Sententia libri Politicorum
Commentary on Aristotle's Politics

Book 1: Lesson 1, and Book 3: Lessons 1-6
Translated by Ernest L. Fortin and Peter D. O'Neill

This translation is based on the Spiazzi 1951 edition. The Leonine differs in text and arrangement, and corrections were made accordingly.

PROEMIUM PROEMIUM
Sicut philosophus docet in secundo physicorum, ars imitatur naturam. Cuius ratio est, quia sicut se habent principia adinvicem, ita proportionabiliter se habent operationes et effectus. Principium autem eorum quae secundum artem fiunt est intellectus humanus, qui secundum similitudinem quamdam derivatur ab intellectu divino, qui est principium rerum naturalium. Unde necesse est, quod et operationes artis imitentur operationes naturae; et ea quae sunt secundum artem, imitentur ea quae sunt in natura. Si enim aliquis instructor alicuius artis opus artis efficeret; oporteret discipulum, qui ab eo artem suscepisset, ad opus illius attendere, ut ad eius similitudinem et ipse operaretur. Et ideo intellectus humanus ad quem intelligibile lumen ab intellectu divino derivatur, necesse habet in his quae facit informari ex inspectione eorum quae sunt naturaliter facta, ut similiter operetur. 1 As the Philosopher teaches in Book II of the Physics, art imitates nature. The reason for this is that operations and effects stand proportionately in the same relation to one another as their principles among themselves. Now the principle of those things that come about through art is the human intellect, and the human intellect derives according to a certain resemblance from the divine intellect, which is the principle of natural things. Hence the operations of art must imitate the operations of nature and the things that exist through art must imitate the things that are in nature. For if an instructor of some art were to produce a work of art, the disciple who receives his art from him would have to observe that work so that he himself might act in like manner. And so in the things that it makes, the human intellect, which derives the light of intelligence from the divine intellect, must be informed by the examination of the things that come about through nature so that it may operate in the same way.
Et inde est quod philosophus dicit, quod si ars faceret ea quae sunt naturae, similiter operaretur sicut et natura: et e converso, si natura faceret ea quae sunt artis, similiter faceret sicut et ars facit. Sed natura quidem non perficit ea quae sunt artis, sed solum quaedam principia praeparat, et exemplar operandi quodam modo artificibus praebet. Ars vero inspicere quidem potest ea quae sunt naturae, et eis uti ad opus proprium perficiendum; perficere vero ea non potest. Ex quo patet quod ratio humana eorum quae sunt secundum naturam est cognoscitiva tantum: eorum vero quae sunt secundum artem, est et cognoscitiva et factiva: unde oportet quod scientiae humanae, quae sunt de rebus naturalibus, sint speculativae; quae vero sunt de rebus ab homine factis, sint practicae, sive operativae secundum imitationem naturae. 2 And that is why the Philosopher says that if art were to make the works of nature, it would operate in the same way as nature; and, conversely, if nature were to make the works of art, it would make them the same way art does. But nature, of course, does not achieve works of art; it only prepares certain principles and in some way supplies artists with a model according to which they may operate. Art, on the other hand, can examine the works of nature and use them to perfect its own work. From this it is clear that human reason can only know the things that exist according to nature, whereas it both knows and makes the things that exist according to art. The human sciences that deal with natural things are necessarily speculative, therefore, while those that deal with things made by man are practical or operative according to the imitation of nature.
Procedit autem natura in sua operatione ex simplicibus ad composita; ita quod in eis quae per operationem naturae fiunt, quod est maxime compositum est perfectum et totum et finis aliorum, sicut apparet in omnibus totis respectu suarum partium. Unde et ratio hominis operativa ex simplicibus ad composita procedit tamquam ex imperfectis ad perfecta. 3 Now nature in its operation proceeds from the simple to the complex, so that in the things that come about through the operation of nature, that which is most complex is perfect and whole and constitutes the end of the other things, as is apparent in the case of every whole with respect to its parts. Hence human reason also, operating from the simple to the complex, proceeds as it were from the imperfect to the perfect.
Cum autem ratio humana disponere habeat non solum de his quae in usum hominis veniunt, sed etiam de ipsis hominibus qui ratione reguntur, in utrisque procedit ex simplicibus ad compositum. In aliis quidem rebus quae in usum hominis veniunt, sicut cum ex lignis constituit navem et ex lignis et lapidibus domum. In ipsis autem hominibus, sicut cum multos homines ordinat in unam quamdam communitatem. Quarum quidem communitatum cum diversi sint gradus et ordines, ultima est communitas civitatis ordinata ad per se sufficientia vitae humanae. Unde inter omnes communitates humanas ipsa est perfectissima. Et quia ea quae in usum hominis veniunt ordinantur ad hominem sicut ad finem, qui est principalior his quae sunt ad finem, ideo necesse est quod hoc totum quod est civitas sit principalius omnibus totis, quae ratione humana cognosci et constitui possunt. 4 Now since human reason has to order not only the things that are used by man but also men themselves, who are ruled by reason, it proceeds in either case from the simple to the complex: in the case of the things used by man when, for example, it builds a ship out of wood and a house out of wood and stones; in the case of men themselves when, for example, it orders many men so as to form a certain society. And since among these societies there are various degrees and orders, the highest is that of the city, which is ordered to the satisfaction of all the needs of human life. Hence of all the human societies this one is the most perfect. And because the things used by man are ordered to man as to their end, which is superior to the means, that whole which is the city is therefore necessarily superior to all the other wholes that may be known and constituted by human reason.
Ex his igitur quae dicta sunt circa doctrinam politicae, quam Aristoteles in hoc libro tradit, quatuor accipere possumus. 5 From what we have said then concerning political doctrine, with which Aristotle deals in this book, four things may be gathered.
Primo quidem necessitatem huius scientiae. Omnium enim quae ratione cognosci possunt, necesse est aliquam doctrinam tradi ad perfectionem humanae sapientiae quae philosophia vocatur. Cum igitur hoc totum quod est civitas, sit cuidam rationis iudicio subiectum, necesse fuit ad complementum philosophiae de civitate doctrinam tradere quae politica nominatur, idest civilis scientia. First, the necessity of this science. For in order to arrive at the perfection of human wisdom, which is called philosophy, it is necessary to teach something about all that can be known by reason. Since then that whole which is the city is subject to a certain judgment of reason, it is necessary, so that philosophy may be complete, to institute a discipline that deals with the city; and this discipline is called politics or civil science.
Secundo possumus accipere genus huius scientiae. Cum enim scientiae practicae a speculativis distinguantur in hoc quod speculativae ordinantur solum ad scientiam veritatis, practicae vero ad opus; necesse est hanc scientiam sub practica philosophia contineri, cum civitas sit quiddam totum, cujus humana ratio non solum est cognoscitiva, sed etiam operativa. 6 Secondly, we can infer the genus of this science. For since the practical sciences are distinguished from the speculative sciences in that the speculative sciences are ordered exclusively to the knowledge of the truth, whereas the practical sciences are ordered to some work, this science must be comprised under practical philosophy, inasmuch as the city is a certain whole that human reason not only knows but also produces.
Rursumque cum ratio quaedam operetur per modum factionis operatione in exteriorem materiam transeunte, quod proprie ad artes pertinet, quae mechanicae vocantur, utpote fabrilis et navifactiva et similes: quaedam vero operetur per modum actionis operatione manente in eo qui operatur, sicut est consiliari, eligere, velle et hujusmodi quae ad moralem scientiam pertinent: manifestum est politicam scientiam, quae de hominum considerat ordinatione, non contineri sub factivis scientiis, quae sunt artes mechanicae, sed sub activis quae sunt scientiae morales. Furthermore, since reason produces certain things [2] by way of making, in which case the operation goes out into external matter--this pertains properly to the arts that are called mechanical, such as that of the smith and the shipwright and the like--and other things by way of action, in which case the operation remains within the agent, as when one deliberates, chooses, wills, and performs other similar acts pertaining to moral science, it is obvious that political science, which is concerned with the ordering of men, is not comprised under the sciences that pertain to making or mechanical arts, but under the sciences that pertain to action, which are the moral sciences.
Tertio possumus accipere dignitatem et ordinem politicae ad omnes alias scientias practicas. Est enim civitas principalissimum eorum quae humana ratione constitui possunt. Nam ad ipsam omnes communitates humanae referuntur. 7 Thirdly, we can infer the dignity and the order of political science with reference to all the other practical sciences. The city is indeed the most important of the things that can be constituted by human reason, for all the other human societies are ordered to it.
Rursumque omnia tota quae per artes mechanicas constituuntur ex rebus in usum hominum venientibus, ad homines ordinantur, sicut ad finem. Si igitur principalior scientia est quae est de nobiliori et perfectiori, necesse est politicam inter omnes scientias practicas esse principaliorem et architectonicam omnium aliarum, utpote considerans ultimum et perfectum bonum in rebus humanis. Et propter hoc philosophus dicit in fine decimi Ethicorum quod ad politicam perficitur philosophia, quae est circa res humanas. Furthermore, all the wholes constituted by the mechanical arts out of the things that are used by men are ordered to man as to their end. If the most important science, then, is the one that deals with what is most noble and perfect, of all the practical sciences political science must necessarily be the most important and must play the role of architectonic science with reference to all the others, inasmuch as it is concerned with the highest and perfect good in human affairs. And that is why the Philosopher says at the end of Book X of the Ethics that the philosophy that deals with human affairs finds its perfection in politics.
Quarto ex praedictis accipere possumus modum et ordinem huiusmodi scientiae. Sicut enim scientiae speculativae quae de aliquo toto considerant, ex consideratione partium et principiorum notitiam de toto perficiunt passiones et operationes totius manifestando; sic et haec scientia principia et partes civitatis considerans de ipsa notitiam tradit, partes et passiones et operationes eius manifestans: et quia practica est, manifestat insuper quomodo singula perfici possunt: quod est necessarium in omni practica scientia. 8 Fourthly, from what has already been said we can deduce the mode and the order of this science. For just as the speculative sciences, which treat of some whole, arrive at a knowledge of the whole by manifesting its properties and its principles from an examination of its parts and its principles, so too this science examines the parts and the principles of the city and gives us a knowledge of it by manifesting its parts and its properties and its operations. And because it is a practical science, it manifests in addition how each thing may be realized, as is necessary in every practical science.
Liber 1 BOOK ONE
Lectio 1 LESSON I
His igitur praelibatis, sciendum est quod Aristoteles in hoc libro praemittit quoddam prooemium, in quo manifestat intentionem huius scientiae: et deinde accedit ad propositum manifestandum, ibi, quoniam autem manifestum ex quibus partibus et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit dignitatem civitatis, de qua est politica, ex eius fine: secundo ostendit comparationem civitatis ad alias communitates, ibi, quicumque quidem igitur et cetera. 9 After these preliminary remarks, then, it should be noted that in this book Aristotle begins with a preamble of some kind in which he manifests the aim of this science; then he proceeds to manifest what he has proposed. Concerning the first point, he does two things. First, he shows the dignity of the city, with which politics is concerned, from its end; secondly, he shows the relation of the city to the other societies.
Circa primum duo intendit probare. Quorum primum est, quod civitas ordinetur ad aliquod bonum, sicut ad finem. Secundo, quod bonum ad quod ordinatur civitas, sit principalissimum inter bona humana, ibi, maxime autem principalissimum omnium et cetera. 10 Concerning the first point, he intends to prove two things: first, that the city is ordered to some good as to its end; secondly, that the good to which the city is ordered is the highest human good.
Circa primum ponit talem rationem. Omnis communitas est instituta gratia alicuius boni. Sed omnis civitas est communitas quaedam, ut manifeste videmus. Ergo omnis civitas est instituta gratia alicuius boni. Quia igitur minor manifestatur, maiorem sic probat. Omnes homines omnia quae faciunt operantur gratia eius quod videtur bonum; sive sit vere bonum, sive non. Sed omnis communitas est instituta aliquo operante. Ergo omnes communitates coniectant aliquod bonum, idest intendunt aliquod bonum, sicut finem. Concerning the first point, he sets down the following argument. Every society is established for the sake of some good. But every city is a society of some kind. Therefore, every city is established for the sake of some good. Since then the minor premise is evident, he proves the major as follows. All men perform everything they do for the sake of that which is seen as a good, whether it is truly good or not. But every society is established through the work of someone. Therefore, all societies seek some good, that is to say, they aim at some good as an end.
Deinde cum dicit maxime autem etc., ostendit quod illud bonum ad quod ordinatur civitas, est principalissimum inter bona humana, tali ratione. Si omnis communitas ordinatur ad bonum, necesse est quod illa communitas quae est maxime principalis, maxime sit coniectatrix boni quod est inter omnia humana bona principalissimum. Oportet enim quod proportio eorum quae sunt ad finem, sit secundum proportionem finium. 11 Then he shows that that good to which the city is ordered is the highest among human goods by means of the following argument. If every society is ordered to a good, that society which is the highest necessarily seeks in the highest degree the good that is the highest among all human goods. For the importance of the means to an end is determined according to the importance of the ends.
Quae autem communitas sit maxime principalis, manifestat per hoc quod addit. Et omnes alias circumplectens. Est enim communitas quoddam totum: in omnibus autem totis, talis ordo invenitur quod illud totum quod in se includit aliud totum principalius est: sicut paries est quoddam totum: et quia includitur in hoc toto quod est domus, manifestum est quod domus est principalius totum: et similiter communitas quae includit alias communitates est principalior. Manifestum est autem quod civitas includit omnes alias communitates. Nam et domus et vici sub civitate comprehenduntur; et sic ipsa communitas politica est communitas principalissima. Est ergo coniectatrix principalissimi boni inter omnia bona humana: intendit enim bonum commune quod est melius et divinius quam bonum unius, ut dicitur in principio Ethicorum. Now he makes clear which society is the highest by what he adds. A society is indeed a certain whole. But in all wholes is found an order such that that whole which includes another whole within itself is the higher; a wall, for example, is a whole, and because it is included in that whole which is the house, it is clear that the house is the higher of the two wholes; and likewise, the society that includes other societies is the higher. Now it is clear that the city includes all the other societies, for households and villages are both comprised under the city; and so political society itself is the highest society. Therefore, it seeks the highest among all human goods, for it aims at the common good, which is better and more divine than the good of one individual, as is stated in the beginning of the Ethics.
Deinde cum dicit quicumque quidem igitur etc., comparat civitatem ad alias communitates: et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ponit quorumdam falsam opinionem. Secundo ostendit quomodo positae opinionis falsitas innotescere possit, ibi, haec autem non sunt vera et cetera. Tertio secundum assignatum modum ponit veram comparationem civitatis ad alias communitates, ibi, necesse itaque primum combinare. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit falsam opinionem. Secundo inducit eorum rationem, ibi, multitudine enim et paucitate et cetera. 12 Then he compares the city to the other societies, and in this connection he does three things. First, he states the false opinion of certain persons. Secondly, he shows how the falsity of the stated opinion can be made known. Thirdly, in accordance with the method indicated, he sets down the true relationship of the city to the other societies. Concerning the first point, he does two things. First, he states the false opinion. Secondly, he produces their reason.
Circa primum considerandum est, quod duplex est communitas omnibus manifesta: scilicet civitatis et domus. Civitas autem duplici regimine regitur: scilicet politico et regali. Regale quidem est regimen, quando ille qui civitati praeest habet plenariam potestatem. Politicum autem regimen est quando ille qui praeest habet potestatem coarctatam secundum aliquas leges civitatis. Et similiter duplex est regimen domus; scilicet oeconomicum et despoticum. Despotes quidem vocatur omnis habens servos. Oeconomus autem vocatur procurator et dispensator alicuius familiae. Unde despoticum regimen est quo aliquis dominus suis servis praesidet: oeconomicum autem regimen est quo aliquis dispensat ea quae pertinent ad totam familiam, in qua continentur non solum servi, sed etiam liberi multi. Posuerunt ergo quidam, sed non bene, quod ista regimina non differunt, sed sunt omnino idem. 13 Concerning the first point, it should be noted that there is a twofold society that is obvious to all, namely, the city and the household. The city is governed by a twofold rule, namely, the political and the kingly. There is kingly rule when he who is set over the city has full power, whereas there is political rule when he who is set over the city exercises a power restricted by certain laws of the city. Similarly, the household has a twofold rule, namely, the domestic and the despotic. Everyone who possesses slaves is called a despot, whereas the procurator or superintendent of a family is called the domestic head. Hence despotic rule is that by which a master commands slaves, [7] while domestic rule is that by which one dispenses the things that pertain to the entire family, in which are contained not only slaves but many free people as well. Some persons have maintained then, but not rightly, that these two rules do not differ but are entirely the same.
Deinde cum dicit multitudinem enim et paucitate etc., ponit rationem eorum; quae talis est. Quaecumque differunt solum multitudine et paucitate non differunt specie; quia differentia quae est secundum magis et minus non diversificat speciem. Sed praedicta regimina differunt solum multitudine et paucitate; quod sic manifestabant. Si enim communitas, quae regitur, sit paucorum, sicut in aliqua parva domo, ille qui praeest dicitur paterfamilias, ad quem pertinet despoticus principatus. Si autem sit plurium, ita quod non solum contineat servos, sed etiam multitudinem liberorum, dicitur ille qui praeest, oeconomus. Si autem sit adhuc plurium, puta non solum eorum qui sunt unius domus, sed unius civitatis, tunc dicitur regimen politicum aut regale. 14 Then he sets forth their reason, which is as follows. Things that differ solely by reason of larger and smaller numbers do not differ specifically, because a difference according to more and less does not diversify a species. But the rules just mentioned differ solely by reason of larger or smaller numbers; this they manifested as follows. If the society that is ruled is made up of a small number of people, as in the case of some small household, he who is set over them is called the father of the family and he possesses despotic rule. If the society is made up of a larger number of people, in such a way as to contain not only slaves but a number of free men as well, he who is set over them is called the domestic head. And if the society is made up of a still larger number of people, for example, not only of those who belong to one household but of those who belong to one city, then the rule is said to be political or kingly.
Quod quidem dicebant tamquam nihil differret domus a civitate nisi magnitudine et parvitate; ita quod magna domus sit parva civitas, et e converso; quod ex sequentibus patet esse falsum. Similiter etiam politicum et regale regimen ponebant differre solum multitudine et paucitate. Quando enim ipse homo praeest simpliciter et secundum omnia, dicitur regimen regale. Quando autem praeest secundum sermones disciplinales, idest secundum leges positas per disciplinam politicam, est regimen politicum; quasi secundum partem principetur, quantum ad ea scilicet quae eius potestatem subsunt; et secundum partem sit subiectus, quantum ad ea in quibus subiicitur legi. Ex quibus omnibus concludebant quod omnia praedicta regimina, quorum quaedam pertinent ad civitatem quaedam ad domum, non differant specie. 15 The falsity of what certain persons used to say to the effect that the household and the city differ only by reason of their magnitude and smallness, in such a way that a large household is a small city and vice versa, will become apparent from what follows. Likewise they used to assert also that political rule and kingly rule differed solely by reason of larger and smaller numbers. For, when a man himself rules absolutely and in all ways, the rule is said to be kingly. When, however, he commands in part, in accordance with the principles of a given science, that is, in accordance with the laws set down by political teaching, the rule is said to be political, as though he were in part a ruler, namely, as regards the things that come under his power, and in part a subject, namely, as regards the things in which he is subjected to the law. From all this they inferred that all the previously mentioned rules, some of which pertain to the city and others to the household, do not differ specifically.
Deinde cum dicit haec autem non sunt vera etc., ostendit modum manifestandi falsitatem praedictae opinionis: et dicit quod ea quae dicta sunt non sunt vera: et hoc erit manifestum si quis velit intendere secundum subiectam methodum, idest secundum artem considerandi talia quae infra ponetur. Modus autem huius artis est talis. Quod sicut in aliis rebus ad cognitionem totius necesse est dividere compositum usque ad incomposita, idest usque ad indivisibilia quae sunt minimae partes totius (puta ad cognoscendum orationem, necesse est dividere usque ad literas, et ad cognoscendum corpus naturale mixtum, necesse est dividere usque ad elementa): sic, si consideremus ex quibus civitas componatur, magis poterimus videre ex praemissis regiminibus quid unumquodque sit secundum se et quid differant adinvicem, et utrum aliquid circa unumquodque eorum possit artificialiter considerari. In omnibus enim ita videmus quod siquis inspiciat res secundum quod oriuntur ex suo principio, optime poterit in eis contemplari veritatem. Et hoc sicut est verum in aliis rebus, ita etiam est verum in his de quibus intendimus. In his autem verbis philosophi considerandum est quod ad cognitionem compositorum primo opus est via resolutionis, ut scilicet dividamus compositum usque ad individua. Postmodum vero necessaria est via compositionis, ut ex principiis indivisibilibus iam notis diiudicemus de rebus quae ex principiis causantur. 16 Then he shows how the falsity of this opinion can be manifested. He states that what has been said is not true, and that this will become evident to those who examine the matter according to the mode indicated, that is, according to the art of studying such things as will be set down below. Now the mode of this art is the following. Just as, in other things, in order to arrive at a knowledge of the whole, it is necessary to divide the compound into its elements, that is, into the indivisibles, which are the smallest parts of the whole (for instance, to understand a sentence it is necessary to divide it into its letters, and to understand a natural mixed body it is necessary to divide it into its elements), in the same manner if we examine those things out of which the city is compounded, we shall be able to see better what each one of the previously mentioned rules is in itself, and how they differ from one another, and whether in each case something can be studied in an artful way. For in all things we see that if someone examines things as they arise from their principles, he will best be able to contemplate the truth in them. And just as this is true of other things, so also is it true of those things to which we are directing our attention. Now in these words of the Philosopher it should be noted that, in order to arrive at a knowledge of compounds, it is necessary to use the resolutive way, namely, so that we may divide the compound into its elements. Afterwards, however, the compositive way is necessary, so that from the indivisible principles already known we may judge of the things that proceed from these principles.
Deinde cum dicit necesse itaque primum combinare etc., secundum praemissum modum ponit veram comparationem aliarum communitatum ad civitatem: et circa hoc duo facit. Primo agit de aliis communitatibus quae ordinantur ad civitatem. Secundo de communitate civitatis, ibi, quae autem ex pluribus vicis. Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit communitatem personae ad personam. Secundo ponit communitatem domus quae complectitur diversas personarum communicationes, ibi, ex his quidem igitur duabus et cetera. Tertio ponit communitatem vici, quae est ex pluribus multitudinibus, ibi, ex pluribus autem domibus et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit duas communicationes personales. Secundo comparat eas adinvicem, ibi, natura quidem igitur et cetera. 17 Then, in accordance with the mode just indicated, he sets down the true relationship of the other societies to the city; and in connection with this, he does two things. First, he treats of the other societies that are ordered to the city. Secondly, he treats of civil society. Concerning the first point, he does three things. First, he sets forth the society of one person to another person. Secondly, he sets down the domestic society, which comprises different associations of persons. Thirdly, he sets down the village society, which is made up of several groups. Concerning the first point, he does two things. First, he sets down two personal associations. Secondly, he compares them to each other.
Duarum autem communicationum personalium, primo ponit eam quae est maris et feminae: et dicit, quod quia oportet nos dividere civitatem usque ad partes minimas, necesse est dicere quod prima combinatio est personarum quae sine invicem esse non possunt, scilicet maris et feminae. Huiusmodi enim combinatio est propter generationem per quam producuntur et mares et feminae. Et ex hoc patet quod sine invicem esse non possunt. Now the first of these two personal associations that he sets down is that of male and female; and he says that, since we have to divide the city into its smallest parts, it is necessary to say that the first union is that of persons who cannot be without each other, namely, the male and the female. For this union is for the sake of generation through which are produced both males and females. From this it is clear that they cannot be without each other.
Sed quare ista combinatio sit prima, ostendit per hoc quod subdit, quod non ex electione. Ubi considerandum est, quod in homine est aliquid quod est proprium eius, scilicet ratio, secundum quam ei competit quod et consilio et electione agat. Invenitur etiam aliquid in homine quod est commune ei et aliis, et huiusmodi est generare. Hoc igitur non competit eis ex electione, idest secundum quod habet rationem eligentem, sed competit ei secundum rationem communem sibi et animalibus et etiam plantis. 18 He shows how this union is the first by what he adds. Here it should be noted that in man there is something that is proper to him, namely, reason, according to which it belongs to him to act from counsel and choice. There is also found in man something that is common to him and to others; such is the ability to generate. This then does not belong to him as a result of choice, that is, in so far as he has a reason that chooses; rather it belongs to him in so far as he has a reason that is common to him and to animals and even to plants. For there is in all these a natural [8] appetite to leave after them another being like themselves, so that in this manner, through generation, what cannot be preserved numerically the same is preserved according to its species.
Omnibus enim his inest naturalis appetitus, ut post se derelinquat alterum tale quale ipsum est; ut sic per generationem conservetur in specie quod idem numero conservari non potest. Est quidem igitur huiusmodi naturalis appetitus etiam in omnibus aliis rebus naturalibus corruptibilibus. Sed quia et viventia, scilicet plantae et animalia habent specialem modum generandi, ut scilicet generent ex seipsis, ideo specialiter de plantis et animalibus mentionem facit. Nam etiam in plantis invenitur vis masculina et feminina, sed coniuncta in eodem individuo, licet in uno abundet plus una, in alio altera; ita scilicet, ut imaginemur plantam omni tempore esse talem qualia sunt mas et femina tempore coitus. There is, accordingly, a natural appetite of this kind in all other natural corruptible beings. But because living beings, namely, plants and animals, have a special way of generating in that they generate from themselves, he makes special mention of plants and animals. For even in plants a masculine and a feminine power is found, but they are joined in the same individual, even though there is a greater abundance of one or the other in this or that individual, is such a way that we can imagine a plant to be at all times such as are male and female at the time of intercourse.
Deinde cum dicit principans autem etc., ponit secundam communicationem personarum, scilicet principantis et subiecti: et haec etiam communicatio est a natura propter salutem. Natura enim non solum intendit generationem, sed etiam quod generata salventur. Et quod hoc quidem contingat in hominibus per communicationem principantis et subiecti, ostendit per hoc quod ille est naturaliter principans et dominans qui suo intellectu potest praevidere ea quae congruunt saluti, puta consequendo proficua et repellendo nociva: ille autem qui potest per fortitudinem corporis implere opere quod sapiens mente praeviderit, est naturaliter subiectus et servus. Ex quo patet quod idem expedit utrique ad salutem, scilicet quod iste principetur et ille subiiciatur. Ille enim qui propter sapientiam potest mente praevidere, interdum salvari non posset deficientibus viribus corporis, nisi haberet servum qui exequeretur; nec ille qui abundat viribus corporis, posset salvari, nisi alterius prudentia regeretur. 19 Then he sets down the second association of persons, namely, that of ruler and subject. This association too stems from nature for the sake of preservation, for nature aims not only at generation but also at the preservation of the things generated. That among men this indeed comes about through the association of ruler and subject he shows by the fact that he who by his intellect can foresee the things that are conducive to preservation, for instance, by providing what is advantageous and repelling what is harmful, naturally commands and rules, whereas he who by reason of bodily strength is able to carry out in deed what the wise man has foreseen mentally is naturally a subject and a slave. From this it clearly appears that the same thing is profitable to both in view of their preservation, namely, that the former should rule and the latter be ruled. For he who by reason of his wisdom can foresee mentally would not be able to survive at times because of a deficiency of bodily strength if he did not have a slave to carry out his ideas, nor would he who abounds in bodily strength be able to survive if he were not ruled by the prudence of another.
Deinde cum dicit natura quidem igitur etc., comparat praedictas communicationes adinvicem. Et primo secundum veritatem. Secundo excludit errorem, ibi, inter barbaros autem et cetera. 20 Then he compares the associations just mentioned to each other; first, according to the truth; secondly, he rules out an error.
Concludit ergo primo ex praedictis, quod femina et servus naturaliter distinguuntur. Femina enim naturaliter est disposita ad generandum ex alio; non autem est robusta corpore, quod requiritur in servo. Et sic praedictae duae communicationes abinvicem differunt. He infers then, first of all, from what has been said that there is a natural distinction between woman and slave. For a woman has a natural disposition to beget from another, but she is not robust in body, which is what is required in a slave. And so the two associations just mentioned differ from each other.
Causas autem praemissae distinctionis assignat ex hoc: quod natura non facit aliquod tale, sicut illi qui fabricant ex aere, idest ex metallo, Delphicum gladium pro aliquo paupere. Apud Delphos enim fiebant quidam gladii, quorum unus ad plura ministeria deputabatur: puta si unus gladius esset ad incidendum, ad limandum et ad aliqua alia huiusmodi. Et hoc fiebat propter pauperes qui non poterant plura instrumenta habere. Natura autem sic non facit ut unum ordinet ad diversa officia; sed unum deputat ad unum officium. Et propter hoc femina non deputatur a natura ad serviendum, sed ad generandum: sic enim optime fient omnia, quando unum instrumentum non deservit multis operibus, sed uni tantum. Sed hoc est intelligendum quando accideret impedimentum in utroque vel altero duorum operum, quibus idem instrumentum attribueretur; ut puta si oporteret utrumque opus frequenter simul exercere. Si autem per vices diversa opera exerceantur, nullum impedimentum sequitur, si unum instrumentum pluribus operibus accommodetur. Unde et lingua congruit in duo opera naturae; scilicet in gustum et locutionem, ut dicitur in III de anima. Non enim haec duo opera secundum idem tempus sibiinvicem coincidunt. 21 Now he establishes the cause for this distinction from the fact that nature does not make things in the same way as those who manufacture Delphic knives out of brass, that is to say, out of metal, for some poor people. For among the Delphians certain knives were made that were designed to serve several purposes, as for example, if a single knife were to be used to cut, to file, and to perform other similar duties. This was done for the benefit of the poor who could not afford several instruments. Nature, however, does not act in such a way as to order one thing to different functions; rather it assigns one thing to one function. For this reason woman is not assigned by nature to serve but to beget. Thus all things will best come about when an instrument is not used for many functions but for one only. This is to be understood, however, of cases in which an obstacle would be encountered in one or both of the two functions to which the same instrument were to be assigned, for instance, if it were often necessary to exercise both functions simultaneously. But if the different functions are exercised one after the other, the adaptation of a single instrument to several functions does not give rise to any obstacle. Hence the tongue is suited for two functions of nature, namely, taste and speech, as is said in Book II of the [treatise] On the Parts of Animals. For these two functions do not coincide with each other in time.
Deinde cum dicit inter barbaros autem etc., excludit errorem contrarium. Et primo ponit errorem. Secundo ostendit causam erroris, ibi, causa autem quia natura et cetera. 22 Then he rules out the contrary error. First, he states the error. Secondly, he shows the cause of the error.
Dicit ergo primo, quod apud barbaros femina et servus habentur quasi eiusdem ordinis; utuntur enim feminis quasi servis. Potest autem hic esse dubium qui dicantur barbari. Dicunt enim quidam omnem hominem barbarum esse ei qui linguam eius non intelligit. Unde et apostolus dicit: si nesciero virtutem vocis, ero ei cui loquar barbarus, et qui loquitur mihi barbarus. Quibusdam autem videtur illos barbaros dici, qui non habent literalem locutionem suo vulgali ydiomati respondentem. Unde et Beda dicitur in linguam Anglicam liberales artes transtulisse, ne Anglici barbari reputarentur. Quibusdam autem videtur barbaros esse eos qui ab aliquibus civilibus legibus non reguntur. He says then, first of all, that among the barbarians, woman and slave are considered as belonging to the same order; for they use women as slaves. There can be a doubt here, however, as to who are called barbarians. Some people say that everyone is a barbarian to the man who does not understand his tongue. Hence the Apostle says, If I know not the power of the voice, I shall be to him, to whom I speak, a barbarian, and he that speaketh, a barbarian to me [1 Cor. 14:11]. To others it seems that those men are called barbarians who have no written language in their own vernacular. Hence Bede is said to have translated the liberal arts into the English language, lest the English be reputed barbarians. And to others it seems that the barbarians are those who are not ruled by any civil laws.
Et quidem omnia aliqualiter ad veritatem accedunt: in nomine enim barbari extraneum aliquid intelligitur. Potest enim aliquis homo extraneus dici vel simpliciter vel quo ad aliquem. Simpliciter quidem extraneus videtur ab humano genere qui deficit ratione, secundum quam homo dicitur; et ideo simpliciter barbari nominantur illi qui ratione deficiunt vel propter plagam caeli quam intemperatam sortiuntur, ut ex ipsa dispositione regionis hebetes ut plurimum inveniantur: vel etiam propter aliquam malam consuetudinem in aliquibus terris existentem; ex qua provenit, ut homines irrationales et quasi brutales reddantur. Manifestum est autem quod ex virtute rationis procedit quod homines rationabili iure regantur, et quod in literis exercitentur. Unde barbaries convenienter hoc signo declaratur, quod homines vel non utuntur legibus vel irrationabilibus utuntur: et similiter quod apud aliquas gentes non sint exercitia literarum. Sed quo ad aliquem dicitur esse extraneus qui cum eo non communicat. Maxime autem homines nati sunt sibi communicare per sermonem: et secundum hoc, illi qui suum invicem sermonem non intelligunt, barbari ad seipsos dici possunt. Philosophus autem loquitur hic de his qui sunt simpliciter barbari. 23 And in fact all these things come close to the truth in some way; for by the name "barbarian" something foreign is understood. Now a man can be said to be foreign either absolutely or in relation to someone. He who is lacking in reason, according to which one is said to be a man, seems to be foreign to the human race absolutely speaking; and so the men who are called barbarians absolutely are the ones who are lacking in reason, either because they happen to live in an exceedingly intemperate region of the sky, so that by the very disposition of the region they are found to be dull for the most part, or else because of some evil custom prevailing in certain lands from which it comes about that men are rendered irrational and almost brutal. Now it is evident that it is from the power of reason that men are ruled by reasonable laws and that they are practiced in writing. [9] Hence barbarism is appropriately manifested by this sign, that men either do not live under laws or live under irrational ones, and likewise that among certain peoples there is no training in writing. But a man is said to be foreign in relation to someone if he cannot communicate with him. Now men are made to communicate with one another above all by means of speech; and according to this, people who cannot understand one another's speech can be called barbarians with reference to one another. The Philosopher, however, is speaking here of those who are barbarians absolutely.
Deinde cum dicit causa autem assignat causam praedicti erroris. Et dicit quod causa eius est, quia apud barbaros non est principatus secundum naturam. Dictum est enim supra, quod principans secundum naturam est, qui potest mente praevidere: servus autem qui potest corpore exequi. Barbari autem ut plurimum inveniuntur corpore robusti et mente deficientes. Et ideo apud eos non potest esse naturalis ordo principatus et subiectionis. Sed apud ipsos fit quaedam communicatio servae et servi; idest communiter utuntur serva, scilicet muliere, et servo. Et quia naturaliter non est principatus in barbaris, sed in his qui mente abundant, propter hoc dicunt poetae quod congruum quod Graeci qui sapientia praediti erant, principentur barbaris: ac si idem sit naturaliter esse barbarum et esse servum. Cum autem e converso est, sequitur perversio et inordinatio in mundo, secundum illud Salomonis: vidi servos in equis, et principes ambulantes sicut servos super terram. 24 Then he establishes the cause of the error just mentioned. Its cause, he says, is that among barbarians there is no rule according to nature. For it was stated above that the man who commands according to nature is the one who is able to foresee mentally, whereas the slave is the one who is able to carry things out in deed. Now barbarians for the most part are found to be robust in body and deficient in mind. Hence the natural order of rule and subjection cannot exist among them. But there arises among them a certain association of female and male slave, that is to say, they commonly make use of a female slave, namely, a woman, and of a male slave. And because there is no natural rule among barbarians but only among those who abound in reason, the poets say that it is fitting that the Greeks, who were endowed with wisdom, should rule over the barbarians, as if to say that it is the same thing by nature to be a barbarian and to be a slave. But when the converse takes place, there ensues a perversion and a lack of order in the world, according to the words of Solomon, I have seen servants upon horses and princes walking on the ground as servants [Eccles. 10:7].
Deinde cum dicit: ex his quidem igitur etc., determinat de communitate domus quae constituitur ex pluribus communicationibus personalibus. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit ex quibus consistit ista communitas. Secundo ostendit ad quid sit, ibi, in omnem quidem igitur et cetera. Tertio ostendit quomodo nominantur qui in hac communitate sunt, ibi, quos Charondas quidem et cetera. 25 Then he treats of the domestic society, which is made up of several personal associations. In this connection he does three things. First, he shows what this society consists of. Secondly, he shows its purpose. Thirdly, he shows how those who live in this society are designated.
Dicit ergo primo, quod ex praedictis duabus communitatibus personalibus, quarum una est ad generationem, alia ad salutem, constituitur prima domus. Oportet enim in domo esse virum et feminam, et dominum et servum. Ideo autem dicitur domus prima, quia est et alia communicatio personalis quae invenitur in domo, scilicet patris et filii, quae ex prima causatur. Unde primae duae sunt primordiales. Et ad hoc inducit verbum Hesiodi poetae, qui dixit quod domus habet haec tria: dominum qui praeeminet et mulierem et bovem ad arandum. In paupere enim domo bos est loco ministri. Utitur enim homo bove ad exequendum aliquod opus, sicut et ministro. He says then, first of all, that out of the two previously mentioned personal associations, one of which is ordered to generation and the other to preservation, the first household is constituted. For in a household there have to be a man and a woman, and a master and a slave. Now it is called the first household because there is also another personal association that is found in the household, namely, that of father and son, which arises out of the first. Hence the first two associations are primordial. To show this he adduces a saying of the poet Hesiod, who stated that a household has these three things: a master who rules, a woman, and an ox for plowing. For in a poor household the ox takes the place of a servant; man uses an ox, just as he uses a servant, to carry out some work.
Deinde cum dicit in omnem quidem igitur etc., ostendit ad quid ordinetur communitas domus. Ubi considerandum est quod omnis humana communicatio est secundum aliquos actus. Actuum autem humanorum quidam sunt quotidiani, sicut comedere, calefieri ad ignem, et alia huiusmodi. Quidam autem non sunt quotidiani, sicut mercari, pugnare, et alia huiusmodi. Naturale est autem hominibus, ut in utroque genere operum sibi communicent seinvicem iuvantes. Et ideo dicit quod nihil aliud est domus quam quaedam communitas secundum naturam constituta in omnem diem, idest ad actus, qui occurrunt quotidie agendi. Et hoc manifestat consequenter per nomina. Quidam enim Charondas nomine nominat eos qui communicant in domo, homostitios, quasi unius pulmenti, quia communicant in cibo. Quidam autem alius nomine Epimenides, natione Ocres, vocat eos homocapnos quasi unius fumi, quia sedent ad eumdem ignem. 26 Then he shows to what the domestic society is ordered. Here it should be noted that every human association is an association according to certain acts. Now among human acts some are performed every day, such as eating, warming oneself at the fire, and others like these, whereas other things are not performed every day, such as buying, fighting, and others like these. Now it is natural for men to communicate among themselves by helping one another in each of these two kinds of work. Thus he says that a household is nothing other than a certain society set up according to nature for everyday life, that is, for the acts that have to be performed daily. And he goes on to show this by means of names. For a certain Charondas by name calls those who communicate in a household homositios, or men of one fare, because they communicate in food; and a certain other named Epimenides, a Cretan by nationality, calls them homokapnos, or men of one smoke, because they sit at the same fire.
Deinde cum dicit ex pluribus autem domibus etc., ponit tertiam communitatem, scilicet vici. Et primo ostendit ex quibus sit ista communitas et propter quid. Secundo ostendit quod sit naturalis, ibi, maxime autem videtur et cetera. 27 Then he sets down the third society, namely, the village. First, he shows of what this society is made up and what its purpose is. Secondly, he shows that it is natural.
Dicit ergo primo, quod prima communicatio quae est ex pluribus domibus, vocatur vicus: et dicitur prima ad differentiam secundae quae est civitas: haec autem communitas non est constituta in diem sicut dicit de domo, sed est instituta gratia usus non diurnalis. Illi enim qui sunt convicanei, non communicant sibi in actibus quotidianis in quibus communicant sibi illi qui sunt unius domus, sicut est comedere, sedere ad ignem et huiusmodi: sed communicant sibi in aliquibus exterioribus actibus non quotidianis. He says then, first of all, that the first association made up of several households is called a village; and it is called the first as distinguished from the second, which is the city. Now this society is not established for everyday life, as he says of the household; rather it is instituted for the sake of nondaily uses. For those who are fellow-villagers do not communicate with one another in the daily acts in which those who are members of one household communicate, such as eating, sitting at the fire, and things of this sort; rather they communicate with one another in certain external acts that are not performed daily.
Deinde cum dicit maxime autem videtur etc., ostendit quod communitas vici sit naturalis. Et primo ostendit propositum per rationem. Secundo per quaedam signa, ibi, propter quod et primum et cetera. 28 Then he shows that the village society is natural. First, he establishes his thesis by means of a reason. Secondly, by means of certain signs.
Dicit ergo primo, quod vicinia domorum, quae est vicus, maxime videtur esse secundum naturam. Nihil enim est magis naturale quam propagatio multorum ex uno in animalibus; et hoc facit viciniam domorum. Hos enim qui habent domos vicinas, quidam vocant collactaneos, puerosque, idest filios, et puerorum pueros, idest nepotes, ut intelligamus quod huiusmodi vicinia domorum ex hoc primo processit quod filii et nepotes multiplicati instituerunt diversas domos iuxta se habitantes. Unde cum multiplicatio prolis sit naturalis, sequitur quod communitas vici sit naturalis. He says then, first of all, that the proximity of households, which constitutes the village, seems to be according to nature in the highest degree. For nothing is more natural than the propagation of many from one in animals; and this brings about a proximity of households. Indeed, some people call those who have neighboring households foster brothers and children, that is, sons and children of children, that is, grandsons, so that we may understand that such a proximity of households originally springs from the fact that sons and grandsons, having multiplied, founded different households and lived close to one another. Hence, since the multiplication of offspring is natural, it follows that the village society is natural. [10]
Deinde cum dicit propter quod et primum etc., manifestat idem per signa. Et primo secundum ea quae videmus in hominibus. Secundo secundum ea quae dicebantur de diis, ibi, et deos autem propter hoc et cetera. 29 Then he manifests the same thing by means of signs. First, according to what we see among men. Secondly, according to what used to be said about the gods.
Dicit ergo primo, quod quia ex multiplicatione prolis constituta est vicinia, ex hoc processit, quod a principio quaelibet civitas regebatur rege: et adhuc aliquae gentes habent regem, etsi singulae civitates singulos reges non habeant; et hoc ideo, quia civitates et gentes instituuntur ex his qui sunt subiecti regi. Quomodo autem signum hoc respondeat praemissis, ostendit per hoc, quod subditur: quia omnis domus regitur ab aliquo antiquissimo, sicut a patrefamilias reguntur filii. Et exinde contingit, quod etiam tota vicinia, quae erat instituta ex consanguineis, regebatur propter cognationem ab aliquo qui erat principalis in cognatione, sicut civitas regitur a rege. Unde Homerus dixit, quod unusquisque uxori et pueris suis instituit leges, sicut rex in civitate. Ideo autem hoc regimen a domibus et vicis processit ad civitates, quia diversi vici sunt sicut civitas dispersa in diversas partes; et ideo antiquitus habitabant homines dispersi per vicos, non tamen congregati in unam civitatem. Sic ergo patet, quod regimen regis super civitatem vel gentem processit a regimine antiquioris in domo vel vico. He says then, first of all, that, since the neighborhood was established as a result of the multiplication of offspring, from this it came about that at first any city was ruled by a king; and this because cities and nations are made up of people who are subject to a king. And he shows how this sign corresponds to what has already been said by what he adds, namely, that every household is ruled by some very old member, just as sons are ruled by the father of the family. Hence it comes about that the entire neighborhood too, which was formed of blood relations, was ruled on account of this kinship by someone who was first in the order of kinship, just as a city is ruled by a king. That is why Homer has said that each one lays down laws for his wife and children, like the king in a city. Now this rule passed from households and villages to cities, because different villages are like a city spread out into different parts; and thus in former times men used to dwell dispersed through villages and not gathered in one city. So it is clear then that the rule of the king over a city or a nation derived from the rule of an older member in a household or a village.
Deinde cum dicit et deos autem etc., ponit aliud signum per ea quae de diis dicebantur. Et dicit, quod propter praemissa omnes gentiles dicebant, quod eorum dii regebantur ab aliquo rege, dicentes Iovem esse regem deorum. Et hoc ideo, quia homines adhuc aliqui regibus reguntur, antiquitus autem fere omnes regebantur regibus. Hoc autem fuit primum regimen, ut infra dicetur. Homines autem sicut assimilant sibi species deorum, idest, formas eorum, aestimantes deos esse in figura quorumdam hominum, ita et assimilant sibi vitas deorum idest, conversationes, aestimantes eos conversari secundum quod vident conversari homines. Hic Aristoteles (deos) nominat more Platonicorum substantias separatas a materia, ab uno tantum summo Deo creatas, quibus gentiles erronee et formas et conversationes hominum attribuebant, ut hic philosophus dicit. 30 Then he sets down another sign from what used to be said about the gods. He states that because of what has just been indicated, all the pagans used to say that their gods were ruled by some king and claimed that Jupiter was the king of the gods, and this because some men are still ruled by kings; but in former times almost all men were ruled by kings. This was the first rule, as will be said later. Now just as men liken the outward appearance of the gods, that is to say, their forms, to themselves, thinking the gods to be in the image of certain men, so also they liken the lives of the gods, that is to say, their behavior, to their own, thinking them to behave the way they see men behave. Aristotle is here referring, after the manner of the Platonists, to the substances separated from matter and created by only one supreme god, to whom the pagans erroneously attributed both human forms and human habits, as the Philosopher says here.
Quae autem ex pluribus vicis et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de communitatibus ordinatis ad civitatem, hic determinat de ipsa communitate civitatis. Et dividitur in partes tres. In prima ostendit qualis sit civitatis communitas. Secundo ostendit, quod est naturalis, ibi, propter quod omnis civitas et cetera. Tertio agit de institutione civitatis, ibi natura igitur quidem et cetera. 31 After having treated of the societies ordered to the city, the Philosopher treats here of civil society itself. This treatise is divided into three parts. First, he shows what kind of society the city is. Secondly, he shows that it is natural. Thirdly, he treats of the foundation of the city.
Circa primum ostendit conditionem civitatis quantum ad tria. Primo ostendit ex quibus sit civitas. Quia sicut vicus constituitur ex pluribus domibus, ita et civitas ex pluribus vicis. Secundo dicit, quod civitas est communitas perfecta: quod ex hoc probat, quia cum omnis communicatio omnium hominum ordinetur ad aliquid necessarium vitae, illa erit perfecta communitas, quae ordinatur ad hoc quod homo habeat sufficienter quicquid est necessarium ad vitam: talis autem est communitas civitatis. Est enim de ratione civitatis, quod in ea inveniantur omnia quae sufficiunt ad vitam humanam, sicut contingit esse. Et propter hoc componitur ex pluribus vicis, in quorum uno exercetur ars fabrilis, in alio ars textoria, et sic de aliis. Unde manifestum est, quod civitas est communitas perfecta. Tertio ostendit ad quid est civitas ordinata: est enim primitus facta gratia vivendi, ut scilicet homines sufficienter invenirent unde vivere possent: sed ex eius esse provenit, quod homines non solum vivant, sed quod bene vivant, inquantum per leges civitatis ordinatur vita hominum ad virtutes. Concerning the first point, he shows the condition of the city with reference to three things. First, he shows of what things the city is made up. For, just as a village is made up of several households, so a city is made up of several villages. Secondly, he says that the city is a perfect society; and this he proves from the fact that, since every association among all men is ordered to something necessary for life, that society will be perfect which is ordered to this: that man have sufficiently whatever is necessary for life. Such a society is the city. For it is of the nature of the city that in it should be found all the things that are sufficient for human life; and so it is. And for this reason it is made up of several villages, in one of which the art of the smith is practiced, in another the art of the weaver, and so of the others. Hence it is evident that the city is a perfect society. Thirdly, he shows to what the city is ordered. It is originally made for the sake of living, namely, that men might find sufficiently that from which they might be able to live; but from its existence it comes about that men not only live but that they live well, in so far as by the laws of the city the life of men is ordered to the virtues.
Deinde cum dicit propter quod omnis civitas etc., ostendit, quod communitas civitatis est naturalis. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit, quod civitas est naturalis. Secundo, quod homo est naturaliter animal civile, ibi, ex his igitur manifestum et cetera. Tertio ostendit, quid sit prius secundum naturam, utrum unus homo, aut domus, vel civitas, ibi, et prius itaque civitas et cetera. 32 Then he shows that civil society is natural. In this connection he does three things. First, he shows that the city is natural. Secondly, that man is by nature a political animal. Thirdly, he shows what is prior according to nature, whether it is one man, the household, or the city.
Circa primum ponit duas rationes: quarum prima talis est. Finis rerum naturalium est natura ipsarum. Sed civitas est finis praedictarum communitatum, de quibus ostensum est quod sunt naturales: ergo et civitas est naturalis. Quod autem natura sit finis rerum naturalium, probat, ibi, quale enim etc. tali ratione. Illud dicimus esse naturam uniuscuiusque rei, quod convenit ei quando est eius generatio perfecta: sicut natura hominis est, quam habet post perfectionem generationis ipsius: et similiter et de equo, et de domo: ut tamen natura domus intelligatur forma ipsius. Sed dispositio rei quam habet perfecta sua generatione, est finis omnium eorum quae sunt ante generationem ipsius: ergo id quod est finis naturalium principiorum ex quibus aliquid generatur, est natura rei. Et sic cum civitas generetur ex praemissis communitatibus, quae sunt naturales, ipsa erit naturalis. Concerning the first point, he sets down two arguments, the first of which is as follows. The end of natural things is their nature. But the city is the end of the previously mentioned societies, which were shown to be natural. Therefore, the city is natural. Now, that nature is the end of natural things he proves by the following argument. We call the nature of each thing that which belongs to it when its generation is perfect; for example, the nature of man is that which he possesses once his generation is perfect, and the same holds for a horse and for a house, in such a way, however, that by the nature of a house is understood its form. But the disposition that a thing has by reason of its perfect generation is the end of all the things that precede its generation. Therefore, that which is the end of the natural principles from which something is generated is the nature of a thing. And thus, since the city is generated from the previously mentioned societies, which are natural, it will itself be natural.
Secundam rationem ponit, ibi, adhuc quod cuius gratia et cetera. Quae talis est. Illud quod est optimum in unoquoque, est finis, et cuius gratia aliquid fit: sed habere sufficientiam est optimum: ergo habet rationem finis. Et sic, cum civitas sit communitas habens per se sufficientiam vitae, ipsa est finis praemissarum communitatum. Unde patet, quod haec secunda ratio inducitur ut probatio minoris praecedentis rationis. 33 Then he sets down the second argument, which is as follows. That which is best in each thing is the end and that for the sake of which something comes about. But to have what is sufficient is best. Therefore, it has the nature of an end. And thus, since the city is a society that has of itself what is sufficient for life, it is itself the end of the previously mentioned societies. Hence it is clear [11] that this second argument is presented as a proof of the minor of the preceding one.
Deinde cum dicit ex hiis igitur manifestum etc., ostendit, quod homo sit naturaliter civile animal. Et primo concludit hoc ex naturalitate civitatis. Secundo probat hoc per operationem propriam ipsius, ibi, quod autem civile et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit propositum. Secundo excludit dubitationem, ibi, et qui incivilis et cetera. 34 Then he shows that man is by nature a political animal. First, he infers this from the naturalness of the city. Secondly, he proves this from man's proper operation. Concerning the first point, he does two things. First, he establishes his thesis. Secondly, he rules out a doubt.
Concludit ergo primo ex praemissis, quod civitas est eorum quae sunt secundum naturam. Et cum civitas non sit nisi congregatio hominum, sequitur, quod homo sit animal naturaliter civile. He infers then, first of all, from what has already been said that a city is made up of things that are according to nature. And since a city is nothing other than a congregation of men, it follows that man is a naturally political animal.
Posset autem hoc alicui venire in dubium ex hoc, quod ea quae sunt secundum naturam omnibus insunt. Non autem omnes homines inveniuntur esse habitatores civitatum. Et ideo ad hanc dubitationem excludendam consequenter dicit, quod aliqui sunt non civiles propter fortunam, utpote quia sunt expulsi de civitate, vel propter paupertatem necesse habent excolere agros, aut animalia custodire. Et hoc patet quod non est contrarium ei quod dictum est, quod homo sit naturaliter civilis: quia et alia naturalia aliquando deficiunt propter fortunam: puta, cum alicui amputatur manus, vel cum privatur oculo. Sed si aliquis homo habet quod non sit civilis propter naturam, necesse est quod vel sit pravus, utpote cum hoc contingit ex corruptione naturae humanae; aut est melior quam homo, inquantum scilicet habet naturam perfectiorem aliis hominibus communiter, ita quod per se sibi possit sufficere absque hominum societate; sicut fuit in Ioanne Baptista, et beato Antonio heremita. 35 However, there could be a doubt in someone's mind concerning this, due to the fact that the things that are according to nature are found in all men. But not all men are found to be city dwellers. And so, in order to eliminate this doubt, he goes on to say that some men are not political on account of fortune, for instance, because they have been expelled from the city, or because poverty compels them to till fields or tend animals. And it is clear that this is not contrary to what has been said to the effect that man is naturally political, because other natural things too are sometimes lacking on account of fortune, for example, when someone loses a hand through amputation or when he is deprived of an eye. But if a man is such that he is not political on account of nature, either he is bad, as when this happens as a result of the corruption of human nature, or he is better than man, namely, in so far as he has a nature more perfect than that generally found in other men, in such a way that by himself he can be self-sufficient without the company of men, as was the case with John the Baptist and Blessed Anthony the hermit.
Inducit ad hoc verbum Homeri maledicentis quemdam, qui non erat civilis propter pravitatem. Dicit enim de ipso quod erat insocialis, quia non poterat contineri vinculo amicitiae, et illegalis, quia non poterat contineri sub iugo legis, et sceleratus, quia non poterat contineri sub regula rationis. Qui autem est talis secundum naturam, simul cum hoc oportet quod habeat quod sit affectator belli, quasi litigiosus et sine iugo existens. Sicut videmus quod volatilia, quae non sunt socialia, sunt rapacia. In support of this he adduces a saying of Homer cursing someone who was not political because of depravity. For he says of him that he was without tribe because he could not be contained by the bond of friendship, and without right because he could not be contained under the yoke of the law, and vicious because he could not be contained under the rule of reason. Now he who is such by nature, being quarrelsome and living without yoke, is at the same time necessarily inclined to be avid for war, just as we see that wild fowls are rapacious.
Deinde cum dicit quod autem civile animal etc., probat ex propria operatione hominis quod sit animal civile, magis etiam quam apis, et quam quodcumque gregale animal, tali ratione. Dicimus enim quod natura nihil facit frustra, quia semper operatur ad finem determinatum. Unde, si natura attribuit alicui rei aliquid quod de se est ordinatum ad aliquem finem, sequitur quod ille finis detur illi rei a natura. Videmus enim quod cum quaedam alia animalia habeant vocem, solus homo supra alia animalia habeat loquutionem. Nam etsi quaedam animalia loquutionem humanam proferant, non tamen proprie loquuntur, quia non intelligunt quid dicunt, sed ex usu quodam tales voces proferunt. 36 Then he proves from his proper operation that man is a political animal, more so even than the bee and any gregarious animal, by the following argument. We say that nature does nothing in vain because it always works for a determinate end. Hence, if nature gives to a being something that of itself is ordered to some end, it follows that this end is given to this being by nature. For we see that, whereas certain other animals have a voice, man alone above the other animals has speech. Indeed, although certain animals produce human speech, they do not properly speak, because they do not understand what they are saying but produce such words out of a certain habit.
Est autem differentia inter sermonem et simplicem vocem. Nam vox est signum tristitiae et delectationis, et per consequens aliarum passionum, ut irae et timoris, quae omnes ordinantur ad delectationem et tristitiam, ut in secundo Ethicorum dicitur. Et ideo vox datur aliis animalibus, quorum natura usque ad hoc pervenit, quod sentiant suas delectationes et tristitias, et haec sibiinvicem significent per aliquas naturales voces, sicut leo per rugitum, et canis per latratum, loco quorum nos habemus interiectiones. Now there is a difference between language and mere voice. Voice is a sign of pain and pleasure and consequently of the other passions, such as anger and fear, which are all ordered to pleasure and pain, as is said in Book II of the Ethics. Thus voice is given to the other animals, whose nature attains the level where they sense their pleasures and pains, and they signify this to one another by means of certain natural sounds of the voice, as a lion by his roar and a dog by his bark, in the place of which we use interjections.
Sed loquutio humana significat quid est utile et quid nocivum. Ex quo sequitur quod significet iustum et iniustum. Consistit enim iustitia et iniustitia ex hoc quod aliqui adaequentur vel non aequentur in rebus utilibus et nocivis. Et ideo loquutio est propria hominibus; quia hoc est proprium eis in comparatione ad alia animalia, quod habeant cognitionem boni et mali, ita et iniusti, et aliorum huiusmodi, quae sermone significari possunt. 37 Human speech, on the other hand, signifies what is useful and what is harmful. It follows from this that it signifies the just and the unjust. For justice and injustice consist in this, that some people are treated equally or unequally as regards useful and harmful things. Thus speech is proper to men, because it is proper to them, as compared to the other animals, to have a knowledge of the good and the bad, the just and the unjust, and other such things that can be signified by speech.
Cum ergo homini datus sit sermo a natura, et sermo ordinetur ad hoc, quod homines sibiinvicem communicent in utili et nocivo, iusto et iniusto, et aliis huiusmodi; sequitur, ex quo natura nihil facit frustra, quod naturaliter homines in his sibi communicent. Sed communicatio in istis facit domum et civitatem. Igitur homo est naturaliter animal domesticum et civile. Since language is given to man by nature, therefore, and since language is ordered to this, that men communicate with one another as regards the useful and the harmful, the just and the unjust, and other such things, it follows, from the fact that nature does nothing in vain, that men naturally communicate with one another in reference to these things. But communication in reference to these things is what makes a household and a city. Therefore, man is naturally a domestic and political animal.
Deinde cum dicit et prius itaque civitas etc., ostendit ex praemissis, quod civitas sit prior secundum naturam quam domus, vel quam unus homo singularis, tali ratione. Necesse est totum esse prius parte, ordine scilicet naturae et perfectionis. Sed hoc intelligendum est de parte materiae, non de parte speciei, ut ostenditur in septimo metaphysicae. Et hoc sic probat: quia destructo toto homine, non remanet pes neque manus nisi aequivoce, eo modo quo manus lapidea posset dici manus. Et hoc ideo, quia talis pars corrumpitur corrupto toto. Illud autem, quod est corruptum, non retinet speciem, a qua sumitur ratio definitiva. Unde patet, quod non remanet eadem ratio nominis, et sic nomen aequivoce praedicatur. Et quod pars corrumpatur corrupto toto, ostendit per hoc, quod omnis pars definitur per suam operationem, et per virtutem qua operatur. Sicut definitio pedis est, quod sit membrum organicum habens virtutem ad ambulandum. Et ideo, ex quo iam non habet talem virtutem et operationem, non est idem secundum speciem, sed aequivoce dicitur pes. Et eadem ratio est de aliis huiusmodi partibus, quae dicuntur partes materiae, in quarum definitione ponitur totum, sicut et in definitione semicirculi ponitur circulus. Est semicirculus media pars circuli. Secus autem est de partibus speciei, quae ponuntur in definitione totius, sicut lineae ponuntur in definitione trianguli. 38 Then he shows from what has been said that the city is by nature prior to the household and to one individual man by the following argument. The whole is necessarily prior to the part, namely, in the order of nature and perfection. This is to be understood, however, of the part of matter, not of the part of the species, as is shown in Book VII of the Metaphysics. And he proves this as follows: if the whole man is destroyed, neither the foot nor the hand remains, except equivocally, in the manner in which a hand made out of stone can be called a hand. This because such a part is corrupted when the whole is corrupted. Now that which is corrupted does not retain its species, from which it receives its definition. Hence it is clear that the name does not retain the same meaning, and so it is predicated in an equivocal sense. That the part is corrupted when the whole is corrupted he shows by the fact that every part is defined by its operation and by the power by which it operates. For example, the definition of a foot is that it is an organic member having the power to walk. And thus, from the fact that it no longer has this power and this operation, it is not the same according to its species but is equivocally called a foot. The same reasoning holds for other similar parts, which are called parts of matter, in whose definition the whole is included, just as circle is included in the definition of a semicircle, for [12] a semicircle is a half circle. Not so, however, with the parts of the species, which are included in the definition of the whole, as, for example, lines are included in the definition of a triangle.
Sic igitur patet, quod totum est prius naturaliter quam partes materiae, quamvis partes sint priores ordine generationis. Sed singuli homines comparantur ad totam civitatem, sicut partes hominis ad hominem. Quia sicut manus aut pes non potest esse sine homine, ita nec unus homo est per se sufficiens ad vivendum separatus a civitate. 39 So it is clear then that the whole is naturally prior to the parts of matter, even though the parts are prior in the order of generation. But individual men are related to the whole city as are the parts of man to man. For, just as a hand or a foot cannot exist without a man, so too one man cannot live self-sufficiently by himself when separated from the city.
Si autem contingat, quod aliquis non possit communicare societate civitatis propter suam pravitatem, est peior quam homo, et quasi bestia. Si vero nullo indigeat, et (sit) quasi habens per se sufficientiam, et propter hoc non sit pars civitatis, est melior quam homo. Est enim quasi quidam Deus. Relinquitur ergo ex praemissis, quod civitas est prius secundum naturam quam unus homo. Now if it should happen that someone is unable to participate in civil society because of his depravity, he is worse than a man and is, as it were, a beast. If, on the other hand, he does not need anyone and is, as it were, self-sufficient, he is better than a man, for he is, as it were, a god. It remains true, therefore, from what has been said, that the city is by nature prior to one man.
Deinde cum dicit natura igitur quidem etc., agit de institutione civitatis; concludens ex praemissis, quod in omnibus hominibus inest quidam naturalis impetus ad communitatem civitatis sicut et ad virtutes. Sed tamen, sicut virtutes acquiruntur per exercitium humanum, ut dicitur in secundo Ethicorum, ita civitates sunt institutae humana industria. Ille autem qui primo instituit civitatem, fuit causa hominibus maximorum bonorum. 40 Then he treats of the foundation of the city and infers from what has been said that there is in all men a certain natural impulse toward the city, as also toward the virtues. But nevertheless, just as the virtues are acquired through human exercise, as is stated in Book II of the Ethics, in the same way cities are founded by human industry. Now the man who first founded a city was the cause of the greatest goods for men.
Homo enim est optimum animalium si perficiatur in eo virtus, ad quam habet inclinationem naturalem. Sed si sit sine lege et iustitia, homo est pessimum omnium animalium. Quod sic probat. Quia iniustitia tanto est saevior, quanto plura habet arma, idest adiumenta ad male faciendum. Homini autem secundum suam naturam convenit prudentia et virtus quae de se sunt ordinata ad bonum: sed quando homo est malus, utitur eis quasi quibusdam armis ad male faciendum: sicut cum per astutiam excogitat diversas fraudes, et per abstinentiam potens fit ad tolerandum famem et sitim, ut magis in malitia perseveret, et similiter de aliis; et inde est, quod homo sine virtute quantum ad corruptionem irascibilis est maxime scelestus et silvestris, utpote crudelis et sine affectione. Et quantum ad corruptionem concupiscibilis est pessimus quantum ad venerea, et quantum ad voracitatem ciborum. Sed homo reducitur ad iustitiam per ordinem civilem: quod patet ex hoc, quod eodem nomine apud Graecos nominatur ordo civilis communitatis, et iudicium iustitiae, scilicet diki. Unde manifestum est, quod ille qui civitatem instituit, abstulit hominibus quod essent pessimi, et reduxit eos ad hoc quod essent optimi secundum iustitiam et virtutes. 41 For man is the best of the animals if virtue, to which he has a natural inclination, is perfected in him. But if he is without law and justice, man is the worst of all the animals. This he proves as follows. Injustice is all the more cruel in proportion as it has a greater number of arms, that is, instruments for doing evil. Now prudence and virtue, which of themselves are ordered to the good, belong to man according to his nature. But when a man is evil, he makes use of these as certain arms to do evil; for example, by his shrewdness he thinks up different frauds, and through abstinence he becomes capable of bearing hunger and thirst, so that he might be more persevering in his malice, and so of the other virtues. Hence it is that a man without virtue is most vicious and savage as regards the corruption of his irascible appetite, being as he is cruel and without affection; and as regards the corruption of his concupiscible appetite, he is most evil in relation to sexual matters and greediness for food. But man is reduced to justice by means of the political order. This is clear from the fact that among the Greeks the order of political society and the judgment of justice are called by the same name, to wit, dike. Hence it is evident that the man who founded the city kept men from being most evil and brought them to a state of excellence in accordance with justice and the virtues.
Liber 3 BOOK THREE
Lectio 1 LESSON I
Ei qui de politia considerat et cetera. Postquam philosophus in secundo libro inquisivit de politiis secundum traditionem aliorum, hic incipit prosequi de eis secundum propriam opinionem. Et dividitur in partes duas. In prima manifestat diversitatem politiarum, in secunda docet qualiter optima politia sit instituenda, in principio septimi libri, ibi, de politia optima facturum et cetera. Prima autem pars dividitur in duas. In prima distinguit politias. In secunda determinat de singulis earum, in quarto libro, ibi, in omnibus artibus et scientiis et cetera. Prima autem pars dividitur in duas. In prima parte determinat id, quod pertinet ad politiam in communi. In secunda dividit politias, ibi, quoniam autem haec determinata sunt, et cetera. Prima pars dividitur in duas. In prima dicit de quo est intentio. In secunda prosequitur propositum, ibi, eos quidem igitur qui aliter qualiter et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit, quod ad tractandum de politiis, necesse est primo considerare de civitate. Secundo ostendit, quod ad tractandum de civitate, necesse est considerare quid sit civis, ibi, quoniam autem civitas, et cetera. 348 After having examined the forms of government according to the teaching of others in Book II, the Philosopher begins to treat of them according to his own opinion. This section is divided into two parts. In the first, he manifests the diversity of regimes. In the second, he teaches how to set up the best regime, in the beginning of Book VII. The first part is divided into two parts. In the first, he distinguishes the regimes. In the second, he treats of each one in particular, in Book IV. The first part is divided into two parts. In the first, he determines what pertains to the regime in general. In the second, he divides the regimes. The first part is divided into two parts. In the first, he states his intention. In the second, he carries out his proposal. Concerning the first point, he does two things. First, he shows that, in order to treat of regimes, one must first deal with the city. Secondly, he shows that, in order to treat of the city, one must consider what a citizen is.
Dicit ergo primo, quod ille qui vult considerare de politia, quae unaquaeque sit secundum propriam rationem et qualis sit, utrum scilicet bona vel mala, iusta vel iniusta, necesse est, quod primo consideret quid sit civitas. Et hoc probat duplici ratione: quarum prima est, quia de hoc potest esse dubitatio. Dubitant enim aliqui circa aliqua negotia, utrum sint facta a civitate, puta cum sint facta a tyranno, vel a divitibus civitatis. In quo casu aliqui dicunt, quod civitas haec fecit; aliqui autem dicunt, quod non fecit haec civitas, sed oligarchia, id est divites principantes, vel etiam tyrannus: et sic videtur in dubium verti, utrum soli divites principantes sint civitas. Et quia dubium est; oportet quod determinetur. Secunda ratio est, quia tota intentio eorum, qui tractant de politiis et legislatione, negotiatur circa civitatem, quia politia nihil aliud est quam ordo inhabitantium civitatem. 349 He says then, first of all, that he who wishes to study the regime and determine what each regime is according to its proper nature, and what kind of regime it is, namely, whether it is good or bad, just or unjust, must first consider what a city is. He proves this by two reasons, the first of which is that there may be some doubt concerning this point. For some people are in doubt whether certain transactions were effected by the city when, for example, they were accomplished by a tyrant or by the rich men of the city; in which case some say that the city acted, while others say that it was not the city but the rich rulers or even the tyrant. Thus there seems to be a question whether the rich rulers alone constitute the city; and because there is a question, it must be elucidated. The second reason is that the whole aim of those who treat of regimes and legislation revolves around the city, for the regime is nothing other than the order of the inhabitants of the city.
Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem civitas etc., ostendit, quod necessarium est determinare de cive, duplici ratione: quarum prima talis est. In omnibus illis quae sunt composita ex multis partibus, necesse est prius considerare partes. Civitas autem est quoddam totum constitutum ex civibus sicut ex partibus, cum civitas nihil aliud sit, quam quaedam civium multitudo. Ergo ad cognoscendum civitatem, oportet considerare quid sit civis. Secunda ratio est, quod de hoc etiam contingit dubitationem esse: non enim omnes concorditer confitentur, quod idem sit civis. Aliquis enim popularis, qui est civis in democratia secundum quam populus principatur, non reputatur quandoque civis in oligarchia, secundum quam divites principantur: quia frequenter talis est oligarchia, quod populus nullam habet ibi partem. 350 Then he shows that we must treat of the citizen for two reasons, the first of which is as follows. In everything that is composed of a multiplicity of parts, one must first consider the parts. The city is a certain whole made up of citizens who are, as it were, its parts, since the city is nothing other than a certain [122] multiplicity of citizens. Hence in order to arrive at a knowledge of the city, one must consider what a citizen is. The second reason is that concerning this point, too, there happens to be a difficulty; for not everyone is in agreement as to what a citizen is. Sometimes a common man, who is a citizen in a popular regime, where the people govern, is not reckoned a citizen under a rule of the few, where the rich govern, because it is often such that the people have no role to play in it. Hence it is evident that there is a controversy concerning the citizen, who is a citizen, and who should be called a citizen.
Deinde cum dicit eos quidem igitur etc., prosequitur propositum. Et dividitur in partes duas. In prima ostendit quid sit civis. In secunda ostendit quae sit virtus, quae facit bonum civem, ibi, his autem quae dicta sunt et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo determinat quid sit civis. Secundo movet circa hoc quasdam dubitationes, ibi, sed forte illi magis et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit, quid sit civis secundum rei veritatem. Secundo excludit quandam falsam determinationem, ibi, determinant etiam secundum usum et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit quosdam modos secundum quos aliqui sunt cives secundum quid et non simpliciter. Secundo ostendit quid sit civis simpliciter, ibi, civis autem simpliciter et cetera. 351 Then he carries out his aim. This section is divided into two parts. In the first, he shows what a citizen is. In the second, he shows what virtue makes a good citizen. Concerning the first point, he does two things. First, he determines what a citizen is. Secondly, he raises certain difficulties in this connection. Concerning the first point, he does two things. First, he shows what a citizen is according to virtue. Secondly, he rules out a certain false notion. Concerning the first point, he does two things. First, he sets down certain ways according to which some people are citizens in a qualified sense but not absolutely. Secondly, he shows what a citizen is absolutely speaking.
Dicit ergo primo, quod debemus ad praesens dimittere illos qui dicuntur cives secundum aliquem modum poeticum, idest secundum metaphoram vel similitudinem; quia isti non sunt vere cives. 352 He says then, first of all, that for the present we must exclude those who are called citizens in a certain way, that is to say, metaphorically or by comparison, for these are not really citizens.
Et primus quidem modus est secundum habitationem. Non autem dicuntur vere cives aliqui ex hoc quod civitatem inhabitant: quia advenae et servi habitant in civitate, nec tamen sunt simpliciter cives. The first way is by residence. People are not said to be truly citizens by the fact that they reside in a city, for foreigners and slaves reside in a city and yet they are not citizens absolutely speaking.
Secundus modus est, quod aliqui possunt dici cives, quia subduntur iurisdictioni civitatis, ut scilicet participent iustitiam civitatis in hoc, quod quandoque obtineant sententiam pro se, et quandoque iudicentur, idest condemnentur: quia hoc etiam convenit illis qui habent aliquos contractus inter se, qui tamen non sunt unius civitatis cives. Et tamen in quibusdam civitatibus extranei non participant perfecte huiusmodi iustitia sicut cives: sed necesse est, quod si volunt iudicio contendere, quod dent astitorem, idest fideiussorem de parendo iuri. Unde patet, quod adventitii imperfecte participant communionem iustitiae: et ita secundum hoc non sunt simpliciter cives, sed possunt dici cives secundum quid. Sicut etiam tertio modo dicimus pueros cives, qui nondum conscripti sunt in numero civium. The second way is that some people may be called citizens because they are subject to the jurisdiction of the city. Thus they share in the justice of the city in that at times they obtain a favorable verdict and at other times they are judged, that is to say, condemned. But this is also true of people who are bound by contracts and who are not citizens of the same city. In certain cities, however, foreigners do not share perfectly in this justice, like the citizens, but must present a sponsor, that is to say, someone who vouches for their obedience to the law, if they wish to litigate. Hence it is clear that outsiders share imperfectly in the interchange of justice and so, in this respect, they are not citizens absolutely speaking but can be called citizens in a qualified sense.
Et sicut dicimus senes cives, qui iam emissi sunt a numero civium, ut non possunt exequi opera civium: utrosque enim non dicimus simpliciter cives, sed cum aliqua adiectione. Pueros quidem tamquam imperfectos. Senes autem tanquam ultra provectos, quam requirat conditio civium. Vel si etiam aliud aliquid tale apponatur, nihil differt. Manifestum est enim illud quod intendimus dicere: inquirimus enim nunc quid sit simpliciter civis absque aliqua additione, quae sit necessaria ad dirigendum vel exponendum nomen civis. Likewise also, in a third sense, we call children citizens, even though they have not yet been enlisted among the ranks of the citizens, and we call old men citizens, even though they have already been dropped from the rolls since they can no longer discharge the functions of citizens. We do not refer to either group as citizens absolutely speaking but only with some qualification: to the children as imperfect citizens, and to old men as people who have gone beyond the limit required by the condition of citizens. Or if some other such qualification is added, it makes no difference, for what we are trying to say is obvious: we are now asking what a citizen is absolutely and without any qualification that would be needed in order to set forth correctly the meaning of the word "citizen."
Est autem et quartus modus, in quo est eadem dubitatio et solutio: scilicet circa profugos et viles, id est infames personas; quia scilicet tales sunt cives secundum quid, et non simpliciter. There is a fourth way, in which we encounter the same difficulty and the same solution, and that concerns fugitives and disreputable persons, who are citizens in a qualified sense but not absolutely.
Deinde cum dicit civis autem simpliciter etc., ostendit quid sit civis simpliciter. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ponit quamdam determinationem civis. Secundo ostendit quod illa determinatio non est communis in qualibet politia, ibi, oportet autem non latere et cetera. Tertio ostendit quomodo possit corrigi ut sit communis, ibi, sed habet directionem et cetera. 353 Then he shows what a citizen is absolutely speaking; and in this connection he does three things. First, he sets down a certain definition of the citizen. Secondly, he shows that this definition is not common to any regime. Thirdly, he shows how it may be amended so that it will become common.
Dicit ergo primo, quod per nihil aliud melius potest determinari civis simpliciter, quam per hoc, quod participet in civitate iudicio, ut scilicet possit de aliquo iudicare et principatu, ut scilicet aliquam habeat potestatem in negotiis civitatis. He says then, first of all, that there is no better way of defining the citizen absolutely speaking than by the fact that he shares in the administration of justice in the city, so that he has the power to judge in certain matters and possesses some authority in the affairs of the city.
Sed sciendum, quod principatuum sunt duo genera. Quidam enim sunt determinati ad certum tempus, ita quod apud quasdam civitates non liceat, quod idem homo bis obtineat eumdem principatum, vel quod obtineat per determinata tempora, puta quod exerceat aliquod officium ad annum, et postea non possit institui in eodem officio usque ad tres vel quatuor annos. Alius autem principatus est qui non determinatur secundum aliquod tempus, sed quocumque tempore potest homo illud officium exercere: sicut praetor, qui scilicet habet potestatem iudicandi de aliquibus causis, et concionator qui habet potestatem dicendi suam sententiam in concione civitatis. Potest autem contingere quod aliquis huiusmodi iudices vel concionatores non nominet principes, et quod dicatur quod non habent propter hoc aliquem principatum quod possint concionari vel iudicare. Sed hoc nihil ad propositum differat, quia ista dubitatio non est nisi in nomine: non enim invenimus aliquod nomen commune iudici et concionatori: et ideo imponatur eis hoc nomen, ut dicatur indeterminatus. Sic igitur ponimus eos qui participant huiusmodi principatu, esse cives: et ista videtur esse melior determinatio civis simpliciter. We must bear in mind, however, that there are two kinds of rules. Some rules are limited to a definite period of time. Thus in certain cities the same man is not allowed to hold the same office twice, or else he may hold it for a limited time, exercising a certain office for one year, for example, after which he may not be appointed to the same office for another three or four years. The other rule is that which is not limited to a certain period of time but can be exercised by one man for any length of time, as, for example, that of the praetor, who has the authority to judge certain cases, and that of the speaker, who has the authority to express his opinion in the public assembly. It may happen, however, that some such judges or speakers are not called rulers and, for this reason, it may be argued that they do not have any authority by which they may judge or address the assembly. But this is irrelevant, for the difficulty is one of words only. We do not find any name common to the judge and to the member of the assembly. Let us then give their office a name and call it "indeterminate office." Thus we assert that the men who share in this rule are citizens. This seems to be a better definition of the citizen absolutely speaking.
Deinde cum dicit oportet non latere etc., ostendit quod huiusmodi determinatio civis non est communis in omnibus politiis. Et dicit quod oportet hoc manifestum esse quod in omnibus rebus in quibus supposita differunt specie, et unum eorum est primum, aliud secundum, aliud habitum, id est consequenter se habens, vel nihil est commune in eis, sicut in aequivocis, vel vix est aliquid commune, idest secundum aliquid modicum. Politiae autem, ut infra dicetur, differunt secundum speciem, et quaedam earum sunt priores et quaedam posteriores; quia illae quae sunt vitiatae et transgrediuntur rectum ordinem politiae, sunt posteriores naturaliter politiis non vitiatis, sicut in quolibet genere perfectum est naturaliter prius corrupto. Quomodo autem aliquae politiae transgrediuntur rectum ordinem, infra erit manifestum. 354 Then he shows that this definition of the citizen is not common to all regimes. He says that it must be made clear that in all matters where individual subjects differ [123] according to species and where one of them is first by nature, another second, and so on, either nothing is common to them absolutely, in so far as they are such, as in the case of equivocal names, or else there is something common, but only faintly and obscurely, that is to say, in some small measure. Now regimes, as we shall see later, differ according to species. Some of them are prior and others posterior; for those that are ordered according to right reason take precedence over the others, while those that are corrupt and violate the right order of the regime are by nature posterior to noncorrupt regimes, just as in any genus the perfect is by nature prior to the corrupt. Just how some regimes are perversions of the right order will become clear later on.
Unde oportet quod altera sit ratio civis in diversis politiis. Unde praedicta determinatio civis maxime convenit in democratia in qua quilibet de populo habet potestatem iudicandi de aliquo et concionandi. In aliis autem politiis quandoque contingit, quod quilibet civis habet hanc potestatem; non tamen est hoc necessarium, quia in quibusdam non est populus habens aliquam civilitatem, neque aliquid reputant Ecclesiam, id est congregationem populi, sed solum aliquos specialiter convocatos, et isti soli per partes iudicant aliquas sententias, sicut in Lacedaemonia ephori iudicant sententias contractuum, alii tamen alias, diversi diversas. Senes autem iudicant causas homicidiales, et alii principatus alias. Et ita etiam est apud Calchedonem, quia omnes sententiae iudicantur per aliquos principes, et sic populares cives non participant iudicio: unde praedicta determinatio civis in talibus politiis non convenit. Hence the notion of citizen must necessarily vary with different regimes. For that reason, the definition of the citizen given above applies above all to the popular state, in which anyone among the people has the authority to judge in certain matters and to address the assembly. In other regimes, however, it sometimes happens that any citizen has this authority, but this is not necessarily so, for in some of them the people do not have any authority, nor is the assembly of the people taken into account but only others who have been especially summoned and these alone, divided into groups, judge certain cases. In Sparta, for example, the ephors judge the cases that arise among fellow-citizens and others pass sentence on other matters, and different groups judge different cases. The elders rule on homicide and other magistrates used to rule on other matters. This is also the case among the Carthaginians, for all matters are judged by certain magistrates and so the common citizens have no part in the judgment. Hence in such regimes the notion of citizen proposed above does not apply.
Deinde cum dicit sed habet directionem etc., corrigit praedictam definitionem civis; et dicit quod praedicta definitio potest dirigi ad hoc quod sit communis, quia in aliis politiis quam democratia concionator et praetor non habet indeterminatum principatum, sed haec duo pertinent solum ad eos qui habent determinatos principatus, quia quibusdam horum, aut etiam omnibus, convenit iudicare et consiliari, vel de quibusdam, vel de omnibus. 355 Then he amends the aforesaid definition of the citizen. He says that this definition can be rectified so as to become common, for in regimes other than the popular state the member of the assembly and the praetor do not hold office for an indeterminate period; rather, these two functions pertain only to those who hold office for a determinate period; for it belongs to some of them or even to all of them to judge and to deliberate either in some matters or in all matters.
Et ex hoc potest esse manifestum quid sit civis: non enim ille qui participat iudicio et concione, sed ille qui potest constitui in principatu consiliativo vel iudicativo. Illi enim qui non possunt assumi ad talia officia, in nullo videntur participare politia, unde non videntur esse cives. From this one can see clearly what a citizen is. He is not the one who participates in the administration of justice or in the assembly but the one upon whom the deliberative or judicial function can be conferred. For those who cannot be appointed to such offices seem to have no share in the government and hence do not appear to be citizens.
Ultimo autem ex hoc concludit quod civitas nihil est aliud, quam multitudo talium, qui sic dicuntur cives sufficiens ad autarkiam, id est per se sufficientiam vitae ut potest absolute dici. Est enim civitas communitas per se sufficiens, ut in primo dictum est. Finally, he infers from this that a city is nothing other than a large number of persons such as these, who are called citizens, [associated] in such a way that they can live self-sufficiently in an absolute sense. For a city is a self-sufficient society, as was said in Book I.
Deinde cum dicit determinant etiam secundum usum etc., excludit quamdam determinationem qua quidam definiunt civem. Et dicit, quod quidam secundum consuetudinem determinant eum esse civem, qui natus est ex ambobus parentibus civibus, et non ex altero solum, scilicet patre vel matre. Quidam autem amplius requirunt ad hoc quod aliquis sit civis, scilicet quod deducatur eius generatio ad cives avos usque ad secundum gradum, vel tertium, vel ultra. Et si sic determinetur civis politice, idest secundum consuetudinem quarumdam civitatum et celeriter, id est ante debitam disquisitionem, consurgit dubitatio, quomodo iste tertius vel quartus avus fuit civis. Secundum enim praedictam determinationem non poterit dici fuisse civis, nisi et eius generatio reducatur ad tertium vel quartum avum civem: et ita erit procedere in infinitum. 356 Then he rejects a certain definition of the citizen that has some currency. He says that some people, in accordance with their custom, define the citizen as he who is born of parents both of whom are citizens, and not one only, whether it be the father or the mother. Others further require that, in order to be a citizen, one trace his ancestry back to the second or third generation and even beyond. If a citizen is so defined politically, that is to say, in accordance with the custom of certain cities, and summarily, and prior to any proper investigation, there arises a problem as to how this third or fourth ancestor was a citizen. For, according to this definition, one will not be able to call him a citizen unless his ancestry, too, is traced back to a citizen of the third or fourth generation, and so we would have an infinite regress. But this is impossible because a regime does not regress to infinity. Hence it is obvious that we must arrive at such citizens who were not born of citizens.
Circa hoc autem ponit dictum Gorgiae Siculi Leontini qui quaedam verba sapientia (circa) praedictas determinationes dixit, sive quia non erat certus de veritate, sive quia ironice loquebatur. Dixit enim quod sicut mortariola sunt illa quae fiunt ab artificibus mortariorum, ita et cives Larissaei sunt qui sunt facti, idest geniti ab aliis civibus Larissaeis, qui sunt factivi civium Larissaeorum. Hoc autem dictum est simpliciter et sine ratione: quia si aliqui participant politia secundum definitionem praedictam a nobis, oportet dicere, quod sint cives etiam si non sint progeniti ex civibus: alioqui ista determinatio quam isti dant non potest adaptari primis, qui aedificaverunt, aut inhabitaverunt civitatem; de quibus constat quod non fuerunt nati ex civibus illius civitatis: unde sequeretur, quod non fuerunt cives; et per consequens nec alii, qui ab eis derivantur; quod est inconveniens. In this connection, he reports a saying of Gorgias, a Sicilian of Leontini, who said something regarding the aforesaid definition, either because he was not sure of the truth or because he was speaking ironically, namely, that just as mortars are things that are made by craftsmen who are mortar-makers, so Larissaeans are persons who are made, that is to say, begotten, by other Larissaeans, who are makers of Larissaeans. But this statement is naive and senseless, for if some people share in the regime according to the definition that we have given, we have to say that they are citizens even if they were not born of citizens. Otherwise, this definition that they give could not be applied to the first men who built or settled the city and who were clearly not born of citizens of that city. Hence it would follow that neither they nor, consequently, their descendants were citizens, which is absurd.
Lectio 2 LESSON II
Sed forte illi magis et cetera. Postquam determinavit quid sit civis, hic manifestat quasdam dubitationes circa praedicta, et determinat eas. Et ponit quatuor dubitationes se invicem consequentes. 357 After having determined what a citizen is absolutely speaking, the Philosopher here points out certain difficulties concerning what has been said and treats of them. He lists four difficulties that follow upon one another.
Est autem prima dubitatio de his qui facta mutatione politiae assumuntur ad communicationem politiae, sicut quidam sapiens Clisthenes nomine fecit apud Athenas tyrannis eiectis. Adiunxit enim societatibus civitatis multos extraneos, et etiam quosdam servos adventitios, ut multiplicato populo, divites non possent tyrannice opprimere ipsum. Ad hanc autem dubitationem solvendam dicit quod circa hos dubitatio est non an sint cives; quia ex quo sunt facti cives, cives sunt: sed est dubitatio, utrum sint iuste vel iniuste. The first difficulty has to do with those who, after a change of regime, are received as members of the political community. This, for example, is what a certain wise man by the name of Cleisthenes did in Athens after the expulsion of the tyrants. He added to the associations of the city many foreigners and even a certain number of alien slaves, so that, as a result of the increase in population, the rich would not be able to oppress the people tyrannically. By way of solving this difficulty, he says that there is no question whether these men are citizens or not, since, from the very fact that they were made citizens, they are citizens. But there is a question whether this was done justly or unjustly; and what the Philosopher seems to be driving at is that those who are instated by the person who overthrows the regime are citizens.
Secundam dubitationem movet, ibi, equidem cum hoc et cetera. Potest enim aliquis dubitare, utrum ille qui non est iuste civis, sit civis; ac si tantum valeat circa hoc iniustum quantum falsum: manifestum enim est quod falsus civis non est civis. Et ad hoc solvit quod cum aliqui qui principantur iniuste, principes tamen habeantur, eadem ratione et illi qui sunt iniuste cives, dicendi sunt cives, quia civis dicitur ex hoc quod participat aliquo principatu, ut supra dictum est. 358 Then he raises a second difficulty: one could question whether he who is not in justice a citizen is a citizen, as if in this matter "unjust" meant the same thing as "false." For it is obvious that a false citizen is not a citizen. To this he answers that, since some people are held to be rulers notwithstanding the fact that they rule unjustly, for the same reason those who are citizens unjustly are to be called citizens, because one is called a citizen as a result of his having some share in the government, as was said earlier.
Tertiam dubitationem ponit, ibi, de eo autem quod est iuste et cetera. Et dicit quod an aliquis sit iuste civis vel iniuste videtur esse coniunctum praecedenti dubitationi, quae in principio huius libri tertii mota est. In transmutationibus enim politiarum circa aliquam civitatem dubitari solet, quando id quod fit, sit factum civitatis, et quando non, sicut contingit quandoque quod politia civitatis mutatur de tyrannide vel oligarchia in democratiam, et tunc populus potestatem politiae accipiens, non vult adimplere conventiones quae sunt factae vel per tyrannum vel per divites prius dominantes: dicunt enim quod si qua sunt data tyranno vel divitibus civitatis, non accepit ea civitas: et ita est in multis talibus, quia in quibusdam politiis, illi qui praesident, obtinent aliqua ab aliis, non propter communem utilitatem civitatis, sed propter proprium commodum. Solvit autem hanc dubitationem: quod si haec civitas maneat eadem facta transmutatione politiae, sicut est factum huius civitatis, illud quod fit ex democratia, ita illud quod fit ex oligarchia vel tyrannide: quia sicut tunc habebat in civitate potestatem tyrannus vel divites, ita etiam in democratia populus. 359 Then he states the third difficulty. He says that the question whether one is or is not in justice a citizen is bound up with a previous difficulty raised at the beginning of this third book. When complete changes of regimes occur in a city, one usually asks: When is that which is done an act of the city and when is it not? For example, it sometimes happens that the regime of a city changes from a tyranny or from a rule of the rich to a popular rule, and then the people, assuming control of the government, do not wish to honor the agreements that were made either by the tyrant or by the rich who once ruled. They claim that if some things were given to the tyrant or to the rich men of the city, the city did not receive them; and so it is in many such cases, for in certain regimes, the men in power obtain certain things from others, not for the common benefit of the city, but for their private advantage. And he solves this difficulty [by saying] that, if the city remains the same once a complete change in regime has occurred, just as that which is done by the popular state is an act of the city, so, too, is that which is done when a few or a tyrant are in power. For just as the power in the city was then held by the tyrant or by the rich, so also in a popular state it is held by the people.
Quartam dubitationem ponit, ibi, videtur autem sermo et cetera. Et primo ponit hanc dubitationem in generali: et dicit quod proprius sermo ad solvendum tertiam dubitationem est, quomodo oporteat civitatem dicere eamdem vel non eamdem. Secundo ibi, superficialis quidem igitur etc. dividit praedictam dubitationem in duas partes: et dicit quod huiusmodi quaestio in ipsa superficie apparet, quod est circa duo: scilicet circa locum civitatis, et circa homines inhabitantes civitatem. Contingit enim quandoque aliter separari homines a loco: puta cum omnes cives expelluntur de civitate, et quidam ducuntur ad unum locum, et quidam ad alium. Potest igitur esse dubitatio si superinducantur alii habitatores, utrum sit eadem civitas vel non: et haec quidem dubitatio mitior est, idest facilior. Civitas enim multipliciter dicitur. Uno modo ipse locus civitatis: et sic civitas est eadem; alio modo populus civitatis, et sic civitas non est eadem. 360 Then he states the fourth difficulty. First, he states this difficulty in general, and he says that, in order to solve the third difficulty, the proper way to speak is to ask how one should say that a city is or is not the same. Secondly, he divides the aforesaid difficulty into two parts. He says that this question on the surface appears to refer to two things, namely, the territory of the city and the men who reside in the city. For it sometimes happens that men are separated from the territory in different ways, as, for example, when all the citizens are expelled from the city and some are led away to one place and others to another. Hence, if other residents are brought in to replace them, a question may arise whether the city is or is not the same. But this difficulty is really less serious, that is to say, easier to answer. For the term "city" has many meanings. In one sense, it refers to the territory of the city, and in this sense the city is the same. In another sense, it refers to the people of the city, and in this sense it is not the same.
Sed tunc remanet alia dubitatio, quam tangit ibi, similiter autem et hominum et cetera. Si enim semper iidem homines habitent eumdem locum, potest esse dubium quando sit una civitas, et quando non. 361 But then there remains another difficulty, [126] for if the same men always reside in the same place, there can be a doubt as to when the city is, or is not, one.
Et primo excludit unam rationem unitatis, cum dicit, non enim utique muris et cetera. Et dicit quod non potest dici, quod homines inhabitantes civitatem conservent identitatem civitatis propter muros eosdem. Posset enim contingere quod toti uni regioni, puta Peloponneso, id est Achayae, circumduceretur unus murus, et tamen non esset eadem civitas, et ita fuit de Babylone vel de quacumque alia maxima civitate, in qua magis comprehenditur una gens, quam una civitas. Dicitur enim de Babylone quod quando fuit capta, usque ad tertium diem non sensit quaedam pars civitatis propter murorum amplitudinem. First, he eliminates one notion of unity. He asserts that it cannot be said that the men residing in a city preserve the identity of the city because they live within the same walls. For one whole region, for example, the Peloponnesus, could happen to be encircled by one wall and yet not constitute the same city. Such was the case with Babylon or with any other very large city that comprises one nation rather than one city. Indeed, it is said of Babylon that when one part of the city was captured, the other part did not hear about it until three days later because of the length of the walls.
Et interponit quod de hac dubitatione, scilicet utrum expediat esse ita magnam civitatem, considerandum erit alibi, idest in septimo. Pertinet enim ad politicum cognoscere quanta debeat esse magnitudo civitatis, et utrum debeat continere homines unius gentis vel plurium. 362 And he remarks parenthetically that this question, namely, whether it is advantageous to have a city of that size, will have to be considered elsewhere, that is, in Book VII. For it pertains to the statesman to know how large a city should be and whether it should include men of one nation or of several.
Deinde cum dicit sed et eisdem etc., inquirit de alia ratione unitatis: utrum scilicet hominibus remanentibus in eodem loco, sit dicenda civitas eadem propter idem genus inhabitantium, quia scilicet quidam succedunt quibusdam, quamvis non sint iidem homines numero: sed sicut dicimus fontes vel fluvios esse eosdem propter successionem aquarum, quamvis quaedam effluat, et quaedam adveniat. 363 Then he investigates another notion of unity, namely, whether, when men remain in the same place, the city must be said to be the same because its inhabitants belong to the same race; for even though they are not the same numerically, one generation is succeeded by another. Just as we say that springs or rivers are the same because of the steady flow of waters, even though one part runs off and another part runs in, so we say that a city is the same, even though some men die and others are born, so long as the same race of men endures.
Deinde cum dicit aut homines quidem etc., solvens hanc dubitationem ostendit veram rationem unitatis civitatis. Et dicit quod propter praedictam successionem hominum unius generis potest aliqualiter dici eadem multitudo hominum; non tamen potest dici eadem civitas, si mutetur ordo politiae. Cum enim communicatio civium, quae politia dicitur, sit de ratione civitatis, manifestum est quod mutata politia non remanet eadem civitas, sicut videmus in illis qui dicunt cantiones in choreis quod non est idem chorus, si quandoque sit comicus, idest dicens cantiones comediales de factis infimarum personarum, quandoque autem tragicus, idest dicens tragicas cantiones de bellis principum: et ita etiam videmus in omnibus aliis quae consistunt in quadam compositione vel communione, quod quandocumque fit alia species compositionis non remanet identitas: sicut non est eadem harmonia, si quandoque sit Dorica, idest septimi vel octavi toni, quandoque autem Phrygia idest tertii vel quarti. 364 Then, by solving this difficulty, he reveals the true nature of the unity of the city. He says that, because of the aforesaid succession of men belonging to the same race, a multitude of men can be called the same in a sense; a city, however, cannot be called the same if the political order [or regime] is changed. For, since the association of citizens, which we call a regime, pertains to the nature of the city, it is evident that, if the regime is changed, the city does not remain the same. We see, for example, among those who sing in choruses, that the chorus is not the same if at one time it is a comic chorus, that is to say, if it sings comic songs about the deeds of lowly persons, and if at another time it is a tragic chorus, that is to say, if it sings tragic songs about the exploits of princes. So, too, we see in all other things that consist in a certain composition or association that, whenever there is a different species of composition, the identity is destroyed, just as, for example, a harmony is not the same if at one time it is Dorian, that is to say, if it is a harmony of the seventh or eighth tone, and at another time Phrygian, that is to say, if it is a harmony of the third or fourth tone.
Cum igitur omnia talia habeant hunc modum, manifestum est quod civitas est dicenda eadem respiciendo ad ordinem politiae; ita quod mutato ordine politiae, licet remaneat idem locus et iidem homines, non est eadem civitas, quamvis materialiter sit eadem. Potest autem civitas sic mutata vocari, vel eodem vel altero nomine, sive sint iidem, sive alii: sed si est idem nomen, erit aequivoce dictum. Utrum autem propter hoc quod non remanet eadem civitas facta transmutatione politiae, sit iustum, quod conventiones prioris politiae adimpleantur, vel non, pertinet ad aliam considerationem, quod quidem in sequentibus determinabitur. Since, then, this is the case with all such things, it is evident that a city must be said to be the same with respect to the order of the regime, in such a way that, if the order of the regime is changed, though the territory and the men remain unchanged, the city is not the same, even if materially it is the same. A city changed in this manner may be called by the same name or by another name, whether the men be the same or different; but if it retains the same name, the name will be used equivocally. Now whether, due to the fact that the city does not remain the same once a complete change of regime has taken place, it is just or not that the agreements contracted by the previous regime be honored, is another matter, which will be discussed later.
Lectio 3 LESSON III
Hiis autem quae dicta sunt et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit quid sit civis, hic inquirit de virtute civis. Et dividitur in partes duas. In prima ostendit, quod non est simpliciter eadem virtus civis, et virtus boni viri. In secunda parte movet circa hoc quasdam dubitationes, ibi, circa civem autem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit, quod non est eadem simpliciter virtus civis, et boni viri. In secunda ostendit, quod alicuius civis est eadem virtus, quae et boni viri, ibi, sed forte erit alicuius et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo dicit de quo est intentio: quia post praedicta habitum est, id est consequens considerare, utrum debeamus ponere eamdem virtutem boni civis et boni viri, vel non: quod est quaerere, utrum ab eodem dicatur aliquis bonus vir, et bonus civis: nam virtus est, quae bonum facit habentem. Ad hoc autem, quod ista quaestio debitam inquisitionem accipiat, oportet primo ostendere, quae sit virtus civis, quodam typo, id est sub quadam figura et similitudine. 365 After having shown what a citizen is and solved certain difficulties, the Philosopher here inquires into the virtue that characterizes the citizen. This section is divided into two parts. In the first, he shows that the virtue of the citizen is not the same absolutely as that of the good man. In the second, he raises certain difficulties in this connection. Concerning the first point, he does two things. First, he shows that the virtue of the dedicated citizen is not the same absolutely as that of the good man. Secondly, he shows that the virtue of a certain citizen is the same as that of the good man. Concerning the first point, he does two things. First, he states his intention; for, after what has been said, we must now consider whether or not we should assert that the virtue [of the good citizen] is the same as that of the good man. This is to ask whether the same thing prompts us to call someone a good man and a good citizen; for virtue is that which makes the person who possesses it good. Now, in order to investigate this question properly, we must first show what the virtue of the citizen is in some sort of outline and likeness.
Secundo, ibi, sicut igitur nauta etc., ostendit, quod non sit eadem virtus civis et boni viri, tribus rationibus. 366 Secondly, he shows that the virtue of the good citizen is not the same as that of the good man for three reasons.
In quarum prima praemittit similitudinem, ad ostendendum, quae sit virtus boni civis: et dicit, quod sicut nauta significat aliquid commune multis, ita et civis. Quod autem nauta sit communis multis, manifestat, quia cum multi dissimiles in potentia, idest arte et officio, dicantur nautae, quidam eorum est remigator, qui movet navem remis, quidam gubernator, qui dirigit motum navis gubernaculo, quidam autem est prorarius, idest custos prorae, quae est anterior pars navis, et alii habent alia nomina et alia officia. Manifestum est autem, quod unicuique horum convenit aliquid secundum propriam virtutem, et aliquid secundum communem. Ad propriam enim virtutem uniuscuiusque pertinet, quod habeat diligentem rationem et curam de proprio officio, sicut gubernator de gubernatione, et sic de aliis. Communis autem virtus est quaedam, quae convenit omnibus: omnium enim eorum opus ad hoc tendit, ut navigatio sit salva: ad hoc enim tendit desiderium et intentio cuiuslibet nautarum: et ad hoc ordinatur virtus communis nautarum, quae est virtus nautae inquantum est nauta. Ita etiam cum sint diversi cives habentes dissimilia officia, et status dissimiles in civitate, opus commune omnium est salus communitatis: quae quidem communitas consistit in ordine politiae. Unde patet, quod virtus civis inquantum est civis, consideretur in ordine ad politiam; ut scilicet ille sit bonus civis, qui bene operatur ad conservationem politiae. In the first of these, he begins by proposing a comparison to illustrate what the virtue of the good citizen is. He says that, just as the word "sailor" signifies something common to many persons, so, too, does the word "citizen." And he explains how the word "sailor" is common to many men. Many men who differ in power, that is to say, by their art and by their function, are called sailors: one of them is a rower, who propels the ship by means of oars; another is a pilot, who steers the ship by means of the rudder; another a look-out or guardian of the prow, which is the forepart of the ship; and others have other names and functions. Now it is obvious that each one of these men has something that belongs to him [129] by reason of his proper competence and something that belongs to him by reason of a common competence. It pertains to the competence of each one individually to understand and look after his own function diligently, steering, for example, in the case of the pilot, and the same for the others. The common competence, on the other hand, is one that belongs to all, for the work of all of them is directed toward one end, namely, safe navigation; for it is to this end that the aim and desire of any sailor is directed and that the common competence of sailors, which is the competence of the sailor as sailor, is ordered. In the same way also, since there are different citizens having dissimilar functions and dissimilar positions by means of which they exercise their proper operations in the city, the common work of all is the safety of the community; and this community consists in the order of the regime. Hence it is clear that the virtue of the citizen as citizen is considered in relation to the regime, so that the good citizen is the man who works well to preserve the regime.
Sunt autem plures species politiae, ut infra dicetur, et ex superioribus aliqualiter est manifestum: ad diversas autem politias ordinantur homines bene, secundum diversas virtutes. Alio enim modo conservatur democratia, et alio modo oligarchia, aut tyrannis. Unde manifestum est quod non est una virtus perfecta secundum quam civis possit simpliciter dici bonus; sed aliquis dicitur bonus vir secundum unam virtutem perfectam, scilicet secundum prudentiam, ex qua omnes virtutes morales dependent. Contingit igitur aliquem esse bonum civem, qui tamen non habet virtutem secundum quam aliquis est bonus vir; et hoc in politiis, quae sunt praeter optimam politiam. Now there are several species of regimes, as we shall see later and as is evident to some extent from what we have already said; and men are well ordered to different regimes by means of different virtues. For a popular state is preserved in one way and a rule of the few or a tyranny in another. Hence it is evident that there does not exist a perfect virtue according to which a citizen [that is, as citizen] could be called good absolutely; but a man is called virtuous by reason of a single perfect virtue, namely, prudence, upon which all the moral virtues depend. It happens, therefore, that someone is a good citizen although he does not possess the virtue by which one is a good man; and this is the case in regimes other than the best regime.
Secundam rationem ponit, ibi, quinimmo et secundum alium modum et cetera. Et dicit, quod per alium modum possumus inquirendo sive obiiciendo pervenire ad eamdem rationem, et circa optimam politiam, scilicet quod non sit eadem virtus boni civis et boni viri: quia impossibile est, quantumcumque sit bona politia, quod omnes cives sint virtuosi: sed tamen oportet, quod unusquisque faciat opus suum quod ad civitatem pertinet, bene: quod quidem fit secundum virtutem civis, inquantum est civis. Et ideo dico, opus quod secundum ipsum, quia non possunt esse omnes cives similes, ut idem opus ad omnes pertineat. Et ex hoc sequitur, quod non sit una virtus civis et boni viri. Quam quidem consequentiam sic manifestat. Quia in optima politia, oportet quod quilibet civis habeat virtutem boni civis. Per hunc enim modum civitas erit optima: sed virtutem boni viri, impossibile est quod omnes habeant, quia non omnes sunt virtuosi in una civitate, ut dictum est. 367 Then he states the second reason. He says that by inquiring and raising objections, we can in another way reach the same conclusion even concerning the best regime, namely, that the virtue of the good citizen and that of the good man are not the same. For it is impossible, however good the regime may be, that all the citizens be virtuous; nevertheless, each one must perform his work pertaining to the city well, and this is accomplished by means of the virtue of the citizen as citizen. I say, therefore, that all the citizens cannot be alike in the sense that they would all perform the same work. From this it follows that the virtue of the good man and that of the good citizen are not identical. This consequence he manifests as follows. In the best regime, every citizen must possess the virtue of the good citizen, for in this manner the city will be most perfect. But it is impossible that all possess the virtue of the good man, because all the men in a city arc not virtuous, as we have said.
Tertiam rationem ponit, ibi, adhuc quoniam et ex dissimilibus et cetera. Et dicit, quod omnis civitas constat ex dissimilibus partibus, sicut animal constat statim quidem ex dissimilibus, scilicet ex anima et corpore, et similiter anima humana constat dissimilibus, scilicet ex vi rationabili et appetitiva, et iterum domestica societas consistit ex dissimilibus, scilicet ex viro et muliere, et possessio etiam constat ex domino et servo. Civitas autem constat ex omnibus istis diversitatibus, et ex multis aliis. Dictum est autem in primo, quod non est eadem virtus principantis et subiecti, neque in anima, neque etiam in aliis: unde etiam relinquitur, quod non sit una et eadem virtus omnium civium: sicut videmus, quod in choreis non est eadem virtus summi, idest illius qui ducit choream, et astantis, idest illius qui assistit. Manifestum est autem, quod una et eadem est virtus boni viri: relinquitur ergo, quod non sit eadem virtus boni civis et boni viri. 368 Then he states the third reason. He says that every city is made up of heterogeneous elements, like an animal. An animal is indeed composed forthwith of heterogeneous elements, namely, soul and body; and likewise, the human soul is made up of heterogeneous parts, namely, a rational power and an appetitive power. The domestic society, in turn, is composed of heterogeneous parts, namely, man and woman, and [the art of] acquisition also requires a master and a slave. Now the city is made up of all these different parts and of many others. But we said in Book I that the virtue of the ruler is not the same as that of the subject, either in the soul or in other things. Hence it remains that the virtue of all the citizens is not one and the same, just as we see that in a chorus the virtue of the leader, that is, the one who directs the chorus, is not the same as that of the man who is next to him or his assistant. But it is obvious that the virtue of the good man is one and the same. It remains, therefore, that the virtue of the good citizen is not the same as that of the good man.
Deinde cum dicit sed forte erit alicuius eadem etc., ostendit, quod alicuius civis est eadem virtus, quae et boni viri. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit propositum. Secundo ex hoc concludit conclusionem probatam in praemissis, ibi, et disciplinam autem et cetera. Tertio movet quamdam dubitationem circa praemissa, et solvit, ibi, at vero laudatur et cetera. 369 Then he shows that the virtue of one particular citizen is the same as that of the good man; and in this connection he does three things. First, he shows what he proposes. Secondly, he draws the conclusion arrived at in what has already been said. Thirdly, he raises a certain difficulty concerning what has already been said and resolves it.
Dicit ergo primo, quod forte poterit dici, quod alicuius civis, ad hoc quod sit bonus, requiritur eadem virtus, quae est boni viri. Non enim dicitur aliquis esse bonus princeps, nisi sit bonus per virtutes morales et prudens. Dictum est enim in sexto Ethicorum quod politica est quaedam pars prudentiae: unde oportet politicum, idest rectorem politiae, esse prudentem, et per consequens bonum virum. He says then, first of all, that one will perhaps be able to say that the same virtue as that of the good man is required of a certain citizen in order that he may be good. For a man is not said to be a good ruler unless he is good as a result of his possessing the moral virtues and unless he is prudent. For it is said in Book VI of the Ethics that government is a certain part of prudence. Hence the statesman, that is to say, the head of the regime, must be prudent and, consequently, he must be a good man.
Deinde cum dicit et disciplinam autem etc., concludit ex hoc, quod non sit eadem virtus boni civis simpliciter, et boni viri. Et ad hoc probandum primo inducit, quod quidam dicunt aliam esse disciplinam principis, qua est instruendus ad virtutem, et disciplinam civis, ut apparet ex hoc quod filii regum erudiuntur in equestri et bellica disciplina. Unde, et Euripides dixit loquens ex persona principis: non ad me pertinet scire quae sunt varia, et alta, quae scilicet philosophi considerant, sed ea quorum opus est ad regimen civitatis. Et hoc dixit ad significandum, quod est quaedam propria disciplina principis. 370 Then from this he infers that the virtue of the good citizen is not the same absolutely as that of the good man. In order to prove this, he first adduces the statement made by some people to the effect that the training by which the ruler is to be educated to virtue is other than that of the citizen, as is clear from the fact that the sons of rulers are instructed in the science of horsemanship and warfare. Hence Euripides also, speaking in the person of a ruler, said, "It is not for me to know beautiful and profound things," namely, those things that are the concern of the philosopher, "but what is necessary to rule a city." This he said to indicate that there is a certain training proper to the ruler.
Et quo concludit, quod si eadem sit disciplina et virtus boni principis et boni viri, non autem omnis civis est princeps, sed etiam subditi sunt cives; sequitur, quod non sit simpliciter eadem virtus civis, et viri, nisi forte alicuius civis, illius scilicet, qui potest esse princeps. Et hoc ideo, quia non est eadem virtus principis et civis. Propter quod Iason dixit, quod esuriebat quando non tyrannizabat, ac si nesciret vivere sicut ydiota, id est sicut privata persona. From this he infers that, if the training and virtue of the good ruler are the same as that of the good man, and if not every citizen is a ruler--for there are also citizens who are subjects--it follows that the virtue of the citizen is not the same absolutely as that of the good man, unless perhaps it be that of a certain citizen, namely, the one who can be a ruler. This is so because the virtue of the ruler is not the same as that of the citizen. That is why Jason said that he used to grieve when he was not a tyrant, as if he did not know how to live as a private person. [130]
Deinde cum dicit at vero laudatur etc., movet dubitationem circa praemissa. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo obiicit contra praemissa. Secundo solvit, ibi, quoniam igitur aliquando videtur et cetera. 371 Then he raises a difficulty concerning what has been said. In this connection he does two things. First, he raises an objection against what has been said. Secondly, he resolves it.
Dicit ergo primo, quod quandoque laudatur civis ex hoc, quod potest bene principari et subiici. Si ergo virtus boni viri est, quae est virtus boni principis; virtus autem boni civis est, quae se habet ad utrumque, scilicet ad principandum et subiiciendum: sequitur, quod non sunt ambo similiter laudabilia, scilicet esse bonum civem et bonum virum; sed esse bonum civem sit multo melius. He says then, first of all, that sometimes a citizen is praised because of the fact that he is able to rule and obey well. If, therefore, the virtue of the good man is the same as that of the good ruler, and if the virtue of the good citizen is ordered to both of these things, namely, to rule and to obey, it follows that both things, namely, to be a good citizen and a good man, are not praiseworthy in the same way, but that it is much better to be a good citizen.
Deinde cum dicit quoniam igitur etc., solvit praedictam dubitationem. Et primo ponit, quomodo est eadem disciplina principis et subiecti, et quomodo non. Secundo ostendit, quomodo sit eadem virtus utriusque, ibi horum autem virtus et cetera. 372 Then he resolves the aforesaid difficulty. First, he shows how the training of the ruler is the same as that of the subject and how it is not. Secondly, he shows how both ruler and subject possess the same virtue.
Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit quod intendit: et dicit, quod quia, sicut praedictum est, aliquando utrumque horum videtur, scilicet quod non oporteat eadem discere principem et subditum; et iterum, quod bonus civis debet scire utrumque, scilicet principari et subiici: quomodo utrumque sit verum, oportet considerare ex sequentibus. Concerning the first point, he does three things. First, he states his intention. He says that, because, as we have already said, both of these statements seem at times to hold, namely, that the ruler must not receive the same training as the subject and, again, that the good citizen should know both how to rule and how to obey, we must consider how each one is true from what follows.
Secundo, ibi, est enim principatus et cetera. Ponit unum modum principatus, in quo verificatur unum eorum, quae dicta sunt: scilicet quod alia est disciplina principis et subditi. Et dicit, quod est quidam principatus despoticus, id est dominativus, in quo princeps est dominus subditorum; et talem principem non oportet quod sciat facere ea quae pertinent ad ministeria necessaria vitae, sed magis quod sciat uti eis: alterum autem, scilicet posse servire in his quae pertinent ad actiones ministrorum, non videtur esse principativum vel dominativum, sed magis servile. 373 Secondly, he sets down one type of rule in which one of the statements made, namely, that the training of the ruler is other than that of the subject, is verified. He says that there is a certain rule that is despotic, in which case the ruler is the master of the subjects. Such a ruler does not have to know how to do the things that pertain to the services necessary for life; rather, he should know how to make use of them. The other element, namely, to be able to serve in the things that pertain to the ministerial actions, appears to be of a servile rather than princely or despotic nature.
Sunt autem diversae species servorum secundum diversas operationes ministrantium: inter quos unam partem tenent illi qui manibus operantur, sicut calcifices, coquinarii, et similes. Isti autem vivunt de operibus manuum, sicut ex nomine ipsorum significatur: et inter tales computatur banausus artifex, idest qui opere suae artis maculat corpus, ut in primo dictum est. Et quia operationes horum artificum non sunt principativae, sed magis serviles, ideo antiquitus apud quosdam artifices non habebant aliquam partem in principatu civitatis; et hoc dico antequam fuisset demus, id est populus extremus, idest antequam infimi de populo acciperent potestatem in civitatibus. Now there are different kinds of slaves according to the different operations of servants. Among them, one role is played by those who work with their hands, as do craftsmen, cooks, and the like. These men live from the works of their hands, as their name indicates; and among such men must be reckoned the menial craftsmen, that is to say, those who by the work of their art dirty their bodies, as was said in Book I. Because the operations of these craftsmen are not those of a ruler but are rather of a servile nature, formerly, among certain peoples, craftsmen did not have any share in the government of the city. This, I say, was the case before the advent of an extreme form of popular rule, that is to say, before the lowliest among the people were invested with power in the cities.
Sic igitur patet, quod huiusmodi opera subditorum non oportet addiscere neque bonum politicum, idest gubernatorem civitatis, neque etiam bonum civem, nisi quandoque propter aliquam utilitatem ad seipsum; non quod in hoc serviat aliis, quia iam non esset distinctio inter dominum et servum, si huiusmodi servilia opera domini exercerent. So it is clear, then, that neither the good statesman, or ruler of the city, nor even the good citizen should learn to perform works of subjects such as these, except occasionally because of some advantage to himself, and not because in these matters he should serve others; for then, if the masters were to exercise these servile functions, the distinction between master and slave would be obliterated.
Tertio ibi, sed est quidam principatus et cetera. Ponit alium principatum in quo alia pars verificatur: scilicet quod eadem debet addiscere et princeps et subditus. Et dicit, quod est quidam principatus secundum quem aliquis principatur, non sicut dominus servis, sed sicut liberis, et sibi aequalibus. Et hic est civilis principatus, secundum quem in civitatibus nunc hi, nunc alii assumuntur ad principandum. Et huiusmodi principem oportet subiectum addiscere qualiter debet principari; sicut principari equestribus addiscit aliquis per hoc quod inter equites subiectus fuit, et esse dux exercitus addiscit aliquis per hoc quod fuit sub duce exercitus, et qui alicui particulari ordini praefuit, puta uni centuriae vel uni cohorti, et qui insidias disposuit ad mandatum ducis. Magnum enim principatum exercere addiscit homo, et per subiectionem et per exercitium in minoribus officiis. Et quantum ad hoc bene dicitur in proverbio, quod non potest bene principari, qui non fuit sub principe. 374 Thirdly, he sets down another type of rule, in which the second statement, namely, that ruler and subject should learn the same things, is verified. He says that there is a certain rule according to which one rules, not as a master over slaves, but over free men and equals. This is political rule, according to which now some people and now others are called upon to rule in the cities. A ruler such as this one must learn how to rule while he is still a subject, just as one learns how to command cavalrymen by having been a subject among cavalrymen, and how to be a general by having served under a general, and having been in charge of a particular unit, for example, a company or a cohort, and having laid ambushes at the general's orders. For a man learns to exercise a high office both by obedience and by training in lower offices. In this respect the proverb is right in stating that he who has not served under a ruler cannot rule well.
Deinde cum dicit horum autem virtus quidem etc., ostendit, quomodo sit eadem virtus, vel diversa principis et aliorum. Et dicit, quod etiam in hoc principatu est altera virtus principis et subiecti: sed tamen oportet, quod ille qui est simpliciter bonus civis, sciat et principari, et subiici, principatu scilicet non dominativo, qui est servorum, sed politico, qui est liberorum. Et haec est virtus civis, ut ad utrumque bene se habeat: et similiter boni viri sunt ambo, scilicet, et bene principari, et bene subiici. Et sic boni civis, inquantum est potens principari, est eadem virtus quae et boni viri; sed inquantum est subiectus, est alia virtus principis et boni viri, a virtute boni civis: puta altera species est temperantiae et iustitiae principis, et temperantiae et iustitiae subditorum. Subiectus enim qui est liber et bonus, non habet unam tantum virtutem, puta iustitiam; sed iustitia eius habet duas species; secundum unam quarum potest bene principari, et secundum aliam bene subiici: et ita etiam de aliis virtutibus. 375 Then he shows how the virtue of the ruler is the same as that of other men and how it differs from it. He says that even in this type of rule the virtue of the ruler is other than that of the subject; the fact remains, however, that the man who is a good citizen absolutely should know both how to rule and how to be subject to a rule, not indeed to a despotic rule, which is that of slaves, but to a political rule, which is that of free men. This is the virtue of the citizen, namely, that he be well disposed toward one and the other. Good men, absolutely speaking, know both how to rule well and how to obey well. Thus the virtue of the good citizen, in so far as he is able to rule, is the same as that of the good man; but in so far as he is a subject, the virtue of the ruler and of the good man is other than that of the good citizen. For example, the temperance and justice of the ruler and the temperance and justice of the subjects are of a different species. For the subject who is free and good does not possess only one virtue, for example, justice; rather, his justice belongs to two species, according to one of which he can rule well and according to the other of which he can obey well. Such is also the case with the other virtues.
Et manifestat hoc per exemplum: quia alia est temperantia et fortitudo viri et mulieris: quia vir reputabitur timidus, si non sit magis fortis quam fortis mulier; et mulier quam decet taciturnitas, reputabitur loquax, si sit ornata, id est facunda sicut bonus vir. Et hoc ideo, quia etiam in dispensatione domus, aliud pertinet ad virum, aliud ad mulierem. Ad virum enim pertinet acquirere divitias, ad mulierem autem conservare. 376 And he illustrates this by means of an example. The temperance and fortitude of a man and of a woman are different. A man is reputed timid if he is not more courageous than a courageous woman; and a woman, for whom silence is becoming, is reputed loquacious if she is as voluble as a good man. This is so because even in the management of the household, some things pertain to the man and other things to the woman; for it is the proper concern of the man to acquire riches and the proper concern of the woman to preserve them.
Et sic etiam se habet in civitate circa principem et subiectum. Nam proprie virtus principis est prudentia, quae est regitiva et gubernativa. Aliae vero virtutes morales, quarum ratio consistit in gubernari et subiici, sunt communes et subditorum et principum: sed tamen aliquid prudentiae participant subditi, ut scilicet habeant opinionem veram de agendis, per quam possint seipsos gubernare in propriis actibus secundum gubernationem principis. Et ponit exemplum de illo qui facit fistulas, qui se habet ad fistulatorem, qui utitur fistulis, sicut subiectus ad principem: operatur enim recte faciendo fistulas, si habeat opinionem regulatam secundum mandatum fistulatoris: et ita est in civitate de subiecto et principe. Loquitur autem hic de virtute subditi, non inquantum est bonus vir, quia sic indiget habere prudentiam, sed loquitur de eo inquantum est bonus subditus: ad hoc enim non requiritur nisi quod habeat opinionem veram de his quae ei mandantur. The same obtains in the city with regard to ruler and subject. For the virtue of the ruler is properly prudence, which directs and governs. The other moral virtues, whose nature it is to be governed and to obey, are [131] common to both subjects and rulers. Nevertheless, subjects share in prudence to the extent to which they have true opinion concerning things to be done, by which they can govern themselves in their own acts in accordance with the government of the ruler. And he cites the example of the flute-maker, who is related to the flute-player, who uses the flutes, in the same way as the subject to the ruler; for he works well in making flutes if his opinion is regulated in accordance with the orders of the flute-player. The case is the same in the city with reference to subject and ruler. Now he is speaking here of the virtue of the subject, not in so far as he is a good man, who as such must have prudence; rather, he is speaking of him in so far as he is a good subject, for this requires only that he have true opinion regarding the things that are demanded of him.
Ultimo autem epilogando concludit, manifestum esse ex praemissis, an sit eadem vel altera virtus boni viri et boni civis; et iterum, quomodo sit eadem et quomodo altera, quia est eadem inquantum potest bene principari, alia autem inquantum potest bene subiici. 377 Finally, in an epilogue, he concludes from what has been said that it is obvious whether or not the virtue of the good man is the same as that of the good citizen, and, further, how it is the same and how it differs: it is the same in so far as he is able to rule well, and different in so far as he is able to obey well.
Lectio 4 LESSON IV
Circa civem autem adhuc restat et cetera. Postquam philosophus ostendit, quae sit virtus civis, et utrum sit eadem cum virtute boni viri, hic movet quamdam dubitationem circa praedeterminata. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo movet dubitationem. Secundo solvit eam, ibi, aut propter hanc quidem rationem et cetera. Tertio solutionem manifestat, ibi, manifestum autem hinc parum et cetera. 378 After having shown what the virtue of the dedicated citizen is and whether it is the same as that of the good man, the Philosopher raises a certain difficulty concerning the things that have already been treated. In this connection, he does three things. First, he raises the difficulty. Secondly, he resolves it. Thirdly, he clarifies the solution.
Dicit ergo primo, quod circa civem adhuc remanet quaedam dubitatio: utrum scilicet ille solus sit civis, qui potest communicare in principatu civitatis; an etiam banausi, id est viles artifices sint ponendi cives, quos non contingit communicare in principatu. Et obiicit ad utramque partem: quia si banausi dicantur cives, ad quos nihil pertinet de civitatibus, sequetur, quod virtus quam diximus esse boni civis, ut scilicet possit bene principari et subiici, non pertineat ad omnem civem, quia iste civis ponitur, qui tamen non potest principari: si autem dicatur, quod nullus talium sit civis: remanebit dubium, in quo genere sint ponendi banausi. Non enim potest dici quod sint advenae, quasi aliunde venientes ad habitandum in civitate; neque quod sint peregrini, sicut viatores, qui propter aliquod negotium ad civitatem veniunt, non causa manendi. Huiusmodi enim artifices, et mansionem in civitate habent, et in civitate sunt nati, non advenientes aliunde. He says then, first of all, that there still remains a certain difficulty concerning the citizen, namely, whether only he who can share in the government of the city is a citizen or whether menial craftsmen, who have no share in the government, should also be ranked among the citizens. And he objects to both parts. For if laborers, who have nothing to do with the city, are called citizens, it will follow that the virtue that we said is that of the good citizen, namely, that he be able to rule and to obey well, does not apply to every citizen, because this man is ranked among the citizens despite the fact that he is not able to rule. If we say that no one of this sort is a citizen, there still remains a question, namely, in what category should laborers be placed. We cannot call them aliens, as if they came from elsewhere to reside in the city; nor can we call them strangers, like travelers who come to the city on business and not to stay; for these craftsmen make their home in the city, and were born there, and do not come from elsewhere.
Deinde cum dicit aut propter hanc quidem etc.; solvit praedictam dubitationem, et dicit, quod propter hanc ultimam rationem (quae) dubitat in qua parte ponendi sunt artifices, si non cives sunt, non sequitur aliquod inconveniens. Multi enim sunt, qui non sunt cives, et tamen neque sunt advenae neque peregrini; sicut patet de servis et libertinis, qui sunt ex servitute libertati restituti. Verum est enim quod non omnes sunt cives, qui sunt necessarii ad complementum civitatis, sine quibus civitas esse non potest; quia non solum de servis, sed etiam de pueris videmus, quod non sunt ita perfecte cives sicut et viri. Viri enim sunt simpliciter cives, quasi potentes operari ea quae sunt civium: sed pueri sunt cives ex suppositione, idest cum aliqua determinatione diminuente. Sunt enim cives imperfecti: et sicut servi et pueri sunt quidem aliqualiter cives, sed non perfecte, ita etiam est et de artificibus. Unde in antiquis temporibus banausi, id est viles artifices opere suae artis maculantes corpus, et etiam peregrini apud quasdam civitates erant servi, sicut etiam et modo multi sunt tales. 380 [379 not in Leonine] Then he clarifies this solution, for even in the best disposed city workers could not be citizens. And if we say that a worker is a citizen in some way, then we have to say that the virtue of the citizen, which we have defined as consisting in the ability to rule and to obey well, is not that of the citizen, notwithstanding the fact that the word "citizen" is used in any way whatever. Rather, in order that this virtue may apply to them, it is necessary not only that they be free but also that they be discharged, that is to say, released from the tasks necessary for life. For if those who are assigned to such necessary tasks serve one man only, they are doing what is properly the work of slaves; for slaves used to perform such services for their masters. If, on the other hand, they perform these services for anyone indiscriminately, they are doing the work of laborers and mean persons who serve anyone for money.
Sed modo etiam in civitate optime disposita non possunt esse banausi cives. Et si dicatur, quod banausus est civis aliquo modo; tunc dicendum est, quod virtus civis, quam determinavimus, ut scilicet possit bene principari et subiici, non est cuiuslibet civis quomodocumque dicti: sed oportet, ad hoc quod ad eos pertineat huiusmodi virtus, quod non solum sint liberi, sed etiam sint dimissi, idest absoluti ab operibus necessariis vitae. Illi enim qui sunt deputati talibus necessariis operibus, siquidem in his ministrent uni tantum, hoc est proprie servorum: consueverunt enim servi huiusmodi ministeria exhibere dominis suis. Si autem haec ministeria exhibeant communiter quibuscumque, hoc pertinet ad banausos et mercenarios, nam calcifices et pistores serviunt quibuscumque pro pecunia. 381a But even though strangers, aliens, and lowly persons cannot be citizens in the sense that they are able to rule in cities that are well established, nevertheless, in many regimes, namely, in many popular regimes, the law stipulating that strangers and aliens are not citizens is relaxed; for in certain cities he who is born of a citizen mother is considered a citizen, even if his father is an alien or a stranger. There is likewise also in many places a law to the effect that illegitimate children are citizens; but they do this on account of the scarcity of good citizens and the smallness of the population. Suffering from a deficiency of numbers, in which the power of the popular state consists, they make use of such laws so as first to choose as citizens those who were born of a male or female slave, provided one of the parents is a freeman. Then, as the population increases, they exclude all the sons of slaves but regard as citizens those whose mothers are citizens but whose fathers are aliens. Finally, they come to a point where they consider as citizens those who were born of parents both of whom are freemen and citizens. So it is evident then that there are different species of citizens according to the difference of regimes.
Deinde cum dicit manifestum autem etc., manifestat propositam solutionem. Et circa hoc facit tria. Primo ostendit, quomodo aliquis diversimode in diversis politiis est civis. Secundo ostendit, quod maxime civis est in qualibet politia, qui potest participare principatu, ibi, quod dicitur maxime civis et cetera. Tertio epilogando colligit ea quae dicta sunt de virtute civis. 381 Then he clarifies the proposed solution. And concerning this, he does three things. First, he shows how one is a citizen differently under different regimes. Secondly, he shows that he who can share in the government is most of all a citizen under any regime. Thirdly, he gathers together in an epilogue all that has been said about the virtue of the citizen.
Dicit ergo primo, quod manifestum erit, quomodo se habeat veritas circa praemissa, ex parva consideratione eorum quae sequuntur. Si enim aliquis perfecte videat id quod dicetur, fiet ei evidens quod dictum est: cum enim sint plures politiae specie differentes, et civis dicatur in ordine ad politiam, ut dictum est; necesse est etiam, quod civis habeat plures species. Et maxime ista differentia attenditur quantum ad cives subditos, qui in diversis politiis diversimode se habent ad principatum. Illi autem qui praesident in qualibet politia principantur. Unde propter diversitatem politiarum, et per consequens civium, necesse est, quod in aliqua politia, scilicet in democratia, in qua quaeritur solum libertas, banausi et mercenarii sint cives: poterunt enim ad principatum promoveri, cum sint liberi. Sed in aliquibus politiis est hoc impossibile, sicut maxime contingit in aristocratia, in qua dantur honores dignis secundum eorum virtutem, illi autem qui vivunt vita banausa vel mercenaria non possunt civitati exhibere in suo regimine ea quae pertinent ad virtutem, quia non sunt in talibus exercitati. Sed in oligarchiis mercenarii quidem non possunt esse cives, quia in huiusmodi politiis assumuntur aliqui ad principatus propter diuturnos honores praecedentes. Unde non de facili potest contingere, quod mercenarii ad honores assumantur, qui vix per totam vitam suam possunt congregare, unde divites fiant. Sed banausi, id est artifices in talibus politiis possunt esse cives et principes, quia multi artifices cito ditantur, et ita possunt propter divitias in oligarchiis assumi ad principatus, cum per aliquod tempus ab artificiis se abstinentes, postquam fuerint ditati, honorabilem duxerunt vitam: unde apud Thebas erat statutum, quod ille qui non abstinuisset a foro venalium rerum decem annis, non posset participare virtute, scilicet principativa. He says then, first of all, that the truth concerning the things that have been said will become evident from a brief consideration of what follows. For if one understands perfectly what will be said, what has already been said will become obvious to him. Since there are many regimes differing in species, and since one speaks of a citizen in relation to a regime, as we have said, there must also necessarily be several species of citizens. This difference is best seen with reference to the subjects among the citizens, who are diversely related to the rulers under different regimes. Now those who are set over the others are the rulers under any regime. Hence, because of the diversity of regimes and consequently of citizens, it is necessary that under a certain regime, namely, the popular state, in which only freedom is sought, laborers be citizens; for, since they are free, they will have the possibility of being promoted to the government. Under other regimes, however, this is impossible, as is especially the case in the rule of the best, where honors are granted to those who are worthy of them by reason of their virtue. Those who live the life of laborers cannot, as rulers, provide the city with the things that pertain to virtue since they are not practiced in such things. But not even in the rule of the few are laborers capable of being citizens because in regimes of this sort some men are called upon to rule by reason of previous long-standing honors and riches. Hence it cannot easily happen that laborers are elevated to positions of honor, since throughout their whole lives they can scarcely gather enough [134] to become rich. But craftsmen under such regimes can be citizens and rulers because many craftsmen become rich quickly and so, by reason of their riches, can be called upon to govern in a rule of the few, when, abstaining from the practice of their art for a certain period of time after they have become rich, they have led honorable lives. Hence among the Thebans there was a statute enabling a man who had abstained from the affairs of the market place for ten years to participate in virtue, namely, ruling virtue.
Sed quamvis peregrini et advenae, et abiectae personae non possint esse cives, quasi potentes principari in civitatibus bene institutis, tamen in multis politiis, scilicet democraticis, restringitur lex de peregrinis et advenis ut non sint cives; quia in quibusdam democratiis, ille qui est natus ex matre cive, reputatur civis, licet pater sit advena vel peregrinus. Et ita etiam restringitur lex de spuriis apud multos, ut scilicet sint cives: sed hoc faciunt propter indigentiam bonorum civium, et propter paucitatem hominum. Habentes defectum turbae, in qua consistit potestas democratiae, utuntur talibus legibus, ut primo eligant eos in cives, qui sunt nati ex servo vel ex serva, dummodo alter parentum sit liber; deinde crescente multitudine, excludunt omnes filios servorum, sed reputant cives eos, qui sunt nati ex mulieribus civibus, quamvis patres sint advenae; tandem autem diriguntur ad hoc, quod iudicant cives solum illos, qui sunt nati ex ambobus liberis et civibus. Sic igitur manifestum est, quod sunt diversae species civium, secundum diversitatem politiarum. [not in Spiazzi: Although strangers, settlers and abject persons cannot be citizens, with the right to rule in well constituted cities, nevertheless in many polities, that is, in democracies, the law preventing them from being citizens is restricted. In some democracies, whoever is born of a citizen mother is considered a citizen, even though the father is a settler or stranger. but they do this because of the lack of good citizens the fewness of men. With the shortcomings of a mob, in which democratic power consists, they use such laws to make citizens out of those born from a slave father or mother, provided the other parent is free. Later, when the population increases, the exclude all children of slaves, and consider citizens only those born of citizen mothers, while the fathers are settlers. Finally they are led to judging citizens only those whose both parents are free and citizens. Thus it is plain that there are different categories of citizens, according to different polities.]
Deinde cum dicit et quod dicitur maxime etc., ostendit, quid sit maxime civis. Et dicit quod maxime ille dicitur civis in qualibet politia, qui participat honoribus civitatis. Unde Homerus dixit poetice de quodam quod post alios exsurrexit, puta ad loquendum, sicut quidam inhonoratus idest sicut quidam advena, qui non erat civis. Sed ubi ista ratio civis occultatur propter deceptionem, cohabitantium (est) esse civem, ut scilicet omnes inhabitantes civitatem cives dicantur; sed hoc non est conveniens quia ille qui non participat honoribus civitatis, est sicut advena in civitate. 382 Then he shows who is most of all a citizen. He says that in any regime he who shares in the honors of the city is most of all said to be a citizen. Hence Homer says poetically of someone that he arose, that is, to speak, after the others as one unhonored, that is, as an alien who was not a citizen. But this notion of citizen is hidden; men are indeed misled due to the fact that they live together and therefore think that all those who reside together in the city are citizens. This is not proper, however, because he who does not share in the honors of the city is like an alien in the city.
Deinde cum dicit utrum quidem igitur etc., colligit epilogando quae dixerat: et dicit quod circa hanc quaestionem qua quaerebatur, utrum sit eadem virtus boni viri et studiosi civis, ostensum est quod in aliqua civitate, scilicet aristocratica, idem est bonus vir et bonus civis, quia scilicet principatus dantur secundum virtutem quae est boni viri. In aliquibus autem alius est bonus vir et alius bonus civis, scilicet in corruptis politiis in quibus principatus dantur non secundum virtutem. Et ille cives qui est idem cum bono viro, non est quicumque civis, sed ille qui est civilis, id est rector civitatis et dominus vel potens esse dominus eorum quae pertinent ad curam communitatis, vel solus vel etiam cum aliis. Dictum enim est supra quod eadem est virtus principis et boni viri. Unde si civis accipiatur, qui est princeps vel qui potest esse, eadem est virtus eius et boni viri. Si autem accipiatur civis imperfectus qui non potest esse princeps, non erit eadem virtus boni civis et boni viri, ut ex praedictis patet. 383 Then in an epilogue he gathers together what has been said. He says that, concerning the question whether the virtue of the good man is the same as that of the dedicated citizen, we have shown that in a certain city, namely, that of the best, in which the ruling offices are granted according to the virtue which is that of the good man, the good man and the good citizen are identical, while in other cities, namely, in corrupt regimes, in which ruling offices are not distributed according to virtue, the good citizen is not the same as the good man. Furthermore, the one who is identical to the good man is not any citizen whatever but the ruler of the city and the master of those things that pertain to the care of the community, or the man who is capable of becoming such, either alone or with others. For we have said above that the virtue of the ruler is the same as that of the good man. Hence, if by citizen we mean he who is or is capable of being a ruler, his virtue is the same as that of the good man. But if by citizen we mean an imperfect citizen, who cannot become a ruler, then the virtue of the good citizen will not be the same as that of the good man, as is clear from what we have said.
Lectio 5 LESSON V
Quoniam autem haec determinata sunt et cetera. Postquam philosophus determinavit de cive, ex cuius notitia cognosci potest quid sit civitas, hic consequenter intendit distinguere politiam in suas species. Et dividitur in partes tres. In prima distinguit politias. In secunda ostendit quid sit iustum in unaquaque politia, ibi, sumendum autem et cetera. Tertio ostendit quae politiarum sit potior, ibi, habet autem dubitationem et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo dicit de quo est intentio. Secundo ostendit quid sit politia, ibi, est autem politia et cetera. Tertio dividit politias, ibi, supponendum itaque primo et cetera. 384 After having treated of the citizen, from the knowledge of whom we can discover what the city is, the Philosopher seeks next to divide the regime into its species. This section is divided into three parts. In the first, he distinguishes the regimes. In the second, he shows what is just in each regime. In the third, he shows which regime is preferable. Concerning the first point, he does three things. First, he states his intention. Secondly, he shows what a regime is. Thirdly, he divides the regimes.
Dicit ergo primo, quod determinatis praedictis restat considerare, utrum sit una politia tantum vel plures; et si sunt plures, quot et quae sint, et quomodo adinvicem differant. He says then, first of all, that, now that these things have been determined, it remains to consider whether there is only one regime or whether there are several and, if several, how many there are, and what they are, and how they differ from one another.
Deinde cum dicit est autem politia etc., ostendit quid sit politia. Et dicit quod politia nihil est aliud quam ordinatio civitatis quantum ad omnes principatus qui sunt in civitate, sed praecipue quantum ad maximum principatum, qui dominatur omnibus aliis principatibus. Et hoc ideo, quia politeuma civitatis id est positio ordinis in civitate, tota consistit in eo qui dominatur civitati; et talis impositio ordinis est ipsa politia. Unde praecipue politia consistit in ordine summi principatus secundum cuius diversitatem politiae diversificantur: sicut in democratiis dominatur populus, in oligarchiis quidem pauci divites: et ex hoc est diversitas harum politiarum. Et eodem modo dicendum est de aliis politiis. 385 Then he shows what a commonwealth is. He says that a commonwealth is nothing other than the disposition of a city with respect to all the rules that are found in it but principally with respect to the highest rule, which governs all the others. This is so because the imposition of order in a city resides entirely with the person who rules over the city; and such an imposition of order is the commonwealth itself. Hence the commonwealth consists principally in the order of the highest rule, according to the diversity of which commonwealths are diversified. Thus in a popular state the people rule and in a state of the few a few rich men. From this stems the diversity of these regimes. We must speak in the same way about the other regimes.
Deinde cum dicit supponendum itaque primo etc., distinguit politias. Et primo ostendit quomodo distinguantur rectae politiae ab iniustis. Secundo quomodo distinguantur utraeque politiae in seipsis, ibi, determinatis autem his et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo ostendit ad quid sit civitas ordinata. Secundo ostendit quomodo distinguantur principatus adinvicem, ibi at vero et principatus etc.; tertio concludit differentiam rectarum politiarum et iniquarum, ibi, manifestum igitur et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo dicit de quo est intentio. Secundo incipit exequi propositum, ibi, dictum est autem et cetera. 386 Then he distinguishes the regimes. First, he states how just regimes are distinguished from unjust regimes, and secondly, how true regimes are distinguished among themselves. Concerning the first point, he does three things. First, he shows to what the city is ordered. Secondly, he shows how the rules are distinguished from one another. Thirdly, he infers the difference between just and unjust regimes. Concerning the first point, he does two things. First, he states his intention. Secondly, he begins to carry out his proposal.
Dicit ergo primo, quod cum oporteat distinguere politias abinvicem, oportet primo duo praemittere; quorum primum est propter quid civitas sit instituta. Secundum est, quod sint differentiae principatuum, qui sunt circa homines et circa omnia quae veniunt in communionem vitae. Ex his enim duobus poterit accipi differentia iustae et iniustae politiae. He says then, first of all, that, since we must distinguish the regimes from one another, we should begin by premising two things, the first being the reason for which the city was founded, and the second, the fact that there are differences of rules dealing with all the things that pertain to the community of life. For from these two things we shall be able to see the difference between just and unjust regimes.
Deinde cum dicit dictum est autem in primis etc., ostendit quid sit finis civitatis vel politiae. Et dicit quod dictum est in primo libro, in quo determinatum est de oeconomia et despotia, quod homo naturaliter est animal civile; et ideo homines appetunt adinvicem convivere et non esse solitarii, etiam si in nullo unus alio indigeret ad hoc quod ducerent vitam politicam: sed tamen magna utilitas est communis in communione vitae socialis. Et hoc quantum ad duo. Primo quidem quantum ad bene vivere: ad quod unusquisque affert suam partem, sicut videmus in qualibet communitate, quod unus servit communitati de uno officio, alius de alio, et sic omnes communiter bene vivunt. Hoc igitur, scilicet bene vivere, maxime est finis civitatis vel politiae et communiter quantum ad omnes et sigillatim quantum ad unumquemque. Secundo utilis est vita communis etiam propter ipsum vivere, dum unus in communitate vitae existentium alii subvenit ad sustentationem vitae et contra pericula mortis. Et propter hoc homines ad invicem conveniunt et conservant politicam communionem, quia etiam ipsum vivere secundum se consideratum absque aliis quae faciunt ad bene vivendum est quiddam bonum et diligibile, nisi forte homo in vita sua patiatur aliqua valde gravia et crudelia. Et hoc patet ex hoc quod homines etiam si multa mala sustineant, tamen perseverant in affectu vivendi quodam modo inviscati id est fortiter coniuncti ad desiderium vitae, ac si ipsa vita habeat in se quoddam solatium et dulcedinem naturalem. 387 Then he shows what the end of the city or of the regime is. He says that it was stated in Book I, in [137] which the question of domestic and despotic rule was treated, that man is by nature a political animal and, therefore, that men desire to live with one another and not be alone. Even if one man did not have need of another for anything in order to lead a political life, there is nevertheless a great common benefit in the sharing of social life, and this with reference to two things. First, it is indeed so with reference to living well, to which each man contributes his share. For example, in any society we see that one person serves the society by performing one function, another by performing another function, and in this manner all live well together. This, then, namely, to live well, is above all else the end of the city or of the regime, both collectively with reference to all and severally with reference to each individual. Secondly, the common life is beneficial even for mere existence, since among those who share a common life one comes to the aid of another to sustain his life and preserve him against the dangers that threaten it. For this reason men come together and maintain a political association, for even mere living considered in itself without the things that are conducive to living well is a good and desirable thing, unless perhaps a man suffers some exceedingly grave and cruel evils in his life. This is clear from the fact that, even if they bear many evils, men nevertheless persevere in their will to live and are attracted to the desire of life by a certain natural sweetness, as if life possessed in itself a certain solace and natural sweetness.
Deinde cum dicit at vero et principatus etc., distinguit species principatus. Et primo in oeconomicis. Secundo in politicis, ibi, propter quod et politicos et cetera. Dicit ergo, quod facile est distinguere modos principatus qui dicuntur, quia saepe etiam facta est mentio in extraneis sermonibus praeter principalem intentionem de ipsis, sicut in octavo Ethicorum, et supra etiam in secundo. 388 Then he distinguishes the species of rule, first in domestic matters, and secondly in political matters. He says that it is easy to distinguish the modes of rule that are said to exist, because he himself has made mention of them in other treatises that were not primarily concerned with them, as in Book VIII of the Ethics and above in Book II.
Est autem in domesticis duplex principatus. Unus quidem est domini ad servos, qui vocatur despotia: et quamvis idem sit secundum rei veritatem utile ei qui est naturaliter servus, et ei qui est naturaliter dominus, ut scilicet iste ab illo regatur, tamen dominus principatur servo ad utilitatem domini, non autem ad utilitatem servi, nisi forte per accidens, inquantum scilicet corrupto servo cessat dominium. Alius autem est principatus ad liberos, sicut ad filios et uxorem et totam familiam, qui vocatur principatus oeconomicus. In quo quidem principatu intenditur utilitas subditorum, vel etiam communis utrorumque. Per se quidem et principaliter, utilitas subditorum, sicut videmus in aliis artibus, sicut ars medicinae intendit principaliter utilitatem eorum qui medicantur, et ars exercitativa intendit principaliter utilitatem eorum qui exercitantur: sed per accidens contingit, quod etiam utilitas redundat in ipsos qui habent artem. Ille enim qui exercitat pueros etiam ipse simul exercitatur; aliquando etiam est de numero eorum qui exercitantur, sicut gubernator unus est nautarum. Sic igitur exercitator puerorum et gubernator navis considerat per se subiectorum utilitatem: sed quia ipse est unus de numero eorum, ideo uterque per accidens participat utilitate communi quam procurat. Et similiter pater participat utilitate domus quam procurat. In domestic affairs there is a twofold rule. One is the same as that of master over slave and is called domination. Although, according to the truth of the matter, the same thing benefits the man who is by nature a slave and the man who is by nature a master, namely, that the former be ruled by the latter, the fact remains that the master rules the slave for the benefit of the master and not for the benefit of the slave, except perhaps incidentally, in so far as when the slave dies the dominion ceases to exist. The other rule is that over free men, like that over sons, wife, and the entire family, and it is called domestic rule. What is sought in this rule is the benefit of the subjects or even the benefit common to both, but essentially and primarily the benefit of the subjects, as we see in the other arts, such as the art of medicine, which seeks principally the benefit of those who are healed, and the art of gymnastics, which seeks principally the benefit of those who exercise. Incidentally, however, it happens that the benefit redounds to those who possess the art. For he who exercises boys is also at the same time exercising himself; he, too, is sometimes among the number of those who exercise, just as the pilot is one of the crew who sail a ship. Accordingly, the exerciser of boys and the pilot of a ship consider per se the benefit of the subjects. But because they themselves are among the number of those who exercise or sail, they both share incidentally in the common benefit that they procure. In like manner, the father shares in the benefit of the household that he procures.
Deinde cum dicit propter quod et politicos etc., distinguit secundum praemissa principatus politicos. Et dicit quod quia principatus qui est supra liberos ordinatur principaliter ad utilitatem subditorum; ideo dignum reputatur quod particulariter principentur cives secundum principatus politicos, quando fuerint instituti secundum aequalitatem et similitudinem civium. Tunc enim dignum videtur quod in una parte temporis quidam principentur, in alia vero alii. Secus autem esset, si quidam civium multum excederent alios in bonitate: tunc enim dignum esset, ut illi semper principarentur; sicut infra dicetur. 389 Then, in accordance with what was said, he distinguishes the political rules. He says that, since the rule over free men is primarily for the benefit of the subjects, it is therefore considered fitting that citizens particularly be governed according to political rules when they have been established in conformity with the equality and similarity of the citizens. For then it seems fitting that some persons should rule for one period of time and others for another period. It would be otherwise, however, if some of the citizens greatly surpassed others in goodness. For then it would be fitting for them to rule all of the time, as will be said below.
Sed circa istud dignum variatur aestimatio hominum secundum temporum diversitatem. A principio enim ipsi qui principabantur quasi aliis servientes reputabant dignum, sicut et erat, ut ipsi in parte ministrarent aliis intendentes utilitati aliorum, et iterum alio tempore aliquis alius principaretur qui intenderet ad bonum eius, sicut ipse prius intenderat ad bonum aliorum: sed postea homines, propter utilitates quae veniunt ex bonis communibus quae sibi principantes usurpant et quae veniunt etiam ex ipso iure principatus, volunt semper principari, ac si principari esset sanum esse, et non principari, esset infirmum esse. Sic enim videntur homines appetere principatum, sicut infirmi appetunt sanitatem. Concerning this question of fittingness, however, the judgment of men differs according to different times. For in the beginning, those who ruled by serving others thought it fitting, as indeed it was, that they themselves should serve others for a time by seeking their benefit and that in turn someone else should rule for a time and seek their benefit, just as they themselves had previously sought the good of others. Afterwards, however, because of the benefits accruing from the common goods that rulers usurp for themselves and also from the very right of sovereignty, men wish to rule always, as if to rule were to be healthy and not to rule to be sick. Thus men seem to desire rulership as the sick desire health.
Deinde cum dicit manifestum igitur etc., concludit ex dictis distinctionem rectarum politiarum ab iniustis. Cum enim ita sit quod principatus liberorum sit ordinatus ad utilitatem subditorum, manifestum est quod in quibuscumque politiis principes intendunt communem utilitatem, illae sunt rectae politiae secundum iustitiam absolutam: in quibuscumque vero politiis intenditur sola utilitas principantium, illae sunt vitiatae et corruptiones quaedam rectarum politiarum: non enim in eis est iustum simpliciter, sed iustum secundum quid, ut infra dicetur. Principantur enim despotice civitati utentes civibus sicut servis, scilicet ad suam utilitatem: et hoc est contra iustitiam, quia civitas est communitas liberorum; servus enim non est civis, ut supra dictum est. 390 Then from what has been said he infers the distinction between just and unjust regimes. For, since it is true that the rule of free men should be for the benefit of the subjects, it is evident that any regime in which the ruler seeks the common benefit is a just regime according to absolute justice, while any regime in which the sole benefit of the ruler is sought is an unjust regime and a corruption of some sort of the just regime. For in such cases that which is simply just does not exist but only that which is just in a relative sense, as will be said later. For they rule by dominating the city and make use of the citizens as slaves, that is to say, for their own benefit. This is contrary to justice, because a city is an association of free men and a slave is not a citizen, as was said earlier.
Lectio 6 LESSON VI
Determinatis autem hiis et cetera. Postquam philosophus distinxit politias rectas ab iniustis, hic intendit distinguere utrasque abinvicem. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo dicit de quo est intentio. Secundo exequitur propositum, ibi, quoniam autem politia et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod postquam praedicta determinata sunt, consequens est determinare de politiis quot sint numero et quae sint; et hoc ordine, ut primo consideremus de politiis rectis, secundo de iniustis. 391 After having distinguished just regimes from unjust ones, the Philosopher here seeks to distinguish both groups among themselves. In this connection he does two things. First, he states his aim. Secondly, he carries out his proposal. He says then, first of all, that, now that these things have been determined, we must next treat of the number and nature of the regimes in the following order: first, we shall consider the just regimes and, secondly, the unjust regimes.
Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem politia etc., distinguit politias. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit secundum quid accipienda sit politiarum distinctio. Secundo distinguit politias, ibi, vocare autem consuevimus et cetera. Tertio obiicit contra praedicta, ibi, oportet autem paulo et cetera. 392 Then he distinguishes the regimes, and in this connection he does three things. First, he shows on what basis the distinction of the regimes is to be made. Secondly, he distinguishes the regimes. Thirdly, he raises an objection against what has been said.
Dicit ergo primo, quod (quia) politia nihil est aliud quam politeuma, quod significat ordinem dominantium in civitate. Necesse est quod distinguantur politiae secundum diversitatem dominantium. Aut enim in civitate dominatur unus, aut pauci, aut multi. Et quodlibet horum trium fuerit, potest dupliciter contingere. Uno modo quando principantur ad utilitatem communem, et tunc erunt rectae politiae. Alio modo quando principantur ad propriam utilitatem eorum qui dominantur, sive sit unus, sive pauci, sive plures; et tunc sunt transgressiones politiarum; quia oportet dicere quod vel subditi non sint cives, vel quod in aliquo communicent utilitate civitatis. He says then, first of all, that a regime is nothing other than the order of the rulers in the city; and indeed regimes must be distinguished according to the difference of rulers. In a city, either one, or a few, or the many rule; and any one of these three cases can come about in two ways: one, when they rule for the common benefit, and in this case we shall have just regimes; the other, when they rule for the private benefit of those who are in power, whether that be one man, or a few, or many, and in this case we have perversions of regimes; for we have to say either that the subjects are not citizens or that in some things they share in the benefit of the city.
Deinde cum dicit vocare autem consuevimus etc., distinguit utrasque politias per propria nomina. Et primo rectas. Secundo vitiosas, ibi, transgressiones autem et cetera. 393 Then he distinguishes both groups of regimes by their proper names. First, he distinguishes the just regimes and, secondly, the corrupt regimes.
Dicit ergo primo, quod si sit monarchia, id est principatus unius, vocatur regnum consueto nomine si intendat utilitatem communem. Illa vero politia in qua pauci principantur propter bonum commune, plures tamen uno, vocatur aristocratia, id est potestas optimorum vel optima, vel quia optimi principantur, scilicet virtuosi; vel quia ordinatur talis politia ad id quod est optimum civitati et omnium civium. Sed quando multitudo principatur intendens ad utilitatem communem, vocatur politia, quod est nomen commune omnibus politiis. Et hoc quod ista politia vocetur tali nomine, rationabiliter accidit: de facili enim contingit quod in civitate inveniatur unus vel pauci qui multum excedant alios in virtute: sed valde difficile quod multi inveniantur qui perveniant ad perfectum virtutis; sed maxime hoc contingit circa bellicam virtutem, ut scilicet multi in ea sint perfecti. Et ideo in hac politia principantur viri bellatores et illi qui habent arma. He says then, first of all, that if there is a rule of one man, it is usually called kingly rule if it seeks the common benefit. The regime in which only a few, but more than one, rule for the sake of the common good is called the state of the best, either because the best, that is to say, the virtuous, rule or because such a regime is ordered to the greatest good of the city and all the citizens. And when the multitude rules and seeks the common benefit, the regime is called a commonwealth (respublica), which is a name common to all the regimes. And it is not without reason that this regime should chance to be called by this name; for it easily happens that in a city one or a few men are found who greatly surpass the others in virtue, but it is extremely difficult to find many who arrive at the perfection of virtue. This rather happens above all with reference to military virtue, namely, that many should excel in it. Hence in this regime, military men and men who possess arms are the ones who rule.
Deinde cum dicit transgressiones autem etc., distinguit corruptiones dictarum politiarum per nomina. Et dicit quod dictarum politiarum sunt istae transgressiones: tyrannis quidem regni; oligarchia autem, id est principatus paucorum, aristocratiae transgressio est; democratia autem, id est potestas populi, id est vulgalis multitudinis, est transgressio politiae in qua multi principantur saltem propter virtutem bellicam. Ex quo concludit quod tyrannis est monarchia, id est principatus unius intendens utilitatem principantis. Oligarchia vero est tendens ad utilitatem divitum. Democratia vero ad utilitatem pauperum: nulla vero earum intendit ad utilitatem communem. 394 Then he distinguishes the corruptions of these regimes by name. He says that the perversions of the aforesaid regimes are the following: tyranny is a perversion of kingship, the rule of the few a perversion of the rule of the best, and the popular state a perversion of the commonwealth. From this he concludes that tyranny is the rule of one man seeking his own benefit; the rule of the few, that which seeks the benefit of the rich; and a popular state, that which seeks the benefit of the poor. None of these seeks the common benefit.
Deinde cum dicit oportet autem paulo etc., obiicit contra praedicta. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo dicit de quo est intentio: et repetit quae praedicta sunt. Secundo movet dubitationem, ibi, prima autem dubitatio est et cetera. Tertio ponit solutionem, ibi, videtur igitur ratio et cetera. 395 Then he raises an objection to what has been said; and in this connection he does three things. First, he states his aim and repeats what has been said. Secondly, he raises a difficulty. Thirdly, he proposes the solution.
Dicit ergo primo, quod oportet aliquantulum a remotiori discutere quae sit unaquaeque politiarum praedictarum cum habeat quasdam dubitationes. Ille qui philosophatur in unaquaque arte, quasi considerans veritatem et non solum respicit ad id quod est utile ad agendum, nihil debet despicere vel praetermittere, sed in singulis declarare veritatem. Dictum est autem quod tyrannis est quaedam monarchia despotica id est dominativa politicae communitatis, quia scilicet utitur civibus ut servis. Oligarchia vero est quando dominantur politiae illi qui abundant in divitiis. Democratia vero est quando dominantur politiae non illi qui possident multitudinem divitiarum, sed magis pauperes. He says then, first of all, that we must stand at a slightly greater distance and discuss what each one of the previously mentioned regimes is, since it presents certain difficulties. He who philosophizes in any art and considers the truth, as it were, not only looks to what is useful for action; he should not look down on or pass over anything but rather set out the truth in each instance. Now we said that a tyranny is a certain monarchy that exercises its domination over the political community because it makes use of citizens as slaves. A rule of the few exists when the regime is dominated by those who abound in riches. And a popular state exists when the regime is dominated, not by those who have an abundance of riches, but rather by the poor.
Deinde cum dicit prima autem dubitatio etc., movet dubitationem. Et primo ponit dubitationem, secundo excludit quamdam responsionem, ibi, at vero siquis et cetera. 396 Then he raises the difficulty. First, he states the difficulty. Secondly, he eliminates a certain answer.
Dicit ergo primo, quod prima dubitatio est contra definitionem, scilicet democratiae et oligarchiae. Dictum est enim quod democratia est quando dominantur in civitate egeni oligarchia autem quando dominantur divites; ipsum autem nomen oligarchiae designat principatum paucorum, nomen autem democratiae designat principatum populi sive multitudinis. Ponatur ergo quod in aliqua civitate sint plures divites quam pauperes, et divites sint domini civitatis: videtur, secundum hoc, quod sit ibi democratia, quae est quando multitudo dominatur; similiter autem si alicubi contingat quod pauperes sint pauciores, sed sint meliores et fortiores et dominentur civitati, sequetur, secundum hoc, quod sit ibi oligarchia quia pauci dominantur. Non ergo videtur quod sit bene definitum de politiis cum dictum est quod democratia est dominium pauperum, oligarchia dominium divitum. He says then, first of all, that the first difficulty concerns the definition of popular rule and of the rule of the few. Let us suppose, then, that in a certain city the rich outnumber the poor and that the rich are the masters of the city. It seems, according to this, that there exists here a rule of the many. Likewise, if it should happen, on the other hand, that the poor are fewer but better and stronger and dominate the city, it will follow, according to this, that there exists here a rule of the few. It does not seem, therefore, that we defined the regimes properly when [140] we said that the state of the many consists in the domination of the poor and the state of the few in the domination of the rich.
Deinde cum dicit at vero si quis connectens etc., excludit quamdam responsionem. Posset enim aliquis dicere, quod in definitione oligarchiae est coniungenda paucitas divitiis; et in definitione democratiae est coniungenda multitudo paupertati; ita scilicet quod oligarchia sit in qua pauci divites principantur, democratia autem in qua multi pauperes. Sed hoc iterum habet aliam dubitationem: si enim sufficienter divisae sunt politiae, ita scilicet quod nulla sit alia politia praeter praedictas, non erit dare sub qua politia comprehendantur duae praedictae politiae: scilicet quando principantur vel multi divites, vel pauci pauperes. 397 Then he eliminates an answer. Someone could indeed say that, in the definition of the rule of the few, fewness should be added to riches, and, in the definition of the rule of the many, multitude should be added to poverty, in such a way that the rule of the few is that in which a few rich men govern, and the rule of the many that in which many poor men govern. But this, in turn, poses another problem. For, if the regimes have been adequately divided, so that there is no other regime besides the ones mentioned, it will be impossible to say under which regime the two aforesaid regimes, the ones in which either many rich men or a few poor men rule, are comprised.
Deinde cum dicit videtur igitur etc., concludit ex praemissis solutionem dubitationis. Et dicit quod ratio praemissae dubitationis videtur manifestare, quod principes esse multos, per accidens se habeat ad democratias: et eos esse paucos per accidens se habeat ad oligarchias, eo quod ubique inveniuntur plures pauperes quam divites; et secundum hoc nomina sunt posita prout in pluribus invenitur. Sed quia id quod per accidens est, non est differentia specifica; ideo oligarchiae non distinguuntur a democratiis per se loquendo secundum multitudinem et paucitatem: sed id quo per se differunt sunt paupertas et divitia: alia enim est ratio regiminis quod ordinatur ad opulentiam et eius quod ordinatur ad libertatem quae est finis democratiae. Et ideo necesse est quod ubicumque aliqui dominantur propter divitias, sive sint plures, sive pauciores, quod ibi sit oligarchia; et ubicumque dominantur pauperes, ibi sit democratia: sed per accidens est, quod hi sint multi, et illi pauci. Pauci enim sunt, qui abundant divitiis, sed omnes participant libertate; et propter haec duo altercantur sibi invicem; dum pauci volunt praeesse propter excessum divitiarum, et multi volunt praevalere paucis, quasi aequivalentes eis propter libertatem. 398 Then from what has been premised he infers the solution of the difficulty. He says that the nature of the difficulty just mentioned seems to indicate that the fact that there are many rulers is related only incidentally to the rule of the few, since everywhere one finds that the poor outnumber the rich; and, accordingly, these things are named as they are found to exist for the most part. But that which is incidental does not constitute a specific difference and, hence, the rules of the few are not distinguished, essentially speaking, from the rule of the many on the basis of large and small numbers. Rather, that by which they differ essentially is poverty and riches. For the nature of the rule that is ordered to opulence is other than that of the rule that is ordered to freedom, which constitutes the end of the rule of the many. And hence, wherever some rule for the sake of riches, whether they be more numerous or less numerous, there we necessarily have a state of the few; and wherever the poor rule, there we necessarily have a rule of the many. It is incidental, however, that the latter be numerous and the former few. For those who abound in riches are few, but all share in freedom; and for this reason these two elements fight with each other. The few wish to be set over the others on account of their excess of riches, and the many wish to prevail over the few, being as it were their equals on account of freedom.

[Here ends Aquinas' commentary on the Politics of Aristotle.]