QUESTION X
THE PROCESSION OF THE DIVINE PERSONS

Et primo quaeritur utrum sit aliqua processio in divinis. Secundo utrum in divinis sit tantum una processio. Tertio de ordine processionum ad relationem in divinis. Quarto utrum spiritus sanctus procedat a filio. Quinto utrum spiritus sanctus remaneret a filio distinctus, si ab eo non procederet.

Is there procession in God? Is there only one procession in God? What is the order between procession and relation in God? Does the Holy Spirit proceed from the Son? Would the Holy Spirit still be distinct from the Son if he did not proceed from him?

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Q. X: ARTICLE I Is there Procession in God? [ Sum. Th. I, Q. xxvii: G.G. IV, ii]
Et primo quaeritur utrum sit aliqua processio in divinis personis. Et videtur quod non.	THE first point of inquiry is whether there be processions in the divine persons: and seemingly there are not.
Omne enim quod procedit ab aliquo, distat ab eo. Sed divinarum personarum non est aliqua distantia ab invicem: dicit enim filius, Ioan. XIV, 10: ego in patre et pater in me est; et idem dici potest de spiritu sancto, quod scilicet sit in patre et filio, et e converso. Ergo in divinis una persona non procedit ab alia.	1. Whatsoever proceeds from a thing is separated from it. But the divine persons are not separated from one another: thus the Son says (Jo. xiv, 10): I am in the Father and the Father in me: and the same applies to the Holy Spirit, namely that he is in the Father and the Son and vice versa. Therefore in God one person proceeds not from another.
Praeterea, nihil quod ad motum pertinet, Deo proprie attribui potest, sicut nec aliquid quod materiam importat. Processio autem significat quemdam motum. Ergo non proprie potest dici in divinis.	2. Nothing savouring of motion, even as nothing pertaining to matter should be attributed to God in its proper sense. Now procession denotes motion. Therefore it cannot be attributed to God in its proper sense.
Praeterea, omne procedens praeintelligitur processioni: nam procedens est processionis subiectum: sed in divinis non potest esse aliquid procedens processioni praeintellectum: essentia enim divina non est procedens, sicut nec genita; relatio autem non praeintelligitur processioni, sed e converso, sicut iam dictum est. Non ergo potest esse processio in divinis.	3. Whatsoever proceeds is logically prior to its procession, since it is the subject thereof. Now in God nothing that proceeds can be prior to its procession: for the divine essence does not proceed as neither is it begotten; and relation is not prior to procession, but contrariwise as we have already stated (Q. viii, A. 3). Therefore procession is impossible in God.
Praeterea, omne procedens sicut ab aliquo procedit, ita oportet quod procedat in aliquid. Quod autem in aliquid procedit, non est per se subsistens. Cum ergo personae divinae sint per se subsistentes, non videtur eis competere quod procedant.	4. Even as that which proceeds is from something so also is it to something. But that which proceeds to something is not self-subsistent. Therefore seeing that the divine persons are self-subsistent it would seem incompetent for them to proceed.
Praeterea, cum creaturae nobiliores sint etiam Deo similiores, quod invenitur in inferioribus creaturis, non autem in superioribus, nec etiam in Deo invenitur sicut quantitas dimensiva, materia, et alia huiusmodi. Processio autem invenitur in inferioribus creaturis, in quibus unum individuum generat aliud eiusdem speciei; quod non contingit in creaturis superioribus. Ergo neque in Deo processio invenitur.	5. Inasmuch as the more excellent creatures are more like to God, that which is found in the lower creaturess and not in the higher is not found in God: for instance, dimensive quantity, matter and so forth. Now procession is to be found in the lower creatures, where one individual engenders another of the same species: whereas this does not obtain in the higher creatures. Neither therefore in God is procession to be found.
Praeterea, illud quod derogat divinae dignitati, nullo modo est Deo attribuendum. In hoc autem maxime consideratur divina dignitas, quod est prima causa essendi non habens ab alio esse, cui videtur repugnare processio: nam omne procedens quodammodo ab alio est. Non ergo dicendum est quod aliquid sit procedens in divinis.	6. We should by no means attribute to God anything that is derogatory to his dignity. Now God’s dignity consists chiefly in his being the first cause of existence, and not deriving existence from anything else: which would seem incompatible with procession, since whatsoever proceeds derives its existence in some way from another. ~ Therefore it must not be said that anything proceeds in God.
Praeterea, persona est hypostasis proprietate distincta ad dignitatem pertinente. Accipere autem ab alio (quod importat processio), non videtur ad dignitatem pertinere. Non ergo processio debet attribui divinis personis sicut aliqua personalis proprietas.	7. A person is a “hypostasis distinguished by a property pertaining to dignity.” But it does not savour of dignity that one receive from another (which is implied by procession). Therefore procession should not be ascribed to the divine persons as though it were a personal property.
Praeterea, illud a quo aliquid procedit, oportet esse aliquo modo causam illius. Sed una persona non potest esse causa alterius: neque enim esse potest una alterius causa intrinseca, formalis scilicet vel materialis, cum in divinis non sit compositio formae et materiae; nec iterum causa extrinseca, cum una persona sit in alia. Non ergo est processio in divinis.	8. A thing is in some way the cause of that which proceeds from it. But one divine person cannot be the cause of another: not an intrinsic cause, i.e. formal or material, since in God there is no composition of form and matter; nor extrinsic, since one person dwells within the other. Hence there is no procession in God.
Praeterea, omne procedens procedit ab aliquo sicut a principio. Una autem persona non potest dici alterius principium, quia —cum principium ad principiatum dicatur— oportet aliquam personam principiatam dici, quod videtur solis creaturis competere. Non ergo est processio in divinis.	9. Whatsoever proceeds issues from another as from its principium. Now one (divine) person cannot be described as the principium of another: for seeing that principium connotes that which is principiated, we should have to say that some divine person is principiated, and this seemingly is peculiar to creatures. Hence there is no procession in God.
Praeterea, nomen principii a prioritate sumptum esse videtur. Sed in personis divinis nihil est prius et posterius, ut Athanasius dicit. Non est ergo una persona principium alterius; et sic non debet dici una procedens ab alia.	10. The word principium would seem to indicate priority, whereas according to Athanasius there is no priority or posterity in God. Therefore one person is not the principium of another, and one should not be described as proceeding from the other.
Praeterea, omne principium est operativum vel factivum. Sed una persona non est factiva alterius nec operativa, alioquin in divinis personis esset aliquid factum vel creatum. Ergo divina persona non habet principium, neque est procedens.	11. Every principium is operative or productive. Now one person is not productive or operative of another, else in God there would be something made or created. Therefore a divine person has no principium and does not proceed.
Praeterea, quandocumque est aliquid ab aliquo procedens, oportet esse aliquid commune utrique, quod scilicet procedenti communicatur ab eo a quo procedit, et aliquid proprium, per quod procedens distinguitur ab eo a quo procedit: nihil enim procedit a se ipso. Ubicumque autem est aliquid et aliquid, ibi est compositio. Ergo ubicumque est processio, ibi est compositio. In divinis autem non est compositio. Ergo neque processio.	12. If B proceeds from A, B must have something in common with A and communicated to it by A; and also something proper whereby it is distinguished from A; since nothing proceeds from itself. Now wherever there is something and something else there is composition. Therefore wherever there is procession there is composition. But there is no composition in God: and consequently neither is there procession.
Praeterea, omne procedens ab alio, recipit aliquid ab eo. Quod autem recipit aliquid, est indigentis naturae: nisi enim indigeret, non reciperet; propter quod etiam in rebus naturalibus receptibilitas attribuitur materiae. Ergo omne procedens est indigentis naturae. In divinis autem non est aliqua indigentia, sed summa perfectio. Ergo non est ibi processio.	13. That which proceeds from another receives something from it: and whatsoever receives something is of a needy nature: for if it needed not it would not receive: for which reason in natural things receptivity is ascribed to matter. Therefore whatsoever proceeds is by nature needy. But in God there is no such thing as need for he is supremely perfect. Therefore there is no procession in God.
Sed dices, quod recipiens quando praeexistit receptioni, est indigens, quando vero iam recipit, habet et non est indigens; filius autem et spiritus sanctus recipiunt quidem a Deo patre, non tamen praeexistunt receptioni; et sic in eis nulla est indigentia. —Sed contra, creatura quaelibet est indigentis naturae, et tamen non praeexistit receptioni qua recipit esse a Deo. Non ergo excludit indigentiam a recipiente hoc quod receptioni non praeexistit.	14. To this it will be replied that the recipient is imperfect when it exists before receiving, and when having received it is in possession and no longer needy. Now the Son and the Holy Spirit receive indeed from the Father, but they do not exist before receiving: and thus they are not in need. —On the contrary every creature is needy by nature, and yet it, does not exist before receiving existence from God. Therefore the fact of not existing before receiving does not disprove need.
Praeterea, omne quod non habet aliquid nisi secundum quod recipit illud ab alio, in se consideratum caret illo; sicut aer in se consideratus caret lumine, quod ab alio recipit. Si ergo filius et spiritus sanctus non habent esse nisi per hoc quod recipiunt a patre (quod oportet dicere, si a patre procedunt), necesse est quod si in se considerentur, nihil sint. Quod autem in se consideratum nihil est, si habeat esse ab alio, oportet quod ex nihilo est, et ita quod sit creatura. Si ergo filius et spiritus sanctus procedunt a patre, oportet quod sint creaturae; quod est Arianae impietatis. Non ergo est processio in divinis personis.	15. Whatsoever has a thing only by receiving it from another, considered in itself lacks that thing: thus air considered in itself lacks light which it receives from something else. If then the Son and the Holy Spirit have being only through receiving it from the Father (which must be the case if they proceed from the Father) it follows of necessity that considered in themselves they do not exist. Now that which considered in itself is nothing, if it receive being from another, must necessarily come from nothing and consequently must be a creature. If then the Son and the Holy Spirit proceed from the Father they must be creatures; and this is the blasphemy of Arius. Therefore there is no procession in God.
Praeterea, quod procedit ab aliquo, ad hoc procedit ut sit. Quod autem procedit ut sit, non semper fuit; sicut quod procedit ad locum, non semper fuit in loco illo. Personae autem divinae sunt sempiternae. Ergo nulla persona divina est procedens.	16. That which proceeds from another proceeds that it may come into existence: and that which proceeds that it may exist did not always exist: thus if a thing proceeds to a place it was not always in that place. But the divine persons are eternal. Therefore no divine person proceeds.
Praeterea, principium a quo aliquid procedit, habet aliquam auctoritatem respectu illius quod procedit a principio. Si ergo aliqua persona divina procedit ab alia, utpote filius et spiritus sanctus a patre, oportet quod in patre sit aliqua auctoritas respectu filii et spiritus sancti: et ita, cum auctoritas sit quaedam dignitas, aliqua dignitas erit in patre quae non est in filio et spiritu sancto; et sic erit inaequalitas in divinis personis: quod est contra Athanasium dicentem quod in Trinitate nihil est prius et posterius; nihil maius aut minus: sed totae tres personae coaeternae sibi sunt et coaequales. Non ergo est processio in divinis personis.	17. The principle whence a thing proceeds exercises a certain authority over that which proceeds from it as from a principle. If then one divine person proceeds from another, for instance, the Son and the Holy Spirit from the Father, there must be in the Father some authority over the Son and the Holy Spirit: and thus, since authority is a kind of dignity there will be a dignity in the Father that is not in the Son and the Holy Spirit, and consequently there will be inequality in the divine persons, and this is contrary to the saying of Athanasius (Symb.) that in the Trinity “there is neither priority no posteriority, neither greater nor lesser: but all three persons are co-eternal and co-equal with one another.” Therefore there is no procession in the divine persons.
Sed contra. Est quod dicit filius Ioan. cap. VIII, 42: ego ex Deo processi et veni.	On the contrary the Son says (Jo. viii, 42) : From God I proceeded and came.
Praeterea, Ioan. XV, 26, dicitur, quod spiritus veritatis, qui a patre procedit. Est ergo processio in divinis personis.	Again it is stated (Jo. xv, 26) that the Spirit of truth proceeds from the Father. Therefore there is procession in the divine persons.
Respondeo. Dicendum quod cognitio intellectiva in nobis sumit principium a phantasia et sensu, quae ultra continuum se non extendunt; et inde est quod ex his quae in continuo inveniuntur, transumimus nomina ad omnia quae capimus intellectu; sicut patet in nomine distantiae, quae primo invenitur in loco, et exinde transumitur ad quamcumque formarum differentiam, propter quod omnia contraria, in quocumque sint genere, dicuntur esse maxime distantia, licet distantia primo inveniatur in ubi, ut philosophus dicit in X Metaph. Similiter autem nomen processionis primo est inventum ad significandum motum localem, secundum quem aliquid ordinate ab uno loco per media ordinatim in extremum transit; et ex hoc transumitur ad significandum omne illud in quo est aliquis ordo unius ex alio, vel post aliud; et inde est quod in omni motu utimur nomine processionis; sicut dicimus, quod corpus procedit ab albedine in nigredinem, et de parva quantitate ad magnam et de non esse in esse, et e converso, et similiter utimur nomine processionis, ubi est aliqua emanatio alicuius ab aliquo; sicut dicimus quod radius procedit a sole, et omnis operatio ab operante, et etiam operatum, sicut artificiatum ab artifice, vel genitum a generante; et universaliter omnium huiusmodi ordinem nomine processionis significamus. Est autem duplex operatio: quaedam quidem transiens ab operante in aliquid extrinsecum, sicut calefactio ab igne in lignum; et haec quidem operatio non est perfectio operantis, sed operati: non enim aliquid acquiritur igni ex hoc quod est calefaciens, sed calefactio acquiritur calor. Alia vero est operatio non transiens in aliquid extrinsecum, sed manens in ipso operante, sicut intelligere, sentire, velle, et huiusmodi. Hae autem operationes sunt perfectiones operantis: intellectus enim non est perfectus nisi per hoc quod est intelligens actu; et similiter nec sensus, nisi per hoc quod actu sentit. Primum autem operationum genus commune est viventibus et non viventibus, sed secundum operationum genus est proprium viventium; unde, si largo modo accipiamus motum pro qualibet operatione, sicut philosophus accipit in III de anima, ubi dicitur, quod sentire et intelligere sunt motus quidam, non quidem motus qui est actus imperfecti, ut definitur III Physic., sed motus qui est actus perfecti, sic proprium videtur esse viventis, et in hoc ratio videtur consistere, quod aliquid sit movens se ipsum. Nam quidquid invenimus per se et in se operari quocumque modo, dicimus vivere; et per hunc modum Plato posuit, quod primum movens movet se ipsum. Secundum autem utrumque operationis genus invenitur in creaturis aliqua processio: nam secundum primum genus dicimus, quod generatum procedit a generante, et factum a faciente. Quantum autem ad secundum operationis genus, dicimus, quod verbum procedit a dicente, et amor ab amante. Huiusmodi autem duplex operationis genus Deo attribuimus. Genus quidem operationis in aliud extrinsecum transeuntis Deo attribuimus, in quantum dicimus, quod creat, conservat et gubernat omnia. Ex quo quidem operationis genere nulla perfectio Deo advenire significatur, sed magis quod proveniat in creatura perfectio ex perfectione divina. Aliud vero operationis genus Deo attribuimus, in quantum ipsum intelligentem et volentem dicimus, in quo ipsius perfectio significatur. Non enim esset perfectus, nisi esset intelligens et volens actu; et inde est quod confitemur eum viventem. Secundum ergo utramque operationem Deo processionem attribuimus: secundum quidem primum operationis genus dicimus divinam sapientiam aut bonitatem in creaturas procedere, ut Dionysius dicit, IX cap. de Divin. Nomin.: et etiam quod creaturae procedunt a Deo. Secundum vero aliud operationis genus dicimus in divinis processionem verbi et amoris; et haec est processio personae filii a patre, qui est verbum ipsius, et spiritus sancti, qui est amor eius et spiramen vivificum. Unde Athanasius in quodam sermone Nicaeni Concilii dicit, quod Ariani ponentes filium et spiritum sanctum non esse coessentiales patri, per consequens videbantur dicere Deum non viventem et intelligentem, sed mortuum et sine mente.	I answer that in us intellectual knowledge originates in the imagination and senses which do not transcend continuous matter. For this reason we take the terms that apply to continuous matter and transfer them to whatsoever we grasp with the intellect. Take, for instance, the word distance which is applied first to place and is afterwards transferred to any difference of forms: wherefore all contraries of any genus whatsoever are said to be the most distant, although distance is applied first of all to ubiety, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. x). In like manner the term procession was first employed to signify that local movement whereby a thing passes from one place through intermediate places to an extreme place in an ordinate manner: and thence it is transferred to denote the order between any two things one of which issues from or succeeds the other. Hence we apply the word procession to all kinds of movement: for instance, we say that a body proceeds from whiteness to blackness, or from a great to a small quantity or from non-being to being, and vice versa: and in like manner we use the word procession to indicate the emanation of one thing from another; thus we say that the ray proceeds from the sun, and the operation or even the thing produced from the operator; thus the thing made by a craftsman is said to proceed from him, and the thing generated from the generator, and in a general way we designate any such order as a procession. Now operation is twofold. There is an operation that passes from the operator into something extrinsic, as heating passes from fire into wood: this operation is not a perfection of the operator but of the thing operated, since the fire gains nothing by heating, whereas the thing heated acquires heat. Another operation does not pass into something outside but remains in the operator, such as understanding, sensation, willing and the like. These operations are perfections of the operator: for the intellect is not perfect except by understanding actually, and the senses except by sensing actually. The first kind of operation is common to animate and inanimate beings: whereas the second is proper to animate beings: wherefore, if we take movement in a wide sense for any kind of operation—as the Philosopher takes it (De Anima iii), where it is stated that sensation and understanding are a kind of movement—not indeed the movement which is the act of an imperfect thing (Phys. iii, i) but that which is the act of a perfect thing—it would seem proper to animate beings; and this is what is meant when we speak of a thing being the cause of its own movement. Because whenever we observe that a thing operates of itself and in itself in any way whatever we say that it lives: and in this sense Plato (Tim.) says that the first mover moves itself. In respect of both kinds of operation procession is found in creatures. In regard to the first kind we say that the thing generated proceeds from the generator and the thing made from the maker. With regard to the second kind we say that words proceed from the speaker, and love from the lover. And we attribute both kinds of operation to God, when we say that he creates, preserves and governs all things. Nor by this do we signify that any perfection accrues to God by such operation, but rather that the creature acquires perfection from the divine perfection. We attribute the other kind of operation to God when we ascribe him as understanding and willing whereby we indicate his perfection. For he were not perfect did he,not understand and will actually: and for this reason we acknowledge him to be living. In respect of either operation we attribute procession to God. As regards the first we speak of divine wisdom or goodness as proceeding to creatures, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix), and of creatures as proceeding from God. As regards the second we acknowledge in God a procession of word and love; and this is the procession of the Son from the Father (for the Son is the Father’s word) and of the Holy Spirit who is his love and life-giving breath (spiritus). Hence Athanasius in a discourse pronounced in the Council of Nicea says that the Arians through maintaining that the Son and Holy Spirit are not consubstantial with the Father, seemed in consequence to say that God is not a living and intelligent being, but dead and unintelligent.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod obiectio illa procedit de processione quae attenditur secundum operationem in aliquid extrinsecum transeuntem. Sic autem non procedunt divinae personae, sed magis per modum processionis quae attenditur secundum operationem in operante manentem; quod enim sic procedit non distat ab eo a quo procedit; sicut etiam humanum verbum est in intellectu loquentis, non distans ab eo.	Reply to the First Objection. This argument considers the procession that is an operation passing into something extrinsic. But the divine persons do not proceed thus; and their procession partakes rather of the nature of an immanent operation: since that which proceeds in this way is not distant from that whence it proceeds: even so the human word is in the mind of the speaker and not distant from him.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod processio prout significat motum localem, non ponitur in divinis personis, sed secundum quod importat quemdam emanationis ordinem.	Reply to the Second Objection. The procession attributed to the divine persons is not a local movement, but one that indicates order of emanation.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod in processione quae est motus localis, necesse est quod procedens processioni praeintelligatur, cum sit eius subiectum; sed in processione quae importat originis ordinem procedens se habet ad processionem ut terminus. Unde si procedens sit ex materia et forma compositum, et per viam generationis in esse productum, materia quidem praeexistit processioni ut subiectum, forma vero vel etiam compositum, sequitur secundum intellectum ad processionem ut terminus; sicut cum ignis ab igne per generationem procedit. Cum vero id quod procedit, non est compositum, sed forma tantum, vel etiam per creationem in esse eductum— cuius terminus est tota rei substantia— tunc nullo modo procedens praeintelligitur processioni, sed e converso; sicut creatura non praeintelligitur creationi, nec splendor processioni ipsius a sole, nec verbum processioni eius a dicente; et similiter nec verbum processioni eius a patre.	Reply to the Third Objection. That which proceeds by local movement must precede its procession since it is the subject thereof: but that which proceeds in the order of origin is the term of the procession. Hence if it be composed of matter and form and comes into being by generation, the matter precedes the procession as subject, while the form or even the composite follows logically the procession as term: as when fire proceeds from fire by generation. But when that which proceeds is not composite but a pure form; or again if it come into being by creation the term of which is the whole substance, then that which proceeds in no way precedes the procession but on the contrary: thus the creature is not conceived as existing before creation, nor brightness as preceding its emission from the sun, nor the Word as preceding his procession from the Father.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod secundum processionem quae importat originis ordinem, potest aliquid procedere ut in se subsistens, non relatum ad aliud; quamvis secundum processionem localem procedat aliquid, non ut simpliciter in se subsistat, sed ut sit in loco. Talis autem processio non est in divinis personis.	Reply to the Fourth Objection. In so far as procession may denote order of origin, a thing may proceed as self-subsistent and without relation to another thing: although by local movement a thing does not proceed so as to subsist in itself simply, but so as to be in a place. Such procession, however, is not in God.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod in intellectualibus substantiis, quae sunt nobilissimae creaturae, est etiam processio secundum operationem intellectus et voluntatis; et quantum ad hoc invenitur in eis increatae Trinitatis imago. Sed verbum et amor in eis non sunt personae subsistentes: earum enim intelligere et velle non est ipsarum substantia, sed hoc proprium Dei est; unde verbum et amor procedunt in Deo ut personae subsistentes, non autem in intellectualibus creaturis.	Reply to the Fifth Objection. In intellectual substances which are the most noble creatures there is also procession according to the operations of the intellect and will: and in this respect the image of the Trinity is in them. In them, however, word and love are not subsistent persons, because their understanding and willing are not their substance, and this is proper to God: hence in God word and love proceed as subsistent persons, but not in intellectual creatures.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod habere originem ab aliquo quod sit in essentia diversum, derogat dignitati divinae: hoc enim est proprium creaturae; sed habere originem ab aliquo coessentiali, magis ad perfectionem divinam pertinet. Non enim esset in divinitate perfectio, nisi esset ibi intelligere et velle in actu. Quibus positis necesse est poni verbi et amoris processionem.	Reply to the Sixth Objection. It would be derogatory to God’s dignity to originate from something essentially diverse, for this is proper to the creature: but to originate from that which is consubstantial pertains to the divine perfection. For there would not be perfection in the Godhead unless its understanding and willing were actual: and this being the case we must acknowledge in God the procession of word and love.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod licet accipere, in quantum huiusmodi, perfectionem non dicat, tamen ex parte eius a quo accipitur, perfectionem importat, et praecipue in divinis personis, quae accipiunt plenitudinem deitatis.	Reply to the Seventh Objection. Although receiving does not in itself connote perfection, it does imply perfection on the part of the one from whom something is received: and especially in the divine persons who receive the fulness of the Godhead.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod Latini doctores raro vel nunquam ad significandum originem divinarum personarum, nomine causae utuntur: tum quia causae apud nos respondet effectus— unde ne cogamur filium vel spiritum sanctum factos dicere, patrem non dicimus causam eorum— tum quia apud nos nomen causae significat aliquid in essentia diversum; dicimus enim causam ad quam sequitur aliud; tum etiam quia apud gentiles philosophos nomen causae dictum de Deo, habitudinem ipsius ad creaturas designat. Dicunt enim Deum esse primam causam, et creaturas esse eius causata. Unde ne aliquis filium et spiritum sanctum inter creaturas secundum essentiam a Deo diversas suspicetur esse ponendas, nomen causae refugimus in divinis. Graeci tamen absolutius in divinis utuntur nomine causae, ex ipso solam originem significantes; et ideo in divinis personis utuntur nomine causae. Aliquid enim inconvenienter in lingua Latina dicitur quod propter proprietatem idiomatis convenienter in lingua Graeca dici potest. Non autem oportet si nomen causae confitemur in divinis secundum Graecos, quod eodem modo accipiatur sicut cum de creaturis dicitur, prout in quatuor genera secundum philosophos dividitur.	Reply to the Eighth Objection. Seldom or never do the Latin doctors employ the word cause to indicate the origin of the divine persons; both because with us cause connotes effect, wherefore lest we be forced to say that the Son and Holy Spirit are made, we do not say that the Father is their cause; and because with us the word cause signifies something essentially diverse, for we describe as a cause that whence something different follows; and again because the pagan philosophers apply the word cause to God to denote his relation to creatures: for they say that God is the first cause and that creatures are caused by him. Hence lest anyone think that the Son and the Holy Spirit should be reckoned among creatures differing essentially from God, we avoid the word cause when we speak of God. On the other hand the Greeks employ the word cause more absolutely when speaking of God, and indicate origin only thereby: wherefore they apply the word cause to the divine persons. For an expression may be objectionable in Latin whereas in Greek it is admissible on account of a peculiarity of idiom. And if in speaking of God we admit the use of the word cause in Greek it does not follow that it has the same sense as when applied to creatures, and as divided by philosophers into four kinds.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod inter omnia ad originem spectantia magis convenit in divinis hoc nomen principium. Quia enim divina comprehendi a nobis non possunt, convenientius a nobis significantur per nomina communia quae indefinite aliquid significant, quam per nomina specialia, quae definite rei species exprimunt; unde hoc nomen qui est, quod secundum Damascenum significat substantiae pelagus infinitum, convenientissimum nomen dicitur esse, ut patet Exod. III, 14. Sicut autem causa communior est quam elementum, quod significat aliquid primum et simplex in genere causae materialis, ita etiam principium est communius quam causa; nam prima pars motus vel lineae dicitur principium sed non causa. In quo patet quod principium potest dici aliquid quod non est secundum essentiam distinctum, ut punctum lineae; non autem causa, maxime si loquamur de causa originante, quae est causa efficiens. Quamvis autem pater dicatur esse principium filii et spiritus sancti, non tamen videtur indifferenter dicendum, quod filius sit principiatum, vel etiam spiritus sanctus, licet etiam hoc modo loquendi Graeci utantur, et possit apud sane intelligentes concedi; tamen ea quae minorationem aliquam importare videntur, refugere debemus, ne filio vel spiritui sancto attribuantur, propter Arianorum errorem vitandum; sicut Hilarius, etsi concedat patrem esse maiorem filio propter auctoritatem originis, non tamen concedit quod filius sit minor patre cui est aequale esse donatum a patre. Et similiter non est extendendum nomen subauctoritatis vel principiati in filio, licet nomen auctoritatis, vel principii concedatur in patre.	Reply to the Ninth Objection. Of all the terms relating to origin, the word principle is most appropriate to God. For since we are unable to comprehend the things of God it is better for us to indicate them by means of general terms which have an indefinite meaning, than to employ special words that have a definite signification. Wherefore the name He who is (Exod. iii, 13, 14) is said to be most appropriate, seeing that according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. i. o) it signifies the boundless sea of substance. Now just as cause is a more general term than element which denotes something primary and simple in the genus of material cause, so is principle a more general term than cause; thus the first part of movement or of a line is called a principium but not a cause. From this it is clear that a principium may be something that is not essentially distinct, as a point in relation to a line; whereas a cause cannot, especially if we speak of an originating, i.e. an efficient, cause. Now though the Father is called the principium of the Son and the Holy Spirit, it does not seem right to say without qualification that the Son or Holy Spirit is principiated, although the Greeks use the expression, which may be allowed to pass if understood aright. Nevertheless we must avoid using words that seem to imply subjection, lest they be attributed to the Son or the Holy Spirit and we fall into the error of the Arians. Thus Hilary (De Trin. vii) while granting that the Father is greater than the Son on account of his pre-eminence as origin, denies that the Son is less than the Father since he received equality of essence from him. Likewise we must not stress such terms as subjection and principiation in the Son, although we employ the words authority and principium in speaking of the Father.
Ad decimum dicendum quod, licet principium secundum rationem nominis a prioritate sumatur, non tamen imponitur ad significandum prioritatem sed originem; sicut etiam hoc nomen lapis non imponitur ad significandum laesionem pedis, licet ab hoc nomen sumi videatur. Licet ergo pater non sit prior filio, est tamen eius principium.	Reply to the Tenth Objection. Although the word principium is derived from priority, it is employed to signify not priority but origin: even as the word lapis is not employed to denote the hurt done to the foot, although it is thought that this is its derivation. Thus although the Father is not prior to the Son he is his principium.
Ad undecimum dicendum, quod non omne principium est operativum vel factivum; neutro enim modo punctum est principium lineae.	Reply to the Eleventh Objection. Not every principium is operative or productive: for in neither way is a point the principium of a line.
Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod non omne est aliquid commune patri, scilicet essentia; et aliquid per quod a patre distinguitur, scilicet relatio. Non tamen est ibi compositio, quia relatio est secundum rem essentia, sicut ex superioribus disputationibus patet.	Reply to the Twelfth Objection. In the Son there is something common to the Father, namely the essence; and something whereby he is distinguished from the Father, namely the relation. Yet there is not composition, because the relation is really the essence, as we have explained in previous discussions (Q. viii, A. 2).
Ad decimumtertium dicendum quod recipiens, antequam recipiat, indiget— ad hoc enim accipit, ut indigentiam repleat, —Sed postquam iam acceperit non indiget, habet enim quo indigebat. Si ergo aliquid est quod receptioni non praeexistit, sed semper est in recepisse, hoc nullo modo est indigens. Filius autem non sic accipit a patre quasi prius non habens et postea accipiens; sed quia hoc ipsum quod est, habet a patre. Unde non sequitur quod sit indigens.	Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. The recipient before receiving is in need, since he receives in order to supply his need: but after receiving he no longer needs, since he has what he needed. If then there be something that does not exist before receiving, and is always in the state of having received, it is by no means in need. Now the Son receives not from the Father as though he previously lacked and afterwards received, but he receives his very being from the Father. Hence it does not follow that he is in need.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod creatura accipit a Deo esse quoddam, quod non esset permanens, nisi divinitus conservaretur; et ideo etiam postquam esse accepit, indiget divina operatione ut conservetur in esse, et sic est naturae indigentis. Filius autem accipit a patre idem numero esse et eamdem naturam numero quam pater habet; unde non est naturae indigentis.	Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. The creature receives from God a certain existence which would not continue unless God preserved it: wherefore even after it has received existence, it needs the divine action to preserve it in being and consequently is of a needy nature. On the other hand the Son receives from the Father identically the same being and identically the same nature as that of the Father; wherefore he is not of a needy nature.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod filius in se consideratur secundum illud quod absolute habet, quod est patris essentia; et secundum hoc non est nihil, sed unum cum patre. Secundum vero quod refertur ad patrem, consideratur ut recipiens esse a patre: unde nec sic etiam est nihil; et ita nullo modo filius est nihil. Esset autem in se consideratus nihil, si esset in eo aliquid absolutum distinctum a patre, sicut est in creaturis.	Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. The Son is considered in himself in reference to that which he has absolutely, and this is the essence of the Father: and in this respect he is not nothing, but one with the Father. And if we consider him in reference to the Father, we conceive him as receiving being from the Father: wherefore thus again he is not nothing. Consequently in no sense is the Son nothing. He would, however, be nothing considered in himself if there were anything absolute in him distinct from the Father, as is the case with creatures.
Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod filius ad hoc procedit ut sit; sed processio eius est aeterna, sicut processio splendoris a sole est ei coaeva; et propter hoc etiam filius est aeternus.	Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. The Son does indeed proceed that he may exist: but his procession is eternal (even as the procession of light from the sun is coeval with the sun) wherefore the Son also is eternal.
Ad decimumseptimum dicendum, quod auctoritas in patre non est aliud quam relatio principii. Secundum relationem autem non dicitur aliquid aequale vel inaequale, sed secundum quantitatem, ut Augustinus dicit et propter hoc filius non est inaequalis patri.	Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. Authority in the Father is nothing but the relation of principle. Now equality or inequality refer not to relation but to quantity, as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 4; v, 6). Hence the Son is not unequal to the Father.

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Q. X: ARTICLE II Is There But One Procession in God Or Are There More? [ Sum. Th. I, Q. xxvii, A. 3]
Secundo quaeritur utrum in divinis sit una tantum processio vel plures. Et videtur quod sit una tantum.	THE second point of inquiry is whether there is only one procession in God, or more than one: and seemingly there is but one.
Dicit enim Boetius in libro de Trinitate, quod processio in Deo est substantialis. Substantialia autem non multiplicantur in divinis. Ergo processiones in divinis non sunt plures.	1. Boethius (De Trin.) says that in God procession is substantial. Now in God what is substantial is not multiplied. Therefore there are not several processions in God.
Sed dicendum, quod processiones in divinis non distinguuntur per distinctionem substantiae, quae secundum processionem communicatur, ratione cuius processiones substantiales dicuntur; sed distinguuntur seipsis. —Sed contra, quaecumque ab invicem distinguuntur, vel distinguuntur per divisionem materiae, sicut individua eiusdem speciei; vel formaliter, sicut ea quae differunt vel genere vel specie. Processione autem non distinguuntur in divinis ad modum eorum quae materialiter distinguuntur, cum Deus sit omnino immaterialis. Relinquitur ergo quod omnis distinctio quae est in divinis, sit ad modum eorum quae formaliter distinguuntur. Omnis autem formalis distinctio est per aliquam oppositionem, et maxime eorum quae sunt unius generis: nam genus dividitur contrariis differentiis, per quas species distinguuntur, ut dicitur in X Metaph. Oportet ergo, si processiones distinguantur in divinis, quod hoc sit ratione alicuius oppositionis. Processiones autem et actiones et motus non habent oppositionem ad invicem nisi ratione principiorum vel ratione terminorum, sicut patet de calefactione et infrigidatione, ascensu et descensu. Ergo impossibile est quod processiones in divinis distinguantur seipsis: sed si distinguuntur, oportet quod distinguantur ex parte principii processionis, vel ex parte termini, id est personae ad quam processio terminatur.	2. To this it will be replied that the processions in God do not differ in respect of the substance which is communicated by procession and by reason of which the processions are said to be substantial, but by themselves.—On the contrary whenever a number of things are distinct from one another, their difference is either one of matter, as, for instance, individuals of the same species, or of form, as for example things of different genus or species. Now the processions in God are not distinguished in the same way as things that differ in matter, since God is altogether immaterial. Wherefore it follows that all distinction in God is after the manner of a formal distinction. Now all formal distinction is by reason of some opposition, especially in things of the same genus: because a genus is divided by contrary differences which differentiate the species (Metaph. x). Accordingly if there be a distinction between the divine processions, this must be by reason of some opposition. But processions, actions and movements are not mutually opposed except by reason either of their principles or of their terms; as, for example, heating and chilling, ascent and descent. Therefore the divine processions cannot be distinguished by themselves: but if they be distinguished at all, this must be either on the part of the principle of the procession, or on the part of the term, i.e. the person in whom the procession terminates.
Praeterea, ea quae possunt simul esse, non sunt distinctiva aliquorum: sicut album et dulce non sunt distinctiva duorum substantivorum, quia possunt eidem inesse; ex hoc enim unumquodque ab altero distinguitur quod unum eorum alterum esse non potest. Quod aliqua autem non possint esse simul, hoc contingit ex natura alicuius oppositionis; ea enim dicuntur esse opposita quae simul esse non possunt. Nihil igitur distinguitur ab altero nisi ratione alicuius oppositionis; nam et in divisione quae est secundum materiam, attenditur oppositio secundum situm, cum eadem divisio sit secundum quantitatem. Si ergo oppositio processionum esse non potest nisi ratione terminorum vel principiorum, ut dictum est, impossibile est quod processiones distinguantur seipsis.	3. Things that can exist side by side cannot constitute difference (thus white and sweet do not differentiate two substances, since they can be together in the same subject): because the reason why one thing is distinct from another is that the one cannot be the other. Now that certain things cannot be together in the same subject is due to some kind of opposition: for things are said to be opposite when they cannot coexist in the same subject. Hence there can be no distinction without opposition: thus even when things differ by reason of matter, there is opposition in regard to situation, since such a division is one of quantity. If then there cannot be opposite processions otherwise than by reason of the terms or principles, as stated above (obj. 2), it is impossible that the processions be distinguished by themselves.
Sed dicendum, quod processiones distinguuntur in divinis ex eo quod una est per modum naturae, scilicet processio filii, et altera per modum voluntatis, scilicet processio spiritus sancti. —Sed contra, quod procedit naturaliter, procedit per modum naturae. Spiritus sanctus autem procedit a patre naturaliter: dicit enim Athanasius quod est naturalis spiritus patris. Ergo procedit per modum naturae.	4. But it will be replied that the divine processions are distinguished in that one is by way of nature, i.e. the procession of the Son, and the other by way of will, i.e. the procession of the Holy Spirit.—On the contrary, that which proceeds naturally proceeds by way of nature: and the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father naturally: for Athanasius says that he is the natural Spirit of the Father. Therefore he proceeds by way of nature.
Praeterea, voluntas libera est. Quod ergo procedit per modum voluntatis procedit per modum libertatis. Si ergo spiritus sanctus procedit per modum voluntatis, oportet quod procedat per modum libertatis. Quod autem procedit per modum libertatis, potest procedere et non procedere, et in tantum vel non in tantum procedere; quia quae libere fiunt, non sunt determinata ad unum, ergo pater potuit producere spiritum sanctum vel non producere, et dare ei quamcumque mensuram magnitudinis vellet. Sequitur ergo quod spiritus sanctus sit ens possibile, et non ens per se necesse esse: et sic non erit divinae naturae; quod est haeresis Macedonianae.	5. The will is free and consequently that which proceeds by way of will proceeds by way of liberty. If then the Holy Spirit proceeds by way of will he must proceed by way of liberty. Now that which proceeds by way of liberty may or may not proceed, and may proceed in this or that degree, since what is done freely is not confined to this or that. Therefore the Father could produce the Holy Spirit or not, and could give him whatsoever degree of greatness he wished. Hence it follows that the Holy Spirit was a potential being and not an essentially necessary being, and thus he would not be of divine nature, which is the heresy of Macedonius.
Praeterea, Hilarius dicit, differentiam assignans inter creaturas et filium, quod omnibus creaturis substantiam Dei voluntas attulit, filius autem naturali nativitate substantiam a patre accepit. Si ergo spiritus sanctus procedit per modum voluntatis, sequitur quod procedit sicut creatura.	6. Hilary (De Synod.) in assigning the difference between creatures and the Son, says that “the will of God gave all creatures their substance, while the Son received his substance from the Father by a natural birth”: Therefore if the Holy Spirit proceeds by way of will it follows that he proceeds in the same way as creatures.
Praeterea, natura et voluntas in Deo non differunt nisi secundum rationem. Si ergo processio filii et spiritus sancti distinguantur ex eo quod una est per modum naturae, altera vero per modum voluntatis, sequitur quod processio filii et spiritus sancti non differant nisi ratione tantum; et ita filius et spiritus sanctus personaliter non distinguuntur.	7. In God nature and will differ but logically. If then the processions of the Son and the Holy Spirit differ in that one is by way of nature and the other by way of will, it follows that these processions differ but logically: and thus the Son and the Holy Spirit are not distinct persons.
Sed dicendum quod vis spirativa et generativa in patre differunt ratione tantum, et tamen haec est distinctio realis in filio et spiritu sancto; et similiter natura et voluntas possunt realem distinctionem in processionibus et procedentibus constituere, licet differant ratione tantum. —Sed contra, filius et spiritus sanctus distinguuntur per ea quae in eis sunt. Vis autem generativa non est in filio, nec spirativa in spiritu sancto. Ergo per haec filius et spiritus sanctus non distinguuntur.	8. But it will be replied that the spirative and generative powers in the Father differ but logically, and yet there is a real distinction between the Son and the Holy Spirit: and likewise nature and will can cause a real distinction in processions and proceeding persons, although they differ but logically.—On the contrary, the Son and the Holy Spirit are distinguished by things that are in them. But the generative power is not in the Son, nor is the spirative power in the Holy Spirit. Therefore the Son and the Holy Spirit are not distinguished by these things.
Praeterea, ex hoc ostenditur quod generatio, quae est processio per modum naturae, est in divinis, quod eius similitudo creaturae communicatur, ut patet Is., LXVI, 9: numquid ego qui (...) generationem aliis tribuo sterilis ero? Processio autem quae est per modum voluntatis non communicatur creaturae, non enim invenitur in creaturis aliquid quod naturam accipiat nisi per modum generationis. Non est ergo aliqua processio in divinis personis per modum voluntatis.	9. Generation which is procession by way of nature is proved to be in God by the fact that its likeness is communicated to the creature according to Isaiah lxvi, 9, Shall I that give generation to others be barren ? But procession by way of will is not communicated to the creature, since nothing created receives its nature otherwise than by generation. Therefore in God there is no procession by way of will.
Praeterea, modus aliquid adiicit rei et per consequens compositionem facit; et multo magis, si sit modorum pluralitas. Sed in divinis est omnimoda simplicitas. Ergo non est ibi modorum pluralitas, ut possit dici, quod filius procedit uno modo, scilicet per modum naturae, et spiritus sanctus alio modo, scilicet per modum voluntatis.	10. Mode adds somewhat to a thing and consequently induces composition, especially if there be a number of modes. Now in God there is utter simplicity: and consequently there are not a number of modes in him to justify one’s saying that the Son has one mode of procession, i.e. the mode of nature, and the Holy Spirit another, i.e. the mode of the will.
Praeterea, in divinis voluntas non plus differt a natura quam intellectus. Sed non est alia processio in divinis per modum intellectus ab ea quae est per modum naturae. Ergo etiam non est alia processio quae est per modum voluntatis, ab ea quae est per modum naturae.	11. In God will differs from nature no more than does the intellect. But there is not in God a procession by way of the intellect other than that by way of nature. Therefore neither is there another procession by way of the will besides that which is by way of nature.
Sed dicendum, quod processio spiritus sancti differt a processione filii, ex eo quod processio filii est a non procedente tantum, scilicet a patre; processio autem spiritus sancti est a non procedente et procedente, et simul, scilicet a patre et filio. —Sed contra, si ponantur duae processiones in divinis, oportet quod differant numero tantum aut specie. Si numero tantum, sequitur quod utraque processio debeat dici generatio vel nativitas, et uterque procedens debeat dici filius; si autem differant specie, oportet quod natura per processionem communicata specie differat: sic enim specie differt processio hominis et equi a suo principio, non autem processio Socratis et Platonis. Cum ergo una tantum sit natura divina, non possunt esse plures processiones specie differentes, per hoc quod una est a procedente, alia vero non.	12. It will be replied that the procession of the Holy Spirit differs from that of the Son in that the procession of the Son is solely from one who does not proceed, i.e. the Father, whereas the procession of the Holy Spirit is both from one who proceeds not and from one who proceeds, and simultaneously, namely from the Father and the Son.—On the contrary, if we allow that there are two processions in God,, they must differ either numerically only, or specifically. If only numerically, it follows that both must be called generation or birth, and each of the proceeding persons must be called a Son:, and if they differ specifically, the nature communicated by the procession must differ specifically: for thus the procession of a man and that of a horse from their respective principles differ specifically, whereas the procession of Socrates and that of Plato do not. Since then there is but one divine nature there cannot be several specifically different processions, although one is from one who proceeds and the other not.
Praeterea, filius et spiritus sanctus non distinguuntur ad modum eorum quae specie differunt in creaturis: sunt enim unius naturae hypostases. Processiones autem quibus procedunt aliqua quae sunt specie unum, numero vero differentia, non differunt secundum speciem, sicut generatio Socratis et generatio Platonis. Ergo processio filii et processio spiritus sancti non sunt distinctae processiones secundum speciem.	13. The Son and the Holy Spirit are not distinct in the same way as creatures that differ specifically, for they are hypostases of one nature. Now processions whereby things proceed that are of the same species but are distinct numerically, do not themselves differ specifically, as, for instance, the generation of Socrates and the generation of Plato. Therefore the procession of the Son and that of the Holy Spirit are not specifically distinct processions.
Praeterea, sicut aliquid potest esse procedens a procedente, ita potest esse aliquis natus a nato, ut patet in hominibus, in quibus qui nascitur ab uno habet alium de se natum. Si ergo in divinis sunt duae processiones per hoc quod a procedente alius procedit, pari ratione poterunt esse duae generationes per hoc quod a genito alius generatur.	14. Just as it is possible for one to proceed from one who proceeds so is it possible for one to be born of one who was born: for instance, A who is the son of B may himself have a son C. If then there are two processions in God through another person proceeding from one who proceeds, there will likewise be two generations through another person being begotten of one who is begotten.
Praeterea, si processio spiritus sancti distinguitur a processione filii per hoc quod spiritus sanctus procedit a non procedente et procedente, id est a patre et filio, aut procedit ab eis in quantum sunt unum, aut in quantum sunt plures. Si in quantum sunt plures sequitur quod spiritus sanctus sit compositus: nam processio unius simplicis non potest esse nisi ab uno sicut a principio. Si autem procedit ab eis in quantum sunt unum, nihil differt quod procedit a pluribus, aut quod procedit ab uno solo. Non ergo potest processio spiritus sancti distingui a processione filii per hoc quod filius procedit ab uno solo, sed spiritus sanctus a duobus.	15. If the procession of the Holy Spirit differs from the procession of the Son, in that the Holy Spirit proceeds from one who does not proceed and from one who does, i.e. from Father and Son, then either he proceeds from them inasmuch as they are one or inasmuch as they are several. If inasmuch as they are several it follows that the Holy Spirit is composite, since one simple thing cannot proceed otherwise than from one as principle — and if he proceeds from them inasmuch as they are one, it matters not whether he proceed from both or from one only. Consequently the procession of the Holy Spirit cannot differ from that of the Son by the fact that the Son proceeds from one only and the Holy Spirit from two.
Praeterea, processio condividitur paternitati et filiationi: dicuntur enim tres esse proprietates personales. Sed in divinis est tantum una paternitas et una filiatio. Ergo etiam tantum una processio.	16. Procession is condivided with paternity and filiation for these are called the three personal properties. Now in God there is but one paternity and one filiation. Therefore there is likewise but one procession.
Praeterea, in creaturis non invenitur nisi unus processionis modus per quem communicetur natura, propter quod Commentator dicit, quod non sunt eadem specie animalia quae generantur ex semine, et quae generantur sine semine per putrefactionem. Natura autem divina est una tantum. Ergo non potest communicari nisi per unum modum processionis: non sunt ergo plures processiones in divinis.	17. In creatures there is but one kind of procession whereby the nature is communicated, for which reason the Commentator (Phys. vii) says that animals generated by seed are not of the same species as those which are engendered by corrupt matter and without seed. Now the divine nature is one only. Therefore it cannot be communicated by more than one kind of procession. Therefore there are not several processions in God.
Praeterea, filius procedit a patre ut splendor, secundum illud Hebr. I, 3: qui cum sit splendor gloriae; et hoc ideo, quia filius procedit a patre ut coaeternus ei, sicut splendor a sole vel ab igne. Sed similiter spiritus sanctus procedit a patre coaeternus ei. Ergo procedit ab eo eodem modo sicut filius; et ita non sunt plures processiones in divinis.	18. The Son proceeds from the Father as brightness according to Hebrews i, 3, Who being the brightness of his glory: and this because he proceeds from the Father as co-eternal with him, as brightness from the sun or fire. But the Holy Spirit likewise proceeds from the Father as co-eternal with him. Therefore he proceeds from him in the same way as the Son, and thus there are not several processions in God.
Praeterea, processio aeterna divinae personae est ratio et causa temporalis processionis creaturae et eius quod in creatura est. Unde Augustinus super Genesim ad litteram, sic exponit illud quod dicit Genes. I: dixit et factum est; id est: verbum genuit, in quo erat ut fieret. Filius autem est perfecte ratio et causa productionis creaturae. Non ergo oportet esse aliam processionem divinae personae praeter processionem filii.	19. The eternal procession of the divine person is the type and cause of the temporal procession of the creature and of whatsoever is in the creature. Hence Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 6) expounds the words of Genesis i, He spoke... and it was made, thus: He begot the Word in whom (the creature) was that it might be made. Now the Son is the perfect type and cause of the creature’s production. Therefore there is no need of another procession of a divine person besides that of the Son.
Praeterea, quanto natura est perfectior, tanto per pauciora operatur. Sed natura divina est perfectissima. Cum ergo natura creata una non communicetur nisi per unum modum processionis, nec divina natura communicari poterit nisi per unum processionis modum.	20. The more perfect a nature the fewer the things through which it works. Now the divine nature is most perfect. Since then one created nature is communicated by only one kind of procession, neither can the divine nature be communicated by more than one kind of procession.
Praeterea, ab uno simplici non potest esse nisi unum. Sed pater est unum simplex. Ergo ab eo non potest esse nisi processio una; non sunt ergo processiones plures in divinis.	21. From one simple thing only. one thing can proceed. Now the Father is one simple thing. Therefore there can be but one procession from him: and thus there are not several processions in God.
Praeterea, unumquodque ex hoc generari dicitur quod accipit formam; nam generatio in rebus creatis est mutatio ad formam. Sed spiritus sanctus sua processione accipit formam, id est essentiam divinam, de qua dicitur Philipp. II, 6: cum in forma Dei esset, non rapinam arbitratus est esse se aequalem Deo. Ergo processio spiritus sancti est generatio; et ita non differt a generatione filii.	22. A thing is said to be generated inasmuch as it receives a form: since in creatures generation is change terminating in a form. Now the Holy Spirit by proceeding receives a form, i.e. the divine essence, of which it is said (Phil. ii, 6): Who being in the form of God thought it not robbery to be equal with God. Therefore the procession of the Holy Spirit is generation; and thus it differs not from the generation of the Son.
Praeterea, nativitas est via in naturam, sicut ipsum nomen demonstrat. Sed per processionem spiritus sancti communicatur ei divina natura. Ergo processio spiritus sancti est nativitas; non ergo differt a processione filii; et ita non sunt duae processiones in divinis.	23. Nativity is the way to nature as the very word implies. Now the divine nature is communicated to the Holy Spirit through his procession. Therefore the procession of the Holy Spirit is nativity: thus it differs not from the procession of the Son, and consequently there are not two processions in God.
Videtur quod sint in divinis plures processiones quam duae.	On the other hand it would seem that there are more than two processions in God.
Est enim processio per modum naturae, secundum quam filius nominatur, et processio per modum intellectus, secundum quod nominatur verbum, et processio per modum voluntatis, secundum quam nominatur in divinis amor procedens. Sunt ergo in divinis tres processiones.	1. There is a procession by way of nature in respect of which the Son is named, and a procession by way of intellect, in respect of which the Word is named, and a procession by way of will in respect of which the proceeding Love is named. Therefore there are three processions in God,
Sed dicendum, quod una et eadem est processio in divinis quae est per modum naturae et quae est per modum intellectus; nam idem est filius et verbum. —Sed contra, processiones creaturarum exemplatae sunt a processionibus divinarum personarum; unde dicitur Ephes. III, 15, de Deo patre, quod ex eo omnis paternitas in caelo et in terra nominatur. Sed in creaturis alia est processio naturae, secundum quam homo generat hominem; et alia processio intellectus, secundum quam intellectus producit verbum. Ergo nec etiam in divinis est una processio quae est per modum intellectus et quae est per modum naturae.	2. It will be replied that in God the procession by way of nature is one and the same as the procession by way of intellect: since the Son is the same person as the Word. —On the contrary processions in creatures are a representation of the processions of the divine persons; wherefore it is said of God the Father that of him all paternity in heaven and earth is named (Eph. iii, 15). Now in creatures the procession of nature whereby man begets man is distinct from the processions of the intellect whereby it produces its word. Therefore neither in God is there a distinction between procession by way of intellect and procession by way of nature.
Praeterea, secundum Dionysium, ad divinam bonitatem pertinet ut procedat. Sed pater est summe bonus. Ergo procedit. Sunt ergo in divinis tres processiones: una qua procedit pater, et alia qua procedit filius, et tertia qua procedit spiritus sanctus.	3. According to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iii) it belongs to the divine goodness that it proceed. Now the Father is supremely good. Therefore he proceeds. Hence in God there are three processions, one whereby the Father proceeds, another whereby the Son proceeds, and a third whereby the Holy Spirit proceeds.
Sed contra, videtur quod in divinis sint duae tantum processiones. Dicit enim Augustinus in V de Trinit., quod processio filii, genitura vel nativitas est, processio autem spiritus sancti, nativitas non est; utraque tamen ineffabilis est. Sunt ergo in divinis duae tantum differentes processiones.	On the contrary it would seem that in God there are but two processions. For Augustine says (De Trin. v) that the procession of the Son is “a begetting or nativity, the Procession of the Holy Spirit is not a nativity, yet both are ineffable.” Therefore in God there are but two distinct processions.
Respondeo. Dicendum quod haereticorum instantia coegit antiquos fidei doctores de his quae sunt fidei disputare. Arius enim aestimavit quod esse ab alio, divinae repugnaret naturae; unde posuit quod filius et spiritus sanctus, qui in Scripturis sanctis ab alio esse dicuntur, sint creaturae. Ad cuius erroris destructionem necessarium fuit sanctis patribus manifestare quod non est impossibile esse aliquid procedens a Deo patre quod sit ei coessentiale, in quantum accipit ab eo eamdem naturam quam pater habet. Sed quia filius ex eo quod accipit a patre eius naturam, dicitur ab eo natus vel genitus, spiritus sanctus autem non dicitur in Scripturis natus vel generatus, et tamen dicitur esse a Deo, aestimavit Macedonius quod spiritus sanctus non sit coessentialis patri, sed sit eius creatura; non enim credebat quod aliquis possit ab alio naturam eius accipere nisi ab eo nasceretur et eius filius esset. Unde aestimavit infallibiliter sequi, si spiritus sanctus accipit a patre naturam et essentiam eius, quod sit genitus et filius. Et ideo ad huius erroris exclusionem necessarium fuit quod doctores nostri manifestarent quod divina natura potest communicari duplici processione; quarum una est generatio vel nativitas, alia vero non; et hoc est quaerere processionum distinctionem in divinis. Quidam ergo dixerunt, quod processiones in divinis distinguuntur seipsis; et ratio huius positionis fuit, quia ponebant quod relationes non distinguunt divinas hypostases, sed earum distinctionem manifestant tantum, aestimantes quod relationes in divinis essent ad modum proprietatum individualium in rebus creatis, quae distinctionem individuorum non causant, sed manifestant tantum. Dicunt ergo quod hypostases in divinis distinguuntur solum per originem. Et quia ea quibus primo aliqua distinguuntur, oportet quod seipsis distinguantur, sicut differentiae oppositae, quibus species differunt, distinguuntur seipsis— ne in infinitum procedatur— ideo dicunt, quod processiones in divinis distinguuntur se ipsis. Hoc autem non potest esse verum: nam unumquodque distinguitur ab alio secundum speciem per id a quo speciem habet, et secundum numerum per id a quo individuatur. Differentia autem inter processiones divinas oportet quod sit non solum sicut ea quae differunt numero tantum, sed etiam sicut ea quae differunt specie, cum una sit generatio, alia vero non. Relinquitur ergo quod processiones divinae distinguantur secundum id a quo speciem habent. Nulla autem processio nec operatio nec motus habet speciem a se, sed sortitur speciem a termino vel a principio. Unde nihil est dictu, quod processiones aliquae distinguantur seipsis; sed oportet quod distinguantur penes principia vel penes terminos.	I answer that the early doctors of the faith were compelled to discuss matters of faith on account of the insistence of heretics. Thus Arius thought that existence from another is incompatible with the divine nature, wherefore he maintained that the Son and the Holy Spirit, whom Holy Writ describes as being from another, are creatures. In order to refute this error the holy fathers had to show that it is not impossible for someone to proceed from God the Father and yet be consubstantial with him, inasmuch as he receives from him the same nature as the Father has. Since, however, the Son in that he receives from the Father the nature of the Father is said to be born or begotten of the Father; whereas the Holy Spirit is not said in the Scriptures to be born or begotten while he is said to be from God, Macedonius thought that the Holy Spirit is not consubstantial with the Father but his creature: for he did not believe it possible for anyone to receive from another the latter’s nature unless he were born of him (and were his son. Hence he thought that if the Holy Spirit receives from the Father the latter’s nature and essence it must infallibly follow that he is begotten and a Son. Wherefore to refute this error it was necessary for our doctors to show that the divine nature can be communicated by a twofold procession, one being a begetting or nativity, and the other not: and this is the same as to seek the difference between the divine processions. Accordingly some have maintained that the processions in God are distinct by themselves. The reason for this view was because they held that the relations do not differentiate the divine hypostases but only manifest their distinction: for they thought relations in God were like individual properties in creatures, which properties do not cause but only manifest the distinction between individuals. They say then that in God the hypostases are distinct only by their origin. And seeing that those things whereby certain things are distinguished primarily must be distinguished by themselves—thus opposite differences, whereby species differ, differ by themselves, otherwise we should go on for ever—they maintain that the divine processions are distinct by themselves. But this cannot be true: because one thing is distinguished from another specifically by that which gives it its species, and numerically by that which gives it individuality. Now the difference between the divine processions must not be merely like that which distinguishes things numerically; it must be like that which differentiates things specifically, since one is generation and the other not. Consequently the divine processions are distinguished by that which gives them their species. But no procession, operation or movement has its species from itself, but from its term or principle. Hence it is futile to say that any processions are distinguished by themselves: and they must differ in relation either to their principles or to their terms.
Et ideo dixerunt quidam, quod processiones in divinis distinguuntur penes principia; secundum hoc, dico, quod una processio est per modum naturae vel intellectus, alia vero per modum voluntatis; nomina enim intellectus et voluntatis significare videntur quaedam operationum et processionum principia. Sed, si quis diligenter consideret, de facili videre potest quod hoc non sufficit ad divinarum processionum distinctionem, nisi aliud addatur. Cum enim oporteat in procedente inveniri similitudinem eius quod est processionis principium, sicut in rebus creatis similitudinem formae generantis necesse est esse in genito; oportet, quod si processiones in divinis distinguuntur per hoc quod principium unius est natura vel intellectus, alterius vero voluntas, quod in procedente secundum unam processionem inveniatur tantum id quod naturae est vel intellectus; in altero vero id quod est voluntatis tantum; quod patet esse falsum. Nam per unam processionem, quae est filii a patre, communicat pater filio quidquid habet, et naturam et intellectum et potentiam et voluntatem, et quidquid absolute dicitur: ut sicut filius est verbum, id est sapientia genita, ita posset dici natura vel voluntas vel potentia genita, idest per generationem accepta, vel magis huiusmodi per generationem accipiens. Unde patet quod ex quo omnia attributa essentialia concurrunt in unam processionem filii, non possit processionum differentia inveniri secundum rationes attributorum diversas; ita quod per unam processionem attendatur communicatio unius attributi, et per aliam communicatio alterius. Cum autem processionis terminus sit habere (cum ad hoc procedat persona divina ut habeat quod accipit procedendo) processiones autem secundum terminos distinguantur, necesse est ut sicut habens distinguitur in divinis, ita distinguatur et procedens. Habens autem non distinguitur in divinis ab habente per hoc quod hic habeat haec attributa, ille vero alia; sed per hoc quod eadem unus habet ab alio. Nam omnia quae habet pater habet filius; sed in hoc distinguitur filius a patre, quia filius habet ea a patre. Sic ergo procedens ab alio procedente distinguitur non quia unus haec procedendo accipiat, alius illa, sed quia unus eorum ab alio accipit. Quidquid ergo invenitur in processione divina quod statim in una processione potest intelligi, nulla alia praeintellecta, unius tantum processionis est; ibi vero statim alia processio inveniri potest, ubi eadem quae per prima processionem sunt accepta, iterum derivantur in aliam. Et sic solus ordo processionum qui attenditur secundum originem processionis, multiplicat in divinis.	Wherefore some said that in God the processions are distinguished in relation to their principles: inasmuch as one procession is by way of nature or intellect, and the other by way of will, since the terms intellect and will would seem to indicate principles of operations and processions. But if we consider the matter carefully we shall easily see that this does not suffice for the distinction of the divine persons unless something else be added. For since that which proceeds must bear a resemblance to the principle of the procession, just as in creatures a likeness to the form of the generator must be in the thing generated; it follows—if processions in God are distinguished by the fact that the principle of one is the nature or intellect, while the principle of the other is the will—that in the person proceeding by the one procession there will be something pertaining only to nature or intellect, and in the other something that pertains only to the will: which is evidently false. Because by the one procession, i.e. of the Son from the Father, the latter communicates to the Son all that he has, nature, intelligence, power and will, and whatsoever is attributed to him absolutely; wherefore as the Son is the Word, i.e. Wisdom Begotten, so may he be called Begotten Nature, Will, or Power Begotten, i.e. received by generation, or rather the recipient of these by generation. Hence it is plain that since all the essential attributes concur towards the one procession of the Son, the difference between the processions cannot be ascribed to the different concepts of the attributes; as though one attribute were communicated by one procession, and another attribute by another procession. Now whereas the term of a procession is to have (since a divine person proceeds so as to have what he receives by proceeding), and whereas processions are distinguished by their terms, it follows of necessity that in God he who proceeds is distinguished in the same way as he who has. Now in God haver is not distinguished from haver by the fact that the one has these attributes, and the other has those; but by the fact that the one has the same things from the other. For the Son has all that the Father has: yet in this is he distinguished from the Father, that he has them from the Father. Accordingly one proceeding person is distinguished from the other proceeding person, not as though the one by proceeding receives some things, while the other receives other things, but because one of them receives from the other. Hence whatever is in a divine procession that can at once be conceived as being in one procession without any other procession being presupposed, belongs to one procession only: but there will be at once another procession if those same things that were received by the first procession are again received by another procession. Thus it is only the order of processions, which arises from their origin, that multiplies processions in God.
Unde convenienter dixerunt qui posuerunt unam processionem esse per modum naturae et intellectus, aliam per modum voluntatis, quantum ad id quod processio quae est secundum naturam vel intellectum non praeexigit aliam processionem; processio autem quae est per modum voluntatis, aliam processionem praeexigit: nam amor alicuius rei non potest a voluntate procedere nisi praeintelligatur processisse ab intellectu illius rei verbum conceptum; bonum enim intellectum est obiectum voluntatis.	Hence not without reason some held that one procession being by way of intelligence and nature, and the other by way of will, the former procession does not presuppose another procession, whereas the latter does: because love of a thing cannot proceed from the will except on the presupposition that the conceived word of that thing has already proceeded: since good understood is the object of the will.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod processio in divinis dicitur esse substantialis quia non secundum aliquod accidens attenditur; sed per eam, substantiam recipit persona procedens.	Reply to the First Objection. Procession in God is said to be substantial because it does not arise from an accident:. nevertheless thereby the proceeding person receives substance.
Secundum et tertium concedimus.	We grant the Second and Third Objections.
Ad quartum dicendum est, quod nihil prohibet a voluntate aliquid naturaliter procedere. Voluntas enim naturaliter tendit in ultimum finem, sicut et quaelibet alia potentia naturaliter operatur ad suum obiectum; et inde est quod homo naturaliter appetit felicitatem; et eodem modo Deus naturaliter amat suam bonitatem, sicut etiam naturaliter intelligit suam veritatem. Sicut ergo filius naturaliter procedit a patre ut verbum, ita spiritus sanctus naturaliter procedit ab eo ut amor. Nec tamen spiritus sanctus procedit per modum naturae: hoc enim procedere dicitur in divinis per modum naturae quod procedit sicut ea quae in creaturis a natura producuntur, et non a voluntate. Sic ergo differt naturaliter produci, et produci per modum naturae; dicitur enim aliquid produci naturaliter propter naturalem habitudinem quam habet ad suum principium: per modum vero naturae produci dicitur quod producitur ab aliquo principio sic producente sicut natura producit.	Reply to the Fourth Objection. There is nothing to prevent something proceeding from the will naturally. For the will naturally tends to the ultimate end, just as every other power naturally works to attain its object. Hence it is that man naturally desires happiness, and in like manner God naturally loves his own goodness, just as he naturally understands his own truth. Accordingly just as the Son as Word naturally proceeds from the Father, so the Holy Spirit naturally proceeds from him as Love. The Holy Spirit does not, however, proceed by way of nature, because in God to proceed by way of nature is to proceed in the same way as in creatures things are produced by nature and not by the will. Wherefore to be produced naturally and to be produced by way of nature differ inasmuch as a thing is said to be produced naturally on account of its natural connexion with its principle, whereas it is said to be produced by way of nature if it be produced by a principle in the same way as nature produces.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod naturalis necessitas secundum quam voluntas aliquid ex necessitate velle dicitur, ut felicitatem, libertati voluntatis non repugnat, ut Augustinus docet. Libertas enim voluntatis violentiae vel coactioni opponitur. Non est autem violentia vel coactio in hoc quod aliquid secundum ordinem suae naturae movetur, sed magis in hoc quod naturalis motus impeditur: sicut cum impeditur grave ne descendat ad medium; unde voluntas libere appetit felicitatem, licet necessario appetat illam. Sic autem et Deus sua voluntate libere amat seipsum, licet de necessitate amet seipsum. Et necessarium est quod tantum amet seipsum quantum bonus est, sicut tantum intelligit seipsum quantum est. Libere ergo spiritus sanctus procedit a patre, non tamen possibiliter, sed ex necessitate. Nec possibile fuit ipsum procedere minorem patre; sed necessarium fuit ipsum patri esse aequalem, sicut et filium, qui est verbum patris.	Reply to the Fifth Objection. As Augustine teaches (De Civ. Dei, v, 10) the natural necessity under which the will is said to will a thing of necessity—happiness, for instance—is not incompatible with free-will: but free-will is opposed to violence or compulsion. Now there is no violence or compulsion when a thing is moved in accordance with the order of its nature, but there is if its natural movement be hindered, as when a heavy body is prevented from moving down towards the centre. Hence the will naturally desires happiness, although it desires it necessarily: and thus also God by his will loves himself freely, although he loves himself of necessity. Moreover it is necessary that he love himself as much as he is good, even as he understands himself as much as he is. Therefore the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father freely, not however potentially but necessarily. Nor was it possible for him to proceed so as to be less than the Father: but it was necessary for him to be equal to the Father, even as the Son who is the Father’s Word.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod creatura non procedit a voluntate divina naturaliter neque ex necessitate; licet enim Deus sua voluntate naturaliter et ex necessitate amet suam bonitatem, et talis amor procedens sit spiritus sanctus; non tamen naturaliter aut ex necessitate vult creaturas produci, sed gratis. Non enim creaturae sunt ultimus finis voluntatis divinae, neque ab eis dependet bonitas Dei, qui est ultimus finis, cum ex creaturis divinae bonitati nihil accrescat; sicut etiam homo ex necessitate vult felicitatem, non tamen ea quae ad felicitatem ordinantur.	Reply to the Sixth Objection. The creature does not proceed naturally or necessarily from the divine will: for though God by his will naturally and necessarily, loves his goodness, and the love thus proceeding is the Holy Spirit, yet neither naturally nor necessarily does he will creatures to be produced, but gratuitously. For creatures are not the last end of the divine will, nor does God’s goodness depend on them (which goodness is his last end), since it gains nothing from creatures: even so man of necessity desires happiness, but not the things ordained thereto.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod licet natura et voluntas in Deo non differant re, sed ratione tantum, tamen ille qui procedit per modum voluntatis, oportet quod realiter differat ab eo qui procedit per modum naturae, et una processio realiter ab alia differat. Dictum est enim, quod processio per modum naturae intelligitur quando aliquid procedit ab aliquo sicut illud quod procedit a natura; et similiter per modum voluntatis quando procedit sicut id quod procedit a voluntate. Semper enim voluntas aliquid producit aliqua processione praesupposita. Non enim voluntas in aliquid tendit nisi praeexistente productione intellectus aliquid concipientis: cum bonum intellectum moveat voluntatem. Processio autem quae est a naturali agente, non praesupponit aliam processionem nisi per accidens, in quantum scilicet unum naturale agens dependet ab alio naturali agente: sed tamen hoc non pertinet ad rationem naturae in quantum natura est. Unde illa processio per modum naturae intelligitur in divinis quae nullam aliam praesupponit; illa vero per modum voluntatis quae ex praesupposita processione principium sumit. Et sic oportet processionem esse ex processione, et procedentem ex procedente; hoc autem facit realem differentiam in divinis.	Reply to the Seventh Objection. Although nature and will in God differ not in reality but logically, nevertheless he who proceeds by way of will must be distinct from him who proceeds by way of nature, and the one procession must differ from the other. For we have already stated that to proceed by way of nature means to proceed in the same way as that which proceeds from nature, and that to proceed by way of will means to proceed as that which proceeds from the will. Now the will does not proceed without a previous procession; for it does not tend to a thing without the previous procession of the intellect in forming its concept of that thing, since the good understood moves the will. Now the procession from a natural agent does not presuppose another procession unless accidentally, inasmuch as one natural agent depends on another natural agent: but this is not essential to nature qua nature. Therefore in God this procession by way of nature is one that presupposes no other: while the procession by way of will has its beginning from a procession that is presupposed. Hence there must needs be procession from procession, and proceeding person from a proceeding person: and this causes a real distinction in God.
Octavum concedimus.	We grant the Eighth Objection.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod utriusque processionis similitudinem Deus indidit creaturis: sed tamen per processionem quae est per modum naturae, natura in rebus creatis communicari potest: effectus enim est similis agenti in quantum est agens; unde per actionem cuius natura est principium, effectus naturam recipere potest; sed per actionem cuius voluntas est principium, effectus non potest recipere nisi similitudinem eius quod est in voluntate, sicut finis vel formae, ut in artificialibus patet. Quidquid autem est in Deo, est divina natura; unde oportet quod per utramque processionem natura communicetur.	Reply to the Ninth Objection. God has implanted in the creature a likeness to both processions. By the procession that is by way of nature it is possible in created things for the nature to be communicated, since the effect is like the agent as such: wherefore by an action whereof nature is the principle, the effect can receive the nature: whereas by an action whereof the will is the principle, the effect can receive the likeness of that alone which is in the will, for instance, a likeness of the end in view; or of the form, as in the products of art. But whatsoever is in God is the divine nature: and consequently the nature must be communicated by either procession.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod cum dicitur in divinis processio per modum naturae vel voluntatis, non ponitur in Deo modus qui sit qualitas divinae substantiae superaddita, sed ostenditur similitudinis cuiusdam comparatio inter processiones divinas et processiones quae sunt in rebus creatis.	Reply to the Tenth Objection. When we speak of procession in God by way of nature or will, we do not ascribe to God a mode as though it were a quality added to the divine substance, but we indicate a comparative likeness between the divine processions and the processions to be observed in creatures.
Ad undecimum dicendum, quod in divinis processio quae est per modum intellectus, non distinguitur a processione quae est per modum naturae; distinguitur autem ab utraque processio quae est per modum voluntatis. Et hoc propter tria: primo quidem, quia sicut processio quae est per modum naturae, non praeexigit aliam processionem, ita nec processio quae est per modum intellectus; processio autem quae est per modum voluntatis, de necessitate praeexigit processionem quae est per modum intellectus. Secundo, quia sicut natura producit aliquid in similitudinem sui, ita et intellectus tam intra quam extra; intra quidem, sicut verbum est similitudo rei intellectae, et intellectus intelligentis seipsum; extra autem, sicut forma intellecta inducitur in artificiatum. Voluntas autem non producit suam similitudinem nec intus, nec extra. Intus quidem non, quia amor, qui est intranea processio voluntatis, non est similitudo aliqua voluntatis vel voliti, sed quaedam impressio relicta ex volito in voluntate, aut quaedam unio unius ad alterum. Extra autem non, quia voluntas imprimit in artificiatum formam intellectam prius quam volitam secundum ordinem rationis; unde principaliter est similitudo intellectus, licet secundario voluntatis. Tertio, quia processio naturae est tantum ab uno sicut ab agente, si sit perfectum agens. Nec obstat quod in animalibus generatur aliquid ex duobus, scilicet ex patre et matre; nam solus pater est agens in generatione, mater vero patiens. Similiter autem processio intellectus est ab uno solo; sed amicitia, quae est amor mutuus, procedit ex duobus ad invicem se amantibus.	Reply to the Eleventh Objection. In God there is no distinction between procession by way of intelligence and procession by way of nature: but there is a distinction between both of these and the procession by way of will: and this for three reasons.—First, because just as procession by way of nature does not presuppose another procession, so neither does procession by way of intelligence: whereas procession by way of will necessarily presupposes procession by way of intelligence.—Secondly, because just as nature produces something in likeness to itself, so also does the intellect both within and without: within, since the word is the likeness of the thing understood, and of the intellect understanding itself: without, as when the form understood is introduced into the product of art. On the other hand the will does not produce its likeness either within or without. Not within, since love which is the intimate procession of the will is not a likeness of the will or the thing willed, but a kind of impression made on the will by the thing willed, or a kind of union between these two. Nor without, because the will imprints on the artifact the form which in the logical order was understood before it was willed, wherefore it is a likeness first of the intellect, though secondly of the will.—Thirdly, because the procession of nature is from only one agent, if the agent be perfect. Nor does it matter that in animals one is generated of two, namely the father and mother; since the father alone is agent in generation while the mother is patient. Likewise the procession of the intellect is from one only; whereas friendship or mutual love proceeds from two loving each other.
Ad duodecimum dicendum quod, licet in divinis non proprie dicatur genus et species, vel universale et particulare, tamen— ut de divinis secundum quamdam similitudinem creaturarum loquamur— pater et filius et spiritus sanctus distinguuntur sicut plura individua unius speciei, ut etiam Damascenus dicit. Sed attendendum est, quod in aliquo individuo in genere substantiae possumus speciem dupliciter considerare: uno modo speciem hypostasis ipsius; alio modo speciem proprietatis individualis. Dato enim quod Socrates sit albus et Plato sit niger, et posito quod albedo et nigredo sint proprietates individuantes Socratem et Platonem, verum erit dicere, quod Socrates et Plato sunt unum specie, sub qua specie hypostases continentur. Conveniunt enim in humanitate, sed distinguuntur secundum speciem proprietatis; albedo enim et nigredo specie differunt; et similiter est in patre et filio. Considerantur enim ut unum specie, cuius istae hypostases sunt supposita, in quantum conveniunt in una natura deitatis; sed secundum speciem proprietatis personalis inveniuntur differre; paternitas enim et filiatio sunt relationes secundum speciem diversae. Sciendum est etiam, quod generatio in rebus creatis per se ordinatur ad speciem: natura enim intendit generare hominem; unde et natura speciei per generationem multiplicatur in rebus creatis. Processio autem in divinis est ad multiplicationem hypostasum, in quibus natura divina una numero invenitur: unde processiones in divinis sunt differentes quasi secundum speciem, propter differentiam proprietatum personalium, licet in procedentibus sit una natura communis.	Reply to the Twelfth Objection. Although strictly speaking genus and species, universal and particular, are not predicated of God, nevertheless as far as it is possible to compare God to creatures, the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are distinguished from one another like several individuals of one species, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4). It must be observed, however, that there are two ways of considering the species in a particular individual of the genus of substance: we may consider the species of its hypostasis, or we may consider the species of its individual property. Thus given that Socrates is white and Plato black, and granted that white and black are properties individualising Socrates and Plato, it will be true to say that Socrates and Plato are one in species, in which their hypostases are contained. For they agree in humanity, but differ in the species of their property; since white and black differ specifically. It is the same with the Father and the Son. For they are considered as one in the species of which their hypostases are supposits, in that they agree in the nature of the Godhead: but they differ in the species of a personal property: since paternity and filiation are relations of different species. It must also be observed that in creatures generation is Per se directed to the species, for nature intends to generate a man; wherefore the specific nature is multiplied by generation in created things. But in God procession is directed to the multiplication of hypostases in which the divine nature is numerically one: wherefore in God the processions are quasi-specifically different by reason of the difference between the personal properties, although in the proceeding persons there is one common nature.
Et per hoc patet solutio ad decimumtertium et ad decimumquartum.	This suffices for the Replies to the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Objections.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod spiritus sanctus procedit a patre et filio in quantum sunt plures, si habeatur respectus ad supposita spirantia. Cum enim spiritus sanctus sit amor mutuus et nexus duorum, oportet quod a duobus spiretur. Sed si habetur respectus ad id quo spirantes spirant, sic procedit ab eis, in quantum sunt unum in natura divina: non enim potest ab aliquo procedere Deus nisi a Deo.	Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as from two persons if we consider the spirating supposits: because since the Holy Spirit is the mutual love and bond of two he must needs be spirated by two. But if we consider that whereby they spirate, thus he proceeds from them as one in the divine nature: since from none but God can God proceed.
Ad decimumsextum dicendum est quod processio, quae condividitur paternitati et filiationi, est proprietas personalis spiritus sancti; quae licet sit relatio, quia tamen non est nominata, sicut paternitas et filiatio, significatur nomine processionis, ac si filiatio esset innominata et significaretur nomine nativitatis, quod est speciale nomen processionis filii. Processio autem spiritus sancti non habet speciale nomen, eo quod per talem modum processionis non invenitur in creaturis aliqua natura communicari, ut iam dictum est. Nomina vero a creaturis in divina transferimus; unde non sequitur quod processio communis in divinis sit una tantum.	Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. Procession as condivided with paternity and filiation is the personal property of the Holy Spirit: and although it is a relation, yet since it has not a special name. as paternity and filiation have, it is indicated by the name procession, just as if filiation were unnamed, and signified under the name of nativity, which is the special name of the Son’s procession. The procession of the Holy Spirit has no special name because, as already stated, in creatures a nature is not communicated in this way: and we transfer names from creatures in speaking of God. Hence it does not follow that in God there is but one common procession.
Ad decimumseptimum dicendum, quod in creatura quae est accidentium susceptiva, potest aliquid esse quod non est rei natura; non autem in Deo: et propter hoc in divinis secundum quemlibet modum processionis communicatur natura, non autem in creaturis; licet enim sint in eis processiones diversae, tamen natura non communicatur nisi per unum modum.	Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. In a creature which is susceptive of accidents there can be something in a thing besides its nature: but not in God. For this reason in God the nature is communicated by any mode of procession, but not in creatures: because although there are various processions in creatures, the nature is communicated in one way only.
Ad decimumoctavum dicendum, quod procedere a patre secundum modum coaeternitatis competit processioni filii in quantum est processio divina: unde convenit etiam processioni spiritus sancti; tamen non competit processioni filii secundum quod distinguitur a processione spiritus sancti.	Reply to the Eighteenth Objection. The procession of the Son is co-eternal with the Father inasmuch as it is a divine procession, wherefore this applies also to the procession of the Holy Spirit: but it does not apply to the procession of the Son as distinct from that of the Holy Spirit.
Ad decimumnonum dicendum, quod filius est sufficiens ratio processionis temporalis creaturae ut verbum et exemplar; sed oportet quod spiritus sanctus sit ratio processionis creaturae ut amor. Sicut enim dicitur Sap. IX, 1, quod Deus facit omnia suo verbo, ita dicitur Sap. XI, 25; quod diligit omnia quae sunt, et nihil odit eorum quae fecit; et Dionysius dicit, quod divinus amor non permisit ipsum sine germine esse.	Reply to the Nineteenth Objection. The Son is a sufficient type of the temporal procession of the creature, if we consider him as Word and exemplar: but the Holy Spirit must needs be the type of that procession inasmuch as he is Love. For just as it is said (Wis. ix, I) that God made all things by his Word, so is it stated (ibid. xi, 23) that he loves all things that are and hates none of the things which he has made: and Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). that “God’s love did not permit him to be barren.”
Ad vicesimum dicendum, quod natura perfecta in multas operationes potest, licet ad unamquamque operationem ei pauca sufficiant.	Reply to the Twentieth Objection. Perfect nature is capable of many works although few things suffice it for each one.
Ad vicesimumprimum dicendum, quod a patre uno et solo, est una sola processio, scilicet filii; a patre autem et a filio simul, est alia processio, scilicet spiritus sancti.	Reply to the Twenty-first Objection. From the one Father alone there is only one procession, namely of the Son: but from the Father and Son together, there is another procession, that of the Holy Spirit.
Ad vicesimumsecundum dicendum, quod processio spiritus sancti est processio amoris. Per processionem autem amoris non producitur aliquid ut recipiens formam eius a quo procedit, sive naturam; et ideo processio amoris non habet rationem generationis vel nativitatis. Sed quod spiritus sanctus naturam et formam Dei patris recipiat sua processione, hoc habet in quantum est amor Dei, in quo non est aliquid quod non sit de natura ipsius.	Reply to the Twenty-second Objection. The procession of the Holy Spirit is a procession of love. Now by a procession of love nothing is produced as a recipient of the form or nature of that whence it proceeds: and consequently it is not a generation or nativity. That the Holy Spirit receives by his procession the nature and form of God the Father is owing to the fact that he is God’s love, wherein there is nothing that is not the divine nature.
Et per hoc patet responsio ad vicesimumtertium.	This suffices for the Reply to the Twenty-third Objection.
Ad ea etiam quibus ostendebatur quod sunt in divinis plures processiones quam duae, respondendum est.	We must also reply to the arguments which concluded that there are more than two processions in God.
Ad quorum primum dicendum, quod in divinis una et eadem est processio quae est per modum intellectus et quae est per modum naturae, ut supra, ostensum est.	1. As stated above (replies to seventh and eleventh objections) in God it is but one and the same procession by way of intelligence and by way of nature.
Ad secundum dicendum quod natura humana materialis est, id est ex materia et forma composita; et ideo in hominibus processio per modum naturae non potest esse nisi secundum aliquam transmutationem naturalem; processio autem quae est per modum intellectus, semper est immaterialis, secundum quod ipse intellectus immaterialis est; unde in hominibus non potest esse una et eadem processio quae est per modum naturae et quae est per modum intellectus; in divinis autem est una et eadem, eo quod natura divina immaterialis est.	2. Human nature is material, that is to say composed of matter and form: wherefore in man there cannot be procession by way of nature save in respect of a natural transmutation. But procession by way of intelligence is always immaterial, wherefore in man procession by way of nature and procession by way of intelligence cannot be one and the same, whereas in God it is one and the same because the divine nature is immaterial.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod aliud est procedere in alterum, et aliud est procedere ab alio; procedere enim in alterum est suam similitudinem alteri communicare: et per hunc modum est intelligenda divinae bonitatis processio in creaturas, secundum Dionysium; procedere autem ab alio est esse ab alio habere; et sic loquimur hic de processione, secundum quem modum constat quod non convenit patri procedere.	3. Procession into differs from procession from. To proceed into something is to communicate one’s likeness to something, and in this sense Dionysius means that the divine goodness proceeds into creatures. To proceed from a thing is to receive one’s being from another, and as in this sense We are speaking of procession now, it is clear that procession is not to be attributed to the Father.

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Q. X: ARTICLE III The Order Between Procession and Relation in God [ Sum. Th. I, Q. xiii, A. 3.]
Tertio quaeritur de ordine processionis ad relationem in divinis. Et videtur quod processio secundum intellectum sit prior relatione in divinis.	THE third point of inquiry concerns the order between procession and relation in God: and it would seem that in God procession logically precedes relation.
Dicit enim Magister in XXVII distinct. I Lib. Sentent., quod pater semper est pater, quia semper genuit filium. Generatio autem processionem significat, pater autem relationem. Ergo processio secundum intellectum praecedit relationes in divinis.	1. The Master (I, D. 27) says that the Father is Father from eternity because from eternity he begot the Son. Now begot indicates procession and Father indicates relation. Therefore logically procession precedes relation in God.
Praeterea, philosophus dicit, quod relationes ex actionibus nascuntur, vel ex quantitatibus. Constat autem quod relationes divinae non innascuntur ex quantitate. Ergo secundum modum intelligendi consequitur ex actione. Processiones autem in divinis personis significantur per modum personalium actionum. Ergo processiones in divinis praecedunt secundum intellectum relationes.	2. The Philosopher (Metaph. v), says that relations result from action or quantity. But it is plain that the divine relations do not arise from quantity: therefore in our way of thinking they arise from action. Now processions in the divine persons are designated after the manner of divine actions. Therefore the divine processions logically precede the relations.
Praeterea, absolutum est prius relativo, sicut unum est prius quam multa. Sed actiones magis ad absoluta accedunt quam relationes. Ergo priores sunt secundum intellectum.	3. The absolute precedes the relative, even as unity precedes number. Now actions are more akin to the absolute than relations are. Therefore logically they precede.
Praeterea, omne relativum ad aliud dicitur. Non autem potest esse aliud ubi non est distinctio. Ergo relatio distinctionem praesupponit. Distinctio autem in divinis personis est secundum originem, prout scilicet unus procedit ab alio. Ergo processiones secundum intellectum praecedunt relationes in divinis.	4. A thing is said to be relative in relation to something else. Now there cannot be something else where there is ‘no distinction. Therefore relation presupposes distinction. But in God distinction in the divine persons is according to origin, inasmuch as one person proceeds from another. Therefore in God the processions precede logically the relations.
Praeterea, omnis processio praecedit secundum intellectum processionis terminum. Filiatio autem quae est relatio filii, est terminus nativitatis, quae est eiusdem filii processio. Ergo processio filii praecedit filiationem. Sed filiatio et paternitas sunt simul non solum natura et tempore, sed etiam intellectu; quia unum relativorum est de intellectu alterius. Nativitas ergo filii praecedit paternitatem secundum intellectum, et multo magis generatio, quae est actus patris. Processiones ergo simpliciter relationes praecedunt secundum intellectum in divinis.	5. Logically every procession precedes its term. Now filiation which is the relation of the Son is the term of nativity which is his procession. Therefore the Son’s procession precedes filiation. But filiation and paternity not only in nature and time but also logically are simultaneous: because the one relative cannot be understood without the other. Therefore the Son’s nativity and a fortiori generation which is the act of the Father logically precede paternity: and consequently the procession is in God simply precede the relations logically.
Sed contra. Prius secundum intellectum est persona quam actio personalis. Relationes autem sunt constitutivae personarum, processiones autem sunt quasi personales actiones. Ergo prius secundum intellectum sunt relationes quam processiones.	On the contrary logically person precedes personal action. Now the divine relations constitute the persons, while the processions are personal actions as it were. Therefore the relations precede the processions logically.
Praeterea, processio oportet quod sit alicuius ab alio; sicut enim nulla res generat seipsam ut sit, ut Augustinus dicit, ita nulla res a seipsa procedit. Processio ergo distinctionem in divinis requirit. Distinctio autem non est in divinis nisi per relationes. Ergo processiones in divinis praesupponunt relationes.	Again procession must needs be from one thing to another, for just as nothing brings itself into being according to Augustine (De Trin. i, i) so nothing proceeds from itself: wherefore in God procession postulates distinction. But there is no distinction in God except by the relations. Therefore in God procession presupposes relation.
Respondeo. Dicendum quod ordo absque distinctione non est. Unde ubi non est distinctio secundum rem, sed solum secundum modum intelligendi, ibi non potest esse ordo nisi secundum modum intelligendi. Distinctio autem secundum rem in divinis non est, nisi personarum ad invicem, et oppositarum relationum; unde in divinis non est ordo realis nisi quantum ad personas, inter quas est ordo naturae, secundum Augustinum, prout est alter ex altero, non quod alter sit prior altero. Processiones autem et relationes non distinguuntur in divinis secundum rem, sed solum secundum modum intelligendi. Unde et Augustinus dicit quod proprium patris est quod genuit filium. In quo datur intelligi, quod generare filium sit proprietas patris; nec est alia proprietas quam paternitas, quae dicitur esse patris proprietas personalis. Non est ergo inter processionem et relationem in divinis quaerendus ordo secundum rem, sed secundum modum intelligendi tantum. Sicut autem relatio et processio in divinis sunt idem secundum rem, et differunt secundum rationem tantum, ita et ipsa relatio, quamvis sit una secundum rem, est tamen multiplex secundum modum intelligendi. Intelligimus enim ipsam relationem ut constitutivam personae; quod quidem non habet in quantum est relatio. Quod ex hoc patet, quia relationes in rebus humanis non constituunt personas, cum relationes sint accidentia; persona vero est aliquid subsistens in genere substantiae; substantia autem per accidens constitui non potest. Sed habet hoc relatio in divinis quod personam constituat in quantum est divina relatio; ex hoc enim habet quod sit idem cum divina essentia, cum in Deo nullum accidens esse possit: relatio enim, quia secundum rem est ipsa natura divina, hypostasim divinam constituere potest. Est ergo alius modus intelligendi quo intelligitur relatio ut constitutiva divinae personae, et alius quo intelligitur relatio ut relatio est. Unde nihil prohibet quod quantum ad unum modum intelligendi, relatio praesupponat processionem, quantum vero ad alium sit e converso. Sic ergo dicendum est, quod si consideretur relatio ut relatio est, praesupponit processionis intellectum; si autem consideretur ut est constitutiva personae, sic relatio quae est constitutiva personae, a qua est processio, est prior secundum intellectum quam processio; sicut paternitas in quantum est constitutiva personae patris, est prior secundum intellectum quam generatio. Relatio autem quae est constitutiva personae procedentis etiam in quantum est constitutiva personae, est posterior secundum intellectum quam processio, sicut filiatio quam nativitas; et hoc ideo quia persona procedens intelligitur ut terminus processionis.	I answer that there is no order without distinction: hence where there is no real but only logical distinction there can be only a logical order. Now in God there is no real distinction except between the persons and opposite relations: wherefore in God there is not real order except as regards the persons between whom, according to Augustine (Contra Maxim. iv), there is order of nature inasmuch as one is from another, not one before another. Now in God processions and relations are not really but only logically distinct. Wherefore Augustine says that it is proper to the Father to beget the Son: whereby he gives us to understand that to beget the Son is the personal property of the Father; nor is there any other property besides paternity that is the personal property of the Father. Consequently we are not to look for real order but only, for logical order between the divine processions and relations. Now just as in God relation and procession are in reality the same thing, and do not differ except logically; even so relation itself, although but one in reality is in our way of thinking manifold. For we consider relation as constituting the person: and yet it does not do this qua relation: which is clear from the fact that in man relations do not constitute persons, since relations are accidents, while person is something subsistent in the genus of substance; and substance cannot be constituted by an accident. But in God relation constitutes a person inasmuch as it is a divine relation: because it is identical with the divine essence, since in God there cannot be any accidents: wherefore relation being in reality the divine essence can constitute a divine hypostasis. Consequently the consideration of a relation as constituting a divine person differs from the consideration of a relation qua relation. Wherefore there is nothing to prevent relation from presupposing procession if we consider relation from the one point of view, whereas the contrary obtains if we consider it from the other point of view. Accordingly we conclude that if we consider relation as such it presupposes procession logically, whereas if we consider it as constituting a person, the relation that constitutes the person from whom there is a procession precedes that procession logically: thus paternity as constituting the person of the Father logically precedes generation. On the other hand the relation that constitutes the proceeding person, even considered as constituting that person, is logically posterior to the procession as filiation is posterior to nativity: and this because the proceeding person is considered as the term of the procession.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Magister loquitur de paternitate considerata secundum quod relatio est.	Reply to the First Objection. The Master is speaking of paternity considered as a relation:
Et similiter dicendum ad secundum et tertium.	and the same answer applies to the Second and Third Objections.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod in rebus in quibus relationes sunt accidentia, oportet quod relatio praesupponat distinctionem; in divinis autem relationes constituunt tres personas distinctas.	Reply to the Fourth Objection. In things where relations Are accidents relation must presuppose distinction: but in’ God the relations constitute three distinct persons,
Ad quintum dicendum, quod paternitas est de intellectu filiationis, et e converso, secundum quod utrumque consideratur ut relatio quaedam. Sic autem dicimus, quod relationes sequuntur processiones ordine intellectus.	Reply to the Fifth Objection. If we consider paternity and filiation as relations the one cannot be understood without the other: and in this sense we say that relations follow the processions in the logical order.
Aliae duae rationes procedunt de relationibus secundum quod sunt constitutivae personarum.	The remaining two objections consider the relations as constituting the persons.

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Q. X: ARTICLE IV Does the Holy Spirit Proceed From the Son? [ Sum. Th. I, Q. xxxvi, A. 2: C.G. IV, xxiv, xxv]
Quarto quaeritur utrum spiritus sanctus procedat a filio. Et videtur quod non.	THE fourth point of inquiry is whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son: and it would seem that he does not.
Dicit enim Dionysius, quod filius et spiritus sanctus sunt sicut flores deigenae divinitatis. Flos autem non est a flore. Ergo spiritus sanctus non est a filio.	1. Dionysius (Div. Nom. iii) says that “the Son and the Holy Spirit are as it were flowers of the God-bearing divinity.” Now flower does not proceed from flower. Therefore the Holy Spirit is not from the Son.
Praeterea, si filius est principium spiritus sancti, aut hoc habet a se, aut ab alio. A se non habet: non enim filio in quantum filius est, convenit esse principium, sed magis esse a principio. Si autem habet a patre, oportet quod hoc modo sit principium sicut pater. Pater autem est principium per generationem. Ergo filius erit principium spiritus sancti per generationem; et ita spiritus sanctus erit filius filii.	2. If the Son is the principle of the Holy, Ghost he has this either from himself or from another. He has it not from himself, since it belongs to the Son, as Son, to be from another rather than to be a principle. And if he has this from the Father he must needs be a principle in the same, way as the Father. But the Father is a principle by generation. Therefore the Son must be the principle of the Holy Spirit by generation, and thus the Holy Spirit will be the Son of the Son.
Praeterea, quidquid est commune patri et filio, similiter convenit utrique. Si ergo esse principium est commune patri et filio, filius erit principium eo modo quo pater. Pater autem est principium per generationem. Ergo et filius; et sic idem quod prius.	5. Whatsoever is common to the Father and the Son belongs to each in the same way. If then it is common to the Father and Son to be a principle, the Son will be a principle in the same way as the Father: and since the Father is a principle by generation the Son will be so also; and thus the same conclusion follows as above.
Praeterea, filius ideo filius est, quia procedit a patre et est verbum ipsius; spiritus autem sanctus dicitur verbum filii, secundum Basilium, qui hoc accipit ex eo quod apostolus dicit Hebr. I, 3, quod filius portat omnia verbo virtutis suae. Si ergo spiritus sanctus procedit a filio, oportet quod sit filius filii.	4. The Son is Son because he proceeds from the Father and is his Word. Now the Holy Spirit is the word of the Son, according to Basil (Contra Eunom. v), who gathers this from the statement of the Apostle (Heb. i, 3) that the Son upholds all things by the word of his Power. Therefore if the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son he must be the Son of the Son.
Praeterea, licet secundum rem paternitas et filiatio per prius sit in Deo quam in nobis, secundum illud apostoli ad Ephes. III, 15: ex quo, scilicet Deo patre, omnis paternitas in caelo et in terra nominatur; tamen secundum nominis impositionem haec nomina translata sunt ab humanis ad divina. Sed in humanis procedens a filio vocatur nepos. Si ergo spiritus sanctus procedit a filio, erit nepos patris; quod est absurdum.	5. Although in reality paternity and filiation are in God before being in us, according to the saying of the Apostle (Eph. iii, 15): Of whom, i.e. God the Father, all Paternity in heaven and earth is named: yet as regards the use of the terms they were transferred from human things to divine. Now among men the offspring of a son is a grandson: so, that if the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son he will be the Father’s grandson, which is absurd.
Praeterea, proprietas filii est in accipiendo: ex hoc enim filius dicitur quod accipit naturam patris per generationem. Si ergo filius ex se emittat spiritum sanctum, erunt in filio proprietates contrariae; quod est inconveniens.	6. The property of the Son consists in his receiving: for he is called Son because he receives the Father’s nature by generation. If then the Son sends forth the Holy Ghost from himself there will be two contrary properties in the Son, which is inadmissible.
Praeterea, quidquid est in divinis, aut est commune, aut proprium. Emittere autem spiritum sanctum non est commune toti Trinitati: non enim convenit spiritui sancto. Ergo est proprium patris, et sic non convenit filio.	7. Whatsoever is in God is either common or proper. Now the emission of the Holy Spirit is not common to all the Trinity, since it does not apply to the Holy Spirit. Therefore it is proper to the Father and does not apply to the Son.
Praeterea, spiritus sanctus amor est, ut Augustinus probat in Lib. de Trinit. Amor autem patris in filium gratuitus est; non enim amat filium quasi aliquid ab eo accipiens, sed solum quasi aliquid ei dans. Amor autem filii in patrem, est amor debitus; sic enim amat patrem quasi aliquid ab eo accipiens. Amor autem debitus est alius ab amore gratuito. Si ergo spiritus sanctus sit amor a patre et filio procedens, sequitur quod sit alius a seipso.	8. Augustine proves (De Trin. vi) that the Holy Spirit is love. Now the Father’s love of the Son is gratuitous, since he loves the Son not as though he received something from him but only as giving him something: whereas the Son’s love of the Father is a love that is due; because he loves the Father in that he receives from him. Now the love which is due is distinct from the love that is gratuitous Hence if the Holy Spirit is love proceeding from the Father and Son it follows that he is distinct from himself.
Praeterea, spiritus sanctus est amor gratuitus; unde et ab eo profluunt divisiones gratiarum, secundum illud I Cor. XII, 4: divisiones gratiarum sunt, idem vero spiritus. Si ergo amor filii in patrem non est amor gratuitus, spiritus sanctus non erit amor filii; non ergo procedit a filio.	9. The Holy Spirit is gratuitous love: wherefore from him flow the diversities of graces according to 1 Cor. xii, 4: There are diversities of graces, but the same spirit. If then the Son’s love of the Father is not gratuitous, the Holy Spirit will not be the Son’s love, and thus he does not proceed from him.
Praeterea, si spiritus sanctus procedit a filio ut amor, cum filius amet patrem sicut mater filium, oportebit quod spiritus sanctus sicut procedit a patre in filium, ita procedat a filio in patrem. Hoc autem est impossibile, ut videtur; sequeretur enim quod pater aliquid a filio reciperet, quod penitus esse non potest.	10. If the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son as love, since the Son loves the Father as the Father loves the Son, it will follow that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son to the Father just as he proceeds from the Father to the Son. But this is apparently impossible: for it would follow that the Father receives from the Son, which is utterly inadmissible.
Praeterea, sicut pater et filius diligunt se, ita filius et spiritus sanctus, vel pater et spiritus sanctus. Si ergo spiritus sanctus procedit a patre et filio, quia pater et filius diligunt se; pari ratione quia pater et spiritus sanctus diligunt se, procedit spiritus sanctus a seipso, quod est impossibile.	11. As the Father and Son love each other, so also do the Son and the Holy Spirit, or the Father and the Holy Spirit. If then the Holy Spirit proceeds from Father and Son because Father and Son love each other, in like manner because Father and Holy Spirit love each other, the Holy Spirit proceeds from himself: and this is impossible.
Praeterea, Dionysius dicit: universaliter non est audendum dicere aliquid nec etiam cogitare de supersubstantiali occulta divinitate, praeter ea quae divinitus nobis ex sacris eloquiis sunt expressa. In Scriptura autem sacra non exprimitur quod spiritus sanctus procedat a filio, sed solum quod procedat a patre, secundum illud Ioan. XV, 26: cum venerit Paraclitus quem ego mittam vobis a patre, spiritum veritatis, qui a patre procedit. Non ergo dicendum est nec cogitandum quod spiritus sanctus procedit a filio.	12. Dionysius (Div. Nom. i) says: “We must not dare to say or even think anything concerning the supersubstantial and hidden Godhead except what has been divinely revealed to us by the sacred oracles.” Now Scripture does not assert that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, but only that he proceeds from the Father, according to Jo. xv, 26; When the Paraclete cometh whom I will send you from the Father, the Spirit of truth, who proceeds from the Father. Therefore we must neither say nor think that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son.
Praeterea, in gestis I Ephesinae synodi sic dicitur, quod perlecto symbolo Nicenae synodi decrevit sancta synodus aliam fidem nulli licere proferre vel conscribere vel componere, praeter definitam a sanctis patribus, qui in Nicaea congregati sunt cum spiritu sancto; praesumentes autem aut componere fidem alteram aut protendere aut proferre volentibus converti ad notitiam veritatis vel ex Paganitate vel ex Iudaismo, vel ex haeresi aliqua; hos, si quidem sint episcopi aut clerici, alienos esse episcopos ab episcopatu, et clericos a clericatu; si vero sint laici, anathematizari. Et similiter in gestis Chalcedonensis synodi, post recitatam determinationem Conciliorum subditur: eos autem qui ausi sunt componere fidem alteram, aut proferre aut docere aut tradere alterum symbolum volentibus vel ex gentilitate ad cognitionem veritatis, vel Iudaeis, vel ex haeresi quacumque converti; hoc, si episcopi fuerint aut clerici, alienos esse episcopos ab episcopatu, et clericos a clero; si vero monachi aut laici fuerint, anathematizari.	13. In the Acts of the Council of Ephesus it is stated that after the reading of the Creed of the Council of Nicaea the holy synod decreed that “no one might Profess, write or devise any other faith other than that which was defined by the holy fathers assembled at Nicaea together with the Holy Spirit, and whosoever shall either presume to devise or teach or suggest another faith to such Pagans, Jews or heretics as are desirous of being converted to a knowledge of the truth, let them be deprived of their bishopric if they be bishops, and banished from the clergy if they be clerks: if they be laymen let them be excommunicated.” In like terms the Council of Chalcedon, after setting forth the decisions of other councils, continues: “Whosoever shall dare to devise another faith, or pronounce, teach or deliver another Creed to pagans, Jews or heretics wishing to be converted, such, if they be bishops or clerks, shall be deprived of their sees in the case of bishops, and unfrocked if they be clerks; and if they be monks or laymen they shall be excommunicated.”
In praemissa autem Concilii determinatione non habetur quod spiritus sanctus procedit a filio, sed solum quod procedat a patre. Legitur etiam in symbolo Constantinopolitanae synodi: credimus in spiritum sanctum dominum et vivificantem, ex patre procedentem, cum patre et filio adorandum et conglorificandum. Nullo ergo modo debuit addi in symbolo fidei quod spiritus sanctus procedat a filio.	Now in the definitions of the foregoing councils it is not stated that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, but only that he proceeds from the Father. Moreover we read in the profession of faith of the Council of Constantinople: “We believe in the Holy Spirit, Lord and Lifegiver, who proceeds from the Father; with the Father and Son to be adored and glorified.” Therefore by no means should it have been added in the Creed that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son.
Praeterea, si spiritus sanctus dicitur a filio procedere, aut hoc dicitur propter aliquam auctoritatem Scripturae, aut propter aliquam rationem. Auctoritas quidem sacrae Scripturae ad hoc ostendendum nulla videtur esse sufficiens; habetur siquidem in sacris Scripturis, quod spiritus sanctus sit filii; sicut dicitur Galat. IV, 6: misit Deus spiritum filii sui in corda vestra; et Rom. VIII, 9: si quis spiritum Christi non habet, hic non est eius. Habetur etiam quod spiritus sanctus sit missus a filio: dicit enim Christus, Ioan. XVI, 7: si enim non abiero, Paraclitus non veniet ad vos, si autem abiero, mittam eum ad vos. Non autem sequitur quod spiritus sanctus procedat a filio ex eo quod est filii, quia hoc huius multipliciter dicitur, secundum philosophum. Similiter etiam neque ex eo quod spiritus sanctus dicitur missus a filio; quia licet filius non sit a spiritu sancto dicitur tamen a spiritu sancto missus, secundum illud Is. XLVIII, 16, ex persona Christi: et nunc misit me dominus Deus, et spiritus eius; et Is., LXI, 1: spiritus domini super me (...) ad evangelizandum mansuetis misit me: quod in se dicit Christum esse completum.- Similiter etiam non potest per rationem efficaciter probari. Licet enim spiritus sanctus non sit a filio, adhuc tamen, ut videtur, distincti ad invicem remanebunt: differunt enim suis proprietatibus personalibus. Nihil ergo videtur cogere ad dicendum spiritum sanctum procedere a filio.	14. If it be asserted that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, this statement is made either on the authority of Scripture or on account of some proof. But seemingly Scripture nowhere affords sufficient authority for this statement. It is true that Holy Writ speaks of the Holy Spirit as being of the Son, thus (Gal. iv, 6) it is said: God sent the Spirit of his Son into your hearts, and (Rom. viii, 9): If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his. Again we read that the Holy Spirit was sent by the Son; thus Christ said (Jo. xvi, 7): For if I go not, the Paraclete will not come to you, but if I go, I will send him to you. Now it does not follow that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, from the fact that he is the Spirit of the Son, because according to the Philosopher the genitive case has many significations. Again it does not follow from the fact that the Holy Spirit is stated to be sent by the Son; since although the Son does not proceed from the Holy Spirit, he is said to be sent by the Holy Spirit, according to the words (Isa. xlviii, 16) spoken in Christ’s person: And now the Lord God and his Spirit hath sent me, and (Isa. lxi, I): The Spirit of the Lord is upon me... he hath sent me to preach to the meek: which words Christ declared to have been fulfilled in himself. Furthermore the statement cannot be upheld by any satisfactory argument. Thus even if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son they would still remain distinct from each other, since they differ by their personal properties. Nothing therefore compels us to say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son.
Praeterea, omne quod procedit ab aliquo, habet aliquid ab eo. Si ergo spiritus sanctus procedit a duobus, scilicet a patre et filio, oportet quod a duobus accipiat; et sic videtur sequi quod sit compositus.	15. Whatsoever proceeds from another derives something from that other. If then the Holy Spirit proceeds from two, namely the Father and the Son, it follows that he receives from two, and thus apparently that he is composite.
Praeterea, de ratione principii est quod non sit ab alio, secundum philosophum. Sed filius est ab alio, scilicet a patre. Ergo filius non est principium spiritus sancti.	16. It is essential to a principle that it derive not from another, according to the Philosopher (Phys. i, 6). Now the Son proceeds from another, namely the Father. Therefore the Son is not a principle of the Holy Spirit.
Praeterea, voluntas movet intellectum ad operandum, homo enim intelligit quando vult. Sed spiritus sanctus procedit per modum voluntatis ut amor, filius autem per modum intellectus ut verbum. Non ergo videtur quod spiritus procedat a filio, sed magis e converso.	17. The will moves the intellect to its act, since a man understands when he wills. But the Holy Spirit proceeds by way of will as love: and the Son proceeds by way of intellect as word. Therefore seemingly the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son but contrariwise.
Praeterea, nihil procedit ab eo in quo quiescit. Sed spiritus sanctus a patre procedit et in filio quiescit, ut scribitur in passione beati Andreae. Ergo spiritus sanctus non procedit a filio.	18. Nothing proceeds from that wherein it abides. Now the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and abides in the Son, as stated in the Acts of the Blessed Andrew. Therefore the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son.
Praeterea, simplex non potest procedere a duobus, quia effectus esset simplicior et prior quam causa. Sed spiritus sanctus est simplex. Non ergo procedit a duobus, scilicet a patre et filio.	19. A simple thing cannot proceed from two, since then the effect would be more simple than and prior to the cause. But the Holy Spirit is simple. Therefore he does not proceed from two, namely the Father and the Son.
Praeterea, si aliquid perfecte procedit ab uno, superfluum est quod procedat a duobus. Sed spiritus sanctus perfecte procedit a patre. Ergo superfluum esset quod procederet a patre et filio simul.	20. If a thing proceeds perfectly from one it is superfluous for it to proceed from two. Now the Holy Spirit proceeds perfectly from the Father. Therefore it would be superfluous for him to proceed from the Father and Son together.
Praeterea, sicut pater et filius sunt unum in substantia et natura, ita pater et spiritus sanctus. Sed spiritus sanctus non convenit cum patre in generatione filii. Ergo nec filius convenit cum patre in emissione spiritus sancti.	21. As the Father and the Son are one in substance and nature, so also are the Father and the Holy Spirit. Now the Holy Spirit does not concur with the Father in the generation of the Son. Neither therefore does the Son concur with the Father in sending forth the Holy Spirit.
Praeterea, filius est radius patris, ut patet per Dionysium. Spiritus autem sanctus est splendor. Splendor autem non est a radio. Ergo nec spiritus sanctus est a filio.	22. As Dionysius expresses it (Coelest. Hier. i) the Son is the ray of the Father. Now the Holy Spirit is brightness: and brightness does not issue from the ray. Therefore neither does the Holy Spirit proceed from the Son.
Praeterea, filius est quoddam lumen patris, cum sit verbum eius. Spiritus autem sanctus est sicut calor, est enim amor quidam; unde et super apostolos in specie ignis apparuit. Calor autem non est a lumine. Ergo nec spiritus sanctus a filio.	23. The Son is a kind of light of the Father, since he is his word: and the Holy Spirit is like heat, for he is love: wherefore he appeared over the Apostles under the form of fire (Acts xi). But heat does not come from light. Neither then does the Holy Spirit proceed from the Son.
Praeterea, Damascenus dicit, quod spiritus sanctus dicitur esse filii, sed non a filio.	24. Damascene (De Fide Orth. i) says that the Holy Spirit is said to be of the Son but not from the Son.
Sed contra. Est quod Athanasius dicit: spiritus sanctus a patre et filio non factus nec creatus nec genitus, sed procedens.	On the contrary Athanasius says (Symb.): The Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son; not made, nor created, but Proceeding.
Praeterea, spiritus sanctus dicitur tertia in Trinitate persona, secunda filius, prima pater. Ternarius autem procedit ab unitate mediante binario. Ergo spiritus sanctus procedit a patre mediante filio.	Again, the Holy Spirit is said to the third person in the Trinity, the Son the second, the Father the first. Now the number three proceeds from unity through the number two. Therefore the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son.
Praeterea, cum inter divinas personas sit summa convenientia, quaelibet divinarum personarum ad aliam habet immediatam germanitatem. Hoc autem non esset, si spiritus sanctus non esset a filio; tunc enim filius et spiritus sanctus non haberent germanitatem ad invicem immediate, sed solum mediante patre, in quantum ambo sunt ab uno. Ergo spiritus sanctus est a filio.	Again, since there is supreme agreement between the divine persons, each of them is immediately akin with the others. But this would not be the case if the Holy Spirit were not from the Son, for then the Son and the Holy Spirit would not be immediately akin with each other, but only through the Father, inasmuch as both are from one. Therefore the Holy Spirit is from the Son.
Praeterea, divinae personae non distinguuntur ab invicem nisi secundum originem. Si ergo spiritus sanctus non esset a filio, non distingueretur ab eo, quod est inconveniens.	Again, the divine persons are not distinct from one another otherwise than according to origin: so that if the Holy Spirit were not from the Soil he would not be distinguished from him; which is inadmissible.
Respondeo. Dicendum quod, secundum ea quae supra determinata sunt, necesse est spiritum sanctum a filio procedere; oportet enim, si filius et spiritus sanctus sunt duae personae, quod alia sit processio unius et alia alterius. Ostensum autem est supra, quod non possunt esse duae processiones in divinis nisi secundum ordinem processionum, ut scilicet a procedente secundum unam processionem sit alia processio. Necesse est ergo quod spiritus sanctus sit a filio.	I answer that according to what has already been concluded it is necessary that the Holy Spirit proceed from the Son. For since the Son and the Holy Spirit are two persons the procession of one must be distinct from the procession of the other. Now it has been proved (A. 2) that there cannot be two processions in God except by reason of order between processions, namely that there be a second procession from one who proceeds. It follows then of necessity that the Holy Spirit must be from the Son.
Sed praeter hanc rationem etiam ex aliis rationibus de necessitate probatur quod spiritus sanctus sit a filio. Oportet enim quod omnis differentia aliquorum sequatur ex prima radice distinctionis ipsorum; nisi forte sit differentia per accidens, sicut ambulans differt a sedente; et hoc ideo quia quaecumque per se insunt alicui, vel sunt de essentia eius, vel consequuntur essentialia principia, ex quibus est prima radix distinctionis rerum. In divinis autem non potest esse aliquid per accidens; quia omne quod inest alicui per accidens, cum sit extraneum a natura eius, oportet quod conveniat ei ex aliqua exteriori causa: quod non potest dici in divinis. Oportet ergo quod omnis differentia divinarum personarum ad invicem sequatur ex prima radice distinctionis earum. Prima autem radix distinctionis patris et filii, est ex paternitate et filiatione. Oportet ergo quod omnis differentia quae est inter patrem et filium, sequatur ex hoc quod ipse est pater, et ille filius. Esse autem principium spiritus sancti non convenit patri in quantum pater est, ratione paternitatis: sic enim non refertur nisi ad filium; unde sequeretur quod spiritus sanctus esset filius. Similiter autem nec hoc repugnat rationi filiationis, quia, secundum filiationem, non refertur ad aliud nisi ad patrem. Non ergo potest esse differentia inter patrem et filium in hoc quod pater sit principium spiritus sancti, non autem filius.	Besides this argument, however, there are other reasons which prove that the Holy Spirit is from the Son. All differences between any two things must arise from the original root of their distinction (except in the case of an accidental difference, as that between one who walks and one who sits) and this because whatsoever is in a thing per se, is either essential to it or results from its essential principles, and these things are the original root of distinction between things. In God, however, nothing can be accidental: because whatsoever is in a thing accidentally, since it is outside the nature of that thing, must come to it from some external cause, and this cannot be said of God. Accordingly any difference between the divine persons must follow from the original root of their distinction. Now the original root of the distinction between the Father and the Son is paternity and filiation. Wherefore any difference between the Father and the Son must follow from the fact that this one is the Father and that one the Son. But it does not belong to the Father as Father by reason of paternity to be the principle of the Holy Spirit, since thus he is related to the Son only, and it would follow that the Holy Spirit is the Son. In like manner this is not repugnant to the notion of filiation, since filiation implies relation to none but the Father. Consequently the difference between the Father and the Son cannot arise from the fact that the Father is the principle of the Holy Spirit and the Son not.
Item, sicut in libro de synodis dicitur, creaturae proprium est quod voluntate sua Deus eam produxerit. Quod Hilarius ex hoc probat quod creatura non est talis qualis est Deus, sed qualem Deus eam voluit esse. Quia vero filius est talis qualis est pater, dicitur quod pater genuit filium naturaliter. Eadem autem ratione spiritus sanctus est a patre naturaliter, quia est similis et aequalis patri: natura enim producit sibi simile. Oportet autem quod creatura, quae est a patre secundum suam voluntatem, sit etiam a filio: quia eadem est voluntas patris et filii. Similiter autem et eadem est natura utriusque. Oportet ergo quod sicut spiritus sanctus est a patre, ita sit a filio. Nec tamen sequitur quod filius vel spiritus sanctus sint a spiritu sancto, licet et ipse habeat unam naturam cum patre; sicut sequitur quod creatura est ab eo in quantum habet unam voluntatem cum patre, propter repugnantiam quae sequeretur, si spiritus sanctus diceretur esse a seipso, vel si ab eo diceretur esse filius, qui est eius principium.	Again, as stated in De Synod., it is proper to the creature that God produced it by his will: and Hilary proves this from the fact that the creature is not as God, is but as God wills it to be. Now because the Son is as the Father it is said that the Father begot him naturally. For the same reason the Holy Spirit is from the Father naturally because he is like and equal to the Father, since mature produces its like. Now the creature which proceeds from the Father according to his will must also proceed from the Son, since the Father and the Son have the same will. Likewise they both have the same nature. Consequently as the Holy Spirit is from the Father so also must he be from the Son. And yet it does not follow that the Son or the Holy Spirit is from the Holy Spirit, although he also has the same nature with the Father (whereas it does follow that the creature is from him inasmuch as he also has the same will with the Father) on account of the absurdity that would follow if one were to say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from himself, or that the Son, who is his principle, proceeds from him.
Hoc autem apparet alio modo: non enim potest esse in divinis personis distinctio nisi secundum relationes; ea enim quae absolute dicuntur in divinis, essentiam significant, et communia sunt, ut bonitas, sapientia et huiusmodi. Relationes autem diversae non possunt facere distinctionem nisi ratione suae oppositionis; diversae enim relationes possunt esse unius ad idem: patet enim quod idem eiusdem potest esse filius, discipulus, aequalis, et quaecumque aliae relationes quae oppositionem non includunt. Patet autem quod filius distinguitur a patre per hoc quod aliqua relatione ad ipsum refertur, et similiter spiritus sanctus a patre distinguitur propter aliquam relationem. Istae ergo relationes quantumcumque videantur disparatae, nullo modo poterunt distinguere spiritum sanctum a filio, nisi sint oppositae. Oppositio autem alia in divinis esse non potest nisi secundum originem, prout scilicet unus est ab alio. Nullo ergo modo filius et spiritus sanctus poterunt esse distincti per hoc quod uterque diversimode referatur ad patrem, nisi unus eorum referatur ad alterum ut ab eo existens. Constat autem quod filius non est a spiritu sancto: de ratione enim filii est quod non referatur nisi ad patrem ut ab eo existens. Relinquitur, ergo de necessitate quod spiritus sanctus sit a filio.	The same conclusion may be proved in yet another way. No distinction is possible between the divine persons except according to the relations, since in God whatsoever is ascribed absolutely signifies the essence and is common, such as goodness, wisdom and so forth. But diverse relations cannot cause distinction except by reason of their opposition: since one and the same thing can have diverse relations to the same thing. Thus A may stand to B in the relation of son, disciple, equal or any other relation that does not imply opposition. Now it is plain that the Son is distinguished from the Father in that he stands in a certain relation to him, and likewise the Holy Spirit is distinguished from the Father by reason of a relation. Wherefore, their relations, however diverse they may appear to be by no means distinguish the Holy Spirit from the Son unless they be opposed to each other. But there can be no opposition in God other than that which is by reason of origin, in that one person is from another. Therefore the Son and the Holy Spirit can by no means be distinguished from each other simply because each is differently related to the Father, unless one of them be related to the other as proceeding from him. Now it is evident that the Son does not proceed from the Holy Spirit, since the notion of a son consists in being related to a father by receiving existence from him. It remains then of necessity that the Holy Spirit is from the Son.
Sed quia potest aliquis dicere, quod ea quae sunt fidei non sunt solum rationibus sed auctoritatibus confirmanda, restat ostendere per auctoritates sacrae Scripturae quod spiritus sanctus sit a filio. Habetur enim in pluribus sacrae Scripturae locis quod spiritus sanctus sit filii; sicut Rom. VIII, 9: qui spiritum Christi non habet, hic non est eius; et Galat., IV, 6: misit Deus spiritum filii sui in corda vestra; et Act. XVI, 7: tentabant ire Bithyniam, et non permisit eos spiritus Iesu. Non enim potest intelligi quod spiritus sanctus sit spiritus Christi solum secundum humanitatem, quasi ipsum replens, quia spiritus sanctus est alicuius hominis ut habentis, non autem ut dantis. Filii autem est spiritus sanctus ut dantis ipsum, secundum illud I Ioan. IV, 13: in hoc cognoscimus quoniam in eo manemus, et ipse in nobis, quia de spiritu suo dedit nobis; et Act. V, 32, dicitur, quod dedit spiritum sanctum obedientibus sibi. Oportet ergo quod dicatur esse spiritus sanctus filii, in quantum est divina persona. Aut ergo dicitur esse absolute eius, aut dicitur esse eius ut spiritus eius. Si autem absolute, tunc oportet quod sit aliqua auctoritas filii respectu spiritus sancti. Apud nos enim potest dici aliquis esse alterius secundum quid, qui non habet auctoritatem respectu ipsius, sicut cum dicitur, Petrus est socius Ioannis; sed non potest dici, Petrus esse Ioannis absolute, nisi sit quaedam possessio eius, sicut servus, hoc ipsum quod est, dicitur esse domini. In divinis autem non potest esse aliquid serviens vel subiectum; sed intelligitur ibi auctoritas secundum solam originem. Oportebit ergo quod spiritus sanctus habeat originem a filio. Et idem sequitur, si dicatur spiritus sanctus esse filii ut spiritus eius; quia spiritus, secundum quod est nomen personale, importat relationem originis ad spirantem, sicut filius ad generantem.	Since, however, someone might say that articles of faith should be confirmed not only by reasons but also by authorities, it remains for us to show by the authority of Holy Writ, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. In several passages of Scripture the Holy Spirit is mentioned as (the Spirit) of the Son. Thus (Rom. viii, 9) He that hath not the Spirit of Christ is none of his; (Gal. iv, 6) God hath sent the Spirit of his Son into your hearts; and (Acts xvi, 7) They attempted to go into Bithynia, and the Spirit of Jesus suffered them not. For we cannot take this as meaning that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of Christ as to his humanity, filling him as it were, because the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of a man as haver and not giver: whereas the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Son as giver, according to i Jo. iv, 13, In this we know that we abide in him and he in us, because he hath given us of his Spirit: and (Acts v, 32) it is said that God hath given his Spirit to them that obey him. Accordingly the Holy Spirit must be called the Spirit of the Son inasmuch as he is a divine person. Either then he is said to be his absolutely, or his as his spirit. If absolutely, then the Son must exercise authority over the Holy Spirit. Thus with us one may be said to be another’s in a restricted sense, as, for instance, Peter is John’s companion, but we cannot say that Peter is John’s absolutely, unless there be some kind of possession, thus a slave as to all that he is is his master’s. Now in God there is no slavery or subjection, and authority in him is only in respect of origin. Consequently the Holy Spirit must originate from the Son. The same conclusion follows if it be said that the Holy Spirit is the Son’s as his spirit: because Spirit as a personal name, implies the relation of origin to the Spirator, as the Son to the Begetter.
Similiter etiam invenitur in Scripturis quod filius mittit spiritum sanctum, sicut supra dictum est. Semper autem mittens videtur habere auctoritatem supra missum. Auctoritas autem in divinis, ut dictum est, non est nisi secundum originem. Unde sequitur quod spiritus sanctus originem habeat a filio. Habetur autem ex sacra Scriptura quod per spiritum sanctum configuramur filio, secundum illud Rom. VIII, 15: accepistis spiritum adoptionis filiorum; et Galat. IV, 6: quoniam estis filii, misit Deus spiritum filii sui in corda vestra. Nihil autem configuratur alicui nisi per eius proprium characterem.	Moreover we find it stated in the Scriptures that the Son sends the Holy Spirit, as stated above. For the sender apparently always exercises authority over the one sent. Now as already stated authority in God is only in respect of origin. Hence it follows that the Holy Spirit originates from the Son. Now we have it from Holy Writ that by the Holy Spirit we are conformed to the Son, according to Rom. viii, 15, You have received the Spirit of adoption of sons; and Gal. iv, 6, Because you are sons God hath sent the Spirit of his Son into your hearts. But nothing is conformed to a thing except in its proper characteristics.
In naturis etiam creatis ita est quod id quod conformat aliquid alicui, est ab eo; sicut semen hominis non assimilatur equo, sed homini a quo est. Spiritus autem sanctus est a filio tamquam proprius character eius; unde dicitur de Christo, II Cor. I, 21-22: quod signavit nos, et unxit nos et dedit pignus spiritus in cordibus nostris. Expressius autem filii, de spiritu sancto dicentis: ille me clarificabit quia de meo accipiet. Constat autem quod non accipit a filio spiritus sanctus, quasi prius non habens: quia sic esset mutabilis et indigentis naturae. Constat ergo quod ab aeterno accipit a filio; nec potuit accipere aliquid quod non sit eius essentia ab aeterno. Ergo accepit spiritus sanctus essentiam de filio. Rationem autem quare de filio acceperit spiritus sanctus, ipsemet filius subiunxit, dicens, Ioan. XVI, 15: omnia quaecumque habet pater mea sunt. Propterea dixi: quia de meo accipiet; quasi diceret quia eadem est essentia patris et mea, non potest spiritus sanctus esse de essentia patris, quin sit de mea essentia.	And in creatures that which conforms A to B is from B, thus the seed of man produces the like not of a horse but of a man whence it is. Now the Holy Spirit is from the Son as his proper characteristic, wherefore it is said of Christ (2 Cor. i, 22) : Who hath sealed us and given the pledge of the Spirit in our hearts. More explicit still are the words spoken by Christ of the Holy Spirit (Jo. xvi, 4): He shall glorify me because he shall receive of mine. Now it is plain that the Holy Spirit does not receive from the Son as though he had not before, since thus he would be of a changeable and indigent nature. It is evident then that he received from the Son from eternity; nor could he receive anything that was not his from eternity. Therefore the Holy Spirit received the essence from the Son. The reason why the Holy Spirit received from the Son is stated by the Son himself when he says (ibid. 15): All things whatsoever the Father hath are mine: therefore I said that he shall receive of mine: as though to say: ‘Since mine and the Father’s is the same essence, the Holy Spirit cannot have the same essence as the Father without having mine.
Traditur etiam in sacra Scriptura quod filius per spiritum operatur, sicut habetur Rom. XV, 18: per me effecit Christus, scilicet miracula, et alia bona in spiritu sancto, idest per spiritum sanctum; et Hebr. IX, 14, dicitur quod per spiritum sanctum obtulit semetipsum. Quandocumque autem aliquis per aliquem dicitur operari, oportet quod vel operans det virtutem operativam ei per quem operatur, sicut rex dicitur operari per praepositum vel ballivum; vel e converso, sicut cum dicitur ballivus operari per regem. Oportet ergo, si filius operatur per spiritum sanctum, quod vel spiritus sanctus det virtutem operativam filio, vel filius spiritui sancto; et ita quod unus alteri det essentiam, cum virtus operativa utriusque non sit aliud quam eius essentia. Constat autem quod spiritus sanctus non dat essentiam filio, cum filius non sit filius nisi patris. Relinquitur ergo quod spiritus sanctus sit a filio.	Holy Scripture also states that the Son works through the Spirit: for instance (Rom. xv, 18, 19): Which, i.e. miracles and other blessings, Christ works by me, says the Apostle, in... the Holy Spirit, i.e. through the Holy Spirit: and (Heb. ix, 4 it is stated that Christ offered himself by the Holy Spirit. Now whenever one person is said to work through another, either it is he who gives active power to the one through whom he works, as a king is said to work through a provost or bailiff, or contrariwise as when the bailiff is said to work by virtue of the king. Accordingly if the Son works through the Holy Spirit, either the Holy Spirit gives operative power to the Son, or the Son to the Holy Spirit: and consequently one gives the essence to the other, since the operative power in each is not distinct from the essence. Now it is plain that the Holy Spirit does not give the essence to the Son, since the Son is Son of none but the Father. It follows therefore that the Holy Spirit is from the Son.
Ex hac ergo ratione per ea quae Graeci confitentur, potest idem haberi: confitentur enim ipsi quod spiritus sanctus est a patre per filium, et quod pater spirat spiritum sanctum per filium. Semper autem illud per quod aliquid producitur est principium eius quod producitur. Oportet ergo quod filius sit principium spiritus sancti. Si autem refugiant confiteri quod spiritus sanctus sit a filio, quia filius est ab alio— et sic non est prima radix originis spiritus sancti— manifestum est quod vane moventur; nullus enim refugit dicere lapidem moveri a baculo, licet baculus moveatur a manu; nec Iacob esse ab Isaac, licet Isaac sit ab Abraham. Sed adhuc minus est in proposito refugiendum; est enim una vis productiva patris et filii; quod non accidit in moventibus et agentibus creatis. Unde sicut confitendum est quod creaturae sunt a filio, licet filius sit a patre, ita confitendum est quod spiritus sanctus sit a filio, licet filius sit a patre. Manifestum est ergo quod dicentes spiritum sanctum esse a patre per filium, non autem a filio, propriam vocem ignorant, sicut Aristoteles de Anaxagora dicit: volentes enim esse legis doctores, non intelligunt neque de quibus loquuntur, neque de quibus affirmant, ut dicitur I Timoth. cap. I, 7.	Yet another argument in support of the same conclusion may be taken from the points acknowledged by the Greeks. They believe that the Holy Spirit is from the Father through the Son, and that the Father spirates the Holy Spirit through the Son. Now that through which a thing is produced is always a principle thereof. Wherefore it follows that the Son is a principle of the Holy Spirit. If, however, they refuse to acknowledge that the Holy Spirit is from the Son because the Son is from another and consequently is not the first root of the Holy Spirit’s origin, it is plain that this motive is unreasonable: since no one declines to allow that the stone is moved by the stick, although the stick is moved by the hand: or that Jacob was of Isaac although Isaac was of Abraham. In fact in the point at issue still less reason is there for this refusal: since Father and Son have one and the same productive power, which is not the case in created movements and agents. Therefore just as we must acknowledge that creatures are from the Son though the Son is from the Father, even so must we acknowledge that the Holy Spirit is from the Son, though the Son is from the Father. It is evident then that those who assert that the Holy Spirit is from the Father through the Son, but not from the Son, know not what they are talking about, as Aristotle said of Anaxagoras: and it is written: Desiring to be teachers of the law, understanding neither the things they say nor whereof they affirm (i Tim. i, 7).
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod filius et spiritus sanctus dicuntur flores deigenae divinitatis, id est paternae, prout uterque a patre est. Sed quantum ad hoc quod spiritus sanctus a filio est, potest dici filius esse radix, et spiritus sanctus flos; non enim oportet ut similitudo rerum corporalium observetur quantum ad omnia in divinis.	Reply to the First Objection. The Son and the Holy Spirit are said to be flowers of the Godbearing, i.e. paternal Divinity, inasmuch as both are from the Father. But inasmuch as the Holy Spirit is from the Son, the Son may be called the root and the Holy Spirit the flower: for comparisons with corporeal things must not be extended to all things in God.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod filius hoc habet a patre quod ex se spiritum sanctum emittat: unde et eodem modo convenit ei sicut et patri. Sed pater non est principium divinae personae uno modo tantum, sed duobus, scilicet per generationem et spirationem. Unde non potest concludi quod filius sit principium spiritus sancti per generationem; sed est fallacia consequentis, et praecipue cum nec etiam pater sit principium spiritus sancti per generationem.	Reply to the Second Objection. The Son has this from the Father that of himself he sends forth the Holy Spirit: wherefore it belongs to him in the same way as to the Father. Now the Father is the principle of a divine person not in one way only, but in two ways, namely by generation and spiration. Wherefore we cannot conclude that the Son is the principle of the Holy Spirit by generation: this is a fallacy of the consequent, and so much the more so, seeing that the Father is not the principle of the Holy Spirit by generation.
Et similiter dicendum est ad tertium.	The same answer applies to the Third Objection.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod spiritus sanctus non potest dici verbum proprie, sed communiter, prout omne quod est manifestativum alicuius verbum ipsius dicitur. Spiritus enim sanctus est manifestativus filii, secundum quod de spiritu sancto filius dicit Ioan. XVI, 14: ille me clarificabit, quia de meo accipiet. Filius autem proprie dicitur verbum, quasi conceptio intellectus divini.	Reply to the Fourth Objection. The Holy Spirit cannot be called the Word strictly speaking, but in a loose manner of speaking, for as much as anything that makes a thing known is the word of that thing. Thus the Holy Spirit makes the Son known as stated by this same Son concerning the Holy Spirit (Jo. xvi, 14): He shall glorify me because he will receive of mine. But the Son is called the Word in the strict sense, because he is the concept of the divine Intellect.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod in humana origine dicitur nepos qui eodem modo procedit a filio sicut filius a patre. Spiritus autem sanctus non procedit in divinis a filio sicut filius a patre; et ideo ratio non sequitur.	Reply to the Fifth Objection. In a human genealogy a grandson is one who proceeds from the son in the same way as the son from his father: whereas in God the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son in the same way as the Son from the Father: hence the objection fails.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod esse principium non est contrarium ei quod est esse a principio, nisi intelligatur respectu eiusdem: non enim potest esse aliquid principium eius a quo est sicut a principio. Unde non sequitur quod in filio sint contrariae proprietates, si sit a patre sicut a principio et sit principium spiritus sancti.	Reply to the Sixth Objection. There is no opposition between being a principle and being from a principle except in respect of the same thing; thus A cannot be a principle of B if B is a principle of A. Hence it does not follow that there are contrary properties in the Son if he proceeds from the Father as his principle and is himself the principle of the Holy Spirit.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod omne quod est in divinis, est commune vel proprium. Sed proprium dupliciter dicitur: uno modo simpliciter et absolute, quod uni soli convenit, sicut risibile homini; alio modo dicitur aliquid proprium non simpliciter, sed ad aliquid; ut si dicatur, quod rationale est proprium homini in comparatione ad equum, licet et alii conveniat, scilicet Angelo. Est ergo in divinis aliquid commune quod convenit tribus personis, ut esse Deum et huiusmodi; aliquid quod est proprium simpliciter, quod convenit uni personae tantum; et aliquid quod est proprium quoad aliquid, sicut spirare spiritum sanctum est proprium patri et filio per respectum ad spiritum sanctum; tale enim proprium oportet in divinis poni, etiam si spiritus sanctus non sit a filio; quia esse ab alio, adhuc remanet proprium filio et spiritui sancto in comparatione ad matrem.	Reply to the Seventh Objection. Whatsoever is in God is indeed either proper or common. Proper, however, admits of a twofold application: it is said simply and absolutely of a thing to which it applies exclusively, thus risibility is proper to man: and it is said of a thing not simply but relatively, as, for instance, one might say that rationality is proper to a man in relation to a horse, although it applies to another, viz. an angel. Accordingly in God there is something common that applies to the three persons, for instance ‘to be God’ and so forth: something that is proper simply and applies to one person only: and something that is proper relatively, as, for instance, to, spirate the, Holy Spirit is proper to the Father and the Son with respect to the Holy Spirit: since we must needs acknowledge this kind of property in God even if the Holy Spirit were not from the Son, because ‘to be from another’ still remains proper to the Son and Holy Spirit as compared with the Father.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod nomen debiti in personis divinis, si quis recte diiudicare velit, non omnino recte sonat; quia debitum quamdam subiectionem et obligationem importat, quae in divinis esse non possunt. Richardus tamen de sancto Victore, utitur distinctione amoris gratuiti et debiti; nec intelligit per gratuitum nisi quod non est ab alio, per debitum vero quod ab alio est; secundum quem modum nihil prohibet intelligi eumdem amorem esse gratuitum ut est patris, debitum vero ut est filii; idem est enim amor quo pater et quo filius amat; sed hunc amorem filius a patre habet, pater vero a nullo.	Reply to the Eighth Objection. If we are to come to a right decision on this point it seems hardly correct to speak of anything being due in the divine persons, since this word due implies subjection and obligation of a kind, and such things cannot be in God. Richard of St Victor, however (De Trin. iii, 3; v. 17, 18), distinguishes between due and gratuitous love: but by gratuitous love he means love not received from another, and by due love, that which is received from another. In this sense there is nothing to hinder the same love from being gratuitous as the Father’s, and due as the Son’s: since it is the same love whereby the Father loves and whereby the Son loves: yet this love the Son has from the Father, but the Father from none.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod spiritus sanctus est tantum gratuitus amor, secundum quod amori gratuito contraponitur mercenarius amor, quo aliquid non propter seipsum amatur, sed propter aliquem extrinsecum fructum. Secundum vero quod gratuitus amor dicitur, propter hoc quod ab alio sumit originem, non est contra rationem spiritus sancti quod sit gratuitus amor: nam et ille amor quo per spiritum sanctum Deum diligimus, originem habet ex his quae nobis a Deo sunt data; et sic nihil prohibet etiam amorem filii, qui ab alio habet quod amat, spiritum sanctum esse.	Reply to the Ninth Objection. The Holy Spirit is gratuitous love, only inasmuch as it is opposed to mercenary love whereby a thing is loved not for itself but for the sake of some benefit extrinsic to it. But if by gratuitous love we understand the love that originates from another, it is not incompatible with the Holy Spirit that he be gratuitous love, since the love whereby we love God through the Holy Ghost originates in God’s benefits bestowed on us: and thus nothing prevents even the love of the Son who derives this love from another, from being the Holy Spirit.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod spiritus sanctus et a patre procedit in filium, et a filio in patrem, non quidem sicut in recipientem, sed sicut in obiectum amoris. Dicitur enim spiritus sanctus a patre in filium procedere, in quantum est amor quo pater amat filium; et simili ratione potest dici quod spiritus sanctus est a filio in patrem, in quantum est amor quo filius patrem amat; potest autem intelligi quod procedat a patre in filium, in quantum filius a patre accipit virtutem spiritum sanctum spirandi; sed sic non potest dici quod procedat a filio in patrem, cum a filio nihil accipiat pater.	Reply to the Tenth Objection. The Holy Spirit proceeds both from the Father to the Son and from the Son to the Father, not as recipients but as objects of love. For the Holy Spirit is said to proceed from the Father to the Son inasmuch as he is the love whereby the Father loves the Son; and in the same way it may be said that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the son to the Father inasmuch as he is the love whereby the Son loves the Father. He may be understood, however, to proceed from the Father to the Son inasmuch as the Son receives from the Father the power to spirate the Holy Spirit, and in this sense he cannot be said to proceed from the Son to the Father, seeing that the Father receives nothing from the Son.
Ad undecimum dicendum, quod hoc verbum diligit non solum dicit missionem amoris, sed etiam quamdam affectionem vel dispositionem secundum amorem. Ea vero quae in divinis emissionem dicunt, personaliter tantum accipi possunt, ut generare, spirare et huiusmodi: quae vero non important emissionem, sed magis ad informationem eius pertinent de quo dicuntur, essentialiter in divinis dicuntur, ut esse bonum, intelligentem et huiusmodi. Et inde est quod spiritus sanctus dicitur diligere non quasi amorem emittens— sic enim convenit tantum patri et filio, —Sed secundum quod diligere sumitur essentialiter in divinis.	Reply to the Eleventh Objection. This word love signifies not only the outpouring of love, but also a certain affection or disposition according to love. Now in God whatsoever is significative of outpouring must be taken as referring to the person only, as, for instance, begetting, spirating and so forth: while terms that do not denote outpouring but pertain rather to the information of the subject whereof they are predicated, must be taken as referring to the essence, as, for instance, being good, intelligent, and the like. For this reason the Holy Spirit is said to love not as emitting love—for thus it applies to the Father and the Son—but for as much as to love is an essential property in God.
Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod hoc regulariter in sacra Scriptura invenitur, quod id quod dicitur de patre, oportet quod de filio intelligatur; et quod dicitur de utroque vel altero eorum, oportet intelligi de spiritu sancto, etiam si dictio exclusiva ponatur, praeter illa tantum quibus personae divinae ab invicem distinguuntur; sicut quod dicitur Ioan. XVII, 3: haec est vita aeterna: ut cognoscant te, solum Deum verum, et quem misisti Iesum Christum. Non enim potest dici, quod filio non conveniat esse Deum verum, quod ipse filius soli patri attribuit; quia cum pater et filius unum sint, licet non unus, oportet quod de patre dicitur, de filio quoque intelligi. Nec etiam negandum est in cognitione spiritus sancti vitam aeternam non esse, cum sit una cognitio trium. Similiter autem non est subtrahenda spiritui sancto patris filiique cognitio, licet Matth. XI, 27, dicatur: nemo novit filium nisi pater; neque patrem quis novit nisi filius. Unde, cum hoc quod est habere ex se spiritum sanctum procedentem, non pertineat ad rationem paternitatis et filiationis, quibus pater et filius distinguuntur, oportet ut cum dicitur in Evangelio, quod spiritus sanctus de patre procedit, in hoc ipso intelligatur quod procedat a filio.	Reply to the Twelfth Objection. In Holy Writ it must be regarded as a constant rule that what is said of the Father must be understood as applicable to the Son, and what is said of both or either of them must be taken as applicable to the Holy Spirit, even though the expression should contain an exclusive term, except when reference is made to the distinction between the divine persons. Take, for instance, the following: This is eternal life that they know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent (Jo. xvii, 3): for it cannot be denied that the Son is true God, although the Son himself affirms this of the Father alone, because since the Father and Son are one thing though not one person, it follows that what is said of the Father must be understood of the Son also. Nor again may we deny (seeing that no mention is made there of the Holy Spirit) that eternal life is in knowing the Holy Spirit, since there is but one knowledge of the Three. In like manner we are not to deny that the Holy Spirit knows the Father and the Son, although it is said (Mt. xi, 27): No one knows the Son but the Father, neither doth anyone know the Father but the Son. Wherefore since to have the Holy Spirit proceeding from oneself does not enter into the notion of Paternity or Filiation whereby the Father and the Son are distinguished from each other, it follows that from the very fact that it is said in the Gospel that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father we must gather that he proceeds from the Son.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod doctrina Catholicae fidei sufficienter tradita fuit in symbolo Nicaeno; unde sancti patres in sequentibus synodis non intenderunt aliquid addere, sed propter insurgentes haereses id quod implicite continebatur explicare studuerunt; unde in determinatione Chalcedonensis synodi dicitur: praesens nunc sancta et magna atque universalis synodus praedicationem hanc ab initio inconcussam docens, definivit principaliter trecentorum decem et octo sanctorum patrum, qui scilicet in Nicaea convenerunt fidem manere intentabilem; et propter illos quidem qui adversum spiritum sanctum pugnant, posteriori tempore a patribus apud Constantinopolim centum quinquaginta congregatis, de substantia spiritus traditam doctrinam corroborat, quam illi omnibus notam fecerunt, non quasi quidem aliquid esset minus in praecedentibus, inferentes; sed de spiritu sancto intellectum eorum adversus eos qui dominium eius respuere tentaverunt, Scripturarum testimoniis declarantes. Et per hunc modum dicendum est, quod processio spiritus sancti a filio implicite in symbolo Constantinopolitano continetur, in quantum continetur ibi quod procedit a patre, quia quod de patre intelligitur, oportet et de filio intelligi, cum in nullo differant, nisi quia hic est filius et ille pater. Sed propter insurgentes errores eorum qui spiritum a filio esse negabant, conveniens fuit ut in symbolo poneretur, non quasi aliquid additum, sed explicite interpretatum quod implicite continebatur. Sicut si insurgeret haeresis quae negaret spiritum sanctum esse factorem caeli et terrae, oporteret hoc explicite poni, cum in praedicto symbolo hoc non dicatur nisi de patre. Sicut autem posterior synodus potestatem habet interpretandi symbolum a priore synodo conditum, ac ponendi aliqua ad eius explanationem, ut ex praedictis patet; ita etiam Romanus pontifex hoc sua auctoritate potest, cuius auctoritate sola synodus congregari potest, et a quo sententia synodi confirmatur, et ad ipsum a synodo appellatur. Quae omnia patent ex gestis Chalcedonensis synodi. Nec est necessarium quod ad eius expositionem faciendam universale Concilium congregetur, cum quandoque id fieri prohibeant bellorum dissidia, sicut in septima synodo legitur, quod Constantinus Augustus dixit, quod propter imminentia bella universaliter episcopos congregare non potuit; sed tamen illi qui convenerunt, quaedam dubia in fide exorta, sequentes sententiam Agathonis Papae, determinaverunt, scilicet quod in Christo sint duae voluntates et duae actiones; et similiter patres in Chalcedonensi synodo congregati, secuti sunt sententiam Leonis Papae, qui determinavit Christum esse in duabus naturis post incarnationem.	Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. The doctrine of the Catholic Faith was sufficiently laid down by the Council of Nicaea: wherefore in the subsequent councils the fathers had no mind to make any additions. Yet on account of the heresies that arose they were at pains to declare explicitly what had already been implicitly asserted. Thus in the definition of the Council of Chalcedon it is said: “This holy, great and universal synod teaches this doctrine which has been constantly held from the beginning, the same which 318 holy fathers assembled at Nicaea defined to be the unalterable faith. On account of those who contend against the Holy Spirit, we confirm the doctrine delivered afterwards by the 150 fathers assembled at Constantinople concerning the substance of the Holy Spirit, which doctrine they made known to all, not indeed as though something were lacking in previous definitions, but by appealing to the authority of the Scriptures to explain what had already been defined against those who endeavoured to belittle the Holy Spirit.” Accordingly we must acknowledge that the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son was contained implicitly in the definition of the Council of Constantinople inasmuch as it is declared there that he proceeds from the Father: because what is said of the Father must be understood to be true of the Son, since they differ in nothing except in that one person is the Son and another the Father. However, on account of errors arising of those who denied that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, it was becoming that in the Creed should be made an insertion not by way of addition but by way of explicit interpretation of what it already contained implicitly. Thus were a heresy to arise denying the Holy Spirit to be the Maker of heaven and earth, it would be necessary to mention this explicitly, since in the Creed this is attested explicitly of the Father only. Now just as a subsequent Council has the power to interpret the Creed of a previous Council, and to insert an explanation of what that Creed contains, as appears from what has been said above; even so the Roman Pontiff can do this of his own authority, since by his authority alone can a council be convoked, and by him are its decisions confirmed, and since from the Council appeals can be made to him: all of which is clear from the Acts of the Council of Chalcedon. Nor does such an explanation require the assembling of an ecumenical council, since sometimes this is impossible on account of war: thus we read of the sixth Council that the Emperor Constantine found that he was prevented by the imminence of war from summoning all the bishops together: and yet those who met decided certain doubtful points of faith in accordance with the mind of Pope Agatho, to wit that in Christ there are two wills and two operations. In like manner the fathers assembled in the Council of Chalcedon adopted the view of Pope Leo who defined that after the Incarnation there were two natures in Christ.
Attendi tamen debet, quod ex determinatione principalium Conciliorum habetur, quod spiritus sanctus procedit a filio. Suscepit enim Chalcedonensis synodus, sicut in eius determinatione dicitur, epistolas beati Cyrilli Alexandrinae Ecclesiae praesulis synodicas ad Nestorium et ad alios per orientem. In quarum una sic legitur: quoniam ad demonstrationem suae divinitatis Christus utebatur suo spiritu ad magnas operationes, glorificari se dicebat ab eo, velut si quispiam dicat eorum qui secundum nos sunt insita sibi fortitudine vel disciplina, vel de quolibet, quia glorificabunt me. Sic enim et est in subsistentia spiritus speciali, vel certe intelligitur per se, secundum quod spiritus est et non filius; sed tamen non est alienus ab eo: spiritus enim veritatis nominatur, et est spiritus veritatis, et profluit ab eo, sicut denique et ex Deo patre. Nec obstat quod dicit: profluit, et non procedit; quia sicut ex praedictis patet, hoc verbum procedit, est communissimum eorum quae ad originem spectant. Unde quidquid emittitur vel profluit vel quocumque modo exoritur, ex hoc sequitur quod procedat. Habetur etiam in determinatione quinti Concilii Constantinopolitani: sequimur per omnia sanctos patres et doctores Ecclesiae, Athanasium, Hilarium, Basilium, Gregorium theologum, et Gregorium Nicaenum, Ambrosium, Augustinum, Theophilum, Ioannem Constantinopolitanum, Gulielmum, Leonem, Proculum; et suscipimus omnia quae de recta fide ad condemnationem haereticorum exposuerunt. Patet autem quia a pluribus horum in doctrina fidei traditum est, quod spiritus sanctus procedit a filio; a nullo vero eorum invenitur esse negatum. Unde non est contra Concilia, sed eis consonum, quod spiritus sanctus procedere dicatur a filio.	We must observe, however, that we may gather from the definitions of the principal councils that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. Thus as stated in its decree the Council of Chalcedon received the synodal letters of the Blessed Cyril, bishop of Alexandria, addressed to Nestorius and others in the East. In one of these we read: “Seeing that Christ in proof of his Godhead used his Spirit to perform great works, asserted that he was glorified by him, even as a man might say of his own strength, knowledge or any other gift that they glorify him: even so is this true of the subsistent Spirit considered as a distinct person from the Son; although he is not of a different nature, for he is called and is the Spirit of truth and flows from him, as also from God the Father.” It does not signify that he says flows and not proceeds, because as we have already clearly stated this word proceed is the most general of all the terms denoting origin. Wherefore anything that is emitted or flows forth or in any way originates may be said for this very reason to proceed. Again in the definition of the fifth Council held at Constantinople it is said: “In all things we follow the holy doctors of the Church, Athanasius, Hilary, Basil, Gregory the Theologian, Gregory of Nyssa, Ambrose, Augustine, Theophilus, John of Constantinople, William [=Cyril], Leo, Proclus, and we receive all that they have taught in the true faith for the refutation of heretics.” Now it is plain that many of these taught that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, and that this has not been denied by any one of them. Wherefore it is not contrary to but in harmony with the Councils to say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod licet hoc huius multipliciter dicatur, tamen in divinis hoc intelligi non potest nisi secundum habitudinem originis. Circa missionem vero sciendum est, quod in hoc omnes doctores conveniunt, quod persona non mittitur nisi quae ab alio est; unde patri, qui a nullo est, penitus non convenit mitti. Sed quantum ad personam a qua fit missio, diversa est doctorum sententia:- Athanasius autem et quidam alii dicunt, quod nulla persona mittitur temporaliter nisi ab illa a qua est aeternaliter, sicut filius mittitur temporaliter a patre, a quo ab aeterno processit; et secundum hoc infallibiliter concludi potest, si spiritus sanctus a filio mittitur, quod aeternaliter ab eo existat. Quod vero dicitur filius a spiritu sancto mitti, intelligendum est de filio secundum humanam naturam, qui a spiritu sancto missus est ad praedicandum; unde significanter dicitur Isai. LXI, 1: ad evangelizandum pauperibus misit me; et sic exponit Ambrosius in libro de spiritu sancto, licet Hilarius hoc exponat, ut per spiritum intelligatur pater, secundum quod spiritus aeternaliter sumitur in divinis.- Augustinus vero ponit quod persona procedens temporaliter mittatur ab ea etiam a qua aeternaliter non procedit. Nam cum missio divinae personae intelligatur secundum aliquem effectum in creatura, quae est a tota Trinitate, persona missa a tota Trinitate mittitur; ut in missione non intelligatur auctoritas mittentis ad personam quae mittitur, sed causalitas ad effectum, secundum quem dicitur mitti persona.	Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. It is true that the genitive case of the personal pronoun has many significations, but in God it has no other signification than that of origin. As regards mission it must be observed that all doctors are agreed that no person is sent who does not. proceed from another: wherefore it is altogether inappropriate to the Father to be sent since he proceeds not from another. But as regards the person sending doctors are divided in opinion. Athanasius (Literae tui sanctissimi) and others say that no person is sent temporally save by the person from whom he proceeds eternally: thus the Son is sent temporally by the Father from whom he proceeds eternally: and in accordance with this view it may be inferred without fear of error that if the Holy Spirit is sent by the Son, he proceeds from him eternally. And if the Son is said to be sent by the Holy Spirit this must be understood in reference to the Son in his human nature being sent to preach by the Holy Spirit. Wherefore it is said explicitly (Isa. lxi, i): He hath sent me to Preach to the meek! This is the interpretation given by Ambrose (De Spir. Sanct. iii, i): but Hilary (De Trin. viii) expounds the words as referring to the Father inasmuch as in God the word spirit may be, taken essentially. On the other hand Augustine (De Trin. et Unit. x) holds that a person who proceeds may be sent temporally even by one from whom he does not proceed eternally. For since the mission of a divine person is understood in reference to some effect in creatures who proceed from the whole Trinity, the person sent is sent by the whole Trinity: so that mission does not imply authority of the sender over the person sent, but causality in reference to the effect, and with regard to this effect the person is said to be sent.
Non autem excluditur ratio probans spiritum sanctum a filio procedere per distinctionem ipsorum, per hoc quod proprietatibus distinguuntur; quia proprietates illae relativae sunt, et distinguere non possunt nisi ad invicem opponantur, sicut ex dictis patet.	The argument proving that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son because they are distinct from each other is not refuted by saying that they are distinct by their properties, since these properties are relative and cannot cause distinction unless they be mutually opposed, as already stated (Q. viii, AA. 3, 4).
Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod licet spiritus sanctus sit a duobus, non tamen est compositus, quia illi duo, scilicet pater et filius, sunt per essentiam unum.	Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. Although the Holy Spirit proceeds from two he is not composite: because those two, namely the Father and the Son, are one in essence.
Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod philosophus attribuit principiis non esse ab alio, in quantum sunt prima. Principium autem primum, est principium non de principio, quod est pater.	Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. The Philosopher (Phys. i) says that principles derive from nothing else in so far as they are first principles: and the First Principle (so to say) is a Principle proceeding from no other, and that is the Father.
Ad decimumseptimum dicendum, quod licet voluntas moveat intellectum ad aliquid intelligendum, non tamen voluntas aliquid velle potest, nisi sit praeintellectum; unde cum non sit procedere in infinitum, oportet devenire ad hoc quod intellectus aliquid intelligit naturaliter non ex imperio voluntatis. Filius autem procedit a patre naturaliter; unde quamvis procedat per modum intellectus, non sequitur quod sit a spiritu sancto, sed e converso.	Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. Although the will moves the intellect to the act of understanding, it cannot will but what is already understood: wherefore since it is impossible to go on indefinitely, one must come at length to an act whereby the intellect understands something naturally and not at the will’s command. Now the Son proceeds from the Father naturally, so that although he proceeds by way of intelligence, it does not follow that he proceeds from the Holy Spirit but vice versa.
Ad decimumoctavum dicendum, quod spiritus sanctus potest dici quiescere in filio tripliciter: uno modo secundum humanam naturam, secundum illud Is., XI, 1: egredietur virga de radice Iesse, et flos de radice eius ascendet, et requiescet super eum spiritus domini. Alio modo, ut intelligatur spiritus in filio requiescere, quia virtus spirativa a patre datur filio, et ultra non protenditur. Tertio modo secundum quod amor dicitur requiescere in amato, in quo quietatur amantis affectus. Nullo autem istorum modorum excluditur processio spiritus sancti a filio.	Reply to the Eighteenth Objection. The Holy Spirit may be said to abide in the Son in three ways. In one way in respect of the human nature, according to Isaiah xi, i: There shall come forth a rod out of the root of Jesse, and a flower shall rise up out of his root, and the Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him. In another way the Holy Spirit is said to rest in the Son, since the spirative power is given to the Son by the Father and extends no further. Thirdly, according as love is said to rest in the beloved, thereby staying the emotion of the lover. In none of these ways is the procession of the Holy Spirit excluded from the Son.
Ad decimumnonum dicendum, quod non repugnat simplicitati spiritus sancti, quod procedit a duobus, scilicet patre et filio, cum sint per essentiam unum.	Reply to the Nineteenth Objection. It is not incompatible with the simplicity of the Holy Spirit that he proceeds from two, namely the Father and the Son, inasmuch they are of one essence.
Ad vicesimum dicendum, quod eadem est perfectio patris et filii: unde per hoc quod spiritus sanctus procedit a patre perfecte, non excluditur quin procedat a filio; alioquin sequeretur quod creatura non creetur a filio cum perfecte creetur a patre.	Reply to the Twentieth Objection. The same perfection is that of Father and Son: wherefore the fact that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father perfectly does not exclude his proceeding from the Son: else it would follow that the creature is not created by the Son, since it is created perfectly by the Father.
Ad vicesimumprimum dicendum, quod unitas essentiae non inducit confusionem personarum; unde ex unitate essentiae non possunt concludi illa quae repugnant distinctioni relativae; et sic ex hoc quod pater et spiritus sanctus sunt unum, non potest concludi quod filius sit a spiritu sancto, licet filius sit a patre: quia spiritus sanctus est ab eo; et iterum quia sequeretur quod spiritus sanctus esset pater, cum nihil aliud sit esse patrem quam habere filium de se procedentem.	Reply to the Twenty-first Objection. Unity of essence does not involve confusion of persons: wherefore from unity of essence we cannot draw conclusions that are incompatible with relative distinction: thus from the fact that Father and Son are one thing, we cannot infer that the Son proceeds from the Holy Spirit although he proceeds from the Father, because the Holy Spirit proceeds from him: and again because it would follow that the Holy Spirit is the Father, seeing that to be the Father is nothing but to have the Son proceeding from him.
Ad vicesimumsecundum dicendum, quod splendor est a radio, cum nihil aliud sit quam reverberatio radii ad corpus clarum; et tamen splendor filio attribuitur, Heb. I, 3: cum sit splendor gloriae.	Reply to the Twenty-second Objection. Brightness comes indeed from the ray, since it is nothing else than the reflection of light shining on a clear body. Moreover brightness is attributed to the Son (Heb. i, 3), Who being the brightness of glory.
Ad vicesimumtertium dicendum, quod calor est a splendore: nam corpora caelestia in istis inferioribus per suos radios causant calorem.	Reply to the Twenty-third Objection. Heat proceeds from brightness: for the heavenly bodies by their rays cause heat in the lower world.
Ad vicesimumquartum dicendum, quod positio Nestorianorum fuit quod spiritus sanctus non sit a filio; unde in quodam symbolo Nestorianorum, condemnato in I Ephesina synodo, dicitur sic: spiritum sanctum neque filium putamus, neque per filium essentiam accepisse. Propter quod Cyrillus contra Nestorium, in epistola praedicta, posuit spiritum sanctum esse a filio. Theodorus vero, in quadam epistola ad Ioannem Antiochenum sic dicit: spiritus sanctus non ex filio aut per filium habens substantiam, sed procedens quidem a patre; spiritus vero filii, eo quod et ei consubstantialis sit, nominatus. Haec autem verba Theodorus praedictus imponit Cyrillo, tamquam ab eo sint dicta in epistola quam ad Ioannem Antiochenum scripsit, licet in illa epistola hoc non legatur; sed dicitur ibi sic: spiritus Dei patris procedit quidem ex ipso, est autem et a filio non alienus secundum unius essentiae rationem. Hanc autem Theodori sententiam secutus est postmodum Damascenus, quamvis dogmata eiusdem Theodori sint in quinta synodo condemnata. Unde in hoc non est standum sententiae Damasceni.	Reply to the Twenty-fourth Objection. It was the contention of the Nestorians that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son: hence in one of their synods condemned by the Council of Ephesus it is said thus: “We hold that the Holy Spirit neither is the Son nor receives his essence from the Son.” For this reason Cyril in the epistle already quoted, affirmed against Nestorius that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. Again Theodore in an epistle to John of Antioch expresses himself as follows: “The Holy Spirit does not come from the Son nor has he his substance from the Son, but he proceeds from the Father: he is called the Spirit of the Son because he is consubstantial with him.” Now the above words were attributed by this Theodore to Cyril, as though he had written them in a letter which he wrote to John of Antioch, and yet they are not to be found there: but he expresses himself thus: “The Spirit of God the Father proceeds indeed from him, but he proceeds also from the Son, being one with him in essence.” Later on Damascene followed this opinion of Theodore, although the latter theologian’s teaching was condemned in the Fifth Council. Wherefore in this we must not agree with Damascene.

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Q. X: ARTICLE V Would the Holy Spirit Still Be Distinguished From the Son If He Did Not Proceed From Him?
Quinto quaeritur utrum spiritus sanctus a filio remaneret distinctus, si ab eo non procederet. Et videtur quod sic.	THE fifth point of inquiry is whether the Holy Spirit would still be distinguished from the Son if he did not proceed from him: and seemingly he would.
Dicit enim Richardus de sancto Victore, quod personae secundum originem differunt, quod unus originem habet, alter origine caret: vel si originem habet, tamen origo unius differt ab origine alterius. Sed alia est origo spiritus sancti, alia est origo filii: nam spiritus sanctus procedit quasi spiratus, filius autem quasi genitus. Ergo spiritus sanctus personaliter differt a filio, etiam si ab eo non procederet, propter originem diversam.	1. Richard of S. Victor (De Trin. iv, 13, 15) says that the persons differ in origin in that one has an origin and the other not: or if they have an origin, in that the origin of the one differs from the origin of the other. Now the origin of the Holy Spirit differs from that of the Son, since the Holy Spirit proceeds as spirated, but the Son as begotten. Therefore the Holy Spirit would differ personally from the Son even if he did not proceed from him, on account of the difference of origin.
Item, Anselmus dicit: habet utique a patre esse filius ac spiritus sanctus, sed diversimode; quia alter nascendo, alter procedendo, ut alii per hoc sint ad invicem; et postea subdit: nam si per aliud non essent plures filius et spiritus sanctus, per hoc solum essent diversi. Ergo etsi spiritus sanctus a filio non procederet, tamen remaneret personaliter distinctus a filio propter diversum originis modum.	2. Anselm says (De Process. Sp. S. ii): “The Son and the Holy Spirit have their being from the Father, but each in a different way; one by birth, the other by procession, so that thus they are distinct from each other,” and afterwards he adds “For even if for no other reason were the Son and Holy Spirit distinct, this alone would distinguish them.” Therefore even if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, he would be a distinct person from the Son on account of the different manner of origin.
Item, in divinis personae distinguuntur propter hoc quod una est ab alia secundum aliquem originis modum. Sed secundum unum originis modum una persona in divinis procedit. Ergo si sunt duo modi originis, erunt duae personae procedentes, etiam si una ab altera non procedat. Constat autem quod secundum alium modum originis procedit filius a patre, et secundum alium spiritus sanctus. Ergo filius et spiritus sanctus personaliter ab invicem distinguuntur, etiam dato quod unus ab alio non procedat.	3. The divine persons are distinct from one another for the reason that one is from another according to a particular manner of origin. Now in God one person proceeds according to one manner of origin: and consequently if there be two manners of origin there will be two proceeding persons, even though one proceed not from the other. Now it is agreed that the Son and the Holy Spirit proceed from the Father according to different ways of origin. Therefore the Son and the Holy Ghost are distinct persons even if we suppose that one does not proceed from the other.
Item, impossibile est quod aliqua hypostasis secundum unam naturam pluribus processionibus procedat, quia hypostasis per id quod procedit, naturam accipit; unde filius habet duas nativitates secundum duas naturas. Sed in divinis sunt duae processiones, una quae est per modum nativitatis, alia quae est per modum spirationis. Impossibile est ergo quod una et eadem persona his duabus processionibus procedat. Necessarium est ergo quod sint duae personae distinctae, quae his duabus processionibus procedant. Ergo spiritus sanctus remanet personaliter distinctus a filio, etiam si ab eo non procedat.	4. No hypostasis can possibly proceed in respect of one nature by more than one procession, since a hypostasis receives its nature by proceeding: thus the Son has two nativities corresponding to his two natures. Now in God there are two processions, one in respect of nativity, the other in respect of spiration. Consequently it is impossible that one and the same Person proceed according to these two modes of procession. Therefore the Persons who proceed by these two processions must needs be distinct. Therefore the Holy Ghost would still be personally distinct from the Son even if he did not proceed from him.
Item relationes aeternae in divinis non sunt accidentes neque assistentes, sed subsistentes personae. Illud ergo ad quod sequitur pluralitas relationum in divinis, sufficit ad personarum distinctionem. Sed diversitas actionum secundum speciem sufficit ad diversas relationes; ex hac enim actione quae est gubernatio, consequitur relatio dominii; ex illa vero actione quae est generatio, sequitur alia relatio, quae est paternitas: sicut etiam ad diversas quantitates secundum speciem consequuntur diversae relationes; ad binarium enim consequitur relatio dupli, et ad ternarium relatio tripli. Processiones autem in divinis significantur per modum actionum. Si ergo sunt duae processiones, oportet quod sint duae relationes consequentes processiones. Ergo oportet quod sint duae personae; et sic idem quod prius.	5. The eternal relations in God are neither accidental nor assistant, but are subsistent Persons. Consequently whatever causes plurality of relations in God suffices for a distinction of Persons. Now specific diversity of actions suffices for a diversity of relations. Thus from the action of governing follows the relation of lordship, while from the action of begetting follows another relation which is paternity. Even so different relations follow from specifically different quantities: thus the relation double results from the number two and treble from the number three. Now in God processions are indicated as actions: wherefore if there are two processions there must be two relations resulting from the processions and consequently two Persons: so that we come to the same conclusion as before.
Item, processio perfectius invenitur in divinis quam in rebus creatis: unde apostolus ad Ephes. III, 15, dicit, quod ex patre caelesti omnis paternitas in caelo et in terra nominatur. In rebus autem creatis processio sufficit ad distinguendum supposita procedentia: nam alia processione sive nativitate alius homo nascitur. Ergo in divinis processionis differentia sufficit ad distinguendum personas divinas, scilicet filium et spiritum sanctum.	6. Procession is more perfect in God than in creatures therefore the Apostle says (Eph. iii, 15) that of the heavenly Father all paternity in heaven and earth is named. Now in creatures procession suffices to distinguish the proceeding supposits: thus distinct men are born by distinct processions or births. Therefore in God a difference of procession suffices to distinguish the divine Persons, namely the Son and the Holy Ghost.
Item, non est idem procedere per modum naturae quod procedere per modum amoris. Sed nomine filii designatur persona procedens per modum naturae: nomine autem spiritus sancti designatur persona procedens per modum amoris. Ergo spiritus sanctus distinguetur a filio, etiam si ab ipso non procedat per solam processionis differentiam.	7. Procession by way of nature is not the same as procession by way of love. Now the name son designates a person proceeding by way of nature, while the name Holy Spirit indicates a person proceeding by way of love. Therefore even if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son he would be distinct from him for the sole reason that their processions are different.
Item, in patre invenitur activa generatio et activa spiratio. Sed generare et spirare, in divinis distinguunt personas. Ergo sicut filius est a patre ut persona distincta per hoc quod a patre generatur; ita spiritus sanctus est a patre ut persona distincta, per hoc quod a patre spiratur. Sic ergo sunt tres personae in divinis, etiam si spiritus sanctus a filio non procedat.	8. In the Father there are active generation and active spiration. Now generation and spiration distinguish the Persons in God. Therefore as the Son proceeds from the Father as a distinct person by the fact that he is begotten of the Father; even so the Holy Ghost by the fact that he is spirated by the Father proceeds, as a distinct person, from the Father. Thus then there are three persons in God even if the Holy Ghost proceed not from the Son.
Item, Anselmus in Lib. de processione spiritus sancti, dicit, quod spiritus sanctus ita perfecte est a patre sicut a patre et filio. Sed a patre et a filio est sicut distinctus ab utroque. Ergo si a patre solo esset, remaneret ab utroque distinctus.	9. Anselm (De Process. Sp. S.) says that the Holy Ghost is as perfectly from the Father as from the Father and the Son. Now he proceeds from the Father and the Son as distinct from both. Therefore he would still be distinct from both even if he proceeded from the Father alone.
Item, pater est sufficiens et perfectum principium. Perfectum autem principium alicuius non indiget alio ad perfecte producendum id cuius est principium. Ergo pater non indiget filio ad hoc quod producat tertiam personam, scilicet spiritum sanctum: ergo dato quod spiritus sanctus non procederet a filio, adhuc essent tres personae distinctae in divinis.	10. The Father is an adequate and perfect principle. Now the perfect principle of a thing needs not another in order to produce perfectly that whereof it is the principle. Consequently the Father needs not the Son in order to produce a third person, namely the Holy Ghost. Therefore granted that the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son, there would still be three distinct persons in God.
Item, remoto posteriori non removetur de necessitate prius; sicut remoto homine non removetur animal. De personis autem divinis tria dicuntur, scilicet processio, communio et germanitas. Ratio autem processionis praecedit rationem communionis et etiam rationem germanitatis. In divinis autem non esset communio vel germanitas, nisi esset pluralitas personarum, quae per processionem multiplicantur. Ergo, remota communione et germanitate in divinis, adhuc remanet processio. Licet ergo patris et filii non sit communio ad spirandum spiritum sanctum, neque sit germanitas spiritus sancti ad filium in hoc quod ab ipso procedat, adhuc remanet processio spiritus sancti a patre; et ita remanent tres personae distinctae, scilicet duae procedentes, et una a qua procedit.	11. The removal of that which follows does not of necessity involve the removal of what proceeds: thus if we remove man we do not thereby remove animal. Now three things are predicated of the divine persons, to wit procession, communion and kinship. The notion of procession precedes the notion of community as also the notion of kinship. But there would be neither communion nor kinship in God without plurality of persons multiplied by procession. Consequently if we remove communion and kinship from God procession still remains. Hence even if there were not community of Father and Son in spirating the Holy Ghost, nor kinship of the Holy Ghost to the Son resulting from his proceeding from him: there would still remain procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father, and thus there would still be three distinct persons, namely two proceeding and one from whom they proceed.
Item, in divinis dicuntur proprietates, relationes et notiones. Ratio autem proprietatis prius est quam ratio relationis vel notionis, quia prius est intelligere personas constitutas proprietatibus personalibus quam quod ad invicem referantur vel innotescant. Remotis etiam relationibus, adhuc remanent proprietates constituentes personas. Ergo quamvis spiritus sanctus non referatur ad filium ut ab eo existens, adhuc tamen filius et spiritus sanctus erunt personae distinctae per suas proprietates.	12. We speak of properties, relations and notions as being in God. Now property logically precedes relation or notion, since the persons are first understood as constituted with their, personal properties and afterwards as related to one another and be known. Moreover apart from the relations the properties still remain which constitute the persons. Therefore even if the Holy Spirit were not related to the Son as having existence from him, the Son and Holy Spirit would still be distinct persons by reason of their properties.
Item, filiatio est proprietas filii constituens personam ipsius; processio autem est proprietas spiritus sancti, eius personam constituens. Filiatio autem non est processio, nec ei opponitur relative. Ergo remota omni relatione spiritus sancti ad filium, adhuc remanebunt filius et spiritus sanctus personae distinctae.	13. Filiation is the property of the Son constituting his person: and procession is the property of the Holy Spirit constituting his person. But Filiation is not procession nor is it opposed thereto relatively. Therefore even if we entirely remove relation of the Holy Spirit to the Son, the Son and Holy Spirit will still be distinct persons.
Item, multi posuerunt spiritum sanctum a filio non procedere, qui tamen tres personas in divinis posuerunt, sicut patet de Graecis. Ergo quamvis spiritus sanctus a filio non procedat, adhuc remanet a filio distinctus.	14. Many, the Greeks for instance, have denied that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, and yet acknowledged three persons in God. Therefore even if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, he would still be distinct from him.
Item, Damascenus dicit: spiritum sanctum ex patre dicimus procedere; non autem ex filio, sed spiritum filii nominamus. Ergo quamvis a filio non procedat, adhuc remanet quod sit spiritus filii; et ita remanet quod sit ab eo distinctus.	15. Damascene (De Fide Orth. i, ii) says: “We assert that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father but not from the Son, but we call him the Spirit of the Son.” Consequently even if he proceed not from the Son he is still the Spirit of the Son and therefore distinct from him.
Item, sancti Graeci loquentes de filio et spiritu sancto secundum similitudinem corporalium, dicunt esse sicut duos radios paternae claritatis, et sicut duos rivos fontis divinitatis qui est in patre, et sicut duos flores paternae naturae. Sed radii, rivi et flores distinguuntur ab invicem, etiam si unus ab altero non sit. Ergo et filius et spiritus sanctus distinguuntur ab invicem.	16. The Greek saints in speaking of the Son and Holy Spirit in comparison with the material world, say that they are like two rays of the Father’s splendour; as two streams of the Godhead that is in the Father; and as two flowers of the Father’s nature. Now rays, streams and flowers are mutually distinct even if one does not proceed from the other. Therefore the Son and the Holy Spirit are in like manner distinct from each other.
Sed contra. Boetius dicit, quod in divinis sola relatio multiplicat Trinitatem. Sed, si spiritus sanctus non procedit a filio, non erit aliqua relatio spiritus sancti ad filium. Ergo non distinguetur secundum numerum personae ab eo.	On the contrary, Boethius (De Trin. vi) says that in God “relation alone multiplies the Trinity.” But if the Holy Spirit proceed not from the Son there will not be a relation of the Holy Spirit to the Son. Therefore he would not be personally distinct from him.
Item, Anselmus dicit, quod pater et filius in omnibus unum sunt, nisi in his in quibus distinguit inter eos relationis oppositio; et hoc propter essentiae unitatem. Sed similiter est una essentia filii et spiritus sancti. Ergo in omnibus unum sunt, nisi in his in quibus dividit inter eos relationis oppositio. Sed si spiritus sanctus non sit a filio, nullo modo dividit inter eos relationis oppositio. Ergo nullo modo erunt distincti ab invicem.	Again, Anselm (De Process. Sp. S. ii) says that “the Father and Son are in every respect one except in so far as they are distinguished by relative opposition”: and this by reason of the unity of essence. Now the Son and Holy Spirit are likewise one in essence. Therefore they are one in every respect, except in those things wherein relative opposition makes them distinct. But if the Holy Spirit proceed not from the Son they would nowise be distinct by reason of relative opposition: and consequently they would in no way be distinct from each other.
Item, Richardus de sancto Victore dicit, quod non potest esse in Trinitate nisi una sola persona quae sit ab una persona tantum. Si autem spiritus sanctus non sit a filio; sicut filius est ab una persona sola, scilicet a patre, ita et spiritus sanctus. Ergo et filius et spiritus sanctus erunt una sola persona.	Again, Richard of S. Victor (De Trin. v, 14) says that in the Trinity there can be but one person who proceeds from only one. Now if the Holy Spirit be not from the Son: then like the Son he will be from one person only, namely the Father: and consequently the Son and Holy Spirit will be but one person.
Item, dicit, quod non potest in divinis esse nisi unus solus qui de se procedentem non habeat. Si autem spiritus sanctus a filio non procedit; sicut spiritus sanctus non habet de se procedentem, ita nec filius habebit. Ergo filius et spiritus sanctus erunt unus solus.	Again (ibid.) he says that in God there can be but one person from whom no other person proceeds. But if the Holy Spirit proceed not from the Son, just as he has no person proceeding from him, so neither has the Son: and thus the Son and the Holy Spirit will be only one person.
Item, ubicumque personae per relationes distinguuntur, oportet referri quod personaliter distinguitur. In divinis autem personae per relationes distinguuntur: non enim possunt per aliquod absolutum distingui. Ergo quod non refertur, non distinguitur. Sed si spiritus sanctus non procedit a filio, non refertur ad ipsum. Ergo non distinguitur personaliter ab eo.	Again, wherever persons are distinguished by relations the persons thus distinct must be related to each other. Now in God the persons are distinguished by relations: since they cannot be distinguished by anything absolute. Therefore in God there is no distinction where there is no relation. But if the Holy Spirit proceed not from the Son he is not related to him: and consequently is not personally distinct from him.
Item, unum oppositorum non distinguit id cui inest, nisi ab eo in quo est reliquum oppositum; sicut per albedinem non distinguitur aliquid nisi ab eo in quo est nigredo. Ergo et relatio non distinguit id in quo est nisi ab eo in quo est opposita relatio. Propria autem relatio spiritus sancti, per quam personaliter distinguitur, est processio. Non ergo personaliter distinguitur nisi ab eo in quo est opposita relatio, quae est activa spiratio; quae non est in filio, si spiritus sanctus non sit a filio. Ergo si spiritus sanctus non sit a filio, non distinguitur personaliter ab eo.	Again, of two opposites the one does not differentiate its subject otherwise than from the subject of the other: thus whiteness does not differentiate a thing except from that which is black. Therefore a relation does not distinguish its subject except from the subject of the opposite relation. Now the relation proper to the Holy Spirit and whereby he is a distinct person is procession. Consequently he is not personally distinct save from the person in whom is the opposite relation which is active spiration: and this is not in the Son unless the Holy Spirit proceeds from him. Therefore if the Holy Spirit be not from the Son, he is not personally distinct from him.
Item, ad relationem pertinentia in divinis sunt duo in communi, a quo alius, et qui ab alio. Sed a quo alius non distinguitur personaliter per diversum modum originis: nam eadem persona patris est a qua est filius per generationem et spiritus sanctus per processionem. Ergo nec qui est ab alio per spirationem, scilicet spiritus sanctus, distinguitur ab eo qui est ab alio per generationem, scilicet a filio.	Again, in God two things belong in common to relation, one from whom another is and one who is from another. Now he from whom another is is not personally distinct by reason of a different mode of origin, since from the same person of the Father is the Son by generation, and the Holy Spirit by procession. Neither then is he who is from another by spiration (i.e., the Holy Spirit) distinct from him who is from another by generation (i.e. from the Son).
Item, Richardus, assignans differentiam inter duas processiones filii et spiritus sancti, dicit: communio maiestatis fuit, ut sic dicam, causa originis unius, scilicet filii; communio amoris fuit causa originis alterius; scilicet spiritus sancti. Non esset autem processio spiritus sancti ex communione amoris, nisi pater et filius mutuo se amarent, et sic spiritus sanctus ab eis procederet. Ergo si spiritus sanctus a filio non procederet, non esset differentia inter processionem spiritus sancti et generationem filii, et sic neque personaliter spiritus sanctus esset a filio distinctus.	Again, Richard (De Trin. vi) states the difference between the two processions of the Son and of the Holy Spirit in the following terms: “Communion of majesty, so to speak, was the cause of the one’s origin,” namely the Son’s; “communion of love was the cause of the other’s origin,” namely the Holy Spirit’s. Now the procession of the Holy Spirit would not be caused by communion of love, unless the Father and the Son loved each other, and thus the Holy Spirit would proceed from them. Therefore if the Holy Spirit proceeded not from the Son there would be no difference between the procession of the Holy Spirit and the generation of the Son, and consequently neither would the Holy Spirit be personally distinct from the Son.
Respondeo. Dicendum quod, si quis recte consideret dicta Graecorum, inveniet quod a nobis magis differunt in verbis quam in sensu. Non enim concedunt spiritum sanctum a filio procedere, vel propter ignorantiam vel proterviam seu calumniam, vel propter quamcumque aliam causam; concedunt tamen spiritum sanctum esse spiritum filii, et esse a patre per filium: quod non posset dici, si processio spiritus sancti omnino esset a filio absoluta. Unde datur intelligi quod etiam ipsi Graeci processionem spiritus sancti aliquem ordinem ad filium habere intelligunt. Dico autem, quod si spiritus sanctus non sit a filio, nec aliquo modo filius sit principium processionis spiritus sancti, impossibile est quod spiritus sanctus a filio personaliter distinguatur, et etiam impossibile est quod processio spiritus sancti differat a filii generatione.	I answer that if we take careful note of the statements of the Greeks we shall find that they differ from us in words rather than in thought. Thus they will not grant that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, either through ignorance, obstinacy or sophistry or some other cause, no matter what, and yet they acknowledge that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Son, and that he is of the Father through the Son, which would not be true if the procession of the Holy Spirit were entirely, independent of the Son. Hence we may infer that even the Greeks themselves understand that the procession of the Holy Spirit has some connection with the Son. But I say that if the Holy Spirit be not from the Son, and if the Son be in no way a principle of the Holy Spirit’s procession, then it is impossible that the Holy Spirit be a distinct person from the Son, and further that the procession of the Holy Spirit cannot possibly differ from the generation of the Son.
Quod quidem manifestum est, si quis consideret ea ex quibus aliqui divinarum personarum distinctionem manifestant. Loquuntur enim quidam de distinctione personarum secundum relationes; alii vero secundum modos originis; quidam autem per comparationem ad essentialia attributa. Si ergo consideremus modum distinguendi personas per relationes, manifeste apparet quod spiritus sanctus personaliter a filio distingui non potest, si ab eo non procedat: primo quidem, quia distinctio aliquorum ab invicem non proprie potest esse nisi vel propter divisionem materialem seu quantitativam, vel propter divisionem formalem. Distinctio autem secundum materialem et quantitativam divisionem, invenitur in corporalibus rebus, in quibus eiusdem speciei sunt individua plura ex eo quod forma speciei in diversis partibus materiae secundum quantitatem divisionis invenitur: unde et si aliquod est individuum quod constat ex tota materia, in qua possibile est esse formam speciei, impossibile est quod illius speciei sint individua plura, sicut probat Aristoteles de mundo, in principio caeli et mundi. Hunc autem modum distinctionis omnino oportet a divinis removeri, cum in Deo non sit materia nec quantitas corporalis. Distinctio autem aliquorum habentium unam naturam saltem generis, per divisionem formalem esse non potest nisi ratione alicuius oppositionis. Unde invenimus quod cuiuslibet generis differentiae sunt oppositae. Et ideo in natura divina non potest nec esse nec intelligi aliqua distinctio, cum sit una non solum genere sed numero, nisi per aliquam oppositionem. Unde cum personae distinguantur in divinis, oportet quod hoc sit per aliquam oppositionem relativam, quia alia oppositio in divinis esse non potest: et hoc satis manifeste apparet. Nam quantumcumque aliqua dividantur secundum rationem diversam, sicut essentialia attributa, non distinguunt personas quia ad invicem non opponuntur. Sic etiam plures notiones inveniuntur in una persona divina, propter hoc quod oppositionem ad invicem non habent, sicut in patre: scilicet innascibilitas, paternitas, et spiratio activa. Ibi enim primo invenitur distinctio ubi primo occurrit oppositio relativa, sicut in hoc quod est esse patrem et filium. Ubi ergo non est oppositio relativa in divinis, non potest esse realis distinctio, quae est distinctio personalis. Si autem spiritus sanctus non procedit a filio, non erit oppositio aliqua inter filium et spiritum sanctum, et ita non distinguetur personaliter spiritus sanctus a filio. Nec potest dici, quod ad talem distinctionem faciendam sufficiat oppositio affirmationis et negationis; quia talis oppositio sequitur distinctionem, non autem distinctionem causat, cum existens ab altero distinguatur per aliquid sibi inhaerens substantialiter vel accidentaliter; quod autem hoc non sit hoc, sequitur ex hoc quod distincta sunt. Similiter etiam patet quod veritas cuiuslibet negativae in existentibus supra veritatem affirmativae fundatur: sicut veritas huius negativae Aethiops non est albus, fundatur supra veritatem huius affirmativae Aethiops est niger. Et ideo oportet omnem differentiam quae est per oppositionem affirmationis et negationis, reduci in differentiam alicuius affirmativae oppositionis. Unde non potest esse prima distinctionis ratio inter filium et spiritum sanctum ex hoc quod filius est genitus, non spiratus; alius spiratus, non genitus nisi praeintelligatur distinctio inter generationem et spirationem, et inter filium et spiritum sanctum, per aliquam oppositionem duarum affirmationum.	This will be evident if we consider those things in reference to which various writers explain the distinction between the divine persons. Thus some refer the distinction of tile persons to the relations; others, to the mode of origin; others, to the essential attributes. If then we consider the manner of distinguishing the persons by the relations, it is evident that the Holy Spirit cannot be personally distinct from the Son if he does not proceed from him. First, because things cannot be properly distinct from one another otherwise than either by reason of matter, i.e. by a difference of quantity, or by reason of form. Now distinction in respect of material and quantitative division is to be found in corporeal things wherein there are several individuals of the same species by reason of the specific form being in various parts of matter according as it is divided quantitatively: wherefore if there be an individual consisting of all the matter wherein the specific form can be, there cannot be more than one individual of that species, as Aristotle proves (De Coelo et Mundo i). Now this kind of distinction is utterly foreign to God, seeing that in him there is neither matter nor corporeal quantity. Things that have a common, and at least generic, nature, cannot be distinct from one another by reason of a difference of forms except on account of some kind of opposition. Hence we find that the differences of any genus are in opposition to one another: and consequently it is impossible and even inconceivable that there be any distinction save one of opposition in the divine nature, seeing that it is one not only in genus but also in number. Wherefore since the divine persons are distinct from one another, this must be on account of a relative opposition, in that no other opposition is possible in God. This is sufficiently evident, since no matter how much certain things may differ in definition, for instance the essential attributes, they do not distinguish the persons, since they are not mutually opposed to one another. Thus again several notions are to be found in one divine person, for the reason that they are not opposed to one another: for instance, in the Father there are innascibility, paternity and active spiration. For there do we first find distinction where first there is relative opposition: for instance, in this that there are Father and Son. Accordingly in God where there is no relative opposition there can be no real distinction and this is a distinction of persons. Now if the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, there will be no opposition between them and the Holy Spirit will not be a distinct person from the Son. Nor can it be said that for this distinction opposition of affirmation and negation is enough: because this kind of opposition follows and does not cause distinction, since that which already exists is distinct from another by something inherent either substantial or accidental: whereas that this is not that, is a result of their being distinct. Likewise it is evident that the truth of a negative statement about things in existence is based on the truth of a positive statement: thus the truth of this negation, An African is not white is based on the truth of this affirmation, An African is black: wherefore all differences in respect of affirmation and negation must be reducible to a difference of positive opposition. Consequently the primary reason for the distinction between the Son and Holy Spirit cannot be that the one is begotten and not spirated, the other spirated and not begotten, unless we presuppose the distinction between begetting and spirating and between Son and Holy Spirit by reason of an opposition between two affirmations.
Secundo, quia, secundum Augustinum, in divinis quod dicitur absolute, est commune tribus personis. Unde relinquitur quod divinarum personarum distinctio esse non possit nisi secundum id quod ad aliquid dicitur; haec enim duo praedicamenta sunt in divinis. Prima autem distinctio quae in divinis secundum relationem invenitur, est per haec duo, a quo alius, et qui a nullo. Si autem alterum eorum subdistinguendum est, scilicet quod est ab alio, oportet quod subdistinguatur per ea quae sunt eiusdem rationis. Ut enim philosophus docet, si quis in subdividendo utatur his quae sunt per accidens et non per se, non rectum divisionis ordinem sequitur; sicut si diceretur: animalium aliud est rationale aliud irrationale; irrationalium vero aliud album, aliud nigrum; non esset recta divisio, quia cum ex his quae sunt per accidens, non fiat unum simpliciter, ultima species, ex differentiis multis constituta, non esset unum simpliciter. Oportet ergo, si in divinis qui est ab alio distinguatur vel subdividatur, quod hoc sit per differentias eiusdem rationis, ut videlicet eorum quae sunt ab alio, unus eorum ab eorum altero sit; et hoc importat differentia processionum, quae significatur cum dicitur quod unus procedit per generationem, alius per spirationem. Unde Richardus hoc modo distinguit procedentem ab alio, quod unus habeat alium de se procedentem, alius vero non.	Secondly, because according to Augustine (De Trin. vi, 2) whatsoever is said of God absolutely is common to the three persons. Whence it follows that distinction between the divine persons can only be in respect of what is said relatively: for these two predicaments are applicable to God. Now the primary relative distinction to be found in God is that between one from whom is another and one who is from another. And if one of these must be subdivided, namely one that is from another, it must be subdivided by something that belongs to it per se. For as the Philosopher teaches (Metaph. viii) it is against the rules of subdivision to subdivide a thing in reference to that which is accidental to it and does not belong to it per se: thus, if one were to say animals are divided into rational and irrational, and irrational animals are divided into white and black, the division would not be right, because since things that are accidental do not combine to make that which is simply one, the ultimate species resulting from many differences would not be one simply. Accordingly, if in God he who is from another be distinguished or subdivided, this must be in reference to differences per se, namely that one of those who is from another be from the other: and this involves a difference of processions, which is indicated when we say that one proceeds by generation, the other by spiration. Hence Richard of S. Victor (De Trin. v, 10) distinguishes the person proceeding from another thus—one who has another proceeding from him and one who has not.
Tertio, quia cum in patre sint duae relationes, scilicet paternitas et activa spiratio, sola paternitas constituit personam patris: unde dicitur proprietas sive relatio personalis; spiratio vero activa est relatio personae non personalis, quasi personae iam constitutae superveniens. Ex quo patet quod generatio activa, sive paternitas, secundum ordinem intelligendi, praesupponitur ad spirationem. Oportet ergo quod similiter filiatio, quae paternitati per oppositionem respondet, secundum aliquem ordinem praesupponatur ad spirationem passivam, quae est processio spiritus sancti. Aut ergo ita quod spiratio passiva intelligatur supervenire filiationi in eadem persona, sicut spiratio activa paternitati: et sic erit in eadem persona spirati et nati, sicut generantis et spirantis; aut oportet quod aliquem alium ordinem habeat filiatio ad spirationem passivam. Non est autem ordo in divinis nisi naturae, secundum quod aliquis est ab aliquo, ut dicit Augustinus. Unde relinquitur quod vel sit una persona filii et spiritus sancti spirati, vel quod spiritus sanctus sit a filio.	Thirdly, because whereas in the Father there are two relations, paternity and active spiration, paternity alone constitutes the person of the Father: wherefore it is said to be a personal property or relation: while active spiration, being adventitious, so to speak, to the already constituted person, is the relation of a person but not a personal relation. Hence it is plain that active generation or paternity, in the logical order, precedes active spiration. Consequently in like manner filiation which corresponds to paternity as its opposite must in some order be presupposed to passive spiration which is the procession of the Holy Spirit: and this must mean—either that passive spiration. is understood as supervening to filiation in the same person, just as active spiration supervenes to paternity, and thus the same person will be spirated and begotten just as the same person begets and spirates—or that there is some other order between filiation and passive spiration. But there is no order in God other than that of nature, in respect of which one is from another, as Augustine says (De Trin. et Unit. xiii). It follows then that either the Son and the Holy Spirit are one person, or the Holy Spirit is from the Son.
Si quis autem distinctionem divinarum personarum per ipsam originem consideret, non per relationes originis, idem sequitur; sicut ex his quae dicentur apparebit. Primo quidem, quia si quis proprietatem divinae naturae consideret, impossibile est in Deo esse pluralitatem personarum nisi per hoc quod una ab alia oriatur, nullo autem modo per hoc quod duae oriuntur ab una. Quod patet, si quis consideret qualiter in diversis rebus distinctio invenitur. In rebus enim materialibus, in quibus possibile est fieri multiplicationem per divisionem materiae et quantitatis, ut dictum est, possibile est duo individua unius speciei ex aequo se habere, sicut et duae partes quantitatis ex aequo se habent; ubi autem invenitur prima differentia secundum formam, ibi impossibile est quod aliquo duo se habeant ex aequo. Ut enim philosophus dicit, formae rerum sunt sicut numeri, in quibus variantur species per unitatis additionem vel subtractionem: et formales rerum differentiae consistunt in quodam perfectionis ordine. Nam planta specie differt a lapide in hoc quod superaddit vitam; animal vero brutum a planta in hoc quod superaddit sensum: homo vero a bruto in hoc quod superaddit rationem. Et ideo in rebus immaterialibus, in quibus non potest esse multiplicatio secundum divisionem materiae, impossibile est quod sit pluralitas nisi cum ordine quodam. In substantiis quidem immaterialibus creatis est ordo perfectionis, secundum quod unus Angelus est perfectioris naturae quam alius. Et quia quidam philosophi crediderunt quod omnis natura imperfecta crearetur a perfectiori, ideo dixerunt quod in substantiis separatis non potest esse multiplicatio nisi per causam et causatum: quod tamen recta fides non tenet, quia credimus, ex ordine divinae sapientiae, differentes ordines substantiarum immaterialium productos esse. Cum autem in divinis non possit esse ordo perfectionis, ut Ariani posuerunt— dicentes patrem filio esse maiorem, et utrumque spiritu sancto— relinquitur quod pluralitas in divinis personis esse non potest nec intelligi nisi secundum ordinem originis solum, ut scilicet filius sit a patre, et spiritus sanctus a filio. Si enim spiritus sanctus non esset a filio, ex aequo respiceret patrem quantum ad originem; unde vel non essent duae personae; vel esset ordo inter eos perfectionis secundum Arianos; vel esset inter eos materialis divisio; quod est impossibile. Et hanc rationem sequens Hilarius dicit, quod ponere in divinis duos ingenitos, id est non ab aliquo existentes, est ponere duos deos; quia si non sit multiplicatio per originis ordinem, oportet quod sit per ordinem naturarum. Et ideo eadem est ratio, si inter filium et spiritum sanctum originis ordo non ponatur.	We shall come to the same conclusion if we consider the distinction of the divine persons in reference to their origin, but not to their relations of origin. This is evident for the following reasons. First, if we consider a property of the divine nature, we shall see how impossible it is that there be distinction between the divine persons unless one originate from another, and that the fact that two originate from one does not cause a personal distinction. This is made plain if we observe how various things are distinguished from one another. In the material world where, as stated above, it is possible for things to be multiplied by a division of matter and quantity, two individuals of the same species can be on an equal footing, thus two quantitative parts may be equal: but where the primary difference is one of form it is impossible for two individuals to be on a par with each other. For as the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii) forms are like numbers in which the species vary by the addition or subtraction of unity: and formal differences consist in a certain order of perfection. Thus the species of the plant differs from that of the stone in that it has life in addition: and the species of the dumb animal from that of the plant in that it has sensation, and the species of man from that of the dumb animal in that reason is added to it. Wherefore in immaterial things which cannot be multiplied by a division of matter, there cannot be plurality without some kind of order. Thus in created immaterial substances there is order of perfection according as one angel is in nature more perfect than another. And as some philosophers thought that every imperfect nature is created by a more perfect one, they therefore contended that in separate substances there cannot be multiplication otherwise than by reason of cause and effect. The true Faith, however, does not hold this, since we believe that the various orders of immaterial substances were produced according to the disposition of divine wisdom. Now whereas in God there cannot be order of perfection, as the Arians, contended, saying that the Father is greater than the Son, and each of them greater than the Holy Spirit, we must conclude that plurality in the divine persons cannot even be conceived otherwise than according to the sole order of origin: so that, to wit, the Son be from the Father, and the Holy Spirit from the Son. For if the Holy Spirit were not from the Son, they would be equally referred to the Father in point of origin: wherefore either they would not be two persons, or there would be order of perfection between them as the Arians pretended, or there would be a distinction of matter between them: which is impossible. Hilary follows this line of argument (De Synod.) when he says that to assert that in God there are two who are unbegotten, i.e. who do not derive existence from another, is to posit two Gods: since if multiplication be not by the order of origin, it must be by the order of nature: so that the same argument avails if we do not acknowledge order of origin between the Son and Holy Spirit.
Secundo, quia quod procedit ab uno naturaliter, oportet esse unum: natura enim semper ad unum se habet; sed quae procedunt ab aliquo per voluntatem operantem, possunt esse plura, licet sint ab uno: sicut ab uno Deo diversae creaturae processerunt secundum voluntatem ipsius. Constat autem quod filius procedit a patre naturaliter et non per voluntatem, ut Ariani dixerunt; et hoc ideo quia Hilarius dicit: quod naturaliter procedit ab aliquo, est tale quale est ipsum a quo procedit; quod autem procedit ab aliquo secundum voluntatem agentem, non est tale quale est illud a quo procedit, sed quale vult esse illud. Filius autem talis est qualis est pater; creaturae vero sunt tales quales Deus voluit eas esse. Unde filius est a patre naturaliter, creaturae autem ab eo per voluntatem. Similiter autem et spiritus sanctus talis est qualis est pater; non enim est creatura, ut Arius et Macedonius dixerunt. Unde oportet quod naturaliter a patre procedat; propter quod dicitur ab Athanasio et aliis sanctis esse naturalis spiritus patris et filii. Impossibile est ergo quod filius et spiritus sanctus procedant a patre nisi hoc modo quod a solo patre procedit unus solus, scilicet filius; et a patre et filio, in quantum unum sunt, unus spiritus sanctus.	Secondly, because that which proceeds naturally from one must itself be one: since nature is always confined to one effect: whereas things which proceed from the operation of the will may be many, although they proceed from one: thus from one God a diversity of creatures proceeded according to his will. Now it is certain that the Son proceeds from the Father naturally, and not through his will as the Arians maintained: and this because, as Hilary says (De Synod.), that which Proceeds from its source naturally is of the same nature as its source, but that which proceeds according to the direction of a will, is not of the same mature as he from whom it proceeds, but such as he wishes it to be. Now the Son is of the same nature as the Father: while creatures are such as God wished them to be. Hence the Son is from the Father naturally, and creatures proceed from him according to his will. In like manner the Holy Spirit is of the same nature as the Father, for he is not a creature as Arius and Macedonius asserted. Wherefore he must proceed from the Father naturally: for which reason he is said by Athanasius and other holy men to be the natural spirit of the Father and the Son. Consequently it is impossible that the Son and Holy Spirit proceed from the Father except in such wise that from the Father alone one alone, i.e. the Son, proceeds, and from the Father and Son inasmuch as they are one the one Holy Spirit proceeds.
Tertio, quia, sicut Richardus probat, impossibile est quod in divinis sit mediata processio. Cum enim quaelibet divina persona sit in alia, oportet quod quaelibet divina persona immediate ad aliam ordinetur. Si autem filius et spiritus sanctus essent a patre absque hoc quod spiritus sanctus esset a filio, spiritus sancti ad filium non esset immediatus ordo: non enim ordinaretur ad invicem nisi mediante uno a quo existerent, sicut duo fratres ab uno patre geniti. Unde impossibile est quod filius et spiritus sanctus hoc modo sint a patre, sicut duae personae distinctae, quod unus eorum non sit ab alio.	Thirdly, because as Richard (De Trin. v, 9) proves, there cannot be an indirect procession in God. Because since each divine person dwells in the other, each must be ordered immediately to the other. But if the Son and Holy Spirit were from the Father without the Holy Spirit being from the Son, there would not be immediate order between the Son and the Holy Spirit, since they would not be ordered to each other except through the one from whom they proceed; like two brothers begotten of the same father. Hence it is impossible that the Son and the Holy Spirit proceed from the Father as distinct persons, unless one proceed from the other.
Si vero aliquis consideret distinctionem personarum per ordinem ad attributa essentialia, patet etiam quod idem sequitur. Primo quidem, quia secundum hoc dicitur, quod filius procedit per modum naturae, spiritus autem sanctus per modum voluntatis. Nam semper processio naturae est principium et origo cuiuslibet alterius processionis; omnia enim quae per artem et voluntatem vel intellectum fiunt, procedunt ab his quae secundum naturam sunt. Et ideo Richardus dicit, quod inter omnes procedendi modos constat primum locum tenere et ceteris principaliorem esse illum modum procedendi qui est filii a patre. Nam nisi iste praecesserit, ceterorum nullus existendi locum habebit omnino. Secundo manifestum est si dicatur, quod filius procedit processione intellectuali ut verbum, spiritus autem sanctus processione voluntatis ut amor. Non enim potest esse nec intelligi quod amor sit alicuius quod non est in intellectu praeconceptum: unde quilibet amor est ab aliquo verbo, loquendo de amore in intellectuali natura. Tertio idem apparet, si spiritum sanctum dicamus esse vivificum quoddam spiramen divinitatis, ut dicit Athanasius. Omnis enim motus et actio vitae ordinatur per intellectum, nisi ex imperfectione naturae contrarium accidat. Unde ex omnibus supradictis datur intelligi, quod nec spiritus sanctus esset alius a filio si ab eo non procederet, nec spiratio esset aliud a generatione.	Again, if we consider the distinction of the persons in reference to the essential attributes we shall come to the same conclusion. First, because in this respect we say that the Son proceeds by way of the nature, and the Holy Spirit by way of the will: and the procession of nature is the source and origin of every other kind of procession, for whatsoever things have their being through art and the will or the intellect, proceed from things that are according to nature. Hence Richard (De Trin. vi, 17) says that without doubt of all modes of procession the first and chief place belongs to the way in which the Son proceeds from the Father: since unless the Father had preceded neither of the other persons would have had any foundation for his existence. Secondly, this is evident if we realise that the Son proceeds by an intellectual procession as the Word, and the Holy Spirit by a procession of the will as Love. For it is both impossible and inconceivable that an object can be loved that has not first been understood by the intellect, wherefore in the intellectual nature all love proceeds from a word. Thirdly, it is evident, if we say with Athanasius that the Holy Spirit is the life-giving breath of the Godhead. Because all vital movement and action is directed by an intelligence, unless the contrary occur on account of an imperfection of nature. Hence from all that has been said we infer that the Holy Spirit would not be a distinct person from the Son if he proceeded not from him, nor would spiration be distinct from generation.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod spiritus sanctus distinguitur substantialiter a filio in hoc quod origo unius differt ab origine alterius; sed ipsa differentia originis est per hoc quod filius est a patre solo, spiritus autem sanctus a patre et filio. Quod patet per Richardum de sancto Victore qui in II de Trin. dicit: notandum, quod huiusmodi differentia proprietatum in solo consistit numero producentium; nam prima earum habet esse a nulla alia, altera ab una sola, tertia vero a gemina.	Reply to the First Objection. The Holy Spirit is personally distinct from the Son in that the origin of the one differs from the origin of the other: but this very difference of origin is due to the Son being from the Father alone, whereas the Holy Spirit is from both the Father and the Son. Richard of S. Victor makes this plain when he says (De Trim. v, 20): “Observe that this difference of properties consists merely in the number of persons Producing, in that the first has being from no other, the second from one only, the third from two.”
Ad secundum dicendum, quod id quod dicit Anselmus, quod filius et spiritus sanctus per hoc solum ad invicem distinguuntur quod diverso modo procedunt, est omnino verum; sed, sicut ostensum est, diverso modo procedere non possent, nisi spiritus sanctus a filio esset; unde remoto quod spiritus sanctus non sit a filio, omnino distinctio spiritus sancti removetur a filio. Est autem intentio Anselmi prius ponere ea in quibus nos convenimus cum negantibus spiritum sanctum a filio esse, qui tamen spiritum sanctum a filio dicunt distingui. Unde verba praedicta Anselmi inducta sunt magis ut disputativa suppositio quam veritatis definitio.	Reply to the Second Objection. Anselm is quite correct in saying that the Son and the Holy Spirit are distinct from each other by this alone that they proceed in different ways: but as we have already shown, they cannot proceed in different ways unless the Holy Spirit proceed from the Son: wherefore if it be denied that the Holy Spirit is from the Son, it must likewise be denied that he is distinct from the Son. However, it is Anselm’s intention (in his work on the Procession of the Holy Spirit) first to indicate the points in which we agree with those who deny that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son and yet assert that he is a distinct person from him. Wherefore the words quoted from Anselm are in the nature of an argumentative hypothesis rather than a statement of the truth.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod bene sequitur si sunt duo modi originis in divinis, quod sunt duae personae procedentes; sed duo modi originis esse non possunt nisi per hoc quod spiritus sanctus procedit a filio, ut ostensum est.	Reply to the Third Objection. If there are two modes of origin in God it is right to infer that there are two persons; who proceed: but as we have shown there cannot be two modes of origin except by reason of the Holy Spirit proceeding from the Son.
Et similiter dicendum ad quartum.	The same answer applies to the Fourth Objection.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod non oportet quod tot sint personae subsistentes in divinis, quot sunt relationes: nam in una persona patris sunt duae relationes, scilicet paternitas, per quam refertur ad filium, et communis spiratio, per quam refertur ad spiritum sanctum: paternitatis enim relatio constituit personam subsistentem; sed relatio communis spirationis non est proprietas personam constituens, sed relatio personae subsistenti inhaerens. Unde non sequitur, si ex generatione et processione consequuntur duae relationes, quod propter hoc sint tantum duae personae subsistentes. Potest etiam responderi, quod non sunt duae processiones nisi unus procedentium sit ab alio, ut dictum est.	Reply to the Fifth Objection. There need not be as many subsistent persons in God as there are relations: since in the one person of the Father there are two relations, namely paternity whereby he is referred to the Son, and common spiration whereby he is referred to the Holy Spirit. For the relation of paternity constitutes a subsistent person; whereas the relation of common spiration is not a property constituting a person, but a relation inherent to a subsistent person. Thus if two relations result from generation and procession it does not follow that therefore there are only two subsistent persons: since one might reply that there are not two processions unless one of the proceeding persons proceed from the other, as we have already stated.
Et per hoc patet solutio ad sextum.	From this may be gathered the Reply to the Sixth Objection.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod illud quod procedit per modum amoris, oportet quod procedat ab eo quod procedit per modum naturae, ut ex dictis patet.	Reply to the Seventh Objection. As already explained, that which proceeds as love must proceed from that which proceeds by way of nature.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod spiratio distinguit spiritum sanctum a spirante, sicut generatio generatum a generante; non tamen ex hoc sequitur quod spiratus a generato distinguatur, cum et spirans et generans sint idem. Nec propter hoc quod idem non potest duabus processionibus diversis procedere: sed processiones in divinis non possunt esse diversae, nisi per hoc quod unus procedentium est ab alio, ut ostensum est.	Reply to the Eighth Objection. Spiration. distinguishes the Holy Spirit from the Spirator, just as generation distinguishes the Begotten from the Begetter: but it does not follow that the Spirated is distinct from the Begotten, since both Spirator and Begetter are the same person. Nor does it follow from the fact that the same thing can proceed by two processions, that processions in God cannot differ except by reason of one proceeding person being from another, as proved above (A. 4).
Ad nonum dicendum, quod spiritus sanctus ita perfecte est a patre, sicut a patre et filio; non tamen propter hoc quod est a patre, a filio distinguitur, sed propter hoc quod est a filio.	Reply to the Ninth Objection. The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father as perfectly as from the Father and Son: yet he is distinct from the Son, not because he proceeds from the Father, but because he proceeds from the Son.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod pater est sufficiens principium spiritus sancti, nec indiget alio principio ad spirationem spiritus sancti; filius enim non est aliud principium spiritus sancti a patre, sed unum principium cum ipso.	Reply to the Tenth Objection. The Father is the sufficient principle of the Holy Spirit, nor does he need another principle for the Holy Spirit’s spiration: because in spirating the Holy Spirit the Son is not a distinct principle from the Father, but is one principle with him.
Ad undecimum dicendum, quod licet processio sit prius per intellectum quam communio, sicut commune quam proprium, tamen talis processio— scilicet spiritus sancti, qui procedit quasi amor et communio et nexus patris et filii— non est prius secundum intellectum quam communio. Unde non oportet quod, remota communione, remaneat processio; sicut animal est prius secundum rationem quam homo, non autem animal rationale.	Reply to the Eleventh Objection. Although procession is logically prior to communion, as communion is to property: nevertheless in this particular kind of procession, namely that of the Holy Spirit who proceeds as love, communion and kinship of Father and Son is not logically prior to communion: wherefore it does not follow that if we remove communion procession remains: thus animal is prior to man logically, whereas rational animal is not.
Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod eaedem secundum rem in divinis sunt proprietates et relationes et notiones; nisi quod proprietates sunt solum tres, scilicet paternitas, filiatio et processio. Relationes autem sunt quatuor, addita praedictis proprietatibus tribus communi spiratione, quae relatio quidem est, non tamen proprietas, quia non uni personae convenit, sed duabus. Notiones vero sunt quinque, addita innascibilitate; quae non est relatio, sed notio, quia per eam pater innotescit; est etiam proprietas, quia convenit soli patri; non tamen proprietas personalis, quia non constituit personam patris. Quantum ergo ad rem, ordinem habere non possunt proprietates, relationes et notiones, cum idem sub tribus contineatur. Si autem eorum ordo quantum ad proprias rationes requiratur, tunc notio prior est relatione secundum ordinem quo aliquid dicitur prius quoad nos; relatio autem et proprietas secundum ordinem quo aliquid prius est secundum rem. Si autem relationis et proprietatis ordinem requiramus, in rebus creatis non est eorum ordinem assignare. Nam aliqua proprietas est relatio, sed non omnis; similiter et aliqua relatio est proprietas, sed non omnis. Si tamen proprietas ab aliquo absoluto sumatur, sic proprietas primum est eo ordine quo absolutum est prius relato. In divinis autem personis oportet quod relationis ratio rationem proprietatis praecedat; nam cum proprium sit quod uni soli convenit, ratio proprietatis distinctionem praesupponit. In divinis autem non potest esse aliquid distinctum, nisi per hoc quod est ad aliquid. Unde relatio, quae est distinctionis principium in divinis, secundum rationem prior est proprietate. Sciendum tamen est, quod neque proprietas neque relatio, secundum quod huiusmodi, habent rationem constituendi personam. Nam cum persona sit rationalis naturae individua substantia, id quod est extra substantiam, personam constituere non potest; unde in rebus creatis proprietates et relationes non sunt constituentes, sed magis advenientes constitutis personis. In divinis autem ipsa relatio, quae est etiam proprietas, est divina essentia; et ex hoc habet quod id quod per eam constitutum est, sit persona: nisi enim paternitas esset divina essentia, nullatenus hoc nomen pater significaret personam, sed solum accidens relativum personae, sicut patet in personis humanis. Paternitas ergo, in quantum est divina essentia, constituit hypostasim subsistentem in divina natura; in quantum vero est relatio, distinguit; in quantum vero est proprietas, convenit uni personae, et non alii; in quantum vero est notio, est principium innotescendi personam. Sic ergo secundum ordinem intellectus, primum est quod sit personam constituens; secundum quod sit distinguens; tertium quod sit proprietas; quartum quod sit notio.	Reply to the Twelfth Objection. In God property, relation and notion are one and the same in reality: except that there are but three properties, to wit paternity, filiation and procession, while there are four relations, common spiration being added to the three aforesaid relations, since it is a relation but not a property, inasmuch as it belongs not to one person but to two. The notions are five in number, since they include innascibility which is not a relation but a notion, inasmuch as by it the Father is known: besides which it is a property since it belongs to the Father alone, but not a personal property, since it does not constitute the person of the Father. Accordingly there can be no real order between the properties, relations and notions since the same thing is identified with all three. But if we consider their order in the light of their respective definitions, then notion precedes relation logically in the same way as one thing is prior to another from our point of view: while relation and property precede in the order of real priority. If, however, we seek the order between relation and property, we can find no such order in creatures: because some properties are relations, but not all, and in like manner some relations are properties, but not all. If, however, we consider property in something absolute, then property precedes in the order whereby the absolute precedes the relative. In the divine persons relation precedes property logically: because as the property is that which belongs to one alone, property logically presupposes distinction: and in God nothing is distinct otherwise than by reason of a relation. Wherefore relation which is the principle of distinction in God is logically prior to property. It must be observed, however, that neither property nor relation as such are defined as constituting a person. Because since a person is an individual substance of rational nature, that which is outside substance cannot constitute a person: wherefore in created things properties and relations are not constituent of, but are incidental to the persons already constituted: whereas in God the relation itself which is also a property is the divine essence: so that by this very fact that which is constituted thereby is a person: inasmuch as unless paternity were the divine essence, the name Father could by no means signify a person, but only a relative accident of a person, as in the case of human persons. Hence paternity inasmuch as it is the divine essence constitutes a hypostasis, subsisting in the divine nature; inasmuch as it is a relation it distinguishes; inasmuch as it is a property it belongs to one person only and not to another; inasmuch as it is a notion it is the principle whereby that person is known. Accordingly in the logical order, the first is that which constitutes the person, the second is that which distinguishes it, the third is the property, and the fourth is the notion.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum est, quod licet filiatio non opponatur relative processioni, tamen procedens opponitur relative filio; et per hoc processio a filiatione distinguitur.	Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. Although filiation is not opposed relatively to procession, nevertheless the person proceeding is opposed relatively to the Son; and this is the reason why procession is distinguished from filiation.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod licet Graeci non confiteantur spiritum sanctum a filio procedere, confitentur tamen filium esse aliquo modo principium originis spiritus sancti; quod patet ex hoc quod dicunt spiritum sanctum a patre esse per filium, et spiritum sanctum esse filii. Nihilominus tamen aliquid implicite contradictionem implicat, quod nihil prohibet ab alio explicite nesciente concedi; et sic aliquis non intelligens potest dicere, spiritum sanctum non esse a filio, licet a filio sit distinctus.	Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. Though the Greeks do not acknowledge that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, they believe that the Son in some way is the principle whence the Holy Spirit originates. This is plain from the fact that they state that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, and that he is the Spirit of the Son. And yet a statement may imply a contradiction, whereas one who is ignorant may grant it explicitly: and thus an unintelligent person might say that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son and yet is distinct from the Son.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod in hoc quod Damascenus spiritum sanctum esse filii confitetur, dat intelligere quod origo spiritus sancti aliquo modo sit a filio	Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. By acknowledging that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Son Damascene implies that in some way the Holy Spirit originates from the Son.
Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod spiritus sanctus et filius dicuntur esse duo rivi in quantum procedunt ambo a patre; dicitur tamen et a Graecorum doctoribus, quod filius sit fons spiritus sancti, sed quod spiritus sanctus non est a filio; et idem potest dici de aliis similitudinibus.	Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. The Holy Spirit and the Son are said to be two streams inasmuch as both proceed from the Father. Yet the Greek doctors say that the Son is the fount of the Holy Spirit, but that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from him. The same applies to the other comparisons.

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