion that truth if equivalent to appearances; and in regard to this he does two things. First (369:C 718), he rejects this opinion. Second (381:C 718), he draws his intended conclusion (“Let this suffice”). Circa primum duo facit. Primo disputat contra illos, qui praedictam positionem propter aliquam rationem vel dubitationem posuerunt. Secundo contra protervientes, ibi, sunt autem quidam. In regard to the first he does two things. First, he argues dialectically against those who held this opinion because of some theory or difficulty. Second (376:C 708), he argues against those who held this opinion because of insolence (“Now there are some”). Circa primum ponit septem rationes. Circa primam sic dicit. Ostensum est, quod non omnia sunt mutabilia, sed de veritate quod non omne apparens sit verum, ista consideranda sunt: quorum primum est quod sensus non est proprie causa falsitatis, sed phantasia, quae non est idem sensui: quasi dicat: diversitas iudiciorum, quae dantur de sensibilibus, non provenit ex sensu, sed ex phantasia, ad quam propter aliquod impedimentum naturae proveniunt deceptiones sensuum. Phantasia autem non est eadem sensui, ut probatur tertio de anima, sed est motus factus a sensu secundum actum. Unde quod ipsi attribuerunt sensui istam diversitatem iudiciorum, per quam unus iudicatur falsum sentire de hoc, de quo alius verum sentit, non convenienter faciunt. Alia translatio melius habet, et primum quidem quia nec sensus falsus proprii est. Sed phantasia non idem est sensui: quasi dicat, quod nullus sensus de proprio obiecto decipitur, sicut visus non decipitur de coloribus. Ex quo patet quod iudicium sensus de sensibili proprio est determinatum. Unde oportet determinatam veritatem esse in rebus. In regard to the first part (369) he gives seven arguments. The first of these is as follows: it has been shown (367:C 690) that not all things are changeable, and “concerning the truth that not everything which appears is true,” these points must be considered. First, the proper cause of falsity is not the senses but the imagination, which is not the same as the senses. That is to say, the diversity of judgments made about sensible objects is not attributable to the senses but to the imagination, in which errors are made about sensory perceptions because of some natural obstacle. Now imagination is not the same as perception, as is proved in Book III of The Soul, but is a motion produced as a result of actual sensing. Therefore in attributing to the senses this diversity of judgments by which one person is considered to have a false perception of a particular object about which another has a true perception, they do not proceed as they should. Another translation states this better, saying, “And, first, it must be understood that a sense is not false with regard to its proper object,” implying that no sense makes a mistake about its own proper object; for example, sight is not mistaken about colors. From this it is evident that the judgment which a sense makes about its proper sensible object is a definite one, so that there must be some definite truth in the world. Et si obiiciatur quod aliquando etiam circa sensibilia propria error accidit, respondet quod hoc non est ex sensu, sed ex phantasia, per cuius indispositionem aliquando contingit quod id quod per sensum accipitur, aliter ad ipsam perveniat quam sensu percipiatur, sicut patet in phreneticis in quibus organum phantasiae est laesum. 693. And if someone raises the objection that error sometimes arises even with regard to proper sensibles, his answer is that this is attributable not to the senses but to the imagination; for when the imagination is subject to some sort of abnormality, it sometimes happens that the object apprehended by a sense enters the imagination in a different way than it was apprehended by the sense. This is evident, for example, in the case of madmen, in whom the organ of imagination has been injured. 694. Second, that it is (370). Deinde cum dicit deinde dignum secundam rationem ponit, circa quam sic dicit. Dignum est admirari si aliqui de hoc quaerunt, vel dubitant, secundum aliam literam, utrum magnitudines tales sint quales videntur a remotis, vel quales videntur a propinquis. Quasi enim per se verum est quod sensus propinquas magnitudines iudicat tales esse quales sunt, remotas autem minores quam sint, quia quod a remotiori videtur, videtur minus, ut in perspectiva probatur. Then he gives his second argument, and it runs thus: it is surprising if some “should raise the question,” or “be puzzled,” as another text says, whether continuous quantities are such as they appear to those who are at a distance or to those who are close at hand. For it is just about self-evidently true that a sense judges quantities which are close at hand to be such as they are, and those which are far away to be smaller than they are, because what seems farther away appears small, as is proved in the science of optics. Et simile est si quis dubitat utrum colores sint tales quales videntur a remotis, vel quales videntur a propinquis. Constat enim quod virtus agentis quanto plus in remotis porrigitur in agendo, tanto deficientior eius invenitur effectus. Ignis enim minus calefacit quae distant, quam quae sunt propinqua. Unde et color corporis perfecti sensitivi non ita immutat perfecte in remoto ut in propinquo diaphanum. Et propter hoc verius est iudicium sensus de coloribus sensibilibus in propinquo quam in remoto. 695. The same thing applies if someone raises the question whether colors are such as they appear to those who are close at hand; for it is evident that the farther an agent’s power is extended when it acts, the more imperfect is its effect; for fire heats those things which are far away to a lesser degree than those which are close at hand. And for the same reason the color of a perfect sensible body does not change that part of the transparent medium which is far away from it as completely as it changes that part which is close to it. Hence the judgment of a sense is truer about sensible colors in things close at hand than it is about those in things far away. Et simile est etiam si quis dubitat utrum aliqua talia sint qualia videntur sanis, aut qualia videntur laborantibus, idest infirmis. Sani enim habent organa sensuum bene disposita, et ideo species sensibilium in eis recipiuntur prout sunt, et propter hoc verum est iudicium sanorum de sensibilibus. Organa vero infirmorum sunt indisposita. Unde non convenienter immutantur a sensibilibus. Et propter hoc eorum iudicium de eis non est rectum, ut patet in gustu: cuius organum quia in infirmis corruptis humoribus est infectum, ea quae sunt boni saporis eis insipida videntur. 696. The same thing is also true if someone asks whether things are such as they appear to those who are healthy or “to those who are ailing,” i.e., those who are ill. For healthy people have sensory organs which are well disposed, and therefore the forms of sensible things are received in them just as they are; and for this reason the judgment which healthy people make about sensible objects is a true one. But the organs of sick people are not properly disposed, and therefore they are not changed as they should be by sensible objects. Hence their judgment about such objects is not a true one. This is clear with regard to the sense of taste; for when the organ of taste in sick people has been rendered inoperative as a result of the humors being destroyed, things which have a good taste seem tasteless to them. Et simile iterum est utrum pondera sint ita gravia sicut videntur debilibus, vel sicut videntur robustis. Constat enim quod robusti de ponderibus iudicant secundum quod sunt. Non autem ita est in debilibus in quibus difficultas ad sustinendum pondus, non solum provenit ex magnitudine ponderis, quemadmodum in robustis, sed etiam ex paucitate virtutis. Unde etiam parva pondera eis magna videntur. 697. The same thing also applies regarding the question whether things having weight are as heavy as they seem to those who are weak or to those who are strong; for it is clear that the strong judge about heavy things as they really arc. But this is not the case with the weak, who find it difficult to lift a weight not only because of the heaviness of it (and this sometimes happens even with the strong) but also because of the weakness of their power, so that even less heavy things appear heavy to them. Simile est si aliqui dubitant utrum veritas sic se habeat sicut videtur dormientibus aut sicut videtur vigilantibus. In dormientibus enim ligati sunt sensus, et ita iudicium eorum de sensibilibus non potest esse liberum, sicut est iudicium vigilantium, quorum sensus sunt soluti. Supra autem dictum est quod mirandum est si dubitant, quia ex eorum actibus apparet quod non dubitant, nec existimant omnia praedicta iudicia aequaliter esse vera. Si enim aliquis existens in Lybia in somnis videat se esse Athenis, vel aliquis existens Parisiis videat se esse in Hungaria in somnis, a somno surgens non talia operatur, qualia operaretur si in vigilia hoc percepisset. Iret enim ad Odion, idest ad locum quemdam qui est Athenis, si in vigilia se Athenis esse videret, quod non facit si hoc somniavit. Ergo patet quod putat similiter esse verum, quod videtur dormienti et vigilanti. 698. The same thing again applies if the question is raised whether the truth is such as it appears to those who are asleep or to those who are awake. For the senses of those who are asleep are fettered, and thus their judgment about sensible things cannot be free like the judgment of those who are awake and whose senses are unfettered. For it has been pointed out above that it would be surprising if they should be perplexed, because it appears from their actions that they are not perplexed, and that they do not think that all of the above-mentioned judgments are equally true. For if someone in Lybia seems in his dreams to be in Athens, or if someone in Paris seems in his dreams to be in Hungary, he does not when he awakens act in the same way that he would if he were to perceive this when he is awake. For, if he were awake in Athens, he would go to the Odeon, i.e., a building in Athens; but he would not do this if he had merely dreamed it. It is clear, then, that he does not think that what appears to him when he is asleep and what appears when he is awake are equally true. Similiter potest argui de aliis quaestionibus praedictis. Licet enim oretenus de talibus quaerant, tamen de eis in mente non dubitant. Unde patet rationem, esse nullam, qua ponebant omne quod videtur esse verum. Hoc enim ponebant, quia diversarum opinionum non potest accipi quae verior sit, sicut supra dictum est. 699. We can argue in the same way with regard to the other issues mentioned above; for even though men often raise questions about these issues, they are not in their own mind perplexed about them. Hence it is clear that their reason for holding to be true everything which appears, is invalid; for they held this position because of the impossibility of deciding which of several opinions is the truer, as has been stated above (353:C 663). 700. Again, concerning future (371). Deinde cum dicit amplius autem tertiam rationem ponit; dicens quod de futuris, sicut Plato dicebat, non similiter est propria, idest principalis firma et vera et digna credi opinio medici, et ignorantis medicinam, sicut de hoc futuro quod est infirmatum sanari vel non sanari. Nam medicus, qui scit causam sanitatis, potest aliqua signa sanitatis futurae praescire, quae nescit artis medicinalis ignarus. Unde patet quod stulta est opinio, qua creditur omnes opiniones aequaliter esse veras. Here he gives his third argument. He says that in the case of future events, as Plato points out, the opinion of a physician and that of a person who is ignorant of the art of medicine are not “of equal value,” i.e., equally important, certain, true or acceptable, as to the future possibility of some sick person being cured or not. For, while a physician knows the cause of health, this is unknown to someone who is ignorant of the art of medicine. It is clear, then, that the opinion which some held that all opinions are equally true is a foolish one. 701. Again, in the case (372). Deinde cum dicit amplius autem quartam rationem ponit, quia in sensibilibus non similiter est propria, idest vera et credibilis iudicatio sensus de alieno sensibili, et de proprio. Sicut visus non similiter iudicat de coloribus et gustus. Sed credendum est de coloribus iudicio visus. Et de chymis, idest saporibus, iudicio gustus. Unde si visus iudicet aliquid dulce esse, et gustus percipit idem esse amarum, credendum est magis gustui quam visui. He gives his fourth argument, which runs thus: in the case of sensible objects the judgment which a sense makes about some sensible object foreign to it and that which it makes about its proper sensible object are not of equal “value,” i.e., equally true and acceptable; for example, sight and taste do not make the same sort of judgment about colors and flavors, but in the case of colors the judgment of sight must be accepted, “and in the case of flavors,” or savors, the judgment of taste must be accepted. Hence, if sight judges a thing to be sweet and taste judges it to be bitter, taste must be accepted rather than sight. Et similiter etiam non est aequalis ponderis iudicium sensus de proprio sensibili, et de eo quod est proprio propinquum. Propinqua autem propriis sensibilibus hic dicuntur sensibilia communia, ut magnitudo, numerus, et huiusmodi, circa quae magis decipitur sensus quam circa sensibilia propria, minus tamen quam circa sensibilia alterius sensus, vel circa ea quae sunt sensibilia per accidens. Et ita patet quod stultum est dicere omnia iudicia aequaliter esse vera. 702. And in the same way too the judgment which a sense makes about its proper sensible object and the one which it makes about something akin to its proper object are not of equal value. Now those things which are said here to be akin to proper sensible objects are called common sensibles, for example, size, number and the like, about which a sense is deceived to a greater degree than it is about its proper sensible object, although it is deceived about them to a lesser degree than it is about the sensible objects of another sense or about things which are called accidental sensible objects. Hence it is clearly foolish to say that all judgments are equally true. 703. And no one (373). Deinde cum dicit quorum unusquisque quintam rationem ponit; dicens, quod nullus sensus in eodem tempore simul dicit circa idem ita se habere et non habere. In eodem enim tempore non dicit visus aliquid esse album et non album, nec bicubitum et non bicubitum, nec dulce et non dulce. Sed quamvis in diversis temporibus videatur iudicium sensus opposita de eodem iudicare, nunquam tamen dubitatio accidit ex iudicio circa passionem ipsam sensibilem, sed circa passionis subiectum, verbi gratia, de eodem subiecto, scilicet vino, gustui quandoque videtur quod est dulce, et quandoque quod non est dulce. Quod provenit vel propter mutationem corporis sensibilis, vel instrumenti quod est infectum amaris humoribus; et sic quicquid gustat ei non dulce videtur; vel propter mutationem ipsius vini. Sed nunquam gustus mutat iudicium suum quin ipsam dulcedinem talem iudicet esse qualem perpendit in dulci, quando iudicavit eam esse dulcem; sed de ipsa dulcedine semper verum dicit, et semper eodem modo. Unde si iudicium sensus est verum, sicut ipsi ponunt, sequitur etiam quod natura dulcis ex necessitate sit talis, et sic aliquid erit determinate verum in rebus. Sequitur etiam quod nunquam affirmatio vel negatio sunt simul vera, quia nunquam sensus simul dicit aliquid esse dulce et non dulce, ut dictum est. He now gives his fifth argument. He says that no sense affirms at one instant of time that a thing is simultaneously both so and not so. For sight does not at the same moment affirm that something is white and not white or that it is two cubits and not two cubits or that it is sweet and not sweet. But while a sense’s power of judging may seem at different times to form opposite judgments about the same thing, still from this judgment no difficulty ever arises about the sensible modification itself, but only about the subject of this modification. For example, if we take the same subject, wine, sometimes it appears to the sense to taste sweet and sometimes not. This happens either because of some change in the sentient body, i.e., in the organ, which is infected by bitter humors, so that whatever it tastes does not seem sweet to it, or else because of some change in the wine itself. But the sense of taste never changes its judgment without judging sweetness itself to be such as it considered it to be in the sweet thing when it judged it to be sweet; but about sweetness itself it always makes a true affirmation, and always does this in the same way. Hence, if the judgment of a sense is true, as these men claimed, it also follows that the nature of sweetness is necessarily such as it is; and thus something will be definitely true in reality. And it also follows that both an affirmation and a negation can never be true at the same time, because a sense never affirms that something is both sweet and not sweet at the same time, as has been stated. 704. Yet all these (374). Deinde cum dicit quamvis et sextam rationem ponit, dicens, quod praedictae rationes omnes vel opiniones sicut auferunt omnia substantialia praedicata, ut supra ostensum est, ita auferunt omnia praedicata necessaria. Sequitur enim quod nihil de altero praedicatur substantialiter aut necessario. Et quod non substantialiter, ex supra dictis patet. Quod autem non necessario, sic probatur. Quia necessarium est, quod non contingit aliter se habere. Si ergo omne quod est, est sic vel aliter, secundum eos qui dicunt contradictoria simul esse vera, et oppositas opiniones, sequetur quod nihil sit necessarium in rebus. He gives the sixth argument. He says that, just as all of the above-mentioned theories or opinions destroy substantial predicates, as has been shown above (341:C 625), in a similar way they destroy all necessary predicates. For it follows that nothing could ever be predicated of anything else either substantially or necessarily. That nothing could be predicated of anything else substantially is clear from what has been stated above. That nothing could be predicated of anything else necessarily is proved as follows. That is necessary which cannot be otherwise than it is; therefore, if everything which is can exist in one way or in another way, as is held by those who say that contradictories and opposite opinions are true at the same time, it follows that nothing is necessary in the world. 705. And in general (375). Deinde cum dicit et ex toto septimam rationem ponit, dicens. Si omne apparens est verum, nec aliquid est verum nisi ex hoc ipso quod est apparens sensui, sequetur quod nihil est nisi inquantum sensibile est in actu. Sed si solum sic aliquid est, scilicet inquantum est sensibile, sequetur quod nihil sit si non erunt sensus. Et per consequens si non erunt animata vel animalia. Hoc autem est impossibile. Then he gives the seventh argument. He says that, if everything which appears is true, and a thing is true only insofar as it appears to the senses, it follows that a thing exists only insofar as, it is actually being sensed. But if something exists only in this way, i.e., insofar as it is being sensed, then it follows that nothing would exist if the senses did not exist; and this would follow if there were no animals or living things. But this is impossible. Nam hoc potest esse verum quod sensibilia inquantum sensibilia non sunt, idest si accipiantur prout sunt sensibilia in actu, quod non sunt sine sensibus. Sunt enim sensibilia in actu secundum quod sunt in sensu. Et secundum hoc omne sensibile in actu est quaedam passio sentientis, quae non potest esse si sentientia non sunt. Sed quod ipsa sensibilia quae faciunt hanc passionem in sensu non sint, hoc est impossibile. Quod sic patet. Remoto enim posteriori, non removetur prius: sed res faciens passiones in sensu non est ipsemet sensus, quia sensus non est suimet, sed alterius, quod oportet esse prius sensu naturaliter, sicut movens moto naturaliter est prius. Visus enim non videt se sed colorem. 706. For this can be true, that sensibles under the aspect of their sensibility do not exist; i.e., if they are considered under the aspect of sensibles actualized, they do not exist apart from the senses, for they are sensibles actualized insofar as they are present in a sense. And according to this every actualized sensible is a certain modification of the subject sensing, although this would be impossible if there were no sensory beings. But that the sensible objects which cause this modification in a sense should not exist is impossible. This becomes clear as follows: when some subsequent thing is removed it does not follow that a prior thing is removed. But the thing producing the modification in a sense is not the perception itself, because a perception is not the perception of itself but of something else, and this must be naturally prior to the perception just as a mover is prior to the thing which is moved. For sight does not see itself but sees color. Et si contra hoc dicatur quod sensibile et sensus sunt relativa adinvicem dicta, et ita simul natura, et interempto uno interimitur aliud; nihilominus sequitur propositum; quia sensibile in potentia non dicitur relative ad sensum quasi ad ipsum referatur, sed quia sensus refertur ad ipsum, ut in quinto huius habetur. Patet igitur quod impossibile est dici quod ex hoc sunt aliqua vera, quia sensui apparent. Quod ponunt illi qui ponunt omnia apparentia esse vera, ut ex praedictis patet. 707. And even if someone were to raise the objection that a sensible object and a sense are correlative and thus naturally simultaneous, so that when one is destroyed the other is destroyed, Aristotle’s thesis is still true; for what is potentially sensible is not said to be relative to a sense because it is referred to a sense, but because the sense is referred to it, as is stated in Book V of this work (496:C 1027)- It is dearly impossible, then, to say that some things are true because they appear to the senses; yet this is what those men maintain who claim that all appearances are true, as is evident from the foregoing statements.
LESSON 15 Refutation of the View that Contradictories Can Be Shown to Be True at the Same Time. Contraries Cannot Belong to the Same Subject at the Same Time
ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 6: 1011a 3-1011b 22 εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἳ ἀποροῦσι καὶ τῶν ταῦτα πεπεισμένων καὶ τῶν τοὺς λόγους τούτους μόνον λεγόντων: ζητοῦσι γὰρ  τίς ὁ κρινῶν τὸν ὑγιαίνοντα καὶ ὅλως τὸν περὶ ἕκαστα κρινοῦντα ὀρθῶς. τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα ἀπορήματα ὅμοιά ἐστι τῷ ἀπορεῖν πότερον καθεύδομεν νῦν ἢ ἐγρηγόραμεν, δύνανται δ᾽ αἱ ἀπορίαι αἱ τοιαῦται πᾶσαι τὸ αὐτό: πάντων γὰρ λόγον ἀξιοῦσιν εἶναι οὗτοι: ἀρχὴν γὰρ ζητοῦσι, καὶ ταύτην  δι᾽ ἀποδείξεως λαμβάνειν, ἐπεὶ ὅτι γε πεπεισμένοι οὐκ εἰσί, φανεροί εἰσιν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν. ἀλλ᾽ ὅπερ εἴπομεν, τοῦτο αὐτῶν τὸ πάθος ἐστίν: λόγον γὰρ ζητοῦσιν ὧν οὐκ ἔστι λόγος: ἀποδείξεως γὰρ ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἀπόδειξίς ἐστιν. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ῥᾳδίως ἂν τοῦτο πεισθεῖεν (ἔστι γὰρ οὐ χαλεπὸν λαβεῖν): 376. Now there are some, both of those who have been convinced by theories of this kind and of those who merely state them, who raise a difficulty; for they ask who it is that judges a man to be healthy, and in general who it is that judges rightly in each particular case. But such difficulties are like wondering whether we are now asleep or awake; and all such difficulties amount to the same thing. For these people think it fitting that there should be a reason for everything; for they are seeking a starting point, and they think they can get this by demonstration. Yet that sometimes they are not convinced they make evident in their actions. But according to what we have said this is characteristic of them; for they are seeking a reason for things for which no reason can be given, because the starting point of demonstration is not demonstration. These men, then, might easily believe this truth, for it is not difficult to grasp.  οἱ δ᾽ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τὴν βίαν μόνον ζητοῦντες ἀδύνατον ζητοῦσιν: ἐναντία γὰρ εἰπεῖν ἀξιοῦσιν, εὐθὺς ἐναντία λέγοντες. 377. But those who seek compulsion only in words are seeking the impossible. For they deem it right to speak as they do, and immediately say contrary things. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι πάντα πρός τι, ἀλλ᾽ ἔνιά ἐστι καὶ αὐτὰ καθ᾽ αὑτά, οὐκ ἂν εἴη πᾶν τὸ φαινόμενον ἀληθές: τὸ γὰρ φαινόμενον τινί ἐστι φαινόμενον: ὥστε ὁ λέγων ἅπαντα τὰ  φαινόμενα εἶναι ἀληθῆ ἅπαντα ποιεῖ τὰ ὄντα πρός τι. διὸ καὶ φυλακτέον τοῖς τὴν βίαν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ζητοῦσιν, ἅμα δὲ καὶ ὑπέχειν λόγον ἀξιοῦσιν, ὅτι οὐ τὸ φαινόμενον ἔστιν ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ᾧ φαίνεται καὶ ὅτε φαίνεται καὶ ᾗ καὶ ὥς. ἂν δ᾽ ὑπέχωσι μὲν λόγον, μὴ οὕτω δ᾽  ὑπέχωσι, συμβήσεται αὑτοῖς τἀναντία ταχὺ λέγειν. ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ κατὰ μὲν τὴν ὄψιν μέλι φαίνεσθαι τῇ δὲ γεύσει μή, καὶ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν δυοῖν ὄντοιν μὴ ταὐτὰ ἑκατέρᾳ τῇ ὄψει, ἂν ὦσιν ἀνόμοιαι: ἐπεὶ πρός γε τοὺς διὰ τὰς πάλαι εἰρημένας αἰτίας τὸ φαινόμενον φάσκοντας  ἀληθὲς εἶναι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάνθ᾽ ὁμοίως εἶναι ψευδῆ καὶ ἀληθῆ: οὔτε γὰρ ἅπασι ταὐτὰ φαίνεσθαι οὔτε ταὐτῷ ἀεὶ ταὐτά, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις τἀναντία κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον (ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἁφὴ δύο λέγει ἐν τῇ ἐπαλλάξει τῶν δακτύλων ἡ δ᾽ ὄψις ἕν): ἀλλ᾽ οὔ τι τῇ αὐτῇ γε καὶ  κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ αἰσθήσει καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ, ὥστε τοῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη ἀληθές. [1011β]  ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως διὰ τοῦτ᾽ ἀνάγκη λέγειν τοῖς μὴ δι᾽ ἀπορίαν ἀλλὰ λόγου χάριν λέγουσιν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθὲς τοῦτο ἀλλὰ τούτῳ ἀληθές. 378. Yet if not all things are relative but some things are absolute, not everything which appears will be true; for that which appears appears to someone. Thus he who says that all things which appear are true, makes all things which are, relative. Hence, those who look for compulsion in words, and think it fitting to maintain this view at the same time, must be careful to add that it is not what appears that is true, but what appears for him to whom it appears, and at the time when it appears, and in the manner in which it appears, and so on. And if they maintain their view but not in this way, it will soon happen that they are saying contrary things. For it is possible that the same thing may appear to be honey to the sense of sight but not to the sense of taste, and that, since we have two eyes, things will not appear the same to each if their sight is unequal. Now, as we have stated, there are some who say, for the reasons already given (357), that what appears is true, and that all things are therefore equally true and false, because they do not always appear the same to all men or to the same man (for they do not always happen to be the same) but often have contrary appearances at the same time. For touch says there are two objects when the fingers are crossed, but sight says there is one. And in answering these men we must say that what appears is true, but not for the same man and in the same way and at the same time, so that when these qualifications are added what appears will be true. But perhaps it is for this reason that those who argue thus, not because of some difficulty but for the sake of argument, must say that this is not true but true for this person. καὶ ὥσπερ δὴ πρότερον εἴρηται, ἀνάγκη πρός τι ποιεῖν  ἅπαντα καὶ πρὸς δόξαν καὶ αἴσθησιν, ὥστ᾽ οὔτε γέγονεν οὔτ᾽ ἔσται οὐθὲν μηθενὸς προδοξάσαντος. εἰ δὲ γέγονεν ἢ ἔσται, δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἅπαντα πρὸς δόξαν. 379. And, as has been said before (378), they must make everything relative both to opinion and to perception, so that nothing has come to be or will come to be unless someone has first formed an opinion about it. But if something has come to be or will come to be, it is evident that not all things depend on opinion. ἔτι εἰ ἕν, πρὸς ἓν ἢ πρὸς ὡρισμένον: καὶ εἰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἥμισυ καὶ ἴσον, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πρὸς τὸ διπλάσιόν γε τὸ ἴσον. πρὸς δὴ τὸ δοξάζον  εἰ ταὐτὸ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ δοξαζόμενον, οὐκ ἔσται ἄνθρωπος τὸ δοξάζον ἀλλὰ τὸ δοξαζόμενον. εἰ δ᾽ ἕκαστον ἔσται πρὸς τὸ δοξάζον, πρὸς ἄπειρα ἔσται τῷ εἴδει τὸ δοξάζον. 380. Further, if a thing is one, it is relative to one thing or to a determinate number; and if the same thing is both half and equal, still the equal is not relative to the double or the half to the equal. If, then, in relation to the thinking subject, man and the object of thought are the same, man will not be the thinking subject but the object of thought. And if each thing is relative to the thinking subject, the thinking subject will be relative to things infinite in species. ὅτι μὲν οὖν βεβαιοτάτη δόξα πασῶν τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀληθεῖς ἅμα τὰς ἀντικειμένας φάσεις, καὶ τί συμβαίνει τοῖς οὕτω  λέγουσι, καὶ διὰ τί οὕτω λέγουσι, τοσαῦτα εἰρήσθω: 381. Let this suffice, then, regarding the points under discussion: that the firmest opinion of all is the one which asserts that opposite statements are not true at the same time; the conclusions that follow for those who say that they are true; and why they speak as they do. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἀδύνατον τὴν ἀντίφασιν ἅμα ἀληθεύεσθαι κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδὲ τἀναντία ἅμα ὑπάρχειν ἐνδέχεται τῷ αὐτῷ: τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἐναντίων θάτερον στέρησίς ἐστιν οὐχ ἧττον, οὐσίας δὲ στέρησις: ἡ δὲ στέρησις ἀπόφασίς ἐστιν ἀπό  τινος ὡρισμένου γένους: εἰ οὖν ἀδύνατον ἅμα καταφάναι καὶ ἀποφάναι ἀληθῶς, ἀδύνατον καὶ τἀναντία ὑπάρχειν ἅμα, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ πῇ ἄμφω ἢ θάτερον μὲν πῇ θάτερον δὲ ἁπλῶς. 382. But since it is impossible for contradictories to be true of the same subject at the same time, it is evident that contraries cannot belong to the same subject at the same time; for one of two contraries is a privation. But a privation is nothing less than the negation of substance from some determinate genus. Therefore, if it is impossible to affirm and deny something truly at the same time, it is also impossible for contraries to belong to the same subject at the same time; but either both belong in a certain respect, or the one in a certain respect and the other absolutely. COMMENTARY Disputat contra illos, qui praedictam rationem non ex ratione, sed ex pertinacia susceperunt: et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ponit qualiter isti moventur ad hanc opinionem ponendam. Secundo ostendit qualiter est resistendum, ibi, qui vero vim in solo verbo et cetera. 708. He argues against those who adopted the above-mentioned theory not because of any reason but merely because they are obstinate; and in regard to this he does two things. First (376:C 708), he shows how these men were moved to adopt this opinion; and second (377:C 711), how this opinion must be dealt with (“But those who”). Dicit ergo primo, quod praeter praedictos qui in praedictam opinionem ex quibusdam dubitationibus inciderunt, sunt aliqui qui interrogant persuasos in his, scilicet opinionibus, idest deceptos, ut eos in deceptione detineant, et has solas rationes habent ad suam opinionem confirmandam. Alia translatio habet: sunt autem quidam qui deficiunt sive dubitant huiusmodi persuasorum has rationes solum dicentium. Et est sensus, quia quidam deceptorum, qui praedictam opinionem tenent, has solas dubitationes tenent, et his rationibus utuntur, quae infra dicentur. Si enim dicatur eis quod inter contrarias opiniones credendum est magis sanis quam infirmis, et sapientibus quam ignorantibus, et vigilantibus quam dormientibus, ipsi iterato quaerunt quomodo possit diiudicari sanus per certitudinem ab infirmo, et vigilans a dormiente, et sapiens a stulto: et breviter in omnibus diversitatibus opinionum quomodo potest discerni quis illorum iudicat recte in omnibus, cum quibusdam videatur aliquis esse sapiens qui aliis videtur stultus, et sic de aliis. He accordingly says, first (376), that, besides the foregoing thinkers who adopted the above-mentioned opinion because of certain difficulties, there are some “among those who have been persuaded to accept these views,” or opinions (i.e., those who continue to deceive themselves and have only these arguments to support their view), who raise a question. Another translation reads: “Now there are some, both of those who have been convinced by theories of this kind and of those who merely state them, who are puzzled or raise a question.” And this statement means that some of those who are puzzled, i.e., some of those who hold the above-mentioned opinion, consider only these difficulties and use the arguments which are given below. For if someone says to them that in the case of contrary opinions we should believe those persons who are healthy rather than those who are ill, and those who are wise rather than those who are ignorant, and those who are awake rather than those who are asleep, they will immediately ask how it is possible to distinguish with certainty between a healthy person and a sick one, and one who is awake and one who is asleep, and one who is wise and one who is foolish. In short, regarding all differences of opinion they will ask how it is possible to decide which one of these judges rightly in each particular case; for a man may seem to be wise to some and foolish to others, and the same applies in other cases. Sed istae dubitationes stultae sunt. Similes enim sunt illi dubitationi, qua dubitatur, utrum nunc dormiamus, an vigilemus. Horum enim omnium distinctio per se non est. Omnes autem dubitationes praedictae idem valent, quia ex eadem radice procedunt. Volunt enim isti sophistae quod omnium possent accipi rationes demonstrativae. Patet enim quod ipsi quaerebant accipere aliquod principium, quod esset eis quasi regula ad discernendum inter infirmum et sanum, inter vigilantem et dormientem. Nec erant contenti istam regulam qualitercumque scire, sed eam volebant per demonstrationem accipere. Ergo quod ipsi decepti sunt, manifestum est in eorum actibus secundum quod diximus. Ex quibus apparet quod positio eorum sit falsa. Nam si aequaliter efficax esset iudicium dormientis et vigilantis, eadem sequerentur in actibus hominum ex utroque iudicio; quod patet esse falsum. Alia litera habet: quandoque vero quod non persuasi sunt: et est sententia convenientior praemissis. Ipsi enim licet hoc ponant et oretenus quaerant, non tamen mente in hoc decipiuntur quod credant similiter esse verum iudicium dormientis et vigilantis; quod ex eorum actibus patet, ut dictum est. 709. But these questions are foolish, for they are similar to the question whether we are now asleep or awake; for the distinction between all of these is not essential. Yet all of the foregoing difficulties amount to the same thing since they have a common root. For these sophists desire that demonstrative arguments should be given for all things; for it is obvious that they wanted to take some starting point which would be for them a kind of rule whereby they could distinguish between those who are healthy and those who are ill, and between those who are awake and those who are asleep. And they were not content to know this rule in just any way at all but wanted to acquire it by demonstration. That these men were in error, then, becomes evident from their actions, according to what has been said. And from these considerations it appears that their position is false; for if the judgments of one who is asleep and of one who is awake were equally good, then the same thing would result from each judgment when men act. But this is clearly false. Another text says, “But that sometimes they are not convinced they make evident in their actions”; and this statement is the clearer one in the light of the things laid down above. For although these men maintain this view and raise such questions, still they are not deceived in their own mind so that they believe the judgment of one who is asleep and the judgment of one who is awake to be equally true. And this is clear from their actions, as has been pointed out. Sed quamvis non sint decepti ut in hoc dubitent, haec tamen est passio eorum, idest infirmitas mentis quod quaerunt rationem demonstrativam eorum quorum non est demonstratio. Nam principium demonstrationis non est demonstratio, idest de eo demonstratio esse non potest. Et hoc est eis facile ad credendum, quia non est hoc difficile sumere etiam per demonstrationem. Ratio enim demonstrativa probat quod non omnia demonstrari possunt, quia sic esset abire in infinitum. 710. But even though they are not deceived so as to be perplexed in this matter, this “nevertheless is characteristic of them,” i.e., this weakness of mind that they should seek a demonstrative argument for things for which no demonstration can be given. For “the starting point of demonstration is not demonstration”; i.e., there can be no demonstration of it. And this is easy for them to believe, because this too is not difficult to grasp by demonstration; for a demonstrative argument proves that not all things can be demonstrated, otherwise there would be an infinite regress. 711. But those who (377). Deinde cum dicit qui vero disputat contra istos, vel contra alios, qui nec hac ratione moventur ad ponendum omnia apparentia esse vera, quia non potest per demonstrationem accipi regula, per quam certitudinaliter possit discerni inter iudicantes vere et non vere, sed solum ex quadam protervia rationem praedictam ponunt. He now argues against the other philosophers, i.e., against those who were not moved to maintain that all appearances are true on the grounds that no rule can be established demonstratively whereby it is possible to distinguish with certainty between those who judge rightly and those who do not, but who hold the above-mentioned theory or view only because they are insolent. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit quod tales protervientes tendant ducere ad impossibile. Secundo qualiter resistendum est eis apparenter, ibi, verum si non omnia. Tertio qualiter eis obviandum est secundum veritatem, ibi, et sicut praedictum est et cetera. In regard to this he does three things. First (377:C 711), he shows that such insolence tends to lead to an impossible conclusion. Second (378:C 712), he indicates the way in which it seems necessary to oppose them (“Yet if not all things”). Third (379:C V6), he explains how we must meet their argument from the viewpoint of truth (“And, as has been”). Dicit ergo primo, quod illi qui quaerunt vim in solo verbo, idest qui non moventur ex aliqua ratione, nec propter difficultatem alicuius dubitationis, nec propter defectum demonstrationis, sed solum verbis innituntur, et credunt quod omnia possunt dicere quae improbari non possunt, isti tales quaerunt ducere ad aliquod impossibile. Volunt enim ad hoc ducere, quod contraria sint simul vera, per hoc quod omnia apparentia sunt vera. He accordingly says, first (377), that those who seek “compulsion merely in words,” i.e., those who are not moved by any reason or because of the difficulty involved in some problem or because of some failure in demonstration but depend solely on words and believe that they can say anything which cannot be disproved-such people as these want to argue to an impossible conclusion. For they want to adopt the principle that contraries are true at the same time on the grounds that all appearances are true. 712. Yet if not all (378). Deinde cum dicit verum si docet ex eorum positione eis resistere, et praedictum inconveniens evitare; dicens, quod nisi ponantur omnia quae sunt esse ad aliquod, non potest dici, quod omne apparens sit verum. Si enim sunt quaedam in rebus, quae secundum se habent esse absolutum, non per relationis sensum vel opinionem, non idem erit eis esse quod apparere: hoc enim dicit relationem ad sensum vel opinionem, quia apparens alicui apparet. Et ita oportebit quod non apparens sit verum. Patet igitur quod quicumque dicit omnia apparentia esse vera, facit omnia entia esse ad aliquid, scilicet in respectu ad opinionem vel sensum. Et ideo contra praedictos sophistas, qui quaerunt vim in oratione, si aliquis dignetur eis dare orationem, idest concedere hanc positionem, quam ipsi ponunt, custodiendum sive observandum est eis ne deducantur ad concedendum contradictoria simul esse vera; quia non est dicendum absolute quod omne apparens est verum; sed quod apparet, est verum cui apparet, et quantum apparet, et quando apparet et sicut apparet: hoc enim licitum erat nobis apponere, ex quo res non habent esse absolutum, sed relativum tantum. Then he shows how we may oppose these men by using their own position and avoid the foregoing impossible conclusion. He says that, unless everything which is, is claimed to be relative, it cannot be said that every appearance is true. For if there are some things in the world which have absolute being and are not relative to perception or to opinion, being and appearing will not be the same; for appearing implies a relation to perception or to opinion, because that which appears appears to someone; and thus whatever is not an appearance must be true. It is clear, then, that whoever says that all appearances are true, makes all beings relative, i.e., to perception or to opinion. Hence, in opposing the foregoing sophists who seek compulsion in words, we may say that, if anyone thinks it fitting “to grant this view,” i.e., to concede this opinion which they maintain, he must be careful, or observant, lest he be led to admit that contradictories are true at the same time; for it should not be said unqualifiedly that everything which appears is true, but that what appears is true for the one to whom it appears, and inasmuch as it appears, and when it appears, and in the manner in which it appears. We would be allowed to add these qualifications on the grounds that a thing does not have being in an absolute sense but only relatively. Ideo autem hoc observandum est volentibus hanc positionem concedere, quia si aliquis concedat eis quod omne apparens est verum, et ita non concedat cum praedictis determinationibus, sicut dictum est, sequeretur quod statim dicat contraria simul esse vera. Contingit enim quod idem secundum visum videtur mel propter similem colorem mellis, et secundum gustum non mel propter dissimilem saporem. Et similiter cum duo oculi sint dissimiles, non eadem est visio quae fit per utrumque oculum, vel non eadem videntur utrique visui qui fit per utrumque oculum. Ut si pupilla unius oculi infecta sit aliquo grosso vel nigro vapore, alia vero pura, videbuntur per oculum infectum omnia nigra vel obscura, per alium autem non. Ideo autem dico hoc esse custodiendum vel observandum, quia hoc est necessarium apud praedictos sophistas, qui dicunt ex causis praedictis omne apparens esse verum. 713. Now this should be noted by those who want to adopt this position, because if someone were to grant them that every appearance is true, and thus not admit the above-mentioned qualifications, as has been stated, it would follow immediately that he is saying that contraries are true at the same time. For it is possible that the same thing may appear to be honey to the sense of sight because its color resembles that of honey, and not appear to be honey to the sense of taste because it does not taste like honey. And similarly when two eyes are unlike, the vision which is had through each is not the same, or the visual impressions which we get through each eye do not seem the same. For example, if the pupil of one eye were infected by some gross or dark vapor, and the other were free of this, all things would seem dark or obscure through the infected eye but not through the good one. I say, then, that one must be careful, or observant, because this is necessary in confronting the foregoing sophists, who say, for the reasons given above (376:C 708), that every appearance is true. Et ex hoc sequi potest, quod omnia similiter sunt vera et falsa, propter hoc quod non omnibus eadem apparent, nec etiam eadem ad seipsum, cum multoties idem homo secundum idem tempus iudicet contraria secundum diversos sensus. Sicut visus iudicat esse unum, quod tactus iudicat esse duo propter variationem digitorum, qua contingit quod idem tangibile per diversa instrumenta tangibilia, scilicet tactus per diversos digitos, ad vim tactivam pervenit ac si essent duo tangibilia. Nullatenus autem eidem homini secundum eumdem sensum similiter et in eodem tempore, videtur quod hoc sit verum, scilicet contraria simul esse. 714. And from this position it would also follow that all things are equally true and false, because they do not appear the same to all men or even the same to one man, since the same man very often makes contrary judgments about the same thing at the same time on the basis of different senses; for example, sight judges that thing to be one which touch judges to be two, because when the fingers are crossed it happens that the same tangible object is sensed by different organs of touch; that is, the contact through different fingers affects the tactual power as though there were two tangible objects. But it does not seem to the same man through the same sense and in the same way and at the same time that this is true namely, that contraries are true at the same time. Ideo autem forsan est necessarium sic respondere praedictis sophistis, qui dicunt non propter dubitationem sed orationis causa, quasi ex protervia ipsam orationem propter seipsam concedentibus, quia hoc non est verum simpliciter, sed huic verum. Ex hoc enim non sequitur contradictoria simul esse vera. Esse enim huic verum, et non esse verum illi, non est contradictorium. 715. Therefore, it is perhaps necessary to use this answer against the above-mentioned sophists who argue thus not because of some difficulty but for the sake of argument (as though upholding this statement for its own sake because they are perverse), namely, that this is not true absolutely but true for this person. For it does not follow from this that contradictories are true at the same time, because it is not contradictory that something should be true for one person and not true for another. 716. And, as has been said (379). Deinde cum dicit et sicut docet resistere sophistis praedictis secundum veritatem, et non solum ad hominem; scilicet non concedendo falsam opinionem, quam ipsi ponunt. Et hoc duabus rationibus: quarum prima sic dicit. Sicut dictum est prius, si omne apparens est verum, necesse est facere omnia ad aliquid, scilicet ad opinionem et sensum. Et ex hoc sequitur hoc inconveniens quod nihil sit, nec fiat, nullo opinante. Si autem hoc falsum est, quia multa sunt et fiunt de quibus nulla est opinio vel cognitio, sicut quae sunt in profundo maris vel in visceribus terrae, manifestum est quod non omnia sunt ad aliquid, idest ad opinionem et sensum. Et ita non omne apparens est verum. He tells us that we should oppose the foregoing sophists from the standpoint of the truth and not just offer an argument ad hominem, namely, not by granting the false opinion which they maintain. And he does this by means of two arguments. The first is this: as has been stated before, if everything which appears is true, they must “make all things relative,” i.e., to perception or to opinion. Now from this the untenable position follows that nothing may exist or come to be if it is not thought of in some way. But if this is false (because’ many things are and come to be of which there is neither opinion nor knowledge, for example, things which exist in the depths of the sea or in the bowels of the earth), it is evident that not all things are relative, i.e., to perception or to opinion. Hence not every appearance is true. 717. Further, if a thing (380). Deinde cum dicit amplius si ponit secundam rationem, dicens, quod unum non refertur nisi ad unum; et non ad quodcumque unum, sed ad unum determinatum. Sicut patet quod sint idem subiecto dimidium et aequale; non tamen ad aequale dicitur duplum, sed magis ad dimidium. Aequale vero dicetur ad aequale. Et similiter si ipse homo qui est opinans sit etiam opinatus, non refertur homo ad opinans inquantum est opinans, sed inquantum est opinatus. Si igitur omnia entia inquantum sunt huiusmodi, referuntur ad opinans inquantum opinans est, sequetur quod hoc quod dico opinans non sit unum, cum ad unum non referatur nisi unum, sed infinita secundum speciem, cum infinita referantur ad ipsum; quod est impossibile. Unde non potest dici quod omnia relative dicantur ad opinans, nec per consequens quod omne apparens vel opinans sit verum. He gives the second argument. He says that what is one is relative only to one thing, and not to any one thing at all but to a determinate one. For example, it is clear that the half and the equal may be the same in their subject, yet the double is not said to be relative to the equal but rather to the half; but equal is said to be relative to equal. Similarly, if man himself as a thinking subject is also the object of thought, man is not relative to the thinking subject as a thinking subject, but as the object of thought. If, then, all beings are relative to a thinking subject as such, it follows that what I call the thinking subject is not one, since one is relative only to one, but it is an infinite number of things in species, since an infinite number of things are related to it. But this is impossible. Hence it cannot be said that all things are said to be relative to a thinking subject, or that everything which appears so, or is thought to be so, is therefore true. 718. Let this suffice (381). Deinde cum dicit igitur quia concludit conclusionem suam intentam: et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ponit ipsam principalem conclusionem. Secundo inducit quoddam corollarium ex ea, ibi, si igitur impossibile. He now draws his intended conclusion, and in regard to this he does two things. First, he draws his main conclusion; and second (382:C 719), he derives a corollary from it (“But since it is impossible”). Dicit ergo primo, quod ex praedictis patet, quod inter omnes opiniones vel sententias ista est firmissima, qua dicitur oppositas dictiones sive propositiones sive contradictiones non simul esse veras. Et etiam dictum est quae inconvenientia accidunt dicentibus eas simul esse veras, et ex qua causa moti sunt ad illa dicendum. He accordingly says, first (381), that it is clear from the above statement that the most certain of all opinions or views is the one which states that opposite statements or propositions, i.e., contradictory ones, are not true at the same time. And the impossible conclusions which face those who say that they are true at the same time, and the reason which moved them to say this, have also been explained. 719. But since it is impossible (382). Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem concludit corollarium, dicens, ex dictis, quod quia impossibile est simul contradictionem verificari de eodem, manifestum est, quod nec etiam contraria eidem inesse possunt; quia manifestum est quod non minus in contrariis alterum eorum est privatio, quam in aliis oppositis, licet utrumque contrariorum sit natura aliqua; quod non est in affirmatione et negatione, vel in privatione et habitu. Alterum enim eorum est imperfectum respectu alterius, sicut nigrum respectu albi, et amarum respectu dulcis. Et sic habet privationem quamdam adiunctam. Privatio autem est aliqua negatio substantiae, idest in aliquo subiecto determinato. Et est etiam ab aliquo genere determinato. Est enim negatio infra genus. Non enim omne non videns dicitur caecum, sed solum in genere videntium. Sic igitur patet quod contrarium includit privationem, et privatio est quaedam negatio. Si igitur impossibile est simul affirmare et negare, impossibile est contraria simul inesse eidem simpliciter, sed vel ambo insunt quo, idest secundum aliquid, sicut quando utrumque in potentia vel secundum partem, vel unum secundum quid et alterum simpliciter: sicut quando unum est in actu et alterum est in potentia; vel unum secundum plures et principaliores partes, alterum tantum secundum aliquam partem, sicut Aethiops est niger simpliciter et albus dente. He draws the corollary. He says that, since it is impossible, from what has been said, for two contradictories to be true of the same subject at the same time, it is also evident that contraries cannot belong to the same subject; for the privative character of one of two contraries is no less evident in the case of contraries than it is in the case of other opposites, although each of two contraries is a positive reality; for it does not consist in affirmation and negation or in privation and possession. For one of them is imperfect when compared with the other, as black when compared with white, and bitter with sweet; and thus it has a kind of privation added to it. But privation is negation of substance, i.e., in some determinate subject. And it is also the deprivation of some determinate genus; for it is a negation within a genus. For not everything which does not see is said to be blind, but only that which is found in the genus of seeing things. It is clear, then, that a contrary includes privation, and that privation is a kind of negation. Hence, if it is impossible both to affirm and to deny something at the same time, it is also impossible for contraries to belong absolutely to the same subject at the same time; but either “both belong to it,” i.e., relatively, as when both are present potentially or partially, or one is present in a certain respect and the other absolutely; or one is present in many and the more important parts, and the other only in some part; for example, an Ethiopian is black absolutely and white as regards his teeth.
LESSON 16 No Intermediate between Contradictories. How Heraclitus and Anaxagoras Influenced This Position
ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 7: 1011b 23-1012a 28 ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ μεταξὺ ἀντιφάσεως ἐνδέχεται εἶναι οὐθέν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνάγκη ἢ φάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι ἓν καθ᾽ ἑνὸς ὁτιοῦν.  δῆλον δὲ πρῶτον μὲν ὁρισαμένοις τί τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ ψεῦδος. τὸ μὲν γὰρ λέγειν τὸ ὂν μὴ εἶναι ἢ τὸ μὴ ὂν εἶναι ψεῦδος, τὸ δὲ τὸ ὂν εἶναι καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν μὴ εἶναι ἀληθές, ὥστε καὶ ὁ λέγων εἶναι ἢ μὴ ἀληθεύσει ἢ ψεύσεται: ἀλλ᾽ οὔτε τὸ ὂν λέγεται μὴ εἶναι ἢ εἶναι οὔτε τὸ μὴ ὄν. 383. Neither can there be an intermediate between contradictories, but of each subject it is necessary either to affirm or to deny one thing. This first becomes evident when people define what truth and falsity are; for to say that what is, is not, or that what is not, is, is false; and to say that what is, is, or that what is not, is not, is true. Hence he who affirms that something is or is not will say either what is true or what is false. But neither what is nor what is not is said to be or not to be. ἔτι  ἤτοι μεταξὺ ἔσται τῆς ἀντιφάσεως ὥσπερ τὸ φαιὸν μέλανος καὶ λευκοῦ, ἢ ὡς τὸ μηδέτερον ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἵππου. εἰ μὲν οὖν οὕτως, οὐκ ἂν μεταβάλλοι (ἐκ μὴ ἀγαθοῦ γὰρ εἰς ἀγαθὸν μεταβάλλει ἢ ἐκ τούτου εἰς μὴ ἀγαθόν), νῦν δ᾽ ἀεὶ φαίνεται (οὐ γὰρ ἔστι μεταβολὴ ἀλλ᾽ ἢ εἰς τὰ ἀντικείμενα  καὶ μεταξύ): εἰ δ᾽ ἔστι μεταξύ, καὶ οὕτως εἴη ἄν τις εἰς λευκὸν οὐκ ἐκ μὴ λευκοῦ γένεσις, νῦν δ᾽ οὐχ ὁρᾶται. 384. Further, an intermediate between contradictories will be such either in the way that green is an intermediate between white and black, or as what is neither a man nor a horse is an intermediate between a man and a horse. If it is of the latter sort, there will then be no change; for change is from what is good to what is not-good, or from the latter to the former. But that this now occurs is always apparent; for change takes place only between opposites and intermediates. But if it is a true intermediate, then in this case there will be a kind of change to something white, but not from what is not-white. However, this is not now apparent. [1012α]  ἔτι πᾶν τὸ διανοητὸν καὶ νοητὸν ἡ διάνοια ἢ κατάφησιν ἢ ἀπόφησιν—τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐξ ὁρισμοῦ δῆλον—ὅταν ἀληθεύῃ ἢ ψεύδηται: ὅταν μὲν ὡδὶ συνθῇ φᾶσα ἢ ἀποφᾶσα, ἀληθεύει,  ὅταν δὲ ὡδί, ψεύδεται. 385. Further, the mind either affirms or denies every sensible and intelligible object. This is clear from the definition, because it expresses what is true or what is false. Indeed, when the mind composes in this way by affirming or denying, it says what is true; and when it does it otherwise, it says what is false. ἔτι παρὰ πάσας δεῖ εἶναι τὰς ἀντιφάσεις, εἰ μὴ λόγου ἕνεκα λέγεται: ὥστε καὶ οὔτε ἀληθεύσει  τις οὔτ᾽ οὐκ ἀληθεύσει, καὶ παρὰ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν ἔσται, ὥστε καὶ παρὰ γένεσιν καὶ φθορὰν μεταβολή τις ἔσται. 386. Again, there must be an intermediate in addition to all contradictories, unless one is arguing for the sake of argument. In that case one will say what is neither true nor false. And then there will be something else besides being and non-being; and therefore there will also be some kind of change besides generation and corruption. ἔτι ἐν ὅσοις γένεσιν ἡ ἀπόφασις τὸ ἐναντίον ἐπιφέρει,  καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἔσται, οἷον ἐν ἀριθμοῖς οὔτε περιττὸς οὔτε οὐ περιττὸς ἀριθμός: ἀλλ᾽ ἀδύνατον: ἐκ τοῦ ὁρισμοῦ δὲ δῆλον. 387. Again, there will also be an intermediate in all those classes of things in which the negation of a term implies its contrary; for example, in the class of numbers there will be a number which is neither even nor odd. But this is impossible, as is evident from the definition. ἔτι εἰς ἄπειρον βαδιεῖται, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἡμιόλια τὰ ὄντα ἔσται ἀλλὰ πλείω. πάλιν γὰρ ἔσται ἀποφῆσαι τοῦτο πρὸς τὴν φάσιν καὶ τὴν ἀπόφασιν, καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἔσται τι: ἡ  γὰρ οὐσία ἐστί τις αὐτοῦ ἄλλη. 388. Further, there will be an infinite regress, and there will be things which are related not only as half again as much but even more. For it will also be possible to deny the intermediate both with reference to its affirmation and to its negation; and this again will be something, for its substance is something different. ἔτι ὅταν ἐρομένου εἰ λευκόν ἐστιν εἴπῃ ὅτι οὔ, οὐθὲν ἄλλο ἀποπέφηκεν ἢ τὸ εἶναι: ἀπόφασις δὲ τὸ μὴ εἶναι. 389. Again, when one answers “no” to the question whether a thing is white, he has denied nothing except that it is; and its not-being is a negation. ἐλήλυθε δ᾽ ἐνίοις αὕτη ἡ δόξα ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλαι τῶν παραδόξων: ὅταν γὰρ λύειν μὴ δύνωνται λόγους ἐριστικούς, ἐνδόντες τῷ λόγῳ σύμφασιν ἀληθὲς  εἶναι τὸ συλλογισθέν. οἱ μὲν οὖν διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν λέγουσιν, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ πάντων ζητεῖν λόγον. 390. Now some men have formed this opinion in the same way that other unreasonable opinions have been formed; for when they cannot refute eristic arguments, they assent to the argument and claim that the conclusion is true. Some men hold this view, then, for this reason, and others because they seek an explanation for everything. ἀρχὴ δὲ πρὸς ἅπαντας τούτους ἐξ ὁρισμοῦ. ὁρισμὸς δὲ γίγνεται ἐκ τοῦ σημαίνειν τι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι αὐτούς: ὁ γὰρ λόγος οὗ τὸ ὄνομα σημεῖον ὁρισμὸς ἔσται. 391. The starting point to be used against all of these people is the definition, and the definition results from the necessity of their meaning something; for the concept, of which the word is a sign, is a definition. ἔοικε δ᾽ ὁ μὲν Ἡρακλείτου  λόγος, λέγων πάντα εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, ἅπαντα ἀληθῆ ποιεῖν, ὁ δ᾽ Ἀναξαγόρου, εἶναί τι μεταξὺ τῆς ἀντιφάσεως, πάντα ψευδῆ: ὅταν γὰρ μιχθῇ, οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε οὐκ ἀγαθὸν τὸ μῖγμα, ὥστ᾽ οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν ἀληθές. 392. Now the statement of Heraclitus, which says that all things are and are not, seems to make all things true; and the statement of Anaxagoras that there is an intermediate between contradictories seems to make everything false; for when all things are mixed together, the mixture is neither good nor not good, so that it is impossible to say anything true. COMMENTARY Postquam disputavit contra ponentes contradictoria simul esse vera, hic disputat contra ponentes esse medium inter contradictionem: hi enim dicunt non semper alteram partem contradictionis esse veram. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo disputat contra ipsam positionem. Secundo contra quasdam alias quaestiones inopinabiles, hanc et superiorem positionem comitantes, ibi, his autem definitis. 720. Having argued dialectically against those who maintain that contradictories are true at the same time, Aristotle now argues against those who maintain that there is an intermediate between contradictories; for these thinkers do not always say that the one or the other part of a contradiction is true. In regard to this he does two things. First (383:C 720), he argues against this position. Second (393:C 736), he argues against certain other unreasonable questions which follow from this position and from the one above (“With these points”). Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit rationes contra dictam positionem. Secundo ostendit causam, quare aliqui moti sunt ad positionem illam ponendam, ibi, evenit autem quibusdam et cetera. In regard to the first he does two things. First, he raises arguments against the position mentioned. Second (390:C 730, he gives the reason why some thinkers have been moved to hold this position (“Now some men”). Circa primum ponit septem rationes: dicens primo, quod sicut contradictoria non possunt simul esse vera, ita nec potest esse medium inter contradictionem; sed de unoquoque necessarium est aut affirmare aut negare. In regard to the first part he gives seven arguments. He says, first (383), that, just as contradictories cannot be true at the same time, neither can there be an intermediate between contradictories, but it is necessary either to affirm or deny one or the other. Et hoc manifestum est primo ex definitione veri vel falsi: non enim aliud est magis falsum quam dicere non esse quod est, aut esse quod non est. Et nihil aliud est magis verum quam dicere esse quod est, aut non esse quod non est. Patet igitur, quod quicumque dicit aliquid esse, aut dicit verum, aut dicit falsum: si dicit verum, oportet ita esse, quia verum est esse quod est. Si dicit falsum, oportet illud non esse, quia falsum nihil aliud est quam non esse quod est. Et similiter si dicit hoc non esse, si dicit falsum, oportet esse; si verum, oportet non esse; ergo de necessitate aut affirmativa aut negativa est vera. Sed ille, qui ponit medium inter contradictionem, non dicit quod necesse sit dicere de ente esse vel non esse, neque quod necesse sit de non ente. Et ita nec affirmans nec negans, de necessitate dicit verum vel falsum. 721. This first becomes evident from the definition of truth and falsity; for to say what is false is simply to say that what is, is not, or that what is not, is. And to say what is true is simply to say that what is, is, or that what is not is not. It is clear, then, that whoever says that something is, says either what is true or what is false; and if he says what is true, it must be so, because to say what is true is to say that what is, is. And if he says what is false, it must not be so, because to say what is false is simply to say that what is, is not. The same thing applies if he says that something is not; for if he says what is false, it must be; and if he says what is true, it must not be. Therefore, either the affirmation or the negation is necessarily true. But he who holds that there is an intermediate between contradictories does not claim that it is necessary to say that what is either is or is not; nor does he claim that it is necessary to speak in this way about what is not. Thus neither he who affirms nor he who denies need say what is true or what is false. 722. Further, an intermediate (384). Deinde cum dicit amplius autem secundam rationem ponit; quae talis est. Medium inter duo aliqua accipi potest uno modo vel participatione utriusque extremi, quod est medium in eodem genere, sicut viride vel pallidum inter album et nigrum. Alio modo per abnegationem, quod etiam est diversum in genere, sicut inter hominem et equum, quod nec est homo, nec est equus, ut lapis. Si ergo inter contradictoria est medium, aut hoc erit primo modo, aut secundo: He gives the second argument, which runs thus: an intermediate between any two contradictories can be understood in one way as something that participates in each of the extremes, and this is an intermediate in the same genus, as green or yellow is an intermediate between white and black; or in another way as something that is the negation of each extreme, and such an intermediate is different in genus; for example, a stone, which is neither a man nor a horse, is an intermediate between a man and a horse. Therefore, if there is an intermediate between contradictories, it will be such either in the first way or in the second. Si secundo modo, tunc nihil permutatur: quod sic patet. Omnis enim permutatio est ex non bono in bonum, aut ex bono in non bonum. Quare etiam cum est mutatio inter contraria, ut inter album et nigrum, est mutatio inter contradictorie opposita. Nam nigrum est non album, ut ex praedictis patet. Secundum autem praedicta non posset fieri mutatio ex non bono in bonum, vel e converso: ergo nulla esset mutatio: cum tamen semper hoc appareat vel videatur, quod ex non bono in bonum fiat mutatio, vel e converso. Quod autem omnis talis mutatio tollatur ex praedicta positione facta, sic patet. Non enim potest esse mutatio nisi inter contraria et media quae sunt unius generis: nec potest esse mutatio de uno extremo in alterum nisi per medium. Si igitur est medium inter contradictoria per abnegationem, idest alterius generis, nulla poterit esse mutatio de extremo in medium, et ita per consequens de extremo in extremum. 723. If it is an intermediate in the second way, there will be no change. This becomes clear as follows: every change is from what is not-good to what is good, or from what is good to what is not-good. Hence, since change is between contraries, for example, white and black, change must take place between things which are opposed as contradictories; for black is not white, as is clear from the above statements. But according to the foregoing position there cannot be change from what is not-good to what is good, or the reverse. Hence there will be no change. Yet it always appears or seems that change proceeds from what is not-good to what is good, or the reverse. That every change of this sort would be destroyed if the foregoing position is true ‘becomes clear as follows. Change can take place only between contraries and intermediates which belong to the same genus. But there can be a change from one extreme to another only through an intermediate. Therefore, if there is an intermediate between contradictories as the negation of both, i.e., as something belonging to a different genus, it will be impossible for change to take place between an extreme and an intermediate, and therefore between one extreme and another. Si autem primo modo, scilicet quod sit medium in contradictione quasi eiusdem generis, participatione utriusque, sicut pallidum inter album et nigrum, sequitur hoc inconveniens, quod sit aliqua generatio quae terminetur ad album, et non fiat ex non albo; quia ad unum extremum non tantum fit mutatio ex alio extremo, sed etiam ex medio. Hoc autem non videtur esse verum, scilicet quod sit aliqua generatio terminata ad album quae non fiat ex non albo. Et sic patet quod nullo modo potest esse medium in contradictione. 724. And if it is an intermediate in the first way, so that the intermediate between contradictories belongs to the same genus by participating in both, as yellow is an intermediate between white and black, ‘this impossible conclusion follows: there will be some process of generation which terminates in white and does not come from the not-white, because change proceeds not only from one extreme to another but also from an intermediate. But it does not seem to be true that there is any process of change terminating in the white which does not proceed from the not-white. Thus it is clear that there is no way at all in which there can be an intermediate between contradictories. 725. Further, the mind (385). Deinde cum dicit amplius omne tertiam rationem ponit, quae talis est. Intellectus in omni conceptione sua, qua sentit et intelligit, aut affirmat aliquid aut negat. Ex definitione autem veri et falsi apparet quod sive aliquis affirmet sive neget, oportet ut verum dicat, aut mentiatur: quia quando intellectus sic componit vel affirmando vel negando sicut est in re, dicit; quando autem non sic, mentitur. Et ita patet quod semper oportet quod sit vera vel affirmatio vel negatio; quia oportet quod aliqua opinio sit vera, et omnis opinio affirmatio est vel negatio: unde oportet quod semper affirmatio vel negatio sit vera: et sic non est medium in contradictione. He gives the third argument, which runs thus: in every one of the conceptions by which the intellect knows or understands, it either affirms or denies something. Now from the definition of truth and falsity it seems that whether one affirms or denies he must say what is true or what is false; because when the intellect composes in this way, either by affirming or denying as the matter stands in reality, it expresses what is true; but when it does it otherwise, it expresses what is false. Thus it is clear that a true statement must always be either an affirmation or a negation, because some opinion must be true, and every opinion is either an affirmation or a negation. Hence it must always be either an affirmation or a negation that is true; and thus there is no intermediate between contradictories. 726. Again, there must (386). Deinde cum dicit amplius autem quartam rationem ponit, quae talis est. Si in contradictione ponatur medium, oportet hoc in omnibus contradictionibus dicere, quod scilicet praeter omnes contradictiones sit aliquid verum quod est medium inter eas, nisi hoc dicat aliquis orationis causa, idest absque omni ratione, solum quia placet ei ita dicere. Sed hoc non potest verum esse in omnibus, quia verum et non verum sunt contradictoria quaedam. Et ita sequeretur quod aliquis esset, qui nec verum diceret, nec non verum. Cuius contrarium patuit ex definitione veri et falsi. Then he gives the fourth argument, which runs thus: if one maintains that there must be an intermediate between contradictories, then it is necessary to say that in the case of all contradictories there must be besides the contradictories themselves something true which is an intermediate between them, unless this person is arguing “for the sake of argument,” i.e., without any real reason but only because it pleases him to speak in this way. But this cannot be true in all cases, because the true and the not-true are contradictories. Thus it would follow that there is someone who says what is neither true nor false. But the opposite of this was made clear from the definition of truth and falsity. Similiter, cum ens et non ens sint contradictoria, sequitur quod aliquid sit praeter ens et non ens. Et ita erit quaedam transmutatio praeter generationem et corruptionem. Nam generatio est transmutatio ad esse, et corruptio ad non esse; ergo in nulla contradictione erit medium. 727. Similarly, since being and nonbeing are contradictories, it will follow that there is something besides being and non-being, and thus there will be some kind of change besides generation and corruption; for generation is a change to being, and corruption a change to non-being. Therefore there can be no intermediate between contradictories. 728. Again, there will (387). Deinde cum dicit amplius in quintam rationem ponit, dicens, quod negatio in quibusdam generibus inest loco contrariae differentiae. Vel secundum aliam literam negatio implet contrarium, quia alterum contrariorum, quae necesse est esse in eodem genere, ex negatione rationem habet; sicut patet de pari et impari, iusto et iniusto. Si igitur inter affirmationem et negationem esset aliquod medium, in omnibus istis contrariis esset aliquod medium, cum affirmationem et negationem manifeste sequantur. Sicut in numero si esset aliquis numerus qui nec esset par nec impar. Hoc autem patet esse impossibile ex definitione paris et imparis. Nam par est quod potest dividi in aequalia. Impar vero quod non potest. Relinquitur ergo quod inter affirmationem et negationem non potest esse medium. He gives the fifth argument. He says that in some genera a negation takes the place of a contrary difference; or, according to another text, “negation supplies the contrary,” because one of two contraries, which must be in the same genus, derives its definition from negation, as is clear in the case of the even and the odd, and the just and unjust. Therefore, if there is an intermediate between affirmation and negation, there will be some intermediate between all these contraries, since they obviously depend on affirmation and negation; for example, in the case of number, there will be some number which is neither even nor odd. But this is clearly impossible in the light of the definition of the even and the odd; for the even is what can be divided into equal numbers, and the odd is what cannot. Therefore it follows that there cannot be an intermediate between affirmation and negation. 729. Further, there will (388). Deinde cum dicit amplius in sextam rationem ponit, quae talis est. Ponentes aliquid medium inter affirmationem et negationem, ponunt aliquod tertium praeter illa duo, quae ponunt omnes communiter, dicentes nihil inter ea esse medium. Tria autem ad duo se habent in hemiolia, idest in sesquialtera proportione. Secundum igitur opinionem eorum qui ponunt inter affirmationem et negationem medium, in primo aspectu apparet quod omnia erunt hemiolia, idest in sesquialtera proportione ad ea quae ponuntur; quia non solum erunt affirmationes et negationes, sed etiam media. Non solum autem hoc sequetur, sed etiam quod sint in infinitum plura. Constat enim quod omne quod contingit affirmare, contingit negare. Contingit autem affirmare haec tria esse, scilicet affirmationem, negationem, et medium; ergo contingit ista tria negare. Et sicut negatio est aliud ab affirmatione, ita aliud erit quoddam quartum praeter tria praedicta. Erit enim eius substantia et ratio alia a praedictis, sicut et negationis alia ab affirmatione. Item ista quatuor contingit negare, et horum negatio erit verum, et sic in infinitum. Erunt igitur plura in infinitum quam modo ponantur. Quod videtur inconveniens. He now gives the sixth argument: those who claim that there is an intermediate between an affirmation and a negation hold some third thing besides these two, which all posit in common, saying that there is nothing intermediate between them. But three is related it) two “as half again as much,” i.e., in a proportion of one and a half to one. Therefore, according to the opinion of those who hold an intermediate between an affirmation and a negation it appears at first sight that all things “will be related as half again as much,” i.e., in a proportion of one and a half to one to the things which are given, because there will be not only affirmations and negations but also intermediates. And this is not the only conclusion that follows, but it also follows that there will be many more things in infinite regression. For it is evident that everything which can be affirmed can also be denied. But if it is possible to affirm that the following three things exist: an affirmation, a negation and an intermediate, it is then also possible to deny these three. And just as a negation differs from an affirmation, in a similar way there will also be some fourth thing which differs from the three mentioned; for it will have a different substance and intelligible structure than those just mentioned, in the same way that a negation has a different substance and intelligible structure from an affirmation. And it is possible to deny these four, and the negations of these will be true; and so on to infinity. Hence there will be infinitely more things than have just been posited. This seems absurd. 730. Again, when one (389). Deinde cum dicit amplius quando septimam rationem ponit, quae talis est. Si quis interrogaret utrum homo vel aliquid aliud sit album, oportet quod respondens vel assentiat vel non assentiat: et si assentiat, planum est quod dicit affirmationem esse veram; si autem non assentiat respondendo non, constat quod negat. Nec negat aliquid aliud quam illud quod ille interrogavit; et ipsa negatio est non esse, quia negativa. Relinquitur igitur, quod respondens ad quaestionem, vel necesse habet concedere affirmationem, vel proferre negativam; et ita inter haec duo non est medium. He gives the seventh argument, and it runs as follows: if someone were to ask whether a man or some other thing is white, the one answering him must say either “yes” or “no.” If he says “yes,” it is plain that he says that the affirmation is true; but if he does not affirm this but says “no,” it is clear that he denies this. Now the only thing which he denies is what he was asked, and the negation of this is non-being because it is negative. Therefore it follows that, when he answers this question, he must of necessity either admit the affirmative or assert the negative. Hence there is no intermediate between these two. 731. Now some men (390). Deinde cum dicit evenit autem ostendit causam quare quidam in hanc opinionem incidunt: et circa hoc tria facit. Primo enim ostendit quare quidam hanc opinionem posuerunt. Secundo modum disputandi contra eos, ibi, principium autem ad hos omnes. Tertio ad quas opiniones philosophorum praedictae opiniones sequuntur, ibi, videtur autem Heracliti. He gives the reason why some men adopt this opinion, and in regard to this he does three things. First, he shows why some men have held this opinion. Second (391:C 733), he explains how one can argue dialectically against them (“The starting point”). Third (392:C 734), he notes the philosophical views on which the foregoing opinions depend (“Now the statement”) Dicit ergo primo, quod praedicta opinio evenit quibusdam, sicut et aliae opiniones inopinabilium, ex duplici causa: quarum prima est, quia quando aliqui non possunt solvere orationes contentiosas, idest rationes litigiosas sive sophisticas factas eis ab aliis vel a seipsis, consentiunt rationi probanti, et concedunt conclusionem, dicentes verum esse quod syllogizatum est. Et ulterius ipsam nituntur confirmare aliquas alias rationes adinveniendo. He accordingly says, first (390), that the foregoing opinion, like other unreasonable opinions, is adopted by certain thinkers for one of two reasons. The first is this: when some men cannot refute “eristic arguments,” i.e., disputatious or sophistical arguments, which are presented to them either by others or by themselves, they agree with the one giving the argument and assent to the conclusion, saying that what has been shown is true. And then they try to confirm this by devising other arguments. Secunda est propter hoc, quod quidam volunt inquirere rationem probantem de omnibus; et ideo illa quae probari non possunt, nolunt concedere, sed negant. Prima autem principia quae sunt omnium conceptiones communes probari non possunt; et ideo eas negant, per hoc in positiones inopinabiles incidentes. 732. The second reason why men adopt this position is that some men want to discover an argument to prove everything, and therefore whatever cannot be proved they do not want to affirm but deny. But first principles, which are the common conceptions of all men, cannot be proved. Hence these men deny them and thereby adopt unreasonable views. 733. The starting point (391). Deinde cum dicit principium autem ostendit ex quo principio debeat procedi contra tales opiniones; et dicit quod ex definitione veri vel falsi vel aliquorum aliorum nominum, sicut ex supra dictis rationibus patet. Necesse est enim eis concedere definitiones rerum, si ponunt quod nomina aliquid significent. Nam ratio quam nomen significat est definitio rei. Si autem non concedunt omnia significare aliquid, tunc non differunt a plantis, sicut supra dictum est. He indicates the starting point from which one must proceed to argue against such opinions. He says that the starting point is derived from the definitions of truth and falsity, or from the definitions of other terms, as is clear from the arguments given above. For men must admit the definitions of things if they hold that words signify something; for the intelligible expression of a thing which a word signifies is a thing’s definition. But if they do not admit that all words signify something, they do not differ from plants, as has been said above (348:C 652). 734. Now the statement (392). Deinde cum dicit videtur autem ostendit ad quas opiniones praedictae positiones consequuntur: et dicit quod ad positionem Heracliti, qui dicebat omnia moveri simul, et per consequens esse et non esse. Et quia id quod movetur habet non esse admixtum cum esse, sequitur quod omnia sunt vera. Here he gives the opinion on which the foregoing opinions depend. He says that these opinions stem from the position of Heraclitus, who said that all things are in motion, and therefore that they both are and are not at the same time. And since what is being moved has non-being mixed with being, it follows that everything is true. Ad positionem vero Anaxagorae sequitur quod aliquid sit medium contradictionis. Ipse enim ponebat quod quodlibet miscetur cum quolibet, propter hoc quod quodlibet fit ex quolibet. De permixto autem neutrum extremorum potest dici; sicut colores medii nec sunt albedo nec nigredo. Unde illud quod est mixtum, nec est bonum nec non bonum, nec album nec non album. Et sic est aliquid medium contradictionis. Et per consequens sequitur omnia esse falsa. Nihil enim secundum communem opinionem ponimus nisi affirmationem et negationem. Unde si affirmatio et negatio sunt falsa, sequitur omnia falsa esse. 735. And from the position of Anaxagoras it follows that there is an intermediate between contradictories; for he held that everything is mixed with everything, because everything comes from everything. But neither of the extremes can be predicated of the mixture; for example, intermediate colors are neither whiteness or blackness. Hence the mixture is neither good nor not-good, neither white nor not-white; and thus there is an intermediate between contradictories. It follows, then, that everything is false; for according to the common opinion we posit nothing but affirmation and negation. Hence, if both an affirmation and its negation are false, it follows that everything is false.
LESSON 17 Rejection of the opinions that Everything Is True and False, and that Everything Is at Rest and in Motion
ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 8: 1012a 29-1012b 31 διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ τὰ μοναχῶς  λεγόμενα καὶ κατὰ πάντων ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν ὥσπερ τινὲς λέγουσιν, οἱ μὲν οὐθὲν φάσκοντες ἀληθὲς εἶναι (οὐθὲν γὰρ κωλύειν φασὶν οὕτως ἅπαντα εἶναι ὥσπερ τὸ τὴν διάμετρον σύμμετρον εἶναι), οἱ δὲ πάντ᾽ ἀληθῆ. σχεδὸν γὰρ οὗτοι οἱ λόγοι οἱ αὐτοὶ τῷ Ἡρακλείτου: ὁ γὰρ λέγων  ὅτι πάντ᾽ ἀληθῆ καὶ πάντα ψευδῆ, καὶ χωρὶς λέγει τῶν λόγων ἑκάτερον τούτων, [1012β]  ὥστ᾽ εἴπερ ἀδύνατα ἐκεῖνα, καὶ ταῦτα ἀδύνατον εἶναι. 393. With these points settled it is evident that the theories which have been expressed univocally and about all things cannot be true as some affirm them to be. Now some say that nothing is true (for they say that there is nothing to prevent all statements from being like the statement that the diagonal of a square is commensurable with one of its sides), and others say that everything is true. These views are almost the same as that of Heraclitus; for he who says that all things are true and all false admits both views apart from his own words. Hence, if those are impossible, these also must be impossible. ἔτι δὲ φανερῶς ἀντιφάσεις εἰσὶν ἃς οὐχ οἷόν τε ἅμα ἀληθεῖς εἶναι—οὐδὲ δὴ ψευδεῖς πάσας: καίτοι δόξειέ γ᾽ ἂν μᾶλλον ἐνδέχεσθαι ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. 394. Further, it is evident that there are contradictories which cannot be true at the same time. Nor can they all be false, though this would seem more possible from what has been said. ἀλλὰ πρὸς πάντας τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους αἰτεῖσθαι δεῖ, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐπάνω λόγοις, οὐχὶ εἶναί τι ἢ μὴ εἶναι ἀλλὰ σημαίνειν τι, ὥστε ἐξ ὁρισμοῦ διαλεκτέον λαβόντας τί σημαίνει τὸ ψεῦδος ἢ τὸ ἀληθές. εἰ δὲ μηθὲν ἄλλο τὸ ἀληθὲς φάναι ἢ <�ὃ> ἀποφάναι; ψεῦδός ἐστιν, ἀδύνατον  πάντα ψευδῆ εἶναι: ἀνάγκη γὰρ τῆς ἀντιφάσεως θάτερον εἶναι μόριον ἀληθές. 395. But in opposing all such views it is necessary to postulate, as has been stated in the above discussion (332), not ‘ that something is or is not, but that a word signifies something. Hence it is necessary to argue from a definition, once we have accepted what truth and falsity mean. But if to say what is true is merely to deny what is false, not everything can be false. For one part of a contradiction must be true. ἔτι εἰ πᾶν ἢ φάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι ἀναγκαῖον, ἀδύνατον ἀμφότερα ψευδῆ εἶναι: θάτερον γὰρ μόριον τῆς ἀντιφάσεως ψεῦδός ἐστιν. 396. Again, if everything must be either affirmed or denied, both cannot be false; for one part of a contradiction is false. συμβαίνει δὴ καὶ τὸ θρυλούμενον πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις λόγοις, αὐτοὺς  ἑαυτοὺς ἀναιρεῖν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ πάντα ἀληθῆ λέγων καὶ τὸν ἐναντίον αὑτοῦ λόγον ἀληθῆ ποιεῖ, ὥστε τὸν ἑαυτοῦ οὐκ ἀληθῆ (ὁ γὰρ ἐναντίος οὔ φησιν αὐτὸν ἀληθῆ), ὁ δὲ πάντα ψευδῆ καὶ αὐτὸς αὑτόν. ἐὰν δ᾽ ἐξαιρῶνται ὁ μὲν τὸν ἐναντίον ὡς οὐκ ἀληθὴς μόνος ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ τὸν αὑτοῦ ὡς οὐ ψευδής,  οὐδὲν ἧττον ἀπείρους συμβαίνει αὐτοῖς αἰτεῖσθαι λόγους ἀληθεῖς καὶ ψευδεῖς: ὁ γὰρ λέγων τὸν ἀληθῆ λόγον ἀληθῆ ἀληθής, τοῦτο δ᾽ εἰς ἄπειρον βαδιεῖται. 397. And the view commonly expressed applies to all such theories—they destroy themselves; for he who says that everything is true makes the contrary of his own statement true, and thus makes his own not true; for the contrary denies that it is true. And he who says that everything is false makes his own statement false. But if the former makes an exception of the contrary statement, saying that it alone is not true, and the latter makes an exception of his own statement, saying that it is not false, still they will have to consider the truth and falsity of an infinite number of statements. For he who says that a true statement is true is right; and this process will go on to infinity. φανερὸν δ᾽ ὅτι οὐδ᾽ οἱ πάντα ἠρεμεῖν λέγοντες ἀληθῆ λέγουσιν οὐδ᾽ οἱ πάντα κινεῖσθαι. 398. Now it is evident that those who say that all things are at rest do not speak the truth, and neither do those who say that all things are in motion. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἠρεμεῖ πάντα, ἀεὶ ταὐτὰ ἀληθῆ καὶ  ψευδῆ ἔσται, φαίνεται δὲ τοῦτο μεταβάλλον (ὁ γὰρ λέγων ποτὲ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἦν καὶ πάλιν οὐκ ἔσται): 399. For if all things are at rest, the same thing will always be true and false; but this seems to be something that changes, for he who makes a statement at this time was not and again will not be. εἰ δὲ πάντα κινεῖται, οὐθὲν ἔσται ἀληθές: πάντα ἄρα ψευδῆ: ἀλλὰ δέδεικται ὅτι ἀδύνατον. 400. And if all things are in motion, nothing will be true, and so everything will be false. But it has been shown that this is impossible. ἔτι ἀνάγκη τὸ ὂν μεταβάλλειν: ἔκ τινος γὰρ εἴς τι ἡ μεταβολή. 401. Further, it must be some being which is changed; for change is from something to something. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ πάντα ἠρεμεῖ  ἢ κινεῖται ποτέ, ἀεὶ δ᾽ οὐθέν: ἔστι γάρ τι ὃ ἀεὶ κινεῖ τὰ κινούμενα, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον αὐτό. 402. But it is not true that all things are at rest or in motion sometimes, and nothing always; for there is something which always moves the things that are being moved, and the first mover is itself immovable. COMMENTARY Disputat contra quasdam positiones, quae ad praedicta consequuntur. Et primo contra quosdam, qui destruunt principia logicae. Secundo contra quosdam, qui destruunt principia physicae, ibi, palam autem quia neque qui omnia et cetera. 736. He argues dialectically against certain positions which stem from those mentioned above. First (393:C736), he argues against certain men who destroy the principles of logic; and second (398:C 744), against certain men who destroy the principles of natural philosophy (“Now it is evident”). Philosophus enim primus debet disputare contra negantes principia singularium scientiarum, quia omnia principia firmantur super hoc principium, quod affirmatio et negatio non sunt simul vera, et quod nihil est medium inter ea. Illa autem sunt propriissima huius scientiae, cum sequantur rationem entis, quod est huius philosophiae primum subiectum. Verum autem et falsum pertinent proprie ad considerationem logici; consequuntur enim ens in ratione de quo considerat logicus: nam verum et falsum sunt in mente, ut in sexto huius habetur. Motus autem et quies sunt proprie de consideratione naturalis, per hoc quod natura definitur quod est principium motus et quietis. Ad errorem autem qui accidit circa esse et non esse, sequitur error circa verum et falsum: nam per esse et non esse verum et falsum definitur, ut supra habitum est. Nam verum est cum dicitur esse quod est, vel non esse quod non est. Falsum autem, e converso. Similiter autem ex errore, qui est circa esse vel non esse, sequitur error qui est circa moveri et quiescere. Nam quod movetur, inquantum huiusmodi, nondum est. Quod autem quiescit, est. Et ideo destructis erroribus circa esse et non esse, ex consequenti destruuntur errores circa verum et falsum, quietem et motum. For first philosophy should argue dialectically against those who deny the principles of the particular sciences, because all principles are based on the principle that an affirmation and a negation are not true at the same time, and that there is no intermediate between them. Now these principles are the most specific principles of this science, since they depend on the concept of being, which is the primary subject of this branch of philosophy. But the true and the false belong specifically to the study of logic; for they depend on the kind of being which is found in the mind, with which logic deals; for truth and falsity exist in the mind, as is stated in Book VI of this work (558:C 1231). Motion and rest, on the other hand, belong properly to the study of natural philosophy, because nature is defined as a principle of motion and of rest. Now the error made about truth and falsity is a result of the error made about being and nonbeing, for truth and falsity are defined by means of being and non-being, as has been said above. For there is ‘truth when one says that what is, is, or that what is not, is not; and falsity is defined in the opposite way. And similarly the error made about rest and motion is a result of the error made about being and non-being; for what is in motion as such does not yet exist, whereas what is at rest already is. Hence, when the errors made about being and non-being have been removed, the errors made about truth and falsity and rest and motion will then also be removed. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit opiniones falsas circa verum et falsum. Secundo reprobat eas, ibi, amplius autem palam et cetera. 737. Regarding the first part of this division he does two things. First (393:C 737), he gives the erroneous opinions about truth and falsity. Second (394:C 739), he criticizes these opinions (“Further, it is evident”). Dicit ergo, quod definitis, idest determinatis praedictis quae erant dicenda contra praedictas inopinabiles opiniones, manifestum est quod impossibile est quod quidam dixerunt quod univoce, idest uno modo sententiandum est de omnibus, ut dicamus omnia similiter esse falsa vel similiter esse vera. Quidam enim dixerunt nihil esse verum, sed omnia esse falsa, et quod nihil prohibet quin dicamus omnia sic esse falsa, sicut illa est falsa, diameter est commensurabilis lateri quadrati, quod est falsum. Alii vero dixerunt quod omnia sunt vera. Et huiusmodi orationes consequuntur ad opinionem Heracliti, sicut dictum est. Ipse enim dixit simul esse et non esse, ex quo sequitur omnia esse vera. Thus he says (393) that, “with these points settled,” i.e., with the foregoing points established which have to be used against the paradoxical positions mentioned above, it is obviously impossible that the views of some men should be true, namely, that we must form an opinion “univocally,” i.e., think in the same way, about all things, so that we should say that all things are equally true or equally false. For some thinkers said that nothing is true but everything false, and that there is nothing to prevent us from saying that all statements are just as false as the statement (which is false) that the diameter of a square is commensurate with one of its sides. But others have said that all things are true. Statements of the latter kind are a result of the opinion of Heraclitus, as has been pointed out (362:C 684); for he said that a thing is and is not at the same time, and from this it follows that everything is true. Et ne forte aliquis diceret quod praeter has opiniones est etiam tertia, quae dicit quod omnia simul sunt vera et falsa, quasi tacitae obiectioni respondens dicit, quod qui hoc ponit, utrumque praedictorum ponit. Unde si duae primae opiniones sunt impossibiles, illam tertiam oportet esse impossibilem. 738. And lest perhaps someone might say that besides these opinions there is also a third one, which states that everything is both true and false at the same time, he replies, as though meeting a tacit objection, that anyone who maintains this opinion also maintains both of the foregoing ones. Hence, if the first two opinions are impossible, the third must also be impossible. 739. Further, it is evident (394). Deinde cum dicit amplius autem ponit rationes contra praedictas opiniones; quarum prima talis. Constat quasdam esse contradictiones quas impossibile est simul esse veras nec simul falsas, sicut verum et non verum, ens et non ens. Et hoc magis potest sciri ex dictis. Si igitur harum contradictionum necesse est alteram esse veram et alteram falsam, non omnia sunt vera nec omnia sunt falsa. Then he presents arguments against the foregoing opinions, and the first of these is as follows: it is evident that there are certain contradictories which cannot be true at the same time or false at the same time, for example, the true and not-true, being and non-being. This can be better understood from what has been said. Therefore, if one of these two contradictories must be false and the other true, not all things can be true or all false. 740. But in opposing (395). Deinde cum dicit sed ad omnes secundam rationem ponit, dicens, quod ad istas orationes, idest positiones, non oportet quaerere, idest petere concedendum aliquid esse vel non esse in rebus, quemadmodum supra dictum est; quia hoc videtur petere principium. Sed hoc petendum est, quod detur nomina aliquid significare; quo non dato, disputatio tollitur. Hoc autem dato, oportet ponere definitiones, sicut iam supra dictum est. Et ideo ex definitionibus contra eos disputare oportet, et praecipue in proposito, accipiendo definitionem falsi. Si autem non est aliud verum, quam illud affirmare, quod falsum est negare, et e converso: et similiter falsum non aliud est quam affirmare id quod negare est verum, et e converso: sequitur quod impossibile sit omnia esse falsa; quia necesse erit vel affirmationem vel negationem esse veram. Patet enim, quod verum nihil est aliud quam dicere esse quod est, vel non esse quod non est. Falsum autem, dicere non esse quod est, vel esse quod non est. Et ideo patet, quod verum est dicere illud esse, quod falsum est non esse; vel non esse, quod falsum est esse. Et falsum est dicere id esse, quod verum est non esse; vel non esse quod verum est esse. Et ita, ex definitione veri vel falsi, patet quod non sunt omnia falsa. Et ratione eadem patet quod non omnia sunt vera. He gives the second argument. He says that in opposing “these views,” or positions, “it is necessary to postulate,” or request, not that someone should admit that something either is or is not in reality, as has been stated above (332:C 611), because this seems to be begging the question, but that he should admit that a word signifies something. Now if this is not granted, the dispute comes to an end; but if it is granted, it is then necessary to give definitions, as has already been stated above (332:C 611). Hence we must argue against these thinkers by proceeding from definitions, and in the case of the present thesis we must do this especially by considering the definition of falsity. Now if truth consists merely in affirming what it is false to deny, and vice versa, it follows that not all statements can be false, because either the affirmation or the negation of something must be true. For obviously truth consists simply in saying that what is, is, or in saying that what is not, is not; and falsity consists in saying that what is, is not, or in saying that what is not, is. Hence it is clear that it is true to say that that is of which it is false that it is not, or to say that that is not of which it is false that it is; and it is false to say that that is of which it is true that it is not, or to say that that is not of which it is true that it is. Thus from the definition of truth and falsity it is clear that not all things are false. And for the same reason it is clear that not all things are true. 741. Again, if everything (396). Deinde cum dicit amplius si tertiam rationem ponit, quae talis est. Constat ex praedictis, quod necesse est de quolibet aut affirmare aut negare, cum nihil sit medium in contradictione. Igitur impossibile est omnia falsa esse. Et eadem ratione probatur quod impossibile est omnia esse vera, per hoc quod ostensum est, quod non est simul affirmare et negare. Here he gives the third argument, which runs thus: it is clear from what has been said above that we must either affirm or deny something of each thing since there is no intermediate between contradictories. It is impossible, then, for everything to be false. And by the same reasoning it is proved that it is impossible for everything to be true, i.e., by reason of the fact that it is impossible both to affirm and to deny something at the same time. 742. And the view (397). Deinde cum dicit contingit autem quartam rationem ponit, quae talis est. Ad omnes praedictas orationes, idest positiones, contingit hoc inconveniens quod seipsas destruunt. Et hoc est famatum, idest famosum ab omnibus dictum. Unde alius textus habet, accidit autem et id vulgare. Quod sic probat. Ille enim, qui dicit omnia esse vera, facit opinionem contrariam suae opinioni esse veram; sed contraria suae opinionis est quod sua opinio non sit vera: ergo qui dicit omnia esse vera, dicit suam opinionem non esse veram, et ita destruit suam opinionem. Et similiter manifestum est quod ille, qui dicit omnia esse falsa, dicit etiam seipsum dicere falsum. He gives the fourth argument: all of the foregoing statements, or opinions, face this unreasonable result-they destroy themselves. This is “the view commonly expressed,” i.e., a frequently heard statement made by all; and thus another text says, “It happens that it is commonly held.” He proves this view as follows: anyone who says that everything is true makes the contrary of his own opinion true. But the contrary of his own opinion is that his own opinion is not true. Therefore he who says that everything is true says that his own opinion is not true; and thus he destroys his own opinion. Similarly it is evident that he who says that everything is false also says that his own opinion is false. Et quia posset aliquis dicere quod dicens omnia vera excipit aut aufert ab universalitate suam contrariam, et similiter, qui dicit omnia esse falsa excipit suam opinionem: ideo hanc responsionem excludit; et dicit, quod si ille qui dicit omnia esse vera, excipiat suam contrariam, dicens solam eam esse non veram, et dicens omnia esse falsa excipiat suam opinionem dicens quod ipsa sola non est falsa, nihilominus sequitur quod contingat eis quaerere, idest repetere infinitas esse orationes veras contra ponentes omnia esse falsa, et infinitas falsas contra ponentes omnia vera esse. Si enim detur una opinio vera, sequetur infinitas esse veras. Et si detur una opinio falsa, sequetur infinitas esse falsas. Si enim haec positio vel opinio est vera: Socrates sedet, ergo et haec erit vera: Socratem sedere est verum. Et si illa est vera, ulterius haec erit vera, Socratem sedere esse verum est verum, et sic in infinitum. Semper enim qui dicit de oratione vera quod sit vera, verus est. Et qui dicit de oratione falsa quod sit vera, falsus est. Et hoc potest procedere in infinitum. 743. And because someone could say that he who claims that everything is true makes an exception of the one contrary to his own statement or bars it from what holds universally (and the same thing applies to one who says that everything is false), he therefore rejects this answer. He says that, if the one who says that everything is true makes his own contrary opinion an exception, saying that it alone is not true, and if the one who says that everything is false makes his own opinion an exception, saying that it alone is not false, none the less it follows that they will be able “to consider,” or bring forward, an infinite number of true statements against those who hold that all are false, and an infinite number of false statements against those who hold that all are true. For granted that one opinion is true, it follows that an infinite number are true. And granted that one opinion is false, it follows that an infinite number are false. For if the position, or opinion, that Socrates is sitting is true, then the opinion that it is true that Socrates is sitting will also be true, and so on to infinity. For he who says that a true statement is true is always right; and he who says that a false statement is true is always wrong; and this can proceed to infinity. 744. Now it is (398). Deinde cum dicit palam autem disputat contra opiniones destruentes principia naturae, scilicet motum et quietem: et circa hoc tria facit. He argues against those who destroy the principles of nature, i.e., motion and rest, and in regard to this he does three things. Primo tangit falsitatem harum opinionum; dicens, quod ex praedictis est manifestum, quod nec opinio dicens omnia moveri, nec opinio dicens omnia quiescere, vera est. First, he mentions the falsity of these opinions, saying that it is evident, from what has been said above, that neither the opinion which states that everything is in motion, nor the one which states that everything is at rest, is true. 745. For if all things (399). Deinde cum dicit nam si quiescunt secundo ostendit has opiniones esse falsas. Et primo ostendit quod opinio sit falsa, quae ponit omnia quiescere: quia si omnia quiescunt, tunc nihil removetur a dispositione, in qua aliquando est; et ideo quicquid est verum, semper erit verum, et quicquid est falsum, semper est falsum. Sed hoc videtur inconveniens: transmutatur enim veritas et falsitas propositionis. Nec hoc est mirum: quia homo, qui opinatur vel profert propositionem, aliquando non erat, postmodum fuit, et iterum non erit. Second, he shows that these opinions are false. First of all he shows that the opinion which holds that everything is at rest is false; for if everything were at rest,’nothing would then be changed from the state in which it sometimes is. Hence, whatever is true would always be true, and whatever is false would always be false. But this seems to be absurd; for the truth and falsity of a proposition is changeable. Nor is this to be wondered at, because the man who has an opinion or makes a statement at one time was not and now is and again will not be. Secundo ostendit esse falsam opinionem quae ponit omnia moveri, duabus rationibus. Quarum primam ponit ibi, si vero omnia. Quae talis est. Si omnia moventur et nihil est quiescens, nihil erit verum in rebus: quia quod est verum, iam est; quod autem movetur nondum est: ergo oportet omnia esse falsa: quod est impossibile, ut ostensum est. 746. Second, he uses two arguments to show that the opinion which holds that all things are in motion is false. He gives the first (400) where he says, “And if all things.” It is as follows. If all things are in motion and nothing is at rest, nothing will be true in the world; for what is true already exists, but what is in motion does not yet exist. Hence everything must be false. But this is impossible, as has been shown (395:C 740). 747. Further, it must be (401). Deinde cum dicit amplius autem secundam rationem ponit, quae talis est. Omne quod permutatur, necessario est ens; quia omne quod permutatur, ex aliquo in aliud permutatur; et omne quod in aliquo permutatur, inest ei quod permutatur. Unde non oportet dicere quod quicquid est in re permutata, mutetur, sed quod aliquid sit manens; et ita non omnia moventur. He gives the second argument, and it runs thus: everything that is undergoing change is necessarily a being, because everything that is being changed is being changed from something to something else, and everything that is being changed in something else belongs to the subject that is undergoing change. Hence it is not necessary to say that everything in the subject undergoing change is being changed, but that there is something which remains. Hence not everything is in motion. 748. But it is not (402). Deinde cum dicit sed nec omnia tertiam rationem ponit, excludens quamdam falsam opinionem, quae posset occasionari ex praedictis. Posset enim aliquis credere quod, quia non omnia moventur nec omnia quiescunt, quod ideo omnia quandoque moventur et quandoque quiescunt. Et hoc removens, dicit, quod non est verum quod omnia quandoque quiescant et quandoque moveantur. Sunt enim quaedam mobilia, quae semper moventur; scilicet corpora super caelestia; et est quoddam movens, scilicet primum, quod semper est immobile, et semper eodem modo se habet, ut probatum est octavo physicorum. He gives the third argument, and it disposes of a false opinion which could arise from what has been said above. For, since not all things are in motion nor all at rest, someone could therefore think that all things are sometimes in motion and sometimes at rest. In disposing of this opinion he says that, it is not true that all things are sometimes in motion and sometimes at rest, for there are certain movable things which are always being moved, namely, the celestial bodies above us, and there is a mover, namely, the first, which is always immovable and ever in the same state, as has been proved in Book VIII of the Physics.