METAPHYSICS
BOOK VIII

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 1: 1042a 3-1042b 8
[1042α] [3] ἐκ δὴ τῶν εἰρημένων συλλογίσασθαι δεῖ καὶ συναγαγόντας τὸ κεφάλαιον τέλος ἐπιθεῖναι.	691. It is necessary, then, to argue from the points which have been made, and after making a summary, to bring our investigations to a close.
εἴρηται δὴ ὅτι [5] τῶν οὐσιῶν ζητεῖται τὰ αἴτια καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα.	692. It has been stated that it is the causes, principles and elements of substances which are being sought (564).
οὐσίαι δὲ αἱ μὲν ὁμολογούμεναί εἰσιν ὑπὸ πάντων, [7] περὶ δὲ ἐνίων ἰδίᾳ τινὲς ἀπεφήναντο: ὁμολογούμεναι μὲν αἱ φυσικαί, οἷον πῦρ γῆ ὕδωρ ἀὴρ καὶ τἆλλα τὰ ἁπλᾶ σώματα, ἔπειτα τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ μόρια αὐτῶν, καὶ τὰ [10] ζῷα καὶ τὰ μόρια τῶν ζῴων, καὶ τέλος ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ τὰ μόρια τοῦ οὐρανοῦ: ἰδίᾳ δέ τινες οὐσίας λέγουσιν εἶναι τά τ᾽ εἴδη καὶ τὰ μαθηματικά.	693. Now some substances are admitted by all; but there are others about which some thinkers have expressed views peculiar to themselves. Those which are admitted by all are physical substances, such as fire, earth, water and the other simple bodies; plants and their parts; animals and the parts of animals; and finally the heaven and its parts. But certain other thinkers make the peculiar claim that the Forms and the objects of mathematics are substances (566).
ἄλλας δὲ δὴ συμβαίνει ἐκ τῶν λόγων οὐσίας εἶναι, τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον: ἔτι ἄλλως τὸ γένος μᾶλλον τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τὸ καθόλου τῶν [15] καθ᾽ ἕκαστα: τῷ δὲ καθόλου καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ αἱ ἰδέαι συνάπτουσιν (κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν γὰρ λόγον οὐσίαι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι).	694. From other arguments it also follows that there are other substances, i.e., the essence and the underlying subject. Again, from another point of view a genus is substance to a greater degree than species, and a universal to a greater degree than singular things (568). And the Ideas have a connection with the universal and the genus, for they seem to be substances on the same grounds.
ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι οὐσία, τούτου δὲ λόγος ὁ ὁρισμός, διὰ τοῦτο περὶ ὁρισμοῦ καὶ περὶ τοῦ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ διώρισται: ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁ ὁρισμὸς λόγος, ὁ δὲ λόγος μέρη ἔχει, ἀναγκαῖον καὶ [20] περὶ μέρους ἦν ἰδεῖν, ποῖα τῆς οὐσίας μέρη καὶ ποῖα οὔ, καὶ εἰ ταῦτα καὶ τοῦ ὁρισμοῦ. ἔτι τοίνυν οὔτε τὸ καθόλου οὐσία οὔτε τὸ γένος: περὶ δὲ τῶν ἰδεῶν καὶ τῶν μαθηματικῶν ὕστερον σκεπτέον: παρὰ γὰρ τὰς αἰσθητὰς οὐσίας ταύτας λέγουσί τινες εἶναι. νῦν δὲ περὶ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων οὐσιῶν [25] ἐπέλθωμεν. αὗται δ᾽ εἰσὶν αἱ αἰσθηταί:	695. Further, since the essence is substance, and the definition is the intelligible expression of the essence, for this reason we have examined both the definition and everything that is predicated essentially (576-597). And since the definition of a thing is its intelligible expression, and the intelligible expression has parts, then concerning the notion of part it was also necessary to consider what things are parts of substance and what are not, and whether these are necessary to the definition (625-649). Further, neither the universal nor the genus is substance (650-681). Related questions concerning the Ideas and the objects of mathematics must be examined later on; for some say that these are substances in addition to sensible ones. But now we must treat those things which all admit to be substances, and these are sensible substances.
αἱ δ᾽ αἰσθηταὶ οὐσίαι πᾶσαι ὕλην ἔχουσιν. ἔστι δ᾽ οὐσία τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ἄλλως μὲν ἡ ὕλη (ὕλην δὲ λέγω ἣ μὴ τόδε τι οὖσα ἐνεργείᾳ δυνάμει ἐστὶ τόδε τι), ἄλλως δ᾽ ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ μορφή, ὃ τόδε τι ὂν τῷ λόγῳ χωριστόν ἐστιν: τρίτον δὲ τὸ [30] ἐκ τούτων, οὗ γένεσις μόνου καὶ φθορά ἐστι, καὶ χωριστὸν ἁπλῶς: τῶν γὰρ κατὰ τὸν λόγον οὐσιῶν αἱ μὲν αἱ δ᾽ οὔ.	696. All sensible substances have matter. And the underlying subject is substance; in one sense the matter (by matter I mean that which is not a particular thing actually but potentially); and in another sense the intelligible structure or form, which is a particular thing and is separable in thought; and in a third sense the thing composed of these, which alone is subject to generation and corruption, and is separable in an absolute sense. For according to the intelligible structure of substances, some are separable and others are not.
ὅτι δ᾽ ἐστὶν οὐσία καὶ ἡ ὕλη, δῆλον: ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς ἀντικειμέναις μεταβολαῖς ἐστί τι τὸ ὑποκείμενον ταῖς μεταβολαῖς, οἷον κατὰ τόπον τὸ νῦν μὲν ἐνταῦθα πάλιν δ᾽ [35] ἄλλοθι, καὶ κατ᾽ αὔξησιν ὃ νῦν μὲν τηλικόνδε πάλιν δ᾽ ἔλαττον ἢ μεῖζον, καὶ κατ᾽ ἀλλοίωσιν ὃ νῦν μὲν ὑγιὲς πάλιν δὲ κάμνον: [1042β] [1] ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατ᾽ οὐσίαν ὃ νῦν μὲν ἐν γενέσει πάλιν δ᾽ ἐν φθορᾷ, καὶ νῦν μὲν ὑποκείμενον ὡς τόδε τι πάλιν δ᾽ ὑποκείμενον ὡς κατὰ στέρησιν.	697. Now it is evident that matter is substance; for in every process of change between contraries there is something which underlies these changes. For example, in change of place, there is something which is now here and afterwards somewhere else; and in change of size, that which is now of such a size and afterwards smaller or greater; and in change of quality, that which is now healthy and afterwards diseased. And similarly in change of substance there is something which is now in the process of generation and afterwards in the process of corruption, and which is now a subject and this particular thing and afterwards a subject of privation.
καὶ ἀκολουθοῦσι δὴ ταύτῃ αἱ ἄλλαι μεταβολαί, τῶν δ᾽ ἄλλων ἢ [5] μιᾷ ἢ δυοῖν αὕτη οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ: οὐ γὰρ ἀνάγκη, εἴ τι ὕλην ἔχει τοπικήν, τοῦτο καὶ γεννητὴν καὶ φθαρτὴν ἔχειν. τίς μὲν οὖν διαφορὰ τοῦ ἁπλῶς γίγνεσθαι καὶ μὴ ἁπλῶς, ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς εἴρηται.	698. And the other changes follow upon this change, but this change does not follow upon one or two of the others. For if a thing has matter which is subject to change of place, it is not necessary that it also have matter which is generable and corruptible. The difference between coming-to-be in an absolute sense and coming-to-be in a qualified sense has been explained in the Physics.

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 2: 1042b 9-1043a 28
ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἡ μὲν ὡς ὑποκειμένη καὶ ὡς ὕλη οὐσία ὁμολογεῖται, [10] αὕτη δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ δυνάμει, λοιπὸν τὴν ὡς ἐνέργειαν οὐσίαν τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰπεῖν τίς ἐστιν.	699. But since that which has the character of a subject or matter has been admitted by all to be substance, and this is what is in potentiality, it remains to explain what it is that constitutes the substance of sensible things in the sense of actuality.
Δημόκριτος μὲν οὖν τρεῖς διαφορὰς ἔοικεν οἰομένῳ εἶναι (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑποκείμενον σῶμα, τὴν ὕλην, ἓν καὶ ταὐτόν, διαφέρειν δὲ ἢ ῥυσμῷ, ὅ ἐστι σχῆμα, ἢ τροπῇ, ὅ ἐστι θέσις, ἢ διαθιγῇ, ὅ [15] ἐστι τάξις):	700. Now Democritus is like one who thinks that there are three differences in things. For he holds that the underlying body, as matter, is the same for all things, but that it differs in contour, which is shape; or in disposition, which is position; or in distribution, which is arrangement.
φαίνονται δὲ πολλαὶ διαφοραὶ οὖσαι, οἷον τὰ μὲν συνθέσει λέγεται τῆς ὕλης, ὥσπερ ὅσα κράσει καθάπερ μελίκρατον, τὰ δὲ δεσμῷ οἷον φάκελος, τὰ δὲ κόλλῃ οἷον βιβλίον, τὰ δὲ γόμφῳ οἷον κιβώτιον, τὰ δὲ πλείοσι τούτων, τὰ δὲ θέσει οἷον οὐδὸς καὶ ὑπέρθυρον (ταῦτα γὰρ [20] τῷ κεῖσθαί πως διαφέρει), τὰ δὲ χρόνῳ οἷον δεῖπνον καὶ ἄριστον, τὰ δὲ τόπῳ οἷον τὰ πνεύματα: τὰ δὲ τοῖς τῶν αἰσθητῶν πάθεσιν οἷον σκληρότητι καὶ μαλακότητι, καὶ πυκνότητι καὶ ἀραιότητι, καὶ ξηρότητι καὶ ὑγρότητι, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐνίοις τούτων τὰ δὲ πᾶσι τούτοις, καὶ ὅλως τὰ [25] μὲν ὑπεροχῇ τὰ δὲ ἐλλείψει.	701. However, there seem to be many differences inasmuch as some things are said to be by reason of the way in which their material parts are combined; for example, some things are combined by mixture, as honey-water; others by a binding, as the binding around a head; others by birdlime, as a book; others by a nail, as a chest; and others in several of these ways. Others differ by position, as a threshold and a lintel, for these differ in a sense according to their position; others differ in point of time, as dinner and breakfast; others with respect to place, as the air currents; others by reason of sensible properties, as hardness and softness, density and rarity, dryness and moistness. And some things differ by some of these differences and others by all taken together; some by excess and others by defect.
ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸ ἔστι τοσαυταχῶς λέγεται: οὐδὸς γὰρ ἔστιν ὅτι οὕτως κεῖται, καὶ τὸ εἶναι τὸ οὕτως αὐτὸ κεῖσθαι σημαίνει, καὶ τὸ κρύσταλλον εἶναι τὸ οὕτω πεπυκνῶσθαι. ἐνίων δὲ τὸ εἶναι καὶ πᾶσι τούτοις ὁρισθήσεται, τῷ τὰ μὲν μεμῖχθαι, τὰ δὲ κεκρᾶσθαι, [30] τὰ δὲ δεδέσθαι, τὰ δὲ πεπυκνῶσθαι, τὰ δὲ ταῖς ἄλλαις διαφοραῖς κεχρῆσθαι, ὥσπερ χεὶρ ἢ πούς.	702. For this reason it is evident that being is also used in the same number of ways; for a threshold is such because it is placed in this particular position, and to be a threshold means to be placed in such and such a position; and to be ice means to be congealed in such and such a way. However, the being of some things will be defined in all of these ways: one by being mixed; others by being combined; others by being tied together; others by being condensed; and others by other differences, as a hand and a foot.
ληπτέα οὖν τὰ γένη τῶν διαφορῶν (αὗται γὰρ ἀρχαὶ ἔσονται τοῦ εἶναι), οἷον τὰ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ἢ πυκνῷ καὶ μανῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς τοιούτοις: πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα [35] ὑπεροχὴ καὶ ἔλλειψίς ἐστιν. εἰ δέ τι σχήματι ἢ λειότητι καὶ τραχύτητι, πάντα εὐθεῖ καὶ καμπύλῳ. τοῖς δὲ τὸ εἶναι τὸ μεμῖχθαι ἔσται, ἀντικειμένως δὲ τὸ μὴ εἶναι.	703. Further, we must consider the classes of differences, for these will be the principles of being of things, as differences in degree, or in density and rarity, and others such as these; for all are instances of excess and defect. Indeed, if [anything differs] either in figure or in smoothness and roughness [these are reducible to differences] in straightness and curvature. Further, the being of some things will consist in being mixed, and their non-being will consist in the opposite state.
[1043α] [1] φανερὸν δὴ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι εἴπερ ἡ οὐσία αἰτία τοῦ εἶναι ἕκαστον, ὅτι ἐν τούτοις ζητητέον τί τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι τούτων ἕκαστον. οὐσία μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν τούτων οὐδὲ συνδυαζόμενον, ὅμως [5] δὲ τὸ ἀνάλογον ἐν ἑκάστῳ: καὶ ὡς ἐν ταῖς οὐσίαις τὸ τῆς ὕλης κατηγορούμενον αὐτὴ ἡ ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁρισμοῖς μάλιστα. οἷον εἰ οὐδὸν δέοι ὁρίσασθαι, ξύλον ἢ λίθον ὡδὶ κείμενον ἐροῦμεν, καὶ οἰκίαν πλίνθους καὶ ξύλα ὡδὶ κείμενα (ἢ ἔτι καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἐπ᾽ ἐνίων ἔστιν), εἰ δὲ κρύσταλλον, [10] ὕδωρ πεπηγὸς ἢ πεπυκνωμένον ὡδί: συμφωνία δὲ ὀξέος καὶ βαρέος μῖξις τοιαδί: τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.	704. It is evident, then, from these instances that, if substance is the cause of the being of each thing which is composed of these differences, we must look for the cause of the being of each one of these among these differences. Now substances is none of these differences nor any combination of them; yet it is found analogously in each. And just as in the case of substance that which is predicated of matter is the actuality itself, in a similar way this is most true in the case of other definitions. Thus if a threshold has to be defined, we shall say that it is a piece of wood or stone placed in such and such a position; and we shall say that a house is bricks and timbers placed in such and such a position. (Or again in some cases there is also the final cause). And if ice is to be defined, we shall say that it is water frozen or condensed in such and such a way; and we shall say that a harmony is such and such a combination of high and low notes. [And we must proceed] in the same way too in other things.
φανερὸν δὴ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι ἡ ἐνέργεια ἄλλη ἄλλης ὕλης καὶ ὁ λόγος: τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἡ σύνθεσις τῶν δ᾽ ἡ μῖξις τῶν δὲ ἄλλο τι τῶν εἰρημένων.	705. From these instances, then, it is evident that different matters have a different actuality and intelligible structure; for of some things it is combination, of others mixing, and of others some of those differences mentioned above.
διὸ τῶν ὁριζομένων οἱ μὲν [15] λέγοντες τί ἐστιν οἰκία, ὅτι λίθοι πλίνθοι ξύλα, τὴν δυνάμει οἰκίαν λέγουσιν, ὕλη γὰρ ταῦτα: οἱ δὲ ἀγγεῖον σκεπαστικὸν χρημάτων καὶ σωμάτων ἤ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον προτιθέντες, τὴν ἐνέργειαν λέγουσιν: οἱ δ᾽ ἄμφω ταῦτα συντιθέντες τὴν τρίτην καὶ τὴν ἐκ τούτων οὐσίαν (ἔοικε γὰρ ὁ μὲν διὰ τῶν διαφορῶν [20] λόγος τοῦ εἴδους καὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας εἶναι, ὁ δ᾽ ἐκ τῶν ἐνυπαρχόντων τῆς ὕλης μᾶλλον): ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἵους Ἀρχύτας ἀπεδέχετο ὅρους: τοῦ συνάμφω γάρ εἰσιν. οἷον τί ἐστι νηνεμία; ἠρεμία ἐν πλήθει ἀέρος: ὕλη μὲν γὰρ ὁ ἀήρ, ἐνέργεια δὲ καὶ οὐσία ἡ ἠρεμία. τί ἐστι γαλήνη; ὁμαλότης θαλάττης: [25] τὸ μὲν ὑποκείμενον ὡς ὕλη ἡ θάλαττα, ἡ δὲ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ μορφὴ ἡ ὁμαλότης.	706. Therefore, among those who give definitions, those who state what a house is by saying that it is stones, bricks and timbers, are speaking of a potential house; for these are its matter. But those who say that it is a shelter for protecting goods and bodies, or by adding some other such property, speak of its actuality. And those who speak of both of these together speak of the third kind of substance, which is the thing composed of these. For the intelligible structure which is expressed by means of differences seems to be that of the form or actuality of a thing, but that which is expressed by a thing’s intrinsic parts is rather that of its matter. The same thing is true of the definitions of which Archytas approved, for they are both of these together. For example, What is stillness? Rest in a large expanse of air, where air is as matter and rest as actuality or substance. What is a calm? Smoothness of the sea, where the sea is as subject or matter, and smoothness as actuality or form.
φανερὸν δὴ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων τίς ἡ αἰσθητὴ οὐσία ἐστὶ καὶ πῶς: ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὡς ὕλη, ἡ δ᾽ ὡς μορφὴ καὶ ἐνέργεια, ἡ δὲ τρίτη ἡ ἐκ τούτων.	707. From what has been said, then, it is evident what sensible substance is and how it exists; for in one sense it has the character of matter, and in another the character of form (because it is actuality), and in a third sense it is the thing composed of these.

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 3: 1043a 29-1044a 14
δεῖ δὲ μὴ ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ἐνίοτε λανθάνει πότερον σημαίνει [30] τὸ ὄνομα τὴν σύνθετον οὐσίαν ἢ τὴν ἐνέργειαν καὶ τὴν μορφήν, οἷον ἡ οἰκία πότερον σημεῖον τοῦ κοινοῦ ὅτι σκέπασμα ἐκ πλίνθων καὶ λίθων ὡδὶ κειμένων, ἢ τῆς ἐνεργείας καὶ τοῦ εἴδους ὅτι σκέπασμα, καὶ γραμμὴ πότερον δυὰς ἐν μήκει ἢ [ὅτι] δυάς, καὶ ζῷον πότερον ψυχὴ ἐν [35] σώματι ἢ ψυχή: αὕτη γὰρ οὐσία καὶ ἐνέργεια σώματός τινος.	708. And we must not disregard the fact that sometimes it is not apparent whether a name signifies the composite substance or the actuality or form; for example, whether house signifies both the form and the matter together, i.e., a shelter composed of bricks, timbers and stones arranged in such and such a way, or whether it signifies the actuality or form—a shelter; and whether line signifies twoness in length or twoness; and whether animal signifies a soul in a body or a soul, for the latter is the substance or actuality of some body.
εἴη δ᾽ ἂν καὶ ἐπ᾽ ἀμφοτέροις τὸ ζῷον, οὐχ ὡς ἑνὶ λόγῳ λεγόμενον ἀλλ᾽ ὡς πρὸς ἕν.	709. Now animal will also apply to both, not in the sense that both are expressed by one meaning, but insofar as they are related to some one thing.
ἀλλὰ ταῦτα πρὸς μέν τι ἄλλο διαφέρει, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ζήτησιν τῆς οὐσίας τῆς αἰσθητῆς οὐδέν: [1043β] [1] τὸ γὰρ τί ἦν εἶναι τῷ εἴδει καὶ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ὑπάρχει. ψυχὴ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ψυχῇ εἶναι ταὐτόν, ἀνθρώπῳ δὲ καὶ ἄνθρωπος οὐ ταὐτόν, εἰ μὴ καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἄνθρωπος λεχθήσεται: οὕτω δὲ τινὶ μὲν τινὶ δ᾽ οὔ.	710. These distinctions make a difference with regard to something else, but not to the investigation of sensible substances, because the essence of this other thing consists of form or actuality. For a soul and the essence of a soul are the same, but a man and the essence of a man are not the same, unless a man is also called a soul. And in some things essence and thing are identical and in others not.
οὐ φαίνεται [5] δὴ ζητοῦσιν ἡ συλλαβὴ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων οὖσα καὶ συνθέσεως, οὐδ᾽ ἡ οἰκία πλίνθοι τε καὶ σύνθεσις. καὶ τοῦτο ὀρθῶς: οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ σύνθεσις οὐδ᾽ ἡ μῖξις ἐκ τούτων ὧν ἐστὶ σύνθεσις ἢ μῖξις. ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐθέν, οἷον εἰ ὁ οὐδὸς θέσει, οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ οὐδοῦ ἡ θέσις ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον [10] οὗτος ἐξ ἐκείνης. οὐδὲ δὴ ὁ ἄνθρωπός ἐστι τὸ ζῷον καὶ δίπουν, ἀλλά τι δεῖ εἶναι ὃ παρὰ ταῦτά ἐστιν, εἰ ταῦθ᾽ ὕλη, οὔτε δὲ στοιχεῖον οὔτ᾽ ἐκ στοιχείου, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ οὐσία: ὃ ἐξαιροῦντες [13] τὴν ὕλην λέγουσιν. εἰ οὖν τοῦτ᾽ αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι, καὶ οὐσία τοῦτο, αὐτὴν ἂν τὴν οὐσίαν οὐ λέγοιεν.	711. Accordingly, to those who make investigations it does not seem that a syllable consists of letters and their combination, nor does a house consist of bricks and their combination. And this is true, because a combination or mixture does not consist of the things of which it is the combination or mixture. Nor likewise do any of the other differences. If a threshold, for example, is constituted by its position, the position is not constituted by the threshold, but rather the latter by the former. Nor is man animal and two-footed, but there must be something else in addition to these, if these are matter. Now this is neither an element nor a combination of the elements, but the substance; but omitting this they speak only of matter. Therefore, if this is the cause of a thing’s being, and this is its substance, they will not be stating its substance.
(ἀνάγκη δὴ ταύτην ἢ [15] ἀΐδιον εἶναι ἢ φθαρτὴν ἄνευ τοῦ φθείρεσθαι καὶ γεγονέναι ἄνευ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι. δέδεικται δὲ καὶ δεδήλωται ἐν ἄλλοις ὅτι τὸ εἶδος οὐθεὶς ποιεῖ οὐδὲ γεννᾷ, ἀλλὰ ποιεῖται τόδε, γίγνεται δὲ τὸ ἐκ τούτων.	712. Now this must be either eternal or corruptible without being in the process of corruption, and generated without being in the process of generation. But it has been demonstrated and made clear elsewhere (611) that no one produces a form, nor is it generated; but it is this particular thing which is produced and comes to be from these principles.
εἰ δ᾽ εἰσὶ τῶν φθαρτῶν αἱ οὐσίαι χωρισταί, οὐδέν πω δῆλον:	713. But whether the substances of corruptible things are separable or not is not yet clear.
πλὴν ὅτι γ᾽ ἐνίων οὐκ ἐνδέχεται [20] δῆλον, ὅσα μὴ οἷόν τε παρὰ τὰ τινὰ εἶναι, οἷον οἰκίαν ἢ σκεῦος.	714. It is evident, however, that this may not occur in the case of some things, i.e., in the case of all those that are incapable of existing apart from particular things, for example, a house or a vessel.
ἴσως μὲν οὖν οὐδ᾽ οὐσίαι εἰσὶν οὔτ᾽ αὐτὰ ταῦτα οὔτε τι τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα μὴ φύσει συνέστηκεν: τὴν γὰρ φύσιν μόνην ἄν τις θείη τὴν ἐν τοῖς φθαρτοῖς οὐσίαν.)	715. Indeed, perhaps neither these particular things nor any of the others which are not produced by nature are substances. For at least one might hold that only the nature of corruptible things is substance.
ὥστε ἡ ἀπορία ἣν οἱ Ἀντισθένειοι καὶ οἱ οὕτως ἀπαίδευτοι ἠπόρουν [25] ἔχει τινὰ καιρόν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τὸ τί ἔστιν ὁρίσασθαι (τὸν γὰρ ὅρον λόγον εἶναι μακρόν), ἀλλὰ ποῖον μέν τί ἐστιν ἐνδέχεται καὶ διδάξαι, ὥσπερ ἄργυρον, τί μέν ἐστιν οὔ, ὅτι δ᾽ οἷον καττίτερος: ὥστ᾽ οὐσίας ἔστι μὲν ἧς ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ὅρον καὶ λόγον, οἷον τῆς συνθέτου, ἐάν τε αἰσθητὴ [30] ἐάν τε νοητὴ ᾖ: ἐξ ὧν δ᾽ αὕτη πρώτων, οὐκέτι, εἴπερ τὶ κατὰ τινὸς σημαίνει ὁ λόγος ὁ ὁριστικὸς καὶ δεῖ τὸ μὲν ὥσπερ ὕλην εἶναι τὸ δὲ ὡς μορφήν.	716. For this reason the problem which confronted Antisthenes and other uninstructed people is applicable here, i.e., that one cannot define what a thing is (for according to them the definition is a lengthy statement), but one can say what it is like; for example, one cannot say what silver is, but one can say that it is like tin. Hence, of one kind of substance there can be a limit or definition, i.e., of the composite, whether it be sensible or intelligible. But this cannot be true of the primary parts of which it is composed, since the definitive concept designates something as determining something else, and one of these must have the character of matter and the other that of form.
φανερὸν δὲ καὶ διότι, εἴπερ εἰσί πως ἀριθμοὶ αἱ οὐσίαι, οὕτως εἰσὶ καὶ οὐχ ὥς τινες λέγουσι μονάδων: ὅ τε γὰρ ὁρισμὸς ἀριθμός τις: [35] διαιρετός τε γὰρ καὶ εἰς ἀδιαίρετα (οὐ γὰρ ἄπειροι οἱ λόγοι), καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς δὲ τοιοῦτον.	717. Further, it is also clear that if numbers are in any sense substances, they are such in this way and not (as groups) of units, as some claim. For a definition is like a number and is divisible into indivisible parts, because definitions are not made up of an unlimited number of parts; and this is also true of numbers.
καὶ ὥσπερ οὐδ᾽ ἀπ᾽ ἀριθμοῦ ἀφαιρεθέντος τινὸς ἢ προστεθέντος ἐξ ὧν ὁ ἀριθμός ἐστιν, οὐκέτι ὁ αὐτὸς ἀριθμός ἐστιν ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερος, κἂν τοὐλάχιστον ἀφαιρεθῇ ἢ προστεθῇ, [1044α] [1] οὕτως οὐδὲ ὁ ὁρισμὸς οὐδὲ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι οὐκέτι ἔσται ἀφαιρεθέντος τινὸς ἢ προστεθέντος.	718. And just as when any part constituting a number is subtracted or added it is no longer the same number that remains but a different one, even though the minimum is subtracted or added, so too neither the definition nor the essence will any longer be the same when anything is subtracted or added.
καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν δεῖ εἶναί τι ᾧ εἷς, ὃ νῦν οὐκ ἔχουσι λέγειν τίνι εἷς, εἴπερ ἐστὶν εἷς (ἢ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλ᾽ οἷον σωρός, ἢ [5] εἴπερ ἐστί, λεκτέον τί τὸ ποιοῦν ἓν ἐκ πολλῶν): καὶ ὁ ὁρισμὸς εἷς ἐστίν, ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτον ἔχουσι λέγειν. καὶ τοῦτο εἰκότως συμβαίνει: τοῦ αὐτοῦ γὰρ λόγου, καὶ ἡ οὐσία ἓν οὕτως, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὡς λέγουσί τινες οἷον μονάς τις οὖσα ἢ στιγμή, ἀλλ᾽ ἐντελέχεια καὶ φύσις τις ἑκάστη.	719. And there must be something by reason of which a number is one thing, although they cannot say what makes it to be one thing; i.e., if it is one thing. For either it is not one thing but like a heap, or if it is one thing it is necessary to state what makes it to be one thing out of many. And a definition is one thing; but they are also unable to say what makes it to be one thing; and this follows as a natural consequence. For by the same argument substance is also one thing in the way we have explained, but not, as some claim, as being a kind of unit or point, but as an actuality and a kind of nature.
καὶ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ὁ [10] ἀριθμὸς ἔχει τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, οὐδ᾽ ἡ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος οὐσία, ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ, ἡ μετὰ τῆς ὕλης.	720. And just as number does not admit of more or less, neither does substance in the sense of form; but if this were the case [it would be that substance which is joined] to matter.
περὶ μὲν οὖν γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τῶν λεγομένων οὐσιῶν, πῶς τ᾽ ἐνδέχεται καὶ πῶς ἀδύνατον, καὶ περὶ τῆς εἰς τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἀναγωγῆς, ἔστω μέχρι τούτων διωρισμένον. [15]	721. In regard to the generation and corruption of the foregoing substances, in what way this is possible and in what way it is impossible, and in regard to the likeness which they have to numbers, we have established these things this far.

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapters 4 & 5: 1044a 15-1045a
περὶ δὲ τῆς ὑλικῆς οὐσίας δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν ὅτι εἰ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πάντα πρώτου ἢ τῶν αὐτῶν ὡς πρώτων καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ὕλη ὡς ἀρχὴ τοῖς γιγνομένοις, ὅμως ἔστι τις οἰκεία ἑκάστου, οἷον φλέγματος [ἐστι πρώτη ὕλη] τὰ γλυκέα ἢ λιπαρά, χολῆς δὲ τὰ πικρὰ ἢ ἄλλ᾽ ἄττα: ἴσως δὲ [20] ταῦτα ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ.	722. Concerning material substance we must not remain ignorant of the fact that, even though all things come from the same first [principle] or from the same [principles] or first [causes], and even though the same matter is the first principle of things which come to be, still there is some proper matter of each thing; for example, the first matter of phlegm is the sweet or the fat, but of bile the bitter or something else. But perhaps these come from the same matter.
γίγνονται δὲ πλείους ὗλαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὅταν θατέρου ἡ ἑτέρα ᾖ, οἷον φλέγμα ἐκ λιπαροῦ καὶ γλυκέος εἰ τὸ λιπαρὸν ἐκ τοῦ γλυκέος, ἐκ δὲ χολῆς τῷ ἀναλύεσθαι εἰς τὴν πρώτην ὕλην τὴν χολήν. διχῶς γὰρ τόδ᾽ ἐκ τοῦδε, ἢ ὅτι πρὸ ὁδοῦ ἔσται ἢ ὅτι ἀναλυθέντος εἰς τὴν [25] ἀρχήν.	723. Further, there are several matters of the same thing when one comes from another, as phlegm comes from the fat and the sweet, if the fat comes from the sweet. And something comes from bile by dissolving bile into its first matter. For one thing comes from another in two ways: either because it is prior to the other [in the process of development] or because it comes from the dissolving of a thing into its first principle.
ἐνδέχεται δὲ μιᾶς τῆς ὕλης οὔσης ἕτερα γίγνεσθαι διὰ τὴν κινοῦσαν αἰτίαν, οἷον ἐκ ξύλου καὶ κιβωτὸς καὶ κλίνη. ἐνίων δ᾽ ἑτέρα ἡ ὕλη ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἑτέρων ὄντων, οἷον πρίων οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἐκ ξύλου, οὐδ᾽ ἐπὶ τῇ κινούσῃ αἰτίᾳ τοῦτο: οὐ γὰρ ποιήσει πρίονα ἐξ ἐρίου ἢ ξύλου. εἰ δ᾽ ἄρα [30] τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνδέχεται ἐξ ἄλλης ὕλης ποιῆσαι, δῆλον ὅτι ἡ τέχνη καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἡ ὡς κινοῦσα ἡ αὐτή: εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἡ ὕλη ἑτέρα καὶ τὸ κινοῦν, καὶ τὸ γεγονός.	724. Now when there is one matter it is possible for different things to come into being by virtue of the cause of motion, as a chest and a bed come from wood. But of certain things the matter is necessarily different when the things are different; e.g., a saw cannot be made from wood, and it is not within the power of the cause of motion to do this; for he is incapable of making a saw from wool or from wood. But if the same thing can be made from different matters, it is clear that the art and the principle which acts as a mover are the same. For if both the matter and the cause of motion are different, so also will be the thing that is made.
ὅταν δή τις ζητῇ τὸ αἴτιον, ἐπεὶ πλεοναχῶς τὰ αἴτια λέγεται, πάσας δεῖ λέγειν τὰς ἐνδεχομένας αἰτίας. οἷον ἀνθρώπου τίς αἰτία ὡς [35] ὕλη; ἆρα τὰ καταμήνια; τί δ᾽ ὡς κινοῦν; ἆρα τὸ σπέρμα; τί δ᾽ ὡς τὸ εἶδος; τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. τί δ᾽ ὡς οὗ ἕνεκα; τὸ τέλος.	725. Hence, when one asks what the cause of anything is, it is necessary to mention all the causes concerned, since causes are spoken of in several senses. For example, What is a man’s material cause? The menstrual fluid. What is his moving cause? The seed. What is his formal cause? His essence. What is his final cause? His end. But perhaps both of these are the same.
[1044β] [1] ἴσως δὲ ταῦτα ἄμφω τὸ αὐτό. δεῖ δὲ τὰ ἐγγύτατα αἴτια λέγειν. τίς ἡ ὕλη; μὴ πῦρ ἢ γῆν ἀλλὰ τὴν ἴδιον.	726. It is necessary also to give the proximate causes. What is the matter of man? Not earth or fire, but his proper matter.
περὶ μὲν οὖν τὰς φυσικὰς οὐσίας καὶ γενητὰς ἀνάγκη οὕτω μετιέναι εἴ τις μέτεισιν ὀρθῶς, εἴπερ ἄρα [5] αἴτιά τε ταῦτα καὶ τοσαῦτα καὶ δεῖ τὰ αἴτια γνωρίζειν:	727. Indeed, concerning natural substances which are generable it is necessary to proceed in this way, if one is to proceed correctly, granted that these are the causes, that they are of this number, and that it is necessary to know the causes.
ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν φυσικῶν μὲν ἀϊδίων δὲ οὐσιῶν ἄλλος λόγος. ἴσως γὰρ ἔνια οὐκ ἔχει ὕλην, ἢ οὐ τοιαύτην ἀλλὰ μόνον κατὰ τόπον κινητήν.	728. In the case of natural substances which are eternal there is another procedure. Perhaps some of them do not have matter or do not have this kind of matter but only that which is subjected to change of place.
οὐδ᾽ ὅσα δὴ φύσει μέν, μὴ οὐσίαι δέ, οὐκ ἔστι τούτοις ὕλη, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἡ οὐσία. οἷον τί [10] αἴτιον ἐκλείψεως, τίς ὕλη; οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ σελήνη τὸ πάσχον. τί δ᾽ αἴτιον ὡς κινῆσαν καὶ φθεῖραν τὸ φῶς; ἡ γῆ. τὸ δ᾽ οὗ ἕνεκα ἴσως οὐκ ἔστιν. τὸ δ᾽ ὡς εἶδος ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ ἄδηλος ἐὰν μὴ μετὰ τῆς αἰτίας ᾖ ὁ λόγος. οἷον τί ἔκλειψις; στέρησις φωτός. ἐὰν δὲ προστεθῇ τὸ ὑπὸ γῆς ἐν [15] μέσῳ γιγνομένης, ὁ σὺν τῷ αἰτίῳ λόγος οὗτος. ὕπνου δ᾽ ἄδηλον τί τὸ πρῶτον πάσχον. ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι τὸ ζῷον; ναί, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο κατὰ τί, καὶ τί πρῶτον; καρδία ἢ ἄλλο τι. εἶτα ὑπὸ τίνος; εἶτα τί τὸ πάθος, τὸ ἐκείνου καὶ μὴ τοῦ ὅλου; ὅτι ἀκινησία τοιαδί; ναί, ἀλλ᾽ αὕτη τῷ τί πάσχειν [20] τὸ πρῶτον;	729. Thus all those things which are by nature but are not substances do not have matter, but the underlying subject is their substance. For example, What is the matter of an eclipse? There is none, but it is the moon that is the patient. What is the efficient cause destroying the light? The earth. What is the final cause? Perhaps there is none. What is the formal cause? The definition. But this will not be clear if it does not include the [efficient] cause. For example, What is an eclipse? A privation of light. And if one adds, as a result of the earth intervening, this definition is one which includes the [efficient] cause. However, in the case of sleep it is not clear what the primary subject is, although it is clear that the animal is also a primary subject. But it is such in a qualified sense. And what is the primary subject, the heart or some other part? Then, by what [is this modification produced]? And what is this modification which pertains to that [part] and not to the whole? Is this a special kind of immobility? It is, but it belongs [to the animal] by reason of some primary subject.
Chapter 5
ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἔνια ἄνευ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς ἔστι καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν, οἷον αἱ στιγμαί, εἴπερ εἰσί, καὶ ὅλως τὰ εἴδη (οὐ γὰρ τὸ λευκὸν γίγνεται ἀλλὰ τὸ ξύλον λευκόν, εἰ ἔκ τινος καὶ τὶ πᾶν τὸ γιγνόμενον γίγνεται), οὐ πάντα [25] ἂν τἀναντία γίγνοιτο ἐξ ἀλλήλων, ἀλλ᾽ ἑτέρως λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος ἐκ μέλανος ἀνθρώπου καὶ λευκὸν ἐκ μέλανος: οὐδὲ παντὸς ὕλη ἔστιν ἀλλ᾽ ὅσων γένεσις ἔστι καὶ μεταβολὴ εἰς ἄλληλα: ὅσα δ᾽ ἄνευ τοῦ μεταβάλλειν ἔστιν ἢ μή, οὐκ ἔστι τούτων ὕλη.	730. But since some things are and are not, without generation and corruption, such as points, if they do in fact exist, and in general the forms and specifying principles of things, then all contraries do not come from each other. For whiteness does not come to be but white wood does; and everything which comes to be comes from something and becomes something. And white man comes from black man and white from black in different ways. Nor do all things have matter but only those which may be generated and changed into each other. There is no matter in those things which are and are not without undergoing change.
ἔχει δ᾽ ἀπορίαν πῶς πρὸς τἀναντία ἡ [30] ὕλη ἡ ἑκάστου ἔχει. οἷον εἰ τὸ σῶμα δυνάμει ὑγιεινόν, ἐναντίον δὲ νόσος ὑγιείᾳ, ἆρα ἄμφω δυνάμει; καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ δυνάμει οἶνος καὶ ὄξος; ἢ τοῦ μὲν καθ᾽ ἕξιν καὶ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ὕλη, τοῦ δὲ κατὰ στέρησιν καὶ φθορὰν τὴν παρὰ φύσιν;	731. Again, there is the problem how the matter of each thing is related to contraries. For example, if the body is potentially healthy and the opposite of health is disease, is the body potentially both? And is water potentially wine and vinegar? Or is it related to one as matter to its form or actuality, and to the other as the privation and natural corruption [of its form or actuality]?
ἀπορία δέ τις ἔστι καὶ διὰ τί ὁ οἶνος οὐχ [35] ὕλη τοῦ ὄξους οὐδὲ δυνάμει ὄξος (καίτοι γίγνεται ἐξ αὐτοῦ ὄξος) καὶ ὁ ζῶν δυνάμει νεκρός. ἢ οὔ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἱ φθοραί, [1045α] [1] ἡ δὲ τοῦ ζῴου ὕλη αὐτὴ κατὰ φθορὰν νεκροῦ δύναμις καὶ ὕλη, καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ ὄξους: γίγνεται γὰρ ἐκ τούτων ὥσπερ ἐξ ἡμέρας νύξ. καὶ ὅσα δὴ οὕτω μεταβάλλει εἰς ἄλληλα, εἰς τὴν ὕλην δεῖ ἐπανελθεῖν, οἷον εἰ [5] ἐκ νεκροῦ ζῷον, εἰς τὴν ὕλην πρῶτον, εἶθ᾽ οὕτω ζῷον: καὶ τὸ ὄξος εἰς ὕδωρ, εἶθ᾽ οὕτως οἶνος.	732. Now this raises the problem why wine is not the matter of vinegar, even though vinegar comes from it, and why the living is not the potentially dead; or whether this is not the case, but the corruptions of these occur in virtue of something else. As a matter of fact the matter of a living body is by corruption the potency and matter of a dead body, and water is the matter of vinegar; for they come from each other as night comes from day. Hence whatever things are changed into each other in this way must return to their matter. For example, if a living body is to come from a dead one [the latter must return] to its first matter, and then a living body comes into being. And vinegar [must return] to water, and then wine comes into being.

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 6: 1045a 7-1045b 23
περὶ δὲ τῆς ἀπορίας τῆς εἰρημένης περί τε τοὺς ὁρισμοὺς καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἀριθμούς, τί αἴτιον τοῦ ἓν εἶναι; πάντων γὰρ ὅσα πλείω μέρη ἔχει καὶ μὴ ἔστιν οἷον σωρὸς τὸ πᾶν [10] ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι τι τὸ ὅλον παρὰ τὰ μόρια, ἔστι τι αἴτιον, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς σώμασι τοῖς μὲν ἁφὴ αἰτία τοῦ ἓν εἶναι τοῖς δὲ γλισχρότης ἤ τι πάθος ἕτερον τοιοῦτον. ὁ δ᾽ ὁρισμὸς λόγος ἐστὶν εἷς οὐ συνδέσμῳ καθάπερ ἡ Ἰλιὰς ἀλλὰ τῷ ἑνὸς εἶναι. τί οὖν ἐστὶν ὃ ποιεῖ ἓν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ διὰ τί [15] ἓν ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πολλά, οἷον τό τε ζῷον καὶ τὸ δίπουν,	733. It seems that we must discuss next the problem which was mentioned with regard to definitions and numbers: what it is that causes them to be one. For all things which have several parts, and of which the whole is not a kind of heap but is something over and above the parts, have some cause that makes them one. For in some bodies contact is the cause of their unity, and in others stickiness or some other such quality. But a definition is one intelligible structure not by the connection of its parts, like the Iliad, but by being one thing. What is it, then, that makes man to be one; and why is he one thing and not many, for example, animal and two-footed?
ἄλλως τε δὴ καὶ εἰ ἔστιν, ὥσπερ φασί τινες, αὐτό τι ζῷον καὶ αὐτὸ δίπουν; διὰ τί γὰρ οὐκ ἐκεῖνα αὐτὰ ὁ ἄνθρωπός ἐστι, καὶ ἔσονται κατὰ μέθεξιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι οὐκ ἀνθρώπου οὐδ᾽ [19] ἑνὸς ἀλλὰ δυοῖν, ζῴου καὶ δίποδος, καὶ ὅλως δὴ οὐκ ἂν [20] εἴη ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἓν ἀλλὰ πλείω, ζῷον καὶ δίπουν;	734. And if, in a different way, as some claim, there is an animal-itself and a two-footed-itself, why is man not these two things? And if this were the case, men would not be such by participating in man, i.e., by participating in one thing, but in two, namely, in animal and two-footed. Hence in general man will not be one thing but many, i.e., animal and two-footed.
φανερὸν δὴ ὅτι οὕτω μὲν μετιοῦσιν ὡς εἰώθασιν ὁρίζεσθαι καὶ λέγειν, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἀποδοῦναι καὶ λῦσαι τὴν ἀπορίαν: εἰ δ᾽ ἐστίν, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, τὸ μὲν ὕλη τὸ δὲ μορφή, καὶ τὸ μὲν δυνάμει τὸ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ, οὐκέτι ἀπορία δόξειεν ἂν [25] εἶναι τὸ ζητούμενον.	735. It is evident, then, that those who accept this position and discuss and define things in the way they have been accustomed to do, cannot find an answer or solution to this problem. But if (as we say) one part is as matter and the other as form, or one is in potency and the other in act, the problem with which we are dealing will no longer appear to be a difficulty.
ἔστι γὰρ αὕτη ἡ ἀπορία ἡ αὐτὴ κἂν εἰ ὁ ὅρος εἴη ἱματίου στρογγύλος χαλκός: εἴη γὰρ ἂν σημεῖον τοὔνομα τοῦτο τοῦ λόγου, ὥστε τὸ ζητούμενόν ἐστι τί αἴτιον τοῦ ἓν εἶναι τὸ στρογγύλον καὶ τὸν χαλκόν. οὐκέτι δὴ ἀπορία φαίνεται, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὕλη τὸ δὲ μορφή. [30] τί οὖν τούτου αἴτιον, τοῦ τὸ δυνάμει ὂν ἐνεργείᾳ εἶναι, παρὰ τὸ ποιῆσαν, ἐν ὅσοις ἔστι γένεσις; οὐθὲν γάρ ἐστιν αἴτιον ἕτερον τοῦ τὴν δυνάμει σφαῖραν ἐνεργείᾳ εἶναι σφαῖραν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ᾽ ἦν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἑκατέρῳ.	736. For this problem is just the same as we should have if the definition of cloak were round bronze. Now let us suppose that this term is the sign of this definition. Then when one asks what causes round and bronze to be one thing, there will no longer be a problem, because one is as matter and the other as form. What is it, then, apart from the efficient cause, that causes the potential to become actual in the case of things which are generated? For there is no other cause of the potential sphere being an actual sphere; but this was the essence of each.
ἔστι δὲ τῆς ὕλης ἡ μὲν νοητὴ ἡ δ᾽ αἰσθητή, καὶ ἀεὶ τοῦ λόγου τὸ μὲν [35] ὕλη τὸ δὲ ἐνέργειά ἐστιν, οἷον ὁ κύκλος σχῆμα ἐπίπεδον.	737. Further, some matter is intelligible and some sensible. And one part of a definition is always as matter and the other as actuality; for example, a circle is a plane figure.
ὅσα δὲ μὴ ἔχει ὕλην μήτε νοητὴν μήτε αἰσθητήν, εὐθὺς ὅπερ ἕν τί [εἶναί] ἐστιν ἕκαστον, [1045β] [1] ὥσπερ καὶ ὅπερ ὄν τι, τὸ τόδε, τὸ ποιόν, τὸ ποσόν—διὸ καὶ οὐκ ἔνεστιν ἐν τοῖς ὁρισμοῖς οὔτε τὸ ὂν οὔτε τὸ ἕν—, καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι εὐθὺς ἕν τί ἐστιν ὥσπερ καὶ ὄν τι—διὸ καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἕτερόν τι αἴτιον τοῦ [5] ἓν εἶναι οὐθενὶ τούτων οὐδὲ τοῦ ὄν τι εἶναι: εὐθὺς γὰρ ἕκαστόν ἐστιν ὄν τι καὶ ἕν τι, οὐχ ὡς ἐν γένει τῷ ὄντι καὶ τῷ ἑνί, οὐδ᾽ ὡς χωριστῶν ὄντων παρὰ τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα.	738. But each of those things which do not have matter, either intelligible or sensible, is at once one thing, just as it is a being: a particular thing, a quality, or a quantity; and for this reason neither being nor unity is expressed in their definitions. And their essence is at once one thing just as it is also a being. For this reason there is not some other cause of each of these being one or of being something; for each is at once a being and a unity, not as belonging to the class of being or unity, nor because these distinctions exist separately from singular things.
διὰ ταύτην δὲ τὴν ἀπορίαν οἱ μὲν μέθεξιν λέγουσι, καὶ αἴτιον τί τῆς μεθέξεως καὶ τί τὸ μετέχειν ἀποροῦσιν: οἱ δὲ συνουσίαν [10] [ψυχῆς], ὥσπερ Λυκόφρων φησὶν εἶναι τὴν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ψυχῆς: οἱ δὲ σύνθεσιν ἢ σύνδεσμον ψυχῆς σώματι τὸ ζῆν.	739. And it is because of this difficulty that some men speak of participation, and raise the question as to what causes participation and what it is to participate. For some speak of the coexistence of the soul, as Lycophron, who says that knowledge is the coexistence of the act of knowing and the soul; and others say that life is the composition or connection of soul with body.
καίτοι ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐπὶ πάντων: καὶ γὰρ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν ἔσται ἢ συνουσία ἢ σύνδεσμος ἢ σύνθεσις ψυχῆς καὶ ὑγιείας, καὶ τὸ τὸν χαλκὸν εἶναι τρίγωνον [15] σύνθεσις χαλκοῦ καὶ τριγώνου, καὶ τὸ λευκὸν εἶναι σύνθεσις ἐπιφανείας καὶ λευκότητος.	740. The same argument applies in all cases. For being healthy will be either the coexistence or conjunction or composition of soul and health; and being a bronze triangle will be the composition of bronze and triangle; and being white will be the composition of surface and whiteness.
αἴτιον δ᾽ ὅτι δυνάμεως καὶ ἐντελεχείας ζητοῦσι λόγον ἑνοποιὸν καὶ διαφοράν. ἔστι δ᾽, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ἡ ἐσχάτη ὕλη καὶ ἡ μορφὴ ταὐτὸ καὶ ἕν, δυνάμει, τὸ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ, ὥστε ὅμοιον τὸ ζητεῖν τοῦ [20] ἑνὸς τί αἴτιον καὶ τοῦ ἓν εἶναι: ἓν γάρ τι ἕκαστον, καὶ τὸ δυνάμει καὶ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ἕν πώς ἐστιν, ὥστε αἴτιον οὐθὲν ἄλλο πλὴν εἴ τι ὡς κινῆσαν ἐκ δυνάμεως εἰς ἐνέργειαν. ὅσα δὲ μὴ ἔχει ὕλην, πάντα ἁπλῶς ὅπερ ἕν τι.	741. Now the reason for this position is that these thinkers are looking for some unifying principle and difference of potentiality and actuality. But, as we have pointed out (736), both the ultimate matter and form are the same, one potentially and the other actually. Hence to ask what the cause of their unity is, is the same as to ask what makes them one; for each particular thing is a unity, and what is potential and what is actual are in a sense one thing. Hence there is no other cause except that which causes motion from potentiality to actuality. And all those things which do not have matter are simply one.