METAPHYSICS
BOOK VII

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapters 1 & 2: 1028a 10-1028b 32
[1028α] [10] τὸ ὂν λέγεται πολλαχῶς, καθάπερ διειλόμεθα πρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ τοῦ ποσαχῶς: σημαίνει γὰρ τὸ μὲν τί ἐστι καὶ τόδε τι, τὸ δὲ ποιὸν ἢ ποσὸν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον τῶν οὕτω κατηγορουμένων. τοσαυταχῶς δὲ λεγομένου τοῦ ὄντος φανερὸν ὅτι τούτων πρῶτον ὂν τὸ τί ἐστιν, ὅπερ σημαίνει [15] τὴν οὐσίαν	560. The term being is used in many senses, as we have explained in our discussions on the different meanings of words (435). For in one sense it signifies the whatness of a thing and this particular thing; and in another sense it signifies of what sort a thing is or how much or any one of the other things which are predicated in this way. But of all the senses in which being is used, it is evident that the first of these is the whatness of a thing, which indicates substance.
(ὅταν μὲν γὰρ εἴπωμεν ποῖόν τι τόδε, ἢ ἀγαθὸν λέγομεν ἢ κακόν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τρίπηχυ ἢ ἄνθρωπον: ὅταν δὲ τί ἐστιν, οὐ λευκὸν οὐδὲ θερμὸν οὐδὲ τρίπηχυ, ἀλλὰ ἄνθρωπον ἢ θεόν), τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα λέγεται ὄντα τῷ τοῦ οὕτως ὄντος τὰ μὲν ποσότητες εἶναι, τὰ δὲ ποιότητες, τὰ δὲ πάθη, τὰ δὲ [20] ἄλλο τι.	561. For when we state of what sort a thing is, we say that it is good or evil, and not that it is three cubits long or a man; but when we state what a thing is, we do not say that it is white or black or three cubits long, but that it is a man or a god. And other things are called beings because they belong to such a being; for some are qualities of it, others quantities, others affections, and so on.
διὸ κἂν ἀπορήσειέ τις πότερον τὸ βαδίζειν καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ τὸ καθῆσθαι ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ὂν σημαίνει, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁτουοῦν τῶν τοιούτων: οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐστὶν οὔτε καθ᾽ αὑτὸ πεφυκὸς οὔτε χωρίζεσθαι δυνατὸν τῆς οὐσίας, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον, εἴπερ, τὸ βαδίζον [25] τῶν ὄντων καὶ τὸ καθήμενον καὶ τὸ ὑγιαῖνον. ταῦτα δὲ μᾶλλον φαίνεται ὄντα, διότι ἔστι τι τὸ ὑποκείμενον αὐτοῖς ὡρισμένον (τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον), ὅπερ ἐμφαίνεται ἐν τῇ κατηγορίᾳ τῇ τοιαύτῃ: τὸ ἀγαθὸν γὰρ ἢ τὸ καθήμενον οὐκ ἄνευ τούτου λέγεται. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι διὰ [30] ταύτην κἀκείνων ἕκαστον ἔστιν, ὥστε τὸ πρώτως ὂν καὶ οὐ τὶ ὂν ἀλλ᾽ ὂν ἁπλῶς ἡ οὐσία ἂν εἴη.	562. Hence one may even be puzzled whether each of the following terms, namely, to walk, to be healthy and to sit, is a being or a non-being. And it is similar in the case of other things such as these; for no one of them is fitted by nature to exist of itself or is capable of existing apart from substance. But if anything is a being, it is rather the thing that walks and sits and is healthy. Now these appear to be beings to a greater degree because there is some subject which underlies them; and this is substance and the individual, which appears in a definite category; for the term good or sitting is not used without this. Evidently then it is by reason of this that each of the other categories is a being. Hence the first kind of being, and not being of a special sort but being in an unqualified sense, will be substance.
πολλαχῶς μὲν οὖν λέγεται τὸ πρῶτον: ὅμως δὲ πάντως ἡ οὐσία πρῶτον, καὶ λόγῳ καὶ γνώσει καὶ χρόνῳ. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλων κατηγορημάτων οὐθὲν χωριστόν, αὕτη δὲ μόνη: καὶ τῷ λόγῳ δὲ τοῦτο [35] πρῶτον (ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἑκάστου λόγῳ τὸν τῆς οὐσίας ἐνυπάρχειν): καὶ εἰδέναι δὲ τότ᾽ οἰόμεθα ἕκαστον μάλιστα, ὅταν τί ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος γνῶμεν ἢ τὸ πῦρ, [1028β] [1] μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ποιὸν ἢ τὸ ποσὸν ἢ τὸ πού, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτῶν τούτων τότε ἕκαστον ἴσμεν, ὅταν τί ἐστι τὸ ποσὸν ἢ τὸ ποιὸν γνῶμεν.	563. Now there are several senses in which a thing is said to be first; but substance is first in every respect: in definition, in the order of knowing, and in time; for none of the other categories can exist separately, but only substance. And it is first in definition, because in the definition of each thing it is necessary to include the definition of substance. And we think that we know each thing best when we know what it is (for example, what a man is or what fire is) rather than when we know of what sort it is or how much it is or where it is; for we know each of these things only when we know what the quality or quantity is.
καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ πάλαι τε καὶ νῦν καὶ ἀεὶ ζητούμενον καὶ ἀεὶ ἀπορούμενον, τί τὸ ὄν, τοῦτό ἐστι τίς ἡ οὐσία (τοῦτο γὰρ οἱ μὲν ἓν εἶναί [5] φασιν οἱ δὲ πλείω ἢ ἕν, καὶ οἱ μὲν πεπερασμένα οἱ δὲ ἄπειρα), διὸ καὶ ἡμῖν καὶ μάλιστα καὶ πρῶτον καὶ μόνον ὡς εἰπεῖν περὶ τοῦ οὕτως ὄντος θεωρητέον τί ἐστιν.	564. And the question which was raised formerly and is raised now and always, and which always causes difficulty, is what being is; and this is the question what substance is. For some say that it is one, and others more than one; and some say that it is limited, and others unlimited. And for this reason we must investigate chiefly and primarily and solely, as we might say, what this kind of being is.
Chapter 2
δοκεῖ δ᾽ ἡ οὐσία ὑπάρχειν φανερώτατα μὲν τοῖς σώμασιν (διὸ τά τε ζῷα καὶ τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ μόρια αὐτῶν [10] οὐσίας εἶναί φαμεν, καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ σώματα, οἷον πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἕκαστον, καὶ ὅσα ἢ μόρια τούτων ἢ ἐκ τούτων ἐστίν, ἢ μορίων ἢ πάντων, οἷον ὅ τε οὐρανὸς καὶ τὰ μόρια αὐτοῦ, ἄστρα καὶ σελήνη καὶ ἥλιος): πότερον δὲ αὗται μόναι οὐσίαι εἰσὶν ἢ καὶ ἄλλαι, ἢ τούτων τινὲς [15] ἢ καὶ ἄλλαι, ἢ τούτων μὲν οὐθὲν ἕτεραι δέ τινες, σκεπτέον.	565. Now it seems that substance is found most evidently in bodies. Hence we say that animals and plants and their parts are substances, and also natural bodies, such as fire, water, earth and particular things of this kind, and all things which are either parts of these or composed of these, either of parts or of all, for example, the heaven and its parts, such as the stars, the moon and the sun. But whether these alone are substances, or other things also are, or none of these but certain other things, must be investigated.
δοκεῖ δέ τισι τὰ τοῦ σώματος πέρατα, οἷον ἐπιφάνεια καὶ γραμμὴ καὶ στιγμὴ καὶ μονάς, εἶναι οὐσίαι, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὸ στερεόν. ἔτι παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ οἱ μὲν οὐκ οἴονται εἶναι οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον, οἱ δὲ πλείω καὶ μᾶλλον ὄντα ἀΐδια, ὥσπερ Πλάτων [20] τά τε εἴδη καὶ τὰ μαθηματικὰ δύο οὐσίας, τρίτην δὲ τὴν τῶν αἰσθητῶν σωμάτων οὐσίαν, Σπεύσιππος δὲ καὶ πλείους οὐσίας ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἀρξάμενος, καὶ ἀρχὰς ἑκάστης οὐσίας, ἄλλην μὲν ἀριθμῶν ἄλλην δὲ μεγεθῶν, ἔπειτα ψυχῆς: καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον ἐπεκτείνει τὰς οὐσίας. ἔνιοι δὲ [25] τὰ μὲν εἴδη καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχειν φασὶ φύσιν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἐχόμενα, γραμμὰς καὶ ἐπίπεδα, μέχρι πρὸς τὴν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ οὐσίαν καὶ τὰ αἰσθητά.	566. Again, it seems to some that the limits of a body, such as surface, line, point and unit, are substances to a greater degree than a body or solid. And some are of the opinion that there is nothing of this sort apart from sensible substances, while others think that there are eternal substances which are more numerous and possess being to a greater degree. Thus Plato claimed that there are two kinds of substances: the separate Forms and the objects of mathematics, and a third kind: the substances of sensible bodies. And Speusippus admitted still more kinds of substances, beginning with the unit; and he posited principles for each kind of substance: one for numbers, another for continuous quantities, and still another for the soul; and by proceeding in this way he increases the kinds of substance. And some say that the separate Forms and numbers have the same nature, and that other things, such as lines and surfaces, depend on these; and so on until one comes to the substance of the heavens and sensible bodies.
περὶ δὴ τούτων τί λέγεται καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς, καὶ τίνες εἰσὶν οὐσίαι, καὶ πότερον εἰσί τινες παρὰ τὰς αἰσθητὰς ἢ οὐκ εἰσί, καὶ αὗται πῶς [30] εἰσί, καὶ πότερον ἔστι τις χωριστὴ οὐσία, καὶ διὰ τί καὶ πῶς, ἢ οὐδεμία, παρὰ τὰς αἰσθητάς, σκεπτέον, ὑποτυπωσαμένοις τὴν οὐσίαν πρῶτον τί ἐστιν.	567. Regarding these matters, then, it is necessary to investigate which statements are true and which are not; and what things are substances; and whether there are or are not any ‘substances in addition to sensible ones; and how these exist; and whether there is any separable substance (and if so, why and how), or whether there is no such substance apart from sensible ones. This must be done after we have first described what substance is.

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapters 3 & 4: 1028b 33-1029b 12
λέγεται δ᾽ ἡ οὐσία, εἰ μὴ πλεοναχῶς, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τέτταρσί γε μάλιστα: καὶ γὰρ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ τὸ καθόλου [35] καὶ τὸ γένος οὐσία δοκεῖ εἶναι ἑκάστου, καὶ τέταρτον τούτων τὸ ὑποκείμενον. τὸ δ᾽ ὑποκείμενόν ἐστι καθ᾽ οὗ τὰ ἄλλα λέγεται, ἐκεῖνο δὲ αὐτὸ μηκέτι κατ᾽ ἄλλου: διὸ πρῶτον περὶ τούτου διοριστέον: [1029α] [1] μάλιστα γὰρ δοκεῖ εἶναι οὐσία τὸ ὑποκείμενον πρῶτον.	568. The term substance is used chiefly of four things, if not of more; for the essence (or quiddity) and the universal and the genus seem to be the substance of each thing, and fourthly the subject. Now the subject is that of which the others are predicated, while it itself is not predicated of anything else. And for this reason it is first necessary to establish the truth about this, because this first subject seems in the truest sense to be substance.
τοιοῦτον δὲ τρόπον μέν τινα ἡ ὕλη λέγεται, ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ἡ μορφή, τρίτον δὲ τὸ ἐκ τούτων (λέγω δὲ τὴν μὲν ὕλην οἷον τὸν χαλκόν, τὴν δὲ μορφὴν τὸ σχῆμα τῆς [5] ἰδέας, τὸ δ᾽ ἐκ τούτων τὸν ἀνδριάντα τὸ σύνολον),	569. Now in one sense matter is said to be the subject, and in another, the form, and in still another, the thing composed of these. By matter I mean the bronze, and by form the specifying figure, and by the thing composed of these the whole statue.
ὥστε εἰ τὸ εἶδος τῆς ὕλης πρότερον καὶ μᾶλλον ὄν, καὶ τοῦ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν πρότερον ἔσται διὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον. νῦν μὲν οὖν τύπῳ εἴρηται τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία, ὅτι τὸ μὴ καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένου ἀλλὰ καθ᾽ οὗ τὰ ἄλλα: δεῖ δὲ μὴ μόνον οὕτως: οὐ γὰρ ἱκανόν: [10] αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτο ἄδηλον,	570. If, then, the specifying principle is prior to the matter and is being to a greater degree, for the same reason it will also be prior to the thing composed of these. We have now sketched what substance is, namely, that it is not what is predicated of a subject, but that of which all other things are predicated. However, it must not be considered merely in this way; for this is not enough, since this is evident.
καὶ ἔτι ἡ ὕλη οὐσία γίγνεται. εἰ γὰρ μὴ αὕτη οὐσία, τίς ἐστιν ἄλλη διαφεύγει: περιαιρουμένων γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων οὐ φαίνεται οὐδὲν ὑπομένον: τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλα τῶν σωμάτων πάθη καὶ ποιήματα καὶ δυνάμεις, τὸ δὲ μῆκος καὶ πλάτος καὶ βάθος ποσότητές τινες ἀλλ᾽ [15] οὐκ οὐσίαι (τὸ γὰρ ποσὸν οὐκ οὐσία), ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ᾧ ὑπάρχει ταῦτα πρώτῳ, ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν οὐσία. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀφαιρουμένου μήκους καὶ πλάτους καὶ βάθους οὐδὲν ὁρῶμεν ὑπολειπόμενον, πλὴν εἴ τί ἐστι τὸ ὁριζόμενον ὑπὸ τούτων, ὥστε τὴν ὕλην ἀνάγκη φαίνεσθαι μόνην οὐσίαν οὕτω σκοπουμένοις.	571. And from this point of view matter is substance; for if it is not, it eludes us to say what else is. For when everything else is taken away, nothing but matter appears to remain, because the other things are affections, activities and potencies of bodies. And length, width and depth are quantities and not substances; for quantity is not substance, but substance is rather the first thing to which these belong. But when length, width and depth are taken away, we see that nothing remains unless there is something which is limited by them. Hence to those who consider the situation in this way, matter alone must seem to be substance.
[20] λέγω δ᾽ ὕλην ἣ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν μήτε τὶ μήτε ποσὸν μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν λέγεται οἷς ὥρισται τὸ ὄν. ἔστι γάρ τι καθ᾽ οὗ κατηγορεῖται τούτων ἕκαστον, ᾧ τὸ εἶναι ἕτερον καὶ τῶν κατηγοριῶν ἑκάστῃ (τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλα τῆς οὐσίας κατηγορεῖται, αὕτη δὲ τῆς ὕλης), ὥστε τὸ ἔσχατον καθ᾽ αὑτὸ οὔτε τὶ οὔτε ποσὸν [25] οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδέν ἐστιν: οὐδὲ δὴ αἱ ἀποφάσεις, καὶ γὰρ αὗται ὑπάρξουσι κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων θεωροῦσι συμβαίνει οὐσίαν εἶναι τὴν ὕλην: ἀδύνατον δέ:	572. And by matter I mean that which in itself is neither a quiddity nor a quantity nor anything expressed by any of the other categories by which being is made determinate. For there is something of which each of these is predicated, whose being is different from that of each of the other categories, because the others are predicated of substance, but this is predicated of matter. Therefore the ultimate subject is in itself neither a quiddity nor a quantity nor anything else. Nor again is it the negations of these, for they too will be accidental to it. Therefore for those who ponder the question it follows from these arguments that matter is substance.
καὶ γὰρ τὸ χωριστὸν καὶ τὸ τόδε τι ὑπάρχειν δοκεῖ μάλιστα τῇ οὐσίᾳ, διὸ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν οὐσία δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι μᾶλλον [30] τῆς ὕλης.	573. But this is impossible; for to exist separately and to be a particular thing seem to belong chiefly to substance; and for this reason it would seem that the specifying principle and the thing composed of both the specifying principle and matter are substance to a greater degree than matter.
τὴν μὲν τοίνυν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν οὐσίαν, λέγω δὲ τὴν ἔκ τε τῆς ὕλης καὶ τῆς μορφῆς, ἀφετέον, ὑστέρα γὰρ καὶ δήλη: φανερὰ δέ πως καὶ ἡ ὕλη: περὶ δὲ τῆς τρίτης σκεπτέον, αὕτη γὰρ ἀπορωτάτη.	574. Yet that substance which is now composed of both (I mean of form and matter) must be dismissed; for it is subsequent and open to view. And matter too is in a sense evident. But it is necessary to investigate the third kind of substance, for this is the most perplexing.
ὁμολογοῦνται δ᾽ οὐσίαι εἶναι τῶν αἰσθητῶν τινές, ὥστε ἐν ταύταις ζητητέον πρῶτον.	575. Now some admit that among sensible things there are substances, and therefore these must be investigated first.
Chapter 4
πρὸ ἔργου γὰρ τὸ μεταβαίνειν εἰς τὸ γνωριμώτερον. ἡ γὰρ μάθησις οὕτω γίγνεται πᾶσι διὰ τῶν ἧττον γνωρίμων φύσει [5] εἰς τὰ γνώριμα μᾶλλον:	576. Since we have established at the very beginning (568) the different senses into which we have divided the term substance, and that one of these seems to be the essence of a thing, this must be investigated.
καὶ τοῦτο ἔργον ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐκ τῶν ἑκάστῳ ἀγαθῶν τὰ ὅλως ἀγαθὰ ἑκάστῳ ἀγαθά, οὕτως ἐκ τῶν αὐτῷ γνωριμωτέρων τὰ τῇ φύσει γνώριμα αὐτῷ γνώριμα. τὰ δ᾽ ἑκάστοις γνώριμα καὶ πρῶτα πολλάκις ἠρέμα ἐστὶ γνώριμα, καὶ μικρὸν ἢ [10] οὐθὲν ἔχει τοῦ ὄντος: ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως ἐκ τῶν φαύλως μὲν γνωστῶν αὐτῷ δὲ γνωστῶν τὰ ὅλως γνωστὰ γνῶναι πειρατέον, μεταβαίνοντας, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, διὰ τούτων αὐτῶν.	577. For this is a preparatory task in order that one may pass to what is more knowable, because learning is acquired by all in this way, by proceeding from things which are less knowable by nature to those which are more knowable. And just as in practical matters one’s task is to proceed from things which are good for each individual to those which are totally good and good for each, in a similar fashion our task now is to proceed from things which are more knowable to us to those which are more knowable by nature. But what is knowable and first to individual men is often only slightly knowable and has little or nothing of being. Yet starting from what is only slightly knowable but knowable to oneself, we must try to acquire knowledge of things which are wholly knowable, by proceeding, as has been said, by way of the very things which are knowable to us.

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 4: 102gb 12-1030a 17
[1] ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἐν ἀρχῇ διειλόμεθα πόσοις ὁρίζομεν τὴν οὐσίαν, καὶ τούτων ἕν τι ἐδόκει εἶναι τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, θεωρητέον περὶ [13] αὐτοῦ. καὶ πρῶτον εἴπωμεν ἔνια περὶ αὐτοῦ λογικῶς, ὅτι ἐστὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἑκάστου ὃ λέγεται καθ᾽ αὑτό. οὐ γάρ ἐστι τὸ σοὶ [15] εἶναι τὸ μουσικῷ εἶναι: οὐ γὰρ κατὰ σαυτὸν εἶ μουσικός. ὃ ἄρα κατὰ σαυτόν.	578. And first let us make some dialectical comments about the essence of a thing, because the essence of each thing is what each is said to be essentially (per se). For being you is not being musical, because you are not musical essentially. Therefore your essence is what you are said to be essentially.
οὐδὲ δὴ τοῦτο πᾶν: οὐ γὰρ τὸ οὕτως καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ὡς ἐπιφανείᾳ λευκόν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἐπιφανείᾳ εἶναι τὸ λευκῷ εἶναι. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, τὸ ἐπιφανείᾳ λευκῇ, ὅτι πρόσεστιν αὐτό. ἐν ᾧ ἄρα μὴ ἐνέσται λόγῳ [20] αὐτό, λέγοντι αὐτό, οὗτος ὁ λόγος τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι ἑκάστῳ, ὥστ᾽ εἰ τὸ ἐπιφανείᾳ λευκῇ εἶναί ἐστι τὸ ἐπιφανείᾳ εἶναι λείᾳ, τὸ λευκῷ καὶ λείῳ εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἕν.	579. But not even all of this is the essence of a thing; for the essence of a thing is not what is predicated of it essentially in the way that white is predicated of surface, because being a surface is not being white. Nor is the essence of a thing the composite of the two, namely, being a white surface. Why? Because white inheres in surface. Therefore the concept (or formula) which expresses what each thing is but does not contain the thing itself is the concept of its essence. Hence, if being a white surface is always being a smooth surface, then being white and being smooth will be one and the same thing.
ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἔστι καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας κατηγορίας σύνθετα (ἔστι γάρ τι ὑποκείμενον ἑκάστῳ, οἷον τῷ ποιῷ καὶ τῷ ποσῷ καὶ τῷ [25] ποτὲ καὶ τῷ ποὺ καὶ τῇ κινήσει), σκεπτέον ἆρ᾽ ἔστι λόγος τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι ἑκάστῳ αὐτῶν, καὶ ὑπάρχει καὶ τούτοις τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, οἷον λευκῷ ἀνθρώπῳ [τί ἦν λευκῷ ἀνθρώπῳ]. ἔστω δὴ ὄνομα αὐτῷ ἱμάτιον. τί ἐστι τὸ ἱματίῳ εἶναι;	580. Now since there are also composites in the case of the other categories, for there is some subject of each, for example, of quantity, quality, when, where and motion, it is therefore necessary to inquire whether there is a concept of the essence of each one of them, and whether this essence is found in them, for example, whether the essence of white man is found in white man. Now let the name of this composite be garment. What is the essence of garment?
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῶν καθ᾽ αὑτὸ λεγομένων οὐδὲ τοῦτο. ἢ τὸ οὐ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ [30] λέγεται διχῶς, καὶ τούτου ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν ἐκ προσθέσεως τὸ δὲ οὔ. τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῷ αὐτὸ ἄλλῳ προσκεῖσθαι λέγεται ὃ ὁρίζεται, οἷον εἰ τὸ λευκῷ εἶναι ὁριζόμενος λέγοι λευκοῦ ἀνθρώπου λόγον: τὸ δὲ τῷ ἄλλο αὐτῷ, οἷον εἰ σημαίνοι τὸ ἱμάτιον λευκὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὁ δὲ ὁρίζοιτο ἱμάτιον ὡς λευκόν. τὸ δὴ λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος ἔστι μὲν λευκόν, [1030α] [1] οὐ μέντοι <�τὸ> τί ἦν εἶναι λευκῷ εἶναι. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἱματίῳ εἶναι ἆρά ἐστι τί ἦν εἶναί τι [ἢ] ὅλως; ἢ οὔ; ὅπερ γάρ τί ἐστι τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι: ὅταν δ᾽ ἄλλο κατ᾽ ἄλλου λέγηται, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπερ τόδε τι, οἷον ὁ [5] λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπερ τόδε τι, εἴπερ τὸ τόδε ταῖς οὐσίαις ὑπάρχει μόνον: ὥστε τὸ τί ἦν εἶναί ἐστιν ὅσων ὁ λόγος ἐστὶν ὁρισμός. ὁρισμὸς δ᾽ ἐστὶν οὐκ ἂν ὄνομα λόγῳ ταὐτὸ σημαίνῃ (πάντες γὰρ ἂν εἶεν οἱ λόγοι ὅροι: ἔσται γὰρ ὄνομα ὁτῳοῦν λόγῳ, ὥστε καὶ ἡ Ἰλιὰς ὁρισμὸς ἔσται), [10] ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν πρώτου τινὸς ᾖ: τοιαῦτα δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὅσα λέγεται μὴ τῷ ἄλλο κατ᾽ ἄλλου λέγεσθαι. οὐκ ἔσται ἄρα οὐδενὶ τῶν μὴ γένους εἰδῶν ὑπάρχον τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τούτοις μόνον (ταῦτα γὰρ δοκεῖ οὐ κατὰ μετοχὴν λέγεσθαι καὶ πάθος οὐδ᾽ ὡς συμβεβηκός): ἀλλὰ λόγος μὲν ἔσται ἑκάστου [15] καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τί σημαίνει, ἐὰν ᾖ ὄνομα, ὅτι τόδε τῷδε ὑπάρχει, ἢ ἀντὶ λόγου ἁπλοῦ ἀκριβέστερος: ὁρισμὸς δ᾽ οὐκ ἔσται οὐδὲ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι.	581. But neither is this one of those terms which are predicated essentially. Now there are two ways in which a term can be predicated in a non-essential way of a subject: one of these is by addition, and the other is not. For in one case the term is predicated of the thing defined because the term is added to something else. For example, if in defining white one might give the concept of white man. And in the other case it is so predicated because some other term is added to the subject; for example, if the word garment were to signify white man, and someone were to define a garment as white, then a white man would be something white, yet his essence does not consist in being white, but in being a garment. Therefore the essence is what a thing of a definite sort is, whether it expresses that thing wholly or not. Now a thing’s essence is what a thing is. But when something is predicated of another this is not some definite thing; for example, white man is not really a definite thing, i.e., if being a definite thing belongs to substances alone. Hence essence belongs to those things whose concept is a definition. Now there is not a definition if the name signifies the same thing as the concept; for then all concepts would be limiting terms, because the name of any concept would be the same. Hence even the Iliad will be a definition. But there is a definition if the concept is of some primary thing. And such things are those which are predicated without predicating something else of the subject. Thus essence will not be found in any of those things which are not species of a genus, but in these alone; for it seems that these things are not predicated according to participation and affection, or as an accident. But of each of the other things, if it has a name, there will be a concept of what it means, namely, that this accident inheres in this subject; or in place of a simple term one will be able to give a more definite one; but there will be no definition or essence.

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapters 4 & 5: 1030a 17-1031a 14
ἢ καὶ ὁ ὁρισμὸς ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ τί ἐστι πλεοναχῶς λέγεται; καὶ γὰρ τὸ τί ἐστιν ἕνα μὲν τρόπον σημαίνει τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ τόδε τι, ἄλλον δὲ ἕκαστον [20] τῶν κατηγορουμένων, ποσὸν ποιὸν καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἔστιν ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν πρώτως τοῖς δ᾽ ἑπομένως, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τί ἐστιν ἁπλῶς μὲν τῇ οὐσίᾳ πὼς δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις: καὶ γὰρ τὸ ποιὸν ἐροίμεθ᾽ ἂν τί ἐστιν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ ποιὸν τῶν τί ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾽ [25] οὐχ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος λογικῶς φασί τινες εἶναι τὸ μὴ ὄν, οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ μὴ ὄν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ποιόν.	582. Or another solution is that definition, like the whatness of a thing, is used in many senses. For in one sense whatness signifies the substance and this particular thing, and in another sense it signifies any of the categories, such as quantity, quality, and others such as these. For just as being is found in all things, although not in the same way, but in one thing primarily and in the others secondarily, so too whatness is found in an unqualified sense in substance, but in another sense in the other categories. For we might even speak of the whatness of quality, so that quality is also one of those things which have whatness; not in an unqualified sense, however, but just as some say, in a logical sense, that non-being is, not in an unqualified sense, but insofar as it is nonbeing; and this is also the case with quality.
δεῖ μὲν οὖν σκοπεῖν καὶ τὸ πῶς δεῖ λέγειν περὶ ἕκαστον, οὐ μὴν μᾶλλόν γε ἢ τὸ πῶς ἔχει: διὸ καὶ νῦν ἐπεὶ τὸ λεγόμενον φανερόν, καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ὁμοίως ὑπάρξει πρώτως [30] μὲν καὶ ἁπλῶς τῇ οὐσίᾳ, εἶτα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ τί ἐστιν, οὐχ ἁπλῶς τί ἦν εἶναι ἀλλὰ ποιῷ ἢ ποσῷ τί ἦν εἶναι. δεῖ γὰρ ἢ ὁμωνύμως ταῦτα φάναι εἶναι ὄντα, ἢ προστιθέντας καὶ ἀφαιροῦντας, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐπιστητὸν ἐπιστητόν, ἐπεὶ τό γε ὀρθόν ἐστι μήτε ὁμωνύμως φάναι [35] μήτε ὡσαύτως ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ τὸ ἰατρικὸν τῷ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν καὶ ἕν, οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ δὲ καὶ ἕν, οὐ μέντοι οὐδὲ ὁμωνύμως: [1030β] [1] οὐδὲ γὰρ ἰατρικὸν σῶμα καὶ ἔργον καὶ σκεῦος λέγεται οὔτε ὁμωνύμως οὔτε καθ᾽ ἓν ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ὁποτέρως τις ἐθέλει λέγειν διαφέρει οὐδέν:	583. Therefore it is also necessary to consider how we must predicate it of each particular thing, yet not more than the condition of each warrants. Hence, too, since what is said is evident, essence (or whatness) will also be found in like manner primarily and unqualifiedly in substance, and then in the other categories, not as essence in an unqualified sense, but as the essence of quality and quantity. For these things must be said to be beings either equivocally or by adding or removing something, just as it is said that the unknowable is known. For the truth of the matter is that this word is used neither equivocally nor according to the same meaning, but just as the word medical is used in reference to one and the same thing, although not according to one and the same meaning or equivocally; for a body and an operation and an instrument are called medical neither equivocally nor according to one meaning, but in reference to one thing. It makes no difference, then, as to the way in which one wishes to express this.
ἐκεῖνο δὲ φανερὸν [5] ὅτι ὁ πρώτως καὶ ἁπλῶς ὁρισμὸς καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι τῶν οὐσιῶν ἐστίν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως ἐστί, πλὴν οὐ πρώτως. οὐ γὰρ ἀνάγκη, ἂν τοῦτο τιθῶμεν, τούτου ὁρισμὸν εἶναι ὃ ἂν λόγῳ τὸ αὐτὸ σημαίνῃ, ἀλλὰ τινὶ λόγῳ: τοῦτο δὲ ἐὰν ἑνὸς ᾖ, μὴ τῷ συνεχεῖ ὥσπερ ἡ Ἰλιὰς ἢ ὅσα συνδέσμω [10] ι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν ὁσαχῶς λέγεται τὸ ἕν: τὸ δ᾽ ἓν λέγεται ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν: τὸ δὲ ὂν τὸ μὲν τόδε τι τὸ δὲ ποσὸν τὸ δὲ ποιόν τι σημαίνει. διὸ καὶ λευκοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἔσται λόγος καὶ ὁρισμός, ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον καὶ τοῦ λευκοῦ καὶ οὐσίας.	584. Now it is evident that definition and essence in the primary and unqualified sense belong to substances. And they belong not only to these but also to other things as well, although not in the primary sense. For if we maintain this, it is not necessary that there be a definition of any word which means the same thing as any concept, but it must mean the same thing as any determinate concept. And this will be the case if it is the concept of some one thing, not because it is continuous, like the Iliad, or one of the things which are one by being linked together, but if it is one according to one of the many meanings of that term. But the word one is used in the same number of senses as being is; and in one sense being signifies a particular thing, and in another, quantity, and in another quality. And for this reason there will be a definition and concept of white man, but in a different sense from that of whiteness and of substance.
Chapter 5
ἔχει δ᾽ ἀπορίαν, ἐάν τις μὴ φῇ ὁρισμὸν εἶναι τὸν ἐκ [15] προσθέσεως λόγον, τίνος ἔσται ὁρισμὸς τῶν οὐχ ἁπλῶν ἀλλὰ συνδεδυασμένων: ἐκ προσθέσεως γὰρ ἀνάγκη δηλοῦν. λέγω δὲ οἷον ἔστι ῥὶς καὶ κοιλότης, καὶ σιμότης τὸ ἐκ τῶν δυοῖν λεγόμενον τῷ τόδε ἐν τῷδε, καὶ οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός γε οὔθ᾽ ἡ κοιλότης οὔθ᾽ ἡ σιμότης πάθος τῆς ῥινός, ἀλλὰ καθ᾽ [20] αὑτήν: οὐδ᾽ ὡς τὸ λευκὸν Καλλίᾳ, ἢ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτι Καλλίας λευκὸς ᾧ συμβέβηκεν ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς τὸ ἄρρεν τῷ ζῴῳ καὶ τὸ ἴσον τῷ ποσῷ καὶ πάντα ὅσα λέγεται καθ᾽ αὑτὰ ὑπάρχειν. ταῦτα δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἐν ὅσοις ὑπάρχει ἢ ὁ λόγος ἢ τοὔνομα οὗ ἐστὶ τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, καὶ μὴ ἐνδέχεται δηλῶσαι [25] χωρίς, ὥσπερ τὸ λευκὸν ἄνευ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐνδέχεται ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τὸ θῆλυ ἄνευ τοῦ ζῴου: ὥστε τούτων τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ ὁρισμὸς ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδενὸς ἤ, εἰ ἔστιν, ἄλλως, καθάπερ εἰρήκαμεν.	585. Now if one denies that a concept which involves the addition of something else is a definition, the problem arises how there can be a definition of things which are not simple but compound; for this must come about by way of addition. I mean, for example, that there is nose and concavity and snubness, which is a word compounded of the two, because the one is found in the other; and neither concavity nor snubness is an accidental attribute of nose, but an essential one. Nor do they belong to nose as white belongs to Callias or to man (because Callias, who happens to be a man, is white), but as male belongs to animal and equal to quantity, and as all those attributes which are said to belong to something else essentially. Now these attributes are those in which is found either the concept or name of the subject to which each one belongs, and which cannot be explained apart from it; for example, it is impossible to explain white apart from man, but not female apart from animal. Hence there is either no essence and definition of any of these things, or if there is, it is in the way we have described (582-84).
ἔστι δὲ ἀπορία καὶ ἑτέρα περὶ αὐτῶν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτό ἐστι σιμὴ ῥὶς καὶ κοίλη ῥίς, τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται τὸ σιμὸν καὶ τὸ [30] κοῖλον: εἰ δὲ μή, διὰ τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶναι εἰπεῖν τὸ σιμὸν ἄνευ τοῦ πράγματος οὗ ἐστὶ πάθος καθ᾽ αὑτό (ἔστι γὰρ τὸ σιμὸν κοιλότης ἐν ῥινί), τὸ ῥῖνα σιμὴν εἰπεῖν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ δὶς τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται εἰρημένον, ῥὶς ῥὶς κοίλη (ἡ γὰρ ῥὶς ἡ σιμὴ ῥὶς ῥὶς κοίλη ἔσται), διὸ ἄτοπον τὸ ὑπάρχειν τοῖς τοιούτοις τὸ τί [35] ἦν εἶναι: εἰ δὲ μή, εἰς ἄπειρον εἶσιν: ῥινὶ γὰρ ῥινὶ σιμῇ ἔτι ἄλλο ἐνέσται. [1031α] [1] δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι μόνης τῆς οὐσίας ἐστὶν ὁ ὁρισμός. εἰ γὰρ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κατηγοριῶν, ἀνάγκη ἐκ προσθέσεως εἶναι, οἷον τοῦ ποιοῦ καὶ περιττοῦ: οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ ἀριθμοῦ, οὐδὲ τὸ θῆλυ ἄνευ ζῴου (τὸ δὲ ἐκ προσθέσεως λέγω ἐν οἷς [5] συμβαίνει δὶς τὸ αὐτὸ λέγειν ὥσπερ ἐν τούτοις). εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἀληθές, οὐδὲ συνδυαζομένων ἔσται, οἷον ἀριθμοῦ περιττοῦ:	586. And there is also a second difficulty about them. For if snub nose and concave nose are the same, snub and concave will be the same; but if they are not, then, since it is impossible to use the word snub without the thing of which it is a proper attribute (because snub is concavity in a nose), either it is impossible to speak of a snub nose, or the same term is used twice-a concave nose nose. For a snub nose will be a concave nose nose. Hence it is absurd that such things should have an essence. And if they have, there will be an infinite regression; because some other nose will be found in the nose of snub-nose. It is clear, then, that there is definition of substance alone; for if the other categories also had a definition, this would have to be a result of adding something, just as there is no definition of equal and odd without number or of female without animal. And by “adding something” I mean those expressions in which the same thing happens to be said twice. And if this is true, there will not be any definition of those things which are compounded, for example, odd number.
ἀλλὰ λανθάνει ὅτι οὐκ ἀκριβῶς λέγονται οἱ λόγοι. εἰ δ᾽ εἰσὶ καὶ τούτων ὅροι, ἤτοι ἄλλον τρόπον εἰσὶν ἢ καθάπερ ἐλέχθη πολλαχῶς λεκτέον εἶναι τὸν ὁρισμὸν καὶ τὸ τί ἦν [10] εἶναι, ὥστε ὡδὶ μὲν οὐδενὸς ἔσται ὁρισμὸς οὐδὲ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι οὐδενὶ ὑπάρξει πλὴν ταῖς οὐσίαις, ὡδὶ δ᾽ ἔσται. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὁ ὁρισμὸς ὁ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι λόγος, καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἢ μόνων τῶν οὐσιῶν ἐστὶν ἢ μάλιστα καὶ πρώτως καὶ ἁπλῶς, δῆλον. [15]	587. But this is hidden from us, because the concepts of these things are not expressed exactly. But if these things also have formulae, either they have such in a different way-or, as we have said (582-84), definition and essence must be used in many senses. Hence in one sense there will be no definition of anything, and definition and essence will be found only in substance; and in another sense the other things will have a definition and essence. It is evident, then, that a definition is a concept of the essence of a thing, and that essence belongs to substances either alone, or chiefly, primarily, and without qualification.

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 6: 1031a 15-1032a 11
πότερον δὲ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἢ ἕτερον τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ ἕκαστον, σκεπτέον.	588. Moreover, it is necessary to inquire whether each thing and its essence are the same or different; for this is a kind of preamble to the inquiry about substance.
ἔστι γάρ τι πρὸ ἔργου πρὸς τὴν περὶ τῆς οὐσίας σκέψιν: ἕκαστόν τε γὰρ οὐκ ἄλλο δοκεῖ εἶναι τῆς ἑαυτοῦ οὐσίας, καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι λέγεται εἶναι ἡ ἑκάστου οὐσία.	589. For each thing seems not to be different from its own substance, and the essence is said to be the substance of each thing.
ἐπὶ μὲν δὴ τῶν λεγομένων κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δόξειεν ἂν [20] ἕτερον εἶναι, οἷον λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος ἕτερον καὶ τὸ λευκῷ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι (εἰ γὰρ τὸ αὐτό, καὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι καὶ τὸ λευκῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ αὐτό: τὸ αὐτὸ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος καὶ λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος, ὡς φασίν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ λευκῷ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ: ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη ὅσα κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς εἶναι [25] ταὐτά, οὐ γὰρ ὡσαύτως τὰ ἄκρα γίγνεται ταὐτά: ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως γε ἐκεῖνο δόξειεν ἂν συμβαίνειν, τὰ ἄκρα γίγνεσθαι ταὐτὰ τὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἷον τὸ λευκῷ εἶναι καὶ τὸ μουσικῷ:	590. Now in the case of accidental predications each thing would seem to be different from its essence, as a white man would seem to be different from the being of a white man. For if it were the same, then the being of a man and that of a white man would be the same; for a man and a white man are the same, as they say, and therefore the being of a white man is the same as that of a man. Or [perhaps] it is not necessary that all those things which are predicated accidentally should be the same. For the extreme terms of a syllogism do not become the same in an absolute sense. But perhaps it might seem to follow that extreme terms which are accidental become the same, as the being of white and the being of musical. However, this does not seem to be the case.
δοκεῖ δὲ οὔ): ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν καθ᾽ αὑτὰ λεγομένων ἆρ᾽ ἀνάγκη ταὐτὸ εἶναι, οἷον εἴ τινες εἰσὶν οὐσίαι ὧν ἕτεραι [30] μὴ εἰσὶν οὐσίαι μηδὲ φύσεις ἕτεραι πρότεραι, οἵας φασὶ τὰς ἰδέας εἶναί τινες; εἰ γὰρ ἔσται ἕτερον αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι, καὶ ζῷον καὶ τὸ ζῴῳ, καὶ τὸ ὄντι καὶ τὸ ὄν, [1031β] [1] ἔσονται ἄλλαι τε οὐσίαι καὶ φύσεις καὶ ἰδέαι παρὰ τὰς λεγομένας, καὶ πρότεραι οὐσίαι ἐκεῖναι, εἰ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι οὐσία ἐστίν.	591. But in the case of essential predications a thing and its essence must always be the same. And this must be the case if there are substances which have no other substances or natures prior to them, such as some affirm the Ideas to be. For if the being of the good differs from the good-itself, and the being of animal from animal-itself, and the being of being from being-itself, there will be certain substances and natures and Ideas in addition to those mentioned, and these will be prior to substance, if essence belongs to substance.
καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀπολελυμέναι ἀλλήλων, τῶν μὲν οὐκ ἔσται ἐπιστήμη τὰ δ᾽ οὐκ ἔσται ὄντα (λέγω δὲ τὸ ἀπολελύσθαι [5] εἰ μήτε τῷ ἀγαθῷ αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει τὸ εἶναι ἀγαθῷ μήτε τούτῳ τὸ εἶναι ἀγαθόν): ἐπιστήμη τε γὰρ ἑκάστου ἔστιν ὅταν τὸ τί ἦν ἐκείνῳ εἶναι γνῶμεν, καὶ ἐπὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως ἔχει, ὥστε εἰ μηδὲ τὸ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι ἀγαθόν, οὐδὲ τὸ ὄντι ὂν οὐδὲ τὸ ἑνὶ ἕν: ὁμοίως δὲ πάντα ἔστιν ἢ οὐθὲν τὰ [10] τί ἦν εἶναι, ὥστ᾽ εἰ μηδὲ τὸ ὄντι ὄν, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδέν. ἔτι ᾧ μὴ ὑπάρχει ἀγαθῷ εἶναι, οὐκ ἀγαθόν.	592. And if they are separated from each other, there will be no understanding of them, and they will not be beings. Now by separated is meant, if the being of the good is not present in the good-itself, and being good does not belong to this. For there is understanding of each thing by reason of the fact that its being is known; and the same thing applies to the good and to other things. Hence if the being of the good is not good, neither is the being of being being, nor the being of the one one. Now all essences are alike or none of them are. Hence if the essence of being is not being, neither will this be so in the case of other things. Furthermore, anything in which the being of the good is not found is not good.
ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἓν εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι καὶ καλὸν καὶ καλῷ εἶναι, <�καὶ> ὅσα μὴ κατ᾽ ἄλλο λέγεται, ἀλλὰ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ καὶ πρῶτα: καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ἱκανὸν ἂν ὑπάρχῃ, κἂν μὴ ᾖ εἴδη, [15] μᾶλλον δ᾽ ἴσως κἂν ᾖ εἴδη (ἅμα δὲ δῆλον καὶ ὅτι εἴπερ εἰσὶν αἱ ἰδέαι οἵας τινές φασιν, οὐκ ἔσται τὸ ὑποκείμενον οὐσία: ταύτας γὰρ οὐσίας μὲν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, μὴ καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένου δέ: ἔσονται γὰρ κατὰ μέθεξιν). ἔκ τε δὴ τούτων τῶν λόγων ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸ οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αὐτὸ ἕκαστον [20] καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι γε τὸ ἐπίστασθαι ἕκαστον τοῦτό ἐστι, τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἐπίστασθαι, ὥστε καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἔκθεσιν ἀνάγκη ἕν τι εἶναι ἄμφω	593. It is necessary, then, that the good be one with the being of the good, and that the amicable be one with the being of the amicable, and the same is true of all those things which are not predicated of something else, but are predicated primarily and essentially. For it is enough if this is so, even if they are not separate Forms; and perhaps even more if they are. It is also evident at the same time that, if the Ideas are such as some claim their subject will not be substance; for the Ideas must be substances but not be predicable of a subject; for if they were, they would exist only by participation in it. It is clear from these arguments, then, that each thing is one and the same as its essence, but not in an accidental way; and that to know each of these things is to know its essence. Hence according to this exposition both must be one thing.
(τὸ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς λεγόμενον, οἷον τὸ μουσικὸν ἢ λευκόν, διὰ τὸ διττὸν σημαίνειν [24] οὐκ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὡς ταὐτὸ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ αὐτό: καὶ [25] γὰρ ᾧ συμβέβηκε λευκὸν καὶ τὸ συμβεβηκός, ὥστ᾽ ἔστι μὲν ὡς ταὐτόν, ἔστι δὲ ὡς οὐ ταὐτὸ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ αὐτό: τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τῷ λευκῷ ἀνθρώπῳ οὐ ταὐτό, τῷ πάθει δὲ ταὐτό).	594. But it is not true to say that a term which is predicated accidentally, as musical or white, is the same as its essence, in view of its twofold meaning; for both the subject to which the accident belongs and the accident itself are white. Hence in a sense an accident and its essence are the same, and in a sense they are not; for the essence of white is not the same as the essence of white man, but it is the same as the attribute white.
ἄτοπον δ᾽ ἂν φανείη κἂν εἴ τις ἑκάστῳ ὄνομα θεῖτο τῶν τί ἦν εἶναι: ἔσται γὰρ καὶ παρ᾽ ἐκεῖνο [30] ἄλλο, οἷον τῷ τί ἦν εἶναι ἵππῳ τί ἦν εἶναι [ἵππῳ] ἕτερον. καίτοι τί κωλύει καὶ νῦν εἶναι ἔνια εὐθὺς τί ἦν εἶναι, εἴπερ οὐσία τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι; ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐ μόνον ἕν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς αὐτῶν, ὡς δῆλον καὶ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων: [1032α] [1] οὐ γὰρ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἓν τὸ ἑνὶ εἶναι καὶ ἕν.	595. Now the absurdity will become apparent if a name is given to the essence of each one of these; for there will also be another essence besides the original essence; for example, besides the essence of horse there will be another essence of horse. And what will prevent some things from already being the same as their essence, if the essence of a thing is its substance? Indeed, they are not only one, but their intelligible structure is also the same, as is clear from what has been said; for the unity of the essence of the one and the one is not accidental.
ἔτι εἰ ἄλλο ἔσται, εἰς ἄπειρον εἶσιν: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔσται τί ἦν εἶναι τοῦ ἑνὸς τὸ δὲ τὸ ἕν, ὥστε καὶ ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνων ὁ αὐτὸς ἔσται λόγος. ὅτι [5] μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τῶν πρώτων καὶ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ λεγομένων τὸ ἑκάστῳ εἶναι καὶ ἕκαστον τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἕν ἐστι, δῆλον:	596. Again, if they are different, there will be an infinite regress; for the one will be the essence of the being of the one, but the other will be the one itself. Hence the same reasoning will apply in the case of other things. It is clear, then, that in the case of those predications which are primary and essential, each thing and its being are identical.
οἱ δὲ σοφιστικοὶ ἔλεγχοι πρὸς τὴν θέσιν ταύτην φανερὸν ὅτι τῇ αὐτῇ λύονται λύσει καὶ εἰ ταὐτὸ Σωκράτης καὶ Σωκράτει εἶναι: οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει οὔτε ἐξ ὧν ἐρωτήσειεν ἄν τις οὔτε ἐξ ὧν [10] λύων ἐπιτύχοι. πῶς μὲν οὖν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ταὐτὸν καὶ πῶς οὐ ταὐτὸν ἑκάστῳ, εἴρηται.	597. Moreover, it is evident that the sophistical arguments raised against this position, and the question whether Socrates and the being of Socrates are the same, are answered in the same way; for there is no difference either in the things from which one asks the question, or in those from which one solves it. Hence it has now been stated how the essence of each thing is the same as that thing, and how it is not.

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 7: 1032a 12-1033a 23
τῶν δὲ γιγνομένων τὰ μὲν φύσει γίγνεται τὰ δὲ τέχνῃ τὰ δὲ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου,	598. Now of those things which come to be, some come to be by nature, some by art, and some spontaneously.
πάντα δὲ τὰ γιγνόμενα ὑπό τέ τινος γίγνεται καὶ ἔκ τινος καὶ τί: τὸ δὲ τὶ λέγω καθ᾽ [15] ἑκάστην κατηγορίαν: ἢ γὰρ τόδε ἢ ποσὸν ἢ ποιὸν ἢ πού.	599. And everything which comes to be comes to be by something and from something and becomes something. And this something which I say it comes to be may be in any category; for it may come to be either a this or so much or of such a sort or at some time.
αἱ δὲ γενέσεις αἱ μὲν φυσικαὶ αὗταί εἰσιν ὧν ἡ γένεσις ἐκ φύσεώς ἐστιν,	600. Now natural generations are those which come about by nature.
τὸ δ᾽ ἐξ οὗ γίγνεται, ἣν λέγομεν ὕλην, τὸ δὲ ὑφ᾽ οὗ τῶν φύσει τι ὄντων, τὸ δὲ τὶ ἄνθρωπος ἢ φυτὸν ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, ἃ δὴ μάλιστα λέγομεν οὐσίας εἶναι	601. And that from which a thing comes to be is what we call matter; and that by which it comes to be is one of those things which exist by nature. And this something which it comes to be is a man or a plant or some other one of those things which we chiefly claim to be substances.
[20] —ἅπαντα δὲ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἢ φύσει ἢ τέχνῃ ἔχει ὕλην: δυνατὸν γὰρ καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ ἐν ἑκάστῳ ὕλη—	602. Now all things which come to be either by nature or by art have matter; for it is possible for each one of them to be and not to be, and this possibility is the matter of each.
καθόλου δὲ καὶ ἐξ οὗ φύσις καὶ καθ᾽ ὃ φύσις (τὸ γὰρ γιγνόμενον ἔχει φύσιν, οἷον φυτὸν ἢ ζῷον) καὶ ὑφ᾽ οὗ ἡ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος λεγομένη φύσις ἡ ὁμοειδής [25] (αὕτη δὲ ἐν ἄλλῳ): ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ: οὕτω μὲν οὖν γίγνεται τὰ γιγνόμενα διὰ τὴν φύσιν,	603. And in general both that from which they come to be and that according to which they come to be is nature; for the thing generated, such as a plant or an animal, has a nature. And that by which they are generated, i.e., the so-called specific nature, which is specifically the same, is also nature (although this is found in something else); for man begets man. The things which come to be by nature, then, are produced in this way.
αἱ δ᾽ ἄλλαι γενέσεις λέγονται ποιήσεις. πᾶσαι δὲ εἰσὶν αἱ ποιήσεις ἢ ἀπὸ τέχνης ἢ ἀπὸ δυνάμεως ἢ ἀπὸ διανοίας. τούτων δέ τινες γίγνονται καὶ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης παραπλησίως [30] ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἀπὸ φύσεως γιγνομένοις: ἔνια γὰρ κἀκεῖ ταὐτὰ καὶ ἐκ σπέρματος γίγνεται καὶ ἄνευ σπέρματος. περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον,	604. But the other kinds of generation are called “productions”; and all productions are a result either of art, of power, or of mind. And some of these are a result of chance and fortune in the same way as things which come to be by nature; for some of these same things are generated both from seed and without seed. Therefore we shall have to investigate these later on (619).
[1032β] [1] ἀπὸ τέχνης δὲ γίγνεται ὅσων τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ (εἶδος δὲ λέγω τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἑκάστου καὶ τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν): καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἐναντίων τρόπον τινὰ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος: τῆς γὰρ στερήσεως οὐσία ἡ οὐσία ἡ ἀντικειμένη, οἷον ὑγίεια νόσου, ἐκείνης γὰρ ἀπουσία [5] ἡ νόσος, ἡ δὲ ὑγίεια ὁ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ λόγος καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη.	605. Now those things are produced by art whose form exists in the mind; and by form I mean the essence of each thing and its first substance. For even contraries have in a sense the same form; for the substance of a privation is the same as the substance of its opposite, as health is the substance of sickness, for sickness is made apparent by the absence of health; and the health which exists in the mind is the concept in scientific knowledge.
γίγνεται δὲ τὸ ὑγιὲς νοήσαντος οὕτως: ἐπειδὴ τοδὶ ὑγίεια, ἀνάγκη εἰ ὑγιὲς ἔσται τοδὶ ὑπάρξαι, οἷον ὁμαλότητα, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, θερμότητα: καὶ οὕτως ἀεὶ νοεῖ, ἕως ἂν ἀγάγῃ εἰς τοῦτο ὃ αὐτὸς δύναται ἔσχατον ποιεῖν. εἶτα ἤδη [10] ἡ ἀπὸ τούτου κίνησις ποίησις καλεῖται, ἡ ἐπὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν. ὥστε συμβαίνει τρόπον τινὰ τὴν ὑγίειαν ἐξ ὑγιείας γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὴν οἰκίαν ἐξ οἰκίας, τῆς ἄνευ ὕλης τὴν ἔχουσαν ὕλην: ἡ γὰρ ἰατρική ἐστι καὶ ἡ οἰκοδομικὴ τὸ εἶδος τῆς ὑγιείας καὶ τῆς οἰκίας, λέγω δὲ οὐσίαν ἄνευ ὕλης τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι.	606. Health comes about, then, as a result of thinking in this manner: since health is such and such, if health is to exist, such and such a condition must exist, for example, regularity; and if this is to exist there must be heat; and the physician continues to think in this way until he eventually comes to some final tiling which he is capable of doing. Hence, the motion which begins from this, which is ordained to the acquisition of health, is called production. Hence it turns out that in a sense health comes from health, and a house from a house, and what has matter from what is without matter; for the medical art and the building art are the form of health and the form of a house. And by substance without matter I mean the essence.
[15] τῶν δὴ γενέσεων καὶ κινήσεων ἡ μὲν νόησις καλεῖται ἡ δὲ ποίησις, ἡ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ τοῦ εἴδους νόησις ἡ δ᾽ ἀπὸ τοῦ τελευταίου τῆς νοήσεως ποίησις. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν μεταξὺ ἕκαστον γίγνεται. λέγω δ᾽ οἷον εἰ ὑγιανεῖ, δέοι ἂν ὁμαλυνθῆναι. τί οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ ὁμαλυνθῆναι; τοδί, [20] τοῦτο δ᾽ ἔσται εἰ θερμανθήσεται. τοῦτο δὲ τί ἐστι; τοδί. ὑπάρχει δὲ τοδὶ δυνάμει: τοῦτο δὲ ἤδη ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ. τὸ δὴ ποιοῦν καὶ ὅθεν ἄρχεται ἡ κίνησις τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν, ἂν μὲν ἀπὸ τέχνης, τὸ εἶδός ἐστι τὸ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ,	607. Now of generations and motions one part is called thinking and the other producing; for that which proceeds from the principle and the form is thinking, and that which proceeds from the terminus of thinking is producing. And each of the other, intermediate, things is produced in the same way. I mean that if health is to be restored a balance must be achieved. What, then, does a balance involve? Some particular thing. And this will occur if the body is heated. And what does this involve? Something else. And this exists potentially; and it is present already in the physician himself. The thing which produces the effect, then, and that from which the restoration of health begins if it comes to be by art, is the form in the mind.
ἐὰν δ᾽ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου, ἀπὸ τούτου ὅ ποτε τοῦ ποιεῖν ἄρχει τῷ ποιοῦντι ἀπὸ [25] τέχνης, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἰατρεύειν ἴσως ἀπὸ τοῦ θερμαίνειν ἡ ἀρχή (τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖ τῇ τρίψει): ἡ θερμότης τοίνυν ἡ ἐν τῷ σώματι ἢ μέρος τῆς ὑγιείας ἢ ἕπεταί τι αὐτῇ τοιοῦτον ὅ ἐστι μέρος τῆς ὑγιείας, ἢ διὰ πλειόνων: τοῦτο δ᾽ ἔσχατόν ἐστι, τὸ ποιοῦν τὸ μέρος τῆς ὑγιείας, καὶ τῆς οἰκίας [30] (οἷον οἱ λίθοι) καὶ τῶν ἄλλων:	608. But if it comes to be by chance, the thing which produces it is the starting point of production for the one who acts by art. For instance, in the restoration of health the starting point may perhaps be the production of heat, which the physician causes by rubbing. The heat in the body, then, is either a part of health, or it is followed by some such thing as is a part of health, or it comes about through several intermediaries. Now this last thing is the one producing health, and what is such is a part of health, as stones are parts of a house and other materials are parts of other things.
ὥστε, καθάπερ λέγεται, ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι εἰ μηδὲν προϋπάρχοι. ὅτι μὲν οὖν τι μέρος ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρξει φανερόν: ἡ γὰρ ὕλη μέρος (ἐνυπάρχει γὰρ καὶ γίγνεται αὕτη). [1033α] [1] ἀλλ᾽ ἆρα καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ; ἀμφοτέρως δὴ λέγομεν τοὺς χαλκοῦς κύκλους τί εἰσι, καὶ τὴν ὕλην λέγοντες ὅτι χαλκός, καὶ τὸ εἶδος ὅτι σχῆμα τοιόνδε, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ γένος εἰς ὃ πρῶτον τίθεται. ὁ δὴ [5] χαλκοῦς κύκλος ἔχει ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τὴν ὕλην.	609. Hence, as is said, it is impossible for anything to be produced if nothing pre-exists. Therefore that some part will necessarily pre-exist is evident; for the matter is a part, since it exists in the product and becomes something. Hence it is also one of those things which are contained in the intelligible expression of a thing. And we describe what brazen circles are in both ways, saying about the matter that it is bronze, and about the specifying principle that it is such and such a figure. And this is the genus in which circle is first placed. Hence a brazen circle has matter in its intelligible expression.
ἐξ οὗ δὲ ὡς ὕλης γίγνεται ἔνια λέγεται, ὅταν γένηται, οὐκ ἐκεῖνο ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνινον, οἷον ὁ ἀνδριὰς οὐ λίθος ἀλλὰ λίθινος, ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ὁ ὑγιαίνων οὐ λέγεται ἐκεῖνο ἐξ οὗ: αἴτιον δὲ ὅτι γίγνεται ἐκ τῆς στερήσεως καὶ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, ὃ λέγομεν τὴν [10] ὕλην (οἷον καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ κάμνων γίγνεται ὑγιής), μᾶλλον μέντοι λέγεται γίγνεσθαι ἐκ τῆς στερήσεως, οἷον ἐκ κάμνοντος ὑγιὴς ἢ ἐξ ἀνθρώπου, διὸ κάμνων μὲν ὁ ὑγιὴς οὐ λέγεται, ἄνθρωπος δέ, καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὑγιής: ὧν δ᾽ ἡ στέρησις ἄδηλος καὶ ἀνώνυμος, οἷον ἐν χαλκῷ σχήματος ὁποιουοῦν ἢ [15] ἐν πλίνθοις καὶ ξύλοις οἰκίας, ἐκ τούτων δοκεῖ γίγνεσθαι ὡς ἐκεῖ ἐκ κάμνοντος: διὸ ὥσπερ οὐδ᾽ ἐκεῖ ἐξ οὗ τοῦτο, ἐκεῖνο οὐ λέγεται, οὐδ᾽ ἐνταῦθα ὁ ἀνδριὰς ξύλον, ἀλλὰ παράγεται ξύλινος, [οὐ ξύλον,] καὶ χαλκοῦς ἀλλ᾽ οὐ χαλκός, καὶ λίθινος ἀλλ᾽ οὐ λίθος, καὶ ἡ οἰκία πλινθίνη ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πλίνθοι, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ [20] ὡς ἐκ ξύλου γίγνεται ἀνδριὰς ἢ ἐκ πλίνθων οἰκία, ἐάν τις ἐπιβλέπῃ σφόδρα, οὐκ ἂν ἁπλῶς εἴπειεν, διὰ τὸ δεῖν μεταβάλλοντος γίγνεσθαι ἐξ οὗ, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὑπομένοντος. διὰ μὲν οὖν τοῦτο οὕτως λέγεται.	610. Now as for that from which as matter a thing, is produced, some things when they are produced are hot said to be that but of that kind; for instance, a statue is not stone but of stone. And a man who is recovering his health is not said to be that from which he has come. The reason is that, although a thing comes both from its privation and from its subject, which we call matter (for example, what becomes healthy is both a man and one who is sick), we say that it comes rather from its privation (for example, a healthy person comes from a sick one rather than from a man). And for this reason a healthy person is not said to be a sick one, but to be a man, and the man is said to be healthy. However, as regards those things of which the privation is not evident and is nameless (for example, the privation of some particular figure in bronze or in the bricks and timbers of a house), the thing produced seems to come from these just as a healthy person comes from a sick one. Hence, just as in the former case a thing is not said to be that from which it comes to be, so too in this case the statue is not said to be wood but wooden, not bronze but brazen, not stone but of stone; and a house is not said to be bricks but of bricks. For if someone were to examine the question carefully, he would not say without qualification either that the statue comes from wood or the house from bricks, because there must be change in that from which something comes to be without remaining. It is for this reason, then, that we speak in this way.

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 8: 1033a 24-1034a 8
ἐπεὶ δὲ ὑπό τινός τε γίγνεται τὸ γιγνόμενον (τοῦτο δὲ [25] λέγω ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεώς ἐστι) καὶ ἔκ τινος (ἔστω δὲ μὴ ἡ στέρησις τοῦτο ἀλλ᾽ ἡ ὕλη: ἤδη γὰρ διώρισται ὃν τρόπον τοῦτο λέγομεν) καὶ τὶ γίγνεται (τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἢ σφαῖρα ἢ κύκλος ἢ ὅ τι ἔτυχε τῶν ἄλλων), ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ποιεῖ, τὸν χαλκόν, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὴν σφαῖραν, εἰ μὴ [30] κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὅτι ἡ χαλκῆ σφαῖρα σφαῖρά ἐστιν ἐκείνην δὲ ποιεῖ. τὸ γὰρ τόδε τι ποιεῖν ἐκ τοῦ ὅλως ὑποκειμένου τόδε τι ποιεῖν ἐστίν (λέγω δ᾽ ὅτι τὸν χαλκὸν στρογγύλον ποιεῖν ἐστὶν οὐ τὸ στρογγύλον ἢ τὴν σφαῖραν ποιεῖν ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερόν τι, οἷον τὸ εἶδος τοῦτο ἐν ἄλλῳ: εἰ γὰρ ποιεῖ, ἔκ τινος ἂν ποιοίη ἄλλου, τοῦτο γὰρ ὑπέκειτο: [1033β] [1] οἷον ποιεῖ χαλκῆν σφαῖραν, τοῦτο δὲ οὕτως ὅτι ἐκ τουδί, ὅ ἐστι χαλκός, τοδὶ ποιεῖ, ὅ ἐστι σφαῖρα): εἰ οὖν καὶ τοῦτο ποιεῖ αὐτό, δῆλον ὅτι ὡσαύτως ποιήσει, καὶ βαδιοῦνται αἱ γενέσεις εἰς ἄπειρον. [5] φανερὸν ἄρα ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸ εἶδος, ἢ ὁτιδήποτε χρὴ καλεῖν τὴν ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ μορφήν, οὐ γίγνεται, οὐδ᾽ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ γένεσις, [7] οὐδὲ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι (τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ὃ ἐν ἄλλῳ γίγνεται ἢ ὑπὸ τέχνης ἢ ὑπὸ φύσεως ἢ δυνάμεως).	611. Now since that which comes to be comes to be by something (and by this I mean the principle of generation), and from something (and by this let us understand not the privation but the matter; for this has already been defined [601] in our discussion about these things), and becomes something (i.e., a sphere or a circle or whatever else it may be), just as the agent does not produce the underlying subject, i.e., the bronze, neither does he produce a sphere, except accidentally, because a brazen sphere is a sphere and he produces the former. For to make this particular thing is to make it out of the subject totally. I mean that to make the bronze round is not to make round or sphere but something else, i.e., to cause this form in something else. For if he makes a form he makes it out of something else (this was assumed above); for example, he makes a brazen sphere. And he makes this in the sense that he makes this thing which is a sphere out of this thing which is bronze. Hence if he also produces the underlying subject itself, evidently he will produce it in the same way, and processes of generation will then proceed to infinity. Hence it is evident that neither the form nor anything else which we term the form in a sensible thing comes to be; i.e., the form or essence is not generated, for this is what comes to be in some thing else either by art, by nature or by power.
τὸ δὲ χαλκῆν σφαῖραν εἶναι ποιεῖ: ποιεῖ γὰρ ἐκ χαλκοῦ καὶ σφαίρας: [10] εἰς τοδὶ γὰρ τὸ εἶδος ποιεῖ, καὶ ἔστι τοῦτο σφαῖρα χαλκῆ. τοῦ δὲ σφαίρᾳ εἶναι ὅλως εἰ ἔσται γένεσις, ἔκ τινος τὶ ἔσται. δεήσει γὰρ διαιρετὸν εἶναι ἀεὶ τὸ γιγνόμενον, καὶ εἶναι τὸ μὲν τόδε τὸ δὲ τόδε, λέγω δ᾽ ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὕλην τὸ δὲ εἶδος. εἰ δή ἐστι σφαῖρα τὸ ἐκ τοῦ μέσου σχῆμα ἴσον, τούτου τὸ μὲν [15] ἐν ᾧ ἔσται ὃ ποιεῖ, τὸ δ᾽ ἐν ἐκείνῳ, τὸ δὲ ἅπαν τὸ γεγονός, οἷον ἡ χαλκῆ σφαῖρα. φανερὸν δὴ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὡς εἶδος ἢ οὐσία λεγόμενον οὐ γίγνεται, ἡ δὲ σύνολος ἡ κατὰ ταύτην λεγομένη γίγνεται, καὶ ὅτι ἐν παντὶ τῷ γεννωμένῳ ὕλη ἔνεστι, καὶ ἔστι τὸ μὲν τόδε τὸ δὲ τόδε.	612. But he does make a brazen sphere to be. For he makes it from bronze and and a sphere, because he causes this form in this matter, and this constitutes a brazen sphere; and this is the being of a sphere. But if the being of sphere in general is to be produced, something will be produced from nothing; for that which comes to be must be divisible, and this is this and that is that. And by this I mean the matter, and by that the form. Therefore, if a sphere is a figure everywhere equidistant from a center, one part of this will be that in which the thing produced exists, and the other will be what exists in this. But this is all that has been produced, as in the case of a brazen sphere. It is evident from what has been said, then, that it is not the thing which is called the form or substance that is generated, but the concrete whole which gets its name from this; and there is matter in everything which is generated; and that this is this and that is that.
πότερον [20] οὖν ἔστι τις σφαῖρα παρὰ τάσδε ἢ οἰκία παρὰ τὰς πλίνθους; ἢ οὐδ᾽ ἄν ποτε ἐγίγνετο, εἰ οὕτως ἦν, τόδε τι, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιόνδε σημαίνει, τόδε δὲ καὶ ὡρισμένον οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ ποιεῖ καὶ γεννᾷ ἐκ τοῦδε τοιόνδε, καὶ ὅταν γεννηθῇ, ἔστι τόδε τοιόνδε; τὸ δὲ ἅπαν τόδε, Καλλίας ἢ Σωκράτης, ἐστὶν ὥσπερ [25] ἡ σφαῖρα ἡ χαλκῆ ἡδί, ὁ δ᾽ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ ζῷον ὥσπερ σφαῖρα χαλκῆ ὅλως. φανερὸν ἄρα ὅτι ἡ τῶν εἰδῶν αἰτία, ὡς εἰώθασί τινες λέγειν τὰ εἴδη, εἰ ἔστιν ἄττα παρὰ τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα, πρός γε τὰς γενέσεις καὶ τὰς οὐσίας οὐθὲν χρησίμη: οὐδ᾽ ἂν εἶεν διά γε ταῦτα οὐσίαι καθ᾽ αὑτάς.	613. The problem, then, is as follows: is there a. sphere apart from these particular spheres, or a house apart from bricks, or one that has never been produced? Now if this were true, no particular thing would exist. But since house means what is such and such, it is not a definite thing, yet the agent makes and generates something that is such and such from this. And when this has been generated it is such and such a particular thing; and this whole particular thing, such as Callias or Socrates, is like a brazen sphere, but man and animal are like brazen sphere in general. It is evident, then, that the cause which consists of the Forms, in the sense in which some are accustomed to speak of them, i.e., supposing that they do exist apart from singular things, is useless so far as processes of generation and substances are concerned. Nor will the Forms be, for this reason, substances existing by themselves.
ἐπὶ μὲν δή [30] τινων καὶ φανερὸν ὅτι τὸ γεννῶν τοιοῦτον μὲν οἷον τὸ γεννώμενον, οὐ μέντοι τὸ αὐτό γε, οὐδὲ ἓν τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἀλλὰ τῷ εἴδει, οἷον ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς—ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ—ἂν μή τι παρὰ φύσιν γένηται, οἷον ἵππος ἡμίονον (καὶ ταῦτα δὲ ὁμοίως: ὃ γὰρ ἂν κοινὸν εἴη ἐφ᾽ ἵππου καὶ ὄνου οὐκ ὠνόμασται, τὸ ἐγγύτατα γένος, εἴη δ᾽ ἂν ἄμφω ἴσως, οἷον ἡμίονος): [1034α] [1] ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι οὐθὲν δεῖ ὡς παράδειγμα εἶδος κατασκευάζειν (μάλιστα γὰρ ἂν ἐν τούτοις ἐπεζητοῦντο: οὐσίαι γὰρ αἱ μάλιστα αὗται) ἀλλὰ ἱκανὸν τὸ γεννῶν ποιῆσαι [5] καὶ τοῦ εἴδους αἴτιον εἶναι ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ. τὸ δ᾽ ἅπαν ἤδη, τὸ τοιόνδε εἶδος ἐν ταῖσδε ταῖς σαρξὶ καὶ ὀστοῖς, Καλλίας καὶ Σωκράτης: καὶ ἕτερον μὲν διὰ τὴν ὕλην (ἑτέρα γάρ), ταὐτὸ δὲ τῷ εἴδει (ἄτομον γὰρ τὸ εἶδος).	614. And in some cases it is evident that the thing which generates is of the same kind as the thing which is generated, although they are not the same numerically but specifically, for example, in the case of natural generations (for man begets man), unless something contrary to nature is generated, as when a horse begets a mule. And even these cases are alike; for what is common both to horse and ass as their proximate genus has no name, but perhaps both might be something like mule. Hence there is evidently no need to furnish a Form as an exemplar; for men would have searched for Forms especially in sensible things, since these are substances in the highest degree. But the thing which generates is adequate for producing the thing and for causing the form in the matter. And when the whole is such and such a form in this flesh and these bones, this is Callias or Socrates; and they differ in their matter (for the matter of each is different) but are the same in form, because form is indivisible.

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 9: 1034a 9-1034b 19
ἀπορήσειε δ᾽ ἄν τις διὰ τί τὰ μὲν γίγνεται καὶ τέχνῃ [10] καὶ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου, οἷον ὑγίεια, τὰ δ᾽ οὔ, οἷον οἰκία.	615. However, someone might raise the question why some things come to be both by art and by chance, as health, while others do not, as a house.
αἴτιον δὲ ὅτι τῶν μὲν ἡ ὕλη ἡ ἄρχουσα τῆς γενέσεως ἐν τῷ ποιεῖν καὶ γίγνεσθαί τι τῶν ἀπὸ τέχνης, ἐν ᾗ ὑπάρχει τι μέρος τοῦ πράγματος, ἡ μὲν τοιαύτη ἐστὶν οἵα κινεῖσθαι ὑφ᾽ αὑτῆς ἡ δ᾽ οὔ, καὶ ταύτης ἡ μὲν ὡδὶ οἵα τε ἡ δὲ ἀδύνατος: πολλὰ [15] γὰρ δυνατὰ μὲν ὑφ᾽ αὑτῶν κινεῖσθαι ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὡδί, οἷον ὀρχήσασθαι. ὅσων οὖν τοιαύτη ἡ ὕλη, οἷον οἱ λίθοι, ἀδύνατον ὡδὶ κινηθῆναι εἰ μὴ ὑπ᾽ ἄλλου, ὡδὶ μέντοι ναί—καὶ τὸ πῦρ. διὰ τοῦτο τὰ μὲν οὐκ ἔσται ἄνευ τοῦ ἔχοντος τὴν τέχνην τὰ δὲ ἔσται: ὑπὸ γὰρ τούτων κινηθήσεται τῶν οὐκ ἐχόντων [20] τὴν τέχνην, κινεῖσθαι δὲ δυναμένων αὐτῶν ὑπ᾽ ἄλλων οὐκ ἐχόντων τὴν τέχνην ἢ ἐκ μέρους.	616. And the reason is that in some of these the matter, which is the principle of generation in the making and producing of everything which comes to be by art, and in which some part of the thing made is present, the matter of these, I say, is such that it can set itself in motion, whereas the matters of others cannot. And of the former kind some can set itself is motion in a special way, and some cannot; for many things can move themselves but not in some special way, as in dancing. Those things, then, whose matter is of such a kind, for instance, stones, can only be moved by something else. Yet in another way they can move themselves, as in the case of fire. And for this reason some things will not exist apart from one who possesses an art, while others will; for they will be moved either by those things which do not have art or by those which have it in part.
δῆλον δ᾽ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ ὅτι τρόπον τινὰ πάντα γίγνεται ἐξ ὁμωνύμου, ὥσπερ τὰ φύσει, ἢ ἐκ μέρους ὁμωνύμου (οἷον ἡ οἰκία ἐξ οἰκίας, ᾗ ὑπὸ νοῦ: ἡ γὰρ τέχνη τὸ εἶδος) [ἢ ἐκ μέρους] ἢ [25] ἔχοντός τι μέρος, ἐὰν μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γίγνηται:	617. And it is evident from what has been said that in a sense all things come from something which is univocal (as natural things), or from something which is univocal in part (as a house comes from a house, or by means of mind; for art is a form), or from a part or from something having a part, unless it comes to be accidentally.
γὰρ αἴτιον τοῦ ποιεῖν πρῶτον καθ᾽ αὑτὸ μέρος. θερμότης γὰρ ἡ ἐν τῇ κινήσει θερμότητα ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐποίησεν: αὕτη δὲ ἐστὶν ἢ ὑγίεια ἢ μέρος, ἢ ἀκολουθεῖ αὐτῇ μέρος τι τῆς ὑγιείας ἢ αὐτὴ ἡ ὑγίεια: διὸ καὶ λέγεται ποιεῖν, ὅτι ἐκεῖνο [30] ποιεῖ [τὴν ὑγίειαν] ᾧ ἀκολουθεῖ καὶ συμβέβηκε [θερμότης]. ὥστε, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς συλλογισμοῖς, πάντων ἀρχὴ ἡ οὐσία: ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ τί ἐστιν οἱ συλλογισμοί εἰσιν, ἐνταῦθα δὲ αἱ γενέσεις.	618. For the first and proper cause of the production of anything is a part of the thing produced; for the heat in the motion produces heat in the body; and this is either health or a part of health, or some part of health or health itself follows from it. Hence it is said to cause health, because it causes that from which health follows, and of which health is an accident. Hence, just as in syllogisms the basis of everything is substance (for a syllogism proceeds from the whatness of a thing), so too in this case processes of generation proceed from it.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ φύσει συνιστάμενα τούτοις ἔχει. τὸ μὲν γὰρ σπέρμα ποιεῖ ὥσπερ τὰ ἀπὸ τέχνης (ἔχει γὰρ δυνάμει τὸ εἶδος, [1034β] [1] καὶ ἀφ᾽ οὗ τὸ σπέρμα, ἐστί πως ὁμώνυμον—οὐ γὰρ πάντα οὕτω δεῖ ζητεῖν ὡς ἐξ ἀνθρώπου ἄνθρωπος: καὶ γὰρ γυνὴ ἐξ ἀνδρός—ἐὰν μὴ πήρωμα ᾖ: διὸ ἡμίονος οὐκ ἐξ ἡμιόνου): ὅσα δὲ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ γίγνεται, [5] ὅσων ἡ ὕλη δύναται καὶ ὑφ᾽ αὑτῆς κινεῖσθαι ταύτην τὴν κίνησιν ἣν τὸ σπέρμα κινεῖ: ὅσων δὲ μή, ταῦτα ἀδύνατα γίγνεσθαι ἄλλως πως ἢ ἐξ αὐτῶν.	619. And those things which are constituted by nature are similar to these; for the seed produces something in the same way as things which operate by art; for it contains the form potentially, and that from which the seed comes [and the thing which it generates] are in a sense univocal, for it is not necessary to inquire about all things in the same way as we do when we say that a man comes from a man; for a woman also comes from a man. Hence a mule does not come from a mule, unless there should be some defect. And whatever things arise by chance, as some artificial things do, are those whose matter can be moved by itself by the very motion by which the seed moves. But those things whose matter does not possess this capacity cannot be generated in any other way than by the agents themselves.
οὐ μόνον δὲ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας ὁ λόγος δηλοῖ τὸ μὴ γίγνεσθαι τὸ εἶδος, ἀλλὰ περὶ πάντων ὁμοίως τῶν πρώτων κοινὸς ὁ λόγος, οἷον ποσοῦ [10] ποιοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κατηγοριῶν. γίγνεται γὰρ ὥσπερ ἡ χαλκῆ σφαῖρα ἀλλ᾽ οὐ σφαῖρα οὐδὲ χαλκός, καὶ ἐπὶ χαλκοῦ, εἰ γίγνεται (ἀεὶ γὰρ δεῖ προϋπάρχειν τὴν ὕλην καὶ τὸ εἶδος), οὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ τί ἐστι καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ποιοῦ καὶ ποσοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως κατηγοριῶν: οὐ γὰρ γίγνεται [15] τὸ ποιὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ ποιὸν ξύλον, οὐδὲ τὸ ποσὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ ποσὸν ξύλον ἢ ζῷον.	620. Now it is not only with reference to substance that our argument proves that the specifying principle does not come to be, but the common reasoning also applies in a similar way to all the primary genera, such as quantity, quality and the other categories. For a brazen sphere as such comes to be, but not the sphere or the bronze, but if it does come to be, it comes to be in the bronze (because it is always necessary that the form and the matter pre-exist). This must also be the case with the quiddity, with quality, with quantity, and also with the other categories; for quality does not come to be, but wood of such a quality; and quantity does not come to be, but so much wood or so large an animal.
ἀλλ᾽ ἴδιον τῆς οὐσίας ἐκ τούτων λαβεῖν ἔστιν ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον προϋπάρχειν ἑτέραν οὐσίαν ἐντελεχείᾳ οὖσαν ἣ ποιεῖ, οἷον ζῷον εἰ γίγνεται ζῷον: ποιὸν δ᾽ ἢ ποσὸν οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἀλλ᾽ ἢ δυνάμει μόνον. [20]	621. But from these remarks it is possible to learn a property of substance, namely, that there must always pre-exist another actual substance which produces it; for example, an animal must pre-exist if an animal is generated. But quantity and quality must pre-exist only potentially.

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 10: 1034b 20-1035b 3
ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁ ὁρισμὸς λόγος ἐστί, πᾶς δὲ λόγος μέρη ἔχει, ὡς δὲ ὁ λόγος πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα, καὶ τὸ μέρος τοῦ λόγου πρὸς τὸ μέρος τοῦ πράγματος ὁμοίως ἔχει, ἀπορεῖται ἤδη πότερον δεῖ τὸν τῶν μερῶν λόγον ἐνυπάρχειν ἐν τῷ τοῦ ὅλου λόγῳ ἢ οὔ. ἐπ᾽ ἐνίων μὲν γὰρ φαίνονται ἐνόντες ἐνίων δ᾽ οὔ. τοῦ μὲν [25] γὰρ κύκλου ὁ λόγος οὐκ ἔχει τὸν τῶν τμημάτων, ὁ δὲ τῆς συλλαβῆς ἔχει τὸν τῶν στοιχείων: καίτοι διαιρεῖται καὶ ὁ κύκλος εἰς τὰ τμήματα ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ συλλαβὴ εἰς τὰ στοιχεῖα.	622. But since the definition is the intelligible expression of a thing, and every intelligible expression has parts, and just as the intelligible expression is related to the thing, so is a part of the intelligible expression to a part of the thing, the problem now arises whether the intelligible expression of the parts must be present in the intelligible expression of the whole or not; for in some cases they seem to be and in others they do not, for the intelligible expression of a circle does not include that of its segments [but the intelligible expression of a syllable includes that of its letters], yet a circle is divided into segments as a syllable is into elements.
ἔτι δὲ εἰ πρότερα τὰ μέρη τοῦ ὅλου, τῆς δὲ ὀρθῆς ἡ ὀξεῖα μέρος καὶ ὁ δάκτυλος τοῦ ζῴου, πρότερον ἂν εἴη ἡ ὀξεῖα [30] τῆς ὀρθῆς καὶ ὁ δάκτυλος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. δοκεῖ δ᾽ ἐκεῖνα εἶναι πρότερα: τῷ λόγῳ γὰρ λέγονται ἐξ ἐκείνων, καὶ τῷ εἶναι δὲ ἄνευ ἀλλήλων πρότερα.	623. Further, if parts are prior to a whole, and an acute angle is a part of a right angle, and a finger a part of a man, an acute angle will be prior to a right angle, and a finger prior to a man. However, the latter seem to be prior; for in the intelligible expression the parts are explained from them; and wholes are prior because they can exist without a part.
ἢ πολλαχῶς λέγεται τὸ μέρος, ὧν εἷς μὲν τρόπος τὸ μετροῦν κατὰ τὸ ποσόν—ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ἀφείσθω: ἐξ ὧν δὲ ἡ οὐσία ὡς μερῶν, τοῦτο σκεπτέον. [1035α] [1] εἰ οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν ὕλη τὸ δὲ εἶδος τὸ δ᾽ ἐκ τούτων, καὶ οὐσία ἥ τε ὕλη καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ ἐκ τούτων, ἔστι μὲν ὡς καὶ ἡ ὕλη μέρος τινὸς λέγεται, ἔστι δ᾽ ὡς οὔ, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ὧν ὁ τοῦ εἴδους λόγος. οἷον τῆς μὲν κοιλότητος οὐκ ἔστι μέρος [5] ἡ σάρξ (αὕτη γὰρ ἡ ὕλη ἐφ᾽ ἧς γίγνεται), τῆς δὲ σιμότητος μέρος: καὶ τοῦ μὲν συνόλου ἀνδριάντος μέρος ὁ χαλκὸς τοῦ δ᾽ ὡς εἴδους λεγομένου ἀνδριάντος οὔ (λεκτέον γὰρ τὸ εἶδος καὶ ᾗ εἶδος ἔχει ἕκαστον, τὸ δ᾽ ὑλικὸν οὐδέποτε καθ᾽ αὑτὸ λεκτέον): διὸ ὁ μὲν τοῦ κύκλου λόγος οὐκ ἔχει [10] τὸν τῶν τμημάτων, ὁ δὲ τῆς συλλαβῆς ἔχει τὸν τῶν στοιχείων: τὰ μὲν γὰρ στοιχεῖα τοῦ λόγου μέρη τοῦ εἴδους καὶ οὐχ ὕλη, τὰ δὲ τμήματα οὕτως μέρη ὡς ὕλη ἐφ᾽ ἧς ἐπιγίγνεται: ἐγγυτέρω μέντοι τοῦ εἴδους ἢ ὁ χαλκὸς ὅταν ἐν χαλκῷ ἡ στρογγυλότης ἐγγένηται. ἔστι δ᾽ ὡς οὐδὲ τὰ στοιχεῖα πάντα [15] τῆς συλλαβῆς ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἐνέσται, οἷον ταδὶ τὰ κήρινα ἢ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι: ἤδη γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα μέρος τῆς συλλαβῆς ὡς ὕλη αἰσθητή. καὶ γὰρ ἡ γραμμὴ οὐκ εἰ διαιρουμένη [18] εἰς τὰ ἡμίση φθείρεται, ἢ ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἰς τὰ ὀστᾶ καὶ νεῦρα καὶ σάρκας, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ εἰσὶν ἐκ τούτων οὕτως [20] ὡς ὄντων τῆς οὐσίας μερῶν, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἐξ ὕλης, καὶ τοῦ μὲν συνόλου μέρη, τοῦ εἴδους δὲ καὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος οὐκέτι: διόπερ οὐδ᾽ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. τῷ μὲν οὖν ἐνέσται ὁ τῶν τοιούτων μερῶν λόγος, τῷ δ᾽ οὐ δεῖ ἐνεῖναι, ἂν μὴ ᾖ τοῦ συνειλημμένου: διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο ἔνια μὲν ἐκ τούτων ὡς ἀρχῶν ἐστὶν εἰς ἃ [25] φθείρονται, ἔνια δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν. ὅσα μὲν οὖν συνειλημμένα τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἡ ὕλη ἐστίν, οἷον τὸ σιμὸν ἢ ὁ χαλκοῦς κύκλος, ταῦτα μὲν φθείρεται εἰς ταῦτα καὶ μέρος αὐτῶν ἡ ὕλη: ὅσα δὲ μὴ συνείληπται τῇ ὕλῃ ἀλλὰ ἄνευ ὕλης, ὧν οἱ λόγοι τοῦ εἴδους μόνον, ταῦτα δ᾽ οὐ φθείρεται, ἢ ὅλως ἢ [30] οὔτοι οὕτω γε: ὥστ᾽ ἐκείνων μὲν ἀρχαὶ καὶ μέρη ταῦτα τοῦ δὲ εἴδους οὔτε μέρη οὔτε ἀρχαί. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο φθείρεται ὁ πήλινος ἀνδριὰς εἰς πηλὸν καὶ ἡ σφαῖρα εἰς χαλκὸν καὶ ὁ Καλλίας εἰς σάρκα καὶ ὀστᾶ, ἔτι δὲ ὁ κύκλος εἰς τὰ τμήματα: ἔστι γάρ τις ὃς συνείληπται τῇ ὕλῃ: [1035β] [1] ὁμωνύμως γὰρ λέγεται κύκλος ὅ τε ἁπλῶς λεγόμενος καὶ ὁ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἴδιον ὄνομα τοῖς καθ᾽ ἕκαστον.	624. Or perhaps it happens that the term part is used in many senses, one of which is what measures a thing quantitatively. But let us dismiss this sense of the term and inquire about those things which constitute the parts of which substance is composed. Now if matter is one of these, and form another, and the thing composed of these a third, then there is one sense in which even matter is called a part of a thing, and there is another in which it is not, but only those things of which the intelligible expression or specifying principle consists. For example, flesh is not a part of concavity, because flesh is the matter in which concavity is produced; but it is a part of snubness. And bronze is a part of the whole statue, but it is not a part of the statue in the sense of form; for predications must be made according to a thing’s form and insofar as each thing has a form, but the material principle should never be predicated of a thing essentially. And this is why the intelligible expression of a circle does not contain that of its segments, whereas the intelligible expression of a syllable does contain that of its letters; for the letters are parts of the intelligible expression of the form, and are not matter. But segments of this kind are parts of the matter in which the form is produced, yet they are more akin to the form than bronze is when roundness is produced in bronze. However, not all the elements of a syllable will be contained in its intelligible expression; for example, the letters inscribed in wax or produced in the air; for these are already parts of the syllable as its sensible matter. For even if a line when divided is dissolved into halves, or a man into bones and sinews and flesh, it does not follow for this reason that they are composed of these as parts of their substance, but as their matter; and these are parts of the concrete whole, but not of the specifying principle, or of that to which the intelligible expression belongs. Hence they are not included in the intelligible expression of these things. Therefore in some cases the intelligible expression of a thing will include that of such parts as those mentioned, but in other cases it need not include them unless taken together they constitute the intelligible expression of the thing. For it is by reason of this that some things are composed of these as the principles into which they are dissolved, while others are not. Hence all things which are matter and form taken together, as snub and brazen circle, are dissolved into these parts, and matter is one of them. But all things which are not conceived with matter but without it, as the intelligible expression of form alone, are not corrupted either in an unqualified sense or in such a way as this. Hence these material parts are the principles and parts which come under these, but they are neither parts nor principles of the form. Therefore a statue made of clay is dissolved into clay, and a sphere into bronze, and Callias into flesh and bones; and again a circle is dissolved into its segments, because it is something conceived with matter. For the term circle is used equivocally both of that which is called such without qualification and of an individual circle, because there is no proper name for individual circles.

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 10: 1035b 3-1036a 25
εἴρηται μὲν οὖν καὶ νῦν τὸ ἀληθές, ὅμως δ᾽ ἔτι σαφέστερον εἴπωμεν ἐπαναλαβόντες. ὅσα μὲν γὰρ τοῦ λόγου [5] μέρη καὶ εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται ὁ λόγος, ταῦτα πρότερα ἢ πάντα ἢ ἔνια: ὁ δὲ τῆς ὀρθῆς λόγος οὐ διαιρεῖται εἰς ὀξείας λόγον, ἀλλ᾽ <�ὁ> τῆς ὀξείας εἰς ὀρθήν: χρῆται γὰρ ὁ ὁριζόμενος τὴν ὀξεῖαν τῇ ὀρθῇ: "ἐλάττων"γὰρ "ὀρθῆς"ἡ ὀξεῖα. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ κύκλος καὶ τὸ ἡμικύκλιον ἔχουσιν: τὸ [10] γὰρ ἡμικύκλιον τῷ κύκλῳ ὁρίζεται καὶ ὁ δάκτυλος τῷ ὅλῳ: "τὸ"γὰρ "τοιόνδε μέρος ἀνθρώπου"δάκτυλος. ὥσθ᾽ ὅσα μὲν μέρη ὡς ὕλη καὶ εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται ὡς ὕλην, ὕστερα: ὅσα δὲ ὡς τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῆς οὐσίας τῆς κατὰ τὸν λόγον, πρότερα ἢ πάντα ἢ ἔνια.	625. The truth, then, has now been stated; but let us state it even more clearly by repeating the same discussion. For all things which are parts of a thing’s inintelligible expression and that into which its intelligible expression is divided, are prior to it, either all or some of them. But the intelligible expression of a right angle is not divided into that of an acute angle, but the intelligible expression of an acute angle is divided into that of a right angle; and one who defines an acute angle uses a right angle, for an acute angle is less than a right angle. And the same thing is true of a circle and a semicircle; for a semicircle is defined by means of a circle, and a finger is defined by means of the whole man, because a finger is such and such a part of man. Hence all parts which have the nature of matter and are that into which the whole is divided as matter are subsequent [to the whole]. But all things which are parts of the intelligible expression and of the substance according to its intelligible expression are prior, either all or some of them.
ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ τῶν ζῴων ψυχή [15] (τοῦτο γὰρ οὐσία τοῦ ἐμψύχου) ἡ κατὰ τὸν λόγον οὐσία καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι τῷ τοιῷδε σώματι (ἕκαστον γοῦν τὸ μέρος ἐὰν ὁρίζηται καλῶς, οὐκ ἄνευ τοῦ ἔργου ὁριεῖται, ὃ οὐχ ὑπάρξει ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως), ὥστε τὰ ταύτης μέρη πρότερα ἢ πάντα ἢ ἔνια τοῦ συνόλου ζῴου, καὶ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον [20] δὴ ὁμοίως, τὸ δὲ σῶμα καὶ τὰ τούτου μόρια ὕστερα ταύτης τῆς οὐσίας, καὶ διαιρεῖται εἰς ταῦτα ὡς εἰς ὕλην οὐχ ἡ οὐσία ἀλλὰ τὸ σύνολον, τοῦ μὲν οὖν συνόλου πρότερα ταῦτ᾽ ἔστιν ὥς, ἔστι δ᾽ ὡς οὔ (οὐδὲ γὰρ εἶναι δύναται χωριζόμενα: οὐ γὰρ ὁ πάντως ἔχων δάκτυλος ζῴου, ἀλλ᾽ [25] ὁμώνυμος ὁ τεθνεώς): ἔνια δὲ ἅμα, ὅσα κύρια καὶ ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ οὐσία, οἷον εἰ τοῦτο καρδία ἢ ἐγκέφαλος: διαφέρει γὰρ οὐθὲν πότερον τοιοῦτον. ὁ δ᾽ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ ἵππος καὶ τὰ οὕτως ἐπὶ τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστα, καθόλου δέ, οὐκ ἔστιν οὐσία ἀλλὰ σύνολόν τι ἐκ τουδὶ τοῦ λόγου καὶ τησδὶ [30] τῆς ὕλης ὡς καθόλου: καθ᾽ ἕκαστον δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς ἐσχάτης ὕλης ὁ Σωκράτης ἤδη ἐστίν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως. μέρος μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ εἴδους (εἶδος δὲ λέγω τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) καὶ τοῦ συνόλου τοῦ ἐκ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ τῆς ὕλης <�καὶ τῆς ὕλης> αὐτῆς.	626. And since the soul of animals (for this is the substance of living things) is their form according to the intelligible expression, and is the substance, species, or essence of such a body (for if a part of each animal is properly defined, it will not be defined without its function, and this will not be possible without sensation), therefore parts of this kind, either all or some of them, are prior to the concrete whole, the animal; and this is likewise true of every individual thing. But the body and parts of this kind are subsequent to this substance; and it is not substance but the concrete whole which is divided into these as its matter. Therefore in a sense these are prior to the concrete whole and in a sense they are not; for they cannot exist apart, because a finger is not a part of an animal when it is disposed in just any way at all; for a dead finger is called a finger equivocally. But some parts are simultaneous with the whole, and these are the principal parts in which the intelligible expression and substance are present, for example, the heart or the brain, because it makes no difference which of them is such. But man and horse and those terms which are applied in this way to singular things, but are taken universally, are not substance, but a certain concrete whole composed of this matter and this intelligible expression taken universally. Socrates, however, is already a singular thing by reason of ultimate matter; and it is similar in other cases. Hence a part is a part of the species (which means the essence of a thing) and of the concrete whole which is composed of species and matter itself.
ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου μέρη τὰ τοῦ εἴδους μόνον ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐστὶ τοῦ καθόλου: [1036α] [1] τὸ γὰρ κύκλῳ εἶναι καὶ κύκλος καὶ ψυχῇ εἶναι καὶ ψυχὴ ταὐτό. τοῦ δὲ συνόλου ἤδη, οἷον κύκλου τουδὶ καὶ τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστά τινος ἢ αἰσθητοῦ ἢ νοητοῦ—λέγω δὲ νοητοὺς μὲν οἷον τοὺς μαθηματικούς, αἰσθητοὺς δὲ οἷον τοὺς χαλκοῦς [5] καὶ τοὺς ξυλίνους—τούτων δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁρισμός, ἀλλὰ μετὰ νοήσεως ἢ αἰσθήσεως γνωρίζονται, ἀπελθόντες δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἐντελεχείας οὐ δῆλον πότερον εἰσὶν ἢ οὐκ εἰσίν: ἀλλ᾽ ἀεὶ λέγονται καὶ γνωρίζονται τῷ καθόλου λόγῳ. ἡ δ᾽ ὕλη ἄγνωστος καθ᾽ αὑτήν. ὕλη δὲ ἡ μὲν αἰσθητή ἐστιν ἡ δὲ [10] νοητή, αἰσθητὴ μὲν οἷον χαλκὸς καὶ ξύλον καὶ ὅση κινητὴ ὕλη, νοητὴ δὲ ἡ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ὑπάρχουσα μὴ ᾗ αἰσθητά, οἷον τὰ μαθηματικά. πῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχει περὶ ὅλου καὶ μέρους καὶ περὶ τοῦ προτέρου καὶ ὑστέρου, εἴρηται:	627. But only the parts of the species ire parts of the intelligible expression, and the intelligible expression is of the universal; for the being of a circle is the same as a circle, and the being of a soul the same as a soul. But in the case of a concrete whole, for example, this circle, or any singular thing, either sensible or intelligible (by sensible circles I mean those made of bronze and wood, and by intelligible, such as are the objects of mathematics), of these there is no definition; but they are known by intellect or by sense, i.e., when they are actually seen. And when they are removed from a state of actuality, it is not clear whether they exist or not; but they are always known and expressed by a universal formula. Now matter is unknowable in itself. And in one respect matter is sensible, and in another it is intelligible; sensible matter being such as brass and wood and anything mobile, and intelligible matter being what is present in sensible things but not as sensible, such as the objects of mathematics. How this applies to whole and part and to the prior and subsequent has therefore been stated.
πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἐρώτησιν ἀνάγκη ἀπαντᾶν, ὅταν τις ἔρηται πότερον ἡ ὀρθὴ [15] καὶ ὁ κύκλος καὶ τὸ ζῷον πρότερον ἢ εἰς ἃ διαιροῦνται καὶ ἐξ ὧν εἰσί, τὰ μέρη, ὅτι οὐχ ἁπλῶς. εἰ μὲν γάρ ἐστι καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ζῷον ἢ ἔμψυχον, ἢ ἕκαστον ἡ ἑκάστου, καὶ κύκλος τὸ κύκλῳ εἶναι, καὶ ὀρθὴ τὸ ὀρθῇ εἶναι καὶ ἡ οὐσία ἡ τῆς ὀρθῆς, τὶ μὲν καὶ τινὸς φατέον ὕστερον, οἷον [20] τῶν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τινὸς ὀρθῆς (καὶ γὰρ ἡ μετὰ τῆς ὕλης, ἡ χαλκῆ ὀρθή, καὶ ἡ ἐν ταῖς γραμμαῖς ταῖς καθ᾽ ἕκαστα), ἡ δ᾽ ἄνευ ὕλης τῶν μὲν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ὑστέρα τῶν δ᾽ ἐν τῷ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα μορίων προτέρα, ἁπλῶς δ᾽ οὐ φατέον: εἰ δ᾽ ἑτέρα καὶ μὴ ἔστιν ἡ ψυχὴ ζῷον, καὶ οὕτω τὰ μὲν [25] φατέον τὰ δ᾽ οὐ φατέον, ὥσπερ εἴρηται.	628. But when anyone asks whether a right angle and a circle and an animal are prior to the parts into which they are divided and of which they are composed, the answer must be that these are not parts without qualification. For if the soul is the same as an animal or a living thing, or the soul of each individual is the same as each individual, and if a circle is the same as the being of a circle, and a right angle is the same as the being of a right angle, the thing must be said to be subsequent to that by which it is, for example, to those parts which are included in its intelligible expression and to those in the universal right angle. For both the right angle which is found in matter, which is a bronze right angle, and that found in these particular lines, are subsequent to their parts; but the right angle which is immaterial is subsequent to the parts found in the intelligible expression, but is prior to those found in a particular thing. But to this question an unqualified answer must not be given. However, if the soul is something different and is not the same as an animal, even if this is so, in one sense it must be said that the parts are prior, and in another sense it must not, as has been stated.

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 11: 1036a 26-1037b 7
ἀπορεῖται δὲ εἰκότως καὶ ποῖα τοῦ εἴδους μέρη καὶ ποῖα οὔ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ συνειλημμένου. καίτοι τούτου μὴ δήλου ὄντος οὐκ ἔστιν ὁρίσασθαι ἕκαστον: τοῦ γὰρ καθόλου καὶ τοῦ εἴδους ὁ ὁρισμός: ποῖα οὖν ἐστὶ τῶν μερῶν ὡς ὕλη καὶ ποῖα [30] οὔ, ἐὰν μὴ ᾖ φανερά, οὐδὲ ὁ λόγος ἔσται φανερὸς ὁ τοῦ πράγματος.	629. Now the problem rightly arises as to what parts are parts of the species, and which are not parts of the species but of the concrete whole. For if this is not clear it is impossible to define anything, because definition refers to the universal and the species. Hence, if it is not evident as to what parts are material and what are not, the intelligible expression of the thing will not be clearly known.
ὅσα μὲν οὖν φαίνεται ἐπιγιγνόμενα ἐφ᾽ ἑτέρων τῷ εἴδει, οἷον κύκλος ἐν χαλκῷ καὶ λίθῳ καὶ ξύλῳ, ταῦτα μὲν δῆλα εἶναι δοκεῖ ὅτι οὐδὲν τῆς τοῦ κύκλου οὐσίας ὁ χαλκὸς οὐδ᾽ ὁ λίθος διὰ τὸ χωρίζεσθαι αὐτῶν: ὅσα δὲ [35] μὴ ὁρᾶται χωριζόμενα, οὐδὲν μὲν κωλύει ὁμοίως ἔχειν τούτοις, ὥσπερ κἂν εἰ οἱ κύκλοι πάντες ἑωρῶντο χαλκοῖ: [1036β] [1] οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἧττον ἦν ὁ χαλκὸς οὐδὲν τοῦ εἴδους: χαλεπὸν δὲ ἀφελεῖν τοῦτον τῇ διανοίᾳ. οἷον τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶδος ἀεὶ ἐν σαρξὶ φαίνεται καὶ ὀστοῖς καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις μέρεσιν: [5] ἆρ᾽ οὖν καὶ ἐστὶ ταῦτα μέρη τοῦ εἴδους καὶ τοῦ λόγου; οὔ, ἀλλ᾽ ὕλη, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ καὶ ἐπ᾽ ἄλλων ἐπιγίγνεσθαι ἀδυνατοῦμεν χωρίσαι;	630. Therefore in the case of all those things which seem to be produced in specifically different matters, as a circle in bronze and in stone and in wood, it seems to be evident that none of these, either bronze or stone or wood, belong to the substance of a circle, because it can be separated from them. And with regard to those things which do not seem to be separable, nothing prevents them from being similar to these, as, for instance, if all sensible circles were of bronze; for none the less the bronze would be no part of the species. But it is difficult to separate it in the mind; for example, the species of man always appears in flesh and bones and such parts. Hence the question arises whether these are parts of the species and intelligible expression of man, or are not but have the character of matter. But since such species do not occur in other matters, we cannot separate them.
ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτο δοκεῖ μὲν ἐνδέχεσθαι ἄδηλον δὲ πότε, ἀποροῦσί τινες ἤδη καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ κύκλου καὶ τοῦ τριγώνου ὡς οὐ προσῆκον γραμμαῖς ὁρίζεσθαι καὶ τῷ [10] συνεχεῖ, ἀλλὰ πάντα καὶ ταῦτα ὁμοίως λέγεσθαι ὡσανεὶ σάρκες καὶ ὀστᾶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ χαλκὸς καὶ λίθος τοῦ ἀνδριάντος: καὶ ἀνάγουσι πάντα εἰς τοὺς ἀριθμούς, καὶ γραμμῆς τὸν λόγον τὸν τῶν δύο εἶναί φασιν. καὶ τῶν τὰς ἰδέας λεγόντων οἱ μὲν αὐτογραμμὴν τὴν δυάδα, οἱ δὲ τὸ [15] εἶδος τῆς γραμμῆς, ἔνια μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος καὶ οὗ τὸ εἶδος (οἷον δυάδα καὶ τὸ εἶδος δυάδος), ἐπὶ γραμμῆς δὲ οὐκέτι.	631. Now since this seems to be possible, but it is not clear when, some thinkers are puzzled even in the case of a circle and a triangle, as if it were not right to define these by lines and by what is continuous, but that all these should be predicated in a way similar to the flesh and bones of a man and the bronze and stone of a circle. And they refer all things to numbers and say that the intelligible expression of a line is that of the number two. And of those who speak of Ideas, some claim that the number two is the line itself, and others claim that it is the Form of a line; for some say that a Form and the thing of which it is the Form are the same, for example, the number two and the Form of twoness; but this is not so in the case of a line.
συμβαίνει δὴ ἕν τε πολλῶν εἶδος εἶναι ὧν τὸ εἶδος φαίνεται ἕτερον (ὅπερ καὶ τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις συνέβαινεν),	632. It follows, then, that there is one Form of many things whose Form appears to be different; and this is a conclusion that also faced the Pythagoreans (68).
καὶ ἐνδέχεται ἓν πάντων ποιεῖν αὐτὸ [20] εἶδος, τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα μὴ εἴδη: καίτοι οὕτως ἓν πάντα ἔσται. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔχει τινὰ ἀπορίαν τὰ περὶ τοὺς ὁρισμούς, καὶ διὰ τίν᾽ αἰτίαν, εἴρηται:	633. And it is possible [according to this view] to make one Form proper to all things, and to maintain that nothing else is a Form at all.
διὸ καὶ τὸ πάντα ἀνάγειν οὕτω καὶ ἀφαιρεῖν τὴν ὕλην περίεργον:	634. However, in this way all things will be one. Therefore that the questions about definitions constitute a problem, and why, has been stated.
ἔνια γὰρ ἴσως τόδ᾽ ἐν τῷδ᾽ ἐστὶν ἢ ὡδὶ ταδὶ ἔχοντα. καὶ ἡ παραβολὴ ἡ ἐπὶ τοῦ ζῴου, [25] ἣν εἰώθει λέγειν Σωκράτης ὁ νεώτερος, οὐ καλῶς ἔχει: ἀπάγει γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, καὶ ποιεῖ ὑπολαμβάνειν ὡς ἐνδεχόμενον εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἄνευ τῶν μερῶν, ὥσπερ ἄνευ τοῦ χαλκοῦ τὸν κύκλον. τὸ δ᾽ οὐχ ὅμοιον: αἰσθητὸν γάρ τι τὸ ζῷον, καὶ ἄνευ κινήσεως οὐκ ἔστιν ὁρίσασθαι, διὸ [30] οὐδ᾽ ἄνευ τῶν μερῶν ἐχόντων πώς. οὐ γὰρ πάντως τοῦ ἀνθρώπου μέρος ἡ χείρ, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ δυναμένη τὸ ἔργον ἀποτελεῖν, ὥστε ἔμψυχος οὖσα: μὴ ἔμψυχος δὲ οὐ μέρος.	635. Hence to reduce all things in this way and to do away with matter is superfluous; for perhaps some things are a this in this, or are things having these two principles. And the analogy of the animal, which the younger Socrates was accustomed to state, is not a good one; for it leads us away from the truth and makes us suppose that it is possible for man to exist without parts, as a circle exists without bronze. But this case is not similar; for an animal is something sensible and cannot be defined without motion, and therefore it cannot be defined without its parts being disposed in some way. For it is not a hand in any condition which is part of a man, but when it is capable of performing the function of a hand. Hence it is a part when it is animated, but it is not a part when it is not animated.
περὶ δὲ τὰ μαθηματικὰ διὰ τί οὐκ εἰσὶ μέρη οἱ λόγοι τῶν λόγων, οἷον τοῦ κύκλου τὰ ἡμικύκλια; οὐ γάρ ἐστιν αἰσθητὰ ταῦτα. [35] ἢ οὐθὲν διαφέρει; ἔσται γὰρ ὕλη ἐνίων καὶ μὴ αἰσθητῶν: [1037α] [1] καὶ παντὸς γὰρ ὕλη τις ἔστιν ὃ μὴ ἔστι τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ εἶδος αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ἀλλὰ τόδε τι. κύκλου μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔσται τοῦ καθόλου, τῶν δὲ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα ἔσται μέρη ταῦτα, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον: ἔστι γὰρ ὕλη ἡ μὲν αἰσθητὴ ἡ [5] δὲ νοητή.	636. And with regard to the objects of mathematics the question arises why the intelligible structures of the parts are not parts of the intelligible structure of the whole (for example, why semicircles are not parts of the intelligible structure of a circle), for they are not sensible. But perhaps this makes no difference; for there will be matter of certain things and of those which are not sensible. And this will be true of everything which is not an essence or species considered in itself, but a particular thing. Therefore the semicircle will not be part of the circle which is universal, but semicircles will be parts of singular circles, as was said before (627); for some matter is sensible and some intelligible.
δῆλον δὲ καὶ ὅτι ἡ μὲν ψυχὴ οὐσία ἡ πρώτη, τὸ δὲ σῶμα ὕλη, ὁ δ᾽ ἄνθρωπος ἢ τὸ ζῷον τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ὡς καθόλου: Σωκράτης δὲ καὶ Κορίσκος, εἰ μὲν καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ Σωκράτης, διττόν (οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὡς ψυχὴν οἱ δ᾽ ὡς τὸ σύνολον), εἰ δ᾽ ἁπλῶς ἡ ψυχὴ ἥδε καὶ <�τὸ> σῶμα τόδε, ὥσπερ τὸ [10] καθόλου [τε] καὶ τὸ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον.	637. And it is also evident that the soul is a primary substance, and that the body is matter, and that man or animal is the composite of both taken universally. And Socrates and Coriscus are composed of soul and body taken individually, i.e., if the term soul is taken in two senses; for some take soul as soul and others as the whole. But if soul and body without qualification mean this individual soul and this individual body, each term is used both as a universal and as a singular.
πότερον δὲ ἔστι παρὰ τὴν ὕλην τῶν τοιούτων οὐσιῶν τις ἄλλη, καὶ δεῖ ζητεῖν οὐσίαν ἑτέραν τινὰ οἷον ἀριθμοὺς ἤ τι τοιοῦτον, σκεπτέον ὕστερον. τούτου γὰρ χάριν καὶ περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὐσιῶν πειρώμεθα διορίζειν, ἐπεὶ τρόπον τινὰ τῆς φυσικῆς καὶ [15] δευτέρας φιλοσοφίας ἔργον ἡ περὶ τὰς αἰσθητὰς οὐσίας θεωρία: οὐ γὰρ μόνον περὶ τῆς ὕλης δεῖ γνωρίζειν τὸν φυσικὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸν λόγον, καὶ μᾶλλον. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ὁρισμῶν πῶς μέρη τὰ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, καὶ διὰ τί εἷς λόγος ὁ ὁρισμός (δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τὸ πρᾶγμα ἕν, τὸ δὲ [20] πρᾶγμα τίνι ἕν, μέρη γε ἔχον;), σκεπτέον ὕστερον.	638. But whether there are besides the matter of such substances other substances as well, and whether it is necessary to look for some different substance in these, such as numbers or something of this kind, must be examined later (Books XIII & XIV); for it is for the sake of these too that we are trying to define sensible substances, since in a sense the study of sensible substances constitutes the work of the philosophy of nature, or second philosophy. For the philosopher of nature must have scientific knowledge not only of matter but of the part which is intelligible, and the latter is the more important. And with regard to definitions the philosopher must know how the parts in the intelligible expression are disposed, and why the definition is one intelligible expression; for it is evident that a thing is one. But how a thing having parts is one must be examined later (733).
τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ πῶς αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτό, καθόλου περὶ παντὸς εἴρηται, καὶ διὰ τί τῶν μὲν ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι ἔχει τὰ μόρια τοῦ ὁριζομένου τῶν δ᾽ οὔ, καὶ ὅτι ἐν μὲν τῷ τῆς οὐσίας λόγῳ τὰ οὕτω μόρια [25] ὡς ὕλη οὐκ ἐνέσται—οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐκείνης μόρια τῆς οὐσίας ἀλλὰ τῆς συνόλου, ταύτης δέ γ᾽ ἔστι πως λόγος καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν: μετὰ μὲν γὰρ τῆς ὕλης οὐκ ἔστιν (ἀόριστον γάρ), κατὰ τὴν πρώτην δ᾽ οὐσίαν ἔστιν, οἷον ἀνθρώπου ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς λόγος: ἡ γὰρ οὐσία ἐστὶ τὸ εἶδος τὸ ἐνόν, ἐξ οὗ καὶ τῆς [30] ὕλης ἡ σύνολος λέγεται οὐσία, οἷον ἡ κοιλότης (ἐκ γὰρ ταύτης καὶ τῆς ῥινὸς σιμὴ ῥὶς καὶ ἡ σιμότης ἐστί [δὶς γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ὑπάρξει ἡ ῥίς])—ἐν δὲ τῇ συνόλῳ οὐσίᾳ, οἷον ῥινὶ σιμῇ ἢ Καλλίᾳ, ἐνέσται καὶ ἡ ὕλη: καὶ ὅτι τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ ἕκαστον ἐπὶ τινῶν μὲν ταὐτό, [1037β] [1] ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν, οἷον καμπυλότης καὶ καμπυλότητι εἶναι, εἰ πρώτη ἐστίν (λέγω δὲ πρώτην ἣ μὴ λέγεται τῷ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ εἶναι καὶ ὑποκειμένῳ ὡς ὕλῃ), ὅσα δὲ ὡς ὕλη ἢ [5] ὡς συνειλημμένα τῇ ὕλῃ, οὐ ταὐτό, οὐδ᾽ <�εἰ> κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἕν, οἷον Σωκράτης καὶ τὸ μουσικόν: ταῦτα γὰρ ταὐτὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.	639. We have stated, then, what the essence of a thing is and how it is predicated essentially of all things (582), as well as why the intelligible expression of the essence of some things contains the parts of the thing defined, and why that of others does not. And we have also stated that those parts which have the nature of matter are not found in the intelligible expression of substance; for they are not parts of that substance, but of the whole. And in one sense there is an intelligible expression of this and in another sense there is not; for there is no intelligible expression that involves matter, because this is indeterminate. But there is an intelligible expression of the whole with reference to primary substance; for example, in the case of man there is an intelligible expression of the soul; for the substance of a thing is the specifying principle intrinsic to it, and the whole substance is composed of this along with matter. Concavity, for example, is such a principle, for from this and from nose snubnose and snubnesss are derived. For nose is also contained twice in these expressions; but in the whole substance or in snubnose or in Callias matter is also present. And we have also stated that in some cases the essence of the thing is the same as the thing itself, as in the case of primary substances; for curvature and the essence of curvature are the same, if curvature is primary. And by primary I mean what does not refer to something as existing in something else as its subject or matter. But all things which have the nature of matter or are conceived with matter, are not the same-not even if they are one accidentally, as Socrates and musician, for they are accidentally the same (590).

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 12: 1037b 8-1038a 35
νῦν δὲ λέγωμεν πρῶτον ἐφ᾽ ὅσον ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς περὶ ὁρισμοῦ μὴ εἴρηται: ἡ γὰρ ἐν ἐκείνοις ἀπορία [10] λεχθεῖσα πρὸ ἔργου τοῖς περὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἐστὶ λόγοις. λέγω δὲ ταύτην τὴν ἀπορίαν, διὰ τί ποτε ἕν ἐστιν οὗ τὸν λόγον ὁρισμὸν εἶναί φαμεν, οἷον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ ζῷον δίπουν: ἔστω γὰρ οὗτος αὐτοῦ λόγος. διὰ τί δὴ τοῦτο ἕν ἐστιν ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πολλά, ζῷον καὶ δίπουν;	640. And now let us speak first of definition insofar as it has not been discussed in the Analytics; for the problem mentioned there constitutes a preamble to the arguments about substance. And by this problem I mean: for what reason is that thing one whose intelligible expression we call a definition? For example, two-footed animal is the definition of man; for let this be his intelligible expression. Why, then, is this one thing and not many, namely, animal and two-footed?
ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ἄνθρωπος [15] καὶ λευκὸν πολλὰ μέν ἐστιν ὅταν μὴ ὑπάρχῃ θατέρῳ θάτερον, ἓν δὲ ὅταν ὑπάρχῃ καὶ πάθῃ τι τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ὁ ἄνθρωπος (τότε γὰρ ἓν γίγνεται καὶ ἔστιν ὁ λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος): ἐνταῦθα δ᾽ οὐ μετέχει θατέρου θάτερον: τὸ γὰρ γένος οὐ δοκεῖ μετέχειν τῶν διαφορῶν (ἅμα γὰρ ἂν τῶν [20] ἐναντίων τὸ αὐτὸ μετεῖχεν: αἱ γὰρ διαφοραὶ ἐναντίαι αἷς διαφέρει τὸ γένος).	641. For man and white are many since the latter is not present in the former; but they are one when the latter is present in the former, and the subject, man, is the recipient of some attribute; for then one thing is produced, and this is white man. But in this case one does not participate in the other; a genus does not participate in its differences, for then the same thing would participate in contraries; for the differences by which a genus is distinguished are contraries.
εἰ δὲ καὶ μετέχει, ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, εἴπερ εἰσὶν αἱ διαφοραὶ πλείους, οἷον πεζὸν δίπουν ἄπτερον. διὰ τί γὰρ ταῦθ᾽ ἓν ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πολλά; οὐ γὰρ ὅτι ἐνυπάρχει: οὕτω μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ἁπάντων ἔσται ἕν.	642. And even if it does not participate in them, the same argument applies if the differences are many, for example, capable of walking, two-footed and wingless. For why are all these one and not many? It is not because they are found in one thing, because then one thing will he composed of all differences.
δεῖ δέ γε ἓν [25] εἶναι ὅσα ἐν τῷ ὁρισμῷ: ὁ γὰρ ὁρισμὸς λόγος τίς ἐστιν εἷς καὶ οὐσίας, ὥστε ἑνός τινος δεῖ αὐτὸν εἶναι λόγον: καὶ γὰρ ἡ οὐσία ἕν τι καὶ τόδε τι σημαίνει, ὡς φαμέν.	643. But all the elements of a definition must be one, because a definition is one intelligible expression and one substance. Hence it must be the intelligible expression of some one particular thing; for substance signifies one thing and a particular thing, as we have said (582).
δεῖ δὲ ἐπισκοπεῖν πρῶτον περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὰς διαιρέσεις ὁρισμῶν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἐν τῷ ὁρισμῷ πλὴν τὸ [30] πρῶτον λεγόμενον γένος καὶ αἱ διαφοραί: τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα γένη ἐστὶ τό τε πρῶτον καὶ μετὰ τούτου αἱ συλλαμβανόμεναι διαφοραί, οἷον τὸ πρῶτον ζῷον, τὸ δὲ ἐχόμενον ζῷον δίπουν, καὶ πάλιν ζῷον δίπουν ἄπτερον: ὁμοίως δὲ κἂν διὰ πλειόνων λέγηται. [1038α] [1] ὅλως δ᾽ οὐδὲν διαφέρει διὰ πολλῶν ἢ δι᾽ ὀλίγων λέγεσθαι, ὥστ᾽ οὐδὲ δι᾽ ὀλίγων ἢ διὰ δυοῖν: τοῖν δυοῖν δὲ τὸ μὲν διαφορὰ τὸ δὲ γένος, οἷον τοῦ ζῷον δίπουν τὸ μὲν ζῷον γένος διαφορὰ δὲ θάτερον. [5] εἰ οὖν τὸ γένος ἁπλῶς μὴ ἔστι παρὰ τὰ ὡς γένους εἴδη, ἢ εἰ ἔστι μὲν ὡς ὕλη δ᾽ ἐστίν (ἡ μὲν γὰρ φωνὴ γένος καὶ ὕλη, αἱ δὲ διαφοραὶ τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐκ ταύτης ποιοῦσιν), φανερὸν ὅτι ὁ ὁρισμός ἐστιν ὁ ἐκ τῶν διαφορῶν λόγος.	644. Now it is necessary first to examine those definitions which are attained by the process of division. For there is nothing in a definition except the primary genus and the differences; and the other genera consist of the so-called primary genus and the differences included in this; for example, the primary genus is animal, and the next is two-footed, and the next is two-footed animal without wings. And the same thing also applies if a definition is expressed by many terms. And on the whole it makes no difference whether it is expressed by many or by few, or whether it is expressed by few or by two. Of the two, then, the one is the difference and the other the genus; for example, in the expression “two-footed animal,” animal is the genus and the other term is the difference. Hence, if a genus in an unqualified sense does not exist apart from those things which are its species, or if it has the nature of matter (for the spoken word is both a genus and matter, and the differences make the species, i.e., the letters, out of this), it is clear that the definition is the intelligible expression composed of the differences.
ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ δεῖ γε διαιρεῖσθαι τῇ τῆς διαφορᾶς [10] διαφορᾷ, οἷον ζῴου διαφορὰ τὸ ὑπόπουν: πάλιν τοῦ ζῴου τοῦ ὑπόποδος τὴν διαφορὰν δεῖ εἶναι ᾗ ὑπόπουν, ὥστ᾽ οὐ λεκτέον τοῦ ὑπόποδος τὸ μὲν πτερωτὸν τὸ δὲ ἄπτερον, ἐάνπερ λέγῃ καλῶς (ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ ἀδυνατεῖν ποιήσει τοῦτο), ἀλλ᾽ ἢ τὸ μὲν σχιζόπουν τὸ δ᾽ ἄσχιστον: αὗται [15] γὰρ διαφοραὶ ποδός: ἡ γὰρ σχιζοποδία ποδότης τις. καὶ οὕτως ἀεὶ βούλεται βαδίζειν ἕως ἂν ἔλθῃ εἰς τὰ ἀδιάφορα: τότε δ᾽ ἔσονται τοσαῦτα εἴδη ποδὸς ὅσαιπερ αἱ διαφοραί, καὶ τὰ ὑπόποδα ζῷα ἴσα ταῖς διαφοραῖς.	645. Again, it is necessary too that a difference should be divided by a difference, as “having feet” is a difference of animal; and it is necessary also to know the difference of animal having feet, inasmuch as it has feet. Therefore, if someone is to speak correctly of something having feet, he must not say that one kind is winged and another wingless; and if he does say this it will be because of incompetence. But he will speak correctly only if he says that one kind has cloven feet and the other not; because these are the differences of the difference having feet, since a cloven foot is a certain kind of foot. And one always wants to proceed in this way until he comes to the species which have no differences; and then there will be as many species of foot as there are differences, and the species of animals having feet will be equal in number to the differences.
εἰ δὴ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, φανερὸν ὅτι ἡ τελευταία διαφορὰ ἡ οὐσία τοῦ [20] πράγματος ἔσται καὶ ὁ ὁρισμός, εἴπερ μὴ δεῖ πολλάκις ταὐτὰ λέγειν ἐν τοῖς ὅροις: περίεργον γάρ. συμβαίνει δέ γε τοῦτο: ὅταν γὰρ εἴπῃ ζῷον ὑπόπουν δίπουν, οὐδὲν ἄλλο εἴρηκεν ἢ ζῷον πόδας ἔχον, δύο πόδας ἔχον: κἂν τοῦτο διαιρῇ τῇ οἰκείᾳ διαιρέσει, πλεονάκις ἐρεῖ καὶ ἰσάκις ταῖς [25] διαφοραῖς. ἐὰν μὲν δὴ διαφορᾶς διαφορὰ γίγνηται, μία ἔσται ἡ τελευταία τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἡ οὐσία:	646. If these things are so, then, it is evident that the ultimate difference will be the substance and definition of the thing, if the same thing is not to be expressed many times over in definitive expressions, because this is superfluous. However, this sometimes happens, for when one says “two-footed animal having feet,” he has said nothing more than animal having feet and having two feet. And if he divides this by its proper difference, he will express the same thing many times, and equal in number to the differences. If, then, a difference of a difference may be produced, the one which is the ultimate difference will be the specific form and substance.
ἐὰν δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἷον εἰ διαιροῖ τοῦ ὑπόποδος τὸ μὲν λευκὸν τὸ δὲ μέλαν, τοσαῦται ὅσαι ἂν αἱ τομαὶ ὦσιν.	647. But if the division is made according to what is accidental, as if one were to divide what has feet into what is white and what is black, there will be as many differences as there are divisions.
ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ὁ ὁρισμὸς λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ ἐκ τῶν διαφορῶν, καὶ τούτων τῆς τελευταίας [30] κατά γε τὸ ὀρθόν.	648. Hence it is evident that the definition is an intelligible expression composed of differences, and that it is composed of the last of these if the definition is formed correctly.
δῆλον δ᾽ ἂν εἴη, εἴ τις μετατάξειε τοὺς τοιούτους ὁρισμούς, οἷον τὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, λέγων ζῷον δίπουν ὑπόπουν: περίεργον γὰρ τὸ ὑπόπουν εἰρημένου τοῦ δίποδος. τάξις δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ: πῶς γὰρ δεῖ νοῆσαι τὸ μὲν ὕστερον τὸ δὲ πρότερον; περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν κατὰ τὰς διαιρέσεις [35] ὁρισμῶν τοσαῦτα εἰρήσθω τὴν πρώτην, ποῖοί τινές εἰσιν. [1038β] [1]	649. Moreover, this will be evident if we change the order of the words in such definitions, for example, in the definition of man by saying “two-footed animal having feet”; for having feet is superfluous when two-footed has been stated. But there is no sequence of parts in substance, for how are we to understand that one part is subsequent and the other prior? Therefore with regard to those definitions which are formed by the process of division, let this much be a preliminary statement of the kind of things they are.

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 13: 1038b 1-1039a 23
ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἡ σκέψις ἐστί, πάλιν ἐπανέλθωμεν. λέγεται δ᾽ ὥσπερ τὸ ὑποκείμενον οὐσία εἶναι καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἐκ τούτων, καὶ τὸ καθόλου. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῖν δυοῖν εἴρηται (καὶ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ τοῦ [5] ὑποκειμένου, ὅτι διχῶς ὑπόκειται, ἢ τόδε τι ὄν, ὥσπερ τὸ ζῷον τοῖς πάθεσιν, ἢ ὡς ἡ ὕλη τῇ ἐντελεχείᾳ), δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ καθόλου αἴτιόν τισιν εἶναι μάλιστα, καὶ εἶναι ἀρχὴ τὸ καθόλου: διὸ ἐπέλθωμεν καὶ περὶ τούτου.	650. But since our investigation has to do with substance, let us return to it. And just as the subject and the essence and the composite of these are called substance, so also is the universal. Two of these, then, have been discussed already, namely, the essence (576-597; 622-649) and the subject (568-575); and it has been stated that a thing is a subject in two ways: either as this particular thing (as an animal is the subject of its attributes), or as matter is the subject of actuality. But according to some thinkers the universal also seems to be in the fullest sense a cause and principle. Therefore let us treat of this.
ἔοικε γὰρ ἀδύνατον εἶναι οὐσίαν εἶναι ὁτιοῦν τῶν καθόλου λεγομένων. πρῶτον [10] μὲν γὰρ οὐσία ἑκάστου ἡ ἴδιος ἑκάστῳ, ἣ οὐχ ὑπάρχει ἄλλῳ, τὸ δὲ καθόλου κοινόν: τοῦτο γὰρ λέγεται καθόλου ὃ πλείοσιν ὑπάρχειν πέφυκεν. τίνος οὖν οὐσία τοῦτ᾽ ἔσται; ἢ γὰρ πάντων ἢ οὐδενός, πάντων δ᾽ οὐχ οἷόν τε: ἑνὸς δ᾽ εἰ ἔσται, καὶ τἆλλα τοῦτ᾽ ἔσται: ὧν γὰρ μία ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι [15] ἕν, καὶ αὐτὰ ἕν.	651. For it seems impossible that any of those things which are predicated universally should be substance. For, first, the substance of each thing is the substance which is proper to it and belongs to nothing else, whereas the universal is common; for that is said to be universal which is suited by its nature to be found in many things. Of what particular thing, then, will it be the substance? For it is either the substance of all or of one. But it cannot be the substance of all. And if it is the substance of one, all things will also be that one; for those things whose substance is one have one essence and are themselves one.
ἔτι οὐσία λέγεται τὸ μὴ καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένου, τὸ δὲ καθόλου καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται ἀεί.	652. Furthermore, substance means what is not predicated of a subject, whereas a universal is always predicated of some subject.
ἀλλ᾽ ἆρα οὕτω μὲν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ὡς τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, ἐν τούτῳ δὲ ἐνυπάρχειν, οἷον τὸ ζῷον ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ἵππῳ; οὐκοῦν δῆλον ὅτι ἔστι τις αὐτοῦ λόγος. διαφέρει δ᾽ οὐθὲν οὐδ᾽ εἰ μὴ [20] πάντων λόγος ἔστι τῶν ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ: οὐδὲν γὰρ ἧττον οὐσία τοῦτ᾽ ἔσται τινός, ὡς ὁ ἄνθρωπος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐν ᾧ ὑπάρχει, ὥστε τὸ αὐτὸ συμβήσεται πάλιν: ἔσται γὰρ ἐκείνου οὐσία, οἷον τὸ ζῷον, ἐν ᾧ ὡς ἴδιον ὑπάρχει.	653. But while a universal cannot be a substance in the way in which the essence of a thing is, it is found in this in the way in which animal is found in man and in horse. Therefore it is evident that it has some kind of intelligible expression. However, it makes no difference if there is no definitive expression of all those things which are present in substance; for none the less this will be the substance of something, as man is the substance of the particular man in whom it is present. Hence the same thing will happen again, for substance will be the substance of that thing, as animal will be the substance of that in which it is present as its proper form.
ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἀδύνατον καὶ ἄτοπον τὸ τόδε καὶ οὐσίαν, εἰ ἔστιν ἔκ τινων, [25] μὴ ἐξ οὐσιῶν εἶναι μηδ᾽ ἐκ τοῦ τόδε τι ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ ποιοῦ: πρότερον γὰρ ἔσται μὴ οὐσία τε καὶ τὸ ποιὸν οὐσίας τε καὶ τοῦ τόδε. ὅπερ ἀδύνατον: οὔτε λόγῳ γὰρ οὔτε χρόνῳ οὔτε γενέσει οἷόν τε τὰ πάθη τῆς οὐσίας εἶναι πρότερα: ἔσται γὰρ καὶ χωριστά.	654. Furthermore, it is both impossible and absurd that this particular thing, or substance, if it is composed of certain parts, should not be composed of substances or of a particular thing but of quality; for that which is not substance, i.e., quality, will then be prior both to substance and to the particular thing itself. But this is impossible; for accidental attributes cannot be prior to substance either in intelligibility or in time or in the process of generation; for they would then be separable from it.
ἔτι τῷ Σωκράτει ἐνυπάρξει οὐσία οὐσίᾳ, [30] ὥστε δυοῖν ἔσται οὐσία. ὅλως δὲ συμβαίνει, εἰ ἔστιν οὐσία ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὅσα οὕτω λέγεται, μηθὲν τῶν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ εἶναι μηδενὸς οὐσίαν μηδὲ χωρὶς ὑπάρχειν αὐτῶν μηδ᾽ ἐν ἄλλῳ, λέγω δ᾽ οἷον οὐκ εἶναί τι ζῷον παρὰ τὰ τινά, οὐδ᾽ ἄλλο τῶν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις οὐδέν. ἔκ τε δὴ τούτων θεωροῦσι [35] φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδὲν τῶν καθόλου ὑπαρχόντων οὐσία ἐστί, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν σημαίνει τῶν κοινῇ κατηγορουμένων τόδε τι, [1039α] [1] ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε.	655. Furthermore, Socrates will have a substance in his substance, and therefore it will be the substance of two things. And in general it follows, if man and all terms used in this way are substance, that no one of the parts in the intelligible expression is the substance of anything, nor does it exist apart from the species or in anything else. And I mean that there is no animal existing apart from particular ones, and the same is true of everything contained in the intelligible expressions of things. From these considerations it is evident to those who study the matter that no universal is a substance, and that none of the categories signify particular things but things of such and such a kind.
εἰ δὲ μή, ἄλλα τε πολλὰ συμβαίνει καὶ ὁ τρίτος ἄνθρωπος. ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὧδε δῆλον.	656. And if this is not the case, many absurdities will follow, among them the third man (107).
ἀδύνατον γὰρ οὐσίαν ἐξ οὐσιῶν εἶναι ἐνυπαρχουσῶν ὡς ἐντελεχείᾳ: τὰ γὰρ δύο [5] οὕτως ἐντελεχείᾳ οὐδέποτε ἓν ἐντελεχείᾳ, ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν δυνάμει δύο ᾖ, ἔσται ἕν (οἷον ἡ διπλασία ἐκ δύο ἡμίσεων δυνάμει γε: ἡ γὰρ ἐντελέχεια χωρίζει), ὥστ᾽ εἰ ἡ οὐσία ἕν, οὐκ ἔσται ἐξ οὐσιῶν ἐνυπαρχουσῶν καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, ὃν λέγει Δημόκριτος ὀρθῶς: ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναί φησιν ἐκ [10] δύο ἓν ἢ ἐξ ἑνὸς δύο γενέσθαι: τὰ γὰρ μεγέθη τὰ ἄτομα τὰς οὐσίας ποιεῖ. ὁμοίως τοίνυν δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐπ᾽ ἀριθμοῦ ἕξει, εἴπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ἀριθμὸς σύνθεσις μονάδων, ὥσπερ λέγεται ὑπό τινων: ἢ γὰρ οὐχ ἓν ἡ δυὰς ἢ οὐκ ἔστι μονὰς ἐν αὐτῇ ἐντελεχείᾳ.	657. Furthermore it is also evident in this way that a substance cannot be composed of substances which are actually present in it, for what is actually two can never be actually one; but if something is potentially two, it will be actually one; for example, the whole line consists of two halves existing potentially. For actuality separates. Hence, if substance is one it will not consist of substances present in it. And in this sense Democritus is right; for he says that it is impossible for one thing to be produced from two, or two from one; because he makes indivisible continuous quantities substances. It is evident, then, that the same thing will also be true of numbers if a number is a composite of units as some say, because either the number two is not one or the unit is actually present in it.
ἔχει δὲ τὸ συμβαῖνον ἀπορίαν. εἰ γὰρ [15] μήτε ἐκ τῶν καθόλου οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι μηδεμίαν οὐσίαν διὰ τὸ τοιόνδε ἀλλὰ μὴ τόδε τι σημαίνειν, μήτ᾽ ἐξ οὐσιῶν ἐνδέχεται ἐντελεχείᾳ εἶναι μηδεμίαν οὐσίαν σύνθετον, ἀσύνθετον ἂν εἴη οὐσία πᾶσα, ὥστ᾽ οὐδὲ λόγος ἂν εἴη οὐδεμιᾶς οὐσίας. ἀλλὰ μὴν δοκεῖ γε πᾶσι καὶ ἐλέχθη πάλαι ἢ [20] μόνον οὐσίας εἶναι ὅρον ἢ μάλιστα: νῦν δ᾽ οὐδὲ ταύτης. οὐδενὸς ἄρ᾽ ἔσται ὁρισμός: ἢ τρόπον μέν τινα ἔσται τρόπον δέ τινα οὔ. δῆλον δ᾽ ἔσται τὸ λεγόμενον ἐκ τῶν ὕστερον μᾶλλον.	658. But the result involves a difficulty; for if no single substance can consist of universals (because a universal signifies such and such a thing but not a particular thing), and if no single substance can be composed of actual substances, then every substance will lack composition. Hence no substance will have an intelligible expression. But it appears to all, and this has already been stated (587), that it is either substance alone or chiefly substance that is defined. But now it seems that not even this kind of substance is defined. Hence there will be no definition of anything, or in one sense there will be and in another there will not. The meaning of this will become clearer from what follows (669-676; 733-741).

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 14 1039a 24-1039b 19
φανερὸν δ᾽ ἐξ αὐτῶν τούτων τὸ συμβαῖνον καὶ τοῖς [25] τὰς ἰδέας λέγουσιν οὐσίας τε χωριστὰς εἶναι καὶ ἅμα τὸ εἶδος ἐκ τοῦ γένους ποιοῦσι καὶ τῶν διαφορῶν. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι τὰ εἴδη, καὶ τὸ ζῷον ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ἵππῳ, ἤτοι ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἐστὶν ἢ ἕτερον:	659. And from these facts it is evident what consequences face those who say that the Ideas are substances and are separable, and who also at the same time make the form out of genus and difference. For if there are Forms, and if animal exists in man and in horse, it is either one and the same numerically or different.
τῷ μὲν γὰρ λόγῳ δῆλον ὅτι ἕν: τὸν γὰρ αὐτὸν διέξεισι λόγον ὁ λέγων [30] ἐν ἑκατέρῳ. εἰ οὖν ἐστί τις ἄνθρωπος αὐτὸς καθ᾽ αὑτὸν τόδε τι καὶ κεχωρισμένον, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐξ ὧν, οἷον τὸ ζῷον καὶ τὸ δίπουν, τόδε τι σημαίνειν καὶ εἶναι χωριστὰ καὶ οὐσίας: ὥστε καὶ τὸ ζῷον.	660. For it is evident that they are one in their intelligible expression, for one will express the same notion in speaking of each. Therefore, if there is a man-in-himself, who is a particular thing and is separate, the things of which he is composed, such as animal and two-footed, must also signify particular things and be separable and be substances. Hence animal will also be such.
εἰ μὲν οὖν τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἓν τὸ ἐν τῷ ἵππῳ καὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὥσπερ σὺ σαυτῷ, πῶς τὸ ἓν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι χωρὶς ἓν ἔσται,	661. If, then, the animal in horse and in man is one and the same, as you are in yourself, how can one thing be present in many things which exist separately?
[1039β] [1] καὶ διὰ τί οὐ καὶ χωρὶς αὑτοῦ ἔσται τὸ ζῷον τοῦτο;	662. And why will this animal not exist apart from itself?
ἔπειτα εἰ μὲν μεθέξει τοῦ δίποδος καὶ τοῦ πολύποδος, ἀδύνατόν τι συμβαίνει, τἀναντία γὰρ ἅμα ὑπάρξει αὐτῷ ἑνὶ καὶ τῷδέ τινι ὄντι: εἰ δὲ μή, τίς ὁ τρόπος [5] ὅταν εἴπῃ τις τὸ ζῷον εἶναι δίπουν ἢ πεζόν; ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως σύγκειται καὶ ἅπτεται ἢ μέμικται: ἀλλὰ πάντα ἄτοπα.	663. Again, if it participates in two-footed and in many-footed, an impossible conclusion follows, for contrary attributes will belong at the same time to this thing which is one and a particular being. And if it does not, what mode of being is meant when one says that an animal is two-footed or is capable of walking? But perhaps they are combined or joined together or mixed. Yet all such views are untenable.
ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερον ἐν ἑκάστῳ: οὐκοῦν ἄπειρα ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἔσται ὧν ἡ οὐσία ζῷον: οὐ γὰρ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐκ ζῴου ἅνθρωπος.	664. But what will happen if there is a different animal in each? There will then be an infinite number of things whose substances is animal, for man does not come from animal accidentally.
ἔτι πολλὰ ἔσται αὐτὸ τὸ ζῷον: οὐσία τε γὰρ τὸ [10] ἐν ἑκάστῳ ζῷον (οὐ γὰρ κατ᾽ ἄλλο λέγεται: εἰ δὲ μή, ἐξ ἐκείνου ἔσται ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ γένος αὐτοῦ ἐκεῖνο),	655. Again, animal-in-itself will be many things; for the animal in each will be substance, since it is not predicated of anything else. But if this is not so, man will consist of that other thing, and that will be the genus of man.
καὶ ἔτι ἰδέαι ἅπαντα ἐξ ὧν ὁ ἄνθρωπος: οὐκοῦν οὐκ ἄλλου μὲν ἰδέα ἔσται ἄλλου δ᾽ οὐσία (ἀδύνατον γάρ): αὐτὸ ἄρα ζῷον ἓν ἕκαστον ἔσται τῶν ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις.	666. Further, all the things of which man is composed will be Ideas. Hence no one of them will be the Idea of one thing and the substance of something else, for this is impossible. Therefore animal-in-itself will be each of these things which are contained in animals.
ἔτι ἐκ τίνος τοῦτο, καὶ [15] πῶς ἐξ αὐτοῦ ζῴου; ἢ πῶς οἷόν τε εἶναι τὸ ζῷον, ᾧ οὐσία τοῦτο αὐτό, παρ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ ζῷον;	667. Again, from what is it derived? And how is it derived from animal-in-itself? Or how is it possible that the animal which is a substance should exist apart from animal-in-itself?
ἔτι δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ταῦτά τε συμβαίνει καὶ τούτων ἀτοπώτερα. εἰ δὴ ἀδύνατον οὕτως ἔχειν, δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν εἴδη αὐτῶν οὕτως ὥς τινές φασιν. [20]	668. Again, these are the conclusions which follow in the case of sensible things, and there are others more absurd than these. If it is impossible, then, that this should be so, it is evident that there is no Idea of these sensible things, as some affirm.

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 15: 1039b 20-1040b 4
ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἡ οὐσία ἑτέρα, τό τε σύνολον καὶ ὁ λόγος (λέγω δ᾽ ὅτι ἡ μὲν οὕτως ἐστὶν οὐσία, σὺν τῇ ὕλῃ συνειλημμένος ὁ λόγος, ἡ δ᾽ ὁ λόγος ὅλως), ὅσαι μὲν οὖν οὕτω λέγονται, τούτων μὲν ἔστι φθορά (καὶ γὰρ γένεσις), τοῦ δὲ λόγου οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως ὥστε φθείρεσθαι (οὐδὲ γὰρ γένεσις, οὐ [25] γὰρ γίγνεται τὸ οἰκίᾳ εἶναι ἀλλὰ τὸ τῇδε τῇ οἰκίᾳ), ἀλλ᾽ ἄνευ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς εἰσὶ καὶ οὐκ εἰσίν: δέδεικται γὰρ ὅτι οὐδεὶς ταῦτα γεννᾷ οὐδὲ ποιεῖ. διὰ τοῦτο δὲ καὶ τῶν οὐσιῶν τῶν αἰσθητῶν τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστα οὔτε ὁρισμὸς οὔτε ἀπόδειξις ἔστιν, ὅτι ἔχουσιν ὕλην ἧς ἡ φύσις τοιαύτη ὥστ᾽ ἐνδέχεσθαι [30] καὶ εἶναι καὶ μή: διὸ φθαρτὰ πάντα τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα αὐτῶν. εἰ οὖν ἥ τ᾽ ἀπόδειξις τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ ὁ ὁρισμὸς ἐπιστημονικόν, καὶ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, ὥσπερ οὐδ᾽ ἐπιστήμην ὁτὲ μὲν ἐπιστήμην ὁτὲ δ᾽ ἄγνοιαν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ δόξα τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν, οὕτως οὐδ᾽ ἀπόδειξιν οὐδ᾽ ὁρισμόν, ἀλλὰ δόξα ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐνδεχομένου ἄλλως ἔχειν, [1040α] [1] δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἂν εἴη αὐτῶν οὔτε ὁρισμὸς οὔτε ἀπόδειξις. ἄδηλά τε γὰρ τὰ φθειρόμενα τοῖς ἔχουσι τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὅταν ἐκ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἀπέλθῃ, καὶ σωζομένων τῶν λόγων ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τῶν [5] αὐτῶν οὐκ ἔσται οὔτε ὁρισμὸς ἔτι οὔτε ἀπόδειξις. διὸ δεῖ, τῶν πρὸς ὅρον ὅταν τις ὁρίζηταί τι τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστον, μὴ ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ἀεὶ ἀναιρεῖν ἔστιν: οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ὁρίσασθαι. οὐδὲ δὴ ἰδέαν οὐδεμίαν ἔστιν ὁρίσασθαι. τῶν γὰρ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἡ ἰδέα, ὡς φασί, καὶ χωριστή:	669. But since there are two kinds of substance, the concrete whole and the intelligible structure of a thing (and I say that the former is substance taken as the intelligible structure conceived with matter, and the latter is the intelligible structure in general), then all things which are called substance in the former way are subject to corruption; for these are also subject to generation. But the intelligible structure is not subject to corruption in such a way that it perishes, since it is not subject to generation; for it is not the being of house that is produced, but the being of this house. But they both are and are not without generation and corruption; for it has been shown (611) that no one generates or produces these. And for this reason, too, there is neither definition nor demonstration of singular sensible substances, because they have matter whose nature is such that it is possible for them both to be and not to be; and for this reason all singular instances of these are corruptible. Now demonstration is of necessary things, and definition is scientific. And just as scientific knowledge cannot sometimes be scientific knowledge and sometimes ignorance, but what is such is opinion, so too neither can it be admitted that demonstration or definition is such (but it is opinion then which is concerned with something that can be otherwise than it is). But if this is true, it is evident that there will not be demonstration or definition of these things. For corruptible things are not evident to those having scientific knowledge; and when they have been removed from the sphere of sensory perception, even though their intelligible expressions remain the same in the mind, there will be neither demonstration nor definition of them. And for this reason when anyone, eager for setting the limits of things, defines one of these singulars, he must not ignore the fact that it is always possible to overthrow his definition; for it is not possible to define such a thing. Nor is it possible, then, to define any of the Ideas; for an Idea is of singular things (as they say), and is separable.
ἀναγκαῖον δὲ ἐξ ὀνομάτων [10] εἶναι τὸν λόγον, ὄνομα δ᾽ οὐ ποιήσει ὁ ὁριζόμενος (ἄγνωστον γὰρ ἔσται), τὰ δὲ κείμενα κοινὰ πᾶσιν: ἀνάγκη ἄρα ὑπάρχειν καὶ ἄλλῳ ταῦτα: οἷον εἴ τις σὲ ὁρίσαιτο, ζῷον ἐρεῖ ἰσχνὸν ἢ λευκὸν ἢ ἕτερόν τι ὃ καὶ ἄλλῳ ὑπάρξει.	670. And it is necessary that the intelligible expression of a thing should be composed of words; and one who forms a definition will not coin a word (for it would be unknown), but the attributes which are posited are common to all things. It is necessary, then, that these also apply to other things; for example, if anyone were to define you, he would say that you are an animal capable of walking or white or having some other attribute which is found in something else.
εἰ δέ τις φαίη μηδὲν κωλύειν χωρὶς μὲν πάντα πολλοῖς [15] ἅμα δὲ μόνῳ τούτῳ ὑπάρχειν, λεκτέον πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι καὶ ἀμφοῖν, οἷον τὸ ζῷον δίπουν τῷ ζῴῳ καὶ τῷ δίποδι (καὶ τοῦτο ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἀϊδίων καὶ ἀνάγκη εἶναι,	671. But if anyone were to say that nothing prevents all things considered separately from being present in many things, but that taken together they are present together only in this one thing, it is first necessary to say that they belong to both; e.g., two-footed animal belongs both to animal and to two-footed. And this must be the case with eternal things.
πρότερά γ᾽ ὄντα καὶ μέρη τοῦ συνθέτου: ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ χωριστά, εἴπερ τὸ ἄνθρωπος χωριστόν: ἢ γὰρ οὐθὲν ἢ ἄμφω: [20] εἰ μὲν οὖν μηθέν, οὐκ ἔσται τὸ γένος παρὰ τὰ εἴδη, εἰ δ᾽ ἔσται, καὶ ἡ διαφορά):	672. It is also necessary that they be prior existents and parts of the composite. And even more, they must be separable if man is separable; for either neither or both will be such. If, then, neither is separable, a genus will not exist apart from species; but if both are, so also will a difference be.
εἶθ᾽ ὅτι πρότερα τῷ εἶναι: ταῦτα δὲ οὐκ ἀνταναιρεῖται.	673. Again, because they are prior to being itself, they will therefore not be destroyed.
ἔπειτα εἰ ἐξ ἰδεῶν αἱ ἰδέαι [23] (ἀσυνθετώτερα γὰρ τὰ ἐξ ὧν),	674. And, again, if the Ideas are composed of Ideas, less composite things are the elements of others.
ἔτι ἐπὶ πολλῶν δεήσει κἀκεῖνα κατηγορεῖσθαι ἐξ ὧν ἡ ἰδέα, οἷον τὸ ζῷον καὶ τὸ [25] δίπουν. εἰ δὲ μή, πῶς γνωρισθήσεται; ἔσται γὰρ ἰδέα τις ἣν ἀδύνατον ἐπὶ πλειόνων κατηγορῆσαι ἢ ἑνός. οὐ δοκεῖ δέ, ἀλλὰ πᾶσα ἰδέα εἶναι μεθεκτή.	675. It will, moreover, be necessary that those things of which an Idea is composed should be predicated of many things, as animal and two-footed. But if this is not true, how will they be known? For there will be an Idea which cannot be predicated of more things than one. However, this does not seem to be the case, but every Idea is capable of being participated.
ὥσπερ οὖν εἴρηται, λανθάνει ὅτι ἀδύνατον ὁρίσασθαι ἐν τοῖς ἀϊδίοις, μάλιστα δὲ ὅσα μοναχά, οἷον ἥλιος ἢ σελήνη. οὐ μόνον γὰρ διαμαρτάνουσι [30] τῷ προστιθέναι τοιαῦτα ὧν ἀφαιρουμένων ἔτι ἔσται ἥλιος, ὥσπερ τὸ περὶ γῆν ἰὸν ἢ νυκτικρυφές (ἂν γὰρ στῇ ἢ φανῇ, οὐκέτι ἔσται ἥλιος: ἀλλ᾽ ἄτοπον εἰ μή: ὁ γὰρ ἥλιος οὐσίαν τινὰ σημαίνει): ἔτι ὅσα ἐπ᾽ ἄλλου ἐνδέχεται, οἷον ἐὰν ἕτερος γένηται τοιοῦτος, δῆλον ὅτι ἥλιος ἔσται: κοινὸς ἄρα ὁ λόγος: [1040β] [1] ἀλλ᾽ ἦν τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστα ὁ ἥλιος, ὥσπερ Κλέων ἢ Σωκράτης: ἐπεὶ διὰ τί οὐδεὶς ὅρον ἐκφέρει αὐτῶν ἰδέας; γένοιτο γὰρ ἂν δῆλον πειρωμένων ὅτι ἀληθὲς τὸ νῦν εἰρημένον. [5]	676. Therefore, as was stated (671), the fact that it is impossible to give definitions of eternal things, and especially of any singular instances of these, as the sun and the moon, is hidden from these people. For people err by adding such attributes as can be removed and let the sun remain, for example, going around the earth or being hidden at night; (for according to them) if it stands still or is visible at night, it will no longer be the sun; but it is absurd if it is not so (for the sun means a certain substance); and they also err by adding attributes which are capable of belonging to something else; for example, supposing that another such thing should come into being, it would evidently be a sun. Therefore the definitive expression is common. But the sun was taken to be a singular thing, like Cleon and Socrates. For why do none of these thinkers offer any fixed limits of an Idea? For to those attempting this it would become evident that what has been said just now is true.

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 16: 1040b 5-1041a 5
φανερὸν δὲ ὅτι καὶ τῶν δοκουσῶν εἶναι οὐσιῶν αἱ πλεῖσται δυνάμεις εἰσί, τά τε μόρια τῶν ζῴων (οὐθὲν γὰρ κεχωρισμένον αὐτῶν ἐστίν: ὅταν δὲ χωρισθῇ, καὶ τότε ὄντα ὡς ὕλη πάντα) καὶ γῆ καὶ πῦρ καὶ ἀήρ: οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἕν ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾽ οἷον σωρός, πρὶν ἢ πεφθῇ καὶ γένηταί τι [10] ἐξ αὐτῶν ἕν. μάλιστα δ᾽ ἄν τις τὰ τῶν ἐμψύχων ὑπολάβοι μόρια καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάρεγγυς ἄμφω γίγνεσθαι, ὄντα καὶ ἐντελεχείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει, τῷ ἀρχὰς ἔχειν κινήσεως ἀπό τινος ἐν ταῖς καμπαῖς: διὸ ἔνια ζῷα διαιρούμενα ζῇ. ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως δυνάμει πάντ᾽ ἔσται, ὅταν ᾖ ἓν καὶ [15] συνεχὲς φύσει, ἀλλὰ μὴ βίᾳ ἢ συμφύσει: τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον πήρωσις.	677. It is also evident that many of the things which are thought to be substances are potential, as the parts of animals; for none of them are separate. But when they have been separated, all are then like matter, for example, earth, fire and air; for none of them constitute a unity but they are like a heap of things before they are arranged and some one thing is produced from them. But someone might very easily suppose that the parts of living things and the parts of the soul which are close to them exist in actuality as well as in potency, because they have principles of motion consisting in something in their joints; and for this reason some animals live when they have been divided. Yet all parts exist potentially when they are one and continuous by nature, not by compulsion or by being joined together; for such a thing is a mutilation.
ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἓν λέγεται ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὄν, καὶ ἡ οὐσία ἡ τοῦ ἑνὸς μία, καὶ ὧν μία ἀριθμῷ ἓν ἀριθμῷ, φανερὸν ὅτι οὔτε τὸ ἓν οὔτε τὸ ὂν ἐνδέχεται οὐσίαν εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ στοιχείῳ εἶναι ἢ ἀρχῇ: ἀλλὰ [20] ζητοῦμεν τίς οὖν ἡ ἀρχή, ἵνα εἰς γνωριμώτερον ἀναγάγωμεν. μᾶλλον μὲν οὖν τούτων οὐσία τὸ ὂν καὶ ἓν ἢ ἥ τε ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ στοιχεῖον καὶ τὸ αἴτιον,	678. And since the term one is used in the same senses as the term being, and the substance of unity is one, and those things whose substance is one are numerically one, it is evident that neither unity nor being can be the substance of things, as neither can the being of an element or a principle. But we look for the principle in order to reduce the thing to something better known. Therefore, among these unity and being are substance to a greater degree than principle, element or cause.
οὔπω δὲ οὐδὲ ταῦτα, εἴπερ μηδ᾽ ἄλλο κοινὸν μηδὲν οὐσία: οὐδενὶ γὰρ ὑπάρχει ἡ οὐσία ἀλλ᾽ ἢ αὑτῇ τε καὶ τῷ ἔχοντι αὐτήν, οὗ ἐστὶν οὐσία.	679. But neither are these substance, if nothing that is common is substance; for substance is not present in anything else but itself and in that which has it, of which it is the substance.
[25] ἔτι τὸ ἓν πολλαχῇ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἅμα, τὸ δὲ κοινὸν ἅμα πολλαχῇ ὑπάρχει: ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲν τῶν καθόλου ὑπάρχει παρὰ τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα χωρίς.	680. Furthermore, unity will not be present in many things at the same time; but what is common is present in many things at the same time. Hence it is evident that nothing universal exists apart from singular things.
ἀλλ᾽ οἱ τὰ εἴδη λέγοντες τῇ μὲν ὀρθῶς λέγουσι χωρίζοντες αὐτά, εἴπερ οὐσίαι εἰσί, τῇ δ᾽ οὐκ ὀρθῶς, ὅτι τὸ ἓν ἐπὶ πολλῶν εἶδος [30] λέγουσιν. αἴτιον δ᾽ ὅτι οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἀποδοῦναι τίνες αἱ τοιαῦται οὐσίαι αἱ ἄφθαρτοι παρὰ τὰς καθ᾽ ἕκαστα καὶ αἰσθητάς: ποιοῦσιν οὖν τὰς αὐτὰς τῷ εἴδει τοῖς φθαρτοῖς (ταύτας γὰρ ἴσμεν), αὐτοάνθρωπον καὶ αὐτόϊππον, προστιθέντες τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὸ ῥῆμα τὸ "αὐτό". καίτοι κἂν εἰ μὴ ἑωράκειμεν τὰ ἄστρα, [1041α] [1] οὐδὲν ἂν ἧττον, οἶμαι, ἦσαν οὐσίαι ἀΐδιοι παρ᾽ ἃς ἡμεῖς ᾔδειμεν: ὥστε καὶ νῦν εἰ μὴ ἔχομεν τίνες εἰσίν, ἀλλ᾽ εἶναί γέ τινας ἴσως ἀναγκαῖον. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὔτε τῶν καθόλου λεγομένων οὐδὲν οὐσία οὔτ᾽ ἐστὶν οὐσία [5] οὐδεμία ἐξ οὐσιῶν, δῆλον.	681. But those who speak of the Forms are right in a sense when they make them separate, if they are substances; but in a sense they are wrong, because they say that a Form is one in many things. And the reason for this is that they cannot explain what are the incorruptible substances of this kind which exist apart from singular, sensible substances. Therefore they make them specifically the same as corruptible things (for we know these things); i.e., they invent a man himself and a horse itself by adding the word itself to sensible things. Hence, even if we did not see the stars, none the less, as I should presume, there would be eternal substances besides those which we see. Hence, even if we do not now know what they are, perhaps it is still necessary that there should be some. It is evident, then, that no universal predicates are substance, and that one substance is not composed of substances.

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 17: 1041a 6-1041b 33
τί δὲ χρὴ λέγειν καὶ ὁποῖόν τι τὴν οὐσίαν, πάλιν ἄλλην οἷον ἀρχὴν ποιησάμενοι λέγωμεν: ἴσως γὰρ ἐκ τούτων ἔσται δῆλον καὶ περὶ ἐκείνης τῆς οὐσίας ἥτις ἐστὶ κεχωρισμένη τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὐσιῶν. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ οὐσία ἀρχὴ καὶ [10] αἰτία τις ἐστίν, ἐντεῦθεν μετιτέον.	682. But let us state both what and what kind of thing it is necessary to say substance is, as though we were making a fresh start; for perhaps from these things we shall come to an understanding of that kind of substance which is separate from sensible substances. Hence, since substance is a principle and cause, let us proceed from this starting point.
ζητεῖται δὲ τὸ διὰ τί ἀεὶ οὕτως, διὰ τί ἄλλο ἄλλῳ τινὶ ὑπάρχει. τὸ γὰρ ζητεῖν διὰ τί ὁ μουσικὸς ἄνθρωπος μουσικὸς ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν, ἤτοι ἐστὶ τὸ εἰρημένον ζητεῖν, διὰ τί ὁ ἄνθρωπος μουσικός ἐστιν, ἢ ἄλλο. τὸ μὲν οὖν διὰ τί αὐτό ἐστιν αὐτό, οὐδέν ἐστι [15] ζητεῖν (δεῖ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι καὶ τὸ εἶναι ὑπάρχειν δῆλα ὄντα—λέγω δ᾽ οἷον ὅτι ἡ σελήνη ἐκλείπει—, αὐτὸ δὲ ὅτι αὐτό, εἷς λόγος καὶ μία αἰτία ἐπὶ πάντων, διὰ τί ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπος ἢ ὁ μουσικὸς μουσικός, πλὴν εἴ τις λέγοι ὅτι ἀδιαίρετον πρὸς αὑτὸ ἕκαστον, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἦν τὸ ἑνὶ εἶναι: ἀλλὰ τοῦτο [20] κοινόν γε κατὰ πάντων καὶ σύντομον): ζητήσειε δ᾽ ἄν τις διὰ τί ἅνθρωπός ἐστι ζῷον τοιονδί. τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν δῆλον, ὅτι οὐ ζητεῖ διὰ τί ὅς ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν: τὶ ἄρα κατά τινος ζητεῖ διὰ τί ὑπάρχει (ὅτι δ᾽ ὑπάρχει, δεῖ δῆλον εἶναι: εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως, οὐδὲν ζητεῖ), οἷον διὰ τί [25] βροντᾷ; διὰ τί ψόφος γίγνεται ἐν τοῖς νέφεσιν; ἄλλο γὰρ οὕτω κατ᾽ ἄλλου ἐστὶ τὸ ζητούμενον. καὶ διὰ τί ταδί, οἷον πλίνθοι καὶ λίθοι, οἰκία ἐστίν; φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι ζητεῖ τὸ αἴτιον: τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, ὡς εἰπεῖν λογικῶς, ὃ ἐπ᾽ ἐνίων μέν ἐστι τίνος ἕνεκα, οἷον ἴσως ἐπ᾽ οἰκίας ἢ κλίνης, [30] ἐπ᾽ ἐνίων δὲ τί ἐκίνησε πρῶτον: αἴτιον γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν τοιοῦτον αἴτιον ἐπὶ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι ζητεῖται καὶ φθείρεσθαι, θάτερον δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ εἶναι.	683. Now the why of a thing is always investigated in the following way: why does one thing belong to something else? For to ask why a musical man is a musical man, is either to ask (as has been said) why the man is musical, or to ask about something else. Therefore to ask why a thing is itself is to make no inquiry at all; for both the fact that a thing is such and its existence must be evident from the first; and I mean, for example, that the moon undergoes an eclipse. And in the case of all things there is one reason and one cause of the fact that a thing is itself, for example, why a man is a man, or why the musical is musical—unless one were to say that each thing is indivisible in relation to itself. But this is what being one really is. However, this is common to all things and is small. But someone might ask, “Why is man such and such an animal?” This, then, is evident, that he is not asking why he who is a man is a man. Therefore one is asking why something is predicated of something else; for if this were not so, the inquiry would be about nothing, for example, “Why does it thunder?” The answer is, “because sound is produced in the clouds.” For what is being investigated is one thing as predicated in this way of something else. And “Why are these things,” for example, bricks and stones, “a house?” It is evident, then, that he is asking about the cause. And this—to speak logically—is the quiddity. Now in the case of some things this is that for the sake of which a thing exists [its end or goal], as, say, in the case of a house or a bed. But in the case of other things it is the thing which first moves them, for this also is a cause. Such a cause is sought in the process of generation and corruption, while the other is also sought in the case of being.
λανθάνει δὲ μάλιστα τὸ ζητούμενον ἐν τοῖς μὴ κατ᾽ ἀλλήλων λεγομένοις, [1041β] [1] οἷον ἄνθρωπος τί ἐστι ζητεῖται διὰ τὸ ἁπλῶς λέγεσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ διορίζειν ὅτι τάδε τόδε.	684. Now the object of our inquiry is most obscure in cases concerned with things not predicated of others, as when we ask what man is; because a single term is used and it is not said definitely that he is this or that.
ἀλλὰ δεῖ διαρθρώσαντας ζητεῖν: εἰ δὲ μή, κοινὸν τοῦ μηθὲν ζητεῖν καὶ τοῦ ζητεῖν τι γίγνεται. ἐπεὶ δὲ δεῖ ἔχειν τε καὶ ὑπάρχειν τὸ [5] εἶναι, δῆλον δὴ ὅτι τὴν ὕλην ζητεῖ διὰ τί <�τί> ἐστιν: οἷον οἰκία ταδὶ διὰ τί; ὅτι ὑπάρχει ὃ ἦν οἰκίᾳ εἶναι. καὶ ἄνθρωπος τοδί, ἢ τὸ σῶμα τοῦτο τοδὶ ἔχον. ὥστε τὸ αἴτιον ζητεῖται τῆς ὕλης (τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ εἶδος) ᾧ τί ἐστιν: τοῦτο δ᾽ ἡ οὐσία.	685. But in dealing with this question corrections must be; for if this is not done, it will turn out that asking something and asking nothing will have something in common. But since it is necessary to assume that the thing exists, it is clear that the question is why the matter is such and such, for example, why are these materials a house? Because these are the ones that constitute the being of a house. And why is this individual a man? or why is a thing having such and such a body a man? Hence what is being sought is the cause of the matter, and this is the specifying principle by reason of which something exists; and this is substance.
φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι ἐπὶ τῶν ἁπλῶν οὐκ ἔστι ζήτησις [10] οὐδὲ δίδαξις, ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερος τρόπος τῆς ζητήσεως τῶν τοιούτων.	686. Hence it is evident that there is no inquiry or teaching as regards simple things, but that there is a different method of investigating such things.
ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἔκ τινος σύνθετον οὕτως ὥστε ἓν εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, [ἂν] μὴ ὡς σωρὸς ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἡ συλλαβή—ἡ δὲ συλλαβὴ οὐκ ἔστι τὰ στοιχεῖα, οὐδὲ τῷ <�βα> ταὐτὸ τὸ <�β> καὶ <�α>, οὐδ᾽ ἡ σὰρξ πῦρ καὶ γῆ (διαλυθέντων γὰρ τὰ μὲν οὐκέτι ἔστιν, [15] οἷον ἡ σὰρξ καὶ ἡ συλλαβή, τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα ἔστι, καὶ τὸ πῦρ καὶ ἡ γῆ): ἔστιν ἄρα τι ἡ συλλαβή, οὐ μόνον τὰ στοιχεῖα τὸ φωνῆεν καὶ ἄφωνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕτερόν τι, καὶ ἡ σὰρξ οὐ μόνον πῦρ καὶ γῆ ἢ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕτερόν τι	687. Now since what is composed is composed of something in such a way that the whole is one, though not as a heap of things, but as a syllable is, a syllable is not the same as its letters i.e., ba is not the same as the letters b and a; nor is flesh the same as fire; for when these are dissociated, they no longer exist, for example, flesh and the like; but the elements exist, and fire and earth exist. Hence a syllable is a determinate thing, and not merely the elements of speech, as the vowel and the consonant, but something else as well. And flesh is not merely fire and earth, or the hot and the cold, but something else as well.
—εἰ τοίνυν ἀνάγκη κἀκεῖνο ἢ στοιχεῖον [20] ἢ ἐκ στοιχείων εἶναι, εἰ μὲν στοιχεῖον, πάλιν ὁ αὐτὸς ἔσται λόγος (ἐκ τούτου γὰρ καὶ πυρὸς καὶ γῆς ἔσται ἡ σὰρξ καὶ ἔτι ἄλλου, ὥστ᾽ εἰς ἄπειρον βαδιεῖται): εἰ δὲ ἐκ στοιχείου, δῆλον ὅτι οὐχ ἑνὸς ἀλλὰ πλειόνων, ἢ ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ ἔσται, ὥστε πάλιν ἐπὶ τούτου τὸν αὐτὸν ἐροῦμεν λόγον καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς [25] σαρκὸς ἢ συλλαβῆς.	688. Therefore, if something must either be an element or composed of elements, then if it is an element the same argument will again apply; for flesh will consist of this and fire and earth and something else besides, so that there will be an infinite regress. But if it is composed of elements, it is evident that it is not composed of one (otherwise it would be that very thing itself), but of many. Hence we use the same argument in this case as we did in that of a syllable or of flesh.
δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν εἶναι τὶ τοῦτο καὶ οὐ στοιχεῖον, καὶ αἴτιόν γε τοῦ εἶναι τοδὶ μὲν σάρκα τοδὶ δὲ συλλαβήν: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. οὐσία δὲ ἑκάστου μὲν τοῦτο (τοῦτο γὰρ αἴτιον πρῶτον τοῦ εἶναι)—	689. Now it would seem that this something else exists, and that it is an element and the cause of being, i.e., that it is the cause of this being flesh and of this being a syllable; and it is similar in other cases. But this element is the substance of each thing and the first cause of being.
ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἔνια οὐκ οὐσίαι τῶν πραγμάτων, ἀλλ᾽ ὅσαι οὐσίαι, κατὰ φύσιν [30] καὶ φύσει συνεστήκασι, φανείη ἂν [καὶ] αὕτη ἡ φύσις οὐσία, ἥ ἐστιν οὐ στοιχεῖον ἀλλ᾽ ἀρχή—: στοιχεῖον δ᾽ ἐστὶν εἰς ὃ διαιρεῖται ἐνυπάρχον ὡς ὕλην, οἷον τῆς συλλαβῆς τὸ <�α> καὶ τὸ <�β>.	690. And since certain things are not substances, although all those which are according to nature and are constituted such by nature are substances, it is evident that in some cases this substance is a nature which is not an element but a principle. Now an element is something into which a thing is divided and which is intrinsic as matter; for example, a and b are the elements of a syllable.