| Quia subtili indagatione ostendit quod nec materiae contrarietas, nec veri falsique qualiscunque oppositio contrarietatem opinionum constituit, sed quod aliqua veri falsique oppositio id facit, ideo nunc determinare intendit qualis sit illa veri falsique oppositio, quae opinionum contrarietatem constituit. Ex hoc enim directe quaestioni satisfit.
| 1. Aristotle has just completed a subtle investigation in which he has shown that contrariety of matter does not constitute contrariety of opinion, nor does just any kind of opposition of true and false, but some opposition of true and false does. Now he intends to determine what kind of opposition of true and false it is that constitutes contrariety of opinions, for this will answer the question directly.
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| Et intendit quod sola oppositio opinionum secundum affirmationem et negationem eiusdem de eodem etc. constituit contrarietatem earum. Unde intendit probare istam conclusionem per quam ad quaesitum respondet: opiniones oppositae secundum affirmationem et negationem eiusdem de eodem sunt contrariae; et consequenter illae, quae sunt oppositae secundum affirmationem contrariorum praedicatorum de eodem, non sunt contrariae, quia sic affirmativa vera haberet duas contrarias, quod est impossibile. Unum enim uni est contrarium.
| He maintains that only opposition of opinions according to affirmation and negation of the same thing of the same thing, etc., constitutes their contrariety. Accordingly, as the response to the question, he intends to prove the following conclusion: opinions opposed according to affirmation and negation of the same thing of the same thing are contraries; and consequently, opinions opposed according to affirmation of contrary predicates of the same subject are not contraries, for if these were contraries, the true affirmative would have two contraries, which is impossible, since one is contrary to one other.
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| Probat autem istam conclusionem tribus rationibus. Prima est: opiniones in quibus primo est fallacia sunt contrariae; opiniones oppositae secundum affirmationem et negationem eiusdem de eodem sunt in quibus primo est fallacia; ergo opiniones oppositae secundum affirmationem et negationem eiusdem de eodem sunt contrariae.
| 2. Aristotle uses three arguments to prove this conclusion. The first one is as follows: Those opinions in which there is fallacy first are contraries. Opinions opposed according to affirmation and negation of the same predicate of the same subject are those in which there is fallacy first. Therefore, these are contraries.
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| Sensus maioris est: opiniones quae primo ordine naturae sunt termini fallaciae, idest deceptionis seu erroris, sunt contrariae: sunt enim, cum quis fallitur seu errat, duo termini, scilicet a quo declinat, et ad quem labitur.
| The sense of the major is this: Opinions which first in the order of nature are the limits of fallacy, i.e., of deception or error, are contraries; for when someone is deceived or errs, there are two limits, the one from which he turns away and the one toward which he turns.
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| Huius rationis in littera primo ponitur maior, cum dicitur: sed in quibus primo fallacia est; adversative enim continuans sermonem supradictis, insinuavit non tot enumeratas opiniones esse contrarias, sed eas in quibus primo fallacia est modo exposito. Deinde subdit probationem minoris talem: eadem proportionaliter sunt, ex quibus sunt generationes et ex quibus sunt fallaciae; sed generationes sunt ex oppositis secundum affirmationem et negationem; ergo et fallaciae sunt ex oppositis secundum affirmationem et negationem. Quod erat assumptum in minore. Unde ponens maiorem huius prosyllogismi, ait: haec autem, scilicet fallacia, est ex his, scilicet terminis, proportionaliter tamen, ex quibus sunt et generationes. Et subsumit minorem: ex oppositis vero, scilicet secundum affirmationem et negationem, et generationes fiunt. Et demum concludit: quare etiam fallacia, scilicet, est ex oppositis secundum affirmationem et negationem eiusdem de eodem.
| In the text the major of the argument is posited first: Rather, those opinions in which there is fallacy must be posited as contrary to true opinions. By uniting this part of the text adversatively with what was said previously, Aristotle implies that not just any of the number of opinions enumerated are contraries, but those in which there is fallacy first in the manner we have explained. Then he gives this proof of the minor: those things from which generations are and from which fallacies are, are the same proportionally; generations are from opposites according to affirmation and negation; therefore fallacies, too, are from opposites according to affirmation and negation (which was assumed in the minor). Hence he posits the major of this prosyllogism: Now the things from which fallacies arise, namely, limits, are the things from which generations arise —proportionally however. Under it he posits the minor: but generations are from opposites, i.e., according to affirmation and negation. Finally, he concludes, therefore also fallacies, i.e., they are from opposites according to affirmation and negation of the same thing of the same thing.
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| Ad evidentiam huius probationis scito quod idem faciunt in processu intellectus cognitio et fallacia seu error, quod in processu naturae generatio et corruptio. Sicut namque perfectiones naturales generationibus acquiruntur, corruptionibus desinunt; ita cognitione perfectiones intellectuales acquiruntur, erroribus autem seu deceptionibus amittuntur. Et ideo, sicut tam generatio quam corruptio est inter affirmationem et negationem, ut proprios terminos, ut dicit V Physic.; ita tam cognoscere aliquid, quam falli circa illud, est inter affirmationem et negationem, ut proprios terminos: ita quod id ad quod primo attingit cognoscens aliquid in secunda operatione intellectus est veritatis affirmatio, et quod per se primo abiicitur est illius negatio. Et similiter quod per se primo perdit qui fallitur est veritatis affirmatio, et quod primo incurrit est veritatis negatio. Recte ergo dixit quod iidem sunt termini inter quos primo est generatio, et illi inter quos est primo fallacia, quia utrobique termini sunt affirmatio et negatio.
| 3. This proof will be more evident from the following: Knowledge and fallacy, or error, bring about the same thing in the intellect’s progression as generation and corruption do in nature’s progression. For just as natural perfections are acquired by generations and perish by corruptions, so intellectual perfections are acquired by knowledge and lost by errors or deceptions. Accordingly, just as generation and corruption are between affirmation and negation as proper terms, as is said in V Physicae [1:224b 35] so both to know something and to be deceived about it is between affirmation and negation as proper terms. Consequently, what one who knows attains first in the second operation of the intellect is affirmation of the truth, and what he rejects per se and first is the negation of it. In like manner, what he who is deceived loses per se and first is affirmation of the truth, and acquires first is negation of the truth. Therefore Aristotle is correct in maintaining that the terms between which there is generation first and between which there is fallacy first are the same, because with respect to both, the terms are affirmation and negation.
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| Deinde cum dicit: si ergo quod bonum est etc., intendit probare maiorem principalis rationis. Et quia iam declaravit quod ea, in quibus primo est fallacia, sunt affirmatio et negatio, ideo utitur, loco maioris probandae, scilicet, opiniones in quibus primo est fallacia, sunt contrariae, sua conclusione, scilicet, opiniones oppositae secundum affirmationem et negationem eiusdem sunt contrariae. Aequivalere enim iam declaratum est. Fecit autem hoc consuetae brevitati studens, quoniam sic procedendo, et probat maiorem, et respondet directe quaestioni, et applicat ad propositum simul.
| 4. When he says, Now, if that which is good is both good and not evil, the former per se, the latter accidentally, etc., he intends to prove the major of the principal argument. He has already shown that the opinions in which there is fallacy first are affirmation and negation, and therefore in place of the major to be proved (i.e., opinions in which it there is fallacy first are contraries) he uses his conclusion—which has already been shown to be equivalent—that opinions opposed according to affirmation and negation of the same thing are contraries. Thus with his customary brevity he at once proves the major, responds directly to the question, and applies it to what he has proposed.
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| Probat ergo loco maioris conclusionem principaliter intentam quaestionis, hanc, scilicet: opiniones oppositae secundum affirmationem et negationem eiusdem sunt contrariae; et non illae, quae sunt oppositae secundum contrariorum affirmationem de eodem. Et intendit talem rationem. Opinio vera et eius magis falsa sunt contrariae opiniones; oppositae secundum affirmationem et negationem sunt vera et eius magis falsa; ergo opiniones oppositae secundum affirmationem et negationem sunt contrariae. Maior probatur ex eo quod, quae plurimum distant circa idem sunt contraria; vera autem et eius magis falsa plurimum distant circa idem, ut patet. Minor vero probatur ex eo quod opposita secundum negationem eiusdem de eodem est per se falsa respectu suae affirmationis verae. Opinio autem per se falsa magis falsa est quacunque alia. Unumquodque enim quod est per se tale, magis tale est quolibet quod est per aliud tale.
| In place of the major, then, he proves the conclusion principally intended, i.e., that opinions opposed according to affirmation and negation of the same thing are contraries, and not those opposed according to affirmation of contraries about the same thing. His argument is as follows: A true opinion and the opinion that is more false in respect to it are contrary opinions, but opinions opposed according to affirmation and negation are the true opinion and the opinion that is more false in respect to it; therefore, opinions opposed according to affirmation and negation are contraries. The major is proved thus: those things that are most distant in respect to the same thing are contraries; but the true and the more false are most distant in respect to the same thing, as is clear. The proof of the minor is that the opposite according to negation of the same thing of the same thing is per se false in relation to the true affirmation of it. But a per se false opinion is more false than any other, since each thing that is per se such is more such than anything that is such by reason of something else.
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| Unde ad suprapositas opiniones in propositione quaestionis rediens, ut ex illis exemplariter clarius intentum ostendat, a probatione minoris inchoat tali modo. Sint quatuor opiniones, duae verae, scilicet, bonum est bonum, bonum non est malum, et duae falsae, scilicet, bonum non est bonum, et, bonum est malum. Clarum est autem quod prima vera est ratione sui, secunda autem est vera secundum accidens, idest, ratione alterius, quia scilicet non esse malum est coniunctum ipsi bono: ideo enim ista est vera, bonum non est malum, quia bonum est bonum, et non e contra; ergo prima quae est secundum se vera, est magis vera quam secunda: quia in unoquoque genere quae secundum se est vera est magis vera. Illae autem duae falsae eodem modo censendae sunt, quod scilicet magis falsa est, quae secundum se est falsa. Unde quia prima earum, scilicet, bonum non est bonum, quae est negativa, est per se et non ratione alterius falsa, relata ad illam affirmativam, bonum est bonum; et secunda, scilicet, bonum est malum, quae est affirmativa contrarii, ad eamdem relata est falsa per accidens, idest ratione alterius (ista enim, scilicet, bonum est malum, non immediate falsificatur ab illa vera, scilicet bonum est bonum, sed mediante illa alia falsa, scilicet, bonum non est bonum); idcirco magis falsa respectu affirmationis verae est negatio eiusdem quam affirmatio contrarii. Quod erat assumptum in minore.
| 5. Accordingly, returning to the opinions already given in proposing the question so as to show his intention more clearly by example, he begins with the proof of the minor. There are four opinions, of which two are true, “A good is good,” “A good is not evil”; two are false, “A good is not good” and “A good is evil.” It is evident that the first is true by reason of itself, the second accidentally, i.e., by reason of another, for not to be evil is added to that which is good. Hence, “A good is not evil” is true because a good is good, and not contrarily. Therefore, the first of these opinions, which is per se true, is more true than the second, for in each genus that which per se is true is more true. The two false opinions are to be judged in the same way. The more false is the one that is per se false. The first of them, the negative, “A good is not good,” in relation to the affirmative, “A good is good,” is per se false, not false by reason of another. The second, the affirmative of the contrary, “A good is evil,” in relation to the same opinion, is false accidentally, i.e., by reason of another (for “A good is evil” is not immediately falsified by the true opinion, “A good is good,” but mediately through the other false opinion “A good is not good”). Therefore, the negation of the same thing is more false in respect to a trite affirmation than the affirmation of a contrary. This was assumed in the minor.
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| Unde rediens ad supra positas (ut dictum est) opiniones, infert primas duas veras opiniones dicens: si ergo quod bonum est et bonum est et non est malum, et hoc quidem, scilicet quod dicit prima opinio, est verum secundum se, idest ratione sui; illud vero, scilicet quod dicit secunda opinio, est verum secundum accidens, quia accidit, idest, coniunctum est ei, scilicet bono, malum non esse. In unoquoque autem ordine magis vera est illa quae secundum se est vera. Etiam igitur falsa magis est quae secundum se falsa est: siquidem et vera huius est naturae, ut declaratum est, quod scilicet magis vera est, quae secundum se est vera.
| 6. As was pointed out above, Aristotle returns to the opinions already posited, and infers the first two true opinions: Now if that which is good is both good and not evil, and if what the first opinion says is true per se, i.e., by reason of itself, and what the second opinion says is trite accidentally (since it is accidental to it, i.e., added to it, that is, to the good, not to be evil) and if in each order that which is per se true is more true, then that which is per se false is more false, since, as has been shown, the true also is of this nature, namely, that the more true is that which per se is true.
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| Ergo illarum duarum opinionum falsarum in quaestione propositarum, scilicet, bonum non est bonum, et, bonum est malum, ea quae est dicens, quoniam non est bonum quod bonum est, idest negativa; scilicet, bonum non est bonum, est consistens falsa secundum se, idest, ratione sui continet in seipsa falsitatem; illa vero reliqua falsa opinio, quae est dicens, quoniam malum est, idest, affirmativa contraria, scilicet, bonum est malum, eius, quae est, idest, illius affirmationis dicentis, bonum est bonum, secundum accidens, idest, ratione alterius falsa est.
| Therefore, of the two false opinions proposed in the question, namely, “A good is not good,” and “A good is evil,” the one saying that what is good is not good, namely, the negative, is an opinion positing what is per se false, i.e., by reason of itself it contains falsity in it. The other false opinion, the one saying it is evil, namely, the affirmative contrary in respect to it, i.e., in respect to the affirmation saying that a good is good, is false accidentally, i.e., by reason of another.
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| Deinde subdit ipsam minorem: quare erit magis falsa de bono, opinio negationis, quam contrarii. Deinde ponit maiorem dicens quod, semper magis falsus circa singula est ille qui habet contrariam opinionem, ac si dixisset, verae opinioni magis falsa est contraria. Quod assumptum erat in maiore. Et eius probationem subdit, quia contrarium est de numero eorum quae circa idem plurimum differunt. Nihil enim plus differt a vera opinione quam magis falsa circa illam.
| Then he gives the minor: Therefore, the opinion of the negation of the good will be more false than the opinion affirming a contrary. Next, he posits the major, the one who holds the contrary judgment about each thing is most mistaken, i.e., in relation to the true judgment the contrary is more false. This was assumed in the major. He gives as the proof of this, for contraries are those that differ most with respect to the same thing, for nothing differs more from a true opinion than the more false opinion in respect to it.
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| Ultimo directe applicat ad quaestionem dicens: quod si (pro, quia) harum falsarum, scilicet, negationis eiusdem et affirmationis contrarii, altera est contraria verae affirmationi, opinio vero contradictionis, idest, negationis eiusdem de eodem, magis est contraria secundum falsitatem, idest, magis est falsa, manifestum est quoniam haec, scilicet opinio falsa negationis, erit contraria affirmationi verae, et e contra. Illa vero opinio quae est dicens, quoniam malum est quod bonum est, idest, affirmatio contrarii, non contraria sed implicita est, idest, sed implicans in se verae contrariam, scilicet, bonum non est bonum. Etenim necesse est ipsum opinantem affirmationem contrarii opinari, quoniam idem de quo affirmat contrarium non est bonum. Oportet siquidem si quis opinatur quod vita est mala, quod opinetur quod vita non sit bona. Hoc enim necessario sequitur ad illud, et non e converso; et ideo affirmatio contrarii implicita dicitur. Negatio autem eiusdem de eodem implicita non est. Et sic finitur prima ratio.
| 7. Finally, he directly approaches the question. If (for “since”), then, of two opinions (namely, false opinions—the negation of the same thing and the affirmation of a contrary), one is the contrary of the true affirmation, and, the contradictory opinion, i.e., the negation of the same thing of the same thing, is more contrary according to falsity, i.e., is more false, it is evident that the false opinion of negation will be contrary to the true affirmation, and conversely. The opinion saying that what is good is evil, i.e., the affirmation of a contrary, is not the contrary but implies it, i.e., it implies in itself the opinion contrary to the true opinion, i.e., “A good is not good.” The reason for this is that the one conceiving the affirmation of a contrary must conceive that the same thing of which he affirms the contrary, is not good. If, for example, someone conceives that life is evil, he must conceive that life is not good, for the former necessarily follows upon the latter and not conversely. Hence, affirmation of a contrary is said to be implicative, but negation of the same thing of the same thing is not implicative. This concludes the first argument.
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| Notandum est hic primo quod ista regula generalis tradita hic ab Aristotele de contrarietate opinionum, quod scilicet contrariae opiniones sunt quae opponuntur secundum affirmationem et negationem eiusdem de eodem, et in se et in assumptis ad eius probationem propositionibus scrupulosa est. Unde multa hic insurgunt dubia. Primum est quia cum oppositio secundum affirmationem et negationem non constituat contrarietatem sed contradictionem apud omnes philosophos, quomodo Aristoteles opiniones oppositas secundum affirmationem et negationem ex hoc contrarias ponat. Augetur et dubitatio quia dixit quod ea in quibus primo est fallacia sunt contraria, et tamen subdit quod sunt oppositae sicut termini generationis, quos constat contradictorie opponi. Nec dubitatione caret quomodo sit verum id quod supra diximus ex intentione s. Thomae, quod nullae duae opiniones opponantur contradictorie, cum hic expresse dicitur aliquas opponi secundum affirmationem et negationem.
| 8. The general rule about the contrariety of opinions that Aristotle has given here (namely, that contrary opinions are those opposed according to affirmation and negation of the same thing of the same thing) is accurate both in itself and in the propositions assumed for its proof. Many questions may arise, however, as a consequence of this doctrine and its proof. First of all, all philosophers hold that opposition according to affirmation and negation constitutes contradiction, not contrariety. How, then, can Aristotle maintain that opinions opposed in this way are contraries? The difficulty is augmented by the fact that he has said that those opinions in which there is fallacy first are contraries, yet he adds that they are opposed as the terms of generation are, which he establishes to be opposed contradictorily. In addition, there is a difficulty as to the way in which the assertion of St. Thomas, which we used above, is true, namely, that no two opinions are opposed contradictorily, since here it is explicitly said that some are opposed according to affirmation and negation.
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| Dubium secundo insurgit circa id quod assumpsit, quod contraria cuiusque verae est per se falsa. Hoc enim non videtur verum. Nam contraria istius verae, Socrates est albus, est ista, Socrates non est albus, secundum determinata; et tamen non est per se falsa. Sicut namque sua opposita affirmatio est per accidens vera, ita ista est per accidens falsa. Accidit enim isti enunciationi falsitas. Potest enim mutari in veram, quia est in materia contingenti.
| The second question involves his assumption that the contrary of each true opinion is per se false. This does not seem to be true, for according to what was determined previously, the contrary of the true opinion “Socrates is white” is “Socrates is not white.” But this is not per se false, for the opposed affirmation is true accidentally, and hence its negation is false accidentally. Falsity is accidental to such an enunciation because, being in contingent matter, it can be changed into a true one.
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| Dubium est tertio circa id quod dixit: magis vero contradictionis est contraria. Ex hoc enim videtur velle quod utraque, scilicet, opinio negationis et contrarii, sit contraria verae affirmationi; et consequenter vel uni duo ponit contraria, vel non loquitur de contrarietate proprie sumpta: cuius oppositum supra ostendimus.
| A third difficulty arises from the fact that Aristotle says the contradictory opinion is not contrary. He seems to be proposing, according to this, that both the opinion of the negation and of a contrary are contrary to a true affirmation. Consequently, he is either positing two opinions contrary to one or he is not taking contrariety strictly, although we showed above that he was taking contrariety properly and strictly.
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| Ad evidentiam omnium, quae primo loco adducuntur, sciendum quod opiniones seu conceptiones intellectuales, in secunda operatione de quibus loquimur, possunt tripliciter accipi: uno modo, secundum id quod sunt absolute; alio modo, secundum ea quae repraesentant absolute; tertio, secundum ea quae repraesentant, ut sunt in ipsis opinionibus. Primo membro omisso, quia non est praesentis speculationis, scito quod si accipiantur secundo modo secundum repraesentata, sic invenitur inter eas et contradictionis, et privationis, et contrarietatis oppositio. Ista siquidem mentalis enunciatio, Socrates est videns, secundum id quod repraesentat opponitur illi, Socrates non est videns, contradictorie; privative autem illi, Socrates est caecus; contrarie autem illi, Socrates est luscus; si accipiantur secundum repraesentata. Ut enim dicitur in postpraedicamentis, non solum caecitas est privatio visus, sed etiam caecum esse est privatio huius quod est esse videntem, et sic de aliis.
| 9. In order to answer all of the difficulties in regard to the first argument it must be noted that opinions, or intellectual conceptions in the second operation, can be taken in three ways: (1) according to what they are absolutely; (2) according to the things they represent absolutely, (3) according to the things they represent, as they are in opinions. We will omit the first since it does not belong to the present consideration. If they are taken in the second way, i.e., according to the things represented, there can be opposition of contradiction, of privation, and of contrariety among them. The mental enunciation “Socrates sees,” according to what it represents, is opposed contradictorily to. Socrates does not see”; privatively to “Socrates is blind”; contrarily to “Socrates is purblind.” Aristotle points out the reason for this in the Postpredicamenta [ Categ. 10: 12a 35]: not only is blindness privation of sight but to be blind is also a privation of to be seeing, and so of others.
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| Si vero accipiantur opiniones tertio modo, scilicet, prout repraesentata per eas sunt in ipsis, sic nulla oppositio inter eas invenitur nisi contrarietas: quoniam sive opposita contradictorie sive privative sive contrarie repraesententur, ut sunt in opinionibus, illius tantum oppositionis capaces sunt, quae inter duo entia realia inveniri potest. Opiniones namque realia entia sunt. Regulare enim est quod quidquid convenit alicui secundum esse quod habet in alio, secundum modum et naturam illius in quo est sibi convenit, et non secundum quod exigeret natura propria. Inter entia autem realia contrarietas sola formaliter reperitur. Taceo nunc de oppositione relativa. Opiniones ergo hoc modo sumptae, si oppositae sunt, contrarietatem sapiunt, sed non omnes proprie contrariae sunt, sed illae quae plurimum differunt circa idem veritate et falsitate. Has autem probavit Aristoteles esse opiniones affirmationis et negationis eiusdem de eodem. Istae igitur verae contrariae sunt. Reliquae vero per reductionem ad has contrariae dicuntur.
| Opinions taken in the third way, i.e., as the things represented through opinions are in the opinions, have no opposition except contrariety; for opposites as they are in opinions, whether represented contradictorily or privatively or contrarily, only admit of the opposition that can be found between two real beings, for opinions are real beings. The rule is that whatever belongs to something according to the being which it has in another, belongs to it according to the mode and nature of that in which it is, and not according to what its own nature would require. Now, between real beings only contrariety is found formally. (I am omitting here the consideration of relative opposition.) Therefore, opinions taken in this mode, if they are opposed, represent contrariety, although not all are contraries properly. Only those differing most in respect to truth and falsity about the same thing are contraries properly. Now Aristotle proved that these are - judgments affirming and denying the same thing of the same thing. Therefore, these are the true contraries. The rest are called contraries by reduction to these.
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| Ex his patet quid ad obiecta dicendum sit. Fatemur enim quod affirmatio et negatio in seipsis contradictionem constituunt; in opinionibus vero existentes contrarietatem inter illas causant propter extremam distantiam, quam ponunt inter entia realia, opinionem scilicet veram et opinionem falsam circa idem. Stantque ista duo simul quod ea, in quibus primo est fallacia, sint opposita ut termini generationis, et tamen sint contraria utendo supradicta distinctione: sunt enim opposita contradictorie ut termini generationis secundum repraesentata; sunt autem contraria, secundum quod habent in seipsis illa contradictoria. Unde plurimum differunt.
| 10. From this the answer to the objections is clear. We grant that affirmation and negation in themselves constitute contradiction. In actual judgments,”’ affirmation and negation cause contrariety between opinions because of the extreme distance they posit between real beings, namely, true opinion and false opinion in respect to the same thing. And these two stand at the same time: those in which there is fallacy first are opposed as the terms of generation are and yet they are contraries by the use of the foresaid distinction—for they are opposed contradictorily as terms of generation according to the things represented, but they are contraries insofar as they have in themselves those contradictories and hence differ most.
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| Liquet quoque ex hoc quod nulla est dissentio inter dicta Aristotelis et s. Thomae, quia opiniones aliquas opponi secundum affirmationem et negationem verum esse confitemur, si ad repraesentata nos convertimus, ut hic dicitur.
| It is also evident that there is no disagreement between Aristotle and St. Thomas, for we have shown that it is true that some opinions are opposed according to affirmation and negation if we consider the things represented, as is said here.
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| Tu autem qui perspicacioris ac provectioris ingenii es compos, hinc habeto quod inter ipsas opiniones oppositas quidam tantum motus est, eo quod de affirmato in affirmatum mutatio fit: inter ipsas vero secundum repraesentata, similitudo quaedam generationis et corruptionis invenitur, dum inter affirmationem et negationem mutatio clauditur. Unde et fallacia sive error quandoque et motus et mutationis rationem habet diversa respiciendo, quando scilicet ex vera in per se falsam, vel e converso, quis mutat opinionem; quandoque autem solam mutationem imitatur, quando scilicet absque praeopinata veritate ipsam falsam offendit quis opinionem; quandoque vero motus undique rationem possidet, quando scilicet ex vera affirmatione in falsam circa idem contrarii affirmationem transit.
| 11. It will be noted, however, by those of you who are more penetrating and advanced in your thinking, that between opposite opinions there is something of true motion when a change is made from the affirmed to the affirmed; but according to the order of representation there is a certain similitude to generation and corruption so long as the change is bounded by affirmation and negation. Consequently, fallacy or error may be regarded in different ways. Sometimes it has the aspect of both movement and change. This is the case when someone changes his opinion from a true one to one that is per se false, or conversely. Sometimes change alone is imitated. This happens when someone arrives at a false opinion apart from a former true opinion. Sometimes, however, there is movement in every respect. This is the case when reason passes from the true affirmation to the false affirmation of a contrary about the same thing.
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| Quia tamen prima ut quis fallatur radix est oppositio affirmationis et negationis, merito ea in quibus primo est fallacia, sicut generationis terminos opponi dixit.
| However, since the first root of being in error is the opposition of affirmation and negation, Aristotle is correct in saying that those in which there is fallacy first are opposed as are the terms of generation.
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| Ad dubium secundo loco adductum dico quod peccatur ibi secundum aequivocationem illius termini per se falsa, seu per se vera. Opinio enim et similiter enunciatio potest dici dupliciter per se vera seu falsa. Uno modo, in seipsa, sicut sunt omnes verae secundum illos modos perseitatis qui enumerantur I posteriorum, et similiter falsae secundum illosmet modos, ut, homo non est animal. Et hoc modo non accipitur in hac regula de contrarietate opinionum et enunciationum opinio per se vera aut falsa, ut efficaciter obiectio adducta concludit. Si enim ad contrarietatem opinionum hoc exigeretur non possent esse opiniones contrariae in materia contingenti: quod est falsissimum.
| 12. With respect to the second question, I say that there is an equivocation of the term “per se false” and “per se true” in the objection. Opinion, as well as enunciation, can be called per se true or false in two ways. It can be called per se true in itself. This is the case in respect to all opinions and enunciations that are in accordance with the modes of perseity enumerated in I Posteriorum [4: 73a; 34–73b 15]. Similarly, they can be said to be per se false according to the same modes. An example of this would be “Man is not an animal.” Per se true or false is not taken in this mode in the rule about contrariety of opinions and enunciations, as the objection concludes. For if this were needed for contrariety of opinions there could not be contrary opinions in contingent matter, which is false.
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| Alio modo potest dici opinio sive enunciatio per se vera aut falsa respectu suae oppositae. Per se vera quidem respectu suae falsae, et per se falsa respectu suae verae. Et tunc nihil aliud est dicere, est per se vera respectu illius, nisi quod ratione sui et non alterius verificatur ex falsitate illius. Et similiter cum dicitur, est per se falsa respectu illius, intenditur quod ratione sui et non alterius falsificatur ex illius veritate. Verbi gratia; istius verae, Socrates currit, non est per se falsa, Socrates sedet, quia falsitas eius non immediate sequitur ex illa, sed mediante ista alia falsa, Socrates non currit, quae est per se illius falsa, quia ratione sui et non per aliquod medium ex illius veritate falsificatur, ut patet. Et similiter istius falsae, Socrates est quadrupes, non est per se vera ista, Socrates est bipes, quia non per seipsam veritas istius illam falsificat, sed mediante ista, Socrates non est quadrupes, quae est per se vera respectu illius: propter seipsam enim falsitate istius verificatur, ut de se patet.
| Secondly, an opinion or enunciation can be said to be per se true or false in respect to its opposite: per se true with respect to its opposite false opinion, and per se false with respect to its opposite true opinion. Accordingly, to say that an opinion is per se true in respect to its opposite is to say that on its own account and not on account of another it is verified by the falsity of its opposite. Similarly, to say that an opinion is per se false in respect to its opposite means that on its own account and not on account of another it is falsified by the truth of the opposite. For example, the opinion that is per se false in respect to the true opinion “Socrates is running “is not, “Socrates is sitting,” since the falsity of the latter does not immediately follow from the former, but mediately from the false opinion, “Socrates is not running.” It is the latter opinion that is per se false in relation to “Socrates is running,” since it is falsified on its own account by the truth of the opinion “Socrates is running,” and not through an intermediary. Similarly, the per se true opinion in respect to the false opinion “Socrates is four-footed” is not, “Socrates is two-footed,” for the truth of the latter does not by itself make the former false; rather, it is through “Socrates is not four-footed” as a medium, which is per se true in respect to “Socrates is four-footed”; for “Socrates is not four-footed” is verified on its own account by the falsity of “Socrates is four-footed,” as is evident.
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| Et hoc secundo modo utimur istis terminis tradentes regulam de contrarietate opinionum et enunciationum. Invenitur siquidem sic universaliter vera in omni materia regula dicens quod, vera et eius per se falsa, et falsa et eius per se vera, sunt contrariae. Unde patet responsio ad obiectionem, quia procedit accipiendo ly per se vera, et per se falsa primo modo.
| We are using “per se true” and “per se false” in this second mode in propounding the rule concerning contrariety of opinions and enunciations. Thus the rule that the true opinion and the per se false opinion in relation to it and the false opinion and the per se true in relation to it are contraries, is universally true in all matter. Consequently, the response to the objection is clear, for it results from taking “per se true” and “per se false” in the first mode.
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| Ad ultimum dubium dicitur quod, quia inter opiniones ad se invicem pertinentes nulla alia est oppositio nisi contrarietas, coactus fuit Aristoteles (volens terminis specialibus uti) dicere quod una est magis contraria quam altera, insinuans quidem quod utraque contrarietatis oppositionem habet respectu illius verae. eterminat tamen immediate quod tantum una earum, scilicet negationis opinio, contraria est affirmationi verae.
| 13. The answer to the third difficulty is the following. Since there is no other opposition but contrariety between opinions pertaining to each other, Aristotle (since he chose to use limited terms) has been forced to say that one is more contrary than another, which implies that both have opposition of contrariety in respect to a true opinion. However, he determines immediately that only one of them, the negative opinion, is contrary to a true affirmation, when he adds, it is evident that it must be the contrary.
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| DSubdit enim: manifestum est quoniam haec contraria erit. Duo ergo dixit, et quod utraque, tam scilicet negatio eiusdem quam affirmatio contrarii, contrariatur affirmationi verae, et quod una tantum earum, negatio scilicet, est contraria. Et utrunque est verum. Illud quidem, quia, ut dictum est, ambae contrarietates oppositione contra affirmationem moliuntur; sed difformiter, quia opinio negationis primo et per se contrariatur, affirmationis vero contrarii opinio secundario et per accidens, idest per aliud, ratione scilicet negativae opinionis, ut declaratum est: sicut etiam in naturalibus albo contrariantur et nigrum et rubrum, sed illud primo, hoc reductive, ut reducitur scilicet ad nigrum illud inducendo, ut dicitur V Physic.
| What he says, then, is that each, i.e., both negation of the same thing and affirmation of a contrary, is contrary to a true affirmation, and that only one of them, i.e., the negation, is contrary. Both of these statements are true, for both contrarieties are caused by an opposition contrary to the affirmation, as was said, but not uniformly. The opinion of negation is contrary first and per se, the opinion of affirmation of a contrary, secondarily and accidentally, i.e., through another, namely, by reason of the negative opinion, as has already been shown. There is a parallel to this in natural things: both black and red are contrary to white, the former first, the latter reductively, i.e., inasmuch as red is reduced to black in a motion from white to red, as is said in V Physicorum [5: 229b 15].
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| Secundum autem dictum simpliciter verum est, quoniam simpliciter contraria non sunt nisi extrema unius latitudinis, quae maxime distant; extrema autem unius distantiae non sunt nisi duo. Et ideo cum inter pertinentes ad se invicem opiniones unum extremum teneat affirmatio vera, reliquum uni tantum falsae dandum est, illi scilicet quae maxime a vera distat. Hanc autem negativam opinionem esse probatum est. Haec igitur una tantum contraria est illi, simpliciter loquendo. Caeterae enim oppositae ratione istius contrariantur, ut de mediis dictum est.
| However, the second statement, i.e., that only one of them, the negation, is contrary, is true simply, for the most distant extremes of one extent are contraries absolutely. Nov,, there are only two extremes of one distance and since between opinions pertaining to each other true affirmation is at one extreme, the remaining extreme must be granted to only one false opinion, i.e., to the one that is most distant from the true opinion. This has been proved to be the negative opinion. Only this one, then, is contrary to that absolutely speaking. Other opposites are contrary by reason of this one, as was said of those in between.
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| Non ergo uni plura contraria posuit, nec de contrarietate large loquutus est, ut obiiciendo dicebatur.
| Therefore, Aristotle has not posited many opinions contrary to one, nor used contrariety in a broad sense, both of which were maintained by the objector.
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| Deinde cum dicit: amplius si etiam etc., probat idem, scilicet quod affirmationi contraria est negatio eiusdem, et non affirmatio contrarii secunda ratione, dicens: si in aliis materiis oportet opiniones se habere similiter, idest, eodem modo, ita quod contrariae in aliis materiis sunt affirmatio et negatio eiusdem; et hoc, scilicet quod diximus de boni et mali opinionibus, videtur esse bene dictum, quod scilicet contraria affirmationi boni non est affirmatio mali, sed negatio boni. Et probat hanc consequentiam subdens: aut enim ubique, idest, in omni materia, ea quae est contradictionis altera pars censenda est contraria suae affirmationi, aut nusquam, idest, aut in nulla materia. Si enim est una ars generalis accipiendi contrariam opinionem, oportet quod ubique et in omni materia uno et eodem modo accipiatur contraria opinio. Et consequenter, si in aliqua materia negatio eiusdem de eodem affirmationi est contraria, in omni materia negatio eiusdem de eodem contraria erit affirmationi.
| 14. When Aristotle says, Further, if this necessarily holds in a similar way in till other cases it would seen that what we have said is correct, etc., he gives the second argument to prove that the negation of the same thing is contrary to the affirmation, and not the affirmation of a contrary. If opinions are necessarily related in a similar way, i.e., in the same way, in other matter, that is, in such a way that affirmation and negation of the same thing are contraries in other matter, it would seem that what we have said about the opinions of that which is good and that which is evil is correct, i.e., that the contrary of the affirmation of that which is good is not the affirmation of evil but the negation of good. He proves this consequence when he adds: for the opposition of contradiction either holds everywhere or nowhere, i.e., in every matter one part of a contradiction must be judged contrary to its affirmation—or never, i.e., in no matter. For if there is a general art which deals with contrary opinions, contrary Opinions must be taken everywhere and in every matter in one and the same mode. Consequently, if in any matter, negation of the same thing of the same thin- is the contrary of the affirmation, then in all matter negation of the same thing of the same thing will be the contrary of the affirmation.
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| Deinde intendens concludere a positione antecedentis, affirmat antecedens ex sua causa, dicens quod illae materiae quibus non inest contrarium, ut substantia et quantitas, quibus, ut in praedicamentis dicitur, nihil est contrarium. De his quidem est per se falsa ea, quae est opinioni verae opposita contradictorie, ut qui putat hominem, puta Socratem non esse hominem, per se falsus est respectu putantis, Socratem esse hominem. Deinde affirmando ipsum antecedens formaliter, directe concludit intentum a positione antecedentis ad positionem consequentis dicens: si ergo hae, scilicet, affirmatio et negatio in materia carente contrario, sunt contrariae, et omnes aliae contradictiones contrariae censendae sunt.
| Since he intends in his proof to conclude from the position of the antecedent, Aristotle affirms the antecedent through its cause: in matter in which there is not a contrary, such as substance and quantity, which have no contraries, as is said in the Predicamenta [ Categ. 5: 3b 24; 6: 5b 10], the one contradictorily opposed to the true opinion is per se false. For example, he who thinks that man, for instance Socrates, is not man, is per se mistaken with regard to one who thinks that Socrates is man. Then he affirms the antecedent formally and concludes directly from the position of the antecedent to the position of the consequent. If then these, namely, affirmation and negation in matter which lacks a contrary, are contraries, all other contradictions must be judged to be contraries.
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| Deinde cum dicit: amplius similiter etc., probat idem tertia ratione, quae talis est: sic se habent istae duae opiniones de bono, scilicet, bonum est bonum, et, bonum non est bonum, sicut se habent istae duae de non bono, scilicet, non bonum non est bonum, et, non bonum est bonum.
| 15. Then he says, Again, the opinions of that which is good, that it is good and of that which is not good, that it is not good, are parallel. This begins the third argument to prove the same thing.
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| Utrobique enim salvatur oppositio contradictionis. Et primae utriusque combinationis sunt verae, secundae autem falsae. Unde proponens hanc maiorem quoad primas veras utriusque combinationis ait: similiter se habet opinio boni, quoniam bonum est, et non boni quoniam non est bonum. Et subdit quoad secundas utriusque falsas: et super has opinio boni quoniam non est bonum, et non boni quoniam est bonum. Haec est maior. Sed illi verae opinioni de non bono, scilicet, non bonum non est bonum, contraria non est, non bonum est malum, nec bonum non est malum, quae sunt de praedicato contrario, sed illa, non bonum est bonum, quae est eius contradictoria; ergo et illi verae opinioni de bono, scilicet, bonum est bonum, contraria erit sua contradictoria, scilicet, bonum non est bonum, et non affirmatio contrarii, scilicet, bonum est malum. Unde subdit minorem supradictam dicens: illi ergo verae opinioni non boni, quae est dicens quoniam scilicet non bonum non est bonum, quae est contraria. Non enim est sibi contraria ea opinio, quae dicit affirmativae praedicatum contrarium, scilicet, quod non bonum est malum: quia istae duae aliquando erunt simul verae. Nunquam autem vera opinio verae contraria est. Quod autem istae duae aliquando simul sint verae, patet ex hoc quod quoddam non bonum malum est: iniustitia enim quoddam non bonum est, et malum. Quare contingeret contrarias esse simul veras: quod est impossibile. At vero nec supradictae verae opinioni contraria est illa opinio, quae est dicens praedicatum contrarium negativae, scilicet, non bonum non est malum, eadem ratione, quia simul et hae erunt verae. Chimaera enim est quoddam non bonum, de qua verum est simul dicere quod non est bona, et quod non est mala.
| The two opinions of that which is good, that it is good, and that it is not good, are related in the same way as the two opinions of that which is not good, that it is not good and that it is good; i.e., the opposition of contradiction is kept in both. The first opinion of each combination is true, the second false. Hence with respect to the first true opinions of each combination he proposes this major: Again, the opinions of that which is good, that it is good, and of that which is not good, that it is not good, are parallel. With respect to the second false judgment of each combination he adds: so also are the opinions of that which is good, that it is not good, and of that which is not good, that it is good. This is the major. But the contrary of the true opinion of that which is not good, namely, the true opinion “That which is not good is not good,” is not, “That which is not good is evil,” nor “That which is not good is not evil,” which have a contrary predicate, but the opinion that that which is not good is good, which is its contradictory. Therefore, the contrary of the true opinion of that which is good, namely, the true opinion “That which is good is good,” will also be its contradictory, “That which is good is not good,” and not the affirmation of the contrary “That which is good is evil.” Hence he adds the minor which we have already stated: What, then, would be the contrary of the true opinion asserting that that which is not good is not good? The contrary of it is not the opinion which asserts the contrary predicate affirmatively, “That which is not good is evil,” because these two are sometimes at once true. But a true opinion is never contrary to a true opinion. That these two are sometimes at once true is evident from the fact that some things that are not good are evil. Take injustice; it is something not good, and it is evil. Therefore, contraries would be true at one and the same time, which is impossible. But neither is the contrary of the above true opinion the one asserting the contrary predicate negatively, “That which is not good is not evil,” and for the same reason. These will also be true at the same time. For example, a chimera is something not good, and it is true to say of it simultaneously that it is not good and that it is not evil.
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| Relinquitur ergo tertia pars minoris quod ei opinioni verae quae, est dicens quoniam non bonum non est bonum, contraria est ea opinio non boni, quae est dicens quod est bonum, quae est contradictoria illius. Deinde subdit conclusionem intentam: quare et ei opinioni boni, quae dicit bonum est bonum, contraria est ea boni opinio, quae dicit quod bonum non est bonum, idest, sua contradictoria. Contradictiones ergo contrariae in omni materia censendae sunt.
| There remains the third part of the minor: the contrary of the true opinion that that which is not good is not good is the opinion that it is good, which is the contradictory of it. Then he concludes as he intended: the opinion that a good is not good is contrary to the opinion that a good is good, i.e., its contradictory. Therefore, it must be judged that contradictions are contraries in every matter.
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| Deinde cum dicit: manifestum est igitur etc., declarat determinatam veritatem extendi ad cuiusque quantitatis opiniones. Et quia de indefinitis, et particularibus, et singularibus iam dictum est, eo quod idem evidenter apparet de eis in hac re iudicium (indefinitae enim et particulares nisi pro eisdem supponant sicut singulares, per modum affirmationis et negationis non opponuntur, quia simul verae sunt); ideo ad eas, quae universalis quantitatis sunt se transfert, dicens, manifestum esse quod nihil interest quoad propositam quaestionem, si universaliter ponamus affirmationes. Huic enim, scilicet, universali affirmationi, contraria est universalis negatio, et non universalis affirmatio de contrario; ut opinioni quae opinatur, quoniam omne bonum est bonum, contraria est, nihil horum, quae bona sunt, idest, nullum bonum est bonum. Et declarat hoc ex quid nominis universalis affirmativae, dicens: nam eius quae est boni, quoniam bonum est, si universaliter sit bonum: idest, istius opinionis universalis, omne bonum est bonum, eadem est, idest, aequivalens, illa quae opinatur, quidquid est bonum est bonum; et consequenter sua negatio contraria est illa quam dixi, nihil horum quae bona sunt bonum est, idest, nullum bonum est bonum.
| 16. He then says, It is evident that it will make no difference if we posit the affirmation universally, etc. Here he shows that the truth he has determined is extended to opinions of every quantity. The case has already been stated in respect to indefinites, particulars, and singulars. On this point their status is alike, for indefinites and particulars, unless they stand for the same thing, as is the case in singulars, are not opposed by way of affirmation and negation, since they are at once true. Therefore he turns his attention to those of universal quantity. It is evident, he says, that it will make no difference with respect to the proposed question if we posit the affirmations universally, for the contrary of the universal affirmative is the universal negative, and not the universal affirmation of a contrary. For example, the contrary of the opinion that everything that is good is good is the opinion that nothing that is good (i.e., no good) is good. He manifests this by the nominal definition of universal affirmative: for the opinion that that which is good is good, if the good is universal, i.e., the universal opinion “Every good is good,” is the same, i.e., is equivalent to the opinion that whatever is good is good. Consequently, its negation is the contrary I have stated, “Nothing which is good is good,” i.e., “No good is good.”
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| Similiter autem se habet in non bono: quia affirmationi universali de non bono reddenda est negatio universalis eiusdem, sicut de bono dictum est.
| The case is similar with respect to the not good. The universal negation of the not good is opposed to the universal affirmation of the not good, as we have stated with respect to the good.
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| Deinde cum dicit: quare si in opinione sic se habet etc., revertitur ad respondendum quaestioni primo motae, terminata iam secunda, ex qua illa dependet. Et circa hoc duo facit: quia primo respondet quaestioni; secundo, declarat quoddam dictum in praecedenti solutione; ibi: manifestum est autem quoniam et cetera. Circa primum duo facit.
| 7. Then he says, If, therefore, this is the case with respect to opinion, and. affirmations and negations in vocal sound are signs of those in the soul, etc. With this he returns to the question first advanced, to reply to it, for he has now completed the second on which the first depends. He first replies to the question, then manifests a point in the solution of a preceding difficulty where he says, It is evident, too, that true cannot be contrary to true, either in opinion or in contradiction, etc.
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| Primo, directe respondet quaestioni, dicens: quare si in opinione sic se habet contrarietas, ut dictum est; et affirmationes et negationes quae sunt in voce, notae sunt eorum, idest, affirmationum et negationum quae sunt in anima; manifestum est quoniam affirmationi, idest, enunciationi affirmativae, contraria erit negatio circa idem, idest, enunciatio negativa eiusdem de eodem, et non enunciatio affirmativa contrarii. Et sic patet responsio ad primam quaestionem, qua quaerebatur, an enunciationi affirmativae contraria sit sua negativa, an affirmativa contraria. Responsum est enim quod negativa est contraria.
| First, then, he replies directly to the question: If, therefore, contrariety is such in the case of opinions, and affirmations and negations in vocal sound are signs of affirmations and negations in the soul, it is evident that the contrary of the affirmation, i.e., of the affirmative, enunciation, is the negation of the same subject. In other words, the negative enunciation of the same predicate of the same subject will be the contrary, and not the affirmative enunciation of a contrary. Thus the response to the first question—whether the contrary of the affirmative enunciation is its negative or the contrary affirmative—is clear. The answer is that the negative is the contrary.
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| Secundo, dividit negationem contrariam affirmationi, idest, negationem universalem et contradictoriam, dicens: universalis, scilicet, negatio, affirmationi contraria est et cetera. Ut exemplariter dicatur, ei enunciationi universali affirmativae quae est, omne bonum est bonum, vel, omnis homo est bonus, contraria est universalis negativa, ea scilicet, nullum bonum est bonum, vel, nullus homo est bonus: singula singulis referendo. Contradictoria autem negatio, contraria illi universali affirmationi est, aut, non omnis homo est bonus, aut, non omne bonum est bonum, singulis singula similiter referendo. Et sic posuit utrunque divisionis membrum, et declaravit.
| Next, he divides negation as it is contrary to affirmation, i.e., into the universal negation, and the contradictory: The universal, i.e., negation, is contrary to the affirmation, etc. In order to state this division by way of example he relates one enunciation to one enunciation: the contrary of the universal affirmative enunciation “Every good is’ good” or “Every man is good,” is the universal negative “No good is good” or “No man is good.” Again, relating one to one, he says that the contradictory negation contrary to the universal affirmation is “Not every man is good” or “Not everything good is good.” Thus he posits both members of the division and makes the division evident.
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| Sed est hic dubitatio non dissimulanda. Si enim affirmationi universali contraria est duplex negatio, universalis scilicet et contradictoria, vel uni duo sunt contraria, vel contrarietate large utitur Aristoteles: cuius oppositum supra declaravimus. Augetur et dubitatio: quia in praecedenti textu dixit Aristoteles quod, nihil interest si universalem negationem faciamus ita contrariam universali affirmationi, sicut singularem singulari. Et ita declinari non potest quin affirmationi universali duae sint negationes contrariae, eo modo quo hic loquitur de contrarietate Aristoteles.
| 18. A difficulty arises at this point which we cannot disregard. If the contrary of the universal affirmative is a twofold negation, namely, the universal and the contradictory, either there are two contraries to one affirmation or Aristotle is using contrariety in a broad sense, although we showed that this was not the case apropos of an earlier passage of the text. The difficulty is augmented by the fact that Aristotle said in the passage immediately preceding that it makes no difference if we take the universal negation as contrary to the universal affirmation, i.e., as one of its negations. Hence, the conclusion cannot be avoided that in the mode in which Aristotle speaks of contrariety here, there are two contrary negations to the universal affirmative.
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| Ad huius evidentiam notandum est quod, aliud est loqui de contrarietate quae est inter negationem alicuius universalis affirmativae in ordine ad affirmationem contrarii de eodem, et aliud est loqui de illamet universali negativa in ordine ad negationem eiusdem affirmativae contradictoriam. Verbi gratia: sint quatuor enunciationes, quarum nunc meminimus, scilicet, universalis affirmativa, contradictoria, universalis negativa, et universalis affirmatio contrarii, sic dispositae in eadem linea recta: omnis homo est iustus, non omnis homo est iustus, omnis homo non est iustus, omnis homo est iniustus: et intuere quod licet primae omnes reliquae aliquo modo contrarientur, magna tamen differentia est inter primae et cuiusque earum contrarietatem. Ultima enim, scilicet affirmatio contrarii, primae contrariatur ratione universalis negationis, quae ante ipsam sita est: quia non per se sed ratione illius falsa est, ut probavit Aristoteles, quia implicita est. Tertia autem, idest universalis negatio, non per se sed ratione secundae, scilicet negationis contradictoriae, contrariatur primae eadem ratione, quia, scilicet, non est per se falsa illius affirmationis veritate, sed implicita: continet enim negationem contradictoriam, scilicet, non omnis homo est iustus, mediante qua falsificatur ab affirmationis veritate, quia simpliciter et prior est falsitas negationis contradictoriae falsitate negationis universalis: totum namque compositius et posterius est partibus. Est ergo inter has tres falsas ordo, ita quod affirmationi verae contradictoria negatio simpliciter sola est contraria, quia est simpliciter respectu illius per se falsa; affirmativa autem contrarii est per accidens contraria, quia est per accidens falsa; universalis vero negatio, tamquam medium sapiens utriusque extremi naturam, relata ad contrarii affirmationem est per se contraria et per se falsa, relata autem ad negationem contradictoriam est per accidens falsa et contraria. Sicut rubrum ad nigrum est album, et ad album est nigrum, ut dicitur in V physicorum.
| 19. To clear up this difficulty we must note that it is one thing to speak of the contrariety there is between the negation of some universal affirmative in relation to the affirmation of a contrary, and another to speak of that same universal negative in relation to the negation contradictory to the same affirmative. For example, the four enunciations of which we are now speaking are the universal affirmative, the contradictory, the universal negative, and the universal affirmation of a contrary: “Every man is just,” “Not every man is just,” “No man is just,” “Every man is unjust.” Notice that although all the rest are contrary to the first in some way, there is a great difference between the contrariety of each to the first. The last one, the affirmation of a contrary, is contrary to the first by reason of the preceding universal negation, for it is false, not per se but by reason of that negation, i.e., it is implicative, as Aristotle has already proved. The third, the universal negation, is not per se contrary to the first either. It is contrary by reason of the second, the contradictory negation, and for the same reason, i.e., it is not per se false in respect to the truth of the affirmation but is implicative, for it contains the contradictory negation “Not every man is just,” by means of which it is made false in respect to the truth of the affirmation. The reason for this is that the falsity of the contradictory negation is prior absolutely to the falsity of the universal negation, for the whole is more composite and posterior as compared to its parts. There is, therefore, an order among these three false enunciations. Only the contradictory negation is simply contrary to the true affirmation, for it is per se false simply in respect to the affirmation; the affirmative of the contrary is per accidens contrary, since it is per accidens false; the universal negation, which is a medium partaking of the nature of each extreme, is per se contrary and per se false as related to the affirmation of a contrary, but is per accidens false and per accidens contrary as related to the contradictory negation; just as red in a motion from red to black takes the place of white, and in a motion from red to white takes the place of black, as is said in V Physicorum [5: 229b 15].
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| Aliud igitur est loqui de negatione universali in ordine ad affirmationem contrarii, et aliud in ordine ad negationem contradictoriam. Si enim primo modo loquamur, sic negatio universalis per se contraria et per se falsa est; si autem secundo modo, non est per se falsa, nec contraria affirmationi.
| Therefore, it is one thing to speak of the universal negation in relation to affirmation of a contrary and another to speak of it in relation to the contradictory negation. If we are speaking of it in the first way, the universal negation is per se contrary and per se false; if in the second, it is not per se false or contrary to the affirmation.
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| Quia ergo agitur ab Aristotele nunc quaestio, inter affirmationem contrarii et negationem quae earum contraria sit affirmationi verae, et non agitur quaestio ipsarum negationum inter se, quae, scilicet, earum contraria sit illi affirmationi, ut patet in toto processu quaestionis; ideo Aristoteles indistincte dixit quod utraque negatio est contraria affirmationi verae, et non affirmatio contrarii. Intendens per hoc declarare diversitatem quae est inter affirmationem contrarii et negationem in hoc quod verae affirmationi contrariantur, et non intendens dicere quod utraque negatio est simpliciter contraria. Hoc enim in dubitatione non est quaesitum, sed illud tantum.
| 20. Since Aristotle is now treating the question as to which is the contrary of a true affirmation, affirmation of a contrary or the negation, and not the question as to which of the negations is contrary to a true affirmation—as is clear in the whole progression of the question—his answer is that both negations are contrary to the true affirmation without distinction, and that affirmation of a contrary is not. His intention is to manifest the diversity between the negation, and the affirmation of a contrary, inasmuch as they are contrary to a true affirmation. He does not intend to say that both negations are contrary simply, for this is not the difficulty in question here, but the former is.
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| Et similiter dixit quod nihil interest si quis ponat negationem universalem: nihil enim interest quoad hoc, quod affirmatio contrarii ostendatur non contraria affirmationi verae, quod inquirimus. Plurimum autem interesset, si negationes ipsas inter se discutere vellemus quae earum esset affirmationi contraria.
| With respect to his saying that it makes no difference if we posit the universal negation, the same point applies, for in regard to showing that affirmation of a contrary is not contrary to a true affirmation, which is the question at issue here, it makes no difference which negation is posited. It would make a great deal of difference, however, if we wished to discuss which negation was contrary to a true affirmation.
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| Sic ergo patet quod subtilissime Aristoteles locutus de vera contrarietate enunciationum, unam uni contrariam posuit in omni materia et quantitate, dum simpliciter contrarias contradictiones asseruit.
| It is evident, then, that Aristotle’s discussion of the true contrariety of enunciations is very subtle, for he has posited one to one contraries in every matter and quantity, and affirmed that contradictions are contraries simply.
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| Deinde cum dicit: manifestum est autem etc., resumit quoddam dictum ut probet illud, dicens manifestum est autem ex dicendis quod non contingit veram verae contrariam esse, nec in opinione mentali, nec in contradictione, idest, vocali enunciatione. Et causam subdit: quia contraria sunt quae circa idem opposita sunt; et consequenter enunciationes et opiniones verae circa diversa contrariae esse non possunt. Circa idem autem contingit simul omnes veras enunciationes et opiniones verificari, sicut et significata vel repraesentata earum simul illi insunt: aliter verae tunc non sunt. Et consequenter omnes verae enunciationes et opiniones circa idem contrariae non sunt, quia contraria non contingit eidem simul inesse. Nullum ergo verum sive sit circa idem, sive sit circa aliud, est alteri vero contrarium.
| 21. When he says, It is evident, too, that true cannot be contrary to true, either in opinion or in contradiction, etc., he returns to a statement he has already made in order to prove it. It is evident, too, from what has been said, that true cannot be contrary to true, either in opinion or in contradiction, i.e., in vocal enunciation. He gives as the cause of this that contraries are opposites about the same thing; consequently, true enunciations and opinions about diverse things cannot be contraries. However, it is possible for all true enunciations and opinions about the same thing to be verified at the same time, inasmuch as the things signified or represented by them belong to the same thing at the same time; otherwise they are not true. Consequently, not all true enunciations and opinions about the same thing are contraries, for it is not possible for contraries to be in the same thing at the same time. Therefore, no true opinion or enunciation, whether it is about the same thing or is about another is contrary to another.
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| Et sic finitur expositio huius libri perihermenias. Anno nativitatis dominicae 1496, in festo divi Thomae Aquinatis. Cui sit honor et gloria, eo quod dederit opus a se inceptum, tanto tempore incompletum, perfici.
| [We conclude the commentary on this book Peri Hermenias,1496 A.D., on the feast of St. Thomas Aquinas. Glory and honor to Him for allowing me to bring this work, so long left unfinished, to completion.]
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