QUESTION III
CREATION

  1. Et primo quaeritur utrum Deus possit aliquid creare.
  2. Secundo utrum creatio sit mutatio.
  3. Tertio utrum creatio sit aliquid realiter in creatura.
  4. Quarto utrum potentia creandi sit creaturae communicabilis.
  5. Quinto utrum possit esse aliquid quod non sit a Deo creatum.
  6. Sexto utrum sit unum tantum creationis principium.
  7. Septimo utrum Deus operetur in omni operatione naturae.
  8. Octavo utrum creatio operi naturae admisceatur.
  9. Nono utrum anima creetur.
  10. Decimo utrum anima sit creata in corpore, vel extra corpus.
  11. Undecimo utrum anima sensibilis et vegetabilis sint per creationem.
  12. Duodecimo utrum sint in semine quando discinditur.
  13. Decimotertio utrum aliquod ens ab alio, possit esse aeternum.
  14. Decimoquarto utrum id quod est divisum a Deo per essentiam, possit semper fuisse.
  15. Decimoquinto utrum res processerint a Deo per necessitatem naturae.
  16. Decimosexto utrum ab uno primo possit procedere multitudo.
  17. Decimoseptimo utrum mundus semper fuerit.
  18. Decimoctavo utrum Angeli sint creati ante mundum visibilem.
  19. Undevigesimo utrum potuerint esse Angeli ante mundum visibilem.
  1. Can God Create a Thing from Nothing?
  2. Is Creation a Change?
  3. Is Creation Something Real in the Creature, and If So, What Is It?
  4. Is the Creative Power or Act Communicable to a Creature?
  5. Can There Be Anything That Is Not Created by God?
  6. Is There but One Principle of Creation?
  7. Does God Work in Operations of Nature?
  8. Does God Work in Nature by Creating?
  9. Is the Rational Soul Brought into Being by Creation or Is it Transmitted Through the Semen?
  10. Is the Rational Soul Created in the Body?
  11. Is the Sensible and Vegetal Soul Created or Is it Transmitted Through the Semen?
  12. Is the Sensible or Vegetal Soul in the Semen Prom the Beginning of the Latter’s Separation?
  13. Can That Which Proceeds from Another Be Eternal?
  14. Is it Possible for That Which Differs from God Essentially to Have Always Existed?
  15. Did Things Proceed from God of Natural Necessity or by the Decree of His Will?
  16. Can a Multitude of Things Proceed from One First Thing?
  17. Has the World Always Existed?
  18. Were the Angels Created Before the Visible World?
  19. Was it Possible for the Angels to Exist Before the Visible World?
Q. III:
ARTICLE I
Can God Create a Thing from Nothing?

[ Sum. Th. 1. Q. xiv, A. 2]
Et primo quaeritur utrum Deus possit aliquid creare ex nihilo. Et videtur quod non. WE now inquire about the creation, which is the first effect of the divine power; and the first point of inquiry is whether God can create anything out of nothing. Seemingly the reply should be in the negative.
Deus enim non potest facere contra communem animi conceptionem, sicut quod totum non sit maius sua parte. Sed, sicut dicit philosophus, communis conceptio ex sententia philosophorum fuit, quod ex nihilo nihil fiat. Ergo Deus non potest de nihilo aliquid facere. 1. God cannot act counter to first principles; for instance, he cannot make a whole not greater than its part. Now according to Aristotle (Phys. i, 8) philosophers declare it is a commonly received axiom that out of nothing nothing comes. Therefore God cannot make a thing out of nothing.
Praeterea, omne quod fit, antequam esset, possibile erat esse: si enim erat impossibile esse, non erat possibile fieri: nihil enim mutatur ad id quod est impossibile. Sed potentia qua aliquid potest esse, non potest esse nisi in aliquo subiecto; nisi forte ipsamet sit subiectum; nam accidens absque subiecto esse non potest. Ergo omne quod fit, fit ex materia vel subiecto. Impossibile est ergo ex nihilo aliquid fieri. 2. Whatever is made was possible before it was made for if it could not be, it could not be made, since the impossible cannot be the term of a change. Now the potentiality by virtue of which a thing is possible, cannot be otherwise than in a subject, unless it be itself a subject: because an accident cannot exist but in a subject. Therefore whatever is made, is produced from matter or a subject. Therefore nothing can be made out of nothing.
Praeterea, infinitam distantiam non contingit pertransire. Sed non entis simpliciter ad ens est infinita distantia; quod ex hoc patet, quia quanto potentia est minus ad actum disposita, tanto magis ab actu distat; unde si omnino potentia subtrahatur, erit infinita distantia. Ergo impossibile est quod aliquid transeat simpliciter de non ente ad ens. 3. Infinite distance cannot be crossed. Now there is an infinite distance between absolute non-being and being: because the less a potentiality is disposed to actuality the further is it removed from act, so that if there be no potentiality at all, the distance will be infinite. Therefore it is impossible for a thing to come into being from absolute non-being.
Praeterea, philosophus dicit, quod omnifariam dissimile, non agit in omnifariam dissimile; oportet enim quod agens et patiens conveniant in genere et in materia. Sed non ens simpliciter et Deus in nullo conveniunt. Ergo Deus non potest agere in non ens simpliciter, et ita non potest facere aliquid de nihilo. 4. The Philosopher says (De Gen. i, 7) that things utterly dissimilar do not act on one another: because there must be common genus and matter in agent and patient. Now absolute non-entity and God are utterly dissimilar. Therefore God cannot act on absolute non-entity: and consequently he cannot make a thing out of nothing.
Sed dicebat, quod ratio ista procedit de agente cuius actio differt a sua substantia, quam oportet in aliquo subiecto recipi.- Sed contra Avicenna dicit, quod si calor esset a materia expoliatus, per se ipsum ageret absque materia; et tamen eius actio non esset sua substantia. Ergo hoc quod actio Dei est sua essentia, non est ratio quod materia non indigeat. 5. Should it be said that the foregoing argument applies to an agent whose action is distinct from its substance, and presupposes a subject into which it is received? —On the contrary, Avicenna says (Metaph. ix, 2) that if heat were separated from matter it would act of itself without its matter: and yet its action would not be its substance. Therefore the fact that God’s action is his substance is no reason for his not needing matter.
Praeterea, ex nihilo nihil concluditur: quod est quoddam fieri rationis. Sed esse rationis consequitur esse naturae. Ergo etiam in natura ex nihilo nihil fieri potest. 6. From no premises we can draw no conclusion, which is a process, of reason. Now logical being is consequent to natural being. Therefore neither can anything in nature be made from nothing.
Praeterea, si ex nihilo aliquid fiat, haec praepositio ex aut notat causam, aut ordinem. Causam autem non videtur notare nisi efficientem, vel materialem. Nihil autem neque efficiens causa entis esse potest, neque materia; et sic in proposito non denotat causam; similiter nec ordinem, quia, ut dicit Boetius, entis ad non ens non est aliquis ordo. Ergo nullo modo ex nihilo potest aliquid fieri. 7. If a thing is made from nothing, this preposition from connotes either cause or order. And apparently if it connotes a cause it will be either the efficient or the material cause. But nothing cannot be the efficient cause of being, nor can it be the material cause, so that as regards the point at issue ‘from’ does not denote a cause. Nor can it denote order, because as Boethius says there is no order between non-being and being. Therefore in no sense can a thing be made from nothing.
Praeterea, potentia activa secundum philosophum, est principium transmutationis in aliud, secundum quod est aliud. Potentia autem Dei non est nisi potentia activa. Ergo requirit aliquod subiectum transmutationis; et sic non potest ex nihilo aliquid facere. 8. According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 12) active power is the cause whereby one thing is changed into another, as such. Now there is no power in God save that which is active. Therefore it requires a thing which is the subject of change and consequently cannot make a thing out of nothing.
Praeterea, in rebus invenitur diversitas, prout una res est alia perfectior. Huius autem diversitatis causa non est ex parte Dei, qui est unus et simplex. Ergo oportet huius diversitatis causam assignare ex parte materiae. Oportet ergo ponere res factas esse ex materia et non ex nihilo. 9. Things differ from one another in that one is more perfect than another. Now the cause of this difference is not on the part of God, since he is one and simple. Therefore we must assign matter as the cause thereof: and consequently we must hold that things were made from matter and not from nothing.
Praeterea, quod ex nihilo factum est, habet esse post non esse. Est ergo considerare aliquod instans in quo ultimo non est, ex quo non esse desinit, et aliquod in quo primo est, ex quo esse incipit. Aut ergo est unum et idem instans, aut diversa. Si idem, sequitur duo contradictoria esse in eodem instanti; si diversa, cum inter duo instantia sit tempus medium, sequitur aliquid esse medium inter affirmationem et negationem: nam non potest dici non esse post ultimum instans in quo non fuit, nec esse ante primum instans in quo fuit. Utrumque autem est impossibile, scilicet contradictionem esse simul, et eam habere medium. Ergo impossibile est aliquid fieri ex nihilo. 10. That which is made from nothing has being after nonbeing. Consequently it is possible to conceive an instant which is the last of its non-being, and when it ceases not to be; and another instant which is the first of its being and from which it begins to be. Now these instants are either one and the same, or distinct. If they coincide it follows that two contradictory statements are true at the same instant: if they are distinct, then since there is an intervening time between the two instants, it follows that there is a mean between affirmation and negation: for it cannot be said that it is not after the last instant of its non-existence, nor that it is before the first instant of its existence. But both these things are impossible, namely that contradictory statements be true simultaneously, and that they have a mean. Therefore a thing cannot be made from nothing.
Praeterea, quod factum est, necesse est aliquando fieri; et quod creatum est, aliquando creari. Aut ergo simul fit et factum est, quod creatur, aut non simul. Sed non potest dici quod non simul, quia creatura non est antequam facta sit. Si ergo fieri eius sit antequam facta sit, oportebit esse aliquod factionis subiectum, quod est contra creationis rationem. Si autem simul fit et factum est, sequitur quod simul fit et non fit, quia quod factum est in permanentibus, est; quod tamen fit, non est. Hoc autem est impossibile. Ergo impossibile est aliquid fieri ex nihilo, vel creari. 11. That which is made of necessity at some time was becoming: and what is created was at some time being created. Hence that which is created was becoming and was made either simultaneously or not simultaneously. Now it cannot be mid that it was not simultaneously, since the creature, before it is made, is not: and if its becoming precedes its having been made, there must have been a subject of the making, and this is contrary to the definition of creation. On the other hand if its becoming and its having been made are simultaneous, it follows that at the same time it is being made and not being made, since in things that are not purely transient, that which has been made is: whereas that which is being made, is not. But this is impossible. Therefore it is impossible for a thing to be made from nothing or to be created.
Praeterea, omne agens agit simile sibi. Omne autem agens agit secundum quod est in actu. Ergo nihil fit nisi quod est in actu. Sed materia prima non est in actu. Ergo fieri non potest, praecipue a Deo, qui est purus actus; et sic quaecumque fiunt, fiunt ex praesupposita materia, et non ex nihilo. 12. Every agent produces its like: and every agent acts forasmuch as it is actual. Therefore nothing is made but what is actual. Now primal matter is not actual. Therefore it cannot be made, especially by God who is pure act. Hence whatsoever things are made, are made from pre-existing matter, and not from nothing.
Praeterea, quidquid facit Deus, per ideam operatur, sicut artifex agit artificiata per formas artis. Sed materia prima non habet ideam in Deo: quia idea forma est, et similitudo ideati. Materia autem prima cum intelligatur secundum suam essentiam absque omni forma, non potest forma eius esse similitudo. Ergo materia prima a Deo fieri non potest; et sic idem quod prius. 13. Whatsoever God makes he fashions according to his idea, even as an artist produces art-works according to art-forms. Now there is no idea of primal matter in God, because an idea is a form and the likeness of that which it represents: whereas primal matter, since it is conceived to be essentially formless, cannot be represented by a form. Therefore primal matter cannot be made by God; and thus the same conclusion follows.
Praeterea, non potest esse idem perfectionis et imperfectionis principium. In rebus autem imperfectio invenitur, cum rerum quaedam aliis potiores sint; quod contingere non potest nisi per inferiorum imperfectionem. Cum ergo perfectionis principium sit Deus, oportebit imperfectionem in aliud principium reducere. Sed non nisi in materiam. Ergo oportebit res ex aliqua materia esse factas, et non ex nihilo. 14. The same thing cannot be a principle both of perfection and of imperfection. Now things are said to be imperfect when they are inferior to others, and this can only be the case when their inferiority is due to their being imperfect. Since then God is the principle of perfection, we must needs ascribe imperfection to some other principle: and this can only be matter. Therefore things must needs have been made from matter of some kind, and not from nothing.
Praeterea, si aliquid fit ex nihilo aut fit ex eo sicut ex subiecto, sicut statua ex aere; aut sicut ex opposito, sicut figuratum ex infigurato; aut ex composito, sicut statua ex aere infigurato. Sed aliquid non potest fieri ex nihilo sicut ex subiecto, quia non ens non potest esse entis materia; neque sicut ex composito, quia sic non ens converteretur in ens, sicut aes infiguratum convertitur in aes figuratum; et ita oporteret aliquid esse commune enti et non enti, quod est impossibile; neque etiam sicut ex opposito, cum plus differant non esse simpliciter et ens quam duo entia diversorum generum, ex quorum uno non fit aliud, sicut figura non fit color, nisi forte per accidens. Ergo nullo modo aliquid potest fieri ex nihilo. 15. If a thing. is made from nothing, it is made therefrom either as from a subject, as a statue made of bronze; or as from its opposite, as a shape from something shapeless: or as from these two combined, as a statue from shapeless bronze. Now a thing cannot be made from nothing as subject, since non-being cannot be the matter of being. Nor as a composite, since then non-being would be transformed into being, as shapeless bronze is transformed into shapely bronze; so that there would have to be something common to being and non-being; which is impossible. Nor again as from its opposite, since absolute non-being differs more from being than two beings, of the same genus, and yet one of the latter cannot be changed into another; for instance, shape is not changed into colour, except perhaps accidentally. Therefore by no means can a thing be made from nothing.
Praeterea, omne quod est per accidens, reducitur ad per se. Sed ex opposito fit aliquid per accidens, ex subiecto autem per se; sicut statua ex infigurato fit per accidens, ex aere autem per se, quia aeri accidit esse infiguratum. Si ergo aliquid fiat ex non ente, hoc erit per accidens. Ergo oportet quod fiat per se ex aliquo subiecto; et ita non fit ex nihilo. 16. Whatsoever accidentally is originates in that which is essential. From that which is opposite a thing is made accidentally, and from a subject a thing is made essentially: thus a statue is made accidentally from that which is shapeless, but from bronze essentially, since shapelessness is accidental to the bronze. If, then, a thing is made from nothing, this will be accidentally: and thus it follows that it will need to be made from a subject, and therefore not from nothing.
Praeterea, ei quod fit faciens dat esse. Si ergo Deus facit aliquid ex nihilo, Deus alicui dat esse. Aut ergo est aliquid recipiens esse, aut nihil. Si nihil: ergo nihil constituitur in esse per illam actionem; et sic non fit aliquid. Si autem est aliquid recipiens esse, hoc erit aliud ab eo quod est Deus; quia non est idem recipiens et receptum. Ergo Deus facit ex aliquo praeexistenti, et ita non ex nihilo. 17. The maker gives being to that which is made. If then God makes a thing out of nothing, he gives being to that thing. Hence either there is something that receives being, or there is nothing. If nothing, then nothing receives being by that action of God’s, and thus nothing is made thereby. And if there is something that receives being, this something will be distinct from that which is from God, since recipient is distinct from that which is received. Therefore God makes a thing from something already existing, and not from nothing.
Sed contra. Genes. I, 1: in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram, dicit Glossa, ex Beda, quod creare est ex nihilo facere aliquid. Ergo Deus potest facere aliquid ex nihilo. On the contrary, on Genesis i, 1, In the beginning God created heaven and earth, a gloss taken from Bede says that to create is to make a thing from nothing. Therefore God can make a thing from nothing.
Praeterea, Avicenna dicit quod agens cui accidit agere, requirit materiam in quam agat. Sed Deo non accidit agere, immo sua actio est sua substantia. Ergo non requirit materiam in quam agat, et ita potest ex nihilo aliquid facere. Again, Avicenna (Metaph. vii, 2) says that an agent who acts by virtue of an accident requires matter to act upon. But God does not act by virtue of an accident, indeed his action is his very substance. Therefore he requires no matter to act upon, and consequently can make a thing from nothing.
Praeterea, virtus divina est potentior quam virtus naturae. Sed virtus naturae facit aliquod ens ex hoc quod erat in potentia. Ergo virtus divina aliquid amplius facit, et ita facit ex nihilo. Again, God’s power is greater than that of nature. Now the power of nature makes things from that in which previously they were in potentiality. Therefore God’s power does something more, and makes things out of nothing.
Respondeo. Dicendum, quod tenendum est firmiter, quod Deus potest facere aliquid ex nihilo et facit. I answer that we must hold firmly that God can and does make things from nothing.
Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est, quod omne agens agit, secundum quod est actu; unde oportet quod per illum modum actio alicui agenti attribuatur quo convenit ei esse in actu. Res autem particularis est particulariter in actu: et hoc dupliciter: primo ex comparatione sui, quia non tota substantia sua est actus, cum huiusmodi res sint compositae ex materia et forma; et inde est quod res naturalis non agit secundum se totam, sed agit per formam suam, per quam est in actu. Secundo in comparatione ad ea quae sunt in actu. Nam in nulla re naturali includuntur actus et perfectiones omnium eorum quae sunt in actu; sed quaelibet illarum habet actum determinatum ad unum genus et ad unam speciem; et inde est quod nulla earum est activa entis secundum quod est ens, sed eius entis secundum quod est hoc ens, determinatum in hac vel illa specie: nam agens agit sibi simile. Et ideo agens naturale non producit simpliciter ens, sed ens praeexistens et determinatum ad hoc vel ad aliud, ut puta ad speciem ignis, vel ad albedinem, vel ad aliquid huiusmodi. Et propter hoc, agens naturale agit movendo; et ideo requirit materiam, quae sit subiectum mutationis vel motus, et propter hoc non potest aliquid ex nihilo facere. In order to make this evident we must observe that every agent acts forasmuch as it is in act: wherefore action must needs be attributed to an agent according to the measure of its actuality. Now a particular thing is actual in a particular manner, and this in two ways. First by comparison with itself, because its substance is not wholly act, since such things are composed of matter and form: for which reason a natural thing acts not in respect of its totality, but in respect of its form whereby it is in act. Secondly, in comparison with things that are in act: because no natural thing comprises the acts and perfections of all the things that are in act: but each one has an act confined to one genus and one species, so that none has an activity extending to being as such, but only to this or that being as such, and confined to this or that species: for an agent produces its like. Wherefore a natural agent produces a being not simply, but determines a pre-existent being to this or that species, of fire, for example, or of whiteness and so forth. Wherefore the natural agent acts by moving something, and consequently requires matter as a subject of change or movement, and thus it cannot make a thing out of nothing.
Ipse autem Deus e contrario est totaliter actus,- et in comparatione sui, quia est actus purus non habens potentiam permixtam - et in comparatione rerum quae sunt in actu, quia in eo est omnium entium origo; unde per suam actionem producit totum ens subsistens, nullo praesupposito, utpote qui est totius esse principium, et secundum se totum. Et propter hoc ex nihilo aliquid facere potest; et haec eius actio vocatur creatio. Et inde est quod in Lib. de causis, dicitur, quod esse eius est per creationem, vivere vero, et caetera huiusmodi, per informationem. Causalitates enim entis absolute reducuntur in primam causam universalem; causalitas vero aliorum quae ad esse superadduntur; vel quibus esse specificatur, pertinet ad causas secundas, quae agunt per informationem, quasi supposito effectu causae universalis: et inde etiam est quod nulla res dat esse, nisi in quantum est in ea participatio divinae virtutis. Propter quod etiam dicitur in Lib. de causis, quod anima nobilis habet operationem divinam in quantum dat esse. On the other hand God is all act,—both in comparison with himself, since he is pure act without any admixture of potentiality,—and in comparison with the things that are in act, because in him is the source of all things, wherefore by his action he produces the whole subsistent being, without anything having existed before (since he is the source of all being), and in respect of his totality. For this reason he can make a thing from nothing, and this action of his is called creation. Wherefore it is stated in De Causis (prop. xviii) that being is by creation, whereas life and the like are by information: for all causation of absolute being is, traced to the first universal cause, while the causation of all that is in addition to being, or specific of being, belongs to second causes which act by information, on the presupposition as it were of the effect of the first cause. Hence no thing gives being except in so far as it partakes of the divine power. For this reason it is said again in De Causis (prop. iii) that the soul, by giving us being, has a divine operation.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ex nihilo nihil fieri, philosophus dicit esse communem animi conceptionem vel opinionem naturalium, quia agens naturale, quod ab eis consideratur, non agit nisi per motum; unde oportet esse aliquod subiectum motus vel mutationis, quod in agente supernaturali non oportet, ut dictum est. Reply to the First Objection. The Philosopher says that it is a common axiom or opinion of the physicists that from nothing nothing is made, because the natural agent, which was the object of their researches, does not act except by movement. Consequently there must needs be a subject of movement or change which, as we have stated, is not required for a supernatural agent.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod antequam mundus esset, possibile erat mundum esse; non tamen oportet quod aliqua materia praeexisteret, in qua potentia fundaretur. Dicitur enim V Metaph., aliquid aliquando dici possibile, non secundum aliquam potentiam, sed quia in terminis ipsius enuntiabilis non est aliqua repugnantia, secundum quod possibile opponitur impossibili. Sic ergo dicitur, antequam mundus esset, possibile mundum fieri, quia non erat repugnantia inter praedicatum enuntiabilis et subiectum. Vel potest dici, quod erat possibile propter potentiam activam agentis, non propter aliquam potentiam passivam materiae. Philosophus autem utitur hoc argumento, in generationibus naturalibus contra Platonicos, qui dicebant formas separatas esse naturalis generationis principia. Reply to the Second Objection. Before the world was, it was possible for the world to be: but it does not follow that there was need of matter as the base of that possibility. For it is stated in Metaph. v, 12, that sometimes a thing is said to be possible, not in respect of some potentiality, but because it involves no contradiction of terms, in which sense the possible is opposed to the impossible. Accordingly it is said that before the world was it was possible for the world to be made, because the statement involved no contradiction between subject and predicate. We may also reply that it was possible by reason of the active power of the agent, but not on account of any passive power of matter. The Philosopher uses this argument (Metaph. vii, 13) in treating of natural generation against the Platonists who maintained that separate forms are the principles of natural generation.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod entis et non entis simpliciter est aliquo modo et semper infinita distantia, non tamen eodem modo: sed quandoque quidem ex utraque parte infinita, sicut cum comparatur non esse ad esse divinum quod infinitum est, ac si comparetur albedo infinita ad nigredinem infinitam; quandoque autem est finita ex una parte tantum, sicut cum comparatur non esse simpliciter ad esse creatum quod finitum est, ac si comparetur nigredo infinita ad albedinem finitam. In illud ergo esse quod est infinitum, non potest fieri transitus ex non esse; sed in illud esse quod est finitum, talis transitus fieri potest, prout distantia non esse ad illud esse ex una parte terminatur, quamvis non sit transitus proprie: sic enim est in motibus continuis, per quos transit pars post partem. Sic enim contingit nullo modo infinitum transire. Reply to the Third Objection. Between being and absolute non-being there is an infinite distance in a certain sense, and that always, but not in the same way. Sometimes it is infinite on both sides, as when we compare non-being with the divine being which is infinite: thus we might compare infinite whiteness with infinite blackness. Sometimes it is finite on one side only, as when we compare absolute non-being with created being which is finite: thus we might compare infinite blackness with finite whiteness. Accordingly then from non-being it is impossible to pass to the being that is infinite: but it is possible to pass to the being that is finite, inasmuch as the distance from non-being to that kind of being is determinate on the one side, although there is no passage properly speaking: for thus it is in continuous movements through which one part passes after another. But there is no such passage for that which is infinite.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod cum fit aliquid ex nihilo, non esse, sive nihil, non se habet per modum patientis nisi per accidens, sed magis per modum oppositi ad id quod fit per actionem. Nec etiam in naturalibus oppositum se habet per modum patientis nisi per accidens, sed magis subiectum. Reply to the Fourth Objection. When a thing is made from nothing, non-being or nothing does not hold the position of patient, save accidentally, but rather that of the opposite to the thing made by the action. Nor again is the opposite in the position of patient in the action of nature, except accidentally; but the subject is this.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod calor, si esset expoliatus a materia, ageret quidem sine materia quae requireretur ex parte agentis, sed non sine materia quae requireretur ex parte patientis. Reply to the Fifth Objection. If heat were separated from matter, it would act indeed without matter as a requisite for the agent, but not without that matter that is required on the part of the patient.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod concludi se habet in actibus rationis sicut moveri in actibus naturae, eo quod in concludendo ratio ab uno in aliud discurrit; et ideo sicut motus omnis naturalis est ex aliquo, ita et omnis conclusio rationis. Sicut vero intelligere principia, quod est concludendi principium, non est ex aliquo ex quo concludatur, ita creatio, quae est omnis motus principium, non est ex aliquo. Reply to the Sixth Objection. In the acts of the reason to come to a conclusion is like being moved in the processes of nature, because in reaching a conclusion the reason discourses from one thing to another: wherefore as all natural movement is from a starting-point, so also is every conclusion of the reason. And as the understanding of first principles, which is the starting-point whence the conclusion is derived, does not proceed as a conclusion from something else, even so creation which is the principle of all movement, is not from something else.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod cum dicitur aliquid fieri ex nihilo, duplex est sensus, ut patet per Anselmum in suo Monologio. Nam negatio importata in nihilo potest negare praepositionem ex, vel potest includi sub praepositione. Si autem neget praepositionem, adhuc potest esse duplex sensus: unus, ut negatio feratur ad totum, et negetur non solum praepositio, sed etiam verbum, ut si dicatur aliquid ex nihilo fieri quia non fit, sicut de tacente possumus dicere quod de nihilo loquitur: et sic de Deo possumus dicere quod de nihilo fit, quia omnino non fit; quamvis iste modus loquendi non sit consuetus. Alius sensus est, ut verbum remaneat affirmatum, sed negatio feratur solum ad praepositionem; et ideo dicatur aliquid ex nihilo fieri, quia fit quidem, sed non praeexistit aliquid ex quo fiat; sicut dicimus aliquem tristari ex nihilo, quia non habet tristitiae suae causam: et hoc modo per creationem dicitur aliquid ex nihilo fieri. Si vero praepositio includit negationem, tunc est duplex sensus: unus verus, et alius falsus. Falsus quidem, si positio importet habitudinem causae (non ens enim esse nullo modo potest causa entis); verus autem, si importet ordinem tantum, ut dicatur aliquid fieri ex nihilo quia fit post nihilum, quod etiam verum est in creatione. Quod autem Boetius dicit, quod non entis ad ens non est ordo, intelligendum est de ordine determinatae proportionis, vel de ordine qui sit realis relatio, quae inter ens et non ens esse non potest, ut Avicenna dicit. Reply to the Seventh Objection. When a thing is said to be made from nothing, the sense is twofold, as Anselm says (Monolog. v, viii). The negative implied in the word nothing may bear directly on the preposition from, or it may be included in that preposition. If it bears directly on the preposition, again a twofold sense is possible. It may bear on the whole so that the negative extends not only to the preposition but also to the verb; in this sense we might say that a thing is made from nothing because it is not made: thus it could be said of a silent man that he speaks of nothing. In this sense we may say of God that he is made from nothing, because he is utterly not made: but this manner of speaking is not customary. In another sense the verb remains affirmed, and the negative bears on the preposition only: and then we say that a thing is made from nothing, because it is made indeed, but there is no preexisting thing from which it is made: thus we say that so-and-so grieves for nothing, because he has no cause for grieving: it is in this sense that a thing is said to be made from nothing by creation. If, however, the preposition includes the negation, then again the sense is twofold, one true, one false. It is false if the preposition connotes causality (since in no way can non-being be the cause of being): it is true if it implies mere order, so that to make a thing from nothing, is to make a thing whereas before there was nothing, and this is true of creation. The statement of Boethius that there is no order between non-being and being, refers to the order of definite proportion, or of real relation; such order, says Avicenna (Metaph. iii) cannot be between being and non-being.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod definitio illa intelligitur de potentia activa naturali. Reply to the Eighth Objection. This definition applies to a natural active power.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod Deus non producit res ex necessitate naturae, sed ex ordine suae sapientiae. Et ideo diversitas rerum non oportet quod sit ex materia, sed ex ordine divinae sapientiae; quae ad complementum universi diversas naturas instituit. Reply to the Ninth Objection. God produces things not of natural necessity but according to the order of his wisdom. Hence it does not follow that diversity among things arises from their matter but from the ordering of divine wisdom, which established diverse natures for the adornment of the universe.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod cum fit aliquid ex nihilo, esse quidem eius quod fit, est primo in aliquo instanti; non esse autem non est in illo instanti nec in aliquo reali, sed in aliquo imaginario tantum. Sicut enim extra universum non est aliqua dimensio realis, sed imaginaria tantum, secundum quam possumus dicere quod Deus potest aliquid facere extra universum tantum, vel tantum distans ab universo; ita ante principium mundi non fuit aliquod tempus reale, sed imaginarium; et in illo possibile est imaginari aliquod instans in quo ultimo fuit non ens. Nec oportet quod inter ista duo instantia sit tempus medium, cum tempus verum et tempus imaginarium non continuentur. Reply to the Tenth Objection. When a thing is made from nothing, its being begins in an instant, and its non-being is not in that instant, nor is it in any real but only in an imaginary instant. For as outside the universe there is no real but only in an imaginary dimension, in respect of which we may say that God is able to make a thing outside the universe at this or that distance from the universe; even so before the beginning of the world there was no real but an imaginary time, wherein it is possible to conceive an instant which was the last instant of non-being. Nor does it follow that there must have been a time between those two instants, since real time is not a continuation of imaginary time.
Ad undecimum dicendum, quod illud quod fit ex nihilo, simul fit et factum est; et similiter est in omnibus mutationibus momentaneis; simul enim aer illuminatur et illuminatus est. Ipsum enim factum esse in talibus dicitur fieri, secundum quod est in primo instanti in quo factum est. Reply to the Eleventh Objection. That which is made from nothing becomes and is already made simultaneously: and the same applies to all instantaneous changes; thus the air is being illuminated and is actually illuminated at the same time. For in such things to become and to be already made are synonymous, in so far as a thing already is in the first instant of its making.
Vel potest dici quod id quod fit ex nihilo, dicitur fieri quando factum est non secundum motum, quod est ab uno termino in alterum, sed secundum effluxum ab agente in factum. Haec enim duo in generatione naturali inveniuntur, scilicet transitus de uno termino in alterum, et effluxus ab agente in factum, quorum alterum tantum proprie est in creatione. It may also be replied that a thing which is made from nothing is said to be in course of making when it is already made, not in respect of movement, which is from one term to another, but in respect of the outflow of the agent into the thing made. For these two are to be found in natural generation, namely transition from one term to another, and outflow of agent into the thing made, but the latter alone has a place in creation.
Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod neque materia neque forma neque accidens proprie dicuntur fieri; sed id quod fit est res subsistens. Cum enim fieri terminetur ad esse, proprie ei convenit fieri cui convenit per se esse, scilicet rei subsistenti: unde neque materia neque forma neque accidens proprie dicuntur creari, sed concreari. Proprie autem creatur res subsistens, quaecumque sit. Si tamen in hoc vis non fiat, tunc dicendum, quod materia prima habet similitudinem cum Deo in quantum participat de ente. Sicut enim lapis est similis Deo in quantum ens, licet non sit intellectualis sicut Deus, ita materia prima habet similitudinem cum Deo in quantum ens, non in quantum est ens actu. Nam ens, commune est quodammodo potentiae et actui. Reply to the Twelfth Objection. Properly speaking neither matter, nor form, nor accident are said to be made: but that which is made is the thing that subsists. For since to be made terminates in being, it belongs properly to that to which it belongs per se to be, namely to a subsistent thing: wherefore neither matter, nor form, nor accident are said properly speaking to be created, but to be concreated: whereas a subsistent thing, whatsoever it may be, is properly said to be created. Without, however, laying stress on this, we may reply that primal matter has a likeness to God in so far as it has a share of being. For even as a stone, as a being, is like God, although it has no intelligence as God has, so primal matter in so far as it has being and yet not actual being, is like God. Because being is, so to say, common to potentiality and act.
Et sic etiam patet responsio ad decimumtertium. Nam proprie loquendo, materia non habet ideam, sed compositum, cum idea sit forma factiva. Potest tamen dici esse aliquam ideam materiae secundum quod materia aliquo modo divinam essentiam imitatur. The reply to the Thirteenth Objection follows from this: because properly speaking there is no idea of matter but of the composite, since the idea is the form whereby something is made. Yet we may say that there is an idea of matter in so far as matter in a sense reflects the divine essence.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod non oportet, si duarum creaturarum est aliqua dignior, quod minus digna habeat aliquam imperfectionem: nam imperfectio designat carentiam alicuius quod natum est haberi vel debet haberi. Unde et in gloria, quamvis unus sanctorum alium excedat, nullus tamen imperfectus erit. Si tamen aliqua imperfectio in creaturis sit, non oportet quod sit ex Deo neque ex materia; sed in quantum creatura est ex nihilo. Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. If one of two creatures be inferior to the other, it does not follow that it is imperfect, because imperfection denotes the lack of something which is natural or due to a thing. Hence in heaven though one saint is above another, none will be imperfect. And if there be imperfection in creatures, it need not be ascribed to God or to matter, but to the fact that the creature is made from nothing.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod ex nihilo dicitur aliquid fieri sicut ex opposito secundum unum sensum superius expositum. Nec tamen oportet quod ex ente unius generis fiat ens alterius generis, sicut ex colore et figura; ens enim et non ens non possunt esse simul; color autem et figura simul esse possunt. In autem ex quo aliquid fit, debet esse in contingens ei quod fit, ut dicitur I Phys., quod non contingat simul esse. Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. A thing is said to be made from nothing as from an opposite, in the sense explained above. Yet it does not thereby follow that a being of one kind can be made from one of another kind, for instance, shape from colour: because being and non-being cannot possibly co-exist, whereas colour and shape can. On the other hand that wherefrom a thing is made must needs be in contact with the thing made, yet they are not simultaneous.
Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod si ly ex nominet causam, non fit aliquid ex opposito nisi per accidens, ratione scilicet subiecti. Si vero nominet ordinem, tunc fit aliquid ex opposito etiam per se; unde et privatio dicitur principium esse fiendi, sed non essendi. Hoc autem modo dicitur aliquid fieri ex nihilo, ut prius dictum est, in corp. art. Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. If from connotes causality, a thing is not made from its opposite except accidentally, that is by reason of the subject. If however it connotes order, a thing is made from its opposite even per se: hence privation is said to be the principle of a thing’s becoming but not of its being. It is in this sense, as stated above, that a thing is said to be made from nothing.
Ad decimumseptimum dicendum, quod Deus simul dans esse, producit id quod esse recipit: et sic non oportet quod agat ex aliquo praeexistenti. Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. God at the same time gives being and produces that which receives being, so that it does not follow that his action requires something already in existence.
Q. III:
ARTICLE II
Is Creation a Change?

[ Sum. Th. I, Q. xiv, A. 2, ad 2]
Secundo quaeritur utrum creatio sit mutatio. Et videtur quod sic. THE second point of inquiry is whether creation is a change: and seemingly the reply should be in the affirmative.
Mutatio enim secundum nomen suum designat hoc esse post hoc, ut patet V Phys. Sed hoc habet creatio: nam fit esse post non esse. Ergo creatio est mutatio. 1. Change denotes the succession of one being after another, as stated in Phys. v, i: and this is true of creation, which is the production of being after non-being. Therefore creation is a change.
Praeterea, omne quod fit, fit aliquo modo ex non ente; quia quod est, non fit. Sicut ergo se habet generatio, secundum quam fit res secundum partem substantiae suae, ad privationem formae, quae est non esse secundum quid; ita se habet creatio, per quam fit secundum totam substantiam suam, ad non esse simpliciter. Sed privatio proprie loquendo, est terminus generationis. Ergo et non esse simpliciter, proprie loquendo, est terminus creationis; et sic creatio, proprie loquendo, est mutatio. 2. Whatever is made, in a sense is made from non-being: since what is, is not being made. Consequently as generation (whereby a thing is made as to a part of its substance) is to the privation of the form (which privation is non-being in a certain respect), so is creation (whereby a thing is made as to its entire substance) to absolute non-being. Now properly speaking, privation is the term from which generation begins. Therefore properly speaking absolute nonbeing is the term from which creation begins; so that creation properly speaking is a change.
Praeterea, quanto est maior distantia inter terminos, tanto maior est mutatio. Maior enim est mutatio de albo in nigrum quam de albo in pallidum. Sed plus distat non ens simpliciter ab ente quam contrarium a contrario, vel non ens secundum quid ab ente. Ergo cum transitus de contrario in contrarium, vel de non ente secundum quid in ens, fit mutatio, multo magis transitus de non ente simpliciter in ens, quod est creatio, erit mutatio. 3. The greater the distance between the terms, the greater the change. Thus a change from white to black is greater than a change from white to pale. Now absolute non-being is more distant from being than one contrary from another, or than relative non-being from being. Therefore since transition from contrary to contrary, or from relative non-being to being is a change, much more is creation, a change, since it is the transition of absolute non-being into being.
Praeterea, quod non similiter habet se nunc et prius, mutatur vel movetur. Sed quod creatur non similiter se habet nunc et prius: quia prius erat simpliciter non ens, et postea fit ens. Ergo quod creatur, movetur vel mutatur. 4. That which is in a condition now otherwise than before is changed or moved. Now the creature is conditioned now otherwise than before: since formerly it was absolute nonbeing, and afterwards became a being. Therefore that which is created is changed or moved.
Praeterea, illud quod exit de potentia in actum, mutatur. Sed quod creatur, exit de potentia in actum; quia ante creationem erat tantum in potentia facientis, postea autem est in actu. Ergo quod creatur, movetur vel mutatur: ergo creatio est mutatio. 5. That which passes from potency to act is changed. Now the creature passes from potency to act: since before it was created it was only in the potency of the maker, and now it actually is. Hence that which is created is moved or changed, and consequently creation is a change.
Sed contra, species motus vel mutationis sunt sex, secundum philosophum in praedicamentis. Nulla autem earum est creatio ut patet per singula inducenti. Ergo creatio non est mutatio. On the contrary, according to the Philosopher (Categ. 14) in his work on the Categories, there are six kinds of movement or change: but none of them is creation, as one may see by taking them one by one. Therefore creation is not a change.
Respondeo. Dicendum, quod in mutatione qualibet requiritur quod sit aliquid idem commune utrique mutationis termino. Si enim termini mutationis oppositi in nullo eodem convenirent, non posset vocari transitus ex uno in alterum. In nomine enim mutationis et transitus designatur aliquid idem, aliter se habere nunc et prius; et etiam ipsi mutationis termini non sunt incontingentes, quod requiritur ad hoc ut sint mutationis termini, nisi in quantum referuntur ad idem. Nam duo contraria si ad diversa subiecta referantur, contingit simul esse. Quandoque ergo contingit quod utrique mutationis termino est unum commune subiectum actu existens; et tunc proprie est motus; sicut accidit in alteratione et augmento et diminutione et loci mutatione. Nam in omnibus his motibus subiectum unum et idem actu existens, de opposito in oppositum mutatur. Quandoque vero est idem commune subiectum utrique termino, non quidem ens actu, sed ens in potentia tantum, sicut accidit in generatione et corruptione simpliciter. Formae enim substantialis et privationis subiectum est materia prima, quae non est ens actu: unde nec generatio nec corruptio proprie dicuntur motus, sed mutationes quaedam. Quandoque vero non est aliquod subiectum commune neque actu neque potentia existens; sed est idem tempus continuum, in cuius prima parte est unum oppositum et in secunda aliud, ut cum dicimus hoc fieri ex hoc, id est post hoc, sicut ex mane fit meridies. Sed haec non proprie vocatur mutatio, sed per similitudinem, prout ipsum tempus imaginamur quasi subiectum eorum quae in tempore aguntur. In creatione autem non est aliquid commune aliquo praedictorum modorum. Neque enim est aliquod commune subiectum actu existens, neque potentia. Tempus etiam non est idem, si loquamur de creatione universi; nam ante mundum tempus non erat. Invenitur tamen aliquod commune subiectum esse secundum imaginationem tantum, prout scilicet imaginamur unum tempus commune dum mundus non erat, et postquam mundus in esse productus est. Sicut enim extra universum non est aliqua realis magnitudo, possumus tamen eam imaginari; ita et ante principium mundi non fuit aliquod tempus, quamvis sit possibile ipsum imaginari: et quantum ad hoc creatio secundum veritatem, proprie loquendo, non habet rationem mutationis, sed solum secundum imaginationem quamdam; non proprie, sed similitudinarie. I answer that in every change there needs to be something common to either term thereof: because if the opposite terms of a change had nothing in common, it could not be defined as a transition from one thing to another. For change and transition signify that one same thing is otherwise now than before. Moreover the very terms of a change are not incompatible except in so far as they are referred to one same thing: because two contraries if referred to different subjects can exist simultaneously. Accordingly there is sometimes one actually existent common subject of both terms of a change, and then we have movement properly so called, an example of which we have in alteration, increase and decrease, and local movement. In all such movements the one subject while actually remaining the same is changed from one contrary to another. Sometimes again we find the one subject common to either term, yet it is not an actual but only a potential being, as is the case in simple generation and corruption. For the subject of the substantial form and of the privation thereof is primal matter which is not an actual being: wherefore neither generation nor corruption are movements properly so called, but a kind of change. And sometimes there is no common subject actually or potentially existent: but there is the one continuous time, in the first part of which we find the one contrary, and in the second part the other: as when we say that this thing is made from that, namely after that, for instance, from the morning comes noon. This, however, is a change not properly but metaphorically speaking, forasmuch as we imagine time as being the subject of those things that take place in time. Now in creation there is nothing common in the ways above mentioned: for there is no common subject actually or potentially existent. Again there is no continuous time, if we refer to the creation of the universe, since there was no time when there was no world. And yet we may find a common but purely imaginary subject, in so far as we imagine one common time when there was no world and afterwards when the world had been brought into being. For even as outside the universe there is no real magnitude, we can nevertheless picture one to ourselves: so before the beginning of the world there was no time and yet we can imagine one. Accordingly creation is not in truth a change, but only in imagination, and not properly speaking but metaphorically.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod mutatio secundum suum nomen designat hoc esse post hoc circa aliquid idem, ut praedictum est, in corp. art. Hoc autem in creatione non est. Reply to the First Objection. As stated above, the word change denotes the existence of one thing after another in connection with one same subject: but this is not the case in creation.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod in generatione, secundum quam fit aliquid secundum partem substantiae suae, est aliquid commune subiectum privationi et formae, et non est in actu existens: et ideo sicut proprie ibi accipitur terminus, sic etiam et proprie accipitur ibi transitus; quod in creatione non est. Reply to the Second Objection. In generation whereby a thing is made in respect of part of its substance, there is a common subject of privation and form, that is not actually existent: wherefore, just as in generation we find a term properly speaking, so also properly speaking do we find transition: but it is not so with creation, as stated above.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod ubi est maior distantia terminorum, est maior mutatio, supposita identitate subiecti. Reply to the Third Objection. It is true that the greater the distance the greater the change, provided that the subject is identical.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod id quod non similiter se habet nunc et prius, mutatur, supposita consistentia subiecti: alias non ens simpliciter mutaretur; quia non ens simpliciter, non similiter se habet nunc et prius, neque dissimiliter. Oportet autem ad hoc quod sit mutatio, quod sit aliquid idem dissimiliter se habens nunc et prius. Reply to the Fourth Objection. That which is otherwise now than it was before is changed, provided the subject remains: else absolute non-being would be changed, because it is neither the same as nor otherwise than it was before. And in order that there be a change, one same thing must be otherwise than it was before.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod potentia passiva est subiectum mutationis, non autem activa; et ideo quod exit de potentia passiva in actum, mutatur, non autem quod de potentia activa exit: et ideo non valet obiectio. Reply to the Fifth Objection. Passive and not active power is the subject of change: hence that which proceeds from passive power into act is changed, but not that which proceeds from an active power: and so the objection proves nothing.
Q. III:
ARTICLE III
Is Creation Something Real in the Creature, and If So, What Is It?

[ Sum. Th. I, Q. xiv, A. 3]
Tertio quaeritur utrum creatio sit aliquid realiter in creatura, et si est, quid sit. Et videtur quod non sit aliquid reale in creatura. THE third point of inquiry is whether creation be anything real in the creature, and if so what is it? Seemingly it is not anything real in the creature.
Ut enim dicitur in libro de causis, omne quod recipitur in aliquo, est in eo per modum recipientis. Sed actio Dei creantis recipitur simpliciter in non ente: quia Deus creando ex nihilo aliquid facit. Ergo creatio nihil reale ponit in creatura. 1. As stated in De Causis (prop. x) whatever is received into a thing is therein according to the mode of the recipient. Now the creative action of God is received in absolute nonbeing, since in creating God makes a thing from nothing. Therefore creation places nothing real in the creature.
Praeterea, omne quod est in rerum natura, aut est creator aut creatura. Sed creatio non est creator, quia sic esset ab aeterno; nec etiam creatura, quia aliqua creatione crearetur; quae etiam creatio, aliqua creatione indigeret creari, et sic in infinitum. Ergo creatio non est aliquid in rerum natura. 2. All that is real is either God or a creature. Now creation is not the Creator, else it would be eternal: nor is it a creature, since then it would need to be created by another creative act: and this creature again would need to be created by yet another creative act, and so on indefinitely. Therefore creation is not a real thing.
Praeterea, omne quod est, vel est substantia vel accidens. Sed creatio non est substantia, cum non sit nec materia neque forma neque compositum, ut de facili patere potest: nec etiam accidens, quia accidens sequitur suum subiectum; creatio autem est naturaliter prior creato, quod nullum sibi supponit subiectum. Ergo creatio non est aliquid in rerum natura. 3. Whatever is is either substance or accident. But creation is not a substance, for it is neither matter nor form nor composite, as can easily be proved. Nor is it an accident, for an accident is subsequent to its subject, whereas creation is naturally prior to its subject, since it presupposes no subject. Therefore creation is nothing real in things.
Praeterea, sicut se habet generatio ad rem generatam, ita se habet creatio ad rem creatam. Sed generationis subiectum non est res generata, sed magis terminus; subiectum vero eius est materia prima, ut dicitur in de Generat. et Corrupt. Ergo nec subiectum creationis est res creata. Nec potest dici quod subiectum eius sit aliqua materia, cum res creata non creetur ex aliqua materia. Ergo creatio non habet subiectum aliquod, et ita non est accidens. Constat autem quod non est substantia. Ergo non est aliquid in rerum natura. 4. As generation is to the thing generated, so is creation to the thing created. But the subject of generation is not the thing generated, but its term; its subject is primal matter (De Generat. et Corrupt. x, i). Neither therefore is the thing created the subject of creation. Nor can it be said that its subject is some matter, since the creature is not created from any matter. Therefore creation has no subject, and hence it is not an accident: and it is clear that it is not a substance. Therefore it is nothing real in things.
Praeterea, si creatio est aliquid in rerum natura, cum non sit mutatio, ut supra dictum est, maxime videtur esse relatio. Sed non est relatio, cum in nulla relationis specie contineri possit. Simpliciter enim non enti, ex quo est relatio, ens simpliciter neque supponitur neque aequatur. Ergo creatio non est aliquid in rerum natura. 5. If creation be something real in a thing, since it is not a change, as proved above, it would seem most likely that it is a relation. But it is not a relation, since it cannot belong to any of the species of relation: because absolute being is neither subject nor equal to absolute non-being whence such relation would proceed. Therefore creation is nothing real in a thing.
Praeterea, si creatio importet relationem entis creati ad Deum a quo esse habet; cum ista relatio semper maneat in creatura, non solum quando incipit esse, sed quamdiu res est; continue aliquid crearetur: quod videtur absurdum. Ergo creatio non est relatio: et sic idem quod prius. 6. If creation implies a relation of the creature to God from whom it has its being: since such relation remains ever in the creature, not only when the latter begins to be, but as long as it exists, something would be continually created; which would seem absurd. Hence creation is not a relation, and the same conclusion follows as before.
Praeterea, omnis relatio realiter in rebus existens, acquiritur ex aliquo quod est diversum ab ipsa relatione, sicut aequalitas a quantitate, et similitudo a qualitate. Si ergo creatio sit aliqua relatio in creatura realiter existens, oportet quod differat ab eo ex quo acquiritur relatio. Hoc autem est quod per creationem accipitur. Sequitur ergo quod ipsa creatio non sit per creationem accepta; et ita sequitur quod sit aliquid increatum: quod est impossibile. 7. Every relation that exists really in things derives from something distinct from that relation, for instance, equality results from quantity, and likeness from quality. If then creation be a relation really existing in the creature, it must needs be distinct from the source whence it flows. Yet this is that which is received through creation. But it would follow that creation is not received by the creative act, and consequently that it, is something uncreated: which is impossible.
Praeterea, omnis mutatio reducitur ad illud genus ad quod terminatur, sicut alteratio ad qualitatem, et augmentum ad quantitatem; et propter hoc dicitur, in III Phys., quod quot sunt species entis, tot sunt species motus. Sed creatio terminatur ad substantiam; nec tamen potest dici quod sit in genere substantiae, ut supra, argum. 3, dictum est. Ergo non videtur quod sit aliquid secundum rem. 8. Every change is reduced to the genus which is its term, for instance, alteration is referred to quality, increase to quantity: and for this reason it is stated in Phys. III, I, that there are as many kinds of movement as there are of being. Now creation terminates in substance, and yet cannot be said, to belong to the genus of substance, as was proved above (Obj. 3). Therefore seemingly it is nothing real.
Sed contra. Si creatio non est aliqua res, ergo nec aliquid realiter creatur. Hoc autem apparet esse falsum. Ergo creatio aliquid est in rerum natura. On the contrary, if creation is nothing real, nothing is really created. Now this is clearly false. Therefore creation is something real.
Praeterea, ex hoc Deus est dominus creaturae, quia eam creando in esse produxit. Sed dominium est quaedam relatio realiter in creatura existens. Ergo multo fortius creatio. Again, God is Lord of the creature because he brought it into being by creating it. Now dominion implies a real relation in the creature. Much more therefore does creation.
Respondeo. Dicendum quod quidam dixerunt creationem aliquid esse in rerum natura medium inter creatorem et creaturam. Et quia medium neutrum extremorum est, ideo sequebatur quod creatio neque esset creator neque creatura. Sed hoc a magistris erroneum est iudicatum, cum omnis res quocumque modo existens non habeat esse nisi a Deo, et sic est creatura. I answer that some have said that creation is something real between the Creator and the creature. And since the mean is neither of the extremes, it would follow that creation is neither the Creator nor the creature. But the Masters judged this to savour of error, since everything that in any way exists has its existence not otherwise than from God, and consequently is a creature.
Et ideo alii dixerunt, quod ipsa creatio non ponit aliquid realiter ex parte creaturae. Sed hoc etiam videtur inconveniens. Nam in omnibus quae secundum respectum ad invicem referuntur, quorum unum ab altero dependet, et non e converso, in eo quod ab altero dependet, relatio realiter invenitur, in altero vero secundum rationem tantum; sicut patet in scientia et scibili, ut dicit philosophus. Creatura autem secundum nomen refertur ad creatorem. Dependet autem creatura a creatore, et non e converso. Unde oportet quod relatio qua creatura ad creatorem refertur, sit realis; sed in Deo est relatio secundum rationem tantum. Et hoc expresse dicit Magister in I Sent. distinct. 30. Wherefore others said that creation itself does not posit anything real on the part of the creature. But this would also seem unreasonable. Because in all those things that are referred the one to the other, the one depending on the other but not conversely, there is a real relation in the one that is dependent, and in the other there is a logical relation, as in the case of knowledge and the thing known, according to the teaching of the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 15). Now the creature by its very name is referred to the Creator: and depends on the Creator who does not depend on it. Wherefore the relation whereby the creature is referred to the Creator must be a real relation, while in God it is only a logical relation. The Master says this expressly (I., D. 30).
Et ideo dicendum est, quod creatio potest sumi active et passive. Si sumatur active, sic designat Dei actionem, quae est eius essentia, cum relatione ad creaturam; quae non est realis relatio, sed secundum rationem tantum. Si autem passive accipiatur, cum creatio, sicut iam supra dictum est, proprie loquendo non sit mutatio, non potest dici quod sit aliquid in genere passionis, sed est in genere relationis. Quod sic patet. In omni vera mutatione et motu invenitur duplex processus. Unus ab uno termino motus in alium, sicut ab albedine in nigredinem; alius ab agente in patiens, sicut a faciente in factum. Sed hi processus non similiter se habent in ipso moveri, et in termino motus. Nam ipso moveri, id quod movetur recedit ab uno termino motus et accedit ad alterum; quod non est in termino motus; ut patet in eo quod movetur de albedine in nigredinem: quia in ipso termino motus iam non accedit in nigredinem, sed incipit esse nigrum. Similiter dum est in ipso moveri, patiens vel factum transmutatur ab agente; cum autem est in termino motus, non ulterius transmutatur ab agente, sed consequitur factum quamdam relationem ad agentem, prout habet esse ab ipso, et prout est ei simile quoquomodo, sicut in termino generationis humanae consequitur natus filiationem. Creatio autem, sicut dictum est, non potest accipi ut moveri, quod est ante terminum motus, sed accipitur ut in facto esse; unde in ipsa creatione non importatur aliquis accessus ad esse, nec transmutatio a creante, sed solummodo inceptio essendi, et relatio ad creatorem a quo esse habet; et sic creatio nihil est aliud realiter quam relatio quaedam ad Deum cum novitate essendi. We must accordingly say that creation may be taken actively or passively. Taken actively it denotes the act of God, which is his essence, together with a relation to the creature: and this is not a real but only a logical relation. But taken passively, since, as we have already said, it is not properly speaking a change, it must be said to belong, not to the genus of passion, but to that of relation. This is proved as follows. In every real change and movement there is a twofold process. One is from one term of movement to the other, for instance from whiteness to blackness: the other is from the agent to the patient, for instance from the maker to the thing made. These processes however differ from each other while the movement is in progress, and when the term has been reached. While the movement is in progress, the thing moved is receding from one term and approaching the other: which does not apply when the term has been reached: as may be seen in that which is moved from whiteness to blackness, for at the term of the movement it no longer approaches to blackness, but begins to be black. Likewise while it is in movement the patient or the thing made is being changed by the agent: but when it is at the term of the movement, it is no longer being changed by the agent: but acquires a certain relation to the agent, inasmuch as it has its being therefrom, and is in some way like unto it: thus at the term of human generation the offspring acquires sonship. Now creation, as stated above (A. 2), cannot be taken for a movement of the creature previous to its reaching the term of movement, but denotes the accomplished fact. Wherefore creation does not denote an approach to being, nor a change effected by the Creator, but merely a beginning of existence, and a relation to the Creator from whom the creature receives its being. Consequently creation is really nothing but a relation of the creature to the Creator together with a beginning of existence.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in creatione non ens non se habet sicut recipiens divinam actionem, sed id quod creatum est, ut supra dictum est. Reply to the First Objection. In creation the recipient of the divine action is not non-being but that which is created, as stated above.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod creatio active accepta significat divinam actionem cum quadam relatione cointellecta, et sic est increatum; accepta vero passive, sicut dictum est, realiter relatio quaedam est significata per modum mutationis ratione novitatis vel inceptionis importatae. Haec autem relatio, creatura quaedam est, accepto communiter nomine creaturae pro omni eo quod est a Deo. Nec oportet procedere in infinitum, quia creationis relatio non refertur ad Deum alia relatione reali, sed seipsa. Nulla enim relatio refertur alia relatione, ut Avicenna dicit in sua Metaph. Si vero nomen creaturae accipiamus magis stricte pro eo tantum quod subsistit (quod proprie fit et creatur, sicut proprie habet esse), tunc relatio praedicta non est quoddam creatum, sed concreatum, sicut nec est ens proprie loquendo, sed inhaerens. Et simile est de omnibus accidentibus. Reply to the Second Objection. Creation taken actively denotes the divine action to which the mind attaches a certain relation, and thus it is uncreated: but taken passively as stated above, it is a real relation signified after the manner of a change on account of the newness or beginning that it implies. Now this relation is a kind of creature, taking creature in a broad sense for anything that comes from God. Nor is it necessary to proceed to infinity, since the relation of creation is not referred to God by another real relation but by itself: because no relation is related by another relation, as Avicenna says (Metaph. iii, 10). If, however, we take creature in a stricter sense for that only which subsists (which properly speaking is made and created, even as properly speaking it has being), then the aforesaid relation is not a created thing, but is concreated; even as properly speaking it is not a being, but something inherent. The same applies to all accidents.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod illa relatio accidens est, et secundum esse suum considerata, prout inhaeret subiecto, posterius est quam res creata; sicut accidens subiecto, intellectu et natura, posterius est; quamvis non sit tale accidens quod causetur ex principiis subiecti. Si vero consideretur secundum suam rationem, prout ex actione agentis innascitur praedicta relatio, sic est quodammodo prior subiecto, sicut ipsa divina actio, est eius causa proxima. Reply to the Third Objection. This relation is an accident, and considered in its being, inasmuch as it adheres to a subject, is subsequent to the thing created: even so an accident both logically and naturally is subsequent to its subject: although it is not an accident such as is caused by the principles of its subject. If, however, we consider it from the point of view of its arising from the action of the agent, then the aforesaid relation is after a fashion prior to its subject, because like the divine act itself it is the proximate cause thereof.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod in generatione est et mutatio et relatio, qua refertur genitum ad generans. Ratione ergo mutationis non habet pro subiecto ipsum generatum, sed eius materiam; sed ratione relationis habet subiectum ipsum generatum. In creatione vero est relatio, sed non mutatio proprie, ut dictum est; et ideo non est simile. Reply to the Fourth Objection. In generation there is both change and a relation whereby the thing generated is referred to the generator. Considered from the point of view of change its subject is not the thing generated but the matter thereof: but considered as implying a relation its subject is the thing generated. On the other hand in creation there is a relation, but there is not a change properly speaking, as already stated: hence the comparison fails.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod relatio praedicta non est intelligenda entis ad non ens; quia talis relatio non potest esse realis, ut Avicenna dicit, sed est entis creati ad creatorem; unde patet quod est relatio suppositionis. Reply to the Fifth Objection. This relation is not to be taken as existing between being and non-being, for such a relation cannot be real, as Avicenna says (Metaph. iii.), but as between a being and its Creator: wherefore it is clear that it is a relation of subjection.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod creatio importat relationem praedictam cum novitate essendi; unde non oportet quod res, quandocumque est, creetur, licet semper referatur ad Deum: quamvis non esset inconveniens dicere quod sicut aer quamdiu lucet, illuminetur a sole, ita creatura, quamdiu habet esse, fiat a Deo, ut etiam Augustinus dicit super Genes. ad Litt. Sed in hoc non est diversitas nisi secundum nomen, prout nomen creationis potest accipi cum novitate, vel sine. Reply to the Sixth Objection. Creation denotes this relation together with inception of existence: hence it does not follow that a thing, whenever it may be, is being created, although its relation to God ever remains. Yet even as the air as long as it is light is illuminated by the sun, so may we say with Augustine (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) that the creature, as long as it is in being, is made by God. But this is only a distinction of words, inasmuch as creation may be understood with newness of existence or without.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod id ex quo acquiritur relatio creationis principaliter, est res subsistens, a qua differt ipsa creationis relatio, quae et ipsa creatura est; et non principaliter, sed quasi secundario, sicut quid concreatum. Reply to the Seventh Objection. That from which the creative relation derives chiefly is the subsistent being, from which that relation, itself a creature, differs, not principally but secondarily as it were, as something concreated.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod motus reducitur ad genus sui termini, in quantum proceditur de potentia in actum: nam in ipso motu terminus motus est in potentia, et potentia et actus reducuntur ad idem genus. In creatione autem non est exitus de potentia in actum; et ideo non est simile. Reply to the Eighth Objection. Movement is reduced to the genus of its term, in so far as there is a process from potency to act; since during the movement the term thereof is potential, and potency and act belong to the same genus. But in creation there is no process from potency to act; wherefore the comparison fails.
Q. III:
ARTICLE IV
Is the Creative Power or Act Communicable to a Creature?

[ Sum. Th. I, Q. xi. A. 5]
Quarto quaeritur utrum potentia creandi sit alicui creaturae communicabilis, vel etiam actus creationis. Et videtur quod sic. THE fourth point of inquiry is whether the creative power or act be communicable to a creature. And seemingly it is.
Eodem enim modo et ordine quo res exeunt a primo principio, reordinantur in ultimum finem, cum idem sit primum principium et ultimus rerum finis. Sed inferiores creaturae ordinantur in Deum sicut in finem mediantibus superioribus creaturis; quia, sicut Dionysius dicit, lex divinitatis est, per prima, ultima ad se adducere. Ergo et creaturae inferiores exeunt a primo principio per creationem mediantibus superioribus creaturis; et ita creationis actus creaturae communicatur. 1. The same manner and order in which things flow from their first principle is observed in their direction to their last end, since their first principle is the same as their last end. Now the lower creatures are directed to God as their end by means of the higher creatures, because as Dionysius s says (Coel. Hier. v. i) it is a rule of the Godhead to draw to himself the last things through the first. Therefore the lower creatures also flow from their first principle through creation by means of the higher creatures, so that the creative act is communicated to the creature.
Praeterea, illud quod communicatum creaturae non trahit ipsam extra terminos creaturae, est alicui creaturae communicabile per potentiam creatoris, qui potest etiam nova genera condere creaturarum. Sed posse creare, si creaturae communicaretur, non poneret ipsam extra terminos creaturae. Ergo posse creare est creaturae communicabile. Probatio mediae. Illud dicitur extra terminos creaturae rem aliquam ponere quod rationi creaturae repugnat. Posse autem creare non repugnat rationi creaturae, nisi propter infinitatem virtutis quae videtur ad creationem requiri. Non autem requiritur, ut videtur; nam unumquodque tantum distat ab uno oppositorum quantum de natura alterius participat. Tantum enim aliquid est album, quantum distat a nigro. Ens autem creatum finite participat naturam entis. Ergo finite distat a non esse simpliciter. Educere autem aliquid in esse ex distantia finita, non demonstrat potentiam infinitam; et sic relinquitur quod potentiae finitae possit esse creationis actus; et sic posse creare rationi creaturae non repugnat, nec ponit ipsam extra terminos creaturae. 2. Whatsoever can be communicated to a creature without taking it outside the bounds of a creature is communicable to a creature by the power of the Creator, who is able to create even new kinds of creatures. Now the power to create if communicated to a creature would not place the creature outside its bounds. Therefore the creative power is communicable to a creature. The minor is proved as follows. To place a creature outside its bounds is to attribute something that is incompatible with the notion of being created. Now it is not incompatible with the notion of being created that a creature be able to create, unless because it would seem to need an infinite power in order to create. But it would not need such a power, as it seems: since a thing is as distant from one of two opposites as it shares in the nature of the other: thus the further a thing is from being black the more white it is. Now the creature has a finite share in the nature of being: wherefore its distance from absolute non-being is also finite. And the bringing of a thing into being from a finite distance is not a proof of infinite power; wherefore the creative act can proceed from a finite power, and consequently the creative power is not incompatible with the notion of being created, nor does it place the creature beyond its bounds.
Sed diceretur, quod hoc quod dicitur, quod unumquodque tantum distat ab uno oppositorum quantum participat de alio, locum habet in illis oppositis quorum utrumque est natura quaedam, sicut sunt contraria; non autem in illis quorum alterum tantum est natura, sicut in privatione et habitu, affirmatione et negatione.- Sed contra, praedicta oppositio locum habet in contrariis secundum hoc quod ad invicem distant; quod quidem eis competit in quantum opposita sunt. Sed causa oppositionis in contrariis et radix, est oppositio affirmationis et negationis, ut probatur. Ergo in oppositione affirmationis et negationis maxime debet locum habere. 3. Regarding the statement just made that a thing is as distant from one opposite as it shares in the nature of the other, it might be remarked that this is true when both opposites are natures, such as contraries are, but not when one is a nature and the other not, as privation and habit, affirmation and negation.—On the contrary, the opposition in question is between contraries in the point of their being distant from each other, and this belongs to them inasmuch as they are opposites. Now the cause and root of opposition in contraries is the opposition of affirmation and negation (Metaph. iv, 6). Therefore the above statement is especially true of the opposition of affirmation and negation.
Praeterea, secundum Augustinum tripliciter res fieri dicuntur. Uno modo in verbo, alio modo in angelica cognitione, et tertio modo in propria natura. Propter quod Genes., I, 1-2, dicit: dixit, fiat, et factum est. Modus autem quo res dicuntur in angelica intelligentia fieri, medius est inter illos duos modos. Ergo videtur quod res creatae procedant ut sint in propria natura a verbo creatoris cognitione angelica mediante; et sic videtur quod mediantibus Angelis res creentur. 4. According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8) things are said to be made in three ways: in the Word, in the angelic intelligence, in their own nature. Wherefore it is said (Gen. i) : He said: Be made, and it was made. Now the manner in which things were made in the angelic intelligence comes between the other two ways. Therefore seemingly creatures come into being in their own nature from the Word of the Creator through the medium of the angelic knowledge: so that they could be created by means of the angels.
Praeterea, nihil et aliquid plus distant quam aliquid et esse, cum nihil et aliquid nihil habeant commune, aliquid autem sit entis pars. Deus autem facit creando, ut quod nihil erat, aliquid fiat, et per consequens quod nulla potentia fiat aliqua potentia. Ergo multo amplius facere potest quod aliqua potentia terminata, cuiusmodi est potentia creaturae, fiat omnipotentia, cuius est creare. Et sic communicari potest creaturae quod creet. 5. Nothing and something are more distant than something and being, since nothing and something have nought in common, whereas something is a part of being. Now God by creating makes that which was nothing to become something, and consequently that there be power where before there was no power. Much more then can he make a limited power such as that of a creature to have omnipotence whereby things are created. Therefore he can communicate to a creature the act of creation.
Praeterea, lux spiritualis est nobilior et potentior quam corporalis. Sed lux corporalis se ipsam multiplicat. Ergo Angelus, qui est lux spiritualis secundum Augustinum, potest se ipsum multiplicare. Sed hoc non potest facere nisi creando. Ergo Angelus potest creare. 6. Spiritual light is more excellent and more powerful than material light. Now material light multiplies itself. Therefore an angel who is spiritual light according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22) is able to multiply himself. But he cannot do this except by creating. Therefore an angel can create.
Praeterea, cum formae substantiales non generentur, eo quod solum compositum generatur, ut probat philosophus, non possunt deduci in esse nisi per creationem. Sed natura creata disponit materiam ad formam. Ergo ministerio aliquid operatur ad creationem; et sic communicari potest creaturae, quod habeat in creatione ministerium. 7. Substantial forms are not generated, since the composite alone is generated as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii, 8, 9), wherefore they cannot be brought into being except by creation. Now created nature disposes matter for its form. Therefore it co-operates in creation ministerially; and consequently a creature can receive the power to help in the work of creation.
Praeterea, opus iustificationis est nobilius quam creationis, cum gratia sit supra naturam. Unde et Augustinus dicit quod maius est iustificare impium quam creare caelum et terram. Sed in iustificatione impii ministerium exhibet creatura: sacerdos enim dicitur ut minister iustificare, sive peccata remittere. Ergo multo magis potest creatura ministerium exhibere in creationis actu. 8. The work of justification ranks higher than the work of creation, forasmuch as grace surpasses nature. Hence Augustine says (Tract. lxxii, 3, in Joan.) that the justification of a sinner is a greater work than the creation of heaven and earth. Now the creature renders service in the justification of a sinner: since the priest is said to justify or forgive sins ministerially. Much more therefore can a creature administer in the act of creation.
Praeterea, oportet omne factum simile esse agenti, ut probatur in VII Metaph. Sed creatura corporalis non est similis Deo neque specie neque genere. Ergo non potest a Deo per creationem procedere nisi mediante aliqua creatura, quae sit similis saltem in genere; et sic videtur quod res corporales creentur a Deo mediantibus superioribus creaturis. 9. Every made thing must be like the agent, as is proved in Metaph. vii, 8. Now the corporeal creature-is not like God either specifically or generically. Therefore it cannot come from God by creation except by means of a creature like unto it at least in genus: and consequently it would seem that corporeal creatures are created by God by means of the higher creatures.
Praeterea, in Lib. de causis dicitur, quod illa quae est intelligentia secunda, non recipit ex bonitatibus primis, quae procedunt ex causa prima, nisi mediante intelligentia superiori. Sed de primis bonitatibus est ipsum esse. Ergo intelligentia secunda non recipit esse a Deo nisi mediante intelligentia prima; et sic videtur quod Deus actum creationis alicui creaturae communicet. 10. It is stated in De Causis (prop. xix) that the second intelligence does not receive of the higher goods which come from the first cause, save through the medium of the higher intelligence. Now being is one of the higher goods. Therefore the second intelligence does not receive its being from God except through the first intelligence: so that seemingly God communicates the creative act to a creature.
Praeterea, in eodem Lib. dicitur, quod intelligentia scit quod sub se est, per modum substantiae suae, in quantum est ei causa. Sed una intelligentia cognoscit intelligentiam aliam quae est sub ipsa: ergo est eius causa. Sed non causatur nisi per creationem, cum non sit composita. Ergo intelligentia creare potest. 11. In the same work (prop. viii) it is stated that an intelligence knows what is beneath it after the manner of its substance inasmuch as it is its cause. Now one intelligence understands another that is beneath it: therefore it is its cause. But an intelligence, since it is not composite, is not caused otherwise than by creation. Therefore an intelligence can create.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, quod creatura spiritualis communicat corporali speciem et esse; et sic videtur quod creaturae corporales creentur mediantibus spiritualibus. 12. Augustine says (De immortal. anim. xvi) that the spiritual creature gives species and being to the corporeal creature: and so it would seem that corporeal creatures are created by means of the spiritual.
Praeterea, duplex est cognitionis genus; una siquidem cognitio est ad rem, et alia quae est a rebus. Angelus autem cognoscit res corporales non cognitione quae est a rebus, cum careat potentiis sensitivis, quibus mediantibus pervenit cognitio sensibilium ad intellectum. Ergo cognoscit res cognitione quae est ad rem, quae est similis divinae cognitioni. Sicut ergo Deus per suam scientiam est causa rerum, ita et scientia Angeli rerum causa esse videtur. 13. Knowledge is twofold, that from which things derive (ad rem) and that which is derived from things (a rebus). Now an angel’s knowledge of corporeal things is not derived from things, since he has no sensitive faculties which are the channels through which the intellect derives its knowledge of sensible objects. Hence he knows things by knowledge from which things derive, which is like God’s. Therefore as God is the cause of things by his knowledge, so seemingly the angelic knowledge is the cause of things.
Praeterea, duplex est modus quo res in esse exeunt: unus secundum quod exeunt de puro non esse in esse, quod fit per creationem: alius secundum quod exeunt de potentia in actum. Virtus autem materialis, quae est rerum naturalium, potest res producere modo secundo, scilicet extrahendo res de potentia in actum. Ergo virtus immaterialis, quae est potentior, qualis est virtus Angeli, potest aliquid producere in esse modo primo, quod est maioris virtutis, scilicet de puro non esse in esse, quod est creare; et sic videtur quod Angelus possit creare. 14. Things come into being in two ways; first through issuing from absolute non-being into being by creation; secondly through issuing from potency into act. Now the material forces of nature can produce things in the second way, namely by drawing them out of potency into act. Therefore an immaterial force which is more powerful, such as that of an angel, can bring a thing into being in the first way which belongs to the greater power, namely by producing it from absolute non-being, which is to create: and so it would seem that an angel can create.
Praeterea, infinito non est maius aliquid. Sed infinitae potentiae est educere aliquid de nihilo in esse: alias nihil prohiberet creaturas creare. Nulla ergo potentia potest esse maior quam ista. Et sic non est maius facere creaturam ex nihilo et dare ei potentiam creandi quam creare. Primum autem Deus potest. Ergo et secundum. 15. Nothing surpasses the infinite. Now it requires an infinite power to produce a thing out, of nothing, otherwise there would be no reason why creatures should not create. Wherefore no other power can surpass it: so that to produce a creature out of nothing and give it the power to create is no more than to create. Now God can do the latter: wherefore he can also do the former.
Praeterea, quanto maior est resistentia patientis ad agens, tanto maior est difficultas in agendo. Sed contrarium magis resistit quam non ens; non ens enim agere non potest sicut agit contrarium. Cum ergo creatura possit aliquid ex contrario facere, videtur quod multo magis possit aliquid facere ex nihilo, quod est creare. Ergo potest creatura creare. 16. The greater the resistance offered by the patient to the agent, the greater the difficulty encountered by the agent. Now a contrary offers more resistance than a nonbeing: since a non-being cannot act as a contrary can. Since then a creature is able to make a thing from its contrary, much more seemingly should it be able to make something out of nothing, which is to create. Therefore a creature can create.
Sed contra. Ens et non ens in infinitum distant. Sed operari aliquid ex distantia infinita est infinitae virtutis. Ergo creare est infinitae virtutis; et ita non potest alicui creaturae communicari. On the contrary being and non-being are infinitely apart. Now an infinite power is required to operate at an infinite distance. Therefore an infinite power is required to create: so that the creative power cannot be communicated to a creature.
Praeterea, superiores creaturae ut Angeli, secundum Dionysium dividuntur in essentiam, virtutem, et operationem: ex quo haberi potest quod nullius creaturae virtus est sua essentia, et sic nulla creatura agit se tota, cum id quo res agit sit virtus eius. Sed secundum quod agens agit, effectus agitur. Ergo nulla creatura potest aliquem effectum totum producere; et sic non potest creare, sed semper in sua actione materiam praesupponit. Again, according to Dionysius (Coelest. Hier. xi) the higher creatures such as the angels are divided into essence, power and operation: whence we may conclude that no creature’s power is its essence: so that no creature acts of its whole self, since that by which a thing acts is its power. Now the production of the effect corresponds to the act of the agent. Therefore no creature is able to produce an effect in its entirety, and consequently it cannot create, but always presupposes matter for its action.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, quod Angeli non possunt esse creatores alicuius rei, nec boni nec mali. Inter ceteras vero creaturas Angelus est nobilior. Ergo multo minus aliqua alia creatura potest creare. Moreover, Augustine (De Trin. iii, 8, 9) says that angels cannot create anything, be they good or bad. Now of all creatures the angels rank highest: much less then can any other creature create.
Praeterea, eiusdem virtutis est creare et creaturas in esse conservare. Sed creaturae non possunt in esse conservari nisi per virtutem divinam, quae si se rebus subtraheret, in momento deficerent, secundum Augustinum. Ergo res non possunt creari nisi per virtutem divinam. Again, it belongs to the same power to create and to preserve creatures in being. Now creatures cannot be preserved in being save by the divine power, since if it withdrew from things they would at once cease to be, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 12). Therefore things cannot be created except by the divine power.
Praeterea, illud quod est alicuius proprie proprium, alteri convenire non potest. Sed creare dicitur communiter proprium esse Deo. Ergo creare non potest alteri convenire. Again, that which belongs strictly to one thing cannot be appropriate to another. Now it is generally agreed that to create belongs to God, Therefore to create cannot be appropriate to a creature.
Respondeo. Dicendum, quod quorumdam philosophorum fuit positio, quod Deus creavit creaturas inferiores mediantibus superioribus, ut patet in Lib. de causis; et in Metaphys. Avicennae, et Algazelis, et movebantur ad hoc opinandum propter quod credebant quod ab uno simplici non posset immediate nisi unum provenire, et illo mediante ex uno primo multitudo procedebat. Hoc autem dicebant, ac si Deus ageret per necessitatem naturae, per quem modum ex uno simplici non fit nisi unum. Nos autem ponimus, quod a Deo procedunt res per modum scientiae et intellectus, secundum quem modum nihil prohibet ab uno primo et simplici Deo multitudinem immediate provenire, secundum quod sua sapientia continet universa. Et ideo secundum fidem Catholicam ponimus, quod omnes substantias spirituales et materiam corporalium Deus immediate creavit, haereticum reputantes si dicatur per Angelum vel aliquam creaturam aliquid esse creatum; unde Damascenus dicit: quicumque dixerit Angelum aliquid creare, anathema sit. Quidam tamen Catholici tractatores dixerunt quod, etsi nulla creatura possit aliquid creare, communicari tamen potuit creaturae ut per eius ministerium Deus aliquid crearet. Et hoc ponit Magister in 5 dist., IV libro Sentent. Quidam vero e contrario dicunt, quod nullo modo creaturae communicari potuit ut aliquid crearet; quod etiam communius tenetur. I answer that, certain philosophers held that God created the lower creatures through the instrumentality of the higher (De Causis, prop. x; Avicenna, Metaph. ix, 4; Algazel). They were led t this conclusion through supposing that from one simple being only one being can be produced, and that through the instrumentality of the latter a multitude of things were produced by the first being. They spoke thus as though God acted from natural necessity; for thus from one simple thing only one can. proceed. We, on the other hand, hold that things proceed from Goa by way of knowledge and intelligence, in which way there is nothing to prevent a multitude of things from proceeding immediately from the one first and simple being God, inasmuch as his wisdom contains all things. Hence according to the Catholic Faith we hold that God immediately created all spiritual substances and corporeal matter, and deem it heresy to say that anything was created by an angel or by any creature. Wherefore Damascene (De Orth. Fid. ii, 2) declares: Whosoever shall say that an angel created anything, let him be anathema. Certain Catholic writers, however, have maintained that, although no creature can create, it could be granted to a creature that God should create a thing through its instrumentality. The Master favours this opinion (IV., D. 5). Some on the other hand hold that the creative act cannot in any sense be communicated to a creature: and this is the more common opinion.
Ad horum autem evidentiam sciendum est quod creatio nominat activam potentiam, qua res in esse producuntur; et ideo est absque praesuppositione materiae praeexistentis et alicuius prioris agentis: hae enim solae causae praesupponuntur ad actionem. Nam forma geniti est terminus actionis generantis, et ipsa est etiam finis generationis quae secundum esse non praecedit sed sequitur actionem. Quod enim creatio materiam non praesupponat, patet ex ipsa nominis ratione. Dicitur enim creari quod ex nihilo fit. Quod etiam non praesupponat aliquam priorem causam agentem, patet ex hoc quod Augustinus dicit, ubi probat Angelos non esse creatores, quia operantur ex seminibus naturae inditis quae sunt virtutes activae in natura. Si igitur sic stricte creatio accipitur, constat quod creatio non potest nisi primo agenti convenire, nam causa secunda non agit nisi ex influentia causae primae; et sic omnis actio causae secundae est ex praesuppositione causae agentis. Nec etiam ipsi philosophi posuerunt Angelos vel intelligentias aliquid creare, nisi per virtutem divinam in ipsis existentem, ut intelligamus quod causa secunda duplicem actionem habere potest; unam ex propria natura, aliam ex virtute prioris causae. Impossibile est autem quod causa secunda ex propria virtute sit principium esse in quantum huiusmodi; hoc enim est proprium causae primae; nam ordo effectuum est secundum ordinem causarum. Primus autem effectus est ipsum esse, quod omnibus aliis effectibus praesupponitur et ipsum non praesupponit aliquem alium effectum; et ideo oportet quod dare esse in quantum huiusmodi sit effectus primae causae solius secundum propriam virtutem; et quaecumque alia causa dat esse, hoc habet in quantum est in ea virtus et operatio primae causae, et non per propriam virtutem; sicut et instrumentum efficit actionem instrumentalem non per virtutem propriae naturae, sed per virtutem moventis; sicut calor naturalis per virtutem animae generat carnem vivam, per virtutem autem propriae naturae solummodo calefacit et dissolvit. Et per hunc modum posuerunt quidam philosophi, quod intelligentiae primae sunt creatrices secundarum, in quantum dant eis esse per virtutem causae primae in eis existentem. Nam esse per creationem, bonum vero et vita et huiusmodi, per informationem, ut in libro de causis habetur. Et hoc fuit idolatriae principium, dum ipsis creatis substantiis quasi creatricibus aliarum, latriae cultus exhibebatur. In order to make this point clear, we must observe that creation denotes an active power whereby things are brought into being, wherefore it requires no pre-existing matter or previous agency: for these are the only causes that ate pre-requisite for action. The reason of this is that the form of the thing generated is the term of the generator’s action, and is likewise the end of generation which as to its being does not precede. but follows the action. Now it is clear from its definition, that creation does not presuppose matter: since to create is to make a thing from nothing. That it does not presuppose a previous active cause is clear from the teaching of Augustine who (De Trin. iii, 8) proves that the angels cannot create, because they work by means of nature’s implanted seeds, namely the active forces of nature. Accordingly if we take creation thus strictly, it is evident that the first agent alone is competent to create, since a second cause does not act save through the influx of the first: so that every action of a second cause is dependent on a pre-existing active cause. Nor did the philosophers maintain that angels or intelligences create, except through a divine power communicated to them: in the sense that the second cause could have a twofold action, one proceeding from its own nature, the other from the power of a preexisting cause. For it is not possible that a second cause by its own power be the principle of being as such: this belongs to the first cause, since the order of effects follows the order of causes. Now the first of all effects is being, which is presupposed to all other effects, and does not presuppose any other effect: wherefore to give being as such must be the effect of the first cause alone by its own power: and whatever other cause gives being does this in so far as it is the recipient of the divine power and operation, and not by its own power. Thus an instrument performs an instrumental operation not by the power of its own nature, but by the power of the person who handles it: and thus the natural heat engenders living flesh by the power of the soul, while by the power of its nature it merely causes heat and dissolution. In this sense then certain philosophers held the first intelligences to create the second in giving them being by the power of the first cause communicated to them. For being is by creation, while goodness, life and so forth are by information as stated in De Causis. This was the foundation of idolatry, in that divine worship was accorded to created substances as though they were the creators of others.
Magister vero in IV sententiarum ponit hoc esse communicabile creaturae non quidem ut propria virtute creet, quasi auctoritate, sed ministerio quasi instrumentum. Sed diligenter consideranti apparet hoc esse impossibile. Nam actio alicuius, etiamsi sit eius ut instrumenti, oportet ut ab eius potentia egrediatur. Cum autem omnis creaturae potentia sit finita, impossibile est quod aliqua creatura ad creationem operetur, etiam quasi instrumentum. Nam creatio infinitam virtutem requirit in potentia a qua egreditur: quod ex quinque rationibus apparet. The Master, however (l.c.), holds that it is possible for a, creature to receive the power to create not as by its own power, or authority as it were, but ministerially as an instrument. But if we look into the question carefully, it will be clear that this is impossible. The action of any thing, even though it be performed instrumentally, must proceed from that thing’s power. And since the power of every creature is finite, no creature can possibly act, even as an instrument, to the effect of creating something: since creation demands infinite energy in the power whence it proceeds. This is made clear by the five following arguments.
Prima est ex hoc quod potentia facientis proportionatur distantiae quae est inter id quod fit et oppositum ex quo fit. Quanto enim frigus est vehementius, et sic a calore magis distans, tanto maiori virtute caloris opus est ut ex frigido fiat calidum. Non esse autem simpliciter, in infinitum ab esse distat, quod ex hoc patet, quia a quolibet ente determinato plus distat non esse quam quodlibet ens, quantumcumque ab alio ente distans invenitur; et ideo ex omnino non ente aliquid facere non potest esse nisi potentiae infinitae. The first is based on the fact that the power of a maker is proportionate to the distance between the thing made and the opposite thing from which it is made: thus the colder a thing is, and therefore the further removed it is from being hot, the greater will be the heat-power required to make that cold thing hot. Now absolute non-being is infinitely distant from being: because non-being is further removed from any particular being than any other particular being however distant these may be: and consequently none but an infinite power can produce being from non-being.
Secunda ratio est, quia hoc modo factum agitur quo faciens agit. Agens autem agit secundum quod actu est; unde id solum se toto agit quod totum actu est, quod non est nisi actus infiniti qui est actus primus; unde et rem agere secundum totam eius substantiam solius infinitae virtutis est. The second reason is that in the making of a thing the manner of the making depends on the action of the maker. Now the agent acts forasmuch as it is in act: wherefore that alone acts by its whole self, which is wholly in act, and this belongs to. none but the infinite act who is the first act: and consequently none but an infinite power can make a thing as to its whole substance.
Tertia ratio est, quia cum accidens oporteat esse in subiecto, subiectum autem actionis sit recipiens actionem; illud solum faciendo aliquid recipientem materiam non requirit, cuius actio non est accidens, sed ipsa substantia sua, quod solius Dei est; et ideo solius eius est creare. The third reason is that since an accident must needs be in a subject, and the subject of an action is the recipient of that action, that agent alone whose action is not an accident but its very substance requires no recipient matter when it makes a thing; and such an agent is none but God, who therefore alone can create.
Quarta ratio est, quia cum omnes secundae causae agentes a primo agente habeant hoc ipsum quod agant, ut in Lib. de causis probatur; oportet quod a primo agente, omnibus secundis agentibus modus et ordo imponatur; ei autem non imponitur modus vel ordo ab aliquo. Cum autem modus actionis ex materia dependeat quae recipit actionem agentis, solius primi agentis erit absque materia praesupposita ab alio agente agere, et aliis omnibus secundis agentibus materiam ministrare. The fourth reason is that as all second causes derive their action from the first cause, as is proved in De Causis, prop. xix, xx, it follows that all second agents receive their mode and order from the first agent, who receives neither mode nor order from any other. Now, since the mode of an action depends on the matter that is the recipient of the agent’s action, the first agent alone will be competent to act without presupposing matter from another agent, and to provide matter for all second agents.
Quinta ratio est ducens ad impossibile. Nam secundum elongationem potentiae ab actu, est proportio potentiarum de potentia in actum aliquid reducentium: quanto enim plus distat potentia ab actu, tanto maiori potentia indigetur. Si ergo sit aliqua potentia finita quae de nulla potentia praesupposita aliquid operetur, oportet eius esse aliquam proportionem ad illam potentiam activam quae educit aliquid de potentia in actum; et sic est aliqua proportio nullius potentiae ad aliquam potentiam, quod est impossibile. Non entis enim ad ens nulla est proportio, ut habetur IV Physic. Relinquitur ergo quod nulla potentia creaturae potest aliquid creare neque propria virtute, neque sicut alterius instrumentum. The fifth argument is a reduction to absurdity. In so far as they reduce a thing from potentiality to act powers are proportionate to one another according to the distance of the potentiality from the act, since the further the potentiality is removed from the act, the greater is the power required. Hence if there be a finite power productive of something without any presupposed potentiality, there must be some proportion between it and a power that educes a thing from potentiality to act: so that there will be proportion between no potentiality and some potentiality: which is impossible: for there is no proportion between non-being and being. We conclude then that no power of a creature can create, neither by its own virtue, nor as the instrument of another.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in reducendo ad finem, praeexistunt ea quae sunt ad finem: et ideo non impossibile est per actionem alicuius cooperari Deo ad hoc quod res aliquae in finem ultimum reducantur. Sed in universali eductione rerum in esse, nihil praesupponitur; unde non est simile. Reply to the First Objection. In the bringing of things to their end, the means to that end are already in existence: wherefore it is not impossible for a creature to co-operate, with God in the direction of things to their last end: whereas in the general bringing of things into being nothing existed as yet: hence the comparison fails.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod nihil prohibet aliquam distantiam imaginari infinitam ex una parte et ex alia finitam. Ex utraque autem parte infinitam imaginamur distantiam, quando utrumque oppositorum ponitur infinitum; puta si sint calor et frigus infinita. Ex parte autem altera, quando alterum est finitum; sicut si calor esset infinitus, et frigus finitum. Distantia ergo infiniti entis a non esse simpliciter, est infinita ex utraque parte. Distantia autem entis finiti a non esse simpliciter est infinita ex una parte tantum, et requirit nihilominus potentiam infinitam agentem. Reply to the Second Objection. Nothing prevents our imagining a distance on the one part infinite and on the other finite. We imagine a distance infinite on either part, when either opposite extreme is infinite, for instance, infinite heat and infinite cold: but the imagined distance will be finite on the one hand, when one of the opposite extremes is finite; for instance, infinite heat and finite cold. Accordingly infinite being is infinitely removed on both hands from absolute non-being: whereas finite being from absolute non-being is removed infinitely on the one hand only; yet it requires an infinite active power.
Tertium concedimus, non enim quantum ad hoc differt, an utrumque oppositorum sit natura quaedam an alterum tantum. The Third Objection we grant, since it makes no difference to the point at issue whether both opposite extremes be a nature, or one only.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod res in intelligentia dicuntur fieri secundum cognitionem tantum, non secundum rationem operativae virtutis: unde res non producuntur a Deo mediantibus Angelis operantibus, sed solum Angelis cognoscentibus. Reply to the Fourth Objection. Things are said made in our intelligence in respect of knowledge only, and by reason of an operative power: wherefore things are brought into being not with the co-operation of the angels, but with their knowledge.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod aliquid dicitur non posse fieri ab aliquo, non solum propter distantiam extremorum, sed etiam propter hoc quod omnino fieri non potest; ut si dicamus quod ex aliquo corpore non potest fieri Deus, quia Deus omnino fieri non potest. Sic ergo dicendum quod ex aliqua potentia non potest fieri omnipotentia, non solum propter distantiam utriusque potentiae, sed etiam propter hoc quod omnipotentia omnino fieri non potest. Nam omne quod fit, purus actus esse non potest, cum ex hoc ipso quod ex alio esse habeat, potentia in eo deprehendatur: et ideo non potest esse potentia infinita. Reply to the Fifth Objection. A thing is said to be impossible to someone not only on account of the distance between the extremes, but also because it is altogether impossible to be done: for instance, we might say that God cannot be made from a body, because it is altogether impossible for God to be made. Accordingly we reply that omnipotence cannot be made from a power, not only on account of the distance between them, but also because omnipotence is utterly unmakable. For whatever is made cannot be pure act, since from the very fact that it has its being from another, it is proved to have potentiality, and consequently cannot have infinite power.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod lux corporalis multiplicat se non per creationem novae lucis, sed diffundendo se super materiam: quod de Angelis dici non potest, cum sint substantiae per se stantes. Reply to the Sixth Objection. Material light multiplies itself not by creating a new light, but by shedding itself over matter. This cannot be said of the angels since they are self-subsistent substances.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod forma potest considerari dupliciter: uno modo secundum quod est in potentia; et sic a Deo materia concreatur, nulla disponentis naturae actione interveniente. Alio modo secundum quod est in actu; et sic non creatur, sed de potentia materiae educitur per agens naturale; unde non oportet quod natura aliquid agat dispositive ad hoc quod aliquid creetur. Quia tamen aliqua forma naturalis est quae per creationem in esse producitur, scilicet anima rationalis, cuius materiam natura disponit; ideo sciendum est, quod cum creationis opus materiam tollat, dupliciter aliquid creari dicitur. Nam quaedam creantur nulla materia praesupposita, nec ex qua nec in qua, sicut Angeli et corpora caelestia; et ad horum creationem natura nihil operari potest dispositive. Quaedam vero creantur, etsi non praesupposita materia ex qua sint, praesupposita tamen materia in qua sint, ut animae humanae. Ex parte ergo illa qua habent materiam in qua, natura potest dispositive operari; non tamen quod ad ipsam substantiam creati, naturae actio se extendat. Reply to the Seventh Objection. A form may be considered in two ways. First, in so far as it is in potentiality: and thus God concreates it with matter, without any concurrent action of nature for the disposition of the matter. Secondly, in so far as it is in act, and thus it is not created, but is educed by natural agency from the potentiality of matter: wherefore there is no need of dispositive action on the part of nature in order that a thing be created. Seeing, however, that there is a natural form, namely the rational soul, which is brought into being by creation, and whose matter is disposed by nature, we must observe that since the creative act is independent of matter, there are two senses in which a thing is said to be created. Some things are created without any presupposed matter, and produced neither from matter nor in matter, for instance, the angels and the heavenly bodies: and for the creation of such nature can do nothing dispositively. On the other hand some things are created, without any matter presupposed from which they be made, but on the presupposition of matter in which they may be: such are human souls. So far then as they have matter in which to be, nature can act dispositively yet not so that the action of nature extend to the substance of that which is created.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod in opere iustificationis homo aliquid operatur ministerio tantum per hoc quod adhibet sacramenta: unde cum sacramenta iustificare dicantur instrumentaliter et dispositive, solutio redit in idem cum solutione praedicta. Reply to the Eighth Objection. In the work of justification man does something, but only as a minister by employing the sacraments: so that as the sacraments are said to justify instrumentally and dispositively, the solution comes to the same as the preceding one.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod quamvis inter Deum et creaturam non possit esse similitudo generis vel speciei; potest tamen esse similitudo quaedam analogiae, sicut inter potentiam et actum, et substantiam et accidens. Et hoc dicitur uno modo in quantum res creatae imitantur suo modo ideam divinae mentis, sicut artificiata formam quae est in mente artificis. Alio modo secundum quod res creatae ipsi naturae divinae quodammodo similantur, prout a primo ente alia sunt entia, et a bono bona, et sic de aliis. Tamen haec obiectio non est ad propositum: quia supposito quod creaturae a Deo procedant mediante aliqua potentia creata, adhuc redibit eadem difficultas, qualiter scilicet illa prima natura creata esse possit a Deo, similitudine non existente. Reply to the Ninth Objection. Although between God and the creature there cannot be a generic or specific likeness, there can nevertheless be a certain likeness of analogy, as between potentiality and act, substance and accident. This is true in one way forasmuch as creatures reproduce, in ‘their own way, the idea of the divine mind, as the work of a craftsman is a reproduction of the form in his mind. In another way it is true in that creatures are somewhat likened to the very nature of God, forasmuch as they derive their being from the first being, their goodness from the sovereign good, and so on. However this objection is not to the point: for even granted that creatures proceed from God through the instrumentality of some created power, the same difficulty remains, namely how this first nature can be created by God and yet not be like God.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod error iste expresse in libro de causis invenitur, quod creaturae inferiores creatae sunt a Deo superioribus mediantibus: unde in hoc auctoritas illius non est recipienda. Reply to the Tenth Objection. This error is contained explicitly in De Causis (prop. x) whose author holds that the lower creatures were created by God by means of the higher: wherefore in this matter the authority of this book is not to be accepted.
Et similiter dicendum ad undecimum. The same is to be said of the Eleventh Objection.
Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod Augustinus ibi loquitur de anima, quae communicat corpori esse et speciem non per modum creantis, sed per modum formae. Reply to the Twelfth Objection. Augustine is speaking, there of the soul which gives being and species to a corporeal thing not as creating but as informing it.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod licet Angelus non cognoscat res cognitione quae est a rebus accepta, non tamen oportet quod cognoscat tali cognitione quae sit causa rerum: est enim cognitio eius media inter duas cognitiones praedictas. Cognoscit enim res naturali cognitione, quae est per rerum similitudines in eius intellectum effluxas a divino intellectu; ut sic eius cognitio non sit ad rem quasi rerum causa, sed sit quaedam similitudo divinae cognitionis, quae res causat. Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. Although an angel’s knowledge of things is not derived from them, it does not follow that his knowledge of them is their cause. His knowledge is a mean between the two kinds of knowledge e mentioned. For he knows things by a natural knowledge by means of ideas implanted in his mind from the divine intellect: so that his knowledge is not directed to things as their cause, but is a likeness of the divine intellect which is their cause.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod in educendo res de potentia in actum multi gradus attendi possunt, in quantum aliquid potest educi de potentia magis vel minus remota in actum, et etiam facilius vel minus faciliter: unde non oportet, si virtus Angeli virtutem naturae materialis excedat, quod possit aliquid facere de puro non esse, natura educente aliquid de potentia in actum; sed quod hoc possit multo facilius quam natura; sicut etiam Augustinus dicit, quod Daemones seminibus naturae occultius et efficacius operantur quam nos operari sciamus. Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. In the eduction of things from potentiality to act many degrees may be observed, inasmuch as a thing may be educed from more or less remote potentiality to act, and again more or less easily. Hence although the angel’s power surpasses that of material nature it does not follow that he is able to make a thing from absolute non-being because nature is able to educe a thing from potentiality to act: but that he can do this much more easily than nature. Thus Augustine (De Trin. iii, 8, 9) says that demons are able to apply the forces of nature more secretly and efficaciously than we are aware.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod nulla est maior potentia quam potentia creandi: nec oportet quod potentia creantis ad hoc se extendat quod alicui creaturae potentiam creandi communicet, eo quod creaturae communicabilis nullo modo est. Quod enim aliquid fieri non possit, non solum provenit ex defectum potentiae facientis, sed quandoque ex ipsa factione rei, quae fieri non potest; sicut Deus non potest facere Deum, non propter defectum suae potentiae, sed quia Deus a nullo fieri potest; et similiter potentia creandi finita esse non potest, nec creaturae communicari, cum sit infinita. Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. No power is greater than the power to create: nor does this prove that the creative power must include the bestowal on a creature of the power to create, since it is utterly incommunicable to a creature. That a thing be impossible may be due not only to one’s inability to do it, but also sometimes to the fact that the thing itself cannot be done: thus God cannot make God, not through a defect of power, but because God cannot be made by anyone. In like manner the creative power cannot be finite, nor can it be communicated to a creature, because it is infinite.
Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod in actu potest attendi difficultas dupliciter: uno modo ex hoc quod patiens resistit contra agentem; et hoc non est in omnibus generale, sed solum in his quae mutuo agunt et patiuntur in invicem, in quibus agens patitur ex contraria actione patientis: et sic corpora caelestia, quae contrarium non habent agendo, non patiuntur difficultatem in agendo ex contraria actione patientis; multo minus Deus. Alio modo, qui generalis est, secundum quod patiens elongatur ab actu. Quanto enim potentia magis ab actu elongata invenitur, tanto maior est difficultas in actione agentis. Unde cum magis elongetur ab actu purum non ens quam materia cuicumque contrario subiecta, quantumcumque intenso, manifestum est maioris esse virtutis producere aliquid de nihilo quam facere contrarium de contrario. Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. A thing is difficult to do in two ways. First, because the patient resists the agent. This does not apply in every case, but only when there is action and reaction, and the agent is subject to the reaction of the patient: thus the heavenly bodies, whose action meets with no opposition on the part of another agent, suffer no difficulty in their action through the patient’s counteraction: and much less does God. Secondly, and this applies to all cases, because the patient is far removed from the action: since the further the potentiality is removed from act, the greater is the difficulty encountered by the action of the agent. Wherefore, since absolute non-being is further removed from act than matter subject to any contrary whatsoever, however intense the other contrary may be: it is evident that it requires a greater power to produce a thing from nothing, than one contrary from another.
Q. III:
ARTICLE V
Can There Be Anything That Is Not Created by God?

[ Sum. Th. I, Q. xiiv, A. I]
Quinto quaeritur utrum possit esse aliquid quod non sit a Deo creatum. Et videtur quod sic. THE fifth point of inquiry is whether there can be anything that is not created by God. Seemingly this is possible.
Cum enim causa sit potentior effectu, illud quod est possibile nostro intellectui, qui a rebus notitiam sumit, videtur magis esse possibile in natura. Sed intellectus noster potest aliquid intelligere non intelligendo illud esse a Deo, cum causa efficiens non sit de natura rei, et sic sine ea res intelligi possit. Ergo multo magis in rerum natura potest aliquid esse quod non sit a Deo. 1. Since the cause is more powerful than its effect, that which is possible to our intellect which takes its knowledge from things would seem yet more possible to nature. Now our intellect can understand a thing apart from understanding that it is from God, because its efficient cause is not part of a thing’s nature, so that the thing can be understood without it. Much more therefore can there be a real thing that is not from God.
Praeterea, omnia quae a Deo sunt facta dicuntur esse Dei creaturae. Creatio autem terminatur ad esse: prima enim rerum creatarum est esse, ut habetur in Lib. de causis. Cum ergo quidditas rei sit praeter esse ipsius, videtur quod quidditas rei non sit a Deo. 2. All things made by God are called his creatures. Now creation terminates at being: for the first of created things is being (De Causis, prop. iv). Since then the quiddity of a thing is in addition to its being, it would seem that the quiddity of a thing is not from God.
Praeterea, omnis actio terminatur ad aliquem actum, sicut et procedit ab aliquo actu: nam omne agens agit in quantum actu est, et omne agens agit sibi simile in natura. Sed materia prima est pura potentia. Ergo actio creantis ad ipsam terminari non potest; et ita non omnia sunt a Deo creata. 3. Every action terminates in an act, even as it proceeds from an act: because every agent acts in so far as it is in act, and every agent produces its like in nature. But primal matter is pure potentiality. Therefore the creative act cannot terminate therein: so that not all things are created by God.
Sed contra. Est quod dicitur Rom. XI, 36: ex ipso et per ipsum et in ipso sunt omnia. On the contrary it is said (Rom. xi, 36): From him and by him and in him are all things.
Respondeo. Dicendum, quod secundum ordinem cognitionis humanae processerunt antiqui in consideratione naturae rerum. Unde cum cognitio humana a sensu incipiens in intellectum perveniat priores philosophi circa sensibilia fuerunt occupati, et ex his paulatim in intelligibilia pervenerunt. Et quia accidentales formae sunt secundum se sensibiles, non autem substantiales, ideo primi philosophi omnes formas accidentia esse dixerunt, et solam materiam esse substantiam. Et quia substantia sufficit ad hoc quod sit accidentium causa, quae ex principiis substantiae causantur, inde est quod primi philosophi, praeter materiam, nullam aliam causam posuerunt; sed ex ea causari dicebant omnia quae in rebus sensibilibus provenire videntur; unde ponere cogebantur materiae causam non esse, et negare totaliter causam efficientem. Posteriores vero philosophi, substantiales formas aliquatenus considerare coeperunt; non tamen pervenerunt ad cognitionem universalium, sed tota eorum intentio circa formas speciales versabatur: et ideo posuerunt quidam aliquas causas agentes, non tamen quae universaliter rebus esse conferrent, sed quae ad hanc vel ad illam formam, materiam permutarent; sicut intellectum et amicitiam et litem, quorum actionem ponebant in segregando et congregando; et ideo etiam secundum ipsos non omnia entia a causa efficiente procedebant, sed materia actioni causae agentis praesupponebatur. Posteriores vero philosophi, ut Plato, Aristoteles et eorum sequaces, pervenerunt ad considerationem ipsius esse universalis; et ideo ipsi soli posuerunt aliquam universalem causam rerum, a qua omnia alia in esse prodirent, ut patet per Augustinum. Cui quidem sententiae etiam Catholica fides consentit. Et hoc triplici ratione demonstrari potest: quarum prima est haec. I answer that the ancients in their investigations of nature proceeded in accordance with the order of human knowledge. Wherefore as human knowledge reaches the intellect by beginning with the senses, the early philosophers were intent on the domain of the senses, and thence by degrees reached the realm of the intellect. And seeing that accidental forms are in themselves objects of sense, whereas substantial forms are not, the early philosophers said that all forms are accidental, and that matter alone is a substance. And because substance suffices to cause accidents that result from the substantial elements, the early philosophers held that there is no other cause besides matter, and that matter is the cause of whatever we observe in the sensible world: and consequently they were forced to state that matter itself has no cause, and to deny absolutely the existence of an efficient cause. The later philosophers, however, began to take some notice of substantial forms: yet they did not attain to the knowledge of universals, and they were wholly intent on the observation of special forms; and so they posited indeed certain active causes, not such as give being to things in their universality, but which transmute matter to this or that form: these causes they called intelligence, attraction and repulsion, which they held responsible for adhesion and separation. Wherefore according to them not all beings came from an efficient cause, and matter was in existence before any efficient cause came into action. Subsequent to these the philosophers as Plato, Aristotle and their disciples, attained to the study of universal being: and hence they alone posited a universal cause of things, from which all others came into being, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei viii, 4). This is in agreement with the Catholic Faith; and may be proved by the three arguments that follow.
Oportet enim, si aliquid unum communiter in pluribus invenitur, quod ab aliqua una causa in illis causetur; non enim potest esse quod illud commune utrique ex se ipso conveniat, cum utrumque, secundum quod ipsum est, ab altero distinguatur; et diversitas causarum diversos effectus producit. Cum ergo esse inveniatur omnibus rebus commune, quae secundum illud quod sunt, ad invicem distinctae sunt, oportet quod de necessitate eis non ex se ipsis, sed ab aliqua una causa esse attribuatur. Et ista videtur ratio Platonis, qui voluit, quod ante omnem multitudinem esset aliqua unitas non solum in numeris, sed etiam in rerum naturis. First, if in a number of things we find something that is common to all, we must conclude that this something was the effect of some one cause: for it is not possible that to each one by reason of itself this common something belong, since each one by itself is different from the others: and diversity of causes produces a diversity of effects. Seeing then that being is found to be common to all things, which are by themselves distinct from one another, it follows of necessity that they must come into being not by themselves, but by the action of some cause. Seemingly this is Plato’s argument, since he required every multitude to be preceded by unity not only as regards number but also in reality.
Secunda ratio est, quia, cum aliquid invenitur a pluribus diversimode participatum oportet quod ab eo in quo perfectissime invenitur, attribuatur omnibus illis in quibus imperfectius invenitur. Nam ea quae positive secundum magis et minus dicuntur, hoc habent ex accessu remotiori vel propinquiori ad aliquid unum: si enim unicuique eorum ex se ipso illud conveniret, non esset ratio cur perfectius in uno quam in alio inveniretur; sicut videmus quod ignis, qui est in fine caliditatis, est caloris principium in omnibus calidis. Est autem ponere unum ens, quod est perfectissimum et verissimum ens: quod ex hoc probatur, quia est aliquid movens omnino immobile et perfectissimum, ut a philosophis est probatum. Oportet ergo quod omnia alia minus perfecta ab ipso esse recipiant. Et haec est probatio philosophi. The second argument is that whenever something is found to be in several things by participation in various degrees, it must be derived by those in which it exists imperfectly from that one in which it exists most perfectly: because where there are positive degrees of a thing so that we ascribe it to this one more and to that one less, this is in reference to one thing to which they approach, one nearer than another: for if each one were of itself competent to have it, there would be no reason why one should have it more than another. Thus fire, which is the extreme of heat, is the cause of heat in all things hot. Now there is one being most perfect and most true: which follows from the fact that there is a mover altogether immovable and absolutely perfect, as philosophers have proved. Consequently all other less perfect beings must needs derive being therefrom. This is the argument of the Philosopher (Metaph. ii, I).
Tertia ratio est, quia illud quod est per alterum, reducitur sicut in causam ad illud quod est per se. Unde si esset unus calor per se existens, oporteret ipsum esse causam omnium calidorum, quae per modum participationis calorem habent. Est autem ponere aliquod ens quod est ipsum suum esse: quod ex hoc probatur, quia oportet esse aliquod primum ens quod sit actus purus, in quo nulla sit compositio. Unde oportet quod ab uno illo ente omnia alia sint, quaecumque non sunt suum esse, sed habent esse per modum participationis. Haec est ratio Avicennae. Sic ergo ratione demonstratur et fide tenetur quod omnia sint a Deo creata. The third argument is based on the principle that whatsoever is through another is to be reduced to that which is of itself. Wherefore if there were a per se heat, it would be the cause of all hot things, that have heat by way of participation. Now there is a being that is its own being: and this follows from the fact that there must needs be a being that is pure act and wherein there is no composition. Hence from that one being all other beings that are not their own being, but have being by participation, must needs proceed. This is the argument of Avicenna (in Metaph. viii, 6; ix, 8). Thus reason proves and faith holds that all things are created by God,
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod licet causa prima, quae Deus est, non intret essentiam rerum creatarum; tamen esse, quod rebus creatis inest, non potest intelligi nisi ut deductum ab esse divino; sicut nec proprius effectus potest intelligi nisi ut deductus a causa propria. Reply to the First Objection. Although the first cause that is God does not enter into the essence of creatures, yet being which is in creatures cannot be understood except as derived from the divine being: even as a proper effect cannot be understood save as produced by its proper cause.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod ex hoc ipso quod quidditati esse attribuitur, non solum esse, sed ipsa quidditas creari dicitur: quia antequam esse habeat, nihil est, nisi forte in intellectu creantis, ubi non est creatura, sed creatrix essentia. Reply to the Second Objection. From the very fact that being is ascribed to a quiddity, not only is the quiddity said to be but also to be created: since before it had being it was nothing, except perhaps in the intellect of the creator, where it is not a creature but the creating essence.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod ratio illa probat, quod materia prima per se non creatur; sed ex hoc non sequitur quod non creetur sub forma; sic enim habet esse in actu. Reply to the Third Objection. This argument roves that primal matter is not created per se: but it does not follow that it is not created under a form: for it is thus that it has actual being.
Q. III:
ARTICLE VI
Is There but One Principle of Creation?

[ Sum. Th. I, Q. xiix]
Sexto quaeritur utrum sit unum tantum creationis principium. Et videtur quod non. THE sixth point of inquiry is whether there be but one principle of creation: and seemingly the reply should be in the negative.
Dicit enim Dionysius: non est causa mali bonum. Aliquod autem malum est in mundo. Aut ergo est causatum ab aliqua causa quae non est bonum; aut nullo modo est causatum, sed est causa prima; et utrolibet modo oportet ponere plura creationis principia: nam constat primum principium creationis bonorum esse bonum. 1. Dionysius says (De Div. Nom. iv): The cause of evil is not a good. Now there is evil in the world. Either, then, it is produced by a cause which is not a good, or it is not caused at all, but is a first cause: and in either case we must posit more than one principle of creation: since it is clear that the first cause of good things must be a good.
Sed diceretur, quod bonum non est causa mali per se, sed per accidens.- Sed contra, omnis effectus qui est alicuius causae per accidens, est alterius causae per se; cum omne per accidens ad per se reducatur. Si ergo malum est effectus boni per accidens, erit per se effectus alicuius alterius; et sic idem quod prius. 2. But someone may say that a good is the cause of evil, not per se but accidentally.—On the contrary every effect that flows from a cause accidentally, flows from some other cause per se: since everything accidental can be traced to something per se. Hence if evil be the effect of good accidentally, it will be the per se effect of something else, so that the same conclusion follows as before.
Praeterea, effectus causae per accidens, accidit praeter intentionem causae, et non fit. Si ergo bonum est causa mali per accidens, sequeretur quod malum non sit factum. Sed nihil est non creatum nisi creationis principium, ut supra, art. praeced., ostensum est. Ergo malum est creationis principium. 3. An effect that is produced accidentally happens beside the intention of the cause and is not a thing made. If, then, a good be the accidental cause of evil, it follows that evil is not something made. Now nothing is uncreated save the principle of creation, as we have shown above (A. 1). Therefore evil is a principle of creation.
Praeterea, nullum nocumentum accidit in effectu praeter intentionem agentis, nisi vel propter ignorantiam agentis qui non providet, vel propter impotentiam quam vitare non potest. Sed in Deo, qui est creator boni, non est neque impotentia neque ignorantia. Ergo malum, quod nocivum est, Dei effectibus non potest praeter intentionem provenire. Nam Augustinus dicit, quod ideo dicitur malum, quia nocet. 4. No vice occurs in the effect beside the intention of the cause, except either by reason of ignorance on the part of the cause through lack of foresight, or by reason of impotence that could not be avoided. But in God the Creator of all good there is neither impotence nor ignorance. Therefore evil, which is vicious, cannot occur in God’s effects beside his intention; for Augustine says (Enchir. ii) that the reason why a thing is evil is because it is vicious.
Praeterea, quod est per accidens est ut in paucioribus, ut habetur in II Physic. Malum autem est ut in pluribus, ut habetur in II Topic. Ergo malum non est ab aliqua causa per accidens. 5. That which occurs accidentally happens in the minority of cases (Phys. ii, 5). But evil occurs in the majority of cases (Top. ii, 6). Therefore evil is not due to an accidental cause.
Praeterea, malum, secundum Augustinum, non habet causam efficientem sed deficientem. Sed causa per accidens est causa efficiens. Ergo bonum non est causa mali per accidens. 6. According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xii, 7) the cause of evil is not effective but defective. But an accidental cause is effective. Therefore a good is not the accidental cause of evil.
Praeterea, quod non est, non habet causam; quia quod non est, neque causa neque causatum est. Sed malum nihil est, secundum Augustinum. Ergo malum non habet aliquam causam nec per se nec per accidens. Falsum est ergo quod dicebatur, quod bonum est causa mali per accidens. 7. That which is not has no cause: since what is not is neither cause nor caused. Now evil, according to Augustine (Tract. i, 13, in Joann), is not a thing. Consequently evil has no cause, neither Per se nor accidental. Therefore there is no truth in the statement that a good is the accidental cause of evil.
Praeterea, secundum philosophum, illud cui aliquid inest per prius, est causa omnium in quibus illud per posterius invenitur: sicut ignis est causa caloris in omnibus calidis. Sed malitia per prius fuit in Diabolo. Ergo ipse est causa malitiae in omnibus malis; et sic est unum principium omnium malorum, sicut et bonorum. 8. According to the Philosopher (Metaph. ii, i) that in which a thing is first is the cause of whatsoever contains that thing subsequently: thus fire causes heat in whatsoever is hot. Now malice was first in the devil. Therefore he is the cause of malice in all the wicked: and consequently there is one principle of all the wicked as there is of all the good.
Praeterea, secundum Dionysium, bonum contingit uno modo: sed malum omnifariam. Malum ergo propinquius est ad esse quam bonum. Si ergo bonum est natura aliqua indigens creatore, et malum etiam indigebit creatore; et sic idem quod prius. 9. According to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) good is in one way, but evil in many ways. Consequently evil is nearer to being than good is. Therefore if good is a nature needing a creator, evil also will need a creator: and so the same conclusion follows.
Praeterea, quod non est non potest esse genus nec species. Sed malum ponitur genus. Dicitur enim in praedicamentis, quod bonum et malum non sunt in genere, sed sunt genera aliorum. Ergo malum est ens: et sic indiget aliquo creante: unde cum non creetur a bono, videtur quod oporteat aliquod malum ponere creationis principium. 10. That which is not can be neither genus nor species. Now evil is taken to be a genus. For it is stated (Categ., 10) that good and evil are not in a genus but are themselves genera. Evil, therefore, is a being and consequently needs a creator. Therefore since it is not created by a good, we must, apparently admit that there is an evil principle of creation.
Praeterea, utrumque contrariorum est natura aliqua positive: contraria enim sunt in eodem genere. Quod autem non est, non potest esse in genere. Sed bonum et malum sunt contraria. Ergo est natura aliqua; et sic idem quod prius. 11. Both of two contraries is a positive nature, since contraries are in the same genus. Now what is not cannot be in a genus. But good and evil are contrary to each other. Therefore evil is a nature: and we come to the same conclusion.
Praeterea, differentiae constitutivae speciei significant naturam aliquam; unde uno modo natura est unumquodque informans specifica differentia, ut Boetius dicit. Sed malum est differentia constitutiva speciei alicuius: bonum enim et malum sunt differentiae habituum. Ergo malum est natura aliqua; et sic idem quod prius. 12. The difference that makes a species signifies a nature wherefore nature, in one way, is that which gives a thing its specific difference, according to Boethius (De Duab. Nat.). Now evil is a difference constituting a species: for good and evil differentiate habits. Therefore evil is a nature: and thus the same conclusion follows.
Praeterea, Eccli. XXXIII, 15: contra malum bonum est, et contra vitam mors, sic et contra virum iustum peccator. Si ergo est unum creationis principium bonum, oportet esse aliud malum quod sit ei contrarium. 13. Good is set against evil, and life against death: so also is the sinner against a just man (Ecclus. xxxiii, 15). If, therefore, good is one principle of creation, there must be set against it an evil principle.
Praeterea, intentio et remissio dicuntur per respectum ad aliquem terminum. Sed invenitur aliquid esse alio peius. Ergo oportet inveniri aliquid quod sit pessimum, in quo sit malorum terminus: et illud oportet esse principium omnium malorum, sicut summum bonum est principium bonorum. 14. Intensity and remission connote relation to some term. Now one thing is worse than another. Hence there must be something supremely bad that is the term of all evil: and this must be the principle of all evil things, even as the supreme good is the principle of all good things.
Praeterea, Matth. VII, 18, dicitur: non potest arbor bona fructus malos facere. Aliquid autem invenitur esse malum in mundo. Ergo non potest esse fructus, id est effectus, causae bonae, quae per arborem bonam significatur; et sic oportet quod omnium malorum sit causa aliquod primum malum. 15. A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit (Mat. vii, 18). Now evil exists in the world. Therefore it cannot be a fruit, otherwise an effect, of a good cause which is denoted by a good tree: and consequently some first evil must be the cause of all evils.
Praeterea, Genes. I, 2, dicitur quod in principio creationis rerum erant tenebrae super faciem abyssi. Sed a bono, quod habet naturam lucis, non potest esse creatio tenebrarum. Ergo creatio quae ibi describitur, non est a bono principio, sed a malo. 16. We are told (Gen. i, 2) that when things were first created darkness was on the face of the earth. But the good by its very nature is enlightening and therefore cannot be the creation of darkness. Consequently the creation described there originates not from a good but from an evil principle.
Praeterea, omne quod exit ab aliquo, attestatur ei a quo exit, in quantum est ei simile. Sed malum nullo modo attestatur Deo, nec habet in ipso aliquam similitudinem. Ergo non potest esse ab ipso, sed ab alio principio. 17. The effect bears witness to its cause as being similar thereto. But evil nowise bears witness to God, nor is it in any way like him. Therefore it cannot come from him but must be from another principle.
Praeterea, nihil exit ab aliquo, nisi quod est in ipso in potentia. Sed malum non est in Deo nec in actu nec in potentia. Ergo non est a Deo; et sic idem quod prius. 18. Every effect exists potentially in its cause. But evil is not in God, either actually or potentially. Therefore it comes not from God; and the some conclusion follows.
Praeterea, sicut generatio est motus naturalis, ita et corruptio. Sed corruptio terminatur ad privationem, sicut generatio ad formam. Ergo sicut forma inducitur ex intentione naturae, ita et privatio: et sic oportet quod malum, quod est privatio, habeat aliquam causam agentem per se, sicut et forma. 19. just as generation is a natural movement so also is corruption. Now the end of corruption is privation, just as the end of generation is the form. Hence just as the intention of nature is the induction of the form, so also does nature intend privation: and consequently evil being a privation must be produced, even as the form, by a per se active cause.
Praeterea, omne agens, agit ex praesuppositione primi agentis. Sed liberum arbitrium, cum peccat, non agit ex praesuppositione divinae actionis: nam aliquod peccatum est, sicut fornicatio vel adulterium, quod non potest a sua deformitate separari, quae non potest esse a Deo. Ergo oportet quod liberum arbitrium sit primum agens, vel quod reducatur ad aliquod aliud primum agens quam Deum. 20. Every agent acts on the presupposition of the first agent. Now the free-will, in sinning, does not act on the presupposition of the divine action: for there are sins like fornication and adultery which are inseparable from their deformity which cannot come from God. Therefore the free-will must either be a first agent or be reducible to a first agent other than God.
Sed diceretur, quod substantia actus peccati est a Deo, non autem deformitas.- Sed contra est quod Commentator dicit: impossibile est unius agentis actionem terminari ad materiam, et alterius ad formam. Sed deformitas est quasi forma actus peccati. Ergo non potest esse deformitas peccati ab uno auctore, et substantia ab alio. 21. It will be said perhaps that the substance, and not the deformity of the act, comes from God.—On the contrary the Commentator (in Metaph. vii, 8) says: It is impossible for the matter to result from the action of one agent while the form results from the action of another. Now deformity is the form as it were of the sinful act. Wherefore the deformity of sin cannot be ascribed to one cause, and its substance to another.
Praeterea, ab uno simplici non procedit nisi simplex. Sed Deus est omnino simplex. Ergo huiusmodi composita non sunt ab ipso, sed ab alio auctore. 22. From one simple cause only a simple effect can proceed. Now God is utterly simple. Therefore suchlike composite things are not from him but from some other cause.
Praeterea, macula aliquid ponit in anima: si enim esset gratiae privatio solum, tunc per quodlibet peccatum mortale homo haberet maculam omnium peccatorum. Sed macula peccati non est a Deo, cum Deus non sit illius rei auctor cuius est ultor, secundum Fulgentium, et cum non sit ab aeterno, oportet quod habeat causam. Ergo oportet reducere in aliquam causam primam, quae non est Deus. 23. The stain of sin is something in the soul: for were it nothing besides the privation of grace, a man by committing one mortal sin would be guilty of all. Now the stain of sin is not from God, for God is not the author of that which he punishes, as Fulgentius says (Ad Monim. i): and since it is not from eternity it must have a cause. Therefore it must be ascribed to some cause other than God.
Praeterea, Eccle. III, 14, dicitur: didici quod omnia opera quae fecit Deus, perseverant in aeternum. Haec autem corruptibilia in aeternum non perseverant. Ergo non sunt opera Dei, sed oportet ea reducere in aliud principium. 24. It is written (Ecclus. iii, 14) : I have learned that all the works which God hath made, continue for ever. Now corruptible things do not continue for ever. Therefore they are not the work of God, and they must be referred to another principle.
Praeterea, omne agens agit sibi simile. Sed huiusmodi corpora corruptibilia non sunt Deo similia: nam Deus spiritus est, ut habetur Ioan. IV 24. Ergo huiusmodi corruptibilia non sunt a Deo; et sic idem quod prius. 25. Every agent produces its like. But corruptible bodies are not like God, for God is a spirit (Jo. iv, 24). Therefore corruptible bodies are not from God: and the same conclusion follows.
Praeterea, natura semper fecit quod melius est, secundum philosophum et hoc ex bonitate naturae provenit. Sed bonitas Dei est perfectior quam naturae. Ergo Deus facit aliquid quanto melius potest. Sed meliora sunt spiritualia corporalibus. Ergo corporalia non facit Deus; quia si fecisset Deus ea, dedisset eis spiritualem bonitatem; et sic relinquitur quod oportet ponere plura creationis principia. 26. Nature always does what is best, according to the Philosopher (De Caelo ii, 5): and this is due to the goodness of nature. But God’s goodness surpasses nature’s. Consequently God makes things as good as he can. Now spiritual things are better than things corporeal. Therefore the latter are not from God, since had he made them he would have given them spiritual goodness. It follows then that we must admit several principles of creation.
Sed contra. Est quod habetur Isai. XLV, vers. 6: ego dominus, et non est alter Deus, formans lucem et creans tenebras, faciens pacem et creans malum; ego dominus faciens omnia haec. On the contrary it is written (Isa. xlv, 6, 7): I am the Lord, and there is none else. I form the light and create darkness, I make peace and create evil; I the Lord do all these things.
Praeterea, malum non radicatur nisi in natura boni, ut manifestat Dionysius. Hoc autem non esset, si malum haberet contrarium creationis principium ei qui creat bona: alias principium malorum esset potentius quam principium bonorum, ex quo in ipsis bonis effectum suum induceret. Ergo malum non est ab aliquo alio creationis principio quam bonum. Again, evil has no other root but the nature of good, as Dionysius shows (Div. Nom. iv). But this would not be true if the creative principle of evil were distinct from that of good: else the principle of evil things would be more powerful than that of good things since it would produce its own effect even in good things. Therefore evil is not from a creative principle other than that of good.
Praeterea, philosophus probat, esse unum primum motorem. Hoc autem non esset, si essent diversa creationis principia prima: nam unum principium non gubernaret nec moveret creaturas alterius principii sibi contrarii. Non est ergo nisi unum tantum creationis principium. Again, the Philosopher, shows (Phys. viii, 6) that there is but one principle of movement. But this would not be true, if there were divers first creative principles: because one principle would not govern or move the creatures of another contrary principle. Therefore there is but one principle of creation.
Respondeo. Dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, antiqui philosophi specialia principia tantum naturae considerantes, ex consideratione materiae in hunc errorem devenerunt, quod non omnia naturalia creata esse credebant: ita quod ex consideratione contrariorum, quae cum materia ponuntur principia in natura, devenerunt in hoc ut rerum duo prima principia constituerent: et hoc propter triplicem defectum qui eis aderat in contrariorum consideratione. Primus erat, quia contraria considerabant secundum hoc tantum quod diversa sunt ex natura speciei, non autem secundum quod est aliquid unum in eis ex natura generis, licet contraria in eodem genere sint: unde non attribuebant eis causam secundum id in quo conveniunt, sed secundum hoc in quo differunt: et propter hoc in duo prima contraria, sicut in duas primas causas, omnia contraria reduxerunt, ut habetur in I Physic. I answer that, as we have already stated, the ancient philosophers, through taking note only of the material principles of nature, when they considered material things fell into the error of holding that all natural things are not created. Hence from holding matter and contrariety to be the principles of nature they came to conceive of two first principles of things: and this was owing to a threefold fault in their consideration of contraries. The first was that they considered contraries only in the point of their specific diversity, and disregarded their generic unity and the fact that contraries are in the same genus. Consequently they ascribed to them a cause not in respect of what they have in common but in respect of that wherein they differ. Hence, as stated (Phys. i, 4), they referred all contraries to two first contraries as two first principles.
Sed inter eos Empedocles prima contraria etiam primas causas agentes posuit, scilicet amicitiam et litem: et hic, ut habetur I Metaph., primo posuit bonum et malum principia. Secundus defectus fuit, quia utrumque contrariorum aequaliter iudicabant; cum tamen oporteat semper duorum contrariorum unum esse cum privatione alterius: et propter hoc unum est perfectum et aliud imperfectum, et unum melius et aliud peius, ut habetur I Phys. Et exinde provenit quod tam bonum quam malum, quae videbantur esse generaliora contraria, ponebant quasi quasdam naturas diversas. Et inde fuit quod Pythagoras posuit duo genera rerum, scilicet bonum et malum; et in genere boni posuit omnia perfecta, ut lucem, masculum, quietem et huiusmodi; et in genere mali posuit omnia imperfecta, ut tenebras, feminam et huiusmodi. Tertius defectus fuit, quia iudicaverunt de rebus secundum quod in se considerantur tantum, vel secundum ordinem unius rei ad aliam rem particularem, non autem in comparatione ad totum ordinem universi. Et inde est quod si invenerunt aliquam rem esse alteri nocivam, vel esse in se imperfectam respectu aliarum perfectarum, iudicaverunt eam simpliciter malam secundum naturam suam, et non ducere originem a causa boni. Et propterea Pythagoras feminam, quae est quid imperfectum, posuit in genere mali. Et ex hac radice provenit quod Manichaei corruptibilia, quae respectu incorruptibilium; et visibilia, quae respectu invisibilium; et vetus testamentum, quod respectu novi testamenti, imperfecta sunt, non posuerunt esse a Deo bono, sed a contrario principio. Et praecipue, cum viderent alicui creaturae bonae, utpote homini, provenire aliquod nocumentum ex aliquibus visibilium et corruptibilium creaturarum. Hic autem error est omnino impossibilis; sed oportet omnia reducere in unum principium primum, quod est bonum: quod quidem tribus rationibus ostenditur ad praesens. Among them Empedocles, made the first contraries to be the first active principles, to wit attraction and repulsion: and it is stated (Metaph. i, 4) that he was the first to uphold two principles, good and evil. The second fault was that they judged both contraries equally, whereas one of them must always imply privation of the other, and consequently be perfect while the latter is imperfect, the former good and the latter less good (Phys. i, 2). In consequence they held both good and evil to be distinct natures, because they seemed to them the most generic contraries. For this reason Pythagoras said that things were divided into two genera, good and evil; in the genus of good things he placed all perfect things, such as light, males, rest and the like, while in the genus of evil things he placed darkness, females and the like. The third fault was that they considered things in reference to the things themselves, or in the mutual relationships between one individual thing and another, but not as bearing upon the order of the universe. Hence when they found one thing harmful to another, or imperfect in comparison with perfect things, they pronounced it to be simply evil in its nature and not to owe its origin to the cause of good. Wherefore Pythagoras placed women, as being imperfect, in the genus of evil. This again was at the root of the Manichean statement that corruptible things being imperfect in comparison with things incorruptible are the work not of the good God but of a contrary principle, and likewise the visible in comparison with the invisible, and the Old Testament in comparison with the New; an opinion that was confirmed by their observing that certain good creatures, man for instance, suffer harm from certain visible and corruptible creatures. Now this error is utterly impossible: since all things must be traced to one first principle which is good. For the present this may be proved by three arguments.
Quarum prima est, quia in quibuscumque diversis invenitur aliquid unum commune, oportet ea reducere in unam causam quantum ad illud commune, quia vel unum est causa alterius, vel amborum est aliqua causa communis. Non enim potest esse quod illud unum commune utrique conveniat secundum illud quod proprie utrumque eorum est, ut in praecedenti quaestione, art. praec., est habitum. Omnia autem contraria et diversa, quae sunt in mundo, inveniuntur communicare in aliquo uno, vel in natura speciei, vel in natura generis, vel saltem in ratione essendi: unde oportet quod omnium istorum sit unum principium, quod est omnibus causa essendi. Esse autem, in quantum huiusmodi, bonum est: quod patet ex hoc quod unumquodque esse appetit, in quo ratio boni consistit, scilicet quod sit appetibile; et sic patet quod supra quaslibet diversas causas oportet ponere aliquam causam unam, sicut etiam apud naturales supra ista contraria agentia in natura ponitur unum agens primum scilicet caelum, quod est causa diversorum motuum in istis inferioribus. Sed quia in ipso caelo invenitur situs diversitas in quam sicut in causam reducitur inferiorum corporum contrarietas, ulterius oportet reducere in primum motorem, qui nec per se nec per accidens moveatur. First argument. Whenever different things have one thing in common, they must be referred to one cause in respect of that common thing: since either one is the cause of the other, or they both proceed from a common cause: seeing that it is impossible for that which they have in common to be derived from the properties in which they differ; as we proved before (A. 5). Now all contraries and things differing from one another, that exist in the world, have some one thing in common, either the specific or the generic nature, or at least the common ratio of being: and consequently they must all have one principle which is the cause of being in all of them. Now being, as such, is a good which is evidenced by the fact that everything desires to be and the good is defined as that which is desirable. Hence above all various causes we must place one first cause, even as above these contrary agents in nature the natural philosophers placed one primal agent, namely the heaven, as the cause of all movement here below. Since, however, in this heaven there is variety of position, to which variety is to be traced the contrariety of inferior bodies, it is necessary to have recourse to a first mover that is not moved either per se or accidentally.
Secunda ratio est, quia omne agens agit secundum quod actu est, et per consequens secundum quod est aliquo modo perfectum. Secundum autem quod malum est, non est actu, cum unumquodque dicatur malum ex hoc quod potentia est privata proprio et debito actu. Secundum vero quod actu est unumquodque, bonum est: quia secundum hoc habet perfectionem et entitatem, in qua ratio boni consistit. Nihil ergo agit in quantum malum est, sed unumquodque agens agit in quantum bonum est. Impossibile est ergo ponere aliud activum rerum principium nisi bonum. Et cum omne agens agat sibi simile, nihil etiam fit nisi secundum quod actu est; ac per hoc, secundum quod bonum est. Ex utraque ergo parte positio est impossibilis qua ponitur malum esse principium creationis malorum. Et huic rationi concordant verba Dionysii qui dicit, quod malum non agit nisi virtute boni, et quod malum est praeter intentionem et generationem. Second argument. Every agent acts forasmuch as it is in act, and consequently forasmuch as it is in some way perfect. Now forasmuch as a thing is evil it is not in act, since a thing is said to be evil through being in a state of potentiality, and deprived of its proper and due act. But forasmuch as a thing is in act, it is good; because in this respect it has perfection and entity, and it is in this that the good essentially consists. Therefore nothing acts forasmuch as it is evil, but everything acts inasmuch as it is good. Consequently there cannot be an active principle of things other than a good. And since every agent produces its like, nothing is produced except forasmuch as it is in act, and for this reason, forasmuch as it is good. On both sides therefore the position is shown to be untenable which holds evil to be the creative principle of evils. This argument agrees with the words of Dionysius (Divin. Nom. iv) who states that evil acts not save by virtue of a good, and that evil is outside the scope of intention and generation.
Tertia ratio est, quia, si diversa entia essent omnino a contrariis principiis in unum principium non reductis, non possent in unum ordinem concurrere nisi per accidens. Ex multis enim non fit coordinatio nisi per aliquem ordinantem, nisi forte multa casualiter in idem concurrant. Videmus autem corruptibilia et incorruptibilia, spiritualia et corporalia, perfecta et imperfecta in unum ordinem concurrere. Nam spiritualia movent corporalia, quod ad minus in homine apparet. Corruptibilia etiam per corpora incorruptibilia disponuntur, sicut patet in alterationibus elementorum a corporibus caelestibus. Nec potest dici, quod haec casualiter eveniant, nam non contingeret ita semper vel in maiori parte, sed solum in paucioribus. Oportet ergo omnia ista diversa in aliquod unum primum principium reducere a quo in unum ordinantur: unde philosophus concludit quod unus est principatus. Third argument. If diverse beings were to be exclusively to contrary principles without these being traced to one supreme principle, they could not possibly come together into one order except accidentally: because co-ordination of many things cannot result but from one co-ordinator, except by chance. Now we observe corruptible and incorruptible things, spiritual and corporal, perfect and imperfect coming together into one order. Thus the spiritual move the corporal: which is evident at least in man. Again things corruptible are controlled by incorruptible: as may be observed in the alterations of elements by heavenly bodies. Nor may it be said that such occurrences are fortuitous: for they would not happen always or for the most part, but only in the minority of cases. Consequently all these various things must be traced to one first principle whereby they are co-ordinated: and for this reason the Philosopher concludes (Metaph. xii, 10) that there is one ruler over all.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod malum, sicut supra ostensum est, cum non sit ens, sed defectus entis, non potest esse per se loquendo, factum; et pro tanto dicit Dionysius, quod bonum non est causa mali; non autem ad hoc quod malum in causam primam reducatur. Reply to the First Objection. As we have shown above, Avil is not a being but a lack of being, and consequently cannot be a per se effect. In this sense Dionysius says that good is not the cause of evil, and not as though evil were to be made a first cause.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod obiectio illa procedit de effectu qui potest per se causam habere. Tale autem non est malum: unde nec proprie effectus dici potest. Reply to the Second Objection. This argument. is true of an effect that can have a cause per se. Such is not evil: which therefore cannot properly speaking be described as an effect.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod, malum est incidens effectibus; sed non est factum, per se loquendo; quod ex hoc patet quod non est intentum. Nec tamen sequitur quod sit primum principium, nisi cum hoc adderetur quod malum esset natura quaedam. Sicut enim malum per hoc quod non est ens, sed entis privatio, caret propria ratione effectus; ita et multo amplius caret ratione causae, ut probatum est. Reply to the Third Objection. Evil is incidental to an effect, but it is not an effect properly speaking: this follows from the fact that it is not intended. And yet it does not follow that it is a first principle, unless it be added that evil is a nature. For just as evil, since it is not a being but a privation of being, lacks the essential condition of an effect, so and much more indeed does it lack the necessary condition of a cause, as we have shown.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod, secundum Augustinum, Deus est adeo bonus quod numquam aliquod malum esse permitteret, nisi esset adeo potens quod de quolibet malo posset elicere bonum. Unde nec propter impotentiam nec propter ignorantiam Dei est quod mala in mundo proveniunt; sed est ex ordine sapientiae suae et magnitudine bonitatis, ex qua provenit quod multiplicantur diversi gradus bonitatis in rebus; quorum multi deficerent, si nullum malum esse permitteret; non enim esset bonum patientiae, nisi accidente malo persecutionis; nec esset bonum conservationis vitae in leone, nisi esset malum corruptionis in animalibus ex quibus vivit. Reply to the Fourth Objection. According to Augustine (Enchir. xcvi): God is so good that never would he allow evil to exist, unless he were so powerful as to be able to draw good from evil. Hence it is due to neither impotence nor ignorance on God’s part that evils occur in the world, but it is owing to the order of his wisdom and to the greatness of his goodness, whence come the many and divers grades of goodness in things, many of which would be lacking were he to allow no evil to exist. Thus there would be no good of patience without the evil of persecution, nor the good of the preservation of its life in a lion, without the evil of the destruction of the animals on which it lives.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod malum nunquam invenitur nisi in paucioribus, si referuntur effectus ad causas proprias: quod quidem in naturalibus patet. Nam peccatum vel malum non accidit in actione naturae, nisi propter impedimentum superveniens illi causae agenti; quod quidem non est nisi in paucioribus, ut sunt monstra in natura, et alia huiusmodi. In voluntariis autem magis videtur malum esse ut in pluribus quantum ad factibilia, in quantum ars non deficit nisi ut in paucioribus, imitatur enim naturam. In agibilibus autem, circa quae sunt virtus et vitium, est duplex appetitus movens, scilicet rationalis et sensualis; et id quod est bonum secundum unum appetitum, est malum secundum alterum, sicut prosequi delectabilia est bonum secundum appetitum sensibilem, qui sensualitas dicitur, quamvis sit malum secundum appetitum rationis. Et quia plures sequuntur sensus quam rationem, ideo plures inveniuntur mali in hominibus quam boni. Sed tamen sequens appetitum rationis in pluribus bene se habet, et non nisi in paucioribus male. Reply to the Fifth Objection. Evil occurs in the minority of cases if we compare effects with their proper causes. This is clear in the process of nature: because there is no fault or evil in the action of nature, except when the active cause is affected by some impediment: and this is only in the minority of cases, as when nature produces monsters and the like. On the other hand in the domain of the will evil would seem to be of more frequent occurrence in things done than in things made, forasmuch as art through imitating nature fails only in the minority of cases. Whereas in actions which are affected by vice and virtue there is a twofold appetite moving man to action, to wit the rational and the sensual: and that which is good in relation to the one appetite is evil in relation to the other: thus the pursuit of pleasure is good with reference to the sensual appetite, which we call sensuality, whereas it is evil with reference to the appetite of reason. And seeing that the majority follow their senses rather than their reason, consequently bad men are more numerous than good. On the other hand he who follows his rational appetite behaves well more often than ill.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod duplex est causa per accidens. Una quae aliquid operatur ad effectum; sed dicitur causa eius per accidens, quia praeter intentionem ille effectus a tali causa sequitur; sicut patet in eo qui fodiendo sepulcrum, invenit thesaurum. Alia causa per accidens est quae nihil operatur ad effectum; sed ex eo quod accidit causae agenti, causa per accidens nominatur; sicut album dicitur esse causa domus per accidens, eo quod accidit aedificatori. Similiter duplex est effectus per accidens. Unus ad quem potest terminari actio causae, licet praeter eius intentionem accidat, sicut inventio thesauri; et talis effectus licet sit huiusmodi causae per accidens, potest esse alterius causae effectus per se. Hoc autem modo malum non habet causam per accidens; quia, sicut iam dictum est, non potest esse terminus alicuius actionis. Alius effectus per accidens est ad quem non terminatur actio alicuius agentis; sed ex eo quod accidit effectui, effectus per accidens nominatur; sicut album accidens domui, potest dici effectus per accidens aedificatoris; et sic nihil prohibet malum habere causam per accidens. Reply to the Sixth Objection. The accidental, cause is twofold. The one does something towards the effect, but is said to cause it accidentally, because the effect that ensues is not intended by it: such is the man who finds a treasure while digging a grave. The other does nothing towards the effect, but is called accidental because it is accidental to the active cause: thus white may be said to be the cause of the house, because it is an accident of the builder. Likewise the accidental effect is twofold. The one could be the term of the cause’s action, but occurs beside the cause’s intention, as, for instance, the finding of the treasure: such an effect, though accidental with regard to that cause, can be the per se effect of another cause. In this sense evil has no accidental cause, because as already stated it cannot be the term of an action. The other kind of accidental effect is one which is not the term of an agent’s action, but it is called an accidental effect because it is accidental to an effect: thus white that is accidental to a house may be said to be an accidental effect of the builder. In this sense nothing prevents evil from having an accidental cause.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod malum licet non sit natura aliqua, non est tamen negatio pura, sed est privatio; quae secundum philosophum est negatio alicui subiecto inhaerens: nam privatio est negatio in substantia; unde ex hoc ipso quod accidit alicui, potest ei causa per accidens assignari modo praedicto. Reply to the Seventh Objection. Evil, though it is not as nature, is not a pure negation but a privation: and this according to the Philosopher (Metaph. iv, 2) is a negation adhering to a subject, for privation is negation in a subject, so that inasmuch as it is accidental to something, it can have an accidental cause in the sense already explained.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod malum per prius inest Diabolo quam aliis, tempore, non natura, quasi malitia sit eius essentia vel accidens ex principiis propriae naturae derivatum. Nec obstat, si ipse est aliis peior, cum hoc non sit propter connaturalitatem malitiae ad ipsum, sed per accidens, quia amplius peccavit. Illa autem principia aliorum sunt de quibus aliquid maxime dicitur per se, et non secundum accidens. Reply to the Eighth Objection. Evil was in the devil before others in point of time; but not in point of nature, as though wickedness were his essence or an accident deriving from the principles of his nature. Nor does it matter that he,be worse than others, since this is not on account of any connaturality of wickedness to him, but is accidental through his having sinned more grievously. Now a thing is said to be a principle in relation to other things with regard to that which is said of it per se and not accidentally.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod ex perfectione boni est quod solum uno modo contingat; nam non potest esse aliquid perfectum, nisi omnibus concurrentibus ex quibus eius perfectio quasi integratur. Quodcumque autem eorum deficiat, est imperfectum, et per consequens malum; unde ex imperfectione mali est quod malum multipliciter contingit; et ideo malum habet minus de ratione entis quam bonum. Reply to the Ninth Objection. It is owing to its perfection that good happens in but one way: because a thing cannot be perfect unless all those conditions are fulfilled which combine together to make it perfect. If any of these be lacking the thing is imperfect and therefore evil: and consequently the imperfection of evil is the reason why evil is so manifold: and thus evil is less a being than good is.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod verbum philosophi est accipiendum secundum opinionem Pythagorae, qui posuit bonum et malum esse genera, ut prius dictum est. Habet tamen eius opinio aliquid veritatis. Nam cum bonum positive dicatur malum vero privative, ut dictum est; sicut omnis forma habet rationem boni, ita omnis privatio habet rationem mali; et sic bonum et malum quodammodo convertuntur cum ente et cum privatione entis. In quibuslibet autem contrariis, ut probatur in X Metaph., includitur privatio et habitus; et ideo semper alterum contrariorum quod est perfectius reducitur ad bonum; et alterum quod est imperfectius reducitur ad malum. Reply to the Tenth Objection. The statement of the Philosopher refers to the opinion of Pythagoras who maintained that good and evil are genera, as we have said above. This opinion, however, has some truth in it. For since, as we have observed, good indicates something positive whereas evil indicates a privation; just as every form is a good, so is every privation an evil, wherefore good and evil are in a sense convertible with being and privation of being. Now, it is shown in Metaph. x, 4, that in all contraries there is an implication of privation and habit, so that always the contrary that is the more perfect is reducible to a good, while the other which is less perfect is reducible to an evil.
Unde philosophus dicit, quod altera pars contrarietatis ad maleficium pertinet, et pro tanto bonum et malum possunt dici contrariorum genera. Hence the Philosopher (Phys. i, 9) says that one of two contraries is harmful: and in this sense good and evil may be described as contrary generically.
Ad undecimum dicendum, quod malum, quod est contrarium bono, non dicit privationem solam, sed habitum quemdam cum privatione; qui quidem habitus non habet rationem mali in quantum habet de ente, sed in quantum habet adiunctam privationem perfectionis debitae. Reply to the Eleventh Objection. The evil that is contrary to a good indicates not only a privation of that good, but a habit to which that privation is annexed: which habit is evil not by reason of its entity, but because it has annexed to it the privation of a due perfection.
Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod malum, in quantum est privatio sola, non ponitur differentia constitutiva habitus vitiosi, sed secundum quod adiungitur intentioni finis indebite, in qua non invenitur ratio mali ex fine intento, nisi in quantum cum hoc fine non potest stare debitus finis: sicut cum fine delectationis carnalis non potest stare bonum rationis. Ideo autem in habitibus animae specialiter bonum et malum poni dicuntur, quia morales actus, et per consequens habitus, specificantur ex fine, qui est quasi forma voluntatis, quae est principium proprium malorum actuum. Bonum vero et malum dicuntur per comparationem ad finem. Reply to the Twelfth Objection. Evil differentiates the vicious habit, not merely as a privation, but with the addition of the intention of an undue end, which intention does not include the notion of evil except in so far as the end in question is inconsistent with a due end: thus the end of carnal pleasure is inconsistent with the good dictated by reason. The reason why good and evil are assigned as specifying the habits of the soul is that moral acts, and consequently habits, are specified by the end, which is so to say the form of the will, the proper principle of evil deeds and good and evil denote relation to the end.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod non intelligitur contra malum esse bonum sicut unum principium primum contra aliud principium primum, sed sicut duo provenientia ex uno primo principio; quorum unum per se provenit, et aliud per accidens; quod patet ex eo quod subditur: et sic intuere in omnia opera altissimi, et cetera. Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. The meaning is not that good is set against evil as one first principle against another first principle, but that they both derive from one first principle, the one per se, the other accidentally: this is clear from what follows: And so look upon all the works of the Most High, etc.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod malum non intenditur per accessum ad aliquem terminum, sed per recessum ab aliquo termino: sicut enim dicitur aliquid bonum per participationem boni, ita dicitur malum per recessum a bono. Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. Evil is not intensified by approach to a term, but by recession from a term: for as a thing is said to be good as participating of goodness, so is it said to be evil as lacking in goodness.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod dominus per arborem bonam intelligit causam boni, non quidem primam, sed proximam ad aliquem singularem effectum; et simile est de arbore mala; unde per arborem malam haereticos vult intelligi, qui ex suis operibus cognoscuntur, quasi arbor ex fructibus: et hoc etiam patet per similitudinem attendenti; nam fructus non est arbor causa prima, sed radix. Si tamen per arborem universaliter omnem causam intelligamus, sicut Dionysius videtur accipere: tunc respondendum est, quod bonum non est per se causa mali, sicut ad primum dictum est. Reply to the, Fifteenth Objection. By the good tree our Lord means a cause of good, not the first cause but the second cause in relation to some particular effect: the same applies to the evil tree. Hence by the evil tree he indicates heretics who are known by their works, as a tree by its fruit. This is clear if we consider the comparison: for the first cause of the fruit is not the tree but the root. If, however, we take the tree to signify any cause, as Dionysius apparently does, then we reply as in the answer to the First Objection, that good is not the per se cause of evil.
Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod tenebrae, de quibus in principio creationis dicitur, non fuerunt aliqua creatura, sed sola carentia lucis in aere; non tamen malum, quia illa sola carentia boni et mali rationem inducit quae est eius quod potest et debet inesse. Non enim est malum in lapide, qui non habet sensum; vel in puero statim nato, qui non ambulat. Nec tamen ex imperfectione agentis provenit quod aerem sine luce creavit, sed ab eius sapientia: cuius ordo requirit quod aliquid ex imperfecto ad perfectum ducatur. Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. The darkness mentioned as existing at the beginning of the creation was not a creature, but simply the absence of light in the atmosphere. It was not however an evil, since absence of good is an evil only when that good can and ought to be present. Thus it is not an evil in a stone that it cannot sense, nor is it an evil in a newly born child that it cannot walk. Nor was it owing to imperfection in the active cause that the air was created without light, but through its wisdom that so orders things that they are brought from imperfection to perfection.
Ad decimumseptimum dicendum, quod obiectio illa procedit, ac si malum haberet causam per se, quod supra ostensum est falsum esse. Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. This argument supposes that evil has a cause per se: and we have shown this to be false.
Et similiter dicendum ad decimumoctavum. The Eighteenth Objection is met with the same reply.
Ad decimumnonum dicendum, quod aliter se habet natura ad generationem et corruptionem. Forma enim quae est terminus generationis, est per se intenta tam a natura universali quam a natura particulari: privatio vero est praeter intentionem naturae particularis; est autem secundum intentionem naturae universalis, non quidem ut per se intenta, sed quia sine privatione alicuius formae non potest alia forma introduci; et sic generatio est naturalis omnibus modis. Corruptio vero dicitur quandoque contra naturam, habito respectu ad naturam particularem. Reply to the Nineteenth Objection. Nature stands in relation to generation otherwise than to corruption. The form that is the term of generation is directly intended by nature both universal and particular, whereas privation of a form is beside the intention of a particular nature, although it is intended by universal nature, not indeed directly but as necessary for the introduction of another form. Hence generation is natural in every way, whereas corruption is sometimes against nature, if we refer it to a nature in particular.
Ad vicesimum dicendum, quod in actu peccati quidquid est entitatis vel actionis reducitur in Deum sicut in primam causam; quod vero est ibi deformitatis reducitur sicut in causam in liberum arbitrium; sicut quod est de gressu in claudicatione reducitur in virtutem motivam sicut in primam causam; quidquid autem est ibi obliquitatis provenit ex curvitate cruris. Reply to the Twentieth Objection. Whatever there is of entity or action in a sinful act is referred to God as first cause: while the element of deformity is referred to the free will as cause. Thus when a man limps his walking is due, to the motive power as first cause, but that he walks awry is due to a deformity in his leg.
Ad vicesimumprimum dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit de duobus agentibus omnino disparatis, non autem quando unum agens in alio operatur: sic enim potest unus eorum esse effectus. Deus autem in omni natura et voluntate operatur; unde ratio non sequitur. Reply to the Twenty-first Objection. This argument applies to two agents entirely unrelated, but not when one of them operates in the other: for then one effect can proceed from both. Now God operates in every nature and in every will: hence the argument does not prove.
Ad vicesimumsecundum dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit de agente per necessitatem naturae, quod si unum sit, unum effectum producit. Nec tamen oportet effectum esse simplicem sicut causam: quia nec in universalitate nec in simplicitate oportet effectum causae aequari. Deus vero non agit per necessitatem naturae, sed per voluntatem: unde potest simplicia et composita mutabilia et immutabilia facere. Reply to the Twenty-second Objection. This argument refers to an agent that acts of natural necessity: and one such agent is confined to one effect. Nor does it follow that an effect must be simple because its cause is simple: because an effect need not equal its cause either in universality or in simplicity. But God does not act of natural necessity, but of his own will: wherefore he is able to make both simple things and composite things, things mutable and things immutable.
Ad vicesimumtertium dicendum, quod macula in anima non ponit naturam aliquam, sed solam gratiae privationem, tamen cum respectu ad actum peccati praecedentem, qui huius privationis causa fuit vel esse potuit: et sic non oportet quod habeat maculam alicuius peccati, qui actum peccati illius non commisit. Reply to the Twenty-third Objection. The stain of sin does not impose a nature on the soul, but only the privation of grace: which privation is referred to the preceding sinful act, that caused or might have caused it. Consequently it does not follow that one who has not committed the act of a particular sin, has the stain of that sin.
Ad vicesimumquartum dicendum, quod opera Dei perseverant in aeternum, non secundum numerum, sed secundum speciem vel genus, et secundum substantiam, non secundum modum essendi: praeterit enim figura huius mundi, ut dicitur I Cor. VII, 31. Reply to the Twenty-fourth Objection. God’s works continue for ever not in number but in species or genus; in their substance, but not in their mode of being, for the fashion of this world passes away (1 Cor. vii, 31).
Ad vicesimumquintum dicendum, quod Deus licet sit spiritus, habet tamen in sua sapientia rationes corporum, quibus corpora assimilantur per modum quo artificiata artifici similantur quantum ad suam artem; nihilominus tamen corpora Deo similantur quantum ad eius naturam, in quantum sunt et bona sunt et unitatem aliquam habent. Reply to the Twenty-fifth Objection. Although God is a spirit his wisdom contains the ideas of bodies; and bodies are made like them in the same way as a craftsman’s work is like him in respect of his art. However, bodies are like God in respect of his nature, in so far as they have being, goodness and a certain unity.
Ad vicesimumsextum dicendum, quod natura non facit semper quod melius est habito respectu ad partem, sed habito respectu ad totum; alias totum corpus hominis faceret oculum vel cor; hoc enim unicuique partium melius esset, sed non toti. Similiter licet melius esset alicui rei quod in altiori ordine poneretur, non tamen esset melius universo, quod imperfectum remaneret, si omnes creaturae unius ordinis essent. Reply to the Twenty-sixth Objection. Nature always does what is best, not with regard to the part but with regard to the whole: otherwise it would make a man’s body all eye or all heart: for it would be better for the part but not for the whole. In like manner, although it would be better for this or that thing to be placed in a higher order, it would not be better for the universe, which would remain imperfect if all creatures were of one order.
Q. III:
ARTICLE VII
Does God Work in Operations of Nature?

[ Sum. Th. I, Q. cv, A. 5: C.G. III. lxvii; I-II, Q. x, art. 4]
Septimo quaeritur utrum Deus operetur in operatione naturae. Et videtur quod non. THE seventh point of inquiry is whether God works in the operations of nature: and apparently the answer should be in the negative.
Natura enim neque deficit in necessariis neque abundat in superfluis. Sed ad actionem naturalem sufficit virtus activa ex parte agentis, et passiva ex parte recipientis. Ergo non requiritur virtus divina in rebus operans. 1. Nature neither fails in necessary things nor abounds in the superfluous. Now the action of nature requires nothing more than an active force in the agent, and passivity in the recipient. Therefore there is no need for the divine power to operate in things.
Sed dices, quod virtus activa naturae dependet in sua operatione ab operatione divina.- Sed contra, sicut operatio naturae creatae dependet ab operatione divina, ita operatio corporis elementaris dependet ab operatione corporis caelestis: nam corpus caeleste comparatur ad corpus elementare sicut causa prima ad secundam. Non autem dicitur, quod corpus caeleste operetur in quolibet corpore elementari agente. Ergo non est dicendum, quod Deus operetur in qualibet operatione naturae. 2. It may be replied that the active force of nature depends in its operation on the operation of God.—On the contrary as the operation of created nature depends on the divine operation, so the operation of an elemental body depends on the operation of a heavenly body: because the heavenly body stands in relation to the elemental body, as a first to a second cause. Now no one maintains that the heavenly body operates in every action of an elemental body. Therefore we must not say that God operates in every operation of nature.
Praeterea, si Deus operatur in qualibet operatione naturae, aut una et eadem operatione operatur Deus et natura, aut diversis. Sed non una et eadem: unitas enim operationis attestatur unitati naturae; unde quia in Christo sunt duae naturae, sunt etiam ibi duae operationes: creaturae autem et Dei constat non esse unam naturam. Similiter nec est possibile quod sint operationes diversae: nam diversae operationes non videntur ad idem factum terminari; cum motus et operationes penes terminos distinguantur. Ergo nullo modo est possibile quod Deus in natura operetur. 3. If God operates in every operation of nature God’s operation and nature’s are either one and the same operation or they are distinct. They are not one and the same: since unity of operation proves unity of nature: wherefore as in Christ there are two natures, so also are there two operations: and it is clear that God’s nature and man’s are not the same. Nor can they be two distinct operations: because distinct operations cannot seemingly terminate in one and the same product, since movements and operations are diversified by their terms. Therefore it is altogether impossible that God operate in nature.
Sed dices, quod duae operationes possunt terminari ad idem, quae se habent secundum prius et posterius. —Sed contra, ea quae immediate se habent ad aliquid unum, non habent ad invicem ordinem. Sed tam Deus quam natura immediate operatur effectum naturalem. Ergo operatio Dei et operatio naturae non se habent secundum prius et posterius. 4. It will be replied that two operations can have the same term, if one is subordinate to the other.—On the contrary, when several things are immediately related to some one thing, one is not subordinate to the other. Now both God and nature produce the natural effect immediately. Therefore of God’s operation and nature’s one is not subordinate to the other.
Praeterea, quandocumque Deus aliquam naturam instituit, ex hoc ipso dat ei omnia illa quae sunt de ratione illius naturae; sicut ex hoc ipso quod facit hominem, dat ei animam rationalem. Sed de ratione virtutis est quod sit principium agendi, cum virtus sit ultimum potentiae, quae est principium agendi in alio secundum quod est aliud, ut dicitur in V Metaph. Ergo ex hoc ipso quod virtutes naturales rebus indidit, dedit eis quod operationes naturales perficerent. Non ergo oportet quod ulterius in rebus naturalibus operetur. 5. Whenever God fashions a nature, by that very fact he gives it all that belongs essentially to that nature: thus by the very fact that he makes a man he gives him a rational soul. Now strength is essentially a principle of action, since it is the perfection of power, and power is a principle of acting on another which is distinct (Metaph. v,12). Therefore by implanting natural forces in things, he enabled them to perform their natural operations. Hence there is no need for him also to operate in nature.
Sed dices, quod virtutes naturales non possent durare, sicut nec alia entia, nisi virtute divina continerentur.- Sed contra, non est idem operari ad rem et operari in re. Sed operatio Dei qua virtutem naturalem vel facit vel in esse conservat, est operatio ad illam virtutem constituendam vel conservandam. Non ergo propter hoc potest dici, quod Deus in virtute naturali operante operetur. 6. It might be replied that natural forces like other beings cannot last unless they be upheld by the divine power.—On the contrary, to operate on a thing is not the same as to operate in it. Now the operation whereby God either produces or preserves the forces of nature, has its effect on those forces by producing or preserving them. Therefore this does not prove that God works in the operations of nature.
Praeterea, si Deus in natura operante operatur, oportet quod operando aliquid rei naturali tribuat: nam agens, agendo, aliquid actu facit. Aut ergo illud sufficit ad hoc quod natura possit per se operari, aut non. Si sufficit, cum etiam virtutem naturalem Deus naturae tribuerit, eadem ratione potest dici quod et virtus naturalis sufficiebat ad agendum: nec oportebit quod Deus, postquam virtutem naturae contulit, ulterius ad eius operationem aliquid operetur. Si autem non sufficit, oportet quod ibi aliquid aliud iterum faciat; et si illud non sufficit, iterum aliud, et sic in infinitum; quod est impossibile. Nam unus effectus non potest dependere ab actionibus infinitis: quia cum infinita non sit pertransire, nunquam compleretur. Ergo standum est in primo, dicendo quod virtus naturalis sufficit ad actionem naturalem, sine hoc quod Deus in ea ulterius operetur. 7. If God works in the operations of nature, it follows that by so doing be imparts something to the natural agent: since every agent by acting makes something to be actual. Either then this something suffices for nature to be able to operate by itself, or it does not suffice. If it suffices, then since God also gave nature its natural forces, for the same reason we may say that the natural forces were sufficient for nature to act: and there will be no further need for God to do anything towards nature’s operation besides giving nature the natural forces. If on the other hand it does not suffice, he will need to do something more, and if this is not sufficient, more still and so on indefinitely, which is impossible: because one effect cannot depend on an infinite number of actions, for, since it is not possible to pass through an infinite number of things, it would never materialise. Therefore we must accept the alternative, namely that the forces of nature suffice for the action of nature without God operating therein.
Praeterea, posita causa ex necessitate naturae agente, sequitur eius actio nisi per accidens impediatur, eo quod natura est determinata ad unum. Si ergo calor ignis agit ex necessitate naturae: ergo posito calore, sequitur calefactio, nec requiritur aliqua virtus superior agens in ipso. 8. Further, given a cause that acts of natural necessity, its action follows unless it be hindered accidentally, because nature is confined to one effect. If, then, the heat of fire acts of natural necessity, given heat, the action of heating follows, and there is no need of a higher power to work in the heat.
Praeterea, ea quae sunt omnino disparata, possunt ab invicem separari. Sed actio Dei et actio naturae sunt omnino disparatae; cum Deus agat per voluntatem, natura vero per necessitatem. Ergo actio Dei potest separari ab actione naturae; et ita non oportet quod Deus in natura agente operetur. 9. Things that are altogether disparate can be separate from each other. Now God’s action and nature’s are altogether disparate, since God acts by his will and nature by necessity. Therefore God’s action can be separated from the action of nature, and consequently he need not operate in the action of nature.
Praeterea, creatura in se considerata, Dei similitudinem habet, in quantum actu est, et actu agit; et secundum hoc est divinae bonitatis particeps. Hoc autem non esset, si virtus sua ad agendum non sufficeret. Sufficit ergo creatura ad agendum sine hoc quod Deus in ea operetur. 10. A creature, considered as such, is like God inasmuch as it actually exists and acts: and in this respect it participates of the divine goodness. But this would not be so if its own forces were not sufficient for it to act. Therefore a creature is sufficiently equipped for action without God’s operation therein.
Praeterea, duo Angeli in uno loco esse non possunt, ut a quibusdam dicitur, ne operationum confusio sequatur; quia Angelus ubi est, ibi operatur. Plus autem distat Deus a natura quam unus Angelus ab alio. Ergo Deus non potest simul in eodem cum natura operari. 11. Two angels cannot be in the same place, according to some, lest confusion of action should result: because an angel is where he operates. Now God is more distant from nature than one angel from another. Therefore God cannot operate in the same action with nature.
Praeterea, Eccli. XI, 14, dicitur, quod Deus fecit hominem, et reliquit eum in manu consilii sui. Non autem reliquisset, si semper in voluntate operaretur. Ergo non operatur in voluntate operante. 12. Moreover, it is written (Ecclus. xv, 14) that God made man and left him in the hand of his own counsel. But he would not have so left him, if he always operated in man’s will. Therefore he does not operate in the operation of the will.
Praeterea, voluntas est domina sui actus. Hoc autem non esset, si agere non posset nisi Deo in ipsa operante; cum voluntas nostra non sit domina divinae operationis. Ergo Deus non operatur in voluntate nostra operante. 13. The will is master of its own action. But this would not be the case, if it were unable to act without God operating in it, for our will is not master of the divine operation. Therefore God does not operate in the operation of the win.
Praeterea, liberum est quod causa sui est, ut dicitur in I Metaph. Quod ergo non potest agere nisi causa in ipso agente non est liberum in agendo. Sed voluntas nostra est libera in agendo. Ergo potest agere, nulla alia causa in ipsa operante: et sic idem quod prius. 14. To be free is to be the cause of one’s own action (Metaph. i, 2). Consequently that which cannot act without receiving the action of another cause is not free to act: now man’s will is free to act. Therefore it can act without any other cause operating in it: and the same conclusion follows.
Praeterea, causa prima plus est influens in causatum quam causa secunda. Si ergo Deus operetur in voluntate et natura, sicut causa prima in secunda; sequeretur quod defectus qui accidunt in operatione voluntatis et naturae, magis Deo quam naturae vel voluntati attribuerentur; quod est inconveniens. 15. A first cause enters more into the effect than does a second cause. If, then, God operates in will and nature as a first in a second cause, it follows that the defects that occur in voluntary and natural actions are to be ascribed to God rather than to nature or will: and this is absurd.
Praeterea, posita causa sufficienter operante, superfluum est alterius causae operationem ponere. Sed constat, si Deus operetur in natura et voluntate, quod sufficienter operatur. Ergo superflueret omnis operatio naturae et voluntatis. Cum ergo in natura nihil sit superfluum; nec natura nec voluntas aliquid operaretur, sed solus Deus. Hoc autem est inconveniens. Ergo et primum, scilicet quod Deus in natura et voluntate operetur. 16. Given a cause whose action suffices, it is superfluous., to require the action of another cause. Now it is clear, that if God operates in nature and will, his action is sufficient, since God’s works are Perfect (Deut. xxii, 4). Therefore all action of nature and will would be superfluous. But nothing in nature is superfluous, and consequently neither nature nor will would do anything, and God alone would act. This, however, is absurd: therefore it is also absurd to state that God operates in nature and will.
Sed contra. Est quod dicitur Is. XXVI, vers. 12: omnia opera nostra operatus es in nobis, domine. On the contrary it is written (Isa. xxvi, 12) : Lord, thou hast wrought all our works in us.
Praeterea, sicut ars praesupponit naturam, ita natura praesupponit Deum. Sed in operatione artis operatur natura; non enim sine operatione naturae, artis operatio efficitur, sicut igne emollitur ferrum ut percussione fabri extendatur. Ergo et Deus in operatione naturae operatur. Moreover, even as art presupposes nature, so does nature presuppose God. Now nature operates in the operations of art: since art does not work without the concurrence of nature: thus fire softens the iron so as to render it malleable under the stroke of the smith. Therefore God also operates in the operation of nature.
Praeterea, secundum philosophum, homo generat hominem et sol. Sed sicut operatio hominis in generatione dependet ab actione solis, ita et multo amplius actio naturae dependet ab actione Dei. Ergo quidquid operatur natura etiam Deus operatur. Again, according to the Philosopher (Phys. ii, 2) man and the sun generate man. Now just as the generative act in man depends on the action of the sun, so and much more does the action of nature depend on the action of God. Therefore in every action of nature God operates also.
Praeterea, nihil potest operari nisi sit ens. Sed natura non potest esse nisi Deo operante; in nihilum enim decideret nisi divinae potentiae actione conservaretur in esse, ut patet per Augustinum super Genes. ad litteram. Ergo natura non potest agere nisi Deo agente. Further, nothing can act except what exists. Now nature cannot exist except through God’s action, for it would fall into nothingness were it not preserved in being by the action of the divine power, as Augustine states (Gen. ad lit.). Therefore nature cannot act unless God act also.
Praeterea, virtus Dei est in qualibet re naturali, quia Deus in omnibus rebus esse dicitur per essentiam et potentiam et praesentiam. Sed non est dicendum quod virtus divina secundum quod est in rebus sit otiosa. Ergo secundum quod est in natura operatur. Nec potest dici quod aliud quam ipsa natura operetur, cum non appareat ibi nisi una operatio. Ergo in qualibet naturae operatione Deus operatur. Again, God’s power is in every natural thing, since he is in all things by his essence, his presence and his power. Now it cannot be admitted that God’s power forasmuch as it is in things is not operative: and consequently it operates as being in nature. And it cannot be said to operate something besides what nature operates, since evidently there is but one operation. Therefore God works in every operation of nature.
Respondeo. Dicendum, quod simpliciter concedendum est Deum operari in natura et voluntate operantibus. Sed quidam hoc non intelligentes, in errorem inciderunt: attribuentes Deo hoc modo omnem naturae operationem quod res penitus naturalis nihil ageret per virtutem propriam; et ad hoc quidem ponendum sunt diversis rationibus moti. Quidam enim loquentes in lege Maurorum, ut Rabbi Moyses narrat, dixerunt, omnes huiusmodi naturales formas accidentia esse: et cum accidens in aliud subiectum transire non possit, impossibile reputabant quod res naturalis per formam suam aliquo modo induceret similem formam in alio subiecto; unde dicebant quod ignis non calefacit, sed Deus creat calorem in re calefacta. Sed si obiiceretur contra eos, quod ex applicatione ignis ad calefactibile, semper sequatur calefactio, nisi per accidens esset aliquid impedimentum igni, quod ostendit ignem esse causam caloris per se; dicebant, quod Deus ita statuit ut iste cursus servaretur in rebus, quod nunquam ipse calorem causaret nisi apposito igne; non quod ignis appositus aliquid ad calefactionem faceret. Haec autem positio est manifeste repugnans sensui: nam cum sensus non sentiat nisi per hoc quod a sensibili patitur (quod etsi in visu sit dubium, propter eos qui visum extra mittendo fieri dicunt, in tactu et in aliis sensibus est manifestum), sequitur quod homo non sentiat calorem ignis si per ignem agentem non sit similitudo caloris ignis in organo sentiendi. Si enim illa species caloris in organo ab alio agente fieret, tactus etsi sentiret calorem, non tamen sentiret calorem ignis nec sentiret ignem esse calidum, cum tamen hoc iudicet sensus, cuius iudicium in proprio sensibili non errat. I answer that we must admit without any qualification that God operates in the operations of nature and will. Some, however, through failing to understand this aright fell into error, and ascribed to God every operation of nature in the sense that nature does nothing at all by its own power. They were led to hold this opinion by various arguments. Thus according to Rabbi Moses some of the sages in the Moorish books of law asserted that all these natural forms are accidents, and since an accident cannot pass from one subject to another, they deemed it impossible for a natural agent by its form to produce in any way a similar form in another subject, and consequently they said that fire does not heat but God creates heat in that which is made hot. And if it were objected to them, that a thing becomes hot whenever it is placed near the fire, unless some obstacle be in the way, which shows that fire is the per se cause of heat; they replied that God established the order to be observed according to which he would never cause heat except at the presence of fire: and that the fire itself would have no part in the action of heating. This opinion, is manifestly opposed to the nature of sensation: for since the senses do not perceive unless they are acted upon by the sensible object—which is clearly true in regard to touch and the other senses except sight, since some maintain that this is effected by the visual organ projecting itself on to the object—it would follow that a man does not feel the fire’s heat, if the action of the fire does not produce in the sensorial organ a likeness of the heat that is in the fire. In fact if this heat-species be produced in the organ by another agent, although the touch would sense the heat, it would not sense the heat of the fire, nor would it perceive that the fire is hot, and yet the sense judges this to be the case, and the senses do not err about their proper object.
Repugnat etiam rationi, per quam ostenditur in rebus naturalibus nihil esse frustra. Nisi autem res naturales aliquid agerent, frustra essent eis formae et virtutes naturales collatae: sicut si cultellus non incideret, frustra haberet acumen. Frustra etiam requireretur appositio ignis ad ligna, si Deus absque igne ligna combureret. It is also opposed to reason which convinces us that nothing in nature is void of purpose. Now unless natural things had an action of their own the forms and forces with which they are endowed would be to no purpose; thus if a knife does not cut, its sharpness is useless. It would also be useless to set fire to the coal, if God ignites the coal without fire.
Repugnat etiam divinae bonitati, quae sui communicativa est; ex quo factum est quod res Deo similes fierent non solum in esse, sed etiam in agere. It is also opposed to God’s goodness which is self-communicative: the result being that things were made like God not only in being but also in acting.
Ratio vero quam pro se inducunt, est omnino frivola. Nam cum dicitur accidens de subiecto in subiectum aliud non transire, intelligitur de accidente eodem secundum numerum, non quia simile accidens secundum speciem possit induci in aliud subiectum virtute accidentis quod alicui subiecto naturali inest. Et hoc est necesse in omni actione naturali contingere. Falsum etiam est quod supponunt, omnes formas esse accidentia: quia sic nullum esset in rebus naturalibus esse substantiale, cuius principium forma accidentalis esse non potest, sed substantialis tantum. Periret etiam generatio et corruptio, et multa alia inconvenientia sequerentur. The argument which they put forward is altogether frivolous. When we say that an accident does not pass from one subject to another, this refers to the same identical accident, and we do not deny that an accident subjected in a natural thing can produce an accident of like species in another subject: indeed this happens of necessity in every natural action. Moreover, they suppose that all forms are accidents, and this is not true: because then in natural things there would be no substantial being, the principle of which cannot be an accidental but only a substantial form. Moreover, this would make an end of generation and corruption: and many other absurdities would follow.
Avicebron etiam in libro fontis vitae dicit, quod nulla substantia corporalis agit, sed vis spiritualis penetrans per omnia corpora agit in eis, et tanto corpus aliquod est magis activum quanto est purius et subtilius et per consequens a virtute spirituali penetrabilius. Et ad hoc inducit tres rationes: quarum prima est, quod omne agens post Deum requirit subiectam materiam in quam agat; corporali autem substantiae non subiicitur aliqua materia, et sic videtur quod agere non possit. Secunda est quia quantitas impedit actionem et motum: cuius signum ponit, quia multitudo quantitatis retardat motum et addit corpori gravitatem; et ita substantia corporalis quae est implicita quantitati, agere non potest. Tertia ratio est, quod substantia corporalis est remotissima a primo agente, quod est agens tantum et non patiens, substantiae autem mediae sunt agentes et patientes; unde oportet substantiam corporalem, quae est ultima, esse patientem tantum et non agentem. Avicebron (Fons Vitae) says that no corporeal substance acts, but that a spiritual energy penetrating all bodies acts in them, and that the measure of a body’s activity is according to the measure of its purity and subtlety, whereby it is rendered amenable to the influence of a spiritual force. He supports his statement by three arguments. His first argument is that every agent after God requires subject-matter on which to act: and no corporeal agent has matter subject to it, wherefore seemingly it cannot act. His second argument is that quantity hinders action and movement: in proof of which he points out that a bulky body is slow of movement and heavy: wherefore a corporeal substance being inseparable from quantity cannot act. His third argument is that the corporeal substance is furthest removed from the first agent, which is purely active and nowise passive, while the intermediate substances are both active and passive: and therefore corporeal substances which come last, must needs be passive only and not active.
Sed in hoc est manifesta deceptio ex hoc quod accipitur tota substantia corporalis quasi una et eadem numero substantia, ac si non esset secundum esse substantiale distincta sed solo accidente. Si enim diversae substantiae corporales substantialiter distinctae accipiantur, tunc non quaelibet substantia corporalis erit ultima entium et remotissima a primo agente, sed una erit alia superior et primo agenti propinquior, et sic una in alia agere poterit. Item in praedictis consideratur substantia corporalis tantum secundum rationem materiae, et non ratione suae formae, cum tamen ex utroque sit composita. Substantiae enim corporali competit esse ultimum entium, et non habere inferius subiectum, ratione materiae, non autem ratione formae; quia ratione formae est inferius subiectum omnis substantia in cuius materia est in potentia forma illa quam haec res designata habet in actu. Et inde sequitur quod est mutua actio in substantiis corporalibus, cum in materia unius sit in potentia forma alterius, et e converso. Si autem ipsa forma non est sufficiens ad agendum eadem ratione nec vis substantiae spiritualis, quam corporalis substantia per modum suum necesse est quod recipiat. Quantitas etiam non tollit motum et actionem, cum nihil moveatur nisi quantum ut in VI Physic. probatur. Nec est verum quod quantitas sit causa gravitatis. Hoc enim reprobatur in IV Cael. et mundi. Unde et quantitas addit in velocitatem motus naturalis; nam corpus grave quanto est maius, tanto velocius deorsum fertur, et similiter leve sursum. Licet etiam quantitas secundum se non sit actionis principium non tamen potest assignari ratio quare actionem impediat, cum magis sit quoddam instrumentum qualitatis activae, nisi quatenus formae activae in materia subiecta quantitati receptae, esse quoddam limitatum recipiunt et individuatum ad materiam illam, ut sic per actionem in aliam materiam non se extendat. Sed quamvis esse individuatum in materia consequantur, rationem tamen speciei non amittunt, ex qua simile sibi in specie producere possunt, licet ipsaemet in alio subiecto esse non possint. Non ergo sic est intelligendum quod Deus in omni re naturali operetur, quasi res naturalis nihil operetur; sed quia in ipsa natura vel voluntate operante Deus operatur: quod quidem qualiter intelligi possit, ostendendum est. Now all this is manifestly fallacious in that he takes all corporeal substances as one single substance; and as though they differed from one another only in accidental and not in their substantial being. If the various corporeal substances be taken as substantially distinct, every one will not occupy the last place and the furthest removed from the first agent, but one will be higher than another and nearer to the first agent, so that one will be able to act on another. Again in the foregoing arguments the corporeal substance is considered only in respect of its matter and not in respect of its form, whereas it is composed of both. It is true that the corporeal substance belongs to the lowest grade of beings, and has no subject beneath it, but this is by reason of its matter, not of its form: because in respect of its form a corporeal substance has an inferior subject in any other substance whose matter has potentially that form which the corporeal substance in question has actually. Hence it follows that there is mutual action in corporeal substances, since in the matter of one there is potentially the form of another, and vice versa. And if this form does not suffice to act, for the same reason neither does the energy of a spiritual substance, which the corporeal substance must needs receive according to its mode.—Nor does quantity hinder movement and action, since nothing is moved but that which has quantity (Phys. vi, 10). Nor is it true that quantity causes weight. This is disproved in De Coelo iv, 2. In fact, quantity increases the speed of natural movement, thus a weighty body, the greater it is, the greater the velocity of its downward movement, and in like manner that of a light body in its movement upwards. And although quantity in itself is not a principle of action, no reason can be given why it should hinder action, seeing that rather is it the instrument of an active quality; except in so far as active forms in quantitative matter receive a certain limited being that is confined to that particular matter, so that their action does not extend to an extraneous matter. But though they receive individual being in matter, they retain their specific nature, by reason whereof they can produce their like in species, and yet are unable themselves to be in another subject. Hence we are to understand that God works in every natural thing not as though the natural thing were altogether inert, but because God works in both nature and will when they work. How this may be we must now explain.
Sciendum namque est, quod actionis alicuius rei res alia potest dici causa multipliciter. Uno modo quia tribuit ei virtutem operandi; sicut dicitur in IV Physic., quod generans movet grave et leve, in quantum dat virtutem per quam consequitur talis motus: et hoc modo Deus agit omnes actiones naturae, quia dedit rebus naturalibus virtutes per quas agere possunt, non solum sicut generans virtutem tribuit gravi et levi, et eam ulterius non conservat, sed sicut continue tenens virtutem in esse, quia est causa virtutis collatae, non solum quantum ad fieri sicut generans, sed etiam quantum ad esse, ut sic possit dici Deus causa actionis in quantum causat et conservat virtutem naturalem in esse. Nam etiam alio modo conservans virtutem dicitur facere actionem, sicut dicitur quod medicinae conservantes visum, faciunt videre. Sed quia nulla res per se ipsam movet vel agit nisi sit movens non motum. Tertio modo dicitur una res esse causa actionis alterius in quantum movet eam ad agendum; in quo non intelligitur collatio aut conservatio virtutis activae, sed applicatio virtutis ad actionem; sicut homo est causa incisionis cultelli ex hoc ipso quod applicat acumen cultelli ad incidendum movendo ipsum. Et quia natura inferior agens non agit nisi mota, eo quod huiusmodi corpora inferiora sunt alterantia alterata; caelum autem est alterans non alteratum, et tamen non est movens nisi motum, et hoc non cessat quousque perveniatur ad Deum: sequitur de necessitate quod Deus sit causa actionis cuiuslibet rei naturalis ut movens et applicans virtutem ad agendum. Sed ulterius invenimus, secundum ordinem causarum, esse ordinem effectuum, quod necesse est propter similitudinem effectus et causae. Nec causa secunda potest in effectum causae primae per virtutem propriam, quamvis sit instrumentum causae primae respectu illius effectus. Instrumentum enim est causa quodammodo effectus principalis causae, non per formam vel virtutem propriam, sed in quantum participat aliquid de virtute principalis causae per motum eius, sicut dolabra non est causa rei artificiatae per formam vel virtutem propriam, sed per virtutem artificis a quo movetur et eam quoquomodo participat. Unde quarto modo unum est causa actionis alterius, sicut principale agens est causa actionis instrumenti; et hoc modo etiam oportet dicere, quod Deus est causa omnis actionis rei naturalis. Quanto enim aliqua causa est altior, tanto est communior et efficacior, et quanto est efficacior, tanto profundius ingreditur in effectum, et de remotiori potentia ipsum reducit in actum. In qualibet autem re naturali invenimus quod est ens et quod est res naturalis, et quod est talis vel talis naturae. Quorum primum est commune omnibus entibus; secundum omnibus rebus naturalibus; tertium in una specie; et quartum, si addamus accidentia, est proprium huic individuo. Hoc ergo individuum agendo non potest constituere aliud in simili specie nisi prout est instrumentum illius causae, quae respicit totam speciem et ulterius totum esse naturae inferioris. Et propter hoc nihil agit ad speciem in istis inferioribus nisi per virtutem corporis caelestis, nec aliquid agit ad esse nisi per virtutem Dei. Ipsum enim esse est communissimus effectus primus et intimior omnibus aliis effectibus; et ideo soli Deo competit secundum virtutem propriam talis effectus: unde etiam, ut dicitur in Lib. de causis, intelligentia non dat esse, nisi prout est in ea virtus divina. Sic ergo Deus est causa omnis actionis, prout quodlibet agens est instrumentum divinae virtutis operantis. Sic ergo si consideremus supposita agentia, quodlibet agens particulare est immediatum ad suum effectum. It must be observed that one thing may be the cause of another’s action in several ways. First, by giving it the power to act: thus it is said that the generator moves heavy and light bodies, inasmuch as it gives them the power from which that movement results. In this way God causes all the actions of nature, because he gave natural things the forces whereby they are able to act, not only as the generator gives power to heavy and light bodies yet does not preserve it, but also as upholding its very being, forasmuch as he is the cause of the power bestowed, not only like the generator in its becoming, but also in its being; and thus God may be said to be the cause of an action by both causing and upholding the natural power in its being. For secondly, the preserver of a power is said to cause the action; thus a remedy that preserves the sight is said to make a man see. But since nothing moves or acts of itself unless it be an unmoved mover; thirdly, a thing is said to cause another’s action by moving it to act: whereby we do not mean that it causes or preserves the active power, but that it applies the power to action, even as a man causes the knife’s cutting by the very fact that he applies the sharpness of the knife to cutting by moving it to cut. And since the lower nature in acting does not act except through being moved, because these lower bodies are both subject to and cause alteration: whereas the heavenly body causes alteration without being subject to it, and yet it does not cause movement unless it be itself moved, so that we must eventually trace its movement to God, it follows of necessity that God causes the action of every natural thing by moving and applying its power to action. Furthermore we find that the order of effects follows the order of causes, and this must needs be so on account of the likeness of the effect to its cause. Nor can the second cause by its own power have any influence on the effect of the first cause, although it is the instrument of the first cause in regard to that effect: because an instrument is in a manner the cause of the principal cause’s effect, not by its own form or power, but in so far as it participates somewhat in the power of the principal cause through being moved thereby: thus the axe is the cause of the craftsman’s handiwork not by its own form or power, but by the power of the craftsman who moves it so that it participates in his power. Hence, fourthly, one thing causes the action of another, as a principal agent causes the action of its instrument: and in this way again we must say that God causes every action of natural things. For the higher the cause the greater its scope and efficacity: and the more efficacious the cause, the more deeply does it penetrate into its effect, and the more remote the potentiality from which it brings that effect into act. Now in every natural thing we find that it is a being, a natural thing, and of this or that nature. The first is common to all beings, the second to all natural things, the third to all the members of a species, while a fourth, if we take accidents, into account, is proper to this or that individual. Accordingly this or that individual thing cannot by its action produce another individual of the same species except as the instrument of that cause which includes in its scope the whole species and, besides, the whole being of’ the inferior creature. Wherefore no action in these lower bodies attains to the production of a species except through the power of the heavenly body, nor does anything produce being except by the power of God. For being is the most common first effect and more intimate than all other effects: wherefore it is an effect which it belongs to God alone to produce by his own power: and for this reason (De Causis, prop. ix) an intelligence does not give being, except the divine power be therein. Therefore God is the cause of every action, inasmuch as every agent is an instrument of the divine power operating.
Si autem consideremus virtutem qua fit actio, sic virtus superioris causae erit immediatior effectui quam virtus inferioris; nam virtus inferior non coniungitur effectui nisi per virtutem superioris; unde dicitur in Lib. de Caus., quod virtus causae primae prius agit in causatum, et vehementius ingreditur in ipsum. Sic ergo oportet virtutem divinam adesse cuilibet rei agenti, sicut virtutem corporis caelestis oportet adesse cuilibet corpori elementari agenti. Sed in hoc differt; quia ubicumque est virtus divina, est essentia divina; non autem essentia corporis caelestis est ubicumque est sua virtus: et iterum Deus est sua virtus, non autem corpus caeleste. Et ideo potest dici quod Deus in qualibet re operatur in quantum eius virtute quaelibet res indiget ad agendum: non autem potest proprie dici quod caelum semper agat in corpore elementari, licet eius virtute corpus elementare agat. Sic ergo Deus est causa actionis cuiuslibet in quantum dat virtutem agendi, et in quantum conservat eam, et in quantum applicat actioni, et in quantum eius virtute omnis alia virtus agit. Et cum coniunxerimus his, quod Deus sit sua virtus, et quod sit intra rem quamlibet non sicut pars essentiae, sed sicut tenens rem in esse, sequetur quod ipse in quolibet operante immediate operetur, non exclusa operatione voluntatis et naturae. If, then, we consider the subsistent agent, every particular agent is immediate to its effect: but if we consider the power whereby the action is done, then the power of the higher cause is more immediate to the effect than the power of the lower cause; since the power of the lower cause is not coupled with its effect save by the power of the higher cause: wherefore it is said in De Causis (prop. i) that the power of the first cause takes the first place in the production of the effect and enters more deeply therein. Accordingly the divine power must needs be present to every acting thing, even as the power of the heavenly body must needs be present to every acting elemental body. Yet there is a difference in that wherever the power of God is there is his essence, whereas the essence of the heavenly body is not wherever its power is: and again God is his own power, whereas the heavenly body is not its own power. Consequently we may say that God works in everything forasmuch as everything needs his power in order that it may act: whereas it cannot properly be said that the heaven always works in an elemental body, although the latter acts by its power. Therefore God is the cause of everything’s action inasmuch as he gives everything the power to act, and preserves it in being and applies it to action, and inasmuch as by his power every other power acts. And if we add to this that God is his own power, and that he is in all things not as part of their essence but as upholding them in their being, we shall conclude that he acts in every agent immediately, without prejudice to the action of the will and of nature.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod virtus activa et passiva rei naturalis sufficiunt ad agendum in ordine suo; requiritur tamen virtus divina, ratione iam dicta, in corp. art. Reply to the First Objection. The active and passive powers. of a natural thing suffice for action in their own order: yet the divine power is required for the reason given above.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod operatio virtutis naturalis ad Deum et corporis elementaris ad corpus caeleste sunt quantum ad aliquid similes, non autem quantum ad omnia. Reply to the Second Objection. Although the action of the forces of nature may be said to depend on God in the same way as that of an elemental body depends on the heavenly body, the comparison does not apply in every respect.
Ad tertium dicendum quod in operatione qua Deus operatur movendo naturam, non operatur natura; sed ipsa naturae operatio est etiam operatio virtutis divinae; sicut operatio instrumenti est per virtutem agentis principalis. Nec impeditur quin natura et Deus ad idem operentur, propter ordinem qui est inter Deum et naturam. Reply to the Third Objection. In that operation whereby God operates by moving nature, nature itself does not operate: and even the operation of nature is also the operation of the divine power, just as the operation of an instrument is effected by the power of the principal agent. Nor does this prevent nature and God from operating to the same effect, on account of the order between God and nature.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod tam Deus quam natura immediate operantur; licet ordinentur secundum prius et posterius, ut ex dictis patet. Reply to the Fourth Objection. Both God and nature operate immediately, although as already stated there is order between them of priority and posteriority.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod de ratione virtutis inferioris est quod sit aliquo modo operationis principium in suo ordine, id est ut agat ut instrumentum superioris virtutis: unde, exclusa superiori virtute, inferior virtus operationem non habet. Reply to the Fifth Objection. It belongs to the lower power to be a principle of operation in a certain way and in its own order, namely as instrument of a higher power: wherefore, apart from the latter it has no operation.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod Deus non solum est causa operationis naturae ut conservans virtutem naturalem in esse, sed aliis modis, ut dictum est. Reply to the Sixth Objection. God is the cause of nature’s operation not only as upholding the forces of nature in their being, but in other ways also, as stated above.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod virtus naturalis quae est rebus naturalibus in sua institutione collata, inest eis ut quaedam forma habens esse ratum et firmum in natura. Sed id quod a Deo fit in re naturali, quo actualiter agat, est ut intentio sola, habens esse quoddam incompletum, per modum quo colores sunt in aere, et virtus artis in instrumento artificis. Sicut ergo securi per artem dari potuit acumen, ut esset forma in ea permanens, non autem dari ei potuit quod vis artis esset in ea quasi quaedam forma permanens, nisi haberet intellectum; ita rei naturali potuit conferri virtus propria, ut forma in ipsa permanens, non autem vis qua agit ad esse ut instrumentum primae causae; nisi daretur ei quod esset universale essendi principium: nec iterum virtuti naturali conferri potuit ut moveret se ipsam, nec ut conservaret se in esse: unde sicut patet quod instrumento artificis conferri non oportuit quod operaretur absque motu artis; ita rei naturali conferri non potuit quod operaretur absque operatione divina. Reply to the Seventh Objection. The natural forces implanted in natural things at their formation are in them by way of fixed and constant forms in nature. But that which God does in a natural thing to make it operate actually, is a mere intention, incomplete in being, as colours in the air and the power of the craftsman in his instrument. Hence even as art can give the axe its sharpness as a permanent form, but not the power of the art as a permanent form, unless it were endowed with intelligence, so it is possible for a natural thing to be given its own proper power as a permanent form within it, but not the power to act so as to cause being as the instrument of the first cause, unless it were given to be the universal principle of being. Nor could it be given to a natural power to cause its own movement, or to preserve its own being. Consequently just as it clearly cannot be given to the craftsman’s instrument to work unless it be moved by him, so neither can it be given to a natural thing to operate without the divine operation.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod necessitas naturae, per quam calor agit, constituitur ex ordine omnium causarum praecedentium; unde non excluditur virtus causae primae. Reply to the Eighth Objection. The natural necessity whereby heat acts is the result of the order of all the preceding causes: wherefore the power of the first cause is not excluded.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod licet natura et voluntas sint secundum esse disparata, tamen in agendo habent aliquem ordinem. Nam sicut actio naturae praecedit actionem voluntatis nostrae, ratione cuius in operibus artis, quae a voluntate sunt, naturae operatione indiget; ita voluntas Dei, quae est origo omnis naturalis motus, praecedit operationem naturae; unde et eius operatio in omni operatione naturae requiritur. Reply to the Ninth Objection. Although nature and will are disparate in themselves, there is a certain order between them as regards their respective actions. For just as the action of nature precedes the act of our will, so that operations of art which proceed from the will presuppose the operation of nature: even so the will of God which is the origin of all natural movement precedes the operation of nature, so that its operation is presupposed in every operation of nature.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod creatura habet aliquam Dei similitudinem participando bonitatem ipsius, in quantum est et agit, non tamen ita quod per similitudinis perfectionem ad aequalitatem perveniat; et ideo sicut imperfectum indiget perfecto, ita virtus naturae in agendo indiget operatione divina. Reply to the Tenth Objection. The creature has a certain likeness to God by sharing in his goodness, in so far as it exists and acts, but not so that it can become equal to him through that likeness being perfected: wherefore as the imperfect needs the perfect, so the forces of nature in acting need the action of God.
Ad undecimum dicendum, quod duo Angeli minus distant secundum gradum naturae quam Deus et natura creata; tamen in ordine causae et effectus, Deus et natura conveniunt, non autem duo Angeli; unde Deus in natura operatur, non autem unus Angelus in alio. Reply to the Eleventh Objection. One angel is less distant from another in the degree of nature than God from created nature; and yet in the order of cause and effect God and the creature come together, whereas two angels do not: wherefore God operates in nature, but one angel does not operate in another.
Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod Deus non dicitur hominem dereliquisse in manu consilii sui, quin in voluntate operetur; sed quia voluntati hominis dedit dominium sui actus, ut non esset obligata ad alteram partem contradictionis: quod quidem dominium naturae non dedit, cum per suam formam sit determinata ad unum. Reply to the Twelfth Objection. God is said to have left man in the hand of his counsel not as though he did not operate in the will: but because he gave man’s will dominion over its act, so that it is not bound to this or that alternative: which dominion he did not bestow on nature since by its form it is confined to one determinate effect.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod voluntas dicitur habere dominium sui actus non per exclusionem causae primae, sed quia causa prima non ita agit in voluntate ut eam de necessitate ad unum determinet sicut determinat naturam; et ideo determinatio actus relinquitur in potestate rationis et voluntatis. Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. The will is said to have dominion over its own act not to the exclusion of the first cause, but inasmuch as the first cause does not act in the will so as to determine it of necessity to one thing as it determines nature; wherefore the determination of the act remains in the power of the reason and will.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod non quaelibet causa excludit libertatem, sed solum causa cogens: sic autem Deus non est causa operationis nostrae. Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. Not every cause excludes liberty, but only that which compels: and it is not thus that God causes our operations.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod quia causa prima magis influit in effectum quam secunda, ideo quidquid perfectionis est in effectu, principaliter reducitur ad primam causam; quod autem est de defectu, reducendum est in causam secundam, quae non ita efficaciter operatur sicut causa prima. Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. Forasmuch as the first cause has more influence in the effect than the second cause, whatever there is of perfection in the effect is to be referred chiefly to the first cause: while all defects must be referred to the second cause which does not act as efficaciously as the first cause.
Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod Deus perfecte operatur ut causa prima; requiritur tamen operatio naturae ut causae secundae. Posset tamen Deus effectum naturae etiam sine natura facere; vult tamen facere mediante natura, ut servetur ordo in rebus. Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. God acts perfectly as first cause: but the operation of nature as second cause is also necessary. Nevertheless God can produce the natural effect even without nature: but he wishes to act by means of nature in order to preserve order in things.
Q. III:
ARTICLE VIII
Does God Work in Nature by Creating?

[ Sum. Theol. I, Q. xiv, A. 8.]
Octavo quaeritur utrum Deus operetur in natura creando; quod est quaerere: utrum creatio operi naturae admiscetur. Et videtur quod sic. THE eighth point of inquiry is whether God works in nature by creating; and this is to ask whether creation is mingled in the works of nature: and seemingly the reply should be in the affirmative.
Per hoc quod dicit Augustinus: apostolus, inquit, Paulus discernens interius Deum creantem atque formantem ab operibus creaturae quae admoventur extrinsecus, de agricultura similitudinem assumens ait: ego plantavi, Apollo rigavit, sed Deus incrementum dedit. 1. Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): “The apostle Paul considering the secret works of God in the creation and formation of things, and the outward works of creatures, takes a comparison from agriculture when he says I have planted, Apollo watered, but God gave the increase.”
Sed dices, quod creatio accipitur ibi large pro qualibet factione.- Sed contra, Augustinus, ex auctoritate apostoli intendit in verbis praedictis distinguere operationem creaturae ab operatione Dei. Non autem distinguitur per creationem communiter acceptam pro qualibet factione, quia sic etiam natura creat; aliquid enim facit, ut ostensum est supra, art. praeced., sed non per creationem proprie acceptam. Ergo de creatione proprie accepta oportet verba praemissa intelligere. 2. To this it may be answered that creation here stands for any kind of making.—On the contrary Augustine (ibid.) intends there to draw from the Apostle’s words the distinction between the creature’s operation and that of God. Now this distinction is not based upon creation taken in a general sense for any kind of making, because thus even nature creates, since it does make something as we have shown above, but not by creation in the strict sense. Therefore the words quoted must be taken as referring to creation properly so called.
Praeterea, idem Augustinus subdit: sicut in ipsa vita nostra mentem iustificando formare non potest nisi Deus, praedicare autem extrinsecus Evangelium etiam homines possunt; ita creationem rerum visibilium Deus interius operatur, exteriores autem operationes bonorum sive malorum Angelorum vel hominum, vel quorumcumque animalium, ita rerum naturae adhibet, in qua creat omnia, quemadmodum terrae agriculturam. Sed mentem nostram iustificando format creatione proprie accepta: nam gratia per creationem dicitur esse. Ergo et creatione proprie dicta formas naturales creat. 3. Augustine adds (ibid.): just as in our life none but God can inform the soul with righteousness, whereas even men can outwardly preach the Gospel, so God inwardly creates the visible world, while he applies to nature in which he creates all things the various external operations of good or bad angels or men or any animals whatsoever; thus to the soil he applies husbandry. Now he informs the soul with righteousness by creating in the strict sense of the word: since grace is effected by creation. Therefore he creates the forms of things in the strict sense of the term.
Sed dices, quod formae naturales habent causam in subiecto, non autem gratia; et pro tanto gratia proprie creatur, non autem formae naturales.- Sed contra, ut dicitur in Glossa Genes. I, creare est ex nihilo aliquid facere. Cum autem haec praepositio ex quandoque importet habitudinem causae efficientis, sicut I Corinth., VIII, 6: ex quo omnia, per quem omnia, quandoque autem habitudinem causae materialis, sicut habetur Tobiae cap. XIII, 21-22: omnis circuitus murorum eius ex lapide candido et mundo; cum dicitur aliquid ex nihilo fieri, non negatur habitudo causae efficientis (quia sic Deus rerum creatarum causa efficiens non esset), sed negatur habitudo causae materialis. Formae autem naturales habent in subiectis causas efficientes, per quod differunt a gratia; habent etiam et materiam in qua, quod et gratiae competit. Non ergo magis competit ratio creationis gratiae quam naturalibus formis, per hoc quod est habere causam in subiecto. 4. You may say, however, that natural forms have a cause in their subject, whereas grace has not: and this is why grace is created in the proper sense of the word, while natural forms are not.—On the contrary according to a gloss on Genesis i, i, “to create is to make a thing out of (ex) nothing.” Now this preposition ex sometimes connotes efficient causality as in 1 Corinthians viii, 6, “Of (ex) whom are all things,... by whom are all things”: and sometimes it connotes material causality, as in Tobit xiii, 21, “all the walls thereof round about of (ex) precious stones.” Hence when a thing is said to be made out of nothing, it is not the relation of an efficient cause that is denied (since then God would not be the efficient cause of creatures), but that of a material cause. But natural forms have efficient causes in their subjects, and in this they differ from grace: they also have matter in which they are, and this is also competent to grace. Consequently grace is not more capable of being created than natural forms are, since it also has a cause in its subject.
Praeterea, formae artificiales non habent causam in subiecto, sed sunt totaliter ab extrinseco. Si ergo gratia propter hoc creari dicitur quia non habet causam in subiecto, pari ratione formae accidentales artificiales creabuntur. 5. Art-forms have no cause in their subject but are entirely effected from without. If, then, grace is said to be created because it has no cause in its subject, for the same reason accidental art-forms must be the result of creation.
Praeterea, id quod non habet materiam partem sui, non potest ex materia fieri. Sed formae non habent materiam partem sui: quia forma distinguitur et contra materiam et contra compositum, ut patet in principio secundi de anima. Cum ergo formae fiant quia de novo esse incipiunt, videtur quod non fiant ex materia; et sic fiunt ex nihilo, et per consequens creantur. 6. That which has no matter as a constituent part cannot be made of matter. Now forms have no matter as a constituent part: because form is contradistinguished both from matter and from composite things (De Anima ii, i). Since, then, forms are made since they. have a beginning of existence, it would seem that they are not made out of matter; and consequently are made out of nothing and therefore are created.
Sed diceretur, quod licet formae naturales non habeant materiam partem sui ex qua sint, habent tamen materiam in qua sunt, et pro tanto non creantur.- Sed contra, sicut aliae formae naturales, ita et anima rationalis est forma in materia. Sed anima rationalis creari ponitur. Ergo et similiter est de aliis formis naturalibus ponendum. 7. But it might be said that although natural forms have no matter as a constituent part, they have matter as a subject, and as such are not created.—On the contrary the rational soul is a form in matter like other natural forms. But it is admitted that the rational soul is created. Therefore we must say the same of other natural forms.
Sed dices, quod anima rationalis non educitur de materia, sicut aliae formae naturales. Sed contra, nihil educitur de aliquo quod non est in eo. Sed ante finem generationis forma, quae est generationis terminus, non erat in materia; alias essent formae contrariae in materia simul. Ergo formae naturales non educuntur de materia. 8. If you say that the rational soul is not as other natural forms educed from matter.—On the contrary nothing is educed from that in which it is not. Now before generation is complete the form which is the term of generation is not in the matter; otherwise contrary forms would be in matter at the same time. Therefore natural forms are not educed from matter.
Praeterea, forma quae est generationis terminus, non apparebat ante generationem completam. Si ergo erat ibi, erat latens: et ita sequeretur latitatio cuiuslibet in quolibet, quam ponebat Anaxagoras, et Aristoteles improbat in I Phys. 9. The form which is the term of generation does not make its appearance before generation is complete. If then it was there it was latent: and the result would be that all kinds of forms are latent in all kinds of matter, an opinion upheld by Anaxagoras and disproved by Aristotle (Phys. i, 4).
Sed dices, quod forma naturalis non existebat in materia ante completam generationem, complete, ut Anaxagoras ponebat, sed incomplete.- Sed contra, si forma aliquo modo est in materia ante terminum generationis, est ibi secundum aliquid sui. Si autem non est ibi complete secundum aliquid sui, non praeexistit. Habet ergo forma aliquid et aliquid, et sic non est simplex; cuius contrarium in principio sex principiorum habetur. 10. You will say perhaps, that the natural form does not exist completely as Anaxagoras maintained before generation is complete, but incompletely.—On the contrary if the form is in any way at all in matter before generation’ is complete, it is there as to some part of itself: and if it be not there completely as to some part of itself, it does not pre-exist at all. Hence the form will have several parts, and consequently is not simple: which is contrary to what is laid down at the beginning of the Six Principles [by Gilbert de la Porrée].
Praeterea, si non complete praeexistit in materia, et postmodum completur, oportet quod per generationem ei adveniat complementum. Illud autem complementum in materia non praeexistebat, quia sic fuisset ibi complete. Ergo illud complementum per creationem erit ad minus. 11. If the form does not pre-exist completely in matter and is made complete subsequently, this complement must be the result of generation. Now this complement does not pre-exist in matter, because in that case the form would be already complete. Therefore this complement at least would be created.
Sed dices, quod praeexistebat in materia incomplete, non quidem secundum partem, sed quia alio modo erat ante, et alio modo post: prius enim erat in potentia, sed post est in actu.- Sed contra, ex hoc quod aliquid alio et alio modo se habet, est alteratio, non generatio. Si ergo per opus naturae non fit aliquid, nisi quod forma quae prius erat in potentia, postea fit actu; sequeretur quod per operationem naturae non sit aliqua generatio, sed alteratio sola. 12. It will be said perhaps that this complement preexisted in matter incompletely, not in respect of a part, but because it existed at first in one way and afterwards in another way: since at first it was potential and afterwards actual.—On the contrary, when a thing is in one way at first and afterwards in another way it is altered and not generated. Hence if the work of nature consists in nothing more than that a form which was previously in potentiality becomes afterwards actual, it follows that nature’s operation does not produce generation but only alteration.
Praeterea, in natura inferiori non invenitur aliquod activum principium, nisi accidens: nam ignis agit per calorem, qui est accidens; et similiter de aliis. Sed accidens non potest esse causa activa formae substantialis, quia nihil agit ultra suam speciem; effectus autem non praeeminet causae, cum tamen forma substantialis praeemineat accidenti. Ergo forma substantialis non producitur per actionem naturae inferioris; et ita oportet quod sit per creationem. 13. In the lower nature there is no active principle that is not an accident: thus fire acts by heat which is an accident, and so on. Now an accident cannot be the active cause of a substantial form, since nothing acts beyond its own species: and an effect cannot transcend its cause, whereas a substantial form transcends an accident. Therefore a substantial form is not produced by the action of a lower nature, and consequently it is the result of creation.
Praeterea, imperfectum non potest esse causa perfecti. Sed in semine bruti animalis non est vis animae nisi imperfecte. Ergo anima bruti non producitur per actionem naturalem virtutis seminalis; et ita oportet quod sit per creationem et pari ratione omnes aliae formae naturales. 14. The imperfect cannot be the cause of the perfect. Now the soul’s power is not in the semen of the dumb animal except imperfectly. Therefore the soul of a dumb animal is not produced by the natural action of the seminal force: and thus it must needs be produced by creation, and likewise all other natural forms.
Praeterea, illud quod non est animatum nec vivum, non potest esse causa rei animatae viventis. Sed animalia quae generantur ex putrefactione, sunt res animatae viventes; non autem inveniuntur in natura aliqua viventia, a quibus eis vita conferatur. Ergo oportet quod eorum animae sint per creationem a primo vivente, et pari ratione aliae formae naturales. 15. That which is neither animate nor living cannot be the cause of an animate and living being. Now animals engendered from putrid matter are living animated beings and there are not to be found in nature any living beings from which they receive life. Therefore their souls must be produced by creation by the first living being, and for like reason so also must other natural forms.
Praeterea, natura non agit nisi sibi simile. Sed aliqua res naturalis invenitur generari, cuius similitudo in generante non praecessit. Mulus enim neque equo, neque asino est similis in specie. Ergo forma muli non est per actionem naturae, sed per creationem; et sic idem quod prius. 16. Again, nature does not produce other than its like. But. we find certain natural things of which there is no previous likeness in their generator: thus a mule is not like in species either a horse or an ass. Therefore the form of the mule is not the result of nature’s action but of creation: and thus the same conclusion follows.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in Lib. de vera Relig., quod res naturales formis suis formatae non essent, nisi esset aliquid primum unde formarentur. Hoc autem est ipse Deus. Ergo omnes formae sunt per creationem a Deo. 17. Again, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. iii; De Lib. Arb. ii, 17) that natural things would not be informed by their forms, unless there were some first being whereby they are informed. But this is God. Therefore all forms are created by God.
Praeterea, Boetius dicit, quod ex formis quae sunt sine materia, venerunt formae quae sunt in materia. Formae autem quae sunt sine materia, non possunt intelligi in proposito, nisi ideae rerum in mente divina existentes. Nam Angeli, qui possunt dici sine materia formae non sunt causae formarum naturalium, ut patet per Augustinum. Ergo formae naturales non sunt per actionem naturae, sed a datore creante. 18. Again, Boethius says (De Trin.) that forms which exist in matter are produced by forms which exist without matter. Now a form that exists without matter, so far as the present question is concerned, can only be an idea of a thing, which idea exists in the divine mind: because the angels who may be described as forms existing without matter are not the causes of material forms, according to Augustine (De Trin. iii, 8, 9). Therefore natural forms are not produced by the action of nature but are bestowed by creation.
Praeterea, in libro de causis, dicitur, quod esse est per creationem. Hoc autem non esset nisi formae crearentur: nam forma est essendi principium. Ergo formae sunt per creationem: ergo Deus in materia operatur aliquid creando, scilicet ipsas formas. 19. Being is caused by creation (De Causis, prop. xviii). Now this would not be true unless forms were created, since the form is the principle of being. Therefore forms are made by creation, and God produces something in nature by creation, namely forms.
Praeterea, id quod est per se, est causa eius quod non est per se. Sed formae rerum naturalium non sunt per se, sed sunt in materia. Ergo earum causa est forma per se stans; et ita oportet quod formae naturales sint per creationem ab agente extrinseco; et sic videtur quod Deus in natura operetur, formas creando. 20. That which is self-subsistent is the cause of that which is not self-subsistent. Now the forms of natural things are not self-subsistent but subsist in matter. Therefore their cause is a self-subsistent form: and consequently must be created by an extrinsic agent. Hence it would seem that God works in nature by creating forms.—
Sed contra. Opus creationis distinguitur ab opere gubernationis et propagationis. Quod autem actione naturae agitur, pertinet ad opus gubernationis et ad rerum propagationem. Ergo creatio operi naturae non admiscetur. On the contrary the work of creation is distinct from the work of government and that of propagation. Now that which is done by the action of nature belongs to the works of government and propagation. Therefore creation is not mingled with the work of nature.
Praeterea, nihil potest creare nisi solus Deus. Si ergo formae sunt per creationem, non erunt nisi a Deo; et sic omnis actio naturae frustrabitur, cuius finis est forma. Moreover, God alone can create. Hence if forms are created, they will be the work of God alone, so that all nature’s work, the purpose of which is the form, will be useless.
Praeterea, sicut forma substantialis non habet materiam partem sui, ita nec accidentalis. Si ergo propter hoc formas substantiales oportet esse per creationem, quia non habent materiam, pari ratione et formae accidentales. Sicut autem res generata perficitur per formam substantialem, ita fit dispositio per formam accidentalem. Ergo res naturalis nullo modo erit generans, neque sicut perficiens neque sicut disponens; et sic cassa erit omnis naturae actio. Moreover, just as matter is not a part of the substantial form so neither is it a part of the accidental form. Hence if the reason why substantial forms must be produced by creation is because they have no matter, the same argument will apply to accidental forms. Now as the thing generated is perfected by the substantial form, so does it receive a certain disposition from the accidental form: and consequently nature would take no part in generating, neither as perfecting nor as disposing, and all natural action would be useless.
Praeterea, natura est ex similibus similia procreans. Sed generatum invenitur simile generanti secundum speciem et formam. Ergo ipsa forma generati fit per actionem generantis, et non per creationem. Further, nature produces like from like. Now the thing generated is like its generator in species and form. Therefore the form is produced by the action of the generator and not by creation.
Praeterea, diversorum agentium actiones non terminantur ad unum effectum. Sed ex materia et forma fit unum simpliciter. Ergo non potest esse quod sit aliud agens quod disponit materiam et quod inducit formam. Disponens autem materiam, est agens naturale. Ergo et inducens formam; et sic formae non sunt per creationem, et ita creatio non admiscetur operibus naturae. Further, the actions of diverse agents do not terminate in one same effect. But matter and form combine to produce that which is one simply. Therefore there cannot be one agent to dispose the matter and another to induce the form. Now it is the natural agent that disposes the matter: therefore it also induces the form. Consequently forms are not produced by creation, and creation is not mingled with the works of nature.
Respondeo. Dicendum, circa istam quaestionem diversae fuerunt opiniones. Quarum omnium videtur radix fuisse unum et idem principium, secundum quod natura non potest ex nihilo aliquid facere. Ex hoc enim aliqui crediderunt quod nulla res fieret aliter nisi per hoc quod extrahebatur a re alia in qua latebat, sicut de Anaxagora narrat philosophus, qui ex hoc videtur fuisse deceptus, quia non distinguebat inter potentiam et actum; putabat enim oportere quod actu praeextiterit illud quod generatur. Oportet autem quod praeexistat potentia et non actu; si enim non praeexisteret potentia, fieret ex nihilo; si vero praeexisteret actu, non fieret: quia quod est, non fit. I answer that there have been different opinions on this point, and they all arose seemingly from this one principle that nature cannot make a thing out of nothing. Whence some concluded that nothing is made except in the sense that it is drawn out of another wherein it was latent. The Philosopher (Phys. i, 4) imputes this opinion to Anaxagoras who apparently was deceived through failing to distinguish potentiality from act: for he thought that whatever is generated must already have been in actual existence: whereas it must have pre-existed potentially and not actually. For if it pre-existed potentially it would become out of nothing: while if it pre-existed actually it would not become at all, since what is does not become.
Sed quia res generata est in potentia per materiam, et in actu per suam formam; posuerunt aliqui, quod res fiebat quantum ad formam materia praeexistente. Et quia operatio naturae non potest esse ex nihilo, et per consequens oportet quod sit ex praesuppositione, non operabatur, secundum eos, natura, nisi ex parte materiae disponendo ipsam ad formam. Formam vero, quam oportet fieri et non praesupponi, oportet esse ex agente qui non praesupponit aliquid, sed potest ex nihilo facere: et hoc est agens supernaturale, quod Plato posuit datorem formarum. Et hoc Avicenna dixit esse intelligentiam ultimam inter substantias separatas. Quidam vero moderni eos sequentes, dicunt hoc esse Deum. Since, however, the thing generated is in potentiality through its matter, and in act through its form, others maintained that a thing becomes as regards its form while its matter was already in existence. And seeing that nature cannot operate on nothing, and therefore presupposes something to act on, according to them nature’s operation is confined to disposing matter for its form. While the form which must needs become and cannot be presupposed, must be produced by an agent who does not presuppose anything and can make something out of nothing: and such is the supernatural agent which Plato held to be the giver of forms. Avicenna held this to be the lowest intelligence among separate substances: while more recent followers of this opinion say that it is God.
Hoc autem videtur esse inconveniens. Quia cum unumquodque natum sit simile sibi agere (nam unumquodque agit in eo quod actu est, hoc scilicet quod est in potentia id quod agendum est), non requireretur similitudo secundum formam substantialem in agente naturali, nisi forma substantialis geniti esset per actionem agentis. Ex quo etiam id quod in genito acquirendum est, actu in generante naturali invenitur, et unumquodque agit secundum quod actu est; inconveniens videtur, hoc generante praetermisso, aliud exterius inquirere. Now seemingly this is unreasonable. Since everything has a natural tendency to produce its like (because a thing acts forasmuch as it is actual, namely by making actual that which previously was potential) there would be no need of likeness in the substantial form in the natural agent, unless the substantial form of the thing generated were produced by the action of the agent. For which reason that which is to be acquired in the thing generated is found to be actually in the natural generator, and each one acts inasmuch as it is in act: wherefore seemingly there is no reason to seek another generator and pass over this one.
Unde sciendum est, quod istae opiniones videntur provenisse ex hoc quod ignorabatur natura formae, sicut et primae provenerunt ex hoc quod ignorabatur natura materiae. Forma enim naturalis non dicitur univoce esse cum re generata. Res enim naturalis generata dicitur esse per se et proprie, quasi habens esse, et in suo esse subsistens; forma autem non sic esse dicitur, cum non subsistat, nec per se esse habeat; sed dicitur esse vel ens, quia ea aliquid est; sicut et accidentia dicuntur entia, quia substantia eis est vel qualis vel quanta, non quod eis sit simpliciter sicut per formam substantialem: unde accidentia magis proprie dicuntur entis, quam entia, ut patet in Metaphys. Unumquodque autem factum, hoc modo dicitur fieri quo dicitur esse. Nam esse est terminus factionis: unde illud quod proprie fit per se, compositum est. Forma autem non proprie fit, sed est id quod fit, id est per cuius acquisitionem aliquid dicitur fieri. It must be observed, then, that these opinions arose from ignorance of the nature of form, just as the first-mentioned opinions arose from ignorance of the nature of matter. For being is not predicated univocally of the form and the thing generated. A generated natural thing is said to be per se and properly, as having being and subsisting in that being: whereas the form is not thus said to be, for it does not subsist, nor has it being per se; and it is said to exist or be, because something is by it: thus accidents are described as beings, because by them a substance is qualified or quantified, but not as though by them it is simply, as it is by its substantial form. Hence it is more correct to say that an accident is of something rather than that it is something (Metaph. vii, 2). Now that which is made is said to become according to the way in which it is: because its being is the term of its making: so that properly speaking it is the composite that is made per se. Whereas the form properly speaking is not made but is that whereby a thing is made, that is to say it is by acquiring the form that a thing is said to be made.
Nihil ergo obstat per hoc quod dicitur quod per naturam ex nihilo nihil fit, quin formas substantiales, ex operatione naturae esse dicamus. Nam id quod fit, non est forma, sed compositum; quod ex materia fit, et non ex nihilo. Et fit quidem ex materia, in quantum materia est in potentia ad ipsum compositum, per hoc quod est in potentia ad formam. Accordingly the fact that nature makes nothing out of nothing does not prevent our asserting that substantial forms acquire being through the action of nature: since that which is made is not the form but the composite, which is made from matter and not out of nothing. And it is made from matter, in so far as matter is potentially the composite through having the form potentially.
Et sic non proprie dicitur quod forma fiat in materia, sed magis quod de materiae potentia educatur. Ex hoc autem ipso quod compositum fit, et non forma, ostendit philosophus, quod formae sunt ex agentibus naturalibus: nam, cum factum oporteat esse simile facienti, ex quo id quod factum est, est compositum, oportet id quod est faciens, esse compositum, et non forma per se existens, ut Plato dicebat; ut sic sicut factum est compositum, quo autem fit, est forma in materia in actum reducta; ita generans sit compositum, non forma tantum; sed forma sit quo generat: forma, inquam, in hac materia existens, sicut in his carnibus et in his ossibus et in aliis huiusmodi. Consequently it is not correct to say that the form is made in matter, rather should we say that it is educed from the potentiality of matter. And from this principle that the composite and not the form is made the Philosopher (Metaph. vii, 8) proves that forms result from natural agents. Because since the thing made must needs be like its maker, and that which is made is the composite, it follows that the maker must be composite and not a self-subsistent form, as Plato, maintained: so that as the thing made is composite, and that by which it is made is a form in matter made actual, so the generator is composite and not a mere form, while the form is that whereby it generates, a form to, wit existing in that particular matter such as that flesh, those bones and so forth.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ex verbis Augustini in operibus naturae creatio Deo attribuitur ratione virtutum naturalium, quas in principio materiae indidit per opus creationis, non quod in quolibet naturae opere aliquod creetur. Reply to the First Objection. In these words Augustine ascribes creation to God in the works of nature by reason of nature’s forces which at the beginning God implanted in matter by the work of creation, not as though something were created in every work of nature.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod creatio proprie accipitur in verbis Augustini; non tamen referenda est ad effectus naturae, sed ad virtutes quibus natura operatur; quae per opus creationis naturae sunt inditae. Reply to the Second Objection. In these words of, Augustine creation is to be taken in its proper sense, but it is not to be referred to natural effects but to the forces by which nature works; which forces were planted in nature by the work of creation.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod gratia, cum non sit forma subsistens, nec esse nec fieri ei proprie per se competit: unde non proprie creatur per modum illum quo substantiae per se subsistentes creantur. Infusio tamen gratiae accedit ad rationem creationis in quantum gratia non habet causam in subiecto, nec efficientem, nec talem materiam in qua sit hoc modo in potentia, quod per agens naturale educi possit in actum, sicut est de aliis formis naturalibus. Reply to the Third Objection. Since grace is not a subsistent form it cannot properly be said to be or to be made, and consequently properly speaking it is not created in the same way as self-subsistent substances are. Nevertheless the infusion of grace approaches somewhat to the nature of creation in so far as grace has not a cause in its subject—neither an efficient cause nor a material cause wherein it pre-exists potentially in such a way that it can like other natural forms be educed into act by a natural agent.
Unde patet solutio ad quartum. Nam cum dicitur aliquid fieri ex nihilo, negatur causa materialis. Hoc vero aliquo modo ad carentiam materiae pertinet, quod aliqua forma de naturali materiae potentiae educi non potest. Hence the reply to the Fourth Objection is clear because when we say that a thing is made out of nothing we deny that it has a material cause: and it somewhat savours of absence of matter that a form cannot be educed from the natural potentiality of matter.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod licet in natura non inveniatur principium efficiens respectu formarum artificialium, tamen huiusmodi formae non excedunt naturae ordinem, sicut gratia; immo infra subsistunt, quia omne naturale est nobilius quam artificiale. Reply to the Fifth Objection. Although nature contains no effective principle with regard to art-forms, such forms do not surpass the order of nature, as grace does: in fact they are beneath that order, because nature is above art.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod ex hoc quod forma non habet materiam partem sui, sequeretur quod ei creari competeret, ei proprie fieri posset sicut res per se subsistens. Reply to the Sixth Objection. That a form has no matter as part thereof would prove that it is competent to be created, if like a self-subsistent thing it could be, made properly speaking.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod licet anima rationalis habeat materiam in qua sit, non tamen educitur de potentia materiae, cum eius natura supra omnem materialem ordinem elevetur: quod eius intellectualis operatio declarat. Et iterum haec forma est res per se subsistens, cum corrupto corpore, maneat. Reply to the Seventh Objection. Although the rational soul has matter for its subject, it is not educed from the potentiality of matter, since its nature is raised above the entire material order, as is evidenced by its intellectual operation. Moreover, this form is a self-subsistent thing that remains when the body dies.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod forma, quae est generationis terminus, erat in materia ante generationem completam, non in actu, sed in potentia. Non est autem inconveniens duorum contrariorum unum esse actu et aliud in potentia. Reply to the Eighth Objection. The form which is the term of generation was in matter before generation was complete, not actually but potentially: and there is nothing to prevent two contraries being together in the same subject, one actually and the other potentially.
Et per hoc patet responsio ad nonum. Nam Anaxagoras non ponebat formas actu praeexistere in materia, sed latere. The reply to the Ninth Objection is thus made clear: since Anaxagoras held that forms pre-exist in matter not actually but in a latent state.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod forma praeexistit in materia imperfecte; non quod aliqua pars eius sit ibi in actu, et alia desit; sed quia tota praeexistit in potentia, et postmodum tota producitur in actu. Reply to the Tenth Objection. The form pre-exists in matter imperfectly, not as though a part of it were actually there and another part not, but because it is wholly there in potentiality, and is afterwards educed wholly into actuality.
Et per hoc etiam patet responsio ad undecimum; patet enim quod non perficitur esse formae in materia alio exteriori addito, quod in potentia materiae non esset. Whence we may gather the reply to the Eleventh Objection, since the form is not perfected by adding to the matter something extraneous that was not already in the matter potentially.
Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod esse in potentia et esse in actu non dicunt diversos modos accidentales, ex quorum diversitate alteratio proveniat, sed substantiales. Nam etiam substantia dividitur per potentiam et actum, sicut et quodlibet aliud genus. Reply to the Twelfth Objection. Actuality and potentiality are not different accidental modes of being, such as go to make alteration: they are substantial modes of being. For even substance is divided by potentiality and act, like any other genus.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum quod forma accidentalis agit in virtute formae substantialis quasi instrumentum eius; sicut etiam in II de anima calor ignis dicitur esse instrumentum virtutis nutritivae; et ideo non est inconveniens, si actio formae accidentalis ad formam substantialem terminetur. Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. An accidental form acts by virtue of the substantial form whose instrument it is: thus heat is said to be the instrument of the nutritive power (De Anima ii, 4): wherefore it is not unreasonable if the action of an accidental form terminate in a substantial form.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod etiam in semine calor seminis agit ut instrumentum virtutis animae, quae est in semine: quae quidem licet imperfecta sit, tamen est impressio quaedam animae perfectae relicta: est enim in semine ab anima generantis, et agit etiam in virtute corporis caelestis cuius est quasi instrumentum; et propter hoc non dicitur quod semen generet, sed quod anima et sol. Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. Again the heat in the semen acts as the instrument of the soul’s power which is in the semen: and though this power has an imperfect being it results from the action of a perfect soul, because the semen derives it from the soul of the generator. Moreover, it acts by virtue of a heavenly body whose instrument it is after a fashion. Hence we do not say that the semen begets, but the soul and the sun.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod animalia generata ex putrefactione sunt minoris perfectionis aliis animalibus; unde in eorum generatione efficit vis caelestis corporis inferiori materiae impressa, quod in generatione animalium perfectorum facit eadem vis caelestis cum virtute seminis. Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. Animals engendered from putrid matter are less perfect than other animals: hence in engendering them the power of the heavenly body by acting on inferior matter has the same effect as it has in conjunction with the power of the semen in engendering the bodies of more perfect animals.
Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod licet mulus non sit similis equo vel asino in specie, est tamen similis in genere proximo: ratione cuius similitudinis ex diversis speciebus sua species, quasi media generatur. Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. Although a mule is unlike a horse or ass in species, it is like them in the proximate genus: by reason of which likeness one species, a mean species as it were, is engendered from different species.
Ad decimumseptimum dicendum, quod sicut virtus divina, scilicet primum agens, non excludit actionem virtutis naturalis, ita nec prima exemplaris forma, quae est Deus, excludit derivationem formarum ab aliis inferioribus formis, quae ad sibi similes formas agunt. Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. just as the divine power, the first agent to wit, does not exclude the action of the natural forces, so neither does the prototypal form which is God exclude the derivation of forms from other lower forms whose action terminates in like forms.
Et per hoc patet responsio ad decimumoctavum. Nam Boetius, intelligit formas quae sunt in materia, provenire ex formis quae sunt sine materia, sicut a primis exemplaribus, non sicut a proximis. Hence we gather the reply to the Eighteenth Objection; for Boethius means to say that forms which are in matter derive from forms which are without matter not as from proximate causes but as from the prototypes.
Ad decimumnonum dicendum, quod esse per creationem dicitur, in quantum omnis causa secunda dans esse, hoc habet in quantum agit in virtute primae causae creantis; cum esse sit primus effectus nihil aliud praesupponens. Reply to the Nineteenth Objection. Being is said to be the result of creation in so far as every second cause when it gives being does so forasmuch as it acts by the power of the first creating cause: since being is the first effect and presupposes nothing else.
Ad vicesimum dicendum, quod forma naturalis, quae est in materia, non potest reduci ad formam per se existentem eiusdem speciei, cum forma naturalis habeat materiam in sui ratione; sed reducitur ad formam per se existentem, sicut dictum est. Reply to. the Twentieth Objection. A natural form that is in matter cannot be produced by a self-subsistent form of the same species because matter is essential to a natural form: yet it is produced by a self-subsistent form, as we have stated.
Q. III:
ARTICLE IX
Is the Rational Soul Brought into Being by Creation or Is it Transmitted Through the Semen?

[ Sum. Th. I, Q. cxviii]
Nono quaeritur utrum anima rationalis educatur in esse per creationem, vel per seminis traductionem. Et videtur quod propagetur cum semine. THE ninth point of inquiry is whether the soul be brought into being by creation or by transmission through the semen: and it would seem that it is transmitted through the semen.
Dicitur enim Gen. XLVI, 26: cunctae animae quae ingressae sunt cum Iacob in Aegyptum, et egressae sunt de femore illius, absque uxoribus filiorum eius, sexaginta sex. Sed nihil egreditur de femore patris, nisi per seminis traductionem. Ergo anima rationalis traducitur cum semine. 1. It is written (Gen. xlvi, 26): All the souls that went with Jacob into Egypt and that came out of his thigh, besides his sons’wives, sixty-six. Now nothing comes from a father’s thigh but what is transmitted through the semen. Therefore the rational soul is transmitted with the semen.
Sed diceretur, quod ponitur pars pro toto, id est anima pro homine - sed contra, homo est quid compositum ex anima et corpore. Si ergo totus homo ex femore patris egreditur, non solum corpus, sed etiam anima cum semine traducetur, ut prius. 2. It may be replied that the part is taken for the whole, namely the soul for the man.—On the contrary, a man is composed of soul and body, and therefore if the whole man comes out of his father’s thigh, it follows as above that not the body only but also the soul is transmitted with the semen.
Praeterea, accidens traduci non potest nisi subiectum traducatur, eo quod accidens de subiecto in subiectum non transeat. Sed anima rationalis est subiectum peccati originalis. Cum ergo peccatum originale traducatur a parente in prolem, videtur etiam quod anima rationalis filii a parente traducatur. 3. An accident cannot be transmitted unless its subject be transmitted, since an accident does not pass from one.subject to another. Now the rational soul is the subject of original sin. Therefore seeing that original sin is transmitted from parent to child it would seem that the child’s rational soul is transmitted from its parent.
Sed diceretur, quod peccatum originale, licet sit in anima sicut in subiecto, est tamen in carne sicut in causa; unde per carnis traductionem traducitur.- Sed contra, Rom. V, 12, dicitur: peccatum per unum hominem in mundum intravit, et per peccatum mors: et ita mors in omnes pertransit, in quo omnes peccaverunt. Glossa autem exponit: in quo homine peccatore, vel in quo peccato. Non autem in illo peccato omnes peccassent, nisi illud unum peccatum in omnes traductum fuisset. Illud ergo unum peccatum quod in Adam fuit, in omnes traducitur; et sic anima illius, quae peccati subiectum erat, traducitur in omnes. 4. It may be said that although original sin is in the soul as its subject, it is in the flesh as its cause: and consequently is transmitted by the transmission of the flesh.—On the contrary it is written (Rom. v, 12) : By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death; and so death passed upon all men in whom all have sinned. The words in quo are expounded by a gloss of Augustine (De Pecc. Mer. et Rem. i, 10) as meaning in which sinner or in which sin. Now all would not have sinned in that sin, unless that same sin had been transmitted to all. Therefore the same sin that was in Adam is transmitted to all men; and consequently the soul that was the subject of that sin.
Praeterea, omne agens agit sibi simile. Sed omne agens agit per virtutem formae. Ergo illud quod agit agens, est forma. Sed generans agens est. Ergo forma generati est per actionem generantis. Cum ergo homo generet hominem, et anima rationali sit forma hominis; videtur quod anima rationalis sit per generationem, et non per creationem. 5. Every agent produces its like. Also every agent acts by virtue of its form. Therefore that which it produces is a form. Now the begetter is an agent. Therefore the form of the begetter is produced by the action of the begetter. Since then a man begets a man, and the rational soul is the form of a man, it would seem that the rational soul is produced by generation and not by creation.
Praeterea, secundum philosophum in II Phys., causa efficiens in suo effectu incidit in idem specie. Sed homo sortitur speciem per animam rationalem. Ergo videtur quod id quod facit generans in genito, sit anima rationalis. 6. According to the Philosopher (Phys. ii, 7) the efficient cause produces its own species in its effect. Now man takes his species from his rational soul. Therefore seemingly the rational soul is caused by the begetter in the begotten.
Praeterea, filii similantur parentibus propter hoc quod a parentibus propagantur. Similantur autem parentibus filii, non solum quantum ad dispositiones corporales, sed etiam quantum ad dispositiones animae. Ergo sicut corpora a corporibus, ita animae ab animabus traducuntur. 7. Children are like their parents because they are begotten by their parents. And they are like their parents not only in dispositions of the body but also in those of the soul. Therefore as bodies derive from bodies, so do souls derive from souls.
Praeterea, Moyses dicit, Levit. XVII, 11: anima carnis in sanguine est. Sed sanguis cum semine traducitur: praecipue cum sperma non sit nisi sanguis decoctus. Ergo et anima cum semine traducitur. 8. Moses says (Levit. xvii, 14): The soul of all flesh is in the blood. Now blood is transmitted with the semen, especially as the seed of the male is merely blood depurated by heat. Therefore the soul is transmitted with the semen.
Praeterea, embrio antequam anima rationali perficiatur, habet aliquam operationem animae; quia augetur et nutritur et sentit. Sed operatio animae non est sine vita. Ergo vivit. Vitae vero corporis principium est anima. Ergo habet animam. Sed non potest dici quod adveniat ei alia anima; quia tunc in uno corpore essent duae animae. Ergo ipsa anima quae prius erat in semine propagata, est anima rationalis. 9. Moreover the embryo before it is perfected with the rational soul, has certain animate actions, namely growth, nourishment and sensation: and where there is animate action there is life: consequently it lives. Now the soul is the principle of life in a body: consequently it has a soul. But it cannot be said that it receives yet another soul: because then there would be two souls in one body. Therefore the soul which was from the beginning transmitted in the semen is the rational soul.
Praeterea, diversae animae secundum speciem, constituunt diversas animas secundum speciem. Si ergo in semine ante ipsam animam rationalem erat anima quae non erat rationalis, erat ibi animal secundum speciem diversum ab homine; et sic ex illo non poterit homo fieri; quia diversae species animalis non transeunt in invicem. 10. Souls differing in species constitute animals of different species. If, then, before the rational soul there was in the semen a soul that was not rational, there was an animal of a different species from man: which consequently could not become a man since animals do not pass from one species to another.
Sed dices, quod huiusmodi operationes animae non conveniunt embrioni per animam, sed per aliquam virtutem animae, quae dicitur virtus formativa.- Sed contra, virtus supra substantiam radicatur; unde ponitur media inter substantiam et operationem, ut habetur a Dionysio. Si ergo est ibi virtus animae, erit ibi animae substantia. 11. You will say that these actions belong to the embryo not through the soul, but by some power of the soul known as the formative power.—On the contrary, power is rooted in substance; hence it occupies a place between substance and operation according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xi). Consequently if the soul’s power is there, its substance is there also.
Praeterea, philosophus dicit in XVI de animalibus, quod embrio prius vivit quam animal, et prius animal quam homo. Sed omne animal habet animam. Ergo prius est ibi aliqua anima quam sit ibi anima rationalis per quam homo est homo. 12. The Philosopher says (De Gener. Anim. ii, 3) that the embryo is a living being before it is an animal, and an animal before it is a human being. Now every animal has a soul. Therefore it has a soul before it has a rational soul whereby it is a human being.
Praeterea, secundum philosophum, anima est actus viventis corporis in quantum huiusmodi. Sed si embrio vivit, et operationem vitae exercet per huiusmodi virtutem formativam, ipsa virtus erit actus eius in quantum est vivens. Ergo erit anima. 13. According to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, i) a soul is “the act of a living body as such.” Now if the embryo is a living being and has vital functions by means of this formative power, this very power will be its act in so far as it is a living thing. Therefore it will be a soul.
Praeterea, ut dicitur in I de anima, vivere inest omnibus viventibus per animam vegetabilem. Sed manifestum est embrionem vivere ante infusionem animae rationalis, cum in eo operationes vitae inveniantur. Ergo est ibi anima vegetabilis antequam sit anima rationalis. 14. According to De Anima i, 2, life comes into all living things by the vegetal soul. Now it is clear that the embryo lives before the infusion of the rational soul, since it gives signs of exercising vital functions. Therefore the vegetal soul is in it before the rational soul.
Praeterea, in II de anima, improbat philosophus quod augeri non est actus ignis sicut principalis agentis, sed magis animae vegetabilis. Sed embrio ante adventum animae rationalis augetur. Ergo habet animam vegetabilem. 15. The Philosopher (De Anima ii, 4) disproves the assertion that growth is not the effect of fire as principal agent, but of the vegetal soul. Now the embryo grows before the advent of the rational soul. Therefore it has a vegetal soul.
Praeterea, si non est ibi anima vegetabilis ante adventum animae rationalis, sed virtus formativa; adveniente anima, illa virtus suam operationem non habebit; cum operatio quam illa virtus faciebat in embrione, sufficienter postmodum fiat in animali per animam. Ergo erit ibi otiosa; quod videtur esse inconveniens, cum nihil sit otiosum in natura. 16. If before the advent of the rational soul there is not a vegetal soul but a formative power, at the advent of the soul this power will be inoperative, since the function it exercised in the embryo will subsequently be sufficiently fulfilled in the animal by the soul. Consequently it would remain superfluous: and this would seem to be unreasonable since nothing is superfluous in. nature.
Sed dices, quod illa virtus destruitur adveniente anima rationali.- Sed contra, dispositiones non destruuntur adveniente forma, sed manent, et quodammodo tenent formam in materia. Sed illa virtus erat quaedam dispositio ad animam. Ergo adveniente anima, illa virtus non destruitur. 17. You will say perhaps that this power ceases at the advent of the rational soul.—On the contrary, dispositions do not cease at the advent of the form, but remain, and after a fashion maintain the form in matter. Now this power was a kind of disposition to the soul. Therefore at the advent of the latter, it does not cease.
Praeterea, ex actione illius virtutis pervenitur ad introductionem animae. Si ergo anima adveniente illa virtus destruitur, videtur quod aliquid agat ad sui destructionem; quod est impossibile. 18. By its action this power conduces to the infusion of the soul. If, then, at the soul’s advent this power is destroyed, seemingly the soul has something to do with its destruction: and this is impossible.
Praeterea, homo est homo per animam rationalem. Si ergo anima non exit in esse per generationem, nec erit verum dicere quod homo generetur; quod patet esse falsum. 19. A man is a human being by his rational soul. Therefore if the soul is not brought into being by generation, it win not be true that a man is generated: which is clearly false.
Praeterea, corpus hominis exit in esse per actionem generantis. Si ergo anima non exit in esse a generante, erit in homine duplex esse; unum corporis, quod facit generans; et aliud animae, quod non facit; et sic ex anima et corpore non fit unum simpliciter, cum secundum esse differant. 20. Further, the human body comes into being by the action of its begetter. If, then, the soul is not brought into being by the begetter, there will be a twofold being in man; corporeal being derived from the begetter, and animate being derived from another source: and consequently soul and body will not form one being simply, since each has its own being.
Praeterea, impossibile est quod actio unius agentis terminetur ad materiam, et alterius ad formam; alias ex forma et materia non esset unum simpliciter, cum unum factum sit per unam actionem. Sed actio naturae generantis terminatur ad corpus. Ergo et terminatur ad animam, quae est forma eius. 21. Moreover, it is impossible that the matter be the term of action of one agent, and the form the term of action of another agent: otherwise form and matter would not together make one thing simply, for one thing is made by one action. Now the action of nature in generating terminates in the body. Therefore it, terminates in the soul also, which is the form of the body.
Praeterea, secundum philosophum in libro XVI de animalibus, principia quorum actiones non sunt sine corpore, cum corpore producuntur. Sed actio animae rationalis non est sine corpore; maxime enim intelligere esset sine corpore, quod patet esse falsum; non enim est intelligere sine phantasmate, ut dicitur in I et III de anima; phantasma autem non est sine corpore. Ergo anima rationalis cum corpore traducitur. 22. Moreover, according to the Philosopher (De Gen. Anim. ii, 3) principles whose actions are not performed independently of the body are produced together with the body. Now the action of the rational soul is not performed independently of the body: since most of all would understanding be independent of the body, and this is clearly not the case, because we cannot understand without images (De Anima iii, 8): and there cannot be images without a body. Therefore the rational soul is transmitted with the body.
Sed dicebat, quod anima rationalis indiget phantasmate intelligendo quantum ad acquisitionem specierum intelligibilium, non autem postquam eas iam acquisivit.- Sed contra, homo postquam acquisivit scientiam, impeditur in actione intellectus laeso organo phantasiae. Hoc autem non esset, si intellectus post acquisitionem scientiae, phantasmatibus non indigeret. Indiget ergo eis non solum in acquirendo scientiam, sed in utendo scientia acquisita. 23. To this it may be replied that the rational soul when it understands requires images for the acquisition of intelligible species but not after it has acquired them.—On the contrary, after a man has acquired knowledge, his act of intelligence is hindered if the organ of imagination be injured. And this would not be the case if the intellect after acquiring knowledge were no longer in need of images. Consequently it needs them not only in acquiring knowledge but also in applying the knowledge it has acquired.
Sed dices, quod impedimentum operationis intellectualis ex laesione organi phantasiae provenit non ex hoc quod intellectus indigeat phantasmatibus in utendo scientia acquisita, sed ex hoc quod imaginatio et intellectus sunt in una essentia animae: unde per accidens, imaginatione impedita, impeditur et intellectus.- Sed contra est quod coniunctio potentiarum in una essentia animae est causa quare quando una potentiarum intenditur in suo actu, alterius actus remittitur; sicut quando aliquis attente videt, minus attente audit; et est etiam causa quare una potentiarum cessante a suo actu, alia in suo actu roboratur; unde caeci plerumque acutius audiunt. Non ergo propter huiusmodi coniunctionem contingeret quod propter impedimentum potentiae imaginativae impediretur actio intellectus, sed magis roboraretur. 24. And if it be replied that the impediment to the act of intelligence arising from an injury to the organ of imagination arises not from the fact that the intellect needs images in using the knowledge it has acquired, but from the imagination and intellect being both seated in the one essence of the soul, so that the intellect is hindered accidentally through the imagination being hindered.—On the contrary the conjunction of powers in the one essence of the soul is the reason why if the act of one power be intense the act of the other is remiss: thus a person who is intent on seeing is less intent on hearing. It is also the reason why one power acts with greater strength when another is deprived of its act: thus the blind are often sharp of hearing. Therefore this conjunction of powers is not a reason for the action of the intellect being hindered through an impediment to the imagination, in fact it should rather be strengthened.
Praeterea, quicumque dat ultimum complementum operationi alicui, ille maxime operanti cooperatur. Sed si omnes animae humanae creantur a Deo, et ab ipso corporibus infunduntur, ipse dat ultimum complementum generationi quae est ex adulterio. Ergo ipse cooperabitur adulteris; quod videtur absurdum. 25. He who gives the work its final complement is the worker’s chief co-operator. Now if all human souls are created by God and by him infused into bodies, he gives the final complement to a generation that comes of adultery. Therefore he co-operates in adultery: and this is absurd.
Praeterea, secundum philosophum, perfectum unumquodque est quod potest sibi simile facere. Quanto ergo aliquid est perfectius, tanto magis potest sibi simile facere. Sed animae rationales sunt perfectiores materialibus formis elementorum, quae sibi similes formas producunt. Ergo virtute animae rationalis poterit anima rationalis produci per viam generationis. 26. According to the Philosopher (Meteor. iv, 12; De Anima ii, 4) a perfect thing is one that can make its like: land consequently the more perfect a thing is, the more is it able to make its like. Now the rational soul is more perfect than the material forms of the elements which produce other forms like themselves. Therefore the rational soul has the power by way of generation to produce another rational soul.
Praeterea, anima rationalis constituta est inter Deum et res corporales media; unde in libro de causis dicitur, quod est creata in horizonte aeternitatis et temporis. Sed in Deo generatio invenitur, similiter in rebus corporalibus. Ergo et anima, quae est media, per generationem producitur. 27. The rational soul is situated between God and corporeal things: wherefore (De Causis, prop. ii) it is asserted that it is created on the horizon between eternity and time. Now in God there is generation and also in corporeal things. Therefore the soul which is situated between them is produced by generation.
Praeterea, philosophus in XVI de animalibus dicit, quod spiritus qui exit cum spermate, est virtus principii animae et est res divina; et tale dicitur intellectus; et ita videtur quod intellectus propagetur cum semine. 28. The Philosopher (De Gener. Anim. ii, 3) says that the spirit that comes forth with the seed of the male, is a force emanating from the soul, and is a divine thing. Now such a thing is the intellect. Therefore the intellect seemingly is transmitted with the seed.
Praeterea, in eodem Lib., philosophus dicit, quod in generatione femina dat corpus, et anima est ex mare; et ita videtur quod anima sit per seminis propagationem, et non per creationem. 29. The Philosopher (ibid. 4) says that in generation the female provides the body, and that the soul proceeds from the male: so that seemingly the soul is procreated and not created.
Sed contra. Est quod dicitur Isai. LVII, vers. 16: omnem flatum ego feci. Per flatum autem intelligitur anima. Ergo videtur quod anima creetur a Deo. On the contrary it is written (Isa. lvii, 16): Every breathing I have made, and by breathing we are to understand the soul. Therefore seemingly the soul is created by God.
Praeterea, in Psal. XXXII, 15, dicitur: qui finxit singillatim corda eorum. Non ergo una anima propagatur ex alia, sed omnes seorsum creantur a Deo. Again, it is written (Ps. xxxii, 15) : He makes the heart of each one of them. Therefore one soul is not engendered by another, but all are created separately by God.
Respondeo. Dicendum quod, circa hanc quaestionem antiquitus diversa dicebantur a diversis. Quidam namque dicebant, animam filii ex parentis anima propagari, sicut et corpus propagatur ex corpore. Alii vero dicebant, omnes animas seorsum creari; sed ponebant a principio eas extra corpora fuisse creatas simul, et post modum corporibus seminatis coniungebantur, vel proprio motu voluntatis, secundum quosdam, vel Deo mandante et faciente, secundum alios. Alii vero dicebant, animas simul cum creantur, corporibus infundi. Quae quidem opiniones, quamvis aliquo tempore sustinerentur, et quae earum esset verior in dubium verteretur, ut patet ex Augustino, et in libris quos scribit de origine animae; tamen primae duae postmodum iudicio Ecclesiae sunt damnatae, et tertia approbata; unde dicitur in Lib. de ecclesiasticis dogmatibus: animas hominum non esse ab initio inter ceteras intellectuales naturas, nec simul creatas credimus, sicut Origenes fingit; neque cum corporibus per coitum seminantur, sicut Luciferiani et Cyrillus et aliqui Latinorum praesumptores affirmant. Sed dicimus corpus tantum per coniugii copulam seminari, ac formato iam corpore, animam creari et infundi. I answer that in times past this question has been answered in various ways by different people. Some said that the soul of the child is procreated from the soul of the parent, even as its body is from the body of the parent. Others said that all souls were created apart from bodies: but they held that they were all created together without bodies, and afterwards each one was united to a body when this was begotten, either by an act of its will according to some, or by God’s command and operation according to others. Others held that souls are created and at the same time infused into bodies. Although formerly these opinions were held and it was doubtful which of them came nearest to the truth, as may be gathered from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. x, 21, 22; De Anima et ejus orig.), afterwards, however, the first two were condemned by the Church and the third approved [Pope Vigilius, Can. i, contra Originem; Council of Braga, Anathem. vi, Contra haeret.; Pope Anastasius II, Epist. ad episc. Galliae ]. Hence we read in De Eccles. Dogm. (xiv): “We do not believe in the fiction of Origen that human souls were created at the beginning with other intellectual natures, nor that they are Procreated together with their bodies by coition, as the Luciferians with Cyril, and certain Latin writers have Presumed to maintain. But we affirm that the body alone is begotten by sexual Procreation, and that after the formation of the body the soul is created and infused.”
Diligenter autem consideranti apparet rationabiliter illam opinionem esse damnatam quae ponebat animam rationalem cum semine propagari, de qua nunc est quaestio. Et hoc tribus rationibus potest videri ad praesens: A careful examination will make it clear that the opinion now under consideration was rightly condemned which held the rational soul to be transmitted with the semen. Three arguments will make this sufficiently evident for the present.
prima est, quia rationalis anima in hoc a ceteris formis differt, quod aliis formis non competit esse in quo ipsae subsistant, sed quo eis res formatae subsistant; anima vero rationalis sic habet esse ut in eo subsistens; et hoc declarat diversus modus agendi. Cum enim agere non possit nisi quod est, unumquodque hoc modo se habet ad operandum vel agendum, quomodo se habet ad esse; unde, cum in operatione aliarum formarum necesse sit communicare corpus, non autem in operatione rationalis animae, quae est intelligere et velle; necesse est ipsi rationali animae esse attribui quasi rei subsistenti, non autem aliis formis. Et ex hoc est quod inter formas, sola rationalis anima a corpore separatur. Ex hoc ergo patet quod anima rationalis exit in esse, non sicut formae aliae, quibus proprie non convenit fieri, sed dicuntur fieri facto quodam. Sed res quae fit, proprie et per se fit. Quod autem fit, fit vel ex materia vel ex nihilo. Quod vero ex materia fit, necesse est fieri ex materia contrarietati subiecta. Generationes enim ex contrariis sunt, secundum philosophum: unde cum anima vel omnino materiam non habeat, vel ad minus non habeat materiam contrarietati subiectam, non potest fieri ex aliquo. Unde restat quod exeat in esse per creationem, quasi ex nihilo facta. Ponere autem quod per generationem corporis fiat, est ponere ipsam non esse subsistentem, et per consequens cum corpore corrumpi. First argument. The rational soul differs from other forms, in that the latter have a being not wherein they subsist but whereby the things informed by them subsist: whereas the rational soul has being in such wise as to subsist therein: and this is made clear by their respective modes of action. For seeing that only that which exists can act, a thing is referred to operation or action as it is referred to being: so that since the body must of necessity take part in the action of other forms, but not in the action of the rational soul, which is to understand and will: it follows of necessity that being must be ascribed to the rational soul as subsisting, but not to other forms. For this reason the rational soul is the only form that can exist separate from the body. Hence it is clear that the rational soul is brought into being not as other forms are, which properly speaking are not made but are said to be made in the making of this or that thing. That which is made is made properly speaking and per se. And that which is made, is made either of matter or out of nothing. Now that which is made from matter, must needs be made from matter subject to contrariety: since generation is from contraries according to the Philosopher (De Gen. Anim. i, 18). Wherefore since a soul has either no matter at all or at least none that is subject to contrariety it cannot be made out of something. Hence it follows that it comes into being by creation as being made out of nothing. Now to maintain that the soul is made by the generation of the body, is to say that it is not subsistent and consequently that it ceases with the body.
Secunda ratio est, quia impossibile est actionem corporeae virtutis ad hoc elevari quod virtutem penitus spiritualem et incorpoream causare possit; nihil enim agit ultra suam speciem; immo agens oportet esse praestantius patiente, secundum Augustinum. Generatio autem hominis fit per virtutem generativam, quae organum habet corporale; virtus etiam quae est in semine, non agit nisi mediante calore, ut dicitur in XVI de animalibus; unde, cum anima rationalis sit forma penitus spiritualis, non dependens a corpore nec communicans corpori in operatione, nullo modo per generationem corporis potest propagari, nec produci in esse per aliquam virtutem quae sit in semine. Second argument. It is impossible for the action of a material force to rise to the production of a force that is wholly spiritual and immaterial: because nothing acts beyond its species, in fact the agent must needs be more perfect than the patient as Augustine asserts (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). Now the begetting of a man is effected by the generative power which is exercised through organs of the body: moreover, the seminal force acts only by means of heat (De Gen. Anim. ii, 3): wherefore since the rational soul is a wholly spiritual form, neither dependent on the body nor exercising its action in common with the body, it can by no means be produced through the procreation of the body, nor be brought into being by an energy residing in the seed.
Tertia ratio est, quia omnis forma quae exit in esse per generationem, vel per virtutem naturae, educitur de potentia materiae, ut probatur in VII Metaph. Anima vero rationalis non potest educi de potentia materiae. Formae enim quarum operationes non sunt cum corpore, non possunt de materia corporali educi. Unde relinquitur quod anima rationalis non propagetur per virtutem generantis; et haec est ratio Aristotelis. Third argument. Every form that comes into being by generation or the forces of nature is educed from the potentiality of matter (Metaph. vii, 7). Now the rational soul cannot be educed from the potentiality of matter: because a form whose operation is independent of matter cannot be produced from corporeal matter. It follows, then, that the rational soul is not evolved by the generative power. This argument is given by Aristotle (De Gen. Animal. ii, 3).
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in auctoritate inducta per synecdochem ponitur pars pro toto, id est anima pro toto homine; et hoc ideo quia anima est principalior pars hominis, et unumquodque totum videtur esse id quod est principalius in eo; unde totus homo videtur esse anima vel intellectus, secundum quod dicitur in IX Ethic., cap. IV. Reply to the First Objection. In the passage quoted the part stands for the whole, namely the soul for the whole man, by the figure of synecdoche: and this because the soul is the chief part of man, and a whole is considered as though it were identified with its most important part: so that the soul or intellect is considered as constituting to whole man (Ethic. ix, 4).
Ad secundum dicendum, quod totus homo egreditur de femore generantis, propter hoc quod virtus seminis de femore egredientis operatur ad unionem corporis et animae, disponendo materiam ultima dispositione, quae est necessitans ad formam; ex qua unione homo habet quod sit homo; non autem ita quod quaelibet pars hominis per virtutem seminis causetur. Reply to the Second Objection. The whole man comes from the thigh of the begetter,—in so far as the force in the semen coming from the thigh conduces to the union of soul and body, by giving the matter its ultimate disposition which calls for the introduction of the form: by reason of which union man is a man:—but not as though each part of man were caused by that seminal force.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod peccatum originale dicitur peccatum totius naturae, sicut peccatum actuale dicitur peccatum personale; unde quae est comparatio peccati actualis ad unam personam singularem, eadem est comparatio peccati originalis ad totam naturam humanam traditam a primo parente, in quo fuit peccati initium et per cuius voluntatem in omnibus originale peccatum quasi voluntarium reputatur. Sic ergo originale peccatum est in anima in quantum pertinet ad humanam naturam. Humana autem natura traducitur a parente in filium per traductionem carnis, cui postmodum anima infunditur; et ex hoc infectionem incurrit quod fit cum carne traducta una natura. Si enim non uniretur ei ad constituendam naturam, sicut Angelus unitur corpori assumpto, infectionem non reciperet. Reply to the Third Objection. Original sin is said to be the sin of the entire nature just as actual sin is said to be the sin of the individual: wherefore the comparison between actual sin and the one individual person is the same as that between original sin and the entire human nature transmitted by our first parent in whom was the beginning of sin and by whose voluntary act original sin is imputed as voluntary to all men. Hence original sin is in the soul in so far as it is the sin of human nature. Now human nature is transmitted from parent to child by procreation of the flesh into which subsequently the soul is infused: and the soul contracts the infection because together with the transmitted flesh it forms one nature: for were it not united thereto so as to form one nature it would not contract the infection, as neither does an angel by assuming a human body.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod sicut in natura Adae erat natura omnium nostrum originaliter; ita et peccatum originale, quod in nobis est, erat in illo peccato originali originaliter. Nam peccatum originale, ut dictum est, per se recipit natura, anima vero ex consequenti. Reply to the Fourth Objection. As in Adam’s nature the nature of us all originated, so original sin which is in us originated in that original sin: because nature, as already stated, is the direct recipient of original sin, while the soul is its consequent recipient.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod homo generans generat sibi simile in specie per virtutem formae suae, scilicet animae rationalis; non quod ipsa sit immediatum principium in generatione humana agens, sed quia vis generativa, et ea quae in semine agunt, non disponerent materiam, ut fieret corpus perfectibile anima rationali, nisi quatenus agerent ut instrumenta quaedam rationalis animae. Et tamen ista actio non potest pertingere ad factionem animae rationalis, rationibus praedictis. Reply to the Fifth Objection. A man begets his like in species by virtue of his form, namely his rational soul: not that this is the immediate active principle in human generation, but because the generative force and the active principles of the semen do not dispose the matter so as to make it a body fit to be perfected by a rational soul, except in so far as they act as instruments of a rational soul. Nevertheless this action does not go so far as to produce a rational soul, for the reasons already given.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod generans generat sibi simile in specie, in quantum generatum per actionem generantis producitur ad participandum speciem eius; quod quidem fit per hoc quod generatum consequitur formam similem generanti. Si ergo forma illa non sit subsistens, sed esse suum sit solum in hoc quod uniatur ei cuius est forma; oportebit quod generans sit causa ipsius formae, sicut accidit in omnibus formis materialibus. Si autem sit talis forma quae subsistentiam habeat, et non dependeat esse suum totaliter ex unione ad materiam, sicut est in anima rationali; tunc sufficit quod generans sit causa unionis talis formae ad materiam per hoc quod disponit materiam ad formam; nec oportet quod sit causa ipsius formae. Reply to the Sixth Objection. The generator begets his like in species in so far as the begotten is produced by the action of the generator in order that it may share in his species: and this comes to pass by the begotten receiving a form like that of the generator. If, then, that, form be non-subsistent, and its being consist merely in that it is united to its subject, it will be necessary for the generator to be cause of that form; as is the case with all material forms. If on the other hand it be a subsistent form, so that its being is not entirely dependent on its union with matter, as in the case of the rational soul, then it suffices that the generator be the cause of the union of such a form with matter by merely disposing the matter for the form: nor need it be the cause of the form.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod ipsam dispositionem corporis sequitur dispositio animae rationalis; tum quia anima rationalis accipit a corpore; tum quia secundum diversitatem materiae diversificantur et formae. Et ex hoc est quod filii similantur parentibus etiam in his quae pertinent ad animam, non propter hoc quod anima ex anima traducatur. Reply to the Seventh Objection. The disposition of the rational soul is in keeping with the disposition of the body: both because it receives something from the body, and because forms are diversified according to the diversity of their matter. Hence it is that children are like their parents even in things pertaining to the soul, and not because one soul is evolved from another.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod quia anima est proprie actus corporis viventis, vivere autem est per calidum et humidum, quae in animali per sanguinem conservantur; ideo dicitur quod anima est in sanguine, ad designandum propriam dispositionem corporis, in quantum est materia perfecta per animam. Reply to the Eighth Objection. Because properly speaking a soul is the act of a living body, and life is conditional upon heat and humidity which are preserved in an animal by means of its blood: therefore it is stated that the soul is in the blood, thus indicating the proper disposition of the body as matter perfected by the soul.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod circa embrionis vitam sunt aliqui diversimode opinati. Quidam namque assimilaverunt in generatione humana progressum animae rationalis progressui corporis humani, dicentes, quod sicut corpus humanum in semine est virtualiter, non tamen habens actu humani corporis perfectionem, quae in distinctione organorum consistit, sed paulatim per virtutem seminis ad perfectionem huiusmodi pervenitur; ita in principio generationis est ibi anima, virtute quadam habens omnem perfectionem quae postea apparet in homine completo, non tamen eam habens actu, cum non appareant animae actiones, sed processu temporis paulatim eam acquirit; ita quod primo apparent in ea actiones animae vegetabilis, et postmodum animae sensibilis, et tandem animae rationalis. Et hanc opinionem tangit Gregorius Nyssenus in Lib. quem fecit de homine. Sed haec opinio non potest stare, quia aut intelligit quod ipsa anima secundum speciem suam existat a principio in semine, nondum habens perfectas operationes propter organorum defectum, aut intelligit quod in semine a principio sit aliqua virtus vel forma, quae nondum habet speciem animae; sicut nec semen habet speciem humani corporis, sed paulatim producitur per actionem naturae ad hoc quod ipsa eadem sit anima primo quidem vegetabilis, secundo sensibilis et deinde rationalis. Prima autem pars huius divisionis destruitur: primo quidem per auctoritatem philosophi. Dicitur enim in II de anima, quod potentia vitae quae est in corpore physico organico, cuius actus est anima, non est abiiciens animam, sicut semen et fructus; ex quo datur intelligi, quod semen est ita in potentia ad animam quod anima caret. Secundo, quia cum semen nondum sit ultima assimilatione membris assimilatum (sic enim eius resolutio esset corruptio quaedam) sed sit superfluitas ultimae digestionis, ut dicitur in XV de animalibus, nondum fuit in corpore generantis existens anima perfectum; unde non potest esse quod in principio suae decisionis sit in eo anima. Tertio, quia dato quod cum eo decideretur anima, non tamen potest hoc dici de anima rationali; quae cum non sit actus alicuius partis corporis, non potest deciso corpore decidi. Reply to the Ninth Objection. There are several opinions about the life of the embryo. According to some in human generation the soul, like the human body, is subject to stages of progression, so that as the human body is virtually in the semen, yet has not actually the perfection of a human body by having distinct members, but gradually reaches this perfection through the force of the semen, so at the beginning of the generation the soul is there having virtually all the perfection which subsequently is to be seen in the perfect human being, yet it has not this perfection actually, since there is no sign of the soul’s activity, but attains thereto by degrees: so that at first there are indications of the action of the vegetal soul, then of the sensitive soul, and lastly of the rational soul. Gregory of Nyssa mentions this opinion (De Homine): but it cannot be admitted. It means either that the soul in its species is in the semen from the very. outset, deprived however of its perfect activity through lack of organs, or that from the beginning there is in the semen some energy or form not having as yet the species of a soul (just as the semen has not as yet the appearance of a human body) but by the action of nature gradually transformed into a soul at first vegetal, then sensitive and lastly rational. The former alternative is rebutted first by the authority of the Philosopher. He says, in fact (De Anima ii, i), that when we say that the soul is the act of a physico-organic body which has life potentially we do not exclude the soul, as we exclude it from the semen and the fruit. Hence we gather that the semen is animated potentially in that the soul is not therein. Secondly, because as the semen has no definite likeness to the members of the human body (else its resolution would be a kind of corruption) but is the residue of the final digestion (De Gener. Anim. i, 19), it was not yet while in the body of the begetter perfected by the soul, so that in the first instant of its separation it could not have a soul. Thirdly, granted that it was animated when it was separated, this cannot refer to the rational soul: because since it is not the act of a particular part of the body, it cannot be sundered when the body is sundered.
Secundam etiam partem divisionis praedictae patet esse falsam. Cum enim forma substantialis non continue vel successive in actum producatur, sed in instanti (alias oporteret esse motum in genere substantiae, sicut est in genere qualitatis) non potest esse quod illa virtus quae est a principio in semine, successive proficiat ad diversos gradus animae. Non enim forma ignis in aere hoc modo inducitur ut continuo procedat de imperfecto ad perfectum; cum nulla forma substantialis suscipiat magis et minus; sed solum materia per alterationem praecedentem variatur, ut sit magis et minus disposita ad formam. Forma vero non incipit esse in materia nisi in ultimo instanti alterationis. The second alternative is also clearly false. For seeing that a substantial form is brought into act not continuously or by degrees but instantaneously (else movement would needs be in the genus of substance just as it is in that of quality) the force which from the outset is in the semen cannot by degrees advance to the various degrees of soul. Thus the form of fire is not produced in the air so as gradually to advance from imperfection to perfection, since no substantial form is subject to increase and decrease, but it is the matter alone that is changed by the previous alteration so as to be more or less disposed to receive the form: and the form does not begin to be in the matter until the last instant of this alteration.
Alii vero dicunt, quod in semine primo est anima vegetabilis, et post modum ea manente, inducitur anima sensibilis ex virtute generantis, et ultimo inducitur anima rationalis per creationem, ita quod ponunt in homine esse tres animas per essentiam differentes. Sed contra hoc est quod dicitur: neque duas animas dicimus esse in uno homine sicut et Iacobus et alii Syrorum scribunt, unam animalem qua animatur corpus et immixta sit sanguini, et alteram spiritualem quae rationem ministret. Et iterum impossibile est unius et eiusdem rei esse plures formas substantiales: nam cum forma substantialis faciat esse non solum secundum quid, sed simpliciter, et constituat hoc aliquid in genere substantiae, si prima forma hoc facit, secunda adveniens, inveniens subiectum iam in esse substantiali constitutum, accidentaliter ei adveniet; et sic sequeretur quod anima sensibilis et rationalis in homine corpori accidentaliter uniantur. Nec potest dici quod anima vegetabilis quae in planta est forma substantialis, in homine non sit forma substantialis, sed dispositio ad formam: quia quod est de genere substantiae nullius accidens esse potest, ut dicitur in I Physic. Others say that in the semen there is at first the vegetal soul and that afterwards while this remains the sensitive soul is introduced by the power of the generator, and that lastly the rational soul is introduced by creation. So that they posit in man three essentially different souls. Against this, however, is the authority of the book De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus (xv): “Nor do we say that there are two souls in one man as James and other Syrians write; one, animal, by which the body is animated and which is mingled with the blood, the other spiritual, which obeys the reason.” Moreover, it is impossible for one and the same thing to have several substantial forms, because, since the substantial form makes a thing to be, not in this or that way, but simply, and establishes this or that thing in the genus of substance; if the first form, does this, the second form at its advent will find the subject already established with substantial being and consequently win accrue to it accidentally: and thus it would follow that the sensitive and rational souls in man would be united accidentally to the body, Nor can it be said that the vegetal soul which is the substantial form in a plant is not the substantial form in a man, but a mere disposition to the form, since that which is in the genus of substance cannot be an accident of anything.
Unde alii dicunt, quod anima vegetabilis est in potentia ad animam sensibilem et sensibilis est actus eius; unde anima vegetabilis quae primo est in semine, per actionem naturae perducitur ad complementum animae sensibilis; et ulterius anima rationalis est actus et complementum animae sensibilis; unde anima sensibilis perducitur ad suum complementum, scilicet ad animam rationalem, non per actionem generantis sed per actum creantis; et sic dicunt quod ipsa rationalis anima in homine partim est ab intrinseco, scilicet quantum ad naturam intellectualem; et partim ab extrinseco, quantum ad naturam vegetabilem et sensibilem. Sed hoc nullo modo potest stare: quia vel hoc ita intelligitur quod natura intellectualis sit alia anima a vegetabili et sensibili, et sic redit in idem cum secunda opinione: vel intelligitur ita quod ex istis tribus naturis constituatur substantia animae in qua natura intellectualis erit ut formale, et natura sensibilis et vegetabilis erit ut materiale. Ex quo sequitur quod cum natura sensibilis et vegetabilis sint corruptibiles, utpote de materia eductae, substantia animae humanae non possit esse perpetua. Sequitur idem etiam inconveniens quod inductum est contra primam, scilicet quod forma substantialis successive educatur in actum. Hence others say that the vegetative soul is potentially sensitive and that the sensitive soul is its act: so that the vegetative soul which at first is in the semen is raised to the perfection of the sensitive soul by the action of nature; and further that the rational soul is the act and perfection of the sensitive soul, so that the sensitive soul is brought to its perfection consisting in the rational soul, not by the action of the generator but by that of the Creator. Hence they hold that the rational soul is in man partly from within, namely as regards its intellectual nature, and partly from without as regards its vegetative and sensitive nature. Now this is altogether impossible, because either it means that the intellectual nature is distinct from the vegetal and sensitive souls, and thus we return to the second opinion, or it means that these three natures constitute the substance of the soul wherein the intellectual nature will be the form as it were, and the sensitive and vegetative natures, matter. From, this it would follow, as the sensitive and vegetative natures are corruptible through being educed from matter, that the substance of the rational soul would not be immortal. Moreover, this opinion is involved in the same impossibility as we have shown to be implicated in the first opinion, namely that a substantial form be brought into act by degrees.
Alii vero dicunt, quod embrio non habet animam, quousque perficiatur anima rationali: operationes autem vitae quae in eo apparent sunt ex anima matris. Sed hoc non potest esse: nam in hoc viventia a non viventibus differunt, quia viventia movent se ipsa secundum operationes vitae, quod de non viventibus dici non potest; unde non potest esse quod nutriri et augeri, quae sunt propriae operationes viventis, sint in embrione a principio extrinseco, scilicet ab anima matris. Et praeterea virtus nutritiva matris assimilaret cibum corpori matris, et non corpori embrionis; cum nutritiva deserviat individuo sicut generativa speciei. Et iterum sentire non posset esse in embrione ex anima matris. Et ideo alii dicunt, quod in embrione non est anima ante infusionem animae rationalis, sed est ibi vis formativa, quae huiusmodi operationes vitae in embrione exercet. Sed hoc etiam esse non potest: quia cum appareant esse in embrione ante ultimum complementum, diversae operationes vitae, non possunt esse ab una virtute: unde oportet quod sit ibi anima habens diversas virtutes. Others say that there is no soul in the embryo until it is perfected by the rational soul, and that the vital functions to be observed therein proceed from the soul of the mother. But this also is impossible: because living and non-living things differ in that living things are self-moving in respect of vital functions, whereas non-living things are not. Wherefore nutrition and growth which are the functions proper to a living being cannot result in the embryo from an extrinsic principle such as the mother’s soul. Moreover, the mother’s nutritive power would assimilate food to the mother’s body and not to the body of the embryo: ‘since nutrition serves the individual just as generation serves the species. Further, sensation cannot be caused in the embryo by the mother’s soul. Wherefore others say that there is no soul in the embryo before the infusion of the rational soul, but that there is a formative force that exercises these vital functions in the embryo. This again is impossible, because before the embryo attains to its ultimate complement it shows signs of various vital functions; and these cannot be exercised by one power: so that there must needs be a soul there having various powers.
Et ideo aliter est dicendum, quod in semine a principio suae decisionis non est anima, sed virtus animae; quae fundatur in spiritu qui in semine continetur quod de natura sui spumosum est, et consequens corporalis spiritus contentivum. Ista autem virtus agit disponendo materiam, et formando ad susceptionem animae. Et sciendum quod aliter est in generatione hominis vel animalis, et aliter in generatione aeris vel aquae. Nam generatio aeris est simplex, cum in tota generatione aeris non appareant nisi duae formae substantiales, una quae abiicitur et alia quae inducitur, quod totum fit simul in uno instanti: unde ante introductionem formae aeris semper manet ibi forma aquae; nec sunt ibi dispositiones ad formam aeris. In generatione autem animalis apparent diversae formae substantiales, cum primo appareat sperma, et postea sanguis, et sic deinceps quousque sit forma hominis vel animalis. Et sic oportet quod huiusmodi generatio non sit simplex, sed continens in se plures generationes et corruptiones. Non enim potest esse quod una et eadem forma substantialis gradatim educatur in actum, ut ostensum est. Sic ergo per virtutem formativam, quae a principio est in semine, abiecta forma spermatis, inducitur alia forma; qua abiecta, iterum inducatur alia: et sic primo inducatur anima vegetabilis; deinde ea abiecta, inducatur anima sensibilis et vegetabilis simul; qua abiecta, inducatur non per virtutem praedictam sed a creante, anima quae simul est rationalis sensibilis et vegetabilis. Et sic dicendum est secundum hanc opinionem quod embrio antequam habeat animam rationalem, vivit et habet animam, qua abiecta, inducitur anima rationalis. Et sic non sequitur duas animas esse in eodem corpore, nec animam rationalem traduci cum semine. We must therefore say differently that from the moment of its severance the semen contains not a soul but a soul power: and this power is based on the spirit contained in the semen which by nature is spumy and consequently contains corporeal spirit. Now this spirit acts by disposing matter and forming it for the reception of the soul. And we must observe a difference between the process of generation in men and animals and in air or water. The generation of air is simple, since therein only two substantial forms appear, one that is voided and one that is induced, and all this takes place together in one instant, so that the form of water remains during the whole period preceding the induction of the form of air; without any previous dispositions to the form of air. On the other hand in the generation of an animal various substantial forms appear: first the semen, then blood and so on until we find the form of an animal or of a man. Consequently this kind of generation is not simple, but consists of a series of generations and corruptions: for it is not possible, as we have proved above, that one and the same substantial form be educed into act by degrees. Thus, then, by the formative force that is in the semen from the beginning, the form of the semen is set aside and another form induced, and when this has been set aside yet another comes on the scene, and thus the vegetal form makes its first appearance: and this being set aside, a soul both vegetal and sensitive is induced; and this being set aside a soul at once vegetal, sensitive and rational is induced, not by the aforesaid force but by the Creator. According to this opinion the embryo before having a rational soul is a living being having a soul, which being set aside, a rational soul is induced: so that it does not follow that two souls are together in the same body, nor that the rational soul is transmitted together with the body.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod embrio antequam habeat animam rationalem non est ens perfectum, sed in via ad perfectionem; unde non est in genere vel specie nisi per reductionem sicut incompletum reducitur ad genus vel speciem completi. Reply to the Tenth Objection. Before the advent of the rational soul the embryo is not a perfect being but is on the way to perfection: and therefore it is not in a genus or species save by reduction, just as the incomplete is reduced to the genus or species of the complete.
Ad undecimum dicendum, quod in semine a principio quamvis non sit anima, est tamen ibi virtus animae, ut dictum est, quae quidem virtus fundatur in spiritu qui in spermate continetur, et dicitur virtus animae quia est ab anima generantis. Reply to the Eleventh Objection. Although the soul is not in the semen from the beginning, the soul-force is there, as stated above, which force is based on the spirit contained in the semen; and is called a soul-force because it comes from the soul of the generator.
Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod embrio ante animam rationalem vivit et animam habet, ut dictum est, unde hoc argumentum concedimus. Reply to the Twelfth Objection. Before the advent of the rational soul the semen is a living and animate being, as stated above; wherefore we grant this argument.
Et similiter ad decimumtertium, decimumquartum et decimumquintum. The same answer applies to the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Objections.
Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod virtus formativa quae in principio est in semine, manet adveniente etiam anima rationali; sicut et spiritus in quos fere tota substantia spermatis convertitur manent. Et illa quae prius fuit formativa corporis fit postmodum corporis regitiva. Sicut etiam calor qui fuit dispositio ad formam ignis manet forma ignis adveniente, ut instrumentum formae in agendo. Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. The formative force that is from the outset in the semen remains even after the advent of the rational soul; just as the animal spirits remain into which nearly the whole substance of the semen is changed. This force, which at first served to form the body, afterwards regulates the body. Thus heat which at first disposes matter to the form of fire remains after the advent of the form of fire as an instrument of the latter’s activity.
Et per hoc patet solutio ad decimumseptimum et decimumoctavum. This answer applies to the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Objections.
Ad decimumnonum dicendum, quod licet anima rationalis non sit a generante, unio tamen corporis ad eam, est quodammodo a generante, ut dictum est. Et ideo homo dicitur generari. Reply to the Nineteenth Objection. Although the rational soul is not evolved from the generator, its union with the body is in a manner from the generator, as stated above. Consequently we say that a man is begotten.
Ad vicesimum dicendum, quod pro tanto in homine non est duplex esse, quia non est sic intelligendum corpus esse a generante et animam a creante, quasi corpori acquiratur esse separatum a generante, et separatim animae a creante; sed quia creans dat esse animae in corpore, et generans disponit corpus ad hoc quod huius esse sit particeps per animam sibi unitam. Reply to the Twentieth Objection. There is not a twofold being in man for the simple reason that when it is said that man’s body is from his begetter and his soul from his Creator we are not to understand that the being acquired by the body from its begetter is distinct from that which the soul acquires from its Creator, but that the Creator gives being to the soul in the body, while the begetter disposes the body to participate in this being through the soul united to it.
Ad vicesimumprimum dicendum, quod duo agentia omnino disparata non possunt hoc modo se habere quod actio unius terminetur ad materiam, et alterius ad formam; hoc tamen contingit in duobus agentibus ordinatis, quorum unum est instrumentum alterius. Actio enim principalis agentis se extendit quandoque ad aliquid ad quod non potest se extendere actio instrumenti. Natura autem est sicut instrumentum quoddam divinae virtutis ut supra, ostensum est. Unde non est inconveniens, si virtus divina sola faciat animam rationalem, actione naturae se extendente solum ad disponendum corpus. Reply to the Twenty-first Objection. Two agents that are altogether disparate cannot combine so that the one’s action terminate in the matter and the other’s in the form, but this is possible in the case of two co-ordinate agents one of which is the instrument of the other: because the action of the principal agent sometimes extends to something that is beyond the range of the instrument. Now nature is a kind of instrument of the, divine power as we have shown above (A. 8, rep. 14; A. 7). Hence it is not impossible that the divine power alone produce the rational soul, while the action of nature extends no further than to giving the body the requisite disposition.
Ad vicesimumsecundum dicendum, quod intellectus in corpore existens non indiget aliquo corporali ad intelligendum, quod simul cum intellectu sit principium intellectualis operationis, sicut accidit in visu: nam principium visionis non est visus tantum, sed oculus constans ex visu et pupilla. Indiget autem corpore tamquam obiecto, sicut visus indiget pariete in quo est color: nam phantasmata comparantur ad intellectum ut colores ad visum, sicut dicitur in III de anima. Et ex hoc est quod intellectus impeditur in intelligendo, laeso organo phantasiae: quia quamdiu est in corpore indiget phantasmatibus non solum quasi accipiens a phantasmatibus dum acquirit scientiam, sed etiam comparans species intelligibiles phantasmatibus dum utitur scientia acquisita. Et propter hoc exempla in scientiis sunt necessaria. Reply to the Twenty-second Objection. An intelligence existing in a body, in order to understand, needs nothing corporeal as a co-principle of intellectual action, in the same way as the sight in order to see: for the principle of vision is not the sense of sight only, but the eye consisting of pupil and the faculty of seeing. But it needs a body objectively, as the sight needs the wall on which is the colour: because images are compared to the intellect as colours to sight (De Anima iii, 5). This is why the intellect is prevented from, understanding when the organ of the imagination is injured: since so long as it is in the body it needs images, not only as receiving from the images when it is acquiring knowledge; but also as referring the intelligible species to the images when it applies knowledge already acquired. For this reason science makes use of examples.
Et per hoc patet responsio ad vicesimumtertium et vicesimumquartum. From this we gather how to reply to the Twenty-third and Twenty-fourth Objections.
Ad vicesimumquintum dicendum, quod illa ratio est Apollinaris, ut Gregorius Nyssenus dicit. Decipiebatur autem in hoc quod non distinguebat operationem naturae, quae est generatio prolis, cui Deus dat complementum, ab operatione voluntaria adulterii in qua peccatum consistit. Reply to the Twenty-fifth Objection. This was the argument of Apollinaris according to Gregory of Nyssa (De Homine vi). He was deceived, however, in failing to distinguish the action of nature which is the procreation of the child, to which action God gives the complement, from the deliberate act of adultery wherein the sin consists.
Ad vicesimumsextum dicendum, quod anima, cum sit perfectior formis materialibus, posset sibi similem producere si anima rationalis posset produci aliter quam per creationem, quod esse non potest; et hoc provenit ex eius perfectione, ut ex praedictis potest patere. Reply to the Twenty-sixth Objection. The soul being more perfect than material forms would be able to produce its like if a rational soul could be produced otherwise than by creation, which is impossible. And this is owing to its perfection as may be gathered from what has been said.
Ad vicesimumseptimum dicendum, quod in solo Deo potest esse una natura in pluribus suppositis; et ideo ibi solummodo potest esse generatio sine imperfectione mutationis et divisionis; unde nobiliores creaturae, quae sunt indivisibiles nec substantialiter transmutantur, sicut anima rationalis et Angelus, non generantur; sed inferiores creaturae, quae sunt divisibiles et corruptibiles. Reply to the Twenty-seventh Objection. In God alone can there be one nature in several supposits, wherefore in him alone can there be generation without the imperfection of change and division. Hence the higher creatures which are indivisible and unchangeable in substance such as the rational soul and the angels are not generated: whereas the lower creatures are, being divisible and corruptible.
Ad vicesimumoctavum dicendum, quod virtus illa quae est in semine, a philosopho vocatur intellectus, ut dicit Commentator, propter quamdam similitudinem: quia sicut intellectus operatur absque organo, ita et illa virtus. Reply to the Twenty-eighth Objection. The force that is in the semen is called intellect by the Philosopher according to the Commentator (in Metaph. vii, 9) on account of a certain likeness: inasmuch as like the intellect its action, is exercised without an organ.
Ad vicesimumnonum dicendum, quod verbum illud philosophi est intelligendum de anima sensibili, non de rationali. Reply to the Twenty-ninth Objection. This saying of the Philosopher refers to the sensitive but not the rational soul.
Q. III:
ARTICLE X
Is the Rational Soul Created in the Body?

[ Sum. Th. 1, Q. xc, A. 4.]
Decimo quaeritur utrum anima rationalis sit creata in corpore, vel extra corpus. Et videtur quod sit creata extra corpus. THE tenth point of inquiry is whether the rational soul be created in or apart from the body. Seemingly it is created apart from the body.
Eorum enim quae sunt idem secundum speciem, est idem modus prodeundi in esse. Sed animae nostrae sunt eiusdem speciei cum anima Adae. Anima autem Adae fuit extra corpus cum Angelis creata, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo et aliae animae humanae extra corpus creantur. 1. Things belonging to the same species come into being in the same way. Now our souls belong to the same species as Adam’s: and Adam’s soul was created apart from his body and at the same time as the angels, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. vii, 25,27). Therefore other human souls are also created apart from their bodies.
Praeterea, omne totum imperfectum est cui deest aliqua pars quae ad eius perfectionem pertinet. Sed animae rationales magis pertinent ad perfectionem universi quam etiam substantiae corporales, cum substantia intellectualis sit nobilior corporali substantia. Si ergo animae rationales a principio non fuerunt omnes creatae, sed quotidie creantur cum corpora generantur; sequitur quod universum sit imperfectum ex eo quod desunt sibi nobilissimae partes eius. Hoc videtur esse inconveniens. Ergo animae rationales sunt a principio extra corpora creatae. 2. A whole is imperfect if it lacks one of the parts required for its perfection. Now rational souls belong to the perfection of the universe more than corporeal substances, since an intellectual substance excels a corporeal substance. If, then, rational souls were not all created from the beginning, but created day by day when their bodies are begotten, it follows that the universe is imperfect through lacking its most excellent parts: and this seemingly is unreasonable. Therefore rational souls were created from the beginning apart from their bodies.
Praeterea, theatralibus ludis videtur esse simile, quod tunc universum destruatur, quando ad ultimam perfectionem devenerit. Sed mundus tunc finietur quando hominum generatio cessabit, et tunc completissima universi perfectio erit, si animae simul creantur cum corpora generantur. Ergo secundum hoc divina gubernatio, quae mundum regit, erit similis ludo; quod videtur esse absurdum. 3. It savours of a theatrical display that the universe should be destroyed when it attains to its ultimate perfection. Now the world will come to an end when the begetting of men ceases, and then the universe will have reached the utmost height of its perfection, if souls are created at the same time as their bodies are begotten: wherefore in that case the divine government will be like a play: which is surely absurd.
Sed dices, quod nihil prohibet perfectioni universi deesse aliquid secundum numerum, cum tamen quantum ad omnes eius species sit completum. —Sed contra, species rerum ex hoc quod, quantum in ipsis est, perpetuitatem quamdam habent, pertinent ad essentialem perfectionem universi, utpote per se intentae ab universi auctore. Individua vero, quae non habent esse perpetuum, pertinent ad quamdam accidentalem universi perfectionem, utpote non propter se intenta, sed propter speciei conservationem. Animae autem rationales non solum secundum speciem, sed etiam secundum singula individua perpetuitatem habent. Ergo si a principio omnes animae rationales defuerunt; ita fuit universum imperfectum, ac si aliquae species universi defuissent. 4. You will say perhaps that there is no reason why the perfection of the universe should not lack something in point of numbers, seeing that it is complete in respect of all its species.—On the contrary, as the species of things, considered in themselves enjoy a certain perpetuity, they belong to the essential perfection of the universe, in that they are per se intended by the Author of the universe. Individuals, however, which have not perpetuity belong to a certain accidental perfection of the universe, in that they are intended not per se but for the conservation of the species. Now rational souls not only in their species but also in each individual enjoy perpetuity. Therefore if rational souls were all lacking at the beginning, the universe was imperfect even as it would have been had some of the species of the universe been wanting.
Praeterea, Macrobius super somnium Scipionis, duas portas in caelo posuit: unam deorum, et aliam animarum, in cancro scilicet, et Capricorno; per quarum alteram animae ad corpus descendebant. Sed hoc non esset, nisi animae extra corpus in caelo crearentur. Ergo animae extra corpora creatae sunt. 5. Macrobius (Super Somn. Scip. i) assigned two gates to heaven, one for the gods, and one for souls, in Cancer namely and in Capricorn, through one of which souls came down to earth. But it would not be so unless souls were created in heaven apart from their bodies. Therefore souls were created independently of bodies.
Praeterea, causa efficiens praecedit tempore suum effectum. Sed anima est causa efficiens corporis, ut dicitur in II de anima. Ergo est ante corpus, et ita non creatur in corpore. 6. An efficient cause precedes its effect in point of time. Now the soul is the efficient cause of the body (De Anima ii, 4). Therefore it exists before the body and is not created in the body.
Praeterea, in libro de spiritu et anima, dicitur, quod anima antequam corpori uniatur, habet irascibilitatem et concupiscibilitatem. Sed haec non possunt esse in anima antequam anima sit. Ergo anima est antequam corpori uniatur, et ita non creatur in corpore. 7. It is stated in De Spiritu et Anima (xiii) that before its union with the body the soul has the irascible and concupiscible appetite. But these cannot be in the soul before it exists. Therefore the soul exists before its union with the body, and consequently is not created in the body.
Praeterea, substantia animae rationalis tempore non mensuratur: quia, ut dicitur in Lib. de causis, est supra tempus; nec iterum mensuratur aeternitate, quia hoc solius Dei est. In Lib. etiam de causis dicitur, quod anima est infra aeternitatem. Ergo mensuratur aevo, sicut et Angeli: et ita eadem est mensura durationis Angeli et animae. Cum ergo Angeli sint creati a principio mundi, videtur quod etiam animae tunc sint creatae, et non in corporibus. 8. The substance of the rational soul is not measured by time, since it is above time (De Causis ii): nor is it measured by eternity, because this belongs to God alone. Again it is stated (De Causis, l.c.) that the soul is beneath eternity, therefore like the angels it is measured by eviternity, so that the duration of angels and souls has the same unit of measurement. Consequently as the angels were created at the beginning of the world, seemingly souls were created then also and not in their respective bodies.
Praeterea, in aevo non est prius et posterius: alias a tempore non differret, ut quibusdam videtur. Sed si Angeli ante animas essent creati, vel una anima post aliam crearetur, esset in aevo prius et posterius, cum mensura animae sit aevum, ut ostensum est. Ergo oportet omnes animas simul creari cum Angelis. 9. In eviternity there is no before and after, else it would not differ from time, as some think. Now if angels were created before souls, or one soul before another, there would be before and after in eviternity, since this is the measurement of the soul’s duration, as stated above. Therefore souls must all have been created together with the angels.
Praeterea, unitas loci attestatur unitati naturae: unde et diversorum corporum secundum naturam, diversa sunt loca. Sed Angeli et animae conveniunt in natura, cum sint substantiae spirituales et intellectuales. Ergo animae creatae sunt in caelo Empyreo, sicut Angeli, et non in corporibus. 10. Unity of place indicates unity of nature: wherefore different places are assigned to bodies differing in nature. But angels and souls agree in nature, since they are spiritual and intellectual substances. Therefore souls like the angels were created in the empyrean and not in bodies.
Praeterea, quanto aliqua substantia est subtilior, tanto ei altior locus debetur; unde ignis locus altior est quam aeris vel aquae. Sed anima est multo simplicior substantia quam aliquod corpus. Ergo videtur quod sit creata supra omnia corpora, et non in corpore. 11. The more subtle a substance is the higher place it requires: thus the place of fire is higher than that of air or water. Now the soul is a much more subtle substance than a body. Therefore seemingly it was created above all bodies. and not in the body.
Praeterea, cuiuslibet rei ultima perfectio est secundum quod est in proprio loco; cum non sit extra proprium locum nisi per violentiam quamdam. Sed ultima perfectio animae est in caelesti habitatione. Ergo ibi locus est congruens naturae eius; et ita videtur quod ibi sit creata. 12. A thing reaches its ultimate perfection forasmuch as it occupies its proper place, for it cannot be outside its proper place except through violence. Now the ultimate perfection of the soul is’a heavenly home. Therefore this is the place befitting its nature, and so it would seem that it was created there.
Praeterea, Genes. II, 2, dicitur: requievit Deus die septimo ab universo opere quod patrarat. Ex quo intelligi datur quod tunc Deus a novis creaturis creandis cessavit. Sed hoc non esset, si nunc quotidie animae crearentur. Ergo animae non creantur in corpore, sed creatae sunt a principio extra corpus. 13. It is written (Gen. ii, 2) : God rested on the seventh day from all the work which he had done: whereby we are given to understand that God ceased then from creating anything new. Therefore souls are not created in their respective bodies, but were created independently at the beginning.
Praeterea, opus creationis praecedit opus propagationis. Hoc autem non esset, si simul animae crearentur dum corpora propagantur. Ergo animae ante corpora sunt creatae. 14. The work of creation preceded the work of increase. But this would not be, if souls be created as bodies increase in number. Therefore they were created before bodies.
Praeterea, Deus omnia secundum iustitiam operatur. Sed secundum iustitiam non dantur diversa et inaequalia nisi in illis in quibus aliqua inaequalitas meriti praeexistit. Cum ergo in nativitate hominum circa animas multa inaequalitas attendatur: tum ex hoc quod quaedam uniuntur corporibus ad operationes animae aptis, quaedam vero ineptis; tum ex hoc quod quidam ex infidelibus nascuntur alii vero ex fidelibus, qui per sacramentorum susceptionem salvantur; videtur quod inaequalitas meriti in animabus praecesserit: et sic videtur quod animae fuerint ante corpora. 15. God does all things according to justice. Now justice requires that diverse and unequal awards should not be made save to those who are found to be unequal in merit. Now we find that men from their birth are subject to many inequalities of soul: in some cases the body to which a soul is united is well adapted to the soul’s actions, in others the body is ill-adapted to them: some are born of unbelievers, others are born of believers and are saved through receiving the sacraments. Therefore it would seem that there preceded in souls an inequality of merits, and consequently that souls were created before bodies.
Praeterea, ea quorum una est inceptio, videtur quod secundum esse dependeant ad invicem. Sed anima secundum esse suum non dependet a corpore, quod patet ex hoc quod corrupto corpore manet. Ergo nec anima simul incipit cum corpore. 16. Things that are united in their beginning would seem to depend on each other as to their being. But the soul is independent of the body as to its being: which is shown by the fact that it remains when the body has ceased to be. Therefore it does not begin to exist together with the body.
Praeterea, ea quorum unum impedit alterum, non naturaliter uniuntur. Sed anima impeditur a sua operatione a corpore: corpus enim quod corrumpitur, aggravat animam, ut dicitur Sapient. cap. IX, 15. Ergo anima non naturaliter unitur corpori; et ita videtur quod prius fuerit corpori non unita quam uniretur. 17. Things that hinder each other are not naturally united. Now the soul is hindered in its action by the body, for the corruptible body is a load upon the soul (Wis. ix, 15). Therefore the soul is not naturally united to the body, and thus it would seem that before its union with the body it existed apart therefrom.
Sed contra. Est quod dicitur in libro de Ecclesiast. dogmatibus, quod animae ab initio inter ceteras intellectuales creaturas non simul creantur. On the contrary it is stated (Eccles. Dogm. xiv) that souls were not created together with other intellectual creatures.
Praeterea, Gregorius Nyssenus dicit, quod assertio utriusque opinionis vituperatione non caret: et eorum qui prius vivere animas in suo quodam statu atque ordine fabulantur, et eorum qui eas post corpora creatas existimant. Further, Gregory of Nyssa says (De Creat. Hom. xxix) that it is reprehensible “to hold either opinion, whether of those who foolishly assert a previous existence of souls in a certain state and order becoming to them, or of those who maintain that our souls are created after our bodies.”
Praeterea, Hieronymus dicit in symbolo fidei, quem composuit: eorum condemnamus errorem qui dicunt animas ante peccasse, vel in caelis conversatas fuisse, quam in corpora immitterentur. Further, Jerome says (Symb. Fid. ii): “We condemn the error of those who hold that souls sinned or lived in heaven before being united to bodies.”
Praeterea, proprius actus fit in propria materia. Sed anima est proprius actus corporis. Ergo in corpore anima creatur. Further, the proper act is evolved in its proper matter. Now the soul is the proper act of the body. Therefore it is created in the body.
Respondeo. Dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, quorumdam opinio fuit, quod animae omnes simul creatae fuerunt extra corpus. Cuius quidem opinionis falsitas potest ad praesens quatuor rationibus ostendi: I answer that as we have stated (A. 9) some held the opinion that our souls were all created together apart from our bodies: and that this is false we shall now proceed to show by four arguments.
quarum prima est, quod res creatae sunt a Deo in sua perfectione naturali. Perfectum enim naturaliter praecedit imperfectum, secundum philosophum. Et Boetius dicit, quod, natura a perfectis sumit exordium. Anima autem non habet perfectionem suae naturae extra corpus, cum non sit per se ipsam species completa alicuius naturae, sed sit pars humanae naturae: alias oporteret quod ex anima et corpore non fieret unum nisi per accidens. Unde non fuit anima humana extra corpus creata. Quicumque autem posuerunt animas extra corpora fuisse antequam corporibus unirentur, aestimaverunt eas esse naturas perfectas, et quod naturalis perfectio animae non est esse in hoc quod anima corpori uniretur, sed uniretur ei accidentaliter, sicut homo indumento: sicut Plato dicebat, quod homo non est ex anima et corpore, sed est anima utens corpore. Et propter hoc omnes qui posuerunt animas extra corpora creari, posuerunt transcorporationem animarum; ut sic anima exuta a corpore uno, alteri corpori uniretur, sicut homo exutus uno vestimento induit alterum. First argument. Things when created by God were in a state of natural perfection: for the perfect naturally precedes the imperfect according to the Philosopher (De Coelo i, 2): and Boethius says (De Consol. x, pros. 10) that nature originates in perfect things. Now the soul apart from the body has not the perfection of its nature, because by itself it is not the complete species of a nature, but a part of human nature: otherwise soul and body would not together form one thing save accidentally. Hence the human soul was not created before its body. Now all those who held that souls exist outside bodies before being united to them, supposed them to be perfect natures, and that the natural perfection of the soul is not that it be united to its body, and that it is united to it accidentally as a man to his clothes: thus Plato said that a man is not made of soul and body, but is a soul making use of a body. Wherefore all those who held souls to be created apart from bodies, believed in the transmigration of souls, namely that a soul after casting off one body is united to another body, even as a man changes from one suit of clothes to another.
Secunda ratio est Avicennae. Cum enim anima non sit composita ex materia et forma, distinctio animarum ab invicem esse non posset nisi secundum formalem differentiam, si solum secundum se ipsas distinguerentur. Formalis autem differentia diversitatem speciei inducit. Diversitas autem secundum numerum in eadem specie ex differentia materiali procedit: quae quidem animae competere non potest secundum naturam ex qua fit, sed secundum materiam in qua fit. Sic ergo solum ponere possumus plures animas humanas eiusdem speciei, numero diversas esse, si a sui principio corporibus uniantur, ut earum distinctio ex unione ad corpus quodammodo proveniat, sicut a materiali principio, quamvis sicut ab efficiente principio talis distinctio sit a Deo. Si vero extra corpora animae humanae fuissent creatae oportuisset eas esse specie differentes, sublato distinctionis materiali principio, sicut et omnes substantiae separatae a philosophis ponuntur specie differentes. The second argument is given by Avicenna. Seeing that the soul is not composed of matter and form—for it is distinct both from matter and from the composite (De Anima ii, i)—there could be no distinction between one soul and another except that which arises from a difference of forms, supposing that souls differ from one another by themselves. Now difference of form implies difference of species. And numerical distinction within the same species arises from distinction of matter: and this cannot apply to the soul as regards the matter of which a thing is made but only as regards the matter in which the soul comes into being. Consequently there cannot be many human souls of the same species and distinct individually unless from their very beginning they be united to bodies, so that their mutual distinction arises from their union to bodies, as from a material principle in a manner of speaking, although that distinction comes from God as their efficient cause. Now if souls were created apart from their bodies, as there would have been no material principle to distinguish them they would have differed in species like all separate substances which according to the philosophers differ specifically.
Tertia ratio est, nam anima rationalis humana non differt secundum substantiam a sensibili et vegetabili, sicut superius est ostensum; vegetabilis autem et sensibilis animae origo non potest esse nisi in corpore, cum sint actus quarumdam partium corporis; unde nec anima rationalis potest nisi in corpore creari secundum naturae suae convenientiam, tamen absque divinae praeiudicio potestatis. Third argument. We have already shown that man’s rational soul is not in substance distinct from the sensible and vegetal soul: moreover the vegetal and sensible soul,cannot originate except from the body since they are acts of certain parts of the body. Wherefore neither can the rational soul, so far as is becoming to its nature, be created apart from the body; without prejudice, however, to the divine power.
Quarta ratio est, quia si anima rationalis extra corpus creata fuit, et ibi habuit sui esse naturalis complementum, impossibile est convenientem causam assignare unionis eius ad corpus. Non enim potest dici, quod proprio motu se corporibus adiunxit, cum videamus quod deserere corpus non subiaceat animae potestati; quod esset, si ex voluntate sua corpori esset unita. Et praeterea si sunt creatae omnino separatae, non potest dici quare unio corporis voluntatem separatae animae illexisset. Nec iterum potest dici, quod post aliquos annorum circuitus naturalis ei appetitus supervenerit corpori adhaerendi; et quod ex operatione naturae huiusmodi unio sit causa. Nam ea quae certo temporis spatio secundum naturam aguntur, ad motum caeli reducuntur sicut ad causam, per quam temporum spatia mensurantur. Animas autem separatas non est possibile caelestium corporum motibus subiacere. Similiter non potest dici, quod a Deo sint corpori alligatae, si eas prius absque corporibus creavisset. Si enim dicatur, quod ad earum perfectionem hoc fecit, non fuisset ratio quare absque corporibus crearentur. Si vero in earum poenam hoc factum est, ut corporibus quasi quibusdam carceribus intruderentur, sicut Origenes dixit, propter peccata commissa, sequeretur quod institutio naturarum ex spiritualibus et corporalibus substantiis compositarum, esset per accidens, et non ex prima Dei intentione: quod est contra id quod legitur Genes. I, 31: vidit Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona: ubi manifeste ostenditur bonitatem Dei et non malitiam cuiuscumque creaturae fuisse causam bonorum operum condendorum. Fourth argument. If the rational soul were created apart from the body, and in that state were possessed of the perfection of its natural being, no reasonable cause can be assigned for its union with the body. It cannot be said that it united itself to a body of its own accord, for clearly it is not in the soul’s power to abandon the body, which it could do were it united to the body by its own choice. Moreover, if souls were created wholly apart from bodies, it cannot be explained why the soul thus separated desired to be united to a body. Nor can it be said that after an interval of years the soul acquired a natural desire for union with a body, and that nature brought about this union: because things that happen at certain intervals of time, are referred to the celestial movement as their cause, since that movement is the measure of the spaces of time: and souls separate from bodies cannot be subject to the movements of heavenly bodies. Again it cannot be said that they were united to bodies by God, if they were previously created by him without bodies. For if it be alleged that he did so to perfect them, why did he create them at first without bodies? On the other hand if he did this to punish them for their sins so that the soul was thrust into a body as into a prison, as Origen asserted, it would follow that the formation, of natures composed of spiritual and corporal substances was accidental and not according to God’s original intention: and this is contrary to the statement of Genesis i, 31 : God saw all the things that he had made and they were very good, whence we gather that it was through God’s goodness and not on account of the wickedness of any creature whatsoever that those good works were done.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Augustinus in Lib. super Gen. ad Litt., et praecipue inquirendo de origine animae, loquitur magis investigando quam asserendo, sicut ipsemet dicit. Reply to the First Objection. Augustine in De Genesi ad literam and especially in his work De Origine Animae speaks as inquiring rather than asserting, as he himself declares.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod universum in sui principio fuit perfectum quantum ad species, et non quantum ad omnia individua; vel quantum ad causas rerum naturalium, ex quibus possunt postmodum alia propagari, non quantum ad omnes effectus. Animae vero rationales quamvis non fiant a causis naturalibus; tamen corpora, quibus divinitus infunduntur sicut sibi connaturalibus, per operationem naturae fiunt. Reply to the Second Objection. The universe in its beginning was perfect as regards the species of things, but not as regards all individuals: or as regards nature’s causes from which afterwards other things could be propagated, but not as regards all their effects. And though rational souls are not evolved by natural causes, the bodies into which as being connatural to them they are infused by God are produced by the action of nature.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod in ludo non quaeritur aliquid propter ludum. Sed ex motu quo Deus creaturas corporales movet, quaeritur aliquid propter ipsum motum, scilicet completus numerus electorum, quo habito motus cessabit; licet non substantia mundi. Reply to the Third Objection. The object of the play is the play itself. But in the movement whereby God moves corporeal creatures the object in view is something beside the movement, namely the complete number of the elect, and when that is reached the movement, but not the substance, of the world will cease.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod multitudo animarum pertinet ad essentialem perfectionem universi ultimam, sed non primam, cum tota corporum mundi transmutatio ordinetur quodammodo ad animarum multiplicationem; ad quam requiritur corporum multiplicatio, ut ostensum est, in corp. Reply to the Fourth Objection. The multitude of souls belongs to the ultimate, not the initial essential perfection of the universe, since the entire transformation of mundane bodies is ordered somewhat to the multiplication of souls, which requires a multiplication of bodies as we have proved above.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod Platonici ponebant naturam animarum per se esse completam, et accidentaliter corporibus uniri: unde etiam ponebant transitum animarum de corpore ad corpus. Ad quod ponendum praecipue inducebantur per hoc quod ponebant humanas animas immortales, et generationem numquam deficere. Unde ad infinitatem animarum removendam, ponebant fieri quemdam circulum, ut animae prius exeuntes iterato unirentur. Et secundum hanc opinionem, quae erronea est, Macrobius loquitur: unde eius auctoritas in hac parte non est recipienda. Reply to the Fifth Objection. The Platonists maintained that the soul’s nature is complete in itself, and that the soul is united to the body accidentally, wherefore they affirmed the transmigration of souls from one body to another. Especially were they led to hold this opinion because they held that souls are immortal and that generation never fails. Hence in order to avoid an infinite number of souls they imagined a kind of circle so that a soul after leaving a body was subsequently reunited to it. Macrobius expresses himself in accordance with this opinion which is false: and consequently on this point his authority cannot be admitted.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod philosophus non dicit animam, efficientem esse causam corporis, sed causam unde est principium motus, in quantum est principium motus localis in corpore, et augmenti et aliorum huiusmodi, ut ipsemet exponit ibidem. Reply to the Sixth Objection. The Philosopher (De Anima ii, l.c.) does not state that the soul is the efficient cause of the body, but as he explains (ibid.) the cause whence the body’s movements originate, in so far as it is the principle of locomotion, growth and other like movements in the body.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod in auctoritate illa intelligitur irascibilitas et concupiscibilitas inesse animae prius quam corpori uniretur, natura, non tempore: quia anima hoc non habet a corpore, sed potius corpus ab anima. Reply to the Seventh Objection. The meaning of the authority quoted is that the irascible and concupiscible appetite is in the soul before its union with the body by a priority of nature, not of time: because the soul does not derive it from the body, but rather the body from the soul.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod anima mensuratur tempore secundum esse quo unitur corpori; quamvis prout consideratur ut substantia quaedam spiritualis, mensuretur aevo. Non tamen oportet quod tunc inceperit aevo mensurari quando et Angeli. Reply to the Eighth Objection. The soul is measured by time. in so far as it has being in union with the body: although considered as a spiritual substance it is measured by eviternity. But it does not follow that it began together with the angels to be measured by eviternity.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod licet aevum non habeat prius et posterius quantum ad ea quae mensurat, nihil tamen prohibet quin unum altero prius aevo participet. Reply to the Ninth Objection. Although there is no before and after in eviternity as regards the things it measures, nothing forbids one thing from having before another a part in eviternity.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod licet Angelus et anima conveniant in natura intellectuali, differunt tamen in hoc quod Angelus est quaedam natura in se completa, unde per se creari potuit; anima vero, cum perfectionem suae naturae habeat in hoc quod corpori unitur, non debuit in caelo, sed in corpore cuius est perfectio, creari. Reply to the Tenth Objection. Although the angel and the soul agree in intellectual nature, they differ in that the angel is a nature complete in itself, so that he could be created in himself: whereas the soul through having the perfection of its nature by union with the body, required to be created, not in heaven but in that body whose perfection it is.
Ad undecimum dicendum, quod anima licet sit secundum se simplicior omni corpore, tamen est forma et perfectio corporis ex elementis compositi, cuius locus est circa medium, cum quo simul oportet eam hic creari. Reply to the Eleventh Objection. Although the soul is in itself more simple than any body, it is nevertheless the form and perfection of a body composed of elements, and to which a middle place is due: and together with this body it must needs be created here below.
Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod prima perfectio animae attenditur secundum esse suum naturale: quae quidem perfectio consistit in unione eius ad corpus; et ideo a principio debuit in loco corporis creari. Ultima autem perfectio eius est in hoc quod communicat cum substantiis aliis intellectualibus; et illa perfectio dabitur ei in caelo. Reply to the Twelfth Objection. The initial perfection of the soul regards its natural being, and consists in the soul’s union with the body: wherefore in its beginning it required to be created in the place occupied by the body. But its ultimate perfection regards that which it has in common with other Intellectual substances, and this it will receive in heaven.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod animae quae modo creantur, licet sint novae creaturae secundum numerum, tamen sunt antiquae secundum speciem suam: praecesserunt enim in operibus sex dierum in suo simili secundum speciem, id est in animabus primorum parentum. Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. Souls that are created now are new creatures indeed in point of number, but are old in point of species: since they already existed in the works of the six days, in those who were like them in species, namely in the souls of our first parents.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod opus creationis quo naturae principia instituuntur, oportet praecedere opus propagationis. Non autem tale opus est animarum creatio. Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. It behoved the work of creation whereby the principles of nature were established to precede the work of propagation: but the creation of souls is not a work of that kind.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum est, quod ad iustitiam pertinet reddere debitum; unde contra iustitiam fit, si inaequalia aequalibus dantur, quando debita redduntur, non autem quando gratis aliqua dantur: quod convenit in creatione animarum. Vel potest dici, quod ista diversitas non procedit ex diverso merito animarum, sed ex diversa dispositione corporum; unde et Plato dicebat, quod formae infunduntur a Deo secundum merita materiae. Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. It belongs to justice to render what is due; wherefore it is contrary to justice to treat equal persons unequally if they are being paid what is due to them, but not if they are receiving gratis, as when souls are created. We may also reply that this diversity does not arise from a diversity of merit in souls, but from a diversity of dispositions in bodies: wherefore Plato said (Dial. de Legibus) that forms are infused according to the deserts of matter.
Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod licet anima dependeat a corpore quantum ad sui principium, ut in perfectione suae naturae incipiat, tamen quantum ad sui finem non dependet a corpore, quia acquiritur sibi esse in corpore ut rei subsistenti: unde destructo corpore, nihilominus manet in suo esse, licet non in completione suae naturae, quam habet in unione ad corpus. I Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. Although the soul depends on the body for its beginning, in order to begin its existence in the perfection of its nature, nevertheless it does not, depend on the body for its end, because it exists in the body as a subsistent being, so that when the body ceases to exist the soul remains in its own being, though not in the perfection of its nature that it receives from its union with the body.
Ad decimumseptimum dicendum, quod natura corporis non aggravat animam, sed eius corruptio, ut ex ipsa auctoritate ostenditur. Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. It is not the nature of the body but its corruption that is a load upon the soul, as the text itself declares.
Q. III:
ARTICLE XI
Is the Sensible and Vegetal Soul Created or Is it Transmitted Through the Semen?

[ Sum. Th. 1, Q. cxviii, A. i.]
Undecimo quaeritur utrum anima sensibilis et vegetabilis sint per creationem, vel traducantur ex semine. Et videtur quod sic, hac ratione. THE eleventh point of inquiry is whether the sensible soul be created or transmitted through the semen: and it would seem that it is created.
Eorum enim quae sunt eiusdem rationis, est idem modus prodeundi in esse. Sed anima sensibilis et vegetabilis in homine sunt et in brutis et in plantis eiusdem speciei vel rationis. In homine autem sunt per creationem, cum sint eiusdem substantiae cum anima rationali, quae est per creationem, ut ostensum est. Ergo etiam in brutis et in plantis vegetabilis et sensibilis sunt per creationem. 1. Things of the same kind come into being in the same manner. Now the sensible and vegetal soul in man is of the same species or kind as in dumb animals and plants: and in man it is created since it is substantially one with the rational soul, which is created, as proved above (A. 9). Therefore the sensitive and vegetal souls in animals and plants are created.
Sed dices, quod anima sensibilis et vegetabilis est in plantis et brutis ut forma et perfectio; in hominibus autem ut dispositio.- Sed contra, quanto aliquid est nobilius, tanto nobiliori modo exit in esse. Sed nobilius est esse formam et perfectionem quam esse dispositionem. Si ergo anima sensibilis et vegetabilis in hominibus, in quibus sunt ut dispositiones, exeunt in esse per creationem, qui est nobilissimus modus prodeundi in esse cum nobilissimae creaturae hoc modo esse incipiant; videtur quod multo magis in plantis et brutis sint productae per creationem. 2. It might be said that the sensible and vegetal souls in animals and plants are perfections, whereas in man they are dispositions.—On the contrary the more excellent a thing is the more excellent is the manner of its coming into being. Now it is more excellent to be a form and perfection than to be a disposition: and consequently if the sensible and vegetal souls in man, in whom they are mere dispositions, come into being by creation which is the most excellent way of coming into being, since the highest creatures originate in this manner, seemingly a fortiori are they created in plants and animals.
Praeterea, dicit philosophus: quod vere est, id est substantia, nulli est accidens. Si ergo anima sensibilis et vegetabilis sunt in brutis et in plantis ut formae substantiales, non possunt esse in homine ut dispositiones accidentales. 3. The Philosopher says (Phys. i, 3): “That which really exists, substance to wit, is not accidental to anything”. If, then, the sensible and vegetal souls are substantial forms in animals and plants, they cannot be accidental dispositions in man.
Praeterea, ex virtute generantis producitur aliquid in esse in rebus viventibus per virtutem quae est in semine. Sed in semine non est anima sensibilis vel vegetabilis in actu. Cum ergo nihil agat nisi secundum quod est in actu, videtur quod ex virtute seminis non possit produci anima sensibilis vel vegetabilis; et ita nec per generationem, sed per creationem. 4. In living things the generative power is effective through the force residing in the semen. Now the sensible and vegetal souls are not actually in the semen. Since then nothing acts except inasmuch as it is in act, seemingly the sensible and vegetal souls cannot be produced by the force in the semen, and thus they are produced not by generation but by creation.
Sed dices, quod virtus quae est in semine, licet non sit anima sensibilis actu agit tamen in virtute animae sensibilis, quae erat in patre, a quo semen deciditur.- Sed contra, quod agit in virtute alterius, agit ut instrumentum illius. Instrumentum autem non movet nisi motum; movens autem et motum oportet esse simul, ut probatur VII Phys. Cum ergo virtus quae est in semine, non sit coniuncta animae sensibili generantis, videtur quod non possit agere ut instrumentum eius, nec in virtute illius. 5. You will say perhaps that though the force in the semen is not actually the sensitive soul, yet it acts by virtue of the sensitive soul of the father from whom it issues.—On the contrary, that which acts by virtue of another acts as its instrument. Now an instrument moves not unless it be moved: while mover and moved must be together (Phys. vii, 2). Since then the force that is in the semen is not in contact with the sensible soul of the generator, seemingly it cannot act as its instrument or by virtue thereof.
Praeterea, instrumentum se habet ad principale agens sicut virtus mota et imperata ad virtutem motivam et imperantem, quae est vis appetitiva et motiva. Sed virtus mota imperata non movet, si separetur a motiva imperante, ut patet in partibus animalis decisis. Ergo nec virtus quae est in semine deciso potest operari in virtute generantis. 6. An instrument is compared to the principal agent as a moved and commanded power to a moving and commanding power which is an appetitive and moving force. Now a power that is commanded and moved does not move anything if it be severed from the power that moves and commands it, as may be seen in the severed limbs of an animal. Neither then can the force in the separated semen act by virtue of the generator.
Praeterea, quando effectus deficit a perfectione causae, non potest se extendere in propriam causae actionem; diversitati enim naturarum attestatur diversitas actionum. Sed virtus quae est in semine, etsi sit effectus animae sensibilis generantis, tamen constat quod deficit a perfectione ipsius. Ergo non potest in actionem quae proprie competeret animae sensibili, scilicet producere animam sibi similem in specie. 7. When an effect falls short of the perfection of its cause it cannot compass the action proper to that cause: since diversity of action argues diversity of nature. Now the force in the semen although an effect of the sensible soul of the generator falls short of its perfection. Therefore, it cannot accomplish the action that belongs properly to the sensible soul, namely the production of another soul like to it in species.
Praeterea, ad corruptionem subiecti sequitur corruptio formae et virtutis. Sed sperma in processu generationis corrumpitur, et aliam formam recipit, ut Avicenna dicit. Ergo virtus illa corrumpitur quae erat in semine; non ergo per eam potest produci anima sensibilis in esse. 8. Corruption of their subject leads to corruption of form and power. Now in the process of generation the semen, according to Avicenna, is corrupted and receives another form. Therefore the power that was in the semen is also corrupted, and consequently a sensible soul cannot be produced by it.
Praeterea, natura inferior non agit nisi mediante calore et aliis qualitatibus activis et passivis. Sed calor non potest producere animam sensibilem in esse: quia nihil agit ultra suam speciem; nec potest esse factum nobilius faciente. Ergo anima sensibilis vel vegetabilis non potest educi in esse per aliquod agens naturale; et ita est a creatione. 9. Lower natures function only by means of heat and other active and passive qualities. Now heat cannot give being to the sensible soul, because nothing acts outside its own species: nor can the effect surpass its cause. Therefore the sensible or vegetal soul cannot be brought into being by a natural agent, and consequently it is created.
Praeterea, agens materiale non agit influendo, sed materiam transmutando. Sed per transmutationem materiae non pervenitur nisi ad formam accidentalem. Ergo per agens naturale non potest produci anima sensibilis et vegetabilis, quae sunt formae substantiales. 10. A natural agent acts not by informing but by transmuting matter. Now transmutation of matter can only lead to an accidental form. Therefore a natural agent cannot produce a sensible and vegetal soul which is a substantial form.
Praeterea, anima sensibilis vel vegetabilis habent quamdam quidditatem, quae quidditas est ab alio facta. Haec autem quidditas non erat ante generationem, nisi quia materia poterat eam habere. Ergo oportet quod producatur ab aliquo agente quod operetur non ex materia; et huiusmodi est solus Deus creans. 11. Sensible and vegetal souls have a certain quiddity, and this quiddity is brought into being by something else: moreover it did not exist before being evolved except in so far as it was possible for matter to have it. Hence it must needs be produced by an agent that produces something out of no matter: and this is no other but God creating.
Praeterea, animalia generata ex semine sunt nobiliora animalibus ex putrefactione generatis, utpote perfectiora, et sibi similium generativa. Sed in animalibus ex putrefactione generatis animae sunt a creatione: non enim est dare aliquod agens simile in specie a quo in esse producantur. Ergo videtur multo fortius quod animae animalium ex semine generatorum sint a creatione. 12. Animals produced from seed rank higher than those engendered from corrupt matter, for they are more perfect and reproduce their like. Now the souls of animals engendered from corrupt matter are created, since no agent of like species can be assigned by which they can be produced. Therefore it would seem that there is much more reason for the souls of animals produced from seed to be created.
Sed dices, quod per virtutem caelestis corporis producitur anima sensibilis in animalibus ex putrefactione generatis, sicut et in aliis per virtutem formativam in semine.- Sed contra, sicut dicit Augustinus, substantia vivens praeeminet cuilibet substantiae non viventi. Sed corpus caeleste non est substantia vivens, cum sit inanimatum. Ergo eius virtute produci non potest anima sensibilis, quae est principium vitae. 13. But you will say that the souls of animals engendered from corrupt matter are produced by the power of a heavenly body, just as they are produced in other animals by the formative force in the semen —On the contrary, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. lv), a living substance surpasses all inanimate substances. Now a heavenly body is not a living substance, for it is inanimate. Therefore a sensible soul being a principle of life cannot be produced by its power.
Sed dices, quod corpus caeleste potest esse causa animae sensibilis, prout agit in virtute intellectualis substantiae quae ipsum movet. Sed contra, quod recipitur in alio, est in eo per modum recipientis, et non per modum sui. Si ergo virtus intellectualis substantiae recipitur in corpore caelesti non vivente, non erit ibi ut virtus vitalis quae possit esse principium vitae. 14. But you will say that a heavenly body can be the cause of a sensible soul, inasmuch as it acts by virtue of,an intellectual substance that moves it.—On the contrary that which is received into another, is received according to the mode of the recipient, and not according to its own mode. Wherefore if the power of an intellectual substance is received by an inanimate heavenly body, it will not be there as a vital force that can be a principle of life.
Praeterea, substantia intellectualis non solum vivit, sed etiam intelligit. Si ergo per eius virtute corpus caeleste ab ea motum potest conferre vitam, pari ratione conferre poterit intellectum; et ita anima rationalis erit a generante; quod est falsum. 15. An intellectual substance is not only a living but also an intelligent being. If, then, by its power a heavenly body can be so moved by it as to give life it will be able likewise to give intelligence, so that the rational soul will be produced by the begetter: which is false.
Praeterea, si anima sensibilis est ab aliquo agente naturali, et non per creationem, aut ergo producetur a corpore, aut ab anima. Sed non a corpore, quia sic corpus ageret ultra suam speciem: nec iterum ab anima: quia vel oporteret totam animam patris in filium transfundi, et sic pater absque anima remaneret; vel quoad partem eius, et sic in patre non remaneret tota anima: quorum utrumque est falsum. Ergo anima sensibilis non est a generante, sed a creante. 16. If the sensible soul is produced by a natural agent and not by creation, it must be produced either by the body or by the soul. It is not produced by the body, because then a body would act beyond its species. Nor is it produced by the soul, because then either the whole soul of the father would be transmitted to his child, and thus the father would remain without a soul; or part of it would be transmitted, and thus the whole soul would not remain in the father: and either alternative is false. Therefore the sensible soul is not produced by the begetter but by the Creator.
Praeterea, Commentator dicit, quod nulla virtus cognoscitiva est ab actione elementorum commixtorum. Sed anima sensibilis est virtus cognoscitiva. Ergo non est ab actione elementorum; et ita nec per actionem naturae, cum nulla actio naturae in istis inferioribus sit absque actione elementorum. 17. The Commentator (De Anima iii) says that no cognitive power is evolved by the action of mixed elements. Now the sensible soul is a cognitive power. Therefore it is not evolved by the elements, and consequently not by the action of nature, inasmuch as here below no action of nature is independent of the action of the elements.
Praeterea, nulla forma potest esse movens, quae non est subsistens; unde formae elementorum, secundum philosophum, non sunt moventes; sed generans et removens prohibens. Sed anima sensibilis est movens, cum omne animal a sua anima moveatur. Ergo anima sensibilis non est forma tantum, sed est substantia per se existens. Constat etiam quod non est ex materia et forma composita. Omnis autem talis substantia educitur in esse per creationem, et non aliter. Ergo anima sensibilis educitur in esse per creationem. 18. No form except it be subsistent can cause movement wherefore according to the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 4) movement is not caused by the forms of elements but only by the generator and that which removes an obstacle. But the sensible soul is a cause of movement, since every animal is moved by its soul. Therefore the sensible soul is not a mere form but a self-subsistent substance. It is also clear that it is not composed of matter and form. Now all such substances are brought into being by creation and not otherwise. Therefore the sensible soul comes into being by creation.
Sed dices, quod anima sensibilis non movet per se corpus, sed ipsum corpus animatum movet se ipsum.- Contra, philosophus probat, quod in quolibet movente seipsum oportet unam partem esse quae sit movens tantum, et alteram quae sit mota. Sed corpus non potest esse movens tantum, quia nullum corpus movet nisi motum. Ergo oportet quod anima sit movens tantum; et ita sensibilis anima habet operationem in qua non communicat sibi corpus: et sic anima sensibilis erit substantia subsistens. 19. You will say, perhaps, that the sensible soul does not by itself move the body, but that the animated body moves itself.—On the contrary the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 5) that in everything which puts itself in motion there must be one part that is mover only, and another that is moved. Now the body cannot be mover only, because no body moves except it be moved. Wherefore the soul is mover only, so that the sensible soul will have a function in which the body has no share, and consequently will be a subsistent substance.
Sed dices, quod anima sensibilis movet secundum imperium appetitivae virtutis, cuius actus communiter est animae et corporis. Sed contra, in animali non solum movet vis quae imperat motum, sed etiam est ibi vis exequens motum; cuius operatio non poterit esse animae et corpori communis, rationibus praedictis; et sic oportet quod anima sensibilis aliquam operationem per se habeat. Ergo est substantia per se subsistens; et ita per creationem educitur in esse, et non per generationem naturalem. 20. But you will say that the sensible soul moves according to the command of the appetitive power, whose act is shared by both soul and body.—On the contrary in an animal there is not only a power commanding but also a power executing movement: and the function of this latter power cannot for the reasons already given be shared by both soul and body: and consequently the sensible soul must operate by itself, and therefore is a self-subsistent substance, and is brought into being by creation and not by natural generation.
Sed contra. Est quod dicitur Genes. I, vers. 20: producant aquae reptile animae viventis; et ita videtur quod animae sensibiles reptilium et aliorum animalium sint ex actione corporalium elementorum. On the contrary it is written (Gen. i, 20): Let the waters bring forth the creeping creature having a living soul; so that seemingly the sensible souls of reptiles and of other animals are produced by the action of corporal elements.
Praeterea, sicut se habet corpus patris ad eius animam, ita et corpus filii ad eius animam. Ergo commutatim, sicut se habet corpus filii ad corpus patris, ita et anima filii ad animam patris. Sed corpus filii traducitur a corpore patris. Ergo anima filii traducitur ab anima patris. Further, as the father’s body is in relation to his soul, so is the son’s body in relation to his soul. Therefore reciprocally as the son’s body is to his father’s, so is the son’s soul to his father’s. Now the son’s body is evolved from his father’s. Therefore the son’s soul is evolved from his father’s.
Respondeo. Dicendum quod circa productionem formarum substantialium, philosophorum opiniones diversificantur. Nam quidam dixerunt, quod agens naturale solummodo disponit materiam; forma autem, quae est ultima perfectio, provenit a principiis supernaturalibus. Quae quidem opinio ex duobus praecipue ostenditur esse falsa: primo quidem ex hoc quod, cum esse formarum naturalium et corporalium non consistat nisi in unione ad materiam; eiusdem agentis esse videtur eas producere cuius est materiam transmutare. Secundo, quia cum huiusmodi formae non excedant virtutem et ordinem et facultatem principiorum agentium in natura, nulla videtur necessitas, eorum originem in principia reducere altiora; unde philosophus dicit, quod caro et os generantur a forma quae est in his carnibus et in his ossibus: secundum cuius sententiam non solum agens naturale disponit materiam, sed educit formam in actum, e converso primae opinioni. I answer that philosophers are divided in their opinions about the production of substantial forms. Some maintain that the natural agent only disposes the matter and that the form which is the ultimate perfection is produced by supernatural agency. This opinion is shown to be false chiefly on two counts. First, because seeing that the being of natural and corporal forms consists solely in their union with matter, it would seem that it belongs to the same agent to produce them and to transmute matter. Secondly, inasmuch as these forms do not surpass the power, order and faculty of the active principles of nature, there would seem to be no need to refer their origin to higher principles: wherefore the Philosopher (Metaph. vii, 8) says that flesh and bone are engendered by the form that is in this or that flesh and bone: and in his opinion the natural agent not only disposes the matter, but educes the form into act, which is contrary to the above opinion.
Ab hac autem generalitate formarum oportet excludere animam rationalem. Ipsa enim est substantia per se subsistens; unde esse suum non consistit tantum in hoc quod est materiae uniri; alias separari non posset: quod falsum esse etiam eius operatio ostendit, quae est animae secundum se ipsam absque corporis communione. Nec potest aliter operari quam sit. Quod enim per se non est, per se non operatur. Et iterum intellectualis natura totum ordinem et facultatem excedit materialium et corporalium principiorum; cum intellectus intelligendo omnem corporalem naturam transcendere possit: quod non esset, si eius natura infra limites corporalis naturae contineretur. Nevertheless we must exclude the rational soul from this generality of forms: because it is a subsistent substance, wherefore its being does not consist solely in its union with the body. Otherwise it could not exist apart from the body: the possibility of which is shown by its operation, which belongs to the soul in entire independence of the body. And the mode of its operation indicates the mode of its coming into existence: since that which is not per se does not operate per se. Again the intellectual nature transcends the entire order and faculty of material and corporal principles, since by its act of intelligence the intellect is able to rise above all corporal nature, which would not be the case if its nature were confined within the limits of corporal nature.
Neutrum autem horum de anima sensibili vel vegetabili dici potest. Esse autem huiusmodi animarum non potest consistere nisi in unione ad corpus: quod eorum operationes ostendunt; quae sine organo corporali esse non possunt: unde nec esse earum est eis absolute sine dependentia ad corpus. Propter quod nec a corpore separari possunt, nec iterum in esse produci, nisi quatenus producatur corpus in esse. Unde sicut producitur corpus per actum naturae generantis, ita et animae praedictae. Ponere autem eas seorsum per creationem fieri, videtur redire in opinionem eorum qui ponebant huiusmodi animas post corpora remanere, cum utrumque simul in Lib. de Eccl. dogmatibus condemnetur. Huiusmodi etiam animae ordinem principiorum naturalium non excedunt. Et hoc patet earum operationes considerantibus. Nam secundum ordinem naturarum sunt etiam ordines actionum. Invenimus autem quasdam formas quae se ulterius non extendunt quam ad id quod per principia materialia fieri potest; sicut formae elementares et mixtorum corporum, quae non agunt ultra actionem calidi et frigidi; unde sunt penitus materiae immersae. Anima vero vegetabilis, licet non agat nisi mediantibus qualitatibus praedictis, attingit tamen operatio eius ad aliquid in quod qualitates praedictae se non extendunt, videlicet ad producendum carnem et os, et ad praefigendum terminum augmento, et ad huiusmodi; unde et adhuc retinetur infra ordinem materialium principiorum, licet non quantum formae praemissae. Anima vero sensibilis non agit per virtutem calidi et frigidi de necessitate, ut patet in actione visus et imaginationis et huiusmodi; quamvis ad huiusmodi operationes requiratur determinatum temperamentum calidi et frigidi ad constitutionem organorum, sine quibus actiones praedictae non fiunt; unde non totaliter transcendit ordinem materialium principiorum, quamvis ad ea non tantum deprimatur, quantum formae praedictae. Anima vero rationalis etiam agit actionem ad quam virtus calidi et frigidi non se extendit; nec eam exercet per virtutem calidi et frigidi, nec organo etiam corporali; unde ipsa sola transcendit ordinem naturalium principiorum; non autem anima sensibilis in brutis, vel vegetabilis in plantis. Now neither of these things can be said of the sensible and vegetal souls. That the being of these souls cannot consist otherwise than in union with the body is shown by their functions, which cannot be exercised without a bodily organ, wherefore absolutely speaking they have no being independently of the body. For this reason they cannot exist apart from the body, nor be brought into being except in so far as the body is brought into being. Consequently these souls, like the body, are produced by the natural agency of the generator. To maintain that they are created separately would appear to be in agreement with the opinion of those who held that these souls survived their bodies, whereas both these opinions are condemned in De Eccl. Dogmat. Again these souls do not transcend the order of natural causes. This will be made evident if we consider their operations. The order of actions follows the order of natures. Now we find some forms whose scope of action does not go further than what can be done by material principles: thus the forms of elements and of mixed bodies do not go beyond the action of heat and cold: wherefore they are wholly immersed in matter. On the other hand although the vegetal soul does not function except by means of the qualities aforesaid, its action attains to something that is beyond the scope of these qualities, to the production, namely, of flesh and bone, to the fixation of the term of growth and the like, so that it remains within the order of material principles; though not so much as the forms in question. But the sensible soul does not of necessity function by means of heat and cold, as evidenced by the functions of the sight, imagination and so forth: yet for the exercise of these functions, the organs require to be equipped with a certain degree of heat and cold, without which the aforesaid actions cannot be performed. Hence the sensible soul does not wholly transcend the order of material principles, although it is not lowered to their level as much as the above-mentioned forms. The rational soul, however, also exercises a function that surpasses that of heat and cold, nor does it exercise it by means of heat and cold, nor by means of a bodily organ: wherefore it alone transcends the order of natural principles, whereas the sensible soul in dumb animals and the vegetal soul in plants do not.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod licet anima sensibilis in hominibus et brutis sit eiusdem rationis secundum genus, non tamen est eiusdem rationis secundum speciem, sicut nec idem animal specie est homo et brutum; unde et operationes animae sensibilis sunt multo nobiliores in homine quam in brutis, ut patet in tactu et in apprehensivis interioribus. Nec oportet eorum quae sunt in genere, si specie differant, esse unum modum procedendi in esse, ut patet per animalia generata ex semine et ex putrefactione; quae in genere conveniunt, et specie differunt. Reply to the First Objection. Although the sensible soul in man and dumb animals is of the same genus it does not belong to the same species: thus a man and a dumb animal are not of the same species: consequently the functions of the sensible soul are far more excellent in man than in dumb animals, as evidenced by the touch and the interior powers of apprehension. Nor is it true that things generically but not specifically the same must needs come into being in the same manner, as evidenced in the case of animals engendered from seed and from corrupt matter: since these agree I in genus but not in species.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod in homine non dicitur anima sensibilis ut dispositio, quasi sit aliud in substantia ab anima rationali, et sit dispositio ad ipsam; sed quia non distinguitur sensibile a rationali in homine, nisi sicut potentia a potentia. Anima vero sensibilis in bruto distinguitur ab anima rationali hominis sicut una forma substantialis ab alia. Et tamen sicut potentia sensibilis in homine et vegetabilis fluunt ab essentia animae, ita et in brutis et in plantis. Sed in hoc differunt quia in plantis non fluunt ab essentia animae nisi potentiae vegetabiles, et ideo ab eis anima denominatur; in brutis vero non solum vegetabiles, sed etiam sensibiles a quibus denominatur eorum anima; in homine vero praeter has etiam intellectuales a quibus denominatur. Reply to the Second Objection. In man the sensible soul is said to be a disposition, not as though it differed in substance from the rational soul, and were a disposition thereto, but because the sensitive faculty in man is not distinct from the rational, save as one power from another. On the other hand in dumb animals the sensible soul differs from the rational soul in man as one substantial form from another. Nevertheless as the sensitive and vegetal powers in man flow from the essence of the soul, so do they in dumb animals and plants: but with this difference that in plants there flow only vegetal forces from the essence of the soul, in dumb animals not only vegetal but also sensitive powers whence their soul is denominated, while in man besides the above the intellectual powers flow whence he is denominated.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod substantia, a qua potentia sensibilis fluit, tam in brutis quam in hominibus est forma substantialis; potentia vero utrobique est accidens. Reply to the Third Objection. The substance whence the sensitive faculty flows both in dumb animals and in man is the substantial form: while in both cases the power is an accident.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod anima sensibilis non est actu in semine secundum propriam speciem, sed sicut in virtute activa; sicut domus in actu est in mente artificis ut in virtute activa: et sicut formae corporales sunt in virtutibus caelestibus. Reply to the Fourth Objection. The sensible soul is not actually in the semen as to its own species but as in an active force: thus a house is actually in the mind of the builder as in an active force; and thus are bodily forms in the heavenly powers.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod instrumentum intelligitur moveri a principali agente, quamdiu retinet virtutem a principali agente impressam; unde sagitta tamdiu movetur a proiciente, quamdiu manet vis impulsus proicientis. Sicut etiam generatum tamdiu movetur a generante in gravibus et levibus quamdiu retinet formam sibi traditam a generante; unde et semen tamdiu intelligitur moveri ab anima generantis quamdiu remanet ibi virtus impressa ab anima, licet corporaliter sit divisum. Oportet autem movens et motum esse simul quantum ad motus principium, non tamen quantum ad totum motum, ut apparet in proiectis. Reply to the Fifth Objection. An instrument is understood to be moved by the principal agent so long as it retains the power communicated to it by the principal agent; thus the arrow is moved by the archer as long as it retains the force wherewith it was shot by him. Thus in heavy and light things that which is generated is moved by the generator as long as it retains the form transmitted thereby: so that the semen also is understood to be moved by the soul of the begetter, as long as it retains the force communicated by that soul, although it is in body separated from it. And the mover and the thing moved must be together at the commencement of but not throughout the whole movement, as is evident in the case of projectiles.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod vis appetitiva animae non habet imperium nisi super corpus unitum; unde pars decisa non obedit animae appetitivae ad votum. Sed semen non movetur ab anima generantis per imperium, sed per cuiusdam virtutis transfusionem, quae in semine manet etiam postquam fuerit decisum. Reply to the Sixth Objection. The soul’s appetitive power has no command except on the body united to it, wherefore the separated part does not obey the behest of the soul’s appetitive faculty. Nor is the semen moved by the begetter’s soul through being commanded but through the transfusion of a kind of energy which remains in the semen even after its separation.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod anima sensibilis et vegetabilis de potentia materiae educuntur, sicut et formae aliae materiales ad quarum productionem requiritur virtus materiam transmutans. Virtus autem quae est in semine licet deficiat ab aliis actionibus animae hanc tamen habet. Sicut enim per animam materia transmutatur, ut convertatur in totum in actione nutrimenti; ita et per virtutem praedictam transmutatur materia, ut generetur conceptum; unde nihil prohibet quin virtus praedicta operetur quantum ad hoc ad actionem animae sensibilis in virtute ipsius. Reply to the Seventh Objection. The sensible and vegetal souls are evolved from the potentiality of matter like other material forms for the production of which a power is needed that transforms matter. Now the force that is in the semen has this power although it falls short of the other functions of the soul. For just as by the function of the nutritive force the soul transforms matter so as to change it into the whole body, so by the aforesaid force in the semen matter is transformed so as to result in conception. Consequently nothing hinders this same force from accomplishing the action of the sensitive soul and by virtue thereof.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod virtus praedicta radicatur in spiritu, qui in semine includitur, sicut in subiecto. Fere autem totum semen, ut dicit Avicenna, in spiritum convertitur. Unde licet corpulenta materia, ex qua conceptum formatur, multoties per generationem transmutetur, non tamen virtutis praedictae subiectum destruitur. Reply to the Eighth Objection. This same force has its root in the animal spirit enclosed within the semen as its subject. Now according to Avicenna nearly all the semen is changed into animal spirit. Hence although the corpulent matter whence the embryo is formed undergoes many changes in the process of generation, the subject of that force is not destroyed.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod sicut calor agit ut instrumentum formae substantialis ignis, ita nihil prohibet quin agat ut instrumentum animae sensibilis ad educendum animam sensibilem in actum, non quod propria virtute hoc possit. Reply to the Ninth Objection. As heat acts as the instrument of the substantial form of fire, so there is nothing to prevent it from acting as the instrument of the sensible soul in bringing a sensible soul into being, though it does not do so by its own power.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod materia transmutatur non tantum transmutatione accidentali, sed etiam substantiali; utraque enim forma in materiae potentia praeexistit; unde agens naturale, quod materiam transmutat, non solum est causa formae accidentalis, sed etiam substantialis. Reply to the Tenth Objection. Matter is transmuted hot only by an accidental but also by a substantial change: for both forms pre-exist in the potentiality of matter. Hence a natural agent which transmutes matter is the cause not only of the accidental but also of the substantial form.
Ad decimumprimum dicendum, quod anima sensibilis cum non sit res subsistens, non est quidditas, sicut nec aliae formae materiales, sed est pars quidditatis, et esse suum est in concretione ad materiam; unde nihil aliud est animam sensibilem produci, quam materiam de potentia in actum transmutari. Reply to the Eleventh Objection. The sensible soul since it is not subsistent is not a quiddity, as neither are other material forms, but is part of a quiddity; and its being consists in its forming one substance together with matter: wherefore to say that the sensible soul is produced means nothing more than that the matter is transmuted from potentiality to act.
Ad decimumsecundum dicendum, quod quanto aliquid est imperfectius, tanto ad eius constitutionem pauciora requiruntur. Unde cum animalia ex putrefactione generata, sint imperfectiora animalibus quae ex semine generantur, in animalibus ex putrefactione generatis sufficit sola virtus caelestis corporis quae etiam in semine operatur, licet non sufficiat sine virtute animae ad producendum animalia ex semine generata: virtus enim caelestis corporis in inferioribus corporibus relinquitur, in quantum ab eo transmutantur, sicut a primo alterante. Et propter hoc dicit philosophus, in libro de animalibus, quod omnia corpora inferiora sunt plena virtutibus animae. Caelum autem licet non sit simile in specie cum huiusmodi animalibus ex putrefactione generatis, est tamen similitudo quantum ad hoc quod effectus in causa activa virtualiter praeexistit. Reply to the Twelfth Objection. The more imperfect a thing is the fewer the requisites for its making. Wherefore since animals engendered from corrupt matter are more imperfect than those engendered from seed, in the former the sole power of a heavenly body is sufficient, which power is operative also in the semen, although it does not suffice without the power of the soul for the production of animals from seed. For the power of a heavenly body remains in the lower bodies in so far as they are transmuted by it as by the first cause of alteration. For this reason the Philosopher says (De Animal.) that all these lower bodies are full of a soul’s energy. But the heaven, though not alike in species to the animals engendered from corrupt matter, is like them in so far as an effect virtually persists in its efficient cause.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum est, quod corpus caeleste etsi non sit vivum, agit tamen in virtute substantiae viventis a qua movetur, sive sit Angelus, sive sit Deus. Secundum philosophos tamen ponitur corpus caeleste animatum et vivum. Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. Although the heavenly body is not a living thing, it acts by virtue of a living substance by whom it is moved, whether this be an angel or God. In the opinion of the Philosopher, however, heavenly bodies are animate and living.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod virtus substantiae virtualis moventis relinquitur in corpore caelesti et motu eius, non sicut forma habens esse completum in natura, sed per modum intentionis, sicut virtus artis est in instrumento artificis. Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. The power of the heavenly body which causes movement remains in the heavenly body and its movement, not as a form having complete natural being, but after the manner of an intention, as power is in the craftsman’s tool.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum est quod anima rationalis, ut dictum est, excedit totum ordinem corporalium principiorum; unde nullum corpus potest agere etiam ut instrumentum ad eius productionem. Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. As stated above, the rational soul surpasses the entire order of corporal principles, wherefore no body can act even instrumentally in its production.
Ad decimumsextum dicendum est, quod anima sensibilis producitur in concepto non per actionem corporis nec per decisionem animae, sed per actionem virtutis formativae, quae est in semine ab anima generante, ut dictum est. Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. The sensible soul is produced in the embryo neither by the action of the body, nor by a transmission of the soul, but by the action of the formative energy that is in the semen from the soul of the begetter, as stated above.
Ad decimumseptimum dicendum, quod virtus cognoscitiva negatur esse ab actione elementorum, quasi elementorum virtutes ad eam causandam sufficiant sicut sufficiunt ad causandam duritiem et mollitiem. Non autem negatur quin instrumentaliter aliquo modo cooperari possit. Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. It is denied that a cognitive faculty can be produced by the action of the elements forasmuch as the forces contained in the elements are unable to produce such a power in the same way as they suffice to cause hardness or softness. But it is not denied that they may be competent to co-operate in some way instrumentally.
Ad decimumoctavum dicendum, quod anima sensibilis movet per appetitum. Actio vero appetitus sensibilis non est animae tantum, sed compositi; unde talis vis habet determinatum organum. Unde non oportet ponere, quod anima sensibilis aliquam operationem habeat absque corporis communione. Reply to the Eighteenth Objection. The sensible soul causes movement by its appetite. Now the function of the sensitive appetite is seated not in the soul alone but in the composite; hence this power has a fixed organ. Therefore we cannot conclude that the sensible soul has an operation independent of the body.
Ad decimumnonum dicendum, quod corpus potest movere quasi non motum specie illa motus qua movet, licet non possit movere nisi aliquo modo motum; corpus enim caeli alterat non alteratum, sed localiter motum; et similiter organum virtutis appetitivae movet localiter non motum sed aliquo modo alteratum localiter. Operatio enim appetitivae sensibilis sine corporali alteratione non contingit, sicut patet in ira et in huiusmodi passionibus. Reply to the Nineteenth Objection. A body can cause a movement without being itself moved with the same kind of movement as that which it causes: thus the heavenly body which is moved locally causes alteration without itself being altered: and in like manner the organ of the appetitive power causes local movement, whereas itself is not moved but only altered somewhat locally. For the sensitive appetite does not function without alteration in the body, as evidenced in cases of anger and like passions.
Ad vicesimum dicendum, quod vis motiva exequens motum est magis dispositio mobilis qua natum est moveri a tali motore, quam sit per se movens. Reply to the Twentieth Objection. The motive force that executes a movement does not of itself cause movement, but is rather a disposition of the thing movable whereby it has a natural aptness to be moved by this or that mover.
Q. III:
ARTICLE XII
Is the Sensible or Vegetal Soul in the Semen from the Beginning of the Latter’s Separation?

[ Sum. Th. I, Q. cxix]
Duodecimo quaeritur utrum anima sensibilis vel vegetabilis sint in semine a principio quando deciditur. THE twelfth point of inquiry is whether the sensible or vegetal soul be in the semen as soon as this is separated
Et videtur quod sic. and seemingly the reply should be in the affirmative.
Quia, ut Gregorius Nyssenus dicit, utriusque opinionis assertio vituperatione non caret, et eorum qui prius vivere animas in suo quodam statu atque ordine fabulantur, et eorum qui eas post corpora creatas existimant. Sed si anima in semine non fuit in suo principio, oportet eam fieri post corpus. Ergo anima a principio fuit in semine. 1. Gregory of Nyssa (De Creat. Hom. xxvi) says that “it is reprehensible to hold either opinion, whether of those who foolishly assert a previous existence of souls in a certain state and order becoming to them, or of those who maintain that our souls are created after our bodies.” Now if the soul was not in the semen from the beginning it must be created after the body. Therefore it was in the semen from the beginning.
Praeterea, si anima sensibilis a principio non fuit in semine, sicut nec rationalis; eadem ratio erit de sensibili et rationali. Sed anima rationalis est a creatione. Ergo et anima sensibilis est a creatione: cuius contrarium est ostensum. 2. If the sensitive like the rational soul was not in the semen from the beginning, the same rule will apply to the one as to the other. Now the rational soul comes by creation. Therefore the sensible soul is also created: whereas we have proved the contrary to be the case.
Praeterea, philosophus dicit in XVI de animalibus, quod virtus quae est in semine est sicut filius de domo patris egrediens. Sed filius est eiusdem speciei cum patre. Ergo et illa virtus quae est in semine est eiusdem speciei cum anima sensibili, a qua derivatur. 3. The Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii, 4) that the force residing in the semen is like the son going forth from his father’s house. Now the son is of the same species as his father. Therefore the force in the semen is of the same species as the sensible soul whence it derives.
Praeterea, philosophus dicit in XVI de animalibus, quod virtus illa est sicut ars, quae si in materia esset, ad perfectionem artificiati operaretur. Sed in arte est species artificiati. Ergo in illa virtute seminis est species animae sensibilis quae per semen producitur. 4. The Philosopher says (ibid.) that this same force is like art which, were it in matter, would perfect the work of the craftsman. Now the species of the work done is in the art. Therefore the species of the sensible soul produced through the semen is in the seminal force.
Praeterea, decisio seminis est naturalis, decisio vero animalis anulosi est contra naturam. Sed in parte animalis anulosi decisi est anima, ut philosophus dicit. Ergo multo magis est in semine deciso. 5. The sundering of the semen is natural, whereas the sundering of an annulose animal is unnatural. Now according to the Philosopher the soul is in the sundered part of an annulose animal. Much more then is it in the sundered semen.
Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in XVI de animalibus, quod mas in generatione animalis dat animam. Sed nihil est egrediens a patre nisi semen. Ergo anima est in semine. 6. The Philosopher says (ibid.) that in the generation of an animal the male provides the soul. Now nothing issues from the father except the semen. Therefore the soul is in the semen.
Praeterea, accidens non transfunditur nisi per transfusionem subiecti. Sed aliquae aegritudines transfunduntur a parentibus in filios, sicut lepra et podagra et huiusmodi. Ergo et eorum substantia transfunditur. Haec autem non sunt sine anima. Ergo anima est a principio in semine. 7. An accident is not transmitted unless its subject be transmitted. Now certain diseases are transmitted from parents to their children, such as leprosy, gout and so on. Consequently the subject of these diseases is transmitted: which subject cannot be soulless. Therefore the soul is in the semen from the beginning.
Praeterea, Hippocrates dicit, quod per decisionem venae quae est iuxta aures, generatio impeditur. Hoc autem non esset, nisi semen decideretur a toto corpore, quasi actio per prius existens. Ergo cum id quod est actu pars animalis, habeat animam, videtur, quod semen a principio habeat animam. 8. Hippocrates says that generation is prevented by the excision of a vein in the neighbourhood of the ear. Now this would not be, unless the semen as already actually existing were taken from the whole body. Since then the soul is in whatever is actually part of an animal, it would seem that the soul is in the semen from the beginning.
Praeterea, idem dicit, quod equus quidam propter nimium coitum inventus est sine cerebro. Hoc autem non esset, nisi semen decideretur ab eo quod est actu pars. Ergo idem quod prius. 9. He also says that a certain horse on account of too frequent coition was found to have no brains. But this would not be unless the semen were taken from that which is an actual part of the body. Therefore the same conclusion follows.
Praeterea, quod est superfluum, non est de substantia rei. Si ergo semen sit superfluum, non erit de substantia generantis; et ita filius, qui est ex semine, non erit de substantia patris; quod est inconveniens. Ergo semen est de substantia generantis; et ita est ibi anima in actu. 10. The superfluous is not part of the substance of a thing. Accordingly if the semen is superfluous it will not belong to the substance of the generator: and thus the child that results from the semen will not be of his father’s substance: which is unreasonable. Therefore the semen is part of the generator’s substance, and consequently the soul is therein actually.
Praeterea, omne quod caret anima, est inanimatum. Si ergo semen caret anima, erit inanimatum; et sic corpus inanimatum transmutabitur, et fiet animatum; quod videtur inconveniens. Ergo anima est a principio in semine. 11. That which has no soul is inanimate. If, then, the semen has no soul it will be inanimate. Consequently an inanimate body will be transformed and become animate: and this would seem absurd. Therefore the soul is in the semen from the beginning.
Sed contra. Est quod philosophus dicit quod semen et fructus est in tali potentia ad animam, quae est abiiciens animam. On the contrary the Philosopher says (De Anim. ii, 2) that the semen and the fruit are potentially animate but actually inanimate.
Praeterea, si semen a principio habet animam, hoc non videtur esse possibile nisi duobus modis; vel quod tota anima generantis in semen transeat; vel quod pars eius. Utrumque autem horum videtur esse inconveniens; quia ex primo sequitur quod non remaneat anima in patre, ex secundo autem sequitur quod non remaneat ibi tota. Ergo anima non est in semine a principio. Again, it would seem impossible for the semen to be animate from the first except in two ways, either by the transmission of the generator’s entire soul into the semen, or by the transmission of part thereof. Now, apparently either of these alternatives is impossible, since from the former it would follow that the soul does not remain in the father, and from the latter, that not the entire soul remains. Therefore the soul is not in the semen from the beginning.
Respondeo. Dicendum quod opinio quorumdam fuit, quod anima a principio decisionis esset in semine, volentes quod sicut corpus divideretur a corpore, ita simul anima propagaretur ab anima, ut statim cum corporis particula esset etiam ibi anima. Haec autem opinio non videtur esse vera: quia, secundum quod philosophus probat in XV de animalibus, semen non deciditur ab eo quod fuit actu pars, sed quod fuit superfluum ultimae digestionis; quod nondum erat ultima assimilatione assimilatum. Nulla autem corporis pars est actu per animam perfecta, nisi sit ultima assimilatione assimilata; unde semen ante decisionem nondum erat perfectum per animam, ita quod anima esset forma eius; erat tamen ibi aliqua virtus, secundum quam iam per actionem animae erat alteratum et deductum ad dispositionem propinquam ultimae assimilationi; unde et postquam decisum est, non est ibi anima, sed aliqua virtus animae. Et propter hoc, in XVI de animalibus, philosophus dicit, quod in semine est virtus principii animae. Et praeterea si anima esset in semine a principio, aut esset ibi habens actu speciem animae, aut non, sed ut quaedam virtus, quae converteretur postmodum in animam. Primum esse non potest: quia cum anima sit actus corporis organici, ante qualemcumque organizationem corpus susceptivum animae esse non potest. Et etiam sic sequitur quod totum id quod agit in seminibus, non est nisi quaedam dispositio materiae, et per consequens non esset generatio, cum generatio non sequatur, sed praecedat formam substantialem. Nisi forte dicatur, quod corporis sit alia forma substantialis praeter animam; ex quo sequitur quod anima non substantialiter corpori uniretur, utpote adveniens corpori, postquam est iam per aliam formam hoc aliquid constitutum. Sequeretur ulterius quod generatio viventis non esset generatio, sed decisio quaedam; sicut pars ligni separatur a ligno, ut sit actu lignum. I answer that some held the opinion that the soul is in the semen from the moment of its separation, so that they would have the soul procreated by the soul at the same time as the body (of the semen) is cut off from the body, and the part severed from the body would at once become animate. But this opinion is apparently false: because as the Philosopher proves (De Gener. Anim. i, 18, 19) the semen is not severed from what was an actual part, but from the surplus remaining after the final digestion, and not definitely assimilated. Now no part of the body is actually perfected by the soul, unless it be finally assimilated; wherefore the semen before being separated was not perfected by the soul so as to be informed by it: but there was in the semen a certain energy in respect of which by the action of the soul it was altered and brought to the final disposition required for definite assimilation: so that after separation it was not animate but contained a certain energy derived from the soul. For this reason the Philosopher (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3) says that in the semen there is a power that emanates from the soul. Moreover if the soul were in the semen from the beginning, it would be either there in its species as a soul actually; or not, but as a kind of energy to be transformed afterwards into a soul. The former is impossible, because since the soul is the act of an organic body, the body cannot receive the soul before it is in any way whatever provided with organs. Moreover it would follow that all that the soul does in the semen, is to dispose the matter, so that consequently there would be no generation, since generation does not follow but precedes the substantial form: —unless one were to say that besides the soul there is another substantial form in the body, the result being that the soul would not be substantially united to the body, seeing that it would be added to the body after the latter had already become an individual thing by reason of this other form. It would follow moreover that the generation of a living being would not be generation but a kind of separation, just as timber cut off from timber is actually timber.
Secunda pars divisionis praedictae esse non potest; quia secundum hoc sequeretur quod forma substantialis non subito sed successive in materia proveniret; et sic in substantia esset motus, sicut in quantitate et qualitate; quod est contra philosophum; et etiam formae substantiales reciperent magis et minus; quod est impossibile. Unde relinquitur quod anima non est in semine, sed virtus quaedam animae, quae agit ad animam producendam, ab anima derivata. The second alternative is also impossible, since in that case it would follow that the substantial form is not at once but by degrees acquired by matter, so that there would be movement in substance as there is in quantity and quality, which is contrary to the teaching of the Philosopher (Phys. v, 2). It would also follow that substantial forms are subject to increase and decrease, which is impossible. It follows then that there is not a soul in the semen, but a certain energy derived from the soul, which prepares the way for the soul’s advent.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod corpus viventis, utpote leonis vel olivae, non est anima, sed est semen corporis tantum ante animam, et ante virtutem quae agit ad animam. Eadem enim est proportio seminis ad virtutem huiusmodi, et corporis ad animam. Reply to the First Objection. Before the advent of the soul and the force that prepares the way for the soul, the body of a living being, e.g. a lion or an olive, is not animate but is merely the seed of a body: for the seed is related to this force as the body is to the soul.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod hoc interest inter animam rationalem et alias animas, quod anima rationalis non est ex virtute seminis sicut aliae animae; quamvis nulla anima sit in semine a principio. Reply to the Second Objection. There is this difference between the rational and other souls, that the rational soul is not evolved from the energy in the seed as the other souls are; although no soul is in the seed from the beginning.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod virtus illa non assimilatur filio egredienti de domo patris quantum ad complementum speciei, sed quantum ad acquisitionem eorum quae desunt utrique ad aliquod complementum. Perfectio enim prima plerumque manifestatur per similitudinem perfectionis secundae. Reply to the Third Objection. This force is likened to a son going forth from his father’s house not in the point of specific completion, but with regard to the acquisition of some particular complement that is lacking. For a first perfection often takes on the likeness of a second perfection.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod assimilatio inter virtutem praedictam et artem procedit quantum ad hoc quod sicut artificiatum praeexistit in arte sicut in virtute activa, ita et res viva generanda in virtute formativa. Reply to the Fourth Objection. The likeness between this force’and art consists in this that as the thing made by the craftsman pre-exists in his art as in an active force, so before it is generated a living being pre-exists in the formative energy.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod ex hoc ipso decisio animalis anulosi est violenta et contra naturam, quod pars decisa erat actu pars, et perfecta per animam; unde per decisionem materiae anima in utraque parte remanet; quae quidem erat in toto una in actu, et plures in potentia. Quod quidem accidit per hoc quod huiusmodi animalia fere sunt similia in toto et partibus; nam eorum animae, quia imperfectiores sunt aliis, modicam diversitatem organorum requirunt. Reply to the Fifth Objection. The reason why the dissection of an annulose animal is violent and unnatural is that the severed part was actually a part of the animal and perfected by its soul: so that by the dissection of the matter the soul remains in either part, which soul was actually one in the whole body, and potentially several. This is because in animals of this kind the whole body is composed of almost homogeneous parts, and their souls being of a lower degree of perfection than others, require but little diversity of organs.
Et inde est quod una pars decisa potest esse animae susceptiva, utpote habens tantum de organis quantum sufficit ad talem animam suscipiendam; sicut accidit in aliis corporibus similibus utpote ligno et lapide, aqua et aere. Ex hoc autem philosophus probat in XV de animalibus, quod sperma non fuit actu pars ante decisionem; quia eius decisio non fuisset naturalis, sed modus corruptionis cuiusdam. Unde non oportet quod per decisionem seminis in ipso semine anima remaneat. Hence it is that when a part is severed it can be a subject of the soul, as having sufficient organs for the purpose: as happens in the case of other like bodies such as wood, stone, water and air. The Philosopher proves (De Gener. Animal. i, 18) that the semen was not actually a part before its separation, for the reason that its separation would not have been natural, but a kind of corruption: wherefore it. does not follow that the soul remains in the semen after its separation.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod mas dicitur dare animam, in quantum in semine maris continetur virtus quae agit ad animam. Reply to the Sixth Objection. The male is said to provide the soul inasmuch as the seed of the male contains a force that prepares the way for the soul.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod aegritudines, de quibus est obiectio, non traducuntur cum semine quasi actu in semine sint, sed quia est principium eorum in semine, per aliquam seminis indispositionem. Reply to the Seventh Objection. The diseases mentioned in the objection are not transmitted together with the semen as though they were actually in the semen, but because their germs are in the semen, thus causing a certain indisposition therein.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod cum sperma sit quaedam superfluitas, habet quasdam proprias vias, sicut et aliae superfluitates, quibus intercisis generatio impeditur; non propter hoc quod aliquid ex eo quod erat actu pars, resolvatur. Reply to the Eighth Objection. Seeing that the semen is a surplus, it has certain outlets like other superfluities: and if these outlets be cut off, generation is prevented, and not because something of what was an actual part of the body has been destroyed.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod sicut immoderatus aliarum superfluitatum fluxus solvit aliquid de eo quod erat iam conversum, per violentiam quamdam; et non naturaliter; ita etiam immoderatus fluxus seminis. Ea vero quae fiunt contra naturam, non sunt in consequentiam naturae trahenda. Reply to the Ninth Objection. It is the same with the immoderate emission of the semen as with the immoderate discharge of other superfluities which destroys that which has already been converted into bodily tissue, a destruction that is violent and unnatural. But things that happen contrary to nature, must not be ascribed to the action of nature.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod semen est tale superfluum, quod licet non sit actu pars substantiae patris, est tamen potentia, tota; et ob hoc filius dicitur de substantia patris esse. Reply to the Tenth Objection. The semen is a surplus in the sense that although it is not actually a part of the father’s substance, it is potentially the whole thereof; and for this reason the child is said to be of his father’s substance.
Ad undecimum dicendum, quod licet semen non sit animatum actu, est tamen animatum virtute; unde non est simpliciter inanimatum. Reply to the Eleventh Objection. Although the semen is not actually animate it is so virtually, whereupon it is not simply inanimate.
Q. III:
ARTICLE XIII
Can That Which Proceeds from Another Be Eternal?
Decimotertio quaeritur utrum aliquod ens ab alio possit esse aeternum. Et videtur quod non. THE thirteenth point of inquiry is whether that which is from another can be eternal: and seemingly it cannot.
Nihil enim quod est semper, indiget aliquo ad hoc quod sit. Omne autem quod est ab aliquo, indiget eo a quo est, ut sit. Ergo nihil quod est ab alio, est semper. 1. Nothing that always is needs something that it may be Therefore nothing that is from another is always.
Praeterea, nihil accipit quod iam habet. Ergo quod semper est, semper esse habet; ergo quod est semper, non accipit esse. Sed omne quod est ab alio, accipit esse ab eo a quo est. Ergo nihil quod est ab alio, est semper. 2. Nothing receives what it has already. Now that which always is always has being; and hence that which is always does not receive being. But that which is from another receives its being from that whence it is. Therefore nothing that is from another is always.
Praeterea, quod est, non generatur neque fit, neque aliquo modo in esse producitur; quia quod fit, non est. Ergo oportet quod omne quod generatur vel fit, vel producitur, aliquando non esset. Omne autem quod est ab alio, est huiusmodi. Ergo omne quod est ab alio aliquando non est. Quod autem aliquando non est, non semper est. Ergo nihil quod est ab alio, est sempiternum. 3. That which is already is not generated or made or in a way brought into being. Because whatsoever is in a state of becoming is not yet. Consequently whatsoever is generated, made or brought into being must at one time not have been. Now such is whatsoever is from another. Therefore whatsoever is from another at some time is not. But that which at some time is not, is not always. Therefore nothing that is from another, is eternal.
Praeterea, quod non habet esse nisi ab alio, in se consideratum, non est. Huiusmodi autem oportet aliquando non esse. Ergo oportet quod omne quod est ab alio, aliquando non esset, et per consequens non esse sempiternum. 4. That which has not being save from another, considered in itself is not: and such a thing must needs not be at some time or other. Therefore whatsoever is from another must needs at some time have not been: and thus it is not eternal.
Praeterea, omnis effectus est posterior sua causa. Quod autem est ab alio, est effectus eius a quo est. Ergo est posterius eo a quo est; et ita non potest esse sempiternum. 5. Every effect is posterior to its cause. Now that which is from another is the effect of that from which it is. Therefore it is posterior to that from which it is, and thus it cannot be eternal.
Sed contra, est quod Hilarius dicit, quod ab aeterno a patre natum, aeternum esse habet quod natum est. Sed filius Dei natus est ab aeterno patre. Ergo aeternum habet quod natum est; ergo est aeternum. On the contrary according to Hilary (De Trin. xii) that which was born of the eternal Father has eternal being from his birth. Now the Son of God was born of the eternal Father. Therefore he has eternal being from his birth and consequently he is eternal.
Respondeo. Dicendum quod, cum ponamus filium Dei naturaliter a patre procedere, oportet quod ita sit a patre, quod tamen sit ei coaeternus: quod quidem hoc modo apparet. I answer that since we affirm that the Son of God proceeds from the Father naturally, it follows that he must proceed from the Father in such wise as to be co-eternal with him. This may be made clear as follows.
Inter voluntatem enim et naturam hoc interest, quod natura determinata est ad unum, quantum ad id quod virtute naturae producitur, et quantum ad hoc quod est producere vel non producere; voluntas vero quantum ad neutrum determinata invenitur. Potest tamen aliquis hoc vel illud per voluntatem facere, sicut artifex scamnum vel arcam, et iterum facere ea et a faciendo cessare; ignis vero non potest nisi calefacere, si subiectum suae actionis adsit; nec potest aliud inducere in materiam quam effectum similem sibi. Unde etsi de creaturis, quae divina voluntate ab ipso procedunt, dici possit quod potuit creaturam talem vel talem facere et tunc vel tunc facere, de filio tamen, qui naturaliter procedit, hoc dici non potest. Non enim potuit alterius modi esse filius secundum naturam, quam se habet patris natura. Nec potuit vel prius vel posterius filius esse nisi quando fuit patris natura: non enim potest dici, quod divinae naturae aliquando perfectio naturae defuerit, qua adveniente virtute naturae, filius Dei sit generatus; cum divina natura sit simplex et immutabilis. Neque potest dici, quod huiusmodi generatio dilata fuerit propter materiae absentiam vel indispositionem, cum omnino haec generatio immutabilis sit. Unde relinquitur, quod cum natura patris ab aeterno fuerit, et filius sit a patre aeternaliter generatus, ac per consequens patri coaeternus. There is this difference between will and nature, that nature is determined to one thing both as regards what is produced by the power of nature and as regards producing or not producing: whereas the will is not determined in either respect. Thus a man is enabled by his will to do this or that, for instance a carpenter can make a bench or a box; and again make, and cease from making them: whereas fire cannot but heat if the subject-matter of its action be present nor can it produce in matter any effect other than its like. Consequently although it may be said of creatures which. proceed from God by his will, that he could make a creature of this or that fashion, and at this or that time, this cannot be said of the Son who proceeds naturally. For the Son proceeding naturally could not be of a fashion different from the nature of the Father. Nor could the Son be sooner or later in relation to the Father’s nature. For it cannot be said that the divine nature was ever lacking in natural perfection, on the advent of which by virtue of the nature God’s Son was begotten: since the divine nature is simple and unchangeable. Nor can it be said that this begetting was delayed through lack or indisposition of matter, seeing that it is altogether void of change. It follows then that since the Father’s nature is eternal, that the Son was begotten of the Father from eternity and that he is coeternal with the Father.
Ariani vero, quia ponebant filium non naturaliter a patre procedere, ponebant filium neque patri coaequalem neque coaeternum, sicut contingit in aliis quae a Deo procedunt secundum arbitrium voluntatis ipsius. Fuit autem difficile considerare generationem filii patri coaeternam, propter assuefactionem humanae cognitionis in consideratione productionis rerum naturalium, in quibus una res ab alia per motum producitur; res autem producta per motum in esse prius esse incipit in principio quam in termino motus. Cum autem principium motus de necessitate terminum motus duratione praecedat, quod necesse est propter motus successionem, nec possit esse motus principium vel initium sine causa ad producendum movente; necesse est ut causa movens ad aliquid producendum praecedat duratione id quod ab ea producitur. Unde quod ab aliquo sine motu procedit, simul est duratione cum eo a quo procedit, sicut splendor in igne vel in sole: nam splendor subito et non successive a corpore lucido procedit, cum illuminatio non sit motus, sed terminus motus. Relinquitur ergo quod in divinis, ubi omnino motus locum non habet, procedens sit simul duratione cum eo a quo procedit; et ideo cum pater sit aeternus, filius et spiritus sanctus ab eo procedentes sunt ei coaeterni. The Arians through holding that the Son does not proceed naturally from the Father, said that like other things that proceed from God according to the decree of his will he was neither co-equal nor co-eternal with the Father. The difficulty of regarding the begetting of the Son as co-eternal with the Father arose from the fact that in our human observation of nature’s works one thing proceeds from another by movement: and a thing brought into being by movement begins to be at the beginning sooner than at the end of the movement. And since the beginning of a movement must needs in point of time precede the end on account of movement implying succession, and again since movement cannot have a beginning without a moving cause to produce it: it follows that the moving cause in the production of anything must precede in point of duration that which it produces. Consequently that which proceeds from another without movement is in point of duration co-existent with that whence it proceeds: such is the flash of the fire or the sun, because the flash of light proceeds from the body of light suddenly and not gradually, for illumination is not a movement but the term of a movement. It follows then that in God in whom there is absolutely no movement, the proceeding one is co-existent with him from whom he proceeds: and thus since the Father is eternal, the Son and the Holy Spirit who proceed from him are co-eternal with him.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod si indigentia importet defectum vel carentiam eius quo indigetur, quod semper est non indiget aliquo ad hoc quod sit. Si vero importet solum ordinem originis ad id a quo est, sic nihil prohibet id quod semper est, aliquo indigere ad hoc quod sit, in quantum non a se ipso, sed ab alio esse habet. Reply to the First Objection. If need denotes a defect or lack of what is needed, then that which is always, needs not another in order that it may exist. But if it denotes nothing more than the order of origin in reference to that whence a thing is, nothing hinders a thing that always is from needing another in order that it may exist, in so far as it has being not from itself but from another.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod accipiens aliquid non habet illud ante acceptionem, habet vero illud quando iam accepit; unde si ad aeterno accipit, ab aeterno habet. Reply to the Second Objection. Before receiving it the recipient has not what he receives, but he has it when he has received it: consequently if he received it from eternity he had it from eternity.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit in generatione quae est per motum; quia quod movetur ad esse, non est. Et pro tanto dicitur quod id quod generatur non est, sed quod est generatum est: unde ubi non est aliud generari et generatum esse, ibi non oportet quod generatur, aliquando non esse. Reply to the Third Objection. This argument applies to generation in which there is movement, since that which is being moved to existence does not exist yet: which is true in the sense that what is being generated is not, whereas what has been generated, is. Consequently where there is no distinction between being generated and having been generated, it does not follow that what is generated is from another.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod illud quod habet esse ab alio, in se consideratum, est non ens, si ipsum sit aliud quam ipsum esse quod ab alio accipit; si autem sit ipsum esse quod ab alio accipit, sic non potest in se consideratum, esse non ens; non enim potest in esse considerari non ens, licet in eo quod est aliud quam esse, considerari possit. Quod enim est, potest aliquid habere permixtum; non autem ipsum esse, ut Boetius dicit in libro de hebdomadibus. Prima quidem conditio est creaturae, sed secunda est conditio filii Dei. Reply to the Fourth Objection. It is true that what has its being from another is nothing considered in itself, if it be distinct from the being that it receives from another: but if it be the very same being that it receives from another, then considered in itself it cannot be nothing: for it is not possible to consider non-being in being itself, although it is possible to consider something besides being in that which is. Because that which is may have a mixed being: but being itself cannot, according to Boethius (De Hebdom.). The first part of this distinction applies to creatures, the second to the Son of God.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod filius Dei non potest dici effectus: quia non fit, sed generatur. Hoc enim fit cuius esse est diversum a faciente; unde nec patrem proprie loquendo causam filii dicimus, sed principium. Nec oportet omnem causam effectum duratione praecedere, sed natura tantum sicut patet in sole et splendore. Reply to the Fifth Objection. The Son of God cannot be called an effect, because he is not made but begotten: since that is said to be made whose being is distinct from its maker. Wherefore neither can the Father be called the cause of the Son properly speaking, but his principle. Nor is it necessary for every cause to precede its effect in point of duration, but only by priority of nature, as in the case of the sun and its shining.
Q. III:
ARTICLE XIV
Is it Possible for That Which Differs from God Essentially to Have Always Existed?
Decimoquarto quaeritur utrum id quod est a Deo diversum in essentia, possit semper fuisse. Et videtur quod sic. THE fourteenth point of inquiry is whether it is possible for that which differs essentially from God to have existed always: and it would seem possible.
Non enim est minor potestas causae producentis totam rei substantiam super effectum suum, quam causae producentis formam tantum. Sed causa producens formam tantum, potest producere eam ab aeterno, si ab aeterno esset; quia splendor qui gignitur ab igne atque diffunditur coaeternus est illi; et esset coaeternus, si ignis esset aeternus, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo multo fortius Deus, potest producere effectum sibi coaeternum. 1. The cause that produces the whole substance of a thing has not less power over its effect than the cause which produces the form alone. Now if the cause which produces the form alone be eternal it can produce it from eternity: thus the light produced and diffused by fire is co-existent with it and would be co-eternal if the fire were eternal, according to Augustine (De Trin.). Much more reason then is there why God who produces the whole substance of a thing, should be able to produce a co-eternal effect.
Sed dices, quod hoc est impossibile; quia sequitur inconveniens, scilicet quod creatura parificetur creatori in duratione. —Sed contra, duratio quae non est tota simul, sed successiva, non potest aequiparari durationi quae est tota simul. Sed si mundus semper fuisset, eius duratio non semper tota simul esset; quia tempore mensuraretur, ut etiam Boetius dicit in fine de Consol. Ergo adhuc Deo non aequipararetur creatura in duratione. 2. It will be said perhaps that this is impossible because it leads to the false position of equalling a creature to God in point of duration.—On the contrary, a duration that is not wholly simultaneous but successive cannot be equalled to one that is ‘wholly simultaneous. Now if the world had always been, its duration would not have been wholly simultaneous, since it would have been measured by time according to Boethius (De Consol. v). Therefore a creature would not be equalled to God in point of duration.
Praeterea, sicut divina persona procedit a Deo sine motu, ita et creatura. Sed divina persona potest esse Deo coaeterna, a quo procedit. Ergo similiter et creatura. 3. As a divine person proceeds from God without movement, so does a creature. Now a divine person can be co-eternal with God from whom he proceeds. Therefore a creature can be likewise.
Praeterea, quod semper eodem modo se habet, semper potest idem facere. Sed Deus semper eodem modo se habet ab aeterno. Ergo ab aeterno potest idem facere. Si ergo aliquando produxit creaturam et ab aeterno producere potuit. 4. That which is unchangeable in its being can always do the same thing. Now God is unchangeable from eternity. Therefore from eternity he can do the same thing: and consequently if he produced a creature at any time he could do so from eternity.
Sed dices, quod ratio ista procedit de agente per naturam, non autem de agente per voluntatem.- Contra, voluntas Dei non dirimit virtutem ipsius. Sed si non ageret per voluntatem, sequeretur quod ab aeterno creaturam produxisset. Ergo posito quod per voluntatem agat, non removetur quia ab aeterno producere potuerit. 5. You will say perhaps that the above argument applies to a natural but not to a voluntary agent.—On the contrary, God’s power is not nullified by his will. Now if he did not work by his will it would follow that he produced the creature from eternity, Therefore even given that he works by his will, it does not remove the possibility of his having created from eternity.
Praeterea, si Deus in aliquo tempore vel instanti creaturam produxit, et eius potentia non est augmentata; potuit etiam ante illud tempus vel instans creaturam producere; et eadem ratione ante illud, et sic in infinitum. Ergo potuit ab aeterno producere. 6. If God produced a creature at a certain time or instant, and if his power does not increase, he could have produced the creature at a previous time or instant, and for the same reason, before that, and so on indefinitely. Therefore he could have produced it from eternity.
Praeterea, plus potest facere Deus quam humanus intellectus possit intelligere; propter quod dicitur Luc. I, 37: non erit impossibile apud Deum omne verbum. Sed Platonici intellexerunt aliquid esse factum a Deo, quod tamen semper fuit; unde Augustinus dicit: de mundo, et de his quos in mundo deos a Deo factos, scribit Plato, apertissime dicit eos esse coepisse, et habere initium; finem tamen non habituros, sed per conditoris potentissimam voluntatem perhibet in aeternum esse mansuros. Verum id quomodo intelligat, Platonici invenerunt, non esse hoc, videlicet temporis, sed institutionis initium. Sicut enim, inquiunt, si pes ab aeternitate fuisset in pulvere, semper subesset vestigium: quod tamen a calcante factum nemo dubitaret: sic mundus semper fuit semper existente qui fecit; et tamen factus est. Ergo Deus potuit facere aliquid quod semper fuit. 7. God can do more than the human intellect can understand, wherefore it is said (Luke i, 37) : No word shall be impossible with God. Now the Platonists understood God to have made something that had always existed. Thus Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 31): “Plato writing about the world and of the gods made by God in the world, asserts most explicitly that they came into existence and had a beginning; yet they will not have an end, and he states that through the all-powerful will of their maker they will live for ever. In explaining, however, what he meant by beginning, the Platonists affirm that he meant the beginning not of time but of their formation. For, say they, even as, if a foot had pressed on the dust from eternity, there would always have been the footprint underneath, which no one would doubt to have been made by the walker, so the world always existed and he who made it always existed, and yet it was made.” Therefore God could make something that always was.
Praeterea, quidquid non est contra rationem creaturae, Deus potest in creatura facere; alias non esset omnipotens. Sed semper fuisse non est contra rationem creaturae in quantum est facta; alias idem esset dicere creaturam semper fuisse et factam non esse; quod patet esse falsum. Nam Augustinus, distinguit duas opiniones; quarum una est quod mundus ita fuerit semper quod non sit a Deo factus; alia est, quod ita mundus sit semper quod tamen a Deo sit factus. Ergo Deus hoc potest facere, quod aliquid ab eo factum, sit semper. 8. God can do in the creature whatever is not inconsistent with the notion of a created thing: else he were not omnipotent. Now it is not inconsistent with the notion of a created thing, considered as made, that it should always have existed, otherwise to say that creatures always existed would be the same as to say that they were not made, which is clearly false. For Augustine (De Civ. Dei xi, 4; x, 31) distinguishes two opinions, one asserting that the world always existed in such wise that it was not made by God; the other stating that the world always was and that nevertheless God made it. Therefore God can do this so that something made by him should always have been.
Praeterea, sicut natura statim potest producere effectum suum, ita et agens voluntarium non impeditum. Sed Deus est agens voluntarium quod impediri non potest. Ergo creaturae quae per eius voluntatem producuntur in esse, ab aeterno produci potuerunt, sicut et filius qui naturaliter a patre procedit. 9. just as nature can produce its effect in an instant, so also can a voluntary agent if unhindered. Now God is a voluntary agent that cannot be hindered. Therefore the creatures brought into being by his will, could be produced from eternity, even as the Son who proceeds from the Father naturally.
Sed contra. Est quod Augustinus dicit, quia omnino incommutabilis est illa natura Trinitatis, ob hoc ita est aeterna, ut ei aliquid coaeternum esse non possit. 1. On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 23): “Seeing that the nature of the Trinity is altogether uncommunicable, it is so exclusively eternal that nothing can be co-eternal with it.”
Praeterea, Damascenus dicit, in I libro: quod ex non ente ad esse deducitur, non est aptum natum esse coaeternum ei quod sine principio et semper est. Sed creatura de non esse ad esse producitur. Ergo non potest fuisse semper. 2. Damascene says (De Fide Orthod. i): That which is brought into being from nothingness by its very nature is incapable of being co-eternal with one who has no beginning and is eternal. Now the creature is brought from nothingness into being. Therefore it cannot have been always.
Praeterea, omne aeternum est invariabile. Sed creatura non potest esse invariabilis; quia si sibi relinqueretur, in nihilum decideret. Ergo non potest esse aeterna. 3. Whatsoever is eternal is unchangeable. But a creature cannot be unchangeable, because were it left to itself it would fall back into nothingness. Therefore it cannot be eternal.
Praeterea, nihil quod dependet ab alio est necessarium, et per consequens nec aeternum; cum omne aeternum sit necessarium. Sed omne quod est factum, dependet ab alio. Ergo nullum factum potest esse aeternum. 4. Nothing that depends on another is necessary, nor consequently eternal: since all that is eternal is necessary. Now that which is made depends on another. Therefore nothing made can be eternal.
Praeterea, si Deus ab aeterno producere potuit creaturam, ab aeterno produxit; quia, secundum philosophum, in sempiternis non differt esse et posse. Sed ponere creaturam ab aeterno fuisse productam, est contra fidem. Ergo et ponere quod produci potuerit. 5. If God could make a creature from eternity, he did; because according to the Philosopher, (Phys. iii, 4) in eternal things there is no difference between what can be and what is. Now it is against faith to say that creatures were made from eternity. Therefore it is also against faith to say that they could be.
Praeterea, voluntas sapientis non differt facere quod intendit, si potest, nisi propter aliquam rationem. Sed non potest reddi ratio quare Deus tunc mundum fecerit et non prius, vel ab aeterno, si ab aeterno fieri potuit. Ergo videtur quod ab aeterno fieri non potuit. 6. A wise man’s will does not delay to do what he intends except for some reason. But no reason can be given why God made the world then and not before or from eternity, if it could be made from eternity. Therefore seemingly it could not.
Praeterea, si creatura est facta, aut ex nihilo, aut ex aliquo. Sed non ex aliquo: quia vel ex aliquo quod est divina essentia, quod est impossibile; vel ex aliquo alio: quod si non esset factum, erit aliquid praeter Deum, non ab ipso creatum; quod supra est improbatum: quod si est factum ex alio, aut procedetur in infinitum, quod est impossibile; aut devenietur ad aliquid quod est factum de nihilo. Impossibile autem est, quod fit ex nihilo, semper fuisse. Ergo impossibile est creaturam semper fuisse. 7. If creatures were made, they were made either from nothing or from something. They were not made from something: since this would either be part of the divine essence, which is impossible, or it would be something else, and if this were not made, there would be something besides God not made by him, and this has been proved to be false: and if it were made from something else, we should either go on indefinitely, which is impossible, or we should come to something made from nothing. Now it is impossible for that which is made from nothing to have always been. Therefore it is impossible for a creature to ‘have been always.
Praeterea, de ratione aeterni est non habere principium, de ratione vero creaturae est habere principium. Ergo nulla creatura potest esse aeterna. 8. It is essential to the eternal not to have a beginning, whereas it is essential to the notion of a creature to have a beginning. Therefore no creature can be eternal.
Praeterea, creatura mensuratur tempore vel aevo. Sed aevum et tempus differunt ab aeternitate. Ergo creatura non potest esse aeterna. 9. A creature is measured either by time or by eviternity. But time and eviternity differ from eternity. Therefore a creature cannot be eternal.
Praeterea, si aliquid est creatum, oportet dare aliquod instans in quo creatum fuerit. Sed ante id non fuit. Ergo oportet dicere creaturam non semper fuisse. 10. If a thing be created it must be possible to assign an instant wherein it was created. Now before that instant it did not exist. Therefore we must conclude that creatures, were not always.
Respondeo. Dicendum, quod secundum philosophum, possibile dicitur quandoque quidem secundum aliquam potentiam, quandoque, vero secundum nullam potentiam; secundum potentiam quidem vel activam, vel passivam. Secundum activam quidem, ut si dicamus possibile esse aedificatori quod aedificet; secundum passivam vero, ut si dicamus, possibile esse ligno quod comburatur. Dicitur autem et quandoque aliquid possibile, non secundum aliquam potentiam, sed vel metaphorice, sicut in geometricis dicitur aliqua linea potentia rationalis, quod praetermittatur ad praesens; vel absolute, quando scilicet termini enuntiationis nullam ad invicem repugnantiam habent. E contrario vero impossibile, quando sibi invicem repugnant; ut simul esse affirmationem et negationem impossibile dicitur, non quia sit impossibile alicui agenti vel patienti, sed quia est secundum se impossibile, utpote sibi ipsi repugnans. Si ergo consideretur hoc enuntiabile, aliquid diversum in substantia existens a Deo fuisse semper, non potest dici impossibile secundum se, quasi sibi ipsi repugnans: hoc enim quod est esse ab alio, non repugnat ei quod est esse semper, ut supra ostensum est; nisi quando aliquid ab alio procedit per motum, quod non intervenit in processu rerum a Deo. Per hoc autem quod additur, diversum in substantia, similiter nulla repugnantia absolute loquendo datur intelligi ad id quod est semper fuisse. I answer that according to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 12) a thing is said to be possible, sometimes in reference to a power, sometimes in reference to no power. If in reference to a power, this power may be active or passive. In reference to an active power, as when we say that to a builder it is possible to build; in reference to a passive power, as when we say that it is possible for the wood to burn. Sometimes, however, a thing is said to be possible, not in reference to a power, but either figuratively, as in geometry a line is said to be potentially rational—this we may pass over for the present; or absolutely, that is when the terms of a proposition are in no way mutually contradictory: whereas we have the impossible when they exclude each other. Thus it is said to be impossible for a thing to be and not to be at the same time, not in reference to an agent or patient, but because it is impossible in itself, as being self-contradictory. If, then, we consider the statement that something substantially distinct from God has always existed, it cannot be described as impossible in itself as though it contained a contradiction in the terms: because to be from another is not inconsistent with being from eternity, as we have proved above; except when the one proceeds from the other by movement, of which there can be no question in the procession of things from God. And when we add substantially distinct, this again involves no contradiction absolutely speaking with the fact of having always been.
Si autem accipiamus possibile dictum secundum potentiam activam, tunc in Deo non deest potentia ab aeterno essentiam aliam a se producendi. If we refer the possibility to an active power, then God does not lack the power to produce from eternity an essence distinct from himself.
Si vero hoc ad potentiam passivam referatur, sic, supposita Catholicae fidei veritate, dici non potest, quod aliquid a Deo procedens in essentia diversum, potuerit semper esse. Supponit enim fides Catholica omne id quod est praeter Deum, aliquando non fuisse. Sicut autem impossibile est, quod ponitur aliquando fuisse, nunquam fuisse: ita impossibile est, quod ponitur aliquando non fuisse, semper fuisse. Unde et dicitur a quibusdam quod hoc quidem est possibile ex parte Dei creantis, non autem ex parte essentiae a Deo procedentis, per suppositionem contrarii, quam fides facit. On the other hand if we refer the possibility to a passive power, then given the truth of the Catholic faith, it cannot be said that something substantially distinct from God can proceed from him and yet have always existed. For the Catholic faith supposes that all things other than God at some time existed not. Now as it is impossible for a thing never to have existed, if it be granted that at some time it has been, so is it impossible for a thing to have been always, if it be granted that at some time it did not exist. Wherefore some say that this is possible on the part of God creating, but not on the part of an essence proceeding from God because our faith teaches the contrary.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit ex parte potentiae facientis, non autem ex parte facti, de quo facta sit suppositio aliquando non fuisse. Reply to the First Objection. This argument considers the question from the point of view of the power of the maker, but not of the thing made, which is supposed not to have existed at some time.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod etiam si creatura semper fuisset, non simpliciter Deo aequipararetur, sed secundum quod eum imitaretur; quod non est inconveniens; unde illa obviatio parum est efficax. Reply to the Second Objection. Even if creatures had always existed they would not be equalled to God simply but in so far as they imitate him. There is nothing unreasonable in this, and so the objection has but little force.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod in persona divina non est aliquid quod supponatur aliquando non fuisse, sicut est in omni essentia aliena a Deo. Reply to the Third Objection. In the divine person there is nothing that is supposed not to have existed at some time, as there is in every essence other than God.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod obiectio procedit ex parte potentiae facientis; quae nec etiam per voluntatem diminuitur, nisi quatenus ex arbitrio voluntatis divinae fuit quod non semper fuerit creatura. Reply to the Fourth Objection. This argument considers the power of the maker, which indeed is not diminished by his will, except in so far as it was by the decree of the divine will that creatures did not always exist.
Unde patet responsio ad quintum. This suffices for the reply to the Fifth Objection.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod si ponatur ante quodcumque tempus datum creaturam fuisse, salvatur positio fidei, qua ponitur nihil praeter Deum semper fuisse; non tamen salvatur, si ponatur eam semper fuisse; unde non est simile. Sciendum etiam, quod forma arguendi non valet. Potest enim Deus quamlibet creaturam facere meliorem, non tamen potest facere infinitae bonitatis creaturam; infinita enim bonitas rationi creaturae repugnat, non autem determinata bonitas quantacumque. Reply to the Sixth Objection. If it be stated that creatures existed before any given time, the position of faith is safeguarded because it is stated that nothing except God existed always: but it is not safeguarded if we say that creatures have always existed: hence the comparison fails. It must also be noted that the argument is lacking in form. For God is able to make any creature better, yet he cannot make a creature of infinite goodness: because infinite goodness is incompatible with the notion of being created, whereas determinate goodness is not, however great it be.
Sciendum etiam, quod si dicatur, Deum potuisse facere mundum antequam fecerit; si haec prioritas ad potentiam facientis referatur, indubitanter est verum: quia ab aeterno affuit ei potentia faciendi; aeternitas vero tempus creationis praecedit. Si autem referatur ad esse facti, ita quod intelligatur ante instans creationis mundi, tempus reale fuisse, in quo potuerit fieri mundus; patet omnino esse falsum, quia ante mundum motus non fuit, unde nec tempus. Possumus tamen imaginari aliquod tempus ante mundum; sicut altitudinem vel dimensiones aliquas extra caelum; per quem modum possumus dicere, et quod altius caelum potuit elevare, et quod prius potuit facere; quia potuit facere et tempus diuturnius, et altitudinem altiorem. It must also be observed that when we say that God could have made the world sooner than he did, if this priority be referred to the power of the maker, the statement is undoubtedly true, because he had from eternity the power to do this; and eternity precedes the time of the creation. if, however, it be referred to the being of the thing made, as though before the instant wherein the world was created there were a real time wherein the world could have been made, it is evident, that then the statement is false, since before the world there was no movement and consequently no time. Yet it is possible to imagine a time anterior to the world, just as we can imagine altitudes and dimensions outside the heavens: and forasmuch we can say that God could make the heavens higher, and that he could have created them sooner, since he could have made time longer and altitude higher.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod Platonici hoc intellexerunt, fidei veritatem non supponendo, sed ab ea alieni. Reply to the Seventh Objection. It is true that the Platonists understood this: but they were not guided by faith, since it was unknown to them.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod ratio illa non probat nisi quod esse factum, et esse semper, non habeant ad invicem repugnantiam secundum se considerata; unde procedit de possibili absolute. Reply to the Eighth Objection. This argument proves nothing more than that to be made and to be always are not. incompatible considered in themselves: so that it considers that which is possible absolutely.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit de possibili ex parte potentiae activae. Reply to the Ninth Objection. This argument considers possibility in reference to an active power.
Sed quia rationes oppositae concludere videntur, quod secundum nullam considerationem sit possibile; ideo ad eas etiam est respondendum. Whereas the arguments on the contrary side would seem to conclude that it is impossible from every point of view, we must now proceed to answer them.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod secundum Boetium in fine de consolatione philosophiae, etiam si mundus semper fuisset, non esset Deo coaeternus eius enim duratio non esset tota simul; quod ad aeternitatis rationem requiritur. Est enim aeternitas interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio, ut ibidem dicitur. Temporis autem successio ex motu causatur, ut ex philosopho patet. Unde quod mutabilitati subiacet, etiam si semper sit, aeternum esse non potest; et propter hoc Augustinus dicit, quod invariabili essentiae Trinitatis nulla creatura coaeterna esse potest. Solution of the First Argument. According to Boethius (De Consol. v), even if the world had always existed it would not be co-eternal with God, because its duration would not be wholly simultaneous, which is essential to eternity. For eternity is the “perfect possession of endless life without succession” (ibid.). Now the succession of time results from movement according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv, ii). Hence whatsoever is subject to change, even if it be always, cannot be eternal: wherefore Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 23) that no creature can be co-eternal with the unchangeable nature of the Trinity.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod Damascenus loquitur supposita fidei veritate; quod patet ex hoc quod dicit, quod ex non esse ad esse deductum est, et cetera. Solution of the Second Argument. Damascene speaks on the supposition of the Catholic faith: this is clear from his saying: “That which is brought into being from nothingness, etc.”
Ad tertium dicendum, quod variabilitas de sui ratione excludit aeternitatem, non autem infinitam durationem. Solution of the Third Argument. Changeableness by its very nature excludes eternity but not indefinite duration.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod id quod ab alio dependet, nunquam esse potest nisi per influxum eius a quo est; quod si semper fuit, et ipsum semper erit. Solution of the Fourth Argument. It is true that what depends on another can never exist unless it be upheld by that whence it proceeds: yet if the latter always existed the former also existed always.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod non sequitur, si Deus aliquid potuit facere, quod illud fecerit, eo quod est agens secundum voluntatem, non secundum necessitatem naturae. Quod autem dicitur, quod in sempiternis non differt esse et posse, intelligendum est secundum potentiam passivam, non autem secundum activam. Potentia enim passiva actui non coniuncta, corruptionis principium est, et ideo sempiternitati repugnat; effectus vero activae potentiae actu non existens, perfectioni causae agentis praeiudicium non affert, maxime in causis voluntariis. Effectus enim non est perfectio potentiae activae sicut forma potentiae passivae. Solution of the Fifth Argument. From the fact that God was able to do a thing it does not follow that he did it, because he acts by his will and not by natural necessity. And where it is said that in eternal things there is no difference between what can be and what is, this refers to passive and not to active power: because a passive power that is not perfected by its act is a principle of corruption and therefore repugnant to eternity: whereas it casts no reflection on an active power that its effect be not actually in existence, especially if the active power be a voluntary cause: because the effect is not the perfection of an active power in the same way as the form is of a passive power.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod circa productionem primarum creaturarum intellectus noster rationem investigare non potest, eo quod non potest comprehendere artem illam quae sola est ratio quod creaturae praedictae hunc habeant modum; unde sicut non potest ratio reddi ab homine quare caelum est tantum et non amplius; ita reddi non potest ratio quare mundus factus non fuit antea, cum tamen utrumque fuerit divinae potestati subiectum. Solution of the Sixth Argument. Our intelligence is unable to fathom the production of the first creatures, because it cannot grasp that Art which is the sole reason why the creatures in question were such as they were. Hence just as no man can explain why the heavens are so great and not greater, so neither can we tell why the world was not made sooner, although both came within the scope of the divine power.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod primae creaturae non sunt productae ex aliquo, sed ex nihilo. Non tamen oportet ex ipsa ratione productionis, sed ex veritate quam fides supponit, quod prius non fuerint, et postea in esse prodierint. Unus enim sensus praedictae locutionis esse potest, secundum Anselmum, ut dicatur creatura facta ex nihilo, quia non est facta ex aliquo, ut negatio includat praepositionem et non includatur ab ea, ut sic negatio ordinem ad aliquid, quem praepositio importat, neget; non autem praepositio importat ordinem ad nihil. Si vero ordo ad nihil remaneat affirmatus, praepositione negationem includente, nec adhuc oportet quod creatura aliquando fuerit nihil. Potest enim dici, sicut et Avicenna dicit, quod non esse praecedat esse rei, non duratione, sed natura; quia videlicet, si ipsa sibi relinqueretur, nihil esset: esse vero solum ab alio habet. Quod enim est natum alicui inesse ex se ipso, naturaliter prius competit ei, eo quod non est ei natum inesse nisi ab alio. Solution of the Seventh Argument. The first creatures were produced not from something but from nothing. Not, however, from the mode of their production but from the teaching of faith do we gather that they were non-existent before they were brought into being. For the statement that a creature is made from nothing may mean according to Anselm (Monolog. viii) that it is not made from something, so that the negation includes the preposition and is not included by it, and thus denies the order implied by the preposition; while the preposition itself does not imply order to nothing. I If on the other hand order to nothing is affirmed, and the preposition includes the negation, it still does not follow that at some time the creature was non-existent. For one might say with Avicenna that nonexistence preceded the existence of a thing not by duration but by nature: since, to wit, were it left to itself it would have no existence, and it has existence solely from another: because that which a thing is competent to have of itself is naturally prior to that which it is not adapted to have save from another.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod de ratione aeterni est non habere durationis principium; de ratione vero creationis habere principium originis, non autem durationis; nisi accipiendo creationem ut accipit fides. Solution of the Eighth Argument. It belongs to the notion of eternity to have no beginning of duration: while it belongs to the notion of a created thing to have a beginning of its origin but not of duration: unless we take creation according to the teaching of faith.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod aevum et tempus ab aeternitate differunt, non solum ratione principii durationis, sed etiam ratione successionis. Tempus enim in se successivum est; aevo vero successio adiungitur prout substantiae aeternae sunt quantum ad aliquid variabiles, etsi quantum ad aliquid non varientur, prout aevo mensurantur. Aeternitas vero nec successionem continet nec successioni adiungitur. Solution of the Ninth Argument. Eviternity and time differ from eternity, not only in the point of a principle of duration but also in the point of succession. Time in itself implies succession; while succession is annexed to eviternity, inasmuch as eviternal substances are in a way changeable, though they are unchangeable as measured by eviternity. On the other hand eternity has no succession nor is succession annexed to it.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod operatio qua Deus res producit in esse, non sic est intelligenda sicut operatio artificis qui facit arcam et postea eam deserit; sed quod Deus continue influat esse, ut Augustinus dicit; unde non oportet assignare aliquod instans productionis rerum antequam productae non sint, nisi propter fidei suppositionem. Solution of the Tenth Argument. God’s work whereby he brings things into being must not be taken as the work of a craftsman who makes a box and then leaves it: because God continues to give being, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 12; viii, 12). Hence it does not follow that we must assign an instant wherein things were brought into being, before which they existed not, except on account of the teaching of faith.
Q. III:
ARTICLE XV
Did Things Proceed from God of Natural Necessity or by the Decree of His Will?

[ Sum. Th. I, Q. xix, A. 4]
Decimoquinto quaeritur utrum res processerint a Deo per necessitatem naturae vel per arbitrium voluntatis. Et videtur quod per necessitatem naturae. THE fifteenth point of inquiry is whether things proceeded from God of natural necessity or by a decree of his will: and it would seem that they proceeded of natural necessity.
Dicit enim Dionysius: sicut noster sol non ratiocinans aut praeeligens, sed per ipsum suum esse omnia lumine eius participare volentia illuminat; ita divina bonitas per essentiam suam omnibus existentibus proportionaliter radios bonitatis immittit. Sed sol sine electione et ratione illuminans hoc agit ex necessitate naturae. Ergo et Deus creaturas producit suam bonitatem communicando per necessitatem naturae. 1. Dionysius (De Div. Nom. iv) says: “As our sun neither “by reason nor by Pre-election, but by its very being enlightens all things that can participate its light, so the divine good by its very essence pours the rays of its goodness upon all things according to their capacity.” Seeing then that the sun enlightens without reason or pre-election, it does so of natural necessity. Therefore God also produces creatures by communicating his goodness to them of natural necessity.
Praeterea, omnis perfectio inferioris naturae a perfectione divinae naturae derivatur. Sed ad perfectionem naturae inferioris pertinet quod sua virtute aliquid simile sibi faciat producendo effectum. Ergo multo fortius Deus similitudinem suae bonitatis creaturis communicat naturaliter, et non voluntarie. 2. Every perfection of a lower nature derives from the perfection of the divine nature. Now it belongs to the perfection of a lower nature by its own power to produce its like in some effect. A fortiori therefore God naturally and not voluntarily communicates the likeness of his goodness to creatures.
Praeterea, omne agens agit sibi simile. Ergo secundum hoc effectus agitur a causa agente, quod eius similitudinem habet. Sed creatura habet similitudinem Dei quantum ad ea quae ad Dei naturam pertinent, scilicet quantum ad esse et bonitatem et unitatem, et alia huiusmodi, non solum quantum ad ea quae sunt in voluntate vel in intellectu, sicut artificiata sunt similia artifici quantum ad formam artis, non quantum ad naturam artificis, propter quod voluntarie et non naturaliter ab artifice procedunt. Ergo creaturae procedunt a Deo per virtutem naturae divinae et non per voluntatem. 3. Every agent produces its like; wherefore the effect proceeds from its active cause in so far as it bears a likeness thereto. Now the creature bears a likeness to God as regards those things which belong to God by nature, namely being, goodness, unity and so forth; and not as regards things willed or understood, as the product of his art bears a likeness to the craftsman as regards the art-given form and not as regards his nature, for which reason he produces it voluntarily and not naturally. Therefore things proceed from God by virtue of his nature and not by his will.
Sed dices, quod similitudinem naturalium attributorum communicat creaturis divina voluntas.- Sed contra, similitudo naturae communicari non potest nisi per virtutem naturae. Sed virtus naturae in nulla re subiacet voluntati; unde et in Deo generatio filii a patre, quae est naturalis, non fit per imperium voluntatis, nec etiam in hominibus vires animae vegetabiles, quae naturales dicuntur, voluntati subduntur. Ergo non potest esse quod voluntate divina, similitudo naturalium attributorum creaturis communicetur. 4. It may be replied that the divine will communicates the likeness of the natural attributes.—On the contrary, a likeness of nature cannot be communicated otherwise than by the power of nature. Now the power of nature is nowhere subject to the will: wherefore in God, since the Father begets the Son naturally he does not beget him by his will: and in man the forces of the vegetal soul which are called natural forces are not subject to his will. Therefore it is not possible for a likeness of the divine attributes to be communicated to creatures by the divine will.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in libro de doctrina Christiana, quod quia Deus bonus est, sumus: et ita bonitas Dei videtur esse causa productionis creaturarum. Sed bonitas est Deo naturalis. Ergo et fluxus rerum a Deo est naturalis. 5. Augustine says (De Doct. Christ. i, 32) that “we exist because God is good,” so that seemingly God’s goodness is the cause of the production of creatures. Now goodness is natural to God. Therefore the emanation of things from God is natural.
Praeterea, in Deo idem est natura et voluntas. Si ergo Deus producat res voluntarie, sequetur quod producat eas naturaliter. 6. In God nature and will are the same: and consequently if he produces things willingly it would seem that he produces them naturally.
Praeterea, necessitas naturae provenit ex hoc quod natura immobiliter operatur idem, nisi impedimentum eveniat. Sed maior est immutabilitas Dei quam naturae inferioris. Ergo magis ex necessitate Deus producit effectum suum quam natura inferior. 7. Natural necessity results from the fact that nature invariably acts in the same way, unless prevented. Now God is more unchangeable than the lower nature. Therefore God produces his effects more of necessity than the lower nature.
Praeterea, operatio Dei est eius essentia. Sed essentia sua est ei naturalis. Ergo naturaliter operatur quidquid operatur. 8. God’s operation is his essence: and his essence is natural to him. Therefore whatever he does he does naturally.
Praeterea, secundum philosophum voluntas est finis, electio eorum quae sunt ad finem. Sed in Deo non est aliquis finis, cum sit infinitus. Ergo non agit ex voluntate, sed magis ex necessitate naturae. 9. Again, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 2) the end is what is willed, the means are what we choose. But God has no end since he is infinite. Therefore he acts not willingly but rather of natural necessity.
Praeterea, Deus operatur in quantum est bonus, ut Augustinus dicit. Sed ipse est bonum necessarium. Ergo ex necessitate operatur. 10. God operates inasmuch as he is good, according to Augustine (De Doct. Christ. i, 32). Now he is the necessary good. Therefore he works of necessity.
Praeterea, omne quod est, vel est contingens, vel necessarium. Necessarium vero est aliquid tripliciter: scilicet per coactionem, ex suppositione, et absolute. Non autem potest dici quod in Deo sit aliquid possibile vel contingens: hoc enim mutabilitati attestatur, ut per philosophum patet, quia quod contingit esse, contingit non esse. Similiter non est ibi aliquid necessarium per coactionem, quia nihil ibi est violentum nec contra naturam, ut dicitur in V Metaph. Similiter nec necessarium ex suppositione: quia hoc necessarium causatur ex aliquibus causis praesuppositis, Deo autem nihil est causa. Relinquitur ergo quod quidquid est in Deo sit necessarium absolute; et ita videtur quod res ex necessitate in esse producat. 11. Whatsoever exists is either contingent or necessary. Now a thing is necessary in three ways, by coercion, by supposition and absolutely. It cannot be said that in God anything is potential or contingent: since this argues mutability according to the Philosopher (Metaph. xi, 5), because what is contingent may happen not to be. Again, nothing. in God is necessary by coercion because in him nothing is violent or contrary to nature (Metaph. v, 5). Nor is ~there anything necessary by supposition, because this depends on certain things being presupposed, and God is not dependent on anything. It remains then that all in God is absolutely necessary, and it would seem consequently that he produced things necessarily.
Praeterea, II ad Timoth. II, 13, dicitur: Deus fidelis permanet et seipsum negare non potest. Sed cum ipse sit sua bonitas, se ipsum negaret si suam bonitatem negaret. Negaret autem suam bonitatem si eam communicando non diffunderet; cum hoc sit proprium bonitatis. Ergo Deus non potest non producere creaturam suam bonitatem communicando: ergo ex necessitate producit: quia non possibile non esse et necesse esse convertuntur, ut patet in II perihermeneias. 12. It is written (2 Tim. ii, 13) that God continues faithful, he cannot deny himself. Now seeing that he is his own goodness he would deny himself were he to deny his own goodness. But he would deny his own goodness were he not to pour it out by communicating it to others, for this is proper to goodness. Consequently God cannot but produce creatures by communicating his own goodness to them: and therefore he produces them of necessity: because that which cannot but be is convertible with that which is necessary (Perihermen. ii, 3).
Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, patrem generare filium, est patrem dicere se suo verbo. Sed Anselmus dicit, quod eodem verbo pater dicit se et creaturam. Cum ergo generatio filii a patre sit naturaliter et non per imperium voluntatis, videtur quod etiam creaturarum productio: nam apud Deum non differt dicere et facere; cum scriptum sit, Ps. XXXII, 9: dixit, et facta sunt. 13. According to Augustine the Father in begetting the Son expressed himself by his word. Now Anselm says (Monolog. lii) that by the same word the Father expresses himself and the creature. Seeing then that the Father begot the Son naturally and not by the command of his will, it would seem that thus also did he produce creatures, since in God to speak and to make do not differ according to the words of Scripture (Ps. xxxi, 1, 9): He spoke and they were made.
Praeterea, omnis volens de necessitate vult suum ultimum finem, sicut homo de necessitate vult esse beatus. Sed ultimus finis divinae voluntatis est suae bonitatis communicatio: propter hoc enim producit creaturas, ut suam bonitatem communicet. Ergo Deus hoc de necessitate vult, ergo et ex necessitate producit. 14. Every voluntary agent wills of necessity his ultimate end; thus man of necessity wills to be happy. Now the ultimate end of the divine will is the communication of his goodness: since to this end did he make creatures that he might communicate his goodness to them. Therefore God wills this of necessity, and thus of necessity does he produce them.
Praeterea, sicut Deus est per se bonum, ita est per se necessarium. Sed in Deo, quia est per se bonus, nihil est nisi bonum. Ergo et similiter in eo nihil est nisi necessarium; et ita ex necessitate producit res. 15. just as God is good by his essence so is he necessary by his essence. Now because God is good by his essence there is nothing in God but what is good. Therefore in like manner there is nothing in him but what is necessary: and consequently he produces things necessarily.
Praeterea, voluntas Dei est determinata ad unum, scilicet ad bonum. Sed natura propter hoc ex necessitate operatur, quia est determinata ad unum. Ergo et voluntas divina ex necessitate operatur creaturas. 16. God’s will is determined to one thing, namely the good. Now nature through being determined to one works necessarily. Therefore God’s will produces creatures necessarily.
Praeterea, pater virtute naturae suae est principium filii et spiritus sancti, ut Hilarius dicit. Sed eadem natura quae est in patre et filio, est etiam in spiritu sancto. Ergo eadem ratione ipse spiritus sanctus est principium naturaliter. Sed non est principium nisi creaturae. Ergo creatura naturaliter procedit a Deo. 17. The Father by virtue of his nature is the principle of the Son and the Holy Spirit, as Hilary says (De Synod.). Now the same nature that is in the Father and Son is also in the Holy Spirit. Therefore likewise the Holy Spirit is a principle by his nature. But he is not a principle except of creatures. Therefore creatures proceed from God naturally.
Praeterea, effectus procedit a causa agente. Ergo agens non comparatur ad effectum nisi per hoc quod comparatur ad actionem vel operationem. Sed comparatio operationis vel actionis divinae ad ipsum est naturalis, cum actio Dei sit sua essentia. Ergo similiter ad effectum comparatur naturaliter producendo ipsum. 18. The effect proceeds from its cause in action: wherefore a cause is not related to its effect except as related to its action or operation. Now the relation of God’s action or operation to himself is natural, since God’s action is his essence. Therefore the relation of God to his effect is also natural so that he produces it naturally.
Praeterea, a per se bono non fit aliquid nisi bonum et bene. Ergo et a per se necessario non fit aliquid nisi necessarium et necessario. Sed Deus est huiusmodi. Ergo omnia procedunt ab ipso ex necessitate. 19. By that which is essentially good nothing is made but what is good and well made. Therefore by that which is essentially necessary, nothing is made but what is necessary and necessarily. made. Now such is God. Therefore all things proceed from him of necessity.
Praeterea, cum id quod est per se, sit prius eo quod est per aliud, oportet primum agens agere per suam essentiam. Sed sua essentia et sua natura idem est. Ergo agit per naturam suam; et ita naturaliter creaturae ab eo procedunt. 20. Since what exists of itself is prior to that which exists by another, it follows that the first agent acts by his essence. Now his essence and his nature are the same. Therefore he acts by his nature: and thus creatures proceed from him naturally.
Sed contra. Est quod Hilarius dicit: omnibus creaturis substantiam Dei voluntas attulit; et ibidem: tales sunt creaturae quales Deus eas esse voluit. Ergo Deus producit creaturas per voluntatem, non per naturae necessitatem. On the contrary Hilary says (De Synod.): “The will of God gave all things their substance: and (ibid.): Such are creatures as God willed them to be.” Therefore God produced creatures by his will and not by natural necessity.
Praeterea, Augustinus in XII Confess., ad Deum loquens, ait duo fecisti, domine: unum prope te, scilicet Angelum, et aliud prope nihil, scilicet materiam. Neutrum tamen est de natura tua: quia neutrum est quod tu es. Sed filius pro tanto naturaliter a patre procedit, quia eamdem habet naturam quam pater, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo creatura non procedit a Deo naturaliter. Moreover Augustine addressing God says (Confess. xii, 7): “Lord, thou didst make two things, one nigh to thyself,” the angel, to wit, “the other nigh to nothing,” namely matter. “Yet neither is of thy nature, since neither is what thou art.” Now the Son proceeds from the Father naturally inasmuch as he has the same nature as the Father, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 14). Therefore the creature does not proceed naturally from God.
Respondeo. Dicendum quod, absque omni dubio, tenendum est quod Deus ex libero arbitrio suae voluntatis creaturas in esse produxit nulla naturali necessitate. Quod potest esse manifestum ad praesens quatuor rationibus: I answer that without any doubt we must hold that God by the decree of his will and by no natural necessity brought creatures into being. This may for the present be made clear by four arguments.
quarum prima est, quod oportet dicere universum aliquem finem habere: alias omnia in universo casu acciderent; nisi forte diceretur, quod primae creaturae non sunt propter finem, sed ex naturali necessitate; posteriores vero creaturae sunt propter finem; sicut et Democritus ponebat caelestia corpora esse a casu facta, inferiora vero a causis determinatis, quod improbatur in II Phys., per hoc quod ea quae sunt nobiliora, non possunt esse minus ordinata quam indigniora. Necesse est igitur dicere, quod in productione creaturarum a Deo sit aliquis finis intentus. Invenitur autem agere propter finem et voluntas et natura, sed aliter et aliter. Natura enim, cum non cognoscat nec finem nec rationem finis, nec habitudinem eius, quod est ad finem in finem, non potest sibi praestituere finem, nec se in finem movere aut ordinare vel dirigere; quod quidem competit agenti per voluntatem, cuius est intelligere et finem et omnia praedicta. Unde agens per voluntatem sic agit propter finem, quod praestituit sibi finem, et seipsum quodammodo in finem movet, suas actiones in ipsum ordinando. Natura vero tendit in finem sicut mota et directa ab alio intelligente et volente, sicut patet in sagitta, quae tendit in signum determinatum propter directionem sagittantis; et per hunc modum a philosophis dicitur, quod opus naturae est opus intelligentiae. Semper autem quod est per aliud, est posterius eo quod est per se. Unde oportet quod primum ordinans in finem, hoc faciat per voluntatem; et ita Deus per voluntatem creaturas in esse produxit, non per naturam. Nec est instantia de filio, quod naturaliter procedit a patre, cuius generatio creationem praecedit: quia filius non procedit ut ad finem ordinatus, sed ut omnium finis. First argument. The universe must needs be directed to an end, otherwise all things in the universe would befall by chance. Unless one were to say that the first creatures were not directed to an end but produced by natural necessity; and that subsequent creatures are directed to an end. This was the opinion of Democritus who maintained that the heavenly bodies were produced by chance, but lower bodies by determinate causes; and is refuted (Phys. ii, 4) for the reason that more exalted beings cannot be less ordinate than those of lower dignity. We must therefore hold that in producing creatures God had some end in view. Now both will and nature act for an end, but not in the same way. Nature has no knowledge of the purpose for which it acts, nor does it view it in the fight of an end, nor is it aware of the connection between the means and the end; so that it cannot propose an end to itself, nor move order or direct itself towards the end, whereas this is within the competency of a voluntary agent that can understand the end and all those other things. Wherefore the voluntary agent acts for the end in such wise that he proposes the end to himself, and to a certain extent moves himself towards the end by directing his actions thereto. On the other hand nature tends to its end as a thing that is moved and directed by an intelligent and voluntary agent, even as an arrow flies towards a certain mark through the aim of the archer: and in this sense philosophers say that the work of nature is the work of an intelligence. Now that which is by another is always preceded by that which is of itself. Consequently the first director to an end must direct by his will: and thus God brought creatures into being by his will and not naturally. Nor may it be objected that the Son was naturally begotten by the Father, and yet his birth preceded creation: because the Son proceeds not as one ordained to an end, but as the end of all.
Secunda vero ratio est, quia natura est determinata ad unum. Cum autem omne agens sibi simile producat, oportet quod natura ad illam similitudinem tendat producendam quae est determinate in uno. Cum autem aequalitas ab unitate causetur, inaequalitas vero ex multitudine quae vario modo se habet (ratione cuius non est aliquid alteri aequale nisi uno modo, inaequale vero secundum multos gradus) natura semper facit sibi aequale, nisi sit propter defectum virtutis activae, vel receptivae sive passivae. Defectus autem passivae potentiae Deo non praeiudicat, cum ipse materiam non requirat; nec iterum virtus sua est deficiens, sed infinita. Unde hoc solum ab eo procedit naturaliter quod est sibi aequale, scilicet filius. Creatura vero, quae est inaequalis, non naturaliter, sed per voluntatem procedit; sunt enim multi gradus inaequalitatis. Nec potest dici quod divina virtus ad unum determinetur tantum, cum sit infinita. Unde cum divina virtus se extendat ad diversos gradus inaequalitatis in creaturis constituendos; quod in hoc gradu determinato creaturam constituit, ex arbitrio voluntatis fuit, non ex naturali necessitate. Second argument. Nature is determined to one thing: and since every agent produces its like, it follows that nature must tend to produce a likeness that is determinately in one subject. Now seeing that equality is caused by unity, whereas inequality is caused by multitude which is manifold (wherefore equality exists between things in only one way, but inequality in many various degrees), nature always produces its equal unless it be hindered by a defect either in the active force or in the recipient or patient. But God is not hindered by a defect in the patient, since he needs not matter: nor is his power defective, but infinite. Wherefore nothing proceeds from him naturally but what is his equal, namely the Son. On the other hand creatures, being unequal, are produced not naturally but voluntarily, for there are many degrees of inequality. Nor may it be said that the divine power is determined to one only, seeing that it is infinite. Wherefore since the power of God extends to the production of various degrees of inequality among creatures, it was by the decree of his. will and not of natural necessity that he fashioned this or that creature in this or that particular degree.
Tertia ratio est, quia cum omne agens agat sibi simile aliquo modo, oportet quod effectus in sua causa aliqualiter praeexistat. Omne autem quod est in aliquo, est in eo per modum eius in quo est; unde cum ipse Deus sit intellectus, creaturae in ipso intelligibiliter praeexistunt propter quod dicitur Ioan. I, 3: quod factum est, in ipso vita erat. Quod autem est in intellectu, non producitur nisi mediante voluntate: voluntas enim est executrix intellectus et intelligibile voluntatem movet; et ita oportet quod res creatae a Deo processerint per voluntatem. Third argument. Since every agent in some way produces its like, the effect must in some way pre-exist in its cause. Now whatsoever is contained in another is therein according to the mode of the container: wherefore as God himself is intelligence it follows that creatures pre-exist in him intelligibly, in which sense it is written (Jo. i, 3): That which was made was life in him. But that which is in an intelligence does not proceed therefrom except by means of the will for the will is the executor of the intellect, and the intelligible moves the will. Consequently creatures must have proceeded from God by his will.
Quarta ratio est, quia, secundum philosophum, duplex est actio: quaedam quae consistit in ipso agente, et est perfectio et actus agentis, ut intelligere, velle et huiusmodi: quaedam vero quae egreditur ab agente in patiens extrinsecum et est perfectio et actus patientis, sicut calefacere, movere et huiusmodi. Actio autem Dei non potest intelligi ad modum huiusmodi secundae actionis, eo quod, cum actio sua sit eius essentia, non egreditur extra ipsum: unde oportet quod intelligatur ad modum primae actionis quae non est nisi in intelligente et volente, vel etiam sentiente; quod etiam in Deum non cadit: quia actio sensus licet non tendat in aliquid extrinsecum, est tamen ab actione extrinseci. Per hoc igitur Deus agit quidquid extra se agit, quod intelligit et vult. Nec hoc generationi filii praeiudicat quae est naturalis, quia huiusmodi generatio non intelligitur terminari ad aliquid quod sit extra divinam essentiam. Necessarium est igitur dicere omnem creaturam a Deo processisse per voluntatem, et non per necessitatem naturae. Fourth argument. According to the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, text 16) action is twofold: one that remains in the agent, of which it is the perfection and act; such as to understand, to will and the like: the other issues from the agent into an extrinsic patient which it perfects and actuates, such as to heat, to move and the like. Now God’s action cannot be taken as belonging to this latter kind of action, because his action is his very essence, and consequently does not issue outside him. Hence it must be taken as belonging to the former kind of action which is only to be found in one possessed of intelligence and will, or also of the faculty of sense, which latter again does not apply to God, because sensation, though it does not issue into an external object, is caused by the action of an external object. Therefore whatsoever God does outside himself he does it as understanding and willing it. Nor does this argument belie the naturalness of the Son’s begetting, the term of which was not something outside the divine essence. We must therefore hold that all creatures proceeded from God by his will and not of natural necessity.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod similitudo Dionysii est intelligenda quantum ad universitatem diffusionis; sol enim in omnia corpora radios effundit, non discernendo unum ab alio, et similiter divina bonitas. Non autem intelligitur quantum ad privationem voluntatis. Reply to the First Objection. The comparison of Dionysius must be understood to refer to the universality of diffusion: as the sun sheds its rays on all bodies without differentiating one from another, so likewise is it with God’s goodness: but it does not apply to the absence of will.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod ex perfectione divinae naturae est quod virtute naturae divinae, ipsius naturae similitudo creaturis communicetur, non tamen haec communicatio fit per necessitatem naturae sed per voluntatem. Reply to the Second Objection. It is owing to the perfection of the divine nature that by virtue thereof its likeness is communicated to creatures: yet this communication was made not of natural necessity but voluntarily.
Et per hoc patet responsio ad tertium. This suffices for the reply to the Third Objection.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod natura non subiacet voluntati in his quae sunt intima rei, sed quantum ad ea quae sunt extra rem, nihil prohibet naturam subiici voluntati; unde et in motu locali in animalibus natura musculorum et nervorum subiacet appetitui imperanti; unde nec est inconveniens, si virtute naturae divinae, creaturae producantur in esse secundum arbitrium divinae voluntatis. Reply to the Fourth Objection. Nature is not subject to will from within: but in externals nothing prevents nature from being subject to the will. Thus in the local movements of animals nature in their muscles and sinews is subject to the command of their appetite. Consequently it is not unreasonable if by virtue of the divine nature creatures be brought into existence according to the behest of the divine will.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod bonum est proprium obiectum voluntatis; unde bonitas Dei, in quantum est ad ipso volita et amata, mediante voluntate est creaturae causa. Reply to the Fifth Objection. The good is the proper object of the will: hence the goodness of God as willed and loved by him is the cause of things through his will.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod licet voluntas et natura, prout in Deo sunt, sint, secundum rem, idem, differunt tamen ratione, secundum quod per ea diversimode designatur respectus ad creaturam; natura enim importat respectum ad aliquid unum determinate, non autem voluntas. Reply to the Sixth Objection. Although will, and nature are identically the same in God, they differ logically, in so far as they express respect to creatures in different ways: thus nature denotes a respect to some one thing determinately, whereas will does not.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod non est ex immobilitate naturae solum quod aliquid ex necessitate producit, sed ex eius determinatione ad unum quae non competit divinae voluntati, licet in ea sit immobilitas summa. Reply to the Seventh Objection. It is owing not merely to the unchangeableness of nature that it produces a particular effect of necessity, but to its being determined to one: this does not apply to the divine will although it is supremely unchangeable.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod licet operatio Dei naturaliter ei competat, cum sit eius natura vel essentia, effectus tamen creaturae operationem consequitur, quae per modum intelligendi consideratur, ut principium voluntatis, sicut et effectus calefactionis sequitur secundum modum caloris. Reply to the Eighth, Objection. Although God’s operation belongs to him naturally seeing that it is his very nature or essence, the created effect follows the operation of his nature which, in our way of understanding, is considered as the principle of his will, even as the effect that is heating follows according to the mode of the heat.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod licet Deus sit infinitus, est tamen finis ad quem omnia ordinantur. Non enim est infinitus privative, sicut finitum est passio quantitatis quae nata est habere finem; hoc enim modo finis neque infinitus, neque finitus est. Dicitur autem infinitus negative, quia nullo modo finitur. Reply to the Ninth Objection. Although God is infinite he is the end of all things. He is not infinite as though he were deprived of finiteness in the same way as there may be an infinite in quantity, although quantity by nature is finite, for in this way an end is neither finite nor infinite. But he is infinite in a negative sense, because be is altogether without an end.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod licet Deus operetur in quantum est bonus, et bonitas ei necessario insit, non tamen sequitur quod de necessitate operetur. Bonitas enim mediante voluntate operatur, in quantum est eius obiectum vel finis; voluntas autem non necessario se habet ad ea quae sunt ad finem; licet respectu ultimi finis necessitatem habeat. Reply to the Tenth Objection. It is true that God operates inasmuch as he is good, and that goodness is in him of necessity, but it does not follow that he works of necessity. Because his goodness works through his will in so far as it is the object or end of his will. Now the will is not inclined of necessity to the means, although it is necessitated in respect of the last end.
Ad undecimum dicendum, quod quantum ad id quod in ipso Deo est, non potest attendi aliqua possibilitas, sed sola necessitas naturalis et absoluta; respectu vero creaturae potest ibi considerari possibilitas, non secundum potentiam passivam, sed secundum potentiam activam, quae non limitatur ad unum. Reply to the Eleventh Objection. As regards the things which are in God himself, nothing can be described as potential: all is naturally and absolutely necessary. But in respect of creatures we can call certain things potential not in regard to passive potentiality, but in regard to an active power which is not limited to one effect.
Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod si Deus hoc modo suam bonitatem negaret quod aliquid contra suam bonitatem faceret, vel in quo sua bonitas non exprimeretur, sequeretur per impossibile quod negaret se ipsum. Non autem hoc sequeretur, si etiam nulli bonitatem suam communicaret. Suae enim bonitati nihil deperiret, si communicata non esset. Reply to the Twelfth Objection. Were God to deny his own goodness by doing something contrary thereto or wherein his goodness were not expressed, we should arrive at the impossible conclusion that he denied himself. But this would not follow if he were not to communicate his goodness to anything since it would suffer nothing by not being communicated.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod licet ipsum verbum Dei naturaliter a patre oriatur, non tamen oportet quod creaturae naturaliter procedant a Deo. Hoc autem modo pater verbo suo creaturas dicit sicut in ipso patre sunt; in quo quidem sunt non ut per necessitatem producendae, sed per voluntatem. Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. Although the Word of God. proceeds from the Father naturally, it does not follow that creatures proceed from God naturally. The Father by his words speaks his creatures according as they ate in him: and in him they are as producible not necessarily but voluntarily.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod communicatio bonitatis non est ultimus finis, sed ipsa divina bonitas, ex cuius amore est quod Deus eam communicare vult; non enim agit propter suam bonitatem quasi appetens quod non habet, sed quasi volens communicare quod habet: quia agit non ex appetitu finis, sed ex amore finis. Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. The last end is not the communication of the divine goodness, but that goodness itself for love of which God wills to communicate it. He works for his goodness’ sake not as desiring to have what he has not, but as wishing to communicate what he has: for he acts not from desire, but from love, of the end.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod sicut in Deo nihil est nisi bonum, ita in eo nihil est nisi necessarium. Non tamen oportet quod quidquid est ab eo, procedat per necessitatem. Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. As in God there is naught but good, so is there naught but what is necessary. But it does not follow that whatsoever proceeds from him does so of necessity.
Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod voluntas Dei, sicut dictum est, in corp. art., naturaliter fertur in suam bonitatem; unde non potest velle nisi id quod est ei conveniens, scilicet bonum; non tamen determinatur ad hoc vel illud bonum; et ideo non oportet quod bona quae sunt, ab eo procedant per necessitatem. Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. As stated above God’s will inclines naturally to his goodness: so that he cannot will but what is becoming to him, namely the good. Yet he is not determined to this or that good: wherefore it does not follow that the goods which exist proceed from him necessarily.
Ad decimumseptimum dicendum, quod licet eadem natura sit patris et filii et spiritus sancti, non tamen eumdem modum existendi habet in tribus, et dico modum existendi secundum relationem. In patre enim est ut non accepta ab alio, in filio vero ut a patre accepta; unde non oportet quod quidquid convenit patri virtute naturae suae, conveniat filio vel spiritui sancto. Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. Though the same nature is in the Father, Son and Holy Spirit it has not the same mode of existence in each one of the three, and when I say mode of existence I mean in respect of the relations. In the Father nature is considered as not received from another: in the Son, as received from another. Consequently we must not infer that whatsoever belongs to the Father by virtue of his nature, belongs also to the Son or the Holy Spirit.
Ad decimumoctavum dicendum, quod effectus sequitur ab actione secundum modum principii agendi; unde cum per modum intelligendi, actionis divinae principium, prout respicit creaturam, consideretur divina voluntas quae ad creaturam non habet necessariam habitudinem, non oportet quod creatura procedat a Deo per necessitatem naturae, licet ipsa actio sit Dei essentia vel natura. Reply to the Eighteenth Objection. The effect follows from the action according to the mode of the principle of the action: wherefore since the divine will which has no necessary connection with creatures is considered, in our way of thinking, to be the principle of the divine action in regard to creatures, it does not follow that the creature proceeds from God by natural necessity, although the action itself is God’s, essence or nature.
Ad decimumnonum dicendum, quod creatura assimilatur Deo quantum ad generales conditiones, non autem quantum ad modum participandi. Alio enim modo, esse est in Deo et in creatura, et similiter bonitas. Unde licet a primo bono sint omnia bona, et a primo ente sint omnia entia, non tamen a summo bono sunt omnia summe bona, nec ab ente necessario sunt omnia per necessitatem. Reply to the Nineteenth Objection. The creature is like God as regards general conditions, but not as to the mode of participation: thus being is in God otherwise than in creatures, and so too is goodness. Hence although from the first good all goods derive, and all beings from the first being, yet all do not derive supreme goodness from the sovereign good, nor from the necessary being do all things proceed of necessity.
Ad vigesimum dicendum, quod voluntas Dei est eius essentia; unde hoc quod agit per voluntatem non removet quin per essentiam suam agat. Non enim est voluntas Dei aliqua intentio addita divinae essentiae, sed ipsa essentia. Reply to the Twentieth Objection. God’s will is his essence: wherefore his working by his will does not prevent his working by his essence. God’s will is not an intention in addition to his essence, but is his very essence.
Q. III:
ARTICLE XVI
Can a Multitude of Things Proceed from One First Thing?

[ Sum. Th. I, Q. xlvii, A. i; C.G. II, xxxix-xlv: III, xcvii]
Decimosexto quaeritur utrum ab uno primo possit procedere multitudo. Et videtur quod non. THE Sixteenth point of inquiry is whether many things can proceed from one: and seemingly the answer should be in the negative.
Sicuti enim Deus est per se bonum, et per consequens summum bonum; ita est per se et summe unum. Sed ab eo in quantum est bonum, non potest procedere nisi bonum. Ergo nec ab eo procedere potest nisi unum. 1. As God is essentially good and consequently the sovereign good, so is he essentially and supremely one. Now inasmuch as he is good nothing can proceed from him but what is good. Therefore inasmuch as he is one, only one thing can proceed from him.
Praeterea, sicut bonum convertitur cum ente, ita et unum. Sed in his quae sunt entia, oportet attendi assimilationem creaturae ad Deum, ut supra, art. praeced., dictum est. Ergo sicut in bonitate, ita et in unitate oportet Deo creaturam assimilari, ut scilicet sit una ab uno. 2. As good is convertible with being, so also is one. Now the creature is like God in that it has being, as stated above. Therefore as it is like God in goodness, so must it be like him in unity, and thus from the one God one creature should proceed.
Praeterea, sicut bonum et malum opponuntur privative, si communiter accipiantur, licet sint contraria, prout sunt habituum differentiae; ita unum et multa opponuntur privative, ut patet in X Metaph. Sed malitiam nullo modo dicimus a Deo procedere, sed ex defectu causarum secundarum eam incidere. Ergo nec debet poni quod multitudinis Deus sit causa. 3. As good and evil taken in general are mutually opposed by way of privation, although they are contraries considered as differentiating habits; so one and many are opposed to each other by way of privation (Metaph. x, 3). Now by no means do we say that wickedness proceeds from God, but from a defect in second causes. Neither therefore should we say that God is the cause of multitude.
Praeterea, oportet proportionaliter accipere causas et causata, quia videlicet singularia sunt causa singularium, et universalia universalium, ut patet per philosophum. Sed Deus est causa maxime universalis. Ergo suus proprius effectus est effectus maxime universalis, scilicet esse. Sed ex hoc quod res habent esse non est multitudo, cum multitudinis sit causa diversitas vel differentia. In esse vero omnia conveniunt. Ergo multitudo non est a Deo; sed ex causis secundis, ex quibus causantur particulares rerum conditiones, secundum quas etiam differunt. 4. Cause and effect should be proportionate to each other, forasmuch as single things cause single things and universal things cause universal, according to the Philosopher (Phys. ii, 3). Now God is the most universal of all causes. Therefore his proper effect is the most universal of all, namely being. Now it is not because things have being that there is not multitude, since diversity and distinction are the cause of multitude, and all things agree in point of being. Therefore multitude is not from God, but from second causes whence each thing derives its particular condition of being, whereby it is differentiated from others.
Praeterea, uniuscuiusque effectus est aliquam propriam causam accipere. Sed impossibile est unum esse proprium multorum. Ergo impossibile est quod unum sit causa multitudinis. 5. Every effect has its proper cause. But one cannot be proper to many. Therefore one cannot be the cause of many.
Sed dices, quod hoc tenet in causis naturalibus, non in causis voluntariis.- Sed contra, artifex est causa artifici per voluntatem. Procedit autem artificiatum ab artifice secundum propriam formam illius artificiati, quae est in artifice. Ergo etiam in voluntariis effectus quilibet requirit propriam causam. 6. You will say perhaps that this is true of natural but not of voluntary causes.—On the contrary the craftsman is the cause of his work by his will. But that work comes from the craftsman in accordance with the proper form thereof existing in the mind of the craftsman. Therefore even in voluntary effects each one requires its proper cause.
Praeterea, oportet esse conformitatem inter causam et effectum. Sed Deus est omnino unus et simplex. Ergo in creatura, quae est eius effectus, nec multitudo nec compositio debet inveniri. 7. There ought to be conformity between cause and effect. God is altogether one and simple. Therefore there should be neither multitude nor composition in the creature which is his effect.
Praeterea, diversorum agentium non potest esse idem effectus immediate. Sed sicut causa appropriatur effectui, ita effectus causae. Ergo nec eiusdem causae possunt esse plures immediate effectus; et sic idem quod prius. 8. One effect cannot proceed immediately from a diversity of agents. Now as the cause is appropriate to the effect, so is the effect to its cause. Therefore from one same cause there cannot proceed many immediate effects: and thus the same conclusion follows.
Praeterea, in Deo est eadem potentia generandi, spirandi et creandi. Sed potentia generandi non est nisi ad unum, similiter nec potentia spirandi: quia in Trinitate non potest esse nisi unus filius et unus spiritus sanctus. Ergo et potentia creandi terminatur tantum ad unum. 9. In God it is the same power that begets, spirates and creates. Now the power to beget terminates in one only, and likewise the power to spirate: because in the Trinity there can be but one Son and one Holy Spirit. Therefore the creative power also terminates in one only.
Sed dices, quod universitas creaturarum est quodammodo unum secundum ordinem. Sed contra, effectum oportet assimilari causae. Sed unitas Dei non est unitas ordinis, quia in Deo non est prius nec posterius, nec superius et inferius. Ergo non sufficit unitas ordinis ad hoc quod ab uno Deo plura possint educi. 10. But you will ‘say that the universe of creatures is somewhat one with regard to order.—On the contrary the effect should be like its cause. But the unity of God is not a unity of order, since in God there is no before and after nor higher and lower. Consequently unity of order does not suffice to make it possible that many things be made by one God.
Praeterea, unius simplicis non est nisi una actio. Sed ab una actione non est nisi unus effectus. Ergo ab uno simplici non potest procedere nisi unus effectus. 11. One simple thing has but one action. Now one action has but one effect. Therefore one simple thing can produce but one effect.
Praeterea, creatura procedit a Deo, non solum sicut effectus a causa efficiente, sed etiam sicut exemplatum ab exemplari. Sed unius exemplati est unum exemplar proprium. Ergo a Deo non potest procedere nisi una creatura. 12. The creature proceeds from God not only as the effect from its effective cause, but also as the exemplate from its exemplar. Now one exemplar has but one proper exemplate. Therefore only one creature can proceed from God.
Praeterea, Deus est causa rerum per intellectum. Agens autem per intellectum agit per formam sui intellectus. Cum igitur in divino intellectu non sit nisi una forma, videtur quod ab eo non possit procedere nisi una creatura. 13. God is cause of things by his intellect. Now an agent by intellect acts by the form in his intellect. Wherefore since there is but one form in the divine intellect, it would seem that only one creature can proceed from it.
Sed dices, quod licet forma divini intellectus sit una secundum rem, quae est eius essentia, tamen attenditur ibi quaedam pluralitas secundum diversos respectus ad creaturas diversas; et sic est ibi pluralitas rationis. Sed contra, aut isti respectus plures sunt in intellectu divino, aut sunt solum in ratione nostra. Si primo modo, ergo sequitur quod in intellectu divino erit pluralitas et non summa simplicitas. Si secundo modo, sequitur quod Deus non producat creaturas diversas nisi mediante ratione nostra: ex quo oportet quod diversas creaturas producat per diversos respectus ad creaturas qui non sunt nisi in ratione nostra; et sic habetur propositum, scilicet quod a Deo immediate non procedat multitudo. 14. But you will say that although the form in the divine intellect is one in substance since it is the divine essence, we may nevertheless consider therein a certain plurality by reason of various respects to various creatures, so that there is a logical plurality.—On the contrary these several respects are either in the divine intellect or solely in our mind. In the first case it will follow that there is plurality and not supreme simplicity in the divine intellect. In the second case, it will follow that God does not produce a variety of creatures except by means of our reason’ and consequently that he produces a variety of creatures through various respects to creatures, which respects exist only in our reason. This is what we are endeavouring to show, namely that multitude does not proceed from God immediately.
Praeterea, Deus per apprehensionem intellectus sui res in esse producit. Sed in eo non est nisi una apprehensio: quia suus intellectus est eius essentia, quae est una. Ergo non producit nisi unam creaturam. 15. God brings things into being through his intellect apprehending them. Now in him there is but one apprehension: since his act of intelligence is his essence which is one. Therefore he produces but one creature.
Praeterea, illud quod non habet esse nisi in ratione, non est creatum a Deo: quia huiusmodi videntur esse quaedam vana, ut Chimaera, et huiusmodi. Sed multitudo non est nisi in ratione: significatur enim per abstractionem a multis quod in rerum natura non invenitur. Ergo Deus non est causa multitudinis. 16. That which has no being save in the mind is not a creature of God, for such things would seem to be vanity, a’s chimeras and the like. Now multitude is only in the reason, because it signifies an abstraction that does not exist in reality. Therefore God is not the cause of multitude.
Praeterea, secundum Platonem, optimi est optima adducere. Sed optimum non potest esse nisi unum. Cum igitur Deus sit optimus, ab eo non potest produci nisi unum. 17. According to Plato (Tim.) the best produces the best. Now the best can only be one. Since then God is best of all things, only one thing can be produced by him.
Praeterea, unusquisque agens propter finem, facit effectum suum propinquiorem fini quantum potest. Sed Deus producendo creaturam ordinat eam in finem. Ergo facit eam propinquissimam fini quantum potest. Sed hoc non potest nisi uno modo fieri. Ergo Deus non producit nisi unam creaturam. 18. Every agent that acts for an end produces an effect as, near to the end as possible. Now God in producing the creature ordains it to an end. Therefore he makes it as near to the end as possible. But this can be done only in one way. Therefore he produces only one creature.
Praeterea, iniustum est quod aliquis inaequalia aliquibus tribuat, nisi aliqua inaequalitate circa eos praecedente, vel meritorum, vel quarumcumque conditionum diversarum. Sed operationem divinam non praecedit aliqua diversitas; alias ipse non esset prima causa omnium. Ergo in prima rerum creatione non dedit creaturis inaequalia dona. Sed diversitas creaturarum et multitudo attenditur secundum hoc quod plus vel minus recipiunt de donis divinis, ut patet in IV cap. Cael. Hierar. Ergo in prima rerum creatione Deus multitudinem non produxit. 19. It is unjust to deal unequally to various recipients, unless these be already unequal either in merit or in some other diversity of condition. Now no diversity precedes God’s work, otherwise he would not be the first cause of all. Therefore when he first created things he did not bestow unequal gifts on his creatures. But diversity and multitude of creatures are in respect of their receiving more or less of the divine gifts (Coel. Hier. iv). Therefore when God first created things he did not produce a multitude.
Praeterea, Deus creaturis communicat suam bonitatem quantum capaces sunt. Sed natura superiorum creaturarum capax fuit huiusmodi perfectionis et dignitatis, ut essent causae inferiorum creaturarum. Id enim quod est perfectius, potest agere in id quod est eo imperfectius, et communicare ei suam perfectionem. Ergo videtur quod Deus creaturas inferiores mediantibus superioribus produxit; et ita ipse immediate non produxit nisi unam creaturam aliis superiorem, quaecumque sit illa. 20. God communicates his goodness to creatures according to, their capacity. Now the nature of higher creatures was capable of such perfection and dignity as to be the causes of lower creatures: because the more perfect things can act on those which are less perfect and communicate their perfection to them. Therefore seemingly God produced the lower creatures by means of the higher, and thus he did not produce immediately more than one creature, whatever it be, higher than the others.
Praeterea, quanto aliquae formae sunt magis immateriales, tanto sunt magis activae, utpote magis a potentia separatae; unumquodque enim agit secundum quod est in actu, non secundum quod est in potentia. Sed formae rerum quae sunt in mente Angeli, sunt magis immateriales quam formae quae sunt in rebus naturalibus. Cum ergo formae naturales sint causae formarum sibi similium, videtur quod multo fortius formae quae sunt in mente Angeli, produxerint formas rerum naturalium sibi similes. Diversitas autem rerum, et per consequens multitudo, est ex forma. Ergo videtur quod multitudo non processerit a Deo nisi mediantibus superioribus creaturis. 21. The more immaterial a form the more active it is, as being more remote from potentiality: since a thing acts forasmuch as it is in act and not as in potentiality. Now in an angel’s mind there are forms of things and these forms are more immaterial than the forms that are in natural things. Now seeing that natural forms are causes of like forms, it would seem that a fortiori the forms in an angel’s mind produce like forms of natural things. But diversity and consequently multitude of things result from the form. Therefore seemingly multitude did not proceed from God except by means of the higher creatures.
Praeterea, quidquid Deus facit, est unum. Ergo ab eo non est nisi unum; et ita ipse non erit causa multitudinis. 22. Whatsoever God makes is one thing. Therefore only one thing proceeds from him: and thus he is not the cause of multitude.
Praeterea, Deus non intelligit nisi unum: quia nihil intelligit extra se, ut probatur in XII Metaph. Sed ipse est causa rerum per intellectum suum. Ergo ipse non causat nisi unum. 23. God understands but one thing, because he understands nothing outside himself (Metaph. xii, 9). Now he is cause of things by his intellect. Therefore he causes but one thing.
Praeterea, Anselmus dicit, quod creatura in Deo est creatrix essentia. Sed creatrix essentia est tantum una. Ergo et creatura in Deo est tantum una. Sed hoc modo creatur creatura a Deo secundum quod in ipso praecessit. Ergo a Deo non est nisi una tantum creatura; et sic a Deo non procedit multitudo. 24. Anselm says (Monolog. viii) that in God the creature is the creative essence. Now the creative essence is but one. Consequently in God the creature is one only. But the creature is produced by God according to the same way as it pre-existed in God. Therefore only one creature proceeds from God and consequently multitude is not from him.
Sed contra. Est quod dicitur Sapient. cap. XI, 21: omnia in numero et pondere et mensura disposuisti, domine. Sed numerus non est sine multitudine. Ergo a Deo procedit multitudo. On the contrary it is written (Wis. xi, 21) : Lord, thou hast disposed all things in number, weight and measure. But there is no number without multitude. Therefore multitude is from God.
Praeterea, virtus Dei praecedit virtutem cuiuslibet alterius rei. Sed unum punctum potest esse principium multarum linearum. Ergo sic Deus, quamvis sit unus, potest esse principium creaturarum multarum. Again, God’s power surpasses that of any other thing. Now one point can be the beginning of many lines. Thus then can God, though he is one, be the beginning of many creatures.
Praeterea, illud quod est proprium uni in quantum est unum, maxime competit ei quod est maxime unum. Sed proprium est unitatis quod sit multitudinis principium. Ergo hoc maxime competit Deo quod est summe unum, quod ab eo multitudo procedat. Again, that which is proper to unity as such is most appropriate to that which is supremely one. Now it is proper to unity to be the principle of multitude. Therefore it is most appropriate to God who is supremely one to be the cause of multitude.
Praeterea, Boetius dicit in principio arithmeticae, quod secundum exemplar numeri Deus res in esse produxit. Sed exemplatum exemplari conformatur. Ergo produxit res sub multitudine et numero. Again, Boethius says (Arith.) that God brought things into being according to a numerical exemplar. Now the exemplate is like the exemplar. Therefore he produced things in multitude and number.
Praeterea, in Psal. CIII, 24, dicitur: omnia in sapientia fecisti. Sed cum sapientis sit ordinare, oportet ea quae per sapientiam fiunt, ordinem habere, et per consequens multitudinem. Ergo rerum multitudo a Deo processit. Again it is written (PS. ciii, 24) : Thou hast done all things in wisdom. Now seeing that it belongs to a wise man to set things in order, it follows that there must be order and consequently multitude in all the things done by wisdom. Therefore the multitude of things is from God.
Respondeo. Dicendum, quod multa non posse procedere ab uno principio immediate et proprie, videtur esse ex determinatione causae ad effectum, ex qua videtur debitum et necessarium ut si est talis causa, talis effectus proveniat. Causae autem sunt quatuor, quarum duae, scilicet materia et efficiens, praecedunt causatum, secundum esse internum; finis vero etsi non secundum esse, tamen secundum intentionem; forma vero neutro modo, secundum quod est forma; quia cum per eam causatum esse habeat, esse eius simul est cum esse causati; sed in quantum etiam ipsa est finis, praecedit in intentione agentis. Et quamvis forma sit finis operationis, ad quem operatio agentis terminatur, non tamen omnis finis est forma. Est enim aliquis finis intentionis praeter finem operationis, ut patet in domo. Nam forma eius est finis terminans operationem aedificatoris; non tamen ibi terminatur intentio eius, sed ad ulteriorem finem, quae est habitatio; ut sic dicatur, quod finis operationis est forma domus, intentionis vero habitatio. Debitum igitur essendi tale causatum non potest esse ex forma in quantum est forma, quia sic concomitatur causatum; sed vel ex virtute causae efficientis, vel ex materia vel ex fine, sive sit finis intentionis, sive finis operationis. Non potest autem dici in Deo, quod effectus eius habeat debitum essendi ex materia. Nam cum ipse sit totius esse auctor, nihil quolibet modo esse habens praesupponitur eius actioni, ut sic ex dispositione materiae necesse sit dicere talem vel talem eius esse effectum. Similiter nec ex potentia effectiva. Nam cum eius activa potentia sit infinita, non terminatur ad unum nisi ad id quod esset aequale sibi, quod nulli effectui competere potest. Unde, si inferiorem sibi effectum producere sit necesse, potentia sua, quantum in se est, non terminatur ad hunc vel illum distantiae gradum, ut sic debitum sit ex ipsa virtute activa talem vel talem effectum produci. Similiter nec ex fine intentionis. Hic enim finis est divina bonitas, cui nihil accrescit ex effectuum productione. I answer that the impossibility of many things proceeding from one immediate and proper principle would seem to arise from the cause being determined to its effect, so that it would seem due and necessary that from such and such a cause such and such an effect should proceed. Now there are four causes two of which, the material and the effective cause to wit, precede the effect as to intrinsic being; while the end precedes it if not in being yet in intention; and the form precedes it in neither way considered as form, since the effect has its being by the form and consequently its being is simultaneous with that of the effect. But in so far as the form is the end it precedes the effect in the intention of the agent. And although the form is the end of the operation, being the end that terminates the operation of the agent, nevertheless every end is not a form. For there is in the intention an end that is not the end of the operation, as in the case of a house. The form of the house is the end terminating the operation of the builder: but his intention does not terminate there but in a further end, namely a dwelling-place, so that the end of the operation is the form of a house, that of the intention, a dwelling-place. Accordingly the necessity of such and such effects coming into being cannot arise from the form as such, since thus it is simultaneous with the effect, but it must arise either from the power of the effective cause, or from the matter, or from the end whether of the intention or of the operation. Now it cannot be said that the effect of God’s action is necessitated by matter: because seeing that he is the author. of all being, nothing in any way whatsoever having being is presupposed to his action, so that one be bound to say that owing to the disposition of matter his action must produce this or that effect. Likewise neither can it arise from the effective power: because seeing that his active power is infinite, it is not determined to one effect save to that which were equal to him, and this cannot be competent to any effect. Wherefore if it be necessary that he produce an effect beneath himself, his power considered in itself is not determined to any particular distant degree, so that it be necessary for such and such an effect to be produced by his active power. Likewise neither can it arise from the end of the intention. For this end is the divine goodness, which gains nothing from the production of the effects.
Nec iterum per effectus potest totaliter repraesentari vel eis totaliter communicari, ut sic possit dici, quod debitum sit talem vel talem Dei effectum esse, ut totaliter divinam bonitatem participet, sed possibile est effectum multis modis eam participare; unde nullius eorum necessitas est ex fine. Sic ex fine necessitas sumitur, quando intentio finis compleri non potest vel omnino, vel inconvenienter, nisi hoc vel illo existente. Relinquitur igitur quod debitum in operibus divinis esse non potest nisi ex forma, quae est finis operationis. Ipsa enim cum non sit infinita, habet determinata principia, sine quibus esse non potest; et determinatum modum essendi, ut si dicamus, quod supposito quod Deus intendat hominem facere, necessarium est et debitum quod animam rationalem ei conferat et corpus organicum, sine quibus homo esse non potest. Et similiter possumus dicere in universo. Quod enim Deus tale universum constituere voluerit, non est necessarium neque debitum, neque ex fine neque ex potentia efficientis, neque materiae, ut ostensum est. Sed supposito quod tale universum producere voluerit, necessarium fuit quod tales et tales creaturas produxerit, ex quibus talis forma universi consurgeret. Et cum ipsa universi perfectio et multitudinem et diversitatem rerum requirat, quia in una earum inveniri non potest propter recessum a complemento bonitatis primae; necesse fuit ex suppositione formae intentae quod Deus multas creaturas et diversas produceret; quasdam simplices, quasdam compositas; et quasdam corruptibiles, et quasdam incorruptibiles. Hoc autem quidam philosophi non considerantes, diversimode a veritate deviaverunt. Again it cannot be wholly represented by those effects nor be wholly communicated to them, so that one be able to say that it were necessary for an effect of God to be such and such in order wholly to’participate of God’s goodness, since it is possible for an effect to participate thereof in many ways, so that no effect is rendered necessary by the end. Necessity arises from the end when the intention of the end cannot be fulfilled, either not at all or not conveniently, without this or that thing. It remains therefore that necessity in God’s works cannot arise except from the form which is the end of operation. For seeing that the form is not infinite it has determined principles without which it cannot exist, and a determined mode of existence; thus we might say, for instance, supposing that God intends to make a man, that it is necessary and due that he give him a rational soul and an organic body, without which there is no such thing as a man. It is the same with the universe. That God wished to make the universe such as it is, was not made necessary or due, either by the end or by the power of the effective cause, or by the potentiality of matter, as we have proved. But given that he wished to make the universe such as it is, it was necessary that he should produce such and such creatures whence such and such a form of universe would arise. And seeing that the perfection of the universe requires both diversity and multitude in things, inasmuch as it cannot be found in one thing on account of the latter’s remoteness from the perfection of the first good, it was necessary on the supposition of that intended form that God should produce many and diverse creatures; some simple, some compound, some corruptible, some incorruptible.
Quidam namque non intelligentes Deum universi esse auctorem, posuerunt materiam non ab alio existentem, et ex eius necessitate rerum diversitatem produci, vel secundum raritatem vel secundum spissitudinem materiae res diversificantes, ut antiquissimi naturalium philosophorum, qui tantum causam materialem perceperunt; vel secundum actionem alicuius causae efficientis, quae secundum diversitatem materiae diversos effectus producebat, sicut Anaxagoras posuit intellectum divinum, qui diversas res producebat, eas a commixtione materiae segregando, et sicut Empedocles, qui per amicitiam et litem, secundum diversitatem materiae diversos effectus vario modo distinctos vel coniunctos ponebat. Quorum falsitas apparet ex duobus. Primo ex hoc quod non ponebant omne esse a primo et summo ente effluere, quod in alia quaestione est ostensum. Secundo, quia secundum eos sequebatur quod partium universi distinctio et earum ordo essent a casu; quia sic necesse erat propter materiae necessitatem. Alii pluralitatem rerum et modos diversos earum ex necessitate causae efficientis ponebant, sicut Avicenna, et eius sequaces. Posuit enim, quod primum ens, in quantum intelligit se ipsum, producit unum tantum causatum, quod est intelligentia prima, quam necesse erat a simplicitate primi entis deficere, utpote in quantum potentialitas incepit admisceri actui, in quantum esse recipiens ab alio non est suum esse, sed quodammodo potentia ad illud. Et sic in quantum intelligit primum ens, procedit ab ea alia intelligentia ea inferior, in quantum vero intelligit potentiam suam procedit ab ea corpus caeli, quod movet; in quantum vero intelligit actum suum, procedit ab ea anima caeli primi; et sic consequenter multiplicantur per multa media res diversae. Sed haec etiam positio stare non potest. Primo, quia ponit potentiam divinam terminari ad unum effectum, qui est intelligentia prima. Secundo, quia ponit alias substantias praeter Deum esse aliarum creatrices, quod esse impossibile in alia quaestione, art. 4, ostensum est. Sequitur etiam ad hanc positionem, sicut et ad primas, quod decor ordinis universi sit casualis, ex quo rerum diversitatem non adscribit intentioni finis, sed terminationi potentiarum activarum ad suos effectus. Through failing to note this some philosophers wandered from the truth. Because they did not understand that God is the author of the universe, some of them maintained that matter was self-existent and that matter itself necessitated diversity among the things evolved therefrom. Some of them would make things to differ according to the rarity or density of matter, like the early physicists who could not see further than the material cause.—Others traced this diversity to the action of some effective cause, whereby different effects were produced according to a difference of matter. Thus Anaxagoras held that a divine intelligence produced a diversity of things by freeing them from the commixture of matter. Thus also Empedocles explained by attraction and repulsion the various differences and affinities arising from diversity of matter. That these were in error is shown for two reasons. First, because they did not hold that all being flows from the first and supreme being, as we proved above (A. 5). Secondly, because according to them it would follow that the order and distinction of the parts of the universe arose from chance, since they were necessitated by the requirements of matter.—Others, like Avicenna and his school (Metaph. ix, 4), ascribed the plurality and diversity of things to a necessity arising from the effective cause. He said that the first being by understanding himself produced one effect only, namely the first intelligence which of necessity fell short of the simplicity of the first being, since potentiality began to be united to act, and that which receives being from another is not its own being, but a potentiality as it were in respect thereof. And so from this first intelligence, in as far as it understands the first being, another and lower intelligence proceeds, and inasmuch as it understands its own potentiality it produced the heavenly body which it moves, and inasmuch as it understands its act it produces the soul of the first heaven. Thus through a number of intermediate causes there arose in consequence diversity among things. This opinion also cannot stand. First, because it would have the divine power limited to one effect which is the first intelligence. Secondly, because it makes other substances besides God to be the creators of other creatures, and we have shown this to be impossible (A. 4). Moreover this opinion like those already mentioned would imply that the beauty arising from the order of the universe is the result of chance, since it ascribes the diversity of things not to the intention of an end, but to the determination of active causes in respect of their effects.
Alii vero circa debitum causae finalis erraverunt, sicut Plato, et eius sequaces. Posuit enim quod bonitati Dei ab eo intellectae et amatae debitum esset tale universum producere, ut sic optimus optimum produceret. Quod quidem potest esse verum, si solum quantum ad ea quae sunt respiciamus; non autem si respiciamus ad ea quae esse possunt. Hoc enim universum est optimum eorum quae sunt; et quod sit sic optimum, ex summa Dei bonitate habet. Non tamen bonitas Dei est ita obligata huic universo quin melius vel minus bonum aliud universum facere potuisset. Others, like Plato and his followers, erred regarding the necessity imposed by the final cause. For he said that the universe as to its actual conformation was the necessary outcome of the divine goodness as understood and loved by God, so that the sovereign good produced the very good. This indeed may be true if we look only at what is and not at what might be. This universe consisting of the things that actually exist is very good, and it is due to the sovereign goodness of God that it is very good. Nevertheless God’s goodness is not so tied to this universe that it could not have produced a better or one that is less good.
Quidam etiam debitum causae formalis non attendentes, sed solum debitum divinae bonitatis, erraverunt, sicut Manichaei; qui cum considerarent Deum esse optimum, crediderunt a Deo esse tantum illas creaturas quae inter alias sunt optimae, scilicet spirituales et incorruptibiles; corporalia vero et corruptibilia alteri attribuerunt principio. Ex simili etiam fonte prodiit Origenis error, licet huic contrarius. Consideravit enim Deum esse optimum et iustum; unde ab ipso primo fuisse conditas optimas creaturarum solas et aequales existimavit, scilicet rationales creaturas; quibus ex libero arbitrio diversimode operantibus in bonum vel in malum, consecutum esse dicebat ut diversi gradus rerum in universo constituerentur, dicens: illas rationales creaturas quae ad Deum conversae sunt, in angelicam dignitatem esse promotas, et secundum diversos ordines, prout magis et minus meruerunt; e contrario vero ceteras rationales quae per liberum arbitrium peccaverunt, in inferiora dicit esse prolapsas, et corporibus alligatas; quasdam quidem soli, lunae et stellis, quae minus peccaverunt; quasdam vero corporibus hominum; quasdam in Daemones esse conversas. Uterque enim error ordinem universi praeterire videtur in sua consideratione, considerando tantummodo singulas partes eius. Ex ipso enim ordine universi potuisset eius ratio apparere, quod ab uno principio, nulla meritorum differentia praecedente, oportuit diversos gradus creaturarum institui, ad hoc quod universum esset complementum (repraesentante universo per multiplices et varios modos creaturarum quod in divina bonitate simpliciter et indistincte praeexistit) sicut et ipsa perfectio domus et humani corporis diversitatem partium requirit. Neutrum autem eorum esset completum si omnes partes unius conditionis existerent; sicut si omnes partes humani corporis essent oculus, aliarum enim partium deessent officia. Et similiter si omnes partes domus essent tectum, domus complementum et finem suum non consequeretur, ut scilicet ab imbribus et caumatibus defendere posset. Sic igitur dicendum est, quod ab uno primo multitudo et diversitas creaturarum processit, non propter materiae necessitatem, nec propter potentiae limitationem, nec propter bonitatem, nec propter bonitatis obligationem; sed ex ordine sapientiae, ut in diversitate creaturarum perfectio consisteret universi. Others again erred through failing to note the necessity resulting from the formal cause, but only that which is due to the divine goodness. Thus the Manicheans considering that God is supremely good, thought that only those creatures proceed from God that are the best of creatures, those, namely, which are spiritual and incorruptible: and they ascribed corporeal and corruptible beings to another principle. The error of Origen although contrary to this comes from the same source (Peril Archon i, 7, 8). He considered God as supremely good and just, and for this reason he believed that at first he created only the best, i.e. rational creatures all equal to one another: and that these by their free-will acted in various ways well or ill, and he maintained that from this resulted the various degrees of things in the universe. He held that those rational creatures which turned to God were promoted to the ranks of the angels, and to the various orders according to the degree of their merits: while on the other hand the remaining rational creatures who by their free-will sinned, were in his opinion cast into the ranks of the lower world and bound to bodies: some which sinned less grievously were bound to the sun, moon and stars, some to human bodies, some transformed into demons. Both of these errors apparently disregard the order of the universe and confine their observation to its individual parts. For the very order of the universe is sufficient proof that from: one principle, without any previous difference of merits, originated various degrees among creatures for the perfection of the universe, which by its multiplicity and variety of creatures reproduces that which in the divine goodness pre-existed without composition or distinction. Even so the perfection of a house or of the human body requires diversity of parts, since neither would be complete if all its parts were of the same condition, for instance, if every part of the human body were an eye, since the functions of the other parts would be wanting: or if every part of the house were the roof, the house would be imperfect and fail of its purpose which is to shelter from rain and disaster. Accordingly we must conclude that the multitude and diversity of creatures proceeded from one principle, not on account of a necessity imposed by matter, not on account of a limitation in power, not on account of goodness or a necessity imposed by goodness, but from the order of wisdom, in order that the perfection of the universe might be realized in the diversity of creatures.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sicut Deus est unus, ita et unum produxit, non solum quia unumquodque in se est unum, sed etiam quia omnia quodammodo sunt unum perfectum, quae quidem unitas diversitatem partium requirit, ut ostensum est. Reply to the First Objection. Inasmuch as God is one, that which he produced is one, not only because each thing is one in itself, but because all things taken together are in a sense one perfect thing, and this kind of unity requires diversity of parts, as we have already shown.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod creatura assimilatur Deo in unitate, in quantum unaquaeque in se una est, et in quantum omnes unum sunt unitate ordinis, ut dictum est. Reply to the Second Objection. The creature is like God in unity, inasmuch as each creature is one in itself, and all together are one by unity of order, as stated above.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod malitia totaliter in non esse consistit; multitudo autem causatur ex ente. Ipsa enim differentia, per quam entia dividuntur ad invicem, quoddam ens est. Unde Deus non est auctor tendendi ad non esse, sed est omnis esse auctor; non est principium malitiae sed est principium multitudinis. Sciendum autem, quod duplex est unum; quoddam scilicet quod convertitur cum ente, quod nihil addit supra ens nisi indivisionem; et hoc unum privat multitudinem, in quantum multitudo ex divisione causatur; non quidem multitudinem extrinsecam quam unum constituit sicut pars; sed multitudinem intrinsecam quae unitati opponitur. Non enim ex hoc quod aliquid dicitur esse unum, negatur quin aliquid sit extra ipsum quod cum eo constituat multitudinem; sed negatur divisio ipsius in multa. Aliud vero unum est quod est principium numeri, quod supra rationem entis addit mensurationem; et huius unius multitudo est privatio, quia numerus fit per divisionem continui. Nec tamen multitudo privat unitatem totaliter, cum diviso toto adhuc remaneat pars indivisa; sed removet unitatem totius. Sed malitia, quantum est in se, removet bonitatem, nullo modo eam constituens, nec ab ea constituta. Reply to the Third Objection. Wickedness consists entirely in privation of being, whereas multitude results from being. Even the difference between one being and another is a being. Wherefore since God is not the cause of a thing tending to non-being, but is the author of all being, he is not the principle of evil, but he is the cause of multitude. It must be observed, however, that unity is twofold. There is a unity that is convertible with being: it adds nothing to being save that it excludes division, and it excludes multitude—in so far as multitude results from division—not extrinsic multitude that is composed of unities as parts, but intrinsic multitude that is opposed to unity: since when we say that a thing is one we do not deny the existence of others extrinsic thereto with which it constitutes a multitude, but we deny its division into many. The other kind of unity is the principle of number, and to the idea of being it adds that of measure: it is this kind of unity that multitude excludes, since number results from the division of continuity. Yet multitude does not entirely exclude unity, since when a whole is divided the parts still remain undivided: but it does exclude unity of the Whole: whereas evil considered in itself excludes the good, since in no way does it constitute a good nor is it constituted thereby.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod ens alio modo se habet ad ea quae sub ente continentur, et alio modo animal vel quodlibet aliud genus ad species suas. Species enim addit supra genus, ut homo supra animal, differentiam aliquam quae est extra essentiam generis. Animal enim nominat tantum naturam sensibilem, in qua rationale non continetur; sed ea quae continentur sub ente, non addunt aliquid supra ens quod sit extra essentiam eius; unde non oportet quod illud quod est causa animalis in quantum est animal, sit causa rationalis in quantum huiusmodi. Oportet autem illud quod est causa entis in quantum est ens, esse causam omnium differentiarum entis, et per consequens totius multitudinis entium. Reply to the Fourth Objection. The relation of being to the things comprised under the head of being is not the same as that of animal or any other genus to its species. The species adds to the genus: as man adds to animal a difference that is not included in the essence of the genus: thus animal denotes merely the sensitive nature which does not contain rationality; whereas the things comprised under being add nothing extraneous to the notion of being. Wherefore it does not follow that the cause of an animal as such, is the cause of the rational nature as such. But it follows that the cause of being as such must be the cause of all the various kinds of being, and consequently of the entire multitude of beings.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod appropriatio causae ad effectum attenditur secundum assimilationem effectus ad causam. Assimilatio autem creaturae ad Deum attenditur secundum hoc quod creatura implet id quod de ipsa est in intellectu et voluntate Dei; sicut artificiata similantur artifici in quantum in eis exprimitur forma artis, et ostenditur voluntas artificis de eorum constitutione. Nam sicut res naturalis agit per formam suam, ita artifex per suum intellectum et voluntatem. Sic igitur Deus propria causa est uniuscuiusque creaturae, in quantum intelligit et vult unamquamque creaturam esse. Quod autem dicitur idem non posse esse plurium proprium, intelligendum est quando fit propriatio per adaequationem; quod in proposito non contingit. Reply to the Fifth Objection. Appropriateness of cause to effect regards the likeness of the effect to its cause. Now the likeness of the creature to God consists in its being a faithful reproduction of what previously existed in God’s intellect and will: even as the products of the craftsman’s art are like him in so far as they express his artistic ideas and witness to his intention of producing them. For just as the natural agent acts by its form, so does the craftsman act by his intellect and will. Accordingly God is the proper cause of each creature, inasmuch as he understands each creature and wills it to be. The statement that the same thing cannot be proper to many is true of appropriateness of equality and does not apply to the case in point.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod solutio patet ex dictis. The Reply to the Sixth Objection is clear from what has been said.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod licet sit quaedam similitudo creaturae ad Deum, non tamen adaequatio; unde non oportet, si unitas Dei caret omni multitudine et compositione, quod propter hoc oporteat talem esse creaturae unitatem. Reply to the Seventh Objection. Although there is a certain likeness between the creature and God, it is not one of equality. Hence it does not follow that because unity in God is altogether free of multitude and composition therefore the same unity is to be found in the creature.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod licet effectus non possit excedere causam suam, tamen causa potest excedere effectum; et ideo licet ab una causa possint procedere plures effectus, tamen non potest unus effectus a pluribus causis immediate procedere. Reply to the Eighth Objection. Although an effect cannot surpass its cause, a cause can surpass its effect: and consequently several effects can proceed from one cause although one effect cannot proceed immediately from several causes.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod licet eadem sit potentia in Deo generandi et creandi secundum rem, non tamen idem respectus in utraque connotatur: sed potentia generandi connotat respectum ad id quod procedit per naturam; et ideo oportet tantum unum esse; sed potentia creandi importat respectum ad id quod procedit per voluntatem; unde non oportet quod sit unum. Reply to the Ninth Objection. Although in God the generative and the creative power is really the same, they do not connote the same respect: the generative power connotes relationship to that which proceeds by nature, and which therefore can be but one: whereas the creative power implies relationship to something that proceeds by the will, and which consequently need not be one.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod non oportet, sicut dictum est, huiusmodi unitatem esse in creatura et in Deo; licet creatura Deum in unitate imitetur. Reply to the Tenth Objection. As we have already indicated, although the creature imitates the unity of God, it does not follow that its unity is of the same kind as God’s.
Ad decimumprimum dicendum, quod quamvis actio Dei sit una et simplex, quia est eius essentia; non tamen oportet quod sit unus tantum effectus, sed multi; quia ex actione divina procedit effectus secundum ordinem sapientiae et arbitrium voluntatis. Reply to the Eleventh Objection. Although God’s action is one and simple, for it is his essence: we must not infer that it has only one effect, but that it has many: because from God’s action effects proceed according to the order of his wisdom and the decree o f his will.
Ad decimumsecundum dicendum, quod quando exemplatum perfecte repraesentat exemplar, ab uno exemplari non est nisi unum exemplatum, nisi per accidens, in quantum exemplata materialiter distinguuntur. Creaturae vero non perfecte imitantur suum exemplar. Unde diversimode possunt ipsum imitari, et sic esse diversa exemplata. Perfectus autem modus imitandi est unus tantum: et propter hoc filius, qui perfecte imitatur patrem, non potest esse nisi unus. Reply to the Twelfth Objection. When the exemplate is a perfect copy of the exemplar, there can be but one copy of one exemplar, except accidentally through the copies differing in matter. Creatures, however, are not perfect representations of their exemplar: wherefore they can imitate it in various ways so that there can be many exemplates. There is but one perfect mode of imitation, for which reason there can be but one Son who is the perfect image of the Father.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod licet forma intellectus divini sit una tantum secundum rem, est tamen multiplex ratione secundum diversos respectus ad creaturam, prout scilicet intelliguntur creaturae diversimode formam divini intellectus imitari. Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. Although the form in the divine intellect is but one really, it is many logically by reason of its manifold respect to creatures, inasmuch as creatures are perceived to represent that form in many ways.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod isti diversi respectus ad creaturam non solum sunt in intellectu nostro, sed etiam in intellectu divino. Nec tamen diversa aliqua sunt in intellectu divino, in quibus Deus intelligat; quia intelligit tantum uno, quod est sua essentia; sed sunt ibi multa, ut ab ipso intellecta. Sicut enim nos intelligimus quod creatura potest Deum multipliciter imitari, ita et Deus hoc intelligit; et per consequens intelligit diversos respectus creaturae ad Deum. Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. These various respects to creatures are not only in our intellect but also in God’s. And yet there are not in the divine intellect different ideas by which God understands; for he understands by one only which is his essence, but they are many as understood by him. Even as we understand that the creature can imitate God in many ways, so also does God understand this: and consequently he understands the various respects of creatures to him.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod sicut Deus uno intelligit omnia, ita etiam et per unam apprehensionem. Nam actum intellectus oportet esse unum vel multos, secundum unitatem vel multitudinem principii quo intelligitur. Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. Even as God understands all things by one, so does he understand them all by one act of apprehension: because the act of the intelligence must needs be one or many according to the unity or plurality of the principle of understanding.
Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod licet multitudo praeter multa, non sit nisi in ratione, multitudo tamen in multis est etiam in rerum natura: sicut etiam animal commune non est nisi in ratione, natura tamen animalis est in singularibus: et propter hoc multitudinem et animalis naturam oportet reducere in Deum, sicut in causam. Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. Although multitude apart from many things is only in the mind, multitude in many things is an objective reality: even so animal in general is only in the mind, but the animal nature is in individuals. A Consequently both multitude and animal nature must be traced to God as their cause.
Ad decimumseptimum dicendum, quod universum quod est a Deo productum, est optimum respectu eorum quae sunt, non tamen respectu eorum quae Deus facere potest. Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. The universe as created by God is the best possible in respect of the things that actually exist; but not in respect of the things that God is able to create.
Ad decimumoctavum dicendum, quod ratio illa tenet quando id quod est ad finem potest totaliter et perfecte consequi finem per modum adaequationis; quod in proposito non contingit. Reply to the Eighteenth Objection. This argument would hold if that which is done in order to obtain an end can gain the end wholly and perfectly by way of equality: and this is not the case in the question at issue.
Ad decimumnonum dicendum, quod illa ratio est Origenis, nec habet magnam efficaciam. Non enim est contra iustitiam quod inaequalia aequalibus dentur nisi quando alicui redditur debitum; quod in prima rerum creatione non potest dici. Quod enim ex propria liberalitate datur, potest dari plus vel minus secundum arbitrium dantis, et secundum quod eius sapientia requirit. Reply to the Nineteenth Objection. This argument which is used by Origen (Peri Archon, 7, 8) is not very convincing. There is no injustice in dealing unequally with equal persons except when one is giving them their due: and this cannot be said of the first creation of things. That which is given out of pure liberality may be given more or less liberally as the giver wills and as his wisdom dictates.
Ad vicesimum dicendum, quod licet creaturae aliae sint Angelo inferiores, tamen earum productio requirit infinitam virtutem producentis, in quantum per creationem producuntur in esse, utpote non ex praeiacenti materia factae. Et ideo omnes creaturae, quae non sunt factae ex praeiacenti materia, oportet dicere immediate a Deo esse creatas. Reply to the Twentieth Objection. Although other creatures are beneath the angels, their production requires infinite power in their maker, inasmuch as they are brought into being by creation, since they are not made from preexistent matter. Consequently we must hold that all creatures as not being made from pre-existent matter are created by God immediately.
Ad vicesimumprimum dicendum, quod cum creatio terminetur ad esse tamquam ad proprium effectum, impossibile est dicere, ea quae a Deo creantur, ab Angelis formas habere, cum omne esse sit a forma. Reply to the Twenty-first Objection. Since being is the term and proper effect of creation, it is impossible that the things created by God receive their forms from the angels, because all being derives from a form.
Ad vicesimumsecundum dicendum, quod licet quidquid Deus facit, in se sit unum, tamen haec unitas, ut dictum est, non removet omnem multitudinem, sed manet illa cuius unum est pars. Reply to the Twenty-second Objection. Whatsoever God makes is indeed one in itself, yet this unity, as stated above, does not exclude all manner of multitude, since that multitude whereof unity is a part remains.
Ad vicesimumtertium dicendum, quod verbum philosophi, cum dicit quod Deus nihil intelligit extra se, non est intelligendum quasi Deus ea quae sunt extra ipsum non intelligat; sed quia illa etiam quae extra ipsum sunt, non extra se, sed in se intuetur, quia per essentiam suam omnia alia cognoscit. Reply to the Twenty-third Objection. When the Philosopher says that God understands nothing outside himself he does not mean that God does not understand things that are outside him, but that even those things that are outside God are seen by him not outside but in him, because he knows all things in his essence.
Ad vicesimumquartum dicendum, quod creatura dicitur esse in Deo dupliciter. Uno modo sicut in causa gubernante et conservante esse creaturae; et sic praesupponitur esse creaturae distinctum a creatore ad hoc quod creatura a Deo esse dicatur. Non enim intelligitur creatura conservari in esse nisi secundum quod iam habet esse in propria natura, secundum quod esse creaturae a Deo distinguitur. Unde creatura hoc modo in Deo existens non est creatrix essentia. Alio modo dicitur creatura esse in Deo sicut in virtute causae agentis, vel sicut in cognoscente; et sic creatura in Deo est ipsa essentia divina, sicut dicitur Ioannis I, 3: quod factum est in ipso vita erat. Quamvis autem hoc modo creatura in Deo existens sit divina essentia, non tamen per istum modum est ibi una tantum creatura, sed multae. Nam essentia Dei est sufficiens medium ad cognoscendum diversas creaturas, et sufficiens virtus ad eas producendas. Reply to the Twenty-fourth Objection. The creature is said to be in God in two ways. First as in its governing cause and preserver of its being: and in this sense the creature is understood as already existing apart from the Creator, so that we may say that the creature derives its being from the Creator. For the creature is not understood to be preserved in being except as already having being in its proper nature, in respect of which being the creature is distinguished from God. Wherefore in this sense the creature as existing in God is not the creative essence. Secondly the creature is said to be in God inasmuch as it exists virtually in its effective cause or as the thing known in the knower. In this sense the creature, as existing in God, is the very essence of God according to Jo. i, 3: That which was made, in him was life. Nevertheless although the creature as existing in God thus, is the divine essence, there is not, in this sense, only one creature in God but many: because the divine essence is an adequate medium for knowing different creatures, and a sufficient power to produce them.
Q. III:
ARTICLE XVII
Has the World Always Existed?

[ Sum. Th. I, Q. xiix, A. i: C.G. II, xxxiv, xxxvii]
Decimoseptimo quaeritur utrum mundus semper fuerit. Et videtur quod sic. THE seventeenth point of inquiry is whether the world has always existed: and it would seem that it has.
Quia proprium semper consequitur id cuius est proprium. Sed, sicut dicit Dionysius, proprium est divinae bonitatis ad communicationem sui ea quae sunt vocare; quod quidem fit creaturas producendo. Cum ergo divina bonitas semper fuerit, videtur quod semper creaturas in esse produxerit; et ita videtur quod semper fuerit mundus. 1. A thing never fails in that which is proper to it. Now according to Dionysius (De Coel. Hier. iv) it is proper to the divine goodness to communicate itself to the things that exist; and this was done by the creation. Since then the divine goodness always was it would seem that it has always brought creatures into being, and that consequently the world has always existed.
Praeterea, Deus non denegavit alicui creaturae id cuius est capax secundum suam naturam. Sed aliquae creaturae sunt quarum natura est capax ut semper fuerit; sicut caelum. Ergo videtur quod hoc fuerit caelo collatum ut semper esset. Sed caelo existente oportet ponere alias creaturas esse, sicut probat philosophus, in II de caelo et mundo. Ergo videtur quod mundus fuerit semper. Probatio mediae. Omne quod est incorruptibile, habet virtutem ut sit semper: quia si haberet virtutem ut esset aliquo tempore determinato tantum, non posset esse semper: et ita non esset incorruptibile. Caelum autem est incorruptibile. Ergo habet naturam quod sit semper. 2. God does not refuse a creature that which it is capable of having according to its nature. Now there are creatures the nature of which is capable of having been always, for instance, the heavens. Therefore seemingly it was granted to the heavens to have been always. But given that the heavens existed we must allow that other creatures existed as the Philosopher proves (De Coelo ii, 3). Therefore it would appear that the world has always existed. The minor premise is proved as follows. That which is incorruptible is capable of having always been, since were it capable of being only for a certain fixed time, it would not exist for ever, and therefore would not be incorruptible. Now the heavens are incorruptible: and consequently are capable of being always.
Sed dicendum, quod caelum non est simpliciter incorruptibile; decideret enim in nihilum, nisi per virtutem Dei contineretur in esse.- Sed contra, non est reputandum aliquid esse possibile vel contingens, propter hoc quod eius destructio sequitur ex destructione consequentis; licet enim hominem esse animal sit necessarium, tamen destructio eius sequitur ad destructionem huius consequentis hominem esse substantiam. Non ergo videtur quod propter hoc possit dici caelum esse corruptibile, quia eius non esse sequitur ad aliquam positionem qua ponitur Deus suam continentiam subtrahere creaturis. 3. It will be replied that the heavens are not absolutely incorruptible, since they would fall away into nothingness if God did not preserve them in being.—On the contrary we must not conclude that a statement is possibly or contingently true from the fact that it would be false if the consequence were false: thus it is necessarily true that man is an animal, and yet it would be false if the consequence were false, namely that man is a substance. Consequently we must not conclude that the heavens are corruptible from the fact that they would cease to exist on the supposition that God withdrew his sustaining power from creatures.
Praeterea, sicut Avicenna probat in sua Metaphysic., quilibet effectus, in comparatione ad suam causam est necessarius; quia si posita causa non necessario sequitur effectus, adhuc posita causa possibile erit effectum esse vel non esse; quod autem est in potentia, non reducitur in actum nisi per id quod est actu; unde oportebit quod praeter causam praedictam sit aliqua alia causa quae faciat effectum prodire in actum ex potentia qua possibile erat ipsum esse vel non esse posita causa. Ex quo potest accipi, quod posita causa sufficienti necesse est ipsum poni. Sed Deus est causa sufficiens mundi. Cum ergo Deus fuerit semper, et mundus fuit semper. 4. As Avicenna proves (Metaph. ix, 4) every effect in comparison with its cause is necessary, since if given the cause the effect does not follow of necessity, even when the cause is present it will be possible for the effect to follow or not. Now that which is possible does not become actual except through something actual: so that besides the aforesaid cause we shall need another cause to make the effect emerge from the potentiality whereby it was possible for it to be or not, to be on the presupposition of its cause. Whence it follows that given a sufficient cause the effect follows of necessity. Now God is the sufficient cause of the world. Therefore as God always was, so also was the world.
Praeterea, omne quod est ante tempus, est aeternum; aevum enim non est ante tempus, sed incepit simul cum tempore. Sed mundus fuit ante tempus, fuit enim creatus in primo instanti temporis, quod constat esse ante tempus; dicitur enim Genes. I, 1: in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram, id est in principio temporis. Ergo mundus fuit ab aeterno. 5. Whatsoever preceded time has always been: for eviternity did not precede time but began with time. Now the world was before time, since it was created in the first instant of time, which clearly was before time: for it is written (Gen. i, i): In the beginning God created heaven and earth, where a gloss notes, “that is in the beginning of time.” Therefore the world existed from eternity.
Praeterea, idem manens idem, semper facit idem, nisi impediatur. Sed Deus semper idem manet, sicut in Ps. ci, 28, legitur: tu autem idem ipse es. Cum igitur in sua actione impediri non possit propter infinitatem suae potentiae, videtur quod semper idem faciat. Et ita, cum aliquando mundum produxerit, videtur quod etiam semper ab aeterno produxerit. 6. That which remains unchanged always produces the same effect, unless it be hindered. Now God is always the same according to Psalm ci, 28 : Thou art always the selfsame. Since then God cannot be hindered in his action on account of the infinity of his power, it would seem that he always produces the same effect: so that as he produced the world at some time, it would seem that he always produced it from eternity.
Praeterea, sicut homo necessario vult suam beatitudinem, ita Deus necessario vult suam bonitatem et quod ad eam pertinet. Sed ad bonitatem divinam pertinet productio creaturarum in esse. Ergo hoc Deus necessitate vult; et ita videtur quod ab aeterno producere creaturas voluerit, sicut voluit ab aeterno bonitatem suam esse. 7. As man necessarily wills his own happiness so God necessarily wills his own goodness and whatsoever pertains to it. Now it belongs to God’s goodness to bring creatures into being. Therefore God wills this of necessity, and seemingly willed to do so from eternity, even as from eternity he willed his own goodness.
Sed dicendum, quod ad bonitatem Dei pertinet quod creaturae producantur in esse, non autem quod producantur in esse ab aeterno.- Sed contra, maioris liberalitatis est aliquid citius dare quam tardius. Sed liberalitas divinae bonitatis est infinita. Ergo videtur quod ab aeterno esse creaturis dederit. 8. It may be said that it belongs to God’s goodness to bring creatures into being, but not to do so from eternity.—On the contrary it is more bountiful to give quickly than tardily: and the bounty of God’s goodness is infinite. Therefore seemingly he gave being to creatures from eternity.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit: illud dico te velle quod facis si potes. Sed Deus ab aeterno voluit mundum producere; alias fuisset mutatus, si accessisset ei nova voluntas mundi creandi. Cum ergo nulla impotentia ei conveniat, videtur quod ab aeterno mundum produxerit. 9. Augustine says (Confess. vii, 4): “In thee to be able is to will, and to will is to do.” Now God from eternity willed to create the, world: otherwise he would have changed, if the will to create came to him anew. Since then there is no inability in God, it would seem that he created the world from eternity.
Praeterea, si mundus non semper fuit; antequam mundus esset, aut erat possibile ipsum esse, aut non. Si non erat possibile, ergo impossibile erat ipsum esse, et necesse non esse; et sic nunquam fuisset in esse productus. Si autem possibile erat eum esse, ergo erat aliqua potentia respectu ipsius; et ita erat aliquod subiectum sive materia, cum potentia non nisi in subiecto esse possit. Sed si fuit materia fuit et forma; cum materia non possit omnino esse a forma denudata. Ergo fuit aliquod corpus compositum ex materia et forma, et ex consequenti fuit totum universum. 10. If the world was not always, before it existed it was either possible for it to exist or it was impossible. If it was not possible, it was impossible and consequently it was necessary for it not to be: and thus it would never have been brought into being. And if it was possible for it to be, there was some potentiality in respect thereof, and consequently a subject or matter, since potentiality demands a subject. But if there was matter there was also form, since matter cannot be entirely devoid of form. Therefore there was a body composed of matter and form, and consequently the entire universe.
Praeterea, omne quod fit actu postquam fuit possibile fieri, educitur de potentia in actum. Si ergo mundum fuit possibile fieri, antequam esset, oportet dicere mundum eductum esse de potentia in actum; et ita materiam praecessisse, et fuisse aeternam: ex quo sequitur idem quod prius. 11. Whatsoever becomes actual after being potential, is brought from potentiality to actuality. Hence if before the world actually existed it was possible for it to exist, we must infer that the world was brought from potentiality to actuality, and consequently that matter preceded and was eternal; so that we come to the same conclusion as before..
Praeterea, omne agens quod de novo incipit agere, movetur de potentia in actum. Sed hoc Deo non potest competere, cum ipse sit omnino immobilis. Ergo videtur quod ipse non incepit de novo agere, sed quod ab aeterno mundum produxerit. 12. An agent that begins to act anew is moved from potentiality to actuality; and this cannot be said of God who is utterly immovable. Therefore it would seem that he does not begin anew to act, but that he created the world from eternity.
Praeterea, agens per voluntatem, si incipit facere quod prius volebat, cum antea non fecisset, oportet ponere aliquid esse nunc inducens ipsum ad agendum, quod prius non inducebat; quod est quodammodo expergefaciens ipsum. Sed non potest dici quod aliquid aliud fuerit praeter Deum ante mundum, quod de novo eum induxerit ad agendum. Cum ergo ab aeterno voluerit mundum facere (alias voluntati eius aliquid accrevisset), videtur quod ab aeterno fecerit. 13. If a voluntary agent begins to do what he already willed but has not done yet, we must suppose that something has occurred to induce him to do it now, which did not induce him before, but stirs him to action as it were. But it cannot be said that before the world existed there was something besides God to offer him a fresh inducement to act. Since then he purposed from eternity to create the world (otherwise something new would have occurred to his will) it would seem that he made the world from eternity.
Praeterea, nihil movet voluntatem divinam ad agendum nisi bonitas eius. Sed bonitas divina semper eodem modo se habet. Ergo et voluntas Dei semper se habet ad productionem creaturarum; et ita ab aeterno creaturas produxit. 14. Further, nothing besides God’s goodness moves the divine will to act. Now the divine goodness is always the same. Therefore God’s will also is always bent on the production of creatures, and thus he produced them from eternity.
Praeterea, illud quod est semper in principio et in fine sui nunquam incipit nec desinit: quia unaquaeque res est post sui principium et ante sui finem. Sed tempus semper est in sui principio et in sui fine; nihil enim est temporis nisi instans, quod est finis praeteriti et principium futuri. Ergo tempus nunquam incipit nec desinit, sed semper est; et per consequens motus semper, et mobile semper, et totus mundus; tempus enim non est sine motu, nec motus sine mobili, nec mobile sine mundo. 15. That which is always in its beginning and always in its end, never begins and never ceases, because a thing is after it has begun and before it has ceased. Now time is always in its beginning and end, because time is nothing but an instant which is the end of the past and the beginning of the future.—Hence time never begins nor ends but is always: and consequently movement also and things that are subject to movement, in fact, the whole world: since there is no time without movement, nor movement without movables, nor movable things apart from the world.
Sed dicendum, quod primum instans temporis non est finis praeteriti, nec ultimum principium futuri.- Sed contra, nunc temporis semper consideratur ut fluens, et in hoc differt a nunc aeternitatis. Sed quod fluit, ab alio in aliud fluit. Ergo oportet omne nunc a priori nunc in posterius fluere. Ergo impossibile est esse aliquod primum vel ultimum nunc. 16. It will be said perhaps that the first instant of time is not the end of the past nor the last beginning of the future.—On the contrary the now of time is always considered as flowing, wherein it differs from the now of eternity: and that which flows passes from one thing to another. Consequently every now passes from a previous to a following now, and there cannot be a first or last now.
Praeterea, motus sequitur mobile, et tempus sequitur motum. Sed primum mobile, cum sit circulare, non habet principium neque finem: quia in circulo non est accipere principium et finem in actu. Ergo neque motus neque tempus habent principium; et sic idem quod prius. 17. Movement follows that which can be moved, and time follows movement. Now the first movable being circular has neither beginning nor end, for it is not possible to indicate the actual beginning or end of a circle. Therefore neither time nor movement has a beginning, and the same conclusion follows as above.
Sed dicendum, quod licet ipsum corpus circulare non habeat principium magnitudinis, habet tamen principium durationis.- Sed contra, duratio motus sequitur mensuram magnitudinis: quia, secundum philosophum, quanta est magnitudo, tantum est et motus, et tantum tempus. Si ergo in magnitudine corporis circularis non est aliquod principium, nec in magnitudine motus et temporis erit principium, et per consequens nec in eorum duratione, cum eorum duratio, et praecipue temporis, sit eorum magnitudo. 18. It will be said that although a circular body has no beginning of its magnitude, it has a beginning of its duration.—On the contrary duration of movement follows the measure of magnitude, because, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv, ii), magnitude, motion and time are mutually proportionate. Hence if there be no beginning of the magnitude of a circular body neither will there be a beginning of the magnitude of movement or of time, and consequently there will be no beginning of their duration, since their duration, especially that of time, is their magnitude.
Praeterea, Deus est causa rerum per scientiam suam. Scientia autem relative dicitur ad scibile. Cum igitur relativa sint simul natura, et scientia Dei sit aeterna, videtur quod res sint ab ipso ab aeterno productae. 19. God is the cause of things by his knowledge: and knowledge connotes relation to the thing knowable. Since then relatives are by nature simultaneous, and God’s knowledge is eternal, it would seem that things were produced by him from eternity.
Praeterea, aut Deus praecedit mundum natura tantum, aut duratione. Si natura tantum, sicut causa effectum sibi coaevum, videtur quod cum Deus fuerit ab aeterno, et creaturae fuerint ab aeterno. Si autem praecedit mundum duratione, si ergo est accipere aliquam durationem priorem duratione mundi, quae se habet ad durationem mundi ut prius ad posterius. Sed duratio quae habet prius et posterius est tempus. Ergo ante mundum fuit tempus, et per consequens motus et mobile; et sic idem quod prius. 20. God precedes the world either in the order of nature only, or by duration. If only in the order of nature, as a cause precedes its synchronous effect, it would seem that creatures must have existed, like God, from eternity. And if he precede the world in duration, there must have been a duration prior to that of the world, so as to constitute a before and after in duration; and this implies time. Therefore the world was preceded by time and consequently by movement and movable things: and we come to the same conclusion as before.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit: Deum ab aeterno dominum non fuisse dicere nolo. Sed quandocumque fuit dominus, habuit creaturam sibi subiectam. Ergo non est dicendum, quod creatura non fuerit ab aeterno. 21. Augustine (De Trin. v, 16) says: “I dare not assert that God was not Lord from eternity.” Now so long as he was Lord he had creatures for his subjects. Therefore we must not assert that creatures are not from eternity.
Praeterea, Deus potuit mundum producere antequam produxerit; alias impotens fuisset. Scivit etiam ante producere; alias ignorans esset. Videtur etiam quod voluit, alias invidus fuisset. Ergo videtur quod non inceperit de novo producere creaturas. 22. God was able to create the world before he created it, else he were impotent. Likewise he knew that he could, else he were ignorant. And apparently he willed, else he were envious. Therefore it would seem that he did not wait to begin creating creatures.
Praeterea, omne quod est finitum, est communicabile creaturae. Sed aeternitas est quoddam finitum; alias nihil posset esse ultra aeternitatem: dicitur enim Exod. XV, 18: dominus regnabit in aeternum et ultra. Ergo videtur quod creatura fuerit aeternitatis capax; et sic conveniens fuit divinae bonitati quod creaturam ab aeterno produxerit. 23. Whatsoever is finite ‘can be communicated to a creature. Now eternity is something finite: else nothing could extend beyond it, and yet it is written (Exod. xv, 18): The Lord shall reign for eternity and beyond. Therefore one would infer that a creature is capable of being eternal, and that it was becoming to the divine goodness to produce creatures from eternity.
Praeterea, omne quod incipit, habet mensuram suae durationis. Sed tempus non potest habere aliquam mensuram suae durationis: non enim mensuratur aeternitate, quia sic semper fuisset: nec aevo, quia sic in perpetuum duraret; nec tempore, quia nihil est mensura sui ipsius. Ergo tempus non incipit esse, et ita nec mobile nec mundus. 24. Whatsoever has a beginning has a measure of its duration. Now time cannot have a measure of its duration: for it cannot be measured by eternity, since then it would have been always: nor by eviternity, since then it would last for ever: nor by time, since nothing is its own measure. Therefore time had no beginning, and consequently neither had movable things, nor the world.
Praeterea, si tempus incepit esse, aut incepit esse in tempore, aut in instanti. Sed non incepit esse in instanti, quia in instanti tempus nondum est; nec iterum in tempore, quia sic nihil temporis ante temporis terminum esset; nihil enim rei est antequam res esse incipiat. Ergo tempus non incepit esse: et sic idem quod prius. 25. If time had a beginning, this was either in time or in an instant. It did not begin in an instant, for in an instant there is not yet time: nor did it begin in time, for in that case no time would precede the term of time, since before a thing begins to exist it is nothing. Consequently time had no beginning and the same conclusion follows as before.
Praeterea, Deus ab aeterno fuit causa rerum: alias oporteret dicere, quod prius fuit causa in potentia, et postea in actu; et sic esset aliquid prius quod reduceret ipsum de potentia in actum, quod est impossibile. Nihil autem est causa, nisi causatum habeat. Ergo mundus fuit a Deo ab aeterno creatus. 26. God from eternity was the cause of things: otherwise we should have to say that he was at first their potential and afterwards their actual cause; so that there would be something already in existence to reduce him from potentiality to act: and this is impossible. Now nothing is a cause unless it has an effect. Therefore the world was created by God from eternity.
Praeterea, verum et ens convertuntur. Sed multa sunt vera ab aeterno; sicut hominem non esse asinum, et mundum futurum esse, et multa similia. Ergo videtur quod multa sunt entia ab aeterno; et non solum Deus. 27. Truth and being are convertible: and many truths are eternal, such as that man is not an ass, and that the world was to be, and many similar truths. Therefore it would seem that many beings are from eternity, and not God alone.
Sed dicendum, quod omnia ista sunt vera veritate prima, quae Deus est.- Sed contra, alia veritas est huius propositionis, mundum futurum esse, et huius, hominem non esse asinum: quia posito per impossibile quod una sit falsa, adhuc reliqua erit vera. Sed veritas prima non est alia et alia. Ergo non sunt vera veritate prima. 28. But it may be said that all these are true by the first truth which is God.—On the contrary, the truth of this proposition, The world will exist, differs from the truth of this proposition, Man is not an ass, because granted, though it is impossible, that the one is false, the other remains true. But the first truth cannot alter. Therefore these propositions are not true by the first truth.
Praeterea, secundum philosophum in praedicamentis, ex eo quod res est vel non est, oratio vera vel falsa est. Si igitur multae propositiones verae sint ab aeterno, videtur quod res per eas signatae ab aeterno extiterint. 29. According to the Philosopher (Categor. 5.) a statement is true or false according as the thing is so or not. if, then, many propositions are true from eternity, it would seem that the things signified by them have existed from eternity.
Praeterea Deo idem est dicere quod facere; unde in Ps. 148, 5: dixit, et facta sunt. Sed dicere Dei est aeternum: alias filius qui est verbum patris non esset patri coaeternus. Ergo et facere Dei est aeternum, et ita mundus est factus ab aeterno. 30. With God to speak and to make are the same according to Psalm xxxii, 9, He spoke and they were made. Now God spoke from eternity, otherwise the Son who is the Father’s Word would not be co-eternal with the Father. Therefore God’s work is eternal and the world was made from eternity.
Sed contra. Est quod dicitur Proverb. cap. VIII, 24, ex ore divinae sapientiae: nondum erant abissi, et ego iam concepta eram: necdum fontes aquarum eruperant, necdum montes gravi mole constiterant; ante omnes colles ego parturiebar; adhuc terram non fecerat et flumina et cardines orbis terrae. Ergo cardines orbis terrae et flumina et terra non semper fuerunt. On the contrary it is said (Prov. viii, 24 seqq.) in the words of divine Wisdom: The depths were not as yet and I was already conceived, neither had the fountains of waters as yet sprung out. The mountains with their huge bulk had not as yet been established: before the hills was I brought forth. He had not yet made the earth, nor the rivers, nor the poles of the world. Therefore the poles of the world, the rivers and the earth were not always.
Praeterea, secundum Priscinianum quanto tempore iuniores, tanto intellectu perspicaciores. Sed perspicacitas non est infinita. Ergo nec tempus quo perspicacitas creavit fuit infinitum, et per consequens nec mundus. Again according to Priscian, the younger in point of time are keener in point of intelligence. But keenness of intelligence is not infinite: therefore the time during which it increases is not infinite and consequently neither is the world.
Praeterea, Iob XIV, 19: alluvione paulatim terra consumitur. Sed terra non est infinita. Si ergo fuisset tempus infinitum, iam totaliter esset consumpta: quod patet esset falsum. Again it is written (Job xxiv, 19): With inundation the ground by little and little is washed away. Now the earth is not infinite: so that if time were infinite the earth would by now have been wholly washed away: and this is clearly false.
Praeterea, constat Deum naturaliter esse mundo priorem, sicut causam effectu. Sed in Deo idem est duratio et natura. Ergo Deus duratione prior est mundo, et ita mundus non semper fuit. Again it is evident that God naturally preceded the world as a cause precedes its effect. But in God duration and nature are the same, therefore God preceded the world by duration, and thus the world was not always.
Respondeo. Dicendum quod firmiter tenendum est mundum non semper fuisse, sicut fides Catholica docet. Nec hoc potest aliqua physica demonstratione efficaciter impugnari. I answer that we must not hesitate to hold that, as the Catholic faith teaches, the world has not always existed. This cannot be disproved by any physical demonstration.
Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est, quod sicut in quaestione alia est habitum, in operatione Dei non potest accipi aliquod debitum ex parte causae materialis, neque potentiae activae agentis, nec ex parte finis ultimi, sed solum ex parte formae quae est finis operationis, ex cuius praesuppositione requiritur quod talia existant qualia competunt illi formae. Et ideo aliter dicendum est de productione unius particularis creaturae, et aliter de exitu totius universi a Deo. Cum enim loquimur de productione alicuius singularis creaturae, potest assignari ratio quare talis sit, ex aliqua alia creatura, vel saltem ex ordine universi, ad quem quaelibet creatura ordinatur, sicut pars ad formam totius. Cum autem de toto universo loquimur educendo in esse, non possumus ulterius aliquod creatum invenire ex quo possit sumi ratio quare sit tale vel tale; unde, cum nec etiam ex parte divinae potentiae quae est infinita, nec divinae bonitatis, quae rebus non indiget, ratio determinatae dispositionis universi sumi possit, oportet quod eius ratio sumatur ex simplici voluntate producentis ut si quaeratur, quare quantitas caeli sit tanta et non maior, non potest huius ratio reddi nisi ex voluntate producentis. Et propter hoc etiam, ut Rabbi Moyses dicit, divina Scriptura inducit homines ad considerationem caelestium corporum, per quorum dispositionem maxime ostenditur quod omnia subiacent voluntati et providentiae creatoris. Non enim potest assignari ratio quare talis stella tantum a tali distet, vel aliqua huiusmodi quae in dispositione caeli consideranda occurrunt, nisi ex ordine sapientiae Dei; unde dicitur Is. XL, 26: levate in excelsum oculos vestros; et videte quis creavit haec. Nec obstat, si dicatur quod talis quantitas consequitur naturam caeli vel caelestium corporum, sicut et omnium natura constantium est aliqua determinata quantitas, quia sicut divina potentia non limitatur ad hanc quantitatem magis quam ad illam, ita non limitatur ad naturam cui debeatur talis quantitas, magis quam ad naturam cui alia quantitas debeatur. Et sic eadem redibit quaestio de natura, quae est de quantitate; quamvis concedamus, quod natura caeli non sit indifferens ad quamlibet quantitatem, nec sit in eo possibilitas ad aliam quantitatem nisi ad istam. Non sic autem potest dici de tempore vel temporis duratione. Nam tempus est extrinsecum a re, sicut et locus; unde etiam in caelo, in quo non est possibilitas respectu alterius quantitatis vel accidentis interius inhaerentis, est tamen in eo possibilitas respectu loci et situs, cum localiter moveatur; et etiam respectu temporis, cum semper tempus succedat tempori, sicut est successio in motu et in ubi; unde non potest dici, quod neque tempus neque ubi consequatur naturam eius, sicut de quantitate dicebatur. Unde patet quod ex simplici Dei voluntate dependet quod praefigatur universo determinata quantitas durationis, sicut et determinata quantitas dimensionis. Unde non potest necessario concludi aliquid de universi duratione, ut per hoc ostendi possit demonstrative mundum semper fuisse. In order to make this clear we must observe that as we have shown in a previous question in God’s works we cannot assign a necessity on the part of the material cause, nor on the part of the active power of the agent, nor on the part of the ultimate end, but only on the part of the form which is the end of the work, since if the form be presupposed it is requisite that things be such as to be fit for such and such a form. Hence we must speak of the production of this or that particular creature otherwise than of the production of the whole universe by God. When we speak of the production of a particular creature, it is possible to gather the reason why it is such and such, from some other creature, or at least from the order of the universe to which every creature is ordained, as a part to the form of the whole. But when we speak of the production of the whole universe, we cannot point to any other creature as being the reason why the universe is such and such. Wherefore since neither on the part of the divine power which is infinite, nor of the divine goodness which stands not in need of creatures, can a reason be assigned for the particular disposition of the universe this reason must be found in the mere will of the Creator: so that if it be asked why the heavens are of such and such a size, no other reason can be given except that their maker willed it so. For this reason too, as Rabbi Moses says, Holy Writ exhorts us to consider the heavenly bodies, since we gather from their disposition how all things are subject to the will and providence of a Creator. For no reason can be given for the distance of this star from that one, or for any other dispositions that we observe in the heavens, save the ordinance of divine wisdom: wherefore it is written (Isa. xl, 26) : Lift up your eyes on high and see who hath created these things. Nor does it matter if someone say that the distance in question results from the nature of the heavens or heavenly bodies, even as a certain quantity is appointed to every natural thing, because just as the divine power is not confined to this rather than to that quantity, so is it not confined to a nature that requires one particular quantity rather than to a nature that requires another quantity. Consequently it makes no difference whether it be a question of quantity or of nature: although we grant that the nature of the heavens is not indifferent to any quantity in particular, and that there is no inherent possibility of the heavens having any other quantity than that which they actually have. But this cannot be said of time or the duration of time. For time like place is extraneous to things: wherefore although there is no possibility in the heavens with respect to another quantity or inherent accident, yet is there a possibility with regard to place and position, since the heavens have a local movement; and with regard to time, since time ever succeeds time, even as there is succession in movement and ubiety: wherefore it cannot be said that neither time nor ubiety result from the heavens’ nature, as was the case with quantity. It is clear then that the appointment of a fixed quantity of duration for the universe depends on the mere will of God, even as the appointment of a fixed quantity of dimension. Consequently we cannot come to a necessary conclusion about the duration of the universe, so as to prove demonstratively that the world has always existed.
Quidam vero non considerantes exitum universi a Deo, coacti sunt circa inceptionem mundi errare. Quidam namque causam agentem praetermittentes, solam materiam a nullo creatam ponentes, quae omnium causa esset, sicut antiquissimi naturales, necessario habuerunt dicere materiam semper fuisse. Cum enim nihil se educat de non esse in esse, oportet causam aliam habere quod incipit esse; et hi posuerunt vel mundum semper fuisse continue, quia non ponebant nisi naturaliter agentia quae determinabantur ad unum, ex quo oportebat quod semper idem effectus sequeretur; vel cum interruptione sicut Democritus; qui ponebat mundum vel mundos potius multoties fuisse compositos et dissolutos casu, propter causalem motum atomorum. Some, however, through failing to observe that the universe was made by God, were unable to avoid erring in this question about the beginning of the world. Thus the earliest physicists recognised no effective cause and maintained that uncreated matter was the cause of all things, and thus they were compelled to hold that matter had always existed. For seeing that nothing brings itself from non-existence into being, that which begins to exist must be caused by something else. These asserted—either that the world was always in continual existence, because they recognised none but natural agents which being confined to one mode of action, of necessity always produced the same effects; —or that the world had an interrupted existence; thus Democritus held the world, or rather worlds, to be in a continual state of formation and destruction on account of the chance movements of atoms.
Sed quia inconveniens videbatur quod omnes convenientiae et utilitates in rebus naturalibus existentes essent a casu, cum semper vel in pluribus inveniantur; quod tamen necesse erat sequi, si solum materia poneretur, et praecipue cum inveniatur quidam effectus ad quos causalitas materiae non sufficit; ideo alii posuerunt causam agentem, sicut Anaxagoras intellectum, et Empedocles amicitiam et litem. Sed tamen isti non posuerunt huiusmodi causas agentes universi esse, sed ad modum aliorum particularium agentium, quae agunt materiam transmutando de uno in aliud. Unde necesse erat eis dicere quod materia esset aeterna, utpote non habens causam sui esse; sed mundum incepisse: quia omnis effectus causae agentis per motum sequitur suam causam in duratione, eo quod effectus non est nisi in termino motus, ante quem est principium motus, cum quo simul oportet esse agens, a quo est principium motus. Since, however, it seemed unreasonable that all the congruities and utilities to be found in nature should be due to chance, whereas they obtain either always or in the majority of cases: and seeing that nevertheless this would follow if there were no other cause but matter, and especially that there are some effects which cannot be sufficiently explained by the causality of matter, others like Anaxagoras posited an intellect as active cause, or like Empedocles, attraction and repulsion. Yet they did not hold these to be the active causes of the universe, but likened them to other particular agents whose activity consists in the transformation of matter from one thing into another. Consequently they were compelled to assert that matter is eternal, through not having a cause of its existence: but that the world had a beginning, because every effect of a cause which acts by, movement follows its cause in duration, since such effect does not exist before the end of the movement, which end is preceded by the initial movement, co-existent with which is the agent that initiates the movement.
Aristoteles vero, considerans, quod si ponatur causa constituens mundum agere per motum, sequeretur quod sit abire in infinitum, quia ante quemlibet motum erit motus, posuit mundum semper fuisse. Non enim processit ex consideratione illa qua intelligitur exitus universi esse a Deo, sed ex illa consideratione qua ponitur aliquod agens incipere operari per motum; quod est particularis causae, et non universalis. Et propter hoc ex motu et immobilitate primi motoris, rationes suas sumit ad mundi aeternitatem ostendendam; unde diligenter consideranti, rationes eius apparent quasi rationes disputantis contra positionem; unde et in principio VIII Phys., mota quaestione de aeternitate motus, praemittit opiniones Anaxagorae et Empedoclis, contra quas disputare intendit. Sed sequaces Aristotelis considerantes exitum totius universi a Deo per suam voluntatem, et non per motum, conati sunt ostendere mundi aeternitatem per hoc quod voluntas non retardat facere quod intendit, nisi propter aliquam innovationem vel immutationem, saltem quam necesse est imaginari in successione temporis, dum vult facere hoc tunc et non prius. Sed isti etiam in defectum similem inciderunt in quem et praedicti. Consideraverunt enim primum agens ad similitudinem alicuius agentis quod suam actionem exercet in tempore quamvis per voluntatem agat; quod tamen non est causa ipsius temporis, sed tempus praesupponit. Deus autem est causa etiam ipsius temporis. Nam et ipsum tempus in universitate eorum quae a Deo facta sunt continetur; unde cum de exitu universi esse a Deo loquimur, non est considerandum, quod tunc et non prius fecerit. Ista enim consideratio tempus praesupponit ad factionem, non autem subiicit factioni. Sed si universitatis creaturae productionem consideramus, inter quas est etiam ipsum tempus, est considerandum quare tali tempori talem mensuram praefixerit, non quare hoc fecit in tali tempore. Praefixio autem mensurae temporis dependet ex simplici voluntate Dei, qui voluit quod mundus non esset semper, sed quandoque esse inciperet, sicut et voluit quod caelum nec esset maius vel minus. Aristotle (Phys. viii, i), observing that if it be said that the efficient cause of the world acted by movement, it would follow that one would have to proceed to infinity, since every movement must be preceded by another movement, maintained that the world has always existed. He argued not from the position that the world was made by God, but from the position that an agent which begins to act must be moved: thus considering the particular and not the universal cause. Wherefore in order to prove the eternity of the world he based his arguments on movement and the immobility of the prime mover: and hence if we consider them carefully, his arguments seem to be those of one who is arguing against a position, so that at the commencement of Phys. viii, having introduced the question of the eternity of movement, he begins by citing the opinions of Anaxagoras and Empedocles, his object being to argue against them. Those who came after Aristotle, however, considering that the whole universe was produced by God through his will and not by movement, endeavoured to prove the eternity of the world from the fact that the will does not wait to do what it intends, except on account of some new occurrence or change, even though we be compelled to imagine it in the succession of time, in that one wills to do this or that now and not sooner. Yet these fell into the same error as those mentioned before. For they considered the first agent as being like an agent which exercises its activity in time and yet acts through its will. Such an agent is not the cause of time but presupposes it: whereas God is cause even of time, since time is included in the universality of the things made by God: and therefore seeing that we are considering the production of all being by God, the fact that he made it then and not sooner does not enter the question. For this considers time as though it preceded the making instead of being conditional on the making. But if we consider the making of the universality of creatures among which time itself is included, we must consider why such and such a measure was affixed to time, and not why the making was at such and such a time. The fixing of the measure to time depends on the mere will of God, who willed that the world should not have always been, but should have a beginning, even as he willed the heavens to be neither greater nor smaller than they are.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod bonitatis proprium est producere res in esse mediante voluntate, cuius est obiectum; unde non oportuit quod quandocumque fuit divina bonitas, res producerentur in esse, sed secundum dispositionem voluntatis divinae. Reply to the First Objection. It is proper to (divine) goodness to bring things into being through the will of which it is the object. Consequently it does not follow that because the divine goodness always existed therefore thin brought into being always existed, produced according to the disposition but that they were of the divine will.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod in corpore caelesti, cum sit incorruptibile, est virtus ut sit semper; sed nulla virtus neque essendi neque operandi respicit praeteritum, sed solum praesens vel futurum; nullus enim habet virtutem ad quod aliquid fecerit, quia quidquid non est factum, non potest factum fuisse; sed habet aliquis virtutem ad hoc ut nunc vel in posterum faciat; unde et virtus existendi semper, quae inest caelo, non respicit praeteritum, sed futurum. Reply to the Second Objection. The heavenly body being incorruptible is capable of always being: but no capability whether of being or of operating regards the past, but only the present or the future: since no man exercises a power over his past actions, for he cannot cause to have been done that which he has not done: but he has the power to do it now or in the future. Consequently the capability in the heavens of being always regards not the past but the future.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod non potest dici, simpliciter loquendo, caelum esse corruptibile propter hoc quod in non esse decideret, si a Deo non contineretur. Sed tamen quia creaturam contineri in esse a Deo, dependet ex immobilitate divina, non ex necessitate naturae, ut possit dici quod sit necessarium absolute, cum sit necessarium solum ex suppositione divinae voluntatis, quae hoc immobiliter statuit, potest concedi secundum quid corruptibile esse caelum, cum hac scilicet conditione, si Deus ipsum non contineret. Reply to the Third Objection. The fact that the heavens would return into nothingness if God ceased to uphold them does not make them corruptible simply. Seeing, however, that the preservation of the creature by God depends on God’s unchangeableness, not on natural necessity (in which case it would be absolutely necessary), and is necessary solely on the supposition that God wills and has unchangeably decreed that preservation, it may be granted that the heavens are corruptible in a restricted sense, in so far as their incorruptibility is dependent on God.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod omnis effectus habet necessariam habitudinem ad suam causam efficientem, sive sit causa naturalis, sive voluntaria. Sed non ponimus Deum causam mundi ex necessitate naturae suae, sed ex voluntate, ut supra dictum est, unde necessarium est effectum divinum sequi non quandocumque natura divina fuit, sed quando dispositum est voluntate divina ut esset, et secundum modum eumdem quo voluit ut esset. Reply to the Fourth Objection. Every effect carries a necessary relationship to its effective cause whether natural or voluntary. But we have already proved (A. 15) that God is the cause of the world not by a necessity of his nature, but by his will: wherefore it was necessary for the divine ‘ effect to follow not whenever the divine nature existed, but when the divine will decreed that it should follow, and in the very manner that he willed.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod ante tempus aliquid esse, potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo ante totum tempus, et ante omne id quod est temporis; et sic mundus non fuit ante tempus, quia instans in quo incepit mundus, licet non sit tempus, est tamen aliquid temporis, non quidem ut pars, sed ut terminus. Alio modo intelligitur aliquid esse ante tempus, quia est ante temporis completionem; quod non completur nisi in instanti ante quod est aliud instans; et sic mundus est ante tempus. Non autem oportet propter hoc quod sit aeternus; quia nec ipsum instans temporis quod sic est ante tempus est aeternum. Reply to the Fifth Objection. A thing may precede time in two ways. First, before the whole of time, and before anything belonging to time. In this way the world did not precede time, because the instant wherein the world began, though not time, is something belonging to time, not indeed a part but the starting-point of time. In another way a. thing is said to precede time because it is before the completion of time: and time is not complete before the instant that is preceded by another instant: in this sense the world preceded time. It does not follow from this that the world is eternal, since the instant of time that precedes time is not eternal.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod cum omne agens agat sibi simile, oportet quod effectus hoc modo sequatur a causa efficaciter operante, quod similitudinem causae retineat. Sicut autem quod est a causa naturaliter agente, retinet similitudinem eius prout habet formam similem formae agentis; ita quod est ab agente voluntario, retinet similitudinem eius, prout habet formam similem causae, secundum quod hoc producitur in effectu quod est in voluntatis dispositione, ut patet de artificiato respectu artificis. Voluntas autem non disponit solum de forma effectus, sed de loco, duratione, et omnibus conditionibus eius; unde oportet quod effectus voluntatis tunc sequatur quando voluntas disponit, non quando voluntas est. Non enim secundum esse, sed secundum id quod voluntas disponit, effectus voluntati similatur. Licet igitur voluntas semper sit eadem, non tamen oportet quod semper ex ea effectus sequatur. Reply to the Sixth Objection. Since every agent produces its like, an effect must follow from an effectively operating cause, so as to bear a likeness to its cause. Now as that which proceeds from a cause that acts by its nature bears a likeness thereto in that it has a form like the form of its cause, so that which proceeds from a voluntary agent bears a likeness thereto in that it has a form like its cause, for as much as the effect is the reproduction of something in accordance with the will, as instanced in the work produced by the craftsman. But the will appoints not only the form of the effect but also the place, time and all other conditions thereof: so that the effect of the will follows when the will decides and not as soon as the will is. For the likeness of the effect to the will is not in the point of being but in the point of disposal by the will. Consequently, though the will remain ever the same, it does not follow that its effect should flow from it from eternity.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod Deus de necessitate vult suam bonitatem et omne id sine quo sua bonitas esse non potest. Tale autem non est creaturarum productio; unde ratio non sequitur. Reply to the Seventh Objection. God necessarily wills his own goodness and whatsoever is necessarily connected with his goodness. Such is not the production of creatures, and consequently the objection fails.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod cum Deus creaturas ad manifestationem sui produxerit, convenientius fuit et melius ut sic producerentur, sicut convenientius et expressius eum poterant manifestare. Expressius autem manifestatur ex creaturis, si non semper sint; quia in hoc manifeste apparet quod ab alio eductae sunt in esse, et quod Deus creaturis non indiget, et quod creaturae omnino divinae subiacent voluntati. Reply to the Eighth Objection. Since God made creatures in order to manifest himself, it was more fitting and more to the purpose that they should be made in such wise as to manifest him in a more becoming manner and more clearly. Now he is more clearly manifested by creatures if they be not from eternity, because this brings into greater evidence the fact that he brought them into being and that he does not need them, and that they are entirely dependent on his will.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod Deus aeternam voluntatem habuit de mundi factione; non tamen ut mundus semper fieret, sed ut tunc fieret quando fecit. Reply to the Ninth Objection. God’s will to create the world was eternal; not that the world should exist from eternity, but that it should be made when he actually did make it.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod antequam mundus esset, possibile erat mundum fieri, non quidem aliqua potentia passiva, sed solum per potentiam activam agentis. Vel potest dici, quod fuit possibile non per aliquam potentiam, sed quia termini non sunt invicem discohaerentes, huiusmodi scilicet propositionis: mundus est. Sic enim dicitur esse aliquid possibile secundum nullam potentiam, ut patet per philosophum, in V Metaph. Reply to the Tenth Objection. Before the world was it was possible for the world to be made, not by a passive potentiality, but by the active power of the agent.—Or we may reply that it was possible not by reason of some power, but because the terms of the proposition, The world exists are not in contradiction to each other. According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 12) a thing may be said to be possible in this way without reference to a potentiality.
Et per hoc patet solutio ad undecimum. This suffices for the reply to the Eleventh Objection.
Ad decimumsecundum dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit de agente quod incipit agere actione nova; sed Dei actio est aeterna, cum sit sua substantia. Dicitur autem incipere agere ratione novi effectus, qui ab aeterna actione consequitur secundum dispositionem voluntatis, quae intelligitur quasi actionis principium in ordine ad effectum. Effectus enim ab actione sequitur secundum conditionem formae, quae est actionis principium; sicut aliquid est calefactum per calefactionem ignis, ad modum caloris ignis. Reply to the Twelfth Objection. This argument stands in the case of an agent that begins a new action, whereas God’s action is eternal, since it is his substance. He is said, however, to begin to act in reference to a new effect that results from his eternal action according to the disposition of his will which is considered as the principle of his action in relation to the effect. For the effect follows from the action according to the condition of the form that is the principle of that action: even so a thing is heated by the action of the fire according to the degree of heat in the fire.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit de agente quod ita facit effectum suum in tempore, quod tamen non est temporis causa; quod in Deo locum non habet, ut ex supra dictis, patet. Reply to the Thirteenth, Objection. This argument considers the agent that produces its effect in time without being the cause of time: this does not apply to God as stated above (A. 5).
Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod si motus proprie accipiatur, divina voluntas non movetur; sed metaphorice loquendo dicitur moveri a suo volito; et sic sola Dei bonitas movet ipsam, secundum quod Augustinus dicit quod Deus movet se ipsum sine loco et tempore. Nec tamen sequitur quod quandocumque fuit bonitas eius, tunc esset creaturarum productio; quia creaturae non procedunt a Deo ex debito vel necessitate bonitatis, cum divina bonitas creaturis non egeat, nec per eas ei aliquid accrescat, sed ex simplici voluntate. Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. If movement be taken strictly God’s will is not moved but it is said to be moved, metaphorically speaking, by its object: and thus God’s goodness alone moves his will, according to the saying of Augustine (Gen. ad lit. viii, 22) that God moves himself independently of place and time. Nor does it follow that creatures were produced whenever God’s goodness existed, because creatures proceed from God not as though they were due or necessary to his goodness, since it does not need them, nor does he gain anything by them, but by his mere will.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod cum prima successio temporis causetur ex motus successione, ut dicitur in IV Phys., secundum hoc verum est quod omne instans et est principium et finis temporis, dicendum quod verum est quod omne momentum est principium et finis motus; unde si supponamus motum non semper fuisse nec semper futurum esse, non oportebit dicere quod quodlibet instans sit principium et finis temporis; sed erit aliquod instans quod est tantum principium, et aliquod quod tantum finis. Unde patet quod ratio ista est circularis, et propter hoc non est demonstratio; sed tamen est efficax secundum intentionem Aristotelis, qui eam inducit contra positionem, ut dictum est, in corp. art. Multae enim rationes sunt efficaces contra positionem propter ea quae ab adversariis ponuntur, quae non sunt efficaces simpliciter. Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. Since the first succession of time was caused by movement (Phys. iv, 12) it is true that every instant is a beginning and an end of time, even as it is true that every moved thing is in a beginning and in an end of movement: so that if we suppose that movement neither always existed nor will always exist, there will be no need to say that every instant is a beginning and an end of time; for there will be an instant which will be only a beginning, and an instant which will be only an end. Hence this objection argues in a circle and consequently does not prove: but it serves the purpose of Aristotle who employs it to attack a position as we have said above. In fact, many arguments serve to rebut an opinion on account of the statements advanced by its holders, and yet in themselves.are not absolute demonstrations.
Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod instans semper consideratur ut fluens, sed non semper ut fluens ab aliquo in aliquid, sed quandoque ut fluens ab aliquo tantum, sicut ultimum instans temporis; quandoque ut fluens in aliquid tantum, sicut primum instans. Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. An instant is indeed always considered as flowing, yet not always as flowing from one thing to another, but sometimes as only flowing from something, for example, the last instant of time, sometimes as flowing only towards something, as the first instant.
Ad decimumseptimum dicendum, quod illa ratio non probat quod motus semper fuerit, sed quod motus circularis possit esse semper, quia ex mathematicis non potest aliquid efficaciter de motu concludi; unde Aristoteles, non probat ex circulatione motus, eius aeternitatem; sed supposito quod sit aeternus, ostendit quod est circularis; quia nullus alius motus potest esse aeternus. Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. This argument does not prove that movement has always existed, but that circular movement can be always, because from mathematical principles we cannot with certainty draw conclusions about movement: hence Aristotle (Phys. viii, 8) does not infer the eternity of a movement from its being circular, but from the fact that a movement is eternal he shows that it must be circular, because no other movement can be eternal.
Et per hoc patet responsio ad decimumoctavum. This suffices for the reply to the Eighteenth Objection.
Ad decimumnonum dicendum, quod sicut se habet scibile ad scientiam nostram, ita se habet scientia Dei ad creaturas. Nam scientia Dei est causa creaturarum, sicut et scibile est causa scientiae nostrae; unde sicut scibile potest esse, scientia nostra non existente, ut dicitur in praedicamentis, ita Dei scientia esse potest, scibili non existente. Reply to the Nineteenth Objection. Things, knowable are related to our knowledge as God’s knowledge is to creatures: because God’s knowledge is the cause of creatures and things knowable are the cause of our knowledge. Wherefore even as things are knowable even without our knowing them (De Categor. 7), so is it possible for God to have knowledge without the knowable thing having existence.
Ad vicesimum dicendum, quod Deus praecedit mundum duratione, non quidem temporis, sed aeternitatis, quia esse Dei non mensuratur tempore. Nec ante mundum fuit tempus reale, sed solum imaginarium, prout scilicet nunc possumus imaginari infinita temporum spatia, aeternitate existente, potuisse revolvi ante temporis inceptionem. Reply to the Twentieth Objection. God does indeed precede the world by duration, not of time but of eternity, since God’s existence is not measured by time. Nor was there real time before the world, but only imaginary; thus now we can imagine an infinite space of time running with eternity and preceding the beginning of time.
Ad vicesimumprimum dicendum, quod si relatio dominii intelligatur consequi actionem qua Deus actualiter creaturas gubernat, sic non est ab aeterno dominus. Si autem intelligatur consequi ipsam potestatem gubernandi, sic competit ei ab aeterno. Nec tamen oportet creaturas ab aeterno ponere, nisi in potentia. Reply to the Twenty-first Objection. If the relation of lordship be regarded as consequent to the action whereby God actually governs creatures, then God was not Lord from eternity. But if it be regarded as consequent to the power of governing, then it belongs to God from eternity. Nor does it follow that creatures must have existed from eternity except potentially.
Ad vicesimumsecundum dicendum, quod ratione illa utitur Augustinus, ad probandum coaeternitatem et coaequalitatem filii ad patrem; quae tamen ratio non est efficax de mundo; quia cum natura filii sit eadem cum patre, requirit aeternitatem et aequalitatem patris; quae si sibi subtraheretur, invidiae esset. Non autem hoc requirit natura creaturae; et ideo non est simile. Reply to the Twenty-second Objection. This is Augustine’s argument (Contra Maxim. ii, 7, 8, 23) to prove that the Son is co-eternal and co-equal with the Father. But this argument is not applicable to the world, because as the Son’s nature is the same as the Father’s it requires to be co-eternal and co-equal with the Father’s, otherwise were this denied him it would savour of envy. The nature of the creature, however, does not require this: and consequently the comparison fails.
Ad vicesimumtertium dicendum, quod secundum Graecos dicitur: dominus regnavit in saeculum saeculi, et adhuc; quod exponens Origenes in Glossa, dicit, quod saeculum intelligitur spatium unius generationis, cuius finis notus est nobis: per saeculum saeculi immensum spatium temporis, quod finem habet, tamen nobis ignotum; sed adhuc ultra illud, regnum Dei extenditur. Et sic aeternum exponitur pro tempore diuturno. Anselmus autem in Proslog., exponit aeternum pro aevo, quod nunquam finem habet; et tamen ultra illud Deus esse dicitur propter hoc: primo, quia aeviterna possunt intelligi non esse. Secundo, quia non essent, nisi a Deo continerentur; et sic de se non sunt. Tertio, quia non habent totum esse suum simul, cum in eis sit aliqua mutationis successio. Reply to the Twenty-third Objection. The Greek text reads: The Lord shall reign for age upon age and beyond: and Origen, as quoted by a gloss, says that by age we are to understand the space of one generation the limits of which are known to us: by age upon age we are to understand an immense space of time which has an end, yet unknown to us: and that God’s reign will extend even beyond this. Hence ‘eternity’ here means the duration of time. Anselm, however (Proslog. xix, xx), takes eternity to mean eviternity, which has no end: and yet God is said to reign beyond it, because in the first place eviternal things can be thought of as non-existent; secondly, because they would not be if God ceased to uphold them, so that of themselves they do not exist: thirdly, because they have not their whole existence at once, but are subject to successive change.
Ad vicesimumquartum dicendum, quod pro tanto oportet illud quod incipit, habere mensuram durationis, quia incipit per motum. Sic autem tempus non incipit per creationem, unde ratio non sequitur; et tamen potest dici, quod omnis mensura in suo genere seipsa mensuratur, sicut linea per lineam, et similiter tempus per tempus. Reply to the Twenty-fourth Objection. That which has a beginning must have a measure of its duration in so far as it begins through movement. But time does not begin thus by creation, wherefore the argument does not prove. However, it may be said that every measure is measured by itself within its own genus: thus a line is measured by a line, and time by time.
Ad vicesimumquintum dicendum, quod tempus non se habet sicut permanentia, quorum substantia est tota simul; unde non oportet quod totum tempus sit quando incipit esse; et sic nihil prohibet dicere, quod tempus incipit in instanti esse. Reply to the Twenty-fifth Objection. Time is not like permanent things which have their whole substance at once: so that there is no need for the whole of time to exist as soon as it begins. Consequently it is not untrue that time begins in an instant.
Ad vicesimumsextum dicendum, quod actio Dei est aeterna, sed effectus non est aeternus, ut supra dictum est; unde licet Deus non semper fuerit causa, cum non semper fuerit effectus, non tamen sequitur quod non fuerit causa in potentia, quia actio eius semper fuit, nisi potentia ad effectum referatur. Reply to the Twenty-sixth Objection. God’s action is eternal, but its effect is not, as we have stated above: hence though God was not always cause, inasmuch as his effect was not always, it does not follow that he was not cause potentially, since his action was always, unless we refer the potentiality to the effect.
Ad vicesimumseptimum dicendum, quod secundum philosophum, verum est in mente, non in rebus; est enim adaequatio intellectus ad res. Unde omnia quae fuerunt ab aeterno, fuerunt vera per veritatem intellectus divini, quae est aeterna. Reply to the Twenty-seventh Objection. According to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi, 4) truth is in the mind, not in things, for it is the equation of thought and thing. Wherefore whatsoever has been from, eternity has been true by the truth of the divine mind, which truth is eternal.
Ad vicesimumoctavum dicendum, quod omnia illa quae ab aeterno dicuntur esse vera, non sunt alia et alia veritate vera, sed una et eadem divini intellectus veritate, ad diversas tamen res in proprio esse futuras relata; et sic ex diversa relatione potest aliqua distinctio in illa veritate designari. Reply to the Twenty-eighth Objection. Whatsoever things are said to be true from eternity do not vary in their truth, but are true by the one same truth of the divine mind, with reference nevertheless to various things as future in their own being: so that we are able to indicate a certain distinction in that truth resulting from their various relations.
Ad vicesimumnonum dicendum, quod verbum etiam philosophi intelligitur de oratione existente in nostro intellectu vel in nostra pronuntiatione; veritas enim nostri intellectus vel verbi, ab existentia rei causatur. Sed e converso veritas divini intellectus est causa rerum. Reply to the Twenty-ninth Objection. The saying of the Philosopher refers to our mental or oral statements, since the truth of our thought or words is caused by things already evident: whereas the truth of the divine mind is the cause of things.
Ad tricesimum dicendum, quod ex parte ipsius Dei facere non importat aliquid quod sit aliud quam suum dicere; non enim actio Dei est accidens, sed eius substantia; sed facere importat effectum actualiter existentem in propria natura, quod per dicere non importatur. Reply to the Thirtieth Objection. On the part of God there is no difference between to make and to speak, for God’s action is not an accident but his substance: nevertheless to make connotes the effect actually existing in its own nature, whereas to speak does not.
Argumenta vero quae obiiciuntur in contrarium, licet verum concludant, non tamen necessario, praeter primum, quod ex auctoritate procedit. Argumentum enim perspicacitatis secundum temporis cursum, non ostendit tempus quandoque incepisse. Potuit enim esse quod scientiarum studia pluries fuerint intermissa, et postmodum post longa tempora quasi de novo incepta, ut philosophus etiam dicit. Terra etiam non ita per illuvionem ex una parte consumitur, quin etiam per mutuam elementorum conversionem ex parte alia augmentetur; duratio etiam Dei, licet sit idem quod eius natura secundum rem, tamen differt ratione; unde non oportet quod sit prior duratione, si est prior natura. The arguments on the contrary side, although they prove what is true, are not demonstrative except the first which is based on authority. The argument taken from the growth of intelligence in the course of time, does not prove that time must have had a beginning: since possibly the study of the sciences may have been frequently interrupted, and subsequently taken up anew after a long interval, as the Philosopher observes. Again the soil is not so much eaten away by erosion on one part of the earth’s surface without a corresponding increase taking place elsewhere through the combination of the elements. And the duration of God, although it be identified with the divine nature in reality, differs therefrom logically: so that it does not follow that God preceded the world in duration from the fact that he preceded it naturally.
Q. III:
ARTICLE XVIII
Were the Angels Created Before the Visible World?

[ Sum. Th. I, Q. lxi]
Decimoctavo quaeritur utrum Angeli sint creati ante mundum visibilem. Et videtur quod sic. THE eighteenth point of inquiry is whether the angels were created before the visible world: and it would seem that they were.
Quia Gregorius Nazianzenus dicit, quod Deus primum excogitavit angelicas virtutes et caelestes; et excogitatio fuit opus eius. Ergo prius fecit Angelos quam mundum visibilem conderet. 1. Damascene (De Fide Orthod. ii, 3) quotes Gregory Nazianzen as saying that “at first God devised the angelic and heavenly Powers, and the devising was the making thereof.” Therefore he created the angels before making the visible world.
Sed dicendum, quod ly primum dicit ordinem naturae, non durationis.- Sed contra, Damascenus ibidem ponit super hoc duas opiniones: quarum una ponit, Angelos primum fuisse creatos, alia vero dicit contrarium. Sed nulla unquam opinio posuit, quin Angeli natura priores essent visibilibus creaturis. Ergo oportet quod intelligatur de ordine durationis. 2. Should it be said that first here denotes order of nature not of duration; on the contrary, Damascene (l.c.) cites two opinions on this point: one of which states that the angels were created first, while the other holds the contrary. Now no one ever denied that the angels were in the order of nature created before visible creatures. Therefore we must take it to refer to the order of duration.
Praeterea, Basilius dicit in principio Hexameron: erat quaedam natura ante hunc mundum intellectui nostro contemplabilis; quod postmodum exponit de Angelis; ergo videtur quod ante hunc mundum Angeli sint creati. 3. Basil says (Hexam. hom. i): “Prior to this world there existed a nature that is intelligible to our understanding: and subsequently he states that this is the angelic nature.” Therefore it would seem that the angels were created before this world.
Praeterea, ea quae cum mundo visibili facta sunt, Scriptura in principio Genesis prosequitur. Sed de Angelis nullam facit mentionem. Ergo videtur quod Angeli non fuerunt creati cum mundo, sed ante mundum. 4. The Scriptures enumerate those things that were created together with the visible world without any mention of the angels. Therefore it would seem that the angels were not created together with the visible world but before.
Praeterea, illud quod ordinatur ad perfectionem alicuius sicut ad finem, est eo posterius. Sed mundus visibilis ordinatur ad perfectionem intellectualis naturae: quia, ut Ambrosius dicit, Deus, qui natura invisibilis est, opus visibile fecit, per quod cognosci posset. Et non nisi a rationali creatura. Ergo rationalis creatura facta est ante mundum visibilem. 5. That which is directed to the perfection of another as its end is subsequent thereto. Now the visible world is directed to the perfection of the intellectual creature since, according to Ambrose (In Hexaem. i, 5), God who by nature is invisible produced a visible work in order to make himself known thereby. But he could only be made known to a rational creature. Therefore the rational creature was made before the visible world.
Praeterea, quidquid est ante tempus, est ante mundum visibilem: quia tempus cum mundo visibili incepit. Sed Angeli creati sunt ante tempus: non enim fuit tempus ante diem; Angeli autem creati sunt ante diem, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo Angeli creati sunt ante mundum visibilem. 6. Whatsoever precedes time precedes the visible world, since time began together with the visible world. Now angels were created before time, since they were created before the day, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. i, 9). Therefore the angels were created before the visible world.
Praeterea, Hieronymus dicit super epistolam ad Titum, cap. I: sex millia necdum nostri temporis implentur annorum; et quantas prius aeternitates, quanta tempora fuisse arbitrandum est, in quibus Angeli Deo servierunt, et eo iubente substiterunt? Sed mundus visibilis cum nostro tempore incepit. Ergo Angeli ante mundum visibilem fuerunt. 7. Jerome says (Super Ep. ad Tit. i, 2): “Six thousand years of our time have not yet elapsed, before which for how many ages, for how long think you the angels served God and to his command owed their existence?” Now the visible world began with our time. Therefore the angels were in existence before the visible world.
Praeterea, sapientis est ordinate suum effectum producere. Sed Angeli praecedunt nobilitatem creaturarum visibilium. Ergo a sapientissimo artifice Deo, primo debuerunt produci in esse. 8. A wise man produces his effects in due order. Now the angels precede visible creatures in point of excellence. Therefore they should have been brought into being first by God who is the supremely wise Master-Craftsman.
[59237]Praeterea, Deus, in quantum bonus est, suae bonitatis alios participes facit. Sed huius dignitatis capaces erant Angeli, quod creaturam visibilem duratione praecederent. Ergo videtur hoc eis per summam Dei bonitatem collatum. 9. God inasmuch as he is good makes others share in his goodness. Now angels were capable of being dignified by preceding the visible creature in point of duration. Therefore seemingly this was vouchsafed them by God’s sovereign goodness.
Praeterea, homo dicitur minor mundus, quia maioris mundi similitudinem gerit. Sed in homine pars eius nobilior ante alias partes formatur, scilicet cor, ut philosophus dicit. Ergo videtur quod Angeli, qui sunt nobilior pars maioris mundi, ante visibiles creaturas sint conditi. 10: Man is described as being a lesser world by reason of his likeness to the greater world. Now man’s more noble part, his heart to wit, is formed before the other parts, according to the Philosopher (De Gen. Animal. ii, 4). Therefore seemingly the angels, who are the more noble part of the greater world, were created before visible creatures.
Praeterea, ut Augustinus dicit, in opere secundae diei et deinceps tripliciter Scriptura rerum factionem commemorat. Dicit enim primo: dixit Deus, fiat firmamentum. Secundo: et factum est ita. Tertio vero: fecit Deus firmamentum. Quorum primum refertur ad esse rerum in verbo; secundum ad esse rerum in cognitione angelica, prout Angeli accipiunt cognitionem creaturae fiendae; tertium vero ad esse creaturae in propria natura. Sed quando creatura visibilis erat fienda, nondum erat. Ergo Angeli fuerunt et habuerunt cognitionem naturae visibilis antequam esset. 11. According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 7, 8), Scripture in the work of the second and following days divided the formation of things into three stages: for first it states that God said: Let there be a firmament made: then: And it was so done, and, thirdly: God made the firmament. The first of these refers to the existence of things in the Word; the second to the existence in the angelic mind, of creatures to be made; the third to the creature’s existence in its own nature. Now when creatures were yet to be made they did not exist. Therefore angels existed and had knowledge of the visible things of nature before the latter existed.
Sed dicendum, quod hic intelligitur de factione creaturae quantum ad eius formationem, non quantum ad primam creationem.- Sed contra, secundum opinionem Augustini, creatio naturae visibilis non praecedit tempore eiusdem formationem. Si ergo Angelus fuit ante formationem creaturae visibilis, fuit et ante eius creationem. 12. It might be said, however, that it is a question of the making of creatures as to their formation and not as to their first creation.—On the contrary, in the opinion of Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, xv), the creation of visible nature did not precede its formation in point of time. Hence if angels existed before the formation of visible creatures, they also existed before its creation.
Praeterea, dicere Dei est causa creaturae fiendae; quod non videtur posse intelligi de aeterna verbi genitura quia illa ab aeterno fuit, nec per vices temporum repetitur; cum tamen in singulis diebus Scriptura repetat Deum aliquid dixisse. Nec etiam potest intelligi de locutione corporali; tum quia nondum erat homo, qui vocem Dei loquentis audiret; tum etiam quia oportuisset ante lucis formationem aliquod aliud corporeum formatum fuisse, cum vox corporalis non fiat nisi per alicuius corporis formationem. Ergo videtur quod intelligatur de spirituali locutione qua Deus ad Angelos loquitur; et sic videtur quod Angelorum cognitio praesupponatur ut causa ad creaturarum visibilium productionem. 13. God’s “speaking was the cause of creatures being made. Now seemingly this cannot refer to the birth of the Word, since this was from eternity and not repeated in course of time: and yet Scripture tells of God speaking from day to day. Nor can it refer to audible speech, both because there was as yet no man to hear the voice of God speaking, and because before the formation of light it would have, been necessary for some other body to be formed, since an audible voice is not produced except by means of a body. It would seem then that it refers to the spiritual speech whereby God spoke to the angels: and consequently that the angels’ knowledge is presupposed as a cause for the production of visible creatures.
Praeterea ut supra dictum est, sacra Scriptura tripliciter actionem rerum commemorat: quorum primum pertinet ad esse rerum in verbo; secundum ad esse rerum in cognitione angelica; tertium in propria natura. Sed primum horum praecedit secundum et duratione et causa. Ergo similiter secundum praecedit tertium duratione et causa, scilicet cognitio angelica existentiam visibilis creaturae. 14. As observed above, Holy Writ employs three expressions in relating the creation; whereof the first refers to the existence of things in the Word, the second to their existence in the angelic knowledge, the third to their existence in their own nature. Now the first of these precedes the second in point both of duration and of causality. Therefore likewise the second, namely the angelic knowledge, precedes the third, namely the existence of the visible creature, both in duration and causality.
Praeterea, non minus requiritur ordo in exitu rerum a principio quam in reductione earum in finem. Sed in reducendo res in finem, haec est lex divinitatis statuta, ut Dionysius dicit, quod ultima reducantur in finem per media. Ergo simpliciter creaturae corporales quae sunt infimae, procedunt a Deo per angelicas creaturas, quae sunt mediae; et sic Angeli corporales creaturas praecedunt, sicut causae effectum. 15. Order is required in the issue of things from their source no less than in their advancement to their end. Now according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v).it is God’s ruling that the lowest things should be brought to their end by the intermediate. Therefore in like manner corporeal creatures being the lowest proceed from God by the angelic creatures who hold the middle position: wherefore the angels precede corporeal creatures as a cause precedes its effect.
Praeterea, eis quae sunt omnino disparata, non competit associatio. Sed Angeli et creaturae visibiles sunt omnino disparata. Ergo non sunt associati in creatione, ut simul fierent. Inordinatum etiam esset quod Angeli post creaturas visibiles fierent. Ergo ante creaturas visibiles sunt conditi. 16. It is unbecoming that things utterly disparate should be associated together. Now angels and visible creatures are altogether disparate. Therefore they were not associated together in the creation by being formed at the same time. And it would be a perversion of order if they were created after visible creatures. Therefore they were created before them.
Praeterea, Eccli. I, 4, dicitur: primo omnium creata est sapientia; quod non potest intelligi de filio Dei, qui est patris sapientia; cum ipse non sit creatus, sed genitus. Ergo sapientia angelica, quae est creatura, est ante omnia alia facta. 17. It is written (Ecclus. i, 4): Wisdom hath been created before all things: and this cannot refer to the Son of God who is the Wisdom of the Father: since he was not created but begotten. Therefore the angelic wisdom which is a creature was formed before all things.
Praeterea Hilarius dicit in Lib. de Trinitate: quid mirum, si dominum nostrum Iesum Christum ante saecula fuisse confiteamur, cum etiam Deus Angelos fecerit ante mundum? Sed Dei filius non solum ordine dignitatis, sed etiam durationis omnia saecula praecessit. Ergo et Angeli mundum visibilem. 18. Hilary says (De Trin. xii): No wonder that we believe that our Lord Jesus Christ was before all ages seeing that even the angels were created by God before the world. Now the Son of God preceded all ages not only in order of dignity but also in duration. Therefore the angels also preceded the visible world.
Praeterea, creatura angelica media est inter naturam divinam et corpoream: aevum etiam, quod est Angeli mensura, medium est inter aeternitatem et tempus. Sed Deus sua aeternitate fuit ante Angelos et visibilem creaturam. Ergo et Angeli suo aevo fuerunt ante mundum visibilem. 19. The angelic nature stands between the divine and the corporeal natures: and eviternity, which measures the angels’ existence, stands between eternity and time. Now by his eternity God preceded the angels and the visible creature. Therefore by their eviternity the angels preceded the visible world.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, quod Angeli semper fuerunt. Sed non potest dici quod creatura corporalis semper fuerit. Ergo Angeli fuerunt ante corpoream creaturam. 20. Augustine (De Civ. Dei xi, 9) says that the angels were always in existence. But it cannot be said that corporeal creatures were always in existence. Therefore the angels preceded the corporeal creature.
Praeterea, motus creaturae corporeae peraguntur per ministerium spiritualis creaturae, ut patet per Augustinum, et per Gregorium. Sed motor praecedit mobile. Ergo Angeli fuerunt ante visibiles creaturas. 21. The movements of corporeal creatures are directed by the ministrations of spiritual creatures, according to Augustine (De Trin. iii, i) and Gregory (Dial. iv). Now the mover precedes that which he moves. Therefore angels, preceded visible creatures.
Praeterea, Dionysius assimilat actionem divinam in res, actioni ignis in corpora quae ab igne patiuntur. Sed ignis prius agit in corpora propinqua quam in remota. Ergo et divina bonitas primo produxit creaturas angelicas sibi propinquas, quam creaturas corporeas magis ab eo distantes; et sic Angeli ante mundum fuerunt. 22. Dionysius likens God’s action on things to the action of fire on the things which it burns. Now fire acts on the nearer bodies before those that are distant. Therefore God’s goodness produced angelic creatures which are nearest to him before corporeal creatures which are distant from him and thus the angels existed before the world.
Sed contra. Est quod dicitur in principio Genes. I, 1: in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram; ubi Glossa Augustini dicit, quod per caelum intelligitur natura angelica, per terram vero natura corporalis. Ergo Angeli simul cum natura corporali fuerunt facti. On the contrary, it is written at the commencement of Genesis: In the beginning God created heavens and earth, where Augustine explains the heavens to mean the angelic nature and the earth the corporeal nature. Therefore the angels were created together with corporeal things.
Praeterea, Glossa Strabonis ibidem dicit, quod per caelum ibi intelligitur caelum Empyreum, quod mox factum sanctis Angelis est repletum. Ergo Angeli simul fuerunt facti cum caelo Empyreo, quod est visibilis creatura. Again, the gloss of Strabo on the same text states that the heavens refer to the empyrean which was inhabited by the holy angels as soon as it was created. Therefore the angels were created at the same time as the empyrean which is a visible creature.
Praeterea, homo minor mundus dicitur, quia habet similitudinem maioris mundi. Sed in homine simul fit corpus et anima. Ergo et in mundo maiori simul fit angelica et corporalis creatura. Again, man is described as the lesser world on account of his likeness to the greater world. Now man’s soul is made at the same time as his body. Therefore in the greater world the angelic and the corporeal creature were made at the same time.
Respondeo. Dicendum quod in hoc omnes Catholici doctores consenserunt, quod Angeli non semper fuerunt, utpote de nihilo in esse producti. Quidam tamen posuerunt Angelos non simul cum mundo visibili, sed ante mundum visibilem incepisse. Ad hoc autem ponendum diversis rationibus sunt moti. Quidam namque aestimaverunt creaturas corporeas non esse productas ex prima Dei intentione, sed occasionem eas producendi ex merito vel demerito spiritualis creaturae Deum habuisse dixerunt. Posuit enim Origenes, a principio simul creatas esse omnes creaturas immateriales et rationales, et eas fuisse aequales, divina iustitia hoc exigente. Non enim videtur quod inaequalitas possit esse in datis, iustitia servata, nisi propter meriti vel demeriti diversitatem. Unde diversitatem creaturarum (quam videmus) praecessisse posuit meriti et demeriti diversitatem, ut secundum quod spiritualium creaturarum quaedam magis Deo adhaeserunt, in altiores ordines Angelorum sint promotae; quae vero magis peccaverunt, grossioribus et ignobilioribus corporibus sint alligatae; quasi ipsa meritorum diversitas exegerit diversos gradus corporum a Deo produci. I answer that all the Catholic Doctors are agreed that the angels have not always existed inasmuch as they were made from nothing. Some, however, held that the angels were not made at the same time as the visible world but before: a conclusion to which they were led by various reasons. Some held that it was not God’s original intention to form corporeal creatures, and that his production of the latter was occasioned by the merits or demerits of spiritual creatures. Thus Origen maintained that in the first instance God made all the immaterial and rational creatures. These, he said, were all equal, for the divine justice required them to be so: since without injustice there could apparently be no reason for inequality in endowments, except diversity of merit and demerit. Consequently he maintained that the diversity which we observe among creatures was preceded by a diversity of merit and demerit, so that those spiritual creatures which were more faithful to God were promoted to the higher orders among the angels, and those who sinned more grievously were chained to the baser and viler bodies: so that this very diversity of merits required that various degrees of bodies should be produced by God.
Hanc autem positionem Augustinus reprobat. Causam enim creaturarum condendarum, tam spiritualium quam corporalium, constat nihil aliud esse quam Dei bonitatem, inquantum creaturae suae, sua bonitate creatae, bonitatem increatam secundum suum modum repraesentant. Propter quod Scriptura dicit de singulis Dei operibus, et postmodum de omnibus simul: vidit Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona; quasi diceret, quod ad hoc Deus creaturas condidit, quod bonitatem haberent. Secundum autem opinionem praedictam non ad hoc conditae fuissent creaturae corporales quia bonum esset eas esse, sed ut malitia spiritualis creaturae puniretur. Sequeretur etiam quod ordo universi quem nunc videmus a casu existeret, in quantum accidit quod diversae rationales creaturae diversimode peccaverunt. Si enim omnes peccassent aequaliter, nulla diversitas naturarum in corporibus esset, secundum eos. Augustine refutes this opinion (De Civ. Dei xi, 23). For it is clear that God’s goodness is the sole reason for his producing creatures both spiritual and corporeal, inasmuch as his creatures which out of his goodness he has fashioned reproduce his uncreated goodness according to their mode. Wherefore Scripture says of each of God’s works and afterwards of all of them together: God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good; as though to say that God had formed creatures in order that they might have goodness. On the other hand in the aforesaid opinion corporeal creatures were formed not because it was good for them to be, but that the wickedness of the spiritual creature might be punished. Moreover it would follow that the order’ we perceive to exist in the universe is the result of chance, forasmuch as various rational creatures happened to sin variously: for had all sinned equally, there would be no difference of nature in bodies, according to this opinion.
Unde hac positione remota, alii ex consideratione naturae spiritualium substantiarum, quae est dignior omni natura corporali, posuerunt spirituales substantias ante corporales conditas esse; ut sicut natura spiritualis creata, media est ordine naturae inter Deum et creaturam corporalem, ita etiam sit media duratione. Haec autem opinio cum fuerit magnorum doctorum, scilicet Basilii, Gregorii Nazianzeni, et quorumdam aliorum, non est tamquam erronea reprobanda. Sed si diligenter consideretur alia opinio, quae est Augustini et aliorum doctorum, quae etiam modo communiter tenetur, rationabilior invenitur. Angeli enim non solum sunt considerandi absolute, sed etiam in quantum sunt pars universi; et haec consideratio eorum intantum est magis attendenda, in quantum bonum universi praeeminet bono cuiuslibet creaturae particularis, sicut bonum totius praeeminet bono partis. Secundum autem quod considerantur Angeli ut partes universi, competit eis quod simul cum creatura corporali sint conditi. Unius enim totius una videtur esse productio. Si autem seorsum essent Angeli creati, viderentur omnino alieni ab ordine creaturae corporalis, quasi aliud universum per se constituentes. Unde dicendum est, quod Angeli simul cum creatura corporali sunt conditi; tamen sine alterius opinionis praeiudicio. Hence others rejecting this opinion held that spiritual substances were created before corporeal substances because they perceived that the nature of the former surpasses the entire range of corporeal nature: and they maintained that the created spiritual nature, even as it ranks between God and the corporeal creature in the order of nature, so is it placed between them in point of duration. Seeing that this opinion was held by such great doctors as Basil, Gregory Nazianzen and others we must not condemn it as being erroneous: but if we consider carefully yet another opinion held by Augustine and other doctors and now more generally accepted, we shall find that the latter is the more reasonable of the two. For we must consider the angels not only absolutely, but also as a part of the universe: and there is all the more reason for doing so inasmuch as the good of the universe is of greater weight than the good of any individual creature, even as the good of the whole is of greater import than that of a part. Now it became the angels, considered as part of the universe, to be created together with corporeal creatures. Because of one whole there should seemingly be one making. And if the angels were created apart, they would seem utterly alienated from the order of corporeal creatures, and to constitute as it were another universe by themselves. Hence we must conclude that the angels were created together with corporeal creatures, yet without prejudice to the other opinion.
Et per hoc patet responsio ad tria prima: quia procedunt secundum mediam opinionem. This suffices for the replies to the first three Objections which follow the lines of the second opinion.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod sicut Basilius dicit in primo Hexameron, Moyses legislator in principio Genesis exordium visibilis creaturae incepit exponere praetermissa creatura spirituali quae ante fuerat condita, de qua mentionem non fecit, quia rudi populo loquebatur, qui ad spiritualia capienda idoneus non erat. Secundum Augustinum vero creaturam spiritualem per caelum intelligit, sicut per terram creaturam corporalem, cum dicit: in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram. Quare autem sub metaphora caeli et non expresse creationem Angelorum tradidit, potest eadem ratio assignari quae et supra, scilicet ex populi ruditate, et iterum ad vitandam idololatriam in quam proni erant; ad quam daretur eis occasio si plures substantiae spirituales ponerentur praeter unum Deum, quae essent caelo nobiliores; et praecipue cum huiusmodi substantiae a gentilibus dii dicerentur. Secundum vero Strabonem, et alios priores, per caelum quod in auctoritate inducta ponitur, intelligitur caelum Empyreum quod est habitaculum sanctorum Angelorum, per metonymiam sicut quando ponitur continens pro contento. Reply to the Fourth Objection. According to Basil (Hexaem. homil. i) the lawgiver Moses at the commencement of Genesis began by relating the origin of visible creatures, omitting spiritual creatures who had been created before: the reason for this omission being that he was addressing himself to an unlettered people incapable of grasping spiritual things. Augustine on the other hand held that by the heavens Moses denoted the spiritual creature and by the earth the corporeal, when he wrote: In the beginning God created heaven and, earth. And the reason why he expressed the creation of the angels under the metaphor of the heavens and not clearly may be the same as that given above, namely because the people were uncultured. Also in order to avoid idolatry to which they were inclined, and of which they would be afforded an occasion if they were told of other spiritual substances besides one God, and ranking above the heavens; and all the more seeing that these very substances were called gods by the gentiles. According to Strabo, and others before him, the heavens in the text quoted signify the empyrean which is the, abode of the holy angels, by the figure of metonymy, the container being put for the content.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod sicut dicit Augustinus, Angeli non cognoscunt Deum ex visibilibus creaturis; unde creaturae visibiles non sunt factae ut Deum ostenderent Angelis, sed rationali creaturae quae est homo; unde ex hoc probatur homo esse finis creaturarum. Finis autem, licet sit prius in intentione, est tamen ultimus in operatione; unde et homo ultimo factus fuit. Reply to the Fifth Objection. According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v, 5) the angels’ knowledge of God is not derived from visible creatures: wherefore the visible creature was made that it might manifest God not to the angels, but to the rational creature which is man: so that this proves to be the end of creatures. Now the end though it is first in intention is the last in execution, wherefore man was made last.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod secundum Augustinum, creatio caeli et terrae non praecessit duratione lucis formationem seu productionem; et ideo non intelligit quod creatio spiritualis naturae fuerit ante primum diem duratione, sed quodam naturae ordine; quia substantia spiritualis et materia informis secundum suam essentiam considerata, alterationibus temporum non subiacent; unde per hoc etiam haberi non potest quod creatura spiritualis sit facta ante corporalem, quia etiam ante lucis factionem agitur de creatione creaturae corporalis, quae per terram intelligitur. Secundum vero alios creatio caeli et terrae ad primum diem pertinet; quia cum caelo et terra creatum est tempus; licet distinctio temporum quantum ad diem et noctem inceperit per lucem: unde tempus ponitur unum de quatuor primo creatis, quae sunt natura angelica, caelum Empyreum, materia informis et tempus. Reply to the Sixth Objection. According to Augustine (Super Gen. i, 5) the creation of heaven and earth did not precede in duration the formation or production of light, wherefore he does not mean to say that the spiritual nature was created before the first day by a priority of duration, but by a kind of natural order: because the spiritual substance and formless matter considered in their respective essences are not subject to the changes of time. Consequently we cannot infer that the spiritual creature was formed before the corporeal, since even before the formation of light mention is made of the creation of the corporeal creature denoted by the earth. According to others the creation of heaven and earth belongs to the first day, because together with them time was created: although the division of time into day and night began with light: hence time is stated to be one of the four things first created, namely the angelic nature, the empyrean heaven, formless matter and time.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod Hieronymus loquitur secundum opinionem antiquorum doctorum. Reply to the Seventh Objection. Jerome is expressing himself in accordance with the opinion of the early doctors.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod ratio illa procederet, si unaquaeque creatura produceretur ut existens per se absolute; sic enim conveniens esset ut unaquaeque separatim crearetur secundum gradum suae bonitatis. Sed quia omnes creaturae producuntur ut partes unius universi, conveniens est ut omnes simul producantur ad unum universum constituendum. Reply to the Eighth Objection. This argument would avail were each creature brought into being as existing absolutely by itself: for then it would be fitting for each one to be created separately according to the degree of its goodness. Seeing, however, that all creatures are produced as parts of one universe, it was fitting that all should be produced together so as to form one universe.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod licet ad aliquam dignitatem creaturae spiritualis pertineret, si ante creaturam visibilem esset creata; non tamen competeret dignitati et unitati universi. Reply to the Ninth Objection. Although it would conduce to a certain dignity of the spiritual creature were it created before the visible creature, it would not conduce to the, dignity and unity of the universe.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod licet cor ante alia membra formetur, tamen totius corporis animalis est una continua generatio, non quod seorsum una generatione formetur cor, et postmodum successive aliis generationibus alia membra aliquibus temporibus interiectis. Hoc autem non potest dici in creatione Angelorum et corporalium creaturarum, quod una productione sint condita, scilicet spiritualis creatura ante corporalem, quasi continue universum sit productum; producere enim successive est in producendis his quae ex materia producuntur, in qua est una pars vicinior complemento quam alia; unde in prima rerum creatione successio locum non habet, etsi in formatione rerum ex materia creata possit locum habere; unde et doctores qui posuerunt Angelos ante mundum creatos, posuerunt omnino distinctam creationem Angelorum et corporum, et multam durationem mediam intervenisse. Et praeterea cor necesse est in animali prius formari, quia virtus cordis operatur ad formationem aliorum membrorum. Creatura autem spiritualis non operatur ad creationem corporalium creaturarum, cum solius Dei sit creare. Unde et Commentator imponit Platoni, quod dixerit, quod Deus primo creavit Angelos, et postea commisit eis creationem corporalium creaturarum. Reply to the Tenth Objection. Although the heart is formed before the other members, there is but one continual generation of the animal’s body, the heart is not formed by a separate generation, and the other members afterwards by a succession of generations at various intervals. This does not apply to the creation of the angels and corporeal creatures, as though they were produced by one formative act, the spiritual creature first and the whole universe by a continuous production: because successive production applies to things produced from matter, in which one part is nearer than another to the final completion. Consequently there was no place for succession in the first creation of things, although it may obtain in the formation of things from created matter. Wherefore the doctors who held that the angels were created before the world, maintained that the creation of the former was entirely distinct from the creation of bodies, and that there was a long interval between. Moreover there is need for the heart in an animal to be formed first, because its activity conduces to the formation of the other members: whereas no spiritual creature co-operates in the creation of corporeal creatures since God alone can create. Hence the Commentator (Metaph. xi, com. 44) finds fault with Plato for asserting that God after treating the angels committed to them the creation of corporeal creatures.
Ad undecimum dicendum, quod Augustinus loquitur de factione creaturarum corporalium, non quantum ad primam creationem, sed quantum ad formationem. Reply to the Eleventh Objection. Augustine is referring to the making of corporeal creatures as regards not their first creation but their formation.
Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod sustinendo quod omnia sint simul creata in forma et materia, creatura spiritualis dicitur habuisse cognitionem creaturae corporalis fiendae, non quia eius formatio esset tempore futura, sed quia cognoscebatur ut futura, prout considerabatur in sua causa, in qua erat ut ex ea posset procedere; sicut qui cognoscit arcam in principiis ex quibus fit, potest dici eam cognoscere ut fiendam. Reply to the Twelfth Objection. If it be maintained that all things were created together in their form and matter, the spiritual creature is said to have known the corporeal creature that was to be made, not that this formation was future in point of time, but because it was known as future forasmuch as it was perceived in its cause wherein it existed potentially: even so one who considers a box in the principles from which it is made may be said to know it as something to be made.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod dicere Dei intelligitur de aeterna verbi Dei generatione, in quo ab aeterno fuit ratio omnium creaturarum condendarum. Nec tamen ideo frequenter repetitur in singulis operibus, dixit Deus, quasi temporaliter dixerit; sed quia licet verbum in se sit unum, tamen in eo est propria ratio singularum creaturarum. Sic ergo singulis operibus praemittitur Dei verbum sicut propria ratio operis fiendi, ne facto opere necesse sit quaerere quare tale opus sit factum, cum ante operis conditionem sit dictum, dixit Deus; sicut cum aliquis volens assignare alicuius rei causam, incipit a causae cognitione. Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. God’s speaking refers to the eternal generation of the divine Word in whom from eternity was the type of all things to be made. Nor does the frequent repetition in each work of the phrase God said imply that God spoke in time: for although the Word is one in himself he contains the proper type of every single creature. Accordingly God’s word prefaces each work as the proper type of the work to be produced, lest the work being complete, it be necessary to ask why that particular work was done, whereas it had already been stated before the production of the work, that God spoke: even so when we wish to indicate the cause of a thing we begin with knowledge of the cause.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod esse rerum in verbo est causa esse rerum in propria natura; sed esse rerum in cognitione angelica non est causa esse rerum in propria natura; et ideo non est simile. Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. The existence of things in the Word is the cause of their existence in themselves: whereas the existence of things in the angelic mind is not the cause of their existence in themselves: wherefore the comparison fails.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod res in finem ordinatur per suam operationem. Non autem producitur in esse per suam operationem, sed solum per operationem causae agentis. Unde magis est conveniens quod creaturae superiores cooperentur Deo in reducendo creaturas inferiores in finem, quam in earum productione. Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. A thing is directed to its end by means of its operation: whereas it is not brought into being by its operation, but only by the operation of its effective cause. Hence it is more fitting that the higher creatures should co-operate with God in bringing things to their end than in their production.
Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod licet creaturae corporales et spirituales sint disparatae secundum proprias naturas, tamen sunt connexae secundum ordinem universi; et ideo oportuit quod simul crearentur. Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. Although corporeal and spiritual creatures are disparate in regard to their own proper natures, they are connected in regard to the order of the universe. Hence the necessity for them to be created together.
Ad decimumseptimum dicendum, quod illa auctoritas Eccli., secundum Augustinum, intelligitur de sapientia creata quae est in natura angelica, quae tamen secundum ipsum non prius creata est tempore sed dignitate. Secundum vero Hilarium in Lib. de synodis intelligitur de sapientia increata, quae est filius Dei; quae quidem simul dicitur et creata et genita, ut patet Prov. VIII, 22, sq., et in diversis Scripturae locis, ut omnis imperfectio a nativitate filii Dei excludatur. In creatione enim attenditur imperfectio ex parte creati, in quantum de nihilo in esse educitur; sed perfectio ex parte creantis, qui absque sui immutatione creaturas producit. In nativitate vero est e contrario; quia importatur perfectio ex parte nati in quantum accipit naturam generantis; sed imperfectio ex parte generantis secundum modum inferioris generationis, in quantum generat cum sui immutatione, vel divisione suae substantiae. Et ideo simul filius Dei et creatus et genitus dicitur, ut per creationem excludatur generantis mutatio, et ex nativitate geniti imperfectio, ut ex utroque unus intellectus constituatur perfectus. Reply to the Seventeenth Objection.’ According to Augustine (Conf. xii, 15) these words of Ecclesiasticus refer to created wisdom abiding in the angelic nature, and he holds that it was created first by priority not of duration but of dignity. According to Hilary (De Synod.) they refer to the uncreated wisdom, namely the Son of God: and it is said to be both created and begotten, as may be gathered from Proverbs viii, and various other passages of Scripture, in order to exclude any imperfection from the birth of God’s Son. Thus creation implies imperfection on the part of the creature in so far as it is made from nothing, but it implies perfection on the part of the Creator, who produces creatures without himself being changed. On the other hand birth implies perfection in the son in so far as he receives the nature of the begetter, while it implies imperfection in the begetter after the manner of generation here below, inasmuch as begetting is accompanied by change or division of substance in the begetter. Hence the Son of God is said to be both created and begotten, in order that creation may exclude change in the begetter, and birth exclude imperfection in the begotten, the two combining to,give us one perfect idea.
Ad decimumoctavum dicendum, quod Hilarius loquitur secundum opinionem antiquorum doctorum. Reply to the Eighteenth Objection. Hilary’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of the early doctors.
Ad decimumnonum dicendum, quod Deus est causa naturae angelicae; non autem natura angelica causa est naturae corporalis; et ideo non est simile. Reply to the Nineteenth Objection. God is the cause of the angelic nature, but the latter is not the cause of the corporeal nature: and thus there is no comparison.
Ad vicesimum dicendum, quod Angeli dicuntur semper fuisse, non quia ab aeterno fuerunt, sed quia omni tempore fuerunt: quia quandocumque fuit tempus, fuerunt Angeli. Et per hunc etiam modum creaturae corporales semper fuerunt. Reply to the Twentieth Objection. The angels are said to have been always in existence, not that they were from,eternity but from all time, because whenever time was the angels were. In this sense corporeal creatures were always.
Ad vicesimumprimum dicendum, quod motor non de necessitate praecedit tempore mobile, sed dignitate, sicut patet in anima et corpore. Reply to the Twenty-first Objection. The mover does not of necessity precede in point of time the thing moved, but in dignity, as for instance, the soul precedes the body.
Ad vicesimumsecundum dicendum, quod in actione ignis in corpora, duplex ordo est considerandus; scilicet situs, et temporis. Ordo situs est in omni actione eius eo quod omnis actio eius est situalis et in corpora sibi magis propinqua plenius suam actionem exercet; unde ulterius procedendo in tantum debilitatur eius effectus, quod tandem totaliter deficit. Ordo autem temporis non attenditur in omni eius actione, sed solum in illa qua agit per motum. Unde cum ignis illuminet et calefaciat corpora, in calefactione servatur ordo situs et temporis; sed in illuminatione, quae non est motus sed terminus motus, attenditur tantum ordo situs. Quia ergo actio Dei quantum ad creationem est absque motu, non attenditur similitudo quantum ad ordinem temporis, sed solum quantum ad ordinem situs. Item enim est in actione spirituali diversus gradus naturae, quod in actione corporali diversus situs. Quantum ergo ad hoc attenditur similitudo Dionysii, quod sicut ignis in corpora sibi vicina plenius suam virtutem effundit, ita Deus rebus sibi propinquioribus gradu dignitatis, copiosius suam bonitatem distribuit. Reply to the Twenty-second Objection. In the action of fire on bodies a twofold order is to be observed, of position and of time. There is order of position in its every action, because all its actions are affected by position, and its activity bears more on the bodies nearest to it: wherefore by spreading it becomes less effective so that at last it is entirely spent. On the other hand order of time does not affect all the actions of fire, but only those that are accompanied by movement. Hence as fire illumines and heats bodies, in heating there is order of position and time; but in illumination which is not movement but the term of a movement there is only order of position. Since then God’s action in creating is without movement the comparison is true, not as regards order of time but as regards order of position. Because in spiritual action the various degrees of nature correspond to diversity of position in corporeal action. Accordingly the comparison of Dionysius is verified in this that as fire is more effective on the bodies nearest to it, so God bestows his goodness more plentifully on those that are nearest to him in the degree of worthiness.
Q. III:
ARTICLE XIX
Was it Possible for the Angels to Exist Before the Visible World?

[ Sum. Th. I, Q. lxi, A. 3]
Decimonono quaeritur utrum potuerint esse Angeli ante mundum visibilem. Et videtur quod non. THE nineteenth point of inquiry is whether it were possible for the angels to exist before the visible world: and seemingly it was impossible.
Quaecumque enim ita se habent quod duo ex ipsis non possunt esse in uno loco distincta, requirunt loci diversitatem. Sed duo Angeli non possunt esse in eodem loco, ut communiter dicitur. Ergo non potest intelligi quod essent duo Angeli distincti nisi sint duo loca distincta. Sed ante creaturam visibilem non fuit locus, cum locus, secundum philosophum, non sit nisi ultimum corporis continentis. Ergo ante mundum visibilem Angeli esse non potuerunt. 1. Two distinct things that cannot be in the same place require a difference of place. Now it is universally agreed that two angels cannot be in the same place. Hence it is inconceivable that there be two distinct angels unless there be two distinct places. Now there was no place before the visible creature, for place according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv, 4) is a space occupied by a body. Therefore the angels could not exist before the visible world.
Praeterea, productio creaturae corporalis Angelis nihil de eorum virtute naturali ademit. Si ergo non facto mundo visibili Angeli absque loco esse potuerunt, etiam nunc mundo visibili facto absque loco esse possent; quod videtur esse falsum; quia si non essent in loco, nusquam essent, et sic viderentur non esse. 2. The production of the corporeal creature nowise deprived the angels of their natural power. Hence if it was possible for the angels to exist outside a place before the visible world was made, it would be possible even now that the visible world has been created: and this apparently is not true, because if they were not in a place they would be nowhere and thus they would seem not to exist at all.
Praeterea, Boetius dicit, quod omnis spiritus creatus corpore indiget. Sed Angelus est spiritus creatus. Ergo indiget corpore, et ita ante creaturam corporalem esse non potuit. 3. Boethius says that every created spirit needs a body. Now an angel is a created spirit. Therefore he needs a body and consequently could not exist before the corporeal creature.
Sed diceretur, quod indiget corpore non quantum ad esse, sed quantum ad ministerium.- Sed contra, ministerium Angelorum exercetur ubi nos sumus, scilicet in hoc mundo. Sed Angeli habent locum corporalem etiam extra habitationem nostram, scilicet caelum Empyreum. Ergo non solum indigent corpore in loco corporali propter ministerium nostrum. 4. To this it may be replied that an angel needs a body not for his existence but for his ministrations.—On the contrary, the angelic ministrations are exercised where we are, namely in this world. Now the angels have a corporeal place besides our abode, namely the empyrean heaven. Therefore it is not only in order to minister to us that they need a body in a corporeal place.
Praeterea, impossibile est imaginari prius et posterius sine tempore. Sed si Angeli fuissent ante mundum, prius fuisset principium quo Angeli esse coeperunt, quam principium quo mundus visibilis esse coepit. Ergo tempus incepisset ante mundum visibilem; quod est impossibile, cum tempus sequatur ad motum, et motus ad mobile. Ergo impossibile est quod Angeli fuerint ante mundum. 5. It is impossible to imagine before and after without time. Now if the angels had existed before the world, the beginning of the angels’ existence would have preceded the beginning of the visible world. Consequently time would have begun before the visible world, and that is impossible, since time follows movement, and movement is consequent to the thing moved. Therefore it was impossible for the angels to exist before the world.
Sed contra, illud quod in creaturis contradictionem non implicat, est Deo possibile. Sed Angelos esse, creatura visibili non existente, nullam contradictionem implicat. Ergo non fuit Deo impossibile producere Angelos ante mundum. On the contrary whatsoever does not involve a contradiction God can do in his creatures. Now no contradiction is involved if the angels exist while the visible creature exists not. Therefore it was not impossible for God to create the angels before the world.
Respondeo. Dicendum quod, sicut Boetius dicit, in divinis non oportet ad imaginationem deduci, et similiter nec in corporalibus omnibus; quia cum imaginatio sit sequela sensus, ut per philosophum patet imaginatio non potest extendi ultra quantitatem, quae est qualitatum sensibilium subiectum. Hoc autem quidam non attendentes, nec imaginationem transcendere valentes, non potuerunt aliquid intelligere nisi per modum rei situalis, et propter hoc quidam antiqui dixerunt, quod illud quod non est in loco, non est, ut in IV Physic. dicitur. Et ex simili errore quidam moderni dixerunt, quod Angeli absque creatura corporali esse non possunt, intelligentes Angelos tamquam ea quae imaginaverunt situaliter distincta; quod quidem praeiudicat sententiae antiquorum, qui Angelos ante mundum fuisse posuerunt; praeiudicat etiam dignitati angelicae naturae quae cum naturaliter sit prior quam creatura corporalis, nullo modo a creatura corporali dependet. Et ideo simpliciter dicimus, quod Angeli esse potuerunt ante mundum. I answer that, as Boethius says (De Trin.) in speaking of God, we must not be led astray by our imagination, nor indeed should we in speaking of any corporeal things whatsoever: because seeing that the imagination is founded upon our senses, according to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 3), it cannot rise above quantity which is the subject of sensible qualities. Through failing to note this, and to transcend their imagination, some have been unable to understand that anything cat exist without being situated somewhere. For this reason some of the philosophers of old said that what is not in a place is not at all (Phys. iv, 3): and through the same error some of the moderns have maintained that angels cannot exist without a corporeal creature, through thinking angels to be like things which they imagine to occupy different places. This is in contradiction with the opinion of those of old who held the angels to have existed before the world. It is also prejudicial to the dignity of the angelic nature which being naturally superior to the corporeal creature is nowise dependent thereon. Therefore absolutely speaking it was possible for the angels to exist before the world.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod duos Angelos esse in uno loco indivisibili non impedit eorum distinctio, sed operationum confusio; unde ratio non sequitur. Reply to the First Objection. Two angels cannot be in the same place, not because they are distinct from each other, but because this would confuse their operations; hence the argument does not prove.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod etiam nunc nihil prohibet Angelos non esse in loco, si voluerint, etsi etiam semper sint in loco propter ordinem quo creatura spiritualis praesidet corporali, secundum Augustinum. Reply to the Second Objection. Even now nothing prevents angels from not being in a place if they so will: although they are always in a place on account of the order by virtue of which the spiritual creature presides over the corporeal, as Augustine states (De Trin. iii).
Ad tertium dicendum, quod sicut ipse Boetius exponit, Angeli indigent corpore solum quantum ad ministerium non quantum ad naturae complementum. Reply to the Third Objection. As Boethius himself explains, angels need bodies only for their ministrations and not for the perfection of their nature.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod Angeli sunt in caelo Empyreo, ut in loco qui est contemplationi congruus, non tamen de necessitate contemplationis. Reply to the Fourth Objection. The angels are in the empyrean heaven as being a place befitting contemplation, not as though contemplation were impossible elsewhere.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod illa prioritas et posterioritas non cogit nos ponere ante mundum tempus reale, sed solum tempus imaginarium, ut in quaestione de aeternitate vel creatione mundi, art. 17, dictum est. Reply to the Fifth Objection. This before and after do not prove that there was real time before the world but only imaginary time, as we have stated above when discussing the eternity or creation of the world.