QUESTION II
Of God’s Generating Power

Et primo quaeritur utrum in divinis sit generativa potentia. Secundo utrum potentia generativa in divinis dicatur essentialiter vel notionaliter. Tertio utrum potentia generativa in actum generationis procedat per imperium voluntatis. Quarto utrum in divinis possint esse plures filii. Quinto utrum potentia generandi sub omnipotentia comprehendatur. Sexto utrum potentia generandi et potentia creandi sint idem.

Is There a Generative Power in God? Is Generation Attributed to God Essentially or Notionally? In the Act of Generation Does the Generative Power Come into Action at the Command of the Will? Can There Be Several Sons in God? Is the Generative Power Included in Omnipotence? Are the Generative and Creative Powers the Same?

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Q. II: ARTICLE I Is There a Generative Power in God? [ Sum. Th. I, Q. xii, A. 4]
Et primo quaeritur utrum in divinis sit potentia generativa. Et videtur quod non.	We are inquiring about God’s generative power, and the first point of inquiry is whether in God there is the power to beget. The reply seemingly should be in the negative.
Omnis enim potentia vel est activa vel passiva. Sed in divinis non potest esse potentia passiva aliqua; nec ibi generativa potentia potest esse activa; quia sic filius esset actus vel factus, quod est contra fidem. Ergo in divinis non est potentia generativa.	1. All power is either active or passive. Now there can be no passive power in God: nor in him can a generative power be active, because then the Son would be the result, of an action and would be made, which is against the faith. Therefore there is no generative power in God.
Praeterea, secundum philosophum, cuius est potentia, eius est actio. Sed generatio non est in divinis. Ergo nec generativa potentia. Probatio mediae. Ubicumque est generatio ibi est communicatio naturae, et receptio eiusdem. Sed cum recipere sit materiae, vel passivae potentiae, quae in divinis non est, receptio Deo competere non potest. Ergo in divinis non potest esse generatio.	2. According to the Philosopher (De Somn. et Vig. i), action belongs to that which has power. Now in God there,. is no begetting: and consequently there is no generative power. The middle proposition is proved thus. Wherever there is a begetting there is communication and reception of nature. But since reception involves matter and passive power, which are not in God, reception is inadmissible in God: and therefore there can be no begetting in God.
Praeterea, generans oportet esse distinctum a genito. Non autem secundum illud quod generans communicat genito, quia in hoc potius conveniunt. Ergo debet esse in genito aliquid aliud ab eo quod est sibi per generationem communicatum; et ita oportet omne genitum esse compositum, ut videtur. In divinis autem non est aliqua compositio. Ergo non potest esse genitus Deus; et sic non est ibi generatio; et ita ut prius.	3. The begetter must needs be distinct from the begotten. Not, however, in that which the begetter communicates to the begotten, since rather are they the same in that regard. Consequently in the begotten there must needs be something besides that which he receives by generation from the begetter: so that seemingly whatsoever is begotten must be composite. But in God there is no composition. Therefore there cannot be a begotten God, and consequently there can be no begetting in God, and the same conclusion follows.
Praeterea, nihil imperfectionis est Deo attribuendum. Sed omnis potentia respectu sui actus, imperfecta est, tam activa quam passiva. Ergo potentia generativa in Deo ponenda non est.	4. No imperfection should be ascribed to God. Now every power, active or passive, in comparison with its act is imperfect. Therefore we should not attribute a generative power to God.
Sed dicit respondens, quod hoc est verum de potentia non coniuncta actui.- Sed contra, omne quod perficitur per alterum est minus perfectum eo per quod perficitur. Sed potentia coniuncta actui perficitur per actum. Ergo actus est ea perfectior; et sic etiam potentia actui coniuncta, respectu actus, imperfecta est.	5. But, you will say, this applies to a power that is not united to its act.—On the contrary, whatsoever is perfected by another is less perfect than that by which it is perfected. Now the power that is united to its act is perfected by that act. Therefore that act is more perfect than the power: so that even a power that is united to its act is imperfect in comparison with its act.
Praeterea, natura divina est efficacior in agendo quam natura creata. Sed in creaturis invenitur natura aliqua quae non operatur per aliquam potentiam mediam sed per se ipsam, sicut sol illuminat aerem et anima vivificat corpus. Ergo multo fortius divina natura non per aliquam potentiam, sed per se ipsam est principium generationis; et ita in divinis non est ponenda potentia generativa.	6. The divine nature is more effective in acting than created nature. Now there is among creatures a nature that works not through the medium of a power, but by itself: thus the sun enlightens the air, and the soul quickens the body. Consequently there is much stronger reason why the divine nature should be by itself the generative principle and not through a power. Therefore there is no generative power in God.
Praeterea, generativa potentia aut attestatur dignitati aut indignitati. Non autem attestatur dignitati, quia sic in superioribus creaturis esset magis quam in infimis, scilicet in Angelis et caelestibus corporibus magis vel potius quam in animalibus et in plantis. Ergo attestatur indignitati, et sic non est in Deo ponenda.	7. Generative power is a sign either of perfection or of imperfection. It is not, however, a sign of perfection because if it were it would be found in the higher ranks of creatures rather than in the lower, in the angels and heavenly bodies more or rather than in animals and plants. Therefore it is a sign of imperfection, and consequently should not be ascribed to God.
Praeterea, in rebus inferioribus duplex invenitur generativa potentia: scilicet completa ut in his quorum generatio est per sexuum commixtionem; et incompleta quae est sine sexuum commixtione ut in plantis. Cum ergo completa Deo non attribuatur, quia non potest poni in divinis sexuum commixtio, videtur quod nullo modo sit ibi potentia generativa.	8. A twofold generative power is to be found in things here below. It is complete in those things where generation is effected by sexual intercourse: it is incomplete when generation takes place without mingling of sexes; in plants, for instance. Since then we cannot ascribe the complete power to God in whom there cannot be an intercourse of sexes, it would seem that generative power cannot in any sense be ascribed to God.
Praeterea, sub potentia non cadit nisi possibile, cum potentia respectu possibilis dicatur. Sed generationem esse in divinis, non est possibile vel contingens, cum sit aeternum. Ergo respectu eius, potentia in divinis dici non potest; et sic non est ibi generativa potentia.	9. The object of power can only be something possible: since power (potentia) is so called from its relationship to the possible (possibilis). Now the existence of generation in God is not a possible or a contingent thing, since it is eternal. Therefore we ‘cannot ascribe to God a power in respect of generation, and consequently the power to generate is not in him.
Praeterea, potentia Dei cum sit infinita, non finitur neque ad actum neque ad obiectum. Sed si sit in Deo potentia generativa, eius actus erit generatio, effectus vero filius. Ergo potentia patris non se habebit tantum ad unum filium generandum, sed ad plures; quod est absurdum.	10. The power of God, being infinite, is not terminated either by its act or by its object. Now if in God there be a generative power, its act will be generation, and its effect will be a Son. Therefore the Father’s power will not be confined to the begetting of one Son but will extend to many; which is absurd.
Praeterea, secundum Avicennam quando res aliqua habet aliquid tantum ab altero, ei secundum se consideratae attribuitur oppositum eius, sicut aer qui non habet lumen nisi ab alio secundum se consideratus est tenebrosus, et per hunc modum omnes creaturae, quae habent ab alio esse, veritatem et necessitatem, secundum se consideratae, sunt non entes, falsae et impossibiles. Sed nihil tale potest esse in divinis. Ergo non potest ibi esse aliquis qui tantum habeat esse ab altero; et ita non potest ibi esse aliquis genitus; et per consequens nec generatio nec generativa potentia.	11. According to Avicenna, when a thing has a certain quality entirely from without, to that thing considered in itself we attribute the opposite quality: thus the air which has no light except from without, is dark considered in itself. In this way since all creatures derive being, truth, and necessity from without, considered in themselves they are non-existent, untrue, and impossible. But nothing of the kind is possible in God. Consequently in God there cannot be one who has being entirely from another, nor can there be one that is begotten, nor generation and generative power.
Praeterea, in divinis filius non habet aliquid nisi quod a patre accipit; aliter sequeretur quod esset ibi compositio. Sed a patre accepit essentiam. Ergo in filio non est nisi essentia. Si ergo est ibi generatio, vel filius est genitus, oportebit essentiam esse genitam; quod est falsum, quia sic essentia distingueretur in divinis.	12. In the Godhead the Son has nothing but what he receives from the Father, else it would follow that there is composition in him. Now he receives his essence from thee Father: and consequently there is nothing in him but the essence. Hence if there be generation in God, or if the Son be begotten, it will follow that the essence is begotten: and this is false, since then there would be a distinction in the divine essence.
Praeterea, si pater generat in divinis, oportet quod ei conveniat secundum suam naturam. Sed eadem est natura in patre et filio et spiritu sancto. Ergo eadem ratione et filius et spiritus sanctus generabunt; quod est contra fidei documenta.	13. If, in God, the Father begets, this must belong to him in respect of his nature. But the nature is the same in Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. For the same reason, then, both Son and Holy Spirit will beget; which is contrary to the teaching of faith.
Praeterea, natura quae perpetuo et perfecte in uno supposito invenitur, non communicatur alteri supposito. Sed natura divina perfecte invenitur in patre, et perpetuo, cum sit incorruptibilis. Ergo alteri supposito non communicatur; et ita non est ibi generatio.	14. A nature that exists perpetually and perfectly in one supposit, is not communicated to another supposit. Now the divine nature exists perfectly in the Father, and again perpetually since it is incorruptible. Therefore it is not communicated to another supposit: and consequently there is no generation there.
Praeterea, generatio est species mutationis. Sed in divinis non est aliqua mutatio. Ergo nec generatio: ergo nec generativa potentia.	15. Generation is a kind of change. But there is no change in God. Neither therefore is there generative power.
Sed contra. Secundum philosophum perfectum unumquodque est quando potest alterum tale facere quale ipsum est. Sed Deus pater est perfectus. Ergo potest alterum talem facere qualis ipse est; et sic potest filium generare.	On the contrary, according to the Philosopher a thing is perfect when it is able to produce its like. Now God the Father is perfect. Therefore he can produce his like, and beget a Son.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit quod si pater generare non potuit, impotens fuit. Sed in Deo nullo modo est impotentia. Ergo potuit generare: et sic est ibi potentia generandi.	Moreover Augustine says (Cont. Maxim. iii, 7) that if the Father could not beget, it follows that he lacked the power. But there is no lack of power in God. Therefore he was able to beget, and in him is the generative power.
Respondeo. Dicendum, quod natura cuiuslibet actus est, quod seipsum communicet quantum possibile est. Unde unumquodque agens agit secundum quod in actu est. Agere vero nihil aliud est quam communicare illud per quod agens est actu, secundum quod est possibile. Natura autem divina maxime et purissime actus est. Unde et ipsa seipsam communicat quantum possibile est. Communicat autem se ipsam per solam similitudinem creaturis, quod omnibus patet; nam quaelibet creatura est ens secundum similitudinem ad ipsam. Sed fides Catholica etiam alium modum communicationis ipsius ponit, prout ipsamet communicatur communicatione quasi naturali: ut sicut ille cui communicatur humanitas, est homo, ita ille cui communicatur deitas, non solum sit Deo similis, sed vere sit Deus. Oportet autem circa hoc advertere, quod natura divina a formis materialibus in duobus differt: primo quidem per hoc quod formae materiales non sunt subsistentes; unde humanitas in homine non est idem quod homo qui subsistit: deitas autem est idem quod Deus; unde ipsa natura divina est subsistens. Aliud est quod nulla forma vel natura creata est suum esse; sed ipsum esse Dei est eius natura et quidditas; et inde est quod proprium nomen ipsius est: qui est, ut patet Exod. cap. III, 14, quia sic denominatur quasi a propria sua forma. Forma ergo in istis inferioribus, quia per se non subsistit, oportet quod in eo cui communicatur, sit aliquid aliud per quod forma vel natura subsistentiam recipiat: et haec est materia, quae subsistit formis materialibus et naturis. Quia vero natura materialis vel forma, non est suum esse, recipit esse per hoc quod in alio suscipitur; unde secundum quod in diversis est, de necessitate habet diversum esse: unde humanitas non est una in Socrate et Platone secundum esse, quamvis sit una secundum propriam rationem. In communicatione vero qua divina natura communicatur, quia ipsa est per se subsistens, non requiritur aliquid materiale per quod subsistentiam recipiat; unde non recipitur in aliquo quasi in materia, ut sic genitus, ex materia et forma inveniatur compositus. Et quia iterum ipsa essentia est suum esse, non accipit esse per supposita in quibus est: unde per unum et idem esse est in communicante et in eo qui communicatur; et sic manet eadem secundum numerum in utroque.	I answer that it is in the nature of every act to communicate itself as, far as possible. Wherefore every agent acts forasmuch as it is in act: while to act is nothing else than to communicate as far as possible that whereby the agent is in act. Now the divine nature is supreme and most pure act: wherefore it communicates itself as far as possible. It communicates itself to creatures by likeness only: this is clear to anyone, since every creature is a being according to its likeness to it. The Catholic Faith, moreover, asserts another mode of communication of the divine nature, in that it is communicated by a quasi-natural communication: so that as one to whom the human nature is communicated is a man, so one to whom the Godhead is communicated is not merely like God, but is truly God. But here we must observe that there is a twofold difference between the divine nature and material forms. In the first place material forms are not subsistent, so that the human nature in a man is not the same thing as the man who subsists: whereas the Godhead is the same thing as God, so that the divine nature itself is subsistent. Secondly, no created form or nature is its own being: whereas God’s very being is his nature and quiddity; so that the name proper to him is: He who is (Exod. iii, 14), because thereby he is named as if from his proper form. Consequently since forms here below are not self-subsistent, there must needs be in the subject to which a form is communicated, besides the form, something whereby the form or nature receives subsistence: this is matter, which underlies material forms and natures. And seeing that a material form or nature is not its own being, it receives being through its reception into something else: wherefore according as it is received into a diversity of subjects it has a diversity of being: thus human nature in respect of being is not one in Socrates and Plato, although the essential notion of humanity is the same in both. On the other hand since the divine nature is self-subsistent, in the communication thereof there is no need of anything material for subsistence: and consequently it is not received into a subject by way of matter, so that he who is begotten be composed of matter and form. And because again the divine essence is its own being, it does not receive being from the supposit in which it is: so that by virtue of one and the same being it is in both the communicator and the one to whom it is communicated, thus remaining identically the same in both.
Huius autem communicationis exemplum in operatione intellectus congruentissime invenitur. Nam ipsa divina natura spiritualis est, unde per exempla spiritualia melius manifestatur. Cum enim alicuius rei extra animam per se subsistentis noster intellectus concipit quidditatem, fit quaedam communicatio rei quae per se existit, prout a re exteriori intellectus noster eius formam aliquo modo recipit; quae quidem forma intelligibilis, in intellectu nostro existens, aliquo modo a re exteriori progreditur. Sed quia res exterior diversa a natura intelligentis est; aliud est esse formae intellectus comprehensae, et rei per se subsistentis. Cum vero intellectus noster sui ipsius quidditatem concipit, utrumque servatur: quia videlicet et ipsa forma intellecta ab intelligente in intellectum aliquo modo progreditur cum intellectus eam format; et unitas quaedam servatur inter formam conceptam quae progreditur et rem unde progreditur, quia utrumque habet intelligibile esse, nam unum est intellectus, et aliud est intelligibilis forma, quae dicitur verbum intellectus. Quia tamen intellectus noster non est secundum suam essentiam in actu perfecto intellectualitatis, nec idem est intellectus hominis quod humana natura; sequitur quod verbum praedictum etsi sit in intellectu, et ei quodammodo conforme, non tamen sit idem quod ipsa essentia intellectus, sed eius expressa similitudo. Nec iterum in conceptione huiusmodi formae intelligibilis, natura humana communicatur, ut generatio proprie dici possit, quae communicationem naturae importat.	We have an example of this communication, and that most becomingly, in the intellect: for the divine nature is spiritual, wherefore it is manifested better by means of spiritual examples. Thus when our intellect conceives the quiddity of a thing that is self-subsistent and outside the mind, there is a kind of communication of this self-subsistent thing, inasmuch as our intellect receives in a way from the exterior thing the form of the latter: and this intelligible form having its existence in our intellect proceeds in a way from that exterior thing. Since, however, the exterior thing differs in nature from the understanding intellect, the form understood by the intellect and the form of the self-subsistent object differ in their respective beings. But when our intellect understands its own quiddity, both conditions stand, since in its process of formation the form understood proceeds after a fashion from the intellect understanding it into the intellect receiving it, and besides a certain unity is maintained between the conceived form which proceeds and the thing whence it proceeds, since both have intelligible being, seeing that one is the intellect, while the other is the intelligible form which is called the word of the intellect. Since, however, our intellect is not by its essence established in the perfect act of intellectuality, nor is the human intellect identical with human nature, it follows that although the aforesaid word is in the intellect and somewhat conformed to it, yet it is not identified with the essence of the intellect, but it expresses its likeness. Again, in the conception of this intelligible form the human nature is not communicated, wherefore it cannot properly be called a begetting which implies a communication of nature.
Sicut autem in nostro intellectu seipsum intelligente invenitur quoddam verbum progrediens, eius a quo progreditur similitudinem gerens; et ita in divinis invenitur verbum similitudinem eius a quo progreditur habens. Cuius processione in duobus verbi nostri processionem superat. Primo in hoc quod verbum nostrum est diversum ab essentia intellectus, ut dictum est; intellectus vero divinus qui in perfecto actu intellectualitatis est secundum suam essentiam, non potest aliquam formam intelligibilem recipere quae non sit sua essentia; unde verbum eius unius essentiae cum ipso est, et iterum ipsa divina natura eius intellectualitas est; et sic communicatio quae fit per modum intelligibilem, est etiam per modum naturae, ut generatio dici possit; in quo secundo processionem verbi nostri Dei verbum excedit. Et hunc modum generationis Augustinus assignat. Quia vero de divinis loquimur secundum modum nostrum,- quem intellectus noster capit ex rebus inferioribus, ex quibus scientiam sumit,- ideo sicut in rebus inferioribus cuicumque attribuitur actio, attribuitur aliquod actionis principium, quod potentia nominatur; ita et in divinis, quamvis in Deo non sit differentia potentiae et actionis, sicut in rebus creatis. Et propter hoc, generatione in Deo posita, quae per modum actionis significatur, oportet ibi concedere potentiam generandi, vel potentiam generativam.	Now even as when our intellect understands itself there is in it a word proceeding and bearing a likeness to that from which it proceeds, so, too, in God there is a word bearing the likeness of him from whom it proceeds. The procession of this word transcends in two ways the procession of our word. First, because our word differs from the essence of the intellect, as already stated, whereas the divine intellect being by its very essence in the perfect act of intellectuality, cannot be the recipient of an intelligible form that is not its essence: consequently its word is essentially one with it. Secondly, the divine nature itself is its intellectuality, wherefore a communication that takes place in an intellectual manner, is also a communication by way of nature, so that it can be called a begetting, and thus again the divine word surpasses the procession of our word, and Augustine (De Trin. i) assigns this mode of generation. Since, however, we are treating of divine things according to our mode whereby our intellect proceeds from its knowledge of things here below, therefore as in these latter wherever we find action we find an active principle which we call power, so do we also in matters concerning God, although in him power and action are not distinct as in creatures. For this reason, given that in God there is generation, a term that is significative of action, it follows that we must grant him the power to beget, or a generative power.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod potentia quae in Deo ponitur nec proprie activa nec passiva est, cum in ipso non sit nec praedicamentum actionis nec passionis, sed sua actio est sua substantia; sed ibi est potentia per modum potentiae activae significata. Nec tamen oportet quod filius sit actus vel factus, sicut nec oportet quod proprie sit ibi actio vel passio.	Reply to the First Objection. The power which we attribute to God is neither active properly speaking nor passive, seeing that the predicaments of action and passion are not in him, and his action is his very substance: but the power which is in him is designated by us after the manner of an active power. Nor does it follow that the Son is the result of action or making, even as neither does it follow that in God there is properly speaking action or passion.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod cum recipere terminetur ad habere, sicut ad finem; dupliciter dicitur aliquid esse recipiens, sicut dupliciter est, habens. Habet enim uno modo materia formam suam, et subiectum accidens, vel qualitercumque habitum est extra essentiam habentis; habet autem alio modo suppositum naturam, ut hic homo humanitatem; quae quidem non est extra essentiam habentis, immo est eius essentia. Socrates enim est vere id quod homo est. Genitus ergo in humanis etiam non recipit formam generantis sicut materia formam, vel sicut subiectum accidens sed sicut suppositum vel hypostasis habet naturam speciei; et similiter est in divinis. Unde non oportet quod sit in Deo genito aliqua materia vel subiectum naturae divinae: sed quod ipse filius subsistens sit qui naturam divinam habeat.	Reply to the Second Objection. While the term and end of receiving is having, there are two ways of receiving and two ways of having. In one way matter has its form, and a subject an accident, or in fact anything that is possessed besides the essence: in another way the supposit has a nature, for instance, a man has human nature: for the nature is not beside the essence of the haver, indeed it is his essence: thus Socrates is truly that which is a man. Accordingly the begotten one even in mankind receives the form of his begetter, not as matter receives form, or subject accident, but as a supposit or hypostasis has the specific nature: and it is thus in God. Hence in God begotten there is no need of matter or of a subject of the divine nature: but it follows that he is the subsistent Son having the nature of God.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod Deus genitus non distinguitur a Deo generante per aliquam essentiam additam, cum, sicut dictum est, non requiratur aliqua materia in qua recipiatur natura divina. Distinguitur autem per ipsam relationem, quae est ab alio habere naturam, ita quod in filio ipsa relatio filiationis tenet locum omnium principiorum individuantium in rebus creatis (propter quod dicitur proprietas personalis), ipsa autem natura divina tenet locum naturae speciei. Quia autem ipsa relatio secundum rem a natura divina non differt, non fit ibi aliqua compositio, sicut apud nos ex principio speciei et ex individuantibus quaedam compositio relinquitur.	Reply to the Third Objection. God begotten is not, distinct from the begetting God by an added essence, since, as stated above, there is no need for matter as a, recipient of the Godhead: they are distinct, however, by the relation implied in receiving one’s nature from another: so that in the Son the relation of sonship, takes the place of all the individualising principles in things created (for which reason it is called a personal property), while the divine nature takes the place of the specific nature. Yet since this same relation is not really distinct from the divine nature, it does not involve any composition therein, whereas with us a certain composition results from the specific and individualising principles.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit, quando potentia illa ab actu differt, sive sit coniuncta actui, sive non; hoc autem non habet locum in divinis.	Reply to the Fourth Objection. This argument avails when power and act, whether united or not, are distinct from each other: but this is not the case in God.
Et sic patet solutio ad quintum.	Wherefore the Reply to the Fifth Objection is clear.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod omne illud quod est principium actionis, ut quo agitur, habet potentiae rationem; sive sit essentia, sive aliquod accidens medium, puta qualitas quaedam inter essentiam et actionem. In creaturis tamen corporalibus vel vix vel nunquam invenitur aliqua actio alicuius naturae substantialis nisi mediante aliquo accidente: sol enim mediante luce quae in ipso est, illuminat. Quia vero anima vivificat corpus est per essentiam animae. Sed vivificare, licet per modum actionis dicatur, non tamen est in genere actionis, cum sit actus primus magis quam secundus.	I Reply to the Sixth Objection. Anything that is a principle whereby an action is done is of the nature of a power, whether it be an essence, or an accidental medium such as a quality standing between essence and action.. In corporeal creatures, however, seldom or never do we find a subsistent nature in action without an intervening accident; thus the sun illumines by means of the light in it. But that the soul quickens the body, is by means of the soul’s essence: yet though the word quickening expresses action, it is not in the genus of action, since it is first act rather than second.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod in creaturis non potest esse generatio sine divisione essentiae vel naturae secundum esse, cum natura non sit suum esse; et ideo in creaturis est generatio cum aliqua indignitate: et propter hoc in creaturis nobilioribus non competit generatio. Sed in Deo potest esse generatio huiusmodi sine huiusmodi vel alia imperfectione; et ideo nihil prohibet generationem ibi ponere.	Reply to the Seventh Objection. In creatures generation is impossible without a distinction of essence or nature in point of existence, since their nature is not their existence. Consequently generation among creatures suggests imperfection: wherefore it is unbecoming to the higher creatures. But in God generation is possible without this or any other imperfection: and so nothing forbids us to ascribe it to God.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod illa ratio procedit de generatione materiali; unde ad propositum, locum non habet.	Reply to the Eighth Objection. This argument considers generation in the material world, and therefore it is not to the point.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod illud quod est obiectum potentiae activae vel passivae cuius actio vel passio est cum motu, oportet esse possibile et contingens, cum omne mobile huiusmodi sit. Talis autem non est potentia generativa in Deo, ut dictum est; unde ratio non sequitur.	Reply to the Ninth Objection. It is true that the object of an active or passive power must be possible and contingent, when the action or passion in question is accompanied by movement (since all movable things are possible and contingent). Such, however, is not the generative power in God, as stated above, wherefore the argument does not prove.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod filius Dei non se habet ad potentiam generativam sicut effectus, cum eum genitum, non factum confiteamur. Si tamen esset effectus, potentia generantis non finiretur ad ipsum, quamvis alius generari filius non possit, quia ipse infinitus est. Quod autem alius filius in divinis esse non potest, contingit, quia ipsa filiatio est proprietas personalis ipsius; et hoc quo, ut ita dicam, individuatur. Cuilibet autem individuo principia individuantia sunt soli sibi; alias sequeretur quod persona vel individuum esset communicabile ratione.	Reply to the Tenth Objection. The Son of God is not the effect of the generative power, for we confess our belief that he is begotten, not made. If, however, he were the effect ‘ the power of the Begetter would not terminate in him, although he cannot beget another Son, because the Begetter is infinite. The reason why there cannot be another Son in God is because Sonship is a personal property and thereby the Son is, so to say, individualised. And the principles of individuality of each individual thing belong to that thing alone: otherwise it would follow that a person or an individual thing would be logically communicable.
Ad undecimum dicendum, quod verbum illud Avicennae intelligendum est, quando id quod recipitur ab alio, non idem numero est in recipiente et dante, sicut accidit in creaturis respectu Dei. Unde omne receptum in creatura, est quasi unitas respectu esse divini: quia creatura non potest esse recipere secundum illam perfectionem quae in Deo est. Sed filius in divinis accipit a patre eamdem naturam numero quam pater habet: et ideo non procedit.	Reply to the Eleventh Objection. The saying of Avicenna is true when that which is received is not identically the same in recipient and giver, as is the case in creatures in relation to God. Hence whatsoever is received by a creature is as vanity in comparison with the being of God, since a creature cannot receive being in that perfection with which it is in God. On the other hand in God the Son receives the same identical nature as that which the Father has: hence the argument fails.
Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod filius non habet aliquid realiter divisum ab essentia quam a patre recipit: sed hoc ipso quod a patre recipit, oportet in ipso esse relationem qua ad patrem referatur, et per quam ab eo distinguatur. Ipsa tamen relatio realiter ab essentia non differt.	Reply to the Twelfth Objection. The Son has nothing that is really distinct from the essence which he receives from the Father: but from the very fact that he receives from the Father it follows that in him is a relation by which he is referred to and distinct from the Father. And yet this relation is not distinct from his essence.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod licet eadem natura sit in patre et filio, est tamen secundum alium modum existendi, scilicet cum alia relatione et ideo non oportet quod quidquid convenit patri per naturam suam, conveniat filio.	Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. Though the same nature is in Father and Son, it is in each by a different mode of existence, that is to say with a different relation. Consequently that which belongs to the Father in respect of his nature does not of necessity belong to the Son.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod creaturae per hoc quod participant naturam speciei, pertingunt ad divinam similitudinem: unde quod aliquod suppositum creatum subsistat in natura creata, est ordinatum ad alterum tamquam ad finem; et ideo ex quo sufficienter pervenitur ad finem per unum individuum, secundum perfectam et propriam participationem naturae speciei, non oportet aliud individuum in illa natura subsistere. Sed natura divina est finis: et non propter aliquem finem. Fini autem congruit ut communicetur secundum omnem possibilem modum. Unde quamvis ibi in uno supposito perfecte et proprie inveniatur; nihil prohibet quin etiam inveniatur in alio.	Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. Creatures become like God by participating in their specific nature; hence the fact that a particular created supposit subsists in a created nature, is directed to something else as its end. Consequently if the end be sufficiently attained by one individual by a perfect and proper participation in the specific nature, there is no need for another individual participating in that nature. On the other hand God’s nature is the end and is not for, the sake of an end: and it is meet that the end should be communicated in every possible way. Hence though in God it is found perfectly and properly in one supposit, nothing, forbids its being in another.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod generatio est species mutationis ex parte illa qua natura per generationem communicata recipitur in aliqua materia, quae est mutationis subiectum. Hoc autem non accidit in divina generatione; ideo ratio non sequitur.	Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. Generation is a kind of change in so far as by means of generation the common nature is received in some matter which is the subject of change. This is not the case in the divine generation, so the conclusion does not follow.

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Q. II: ARTICLE II Is Generation Attributed to God Essentially or Notionally? [ Sum. Theol. I, xxxii, A. 2.]
Secundo quaeritur utrum potentia generativa in divinis dicatur essentialiter vel notionaliter. Et videtur quod notionaliter tantum.	THE second point of inquiry is whether generation is attributed to God essentially or notionally. And it would seem that it is only attributed notionally.
Potentia enim rationem principii habet, ut patet per definitiones positas V Metaph. Sed principium in divinis respectu divinae personae notionaliter dicitur. Cum ergo potentia generandi hoc modo principium importet, videtur quod notionaliter dicatur.	1. Power is a kind of principle, as appears from the definition in Metaph. v, 12. Now when we use the term principle in reference to a divine person the term is used notionally. Since then the generative power implies a principle in this sense, it would seem that it is attributed to God notionally.
Sed dicitur, quod significat simul essentiam et notionem. Sed contra, in divinis, secundum Boetium, sunt haec duo praedicamenta; substantia, ad quam pertinet essentia; et ad aliquid, ad quod pertinent notionalia. Non potest autem aliquid esse in duobus praedicamentis, quia homo albus non est aliquid unum nisi per accidens, ut habetur V Metaph. Ergo potentia generandi non potest in sua ratione utrumque complecti, scilicet substantiam et notionem.	2. Should it be said that it denotes both the essence and a notion,—on the contrary, according to Boethius (De Trin.) there are two predicaments in God, substance to which the essence belongs, and relation to which the notional acts belong. But a thing cannot be in two predicaments, since a white man is not one thing save accidentally (Metaph. v, 7). Therefore the generative power cannot include both, substance namely and notional act.
Praeterea, principium in divinis distinguitur ab eo cuius est principium. Sed essentia non debet distingui. Ergo non competit ei ratio principii: et ita potentia, quae rationem principii includit, non significat essentiam.	3. In God the principle is distinct from that which proceeds therefrom. But there should be no distinction in his essence. Consequently the idea of principle is incompatible with the essence: so that power which involves the idea of a principle does not denote the essence in God.
Praeterea, in divinis quod est proprium, est relativum et notionale; quod vero est commune, est essentiale et absolutum. Potentia autem generandi non est communis patri et filio, sed propria patris. Ergo dicitur relative sive notionaliter, non essentialiter nec absolute.	4. In God property is relative and notional: while that which is common is essential and absolute. Now the generative power is not common to Father and Son, but is proper to the Father. Therefore it is attributed as a notion or relation, and not essentially nor absolutely.
Praeterea, propriae actionis est principium propria forma, non communis; sicut homo per intellectum intelligit: nam haec actio est sibi propria respectu animalium aliorum, sicut et forma rationalitatis sive intellectualitatis. Sed generatio est propria operatio patris in quantum est pater. Ergo eius principium est paternitas, quae est propria forma patris, et non deitas, quae est forma communis. Paternitas vero ad aliquid dicitur. Ergo potentia generandi non solum quantum ad rationem principii, sed etiam quantum ad id quod est principium, dicitur ad aliquid.	5. The principle of a thing’s proper action is its proper form and not the common form: thus man understands by his intellect, because this action is proper to him in relation to other animals, even as the form of rationality or intellectuality. Now generation is the proper operation of the Father as Father. Therefore its principle is Paternity which is the Father’s proper form, and not the Godhead which is the common form. But Paternity is a relative term. Therefore the generative power not only viewed as a principle, but also as to the thing which is a principle, denotes a relation.
Praeterea, sicut potentia generandi realiter ab essentia divina non differt, ita nec etiam paternitas. Sed hoc non obstante paternitas dicitur tantum ad aliquid. Ergo nec propter hoc debet dici quod potentia generandi, cum relatione significet essentiam.	6. As the generative power does not really differ from the essence, so neither does paternity. But this does not prevent paternity from being a purely relative term. Therefore neither does it oblige us to say that the generative power denotes the essence together with a relation.
Praeterea, in divinis tria invenimus quae rationem principii habent, scilicet potentiam et scientiam et voluntatem, quae essentialiter dicuntur in Deo. Sed scientia et voluntas non simul significantur cum aliqua relatione vel notione in divinis. Ergo pari ratione nec potentia; et sic non potest dici quod potentia generandi significet simul essentiam ex parte potentiae, et notionem ex parte generationis; sed videtur quod significet tantum notionem per rationes inductas.	7. In God three things have the nature of a principle, power, knowledge and will, and these are ascribed to God essentially. Now knowledge and will in God do not each signify at the same time some relation or notion. For equal reason, therefore, neither does power: and so it cannot be said that the generative power signifies at the same time the essence on the part of the power, and a notion on the part of generation: but seemingly it signifies nothing. but the notion for reasons already given.
Sed contra. Est quod Magister dicit, 7 dist., I Senten., quod potentia generandi in patre est ipsa divina essentia.	On the contrary the Master says (I.D.vii) that the generative power in the Father is the very essence of God.
Praeterea, Hilarius dicit, quod pater generat virtute naturae divinae. Ergo ipsa natura est generationis principium; et sic rationem potentiae habet.	Further, Hilary says (De Synod.) that the Father begets by virtue of the Godhead. Therefore the Godhead is the principle of generation, and is in the nature of a power.
Praeterea, Damascenus dicit, quod generatio est opus naturae existens; et sic idem quod prius.	Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 27) that generation is the work of nature; and thus the same conclusion follows.
Praeterea, in divinis est tantum una potentia. Sed potentia creandi dicitur essentialis. Ergo et potentia generandi.	Further, there is but one power in God. Now the creative power is attributed to the essence. Therefore the generative power should be also.
Respondeo. Dicendum quod circa hoc est multiplex opinio. Quidam enim dixerunt, quod potentia generandi in divinis dicitur tantum ad aliquid: et movebantur hac ratione: quia potentia secundum suam rationem est principium quoddam; principium autem relative dicitur et est notionale, si referatur ad divinam potentiam et non ad creaturas. Sed in hac ratione videntur fuisse decepti propter duo: primo, quia licet potentiae conveniat ratio principii, quod in genere relationis est, tamen id quod est principium actionis vel passionis, non est relatio, sed aliqua forma absoluta; et id est essentia potentiae; et inde est quod philosophus ponit potentiam non in genere relationis, sed qualitatis, sicut et scientiam, quamvis utrique aliqua relatio accidat. Secundo, quia ea quae in divinis important principium respectu operationis, non dicuntur notionaliter, sed solum ea quae dicunt principium respectu eius quod est operationis terminus: principium enim quod notionaliter dicitur in divinis, est respectu personae subsistentis; operatio autem non significatur ut subsistens: unde ea quae respectu operationis rationem principii habent, non oportet in divinis notionaliter dici; alias voluntas et scientia et intellectus et omnia huiusmodi notionaliter dicerentur. Potentia autem, licet sit principium quandoque et actionis et eius quod est per actionem productum, tamen unum accidit ei, alterum vero competit ei per se: non enim potentia activa semper, per suam actionem, aliquam rem producit quae sit terminus actionis, cum sint multae operationes quae non habent aliquid operatum, ut philosophus dicit; semper enim potentia est actionis vel operationis principium. Unde non oportet quod propter relationem principii, quam nomen potentiae importat, relative dicatur in divinis.	I answer that there are several opinions on this point. Some maintained that the generative power is not ascribed to God otherwise than relatively: and they were moved by the following argument. Power is essentially a principle of a kind: and a principle signifies a relation and a property if attributed to the divine power and not to creatures. Bit in arguing thus they were at fault in two ways. First, although power is rightly described as a kind of principle which comes under the generic head of relation, nevertheless the thing which is a principle of action or passion is not a relation but an absolute form, namely the essence of the power. Wherefore the Philosopher places science in the genus, not of relation but of quality, although a relation is incidental to both. Secondly, when speaking of God, terms that signify a principle in respect of operation are not employed relatively as denoting properties but only those that signify a principle in respect of the term of operations. Because when we speak of a principle as a property in God we refer to the subsistent person: whereas the term operation does not involve subsistence: and consequently it does not follow that terms which denote a principle of operation are employed to signify a property, otherwise will, knowledge, intellect and all like terms would be employed as indicating properties. Power, however, although it is a principle sometimes both of action and of the product of action, yet the latter is incidental to it while the former is essential to it: because active power by its action does not always produce something that is the term of that action, since, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 1; Metaph. ix, 6), there are many operations that have no product: whereas power is always a principle of action or operation. Consequently it does not follow that because power implies the relation of a principle, it is therefore predicated of God relatively.
Ipsa etiam positio veritati consona non videtur. Nam si id quod est potentia, est ipsa res quae est principium actionis, oportet naturam divinam esse id quod est principium in divinis: cum enim omne agens, in quantum huiusmodi, agat simile sibi, illud est principium generationis in generante secundum quod genitus generanti similatur, homo enim virtute humanae naturae generat filium, qui sibi in natura humana similis invenitur: Deo autem patri conformis est Deus genitus in natura divina: unde natura divina est generationis principium, ut cuius virtute generat pater, sicut Hilarius dicit, loc. cit.	Moreover this opinion appears to be in conflict with the truth. If the thing that is a power is the same as the principle of action, it follows that the divine nature is the thing that is a principle in God: for since every agent as such produces its like, that thing in the begetter is the principle of his begetting, in respect of which the begotten is likened to the begetter: thus a man by virtue of his human nature begets a son who is like him in that nature. Now God begotten is like God the Father in the divine nature: hence the divine nature is the generating principle whereby the Father begets, as Hilary says (l.c.).
Et propter hoc alii dixerunt, quod potentia generandi significat essentiam tantum. Sed illud etiam conveniens non videtur: actio enim quae fit virtute naturae communis per aliquid sub natura communi contentum, aliquem modum accipit ex propriis illius principiis; sicut actio quae debetur naturae animalis, fit in homine secundum quod competit principiis speciei humanae: unde et homo perfectius habet actum virtutis imaginativae quam alia animalia, secundum quod competit eius rationalitati. Similiter etiam actio hominis invenitur in hoc et in illo homine secundum quod competit principiis individualibus huius vel illius, ex quibus contingit quod unus homo clarius alio intelligit. Et ideo oportet quod si natura communis sit principium alicuius operationis quae solum patri convenit, oportet quod sit principium, secundum quod competit proprietati personali patri. Et propter hoc in ratione potentiae includitur quodammodo paternitas, etiam quantum ad id quod est generationis principium.	For this reason others said that the generative power signifies the essence alone. But this opinion again appears to be at fault. An action done by virtue of the common nature, by an individual included in that nature, takes on a certain mode from its proper principles: thus an action due to a man’s animal nature is produced in him in accordance with the principles of the human species, wherefore a man on account of his rational nature enjoys a more perfect act of the imagination than other animals. Again actions peculiar to man are performed by this or that individual in accordance with the individualising principles of this or that man; the result being that one man understands better than another. Consequently if the common nature be the principle of an operation that belongs to the Father alone, it follows that it is the principle in accordance with the personal property of the Father. And for this reason the idea of power includes, after a fashion, paternity even in respect of that which is the principle of generation.
Et propter hoc cum aliis dicendum est, quod potentia generandi simul essentiam et notionem significat.	For these reasons we must say with others that the generative power denotes at the same time the essence and the property.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod potentia importat rationem principii respectu operationis, quae notionaliter non dicitur in divinis, ut dictum est.	Reply to the First Objection. Power conveys the idea of a principle in relation to operation which, as already stated, is not ascribed to God as a notional act.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod in rebus creatis unum praedicamentum accidit alteri, propter quod non potest ex duobus fieri unum, nisi unum per accidens; sed in divinis relatio est realiter ipsa essentia: et ideo non est simile.	Reply to the Second Objection. Among creatures one predicament is accidental to another, wherefore one thing cannot result from two, except what is one accidentally; whereas in God relation is in reality the very essence; and thus there is no comparison.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod in rebus creatis principium generationis est duplex, scilicet generans et quo generatur: sed generans quidem per generationem distinguitur a genito, cum nulla res generet se ipsam; sed id quod generans generat, non distinguitur, sed est commune utrique, ut dictum est, in corp. art. unde non oportet naturam divinam distingui, sicut potentia generandi, cum potentia sit principium ut quo.	Reply to the Third Objection. Among creatures the principle of generation is twofold, namely the generator and that whereby he generates. The generator, however, is distinct from the thing generated by virtue of the generation, since nothing generates itself: whereas that whereby the generation takes place is not distinct but is common to both, as stated above. Consequently it does not follow that there is a distinction in the divine nature, as the generative power, since power is the principle whereby the effect is produced.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod ratione relationis implicitae, potentia generandi non est communis, sed propria.	Reply to the Fourth Objection. By reason of the implied relation the generative power is not common but proper.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod in qualibet generatione principium generationis principaliter non est aliqua forma individualis, sed forma quae pertinet ad naturam speciei. Item non oportet quod genitum similetur generanti quantum ad conditiones individuales, sed quantum ad naturam speciei. Paternitas autem non est in patre per modum formae speciei, sicut humanitas in homine, sic enim in eo est divina natura; sed est in eo, ut ita dicam, sicut principium individuale, est enim proprietas personalis: et ideo non oportet quod sit generationis principium principaliter, sed quodammodo cointellectum ratione supradicta: aliter sequeretur quod pater per generationem non solum deitatem, sed paternitatem communicaret; quod est inconveniens.	Reply to the Fifth Objection. In every generation, the generating principle in chief is not an individual form but the form proper to the specific nature. Again there is no need for the thing generated to be like the generator in regard to individual conditions, but in regard to the specific nature. Now fatherhood is not in the Father as the form of a species, as human nature is in man, for then the divine nature is in him; but it is in him, so to speak, as the principle of his individuality, since it is a personal property. Consequently it does not follow that in him it is the generating principle in chief, but that it is understood along with it, so to speak, as we have already explained: otherwise it would follow that the Father by begetting would communicate not only his Godhead but also his Fatherhood which is inadmissible.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod potentia generandi est idem realiter cum natura divina ita quod natura includitur in ratione ipsius: non autem sic est de paternitate, unde non est simile.	Reply to the Sixth Objection. The generative power is really identical with the divine nature, so that the nature is essentially included in it: it is not the same with the Paternity, wherefore the comparison fails.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod scientia vel voluntas non est principium generationis, cum generatio sit naturae, quae in quantum est actionis principium, rationem potentiae habet. Et inde est quod potentia consignificatur cum eo quod est ad aliquid in divinis, non autem scientia vel voluntas.	Reply to the Seventh Objection. Knowledge or will are not the principle of generation, since generation belongs to the nature which as a principle of action may be considered as a power. Hence it is that in God power is cosignified with relation, which does not apply to knowledge or will.
Ad ea autem quae sunt in contrarium de facili patet responsio ex praedictis.	The replies to the arguments on the other side may be easily gathered from what has been said.

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Q. II: ARTICLE III In the Act of Generation Does the Generative Power Come into Action at the Command of the Will? [ Sum. Th. 1, Q. xli, A. 2]
Tertio quaeritur utrum potentia generativa in actum generationis procedat per imperium voluntatis. Et videtur quod sic.	THE third point of inquiry is whether in the act of generation the generative power comes into action at the command of the will. It would seem that the reply should be in the affirmative.
Hilarius enim dicit, quod non naturali ductus necessitate pater genuit filium. Sed si non genuit voluntate, genuit naturali necessitate, quia agens vel est voluntarium vel naturale. Ergo pater genuit filium voluntate; et sic potentia generativa per imperium voluntatis exit in actum generandi.	1. Hilary (De Synod.) says that not by natural necessity was the Father led to beget the Son. Now if he did not beget of his will he begot of natural necessity, since an agent is either voluntary or natural. Therefore the Father begot the Son by his will: and thus the generative power proceeded to generate through the command of the Will.
Sed dicebat, quod pater non genuit filium neque voluntate praecedente, neque voluntate consequente, sed concomitante.- Sed contra, videtur quod haec ratio sit insufficiens. Cum enim quidquid est in Deo sit aeternum, nihil quod est in Deo, potest tempore praecedere aliquid in Deo existens: et tamen invenitur quod aliquid habet ad aliud rationem principii, sicut voluntas Dei ad electionem qua eligit iustos ex hoc solo quod ab intellectu procedit. Ergo quamvis voluntas generationem filii tempore non praecedat, nihilominus, ut videtur, potest poni principium generationis filii ex hoc quod procedit ab intellectu.	2. But, you will say, the Father begot the Son by an act of his will, neither preceding nor following but accompanying the act of generation.—On the contrary this argument is seemingly inadequate. For since everything in God is eternal, nothing in him can precede in point of time anything that is in him: and yet we find in him one thing having to another the relation of a principle, for instance, his will in relation to his election of the just, from the mere fact that it proceeds from his intellect. Therefore though the will to beget did not precede the begetting of the Son, nevertheless it would seem that we may consider it to be the principle of the Son’s generation, for the reason that it proceeds from the intellect.
Praeterea, filius procedit per actum intellectus cum procedat ut verbum: verbum enim intellectuale non est nisi cum intelligimus aliquid cogitantes, ut Augustinus dicit. Sed voluntas est principium intellectualis operationis: imperat enim actum intellectus, sicut et aliarum potentiarum, ut Anselmus dicit; intelligo enim quia volo, sicut et ambulo quia volo. Ergo voluntas est principium processionis filii.	3. The Son proceeds through an act of the intellect since he proceeds as the Word: because there is no intellectual word except when thinking of a thing we understand it, according to Augustine (De Trin. ix, 4). Now the will is the principle of the intellectual operation: for it commands the act of the intellect, even as those of the other powers, as Anselm says (De Simil. ii): thus I understand because I wish to do so, just as I walk because I wish to walk. Therefore the will is the principle of the Son’s generation.
Sed dices, quod in humanis verum est quod voluntas imperat actum intellectus, non autem in divinis.- Sed contra, praedestinatio quodammodo est actus intellectus: dicimus enim, quod Deus praedestinavit Petrum quia voluit, secundum illud Rom. IX, 18: cuius vult miseretur et quem vult indurat. Ergo non solum in humanis sed etiam in divinis voluntas imperat actum intellectus.	4. But, say you, it is true of man that the will commands the act of the intelligence, but not of God.—On the contrary, predestination is, in a way, an act of the intelligence: for we say that God predestined Peter because he willed, according to Romans ix, 18: He has mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardens. Therefore not only in man but also in God does the will command the act of the intelligence.
Praeterea, secundum philosophum, quod movetur ex se ipso potest moveri et non moveri; et eadem ratione quod agit ex se ipso agere potest et non agere. Sed natura non potest agere et non agere, cum sit determinata ad unum. Ergo non agit ex se ipsa, sed quasi mota ab alio. Hoc autem in divinis esse non potest. Nulla ergo actio in divinis est a natura; et sic nec generatio. Et ita generatio est a voluntate, cum omnia agentia reducantur in naturam vel voluntatem, ut patet II Physic.	5. According to the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 5) that which causes its own movement can be either in motion or not: and for the same reason that which is cause of its own act, can act or not act. But nature cannot act or not act, since it is determined to one action. Therefore it is not the cause of its own action, but acts as moved by another. Now this cannot be the case in God. Therefore in God no action is from nature, and consequently neither is generation. Therefore generation is from his will, since all agents are reduced to nature or will as stated in Phys. ii, 4.
Praeterea, si actio naturae praecedat actionem voluntatis, sequitur inconveniens, quod scilicet ratio voluntatis tollatur. Nam cum natura sit determinata ad unum, si voluntatem moveat, eam ad unum tantum movebit; quod est contra rationem voluntatis, quae secundum quod huiusmodi, libera est. Si vero voluntas naturam moveat, neque tolletur ratio naturae neque voluntatis, quia quod se habet ad plura, nihil prohibet quod ad unum moveat. Ergo rationabiliter actio voluntatis praecedit actionem naturae, magis quam e converso. Sed generatio filii est pura actio sive operatio. Ergo est a voluntate.	6. If the action of nature precede that of the will, this leads to an absurdity, for the will would be rendered void. Because since nature is determined to one course of action, if it moved the will, it would move it to one thing alone, and this is contrary to the essence of the will which, as such, is free. On the other hand if the will move nature, neither nature nor will is abrogated, since that which is indifferent to many things is not debarred from moving towards one. Therefore the action of the will reasonably precedes the action of nature, rather than vice versa. Now the generation of the Son is pure action or operation. Therefore it comes from the will.
Praeterea, in Psalm. CXLVIII, 5, dicitur: dixit, et facta sunt, quod Augustinus exponit: id est, verbum genuit in quo erant ut fierent. Sic ergo processio verbi a patre, est ratio creaturae producendae. Si ergo filius non procedit a patre per imperium voluntatis sed naturae, videtur sequi quod omnes creaturae a Deo naturaliter et non solum voluntarie procedant, quod est erroneum.	7. It is written (Ps. cxlviii, 5): He spoke and they were made, which words Augustine expounds as follows (Gen. ad lit. ii, 6, 7): He begat the Word in whom they were that they might be made. Accordingly the procession of the Word from the Father is the reason of the creature’s production. Wherefore if the Son proceeds not from the Father by the command of the Father’s will, it would seem that all creatures proceed from the Father naturally and not only by his will which is erroneous.
Praeterea, Hilarius dicit in libro de synodis: si quis nolente patre natum dicat filium, anathema sit. Non ergo pater genuit filium involuntarie; et sic idem quod prius.	8. Hilary says (De Synod.): If anyone say that the Son was born of the Father without the concurrence of the Father’s will, let him be anathema. Therefore the Father did not beget the Son involuntarily; and so the same conclusion follows.
Praeterea, Ioan. III, 35, dicitur: pater diligit filium, et omnia dedit in manu eius, quod secundum unam Glossam exponitur de datione generationis aeternae. Dilectio ergo patris ad filium est signum potius quam ratio generationis aeternae. Sed dilectio est a voluntate. Ergo voluntas est principium generationis filii.	9. It is written (Jo. iii, 35): The Father loves the Son, and he hath given all things into his hand, which words a gloss expounds of the giving of the eternal generation. Therefore the love of the Father for the Son is the reason rather than the sign of the eternal generation. Now love is from the will. Therefore the will is the principle of the Son’s generation.
Praeterea, Dionysius dicit, quod divinus amor non permittit ipsum sine germine esse. Ex quo etiam videtur idem, scilicet quod amor sit ratio generationis.	10. Dionysius (De Div. Nom. iv) says that God’s love does not allow him to be without offspring. Hence again it would seem to follow that love is the reason of generation.
Praeterea, positio ad quam non sequitur aliquod inconveniens sive error, potest poni in divinis. Sed si ponatur quod pater genuerit filium voluntate, non sequitur aliquod inconveniens: neque enim sequitur quod filius non sit aeternus, ut videtur; neque quod non sit consubstantialis aut aequalis patri: quia spiritus sanctus, qui procedit per modum voluntatis, coaeternus est, coaequalis et consubstantialis patri et filio. Ergo videtur quod non sit erroneum dicere, quod pater genuit filium voluntate.	11. Any opinion about God that does not involve absurdity or error can be maintained. Now if we suppose that the Father begat the Son voluntarily, no absurdity follows, since neither does it follow apparently that the Son is not eternal, nor that he is not consubstantial with or equal to the Father, since the Holy Spirit who proceeds as an act of the will, is co-eternal, co-equal and consubstantial with the Father and Son. Therefore seemingly it is not erroneous to assert that the Father begat the Son by his will.
Praeterea, voluntas quaelibet non potest non velle suum ultimum finem. Sed finis divinae voluntatis est communicatio suae bonitatis, quae maxime fit per generationem. Ergo voluntas patris non potest non velle generationem filii: voluntate ergo genuit filium.	12. No will can fail to will its last end. Now the end of God’s will is to communicate his goodness, and this is especially effected by generation. Therefore the Father’s will cannot but will the generation of the Son. Therefore by his will he begat the Son.
Praeterea, humana generatio a divina extrahitur, secundum illud Ephes. cap. III, 15: ex quo omnis paternitas in caelo et in terra nominatur. Sed humana generatio subiacet imperio voluntatis: aliter in actu generationis peccatum non esset. Ergo etiam divina; et sic idem quod prius.	13. Human generation is drawn from the divine according to Ephesians iii, 15: Of whom all paternity is named in heaven and on earth. Now human generation is subject to the command of the will, else there could be no sin in the act of generation. Therefore the divine generation is also, and so the same conclusion follows.
Praeterea, omnis actio naturae immutabilis est necessaria. Sed natura divina omnino est immutabilis. Si ergo generatio sit operatio naturae et non voluntatis, sequitur quod sit necessaria, et ita quod pater genuit filium necessitate: quod est contra Augustinum.	14. Every action proceeding from an unchangeable nature is necessary. Now the divine nature is utterly unchangeable., Wherefore if the (divine) generation be the operation of the nature and not of the will, it follows that it is necessary, so that the Father begat the Son of necessity: and this is contrary to the teaching of Augustine (Ad Oros. iii).
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, quod filius est consilium de consilio et voluntas de voluntate. Sed haec praepositio de denotat principium. Ergo voluntas est principium generationis filii, et sic idem quod prius.	15. Augustine (De Trin. xv, xx) says that the Son is Counsel of counsel, and will of will. Now the preposition of indicates a principle. Therefore the will is the principle of Son’s generation, and so the same conclusion follows.
Sed contra. Est quod Augustinus dicit: pater neque voluntate neque necessitate genuit filium.	On the contrary Augustine (Ad Oros. iii) says The Father begot the Son neither by his will nor of necessity.
Praeterea, summa diffusio voluntatis est per modum amoris. Filius autem non procedit per modum amoris, sed potius spiritus sanctus. Ergo voluntas non est principium generationis filii.	Again, the supreme effusion of the will is through the channel of love. But the Son proceeds not by way of love, rather is it the Holy Spirit who proceeds thus. Therefore the will is not the principle of the Son’s generation.
Praeterea, filius procedit a patre ut splendor a luce, secundum illud Hebr. cap. I, vers. 3: qui cum sit splendor gloriae et figura substantiae eius. Sed splendor non procedit a luce voluntate mediante. Ergo nec filius a patre.	Further, the Son proceeds from the Father as brightness from light according to Hebrews i, 3: Who being the brightness of his glory, and the figure of his substance. Now brightness does not proceed from light by the will. Neither therefore does the Son proceed thus from the Father.
Respondeo. Dicendum, quod generatio filii potest se habere ad voluntatem ut voluntatis obiectum: pater enim et filium voluit et filii generationem ab aeterno: nullo autem modo voluntas esse potest divinae generationis principium: quod sic patet. Voluntas, inquantum voluntas, cum sit libera, ad utrumlibet se habet. Potest enim voluntas agere vel non agere, sic vel sic facere, velle et non velle. Et si respectu alicuius hoc voluntati non conveniat, hoc accidet voluntati non in quantum voluntas est, sed ex inclinatione naturali quam habet ad aliquid, sicut ad finem ultimum, quem non potest non velle; sicut voluntas humana non potest non velle beatitudinem, nec potest velle miseriam. Ex quo patet quod omne illud cuius voluntas est principium, quantum in se est, possibile est esse vel non esse, et esse tale vel tale, et tunc vel nunc (...) omne autem illud quod sic se habet, est creatum: quia in eo quod increatum est, non est potestas ad esse vel non esse. Sed per se necesse est esse, ut Avicenna probat. Si ergo ponitur filius voluntate genitus, necessario sequitur ipsum esse creaturam. Et propter hoc Ariani qui ponebant filium creaturam, dicebant eum esse genitum voluntate. Catholici autem dicunt filium non natum voluntate, sed natura. Natura enim ad unum determinata est. Et secundum hoc ex hoc quod filius est a patre genitus natura, oportet quod ipse non possit esse non genitus, et quod non possit esse alio modo quam est, aut patri non consubstantialis; cum quod naturaliter procedit, procedat in similitudinem eius a quo procedit. Et hoc est quod Hilarius dicit: omnibus creaturis substantiam Dei voluntas attulit; sed naturam filio dedit perfecta nativitas; et ideo talia sunt cuncta qualia Deus esse voluit; filius autem talis est qualis est Deus. Sicut autem dictum est, voluntas licet respectu aliquorum ad utrumlibet se habeat, tamen respectu finis ultimi naturalem inclinationem habet; et similiter intellectus respectu cognitionis principiorum primorum, naturalem quemdam motum habet. Principium autem divinae cognitionis est ipse Deus qui est finis suae voluntatis; unde illud quod procedit in Deo per actum intellectus cognoscentis seipsum realiter procedit; et similiter quod procedit per actum voluntatis diligentis se ipsam. Et propter hoc cum filius procedat ut verbum per actum intellectus divini in quantum pater cognoscit seipsum et spiritus sanctus per actum voluntatis in quantum pater diligit filium: sequitur quod tam filius quam spiritus sanctus naturaliter procedant, et ex hoc ulterius quod sint consubstantiales et coaequales et coaeterni patri et sibi invicem.	I answer that the generation of the Father may be referred to the will as the object of the will: since the Father both willed the Son and the generation of the Son from eternity: but by no means can the will be the principle of the divine generation. This is made evident as follows. The will as such being free is indifferent to either of the alternatives: for it can act or not act, do thus or do otherwise, will and not will. And if this does not apply to the will with regard to a certain thing, this will be true of the will not as will, but on account of the natural inclination it has for a certain thing, as for the last end which it is unable not to will: thus the human will is unable not to will happiness, and cannot will unhappiness. Wherefore it is clear that whenever a thing has the will for its principle, it is possible for it to be or not to be, to be such or otherwise, to be now or then. Now everything of this description is a creature; since in an uncreated being there is no possibility of being or not being, but the essential necessity of being, as Avicenna proves (Metaph. viii, 4). Wherefore if we suppose the Son to be begotten by the will, it must needs follow that he is a creature. For this reason the Arians who held the Son to be a creature, said that he was begotten by the will: whereas Catholics say that he was begotten not by will but by the nature. For nature is determined to one effect: and accordingly since the, Son is begotten of the Father by nature, it follows that it is impossible for him not to be begotten, or to be otherwise than he is, or not consubstantial with the Father: since that which proceeds naturally, proceeds in likeness to that from which it proceeds. This is the teaching of Hilary (De. Syn.): God’s will gave every creature its nature, whereas a perfect nativity gave the Son his nature. Hence everything is such as God willed it to be, while the Son is such as God is. Now, as already stated, although the will is indifferent to some things, it has a natural inclination in regard to the last end: and in like manner the intellect has a certain natural movement in respect of its knowledge of first principles. Moreover, the principle of the divine knowledge is God himself, who is the end of his will; wherefore that which proceeds in God by his act of self-knowledge, proceeds naturally, and likewise that which proceeds by his act of self-love. And for this reason, since the Son proceeds as the Word by an act of the divine intellect inasmuch as the Father knows himself, and the Holy Spirit by an act of the will inasmuch as the Father loves the Son: it follows that both Son and Holy Spirit proceed naturally, and further, that they are consubstantial, coequal and coeternal with the Father and with each other.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Hilarius loquitur de necessitate quae importat violentiam: quod patet per hoc quod subdit: non naturali necessitate ductus, cum vellet generare filium.	Reply to the First Objection. Hilary is speaking of the necessity that denotes violence: this is evident from the words that follow: Not led by natural necessity, since he willed to beget the Son.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod respectu nullius rei est in Deo voluntas antecedens; quia quidquid aliquando Deus vult, ab aeterno voluit. Concomitans vero est respectu omnium bonorum quae sunt tam in ipso quam in creaturis; vult enim se esse et creaturam esse. Sed praecedens vel antecedens tempore quidem non est nisi respectu creaturae, quae ab aeterno non fuit; praecedens vero intellectus est respectu actuum aeternorum qui significantur ad creaturas terminari; sicut dispositio, praedestinatio et huiusmodi. Generatio vero filii, neque est creatura, neque ad creaturam significatur terminari. Unde respectu eius non est voluntas praecedens nec tempore neque intellectu, sed solum voluntas concomitans.	Reply to the Second Objection. There is not an antecedent will in God in respect of anything whatsoever; because everything that God ever wills, he has willed from eternity. But his will is concomitant with every good that is in him and creatures: for he wills himself to be and the creature to be. It is, however, precedent or antecedent in point of time with reference to creatures alone who have not existed from eternity. His intellect is precedent as regards those eternal acts which are denominated as terminating in creatures, such as government, predestination and the like. But the generation of the Son is neither a, creature nor does it signify an act terminating in a creature. Therefore with regard to it God’s will is not antecedent, either in time or in our way of thinking, but only concomitant.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod sicut actus intellectus videtur sequi actum voluntatis, in quantum a voluntate imperatur; ita e converso actus voluntatis videtur sequi actum intellectus, in quantum per intellectum praesentatur voluntati suum obiectum, quod est bonum intellectum. Unde esset procedere in infinitum, nisi esset ponere statum vel in actu intellectus vel in actu voluntatis. Non autem potest status poni in actu voluntatis, cum obiectum praesupponatur ad actum; unde oportet ponere statum in actu intellectus, qui naturaliter intellectum consequitur; ita quod a voluntate non imperatur. Et per hunc modum procedit filius Dei ut verbum secundum actum intellectus divini, ut ex dictis, in corp. art., patet.	Reply to the Third Objection. just as the act of the intellect seems to follow the act of the will, in so far as it is commanded by the will, so on the other hand the act of the will seems to follow the act of the intellect, in so far as the will’s object, namely the good understood, is offered to it by the intellect. Hence we should go on indefinitely unless we come to a stop either in the act of the intellect or in the act of the will. But we cannot come to a stop in an act of the will whose object is presupposed to its act. Therefore we must come to a stop in an act of the intellect, and an act which proceeds from the intellect naturally, so as not to be commanded by the will. It is in this way that the Son of God proceeds as the Word, by an act of the divine intellect, as we have already stated.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod actus intellectus divini naturalis est secundum quod ad ipsum Deum terminatur, qui est principium suae cognitionis; secundum vero quod significatur ad creaturas terminari, ad quas sic se habet quodammodo ut intellectus noster ad conclusiones, non naturaliter ab intellectu progreditur sed voluntarie; et ideo in divinis aliqui actus intellectus significantur ut imperati a voluntate.	Reply to the Fourth Objection. The act of the divine intellect is natural, in so far as it terminates in God himself who is the principle of his intellect: but in so far as it is described as terminating in creatures, its relation to whom is somewhat like the relation of our intellect to its conclusions, it proceeds not naturally but voluntarily. Consequently some of the acts of the divine intellect are designated as being commanded by the divine will.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod quoad ea ad quae natura potest se extendere secundum propria principia essentialia, non indiget ut ab alio determinetur, sed ad ea tantum ad quae propria principia non sufficiunt. Unde philosophi non sunt ducti ut ponerent opus naturae, opus intelligentiae, ex operibus quae competunt calido et frigido secundum se ipsa; quia in has, etiam ponentes res naturales ex necessitate materiae accidere, omnia naturae opera reducebant. Ducti sunt autem ex illis operationibus ad quas non possunt sufficere virtus calidi et frigidi, et huiusmodi qualitatum; sicut ex membris ordinatis in corpore animalis tali modo quod natura salvatur. Quia ergo naturae divinae secundum se opus est generatio non oportet quod ad hanc actionem ab aliqua voluntate determinetur.- Vel dicendum, quod natura determinatur ab aliquo, ut in finem. Illi autem naturae quae est finis, et non ad finem, non competit ab aliquo determinari.	Reply to the Fifth Objection. With regard to those things to which it can extend by virtue of its essential principles, nature does not need to be determined by another, but only with regard to those things for which its own principles do not suffice. Consequently philosophers in saying that the work of nature is the work of an intelligence, were not led by observing the effects of heat and cold considered in themselves, since even those who said that natural effects were necessitated by matter referred all the works of nature to the agency of heat and cold. But they were led by observing those effects which were beyond the power of these qualities of heat and cold: such as the arrangement of members in the body of an animal in such wise that nature is safeguarded. Since this generation is the work of the divine nature considered in itself, there is no need for it to be determined to such an action by the will.—It may also be replied that nature is determined by something for some particular end. But a nature which is itself the end and not directed to an end does not require determination from without.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod in diversis considerando, actio voluntatis actionem naturae praecedit. Unde totius naturae inferioris actio ex voluntate gubernantis procedit. Sed in eodem oportet quod actio naturae praecedat actionem voluntatis. Natura enim secundum intellectum praecedit voluntatem, cum natura intelligatur esse principium quo res subsistit, voluntas vero ultimum quo ad finem ordinatur. Nec tamen sequitur quod tollatur ratio voluntatis. Quamvis enim ad inclinationem naturae voluntas ad aliquid unum determinetur, quod est ultimus finis a natura intentus, respectu tamen aliorum indeterminata manet; sicut patet in homine, qui naturaliter vult beatitudinem et de necessitate, non autem alia. Sic ergo in Deo naturae actio actionem voluntatis praecedit natura et intellectu; nam generatio filii est ratio omnium eorum quae per voluntatem producuntur, scilicet creaturarum.	Reply to the Sixth Objection. The action of the will precedes the action of nature if we take them in separate subjects. Wherefore the action of the entire inferior nature is dependent on the will of its Governor. But in the same subject the action of nature must needs precede the act of the will. For nature is logically prior to will, since nature in the logical order comes the first in a thing’s subsistence, while the will comes last as directing that thing to its end. Yet it does not follow that the will is rendered void. For although the will follows the natural inclination in being determined to that one thing which is the last end to which nature inclines, it nevertheless remains undetermined with regard to other things. Take man, for instance, who desires happiness naturally and of necessity, but not other things. Accordingly in God the action of nature precedes the act of the will both naturally and logically: for the generation of the Son is the prototype of all the productions that proceed from the divine will, that is to say of all creatures.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod licet in verbo Dei a patre genito fuerit ut omnes creaturae fierent, non tamen oportet, si verbum naturaliter procedit, quod creaturae etiam naturaliter procedant; sicut nec sequitur, si intellectus noster principia naturaliter cognoscit, quod naturaliter cognoscat ea quae ex principiis consequuntur: eo enim quod naturaliter habemus, voluntas utitur ad utramque partem.	Reply to the Seventh Objection. Though all creatures were made’by the Word of God begotten of the Father, it does not follow that if the Word proceeded naturally, creatures also proceed naturally: thus although our intellect knows first principles naturally, it does not follow that it knows naturally the conclusions deduced from them. For the will makes use of our natural gifts for this or that purpose.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod pater voluntarie genuit; sed in hoc non designatur nisi voluntas concomitans.	Reply to the Eighth Objection. The Father begot voluntarily, but this indicates nothing else than his concomitant will.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod si verbum illud de generatione aeterna intelligatur, dilectio patris ad filium non est intelligenda ut ratio illius dationis qua pater filio aeternaliter omnia dat, ut signum. Similitudo enim ratio est amoris.	Reply to the Ninth Objection. If these words are made to refer to the eternal generation, the Father’s love for the Son is not to be taken as the reason but as the sign of that giving whereby the Father from all eternity gave all things to the Son. For likeness is the reason of love.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod Dionysius loquitur de productione creaturae, non de generatione filii.	Reply to the Tenth Objection. Dionysius is speaking of the formation of creatures, not of the generation of the Son.
Ad undecimum dicendum, quod spiritus sanctus procedere dicitur per modum voluntatis, quia procedit per actum qui naturaliter est a voluntate, scilicet per hoc quod pater amat filium, et e converso. Ipse enim amor est spiritus sanctus, sicut filius est verbum quo pater dixit se ipsum.	Reply to the Eleventh Objection. The Holy Spirit is said to proceed by way of the will, because he proceeds by an act which is naturally an act of the will, namely the mutual love of the Father and the Son. For the Holy Spirit is love even as the Son is the Father’s Word expressive of himself.
Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod ex illa etiam ratione non sequitur nisi quod pater rationem filii velit; quod pertinet ad voluntatem concomitantem, quae respicit generationem sicut obiectum, non sicut id cuius sit principium.	Reply to the Twelfth Objection. Again this argument proves only that the Father wills the generation of the Son: and this denotes a concomitant will that regards the generation as its object, not as something whereof it is the principle.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod humana generatio fit per virtutem naturalem, scilicet generativam potentiam, mediante potentia motiva, quae imperio subiacet voluntatis, non autem generativa potentia. Hoc autem non accidit in divinis; et ideo non est simile.	Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. Human generation is effected by a natural force, namely the generative power, through the medium of the motive power which is subject to the command of the will, whereas the generative power is not. This does not apply to God, and so the comparison fails.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod Augustinus non intendit negare necessitatem immutabilitatis, de qua ratio procedit, sed necessitatem coactionis.	Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. Augustine does not mean to deny the necessity attaching to immutability as the argument suggests, but the necessity induced by force.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod cum dicitur filius esse voluntas de voluntate, intelligitur esse de patre, qui est voluntas. Unde haec praepositio de notat generationis principium, quod est generans, non id quo generatur, de quo est praesens quaestio.	Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. When it is said that the Son is ‘will of will’ the sense is ‘will of the Father’ who is will. Hence this preposition ‘of’ denotes the generative principle that is the begetter, and not the principle whereby generation is effected, which is the point of our inquiry.

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Q. II: ARTICLE IV Can There Be Several Sons in God?
Quarto quaeritur utrum in divinis possint esse plures filii. Et videtur quod sic.	THE fourth point of inquiry is, whether there can be several Sons in God. It would seem that the reply should be in the affirmative.
Operatio enim naturae quae convenit uni supposito, convenit etiam omnibus suppositis eiusdem naturae. Sed generatio, secundum Damascenum, est opus naturae, et convenit patri. Ergo etiam filio et spiritui sancto qui sunt supposita eiusdem naturae. Sed filius non generat se ipsum: nam, secundum Augustinum, nulla res potest generare se ipsam. Ergo generat alium filium, et sic in divinis possunt esse plures filii.	1. A natural operation that is becoming to one individual is becoming to every individual of the Same nature. Now according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 27) generation is an operation of nature, and it is becoming to the Father. Therefore it is becoming also to the Son and Holy Spirit who are supposits of the same nature. But the Son does not beget himself since, according to Augustine, nothing can generate itself. Therefore he begets another Son, so that in God there can be several Sons.
Praeterea, totam virtutem suam pater in filium transfundit. Sed potentia generandi pertinet ad virtutem patris. Ergo huiusmodi potentiam habet filius a patre; et sic idem quod prius.	2. The Father communicated all his might to the Son. Now the generative power belongs to the Father’s might. Therefore the Son has this power from the Father; and the same conclusion follows.
Praeterea, filius est perfecta imago patris, ad quod requiritur perfecta assimilatio; quae non esset si filius non quantum ad omnia patrem imitaretur. Ergo sicut pater filium generat, ita et filius; et sic idem quod prius.	3. The Son is the perfect image of the Father, and this demands perfect likeness. But this would not be the case if the Son did not imitate the Father in all respects. Therefore as the Father begets a Son, so also does the Son; and the same conclusion follows.
Praeterea, perfectior est assimilatio ad Deum secundum conformitatem actionis quam secundum conformitatem alicuius formae, ut patet per Dionysium: sicut soli magis assimilatur quod lucet et illuminat quam quod lucet tantum. Sed filius perfectissime assimilatur patri. Ergo est ei conformis non solum in potentia, sed etiam in actu generandi; et sic idem quod prius.	4. According to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iii) likeness to God is more perfect in respect of conformity in action than in respect of conformity in some form: thus that which both shines and illuminates is more like the sun than that which shines only. Now the Son is most perfectly like the Father. Therefore he is conformed to him not only in the power but also in the act of generation. Thus we have the same conclusion as before.
Praeterea, ex hoc contingit quod Deus facta una creatura potest facere aliam, quia eius potentia neque exhauritur neque diminuitur in creando. Sed similiter potentia patris neque exhauritur neque diminuitur ex hoc quod generat filium. Ergo per hoc quod generat filium, non prohibetur quin possit alium filium generare; et sic possunt esse plures filii in divinis.	5. The reason why God after making one creature is able to make another is because his power is neither exhausted nor diminished in creating. Now in like manner the Father’s power is neither exhausted nor diminished through begetting the Son. Therefore by begetting the Son he is not disabled from begetting another: and so there can be several Sons in God.
Sed dices, quod ideo non generat alium filium, quia sequeretur inconveniens quod Augustinus ponit, scilicet quod infinita esset divina generatio, si pater plures filios generaret vel filius patri generaret nepotem, et sic de aliis. Sed contra. In Deo nihil est in potentia quod non sit in actu: esset enim imperfectus. Si ergo est in potentia patris quod plures filios generet, nullo inconvenienti prohibente, erunt plures filii in divinis.	6. But, say you, the reason why he does not beget another Son is that the result would be unbecoming, as Augustine points out, namely that there would be an infinite number of divine generations, if the Father were to beget many sons, or the Son to beget grandsons to the Father, and so on.—On the contrary nothing in God is potential but what is also actual, else he were imperfect. Therefore if it is potential that the Father beget several sons, and nothing arise to prevent it, there will be several Sons in God.
Praeterea, de natura geniti est ut procedat in similitudinem generantis. Sed sicut filius est similis patri, ita et spiritus sanctus; et ita spiritus sanctus est filius, et sic sunt plures filii in divinis.	7. It belongs to the nature of that which is generated to proceed in likeness to the generator. Now as the Son is like the Father, so also is the Holy Spirit so that the Holy Spirit is likewise a Son: and thus there are several Sons in God.
Praeterea, secundum Anselmum, nihil est aliud dicere patrem filium generare, quam patrem dicere se ipsum. Sed sicut pater potest dicere se ipsum, ita et filius et spiritus sanctus. Ergo pater et filius et spiritus sanctus possunt filios generare; et sic idem quod supra.	8. According to Anselm (Monolog. xxxii) for the Father to beget the Son is nothing else but for the Father to speak himself. Now, as the Father can speak himself,” so also can the Son and the Holy Spirit. Therefore Father, Son and Holy Spirit can beget Sons, and the same conclusion follows.
Praeterea, ex hoc pater dicitur filium generare, quod similitudinem suam in intellectu suo concipit. Sed hoc idem possunt facere filius et spiritus sanctus. Ergo idem quod prius.	9. The Father is said to beget the Son, because he conceives intellectually his own likeness. But the Son and Holy Spirit can do the same: and thus we come to the same conclusion.
Praeterea, potentia est media inter essentiam et operationem. Sed una est essentia patris et filii, eademque potentia. Ergo et una operatio; et sic filio convenit generare; et ita ut prius.	10. Power comes between essence and operation. Now the essence of the Father and the Son is one, and theirs is one power. Therefore it becomes the Son to beget: and we conclude as before.
Praeterea, bonitas est diffusionis principium. Sed sicut est infinita bonitas in patre et filio, ita etiam in spiritu sancto. Ergo sicut pater infinita communicatione suam naturam communicat filium generando, ita spiritus sanctus aliquam divinam personam producendo; non enim infinite communicatur divina bonitas creaturae; et sic videtur quod possint esse plures filii in divinis.	11. Goodness is the principle of diffusion. Now even as there is infinite goodness in the Father and the Son so is there in the Holy Spirit. Therefore even as the Father by begetting the Son bestows on him his nature by an infinite communication, so likewise does the Holy Spirit by producing a divine person, since the divine goodness is not bestowed in an infinite degree on a creature. Wherefore it would seem that there can be several Sons in God.
Praeterea, nullius boni sine consortio potest esse iucunda possessio. Sed filiatio est quoddam bonum in filio. Ergo videtur oportere ad perfectam iucunditatem filii, esse alium filium in divinis.	12. No good can be possessed happily unless it be shared with another. Now Sonship is a good possessed by the Son. Therefore seemingly his perfect happiness demands that he should beget a Son.
Praeterea, filius procedit a patre ut splendor a luce, ut patet Hebr. I, 3: qui cum sit splendor gloriae, et figura substantiae eius. Sed splendor potest alium splendorem producere, et ille alium, et alius alium. Ergo similiter videtur esse in processione divinarum personarum, quod filius possit alium filium generare, et sic idem ut prius.	13. The Son proceeds from the Father as brightness from light, according to Hebrews i, 3: Who being the brightness of his glory and the figure of his substance. Now one splendour can produce another, and this one a third, and this one yet another. And thus it would seem to be in the procession of the divine persons, so that the Son can beget another Son; and hence the same conclusion follows.
Praeterea, paternitas in patre ad eius dignitatem pertinet. Sed eadem est dignitas patris et filii. Ergo paternitas convenit filio; et sic sunt plures filii in divinis.	14. Paternity belongs to the Father’s dignity. But the same dignity is both Father’s and Son’s. Therefore paternity is becoming to the Son: and consequently the Son begets.
Praeterea, eius est potentia cuius est actus. Sed potentia generandi est in filio. Ergo filius generat.	15. Where the power is there is the act. But the Son has the power to beget. Therefore he begets.
Sed contra. Illa sunt perfectissima in creaturis quae ex tota materia sua constant, et sunt eorum in singulis speciebus singula tantum. Sed sicut creaturae materiales individuantur per materiam, ita filii persona constituitur filiatione. Ergo cum Deus filius sit perfectus filius, videtur quod in ipso solo in divinis filiatio inveniatur.	On the contrary those creatures are most perfect which contain their entire matter, each one by itself alone forming a single species. Now as material creatures are individualised by their matter, so the person of the Son is constituted by Sonship. Therefore, as the Son of God is a perfect Son, in God seemingly Sonship is in him alone.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, quod si pater posset generare et non generaret, invidus esset. Sed filius non est invidus. Ergo cum non generet, generare non potest. Et sic non possunt esse plures filii in divinis.	Further, Augustine says (Contra Maxim. ii, 7, 18, 23) that if the Father being able to beget did not beget he would be envious. But the Son is not envious. Therefore seeing that he does not beget, he cannot do so. Consequently there cannot be several Sons in God.
Praeterea, quod perfecte dictum est semel iterum dici non oportet. Sed filius est verbum perfectum, cui nihil deest, secundum Augustinum. Ergo non oportet esse plura verba in divinis, et ita nec plures filios.	Again, what has been said perfectly should not be said over again. Now the Son is the perfect Word lacking nothing (Augustine, De Trin. vi, 10; vii, 2). Therefore there ought not to be several Words in God, nor several Sons.
Respondeo. Dicendum, quod in divinis impossibile est esse plures filios; quod sic patet. Personae namque divinae cum in omnibus absolutis conveniant, utpote sibi invicem essentiales, distingui non possunt nisi secundum relationes, nec secundum alias nisi secundum relationes originis. Nam aliarum relationum quaedam distinctionem praesupponunt, ut aequalitas et similitudo; quaedam vero inaequalitatem designant, ut dominus et servus, et alia huiusmodi. Relationes vero originis ex sui ratione conformitatem important: quia quod oritur ex alio, eius similitudinem retinet in quantum huiusmodi. Non est igitur aliquid in divinis quo filius distinguatur ab aliis personis nisi sola relatio filiationis, quae est eius personalis proprietas, et qua filius non solum est filius, sed est hoc suppositum vel haec persona. Impossibile autem est quod illud quo aliquod suppositum est hoc in pluribus inveniri: quia sic suppositum ipsum esset communicabile; quod est contra rationem individui, suppositi, vel personae. Unde nullo modo potest esse alius filius in divinis quam unus. Non enim potest dici, quod una filiatio constituat hunc filium et alia alium: quia cum filiationes ratione non differant, oporteret quod si materia vel quocumque supposito distinguerentur, esset in divinis materia, aut aliquid aliud distinguens quam relatio.	I answer that there cannot be several Sons in God: this is proved as follows. The divine persons in all things absolute are identical, and essentially coincident with one another: and between them there can be no other distinction but that founded on the relations, and on no other relationship but that of origin. The reason of this is that of other relations, some presuppose distinction, such as equality and likeness, while some imply inequality, such as master and servant, and so on. On the other hand relations of origin by their very nature denote conformity: because that which takes its origin from another, as such bears the likeness thereof. In God, therefore, there is nothing whereby the Son can be distinguished from the other persons, except the relation of Sonship, which is his personal property, and by virtue of which he is not only the Son but also this supposit or this person. Now it is impossible for that whereby this particular supposit is individualised to be found in anything else: otherwise the supposit itself would be communicable, which is incompatible with the very nature of an individual, supposit or person. Consequently it is utterly impossible that in God there be more Sons than one. For it cannot be said that one Sonship makes one Son, and another Sonship another Son: because as sonships do not differ logically, it would follow that if they differed in matter or supposit, there would be matter in God, or some principle of distinction other than relation.
Potest autem et alia ratio specialis assignari, quare pater tantum unum filium gignere possit. Natura enim ad unum determinatur; unde cum pater natura generet filium, non potest esse nisi unus filius a patre genitus. Nec potest dici, quod sint plures numero in eadem specie existentes, sicut apud nos accidit; cum ibi non sit materia, quae est principium distinctionis secundum numerum in eadem specie.	Besides the above, another special reason may be given why the Father can beget but one Son. Nature is determined to one effect: and therefore, since the Father begets the Son by nature, there can be but one Son begotten of the Father. Nor can it be said that there are several in the one species, as is the case with us; since in. God there is no matter which is the principle of numerical distinction within the one species.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod generatio quamvis in patre sit quodammodo opus naturae divinae, est tamen eius cum quadam concomitantia personalis proprietatis patris, ut supra, art. 2, dictum est; unde non oportet quod conveniat filio, in quo natura divina sine tali proprietate invenitur.	Reply to the First Objection. Although in the Father generation is an operation of the divine nature, nevertheless it belongs thereto with reference at the same time to the personal property of the Father, as stated above (A. 2): wherefore it does not follow that it belongs to the Son, who has the divine nature without that property.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod pater totam virtutem suam communicat filio, quae naturam divinam sequitur absolute. Potentia vere generandi sequitur naturam divinam cum adiunctione proprietatis patris, ut dictum est.	Reply to the Second Objection. The Father communicates to the Son all that divine might which goes with the divine nature absolutely. But the generative power goes with the divine nature in conjunction with the personal property of the Father, as stated.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod imago assimilatur ei cuius est imago quantum ad speciem, non quantum ad relationem. Non enim oportet quod si imago est ab aliquo quod id cuius est imago, sit ab alio: quia nec similitudo proprie secundum relationem attenditur, sed secundum formam.	Reply to the Third Objection. An image is like the original in point of species, not of relation. For though the image is produced by someone it does not follow that the original is also produced by someone: because neither is likeness properly considered with regard to relation but with regard to form.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod sicut filius assimilatur patri in natura divina, non in proprietate personali; ita et assimilatur ei in actione quae concomitatur naturam, sine concomitantia proprietatis praedictae. Talis autem actio non est generatio; unde ratio non sequitur.	Reply to the Fourth Objection. Even as the Son is like the Father in the divine nature and not in a personal property, so too is he like him in an action that goes with the nature provided it does not go with a personal property. Such, however, is not generation: wherefore the argument fails.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod licet potentia generativa patris non exhauriatur neque minuatur per generationem filii; tamen eius infinitatem adaequat filius, qui est intellectus infinitus, non autem creatura finita; unde non est simile.	Reply to the Fifth Objection. Although the Father’s generative power is not exhausted nor diminished by his begetting the Son: yet the Son equals the infinity of that power, for he is infinite intelligence, and not a finite creature. Hence the comparison fails.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod in ratione ducente ad inconveniens non oportet quod sola inconvenientis vitatio sit causa removendae positionis ex qua inconveniens sequitur, sed etiam causae manifestationis inconvenientis; unde non oportet quod propter hoc solum non sint plures filii in divinis, ne sit generatio infinita.	Reply to the Sixth Objection. In a reductio ad absurdum, the avoiding of the absurdity is not necessarily the only reason for denying the statement from which the absurdity follows, but there are also the reasons for which the absurdity is made manifest. Hence it is not only because an infinity of generations in God would be the result, that there are not more than one Son in God.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod spiritus sanctus procedit per modum amoris. Amor autem non significat aliquid figuratum vel specificatum specie amantis vel amati, sicut verbum significat speciem dicentis et eius quod dicitur habens; et ideo cum filius procedat per modum verbi, ex ipsa ratione suae processionis habet, ut procedat in similem speciem generantis, et sic quod sit filius, et eius processio generatio dicatur. Non autem spiritus sanctus hoc habet ratione suae processionis, sed magis ex proprietate divinae naturae, quia in Deo non potest esse aliquid quod non sit Deus; et sic ipse amor divinus Deus est, in quantum quidem divinus, non in quantum amor.	Reply to the Seventh Objection. The Holy Spirit proceeds after the manner of love. Now love does not denote something that is stamped and specified with the likeness of the lover or of the beloved, whereas the word expresses the idea of the speaker and the thing to which that idea corresponds. Consequently, as the Son proceeds as Word, by the very nature of his procession it belongs to him to proceed in likeness to his Begetter, and therefore he is his Son, and his procession is called a generation. On the other hand this belongs to the Holy Spirit not by reason of his procession, but rather from a property of the divine nature; because in God there can be nothing that is not God: so that the divine love itself is God, precisely because it is divine, not because it is love.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod hoc verbum dicere potest accipi dupliciter: stricte et large: stricte accipiendo dicere, idem est quod verbum a se emittere; et sic est notionale, et convenit tantum patri: et sic accipit dicere Augustinus; unde ponit in principio VI de Trinitate, quod solus pater dicit se. Alio modo potest accipi communiter, prout dicere idem est quod intelligere; et sic essentiale. Et hoc modo Anselmus accipit in Monologio, ubi dicit, quod pater et filius et spiritus sanctus dicunt se.	Reply to the Eighth Objection. To speak may be taken in two senses, strictly and broadly. To speak, in a strict sense, is to utter a word, and then it denotes a notional act and is proper to the Father. Augustine employs the term in this sense when he says (Trin. vii, i) that the Father alone speaks himself. Secondly, to speak may be taken broadly in so far as a person may be said to speak when he understands, and then it is an essential act. In this sense Anselm writes (Monolog. lx) when he says that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit speak themselves.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod sicut generare soli patri convenit in divinis, ita et concipere; unde solus pater suam similitudinem concipit in intellectu, quamvis filius et spiritus sanctus intelligant; quia in intelligendo nulla relatio exprimitur, nisi forte secundum modum intelligendi tantum; sed in generando et in concipiendo exprimitur realis origo.	Reply to the Ninth Objection. Even as to beget in God belongs to the Father alone, so also does to conceive: where fore the Father alone conceives his own likeness intellectually’, although the Son and the Holy Spirit understand it: because no relation is indicated in the word understand, except perhaps only in our way of thinking: whereas begetting and conceiving imply real origin.
[58497]Ad decimum dicendum, quod ratio illa recte procedit de actione quae consequitur naturam absolute sine aliquo respectu ad proprietatem: talis autem non est generatio; unde ratio non sequitur.	Reply to the Tenth Objection. This argument holds in regard to an action that proceeds from the nature absolutely without any relation to a property. Such, however is not generation, wherefore the argument fails.
Ad undecimum dicendum, quod in divinis non potest esse nisi spiritualis processio, quae quidem est solum secundum intellectum et voluntatem: et ideo non potest a spiritu sancto alia persona divina procedere; quia ipse procedit per modum voluntatis ut amor. Filius per modum intellectus ut verbum.	Reply to the Eleventh Objection. In God there can be no other than spiritual procession, and this is only by way of intellect and will. Consequently another divine person cannot proceed from the Holy Spirit, because he proceeds by way of the will as love, and the Son by way of the intellect as Word.
Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod proprietas personalis oportet ut sit incommunicabilis, ut supra dictum est; unde in ea consortium fieri non requirit iucunditas.	Reply to the Twelfth Objection. A personal property must needs be incommunicable, as stated above: wherefore happiness does not demand that it should be shared with another.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod illa similitudo non oportet quod teneat quantum ad omnia.	Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. This comparison does not necessarily apply in every respect.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod sicut paternitas in patre et filiatio in filio sunt una essentia: ita et sunt una dignitas et una bonitas.	Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. Even as paternity in the Father and filiation in the Son are one essence, so too their dignity and goodness are one.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum quod cum dicitur potentia generandi, hoc gerundium generandi tripliciter potest accipi. Uno modo prout est gerundium verbi activi; et sic ille habet potentiam generandi qui habet potentiam ad hoc quod generet. Alio modo prout gerundium est verbi passivi; et sic ille habet generandi potentiam qui habet potentiam ad hoc ut generetur. Tertio modo prout est gerundium verbi impersonalis; et sic dicitur ille habere potentiam generandi qui habet potentiam illam qua ab alio generatur. Primo ergo modo potentia generandi non convenit filio, sed secundo et tertio; unde ratio non sequitur.	Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. When we speak of the potestas generandi the gerund generandi may be taken in three ways. First, as the gerund of the active voice, and thus the potestas generandi (power of generating) is in him who has the power to generate. Secondly, as the gerundive of the passive voice, and thus the potestas generandi (power to be generated) belongs to one who has the power to be generated. Thirdly, as the gerund of an impersonal verb, and then the potestas generandi belongs to one who has the power whereby he is actually generated by another.” In the first sense the Potentia generandi is not in the Son, but it is in the second and third sense: wherefore the argument does not prove.

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Q. II: ARTICLE V Is the Generative Power Included in Omnipotence?
Quinto quaeritur utrum potentia generandi sub omnipotentia comprehendatur. Et videtur quod non.	THE fifth point of inquiry is whether the generative power is included in omnipotence. And seemingly the reply should be in the negative.
Omnipotentia enim convenit filio, secundum illud symboli: omnipotens pater, omnipotens filius, omnipotens spiritus sanctus. Non autem convenit ei potentia generandi. Ergo sub omnipotentia non comprehenditur.	1. Omnipotence is becoming to the Son according to the words of the Creed: The Father is almighty, the Son is almighty, the Holy Spirit is almighty. But the generative power is not becoming to him. Therefore it is not included in omnipotence.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, quod Deus dicitur omnipotens, quia potest omnia quae vult. Ex quo videtur quod potentia illa ad omnipotentiam pertineat quae a voluntate imperatur. Potentia autem generandi non est huiusmodi: quia pater non genuit filium voluntate, ut supra, art. 3, habitum est. Ergo potentia generandi ad omnipotentiam non pertinet.	2. Augustine (Enchir. xcvi) says that God is almighty because he is able to do whatsoever he wills: so that it would seem to follow that omnipotence includes any power that is at the command of the will. Now such is not the generative power: since the Father did not beget the Son by his will, as we have shown above (A. 3). Therefore the generative power does not belong to omnipotence.
Praeterea, omnipotentia Deo attribuitur, in quantum eius omnipotentia ad omnia quae sunt in se possibilia se extendit. Sed generatio filii vel ipse filius non est de possibilibus, sed de necessariis. Ergo potentia generandi sub omnipotentia non comprehenditur.	3. Omnipotence is attributed to God in the sense that it extends to all those things that are in themselves possible. But the generation of the Son or the Son himself comes within the range not of things possible, but of things necessary. Therefore the generative power is not included in omnipotence.
Praeterea, quod convenit pluribus communiter, convenit eis secundum aliquid eis commune, sicut habere tres aequilatero et gradato, secundum hoc quod triangulus sunt. Ergo quod convenit alicui soli, convenit ei secundum hoc quod sibi est proprium. Omnipotentia autem non est propria patris. Cum ergo potentia generandi soli patri conveniat in divinis, non convenit ei in quantum est omnipotens; et ita ad omnipotentiam non pertinebit.	4. That which belongs to several things in common belongs to them in respect of something that is common to all of them. Thus in every triangle the three angles are together equal to two right angles, and this applies to all triangles inasmuch as they are triangular figures. Consequently that which belongs to one thing alone, belongs to it in respect of that which is proper to it. Now omnipotence is not proper to the Father. Since then the generative power in God belongs to the Father alone, it does not belong to him as omnipotent, and consequently is not included in omnipotence.
Praeterea, sicut est una essentia patris et filii, ita et una omnipotentia. Sed ad omnipotentiam filii non reducitur posse generare. Ergo nec ad omnipotentiam patris; et sic nullo modo potentia generandi ad omnipotentiam pertinet.	5. Even as there is one essence of Father and Son, so is there one omnipotence. Now it does not pertain to the Son’s omnipotence that he be able to beget. Neither, then, does it belong to the omnipotence of the Father: and consequently by no means does the generative power belong to omnipotence.
Praeterea, ea quae non sunt unius rationis, sub una distributione non cadunt: non enim cum dicitur omnis canis, distributio sumitur pro latrabili et caelesti. Sed generatio filii et productio aliorum quae omnipotentiae subiacent, non sunt unius rationis. Ergo cum dicitur: Deus est omnipotens, non includitur ibi potentia generandi.	6. Things differing in kind do not come under the same heading: thus when I say ‘all dogs’ I do not include both the dog that barks and the constellation. Now the generation of the Son and the formation of the other things that are the subject-matter of omnipotence are not of the same kind. Therefore when I say: ‘God is almighty’ I do not include his power of generating.
Praeterea, illud ad quod omnipotentia se extendit, est omnipotentiae subiectum. Sed in divinis nihil est subiectum, ut Hieronymus dicit Damascenus, libro IV, capit. XIX et libro III, capit. XXI. Ergo nec generatio filii nec filius omnipotentiae subditur; et sic idem quod prius.	7. The subject-matter of omnipotence is anything to which omnipotence extends. Now in God there is no subject-matter according to Jerome. Therefore neither the Son’s generation nor the Son himself is the subject-matter of omnipotence: and the same conclusion follows as before.
Praeterea, secundum philosophum relatio non potest esse terminus motus per se, et per consequens nec actionis; et ita nec potentiae obiectum, quae dicitur respectu actionis. Sed generatio et filius in divinis relative dicuntur. Ergo Dei potentia ad ea se non extendit; et sic posse generare non includitur in omnipotentia.	8. According to the Philosopher (Phys. v, i) a relation cannot be the direct term of a movement, nor consequently of an action: and therefore it cannot be the object of a power, since power connotes direction to an action. Now generation and Son imply relation in God. Therefore God’s power does not extend to them: and consequently omnipotence does not include the power to beget.
Sed contra. Est quod Augustinus dicit, si pater non potest generare filium sibi aequalem, ubi est eius omnipotentia? Ergo omnipotentia ad generationem se extendit.	On the contrary Augustine says (Contra Maxim. ii, 7, 18, 23): If the Father is unable to beget a Son equal to him, where is his omnipotence? Therefore omnipotence includes begetting.
Praeterea, omnipotentia in Deo dicitur non solum respectu actuum exteriorum, ut creare, gubernare et huiusmodi, qui ad effectus exterius terminari significantur; sed etiam respectu actuum interiorum; ut intelligere et velle. Si quis enim Deum non posse intelligere diceret, eius omnipotentiae derogaret. Sed filius procedit ut verbum per actum intellectus. Ergo respectu generationis filii omnipotentia Dei intelligitur.	Further, omnipotence is attributed to God in respect not only of external acts, such as creation, government and the like, which are expressed as terminating extrinsically in their effects, but also of interior acts, such as intelligence and will. For if anyone were to say that God cannot understand, he would take away from his omnipotence. Now the Son proceeds as Word by an act of intelligence. Therefore God’s omnipotence is understood to include the begetting of the Son.
Praeterea, maius est generare filium quam creare caelum et terram. Sed posse creare caelum et terram est omnipotentiae. Ergo multo magis posse filium generare.	Again, it is a greater thing to beget the Son than to create heaven and earth. But the power to create heaven and earth belongs to omnipotence. Much more, then, does the power to beget the Son.
Praeterea, in quolibet genere est unum principium, ad quod omnia quae sunt illius generis, reducuntur. In genere autem potentiarum principium est omnipotentia. Ergo omnis potentia ad omnipotentiam reducitur; ergo et potentia generandi vel continetur sub omnipotentia, vel in genere potentiarum erunt duo principia, quod est impossibile.	Moreover, in every genus there is a principle to which all that belong to that genus are reduced. Now in the genus of powers the principle is omnipotence. Therefore all power is reduced to omnipotence; and consequently the generative power is either included in omnipotence, or there will be two principles in the genus of power, which is impossible.
Respondeo. Dicendum, quod potentia generandi pertinet ad omnipotentiam patris, non autem ad omnipotentiam simpliciter: quod sic patet.	I answer that the power to beget belongs to the omnipotence of the Father, but not to omnipotence simply. This may be proved as follows.
Cum enim potentia in essentia radicari intelligatur, et sit principium actionis, oportet idem esse iudicium de potentia et actione quod est de essentia. In essentia autem divina hoc considerandum est, quod propter eius summam simplicitatem quidquid est in Deo, est divina essentia; unde et ipsae relationes quibus personae ad invicem distinguuntur, sunt ipsa divina essentia secundum rem. Et quamvis una et eadem essentia sit communis tribus personis, non tamen relatio unius personae communis est tribus, propter oppositionem relationum ad invicem. Ipsa enim paternitas est divina essentia, nec tamen paternitas filio inest, propter oppositionem paternitatis et filiationis. Unde potest dici, quod paternitas est divina essentia prout est in patre, non prout est in filio: non enim eodem modo est in patre et filio, sed in filio ut ab altero accepta, in patre autem non. Nec tamen sequitur quod quamvis paternitatem filius non habeat quam pater habet, aliquid habeat pater quod non habet filius: nam ipsa relatio secundum rationem sui generis, in quantum est relatio, non habet quod sit aliquid, sed solum quod sit ad aliquid. Quod sit vero aliquid secundum rem, habet ex illa parte qua inest, vel ut idem secundum rem, ut in divinis, vel ut habens causam in subiecto, sicut in creaturis. Unde cum id quod est absolutum, communiter sit in patre et filio, non distinguuntur secundum aliquid, sed secundum ad aliquid tantum; unde non potest dici quod aliquid habet pater quod non habet filius; sed quod aliquid secundum unum respectum convenit patri, et secundum alium aliquid filio. Similiter ergo dicendum est de actione et potentia. Nam generatio significat potentiam cum aliquo respectu, et potentia generandi significat potentiam cum respectu; unde ipsa generatio est Dei actio, sed prout est patris tantum; et similiter ipsa potentia generandi est Dei omnipotentia, sed prout est patris tantum. Nec tamen sequitur quod aliquid possit pater quod non possit filius. Sed omnia quaecumque potest pater, potest filius, quamvis generare non possit: nam generare ad aliquid dicitur.	Since power is considered as being rooted in the essence and is the principle of action, we must judge of the power and action as of the essence. Now in the divine essence we must note that, by reason of its supreme simplicity, whatever is in God is his essence: wherefore the very relations by which the persons are distinct one from another, are in reality the divine essence. And though one and the same essence is common to the three persons, nevertheless the relation of one person is not common to the three, on account of the opposition in which these relations stand to one another. Thus paternity is the divine essence, yet paternity is not in the Son, because paternity is opposed to sonship. Hence we may say that paternity is the divine essence forasmuch as this is in the Father, not as in the Son; because the divine essence is not in the same way in the Father as in the Son: it is in the Son as received from another: but not in the Father. And although the Father has paternity which the Son has not, it does not follow that the Father has something that the Son has not: because the relation, by reason of its generic nature as such, is a thing (aliquid), but is purely relative (ad aliquid). That it is something real is due to the fact that it is in a subject, which is either identical with it as in God, or is its cause, as in creatures. Wherefore since that which is absolute is common to Father and Son they are distinct not by something absolute but by something relative: and therefore we must not say that the Father has something that the Son has not, but that something belongs to the Father in one respect, to the Son in another. The same then applies to action and power. Generation denotes action with a certain respect, and the generative power denotes power with a certain respect: so that generation is God’s action, but only as it is in the Father: likewise the generative power is the divine omnipotence, but only as this is in the Father. Yet it does not follow that the Father is able to do what the Son cannot do: but whatsoever the Father can do, the Son can do likewise, although he cannot beget, because to beget implies a relation.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod posse generare, ad omnipotentiam pertinet, sed non prout est in filio, ut dictum est, in corp. articuli.	Reply to the First Objection. Omnipotence includes the power to beget, but not as it is in the Son, as stated above.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod Augustinus non intendit ostendere totam rationem omnipotentiae in verbis illis, sed quoddam omnipotentiae signum. Nec loquitur de omnipotentia nisi secundum quod ad creaturas se extendit.	Reply to the Second Objection. In these words Augustine does not intend to explain the whole meaning of omnipotence, but to indicate a sign of omnipotence. Nor is he speaking of omnipotence except in reference to creatures.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod possibile ad quod omnipotentia se extendit, non est accipiendum solum pro contingenti: quia et necessaria sunt per divinam potentiam ad esse producta: et sic nihil prohibet generationem filii computari inter possibilia divinae potentiae.	Reply to the Third Objection. The possible things to which omnipotence extends must not be confined to those that are contingent, since even necessary things were brought into being by the divine power. Hence there is no reason why the begetting of the Son should not be included among the things possible to the divine power.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod licet omnipotentia absolute considerata non sit propria patris, tamen prout cointelligitur ei determinatus modus existendi, sive determinata relatio, propria fit patri; sicut hoc quod dicitur Deus pater, patri proprium est, quamvis Deus sit tribus commune.	Reply to the Fourth Objection. Though omnipotence absolutely considered is not proper to the Father, nevertheless as considered together with its Particular mode of existence, or definite relation, it becomes proper to the Father. In the same way the expression God the Father is proper to the Father, although God is common to the three persons.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod sicut una et eadem est essentia trium personarum, non tamen sub eadem relatione, vel secundum eumdem modum existendi est in tribus personis; ita est et de omnipotentia.	Reply to the Fifth Objection. just as the three persons have one and the same essence, it is not in each under the same relation, or with the same mode of existence: and the same applies to omnipotence.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod generatio filii et productio creaturarum non sunt unius rationis secundum univocationem, sed secundum analogiam tantum. Dicit enim Basilius quod accipere filius habet commune cum omni creatura; et ratione huius dicitur primogenitus omnis creaturae et hac ratione potest eius generatio productionibus creaturae communicari sub una distributione.	Reply to the Sixth Objection. The generation, of the Son and the formation of creatures are of the same kind not univocally indeed, but only by analogy. Thus Basil (Hom. de Fide xv) says that the Son receives in common with all creatures. In this sense he is called the Firstborn of every creature (Colos. i, 15), and for the same reason his generation may be placed under one common head with the production of creatures.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod generatio filii est subiecta omnipotentiae, non hoc modo quo subiectum inferioritatem designat sed hoc modo quo designat solummodo potentiae obiectum.	Reply to the Seventh Objection. The generation of the Son is the subject-matter of omnipotence; not, however, so as to imply that being subject denotes inferiority, but so as subject-matter indicates the object of power.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod generatio filii significat relationem per modum actionis, et filius per modum hypostasis subsistentis; et ideo nihil prohibet quin respectu horum omnipotentia dicatur.	Reply to the Eighth Objection. The generation of the Son signifies the relation by way of action, and the Son signifies the relation as a subsistent hypostasis: and thus there is no reason why we should not refer omnipotence to these things.
Aliae vero rationes non concludunt, nisi quod posse generare ad omnipotentiam patris pertineat.	The arguments on the other side merely prove that the omnipotence of the Father includes the power to beget.

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Q. II: ARTICLE VI Are the Generative and Creative Powers the Same?
Sexto quaeritur utrum potentia generandi et potentia creandi sint idem. Et videtur quod non.	THE sixth point of inquiry is whether the power to beget is the same as the power to create: and the answer, seemingly should be in the negative.
Generatio enim est operatio vel opus naturae, sicut Damascenus dicit; creatio vero est opus voluntatis, ut patet per Hilarium in libro de Synod. sed voluntas et natura non sunt idem principium, sed ex opposito dividuntur, ut patet II Phys. Ergo potentia generandi et potentia creandi non sunt idem.	1. According to Damascene (De Fide Orthod. ii, 27) generation is the operation or work of nature: whereas according to Hilary (De Synod.) creation is a work of the will. Now will and nature are not one and the same principle, but are opposite members of a division, as stated in Phys. ii, 4, 5. Therefore the generative and creative powers are not the same.
Praeterea, potentiae distinguuntur per actus, ut habetur II de anima. Sed generatio et creatio sunt actus multum differentes. Ergo et potentia generandi et potentia creandi non sunt una potentia.	2. Powers are distinguished by their acts (De Anima ii, 4). Now generation and creation are very different acts. Therefore the generative and creative powers are also distinct.
Praeterea, minor unitas est eorum quae in aliquo univocantur, quam eorum quae habent idem esse. Sed potentia generandi et potentia creandi in nullo univocantur; sicut nec generatio et creatio nec filius et creatura. Ergo potentia generandi et potentia creandi non sunt idem secundum esse.	3. There is less unity among things that admit of a same common predication, than among those that have the same being. Now in no respect do the generative and creative powers admit of a same common predication, as neither do the acts of generating and creating, nor the Son and a creature. Therefore the generative and creative powers are not the same in being.
Praeterea, inter ea quae sunt idem, non cadit ordo. Sed potentia creandi est prior quam potentia generandi secundum intellectum, sicut essentiale notionali. Ergo praedictae potentiae non sunt idem.	4. There is no order among things that are identical. Now the creative power logically precedes the generative power, even as the essential precedes the notional. Therefore these powers are not the same.
Sed contra. In Deo non differt potentia et essentia. Sed una tantum est divina essentia. Ergo et una tantum potentia. Non ergo praedictae potentiae distinguuntur.	On the contrary in God power and essence are not distinct. But there is only one divine essence. Therefore there is only one divine power. Therefore the powers in question are not distinct.
Praeterea, Deus non facit per plura quod potest facere per unum. Sed per unam potentiam Deus potest generare et creare, praecipue cum generatio filii sit ratio productionis creaturae; secundum illam Augustini expositionem: dixit, et facta sunt; id est, verbum genuit, in quo erat ut fierent. Ergo una tantum potentia est generandi et creandi.	Again, God does not do by several means what he is able to do by one. Now God is able both to generate and to create by one power, and all the more seeing that the generation of the Son is the prototype of the production of creatures, as Augustine expounds the words, He spoke, and they were made (Gen. ad lit. ii, 6, 7): That is to say He begot the Word in whom they existed as things to be made. Therefore the generative and creative powers are but one power.
Respondeo. Dicendum, quod, sicut supra, dictum est, ea quae de potentia dicuntur in divinis, consideranda sunt ex ipsa essentia. In divinis autem licet una relatio ab altera distinguatur realiter propter oppositionem relationum, quae reales in Deo sunt; ipsa tamen relatio non est aliud secundum rem quam ipsa essentia, sed solum ratione differens: nam relatio ad essentiam oppositionem non habet. Et ideo non est concedendum quod aliquid absolutum in divinis multiplicetur, sicut quidam dicunt, quod in divinis est duplex esse, essentiale et personale. Omne enim esse in divinis essentiale est, nec persona est nisi per esse essentiae. In potentia vero, praeter id quod est ipsa potentia, consideratur respectus quidam vel ordo ad id quod potentiae subiacet. Si ergo potentia quae est respectu actus essentialis, sicut potentia intelligendi vel creandi, comparetur ad potentiam quae est respectu actus notionalis (cuiusmodi est potentia generandi) secundum id quod est ipsa potentia, invenitur una et eadem potentia, sicut est unum et idem esse naturae et personae. Sed tamen utrique potentiae cointelligitur alius et alius respectus, secundum diversos actus ad quos potentiae dicuntur. Sic ergo potentia generandi et creandi est una et eadem potentia, si consideretur id quod est potentia; differunt tamen secundum diversos respectus ad actus diversos.	I answer that, as stated above (A. 5), in speaking of the divine power we must take as our guide those things that apply to the divine essence. Now in God though one relation is really distinct from another on account of the mutual opposition between the relations which are real in God, nevertheless the relation and the divine essence are distinct not really, but only logically, since there is no opposition between them. Consequently we cannot grant that there are several absolute things in God, as some have asserted who maintained that there is a twofold being in God, an essential being and a personal being. The reason is that all being in God is essential, and the very, persons are constituted by virtue of that essential being. Now when we consider the divine power we find besides the power a certain relation to what is subject to that power. Accordingly if we take power in its relation to an essential act, such as intelligence or creation, and power in its relation to a notional act such as generation, and compare them together as power, we find that they are one and the same power, even as nature and person have but one being. And. yet we understand at the same time that each power has its peculiar relationship to its respective act to which it is directed. Therefore the generative and creative powers are one and the same power, if we consider them as powers, but they differ in their respective relationships to different acts.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod licet in creaturis differant natura et propositum, in divinis tamen sunt idem secundum rem. Vel potest dici, quod potentia creandi non nominat propositum sive voluntatem, sed potentiam prout a voluntate imperatur. Potentia autem generandi, secundum quod natura inclinat, agit. Hoc autem non facit diversitatem potentiae, nam nihil prohibet aliquam potentiam ad aliquem actum imperari a voluntate et ad alium inclinari a natura. Sicut intellectus noster ad credendum inclinatur a voluntate, ad intelligendum prima principia ducitur ex natura.	Reply to the First Objection. Although in creatures nature and will are distinct, in God they are one and the same.—Or we may reply that the creative power does not denote the purpose or will, but the power as directed by the will: whereas the generative power acts as inclined by nature. But this does not necessitate a distinction of powers, since there is nothing to prevent the same power from being directed to one act by the will and inclined to another by nature. Thus our intellect is urged by the will to believe, and is led by nature to understand first principles.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod quanto aliqua potentia est superior, tanto ad plura se extendit, unde minus est distinguibilis per diversitatem obiectorum; sicut imaginatio una potentia est respectu omnium sensibilium, respectu quorum sensus proprii distinguuntur. Divina autem potentia est summe elevata: unde differentia actuum in ipsa potentia, quantum ad id quod est, diversitatem non inducit, sed secundum unam potentiam Deus omnia potest.	Reply to the Second Objection. The higher the power the wider its scope: so that a diversity of objects does not require that it should be divided: thus the imagination is one power covering all objects of sense, for the perception of which distinct senses are appropriated. Now the divine power is raised above all others: wherefore a difference of acts requires no distinction therein, if we consider it as power; but God by his, one power is able to do all things.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod potentia generandi et potentia creandi quantum ad ipsam (ut ita loquar) potentiae substantiam, non solum univocantur, sed sunt unum. Sed quod analogice dicantur, hoc est ex ordine actus.	Reply to the Third Objection. The generative and creative powers, considered as to their substance, so to speak, do not merely admit of a same common predication, but they are one and the same thing: the analogy comes in through this relationship to their respective acts.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod praedictae potentiae non ordinantur secundum prius et posterius, nisi prout distinguuntur. Unde ordo earum non attenditur nisi per respectum ad actus. Et ex hoc patet quod potentia generandi est prior potentia creandi, sicut generatio creatione. Quantum vero ad hoc quod ad essentiam comparantur, sunt idem, et non est in eis ordo.	Reply to the Fourth Objection. There is no order of first and second between these powers, except in respect of their being distinct: so that such an order is only in reference to their acts. Hence it is clear that the generative power precedes the creative power, as generation preceded creation. But in relation to the essence they are identical and there is no order between them.

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